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THUCYDIDES
I
PORTRAIT OF PERIKLES.
BRITISH MUSEUM.
THUCYDIDES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
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IN FOUR VOLUMES

I

HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
BOOKS I AND II

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INTRODUCTION

Three ancient biographies of Thucydides have come down to us, but they are of little value. They are derived from ancient commentaries, and the biographical details which they contain, wherever they do not rest upon inference from the text of the history itself, are often confused and contradictory. These are supplemented by scattered statements of several ancient writers—Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who wrote two treatises on Thucydides (De Thucydidis historia judicium and the Second Letter to Ammæus), Plutarch (Cimon iv), and Pausanias (1. xxxii.).

The only authentic facts about the life of Thucydides are gathered from casual mention in the History. He was the son of Olorus (iv. civ. 4); commenced the compilation of materials for writing the History at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (1. i. 1); and lived through the whole war, ripe in years and

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1 One of these, compiled in three distinct portions "from the commentaries," passed under the name of Marcellinus, who is probably to be identified with the author of Scholia on Hermogenes πείλ στάσεώς, who seems to have lived in the fifth century A.D.; another was by an anonymous grammarian; and the third is a short notice in Suidas, s.v. Θουκυδίδης.
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judgment, following it with close attention, that he might acquire accurate information (v. xxvi. 5). He suffered from the plague of 429 b.c. (II. xlviii. 3), of which he wrote his famous account (II. xlvii-liv). Elected one of the ten generals in 424 b.c., he was sent to the coast of Thrace (where he enjoyed the right of working certain gold mines) to operate against Brasidas. Failing to relieve Amphipolis, he was exiled in 424 b.c., and remained in banishment for twenty years, and thus was able to become acquainted with affairs on both sides (v. xxvi. 5).

For other facts we are dependent largely upon inference; some are reasonably certain, others less so. The name of his father was identical with that of the Thracian prince Olorus, whose daughter Hegesipyle was married to Miltiades, and his tomb, having the inscription Θεοκριτος 'Ολόρου 'Αλμονίως, was in the suburb of Athens known as Κολυτίδας, adjoining those of Cimon and Miltiades (Plut. Cim. iv). We may therefore assume that Olorus, the father of Thucydides, was a near kinsman of the Thracian prince Olorus. If, as Marcellinus says (§ 2), Thucydides' mother was named Hegesipyle, like Cimon's mother, that would be confirmation of the relationship; but Plutarch makes no mention of this. It seems likely, then, that Thucydides was of near kin to Cimon, younger perhaps by one generation. His father Olorus was probably a full citizen of Athens, as is indicated by the fact that, mentioning viii
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himself as στρατηγός (iv. civ. 4), he writes Θουκυδίδην τὸν Ὀλόρου; for only as an Athenian citizen could his father be mentioned in this official style.

As to the date of Thucydides' birth, the only ancient statement that seems worthy of credence was made by Pamphila, a woman writer who in the time of Nero made a great compilation of the results of learning. Aulus Gellius (N.A. xv. 23) quotes from Pamphila that, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Hellanicus was sixty-five years of age, Herodotus fifty-three, Thucydides forty. Pamphila's dates were probably taken from the chronological handbook of Apollodorus (second century B.C.), which was generally accepted among the Greeks and Romans. The term forty years used by Pamphila doubtless meant the ἄκμη or prime of Thucydides, and may have been fixed on the basis of his own assertion that he began to collect material at the opening of the war (i. i. 1) and was then in full maturity of mind (v. xxvi. 5). At any rate his own statement, taken with Pamphila's date, has led to the general assumption that the historian was born somewhere about 472 B.C.

