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THE DIALECTICAL METHOD OF NĀGĀRJUNA

Vigrahavyāvartani
THE DIALECTICAL METHOD
OF NĀGĀRJUNA
Vigrahavyāvartani

Second Edition (Revised and Enlarged)

Translated from the original Sanskrit with Introduction and Notes by
KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA

Text critically edited by
E. H. JOHNSTON and ARNOLD KUNST

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Delhi Varanasi Patna Madras
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

It is gratifying that a second edition of this annotated translation of the *Vigrahavyāvartani* is so soon called for.

The Introduction has been slightly developed, some minor changes have been made in the translation, some new elements have been introduced in the Notes and in the Bibliography, and the Sanskrit text and translation have been re-arranged.

Kamaleswar Bhattacharya

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris
1985

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

An English translation of the *Vigrahavyāvartani* with Introduction and Notes was published, under the same title, in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (Dordrecht, Holland), Vol. 1, 1971. Since then, this work has undergone a good deal of transformation. Thanks to the initiative taken by Messrs. Motilal Banarsidass; it is now being printed, revised and enlarged, along with the Sanskrit original, edited by E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst.

My heartiest thanks are due to my friend E. Gene Smith, not only for revising the proofs and making valuable suggestions but also for his warm hospitality in Delhi while this book was being printed.

Kamaleswar Bhattacharya

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, and University of Toronto
1978
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PART I
Sanskrit Text in Devanagari Script


Text basically the same as the one edited by E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst
विग्रहव्यावर्तनी

सर्वेऽं भावानां सर्वैं न विभेठे स्वभाववेलां ।
लवणमस्वभावचं न निवर्तियितुं स्वभाववालम्।।1।।

यदि सर्वेऽं भावानां हेतु प्रत्रेषयुचं त्येऽं प्रत्रेषयसामयांशृष्टि: पुरूषकृषि: सर्वैं स्वभावो
न विभेठे हेतु: पुरूषार्गृहृदेरित्वं पृथिविः
ब्रजवजेक्षवायवार्तानामेकेकसिंम् प्रत्रेषयसंज्ञितं, न प्रत्रेषयु समप्रेषु, न हेतुप्रत्रेषयसामयांशृष्टि:।
हेतुप्रत्रेषयविनिर्मितं: पृथिवेव च। यस्मादव सर्वैं स्वभावो नासि तस्मानि:—
स्वभावोऽहृदे। यस्मानि:स्वभावसत्तांसचूंयैः। यथा चायमधुरो तित:स्वभावो
नित:स्वभावत्वाच पृथिवेत्तया सर्वभाव अर्पि नित:स्वभाववालशृष्टि:।

अतः वत: ब्रूमः। यदेवम्, तथापि वचनम् ययेतचूंयैः। सर्वभाव इति तदपि शृष्टि:।
कि कारणम्। तदपि हेतुती नासि महाभूतेऽषु संप्रेषुकृष्टे विप्रेषुकृष्टे वा, प्रत्रेषयु नास्त्युः:
कन्तोजिज्ञासान्तममूलतावलनासिकापूर्वभूमितुष्ण यतोपयसामग्रिवान्न नासि, हेतु—
प्रत्रेषयविनिर्मितं: पृथिवेव च नासि। यस्मादव सर्वैं नासि तस्मानि:स्वभावम्।
यस्मानि:स्वभावं तस्माचूंयैः। तस्मादवेन सर्वभावस्वभावव्यवर्तनमश्चयं करुणैः
न हस्तातानिना शयं द्वृत्तम्। न हस्तार्गृहृदेहीनो शयं छेतुम्। न हस्तातीनिर्भरीः
शयं कोदयितुम्। एववसता वचनेन न शयं: सर्वभावस्वभावव्यवर्तनमश्चयं करुणैः
तत् यदुक्तं सर्वभावस्वभाव: प्रतिषिद्ध इति तय:।

अत: सर्वभावमेतत्तु वचनं पूर्वं हुता प्रतिष्ठा तेः।
वैयमकतं तस्मिन्म् विशेषहृदेहुः वक्तं:।।1।।
अथािपि मन्त्रसे मा मूदेष दोष इति सर्वभावमेतत्तुस्य सर्वभावव्यवर्तनाः शृष्ट्यम्।
तस्मादवेन सर्वभावस्वभाव: प्रतिषिद्ध इति, अत्र ब्रूमः। यदेवम्, या ते पूर्वी प्रतिष्ठा,
शृष्ट्या: सर्वभाव इति, हुता सा।

कि चायत्तु सर्वभाववत्तरत: त्वमस्तम्। कस्माचूंयैः सर्वभावयैः त्वमस्तम स्वभाव: प्रतिषिद्ध?: एवं पत्तकोणको वाद: प्रसबत:
विग्रहव्यावहरतनी

स पुनः कथमित। हृत चेतुः पुनः शून्यः सर्वभावाः; तेन लघुर्णं शून्यम्, सर्वभावाःतः गंगतवात। तेन शून्येन प्रतिपेधानुपपत्ति:। तत्र य: प्रतिपेध: शून्यः सर्वभावाः इति सर्वतन्त्रपत्रः। उपप्रश्रशतुः पुनः शून्यः सर्वभावाः इति प्रतिपेधः; तेन लघुर्णपमिः (प्य?)-शून्यम्। (अ) शून्य लघुर्णन प्रतिपेधोज्यपदः। अय शून्यः सर्वभावास्तववाचनः न्यासांक्षयम्, येन प्रतिपेधः; तेन लघुर्णं सर्वभावाः सुहृत्तम्। तत् दृष्टान्तविरोधः।

सर्वं चेतुः संगृहीतं लघुर्णं सर्वभावाः शून्यः; तेन तद्विप्रश्ल्यम्। शून्यारवादनेऽति प्रतिपेधः। अय शून्यारवति चालने प्रतिपेधः शून्यः सर्वभावाः इति, तेन शून्य अपि सर्वभावाः कार्यक्षिपासर्वां भवेवः। न च चेतुः शून्यम्। अय शून्यः सर्वभावाः; न च कार्यक्षिपासर्वां भवति मा नूतन दृष्टान्तविरोधं इति कहूँ, शून्येन तेन लघुर्णने सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिपेधो नोपक्षत् इति।

किंचित्तुः। एवं तद्रतित्वाद् वैष्णमिकत्वप्रसुः: किंचित्मुख्यम् किंचित्वशृणिमित। तस्मिन सुत्रवैष्णमिकते विशेषेषुहृत्तकारसः येन किंचित्मुख्यम् किंचित्वशृणियः स्वतः। स च नोपिक्षतो हृदः। तत्र युक्तं शून्यः सर्वभावाः इति तत्र।

किंचित्तुः।

मा शब्दवदिक्यतेर त्याते बुद्धि चैतुर्यपमुराः।
शब्देन हात सता भविष्यती वारण तत्त्वः।

स्वते बुद्धः, यथा नाम कर्षितः बृहस्पतिः शब्दं कार्यरितिः स्वयमेव शब्दं कुर्यात्ते न शब्देन तस्य श्वरस्व व्यावहाराः किष्टेत, एवमेव शून्यः सर्वभावाः इति शून्येन वचनेन सर्वभावस्वभावस्व व्यावहाराः किष्टेत इति।

अत वव्यः बृहः। एतद् नुपापमुरम्। कि कारणम्। सता हात शब्देन भविष्यत: श्वरस्व प्रतिपेधः किष्टेत। न पुनरिव भवत: सता वचनेन सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिपेधः किष्टेत। तव हि मलेन वचनमयस्तञ्, सर्वभावस्वभावोज्यस्तञ। तस्मादा या शब्दवदिति विषयसोपदेशः।
बिग्रहन्यावत्नी

प्रतिवेदप्रतिपेशोप्येवमिति मतं भवेततदसदेव।।
एवं तव प्रतिज्ञा लक्षणतो दूष्यते न मम।।।

स्याते बुद्धः प्रतिपवेदप्रतिपेशोप्ययनेनेव कपलेनानुपप्तः। तत्र यद्वारान्ं सर्वभावे—
स्वभावप्रतिपेशवचनं प्रतिवेदयति तदनुपप्तमिति। अत्र वयं ब्रमः। सर्वायत्यस्यादेव।
कस्मातु। तत्र हि (एतत्?) प्रतिज्ञालक्षणमात्र न मम। भवानु ब्रह्मीति शून्यः। सर्वभावं
इति नाहूः। गृहस्ये। पक्षो न मम। तत्र यहुःक्तं प्रतिवेदप्रतिपेशोप्ययं सत्यनुपप्तं इति
तम। किल्ल्वस्यायः

प्रत्यक्षेण हि ताब्दू यदुपलम्य विनिवर्त्यति भावान्।
तनासिति प्रत्येकं भावा येनोपलम्यन्ते।।।।

यदि प्रत्यक्ष: सर्वभावानुपप्तम् भवानित्वंत्यति शून्यः। सर्वभावं इति तदनुपप्तम्।
कस्मातु। प्रत्यक्षामिपि हि प्रमाणं सर्वभावान्तः तत्वर्भाजूःन्यम्। यो भवान्युपपते सोऽपि
शून्यः। तस्मातू प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाणेन नोपपलभावः। अनुपप्तमयं च प्रतिपेशानुपप्ततः।
तत्र यहुःक्तं शून्यः। सर्वभावं इति तदनुपप्तलम्। स्याते बुद्धः। अनुमानेनागमनोपपोपमो
सर्वभावानुपप्तम् सर्वभावन्यावतरः किल्ल्वित इति, अत्र ब्रमः।

अनुमानं प्रत्युक्तं प्रत्यक्षेणागमोपमो च।।
अनुमानानायमसाध्यम् येवः वृष्टान्तसाध्यायः।।।।

अनुमानोपमानामास्त्र प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाणेन प्रत्युक्ताः। यथा हि प्रत्यवं प्रमाणं
शून्यम्, सर्वभावान्ं शून्यत्वदेवनुपपलभावमा अपि शून्यः। सर्वभावान्ना
शून्यत्वात्। येज्ञुमानसाध्या अर्था अगमसाध्या उपमानसाध्याय: तेज्ञि शून्यः।
सर्वभावान्ं शून्यत्वात्। अनुमानोपमानामास्त्र यो भवानुपपते सोऽपि शून्यः।
तस्माद्रव्यानुपप्तम्मभावोपपोपल्यावतूः सर्वभावप्रतिपेशानुपप्ततः। तत्र यहुःक्तं
शून्यः। सर्वभावं इति तस्म।

किल्ल्वस्यायः
नैयायिकत्वमायो धर्म मैयायिकार्थ ये तेषाम्।
धर्मस्योक्तानामेतमनैयायिकार्थाः।
तद्ह च धर्मविवेकवतानां नैवाणिकानां धर्माणां नैवाणिकः स्वभावः, अनैवाणिकः
कानामनैवाणिकः, बोध्याणिकानां बोध्याणिकः, अबोध्याणिकानामबोध्याणिकः, बोधि-
पक्षाणिकानां बोधिपक्षाणिकः, अबोधिपक्षाणिकामबोधिपक्षाणिकः। एवमपि शोषणाम्
तथोत्तरत्मारके धर्माणां स्वभावो दृष्टतस्तस्माद् यद्युक्तं नि:स्वभावः सर्वभावा
नि:स्वभाववाच्छूतः इति तस्मात्
किमचायतु?

यदि च न सत्त्वलोको धर्माणां नि:स्वभाव इत्येव।
नामाच्य प्रभेदार्यं नाम धि निर्वेदस्तुकं नारिनि।६॥

यदि सर्वधर्माणां स्वभावो न भवेतस्त्रापि नि:स्वभावो भवेतु। ततः नि:स्वभाव
इत्येवं नामाच्य न भवेतु। कस्मात्। नाम धि निर्वेदस्तुकं किमचायधिपि नारितः। तस्मात्
श्रामशाल्लवातु स्वभावो भवानामस्रति स्वभावस्थाल्लवोऽवलोकायुः: सर्वभावा:। तस्मात्
यदुक्तं नि:स्वभावःसर्वभावा नि:स्वभाववाच्छूतः इति तस्मात्
किमचायतु?  ।

अथ विषये स्वभावः स च धर्माणां न विषये तस्मात्। ॥
धर्मविवस्त्र स्वभावः स यथै तस्मातुक्तमुपदेश्यत्सम्।१०॥

अथ ममश्च महुःस्वस्तुकं नामेति कुलाच्छि स्वभावः। स पुनर्धर्माणां न संभवति,
एवं धर्मविवस्त्रततानि:स्त्वभाववाच्च धर्माणां सिद्धा भविष्यति, न च निर्वेदस्तुकं नामेति, अत्र
वषयः श्रृः। एवं यस्यदानी स स्वभावो धर्मविविनिमुक्तस्याः स युक्तमुपदेश्यत्सम्।
स च नोपदिष्टः। तस्मात् या कल्पनानि न स पुनर्धर्माणामिति सा हीना।
किमचायतु?

सत एवप्रतिपेधो नारिति पदो गंगु इत्येव यस्मात्। ॥
प्रृथ्वः प्रतिपेधोऽथ सत: स्वभावस्य तेतस्मात्।११॥

यह च सतोप्रस्प निष्पेधः निष्पेधः नासतः। तदविया निष्पेधः प्रत्येकः नासतः। एवं नासित स्वभावः दर्श्यामानिः सतः स्वभावस्य प्रतिषेधः निष्पेधः नासतः। तत्र यथौ निः स्वभावः सर्वभावः इति ततः। प्रतिषेधः संभवादेव सर्वभावस्वभावोऽन्तः।

किंचिदान्यत्।

अयं नासित स स्वभावः किं नू प्रतिप्रेयते तयानेन।
वचनेनात्मकतिपेधः तिथिः (२) हस्तः।

अयं नासितेव स स्वभावः अनेन वचनेन ‘निः स्वभावः सर्वभावः’ इति किं प्रभता प्रतिप्रेयते। असतो हि वचनादित्रा सिद्धः श्चर्तिषेधः तदवांणे: शैत्यस्य अपांमृण्यस्य।

किंचिदान्यत्।

बालानामानि मिथ्या शून्तुर्वायाः यथा जलप्राहः।
एवं मिथ्याप्राहः स्याते प्रतिषेधादतो (२) हस्तः।

स्याते बुद्धः। यथा बालानाम शून्तुर्वायां मिथ्या जलमिति प्राहो भवति, नतु निजं जलसा मूलतृतीयो तत्र परिवर्तनार्ध्याये गुणश्चर्तिः किं प्रभता प्रतिप्रेर्यते। एवं नि: स्वभावेवः यः स्वभावः प्राहः सत्तानां स्वयं व्यावर्तनार्ध्य निः स्वभावः सर्वभावः हयुः प्रेमः हि। अयं च।

जूमः।

नन्देवं सत्यते प्राहो प्राहं च तदप्रात्या च।
प्रतिषेधः प्रतिषेधाय प्रतिषेधः चेति द्वमृतात्।

यद्यममु अरस्त तावतस्तवानां प्राहः। अरस्त प्रायुषः, सत्य च तदर्श्यातः। अरस्त प्रतिषेधस्ततस्यायपि मिथ्याप्राणुपातिः प्रतिषेधाय यद्वथ मिथ्याप्राहो नाम, सत्य च प्रतिषेधाद्रो युम्भादयाज्य प्राहुपर्यः सिद्धः प्रकृतः। तस्य प्रकृतः सिद्धत्वादृ यथौ श्च। श्चाय: सर्वभावः इति ततः।

१०, सिद्धते (JK) २ प्रतिषेधातो— (JK)
विग्रह्व्यावतंत्री

अथ नेवासित्र ग्राहो नेव ग्राहां न च ग्रहीतार:।
प्रतिषेध: प्रतिषेधव्र्य प्रतिषेधदारो ननु न सन्नि।।१५।।

अथ मा भूदेप दोष इति कुला नेव ग्राहोसित्र नेव ग्राहां न च ग्रहीतार इत्येव सन्ति
ग्राहय: प्रतिषेधो निस्वभावान: सर्वभावान्ति इति सोजिप नासित्र, प्रतिषेधव्यामपि नासित्र,
प्रतिषेधदारोहपि न सन्नि।

प्रतिषेध: प्रतिषेधव्र्य प्रतिषेधदारस्च यथुत न सन्नि।
सिद्धा हि सर्वभावास्तेयानेव स्वभावस्य।।१६।।

यदि च न प्रतिषेधो न प्रतिषेधव्र्य न प्रतिषेधदार: सत्यप्रतिषेधान: सर्वभावान्ति च
सर्वभावान्ताः स्वभाव:।
किृत्वान्यत्।

हेतुस्वस्ते न सिद्धमेनः स्वभावायः कुलो हि ते हेतु:।
निन्हेतुकस्य सिद्धमेन चोपपभावास्य तेषुस्वस्य।।१७।।

निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावाः इत्येतसिद्धस्य तेन हेतुसिद्ध:। कि कारणम्। निःस्वभावांतः
सर्वभावानां शून्यतावातो हेतु: कुत:। असति हेतो निन्हेतुकस्यार्यस्य शून्या:।
सर्वभावां इति कुत एव प्रतिषेध:। तत्र यथुतस्त् शून्या: सर्वभावाः इति तत:।
कित्वान्यत्।

यदि चाहेऽरूपस: सिद्ध: स्वभावविनिर्वर्तनस्य तेन भवति।।
स्वभावस्यास्वस्तितः नमापि निन्हेतुकं सिद्धम्।।१५।।

अथ मन्यसे निन्हेतुकी(क) सिद्धमेव निन्हेतुकस्य भावानासित्र यथा तव स्वभाव-
विनिर्वर्तनं निन्हेतुकं सिद्धं तथा ममापि स्वभाव स्वभावस्य निन्हेतुक: सिद्ध:।
विग्रहव्यावर्तिनी

अथ हेतोरसितल्वं भावात्त्वाभावायम् इत्यनुपपत्तम्।।
लोकेषु निःस्वभावो न हि करुचं विधते भावः।।१६।।

यदि हेतोरसितल्वं मन्यते निःस्वभावः सर्वभावा इति, तदनुपपत्तम्। कि कारणम्।
न हि लोके निःस्वभावं कश्चिद्रूपावरोपितं।
किव्वचालयत्।

पूर्वं चेत्रत्रिपेशं: पर्यात्रत्रत्विपेश्वमित्रनुपपत्तम्।।
पर्यात्राभावाः युगपदलोकाः सर्वभावः सनू।॥२०॥

इह पूर्वं चेत्रत्रिपेशं: पर्यात्राः प्रतिपेश्वमिति नोपपत्तम्। असति हि प्रतिपेश्वे कस्य प्रतिपेशं। अथ पर्यात्रत्रिपेशं: पूर्वं प्रतिपेश्वमिति च नोपपत्तम्। सिद्धे हि प्रतिपेश्वे कि प्रतिपेशं: करोदित। अथ युगपदलोकां प्रतिपेश्वप्रतिपेश्वे इति तथापि न प्रतिपेशं: प्रतिपेश्वस्यार्थस्य कारणम्, प्रतिपेश्वो न प्रतिपेशस्य च। यथा युगपदलोकाः: शास्त्रशिष्याण्योऽन्तः दक्षिणं सब्बस्य कारणं सब्बं वा दक्षिणस्य कारणं भवतीति। तस्मात् यदुक्तं निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा इति तथा ॥।

अत्रोच्चते। यत्कालः व्यवस्थानं

सव्यं भावानां सर्वं न विधते सर्वभावस्वेतु।
लव्वचनस्वभावाः न निवर्ततिमितुं सर्वभावमलम्॥इति

अथ ब्रूमः।

हेतुप्रत्यययसामया च पूर्वक्ष चापि महत्रो न यदिः।।
ननु शून्यवं: सिद्धं भावानामस्वभावस्वातः॥२१॥

यदि महत्रो हेतु नासित महामूलेषु संबन्धस्वस्य विप्रयुक्तस्य वा, प्रत्येकशु नास्तवुर्वः: कण्ठीप्रभुप्रागत्तमूलतलानासिकसमुक्तमृतमृतमृतमृतते शक्ते, नोभस्वभावायास्मिति, हेतु-

1 प्रतिपेश्वभेद्यै इति (J K) २—cf. NS. II.१२-१४
प्रत्येकांगी विशिष्टिनिमुक्त मूल तथा नासित, तस्मातः व्याकरण, दिन-व्याकरणवाच्यम्।

नन्दु शून्यवर्ग सिद्ध सिद्ध व्याकरणवाच्यम् मदीववचस:। यथा चतुर्भुजवर्ग सिद्ध व्याकरणवाच्यम्।

यथा यद्यौवतं त्वदिववचसः शून्यवाच्यम्। कर्मानाब् सूचन नोपपत्ति हितं तस्।

कििन्नान्तु।

यथा प्रतीत्यभावो भावानां शून्यतेति सा प्रोक्ता॥

यथा प्रतीत्यभावो भवति हि तस्य व्याकरणम्॥२२॥

शून्यताकृच च भवान् भावानामनवसाय प्रवृत्त उपालम्। बक्तु त्वदिववचस निःव्याकरणवाच्यम्।

शिबतु व्याकरणवाच्यम्। यथा हि। प्रतीत्यभावो भवानां सा शून्यता। कर्मान्।

कििन्नान्तु। शिवव्याकरणवाच्यम्। यथा हि। प्रतीत्यसमुपपमा भावान्ते न

सत्वाना भवति श्यावाभावानु। कर्मान्। हे्तुसमापेक्षाल्भु। यथद हि। श्यावाना

ववतो भावानं भवेयुः। प्रत्योभावायपि हे्तुसमाक्षुच भवेयुः॥। न चैवं भवति।

तस्मातः शिबतु श्यावासन। शिबव्याकरणवाच्यम्य। इत्यविद्योहते।

एवं मदीववचस वचन प्रतीत्यसमुपपपत्वाभिः। श्यावासन।

शिबव्याकरणवाच्यम्य। प्रतीत्यसमुपपपत्वाभिः। श्यावासन।

यथा च प्रतीत्यसमुपपपत्वाभिः। श्यावासन।

यथा च प्रतीत्यसमुपपपत्वाभिः श्यावासन। अशिश्चर:।

राधकृष्णः। कार्यः। कार्यम्। मूलम्।

दृष्टि:। शालिवाहिकाः। वर्णाध्यायः। वर्णाध्यायः। शालिवाहिकाः।

स्वामायकाः। निमित्तकः। चेतुः श्यावाभावानां भवाना ववते।

तत्त यदुवलः। निःव्याकरणवाच्यम्। श्यावाभावानां भवाना ववते।

यथा च।

कििन्नान्तु।

निमित्तको निमित्तकान्म मायापुष्पः। श्यावासन।

प्रतिष्कृतम् च यथान् यथापन तथापन श्यालः॥२३॥

यथा निमित्तकः। पुरुषोऽवयन् निमित्तकः पुरुषः। कार्येत्यम्। वर्णमानां निमित्तकोऽत्र च।

मायावर्षे। तस्मातः। श्यावासन। सूचितं कार्येत्यम्। वर्णमानां

मायावर्षे। तस्मातः। श्यावासन। सूचितं कार्येत्यम्। वर्णमानां

मायावर्षे। तस्मातः। श्यावासन। सूचितं कार्येत्यम्। वर्णमानां

मायावर्षे। तस्मातः। श्यावासन। सूचितं कार्येत्यम्। वर्णमानां

मायावर्षे। तस्मातः। श्यावासन। सूचितं कार्येत्यम्। वर्णमानां

मायावर्षे। तस्मातः। श्यावासन। सूचितं कार्येत्यम्। वर्णमानां

मायावर्षे। तस्मातः। श्यावासन। सूचितं कार्येत्यम्। वर्णमानां
विग्रहव्यावहारं

प्रतिषेधयेत्, तत्र यो निर्मितक् पुष्पः प्रतिषिध्यते सोपिः शून्यः। यः प्रतिषेधयति सोपिः शून्यः। यो मायापुलकः प्रतिषिध्यते सोपिः शून्यः। यः प्रतिषेधयति सोपिः शून्यः। एवमेव मद्द्रवने मूर्मेनापि सर्वभावाणि स्वभावप्रतिष्ठेऽपि उपपपः। तत्र युजुर्तोक्तं शून्यात्मान्यसृवध्वरस्मत्वः सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिष्ठेऽपि नोपपपः इति तत्र। तत्र यो भवता पट्टोकोऽवाद उक्तः सोपिः तेनैव प्रतिषिधः। नैव हृदयं सति न सर्वभावानां नारस्त्यूर्मृ। नापि सर्वभावां अशून्यः।

यत्युपन्नबतोत्ततः

अथ सर्वभावसंयतः धूसरं हुतं प्रतिज्ञा तेः।

वैशमिकतं तत्सम्यं विशेषेन्द्रुषु वनतवः।॥२४॥

अन्तपि ब्रमः।

न सर्वभावकिमेत्तदा तस्मात धारानि।

नाशितं च वैशमिकतं विशेषेन्द्रुषु न निमायः।॥२५॥

न तावन्मेवतवः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पज्ञ्यतात् स्वभावोपपपपः। यथा पूर्वमुक्तं स्वभावा

तुपपर्ज्ञ्यवृत्तीत्। यस्माच्च वेदमपि मद्द्रवने मूर्मं शून्यं शोषा अपि सर्वभावा: शून्यः।

सर्वभावाति वैशमिकतः। यदि हि वयं ब्रम इदं वचनमशून्यं शोषा: सर्वभावा: शून्या

इति ततो वैशमिकतं स्यात्। न चैतंदेवम। तस्मात् वैशमिकतः। यस्माच्च

वैशमिकतं न संभवतीतं वचनमशून्यं शोषा: पुनः: सर्वभावा: शून्या इति, तस्मादस्माभि-

विशेषेन्द्रुषु वनतवः इति तत्र यजुर्तोक्तं वादहानिततो वैशमिकतं च विशेषेन्द्रुषु च वनतवः इति तत्र।

यत्युपन्नबतोत्ततम्

मा शब्दविविितस्य तत: बुद्धिं चैतंदेवप्रभुः।

शब्देन हात्र सता भविष्यो वारणं तस्य ॥ इति

अथ ब्रमः।
विग्रह्याबालनी

मा श्रवस्वतिति नायं दुष्टाखो यस्तवया समारखः।
श्रवणं तत्र श्रवस्वप्ति वारणं नैवमेवैततः॥२५॥

नायप्रम्यमार्क दुष्टाखः। यथा कविच्छु मा श्रवन्ति कार्तिकि ज्वलन्ति श्रवणेन करोऽति
श्रवनं च प्रतिसप्तिति, मद्यु तद्भवत्सं चक्रत्वं न शुन्यतां प्रतिसप्तिति। कि कारणम्।
वन हि दुष्टाखो श्रवणं श्रवस्वप्ति वारणं किष्टिते। न चैत्यदेवम्। वर्य ब्रूमो निःस्वभवायः
सवबावा निःस्वभावलक्ष्म्या इति। कि कारणम्।

नैःस्वामायणां चैत्यःस्वामायण सवबावां वारणं यदि हि
नैःस्वामायण्यस्यैौतृती स्वामायण हि प्रसिद्धं स्वायः॥२६॥

यथा मा श्रवन कार्तिकि श्रवणं श्रवस्वप्ति वारणं किष्टिते, एवं यदि नैःस्वामायणेन
वचनेन नैःस्वामायणां भावानं वारणं किष्टिते ततोऽर्ध्व दुष्टाखं उपपशः स्वायः।
इत्यु नैःस्वामायणेन वचनेन भावानं स्वभवाविष्टुः। किष्टिते। यदि नैःस्वामायणेन
वचनेन भावानं नैःस्वामायण्यस्य विष्टुः। किष्टिते नैःस्वामायण्यस्य विष्टुः भावाः
सस्त्वभवाय भेदेयु:। सस्त्वभवलक्ष्म्या: स्युः। शून्यतां च वर्य भावानामाचक्षुमहे
नाशून्यताधित्वमुख्ताचा एवायमिति।

अथवा निमित्तकायां यथा सत्रयं सनिमल्यसदग्रहः॥
निमित्तक: प्रतिहायात् कस्मचिदेवं भवेदेतत्॥२७॥

अथवा यथा कस्मचितकस्य निमित्तकायां सत्रः स्वभावसून्यायाः परमार्थं:
सनिमल्यसदग्रहः स्याृत, एवं ततश्च तेनासदग्रहं स राममुत्पादवत्सृ। तथागापेन:
वा तथागतश्वास्केन वा निमित्तको निमित्तक: स्याृत। तथागतसंधित्तानेन वा तथागत-
श्वास्केन वा स तस्य तमसदग्रहं विनिवर्त्तेऽत्। एवमेव निमित्तकोपमेन
शून्येन भवस्तरेन निमित्तकस्तनासदशुभे सत्रासाधे निःस्वभवेषु योऽवं स्वभवग्रहः स
निवर्त्तेऽत्। तस्मायमात्र दुष्टाखः: शून्यताप्रसाधनं प्रत्युपपदस्मानो नेतर:।
विग्रहत्वावलं

अव्यक्त साध्वसमोऽस्म हेतुन हि विद्यते ध्वने: सत्ता॥
संव्यवहारं च वयं नान्मुपगम्य कथयाम्॥२५॥

मा श्लोकविद्वित साध्वसम एवाय इत्युः। कस्मात्। सर्वभावानां नैःस्वाभावनाविभिन्नतालाव। न हि तस्य ध्वने: प्रतिस्वयमुपत्सशालात् स्वभावसत्ता विद्यते। तस्या: स्वभावस्तत्ताय अविच्छिन्नतावाक्षितां शब्देन द्वारस सत्ता भविष्यतो वार्षिक तस्येकि तद्वियहिते।

अर्प च न वयं व्यवहारसत्तमनम्पुगम्य व्यवहारस्तमृ प्रत्यास्याय कथयाम् शून्या: सर्वभावाः इति। न हि व्यवहारसत्तमनम्पुगम्य शक्या चर्मेदेशाना कर्तुः। यवोक्तं व्यवहारनाशिल्य परमात्माः न देशेये।
परमात्मानम्पुगम्य निर्वाणं नापाण्मयं। इति
तस्मात्मदेशनान्नांग्नं यह सवधावां न नैःस्वाभावलवमयोपचयमानमिति।

यलुःमभवतोक्तम्

प्रतिस्वयप्रतिपेत्योपस्येवविमिति मतं भवेत् तदस्वेद।
एवं तस प्रतिज्ञा लक्षणतो दूष्टज्ञे न मम ॥ इति

अत्र ब्रह्मः।

यदि काचन प्रतिज्ञा स्वात्में तत्त एष में भवेत् दोषः।
नासितं च मम प्रतिज्ञा तस्मात्सवत्सितं म दोषः॥२६॥

यदि च काचन मम प्रतिज्ञा स्वात्म ततो मम प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तवत्सूवकोऽदोषो यथा त्वयोक्तस्तता मम स्वात्। न मम काचिदस्ति प्रतिज्ञा।
तस्मात् सर्वभावायुः शून्येश्वरस्तूपयोज्याते। प्रकृतिविविधको कुत: प्रतिज्ञा। कुत: प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तिः।
कुत: प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तिः दोषः।

तत्र यद्यवतोक्तम तं प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तवत्सूवक्ते दोष इति तत्र।

यतुःमभवतोक्तम
विग्रहावर्तनी

प्रत्येकः हि ताब्धाचूपलम्य विनिवर्तयति भावान्।
तस्मातिः प्रत्यकः भावः येनोपलम्यन्ते॥

अनुमानं प्रत्युक्तं प्रत्येकेणामोपमाने च।
अनुमानामसाध्या येंहि वृष्टान्तसाध्यायच॥ इति
अतः वर्यं हूँमः॥

यदि किल्लच्छुपलमेव प्रवर्तयेऽ निवर्तयेऽ वा।
प्रत्यकादिनितिर्येषष्ठदभावानेनुपालम्॥३०॥

विद्यान्तिन्वर्यमुपलमेव प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानान्विततुभिः प्रमाणंतुरः वा
प्रमाणान्वितत्वमेव, अत एव प्रवर्तयेऽ वा निवर्तयेऽ वा। यदोऽयं निवेद्ये किल्लच्छो-
पलस्य तस्मात प्रवर्तयायम् न निवर्तयायम्।

तत्रैवं सति यो भवतोपालम्य उक्तो यदि प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रमाणान्वितमण्यन्तमोपपमाय
भावाच्चिनिवर्तयत्सि ननु तानि प्रमाणानि न सति, तैश्च प्रमाणपूर्वि गम्या अर्थं न
सतीति स मेवाभवतेवानुपालम्।

किल्लच्छान्यतु।

यदि च प्रमाणतस्ते तेषां तेषां प्रतिदििर्यानाम्।
तेषां पुनः प्रतिदिि दूः द्विपयं ते प्रमाणानाम्॥३१॥

यदि च प्रमाणस्तते तेषां तेषां प्रेमयाणां प्रतिदििस मन्यसे यथा मातृम्यानाम्,
तेषां भावानां प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपपमानानां चतुराँ प्रमाणानां कुलः प्रतिदििः। यदि
तावर्तिप्रमाणानां प्रमाणानां त्यांतसिद्धः, प्रमाणात्यां प्रतिदििरिति हीयते
प्रतिरोचणां। तथोऽपि।

अनुपूर्वे प्रमाणे: प्रमाणसिद्धिभेदतदनवस्तम।

यदि पुनः क्वः प्रेमयाणां प्रतिदििस्तते च प्रमाणानामत्र: प्रमाणे: प्रतिदििरेव-
मनवस्तप्रसंबसः। अनवस्ताप्रसः को दोषः।
विप्रह्यावतः

नादेः: सिद्धिस्त्रासित नैव मध्यस्व नान्त्यस्य।१३२।।

अनवस्थाप्रसङ्कृ आदेः: सिद्धिनासित। फँ कारणम्। तेषामपि हि प्रमाणानामयः
प्रमाणः: प्रसिद्धस्तोषाधमैवरित नास्यवादः। आदेरसुज्ञावतु कुलो मध्यं कुतोज्ज्ञः।
तस्मातेऽथ प्रमाणानायः प्रमाणः: प्रसिद्धिरितयुद्धतं तथोपपचतः इति।

तेषामः प्रमाणैविना प्रसिद्धिविहीयते वादः।।
वैशिष्किकः तस्मानु विशेषणेतुच वक्तव्यः।१३३।।

अथ मन्यते तेषां प्रमाणानां विना प्रमाणः: प्रसिद्धः, प्रमेयाणां पुनरपीतानां प्रमाणः:
प्रसिद्धिरित, एवं सति यस्ते वादः प्रमाणः: प्रसिद्धरपणामित इति स हीर्यते। वैशिष्किकः
च भवति केषांचिद्यानां प्रमाणः: प्रसिद्धः केषांचिन्येति। विशेषणेतुच वक्तव्यो येन
हेतुना केषांचिद्यानां प्रमाणः: प्रसिद्धः केषांचिन्येति। स च नोपिन्दः।। तस्मादिय-
मध्य कल्पत नीपत्तिः।

अन्याः। प्रमाणानेह स्वात्मां परात्मानः प्रसाध्यचति। यथोक्तः

ढोतयति स्वात्मां यथा हृताशस्त्रा परात्मामुः।
स्वपरात्मानाएवं प्रसाध्यचति प्रमाणानि।। इति

यथानि: स्वात्मां परात्मानः प्रकाशयति तथेव प्रमाणानि प्रसाध्यचति स्वात्मां
परात्मानः।

अभोच्यते

विषमोपन्यासोऽत्र न हातानि प्रकाशयत्सिः।।
न हि तस्मानुपलविधिरूढ्ग्ना तमसीव कुमस्य।१३४।।

विषम एवोपन्यासोऽद्वित्तु, प्रमाणानि स्वात्मानः प्रसाध्यचति परात्मानः
प्रसाध्यचति। न हातिरात्मानि प्रकाशयति। यथा प्रागेवान्तिनाप्रकाशितस्त्वत्मसि
कुभो नोपलम्येत् ऊतर्कालमुपलम्येत्तिना प्रकाशितं सति, एवभेद यथप्रकाशिताः
विग्रहश्यावतर्तनी

प्रागानिसत्तमसि स्वात्तरकालमन्दः प्रकाशं स्वात्, अतः स्वात्मानं प्रकाशयंतु । न चैतदेवम्। तस्मादित्यमणि कल्यणं नोपपदित इति।

किष्णान्यतः।

यदि च स्वात्मानमयं लप्खनेन प्रकाशयतर्मिन।
परम्पर नन्त्रासमणं परिप्रेक्ष्यति अतः।१५।११

यदि च लप्खनेन यथा परामानं प्रकाशयस्यतिनिरूपं वस्तुत्तममयं प्रकाशयति, नन्दु यथा परामानं तद्धत्येव वस्तुत्तममयं प्रकाशयति। न चैतदेवम्। तत्र यदुकं परामानमित्र वस्तुत्तममयं प्रकाशयमलिनिर्दित तन्त्र।

यदि च स्वपरामानो लप्खनेन प्रकाशयतर्मिन।
प्रणयश्यिति तमूः स्वपरामानो हुताश इव।१६।१२

यदि च भवतो मतेन स्वपरामानो प्रकाशयतिनं, नन्दिदानां तत्त्रतिपमूलं तमोणि स्वपरामानो चावेतूः। न चैतदु हृदं। तत्र यदुकं स्वपरामानो प्रकाशय-मलिनिर्दित तन्त्र।

किष्णान्यतः।

नासित तमोश्च ज्वलं यत्र च चित्तमयिति परात्मानं ज्वलं।
कुस्ते कथा प्रकाशं स धे प्रकाशश्‌ ब्रह्माकरवः।३७।३७

