EARLY MONASTIC BUDDHISM

VOLUME I
PREFACE

The scope of the present work as indicated by the title is "Early Monastic Buddhism" as distinguished from 'Early Buddhism', which is supposed to have been preached by Gotama the Buddha and his co-founders as Mrs. Rhys Davids would call them. The Pāli Piṭakas undoubtedly passed through several redactions with accretions and omissions till the texts reached the form in which we have them now. The artificial and stereotyped form of each sutta takes away the original freshness of the sayings and distinctly reveals the clipping and shaping hands of the redactors of a time far away from the time of the Teacher. While recognising that Gotama Buddha's teaching might have been a little different from what is found in the Pāli Nikāyas, it appears to my mind to be beating about the bush to ascertain what Gotama Buddha had in mind and actually preached. All that is permissible at the present stage is to state what the Nikāyas and the Vinaya have got to say without confusing the already confused issues.

To be accurate according to Mrs. Rhys Davids, the scope of the present treatise is limited to the texts as edited by the ancient monks and preserved in the monasteries, and interpreted by the ancient commentators, and does not aspire to delve into the unknown, and so the word 'monastic' is used in the title in conformity to the suggestion of Miss I. B. Horner.

In the present volume an attempt has been made to answer three principal questions, viz., what is not Buddhism, what is

1 Mrs. Rhys Davids, Sākya (1931), Buddhism (1934).
2 The Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected (1936), Ch. I.
early (monastic) Buddhism, and how a Buddhist should live. The first seven chapters (pp. 1-92) are devoted to the first question while in the next four and the last chapter is delineated the career of Buddhism during the century immediately following Buddha’s demise along with an account of the first council. The second question is dealt with in chapters XII-XV (pp. 198-273) and the third in the rest.

For the answer to the first question we have depended mainly on the Brahmajāla and Samaññaphala suttas supplemented by Nāgarjuna’s comments as far as they were needed to elucidate the enigmatic expressions of the Brahmajāla. This has led to a discussion of two of the most complicated problems of Buddhist thought, viz., the conceptions of Tathāgata and Anatta.

In dealing with the second question we have depended on the Nikāyas but have taken the Visuddhimagga as our guide. There is no gainsaying the fact that Buddhaghosa is still the best expositor of early monastic Buddhism and his statements are always supported by quotations from the Pāli texts, and so we may state that by following the Visuddhimagga we have not deviated from the original interpretation of the Theravādins.

For the third question we have utilised as far as possible the Pātimokkha codes and the Vinaya texts and tried to remove the misconceptions of the present day writers on ancient Indian democracy about the constitution of the Buddhist Saṅgha.

Some of the chapters were published some time ago in the Indian Historical Quarterly, the Mahābodhi and other periodicals and my work,—the Early History of the Spread of Buddhism.

As there are still many problems of Early Monastic Buddhism to be discussed, another volume devoted to the same will be published in the near future. The Index of both the volumes will appear with Vol. II.
Before I conclude I must express my deep gratitude to Dr. Narendra Nath Law; but for the help rendered by him in several ways it would not have been possible for me to present this work to the students of Buddhism.

My thanks are also due to Mr. P. Das, Manager of the I.H. Quarterly for arranging my mss. and getting them through the press—a task exceedingly arduous, particularly for an author.

N. Dutt
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CHAPTER I

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF VEDIC AND BUDDHIST CULTURE

A long period intervened between the Vedic people and the sacrificing Brāhmaṇas of Kuru-paṇcāla. This period witnessed the growth and development of Brāhmaṇism and Brāhmaṇic sacrificial literature to an extent “unparalleled in the history of the world.” It is when this sacrificial system reached its climax about the 7th century B.C. that Buddhism made its appearance with its voice of protest. But this Brāhmaṇism rooted itself so deep in northern India and made its hierarchy so strong that non-Brāhmaṇic religions including Buddhism could hardly make its way into this stronghold.

To go back to the advent of Aryans, it is the inference of scholars like Grierson, and Oldenberg, that they entered into India in two groups, the later being separated from the earlier by a pretty long distance of time. The later group represented by the Kuru tribe settled in the mid-land comprising the country near the modern Delhi and its immediate north, while the earlier group settled in the outlands encircling the mid-land on the east, south and west. Prof. Keith thinks that the home of the Indo-Aryans of the earliest Vedic period lay in the countries “drained by the Indus river system, corresponding roughly to the N.W.-Frontier Province and the Punjab of the present day. The eastern limit was probably the Yamunā, though the Ganges was already

1 Sir Charles Eliot, Hinduism and Buddhism, I, p. 53.
2 Oldenberg, Buddha, Excursus I.
In the subsequent Vedic period—that of the later Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas—the Indo-Aryan settlers gradually occupied the whole of Kuru-paṇcāla country extending later to the Gangetic Delta of that river. Evidently Brāhmaṇic orthodoxy had its home in the mid-land while the outland represented unorthodoxy roughly in proportion to the distance from the actual centre of orthodoxy, because distance hindered the process of keeping on the same level the orthodoxy of the people of the remote districts while it is also recognised that between the two groups of the Aryans, there were differences of ideas, manners, customs and even perhaps of language. The tradition preserved in the Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa (i. 4. 1. 10 f.) that Videgha Māthava, an Aryan conqueror, crossed the Sadānirā (modern Gandak) but could not take with him Agni the sacrificial fire points to the fact that the Brāhmaṇas of the West considered themselves as superior both in culture and purity of descent to those of the Eastern countries (i.e., modern Tīrthuṭ and Behar). The diluted orthodoxy of the people of the eastern outland favoured the growth of systems of thought that did not care to be in correspondence with those prevailing in the Kuru-paṇcāla country. The eastern outland comprised the Magadhan area as one of its components. It became a fruitful field for the growth of non-Brāhmaṇic religions like Jainism, Ājivikism and Buddhism. There are evidences in the Piṭakas that Brāhmaṇical organization in Magadha and Videha was not so strong and well-knit as to resist effectively the progress of Buddhism. The members belonging to the community were not also so strong in dialectics as to defeat in argument Buddha or the more eminent of the Buddhist monks and several cases are recorded of debates between the Brāhmaṇas and the Buddhists,

1 Vedic Index, I, p. xiv.
in which the former could hardly outwit the latter by exposing
the hollowness of the logic underlying the arguments.

The fact that the Brāhmaṇaṣ of this part of the country are
found, in the Buddhist works, to be tracing their descent from
the Brāhmaṇaṣ of the northern parts of India (udicca) shows that
the source of nobility and purity of descent were believed
to be existing in the north and not in the region where
Buddhism flourished at first.¹ The inference drawn from the
above evidences that Buddhism flourished only in the tract
where the Brāhmaṇic orthodoxy was not so strong is partially
corroborated by the evidences furnished by the Pāli texts. The
first evidence is the definition of the Mājjhima-desa of the Bud-
dhists.² Its boundary is given as follows: On the east Kajāngala,
a place 400 li east of Campā (Bhagalpur); on the south-east the
river Salalavati (Sarāvati); on the south Satakānṅika; on the west
the Brāhmaṇa district of Thūna (identified by S. N. Mazumdar
with Sthāneśvara); and on the north Usira-dhaja mountain
(identified by Hultzsch with Usiragiri near Kankhal, Hardwar).
The boundaries show that the Buddhists went a little beyond
the limits of the less Brāhmaṇised country on the western side.
The second and stronger evidence is the names of countries found
in the Nikāyas. The northernmost places said to have been
visited by Buddha are Kammaṣadhamma and Thullakoṭṭhita of
the Kuru³ while the other place-names are included within the
territories of Kāsi-Kosala, Aṅga-Magadha, Videha, and the
eastern districts ruled by the several clans. The third evidence

¹ R. Fick, Sociale Gliederung etc., transl. pp. 34, 40, 213.
² Mazumdar’s Intro. to Cunningham’s Geography, p. xliii;
B. C. Law, Geography of Early Buddhism, p. 2; Thomas, Life of
Buddha, p. 13; B. C. Law, Geographical Essays, p. 8; Divyāvadāna,
p. 21-2.
³ See Infra.
is the list of places suggested by Ananda as desirable for Buddha’s parinibbāna, viz., Campā, Rājagaha, Sāvatthī, Sāketa, Kosambi and Benares. Though the list is not expected to be exhaustive, it gives an idea of the area wherein resided the largest number of Buddhist lay-devotees. The fourth and last evidence that we can adduce regarding the early home of Buddhism is the list of countries, the rulers of which claimed a share of Buddha’s relics for the purpose of worship. They are Licchavis of Vesāli, Sakayas of Kapilavatthu, Bulis of Allakappa, Koliyas of Rāmagāma, Brāhmaṇas of Vethadipa, Mallas of Pāvā, Mallas of Kusinārā, Moriyas of Pipphalivana. It is further mentioned that besides the above who wanted to worship the relics there were other worshippers, in Rāmagāma, Gandhārapura, Kaliṅga, but this seems to be a later interpolation. Though Buddhism was confined mainly to the territories mentioned above, the geographical knowledge of the Buddhists extended all over India; they were acquainted with the sixteen mahājanapadas and one suttanta, viz., the Mahāgovinda, relates how India was divided into eight dominions, thus, the Central kingdom of Renu and around it Kaliṅga (Dantapura), Assaka (Potana), Avanti (Māhiśsattī), Sovīra (Roruka), Videha (Mithilā), Aṅga (Campā), Kāsi (Bāraṇasī). There were, however, adherents hailing from distant countries


2 Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta, p. 167.

like Madda and Gandhāra\(^1\) in the north, Pañthān in the south and Avanti in the west. In the Sutta Nipāta, one of the oldest books of the Sutta-piṭaka, we have the following account of Bāvari’s tour: the ascetic Bāvari lived on the banks of the Godāvari in the country of the Assakas (the district round Pañthān)\(^2\) ruled by king Aḷaka. He sent his sixteen disciples to Buddha. Their route lay through Patiṭṭhāna, Māhissati, Ujjeni, Gonaddha, Vedisa, Kosambi, Sāketa, Sāvatthi, Setavyā, Kapilavatthu, Kusinārā, Pāvā, Bhoganaṅgara, and Vesāli (Pāsānakacetiya)\(^3\). Most of the place-names are well-known and indicate that though Buddhism did not actually spread as far as the western part of the present Central Provinces, there were adherents hailing from these far off districts. Taking all the above evidences into consideration we may conclude that Buddhism during the first century of its existence did not have its centres beyond Sāvatthi on the north, Campā on the east, and Kosambi on the west and south, but there is no doubt that the fame of this religion spread all over western and northern India from the country of the Assakas to that of the Maddas of the North, attracting converts and lay-devotees from regions beyond the limits of Majjhima-desa.

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CHAPTER II
EARLY INDIAN THOUGHTS AND BELIEFS

Vedic Beliefs

The history of Indian religion and thought commences with the appearance of the Vedas, say about 3000 B.C. when the people were very simple in their habits and thoughts, and were in fact, children of nature, who looked upon the physical forces as so many friends and foes created by the Almighty Father for their reward and punishment. To them Dyaus (sky) was the father and Pṛthivī (earth) the mother, and other natural phenomena, viz., Uṣas, the Aśvins, Agni, Parjanya, Sūrya, the Ādityas, the Maruts and so forth were the children of Dyaus. To Varuṇa, they accorded the place of the ruler, dispensing justice and preserving ethical laws of the world and maintaining at the same time the order of the universe (ṛta) in the interest of sentient beings. With the growth of cosmological ideas, Varuṇa was superseded by another god and that was Prajāpati who was made the creator, ruler and preserver of the universe. He was self-created, the first principle, the unity behind the diversity of the universe, and to him all gods and sentient beings owed their origin. He was in short the "material and efficient cause of the world." As the highest being he had no concern with moral laws, the maintenance of which was entrusted to Varuṇa.

1 Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Veda, p. 95; Dalal, History of India, pp. 51 ff.
3 Ibid., p. 438.
4 Ibid., p. 110.
Most of their hymns are nothing but invocations to and adorations of the gods to help them in gaining their worldly ends. They were optimistic and possessed a strong desire to live the life of the world. Their prayer was mainly for cattle and victory over the Dasyus,¹ who lived in fortified cities and offered them effective opposition. Their constant struggle with the Dasyus hardly gave them any respite to give their thoughts to matters spiritual.

They were not devoid of any religious belief: to them nature in her beneficent aspect was a constant friend, and to her they approached for having their wants fulfilled. They conceived of Indra and other gods as so many replicas of human beings, endowed with supernatural powers, which they exercised in aid of those who satisfied them by offering sacrifices. Indra was always ready to help his votaries; so also other gods whose aid was constantly sought for by their worshippers.² They were mainly physiolators. The pessimistic view of life in this world was yet unknown and hence to them, the question of liberation from the worldly existence did not arise.³ The theory of transmigration did not trouble them nor the influence of Karma in shaping one's destiny. They, however, had a fear for the unknown which in fact led them to perform sacrifices.⁴ They knew that a punctilious performance of the rituals of a sacrifice was all that was necessary for a happy life not only in this world but also in the next. A heavenly existence was all that they sought for by means of sacrifice.⁵ This outlook on life and the world continued among the Vedic Indians

¹ Were they the builders of the cities discovered at Mohenjodaro and Harappa?
² Keith, op. cit., p. 441.
³ Ibid., pp. 243-257.
⁴ Dalal, op. cit., p. 125.
⁵ Keith, op. cit., p. 461.
up to the close of the Brāhmaṇa period (8th century B.C.) and it was only with the appearance of the Upaniṣads that we notice a change in their outlook, their mind turning from the outward to the inward, culminating in the appearance of the philosophy of anitya and Brahmaṇ. In short, the physiologatory of the Vedic people gave way in course of time to the idolatory and sacrifices of the Brāhmaṇas, the Upaniṣads representing a further development from the objective to the subjective.

The simple hymns of the Rg Veda were followed up by the Sāma and Yajur which had already come to look upon the sacrifices as a means to worldly successes, heavenly bliss and emancipation and prescribed rituals for the sacrifices, the proper performance of which was believed to ensure to the sacrificer all the benefits prayed for by link.

After these came the Brāhmaṇas, the well known Satapatha and Taittiriya, the Aitareya and Pañcavimśa and several other texts devoted solely to the sacrificial rituals. Side by side with the Brāhmaṇas there grew up another class of sacrificial literature known as the Aranyakas, the only difference from the Brāhmaṇas being that these prescribed shorter rituals for the sacrifices suited to the conditions of the Vānaprasthas and Yatis, cogitation of the Supreme forming its chief feature.

Ancient Brāhmaṇas as depicted in the Pāli Texts

An interesting picture of the ancient Brāhmaṇas¹ is furnished by the one of the latest Pāli texts, Sutta Nipāta (Brāhmaṇadhammika-sutta). It runs as follows:

"The ancient sages (sīs) were ascetics (tapassino) and lived in self-control avoiding the five pleasures of sense. Their wealth

¹ Sutta Nipāta, p. 50: Na kho brāhmaṇa sandissanti etarahi brāhmaṇā porāṇānaṃ brāhmaṇānaṃ brāhmaṇadhamme ti.
consisted not of cattle, gold or grains but of learning and purity. They lived on food left at the door by the faithful and used the bed and clothes offered to them reverentially by the well-to-do. They were never harmed nor dominated, protected as they were by the dhamma, and their access to any house was never barred. They spent 48 years of their lives as brahmacārins in quest of knowledge and good conduct. Even when they married they lived a life of restraint. They held austerities, rectitude, tenderness, love and forbearance in high esteem. They performed sacrifices with rice, beds, clothes, ghee or oil, which they could collect by begging and never killed cows in sacrifices.

"They possessed a noble stature and a tender and bright mien, and remained always engaged in their own pursuits. In course of time, however, they began to covet king’s riches and splendour and objects of pleasure such as women with ornaments, chariots yoked with stately horses. With an eye to these gains they approached king Okkāka (Ikṣvāku), persuaded him to celebrate āśvamedha, puruṣamedha, sāmyaprāsa, vājapeyya, and received as fees from him wealth, women and chariots, horses and cows, beds and clothes. Coveting more and more they again persuaded king Okkāka to celebrate sacrifices by the offering of cows, which, they said, constituted also wealth of men as are land, gold or grains, and as such were equally fit objects for offering. This slaughter of cows enraged the gods Brahmā, Indra, and even the Asuras and Rākṣasas and multiplied the diseases which were originally three, viz., desires, hunger and decrepitude to ninety-eight and further caused to appear discord among the people and within the household, and to acts, improper and impious, among the various classes of men."

1 Cf. Samyutta, I, 76.
It is stated in the *Subhasutta* that the Brāhmaṇas are expected to observe five *dhammas*, namely, *saccam* (truthfulness), *tapam* (austerity), *brahmacariyam* (pure moral life), *ajjhenam* (study), and *cāgam* (gifts). In the *Sundarika-Bhāradvāja-sutta* there is a reference to the Brāhmaṇas learning Śāvitrī (*Śāvitrī*) consisting of three *padas* and twenty-four *ākṣaras*, and in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, to the Vedic Śākhās, in these words:

“All paths lead to *Brahma-sahavyata* but the paths are different according to the different Brāhmaṇic schools, viz., Addhāriyā (= Sk. adhvaryu or White Yajurvedic), Tittirīyā (= Sk. Tattirīya or Black Yajurvedic), Chandokā (= Śāmavedic), Bavharija (= Bahvīca or Rgvedic).”

Incidentally the names of *ṛṣis* or hymn-composers are referred to as Aṭṭhako, Vāmako, Vāmadevo, Vessāmitto, Yamataggi, Anāgiraso, Bhāradvājo, Vāsetṭho, Kassapo, and Bhaguro. It is then pointed out that the Brāhmaṇas of Buddha’s time were merely repeaters of the hymns composed by these ancient sages.

According to the statements mentioned above as also according to the *Mahāgovinda* and other *suttas*, the goal of the Brāhmaṇas of the 6th century B.C. was mainly the attainment of Brahma-loka by acquisition of merit either through sacrifices or austere practices (*tapasyā*).

The ideal ancient Brāhmaṇas as envisaged in the *Brāhmaṇadhammika-sutta* must have been the ancient seers to whom the authorship of the Rgvedic hymns is attributed. They were, however, not conversant with the sacrificial system which we notice

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1 *Majjhima*, II, p. 199.  
2 *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 79.  
3 *Dīgha*, I, p. 237 (The Burmese reading is preferred here).  
5 *Dīgha*, I, p. 241.
in the Rgveda. They, it seems, were given to intellectual culture alone and depended for their necessaries of life on the charity of the village-folk and towns-people. They belonged to the ancient families of priests like Āṅgirasas, Atharvans and Bhrugas, who, according to Weber, were Indo-Iranian priests, and were, as Macdonell says, accorded a place intermediate between men and gods. These ancient priests are treated in the Rgveda as semi-divine beings and are spoken of as ṛṣis, the exact term by which they are referred to in the Sutta-Nipāta. They practised self-control and performed sacrifices with honey only. According to the Rgvedic tradition, Manu was the first of sacrificers, and he was followed by Āṅgiras, Bhrugu, Atharvan and others.

The time when Brāhmaṇas began to approach for sacrifice to the kings, the first of whom was Okkāka (Ikṣvāku), the eldest son of Manu, must have been the time when the Rgveda was about to take its present shape; for, in it are found already the various classes of priests required for a sacrifice, e.g., Hotṛ, Adhvaryu, Brahman, and the system of taking the aid of a priest by the yajamāna for performing a sacrifice, a custom not prevalent in the pre-Rgvedic period. The practice of the yajamāna giving rich rewards to the priests had already become current at the time of the completion of the Rgveda, while by the time of the Yajurvedas, it became an indispensable religious necessity.

It is in the period of the Brāhmaṇas and the Srauta-sūtras, that we notice an abnormal increase in the avarice of the priests officiating at the sacrificial ceremonies. The references in the Pāli texts are to the state of things as found in the Yajur

1 See Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Veda, p. 224.
2 Isayo pubbakā āsum saṇñatattā tapassino—Sutta Nipāta, p. 28.
Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas. The different śākhās viz., Addhāriyā, Tittiriyā, Chandokā and Bauhrījā evidently refer to Śuklayajurveda, Kṛṣṇa-yajurveda, Sāmaveda and Rgveda respectively. In a sacrifice, the presence of priests of these four classes was compulsory, each being in charge of a particular function.¹

In the early Rgvedic days, according to the Sutta Nipāta, the objects of offering consisted of rice, ghee, beds and clothes which the Brāhmaṇas, who were generally brahmacārins engaged in study and meditation, had to collect by begging. Later on, the offering of animals in a sacrifice came into vogue and it was certainly a fine reasoning, as we find it in the account of the Sutta Nipāta, that in the days when cows were treated as wealth like gold, they came to be included among the objects of offering, and perhaps it was this idea that prompted the Brāhmaṇas of a very early period to introduce the system of offering cows in a sacrifice. With the lapse of time the original idea passed out of people's minds but cows continued to be sacrificed, bringing in its train the system of killing all sorts of beings in a sacrifice. The Pāli texts abound in references to such prevalence of animal sacrifices, against which Buddha raised his voice of protest,² but it is a matter of note that Buddha was not alone or the first in suggesting the various objects of offering in a sacrifice in an descending scale from animals to barley³ but that a similar suggestion is also to be found in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, one of the late works of the Brāhmaṇa period. It runs thus: "At first the gods offered up a man as the victim. When he was offered up, the sacrificial essence went out of him. It

¹ For details, see Law, Ancient Indian Polity, ch. IX.
² Dutt, Early History of the Spread of Buddhism, pp. 5, 6.
³ Ibid.
entered into a horse; they offered up the horse." In this way the horse was replaced by the ox, the ox by the goat, and the goat by barley and rice.¹

This shows that about the sixth century B.C., the practice of offering animals in a sacrifice had already become repugnant to a section of the Brähmanic society, and this feeling found the strongest expression in Buddhism. In this connexion, we have also to take into consideration the appearance of the Āranyakas and the method of sacrifice prescribed in them. Among the Brähmanas there was a section who favoured the ancient Brähmanic ideal of living the life of a recluse and earning merit by the performance of sacrifices by means of meditation, and repetition of Vedic hymns,² and disliked offering of animals. From the Pāli texts it is apparent that at the time of the rise of Buddhism, the system of killing animals in a sacrifice was as much in vogue as that of meditation and repetition of mantras. We have in the Majjhima Nikāya (I, pp. 343-4) a clear hint to that effect.³ "A king or a rich brähmana sometimes gets a hermitage (santhāgāra) built outside the town and lives there after having his hair and beard shaven and putting on rough skins. He is accompanied by his queen and purobita. He sleeps on bare ground and lives on a portion of the milk of a cow, and tends the sacrificial fire. He, however, orders that for sacrifice so many cows, calves, goats, etc., be killed, so many trees be cut

¹ "The sacrificial essence then entered into this earth . . . They found it in . . . rice and barley. Therefore . . . as much efficacy as those sacrificed victims would have for him, so much efficacy has this oblation of rice . . ."

² See Dalal’s History of India, pp. 128-9 quoting from Eggeling’s translation of S. Br.

³ See also Āṅguttara, II, p. 207.
down for yupa, dabba, etc." This account shows that the Brāhmaṇas of the 5th century B.C. combined asceticism with animal sacrifices, but there is no adequate evidence to prove that they took to the extreme forms of self-mortification, to which references are so frequently found in the Nikāyas. It seems that these extreme forms of ascetic practices were confined to the Jainas, Ājīvikas and such other non-Brāhmaṇic ascetic orders.

The Goal of Life

We shall now consider the value of the remark found in the Pāli texts that the ancient Brāhmaṇas of different schools believed that all paths led to union with Brahmā (Brahma-sabāvyata). In the cosmological accounts of the Pāli texts, Brahmaloka is deemed as the highest sphere of existence, next to Ābhassarā and the gods who first appeared there regarded themselves as the first born and as such the lord and creator of all beings who originated after them. They deemed themselves as eternally existing. In the Mahāgovinda-suttanta, it is clearly stated that the highest ambition of Mahāgovinda was to visualize Brahmā the highest god, and a graphic description is also given of Brahmā Sanaṁkumāra. Brahmaloka, the highest sphere of existence, according to Buddhism, was attainable through the

1 The following is a stock passage occurring repeatedly in the Pāli texts: Idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo acelako hoti mūrtāceto hatthā-palekhano na ehibhadantiko etc. See Infra, p. 18.
2 See Digha, II, p. 251; Barua, Pre-Buddhistic etc., pp. 43-44.
3 Digha, I, p. 18: Aham asmi Brahmac Mahābrahmā abhibhū anabhībhūto aṇṇal-atthu-daso vasavatti issaro kattā nimmātā seṭṭho saṇjatā va pitā bhūta-bhavyānaṃ.
4 Digha, I, p. 18: nicco dhuvo sassato aviparīnāma-dhammo.
5 Digha, II, p. 240: vaṇṇavā yasavā sirimā etc.
practice of the four brahmavihāras, viz., mettā, karuṇā, muditā, and upekkhā. The Buddhist accounts of Brahmā and Brahmaloka are practically an echo of the notions current among the ancient Brāhmaṇas, with this difference that the attainment of union with Brahmā was possible, according to the Brāhmaṇa texts, through the study of the Vedas or the performance of a sacrifice correctly, while, according to the Buddhist texts, it was possible only by becoming a recluse, leading an austere life of a brahmācārin and practising the four brahmavihāras.

The conception of Brahmā as the first born can be traced in the Rgvedic account of Prajāpati or Viśvakarman who is described thus: "He is the god who is the first born, the golden germ, Hiranyakarbhā, who creates the whole universe, who gives life, whose commands the gods obey, whose shadow is death and immortality, who is lord of man and beast, of the mountain and the sea." In the Brāhmaṇa period too, Prajāpati is given the place of the creator, the supreme god, the ruler of the universe.

Though to Prajāpati the highest place is accorded in the Vedic texts, and the same finds corroboration in the tradition preserved in the Buddhist texts, the idea of unity behind the diversity, the absence of any being at the very beginning appear also in the Vedic texts, though not in the earlier section i.e.,

1 S. Br., XI, 44: 5, 6, 9 quoted in Keith, op. cit., p. 450.
2 Dīgha, II, p. 241:
   Hitvā mamattām manujesu brahme
   Ekodibhūto karunādhimitto
   Niramagandho virato methunasmā
   Etthaṭhito ettha ca sikkhamāno
   Pappoti macco amatām brahmalokan ti.
   See also Majjhima, II, p. 207.
3 Keith, op. cit., p. 437.
4 Ibid., p. 442.
(Maṇḍalas, II-IX) of the Rgveda. The earliest trace of this conception of unity is found in the Rgvedic hymn X. 86 of Dirghatamasya, where it is said: "They call it Indra, they call by many names, Agni, Yama, Mātarisvan." It is further developed in the hymn X. 129 where it is stated: "in the beginning there was neither being nor not-being: there was no atmosphere nor sky . . . . there was neither death nor immortality, nor night nor day: there was nothing else in the world save the One which breathed, but without wind, of its own power." The above-mentioned two conceptions are linked up together in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa thus: "the first thing is stated to be not-being, then arises Prajāpati, who is the same as Puruṣa, and then the Brahman, the holy science, . . . ." In the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa again, the order is changed: the first entity is not-being, then springs into life mind i.e., the Brahman, and then Prajāpati." In the same Brāhmaṇa again, we notice a further development, viz., the identification of Brahman with Ātman and the enunciation of the theory that the knowledge of the Ātman can free one from his actions—a notion traceable in the Satapatha also. Its development into the philosophy of tat tvam asi or so'ham which we find in the early Upaniṣads followed as a matter of course. Buddhism did not go so far as to identify Brahman with Ātman, but like the Taittiriya and Satapatha Brāhmaṇas, asserted that Brahmā was preceded by 'not-being,' which was also, according to it, the beginning or the real form of the manifest, which began with the god Mahābrahmā. The 'not-being' in Buddhism is termed Nirvāṇa or Buddhhatva, and

1 Keith, op. cit., p. 435.
2 Ibid., pp. 435-6.
3 Ibid., p. 443.
4 Ibid., p. 444.
5 Ibid., p. 450.
EARLY INDIAN THOUGHTS AND BELIEFS

hence one who attains that state is placed above the Brahmaloka or Brahman the personal. Buddhism only kept up the logical sequence by looking upon Brahman or the beings that originated after him as essentially anātman and avoided the illogical step of deriving a being (ātman) from the non-being. It is this little but vital difference that made the Buddhist and Brähmanic schools, though issuing, in fact, from the same line of thought, separate from each other wider and wider. Hence Buddhism and Upaniṣadic thoughts may be treated as contemporary developments, the former paving the way for the advent of non-Brähmanic schools of thought, and the latter bringing forth in its train the various systems of Brähmanic philosophy.

Asceticism

As the ancient brähmanas were mainly occupied with sacrifices, they practised asceticism only so far as was necessary for their proper performance. Neither in the Pāli nor in the early Vedic texts, there are references to Brähmanas practising extreme self-mortifications as were common among the non-Brähmanic religious sects (samana-brāhmaṇa) and a few ascetic orders which claimed to be Brähmanic. In the Āranyakas too, there is not much of ascetic practices, and the central theme of this literature also is the performance of sacrifices, the only difference being that emphasis is laid in it more on meditational exercises than on rituals. In the Pāli text the extreme ascetic practices are spoken of generally in connexion with the paribbajakas and the non-Brähmanic sects. Side by side with the sacrificial rituals of the Brähmanas, there grew up a belief among a certain class of men that āuddhi (purity), or vimukti (emancipation), or svarga (heavenly existence) could be obtained
by means of self-mortifications alone. The Nigāṇṭhas, e.g., held
that sukhṣa or duḥkha or aduḥkṣa-asukhā vedanā was due to pre-
vious karmā; hence, if by ascetic practices (tapas) one could purge
off the effects of his former deeds and avoid performing fresh
acts, he could put an end to his karmā. On the complete stop-
page of karmic effects, advent of duḥkha would be arrested, and
without duḥkha there could be no vedanā (feeling), and absence
of vedanā led to an end of duḥkha.¹ Such reasoning could not
but encourage rigorous ascetic practices and in fact it did among
the non-Brāhmanic religious people.²

The ascetic practices appear in the Nikāyas in a stereotyped
form with hardly any change. These may be summarised as
follows: There are ascetics some of whom remain almost naked
(acelāka), some are devoid of social manners (muttācāra), some
take food by licking hand, while some do not accept food if
invited or if any courtesy be shown to them or if food be offered
from any form of storing vessel or the interior of a house or
by women in certain circumstances, or from a place infested
with flies, or where dogs look for food. They do not drink any
intoxicating liquors, restrict their visits for alms to one or two
or at most seven doors, or limit the quantity of alms to one
or two or at most seven pots and so forth. There are some again
who live on self-grown vegetables, fruits, or food rejections, and
even grass. There are some who put on barks, rags, skins,
rough hair-blankets or feather. There are some who shave their
heads, moustACHES etc., take to different kinds of sitting
postures, use beds of spikes, sleep in the open sky or accept for
bed whatever comes to them by chance. There are some who

² See IHQ, II, pp. 698 ff.
bathe thrice to wash away sins, or are extremely careful in injuring the smallest beings, and sometimes even go to the length of not cleaning their body lest they might injure any being. There are some who live on cow-dung and such other loathsome food or live on just one small fruit and so forth.\(^1\) It will be observed that these ascetic practices are enumerated with a view to show that they are not of much use for \textit{citta-vimutti} (mental freedom), and that Buddha himself in his Bodhisattva stages practised most of these and realised for himself their inefficacies.

In the account given in the \textit{Mahāniddesa}\(^2\) of the various superstitious beliefs current among the ancient Indians for the attainment of purity, a few ascetic practices are mentioned, e.g., strict observance of \textit{silas} (moral precepts), living the life of animals, e.g., elephant, horse, cow and so forth, rubbing the body by earth, cow-dung, etc. In the \textit{Jātakas} also, we get a picture of ascetic life,\(^3\) but as the dates of composition of the above mentioned works are still under controversy, we leave the details for our present purpose.

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Digba}, I, Kassapasihanādasutta; \textit{Majjhima}, II, Mahāsihanādasutta.
\item The \textit{Mahāniddesa} (I, pp. 89) furnishes us with two lists of religieux (\textit{samanabrāhmaṇa}) who seek emancipation through the performance of \textit{Vatas} (vowed observances) and \textit{Mutas}. The Vata-suddhikas are Harthivatika, Assav., Gov., Kukkurav., Kākav., Vāsudevav, Baladevav, Punñabhaddav., Mañjībhaddav. The \textit{Mutasuddhibikas} are those who in proper time rub their body by earth, \textit{harita}, \textit{gomaya}, etc. Cf. "Browsers." "These were solitaries of Mesopotamia, and were so called because they lived on grass, like cattle." \textit{E.R.E.}, VIII, p. 783.
\item See \textit{Indian Culture}, IV, pp. 211-216.
\end{enumerate}
The Upaniṣads

Strangely enough the Pāli texts as also the Buddhist-Sanskrit literature do not breathe a word about the Upaniṣads or the Upaniṣadic teachers. Now that it has been definitely settled that some of the Upaniṣads like the Brhadāranyaka, Aitareya, Kaustubha, Taṅtiriya, Chāndogya, Kena are pre-Buddhistic,¹ the silence of the Buddhist texts needs some words of explanation. One explanation that may be offered is that the Buddhists accepted the principal philosophic viewpoints of the Upaniṣads with certain modifications, and hence had nothing to say against them.

The Upaniṣads and the Buddhist texts, in fact, are at one about the highest reality with this vital difference that according to the Upaniṣads the highest reality is ātman, the self par excellence, the soul of the universe, and it is manomaya while according to the Buddhists, excepting the Vijñānavādins, the highest reality is anātman, indescribable, and is absolutely without any attributes (suññatā) and it is not even manomaya and also not vijnaptimagta as the Vijñānavādins would have us accept. The Chā. Up. (vi. 7) is emphatic in its assertion that there is a very subtle substance (sa ya eso'ñimā) which becomes apparent to us as diverse objects which therefore exist only in appearance not in reality. With the help of several similes the underlying oneness of all objects has been explained to Śvetaketu by his father.

¹ Radhakrishnan, Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, pp. 17-18.

For refs. to Chā., see Indian Culture, IV, i, p. 155. For parallel thoughts see Br. Up. V, 6; Mund. III, i, 7; Śvet. III, 20. IV, 4, etc.
The *Mūlapariyāya Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* attempts also to establish that the so-called objects are not really what they appear to be, that even the so-called Nirvāṇa is unreal, but the Sutta does not drop any hint about the nature of the reality as the Upaniṣads do. The similes of saline taste of all waters, the same water having different names in different places, clay as a common material for different earthen objects and so forth are utilised alike in the Upaniṣads and in the Buddhist texts.

In the early Pāli texts, any attempt to give an idea of the reality has been avoided as far as possible. The only hints thrown out are that the Reality, the Tathāgata, is outside the four-fold probabilities, that is, it cannot be said to exist, or not exist, or both exist and not exist, or neither exist nor not exist. It is by silence that the definition of Nirvāṇa has been given and the only positive account available in the early Pāli texts is that it is *niruṇa paññāvedaniyo atakkāvacaro paccattam veditabbo viññābhi* (subtle, comprehensible by the wise, indescribable and realisable only within one's own self). In the course of criticism of the Brihmanic conception of soul, the Pāli texts distinctly maintain that the real soul, if any, can never exist in the body and that the soul of the body can only be an empirical self. In the words of Prof. Radhakrishnan, we may say that the Pāli texts like "the Upaniṣads refuse to identify the self with the body or the series of mental states or the presentation continuum or the stream of consciousness." It is a fact that the Buddhists maintain that a

1. (i) Hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā?
   (ii) Na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā?
   (iii) Hoti ca na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā.
   (iv) Na hoti ca na na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā?

being is *skandhasantāna*, a continuous series of mental and physical states but it is without any persisting entity.

**Karma**

The *skandha-santāna* is admitted by the Buddhist as subject to the effects of *karma*. A being can never get away from the effects of his *karma*, a law accepted almost universally. The Vedic belief that performance of sacrifices can bring all that a man desires was at a discount in the Upaniṣadic period when *karma* came to be regarded as the inexorable law. The *Br. U.p.*, (iii. 2. 13) after discussing the various theories relating to *karma*, concludes "*punyo vai punyena karmanā bhavati pāpāt pāpeneti*" (merits accrue from meritorious acts while demerits from demeritorious acts). Likewise in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (iii. p. 203) we have "*Ko nu kho, bho Gotama, hetu ko paccayo yena manussānam yena satam manussabhūtānaṃ dissati hīnappanītattā ti?* "*kammassakā, māṇavo, sattā kammadāyādā kammayoni kammabandhu kammapaṭisaraṇā kammaṃ satte vibhajati yad idaṃ hīnappanītāyā ti." (What is the reason of men being in

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1 There are six kinds of *karma* viz.,

(i) Diṭṭhadhammavedaniya-karma.
(ii) Uppajjavedaniya-karma.
(iii) Aparāparavedaniya-karma.
(iv) Yadāsanna-karma.
(v) Upapiḷaka-karma.
(vi) Upatthambhaka-karma.

good and bad circumstances? O manava, beings inherit the effect of their own deeds, they are produced by karma, they are dependent on karma, it is karma that divides men into good and bad). The Sutta-nipāta (654, 666) expresses in a similar strain that a being is subject to his *karma* and that none can evade its effects. Buddhism, however, teaches at the same time that effects of the *kamma* can be neutralised by one following the Buddhist principles. *Kamma* is like a *bija* (seed) growing only in a suitable soil which is *lobha* or *rāga* (desire), *dosa* (hatred) and *moha* (delusion) and so it is ineffective in the case of a person who is without *rāga*, *dosa* and *moha*;¹ arhats are therefore not subject to *kamma*. Buddha’s pain caused by Devadatta or his illness was not due to *kamma*.² The Brāhmaṇic philosophical schools hold a similar view. According to them, *karma* is ineffective for a person who has acquired the highest knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*). Kamma is described as the *bija* (seed), ātmā the soil, false knowledge as water, karmaphala as sprout and the knowledge of the highest truth as summer-heat.³ For an average being who is not an arhat, *kammavipāka* is unavoidable whether in this life or the next or the following.⁴ It follows the person like the unavoidable shadow.⁵ *Kamma* may be both internal and external. It is internal when a person enters into *samādhi* and

1 *Aṅguttara* I, pp. 134-6; 263-4; V, p. 262.
2 See *Milindaapañña*, p. 135. It adds that there may be accidents which are not *Kamma-mūlaṃ*. Cf. *Asa Major*, II, p. 49.
4 *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 415.
5 *Milindaapañña*, p. 72. It adds that Kamma before fructification cannot be pointed out, as mangoes before they have sprouted cannot be located on any branch:—abbhocchinñāya santatiya na sakkā tāni kammāni dassetum: idha vā idha tāni kammāni tiṭṭhatīti.
remains externally inactive, and it is external when one performs a deed by the movement of his physical limbs. The effects of kamma cannot be counteracted by iddhi (miraculous power).\textsuperscript{1} Buddha vehemently criticised the teachers like Makkhali Gosāla or Pūrṇa Kassapa who taught nattī kammaṃ (acts), nattī kiriyam (deeds), nattī viriyam (energy), and declared himself as a kammaṇādīn, kiriyavādīn and viriyavādīn.\textsuperscript{2}

**Metempsychosis or Rebirth**

The ancient brāhmaṇas and the Buddhists were in agreement in the belief that the karma of a previous existence shaped a being’s subsequent existence, but the two systems differed in respect of the carrier of the karma from one existence to another. The Brāhmaṇic system insisted on the conception of an undying soul (ātman) as the unit keeping up the link between two existences while the Buddhists vehemently denied any such entity and maintained in its stead a changing group of entities called skandhas which are divided into two classes, viz., rūpa (matter) and nāma (mental states) such as vedanā (feeling, good, bad and indifferent), samjñā (vague perception), samskāras (impression), and viṣṇāna (clear perception by the organs of sense). The skandhas, according to the Buddhists, may be of the grossest or the subtlest form, and are changing every moment (kṣaṇīka) and as such they are having their normal course even when a being dies and takes rebirth, which event also is a momentary affair. Of the five khandhas, vijnāna is sometimes misconceived as the unit maintaining the link between one existence and another. A discussion relating to this misconception and the Buddhist attitude towards metempsychosis is clearly brought out in the

\textsuperscript{1} Milinda pañha, p. 189.  
\textsuperscript{2} Dīgha, I, p. 132.
Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhayasutta: a bhikkhu Sāti, son of a Kevaṭṭa, gave out that the viññāna is the speaker, feeler and enjoyer of the fruits of karma, good or bad, and that it is the self-same viññāna which passes from one existence to another. Buddha condemned the view of Sāti as wrong and corrected him by pointing out that viññāna can originate only through cause and condition and may well be compared to fire. As fire is given a name according to the nature of the fuel, so viññāna is given a name in accordance to its source and sphere of function, e.g. when it originates by means of cakkhu and have rūpa as its basis, it is called cakkhu-viññāna, and so forth. In the formulae of the chain of causation, it is shown that viññāna originates out of saṅkhārā which in their turn issue out of avījā (ignorance of the truth) or taṇhā (desire) or āhāra (food), hence viññāna cannot have an independent existence of its own. Its appearance is always dependent on an immediately preceding cause and condition (paṭiccasamuppāna). In short, the Buddhists excepting the Sammitiyyas rejected the Brāhmaṇic view that a soul (pudgala) or viññāna keeps a link between two existences, and held that it is as momentary as any one of the other khandhas.

1 Majjhima, I, pp. 256 ff.
2 Ibid., p. 258: Katamaṃ taṃ Sāti viññānaṃ ti? Yavāyam vado vedeyya tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti.
3 Ibid., p. 256: tad ev idaṃ viññānaṃ sandhāvati saṁsārati anāññaṃ.
4 Majjhima, p. 259: aññatra paccayā nattthi viññānasa sambhavo ti. Buddhaghosa in commenting upon the view of Sāti says that as Sāti was merely a Jātakabhaṇaka (reciter of the Jātakas), he was misled by the concluding words in a Jātaka, in which Buddha identified himself with the Bodhisatta. A similar reason is assigned by Buddhaghosa in his comments on the view held by the Pudgalavādins. See Dutt, Doctrines of the Three Principal Schools of Buddhism 1939.
CHAPTER III

THE RELIGIEUX OF ANCIENT INDIA

In the pre-Buddhistic days, people found more leisure to busy themselves with the questions relating to the ultimate problems. The literature produced was all religious, e.g., the Brāhmaṇas, Āranyakas, Śrautasūtras, other kinds of Sūtras, Āgamas and so forth. In view also of the existence of kotuhala-sālās and paribbajākārāmas in towns and villages, it may well be inferred that religious discussions formed an important feature of the cultural life of the period, and the life of a recluse was generally encouraged, no exception being made in the case of sons of even well-to-do families.

The various classes of religious people that we come across in the Pāli texts may broadly be divided thus:

(i) Brāhmaṇical Teachers:

These teachers kept up the Vedic tradition and were mainly engaged in reciting the Vedic hymns and performing the sacrifices. They are referred to in Tevijja and other Suttas in these terms: there were the ṛṣis, e.g. Aṭṭhaka, Vāmaka, Vāmadeva, Vessāmitta, Yamataggi, Āngirasa, Bhāradvāja, Vāseṭṭha, Kassapa and Bhagu,¹ who are said to be the ancestors

¹ Of these few names, five are found in the Rg-Veda, three being reputed as composers of the Rg-Vedic Maṇḍalas, (viz. Vāmadeva of the 4th Maṇḍala, Bhāradvāja of the 6th and Vāseṭṭha of the 7th). The rest are well-known names of the Brāhmaṇa and Śrauta-Sūtra period. Aṭṭhaka is found in the Ait. Br. (VII. 17) and Sānkhāyana Sr. S. (XV.
of the present-day Brāhmaṇas, and composers of hymns (maṅga-
naṃ kattārā). From them have been handed down mantras
which are being recited at present (etarabi) by Brāhmaṇas, pro-
ficient in the three Vedas. According to the Tevijja sutta, they
were not only reciters of Vedic hymns but were also students and
teachers of the sacrificial literature. From the accounts of
Brāhmaṇic sacrifices found in the Kūṭadanta and other suttas, it
becomes apparent how much, at the time of the rise of
Buddhism, the ancient system of Brāhmaṇic sacrifices was in
vogue. In these elaborate sacrifices, services of learned Brāhmaṇas
had to be requisitioned. In a passage of the Kūṭadanta sutta it
is stated that Brāhmaṇas of pure origin, well-versed in the Vedas
and the subsidiary literature, were only engaged for the per-
formance of sacrifices. So evidently there was a class of
Brāhmaṇas who studied mainly the sacrificial literature and earned
their livelihood by officiating at sacrifices.

(ii) Brāhmaṇical Academic Teacher:

In the Tevijja,¹ Kūṭadanta,² Subha³ and other suttas we come
across the names of Caṇiki, Tārakkha, Pokkharasāti, Jānussoni,
Tođeyya, Kūṭadanta and other Brāhmaṇas who are described as
teachers enjoying the revenues of villages given to them by the
king of the country.⁴ These Brāhmaṇas were quite rich, and

26) as one of the sons of Viśvāmitra; Vāmaka and Bhagu appear as
teachers and sages in the 8. Br. (X. 6.5.9; VII. 2.1.11) while Yamataggi
(Jāmadagni) is well-known as the rival of Vaśiṣṭha; and Aṅgira-a as a
teacher is mentioned in the Tait. Saṃ. (III 1.7.3, and VII. 1.4.1).

¹ Dīgha, I, pp. 235 f. ² Dīgha, I, pp. 127 f.
⁴ The terms in which this is expressed are the same in every
account, viz., "Kūṭadanto brāhmaṇo Khānumataṃ (Magadhānaṃ
brāhmaṇagāmaṇi) ajjhāvasati sattussadāṃ satiṇakāṭṭhodakaṃ sadhaṅnaṃ
were known as *mahāśāla-brāhmaṇas*. They occasionally celebrated sacrifices by spending large sums. The thought that troubled Kūṭadanta, viz., that he is not fully aware of the *tividha yaññasampadam solasa-parikkhāram*, leads us to infer that their knowledge relating to sacrifices was only limited. These Brāhmaṇa teachers had all the four qualities mentioned below beside being *brahmavaṇṇi, brahmavaccasi, kalyāṇavāco, kalyāṇa-vākkaraṇo*, etc.² They taught mantras to 300 to 500 students (*māṇavakas*) who flocked to them from different countries (*nāṇādisā nāṇājanapadā māṇavakā āgacchanti*). They are described as proficient in the three Vedas with *nighaṇḍu* and *keṭubha*, in the traditional lore, in worldly sciences and in the science of physiognomy. They commanded respect of the people who thought that it would be beneath the teacher’s dignity to approach Gotama (Buddha) for discussion, and suggested that the latter should come to them. The maxim that guests should be honoured led, however, the Brāhmaṇa teachers, in some instances, to approach Gotama.

-rajabhoggam rañña Māgadhena Seniyena Bimbisārenena dinnaṃ rājadeyyaṃ brahmadeyyaṃ. The custom of giving away lands to Brāhmaṇas is ancient in India and it still prevails.

1 *Majjhima, II, p. 210; Digha, I, p. 128*: The Purohitas are endowed with the following four qualities:

(i) Pure in descent up to the 7th generation both from father’s and mother’s side.

(ii) engaged in study, remembering mantras, proficient in the three Vedas, Nighaṇḍu, Keṭubha, Itihāsa, Lokāyata, Mahāpurisa-lakkhaṇas, etc.

(iii) observant of moral precepts; and

(iv) wise, intelligent and so forth.

2 *Digha, I, p. 114*; these attributes were also applied to Buddha; see *Digha, I, 132*. 
Buddha. The Pāli accounts make it clear that these Brāhmaṇas were expected to enter into discussions with distinguished teachers who paid visits to their countries, and convince the people of their great erudition. The description of the discussions is, however, scanty and one-sided, but it leaves no room for doubt in our mind that these Brāhmaṇas were distinguished scholars and teachers, and were maintained by the king as such; they were not required to officiate at sacrifices as the previously-mentioned class had to do in order to earn their livelihood.

(iii) Anchorites or Hermits

This form of monastic life is very old, and was found in ancient times in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and many other countries of the East. In India, eremetic life was the earliest form of monasticism. In the Āranyakas literature of the pre-Buddhistic period, we are introduced to a class of Brāhmaṇas who retired to forest and were commonly known as Vānaprasthas. They studied the Āranyakas, resorted to the forest and performed sacrifices in their own way by means of meditation and chanting of mantras, and there is no indication in these texts that they practised austerities (tapasyā).¹

It is in the Upaniṣads (Br. Up., IV. 422; Chā. II. 23. 1) that we come across, for the first time, the terms like muni, pravrājin, and tapas referring to persons living in the forests and practising austerities.²

¹ For details about the life of the Āranyakas, see Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Veda, II, pp. 489 ff.

² In the Rgveda (X. 109. 4; 154. 2. VI. 5-4) the words muni, yati, tapas and tapasvānu occur but particulars are lacking as to the sense they bore at the time. Muni is found to refer to those who read the
The division of the people in the Upaniṣads as Pitṛyāṇists and Devayāṇists indicates that austerities were regarded as a better means for going to the higher planes. The Pitṛyāṇists were those who lived in the villages, performed sacrifices, made gifts, practised austerities, and were engaged in works of public utility like the digging of wells etc. and passed to the higher regions along the path called Pitṛyāṇa but had to return to this world (Chā. VI. 2. 16); while the Devayāṇists were those who lived in the forests and practised śraddhā, satya and tapasyā, went to the brāhmaṇaloka along the path called Devayāṇa and never returned to this world (Chā. V. 10. 10 1; Br. VI. 2. 15). The latter were certainly Sannyāsins who dwelt in the forests, practised austerities, wandered about and lived on alms.

The term "muni" is used in the Pāli works in the sense of a person who is restrained in word, thought and speech, a sage, a good Buddhist, a monk. Like muni, the term tapassin in Pāli also bears the meaning of a person having mastery over his senses (Dīgha, III, pp. 48ff; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 184). It retained also the sense that a tapassin is one who resorts to the austere practices of remaining naked, or wearing barks, skins, rough stotras (VII. 56. 8), possessed occult powers (X. 136) and wore long hairs (Cf. Keśins in X. 136). In the Sambhitās and Brāhmaṇas, the term yati occurs, but the details of the life of a yati are again lacking.

1 Law, Studies in Indian History and Culture, p. 13.
2 Cf. Sakṛdāgāmipahala.
3 Cf. Anāgāmipahala.
4 In the Niddesa (I, p. 58) Munis are subdivided into six classes: (i) āgaramunayo = those who lead a household life but know the path and doctrine, (ii) anāgaramunayo = those who retire from the world and know the path and the doctrine; (iii) sekhamunayo = those who have attained one of the 7 maggas and phalas; (iv) ashekhamunayo = the Arhats; (v) paccyea-munayo = pacckekabuddhas; and (vi) munimunayo = sammā-sambuddhas.
cloths or rags etc. (see above p. 18). From the above accounts, it may safely be concluded that rigorous ascetic practices were in vogue in pre-Buddhist times, attaining climax in the 6th century B.C., and that among them were found both Brāhmaṇas and non-Brāhmaṇas.

(iv) Parivrājakas

The Carakas of the Vedic period may be pointed out as the forerunners of the Parivrājakas of the 6th century B.C. The students after completing their education in Gurogrha wandered about in order to give a finishing touch to their education by acquiring a knowledge of the beliefs and customs of different countries. The aim of the Parivrājakas, however, was different. They preferred to lead a wandering life and for 7 or 8 months of the year they roamed about with a view to ascertain the truth by coming into contact with the various expositors of truth.

In the Br. Up. (IV, 4. 22) we come across the term Parivrājaka meaning one who takes pravrājyā (going out from household life) with the object of attaining Him. Yājñavalkya (Br. Up. IV. 5. 1) left his wife and took pravrājyā. In the Upaniṣads, the line of demarcation between the Sannyāsins (Yati) and Parivrājakas is not very well-defined, and the two almost overlap each other. In the Br. Up. (IV. 4. 22), the Parivrājins were also called Sannyāsins and said to have been in the habit of wandering about.

In the Pāli works, the Parivrājakas are described as actually wanderers, whose chief object was to meet distinguished religious teachers and philosophers, listen to their discourses, and enter into discussions with them "on matters of ethics and philosophy, nature lore and mysticism." The following is a typical des-

1 Buddhist India, p. 141.
cription that we get of them in the Nikāyas (see e.g. Udumbarika Sīvanāda-sutta in Digha, III pp. 36 ff.): "Three hundred paribbājakas were dwelling at a paribbājaka-ārāma near Rājagaha. They were making great noise and were engaged in discussions about kings, ministers, wars, articles of food and luxury, and such other desultory talks. They were approached by a distinguished lay devotee of Buddha apparently with the object of having some talks with them on religious or philosophical topics. He was followed by Buddha who at the very outset of his talk condemned the ascetic practices. Nigrodha, the leader of the pari vrājakas endorsed Buddha's view by saying that he and his followers also were not in favour of the ascetic practices. Buddha did his best to convince them of the excellences of his teaching but failed to produce any effective impression." Throughout the Nikāyas are scattered such accounts of Buddha or his disciples meeting pari vrājakas and discussing with them such topics as the nature of the soul, value of ascetic life, 500 states of consciousness, eternity or finiteness of the world and the soul, karma, knowledge of Buddha, etc.¹

For the convenience of discussions, villagers and towns people provided Kotubalaśālas² where congregated the pari vrājakas as also the religious teachers and philosophers.

¹ See B. C. Law, Historical Gleanings, pp. 16-20; Buddhistic Studies, pp. 89-112; Cf. Sarabaites and Gyrovagi or Circumcelliones. "The first kind lived together in towns and threes in a monastery, in order to live a life without rule or law; the Gyrovagi went from monastery to monastery, demanding a lodge for a few days." E.R.E., VIII, pp. 786-7.

Many of these parivrājakas hailed from the Brāhmaṇa society, but the majority, it seems, were non-Brāhmaṇas. Instances are not rare of the parivrājakas changing their faith and embracing that of the vanquisher in arguments.

In the Majjhima Nikāya, there are references to a class of samanabrāhmaṇas who lived in company with female wanderers who used to tie the hair on the top of their head (molibaddha paribbājikā) while in the Samyutta Nikāya, there are references to the existence of female wanderers (paribbājikā).

(v) Saṅghas or Gaṇas

Out of these parivrājakas were formed, from time to time, groups who expressed their allegiance to a certain teacher, or subscribed to some common tenets, marks, or style of dress. Of these we may refer to the Māgāṇḍikas, Vekhanassas, Pārāsāri-yas, orders of the six Teachers: Saṅjaya, Pakudha, Ajita, Maṅkhali Gosāla, Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta and Gautama Buddha (Sākyaputtiya-samanās); and to the Jātīlas, Tedāṇḍikas, Aviruddhakas, and Devadhammikas. In the Nikāyas we have scanty accounts of the teachings of the six teachers, to be dealt with in the next chapter, but none of the rest.

1 Majjhima, I, p. 305.
4 Ibid., II, pp. 40-44.
5 Ibid., I, p. 282.
6 Vinaya, II, pp. 132, 196; Lalitavistara, p. 238.
7 Sutta Nipāta, vs. 365, 704, 854.
CHAPTER IV

THE SIX TITTHIYAS

Among the religious orders (Saṅghas or Gaṅas) that were prevalent in Aṅga and Magadha¹ about Buddha’s time, six are often referred to as either contemporaneous with or anterior to the Buddhist Saṅgha. The names of the teachers of these six orders are:—

(i) Pūraṇa Kassapa
(ii) Makkhali Gosāla
(iii) Ajita Kesakambali
(iv) Pakudha Kaccāyana
(v) Saṅjaya Belatṭhiputta, and
(vi) Niganṭha Nāṭaputta.²

These teachers were respected by wise men, nobles and even kings. In the Pāli texts their doctrines are occasionally referred to but these are given in such a stereotyped form that they are not of much use for a detailed treatment.

In his Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, Dr. Barua has exhaustively dealt with the life and doctrines of each of these teachers by utilising all the available Buddhist and Jaina sources.


² For details, see B. C. Law, Historical Gleanings, p. 21 ff.; Buddhistic Studies, pp. 73 ff.; see also his Mahāvīra, pp. 75 ff. for the light thrown on these teachers by the Jaina sources.
We shall therefore confine ourselves to the bare doctrines of the six teachers as presented in the Pāli texts:—

(i) Pūrṇa Kassapa

This teacher held the view that a person earns neither merit by pious acts such as gifts, sacrifices or austerities nor demerit by impious acts such as killing, stealing, lying and so forth. In other words, he taught *Akiriya-vāda* (theory of non-action), in Dr. Barua’s words “passivity of soul.” Soul, according to this teacher, is inactive, and it is the body which acts; hence, soul remains unaffected by the results of good or bad deeds. This teaching is allied to that of Sāṅkhya as has been pointed out by the Jaina commentator Śilāṅka, but it would be wide of the mark if we say Kassapa’s teaching is the same as that of Sāṅkhya, for the latter school of philosophy does not teach *akiriya* though it holds that *Puruṣa* is only an onlooker, an inactive agent, the functioning factor—being the *Prakṛti*. It does not however deny the doctrine of karman and the theory of transmigration.¹ The Vedantic or the Mādhyamika view of the world also makes a person *niskriya*, for it teaches that the world in its diversity does not exist; hence all actions, a person is supposed to perform, are purely imaginary. Though it is risky to identify Pūrṇa’s teachings with those of Vedānta or Mādhyamika or Sāṅkhya, there is no reason why his teachings should be condemned as leading to moral depravity as the *Majjhima Nikāya*² wants to establish. The suggestion of Dr. Barua based on the *Dīgha* that Pūrṇa’s teaching should be classified as *adhi-

3 *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 279; *Dīgha*. I, p. 28-29.
ccasamuppāniki vāda is more appropriate, i.e., things happen fortuitously without any cause or condition,¹ and have nothing to do with 'soul'.

(ii) Makkhali Gosāla

This teacher of the Ājivikas, it is said, was originally a follower of Pārśvanātha, the first Jaina Tīrthankara, but later on he gave up his old faith on account of his conviction that living beings have only reanimation and not death.

Makkhali Gosāla upheld the doctrine of fatalism (niyati-saṅgati-bhāva) viz. a being's sufferings or happiness does not depend upon any cause or condition. A being is helpless; he can neither help himself nor others, and he cannot attain perfection (vimutti) by exertion. He must transmigrate from one existence to another, and it is only after repeated existences that he will attain emancipation (suddhi). The consecutive existences of a being including the periods and types of existences are unalterably fixed (niyata). The several existences of a being may be compared to a ball of yarn unwinding itself, the ultimate end of the yarn being the suddhi or vimutti i.e., end of existence of a being. In every existence a being is endowed with certain characteristics (saṅgati-bhāva), peculiar to the particular form of existence without any reference to his past deeds just as “fire is hot, ice cold.”² In the Majjhima Nikāya this doctrine is described as abetuka and akiriya dīthi,³ while in the Ariyavatara (I, p. 287) it is said to be a doctrine which denies kamma (deed), kiriya (action) and viṇīya (energy).

¹ See Infra, ch. V.  
² Barua, op. cit., p. 312.  
³ Majjhima, I, p. 409; cf. II, p. 121.
Dr. Barua says that according to Gosāla, there are infinite gradations of existence, and each type of existence is eternal. The Pāli expression for the different types of existence is chalābhijātiyo, which means six types of human beings, the types being distinguished according to the qualities (gunās).

These fatalists, in the opinion of the Buddhists, have no hope of deliverance. Like the followers of other teachers, they are liable to evil deeds. They belong to abrahamacariyāvāsas (those who lead impure lives) and are fond of eulogising themselves and disparaging others.

(iii) Ajita Kesakambali

Ajita was an out and out materialist. He held that a being is composed of the four mabhūtas (elements), viz., earth, water, air and fire, and ākāśa (space), and that after death the physical body disintegrates and merges in the four elements, while the indriyas (organs of sense) pass into space (ākāśa).

1 Barua, op. cit., p. 306.
2 (i) Kanṭhabhijāti:—Bird-catchers, hunters, fishermen, etc.
   (ii) Niḷabhijāti:—Recluses who take to rigorous ascetic prac-
      tices including the Śākyaputriya Samanās.
   (iii) Lohitabhijāti:—Niganthas who wear one piece of cloth.
   (iv) Haliddabhijāti:—Lay-devotees of Acelakas including
      Ājivikasāvakas.
   (v) Sukkābhijāti:—Ājivika ascetics like Nanda, Vaccha,
      Saṅkicca. In the Majjhima (I, p. 238) these ascetics are said to be
      engaged in kāyabhāvanā and not cittabhāvanā.
   (vi) Paramasukkabhijāti: Ājivika saints.
      See Samaṅgalavilāsini, I, p. 162; Aṅguttara, III, p. 121.
3 Majjhima, I, p. 401-2; see also I, p. 483.
4 Ibid., I, p. 524.
5 Ibid., I, p. 515.
There is no rebirth or transmigration, and hence performance of sacrifices and practice of austerities are of no avail, and there are no such acts as good or bad. Dr. Barua points out that Ajita’s doctrine is similar to that of Payāsi who held that the soul is not an entity distinct from the body.

In the Majjhima Nikāya (I, p. 402), Ajita’s teaching is criticised as leading to improper acts, speech and thoughts, and to indulgences in worldly pleasures. Dr. Barua disagrees with the opinion expressed above and in its stead says that Ajita’s teaching has a moral leaning inasmuch as it believed in life rather than in death, and it advocated proper service towards men when they are alive rather than honouring them after death. Dr. Barua, in fact, is trying here to justify the materialistic point of view.

Ajita’s materialistic teaching was not unknown in India. It had been coming down as the Lokāyata or Bārhaspatya School of philosophy, which later on became popular as the doctrine of Cārvāka. In the Nikāyas it is classified as Uccheda-vāda or the doctrine of annihilation after death or Tam jīva tam savāraṇava or the doctrine of identity of the soul and body.

1 Dīgha, II, no. 23: Payāsisuttantā.
2 Barua, op. cit., p. 295.
3 Ibid.
4 Cf. Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha, p. 5-6.
5 See Infra, pp. 46, 47.
(iv) Pakudha Kaccāyana

This teacher held that a being is composed of seven elements, viz., earth, water, air, fire, pleasure (sukha), pain (dukkha) and soul (ājīva), and that these elements even when they compose a being do not interact upon one another. These seven elements eternally exist and they are uncreated, and unalterably fixed, and hence any action, good or bad, is ineffective, e.g., cutting of a man in two pieces means nothing more than passing a sword through some elements. This teaching is classified in the Buddhist texts as Akiriya-vāda as also Sassata-vāda.¹ It is akiriya² inasmuch as it teaches that any act, good or bad, is not capable of bearing any fruit, and it is sassata as the elements remain in their original state unaffected by any composition whatsoever. From the Buddhist stand-point, this teaching is as undesirable as the Ucchedavāda, for it also teaches moral irresponsibility leading men to evil deeds.

(v) Sañjaya Belatthiputta

Sañjaya was an ajñānavādin, i.e., an agnostic or sceptic.³ He refuses to give a definite answer to questions dealing with ultimate problems, e.g., "Is there an after-life or not?" "Is there any fruit of good or evil deeds?" "Does the Tathāgata exist or not after death?" It is rather strange that Sañjaya’s attitude towards the ultimate problems is criticised by the Buddhists, for the Buddhists themselves admit these problems as indeterminable (avāyakata).⁴ It may be that Sañjaya unlike the Buddhist thinkers carried his logic too far inasmuch as he refused to give a definite answer to questions relating even to moral

² Barua, op. cit., p. 286.
³ Ibid., pp. 319, 328.
responsibility. In any case, he is criticised as an *Amarāvikkhepika* but not as an *Akiriya-vādin*. The story that *Sāriputta* was the *quondam* disciple of Saṅjaya is not unworthy of belief, for Saṅjaya’s teaching is only a stepping stone to that of Buddha, who dissuaded men from wasting their time on the solution of ultimate problems before they had developed their intellectual faculties and convinced themselves of the process of origin and destruction of worldly things.

*(vi) Nigantha Nāṭaputta*

In the Pali texts, only the ethical aspect of Nigantha’s teaching has been dealt with. There is not a word about his *Syādvāda,* or the *Nava-tattva,* etc., the only distinctive feature

1. See Infra, p. 47 & ch. VI.

2. The *Syādvāda* of the Jainas is allied to the *Vibhajjavāda* (as opposed to Ekamśavāda) of the Buddhists and the Vikkhepa attitude of Saṅjaya. By this doctrine the Jainas assert that the answer to a problem may be correct from one standpoint but not from another; in other words, it cannot be absolutely correct. Buddha also advocated this view as he pointed out that answers ought to be given by taking into consideration the motive of the inquirer and the answer should be directed to a particular aspect of the problem.

