INDIAN RELIGION AND SURVIVAL
BY THE SAME AUTHOR

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INDIAN RELIGION AND SURVIVAL
A STUDY

by

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TO
THE MAN
OF THE
BIRTHRIGHT IN MANY WORLDS

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PREFACE

FIVE years ago the publishers of this book brought out a remarkable work on a subject more deserving of interest than it yet wins. This was Wincenty Lutosławski’s *Pre-existence and Reincarnation*. It contained a survey of beliefs past and present in different lands concerning Survival, and it contained a request, that his readers would supplement, confirming or otherwise, “the message they had received” in the results of his research.

The study I here present may serve in its own way to supplement his work. Firstly, as an expansion of his too brief reference, half a page in length, to India, as showing two great religions unanimous in their acceptance of the truth of “palingenesis”—a statement which requires much historical qualification. Secondly, it may, in supplementing, also serve as a check to the assumption he makes of the inferiority of “Buddha” to the Polish patriot Mickiewicz. This contrast can only stand if the view presented of the gospel, ascribed in his book to the Indian teacher, be accurate. It is a view many are content to ascribe to it. For me there is not a word of truth in it. “Buddha,” it is said, “saw only the trifling inconveniences of disease, misery and death, and was so much distressed by them that he went into the solitude to seek the remedy, and found none but the complete renunciation of life. Mickiewicz saw not only disease, misery and death . . . but did not go into the wilderness, and needed no prolonged meditation in order to discover that all these evils may be removed, overcome and annihilated by the power of the human will, aided by Divine grace.”

Now for me, the solution found, according to
Lutosławski, by Mickiewicz can be far more truly called the solution found by 'Buddha,' than that which is here called his 'discovery.' The former sought a remedy political, social, for a group of his fellow-creatures. The latter sought to show each and every man a More which lay in his nature, his life, his destiny. This was, that to become, to grow spiritually was of the essence of his nature, as spirit or very-man; that to become 'in the right way' he had to exert will, choice; that in him moved and worked Deity in man's inner sense-of-right, of the 'ought,' known as dharma.

Mr. Lutosławski has, as have alas! so many others, confused the message of the Founder of Buddhism with the monastic decadent teaching of the after-men, with 'Buddhism' in the form it has come down to us from the south of Asia. Book after book has repeated this libel on Gotama, ever since 'a little learning' about 'Buddhism' began to prove a very dangerous thing. It will only be when we see, in this and every great world-religion, not a ready-made identical scheme of values, but a long cinema of changing evolving values that the libel on a great Helper of man will die out, and the real More he brought to man stand out at last in clear relief.

I proffer no apology, that this little study breaks off, in its contemplation of "Indian Religion" after the decline in Indian Buddhism has been dealt with. An expert Indologist, Heinrich Gomperz, sums up Indian religion from the time of the Upanishads as "dominated by the yearning of the human soul to be finally released, be it never so long hence, from her separate existence, and to attain to the holy Source of all things." (Indische Theosopbie, 1925, ch. XXV.) It was as a term for this ideal, that Nirvana first emerges as a sumnum bonum in the Bhagavad-Gītā, and became exalted thereto in
monastic Buddhism, but as only an impersonal ideal; in primitive Buddhism it had been only a name for cathartic training in moral growth. But my book is concerned, as I say in its pages, not with eschatology, but with 'anchistology': with not the Last Things, but with the Next Step, with Survival. In these matters of the Next Things, I have tried to show, that earlier Indian Religion, especially in early Buddhism, had a distinctly New Mandate, a mandate eagerly welcomed when first given, but subsequently worsened and then virtually dropped. And so far I have found no later new word on Survival to deserve closer study.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTORY</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. PRE-BUDDHIST BELIEF IN SURVIVAL</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. SURVIVAL IN EARLY BUDDHISM</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF SURVIVAL</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. SURVIVAL PRIOR TO THIS LIFE</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. THE SURVIVOR</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. RESPONSIBILITY IN SURVIVAL</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A SUMMARY SURVEY</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEX</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDIAN RELIGION AND SURVIVAL

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

I wish here to say something of somewhat maturer import than is the chapter on Rebirth, in the Supplement to the second edition of my manual *Buddhist Psychology* (Quest Series, London, 1st edition 1914; 2nd edition 1924). I have tried to do this in my more recent books: *Gotama the Man* (1928), *The Milinda Questions* (1930), *Sakya, or Buddhist Origins* (1931), and *A Manual of Buddhism* (1932). But in these works the treatment had to be limited to a chapter, and to fragments of chapters. Here I wish to present the subject in a form that is both expanded and concentrated. It is, in any religion, a subject of capital importance; without it religion is just external cult and ethics. But in original Buddhism its capital importance was, as the Pali records show, admitted; in later Buddhism of the so-called Southern (or Pali) form, this importance waned; in modern Buddhism of the same form there has been yet more waning, and there has come an innovating departure from the original teaching—a departure which, as such, has a right to be heard, but which has no right to pose (as it is made to do) for that older teaching.¹

In the *Calcutta Review* for September, 1930, were published my maturer conclusions on this subject under the title "Rebirth in the Pali Scriptures." The present work is an expansion, with revision, of that

¹ Below, p. 83.
article. In that article and indeed in the supplementary chapter of 1924, the reader will no more find sayings from the Pali records put unquestioningly—as the records put them—into the mouth of the Founder of the Sakyan teaching, known as Gotama Buddha. Beyond this correction in historic method, he will find no definite reversion of judgment; he will find added matter, added references and, I think, sounder emphases. He were a poor man of the pen who could add to his experience a decade of study intensive and comparative, yet write nothing wiser on any portion of it after that!

As a historical study, the object of this little book is to answer the question: What was the contribution to Indian religious thought on survival, made by the coming into that thought of the life and teaching of Gotama the Sakyan and his fellow-missioners? This contribution is here analysed and then summed up.

I have used the word ‘survival’ here; not ‘rebirth,’ nor for that matter ‘reincarnation,’ nor ‘transmigration.’ Not one of these terms closely reproduces any Indian word, albeit the last nearly renders ‘samsāra’: ‘farin-on.’ I have chosen ‘survival,’ because in it, for me, the ‘man’ is less expugnable. The history of survival in Buddhism begins with the man-as-surviving; it ends—at present—with the coming into being of a karma-complex, a term for which I can find no rational definition. The Buddhism of the Far East appears to wish to see the two as one. As to that, the thing, the event is important, not the specific term. Nevertheless, for the English reader, whereas he can read about rebirth, reincarnation, transmigration, with an aloofness which has booted his own fate out of the subject-matter, there is about ‘survival’ a non-Orientalism, a common human element, which may possibly convert
him from a mere reader into one who feels himself as also on the ship. I would have, in the picture of these old-world ideas brought to the front, the reader's own life converted into the background, never out of view, of that picture.
CHAPTER II

PRE-BUDDHIST BELIEF IN SURVIVAL

Expert writers on Vedic religion have in the present century made it easier for those not herein expert to gain a truer perspective in later developments. Most informative is the outline in Dr. Radhakrishnan’s *Indian Philosophy*. It is only when he comes to early Buddhism, in which he has apparently found no up-to-date historical criticism to guide him, that he lapses, with other writers when dealing with Buddhism, into a procedure which assumes, that this Protean tradition of many changes, of a long evolution, has no history.

Dr. Radhakrishnan points out that, in the Vedas, the subject of survival of death is on the whole joyous. The deceased may look forward to a ‘good time,’ of the kind which we associate with the word Walhalla, to enjoyment of a material sort, void of nobler ideals. But a terrible doom is also possible, Indra and Varuṇa being hymned as ‘thrusting down’ this or that man. The ‘righteous’ man will find reward; but no gradations of well-being hereafter are met with. Nor is there found that back and forth of life on earth and elsewhere, termed much later *samsāra*. And there is much vagueness in mandates as to the ‘how’ and ‘where’: e.g. “one becomes like the moon,” or again “one becomes just the moon” (*candram eva bhavati*).

In the indefinitely later (but still ancient) period of the compilation of the ritual sayings known as Brāhmaṇas, we find the notion of rebirth as a Yāna or Way: “the Yāna of the Fathers, the Yāna of the Gods.” And we find emerging the belief in rebirth on
earth, held as possibly a blessing. Specific rites are held to avail in procuring rebirth among specific gods. Not yet is there a computing, that a period of punishment there may expiate misdeeds done here. But so much was the man held to be responsible creator of his own future fate, that this is quoted as already a traditional mantra: "when he performs the initiation, ... he makes for it (the self) that world (or place) beforehand, and he is born into the world made by him; hence they say: 'Man is born into the world made (by him).""

The period of the fixing of the earlier Upanishadic Sayings in their present form is not to be clearly dated, nor can it be said of any one of them, that it is void of editorial glosses, so new, so varied and so varying are the emerging mandates. There is advance in discussion of the Next Things—I dislike the absurd term 'eschatological'—but there is no consistent theoretical unity. Karma emerges as being more than ritual 'performance'; as a presumably new idea, a determinant of destiny, not (yet)—so says the BrhadAraNyaka—to be openly taught in the schools. Samsara emerges only in the probably later SvetAsvatara, and the Maitri. There is rebirth to earth-life from other worlds. And this, in passages that for me strongly suggest later glosses, may be in animal form. These passages are three in number (in Brh. U., in Ch. U. and Kau. Up) and merit a more critical study than has yet been awarded them. Further, the idea of life as suffering, as mainly suffering, begins to show its head.

1 Satapatha-BrAhmaNa, VI, 2, 2, 27 (Sacred Books of the East, XLI, p. 180).
2 Should we not rather say 'anchistological': 'next,' not 'last'? 3 Brh. U., 6, 2, 16; Ch. U., 5, 10, 7; Kau. U., 1, 2.
One feature there is which we do not find indicated with clearness in the Upanishads, an absence to which hardly sufficient notice is given. I refer to the lack of any teaching in them about a process of awarding or adjudication, awaiting the man in survival, coupled with any teaching about the survivor as finding warding at the hands of those he comes amongst. We know how very prominent a feature this is in the early Zoroastrian records. In modern treatises on Indian religion I find no mention of anything of the sort, but shall be glad to be corrected. It is only to be expected, that a new mandate of Deity as a moral ideal, such as was that of Zarathustra, would bring with it a revelation of moral vindication, of moral responsibility hereafter. Now it was the mission of original Buddhism to import a like moral earnestness into religion, but it was not given to the brahman teachers of the Upanishads to emphasize this. And hence, all that I find in this connection is one allusion, slight in wording, to a warding as needed by and given to the man newly arrived, after his death on earth. This, be it noted, is a warding of man by man:—

"Now whether there be cremation-obsequies or not, they pass over" ... here follows the vague sort of sequence into this and that affected by Upanishadic teachers. ... "There is a man (puruṣa) not from earth (amānava), he leads them on to Brahman ..." (Cha. Up., IV, 15).

The men so led are bound for the Highest, the uttermost goal; they are, as we might say, post-graduates, super-tribunalians. However that might be, the silence of all writers on this matter; on its Persian and later its Indian emergence—unless of course they are writers on Zoroastrianism—is for me significant. The writers are professedly philosophical
experts writing on religion. India did not segregate
the two subjects. We have done so, but our writers,
though trained in our way, tend to discuss Indian
religion mainly from a philosophical perspective, tend
to become myopic in issues vital for religion.
Lastly, and here again I find the summaries silent,
one feature emerges in the earlier Upanishads which
does not survive in the Sakyan, or original Buddhist
contribution to survival. This is the activity of the
man, in earth-states resembling death, as not exerted
in the earth-body. I refer to the passages, notably in
the Brhadaira"nyaka Upanishad, to the man's leaving
the earth-body, during unconsciousness of any kind,
and in a dual body (called elsewhere 'fine', 'subtle'
(sukshuma), visiting a worthier world, adjacent,
co-penetrating. Such a belief as this in man's 'right of
way,' as I like to call it, in other worlds, even while
yet, to all seeming, earth-man, should have formed
a very stepping-stone to a belief in a sequent persisting
responsibility, in the man-as-surviving, for the cleanli-
ness or otherwise of the hands he comes over withal.
Equally too a stepping-stone to the belief in the
solicitude of those to whom he comes over, that his
hands, if foul or bloody, should undergo cleansing.
Well, hereon, I repeat, the Upanishads, as they have
come down, are dumb. The Persian mandate reached
India, but not through them.
CHAPTER III

SURVIVAL IN EARLY BUDDHISM

I come now to the contribution made by the original Buddhist gospel to Indian religious beliefs about survival. And first a word of comparison between the Upanishads, considered as revealing a pre-Buddhist religious culture, and the records known as the Pali Canon, considered as revealing the earliest data we have about early Buddhism.

In these we are, as Oldenberg phrased it, "on a soil essentially separate from those." This is not wholly, not even mainly, a difference in time. As to that, we do not know when the earlier Upanishads were yet the sayings of living teachers; when they received their finally fixed oral form, nor whether they are free from subsequent glosses. For me, a few of the Sayers were the near precursors of the Sakyan mission, a few, the contemporaries of that mission. The convergence between the latter few Upanishadic Sayers and the Pali Suttas, in certain points of view and certain terms, is herein very significant. We know with a little less vagueness when the Pali Canon began and when it drew towards completion. But, in the compilation of both literatures, the respective difference in time in these two long growths is relatively negligible. The radical difference lies in the different world of culture to which the one and the other addressed itself. There is nothing new in the saying of this, but judging by my experience I find it is not enough emphasized.

In the Upanishads we are in the world of the School,

\footnote{Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus, p. 282.}
the 'University,' a world engrossed in the culture of 'culture,' the administration of a body of traditional knowledge or *vidyā*, the fostering of the sheltered lives of boys and young men away from and prior to the public unsheltered life of the world. It was a cloistered life, a *brahmacharya*. The welfare of the fellowman entered very slightly into this disciplined arena of the *brahmachārin*, or Godfarer; the fellow-woman entered scarcely at all (although one context implies the presence of women in the audience);¹ the child as child entered into it not at all. The teaching of domestic and civic morals in the Upanishads *could be put into a single page*. The hearers were young and death stood afar. In one Upanishad only, the Kaṭha, does Death and his portal come very near, due, I fancy, to an experience gained by the Sayer in a severe illness, which may be an eye-opener to many things. It is a very noteworthy Upanishad, but it is not a typical one. Here, more than elsewhere do we see the man in presence of this world and that, seeking, demanding his right of way. He is indeed on the threshold. In the others, the Unseen is, but it is mostly as a thing that is very far off. In it are deities become or becoming legend and myth, but not he or her "whom we have loved and lost awhile." None appears from beyond to cheer or to warn, to inform and to guide.² Aspiration is very lofty, for the lofty concept of man's nature demands nothing less; but it visualizes nothing *intermediate* in soaring from earth to the Highest, who is conceivable nowise save in some name for 'That.' There is no visualizing of *a More* as between the man of earth and That *Most*. And yet one thing we do find in those earlier Upanishads: everywhere is there a feeling, to an extent not met with before, after

¹ Cf. *Aitareyya Up.*, V, VI.  
² *Chānd. Up.*, 8, 3, 1.
'becoming,' as a fact and as a need, becoming in man, becoming in creation, becoming in what is yet for to come.¹

Leaving the Brahman world of the Academy, of the 'Church,' for the world of the first Sakyan missioners, we come, it is true, into another inner world: the world of the monk. But the student, the man to be educated is now our friend Everyman, the man in public life, not of the sheltered life, the man, yes, and the woman, of the market, of the high-and-by-way, of the home, where the child, if in the background, is not absent. It is, I think, not sufficiently realized, in our cultures so familiar with the feature of the missioner, that in early Buddhism we have the earliest known instance of man sowing in an organized company a religious mandate broadcast among his fellowmen, a mandate not preceded by, or accompanied with the setting up of any already hallowed symbol or rite, but just a Word about the things at the back of rite and symbol.