It is indicated by Marcellinus (§ 46), and is probable in itself, that the decree for Thucydides' banishment was adopted on the motion of Cleon, who was then at the height of his power; and it is probable that the charge brought against him was treachery (προδοσία), as stated by Marcellinus (§ 55)
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and the anonymous biographer (§ 2), and apparently implied by Aristophanes (Vesp. 288). His own words, ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν, admit of this interpretation; and the statement of Pausanias (i. xxiii. 9) that he was later recalled from exile on the motion of Oenobius¹ is best understood on this basis. If he had been banished by a simple decree of the people, the general amnesty that followed the capture of Athens by Lysander would have been sufficient for him as for other exiles; if the sentence was more severe, a special decree would be necessary. But it is possible, of course, that the motion of Oenobius antedated the amnesty of Lysander's peace by a few months.

As to Thucydides' death, there was a persistent tradition that he was assassinated, and the fact that the History breaks off suddenly in the midst of exciting events of the Decelean War seems to support the tradition. Plutarch (Cim. iv. 3) says that it was commonly reported that he died a violent death at Scapte Hyle; Pausanias (i. xxiii. 9), that he was murdered on his journey home from exile; Marcellinus (§ 10), that after his return from exile he died and was buried in Athens. But whether he died in

¹ The name, which is a rare one in the fifth century, is found as that of a general commanding in the neighbourhood of Thasos in 410-9 B.C. and we hear somewhat later of one Eucles, son of Oenobius; hence it has been conjectured that the father of Oenobius was Eucles, who was Thucydides' colleague in Thrace in 424 B.C. (Lv. civ).
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Thrace or in Athens, it seems clear from his own words that he outlived the term of his banishment (v. xxvi. 5, ἐνεδρη μοι φέρεσαι τὴν ἐμαντοῦ ἐκεῖνη) and that he returned to Athens, since his description of the wall of Themistocles, whose remains "may still be seen at the Peiraeus" (t. xciii. 5), shows that he was there after the destruction of the walls by Lysander. If he had lived to see the restoration of the walls by Conon in 395 B.C., it seems he would certainly have mentioned it. There is another reason, too, for supposing that he did not live to this year: in iii. cxvi. 2 he says that the eruption of Aetna, which occurred in the spring of 425 B.C., was the third on record; hence the one mentioned by Diodorus (xiv. lix. 3) for 396 B.C. could not have been known to him. It seems reasonable, then, to assume that he was not alive in 396 B.C.

There is a pretty and oft-repeated story¹ that Thucydides, as a boy, heard Herodotus recite a portion of his History at Olympia and was moved thereby to tears, whereupon Herodotus said, "Olorus, your son’s spirit is aflame with a passion for learning." But Lucian, when telling of the powerful effect of Herodotus’ recitation at Olympia,² would surely have mentioned this circumstance had he known of it; besides, chronology is in the way, it

¹ Suidas s.v. ἄργαλ and Θοοκοδής; Photius, Bibl. 60; Marcellinus, § 54.
² Herod. l.
we hold to Pamphila's testimony. But if he did not as a boy hear Herodotus recite at Olympia, he must have known him later as a man at Athens. The period of his youth and early manhood fell in the time when Athens was most prolific in great men. It is clear that he had heard and admired Pericles, and he must have seen Aeschylus and known Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Gorgias, Antiphon, Pheidias, Polygnotus, Mnesicles, Ictinus, Callicrates, and Hippocrates. Association with such men and the atmosphere of Athens at such a time best explain the development of his genius; but the limits of his subject, as he conceived it, precluded any mention of any of these except Pericles, so that for any personal influence of theirs upon him we are left to inference. The first seven years of the war, before his banishment, were doubtless spent in large part at Athens, where he must have heard the speeches of Pericles, the discussions about Mytilene and about Pylos, as well as about other matters of which we have accounts in this History. But the twenty years of his exile he probably passed largely on his properties in Thrace, engaged in the task of compiling materials for his work about the war, as indeed we are told that he

1 It was his family connection with Thrace which led to his acquiring the right of working gold mines in that region (iv. ev. 1), which is all that he himself says, though his biographers state that he was the owner of gold mines at Scapte Hyle.
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did by Plutarch (De Exil. xiv.) and Marcellinus (§§ 25 and 47).