3. The nine substances are *jīva, ajīva, puṇya, pāpa, āsrava, samvara, bandha, nirjrā and mokṣa.* *Jīva* indicates the soul—that which is conscious while *ajīva* the non-soul—that which is unconscious. *Jīva* acts with the help of *ajīva* just as soul or mind functions with the help of body. The results of such actions (*karman*) through mind, speech and body may be either good (*puṇya*) or bad (*pāpa*), which are also substances. These substances, which are karmic effects, normally flow (*āsrava*) into *jīva*, but again mind, speech and body may function in such a way that the flow of karmic effect into *jīva* may be arrested (*samvara*). In the case of *āsrava*, the *jīva* is invested (*bandha*) with *karman* and suffers on account of
pointed out in the Buddhist texts is that it is like Buddhism a
Kiriya or as opposed to Akiriya of the other teachers.

The principal teaching of Mahāvīra, as embodied in the
Nikāyas, is that perfection can be attained only by neutralising
the effects of past karma and avoiding the accumulation of either
merit or demerit. It advocates rigorous asceticism (tapasyā) for
countering the past karma. By easy means, it teaches, the
highest bliss cannot be attained; it is only by means of rigorous
ascetic practices that it can be obtained. 1 In the Sāmaññaphala-
sutta, the doctrine is described as Cātuyāmasanvāra or the four
restraints, viz., (i) to be free from passion and desire; (ii) to keep
aloof from all kinds of traffic; (iii) to get rid of all parigrahās
(ideas of possession); and (iv) to remain absorbed in knowledge
and meditation of self. 2 The Niganthas laid the utmost em-
phasis on the doctrine of abhimsā (non-injuring of living beings).
In the Majjhima Nikāya (I, 56), it is shown that the Niganthas
laid more emphasis on physical deeds (kāyadāna) than on mental
(manodāna), a point of view which is just the opposite of the
Buddhists. Though the Buddhists and the Niganthas differed
widely in their philosophic viewpoints, there are several agreements
between the two systems in moral outlook and disciplinary rules.

repeated existence (samsāra). A Jaina monk is enjoined to destroy
(nirjara) the effects of karmas by means of samvarā and when the
effects are completely destroyed he attains liberation (mokṣa) from
samsāra (repeated existences). See Shah, Jainism in North India, p. 39 f.

1 Majjhima, I, p. 93. Na sūkha sūkha adhipратibbān, duk-
khena kho sūkha adhipratibbān. Sūkha ca sūkha adhipratibbān
abhavissa rāja Māgadho Seniya Bimbisāro sūkha adhipaccheyya.


3 Gradual Sayings, I, p. 186.
CHAPTER V
OTHER NON-BUDDHISTIC DOCTRINES

Besides the six teachers dealt with above there was a number of other teachers who offered, according to their own lights, solutions of the ultimate problems relating to the soul, the world and the *sumnum bonum* of the man’s life, basing them not so much on reasoning as on intuition or inner experiences acquired through meditation. The use of logic was not much in evidence, and if there was any, it was due to the endeavour of the disciples to establish on a firm basis the theories already propounded by their respective teachers. Along with the various expositions of the highest Truth, the pre-Buddhistic religious and philosophical literatures contain a large body of cosmological and metaphysical speculations together with analyses of the elements composing the living beings of this world as also of the various spheres of existences as conceived in their cosmology. The analyses also have as their basis the intuition or meditational experiences, or the traditional beliefs handed down from the hoary past. Though ostensibly Buddhism wanted to offer a rational solution of the ultimate problems, it did not quite succeed to keep itself free from the intuitional and traditional exposition of the metaphysical themes. It inherited a mass of beliefs relating, for instance, to the origin and form of the universe (*tridhātu*), classification of the worlds and beings (*viññāṇasattthitīs*) and so forth. The gradual evolution of the world (vide *Aggaññasuttanta*), the existence of heavenly beings

1 Digha, II, no. 27.
OTHER NON-BUDDHISTIC DOCTRINES

(vide Mahāsamayasuttanta),¹ the six mystical powers (chala-abhiññā), the mahāpuruṣa-lakṣaṇas,² the eight causes of earthquake, the seven treasures (vide e.g. Mahāparinibbānasuttanta),³ the causes leading to the origin of castes are a few among the various beliefs that were inherited by the early Buddhists. The Buddhist texts, on the other hand, rendered a service to the cause of Indian philosophy by laying bare the irrationality of many of the religious and philosophical views current in Northern India before and after the rise of Buddhism. It has been shown in some of the texts that the views were nothing but inner experiences of persons who had made some progress on the path of spiritual advancement but were far beneath the stage at which the highest truth could be realised. In the Pāli texts these views are summarily dismissed away as untenable without a detailed logical examination of them.⁴

¹ Digha, II, no. 20.
² Ibid., III, no. 30.
³ Ibid., II, no. 16.
⁴ A notion has been made widely current by some of the modern scholars that the ostensible object of the Brahmacālasutta is to give a bird’s-eye view of the non-Buddhistic opinions. This notion is wholly wrong, for the Brahmacālasutta has no presumption of that kind. (Cf. Samantapāsādikā, pp. 60-61; Majjhima, I, p. 40: attavāda and lokavāda; II, pp. 233-8; Visuddhimagga, pp. 443, 587; Mahābodhi, 1933, pp. 166 ff.; E. J. Thomas, Life of Buddha, p. 19). The doctrine of the six tītthiyas; (see chap. IV) not to speak of the Upaniṣadic thoughts, are beyond the purview of the Sutta. Its main object is to draw up a list of the possible theories about the world and the soul that might haunt the minds of the monks who, by meditating according to the Buddhist path of meditation, acquired certain powers but did not reach the highest state. The so-called sixty-two views are really a systematic exposition of the experiences of a Buddhist monk and have very little to do with the then existing non-Buddhistic opinions. There may be a few agreements between some of the sixty-two views and the philo-
The Avyākatas

There are a few problems said to have been left unanswered (avyākata) by Buddha, the reason assigned for doing so being either that they relate to topics or notions which have sophical tenets embodied in the Upaniṣads and other Brāhmaṇic philosophical works, but that does not go to establish that the Brahma-jīlasutta was composed with any reference to them, the cases of agreement being only accidental. The Sutta, however, has served two important purposes, viz., disabusing our minds of many deep-rooted current notions about the world, the soul and their ultimate condition, and cautioning us against interpreting the doctrine of Buddha in the light of our preconceived notions. By way of illustration, I may point out that the notion of Ātman as a permanent, immaculate entity existing within our body unaffected by karma (actions) is likely to distort the true import of the Atta or Puggala of the Buddhist texts, and in the same way the notion of Nibhilism (Ucchedavāda=Naṭṭhatta) may influence the interpretation of Anattā or Suññatā doctrine of the Buddhists. A typical instance is given in the Majjhima Nikāya (I, pp. 136-137): A Sassatavādin hears Buddha’s teaching about the attainment of Nibbāna by the destruction of passion, desire, wrong views etc. and concludes therefrom that Buddha is an Ucchedavādin. Childers writes in his article on Nibbāna (Pali Dictionary, p. 267): “There is probably no doctrine more distinctive of Sākyamuni’s original teaching than that of the annihilation of being” (p. 274): Burnouf “is decidedly in favour of the opinion that the goal of Buddhism is annihilation.”

The best purpose that has been served by the Sutta is that it shows us the way to distinguish Buddha’s doctrines from those that were not his. In the fifth century B.C. or a little later, it was almost impossible for any teacher to give out any fresh line of thought without the chance of its being confused with one or other of the current opinions, and this confusion could best be avoided by pointing out the pitfalls, in which the later interpreters were likely to fall. This has been done in this Sutta to a certain extent. Then again, Buddha, like the other great teachers, had at times recourse to enigmatical language, baffling
nothing to do with the highest Truth, or that they divert our attention from the real goal of our life.¹ These problems are mentioned almost in the identical language throughout the Piṭaka thus:

1. *Sassato loko* (the world is eternal)
2. *Asassato loko* (the world is not eternal);

the attempts of many an erudite commentator to find out the exact sense. The Buddhist texts abound in such enigmatic expressions. This *Sutta*, in marking out what Buddhism is not, serves, therefore, as an excellent guide for the comprehension of the sense of such expressions. Inspite of this *Sutta*, the terse saying did give rise to so many Buddhist schools of thought within a century or two after Buddha's death, not to speak of the divergent explanations offered by the present day scholars of Buddha's conception of Soul and Nibbāna. Though the *Sutta* contains many statements of doubtful value, an exposition of it as a whole may serve to remove many of our misconceptions.

¹ The usual English synonym chosen for *avāyakata* is 'indetermined.' It is equated to *avāyakṛta*, which, literally, means 'not-explained' or 'not-determined.' *Avāyakṛta* is a Buddhist-Sanskrit form derived from the word *Avāyakata*. The Pāli word *avāyakata* may well be taken as corresponding in sense to Sanskrit *avayakta*, meaning 'inexpressible' or 'unanswerable' because the question does not arise, and all answers are inadmissible. It, however, does not bear the philosophical sense of *avayakta* which is commonly in use in Vedānta and Sāṅkhya, but it is quite plausible to hold that Buddha meant by *avāyakata*, inexplicable in worldly language, i.e., the nature of Nibbāna is as unfit for answer as is the question of the existence of the sky-flower. See Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, I, p. 228.

It is this *avāyakata* attitude of Buddha to the ultimate problems that has led the present day scholars to dub Buddha as agnostic. Prof. Kieth goes further and remarks (in his *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 45) that Buddha's 'agnosticism in these matters is not based on any reasoned conviction of the limits of knowledge; it rests on the two-fold ground that the Buddha has not himself a clear conclusion of the truth on these issues, etc.'
3. Antavā loko (the world is finite);
4. Anantavā loko (the world is not finite);
5. Tām jīvam tām sarīram (the soul is identical with the body);
6. Aññam jīvam aññam sarīram (the soul is different from the body);
7. Hoti Tathāgato param marañā (Tathāgata exists after death);
8. Na hoti Tathāgato param marañā (Tathāgata does not exist after death);
9. Hoti ca na ca hoti Tathāgato param marañā (Tathāgata both exists and not exists after death);
10. N'eva hoti na na hoti Tathāgato param marañā (Tathāgata does neither exist nor not exist after death).

Of the problems mentioned in the list, the first six are exhaustively dealt with in the Brahmacāla Sutta. Though the treatment is not quite philosophical, it gives us a clear idea of what the early Buddhists had in their minds as to the implication of these problems. The heads of subjects as arranged in the Brahmacāla Sutta are as follows:

1. Four kinds of Sāsatavādā;
2. Four kinds of Ekaccasassatavādā;
3. Four kinds of Antānāntikā;
4. Four kinds of Amaññakkhepiķā;
5. Two kinds of Adhiccasamuppannikā;
6. Sixteen kinds of Saññīvādā;

1 Sec., e.g., Aggi-Vacchagotta-sutta in the Majjhima, I, pp. 157, 426, 483-489, Āvyākata-samyutta in Samyutta, IV, pp. 376 ff., also III, pp. 214 ff.; Pottapāda-sutta in Diṅgha, I, p. 191; sec also Mādhyamika Vṛtti, p. 446 (mentioning 14 problems), 536; and ch. XXII; Mahāvyutpatti, 206.
7. Eight kinds of Atanatthavādā;
8. Eight kinds of Nevassatānāsatanatthavādā;
9. Seven kinds of Ucchivedavādā; and
10. Five kinds of Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā.

The correspondences between the two lists may be indicated thus:

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<th>Indeterminable problems</th>
<th>Problems in the Brahmajāla Sutta</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Sāsato loko</td>
<td>1. Sassatavādā</td>
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<td>2. Asassato loko¹</td>
<td>2. Ekaccasassatavādā</td>
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<td>5. Adhīcchasampannīkā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>10. Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above comparative table reveals the fact that the problems, which are generally treated in the Pāli text as indeterminable and their exposition as not conducive to the spiritual welfare of persons, are explained in as much detail as possible in the Brahmajāla Sutta, and therefore the charge of

1 The first and second are sometimes put as Sassato loko; Asassato
2 The third and fourth are usually put thus: Antavā loko; loko; Sassatāsassato loko; Nevāva sassato nāsassato loko.
Anantavā loko, Anaṭavānāntavā loko; Nevāva antavā nāṇantava loko.
3 The items 7th to 10th are dealt with here in chapter VI.
agnosticism sometimes laid against the founder of the religion by the present day writers is unwarranted. The explanations, however, have been given more or less in the light of the inner experiences of the Buddhist monks as stated above and are without any reference to the existing non-Buddhistic opinions, or any attempt to refute or reconcile them.

Nāgārjuna, in his Madhyamaka-kārikās, has shown as logically as possible what the indeterminable problems signify and how they are untenable. From the arguments put forward by him, it seems that he is true to the letter and spirit of the discourse as given in the Pāli texts, and that he penetrates right into the innermost core of the problems and brings out what the Teacher had in his mind.

All of these views have been described in the Buddhist texts, whether Hinayānic or Mahāyānic, as wrong (micchādīttī) and are attributed to people's natural inclination of adhering to the heresy of individuality (sakkāyadīttī), consisting in regarding the body or any particular element of it as soul.¹

Speaking about the object of the introduction of this indeterminable problems into the Buddhist texts, Buddhaghosa² almost echoed what the Mahāyāna teachers had said, namely, that they were necessary for the exposition of Suññatā, by which Buddhaghosa, of course, meant only Puggalasuññatā while the Mahāyānists meant both Pudgalasuññatā and Dharmaśuñnyatā.


² Sum. Vil., I, p. 102. Tasmā sabbaññuta-ñañassa mahanta-bhāvadassanattham desanāya ca suññatā-pakāsana-bhāvattham...
In our exposition of the problems we shall follow the arrangement of the *Brahmajāla Sutta* adding, where available, the arguments of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti as presented in the *Mādhyamikavṛtti*.

**Sassatavāda**

I. Four kinds of *Sassatavāda* (Eternalists), i.e. those who hold that the soul and the world exist eternally.¹

The reason assigned by the *Brahmajāla Sutta* as the basis of this view is that some people on account of their spiritual advancement develop the power (*abbiñña*) of remembering their former births (*pubbenivāsānussati*) up to a certain number. They may be divided into three classes in accordance with the number of births that can be remembered by them. The fourth class refers to those persons who arrive at the conclusion that the world and the soul are eternal by means of logic and reasoning only. In short, the memories of the past and future existences, according to the Sutta, make a person a Sassatavādin, for he thinks that the world has been rolling on from eternity and will be rolling on for ever and that he will be born again and again.² Times out of number Buddha was confronted with the question whether he was a Sassatavādin or not, and every time he had to say that he was neither a Sassatavādin nor an Asassata-vādin because the question of Sassata or Assassata does not arise in reference to the highest truth.³ It should, however, be re-


3 The Truth or Nibbāna, according to Buddha, is uncaused and unconditioned (*ahetu-appaccaya*) and hence is non-relative, absolute, and
membered that *Sassata* in the Pāli Nikāyas does not bear the metaphysical sense in which it is used in the Upaniṣads while speaking of the great Ātman. The Sassatavādins, according to the Nikāyas,⁴ are those who take *attā* or self as one of the five khandhas or something apart from them, and hold that it continues for ever and without any change. It is stated in the *Majjhima Nikāya*² that the self (*attā*), according to the Sassatavādins, is the speaker,feeler, and enjoyer of the fruits of good and evil actions (*kamma*), is permanent (*nicca*), fixed (*dhūva*), eternal (*sassata*), unchangeable (*aviparīṇāmadbhamma*), and is steadfast like the so-called eternal objects, viz., the Sun, Moon, ocean, earth and mountain. The Buddhists, because of their *kṣaṇikavāda* and the denial of a permanent entity, are not prepared to admit that the identical being feels the consequences of his action, which as the *Nidāna-Samyutta* asserts, would make them Sassatavādins.³

*Sassatavāda* and *Sāmkhya*

The only Brāhmanic school of philosophy to which the Sassatavāda bears resemblance is the Sāmkhya. According to this school, there are two distinct eternals, the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti*, the former corresponding to *Attā* and the latter to *Loka*,

is only realisable within one’s ownself (*paccattam veditabbo vuññāhi*). It cannot be described by any of the empirical terms, and hence the question of eternality or non-eternality does not arise.

¹ *Majjhima*, I, pp. 98; 182, IV, p. 400.
² *Majjhima*, I, p. 8; *Papāṇicasūdani*, I, p. 71. See *Infra*, ch. VIII.
³ *Samyutta*, II, p. 20: So karoti so paṭīsamvediyatiti kho Kassapa ādito satu sayāṅkataṁ dukkhan ti iti vadāṁ sassatam etāṁ pareti. 
Cf *M.Vr.*, p. 344, see infra. Also Franke, *Dīgha* (transl.), p. 23.
with this difference that, according to the Sassatavādins, the soul is an active agent while the Purusa (= eternal attā) of the Sāṅkhya is an inactive onlooker, the active agent being Abhaṅkāra, the principle of individuation, which however, issues out of the Prakṛti or matter in its primeval form. The eternal Loka of the Sassatavādins is the evolved world in its variety.

Four kinds of Ekaccasassatavāda

II. Ekaccasassatavāda (Partial E非alists), i.e., those who hold that one of the three classes of the higher gods exists eternally while the rest do not do so; or those who contend that the body or the organs of sense are impermanent while the mind or consciousness (cit = mano = viññāna = attā) is permanent.

The three classes of the higher gods referred to above are (A) Ābhassara, (B) Khiḍḍāpadosikā, and (C) Manopadosikā.¹

(A) Ābhassara. According to the cosmogonic speculations of the Buddhists, as also of some of the Upaniṣadic teachers,² there were in the beginning no beings and the first to appear were the Ābhassara gods, capable of taking shape at will,³ feeding themselves only with joy (pīṭi), self-luminous (sayampabhā), moving about in the sky and getting all that they desired.⁴

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³ *Sum. Vil., I*, p. 110: jhānamattena nibbattattā manomaya.
⁴ *Dīgha, III*, pp. 84-5.
After existing for aeons, there appeared a palace of Brahmā (Brahma-vimāna). One of the Ābhassarā gods came to be re-born in the Brahmavimāna or the Brahma-world at the exhaustion of his merits or the span of his life. But he felt very lonely and wished for companions. Like him other Ābhassarā gods also made their appearances in the Brahma-world. The first Ābhassarā god, however, regarded himself as Brahmā or Mahābrahmā thinking that as it was by means of his reflection that other beings appeared in the Brahma-world, he must be their creator. The other beings were also under the impression that the first Ābhassarā god, Mahā-brahmā, having been in existence before them, must have been their lord and originator (issaro kattā nimmātā).

The text says further that in course of time, some of these beings happened to be reborn in the mortal world and through meditation and such other practices could visualize their former existences up to their birth in the Brahma world and gave out the view that Mahābrahmā, who had been existing when they were first born, is the creator of all beings and is eternal (sassata), whereas the beings who were born after Mahābrahmā were created by him and hence impermanent (asassata).

   Te tam bhuktvā svargalokam viśālam/
   kṣiṁe punye martyalokam viṁantī/

2 Brahmakāyikā bhūmi, see Sutta. Vīh., I, p. 110.

3 Mahābrahmā is described in the Pali texts as: abhibhū anabhībhūto aṇñadattthu-daso vasavatti issaro kattā nimmātā settho sañjitā vasi pitā bhūtabhavyānām (the supreme, the unsurpassed, the all-seeing, the mighty, the lord, the creator, the maker, the chief the best, the ruler, and the father of all present and future beings).
This doctrine naturally reminds us of the Upaniṣadic speculations about the creation of the world by Brahmā the Prajāpati, the Primeval Being, who by reflection produced fire, which in its turn produced water, which again produced earth (food or matter). Through these three elements the Primeval Being produced the whole universe. According to the Čāndogya Upaniṣad the created things and beings are mere appearances hence evanescent, while the real, i.e. the eternal things are the Primeval Being and the three above-mentioned elements.¹

(B) Khidāpadosikā.² This class of partial eternalists holds that the Nimmānarati, Paranimmita-vasavatti and such other gods,³ who are not given to excessive pleasure and enjoyment (khidā), exist eternally, while others do not. The reason assigned is similar to the previous one, viz., that some of these gods were reborn in the mortal world, where through meditation and other practices they remembered their former births up to the Khidāpadosika-deva stage and not further. This led them to hold the belief as above.

(C) Manopadosikā.⁴ This class of partial eternalists believe that the Čatummahārajikā gods,⁵ who do not bear ill-will towards one another, exist eternally, while those, who are not so, fall from that state and are impermanent. The reason assigned is similar to the previous one with this difference that in this case they remembered up to their existence as Čatummahārajikā gods.

(D) The Takki Ekaccasassatikas: These, constituting the fourth class, were the logicians who arrive at the

¹ See Ranade, Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, pp. 85-87.
² Dīgha, I, p. 19; III, p. 31.
⁴ Dīgha, I, p. 21; III, pp. 32-3.
⁵ Sum. Vil, I, p. 114.
conclusion that the soul \((= \text{citta} = \text{mano} = \text{viñana})\) is permanent, unchangeable, steadfast, and so forth, while the body is not so. This naturally reminds us of the Maitri Upanishad (II. 3-4) where the soul is described as pure \((\text{suddha})\), tranquil \((\text{santa})\), eternal \((\text{sasvata})\), great by itself \((\text{sve mahimni})\), and making the body living \((\text{anenedam sariram cetanavat pratisthapatam})\). A similar conception is found in the Kausitaki and other Upaniṣads.\(^1\)

Six of the eight forms of the so-called Sassatavādas and Ekaccasassatavādas, if critically examined, will be found to be based on one of the six abhiññas (higher powers) attained by the Arhats, viz., the Pubbennivāsañña (knowledge of former births). It is regarded as one of the various but not essential attainments of an Arhat. This power may be obtained by a person by practising concentration of mind but without fully developing insight into the truth, which is an essential condition of Arhathood. These meditators, who have not yet attained the Arhat stage, but have acquired the power of recalling some of their former births, think that they have known what is to be known and give an interpretation of the truth, i.e. of the ultimate beginning and end of existence, according to their own experiences.

The remaining two classes of speculators, the logicians, one holding the soul and the world to be eternal, and the other holding the soul to be eternal but not the body, have been passed over in the Bhābmajaḍa Sutta with the remarks that opinions are sometimes formed by the logicians who depend purely on reasoning and not on meditation.

\(^1\) See Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upaniṣads, p. 295; Ranade, Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, p. 134.
Nāgārjuna assails the Sassatavādin

As no attempt has been made in the Brahmajāla Sutta to refute the above-mentioned views, it will be worth while to turn to Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakārikās, in the last chapter of which, he takes up for refutation the various doctrines, two of which are the Śāśvata- and Aśāśvata-vādas.

Refuting Śāśvatavāda, Nāgārjuna says¹ that if a person of the past could be shown to be the same as that of the present, then only Śāśvatavāda could stand, but this is not possible as it would give rise to the contingency of permanency (nityatva) of a being as also to the possibility of a being, having a particular form of existence, to assume different bodies (lit. different forms of existence).² A permanent being should not be said to transmigrate nor a human being who was formerly an animal but became a human being through good karma should say that he was an animal, for, Śāśvatavāda should insist that a man must remain a man, an animal an animal, and that is absurd.³

¹ M. Vr., pp. 574-5
² Ibid., Ekagatisthāyāpi nānāgatisamgrhitavapraśaṅgāt. That is, it would lead to the absurdity of an animal, for instance, (if it is nitya) to become a man or a god without passing through death.
³ To comprehend the arguments of Nāgārjuna, it should be remembered that Nāgārjuna uses the undermentioned synonyms of the Real and the Unreal in the absolute sense.

The Real: Nitya=Śāśvata=Svabhāva=Ātmā, meaning that which is permanent, remains eternally the same without origin and destruction and never undergoes the slightest change, something like the so-called eternal Himalaya mountains, the Sun, the Moon.

The Unreal: Anitya=Aśāśvata=Niḥsvabhāva=Anātmā, meaning that which is impermanent and undergoes change is really non-existing like the two Moons seen by a person with diseased eyes.
One may however question, "Well, how could Śākyamuni say, 'At that time I was the Cakravartī king Māndhata', if Śākyamuni was not the same as Māndhata?" The object of such a statement, says Nāgārjuna, is (i) to negative the notion of complete separateness (anyatvapratisedbhakam) and (ii) to establish the non-identity (naikatva-pratipādakam) of the two existences of a transmigrating being. Admitting that Śākyamuni was not totally different from Māndhata, what harm is there in holding that he was identical with Māndhata. Nāgārjuna's reply is that, besides the objection of nityatva (permanency), it would land us in the absurd position that upādāna is responsible for the distinction between the two existences and not ātmā. The absurdity is shown thus: Let us assume that ātmā and upādāna are indistinguishable, and that ātmā of the previous existence is the same as the one in the present, from this it would follow that upādāna (having pañcaśaṇḍha-bālakṣaṇa) of the previous existence is the same as that of the present. But this is absurd as no change in upādāna in two existences is admissible. Then again, if ātmā and upādāna be distinguished as the agent and its object, then also it is not proper to say that object (upādāna) has changed but not its agent (ātmā, i.e., holder, upādātī).

Nāgārjuna then points out that ātmā is inseparable from upādānas, because it cannot exist apart from the upādānas. If it is upādāna which comes into existence and undergoes change on account of ignorance, karma, etc., and not ātmā, then one has to say that the existence of ātmā is without any cause (abhetuka-tvaprasaṅgat) and that is impossible according to Nāgārjuna. Hence ātmā and upādāna are not separable.

1 For details see infra, Ch. VII.
Nāgārjuna then attacks the position of the Āsāsvatavādins.¹ He says that if 'men' and the 'men reborn as gods' be regarded as different, like the Neem and Mango trees, then only the Āsāsvatavādins can maintain that the soul of the man has been destroyed and a different soul has come into existence; but to maintain such a distinction in characteristics as between the Neem and Mango trees goes against the theory of the characteristic continuity (saṃtyānaṇuvṛtti) of beings which is admitted to exist between 'men' and 'the men reborn as gods' and so the position of the Āsāsvatavādins becomes untenable.

Nāgārjuna, explaining the position of the Śāsvatāśāsvatavādins (Pāli. Ekaccasassatikas = Partial Eternalists), says that according to this class of thinkers, a man when reborn as a god should partially give up his human attributes and take the divine in their place; so by the destruction of one part of his being he is aśāsvata, and by the retention of the other, he is śāsvata. To hold that one part of a being is divine and the other human is not proper; hence the position of the Śāsvatāśāsvatavādins is untenable.²

After refuting the three positions mentioned above it becomes easy for Nāgārjuna to disprove the contention of the Naiyāsāsvatanāśāsvatavādins. He says that one may use the

¹ Though it should have been dealt with along with the doctrines of Ucchedavāda (see infra) we cannot help treating it here in order to bring out the force of Nāgārjuna's arguments.

² Nāgārjuna, it seems, is evading the issue here. The contention of the Śāsvatāśāsvatavādins is that the soul is divine and immortal while the body is not so. Nāgārjuna here is not distinguishing the soul from the body. He is refuting those only who hold that the soul is one of the constituents of the body, or is at least not distinguishable from the body. This, however, is never accepted by the Brāhmanic Śāsvatavādins.
expression na śāsvata or na āśāsvata only when he has shown that there was something śāsvata which later on became āśāsvata. But it has been already shown that the śāsvata and āśāsvata nature of beings cannot be established; hence there can be no such being as nāivāśāsvatanāśāsvata.¹

He now rounds up this refutation by examining whether there is, in fact, any padārtha (thing) going about in this beginningless world, the existence of which (thing) we have supposed on the basis of the continuous succession of birth and death without any beginning. If it could be proved that the samskāras,² or, the self is leaving one gati (lit. state of existence) to go to another, from this again, it is going elsewhere, then the samsāra (stream of existence) could be proved to be without a beginning. But this is not possible, because a thing which is permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya) cannot be said to be coming and going. That being so, is it right to say that the stream of existences (samsāra) has a beginning only because of the remoteness and non-perception of the beginning of the chain of births and death (janmaparamāparāyatā atidurgatvenādayanupalambhā)? Then again, when no entity can be shown as transmigrating (samsartur abhāvā), how can the stream of existences (samsāra) be said to have a beginning or not? So it is quite wrong to hold that there is something (kaścit padārthabh) which has been going about in this beginningless world and which can be perceived. There is, in fact, nothing eternal (śāsvata) and so it is meaningless to think of anything as non-eternal (āśāsvata), or both, or neither of the two.³

¹ M. Vr., p. 585.
² M. Vr., p. 586; cf. Ibid., p. 529.
³ For Nāgārjuna’s position see M. Vr., pp. 537, 591.
Antānantikā

III. Four kinds of Antānantikā (limitists and unlimitists). The Antānantikā are those who hold that

(a) the world is limited in extent and circular in shape;
(b) the world is unlimited in extent and is without any end;
(c) the world is limited upwards and downwards but unlimited breadthwise;
(d) the world is neither limited nor unlimited (in any direction whatsoever).

The reasons assigned for these conclusions are as follows: Some meditators who take the finite and circular world as their object of meditation and do not extend it to all the world systems (Cakkavālas), arrive at the first conclusion. Those who take all the Cakkavālas as their object of meditation, arrive at the second, while those who take the Cakkavālas limited upwards and downwards but unlimited breadthwise as their object of meditation, arrive at the third.

These three classes of speculators are, in fact, not concerned about the ultimate end of the world. They speak about the

1 In the usual enumeration of dītis, only the first and second are mentioned. See e.g., Paṭis., I, p. 153.
2 A Cakravāla has a Sun and a Moon as also a multitude of stars moving around the Maḥāmeru.
3 See also Paṭis., I, p. 152-3.
4 As an approach to this view we may point to the theory of the origin of the world in the Aitareyopanisad, where the heaven and the earth are conceived as “encompassed on the upper and nether sides by regions of water.” Ranade, op. cit., p. 95. In the Buddhist cosmology a chiliocosm consisting of 1,000 or more worlds is encompassed by a gigantic wall. See McGovern, Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 48; Hardy, Manual of Buddhism, p. 89.
finiteness and infiniteness of the shape of the world or the universe. In popular Buddhism, the universe is believed to be composed of an infinite number of world systems, of which one thousand or one million or one thousand millions form a chilioscosm. The first three conclusions are, according to the Sutta, nothing but the three kinds of experiences obtained gradually through meditation. The author of the Sutta wants to show that those who have one of these experiences but have not yet obtained the highest conception of Suññatā,¹ give out one's own individual experience as the true conception of the universe.

As regards those who reach the fourth conclusion, the text says they are logicians who depend on pure arguments. The Buddhist logicians are evidently responsible for the fourth theory. Their characteristic method of exposition of all metaphysical topics is by the fourfold process (catuskoti).² It is, as a rule, not applied to empirical things. By this fourfold process it is contended that the world is non-existent as the Śūnyatāvādins hold, or is only a creation of the mind as the Vijñānavādins assert, and hence the question of the attributes of anta and ananta with reference to the world does not arise.

Nāgārjuna's Comment

The exposition of the four Antānantaḍi views given above relates to cosmogony and appears to be a little laboured due, perhaps, to the expositor's desire to bring them into a line with the previously mentioned Sassatāḍi views and to attribute three

² Viz., boti; na boti; boti ca na boti ca; n'eva boti na na boti.
of the four views to ecstatic experiences. The exposition of these views elsewhere is of quite a different nature and sounds reasonable. Nāgarjuna has taken up these problems in his Madhyamaka-kārikā and has shown how these are untenable. He first states their four positions thus:

(a) Those, who cannot foresee the future appearance of the self or the world (ātmano lokasya vā), regard the world as limited (antavān);

(b) Those, who can foresee the future appearance of the self or the world, regard the world as unlimited (na antavān);

(c) Those, who can foresee the future appearance of the self or the world partially and not fully, regard the world as both limited and unlimited;

(d) Those, who cannot foresee the future appearance of the self or the world either partially or fully, regard the world as neither limited nor unlimited.

Refuting the above four propositions, Nāgarjuna says:

(a) The existence of paraloka (after-life or after-world) is admitted by the Buddhists, hence those who admit it should not say that the self or the world has an end because in that case there could not be an after-life or after-world.

(b) Similarly if the existence of paraloka is admitted, one should not say that the self or the world has no end (ananta) because in that case also there cannot be a paraloka.

(c) The third view that the world is both limited and unlimited is not tenable for the following reasons:

(i) Take for instance, the case of a man reborn as a god; if it be held that the skandhas of the man had been destroyed at his death (i.e. antavān), then it cannot be said that they have

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1 M. VI., pp. 536, 573, 587-591.
given rise to a god. They would be like the extinguished lamp with oil but lacking a wick. As it is admitted that a being reappears after death, it should not be said that the self or the world is limited.

(ii) Applying similar reason, it can be shown that the self or the world cannot be said to be unlimited. In the case when a man is reborn as a god, if it be said that the skandhas of the man had not been destroyed at his death, they could not have given rise to a god. The self or the world would be endless and indestructible (ananto vināśi) on account of not giving up its own form. It is only when the previous skandhas cease to exist, and that another set of skandhas comes into existence, as a result of the same, hence it is not proper to say that the self or the world is unlimited (ananta) as the previous skandhas do not exist any further.

In Buddhism, the repeated existences of a being is nothing but the continuous flow of skandhas (skandhasantāna), the skandhas, however, are being destroyed every moment and have fresh existence like the flame of a lamp. In other words, the previous set of skandhas is destroyed every moment but at the same time it becomes a cause for the appearance of the next. It happens uninterruptedly and so it is said to be continuous, though it is not strictly so. The flame of a lamp appears to be continuous and even identical, but, in fact, it is not so because the drop of oil which once fed the flame is exhausted and another drop of oil takes its place to feed the flame, which therefore cannot be the previous one. On account of this apparent uninteruptedness, it is believed to be continuous and even identical. Hence to a Buddhist philosopher, the self or the world cannot be both limited and unlimited, it is ever flowing like a stream undergoing change every moment (until it reaches Nirvāṇa).
Nāgārjuna then takes up for refutation the third view of both limitedness and unlimitedness. He says that the adherents of this view may say that one part of the man (i.e. body) is destroyed, hence antavān; while the other part (i.e. soul) remains undestroyed, hence anantavān. Nāgārjuna in reply says that it is absurd to hold that one part of a being is destroyed and the other is not. He, however, as a Buddhist philosopher, is not prepared to admit the existence of soul and body as two separate entities. He says that, according to his opponents then, a man, if reborn as a god, should be partly human and partly divine, but this is not possible, hence the opponents cannot uphold the view of the self or the world being both limited and unlimited.

He then proceeds to show that this partial identity and partial change cannot be attributed either to the soul (upādātā) or to the elements of the body (upādāna) because it has been established elsewhere1 that the soul has no existence of its own apart from the skandhās, hence to speak of a non-existing entity as partially the same and partially different is absurd on the face of it.

(d) When the third position is not tenable, i.e. when it cannot be said that the self or the world is both limited and unlimited, Nāgārjuna says that no argument need be adduced to refute the fourth view that the self or the world is neither limited nor unlimited.

Amarāvikkhepika

IV. Four kinds of Amarāvikkhepikas (evasive disputants).

There are some thinkers who do not want to draw a line of demarcation between good and evil actions; so when they are

1 See infra, Ch. VII.
confronted with inquiries about good and evil, they do not give a categorical answer, for they believe that they may be wrong in their answer and be opposed by others and that will produce in their mind either conceit and pride, or ill-will and hatred, both of which will be a hindrance to their spiritual progress. If the opinion of an Amarāvikkhepika be contradicted, he would bear ill-will or hatred and this fact proves that he was wrong and guilty of speaking a falsehood, and hence would create a hindrance to his spiritual progress. Should he, however, obstinately adhere to his own view and not accept the view as corrected by his opponents, he would have upādāna (cause for rebirth) and that would also be a hindrance to his further spiritual progress.

The third and fourth classes of Amarāvikkhepikas are those who are afraid of facing a well-trained logician with any positive opinion about good and evil, lest they be vanquished in the dispute and thus be led to bear an ill-will towards their opponents. This ill-will would cause hindrance to their spiritual progress.

These disputants have thus their own good reason for the line of action followed by them in view of the fact good (kusala) and evil (akusala) are relative terms, and no hard and fast line can be drawn between them. To a Mahāyānist or a Vedāntist there is ultimately nothing as good or evil, and hence no positive statement can be made about them, the best course therefore would be either to remain silent or evade a positive answer, and the latter course has been pre-

1 See *Sūtra Vīla*, I, p. 116. Chando=dubbalarāgo; tāgo=balavarāgo; doso=dubbala-kodho; patigho=balava-kodho.
2 See B. M. Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 329.
ferred by the Amarāvikkhepikas. Whatever may have been the justification for the disputants becoming Amarāvikkhepikas, they were, in the eyes of the Buddhists, men of weak intellect and deluded, and supposed to have been generally incapable of being thorough brahmacārins. Hence they were not regarded as capable of attaining the highest truth.¹

Sañjaya, one of the six heretical teachers, has been classed as an Amarāvikkhepika.² The advocates of Navya Nyāya love to indulge in evasions of issues. It is not improbable that these Amarāvikkhepikas were the fore-runners of the Naiyāyikas who very often indulged in slippery arguments (vītaṇḍā).

Adhiccasamuppannika

V. Two classes of Adhiccasamuppannikas (Fortuitous Originists). There are some thinkers who hold that the soul and the world originate accidentally without any cause (adhiccasamuppannika).³

(a) The texts speak of one class of such thinkers thus: There are some meditators who take up Vāyo-kasina⁴ for meditation and then reaching the fourth jhāna discover that mind is the source of all troubles, and so they induce a state in which mind does not function. Should they die while thus meditating, they are reborn as 'Asaññasattā' gods. Some of these again fall from that state by developing saññā and are reborn in the mortal world where some of them practise meditation and develop the

³ In the Samyutta, II, p. 20 it is said that Kassapa once asked Buddha whether misery is uncaused and not due to one's own and others' actions (asayamkāram aparāmkāram adhiccasamuppannam dukkhan ti). See also Digba, III, p. 139; ante, chap. IV, p. 35-6.
power of remembering former births. Their memory does not go beyond the Saññuppāda state, i.e., the time of their fall from their position as ‘Asañña-sattā’ gods, and so they declare that the soul and the world originate fortuitously.

(b) The second class of Adhiccasamuppannikas\(^1\) comprises those who arrive at the above-mentioned conclusion through reasoning. As a parallel to this doctrine, we may refer to the Lokāyatikas or Bārhapatyas who hold that the happiness and misery of persons are brought about by the laws of nature, and that there is no other cause. It was by an accidental combination of elements that the living beings such as a peacock of variegated colours or a human being is born. The conceptions of heaven and hell, merit and demerit, and so forth, according to them, are creations of designing minds. The doctrine of Ajita Kesakambalin is similar to what has been stated above. According to him, there is no preceding cause or condition for the affliction or purification of a person and hence there is no need for exertion. It is a mistake to think, he says, that one can change the course of his life by the observance of precepts or performance of rituals or practice of asceticism.*

\(^1\) *Digba*, I, p. 53-54; *Samyutta*, III, p. 211. Cf. ante, ch. IV, p. 37-38.

* NOTE: In the *Digba Nikāya* (I, p. 30) the five classes of thinkers including the Antānāntikas dealt with before are called Pubbantakappikas (i.e. those who speculate about the beginning of the universe). In the *Mādhyamika-vrtti* (pp. 536, 572), however, the Sāsvatāvādins are only called Pūrvāntikas, while the Antānāntikas are called Aparāntikas (i.e. those who speculate about the future of the universe) (See also *Majjhima*, II, pp. 228 ff.; *Paṭis.,* I, p. 155). Buddhaghosa remarks in a general way that some of those who have developed the power of remembering former births (*pubbenivācāṇussati*) become Pubbantaka-
VI. Sixteen kinds of *Uddhamāghātanika-saṅñivādins* (those who believe in the existence of a conscious soul after death). The sixteen conceptions are as follows:

(a) Soul is material (*rūpi*) and remains healthy and conscious after death (*aroṇa param maraṇa saṅñi*). This view, says Buddhaghosa, is due to the meditator developing the notion that the soul is identical with the object of his meditation. He further says that such beliefs are held by the Ājivikas. From the information collected by Dr. Barua, it is apparent that the Ājivikas conceived of soul as an entity absolutely pure in its nature, but there is nothing to show that the soul, according to the Ājivikas, is material.

ppikas, while some who have developed higher vision (dībbacakku) become Aparāntakappikas (*Samanāga Vilāsinī*, I, p. 119).

1 The Aparāntakappikas, according to the *Digba Nikāya*, number forty-four from the Uddhamāghātanikas to the Dīṭṭha-dhamma-nibbānavādins.

2 *Digba*, I, p. 31; *Majjhima*, II, p. 229.

3 *Rūpi attha* 'Rūpa' is usually translated as 'form.' On the basis of the connotation of 'rūpa' in nāmarūpa, I think it should be translated by the word 'matter.' In the Buddhist cosmological speculations, 'rūpadhātu' means not the world of forms, but the 'material world.' Likewise 'Arūpadhātu' means not the world of the formless but the 'non-material world.'

In the *M. Vr.*, it is clearly stated that 'nāma' is a collective name of the four *arūpinah skandhā* (i.e. immaterial skandhas) while *rūpa* is that which takes form and offers obstruction (*rūpyata iti rūpaṃ bādhyata ityarthab*). The Tibetan rendering of *rūpyate* is gsbig *rin bu*—because it is susceptible of examination and that of *bādhyate* is gnod. *par, bya, bar. rin*—it is susceptible of being struck (see *M. Vr.*, p. 544 fn.). Cf. Another conception of soul similar to this
(b) Soul is non-material (arūpi) but remains healthy and conscious after death. Buddhaghosa thinks that this view is due to the meditator reaching the Arūpasamāpatti stage and confusing the nimitta (object of meditation) of Arūpasamāpatti with attā (soul). He attributes to Mahāvīra a doctrine similar to this. Buddhaghosa seems to be correct in his suggestion, for the Jainas also describe their soul (jīva) as non-material (arūpa) and formless (amūrta).¹

The next six views are more or less stereotyped combinations of rūpi and arūpi, antā and ananta. These are as follows:—
The soul after death is

(c) both material (rūpi) and non-material (arūpi)
(d) neither rūpi nor arūpi
(e) finite (anta)

in the Mahāniddāna Sutta (Dīgha, II, p. 64): Rūpi me paritto attā ti and Rūpi me ananto attā ti.

It may be observed that if Rūpi means ‘form’ it cannot be ananta (infinite) hence rūpi should mean ‘material.’

¹ See Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, p. 309. See also Guerinot, La Religion Dzaina (Paris, 1826), ch. VI: L’âme le dīva, est le principe de la vie, la force vitale. Elle possède une série de qualités: elle est immatérielle, amourta, sans forme, arūpa...........

The only point to which I want to draw attention is that the word 'arūpa' (arūpa) should have been rendered into French by the word 'immatérielle' and 'amourta' (amūrta) by 'sans forme.' Mr. Jaini also in his Outlines of Jainism (Cambridge, 1916), p. 83, translates amūrta by the word 'immaterial.' In the Dravyasamgraha (edited by Sarat Chandra Ghosal, 1917, The Sacred Books of the Jainas Series), pp. 4, 5, 22, amūrta is translated by the word 'formless.'

Mons. Guerinot, however, does not mention the source from which he traced the word 'arūpa.' From the Dravya-samgraha (p. 22) it is apparent that soul, according to the Jainas, in its pure state, is invisible and it takes matter (pudgala) when it is afflicted by passions.
(f) infinite (anānta)
(g) both antavān and anantavān
(h) neither antavān nor anantavān

The soul after death is conscious of
(i) only one object (ekatta)¹
(j) many objects (nānatta)²
(k) limited space or object (paritta)³
(l) unlimited space or object (appamāna).⁴

These four views are attributed by Buddhaghosa to the various experiences acquired by ecstatic meditation. He says that the first (i) view is held by those who have attained the fourth samāpatti, while the second (j) by those who have not attained any one of the samāpattis. The third (k) and fourth (l) are held by those meditators who have for meditation an object or space or viññāṇa, limited (paritta) or unlimited (appamāna).

The soul after death has
(m) unmixed happiness (ekanta-sukhi), e.g., when a being is in the third or fourth jhānabhūmi;
(n) unmixed misery (ekanta-dukkhi), e.g., when a being is in hell;

¹ Similar to the Brahmakāyikā and Subhakīṇṇā gods = 2nd and 4th Viññāṇatthitīs (Dīgā, II, p. 69).
² Similar to Abhassarā gods = 3rd Viññāṇatthitī (Dīgā, II, p. 69).
(o) mixture of happiness and misery, e.g., when a human being is in the mortal world;

(p) neither happiness nor misery, e.g., when a being is in the Vehapphala heaven.

Buddhaghosa attributes these four views to those who form their conception of soul on the basis of the four different kinds of future existences as indicated above.

Uddhamāghātanika-asaññivāda

VII. Eight kinds of Uddhamāghātanika-asaññivādins (upholders of the existence of unconscious soul after death).

Among those who are of opinion that the soul remains unconscious but healthy after death, the following eight conceptions of the soul are current:

The soul is

(a) material (rūpi)
(b) non-material (arūpi)
(c-h) both rūpi and arūpi and so forth as stated above in connection with the conscious soul (c-h)

Uddhamāghātanika-n'eva-saññināsaññivādins

VIII. Eight kinds of Uddhamāghātanika-n'eva-saññināsaññivādins (supporters of the view that the soul after death is neither conscious nor unconscious).

Among those who adhere to the view that the soul after death remains healthy, but is neither conscious nor unconscious, the following eight opinions exist:

The soul is (a) material (rūpi), (b-h) non-material (arūpi) and so forth, as shown under the previous head 'unconscious soul after death.'

1 See above, p. 68.
The opinions placed under the headings ‘Adhiccasamuppannikas’ and ‘Uddhamāghātanikas’, are formed, says Buddhaghosa, according to the object (kasina) of meditation selected by a meditator. He says that the meditators sometimes become so much engrossed with the object of their meditation that they lose their power of judgment. They are carried away by their ecstatic experiences and give out their individual experiences as the Truth. In the exposition of the thirty-four views given above, he pointed out, as far as possible, how far a kasina could be responsible for a particular view.¹ There are some views, however, based on the Buddhist notion of heavens and hells, e.g. atta boti ekantasukhi, ekantadukkhi, sukhi-dukkhi, and so forth.

Ucchedavāda

IX. Seven kinds of Ucchedavāda (Natthattavādins² = Annihilationists). The following are the seven different conceptions of soul held by the Annihilationists in a gradual ascending order but the soul, in every case, is believed to become extinct after death:

(a) The soul has form (rūpayā) and is made of the four elements, and is like the body born of father and mother. In short, its composition is similar to that of the human being.

(b) The soul is heavenly³ and has form. It remains in

¹ An instance is given in the Majjhima Nikāya (I, p. 21) as to how a meditator is sometimes bewildered by the object of his meditation. See Papañcasudani, p. 121-2 commenting on the passage ‘Eke samanabrāhmaṇā rattim eva samānaṃ divā ti sañjānati, etc.’
² Samyutta, IV, p. 401.
³ Sum. Vil., I, p. 120: Dibbo to devaloke sambhūto (by heavenly we mean that it is produced in one of the spheres of Kāmāvacara gods).
the Kāmāvacara sphere and is nourished by material food.

(c) The soul is heavenly, has form and is of the same substance as mind (manomaya). It possesses all the parts of the physical body, major and minor, as also the organs of sense (indriyas).¹

(d) The soul is of the same substance as beings of the ākāśānañcāyatana² i.e. like these beings, it has neither rūpasannā (perception of material objects) nor patigbasañnā (perception of obstructing objects) and is indifferent to the distinctions made between one thing and another identifying itself with infinite space (anantākāsa).

(e) The soul is of the same nature as beings of the viññānañcāyatana.³ Like these beings it can remain beyond the sphere of the Ākāśānañcāyatanupaga gods and identifies itself with 'infinite consciousness' (anantam viññānam).

(f) The soul is like the beings of the ākīncāññāyatana.⁴ Like these beings, it can stay outside the sphere of the Viññānañcāyatanupaga gods.

(g) The soul is similar to the beings of the nevasaññānāsaññāyatana,⁵ and hence superior to the Ākīncāññāyatanupaga gods. This state of the soul is considered as the best (panīta) and the most tranquil (santa). It also becomes extinct after death.

¹ Sum. Vīk., I, p. 120. It is similar to the Rūpāvacara gods.
² i.e. similar to the 4th class of Arūpāvacara gods.
³ i.e. similar to the 3rd class of Arūpāvacara gods.
⁴ i.e. similar to the 2nd class of Arūpāvacara gods.
⁵ i.e. similar to the 1st class of Arūpāvacara gods.
The seven conceptions of the soul are apparently based on the Buddhist classification of beings as shown below, namely, two classes of the Kāmāvacaras, one class of the Rūpāvacaras and four classes of Arūpāvacaras. The underlying idea of these conceptions is that the soul is made of elements that constitute one or other of the above-mentioned categories of beings. In short, these theories amount almost to the identification of the soul with the body (tam ātām tam sarīram), a theory not accepted by any of the Buddhist philosophers.

If we critically examine the views under the head ‘Ucchedavāda’, we find nothing but the Buddhist conception of the seven classes of beings (viññāṇaṇaṭṭhitis). First, the soul is identified with the body, and then it is shown that as the body of beings may be of seven different varieties, so also is the soul. The soul may also be interpreted as something separate from the body but of the same nature as the body.

1 The subdivisions of the Kāmāvacara beings are as follows:—
(a) Beings of Niraya, Tirachāṇayoni, Petaloka, Asurabhavana and Manussaloka.
(b) The gods of Cātummahārajikadevaloka, Tāvatimsabhavana, Nimmānaṇaṭṭidevaloka and Paranimmitavasavatidevaloka.

Those of the Rūpāvacara gods are: Brahmapārisujjadevas, Brahmapurohitadevas etc. up to Akanīṭṭhadevas.
Those of the Arūpāvacara gods are: (a) Ākāsaṇaṇaṇaṭṭiyatana, (b) Viññāṇaṇaṇaṇaṭṭiyatana, (c) Akiṃcaṇaṇaṇaṭṭiyatana and (d) Nevasaṇṇaṇaṇaṇaṇaṛaṇaṇaṇaṇaṭṭiyatana.

For further details see McGovern, Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, pp. 49-50, 60-70; Abhidharmakosa, ch. III, cf. also ‘Satra Viññāṇaṇaṭṭhiyī’ in Dīgha, II, p. 68-69.

For Nāgārjuna’s refutation of the Aśāvatavāda (=Ucchedavāda), see ante, p. 57.

Dīttthagammanibbānavāda

X. Five classes of Dītttha-dhammanibbānavādins (theorisers about the attainment of Nibbāna in this life).

The five classes are as follows:—

Those who believe that the soul attains Nibbāna (perfection)
(a) when it fully enjoys the pleasures of the five senses, viz., rūpa, rasa, śabda, gandha and sparśa;

(b) when it, free from desires (kāma) and evil thoughts and actions (akusala-dhamma), enters into the first jhāna in which state, there is reflection (vitakka) and judgment (vijāra) and a feeling of joy derived through dissociation from the world;

(c) when it, in the second jhāna, becomes free from reflection and judgment, internally serene, and remains with thoughts concentrated and in the enjoyment of happiness derived through meditation;

(d) when it, in the third jhāna, becomes indifferent to happiness and unhappiness, remains conscious of all that is happening, and is pervaded by a sense of ease; and

(e) when it, after dismissing both happiness and unhappiness, pleasure and pain, is in the fourth jhāna, which is a pure state having only equanimity (upekkhā) and memory (sati).

These five views hardly need any comment. The first is that of the worldly man running after worldly pleasures and may well be compared to the materialistic school of philosophy like the Lokāyatikas or the Bārhaspatyas according to whom the summum bonum of human life lies in the full enjoyment of the worldly pleasures attainable through wealth yielded by cattle-rearing, trade, agriculture etc.¹ The next four views refer

¹ See Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha, edited and translated by Prem Sundar Bose, 1929, p. 7.
to the four jānas, which are regarded as the lowest rungs in the ladder of spiritual advancement.

Hence those who have reached one of them are far from Nibbāna, but the people, as the Brahmajāla Sutta wants to show, are led away by their own beliefs and aver that the happy state reached in those stages must be the highest and constitutes Nibbāna in the present life. These four views are also based like the previous ones, on ecstatic experiences, and are given out by those only whose highest attainment has been one of the jānas.¹

¹ It is evident from the above exposition of the Brahmajāla Sutta, that its compiler has spoken more of the opinions of the imperfect Buddhist monks than those of the non-Buddhist thinkers existing at the time of the appearance of Buddhism. It enumerates the misconceptions and misinterpretations current among the Buddhist monks after Buddhism had been in existence for some time.
CHAPTER VI
THE TATHĀGATA

In the previous chapter the six indeterminables have been discussed. The remaining four relate to the question, what is Tathāgata in other words, Nibbāna? Throughout the Buddhist literature, whether Hinayānic or Mahāyānic, the problems are thus presented:

(i) Hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā ti? (Does Tathāgata (henceforth abbreviated as T.) exist after death?)

(ii) Na hoti T. param maraṇā ti? (Does not T. exist after death?)

(iii) Hoti ca na ca hoti T. param maraṇā ti? (Does not T. exist and not exist after death?)

(iv) Neva hoti na na hoti T. param maraṇā ti? (Does T. neither exist nor not exist after death?).

Though in the Buddhist texts, the problems have been treated as avyākata (inexplainable) and not conducive to the spiritual welfare of the inquiries, we find that in the Samyutta Nikāya (iv. pp. 382ff.), the Mādhyamikavṛtti and a few other Mahāyāna texts, there are attempts to offer an explanation of the problems. These have been, in fact, utilized in the Mahāyānic texts to establish their contention of Śūnyatā or Vijñānamātratā.

From the available expositions of these problems, it is apparent that the underlying reason for negating all the four propositions is that the inquirers, who seek a solution of the problems, labour under the misconception that the Tathāgata is an individual, a composite of skandhas, and that the only differ-
ence between a man of the world and the Tathāgata is that the former is composed of impure (sāsrava) skandhas and the latter of pure (anāsrava). In other words the inquirers want to ascertain whether Buddhism has anything to say about the existence of the soul (ātman) and its state when an individual attains mukti. The four problems hinge on the question whether the Tathāgata is a person, and whether his personality, which becomes pure by constant spiritual culture through ages, continues to exist after death (which in this case is Nirvāṇa). As Buddhism denies the existence of personality, the only course open to it is therefore to answer all questions relating to soul in the negative, as such questions do not arise. It is like putting the question whether the flower in the sky is red or blue. Any answer, positive or negative, would be misleading; hence the four propositions stated above are treated in the Buddhist texts as avyākata. The real issue therefore is not the existence of Tathāgata after death, but whether there is attā, and if so, does the attā of Arhats or Buddhhas remain eternally in Nirvāṇa in any form, or become extinct.

In the Samyutta Nikāya (iv. pp. 383-384), just after the discourse that attā should not be identified with one or more or all of the skandhas, it is shown that the Tathāgata likewise should not be identified with one of the skandhas thus:

(a) whether rūpa or vedanā or saṅāṇa or saṅkhārā or viññāṇa is Tathāgata?
(b) whether T. is in rūpa, vedanā etc.
(c) whether T. is something different from rūpa or vedanā etc.
(d) whether rūpa, vedanā etc. all taken together are T.
(e) whether T. is devoid of rūpa, vedanā etc. (arūpt, avedano, asaṅñi, asaṅkhāro, aviññāno).
The answer to each of these questions evidently could be nothing but no h'etam.

What the Samyutta Nikāya has laid down by a few simple statements has been elaborated into a whole chapter\(^1\) in the Madhyamikavṛtti. Nāgārjuna (henceforth abbreviated as N.) commences (the chapter) with the statement that, if the existence of transmigrating beings (bhavasāntati) in reality be proved then only the reality of the Tathāgata, the perfect Buddha, the saviour of the world, can be established, but as the former, is not proved, the existence of the Tathāgata cannot be established. It must be shown that the

(a) Tathāgata is the same as the skandhas; or
(b) T. is different from the skandhas; or
(c) T. is in the skandhas; or
(d) the skandhas are in T.; or
(e) T. is possessed of skandhas (skandhavān), but as none of these are true, and so there is no T. in reality.

Is T. the same as the skandhas?

N. first takes up the proposition that the T. is something pure and indescribable and is identical with the skandhas. There are two sets of skandhas, one being the usual five viz., rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra and viññāna and the other, the five dharmas which make one a Buddha viz., āśīla, samādhi, prajñā, vimukti and vimuktiñānadārśana. As the latter set of skandhas is not found in all beings (avyāpaka), he takes up the question of identity of the first set of skandhas, rūpa, vedanā etc. with the T., and points out the absurdities, to which this identity would lead. He argues thus:

\(^1\) Ch. XXII: Tathāgataparikṣā.
(i) If fire be taken as identical with firewood, or Buddha with upādāna (= skandhas, i.e., elements which make an individual) then the doer, and the thing done, become one.

(ii) If Buddha (i.e., the Ātman of pure being) be identical with skandhas, then Buddha (or pure Ātman) would be subject to origination and destruction\(^1\)

Is. T. different from the skandhas?

N. then assumes that T. is different from the skandhas, and points out the absurdities, to which this assumption would lead. He says:

(i) If fire be different from firewood, fire could exist without the firewood. Again not being dependent on any other material, it does not require to be ignited. It would be self-existent, proving thereby the futility of exertion (ārambha-vaiyartham). Analogously it may be said that Buddha and upādāna being different, Buddha is devoid of upādāna, so he is causeless and is self-existent from this it follows that no exertion is needed to become a Buddha.

(ii) If Buddha be different from the skandhas, he would be devoid of the characteristics of the skandhas.\(^2\)

It follows then that skandhas cannot be different (vyatirikta) from the T. Now, when skandhas and T. are not different entities, the other propositions, viz., skandhas are in T., T. is in skandhas or T. is possessed of skandhas, fall to the ground, for these relations can exist only between two distinct entities.

Thus, Nāgārjuna by the line of reasoning reductio ad absurdum, establishes that the Tathāgata can neither be proved

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1 See M. Vr., p. 434 and infra, pp. 85, 89 f.
2 Ibid., p. 434; for detailed treatment, see infra, pp. 89 f.
to be identical with the skandhas nor different from them, and hence there is no Tathāgata—the Tathāgata which is popularly supposed to be the ultimate perfect state of beings. At the same time Nāgārjuna adds, there is no transmigrating being (bhava-samātati), who is supposed to become the Tathāgata ultimately.

Does T. exist relatively?

N. then says that it may be contended by some that though it has not been possible to establish the existence of T. directly, it may be done, at least, indirectly (parabhāvatā) by proving the existence of the upādānas, and T. as their image. But this also is shown untenable by N. by the application of reductio ad absurdum thus:

Against the argument that the existence of T. can be proved at least as a reflection of pure skandhas similar to the image of an object on a mirror, Nāgārjuna advances the following arguments:

(a) That which appears by depending on something else, e.g. the reflection on a mirror is anātma (substanceless) and whatever is anātma is unreal (nihsvabhāva). Hence, there is no ground for holding that the so-called T. exists in reality.

(b) Again, if T. had been really existent, then only it would have been possible to establish the separate existence (parabhāva) of skandhas by showing their apartness (paratvam) from T. As it has been already proved T. is non-existent by its own nature (svabhāvatāḥ), the question of separate existence (para-bhāva) of skandhas cannot arise, so it is futile to argue that the existence of T. can be proved at least indirectly (para-bhāvatāḥ) with reference to the skandhas, with which paratva (apartness) and hence parabhāvatva (separate existence) of T. is out of the question.
An object must have either an existence of its own (svabhāva) or at least, its existence can be established with reference to some other thing (parabhāva) but T. has neither; hence, how can T. be said to be real.

*Does T. become apparent by means of skandhas?*

Now, it may be contended that T. is not to be spoken of as identical with, or different from, the skandhas; he is known only on account (upādāya) of the skandhas. Nāgārjuna replies that the position also is not tenable, the reason being that it implies the existence of T. as prior to, and distinct from, skandhas; and that T. had the skandhas later on, just as we say, Devadatta exists and he later on acquires wealth. From all considerations, the conclusion that is arrived at is that T. cannot have an existence before he has taken up the skandhas, i.e., he cannot exist uncaused (anupādāya), for that would again give rise to the fallacy that things can originate without cause. That which does not exist at all, how can it take up something else, in this case, the skandhas (upādānas).

From the above it follows that a thing, which is not taken up by something else, cannot be regarded as upādāna. N. says: now that it has been established that T. was non-existent before the acquisition of skandhas, and that T., in fact, did not take up the skandhas, then, is it proper to regard a thing as a cause of some other thing even if the latter does not receive the former

1 The object of the opponents of Nāgārjuna is to say that T. exists for ever, but only when he takes up the aggregates (skandhas), he becomes apparent to us.

2 e.g. flower in the sky, son of a barren woman.

3 Just as it is meaningless to say that the flower in the sky has red petals.
(in some shape or other). Hence, the skandhas should not be regarded as the cause of T. A thing when not taken up by something else cannot be called upādāna (cause) of the latter; in the absence of such cause (upādāna), there can be nothing as producer (upādāty) out of that cause. As there is nothing without substantial cause (nirupādāna), there can be no Tathāgata.¹

The T., when examined in the five-fold way (i.e. identity, difference etc.), has been shown as neither existing by itself (svabhāvatah), nor with reference to the skandhas (= upādānas), (i.e. parabhāvatah). Moreover the skandhas themselves are non-existent, because they are dependently originated (pratītya-samutpannavāt).² Their existence also cannot be established indirectly (parabhāvatah), that is, by their relation to something else, e.g. the upādāty. The existence of upādāna is not possible without an agent (upādāty). Even if the existence of the agent (upādāty) be assumed, how can the reality of a thing be established by showing its relation to the agent (or originator) when the thing itself is non-existent which N. has shown in the chapter on skandhaparikṣā. Nāgārjuna thus concludes that there is neither upādāna nor upādāty.³

We need not follow Nāgārjuna any further, for he passes next to the abstruse conception of Sūnyatā, which is beyond our

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¹ This may be cleared by the following simile: Earth is normally the material cause of a jar. But unless a quantity of earth is taken up and converted into a jar, it cannot be called the cause of the jar. When earth remains unutilised, it is not the material cause of the jar; and the existence of the jar cannot be asserted. From this N.’s conclusion is that there is neither the material cause nor the jar.

² For detailed arguments see M. Vṛ., ch. IV.

³ M. Vṛ. pp. 440-1:
scope here. He is not satisfied with establishing his point that there is no Tathāgata the person—a fact accepted by the Hinayānists, he goes further and shows that there are no skandhas, the existence of which is admitted by the Hinayānists.

Both the Hinayānists and the Mahāyānists agree in holding that there is no persisting entity (pudgala) in a being apart from the skandhas, and any question about the existence of the Tathāgata after his passing away really raises the issue whether there is any persisting entity in a being, and whether that entity continues to exist after the being is thoroughly cleansed of his impurities and passes away for ever. To put it in another way, does the entity (pudgala) exist in Nirvāṇa eternally, or not? As both the Hinayānists and the Mahāyānists deny the existence of that entity—the personality of beings, both refuse to give any answer to the question whether there is Tathāgata (the person) after he has passed away, for a question like that cannot arise and hence any answer, if given, would be misleading, and so it is safer and better to leave it as avyākata or anirvācaniya.

1 It should be remembered that Nāgārjuna denies the existence of Tathāgata the person but not of Tathatā or Śānyatā, for an exposition of which see my Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism, pp. 214-5.

To the Hinayānists, Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins, Nirvāṇa exists but is devoid of any individuality. It is like the sea of one taste, one colour etc. and in which all rivers of different names, colours, tastes lose their individual characters.
CHAPTER VII

DOCTRINE OF ANATTĀ

Most of the doctrines discussed in the previous two chapters relate to the notions current among the imperfect Buddhists and the non-Buddhists about the nature of the soul and its existence. Buddhism wholly denies the existence of the soul which is permanent, immaculate, unaffected by karma, and in this denial (i.e. pudgalanairatmya) there is no difference of opinion between the Hinayānists and the Mahāyānists. The Pāli texts aver that the belief in the existence of the soul, or in other words, the heresy of individuality (sakkayaditthi) is due to the misapprehension of one of the five khandhas as soul in the following four ways:

1. Paṭisambhidāmagga (I, pp. 143-150) explains how this misapprehension happens. It says that a person, while meditating sometimes conceives of

(i) the object of meditation (e.g. paṭhavikasina, āpokasina, nilakasina, pitakasina) as identical with himself i.e., the object of meditation is he and he is the object of meditation. It is like identifying (advayam) the flame (of a burning lamp) with its colour (yā acci so vanno, yo vanno sā acci ti);

(ii) the khandhas as belonging to the self (attā rūpena rūpavā) just as some say that a tree and its shadow are two separate entities and that one belongs to the other (rūkkho imāya chāyāya chāyavā);

(iii) the khandhas as existing in the self (attani rūpam passati) just as one would say that flower and smell are separate and the smell is in the flower (ayam gandho imasmim papphe etc.);

(iv) the khandhas as the container of the self as a casket is of a jewel.
(i) attā is the same as rūpa, or vedanā, or saññā or sañkhārā, or viññāna (rūpaṃ etc. attato samanupassati)

(ii) attā is possessed of rūpa etc.¹ (rūpavantam etc. attānaṃ samanupassati)

(iii) in attā there is rūpa etc. (attani rūpaṃ etc. samanupassati)

(iv) attā is in rūpa etc. (rūpasmiṃ etc. attānaṃ samanupassati)²

It appears from the discourse in the Milinda pañha,³ that among the five khandhas, viññāna was more often identified with attā or āsā than the rest, but no such distinction is noticeable in the Nikāyas. As a consequence of the identification of attā with one of the components of a being, by the non-Buddhists, the texts aver that it can be classified like the beings into three types⁴ thus:

(1) attā of beings of the lower worlds, viz., from Avici to Paranimmita is gross (olārika).⁵

(2) attā of beings of the worlds from Paṭhamajhānabhūmi to Akanīṭṭhabrahmaloka is manomaya,⁶ i.e., material but very subtle like the mind, and

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¹ rūpa etc.=the five khandhas, viz. rūpa, vedanā, saññā, sañkhārā and viññāna.