Verily are we here in "a different world," a new world. Symbol and rite may keep those things, in a way, in view, yet it tends to be a distant view. Concrete though it be, the view is necessarily very general, appealing more to 'men' than to the man. But when the mandate is the word of this man to that man, 'this man' has, in it, a word about a More that is in him to give to 'that man' in whom is therein a Less. And hence we may expect to find in it new guidance, less vaguely general, more pointed and definite, held out to the individual man. In particular, his hereafter will be worded as something to be his own, a matter about which he has his own worries, his own hopes and

¹ See exposition in my Manual of Buddhism, 1932, ch. iv, pp. 88–100.
aspirations, a matter affecting his own will, in its quest after a Goal.

If now we seek, beneath the features in the Pali records belonging to the monkish administration of this human mandate, some such expected ‘difference,’ do we find it? Let us see what we do find.

My work in this field has shown me, that early Buddhism gave to India, and thereby to the world, a more definite doctrine, cult, or theory of survival, rebirth, reincarnation, transmigration than any other religion, before or since. This goes only so far as to say, that it is less vague than any other in this matter. Indefinite it is, unfinished, a patchwork, but it is less so than other creeds. In particular, survival is, in the older Pali records, a thing of vital, present interest. The mature man of the world could thrust it aside no less than the youth in the Academy, but not so much ‘all the time.’ His youth lay behind him; death was on the offering; he was in a world of the dying no less than of the living; and the losing M, and perhaps N had torn his heart. Let us make good this statement in detail.
CHAPTER IV

GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF SURVIVAL

It is not easy to say of pre-Buddhist religious culture to what extent survival at death was accepted. We must not be misled by prayers in Vedas, Brāhmaṇas or Upanishads for amṛta, the not-dead, or, as we say, for immortality. India did not draw, as we tend to draw, a hard and fast line between this and the brief span of earth-life. Amṛta was not the whole of surviving existence; it was the only form of it held desirable. If I still say, that, judging by the Suttas of the Buddhist Nikāyas or Āgamas, we find the vague earlier Indian beliefs, in life before and after life on earth, gathered up into something approaching a definite orderly doctrine; that we find in them, not so much faith in what might happen hereafter, and faith in what might be compelled by efficient ritual to happen hereafter (the teaching of Vedas and Brāhmaṇas respectively) as acquiescence in a scheme of pre-existence and post-existence, which amounted to what we now would call a law of nature; that you were, and you will be, whether you pray and sacrifice, or whether you do not; that your life is taken up into the law of cause and effect:—this, I venture to think, is a new emphasis in standpoint:—if I still say all this with the qualification "emphasis in standpoint," I would here add, that I do not claim for early Buddhism any special unanimity in acquiescence in survival. I would not say, that the early Upanishads are not equally acquiescent, if not equally emphatic in acquiescence. I say rather, that, among the new ideas of the time, acquiescence was becoming a livelier faith,
and that teachers both of the standard religion and of new mandates, Jain and Sakyan, felt this and responded to it.

It is possible, that the livelier expression of interest in survival may have been a reaction to a protest against the emergence of sceptical thought. The Pali books, for instance, show, as if from their very beginnings, an awareness of two opposite tendencies, between which we infer that the Buddhist mandate took a middle way: the tendencies called Sassata-vāda and Uccheda-vāda. In the former the man persisted unchanging; in the latter he was ‘cut off’ from existence. For the Buddhist, the former view was wrong in implying that the survivor remained statically identical, when actually he was in a state of becoming. (This degenerated later into the seeing in that becoming merely change as such.) The latter view was held no less false, because the man, in becoming, persisted.

Nor did the Suttas always name the Uccheda-vāda only to reject it. There is at least one Sutta—in what may well be mainly an early collection: the Threes of the Anguttara-Nikāya—where it is pleaded that the good life, while it will certainly avail for salvation hereafter, is also the best choice, even if there be no life hereafter! I do not seem to hear Gotama or his chief disciples talking in this quasi-modern agnostic way; and as to that, the Suttas reveal as great a variety of teachers, named and unnamed, as of people to be taught. My point is, that deniers of man’s persistence hereafter, qualified or unqualified, were to be met with in those times, and that such denial

1 I.e. primitive Buddhist. It was centuries before Sakyans were called Buddhists.
2 E.g. Dīgha-Nikāya, 1st Suttanta.
3 Anguttara-Nikāya, III, § 65.
may possibly have spurred interest in the hereafter, lack of interest in which is ever one of the greatest clogs on the wheels of religious progress.

Now such a livelier interest we should expect to find expressed in (a) recurrence and emphasis, and (b) in fresh terms.

(b) As to the latter, it may sound curious, but I have found specific or technical terms more to seek in the Pali books than they are in our own discussions on Indian views of survival. Rebirth, reincarnation, transmigration, metempsychosis, survival: none of these is a translation from Indian terms, unless we except transmigration in the word samsāra, ‘faring on,’ with its frequent concomitant sandhāvana: ‘running on.’1 And the one outstanding, the one emphatically Buddhist term our writers usually render wrongly. This is bhava: ‘becoming,’ usually rendered ‘existence,’ or ‘rebirth,’ and puna-bhava: ‘again-becoming.’

Survival here or there is usually called uppatti, ‘happening,’ literally ‘up-winning.’ Thus X ‘was reborn in the happy world’ would read ‘Tusitām uppajjati.’ So the naturally falling, de-cease (cadere, caesum) of dying was called cavati, cuti.2 There is implication of rebirth in the stock formula for human birth:—“That which is of such and such beings in such and such a group (or world: nikāya), is birth (jāti), continued (or sequent) birth: (samjāti), descent (okkanti), more-production (abhīnibbati), manifestation of body and mind, the acquiring of sense-faculties: this is called birth.”3 The later term ‘re-disposing’ (patisandahati) first shows itself in the newer scepticism of the Buddhist monk Nāgasena, in the Milinda

1 E.g. Dīgha-N., Sta. XVI, 4, § 2; Samyutta-N., XV, 4, § 1.
2 Pronounce c as ch.
3 Ibid. Sta. XXII, § 18; XII, § 2.
Questions, to be dated probably at about the former half of the first century B.C.

But the word bhava has a strange and tragic history. Taken over by the first Buddhists from current Brahman teaching, just as it was coming, by this, to be rejected from the Academy, it was the very keystone of the arch of original Buddhist teaching. This sought to expand, to buttress the current teaching of its place and day: “thou art, as man, God” with the proviso: “it is for thee by thy living to become God”; to be is to become, for nothing is unchanged. And this becoming was symbolized by the already accepted Indian simile of the Way:

Scarce visible and old there lies a way
That touches me, e’en me, was found by me;
Thereon the wise, whose is the Brahma-lore,
Fare onward to the world of light, and there
Are utterly released.¹

It was as wayfarer that man became, or ‘grew.’ And the wayfaring involved a concept of life as many lives in many worlds. Now whereas we can say ‘lives,’ India’s idiom could not, or anyway did not; nor was it anything but forcing that idiom to say, in the plural, ‘worlds.’ But to say bhava in the plural came more easily: bhavā; hence we are ever finding both ‘lives’ and ‘worlds’ called bhavā: ‘comings-to-be.’ Then, as monk-values, monk-ideals grew in weight, in influence, all these comings-to-be amounted to the all-encompassing Ill of life. Hence the pristine word of hope in the forward view became blurred, even foul; it was damned in doctrine; its symbol became restricted to this life by the substitution of an eightfold excellence in thought, word and deed attainable here and now.

¹ Brh. U., 4, 4, 8.
A word suggestive of the blotting out—Nirvana—of worlds and of life became substituted for that earlier word of the Way-quest:—attha: the Thing-needed, Thing sought for. To stop becoming: this was Nirvana.

Such is the history, the all but buried history of bhava, and no translation of the word can, in itself, reveal that history. Only the causative form of the Indian word bhū (become): bhāv- with the lengthened stem, remains to show us, in the unworsened appreciation of it, what the whole word-group once meant for Buddhism. This form we can only express by the word ‘make become,’ or develop, or by the synonym in Pali exegesis: ‘grow.’¹ Sometimes translators feel its true significance, yet there are not a few who misrepresent the causative verbal noun: bhāvanā by ‘meditation,’ which it does not mean.

Nor is it only in the treatment of ‘becoming’ that the intimate bond between early Buddhism and the life to come was weakened. Life was further divorced from the hopeful concept of a coming-to-be by being likened to a mere whirling round. Vatta, whirling, or the eddy of whirling water, creeps in as synonymous with samśāra, the going on, going continually.² And the very symbol-of-the-symbol—the wheel as ‘graph’ of the Way—becomes caught up from fruitful progress on earth to a futile aerial revolving, a very wheel of Ixion, to signify life: the bhava-cakka,³ or wheel of becoming, i.e. of lives, of worlds.

The fact that new terms for life’s survival came in to word, not the new mandate, for the Many, of the man

¹ E.g. On Dhammapada, 106: bhavītattānam: = vaddhiat-tānam, etc.
² E.g. Khuddakapāṭha Comy. on ‘Ratana-sutta,’ § 10.
as Deity-in-becoming; God-in-posse, rather than -in-esse, but the monkish contraction of this, reveals a world as little fit to embrace in its fulness the rich gift of that mandate, as was the Palestino-Roman world fit to live up to the rich gift of "The kingdom of God is within you." Each great cult left, it is true, a mark belonging to its essence: the latter in the new and permanent 'Good Samaritan' warding of the poor and afflicted brother, the former in the essentially religious nature of morality in conduct. But the full essence of each still awaits man's realizing, man's acceptance.

(a) I have also said, that we might expect to find the livelier interest in survival betrayed, in the records, by recurrent and emphatic allusions to it. And these we do find. We cannot read far in the Suttas without meeting reference to the here and the beyond, to this world and the next, to the alternative "thrown into purgatory," "arises in the bright world" \(^1\) (thrown is also used for the latter, but rarely\(^2\)). It is true, that not infrequently and with emphasis occur references to a different, a monkish outlook on the hereafter, wherein is envisaged neither a hell nor a heaven, both of them temporary, but a waning out of anything that could be called more life (bhava), since this involved the dis-ease, the intrinsic woe of birth and dying afresh, and was therefore to be averted by the curious Indian panacea of excising the wish to be reborn. But herein we have not the true original gospel for the Many, brought from academy to highway and home by the pioneer missionaries of Sakya. I do not count it as the original contribution to survival made by Buddhism. This was, in this connection, that survival being certain, it depended upon the way in which man

\(^1\) E.g. Anguttara-N., IV, § 20, \(^2\) Ibid., VI., § 82.
prepared himself for it, whether it would prove a promotion in happy life, or the reverse.

Equally frequent and emphatic is the enlarged and more intimate vision in the Pali records of other worlds and their denizens. In those records, when compared with earlier Indian literature, we find their compilers telling many things about the Beyond, as a body of accepted revelation unrevealed before. And therein we hear practically nothing about Deity as external being or beings, or about devils, but a great deal about men (and a very little about women) who, albeit they are yet called deva's, 'gods,' are in reality they who have been fellowmen of earth, and will, it may be, become so, in surviving, again. One of the minor Pali anthologies known as 'the Thus-said-ings': Iti-vuttaka, in a Sutta, which I believe to be unique of its kind, gives vivid expression to this belief, thus:

"When a deva, from the waning of life-span, deceases from deva-world, there go forth three words of devas cheering him: 'Hence, sir, go to happy bourn, to fellowship of men. Become a man. Win faith in the very dharma. That faith settled in thee, become a basis, immovable while life lasts in the well-discerned dharma, do thou, putting off bad ways in thought, word and deed, and all else that is corrupt, doing what is good in thought, word and deed, immeasurable, ungrasping, and because of that building with charity merit, yea, much of it, make other mortals also to dwell in very dharma, in the God-life.' By this compassion do devas, when they know a deva is deceasing cheer him, (saying) again and again Come, deva!"  

1 Anguttara-N., V, §83 (Pali Text Society edition). The three words are a little more clearly specified in the prose portion, the verse portion being what is quoted. They there seem to be: (1) win rebirth as man; (2) choose there the right course; (3) make the right course become (i.e. grow: bhavāhi).
If I have left deva untranslated, as now I always do, it is because I find our word 'god,' or any European equivalent, a misfit for this Indian conception of man-in-the-unseen. Rhys Davids was at first inclined to use angel and archangel, but fell back on 'god.' Dr. Coomaraswamy now wishes to revive 'angel.' And to my objection, that 'angel' is also a misfit, since, quite apart from the absence in deva's of wings, we do not think of angels as, now in this birth, now in that, become human, he reminds me of a line in Aquinas: "men are taken up into the orders of the angels." But this minimizes only half the misfit. The other half is, that we do not associate angels with rebirth as men. The one point of historic importance is that, whether we speak of deva, angel or god in the Pali records, we should be able to visualize as near as may be how the early Buddhist visualized them. And if, in our terms, we confuse deva with the way in which the Greeks visualized their theoi, or Romans their dei, or Christo-Semitism its angels, we shall overlook much that is distinctive in early Buddhism.

In particular, we may fail to grip the world of changed thought concerning the Unseen in which Buddhism was born. In the Vedic pantheon are deities held to be endowed with attributes usually associated with the word, beings having creative power, informing influence, controlling force, able to control nature, human or otherwise, to bestow or withhold, reward or punish, having also some form of cult, special rites, celebrants, votaries. But when Buddhism arose, it was only what we should here and now call the state religion, the popular form of religion, in which personalized ideas of the Supreme were still recognized and,

In Buddhist Birth-Stories, 1880.
2 Isis, No. 55, April, 1933. St. Catherine Press Ltd., Bruges.
by the professional priesthood, waited upon as 'gods.' Among that professional priesthood there were, at the same time, many more earnest men of religion, especially among teachers, who taught a newer thoroughgoing immanent theism, to wit, that deity was knowable by man as within and akin to himself,—in Indian idiom, to the self. The supreme Warder of man was within, the Mentor of man was within; man was no atomy swept along by the fiat of some warrior-god; he was the very shrine of godhead; he was It.

Now the influence of this teaching would tend to leave diseified and unworshipped a world of beings still referred to as deva's. They would not become dead ideas; they would come to be rated as of a different status; on the one hand they would be levelled down to that of the world of those who had, as we say, 'gone before.' On the other hand, the man on earth had undergone a wonderful levelling-up. There had come a great light into his life; he could aspire to the company, the comradeship (sahavyatā) of devas, in that he was one in nature with the Divine. And he could picture them as interested in his prospects of that intercourse, as intervening to help him here, if he was showing himself awake to his kinship with them, as watching his wayfaring, as hailing his arrival among them, either at death or, also, if psychic gifts permitted, as in converse with them before that.