From Thucydides' opening statement, that he began the composition of his History at the outbreak of the war, expecting it to be a great one and more noteworthy than any that had gone before, we should naturally infer that he continued the compilation and composition throughout the war, and in fact—as it is clearly unfinished—until his death. Again, as it was never completed, so it was never completely revised, and it is natural that one can find traces of the different dates at which the several portions were composed. Evidence of this kind has been brought forward in support of different hypotheses as to the composition of the work. The most famous of these was that put forth by F. W. Ullrich in his Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thucydides, Hamburg, 1845, in which it is maintained that Books I–V. xxvi, which contain the history of the Archidamian War (432–421 B.C.), formed a separate treatise composed between the Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition, and that the phrase "this war" in the earlier books refers to the Ten Years' War only.

In v. xxvi Thucydides does make a fresh start with the words, "The same Thucydides recorded the events in order, reckoning by summers and winters;"
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until the fall of Athens." But he adds, "The war lasted for twenty-seven years, and anyone who declines to count the interval of truce as war is mistaken;" which sounds very much like the opening of a second volume of a work that falls into natural divisions. It is quite likely, as Ullrich maintains, that the account of the Archidamian War (I.–v. xxvi.) was composed mainly in the interval between 421 and 416 B.C.; but that it received important additions after the fall of Athens seems certain, e.g. II. lxv. on the career of Pericles. So much may well be admitted for Ullrich's hypothesis, but it is not necessary to admit more. Even the story of the Sicilian expedition, the finest part of the whole work, need not be considered to have been originally a separate treatise, but only to have received especial care. As for the rest, a paragraph from Classen's introduction to Book V outlines a probable order for the growth of the history which seems reasonable: "Though I am convinced that the whole work was written in the shape in which we have it after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, and that Thucydides was called away from life when engaged in the last revision and combination of the portions which he had noted down and sketched in outline from the beginning of the war,

—the larger half, including both spring and autumn—covering the time approximately from March to October, winter from November to February.
yet I do not believe that all parts of the work received an equally thorough review. I think that the masterly introduction, which makes our First Book, was completed with the full knowledge of the disastrous result of the twenty-seven years' war; that then the history of the ten years' war and the Sicilian Expedition, for which it is likely that the results of laborious inquiry were already at hand more or less perfectly worked out, received their final touches; and that after this, before the thread of the narrative was taken up again with the Ionic-Decelean War, the intervening period of the ἰδρυμη ἐποιευτος was described."

The most interesting testimony as to the recognition of the power of Thucydides in ancient times is Lucian's statement (adv. Indoct. 102) that Demosthenes copied out the history eight times. Dio Cassius constantly imitated and borrowed from him, and among others of the later historians who emulated him were Philistus, Arrian, and Procopius. There is internal evidence that Tacitus was influenced by him, and Sallust often imitated him. Quintilian's oft-quoted characterization, Densus et brevis et semper instans subi Thucydidse, shows his appreciation. In modern times his greatest panegyrist is Macaulay: "There is no prose composition, not even the De Corona, which I place so high as the Seventh Book of Thucydides. It is the ne plus ultra of human art"; again, "The retreat from Syracuse - Is it or
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is it not the finest thing you ever read in your life?"; and still again, "He is the greatest historian that ever lived." John Stuart Mill said, "The most powerful and affecting piece of narrative perhaps in all literature is the account of the Sicilian catastrophe in his Seventh Book." The Earl of Chatham, on sending his son William Pitt to Cambridge, "left to professional teachers the legitimate routine in the classic authors, but made it his particular desire that Thucydides, the eternal manual of statesmen, should be the first Greek which his son read after coming to college." And the Earl of Chatham's estimate is well supported by Sir G. Cornwall Lewis: "For close, cogent, and appropriate reasoning on political questions, the speeches of Thucydides have never been surpassed; and indeed they may be considered as having reached the highest excellence of which the human mind is capable in that department."