² In the M. V., p. 432 and elsewhere it is shown that the misapprehension happens in five ways, the fifth being that the Attā is something different from the skandhas; the first four being the same as stated above.

³ Milinda pañha, p. 86.

⁴ Digba, I, p. 195: see also the commentary on Poṭṭhapādasutta.

⁵ Olārika=Rūpi cātummahābhūtiko kabaliṅkārāhāra-bhakkho.

⁶ Manomaya=Rūpi manomayo sabbāṅga-paccaṅgi ahīnindriyo.
(3) attā of beings of the worlds from Ākāsānañcāyatanabhramaloka to Nevasaṅgāsāṅgāyatanabhramaloka is arūpa\(^1\) (non-material).

According to the Buddhists, attā does not exist, it is only a word of common usage\(^2\) and does not correspond to any real entity, hence no question should arise as to its existence, not to speak of its identification with one of the khandhas.

The Milindapañha raises the question whether attā is something different from the khandhas and whether it is an active agent living within the body and acting through the organs of sense. This is refuted by Nāgasena by the argument that as its activity ceases when the organs of sense cease to work, so it cannot be said to have a separate and independent existence of its own.\(^3\)

The Pāli texts refuse to admit the existence of anything in a being besides the five khandhas. Life (jīva), according to them, is dependent on āyu (span of life), usmā (heat) and viññāna (vital principle) just as the sound of a conch-shell has no existence of its own, but is dependent on the blower, his exertion, and the wind blown into it.\(^4\)

In his works, Nāgārjuna also takes up the same position as indicated in the Pāli texts, and proceeds in his own way to show that ātman is not the same as one of the skandhas nor has it a separate and independent existence of its own apart from the skandhas. The stanzas on the point in the Madhyamakāvatāra\(^5\) run thus:—

1 Arūpa=Ārūpi saṅñāmayo.
3 Milindapañha, pp. 55, 86.
4 Dīgha, II, p. 338.
5 See M. Vr., p. 434.
The soul is not in the skandhas, nor are the skandhas in the soul; had they (soul and skandhas) been separate, then one holding the other could have been imagined; but as there is no separateness between the soul and the skandhas, the statement that one holds the other is pure imagination (i.e. false).

As the soul is not made of rūpa (matter), its existence cannot be admitted, and for the same reason, it cannot be said that the soul possesses attributes of its own (vattvārthopayoga). If the soul and rūpa be regarded as separate, then the relation between the soul and rūpa would be like the cowherd and his cows, and if they are regarded as not separate (abheda), the soul would be made of rūpa, hence neither identity (tattva) nor difference (anyata) of the soul and the skandhas can be established.

All the controversies about attā whether in the Pāli texts or in the works of Nāgārjuna rest on the fact that the constituents of a being, if analysed, cannot be shown to have

1 Rūpa here also is not form but matter. It is referring to the skandhas in general by a concrete instance. The translations given here are in the light of their Tibetan renderings. See Madhyamakāvatāra (Tibetan ed.), p. 265; M. Vr., p. 435 fn. 1.
2 See M. Vr., p. 439: tattva=ekatva.
anything called soul, apart from the five skandhas, which include, as they do, all the elements that compose a being.

_Two lines of argument_

The Buddhists therefore take to two lines of argument, viz., that the soul should either be _identical with_ one or more or all of the skandhas, or be wholly _different from_ the skandhas, the stock Pāli expression for this is _tam āvam tam sairam_ or _aṇṇam āvam aṇṇam sairam_. The Pāli texts assert without giving sufficient reasons, that both the above propositions are wrong (miccbādīthi), while Nāgārjuna has recourse to his usual line of reasoning, viz., _reductio ad absurdum_ to show that it is absurd to suppose a relation of identity or difference between the soul and the skandhas. We shall state here concisely Nāgārjuna’s arguments:

What is the Ātman—the basis of the sense of I-ness (Ko’yam) ātma nameti yo’haṅkaṇaraviṣayah)? It should be either the skandhas themselves (skandhasvabhāva) or something apart from the skandhas (skandhasavyatirikta). That is, the relation between the soul and the skandhas should be either one of identity (ekatva) or difference (anyatva). Both these positions according to Nāgārjuna, are untenable on the ground:

अत्मा स्कन्धा गति भवेदाव्यायवभागते।
स्कन्धेयोपस्मयि गति भवेदैवेदक्षणललच्छा॥

[If Ātman be the same as the skandhas, it would be subject to origin and destruction, again if it be different from the

In the case of anyatva again, the question of the relation of the container and the contained (ādbhāra ādbheya) arises, viz., whether Ātman is in the skandhas or the skandhas are in the Ātman. See ante, p. 84; also Mvyut., p. 208.
skandhas it would be without the characteristics appertaining to the skandhas (phun. po'i mtsban. 'nid med. par hgyur).]

Hence, it is not possible to establish any relation of identity or difference between the soul and the skandhas.

(i) Identification of the Soul with the Skandhas how faulty?

The following are some of the untenable positions that would arise by the identification of ātman with the skandhas:

(a) ātman, which had no existence before, comes into being, so it becomes an object constituted (kṛtaka) and hence impermanent, but ātman is regarded by the opponents as unconstituted (akṛtaka) and permanent;

(b) ātman requires a creator but a creator of ātman, apart from the ātmā itself, is not known. If the ātman be conceived as the creator of itself, then the contingency arises that the world has a beginning and that a being which did not exist before can appear, and so ātman becomes constituted (kṛtaka);

(c) ātman originates without any cause (sambhūto vāpya-betukah). If it be said that ātman had no existence before and there was no creator, and then if its present existence be admitted, it would be admitting origination of an object without cause, but this is not permissible;

(d) ātman has momentary origination and destruction like the skandhas or upādāna-skandhas, but that is not acceptable;

1 M. Vṛ., p. 340.
2 M. Vṛ., p. 581.
3 M. Vṛ., p. 581.
4 Further, at the moment just preceding Nirvāṇa, the destruction and origination of ātmā would take place according to the doctrine of momentary existence (ksanikavāda). If the agent has been destroyed, who is it that enjoys the fruit? The contingency that arises is that one acts and another enjoys the fruits.
(c) upādāna (the material cause) and upādātṛ (the agent) become one. Upādāna requires an agent in order that it may be given a shape. If the agent be the same as upādāna, then it would lead to the oneness (aikyam) of the agent and the thing produced by the agent, e.g. between the feller of the tree and the tree, the potter and the pot, the fire and the firewood; but this is not admissible;¹

(f) ātman is many like the skandhas;

(g) there is no contradistinction (vaiparītyam) between the characteristics of matter (dravya) and those of ātman;

(h) ātman is extinct (uccheda) in nirvāṇa.

Thus, it follows that it is futile to establish between the ātman and the skandhas a relation of identity (ekatva) or difference (anyatva), or to give ātman the attributes of permanency (nityatva) or impermanency (anityatva). To say that ātman is permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya) would make one either a Śāsvatavādin or an Ucchedavādin, both of which views are condemned in the Buddhist texts in unequivocal terms. Therefore, ātman should not be identified with the skandhas (upādāna-skandhas).

(ii) Distinguishing the Soul from the Skandhas how faulty?

Having asserted that ātman cannot be identified with the skandhas, Nāgārjuna takes up the counterproposition, viz., whether ātman is different from the skandhas (skandha-vyatiriktaḥ), and shows the absurdities to which this would again lead:

(a) If ātman be different from the skandhas, then it must not have the characteristics of the dependently originating

¹ M. Vr., p. 576.
skandhas, viz., origin, continuity and destruction (utpāda-sthitibhaṅga-lakṣaṇa). As these characteristics are absent in ātman, being different from the skandhas, and as it is said to be not dependently originated, therefore it must be admitted that it is non-existing like the sky-flower, for no definition can be offered of such ātman. It can only be pointed out as the basis of the sense of I-ness.

(b) Again each of the five skandhas possesses some characteristics of their own, e.g., rūpa possesses the characteristic of taking forms (rūpana),1 vedanā and sanjña that of ascertaining the cause of direct perception (anubhavanimittodgrahaṇa) and vijñāna of having detailed knowledge of objects. If ātman be distinguished from the skandhas as vijñāna is done from rūpa, then it should have some characteristics of its own, e.g., it would be something like mind (citā) as distinguished from matter (rūpa). If its special characteristics be denied, it is meaningless to say that it has existence as something different from the skandhas.

It may be contended that the non-Buddhists attribute to ātman some characteristics which are different from those of the skandhas, viz., that ātman is not an agent, but an enjoyer of fruits, attributeless and inactive; it is only when it takes something of the world (prakṛti) as support then only its distinctions are known.2

Nāgārjuna’s conclusion

Nāgārjuna is not prepared to accept the contention of the non-Buddhists that a perfectly pure ātman exists without the skandhas, on the ground that any analysis of the constituents of a being does not furnish us with any proof about its inde-

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1. M. Vṛ., p. 343 n; cf. rupanalakhanan rūpana; rūpa, the object and instrument of nirūpana.
2. M. Vṛ., p. 344.
pendent existence. It has, according to N., for its basis a mere notion, to which the non-Buddhists have attributed existence and qualities.

So he says that the characteristics, which the non-Buddhists, attribute to ātman, are not based on the actual conception of the form of ātman (na svarūpata ātmanamupalabhya). They do not understand the real basis of the notion of ātman; it is a mere term. Though they cannot establish anything, yet, out of fear, they recede from even the conventional truth and become entangled in pure conjectures, and being thus deluded, they conceive of an ātman and attribute to it some characteristics. Nāgārjuna then quotes a few verses giving his own idea of the ātman. He says: Just as on account of a mirror, an image, which is not real, is seen, so also on account of the skandhas, the notion of I-ness, which is unreal, arises.¹ As without a mirror, an image is not seen, so without the conglomeration of elements (skandhas), the notion of I-ness does not arise.²

The topic of anattā forms the subject-matter of Buddha’s second discourse to his five comrades (Vin. I, pp. 13-14) and constitutes the keynote of Buddhism. In this discourse, when Buddha denied the existence of attā, i.e., of any permanent substance apart from the khandhas, he cannot be expected to solve the ‘indeterminable’ (avyākata) problems, as all of them hinge on nature and existence of attā.

¹ The simile is: I=Image on a mirror; skandhas=mirror.
² M. Vr., p. 345:

These verses served to remove the avidyā of Ananda and made him an Arhat.
CHAPTER VIII

APPEARANCE OF BUDDHA

Far away from the din and bustle of the chief cities of Rājagṛha and Śrāvasti, Kausāmbi and Ujjeni appeared in a rather secluded place on the borders of Nepal (Himavantapasse, Dīgha, I, 92) amidst the hills at Kapilavastu¹ the lonely figure of Siddhārtha Gautama, the only son of the chieftain of the Śākya clan—a clan too proud of their birth and zealous about their purity of descent.² This gifted son of the Śākya in accordance

1 A place subject to the authority of the king of Kosala. See Jātaka, IV, 145; Mahāvastu, II, p. 199.

2 They are often criticised as marrying their own sisters for maintaining the purity of blood. See Jātaka, V, 413; Dīgha I, p. 92; Mahāvastu, I, p. 351; Beal, Romantic Legend of Śākya Buddha, p. 22. Mahāvastu, I, p. 348; Beal, op. cit., p. 23. Mahāvamsa, II, 16-24 gives the following lineage:

Mahāsammata
Several successors of Okkākavamsa (cf. Dīgha, I, 92).

Jayasena

Sihahanu (=Kaccānā) Yasodharā
Suddhodano and his 4 brothers (=Māyā and Pajāpatī) and two sisters
Māyā Pajāpati Daṇḍapāṇi Suppabuddha
Amitā & Pamitā (=Amitā)
Siddhārtha
Rāhula (=Bhaddakaccānā)

Devadahasakka of Devadaha

Anjana (=Yasodharā) Kaccānā

Māyā Pajāpati Daṇḍapāṇi Suppabuddha

Bhaddakaccānā Devadatta
with the traditional custom acquired the arts that behoved the sons of the nobility of the clans, and secured for him the due recognition as a prince of physical valour and prowess. He was given in marriage to the daughter of another chieftain of the same clan. He lived with her a few years of ease and luxury and had a son named Râhula. During the adolescence period of Siddhârtha, the Śâkyas, it seems, were passing through peaceful times, living on their own agricultural produce, the troubles having been encountered by them a few years later after the retirement of Siddhârtha. It is not unoften the case in India or elsewhere that all the luxuries of the world cannot bring peace of mind to a few, the giants among men, who feel an inward impulse to cast away to winds the things that give pleasure to the average mind and hanker after the unknown and the unknowable. Prince Siddhârtha was one of these few. He preferred to eschew his dear wife and newly born babe, his kingly pomp and power to embrace the lonely life of a recluse, living on fruits or the gifts of charitably disposed persons. Inspite of all the remonstrances and reasonings of his father’s messengers, he refused to return to home life. The tradition says that he took to this course when he was only twentynine, and for six years he roamed about, sitting at the feet of one teacher or another,

1 We have accounts of two of their feuds. One was with the Koliyas, for the right of drawing water from the river Rohinî. In this feud Buddha intervened and brought about an amicable settlement (Jâtaka, V, 413). The other was with Vidudabhâ, who practically exterminated the Śâkyas for giving the slave-girl Vâsabhâkhattiyâ, his mother, in marriage to his father king Pasenâdi of Kosala and for insulting him when he paid his first visit to Kapilavatthu (Jâtaka, IV, 145 f.).

2 For details, see Beal, op. cit., pp. 163-8.
and imbibing from them all that he could gather. It is said, that he left the palace at the dead of night, crossed the territories of the Śākyas, the Koliyas and the Mallas and reached the Anuvaineya town of the Maineyas at dawn.¹ He visited the hermitages of a Śākyan Brāhmaṇī, of a female ascetic Padmā also a Brāhmaṇī, of Brahmarsi Raivata, and of Rājaka, son of Daṭṭma a daṇḍika.² Then he reached the city of Vaiśāli, in the suburb of which was situated the hermitage of Arāda Kālīma (=Pāli Arāḍa Kāḷīma). He joined the band of disciples whose number was three hundred at the time and within a short time, by the application of his strong will (chanda), energy (vīrya), self-recollectedness (smṛti), meditation (samādhi) and intellection (prajñā), he attained the ākiṁcanyāyatana stage, which, in the Buddhist books, is placed in the Arūpaloka and counted as the last but one (i.e. seventh) samāpatti leading to Nirvāṇa.³ In this stage also he was unable to visualize the Truth—the Reality, the end of misery. He then left Vaiśāli, came to Rājagṛha and stopped all alone at the Pāṇḍava hill. On the following morning donning on his yellow robe and taking his bowl, he entered Rājagṛha by the Tapoda gate for begging alms. Here at his residence on the Pāṇḍava hill, he was met by his old friend king Bimbisāra, who in age was senior to Gautama by five years.⁴ Politely rejecting the offer of Bimbisāra of sharing his kingdom with him, the

¹ Mahāvastu, II, p. 195 f. mentions only the hermitage of Vaiśīṣṭha; Lalita Vistara, p. 225: बीशिस्तत्क्षिप्त भाकानितक्षिप्त बीशानितक्षिप्त ग्राजानिधियामनुयावे निगम यत्सु योजने तत्र बीशिस्तत्क्षिप्त राजयमानोपयोगः।

² Lalita Vistara, p. 238.

³ Lal. Vis., pp. 238-9; according to Arāḍa, physical and mental discipline lead to ākiṁcanyāyatana stage which is identical with Nirvāṇa. See Beal, op. cit., p. 172.

⁴ Beal, op. cit., p. 177 f.; Mahāvamsa, II, 26.
ascetic Gautama paid a visit to the Rudraka Rāmaputra’s hermitage in the outskirts of Rājagrha. On enquiry he learnt that Rudraka could rise to the eighth samāpatti, Naivasamjñānāsamsām-jñāyatana, the one higher than that reached by Arāda Kālāma, but it was still an attainment confined to the constituted world (arūpa) and not transcendental (lokottara) leading to peace and rest, the end of misery, the ultimate Nirvāṇa. Impressed by his extraordinary ability in attaining the Naivasamjñānāsamsām-jñāyatana stage within a comparatively short time and little exertion, five Brāhmaṇa followers of Rudraka preferred to follow Gautama. With them he went to Gayā and stopped at the Gayāśirṣa hill. While dwelling here it struck him that as with two pieces of wet wood one cannot produce fire however briskly he may rub them, so also with mind saturated with kāma (desires) one cannot realize the highest truth however severe he may be in self-mortifications.

On self-examination he found that his mind was free from kāma. He then proceeded to Uruvilva-Senāpatigrāma, and was much pleased at the sight of the river Nairāṇjana with water reaching the edge of the banks covered by shrubs and trees and used as a pasture for the cattle. He observed that he was born at a time when the five kinds of wrong views (pañcakaṣaya) were prevalent. The people of his time were obsessed with the notion of

1 Lal. Vis., p. 243.
2 Lal. Vis., p. 244. संज्ञानी साधने सोबाधानानि अनंतामाधिसंगा पतीनां दीयः.
3 In the Lalita Vistara (pp. 248 ff.) a full account is given of his rigorous ascetic practices, cf. Majjhima Nikāya, pp. 77 ff. The comparison will also show the relation between the Pāli and Sanskrit versions of the Tripitaka.
4 Cf. Beal, op. cit., p. 185.
5 Lal. Vis., p. 248. See Aspects, p. 70: “Sākyamuni came into existence when one of the five Kaśāyas (Kalpakaṣaya, sattvak; kleśak,
the existence of soul, believed in the attainment of purity by means of physical tortures, restriction of food, utterance of mantras, or salutation of the gods and other sacred objects, and sought for heaven in the next life by ritualistic practices, and so forth. With a view to convince the world that the severest ascetic practices were of no avail, he for six years went through all the unthinkable physical tortures known as *duskaracaryās*\(^1\) of the Bodhisattva. He then decided to take food and make his body strong in order to be able to practise the dhyānas, of which he had already a foretaste while he was only a boy,\(^2\) and which he believed would lead him to Nirvāṇa. For changing his method, he was deserted by his five Brāhmaṇa followers who went away to Benares to continue their rigorous ascetic practices. He accepted the food offered by Sujātā and took his seat under the Bodhi tree to try his own method. He entered into the dhyānas one by one, rising to the fourth\(^3\) when he acquired the six supernatural powers,\(^4\) the knowledge of the destruction of his impurities (*āsravakṣayajñāna*), of the causal chain leading to birth and misery in this world,\(^5\) and of the four *āryasatya*.\(^6\) By a momentary *dṛṣṭik., āyuṣ.\) or the sixty-two wrong views like *nityam astīti nāstīti tathāstī nāstī prevailed."

3 *Ibid.*, p. 343. For the four dhyānas, see infra.
4 *Ibid.*, pp. 344-5. For the abhijñās, see infra.
6 See *Aspects*, p. 266. The four āryasatyas are expanded thus in the *Lal. Vis.*, pp. 348-9:

(i) भाष्र: भाषरमुद्रय:, भाषरमिरीक:, भाषरमिरोधागमिणी प्रतिपद [ भाष्र = का्म, भव, भवित, हि्ष्]
flash of the light of knowledge (ekacittakṣaṇasamāyuktayā), he realised the Bodhi. The thirst for worldly objects, wrong views, impurities, hindrances, self-conceit were all dispelled in him and he now fully realised the sameness of all things (dharma mathatā), the limit of existences (bhūtakoti), the universe (dharma dhatu) as also its beings, some of which proceeding along the right path (samyaktvaniyata), some along the wrong (mithyātvaniyata) and some still wavering between right and wrong (aniyata). Being established in the Tathāgatagarbha—the seat of all Tathāgatas, he opened the gates to the haven of Nirvāṇa, the city of Sarvajñatā (omniscience) for all those who were still in fetters of ignorance and impurities. He became a lotus grown in the tank of knowledge, unaffected by the eight lokadharma. He was filled with compassion which helped the rapid growth of the seeds of kuśalamūlas, the sprouts of śraddhā (faith) and lastly he became the distributor of the fruits of vimukti (emancipation).

(ii) चवित्वा, चवित्वासमुदयः, चवित्वाभिशियोऽपि, चवित्वामामिनो प्रविष्टत्
(iii) संक्षेपः, संक्षेपसमुदयः, संक्षेपरापितोऽपि, संक्षेपारिशियोऽपि
and so on with the other items of the formula of the law of causation, and lastly
(iv) मर्मः, मर्मसमुदयः, मर्मनिरीक्षः, मर्मनिरोपशामिनी प्रविष्टत॥

From the above, it is evident that the āryasatyas indicate the four aspects of a thing, viz., the thing, its origin, its decay and the way to its decay, i.e., व:खः, व:खसमुदयः, व:खनिरीक्षः, व:खनिरोपशामिनी प्रविष्टत॥
1 Cf. Asia Major, II.
2 & 3 These are terms common in Mahāyānaism and rarely found in Hinayāna texts.
5 The eight are labho alabho yaso ayaso pasamsā ninda sukham-dukkham.
After achieving his object, for seven days he entered into the Priyāhāravyūha-samādhi, enjoying the bliss of Nirvāṇa. In the second week he walked to and fro, cogitating over all the worlds (trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhatu), in the third, he fixed his gaze on the Bodhi tree, thinking all the while that he had put an end to the beginningless birth, old age and death, and in the fourth he walked again to and fro, this time his object of thought being the area between the eastern and the western ocean, the fifth week, a week of great cold and wind, he spent in the palace of Mucilinda Nāga, the sixth at the foot of Nyagrodha tree of Ajāpāla, and the seventh at the foot of Tārayāna tree, when he came across the two traders of Uttarāpatha, Trapusa and Bhallika and made them his first lay disciples.

1 Lal. Vis., p. 370.  2 Ibid., p. 377.
3 In the Mahāvastu, (III, pp. 303, 310, 313) it is stated that they were travelling with a caravan along the trade-route from Dakṣināpatha to Ukkala a town of Uttarāpatha in the kingdom of Gandhāra.


Their conversion at Uruvela was later on commemorated by the erection of stūpas in their native villages in Gandhāra.

There has been a great difference of opinion with regard to the identification of Ukkala and the birth-place of Trapusa and Bhallika. Though the phonetic similarity between Utakal (Orissa) and Ukkala is very great and the identification of Ukkala with Orissa is alluring, yet in view of the evidence supplied by the Mahāvastu and the Lalitavistara and by Yuan Chwang, Ukkala should be identified with a place in Gandhāra. Yuan Chwang (Watters, I, pp. 111-113) noticed the remains of two of the stūpas mentioned above in the course of his journey from Balkh to Bamiyan.

He was now deliberating within himself whether it would be proper for him to preach a doctrine which was so deep and subtle, inexpressible, unconstituted, signless and tranquil, beyond the range of the organs of sense, or of words and discussions, unsuited for giving or taking or communicating, and realisable only by the wise within himself, and whether it would not be on his part a sheer waste of energy to attempt to preach such a doctrine to the uninitiated.¹ In the Pāli and some of the Sanskrit texts² attempt has been made to explain this unwillingness to preach the doctrine on the part of Buddha as due to the want of suitable men able to comprehend his teaching, and that it was only when Brahmā pointed out there were some whose eyes of knowledge were covered by slight impurities, that Buddha changed his mind and decided to preach the new Truth. This explanation seems to us to be more or less gratuitous, for it is not probable that Buddha who became a sarvajña (omniscient) could have required Brahmā’s intervention for ascertaining that there were some suitable hearers. The plausible explanation is that the truth visualised by Buddha is beyond concept (avyākṛta), and as such it could not be imparted to others through words. It is for this reason that we read often in the Pāli books that Buddha advised people to follow the path chalked out by him leading to Nirvāṇa and not to ask him for an exposition of the truth which is avyākṛta.³ Lastly, when he decided to preach the doctrine, he determined that he would speak about the Path only and not about what is Nirvāṇa or the highest Truth. For explaining his Path too, he sought

1 Lal. Vis., pp. 380-1.
2 See Aspects, pp. 70-1.
3 Cf. Majjhima, I, p. 431: Na h‘etam Māluṅkyaputta atthasamhi-taṃ n‘ādibrahmacariyikam, na nibbidāya.....na nibbānaya samvattati, tasmā taṃ mayā ahyākatam. Kiṁ ca Māluṅkyaputta mayā byākatam: Idam dukkham ti, etc.
for people who were of samyaktvaniyatārāsi i.e. who were possessed of such merits as would lead them to the realisation of the Truth. Scanning the world for such persons, he found out that of the persons who could quickly comprehend his truth, his two teachers, Āraṇḍa and Rudraka, were dead, and his five companions of asceticism were then dwelling at Rṣipatana-mrgadāya on the outskirts of Benares. For imparting his teaching to his quondam companions he started for Benares, meeting on his way the Āśīvaka ascetic, Upaka. He stopped at Gayā in the house of Sudarśana Nāgarāja, and then crossing Rohitavastu, Uruvilva, Anāla, Sārathipura, reached the banks of the Ganges. On the refusal of the ferryman to take him across the river without tarpanya (ferry-hire), he flew over it and reached the other shore, and arrived at Benares. He approached the five ascetics, who, inspite of their plan not to show him any respect, yielded to his sublime look and ultimately listened to his discourses. He delivered his first discourse known as Dhammacakra, in which he referred to the two extreme practices, followed hitherto, viz., the

1 Lal. Vis., p. 400, also p. 351; Kośa, ch. VI; cf. Asia Major (Vasumitra's Treatise), II, pp. 27, 40, 45, 50. This relates to the various gotras, see Aspects, etc. pp. 84-87.

2 Mod. Sarnāth.

3 Lal. Vis., p. 406. In the Mahāvastu (III, pp. 324-329), the tradition is as follows: Leaving Uruvilva, he passed through Gayā, Aparagayā and reached Vāsālā where he was invited to a meal by a bhumiṇa Brāhmaṇa to whom he pointed out as to what makes a true Brāhmaṇa and tried to convert him to Buddhism. Thence he passed through Cundadvilām and Sārathipura, crossed the Ganges and reached Benares.

4 Lal. Vis., p. 407. It is recorded here that Bimbisāra, on hearing of this event, exempted all recluses from the payment of ferry-hire. See also Beal, op. cit., p. 247.
life of ease and that of extreme asceticism, the former probably referring to the life led by Brähmanas and Kṣatriyas who lived in towns and villages and performed elaborate sacrifices, and the latter to that of the ascetics living in the forests and given to severe self-mortifications.¹ He then explained the four Āryasatyas, or the four-fold method of examination of the things of the world,² by means of which, he said he was able to comprehend the causal genesis of things, consisting of three sections and twelve terms.³ It was this causal genesis that convinced him of the impermanent nature of things, and of the non-existence of a doer or a feeler, in other words, the non-existence of a self (ātma = pudgala) or of a transmigrator (saṅkramaka),⁴ and of action, good or bad. He found out that trṣṇā (desire) was the root of sufferings, and aṣṭāṅgikamārga the means to their cessation. He traced the origin of avidyā to careless mental constructions (saṅkalpa-janitena ayonisena bhavate avidyā). Further, he was convinced that skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus do not make a Buddha and that avidyā owes its origin to mental constructions vikalpa) on the cessation of which it disappears and along with it all forms of existence. As he had found out this without the help of a teacher he was a Svayambhū (self-awakened). On hearing this discourse, Ājñātakauṇḍinya, spiritually the most advanced of the five, realised that everything

¹ For a picture of which, see Mahābhārata, I, pp. 77 ff.
² Sec. for details, my Aspects, etc., p. 206.
³ Lal. Vis., p. 418: स एवं चतुर्दशस्यमेव शोभितोमनस्मिकल्पति एवं निर्मितवं शास्त्रकार शास्त्रधस्मस्यप्रवृत्तिस्य. cf. Vinaya, I, p. 11 in which the words yoniso manasi kurvato have been dropped, making the idea a bit hazy (imesu catuṣu ariyasaccësu evam tiparivattam dvādaśākāram etc.).
⁴ Lal. Vis., p. 420.
including the three *ratnas*, Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha or the Brahmaloka were mere relative words, and had no existence in reality.¹

In the *Vinaya Piṭaka* (I, pp. 13-14),² this discourse is followed by another known as the *Anattasutta*, in which each of the five *skandhas* has been pointed out as devoid of a self (*anattā*) and as such they are not subject to the will of the self. Further, they are also impermanent (*anicca*) and as such they are sources of grief (*dukkha*). The conclusion drawn from this discourse is that everything is devoid of self (*pudgalasūnyā*) and one who knows this is said to attain Nirvāṇa.

In the *Lalitavistara*, the *skandhas* are spoken of as devoid of self incidentally, but there is no separate discourse on it as is found in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. In the *Lalitavistara*, however, there is an additional section dealing with the Mahāyānic interpretation of the *Dharmacakra*. It is introduced by Maitreya Bodhisattva⁴ to whom the *Dharmacakra* is explained as the teaching which establishes the oneness of all objects and the absence of any concept, positive or negative, as well as the absence of the origin of so-called things of the world.

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¹ In the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, I, pp. 11-12, Kondaṇṇa is said to have been the first to obtain the *dbhāmsaṇkhīn*.
² See also *Samyutta*, III, p. 66: *Mahāvastu*, III, pp. 337 ff.
⁴ In the *Abhinīśkramana-sūtra* (Beal, *op. cit.*, pp. 258-386) the life-story is continued further, and includes the following topics:—Conversion of Yaśa and his friends, Buddha's visit to Śrāvasti, stories of the conversion of Pūrṇa Maitrīyaṇiputra, Mahākātūyana of Avanti, Sobhiya of Takṣaśilā, the three Kassapas, Bimbisāra, Mahākāśyapa, Mahāprajāpati, Bhadrakā, Sāriputra and M菩提alaputra, Udāyi, Upāli, Rāhula, Nanda, Ānanda and other Śākyan youths. All these topics are given also in the *Mahāvastu* but in a scattered form.
CHAPTER IX
CAUSES OF THE SPREAD OF BUDDHISM

Before we take up the study of the history of the spread of Buddhism during the first two centuries of its existence, it is worth while to make an analysis of the probable causes and circumstances that led to the propagation of Buddhism inspite of the deep-rooted existence of Brāhmanism and the brisk activities of the non-brāhmanic teachers:

(i) Time of the advent of Buddhism

The rise of Buddhism took place at an opportune time when not only India with her brāhmanic and non-brāhmanic teachers but also Greece, Persia and China were experiencing a stir in religious matters through the advent of Socrates with his distinguished pupils and contemporary philosophers in Greece, of Zoroaster in Persia, and of Lao-tse and Confucius in China. In India the elaboration of the brāhmanic sacrifices accompanied with the killing of hundreds of victims had grown into a highly complex system of ritualism, and there also appeared the brāhmanic thinkers who began to question whether, after all, the offerings to the gods, with their laborious construction of altars and collection of numberless requisites, recitations of mantras, chanting of hymns, expiation of errors in the rituals, really achieved the objects for which they were performed? The sacrifices, if rightly performed, were believed as able to secure for the performers not only wealth, health, long life and strength, the good will and grace of the gods in this world, and happiness
in the next, but also final beatitude or emancipation. But there were the dubious who began to question within themselves whether there was not the chance of this belief being wrongly based. Side by side with the elaborate rituals performed by the householders, for celebrating the sacrifices there were provisions for shortened forms of them, as also of mere cogitation of the Supreme, unaccompanied with any rituals, e.g., for the Vānaprasthas and the Yatis. If these latter were right in the pursuit of the course prescribed for them, could not a similar course suited to the masses, but devoid of, or accompanied only, with very simple rituals, be prescribed for the house-holders? Similar views, more or less developed and opposed to the karmakānda of the Brāhmaṇas and specially to the cruel slaying of animals in the sacrifices, were already in the air before Buddha arose to preach his doctrines.1 Brāhmanism allowed various shades of philosophic and religious views to grow up within its fold without taking objection to their existence within its limits. But the key to the reception of this toleration lay in the fact that the dissentient view, side by side with its opposition to one or more of the brāhmanic doctrines, showed its allegiance to one or more of the ultimate fundamental tenets of brāhmanism such as the admission of sanctity of the Vedas, belief in their being revealed books, worship of any of the brāhmanic gods as such, recognition of the Varnāśramas and submission to the authority of the brāhmaṇas. But there was a limit to the degree to which the heresy of its views could be carried by a brāhmanic sect as such. This limit was crossed by Buddha, who stood up as a rock to stop the flow of the religion in order to direct the faiths of the people along the channels of his own.

1 See ante, p. 13; Barua, Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, p. 193-4.
He preached that religious truths lay not in the sacrifices, not in the Vedic works which prescribed these sacrifices, not in the worship of the many deities of brāhmanic pantheon, not in the observance of the caste-rules, not in the magical practices of the Atharva Veda, not in the extreme forms of self-mortifications, and not, in short, in the many other pet beliefs and practices (the silabbataparāmāsa)¹ that came as corollaries to an allegiance to the bases of brāhmanic faiths, but in self-culture 'culminating in arhatship' which constitutes the key-stone of Buddhism.²

(ii) Character and Personality of the Founder and his Disciples

The commanding personality of Buddha, his self-sacrifice, the strength of his character, his spiritual attainments, his super-sensual vision, and the occasional manifestations of miraculous powers served in a great degree to convince the people of the greatness of his religion and made them attach importance to it. Prof. Keith would attribute the vast success of Buddhism not so much to the merits of the religion as to the personality of the founder. He says that "the founder of Buddhism must rank as

¹ One of the fundamental conditions for becoming a sotāpanna is to give up the belief in the efficacy of rituals, the other two being the eschewing of sakkāyadiṭṭhi (the heresy of individuality) and vicikicchā (doubt as opposed to firm faith in Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha).

² Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures, p. 29. "For the first time in the history of the world, it proclaimed a salvation which each man could gain for himself in this world, during this life, without any the least reference to the God, or to gods, either great or small."
one of the most commanding personalities ever produced by the eastern world."

In view of the predominance of the Kṣatriyas in the eastern lands by virtue of wealth and acquisition of learning which made them powerful enough to carry on reactionary movements as against the existing conditions of things as settled or desired by the Brāhmaṇas, it is probable that the Kṣatriya origin of Śākya Simha brought strength to his religious propaganda by virtue of this mere affinity of origin between him and the Kṣatriyas of the place. To assert that this element was altogether absent in the forces which made them cluster under his religious flag would be perhaps going too far. But it should always be borne in mind that the innate strength and attraction of Buddha’s personality and the doctrines preached by him were so great that it put into shade the force of this element.

The character and personality of Buddha’s immediate disciples such as Yaśa, Uruvela-Kassapa, Sāriputta, Moggallāna, Mahākassapa, Mahākaccāyana, Punnā Mantāniputta, Ānanda were equally powerful forces for the propagation of religion. Their excellences are mentioned sometimes by Buddha himself and sometimes by their brother monks. Sāriputta is described as excelling all in wisdom, self-control, and virtue, well-composed in his inner self, dwelling in the highest planes of thought, expert in the knowledge of doctrines and possessing capacity for preaching persuasively. Moggallāna was valiant, self-controlled and possessed of super-normal powers and

1 Keith’s Buddhist Philosophy, p. 147.
able to raise the disciples to the highest stages of moral and spiritual progress;¹ Māhākassapa was the foremost ascetic, self-sacrificing and loving to dwell remote from men; Māhākaccāyana was a great exppositor of dhamma² while Puṇṇa Mantāniputta was an appealing preacher; Ānanda was the foremost of bhikkhus in erudition, morally watchful, steadfast, versed in the sacred lore, and eloquent.³ The qualities mentioned were present in more than ordinary degree in the character of the monks, besides the qualities requisite for a monk. The monks were all at one in their zeal for the propagation of the religion, in the strength of which they had unswerving belief. The earnestness with which the first generation of Buddha’s disciples performed their duties can be best described by comparing it to the zeal with which the Christian apostles did their share of work by practising and spreading the doctrines promulgated by Christ.

The Buddhist leaders in the generation following the immediate disciples of Buddha included likewise prominent characters who might well take their place by the side of his immediate disciples. The names of monks who took a prominent part in the deliberations of the church organization and maintained discipline, moral or otherwise, are many, but the biographical details of only a few of them are found in the Buddhist literature. Among these may be mentioned Sīggaṇa whose perseverance in the cause of the conversion of non-Buddhists to Buddhism is found in the description where he is said to have daily visited, with ultimate success, the house of a Brāhmaṇa Moggali to pursuade his son with teachings and arguments to embrace the

² *Psalms of the Brethren*, pp. 386, 387.
religion;¹ Sambhuta Sānavāsika whose zeal in the maintenance of the orthodox system carried him inspite of his old age to Vesali to suppress the heresies of the Vajjian monks. Revata was vastly learned and free from āsava while Yasa was highly energetic in the work of consolidating the Buddhist doctrines for which the second council was convened, and also in eliminating the evils that the Vajjians were trying to introduce into the church organization by modifying its rules;² Udenna was able to convert Ghoṭamukha Brāhmaṇa after the death of Buddha and have an upaṭṭhānasālā built at Pātaliputra by him;³ Moggaliputta (or Upagupta according to the Sanskrit tradition) was highly intelligent and by the charm of his character and personality could make Aśoka accept him as his spiritual preceptor and help the Buddhist organization by building monasteries and stūpas in several places and give donations for the maintenance of the monks and the spread of Buddhism.

(ii) Patronage of Kings and Clans

It is an undeniable fact that no religion can prosper however excellent may be its teachings without the support of the ruling powers and nobility of the time. Christianity would not have been what it is now without the intervention of emperors like Constantine.

In the 5th century B.C. there was no paramount sovereignty in Northern India. It was divided into a large number of independent states. Of these, the four monarchies of Magadha, Kosala, Vatsa, and Avanti rose into importance and fought with

¹ Cf. Mahāvamsa, ch. V., pp. 41-3: A similar story occurs in the Milinda pañha (p. 8 ff.) regarding the conversion of Nāgasena.
² Mahāvamsa, ch. IV.
³ Majjh. Nik., II, p. 163.
one another for the conquest of places in the possession of the smaller states. The number of preachers of various religions, working in all these domains, was large, and the more prominent among them vied with one another for gaining the support of one or other of the several kings. There are passages in the Buddhist scriptures hinting that Buddha was anxious to enlist the sympathy and patronage of kings, clans, and noblemen in support of his religion. The story of the conversion of Malla Roja, a nobleman, shows explicitly the anxiety felt by Buddha on this score. When Buddha was entering the city of the Mallas, Malla Roja went to welcome him, not out of reverence but for avoiding the liability of paying a fine laid down by the Mallas for those who refused to welcome Buddha. When he came near Buddha, he spoke out to Ānanda his real feeling at which the latter became sorrowful and requested Buddha to work upon the mind of Malla Roja in such a way as to make him one of his ardent adherents, because he was a distinguished nobleman whose influence and example would go a great way towards making Buddhism popular in the locality. Buddha agreed and overcame the indifferent attitude of Malla Roja by exercising the feeling of love (mettā), whereby he was won over to the doctrine.¹ Though we do not come across any express passage showing that Buddha is acting with a similar motive in connection with any of the royal personages, there are several indications in the Vinaya Pitaka that Buddha wanted to comply with the wishes of the rulers and noblemen as far as his doctrinal principles permitted. His direction to his disciples to fix the day of commencement of the vassāvāsa in compliance with the wishes of Bimbisāra on a particular occasion points to the same inference.²

¹ Vinaya, Mahāvagga, VI. 36, 1-4. ² Ibid., III, 4.
The first king met by Buddha after his enlightenment was Bimbisāra who accorded him a very warm welcome, placed at Buddha's disposal his pleasure-garden and asked the headmen of the villages in his domain to listen to Buddha's discourses. It was most probably for Bimbisāra that Buddha gained a very wide popularity in Magadha. The king was bent so much upon the welfare of the saṅgha that he issued the decree that none must do any harm to the Sākyaputtīya Samanās and on many occasions he advised Buddha to frame rules for the welfare of the saṅgha. Some of these rules are, for example, not to give ordination to those who were in royal service, as the kings who were not in favour of the faith might harass the saṅgha on that ground; to hold religious assemblies on the 8th, 14th and 15th day of each month like the other religious orders for the benefit of the upāsakas.

Pāsaṇādi of Kosala was also a great benefactor of the saṅgha, but he does not seem to have given his unqualified support like Bimbisāra. Though he supported many Brāhmaṇa teachers, yet his attention to the welfare of Buddha and his saṅgha was not less than that shown to those teachers. His anxiety to make a suitable gift to Ānanda, his joy at the conversion of the robber Āṅgulimāla who was given immunity for his past misdeeds and was promised a supply of the requisites for a monk; his earnest desire to marry a Sākyya princess and his ultimate marriage with Vāsabhakhattiyā to regain the confidence of the monks lost through inattentions to them; his expression of pride at the fact that he was of the same age with Buddha and

1 Mahāvastu, III, p. 449.
2 Vinaya, I, 42, 1.
3 Ibid., I, 40, 4.
4 Ibid., II, 1-4.
7 Burlingame's Buddhist Legends, I, p. 91.
belonged to the same caste and province with him⁠¹ amply show his love for the religion and his desire to be counted as one of its well-wishers and supporters. In the Nikāyas it is stated that he became a lay-devotee and an ardent admirer of Buddha.⁠² The bas-relief depicting him as proceeding to meet Buddha shows that he was respected by the Buddhists of the 2nd or 3rd century B.C. as a patron of the religion.

It is doubtful how far Buddha was successful in winning over the other two kings, Pajjota of Avanti and Udēna of Kosambī. The references to these kings in the Buddhist scriptures are few and far between. It is said that king Pajjota once sent Mahākaccāyana to welcome Buddha to his dominion, but Buddha, thinking his purpose would be better served by Mahākaccāyana himself preaching the doctrine, did not accede to the king’s request. The king was satisfied with Mahākaccāyana’s exposition of the Law and became an ardent follower of the religion.³ The Samyutta Nikāya⁴ and the Tibetan translation of the Vinaya⁵ state that king Udēna of Kosambī became a convert to Buddhism. The Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā gives in detail the occasion of king Udēna’s conversion. He was much impressed by the piety of one of his queens Sāmāvati who had been an upāsikā of Buddha and at whose request the king became a convert to the religion and made generous gifts.⁶ Evidence is not strong that these two kings actively aided the spread of Buddhism but yet it is a great gain that they did not actively

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1 Majjhima, II, p. 124.
2 Sam. Nik., I, p. 70; Aṅg. Nik., V, pp. 65 ff. see also Diyyavādana, p. 154.
5 Rockhill’s Life of the Buddha, p. 74.
6 Burlingame’s Buddhist Legends, I, p. 84.
oppose its propagation. The mere tolerance of the activities of the Buddhist preachers within their kingdoms should be taken as a favourable circumstance in the spread of the religion.

Buddha was successful in making a large number of converts from among the nobles, ministers, bankers and wealthy citizens. That the enlistment of the supports of Anāthapinḍika, Visākhā, Sīha, Abhayarājakumāra, Jīvaka, Yasa, Ambapālī, Nandaka, etc., furthered the cause of Buddhism to a very great extent needs hardly any comment.

Last but not the least was the support obtained by Buddha from the various clans of the period. Inspite of the fact that Mahāvira had already been in the field and obtained a footing among the clans, Buddha was fairly successful in his missionary activities.

It was not difficult for Buddha to win over the Sākyas because he himself belonged to the clan. Anuruddha, Kimbila, Bhagu, Ānanda, Devadatta, Nanda, Upāli and many other Sākyas joined the order at Buddha’s request. Under the leadership of Mahāpajapati Gotamī,1 many Sākyan ladies also followed the example of the Sākyan youths and joined the order leading to the growth of the order of nuns.

Next to the Sākyas, the Licchavis and the Mallas came under the influence of Buddha, who paid three visits to Vesāli, the city of the Licchavis, and by his preachings brought home to them the charm of Buddhism. He converted many distinguished members of the clan and obtained from them gifts of cetiyas.2 His work among the Mallas was also successful. It was perhaps as a token of favour to the faithful Mallas that Buddha selected Kusināra, an upavana within their country, as a suitable place for his mahanipātibhāna.3

2 Diṭṭha, II, p. 102.
3 Ibid., II, p. 169.
Buddha’s missionary activity among the Bhaggas and the Koliyas was not so successful as among the previously stated clans. Buddha visited three migamas of the Koliyas, and Ananda one, but there is a remarkable paucity in the number of the converts mentioned as hailing from those places. Still less successful was Buddha’s religious mission to the Bhaggas. The only place that was visited by Buddha was the Bhesakalavana deer-park near Sumsamāragiri and the persons won over were Nakula’s parents and Bodhirājakumāra.

We do not hear of other clans coming under the influence of Buddhism except in the statement of the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta that the Bulis of Allakappa and the Moriyas of Pipphalivana along with the clans already mentioned claimed Buddha’s relics for erecting stūpas in their respective countries.

Thus we see that Buddhism owed much of its expansion to Buddha’s ability in securing sympathy and patronage of kings, nobles, and clans, who in many cases had already been supporting other religions. Though later in the field, Buddhism could supplant at times the other religions, ultimately monopolising the sympathy and support of some of the magnates.

(iii) Services of Female Devotees

The part played by women in the spread of Buddhism cannot be ignored or brushed aside as of little importance. On many occasions it was through their influence that whole families were converted to Buddhism. Visakha and Ambapali, for instance, rendered signal services to the saṅgha by their munificent gifts and the former’s work was more valuable because she be-

1 Kakkarapaṭṭam, Haliddavāsanaṃ, Uttaram, and Sāpugam.
came the means of conversion of all the members of her father-in-law's family from Jainism to Buddhism. Anāthapindika's daughter made it possible through her exertions to establish a centre of Buddhism in Anāga through the conversion of the whole of her father-in-law's family.\(^1\) The conversion of king Udēna was effected through one of her queens named Sāmāvati.\(^2\) It was with the help of the Brāhmaṇa girls of Sākya family married at Bhadramukha that Buddha could convert Meṇḍaka gahapati.\(^3\) Instances like this can be multiplied to show that ladies helped a good deal in the propagation of Buddhism.

The formation of the order of nuns was highly appreciated by the womenfolk generally, while at the same time it furthered the cause of Buddhism to a great extent. Not only did it afford relief to many a woman in her knowing miseries but it also recognised the dignified position in which the women had claim to be placed along with the men through the implication that they were as much eligible to the making of efforts for spiritual emancipation as the males. Those of the nuns who could enter into the mysteries of the religion naturally felt an inclination to initiate others into the same mysteries and offer them a permanent solace in their lives. They like the bhikkhus visited the householders and through their easy access to the ladies of the houses had greater opportunities of working upon their impressionable minds and enlisting them either as lay-devotees or nuns. Conversions of this nature were frequent and there are examples in the Therigāthā of women becoming nuns through the exertions of the advanced bhikkunīs. The bhikkunīs thus carried

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2 Burlingame's *Buddhist Legends*, I, p. 84.
3 *Divyāvadāna*, p. 128.
the light of the new religion from house to house and helped the spread of Buddhism far and wide.

(iv) Proselytizing

Conversion by the evangelistical method marks out Buddhism as making a radical departure from the traditionary lines on which the Indian religions brought new adherents into their fold. The ways in which brāhmanism extended the boundaries of its domain are peculiar to itself. Its method of enlisting new recruits are in consonance with the caste-system, its spirit of exclusiveness specially in religious matters and its power of slowly adapting itself to the change effected by forces from within or without. The process followed by it consisted in absorbing the new recruits into the brāhmanic society by attracting them slowly and imperceptibly to adopt more or less the social customs and practices approved by the Brāhmaṇas and thus occupy a place within an existing caste or sub-caste, or form a new sub-caste, as the case may be. The alteration of the religious views is left to follow the social absorption that gradually sets in. The radical departure made by the Buddhists from the traditional method was responsible for the rapid way in which Buddhism spread not only in India but also in the countries outside. The very first resolution made by Buddha after the attainment of the sumnum bonum was to become a religious preacher and save mankind from worldly cares and miseries. He went to Sarnath to convert the five Brāhmaṇas, after whom he 'made many more converts. He formed them into a band of missionaries, of whom he was the leader. In the Vinaya we find Buddha speaking thus to his followers who then numbered only sixtyone: “Go, ye now, O Bhikkhus, and wander, for the gain of the many, for the welfare of the many, out of compassion for the world. Let not two of you go the
same way. Preach the doctrine which is glorious in the beginning, middle, and end, in the spirit and in the letter; proclaim a consummate, perfect, and pure life of holiness. There are beings whose mental eyes are covered by scarcely any dust, but if the doctrine is not preached to them, they cannot attain salvation. They will understand the doctrine. And I will go also, O Bhikkhus, to Uruvela-senā-nigama in order to preach the doctrine." Buddha passed from one country to another preaching the dhamma which is heard by the house-holders who being convinced of its excellence retired from the world leaving their possessions great or small. This example was followed ardently by his disciples: Sāriputta was considered the fittest person after him to roll the wheel of law; Moggallāna, to preach the religion to the denizens of hell, gods and spirits of heaven; Puṇṇa Māntāniputta, to carry on the work among the rough people of Sunāparantaka; Pindola-Bharadvāja, the chief of the sīhanādi-kānam, to remove doubts regarding the Buddhistic path or fruit. This shows how the disciples fulfilled their Master’s desire. The Master was satisfied with their activities as indicated by his departure from the mortal world, which, as said by him to Māra, was conditional on his seeing that his disciples had been sufficiently large in

2 Majjh. Nik., I, p. 179. This is one of the many passages which constantly recur in the Nikāyas.
3 Āṅg. Nik., I, 13, 7; Milindapañha, p. 362.
5 Psalms of the Brethren, p. 111.
number and able to refute the doctrines of their adversaries, and that his religion was well and widely preached."

Conversion of non-Buddhists to Buddhism was regarded as a part of the duty of the monks. To attain Nirvāṇa and without at the same time giving others the benefit of its realization by taking to the right course has about it a taint of selfishness however slight. The means by which the highest can be known and tasted ought not to be the secret of the select few or of an individual. It should be given a wide publicity in order that all men from the highest to the meanest may have the opportunity of exercising judgment and take to the way leading to Nirvāṇa. Animated by the feeling of love and compassion, Buddha and his disciples preached broadcast the truths of their religion in order that the groping humanity may know that there are saving truths which can be attained by particular ways of regulating life and thought. It was from this point of view of looking at proselytizing that the Buddhists drew their stimulus for activities in this direction, and we find the Hinayānists and, in a greater measure, the Mahāyānists exercising their best energies for the propagation of their faith for the diffusion of general well-being and the alleviation of miseries incidental to human existence.

The art of proselytizing was highly developed by the Mahāyānists who led by their Bodhisattva ideal dedicated their lives to the propagation of the faith. There are in the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka² and almost all other Mahāyāna texts, expressions revealing the earnestness which animated the disciples for propagating the religion. Towards the end of a treatise, the Bodhisattvas utter: "When the Tathāgata has become wholly extinct,

1 Dīgha, II, p. 106; Rockhill's Life of the Buddha, p. 34.
2 See Hoernle's Manuscript Remains etc., p. 155.
we, O Lord, want to go in ten directions and persuade all beings to write, read, think over, and proclaim this dharmaparyāya by the power of the Lord." The history of Buddhist faith both in its earlier and later phases reveals the fact that the Buddhist monks gave their best energies to the propagation of the religion and thus acted up to the wishes of the founder of the religion. The despatch of missionaries to various countries both within and abroad during the reign of Aśoka, the successful attempt of the Buddhist monks to colonise Central Asia during the reign of Kaniska, and the perilous journey and voyages undertaken to China, Tibet, Cambodia, Java and the Malay Archipelago by the monks in the later history of Buddhism amply show to what a great extent the Master's bidding was carried out.

(v) Paribbājakas and their Change of Faith

The paribbājakas and the members of the various contemporary religious orders offered a very fruitful field for the recruitment of converts to Buddhism. Embracing of the religion of the victor by the vanquished in a debate was a general practice and this proved an effective means of spreading Buddhism, because Buddha himself as well as many Buddhist preachers were powerful disputants. It is a peculiar feature of the time that members of many of the religious orders attached more importance to belief based on reasoning than to blind faith, and pursuant to this state of things, the vanquished in a disputation left his religious belief as soon as it was brought home to him in a public debate that there was a flaw in the chain of reasoning upon which his belief was based, while no such flaw could be pointed out in the reasoning upon which the belief of the victor was founded. No stigma attached to the relinquishment of a
religious belief by reason of defeat in a controversy or by a change in faith brought about in other ways. It was not so in later times when the ceremonial and social exterior of religion almost ceased to have a living connection with the inner conviction of an individual. At the time of which we are speaking, many students after finishing their education used to wander about in the various parts of India as paribbājakas in order to learn the various religious doctrines and gain mastery over the art of disputation. They were at liberty to embrace any religion that appealed to them most as the vehicle of ultimate truths. In spite of the parents’ objection, we read of many instances of young Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas joining the Buddhist order. It was this state of things that helped Buddha and his band of preachers a good deal in the spread of the religion. The conversion of the followers of Saṅjaya counting among them Sāriputta and Mogallāna, the Jaṭilas, Pokkharasādi, Sakuludāyi, Mahākassapa the Acela, Cāṇki, Esukāri, Ghoṭamukha, Vekhanassa, Saccaka, and a host of others signifies a good record of Buddha’s success in conversion among the paribbājakas and the religious orders both brāhmaṇical and non-brāhmaṇical. Dhammika-upāsaka was right in saying that the disputing titthiyas, Ājivikas, Nigaṇṭhas, many of whom were aged, submitted to the captivating power of Buddha’s exposition of his religion. The influx of converts from the aforesaid classes was so great that Buddha had to introduce a bar to a ready ingress of undesirable men into the order

1 Majjh. Nik., II, p. 148. Assalāyana, a master of brāhmaṇical lore, was asked whether he had wandered about as a paribbājaka (to complete his education) “Carītaṁ kho pana bhotā Assalāyanaṁ paribbājakaṁ; ma bhavaṁ Assalāyano ayuddhapparajātam parajayitī.” See also Barua’s Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, p. 192.

2 Sutta-nipāta, p. 67.
by laying down that those who belonged to a religious order must pass a period of probation for four months.

(vi) Catholicity

Buddhism had in it a large element of catholic spirit which appealed to even the members of other religions. To attack another religion as a whole was never sanctioned by Buddhism. Buddha had to recruit his converts from other religions; he never disparaged any particular religion to which any of them might have belonged, though of course, he showed at times that particular doctrines were wrong and unworthy of being followed. He held the view that the Buddhists should make gifts to the deserving members of all other religious orders and not to the Buddhists alone. He permitted a Jain house-holder after his conversion to Buddhism to continue his charity to the Jain monks winning thereby the admiration of the members of other sects. In the Majjhima Nikāya it is pointed out that an ascetic though an Ājīvika but being a kammavādin would be reborn in heaven. The Brāhmaṇas who led a truly moral life were highly respected by the Buddhists. The spirit of toleration was no doubt a prevailing feature of the religious life of India and it was particularly so among the followers of Buddha, the teacher of mettā and karunā.

(vii) Occult powers

The last factor but not the least was the resort to occult powers to bring conviction home to the minds of the

1 Majjhima, I, p. 523; na ca saddhamma-okkasana na para-
dhamma-vambhanā. See also Aṅguttara, I, p. 27.
2 Aṅguttara, III, 57.1.
3 Vinaya, VI, 32; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 185.
4 Majjhima, I, p. 483.
unconvinced and make them converts. In writing of the spread of a religion, or the life of a founder of a religion, scholars, as a rule, leave this factor out of account, as it is not looked upon as in keeping with the standpoint of the present-day material sciences. It may be said that if once the possession and use of the occult powers be admitted and believed, there will be no criterion by which to sift out the actual expression of the occult powers from the fiction with which the credulous writers would in course of time mix them up, and in consequence, the grossest absurdities will have credence. But apart from the question as to which of the exhibitions of such powers are to be believed and which to be disbelieved, the point that has to be settled is whether it is reasonable to leave altogether out of account a factor without which there would certainly be left a gap in the aggregate of causes that are responsible for the degree and range of influence of a particular religion at a particular time. We often notice in the account of the life of the founder of a religion or its branch that mere appeals to the intellect and reason often fail to convince a person of the truth of a statement or the power of the arguer to lead to the path that takes one to the sumnum bonum of human life. Argumentators, however powerful, are often found to cause bitterness of feeling unless they are aided by other factors including the one under discussion. An exemplary character, a persuasive tongue, acuteness of intelligence, self-abnegation and other elements that make a strong and imposing personality are not sufficient to produce the results that were actually achieved by the founders of religions like Christ, Buddha, Muhammad, and others. A single leper healed by the mere touch of Christ, the power of vision restored to a single blind man are more effective in the spread of a religion than numberless victories in disputations. In the missionary career of Buddha
and of his disciples we meet with many cases where arguments failed to achieve the desired ends, and ultimately, resort was taken to occult powers. Buddha utilized his occult powers (pāṭibāriya) in three ways, viz. iddhis (the ṛddhis of the Hindu Yogaśāstras) which impressed his audience with awe at the sight of physical manifestation of powers ostensibly in transgression of the natural laws; ādesanā or the exhibition of power of thought-reading; and anusāsani or the warning to a person to give up his discursive or evil thoughts revealed to Buddha through thought-reading. He foresaw the abuses incidental to the cultivation and use of such powers by his disciples, for many of them might be in a lower plane of spiritual culture and utilize them for selfish ends. To avoid such abuses, he strictly enjoined his disciples not to display such powers before the householders.

There are several other causes which helped the propagation of the religion but as these have been dealt with in other connections in this work, they are left out here, e.g. internal strength of the organisation of the Buddhist order, unorthodoxy of the people in and around Magadha, persuasive methods employed in making converts, avoidance of metaphysical problems in the teachings, adoption of popular dialects as the medium of instruction, and above all the intrinsic merits of the religion.

2 Vinaya, II, p. 112; na bhikkhave gibuṇaṁ uttarimannaṁ dhammaṁ iddhipātiṇiṁyaṁ dassetabbaṁ.
3 See infra. 4 See Ch. I. 5 See Ch. X.
6 See ante, pp. 44 ff. 7 See infra.
CHAPTER X
METHOD OF PREACHING AND TEACHING

The expansion of Buddhism was due to several causes, some of which have been dealt with in the previous chapter. The discriminating method of preaching adopted by Buddha combined with dialectics, more stress on ethics than on philosophy, the spirit of good will and love, adoption of popular dialects as the medium of instruction, and the individual care taken of the disciples went also a great way towards the success of the religion.

Four ways of exposition

Buddha, it is said, adopted the following four ways for removing the doubts of those who approached him to learn the truth:

(i) Paṭipucchaśāyākaraṇīya;
(ii) Ekaśaśāyākaraṇīya;
(iii) Viśhajāśāyākaraṇīya; and
(iv) Thapanīya.

In the first method, the doubts of the interlocutor are ascertained at the outset by putting suitable questions and then removed by appropriate answers; in the second, a direct reply is given to an enquirer without entering into a discussion with him; in the third, answers are given separately to the different aspects of the question; and in the fourth, it is pointed out that as the question in untenable, no reply will be given.

Buddha insisted that his disciples should be very discriminating in adopting one of these methods\(^1\) for delivering their discourses.

**Gradual course**

For the propagation of his teachings, Buddha directed his disciples to conform to the following rules:

A good preacher should

(a) In ordinary discourses before householders make them gradual i.e. commence with dānakathāṃ, silakathāṃ, etc.

(b) Observe sequence (pariyāyadassāvi) in the details composing a theme.\(^2\)

(c) Use words of compassion (anuuddayataṃ paticca kathām).

(d) Avoid irrelevant matters (nāmisantaram kathāṃ).

(e) Make his speeches free from caustic remarks against others.\(^3\)

For imparting instructions to householders he directed his disciples to be cautious in not giving out the fundamental principles of Buddhism all at once as that would scare them away. To them only the exoteric side of the teaching should be explained first, that is, the elementary tenets, and practices of Buddhism suitable to householders. To those who intend to take them up should be asked to follow at first the tenets and practices that are suitable to their yet undisciplined and undeveloped powers, and then gradually the difficult ones should be placed before them by stages. To a householder, a Buddhist

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2. For the gradual course of training in Buddhism (imasmin dhammavinaye anupubbāsikkhā anupubbakiriyi anupubbapaṭipādā) see Majjh. Nik., III, pp. 2-4.

monk can preach at first the dānakathāṃ silakathāṃ saggakathāṃ
kāmānaṃ ādīnavām okāram saṁkilesām nekkhamme ānisāṃsām
(the discourse on alms-giving, moral precepts, the heavens, the
danger, corruption and impurity of desire and the blessings of
retirement) and when he perceives that his mind has been suffi-
ciently prepared by hearing the discourses, he can preach the
higher teachings, viz., dukkham samudayaṃ niruddham mag-
gam (suffering, origin of suffering, removal of suffering
and way to the removal of suffering). These discourses
have an appealing force which moves the hearts of the people
irrespective of their creeds. The higher and deeper truths of
Buddhism were gradually imparted and explained to the initiated
or rather to the sotāpannas. Thus the Buddhists from the lowest
grade to the highest did not feel embarrassed by the weight of
doctrines and practices too difficult for their yet limited under-
standing or their undeveloped powers of fortitude and devotion.
In order to create a good impression on the minds of the house-
holders, the bhikkhus were enjoined to be sympathetic to the
woes and troubles of their listeners and at the same time they
were asked not to indulge in talks which might be regarded as
worldly and ill-befitting a recluse.

Study of mental leanings

Before delivering a discourse Buddha tried to form
an idea of the leaning of the persons by putting to them
questions on religious matters or answering the questions that
he allowed them to put to himself. In this way he used to select
a subject most suited to the occasion and agreeable to the persons

1 Dīgha. I. p. 148: Vinaya. I. 7. 5-6: VI. 36. 5. Oldenberg’s
Buddha (Hoey’s translation), p. 186.
composing the audience and delivered a discourse on same. Similes, parables, fables very often drawn from experiences of every day life were interspersed with his speeches along with pithy verses to make his arguments sweet and effective.\(^1\) He attached great importance to the art of preaching and tried to impress upon the minds of his disciples the sense of its importance. The particular features by which his speeches were rendered so very impressive were, first because he utilized his higher knowledge (abhiññā), by which he could find out the persons who would benefit by his discourses on a particular day; secondly because the selection of the subjects of his discourses was the result of a correct diagnosis (sanidāna) of the mentality of the listeners.\(^2\)

(\textit{iii}) Disputation

Many are of opinion that Buddha himself avoided entering into discussions with others, and discouraged those of his disciples who entered into discussions on religious matters in the course of their preaching and wandering. Such opinion is not wholly correct. There are passages in the Buddhist scriptures which lend colour to the aforesaid view. To cite one or two such passages: He is said to have declared that his dhamma is not to be grasped by mere logic (atakkāvācara)\(^3\) and he condemned the Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas who took to hair-splitting disputation\(_\text{s}\) saying, ‘Issue has been joined against you, you are defeated, set to work to clear your views, disentangle yourself if you can’ (āropito te vādo, niggabito ’si. Cara vādappamokkhāya, nibbe-

\(^1\) Oldenberg, \textit{Buddha} (Hoev's transl.), pp. 185-193.
\(^2\) Divyāvasādāna, pp. 96, 124. "Āsāyānīkāyaṁ viditvādāhātum prakṛṭim ca jñātvā tādṛśī dhammedeśanā kṛtā."
\(^3\) \textit{Dīgh. Nik.}, 1, p. 12 (\textit{Dial. of Buddha}, vol. 11, p. 26).
thehi va sace pahosi. From such passages, it is not right to
draw the conclusion that Buddha condemned or prohibited the
holding of all disputations on religious matters.