Such, as I now see it, will have been a very important, because very practical result of the transformation in Indian thought from external theism to the new Immanence. Students of that thought have hitherto failed to discern it, because they have not made a

1 *Dīgha-N.,* Sta. XIII; this is wrongly translated as 'union.'

2 *Ibid.,* Stas. XVIII, XIX, XXI.

3 *Vin.,* Mhv. I, 5.

4 Below, pp. 35, 74f.
comparative historical study of earlier Upanishads taken together with earlier Buddhism. They have just said, of the latter: Here is a different world, and have kept the two 'worlds' apart. Let them now consider the two somewhat after this manner:—In the earlier Upanishads we see the man falling out of touch with the Mahā-deva's of the Vedas; we see these become legendary, mythical, Homeric. Aspiration is all towards a mystic Brahman shrouded in a dhātu: in 'conditions,' called amṛta: 'not-dead,' immortal, but here and now to be accessible in a way banishing all fear and opening up a very universe of love, accessible as the very soul or self at the centre of man's individual being. "Thou art That"; from Thee "I no more shrink away"; ¹ "dear is fellowman to me since he too is That." ²

Here is surely very much, yet here is all, here is as far as in those Upanishads man got. That between him and Brahman, Source and End of all, was an intervening hierarchy of the Man at every stage of growth, of 'becoming,' dwelling for the time in other worlds, yet very near to him, "if haply he might feel after and find him";—here is a step further than the Upanishads bring us. And it is this step further that we get in the Pali Suttas. In the Upanishads the step forward is the revealing to man of the marvellous potential virtue and glory inherent in his (yet undeveloped) nature. In the Suttas the step forward is the prospect of life in common with men in whom that virtue and glory are a little more unfolded, together with the possibility, both of preparing here on earth for that intercourse, and of a certain if limited intercourse here and now with those more advanced in growth, through the agency of the psychically gifted friends.

¹ Bryh. U., 4, 4, 15. ² Ibid., 4, 5, 6.
It is true that, in the Suttas, we see the Deity of the Brahmans referred to as personal, external, as not the impersonal Brahman of the Upanishads, but as a quasi-Vedic deity: Brahmā. 'He' (not 'That') is invested with all the attributes of a super-Kshatriyan monarch, and also with moral virtues. But this is because, when the Suttas, the Piṭakas, were finally compiled, there had been a revival, in Brahmanism, of Deity as personal, and the 'Hindu' trinity of Brahmā, Shiva and Vishnu was emerging. The later date of Canonical values is here betrayed; in these we are no more in the day of nascent Buddhism. The Suttas had undergone editing to suit the changed values.

This 'step forward,' which is an emphasized and recurrent feature in the Suttas, can be seen in the following ways:

(i) A great number of Suttas recording converse between Sakyan teachers and worthy men of another world called deva's, the teachers being more especially the Founder, then Cūla-Panthaka, Moggallāna, Anuruddha and a few more.

(ii) Self-training in development of possible psychic gifts, called jhāna, or musing.

(iii) A classification of the modes of psychic gifts, known as iddhi: 'effectuating,' such as is not in the Upanishads:—levitation, clairvoyance, clairaudience, thought-reading, the making another psychic person see visions. In all of this we are as much in a new world of opened up interest for India as were the witnesses in Palestine, at the beginning of our era, in some men's new power of will-healing among the sick, the demented and those in coma, phenomena which are not to be found, if I mistake not, in preceding records.

1 E.g. Dīgha-N., Stas. i, xi, 24 and 13.
2 Pronounce Chīla.
3 See evidence in Sakya, ch. IX.
(4) A cosmological scheme of other worlds, divided originally into (a) four disposers of the four seasons and their entourage, (b) the world of the governor Indra, or later, Sakka, whither to happy or wretched doom went men at death on earth, (c) the world of the worthier, or Brahma-deva’s, (d) worlds ‘beyond that (tat-uttarim).’¹ The world (b) was further distinguished into (i) a political group of thirty governors under the chief governor, (ii) a judicial group acting in the interests of morality, especially as to incomers from earth, (iii) worthy citizens generally as living ‘joyously,’ Tusita, (iv, v) groups which suggest works of artistic creation, and (vi) the prison world for the unworthy. These groups or centres in the ‘next world’ came to be worded as distinct worlds of distinct rebirths.² This subdivision is very irrational and may well have come about when the earlier keen interest in life as of man-cum-deva had waned, a result of the monk-outlook being diverted from life in other worlds. There was yet a hereafter of intermittent punishulent known as the Peta-world:—a word which, meaning literally ‘gone before,’ is held to be a corruption of the older term pitr-, or fathers’-world. Left in as traditional, it did not really fit the newer cosmology.³

(5) A vivid quasi-dramatic presentation, in two Suttas of the First Collection, of the interest shown by deva’s of the next and the Brahmā’s world in the prospects of earth’s impending contribution of her sons surviving death: joy over the advent of the worthy, gloom over the advent of the unworthy.⁴

(6) The frequent compound deva-manussā: ‘gods

¹ Auguttara-N., III, § 70.
² E.g. Majjhima-N., Sta. 97.
⁴ Above, p. 32.
and men’ in the Suttas. It resembles the ‘Jews and Gentiles’ of the New Testament, or the later ‘Church and laity.’ The significance of this new compound has been quite overlooked by Buddhists. Often quoted as it is, in the mission-mandate: “walk ye a walk . . . for the weal, the good, the happiness of devas-and-men,” I have yet to read a single comment on this conjunction of help for the worlds, not earth only.

(7) The ever-recurring admonitions to moral conduct, not mainly as being intrinsically lovely, or as beneficial to fellowmen, but as ensuring, and alone ensuring, a survival in happy and not in unhappy circumstances. Buddhists are much given to hold up their teaching as stressing the former motives only, when the records are for ever stressing the latter.

(8) The phenomenon recorded of the Founder’s day, at least of his last years, of the eager interest shown by the multitude in the psychic powers he was known to possess, because of the opportunity these might afford men of learning the fate of men and women, young and old, known to them and parted by death. Here again we have a precious ancient testimony marred and blurred by the editing hand of men thinking differently. The inquirers are answered, but (a) it is merely according to schedule, (b) the striking simile used of fate in the mirror, whereby, beholding his own face as clean or foul, a man may foretell a corresponding fate hereafter, is distorted into salvation by means of a cult-formula. 2

These eight features—more might possibly be added—are prominent in Sutta, absent in Upanishad. But, I repeat, they represent, not a new India of an alien intrusive growth, but a grown India, in which

1 Vin., Mhv, I, xi. 2 Dīgha, Sta. 16.
the great, but just budding plant of the Upanishadic mandate of immanence had begun to flower. I cannot but believe, that, when we come to consider the Suttas historically and comparatively, this view will find acceptance.

With this revealed evolution, we should go on to see, in historical perspective, a falling away in both the Upanishadic and in the Buddhist ideal. The Upanishadic tradition fell away from the faith in man's becoming That Who he is. It failed to teach that man should become, by way of emulating those who had gone forward in other worlds. The notion of man, of Deity, as Being prevailed over the notion of That as Becoming. The decay that supervenes everywhere in the bodily, in the merely mental worlds, upon becoming, was held as bound up with all, even with spiritual becoming. As to the Buddhist tradition, it saw life, lives, worlds (bhavā), not as opportunities for growth, but as Ill. The layman might win remission of ill for awhile by virtuous living, but the true 'way out' was to win once for all eternal stopping (nirōdha) by entire waning (nirvana). Herein lay no "blest fellowship divine" to be aspired to, but an utter silence of the Void.

So crucially important do I find these 'features,' appearing in the Suttas, to a sure understanding of the original gospel of Buddhism, that I will briefly put their case negatively. Suppose that the monkish teaching, which we find emphasized in the Suttas, represented truly the Founder's teaching, namely, that a man should "train himself against laying hold of this or of any other world,"¹ and depending upon life in them for anything. In that case we should look also to find results of such a teaching in the Suttas. In other

¹ Majjhima-N., Sta. 143.
words, we should find no teaching about (only against) life in other worlds. We should find no teaching relating conduct here to corresponding experience hereafter. Sayings about intercourse with other worlds, and the interest of their inmates in men of earth would have been suppressed. We should not find the Founder having and acknowledging such intercourse. We should not find records, stated as truths, about the constitution of other worlds; I mean, we should not find a new system of worlds emerging in them. But all of this is just what we do find, intermixed with the teaching of that more negative repressive outlook.

This does not make Buddhism, as some have tried to show, an originally dual gospel,\(^1\) teaching one thing for layman, another thing for monk. It became such a dual teaching, and is so even now. But a world-gospel for everyman is not one that begins by cleaving mankind into halves. It speaks to man, not as in this or that social group, but as man, distinguishable only into the man who is furthering becoming by will, or who is not. "Not as houseman or as world-forsaker do I blame or praise a man," the Teacher is recorded as saying, "but according as he walks wrongly or rightly."\(^2\) His message was to the very man, and to man as man. But as man he is wayfarer in the worlds, and to him as such came the Message.

I will cite here a discourse of the Second Collection, which I have so far noted as entirely unnoticed by writers on Buddhism. It is the Nalakapāna Sutta (No. 68), and while it has tragic suggestions of monastic editing, it bears traces of being of 'the old rock.' Gotama asks those of his disciples who were Sakyen nobles and had left all to join him, whether, in ever

\(^1\) Cf. Manual of Buddhism, ch. XV.
\(^2\) Anguttara-N., II, § 10.
striving in the godly life for something ever better than they had yet won, they did not find joy and happiness in so doing. Anuruddha admits that they did so. Now why, Gotama goes on, do you suppose I have told you, as to this disciple and that whom death has taken, what has been his fate? Did you think I wanted to advertise my powers, or to impose upon you, or talk you over? I did not want that. But there are young men who believing are uplifted in knowledge and in joy, and hearing of these things they concentrate the mind on such a state. For them that makes long for good and for happiness.

Here have we Gotama, Man of the Way of Becoming, Man of the Worlds, Man of life as a joyous opportunity.

\footnote{\textit{Tathātāya}.}
Chapter V

Survival Prior to This Life

I would briefly consider survival as belonging also to a man’s past in a separate chapter, because, for the religions of Europe, survival is associated almost solely with man’s hereafter. If I am careful to say ‘almost solely,’ it is because I am not unmindful of a wider vision shown now and then in European thought, from Plato down to the Messianists of Poland. But these visions are sporadic, while in India, and thence to Buddhist countries, the belief in man’s present span of life, as a “moment ’twixt two eternities,” grew up as a perennial growth. And in my theme it is not the sporadic, that may be cited only to be dismissed and forgotten, but the perennial growth that must be kept fully in view.

There have been, there are, writers on Buddhism, who would see in ‘pre-existence’ the ingenious logic of thinkers of old, striving to account for the inequalities of men’s fate, as so often unfitting present merit or demerit, whether or not they sought to “justify the ways of God.” And it is natural that man should see in what is true that which is at the same time reasonable. But it is surely more likely that, in an age-long belief, we have something true which man has tried to explain as reasonable, than something reasonable which he has invented as true, and has convinced many is true.

Yet worse is the estimating man’s fancies in folk-lore as the very matrix itself of his past as very long. Such

1 W. Lutosławski, Pre-existence and Reincarnation, London, 1928, p. 67, etc.
fancies may be and are woven about the belief. But the belief itself in life as no passing thing of a day, but a matter indefinitely greater for each and every man, belongs to the revelations bestowed, now there now then, upon man, of the More that there is in his nature, the More in his life, the More in his destiny.

In the Upanishads this facet of survival does not show itself, save as implicated in the general statement of rebirth. Thus the middle-date, or rather later Muṇḍaka Upanishad (1, 2, 10):

Since doers of deeds do not understand. . . .
Having had enjoyment in the top of heaven won by good works, They re-enter this world, or a lower.

In the Suttas this vaguely general commitment becomes a vital interesting fact. Not only is this so in the passage quoted above about the dying deva; interest is shown in a more personal way, where the Founder is made to tell stories Jātaka-fashion about his own remembered past. His cousin Ānanda sees him smiling and asks what has amused him? An anecdote is told in reply, and the Master then claims to have been one of the characters. The Second Collection gives a few such episodes.¹ In the Vinaya and elsewhere, stories are told as memories but without personal reference. This personal reference, as is well known, was unremittingly applied to every one of the 551 Jātaka stories in the appended Commentarial summing up of the narrative, the personal memory including that of this or that leading disciple as associated with the Founder in what happened.²

In the vast Jātaka Collection itself, we see belief in

¹ E.g. Nos. 81, 83.
² Cf. below, p. 57. Jātaka is literally 'birth-ish,' 'birth-thing.'
pre-existence made not only interesting but profoundly vital. Attention to this has perhaps been too slight. The folklorist has here found a rich field; the philologist has discussed the relative antiquity of prose and verse; the ecclesiastical historian may be preoccupied with the solicitude of the monks, to make their discourses on sabbath and festival so attractive to the illiterate Many that, as in the case of balladmongers of old, their fees should be forthcoming and plentiful. Lastly, the all-pervading Buddha-cult has gone far to blot out the Every-Man. The stories about former lives of the Bodhisattva, the Buddha-to-be, are presented so as to show rather a *unique* rough-hewing, bestowed by destiny on the *one* man who is winning to perfection, than that which is true of every man and woman. There is much too little of You and Me, 'becoming' through life's opportunities in the past as well as in the present.

Yet if logically taught, the Jātakas, for all their fancies, their childishness, their often low standards of moral worth, are the shining proof, that at the heart of Buddhism is the belief in lives, at least in lives on earth, as opportunities for every man to become in time That Who he by nature and in potency is. That not this Bodhisattva only, but every man has it in him eventually to realize Buddhahood: this was brought to the front by Mahāyāna Buddhism. But that cult focussed attention on Bodhisattvaship as a future attainment, neglecting relatively the past. Hinayāna Buddhism focussed attention on Bodhisattvaship in the past, but neglected to show it as equally applicable to every man, and in the future also. How pathetic are our myopias!

There is another feature in pre-existence which, I believe, no Buddhist discourse brings out, so blurred
did all its pregnant worth become by the monastic outlook on life. This is, that in order to mature Manhood a rich diversity in 'reincarnations' is necessary. A thousand consecutive lives in one land, one race, one sex, one rank would not so endow a man with all the wealth that goes to making up the whole man as a mere dozen lives varied in all those respects. No man is fully becoming who sees things under one aspect only.

It may be said:—it has been said to me—Reincarnation is to me irrational, because repeated opportunity, without memory of the past to improve by, were futile. I am not writing here as an apologist for previous existence, but, even for independent discussion, I find here more myopia. A burnt child, we say, dreads the fire. Memory is a help in growth, albeit not always profited by. But growth is not all according to memory. Most of our growth is the result, unconsciously acquired, of having repeatedly done our best. Not always in our decisions are we measuring a past that was too much this way, too little that way. It may be, our measuring has been done previously. Buddhist compilers were mindful of how previous life in another world obscured the recollection of the previous life on earth. They ushered in each Jātaka with the refrain: "he made clear the matter hidden by the intervening life" (bhavantarena paṭichammakāraṇaṁ pākati). But they were not, any more than are we, at pains to show, (a) that the man in that intervening life might have memory of his previous earthlife, and profit thereby, (b) that he would return to earth a grown man, both by remembering while away, and otherwise. Our imagination in things spiritual is marvellously lazy.