इहृ चास्य नासित तमो नापि च यत्तानित्तत्तानान्ति तम।। प्रकाश्च्च नाम तमसः प्रतिपादः। यस्माच्चाचार्य्म स्वादित तमो नापि च यत्तानित्तत्तान्ति तमः, तत्र कस्य तमसः प्रतिपादात्मिनः करोति यस्य प्रतिपादादत्मिनः स्वपरामानी प्रकाशयतीतिः।

अतः। नन्दु यस्मादेवं नासीन तमोमिति नापि यत्तानित्तत्त तमोमिति, तस्मादेव स्वपरामानी न प्रकाशयतिनं, तत्र स्वपरामानी न प्रकाशयतिनं; कुस्ते। तेन इहृ चास्यालोकेनाध्यसिना तमसः प्रतिपादः। तस्माच्चार्य्म तमोमिति नापि यत्तानित्तत्त तमोमिति स्वमादेवयथादमान एवोभर्य प्रकाशय-मलिनः स्वत्तमानं परामानं बृहित्। अत्रोऽध्यते।
अप्राप्तोपि ज्वलनो यदि वा पुनरथ्कारसमुपह्वाद्।
सर्वेऽ पुरुषात्म्यमद्वते संस्थितो हृदयात्।

अधापि मन्त्रेषुप्राप्तोपिमन्निर्भरसमुपह्वानितिति नववदनामिति संस्थितोधिन्ति: सर्वे-
लोकात्म्यमुपह्वानिष्यति तस्मात्वायामप्राप्तो। न चतुर्देवं दृष्टम्। तस्मादार्यायनापी-
निर्भरसमुपह्वानिति यदिष्टं तत्।

यदि स्वतः प्रमाणसिद्धिरप्रेषेत्तत्र प्रमेयाणि।
भवति प्रमाणसिद्धिन परापेक्षा स्वतं: सिद्धि।

यदि चार्धिनवत् स्वतं: प्रमाणसिद्धिरिति मन्त्रेष, अपेक्षापिज्ञ प्रमेयायनर्थद् प्रमाणानं
सिद्धिमयेविष्यति। कि कारणौ। न हि स्वतं: सिद्धि: परमपेक्षते। अपेक्षानुते न
स्वतं: सिद्धि। अतः यदि नापेक्षते प्रमेयायनर्थद् प्रमाणानि को दोषे स्विष्यतीति।
अतोत्ते।

अनपेक्ष्य हि प्रमेयायनर्थद् यदि ते प्रमाणसिद्धिरिति।
न भवति कस्यचिदसनमानि तानि प्रमाणानि।

यदि प्रमेयायनर्थाणपेक्ष्य प्रसिद्धमेविति प्रमाणानामवेव तानीमानि प्रमाणानि न
कस्यपितृति प्रमाणानि भवति। एवं दोषं। अथ कस्यचित्रुवनिति प्रमाणानि नैव-
दानीमनपेक्ष्य प्रमेयायनर्थद् प्रमाणानि भवति।
विग्रहृव्यावतंत्नी

अथ मतमेन्द्र्य सिद्धस्तेप्रामर्यम्ब्रट्र भवति को दोषः।
सिद्धस्त्र साधनं स्वाभासिद्धोनेष्टे हृत्यन्तु॥४२॥

अथापि मतमेन्द्र्य प्रभुर्यान्याध् प्रभुर्यानां सिद्धवत्तीप्रिति, एवं सिद्धस्त्र प्रभुर्या-
चतुष्ठयस्त्र साधनं भवति। कि कारणम्। न हृत्यन्त्यस्त्र्याध्यपेश्वक्षणं भवति। न हृत्यन्त्य
हासिद्धो देवदत्ते: कंविद्यमेन्द्र्यते। न च सिद्धस्त्र साधनं निष्ठु ब्रह्मस्त्र कारणानुप-
पत्तेरति।

किम् चान्यत्।

सिद्धान्ति हि प्रभुर्याध्यपेश्वः यदि सर्वथा प्रभुर्यानां।
भवति प्रभुर्याध्यपेश्वक्षणं प्रभुर्यानां॥४३॥

यदि प्रभुर्याध्यपेश्वः प्रभुर्यानां सिद्धान्ति नेदानां प्रभुर्याध्यपेश्वः प्रभुर्याणिः सिद्धान्ति
कि कारणम्। न हि साधनं साधनं साधारणं साधारणं च किल प्रभुर्याणं
प्रभुर्यानां। किम् चान्यत्।

यदि च प्रभुर्याध्यपेश्वक्षणं भवति प्रभुर्यानां।
कि ते प्रभुर्याध्यपेश्व तानि हि यदेव प्रभुर्यसंस्कृतं तत्॥४४॥

यदि च मन्येनेवस्यथक्षणं प्रभुर्यानां प्रभुर्यानां सिद्धवत्तीप्रिति किम् तैसानां ते प्रभुर्य
सिद्धान्ति पर्यन्त्यिष्ट्यः। कि कारणम्। यदेव हि तानि प्रभुर्यानां पर्यन्त्यिष्ट्येतुः ते प्रभुर्य
अर्थं विनापि प्रभुर्याणि: निद्राः। तत्र कि प्रभुर्य: कृत्यम्।

अथ तु प्रभुर्याध्यपेश्वक्षणं ते प्रभुर्याणि।
व्ययव्य एवं सत्यं ते धृवं प्रभुर्यप्रभुर्यानां॥४५॥

अथापि मन्येनेवस्यथक्षणं प्रभुर्यानघर्तं प्रभुर्यानां सिद्धवत्तीप्रिति मा भूत्यविंक्त्यदेष्टः इति
कृत्यः, एवं ते सत्यं व्ययः: प्रभुर्यप्रभुर्यानां भवति। प्रभुर्यानां ते प्रभुर्याणिः भवति
प्रभुर्यः: साधितवाद्। प्रभुर्याणि च प्रभुर्यानां सिद्धवति प्रभुर्यानां साधितवाद्।

अथ ते प्रभुर्याध्यपेश्वः प्रभुर्यसिद्धि: प्रभुर्याध्यपेश्वः च॥
भवति प्रभुर्याध्यपेश्वक्षणं प्रभुर्याणि ते सिद्धि॥४६॥
बच मन्यजी प्रमाणादि प्रमेयसिद्धमभवति प्रमाणपोषणवत् प्रमेयसिद्धवचि प्रमाणसिद्धभवति प्रमेयपोषणवति, एवं ते सत्यभमस्यापि सिद्धिन्यं भवति। कि कारयम्।

सिद्धांतिण् हि प्रमाणवेशदिप्रमेयाणि तानि तैरेव॥
साध्यानि च प्रमेयपैस्तानिन्यं साधारणिणि ॥४६॥

यदि हि प्रमाणः प्रमेयाणि सिद्धांतिणं तानि च प्रमाणानि तैरेव प्रवेदः साधारणिणि नन्वसिद्धेषु प्रमेयेषु कारणस्याणिध्वादिस्त्वानि कथं साधारणिणि प्रमेयाणि।

सिद्धांतिण् च प्रमेयाणवेशदिप्रमेयाणि तानि तैरेव॥
साध्यानि च प्रमाणपैस्तानिन्यं कथं साधारणिणि ॥४७॥

यदि च प्रमेयः प्रमाणानि सिद्धांतिणं तानि च प्रमेयाणि तैरेव प्रमाणः साधारणिणि नन्वसिद्धेषु प्रमाणानि कारणस्याणिध्वादिस्त्वानि कथं साधारणिणि प्रमाणानि।

पिता यथूपाधि: पुत्रो यदि तेन वै व पुत्रेष।॥
उत्पाधि: स यदि पिताद्व वद तत्रादिपर्यत्मं कः कमू।॥४८॥

यथापि नाम करिचन्द्र बूझायिनशः पुत्र उत्पाधनीयः सच पिता तेके पुत्रेऽपाधनीय इदं, तनेदानी बृहत्तै किन क उत्पाधित्वं इदं। तवेष्व वर्षु महान्तु ब्रवीति प्रमाणः प्रमेयाणि साधारणिणि तानवेष च पुत्रः प्रमाणानि तैरेव प्रमेयपैसिद्धि, तत्तवेणी ते काले: कतमानि साधारणिणि।

कथं पिताद्व खयस्तत्व्य च वृहत्तै तासुभावविच।
पितापुत्रादिकारं यत्र भवति नोजसंदेहः।॥५०॥

तयोएव पूववपैविद्वयो: पितापुत्रयो: कतर: पुत्र: कतर: पिता। उभावपि लाबुद्धा
दक्ष्यस्य पितुलक्षणायापुत्राविद्वाच पुत्रलक्षणधरी। अव न: संदेहो भवति कतरस्य-नापिता कतर: पुत्र इदं। एवमेव यथेतानि भवत: प्रमाणप्रमेयाणि तथा कतराणि

२ -पितृ 'यु'
नव वत: प्रसिद्धं परस्परं: परमाणूं।

न स्वतः न क प्रमेयं चायकस्मातु प्रमाणानाम्।

न स्वतः प्रसिद्धः प्रत्यक्षं तेनेत्र प्रत्यक्षेण, अनुमानं तेनैवानुमानेन, उपमानं तेनैवोपपमानेन, आगमं तेनैवागमेन । नापि परस्परं: प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपपमानागमः

अनुमानं प्रत्यक्षोपपमानागमः, उपमानं प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमः, आगमं प्रत्यक्षानु-

मानोपमानेन: नापि प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपपमानोपपमानागमाः प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपपमानोपपमानाय:।

नापि प्रमेयं: समस्त्ववस्तप: स्वविश्वपरविश्वसंगृहीतः। नापि प्रकर्तवा । नापि समुच्चयनेन्द्रेण कारणानां पूर्वविहितानां विश्वाशिचतवाच्चरितवशृष्टिविशिष्टः।

तत्र यदुकं प्रमाणार्थविध्वंशः प्रमेयाः भवानां सचि च ते प्रमेया भवास्ताति च प्रमाणानि यैस्ते प्रमाणः: प्रमेयार्थाः समधिगता इति तत्र । यतुपन्नवतोक्तम्।

कुशलाः धर्माः धर्मविवाहितः सत्यायनः।

कुशलं जना: स्वभावं श्रोपेयं चिन्यः।

इति

अत्र वृमः।

कुशलाः धर्माः धर्मविवाहितः।

कुशलं स्वभावमेवं प्रविभागानाभिः स्वातु।

कुशलाः धर्माः धर्मविवाहिताः।

स च सन्त्वा प्रविभागेन नोपदेश्यतः स्वातु।

अर्थं स कुशलं स्वभावं: 

इमे ते कुशला धर्माः।

इति तत्कुलां विचाराम्।

अर्थं स कुशलविचारान्स्मावः ।

एवं सत्त्वाम्।

न च तेतदेव दृष्टम्।

तस्मादबुधतं यथास्मापुर्वदर्शः: स्वभावो धर्मादिति तत्र।

किमचाथूर्तः।

यदि च प्रतीत्य कुशलं स्वभावं उत्पत्तिः स कुशलानामः।

धर्माः परमाणं: स्वभावं च एवं कथं सहति।
यदि च कुशलानां धर्मणां स्वभावो हेतुप्रत्ययसार्थां प्रश्नितोपचते स परभावादु-लप्यः: कुशलानां धर्मणां कथ च स्वभावो भवति । एवमेवायुक्तेऽप्रमूर्तीनाम् । तत्र यथूस्त कुशलानाम् धर्मणां कुशल: स्वभावोपपुरुषिणः । एवमुक्तान्तीत्वा चाकुशलादिवरित्ति तत्र ।

किंचिद् न्यायं ॥

अथ न प्रतीत्य किंचिद् स्वभाव उत्पचते स कुशलानाम् ॥

धर्मणामेवं स्पाहासो न ब्रह्मचर्यस्य ॥१४॥

अथ मन्यसे न किंचिद् प्रतीत्य कुशलानां धर्मणां कुशल: स्वभाव उत्पचते, एवम-कुशलानां धर्मणामुक्तान: अव्याहृतानामव्याहृत इति, एवम् सत्यव्रह्माचर्यवातो भवति । किं कारणम् । प्रतीत्यतमुलपादस्य होर्व सति प्रत्याब्ध्यान्त भवति । प्रतीत्य-समुलपादस्य प्रत्याब्ध्यानातु प्रतीत्यतमुलपाददर्शनप्रत्याब्ध्यानं भवति । न ह्यानविश्वामनस्य प्रतीत्यतमुलपादस्य दर्शनमुपपधचणां भवति । असति प्रतीत्यसमुलपाददर्शने धर्मदशंस न भवति । उक्तं हि भगवतव यो हि भीक्षवं: प्रतीत्यसमुलपां पश्यति स धर्मं पश्यतीति ।

धर्मदशंसनामावादु ब्रह्मचर्यवाताभावं ॥

अथवा प्रतीत्यतमुलपादप्रत्याब्ध्यानातु दुःशमुदयप्रत्याब्ध्यानं भवति । प्रतीत्यसमु-लप्यायी हि दुःशमुदय समुप्रयः । दुःशमुदयप्रत्याब्ध्यानातु दुःशमुदयप्रत्याब्ध्यानं भवति । 

असति हि समुदये तत्कुटो दुःशमुदयप्रयः । दुःशमुदयप्रत्याब्ध्यानातु समुदयप्रत्याब्ध्यानान्त: दुःशमुदयप्रत्याब्ध्यानं भवति । असति हि दुःशमुदये कस्य प्रहादानिरिदीथो मभिविभति । (दुःशमुदयप्रत्याब्ध्यानान्त: प्रत्याब्ध्यानं भवति) । असति हि दुःश-मुदयनिरीक्षो कस्य प्रहादानि मानि भविभति हुःशनिरीक्षणानि । एवं चुरुणायं तत्वानात्म-भावः । तेषामभावाच्छादिमण्यफलाभावः । सत्यव्रह्माच्छादिमण्यफलानि हि समविगम्यनि । श्रामण्यफलानामभावावादु ब्रह्मचर्यवातात् इति ॥

किंचिद् न्यायं ॥

नाथगो हर्मो वा संबंधहरारस्त्र लोकिका न स्तुः ॥

निर्वाचन सत्वभावा: स्थुनित्यत्वादहेतुमत: ॥१५॥
विन्ध्यावतनेि

एवं सति प्रतिलय समुपादं प्रत्याचरकांपथं भवति: को दोष: प्रसजयते। धर्मों न भवति। अथः धर्मों न भवति। संप्यावहााराशि लीकिका न भवनि। किं कारणमु। प्रत्यिवसमुत्वां ह्वेत सर्व्यसतति प्रतिलयसमुत्वादे इत्योभिवियति। अथि च सत्यभायो-प्रतिलयसमुत्वादे इत्योभिवियति। स्याद्। तं किं कारणमु। निश्चेतुका हि भावा नित्या। स एव चार्ध्वचर्यवास: प्रसत्येत। स्वसिद्क्रत्विरोधवच। किं कारणमु। अतिशया हि भगवता सर्वसंस्कारा निरितिष्ठा। ते सत्यभाववित्त्वाविभाव्या हि भवि।

एवम्बुध्वक्षात्वयांवक्षेतु नैय्याणिकायांदिवु च दोष।
तस्मात्स्मयं संस्कृतमसंस्कृतं ते भववेव।॥५६॥

यशोध्व कुशलेषु धर्मेण निदिष्टत: कल्प: स एवाकुशलेषु, स एवायाभक्षेषु, स एव नैय्याणिकम्भृतिषु। तस्माते सर्वसिद्क्रत्विरोधवचं संस्कृततमसंस्कृतं संप्वस्ते। किं कारणमु। हेतु हुस्त्वयावपिध्वित्तिमत्वा न भवनि। उत्पादिस्वत्तिमन्मोहसल्वु संस्कृततलवणाभावात् सर्व संस्कृतमसंस्कृतं संप्वस्ते। तत्र यदुक्तं कुशलादीनां भावानां स्वभावसद्यावाद-भूय्या: सर्वभावा इति तत्त। यत्पुर्वत्तवतोक्तं

यदि च न भैरववभावो धर्माणां नि:स्यभाव इत्येव।
नामापि भैरववर्थ नाम हि निर्वचनस्तुकं नासित।॥

अत्र ब्रूमः।

य: सद्यान्तं नामात्र ब्रूयासत्त्वभाव इत्येव।
भवता प्रतिवकात्वो नाम ब्रूमश्च न चयं तत्त।॥५७॥

यो नामात्र सद्यान्तं ब्रूयासत्त्वभाव इति स भवता प्रतिवकात्वय: स्याद्। यस्य सद्यान्तं नाम स्वभावस्य तस्मात्तेनावि स्वभवेन सद्यान्तेन भवित्व्यु। न हुस्त्वयावपिध्वित्तिमत्वे । न पुर्ववत्त्वं नाम सद्यान्तं ब्रूमः। तदपि हि भैरवस्य-भैरवस्यावावात्मा नि:स्यभामः, तस्मात्त्वूढ्युमः, शूर्यविद्यादुभूतमः। तत्र यदुवैषात्तित।
नामसद्यावावातु सद्यान्तं स्वभाव इति तत्त।

किञ्चवायुत्।
नामासविद्यति च यदिदं तालिक कु सतो भवस्वताप्यसत:।।
यदि हि सतो यथसतो द्रिष्टापि तेः हीतेः वाद:।।५५।।

यच्चत्रालमासविद्यति तालिक सतोज्ञाति वा। यदि हि सतस्त्रालम यथसत उभयापि प्रतिष्ठा हीतेः। तत्र यदि तालसतो नामासविद्यति प्रतिष्ठा हीतेः। न हीदानीं तदस्त- दिदानीं सतु। अध्नासातोसविद्यति नाम, अस्वूण्यं नाम न भवित। तस्मात्त प्रतिष्ठा नामः सद्भूतः स्वभाव इति सा हीता।

cऽिज्वान्यात्।

सर्वां भावानां शून्यत्वं चोपपादितं पूर्वम्।
स उपालम्भसत्समात्व भवत्यं चार्यात्मा:।।५६।।

हह चास्माहि: पूर्वेऽव सर्वां भावानां विस्तरतः शून्यत्वमुपादितम्। तत्र
भावानसून्यत्वं परिगृह्या परितृतो वष्टुं यदि भावानां स्वभावो न स्वायस्वभाव इति नामपीतं न स्यायिति तस्माद्वितीयोपालम्भोऽयं भवतः
संपष्टते। न हि वयं नाम सद्भूतमिति बृम्।।

यत्तुर्भवतोत्तम्

अयं विश्वते स्वभावः स च धर्माणं न विश्वते तस्मात्।
धर्मविना स्वभावः यस्य तद्भुतमपेज्जुम्।।इति
अयं बृम्:

अयं विश्वते स्वभावः स च धर्माणं न विश्वते इतीद्यम्।।
आशिफङ्गं यदुतं स्ववन्यावशिष्टं तज्ज्व।।६०।।

न हि वयं धर्माणं स्वभावं प्रतिपेघ्यायमो धर्मविनिमर्युक्तस्य वा कस्यचिदद्वस्य
स्वभावमुप्पन्नामः।। नवेचेव सति य उपालम्भो भवतो यदि धर्मः निःस्वभावः
कस्य बलिविदानीमन्यस्यार्थस्य धर्मविनिमर्युक्तस्य स्वभावो भवित क युक्तमपेज्जुमिति
दूरापक्षेपेत्युवतिः, उपालम्भो न भवित।

यत्तुर्भवतोत्तम्
विश्रामाब्दनी

सत एव प्रतिष्ठेऽध स्वभावस्य सतः स्वभावस्य ते तस्मात्।

इति

अत्र स्रोमः।

सत एव प्रतिष्ठेऽध यदि शून्यतवं नन्तु प्रसिद्धिमिवम्।

प्रतिष्ठेऽधयते ति भवान् भावानां निःस्वभाववत्।।६१।।

यदि सत एव प्रतिष्ठेऽध भवति नासतो भवावेच सर्वभावानां निःस्वभाववत् प्रतिष्ठेऽधयति, नन्तु प्रसिद्ध तत्र सर्वभावानां निःस्वभाववत्। तवद्वयनेन प्रतिष्ठेऽधयसज्जानां निःस्वभाववत् च सर्वभावानां प्रतिष्ठितदत्वात् प्रतिष्ठा शून्यता।

प्रतिष्ठेऽधघयसेषः तव्यतवं तत्व नासति शून्यतवम्।

प्रतिष्ठेऽधम्: सति इति ते नन्तेष बिहीयते वादः।।६२।।

अथ प्रतिष्ठेऽधयसि लं सर्वभावानां निःस्वभाववत् शून्यतवं नासि तत्व शून्यतवम्, या तत्तव्ये प्रतिष्ठा सति: प्रतिष्ठेऽधे भवति नासत इति सा होना।

किंचिदायतः।

प्रतिष्ठेऽधयामि नान्य किंचिदतु प्रतिष्ठेऽधयमिति न च किंचिदतु।।

tस्मात् प्रतिष्ठेऽधयसीत्रत्वाचिलय एषः तवया क्रियते।।६३।।

यथां किंचिदात्प्रतिष्ठेऽधयामि तत्सतादिपि तवया युक्तमेव वक्तुः स्वातः। न चैव यथां
किंचिदतु प्रतिष्ठेऽधयामि, यस्मात् किंचिद्यप्रतिष्ठेऽधयमिति। तस्मात् शून्येपु सर्वभावेयः
श्रव्विचामाने प्रतिष्ठेऽधे प्रतिष्ठेऽधे च प्रतिष्ठेऽधयसीत्रत्वाच्य तवया प्रस्तुतोदतिपिलय: क्रियते इति।

यतुपतनंतरात्तौ।

अथ नासति स स्वभावः किं नु प्रतिष्ठितः तवयानेन।

वचनेनेत् वचनात्मप्रतिष्ठेः सिद्धितः (१) हस्तत इति।।

अत्र स्रोमः।

१ सिद्धितः (JK)
यज्ञवालेः वचनादसतः प्रतिपेधवचनानिसिद्दितिः
अत्र शापयते वामसविति तन्न तस्य न प्रति निरूपितः ।१०५॥

यज्ञ भवानू निश्चिति, क्रृतेद्विप वचनादसतः प्रतिपेधः प्रसिद्धः, तत्र कि निःस्वभावः
स्वभावा इत्येतत्वद्वचनं करोति, अत्र ब्रूमः। निःस्वभावः स्वभावा इत्येतत्तलू
वचनं न निःस्वभावानेव स्वभावानू करोति। किंतु असति स्वभावे भावा निःस्वभावा
ति शापयति। तद्यथा कशिच्चदू भूयादविचारामण्युहे देवसरसा गृहे देवदत्तः इति।
तर्पण कशिचतत्तित्रूपानु नासिति। न तद्यथा देवदत्तस्यायां करोति किंतु शापयति
केवलमसंहं गृहे देवदत्तस्य। तद्वसास्ति स्वभावो भावानामसदीवद्वचनं न भावानां
निःस्वभाववर्तं करोति किंतु स्वभावेषु स्वभावस्यभावं शापयति। तत्र यदूवतोक्तं
किमसति स्वभावे नासिति स्वभाव इत्येति। क्रृतेद्विप वचनातः प्रसिद्धः स्वभा-
वस्याभाव इति तत्र युक्तम्।

अन्यच।

बालानामर्क भिय्या मृगतुष्णायं यथा जलप्राहः।
एवं भिय्याप्राहः स्याते प्रतिपेधतो हस्तसः ।

इत्यादयो या पुनस्चतस्रो गाया लोकोत्तकः अत्र ब्रूमः।

मृगतुष्णादृष्टान्ते या पुनस्चतस्तया महांसचरः।
तत्रापि निर्ष्यं शृणु यथा स दृष्टान्तः उपप्राहः ।१०६॥

य एष लघ्या मृगतुष्णादृष्टान्ते महाःसचर उक्तस्तत्तापि वो निर्ष्यं: स शृणुतं यथोप-
पत्र एष दृष्टान्तो निर्गतिः।

यदि स्वभावतः स्याच्च प्राहो न स्यात्सत्तित्वं संसूतः।
यत्र सत्तित्वं भवति प्राहो ननु शृणुतत्सैव ।१०६॥

यदि मृगतुष्णायं स यथा जलप्राहः: स्वभावत: स्याच्च स्यात्सत्तित्वसमुपत्तः: यतो
मृगतुष्णान्यं सत्तित्व वपरीतत्त्वं दवस्य प्रतीत्यावषोपायोनिमोनस्तायतः सत्तित्व यस्य
दृष्टान्तः: प्रतीत्यसमुपप्रावः। यतस्च सत्तित्वसमुपप्रावः स्वभावतः शृणु एव।
यथा पूर्वम्युक्तं तथा।
फलवचायत्।

यदिच स्वभावः स्याद प्राहः कर्तं निवर्त्येद्य प्राहम्।
शेषेवत्येष बिस्तस्मादेवोजुपालम्।।१६७।।

यदि मृगतृण्यायां जलप्राहः स्वभावः स्यात् क एव तं विनवर्त्येत्। न हि स्वभावः
शक्यो विनवर्त्येतु यथानेन्द्रत्वमपारं द्रव्यमाकायस्य निरावरणत्वम्। वृस्तं चायस्य
विनवर्तनम्। तस्माच्छुद्वस्मभावो प्राहः। यथा चैत्तेवम् शेषेवर्ष घरम्बेव जूमः
प्रत्यवगत्त्वयो प्राप्तहम्बृतितु पञ्चसु। तत्र यत्रज्ञवक्तं द्वक्मभावाद्यून्यः सर्वभावा
इति तथा।

यतुन्मभावतोक्तं

हेतोस्य ते न सिद्धिन्ते स्वभावायुक्तो हि ते हेतु:।
निन्धूनक्य सिद्धिन्ते चोपप्रभाय पर्वस्येति।
अत्र ब्रूमः।

एतेन हेतुभावः प्रत्युक्तः पूर्वभेद स समत्वात्।
मृगतृणणादृष्टात्मवाकृतिनिहो य उकतः: प्राकः।।१६५।।

एतेन चेदानीं चर्चन प्रौद्योगिन हेतुभावोपिप्रत्युक्तोवगन्त्वभ:। य एव हि चर्च।
पूर्वस्त्वम्ब हेतावुक्तः पद्मप्रतितिवेधस्य स एवेहापि चर्चयितवः।
यतुन्मभावतोक्तं

पूर्वेष चेत्तितिवेधः पश्चात्तितिवेधमित्यपन्नपत्रम्।
पश्चात्तितिवेधानुपपत्रों युगपच्च यतः: स्वभावः समू।।२॥ इति
अत्र ब्रूमः।

यस्तैकालेऽहेतु: प्रत्युक्तः पूर्वभेद स समत्वात्।
शैकालप्रतिहेतुश्च शून्यतावादिनां प्रापतः।।१६८।।

य एव हेतुशैकाले प्रतितिबद्धाची स उक्तीतरः प्रत्यवगन्त्वभ:। कस्मात्। साय्य-
समत्वात्। तथा हि तद्वचनेन प्रतितिवेधसैकालेनुपपत्रप्रतितिवेधवत्स प्रतितिवेद्योपिप।
स्वयं क्षेत्रकन्यायः प्रतिबंधतीत्वमेववास्तवः \n
मन्यन्ते प्रतिपधः प्रतिकृतिः इति तत्त्वः \n
यस्य ब्रह्माण्यादिवि संदर्भः यथाया च \n
शुचिन्वन्तिवाच \n
अतिये सक्षेत्रदुष्कोट्याः \n
प्रतिपध्यायमि नाहुं किंतुत्वमन्यते च किंतुत्वः \n
तस्मातप्रतिपध्योपस्यितः एव तथा किंतुते \n
िती प्रतिभुक्तम् \n
अथ मन्यन्ते निश्चय जालेणु प्रतिपद्धः सिद्धः\n
स्रुवं युगपकालीनोपि \n
हेतुः उत्तरकालीनोपि \n
युगपकालीनोपि हेतुः \n
तत्र युगपकालीः हेतुरूपः पिता \n
पुनः स्वतः पश्चात्कालीनो यथा शिष्य आचार्यस्य \n
युगपकालीनो यथा प्रदीपः प्रकाशस्य स्वेत्येन ब्रुः \n
न चैतन्यम् \n
उत्का हृदस्वामिन् क्रोणा त्रयः \n
अथ च यथेवः \n
प्रतिपधपद्धतात्वः युगपकालीनो च \n
स्वाभाविन्द्रीत्योपि सिद्धः प्रभवति \n
च शूचित्वेऽयं यस्य प्रभवति तत्त्व सर्वाधिक \n
प्रभवति \n
तत्त्वात च किंतुत्वम् \n
थस्य प्रभवति तत्त्व सर्वाधिक \n
स्वयं लोकिकलोकोत्तरः \n
प्रभवति \n
कि कारणम् \n
थस्य हि शूचित्वा प्रभवति तत्त्व प्रतीयमात्र समुपदः \n
प्रभवति \n
थस्य प्रतीयमसः \n
प्रभवति तत्त्व चत्वारिः प्रतिपध्यात्मानः \n
प्रभवति \n
थस्य चत्वारिः \n
प्रभवति तस्य \n
श्रीमण्यानान्तः \n
प्रभवति \n
थस्य विविशेषाविन्द्रियमात्राः \n
प्रभवति \n
थस्य विविशेषाविन्द्रियमात्राः \n
प्रभवति
विग्रह्यावर्तनी

विशा किन्नरच्छक्रं बचनेनोपदेश्तुमिति।
भवति चाचर्।

यः शून्यतां प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं मध्यमां प्रतिपदं च।
एकार्यं निजगाद प्रणमामि तमप्रतिमबुद्धम।।

इति कृतिरियमाचार्यनायार्जुनपादानाम्।
PART II
Sanskrit Text in Roman Script

Edited by
E. H. JOHNSTON
and
ARNOLD KUNST
The
VIGRAHAVYĀVARTANĪ of NĀGĀRJUNA
with the Author's Commentary
Edited by
E. H. JOHNSTON
AND
ARNOLD KUNST

PREFACE

The present work, which is the result of a joint effort of Professor E. H. Johnston and myself, was just completed before the former's sudden and premature death at Oxford, England, in 1942. Almost immediately after Professor Johnston's death the paper was submitted to the Royal Asiatic Society, which accepted it for publication, but owing to technical and financial difficulties that arose in connection with the war and its aftermath, the manuscript lay for a number of years in the safe of the Society, which was not in a position to effect the publication. Owing to these circumstances the RAS agreed to the withdrawal of the paper; it has now found a hospitable reception by the "Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques", to which the writer
feels greatly indebted on behalf of the deceased and on his own behalf. It is hoped that in spite of the inevitable delay this modest contribution will still serve its purpose as an addition to the treasury of important texts.

When Professor Johnston suggested to me some years ago the joint restoration of Nāgārjuna’s treatise I grasped the opportunity of rendering useful and palatable an important Buddhist text whose defects in the only available Sanskrit version edited by R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana had worried me since I first came to read it. In the course of our collaboration we used to meet two or three times a week for discussion, and after nearly two years’ work the common task took shape in what is presented to the Sanskrit student as the possibly nearest approximation, as we both believed it, of Nāgārjuna’s original text.

Professor Johnston’s tragic death rendered impossible the joint utilization of a number of remaining sheets with his and my scribbled comments. The arrangement of the text, the introduction and the critical apparatus are the result of joint work. A few dubious points, however, had been tentatively left unsolved in the otherwise final draft with the intention to discuss and possibly insert or substitute them at some later stage. This never materialized and there was never an opportunity of discussing them together. With the purpose of presenting the text as it was left off at Johnston’s death it has remained unaltered except for some minor modifications and corrections of errors. It has been also found more practical to publish the text in Roman characters rather than in Devanāgarī, in which it was originally written.

The following list, which has been prepared later, suggests therefore in addition a few supplementary adjustments and alterations which, in my opinion, render the text final, and may serve as variants to the notes originally attached to the text. The reader will make his own choice as to the preferable version.

Text p. 11, 16-17, note 13: It may be better to maintain partly the text as conveyed in R and to read śūnyeṣu sarvabhāveṣu tvad-vacanamaśūnyam, yenāśūnyatvāt sarvabhāvaṣvabhāvaḥ prasiddhaḥ.
This reading seems to be the simplest and it fulfills the test of fitting into the actual discussion: “If you maintain that, whereas all bhāvas are void, your words are not void, then by means of non-void words you prove the svabhāva of all bhāvas.” The proof arises from the exclusion of words (of which the sarvabhāvas are predicable) from the sarvabhāvas which thus stop being sarvabhāvas. I also suggest a slightly different interpretation of the meaning in the phrase on p. 12, 5, note 3: If the pratiṣedha is valid, then the words expressing this pratiṣedah are void, and so any statement uttered by means of void words is consequently not valid.

As for kārikā 21 the cāsura between the first and second quarter falls in the middle of the word, i.e. before the locative ending of sāmagrī. A similar phenomenon occurs in kārikā 25 where the cāsura between the third and fourth quarter falls before the genitive ending of śabda.

On p. 27, 3, note 1 for preference read with R śūnyena vacanena in spite of T and Y.

In kārikā 35 (note 8) the reading saṃparidhākyatyapi instead of paridhākyatyapi seems to give a satisfactory solution to the difficulty in metre.

P. 36, 11, note 8: Kasy acid is meant to be ambiguous. It probably alludes to the old controversy as to whether para in the parārthānumāṇa refers to the object being proved or to the “other” person for whom it is being proved. Therefore C must have meant it rather “for” than “of” a certain man.

Read kārikā 51 b: parasparato na cānyaiḥ pramāṇair vā. This reading seems to be accounted for also by the commentary; anya fits better in the context than para.

Although the wording as given on p. 45, 10-13, notes 6-9, renders the text more lucid than it is in R, R’s version could be maintained with some slight modifications, namely: tatra yadi tāvat sad, asad iti pratiṣṭhāṇā hiyate / na hidāniṃ tad asad idāniṃ sad / athāsad: asadbhūtasya nāma na bhavati / tasmād...

ARNOLD KUNST
INTRODUCTION

Among the minor works of Nāgārjuna the Vigrahavyāvartanī takes a special place as an admirable illustration of his dialectical methods, as the only extant example of his prose style, and as a lucid exposition of his views on the conceptions of śūnyatā and svabhāva. While sufficient material for the study of the work has been published in recent years, it has not appeared in a form which made understanding of his arguments easy or even certain.

Tibetan translations have proved more than once invaluable help in restoring corrupt Sanskrit texts and thus it is hoped that workers in the field of Buddhist studies and Indian philosophy will find it convenient to have an edition of the Sanskrit text, which is readable and as close to the original as the materials permit; hence this volume, providing what might perhaps be called better a restoration rather than an edition of the treatise.

Of the three available authorities the first is the Sanskrit MS., discovered by Rev. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in the Tibetan monastery of Žalu and edited by him in an appendix to Vol. XXIII, Part III, of the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, referred to henceforward by the letter R. The MS. was written, probably in India, by a Tibetan in the Tibetan character and dates probably to the beginning of the XIIth century. Assuming that it has been correctly transcribed, it is incredibly corrupt, with innumerable mistakes, omissions and interpolations, and the majority of the kārikās offend, often unnecessarily, against the rules of prosody. R corrects some of the minor mistakes (additions in round brackets), and has made additions from the Tibetan version (square brackets in text) or has given alternative readings from the same source in the footnotes; but unfortunately these additions and alternatives often fail to reproduce correctly the information the Tibetan gives us about the state of the text it used, and in general the edition should be regarded as a copy of the MS. with little change. Next there is the Tibetan
translation, for which has been used the version published by Tucci in the Pre-Diûnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, hereafter called $T$; though it is far from being a critical edition and has a number of passages which are corrupt or from which an essential word has dropped out, it has not been possible to go behind it, as it makes use of all the Tibetan editions available in the course of this work. Help has been however derived in doubtful passages from an excellent French translation of it, published by S. Yamaguchi in the Journal Asiatique, tome CCXV, pp. r-86, hereafter called $Y$.

As usual, the Tibetan text appears to be verbatim, but it has one unusual feature in that there exist two separate translations of the kārikās, one of which often fails to give either the text or the sense of the Sanskrit correctly¹; in the majority of cases where the differences occur the version put by Tucci in the footnotes is the more correct. Finally there is the Chinese translation, here denoted by $C$, for which has been used the text printed as No. 1631 in the Taishō Issaikyo edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Vol. XXXII. It is the work of Gautama Prajñāruci and is dated 541 A.D. Much of it follows the Sanskrit closely, far more so than might appear from the translation which Tucci gave of it in the volume quoted above, but occasionally its version is so far removed from the Sanskrit and Tibetan as well as from the logical development of the argument, that it can only be supposed either that the translator had failed to understand the original or that he was unable to express it in Chinese. The translation of the kārikās is in general more defective than that of the commentary.