It should also be kept in mind that the state of the country
at the time of Buddha was not such as could permit a missionary
to keep clear of disputation. One of the essential works of a
preacher was to convince his audience, and this was hardly possible
if argumentation was not given a wide berth. Of this time,
accounts are available of brāhmaṇa and non-brāhmaṇa heads of
religions, wandering about over the whole of eastern India,
sometimes with a large band of disciples, and holding dispu-
tations with the heads of the rival sects to assert their influence
and increase their following. There were the paribbājakas who
wandered about with their minds open for the reception of reli-
gious light wherever available. The lay people also liked to hear
disputations as indicated by their setting up of kutūhala-sālās
(halls for people in quest of truths) or paribbājakārāmas in
different places where the wandering teachers might reside and
hold controversies with convenience in the midst of a large
gathering. The people of a locality felt proud if a good
many religious teachers visited their kutūhalasālās or paribbāja-
kārāmas. References are available in plenty in the Buddhist
works showing that it was often stated at the disputations that
the defeated teacher with his followers relinquished his own
doctrines and embraced those of the winner. These defeats in
disputations were a fruitful source for the enlisting of converts to
the many doctrines and religions that prevailed in the country

Divyāvadāna, p. 143.
at the time, and the teachers vied and struggled with one another for securing the largest following. The discussions of the rival sects indicate that they had to be well-grounded not only in the rules by which the disputation was guided and the argumentation was rendered free from fallacies, but also in the doctrines of the various opponents who had to be faced, over and above their own school or tenets and practices with their philosophical bases, if any. Buddha is described in several places in the Buddhist works as a master of the tenets and practices of the heretical sects. A large number of his disciples was recruited either as the result of defeats suffered by the opponents or from among the followers of the brāhmaṇic and the heretical teachers convinced of the superiority of the doctrines propounded by him. His discussions with Sonaḍanda, Kūḍadanta, Upāli, Sakuludāyi, Vekhanassa, Assalāyana and a host of others are instances in which he argued out his own views and convinced his adversaries at the end. The victories thus gained in large numbers in disquisitions elicited the remark from Dīghatapassi, a Jaina monk to the effect that Gautama was a sorcerer who by the force of his art drew the people of other sects into his own net.¹ The lists of his disciples who were convinced and won over to Buddhism from their own beliefs and practices is a large one, from which the names of the following may be mentioned: Mahākoṭṭhita, Piṇḍola Bharadvāja, Mahākaccāyana, for instance, were masters of the three Vedas and perfect in all the accomplishments of a Brāhmaṇa; Sāriputta and Moggallāna were the disciples of Saṅjaya; the Kassapas were the leaders of the Jātālas; Abhayarakṣakumāra was a distinguished disciple of Niganṭha Nāṭaputta.

To be a successful disputant, one had to be equipped with all the outfit of specious arguments (kūtataṅka) to meet those opponents who made a free use of them whenever needed. It is clear from Buddha's injunctions to the bhikkhus, that he wanted them to use their power of argumentation in the service of truth and truth alone, and not to take to sophistry of their own accord. But a preacher ignorant of the wiles of a specious arguer and unable to use counter-wiles for self-defence would certainly be a weak disputant. It was for this reason perhaps that we see Buddha applying such a method with men who came to argue with crooked intention, or took to crooked ways of disputation. This is seen in the Ambattha Sutta\(^1\) where Buddha in order to silence Ambattha, who claimed the superiority of Brāhmaṇas over all by birth and stated that the Sākyas were of servile origin, related the fictitious account of the origin of the Sākyas and Kaṇhāyanas showing that the latter were the descendants of a dāsiputta (son of a slave-girl) of the former. The object of the use of the story was to put it as a stunner to Ambattha exposing his low origin.

Medium of Instruction

For the proper appreciation of his teaching, Buddha insisted that the medium of instruction should be the popular dialect of a province. His injunction "anujānāmi bhikkhave sakāya niruttiyā buddhavacanām pariṣyāpunitum"\(^2\) has been the subject of a good deal of controversy, but the last word, we think, has been said by Winternitz,\(^3\) who interprets it thus: "I allow you,

O monk, to learn the word of Buddha each in own language,” and this the late professor corroborates by another passage of the Majjhima Nikāya in which it is pointed out that undue importance should not be attached to the dialect of a particular janapada, i.e., a monk should be accommodating to dialectical variations, and not insist upon the use of a particular word, e.g., pāti instead of saravā or dharopā. Buddha’s preference for provincial languages is also responsible for the growth of pitakas in later days in different languages, the existence of which is no longer a matter of doubt. Buddha made a radical departure from the ancient Indian custom of recording the scriptures in a particular language, and this can well be pointed out as one of the causes of the success of Buddhism.

Individual Training

We have already mentioned that Buddha studied the mental leanings of a person before he delivered a discourse. This was particularly evident in the training of his disciples. He constantly watched their conduct and their mode of performance of spiritual practices, studied their character and predilections, and corrected their weaknesses by suitable advice, admonitions and courses of disciplinary practices.

In the Rāhulovādasutta, Buddha is seen instructing Rāhu la how in deed, word, and thought one can make himself pure by paccāvekkhāna (examination and introspection), because he observed that Rāhula was lacking in self-control. When, however, he made some progress in self-control, he was led gradually to realise the anicca-bhāva (impermanence)

¹ Majjhima, III, pp. 234-5, 237: janapadaniruttim nābhini-veseyya.
and dukkha-bhāva (miseries inherent in the nature) of all worldly things and the fact that the four dhātus or five khandhas collectively or separately do not constitute the attā (ego).¹

Nanda, another of his disciples, could not check his anxieties for food and raiment, for which he was taken to task by the Teacher. In due course the check put upon him helped him to control his senses so much that he became the chief of those who had control over their senses (indriyesu guttadvāra-nam aggo).²

Anuruddha could not, owing to slackness of exertion, attain cittavimutti though he had advanced much through his diligence in the path of meditation. This slackness which was clogging his way was removed by Buddha’s guidance supplemented by the personal care taken of him by Sāriputta.³

The weakness of Kīmbila lay similarly in his inability to muster up sufficient mental concentration through in-breathing and out-breathing. This was detected by Buddha and removed by his advice with special reference to the processes which he could not follow in a perfect way.⁴

Sāriputta and Moggallāna were already advanced spiritually before they joined the Saṅgha, hence the training imparted to them was of a higher order. Sāriputta was asked to meditate on suññatā, i.e., to look upon all things as devoid of substance and to practice self-introspection in order to remove from his mind the usual hindrances to vimutti and

² Samyutta, II, p. 281; Anguttara, I, p. 26; IV, p. 166.
³ Anguttara, I, p. 282; IV, pp. 228 ff.
⁴ Samyutta, V, pp. 322-325.
acquire the qualities leading to perfection.\(^1\) Sāriputta, it is said, took only a fortnight to attain arhathood, which stage he reached while listening to a discourse on the origin and decay of vedanā delivered by Buddha to Dīghanakha paribbājaka.\(^2\) Moggallāna was given the dhātus (elements composing a being) as his subject (kammaṭṭhāna) for meditation. While meditating, he became slack in his zeal and so he was taken to task by Buddha. He soon removed his sloth and torpor, became diligent and attained perfection.\(^3\)

The case of Ānanda is interesting. In spite of his insatiable love of knowledge by which he rose to be the chief of the bahussutas (the learned), and in spite of the great care that was bestowed upon him by Buddha for his spiritual culture, he could not attain arhathood during the life-time of Buddha, the reason being that he could not divest himself of his great attachment to Buddha, not as the founder of a religion but as a master to whom he was related as a servitor. This attachment proved a clog to his practice of the doctrine of detachment from the world, the corner-stone of Buddha’s teachings. Buddha used to admonish Ānanda for his inability to get rid of this attachment because therein lay the cause of his failure to attain the state of mind required for arhathood. In the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta we find Buddha expostulating with Ānanda for shedding tears when Buddha expressed his desire to leave this world.\(^4\) So long as Buddha lived, Ānanda could not rise above the stage of sotāpanna. He was a bahussuta on account of his inordinate desire for knowledge as evidenced by the frequent questions that

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1 Majjhima, III, pp. 294ff.
2 Ibid., I, p. 500-1.
3 Manorathapūrani, I, p. 161; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 85.
4 Dīgha, II, pp. 142-144.
are said to have been put by him to Buddha, e.g., about the correctness of Pūraṇa Kassapa's divisions of mankind, Sāriputta's exposition of the origin of dukkha (suffering) from phassa (contact), the theory of causation (paṭiccasamuppāda), the sense of the terms nirodha, loka, suṇna, vedanā, iddhi, ānāpānasati and so forth.¹

The training imparted to Devadatta by Buddha was on lines that were calculated as suitable to his peculiar mental tendencies. This disciple made some progress in yoga attaining ability to perform some miracles. Buddha detected his predilection for gain and fame through the exercise of his power to perform miracles by which he had won over Ajātasattu to his side. With a view to remove this love for gain and fame, he delivered to him discourses calculated to remove this weakness; but so deep-rooted had been this tendency that he continued on his way to ruin, turning deaf ear to his master's warnings.²

The instances can be multiplied but those that have been cited are enough to show how the great teacher used to see through the mental composition of the disciples whom he had occasion to train personally studying their tendencies and mental weaknesses as clearly as if they were reflected on a mirror. This accounts for his great success as a spiritual trainer.

² Majjhima, I, pp. 192 ff.; Mahāvagga, vii, 2 ff.
CHAPTER XI

SPREAD OF BUDDHISM

There is a traditional account of the vassas spent by Buddha at different places. On the basis of this account Prof. Kern and Dr. Thomas have furnished us with an account of the spread of Buddhism. It appears to my mind to be far from satisfactory, and so in this chapter I propose to bring together the facts scattered in the Nikāyas, which throw light on the propagation of Buddhism during the period of Buddha's ministration. On scanning the names of places in the Nikāyas, it appears that Sāvatthi was the scene of the largest number of discourses, the next place in importance being Rājagaha. Vesāli and Kapilavatthu may be counted as the third and fourth localities of importance though the number of discourses delivered at these places is comparatively much less. At the other centres very few discourses have been delivered. Another noteworthy feature that may be noticed in this connection is that the discourses delivered at Rājagaha and other centres of Magadhā have in view mainly the followers of non-brāhmaṇical sects, the paribbājikas,

1 Kern's Manual of Indian Buddhism, p. 4; Thomas, Life of the Buddha, ch. viii. According to the tradition, the places where Buddha stayed each vassa are:—1st Benares, 2nd-4th Rājagaha, 5th Vesāli, 6th Mankula Hill, 7th Tāvatiṣsa heaven, 8th Bhagga near Sūṣumṇāra Hill, 9th Kosambi, 10th Pārāleyyaka-wood, 11th Brahmin village of Nāla, 12th Venuṭṭa, 13th Cāliya hill, 14th Sāvatthi, 15th Kapilavatthu, 16th Ālavi, 17th Rājagaha, 18th Cāliya hill, 19th Rājagaha. Thereafter he stayed permanently at Sāvatthi.
and the members of the order but very rarely the brāhmaṇas while the discourses delivered at Sāvatthi and other centres within Kosala were meant more for the brāhmaṇas than for the non-brāhmaṇas. This will be apparent as we proceed with the story of conversions made at each of the various centres.

KĀSI

Kāsi is counted as one of the sixteen mahājanapadas. It was an independent kingdom in the pre-Buddha days but later on it was annexed to Magadha by Ajātasattu. Benares was its chief city and flourished not only as an emporium of trade and commerce but also as a centre of brāhmanic culture. The frequent mention of the place in the Jātakas is indicative of its great importance in those days. The Isipatana or Rṣipattana has been immortalized in the Buddhist literature as a resort of a large number of rṣis in ancient times, and so the selection of the locality by Buddha for his first discourse was quite in a line with its sacred tradition.

Buddha’s ministration commenced with the conversion of two foreign traders Trapusa and Bhallika who were travelling with a caravan along the trade-route from Dakkhināpatha to Ukkala a town in the kingdom of Gandhāra. Their conversion at Uruvela was later on commemorated by the erection of stūpas in their native villages in Gandhāra.1 Buddha after enlighten-

1 Mahāvastu (Senart), vol. III, pp. 303, 310, 313: Uttarāpatha Ukkalaṃ nāmadhiśṭhānam............Tebhi dāni yathā Keśasthali nāma adhiśṭhāno tabim keśa-stūpaṃ kārāpitam. Bālukkbo nāma nagaram tabim nakhastūpaṃ kārāpitam......Trapusabhollikānām Silukṣa nāma nīgama āvāśītānām......adyāpi Gandhāra-rājye adhiśṭhānam Silanāmena jñāyati. There has been a great difference of opinion with regard to the identification of Ukkala and the birth-place of Trapusa and
ment turned his thoughts first to his comrades in asceticism then residing at Isipatana near Benares. He started from Uruvela and passed through Gayā, Aparagayā and reached Vaśāla where he was invited to a meal by a hūnīka brāhmaṇa to whom he pointed out as to what made a true brāhmaṇa and tried to convert him to Buddhism. Thence he passed through Cumbadvilāṃ and Sārathipura, crossed the Ganges and reached Benares. Here at Isipatana he visited his five comrades who would not accept Buddha's arguments regarding the futility of extreme self-mortifications in taking them to their spiritual goal. Their conviction had to be slowly overcome by Buddha through teachings from day to day impressing upon their minds the impermanence of all worldly things. They were enjoined to live as recluses, practising jhānas and self-control. It was for them that he delivered his famous discourse, the Dhammacakkappavattana which is believed to have embodied truths found by Buddha under the Bodhi tree. It explains the majjhima paṭīpadā or in other words, perfection in the silas, practice of control over citta which included dhyāna, and attainment of paññā or true knowledge. The other discourse delivered to them was Anattasutta showing the essencelessness of the five khandhas. The result of the discourses, of course, was the conversion of the five brāhmaṇas, and their admission into the Saṅgha.

Bhallika. Though the phonetic similarity between Utkala (Orissa) and Ukkala is very great and the identification of Ukkala with Orissa is alluring, yet in view of the evidence supplied by the Mahāvaṣṭu and supported by Yuan Chwang, Ukkala should be identified with a place in Gāndhāra. Yuan Chwang noticed the remains of two of the stūpas mentioned above in the course of his journey from Balkh to Bamian (Watters' Yuan Chwang, I, pp. 111-113).

Buddha accompanied by the five new bhikkhus passed from Isipatana to Benares and met there Yasa; a rich seṭṭhi’s son, who was getting sick of the luxuries of worldly life and hankered after a life of peace and rest. It was in this state of mind that he came across Buddha under a Nigrodha tree on the bank of the river Varaṇā, and listened to a discourse on the merits of giving alms, observing precepts and enjoying thereby a heavenly life as also on the evils suffered by one haunted with desires. He then listened to the higher discourses dealing with the four truths1 and was soon convinced of their excellence. He embraced Buddhism and became a bhikkhu while his parents became upāsakas.

Yasa then introduced to Buddha his four friends Vimala, Subāhu, Puṇṇaji and Gavampati who were also sons of rich seṭṭhis, and fifty other friends. All were admitted into the Saṅgha by Buddha by the simple formulae of “ebi bhikkhu.”2 We are not aware of any other converts made by Buddha at the time though it is evident that several others of Benares joined the order subsequently.

Benares, rather Isipatana, was a favourite resort of many distinguished disciples like Anuruddha, Mahākoṭṭhita, Moggalāna, Mahākaccāyana, and Sāriputta. According to the traditional chronology of Buddha’s vassāvāsa, it is said that he passed the first vassā at Isipatana and passed through it the second time after the twelfth vassā on his way from Varaṇāja to Vesāli.3

1 The word in which he expressed dissatisfaction are upaddutam vo upasattham. Vinaya, I, p. 15-16.
2 See Infra.
3 Samantapāsādikā, I, p. 201; Kern’s Manual of Indian Buddhism, p. 36; IRAS., 1891.
The delivery of Buddha’s first discourse on Dhammacakkha brought the place into prominence, and clothed it with a sacred memory, ranking it as one of the sacred places of pilgrimage for a Buddhist. Several discourses in the Samyutta and Aṅguttara Nikāyas are associated with this place. These deal, among other topics, with avijjā, saddhā, kāyakamma, vacikamma, manokamma, ariyasacca and atthaṅgikamagga.

Besides Isipatana, there were two other resorts of Buddhist monks at Kītāgiri and Khemiyambavana. Buddha visited Kītāgiri and remonstrated there with Assaji and Punabbasu for taking food at night (vikālabhojana). The discourse at Khemiyambavana was delivered by bhikkhu Udena sometime after the parinirvāṇa of Buddha. This discourse, it is said, impressed Ghoṭamukha brāhmaṇa so much that he not only became a upāsaka but promised to the Saṅgha a share of the daily allowance of 500 kāhāpanas received by him from the king of Āṅga. As the bhikkhus were not permitted to accept gold and silver, it was arranged that the money would be utilised in building a monastery at Pāṭaliputta.

The subsequent history of Benares as a seat of the different sects of Buddhism is highly interesting and will be dealt with later on in another volume.

MAGADHA

MAGADHA became the scene of Buddha’s missionary activity after Kāśi. It was one of the most prosperous provinces

1 Vinaya, I, p. 10-11.
2 Digha, II, p. 141.
4 Majjhima, I, p. 473.
5 Ibid., II, p. 157.
during the reign of Bimbisāra, who had under his sway, as the
tradition goes, as many as 80,000 villages. Its capital Rājagaha
attained importance not only as a commercial centre but also as a
rendezvous of religious and intellectual men of diverse views. In
the pre-Buddha days, Magadha was looked down by the
brāhmaṇas as a country unfit for sacrificial fire, and as such unsuitable
for habitation of orthodox brāhmaṇas of noble and pure
descent. On account of the absence of orthodox brāhmaṇas,
non-brāhmanic views found there a free scope for expression and
so it is said that Magadha seethed with sophistic discussions and
that drītikaśāya was there. The Brahmajāla and Sāmaññaphala
suttanīs delivered as Rājagaha amply testify to the fact that
there was no end of brāhmanic and non-brāhmanic views preva-
 lent in Magadha, and that the six titthiyas also selected this
province as their field of work. Side by side with the titthiyas,
there were the brāhmanical teachers like Rudraka Rāmaputra and
Kuṭadanta. The former had an āśrama where Buddha lived for
sometime before the attainment of bodhi while the latter enjoyed
the income of a village granted to him by Bimbisāra, performed
sacrifices on grand scales, killing hundreds of animal victims.
There were a few other brāhmanic teachers who taught that
supernatural powers, heavenly happiness and mokṣa could be
obtained through rigorous asceticism.

Brāhmaṇas of Magadha

It is noteworthy that the discourses delivered in the towns
and villages of Magadha are meant mostly for the paribbājikas
and the non-brāhmanical sects or the Buddhist disciples. The

1 Vinaya, I, p. 29.
4 See Buddhist India, pp. 140-6; Barua, op. cit., p. 188 f.
few brāhmaṇas who came into touch with Buddha or his disciples could not be converted. Vassakāra¹ and Gopaka-Moggalāna,² the brāhmaṇa ministers of Magadha, and Dhānaṇjāni brāhmaṇa³ were admonished without any effect. The only notable converts made among the brāhmaṇas of Magadha were Kūṭādanta of village Khānumata and Kasibharadvāja of village Ekānālā.⁴ In the brāhmaṇa village of Pāncasālā, it is said that Buddha could not obtain a single spoonful of rice.⁵ In the brāhmaṇagāma of Ambasaṇḍā in the neighbourhood of Rājagaha, is laid the scene of Sakkapaṇhasutta⁶ but nothing is mentioned about any converts made there. There are passages, e.g., in the Sutta-nipāta, and Samyutta-nikāya⁷ showing that brāhmaṇas resented Buddha's attitude towards the aged members and his claim of superiority over them. These few references to the brāhmaṇas of Magadha indicate that their number must have been few, and that Buddha was not very successful in his missionary work among them.

Non-Brāhmanical Sects

It has already been mentioned that the six titthiyas chose Magadha and Vesāli as their fields of work. The number of paribbājakas wandering about within Magadha was also fairly large, and so the largest number of converts were made by Buddha from among the non-brāhmaṇas.

1 Digha, II, p. 72.
2 Majjhima, III, p. 15; Aṅguttara, II, pp. 172-3, 179, 180.
3 Samyutta, I, pp. 160.
5 Samyutta, I, p. 114.
6 Digha, II, p. 263; see B. C. Law, Geog. of E. Buddhism, p. 42.
7 Sutta Nipāta, p. 50; Samyutta, II, p. 22.
Sañjaya Belatthaputta, the centre of whose activities was at Rājagaha, was the first non-brāhmanic religious teacher to feel the power of the religion preached by Buddha for within a very short time he saw that half of his following had been won over to Buddha's side. It was Assaji, one of the first five disciples of Buddha, who commenced the missionary work by converting Sāriputta, the principal disciple of Sañjaya, to Buddhism, and Sāriputta in his turn followed him up until half of his quondam fellow disciples including Moggallāna embraced Buddhism. This event together with the previous conversions made by Buddha and his followers created in Magadha a sensation which evoked that Buddha converted 1000 Jaṭilas, 250 followers of Sañjaya, and the sons of distinguished Magadhan families, thereby making the families sonless and the wives husbandless, and there was no knowing who might be taken in next. 1

Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta was a formidable rival of Buddha, and as he was at work earlier than Buddha, he made a fair progress in the spread of his religion in Magadha and the neighbouring states. It appears from the accounts of conversions to Buddhism that Buddha could not win over to his side many followers of Nāṭaputta. But he stole a march upon Nāṭaputta by enlisting among his upāsakas Bimbisāra and Ajātasattu who had been lay-supporters of Nāṭaputta. 2

1 Vinaya, I, pp. 39-44.
2 The Jaina āgamas claim Bimbisāra and Ajātasattu as Jinas while the Buddhist pīṭakas declare them as Buddhists. Neither the Jaina nor the Buddhist literature admits that they were supporters of the religions at different times or at the same time in different degrees. The facts of the lives of the two emperors, however, point to the inference that Bimbisāra supported Jainism when it appeared on the field but inclined decidedly towards Buddhism when it asserted itself
There was at Kāḷaśīlā on the side of Isigili mountain in Rājagaha a large number of Jaina ascetics who were undergoing severe self-mortifications to eradicate their past sins and to attain *mukti*. Buddha failed to convince them of the inefficacies of such mortifications and of their faith being based on wrong views.\(^1\) But this was not the case with Upāligahapati and Abhayarājakumāra.\(^2\) Upāli was convinced that Niganṭha Nāṭaputta was wrong in putting more stress on *kāyakamma* (=dāna) than on *manokamma* while Abhayarājakumāra failed to establish that Buddha was lacking in *anukampā* (compassion) by citing the instance of Devadatta. Both became lay-devotees of Buddha. Dighatapassī, the Jaina monk, though convinced like Upāli, did not change his faith.\(^3\) Asibandhakaputta, a gāmaṇī, was also convinced of Buddha's viewpoint that killing, stealing and such other crimes do not always lead the sinners to hell as Niganṭha Nāṭaputta teaches and that these sins can be counteracted by repentance and knowledge.\(^4\) A few other converts were made from among the followers of Niganṭha Nāṭaputta at Vesāli and Kapilavatthu.\(^5\)

There are no specific instances of converts having been made from among the followers of other non-brāhmaṇical teachers except as a rival of Jainism. Ajātasattu was a supporter of Devadatta who initiated a sect holding views similar to Jainism so far as its discipline was concerned. Abhayarājakumāra, a Jaina, expostulated with Buddha for condemning Devadatta. This shows that Devadatta had Jaina sympathies and Ajātasattu by supporting him shows the nature of his religious views. He, however, was converted to Buddhism a year before Buddha's demise. (Infra, p. 156; Smith's *Early History of India*, p. 33).

\(^1\) * Majjhima*, I, p. 380.
\(^4\) *Samyutta*, IV, pp. 317 ff.
\(^5\) See *Infra*. 
cept that of Acela Kassapa. Upaka, an ājīvika, was impressed by the saintly appearance of Buddha, but did not accept him as his teacher. On several occasions, the doctrines of Pūrana Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Pakudha Kaccāyana and Ajita Kesakambalin were discussed and criticised,¹ and on one occasion it is mentioned that if an ājīvika be a kammavādin, he would go to heaven.² It seems that these teachers had no following at the time of Buddha, and that their doctrines had mere academic interest and were not actually practised. Acela Kassapa is described as an aṇṇatitthiya-pubba but it is not expressly mentioned as to which sect he belonged. He joined the order and became ultimately an arhat.³

Paribbājakas of Magadha

In Magadha there were two classes of paribbājakas: (i) Brāhmanical and (ii) Non-brāhmanical (aṇṇatitthiya).⁴ Buddha recruited his converts mostly from the latter class. Of the prominent paribbājakas who came into contact with the Teacher while he was staying in Magadha, the following may be mentioned: Nigrodha, Dīghanakha, Potaliputta, Anugāra (or Annabhara), Varadharā, Sakuludāyi, Moliyasivaka, Upaka, Manjikāputta, Sutavā, Sāmandaka and Susīma.

Buddha met Nigrodha who was then dwelling at Udumbarika hermitage of the paribbājakas near Rājagaha and explained to him how the ascetic practices did not always conduce

¹ See above ch. IV.  
² Majjhima, I, p. 483.  
³ Samyutta, II, pp. 21-22; IV, 300-2.  
⁴ B. C. Law, Buddhistic Studies, p. 89. In his paper on Gautama Buddha and the Paribbājakas, Dr. Law has given a summary of all the discourses that Buddha or his disciples delivered for the benefit of the paribbājakas.
to purity. It will be interesting to observe that Buddha was trying to impress upon Nigrodha who had ājivika leanings that his discourse on the ascetic practices including cātuyāmasamvara was not meant to win him over to this saṅgha and but just to impress upon him the distinction between kusala and akusala. Nigrodha was silenced but it seems that he did not change his faith. Dīghanakha, a relative of Sāriputta, listened to a discourse on vedanā and was soon convinced of the excellence of Buddha’s teaching and became a bhikkhu. Potaliputta had a talk with Samiddhi, a young bhikkhu, about the Buddhist doctrine of kamma, and was not satisfied with the exposition as Samiddhi gave the answer without sufficient caution and analysis. Anugāra, Varadhara, Sakuludāyi and other noted paribbājakas were staying at Moranivāpa hermitage and discussing among themselves on one occasion about lack of regard for the teacher found among the followers of the six titthiyas and on another occasion about the omniscience and perfection of Nigāṇṭha Nāṭaputta, and such other topics. Buddha explained his doctrines in detail and was able to convince Sakuludāyi of their excellence, ultimately making him an upāsaka. Sakuludāyi’s followers did not like that their leader should become a bhikkhu but they did not object to his becoming an upāsaka. Moliyasiyaka met Buddha at Rājagaha on two occasions and had discussions regarding his

1 See above, ch. IV.  2 Dīgha, III, pp. 55-7.


teaching as producing its fruit directly (sandittthiko dhammo) and the Buddhist theory of kamma. He became satisfied with Buddha's explanations and expressed his desire to become an upāsaka. Susima at the request of his lay-followers studied Buddhism and ultimately became a bhikkhu.\(^1\) Sutavā and Sajja\(^2\) listened to the merits of an arhat appreciatively but did not therefore become upāsakas, so also was the paribbajaka Samandaka,\(^3\) who met Sāriputta at Nālakagāma and listened to a talk on the cause of sukha and dukkha. Sarabha,\(^4\) and Upaka\(^5\) were the two paribbajakas reproved by Buddha and Ajātasattu respectively. The former was a renegade from Buddhism and spoke ill of the religion while the latter had the audacity to challenge Buddha in disputation. It will be observed from the above accounts that one or two paribbajakas became fully ordained bhikkhus, and the rest only expressed their appreciation of the religion by becoming lay-devotees.

Lay-Devotees of Magadha

The brāhmaṇas and the paribbajakas dealt with above became mostly lay-devotees and rarely ordained bhikkhus. The largest enlistment of lay-devotees took place when Buddha visited Rājavali in the second year of his missionary career. At the instance of Bimbisāra, the chiefs of the eighteen Śrenis of his dominion and his officials expressed their faith in Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha. The names of only a few lay-devotees

\(^1\) Samyutta, II, pp. 119-128; IV, pp. 230-1.
\(^2\) Anguttara, IV, pp. 369; 371 f.
\(^3\) Ibid., V, p. 120-2.
\(^4\) Ibid., I, pp. 185-188.
\(^5\) Ibid., II, p. 182.
of Magadha have come down to us through the discourses in the Nikāyas. They may be classified thus:

1. Gāmaṇiś—Talapūṭa nata-gāmaṇi (Saṁ. iv, p. 306); Yodhājivagāmaṇi (Saṁ. iv, p. 308); Assārohagāmaṇi (Saṁ. iv, p. 310); Maniculakagāmaṇi (Saṁ. iv, p. 325); Rāsiyagāmaṇi (Saṁ. iv, p. 340); etc.

2. Setṭhis & Gahapatiś—Jotikā (Saṁ. v, p. 344); Mānadinna (Saṁ. v, 178); Sirivaḍha (Saṁ. v, pp. 176-7); Sana-gahapatiputta (Saṁ. iv, p. 113; Aṅg. iii, 48; iv, 113); Dārukam-mika gahapati of Nāḍika (Aṅg. iii, p. 391); Belattha Kaccāna, a sugar merchant of Andhakavinda (Vin. i, p. 224); Pukkusāri kulaputta (Majjh. iii, p. 237); Dighāvupāsaka (Saṁ. v, p. 244); Jivaka; Anāthapiṇḍika and his setṭhi friend; etc.


4. Brāhmaṇas—Kasibharadvāja brāhmaṇa of Ekanāla; Dhānañjani brāhmaṇa (see ante, p. 141).

5. Ladies—Sāri brāhmaṇi and paribbājikā, mother of Sariputta of Nālakagāma; Dhānañjani a brāhmaṇi (Saṁ. i, p. 160); Velukanṭakī Nandamātā of Dakkhiṇāgiri (Aṅg. ii, p. 236; iv, p. 63); Cundī rājakumāri (Aṅg. iii, p. 35); etc.


Important Sites in Magadha

Among the scenes of Buddha’s activity within Magadha the following may be mentioned: (i) Gayā, (ii), Uruvela, (iii) Rāja-gaha, (iv) Nālandā, (v) Pātaliputta, (vi) Ekanāla, (vii) Andhakavinda, (viii) Kallavālamuttagāma, (ix) Mātulā.
(i) Gayā & (ii) Uruvela

Gayā arrests our attention first for it was the birth-place of the religion which became almost pan-Asiatic in later times. Buddha on his way from Benares to Uruvela, a suburb of Gayā, came across in a forest the thirty Bhaddavaggiya youths, who were seeking pleasures and enjoyments. These youths, according to the tradition, were related to the king of Kosala. On listening to the discourses of Buddha on dāna, śīla, etc. and on the four truths, they became bhikkhus and, it is said, they later on dwelt at Pāṭheyya, a country situated to the west of Kosala. He then stopped at Uruvela, a stronghold of the Jaṭilas. As these ascetics were very difficult to be weaned from the cults in which they had placed implicit faith, it is said that Buddha was put to the necessity of exhibiting miraculous powers to soften their minds in his favour. After preparing his ground in this way, he tried to explain to them the efficacy of following the truth that he had discovered. This explanation shook the foundation of their beliefs to a great extent, though of course, their minds required to be worked up a little further before they could be fully converted. They accompanied Buddha to Gayāśīsa where he delivered the discourse Adittapariyāya (Fire Sermon) intended to explain to the Jaṭilas that the summum bonum which they wanted to attain through fire-worship could be had not through fire-worship but by the extinction of fires of rāga, dosa, and moha kindled by the action of the sense-organs by coming into contact with the objects

1. Hardy's Manual of Buddhism, p. 188; S.B.E., XVII, p. 146 n; Mahāvastu, III, p. 420; Psalms of the Brethren, p. 284; Mahāvagga, i. 14.
2. Vinaya, I, pp. 34, 35.
of those senses. The Jațilas after hearing this discourse gave up their cults and joined the order as bhikkhus.

(iii) Rājagaha

The importance of Rājagaha from the point of view of missionary work was very great. It was a great resort of religious teachers and wanderers (paribbājakas) who used to come to the city usually in the company of the traders who supplied them with food and raiment in their journey from distant places. The city was moreover situated at the junction of several trade-routes facilitating communication and transit of messages to and from distant places. This made it extremely important for the propagation of the truths that Buddha wanted to preach broadcast. Over and above these, the city provided other advantages, valuable for a religious organizer, viz. of entering into disputations with the religieux and asserting the superiority of the religion by defeating them; of setting on a sound footing the organization by which the bhikkhus could pursue the ideals, secure from cares for the bare needs of life; and of establishing suitable hermitages for the monks in the caves of the surrounding hills so convenient for deep thinking and the pursuit of yoga.

On the occasion of Buddha's first visit to Rājagaha in the second year after enlightenment, he stayed at Lāṭṭhivana, five miles from the town. It was here that Bimbisāra with his ministers, courtiers, and village-headmen came to meet him. Buddha's youthful appearance led them to think that he was a disciple of the hoary-headed Uruvelakassapa who had been the leader of the Jațilas, and accompanied Buddha to Lāṭṭhivana. But Uruvelakassapa's homage to Buddha in their presence belied their impression. The youthful Buddha with his sonorous voice
explained the first principles of Buddhism, the anicca (transitoriness) and anattā (essencelessness) of the five khandhas (constituents of being), and brought home to the mind of the king and his attendants that the religion preached by Buddha had excellences, by virtue of which it could lay claim of superiority to other religions of the time.

After enlisting Bimbisāra and his gāmanis and courtiers as lay-devotees and fixing Veluvana for his own residence, Buddha made attempts to carry on further his missionary work. Śāriputta and Moggallāna were the first to be converted at Rājagaha with their companions the two hundred and fifty disciples of Sañjaya. He converted several paribbajakas and householders, an account of which has been given above.

*Hermitages in and around Rājagaha*

The hills around Rājagaha had several hermitages which are important in the history of the spread of Buddhism. They were as follows:

(i) The highest of the hills, the Grijhakūṭa-pabbata,² (Vulture’s Peak) was a favourite resort of Buddha. In the first few years after enlightenment, he spent his time frequently at this place with some of his distinguished disciples, viz. Śāriputta, Moggallāna, Mahākassapa, Anuruddha, Puṇṇa Mantāniputta, Upāli, Ānanda, and Devadatta, delivering discourses and imparting to them necessary training for their spiritual progress and missionary works.³ To facilitate communication with Buddha

3 See above, p. 133 f.
and his disciples, it is said that Bimbisāra made a road from the foot to the top of the hill.\textsuperscript{1} The peak was the scene of the nefarious attempts of Devadatta supported by Ajātasattu to kill Buddha for not putting him in charge of a body of monks. Besides the hermitages on the Vultures' Peak, there were ten other cave-dwellings of bhikkhus on the hills surrounding Rajagaha\textsuperscript{2} viz.,

(ii) Corapapāta (the precipice whence robbers were flung to death);\textsuperscript{3}

(iii) Isigilipasse Kālasilā (the black rock by the side of the Rṣigiri);\textsuperscript{4}

(iv) Vebbārapasse Sattapanṇiguhā (where the first Buddhist synod was held);

(v) Sitavana Sappasondikopobbhāra or the cave situated in a hill infested with snakes near the crematorium called Sitavana which Buddha used to visit with his disciples for passing some time at the place as a part of the spiritual training of his disciples.\textsuperscript{5}

From the nature of this hermitage it would appear that it was

\textsuperscript{1} Watters' \textit{Yuan Chwang}, II, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{3} Watters' \textit{Yuan Chwang}, II, p. 155. The Chinese pilgrims refer to the cases of religious suicide committed here, said to have been approved by Buddha. Cf. \textit{Saṃ. Nik.}, III, pp. 119-124; IV, pp. 55-60; V, p. 320.
\textsuperscript{4} The name Rṣi-giri was transformed into Isi-gili which was supposed to have been derived from the fact that the hill devoured (\textit{gilā=to devour}) the ascetics i.e. those ascetics who entered it never returned, so congenial the place was to them (\textit{Majjh. Nik.}, III, pp. 68 ff.).
\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Divyāvadāna}, p. 268.
specially suited to those monks who took up the sosānika-dhutaṅga i.e. practising samādhi on a cremation-ground for their spiritual uplift;

(vi) Gomata-kandara,

(vii) Tinduka (the cave deriving its name from the Tinduka trees 'Diospyrus Embryopetris');

(viii) Tapoda-kandara (Tapoda = hot spring);

(ix) Tapodārāma;

(x) Indasālagubā where Buddha delivered the Sakka-panhasutta (No. 21) of the Dīgha Nikāya;

(xi) Pippali-gubā named after Pippali mānava, the former name of Mahākassapa, who used to stay here.

These cave-dwellings could not provide sufficient accommodation for all the monks staying at Rājagaha. For this reason as also out of love for solitude, many monks dwelt in arañña-kūṭikas (forest-huts) in the jungles on the hills. Dabba Mallaputta was entrusted with the charge of grouping the monks according to their subjects of study or methods of spiritual discipline, and of allotting to them suitable residences.

After the acceptance of the Veluvana, and the sanction of vihāras as suitable residences for monks, the lay-devotees commenced building vihāras for monks. Three such vihāras in the suburbs of Rājagaha are often mentioned in the Buddhist scriptures viz., Veluvana, Jivaka-ambavana, and Maddakucchi migā.

1 Hot springs still exist there, see Arch. Sur. Rep. 1904-5.
2 Watters, Yuan Chwang, II, p. 173.
3 Manerathapūrani, I, p. 175; Psalms of the Brethren, p. 363.
5 For a description of the Veluvana monastery, see Mr. D. N. Sen, op. cit.
dāya. The first vihāra was presented by Bimbisāra on the occasion of Buddha’s first entrance into Rājagaha, the second by Jivaka in the twentieth vassa of Buddha’s ministry, and the third very probably by a Madda prince when Mahākappina was ordained as a monk.¹

(iv) Nālandā

At Buddha’s time Nālandā was a small but prosperous village situated at a distance of a yojana from Rājagaha.² The usual residence of the monks was at the monastery Pavārika-ambavana. There was another monastery midway between Rājagaha and Nālandā called Ambaltaṭṭhikā where Rāhula stayed at times.³ From the nature of the discourses delivered there and from the particulars of the persons with whom Buddha entered into dismutations, it appears that Nigantha Nāṭaputta had there a firm footing.⁴ Most of the discourses were intended to refute the doctrines of the Jaina faith, the disputants being Dīghatapassi, Upāli, Abhayarājakumāra, and Asibandhakaputta-gāmanī. From the Bhagavati Sūtra also, we learn that Nālandā was the meeting place of Mahāvīra with Gosāla.

(v) Pāṭaliputta

Pāṭaligāma was only a village which Buddha visited with his disciples in the last days of his life. The laity of the place

¹ Mahākappina’s wife was a Madda princess. See Vin. I, p. 105; Burlingame’s Buddhist Legends, II, pp. 169-176.
² Sum. Vil., p. 35; Majjhima, I, p. 377; Dīgha, I, p. 211. It is stated in Yuan Chwang’s Records and Mahāvastu that Nālandā was the birth-place of Sāriputta, but in fact his birth-place was Nālaka which was an unimportant village near Nālandā.
³ Majjhima, I, p. 414.
⁴ Ibid., I, pp. 379, 392 ff.; Samyutta, IV, pp. 110, 317, 323; Mahāvastu, III, p. 56.
invited Buddha and his disciples who on their arrival at the place were accommodated in a rest house probably known later on as the Kukkuta-ārāma. It was at this time that Sunīdha and Vassakāra two ministers of Ajātasattu were fortifying Pāṭaligāma as a defence against the Vajjians. This fortified village afterwards rose to be Pāṭaliputta, the capital of Magadha and a great emporium.¹ Out of respect for Buddha, the two ministers named the gate through which Buddha passed and the ferry ghat whence he departed as Gotama-duvāra and Gotama-tīttha. Near Pāṭaliputta, there were two villages called Kotigāma and Nādi ka where Buddha stopped in his last journey. It was at Kotigāma that Ambapāli came to invite Buddha to Vesālī.² Buddha passed from Kotigāma to Nādi ka where he had many faithful monks and nuns, male and female lay-devotees, some of whom died before his visit to the place,³ hence the discourses that he delivered here were all concerning the maraṇa-sati.⁴

(vi) Ekanālā

In the 11th year of Buddha’s ministration, he visited the brāhmaṇa village Ekanālā and stayed at Dakkhiniṅgiri.⁵ He converted here the two brāhmaṇas Kasi-Bharadvāja⁶ and Sampūrṇa⁷ A distinguished female lay-devotee Velukanṭakī Nanda-

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¹ Mahāvagga, VI, p. 28; Dīgha, II, p. 85.
² Vinaya, I, p. 231.
³ Dīgha, II, pp. 91-92.
⁴ Aṅguttara, III, pp. 303 ff; 391.
⁵ There was another vihāra of this name at Vedisā. See B. C. Law, Geog. of E. Buddhism, pp. 26, 43, 46.
⁷ R. L. Mitra’s Nepalese Buddhist Literature, p. 18.
mātā lived here. It was at this place that Buddha formed his idea of the way in which the cīvara (robes of the bhikkhus) should be made out of pieces of cloth stitched together like the rectangular pieces of land tilled by different persons in the rice-fields near the village.

(vii) Andhakavinda &
(viii) Kallavālamuttagāma

These two villages near Rājagaha, though not so well-known, had monasteries where Buddha stayed at times. At Andhakavinda we find him instructing some newly ordained bhikkhus and converting Belatthha Kaccāna, a sugar-merchant of the place. Mahākassapa while here had once to ford a stream to attend a Pātimokkha assembly at Rājagaha. After this incident the Vinaya rule was instituted that a bhikkhu need not cross a stream, as wherever it exists, it should be made a boundary of the jurisdiction of a monastery. Kallavālamutta-gāma is important on account of its association with Moggallāna who underwent there his first course of training.

Buddha’s last activities in Magadha

In the closing years of Buddha’s life in Magadha took place two notable conversions viz., of Ajātasattu and Jivaka. Ajātasattu became king in the 72nd year of Buddha’s life and continued his patronage to Devadatta who with Kokālika, Kaṭamoratissaka, Khaṇḍadeviyāputta Samuddadatta and Thullanandā bhikkhunī² as the foremost disciples started a sect intended to be a rival to Buddhism. The cause of his influence with a few people is

1 Aṅguttara, IV, pp. 63 ff.
2 Vinaya, III, p. 171; IV, pp. 66, 335.
attributed to his power of working miracles attained through jhāna under the direction of Buddha at Sukarakhata in Gijjha-
kuṭa. He collected about 500 disciples and established a
centre at Gayāsīsa where a monastery was built for him by Ajāta-
sattu. A point of difference between the religious doctrines
preached by him and those by Buddha lay in his bias to rigor-
ous life that appealed so much to the people at large, but
which Buddha left to the option of his disciples for adoption or
rejection. Ajātasattu, who was used as a tool by Devadatta
for the execution of his purposes, felt remorse when he was
advanced in age for helping Devadatta in his evil designs as he
gradually became impressed with the decided superiority of
Buddha to Devadatta in all directions. Jīvaka, who about this
time returned to Rājagaha after completing his medical educa-
tion at Takkhasilā and became so eminent a physician that his
services were eagerly requisitioned by the ruling princes. He
volunteered his services for the medical treatment of Buddha and
his disciples and professed his firm faith in Buddhism. He was a
medical adviser of Ajātasattu and thereby got opportunities of
bringing home to his mind the greatness of Buddha and his
teachings. The introduction to the Sāmaññaphala Sutta relates
how he brought about the interview between Buddha and the
king, on which occasion the latter was converted by Buddha by
means of a discourse on the secular and spiritual merits acquired
by a bhikkhu by his joining the order. This conversion took
place in the 79th year of Buddha’s life i.e. just a year before his
parinibbāna.

1 Watters’ Yuan Chwang, II, p. 16 refers to it as ‘Devadatta
Samādhi cave.’
2 Jātaka, I, pp. 67, 319.
KOSALA

The kingdom of Kosala is next in importance to Magadha in the history of the spread of Buddhism. It is counted as one of the sixteen mahājanapadas and is included among the countries scanned by the Bodhisattva before his descent to the mortal world.¹ In Buddha’s time it was ruled over by Pasenadi, and then by his son Vidudabha. Politically and commercially Kosala stood on the same level as Magadha, containing, it is said, 80,000 villages. From the point of view of culture only, Kosala might be pointed out as more brāhmaṇic than Magadha. But as far as Buddhism is concerned, Kosala could not boast of as many monasteries and hermitages as could Magadha. At the same time, however, it must be admitted that it was at the capital of Kosala that Buddha spent the latter part of his career as a teacher,² delivered the largest number of discourses and framed the largest number of Pātimokkha rules;³ and it was here that the religion, which had passed its infancy in Magadha, developed into its full stature as found in the Nikāyas.

Though according to Oldenberg’s theory,⁴ Kosala falls outside the limits within which orthodox brāhmaṇism flourished, the territory was in fact within the said limits containing, as it did, many brāhmaṇa settlements. Oldenberg based his opinion on two passages, one of the Cullavagga (xii. 2, 3) viz., “Buddhas are born in the puratthima janapadas,” and the other of the Majjhima Nikāya (ii. p. 124) referring to Buddha as a Kosalaka. The word

⁴ Oldenberg’s Buddha, Appendix I.
purattthima however does not imply prācyā-deśa. The passage contemplates only Kapilavatthu lying on the northern extremity of Kosala and not the whole of the territory; and moreover both the town and the territory lay on the west of Sadānirā, an early limit of Aryan colonization as mentioned in the Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa. Hence, as a citizen of Kapilavatthu, which was included in the dominion of Kosala, Buddha could well be called a Kosalaka, though for the matter of that he was not an inhabitant of prācyā-deśa.

Non-brāhmanical Teachers

At the time of the rise of Buddhism, Kosala was a brāhmaṇical country, and so the religion had to make its headway against a strong opposition. It was introduced into Kosala at the instance of Anāthapiṇḍika, who invited the Teacher to Sāvatthi and presented to him the Jetavana-ārāma distinguished in later times as a great resort of bhikkhus, and placed at his disposal all the influence that he could command for the propagation of Buddhism in Kosala.

In spite of the efforts of Anāthapiṇḍika to give Buddhism a footing at Sāvatthi, the heads of the local sects resented the intrusion of a new religion into the field. To counteract the opposition, Buddha sent to Sāvatthi his best disciple Sāriputta entrusted with the ostensible work of supervising the construction of the Jetavana vihāra. Sāriputta was a past master in the art of disputation and had deep knowledge of the brāhmaṇic lore as well as that of the non-brāhmaṇic sects. He had to enter into disputation with many teachers, all of whom he was able

1 Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, I, 4. i quoted also in Oldenberg’s Buddha, pp. 398, 399.
2 See Infra, p. 172.
to silence by dint of his able exposition of the Dhamma.\(^1\) A ground was thus prepared for the advent of Buddhism at the time of Buddha’s arrival at the place. King Pasenadi was also an admirer of the six \textit{tittbiyas} and used to speak of them as distinguished teachers of schools and heads of orders, and revered by the wise (\textit{sanghino ga\'\'ino ga\'\'acariya \textit{ñ\textit{\=a}t\textit{\=a} yasassino\ titthakar\=a s\=adbusammata\=a}) while of Buddha as young in age and fresh as a recluse (\textit{daharo ceva jatiy\=a navo ca pabba\textit{\=aj\=ay\=ati}).\(^2\) Mig\=ara, the rich Set\=thi of S\=avatthi, was a staunch adherent of Nigan\=tha N\=\=ataputta. S\=avatthi, according to the \textit{Uv\=asagadasao}, was the head-quarters of the \=Ajivika sect which held its founder Makkhaleno Gos\=ala in high respect.\(^3\) Behind Jetavana there was a hermitage of the \=Ajivikas.\(^4\) The influence established by this as well as by the other teachers was of long standing, and they tried to dissuade the people from listening to Buddha’s preachings. All his teachings, they said, were but reflections of what they had taught.\(^5\) They made a combined effort to oust him from Kosala by persuading Pasenadi to hold a competition in the exhibition of their miraculous powers. They were however defeated in this competition and Buddha’s reputation as a great religious seer was established. The name and influence of the six teachers began to wane after this event, while those of Buddha increased. Out of envy, they, it is said, went to the length of making the futile attempt of blackening Buddha’s


\(^3\) Barua, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 258, 299, 300.

\(^4\) \textit{J\=ataka}, I, p. 493, see also II, p. 170.

\(^5\) \textit{Majjhima}, I, p. 84.
character by setting on him two courtesans Cīṇcā and Sundāri. Buddha laid bare before the public the weak points in their doctrines and thus gradually sapped the foundation of their influence in the place. During this period, Buddha at times instructed his disciples in the ways in which to meet the arguments advanced by their opponents of the six non-brāhmaṇical sects and trained them to make clear expositions of the rational principles on which Buddhism was based. In his discourse to Visākhā, he explained what is Nīgāṇṭhopasātha and how it fell short of a real uposatha.

Brāhmaṇas of Kosala

The opposition put forth by the six teachers and their disciples to the progress of Buddha's mission was not so strong as that of the orthodox brāhmaṇas and brāhmaṇical teachers, who could hardly tolerate a teacher who had raised the standard of revolt against them. To some of the orthodox brāhmaṇas, even the sight of the shaven-headed Buddha at the time of performance of sacrifices was considered ominous. The sight of Buddha at some distance was a cause for consternation to Aggika-Bharadvāja who cried out to stop the further progress of the Preacher towards the place where he was performing a sacrifice: "Tatre'eva mūndaka tatr'eva samānaka, tatr'eva vasalaka tiṁbhāhī" [(Stay) there, O Shaveling (stay) there, O Samānaka (wretched samana) (stay) there, O Vasalaka (outcast)]. The adverse opinions held by the brāhmaṇas generally about him have found

1 Kern, Manual of Indian Buddhism, pp. 33, 37; Watters, Yuan Chwang, I, pp. 389, 392.
2 Majjhima, I, pp. 64 ff.
3 Āṅguttara, I, p. 205.
4 Sutta Nīpāta, pp. 50 ff.
expression in many places in the Nikāyas in passages like the following.—"Who are these shavelings, sham friars, menial black fellows, the offscouring of our kinsmen's heels." They even sneered at the idea of Buddha coming to converse with brāhmaṇas versed in the threefold Vedic lore." We find it mentioned that a brāhmaṇa was offended with a brāhmaṇa lady with Buddhistic leanings for uttering in his presence the formula of salutation to Buddha and cursed her for doing so. The nature of the opposition encountered by Buddha in the place accounts for many of the topics on which discourses were delivered by him or discussions were carried on with the local brāhmaṇas e.g. the origin of the caste-system and the purpose it served; inefficacy of sacrifices; absurdity of solving the indeterminable problems like the existence or non-existence of soul; permanence and impermanence of the world; falling off of the brāhmaṇas from the ancient brāhmanic ideal; the truth underlying the belief in spiritual sanctification by bathing in the rivers; dependence of the gods of the brāhmanic pantheon on the law of karma, and so forth.

Buddha by his power of disputation and knowledge of the brāhmanic lore brought home to the brāhmaṇas the truths that he was preaching. As soon as they saw the hollowness of their beliefs or the unsoundness of their philosophy, they with their characteristic love of truth embraced the religion which was placed before their eyes with all its charm. Some of them continued as laymen declaring their faith in Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha while others went further and became bhikkhus. Rich and influential brāhmaṇa householders like Jānussoṇi, Aggika-Bharad-

1 Dīgha, I, p. 103.  2 Ibid., I, p. 81 ff.
vāja, and Dhānañjani professed themselves as life-long upāsakas of Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha. Intelligent and learned as they were, they naturally presented difficulty to Buddha in having them converted but once convinced of the truth of Buddha's doctrines, they proved to be his staunch adherents.

The distinct achievement of Buddha in this brāhmanic country is the conversion of some of the distinguished brāhmaṇa teachers (mahāsālas) who lived on grants of villages made by kings and were held in high respect by the people of the locality. In spite of their high positions as orthodox brāhmaṇa teachers, and regardless of the advice and importunities of their disciples and admirers, the renowned mahāsālas Pokkharasādi of Ukkatthā, Lohicca of Sālavatikā, and Cañki of Opasāda took refuge in Buddha and promised to be his followers up to the end of their lives (ajjatagge pāṇupetam saraṇam gatam). So great became Buddha's fame in Kosala that the sixteen disciples of Bāvari came from as far a place as the bank of the Godāvari to join the order. On listening to a discourse, Uggatasatīra brāhmaṇa of Sāvatthi released his sacrificial victims and expressed his devotion to Buddha.

The Nikāyas mention only those names of brāhmaṇa converts with whom Buddha or his disciples had conversation or disputation. The names show that a pretty large number of

1 Sutta Nipāta, p. 21. 2 Majjhima, II, p. 209.
3 Dīgha, I, p. 87; see also infra, p. 169.
4 Ibid., I, p. 224.
5 Sutta Nipāta, p. 192 ff. Bāvari was once the purobīta of king Mahākosala and his son Pasenadi. He retired to the bank of the Godāvari where a hermitage was built for him by Pasenadi.
6 Aṅguttara, IV, p. 45.
brāhmanas of various ranks in life were converted, as for instance, the Brāhmaṇagahapatis of Sālā,1 Kapaṭṭhamānava of Opaśāda,2 Brāhmaṇas of Nagaravinda,3 Manaśakaṭa,4 Venāgapura,5 Icchānāṅgala,6 Daṇḍakappaka;7 Jānussoni, Sundarikabharadvāja, Pingalakoccha, Assalāyana, Esukāri, Subha, Saṅgara, Tikanṭa, Saṅgārava, Dhananaṭjani of Caṇḍalakappa8 and a host of other brāhmaṇas of Sāvatthi.9

Paribbājakas of Kosala

Like other countries, Kosala had also many paribbājakarakārāmas10 the most frequented of which was the one provided by queen Mallikā at Sāvatthi.11 Buddha and his disciples, and even sometimes, his lay-disciples12 visited these ārāmas, eagerly heard the views of these paribbājakas, and expressed their disapproval of those views if they thought it necessary to do so. There were also occasions when the paribbājakas approached Buddha for removing their doubts. As the result of these interviews we hear of paribbājakas like Vekhanassas13

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1 Majjhima, I, p. 285.
2 Ibid., II, p. 164.
3 Ibid., III, p. 290.
4 Digha, I, p. 235.
5 Āṅguttara, III, p. 30.
6 Ibid., III, p. 30.
7 Ibid., III, p. 402.
8 Majjhima, II, p. 209.
9 See Majjhima, I, pp. 39, 175, 205; II, pp. 147, 177, 208, 209; Digha, III, p. 81; Samyutta, I, pp. 177 ff.; Āṅguttara, I, pp. 158 ff.
10 Āṅguttara, IV, p. 378; V, p. 48 "aṇṇatitthiyānāṃ paribbājaskānam ārāmo"
11 Majjhima, II, p. 22 "Samayappavādaka tindukāciro ekasālako Mallikāya ārāmo"
12 Ibid., II, p. 23.
13 Ibid., II, p. 40. He was the founder of a brāhmanical paribbājaka order.
and Poṭṭhāpada becoming lay-devotees of Buddha. The former had a talk with him on parama-vāṇa, kāmaguna, and lack of knowledge about the ultimates among certain teachers, while the latter discussed with him several topics, e.g. perception (saññā) and its cessation (nirūdha), distinction between perception (saññā) and knowledge (ñāṇa), different soul-theories and so forth. Cāṇṇo did not find much difference between his views and those of Ānanda regarding the removal of rāga, dosa and moha. The high estimation in which Buddha was held by some of the paribbājakas is evident from the reply given by Pīlotika to Jānuṣsoṇi’s query about Buddha’s crudition, “Whom am I to judge of the knowledge of Samanā Gotama, who am I to be able to praise him; he is the praised of the praiseworthy, the best of gods, of men; whoever approaches him for disputation whether he be a brāhmaṇa, khattiya, gahapati or samanā-pandita, he comes back satisfied with the exposition of his dhamma.” From these remarks it need not be supposed that Buddha had an unqualified success among the paribbājakas as there were many members of the class who would never recognise the excellences of the religion.

King Pasenadi

Buddha resided here for twentyone vassas in addition to many visits paid to it at other times, so king Pasenadi got many opportunities of meeting him and holding with him conversation on religious topics. From the references to Pasenadi in the Nikāyas, it is evident that the king was a follower of the brāhma-

nic religion, had the brāhmaṇa Bāvari as his first purohita, and celebrated sacrifices involving slaughter of hundreds of animal victims.\(^1\) One of his queens Mallaṅka, and his two sisters Somā and Sakkulā, were devotees of Buddha.\(^2\) Queen Mallikā was once addressed by Buddha regarding the qualities which distinguish one woman from another\(^3\) while Princess Sumanā listened to a sermon on the merit of making gifts.\(^4\) It was probably through the influence of these ladies combined with the occasional instructions from Buddha that the mind of the king was gradually softened towards Buddhism. Later on he declared himself a lay-devotee of Buddha and showed signs of his devotion by occasional gifts to the members of the Order. On the death of Queen Mallikā he repaired to Buddha for words of consolation.\(^5\) In the latter part of his life he expressed his highest admiration (dhāmmanvaya) for Buddha and his Sāṅgha.\(^6\)

**Lay-devotees of Kosala**

Though the infant religion could not at first secure patronage from the king, it did from Anāthapiṇḍika a great magnate and the High Treasurer of the realm. His valuable advice combined with pecuniary help made it possible for the religion to strike its root deep into the soil of Kosala. It was he who organised the delivery of a few discourses by Buddha to lay-people regarding the duties of house-holders and the place occupied by them under his religion. It was these discourses that served as a guide to the house-holders in the performance of their duties as lay-Buddhists.\(^7\) Thus it was through the

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6. *Majjhima*, II, p. 120.
efforts of Anāthapiṇḍika that a place was assigned by Buddha to the lay-Buddhists in the framework of his religion.

The lay-devotee, who as a supporter of Buddhism ranked next to Anāthapiṇḍika in importance, was Vīsākha, daughter of a setṭhi of Sāketa, and wife of the son of a rich setṭhi of Sāvatthi. She persuaded her father-in-law Migāra and other members of the family to give up their faith in the doctrines of Nigantha Nāṭaputta and adopt those of Buddha. Her anxiety for the comforts of the monks and nuns had become proverbial. She built the Pubbārāma monastery where Buddha resided for six vassas. It was at her instance that many of the Vinaya rules for both the bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs were framed. Several discourses were delivered by Buddha and his disciples for her benefit.

A few other noteworthy lay-converts of Kosala whose names may be mentioned in this connection are Gaṇaka Moggallāna, Pañcakaṅga ṭhapaṭi, Isidatta and Purāṇa ṭhapaṭi who were all high state-officials; Sālha, grandson of Migāra, and Rohaṇa, grandson of Pekhiṇiya, who paid occasional visits to Pubbārāma and listened to discourses.

Conversion of Aṅgulimāla

A notable incident connected with Buddha’s missionary work in Kosala is the radical change brought about in the life of Aṅgulimāla who was so turbulent that even the king of the realm could not restrain him. He turned a bhikkhu and ultimately reached arahatship. This conversion made a great impression upon the minds of the people of Kosala as also of the king, and helped greatly the propagation of the religion.

1 Mahāvagga, viii, 15. 7. 2 Majjhima, III, p. 1.
3 Ibid., I, p. 396. 4 Ibid., II, p. 123.
Important Sites in Kosala

This sketch of the spread of Buddhism in Kosala would not be complete without a reference to at least some of the various centres established within the territory for facilitating the propagation of the religion and the pursuit of spiritual exercises by the bhikkhus.

Sāvatthi

The first city that rises in our minds is Sāvatthi which could boast of two of the richest monasteries in India at the time, viz., Jetavana of Anāthapiṇḍika and Pubbārāma Migāramatupāsāda of Visākhā. With the fabulous wealth of Anāthapiṇḍika, the pleasure-garden of Prince Jeta was purchased, and on it was erected the magnificent monastery called Jetavana vihāra or Jetārāma replete with all kinds of rooms required for the well-being of a Saṅgha.

In the building and the ceremony of dedication of Jetārāma, Prince Jeta, King Pasenadi and several rich setthi took part along with Anāthapiṇḍika. Buddha, it is said, spent as many as nineteen vassas at Jetavana, delivering eight hundred and forty-four suttas, and formulating the major portion of the Vinaya code. The other monastery which could vie with Jetavana is Pubbārāma where Buddha passed six vassas, and it is said that while staying at Jetavana, Buddha often passed the day or night at Pubbārāma. This monastery was built by Visākhā and named after his father-in-law Migāra and herself who was fondly called Migāramātā. The erection of Pubbārāma, it is said, was made under the supervision of Moggallāna,

1 This was situated outside the eastern gate of Sāvatthi.
2 See Infra.
3 Malalasekera, Dict. of Pali Proper Names, pp. 965, 1127.
but it seems that the name of Moggallāna has been drawn in by way of a parallel to Sāriputta who supervised the erection of Jetavana.\footnote{Malalasekera, \textit{Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names}, p. 628.} It was situated six to seven miles to the north-east of Jetavana and could accommodate a large number of monks and nuns in its numerous chambers while it afforded facilities for deep meditation in its secluded cells. On account of the amenities of monk-life available here, it was a favourite resort of Buddha and his disciples.

An dhāvana, another monastery situated at a short distance to the north-west of Jetavana Vihāra, ranks next to Pubbārāma in the provision of facilities to monks and nuns for meditation and spiritual exercises. It has been specially mentioned in the \textit{Samyutta-nikāya} as a resort of nuns of Ālavi (a suburb of Sāvatthi), who, seeking solitude, used to come to this monastery.

Rājakārāma was the fourth monastery built opposite to Jetavana by king Pasenadi. Several sermons of the \textit{Samyutta-nikāya} were delivered here.\footnote{\textit{Samyutta}, V, pp. 60 ff.; \textit{Majjhima}, III, p. 271.}

Sāketa

Sāketa was the town next in importance to Sāvatthi, and was situated at a distance of seven leagues from Sāvatthi. It was founded by Visākhā's father, Dhanañjaya, a rich setthi. There were on its outskirts three monasteries, known as Añjanavana, Kālakārāma and Tikanṭakivana. Añjanavana was originally a deer-park of the kings of Kosala. Here Buddha met the paribbājaka Kuṇḍaliya\footnote{\textit{Samyutta}, V, p. 73.} and delivered a discourse on
the restraint of sense-organs, satipaṭṭhāna and bojjhāṅga. Kāḷakārāma was built by Kāḷaka who gave up his faith in Nīgāṇṭha Nāṭaputta and became a Buddhist. Buddha delivered here a discourse on his omniscience.¹ Tīkanṭakīvāna was a grove near Sāketa. Here Sāriputta, Moggallāna and Anuruddha had a talk regarding the qualities which make a sekha (one aspiring for Arhathood)⁵ while Buddha delivered here a discourse on the removal of misconceptions.⁵

Āḷavī

Āḷavī stood on the way from Sāvatthi to Rājagaha,⁴ at a distance of thirty yojanas from Sāvatthi. Buddha passed here the sixteenth vassa at the Aggālava shrine, which was originally a pre-Buddhistic place of worship, and later on converted into a Buddhist hermitage. Vaṅgīsa, a distinguished monk, used to live at this place.⁵ At Āḷavī, Gomagga Simsāpavana was another hermitage where was delivered the Pāyāśi-sutta.⁶ It was the residence of Kumāra Kassapa, and was located to the north of Setavyā, near which was Ukkaṭṭhā.

Ukkaṭṭhā

Ukkaṭṭhā is better known as the village given by Pasenadi to Pokkharasādi as brahmadeyya. Here at Subhagavana Buddha delivered his famous discourse, the Mūlapariyāyasutta,¹ in

¹ Āṅguttara, II, p. 25.  ² Samyutta, V, p. 175.
³ Āṅguttara, III, p. 169.
⁵ Sutta Nīpāta, 59 f.: Samyutta, i, 185-6, 187.
which he explained what he really meant by anatta and nibbāna. The same idea is further developed in the Brahmānimantaka-sutta, in which, however viññāna is described as infinite. In this hermitage there was provision for the residence of both monk and nuns.