Had Buddhism not worsened its conception of life to a mere whirling recurrence, had it kept faith in the
dim splendour, underlying the Jātaka scheme, of the promise and hope in life seen as a whole, what a noble heritage might it not have become for India, instead of dying in that land a dishonoured death! As it is, we have the curious dual picture in it, (i) of the one man grappling with his fate in untold length of time and growing by it to the perfect being, and (ii) of all other men being admonished, that life is not to be welcomed as the essential medium for growth, but is, as we find the Orphics saying, a dolour-laden wheel, off which it behoves them to step with least possible delay. In the former, religion is a Way leading onward; in the latter, it is merely ‘a way out’ (nissaraṇa).

In the legends of the Founder's life, he is made in his last life-span, previous to becoming Siddhattha Gotama, to be a deva among the happy ones of the next world called collectively Tusīta. This is not because he has not, as nearing perfection, visited the worthier Brahma-world—he is made to affirm he has been there—let alone the undefined ‘Beyond-that.’ But in the next world he was, as to his body, not too refined or transcendent to pass straight into an earth-body. This is nowhere so stated, but we do read, in the First Collection, that devas of Brahmaworld were believed to undergo a physical coarsening when they visited the svarga, or world ranked as between them and earth. The legend represents the Founder as entreated by a deva to decease and be reborn on earth as a helper. He is reluctant but consents, and is then shown selecting the circumstances most favourable to his coming work on earth. I have said this, as a further example of how much more the Indian in Buddhist

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1 Jātaka, Nidāna-kathā, Avidūre.
2 Majjhima-N., Sta. 12.
3 Dīgha-N., Sta. 19.
culture was interested in the *whole of survival* than the Indian of earlier culture had been. (I am assuming that this legend emerged on Indian soil.)

It is a great leap to come from preoccupations such as these in Tusita, so worthy of a man at a lofty stage of evolution, to consider the development in Buddhism of a belief in man's rebirths as animal. I have referred to certain slight contexts in the Upanishads\(^1\) which tend to show, that early Buddhism found such a belief, before it fostered and developed the notion. More than this cannot be said. There can be little serious question but that the Upanishads underwent in time, and orally, as much editing as did the Pali Pitakas. Now what if the brief allusions in the former, which are *not integral* at all to the general teaching of the Upanishadic schools, are glosses, due possibly to a Buddhist influence at one time grown preponderant? And not to very early Buddhist influence at that?

I have put forward the theory, and hold it strongly, that the founders of Buddhism did not teach rebirth as animal as any part of their central figure of life as a Way of the worlds. I think that the belief belonged to primitive popular tradition, in common with tree-worship, belief in devils and much else, and that it was waiting to be exploited when, with a great growth in monastic parasitism, it became of first importance to make the alms-supported teaching, not only serious and authoritative, but also popular and attractive.

That the belief should find mention, find apparent if curt acceptance, in the academic teaching of brahmans, that it should be tolerated in the mandate, *when this was new*, of a taking up of manhood into Godhead as intrinsically identical, is for me a very

\(^1\) Above, p. 17.
strange anomaly. I do not say there is not room in the Indian mind for such an anomaly. I see at times incredible frivolity in the ways of the Mother of Religions. Her children, even if saints, will rush in where angels fear to tread. But not when the gospel was new. I can better understand the toleration when the first fervour had congealed into a tradition. But when, in Buddhism—and it happened all too soon—there arose a decline in the sublime worth and sanctity of the nature of the very man, the self, the soul, then the notion of reincarnation in an animal became not only not repugnant, but even plausible. The man: purisa, attā, became worded merely as puggala: male, travestied in exegesis as 'hell-swaller.' Stripped first of Godhead, then stripped of reality as an entity, what had he, if he lacked the lofty faculty of wisdom (pañña), that an animal could not share?

It is to read the new into the old to see in the notion any special Indian or Buddhist sympathy with animals as being by nature akin to man. I do not find animals included among 'beings': sattā. Worth is paid to the relatively high capacity of the horse and elephant for training as beasts. The cult of the monkey is much later. He plays a prominent part in the Jātakas, for cunning, for tribe-feeling, etc. But he is very beast, and it would be interesting were a link eventually to be found between the mediæval nadir of man's worth in Buddhism and the emergence of the ape-cult. The only general reference to life in the 'matrix,' or world of animals dwells on its miseries:—"In many more ways could I talk of how hard it is to state adequately

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1 Visuddhi-magga, my edition, p. 310.
2 Milinda; p. 32.
3 In Mahāyāna they may possibly be included. Cf. Eastern Buddhist, VI, 2, 117.
how ill is (life in) the animal world.” Older estimates of Buddhism will have rated its belief in animal rebirth as a link with the paganism of ancient cults elsewhere, such as infected the European tradition through men like Empedokles, Pythagoras, Plato, thinkers who cannot be said to have more than played with the idea. The modern West, in its excessive cult of the animal, or at least of one or two kinds, tends to look too leniently on this decadent tendency in early Buddhism, and to acquiesce in the belief as having been seriously inculcated by the first Sakyans.

To put a nail in the coffin of this error, it is worth while considering for a moment the number and nature of the references to the subject in the Suttas. On the question whether animal rebirth was possible, as discussed by the Founders, I am unable to bring forward a single passage. But I find this noteworthy feature: animal rebirth is referred to round about thirty times in the stock list of varieties of rebirth. For example, in the Mahā-sīhanāda (Majjhima, 12): “There are these five bourns: hell, animal matrix, peta-region, men, devas.” This is followed by the repeated formula: “But I know hell. . . . I know the animal matrix. . . . I know (the other three bourns), the way going to it and the progress, and how, having progressed, from breaking up of body, from dying one arises there: that too I know.” This is the nearest to anything like teaching on the matter that I have found. Were it not embedded in cult-made formula, it might be taken seriously. The only other passage I know is a remark imputed to the Founder, but so crassly ‘church-made’, as to amount to a libel on him. In the Lohicca it is the remark: “To keep a good thing to one’s self, be it material or spiritual, is to

1 Majjhima-N., Sta. 129. 2 (Dīgha, 12), pronounce Lohiccha.
be unmindful of the welfare of others” . . . (this is all right) . . . “you admit that to hold such a view is wrong: now if a man hold a wrong view, one of two bourns will be his: either hell or the animal world.” This holding that a man may be damned for his opinions may be softened into saying that his conduct may be regulated by his opinions. But it is the presenting the opinion as the criterion in his fate that is so anti-Sakyan. We recall the better known Kālāma Sutta, wherein the views put forward by a man are to be tested solely by their result in conduct, in practical welfare, and not the other way about. The odd remark, in the Lohicca, about the bourns is out of keeping with the discussion. This is, that a teacher, like the brahman interlocutor, is good if he put no obstacle in the onward progress of the student. Conduct and goodwill are stressed; but the value ascribed to the view as such is, I should say, a gloss, and the damnatory clause no less.

The other references are of an even more skeleton nature. They are in the Third and Fourth Collections, and come in a passing allusion to ‘bourns’ (gati), thus: for such and such conduct “goes to hell, to animal world, to peta region.” Or again: “if he have this religion-mirror, he can say of himself: I am he for whom hell is faded out, the animal world, the peta region is faded out.”

It will be said: Well, there is any way in these Pali books no shrinking from the mentioning of rebirth as animal. It is clearly looked upon as no less plausible than rebirth in one of two other calamitous conditions. To delete the one and leave the others were a very serious business. I reply, it is indeed a serious business, and I recollect how John Selden, in his Table Talk of

1 Anguttara-N., III, § 65. 2 Samyutta-N. (vol. v), LV, § 7.
300 years ago, reminded us, that once one began to alter Scripture it was difficult to know when to stop. Nor can I here and now exhaust this question of verbal criticism. But to call criticizing a serious business does not make the Scripture true. I will leave the matter with one or two suggestions.

(1) Let the reader of Suttas, keeping in mind this threefold damnatory formula of niraya, tiracchānayoni, peta (or petti-), compare it with two other recurring modes of reference to post-morten retribution: one being the triad: “the going-off, the bad bourn, the downfall” (apāya-duggati-vinipāta); the other, the most usual, simply niraya (hell or purgatory), with or without the verb “thrown into,” as usually juxtaposed to sagga, or sugati (happy bourn). These being there, it is at least possible, that, in the formula of the first three, we have a later irruption, coinciding with the rise of Jātaka popularity in monastic teachings.

(2) Let him further consider certain allusions to past and future life as affecting, or affected by, previous or present conduct, where is an opening for reference to rebirth as animal, yet where no such reference occurs. I am thinking (a) of the poem of the Founder’s step-mother, Mahā-Pajāpatī Gotamī:

Oh! but 'tis long I’ve wandered down all time,
Living as mother, father, brother, son,
And as grandparent in the ages past,
Not knowing how and what things really are,
And never finding what I needed sore.2

Here is no account taken of any form of life save that of the Man, inherently divine; (b) of the two Suttas

1 The Maha-Nidāna variant is rare: apāyaṁ duggatim vinipātam samāsāram (nātivattati). Dīgha-N., II, 55.
2 Therīgāthā, verse 159.

In the latter, which is restrained and dignified, Subha, a young brahman, asks the Master why and wherefore it is that among human beings there are high and low, hale and ailing, ignorant and well-informed? The reply, now better known than hitherto, is "Beings have their own acts, are heirs of acts, have acts as matrix, as kin, as referee. Action analyses beings so that they are low or high." Subha asks for more detail. In reply, cases are given of moral and immoral living, whence it will follow, in the former kind, that the man goes to a happy world, or, if to earth, to favourable conditions; in the latter kind, that the man goes to *apāyam duggatiṁ vinipātam nirayam*, or, if to earth, to unfavourable conditions. Here is no word of rebirth as animal, let alone as 'peta.' The other longer Sutta, albeit mainly on the same lines, goes into the question, dear to mediæval Buddhist pundits, of karma that is for a while apparently inoperative, and the like. *Here again the animal is absent.* Neither of these references is conclusive evidence that there was a Buddhist mandate in the beginning, which ignored the folklore notion of birth as beast. But such contexts should make us hesitate before jumping to the conclusion, that there was a mandate which accepted it.

There was one way by which the more popular chatter might creep in. This was in the much longer unfixed talk of the exegetical teaching or Commentary. Thus, in the Minor Karma Sutta cited above, the Commentary, lacking the sobriety and dignity of the text, leads off with an absurd, offensive tale about Subha's father, having died, being then the watchdog of the house, and barking at the Founder when he called, etc. It is of no little interest to see, from
Professor Sylvain Lévi’s collected recensions of the Sutta,¹ one of which, in Sanskrit, he secured in Nepal, that this MS. has the commentarial gossip incorporated into the text, evidently from a change in values.

The whole question might be pursued further, with reference to the relative paucity of animal-worship that we find in India. But I leave it here, stressing what is for me, in comparing evidence, the guiding hypothesis. Namely, that a world-religion, never blind to the depths to which the man may fall, brings to him at its birth a message of the More that he fundamentally is and may be, not a Less; and further, that I see in original Buddhism an expansion, a fulfilling of the More which had been brought to India just prior to its birth.

A word here—and it is where the Buddhist tradition in its older stratum is more in agreement with Vedic literature than with its own later outlook—as to the ‘whereness’ of other worlds. These, in that older stratum, are not worded as being ‘above’ or ‘below.’ We first find them as such in Abhidhamma, the latest Piṭaka accretion, and in the Milinda, also in the Commentaries. But not, I believe, in Sutta and Vinaya. Even in the Jātaka story of King Nimi, promoted while on earth, like Dante, to visit the unseen worlds, there is no mention of the deva-chariot plunging downhill at first to visit Niraya, nor of an upward turn to regain svarga. The verb denoting the direction is one and the same: ‘Mātali the driver sent the chariot forwards’ (ratham purato pesetvā). The picture of the drive naturally makes an atmosphere of extension in space inevitable. But in the Suttas, the stock phrase is much more interesting, revealing a concept of the

¹ Mahākammavibhanga, Paris, 1932.
worlds as co-penetrating in identical space (which for me is probably true). It is a more significant concept for us than it used to be. It was easy for Christian belief to rest in an ‘up into heaven’ and a ‘descended into hell,’ when space had not been charted by astronomy as far as thought can reach, and when there were no Antipodes. But we do not now believe in a survival involving journeys to moon or stars, or, with Veda hymns, to the back of the sun. We have to learn to conceive not so much, not so wholly, an otherwhereness, as an otherwiseness. The sense and muscle that can fill space here in one way may, when replaced by other sense and muscle, fill that space with a different ‘content.’ One day, as I often say, this may be our most practical problem of Relativity. It may be that the otherwhereness is more of a super-within-ness than a hyperexpansion of the external.

The idea of up and down I first find in Dhammapaṅgaṇi, §§ 1280 f.: “The universe of sense-desire:—take from the waveless deep of woe beneath (hetṭhā) up (uḍā) to the heaven above of the Parinimittavasavatti-devas inclusive . . . the universe of Rūpa: take from the Brahmā world below up to the heaven above of the Akaniṭṭha devas inclusive,” and so on. In the later day of Milinda-panha we get crude values in measurement: “How far is it from here to the Brahmāworld?” (Here the king does not assume an ‘above.’) “Very far it is, sire. If a rock, the size of an upper chamber were to fall from there, it would take four months to reach the earth, though it came down 48,000 leagues each day and night.”¹ But in the Suttas there seems nothing of this. It is true that, in the Kevaḍgha Suttanta² Rhys Davids gives the rendering “reaching up to Brahmaloka . . . went up to

¹ Text, p. 82.
² Dīgha-Nik., Sta. II.
the realm of the Four Kings (of the firmament).” But this is a regrettable liberty with the text, which has only the word \( yāva \): ‘as far as,’ the translator overlooking the absence of a ‘down’ when the return journey to earth is mentioned. For a man of earth to ‘visit’ the next world, or the Rūpa world, presuming he was abnormally gifted, the ‘transit’ is no movement through space, but the result of an \textit{effort of will} (\textit{iddhī}). This is stated with the true psychological sense of referring the willed self-mandating to the man. The formula runs: “Just as a strong man stretches out his flexed arm, or flexes his outstretched arm, so \( X \) vanished thence and was made manifest in \( Y \).” It is frequently used in the Third and Fourth Collections, rarely in the Second, and the First. In the Ḳevaḍḍha a quite different phrase is used, a matter suggesting that this scurrilous unworthy Sutta is somehow an intruder.

It may be said: There is still in a way a transit, else why the “vanished thence.” True, and I incline to think we have here a corrupt value in the formula, creeping in when the great Clairvoyants and Clairaudients of primitive Buddhism had passed and left no worthy successors. Namely, in the text there is no ‘thence,’ but only the word \textit{antaraha·hito}: “\textit{vanished as to \( X \) world was manifest as to \( Y \) world.” But further—and the corrupt word is here—I read, for \textit{antaraha·hito}, \textit{antara-rahito}: ‘immediately,’ ‘without interval.’ So reading we get the real psychic act. The clairvoyant remains in the earth-body, but using his developed, though invisible ‘other body’ he is in a flash able to see his space filled otherwise, namely by such inmates of the next world as happened to be near him. Clairvoyants will, I fancy, bear me out here.