The textual problems to be solved by this edition are of unusual complexity and no uniform rule can be rigidly applied for their solution. Inevitably $R$ provides the basis for the Sanskrit, and owing to the large amount of repetition there is seldom any difficulty in settling the particular terms used or the equivalents of $T$’s and

¹ For more details cf. ARNOLD KUNST, Kamalaśīla’s Commentary on Śāntarakṣita’s Anumānaparīkṣā of the Tattvaśāṅgraha, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, vol. VIII, pp. 154-155, offprint pp. 48-49.
C's versions. Thus except for minor details the text which T had before him can almost invariably be restored with certainty, but necessarily this is not the case with C, which accordingly is mainly of use for its corroboration of one of the other authorities when they differ. Where possible then, in such instances, the text confirmed by C has been accepted. In a very few cases preference was given to C over the other two, in view of its age; the most important instance is the final clause of kārikā 20, where the opponent states his conclusion. When C is ambiguous or when all three authorities differ among themselves, the judgement on the nature of the argument and of Nāgārjuna's highly individual style had to decide on the reading. In the result it appears that nearly all the kārikās now are presented in the form which the author gave to them, and that too with a minimum of conjecture. The number of kārikās has been reduced to 70, the traditional number for such works because the opponent's verse preceding 34, which has hitherto been treated as a kārikā, is shown by the Sanskrit wording to be a quotation, while the final verse, numbered 72 in R, belongs to the commentary, not to the main work. For the commentary a similar degree of certainty is unattainable; the best has been done so that Nāgārjuna's arguments seem to have been rendered correctly except for a few doubtful passages and two or three minor details, in particular the use of particles such as api and iti and variations between the sources in the longer or shorter statement of argument cannot be decided for good and all. Nevertheless these uncertainties, however trying such minutiae are to the editor, are not such as to impair the value of the text as a statement of Nāgārjuna's views. The apparatus criticus, unavoidably lengthy, has been kept within bounds as much as possible; no mention is made of cases where R has made acceptable minor emendations of the MS. or where the division of the sentences has been altered. Where the text rests on T as against R, the Tibetan text is not quoted as it is easily accessible; and when T differs from the text adopted, generally its reading is quoted only in what is taken to be the form of the Sanskrit text used by the translator. No suggestions of
amendments have been made which would be necessary to put C's
text in order. C has not been quoted in full when it corroborates R
or T against the other, but new translation has been occasionally
given of troublesome passages. For the corrupt list of kuśaia dharmas
in the commentary on verse 7 it was deemed sufficient to give a general
reference to the paper in the Indian Historical Quarterly, XIV,
pp. 314 ff., where the complicated evidence was fully set out and
discussed. Except for these cases, omissions from the apparatus,
which unfortunately could not be entirely avoided, are due to oversight.
In the text use is made occasionally of commas to facilitate its
comprehension.

The scope of this work does not include discussion of the more
general problems raised by the text, but on one or two points a few
words are desirable. In the first place it is a perfect specimen of
contemporary dialectics, illustrating such old descriptions as we have
of philosophical disputations. Every point has to be stated in the
full and every objection has to be taken in its proper order and refuted.
The style accordingly is decidedly archaic in character, devoid of
the allusive references and elliptic statements which often make the
dialectics of a later period hard to read. The Sanskrit, in general,
is good, and the few usages, to which exception might be taken, are
probably due to uncorrected corruptions, for instance the curious
compound avidyamānagṛha in the commentary on verse 64 in the sense
of "not being present in the house", and the phrase tulyam ayam
aprāptaḥ, "like this (fire which dispels darkness) without coming
in contact with it", in the commentary on verse 39. Specifically
Buddhist words and usages are rare, the two most obvious cases
being adhilaya "libel", in verse 63, and pratiśedhyato "(taking
a thing) as capable of being refuted", in verse 13. The rules
governing the āryā metre are found to be strictly observed when the
verses are restored to their correct form, thus proving that this type
of verse must have been well established for some time before the second
century A.D.

While the text is divided in two parts, 20 verses setting out the
opponents’ criticisms of Nāgārjuna’s views and 50 verses giving his reply, the objections are not in fact all made by the same critic. The dharmavasthāvid theorists of verse 7 are clearly Buddhist; though it is difficult to determine their school, the details in the commentary exclude the possibility of their being Sarvāstivādins, to whose theory of the dharmas much of the argument elsewhere would apply. The polemic against the validity of the Naiyāyika pramāṇas in verses 30-51 is more important, because it raises by its parallelism with Nyāyasūtras, II, i, 8-19, the question, whether Adhyāya ii of that composite work was in existence when Nāgārjuna wrote. The parallelism has already been dealt with by Y in his notes, by Tucci on pp. 34 ff. of the notes on his translation, and by R in his Introduction. Without going into details it may be remarked that Vātsyāyana’s bhasya clearly has Nāgārjuna’s position in mind, but it is not obvious that either Nāgārjuna knew the sūtras or vice versa; till the matter is more fully examined all that can safely be said is that the two works reflect the dispute between the two schools at much the same stage, but not necessarily with reference by one to the other. But one point is certain and that is that Nāgārjuna took some of the Naiyāyika arguments from a different work of that school. For he quotes a verse from it just before kārikā 34, and the Naiyāyikas evidently admitted the validity of his criticisms, since the views put forward in that verse are mentioned by Vātsyāyana only to be rejected as incorrect and are stated by Vācaspāti Miśra, Tātparyātikā on II, i, 19, to have been held by an ācāryadesiya. It appears therefore that the verse in question is quoted from some treatise by this discredited teacher, whose name we are never likely to learn. It also seems doubtful if the Naiyāyika principle quoted in the commentary on verse 31, pramāṇato ‘ṛthānāṃ prasiddhīḥ, is in exact accord with the Sūtras; for the opening words of the bhasya on Nyāyasūtras, I, i, 1, appear to have been chosen with great care precisely with the object of evading Nāgārjuna’s criticisms.
ABBREVIATIONS

C Vigrahavyāvartanī, Chinese translation, Chinese Tripitaka, Taisho Issaikyo, XXXII, No. 1631.

MMK Mūlamadhyamikakārikās, ed. La Vallée Poussin, Bibl. Buddh. IV.

R Vigrahavyāvartanī, Sanskrit text, ed. Rāhula Saṅkṛtyāyana, JBORS, XXIV, III.

T Vigrahavyāvartanī, Tibetan translation in G. Tucci, Pre-Dinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, Gaekwad’s Or. Ser., XLIX.


e.c. ex conjectura.

om. omits.
THE VIGRAHAVYĀVARTANI

sarveśāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaścet/
tvad vacanam asvabhāvam na nivartayatum svabhāvamalam

yadi sarveśāṃ bhāvānāṃ hetau pratyayeṣu ca hetupratyayasāmagryāṃ ca prthak ca sarvatra svabhāvo na vidyata iti kṛtvā śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ iti 3 / na hi bihe hetubhūte ‘ṅkuro ‘sti, na prthivyaptejovāyāvādīmekaikasmin pratyayasamjñīte 4, na pratyayeṣu samagreṣu, na hetupratyayasāmagryāṃ, na hetupratyayavinirmuktaḥ prthageva ca 6 / yasmādatra sarvatra 7 svabhāvo nāsti tasmānīḥsvabhāvo ‘ṅkuraḥ / yasmānīḥsvabhāvāvastasmāc-chūṇyāḥ 8 / yathā cāyamaṅkuro nīḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvatvāccha śūnyastathā sarvabhāvā api 10 niḥsvabhāvavatvācchūṇyā iti /

atra vayam brūmaha 11 / yadyevam, tavapi 12 vacanam yadetac-chūṇyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ iti tadapi śūnyam / kim kāraṇam / tadapi hetau nāsti mahābhūtesu samprayukteṣu viprayukteṣu vā, pratyayeṣu nāstyuroḥkaṇṭhauṣṭhajhāvādantamulatālunāsikāmūrdhaprabhṛtisu yatnesu 13, ubhayasāmagryāṃ nāsti 14, hetupratyayavinirmuktaṃ prthageva ca 15 nāsti / yasmādatra sarvatra nāsti tasmānīḥsvabhāv-

1 asvabhāvam, R.
2 R adds yattra.
3 T om. iti.
4 oṣaṃjñīti, R.
5 R adds na hetupratyayeṣu samagreṣu.
6 vā, R.
7 R om. sarvatra, but cf. similar sentence below. T adds ayam.
8 T om. yasānī nīḥsvabhāvas, which C has.
9 T om. ayam.
10 R om. api.
11 T om. this sentence.
12 T om. api.
13 yan naiva, R.
14 R om. na.
15 vā, R.
vam / yasmānāṁsvabhāvāṁ tasmācchūṇyāṁ / tasmādanena sarvabhaḥsvabhāvavāyavartanamaśakyāṁ kartum / na hyasatāgninaśakyāṁ dagdhum / na hyasatā śastreṇa śakyāṁ chettum / na hyasatibhiradbhiḥ śakyāṁ kledayitum / evamasaṭā vacanena śakyāḥ sarvabhaḥsvabhāvapratisedhaḥ kartum / tatra yaduktam sarvabhaḥsvabhāvah pratisiddhaḥ iti tanna /

atha sasvabhāvametadvākyam pūrvaḥ
hatā pratiṣṭhāte
vaiśamikatvam tasmin viśeṣahetuscac vaktavyaḥ // 2 //

athāpi manyase mā bhūdeṣa doṣa iti sasvabhāvametadvākyam sasvabhāvatvāccāśūnyam tasmādanena sarvabhaḥsvabhāvah pratiṣiddha iti, atra brūmaḥ / yadyevam, yā te pūrvaḥ pratiṣṭhā śūnyāḥ sarvabhaḥvāḥ iti hatā sā / kim cānyat / sarvabhaḥvāntargataṁ ca tvadvacanam / kasmācchūṇyeṣu sarvabhaḥvēṣu tvadvacanamaśūnyam, yenāśūnyatvātsarvabhaḥsvabhāvah pratiṣiddhaḥ evam śatkoṭiko vādaḥ prasaktah / sa punah kathamitī / hanta cetpunaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhaḥvāstena

1 niḥsvabhāvatvācchūṇyam, T.
2 T om. svabhāva.
3 R adds kim hāranaṁ, not in C.
4 asadagninā, R.
5 R om. hi.
6 T adds api.
7 R adds the gloss na śakyāḥ sarvabhaḥsvabhāvo nicartayitum.
8 R adds sarvatra bhāvasvabhāvo vinivartate.
9 śrutvā, R; C as in text. Y’s explanation of vaiśamikatva by viśamavyāpti is anachronistic; here it means “discordance”.
10 T has tasmāc for sasvabhāvatvāc.
11 R adds sarvabhaḥsvabhāvo vinivartate.
12 R om. evam yā and pūrvaḥ; C has the latter.
13 The three authorities differ hopelessly in this sentence. The text follows R, adding chūṇyeṣu, which appears in both T and C, and substituting pratisiddhah for its svabhāvaprasiddhah. T has approximately kasmāt? sarvabhaḥvēṣu śūnyeṣu satav evam aṣṭunyatvāt tena sarvabhaḥsvabhāvah pratisiddha iti tvadvacanam asūnyam bhavet. C literally would give yasmāc chūṇyāḥ sarvabhaḥvās tasmāt tvadvacanam śūnyam, tena śūnyatvāt sarvabhaḥsvapratishedho na bhavet.
tvadvacanam śünayam sarvabhāvāntargatattvāt ¹ / tena śünayena pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ / tatra yaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ śünayah sarvabhāvā ² iti so 'nupapannah / upapannaścetpunaḥ śünayah sarvabhāvā iti pratiṣedhastena tvadvacanamapyaśūnyam / aśūnyatvādanena pratiṣedho 'nupapannaḥ ³ / atha śünayah sarvabhāvāstvadvacanam cāśūnyam yena pratiṣedhaḥ, tena tvadvacanam sarvatrāsaṃgrhītam ⁴ / tatra dṛṣṭāntavrodhaḥ / sarvatra cētpunah saṃgrhītam ⁵ tvadvacanam sarvabhāvāśca śünayastena tadapi śūnyam / śūnya-tvādanena nāsti pratiṣedhaḥ / atha śūnyamasti cānena pratiṣedhaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tena śūnyā api sarvabhāvāḥ kāryakriyāsam- arthā bhaveyuḥ / na caitadiśṭam / atha śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā na ca kāryakriyāsamarthā bhāvanti mā bhūd dṛṣṭāntavrodha iti krītvā, śūnyena tvadvacanena sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedho no-papanna iti ⁶ /

kim cānyat / evam tadastitvād?vaisamikatvaprasyāngaḥ kim-cicchūnyaṃ kimcicdaśūnyamiti / tasmiṃśca ⁸ vaisamikatve više-ṣaheturyaktavyo yena ⁹ kimcicchūnyaṃ kimcicdaśūnyam syāt / sa ca nopadiśto hetuḥ / tatra yaduktam śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tanna / kim cānyat /

mā sabdavadyetatsyātte buddhirna ca itadupapannam /

¹ R adds tvadvacanasya.
² śünayah sarvabhāvā, R, which omits so.
³ The three authorities differ for these two sentences. The text follows C, the argument being that, if the pratiṣedha is valid, the words expressing it must be non-void, and since they are non-void and are included in all things, the statement that all things are void is not valid. T reads anupapannas, śūnyam and śūnyatvāt, which does not give as good sense. R as in text, but omitting om apy aśūnyam a⁰.
⁴ T seems to have had sarvāntarasamgrḥitam, which is perhaps better.
⁵ R om. sam.
⁶ T om. iti.
⁷ T has de skad zer na for tadastitvād, the equivalent of which is not clear; C is no help, and it seems necessary to have something to show that the case contemplated is that in which the statement is non-void.
⁸ T apparently had sati ca for tasmiṃśca.
⁹ R adds hi višeṣahetunā.
śabdena hyatraḥ satā bhavisyato vāra-
ñam tasya/ 3//

syātte buddhiḥ, yathā nāma kaścid brūyānma śabdāṁ kāṛśiriti svayameva śabdāṁ kuryāttena ca śabdena tasya śabdasya vyāvarta-
tanāṁ kriyeta evameva sūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti sūnyena vacanena sarvabhāvasvabhāvasya vyāvartanaṁ kriyata iti / atra vayaṁ brūmaḥ / etadapyanupapannam / kim kāraṇam / satā hyatra śabdena bhavisyataḥ śabdasya pratisėdhaḥ kriyate / na punariha bhavataḥ satā vacanena sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratisedhaḥ kriyate / tava hi matena vacanamapyasat, sarvabhāvasvabhāvo ‘pyasan / tasmādayaṁ mā śabdavaditi viśamopanyāṣah 9 /

pratisėdha pratisėdho ‘py evamiti ma-
taṁ bhavetta dasadeva evam tava pratiñā lakṣaṇato dūṣyate
na mama/ 4//

syātte buddhiḥ, pratisėdhapratisedho ‘py anenaiva kalpenānu-
papannāḥ, tatra yadbhavān sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratisedhavacanaṁ pratisėdhayati tad anupapannamiti / atra vayaṁ brūmaḥ / etadapyaśadeva / kasmāt / tava hi pratiñālakṣaṇapraptam na

1 T and R omit hy, which is required by the metre and is given by R when the verse is repeated before kārikā 25.
2 T omits the phrase, but C has it.
3 R repeats mā śabdāṁ kāṛśir and omits svayam eva śabdāṁ kuryāt; T and C as in text.
4 R om. tasya śabdasya.
5 kriyate, R.
6 svabhāvasūnyena, T.
7 T om. kim kāraṇam, certified by C.
8 T om. punar.
9 om ‘nyāṣo ‘sann iti, R, which then adds kim ca, not in T or C.
10 pratisėdhey ‘py, R.
11 pratisėdhaḥ pratisėdhyo ‘py, R.
12 T, which is not clear, apparently read bhavataḥ... vacanapratisedhavacanam, omitting pratisėdhayati.
13 T adds apy.
14 etadosabdena sad eva, R.
15 ‘prōpte mataṁ, R. C, as well as T, omits matam.
mama / bhavān bravīti śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti nāham\(^1\) / pūrvakah pakṣo na mama\(^2\) / tatra yaduktāṃ pratiśedhapratiśedho 'pyevaṃ satyanupapannā iti\(^3\) tanna /
kiṃ cānyat /
pratyakṣeṇa hi tāvadyadyupalabhya vinivartayasi bhāvān /
tannāsti pratyakṣam bhāvā yenopalabhante// 5 //
yadi pratyakṣataḥ sarvabhāvāṇupalabhya bhavānnivartayati śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad\(^4\)anupapannām / kasmāt / pratyakṣamapi hi pramāṇāṃ sarvabhāvāntargatattvačchunyām / yo bhāvāṇ\(^5\)upalabhate so 'pi śūnyaḥ / tasmāt pratyakṣeṇa\(^6\) pramāṇena nopalambhabhāvo 'nupalabdhasya ca pratiśedhānupapattiḥ / tatra yaduktāṃ\(^7\) śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tadanupapannām /
syātte buddhiḥ, anumāṇenāgamenopamāṇena vā sarvabhāvāṇupalabhya\(^8\) sarvabhāvavyāvartanāṃ kriyata iti, atra brūmaḥ /
anumāṇam pratyuktāṃ pratyakṣeṇāga-
mopamāne ca /
anumāṇaṃgamasaḍhyā ye 'ṛtha dṛṣṭānta-
sādhyāśca // 6 //
anumāṇopamāṇaṃgamāśca pratyakṣeṇa pramāṇena pratyuktāḥ yathā\(^9\) hi pratyakṣam pramāṇam śūnyam sarvabhāvānāḥ śūnya-
tvādevamanumāṇopamāṇaṃgamā\(^10\) api śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ śu-

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\(^1\) R adds tasmāt tvatpratijñān napayāmi.
\(^2\) T omits these two sentences, which C has.
\(^3\) pratiśedhaḥ pratiśedhyo 'py evam matam iti upapannam iti, R.
\(^4\) T adds api.
\(^5\) yo 'pi sarvabhāvān, R.
\(^6\) T om. pratyakṣeṇa. This and the previous sentence appear very differently in C, which brings in anumāṇa, apparently confusing it with upalabdhi.
\(^7\) R om. tatra yad uktam.
\(^8\) T om. sarvabhāvān, and adds etat before sarvabhāva\(\text{"}\).
\(^9\) tathā, T.
\(^10\) anumāṇopamāṇaṃgamā, R.
nyatvāt / ye¹ 'numānasādhyā arthā āgamasādhyā upamānasādhyāśca
te 'pi śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvānāṁ śūnyatvāt / anumānopamānāga-
maiśca yo² bhāvānupalabhate so 'pi śūnyāḥ³ / tasmād bhāvānām-
upalambhābhāvo 'nupalabdhānāṁ ca svabhāvapratisedhānupa-
pattih / tatra yaduktaṁ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tanna /
kim cānyat /

kuśalānāṁ dharmānāṁ dharmāvasthāvi-
dasca manyante /
kuśalam janāḥ svabhāvam⁴ seṣeṣv-
apyesa vinīyogāḥ / / 7 //

ihā janā⁵ dharmāvasthāvido manyante kuśalānāṁ dharmā-
ñamekavimāsaśatam⁶ / tadyathaikadeśo vijñānasya vedanāyāḥ
samjñāyāscetanāyāḥ sparśasya manasikārasya cchandasyādhimo-
kāsasya vírasya smṛteḥ samādheḥ prajñāyā upeksāyāḥ prayogasya
samprayogasya prāpteradhyāsavyāsyāpratighasya ratervyasāyas-
syautsyasyonmugdherutsāhasyāvighātatisya vaśītāyāḥ pratighāta-
syāvipratisārasya parigrahasyāparigrahasya ... dhṛteradhyāvasāya-

¹ R adds api.
² R adds api.
³ śūnyāḥ syāt, R; syāt is probably a corruption from tasmāt, missing at the
beginning of the next sentence.
⁴ janavabhā, R, omitting vam.
⁵ R om. janā.
⁶ The following list of 119 qualities has been fully discussed in E. H. Johnston's,
Nāgārjuna's List of Kuśala-dharmas, IHQ, XIV, 314-323. and therefore the full
apparatus criticus which was given there is here omitted. The text of R has many
corruptions and some omissions, and C gives 107 qualities only, so that the list
cannot be restored in its entirety. Probable suggestions cannot be made for the
following numbers, 30 (dran pa, T, possibly a formation from smṛr signifying
remorse), 51 (R and T between them suggest something like ananukūlābhāyava-
hāratā), 70 (vyavakāratā?), 76 (possibly muddha, not considered loc. cit., but see
on 75 below) and 107 (rddhi or an equivalent word). The following restorations
are uncertain in varying degrees, 22 (unnugdhi) a word not otherwise known,
26 (pratighāta), 28 and 29 (parigraha and aparigraha), 34 (anunnugdhi, cf. on 22),
71 (dākṣyā), 75 (possibly upayāsa only, the rest of the word going to 76, for which
see above), 80 (adhyaṭmasaṃprasāda), 102 (manana) and 106 (aranā). The first
81 qualities are in the genitive after ekadeśa, because they are kuśala in certain
aspects only, not in all.
syānautsukyasyānunmugdheranutsāhasya prārthanāyāh pranidher-madasya visayaṇām viprayogasyānairyaṇikatāyā utpādasya sthiten-anityatāyāh samanvāgamasya jarāyāh paritāpasya ratervitarkasya priteḥ prasādasya ... premṇāḥ pratikūlasya pradakṣinagrāhhasya vaisāradyasya gauravasya citrikārasya bhakerabhakteḥ suṣrūṣaiā ādarasyāṇādarasya prāśrabdherhāsasya vāco vispandanāyāh siddhasya prasādasya prāśrabdheḥ ... dākṣasya sauratyasya vipra-tisārasya śokasyopayāśāyāsasya ... apradakṣinagrāhhasya saṃśayasya saṃvarāṇām parisuddheradhyātmasaṃprasādasya bhīrūtāyāh, śraddhāḥ hrītjavamavāncanamupāsado cāpalamapramādo mārdavaṃ pratisamkhyānam nirvairaparidhāvamado 'lobho 'doṣo 'mohaḥ sarvajñatāpratiniḥsargo vibhavo 'patrāpyamaparichada-nām mananaṃ kāruṇyam maitryadinatārāṇā ... anupanāho 'nirṣyā cetaso 'paryādānāṃ ksāntiryavasargo 'sauratyam paribhogāṅvayaḥ puyamasamjaṇīsamāpattirnairyaṇikatāsārvajñatāsāsmitā dharmaḥ ityekonaviṃśasataṃ kuśalānām dharmanāṃ kūsaḷāḥ svabhāvah.

tathākuśalānāṃ dharmanāmākuśalāḥ svabhāvah, nivṛtāvyākrta-nāṃ nivṛtīvyākrtaḥ, prakṛtāvyākrtañāṃ prakṛtāvyākrtaḥ, kāmoṭiṇāṃ kāmoktaḥ, rūpoṭiṇāṃ rūpoktaḥ, ārūpyoktañāṃ ārūpyoktaḥ, anāsrayaṇāmanāsrayaḥ, duḥkhasamudayanirodhamārgoktañāṃ duḥkhasamudayanirodhamārgoktaḥ, bhāvanāprafāta-vyānāṃ bhāvanāpafrāta-vyāyaḥ, aprahāta-vyāṇāmaprafrāta-vyāyaḥ / yasmādevamanekaprakāro dharmaṃsvabhāvo drṣṭastasmādayadutam niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ niḥsvabhāvatvācchūnyā iti tanna / kim cānyat /

1 R om. dharmanāṃ; 9 satasya would be better.
2 R om. dharmanāṃ.
3 R om. nivṛtāvyākyāntāṃ.
4 T adds svabhāvah, which C omits.
5 nivṛtāvyākṛtañāṃ nivṛtāvyākṛtaḥ svabhāvah, T; but C supports R, suggesting however prakṛtā or prakṛta. The category cannot be recognized.
6 R gives these four separately, duḥkhoktañāṃ duḥkhoktaḥ etc., against C and T.
7 C om. aprahāta-vyāṇāṃ aprahāta-vyāyaḥ, and R adds prahāta-vyāṇāṃ prahāta-vyāyaḥ.
8 R adds iha after tasmād.
nairyāṇikasvabhāvo dharmā nairyāṇikāśca ye teṣām/
dharmāvasthoṭanāmevana nairyāṇikādīnam² // 8 //

ihā ca dharmāvasthoṭanām³ nairyāṇikānāṁ dharmānāṁ nairyāṇikaḥ svabhāvaḥ, anairyāṇikānāmanairyāṇikāḥ⁴, bodhyaṅgikānāṁ bodhyaṅgikaḥ, abodhyaṅgikānāmabodhyaṅgikaḥ, bodhipaṅkānāṁ⁵ bodhipaṅkikaḥ, abodhipaṅkānāmabodhipaṅkikaḥ / evam-apī⁶ seṣānāṁ / tadyasmād⁷ evamanekapraṅkāro dharmānāṁ svabhāvo drṣṭastasmaṇḍyadyuktaṁ niḥsvabhāvaḥ sarvabhāvaḥ niḥsvabhāvatvācchūnyā iti tanna /

kim ca nyāt/

yadi ca na bhavetsvabhāvo dharmānāṁ niḥsvabhāva ityeva⁹ /
nāmāpi bhavennaiwam nāma hi¹⁰ nirvastukam nāsti // 9 //

yadi sarvadharmānāṁ svabhāvo na bhavettatāpi niḥsvabhāvo bhavet / tatra niḥsvabhāva ityevam nāmāpi na bhavet / kasmāt / nāma hi nirvastukam kimcidapi nāsti / tasmānāmasadbhāvātsvabhāvo bhāvānāmasti svabhāvasadbhāvāccāsūnyāḥ¹¹ sarvabhāvaḥ / tasmādyaduktam¹² niḥsvabhāvaḥ sarvabhāvaḥ niḥsvabhāvatvācchūnyā iti tanna /

¹ dharmo, R.
² eva ca nair⁵, R; C also shows evam.
³ dharmo 'vastho⁶, R; C omits the entire compound.
⁴ T adds svabhāvaḥ, and C adds the same word after each item.
⁵ R’s bodhipaṅkika is contrary to Buddhist usage.
⁶ R om. api.
⁷ tasmād, T, for tad yasmād.
⁸ yasmād, R.
⁹ ity evam, R.
¹⁰ nāmāpi, R, against the metre; cf. the repetition of the verse before kārikā 57.
¹¹ R omits most of this passage from the beginning of the commentary up to here, probably passing from the first svabhāvo to the second; it runs: yadi dharmānāṁ svabhāvo bhāvānām svabhāvānām sadbhāvāc cāsūnyāḥ. This is restored from T, and C agrees in sense.
¹² tatrā yad uktaṁ, R.
kim cānyat /

atha vidyate svabhāvah sa ca dharmānām na vidyate tasmāt/
dharmairvinā svabhāvah sa yasya1 tadvuktamupadeśtum// ro//

atha manyase mā bhūdavastukaṃ nāmeti kṛtvāsti svabhāvah, sa punardharmānām 2 na saṁbhavati, evaṃ dharmasaṁyata
niḥsvabhāvatvāddharmānāṃ siddhā 3 bhaviṣyati, na ca nirvastukaṃ
nāmeti, atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ / evaṃ yasyedānīṃ 4 sa svabhāvo
dharmavinirmuktyārthasya sa 5 yuktamupadeśṭumarthāḥ / sa ca
nopadiṣṭāḥ / tasmādyā kalpanāsti svabhāvo na sa 6 punardharm-
manāmiti sā hīnā /

kim cānyat /

sata eva pratisedho nāsti ghato geha
ityayam yasmāt/
dṛṣṭāḥ pratisedho ‘yam satāḥ svabhā-
vasyate tasmāt// ir//

iha ca sato ‘ṛthasya pratisedhaḥ kriyate nāsataḥ / tadyathā nāsti
ghato geha iti sato ghaṭasya pratisedhaḥ kriyate nāsataḥ / evameva
nāsti svabhāvo 7 dharmānāmiti satāḥ svabhāvasya pratisedhaḥ
prāpnoti nāsataḥ / tatra yaduktāṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā 8 iti
tanna / pratisedhasaṁbhāvādeva sarvabhāvasvabhāvo ‘pratisid-
dhaḥ 9 /

kim cānyat /

1 yasyāsti, R, against the metre; cf. the repetition of the verse before kārikā 6o.
2 sarvadharmānāṃ, T.
3 niḥsvabhāvavatvām and siddham, R.
4 kasyedānīm, R.
5 tatra, R, for sa.
6 R om. sa.
7 R om. eva.
8 R adds niḥsvabhāvavatvāc chūnyā, not in C or T.
9 svabhāvah prasiddhaḥ, T; C’s equivalent is not clear, but it certainly did not
have prasiddhaḥ.
atha nāsti sa svabhāvaḥ kim nu pratīṣṭhidhyate tvayānena/
vacanenarte vacanatpratīṣedhaḥ sidhyate hyasataḥ // 12 //

atha nāstyeva sa svabhāvo 1 ‘nena vacanena niḥsvabhāvāḥ 2 sarvabhāvā 3 iti kim bhavatā pratīṣidhyate / asato hi 4 vacanādvinā 5 siddhāḥ pratīṣedhaḥ, tadyathāgneh śaityasya, apāmauṣṇyasya / kim cāṇyat /

bālānāmiva mithyā mrgatṛṣṇāyām yathājala grāhāḥ 6 / evaṃ mithyāgrāhaḥ syātte pratīṣedhyato 7 hyasataḥ // 13 //

syātte buddhiḥ, yathā bālānām mrgatṛṣṇāyām mithyā jalamiti grāho bhavati, nanu 8 nirjalā sā mrgatṛṣṇetītatra paṇḍitajātiyena puruṣenocYTE tasya grāhasya 9 vinivartanārtham, evaṃ niḥsvabhāveṣu yaḥ svabhāve grāhāḥ 10 sattvānām tasya vyāvartanārtham niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ityucyata iti 11, atra brūmah /

nanvevaṃ satyaṃ ca tādgrahītaṃ ca / pratīṣedhaḥ pratīṣedhyam pratīṣeddhā ceti śaṅkam tat // 14 //

1 R om. atha and sa and adds iti after svabhāvo.
2 T om. svabhāvāḥ, possibly owing to a misprint.
3 R om. sarva.
4 T has evam for hi.
5 vināpi, T.
6 In view of the commentary on verse 66, yathājala grāhāḥ must be a compound here.
7 pratīṣidhyato, R. Translate according to the common use of -tas, “Thus would be your misconception of the non-existing as something that can be refuted.”
8 T om. nanu.
9 mithyāgrāhasya, R.
10 Should the reading be svabhāvagrāhāḥ?
11 T om. ucyata iti, which is given also by C.
12 tadgrhotam, R.
yadyevaṃ, asti tāvatsattvānāṃ grāhāḥ, asti grāhyam, santi
cā tadgrahitāraḥ, asti pratisedhastasyāpi mithyāgrahasya, asti
pratisedhyanam yadidam mithyāgrāho nāma, santi cā
pratiseddhāro yuṣmadādayo ‘sya grāhasyeti siddhaṃ śaṭkam/tasya
śaṭkasya prasiddhatvādyaudktām śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tanna/

atha naivāsti grāho naiva grāhyam
na ca grahītāraḥ/
pratisedhaḥ pratisedhyāṃ pratiseddhaḥ
nanu na santi//15//

atha mā bhūdeṣa doṣa iti kṛtvā naiva grāho ‘sti naiva grāhyam
na ca grahītāra ityevaṃ sati grāhasya yah pratisedho niḥsvabhāvāḥ
sarvabhāvā iti so ‘pi nāsti, pratisedhyamapi nāsti, pratiseddhāro
‘pi na santi /

pratisedhaḥ pratisedhyāṃ pratiseddhaḥ-
raśca yadyuta na santi/
siddha hi sarvabhāvāsteṣāmeva svabhāvasca//16//

yadi ca na pratisedho na pratisedhyāṃ na pratiseddhaḥraḥ
santyapratisiddhaḥ sarvabhāvā asti ca sarvabhāvānāṃ svabhāvaḥ/kim kannat /

1 R adds nano eva saty.
2 mithyāgrāhaḥ, R; grāho ‘pi, T.
3 santi satinā grahītāraḥ, R.
4 T om. yad and adds api.
5 orāhyam, R.
6 R om. ca.
7 mithyāgrāhasyeti, R.
8 śaṭkasayaḥy aprasiddhatvāt, R, omitting tasya; aprasiddhatvād, T; C shows
9 siddha.
10 na ca, R, against the metre; cf. the commentary.
11 e.c.: sva tu, R, which C and T omit.
12 R om. yah.
13 yesum evam, R.
14 T om. sarva, which C has.
hetosca te\(^1\) na siddhirnai\(h\)svābhāvyāt\(^2\) kuto hi te hetuḥ/ nirhetukasya siddhirna copapannāsyat te 'rthasya // 17 //

niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ityetasminnarthete te hetorasiddhiḥ / kim kāraṇam / niḥsvabhāvatvādhi sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāttato\(^3\) hetuḥ kutaḥ / asati hetau nirhetukasyārthasya śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti kuta eva prasiddhiḥ / tatra yaduktam śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tanna / kim cānyat /

yadi cāhetoḥ siddhiḥ svabhāvavinvitar- tanasya te bhavati/ svābhāvyasyāstītvam mamāpi nirhetuk- kam siddham // 18 //

atha manyase nirhetuki\(^4\) siddhirniḥsvabhāvatvasya bhāvānāmiti yathā tava svabhāvavinvartanam\(^5\) nirhetukam siddham tathā mamāpi svabhāvasadbhāvo\(^6\) nirhetukaḥ siddhah\(^7\) /

atha hetorastītvam bhāvāśvābhāvyam\(^8\) ityanupapannam/ lokesu niḥsvabhāvo\(^9\) na hi kaścana vidyate bhāvah // 19 //

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\(^1\) hetos tato, R; cf. the repetition of the verse before kārikā 68.
\(^2\) naiḥsvabhāvyā is an odd form; the length of the second syllable is guaranteed by the metre. In the four occurrences in MMK, the text has naiḥsvabhāvyā twice, and naiḥsvabhāvyā twice, but none of them occur in a verse.
\(^3\) śūnyatvān na tato, R, which omits kutaḥ, but C as well as T has kutaḥ.
\(^4\) nairhetuki, R; T adds tatra.
\(^5\) R om. vi, but cf. the kārikā.
\(^6\) R adds 'pi.
\(^7\) T adds a gloss, mamāpi mamāsti.
\(^8\) bhāvanaiḥsvabhāvyam, R, against the metre.
\(^9\) lokesu naiḥsvabhāvyāt, R, but T and the commentary show niḥsvabhāvo; lokesu is uncertain, as T does not show the plural, and perhaps therefore lokesu 'pi.
yadi hetorastitvam manyase\(^1\) niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti, tadanupapannam / kim kāraṇam / na hi loke niḥsvabhāvāḥ kaścid-

hāvo 'sti /

kim cānyat /

pūrvaṃ cetuṣṭetiḥ pascaffapannam\(^2\) /
pascācānapannas yugapaccya yataḥ 

svabhāvāḥ san\(^4\) // 20 //

inha pūrvaṃ cetpratiṣedhah paścācca pratiṣedhyamiti\(^5\) nopapannam / asati hi pratiṣedhye kasya pratiṣedhah / atha paścāt-

pratiṣedhah pūrvaṃ pratiṣedhyamiti ca\(^6\) nopapannam / siddhe hi pratiṣedhye kim pratiṣedhah karoti / atha yugapatpratiṣedha-

pratiṣedhyā iti\(^7\) tathāpi na pratiṣedhāḥ pratiṣedhyasyārthasya kāraṇam\(^8\), pratiṣedhyo na pratiṣedhasya ca, yathā yugapadut-

pannayoḥ saśaviśaṁyornaiva\(^9\) daksīṇām savvyasya kāraṇaṁ savvyam 

cakṣiṇasya kāraṇaṁ bhavati\(^10\) / tatra yaduktam niḥsvabhāvāḥ 
sarvabhāvā iti tanna /

\(^1\) This sentence may not be in order; it would improve it to put manyase before hetor and add ca after niḥsvabhāvāḥ. R inserts iha at the beginning, and C seems to have had niḥsvabhāvāsa before hetor. T is ambiguous, but probably had bhāvānāṁ niḥsvabhāvānāṁ eva (or possibly in the locative) before hetor and also eva after asitavam. The argument is that “if you suppose that the cause exists in reality and that all things (which include the cause) are without essence (so that the cause is at the same time really existent and without essence), that argument is not valid.”

\(^2\) iti ca nopapannam, R, against the metre and the reading in the repetition before kārikā 69.

\(^3\) R om. ccā, but see the repetition.

\(^4\) svabhāvo `san, R and T; but C’s reading followed above is unquestionably correct as giving the opponent’s final conclusion. Yataḥ here means “and therefore”, a common use at the close of a verse.

\(^5\) R adds niḥsvabhāvyam and T niḥsvabhāvam before iti, an obvious interpolation which C omits.

\(^6\) T om. ca.

\(^7\) T om. iti.

\(^8\) R adds prati na.

\(^9\) C omits sāsa, possibly rightly, as the argument applies equally well to real horns.