Kesaputta of the Kālāmas

Though as a tribe the Kālāmas of Kesaputta, a town of Kosala, were not very prominent, but in the history of Buddhism, their place is not insignificant, because Ārāja, a Kālāma, was a teacher of Siddhattha while Bharanju, another Kālāma, was not only a co-disciple of Siddhattha but offered him shelter at his āśrama at Kapilavatthu. A group of suttas in the Aṅguttara-nikāya is located here.4

Among other sites of Kosala, where Buddha stopped and delivered discourses, the names of the following may be mentioned: Pānkadhā; Ekasālā; Nalakapāna; and Veludvārā.5

THE SAKYAS

Though the kingdom of the Sakyas falls within the limits of Kosala, the Sakyas were politically independent and formed a separate entity from the social standpoint with customs and practi-

1 Majjhima, I, p. 329.
3 See Infra, p. 171.
4 Aṅguttara, I, p. 188 f.
5 See Malalasekera, op. cit., sv.
6 Aṅguttara, I, p. 276. Sutta Nipāta (V, 422) describes it as "Koṣalesu niketino" while the Mahāvastu (II, p. 199) says it was "Koṣalesu nivāsito." Cf. Dīgha, III, p. 83.
ces peculiar to themselves. They were followers of the brāhmanic religion and did not at first look with favour upon the idea of Buddha launching a new religion in direct opposition to the time-honoured ones. If we examine carefully the account of the reception accorded by the Sakyas to Buddha at the time of his visit to the land of his birth after enlightenment, it will be evident that there was a rift in the lute welcoming his arrival. The people forgot to provide food for the Teacher and his disciples on the first day, refused to give them alms on the following day when they went out for collection of alms, depated only those Sakyas who were junior to Buddha to receive him. 1 
Daṇḍapāṇi Sakka was not very much impressed by Buddha’s doctrine which taught complete severance from kāma, and went away shaking his head. 2 Mahānāma was unable to find out at Kapilavatthu a suitable lodging for Buddha even for one night and had to request his quondam fellow-disciple Bharanḍu-Kālāma to accommodate him in his aśrama. 3 Ānanda did not include Kapilavatthu among the countries where Buddhist lay-devotees lived in large numbers. 4 These reveal the feeling entertained by the Sakyans at the time towards Buddha and his religion. The situation was so dismal that Buddha had to have recourse to miracles for bringing the Sakyas under control. Ultimately he made a few converts from among the Sakyas, some of whom came to be counted among the leading disciples of Buddha, e.g., Anuruddha, Ānanda, Bhaddiya, Kimbila, Bhagu, Devadatta and Upāli. 5

1 Hardy, Manual of Buddhism, p. 198 f.; Burlingame, Buddhist Legends, III, p. 2 f.
4 See ante, p. 4.
5 See ante, pp. 103-8.
SPREAD OF BUDDHISM (AMONG THE SAKYAS)

Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta among the Sakyas

Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta had been among the Sakyas some time before Buddha and secured some followers. Mahānāma, a relation of Buddha, had Jaina leanings. To bring him round, Buddha delivered to him a discourse on the uselessness of the severe forms of self-mortification practised by the Jaina ascetics.¹ The result of this discourse upon Mahānāma's mind has not been mentioned anywhere. He, however, appears as an interlocutor² in many discourses, but nowhere does he appear as giving up his faith to adopt Buddhism.

The nature of the topics dealt with in the discourses delivered by Buddha at Devadaha suggests the inference that there were at the place a few followers of Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta. Daṇḍapāṇi could be counted among them while Devadatta was in favour of the rigorous discipline of the Jainas. There is no reference to the conversion of any of these Jainas to Buddhism. Moggallāna who was with Buddha at the time succeeded however in converting Vappa, a Sakyan Jaina to Buddhism.³

Kapilavattthu

While at Rajagaha Buddha was repeatedly invited by Suddhodana and at last induced by his play-mate Kāludāyi to go to Kapilavatthu. He stopped at Nigrodhārāma on the outskirts of Kapilavatthu. To welcome him, Suddhodana started with his retinue but on hearing the description of his dress and of his followers, he returned to his capital, sad and dejected.

¹ Majjhima, I, pp. 91-95.
² Āṅguttara, I, p. 219; III, p. 286; IV, p. 220; Majjhima, I, pp. 91, 354.
³ Āṅguttara, II, p. 196ff.
Some of the disciples wanted to meet Suddhodana in order to convince him of the greatness of Buddha; the selection fell on Kāludāyi who agreed to take upon himself the task with great hesitation. Kāludāyi appeared before Suddhodana and his courtiers miraculously from the sky and thus made an impression on their minds about his greatness. After this incident, Suddhodana decided to welcome Buddha and started for the purpose along with his guilds and artisans, merchants and officers, sethās and brāhmaṇas. The Sakyas however were in a dilemma, whether to show respects to Buddha or not. This situation was anticipated by Buddha and was avoided by the show of a miracle. After this encounter of Buddha with Suddhodana, the work of propagation of the religion was carried on vigorously, ending in the conversion of a few Sakyan youths and ladies including Nanda and Rāhula, and Mahāpajāpati and Yasodharā. Buddha paid a few more visits to Kapilavatthu, not taking into account the stories of his intervention in the quarrels that the Sakyas had with the Koliyas and with Prince Viḍūdabha. On one occasion he consecrated their new Santhāgāra, while on another he converted Kāligodhā, a Sakyan lady. Two Sakyans Kāla-Khemaka and Ghaṭāya, it is said, provided vihāras for the monks in the Nigrodhārāma. After all Kapilavatthu in spite of its poor response to the call of Buddha received its due honour as the jātibhūmi of the Teacher and came to be counted as one of the sacred places of pilgrimage, and a place fit for the deposit of a portion of the relics.

1 Mahāvastu, iii, pp. 101 ff.
2 Samyutta, V, p. 396.
4 Ibid., I, p. 145.
Other Sites in the Sakya territory

Besides Kapilavatthu, there were within the Sakya territory a few other places which were visited by Buddha. These were Cātumā, Sāmagāma, Khomadussa, Medalumpa, Naṅgara, and Devadaha. At Cātumā Buddha was once so much displeased with the Saṅgha on account of its members making noise that he asked them to leave the place. The Sakyas intervened but failed to persuade Buddha to withdraw his order. They listened to a discourse on the duties of monks regarding the bare necessities of life. While at Sāmagāma he heard of the demise of Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta and of the dissension among his followers. This caused some apprehension in his mind regarding the well-being of his own Saṅgha after his demise and led him to deliver the discourse on the ways of settling disputes (adhikarana-samatha). Medalumpa (or Ulumpa) and Naṅgara were two other Sakyan villages, three leagues apart, that were visited by the Teacher. It was at the former village that Buddha delivered the Dhammacetiya-sutta for the benefit of Pasenadi. At Khomadussa Buddha was able to convince a number of brāhmaṇas of the excellence of his teaching; while at Devadaha he delivered a large number of discourses. Devadaha was a Sakyan town next in importance to Kapilavatthu, and was the home of Māyā and Pajāpati. Near it was the Lumbini garden. It was a centre of the Nigaṇṭhas. In the Devadaha-sutta the Kamma theory of the Nigaṇṭhas is discussed followed by an exposition of the Buddhist doctrine of Kamma. In the Samyutta-nikāya, Devadaha is made the scene of a few discourses on the six senses.

1 Majjhima, I, p. 456 f. 2 Ibid., II, pp. 243 ff.
3 Ibid., II, p. 118-119 fn. 4 Samyutta, I, p. 182.
5 Majjhima, II, p. 214 f. 6 Samyutta, IV, p. 124 f.
THE LICCHAVIS

In ancient India of Buddha's time, the Licchavis were one of the powerful tribes, living at the foot of the Himalayas. They formed a part of the Vajjian confederacy and had a republican form of government. They used to meet together very often in the sanṭhāgāra, to discuss and transact their business, political, social and even religious. They had their seat of government at Vesāli, which has been made in the Nikāyas the scene of a few important discourses.

Brāhmanism

Though the territory of the Licchavis was outside the limits of the brāhmanic middle-country, yet brāhmanism was there the prevailing religion. Belief in the brāhmanic pantheon and the ceremonial worship of deities were all current among them. It may be that some of the deities representing Yakkhas and other spirits were the relics of their ancient belief. A brāhmaṇa named Kāranapāli used to perform the religious functions of the Licchavis (Licchavīnāṃ kammantāṃ kāreti). There is also a reference to another brāhmaṇa named Pingiyāni receiving cloths from the Licchavi youths as a token of their respect for him.1 There were a good many shrines on the outskirts of Vesāli and the regular worship of the images of the deities enshrined in them was carried on by the Licchavis.2 Again the fact that the Licchavis worshipped many gods and goddesses of the brāhmanic pantheon at the time when

1 Aṅguttara, III, p. 236.
2 The shrines around Vesāli, according to Buddhaghosa, were originally Yakkha-shrines but later on converted into Buddhist monasteries or Cetiyas. See Malalasekera, op. cit., pp. 780, 942. Digba, II, p. 102; Mallas also had such shrines e.g. Muktābandhāna,
their country was being ravaged by famine and pestilence shows that the Licchavis were imbued to a large extent with the spirit of brāhmanism.

**Jainism**

When Buddha came among the Licchavis, Jainism had already run through a career of about 250 years from the time of Pārśvanātha and had among its adherents many of the Licchavis.

Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta, the reformer of Jainism, belonged to a distinguished family of the Nāṭa clan with wide influence in the land of the Licchavis. There are accounts of a few adherents of Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta either disputing with Buddha or coming into contact with him or his followers in the course of their missionary work. Saccaka, who as a disputant was held in high respect by the Licchavis, sustained a defeat in a religious disputation with Buddha. It is not clear whether he became a Buddhist convert as the result of the defeat. Abhaya and Paṇḍitakumāraka enquired of Ānanda about the means of destruction of dukkha as pointed out by Buddha and were not satisfied with the answer. On another occasion the former approached Buddha with the question whether ogha (flood of passions etc.) could be overcome either by moral purity or severe penance, to which Buddha replied in the negative and said that it was only by controlling mind, body and speech that a person could save himself from ogha.

The most notable conversion made by Buddha among the Jaina laity was that of Siha who was a military official of the Licchavis and had a great influence in the country. In spite of

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1 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 236, 250.
Nigantha Nattaputta's dissuasion, he met Buddha, and impressed by his discourses on dana, became an upasaka. The weaning of Sihha from the Jaina faith gave a rude shock to Nattaputta's followers who out of jealousy circulated the false report that Sihha had killed animals for feeding Buddha and the bhikkhus.¹

Vesali

In the fifth vassa, Buddha was invited by the people of Vesali to visit the place for removing the pestilence ravaging the city. Buddha in response to the invitation, extended by Mahali, a Licchavi friend of Bimbisara, visited the place and stayed there for a short time. The end of the pestilence synchronized with his stay there and was believed to have been due to the beneficent power of the Teacher who made efforts to drive away the epidemic by uttering the Ratana Sutta. The incident went far to prepare the minds of the people to follow the lead of the wonder-worker in the religion. Buddha visited Vesali many times subsequently.

In spite of active oppositions of the Jainas, Buddha continued his work of conversion in right earnest. The high encomiums showered on Buddha by the Licchavis at a meeting of their assembly, the feeling of wonder expressed by Mahanama at the sudden change of the Licchavi youths under Buddha's influence,² and the desire of Othaddda Licchavi with a large retinue to listen to Buddha's discourses,³ show that Buddha could create a favourable impression on the minds of the local people and achieve some success in his missionary activities. As a mark of their devotion to Buddha they dedicated to him not only the

¹ Mahavagga, vi. 31. 12.
² B. C. Law, Ksatteiya Clans in Buddhist India, pp. 88, 89.
³ Digha, I, p. 151.
Mahāvīra Kusāgārasāla but also a large number of Cetiyas which were also highly appreciated by him as places for meditation. Of these Cetiyas, the one at Gosīngasālavanavā was particularly liked by him and his chief disciples Śāriputta and Moggallāna who passed there many a day in meditation. The conversions made by Buddha among the Licchavis were not commensurate with the acts of generosity mentioned above, as the cases of conversion mentioned in the Nikāyas are not many. Ānanda’s exclusion of Vesāli from the list of places where the lay-devotees lived in large numbers also point to the same conclusion. The names of Mahāli, Mahānāma, Ugga-Gahapati, Nandaka the minister, Piṅgīyāni brāhmaṇa and a few others are mentioned as converts to Buddhism. Oṭṭhaddha Licchāvī and Bhaggava paribbājaka were much impressed by the teachings of Buddha but they did not adopt the religion. On account of the attachment of Sunakkhatta Licchāvīputta to other beliefs and practices, Buddha had to be disappointed in him. He joined the order as a bhikkhu and remained as such for about three years. He expected to see the exhibition of Buddha’s miraculous powers and to have from him the solution of some of the indeterminable problems, all of which Buddha deliberately avoided on principle. This exasperated Sunakkhatta who left the order and commenced speaking ill of it broadcast. This disparagement by Sunakkhatta became the topic of many discussions between Buddha and the Licchavis to whom he explained his position by stating that the benefits of the religion

1 Digha, II, p. 102: "Ramanīyā Ānanda Vesāli, ramanīyam Udenāṇa cetiyam, ramanīyam Gotamaṇa cetiyam, r. Bahuputtam c., r. Sārandadham c., r. Cāpalam c."
2 Majjhima, I, p. 212; Aṅguttara, V, pp. 133-4.
3 Digha, II, p. 169.
could not be derived by one who had attachment to other teachers and their doctrines and practices.¹

Buddha passed through Vesāli in the course of his last tour. The only notable conversion made on this occasion was that of the famous courtezan Ambapāli who gave away her Ambavana to the Buddhist saṅgha. It was while dwelling at Cāpala Cetiya situated on the outskirts of Vesāli that Buddha resolved to end his mortal existence in three months.

_Sanction of the order of nuns_

One of the most important events in the history of Buddhism that transpired at Vesāli was that Buddha gave here his consent to the formation of the order of nuns at the importunities of Ānanda and Mahāpajāpati Gotami. The latter had already advanced a little as a lay-devotee in the path of sanctification at the time of conversion of Rāhula and Nanda. It was after the death of king Suddhodana that she in the fulness of her grief resolved to embrace the life of a recluse. She formed a band of recluses by bringing together a few ladies who had been bent on retirement from the world for some reason or other. With them she travelled under great physical stress and strain from Kapilavatthu to Vesāli where Buddha was staying and obtained his consent to the formation of the order of nuns by agreeing to comply with the eight ordinances laid down at the time by Buddha for the bhikkhuṇīs.² She made a steady progress in spiritual culture under the guidance of Buddha and soon attained the highest stage of sanctification.

¹ _Digha_ I, pp. 150 ff; III, pp. 2 ff.
² _Anguttara_, IV, p. 274; see _Infra._
In the legend of the *Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa* referred to above, Videgha Māthava is said to be the first coloniser of the land of the Videhas across the river Sadānīrā. This river was its western limit while Kauśikī was the eastern; on its north were the Himalayas and the Ganges on the south. In the pre-Buddha days it became an important centre of brāhmanic culture on account of Janaka’s enthusiasm for, and patronage of, learning and spiritual culture which converted his court into an important meeting-place of learned men specially from the western countries of Kosala and Kuru-Paṅcāla. At the time of Buddha the Videhas formed a part of the Vajjian confederacy. In the *Mahāgovinda-sutta*, Mithilā, the capital of the Videhas, is mentioned as one of the seven kingdoms of Northern India. It was given to Mahāgovinda, who was a believer in the Brahmā cult. Ajātasattu was often called Vedehiputta while Ānanda Vedehamuni. This may be due to the fact that their mothers hailed from the land of the Videhas. The *Makhaṭeva* and *Mahājanaka Jātakas* and the *Brahmāyu Sutta* testify to the prevalence of brāhmanism in Videha at the time of Buddha. The *Nikāyas* are silent as to Buddha’s missionary work in the place and the volume of opposition met by him there in the propagation of his religion. It is only in the *Majjhima Nikāya* that we find that he stayed at Makhādeva-ambavāna of Mithilā and converted on a certain occasion Brahmāyu a distinguished and an old brāhmaṇa teacher, who was awe-inspired by the *mahāpurusaḷakkhaṇas* on Buddha’s body.

1 *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, III; Oldenberg’s *Buddha*, p. 398.
THE BHAGGAS

The Bhaggas formed another tribe of the Vajjian confederacy. The fact that Bodhirājakumāra, son of king Udena, resided there in a palace of his, indicates some close political relation of this tribe with Kosambi. Buddha spent the eighth vassa among the Bhaggas at Sūsumāragiri. He succeeded in converting three distinguished inhabitants of the Bhagga country, namely Nakulapitā, Nakulamātā and Bodhirājakumāra. There might have been other converts but their names do not appear in the Nikāyas. Buddha and his chief disciple Moggallāna visited this place on two or three occasions and stayed at Sūsumāragiri Bhesakalāvana-migadāya. Buddha delivered a few discourses, at the instance of Nakulapitā and Nakulamātā, two of his most favourite lay-disciples, detailing the duties of house-holders. The discourses delivered here by Moggallāna relate to the means of overcoming passions (māratajjānīya). It was while Buddha was residing in this country that Bodhirājakumāra requested Buddha to stay in his newly built palace Kokanada for a day in order to sanctify it by his presence, and give him the opportunity of formally taking refuge in Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha.

THE KOLIYAS

The Koliyas of Rāmagāma and Devadaha were also one of the republican clans living at the foot of the Himalayas, close to the settlement of the Sakyas. They attained prominence in the Buddhist texts on account of the relation that they had with

1 Anguttara, II, p. 61; III, p. 295. IV, pp. 85, 268; Samyutta, IV, p. 116.
2 Majjhima, I, pp. 95, 332.
3 Ibid., II, p. 91.
Buddha through his mother and wife. The first visit paid by Buddha to this country was from Vesāli in the fifth year of his ministry when a fight became imminent between the Sakyas and the Koliyas over the right of drawing water from a stream. It was when the armies of the two clans were arrayed in the battle-field that Buddha intervened and brought about an amicable settlement by his thoughtful and pacifying discourses. Many members of both the clans were struck by Buddha’s greatness and were moved so much by his teachings that they retired from the world to become bhikkhus.

Of those who were converted to Buddhism at this place, the names of Punja-govatika and Seniya-kukkuravatika of Hālidavasana should be mentioned, as they were typical brähmanic ascetics believing in the efficacy of severe penances. Kakudha Koliyaputta became a saddhiubārika (novice) of Moggallāna, while Suppāvāsa Koliyadhītā was praised by Buddha as an upāsikā who was the best of the panitadāyikā (givers of sweet food). Pāṭalīyagāmanī of Uttarā became a lay-devotee after he was convinced of the excellences of Buddhism by a pretty long discourse dealing with the various contemporary doctrines. Suppāvāsa, wife of the Licchavi Mahāli, another upāsikā, was a great benefactress of the Saṅgha. She lived at Sajjānela which was visited by Buddha on more than one occasion. The Koliyas of Rāmagāma obtained a share of Buddha’s relics and erected a stūpa on the same.

1 See ante, p. 93-4; Burlingame’s Buddhist Legends, III, pp. 70 ff.; Jātakas, V, pp. 412-413; Hardy’s Manual of Buddhism, pp. 317-20.
2 Majjhima, I, p. 387.
3 Aṅguttara, III, p. 122.
6 Aṅguttara, II, p. 62.
The Mallas were another republican tribe of the same type as the Licchavis. They were divided into two groups, one having their capital at Pāvā and the other at Kusinārā. Pāvā attained prominence as an important centre of the Jainas and also as the scene of Nigaṭha Nāṭaputta’s death, while Kusinārā became immortalised in the Buddhist tradition by Buddha’s selection of the place as the suitable site for his parinibbāna. It is counted as one of the four places of pilgrimage of the Buddhists. At the time of Buddha however it was a small village as has been described by Ānanda.¹

The mandate issued by the Assembly of the Mallas of Kusinārā that persons not according welcome to Buddha would be fined 500 kahāpanas shows that there was among the Mallas a party opposed to Buddha and his religion. Malla Roja belonged to this party but on coming into contact with Buddha, he could not resist turning an upāsaka.² Of the two well-known converts from this clan, one was Dabba Mallaputta, the distributor of food and assigner of residences to the monks at Rājagaha, while the other was Cunda kammāraputta of Pāvā who by serving to Buddha his last meal became a prominent figure in the Buddhist literature.³

Kusinārā is the scene of two important discourses delivered by Buddha. One of them explained to Tapassu gaha-pati the great charm inhering in the spiritual exercises practised by a monk, by virtue of which they could spurn the pleasures of worldly life.⁴ It was the attraction of this happiness in the life of a monk that persuaded even youngmen to turn recluses.

Buddha explained the successive stages by which the highest spiritual culture could be reached through this life of meditation and discipline. The other discourse explained that Buddha came out as a preacher not from any selfish motive but for the spiritual uplift of men who had by previous karma an innate aspiration for the attainment of deliverence from the worldly miseries and required some assistance and guidance for the achievement of their object.  

Pāvā was also the scene of an important discourse called Saṅgiti-sutta² delivered by Sāriputta. It summarises in the Āṅguttara style the essentials of the Buddhist doctrines. It was while dwelling at Pāvā that Buddha heard of the dissension among the followers of Nīgāṇṭha Nārāṉputta.³ The Mallas of Pāvā had their notable hall Ubbhāṭaka consecrated by Buddha. They received a portion of Buddha’s relics and erected a stūpa on the same.

ĀṅGA

In the Buddhist texts Āṅga is compounded with Magadha as Kāśi with Kosala. On the basis of the Buddhist tradition it is now generally accepted as a historical fact that Āṅga became subject to Magadha as much as Kāśi to Kosala in the 6th or 5th century B.C. The fight between the kings of Āṅga and Magadha is graphically described in the Vinaya Piṭaka of the Sarvāstivādins⁴ with the ultimate victory of Bimbisāra, the king of Magadha. Culturally there was little difference between Āṅga and Magadha, for, it was as much non-brāhmanic as Magadha. In the Vedic literature it is condemned as a country unfit for

1 Majjhima II, pp. 238-243.  
2 Dīgha, III, p. 207f.  
3 Dīgha, III, p. 117; Majjhima, II, p. 243.  
4 See IHQ, 1938, p. 212-3; Jātaka, IV, p. 454.
sacrifices and bad enough to be a place whither the fevers should be driven away from the Brahmarishi-desa.¹ Brähmanism, therefore, was not wholly absent from Aṅga for there were brähmana teachers, names of two of whom are preserved in the Buddhist texts. Its capital Campā was one of the important centres of Buddhism and a large portion of the province was included within the Buddhist majjhima-desa, the eastern limit of which was Kajāṅgala, situated 66 miles to the east of Campā.²

Brähmanism

The brähmana teachers mentioned in the Nikāyas are Sonadāṇḍa of Campā³ and Pārāsāriya of Kajāṅgala.⁴ Sonadāṇḍa maintained three hundred students with a permanent source of income granted to him by Bimbisāra. There were at Campā many brähmana gahapatis who respected Sonadāṇḍa and resented his visit to Buddha, but they changed their mind on hearing that Bimbisāra, Pasenadi and Pokkharasāḍi had already become lay-devotees of Buddha. Sonadāṇḍa argued with Buddha about the qualities that make a brähmana and was ultimately silenced by him. The brähmana gahapatis accompanying Sonadāṇḍa were not all very respectful to Buddha, for there were among them some who just announced their name and gottā and did not show him the usual courtesies.⁵ After the disputation, Sonadāṇḍa expressed his faith in Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha. At Kajāṅgala lived the Pārāsāriya brähmana, one of whose disciples (anteväśi) was Uttara. Buddha had a talk with

¹ Satapatha-Brähmana, I, 4, 1; Atharva Veda, V, 22, 14.
² For identification, see Cunningham’s Ancient Geography (2nd ed.), pp. xliii, 548, 723; IRAS., 1904.
³ Dīgha, I, pp. 111 ff.
⁴ Majjhima, III, p. 298.
⁵ Dīgha, I, p. 118.
Uttara about his teacher’s views on the control of sense-organs, and this he made an occasion for imparting a discourse to Ānanda on the methods of indriyabhāvanā.1 Buddha’s missionary activities within Aṅga seem to have been limited, and there was also not much of opposition to the propagation of the new religion. On more than one occasion Buddha had been to Aṅga and dwelt at Campā, Āpāna, Assapūra, and Kajāngala.

Campā

Campā said to have been built by Mahāgovinda,2 was the capital of Aṅga. There was in it a famous lake named after its queen called Gaggarāpokkharanī, on the banks of which the paribbājakas3 as also Buddha with his disciples resided from time to time. Conversion of Sonadaṇḍa brāhmaṇa took place here as also of several other householders,4 of whom the names of Pessa-hathārohapattra and Vajjiyamāḥita are specially mentioned. Pessa was a great admirer of the spiritual exercises and though a householder tried to practise the satipaṭṭhānas,5 while Vajjiya was praised by Buddha for his insight into the Buddhist dhamma, enabling him to silence those paribbājakas who spoke ill of Buddha in his presence.6 The only notable bhikkhu of Campā known to us is Sona Kolivisa, who was the son of Usabhaseṭṭhi.7

1 Majjhima, III, p. 298. 
2 Dīgha, II, p. 235. 
3 Samyutta, V, p. 189; Majjhima, I, p. 339. 
4 Camppeyyaka upāsaka, Kajāngala upāsaka, see Majjhima, III, p. 298; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 59. 
6 Aṅguttara, V, pp. 189-192. 
7 Psalms of the Brethren, p. 135; Mahāvagga, v, 1: it was on
Buddha came across a few paribbājakas at Campā. Names of two only have come down to us. One is Uttiya paribbājaka¹ who tried to elicit from Buddha answers to the indeterminable problems but as usual failed in his effort, and the other is Kandaraka,² who merely expressed his admiration for Buddha but did not discuss any doctrine with him.

Assapura

Buddha visited Assapura in Aṅga but no mention is made of having converted any person there. He delivered the two Assapurasuttas,³ in both of which he discussed what made a true Samanā and gave his own programme of mental and physical disciplinary practices for becoming a Samanā.

Āpāna

Āpāna is described in the Majjhima Nikāya⁴ as Aṅguttara-pānāṃ nigamo and in the Saṃyutta Nikāya⁵ as Aṅgānāṃ nigamo. At Āpāna Buddha converted a distinguished householder called Potaliya by explaining to him the ethical principles of Buddhism and asserting that Buddha’s teaching went beyond vohāra (usage).⁶ Three other discourses were delivered here, dealing with faith (saddhā), desires (kāmaguna), meditation (jhānas), etc.⁷

account of the very delicate feet of the bhikkhu Soṇa Koḷivisa that the rule of using shoes by the bhikkhus came to be introduced.

¹ Aṅguttara, V, p. 193.
³ Ibid., I, p. 271 f., 281 f.
⁴ Ibid., I, p. 359.
⁵ Saṃyutta, V, p. 225.
⁶ Majjhima, I, p. 359 f.
⁷ Majjhima, I, p. 447; Suttanipāta, p. 102 f.; Saṃyutta, V, p. 225.
Kajañgala

Kajañgala, the easternmost limit of the Buddhist majjhima-desa, was visited by Buddha on one or two occasions. The conversion of Uttara mānava described above took place here. There were also a few lay-devotees and a bhikkhuṇī called Kajañgalā.

KOSAMBI

The country of the Vatsas, one of the four monarchies of ancient India, lay to the south of Kosala and was ruled by King Udena, who had his capital at Kosambi. In Buddha’s time Kosambi was one of the chief cities ranking in importance next to Rājagaha and Sāvatthi. It was one of the main stopping places on the trade-routes between Rājagaha or Sāvatthi and Ujjeni or Māhiṣsati. Buddha spent here his ninth vassa and the tenth in a neighbouring forest called Parileyyaka, whither he retired in disgust at the quarrel between the two groups of bhikkhus described as the Dhammadharas and the Vinayadharas. Kosambi is the only city within the country of the Vatsas, which is mentioned in the Nikāyas. In this city there were three hermitages called Ghositārāma, Pāvārika-ambavana and Kukkuṭārāma built by the three setṭhis, viz., Ghosaka, Pāvāriya and Kukkuṭa, of whom Ghosaka was the lord treasurer of the realm. The hermitages were located a league apart on the main road. The three setṭhis once went to Sāvatthi on business. On listening to the discourses of Buddha they became his admirers

1 It is mentioned in the Samyutta Nikāya (V, pp. 89, 168, 169) that the easternmost place visited by Buddha in the course of his missionary tour was Setaka, a nigama of Suhma in Rādhā.
2 Majjhima, III, p. 298.
3 Mahāvagga, x; Dhammapada-atṭhakatthā, I, p. 44 f.
and invited him to their native country. Of the hermitages, Ghositārāma was the one most frequented by Buddha and his disciples. It was while Buddha was staying in this Ārāma that the paribbājakas Maṇḍissa and Jāliya met him and tried to elicit from him an answer to the question whether the soul is identical with, or different from, the body but failed to do so. In the Kosambaka and Upakkile sa suttas Buddha referred to the lack of concord among monks and the ways of avoiding it as also on the various upakkiletas (mental impurities). On this occasion he also framed a number of Vinaya rules to avert the chances of future discord within the Saṅgha. There are a few discourses ascribed to Ānanda, which, it seems, were delivered at Kosambi by him after Buddha’s death, when, according to the tradition, the meeting also took place between him and King Udena. While staying at Ghositārāma, Ānanda met Sandaka paribbājaka with his large following and gave him a discourse dealing with the doctrines of the six Titthiyas, concluding it by an exposition of Buddha’s teaching, and ultimately converting him though much against the will of his followers. On another occasion Ānanda addressed the two brāhmaṇas Uṇṇābha and Bhaddaji, the former on the cessation of all mental states including viriya and citta in the mind of an arhat, and the latter on the cessation of āsavas.

King Udena and others

King Udena was not at first very friendly to the new religion. He married Ghosaka’s daughter, Sāmāvati, who as also her father were ardent devotees of Buddha. He afterwards married

1 Dhammapada-āṭṭhakathā, I, p. 203 f.
2 Dīgha, I, p. 159.
3 Majjhima, I, p. 320; III, p. 152.
Vāsuladattā and the queen of beauty, Māgandiya, daughter of Māgandiya of the Kuru country. Māgandiya was envious of Sāmāvatī and intrigued to bring about her ruin. This she managed to do by convincing the king, who was opposed to Buddhism, by proving Sāmāvatī’s great devotion for Buddha. King Udena later on found out his mistake and became repentant.¹ There were two other occasions when the king showed his resentment at the gifts made by the ladies of his palace to Ānanda and Piṇḍola Bharadvāja but it is said that he later on changed his mind and acquiesced in the gifts.² Among the adherents of Buddha, Khujjutarā, the attending maiden of queen Sāmāvatī, is praised in the Nikāyas as the one of the best of upāsikās and the bhikkhu Piṇḍola Bharadvāja as the chief of sīhanādikās (lion-roarers). Piṇḍola, it is said, was the son of the royal chaplain. He later on converted king Udena to Buddhism.³

CETI OR CEDI

The country of the Cedis to the west of Kosala lay, it seems, beyond the pale of Buddhism during Buddha’s lifetime. Sāhajāti, a place in Cedi, attained some prominence as a centre of Buddhism after the death of Buddha. In the Āṅguttara and Samyutta Nikāyas⁴ we come across the name of this place as the scene of some of the discourses delivered by the bhikkhu Mahācunda and as the resort of many bhikkhus.*

¹ Buddhist India, p. 36; Burlingame, op. cit., I, pp. 277 ff.; Yunn Chwang, I, p. 369; Divyāvadāna, p. 529; Malalasekera, op. cit., p. 612.
² Mahāvagga, II, p. 291; Suttanipāta Comy., p. 514-5.
³ Samyutta, IV, pp. 110 ff.; Āṅguttara, I, p. 25; Samyutta, V, p. 224; Psalms of the Brethren, pp. 110-111.
⁴ Āṅguttara, III, p. 335; V, pp. 41, 157; Samyutta, V, p. 436.
* Here ends the story of the propagation of Buddhism in the Majjhima-desa. In the countries called Paccantima-janapada, the place
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WESTERN & NORTHERN INDIA

Although the countries in western and northern India were not visited by Buddha, Buddhism made a fair progress there and played an important rôle in the later history of Buddhism. During Buddha's life-time, however, it could count among its adherents people from the western countries such as VERAṈJA, AVANTI, SURAṈPARAṈTA and from among the KURUS and the MADDAS.

VERAṈJA

The westernmost point reached by Buddha in his peregrinations was VERAṈJA a place near Madhurā in the twelfth vassa. When Buddha was at Śāvatthi, some brāhmaṇas of Buddhism is nonetheless important. A close study of the Nikāyas shows that Buddha did travel outside the limits of Buddhist MAJHIMA-DESA as far west as VERAṈJA, Madhurā and as far north as the country of the KURUS. Many disciples of Buddha hailed from PACCANTIIMA JANAPADA or border countries. The reason why the designation PACCANTIIMA-DESA was applied to places like SĀṅKASSA and UJJENI is to be found in the fact that they formed the border-land of the MAJHIMA-DESA of the Buddhists. The rules of discipline framed by Buddha were meant generally for the monks residing within the MAJHIMA-DESA, boundaries of which are given in the VINAYA. PĀṬHEYYA, SĀṅKASSA, AVANTI, GANDHĀRA etc. were outside the boundaries. Buddha himself relaxed some of the rules of discipline in regard to the monks of those places in view of the physical conditions under which they lived. This relaxation of the rules shows that Buddha had to take note of the convenience and needs of the monks of the distant regions indicated by the expression PACCANTIIMA-JANAPADA. A century after Buddha's PARINIBBĀNA, AVANTI and PĀṬHEYYA rose to be important centres of Buddhism, so much so that the presence of monks from these distant places was regarded as indispensable at the meetings held for settling points of dispute raised by the VAIJJIAN monks of VESĀLI. See Vol. II of this work.
Verañja used to go there. They had a talk with him about the fruits of good and evil kamma. On one occasion Buddha was invited by the Verañja brāhmaṇas to go to their native country. Buddha accepted their invitation at the outset of the twelfth vassa. On his way from Madhurā to Verañja (antarā ca Madhurāṃ antarā ca Verañjam) he delivered a discourse on what makes an ideal husband and wife, to the house-holders, who were on their way from Verañja to Madhurā. Buddha and his bhikkhus, however, had a bitter experience at Verañja. It was during their residence there that a famine broke out and the bhikkhus were put to a great difficulty in procuring their daily food. They were neglected by the people of the locality and would have starved but for the charity of some horse-dealers of the northern country who stopped there in the midst of their journey and supplied them with steamed grain in patthā measures. Buddha took up his residence at Naḷerupucimanda-mūla where a Verañja brāhmaṇa came and questioned him about the reason of his not showing marks of respect to the aged brāhmaṇas. To this question Buddha made a suitable reply justifying his behaviour and converted the brāhmaṇa to Buddhism. At the very same place he had a talk with Pahārada Asurinda regarding the eight excellences of his dhamma and vinaya. He left Verañja at the end of the vassa

1 Majjhima, I, pp. 290-291.
3 Aṅguttara, II, p. 57.
4 Vinaya, III, p. 6; Burlingame's Buddhist Legends, II, p. 193.
5 Aṅguttara, IV, p. 172; Mahāvagga, ii, pp. 2 ff.
6 Aṅguttara, IV, pp. 197 ff.
and accompanied by Ānanda passed through Soreyya, Saṅkassa, Kaṅnakujja, Payāgapatiṭṭhānam, crossed the Ganges and reached Benares.\(^1\) He met here Mahākaccāyana for the first time and by converting him paved the way for the establishment of a centre of Buddhism in Avantī.

**Avantī**

Avantī was one of the sixteen janapadas of the Buddhist texts. It was ruled over by King Pajjota who had his capital at Ujjeni. In the Mahāgovindasutta, Māhissati is described as the capital of Avantī. Perhaps it was the ancient capital. Buddhism was introduced into Avantī by Mahākaccāyana who was one of the most distinguished apostles of the Buddhist faith and made a substantial contribution to its prosperity. He was the son of the royal priest of King (Caṇḍa) Pajjota and the nephew of rṣi Asita (or Kāladevala) the great seer of the Vindhyācala who paid his homage to Siddhārtha when a child. It was at Asita’s advice that the young ascetic Nālaka (former name of Mahākaccāyana) came to Benares to pay a visit to Buddha and being very much impressed by the unsurpassed erudition of the Teacher, became a Buddhist monk along with his companions.\(^2\) This group of bhikkhus with Mahākaccāyana as their head returned to their native country and founded monasteries there at Kuruṇagharapapātāpabhatā and Makkarakātha. Of the notable converts made here, names of Puṇṇa, Soṇa Kuṭikaṇṇa of Aparānta, Isidatta caravan guide of Velugāma, Kaṇḍarāyana and Lohicca brāhmaṇas

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1 Vinaya, III, p. 11. (From Benares, Buddha went to Vesālī where he spent his 13th vassa).

2 Mahāvastu, II, p. 30; III, p. 382; Romantic History of Buddha (translated from the Chinese Abhiniśkramana Sūtra) by S. Beal, p. 276; Sutta Nipāta (P.T.S.), Nālaka Sutta, vs. 696 ff.
may be mentioned. In the *Thera* and *Theri-gāthā*, we come across the names of a few other monks and nuns of Avantī whose psalms have been preserved in the collection. In the *Majjhima Nikāya* we read of the conversion of king Madhura Avantiputta by Mahākaccāyana by delivering the famous discourse on caste-system some time after Buddha’s demise. The conversion of king Canda Pajjota by Mahākaccāyana is narrated in the *Theragāthā* but there is no reference to it in the *Nikāyas*.

A remarkable feature of the activities of Mahākaccāyana is that he as an expositor was engaged more in giving detailed expositions of Buddha’s enigmatic sayings than delivering independent discourses of his own. People used to come to him for solving their doubts in regard to utterances of Buddha: Kāli upāsikā requested him to explain a stanza from *Kumāripaṇha* of the *Sutta Nipāta* (i, p. 126), the Hāliddikāni gahapati from the Māgandiyapaṇha of the *Aṭṭhakavagga* and Sakkapaṇha Sutta of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (Sutta No. 21) and so forth.

It was under the guidance of Mahākaccāyana helped by Soṇa Kuṭikaṇṇa that Buddhism inspite of adverse circumstances gradually obtained a footing in Avantī. Though the country was situated at a long distance from Magadha, yet on account of its facilities of communication with the ports of Western India and the principal cities of Magadha and Kosala it became an important centre of Buddhism.

1 *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 68; *Samyutta*, IV, pp. 117, 288.
3 *Majjhima*, II, pp. 83 ff.
4 *Aṅguttara*, V, pp. 46 ff.
5 *Samyutta*, III, pp. 12, 13; IV, p. 115.
6 *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 246.
The centre of Buddhism in Avanti, it seems, laid special stress on the ascetic practices allowed by the Buddhist code for which it is remarked in the Vinaya that the bhikkhus of Avanti were followers of dhūtavāda precepts.¹

Sunāparānta

The notable figure of Sunāparānta is Puṇṇa who belonged to Suppāraka, a port of Sunāparānta. His firm resolution to propagate Buddhism inspite of adverse circumstances was commended by Buddha, who on account of this sturdiness in the cause of the religion considered him the fittest person to be entrusted with the work of preaching there his religion.² In the Majjhima Nikāya³ it is stated that Puṇṇa was able to secure 500 upāsikās in that place before he attained nibbāṇa.

THE KURUS

The farthest place in the north visited by Buddha in the course of his missionary tour was that of the Kurus—the ancient home of the highest brāhmānic culture. Buddha delivered two important discourses in the brāhmānic villages called Kammassadhāmā and Thullakottīta. The association of the country with these two discourses has made it memorable in the annals on the spread of Buddhism. These discourses are the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and the Mahāniddāna Suttanta.⁴ The first deals with the principles of the Buddhist system of meditation and teaches how a person can reach a very high stage of sanctification by the simple process of constant satipaṭṭhāna (smṛti-upasthāna) without having recourse to the more arduous

methods prescribed in the *yoga-sāstras*. The second discourse explains the ten-fold\(^1\) chain of causation (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) leading to misery or salvation. A few other discourses relating to the means of cessation of *dukkha*, worthlessness of sensual pleasures, the eight *vimokkhas*, etc. were also delivered at the place.\(^2\)

It appears from the *Rāṭṭhapāla* and *Māgandiya suttas* that some of the brāhmaṇas of the Kuru country held Buddha in great esteem and resorted to him to listen to his teachings. So great was Bharadvājagotta brāhmaṇa’s respect for Buddha that he used to offer a seat to him in his sacrificial hall in the face of protest by Māgandiya paribbājaka.\(^3\) Rāṭṭhapāla, a member of the most respectable brāhmaṇa family of Thullakoṭṭhita, approached Buddha along with a large number of brāhmaṇa gahapatis to listen to his discourses. Rāṭṭhapāla was so much impressed that he at once made up his mind to become a bhikkhu. He had some difficulty in having the consent of his parents to his ordination but ultimately he succeeded and became a bhikkhu. After the attainment of arhathood, he paid a visit to the land of his birth and made a great impression upon the mind of the Kuru king by giving an exposition of some of the principles of Buddhism.\(^4\) The *Nikāyas* do not mention any other convert of the Kuru country except Māgandiya paribbājaka who was at first so very averse to Buddhism.\(^5\)

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1 In the chain the usual first two links are omitted, and *viññāṇa* and *nāmarūpa* are made co-existent instead of the latter being caused by the former. Cf. *Samyutta*, II, pp. 92-93; Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 94.


THE MADDAS

Buddha had also among his disciples the people of the more distant Madda country, the notable of them being the bhikkhu Mahākappina and the two bhikkhuṇīs Khemā and Bhaddā Kapilāni. Buddha converted Khemā, the queen of Bimbisāra, in the seventh year of his missionary career after the institution of the order of nuns at Vesāli. She attained the highest stage of sanctification and was designated by Buddha as the chief of the highly wise nuns (mahāpaṇṇā). Her fame spread all over Magadha and Kosala as panditā, viyattā, medhāvinī, bahussutā, cittakathi, kalyānapaṭibbānā (wise, experienced, intelligent, erudite, charming in her talks, and correct in her accents). She satisfied Pasenadi of Kosala by her expositions of indeterminate problems. The conversion of Khemā contributed to the popularity of the Buddhist order of nuns but also made easy the path of the spread of Buddhism in Sāgala, the capital of the Maddas, sprung as she was from the royal dynasty of the Madda country. Besides Khemā the two other notable converts, who hailed from the Madda country, were Mahākappina of the royal family of Kukkuṭavatī, mentioned by Buddha as the chief of the bhikkhu ovādaka (admonisher of bhikkhus) and Bhaddā Kapilāni of the Sāgala brāhmaṇa families and wife of Mahākassapa, referred to by Buddha as the foremost of the nuns who attained the knowledge of their previous births (pubbenivāsa-anussaranti).

1 Anguttara, I, p. 25; Manorathapūraṇī, I, p. 345.
2 Samyutta, IV, p. 375.
3 Ibid., pp. 375-80.
5 Manorathapūraṇī, I, pp. 318-324.
6 Ibid., pp. 375-6; Psalms of the Sisters, pp. 47-49.
CHAPTER XII

THE MIDDLE PATH

In chapters II-V, we have discussed the religious beliefs of the pre-Buddhistic days and the criticism that Buddha made of the same; in the present and subsequent chapters we propose to review the ethics and doctrines as promulgated by the great Teacher. It is said that the topic of Buddha’s first religious discourse, the Dhammacakkappavattanasutta,1 was the Middle Path (majjhima paṭipadā), which was so called because it kept itself clear of the two extremes, one being the life of worldly pleasures, perhaps pointing to the life led by the brāhmaṇas who believed in the efficacy of sacrifices and rituals, and the other being the life of austere asceticism resorted to by the non-brāhmaṇic orders like the Jainas and the Ājivikas. In the 5th century B.C. when Buddha appeared on the scene, both forms of belief, viz., attainment of the sumnum bonum either by householders through sacrificial rituals or by ascetics through self-mortifications took a strong hold of the people’s minds. In the Aṅguttara-nikāya2 the former is called āgālha paṭipadā and the latter nījhmā paṭipadā. To combat these two beliefs Buddha enunciated his majjhima paṭipadā consisting of the practice of

1 See Ch. VIII, p. 101-2; Thomas, Life of the Buddha, p. 87; Samyutta, V, 420; Lal. Vis., p. 540; Mahāvastu, III, p. 330, Vinaya, I, p. 11.

2 Aṅguttara, I, p. 295: āgālha = natthi kāmesu doso so kāmesu pātavyatam āpajjati; nījhmā = anekavihitam kāyassa ātāpanaparīta-panānuyogaṁ anuyutto viharati.
the eight-fold path and the comprehension of the four truths. The *majjhima paṭipadā* is also explained philosophically as the teaching which establishes the hollowness of the extreme assertions about the ultimates like *asti* and *nāsti*, *sāsvata* and *asaśvata*, *anta* and *ananta*.\(^1\)

For the present we shall leave aside the philosophical interpretation and go into the details of its ethical aspect. For the convenience of readers, the *majjhima-paṭipadā* is explained in original Pāli in a tabular form in the chart annexed hereto.

According to the traditional method of exposition, the whole of the Buddhist discipline as shown in the chart is divided into three sections, which in English phraseology may be put as *physical*, *mental* and *intellectual*, in Pāli *sīla*, *citta* (or *samādhi*) and *pañña*. If the suttas of the *Dīgha* and *Majjhima Nikāyas* be carefully scanned, it will be noticed that the compilers had always kept this division at the back of their minds.\(^2\)

### I. Sīla

In every religion and not in Buddhism alone, the first demand that is made of the followers is observance of moral precepts (*silas*), that is, restraint in physical actions including speech. It is ordinarily known in India as *brahmacarya*.

According to the Buddhists, *sīla* consists of *sammā vācā*, *sammā kammanta* and *sammā ājīva*, the three of the eight divisions of the Path leading to Nibbāna. These three terms

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2. In the *Brahmajāla-sutta* only the first, while in the *Sāmañña-phala-sutta* the first and second have been exhaustively treated, the third being dismissed only with a para on the comprehension of the *ariyasaccas* (*Dīgha*, I, p. 84).
practically include the whole code of moral laws that are prescribed for the conduct of the Buddhist monks. In the Vibhaṅga (pp. 235-6) and the Majjhima Nikāya (III, pp. 251 ff.) these are detailed as follows:

Sammā-vācā = refraining from speaking falsehood, malicious words, harsh and frivolous talk;

Sammā-kammanta = refraining from killing, stealing, and misconduct; and

Sammā-ājīva = refraining from earning livelihood by improper means, i.e. arts and crafts of laymen. Some of these are: astrological or astronomical forecasts, interpretation of dreams and omens, use of magical spells, determination of the nature of men, animal and things by their signs, acting as go-betweens between kings, taking part in marriage ceremonies, giving medicines and so forth.

II. Citta

Next to physical, the discipline that is expected of the followers of a religion is mental, which is generally known as dhyāna (= Pāli jhāna) and saṁādhi. In Buddhism, mental discipline does not necessarily imply only concentration of mind, as will be evident from the three terms that have been used in speaking of it in the formulae of the eightfold path, viz.,

Sammā-vāyāma = exertion to remove the existing evil thoughts, to keep the mind free from being polluted by fresh evil thoughts, and to preserve and increase the good thoughts;

1 For detailed treatment, see Intra, Ch. XIII. Cf. Majjhima, I, p. 301:

Silakkhandha = samma vācā, kammanto and ājīva
Samādhipakkhandha = samma saṁādhi
Paññākkhandha = samma diṭṭhi and saṅkappa.

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1 For detailed treatment, see *Infra, Ch. XIII*. Cf. *Majjhima, I*, p. 301:

Silakkhandha = sammā vācā, kammanto and ājīva
Samādhihikkhandha = sammā samādhi
Paññākkhandha = sammā diṭṭhi and sankappa.

### I. A TABULAR EXPOSITION OF THE MAJJHIMĀ PAṬIPADA

**A. Sila**

| (i) Sammā-vācā (Proper words) | (i) musīvada veramuṇī |
| (ii) pīṣūnāya vācāya v. | (ii) pīṣūnāya vācāya v. |
| (iii) phurusāya vācāya v. | (iv) sampphappalāpā v. |
| (iv) sampphappalāpā v. |

| (ii) aditunādāna veramuṇī |
| (iii) kāmesṭi micchicārā v. |
| (iv) abrahmacariyā v. |

**B. Citta (= Samādhi)**

| (i) Sammā-vāyāma (Proper exertion) | (i) exortion (vāyāma) for anuppannānam akusālānām anuppaṭādaya |
| (ii) | uppannānam akusālānām pahānāya |
| (iii) | anupparinānām kusalānām upādaya |
| (iv) | uppannānam kusalānam vepullāya |

| (ii) vedanāsavo vedanānupassī viharati |
| (iii) citte cittinupassī viharati |
| (iv) dhamme dhāmmānupassī viharati |

**C. Paññā**

| (i) Sammā-samkappa (Right resolutions) | (i) nekkhamma-samkappa |
| (ii) avyāpāda-s. |
| (iii) avihimsā-s. |

| (ii) dukkhaḥ ānāṇī, i.e., saṅkhittena pañcuppādaṇakkaṁhandhe ānāṇī |
| (iii) dukkhasamudaye ānāṇī i.e., tanhāya |
| (iv) dukkha-nirodhe ānāṇī i.e., nibbāne ānāṇī |

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1. The *Atthakathā* on the Rathavinita-sutta (II, p. 126) and *Vism.* p. 443. 678 f. amplify the above three items, called in them *visuddhis* thus:

**I Sila-visuddhi**

| (i) appicchā-kathā |
| (ii) samnurthi-kathā |
| (iii) asampagga-kathā |
| (iv) sīla-kathā |

| (i) pāviveka-kathā |

**II Citta-visuddhi**

| (i) vipākarambhā-kathā |
| (ii) samādhi-kathā |

| (i) diṭṭhi-visuddhi = nāmarūpa-yathāvadassanam |
| (ii) kaṅkhā-vitarāṇa-visuddhi = nāmarūpaṇa paccayaaparipāramah |
| (iii) maggaṁmaggaṁnaṇāsasa-vissuddhi = nātapariṇāṇa, tiriṇapariṇāṇa and pahānānînā sa paccakkhandha añiccadivasena sammassanam etc. |
| (iv) paṭipada-ānādassana-vissuddhi = muñcita-kametā-ānāṇī |
| (v) ānādassana-vissuddhi |

**III Paññā-visuddhi**

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2. In the *Dhammasaṅgani*, p. 33-34. as also in the *Vism.* p. 169 it has been shown that some scholastics split up the second *jātaka* into two thus:—

(a) avitakkaṁ vicāranaṁ samādhiṁ pītuśukham

(b) avitakkaṁ avicāram

3. The division into three sections is given according to the *Majjhima*, I, p. 301 quoted in *Vism.* p. 514 but I would prefer to include sammā-samkappa within Citta (or Samādhi). In the *Abhidhammakośa-yaśasī* (p. 44) samyag-dṛṣṭi, samyak-saṁkalpa and samyag-वायव्य are included in Prajñā-skandha.

4. For detailed exposition, see chapters XIII-XV.
II. A TABULAR EXPOSITION OF PANNĀ

Paññā or niñanam (knowledge)\(^1\)

(i) in 5 upādānakkhambhas (five constituents of a being), viz.
   - rūpa (material parts of a body);
   - vedanā (feeling—good, bad and indifferent);
   - saññā (perception—do);
   - sañkhāra (impressions—do);
   - viññāna (= ciita = mano = detailed knowledge) see Abhi. Kośa, i. p. 149.

(ii) in 12 āyatanas, (six organs of sense and their objects), viz.,
   - cakkhu (eye) and rūpa (object);
   - sota (ear) and saddha (sound);
   - ghāna (nose) and gandha (smell);
   - jhūṃha (tongue) and rasā (taste);
   - kāya (body) and phoṭṭhassa (contactual objects);
   - mano (mind) and dhamma (everything, material and non-material).

(iii) in 18 dhātus (elements upholding a body) viz.,
   - cakkhu, rūpa and cakkhuviññāna (eyes, object and perception acquired through eyes);
   - sota, saddha and sotaviññāna (ears, sound, and perception acquired through ears)
   - ghāna, gandha and ghānaviññāna
   - jhūṃha, rasā and jhūṃhaviññāna
   - kāya, phoṭṭhassa and kāyaviññāna
   - mano, dhamma and manaviññāna
   (to be translated as above).

   - cakkhu (eye)
   - sota (ear)
   - ghāna (nose)
   - jhūṃha (tongue)
   - kāya (body)
   - mano (mind)
   - itthi (femininity)
   - purusa (masculinity)
   - jivita (vitality, āyu)
   - sukha (pleasing physically)
   - dukkha (displeasing physically)
   - somanassa (i.e. cetasikam, see Vibhaṅga, p. 85, pleasing mentally)
   - dumanassa (displeasing mentally)
   - avijjā: (ignorance of the Truth)
   - sañkhāra: (mental impressions)
   - viññāna: (consciousness)
   - nāmarūpa: (mental and physical constituents)
   - salāyatanas: (six organs of sense and their objects)
   - phassa: (contact)
   - vedanā: (feeling, good, bad or indifferent)
   - tanhā: (desire)
   - upādāṇa: (stronger desire, clinging)
   - bhava: (desire for existence)
   - jāti: (birth)
   - jārāmarāṇa, etc. (old age, death, etc.)

\(^1\) For detailed exposition, see chapter XV.
Sammā-sati = mindfulness of all that is happening within the body and mind including feelings, and observant of the things of the world, and at the same time suppressing covetousness (abhijjhā) and avoiding mental depression (domanassa); and Sammā-samādhi = various forms of meditation as recommended in the Buddhist texts.¹

III. Pañña

The third, the intellectual discipline, is denoted by the terms sammā-saṅkappa and sammā-diṭṭhi. The term sammā-saṅkappa means the will to renounce the world, to refrain from bearing ill-will and causing injury to beings while sammā-diṭṭhi means the view propounded by Buddha about the nature of the things of the world and the ultimate.

From the above, it is evident that for physical and mental disciplines, Buddhism drew up only a scheme of its own for the use of its followers from among the various moral and meditational practices prevalent in India, and hence there was nothing particularly Buddhistic in them. It is in the third, pañña or prajña i.e. sammā-diṭṭhi that Buddhism offered its own solution of the highest riddle of the universe and wanted its followers to comprehend its new viewpoint.

By intellectual discipline it means popularly the comprehension of the four ariyasaccas,² but actually, it means realisation of the fact that the khandhas, dhātu, āyatanas etc. are devoid of any real substance (anattā).³ According to the Visuddhimagga⁴ silavisuddhi (moral purification) and citta visuddhi (perfection in mental exercises) form the two legs of Buddhism, its body being

¹ For detailed treatment, see Infra, Ch. XIV.
² Digha, I, p. 84.
³ See Ante, Ch. VII.
⁴ Vism., pp. 433, 515.
the *diṭṭhivisuddhi* (the true or the Buddhistic view about the nature of the Reality. For attaining *diṭṭhivisuddhi* one must comprehend the nature of

(i) *khandhas* (constituents of a being),
(ii) *āyatanas* (organs of sense and their spheres),
(iii) *indriyas* (faculties), and
(iv) the characteristics of the four *dhātus* (spheres of existence), the true meaning of the *ariyasaccas* (truths), and *paṭiccasamuppāda* (the theory of causation).

In the *Mahāsaṅkuludāyisutta* (*Majjhima*, II, pp. 9-22), there is almost a comprehensive scheme of the Buddhist doctrine in its three divisions. First there is the reference to the Sila-practices the severer form of which, though approved by Buddha, has been pointed out as optional; it is followed by an exposition of the four *ariyasaccas*, which comprehend in a popular form the Buddhist philosophical teaching (*pañña*), and then by an enumeration of the thirty-seven *bodhipakkhiyas*, the eight *vimokkhas*, the eight *abhibhāyatanas*, ten *kasinas*, four *jhānas*, and the six *abhiññās*, in short, all that is denoted by *citta* or *samādhi*.

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1 For detailed treatment, see *Infra*, Ch. XV.
CHAPTER XIII

THE MORAL PRECEPTS

Observance of silas or moral precepts, as has been already shown, forms the first step in the spiritual progress of a person. The silas can be generally classified under three heads, kāyika (physical), vācasika (verbal) and mānasika (mental). In several suttas of the Suttapiṭaka, the silas have been treated from different standpoints and hardly admit of enumeration within a small compass. By way of illustration we may refer to the very first sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya for a list of silas which are classified there under cūla (minor), majjhima (medium) and maha (major). In the Visuddhimagga (pp. 10-16), Buddhaghosa has attempted to generalise them in the answer to the question: kathaviddham silam. For the monks and nuns is prescribed a number of moral duties, some of which are codified in the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha and Bhikkhuṇī-pātimokkha, while for the unordained novices (sāmaṇeras) are prescribed the well-known ten silas,¹ of which the first five only are meant for all lay-devotees

1 The ten silas or sikkhāpadas are:

(i) Pāṇātipātā veramaṇi.
(ii) Adinnādānā veramaṇi.
(iii) Abrahmacariyā or kāmesu micchācarā veramaṇi.
(iv) Musāvadā veramaṇi.
(v) Surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhānā veramaṇi.
(vi) Vikalabhōjanā veramaṇi.
(vii) Naccagītavāditavisukadassanā veramaṇi.
(viii) Mālāgandhavilepana-dhāraṇa-maṇḍana-vibhusaṇaṭṭhānā veramaṇi.
(upāsakas and upāsikās), the more faithful among them, however, being permitted to observe the first eight silas on the uposatha days, with the option of observing all the ten silas. These five or eight silas are called by Buddhaghosa gahaṭṭhasilas (precepts meant for householders).

The Pātimokkha is the accepted code of moral duties for the monks and nuns, and the declaration of non-transgression of any of the rules contained in it on the fortnightly uposatha days is regarded as sufficient for making a monk or nun morally pure. Apart from the Pātimokkha rules, there are hundreds of other rules which the monks and nuns are expected to observe. In short, every monk or nun is required to be ideally pure as far as the moral precepts are concerned.

Broadly speaking, the moral duties of a bhikkhu can be divided into the following five sub-sections:

(i) Pātimokkhasamvarasīla

First, a monk is required to be well-restrained according to the 227 disciplinary rules of the Pātimokkha (see infra, ch. xvii). He should also be discreet in his conduct and movements, i.e. he must not commit any wrong either bodily or verbally in carrying on the affairs of his daily life (ācāra), or by frequenting places (gocara) unfit for a Buddhist recluse. He must always be afraid of the commission of the slightest offence (anumattesu vajjesu bhayadassāvi) and in general be observant of all the moral precepts (samādāya sikkhati sikkhāpadesu).

(ix) Uccāsayana-mahātayanā veramaṇī.


1 Vāsam., p. 15. 2 See Infra, Ch. XVII.
3 Atthaśālini, p. 168 omits the fifth, the dhutaṅgas.
4 Vibhaṅga, p. 246-8.
(ii) **Indriyasamvaraśīla**

Next to the observance of the general moral laws and Pātimokkha rules, it is enjoined that a monk must be so restrained in his organs of sense that although these may be functioning as usual the mind of the bhikkhu will not be swayed by the characteristics or the qualities, whether good or bad, of the things seen, heard, smelt, felt or tasted.¹

(iii) **Āśvapārisuddhisīla**

The common Pāli expression for propriety in food as found in the Piṭakas is *bhojane mattaṇṇu*, i.e. a bhikkhu should exercise sufficient self-restraint with regard to his food. He must always remember that he takes food not for making his body good-looking but just for its maintenance in order to be able to fulfil his mission. His food will be of such a nature that he must not develop a taste for new sensations (*vedanān*ī) and at the same time get rid of the old ones.²

In the *Pātimokkha-sutta*, there is a number of restrictions imposed on a monk for the manner in which he should take food, and a series of instructions concerning the right ways of collecting his food, but even all those instructions cannot naturally be exhaustive, so Buddhaghosa says that a bhikkhu must avoid committing offence relating to ājīva but not falling within the scope of the *Pātimokkha* rules, e.g. a bhikkhu may, by talks or signs or direct or indirect hints, persuade the believing laity to offer gifts of food, dress or other requisites to himself, or may take recourse to the various means enumerated in the *Brahmajālasutta* not befitting a Buddhist monk.³

¹ *Vibhaṅga*, p. 248.
³ *Visuddhimagga*, p. 23-4.
(iv) Paccayasannissitasila

After dealing with the likely transgressions that a monk may commit in course of his daily life, Buddhaghosa dilates on what should be the aims and objects of monks in wearing robes, accepting alms for food, using seats and beds, or seeking medicaments. In short, he means that the whole attention of the monk should be fixed on his goal and remain unmindful of his worldly necessities except so far as these are required to keep him up for reaching the goal.

(v) Dhutaṅgas or Ascetic Practices

Buddhaghosa, after thus dealing with the silas in a general way, passes on to the dhutaṅgas, the thirteen rigorous practices permitted to some monks. It will be apparent from what has been said above that according to the Buddhists, purity is more mental than physical, and hence, in Buddhist ethics emphasis has been laid more on mental than on physical discipline.¹ The monks, as a rule, were not required to undergo unnecessary physical discomforts except what was necessary for concentration of mind, i.e., a little food and cloth with a bare bed, seat, medicaments and a resting place. The restrictions which were observed by them in these matters are detailed in the Pātimokkha and other parts of the Vinaya. In the earliest stage of Buddhism, when the monks used to live as hermits in caves and forests, i.e. before the practice of living in monasteries came

¹ In the Majjhima (1, p. 238) it is stated that the ascetic practices do not even lead to kāyabhāvanā (physical discipline) not to speak of cittabhāvanā (mental discipline). Success in the ascetic practices, it is remarked (vide Dīgga, III, pp. 42-45), sometimes leads to joy, self-praise, lack of diligence and love of gain, fame and honour.
into vogue, four nissayas (conditions) were prescribed for them. These were,—

1. *pindiyālopa-bhojanam* (to take food received as alms)
2. *paṃsukūlacivaram* (to use robes made of rags collected from dust heap)
3. *rukhamūlasenāsanam* (to sit and lie at the foot of a tree) and
4. *pūtimuttabhesajjam* (to use excrements and urine as medicines).

In the Sutta-Nipāta and other earlier books of the Piṇḍakas, practice of a rigorous hermit life has been extolled, but with the introduction of monastic life, the rigorousness was gradually relaxed, and a good illustration of this fact is furnished by the Mahāvagga itself.¹

From the rules in the Patimokkha it is apparent that the earliest form of nissayas was already superseded, at the time of its compilation, by the atirekalābha, but in any case there must have been all along a section of monks who were in favour of the observance of rigorous practices in the Buddhist monastic life, and this section was perhaps responsible for the introduction of the dhutaṅgas.

In the four Nikāyas and also in the Vinaya Piṭaka there is no mention of the term dhutaṅgas not to speak of its inclusion in the list of silas. Some of the dhutaṅga-practices, such as sapadānacārī, piṇḍapātiko, paṃsukūliko, rukkhamūliko, abhokāsiko, āraññiko, pantasanāsano are mentioned incidentally in the Nikāyas² and Vinaya³ but it is also stated that Buddha himself did not practise them in his own life while some of his disciples did.⁴ It is therefore evident that the dhutaṅgas were

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¹ See *Infra, Ch. XVI.*
² See *Majjhima, I, 30; II, pp. 6-9*
³ *Vinaya, II, p. 215.*
⁴ *Majjhima, II, p. 9ff.*
not recognised in early Buddhism as a group of practices or at least as subsidiary practices compulsory for the Buddhist monks. It may be contended by some that Mahākassapa is referred to in the Samyutta and the Aṅguttara Nikāyas as the foremost of the dhūtavādins, hence the dhutaṅga practices were in vogue but as against it we may point out that had it been so, the thirteen dhutaṅgas would have found a place in the last section of the Aṅguttara, if not, in the Dasuttarasuttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya. The interpretation given in the Visuddhimagga (pp. 80-81) deserves also attention. According to it, a bhikkhu need not practise the dhutaṅgas in his own life but for that reason he is not debarred from being a dhūtavādin, i.e., an advocate or preacher of the dhutaṅgas. It may be that Mahākassapa like Buddha was only a dhūtavādi and did not observe the dhutaṅgas. The silence of the Nikāyas and the Vinaya is a distinct evidence of its later growth, or at least its later recognition by the Theravāda sect.

In this connection it is worth while to refer to one of the causes of dispute between Buddha and his cousin Devadatta. The latter wanted to make some rigorous practices compulsory on the monks of the Saṅgha, to which, however, Buddha was opposed. The practices were,

1 Samyutta, II, p. 156; Aṅguttara, I, p. 23.
2 In the IHQ., (vol. XIII). Dr. Bapat points out that in the Nikāyas, āraṇṇaka, piṇḍapātika, paṃsukūlika and tecivarika are mentioned while in the Niddesa (p. 188), there are other four, viz., sapadānacārika, khalupacchābhattika, nesajjika and yathāsaṅthatika. In the Milindapañha the number is brought to thirteen. In the Mahāvyutpatti, sapadānacārika and pattapīndika are omitted and nāmatika is added. Cf. Kern, Manual of Buddhism, p. 75-76; Childers, Pāli Dictionary, p. 310.
THE MORAL PRECEPTS

1. bhikkhu yāvajivaṁ āraññakā assu
2. „ „ pinḍapātikā „
3. „ „ pamsukūlikā „
4. „ „ rukkhamūlikā „
5. „ „ macchamaṁsam na khādeyyum.¹

Though the Pāli tradition has nothing but condemnation for Devadatta’s actions, it is apparent that Devadatta was not without some followers and influence, and that his disciplinary principles were not wholly brushed aside by the monks. The adoption of the dhutaṅgas by the Pāli school and the prohibition of eating fish and flesh by the Mahāyānists give the palm to Devadatta. The earliest reference to dhutaṅgas and their excellence is found in the Milindapañha (pp. 351-355) and their full exposition in the Visuddhimagga (pp. 59-83). The thirteen dhutaṅgas are:

1. pamsukūlikāṅgam = to wear robes made of rags collected from dust heaps of streets, cemeteries, etc.;
2. tecūvarikāṅgam = to have not more than three robes, i.e. one each of saṅghāti, uttarāsaṅga and antaravāsaka and even for washing or colouring one must manage with these three only;
3. pinḍapātikāṅgam = to eat food collected by begging only from door to door, and avoid any of the fourteen kinds of food-offerings permitted in the Vinaya;²

¹ Buddha permitted rukkhamūlasenāsaṇa for eight months and the eating of fish and meat under three restrictions, viz., adittham, asutam and aparisaṅkitam. See Vinaya, II, p. 197 also Jātaka, I, p. 34. Cf. the Mahāyānic restrictions about meat-eating in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, ch. viii. See also Thomas, Life of Buddha, pp. 134 ff.
² The fourteen kinds are—saṅghabhuttam, uddesabh., nimanṭanabh., salākabh., pakkhikam, uposathikam, patipādikam, āgantukabh., gāmikabh., gilānabh., gilānuppaṭṭhākabh., vihārabh., dhūrabh., vārakabh.
4. *sapaḍañacaṅkāṅgam* = to beg food from house to house consecutively and without any omission;¹

5. *ekāsaṅkaṅgam* = to take meal at one sitting, i.e., if one is required to stand up or move to show respect to his teacher or do some other work, he cannot resume his seat and take his food again;

6. *pattapindikaṅgam* = to possess only one bowl and not a second and to take all kinds of food thrown into it, be they tasteful or not;

7. *khalupacchāhaṅkāṅgam* = not to take any food after finishing or signifying intention of finishing one’s meal, even if any be offered (cf. *Pācittiya*, 35);

8. *ārāṇīkaṅgam* = to dwell only in forests and not on the outskirts of towns or villages, and the forests must be sufficiently far from any locality;

9. *rukhamūlikkaṅgam* = to live in a place without any shed and under a tree, and the tree must not be one of the boundary marks of a parish, or one within the compound of a monastery or *cetiya* (sanctuary), or one bearing fruits and so forth.