The word ‘vanished’ (\textit{antaraha·hito}) is in a way truer when the psychic act is accompanied by bodily trance.
In this state, whereas the earth-body remains inert (or in trance-mediumship worked by an unseen agency), the man (or self, spirit, soul) is relatively free and can, in his 'other body,' walk away. For psychic vision he may be said to have 'vanished from' the earth body. And it is this relative freedom, in deep sleep or other forms of unconsciousness, that explains why the early Buddhists held trance to be a state of unsurpassed happiness, so delightful, relatively to earth-converse, was converse with devas (among whom their dearest, once on earth, may have been included—and who that has loved and lost will say they were wrong?).

But so has this text come to be misunderstood, that a recent translation ascribes the surpassing pleasure to the mere fact, that feeling and perception are 'laid at rest'. To give point to this false sentiment the translator has inserted the words 'for ever'! \(^1\) Before I understood that the Founders valued Jhāna as other-world converse, I wondered at the sentiment of finding pleasure in total blotting out of pleasure! This has now become plain.

The so-called 'worlds' of Arūpa, or 'Formless' Jhāna, into four efforts of abstraction, to which this total trance is sometimes added, are a fairly obvious scholastic exploiting of the older sober term 'Beyond-That,' \(^2\) and do not really belong to 'early' Buddhism.

It remains for me doubtful whether those psychic Sakyans saw devas of the worthier or Brahmā world, or whether they only heard them. I may be reminded of the vision in the Hesitation scene of a deva who is called a Brahmā.\(^3\) Well, that the visitor in this case, was really Brahmā Sahampati, or in other

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\(^1\) *Further Dialogues of the Buddha (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, V)*, Sutta 59.

\(^2\) Above, p. 35.

\(^3\) *Vin.*, Mhv. I, 5.
cases, that the earthly seer really saw, and did not merely hear, inmates of Brahmā world is attested only by compilers, then by editors, who themselves were not present and who, had they been, would probably have been blind and deaf save to the things of earth. At this distance of place and time, we note and we compare our records, both with one another, and also with such knowledge of the even now uncharted phenomena as we have. Further we cannot go.

1 Vision is implied in the stock description of a deva visiting earth, e.g. Samyutta-N., I, i, § i.
CHAPTER VI

THE SURVIVOR

That it was, in original Buddhism, a given man or woman who survives, who lives on, after death of the body, is always referred to as a truth to be accepted and understood. This may be seen in the stock form of words about dying, found everywhere in the Suttas: "because of the breaking-up of the body after dying." . . ." Thus for instance: "What, master Gotama, is the reason why some beings, because of the breaking-up, etc. . . . arrive in . . . purgatory?" And again: " . . . why some beings, because, etc. . . . arrive in the 'well-bourn,' the bright world?" 'Beings' (sattā) is a term used for all intelligent persons, whether of earth (in which case they are also called manussā, humans), or of other worlds; I have so far never found it including animals.

This conviction of the reality of the survivor as person did not mean, that the survivor always retained his earth-name, but it did mean, that there was persistence of personal identity to this extent, that the survivor remained recognizable by those who had known him on earth, should he revisit earth as a (psychic) sense-experience, felt by any one of psychic gifts. Instances of a change of name occur in plenty in the Jātaka Commentary (as the prose stories framing the Jātaka verses are called). We have there a great number of names alleged to have been successively borne by Gotama Sakyamuni in different lives, not to mention many names similarly borne by a few leading disciples associated with him in former lives. In the Suttas I have found two cases: the Sakyans' first patron, king Bimbisāra of Magadha, is seen visiting a
man of earth and calling himself Jana-vasabha, but
confessing to his identity with Bimbisāra; and Anuruddha, the eminent first-disciple of Gotama’s home-
circle, is found claiming to have borne the name
Anna-bhāra in a former life. But this all amounts to
a reminiscence of earth-life, not to a change of name
on and after the transition to another world. They
only point to belief in identity of person persisting
from one earthlife to another earthlife. I have not
found, or I have forgotten, any new name as assumed
by the survivor on ‘arriving’ in another world. But the
identity as persisting, in spite of the changing earth-
name, is insisted upon. Thus at close of each Jātaka
story, the ‘Teacher’ (the oldest official name we have
of ‘the Buddha,’ a much later title) is said to ‘connect’
the past with the present, thus: “A. was X., B. was
Y., but C. was just I,” or ‘I myself,’ the last two
words: aham eva being in Pali a positive stress. Even
more insistent is the stress in those two Majjhima
Jātakas cited above. “I was then that young Jotipāla.”
“I was then that brahman chaplain.” “Now it may
seem to you, Ānanda, that at that time Jotipāla was
a different person, but you should not look upon it
like that. I at that time was Jotipāla.” Could emphasis
further go? I say this, because later Buddhism came
to deny the passing over of the identical person, came
to deny there was any personal survivor. Let it suffice
if I quote a context from each of two works highly
esteemed by the Buddhism of Southern Asia; one is
the Questions of King Milinda,1 of about the first
century B.C., the other is the Visuddhi-Magga (Way of
Purity), of the fifth century A.D.2

1. Sacred Books of the East, Nos. XXXV, XXXVI.
body to another body? There is not, sire." (Milinda, 72; translation, Sacred Books of the East, XXXV, p. 112.)

"When the body comes to die, . . . consciousness abandons the former basis like a man who crosses a conduit by hanging to a rope tied to a tree on the hither bank, and . . . reaching, or not reaching the latter basis set up by karma. The preceding consciousness is called decease, because it passes away; the latter consciousness is called rebirth (pañisandhi), because it is connected with the beginning of another 'becoming.' But the consciousness did not arrive here from a previous becoming (i.e. world). . . ." (Vis. Magga, 554; translation, 664.)

It will be seen, that here that insistent 'just I' of the earlier Buddhism has become a mere resultant arising of 'consciousness,' there being no man, no 'being' admitted as the user, the experiencer of the consciousness. It is true that, if we again turn back to early Buddhism, we find that the word here rendered 'consciousness' is a special term for 'the man as surviving death.' It only came later to be reduced to meaning practically the equivalent of our word 'consciousness.' But this older special meaning was discarded long before this latter book was written. I shall come back to this.

Instances of a recognition of visitors to earth from the next world by men of psychic power, such as Gotama himself, and his disciples Moggallāna, Anuruddha, and others—these include one nun, Uppalavaṇṇā, and one laywoman, Nanda-mātā—are pre-eminently three in number: Bimbisāra, as already mentioned, the soldier Ajīṭā, a general of the Licchavi oligarchy,
and Sudatta, the merchant, known as Anātha-piṇḍika (feeder of the forlorn). The three contexts are not related as being dreams, or allegories, but as actual experiences, quietly, soberly narrated. Disciples not so gifted, Ānanda for instance, infer, from what they are told, the identity of the visitor, nor do they question the actuality of the event for the more gifted friend who tells of it. Thus Ānanda: “Surely it will have been Sudatta who came to you. You say he praised Sāriputta, and Sudatta always thought so much of Sāriputta.” “Verily, Ānanda,” is the reply, “what a man can get by inference, that have you got. It was Sudatta.”

Where text and commentary show us any inmates of the worlds unseen, we find creatures having both body and mind akin to our own, whether they be of the next or of the Brahmā-world. Both sufferers and enjoyers in the next world were, it is said, expressly watched and consulted by Moggallāna, that he might give his brethren more weight in teaching men how to shape their present lives by what he could, as eyewitness, tell them. Of the former, the so-called Petas, these are reported as dwelling, neither above nor below but around and about the walls of the Indian villages, in dwellings sometimes highly decorated. Sometimes they are reported to be comely, but all, more or less intermittently, are said to be suffering from some distressing penalty in the body, because of their ill-deeds—usually some particular ill-deed—on earth. And their term of suffering could be shortened by the transferred merit of their human kinsmen’s benevolent acts.

How this shortening was effected we find no Buddhist ever even surmising. The belief itself is unknown to the

\[1\] Samyuttā-N., II, 2, § 10 (vol i).
first Buddhists. And it is interesting to note, that converts to Buddhism of to-day have dropped it, mainly in the wish to bring out what they are pleased to call the inexorableness of an 'automatically working karma,' in contrast to the Christian doctrine of a forgiveness of sins.

Nor is the all-knowing Teacher ever recorded as asked to tell of this mystery in any Sutta. But then the quality of omniscience, so stressed in later Buddhism, is in the Suttas but a growing ascription. And when the Teacher is asked by a 'Wandering' student, if he lays claim to it, as the Jainist leader was reported to do, Gotama expressly repudiates any such power. "This testimony is not true; it imputes to me what is false and untrue."

Of the happier ones in the next world, the enjoyers, we hear something in the companion work² to that on the punished ones.³ Mogallāna is again the alleged recorder; he is informed of this or that pleasant experience being enjoyed by a man or woman in the next world as due to good deeds, usually some particular good deed, done on earth. It should be edifying reading; it should also be true reading. I think it is neither. The reward such a man as Moggallāna and his Chief would hold fit consequence of good conduct here would be enjoyment, in spiritual development, or 'becoming,' of a moral and spiritual kind hereafter. But Moggallāna is told only of material wellbeing as the rewards. I have so far failed to find Buddhists deprecating this religious poverty in these anthologies. This is not because they were not held worthy doctrine. In the Ceylon Chronicles of the fourth to sixth centuries A.D., we read, that these two little works were among the

¹ Majjhima-Nikāya, No. 72.  
² Vimāna-vatthu (translation now in hand).  
³ Peta-vatthu.
first 'sermons' uttered by the Buddhist missioners from India in Ceylon, the audience being that of the Court. In the First Collection of Suttas we find a worthier ideal of other-world citizenship hinted at. In the 13th Sutta, moral conduct is enjoined here as an essential preparation for 'companionship' with the devas in a more worthy world.

But in both anthologies one thing is clear, and that is the apparently substantial flesh-and-blood bodies owned by the survivors to both kinds of destiny. Gruesome details in the bodily afflictions of the former are narrated, (and not here only,) no less than attractive features in the bodies of the latter. Here too, and elsewhere in the Suttas, we find devas described as seeing, hearing, walking to meet and greet, taking the visitor's arm, seating him beside them, talking, using chariots: all of course impossible without bodily organs. There is no hint of mere illusion, dream, mirage, things imagined. So also when devas visit earth from either world, and are witnessed as so doing:—from the next world, or from a yet better one called Brahmā-world—they use hand and arm in salute, they speak, they kneel even; they wear clothing; they wear, doff and don armour. They are not wraiths. One feels that were their hand cut, it would bleed.

Moreover, devas are said to be longer-lived, handsomer, more mobile, more radiant, more happy than earth-folk, and some have power to read thought. More noticeable is their concern with things that are greatly worth while. This is naturally the case with those, and they are many, who are recorded as conversing with the Sakyamuni. There is goodness and good-

1 Translated as Dialogues of the Buddha, by Rhys Davids, vol. I. 'Companionship' is a more accurate rendering than the 'union' in the translation.
ness, and it may take all sorts of that to make a deva-world. I mind me of a Sutta, in which a pernickety deva calls a guileless monk a "smell-thief," because he smells a fragrant lotus! I should be more inclined here to smell the monkish poet than to infer the genuine clairvoyant.

As to the opposite extreme of destiny, the niraya or purgatory, neither of this can it be said, that the man was believed to undergo retribution as in any degree disembodied. Buddhists also had their miniature Dantes, and in more than one Sutta (let alone the Jātaka known as Nimi) we are not spared the reading of how man in a relatively primitive culture sought sensationalism in describing his tortured fellows. In every case the suffering experienced is bodily, not mental. And it is not a little significant that, in our present less primitive state, when the prisoner is no longer tortured, we now tend to conceive hell or purgatory as a matter of mental, rather than of physical pain. Body the hell-inmate certainly had; the one distinctive feature in it would seem to have been an increased capacity to endure yet not die.

I come now to ask, did early Buddhism contribute anything towards knowledge about the changing of the discarded body for a new one? The answer is, it did not. Like the Bhagavad-Gītā (which I believe was later than the birth-years of Buddhism), it shows us the man sloughing off the 'old clothes for new ones,' as the Upanishad had shown India the snake sloughing its skin. It uses neither figure, for it was tending to merge the wearer in the things worn, the snake in his skin; it just shows us the embodied survivor and, as

1 *Samyutta-N.,* IX, § 14.  
2 No. 541.  
3 II, 22.  
we say, leaves it at that. Probably the age was in such matters no more truly awake and interested than is as yet our age.

In their case this was perhaps the more curious, because the teaching of another, a dual body in earth-life, as the mate of the earth-body, was almost of necessity implicit in the current brahman theory of the man's other-world-activity during deep sleep. I refer to the treatment of this in the Brhad Upanishad. It was no 'discarnate' spirit who comes forth from the earth-body in sleep, released in some way from the tissues of the latter, but the very man, the soul, encased in a 'finer' vehicle who leaves 'the nest.' By this bright light-body he 'looks down' at his sleeping partner-body, and "goes again to his home, golden person, lonely bird," has a pleasant time of sport, laughter and love, or sees fearsome things, learns things good and evil, and hastens back when earth-body begins to awake, lest he leave that to die. The specific term for this other body I find only in another literature, that of Sānkhya, where it is called, not astral, or etheric, but subtle: sukshuma-sharīra.

Now of this we read in the Pali books not a word. Yet the majority of the first Sakyan missioners were brahmans.

As to that, two things may be said. It is possible that the Upanishads cited, evidently the work of one or more gifted progressive reforming teachers, may not have come to be finally edited and accepted as scriptural in its present form till long after the birth of Buddhism. And then, the Piṭakas too were not finally edited and accepted in and as a Canon till centuries after that birth, till a date when by the Sangha a

2 Kārikā, Aphor. 39.
definitely anti-brahman position had come to be taken up, especially in regard to the 'man.' Any teachings that involved the theory of the man passing over from the world of one body to that of another would, if worded and memorized at first, tend to be let drop out, either because the subject was avoided (as uncongenial) and forgotten, and oral tradition made such a scamping easier; or because it was not avoided, but marked up as a heretic intrusion and editorially expunged.

The theory of the other body persisted in Indian thought, and it would have furnished Buddhism with an explanation of all bodily rebirth called opapāti, i.e. just 'happening,' not of parents. But, I repeat, we must always remember, that in 'scriptures' we have, not records redacted at the time of the utterance of the events or sayings recorded, but edited compilations belonging to, and bearing the stamp of a much later date. And hence, in any scripture we must expect to find its own particular history of changing values. Especially in changing values about the nature, the worth of the Man. In the brahman scriptures, whereas the belief in the reality and sublime nature of the Man is upheld throughout, the Man's activity in the sleep or unconsciousness of the earth-body was only valued for a time; interest in it waned. In the Buddhist scriptures the belief in the reality and sublime nature of the Man is greatly worsening; there is no interest shown in connection with activity during sleep, since this could only be brought forward with a rehabilitation of the older belief in the reality of the Man. Both sleep and death are opportunities, where the theory of the Man as having a dual body might have been proffered as an explanation. But Buddhists, who were coming to merge the Man in his mind and body (in the teeth
of the early warning of their Founder), were not likely
to hold in worth a belief in Man as the user of one
body, let alone two.

Did then Buddhism ever hold that the Man was
somehow reborn into, or as mind? If so, was it into,
or as a brand-new mind? Was it ever held that the
Man had a dual mind?