\(^10\) T om. iti.
atrocyate / yattavadbhavatoktam
sarveṣāṁ bhāvāṁ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaścet /
tvadvacanamasvabhāvam na nivartayitum svabhāvamalamiti //
atra brumāḥ /
hetupratyayasāmagryāṁ ca prthak cāpi1
madvaco na yadi/
nanu śūnyatvam siddham bhāvānām-
asvabhāvatvāt // 21 //
yadi madvaco hetau nāsti mahābhūteṣu2 samprayukteṣu viprayukteṣu vā3, pratyayeṣu nāstyurāḥ kaṇṭhaūṣṭhajihvādantamūlatālu4-
nāsikāmūrdhaprabhṛtiṣu yatneṣu, nobhayasāmagryāmasti5, hetu-
pratyayasāmagravinirmuktam prthageva ca nāsti6, tasmāniḥsva-
bhāvam7, niḥsvabhāvatvācchūṇyam / nanu8 śūnyatvam siddham
niḥsvabhāvatvādasya madiyavacasaḥ / yathā caitanmadvacanam
niḥsvabhāvatvācchūṇyam tathā sarvabhāvā api9 niḥsvabhāva-
tvācchūṇyā10 iti / tatra11 yadbhavatoktam tvadiyavacasaḥ śūnya-
tvācchūṇyatā sarvabhāvānāṁ nopapadyata iti tanna /
kim cānyat /

yāśca pratityabhāvo bhāvānāṁ śūnyateti
sā prakta12 /
yāśca13 pratityabhāvo bhavati hi tasy-
āsvabhāvatvam // 22 //

1 R omits the first ca, then reads prthagbhāve 'pi against the metre.
2 he nāsti mātoḥbhūteṣu, R.
3 vāpi, T.
4 kaṇṭhojihvādantatālu, R.
5 R om. yatneṣu nobhayasā.
6 prthag vāsti, R.
7 obhāvā, R.
8 R adds evam before nanu.
9 R om. api.
10 chūṇyam, R.
11 R om. tatra.
12 R om. bhāvo and sā prakta; the restoration of the last word (brjod, T) is not certain.
13 R om. yāśca.
śūnyatārthaṃ ca bhāvān ¹ bhāvānāmanavasāya pravṛttā upālambham vaktuṃ tvādvacanasya niḥsvabhāvatvād bhāvānāṃ ² svabhāvapratīṣedho nopapadyata iti / iha hi yaḥ pratītyabhāvo bhāvānāṃ ³ sā śūnyatā / kasmāt / niḥsvabhāvatvāt / ye hi pratītyasamutpannā bhāvās te na sasvabhāvā bhavanti svabhāvābhāvāt / kasmāt ⁴ / hetupratīyasāpekṣatvāt ⁵ / yadi hi svabhāvato bhāvā bhaveyuh, pratīkhyāyāpi hetupratīyayaṃ ca ⁶ bhaveyuh / na caivaṃ bhavanti / tasmānniḥsvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvēcchūnāy ītyabhidhiyante / evaṃ madīyamapi vacanaṃ pratītyasamutpannatiṃ niḥsvabhāvāṃ ⁷ niḥsvabhāvatvēcchunāmyamityupapannam / yathā ca pratītyasamutpannattvāt svabhāvāsūnyā api ⁸ rathapatāghatādayāḥ svesū svesū kāreyuṃ kāṣṭhatrāṃṛttikāharaṇe madhūdakapayasāṃ dhāraṇe śītavātātaparāprabhṛtiṣu varante ⁹, evamidāṃ ¹⁰ madīyavacanam pratītyasamutpannattvān ¹¹ niḥsvabhāvamapi ¹² niḥsvabhāvatvaprasādhane bhāvānāṃ ¹³ vartate / tatra yaduktāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvāt tvādīyavacanasya śūnyatvāṃ, śūnyatvāttasya ca tena ¹⁴ sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratīṣedho nopapanna iti tanna /

¹ bhāvān, R.
² The text is uncertain; it seems correct to follow T as reproducing the wording of kārikā 1. R reads tvādvacanasya śūnyatvāt tvaḍvacanasya niḥsvabhāvatvād evam tvādvacanaṇa niḥsvabhāvena bhāvānām. C suggests an original tvādvacanam śūṇyam niḥsvabhāvatvāt, tena niḥsvabhāvena bhāvānām, which finds some confirmation in the last sentence of the commentary on this verse.
³ R reads pratītya bhāvānāṃ bhāvah.
⁴ tasmāt, R; C om. kasmāt.
⁵ ⁰pratyayaṃkṣa, R.
⁶ Should ca be omitted?
⁷ ⁰samutpannam tasmān niḥsvabhāvaṃ, T.
⁸ R om. api.
⁹ For the restoration of this sentence it is advisable to follow C, which gives the text, except that it appears to read ⁰prabhṛtiṣiparitarāṇe. T om. ratha, kāṣṭhatrāṃṛttikā and prabhṛtiṣu. R has kāṣṭhāhanāṃṛttikāharaṇaṃ ... dhāraṇam. Better perhaps rathagrahamapaṭādayāḥ, as suggested by T and the order of the following locatives.
¹⁰ T om. idam, substituting probably api.
¹¹ pratyayasamut, R.
¹² ⁰sadhanaṃ pratyayabhāvānāṃ, R.
¹³ T om. śūnyatvam śūnyatvāt tasya ca tena, but C apparently had the text also.
kim cañyat/

nirmitako nirmitakam māyā puruṣah svamāyā sṛṣṭam/
pratisedhayeta1 yadvat pratisedho 'yam
tathaiva syāt /// 23 ///

yathā nirmitakaḥ puruṣo 'nyaṁ nirmitakam puruṣam kas-
mimiścicidarthvam vartamāṇam2 pratisedhayet, māyākāreṇa vā sṛṣṭo
māyāpuruṣo 'nyaṁ māyāpuruṣam svamāyā sṛṣṭam3 kasmimiścid-
arthvam vartamāṇam pratisedhayet, tatra yo nirmitakaḥ puruṣaḥ
pratisidhyate so 'pi4 śunyāḥ / yaḥ pratisedhayati so 'pi śunyāḥ5 /
yo māyāpuruṣaḥ pratisidhyate so 'pi śunyāḥ / yaḥ pratisedhayati
so 'pi6 śunyāḥ / evameva madvacanena śunyenaśi sarvabhāva-
nāṁ svabhāvapratisedha upapannaḥ / tatra yadbhavatoktaṁ8
śunyatvāttvadvacanasya sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratisedho nopaṇa
itī tanna / tatra yo bhavatā9 satkōti vāda uktaḥ so 'pi tenaiva10
pratisiddhaḥ / naiva hīvam sati na sarvabhāvāntargatam madva-
canam, nāstyaśūnyan11, nāpi sarvabhāva asūnyāḥ12 /

yatunābhavatoktaṁ

atha sasvabhāvametadvākyam pūrvā hatā pratijñā te /
vaśamikatvam tasmin viśeṣahetuśca vaktavya iti //

1 pratisedhayate, R; but grammar and the commentary require the optative.
For the verse cf. MMK, xvii, 31, 32.
2 So T, adding the necessary anyam from C. R has yathā nirmitakaḥ puruṣam
abhāsataṁ tu kaiṣcid arthena vartamāṇam.
3 T omits svamāyāḥ sṛṣṭam, which should be quoted here from the verse; it is
probably the phrase underlying R's reading, māyāpuruṣa saṁanyāva taṁ na. C
omits the phrase both in the verse and here.
4 R om. api.
5 R om. śūnyāḥ / yo.
6 R om. pratisidhyate so 'pi śūnyāḥ / yaḥ pratisedhayati so 'pi.
7 R om. api.
8 T om. bhavatā.
9 R om. tatra yo bhavatā.
10 sa evam, R.
11 nāsti śūnyāṁ, R.
12 śūnyāḥ, R.
atrapi brūmah /
na svābhāvikam etadvākyam tasmānna
vādahānirme/
nāsti ca vaiśamikatvam viśeṣahetuṣca
na nigadyaḥ // 24 //

na tāvanmamaitadvacanaṃ ¹ pratītyasamutpannatvāt svabhāvopapannam / yathā pūrvamuktaṃ svabhāvānupapannatvācchūṇyamiti ² / yasmācchedamapi madvacanaṃ śūnyaṃ seṣā api sarvabhāvāḥ ³ śūnyāḥ, tasmānnāsti vaiśamikatvam / yadi hi vayaṃ brūma idaṃ vacanamaśūnyamaṃ seṣāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ śūnyā iti tato vaiśamikatvam syāt ⁴ / na caitadeval / tasmānna vaiśamikatvam / yasmācca vaiśamikatvam sa sambhartidāṃ vacanamaśūnyamaṃ seṣāḥ punah ⁵ sarvabhāvāḥ śūnyā iti, tasmādasmābhirdviśeṣaheturna ⁶ vaktavyo 'nena hetunem ⁷ vacanamaśūnyam sarvabhāvāḥ punah ⁸ śūnyā iti / tatra yadbhavatoktam ⁹ vādahāniste vaiśamikatvam ca viśeṣahetuṣca tvayā vaktavya iti tanna /
yatpurnarbhavatoktam ¹⁰
mā sadbavadityetatsyatte buddhirna caitadupapannam /
sabdena hyatra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇam tasyeti //
atra brūmaḥ /

mā sabdavaditi nāyam dṛṣṭānto yastvayā
samārabdhaḥ /
sabdena¹¹ tacca sabdasya vāraṇam nai-vamevaitat¹² // 25 //

¹ R om. etad; possibly na tāvad etan madvacanam.
² R om. iti.
³ T om. sarva, but has it in the next sentence.
⁴ T adds api.
⁵ T om. punah.
⁶ T om. "viśeṣa".
⁷ R om. hetunā.
⁸ T om. punah.
⁹ T om. bhavātā.
¹⁰ T om. bhavatā.
¹¹ R adds hi against the metre; alternatively read sabdena hi tac chabdasya.
¹² naiva me vacah, R.
nāpyayamasmākaṃ drṣṭāntaḥ / yathā kaścinmā śabdaṃ kārṣīriti
bruvan śabdameva karoti śabdaṃ ca pratiṣedhayati, tādvant tacchū-
nyāṃ vacanaṃ na 1 śūnyatāṃ pratiṣedhayati / kim kāraṇam / atra
hi drṣṭānte śabdena śabdasya vyāwartanam kriyate / na caitadevam /
vayam brūmo niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvavatvācchūnyā
iti 2 / kim kāraṇam /

naiḥsvābhāvyānāṃ cennaiḥsvābhāvyena 3
vāraṇāṃ yadi hi/
naiḥsvābhāvyanivṛtttau svābhāvyam hi
prasiddham syāt // 26 //

yathā mā śabdam kārṣīriti 4 śabdena śabdasya vyāwartanam
kriyate, evam yadi naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena naiḥsvābhāvyānāṃ
bhāvānām 5 vyāwartanam kriyate tato yaṃ drṣṭānta upapannah
syāt / iha tu naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ svabhāva-
pratiṣedhah kriyate / yadi 6 naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ 7
naiḥsvābhāvyapraṇiṣedhah kriyate naiḥsvābhāvyapraṇiṣiddhatvād-
eva 8 bhāvāḥ 9 sasvabhāvā bhaveyuh / sasvabhāvatvādaśūnyāḥ
syuh / śūnyatāṃ ca vayaṃ bhāvānāmācaksmahe nāśūnyatāṃity-
adṛṣṭānta evāyamiti 10 /

athavā naimitakāyāṃ yathā striyāṃ
striyamityasadgrāham 11 /

1 So T, supplying de before itar in Tucci’s text, as Y’s translation shows he had
it; yadhvat śūnyena vacanena, R.
2 tad tad aśūnyam iti, R.
3 Here and several times more in this passages R has naiḥsvābhāvyā.
4 R om. kārṣīr.
5 R om. bhāvānāṃ.
6 R inserts evam before yadi.
7 naiḥsvābhāvānāṃ, R.
8 So T clearly; āpraṇiṣedhād eva, R.
9 R om bhāvāḥ.
10 T omits iti in both occurences here.
11 e.c.: striyam, R; T om. iyam. R misprints asaṅgrāham; similarly in the
commentary.
nirmitakaḥ pratihanyāt 1 kasyacidevaṁ bhave detat // 27 //

athavā yathā 2 kasyacipuruṣasya nirmitakāyāṁ striyāṁ svabhā-
vaśūnyāṁ paramārthataḥ striyamityasadgrāhaḥ 3 syāt, evaṁ 4
tasyāṁ tenāsadgrāheṇa sa 5 rāgamutpādayet / 6 tathāgatena vā
tathāgataśrāvakena 7 vā nirmitako nirmitaḥ syāt / tathāgata-
dhiṣṭhānena vā tathāgataśrāvakādhiṣṭhānena vā 8 sa 9 tasya tama-
sadgrāham vinivartayet / evameva nirmitakopamena śūnyena
madvacanena10 nirmitakastrīśadvēṣu11 sarvabhāveṣu niḥsvabhāveṣu
yo 'yaṁ svabhāvagrāhaḥ sa12 nivartyate / tasmādayatracīśtāntah
śūnyatāprasādhanam pratyupapadyāmāno13 netaraḥ /

athavā sādhyaśamo 'yaṁ heturṇa hi
vidyaṁ dvaneḥ sattā/
svyavahāraṁ ca vayaṁ nānabhupagamya kathayaṁaḥ // 28 //

mā śadbavaditi sādhyaśama evāyaṁ hetuḥ / kasmāt / sarva-
bhāvānāṁ niḥsvabhāvyenāviśiṣṭatvāt14 / na hi tasya dhvaneḥ
pratītyasamutpannataḥ svabhāvasattā vidyate / tasyaḥ15 svabhā-
vastattāyā avidyamānatiṣṭādyaduktaṁ

śabdena hyatra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇāṁ tasyeti tadvāhanyate /

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1 C omits nirmitakaḥ pratihanyāt in translating the verse.
2 R om. yathā.
3 striyam, R.
4 T om. evaṁ.
5 R om. sa.
6 R inserts tad yathā.
7 tacchrāvakena, R, but C supports T.
8 T omits the reference to adhiṣṭhāna, but C has it.
9 R om. sa.
10 R om. mad.
11 ēśāḍṛiyeṣu, R, which omits sarvabhāveṣu.
12 T om. ayam and sa. R adds the gloss, sa pratiṣidhyate.
13 upapadyāmāno is odd, but occurs again at the end of the commentary on the
   next verse.
14 niḥsvabhāvyena, R.
15 T om. tasyaḥ and has evam or tathā instead.
api ca na vayam vyavahârasatyamabhypagamya vyavahârasatyam ¹ prayâkhyaya kathayâmaha śûnyâḥ sarvabhâvâ iti / na hi vyavahârasatyamanâgamyasyâ dharmadesânâ kartum / yathoktam vyavahâramanâśritya paramârtho na desyate / paramârthamanâgamyanyâ nirvânaṁ nâdhigamyata iti ² // tasmânmadvacanavacchûnyâḥ sarvabhâvâḥ sarvabhâvânâṁ ca niśvabhâvatvamubhayathopadypamânamitii / yatpunanbhavatoktam pratisedhapratisedho ³ 'pyevamiti matam bhavet tadasadeva evam tava pratiññâ lakṣâñato dúṣyate na mameti // atra brûmâha /

yadi kâcana pratiññâ syâne tata esa ⁴ me bhaveddusaḥ / nâsti ca mama pratiññâ tasmânnaivâsti me dosaḥ // 29 //

yadi ca kâcinmama pratiññâ syât tato mama pratiññâlakṣâñapräptatvâtpûrvako ⁵ doño yathâ tvayoktasthâ ⁶ mama syât / na mama kâcidasti pratiññâ / tasmât sarvabhâvesu śûnyesvatyanthropaśântesu prakrtiviviktesu kutah pratiññâ ⁷ / kutah pratiññâlakṣânaprâptih ⁸ / kutah pratiññâlakṣânaprâptikrito ⁹ doṣaḥ / tatra yadbhavatoktam ¹⁰ tava ¹¹ pratiññâlakṣânaprâptatvâttavaiva doṣa iti tanna /

¹ T om. vyavahârasatyam, which C has as well as R. R transposes anabhypagamya and prayâkhyaya.
² This verse is MMK, xxiv, 10.
³ pratisedhah pratisedhya, R.
⁴ tatra syât esa, R; the verse is quoted MMK, p. 16, where the editor reads eva against the MSS.
⁵ R inserts sa before pûrvako; T may have read pûrvamãgamo.
⁶ tvayoktaṁ bhâvâḥ tathâ, R. T om. mama.
⁷ R om. kutah pratiññâ.
⁸ T om. prâptih, which is shown by C, and it adds api.
⁹ T seems to have had oâkṣânasambhavaś ca. Would oâkṣte be better?
¹⁰ T om. bhavatâ.
¹¹ R om. tava.
yatpunarbhavatoktam
pratyakṣaṇa hi tāvadyadyupalabhyā vinivartayasi 1 bhāvān /
tannāsti pratyakṣaṃ bhāvā yenopalabhyante //
anumānaṃ pratyuktam pratyakṣeṇāgamopamāne ca /
anumānāgamasādhyā ye 'rthāa drīḍhāntasādhyāśceti //
atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ /

yadi kimcidupalabheyam 2 pravartayeyam
nivartayeyam vā/
pratyakṣādihīrarthaistadabhāvānme 'nu-
pālabhah //30//

yadyaham kimcidarathamupalabheyam 3 pratyakṣānumānāgamopamā-
ṇāgamaṇisacaturbhiḥ 4 pramaṇaiścaturṇāṃ vā pramaṇāṇāmanyatama-
mena 5, ata eva 6 pravartayeyam vā nivartayeyam vā / yathārtham-
evāhaṃ kimcinnopalabhe 7 tasmāna pravartayāmi na nivartayāmi /
tatraivaṃ sati yo bhavatopālabha ukto yadi pratyakṣādīnāṃ
pramaṇāṇāmanyatamenopalabhyā bhāvānvinvivartayasi 8 nanu tāni 9
pramaṇāni na santi taśca pramaṇairapi 10 gamyā arthā na santīti 11
sa me bhavatyevānupālabheḥ /
kim cānyat /

yadi ca pramaṇataste 12 teśāṃ teśāṃ
pravidhīrarthaḥānām /

1 R om vi.
2 upalabheyā would be better here and in the commentary; the verse is quoted
MMK, p. 16.
3 kimcid, R.
4 R om. mānāgaṃaiś ca.
5 anyatamānyatamaṇa, R.
6 evaṃ, R.
7 R's MS. omits nivartayeyam vā / yathā, and then has artham evāhāṃ kimcīn
napalabhate.
8 R adds iti.
9 bhavatoktāṇi, R.
10 T om.: pramaṇair api.
11 R om. na santi.
12 R om. te; T omits one teśāṃ and adds eva, as if reading pramaṇata eva bhavatas
tesāṃ.
teṣāṁ punah prasiddhīṁ bruhi katham te
pramāṇānām /// 31 ///

yadi ca pramāṇatasteṣāṁ teṣāmarthānāṁ prameyānāṁ prasiddhīṁ
manyase yathā mānairnayānāṁ, teṣāmidānīṁ, pratya-
kṣānumānopamāṇaganāṁ caturṇāṁ pramāṇānāṁ kutāḥ prasidd-
dhiḥ / yadi tavannispramāṇānāṁ pramāṇānāṁ syātprasiddhiḥ,
pramāṇato ‘ṛthānāṁ prasiddhiriti hiyate pratijñā / tathāpi

anyair yadi pramāṇaiḥ pramāṇasiddhir-
ḥavetta danavasthā ///

yadi punarmanyase pramāṇaiḥ prameyānāṁ prasiddhistestāṁ
pramāṇānām anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhirevamanavasthāprasān-
gaḥ / anavasthāprasānge ko dosaḥ ///

nādeḥ siddhistatrāsti naiва madhyaśya
nāntasyā /// 32 ///

10 anavasthāprasāṅga ādeḥ siddhirnāsti / kiṁ kāraṇam / teṣāmapi

1 teṣāṁ, R.
2 T omits one teṣāṁ and has eva instead.
3 R om. pra.
4 R inserts tathā.
5 So R, after substituting pramāṇānām for pramāṇair and cutting out an inter-
polation which consists of 32 cd and the first words of the commentary on it.
C is word for word the same as the text, but T, which is corrupt at the end, reads
yadi tāvat teṣāṁ pramāṇānāṁ anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ syāt, or prasiddhir na
syāt, according as one reads yod par ḫgrub la or med par ḫgrub la. The argument
is that according to the Naibyikya system the principle is that arthas can only be
proved by pramāṇas; but the pramāṇas are themselves arthas, and therefore if they
are not proved by other pramāṇas, the principle does not hold. But this is
repeated under kārikā 33, and the text seems to have already been out of order by
C’s time, as it has the argument of 32 ab in the commentary under 30 and does not
treat 32 as a kārikā. It might therefore be better to omit the entire sentence.
Note that Vatsyayana in the opening of his bhāṣya on the Nyāyasūtras puts the
function of the pramāṇas in different language, so that his statements could not be
twisted in the way Nāgārjuna twists his opponent’s views here.
6 athāpi, T.
7 e.c.: bhavaty anavasthā, R, one mora short. The optative is required, but T
gives no help for the missing syllable.
8 R om. evam; ity evam would be better.
9 T adds tatraivaṁ brūmaḥ.
10 R adds asya at the beginning.
hi pramāṇānāmanyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhisteṣāmanyairiti

nāsty-ādīḥ / āderasadbhāvāt kuto madhyam kuto ‘ntaḥ / tasmātteṣām

pramāṇānāmanyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiriti yaduktaṁ tannopapadyata

2 iti /

teṣāmatha pramāṇairvinā prasiddhivire
dhiyate vādāḥ /

vaisamikatvam tasminviṣeṣahetuscavak-

tavyaḥ // 33 //

atha manyase teṣām pramāṇānāṁ vinā pramāṇaiḥ 3

prasiddhiḥ, prameyāṇāṁ punararthānāṁ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiriti, evaṁ sati

yaste vādāḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhirarthānāṁ iti sa 4 hiyate / vaisa-

mikatvam ca bhavati keśāmcidarthānāṁ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ

keśāṃcīnneti / viṣeṣahetuscavaktavyo yena hetunā keśāmcidarthā-

nāṁ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ keśāṃcīnneti / sa ca nopaṣṭaḥ 5 /

tasmādiyampi kalpanā nopapanneti 6 /

atraṁ / pramāṇānyeva 7 svātmānaṁ parātmānaṁ ca prasā-

dhayanti / yathoktaṁ

dyotayati svātmānaṁ yathā hutāṣastathā parātmānam /

svaparātmānāvevaṁ prasādhayanti pramāṇānīti //

yathāgniḥ svātmānaṁ parātmānaṁ ca prakāṣayati tathāiva pra-

māṇāni prasādhayanti 8 svātmānaṁ parātmānaṁ ceti /

atrocyte /

viṣamopanyāsō ‘yaṁ na hyātmānāṁ prakāśayatyagniḥ/

na hi tasyāṇupalabdhdirdṛṣṭā tamasiva

kumbhasya // 34 //

1 T has atra for iti.

2 R om. iti yad uktam tan, but C supports T.

3 T adds api.

4 R om. sa.

5 sa ca nopaṣṭa, R.

6 T om. iyam and iti.

7 R adds mama.

8 R omits from iti at the end of the verse to prasādhayanti inclusive, having simply param ivu.
viṣama evopanyāso ‘gnivat pramāṇāni svātmānaṁ ca prasādhya-
yanti parātmānaṁ ca prasādhayantīti ¹ / na hyagnirātmānaṁ
prakāśayati ² / yathā pragevāgināprakāśitastamasi kumbho nopala-
bhyate ‘thottarakālamupalabhyyate ³ ‘gninā prakāśitaḥ san, evameva
yadyaprakāśitaḥ prāgagnistamasi syād⁴uttarakālamagneḥ prakā-
śanaṁ syāt, atah svātmānaṁ prakāśayet / na caitadevam ⁵ / tas-
mādiyamapi kalpanā nopapadyata iti ⁶ /
kim cānyat /

yadi ca ⁷ svātmānamayaṁ tvadvacanenapракāśayatya
niḥ /
paramiva nanvātmānaṁ pariḥakṣyatyaapi
hutāṣaḥ ⁸ / 35 //

yadi ca tvadvacanena yathā parātmānaṁ prakāśayatyagnir-
evameva svātmānamapi prakāśayati ⁹, nanu yathā parātmānaṁ
dahatyevameva svātmānamapi dhakṣyati ¹⁰ / na caitadevam / tatra
yaduktam parātmānamiva svātmānamapi ¹¹ prakāśayatyagnirīt
tanna /
kim cānyat /

yadi ca svaparātmānau tvadvacanenap rakāśayatyagniḥ /
pracchādayisyati tamāḥ svaparātmānaui
hutāsa ivā ¹² / 36 //
yadi ca bhavato matena svaparātmānau prakāśayatyagniḥ,

¹ T has merely svaparātmānau prasādhayantīti.
² R adds yadi hi at the beginning.
³ T om. atha.
⁴ yady agninā na prakāśitaḥ prāg agnir nah syād, R.
⁵ R om. ca.
⁶ T om. tasmād and iti, R nopapadyantā.
⁷ R omits ca required by the metre; cf. the commentary.
⁸ So R, leaving the line two morae short; T does not give any extra word. See
p. 3 supra.
⁹ R adds agnir iti.
¹⁰ R adds iti.
¹¹ R om. api.
¹² Cf. MMK. vii, 12
nanvidānīṁ tatpratipākṣabhūtāṁ tamo 1 ‘pi svaparātmānau chādayet / na caitad dṛṣṭam 2 / tatra yaduktaṁ svaparātmānau prakāśayagnirīti tanna /
kīṁ cānyat /

nāsti tamaśca jvalane yatra ca tiṣṭhati
parātmanī 3 jvalanaṁ/
kurute katham prakāśaṁ sa hi prakāśo
‘ndhakāravaṇadhah 4 // 37 //

ihā cāgnau nāsti tamo nāpi ca yatṛāgnistatrāsti tamaḥ / prakāśasca
nāma tamasāḥ pratighātaḥ / yasmāc cāgnau 4 nāsti tamo nāpi ca
yatṛāgnistatrāsti tamaḥ, tatra kasya 5 tamasāḥ pratighātamagniḥ
karoti yasya pratighātadagniḥ 6 svaparātmānau prakāśayatīti 7 /

atrāha 8 / nānu 9 yasmādevam 10 nāgnau tamo ‘stī nāpi yatṛāgnis-
tatra tamo ‘stī, tasmādeva 11 svaparātmānau na prakāśayagniṁ
kutah 12 / tena hyutpadyamāñenaivāgniṁ tamasāḥ pratighātaḥ 13 /
tasmānnagau tamo ‘stī nāpi yatṛāgnistatra tamo ‘stī, yasmādu-
padyamāna evabhayaṁ prakāśayagniṁ svātmānāṁ parātmānāṁ
ceti / atrocye /

utpadyamāna eva prakāśayagnirity-
asadvādaḥ/

1 nunu idānīṁ pratipākṣabhūtatamo, R; T omits idānim and tamo; C has tamo.
2 So C; naitad iṣṭam, R; na caitad evam, T.
3 sadātmanī, R; gāṇ na (= paratraya), T; “and in the place where (fire) itself
and another are present”, C. For the verse cf. MMK, vii, 9.
4 e.c.; tasmāc, T; “if”, C. R omits from yasmāc to tatrāsti tamaḥ inclusive.
5 katham asya, R.
6 R om. agniḥ.
7 T om. iti.
8 R om. atra.
9 R substitutes yat for nunu.
10 T omits evam; which C has.
11 yasmād evam, R; T has dropped a word and may have had yasmād eva or
tasmād eva, but the latter alone is possible.
12 R puts kutah at the end of next sentence, but T shows a question and C has no
negative, so that the text reading alone meets the case.
13 pratigrahaḥ, R.
u tpadyamāna eva prāṇoti tamo na hi hutāśaḥ 1 // 38 //

ayamagniruptpadyamāna eva prakāśayati svātmānam parātmānam
creti nāyamupapadyate vādaḥ / kasmāt / na hyutpadyamāna
evāgnistamah prāṇoti, aprāptaṭvānnaivopahanti tamasāscānupaghatānnāsti prakāśaḥ /
ikīṃ cānyat /

aprāpta ʻpi jvalano yadi vā punarandhakaṁ upahanyāt /
sarvesu lokadhātuṣu tamo 'yamīha 2
saṃsthito hānyat 3 // 39 //

athāpi manyase ʻprāpto ʻpyagnirandhakāramupahantīti nanv-
idānīmiha 4 saṃsthito ʻgniḥ sarvalokadhātusthamupahaniṣyati
tamastulyamayamaprāptah 5 / na caitadevaṃ drṣṭam 6 / tasmād-
aprāpyaivāgnirandhakāramupahantīti yadiṣṭam tanna /
ikīṃ cānyat /

yadi svataśca 7 pramāṇasiddhiranāpeksya tava 8 prameyāni /
bhavati pramāṇasiddhirna parāpeksā svataḥ siddhiḥ 9 // 40 //

yadi cāgnivat svataḥ pramāṇasiddhiriti manyase, anapeksyāpi
prameyānarthanām 10 pramāṇānāṃ prasiddhirbhaviṣyati 11 / kiṃ kāra-

1 Cf. MMK, vii, 10.
2 ya iha, T.
3 saṃsthita upahanyāt, R, against the metre. Cf. MMK, vii, 11, for the verse.
4 T om. idānīm.
5 tulyāyāṁ aprāptah, R; this use of tulyam seems to have no parallel, but there
is no other way of reconstructing T from R, as the palaeographically better tulo
ʻyam is hardly possible.
6 T om. drṣṭam, which C has.
7 yada ca svataḥ, R, against the metre.
8 te, R, against the metre.
9 parāpeksā hi siddhir iti, R; C, which apparently misunderstood the verse,
has svataḥ twice. Cf. with the arguments of verses 40-50, MMK, x, 8-12.
10 prameyāni, R.
11 R om. pra and adds iti at the end.
ṇam / na hi svataḥ siddhiḥ ¹ paramapekṣate / athāpekṣate na
svataḥ siddhiḥ ² /

atraḥa yadi nāpekṣante prameyānarthāṁ pramāṇāni ko doṣo
bhaviṣyatiti / atrocyate /

a n a p e k ṣ y a h i p r a me y ā n a r t h ā n y a d i t e p r a m ā n a s i d d h i r i t i ³ /
na b h a v a n t i k a s y a c i d e v a m i m ā n i t ā ī n i ⁴ p r a m ā n ā n i / / ⁴ ₁ / /

yadi prameyānarthānanapekṣya prasiddhirbhavati⁵ pramāṇāniṁ-
ityevam tāṇīmāṇi ⁶ pramāṇāni na kasyacit pramāṇāni ⁷ bhavanti /
evam doṣaḥ / atha kasyacidbhavanti⁸ pramāṇāni naivedāṇīmana-
pekṣya prameyānarthāṁ pramāṇāni bhavanti /

a t h a m a t a m a p e k ṣ y a s i d d h i s t e ṣ ā m i t y a t r a
b h a v a t i k o d o ś a h ⁹ /
ś i d d h a s y a s ā d h a n a m s y ā n n ā s i d d h o ʻp e-
kṣate hyanyat // ⁴ ₂ //

athāpi matamapekṣya prameyānarthāṁ pramāṇānāṁ siddhir-
bhavatīti, evam¹⁰ siddhasya pramāṇacatuṣṭayasya sādhanaṁ bha-
vati¹¹ / kim kāraṇam¹² / na hyasiddhasyārthasyāpekṣaṇam bhavati /
na hyasiddho devadattaḥ kaṃcidarthamapekṣate / na ca siddhasya
sādhanaṃśatam kṛtasya karāṇānapapatteri¹³ /

¹ R om. siddhiḥ.
² prasiddhiḥ, R.
³ e.c.; pramaṇasiddhir bhavati, R, against the metre. T does not show iti,
but cf. the commentary.
⁴ R om. tāni.
⁵ siddhir, R.
⁶ R om. evam.; T om. tāni and adds te instead.
⁷ T adds api.
⁸ T adds arthasya after kasyacid, but C evidently did not have it, as it under-
stands kasyacid to mean “of a certain man”.
⁹ iti a bhavato ko doṣaḥ, R.
¹⁰ R adds hi sati and T te.
¹¹ R adds iti.
¹² T omits kim kāraṇam, which C has.
¹³ kāraṇaṃ anupa, R. T om. iti.
kim cānyat /
sidhyanti hi prameyānyapekṣya yadi sarvathā pramāṇāni/
bhavati prameyasiddhirnāpekṣyaiva¹ pramāṇāni//43//
yadi prameyānyapekṣya pramāṇāni sidhyanti nedānīṃ pramāṇānyapekṣya prameyāṇi sidhyanti / kim kāraṇam / na hi sādhyam sādhanam sādhayati sādhanāni ca kila prameyāṇāṃ pramāṇāni ² /
kim cānyat /

yadi ca prameyasiddhirnāpekṣyaiva³ bhavati pramāṇāni/
kim te pramāṇasiddhyā tani yadartham prasiddham tat//44//
yadi ca manyase 'napekṣyaiva pramāṇāni prameyāṇāṃ prasiddhirbhavatiti kimiddānīṃ⁴ te pramāṇasiddhyā paryanviṣṭayā / kim kāraṇam / yadartham hi tāni pramāṇāni paryanviṣyeron te prameyā arthā vināpi⁵ pramāṇāniḥ Siddhāḥ / tatra kim⁶ pramāṇāhi krtyam / atha tu pramāṇasiddhirbhavatyapekṣyaiva te prameyāṇi/
vatyaya evam satī te dhruvam pramānaprameyāṇām//45//

athāpi⁷ manyase 'pekṣyaiva prameyānarthān pramāṇāni bhavantīti⁸ mā bhūtpūrvvaktadoṣa iti krtyā, evaṃ te sati vatyayaḥ

¹ anapekṣyaiva, R, against the metre and commentary.
² pramāṇānāṃ prameyāṇi, T, but C also has the text.
³ anapekṣyaiva, R, against the metre, but nōpekṣya here must be understood as a compound equivalent to anapekṣya.
⁴ or bhavatiti kim io are apparently missing in R’s MS. (Owing to damage at the end of the line?)
⁵ R om. api.
⁶ T adds te, which is not in C.
⁷ R om. api.
⁸ R omits iti and adds evam hi sati.
pramāṇaprameyāṇāṃ bhavati / pramāṇāṇi te prameyāṇi bhavanti
prameyaiḥ sādhitatvāt ⁱ / prameyāṇi ca pramāṇāṇi ² bhavanti
pramāṇāṇāṃ sādhakatvāt /

atha te pramāṇasiddhyā prameyasiddhiḥ
prameyasiddhyā ca /
bhavati pramāṇasiddhirnāstyubhayasyāpi
te siddhiḥ // 46 //

atha manyase pramāṇasiddhyā prameyasiddhirbhavati pramāṇa-
pektavāt ³ prameyasiddhyā ca pramāṇasiddhirbhavati prameyā-
pektvāditi, evam te satyubhayasyāpi siddhirna bhavati ⁴ / kim
kāraṇam ⁵ /

sidhyānti hi pramāṇairyadi prameyāṇi
tāni taireva/
sādhyāni ca prameyaiśtāni katham sā-
dhayiśyanti // 47 //

yadi hi pramāṇaiḥ prameyāṇi sidhyanti tāni ca ⁶ pramāṇāṇi
taireva prameyaiḥ sādhayitavyāni nanvasiddheśu prameyēṣu kāra-
nasyāsiddhātvasiddhāni katham sādhayiṣyanti prameyāṇi ⁷ /

sidhyānti ca prameyaiśyadi pramāṇāṇi
tāni taireva/
sādhyāni ca pramāṇaiśtāni ⁸ katham
sādhyiśyanti // 48 //

yadi ca ⁹ prameyaiḥ pramāṇāṇi sidhyanti tāni ca prameyāṇi
taireva pramāṇaiḥ sādhayitavyāni ¹⁰ nanvasiddheśu pramāṇēṣu
kārānasyāsiddhātvasiddhāni katham sādhayiṣyanti pramāṇāṇi /

¹ prāsādhitatvāt, T.
² R interchanges prameyāṇi and pramāṇāṇi.
³ T may read pramānāpektavā, and similarly at the end of the next clause.
⁴ R om. bhavati.
⁵ R om. kim kāra.
⁶ R om. ca.
⁷ R adds iti.
⁸ prameyaiś tāni, R.
⁹ R om. ca.
¹⁰ R adds iti.
piṭrā yadyutpādyah putro yadi tena caiva putreṇa/
utpādyah sa yadi -piṭā vada tatrotpād�ati kāḥ kam//49//
yathāpi nāma 1 kaścid brūyātpitrā putra utpādanīyah sa ca pitā tenaiva 2 putreṇotpādanīya iti, tatredānīṃ 3 brūhi kena ka utpādayitavya iti 4 / tathaiva khalu 5 bhavān bravīti pramāṇaiḥ prameyāṇī śādhayitavyāṇī tānyeva ca punah 6 pramāṇīni taireva 7 prameyaīriti 8, tatredānīṃ 9 te katamaiḥ katamāni śādhayitavyāṇī 10 /
kāśca pitā kāḥ putrastatra tvam brūhi 11 tāvubhāvapi ca/
pitṛputralakṣaṇadharau yato bhavati no 'tra samdehaḥ 12//50//
tayośca pūrvopadistayoh pitṛputrayoh 13 katarāḥ putraḥ katarāḥ pitā / ubhāvapi tāvutpādakatvāt pitṛlakṣaṇadharāvutpādyatvāc ca putralakṣaṇadharau / atra naḥ samdeho bhavati katarastatra pitā katarāḥ 14 putra iti / evameva yāṇyetaḥ bhavataḥ pramāṇaprameyāṇī tatra katarāṇī pramāṇāni katarāṇi prameyāṇī / ubhayāṇyapi hyetāni sādhakatvāt 15 pramāṇāni 16 sādhyaśuḥ prameyāṇī 17 / atra naḥ