10. *abbhokāsikaṅgam* = to live in an open space, i.e., neither under a shed nor under a tree, but one with this vow as well as the previous one is permitted to take shelter in a covered place if it be raining, provided he does not run for any shelter to avoid being drenched;

11. *sosānikaṅgam* = to live in a cemetery. Buddhaghosa in explaining what is a suitable cemetery says that it must not be one used by the people of a village but one left unused for at least twelve years, but from the other

¹ Mahākassapa is said to have been the foremost in this dhutaṅga, see *Vism.*, p. 68.
conditions mentioned by Buddhaghosa (see *Vism.*, p. 77) it seems that he had in mind not a quite unfrequented cemetery;

12. *yathāsanthatikaṅgaṁ* = to use whatever bed or seat is allotted to one without questioning or suggesting an alternative; and

13. *nesajjikaṅgaṁ* = to spend nights sitting and not lying; of the three *yāmas*, one may be spent in walking (*caṅkamana*).

In practising the dhutaṅgas one may be very severe (*ukkattha*), moderately severe (*majjhima*) or moderate (*mudaka*). A bhikkhu may or may not observe all the thirteen dhutaṅgas, and if he practises the severer of them, it follows that he is not required to practise the less severe, e.g. an *abhokāsika* need not bother about *rukhamulikaṅga* or *yathāsanthatikaṅga*; a sapadaṇacārīka must necessarily be a *pindapātika*, and an *ekāsanika* can easily be a *pattapiṇḍika* or *khalupacchābhattika*. A bhikkhuṇī is permitted to practise only eight dhutaṅgas, i.e. they are debarred from being āraṇīka, khalupacchābhattika, abbhokāsika, rukhamulika and sosāṇīka. A sāmañera can practise twelve dhutaṅgas, i.e. omitting tecivarikaṅgaṁ, similarly a sāmañeri can practise seven omitting the tecivarikaṅgaṁ. For the male and female lay-devotees, only two of the dhutaṅgas are prescribed, viz., *ekāsanikaṅgaṁ* and *pattapiṇḍikaṅgaṁ*. 
CHAPTER XIV

THE BUDDHIST MEDITATION

The second course of spiritual exercises prescribed for a monk is for attaining complete control over the mind (citta). In verse after verse in the Dhammapada and in passages after passages in the Nikāyas the difficulty of controlling the fickle citta has been dilated upon, and at the same time it has been emphasised that the only means of attaining Nibbāna is by curbing the citta, i.e., withdrawing it from all that is attractive in the world and directing it to the highest goal. There are endless upakkilesas like rāga, dosa, moha which never permit the citta to rest at peace, and the various meditational practices prescribed in the Buddhist texts have for their first object the steadying of the mind so as not to be affected by the weal and woes of the world. It is only with a steady mind that one is capable of comprehending the essential oneness or sameness and vastness of the beings of the universe—the Nirvāṇa of the Mahāyānic schools of Buddhist philosophy.

It is almost an axiomatic truth that control over mind is attained through meditational exercises.¹

¹ Buddaghosa has often used the two words citta and samādhi synonymously. He gives the etymological meaning of samādhi thus:

"Samādhānattihena samādhi, ekārammañe citta-cetasikānaṁ samaṁ sammā ca ādhāram thapanan ti vuttaṁ hoti." (Vism., p. 84.) Samādhi means firmly placing; the act of putting or placing the mind and mental functions evenly and properly on one object is samādhi.
There is a graduated course in these meditational exercises, and this course ranges from the most elementary form of samādhi, i.e. simple fixation of mind on a black or white circular spot to the most subtle when the meditator loses wholly his consciousness and sensation and reaches a state which is almost akin to the state of death (saññāvedayitanirodha).¹

Buddhaghosa, in order to bring out the various characteristic features of a samādhi, adopted the aṅguttara method of numerical classification, which is as follows: —

(A) Samādhīs of two kinds:

1. upacāra-samādhi and appanā-samādhi. While attempting concentration of mind, upacāra is said to be that mental state which immediately precedes the fixation of the mind on a certain point; the fixation is appanā (Sansk. arpana). It may be described also as the preparatory attempts for developing complete concentration of mind, i.e., appanā;

2. (a) lokiya (when the samādhi is with kusalacitta) and lokuttara (when the samādhi is with ariyamagga);
   (b) sappitika (with joy) and nippitika (without joy);
   (c) sukhasabagata (associated with a happy state of mind) and upekkhāsabagata (associated with an equable state of mind).

(B) Samādhīs of three kinds:

3. (a) bīna (lower), majjhima (middle), and panīta (higher);
   (b) savittaka-savicara (with discursive and discriminatory thoughts), avittaka-vicāramatta (without dis-

¹ See Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism, pp. 158-61.
cursive thoughts but with discrimination), and avitakka-avicāra (without discursive and discriminatory thoughts);

(c) pīti-sabagata (with joy), sukhā-sabagata (with happy state of mind), and upekkhā-sabagata (with equanimity of mind);

(d) paritta (small) (while in upacāra-bhūmi), mahaggata (large) (while in rūpāvacara-kusala and arūpāvacara-kusala bhūmis) and appamāna (measureless) (while ariyamagga-sampayutta).

(C) Samādhis of four kinds:

4. (a) dukkha-paṭipada dandhābhiṇṇo, dukkha- paṭipado khippābhiṇṇo, sukhā- paṭipado dandhābhiṇṇo, and sukhā- paṭipado khippābhiṇṇo.

[Paṭipada is that part of mental exercise which is necessary for collecting one’s thoughts and reaching the upacāra stage, and abhiṇṇa refers to the next course of exercises which lead to appanā (i.e. fixing mind upon one point).

Dukkha here means ‘with difficulty’ as opposed to sukhā ‘with ease’; similarly dandhā means ‘slow’ as opposed to khippā ‘quick’.]

(b) paritto parittārammano (not of a high order with limited basis of meditation), paritto appamāṇa-rammano (not of a high order but with unlimited basis of meditation), appamāṇo parittārammano (unlimited but with a limited basis of meditation), appamāṇo appamāṇārammano (unlimited with unlimited basis of meditation);

(c) vitakka (discursive thoughts), vicāra (discriminatory thoughts), pīti (joy), and sukhā (happy state of
THE BUDDHIST MEDITATION

mind)—four combinations of any two or more of these:

(d) *bāna-bhāgiya* (belonging to a lower category), *thiti-bhāgiyo* (belonging to steadying category), *visesa-bhāgiyo* (belonging to a higher category), and *nibbedhābhāgiyo* (belonging to the highest);

(c) *kāmāvacaro* (belonging to the sensous sphere), *rūpāvacaro* (belonging to the sphere of material forms), *arūpāvacaro* (belonging to the sphere of non-material forms), and *apariyāpanno* (belonging to the highest);

(f) *chanda-samādhi* i.e. concentration (by means of strong will), *viriya-samādhi* (by means of energy), *citta-samādhi* (by means of mind-control) and *vīmānasā-samādhi* (by means of examination).¹

The above classification helps us only to comprehend the various mental states accompanying the different kinds of meditation but it does not tell us anything about the graduated course to be followed by an adept for passing from the lowest to the highest samādhi. So Buddhaghosa goes into minute details of the processes which induce samādhi and it will now be our object to consider them in due order as follows:

(i) ten *Pali* *bodhas* or hindrances to the practice of samādhis,

(ii) forty *kammaṭṭhānas* or the objects of meditation,

(iii) *kalyāṇamitta kammaṭṭhānadāyaka* or the spiritual preceptor,

(iv) the candidate, and

(v) the successive steps in meditation.

¹ See also *Majjhima*, II, p. 11.
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(i) THE TEN PALIBODHAS

The obstructions to one practising meditation may be of a varied nature.¹ Buddthaghoṣa puts them in a nutshell thus:

Āvāsa ca kulaṃ labho gano kammaṇ ca pañcamam
addhānāṃ nāti ābadho gantho iddhi ti te dasā ti.

These ten, Buddthaghoṣa explains, act as hindrances not to all but only to those who has got mental weaknesses as pointed out below:

(i) Āvāsa or dwelling places of monks. This affects those monks who take interest in the construction of monasteries, stūpas, and so forth.

(ii) Kula or family. It affects those who care more for the welfare of his relatives or of the families of his lay-devotees than that of his own spiritual gain.

(iii) Lābbha or gain of food and clothes. It sometimes becomes a source of distraction to the monks of repute, for greater demand is made upon their time by people for the privilege of giving them food and clothes, and not unoften these demands are created by his fellow-brethren who take advantage of his company and receive gifts along with him.

(iv) Gaṇa or members of the congregation. There are some monks whose time is taken up in teaching the texts of the Sutta or Abhidhamma pitakas and hardly find time to be alone and practise meditations.

(v) Kamma or works. Buddthaghoṣa takes it to mean navakamma (construction or repair of buildings). He says that much of a monk’s time who supervises

¹ See Milindapañha, pp. 365-399. Cf. Pātañjala, I, 30:
the building works is taken up in calculating wages of labourers or the works done or to be done.

(vi) *Addhāna* or wayfaring. There are occasions when a monk has got to go to a place to give ordination to a person or to procure any requisite. By leaving it undone, he tries to gain concentration of mind but fails to do so.

(vii) *Nāti* or relatives including in this case the teachers, disciples or fellow-brethren of the church. Sickness of any of the *nātis* is a source of distraction to some monks.

(viii) *Abādha* or one’s own sickness which requires medicine to be cured.

(ix) *Gantha* or scriptures. Some are so absorbed in studying the scriptures that they do not find time or feel inclined to practise meditation.

(x) *Iddhi* or miraculous powers. These are attained as one advances in meditation but their use causes hindrance to the development of insight (*vipassanā*) and so these also are treated as one of the palibodhas.¹

There are some other palibodhas enumerated by Buddhadharma, for instance, long hairs and nails which should be trimmed off; old robes which should be repaired; discoloured robes which should be dyed; unclean bowls which should be cleansed and weak beds which should be strengthened.

(ii) **THE FORTY KAMMAṬṬHĀNAS**

The subjects of meditation are hardly possible of enumeration though traditionally they are said to be forty in number.

¹ *Vism.*, p. 122.
The selection of the subject, as has been shown above, was left to the Kalyāṇamitta who was to choose a subject which, he thought, would be the most suitable for his disciple, no matter whether it was included in the traditional list or not. As, for instance, one of the very common subjects of meditation found in the Nikāya is aniccasāñña to destroy the sense of I-ness (asmimāna),¹ but it is not included in the traditional list.

The forty subjects are:—

1. Ten Kasiṇas
2. Ten Asubhas
3. Ten Anussatis
4. Four Brahmavihāras
5. Four Āruppas
6. One Saññā and
7. One Vavatthāna.

Ten Kasiṇas

The word ‘Kasiṇa’ is very probably a Prākṛt form of the Sanskrit word ‘Krṣna’ meaning ‘entire’. In the Buddhist meditational practices the term is applied to those subjects of meditation, which occupy the ‘entire’ mind, and as such does not give scope to the rising of any other thought.²

I. The first of the Kasiṇas in the list is Pathavākasiṇa, i.e. when earth is taken as an object of meditation. To induce concentration of mind, a beginner is generally asked to fix his attention on a piece of earth which may or may not be specially

¹ See Infra, p. 237, fn. 3.
prepared for him (kata or akata), i.e. he may choose a circular-shaped or square-shaped piece of earth when it is called kata (prepared) or he may choose, say, a ploughed field when it is called akata (unprepared). In the former case particular attention should be given to the fact that the earth must be without any colour as it is likely to divert attention from the earth to its lakkhanas, e.g. colour. It is, however, recommended that the earth should be of reddish-brown colour like that of dawn, and taken, if possible, from the bed of the Ganges. In a secluded place the adept is to take his seat and try to concentrate his mind on the paṭhavaṇaṇa, cogitating all the while the evils of kāma, the solace in overcoming it and the fact that great saints had obtained emancipation by means of such dhyānas, repeating constantly the term paṭhavā or any of its synonyms, mabi, medini, bhūmi, vasudhā, or vasundharā. The adept is to try to see with his eyes shut the image of the paṭhavā inwardly with as vividness and distinctness as he was doing with his eyes open. As soon as this is accomplished, the uggabanimittam is said to have come to stay (jātam).¹ He can now go back to his usual place of residence, and cogitate on the nimitta acquired by him.² By doing so, he gradually gets rid of the five nivarana (or hindrances to religious life),³ and the impurities (kilesas).⁴ By this first attempt

1 Vism., p. 125.
2 He is now advised to use shoes to avoid wasting time in washing his feet and also a walking stick. Vism., p. 125.
3 Viz., kāmaccchanda (strong desire), vyāpāda (hatred), thinamiddha (idleness), uddhaccakukkucca (arrogance) and vicikicchā (doubts).
4 The kilesas are ten in number, viz., lobha, dosa, moha, māna, diṭṭhi, vicikicchā, thinaṁ, uddhaccam, ahirikā, anottapam. The first four and uddhaccam are enumerated when the kilesas are calculated to be five in number.
at concentration (upacārasamādhi), his mind becomes concentrated, and there appears in the mind the paṭibhāganimitta, i.e. the image of the object of meditation (uggahanimitta) but now it is much clearer and brighter than the uggahanimitta and without the kasiṇadosa which remains in uggahanimitta. Then commences really the course of meditational practices commencing with upacāra, appanā and ending with catukka or pañcaka-jhāna.¹

II. The second is Āpo-kasiṇa, i.e. when the object of meditation is water. It may be any natural or existing expanse of water as that of a tank or a lake or even of the sea, or clear rain water collected in a vessel before it has reached the earth. The vessel must be full and placed in a quiet secluded corner of the monastery. As in the case of paṭhavī, the colour-question must be avoided, i.e. the lakkhaṇa of water must not divert the attention of the adept, and the concentration should be induced in the same way as has been explained in the case of paṭhavī, uttering in this case the word ‘āpo’ or its synonyms ambu, udakam, vāri, salilam, etc.² Gradually the uggaha and paṭi-bhāga nimittas appear and the adept proceeds along the course of meditation.

III. The third is Tejokasiṇa, i.e. when the object of meditation is fire. It may be the flame of a lamp, fire in an oven, or a jungle-fire. The fire may also be specially prepared; in that case, some faggots are to be collected and a pile made of them near a tree and then it should be set on fire. A suitable screen with a hole about four fingers wide is to be placed between the fire and the adept. The adept now is to look at the fire without minding the faggots or the smoke or its colour, even its

¹ See for details Infra, pp. 243 ff.; cf. Comp. of Phil., pp. 54-5.
² Vism., p. 170.
heat. He should utter the word ‘tejo’ or any of its synonyms and acquire the uggaha and paṭibhāga nimittas as detailed above.

IV. The fourth is Vāyokasīna, i.e. when the object of meditation is wind. It may be seen or felt. In the former case, the adept observes the swaying or shaking of the sugarcane tops or bamboo tops or hair-tips, and in the latter he feels by his body the rush of wind through a hole in a wall or through a window. He realises that it is wind which is moving the tops of sugarcane, etc. or striking his body, and then as described above he is to utter the word ‘vāyu’ or its synonyms and gradually develop the two nimittas and induce the jhānas.

V. The fifth is Nilakasīna, i.e., when the object of meditation is blue colour. It may be of flowers, a piece of cloth or a blue gem. It may be specially prepared by filling a basket up to the brim with blue flowers in such a way so that the pollens or stalk may not be seen. The basket should be covered by a piece of blue cloth in such a way that the mouth of the basket is to appear like the surface of a drum. It should be surrounded by a band of a different colour. Then he is to concentrate his mind on the blue colour avoiding the other lakkhanas of the flowers and develop the uggaha and paṭibhāga nimittas.

VI-VIII. The sixth, seventh and eighth are Pitakasīna, Lohitakasīna and Odātakasīna, i.e. when the objects of meditation are yellow, red and white respectively. The kasiṇas are to be prepared as detailed above like the Nilakasīna and the process is the same for developing the nimittas and jhānas.

IX. The ninth is Āloka-kasīna, i.e. when the object of meditation is a spot of light. The sun’s or the moon’s rays, if received through a chink in the walls, or windows or through an opening in a thick foliage, form a circular spot of light on the earth. The adept fixes his attention on it and utters ‘obhāso
obhāso’, ‘āloko āloko’. The spot of light may also be obtained artificially by putting a lamp within a jar having a hole in its side. As said before, the adept by concentrating his mind on the spot of light develops the nimittas and jhānas.1

X. The tenth is Paricchinnākāsa-kāśa, i.e. when the object of meditation is limited space. The openings in a wall or a window may well be selected as paricchinnā-ākāsa, or an opening may be made, say, four fingers wide in a well-covered pavilion or in a sheet of leather. The adept is to fix his attention on the opening and utter ‘ākāso ākāso’ and develop gradually the nimittas and jhānas.2

In conclusion, Buddhaghosa speaks of the various miraculous powers acquired by an adept successfully practising the above ten kāsīnas.3

Ten Asubhas

The ten asubha (unpleasant) objects of meditation refer to the ten states through which an uncared for corpse passes before it is completely destroyed. They are,—

(i) uddhumaṭakam or swollen corpse;
(ii) vinilakam, i.e., when the colour of the corpse has become blue;
(iii) vipubbakam or the corpse full of pus;
(iv) vicchiddakam or the corpse with limbs torn asunder (e.g. dead bodies of thieves);
(v) vikkhāyitam, i.e., when the corpse has been mangled by dogs and jackles;
(vi) vikkhittam or the corpse with dismembered limbs;
(vii) batavikkhittam or the corpse with its limbs partly destroyed and partly scattered;

1 Vism., pp. 174-5. 2 Ibid., pp. 175-7. 3 Ibid., p. 175.
(vii) lobitakam or the corpse covered here and there with blood (e.g. of a soldier in a battle field);
(ix) puluvakam or the corpse full of worms;
(x) attibikam or the skeleton.

After enumerating these ten unpleasant objects of meditation, Buddhaghosa deals with the following:

(i) safety of the place where a corpse is found;
(ii) how he should behave or what he should ponder over while going to or coming from the place of meditation;
(iii) sex of the corpse and its suitability;
(iv) advantages of leaving instructions with the teacher and fellow-brethren about the place selected by him for meditation;
(v) the path and direction to be chosen;
(vi) the nature of the noticeable objects around the place where the corpse is found;
(vii) the six characteristics of the corpse to be observed by him, viz., colour, sex, position, direction and size of the corpse, as also joints, apertures, depth of eye sockets etc., thickness, and a general view of the corpse.

The meditator, as in the case of paṭhavī, tries to convert the corpse into a concept (paṭibbāga), and then as usual gets rid of the five nīvaranas,¹ and induce the ecstacies by gradually doing away with vitakka and vicāra, pīti and sukha.²

Six Anussatis

The two previous lists of Kammattthānas speak of actual objects upon which the adept concentrates his mind, gradually

¹ See above, p. 219, fn. 3. ² Vism., p. 189.
converting them into concepts. The present list speaks of pure cogitation of the merits (gunaś)\(^1\) of (i) Buddha, (ii) Dhamma and (iii) Saṅgha, as also of (iv) silaś (observance of precepts), (v) cāga (making gifts) and (vi) devatā (ways and means by which one is reborn in the realm of the gods). Such cogitation leads to

\(^1\) In the Vśuddhimagga, the merits (gunaś) of each of these have been quoted from the Pīṭaka. These are as follows:

(i) Buddhānussati—Iti pi so Bhagavā arahamī sammāsambuddho vijjācaraṇasampanno sugato lokavidū anuttaro purisadammasārathi satthā devamanussānam Buddho Bhagavā ti.

(ii) Dhammānussati—svākkhāto Bhagavatā dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko chhipassiko opanayiko paccattamī veditabbo viśnūhi ti.


(iv) Silānussati—aho vata me silāni akhandāni acchiddāni asabalāni akammāsāni bhujissāni viśnūpasatthāni aparimaṭṭhāni samādhīsamvattanikāni ti.

(v) Cāgānussati—Lābhā vata me, suladdhāṃ vata me, yo’haṃ macccheramalaparīyutṭhitāya pajāya vigatamalamaccherena cetāsā viharāmi, muttacāgo payatapāṇi vossaggarato yāca-yogo dānasamvībhāgarato ti.

(vi) Devatānussati—Santi devā Cātunmahāraṃkikā, santi devā Tāvatimsā, Yāmā, Tusītā, Nimmānaratino, Paranimittavasavatti, santi devā Brahmakāyikā, santi devā tatuttariṇī; yathārūpāya sabbhaṣya samannāgata tā devatā ito cutā tattha uppannā mayham pi tathārūpā saddha sampiṣijjati; yathārūpena silena……..yathārūpena sutenā……..yathārūpena caṇena……..yathārūpāya paññaya samannāgata tā devatā ito cutā tattha uppannā mayham pi tathārūpā paññā sampiṣijjati ti.
quietude of the mind (cittām pasiddati) and destroys the five nīvarānas,¹ produces great joy and ultimately induces vipassanā (insight) leading to arhathood.

Other Anussatis

Besides the six anussatis mentioned above, there are three other anussatis called (i) marañña-sati, (ii) ānāpāna-sati, and (iii) upasamānussati. Unlike the first twenty kammaṭṭhānas, these are matters of cogitation and not external objects to be converted into concepts.

The practice of marañña-sati implies that the adept after having seen a corpse is to ponder over the fact that he is also subject to that inevitable death and by doing so he rouses his mindfulness of death, mental agitation and also knowledge relating to it. This leads to the destruction of the nīvarānas¹ and induction of the jhānas. Buddhaghosa gives detailed direction about the instances of death to be selected by the meditator.²

The practice of kāyagatā-sati means that the adept is to ponder over the fact that this body from head to foot is full of many impure things and that there are in it hair, nails, spleen, intestines, etc. The most popular way of taking up this kammaṭṭhāna is to repeat the list of things contained in the body hundreds or thousands of times either loudly or mentally and thereby induce concentration of mind. Buddhaghosa then gives many other directions about the best way of practising kāyagata-sati, and treats in detail the various contents of the body,—a treatment which may well bear comparison to a modern anatomical study.³

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¹ See above, p. 219, fn. 3.
² Vism., pp. 230 ff.
³ Ibid., pp. 243 ff.; 250 ff.
The second is Ānāpānasati. Inducing meditation by the process of controlling breath is very widely known and is, in fact, adopted by all religions which advocates concentration of mind. It corresponds partly to the Prāṇāyāma as described in the Brāhmaṇic Tantras and Purāṇas and the Yogaśāstras, in which pūraka (inhaling), kumbhaka (stoppage of breath) and recaka (exhaling) form the three essential factors.¹ In the Buddhist meditational practices it is given an important place and forms one of the chief subject-matters of discourse under the heading Satipaṭṭhāna. In the Yogāvacara's Manual, it is given the first place among the various meditational exercises.

Those, who choose breath-control as their Kammaṭṭhāna, are required to go to a forest or to a secluded spot, sever his thoughts from the outside world and direct his attention to his own inhalation and exhalation and thus gradually develop upacāra and appanā.² He should sit cross-legged, keeping his body erect. Then he is to exhale (assāso) and inhale (passāso), observing the time it takes for full inhalation and full exhalation, watching also when exhalation or inhalation starts (ādi), reaches the middle (majjha) and the end (pariyosāna). In exhalation the breath starts from naval (nābhi), passes through heart (hadaya) and reaches the noisetop (nāsikaggam),³ and in inhalation the process is just in the reverse direction. The mind follows the

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¹ Cf. Majjhima, I, p. 243-4; Pāṭaṅjala, I, 34. 49.
² Vism., p. 269.
³ Not nābhisāgga. See Vism., p. 280. In the Sandhyā-upāsanā of the Brāhmaṇas, the three points are nābhi, hṛdaya and lalāṭa, the first being the seat of Brahmā, the second of Keśava and the third of Sambhu. Cf. Pāṭaṅjalabhāṣya, I, 34: वैष्णव नाथोऽनालोकाकाळां प्रथमविषेणान
वन प्राक्केदस्म, विधारेण प्रातायांसः, ताल्पर्वा ता समस्तं विनिः सम्याद्येन्।
course of the breath consciously. It is only by long practice that an adept is able to keep himself aware of all the three stages of in-breathing and out-breathing. Such observation and control of the breath lead to stoppage of all bodily movements (pāsam-bhayam kāyasankhāram).

The artificial aids taken by an adept for ānāpānasati are mainly (i) ganaṇā, i.e. counting, which is not to exceed ten; (ii) anubandhanā, i.e. following the course in its three stages, viz., beginning, middle and end; and (iii) phusana i.e. watching the points of contact, nābhi, hadaya and nāsikaggaṇa. By these aids the adept soon acquires the pāṭibbāga-nimitta (concept) and develops appana (or ṭhapanā, fixation of the mind) and in some cases the body of the adept becomes so light as to rise up in the air. At this stage the external inhalation and exhalation cease but there are internal inhalation and exhalation, to which then the adept’s mind is directed. The subject of meditation may be either assāsa or passāsa, or nimitta (after-image) of either.

By meditating upon the nimitta without vānṇa and lakkhaṇa (characteristics) one destroys the five nīvarānas and develops the jhānas.

The last of this anusattis is Upasamānussati or cogitation of Nibbāna. The adept as usual is to retire to a lonely place and think of the fact that the absence of attachment (virāga) is the best of all dhammas constituted and unconstituted. He thereby develops concentration of mind and the jhānas.

3 Cf. Pāṭaṇjalabhāṣya, I, 50.
4 Vism., p. 278.
6 Vism., p. 285. 7 Ibid., p. 286.
Four Brahmavihāras

The four Brahmavihāras are mettā, karuṇā, muditā and upekkhā.1 These are so called because they make the minds of the adepts pure like those of Brahma-kāyikā gods and after death they are reborn in the highest plane.2

i. The adept desirous of practising mettā-bhāvanā should take his seat in a secluded place after he has finished his meal and realise the evils of dosa-citta (mind full of hatred) and merits of khaṇṭi (forbearance), for, by mettā-bhāvanā dosa is removed and khaṇṭi developed.

The first step in mettā-bhāvanā is to select the person upon whom the adept is to cast a friendly eye but at the same time keeping his mind free from rāga and such other feelings. After pointing out the various difficulties in selecting the person, it is suggested that mettā-feeling should be first exercised in connection with one’s own self, i.e. wish for one’s own good and then in connection with his spiritual preceptor and so forth wishing him all happiness. In this way he is first to develop appanā and then gradually extend his range, including ultimately his enemies, after having completely destroyed his patīgha, if any. He is to extend his range from the inmates of his own āvāsa to those of another and so on, to nine or ten āvāsas, and then to the inhabitants of a village, town and so forth up to a cakka-vāla.3 The next step for him is to break down the line of demarcation (simāsambheda) between any two persons, i.e. his feeling of love towards himself, his friends, his enemies or neutrals should be absolutely without any distinction. As for

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1 Cf. Pātañjala, III, 23, and Bhāsya, I, 33: तत्त्वग्राहिष्ठु सुक्ष्मन्योगविहार- पन्येयं मैत्री भाषणं, दूरिःस्थित करण्यं, पुष्करणस्य संदितां, सईतामकान्तनुषु प्रेयमानं। एवमः कालात्मक, गृही वर्षां उपजायनं। तत्त्व निःसन्धिन्ति, प्रदर्शकायं स्थिरित्यां लभति॥

2 Vism., p. 320.

3 Ibid.
instance, if a man wants to kill his enemy, he must not say
that the life of his enemy be spared and his be taken instead;
it will not then be sīmā-asambheda. To him there should be no
distinction between himself and his enemy and it is this state
of mind that mettā-bhāvanā is expected to create. As soon as
sīmā-asambheda is developed, he has the necessary nimitta,
upacāra and appanā and soon acquires the four jhānas. ¹

In the Nikāyas, the usual statement is that the adept
exercises the mettā-feelings towards all beings in all the direc-
tions one after another. This is possible only after the adept
has gone through the procedure described above.

ii. In karuṇā-bhāvanā also the adept is to choose a
suitable object of compassion, e.g., an indigent person begging
for alms or a criminal when being taken to the place of punish-
ment and so forth. In this way he is to extend his range for
compassion, including ultimately his enemies, after removing
patīgha, if any. Like mettā-bhāvanā, he is to practise sīmā-
asambheda and gradually develop nimitta, upacāra, appanā and
the jhānas.

iii. In muditā-bhāvanā the adept is to have a feeling of joy
at another’s happiness (muditā). The best to start with is a
close friend (atippiyasabāyako) of the adept and then other
persons may be selected and ultimately his enemy. The remain-
ing process is the same as that of mettā-bhāvanā.

iv. Upekkhā-bhāvanā is generally taken up by an adept
who has practised the previous three bhāvanās and acquired the
jhānas. In the jhānas too, there are the feelings of piti and
virāga, which, being akin to anunaya (fondness) and patīgha
(hatred), have to be eschewed in upekkhā-bhāvanā.

¹ Vism., p. 307.
In practising upekkha-bhavana it is suggested that the person to be selected for the exercise of the feeling of equanimity should be a neutral one and then a friend and then an enemy. Like metta-bhavana, in upekkha too, the sima-asaṁbheda is to be practised, developing ultimately the jhana.

Four Aruppas or Samapattis

The Kammadhatanas that we have so far dealt with were meant to induce the jhana up to the fourth, which keep the mind of the adept within the limits of Rupaloka. The subjects of meditation that we propose to treat now induce the higher jhanas from the fifth to the eighth, usually called Samapattis, and carry the mind of the adept to the region of Arupaloka.

1. The first subject of meditation of the Aruppas is akasanañcañyatana (=ananta-akasayatana). It starts with akasa-kasina as dealt with above with the difference that akasa in this case is unlimited extending over the whole cakkavala. So long the conception of akasa is associated with cakkavala, though it is unlimited, the adept does not go beyond the Rupaloka. The adept is to think constantly of ananta-akasa, but without any kasina, i.e. without any reference to the akasa as extending over a cakkavala or so forth. In short, his mind is to be severed from all conceptions of objects (sabbaso rupasaññanam samatikkam), and hence without the possibility of nañatta-sañña (sense of distinction). By constantly meditating over this nimitta, he destroys the nivaranas, develops mindfulness (sati) and concentrates his mind through upacara, and attains the fifth jhana.

1 See above, p. 222.
2 Rupasañña=Patigha-sañña, because by the patighata (contract) of object and eye arises the rupasañña. See Vism., p. 329.
3 See above, p. 219, fn. 3.
4 Vism., p. 328.
2. The second subject of meditation of the Āruppas is viññānañānañcayatana (=ananta-viññānāyatana). This is closely connected with the previous subject of meditation and at the same time a step in advance. In the ākāsānañcayatana meditation, the adept’s mind is not without some notion of sphere (desa). This is considered as faulty and the adept seeks to withdraw his mind from the sense of sphere and confines his attention to viññāna (consciousness)\(^1\) of ananta-ākāsa and cogitates of ananta-viññāna only and develops as usual the jhānas, reaching the sixth.

3. The third subject of meditation of the Āruppas is akiñcaññāyatana (=n’atthi kiñci iti āyatana or nā’ssa kiñcanan ti akiñcanam. Akiñcanassa bhāvo akiñcaññam). In this case the adept withdraws his mind from the consciousness (viññāna) of ananta-ākāsa, and cogitates on voidness or absence of viññāna and everything else (n’atthi n’atthi ti vā suññam suññan ti vā vivittam vivittan ti vā). By such cogitation, his mind realises the non-existence of viññāna and thus gradually develops the seventh jhāna, the jhāna of nothingness.

4. The fourth subject of meditation of the Āruppas is said to be n’evasaññā-nāsaññāyatana, but in fact, the mental state of n’evasaññānāsaññā is derived by cogitation of akiñcaññāyatana, i.e. abhava of viññāna as explained above. In the seventh jhāna, the meditator gradually gets rid of saññā (perception) of the four khandhas (rūpa, vedanā, sañkhārā and viññāna), but retains a saññā (perception) of extreme subtlety—the residuum of sañkhārā. He cannot perceive ordinary things but he is not absolutely without perception. Hence the mental state of

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\(^1\) *Pavatta-viññāna* = the consciousness that has arisen in the adept’s mind by concentrating his mind on ananta-ākāsa.
the meditator in the eighth jhāna is without perception of ordinary things (n'evasañña) but not without the subtlest perception (na+asañña).

The last two Kammatthānas

The last two Kammatthānas are (i) āhare paṭikūlasaññā-bhāvanā and (ii) catudhātu-vavatthānassa bhāvanā.

1. Āhare paṭikūla-sañña or disgust for food. The adept is to ponder over the evils connected with food. The evils may be of many kinds, e.g., botheration of going out for alms and seeking for it; performing the preliminaries when taking food; the unclean stomach which receives the food, undigestibility of food and so forth. By meditating over these evils, he gets rid of desire for food and gradually of all desires (tanbhā). He feels no attachment for his body, and thus attains the summum bonum in this life.¹

2. Catudhātu-vavatthāna, or determination of the four elements of the body. The adept, taking up this Kammatthāna, examines the contents of his body under the four heads: paṭhavi, āpo, tejo and vāyu. He takes into consideration one by one his skin, flesh, sinews, marrow, kidneys, bones etc.,² and examines their functions and then looks upon them as nothing but one of the four elements, and as such they are mere material objects (acetana), indeterminable (avyākata), substanceless (suñña), non-sentient (nissatto) and so forth. Such examination and cogitation make the adept realise the voidness (suññatā) of his self and so, of the world. He can no longer perceive the existence of different beings. As soon as he develops this mental state, he attains the highest knowledge.³

¹ Vism., pp. 341-7. ² For details, see Vism., pp. 358-67. ³ Ibid., pp. 347-70.
(iii) KALYĀṆAMITTA

A monk, anxious to take up a subject for meditation, must, at the first place, choose a competent spiritual preceptor (kalyāṇamitta). He should try to find out one who has mastered the fourth and fifth jhānas and has thereby developed insight (vipassanā) into the truths of the universe, and has, in fact, become an Arhat, by destroying all the impurities (āsavas). Failing to get hold of such persons, he should seek for the next best in the descending scale, thus:

(i) an anāgāmi;
(ii) a sakadāgāmi;
(iii) a sotāpanna;
(iv) a puthujjana who practises the jhānas;
(v-vii) a master of three or two or one piṭaka;
(viii) a master of one nikāya with its āṭṭhakathā, and
lastly, (ix) a lajji (a man of self-restraint).

If the candidate finds a suitable preceptor in the monastery where he lives, so far so good; if not, he should proceed to the place where he may find his preceptor. On his way to, as also on his arrival at, his destination he must not be failing in the duties prescribed in the Vinaya (ii. 223) for an antevāsika, and he should reverentially and discreetly approach his preceptor, and apprise him of his intention of taking up a subject of meditation.

(iv) THE CANDIDATE

The candidate should offer himself to his spiritual preceptor, saying that he is resolved to carry out his commands, and even, if necessary, he would not hesitate to throw himself down a cliff or stop his respiration to death if his kalyāṇamitta wanted him

1 Vism., pp. 98 ff.
to do so. A candidate with such resolution is not afraid of fearful lonely forests and readily listens to the admonitions of his preceptor.¹

He must possess the requisite ajjhāsaya (intention), viz., aversion to lobha, dosa and moha as well as to gharāvāsa (household life), saṅganikā (society) and sabbabhavagati (all forms of existence in the world).² He should have adhimutti i.e. ardent desire for samādhi and ultimately for Nibbāna.

When he approaches his preceptor for a Kammaṭṭhāna, he is to answer the questions, which will be put by his preceptor in order to ascertain the Kammaṭṭhāna that would suit him best. He is to receive his instructions and then ponder over them carefully.³

Anurūpa-Vibhāra

The suitability of the place of meditation should also be taken into consideration. The candidate preferably should dwell with his preceptor in the same monastery. Failing same, he should find out a suitable place not far from the abode of his preceptor, for he is to see him occasionally in order to correct himself about the practice of a Kammaṭṭhāna. Buddhaghosa enumerates eighteen kinds of places⁴ unsuitable for meditational purposes. The suitable place for meditation must fulfil the following conditions:

1 Vism., pp. 115-6.
2 The opposites of these respectively are alobha, adosa, amoha, nekkhamma, paviveka, and nissaraṇa. See Vism., p. 116.
3 Vism., p. 117.
4 Vism., pp. 118-122. The eighteen places are:
Mahāvāsaṁ navāvāsam jarāvāsañ ca panthanim,
Sondim pannañ ca, phalam patthitam eva ca
Nagaram daraña khettañ, visabhāgena pattanam
Paccantasimāsappāyam, yattha mitto na labhati.
(a) not far nor too close,
(b) easy of access,¹
(c) not crowded by day,
(d) quiet at night, and
(e) not exposed to mosquitoes, or serpents, wind or sun.

About the suitability of the time for meditation, it is recommended that it should be after the monk has returned from his begging round and taken his mid-day meal.²

The Candidate’s Mental States

The first and foremost duty of the Kalyāṇamitta (spiritual preceptor) is to study the mental leanings of the candidate before he can prescribe his subject of meditation. It may be incidentally remarked that unless the Kalyāṇamitta is an Arhat or at least an Anāgāmi or Sakadāgāmi, he cannot be expected to have acquired the higher powers (abhiññā) of knowing others’ minds (paracittañāna) or one’s previous births (pubbennivāsanussatāñāna) which are indispensable for ascertaining properly the mental leanings of the candidate. For practical purposes, it is suggested that the spiritual preceptor should ascertain the leanings of the candidate by asking him what he likes and dislikes.³ A person’s leanings should be ascertained by observing closely his movements (iriyāpatha), actions (kieca), food (bhojana), ways of looking at things (dassana),⁴ and lastly the qualities peculiar to him. Buddhaghosa⁵ classifies the mental leanings of individuals under six heads, viz., (i) rāga (attachment), (ii) dosa (hatred), (iii) moha (delusion), (iv) saddhā (faith), (v) buddhi (intelligence) and (vi) vitakka (discursive thoughts).

Class (i) has for its characteristics more of deceitfulness, pride, evil desires, ambition, discontentedness, lasciviousness, fickleness etc.; class (ii) has more of anger, hypocrisy, envy, and miserliness etc.; class (iii) has more of idleness, doubts, obstinacy, etc.; class (iv) i.e. those with sād bhā have the characteristics of being given more to charity, desire of seeing holy persons and hearing religious discourses, has joy, solitude, credulousness etc.; class (v) has amiability, friendship, moderation in food, mindfulness, watchfulness, emotion and exertion etc.; and class (vi) has propensity for discussion, love for frequenting societies, lack of keenness in application for good objects, unsteadiness, fondness for moving about etc.

The above is only a very general classification, for Buddhaghosa points out the possibility of further analysis of mental leanings, e.g., those with rāga like evil deeds while those with sād bhā like moral precepts and so forth; hence there is a commonness between these two classes, i.e. both have a strong feeling or earnestness for evil in one case and for good in the other.

In this way, all the six classes admit of further analysis and a closer discrimination should be made for the prescription of the subjects of meditation.

Another interesting explanation is offered by Buddhaghosa regarding the first three classes. He says that a person’s nature may be ascertained by knowing his previous lives, e.g., those who performed good deeds through rāga and were as a result born in sāgga have in their present life proneness to rāga, while those who in their previous lives injured others in various ways and were as a result born in the hells or nāga worlds develop in this existence a leaning towards dosa; similarly those, who were in their previous lives given to drinking and did not care for learning have more of moha (delusion). Buddhaghosa gives another
interesting explanation of these three classes of persons. He says that those with *moha* have in their body more of the two elements, earth and water, while those with *dosa* have more of fire and air, and those with *rāga* have all the four elements in due proportion.

Further information is furnished by him about the kind of spot to be chosen for a candidate with a particular leaning, what should be the nature of his dress, bowl, begging places, food-givers, food, postures (*iriyāpathas*), and the colour of his subjects of meditation.  

A selection is suggested from among the forty *kammaṭṭhānas* (subjects of meditation) according to the different mental leanings thus:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MENTAL LEANINGS</th>
<th>KAMMAṬṭHĀNAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For <em>rāgacarita</em>, the ten asubhas (unpleasant objects) and kāyagatā sati (mindfulness about body); the four brahmavihāras and four colours (<em>vāṇakasīni</em>);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>,, <em>dosacarita</em>, only ānāpāna-sati (mindfulness about inhaling and exhaling);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>,, <em>mobacarita</em> and <em>vitakkacarita</em>, the six kinds of anussati (see above, p. 224);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>,, <em>saddhācarita</em>, maraṇasati, upasamānussati, catudhātu-vatthāna and āhāre paṭikulasaṅña.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Vism., p. 103.  
2 See for details Vism., pp. 108 ff.  
3 Vism., p. 114; *Abhidhammatthasaṅgāda*, pp. 41-2. Cf. Udāna, iv. 1:  
| asubhā bhāvetabbā rāgassa pahānāya  
| mettā “ vyāpādassa “  
| ānāpānasati “ vitakka-upacchedāya  
| aniccasaṅña “ asmimānassa samugghātāya. |
It is not possible to deal comprehensively with all the mental states in any treatise, but the above exposition makes it clear that the choice of the subjects of meditation was given a very important place in the code of Buddhist meditational practices. Buddhaghosa, however, admits that there is neither any original treatise (Pāli) nor any commentary (āṭṭhakathā) which deals with the mental leanings of a candidate and what has been said above is gleaned by him from the oral instructions of teachers.¹

The Preliminaries

In the Visuddhimagga, a few details are lacking about the preliminaries that a candidate has to go through before he commences his meditational exercises. These are to be found in the Yogāvacāra’s Manual (edited by Dr. Rhys Davids in P.T.S. Series).

The candidate first salutes the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha by uttering the usual formula with the belief that this not only makes him meritorious but also removes many of the hindrances to meditation.²

Then he prays for happiness for all beings including his friends and relatives and at the same time wishes that Māra be kept away from him so that he may succeed in his mission.

He then utters the formula of confession, praying that he may be absolved of all sins that he may have committed knowingly or unknowingly.

¹ Vis., p. 107.
² Iccevam acanta namassaneyyaṁ,
   Namassamāno ratanattayaṁ yaṁ
   Puññābhisandam vipulaṁ aladdham
   Tassānubhiyaṁa hatantarāyo.

Yogavacara’s Manual, p. 3.
He now promises to abide by the teachings of the omniscient Gotama and prays for uggaha-nimitta, paṭibbāga-nimitta, upacāra-vidhi, and appanā-samādhi. To infuse confidence into his mind he thinks of those of Buddha's disciples, who had before him followed this path and succeeded in attaining their object, and resolves that he will likewise with the help of his teacher, succeed in reaching the goal, Nibbāna.

He now sits cross-legged keeping his body erect and fixes his mind on the subject of meditation (Kammattāna).²

(v) THE SUCCESSIVE STEPS IN MEDITATION

I. Upacāra

We have spoken of the various objects of meditation on which the adept fixes his attention, trying all the while to convert it into a concept as clear and distinct as the object he sees with open eyes. The first attempts that he makes at fixation of his mind on the nimitta (i.e. parikkamma-nimitta) are called parikamma-bhāvanā.³ When the adept has been able to see the object in his own mind as vividly as he has been doing with eyes open, he is said to have acquired the uggaha-nimitta.⁴ The attempts that are now being made by the adept to make the concept not only clearer and brighter than the actual object as seen by his physical eyes but free from the lakāhanas (characteristics) of colour, form, size, etc., which are regarded as Kasīṇa-dosas are known as

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1 See Infra.

2 The Yogāvacāra’s Manual does not treat the subject systematically as has been wrongly supposed by Dr. Rhys Davids. It contains just an enumeration, like all other Buddhist texts, of the different mental states and objects of meditation, connected with the four jhānas.

3 Abhidhammattha-sangaha, p. 42.

4 Vism., p. 125.
upacāra-bhāvanā. Even at this stage the mind of the adept cannot be steady in concentration; it is like a child unable to stand though making attempts to stand on his legs. The brighter concept, which he now possesses though intermittently, is called paṭibhāga-nimitta. It is exceedingly difficult to make the paṭibhāga-nimitta steady and this is not possible for an adept so long he is in the upacāra stage. He will now have to exert to pass from upacāra to appanā. He has got to be very particular about the selection of his āvāsa (dwelling place), gocara (places from which to collect alms), bhassa (improper talks), puggala (associates), bhojana (food), utu (seasonal food), and iriyāpathas (postures in which he should pass his time).

II. Appanā

The stage next to upacāra is appanā in which the adept’s power of concentration becomes strong and steady; and the mind is likened to a grown up man able to stand on his legs as long as he likes. In the appanā stage, the adept can fix his attention on the subject of meditation one whole day or one whole night. It is not possible to maintain the paṭibhāga-nimitta for any length of time unless the adept reaches the appanā stage. It sometimes happens that the adept becomes over-energetic and thereby gets excited and fails to attain the firmness of appanā state. As a reaction to it, sometimes it so happens that he gets dejected, his energy slackens and his mind drifts to slothfulness. It is therefore advised that the adept should neither be over-energetic nor slack in directing his mind towards the nimitta. It is by main-

1 Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha, p. 42. 2 Vism., p. 125.
3 Ibid., pp. 127-8. 4 Ibid., p. 126.
raining the balance of mental energy that an adept easily obtains appanā.¹

1. See Vism., p. 137. The ten ways and means for passing from the upacāra to the appanā stage are enumerated as follows:

1. Cleanliness in regard to body and clothing.

2. Equipose (samabhāva) of the faculties of confidence (saddhā), energy (viriya), memory (sati), concentration (samādhi) and intellect (paññā).

3. Proficiency in acquiring the nimitra (object of meditation) and in maintaining it.

4. Avoidance of mental slackness. This is to be done not by passadhi, samādhi and upakkha sambojjhaṅgas, but by dhammavacaya, viriya and piti-sambojjhaṅgas. The dhammavacaya sambojjhaṅga helps the adept to choose those dharmas which put in him more and more of energy (i.e. ārambha, nikkama and parakkama). He develops viriya sambojjhaṅga by remembering the fact that it is by being energetic persons have became great and that he can also be like them if he applies his energy and dismisses his slothfulness. The third is piti sambojjhaṅga which the adept can develop by practising the saussattis (see p. 224) and by associating with gentle persons to the exclusion of the vulgar and by reflecting on Suttantas which produce serene pleasure (pasāda). These three sambojjhaṅgas help the adept to make his mind strong and energetic when necessary and protect his mind from becoming weak. Buddhaghosa enumerates the various ways and means by which these sambojjhaṅgas are to be developed.

5. Not allowing the mind to get excited (uddhata). This is done not by the dhammavacaya, viriya and piti sambojjhaṅgas but by passaddhi (tranquility), samādhi (calm) and upanka (equanimity) sambojjhaṅgas. Buddhaghosa enumerates the various ways and means, by which these three sambojjhaṅgas are developed (Vism., p. 134).

6. Toning the mind. Sometimes the adept gets disheartened by failing to acquire the desired object viz., knowledge or
For the attainment of appanā state the adept stops his bhavaṅga thoughts and concentrates his mind on the object of meditation, which then becomes an object of mental reflection (manodvārāvajjām). It is followed by the seven thought-moments (sattakkhattuṁ javanaṁ javati). It is in the fourth or the fifth moment that the appanā state of mind is developed.\(^1\) It happens in a moment (ekacittakkhanika). Immediately after appanā, i.e. in the sixth or seventh moment, reappear the usual currents of thought (bhavaṅgacitta). The appanā state therefore refers to a certain mental development which the adept acquires in course of meditational practices. One who has developed that state is able to keep up the paṭibhāga-nimitta for a certain length of time and becomes fit for practising the jhānas. He is a gotrabhū.\(^2\) By repeatedly meditating over the paṭibhāga-nimitta, he can induce the paṭhamajjhāna.\(^3\)

### III. The First Trance

The conditions precedent to the attainment of the first trance are:

1. Dissociation from vatthukāma\(^4\) and kilesakāma,\(^5\) the former referring to attractive things of the world and quietude. To get over such depression of mind, he is advised to remember things which would move his mind (samvegavatthūm), for enumeration, see Vism., p. 135.

7. Looking upon the mind with equanimity.

8. & 9. Avoidance of persons not engaged in meditation and association with persons engaged in meditation; and

10. Strong desire for concentration of mind.

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2 Vism., pp. 138-139; Atthasāli, pp. 164 ff.
4 vivicc'eva kāmehi. 5 viviceca akusalehi dhammehi.
the latter to mental impurities like chanda, rāga, or the five nīvaraṇas.¹

2. Directing (abhiniropana) the mind to the object of meditation.² It is compared to the spreading of wings when the bird is about to fly up (abhiniropana).

3. Roaming of the mind on the object of meditation.³ It is compared to the turning round of the bees on the top of a lotus (anuppabandhana).⁴

4. Derivation of mental and physical joy (pīṇaṇa) through the removal of nīvaraṇas and its enjoyment (anubrūhana),² and lastly,

5. Full concentration of mind (ekaggata).⁶

The first trance, in short, is composed of five aṅgas, viz., vitakka, vicāra, pīṭī, sukha and cittekaggata, and leads to (i) paṭipadā-visuddhi, or removal of the hindrances (kāma and akusala-dhamma), (ii) upekkhānubrūhana or development of equanimity on account of the mind becoming pure, calm and concentrated on the subject, and (iii) sampahamsanā or mental

1 See p. 219 fn. 3. 
2 Which is savitakka.
3 Which is savicāra.
4 In the Dukanipātatthakathā (see Vism., p. 142), the simile given of vitakka and vicāra is as follows:

The bird’s act of flying by resting on its wings in the air is compared to the adept’s placing the mind on the object of meditation (vitakka) while its actual flying by moving its wings is compared to the adept’s thoughts going deep into the object of meditation (vicāra).

Another simile of vitakka and vicāra is as follows: firm grasping of a dirty bowl by one hand is vitakka, while the act of cleansing it by the other hand is vicāra.

5 Vivekahāṣṭam pīṭisukham: itthārammanapatilābhatūṭhi pīṭi, paṭiladdharasānubhavanam sukham. For distinction between pīṭi and sukha see Vism., p. 145.
6 When it is said “paṭhamam jhānam upasampajja vibhātata,”
thrill obtained by bringing into being the mental states as described above and by making all the faculties (indriyas) perform one function.

The adept, who has once obtained the first trance, should repeat it, and for the sake of doing it, he should choose the same food, place of residence, companions, etc. as he had when he first developed it. He should be very careful about the hindrances which may spoil his attained fruit. He should now try to enlarge the paṭibhāga-nimitta, i.e. if his paṭibhāga-nimitta be that of a small piece of land, it should be increased gradually to that of a village, a town, a province, a kingdom, the world and so on. He should also constantly practise āvajjana (adverting to trance), samāpajjana (entering into trance), adhiṭṭhāna (maintaining the trance), vutṭhāna (rising from the trance) and paccavokkhaṇa (introspection).¹

IV. The Second Trance

The psychological conditions relating to the second trance are indicated as follows:

1. Cessation of vitakka and vicāra,² which are matters of the first trance. In the second trance, the object of meditation takes a firm hold of the mind (aṅgapaṭubhāva), and the physical sensations are no longer external, gross (olārika) but purely internal, subtle.

2. Attainment of inward calmness and concentration of thoughts on one object (free from vitakka and vicāra).³

¹ Vim., p. 154; Atthas., p. 169 ff.
² Vitakkavicārānaṃ vūpasamo.
THE BUDDHIST MEDITATION

The calmness (sampaśādanam) is attained by the development of faith (saddhā). In the first trance, saddhā is present, but it does not produce complete calmness on account of the presence of vitakka and vicāra. In the second trance, saddhā becomes stronger, tranquillizes the mind completely, ending in complete concentration of thoughts.

3. Total removal of vitakka and vicāra. On account of complete concentration of mind, the indriyas remain impervious to both inward and outward sensations and as such there is not the remote possibility of the appearance of vitakka and vicāra.

4. Derivation of joy (piti) through concentration of mind (samādhiya) and its enjoyment (sukha), and

5. Full concentration of mind (cittakaggata).

Like the first trance, the adept should repeat the second trance. He gradually realises that piti also is a source of disturbance to mental tranquillity and he should now get rid of it in order to reach the third trance.

V. The Third Trance

The conditions for inducing the third trance are that the adept should be (i) upekkhako, (ii) satimā, and (iii) sukhavibhāri.

(i) By upekkhako, it is meant that the mind of the adept should be unaffected either by joy (piti) or disgust (virāga), i.e., his mind must not be perturbed by thoughts of anicca, dukkha and anattā and at the same time it should be passive (anābhoga) and inactive (avyāpāra);

1 avitakkaṃ avicāram. 2 samādhiyaṃ pitisukhaṃ.
3 pitiyā ca virāgā upekkhako. For ten forms of upekkhā, see Vism., p. 160; Atthas., p. 172.
(ii) By satimā, it is meant that the adept should closely observe what is passing within and outside his mind and body and at the same time be cognizant of the various mental conditions concomitant to the second trance without any delusion (asam-moha). These two factors sati and sampajāno are required in upacāra and appanā; so the reason shown for mentioning it in connection with the third trance is that sati and sampajāno are necessary in this case also for keeping the mind away from pīti and sukhā acquired by the adept in the preceding trance.

(iii) By sukhavibārī, it is meant that though the adept's mind is unaffected by sukhā while in meditation, his body is pervaded by a feeling of ease which he realises only after he has arisen from the trance.

Constant practice of this meditation makes the adept firm in this trance and he can now proceed to the fourth.

VI. The Fourth Trance

In the fourth trance, no new mental factors are acquired or got rid of by the adept. This trance is more or less the resultant of the first three. The mental states described in connection with this trance are as follows:

(i) free from physical pain or happiness (sukhassa ca pahanā dukkhhassa ca pahanā);

(ii) free from mental pain or happiness (somanassadoma-nassānam atthaṅgamā);

[These two states are acquired by the adept in the first stage (upacāra) of meditation; only somanassa is completely eradicated in developing the fourth jhāna].

1 Sukhaṁ ca kāyena paṭisamvedeti.
2 For details, see Vism., pp. 166-7; Atthas., p. 177.
(iii) adukkhamasukham, i.e., the adept must get rid of rāga and dosa,¹ as the former is the source of sukha and the latter of dukkha.

(iv) upekkhā satipārisuddhiṁ i.e., memory and other mental states reach the purest state through upekkhā. In this trance when all the obstructing factors to higher meditation have subsided, sati and other factors conducive to the fourth trance becomes pure and serene.

It should be noted that all these four trances² are induced by meditating on the various Kammāṭṭhānas detailed above. In every trance, the adept has to take up the Kammāṭṭhānas, say, paṭhāvī, induce upacāra and appanā, and then if he has previously acquired the first, he easily develops it and passes on to the second. Similarly, in the case of the third and fourth also, the adept has to induce upacāra and appanā with paṭhāvī, pass through the first and second and reach the third or fourth.

There are four higher trances called Samāpattis. These trances are induced by the cogitation of the four āruppas (see above p. 230).

After the fourth jhāna, the adept attains cetovimutti.³

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¹ See ante pp. 235-8: mental states of candidates for meditation.
² By splitting up the second trance into two, four trances are sometimes spoken of as five in number. See Vism., p. 169.
³ Atthas., p. 177.
CHAPTER XV

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

The third step of the Majjhima-patipada is the acquisition of knowledge (pañña), in other words, samma-diṭṭhi or the true view of the worldly objects. According to the Buddhists, the true view is that the five khandhas, which constitute the world, are without any substance (anatta), subject to decay (anicca) and so instead of being a source of happiness are really causes of grief (dukkha). This view of the constituted world can be developed after a long course of physical and mental discipline dealt with in the previous two chapters and a close study of the Nikāyas, which offer an analysis of the constituents and prove that these have only a fleeting existence, and that also in the eyes of a person whose vision is blurred. The aim of the Nikāya literature, therefore, is to clear up the blurred vision of its students. As it is not feasible as well as desirable to place the highest (paramatthā) truth all at once before the eyes of a beginner, it starts with an analysis and examination of the things (dukkha=pañcupādanakkhandha) around him, how they originate (samudaya) and suffer decay (niruddha), and the ways and means (magga) by which their complete decay can be effected.¹ Of these four processes,² the first two are concerned with objects which are not real in the highest sense, so these two should be treated as conventional (sammuti=samvytti) truths, and for this

¹ For the traditional exposition of the ariyasaccas see Infra.
reason, in the *Abhidharmakośa*, these two are called samalaprajña (not immaculate knowledge). The other two, nirodha and magga, are amala-prajña (immaculate knowledge) inasmuch as these are related to the highest (paramattha) truth. The process of intellectual culture in Buddhism, therefore, consists in realising the highest truth, nirodha, through the comprehension of the conventional truths, dukkha and samudaya. By the former are meant the (i) khandhas, (ii) dhatus, (iii) āyatana, (iv) indriyas, and (v) ariyasaccas, and by the latter (vi) the theory of causation, paṭiccaśāmuppāda.

(i) Khandhas

The whole universe, according to Buddhism, is dichotomised into samskṛta (constituted) or lokiya dhātu and asamskṛta (unconstituted) or lokuttara dhātu. The former includes the whole world of animate and inanimate objects and the latter Akāśa (space) and Nirvāṇa, which is sub-divided into two as Pratisamkhyānirdha and Apratisamkhyānirdha.

Samskṛta-dhātu

The world of beings and inanimate objects are described as samskṛta on account of their being constituted of some elements. These elements are usually put under two heads: nāma and rūpa, nāma denoting the non-material or mental states of a being while rūpa the material parts only. All inanimate objects therefore are included in the term rūpa. Nāma is analysed into four states known as vedanā (feeling), saññā (perception), sañkhāra (impressions produced through karma) and viññāna (knowledge derived through the organs of sense). The four subdivisions of nāma with the fifth the rūpa are termed Pañcakkhandha. It

1 Kośasthāna, VII, 2. 2 See Infra, p. 259.
follows from this that according to the early Buddhists every being is a composite of the five *khandhas* (or groups of elements), each *khandha* comprising a particular group of elements, without a sixth the *Puggala* or *Attā* (=soul).

The traditional interpretation of the five *khandhas* (skandhas) as given in the *Dhammasaṅgāṇī* (Bk. II), *Vibhaṅga*, Buddhaghosa’s *Visuddhimagga* and Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharma-kosa* is as follows:

*Rūpakkhandha* denotes the four elements: earth (*pāṭhavi*), water (*āpo*), fire (*tejo*) and air (*vāyu*), including all that is formed out of these four. It comprises all the material objects whether of the past, present or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, near or distant, good or bad. By past *rūpa* is meant the matter that has undergone change; by future, the matter which will come into existence; and by the present, the matter which is existing at the present moment. By internal *rūpa* are meant the flesh, bone and such other constituents of one’s body made out of the four *mahābhūtas*: and by external, the same of bodies other than one’s own. By gross and near *rūpa* are meant the six organs of sense with the sense-objects while by subtle and distant *rūpa*, the masculinity (*purisindriya*) and femininity (*ittbindriya*), vitality (*jīvindriya*: as water is to the lotus, so is vitality to the *rūpa*), the seat of mental faculties (*badaya*), the faculty of intuition by means of physical and vocal signs (*kāyaviññatti* and *vaci viññatti*), the space within and circumscribing the body (*ākāsadbhātu*), the qualities which make

1 *Db.* S. 584: *Cattāro ca mahābhūta catunnaṁ ca mahābhūtānam. upādāya rūpaṁ—idam vuccati sabbaṁ rūpaṁ.*

2 *Vism.* p. 444: *caakkhu, sotaṁ, ghānaṁ, jīvā, kāyo, rūpaṁ, saddo, gandho, and raso.*

3 *Sec Infra, p. 260.*

4 *Vism.* p. 444: *rūpassa labhā, mudutā, kammāniṭṭatā, upacayo, santati, āratā, and aniceatā.*
the body light soft and supple, growing and decaying, and nutritive food (kabaliṅkāro ābāro). The good and bad rūpa indicate only the good or bad nature of the sense-objects.

Vedanākkhandha connotes all that which one feels (vedayitalakkhanām). Though it is by nature one, it is usually treated under three aspects: kusala (good), akusala (bad), and avyākata (indifferent) and sometimes under five aspects, viz., sukkham and dukkham when the object of contact is pleasant and unpleasant, somanassam and domanassam when the object of thought is pleasant and unpleasant, and lastly upekkhā when the object does not produce good or bad feeling.

Viññānakkhandha refers to that faculty by which a being becomes aware of things (viñānana-lakkhaṇa), viññāṇa is a synonym of citta or mano. Though it is of one nature, it is usually treated as of three kinds, kusala (good), akusala (bad) and avyākata (indifferent). Each of these three kinds of Viññāṇa again is subdivided in the Abhidhamma works according to the four spheres in which the world or mental states are divided viz., kāmāvacara, rūpāvacara, arūpāvacara and lokuttara. In the Kāmāvacara sphere, kusalaviññāṇa is analysed into eight kinds, according as it is associated with, or dissociated from, āna

1 In the Vibhaṅga, vedanā and other khandhas have been explained like rūpa as atta, anāgata and paccuppanna, ajjhatta and babiddhā, olārika and sukhuma, bina and panita, dūra and santika, but this has been omitted in the Vism., pp. 472-6.

2 Though in the usual enumeration of khandhas, viññāṇa is put last, it has been treated as the third, in accordance with the arrangement of the Vism., p. 477-8, the reason being that, is the most important and subtlest of the khandhas and the interpretation of all other mental khandhas follow this more or less.

3 Vism., 452; Samyutta, II, 94; see also Ante, p. 24-5.

4 See IHQ., XV: The Dhamma-saṅgani.
(knowledge), and *saṅkhāra* (persuasion by others, e.g. in offering gifts). In the *Rūpāvācara* it is of five kinds in accordance with the mental states developed by a meditator as he rises gradually from the first to the fourth form of meditation (*jhāna*). In the *Arūpāvācara* it is, as before, of four kinds, as the meditator rises from the fifth to the eighth *jhāna* called *āruppas*. And in the *Lokuttara*, it is said to be of four kinds as a person is in one of the four maggas, viz., *sotāpatti*, *sahadāgāmi*, *anāgāmi* and *arabatta*. In all *kusalaviññāna* is of twenty-one kinds.

It should be remembered that these twenty-one *kusalaviññānas* do not belong to the good mental states of an average man. These refer only to the mental states of an individual who is following the Buddhist principles of gradual purification and whose mind rises by stages to the *Arūpāvācara* and ultimately to the *Lokuttara* region.

In the same way *Akusalaviññāna* is explained. As a person who has practised the first form of meditation, not to speak of the higher ones, cannot have *akusalaviññāna*; it is said that *akusalaviññāna* is confined to the Kāmāvacara sphere only, and so from the standpoint of spheres (*avacaras*) it is of one kind only. It is of three kinds according to its source, viz., *lobha* (avarice), *dosa* (hatred) and *moha* (delusion). Each of them again is further subdivided into twelve in accordance with its combination with one or more of the following: *lobha* with or without *somanassa*, *upekkhā*, *diṭṭhi* (non-Buddhist beliefs) and *saṅkhāra* (instigation by others); *dosa* with *domanassa*, *paṭigga* (revenge) and *saṅkhāra* (instigation); and *moha* with *upekkhā* and *vicikicchā* (doubts).

The *Avyākata-viññāna* has so many subdivisions that it will be easier to comprehend it in a tabular form thus:

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1. See above, pp. 241 ff.
The abetukam kusalavipākam avyākata-viññānaṃ is of eight kinds, viz., the six viññānas derived through the six organs of sense (including mano). The function of these viññānas is to make the object just known. Besides these six viññānas, there is the receiving faculty called mano dhātu, located in the heart (badayavatthu). Its function is to cognize the objects. As it is associated either with equanimity (upekkhā), or joy (somanassa) it is said to be of two kinds. All these are further subdivided as shown in the above Table.