When Buddhism came to birth, it was not an accepted
way to think of mind as an entity within the man,
save only in poetic metaphor. When in the old Brāh-
mana books (which were then just Sayings), we read
of 'mind wishing, creating' and the like, it was but the
poet's way, for mind was but a feature of the self.
There was mind (manas), just as there was speech,
breath, sight, hearing and action. But these were, one
and all, reckoned as self-expressions of the Man. With-
out them he could not declare, could not reveal himself.
Their relation to himself was left unquestioned, un-
analysed. In them, as we see in one altar ritual, he
seeks himself:

"Mind when created wished to become manifest ... it
sought after self ... this mind created speech ... this
speech wished to become manifest ... it sought after
self,"

and so on with breath, sight, hearing, karma, all in
poetical formulas.

Now between the wording of such ritual and the
coming of the first Buddhists or Sakyans, the influence
of Kapila's teaching was gaining ground. This was
originally a divorcing of the psychological standpoint,
from which mind is discerned as an orderly parallel
to bodily order, from the religio-philosophical stand-
point. But it was not yet held necessary to talk of
rebirth in terms of mind, as well as of body and the
man, as if it were an entity distinguishable from the Man.

But—and here I ask for the reader’s special attention, or I may seem to be contradicting myself—there is more than one word in old Indian tongues for ‘mind’; there were three: manas (as used above), citta, and viññāṇa, Pali: viññāṇa. These came eventually to be flattened out into meaning just one and the same thing: mind. But before that time, the first (manas) meant active, valuing purposive intelligence; the second (pronounce chitta) meant receptive impressionable intelligence; the third, meaning awareness, cognizing, had a very special meaning of its own. And this meaning, though it has long been lost in Buddhism, runs right through the Suttas, although here and there changing values are seen altering it to mean just sense-awareness. This special meaning of viññāṇa was “the man as surviving death of the body.” We find it when a man is passing, or has just passed from this world to another. It is as if all of knowledge about him, in his passing, that could be claimed by man on this side was just this: that the survivor was still aware, still had intelligence. Twice is there told, in the Third Collection, a legend about the two suicides, the monks Godhika and Vakkāli, where Māra, or impersonated Death and Evil, is said to be looking near their bodies for the viññāṇa, or, as we might say, for their spirits. Of the two, Gotama is made to say, that “by an unreinstated (or unsupported) viññāṇa, each has passed utterly away,” that is, has not been reincarnated in a body. Not because each had taken his life, but because, when taking it, each had attained a fitness not to survive in a body—a point of view on which I here pass no comment.

The term ‘support’ or ‘platform’ (ṭhiti), as needed
by the survivor, is used elsewhere in the Pali Suttas, and refers to both body and world needed in rebirth.

So far for the apparently customary uncritical use of viññāna as ‘man-surviving.’ In the Second Collection we come upon this use of viññāna taken up very critically, and depreciated from this usage to signify practically nothing more than that sense-awareness which it came to stand for, and still stands for, in Buddhism. The Founder is made to condemn, and condemn very sharply, the view that viññāna means ‘just this speaker, this experiencer who experiences here or there the result of good and bad deeds’ . . . ‘just this viññāna which runs on, fares on (i.e. survives).’ ‘Without a cause (or condition) there is no coming to be of viññāna.’ That is, viññāna arises just like any idea of mind, in consequence of a sensation of sight and the like, this being the way of Buddhist discourses.

This talk is supplemented (and much complicated) in a curious and historically interesting way, by paragraphs appended from other Suttas, which the reader can follow, if he fancy, in the translation, but which might be here too technical if analysed. They give the quaint result of showing viññāna, not as a result of a foregoing sense-experience, but as a necessary antecedent of there being any sensation! A position possibly of scholastic interest, or was it of scholastic fog? When in much later scholastic literature, e.g. the Manual: Compendium of Philosophy, of the twelfth century, we see this association of the word viññāna with the dying person lingering on, it is not because the word any longer meant the very man, soul or

1 Further Dialogues, No. 38. Translated by Lord Chalmers (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, V, VI).
spirit. The term has become “rebirth-consciousness” (pāṭi-sandhi-viññāṇa), but there is no longer any ‘passing.’ There is only an arising, in a new complex ‘somehow’ come together, of the result or effect of the latest viññāṇa on this side: the ‘decease-awareness’ (chutī-viññāṇa). Not the body alone was dying; the very Man in this decadent thought was dead.

Here is no simple story of faith; here is history of faith; here is complexity. But of such is often the actual growth in the life of a word.

And man’s awareness of this complex growth is as yet a young output in the growth of his intelligence. The study of history, as not a succession of ‘stories,’ but of evolutonal growth, is perhaps the latest appearance in culture. We might say that it is the conscious and thoroughgoing application of causation to the nature of man, when coupled with an investigation of such records as he has left about himself. Now the very idea of causation, as applied, not to ‘Nature,’ but to the Man himself and that invisible world of him that we call his mind, was but a vigorous infant when Buddhism was born. The records show us this. We see the essence of the matter finely grasped in the early Buddhist axiom: “Given this, that comes to be; given this is not, that does not come to be, etc.” But for centuries there was no question as to how the succession was effected, as put into a general formula. Inquiry about it is seen emerging in the fifth century A.D., ‘cause’ being that which “aids effect into happening.” This is naïf, but can we say we have got beyond it?

Later still, mediaeval ‘Southern Buddhism,’ in the Burmese writer Ariyavamsa, is found annexing the Indian term shakti, effective force or influence, and writing of causal force (pacchāya-shakti).
Before that, recourse was had plentifully to similes, analogies; the reader will find them in the *Questions of King Milinda*: of flame lit from flame, fruit from seed, woman from girl, and the like, used, with no apparent sense of the logical weakness of analogy, to explain (?) the mystery of survival and of responsibility in survival. And we have already seen how the word *viññāṇa*, now become a dummy for the Man, is used by Buddhaghosa in the *Way of Purity* to illustrate death, a timid commitment, where he says but to unsay.

But it was—surely, from our want of will, it still is—a troublesome and mysterious question, and one which, had but the early Buddhist community, in adoring its Founder, maintained that more consistent adoration, which is the keeping intact and alive the teaching which a great psychic like him could have given, did perhaps give, about survival and the worlds unseen, the question might have been, at least for it, neither troubling, nor quite so mysterious.

For it was a wonderful 'moment'—the Buddhist word, with others, for opportunity—hard, as they said, to come by in the life of man. It had come, and what poor fragments, for all the bulky scriptures, are all that the monastic gleaners have left us! It had come, and that in both ways, for without both ways revelation can make no headway. Thus the Man and a few of his fellowHelpers were there to reveal; there was also a world of the Many eager to listen and learn. This for instance is what we read:

"Now at that time the Bhagavan was making on every side (*parito parito*) among the country folk assertions as to the rebirths (*uppatissu*) of adherents who had passed away, among Kāsis and Kosalans, Vajjiansand Mallas, Chetis and Vaṁsas, Kurus and
Pañchālas, Macchas and Surasenas, saying 'Such an one has been reborn there, such an one there.' . . . Now the adherents at Nādika, hearing these things, were pleased, gladdened, filled with joy and happiness at these assertions to their questions." And Ānanda took much pains to make known these things in Magadha also, lest the folk there should feel hurt if not told.¹

It was much, then too as now, to hear that 'our Tissa,' 'my Nandā' were reborn in the happy world of devas. Nor for that matter was the news always as comforting. But the answers, as recorded, are all bloodless statements according to schedule. Nothing as said has been remembered. All the more precious is it to be able to check this dead formalism by the Naḷakapāṇa Sutta, cited above,² of the joy and emulation which the Bhagavan wished to excite in those he spoke to on this wise.

But why is all that we have of his information so lifeless and according to schedule? Because the monk had come, in the days of editing his Sayings, nay, before that, in his repeating those Sayings, to turn with distaste from Survival. It had become an outlook shrouded for him in a gospel of Ill, of the woe in life. He had created a new ideal in the Arahān, or Man of Worth, who had done with passing, or all but done with it. This Arahān, like every man, was but to be known in and as mind. And mind meant ultimately the valuing of sense-impressions. Buddhist psychological analysis virtually always stops at that. Religious advance lay in the moral life, but not in life seen as a Becoming in the worlds. Therein, the monk thought, lay for Man nothing of a genuine More awaiting him. It was a teaching of Man-in-the-Less that had come

¹ Dīgha-N., Sta. 18.
² P. 38.
over Buddhism, literally, one may say, ‘worlds less’ than the teaching of the Founders.

A revival in the worlds as the birthright of man came in with Eastern Buddhism. This had its origin in the teaching of men, exiled from Indian Buddhism because they held with the older teaching. But as not being otherwise Indian, I do not go into it here.
CHAPTER VII

RESPONSIBILITY IN SURVIVAL

There is in the Pali Canon no word for responsibility. It might have emerged when the Milinda Questions were compiled, some four hundred years and more after the birth of Buddhism. The question is there raised, whether, seeing that the monk-teacher denies that the man survives as an identical person, he will not also admit, it is therefore of no consequence to him how he behaves on earth? We might say: Is he not therefore no more responsible, once he dies? But since the idea, that a world of rational fellow-beings was awaiting his advent, concerned therein with the safeguarding of their sodality, had by then faded out, and since moreover there was no longer any question of Mahā-devas or gods to whom he would have to give account, the term 'responsible' was not a felt need. The only term used in Milinda is 'freed,' or 'not freed from' (mutto) his former acts. This word is frequent in the Suttas, but always, in both works, it is a question of being loosened from his own shortcomings. The question of being bound to do or not to do, as in the sight of beings in the unseen, is raised, it is true, and very curiously has it been overlooked by Buddhists and by us writers on Buddhism. It is entirely ignored by Nāgasena, the monk who in the Milinda is made to represent orthodox Buddhist teaching. The following is an example of how the Suttas show that it is not only worthy men on earth, but devas beyond who are judges of a man's conduct while he is yet here below.

1 Text, p. 46.
In the Sutta of the Three Mandates (ādhipateyyāni, Anguttara-Nikāya, Deva-dūta-Vagga, No. 40), which a believer should take as determinants of his spiritual progress: (a) the Self, (b) the Worlds, (c) Dharma, he is advised under the second to admonish himself thus: "Great is this concourse of worlds... there are devas who have psychic powers, have the deva-sight and can read the thought of others. They, though they be afar and though when near they are not seen, know thought by their purpose. They may know this of me: 'look, sirs! at this man who though he has taken up the religious life lives distracted by evil things.' So he stirs up energy and make pure the self. . . . This is called mandate of the worlds."

There is more of this sort that might be quoted. Much closer is the man brought to the mandate of the deva in the Suttas on the adjudication he meets with when death has ended his earth-life. The older, because simpler of the two is also in the Devadūta-vagga (No. 35) and give its name to the chapter. The survivor is brought before one of the deva-judges, or Yama's (an ancient Vedic title, but not used in this connection), and is taxed with having unheeding passed by those three messengers of the deva’s: old age, disease, death, in his fellowmen. He pleads, not ignorance, but carelessness. "But in that you in carelessness did evil, it was not one other than yourself who so acted; it was by you, yes, by you (tayā 've) that it was done, and it is by you that the result will be undergone."

The purgatorial penalties are then described with a wealth of detail that may be paralleled in other literatures of a date when men drew dramatic entertainment, if not moral warning, from the sight of man

1 I give it more fully in "An Overlooked Pali Sutta," J.R.A.S., April, 1933.
in torture. If the Founder really uttered a revelation concerning this tribunal—and I hold it quite likely he did—I do not see him stooping to give those details, almost gloatingly. It may be put down to a prejudiced preconception, if I add, that it had been incongruous in a man who showed man the better, the more in his nature, life and destiny, not the less. I will leave it there. The Sutta does not leave us to imply, that every survivor is found to have wantonly done amiss. It was they who had so acted, who needed the warning. Of worthier survivors there are only appended verses saying that they do heed the messengers, and that with them it is well.

I may add, that there is no evidence of any intermondial system of a watching of man’s moral conduct carried out by deva’s. There is but the vague acquiescence in their supernormal vision and intuition. But this is only to say, that Buddhism brings us herein no further than any other religious literature. We ourselves have got no further than the vague “Thou God seest me,” and are yet a long way from following up A. Russel Wallace’s sublime hypothesis of devolution in the universe. Besides, an oral religious literature would have no clear mandate about any but an oral dossier.

That which, in this Buddhist view of a transmundane tribunal, is really most pregnant is not the so emphasized identity of the doer and he who reaps the result. It is the doer’s, the experiencer’s responsibility as shifted from what he owes to a Deity, e.g. a Pluto, a divine Judge, to the fellowman. Save that man, whether of earth or a deva, was inherently divine, it is, in these Suttas, not Deity who says to him at the judgment-bar: Come, ye blessed! or Depart from me, ye cursed!\footnote{Gospel of Matthew.}
RESPONSIBILITY IN SURVIVAL

The Yama who may at the moment be functioning, and who, in the Sutta, is called not even deva, but just rāja, or chief, is recorded, in an Appendix, as reflecting on the results of men’s actions and as impatient to win rebirth on earth, where he might sit at the feet of a Bhagavan and learn dhārma, the secret of right action. In this respect the Majjhima version² which speaks of not three but five messengers is worth attention. A new-born babe it declares is also a deva-messenger—this is very monastic²—the fifth messenger is an earthly lawcourt. And so it verily is; and we, who dwell in times where immigration is incessant, could see a yet more potent sixth warning messenger in the measures a country may take to keep off from its ports the incoming offscourings of other lands, where these may prove undesirable increments. The social necessity of a purgatorial period in a new world is curiously overlooked. The tremendous matter of religious justice, in man’s experiencing the result hereafter of well or ill doing, blinds us to the matter of social justice warding society, in the lands of the next world, from the advent of the ill-doer, warding it in giving its freedom to the incoming well-doer. It may be, that the Greek, with his keen flair for ‘justice,’ would, had he encountered ‘primitive’ Buddhism, have been less blind. There is, in Pali, no such emphatic term for ‘justice’ as our word, or the dike of the Greek.

When the Greek did come in India up against Buddhism, the monk had put a living interest in the hereafter, such as we find in Plato’s Socrates, well

¹ Sutta 130.
² Or is it an echo of the legend which makes the Founder sigh over the birth of his son? I owe this suggestion to Professor H. Zimmer of Heidelberg.
out of sight. We find, I repeat, no question, in survival, of the man as responsible to That or to Those, for the testimonials as to his behaviour, past or about to come. The question is merely: Does he enter 'free from' or still bound to his deeds?

In this word-poverty, I incline to see a result of wilted interest in the concept, the more 'primitive Buddhist' concept, of man as a citizen of the worlds. These had become for the monk of Nāgasena's date, a mere vortex of lives in saṃsāra, the one thing worth while being the so living as to get off the wheel. The aim of preparing for the new society, as in the Tevijja Suttanta; the joy of striving to emulate here already the 'suchness' of deva-standards, as in the Naḷakapāṇa Sutta:—all this has passed away. The main thing then to affirm and vindicate, had come to be the notion, that the very man did not pass over (sankamati) at death,¹ and yet that whatever emerged in the next world, as the result of his existence here, was thus or thus in consequence of his conduct in that existence.²

The inquiring Hellenic, or semi-Hellenic king Milinda asks for explanation. The only explanation given is by the weak legs of analogies. Weak as they are, the tendency, in the absence of explanation in the Pali Canon, to fall back on them in writers on Buddhism, as if they were of the primitive teaching, is so habitual, that a critical treatment of them is in place.