1 T omits nāma, and R adds yad before yathāpi.
2 R om. tenaiva.
3 T om. idānīṃ.
4 R om. iti.
5 T om. khalu.
6 T om. ca or punaḥ.
7 R om. r eva.
8 R om. iti, and T adds sādhayitavyāṇī before it.
9 T om. idānīṃ.
10 prasādhayitavyāṇī, T.
11 R adds katham.
12 yato na putrasaṇadehaḥ, R, against the metre and commentary; T has tato for yato.
13 pitṛputrayoh vada, R.
14 R adds tatra.
15 R omits sādhakatvāt, and T has prasādhakatvāt.
16 R adds tāni prameyāvī.
17 R adds iti.
sāṃdeho bhavati katarāṇyatra¹ pramāṇāni katarāṇi prameyāṇīti² /
naiva svataḥ prasiddhirna parasparataḥ
para pragmāṇairvā³ /
na⁴ bhavati na ca prameya,irna cāpy-
aksmaṭ pramāṇānām // 51 //

na svataḥ prasiddhiḥ pratyakṣasya tenaiva pratyakṣeṇa, anumā-
ṇasya tenaivānumānena, upamāṇasya tenaivopamānena, āgamasya
tenaiṅgamena / nāpi parasparataḥ pratyakṣasyānumānopamānā-
gamaiḥ, anumāṇasya pratyakṣopamānāgamaiḥ, upamāṇasya pra-
tyakṣānumānāgamaiḥ, āgamasya pratyakṣānumānopamānaiḥ / nāpi
pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamānāmanyaiḥ⁵ pratyakṣānumānopamā-
ṇagamaiṛathāsvam / nāpi prameyaiḥ samastavyastaiḥ svaviṣayapa-
raṣṭasamgrhitaiḥ⁶ / nāpyakṣmaṭ / nāpi⁷ samuccayenaiteśāṃ⁸
kāraṇāniḥ pūrvoddiṣṭānāṃ viṁśatirtimśaccatvārimśatvatvimśater-
vā⁹ / tatra yaduktaṁ¹⁰ pramāṇādhiphagyatvāt prameyāṇām bhā-
vānām santi ca te¹¹ prameyā bhāvāṣṭāni ca pramāṇāni yaiste¹²
pramāṇaiḥ prameyā bhāvāḥ¹³ samadhigata iti tanna /
yatpunarbhavatoktam /
kuśalānāṁ dharmānāṁ dharmāvasthāvidaśca manyante /
kusalaṁ janaḥ svabhāvaṁ¹⁴ sēṣeṣvapyeṣa viniyoga iti //
atra brūmaḥ /

¹ T om. atra.
² T om. iti.
³ R om. para.
⁴ R om. na.
⁵ ogamād anyaiḥ, R.
⁶ viṣṭya[t]āgrhitaḥ, R.
⁷ nāsti, R.
⁸ Both C and T take nāpi samuccayena as a seperate clause and evidently began
the next one with naitetāṁ, but this seems bad sense.
⁹ oviṁṣatitvā, R. If C and T’s division is accepted, one should read viṁṣati-
bhir (palaeographically better than oviṁṣatyā).
¹⁰ T adds bhavatā.
¹¹ R has tu for te.
¹² R reads tu for te.
¹³ R adds sāntai ca bhāvāḥ.
¹⁴ janarvabhāvaṁ manyante, R.
kusalānām dharmānām dharmavasthāvido bruvanti yadi 1/
kusalam 2 svabhāvamevam pravibhāgenābhidheyah syāt // 52 //

cusalānāṁ dharmānāṁ dharmāvasthāvidaḥ kusalām svabhāvaṁ 3 manyante / sa ca bhavatā pravibhāgenopadeštavyaḥ syāt / ayaṁ sa kusalaḥ svabhāvaḥ / ime te kusala dharmāḥ 4 / idaṁ tatkusalam vijñānam / ayaṁ sa 5 kusalavijñānasvabhāvaḥ / evam sarvesām / na caitdevam drṣṭam 6 / tasmādyaduktaṁ yathāsvam-upadiṣṭaḥ 7 svabhāvo dharmānāmiti tanna /
kie cānyaṭ /

yadi ca pratitya kusalaḥ svabhāva upadyate sa kusalānāṁ/
dharmānāṁ parabhāvah svabhāva evam 8 kathāṁ bhavati // 53 //

yadi ca kusalānāṁ dharmānāṁ svabhāvo hetupratyayasamagrīṁ pratityotpadyate sa 9 parabhāvādutpannah kusalānāṁ dharmānāṁ kathāṁ svabhāvo bhavati / evameva kusalapurabhṛtīnāṁ 10 / tatra yaduktaṁ kusalānāṁ 11 dharmānāṁ kusalah svabhāvo 'pyupadiṣṭaḥ 12 , evamakusalādīnāṁ cakusalādiriti 13 tanna /
kie cānyaṭ /

1 bruvate yat, R, against the metre; the text follows the indications of C, but T has gaḥ (yat) and an optative would be better. Possibly therefore bruvirān yat.
2 kusala, R.
3 janasvabhāvam, R.
4 R adds itī.
5 R and T omit sa, required by the context.
6 na caitad upadiṣṭam, T; but C as in text and R.
7 C and R omit yathāsvam, which seems required.
8 eva, R.
9 R om. sa.
10 T adds something like yuktaṁ.
11 kusālayuktyāntāṁ na, R.
12 R om. 'py u.
13 R omits ca, and T adds svabhāva evopadiṣṭaḥ.
atha na pratītya kimcitsvabhāva upadāyate sa kusalānām/
dharmānāmevaṁ syādvāso na brahmacyasya1 // 54 //

atha manyase na kimcitra pratītya kusalānāṁ dharmānāṁ kusalāḥ2 svabhāva upadāyate, evamakusalānāṁ dharmānāmakusalāḥ, avyākṛtānāmavākṛta3 iti, evam satyabrahamacaryavāso bhavati / kim kāraṇam / pratītya samutpādasya hyevaṁ sati pratyākhyānam bhavati / pratītya samutpādasya pratyākhyānāt pratītya samutpādārśana4 pratyākhyānam bhavati / na hyavidyaṁnāsya pratītya samutpādasya darśanamupapadyānamāṁ bhavati / asati pratītya samutpādārśana dharmadarśanaṁ na bhavati / uktaṁ hi bhagavatā yo hi bhikṣavaṁ pratyītya samutpādāṁ paśyati sa dharmam paśyatīti5 / dharmadarśanābhāvād brahmacyavāsābhāvah /

athaś pratyītya samutpādāpratyākhyānādduḥkhasamudayapratyākhyānam bhavati / pratītya samutpādo hi duḥkhasya samudayaḥ / duḥkhasamudayasya pratyākhyānādduḥkhapratyākhyānam bhavati / asati hi samudaye tatkuto6 duḥkhaṁ samudēṣyati / duḥkha-pratyākhyānāt7 samudaya-pratyākhyānācca duḥkhanirodhasya pratyākhyānam bhavati8 / asati hi duḥkhasamudaye9 kasya prahānāṁnirodho bhaviṣyati / [duḥkhanirodhapratyākhyānānāṃmārgasya pratyākhyānam bhavati]10 / asati hi duḥkhanirodhe kasya prāptaye mārge bhaviṣyati duḥkhanirodhāsimi / evam caturṇāmāryasyānāmabhāvah / teṣāmabhāvāc11 chrāmanyaphalābhāvah /

1 Cf. MMK, xxiv, 18-30, for this passage.
2 kusala, R.
3 T abridges the two last clauses to evam cākusalādinām.
4 "darśanaṁ, R; should it be ṣdarśanasya?
5 R om. iti. Quotation from the Śālistambhasūtra.
6 T om. tat.
7 R om. pratyākhyānāt.
8 R om. bhavati.
9 T takes this compound as a dvandva.
10 Neither C, T, nor R have this sentence, which is essential to the context.
11 R omits ṣh teṣām abhāvā, and has ṣva only instead.
satyadarśanācchārāmaṇḍyaṇaḥ phonāni hi samadhigamyaṁ / śrāman-yaphalānāmabhāvādabrahmacaryavāsā iti / kim caṇyat /

nādharmo dharmo vā saṁvyavahārāśca laukikā na syuḥ /
nityāśca sasvabhāvāḥ 4 syunityatvād-ahe tumataḥ 55 //
evaṁ sati pratītyasamutpādaṁ pratītyacakṣāṇasya bhavataḥ ko
doṣaḥ prasajyate / dharmo na bhavati / adharmo na bhavati /
saṁvyavahārāśca laukikā na bhavanti 6 / kim kāraṇaṁ / pratītyasam-
uppanaṁ hyetatsarvasamasati  6 pratītyasamutpāde kuto bha-
viṣyati 7 / api ca sasvabhāvo 8 'pratītyasamutpanno nirhetuko
nityaḥ syāt / kim kāraṇaṁ 9 / nirhetukā hi bhāvā 10 nityāḥ / 11 sa eva
cābrahmacaryavāsaḥ prasajyeta 12 / svasiddhāntavirodhāsa 13 /
kim kāraṇaṁ / anityāḥ hi bhagavatā sarve saṁskārā nirdiṣṭāḥ / te
sasvabhāvanityatvānityāḥ 14 hi bhavanti /

evamakuṣa 15 leśvavayākṛtesu naiyāṇikā-
disu 16 ca doṣaḥ /
tasmātsarvam saṁskṛtam asaṁskṛtām te
bhavatyeva 17 // 56 //

1 "dāriṇādiśrāma", R.
2 R om. hi sama.
3 T om. iti.
4 So C, rightly as the commentary shows; saṁsvabhāvāḥ, R; saṁsvadharmāḥ, T.
5 For the first line cf. MMK, xxiv, 33-36.
6 saṁbhavanti, R.
7 T adds tasmin.
8 saṁbhaviṣyati, T possibly.
9 C, T and R agree on the reading; sc. bhāvāḥ?
10 T omits kim kāraṇam, but C shows it.
11 T omits bhāvā, which C has.
12 R adds tatra.
13 T omits prasajyeta, and R puts a dauḍa before it.
14 T om. eva, and R om. ca.
15 eva cākuśa, R, against the metre.
16 naiyāṇadīṣu, R.
17 evam, R.
yaścaīsā kuśāleṣu dharmeṣu 1 nirdiṣṭāḥ kalpaḥ sa evākuśāleṣu,
sa evāvyāķṛteṣu, sa eva nairṛyāṇikaprabhṛtiṣu 2 /
 tasmātte 3 sarvam-
idaṃ saṃskṛtamasamśkrtaṃ samapadyate /
kim kāraṇam / hetau
hyasatyutpādaśthithibhaṅgā na bhavanti /
utpādasthitibhaṅgeṣv-
asatsu 4 saṃskṛtalakṣaṇābhaṅvāt sarvaṃ saṃskṛtamasamśkrtaṃ sam-
padyate /
tatra yaudakte kuśalādīnāṃ bhāvānāṃ svabhāvasadbhā-
vādaśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tanna /
yatpunarbhavatoktaṃ
yadi ca na bhavetsvabhāvo dharmānām niḥsvabhāva ityeva 5 /
nāmāpi bhavennaivaṃ 6 nāma hi nirvastukaṃ nāstīti //
atra brūmaḥ 7 /

yaḥ sadhbhūtaṃ nāmātra 8 brūyāt
tsavabhāva ityevam/
bhavatā prativaktavyo nāma brūmaśca
na vayam tat// 57 //

yo nāmātra 9 sadbhūtaṃ brūyātsasvabhāva iti sa bhavatā
drativaktavyaḥ syāt / yasya sadbhūtaṃ 10 nāma svabhāvasya
 tasmāttenāpi svabhāvena sadbhūtena bhavitavyam 11 /
na hyasadbhūtasya svabhāvasya 12 sadbhūtaṃ nāma bhavatīti 13 /
na punar-
vayaṃ nāma sadbhūtaṃ brūmaḥ /
tadapi hi bhāvasvabhāvasyā-

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1 R omits dharmeṣu, which C also has.
2 R adds dosaḥ, not in C or T; T adds api or ca.
3 R om. te.
4 teṣu asatsu, T.
5 bhāvānām na svabhāva ity evam, R.
6 bhaved evam, R.
7 R om. iti / atra brūmaḥ.
8 e.c.; R and T om. atra.
9 R om. atra.
10 sadbhūta, R.
11 This is R’s version of the sentence, but tasmāt is clumsy; C simplifies and gives
no help; T had something like yady asadbhūto nāmavataḥ svabhāvas tasmāt tenāpi
nāmāsadbhūtasvabhāvena bhavitavyam.
12 T om. svabhāvaya.
13 T om. iti.
bhāvānāma niḥsvabhāvam\(^1\), tasmācchūṇyam\(^2\), śūnyatvādasadasbhūtam / tatra yadbhavatoktam nāmasadbhāvātsadbhūtah svabhāva iti tanna /
kim cānyat /

nāmāsadi tī ca yaddam tat kim nu satobhavatyutāpyasataḥ\(^3\)/
yadi hi satohadyasato divdhipite hiyate vādaḥ//58//

yaccaitannāmāsadi tatkīṃ satō 'sato vā\(^4\) / yadi hi satas tan-
nāma\(^5\) yadyasata ubhayathāpi pratijña hīyate / tatra yadi tāvatsato
nāmāsadi i\(^6\) pratijña hīyate / na hīdānim tadasadidānim sat /
athāsato 'saditi\(^7\) nāma\(^8\), asadbhūtasya nāma na bhavati\(^9\) /
tasmādyā pratijña nāmānā\(^\text{10}\) sadbhūtah svabhāva iti sā hina /
kim cānyat /

sarveśāṃ bhāvānām śūnyatvatam copa-
pāditam pūrvaṃ/
sa upālambhastasmādbhāvatyayaṃ cā-
pratijñāyāh//59//

īha cāsmābhāhī pūrvameva sarveśāṃ bhāvānāṃ vistarataḥ
śūnyatvamupapāditam / tatra prāñ nāmno 'pi śūnyatvamuktam /
sa bhavānāśūnyatvam\(^\text{11}\) parighṛya parivṛttto vaktum yadi bhāvānāṃ

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1 R omits bhāva before svabhāva and reads niḥsvabhāvatvāt.
2 R om. tasmāc, but should the reading be niḥsvabhāvatvāc, as suggested by the readings in the previous note?
3 e.c.; utāsataḥ, R, against the metre; the alternative uta vāsataḥ would also be unmetrical.
4 satāḥ asataḥ, R.
5 R om. ton.
6 'āvat sat ' asad iti, R.
7 athāsati asad iti, R.
8 R inserts yā pratijñā wrongly here instead of in the next sentence.
9 R adds astitvavabhāvau iti.
10 R om. yā pratijña nāmānā.
11 sambhavom aśūnyatvam, R; C as in text; T omits the entire sentence.
svabhāvo na syādasvabhāva iti nāmāpīdam na syāditi ¹ tasmād-apratijñopālabhob ³ 'yaṃ bhavataḥ sampadyate / na hi vayaṃ nāma sadbhūtamiti brūmaḥ /

⁴yatpunarbhavatoktam
atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ sa ca dharmāṇāṃ na vidyate tasmāt / dharmairvinā svabhāvaḥ sa yasya tadyuktamupadesṭumiti //
atra brūmaḥ ⁵ /

atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ sa ca dharmā-ṇāṃ na vidyata itīdam /
āsaṅkitam yaduktam bhamatyanaśaṅkitam
taccade ⁶//60//

na hi vayaṃ dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvaṃ pratiśedhayāmo dharmavinirmuktasya vā kasyacidarthasya svabhāvamabhypagacchāmah /
nanvevaṃ sati ya ⁶ upālabhob bhavato yadi dharmaḥ niḥsvabhāvaḥ
kasya khalvidānīmanyasyārthasya dharmavinirmuktasya svabhāvo bhavati sa yuktamupadesṭumiti ⁷ dūrāpakṛṣṭamevaitadbhavati, upālabho na bhavati ⁸ /

⁹yatpunarbhavatoktam
sata eva pratiśedho nāsti ghaṭo geha ityayaṃ yasmāt /
dṛṣṭāḥ pratiśedho 'yaṃ sataḥ svabhāvasya te tasmāditi //
atra brūmaḥ /

sata eva pratiśedho yadi śūnyatvam
nanu prasiddham ¹⁰ idam /

¹ C seems to have misunderstood and translates as if reading astabhāvaṃ nāma
syāt.
² tasmād prati, R.
³ T adds api.
⁴ T inserts anyac ca.
⁵ R om. iti / atra brūmaḥ.
⁶ T om. ya.
⁷ odiṣṭaṃ iti, R.
⁸ R om. upālabho na bhavati.
⁹ T inserts anyac ca.
¹⁰ nanu apratisiddham, R, against the metre.
pratisedhayate hi bhave \(bhavana\) \(nivesa\) vihīyate vādaḥ //62//

atha \(pratisedhayasi\) tvam sarvabhāvānām niḥsvabhāvatvam
yā tarhi te pratiṣeṣa yā yā hīyate vādaḥ //63//

\(pratisedhayami\) nāham kimcit pratiṣedhastim ca kimcit/
tasmāt pratiṣedhayasitiyadhilaya ēsā \(tvayā\) kriyate //63//

\(yadyaham kimcitrpratisedhayāmi\) tatastadapi tvāyā yuktameva
vaktum syāt / na caiva hām kimcitpratisedhayāmi, yasmāna

\(1\) R om. bhavāṃś ca sarva.
\(2\) pratisiddham, R.
\(3\) R adds yasi tvam after pratisedha.
\(4\) pratisiddhi śunyati, R.
\(5\) cṛṣṭhayase atha, R; alternatively read śedhayasya atha.
\(6\) R om. \(sa\).
\(7\) R adds śunyatvam.
\(8\) eva, R. Adhilaya (preferably read skur \(pa\) for bhuk \(pa\) in T), “calumny”,
seems to be known only from Mādhyamika works; cf. MMK, Index s.v.
\(9\) R inserts evam api tu kṛteā.
\(10\) R om. tād api tvāyā; pratiṣedhayeyam would be better grammar than pratiṣe-
dhayāmi.
\(11\) tasmān na, R. The text follows T in dividing the sentences, but it would be
possible to take yasmān with the following tasmāc.
kiṃcitpratīṣeddhavyamaṣṭi¹ / tasmācchūnyaṣu sarvabhāveṣvavidyāmāṇe pratīṣedhye ca² pratīṣedhayasya tvayā- prastuto³ ‘dhilayah kriyata iti⁴ /
yatpunarbhatoktam
atha nāsti sa svabhāvaḥ kiṃ nu pratīṣidhyate tvayānena /
vacanenarte vacanatpratīṣedhah sidhyate, hyasata iti⁶ //
atra brahmaḥ /
yaccāharte⁷ vacanādastah pratiṣedhavacanasiddhiriti/
atra jñāpayate vāgasaditi tanna prati
nihanti// 64 //////
yacca bhavān bravīti, ṛte pi⁸ vacanādastah pratiṣedhah
prasiddhaḥ, tatra kiṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ityetattadvacanaṁ⁹ karotiti, atra brahmaḥ / niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā¹⁰ ityetatt-
halv vacanatma niḥsvabhāvāneva¹¹ sarvabhāvān karoti / kiṃtv-
asati svabhāve bhāvā niḥsvabhāvā iti¹² jñāpayati / tadyathā¹³
kaścidbrūyāda vidyāmānagṛhe devadatte ‘sti¹⁴ grhe devadatta iti /
tatrainam kaścitpratīṣṭhrūyān nāstīti / na tadvacanaṃ devadatta-

¹ T adds ca or api after kiṃcit.
² R om. pratiṣedhe ca, but C has it too.
³ e.c.; tvayātra sabhito, R. ‘T does not show atra, and its thog tu mi bubs pa
means something like “missing the mark”, “not meeting the case”, and C
translates “contrary to reason and perverse”. In view of R’s extraordinary
distortions the conjectural restoration is palaeographically possible.
⁴ T om. iti.
⁵ T adds anyac ca.
⁶ R. om. iti.
⁷ yac cāham te, R; yac cāha is represented by ēre na in T.
⁸ sato pi, R. T adds asati ca vacane before rie.
⁹ R om. toad.
¹⁰ R om. oḥ sarvabhāvā.
¹¹ R om. eva.
¹² kinte asatsvabhāvo bhāvānāṃ asatsvabhāvānām iti, R.
¹³ tatra, R.
¹⁴ Devadattas tom asti, R. ayidyanānagṛha is a curious compound but occurs
in other texts.
syāsadbhāvāṁ¹ karoti kiṃtu jñāpayati kevalamasārṣibhavāṁ² grhe devadattasya³ / tadvannāsti svabhāvo bhāvāṁnītyetadvacanām na bhāvāṁ⁴ niḥsvabhāvatvam karoti kiṃtu sarvabhāveṣu⁵ svabhāvasyābhāvām jñāpayati / tatra yadbhavatoktam kimasati svabhāve nāsti svabhāva ityetadvacanaṁ karoti, ṛte 'pi vacanāt prasiddhaḥ⁶ svabhāvasyābhāva iti tanna⁷ yuktam / anyacca⁸ / bālānāmiva mithyā⁹ mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṁ¹⁰ yathājalagrāhah / evam mithyāgrāhah syātte pratiśedhyato¹¹ hyasataḥ // ityādayo yā punaścatastro gāthā bhavatoktā¹² atra brūmah mṛgatṛṣṇādṛṣṭānte yah punar uktas¹³- tvayā mahāmścarcaḥ / tatrāpi niṛṇayāṁ sṛṇu yathā sa dṛṣṭānta upaṇnaḥ // 65 //

ya eta tvayā¹⁴ mṛgatṛṣṇādṛṣṭānte mahāmścarca uktastrapāpi yo niṛṇayaḥ sa śrūyatāṁ yathopapanna eṣa¹⁵ dṛṣṭānto bhavati / sa yādi svabhāvatāḥ syād grāho¹⁶ na syāt pratītya sambhūtaḥ¹⁷ /

¹ na ta Devadattasya sambhavāṁ, R; T shows that R has interchanged sambhava and asadbhāva in this sentence.
² asadbhāvām, R.
³ R adds iti.
⁴ svabhāvānāṁ, R.
⁵ R om. kiṃtu sarva. T interpolates a parallel with a māyāpurusa, which is not found in C or R.
⁶ prasiddhiḥ, R.
⁷ tati na, R.
⁸ yad uktam, R.
⁹ R om. mithyā.
¹⁰ R adds sa.
¹¹ prasidhyate, R.
¹² yat punar bhavato mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṁ ity, R.
¹³ uktam, R.
¹⁴ T adds tasmin.
¹⁵ R omits yathā and reads eva for eṣa.
¹⁶ bhāvo, R.
¹⁷ samudbhūtaḥ, R, against the metre.
Yaśca prātiṣṭaya bhavati grāho nānu śūnyatā saiva // 66 //
yadi 1 mṛgatṛṣṇāyām sa yathājalarāhah svabhāvataḥ syānna
syātpratītyasamutpannaḥ / yato mṛgatṛṣṇām ca prātiṣṭya viparītaṁ
cā darśanam pratītyāyoniṣomanaskāraṁ 2 ca prātiṣṭya syādudbhūto
‘tah prātiṣṭyasamutpannaḥ / yatasca prātiṣṭyasamutpanno ‘tah
svabhāvataḥ śūnya eva / yathā pūrvamuktaṁ tathā /
kim cānyat /
yadi ca svabhāvataḥ syād grāhah kastam
nivartayed 3 grāham /
śeṣeṣvapyesa vidhistasmādeso 4 ‘nupā-
lambhaḥ // 67 //
yadi ca mṛgatṛṣṇāyām jalagrāhaḥ svabhāvataḥ syāt ka eva tam
vinivartayet / na hi svabhāvaḥ śakyo vinivartayitum 5 yathā 6 gner-
uṣnatvamanapām dravatvamākāsasya nirāvaraṇatvam / drṣṭaṁ cāsyā
vinivartanaṁ / tasmācaḥ śvavabhāvo grāhaḥ 7 / yathā 8 caitadevam śeṣeṣvapi
dharmesveṣa kramaḥ pratyavagantavyo grāhaya-
prabhṛtisū 9 pañcasu / tatra yadbhavatoktaṁ śatkabhāvādaśūnyāh 10
sarvabhāvā iti tanna /
yatpunarbhavatoktaṁ 11
hetośca te na siddhirnaiḥsvabhāvyātktu hi te hetuḥ /
nirhetukasya siddhirna copapannāsyā te ‘rthasyeti //
atra brūmaḥ /

1 R adds ca.
2 T om. prātiṣṭya.
3 vinivartayed, R, against the metre.
4 tasmād oṣo, R.
5 nivartayitum, R.
6 tathā, R.
7 grāhyāḥ, R.
8 yadā, R.
9 o prabhṛtisū, R.
10 R omits toktaṁ śatkabhā, and T omits bhavātā.
11 T has anayac ca instead.
etena hetvabhāvah pratyuktaḥ pūrvam- eva sa samatvāt/
mṛgatrṣnāḍrṣṭāntavyāvṛttividhau ya uk taḥ prāk//68//

etena cedānim carcena pūrvoktena hetvabhāvo 'pi pratyukto ¹ 'vagantavyah / ya eva hi carcaḥ pūrvasmin hetāvuktaḥ śaṭkapratise-dhasya sa evehāpi ² carcayitavyah /
yatpunarbhatoktam
pūrvam cetpratishedhaḥ paścātpratishedhyamyantyanupapannam /
paścācānupapanno yugapacca yataḥ svabhāvah sanniti ³ //
atra brūmah /

yatraikālye hetuḥ pratyuktaḥ pūrvam- eva sa samatvāt/
traikālyaapratihetuśca śunyatāvādināṁ
prāptaḥ//69//

ya eva ⁴ hetustraikālye pratiśedhavāci sa uktotaraḥ pratyava-gantavyah ⁵ / kasmāt / sādhyasamatvāt / tathā hi tvadvacanena pratiśedhastraikālye ‘nupapannapratishedhavatsa pratiśedhyo ‘pi ⁶ /
tasmāt pratiśedhapratishedhye ‘sati yadbhavān ⁷ manyate pratiśed-dhaḥ pratiśiddha ⁸ iti tanna / yastrikālapratishedhavāci ⁹ hetureṣa eva śunyatāvādināṁ prāptaḥ sarvabhāvāsvabhāvapratishedhaka-tvān ¹⁰ na bhavataḥ /

¹ R om. ukto.
² R om. dhasya sa eve.
³ svabhāvo 'san, R and T (cf. note on verse 20). R om. iti.
⁴ e.c.; esa, R; T omits the word.
⁵ pratyavamanantaḥ, R; T omits the word, but C has it.
⁶ R mutes this sentence, reading yathā hi pratiśedhas traikalye nopapa pratiśedhahpratiśedhe ‘pi. C supports T, having “Just as the pratiśedha of the traikālya is anupapanna, (your) words too are included among the pratiśedhapra-tiśedhya things”.
⁷ R om. yad.
⁸ pratisi, R; C seems to have had prāptaḥ.
⁹ yatai caiva trikālaḥ, R; yai ca trikāla might be better.
¹⁰ T om. svabhāva.
athavā kathametaduktottaram / 
pratīṣedhayāmī naïham kīncitpratīṣedhyamasti na ca kīncit / 
tasmāt pratīṣedhayasyaṣṭiadhilaya eṣa tvayā kriyate //

iti pratyuktam¹ / atha manyase triṣvapi kāleṣu pratīṣedhaḥ 
siddhaḥ², drṣṭaḥ pūrvakālino ‘pi hetuḥ, uttarakālino ‘pi, yuga- 
patkālino ‘pi hetuḥ, tatra³ pūrvakālino heturyathā⁴ pitā putrasya⁵, 
apaścātākālino yathā śisya ācāryasya, yugapatkālino yathā pradīpaḥ 
prakāśasyetatra brūmah / na caitadevaṃ / uktā⁶ hyetasmin krame 
trayaḥ⁷ pūrvadosāḥ / api ca yadyevam⁸, pratīṣedhasadbhā- 
vastavābhayupagamyate⁹ pratijñāhānīśca te bhavati / etena kramena 
svabhāvapratīṣedho ‘pi siddhaḥ¹⁰ /

prabhavati ca śūnyateyam yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ/
prabhavati na tasya kīmçina prabhavati¹¹ śūnyatā yasya¹² // 70 //

yasya śūnyateyam prabhavati tasya sarvārthā lauṅkikalokottarāḥ 
prabhavanti / kīṃ kāraṇam / yasya hi śūnyatā prabhavati tasya 
pratītyasamutpādaḥ prabhavati / yasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ prab- 
havati tasya catvāryāryasyatāni prabhavanti / yasya catvāryāryasa- 
tāṇi prabhavanti. tasya¹³ śrāmanyaphalāni prabhavanti¹⁴, sarva-

¹ R om. pratyuktam.
² R omits pratīṣedhaḥ siddhaḥ, which C has too.
³ katham, R.
⁴ R om. hetur.
⁵ R inserts tvadvacanena.
⁶ na Caitadevaṃ yuktā, R.
⁷ R omits krame, and T omits trayāḥ which C has.
⁸ R adds kramaḥ.
⁹ obhāvatve ād, R. T adds tasmin asiddhe.
¹⁰ R omits etena kramena and ‘pi siddhaḥ; C has the latter.
¹¹ kīma bhavati, R (two syllables short). For the verse cf. MMK, xxiv, 14; 
Candrakīrti’s commentary there follows closely Nāgärjuna’s commentary here.
¹² R adds iti.
¹³ R omits prabhavanti tasya, which is found in C and in T.
¹⁴ R om. pra.
viśeśādhitam ājayaḥ / yasya sarvaviśeśādhitam prabhavanti 1 / yasya prabhavanti tasya triṇi ratnāni buddhadharmasāmghāḥ prabhavanti / yasya pratyayasamutpadāḥ prabhavati tasya dharmo dharmahetur- dharmapalāḥ ca prabhavanti 2, tasyādharmaḥ dharmaheturadharmapalāḥ ca prabhavanti / yasya dharmadharmau dharmādharmatū dharmadharmapalāḥ ca prabhavanti 3 / tasya klesāḥ klesasamudayaḥ klesavastūni 4 ca prabhavanti / yasyaitatsarvāṇ prabhavati 5 pūrvaktaṁ tasya sugatidurgativyavasthā sugatidurgatigamanāṁ sugatidurgatigāmi mārgaḥ 6 sugatidurgativyakramanāṁ 7 sugatidurgativyakramopāyaḥ sarvasaṃvyavahārāśca laukikā vyavasthāpitaḥ 8 / svayamadhigantavyā anayā diśā kim-cicchakyaṁ vacanenopadeśtumiti 9 /

bhavati cātra

yaḥ śunyatāṁ pratyayasamutpadāṁ madhyamāṁ pratipadaṁ ca 10 / ekārthāṁ nijagāda pranamāmi tamapratimabuddham 11 //

iti 12 kṛṣṇirīyamācāryanāgārjunapādānāṁ //
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PART III
English Translation
INTRODUCTION

Though only a 'minor work' in form, as regards its contents the Vigrahavyāvartani is a fundamental text of Madhyāmaka, as well as of the early Indian dialectical (vāda) tradition. Not only does it admirably illustrate the dialectical method followed by Nāgārjuna, the founder of the school, but it also clarifies the idea of Voidness (śūnyatā) which has been so often misunderstood, not only in modern times and abroad, but in India itself, and in Nāgārjuna's own time. 'You have not understood the meaning of the voidness of the things', says Nāgārjuna to his opponent—a Naiyāyika (commentary on v. XXII).

Written after Nāgārjuna's major work, the Mulamadhyamaka-kārikās (from which it quotes a verse: commentary on v. XXVIII), the Vigrahavyāvartani is undoubtedly 'one of his best works and shows him in all that is peculiar to him, above all in his unperturbed consistency'—as E. Frauwallner observed.

In refuting the logician's criticisms, Nāgārjuna does not disdain formal logic. Why are all things 'void' (śūnya) or 'devoid of an intrinsic nature' (niḥsvabhāva)? Nāgārjuna's 'reason' (hetu) is that all things are 'dependently originated' (pratītyasamutpāna). But the best way for him to refute his opponent's criticisms is to show the inner contradictions of the latter's thought and to use against him his own logic. And that, I think, he does admirably well. We find here, especially, a brilliant criticism of the pramāṇas 'means of true cognition' of the Nyāya system, which occupies in this work the central position (vv. XXXI–LI), and which is also the first one that has come down to us.

The logician's objections against what appears to be a negation, in the doctrine of Voidness, are faithfully reproduced by Nāgārjuna in the Vigrahavyāvartani. If, as Nāgārjuna says, 'all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature' (niḥsvabhāvaḥ sarvabhāvaḥ) or 'the things have no intrinsic nature' (nāsti svabhāvo bhāvānam) or 'all things are void' (śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvaḥ), this enunciation must be equally 'devoid of an intrinsic nature' (niḥsvabhāva) or 'void' (śūnya). But then, how can a void statement deny the other void things? If this negation is valid, the enunciation itself is not void. But, in this case, all things are not
void, since the enunciation, which is included in ‘all things’, is not void. (Kārikā and vṛtti I and II). On the other hand, according to the logicians, a negation is significant only when the object to be negated is a real entity, not when it is a fictitious one. In the circumstances, if the negation of the ‘intrinsic nature’ (svabhāva) of the things, in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy, has a meaning, it only proves that very ‘intrinsic nature’ which is negated! (Kārikā and vṛtti XI-XII).

Nāgārjuna admits the cogency of these arguments. In the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās he even bases his own argumentation often on the logicians’ principle, namely that a negation is not possible if the object to be negated is not real. Candrakīrti makes it explicit in his commentary, the Prasannapadās. Only, Nāgārjuna does not negate anything, for there is nothing to be negated: all things being void, there is neither a thing to be negated nor a negation (kārikā and vṛtti LXIII). The function of the statement ‘All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature’ or ‘The things have no intrinsic nature’, says he, is to ‘make known the absence of an intrinsic nature in all things’, because they are naturally ‘void of an intrinsic nature’ (svabhāvaśūnya), being ‘dependently originated’ (pratītyasamutpādana). [Kārikā and vṛtti LXIV; cf. kārikā and vṛtti XXII; kārikās LIII and LXVI].

Negation of the ‘intrinsic nature’, with Nāgārjuna, is thus designed for dissipating the error of people who see an ‘intrinsic nature’ in the things while they have none. In other words, it has merely a therapeutic value—as Candrakīrti makes it clear in his comment on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XV, 11.

Nāgārjuna strives to express the Inexpressible. All his expressions, therefore, are bound to remain inadequate. ‘All things are void (or devoid of an intrinsic nature)’ is not a “proposition” which denies or affirms something (commentary on v. LX; cf. XXIX, XXX). By ‘making known’ the ‘voidness’ of all things (LXIV), it only expresses, indirectly, the Absolute, which is ‘perfectly appeased’ and ‘isolated’ from all its appearances (commentary on v. XXIX, and notes).

Nāgārjuna seems to be a mystic. But he is not a mystic who renounces thought and its expression in language. Along with all mystical philosophers, he knows that “the ultimate in thinking as the ultimate in communication is silence”. Like them, too, he uses thought in order to transcend it. It is only when by his inexorable logic he has been able to bring to light all the contradictions inherent in our relational way of thought, that he experiences Being or Nirvāṇa, which is beyond all relations,—in a shipwreck so to say.
Nāgārjuna’s Absolute is neither the world nor apart from the world. It is the ‘intrinsic nature’ of the world. But to say ‘It is the intrinsic nature of the world’, is to make of it an object, standing in relation, on one hand, to the thinking subject, and on the other, to other objects, and thus to deprive it of its all-encompassing character. The only way in which Nāgārjuna can speak of it (or, rather, out of it) is to say: ‘All things in the world are devoid of an intrinsic nature’, i.e., the things in the world are not as they appear to us.

Here Nāgārjuna had to face the objection: If all things are void, how can our activities in the world become possible? Even the religious discipline taught by the Buddha becomes meaningless. But this objection, Nāgārjuna replies, springs from a fundamental misunderstanding of ‘voidness’, i.e., ‘dependent origination’. All our activities—religious or not—are possible only in this relational world of becoming. If ‘voidness’, i.e., becoming, is denied, then the world itself is assumed to be the Absolute, ‘not born, not destroyed, immutable, free from the manifold states (of its becoming)’10 ‘There is nothing to be done, no work is undertaken, the agent does not do any work’11.

Thus, Nāgārjuna neither denies the world nor affirms it. His is a ‘middle path’ (madhyamā pratīpad), whence the name of his philosophy, ‘Madhyamaka’12. It is in the world that he transcends the world and thus transfigures it. ‘There is not the slightest difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa’:

\[na \text{ samsārasya nirvāṇat kincid asti viśeṣaṃ} / \]
\[na \text{ nirvāṇasya samsārāt kincid asti viśeṣaṃ} // \]
\[nirvāṇasya ca yā kośaḥ kośih saṃsāraṇasya ca / \]
\[na tayor antaram kincit susūkṣmam api vidyate // \] (MK XXV, 19-20).

‘The difference between them is in our way of looking at them’13. Nirvāṇa is saṃsāra without appearance and disappearance, without ‘dependent origination’:

\[ya \text{ dhāvamjñavābhāva upādāya pratīṣṭya va } / \]
\[so ‘pratīṣṭhānapādāya nirvāṇam upadhiṣṭate // \] (MK XXV, 9).

The reason why I decided to translate this text was that no complete translation of it from the Sanskrit original was available14, while there were already two translations based on the Tibetan and the Chinese versions. The authors of these two translations, S. Yamaguchi15 and
Professor G. Tucci, were not fortunate enough to be able to use the Sanskrit original, which was discovered later in a Tibetan monastery by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana; and, as will be seen, there are notable divergences between their translations and mine.

The text was edited for the first time by K. P. Jayaswal and Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in an appendix to Vol. XXIII, Part III (1937), of the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Patna. The present translation is based on the improved edition by E.H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst in Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, published by the Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, Vol. IX: 1948-51 (Bruxelles, 1951), pp. 99-152. It is to the labours of these two distinguished scholars that we owe now ‘the possibly nearest approximation of Nāgārjuna’s original text’. In some places I have differed from them; but I admire the patience and the sense of Sanskrit of these two scholars, to whose introductory remarks I refer the reader for further details about the text.

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. I have not been able to find an adequate English expression for the title. In German it is rendered well: ‘Die Streitabswehrerin’ (Frauwallner, p. 199).

2. ‘Es ist eines seiner besten Werke und zeigt ihn in seiner ganzen Eigenart, vor allem in seiner unbeirrbaren Folgerichtigkeit’, Frauwallner, p. 199.