The sabetukam kusalavipākam avyākata-viññānaṃ is also of eight kinds. It is similar to the previously said abetuka-viññāna, the only difference being that it is always associated with alobbādivipāka.¹

The Rūpāvacara-avyākata-vipāka-viññānaṃ like the rūpāvacara-kusaladhamma is of five kinds. It occurs to those who are meditating (samāpattivasena)² and progressing along the path. It is manifest in reconception, life-continuum and death.

The Arūpāvacara-avyākata-vipāka-viññānaṃ like the arūpāvacara-kusala is of four kinds and should be interpreted as above.

The Lokuttara-avyākata-vipāka-viññānaṃ like the lokuttara-vipāka is of four kinds, i.e., connected with the four kinds of mental states of four maggas (see above p. 252).

In all, the subdivisions of the avyākata-vipāka-viññānas of the four spheres (avacaras) amount to thirty-six.

The Kiriya-viññāna, as indicated in the above Table, is subdivided according to the three spheres (avacaras) and then the Kāmāvacara into abetuka and sabetuka, which are subdivided

¹ alobbādi=alobha, adosa, amoha and so forth; vipāka=result or resultant consciousness (see Transl. of the Vism., p. 531).
² Vism., Transl., p. 532, by way of right attainment. See above, p. 252.
into eleven kinds, and as before, the Rūpāvacara and Arūpāvacara into nine, thus making in all twenty kinds.

The sum total of viññānas stands thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kusalaviññāna</th>
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<th>... 21</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akusalaviññāna</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>... 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vipākaviññāna</td>
<td>...</td>
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<td>... 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiriyaviññāna</td>
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<td>... 20</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>89</td>
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All these 89 viññānas act in 14 ways, viz., through reconception (patisandhi), life-continuum (bhavaṅga), reviving (āvajjana), seeing (dassana), hearing (savāna), smelling (ghāyana), tasting (sāyana), touching (phusana), receiving (sampaticcchana), examining (santirāna), deciding (votṭhapana), extending (javana), registering (tad-ārammanā) and death (cuti).

Of the fourteen ways in which viññāna functions, as stated above, it is the patisandhi-viññāna that causes re-birth. It is said in the Samyutta Nikāya (I, 122; II, 67, 103) that only when viññāna obtains a footing (patiṭṭhā) on something (ārammanā), then only there is the possibility of the birth of a being, and not otherwise, and the moment the viññāna ceases (cuti), one is regarded as dead. During the span of life limited by the two viññānas, patisandhi and cuti, the remaining twelve viññānas function. Immediately after the patisandhi-viññāna has done its

2 These are functions of mano-dhātu which is treated as the sixth organ of sense.
3 Cf. Samyutta, III, p. 143:
Āyu usma viññānaṃ, ca yadā kāyam jahantimāṃ
apavidbo tada seti, parabhassam acetanaṃ.
part, i.e., having given the form of birth according to kamma, appears the bhavaṅga-viññāna, which is the resultant of one's actions (kammassa vipākabhūtam). The bhavaṅga-viññāna however becomes inactive when the organs of sense grow strong enough to function in their respective spheres. Then those six indriya-viññānas (i.e. including mano-dhātu) function and give rise to the abetuka-kiriya-manoviññāna-dhātu, making bhavaṅgaviññāna (sub-consciousness) passive. The kiriyamano-viññānadāhu is nothing but mind (mano=citta), the function of which is to revive (āvatājana) the objects seen, sounds heard and so forth, and to make the organs of sense function and function again. The function of mind then is to receive things communicated to it through the organs of sense; it becomes good or bad according as the things communicated through the organs of sense are pleasant or unpleasant. When the mind ceases to function, bhavaṅga-viññāna renews its activity, ceasing at death when it is followed by cuti-viññāna, which in its turn gives rise to paṭisandhi-viññāna. In this way the continuity of citta is maintained, and the cycle of existence is continued.¹ It should be

¹ This exposition of viññāna is based on the Vism., pp. 452-460; Transl. Path of Purity, III, pp. 527 ff. See also Attbas., pp. 266, 269-270. In the Attbas. the position of bhavaṅga-viññāna has been explained by a simile which is as follows: The course of a flowing river, if turned, by an obstruction, towards a channel (mabāmātikā), the water not only flows through it but floods over the two sides of the channel, and then by whatever narrow ways it finds, it moves towards the main river.

The flowing river = bhavaṅga-viññāna.

The obstruction turning the course of the river = kiriyamano-dhātu (mind = citta)

The channel = vīṭbicittapavatti (mind functioning through the six organs of sense)
noted that the existence of bhavaṅgaviṁśaṇa or subconsciousness is not explicitly stated anywhere in the Sutta or Abhidhamma Piṭaka, though it is given prominence in the works of later expositors, like Anuruddha and Buddhaghosa.

Saṅnakkhandha refers to all those characteristics which make a thing known. Though it is by nature of one kind, it is, like the vedanākkhandha (see above, p. 251), treated as of three kinds viz., kusala (good), akusala (bad) and avyākata (indifferent), according as it is associated with viṁśaṇa, good, bad or indifferent. There cannot be any viṁśaṇa without saṅna (perception), hence it has as many subdivisions as viṁśaṇa (see above). Its function is (i) to make a thing known through its characteristics, as a piece of wood is known to a carpenter; (ii) to make the characteristics engage the attention of persons, as an elephant felt by the blind; and (iii) to draw attention to the immediate function of an object, as animals know their supplier of grains as the food-giver.

Saṅkharakkhandha. It denotes that aspect of mental states (cetana), the main characteristics of which is to bring together (rāsikaraṇa) two or more mental activities. It has the virtue of putting forward the mind into action, and engaging it in the immediate object, and has for its proximate cause the three other khandhas, viz., vedanā, saṅna and viṁśaṇa. Apparently, then,

The flooding over two sides = javana
Falling into the main river = bhavaṅgotaranam.

1 In the Vibhaṅga (p. 7), saṅkhāra is equated to cetana, the cetana which arises out of contact of the organs of sense with their objects, as does vedanā, saṅna or viṁśaṇa.

2 In the Expositor (p. 540 fn. 4), it has been pointed out that the commentator on the Vism., has explained āyubana by rāsikaraṇa. This, I think, is a slip on the part of the commentator, for in the text āyubana is mentioned as the second characteristic, rāsikaraṇa being the first.
sanākāra means the resultant mental states—the accumulated effect of the three other khandhas or mental functions. These three khandhas do not set the mind into action but leave it to sanākāra to do so. Like the other mental khandhas, it has also been sub-divided in various ways.

Buddhaghosa concludes his exposition of khandhas by the remark that the people are prone to regard the body as one single thing and mistakenly apprehend it as a self and that it is only to warn them against this misapprehension that the Teacher spoke of the khandhas. The khandhas are to be looked upon as bubbles and tempting mirage. These are nothing but a mass of evanescent objects as substanceless as the trunk of a plantain tree.1 Buddhaghosa offers also an explanation for the order (kama) in which the khandhas are enumerated. Rūpa, he says, is mentioned first because it is easily comprehensible to an average man. As this rūpa (matter, object and thing) gives rise to a feeling good, bad, or indifferent, so vedanā is treated as the second khandha. As this vedanā (feeling) that directs one’s attention to the form and nature of the source of the feeling and thus engenders saññā (perception), so saññā is placed next. After saññā, happens the accumulation of mental states, hence sanākāra is treated as the fourth. Though viññāna precedes sanākhāra it is mentioned last as it is the most important of the four mental khandhas, forming, as it does, the basis of vedanā.2

(ii) Dhātus

The term dhātu carries a very wide meaning in the Buddhist literature. When the dhātu is said to be constituted (sanākhata),

1 Vism., pp. 477-480.
2 Vism., p. 477: Yañu vedayati tām sañjānāti ti evamo vedanā- visayassa ākāragāhi kan sanām; saññāvasena abhisākhārake sanākhare; tesam vedanādinaṁ nissayaṁ adhipatibhūtaṁ ca nesaṁ viññānan ti.
it means all the beings and things of the world, e.g., the three spheres of existence, Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa; the four great elements (mahābhūtas) and the things formed out of these elements; the sense-organs, their objects (āyatanas), as also their perceptions; the material and non-material constituents (khandhas). The Babudhātuka-sutta\(^1\) states that for attaining nibbāna, one must be proficient in the dhātus (dhātukusalo), and then enumerates besides the above the following as dhātus: mental and physical pain and pleasure, equanimity, ignorance, desire, renunciation, hatred, and absence of hatred, as also Ākāsa and Nibbāna or Nirodha but the last two are called unconstituted (asaṃkhata) dhātus.

Though the term dhātu has a very wide significance, it is applied at the present instance to the six sense-organs, their objects and the six perceptions derived through them, i.e., cakkhu, rūpa and cakkhuvaññāṇa; sota, sadda and sotaviññāṇa and so forth counting in all the eighteen dhātus. Etymologically dhātu means those elements which uphold a being. In this sense cakkhu is a dhātu and so also are the other sense-organs. The sense-organs are also indriyas\(^2\) inasmuch these act as predominating factors in perceiving objects; again these are also āyatanas inasmuch as these exert (ā-yatanti, utṭhabanti, ghāṭanti, vāya-manti)\(^3\) to perceive an object.

(iii) Āyatana

Āyatanas include both the sense-organs and their objects, the former being distinguished as internal (aijhattika) and the latter as external (bābira), counting twelve in all.\(^4\) The function

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1 Majjhima, III, p. 216.  
2 See Infra.  
3 Vism., p. 481.  
4 See Table facing, p. 249.
of the āyatanas is not only to develop the perceptions (viññāna) but also to entangle a being in samsāra (repeated existences). With the exception of mano, all the eleven āyatanas belong to rūpakkhandha while mano alone belongs to viññānakkhandha. Mano therefore like viññāna can be subdivided into 89 states. The scope of the five organs of sense is limited to their respective objects while the scope of mano is almost unlimited, extending over not only all the other sense-organs and their objects but also over all mental states, denoted in Pāli by the word dhamma.

The Buddhist texts, in conclusion, point out though so much attention has been paid to the analysis of dhātus and āyatanas, one must not forget that these have neither any beginning nor any end, these do not come from anywhere nor go to anywhere; these are in reality substanceless (nirīha) and functionless (avyāpāra).

(iv) Indriyas

Besides the twelve āyatanas and eighteen dhātus, a being requires the twenty-two indriyas (predominating mental factors) for its existence. The six sense-organs as has been mentioned above are indriyas inasmuch as these are predominating factors in a person’s appearance, protection, knowledge and distinctiveness. The seventh and eighth indriyas are masculinity (purīsa) and femininity (ittī) as these are predominating factors in sex-distinction. The ninth indriya is vitality (jīvita) which sustains the body. The five mental states, sukha, dukkha, somanassa, domanassa and

1 Dhātukathā, pp. 2, 117; see above, p. 250.
2 See above, p. 255; Vism., p. 483.
3 Vism., p. 484.
5 Ibid., Intro.
upekkhā,\(^1\) which accompany the āvitindriya are also treated as predominating states in the Buddhist psychology inasmuch as these serve to entangle beings in worldly affairs.\(^2\) The next group of five mental states, viz., self-confidence (saddhā), energy (viriya), watchfulness (sati), concentration of mind (samādhi) and exertion for knowledge (paññā) are also treated as indriyas inasmuch as these serve to disentangle beings from worldly desires and help them to attain Nibbāna. The last three indriyas are (i) the determination to know what is unknown (anānātā + ānassāmi), (ii) determination to know the highest truth (ānā), and (iii) determination to realise what has been attained by the previous two indriyas (ānātāvā). The first of this group acts as the predominating factor in removing wrong views and putting the adept on the right course of exercises for realising the truth while the second in helping the adept to realise the fruits of the exercises, removal of the anuśayas (inclinations for worldly attainments) and development of insight into the truth; the third acts as the predominating factor in attaining knowledge of the cessation of rebirth (kṣayajñāna) and the attainment of Nibbāna in this life.\(^3\)

Though so much has been said about the indriyas, Buddhaghosa in conclusion observes that these do not exist in the highest sense.\(^4\)

(v) Ariyasaaccas

It has been already pointed out that by sammā-dīṭṭhi the early Buddhists meant the comprehension of the four truths,

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1 Sukha and dukkha=physical pleasure and pain. Somanassa and domanassa=mental pleasure and pain. Upekkhā=equanimity.
2 Ak.-vyākbyā, II, Intro. 3 Ibid., p. 11. 4 Vism., p. 526.
dukkha, samudaya, nirodha and magga.¹ These can be expressed in several ways, of which the following appear to be a fair generalisation; pavatti (origin), nivatti (cessation), and tad ubhayabeta (causes of the above mentioned two); ālaya (desires), ālayāramatā (attachment to desires), ālayasamuggbāta (uprooting of desires), and ālayasamugghātupāya (means of uprooting of desires);² akusalaṁ (evil), akusalamūlam (source of evils), kusalaṁ (good), kusalamūlam (source of goodness);³ idam (this = dikkha), bīnam (low = dukkhasamudaya), pañītām (excellent = dukkhanirodha), imassa saññāgatassa nissaranām (getting rid of the misconceptions = dukkhanirodhabhāgāmini-pātipadā).⁴ These various modes of expressions show that the early Buddhists did not mean that the four truths should be confined to the four terms: dikkha, samudaya, nirodha and magga. But as these terms are widely and frequently used, their traditional interpretations are given below:

(1) Dukkha: Birth is dikkha, so are old age, death, grief, lamentation due to the death of friends and relatives, etc.; physical and mental pain; meeting uncongenial persons; separation from dear ones; disappointment in obtaining the desired objects. In short, the congregation of five khandhas is dikkha as it is always accompanied by pain, being subject to change, and ultimately decay.⁵

¹ See above, p. 248; Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism, p. 206-7.
² Vism., p. 497.
³ Majjhima, I, p. 46.
⁴ Ibid., p. 38.
(2) *Samudaya*: It is attributed to *taṇhā* (desires, thirst) which may be for (i) worldly objects, (ii) repeated existence or (iii) dissolution of bodies.¹

(3) *Nirodha*: It is the cessation of *samudaya*, complete detachment from *taṇhā* (desire), relinquishment of all worldly objects and desires for their possession. It is tranquil, beyond death, signless and free from all characteristics. It is not non-existent like the horns of a hare as it can be realised if the right means be adopted. It is, however, not a fruition of the right means as it exists for ever, only its realisation is effected by the right means. It is eternally existing but not like atoms (*aṇu-paramāṇu*) of the Vaiśeṣikas, for, atoms, according to the early Buddhists, are also caused. It is unborn (*ajātam*), unoriginated (*abhūtam*), uncreated (*akatam*) and unconstituted.² It is called *sa-upādisesa* when one who has removed all impurities and realised the truth but still retains the remnants of his past *upadhi*, e.g., an arhat before he lays down his mortal frame. It is called *anupādisesa* when the arhat lays down his body for ever and never takes re-birth.

(4) *Magga*: It is the eight-fold path leading to the cessation of grief as explained above (pp. 199 ff).

The effects of insight into each of the four truths (i) *dukkha* (ii) *samudaya* (iii) *nirodha* and (iv) *magga* leads to the removal of the following beliefs respectively:

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(i) Belief in a self (*sakkāyatidīthi*); it shakes the mental tranquility of those who cling to the view that the constituted things are everlasting (*dhuva*), happy (*sukha*) and good (*subha*).

(ii) Belief that there is no after-life (*uccheda-dīthi*)¹ and that the world is a creation of the God or issued out of *Prakṛti* or *Time* (*kāla*).

(iii) Belief in the eternality of self (*sassata-dīthi*)² and in the existence in *arūpaloka* as the highest.

(iv) Belief in non-action (*akirya-dīthi*);³ it leads to the rejection of the path of ease and pleasure, and the path of rigorous asceticism and self-mortifications.

After explaining in detail the *ariyasaccas*, Buddhaghosa reminds us of the non-existence of any individual (*anatta*) by quoting the following stanza:

Dukkham eva hi na koci dukkhito, kārako na kiriyā va vijjati
atthi nibbuti, na nibbuto pumā, maggam aththi,
gamako na vijjati ti.

[There is grief but none suffering from grief, there is no doer but there is action, there is quietude but none being quieted, there is the path but none going along the path].

(vi) *Paṭiccasamuppāda*

*Paṭiccasamuppāda* or the law of causation is regarded as a contribution of Buddha to the philosophical thoughts of India of the 5th century B.C. By this law Buddha wanted to establish that the constituted world is neither a creation of God nor has issued out of the ever existing *Prakṛti* nor it is a composite of

¹ See above, p. 71.  ² See above, p. 49.  ³ See above, p. 39.
eternal atoms (añu-paramāṇu). It shows that the things of the world have only a dependent origination and hence are impermanent and sources of misery, and that there is nothing except Nibbāna and Ākāsa that is not originated by cause and condition. This law has been utilised to show that all that is caused and conditioned are without any substance. It explains the fixed unchangeable and this-conditioned (iddappaccayata) nature of things and as such it is a key to the eternal truth. The moment a being realises the truth of this law, he sees the reality (yo pātīcecasamuppadām passati so dhammam passati, yo dhammam passati so pātīcecasamuppadām passati). All the Buddhist texts, whether Hinayāna or Mahāyāna, identify this law with Buddha and Dhamma. It was this solution of the truth that appealed to the philosophical mind of Sāriputta and led to his conversion to Buddhism.

"Many scholars, who have dealt with this formula, have attempted to elicit from it Buddha's theory of the origin of a being and some of them have actually drawn parallels between the links of the formula and the causal series of the Sāṃkhya. It is noteworthy that such attempts were also made in Buddhaghosa's time. Buddhaghosa has, however, pointed out that avijjā, the first link of the chain, must not be regarded as similar to pakati (prakṛti) of the Pakativādins (Sāṃkhya) because avijjā is neither uncaused (akāraṇam) nor is it the primary cause (mūlakāraṇam) of the world. It owes its origin to impurities (āsavas). The reason adduced by Buddhaghosa for its being made the first link in the chain is that Buddha used 'avijjā' or 'bhavataṇhā' for commencing (sisabbaṇam) his discourses on topics

1 Majjhima, I, p. 191.
4 See Kern, Manual of Buddhism, p. 46 f.; for other refs., see Poussin, Théories des onze causes, p. vii, fn. 2.

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which by their nature are without any beginning or end (vatta-kathā or anamatagga). It is apparent therefore that avijjā need not necessarily be the first link in the chain of causation but that it is one of the terms found suitable by the author of the formula to begin the chain. It could as well be commenced by bhavatanhā. In the Samyutta Nikāya, the formula starts with āhāra as the first link. Hence, we see that the Paticecasamuppāda is not meant to be an explanation of the origin of the world but just a chain of instances to illustrate the law of idappaccayata (this-conditioned nature, i.e., dependent origination) of things. Those scholars, who expected to find in it a key to the origin of the world, have been disappointed and have condemned it as illogical and incongruous. The author of the formula could not anticipate that his arrangement of the illustrations in a series would give rise to confusion. The chain was not meant to demonstrate a line of evolution. All that is intended to demonstrate is that any two links are related to each other in one or more of the twentyfour ways (paccayas), for which the usual general expression is "imamni sati idam hoti" (this being so that happens). There are in the Paṭṭhāna twentyfour such relations, viz., hetu (root-cause), ārammaṇa (basis, objective cause), anantara (immediate c.), samanantarā (concomitant c.), sabajāta (co-existent c.), aṇṇamaṇṇa (interdependent c.), nissaya (supporting cause as earth to

1 Vism., p. 525.
2 Ibid., p. 525: purimā, bhikkhave, koṭi na paṇnāyati avijjāya (or bhavatanhāya), ito pube avijjā (or bhavatanhā) nāhosi atha pacchā sambhavi ti. Evaṃ c'etām bhikkhave, vuccati, atha ca pana paṇnāyati idappaccayā avijjā (or bhavatanhā). Cf. Samyutta, II, p. 178; III, p. 149
3 Samyutta, II, pp. 101-3; Mahāniddesa, I, pp. 25-6.
5 Cf. Vism., p. 532; translation, p. 635; Intro. to Paṭṭhāna (P.T.S.).
tree), upanissaya (immediately effective cause), purejāta (preceding c.), pacchajāta (succeeding c.), āsevana (cause which requires repetition, e.g. study), kamma (previous actions), vipāka (fruitation of previous actions), ābhāra (sustenance), indriya (predominating factors), jhāna (meditation), magga (the eight-fold path), sampayutta (associated cause), vippayutta (dissociated cause), attī (present cause), nattī (non-present cause), vigāta (absent cause) and avigāta (non-absent cause). It is in one or more of these relations that the two consecutive links are related to each other, e.g., viññāna is related to nāmarūpa as aññamañña; jāti is related to jarā-marana as purejāta and upanissaya, and so forth. The law implies that any two links should be taken up for consideration for realising the idappaccaññata of worldly things.

Buddhaghosa observes that by samuppāda is not meant origin (uppāda), pure and simple. It is not also the doctrine of nothingness (nattīta). It negatives the doctrines of sāsata and ucccha. By the word paṭicca is meant that a thing originates not by itself (ekatito) nor without a cause (nāpi abetuto); it originates by depending on certain other things (paccayasāmaggim paṭicca) as a fruition (phalavobārena). By the compound word paṭiccasamuppāda is meant that a cause leads to an effect (patimukhāṁ ito gato) unalterably, and the cause and effect are not separable from each other; cause and effect are mutually dependent and which mutual dependence is unalterably fixed.

The twelve terms composing the law of causation are explained thus:

(1) Avijjā or lack of true knowledge

The etymological meaning of the word avijjā is that it makes a person learn what should be unlearnt and unlearn what

1 See above, pp. 39, 41.
should be learnt. It debars a person from taking a true view of worldly things. It makes a person see happiness in misery, good in evil, and vice versa, regard the unreals as reals, make differentiation where no differentiation exists, and so forth. The usual meaning attributed to it in the Nikāyas is non-comprehension of the ariyasaccas while in the Abhidhamma, it is non-comprehension of pubbanta and aparanta, sassa and uccheda, and of idappaccayata. Avijjā screens the truth, and it is by the removal of avijjā that the vijjā or truth (i.e. Nibbāna) flashes before the eyes of an adept.

(2) Saṅkhārā or thought-constructions, impressions

By the word saṅkhārā is meant the impressions or traces left in the mind by taking wrong view of things due to avijjā. On account of the lack of true knowledge, a person has the impression that desires conduce to happiness, that performance of sacrifices and practice of extreme austerities lead to liberation and so forth. The relation (paccaya) of saṅkhārā to avijjā may be one or more of the following four, viz., ārammana, adhipati, kamma, and upanissaya. The impressions left on the mind by avijjā lead one to perform deeds which are (i) meritorious (puñña) such as gifts and observance of moral precepts, (ii) sinful (apuñña) such as killing and stealing, and (iii) neither meritorious nor sinful such as beliefs in sassa and uccheda. These three kinds of deeds may be (i) physical (kāyika), or verbal (vācasika) or mental (mānasika). Again, the impressions or thought cons-

1 See above, p. 263. 2 See above, pp. 49 ff.
3 See above, p. 266. Cf. Dhammasāṅgani § 1162.
4 This term saṅkhārā should be distinguished from the word saṅkhārā in phrases like anicca vata saṅkhārā, where it means all that is constituted.
tructions (sañkhāra) may be limited or unlimited, high or low, right or wrong, definite or indefinite. Puññābhisañkhāra cause rebirth in heavens, while apuññābhisañkhāra in hells and āneñjābhisañkhāra in the Arūpalokas. The function of sañkhāra is to produce the paṭisandhi-viññāna (or citta) (the thought with which a being is reborn) and the mental states (viññānas) that follow the paṭisandhi-citta, which are all dependent on its previous deeds (kappapaccaya).

(3) Viññāna or perception &

(4) Nāma-rūpa or mind and matter

The appearance of viññāna and nāma-rūpa marks the inception of the present life of a being. The very fact of a being's having a fresh existence implies that the being could not get rid of avijjā and its consequence sañkhāra in its past life. An Arhat or Buddha only gets rid of the same and so does not have fresh viññāna and nāma-rūpa. The sañkhāra lead to the reappearance of paṭisandhi-viññāna, and the other viññānas immediately succeeding it, and it is around this viññāna that the other four khandhas cluster, forming a complete being with mind and matter.

Of these four khandhas, one is rūpa (matter) and the other three are saññā, vedanā and sañkhāra which along with viññāna, separately stated in the formula, are collectively called nāma. Buddhaghosa derives nāma from the root nam, to bend, and says saññā, vedanā and sañkhāra are called nāma because they bend, direct the viññāna to the object (ārammaṇa). In the formula of twelve links, viññāna is made the paccaya of nāma-rūpa, but nāma also includes viññāna. In some enumerations, viññāna and nāma-rūpa are shown to be interdependent.

1 See above, p. 255-6. 2 Vism., p. 558. 3 Dīgha, II, p. 56.
The reason for making viññāna an independent link is that saṅkhāra carr be the paccaya (i.e. kamma and upanissaya) of viññāna only¹ and not of the other three khandhas or of rūpa. The paṭisandhiviññāna is of nineteen kinds.² Viññānas, which follow the paṭisandhicitta and cuticitta, are the five perceptions derived through the five sense-organs. Besides these five, there is the mano-viññāna which may be sub-divided into thirty-two kinds.³

Now the viññānas, which appear after paṭisandhi-viññāna, gradually lead to saññā (perception), vedanā (feelings), and fresh saṅkhāra (thought-constructions), all of which become ultimately the paccaya of rūpa (matter).⁴ The relation of nāma to rūpa is one of the four paccayas, e.g. sabajāta, aññamañña, nissaya and vipāka.⁵ It is clearly stated in the Vibhaṅga⁶ that the sense-organs as also other matters in their subtlest state originate out of mind. This subtle rūpa is nourished by the food taken by the mother and shaped by the force of previous karma.

(5) Saññayatana or six sense-organs

Nāma-rūpa are mentioned as the paccaya of the six sense-organs. By nāma is meant here the three khandhas, vedanā, saññā and saṅkhāra. By rūpa is taken the four great elements (mahābhūtas), the six objects (vattthus) viz., rūpa, sadda, gandha, rasa, phoṭṭhabba and dhamma, and vitality (jīvita). The above rūpa consisting of eleven elements takes its own course of

evolution (sa-santanti pariyāpannam) and is related to saḷāyatana as sahaṇā, aṇāmaṇī, nissaya, vippayutta, attbi and avigata. Nāma also have the above relations to the six sense-organs with the distinction that it is sampayutta and not vippayutta paccaya and it is also a vipāka paccaya. But these two nāma and rūpa must come together to be a paccaya of the six sense-organs and not otherwise.

(6) Phassa or contact

There are as many kinds of phassa (contact) as there are āyatanas, that is, six. Phasso appears as a result of the āyatanas taking their own course of evolution (sakasāntati-pariyāpannam). The only point to be remembered is that phasso is put in the singular number as it is only one though there may be more than one sense-organ functioning, but one form of phasso is limited to one āyatana. The āyatanas are related to phasso in six or nine ways. The phasso can also be sub-divided like viññāna into thirty-two kinds.

(7) Vedanā or feeling

There are as many feelings as there are doors, i.e., the sense-organs. Vedanā like viññāna may be sub-divided into 89 kinds. Cakkhupasāda, etc., are related to feeling in eight ways.

(8) Taṇhā or thirst, desire

There are as many kinds of thirst as there are sources i.e., the six objects of the sense-organs, viz., rūpa-taṇhā, sadda-taṇhā and

1 Vism., p. 564. 2 Ibid., p. 563. 3 Ibid., p. 562. 4 Ibid., p. 565. 5 Ibid., p. 566. 6 Ibid., p. 565. 7 See above, p. 255. 8 Vism., p. 567.
so forth. Each taṇhā may be of three kinds, kāma, bhava and vibhava. When the taṇhā rouses a taste for the objects, rūpa, sadda, etc., it is called kāma. When it is associated with the belief that the world is eternally existing (sassata) and rouses an attachment (rāga) for future existence, it is called bhavatānha. When it is associated with the belief that there is no after-life (uccheda), and one becomes regardless of this life, it is called vibhava-taṇhā.

(9) Upādāna or strong attachment

The previously mentioned taṇhās lead to upādāna and are related to it in seven or eight ways. There are four kinds of upādāna, kāma, diṭṭhi, silabbata and attavāda. Kāmataṇhā is the cause of kāmapūḍāna, which is the firm grasping of the object, it is thirst for objects not obtained and firmly holding the objects already obtained. Diṭṭhupūḍāna is the firm adherence to wrong views, i.e., firm belief in the doctrine that there is no good effects of gifts or sacrifices, or belief in any one of the indeterminable problems: sassata or uccheda, anta or ananta etc. as true. Silabbatupūḍāna is the firm adherence to the belief that rituals or particular ascetic practices lead to liberation. Attavādupūḍāna is the firm belief in the existence of a soul, and in its identification with one of the five khandhas.

(10) Bhava or desire for existence

It has two distinct meanings, one is existence according to one’s past deeds, called kammabhava, and the other is the plane of existence wherein a being is reborn, called uppattibhava. The former is regulated by the three kinds of sāṅkhārā, puṇṇa, apuṇṇa and āneñja in their two grades low and high. But

1 Vibhaṅga, p. 380. 2 See above, p. 263. 3 Vism., p. 570-1. 4 See above, p. 45-6. 5 See above, p. 85.
saṅkhārā are not mentioned as the paccaya of bhava, so we are to ascertain how upādāna is the paccaya of bhava. Buddhaghosa points out that kāmapūḍāna leads to such actions which cause a being to be reborn in the kāmabhava and so it can be described as kammabhava. Other upādānas viz., diṭṭhi, sīlabbata and attavāda make a person adhere to wrong views, and influenced by those views he performs actions which lead to existences in kāma and other words, so in this sense, it can be called kamma-bhava. By upappabhava is meant the several planes of existence, such as Kāma, Rūpa or Arūpa lokas. Some of these may be asaṅṅā (without perception) and some may be with saṅṅā (perception) but so subtle that it is incapable of perceiving any object (nevasaṅṅā-nāsaṅṅā). Uppappabhava may also be classified according to the number of khandhas, a being may possess, e.g. kāma- or rūpa-bhava have five khandhas while arūpa and neva-saṅṅānāsaṅṅā have only four, asaṅṅābhava has one.

(11) Jāti or birth

Jāti is controlled by kammabhava and not upappabhava. It is related to bhava in two ways, kamma and upanissaya. Birth is dependent on certain external circumstances, but assuming those as common in two beings, one notices differences between the two. This difference is due to the nature of kamma-bhava, in other words, deeds of past life, so it is said kammam satte vibhajati, yad idam hinapaniṭhatāyā ti.¹

(12) Jarāmarana-soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa or old age, death, grief, lamentation, and sorrow

These are all due to jāti but the relation of these to jāti is only two, viz., upanissaya and purejāta.

¹ Majjhima, III, p. 203.
CHAPTER XVI

GROWTH OF THE SÅNGHA

Before and at the time of the appearance of Buddhism monasticism in the form it obtained among the Buddhists was unknown in India. There were brāhmanic and non-brāhmanic recluses who dwelt, or moved about, in groups,¹ and there were also in the forests and outskirts of towns or villages hermitages (āśramas) wherein lived not only those who had taken the third and fourth āśramas of life, viz., vānaprastha and yati but also life-long sannyāsins with their disciples including sometimes the members of their families, male and female, who had taken the vow of brahmacārya. In the Nikāyas,² we come across accounts referring to rich khattiyas and brāhmaṇas, who after having their head and moustache shaven, body unbesmeared with oil, and putting on deer-skins and using deer horns for scratching his body, took resort to hermitages newly built on the outskirts of the town, and dwelt there with wife and purohita, living on cow’s milk. Leading such a life they performed also sacrifices, offering animal-victims and so forth. There were also āśramas of life-long sannyāsins like Ārāḍa Kālāma and Rudraka Rāmaputra. In these āśramas the Guru or the chief teacher not only acted as the spiritual head imparting esoteric and exoteric religious instructions but also regulated the daily life of the inmates according to the usages of brahmacārins.

¹ See above, ch. III.
² Majjhima, I, p. 343-4.
There is nothing on record to show that there existed in the pre-Buddhist days any code of disciplinary rules governing the life of a brāhmaṇārīṇī. The earliest Dharmasūtras are those of Gautama, Baudhāyana and Āpastamba but their date cannot be put earlier than 600 B.C. even according to Prof. Kane. There were sūtra-works of Saṅkha-Likhita and Paññhānasī from which quotations are given in the Dharmasūtras, but references to Ācāryas, the Vedas, the Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa, Taittirīya and other Aranyakas, as sources of much of the materials of the Dharmasūtras prove only that in the seventh century B.C. there did not exist any code for brahmaṇārīṇīs though there were usages for their guidance. In this connection we may refer to the Vekhanassās a brāhmaṇical order referred to in the Nikāyas. Both Gautama and Baudhāyana speak of a Vaikhānasa or Vikhānasa sūtra, and in fact base the chapter on the duties of a recluse on some such work, for which later on the term Vikhānasa became a synonym for vānaprastha.

Pāṇini speaks of a Bhikṣu-sūtra while Baudhāyana and Āpastamba use the term ‘bhikṣu’ instead of ‘parivrājaka’ and mention that bhikṣus lived at one place during the rainy season. Evidently the writers of dharma-sūtras had in mind, besides the brāhmaṇayātis who were also called bhikṣus, the Buddhist bhikṣus as also the parivrājakas whose number became fairly large in the 6th century B.C. These parivrājakas or wandering brahmaṇārīṇīs lived a form of communal life, but there is no evidence of their having any code. Their daily life, it seems, was regulated by their chief according to the traditional usage.

1 Kane, History of the Dharmasastra, p. 19. 2. See ante., p. 33.
3 For Vaikhānasa-dharma-praṇa, see Kane, op. cit., pp. 105 ff.
4 Kane, op. cit., p. 19.
5 See for details Vidhusekhara Sastri, Pātimokkha, Intro., pp. 21 ff.;
Aṅguttara Nikāya there are a few hints relating to dress, food, bed and seats of non-Buddhistic parivrājakas, which are practically the same as detailed in a previous chapter.

The Jainas may be pointed as the only pre-Buddhistic religious order which had a monastic system and a code, which has come down to us in the form of the Ācāraṅga-sūtra. This work contains rules adapted to the ethical principles of the Jainas. It is not improbable that the Buddhists formulated their rules partly on the lines of the Jainas, their Uposathas, Pajjusana, etc.

The Buddhists adopted more or less the general directions scattered in the brāhmanic and non-brāhmanic literatures for the brahmacarins and sannyāsins and it was after some years had passed when the number of followers had grown fairly large that Buddha thought of framing a code of disciplinary rules in keeping with the teaching promulgated by him i.e., the majjhima-paṭipada which kept clear of the two extreme forms of life, viz., that of a rigorous non-brāhmanic ascetic and that of an ease-loving householder. He laid more emphasis on the control of mind (citta) than on body (kāya) and speech (vācā), and so he formulated a code of rules which answered to his ideal. The life of a monk living in a monastery but practising meditation in a forest or cemetery was Buddha’s ideal and so he directed that the monasteries should be located at a lonely spot outside but not very far from the limits of a town or a village so that the monks

Miss D. Bhagvat, Early Buddhist Jurisprudence, 1939, ch. I; Barua, Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, p. 241.

1 Aṅguttara, i, p. 240: anāñatīthiṇā paribbajakā paññāpenti civarapavivekaṁ, piṇḍapātapavivekaṁ and senāsanapavivekaṁ.

2 See ante., p. 18 re. ascetic practices.

3 In contrast to the Jainas who regarded kāyadanda as more important than manodanda. See Majjhima, I, p. 372.
might have little trouble in collecting their food and dress and other requisites from the towns people or village folk for the bare maintenance of the physical frame. The ideal monastery was a cave-dwelling in the hills around a town or village, vow of poverty was the rule, and alms was the sole support. Though magnificent Vihāras were built and all possible comforts compatible with a monk’s life were provided, the bhikkhus were disciplined to look upon them with discarn and utilise them just so far as was necessary to maintain their body. Abuses there must have been, as all bhikkhus were not imbued with the ideals of a bhikkhu life, and so the Buddhists could not help formulating a code to curb the recalcitrants. Once the code was started, it went on being revised and added on, and ultimately receiving the shape of a Piṭaka in five parts. Every aspect of a monk’s life had to be dealt with, to wit, the probationary period and initiation, training under the Ācariya and Upajjhāya, daily life including food, dress and other articles of use, residence and the mode of residing in it, religious ceremonies like the Uposatha, Vassāvāsa, Pavaṇā, and Kathina, ecclesiastical procedure for punishment and absolution from guilt, dissensions in the Saṅgha and the methods of settling disputes among monks.\(^1\) With the introduction of the initiation of women, another code came into existence to regulate

\(^1\) Cf. Anguttara, i, p. 99; iv, p. 144: pātimokkhaṁ, pātimokkhuddesā, pātimokkhathapanaṁ, pavaṇā, pavaṇaṁ-thapanaṁ, tajjaniyakammanṁ, nissayaṁ, pabbajiyak, paṭisāraṇiyak, ukkhhepaniyak, parivāsadānam, mūlaya paṭikassanam, mānattadānam, abbhānam, vosaraṇiyam, nissaraṇiyam, upasampadā, ṇattik, ṇattidutiyak, ṇatticatuththak, sammukhavainayo, sativinayo, amūlhhavainayo, paṭiṇātakaranam yebbuyya-sikā, tassāpāpiyyasiṅkā, tinavatthārako. See also Anguttara, I, p. 231 ff. sadhikam diyaḍḍhasataṁ sikkhaṇḍaṁ anvaddhamāsāṁ uddesam āgacchatī.
the life of the nuns. This code was more or less a supplement to the code of the monks, having some special rules for the conduct of the nuns.¹

Saṅgha: its beginning

Buddha started his mission as an eremetical teacher and had hardly any intention of forming a Saṅgha. The Vinaya tradition shows that the idea of a Saṅgha was thrust upon him, but once he had taken it up, he did his best to place it on as thorough a basis as possible. Every delinquency on the part of a bhikkhu reported to him had his immediate attention, and a rule was framed to avert its future repetition, and this was done with a view to, in the words of Buddha, **appasannānam va pasādāya pasannām va bhīyyobbāvāya** (to make the non-believers believing and the believers doubting their faith).

The story of his forming the first band of disciples is related thus in the **Vinaya Piṭaka**:²

Buddha’s first converts were the five brahmins **Annātakoṇḍañña, Vappa, Bhaddiya, Mahānāma and Assaji**, his quondam companions.³ The words in which they sought admission into the order were simply “**labbeyyāmā mayam bhante bhagavato santike pabbajjam, labbeyyāmā upasampadan ti.**” There was no formality, the only reply given by the Teacher was “**etba bhikkhavo ti.**” The next batch of persons to accept his teaching was Yasa of Benares and his four friends Vimala, Subāhu, Puṇṇaji and Gavampati, and his fifty other friends, and the procedure for admission was the same as above. Now there were in all sixty disciples who were all arhats. Buddha then sent out the sixty arhats to as many places as they could reach,

¹ See *Infra*, ch. XVIII.
³ See above, pp. 101-2, 137.
directing them not to go to one place even in twos.\(^1\) He himself went to Uruvela Senā-nigamo.

The *Vinaya* is silent about the activities of the sixty arhats though it mentions the difficulties experienced by them in admitting persons into the order by having to present them before Buddha for the purpose of ordination.\(^2\) It relates in detail how Buddha converted the thirty Bhaddavaggiya youths and the Jatila teachers, the three Kassapas with their disciples,\(^3\) and how one of the five brāhmaṇa ascetics, Assaji, was instrumental in bringing about the conversion of Sāriputta. The ordination so far effected was made by Buddha personally by uttering the two words: "*ahi bhikkhu*". Neither the *Vinaya* nor the *Nikāyas* continue the story of conversion any further, though they speak of stray converts made by Buddha from time to time, but a continuous story has been attempted in the later works like the *Buddhavamsa* and the *Atthakathās*.\(^4\) After the conversion of Sāriputta and Moggallāna, Buddha naturally turned his eyes to his homeland, Kapilavatthu. Here he permitted Rāhula to join the order and asked Sāriputta to give him the ordination. Among other Sākyas that joined the order were Nanda, Ānanda, Devadatta, Anuruddha, Bhaddiya, Bhagu, Kimbila and the barber Upāli.\(^5\) Most of these figured notably in the subsequent history of the religion and formed in fact the main props of the religion.

It will be observed that Rāhula was ordained by Sāriputta and not by Buddha, and that Sāriputta acted as Rāhula’s *ācariya*. It was on this occasion that Buddha empowered his disciples to

\(^1\) *Vinaya*, I, p. 19-20. Mr. S. Dutt interprets it differently in his *Early Buddhist Monachism*.
\(^2\) *Vinaya*, I, p. 21-22.  
\(^4\) See above, ch. XI.  
confer ordination. Buddha himself did not observe any rule for conferring ordination. After the conversion of Sāriputta and Moggallāna, he admitted into the Saṅgha a few others like Aṅgulimāla by the words "chi bhikkhu."

It was while Buddha was staying at Kapilavatthu that he enlarged the rules of initiation, which were first introduced by him while he was staying at Rājagaha. The sixty disciples sent out by the Teacher for propagating his new teaching had hitherto no authority to confer ordination on desiring entrants and had to bring them from different parts of the country to the place where Buddha was staying at the time. This was sometimes found impracticable and led Buddha to delegate his power of ordination to his disciples who were however directed to observe certain rules. Several restrictions were also imposed to avoid unworthy persons getting into the Saṅgha. The rules and restrictions were generally as follows:—

Rules for Admission

i. A person seeking ordination was required to shave his hair and moustache, put on yellow robes, and after covering one shoulder only by the yellow robes, sit on his legs, salute the bhikkhus, and then with folded hands, utter the tisaraṇa formula.

ii. After some time when the utterance of mere tisaraṇa formula was found inadequate, the system of natti-catutthakkamma was introduced. The procedure was that an entrant,

1 Vinaya, I, 54, 3. 2 Ibid., I, 19, 28, 31 f.
3 Ibid., I, p. 21-2. 4 Sanction of the Saṅgha was required for bhandukamma.—Mv., I, 48, 2.
5 Vinaya, I, p. 21-2. 6 Ibid., I, p. 55-6.
whose age must not be less than fifteen in case of pabbajjā and twenty in case of upasampadā, is to sit on his legs and ask for ordination in a set formulae (kammavācā) before a chapter of at least ten fully ordained monks. He must be presented to the chapter by his upajjhāya, or ācariya, a competent monk selected by him beforehand. He must also satisfy the monks present that he had complied with the preliminary conditions like taking parents' consent, shaving head and so forth. His intention to become a fully ordained monk is announced thrice (natti-cattuttha) by the upajjhāya or ācariya. After the announcement, if there is none dissenting, the ordination is conferred. Immediately after the ordination the entrant is apprised of the four nissayas upon which he is to depend, viz., living on alms, using robes made out of rags, sleeping under trees, and taking urine and such other filthy things as medicine. These were however later on relaxed.

After pabbajjā ceremony a sāmanera is asked to observe only the ten precepts and it was after upasampadā that a monk is asked to observe the four pārājikās and other rules of the Pātimokkha.

Bars to Admission

Persons belonging to non-Buddhistic religious orders could only be admitted into the Saṅgha after they had gone through a probationary period (parivāsa) of four months and behaved...
themselves properly during the period. Exceptions however were made, in the case of the Žātīlas and the Sākyas, the former being believers in the effects of past deeds (kammavādino kiriyavādino) and the latter being kinsmen of the Teacher.

Persons suffering from any of the five diseases, viz., leprosy (kuṭṭham), boils (gando), dry leprosy (kilāso), consumption (soso), and fits (apamāro) were debarred from admission into the Saṅgha. Other persons who were excluded from admission into the Saṅgha were (a) rājabhato (men in royal service), dhaja-baddho coro (declared thieves), kārabhedako coro (jail-breaker), likhitako coro, (proclaimed robber), kāsāhato katāndakəkammə ( scourged offender), lakkhaṇāhato (branded thief), ināyiko (debtor), dāso (slave), a matricide, a patricide, an arhantacide, one who has violated a nun, one who has caused a schism, one who has shed Buddha’s blood, a eunuch, a hermaphrodite, an animal in human form, one whose hand or feet or both have been severed and one who has furtively joined the Saṅgha.

Nissayas

There were two ceremonies of ordination, the first made the desiring entrant a sāmanera by conferring pabbajjā, which literally means ‘going out from home to homeless life’ and the second known as upasampadā made the sāmanera a regular member of the order—a bhikkhu. A newly ordained bhikkhu was required to take nissaya, that is, he had to be dependent on a teacher, for training. The teacher should be a competent monk, whose duty was to make his ward observe and practise the Vinaya rules. Before the ceremony of ordination (upasampadā) could be performed, the monk must have training

1 Mahāvagga, i, 38. 1. 2 Ibid., i, 38. 11. 3 Ibid., i, 61. 1 to i, 71. 1.
for at least ten years and at the same time must prove himself fit and proper for membership of the Saṅgha.¹

The pabbajjā ceremony was not a formal affair. The utterance of tisarana formula was all that was necessary. The Samana, however, at the time of recruitment had to choose formally his upajjhāya,² as also an ācariya,³ both of whom must be learned, discreet and of ten years standing.

A Samana's first duty was to provide himself with an alms-bowl and robes,⁴ observe the ten precepts, and render all possible services to his teacher. As a general rule he must be respectful to all monks,⁵ and should never speak ill of Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha nor adhere to any false belief.⁶ He was taught not only the moral laws, conduct and demeanour, but was also initiated into the mysteries of Buddhist philosophy. There are elaborate rules⁷ regulating the mutual duties and obligations of a teacher (upajjhāya) and his disciple (saddhivibhārika) as also the cessation of their relation. The relation of a teacher and a disciple should be that of a father and son and it is by mutual reverence, confidence and communion that one can prosper in the dhamma and vinaya.⁸ It is not clear what was

¹ Mu., i, 32. 1. In i, 53. 4 ff. the period is reduced to 5 years.
² Mu., i, 25. 7; i, 69. 1.
³ Ibid., i, 32. 1.
⁴ Mu., i, 69. 1; 32. 1.
⁵ Ibid., i, 70. 1 & 5.
⁶ Ibid., i, 60. 1.
⁸ Mu., i, 25. 7; i, 32. 1: evam te aññamaññam sagāravā sappatissā sabhāgavuttino viharantā imasmim dhammavinaye vudhāhim, virulhiṃ vepullām āpajjissanti. Even if the upajjhāya deserves parivāsa, mūlāya paṭikassanā or any other disciplinary measure, it was the duty of the saddhivibhārika to move the Saṅgha for correcting his teacher (Mu., i, 25. 21).
the function of the ācariya. It may be that he gave the nissayás, prescribed the kammaṭṭhānas for meditation to his disciple (ante-vāsika), in short, trained him up in the esoteric practices, while the upajjhāya taught the three piṭākas and imparted the general instructions, in other words, the exoteric aspects of Buddhism. In the absence of the upajjhāya, the ācariya had also to perform the functions of an upajjhāya, and vice versa. In the Mahāvagga and Cullavagga, (viii. 13-14) the functions of an ācariya and upajjhāya are given in identical terms, and it is enjoined that in the absence of one, the other had to perform the functions of both.²

Residence and Articles of furniture

It has been mentioned above that for the residence of monks rukkhamūlasenāsanam (residence under trees) was the original rule, while a monastery (vihāra), a pinnacled house (addhāyoga), a big building (pāsāda), an attic (hammiya) and a cave (gūhā) were later on allowed as atirekalābha.¹ It was at the instance of Bimbisāra that Buddha accepted the Veluvana-vihāra, and in consequence of which he sanctioned ārāmas for the dwelling of monks.³

The monks were still then dwelling at foot of trees, on hills, in grottoes and caves, in cemeteries, forests, open places, or on straw-heaps.⁴ The setthhis of Rājagaha were the first to come forward to provide vihāra, addhāyoga, pāsāda, hammiya and gūhā for the monks.⁵ They built sixty vihāras, and dedicated the same to the use of members of the order of the four

¹ See SBE., XIII, p. 178-9 fn. I am indebted to my colleague Mr. G. D. De for a few suggestions here.
² Mu., i, 3o. 4.
³ Mu., i, 22. 18.
⁴ Cv., vi, 1. 1.
⁵ Mu., i, 2.
corners (saṭṭhīm vihāre āgatānāgatassa cātuḍḍissassa saṅghassa patīṭṭhāpebīti). These had plastered walls, white-washed or coloured, and were provided with doors and windows, verandahs, boundary walls, etc.¹ The vihāras so far constructed were provided with the bare requirements of monks as shown above. It was Anāthapiṇḍika who built a monastery at Sāvatthi with all its component parts, viz., dwelling rooms, cells, gate-chambers, service-halls, halls with fire-places, store-houses, closets, cloisters, rooms for walking exercises, wells, sheds for the well, bathing places, bath-rooms, tanks, pavilions (vihāra, parivēna, koṭṭhaka, upaṭṭhānasālā, aggisālā, kappiyakuti, vakkakuti, caṇkama, caṅkamasālā, udapāna, udapānasālā, jantāghara, jantāgharasālā, pokkharāni, maṇḍapa).²

The institution of Carikamasālās³ and Jantāghara⁴ was permitted at the instance of Jīvaka and elaborate directions are given for the construction of these. The directions for jantāghara were given mostly in connection with the provision of fire in the rooms and the methods of taking baths. For privies and urinating places there are similar directions, and in addition there are also some instructions regarding the use of bath-rooms and privies (jantāghara-vattam and vakkakuti vattam).⁵ The Kappiyakuti also requires some justification because the monks were required to take the vow of poverty and were prohibited to store any food. This anomalous position has been met by

¹ For details, see Cu., vi, 2 & 3.
² Cullavagga, vi, 4, 10; viii, 7, 4; Mahāvagga, iii, 5, 6. For the various kinds of rooms in a house for the use of a householder, see Mu., iii, 5, 10; SBE., vol. XX, p. 189; Dutt, Early Buddhist Monachism, pp. 122-3, 183.
³ Cullavagga, v, 14.
⁴ Ibid., v, 14. 3; viii, 8.
⁵ Ibid., v, 35; viii, 8, 10.
Buddha by recommending *kappiyabhumi* outside the boundary of the monastery.\(^1\)

In consonance with the leniency gradually shown by Buddha in the matter of residence suitable for the monks, great latitude was given also in regard to seats, beds, and other articles of furniture.\(^2\) The monks were allowed to have as their seats or beds benches built against the walls, bedsteads with short removable legs, arm-chairs, sofas, cushioned chairs, carpets, pillows, bolsters stuffed with wool, cotton, grass etc. They were required to keep them clean, and there are also directions for cleaning the vihāra and articles of furniture.\(^3\)

The monks were generally not allowed to use animal skins for seats or beds\(^4\) but exception was made in the case of monks living in Avantidakkhināpatha where the skins of *elaka*, *aja* and *miga* could be used for *aittharana*.\(^5\)

Sometimes difficulties were experienced in accommodating monks in monasteries, some of which were very small. Rules had to be framed for ascertaining the claim of priority, and in course, of time, office-bearers like Senāsanapaññāpaka\(^6\) had to be appointed to arrange for accommodating the incoming bhikkhus properly.

**Dress of Monks**

For the dress of monks, *pamsukulacivara* was the rule while linen, cotton, silk, woollen garments, coarse cloth, hempen

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2. In *Mv.*, v, 10. 5 the following *Uccāsayanamahāsayanāni* were prohibited: *āsandi pallako gonako cittakā paṭikā paṭalikā tūlikā vikatikā* and so forth.
6. Other office-bearers relating to Senāsana were *Navakammika* and *Senāsanagāhāpaka* (*Cv.*, vi, 11. 2). See *Infra.*, p. 322.
(kbo'maṃ kappāsiṅkaṃ koseyyaṃ kambalaṃ sānāṃ bhaṅgam) were extra concessions (atiyekālabha). It was at the instance of Jivaka Komārabhacca that Buddha permitted his followers to accept the robes (cīvaras) offered by laymen. These could be made of six kinds of materials mentioned above. A monk was allowed only three garments (cīvaras), viz., saṅghāti, uttarāsaṅgha and antarāvāsaka. The cīvaras had to be made out of cut pieces of cloth so that when sewn together should look like cultivated fields. There are several rules relating to the dyeing of cīvaras, drying dyed cloths, division and distribution of the cīvaras among the recipients, and so forth. In division and distribution many difficulties cropped up, leading to the creation of office-bearers like cīvarabhājaka (distributor of robes), bhaṇḍāgāra (store-keeper), cīvaranidāhaka (keeper of robes), and cīvaramaṭṭigābaka, (receiver of robes). Each of these office-bearers were formally appointed by the Saṅgha by unanimous consent. The Pātimokkha-sutta takes notice of several irregularities in the distribution and use of cīvaras and so prescribes punishments for the irregularities. Besides cīvaras, the bhikkhus were allowed to accept mantles (pāvara), blankets (kambala), towels (mukha-puṇḍaka colaka), bags (parikkhāracolaka), bathing clothes (udaka-sāṭika), and bandages for itches, wounds, etc. (kaṇḍupaticchādi).

It cannot be definitely stated when the use of shoes by monks came into vogue. According to the tradition, permission was granted by Buddha for the use of shoes when Sāgata was the servitor of Buddha. Once the privilege was given, there were abuses, and to counteract these several restrictions had to be

1 Mu., i, 30. 4; SBE., XIII, p. 173.  
2 Mu., viii, 3. 1.  
3 Mu., viii, 13. 5; SBE., XVII, p. 212; a double waist cloth, a single upper robe, and a single undergarment.  
4 Mu., viii, 12. 2.  
5 Mu., viii, 5-9.  
6 Mu., viii, 17-20.
imposed regarding colour, shape and materials of the shoes⁴
and the use of those in the cloisters (caṇīkamana) or in the
presence of the Upajjhiya, and so forth.

Pūtimuttabhesajjam

Like the previous two nissayas, pūtimuttabhesajjam (urine
and such other medicines) was the original rule, but later on
sappi (butter), navanīta (cream), telā (oil), madhu (honey), phānita
(molasses) were allowed to be taken but only in the forenoon.
Later on, however, the time was not only extended, but permission
was also given for storing the same upto seven days² in superses-
sion of the rule that no food should be stored. In course of time
these were found inadequate to keep the bhikkhus free from ail-
ments, so permission was given for using as medicines animal-
fats, medicinal roots, herbs, leaves, fruits, gums, salts, and such
other drugs prescribed in the Aṇurveda-sāstra, including even
raw meat and blood, besides gruels and broths. Use of hot
baths, purgatives, ointments, and dressing of wounds were recom-
mended in cases of necessity. Receptacles, instruments, and
other articles required for preparing medicines or applying oint-
ments, letting of blood by lancets, use of surgical appliances and
requisities, were sanctioned as a matter of course. Surgical opera-
tion was prohibited only in cases of wounds which were within
two inches of the anus. The monks, in fact, were allowed to take
almost all medicinal and surgical aids available at the time, the only
condition being that they in the name of medicines must not
drift to excesses or enjoy the comforts of a householder.

Pindiyālopaḥbojanam

Originally the monks were enjoined to live only on alms,
but in course of time the rule was relaxed and they were allowed

¹ Mu., v, 1, 30 ff.
² Mu., vi, 1, 5; 15, 10.
to accept invitations when extended to a Saṅgha as a body, or to a group of individuals, or to an individual. They could also accept food distributed by tickets (salākā), fortnightly meals, meals on the Uposatha days or meals offered on every first day (pratīpad) of a fortnight.  

The restrictions regarding food were further relaxed in the section on medicaments. Not only sick but also healthy monks were allowed to take sugar-water, or other sweet drinks, fruits, meat and fish under certain conditions.

By the sanction of Kappiya-bhūmi for the storage of food, further latitude was given to the monks in the matter of obtaining their food, even, if necessary, by cooking. The site of the Kappiyabhūmi had to be selected beyond the boundary limits of a monastery, with the exception that the site if not so found, a cow-shed or a layman’s building within the boundaries of a monastery might be used as a Kappiyabhūmi. A bhikkhu was entrusted with the management of the Kappiyabhūmi. He was called Kappiyakāraka. It is said that bhikkhus undertaking a journey were permitted even to receive gold through the Kappiyakāraka and purchase the necessaries of life. Lastly the bhikkhus were given full discretion in matters of food and medicaments regarding which there was no express direction in the Vinaya.

**Uposatha and Pātimokkha Assemblies**

Following the practice of the non-Buddhistic sects, Buddha introduced (tradition says at the instance of King Bimbisāra) the
fortnightly sitting of monks either on the 14th or 15th (and/or 8th) day, to hold discussions about the Dhamma and Vinaya and to recite the rules of the Pātimokkha. Before the recitation, the preliminaries to be attended to, were: Sweeping of the Uposatha hall, provision of seats, lamps and drinking water, formal announcement of the day, declaration of Pārisuddhi of all the members, selection of monks to put and answer questions relating to dhamma and vinaya, counting of the members to ascertain the completeness of the Saṅgha.

As completeness implied a jurisdiction of the Saṅgha, rules were framed for defining the limits (simā) of a Saṅgha, i.e., of a Pātimokkha assembly. Formal selection was made of the spot where the monks were to meet for the purpose of a Pātimokkha assembly. Completeness of an assembly implied also the presence of not only all the existing members of an āvāsa but also of those who might belong to another āvāsa but happened to be present on the Uposatha day within the simā of that āvāsa. There were occasions when the members of an āvāsa held an assembly without being assured of the presence of members belonging to another āvāsa, but dwelling within the āvāsa on the Uposatha day. Rules were prescribed for bonafide mistakes but, as a rule, if the members of another āvāsa were larger in number, the assembly had to be held anew. When however an assembly was held deliberately to avoid or exclude the incoming members of another āvāsa, the members joining the assembly became guilty of either dukkata or zhullaccaya according


2 Saṅgha would not be complete unless all the bhikkhus attended the meeting personally or by proxy.

3 Mu., ii, 28, 4.
to the nature of the intention. The bhikkhus, however, were
directed not to leave their residence on the Uposatha day except
on an urgent business of the Saṅgha.¹

The bhikkhus were required to attend the assembly fully
dressed (tīcivarena avippavāsa) with certain exceptions, recite the
rules of the Pātimokkha in extenso, abridging it only in cases of
danger. In cases of necessity bhikkhus from other āvāsas were
invited for reciting the Pātimokkha.

There were special procedures for the declaration of
Pārisuddhi by a sick monk, for obtaining his consent to the
ecclesiastical acts passed in the assembly, and for dealing with
a monk who has become insane. The minimum number
of members who could hold a Pātimokkha assembly was four;
for declaration of Pārisuddhi only, the minimum number of bhik-
khūs required was two,² and in both the cases actual attendance of
the members was indispensable. If there were only one bhikkhu
in an āvāsa, he had to take to adhitṭhāna.³ The pārisuddhi of an
assembly was obtained by making all the members declare individ-
ually that they had not committed any breach of the Pātimokkha
rules during the preceding fortnight, or by making those who
had committed any breach confess their offences. There were
exceptional occasions when collective declaration of pārisuddhi
was accepted.⁴

The recitation of the Pātimokkha could be made only in an
assembly in which the members had declared their pārisuddhi
and in which there were no bhikkhuṇis, sāmaṇerās, sāmaṇerīs, or

¹ Mv., ii, 35.
² There is a special procedure in case of one bhikkhu. See Mv.,
ii, 26. 9.
³ Adhitṭhāna = resolution, self-determination.
⁴ Mv., ii, 27. 8.
any bhikkhu undergoing punishment, or persons not admissible to the Sāṅgha. In the Cullavagga it is laid down that the recitation of the Pātimokkha should be interdicted (Pātimokkham thapetabhāmi) if there were any impure bhikkhu in the assembly. The interdiction was required in cases where bhikkhus were too obstinate to acknowledge their guilt.

Vassāvāsa

The observance of vassāvāsa came into vogue among the Buddhist monks at an early date. To avoid the inconvenience of travelling in the rains and the chance of injuring sprouts and insects, it was enjoined that the bhikkhus should stay at one place (āvāsa) during three months of the rains, commencing from the day next to the fullmoon of Açādha (June-July) or Srāvana (July-August). In cases of urgent calls only for the benefit of the Sāṅgha or of the lay-devotees or sick persons, or for some particular business of the Sāṅgha, the bhikkhus were allowed to leave the āvāsa for seven days only. There was however no bar to bhikkhus leaving the āvāsa if there be danger to life through beasts of prey, snakes, robbers, or if the residence be destroyed by fire or water, or if there be great scarcity of food or medicine, or lack of lay-devotees, or any chance of silavipatti or saṅghabheda.

The bhikkhus could take up vassāvāsa with a moving caravan, ship or cattle-pen but not in the hollow of a tree, in the open air or under a sun-shade.

In the selection of the residence during vassā the monks were recommended to stay in those places where the number of lay-

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1 Mu., ii, 36.  
2 Cv., ix.  
3 For Sattābakaraniya, see Mu., iii, 5ff.  
4 For anāpatti vassacchedassa, see Mu., iii, 9ff.  
5 Mu., iii, 12.
devotees was large but a monk who had given previously his word to a lay-devotee must keep it.\(^1\)

**Pavāraṇā**

The ceremony of **Pavāraṇā** was performed at the end of the *vassāvāsa*. The object of the ceremony was to confess all sins of omission and commission (seen, heard or apprehended)\(^2\) that might have been committed during the *vassāvāsa*. It was almost the same as the declaration of *parisuddhi* in the Pātimokkha assemblies dealt with before. Elaborate rules were laid down regarding the procedure of the *pavāraṇā* ceremony, most of them being identical with those of *parisuddhi*. Like the *parisuddhi-thapanam* (interdiction of *parisuddhi* declaration), there was also the system of *pavāraṇā-thapanam* (interdiction of *pavāraṇā* ceremony).\(^3\)

**Kathina**

Another ceremony on the termination of *vassāvāsa* was the making of robes out of the gifts of cloth made by the laity to the bhikkhu-saṅgha within a very short time. The Saṅgha might decide upon a Kathina ceremony if there were any need for it. In that case, it must announce its intention formally before the Saṅgha and obtain the unanimous consent of the members, and then select by another formal announcement the bhikkhu to be entrusted with the making of the robes. The bhikkhu so entrusted was allowed a few privileges regarding his food, dress, and rules of daily life.\(^4\) The ceremony would not be complete unless and until the cloths had been cut to measurement, sewn, braided or doubled where necessary, washed and dyed, distributed

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2. *Diṣṭhena vā suteṇa vā parisaṅkāya vā.*  
4. *Mv.*, vii, 1. 3.
among the monks, and the words of thanksgiving uttered. In
certain circumstances, the ceremony might be either postponed or
abandoned. The bhikkhus taking part in the robe-making were
allowed the use of knives with handles, needles, needle-cases,
wooden frames and other appliances required in tailoring. If
necessary, they could set up temporary open halls or sheds with
high basement and balustrade and could have them plastered and
coloured.¹

The general rule regarding the distribution of robes was that
a residing bhikkhu in an āvāsa was entitled to a share in the
robes, and if among the residing bhikkhus any one went
away beyond the limits of the āvāsa without the intention of
coming back, he was excluded from a share in the division. One,
who had the intention of coming back but failed to do so before
the last day of Kathina ceremony, lost his privilege of sharing
the robes.²

Formation of the order of nuns

Buddha was strongly opposed to the creation of the order of
nuns as he rightly apprehended that the weaker male members of
the Saṅgha might have greater chances of moral lapses.

He, however, as a Teacher, whose watchword was reason,
could not withstand the well-reasoned arguments of Ānanda as to
how could sex stand in the way of attaining perfection and why
should the female sex be deprived of the benefits of the religion.³
Buddha was silenced by Ānanda's arguments and consented

¹ Cv. v, 11.
² Mu., viii, 1 ff.
³ Cv., x, 1, 3; Ānanda said to Bhagavā: bhabbo nu kho mātugāmo tathāgatappavedite dhammavinaye agārasma anagāriyam pabbājītvā sotappattiphalam vā sakādagāmiphalam vā anāgāmiphalam vā arahattam vā sacchikātun ti. Bhagavā answered in the positive.
to the formation of the order of nuns though he recognised that such a step was going to shorten the duration of his religion, based as it was on the maintenance of pure morals. In view of the position of women prevailing at that time, several restrictions were imposed on the movements of the nuns, some of which were so humiliating that they brought forth protest from Mahāpajāpati Gotamī though without any effect.