They are in three groups: (1) the babe, lamp and milk; (2) the mangoes, rice, sugar, fire, wife and milk again; (3) the lamp again and the taught verse. In (1) the link between analogy and survivor is confessedly material only. That is, the stages of growth are can-

¹ Milinda pāñho, text 72.
² Ibid., p. 71.
didly limited to those of the body. The monk admits, that the survivor is neither the same nor another: this is primitive teaching; the man is becoming.\footnote{Samyutta-N., ii, XII, 2, § 17.} But the analogy is materialistic; it does not justify the becoming in mind, nor in the man as fact. The lamp is also a merely material business, and one of consumption at that, not of immaterial renascence. It does not warrant this. And the milk is also material, and merely a change in decay at that. Still less does it illustrate the question of man’s becoming in survival.

In (2) the mangoes, rice-plants, sugarcane plants, as being in a way identical organisms, whether in the seed stage or that of fruition, do not take us beyond material growth. They do not warrant any conclusion beyond that of the materialist. No more does the claim of the man, betrothed to the child-girl, on the girl as grown to womanhood, against a rival but later claimant. It is here merely bodily growth that is taken into account, as in the babe-analogy. As having mind, the woman did not count. That of the flame lit from flame, in group (3), is as material as the rest, without the semi-link of growth or becoming. The fitness is superficial only. And in teacher conveying a verse to pupil, not in writing but orally, the medium is material again. There is no attempt to suggest teaching by televolition or telepathy to show survival by way of mind. This would not yet have been the real survivor in analogy, but it would have lifted the talk above its materialistic level. It may be said, that the king who is here answered was spiritually a mere child, even though a very flattering picture is drawn of his mental culture. That may be so, but the fact remains, that Buddhism has given us nothing on this all-important
subject but just this milk for babes. And it is over-
sterilized, boiled milk at that.

It is always conceivable, that not all early Buddhist
literature survived to reach the written stage. But in
all that has so survived, it is not surprising to the
reader, that, in so far as the teaching which is empha-
sized in the Piṭakas is the garden which produced the
Milinda, the produce in the latter is no better than
it is. Nowhere in the garden, it is true, is the man
declared to be nothing but body and mind. That was
to come; it had not yet come. The man was rejected
as the divine Ātman; the garden left him a reality to
be 'got at' only in mental 'things.' But out of this
impoverished soil no rich growth could be expected.

There is a striking interpolation occurring in two of
the Collections (Sutta 109 of the Majjhima, and
§ 89 of the 22nd Saṃyutta) which seems to imply, that
the man or self is already totally rejected in the ortho-
dox teaching. In a catechism of a pedantically formal
kind, too much honoured by being recorded of the
Founder and his disciples, there comes suddenly a
question of a very different kind. Searching it is, vital,
breaking away from the crude psychology of the
Sāṅkhya vogue; breaking away from the growing
monk-vogue of the day: a question of human, of
mondial import. A monk in the gathering is said to
'think' the unspoken query: "So, sir, you would say:
neither body nor mind is the self! (Now) not-self-done
deeds:—what sort of self will they touch (or affect)?"

Unspoken though it is said to be, the Founder is
recorded to have divined his thought psychically, and
to reply, not to the thinker directly, but only through
the others. Stating that some fool of a man may come
to think the thought as worded silently by this monk,

* Cf. my Milinda Questions, 1920, p. 32 f.
he proceeds, not to reason with such an objector, but to reply in terms of a formula used to deny the Deity in the self, as not being in either body or mind:—the method of the Second Utterance. Namely, body, mind are impermanent; hence are they ill. And what is impermanent and ill are obviously not Divine-Self (Who is permanent and blissful, as well as mind).

Thus we have a question which implies, that deeds are taught by the Sakyans as done-without-a-self, and on that ground asserts, that if this be so, there can be no justice in applying any consequences to a survivor. And we have an answer which does not deny a doer of sorts, but denies in him the attributes of the Divine.

I am compelled to conclude we have, in that unspoken question, a genuine fragment which has, in a tradition both oral and changing, lost its way and got into a wrong context. I have shown elsewhere,\(^1\) that for a man, in unspoken reflection, to use an appellative—the 'sir' (bho) in the thought—is never found. In spoken thought, nothing is, in Pali, more wearisomely ever-present than the appellative, whether it be the name of the addressee, or his office or station. Nor is anything more frequent than for a man to be described as thinking in direct speech—not as 'it occurred to him that, given this, he might do that,' and the like, but as 'it occurred to him: if now A. says "I will do it," then B. will be hurt,' and the like. But I have yet to find a man in musing made to say: 'if you, sir, or you, Ānanda, say you will do it. . . .' Were the Piṭaka prose as free from conventions as is a written literature, written when first composed, I should not here dwell on the bho here as unique. (Perhaps it is not, but I have searched for a parallel

\(^1\) Geiger Festgabe, Munich, 1930.
in vain.) And any reader knows how prevalent and how rigidly followed are Pali speech-conventions.

Well then: if we take the unspoken inquiry out of its context, and it is there a misfit, I am bold enough so to twist its function as to place it in the mouth of a Sakyan teacher, meeting some sceptic of the new thought, some would-be clever young man with the remonstrance: 'But, sir, you do hold, with us, that the result of your deeds on earth will affect you hereafter, at the tribunal of Yama? Now if you maintain the fancy, that of these deeds nor you nor anyone is the doer, then I ask you, what doer, what self will they affect hereafter?'

This may seem overbold. Yet who could carefully reread the Piṭaka context and rest content, that we have in it that which the Piṭaka editors have made it appear to be? It is to reduce the one live question in the Sutta to the prosy level of the rest, and 'answer by the book.' It is to make the Suttas take up (by implication) a nihilism which we only find in Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta of the fifth century A.D.

I may have it said, of the foregoing: Have you not, in your Gotama the Man, made him say: "If I had spoken of man at that time as being only of body or mind, as Buddhists do now, and as in no way a self, an attā (as the books make me say), I should have been held as the veriest madman. No one would have listened to me. It would have been judged as nonsense."¹ Yet you are now seeing in this Sutta the Sakyan arguing with just such a view.

This is rightly quoted, and I do not retract. In it, it is the current religious attitude of the time and place that is cited; the average Conservative view; the 'orthodox' position. But there will have been, just as

¹ P. 65.
there is now, an unsettled, unsettling, inquiring minority, a fermenting movement, working beneath the surface, such as may ultimately come to the top and in turn settle into the 'current attitude,' or which may not. And it is a man representing this new ferment whom I hear, in that inserted passage, being remonstrated with. A very little known Sutta will show I may not be wrong.

In Anguttara-Nikāya, Nipāta 6, Sutta 38, we read of a brahman calling on the Founder and affirming his own view to be, that in a 'doer' or 'agency' (kāro) there is no self, nor any one else. Now listen to the reply: 'Never have I seen or heard of such an avowal, such a view. Pray, how can one step forward or back and say it? Is there such a thing as initiative (ārab-bha-dhātu)? (Yes.) And men are known to initiate? (Yes.) Then if you (the self) can initiate, and if other men are known to, how can you hold such a view?' This is followed up by other modes of initiating action.

Here is no question of the self as being divine or not, but yet as being real. Here is the later (yet still early) view of the very entity: man or self or soul, as being a fiction. On the one hand is the religious world, represented by the Sakyans with their brahman disciples, professing never even to have heard of so preposterous a view, and holding initiative as the creative energy of an agent. On the other hand is the new iconoclastic idea making its voice heard. The Sutta is not, as record, invalidated by the Second Utterance. There it is not the identity of a mere human self with body and mind that is denied; it is the identity of the Self as divine with these that is denied.

We are not unfortunately told how the visitor vindicates his view. But so remarkable, in swiftness and vigour, must have been, in Gotama's late years
and after, the growth of preoccupation with the new study of mind, that I can imagine he would, had Gotama asked, have made out a psychological case for resolving the attā into mental processes causally serial. Such a preoccupation landed the young Buddhism in the skandha doctrine, in the Causal formula, in the 'man' as a 'mass' of 57 'dhamma's', or mental things.

There is a solution now put forward by Buddhists, in both East, Centre and West—possibly suggested by the West—which early Buddhism never mentions, let alone sees as plausible and all-sufficing. It has come into being, I fancy, in my lifetime, and has gained ground. I am anxious Buddhists should know there is nothing of ancient Buddhism in it. Let them at least acknowledge it as very new, or else show the records as containing it. For the Piṭakas cannot teach both it and the tribunal after death without being self-discrepant. The solution is, that a man's collective actions, called karma (action), constitute a force which, at death, takes effect in the rebirth of a new man (in some way unknown), yet of a man who, as resulting from karma \( x \), and not from karma \( y \), is heir to a heritage \( x^a \), and not to a heritage \( y^a \).

It may be seen, that this is already a (novel) departure from the venerated Buddhaghosa. In the citation from the Visuddhi-Magga (p. 554), he sees in dying, several conditions (hetu) operating, in which karma is but one. Hence the modern solution suggests both defective knowledge of the Visuddhi-Magga and a possible acquaintance with the impressive formula of the Majjhima, also cited above (p. 50).

Now while the effective power of karma was more

\(^1\) Cf. 'Karma' by S. Tachibana (B. C. Law's Buddhistic Studies, 1931).
of a central doctrine for the Jains than it was for the Sakyans, there was certainly no trifling with the significance of it among the latter. But, for the latter, a man’s karma took effect solely at, after and because of the tribunal, to what extent he, in the new sodality to which survival has brought him, is esteemed by it. Anything further than this, e.g. the survivor’s investiture in a new body and new mental capacity, before he is arraigned, is never in the records put forward as the mysterious resultant of deeds done, of karma. It is only a metaphysical playing about with ideas rather than with things, which could so trifle with results, that is, with things, as to fancy them gathered up into a sort of cumulative avalanche, automatically bringing to pass the new-born man.

I admit that decadent Buddhist dogmatics to a certain extent invite, from us of the present scientific age, an interpretation of what they may have meant expressed in modern terms of force and resultant. I did myself once mount that hobbyhorse: ‘I have acted, and the effect, a transmitted composite resultant force, no less than is the electric current, is this ‘I’.’¹

... That was a resultant of intensive Abhidhamma studies, streaked across with veins of Anthology-translation. I am now, for better or worse, more concerned to suggest what the earlier editors, late as they are in relation to primitive Buddhism, had in mind regarding survival.

And for them there was not yet felt the need to explain the Man Surviving in terms of ill-fitting materialistic similes of milk and mangoes, fire and lamplighting, such as were found useful and needed by later teachers of changed values. For the Suttas, the man, still held as real, was assumed to be, as were all men they knew,

¹ Buddhism, Home University Library, 1912.
wiler, chooser, valuer, experiencer in deed and in result. Hence it was he who was responsible, not the deed, the *karma*. Deeds once done have left the man. "His works follow him,"¹ but only as *record* of the done, the *dossier*. They are no longer he, nor will they ever become he. In deeds is no responsibility as a feature of the man. "By you, even by you have those things been done; you are to undergo their consequences," says the judge, in the Suttas, at the tribunal. But of that verdict and that bar later Buddhism has not a word to say! It dropped out the man, responsible survivor. Therefore verdict and bar became as fossils and were passed over.

This is by no means to say, that *karma* had nothing to do with the man's incurring one kind of sentence and not another kind. *Karma* on earth is the *outcome of man's becoming this or that*. But it is not the deed as such that experiences the sentence; it is the man as having done the deed, or for that matter not having done the deed. "I was a-hungered and ye fed me not. . . ."² It is a wrong emphasis which sees a formative influence in the deed, or at least in that alone. It is the man-in-survival who faces us: the man-in-the-doing, the having-done, the not-having-done, and who has thereby undergone a becoming which fits him for the sentence that meets him.

I believe it had been impossible for us to have suggested such a purblind solution as this of resultant, mechanically resultant, *karma* to the problem of survival in Buddhism, had we not in the first place failed to consider Buddhism historically, had we not in the second place ourselves been getting as wilted in our concept of the man, or as we are now saying, of personality, as Buddhism grew to be.

² *Gospel of Matthew*. 
When we come to see history in Buddhism, a history of centuries, even already of centuries in these Pali scriptures, a history which three great pioneers have helped to make accessible to the world in one half century: Fausböll, Oldenberg, Rhys Davids, we shall then put forward fewer ill-digested theories. We shall no longer quote as of the Piṭakas, let alone as of the original teaching, standpoints and emphases belonging to the later time of the Milinda Questions, to the yet later days of the chief exegesists. We shall put on one side for distinctive treatment the ever more contracting view of the ‘man’ at which decadent monasticism arrived: of the man in this or that world as a set of momentary successions; of the man at death more often replaced by an animal; of the man as capable of a perfection on earth impossible in any ideal of a perfection adequately conceived.

We shall have sought, underneath this upper crust, for the remnants of a great world-gospel, bringing a new message for the man, a mandate of the More that is in him and that is ultimately awaiting him; a message which bids him, as being by nature one who is becoming, call for the birthright that is his: call not for one world, not for one ‘life’ only, but for many worlds, for many stages, many platforms, opportunities in his wayfaring; a message which bade him in that wayfaring ripen and realize all that lies yet dormant in his nature; a message which bade him not shrink in any way from the vistas of bhava’s, of ‘becomings,’ in that by way of them he will in time come to conceive and to word and ultimately to know That Whom now he worships as an ineffable, inconceivable, yet ever most real Most, without Whom his More is unfulfilled.
A SUMMARY SURVEY

The survey of Indian thought about Survival, during approximately a millennium and a quarter, which I have here tried to give, may be thus summed up.

I have dwelt mainly upon the fresh contribution made in that field of thought by the first teaching in the movement which we have, in modern times, come to call Buddhism, but which India long called, in Pali the dhamma of the Sakyans, or in Sanskrit, the dharma of the Śakyans. So remarkable was this contribution, as appears when we study it critically, that is, historically, that it amounted to what we sometimes speak of as a dispensation. Modern scepticism may discredit the word, as a prejudiced name for our ignorance. I find it an admirable word, since it does not bar the way to a further charting, yet for to come, in things we do not scientifically know. A dispensation, a ‘weighing out,’ may mean “way and mode of administering.” ¹ And those great phenomena in the history of religious thought:—the birth of new gospels—are unpredictable to a degree which baffles our science, and are at all events suggestive of mighty plans in a mysterious ‘bhāvanā’ or making-to-become, such as science is beginning once more to contemplate.

The ‘science’ of the sceptic gets along comfortably till it is confronted by the irruption of the New. The new calls for the initiative act, and this, as we saw in the Buddhist Sutta, implies the agency of a self, one’s own or another’s: aṭṭakāro, parakāro. For Indian thought, when Buddhism was born, this pair of terms involved the nature and working, not of the man

¹ 700 B.C.—A.D. 500.
² So Webster’s Dictionary.
only, but of the Highest, however we call That, conceived as Self, as being fundamentally identical with the human self, the very man. And of such a weighing out, or dispensation does the new birth about man's survival appear in early Buddhism, when we compare, with the religious teaching preceding it, the quickened, expanded, deepened new Manifold, to be disentangled, in the Pali records, from much that we can plausibly call after-growth.