3. Infra, p. 135. Note.—For Nāgārjuna, ‘voidness’ (śūnyatā) is the same thing as ‘being devoid of an intrinsic nature’ (naiḥsvabhāvyam and similar expressions). In order to avoid a misunderstanding of this essential idea of Nāgārjuna, it may be well to indicate here what he means by ‘intrinsic nature’ (svabhāva); ‘Eigenes Wesen’, writes E. Frauwallner, ‘bedeutet nach Nāgārjuna, der indischen Wortbedeutung entsprechend, ein Sein aus sich selbst und nur durch sich selbst bedingt, unabhängig von allem andern. Daraus folgt aber, dass ein solches eigenes Wesen nicht entstanden ist, weil es nicht verursacht sein kann, und dass es nicht dem Vergehen unterworfen ist, weil sein Bestehen von nichts anderem abhängt. Es ist daher ewig und unvergänglich. Und so folgert denn Nāgārjuna, dass die Dinge der Erscheinungswelt, weil sie dem ständigen Werden und Vergehen unterliegen, kein eigenes Wesen besitzen können’. (Frauwallner, p. 173).


5. See infra, pp. 132-33, n. 2 on LXIV.

6. Cf. infra, p. 133, n. 2 on LXIV.

7. ‘Das Letzte des Denkens wie der Communication ist Schweigen’, Karl Jaspers,
INTRODUCTION

Vernunft und Existenz (Aula-Voordachten der Rijksuniversiteit te Groningen, No. 1, 1935), p. 74.—Cf. infra, pp. 113-14, nn. 2-3 on v. XXIX.

8. ‘Im Scheitern das Sein zu erfahren’, Jaspers, Philosophie III (Berlin, 1932), p. 235. —Cf. Murti, p. 160: ‘Negation is thus the despair of thought; but it is at once the opening up of a new avenue—the path of intuition...Śūnyatā is negative only for thought; but in itself it is the non-relational knowledge of the absolute’.

Professor Paul Demiéville, in his Preface to May, p. ii, quotes from Giacomo Leopardi’s poem, L’Infinito: ‘E il naufragar m’è dolce in questo mare’.


10. ajātam aniruddhaṃ ca kūṭasthaṃ ca bhaviṣyati |
    vicītrāḥdiśa vāhantāh vasthāpe rahitam jagat || MK XXIV, 38.

11. na kartavyam bhavet kimcid anāraṇdhā bhavet kriyā |
    kāraṇaḥ syād akuruvatāḥ śūnyatāṃ pratībhādhaṭaḥ || Ibid., 37.—Cf. infra, pp. 125ff., vv. LIV-LVI.

12. jaḥ pratiyasaṃstupādaḥ śūnyatām tām praçaṅkṣamahi |
    sā praṇāptir upādāya praṇaṭītaḥ saiva madhyamā || Ibid., 18.

‘Dependent Origination is that which we call Voidness. It is a mere designation based on something, and it is the Middle way’.—Note the expression upādāya praṇaṭītaḥ ‘a mere designation based on something’ (‘blosse Benennung auf irgendwelcher Grundlage’, Frauwallner, p. 190). It is only an expression of the Inexpressible based on the conventional truth (cf. infra, pp. 111 ff., v. XXVIII).

The term ‘Madhyamaka’ is used by Nāgārjuna’s followers as the name of the philosophy, while they call themselves ‘Madhyamika’. The non-Buddhist writers, however, invariably refer both to the philosophy and to its adherents as ‘Mādhyamika’.


After I completed this work in July 1970, I came to know of a work done on the Vighrahayavartanī by the veteran scholar, Professor Satkari Mookerjee (Nava-Nālandā-Mahāvihāra Research Publication, Vol. I, 1957). I am grateful to Professors B.K. Matilal and J. L. Masson for having made that work available to me from the University of Toronto. Professor Mookerjee gives an exposition of the arguments of our text ‘in a language and manner intelligible to the modern mind’.—I have not been able to consult F. J. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville, Tenn., Abingdon Press, 1967).


16. Vighrahayavartanī by Nāgārjuna, Translation from the Chinese and Tibetan Text, in the author’s Pre-Dīnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, Baroda, 1929 (Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, No. XLIX).

A summary (by myself) of the *Vigrahavyāvartānī* is due to appear in Karl H. Potter (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy).
TRANSLATION

I

OBJECTIONS

I. If an intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of the things (bhāva), whatever they may be, exists nowhere (sarvatra na vidyate), your [very] statement must be devoid of an intrinsic nature (asvabhāva). It is not, therefore, in a position to deny the intrinsic nature [of the things].

Whether in the causes (hetu), in the conditions (pratyaya), in the combination of the causes and the conditions (hetupratyayasāmagri), or in a different thing, nowhere does exist an intrinsic nature of the things, whatever they may be. On this ground it is said that all things are void (śūnyaḥ sarvabhāvāḥ). For instance, the sprout is neither in the seed, its cause, nor in the things known as its conditions, viz., earth, water, fire, wind, etc., taken one by one, nor in the totality of the conditions, nor in the combination of the causes and the conditions, nor is it anything different from the causes and the conditions (na hetupratyayavinirmuktah prthag eva ca). Since there is nowhere an intrinsic nature, the sprout is devoid of an intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva). Being devoid of an intrinsic nature, it is void (śūnya). And just as this sprout is devoid of an intrinsic nature and hence void, so also are all the things void because of being devoid of an intrinsic nature.

Here we observe: If this is so, your statement that all things are void, must also be void. — Why? — Because your statement is neither in its cause — the [four] great elements (mahābhūta), taken collectively or severally (samprayuktesu viprayuktesu vā); — nor in its conditions, the efforts made in the breast, the throat, the lips, the tongue, the roots of the teeth, the palate, the nose, the head, etc. (urahkanthauḥsphajhvādantamūlatālunāsikāṁūrdhaprabhrītiṣu yatnesu); — nor in the combination of both [the cause and the conditions]; — nor again is it anything apart from the cause and the conditions. Since it is nowhere, it is devoid of an intrinsic nature, [and] since it is devoid of an intrinsic nature, it is void. For this reason, it is incapable of
denying the intrinsic nature of all things. A fire that does not exist cannot burn, a weapon that does not exist cannot cut, water that does not exist cannot moisten; similarly a statement that does not exist cannot deny the intrinsic nature of all things. In these circumstances, your statement that the intrinsic nature of all things has been denied, is not valid.

II. Now, if this sentence (vākyā) is endowed with an intrinsic nature (sasvabhāva), your former proposition (pūrvā pratiṣṭhā) is destroyed (hatā). There is a discordance, and you should state the special reason for it (tasmin vīteṣahetu ca vaktavyaḥ).

Now you may think, in order to avoid this defect (mā bhūd eṣa doṣa iti): this sentence is endowed with an intrinsic nature, and being endowed with an intrinsic nature, it is non-void (aśūnya); thus the intrinsic nature of all things has been denied by it. — To this we reply: If so, then your former proposition ‘All things are void’ is destroyed.

Furthermore:

Your statement is included in all things (sarvabhāvaṁtargata). [Now] if all things are void, for what reason is your statement non-void, — that statement which has denied the intrinsic nature of all things because it is [itself] non-void (yenāśūnyatvāt sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pratiṣiddhāḥ)? Thus arises a controversial discussion in six points (ṣaṭkoṭiko vādaḥ). — How is it? — Well,

(1) If all things are void, then your statement is void, being included in all things. [And] a negation by that [statement] which is void is a logical impossibility (tena śunyena pratiṣedhānupapattih). In these circumstances, the negation that all things are void is not valid (anupapanna). (2) If, on the other hand, the negation that all things are void is valid, then your statement is non-void. [But] that negation which it establishes because it is non-void, is not valid (aśūnyatvādu enena pratiṣedho 'nupapannah)⁴. (3) Now, if all things are void, but your statement by which is effected the negation (yena pratiṣedhāḥ) is non-void, then your statement is not included in all things (sarvatraśaṃgrhitam). Your proposition, there, is contradicted by the example⁴. (4) If, on the contrary, your statement is included in all things, and if all things are void, then your statement also is void.
And] since it is void, it cannot establish a negation (śūnyatvād anena nāsti pratiṣedhāḥ). (5) Let us then assume that it is void and that there is the negation by it (atha śūnyam asti cānena pratiṣedhāḥ): ‘All things are void’. But, in that case, all things, though void, would be capable of performing actions (śūnyā api sarvabhāvāḥ kāryakriyāsamarthā bhayeṣuḥ) — which is absurd (na caitad iṣṭam). (6) Let it be granted, then, that all things are void and that they are not capable of performing actions (atha śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā na ca kāryakriyāsamarthā bhavanti); let the proposition be not contradicted by the example (mā bhūd drṣṭāntavirodhaḥ). In that case, however, the negation of the intrinsic nature of all things by your void statement is not valid.

Furthermore:

Thus, if your statement exists (iadastitvāt), there arises the following discordance: some things are void, and some other things, non-void (kīṃcī cīhūm kīṃcid astīnayam). And you should state the special reason for that discordance, explaining why some things are void, while some others are not. You have, however, not stated that reason. In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

1 Yamaguchi’s explanation of vaiśamikatva by viṣamavṛtti is ‘anachronistic’, as pointed out by the editors (p. 43, n. 9). The word has the same meaning as the usual vaiśamya.

2 This has nothing to do with the satpaksirupakathabhāsa (Nyāyasūtras V, 1, 39-43) —despite Yamaguchi’s note (2).

3 For the statement is ‘included in all things’. — This is certainly the correct interpretation, as suggested in the Edition, p.44, n. 3 (and not that on p. 35). The Naiyāyika’s objection here is closely related to that raised in the Nyāyasūtras II, 1, 13-14, in connection with the Mādhyaṃika negation of the Naiyāyika pramāṇas (cf. vv. XXXI-LI below): sarvapramāṇapratīṣedhā ca pratiṣedhānupalpattiḥ; — tatprāmāṇye vā na sarvapramāṇapavitratīṣedhāḥ. Cf. also Vatsyāyana on Nyāyasūtra IV, 2, 30.

4 tatra drṣṭāntavirodhaḥ. — The proposition, ‘All things are void’, is contradicted by the example (drṣṭānta) of the statement that is non-void. Since the statement is not ‘included in all things’, there can be no question of all things being void.

Moreover:

III. If you think that it is like ‘Do not make a sound’, [we reply:] this
also is not valid. For here a sound that is existent prevents the other sound that will be (सङ्गेत्तन ह्य अत्र सत्ता भविष्यतो वर्गान्ति तस्या).

You may think: When somebody says: ‘Do not make a sound’, he himself makes a sound, and that sound prevents the other sound; in just the same manner, the void statement ‘All things are void’ prevents the intrinsic nature of all things. — To this we reply: This also is not valid. — Why? — Because here a sound that is existent negates the future sound. In your case, however, it is not an existent statement that negates the intrinsic nature of all things. For, in your opinion (ताव हि मतेना) the statement is non-existent, the intrinsic nature of all things is non-existent (वाकान्तम अपि असतं सर्वाभवासवभावो ज्ञ्यं असन). Thus, ‘It is like “Do not make a sound” ’ is a defective proposition (विषामोपन्ययसा).

Moreover:

IV. If you think that the same holds true of the negation (प्राचेषधाप्राचेष्ठा) also, that is false. It is your proposition which by virtue of its specific character is thus rendered defective (लक्षणतो दृष्टयते), not mine.

You may think: ‘According to this very method (अनेनायव कल्पना), a negation of negation also is impossible; so your negation of the statement negating the intrinsic nature of all things is impossible (तत्र यद भवानि सर्वाभावसवभावप्रासेधासवाचानाम प्रासेधायति तद अनुपपांतमिति). — To this we reply: This also is false. — Why? — Because the objection applies [only] to the specific character of your proposition, not to that of mine. It is you who say that all things are void, not I. The initial thesis (पुर्वकालं पक्षं) is not mine. — In these circumstances, your statement that, such being the case (ेवानं सति), a negation of negation also is impossible, is not valid.

1 According to the realist, the Mādhyamika commits the logical error of negating, through a void statement, the intrinsic nature of all things. The realist, however,
does not commit any such error when he negates the Mādhyamika’s statement negating the intrinsic nature of all things — for he does not hold that all things are void; his statement, therefore, is not void.

Moreover:

V. Now, if [you say that] you deny the things after having apprehended them through perception (pratyakṣa), [we reply:] that perception through which the things are apprehended does not exist (tān nāsti pratyakṣam bhāva yenopalabhyante).

You cannot say that you deny all things in the statement ‘All things are void’, after having apprehended them through perception. — Why? — Because even perception, an instrument of true cognition (pramāṇa), is void, being included in all things (sarvabhāvāntargatatvatāt). The person who apprehends the things (yo bhāvaṃ upalabhate) is also void. Thus, there is no such thing as apprehension through perception, an instrument of true cognition (tasmāt pratyakṣena pramāṇena nopalambhābhāvaḥ); and a negation of that which is not apprehended is a logical impossibility (anupalabdhasya ca pratiṣedhānupapatiḥ)². In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

You think, perhaps (syāt te buddhiḥ), that you deny all things (sarvabhāvavyāvarṣṭanaṃ kriyate) after having apprehended them through inference (anumāna), verbal testimony (āgama) and comparison (upamāna)².

1 Here and in the following verse are mentioned the four pramāṇas or ‘instruments of true cognition’, typical of the Nyāya school, viz., perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), verbal testimony (āgama or sabda), and comparison (upamāna).

2 Because negation is not possible without an object to be negated (see XI-XII below).

To this we reply:

VI. In our refutation of perception, we have [already] refuted inference, verbal testimony and comparison, as well as the objects to be established by inference, verbal testimony and example (anumānāgamasādhyā ye ‘ṛtāḥ dṛṣṭāntasādhyāḥ ca).¹

We have [already] refuted inference, comparison and verbal testimony, in our refutation of the ‘instrument of true cognition’ (pramāṇa), perception. Just as perception, an ‘instrument of true cognition’, is
void because all things are void (sarvabhūvānām śūnyatāt), so also are inference, comparison and verbal testimony void because all things are void. Those objects which are to be established by inference, verbal testimony and comparison are also void because all things are void. The person who apprehends the things through inference, comparison and verbal testimony, is also void. Thus, there is no apprehension of things (tasmād bhūvānām upalamabhābhāvah), and a negation of the intrinsic nature of things that are not apprehended is a logical impossibility (anupalabhānām ca svabhāvapratisedhānuparipattih). In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

1 Dr̥ṣṭānta ‘example’ is used here in the sense of upamāna ‘comparison’. Notice that in the commentary portion upamāna is used throughout.

Moreover:

**VII.** People conversant with the state of things (dharmāvasthāvido janāḥ) think that the good things have a good intrinsic nature (kuśalānām dharmānāṃ manyante kuśalam svabhāvam). The same distinction (viniyoga) is made with regard to the rest [of the things] too (the bad things, and so on).

The commentary on this verse is a long list of 119 kuśaladharmas and of other dharman, which is of no particular interest in a treatise on dialectics. Quite a number of technical terms used remain, moreover, uncertain. Cf. Text, p. 47, n. 6, which refers to E. H. Johnston’s article ‘Nāgārjuna’s List of Kuśaladharmas’, in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, XIV, pp. 314—323.

In their Introductio (pp.39-40), the editors observe: ‘While the text is divided in two parts, 20 verses setting out the opponents’ criticisms of Nāgārjuna’s views and 50 verses giving his reply, the objections are not in fact all made by the same critic. The dharmāvasthāvid theorists of verse 7 are clearly Buddhist; though it is difficult to determine their school, the details in the commentary exclude the possibility of their being Sarvāstivādins, to whose theory of the dharman much of the argument elsewhere would apply’. Professor Tucci holds the same view (*Pre-Diśśāga Buddhist Texts on Logic*, p. xiii). For my part, I am rather inclined to think that the author of this objection is the Naiyāyika himself, who uses against Nāgārjuna, a Buddhist, the standpoint of the Buddhist realists. Cf. infra, p.128, n. 2, on LV.
VIII. And those things which lead to emancipation (nairṛṭika) have an intrinsic nature that leads to emancipation (nairṛṭikāsvabhāva). Similarly with the things which do not lead to emancipation, and so on (anairṛṭikādīnām), things which have been mentioned in connection with the state of things (dharmāvasthoktānām).

The commentary gives an enumeration of the dharmas and then says, as at the end of the commentary on the preceding verse: Thus, since the intrinsic nature of things is in this way seen to be of different kinds (anekapraśāra), your statement that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature and that being devoid of an intrinsic nature they are void (niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā iti), is not valid.

Furthermore:

IX. If the things had no intrinsic nature, then even the name ‘absence of intrinsic nature’ would not exist (niḥsvabhāva ity evam nāmāpi bhaven naivam)\(^1\); for there is no name without an object [to be named] (nāma hi nirvastukam nāsti).

If all things were devoid of an intrinsic nature, there would, nevertheless, be an absence of intrinsic nature (yadi sarvadharmāṇāṁ svabhāvo na bhavet tatrāpi niḥsvabhāvo bhavet). [But] then, even the name ‘absence of intrinsic nature’ would not exist (tatra niḥsvabhāva ity evam nāmāpi na bhavet). — Why? — Because there is no name whatsoever without an object [to be named] (nāma hi nirvastukam kīṃcid api nāsti).— Thus, since the name exists (nāmasadbhavāt), there is an intrinsic nature of the things; and since they have an intrinsic nature, all things are non-void (aśūnya). Your statement, therefore, that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature and that, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, they are void, is not valid.

\(^1\)At the end of the first line I prefer to read, with Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, evam (eva in Johnston and Kunst’s edition).

Moreover:

X. Now you may say: There is an intrinsic nature, but that does not belong to the things (sa ca dharmāṇāṁ na vidyate). There is, then, an intrinsic nature without the things (dharmair vinā svabhāvāḥ), and you should explain to what it belongs (sa yasya tad yuktam upadesṭum).
Now you may fancy: Let there be no name without an object; there is an intrinsic nature, but that does not belong to the things; thus, the voidness of the things because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature will be established (evam dharmasūnyatā niḥsvabhāvatvād dharmānāṃ siddhā bhavijati), and the name will not be without an object [to be named].—To this we reply: You should explain that object, apart from the things, to which now belongs thus that intrinsic nature (evam yasyedānīṃ sa svabhāvo dharmavinirmuktasyarthasya sa yuktam upadeśīṃ arthaḥ). You have, however, not explained that. Hence your assumption (kalpanā): ‘there is an intrinsic nature but it does not belong to the things’, is ruled out (hinā).

Furthermore:

XI. Since the negation ‘There is no pot in the house’ (nāsti ghaṭo gehe) is seen to be only of an existent (sata eva), this negation of yours is that of an existent intrinsic nature (sataḥ svabhāvasya).

It is only an existent object that is negated, not a non-existent one. For instance, when it is said: ‘There is no pot in the house’, it is an existent pot that is negated, not a non-existent one (sato ghaṭasya pratīṣedhaḥ kriyate nāsataḥ). In like manner it follows that the negation ‘The things have no intrinsic nature’ (nāsti svabhāvo dharmānāṃ) is the negation of an existent intrinsic nature, not of a non-existent one. In these circumstances, the statement that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature is not valid. By the very fact that a negation is possible, the intrinsic nature of all things is non-negated1.

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1 pratīṣedhasambhavād eva sarvabhave不具备pratīṣedhaḥ. Or ‘svabhāvo prasiddhaḥ (‘the intrinsic nature of all things is established’)? Cf. Text, p. 50, n. 9 and v. LXI below. — ‘Whenever we talk of negation or absence, it is relevant to ask of what the absence or negation is that we are talking about. Nyāya does not accept any such thing as ‘pure negation’. Thus, an absence, it claims, must be an absence of something. This something is termed the pratīṣyogin (the counterpositive) of the absence in question. In this respect the term ‘absence’ is comparable to the term ‘cognition’ (jñāna). An instance of cognition is also a cognition of something.

‘...Nyāya arrives at absence as a property by a hypostasis of denial. It interprets denials like “a is not there” or “a is absent there” as “there is an absence of a there.” Thus the absence of a is asserted as a separate entity, and a, the object of denial, is called the ‘counterpositive’. (B. K. Matilal, The Nyāya-nyāya Doctrine of Negation: The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Nyāya-nyāya Philosophy [=Harvard Oriental Series, 46, Cambridge, Mass., 1968], p. 52).
XII. If that intrinsic nature does not exist, what, then, do you negate by this statement? The negation of a non-existent is established without words (ṛte vacanāt pratiṣedhaḥ sidhyateḥ hy asataḥ).

If that intrinsic nature does not really exist, what do you negate by this statement: ‘All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature’? The negation of a non-existent, e.g., that of the coolness of fire (agniḥ satīyasya) or of the heat of water (apām aṣṭīyasya), is established without words.¹

¹ Cf. Matilal, op. cit., p. 54, n. 9: ‘Nyāya insists that the negate of a negation, i.e., the counterpositive of an absence, must not be an unexamplèd term. In other words, we cannot simply negate a term which has no denotation. To put it in another way, we cannot have an absence whose counterpositive is a fictitious entity’. The author cites Udayana’s Nyāyakusumāṇjali III, 2. See also Dinesh Chandra Guha, Nyāya Nyāya System of Logic (Some Basic Theories & Techniques) [Vārānasi, 1968], pp. 112-113. Our passage seems to be an early and simple statement of this theory. See also B. K. Matilal, ‘Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic’, JIF 1 (1970), pp. 83-110.

Furthermore:

XIII. Just as ignorant people (bāla) wrongly perceive a mirage as water, [and that wrong perception is removed by some person who knows, in like manner you may think that] you negate a wrong perception of a non-entity (evam mithyāgraḥaḥ svaḥ te pratiṣedhyatoḥ hy asataḥ).²

When ignorant people wrongly perceive a mirage as water, a scholarly person (paṇḍitajātiṣyena puruṣena), in order to remove that perception, says: ‘But that mirage is without water’ (nirjalaḥ sā mṛga-tṛṣṇā). Likewise, you may think that the statement ‘All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature’ is meant for removing people’s perception of an intrinsic nature in things that are devoid of an intrinsic nature (evam niḥsvabhāvesu yaḥ svabhāve grāhaḥ sattvāniṣaḥ tasya vyāvar-tanārthaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhaḥ āty ucyata iti).
To this we reply:

**XIV.** But this being so, the aggregate of the six following things exists: the perception (grāha), the object to be perceived (grāhya), the perceiver of that object (tadgrahitya), the negation (pratīṣedha), the object to be negated (pratīṣedhya), and the negator (pratīṣeddhṛ).

If this is so, then the perception of people, the object to be perceived, people who perceive it, the negation of that wrong perception, the object to be negated, viz., the wrong perception, and people like you who negate this perception (pratīṣeddhāro yuṣmadādayo 'syā grāhasya) —all these exist. The aggregate of the six is, therefore, established (siddham saṭkam). [And] that aggregate of the six being established (tasya saṭkasya prasiddhatvāt), your statement that all things are void is not valid.

**XV.** You may think that there is no perception, no object to be perceived, and no perceiver. But, in that case, there is no negation, no object to be negated, and no negator.

If, in order to avoid this defect (mā bhūt eṣa doṣa iti kṛtvā), you say that there is no perception, no object to be perceived, and no perceiver, then even the negation of the perception, viz., the statement that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature (grāhasya yah pratīṣedho niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ iti), does not exist. The object to be negated and the negators, too, do not exist.

**XVI.** And if there is no negation, no object to be negated and no negator, then all things are established, as well as their intrinsic nature (siddhā hi sarvabhāvās teśām eva svabhāvas ca).

And if there is no negation, no object to be negated, and no negator, then all things are non-negated (apratīṣiddhāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ), and they have an intrinsic nature (asti ca sarvabhāvānām svabhāvāḥ).

Furthermore:

**XVII.** Your ‘reason’ [for establishing your thesis] cannot be established (hetoṣ ca te na siddhiḥ). How can there be, indeed, a ‘reason’ for
you, when everything is devoid of an intrinsic nature (naiḥsvabhāvyat kuto hi te hetuḥ)? And this thesis of yours which is devoid of a 'reason', cannot be established (nirhetukasya siddhir na copapannasya te 'ṛthasya).

Your reason for the thesis that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature cannot be established (niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity etasminn arthe te hetor asiddhiḥ). — Why? — Because all things, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, are void. How, therefore, can there be a reason (tato hetuḥ kutāḥ)? [And] if there is no reason (asati hetau), how indeed can the thesis devoid of a reason, namely that all things are void, be established? — In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

Moreover:

XVIII. If your negation of the intrinsic nature is established without any reason (yadi cāhetoḥ siddhiḥ svabhāvavinvartanasya te bhavati), my affirmation of the things' being endowed with an intrinsic nature is also established without any reason (svabhāvyasyāstitvaṃ mamāpi nirhetukaṃ siddham).

[The commentary is merely a paraphrase of the verse. For a similar argument cf. Candrakīrti, MKV, pp. 55-6 (L. de La Vallée Poussin pointed this out in his note 1 on page 56).]

XIX. Nor can you hold that the things' being devoid of an intrinsic nature is the existence of the reason (atha hetor astitvaṃ bhāvāsvabhāvyan ity anupapannam); for there is not a single thing in the world which is devoid of an intrinsic nature and [at the same time] existent (lokeṣu niḥsvabhāvo na hi kaścana vidyate bhāvaḥ).

If you think that the fact that the things are devoid of an intrinsic nature is the existence of the reason, [we answer:] that argument is not valid. — Why? — Because there is nothing in the world that is existent, while being devoid of an intrinsic nature

1 This is how I understand this passage. According to the editors (p. 54, n. 1), 'The argument is that 'if you suppose that the cause exists in reality and that all things (which include the cause) are without essence (so that the cause is at the same time really existent and without essence)’, that argument is not valid’. About the commentary sentence, yadi hetor astitvaṃ manyase niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti, tad anupapannam, they further observe: ‘This sentence may not be in order; it would improve it to put manyase before hetor and add ca after niḥsvabhāvāḥ’. All that, it seems to me, is unnecessary.
Furthermore:

**XX.** It is not possible to hold that the negation comes first and then the thing to be negated. Nor is it possible to hold that the negation comes after [the thing to be negated], or that they are simultaneous.

— The intrinsic nature of the things is, therefore, existent (yataḥ svabhāvaḥ san).

It is not possible to hold that the negation comes first and then the thing to be negated. For, if the thing to be negated does not exist (asati hi pratisedhye), of what is the negation (kasya pratisedhah)? Nor is it possible to hold that the negation comes after the thing to be negated. For, if the thing to be negated is [already] established (siddhe hi pratisedhye), what purpose is served by the negation (kim pratisedhah karoṭi)? Now [if you say that] the negation and the thing to be negated are simultaneous, [we answer]: even in that way, the negation is not the cause of the object to be negated, nor is the object to be negated the cause of the negation (na pratisedhah pratisedhyasyārthasya kāraṇam, pratisedhyo na pratisedhasya ca), just as of the two horns\(^1\), grown simultaneously (yugapadutpanyayoḥ), the right horn is not the cause of the left horn, nor is the left horn the cause of the right horn. — In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid\(^2\).

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1 *śata* in the text is an unnecessary addition to *viśapa*, as the editors have rightly observed (p. 54, n. 9). — Cf. Candrakirti on *MK* **XX**, 7: *na caikakālayoh savetyaramo- viśapayor janayajanakatoṃ dṛṣṭam, vāmadakṣinakarayog carapayor vā.* — *Vaidalyapракarana*, quoted by Yamaguchi, p. 78; *Tarkaṭastra* in Tuucci, p. 18; Gauḍapāda, *Āgamaṭāstra* (= *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*) IV, 16 (cf. Vidhushekhara Bhaṭṭācārya, *Gauḍapādīyam Āgama- ṭāstram*, University of Calcutta, 1950, pp. 115-6); Jayantabhaṭṭa, *Nyāyamaṭhārjī*, p. 628, 1. 13; Bhāsarvajña, *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 350, 1. 18 (read savetyaramaḥ, instead of sadhyetaramaḥ).

2 Cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* **II**, 1, 12: *traikālyāṣiddheḥ pratisedhānapapatiḥ.* — Vātsyāyana: *pūrvam hi pratisedhasiddaḥ asati pratisedhye kim anena pratisidhyante? pascātsiddhau pratised- dhyāṣiddhā, pratisedhābhāvād iti.* *yugapaṭisiddhau pratisedhyasyādhyāṣanujñānād anartha- kāḥ pratisedha iti.* As will be seen, Vātsyāyana's interpretation is a little different from that given in the commentary on our verse here. See also *Nyāya-sūtra* **V**, 1, 20.
TRANSLATION

II

REPLY

[Refutation to the first objection]

XXI. If my statement does not exist in the combination of the cause and the conditions, or independently of them, then the voidness of the things is established because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature (śūnyatvam siddham bhāvānām asvabhāvatvāt).

If my statement does not exist in its cause and in its conditions...², it is devoid of an intrinsic nature, and, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, it is void. Now the voidness of this statement of mine is established because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature. And just as this statement of mine is void because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature, so also are all things void because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature. In these circumstances, your statement: 'Because of the voidness of your statement it is not possible to establish the voidness of all things', is not valid.

¹ In this part Nāgārjuna quotes all the verses translated above, and then gives his reply. I have not thought it necessary to repeat them here.

² The commentary here is a restatement of what was said by the opponent in verse I above.

Furthermore:

XXII. That nature of the things which is dependent is called voidness¹, for that nature which is dependent is devoid of an intrinsic nature (yat ca pratityabhāvo bhavati hi tasyāsvabhāvatvam).

You have not understood the meaning of the voidness of the things. So you have set out to criticize me, saying: ‘Since your statement is devoid of an intrinsic nature, the negation of the intrinsic nature of the things is not valid’. That nature of the things which is dependent is voidness. — Why? — Because it is devoid of an intrinsic nature. Those things which are dependently originated are not, indeed, endowed with an intrinsic nature; for they have no intrinsic nature (ye hi pratityasamutpāna bhāvās te na sasvabhāvā bhavanti, svabhāvabhāvat). — Why? — Because they are dependent on causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāpeksatvāt). If the things were by their own nature (svabhāvataḥ), they would be even without the aggregate of causes and conditions (pratyākhyāyāpi hetupratyayam). But
they are not so. Therefore they are said to be devoid of an intrinsic nature, and hence void. Likewise it follows that my statement also, being dependently originated (pratityasamutpānnavāt), is devoid of an intrinsic nature, and, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, is void. —But things like a cart, a pot, a cloth, etc., though void of an intrinsic nature (svabhāvasūnya) because of being dependently originated, are occupied with their respective functions, e.g., carrying wood, grass and earth, containing honey, water and milk, and protecting from cold, wind and heat. Similarly this statement of mine, though devoid of an intrinsic nature because of being dependently originated, is engaged in the task of establishing the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of the things (niḥsvabhāvatapraksādhane bhāvānāṁ vartate).—In these circumstances, your statement: ‘Your statement, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, is void, and, being void, it cannot negate the intrinsic nature of all things’, is not valid.


Furthermore:

**XXIII.** Suppose that a person, artificially created (nirmitaka), should prevent (pratīṣedhayeta) another artificial person, or that a magic man (māyāpuruṣa) should prevent another man created by his own magic (svamāvayā svāsam) [from doing something]. Of the same nature would be this negation (pratīṣedho 'yaṃ tathaiva syāt')

Suppose that an artificial man should prevent another artificial man occupied with something (kasminścid arthe vartamānan), or that a magic man created by a magician (māyākāraṇa svāsyah) should prevent another magic man created by his own magic and occupied with something. There, the artificial man who is prevented is void, and he (the artificial man) who prevents is also void; the magic man who is prevented is void, and he (the magic man) who prevents is also void. In like manner, a negation of the intrinsic nature of all things by my statement is possible, even though this statement is void (evam eva madvacanena śūnyenāpi sarvabhāvānāṁ svabhāvapratiṣedha upapannaḥ). In these circumstances, your statement: ‘Because of the voidness of your statement, a negation of the intrinsic nature of all things is not possible’, is not valid. In this way is also prevented
the controversial discussion in six points that you spoke of (tatra yo bhavaatā satkoṭiko vāda uktah so 'pi tenaiva pratiśiddhaḥ)². For, this being so, it is not true that my statement is not included in all things; there is nothing that is non-void; nor are all things non-void³.

1 Cf. Mk XVII, 31-32.
2 P.95, above.
3 According to the opponent, either the Mādhyamika’s statement is not ‘included in all things’, and in that case some things are void and some others, non-void; or the statement, being ‘included in all things’, is itself void and thus non-existent and hence incapable of performing an action, viz., the negation. But the Mādhyamika says in reply that his statement is ‘included in all things’, being void like all other things. There can be no question of some things being void and of some others being non-void. It cannot be maintained, however, that the statement does not exist at all: it exists in a certain manner — like the artificial man or the magic man. Though void, the latter prevent other void persons from doing something; similarly the statement, though void, can negate other void things.

Now about your statement [contained in v. II above]:

XXIV. This statement is not endowed with an intrinsic nature (na svābhāvikam etad vākyam). There is therefore no abandonment of position on my part (tasmān na vādahānir me). There is no discordance (nāsti ca vaiśamikatvam), and [hence] there is no special reason to be stated (viśeśahetuṣ ca na nigadyaḥ)¹.

This statement of mine, being dependently originated, is not endowed with an intrinsic nature (na svabhāvopapannam). As previously stated, since it is not endowed with an intrinsic nature, it is void. And since this statement of mine is void, just as all other things are void, there is no discordance. For, there would be a discordance [only] if we said: This statement is non-void (aśūnya), while all other things are void (śūnya). We, however, do not say that. There is, therefore, no discordance. And since the following discordance, this statement is non-void while all other things are void, does not exist, we do not have to state the special reason (tasmād asmābhīr viśeśahetuṣ na vaktavyaḥ): for this reason (anena hetunā) this statement is non-void while all [other] things are void. — In these circumstances, your statement: ‘There is on your part an abandonment of position, there is a discordance, and you should state the special reason’, is not valid.

¹ On the word nigadya, which is against Pāṇini III, 1,100, see Indologica Taurinsia (Turin), VII (1979), pp. 110-11.
XXV. The example given by you: ‘It is like “Do not make a sound”’, is not appropriate. There a sound is prevented by another sound, but the case here is not just the same (ṣabdena tac ca ṣabdasya vāraṇam naivam evaitat).

This example, moreover, is not ours (nāpy ayam asmākaṃ drṣṭāntaḥ). That void statement does not prevent voidness (na śūnyatāṃ pratiṣedhayati) as a person, when he says: ‘Do not make a sound’, makes a sound and at the same time prevents a sound.— Why? —Because, in this example, a sound is prevented by another sound. But the case here is not the same. We say: all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature, and hence void. — Why?

XXVI. Because, if things devoid of an intrinsic nature were prevented by something devoid of an intrinsic nature (naiḥsvabhāvyānāṃ cem naiḥsvabhāvyena vāraṇam yadi), with the cessation of [their] being devoid of an intrinsic nature would be established [their] being endowed with an intrinsic nature (naiḥsvabhāvyaniyorattau svabhāvyam hi prasiddham syāt).¹

This example would be appropriate if by a statement devoid of an intrinsic nature were prevented things devoid of an intrinsic nature — as by the sound: ‘Do not make a sound’ is prevented another sound. Here, however, by a statement devoid of an intrinsic nature is negated the intrinsic nature of the things (iha tu naiḥsvabhāvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratisedhah kriyate). If by a statement devoid of an intrinsic nature were negated the things’ being devoid of an intrinsic nature (yadi naiḥsvabhāvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ naiḥsvabhāvyapratisedhah kriyate), the things, by the very fact of being negated in their quality of being devoid of an intrinsic nature (naiḥsvabhāvyapratisiddhatvād eva), would be endowed with an intrinsic nature (sasvabhāva bhaveyuḥ). Being endowed with an intrinsic nature, they would be non-void. We, however, declare that the things are void, not that they are non-void (śūnyatāṃ ca vayam bhāvānāṃ acaksmahe, nāśūnyatām). This, therefore, is a non-example (adrṣṭānta evāyam).²

¹ naiḥsvabhāva is used here both as an adjective and as a noun. The first is derived from naiḥsvabhāva ‘absence of an intrinsic nature’, and the second, from naiḥsvabhāva ‘devoid of an intrinsic nature’. Cf. v. IX above.
XXVII. Or suppose that an artificial person should prevent the false notion of somebody who with regard to an artificial woman thinks: ‘This is a woman’. This would be like that (evaṃ bhaved etat).

Or suppose that in an artificial woman, void of an intrinsic nature (svabhāvaśūnya), some man should have the false notion (asadgrāha) that it is really (paramārthataḥ) a woman and, as a result of that false notion, should feel desire for her. The Tathāgata or a disciple of the Tathāgata would [then] create an artificial man (nirmitako nirmitaḥ syāt), [and] the latter would dispel the false notion of that man, through the power (adhiśṭhāna) of the Tathāgata or of the disciple of the Tathāgata. Likewise, by my void statement, comparable to the artificial man (nirmitakopamena śūnyena madvacanena), is prevented the idea of an intrinsic nature in all things which are devoid of an intrinsic nature and comparable to the artificial woman (nirmitakasrīṣadṛṣṭesu sarvabhāvēsu niḥsvabhāvēsu yo ‘yam svabhāvagrāhaḥ sa nivartya). Thus, this is an appropriate example for establishing voidness, not the other one (tasmādy ayaṃ atra dṛṣṭāntaḥ śūnyatāprasādhanāṃ praty upapadyamānaḥ, netaraḥ).¹

¹ upapadyamāna in this sentence is not so ‘odd’ as the editors think (p. 60, n. 13). See also the end of the commentary on the next verse, and that on v. LIV. The word occurs also in other texts.

XXVIII. Or this reason (hetu) is similar in nature to the thesis to be established (sādhyasama), for sound has no [real] existence (na hi vidyate dhanēḥ sattā). We do not speak, however, without having recourse to the conventional truth (sāmavyahāra).