The restrictions were as follows:

(i) a nun, however old, must show respect to a bhikkhu, but never a monk to a nun,¹

(ii) a nun must not pass vassa in a monastery where there was no bhikkhu,

(iii) every fortnight a nun was required to ascertain from a bhikkhu the date of uposatha and the day fixed for bhikkhu’s exhortation (ovāda) to the nuns,

(iv) a nun must perform pavaraṇā first in the bhikkhu-saṅgha and again in the bhikkhunī-saṅgha,

(v) a mānatta discipline must be taken by a nun first from the bhikkhu-saṅgha and then from the bhikkhunī-saṅgha,

(vi) a nun after training in the six pācittiya rules (63-68) of Bhikkhunī-pātimokkha, should seek upasampadā from both the Saṅghas one after another,

(vii) a nun must not revile a monk,

(viii) a nun must not admonish a monk or fix for the monks any date for uposatha or pavaraṇā.

They were to observe all the sikkhāpadas prescribed for the monks, and were given the general directions that they should

¹ Mahāpajāpati protested against this condition. See Cū., x. 3.
not indulge in such acts as would give rise to desire (rāga), attachment (saññoga), acquisition (ācaya), dissatisfaction (asantuṭṭhi), and so forth.

The mode of life prescribed for them was substantially the same as that of the monks. The Pātimokkha rules, however, differed partially from those of the monks. Most of the twenty-four restrictions that had to be observed in conferring ordination were common to the monks and nuns with a few meant specially for the nuns. The formulae (kammaবācā) for ordination, selection of upajjhāya and ācariya, prescription of nissayas are all identical with those of the monks. In the case of nuns, sanction for ordination had to be taken twice first from the bhikkhu saṅgha and then from the bhikkhunī saṅgha. It is interesting to note that in case a woman was unable to present herself before the Saṅgha for ordination on account of dangers on the way, she could send a messenger to the Saṅgha to seek ordination on her behalf. Such ordination by proxy was allowed. There are a few special directions for such ordinations by proxy. There are also special provisions for conferring ordination on a woman with child, and rules for her mode of life after delivery. The nuns who had once left the order or joined a heretical teacher were refused readmission (x. 26).

As a general rule, the nuns were not allowed to dwell in forests. They could live in a Uddosita (outhouse), Upassaya (hermitage), Navakamma (cottages specially built for them). Regarding their residence, use of beds, seats, and vehicles, they were asked to be more discreet than the monks. They were

1 See Infra, ch. XVIII.
2 Cu., x, 17: animittā, nimittamattā, alohitā, dhuvalohitā, dhu- vacolā, paggharanti, sikhariṇī, itthipandikā, vepurisikā, sambhinnā, and ubhatovyanjanā.
prohibited from using bathing or beauty powders, fancy girdles. Utmost caution has been taken to keep the monks and nuns apart, several restrictions having been imposed on the giving and taking of food, dress, and articles of use between monks and nuns.

The nuns were required to observe the Uposatha and Pavāranā ceremonies, confess their omissions and commissions, if any, and receive admonitions (ovāda). Originally in all these functions, the nuns had to take the assistance of a monk, specially nominated for the purpose by the bhikkhu-saṅgha, but later on this condition was relaxed and the nuns could perform the functions by themselves without the help of a monk. In matters of dispute, however, the service of a bhikkhu was compulsory, but after the infliction of a disciplinary measure, a nun watched the punished nun while undergoing parivāsa or mānatta.¹

¹ For detailed treatment, see Miss D. Bhagvat, Early Buddhist Jurisprudence, ch. IX.
CHAPTER XVII

ECCLESIASTICAL ACTS AND PUNISHMENTS

The Saṅgha grew up into an out and out corporate institution and performed every ecclesiastical act of any importance in an assembly in which the presence in person or by proxy of all monks dwelling within the simā of an āvāsa was compulsory. Every act had to be performed by putting the resolution in formal words¹ before the assembly once or twice, usually thrice and could be passed only on the unanimous consent of all the members.² There were āvāsas in unwonted places in which the number of bhikkhus was so small that no assembly in its proper sense could be held, so a minimum number was fixed for the validity of certain ecclesiastical acts, which is as follows,

(i) Four monks³ for all acts except ordination, pavāraṇa and abbhāna (readmission of a monk into the saṅgha after parivāsa).

(ii) Five monks for all acts except ordination and abbhāna but including ordination outside the limits of the Buddhist majjhimagga.

(iii) Ten monks for all acts excepting abbhāna but including ordination.

(iv) Twenty monks for abbhāna and all other ecclesiastical acts.

¹ The formal words ṇatti and kammavācā were also prescribed.
² The members must be fully ordained monks and placed under no disability.
³ Of these four monks, one must be a Vinayadhara.
Among the ecclesiastical acts figured largely disciplinary measures taken for the breach of any rule or for any moral delinquency, procedure for finding out the guilt of a monk and inflicting punishment therefor, conduct of the monks while undergoing disciplinary punishment, and the restoration of the monk to all the privileges of the Saṁgha. The disciplinary measures as enunciated in the Cullavagga are:—

**Tajjaniyakamma**

A monk who is quarrelsome and pick-up quarrels within the Saṁgha, or one who is foolish and given to commission of offences (āpatti), or one comes into frequent contact with householders deserves censure (tajjaniyak.). A monk who is not scrupulous about his moral conduct and doctrinal views, or one who speaks ill of Buddha, Dhamma and Saṁgha also deserves censure (tajjaniyak.).

The procedure for inflicting the *tajjaniyakamma* is as follows:—

The guilty bhikkhu should be first warned, then reminded of the rule of Pātimokkha which he is infringing, and then charged with the offence alleged to have been committed by him. A qualified bhikkhu is to move thrice before the Saṁgha which must be complete the ūatti that so and so is guilty of such and such an offence, and request the Saṁgha, if it thinks fit, to pronounce the *tajjaniyak.* against him. The guilty bhikkhu also must be present at the meeting and given an opportunity to defend himself, or to confess his guilt. Any deviation from the procedure described above made the act invalid.

The monk, against whom *tajjaniyak.* is pronounced, is denied the following privileges: He cannot

(i) confer *upasampadā,*
(ii) give nissaya (instruction) to a samāna,
(iii) take a sāmaṇera,
(iv) exhort the nuns even if he had been nominated for the purpose beforehand,
(v) object to the presence of a particular bhikkhu in the Uposatha or Pavāraṇā ceremony,
(vi) guide the movements of a younger monk,
(vii) move any resolution for censuring a bhikkhu,
(viii) warn a monk or remind him of his offence.

If the monk so censured observes the above restrictions without any demur against any member of the assembly inflicting the punishment, the taṭṭāniyak will be revoked. The revocation will have to be effected by a competent bhikkhu by placing the case before Saṅgha with the request to revoke the punishment. The guilty bhikkhu also must appear before the Saṅgha and respectfully request for its revocation. A competent bhikkhu then announces the resolution thrice before the Saṅgha and if there be no objection, the taṭṭāniyak is revoked.

Nissayakamma

If a monk, though indiscreet and indiscriminate in his association with the householders and prone to commit minor offences, takes part in ecclesiastical matters like giving parivāsa (probation), mūlāya paṭikkassāna (renewal of probation), mānatta (suspension for Saṅghādisesa offences) and abbhāna (recall of monks to the Saṅgha), the Saṅgha should pronounce against him nissayakamma, i.e. compel him to take a teacher, abide by his instructions, and study with him the Piṭakas. The procedure for pronouncing the nissayak, the disabilities prescribed, and the manner of revocation are all similar to those of taṭṭāniyak, dealt with above.
Pabbājaniyakamma

If a monk becomes a defiler of good families (kuladūsaka) and gives himself up to unholy conduct (pāpasamācāra) like garlanding, and encouraging playing, singing and dancing deserves pabbājaniyakamma (temporary removal from the monastery). The same may also be pronounced against one who is quarrelsome, unscrupulous about moral conduct and doctrinal views, picks up quarrels in the Saṅgha, or speaks ill of Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha, or one who is frivolous (dava), or lacks in manners (anācāra), or earns his food by evil means, or harms others either by speech or action or both.

A monk punished with pabbājaniyak. is required to leave the monastery, behave properly in his new residence, and observe all the restrictions imposed upon him. The restrictions imposed and the procedure for inflicting and revoking the disciplinary measure is similar to that of taṭjaniyak.

Paṭisāraṇiyanikamma

The Paṭisāraṇiyanik. (act of making one ask for pardon) is pronounced against a monk who tries to cause loss to a householder, or reviles him, or speaks ill of Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha in his presence or runs him down. A bhikkhu so punished should behave properly as indicated in the case of taṭjaniyak., and the procedure for inflicting and revoking the disciplinary measure is the same as in taṭjaniyak. Before the Paṭisāraṇiyanik. can be revoked, the guilty bhikkhu is required to approach the offended householder and ask for his pardon, or he may take an attendant (anuduta) formally selected by the Saṅgha to ask for him pardon of the householder.
Ukkhepaniyakamma

A monk who declines to acknowledge or confess the offences committed by him, or upholds an un-Buddhistic doctrine inspite of being asked to give it up is liable to *Ukkhepaniyakamma* (act of suspension), i.e., he is not allowed to dwell, or take food with other monks, or associate himself in any way with them. The procedure for fixing the guilt upon the offending monk and also the ultimate revocation of the punishment is the same as that of *tajjaniyak*. Besides the disabilities prescribed for *tajjaniyak*, the monk is prohibited from repeating the offence for which he is punished, receiving salutations, courtesies, or services from other monks, bringing any charge against another bhikkhu, taking the dress of a householder or a *titthiya*, or performing any ecclesiastical ceremony in company of other monks.

*Patikkossana*, *Nissāraṇā* and *Osāraṇā*

Three other disciplinary measures are mentioned in the *Mahāvagga* (ix. 4.), viz., *paṭikkossana*, *nissāraṇā* and *osāraṇā*.

*Paṭikkossana* (reproving) is a mild form of disciplinary measure applied for minor derelictions. A nun, a female novice or an insane monk, or a monk against whom *ukkhepaniyakamma* has already been pronounced are not to be reproved. Those who commit heinous crimes, or joins a *titthiya* order, or pass beyond the *sīmā* are also beyond reproval.

*Nissāraṇā* is a general term for expulsion of bhikkhus from the Saṅgha while *Osāraṇā* is the act of revocation of a disciplinary measure, including *Parivāsa*. All the exceptions mentioned as above in the case of *Paṭikkossana* are applicable to these two disciplinary measures also.
Parivāsa, Mūlāya Paṭikassanā, Mānatta and Abbhāna

There are four kinds of Parivāsa, one of which is the probationary period of four months prescribed for persons belonging to non-Buddhistic sects and desiring to enter the Buddhist order. The other three are prescribed for Saṁghādisesa offences. A pari-vāsika cannot dwell with a regular monk under the same roof or at the same spot, but he cannot also dwell alone in a monastery in which three is no regular bhikkhu. While undergoing parivāsa, a monk is debarred from enjoying the usual privileges of a bhikkhu, some of which are mentioned above (p. 300) in connection with tajjaniya and ukkhepaniya kammass. There are several other minor restrictions, among which one is that a pari-vāsika monk has got to tell every incoming bhikkhu that he is a pari-vāsika, and the other is that he is to announce the same personally in every Pātimokkha or Pavāranā assembly. In short, a pari-vāsika bhikkhu has to behave like an unclean person and keep himself aloof from the generality of monks. If a monk fails to observe three of these restrictions, viz., sahāvāsa,1 vippavāsa,2 and anārocanā,3 he is regarded as having broken the vow of probation. A pari-vāsika can terminate temporarily his probationary period, and resume it with the permission of the Saṁgha.

Mānatta and Parivāsa are prescribed for Saṁghādisesa offences. The former is limited to six days during which period a monk is debarred from enjoying the usual privileges of the membership of a Saṁgha. The latter is of three kinds, (i) Paṭicechanna (ii) Suddhanta and (iii) Samodhāna. If a guilty monk conceals

1 Dwelling with monks.
2 Going to a residence where there are no bhikkhus.
3 Non-announcement of pari-vāsa before an assembly.
(paṭicchādeti) his guilt for a certain period, his period of probation extends to the number of days he had concealed it plus the six days for mānatta, while for one who has not concealed his guilt, no parivāsa is prescribed, he is to observe only mānatta. For persons who cannot remember the number of days he has concealed the offences committed by him, Sudhantaparivāsa is prescribed, the parivāsa in that case is to extend over as many days as have passed between the day of his ordination and the commencement of his parivāsa. When an offence is committed during the period of probation, the guilty person is required to go through the probation anew and the period of parivāsa already observed by him is not taken into account. This is called Samodhāna parivāsa. In both the cases, mānatta also has to be observed after the parivāsa period.

It is after the mānatta which lasts for six days, that the monk is recalled (abbhāna) to the Saṅgha provided he has observed properly the restrictions imposed upon him for parivāsa and mānatta. If he has failed to do so, he is given mūlāya-paṭikassana, i.e., he is to undergo parivāsa or mānatta anew for the offence committed by him during the period of parivāsa or mānatta.
CHAPTER XVIII

THE PĀTIMOKKHA

There are two Pātimokkha codes, one for the monks and the other for the nuns. In the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha there are nine sections, and in the Bhikkhunī-pātimokkha eight. The ecclesiastical offences are arranged in them in a gradual order from the more serious to the lighter ones.

I. Bhikkhu-Pātimokkha

Section I mentions four offences under the heading Pārājikā [= lit. those immoral actions by which a bhikkhu is overcome (parājita), i.e., make him unfit to remain within the order]. Commission of any of these entails expulsion from the order. These four relate to misconduct with women or animals, theft, murder or abetment of murder, and exaggeration of one’s power of performing miracles, etc.

Section II deals with thirteen offences under the heading Saṅghādisesa (Saṅgha + ādi + reesome). It is so called because infliction of punishment and absolution from the offences must have the sanction of the Saṅgha at the beginning and end. A monk is first taken before the Saṅgha for the punishment to be undergone by him, i.e., temporary exclusion from the Saṅgha and so forth, and then after having undergone the punishment, he is to appear again before the Saṅgha (composed of at least 20 monks) to obtain permission for rejoining the order. Of the thirteen offences, the first five relate to sex matters; the next two (6-7) to the construction of cottages by
monks; nos. 8-9 to false accusations; nos. 10-11 to dissensions in the Saṅgha; and the last two (nos. 12-13) to obstinacy of monks and their refusal to have admonitions.

Section III speaks of two kinds of offences concerning the conduct of a monk with a woman. The guilt of the monk may or may not be of a serious nature, so the punishment may range from that inflicted for Pārājikā to that for Pācittiya. On account of this reason, this section is entitled Aniyata (i.e., to be decided).

Section IV is called Nissaggiya-pācittiya (naiḥsargika-prāyaścittikāh). It contains twenty-six restrictions to be observed by monks while accepting gifts of robes (cīvara), woollen mats (santhatam), bowl and medicinal requisites—and four miscellaneous rules, one (no. 181) of which is about the acceptance of gold and silver, two (nos. 19-20) are about the engagement of monks in buying and selling, and the fourth (no. 30) is a general direction that a monk must not appropriate to himself anything given to the Saṅgha in general. The punishment prescribed for the offences falling within this section is that the things, received by a monk in contravention of the condition imposed, must be given up (nissaggiya) and then he must express regret for it (pācittiya) formally.

Section V is entitled Pācittiya (Tib. ltun byed = pāpātmikā) and contains ninety-two rules, which, it seems, have been drawn up as circumstances have arisen and hence lack a system. There are in it restrictions prohibiting the monks from lying and slandering,—digging earth or cutting trees or drinking water carelessly and thereby committing insecticide,—giving food to the Parivrājakas or Acelakas,—showing disrespect to the teaching of Buddha, Vinaya teachers or the rules of the Pātimokkha,—instructing unordained persons or giving ordination to persons below twenty,—not complying with the conditions
laid down for imparting instructions to nuns,—visiting soldiers or entering king's chamber,—removing valuables from a monastery,—giving unnecessarily mental pain to comrades,—bringing a false charge of Saṅghādisesa against any monk,—associating with unordained women,—and disobeying the orders of the Saṅgha. Besides these prohibitions there are some general directions regarding bed, seat, robes, bath, and such other things of daily life of a monk while living in a monastery. The offences included in this section are regarded not serious and hence expiation from them is attained by simple confession before a monk or by self-imposition of parivāsa.

Section VI contains four rules and is entitled Pātidesaniyā, i.e., absolution from the offences included in this section is obtained by formal confession. All the rules relate to the taking of food by a monk without it being offered by any person.

Section VII entitled Sekhiyā contains 75 instructions, in eight sub-sections, for the good conduct of monks. By the first twenty-six rules, bhikkhus are directed how to enter into the houses of laymen; by the subsequent 35 rules (26-60), they are instructed how to take food inoffensively and how to behave while eating, and after finishing meals. Rules nos. 61 and 62 prohibit monks from entering into a sick-room with shoes on, and the rules nos. 63-72 point out the places and circumstances, in which instructions are not to be imparted to laymen and the last two (nos. 74 and 75) forbid monks from committing nuisance on green grass or in water.

As this section deals with more or less general advices for good conduct, no punishment is prescribed for a person deviating from the rules.

Section VIII is entitled Adhikarana-samatha or the ways of settling disputed matters. Observance of the Pātimokkha
rules occasioned differences of opinion among the members of the Saṅgha and hence, some rules became necessary for their settlement. The rules are as follows:

1) *Sammukhavinaya* (*Mvyut.* sammukha-vinayah) = the method of settling disputes either in the presence of the Saṅgha, or by a reference to the Piṭakas, or by the disputing persons, coming face to face and making up the difference.\(^1\)

2) *Sativinaya* (*Mvyut.* smṛtivinayah) = the method of settling disputes, arising out of a charge that may have been brought against a monk who denies it, by requesting him to appear before the Saṅgha and to declare that he is innocent as far as his memory goes. The members who form such a Saṅgha must be distinguished in the power of recollection.

3) *Amulhavinaya* (*Mvyut.* amūdhavinayah) = the method of settling disputes, arising out of un-Vinayic acts done by a monk while he was not in a sane mood inspite of the repeated remonstrance made by other monks against such actions, by requesting the former to appear before the Saṅgha and declare that for some time he lost sanity and regrets for the improper deeds done by him during that time.

4) *Patiṇṇā* (*Mvyut.* pratijñā-kārakah) = formal (and not indirect) confession of a wrong committed by a monk in the presence of another monk who must be senior to him.\(^2\) Strictly speaking, it should not have been included in the Adhikaraṇa-samathas, but perhaps the questioning of the formality and informality of a patiṇṇā occasioned frequent disputes and that led to its inclusion in this section.

5) *Yebbuyyasikā* (*Mvyut.* Yad-bhūyasikīyah) = settlement of disputes by votes (salākā) in a large assembly of monks.

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1 The last two alternatives are not given in the *Majjhima* (II, 147).
Literally the word means that (yad) which is to be settled by a fresh (bhūyas) appeal to a larger assembly. From the illustration given in the Cullavagga, it is apparent that yebhuyyasikā method was taken recourse to only on the failure of the ubbāhikā method (i.e., decision by a committee formed out of the whole assembly of monks). Both the ubbāhikā and yebhuyyasikā methods of settling disputes are carried out by means of salākā (votes), the distributor and scrutiniser of which must be a well-qualified monk formally chosen by the Saṅgha for the occasion as the salākagāhāpaka.

(6) Tassapāpiyyasikā (Mvyut. tat-svabhāvaisiyah?). This method is adopted when a monk prevaricrates, i.e., first confesses his guilt and then denies it or vice-versa. The Majjhima Nikāya says that in trying to exculpate himself, he, in fact, indirectly implicates himself in the commission of an offence.

Its procedure is as follows: The guilty monk is brought before the Saṅgha and is reminded of his guilt. Though he vacillates, he is charged with an offence and then after the formal three proclamations the due punishment is inflicted upon him.

(7) Tiṇavattbārakā (Mvyut. trnaprastāraka). This method is adopted when there is the likelihood that the matter of dispute if discussed in an open assembly will give rise to questions which may impair the well-being of the Saṅgha. The Majjhima

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1 Cv., iv, p. 97.
2 In the Majjhima (II, p. 24) yebhuyyasikā is placed after sammukhavinaya and is interpreted in a slightly different form. Here it means that when the dispute is not settled by a Saṅgha by the sammukhavinaya process, its decision is referred to another parish where the members of the Saṅgha are larger in number; such cases are called yebhuyyasikā. See Infra, p. 319.
3 Majjhima, II, p. 249.
Nikāya¹ offers a better interpretation. According to it, this method is to be adopted only when a group of monks breaks some laws and they in a body regret for it. The procedure to be adopted in such cases is to shut up any discussion relating to the matter. As filth, which, if disturbed, becomes a greater nuisance, and the safest way is to cover it up by grass, so also some matters relating to the Saṅgha should be shelved in the interest of the Saṅgha.²

II. Bhikkhunī-Phātimokkha

Section I mentions eight offences under the heading Pārājika as against four of the Bhikkhu-phātimokkha. Of the additional four, the fifth and eighth speak of offences having a tinge of sexuality (ubhayajānamandaliKA and atthavattthukā) while the sixth relates to the suppression of the pārājika offence committed by a nun (vajjapaniccadikā). The seventh prohibits a nun from siding with a monk who is under suspension (ukkhittānuvattakā).³

Section II contains 17 rules under the heading Saṅghā-disesa as against 13 of the Bhikkhu-phātimokkha, of which 7 are common to both (nos. 7-9, 14-17 = nos. 5, 8-9, 10, 13 of the Bhikkhu-pā.). Of the remaining ten, the first deals with quarrelsome nuns, the second with those who admit into the Saṅgha a guilty woman. Rules 3, 5 and 6 relate to actions which may occasion moral lapses while rules 4, 10 and 11 refer to cases when a nun does not observe the Pātimokkha restrictions, viz., readmitting a suspended nun without the sanction of the Saṅgha,

¹ Majjhima, p. 250.
² An excellent exposition of these seven methods is given in the Majjhima, II, pp. 247-9; Anguttara, I, p. 99; IV, p. 144.
³ See ante, p. 302.
showing disrespects to the teaching imparted by a nun, and resenting a decision of the Saṅgha. The remaining two, 12-13, forbid nuns to associate closely with householders and conceal one another's lapses.

There is no section corresponding to the Aniyata section of the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha.

Section III called the Nissaggiyā-pācittiya contains 30 rules like the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha. It is divided into three sub-sections: patta, cīvara and āṭarūpa,¹ (bowl, robe, and gold and silver). Eighteen of these rules contained in the last two sub-sections are identical with those of the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha. Of the remaining twelve, the first prohibits nuns from collecting bowls and the second from appropriating a cīvara untimely. The third condemns indecision regarding the exchange of robes. Rules 4-10 prohibit nuns from trying to obtain something which the donor did not intend to give. Rules 11 and 12 limit the price of a nun's warm cīvara to four kamsas and that of a cotton cīvara to two and a half kamsas.

Section IV contains 166 rules under the heading Pācittiya as against only 92 of the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha. It is similar in contents to the Bhikkhu-pā., and does not admit of a clear classification. The rules deal with the following: warnings against self-abuse,—prohibitions relating to food,—decorum to be observed at the house of a host,—keeping away as far as possible from monks, householders and fearful places,—mutual obligations of nuns,—shirking responsibilities once undertaken,—abiding by the vassāvāsa restrictions,—reverting to householder's habits,—size and making of cīvaras as also their distribution,—several restric-

¹ In the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha the corresponding name for the third sub-section is Elaka-lomaka-vagga.
tions to be observed in giving or refusing ordination to females,—avoidance of articles of luxury, dress, and manners not befitting a nun.

Section V contains 8 rules under the heading Pāṭidesaniyā as against four of the Bhikkhu-pāṭimokkha. All the rules are new and have nothing in common with those of the Bhikkhu-pā. These rules only prohibit nuns who are not sick from begging and partaking of (i) butter, (ii) oil, (iii) honey, (iv) molasses, (v) fish, (vi) meat, (vii) sweet milk and (viii) curds.

Section VI contains, under the heading Sekhiya, 75 rules which are identical with those of the Bhikkhu-pāṭimokkha.¹

Section VII contains four rules under the heading Adhikaraṇa samatha and are the same as those in the Bhikkhu-pāṭimokkha.

¹ The statement in the Anguttara (I, p. 230) that there were about 150 rules in the Pāṭimokkha may be supported by excluding the 75 rules of Sekhiya from the code. No punishment is prescribed for breach of the Sekhiya rules and so these can well be left out of calculation.
CHAPTER XIX

CONSTITUTION OF THE SAÑGHA

We shall now turn to the constitution of the Sañgha that led to the growth of the several Buddhist institutions or sañghā-rāmas which trained up the Buddhist monks and sent them out to the world to preach the religion and alleviate human sufferings. A glance at the ancient map of India shows what a large number of such institutions grew up in the different parts of India and how magnificent were some of them, their ruins striking us even to-day with awe and wonder. These Sañghārāmas wielded at a time a great amount of influence over the people of India. Some of these institutions were built by the devotees at an immense expense and were large enough to accommodate thousands of monks. They were mostly located at a distance from the din and bustle, but not beyond the easy reach, of the city to which the inmates looked for their daily necessaries of life. The sites chosen by them were in many cases valleys separated from the inhabited localities by hills, mountains or forests. In cases where such sites were not available, they were shut out from the world by huge walls with gates guarded by competent gate-keepers. Great discretion was used to keep the site aloof from the distractions of the town or village life, giving at the same time an opportunity to the townsfolk and villagers to frequent the āvāsas for listening to religious discourses and making their offerings. An individual monk or a donor was not allowed to select the site for a monastery. It is enjoined in the Pātimokkha-sutta that it must be done by a group of monks (see Sañghādisesa rule 6).
The saṅghārāmas offered shelter to all who submitted to the discipline enforced in them and dedicated their lives to the cause of Buddhism. There appeared from among them brilliant intellects who would shed lustre on any sphere of activities that might be allotted to them. The training imparted by these scholars produced a number of expositors of Buddhist philosophy and religion who carried far and wide the torch of Buddhism within and outside India. In short, these institutions radiated the force which made Buddhism an all-Asiatic faith.

To these institutions flocked from different parts of India and sometimes countries outside India men with different aims and inclinations. They remained there under the strict disciplinary rules for years, receiving instructions from distinguished monks; and it was only when they were found thoroughly chastened in body and spirit that they were sent out to the outside world for carrying on the work of the great Teacher. The fame of the institutions at Takṣasila, Nālandā, Sārnāth, Ajantā or Amarāvatī reached far-off places like China, Central Asia, Siam, Cambodia and Ceylon, and attracted hundreds of students.

The Saṅghārāmas

The members of the Buddhist order at the very beginning of its formation lived mostly in caves and forests, staying for only a short time at a particular place. It was probably the gift of Veluvana to Buddha that constrained him to permit his followers to dwell in hermitages; but he gave his formal consent when he was requested by a merchant of Rājagṛha to accept the sixty vibāras (monasteries) that had been built by him for acquiring merit to go to one of the higher

1 See above, pp. 278, 284.
worlds. Once the sanction was given, the monks as well as the devotees showed so much zeal in the building of monasteries that it necessitated Buddha to frame a number of rules\(^1\) restraining the monks from drifting into luxury. These monasteries were originally used for residential purposes only, but grew up later on into academic centres even during the lifetime of Buddha.

**Headship not by succession or nomination**

Probably as a member of the clans which favoured democratic constitutions, Buddha became imbued with democratic ideas. He wanted to see his saṅgha grow on democratic lines and framed the rules accordingly. He himself, however, acted more as a dictator than as a constitutional head, prescribing rules and giving orders as he thought fit. He consulted the wishes of the people and kings more than those of his followers, and this was probably due to his eagerness to popularize the religion. In spite of the supreme authority wielded by him within the saṅgha, he did not like to admit that he was its leader or that the saṅgha relied on him as the leader.\(^2\) From the words of Devadatta and Buddha's reply to the same,\(^3\) it is apparent that the question of the headship of the saṅgha after Buddha's demise was raised, but Buddha would not nominate any, not even his best disciples like Sāriputta and Moggallāna. In the history of Indian religious orders, the absence of the system of nominating a successor to the headship of an order was probably unknown before Buddha and so it was a riddle to men like Gopaka-Moggallāna who enquired of Ānanda how the saṅgha could maintain its concord when neither Buddha had named his successor nor had the saṅgha

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1. **Pātimokkha**, section ii.
3. **Vinaya**, II, p. 188.
elected one to the supreme headship of the whole congregation. Ananda’s answer was that the saṅgha was not without a guide and that guide was the book of Pātimokkha containing the rules prescribed by Buddha himself for the monks. The Pātimokkha retained the concord of the saṅgha, for it required all the monks residing in or about a parish (gāmakheṭta) to assemble on the uposatha days (i.e., 8th, 14th or 15th day of a fortnight), listen to the rules recited by one of them selected for the purpose, confess their derelictions, if any, and undergo the penance deemed necessary. Ananda added that the monk who was asked to recite the rules was regarded for the time being as the chief of the saṅgha and was called saṅghatthera, saṅghapitara or saṅghaparināyaka. The qualities that an ideal saṅghapitara or saṅghaparināyaka was expected to possess were as follows: (a) he must be a true brāhmaṇārīn, observing all the restrictions prescribed in the Pātimokkha; (b) he should be vastly learned in the details of the dhamma; (c) he must be always satisfied with the food, bed and clothing that he might obtain; and (d) he must be proficient in the four forms of meditations and be in possession of the supernatural powers and abbijñās.

The saṅghatthera was generally selected from among the older monks. In the account of the Second Council Sabbakāmi is described as a saṅghatthera as he was the oldest ordained monk at the time. Generally the saṅghatthera presided over the functions of Pātimokkha-assemblies, but in the deliberations of the Second Council, Revata thera took the lead, perhaps because he was more learned than Sabbakāmi, though spiritually he did not rise as high as the latter.

1 Majjhima, III, p. 9.  
3 Ibid., p. 11-12.  
5 Ibid., p. 299.  
2 Ibid., III, p. 10.  
4 Vinaya, II, p. 303.  
6 Ibid., p. 304.
sāṁghatthera was given the highest position in an assembly of monks and it is enjoined in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sūtra*¹ that he must be respected by all the monks.

**Catuddisa-sāṅgha**

To the constitution of a *sāṅgha*, the term *democracy* or *republic* cannot be justifiably applied, for it does not exactly follow the principles on which a democratic or a republican constitution is based. Though there existed the system of election of the President, the moving of a resolution, use of ballot voting by *salākās*, strict adherence to the rules of a meeting and so forth, the constitution of a Buddhist *sāṅgha* differed in many respects from that of a political institution.

One of the main differences is that any ordained monk, to whatever locality he might belong, was counted as a member of an assembly if he happened to be present on the day of the sitting of the assembly (which was usually the *uposatha* day) within the limits of the parish. An assembly would not be regarded as complete for an ecclesiastical action if a single monk, not excepting an *āgantuka-bhikkhu* (incoming monk), failed to join it either personally or by proxy (i.e. by sending *chanda*, consent).² The only condition for the membership of a *sāṅgha* was ordination and residence on the day of the assembly.

**Quorum**

In the Buddhist *sāṅgha* there was no question of quorum. No sitting was valid unless all the monks living within the *simā* (jurisdiction) of a *sāṅghārāma* (*āvāsa*) were present personally or by

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¹ *Digha*, II, p. 77.  
² *Majjhima*, III, p. 10.
proxy. Some scholars have confused "quorum" with "committees" of the saṅgha, the minimum strength of which is fixed according to the nature of the ecclesiastical business (saṅgha-kamma) to be transacted. In short, there was no question of quorum of a meeting.

Sub-committee or a body of assessors

The resolutions were formally moved generally from the chair. Every resolution had to be announced thrice and no resolution was carried unless it had the unanimous consent of all present. Hence ordinarily there was no question of majority or voting. The question of majority was raised on rare occasions, e.g. in the holding of a Pātimokkha-assembly by the existing members of an āvāsa without āgantuka-bhikkhus. If the āvāsikas (existing members) were larger in number than the āgantukas, the actions of the assembly were regarded as valid provided the āgantuka-bhikkhus who joined the assembly after the fixed time were apprised of the proceedings of the assembly. If in the determination of the uposatha day (i.e. the 14th or 15th of a fortnight) any difference of opinion took place between the inmates of an āvāsa (āvāsikas) and the incoming monks (āgantukas), it was settled as follows: the opinion of the former prevailed if their number was greater than or equal to that of the latter, but the opinion of the latter prevailed only if their number was greater than that of the former.

There was a system of ubbāhika which is usually translated by the term 'voting' but it bears quite a different sense. It corresponds to something like the formation of a sub-committee

1 See above, p. 298. 2 Vinaya, I, p. 129. 3 Ibid., I, p. 132-3.
or a body of assessors. The method of *ubbābika* was restored to when there was a dispute relating to a particular question of discipline (*vivādābikaraṇa*) and when there was no possibility of settling it in an assembly without unnecessary discussions. In a case like this, two or more monks possessing the requisite qualifications were selected from among the members of the assembly and their names were placed before the assembly for approval, and were adopted if the members be unanimous. The selected monks were then entrusted with the duty of settling the dispute. This method of *ubbābika* was adopted in the Second Council to settle the disputes between the Vajjian monks and Yasatthera. It was by *ubbābika* that four monks of the eastern countries and four of Pātheyya were chosen, and the decision of this sub-committee of eight was placed before the whole *saṅgha* for confirmation.2

**Voting**

When the selected monks failed to settle a dispute, the matter was referred back to the *saṅgha*, which then proceeded to appoint one of the members possessing requisite qualifications as *salākāgābhāpaka*. The votes were then taken by means of *salākā* (marked sticks) and the will of the majority was accepted as just. As great responsibility rested on the *salākāgābhāpaka*, many rules had to be framed to guard any misuse of power by him. Such occasions were rare in the *saṅgha*; hence the question of majority or voting is not a subject that has been discussed at length in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*.

1 For details, see *Vinaya*, II, p. 95-6.
2 *Vinaya*, II, p. 305.
Thus we see that the constitution of the saṅgha was clearly democratic in principle but differed in many vital points from a democratic institution of the present day.

A study of the Vinaya Piṭaka further reveals that the bhikkhus, apart from religious practices, were required to act through the corporate body, the saṅgha, and never individually, and it is for this reason that it is said in the Mahāparinibbānasūtta that so long as the monks will assemble frequently, transact business in concord, adhere to the rules already prescribed and avoid laying down new rules, the progress of the bhikkhu-saṅgha is assured and not its decline.

As the members of the order had no individual rights, it became incumbent on the organizers of the saṅgha to frame rules for the receipt and proper distribution of properties, food, clothing and other requisites of a monk.

Ownership of monasteries

Monks as a rule take the vow of poverty, hence individually they cannot own any property. The vihāras cannot be given to a monk; they can be given only to a saṅgha of monks and that again should preferably be to the āgatānāgata-cuttuddisa-saṅgha, i.e. a saṅgha, the members of which are not only the bhikkhus of the four quarters but also those who will be bhikkhus in future. In some of the donative inscriptions of a later period (3rd century B.C. to 5th century A.D.) there are specific directions, dedicating the monasteries to a particular sect. This tendency developed when the Buddhist saṅgha had split up into many rival sects, and the devotees of one sect wanted to give their support to their own sect only. When for the first time

1 *Digba*, II, p. 76-7.
2 *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 314 n.
Buddha permitted his followers to accept āvāsas, ārāmas, vibhāras or parivenas, he enjoined that they should be given to āgatānāgata-cātuddisa-saṅgha.\(^1\) Even while accepting the Jetavana vibhāra from Anāthapindika, he directed the donor to give it to āgatānāgata-cātuddisa-saṅgha.\(^2\)

The saṅgha, therefore, became the owner of the properties given away by the devotees, but the ownership was not absolute, for it could not alienate the properties nor even divide them among the members of the order.\(^3\) This restriction was applied not only to the landed properties including the grass, shrubs, etc., but also to the articles of furniture, utensils made of earth or iron, spades and such other things of common use in an ārāma.\(^4\) To what extent individual ownership was denied, becomes apparent from the fact that on the death of a monk, his robes and other articles of use became the property of the saṅgha,\(^5\) and the saṅgha is advised to distribute the robes and other small articles by proper announcement in an assembly among the monks or novices who served the deceased bhikkhu during his illness. This power of the saṅgha is denied in the case of heavy articles, for they were inalienable and indivisible.\(^6\)

**Office-bearers for distribution of food etc.**

In regard to food and the daily necessities of life also, an attempt has been made to keep the sense of individuality in the background as far as possible. If a devotee wished to offer food to the monks, he had to invite the whole saṅgha and not any particular individual or individuals. In days of scarcity, provision was made for invitations by batches, and so saṅghabhātta

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2. *Ibid., p. 164.*
5. *Ibid., I, p. 303.*
(food for the whole saṅgha) was allowed to be replaced by uddesabbatta, nimantana, salākabbatta, etc.¹ i.e. the devotees might provide food not for all the monks of the saṅgha but for some, who, however, were not to be selected by the hosts. This naturally gave rise to troubles. To avoid these, it became necessary to fix the responsibility of selection upon a particular monk possessing the requisite qualities.² He was called a (i) Bhatuddesaka or the distributor of food. His appointment had also to be made formally by the saṅgha with the unanimous consent of all the members. Besides him there were other office-bearers whose duty was to distribute rice-gruel (yāgu), fruits (phala) and hard food (khajjaka) and they were called (ii) yāgubhājaka, (iii) phalabhājaka and (iv) khajjakabhājaka according to their respective charges.

With the increase in the number of monks and devotees bestowing gifts on the saṅgha, it became indispensible to appoint further office-bearers for maintaining concord in the saṅgha. They were: (v) senāsanagāhāpaka, i.e., the monk who was entrusted with the duty of accepting vihāras, parivenas, etc., on behalf of the saṅgha;³ (vi) senāsanapaññāpaka or the distributor of beds and seats within a monastery, cave-dwelling, etc., (vii) bhāndāgārika or the store-keeper; (viii) ēvarapatiṅgāhāpaka or the receiver of upper robes; (ix) ēvarabhājaka or the distributor of upper robes; (x) sātiyagāhāpaka or the receiver of under-garment; (xi) appamattakavissajjaka or the distributor of trifling things, like needles, girdles and stores; (xii) pattaṅgāhāpaka or the receiver of bowls.

Besides the above there were other office-bearers for different kinds of work. Some of these were (xiii) navakammika⁴ or the

¹ Vinaya, II, p. 175. See above, p. 289.
² Ibid., p. 176.
³ Ibid., II, pp. 167, 176.
⁴ Ibid., p. 160.
monk entrusted with the supervision of the new construction or repair of monasteries; (xiv) ārāmikapesaka or the overseer of labourers engaged for construction or repair work; (xv) sāmañera-pesaka or the overseer of the novices; (xv) āsanapaññāpaka or the arranger of seats at the meetings of monks, and (xvii) sālākāgāhāpaka.

In the appointment of every office-bearer, the usual formality must be observed, i.e. a monk possessing the requisite qualifications was selected first, then his name was announced thrice before an assembly, and if there be none dissenting, he was formally appointed to the office for which his name was proposed.

Every act of the saṅgha was performed in this way. Without the formal announcement and sanction of the assembly, no ecclesiastical act could be performed or was regarded as valid. This discipline in working was strictly enforced and this was the secret of the great power which the saṅgha developed and by which it spread itself all over Asia. It was in and through an organization like this that scholars like Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and Āryadeva, missionaries like Bodhidharma and Atiśa, disputants like Dharmakīrti and Dīnāgā, writers like Vimuktasena and Kamalaśīla, expositors like Subhūti and Kaccāyana, translators like Kumārajīva and Jinamitra radiated rays of light that dazed the whole world.

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1 Vinaya, II, p. 177.  
2 See above, p. 319.
CHAPTER XX

THE FIRST BUDDHIST COUNCIL

The Buddhist tradition speaks of eight Buddhist Councils, in which the Piṭakas are said to have been recited. The first Council held at Rājagṛha and the second at Vaiśāli are referred to in all the traditions whether in Pāli or Sanskrit; the one that was held by the Mahāsaṅghikas as a supplementary council immediately after the session of the second council may be counted as the third, though it is not done so by the porāṇas. The third in the Pāli tradition is the one held during the reign of Aśoka under the presidency of Moggaliputta Tissa. This is, however, ignored in the Sanskrit works, according to which, the third was held at Jalandhar or Kashmir during the reign of Kanishka under the presidency of Vasumitra and the vice-presidency of the famous poet Aśvaghoṣa. This again is ignored in the Pāli books. If we take into account all the councils as handed down by the different traditions, we have in all five councils. The sixth, seventh and eighth were held in Ceylon during the reigns of Devānampiyatisa, Duttāgāmaṇī and Vatṭagāmaṇī respectively and it was in the eighth Council that the Pāli Tipiṭaka that we read today was put into writing.

Modern writers on the Councils

Of the many problems that awakened the interest of orientalists interested in the history of Buddhism, the question of the authenticity of the traditions about the first council is not an insignificant one. The earliest of the scholars to take
up this problem was the Russian savant I. P. Minayeff,¹ to refute whose arguments, Prof. Oldenberg² wrote the long dissertation in the ZDMG. in 1898. Materials for the discussion about the Councils were collected by different scholars, from different sources, viz., by Wassilief, Schiefner and Rockhill from Tibetan, by Beal and Suzuki from Chinese, by Turnour, Rhys Davids, Geiger and a few others from Pāli. An examination of the traditions as well as the arguments of Minayeff and Oldenberg was made thoroughly and comprehensively by Prof. Louis de la Vallée Poussin³ in 1905. Prof. Otto Franke⁴ took up this problem and wrote his long dissertation in 1908 in the IPTS, his attention, however, was directed solely to a searching examination of the Pāli texts with a view to trace the growth of the tradition as recorded in the Cullavagga. After the labours of these scholars there was nothing left for further discussion until the year 1926 when the indefatigable zeal of Prof. Jean Przyluski brought forth the volume Le Concile de Rājagṛha covering about 400 pages and dealing with all the traditions about the first council available in Chinese and Tibetan. In 1931 Dr. R. C. Mazumdar,⁵ perhaps unaware of the appearance of the work of Prof. Prylouski, presented us with an excellent summary of Prof. La Vallée Poussin’s long paper referred to above. Of the latest scholars who have entered into

¹ Recherches sur le Bouddhisme (1887), tr. from Russian into French by R. H. Assier de Pompignan (1894).
³ Le Muséon, VI, pp. 213-323, tr. into English in the Indian Antiquary, 1908. See also Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, sv. Councils.
⁴ IPTS., 1908, pp. 1-80.
⁵ Buddhistic Studies (edited by Dr. B. C. Law), pp. 26-72.
this arena of discussion, mentionable are the names of Profs. Finot and Obermiller whose main contention is that the traditions of the first two councils originally formed the last section of the Mahāparinibbānasutta, and that in course of time the compilers separated the last section from the Sutta and tagged it on to the Cullavagga. By this finding they have cut the ground from underneath the feet of Oldenberg whose main stand for establishing the unauthenticity of the Cullavagga account of the first Council was that the account of the first council did not form a part of the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta.

"Sources"

Of the Pāli accounts the most exhaustive and probably the earliest is the one given in the Cullavagga, XI, from which are derived the traditions preserved in the Ceylonese chronicles and Buddhaghosa's commentaries.

Of the extant Sanskrit accounts there are left only two short notices, one in the Mahāvastu and the other in the Manjuśrīmūlakalpa, and the rest are all in Chinese but derived from the Sanskrit sources. These are:

(a) Vinaya of the Mahiśāsakas;
(b) " " " Dharmaguptas;
(c) " " " Mahāsaṅghikas;
(d) " " " Sarvāstivādins;
(e) Kāśyapa-saṃgīti-sūtra (Kai-ye-kie-king) (tr. A.D. 148-170);
(f) Aśokāvadāna (A-yu-wang-king) (tr. about 300 A.D.);

1 Indian Historical Quarterly, VII (1923), pp. 241-246.
2 Ibid., pp. 781-784. See also History of Buddhism by Buston, tr. by Obermiller, II, pp. 73-96.
3 See Infra, p. 336.
(g) Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (tr. A.D. 402-405);
(h) Parinirvāṇa-sūtra (tr. A.D. 290-306).
(i) Account of the compilation of the Tripiṭaka and of Tsa Tsang by Kāśyapa and Ānanda after the nirvāṇa of Buddha in the kingdom of Magadha, on the north of the town of Saṃkāsyā; (this work is in verse of five Chinese characters, dated between 317 and 420);
(j) The commentary on the first chapter of the Ekottarāgama.

Tibetan sources

(k) Bu-ston’s Chos. bbyung (History of Buddhism) translated into English by Obermiller.
(l) Tāranātha’s History of Buddhism.

The story of the Council may be split up into seven parts thus:

(a) Reasons adduced for convening the Council

Immediately after Buddha’s death an aged monk called Subhadda or Upānanda, who was ordained towards the end of Buddha’s life, gave out that Buddha, so long he had been alive, was a source of trouble to the monks for he constantly admonished the monks to do a certain act and not to do certain others. Now that he was dead, the monks would be free to do as they liked.

This event is related with slight variations in all the Vinaya texts (a, b, c, d) but not in any of Sūtras (e, f, g, h, i, j

1 Relevant portions of all these texts (a-j) are translated into French by Prof. Przyluski.
and k), in which it is said that the suggestion for convening the Council came from the devas who were aggrieved at of the world being thrown again into evil days at the at.

Buddha or his great disciples. In the *Aṣokavādana* (f), it is said in the fashion of Mahāyānic sūtras that Buddha just before entering into parinirvāṇa requested Mahākāśyapa to make a collection of the Piṭakas after his disappearance asked the gods to protect them, and to which request the gods readily acceded. In the *Parinirvāṇa-sūtra* (b), the account is realistic—Mahākāśyapa, Anuruddha and Kātyāyana deliberate over the matter of collecting Buddha’s sayings with Ānanda’s help and decide to write them on bamboo pieces and silk-rolls. In the works (i & j) there are no such prefatory remarks; Mahākāśyapa straightaway strikes the *gandi* (gong) to collect the monks and then announces that he wishes to compile the Piṭakas.

**(b) Question of the inclusion of Ānanda**

In all the accounts (a to j), the indispensability of Ānanda for the compilation of the Piṭakas is acknowledged but at the same time, in most of the accounts, it is pointed out by Kāśyapa that Ānanda was yet a *śaikṣa* and not an *aśaikṣa* (arhat), and hence

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1 The italic letters a to k refer to the works mentioned above.

2 In the *Mahāsāṃghika Vimāya*, the bhikkhu is not named but is simply pointed out as old (mahallaka), the word Mahallaka transliterated in Chinese was taken by Mr. Suzuki as a proper name, and strangely enough this mistake of his is repeated by Dr. R. C. Mazumdar (Buddhistic Studies, p. 30). In the text *Maṇjuśrīmūlakahalpa* also the same mistake has been committed; in it the name of the bhikṣu is given as Mahallaḥ as well as Mahallakah (see pp. 593, 596).

3 A *śaikṣa* is one who is in any one of three stages of sanctification, viz., sotāpatti, sakadāgāmi and anāgāmi., As some texts attri-
he was unfit to take part in the Council which was composed exclusively of Arhats. Some of the sources (e.g. f) make Ānanda attain arhathood (āśāikṣa) just on the eve of the Council. \(^1\) \(^2\) \(^3\) \(^4\) \(^5\) \(^6\)

\(^1\) Āsokāvadāna \(^1\) and the Mabīśāsaka, \(^2\) Mahāśāṅghika \(^3\) and the Dharmagupta \(^4\) Vinaya locate the place of Ānanda’s exertion at Vaiśāli and credit one Vṛjipattra, a disciple of Ānanda, for encouraging Ānanda to make the exertion. Vaiśāli was one of the stopping places of Mahākassapa and his colleagues on their way from Srusinagara to Rājagaha, and it was at Vaiśāli that Ānanda stayed behind to qualify himself for membership of the Council. \(^6\)

This account appears more plausible than that of Cullavagga in which Ānanda is stated to have suddenly attained arhathood on the eve of the session of the Council, but still more plausible is the account of the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, in which it is said that Ānanda though a śaikṣa was admitted into the Council by courtesy with the special permission of the assembly (Saṅgha) of monks. \(^6\)

(c) Charges against Ānanda

All the sources agree about the fact that the Saṅgha found Ānanda guilty of a few ecclesiastical offences, and that for the expiation of same Ānanda was to make his confessions as required by the rules of the Pātimokkha. Though it sounds discordant

bute rāga, dveṣa and moha to Ānanda, we have to infer that Ānanda must have been either in the sotāpatti or sakadāgāmi stage.

1 Le Concile de Rājagrha, pp. 34 ff.
5 Ibid., pp. 173-4. The Cullavagga (p. 286) is, however, silent about Vaiśāli; its account leads us to infer that the attainment of arhathood by Ānanda happened at Rājagaha.
6 Le Concile de Rājagrha, p. 225.
that an arhat was taken to task for some minor ecclesiastical
offences, 1 it was nonetheless necessary to make the chief figure
of the Council absolutely pure according to the Pātimokkha laws.
After Buddha's demise Ānanda as a repository of Buddha's
teachings naturally became the cynosure of all eyes and it be-
came imperative to raise his status to arhathood and to place him
above all reproach.

There are slight differences in the list of charges as given
in the different accounts, 2 though they agree in the main.
The charges were:—

(1) Ānanda did not ascertain the khuddakānukkhuddakāni
sikkhāpadāni (minor precepts), the abrogation of which was
permitted by Buddha;

(2) he stepped upon Buddha's rainy season robe (vassikha-
sāti) when sewing it;

(3) he persuaded Buddha to form the order of nuns;

(4) he permitted women to have a look at the dead body of
Buddha;

(5) he did not request Buddha to live longer when a hint
to that effect was given to him by Buddha himself.

It may be observed that none of these charges are serious
from the moral point of view but they loomed large in the eyes
of the devotees at a time when their object of adoration had just
disappeared, and this disappearance, they believed, could have
been delayed had not Ānanda been inadvertent to the matter.

(d) The Members of the Council

There is very little disagreement among the different accounts
about the fact that Mahākassapa proposed an assembly of arhats

1 Cf. Infra, p. 336 fn.
2 For details, see the Indian Antiquary, 1908, pp. 4-5.
preferably endowed with patisambhidā and abhiñña, and this was agreed to by all the monks present. The number of members was limited to five hundred. Upāli was unanimously selected to recite the Vinaya and Ānanda the Dhamma (which according to some sources included Abhidhamma). Mahākassapa took upon himself the task of putting questions both to Upāli and Ānanda. In some of the sources, (e.g., Vinaya texts of the Mahiśāsakas, Dharmaguptas, Mahāsaṅghikas) a list of monks by seniority is given,¹ the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya adding that whatever was uttered by Upāli and Ānanda was referred to these old monks for approval and confirmation.

(e) Gavāmpati and Purāṇa

Gavāmpati and Purāṇa were distinguished and old arhats of the time, hence an attempt was made by Mahākassapa to have the results of the deliberations of the Council approved by them. Gavāmpati however kept himself aloof, indicating neither his approval nor disapproval of the same while Purāṇa, who lived with a large following at Dākkhiniṅgiri, a place near Rājagrha (perhaps a forest), preferred not to associate himself with the decisions of the Council but he requested Mahākassapa to incorporate seven rules regarding restrictions about storing and cooking food indoors, taking food of one’s own accord, etc.² Prof. La Vallée Poussin has traced some of these rules in the Mahāvagga (vi. 17-19, 20). It should be observed that while

¹ Mahiśāsaka Vinaya (Le Concile de Rājagṛha, p. 168): Ājñāta Kauṇḍinya (1st), Purāṇa (2nd), Dharmika (3rd), Daśabala Kāśyapa (4th), Bhadra Kāśyapa (5th), Mahākāśyapa (6th), Upāli (7th), Anuruddha (8th). For Hāmaivata list, see op. cit., p. 176 and Sarvāstivāda list, op. cit., pp. 227-229.
² Indian Antiquary, 1908, p. 56; Le Concile de Rājagṛha, p. 160.
speaking of Purāṇa, Cullavagga does not refer to his seven rules though they appear in the Mahāvagga, while the Vinayas of the Mahīśāsakas and Dhamaguptas mention them in detail. This shows that the Pāli version of the Vinaya accepted the opinion of Purāṇa. The dissenting voice of Purāṇa¹ and to a certain extent of Gavāṃpati indicates that even at that early date the germs for saṅghabhedas had already appeared and within the following century they sprouted up, resulting in the appearance of the Dhamaguptas, the Mahīśāsakas, the Haimavatas, and others.

(f) The Site

The traditions differ as to the exact site where the Council was held, i.e. whether at Veluvana, or Gṛḍhrakūṭa or Sattapāṇī, but there is no question about the place being Rājagṛha. The proposal of holding a Council was made at Kuśinārā, wherefrom the monks travelled through Vaiśāli and other countries and ultimately congregated at Rājagṛha. The members of the Council, it seems, were collected in course of their journey from Kuśinārā to Rājagṛha.

(g) Texts recited

Though Profs. Minayeff and La Vallée Poussin were convinced about the historicity of the Councils, they expressed their grave doubts about that part of the story which spoke of the recitation of Vinaya and Dharma texts.² Prof. La Vallée Poussin relegated the task of deciding this question to the future scholars who would explore the Chinese documents. Prof. Przyluski took

¹ Cf. Le Concile de Rājagṛha, p. 8.
up this task and acquitted himself well in his work *Le Concile de Rājagrha*.

The following information can be elicited from the various Vinaya texts about the rehearsal of the Piṭakas:

Theravāda Vinaya (*Cullavagga*):

(a) *Vinaya*: 4 Pārājikās and the rest—the two Vinayas;
(b) *Sūtras*: Brahmajāla, Śamaññaphala, etc.—the five Nikāyas.

Mahāsāsaka Vinaya:

(a) *Vinaya*: 4 Pārājikās and the rest;
(b) *Sūtras*: Ekottara, Daśottara, Mahānīdāna, Sakra, Saṅgiṭi, Brahmajāla; Kāṭyāyaṇa classified the sūtras into Dīrgha, Madhyama, Saṁyukta, Ekottara and Tsa Tsang (= Kṣudraka?).

Dharmagupta Vinaya:

(a) *Vinaya*: 4 Pārājikās, Saṅghāvaśesa, Aniyata; Naiḥsargika, Pratideśanīya, Śikṣāpadas, Varṣā, Pavāraṇā up to Ekottara, Bhikṣuṇi Vinaya, Uposatha, Kaṭhina, etc.;
(b) *Sūtras*: Brahmajāla, Ekottara, Daśottara, Saṅgiṭi, Mahānīdāna, Sakraddevendra; these were classified into Dīrgha, Madhyama, Ekottara, Saṁyukta, Jātaka, Vaipulya, Adbhutadharma, Avadāna, Upa- deśa, Arthapada, Dharmapada, Pārāyaṇa and Sthāviragāthā and Tsa Tsang (Kṣudraka?), Kathāvatthu and some books of Abhidharma.

1 Sylvain Lévi and Edouard Chavannes collected from the different accounts of the Council the titles of the sacred texts said to have been recited in the first Council vide *Journal Asiatique* 1916.
Haimavata Vinaya:—

(a) Vinaya: Bhikṣu and Bhikṣuṇī Vinaya, Kaṭhina, Māṭākā, and Ekottara.

(b) Sūtras: Dirghāgama, Madhyamāgama, Ekottarāgama, Saṃyuktāgama, Dharmapada, Arthapada, Pārāyaṇa, etc. up to Upadeśa, Tsa Tsang, and some books of Abhidharma.

Mahāsaṅghika Vinaya:—

(a) Sūtras: Dirgha, Madhyama, Saṃyukta, Ekottara and Kṣudraka;

(b) Vinaya:—

(i) La pureté de la zone interdite.
(ii) La pureté de la loi territoriale.
(iii) La pureté de la pratique des défenses.
(iv) La pureté de la des vénérables.
(v) La pureté du vulgaire.

Sarvāstivādin Vinaya:—

(a) Vinaya: 4 Pārājikās, 5 Saṅghāvaśeṣas and the rest;

(b) All sūtras commencing with the words “evam me śrutam;” Dharmacakra-pravartanasūtra; Abhidharma beginning with the 5 precepts (not to kill, not to steal etc.).

A comparison of the above lists distinctly show that the traditions differ about the recitation of texts excepting the Pātimokkha rules, hence it seems that these are not derived from a common source. Almost all the accounts, as we have seen, agree more or less in regard to the account of the council dealt with under different sub-headings and hence we have not much hesitation to say that they are the outcome of a common basis.

1 Le Concile de Rājagrha, p. 230.
It is with regard to the rehearsals of suttas that we notice some disagreement and this leads us to infer that the story of recitation of the Sutta Piṭaka in the first Council was an afterthought. It, however, cannot be denied that there was some discussion about Dhamma and Vinaya in the Council, though the rehearsal of the complete Sutta-piṭaka or all the sections of the Vinaya-piṭaka cannot be accepted as true.

The story in brief

At Subhadda’s (or Upānanda’s) words apprehending lack of discipline in the church, Mahākassapa proposed a Council of 500 Arhats for taking a stock of Buddha’s teachings. The proposal was made at Kuśinārā and the site selected for the session of the Council was Rājagṛha. Mahākassapa tried to include all the old arhats living at the time among the members of the Council and succeeded in securing the co-operation of arhats like Ājñāta Kauṇḍinya, the two Kāśyapas, and Anuruddha, but failed to persuade Gavāmpati (who was one of the few friends of Yaśa to be converted by Buddha) and Purāṇa (the abbot of Dakkhiṇāgiri) to take part or acquiesce in the proceedings of the Council. The presence of Ānanda as the repository of Buddha’s teachings in the Council was felt indispensable but as he was not an Arhat, he could not be included without the special permission of the Saṅgha. Fortunately Ānanda attained arhathood immediately before the session of the Council and was admitted into the Council, as a matter of course. The Council was held at Rājagṛha, all the necessary arrangements for seats and residence of monks having been made by Ajātasattu. Upāli was selected unanimously to recite the Vinaya rules and Ānanda the Suttas. On the completion of the recitation, Ānanda mentioned about the khuddakānukkhuddakāni sikkhāpadāni, the abrogation of which
was permitted by Buddha but the exact significance of which was not ascertained by him. This failing of Ananda was brought to the notice of the Council. Ananda did not regard these failings of his as anything serious but out of reverence to the wishes of the Saṅgha, he made the formal confession for getting absolution.

Rebuttal of Oldenberg’s theory of fiction

We have indicated above the number of works that preserve the tradition of the Council. Some of them are no doubt reiteration of the earlier ones but the fact remains as pointed out by Minayeff that these earlier ones on account of their unanimity must have a common tradition as their basis. To dismiss this as fictitious was rather too bold on the part of Prof. Oldenberg and it is strange that a number of scholars accepted Oldenberg’s dictum until Prof. La Vallée Poussin challenged it. Prof. Oldenberg’s conclusion is based mainly on the fact that in the

1 In this account the disciplinary action taken against Channa is related thus:

Ananda then announced to the Saṅgha that Buddha had asked him to punish a monk called Channa by brahmadanda, and this he was going to do at Kauśāmbī. Ananda reached Kauśāmbī. The queen of King Udēna approached him with gifts, which were doubled by the King himself after he had been pleased with a talk with Ananda. Channa on his being so punished made a strong effort for arhatthood and attained it soon. He then approached Ananda to have brahmadanda withdrawn but in reply he was told that the moment he had attained arhatthood the danda had ceased.

[A monk punished with brahmadanda is not admonished or instructed by any other monk and he is left to do whatever he likes Prof. La Vallée Poussin uses the appropriate synonym “boycotting.”]
Mahāparinibbāna-sutta the motive of the Council is given but not a word about the session of the Council.

As against this remark of Oldenberg, I think, the recent writings of Finot and Obermiller¹ are a sufficient answer. Prof. Finot points out that the chapters XI and XII of the Cullavagga, which contain the account of the two Councils, have such an abrupt beginning unlike the other chapters of the Cullavagga that they could not have been originally a part of this work.² He further points out that the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta also differs from the other Suttas of the Dīgha Nikāya in the nature of its contents, being more historical in character, and that the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta and the two chapters (XI, XII) of Cullavagga are so similar in nature that they must have been originally parts of one and the same work. In support of this contention of his, he refers to a work entitled Samyukta-vastu (Nanjio 1121), the Vinaya of the Mūla-Sarvāstivādins,³ which contains the account of both parinirvāṇa and the Councils, and concludes therefrom that the Theravādins too had a work corresponding to the Samyukta-vastu, and that it was dismembered at a later date by the ancient editors of the Nikāyas and Vinaya. Dr. Obermiller corroborates Finot’s contention and in support gives us in detail

¹ *IHQ.,* VIII, pp. 241-6, 781-4.

² According to Prof. Finot, both the chapters XI and XII did not form a part of the original Cullavagga. It would have been better if he had distinguished chapter XI only in that way, and not chapter XII, for all the chapters of the Cullavagga commence with the words tena samayena buddho bhagavā including chapter XII while chapter XI only commence with the words atte kho ayasmā Mahākassapa, i.e. in the form in which the chapters of the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta are commenced.

³ Also referred to by Prof. La Vallée Poussin in the *Indian Antiquary,* 1908, p. 704.
the contents of the Vinaya-ksudraka (in Tibetan), and shows that it contains not only the account of the two councils but also the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta. He further points out that “the story of the Councils begins just on the same line (fol. 301, 3, 3) in which the narrative of the burial of the Buddha finishes, without any indication whatsoever.”

In view of these evidences, we may safely take Prof. Finot’s contention as sound, viz., that the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta and at least the chapter XI (and not the chapter XII) of the Cullavagga originally formed one treatise, and on the analogy of the Vinayakṣudraka it may further be stated that the Mahāparinibbānasutta formed originally the first portion of the chapter XI of the Cullavagga. This takes away the force of Oldenberg’s arguments and we may now brush them aside.

Oldenberg remarked also that there were many incoherent and contradictory statements in the account of the Cullavaga. Prof. La Vallée Poussin has gone into them in detail and shown that Oldenberg’s interpretation of internal evidences is based upon some pre-conceived notions and should be taken at their worth. He has discussed at length the pros and cons of the charges brought against Ānanda, and for reconciling them with the then form of Buddhism, he has brought in also the doctrinal deviations found in the Kathāvatthu and attributed to the Mahāsaṅghikas. To me it seems that we need not go so far as to trace in the charges germs of schisms which later on appeared in the Buddhist Church, for the doctrines and rules of discipline were then in an undeveloped state and it must have taken a few decades since then for their development into a clear-cut shape.

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1 Corresponding roughly to Cullavagga.
2 IHQ., VIII, p. 784.
Conclusion

Once more we can safely revive the Russian savant’s contention of 1887 “that the Council was originally a tribunal composed of monks to decide the failings of Ānanda and Channa, and speaks of a time when the Vinaya was not yet codified, and that in course of time the story of the recitation of the pitakas was added to it and the tribunal was given an appearance of a conclave with a theological and literary object.”

This was a little modified in 1905 by Prof. La Vallée Poussin who would regard this Council as an enlarged Pātimokkha assembly. In our opinion also it was so but with an object greater than that of a Pātimokkha assembly.

The kernel of truth embedded in the various accounts as it appears to me is that the principal motive of the Council, was to ascertain the \textit{khuddakānukhuddakāni sikkhāpadāni}, abrogation of which was sanctioned by Buddha just before his demise. There must have been a good deal of difference of opinion about the interpretation of the lesser and minor precepts, and it was to settle this difference that Mahākassapa took the initiative to collect the seniormost monks, and have their approval of the rules that would be recited by Upāli, who had been praised by Buddha as the foremost of the Vinayadharas. As required by the rules of a Pātimokkha assembly, the preliminaries \textit{(uposathakammassā pubbakarana-pubbakicācā)} were gone through, \textit{viz.}, the selection of the monk who was to put questions relating to \textit{Vinaya}\textsuperscript{2} (in this case, it was Mahākassapa) and the monk who would answer them\textsuperscript{3} (i.e. Upāli). After this

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{La Concile de Rājagṛha, Intro., p. ii.}
\item Sunāṭu me bhante saṅgho, yadi saṅghassa pattakallam, aham itthan nāmaṁ vinayaṁ puccheyyam.
\item Sunāṭu me bhante saṅgho yadi saṅghassa pattakallam aham itthan nāmaṁ vinayaṁ puttho vissajjeyyam.
\end{enumerate}
and other preliminaries, the question of pārisuddhi had to be brought up, and so the turn of Ānanda came. As he was not really guilty of any ecclesiastical offence, he had nothing to confess, but the monks resented the heedlessness of Ānanda in certain matters, particularly in regard to non-ascertainment of the minor precepts that could be abrogated. Ānanda in deference to their wishes asked for forgiveness on this account as well as on other accounts and had his pārisuddhi. Then the turn came of Upāli to recite the Pātimokkha rules, which in all probability he did, and there is unanimity of the accounts with regard to this. This was probably followed up by the infliction of brahmadanda by Ānanda, on Channa. The story of the recitation of the suttas by Ānanda, as suggested by Minayeff, was engrafted on to the account later on and that explains the wide divergences in the different traditions regarding the recitation of suttas. And it must be due to this interference by later writers that we find the formality of pārisuddhi of Ānanda shifted from its proper place, the Dharmagupta Vinaya being the only text which put the pārisuddhi in the proper place, i.e., before the recitation of texts.
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