Addressing themselves, in a way unprecedented, not to the School, but to the fellowman-and-woman in the home and at work, the Sakyan missioners, bringing gifts in their hands about life itself, found a world waiting for them. Theories and discussion about them might occupy Sophists, but this 'world' wanted plain answers to common facts: Whence came we? Whither go we? What ought we to do? And about those three questions, through the teaching of Becoming as a Way in the worlds, the new contribution on survival centres: —the life of the man as preceding this life on earth; this life as a moment, an opportunity, to ensure a better next life; first, by living at one's best, and so becoming more fit, next as heeding the unseen warders' opinion about that living further, also by studying to develop the power of learning that opinion in 'jhāna.'

Then, a new revealing through gifted ones about that next life: how its quality was dependent upon the way of living here, and was being shaped by it; how the results of that way of living were to be tested in adjudication after death; of a hierarchy of worlds; of a conceived, but yet unimaginable Agga, or Topmost Point of the way somehow ever ahead; t'amat'age: the culmination of the immortal,¹ and more besides.

Of the aftergrowth, which went very far to stifle

¹ Dīgha-N., XVI, 2, 26.
much of this original seed, I have here and there spoken, and of the causes of it. Quite summarily, they may be stated under the three heads: (i) the Indian reaction against the concept of Becoming, rejecting it as truer word for man's spiritual nature than Being, the former term being associated, in material nature, including body and mind, with decay after growth. (ii) The growth of the vogue in the religious life for men of all ages, not for the aged only. (iii) The preoccupation with mind, as a distinctive life-process parallel to that of body, and the coming to see the man, self, soul as to be known only through or as mind, and then, as 'mindings,' or dhamma's.

As to the present outlook of Buddhism on survival, I could not deal adequately with this, lacking the experience of travel in Buddhist countries and an exhaustive acquaintance with modern Buddhist works in several languages. I can, it is true, speak of what I do both hear and read in my limited opportunities. And I summarize this for what it is worth. The Buddhism of Southern Asia and of South-eastern Asia may very possibly be, though she know it not, nearing the dawn of an awakening from a somewhat stagnant persistence of mediæval slumber. Burma, Japan and the Indo-Chinese states have taken up with zeal the translation of Pali scriptures into the vernacular. The results of similar translations in Christian Europe were very great. There may be great results in the East. Ceylon has not yet moved, nor Siam. But Japan is carrying on similar translations. We move now more quickly and become less illiterate. Nevertheless it may need the lapse of the greater part of this century before the effects will be fully felt.

Till then it may be, that the present acquiescence in the monastic Credo such as is emphasized in the
Piţakas,—the Credo of (1) the four ‘truths,’ (2) the negative moral code, (3) the negative triad: anicca, dukkha, anattā, (4) the Way presented as an inadequate octad of thought, word and deed, (5) mental causation presented as emerging only in ill, (6) the summun bonum presented in a term of waning out,—may continue to be taught, and with it, and largely because of it, the almost utter lack of a vital, a religious interest in survival may persist, such as I notice among Buddhists and their converts.

The Credo may be tersely expressed as a doctrine of ‘Man in the Less.’ Less, because as reality he is denied; less because as rejected, no growth, no becoming, no ‘Werden’ can be rightly seen in what is left; body and mind are left, and it is the decay observable in them that gave the death-blow to the rising gospel in India of Man as Becoming That, not Being That.

Less, because a negative moral code (our Hebrew one is no better in eight items of the ten) does not put in the forefront the higher aspect of warding the other man’s welfare in what is to be done, not avoided.

Less in presenting ‘life’ as mainly and at bottom ‘ill,’ and not as opportunities to a Better on the Way or Road to a Best, positively conceived as a Supremely-Well.

Less, because the main asset in a teaching of causation is not the stopping (nirōdha) of anything, but the producing, the creating, and the making-become.

Survival on the other hand is a matter of Man in the More. Of not one world only, but of man’s birthright and right of way in the worlds. And perhaps in no matter more than in this does the averted gaze, the absence of interest about survival in present-day Buddhism reveal how far it has come away from the life and teaching of the great man whom in lip-worship
it rates so high. I have even seen it stated by a young Buddhist, that the Buddha taught men to concentrate on this world and left the other world to take care of itself. If this be not a departure from what has been cited above from the Piṭakas, then indeed are they unknown to Buddhists, or by them unhonoured.

They are herein as much asleep as yet are we. I heard only last year, broadcast to millions over the ether, words to the same effect concerning the 'future life' spoken by a student of science. Herein, in shrivelled irrational outlook, there was also a telling of a gospel of Man in the Less. No one, knowing he was to take up at some unfixed time a new home in a new land, would dismiss that land, its possibilities, its probabilities from his interests. Or assume that a teacher he ranked as of highest wisdom would leave it a subject unprobed, uncared for. Truly are we most of us asleep, not even calling on the watchman: Watchman! What of the night?

What said he? "The watchman said, The morning cometh, and also the night. If ye will inquire, inquire ye. Turn ye. Come." ¹

¹ Isaiah, ch. xxi (Revised Version).
APPENDIX
ESCHATOLOGICAL

I. NIRVANA

I have already cautioned the reader (p. 9), that this little book is not concerned with 'last things,' but with the Next Step, with Survival. But for the majority, the word Nirvana has come to be looked upon as a central conception of Buddhism from its very start, and hence as having been bound up with the facts of death and survival, much as we tend to say: X has gone to heaven. We have here no knowledge; we have the vaguest notion of what we mean; we do not even, resting to some extent on scripture, say 'Paradise.' But we say it, say it often. And we should look for something about Paradise and Heaven in a book on Survival in Christian teaching. So I add these few words.

The truly last Thing, the end of the Way of Becoming: what was hereon the contribution made by Buddhism? Perhaps there is no one who would not reply Nirvana, or Nibbana. And those who have dipped into translations now available would add: Is it not named as Goal in the First Utterance by the Founder?

Let it be first remembered, that this Saying is a very hoary ruin, a ruined memory, which has certainly undergone much touching-up, both of addition and subtraction down the centuries. Look at it! It was a message for every-man, yet it has been contracted to an injunction to monks. "For one who has left the world" it begins. It then gives three alternative lines of conduct, of which two do not "belong to the Aim (or Thing needed)." Of the third (the Middle Way) we are told, not that it does belong to the Aim (attha), but that it conduces to, not one, but four things: "enlightenment, higher knowledge, peace, nirvana." We are further told, that this Way is eightfold, namely, eight kinds of desirable thought, word and deed.

Now elsewhere we find the Way named without the Eight; we find the Eight without the way; we find other
'kinds' of desirable conduct called the Middle Way. And we see here no association of Way with that Growth, that Becoming so insistently enjoined in the scriptures. We conclude—we shall come to conclude—that the Way was once not just this 'Eightfold,' was once linked with the fact of Growth or Becoming, (bhava), a word which had come to suffer depreciation (above, p. 27 f.).

We turn back to the word Aim. We shall find it came, as the Sayings slowly grew into ecclesiastical literature, to be mostly used for 'meaning,' for 'spirit' as versus 'letter,' and to have lost its once lofty meaning. Hence the editorial need of supplanting it by other terms which had, in monastic life, come to the front.

We also find, that the first disciples are asked what 'Nibbana' means? The answer is not 'heaven' with its implications of consummation, but just that 'cathartic training in moral growth,' mentioned above (p. 9): the "making greed, hate, dulness fade out."

So completely had attha, when the exegeses were written down, ceased to mean the sumnum bonum, that when Nirvana gets defined in a number of equivalents, nearly all of them negatives, the positive term, attha, is absent.

In the Suttas on the other hand, we even find Nirvana defined as merely physical health, thus: "Māgandiya: Teachers have ever said: 'Chief boon is health; Nirvana- happiness stands first.' Gotama: 'As to that, what is health, what is nirvana?' Māgandiya strokes his limbs and says: 'This is health, this is Nirvana. At present I'm in health, well-being, without ailments.' " Now for me, that man's ultimate consummation should be called 'being utterly well' (we have alas! no noun here) is the finest, highest way in which we can yet speak of it. But it is evident, that in current usage 'nirvana' did not then mean That.

Hence, it is reasonable to conclude, that the term Nirvana is a later arrival in Buddhist terms for that ultimate 'Well.'

I am not implying that, when it did come in, it did not hold for the monastic teaching the meaning of sumnum bonum. The word, it is true, is weak, weaker for us than a
APPENDIX

positive term. But then India has ever acknowledged in
the negative a worth in the thing deeper than the name.
She cannot even speak of 'health' save as 'not-ill.' In
religion she has so far truth on her side, that we are dealing
with the yet ineffable, inconceivable, with the ideal, the
trans-real, the super-real.

But here the Indian fell back on to a false analogy. He
said, the Perfect, the Real is there in the man (or soul or
spirit); it is only obscured by error. Clear the errors—
chase the clouds from the sun, the moon—and then the
perfect man will emerge. This idea we find in both Jainism
and Buddhism. But for the latter it is a worsening of the
first teaching, namely, of man's need, by his living, to
become, to grow, into, the Perfect Man. It sees in man a
Being, not a Becoming. It was justly criticized by Jesus
in the simile of the house which the tenant cleaned, holding
this sufficed, but who found the cleaned house infested
with worse inmates. He held, that man must be regenerated,
not just cleansed. It was as needing, not regeneration, but
becoming or growth, that the Founder of Buddhism looked
upon man as in a Way to the Highest. We need not hold
lightly the will to wane in the undesirable, worded by the
monastic Buddhist. But it is the minor task. We should
not call weeding the gardener's main task. If he foster not
his plants in growth, his garden will be tidy but barren.
Analogies are dangerous, but we are here on the common
ground of growth, and it is inner spiritual Growth that is
the centre of original Buddhism.

2. NIRĀYA

Of Nirāya (going out, or down and out) I have spoken
above (pp. 49, 73), as the complement, the alternative, long
in duration but temporary, of the sagga (Sskr.- svarga),
the bright or happy bourn (su-gati). Nirvana came in time
to be spoken of as sassāta, i.e. eternal, but I have not yet
found this adjective or an equivalent applied to any
sentence concerning Nirāya. There is however one rarely
occurring term for certain persons sowing a direful crop
of deeds on earth: 'incurable' (a-tekiccha), which seems to imply a hopeless eternity. It may have come in late, to balance the corresponding ascription to Nirvana. But as to that I have yet failed to find an instance of one coming free from Nirāya, whatever the length of his sentence.

3. Becoming and Consummation

I have said (p. 70), that monastic Buddhism, in dropping the lofty conception of man as inherently Deity-in-posse, with which it began, concentrated its aspirations in the ideal man of highest 'worth,' the 'arahan,' as realizable for some here and now, or at latest in one next step to a worthier world. This did not mean, that he would there live for ever, but that he would there, in dying cease to be what we now call 'man,' anything further being inconceivable and therefore not to be expressed in words. In him, all desires being attained, he would no longer desire. In other words he would cease to become (or seek to become) what he was not before. All the 'making-become,' which is so constantly enjoined in the scriptures in the advance towards the arahan stage (called 'fruit'), has ceased for one who "has done what was to be done, has lived the life."

But their Indian predecessors, the brahman teachers, when they were feeling after the new concept of man as both divine and yet becoming, show a broader grasp of the notion. For the Deity in creating was conceived as becoming; not as becoming less imperfect, else had That not been Deity, but as becoming other, as becoming this or that manifold. We have this same phase of becoming manifested in our highest human efforts; those that we call creations of genius.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adjudication hereafter, 16, 18, 73 f., 84</td>
<td>91, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amyta or amrita, 24, 33, 87</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analogies, 76 f., 93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archistology, 9, 91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal, rebirth as, 17, 45 ff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anuruddha, 57 f.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arahan, 70, 94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becoming (werden), 22, 26 ff., 37, 85, 88, 94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Jātakas, 42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhava, see Becoming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodhisattva, 42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as substantial, 61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incuriosity about, 62 f.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the 'other' body, 19, 63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇas, 16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhaghosa, 58, 69, 82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a mandate for the worlds, 36 earlier and later, 38, 82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of Buddhism, 23 f., 91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coomaraswamy, A. K., 31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmology, a new, 35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damnation—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for opinions, 48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modes of, 49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deities, see Devas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deity, 33 f.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devas, 21, 30 ff., 34 f., 44, 54, 61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dharma, 8, 86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispensation, 86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eschatology, 17, 91 f.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fausböll, 85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal, sumnum bonum, 23, 28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomperz, H., 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gotama, 'the Buddha,' 7 f., 14, 25, 39, 44, 47, 57, 66 f., 74, 81, 92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gotama, 56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rejects omniscience, 60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy of man, 33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History and causation, 68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity in survival, 57, 84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immanence, 27, 32, 37, 87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative of the self, 81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jainism, 25, 83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jātaka stories, 41, 51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesus Christ, 93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhāna, 34, 54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Justice,' no good word for, 75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karma—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-complex, 14, 69, 82 f.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emerging, 17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responsibility in, 78 f.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suttas on, 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevaddha Suttanta, 53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lévi, Sylvain, 51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life as suffering, 17, 37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutosławski, W., 7 f., 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man-concept—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lowered, 46, 78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>raised, 32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
’Merit,’ 59
Messengers, the Devas’, 73, 75
Milinda, Questions of, 26, 52, 57 f., 69, 76 f.
Mind in survival, 65 ff., 88
Mirror-figure, 36, 48
Moggallāna, 58 f.
’Moment,’ 69
Monk—
credo, 88 f.
world, outlook of, 22, 27 ff., 35, 70, 75 f., 88
Morals, profit in, 36
More and Less, 22, 41, 51, 70, 89
More and Most, 21, 85, 87

Nalakapāna Sutta, 38
Names in survival, 56 f.
Nihilism, 80
Niraya, 49, 73, 93
Nirvāṇa (Pali, Nibbāna, Sskr. Nirvāṇa), 8 f., 28, 37

Oldenberg, H., 20, 85
Opatūka, 64

Pali, Canon, 20, 23, 63
Palingenesis, 7
Petas, 59
Psychic powers, 34
Public teaching, 22
Purgatory, 62; see Niraya

Radhakrishnan, Sir S., 16
Rebirth, 14, 16 f.
  scepticism about, 81
  terms for, 26
Reincarnation, 14, 43
Relativity in space, 51 ff.

Religion—
  and philosophy, 19
  and survival, 13, 26
Reminiscence, 41
Responsible, 17, 84
  as ‘not freed,’ 72, 76
Retribution, 16 f.
Rhys Davids, 31, 52, 85

Sagga, svarga, 44, 49, 93
Sakya (Sskr. Shākya), 25, 86 f.
Samsāra, 16 f., 26, 76
Sandhāvana, 26
Selden, John, 48
Shakti, 68

Survival, 14, 23, 29
  and the past, 40 f., 45
  curiosity about, 70
  scepticism about, 25 f.
Symbols, 22

Transmigration, 14

Upanishads—
  and Buddhism compared, 20 f., 33, 37, 41, 63
  as academic, 20
  the earlier, 17 f.

’Vanishing,’ 53
Vedas, 16, 31, 33
Viññāna, see Mind

Wallace, A. R., 74
Way-figure, 27 f., 44
Wheel-figure, 28, 44
Will, 7, 8, 34
World-mandates, 73

Yāna, 16

Zimmer, H., 75 n.
Zoroaster, 18
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call No.</th>
<th>294/Rhy - 7414.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Rhys Davids. (Mrs).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Indian religion and survival.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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