The reason (hetu)¹ ‘It is like “Do not make a sound”’ is of the same nature as the thesis to be established — Why? — Because all things, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, are alike (naiḥsvabhāvyenāvitiṣṭhatvāt). That sound, being dependently originated, has no existence by its own nature (na hi tasya dhanēḥ pratityasamutpannatvāt svabhāvasattā vidyate). [And] since it has no existence by its own nature, your statement: ‘For here a sound that is existent prevents the other sound that will be’, is precluded (svāhanyate). It is not, however, without having
recourse to the conventional truth (nyavahārasatyā), it is not by rejecting
the conventional truth, that we say: All things are void. For it is
not possible to teach the absolute truth (dharma) without having recourse
to the conventional truth. As it is said:

‘The transcendent truth cannot be taught without having recourse
to the conventional truth. [And] Nirvāṇa cannot be attained witho-
out realizing the transcendent truth.’

Thus, all things are void like my statement (tasman madvacanavac
chūṇyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ), and that all things are devoid of an intrinsic
nature, follows in both ways (ubhayathopapadyamānām) [i.e., both by
virtue of the ‘reason’ and of the thesis to be established].

1 The term hetu ‘reason’ is used here in the sense of ḍṛṣṭānta ‘example’. A similar
instance is furnished by Gaṇḍapāda’s Āgamālatātra (= Māṇḍūkyakārikā) IV, 20 (quoted
in my paper referred to in note 3 below). Śaṅkara, in his comment on the latter
passage, observes: hetur iti ḍṛṣṭānto ‘trābhipretaḥ, gamakatvāt. prakṛto hi ḍṛṣṭānto na hetuh.
Note that the ‘reason’ is inseparably connected with the ‘example’ in the Nyāya
inferential system. See Nyāyasūtras I, 1, 34-37, and Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya on I, 1, 39.
Cf. also Nyāyasūtra V, 1, l’1: pratidṛṣṭāntahetute ca nāhetur ḍṛṣṭāntaḥ.

2 nyavahāram anāśriya paramārtho na deśyate/
paramārtham anāganya nirvāṇaṁ nādhiganyate! (MK XXIV, 10).—The verb ā-gam-
is used in both the senses ‘to have recourse to’ and ‘to understand, realize’. On its
use in the latter sense cf. Aśvaghosa, Buddhacarita XII, 38 and 116; Saundarananda
XVI, 42 (both in E. H. Johnston’s editions, Lahore 1936 and 1928, respectively;
The absolute truth is beyond words (anakṣara). But it is taught ‘through super-
imposition’ (samārāphāt), with the help of the conventional truth. — See Murti, pp.
232, 253.

3 For the realist, when one says: ‘Do not make a sound’, a sound that is existent
prevents another sound that is not existent, whereas the Mādhyaṃkika’s statement
“All things are void” cannot prevent anything, for it is itself void. To this the Mādhy-
yāmika replies that there is no sound that is ‘existent’; the objection, therefore, is not
valid. — The idea of sādhyasama will occur again when Nāgārjuna takes up the
question of the possibility of a negation in the three times (v. LXIX). This is one of
the several Naiyāyika technical terms used by Nāgārjuna in this treatise (see
Glossary, published in JIP 5 [1978], pp. 240-41. It should be noted, however, that
Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti do not use the term in the sense in which Nyāya uses it.
See my ‘Note on the interpretation of the term sādhyasama in Madhyamaka Texts’, in JIP
2, 3/4 (March/June 1974), pp. 225-30. Cf. also, for instance, Candrakīrti, MKV.,
p. 283, 11, 3ff. There is a verse in Āryadeva’s Catuḥṣatakā (reconstructed from the
Tibetan), which, although it does not use the term sādhyasama, is clearly reminiscent
of the Nyāya use of it (on which cf. B. K. Matilal, ‘A Note on the Nyāya Fallacy
Sādhyasama and Petitio Principii’, in JIP 2, 3/4, pp. 211-24). The opponent
wants to prove the reality of the sense-objects on the ground that they are perceived.
But Āryadeva argues that they are not perceived, and concludes: tasmāt sādhyena sādhyasya siddhir naivopapadyate. Since the 'reason', the fact of being perceived (pratya-kṣata), is itself to be proved (sādhyā), it cannot establish the thesis to be established (sādhyā). (The Catuḥṣatata of Āryadeva, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts with copious extracts from the Commentary of Candrakīrti, reconstructed and edited by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, Viśva-Bhāratī Series 2, Calcutta 1931, Ch. XIII, v. 5 [Kārikā 305, p. 172]). So far as I can see, Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti never express themselves in this way. — Vaidya's interpretation of Āryadeva's Kārikā 396 (Ch. XVI, v. 21), followed by May (P. L. Vaidya, Études sur Āryadeva et son Catuḥṣatata, chapitres VIII-XVI, Paris 1923, p. 166; cf. May, p. 93, n. 205), is inexact. See Candrakīrti's comment, pp. 289-90. The rendering of sādhyasama by 'petitio principii', 'pétition de principe', found in the modern translations of Nāgārjuna and Candrākīrti, is to be modified in the light of these recent contributions.

Now about your statement [contained in v. IV]:

XXIX.1 If I had any proposition (pratijñā), then this defect (doṣa) would be mine. I have, however, no proposition (nāsti ca mama pratijñā). Therefore, there is no defect that is mine (tasmān naivāsti me doṣāḥ).

If I had any proposition, then the defect previously stated by you would be mine, because it would affect the specific character of my proposition (mama pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvat). [But] I have no proposition. Thus [we observe:] When all things are void, perfectly appeased and by nature isolated2, how can there be a proposition? How can something affect the specific character of a proposition (kutāḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptiḥ)? [And] how can there be a defect, caused by the fact of affecting the specific character of a proposition (kutāḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptikṛto doṣāḥ)? — In these circumstances, your statement: 'The defect is only yours because it affects the specific character of your proposition', is not valid3.

1This and the following verse are quoted by Candrakīrti, MKV, p. 16.

2 śūnyesu atyantopāśāteṣu prakṛtivīviktaṣu. — The things' being devoid of an intrinsic nature does not mean that they have no nature at all. In their essential nature (prakṛti), they are nothing but the universal and absolute Reality, which is 'perfectly appeased' (atyantopāśāta) and 'by nature isolated' (prakṛtivīkta). That Nature, isolated from its appearances, is not, however, an entity that can be determined objectively. 'By their nature, the things are not a determinate entity. Their nature is a non-nature; it is their non-nature which is their nature. For they have only one nature, i.e., no nature (from the objective standpoint)': prakṛtyaiva na te dharmāh kīmei. yā ca prakṛtīḥ sāprakṛtīḥ, yā cāprakṛtīh sa prakṛtīḥ sarvadharmānām — ekalakṣaṇatvād

In the Mahāyāna works the Absolute is often spoken of as beyond ‘grasping’ (upalambaḥ). Objectively speaking, it is ‘non-existent’. But from its objective non-existence we should not conclude its metaphysical non-existence. On the contrary, its objective ‘non-existence’ is evidence of its highest metaphysical ‘existence’, its being ‘not grasped’ in an objective sense is evidence of its being ‘grasped’ in the highest metaphysical sense, i.e., beyond the subject-object split. We read thus in the Mahāyāna-Sūtraśāstra:

yoradiyamānātā saiva paramā vidyamānātā
sarvathāupalambhaḥ ca upalambhaḥ para mataḥ || (IX, 78; ed. by S. Lévi, Paris, 1907).

Cf. also Candrakīrti, MKV, p. 265: avidyātimitiraprabhāvopalabhāṃ bhavajñatāṃ yenadāṃnām vigatāvidyātimitirāṇām āryaṃ ārthakāraṇaṃ viśayatvam upañāti tad eva svarūpam esāṃ svabhāva iti vyavasthāpyate... sa caiva bhāvānāṁ anupādātāmāṁ svabhāvaḥ ‘kīmeśvānābhāvavāmātratvād avadhūtā eveti krtā naśti bhavasvabhāva iti vijñāyatam. [Sūtra, p. 90. See also Atman-Brahman, p. 67, n. 3; pp. 96-8].

The Mādhyamika may say that, if in the realist’s opinion he cannot deny with his void statement the reality of the things, the realist himself cannot deny the Mādhyamika’s negation. To do this the realist replies that the objection does not apply to him, for it is the Mādhyamika, not he, who holds that all things are void; his statement negating the Mādhyamika’s negation is therefore not void. — But the Mādhyamika replies in turn that the realist’s objection is not valid, for the Mādhyamika has no proposition of his own. ‘All things are void’ is not a “proposition”. It only expresses the Inexpressible, with the help of the conventional truth — as he has already explained in the preceding verse. The real language here would be silence: paramārthḥo hy āryaṃ tāsīṃbhāvahaḥ, Candrakīrti (MKV, p. 57; cf. Murti, p. 232; supra, p. 90) for a different reading cf. J. W. de Jong, ‘Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā’ in Indo-Iranian Journal (Dordrecht) 20 (1978), p. 33).

[Refutation of the third objection; see vv. V, VI above].

XXX. If I apprehended something with the help of perception, etc., then I would either affirm or deny (pravartaye yam niṣvartaye yam vā). [But] since that thing does not exist, I am not to blame (tadabhāvān me 'napālambhaḥ).

If I apprehended something with the help of the four pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, identification and verbal testimony, or with the help of one of these, then only would I either affirm or deny. [But] since I do not even apprehend an object of any kind (yathārtham evāham kançin no pālabhe), I neither affirm nor deny (tasman na pravartayeṇa niṣvartayāmi). In these circumstances, your criticism (yo bhavatopālambha uktāḥ): ‘If [you say that] you deny the things after having apprehended them through one of the pramāṇas, viz., perception, etc.,
[we reply:] those \textit{pramāṇas} do not exist, nor do exist the objects to be apprehended through them (\textit{taś ca pramāṇair api gatī arthāh}), does not concern me at all (\textit{sa me bhavaty evānupālambaḥ}).

Furthermore:

**XXXI.** If such and such objects are established for you through the \textit{pramāṇas} (\textit{yadi ca pramāṇatas te tēsaṁ tēsaṁ prasiddhir arthānām}), tell me how those \textit{pramāṇas} are established for you (\textit{tēsaṁ punah prasiddhim brūhi katham te pramāṇānām})\textsuperscript{1}.

If you think that such and such \textquote{objects of true cognition'} (\textit{arthā-nāṁ prameyānām}) are established through the \textquote{instruments of true cognition'} (\textit{pramāṇa}), just as the things to be measured (\textit{meya}) are established through the measuring instruments (\textit{māna}), [we ask:] How are those \textquote{instruments of true cognition', viz., perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony, established? If [you say that] the \textit{pramāṇas} are established without the help of \textit{pramāṇas} (\textit{yadi tēvan niśpramāṇānāṁ pramāṇānāṁ syāt prasiddhiḥ}), then [your] proposition that [all] objects are established through \textit{pramāṇas} is abandoned (\textit{pramāṇato 'rthānāṁ prasiddhir iti hiyate pratiṣṭhā})\textsuperscript{2}.

\textsuperscript{1} The Mādhyamika-Naiyāyika controversy over the \textit{pramāṇas} is well known from the \textit{Nyāyāṣṭra II}, 1, 8-19. Vācaspatimiśra, in his \textit{Nyāyāvarttīkatātparyāśī} (p. 249 in \textit{Vizianagram Sanskrit Series} No. 15, Benares 1898), expressly states that the objector is a Mādhyamika. Furthermore: \textquote{L\’attitude des philosophes bouddhiques est expliquée avec précision'} (L. de La Vallée Poussin, \textit{MKV}, p. 56, n. 1). Here we have the Mādhyamika\textquote{s} own version of this controversy. See on this question Murti, pp. 149ff.

\textsuperscript{2} Because the \textit{pramāṇas}, the \textquote{means of true cognition'}, are also \textquote{objects'} (\textit{artha}). Cf. v. **XXXIII** below. — \textquote{It might be better to omit the entire sentence'} (Text, p. 63, n. 5).

**XXXII a-b.** If the \textit{pramāṇas} are established through other \textit{pramāṇas}, then there is an infinite series (\textit{anavasthā}).

If you think that the \textquote{objects of true cognition'} (\textit{prameya}) are established through the \textquote{means of true cognition'} (\textit{pramāṇa}) and that those \textquote{means of true cognition'} are established through other \textquote{means of true cognition}, then there follows an infinite series — What harm is there if there is an infinite series?—

**XXXII c-d.** Neither the beginning nor the middle nor the end can then be established.
If there is an infinite series, the beginning cannot be established. — Why? — Because those pramāṇas are established through other pramāṇas, and those others again through other pramāṇas. Thus there is no beginning. [And] if there is no beginning, how can there be a middle? how can there be an end?

Consequently, the statement that those pramāṇas are established through other pramāṇas is not valid.

1 Cf. Nyāyasūtra II, 1, 17, with Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara’s Vārttika and Viśvanātha’s Vyāti.

XXXIII. Now, if [you think that] those pramāṇas are established without pramāṇas (pramāṇaṁ vinā), then your philosophic position is abandoned (vihīyate vādāḥ). There is a discordance, and you should state the special reason for that.

Now, if you think: those pramāṇas are established without pramāṇas; the objects to be cognized (prameyāṇam arthānām), however, are established through the pramāṇas, then your position that [all] objects are established through pramāṇas (pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir arthānām) is abandoned. There is, moreover, a discordance, namely that some objects are established through pramāṇas, while some others are not (keśānicid arthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ keśānicin neti). And you should state the special reason why some objects are established through pramāṇas, while some others are not. But you have not stated that. Thus this assumption, too, is not valid (tasmād ihyam api kalpanā nopapanneti).

The opponent replies: The pramāṇas establish themselves as well as other things. As it is said:

‘Fire illuminates itself as well as other things. Likewise, the pramāṇas establish themselves as well as other things.’

(The commentary on this verse is just a paraphrase.)

1 After having refuted the charge of ‘discordance’ (vaśamikatvaḥ; v. II) brought against him by his opponent, Nāgārjuna here returns the same charge to his opponent. — In Nyāyasūtra II, 1, 18, the following objection is raised: If the pramāṇas are established without pramāṇas, then the prameyas also should be established without pramāṇas: tadvinirṛttī vā pramāṇasiddhivat prameyasiddhiḥ. In other words, it would be vain to talk about pramāṇas: evam ca sarvopramāṇaśūlopaḥ (Vātsyāyana).

2 dyotayati svātmāṁ yathā hutosas tathā parātmānāṁ/ svaparātmānāṁ evam prasādhyānti pramāṇāḥ /

The view put forward in this verse is in accord with Nyāyasūtra II, 1, 19: na, pradīpaprakāśa (siddhi)ḥvat tattvādhiḥ. This seems, at least, to have been the view of
Gautama and of some of his followers. Vātsyāyana’s interpretation is different. See on this question my paper entitled ‘On the Relationship between Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartani and the Nyāyasūtras’, in Journal of Indo-European Studies (USA) 5, 3 (Fall 1977), pp. 265-73.

Here we observe:

XXXIV. This is a defective proposition (viṣamopanyāsa)\(^1\). Fire does not illuminate itself, for its non-perception is not seen to be comparable to that of a pot in darkness (na hi tasyānupalabdhir drṣṭā tamasiva kumbhasya).

Your proposition that the pramāṇas establish themselves as well as other things like fire [that illuminates itself as well as other things] is defective. For fire does not illuminate itself. A pot, not illuminated by fire, is first not perceived in darkness. Then, being illuminated by fire, it is perceived. If, in the same manner, fire, not being illuminated, first existed in darkness and then were illuminated, it would be possible to say: it illuminates itself (evam eva yady aprakāśitah prāg agnis tamasi syād uttarakālam agneḥ prakāśanaṁ syat, ataḥ svātmānam prakāśayet). This, however, is not the case. Thus this assumption, too, is not valid.

\(^1\) Cf. supra, p.98, commentary on v. III.

Furthermore:

XXXV. If, as you say, fire illuminates itself as it illuminates other things, then it will also burn itself.

If, as you say, fire illuminates itself just as it illuminates other things, then it will also burn itself just as it burns other things. This, however, is not the case. In these circumstances, your statement that fire illuminates itself as it illuminates other things, is not valid\(^1\).

\(^1\) The subject cannot be the object of its own act. Cf. Śaṅkara, Upadeśasāhasrī, padya XVI, 13 (in Minor Works of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya [ed. by H. R. Bhagavat] = Poona Oriental Series, No. 8, second edition, 1952):

\textit{yaddharmā yath padārtha na tasyaiveyat sa karmatām}  
na hy ātmānam dahaty agnis tathā naiva prakāśayet/}

Śaṅkara criticizes there the Buddhist idealists (Vijñānavādin), who hold that cognition is self-luminous, like a lamp. See also Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya II, 2, 28. On svātmanī kriyāvirodha see also Ātman-Brahman, p. 52 & n. 7. In his comment on Brhadāranyaka - Upaniṣad IV, 3, 7, Śaṅkara uses arguments which recall those used by Nāgārjuna in the preceding verse: yat tucyate, pradipa ātmānam ghaṭanām cāvabhāsrayatī,
XXXVI. If, as you say, fire illuminates both other things and itself, then darkness will cover both other things and itself\(^1\).

If in your opinion fire illuminates both other things and itself, then its opposite (\textit{tatpratipaksabhūtaḥ}), darkness, too, would cover both other things and itself. This, however, is not seen. In these circumstances, your statement that fire illuminates both other things and itself is not valid.

\(^1\) Cf. \textit{MK VII} 12:

\begin{quote}
\textit{pradipaḥ svaparātmānaḥ saṃprakāśayate yadi}
\textit{tamo 'pi svaparātmānaḥ chādejissyaty asaṃsrayam}/
\end{quote}

And again:

XXXVII. There is no darkness in fire nor in something else in which fire stands (\textit{nāsti tamaś ca jvalane yatra ca tiṣṭhati parātmānaḥ jvalanaḥ}). How can it [then] illuminate? For illumination is destruction of darkness\(^1\).

Here, in fire, there is no darkness. Nor is there any darkness where fire is. Now, illumination is obstruction caused to darkness (\textit{tamasah pratīghātaḥ}). But since there is no darkness in fire nor where fire is, what is that darkness which is obstructed by fire, and by virtue of whose obstruction it illuminates both other things and itself (\textit{kasya tamasah pratīghātam agnih karoti, yasya pratīghātād agnih svaparātmānaḥ prakāśayatiti})?

The opponent replies: But is it not true that fire illuminates both other things and itself, for this very reason that there is no darkness in fire nor where fire is (\textit{nanu yasmād evaṃ nāgnaḥ tamo 'sti nāpi yatṛāgnis tatra tamo 'sti, tasmād eva svaparātmānaḥ na prakāśayaty agnih kutaḥ})? For, in the very process of its origination, fire obstructs darkness (\textit{tena hy utpadyamānenaivāgninā tamasah pratīghātaḥ}). If there is no darkness in fire nor where fire is, it is because in the very process of its origination fire illuminates both other things and itself.
TRANSLATION

(tasmān nāgnau tamo ’sti nāpi yatāṅgvis tatra tamo ’sti, yasmād upādyamāna evobhayam prakāśayaty agniḥ svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ceti).

1 Cf. MK VII, 9:
pradīpe nādhakāro ’sti yatra cāsau pratiṣṭhitaḥ
kim prakāśayatī dīpaḥ prakāśo hi tamovadhāḥ/

Here we observe:

XXXVIII. It is wrong to say (asadvāda) that fire illuminates in the very process of its origination. For, in the very process of its origination, fire does not come in contact with darkness1.

The opinion that fire, in the very process of its origination, illumines both other things and itself, is not tenable. — Why? — Because, in the very process of its origination, fire does not come in contact with darkness; since it does not come in contact with it, it does not destroy it; and since darkness is not destroyed, there is no illumination (tamaśaḥ caṇupaghātān nāsti prakāśaḥ).

1 Cf. MK VII, 10:
katham upādyamānena pradīpena tamo hatam/
nottapadyamāno hi tamaḥ pradīpaḥ prāpnaḥ yadā||
Light and darkness cannot coexist: ālokāndhakārayor kaumapadyābhāvāt, Candrakīrtī on this verse.

XXXIX. Or, if fire destroyed darkness even without coming in contact with it, then this fire, standing here, would destroy darkness in all the worlds1.

Or, if you think that fire destroys darkness even without coming in contact with it, then this fire, standing here at this moment, will equally (tulyam)2 destroy the darkness existing in all the worlds, without coming in contact with it. This, however, is not seen to be the case (na ca itad evam drṣṭam). Thus, your opinion that fire destroys darkness even without coming in contact with it, is not valid.

1 Cf. MK VII, 11:
aprāpyaiva pradīpena yadi vā nihataṁ tamaḥ/
ihaṁ ca sarvālokasthānam sa tamo nihāniṣyati/
2 I differ here from the editors (see their note, p. 67, n. 5, and Introduction, p. 39).
Furthermore:

**XL.** If the pramāṇas are self-established (yadi svataḥ ca pramāṇasiddhiḥ), then the ‘means of true cognition’ are established for you independently of the ‘objects of true cognition’ (anapeksya tava prameyāṇi bhavati pramaṇasiddhiḥ). For self-establishment does not require another thing (na parāpeksā svataḥ siddhiḥ).

(The commentary is merely a paraphrase.)

The opponent replies: What defect will ensue (ko doṣo bhaviṣyatī) if the means of true cognition do not require the objects to be cognized (prameyāṇ arthān)?

1 On this and the following verses cf. MK X, 8-12.

Here we observe:

**XLI.** If you think that the ‘means of true cognition’ (pramāṇa) are established independently of the ‘objects of true cognition’ (prameyāṇ arthān), then those pramāṇas are [pramāṇas] of nothing (na bhavanti kasyacid evam imāni tāni pramāṇāni).

If [you think that] the ‘means of true cognition’ are established independently of the ‘objects of true cognition’, then those pramāṇas are pramāṇas of nothing (evam tānimāni pramāṇāni na kasyacid pramāṇāni bhavanti). Thus there is a defect (evam doṣaḥ). If, however, the pramāṇas are pramāṇas of something, they do not then become ‘means of true cognition’ independently of the ‘objects of true cognition’ (atha kasyacid bhavanti pramāṇāni naivedānim anapeksya prameyāṇ arthān pramaṇāṇi bhavanti).

**XLII.** [The opponent may reply:] If it is admitted that they are established in relation [to the objects to be cognized], what defect is there? — [The defect is that] what is [already] established is established [again] (siddhasya sādhanaṃ syāt). For something that is not established does not require something else (nāsiddho ‘peksate hy anyat).

If it is admitted that the ‘means of true cognition’ are established in relation to the ‘objects of true cognition’, then the four ‘means of true cognition’, which are [already] established, are established [anew].

— Why? — Because an object that is not established does not require
something else]. For instance, Devadatta, who is not [yet] established, does not require anything whatever. But it is not admissible (iṣṭa) that something that is [already] established be established [anew]. One does not do something that is [already] done.

Besides:

XLIII. If the pramāṇas are at all events (sarvathā) established in relation to the prameyas, the prameyas are not established in relation to the pramāṇas.

If the pramāṇas are established in relation to the prameyas, then the prameyas are not established in relation to the pramāṇas. — Why?
— Because the object to be established (sādhya) does not establish the instrument by which it is established (sādhana). The pramāṇas, however, it is said, are the instruments by which the prameyas are established (sādhanāni ca kila prameyāṇāṃ pramāṇāni).1

1 This is the ordinary view. But, if it is thought that the pramāṇas themselves are established by the prameyas, in other words, that they are sādhyas in relation to the prameyas, which are sādhanas, they cannot establish the prameyas, for the sādhyas cannot establish the sādhanas. — Note the use of the particle kila 'it is said'. By this Nāgārjuna reports a view ordinarily accepted in the world. Cf. MK I, 5.

XLIV. And if the prameyas are established even independently of the pramāṇas, what do you gain by establishing the pramāṇas (kiṃ te pramāṇasiddhyā)? That whose purpose they serve is [already] established (tāni yadartham prasiddham tat).

(The commentary is just a paraphrase.)

XLV. Besides, if you establish the pramāṇas in relation to the prameyas, then there is certainly an interchange of pramāṇas and prameyas (vyatya evaṃ sati te dhruvaṃ pramāṇaprameyāṇāṃ).

Moreover, if you think, in order to avoid the defect stated before1, that the 'means of true cognition' exist only in relation to the 'objects of true cognition', then there is an interchange of pramāṇas and prameyas. Your pramāṇas become prameyas, because they are established by the prameyas (prameyasāh sādhitatvāt). And the prameyas become pramāṇas, because they establish the pramāṇas (pramāṇānāṃ sādhakatvāt).

1 Cf. v. XLI.
XLVI. Now, if you think that through the establishment of the pramāṇas are established the prameyas, and that through the establishment of the prameyas are established the pramāṇas, then neither the prameyas nor the pramāṇas are established for you.

Now, if you think that through the establishment of the pramāṇas are established the prameyas — because the prameyas require the pramāṇas — and that through the establishment of the prameyas are established the pramāṇas — because the pramāṇas require the prameyas — then neither the prameyas nor the pramāṇas are established. — Why?

XLVII. Because, if the prameyas owe their establishment to the pramāṇas, and if those pramāṇas are to be established by those very prameyas (śidhyanti hi pramāṇaṁ yadi prameyāṇaṁ tāṁ tair eva sādhyaṁ ca prameyaiḥ), how will the pramāṇas establish [the prameyas]?

Because, if the prameyas owe their establishment to the pramāṇas, and if those pramāṇas are to be established by those very prameyas (tāṁ ca pramāṇāṁ tair eva prameyaiḥ sādhyaṁ tāṁ), [we encounter the following difficulty:] the prameyas not having been established, the pramāṇas are not established, for their cause (kāraṇa) is not established. How, then, will the pramāṇas establish the prameyas?

1 I.e., the prameyas.
2 Which themselves are not yet established.

XLVIII. And if the pramāṇas owe their establishment to the prameyas, and if those prameyas are to be established by those very pramāṇas, how will the prameyas establish [the pramāṇas]?

And if the pramāṇas owe their establishment to the prameyas, and if those prameyas are to be established by those very pramāṇas, [we encounter the following difficulty:] the pramāṇas not having been established, the prameyas are not established, for their cause is not established. How, then, will the prameyas establish the pramāṇas?

1 I.e., the pramāṇas.
2 Which themselves are not yet established.
3 In MK XXIII, 10-11, Nāgārjuna argues in a similar way to show the hollowness of the ideas of good and evil:

    anapekṣyāśubhaṁ nāṣṭaṁ asubhaṁ prajñāpāyemahi||
    yat pratītya subhaṁ tasmād schubhaṁ naivo pāpadyate||

    anapekṣyaśubhaṁ nāṣtāṁ subhaṁ prajñāpāyemahi||
    yat pratītyāsqubhaṁ tasmād asubhaṁ naiva vidyate||
XLIX. If the son is to be produced (utpādyā) by the father, and if that father is to be produced by that very son, tell me which of these produces which other (vada tatrotpādayati kaḥ kam).

Supposing somebody said: the son is to be produced (utpādanīya) by the father, and that father is to be produced by that very son, tell me who is to be produced by whom (kena ka utpādayitavya iti). In exactly the same manner you say: the prameyas are to be established by the pramāṇas, and those very pramāṇas in turn are to be established by those very prameyas. Now, which of these are to be established for you by which others (tatredānim te katamaiḥ katamāni sādhayitavyāni)?

L. Tell me which of these is the father, and which other the son. Both of them bear, indeed, the mark of a father and that of a son (tāv ubhāv api ca pitṛputralakṣaṇapadharau), wherefore we have a doubt here (yato bhavati no 'tra sanādehaḥ).

Of that father and that son, mentioned before, which is the son, and which other the father? Both of them, as producers (utpādakāt-vāt), bear the mark of a father, and, as produced (utpādyatvāt), the mark of a son. We have a doubt here: which of these is the father, and which other the son? In just the same manner, of these pramāṇas and prameyas of yours, which are the pramāṇas, and which others the prameyas? For both of these, as those which establish (sādhakatvāt), are pramāṇas, and as those which are to be established (sādhyaatvāt), prameyas. We have a doubt here as to which of these are the pramāṇas, and which others the prameyas\(^1\).

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\(^1\) Pramāṇa and prameya are relative terms. One exists only in relation to the other. They are 'dependently originated', and hence 'void'. In an absolute sense, there is neither any pramāṇa nor any prameya. The example of the father and the son indicates it. The father exists only in relation to the son, and the son exists only in relation to the father; in an absolute sense, there is neither a father nor a son:

\textit{pitā cen na vinā putrāt kutaḥ putrasya sambhavah}\]

\textit{putrābhāve pitā nāsti tathāsatvaṁ tayor dvayoḥ//} (Śāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra IX; 114 [ed. by P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1960]).

We should not conclude, however, that Nāgārjuna does not recognize any empirical validity of the pramāṇas and the prameyas, of the ideas of the father and the son, and so on. On the contrary, he would say, in accord with his doctrine of action (supra, p. 2; infra, vv. LIV-LVI), that it is their 'voidness' which establishes their empirical validity. If 'voidness', i.e. 'dependent origination', is denied, then they become the suprarelational Absolute, and thus annul themselves as such. — Cf. Candrakīrti, MKV, p. 69.
II. The *pramāṇas* are not established by themselves (*svataḥ*) or by one another (*parasparataḥ*) or by other *pramāṇas* (*parāpramāṇaiḥ*). Nor are they established by the *prameyas*, or accidentally (*aksamāt*).

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is not established by that very perception, inference (*anumāṇa*) is not established by that very inference, comparison (*upamāna*) is not established by that very comparison, and testimony (*āgama*) is not established by that very testimony. Nor are they established by one another, i.e., perception by inference, comparison and testimony, inference by perception, comparison and testimony, comparison by perception, inference and testimony, and testimony by perception, inference and comparison. Nor are perception, inference, comparison and testimony established, respectively (*yathāsvam*), by another perception, another inference, another comparison, and another testimony. Nor are the *pramāṇas* established by the *prameyas*, taken collectively or severally (*samastavyastaiḥ*), included in their own field or in those of the other *pramāṇas* as well (*svaaviśayaparaviśayasamgrihitaḥ*).

Nor are they established accidentally. Nor again are they established by a combination of the causes mentioned before (*samuccayenaitesām kāraṇānāṁ pūrvoddistānāṁ*), whatever their number: twenty, thirty, forty or twenty-six. In these circumstances, your statement: ‘Because the things to be cognized are to be apprehended through the means of true cognition (*pramāṇādhigamayatvāt prameyānāṁ bhāvānāṁ*), those things to be cognized (*prameyā bhāvāḥ*) exist as well as those means of true cognition through which those things to be cognized are apprehended (*santi ca te prameyā bhāvās tāni ca pramāṇāni yais te pramāṇaiḥ prameyā bhāvāḥ samadhiṣatā iti*)’, is not valid.

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1 I do not see how the correction suggested by Arnold Kunst in his Preface, p.35, can be accepted.

2 Cf. MK I, 1:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{na svato nāpi parato na duśāhṛtvā nāpy ahetutāḥ} \\
\text{utsparṇā jātā vidyante bhāvāḥ koacana kecana/}
\end{align*}
\]

3 What is the meaning of these numbers, and especially of the number twenty-six, which closes the series? We obtain, in fact, the number twenty, if we combine the causes enumerated above, up to ‘another testimony’. Perhaps the author wants, first, to increase that number by ten, then that number again by ten, and finally to
multiply twenty by some number. Instead of 逯wimśati (sic), I am tempted to read
逯tavimśati 'hundred times twenty'. All that, of course, is mere conjecture.

[Refutation of the fourth objection; see v. VII above]

LII. If people conversant with the state of things say that the good
things have a good intrinsic nature, that has to be stated in detail
(evaṁ pravibhāgenābhidheyah syät).

People conversant with the state of things think that the good
things have a good intrinsic nature. But that has to be stated by you
in detail: this is that good intrinsic nature; these are those good things;
this is that good consciousness (kuṣalam vijñānam); this is that intrinsic
nature of the good consciousness (kuṣalavijñānasvabhāva), and so on
(evaṁ sarvesām). This, however, is not seen to be so (na caitad evam
dṛṣṭam). Thus your statement that the intrinsic nature of each
individual thing has been explained (yathāsvam upadīṣṭaḥ) is not valid.

Furthermore:

LIII. If the good intrinsic nature originates dependently (pratītya
utpadyate), it is an extrinsic nature (parabhāva) of the good things.
How can it be thus their intrinsic nature (svabhāva evaṁ kathāṁ
bhavati)?

If the intrinsic nature of the good things originates in dependence
upon the cause-condition complex (hetupratyayaśāmagrīṁ pratītyotpadya
yate), how can it, being born of an extrinsic nature (parabhāväd utpan-
naḥ), be the intrinsic nature of the good things? The same holds true
of the bad and other things (evaṁ evākuśalaprabhīṣṭāṁ). — In these
circumstances, your statement that the good intrinsic nature of the
good things has been explained, as well as the bad intrinsic nature
of the bad things, and so on, is not valid.

LIV. Now, if [you think:] that intrinsic nature of the good things
originates without depending on anything (na pratītya kimcit), then
there would be no practice of religious life (evaṁ syād vāso na
brahmacaryasya).1

Now, if you think that the good intrinsic nature of the good things
originates without depending on anything, and that the same is true
of the bad intrinsic nature of the bad things and of the indeterminate
(avyākṛta) intrinsic nature of the indeterminate things, then there is no practice of religious life (evam saty abrahmacaryavāso bhavati).—Why?—Because, if this is so, one rejects Dependent Origination (pratityasamutpādasya hy evam sati pratyākhyānāṃ bhavati). By rejecting Dependent Origination, one rejects the vision of Dependent Origination (pratityasamutpādasya pratyākhyānāt pratityasamutpādadasānapratyākhyānāṃ bhavati). For if Dependent Origination does not exist, there can be no question of its vision (na hy avidyāmānasya pratityasamutpādasya darśanam upāpadyamānāṃ bhavati). If there is no vision of Dependent Origination, there is no vision of Dharma. For the Lord has said: 'O monks, he who sees the pratityasamutpāda sees the Dharma'². [And] if one does not see the Dharma, there is no practice of religious life (dharma-darśanābhaṣvad brahmacarya-vāsābhaṣvāḥ).

Or, rejecting Dependent Origination, one rejects the origination of sorrow (atha vā pratityasamutpādapratyākhyānād duḥkhasamudayapratyākhyānāṃ bhavati). For Dependent Origination is the origination of sorrow (pratityasamutpādo hi duḥkhasya samudayaḥ). By rejecting the origination of sorrow, one rejects sorrow (duḥkhasamudayasya pratyākhyānād duḥkhapratyākhyānāṃ bhavati). For, if there is no origination, how will that sorrow originate (asati hi samudaye tat kuto duḥkhāṃ samudasyati)? If sorrow and [its] origination are rejected, then the cessation (niruddha) of sorrow is rejected. For if there is no origination of sorrow, what will come to cease through abandonment (kasya prahārānā nirodho bhavisyati)? [And] if the cessation of sorrow is rejected, the Way (mārga) is rejected. For, if there is no cessation of sorrow, for obtaining what will there be a way leading to the cessation of sorrow (kasya prāptaye mārgo bhavisyati duḥkhanirodhaṃ)? Thus, the Four Noble Truths will cease to exist (evam catunām āryasaṅyānām abhāvāḥ). If they do not exist, there is no result of monasticism (śrāmyāphala). For it is through the vision of [those] Truths that the results of monasticism are attained (satyadarśanāc chrāmyāphalaṃ hi samadhirgamyante). [And] if the results of monasticism do not exist, there is no practice of religious life.

¹ Apparently, the Mādhyamika's assertion that all things are void ruins the foundation of all religious practice. But the Mādhyamika says in reply that it is on the contrary if things are not void, that all religious practice becomes meaningless. Voidness is 'dependent origination' (pratityasamutpāda). But if there is no 'dependent origination', then there is no sorrow, no origination of sorrow, and for that reason, no destruction of sorrow and no way leading to that destruction. Everything is immut-
able, free from the vicissitudes of the empirical world, being the Absolute itself. Thus, if Voidness is not admitted, the Four Noble Truths, which constitute the foundation of all religious practice in Buddhism, cannot be understood. — The whole thing has to be read along with **MK XXIV** (cf. E. Frauwallner’s introduction to his translation of this chapter, pp. 187ff.). See also p.91 above, and the concluding verse of our treatise.

3 This is a quotation from the Śālistamba-sūtra (cf. Mahāyāna-Sūtra-saṃgraha I [ed. by P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1961], p. 100). For the Pāli version see Majjhima-Nikāya I, pp. 190-1 (Pāli Text Society edition). — Dharma, as equivalent to pratītyasaṃutpāda, does not mean the Absolute Truth (in which there is no dependent origination: cf. *supra*, p.91; but is only a negative expression of the Absolute. Cf. Ātman-Brahman, pp. 95, 97.

Furthermore:

LV. There would be neither merit (*dharma*) nor demerit (*adharma*) nor the worldly conventions (*samyuvahārāḥ ca laukikāḥ*). All things, being endowed with an intrinsic nature, would be permanent — for that which has no cause is permanent (*nityāḥ ca sasvabhāvāḥ syur nitya-tvād ahetumataḥ*).

If this is so, what defect follows for you who reject Dependent Origination (*evaṃ sati pratītyasaṃutpādaṃ pratyācakṣānyasya bhavataḥ ko doṣaḥ prasajyate*)? — There is no merit. There is no demerit. Nor do exist the worldly conventions. — Why? — Because all that is dependently originated; how will it be, if there is no dependent origination (*pratītyasaṃutpannant hy etat sarvam; asati pratītyasaṃutpāde kuto bhavisyati*)? Moreover, being endowed with an intrinsic nature (*sasvabhāva*), not dependently originated (*aprattītyasaṃutpanna*) and devoid of a cause (*nirhetuka*), it would be permanent (*nitya*). — Why? — Because things that have no cause are permanent (*nirhetukā hi bhāvā nityāḥ*). — There would thus follow that very non-practice of religious life (*sa eva cābrahmacaryavāśaḥ prasajyeta*). And you would contradict your own tenet (*svasiddhāntavirodhaḥ ca*). — Why? — Because the Lord has taught that all conditioned things are impermanent (*anityā hi bhagavataḥ sarve sanskārā nirdiśtaḥ*). They become permanent, because they are [supposed to be] endowed with an intrinsic nature and hence [to be] permanent (*te sasvabhāvanityatvān nityāḥ hi bhavanti*).

1 The sentence, *aḍi ca sasvabhāvo ’pratītyasaṃutpanno nirhetuko nityāḥ syāt*, does not seem to be all right. The editors suggest: ‘sc. bhāvaḥ?’ (Text, p. 75, n. 8). But it would perhaps be better to read: *sasvabhāvo apratītyasaṃutpannaṃ nirhetukāṃ nityāṃ syāt*. 

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I do not see why we should conclude from this that the objection formulated in v. VII springs from a Hinayānist (cf. p.100, above). The Naiyāyika realist, who uses against Nāgarjuna, a Buddhist, the standpoint of the Buddhist realists, must also accept their tenet — in order to be consistent with himself. Nāgarjuna here uses against his opponent what is commonly regarded as the essence of the Buddha's teaching, namely that all conditioned things are impermanent (anītva).

LVI. And the same defect exists also with regard to the bad things, the indeterminate things, those things which lead to emancipation, and so on (nairṛtyāṅkādiśu). Thus, all that is conditioned certainly becomes for you unconditioned (tasmat sarvam sāṃskṛtam asāṃskṛtam te bhavaty eva).

And the same method that has been indicated, concerning the good things (yaś caiṣa kuśaḷeṣu Ṟharmesu nirdīṣṭāḥ kalpaḥ), applies also to the bad things, to the indeterminate things, to those things which lead to emancipation, and so on (nairṛtyāṅkaprabhṛtiṣu). Thus all that, though conditioned, turns out to be unconditioned for you (tasmat te sarvam idam sāṃskṛtam asāṃskṛtam samādyate). — Why? — Because, there being no cause, there is no origination, no subsistence and no destruction (hetau hy asaty utpādaśasthitibhāṅgā na bhavanti). [And] there being no origination, no subsistence and no destruction, all that is conditioned turns out to be unconditioned, because of the absence of the specific characters of the conditioned (sāṃskṛtalaksanābhāvāt)¹. — In these circumstances, your statement that all things are non-void because the good and other things have an intrinsic nature (kuśalādināṁ bhāvānāṁ svabhāvasadbhāvād aśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti), is not valid.

¹ Cf. MK VII. See also on the question of the characters of the conditioned P. S. Jaini, Abhidharmadīpa with Vijñānaprabhāṣṭīti (Patna : Kashi Prasād Jayaswal Research Institute, second edition, 1977—Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series IV), pp. 104-5 with the notes.

[ Refutation of the fifth objection; see v. IX above ]

LVII. He who says that the name (nāman) is existent (sadbhūta), deserves indeed the answer from you: 'There is an intrinsic nature'¹. We, however, do not say that (brūmaś ca na vayam tat).

He who says that the name is existent, deserves the answer from you: 'There is an intrinsic nature'. That intrinsic nature, which is designated by the existent name, must also be, for that reason, existent (yaśa sadbhūtaṁ nāma svabhāvasya tasmāt tenāpi svabhāvena sadbhūtena bhavitavyam). For a non-existent intrinsic nature cannot have an existent name (na hy asadbhūtasya svabhāvasya sadbhūtam nāma bhavati). We, however, do not say that the name is existent. Since the things have no intrinsic nature, that name also is devoid of an intrinsic nature
(niḥsvabhāva). For that reason, it is void (śūnya), and, being void, it is non-existent (asadbhūta). — In these circumstances, your statement that because of the existence of the name (nāmasadbhāvāt) the intrinsic nature is existent (sadbhūṭaḥ svabhāvaḥ), is not valid.

1 sasvabhāva ity evaṃ bhavatā prativaktavyo nāma. — sasvabhāva here is used as the opposite of niḥsvabhāva or asabhāva ‘absence of intrinsic nature’(v. IX, Vṛtti on LIX). Let us remember that according to the opponent, there can be no name without an object. The name ‘absence of intrinsic nature’ proves, therefore, that very intrinsic nature which it is supposed to deny. The Mādhyamika’s reply to this is that the name ‘absence of intrinsic nature’ does not exist any more than all other things.

Furthermore:

LVIII. Does this name ‘non-existent’ designate something existent or non-existent (nāmasad iti ca yad idam tat kim nu sato bhavaty utāpy asataḥ)? Be it the name of an existent or of a non-existent, in both ways your position is abandoned (yadi hi sato yady asato vidhiḥpi te hiyate vādaḥ).

Does this name ‘non-existent’ designate something existent or non-existent? Be it the name of an existent or of a non-existent thing, in both ways the proposition (pratijñā) is abandoned. First, if [the thing named is] existent, the proposition [‘The name is: ’ ‘Non-existent’] is abandoned. For the same thing cannot be now non-existent, now existent (na hidānīṃ tad asad idānīṃ sat). Then, if [you say that] the thing named is non-existent, [it has to be replied:] that which is non-existent has no name (asadbhūtaśya nāma na bhavati).— Thus your proposition that the name has an existent intrinsic nature is abandoned (tasmād yaḥ pratijñā nāmaḥ sadbhūtaḥ svabhāva iti sā hindi).  

1 For the text cf. Kunst’s Preface, p.35,  

2 For the opponent, even the name ‘non-existent’ is existent. But, for the Mādhyamika, it involves a self-contradiction. See also on this self-contradiction B. K. Matilal, ‘Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic’, loc. cit. pp. 90-93.

Furthermore:

LIX. We have already established the voidness of all things (sarve-śaṃ bhavānām śūnyatvam copapādītatam pūrvam). This criticism, therefore, turns out to be one of something which is not a proposition (sa upālambhas tasmād bhavaty ayaṃ cāpratijñāyaḥ).
Here we have already established in detail (vistarataḥ) the voidness of all things. Even the name has already been stated to be void. Now you, assuming non-voidness, have returned to the charge (sa bhavān aśūnyatvam parighyam pariṣṭto vaktum): If the things had no intrinsic nature, then even the name 'absence of intrinsic nature' would not exist (yadi bhāvānāṁ svabhāvo na syād asvabhāva iti nāmāpidam na syād iti). Your criticism, therefore, turns out to be one of something which is not a proposition (tasmād apratijñopālambho 'yāṁ bhavataḥ saṃpādyate) We do not say, indeed, that the name is existent (na hi vayaṁ nāma sadbhūtam iti brūmāḥ).

Now about your statement [contained in v. X]:

LX. ‘Now [you may say:] There is an intrinsic nature, but that does not belong to the things’ — this suspicion of yours is not shared by us (idam āśaṅkitam yad uktaṁ bhavaty anāśaṅkitam tae ca).

We do not, indeed, deny the intrinsic nature of the things (na hi vayaṁ dharmāṇāṁ svabhāvaṁ pratiṣṭedhayāmāḥ). Nor do we affirm the intrinsic nature of a certain object apart from the things (dharmavinirmuktasya vā kasyacid arthasya svabhāvaṁ abhyupagacchāmaḥ). Now, this being so, your criticism: ‘If the things are devoid of an intrinsic nature, you should explain to what other object, apart from the things, there now happens to belong the intrinsic nature (kasya khalv idānim anyasyārthasya dharmavinirmuktasya svabhāvo bhavati)’, is thrown far away (dūrāpaṅkṛṣṭam eva itad bhavati). It is no criticism at all (upālambho na bhavati)\(^1\).

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\(^1\) As we shall see later on (v. LXIV), Nāgārjuna does not ‘deny’ anything; he only ‘makes known’ the voidness of the things.

[Refutation of the sixth objection; see v. XI above].

LXI. If [it is true that] negation is only of an existent, then this voidness is established (śūnyatvam nanu prasiddham idam) — for you negate the things’ being devoid of an intrinsic nature (pratiṣṭedhayate hi bhavān bhāvānāṁ nīḥsvabhāvatvam).

If negation is only of an existent and not of a non-existent (yadi sata eva pratiṣṭedho bhavati nāsataḥ), and if you negate the being-devoid-
of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things (bhavam ca sarvabhavananam nihsvarbhavatvam pratisedhayati), then the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things is established (namu prasiddham sarvabhavananam nihsvarbhavatvam). Since, in virtue of your statement (tvadvacanena), negation exists (pratisedhasadbhavai)1, and since the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things has been negated (nihsvarbhavatvasya ca sarvabhavananam pratisiddhatovat), voidness is established (prasiddha snyatat).

1 Read pratisedhyat 'object to be negated'?

LXII. Or, if you negate voidness and that voidness does not exist (pratisedhayasya 'tha tvam snyatavam tac ca nasti snyatavam), then your position that negation is of an existent is abandoned (pratisedhah sata iti te nanu esa vihiyate vadah).

Or, if you negate the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things, i.e. their voidness, and that voidness does not exist, then your proposition (pratijna) that negation is of an existent and not of a non-existent, is abandoned1.

1 The Madhyamika here uses the opponent's own logic against him. If the latter's proposition that a significant negation is only of an existent is right, then he proves the Madhyamika's position, by proving the voidness he negates. If, on the other hand, the voidness he negates does not exist, then he abandons his own proposition.

Besides:

LXIII. I do not negate anything, nor is there anything to be negated (pratisedhayami nahan kimcit pratisedhyam asti na ca kimcit). You, therefore, calumniate me when you say: 'You negate' (tasmat pratisedhayasity adhilaya esa tvay kriyate)1.

Even that you could rightly say, if I negated something. I, however, do not negate anything, for there is nothing to be negated (na caiva han kimcit pratisedhayami, yasmun na kimcit pratiseddhayam asti). Thus, while, all things being void, there is neither a thing to be negated (pratisedhya) nor a negation (pratisedha), you make an absurd calumny (aprastuto 'dhilayah) when you say: 'You negate'.

1 adhilaya 'calumny' has been recorded so far only in MK (F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953], s.v.).
Now about your statement (contained in v. XII):

**LXIV.** Regarding your assertion that the statement of the negation of the non-existent is established without words (*ṛte vacanād asataḥ pratiṣedhayacanasiddhir iti*), we observe: Here speech makes it known as non-existent, it does not deny it (*atra jñāpayate vāg asad iti tān na pratinhanti*).

Regarding your statement: ‘The negation of the non-existent is established even without words; what purpose is, therefore, served by your statement ‘All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature’ (*tatra kim niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity etat tvadvacanam karoti*’)? we observe: The statement: ‘All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature’, does not make all things devoid of an intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity etat khalu vacanam na niḥsvabhāvān eva sarvabhāvān karoti*). But, since there is no intrinsic nature (*asati svabhāve*), it makes known (*jñāpayati*) that the things are devoid of an intrinsic nature (*bhāvā niḥsvabhāvā iti*). Here is an example: While Devadatta is not in the house, somebody says that Devadatta is in the house (*avidyamānagrha Devadatte 'sti grhe Devadatta iti*)¹. On that occasion, somebody tells him in reply: ‘He is not [in the house]’. That statement does not create Devadatta’s non-existence, but only makes known Devadatta’s non-existence in the house (*na tad vacanam Devadattasyāsadbhāvam karoti, kim tu jñāpayati kevalam asambhavam grhe Devadattasya*). Similarly the statement ‘The things have no intrinsic nature’ does not create the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of the things, but makes known the absence of an intrinsic nature in all things (*na bhāvānām niḥsvabhāvatvam karoti, kim tu sarvabhāveṣu svabhāvasyabhāvam jñāpayati*). — In these circumstances, your statement: ‘If there is no intrinsic nature, what purpose is served by the statement ‘There is no intrinsic nature’? The absence of an intrinsic nature is established even without words’, is not appropriate (*na yuktam*)².

¹ ‘avidyamānagrha is a curious compound but occurs in other texts’. (Text; p. 80, n. 14).
² Nāgārjuna is not unaware of the weight of the Naiyāyika’s objection. It does not, however, apply to him, for he does not negate anything but only ‘makes known’ the voidness, i.e. the ‘dependent origination’, of the things, where people wrongly see their non-voidness. — In the Madhyamakakārikās Nāgārjuna often uses the Naiyāyika’s principle in his own argumentations. Candrakirti makes this clear in his comments. Thus in Prasannapadā on XXVII, 28 he writes: pratiṣedhyasya vastuno 'sambha-
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vât pratishedhasyoby asambhava ity ato 'ntavatvam cānontavatvam cobbhayasmin apratite kasya pratishedhena naivāntavān nānantasvān leka iti dṛṣṭisambhavaḥ syd iti. The point under discussion here has also been clearly stated by Candrakīrti in his comment on MK XV, 11 (MKV. pp 273, 1. 12-274, 1.4.)—It is possible that Nāgārjuna here drew his inspiration from Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini II, 2, 6, where the grammarian discusses whether the negative particle naN creates absence or simply makes absence known (Mahābhāṣya, Kielhorn's edition, Vol. I, third edition by K.V. Abhyankar, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1962, p. 411, 11. 3ff.). See also Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra II, 1, 11, end, and Uddyotakara's Vārttika: na ca pratisedhasvaitat sōmarthāyam yad vidyamānaṃ padārtham anyathā kuryāt. jñāpakatva ča na sambhavanivrutiḥ. jñāpako 'yaḥ pratiṣedho na saṃbhavanivarteke iti.

[Refutation of the seventh objection].

Now about the four verses (XIII-XVI) uttered by you:

LXV. You have introduced a great deliberation (mahāṃśi caṛcaḥ) with the example of the mirage. Listen to the decision in that matter also (tatrāpi nirṇayaṃ śṛṇu), showing how that example is appropriate (yathā sa dṛṣṭānta upapannāḥ).

(The commentary is a mere paraphrase).

LXVI. If that perception were by its own nature, it would not be dependently originated (sa yadī svabhāvataḥ syād grāho na syāt pratiṣṭya saṃbhūtaḥ). That perception, however, which comes into existence dependently is voidness indeed (yaś ca pratiṣṭya bhavati grāho nanu śūnyatā saiva).

If that perception of a mirage as water (mrgatṛṣṇāyāṃ sa yathājala-grāhaḥ)¹ were by its own nature, it would not be dependently originated. Since, however, it comes into existence in dependence upon the mirage, the wrong sight (viparitaḥ darśanam) and the distracted attention (ayoniṣṭomanaskāra), it is dependently originated (pratiṣṭyasamutpanna). And since it is dependently originated, it is indeed void by its own nature (svabhāvataḥ śūnya eva) — as previously stated (yathā pūrvam uktaṃ tathā).

¹ Cf. supra, p.104, n. 1 on XIII.

Furthermore:

LXVII. If that perception were by its own nature, who would remove that perception (kas ṭaṃ nivartayed grāham)? The same method applies to the rest [of the things] too (sesesu apty esa vidhiḥ). Hence this is a non-criticism (tasmād eso 'nupālambhah).

If the perception of water in a mirage (mrgatṛṣṇāyāṃ jalagrāhaḥ) were by its own nature, who indeed would remove it? For an intrinsic
nature cannot be removed (na hi svabhāvaḥ śakyo vinivartayitum): e.g., the heat of fire, the fluidity of water, the openness (nirāvaraṇatva) of space. Its removal, however, is seen (dṛṣṭam cāsyā vinivartanam). The intrinsic nature of the perception is, therefore, void (tasmāc chānyasvabhāvo grāhaḥ). The same method (krama) is to be understood (pratyavagantavya) with regard to the rest of the things too (ṣeṣeṣu api dharmeṣu), viz., the five things beginning with the object to be perceived (grāhya-prabhṛtiṣu paṇcaṣu). —In these circumstances, your statement that all things are non-void because of the existence of the aggregate of the six (saṭkabhāvāt), is not valid.


2 Cf. v. XIV.

3 According to the realist, the Mādhyamika cannot avoid the difficulty he has been put into, even by affirming that, in saying ‘All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature’, he only negates a wrong perception of a non-existent, comparable to the perception of water in a mirage. For even when one claims to negate a wrong perception of a non-existent, one is bound to admit the six things, viz., the perception, the object to be perceived, the perceiver, the negation, the object to be negated, and the negator (v. XIV). —The Mādhyamika’s rejoinder to this is that the opponent’s criticism springs from a misunderstanding of the meaning of ‘being devoid of an intrinsic nature’. When the Mādhyamika says that all things are ‘devoid of an intrinsic nature’ or ‘void’, he does not at all mean to say that they are non-existent, but only that they are ‘dependently originated’. The six things of which the opponent speaks exist only insefari as they are dependently originated (cf. supra, p.123, n.1 on L).

Perhaps we may pursue our elucidation of this passage further. Nāgārjuna does not confound truth and error. He can distinguish just as a realist can between delusive and non-delusive perceptions, and by the same criteria. The heat of fire, the fluidity of water, and so on, are not just the same thing as the perception of water in a mirage. The latter is erroneous and hence can be removed by a knowing person, whereas the truth of the former is not questioned by anybody in the world. But when Nāgārjuna says that the heat of fire is an ‘intrinsic nature’ (svabhāva), he does not mean to say that it is so in an absolute sense. The heat of fire, too, is ‘dependently originated’ (cf. Candrakirti, MKV., pp. 260ff.). Truth and error have this in common, that both are ‘dependently originated’. The example of the mirage has been chosen because it is the most comprehensive, including as it does not only the perception, the object to be perceived and the perceiver, but also the negation, the object to be negated and the negator. Empirically speaking, all these exist, being related to one another; but in an absolute sense, none of these can be said to exist — for the very same reason that they are ‘dependently originated’.

Thus, the doctrine of voidness has a twofold function: on one hand, it establishes the empirical reality; on the other, it points to its Beyond.
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[Refutation of the eighth objection; see v. XVII above].

LXVIII. The case being the same (samato'it), we have already answered by what precedes [the objection of] absence of reason (hetoabhāva), which was stated in [your] refutation of the example of the mirage (mrga'tśyādṛśāntavyāṃttvividhau ya utkāh prāk).

It should be understood (avagantavya) that by the preceding deliberation (carcena pūrvoktena) we have also answered [the objection of] absence of reason. The same deliberation, which was stated in the preceding reason (pūrvasmin hetav), for the negation of the aggregate of the six (ṣaṭka-pratīṣṭedhasya), should also be considered here (ihāpi caraśyitavyaḥ)\(^1\).

\(^1\) Why are all things 'void' or 'devoid of an intrinsic nature'? The Mādhyamika's 'reason' is that they are dependently originated (pratītyasamutpāna). Put in the standard Naiyāyika form of syllogistic inference (anumāna), it comes to this:

1. Pratīyā
   (Proposition): niḥsvabhāvah sarvabhāvah

2. Hetu
   (Reason): pratītyasamutpagyatā

3. Udañharaṇa
   (Exemplification): yat pratītyasamutpānaṁ tan niḥsvabhāvam dṛṣṭam: yathā
   mrga'tśyāṃ jalagṛāha

4. Upanaṇya
   (Application): tathā ca pratītyasamutpadayā sarvabhāvāḥ

5. Nigamana
   (Conclusion): tasmāt pratītyasamutpānān niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ

(What is dependently originated is seen to be devoid of an intrinsic nature: for example, the perception of water in a mirage).

Unlike Bhāvaviveka, a later Mādhyamika, Nāgārjunia does not show any predilection for 'independent inference' (svatantrānumāna), for he has no 'position' to defend. His 'position' is, in fact, a 'non-position'. He expresses the Inexpressible. And the best way for him to refute his opponent's criticism is to show the contradictions inherent in the latter's own way of thought (cf. supra, p. 90 and n. 3). He is a prāṣaṅgika, not a svātantrika. However, he cannot be accused of not vindicating his position from the standpoint of formal logic. — Cf. Candrakirti's remarks on Buddhāpalīta, a strict follower of Nāgārjuna (MKV, pp. 20-21: Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa [Leningrad, 1927], pp. 99ff.).

[Refutation of the ninth objection; see v. XX above].

LXIX. We have already answered [the question relating to] the reason [for a negation] in the three times (traikālya)\(^1\), for the case is
the same (samavat). And a counter-reason for the three times (traikalyapratisthata) is obtained for the upholders of the doctrine of voidness (śūnyatavādināṁ prāptaḥ).

It has to be understood (pratyavagantavya) that the question why a negation is possible in the three times (hetu traikalya pratisedhavāci) has already received its answer (uktottaraḥ). — Why? — Because the reason is of the same nature as the thesis to be established (sādhyasamavat). To explain: In virtue of your statement (tvadvacanena), a negation is not possible in the three times, and, like the negation, the thing to be negated, also, does not exist. Thus, there being no negation and no object to be negated (pratisedhapanaprashtye 'sati), your opinion that the negation has been negated (yah bhavān manyate pratisedhaḥ pratiṣiddha iti), is untenable. That very reason which expresses a negation of the three times is obtained for the upholders of the doctrine of voidness, for they negate the intrinsic nature of all things, — not for you (yas trikālapraṣṭedhāvācī hetur ecā eva śūnyatavādināṁ prāptaḥ sarva-bhāvasvabhaṇapraṣṭedhāvatāvān na bhavaṁ).³

Or it has been answered in the following way:

'I do not negate anything, nor is there anything to be negated. You, therefore, calumniate me when you say: "You negate".'⁴

Now, if you think: the negation is established in all the three times (trīṣu api kāleśu pratisedhaḥ siddhāḥ); we see the antecedent cause, the subsequent cause, and the simultaneous cause (drśṭaḥ pūrvakālino 'pi hetuḥ, uttaraśāsanaḥ 'pi, yugapatkālino 'pi hetuḥ): antecedent cause, e.g., the father as the cause of the son; subsequent cause, e.g., the disciple as the cause of the teacher; simultaneous cause, e.g., the lamp as the cause of the light, — we reply: this is not so. For in this way are stated the three former defects (uktā hy etasmin krame trayāḥ pūrvatadṛśāḥ).⁵ Moreover, if this is so, you admit the existence of a negation, and you abandon your proposition (api ca yady evam, pratisedhasadbhāvas tvayābhypsagamye, pratiṣṭihāṁ ca te bhavaṁ); the negation of an intrinsic nature is also established in this way (etena krameṇa svabhāva-pratise-dho 'pi siddhāḥ).

¹ Cf. v. XX, and Nyāyaśīra II, 1, 12, quoted above, p.106, n. 2.
² Read: pratisedhayā 'nuppannāḥ, pratisedhavat sa pratisedhyo 'pi.
³ For the realist, a negation is not possible in all the three times (cf. v. XX). The Mādhyamika uses his opponent's own argument to prove that, if the latter's contention is valid, he cannot negate the Mādhyamika's negation. The Mādhyamika himself, however, is safe in his position, for he holds that the three times are as void as all
the other things (cf. MK XIX). (Note the way in which Nāgārjuna uses the two expressions: hetus traikāye pratiṣedhavācet ‘reason expressing a negation in the three times’, and trikālāpratiṣedhavācet hetuh ‘reason [for a negation in the three times] which expresses a negation of the three times’.) — On śākyasama of n. 3 on v. XXVIII above.

4 V. LXIII above.

5 Cf. v. XX.

LXX. All things prevail for him for whom prevails this voidness (prabhavati ca śūnyatēṃ yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ). Nothing prevails for him for whom voidness does not prevail (prabhavati na tasya kimcīn na prabhavati śūnyatā yasya)¹.

For whom this voidness prevails, for him all things — mundane and supramundane (sarvārthā laukikālakottarāḥ) — prevail. — Why? — Because Dependent Origination prevails for him for whom voidness prevails. The Four Noble Truths prevail for him for whom Dependent Origination prevails. The results of monastic life as well as all special acquisitions (viśeśādhigama)² prevail for him for whom the Four Noble Truths prevail. The Three Jewels (trīṇi ratnāni), viz., the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṃgha, prevail for him for whom all the special acquisitions prevail. For whom Dependent Origination prevails, for him merit (dharma), the cause of merit (dharmanetra), the result of merit(dharmaphala), demerit (adharma), the cause of demerit (adharmanetra), the result of demerit (adharmanaphala), — all these prevail. For whom merit and demerit, the causes of merit and demerit and the results of merit and demerit prevail, for him passion (kleśa)³, the origination of passion (kleśāśamudaya), and the objective grounds of passion (kleśavastūni)⁴ prevail. For whom all that prevails (yasyaitat sarvaṃ prabhavati pūrvoktan), for him the law concerning the happy and the unhappy states (sugatidurgatiyavasthā), the attainment of those states (sugatidurgatigamana), the way leading to those states (sugatidurgatigāmi mārgaḥ), the act of passing beyond those states (sugatidurgatiyatikramaṇa), the means of passing beyond those states (sugatidurgatiyatikramanopāya), and all worldly conventions (sarvaśāntasyavahārāḥ ca laukikāḥ) are established (vyavasthāpitāḥ). They are to be understood individually by each person, following this direction (svayam adhigantavya anayā diśā): a part [only] can be taught in words (kimcīc chakyaṃ vacanenopadeśām).
Here again,
I adore that incomparable Buddha (tam apratimabuddham) who taught Voidness, Dependent Origination and the Middle Way as equivalent (ekārtha)\(^6\).

Here ends this work of the venerable master Nāgārjuna\(^6\).

1 Cf. \textit{MK X X IV}, 14:
\begin{verbatim}
sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yaśya yujyate
sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyatā yaśya na yujyate//
\end{verbatim}
Concluding the \textit{Vigrahavyāvartani} with this verse, Nāgārjuna shows that his doctrine of voidness does not reject the empirical world. On the contrary, it establishes on a solid foundation all our activities in the empirical world. — See above, p.91; p.123 n. 1 on L; p.134, n. 3; vv. LIV-LVI.

2 On this term cf. May, n. 828.

3 Cf. \textit{MK X X III}.

4 On \textit{vastu} cf. \textit{MK X X III}, 7, with Candrakirti’s comment (May, [p. 185 and n. 603]).

5 Cf. \textit{MK X X IV}, 18, quoted on p. 4, n. 10, above.

6 That both the \textit{kārikās} and the \textit{uṭṭi} were composed by Nāgārjuna is clearly stated by Candrakirti, \textit{MKV}, pp. 25, 30.
ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES
(For the works rather frequently used)


MK —Nagärjuna, (Mūla-)Madhyamaka-kārikā, ed. by L. de La Vallée Poussin, St. —Pétersbourg 1903-13 (Bibliotheca Buddhica IV).

MKV —Candra-kirtti’s commentary on the preceding, called Prasannapada Madhyamakavrtti; same edition.


Bhāsarvaśa, Nyāya-bhāṣya, ed. by Svāmī Yogindrānanda, Varanasi 1968.

Jayantabhaṭṭa, Nyāyamahājāri, ed. by Mahāmahopādhyāya Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailāṅga, Benares 1895 (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series No. 10).

Nyāyasūtra. The following editions have been used:

My references are to Jhā’s edition in Poona Oriental Series.


Tucci —G. Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, Baroda 1929 (Gaekwang’s Oriental Series XLIX).

Vātsyāyana, Nyāyabhaṣya. See above: Nyāyasūtra.

Yamaguchi —Traité de Nāgārjuna: Pour écarter les vaines discussions [Vigrahayāvartanī], traduit et annoté par Susumu Yamaguchi, in Journal Asiatique (Paris), juillet-septembre 1929, pp. 1-86.
A complete translation of Nāgārjuna’s major work, the Madhyamakakārikās, along with Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, is now available:
Th. Sticherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Delhi, 1978 (chapters I, XXV).
St. Schayer, Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā, W. Krakowie, 1931 (chapters V, XII-XVI).
Besides, R. Gnoli’s Nāgārjuna: Madhyamaka Kārikā, in Italian (Torino, 1961), gives a complete translation of Nāgārjuna’s Kārikās, and E. Frawallner’s Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, pp. 178 ff., 243 ff., gives a translation of the chapters I, XV, XVIII, XXIV and XXV of Nāgārjuna’s Kārikās, and of part of chapter I of Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā.
On Nāgārjuna’s works and philosophy see also now David Seyfort Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Wiesbaden, 1981 (A History of Indian Literature, edited by J. Gonda, Vol. VII, Fasc. 1); Chr. Lindtner, Nāgārjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982 (Indiske Studier IV). The latter work gives also a critical edition of the Kārikās of the Vigrahavyūhavartanī with the Tibetan.
INDEX OF THE SIGNIFICANT NYĀYA TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THE VIGRAHAVYĀVARTANI

dṛṣṭānta = upamāna. Kārikā VI (upamāna in the vṛtti).
dṛṣṭāntavirodha. Vṛtti on kārikā II (cf. Translation, p. 97, n. 4).—A variety of pratijñāvirodha, which is a nigrāhasthāna ‘ground of defeat.’ (cf. Dharmakīrti, Vādanyāya, with Śāntarakṣita’s Viṣṇucitārthā, ed. Swami Dwarkidas Shastri, Varanasi, 1972 [Baudhā Bharati Series 8], p. 78.)

pratijñāhāni (also vādahāni). Kārikās XXIV (cf. kārikā II), XXXIII, LVIII, LXII and vṛtti on kārikās XXXI and LXIX. Also a nigrāhasthāna.

sādhyasama. XXVIII, LXIX. Cf. Translation, Note 3 on XXVIII.
siddhāsthādana. XLII. Cf. also MK X, 9, and Candrakīrti’s comment (which gives the same example as the vṛtti on kārikā XLII of our text: na hy avidyamāno Devadatto grhe kamcīd apestate)—A fallacious reason (hetvābhāsa) according to the old school of Nyāya, but a separate nigrāhasthāna according to the modern school.

svasiddhāntavirodha. Vṛtti on LV. Cf. apasiddhānta, a nigrāhasthāna.

hetu = dṛṣṭānta XXVIII (cf. Translation, p. 112, n. 1).

1. For detailed references see Glossary in JIP 5 (1978), pp. 240-41.

INDEX OF UNCOMMON WORDS

adhilaya LXIII and vṛtti.
avidyamānagrha Vṛtti on LXIV.
nigadya XXIV.
naiḥsvabhāvy a XVII; XXVI and Vṛtti; Vṛtti on XXVIII.
yathājalagrāha XIII and Vṛtti on LXVI.
vaśsamikatva II and Vṛtti; XXIV and Vṛtti; XXXIII and Vṛtti.
INDEX OF THE ANCIENT AUTHORITIES QUOTED
IN THE INTRODUCTION AND IN THE NOTES

Āryadeva: Catuḥśatakā Note 3 on XXVIII (pp. 112-13)
Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Note 2 on XXIX.
Aśvaghoṣa: Buddhacarita and Saundarananda Note 2 on XXVIII.
(p. 112).
Bhāṣarvajñā: Nyāyabhāṣana Note 1 on XX; Note 1 on XXXIX.
Bhāvaviveka Note on LXVIII.
Buddhapālita Note on LXVIII.
Candrakīrti: Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti (MKV) p. 3, n. 3; p. 105;
Note 1 on XX; Note on XXII (p. 108); Note 3 on XXVIII
(p. 112); Notes 1, 2 and 3 on XXIX; Note on XXXVIII; Note
on L; Note 2 on LXIV (pp. 132-33): Notes 1 and 3 on LXVII
(p. 134); Note on LXVIII; Notes 4 and 6 on LXX.
—Commentary on the Catuḥśatakā Note 3 on XXVIII (p. 113).
Gauḍapāda: Āgamaśāstra (Māṇḍūkyakārikā) Note 1 on XX; Note 1 on
XXVIII (p. 112).
Jayantabhaṭṭa: Nyāyamaṇḍi Note 1 on XX; Note 1 on XXXIX.
Mahāyāna-Sātrālaṃkāra Note 2 on XXIX (p. 114).
Majjhima-Nikāya Note 2 on LIV (p. 127).
Nāgarjuna: (Mūla-) Madhyamaka-kārikā (MK.) p. 2; p. 94, nn.
8, 9, 10; Note on XXII (p. 108); Note 1 on XXIII (p. 109);
Note 2 on XXVIII (p. 122); Note 2 on XXIX (p. 114); Notes on
XXXVI-XL; Note on XLIII; Note 3 on XLVIII; Note 2 on
LI; Note 1 on LIV (p. 127); Note on LXIII; Note 2 on LXIV:
Notes 1 and 3 on LXVII (p. 134); Note 3 on LXIX (p. 137)
Notes 1, 3, 4 and 5 on LXX (p. 138).
—Vaidalyaprakaraṇa Note 1 on XX.
Nyāyasūtra Notes 2 and 3 on II (p. 97); Note 2 on XX; Note 1 on
XXVIII (p. 112); Note 1 on XXXI; Note on XXXII (p. 116);
Notes 1 and 2 on XXXIII; Note 1 on LXIX (p. 46).
Pāṇini: Aṣṭādhyāyī Note on XXIV.
Patañjali: Mahābhāṣya Note on III (p. 98); Note 2 on LXIV (p. 133).
Śaṅkara: Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya Note on XXXV.
—Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya Note on XXXV.
—Commentary on the Agamaśāstra Note 1 on XXVIII (p. 112).
—Upadeśasāhasrī Note on XXXV.
Śālistamba-Sūtra Note 2 on LIV (p. 127).
Śāntideva: Bodhicaryāvatāra Note on L.
Tarkaśāstra Note 1 on XX; Note 1 on XXXIX.
Udayana: Nyāyakusumānjali Note on XII.
Uddyotakara: Nyāyavārttika Note on XI (p. 103); Note on XXXII (p. 116); Note 2 on LXIV (p. 133).
Vācaspatimiśra: Nyāyavārttikatāṭparyāṭikā Note 1 on XXXI.
Vātsyāyana: Nyāyabhāṣya Note 2 on II (p. 97); Note 2 on XX; Note 1 on XXVIII (p. 112); Note on XXXII (p. 116); Notes 1 and 2 on XXXIII; Note 1 on XXXIX; Note 2 on LXIV (p. 133).
Viśvanātha: Nyāyasūtraśruti Note on XXXII (p. 116).
Vaiśeṣikasūtra (with the commentary of Candrānanda) Note on XI (p. 103).
Addenda et Corrigenda

Some of the additions and alterations proposed in the Translation and the Notes have been omitted, and some confusions have arisen from the new pagination. The readers are requested to make the following additions and corrections (the entirely obvious misprints are passed without notice).

P. 89, line 13.

For 'unperturbed' read 'imperturbable'.

P. 95.

The number 1 has been misplaced. Its place is after 'yatnesu', line 5 from bottom. The corresponding note, to be placed after 1, is:

'On the question of phonetics see, e.g., W.S. Allen, *Phonetics in Ancient India* (Oxford University Press, 1953). See also G. Tucci's Notes on the *Vigrahavyāvartani*, pp. 23-4.'


After 'sabda', add ': cf. Vātsyāyana on *Nyāyasūtra* I, 1, 1.3'.


For '2' read '3'. The note, which is missing, is: 'Cf. n. 1 above.'

P. 101, v. IX, last line.

The note 2, which has been omitted at the end, is:

'The name 'absence of intrinsic nature' must refer to something which is absent. See X-XII below, with the notes on XI and XII.'

P. 103, end of the note on XI, line 6.

After 'Calcutta', add ': cf. III, 1, 1, p. 699'.

P. 103.

Before v. XII, insert 'And again:'

P. 103, v. XII, line 4.

For 'does not really exist', read 'does not exist at all'.

P. 106, v. XX, line 4.

Read '[of the things]'.

P. 108, note on XXII, line 3.

For '90' read '89'.

P. 109, note 2 on XXIII.

For '95' read '96'.
P. 111, v. XXVIII, line 5 from bottom.
For 'has no existence', read 'has not, indeed, an existence'.

P. 112, note 3 on XXVIII, line 5.
After 'valid', add 'a'; on the contrary, the example proves his thesis.

P. 127, note 2 on LIV, line 2 from bottom.
For 'supra, p. 91; read 'supra, p. 91',

P. 129, v. LVIII, last line.
For 'hinda', read 'hind'.

P. 132, v. LXIV, lines 2 and 6.
For 'the non-existent' read 'a non-existent'.

P. 133, note 2 on LXIV.
As the capital N with the diacritical mark was not available, for 'naN' read 'naN'.

P. 135, note on LXVIII, line 5 from bottom.
For 'p. 90 and n. 3' read 'p. 89 and n. 4'.

P. 138, n. 5.
For 'p. 4, n. 10' read 'p. 93, n. 12'.

P. 139.
'Tucci' should precede 'Uddyotakara'.

P. 140, line 3.
For 'Delhi, 1978' read 'Leningrad, 1927, and Delhi, 1978'.

P. 142.
Under 'Candrakīrti', add 'p. 90', and for 'p. 3, n. 3' read 'p. 92, n. 4'. Under 'Nāgārjuna', for 'p. 2' read 'p. 90'; add 'p. 91'; for 'p. 94, nn. 8, 9, 10', read 'p. 93, nn. 10, 11, 12'; line 3, for '122' read '112'. Under 'Nyāyāsūtra', last line, for '46' read '136'.

P. 143.
Under 'Vātsyāyana', for 'Note 2 on II' read 'Note 3 on II', and add 'Note 1 on V (Addenda et Corrigenda)'.
—Also note in Kunst's Preface, pp. 34-5:
Text p. 11 = p. 43; p. 12 = p. 44; p. 27 = p. 59; p. 36 = p. 68; p. 45 = p. 77.
Dialects ↔ Nagarjun
A book that is shut is but a block.