In the ordinary narration of events the style of Thucydides is clear, direct, graphic. In strong contrast with this generally simple and lucid form of statement is his style in describing battles and other critical events, in generalizations, and especially in the speeches; here the statement is often so concise and condensed as to become very difficult. Thucydides was not the first to use speeches as a means of vivid presentation of important crises and the actors in them; for that he had the precedent of Homer and the Attic drama. But he used this

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means with such impressive effect and success as to induce frequent imitation in later historical writing in ancient times. He does not pretend to give the exact words of the speakers, but says frankly in the Introduction (i. xxii. 1): "As to the speeches that were made by different men, either when they were about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said." As a natural result the language of the speeches has a uniform character, both in the structure of the sentences and in particular expressions—in other words it is that of Thucydides himself; but at the same time the character and mode of thought of the assumed speaker are clearly manifest in each speech. In the hands of Thucydides such a means of presenting to us a critical situation is extraordinarily effective; here, as in his most striking narrations, his readers become spectators, as Plutarch expressed it. Or as Classen said, "Without our own choice we find ourselves involved in the conflict of
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interests, and are put in the position to form judgment for ourselves from the situation and the feeling of parties. Very seldom does the historian himself add a word of comment."

We are accustomed to admire among Thucydides’ great qualities as historian, his impartiality, his trustworthiness, vivid description, sense of contrast, conciseness, epigrammatic sententiousness, reserve, pathos. We come to approve heartily his way of leaving facts clearly stated and skilfully grouped to carry their own judgments. He is never a partisan, and the unsophisticated reader might at times wonder what his nationality was did he not frequently subscribe himself "Thucydides the Athenian." Historians sometimes criticise his attitude, but they all accept his statements of fact. His descriptions of battles read as if he himself had been present. He dramatises history by placing events in such juxtaposition that a world of moral is conveyed without a word of comment; for example, when the funeral oration with its splendid eulogy of Athens is followed by the description of the plague, the disgraceful Melian episode is succeeded by the Sicilian disaster, the holiday-like departure from Athens is set over against the distressful flight from Syracuse. He packs his language so full of meaning that at times a sentence does duty for a paragraph, a word for a sentence. "Of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most," and however much we regret
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his reserve, since for much that he might have told us we have no other witnesses, we come more and more to regard this as great art. As for pathos, no historian ever excelled such passages as those where the utter defeat of a hitherto invincible navy is portrayed (vi. lxxi), or the misery and dejection of the departing Athenian host is described (vi. lxxv), or where the final catastrophe in the river Assinarus seems to occur before our eyes, preparing us for the final sentence: “Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth, nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home.”
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Of Thucydidean manuscripts the following are, according to Hude, the most important:—

A Cisalpinus sive Italus, now in Paris (suppl. Gr. 255), parchment, 11th or 12th century.
B Vaticanus, Vatican Library at Rome (126), parchment, 11th century.
C Laurentianus, Laurentian Library at Florence (69, 2), parchment, 11th century.
E Palatinus, Library at Heidelberg (252), parchment, 11th century.
F Augustanus, Library at Munich (430), parchment, 11th century.
G Monacensis, Library at Munich (228), paper, 13th century.
M Britannicus, British Museum (11727), parchment, 11th century.

No one of these manuscripts is of such age or excellence as to deserve preference before all others; but of the two families which may be distinguished, Laurentianus leads the one, namely, C and G, Vaticanus the other, namely, ABEF. Britannicus holds a sort of middle ground between the two. Hude's preference is for Laurentianus; Clasaen's, following Bekker, for Vaticanus. From vi. xciv on Vaticanus has a special value as coming perhaps from a different copy.

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Aldus: Editio Princeps, Venice, 1502, folio; scholia 1503.
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Boehme: Leipzig, 1856 and 1871-75, annotated; new edition revised by Widmann.
Classen: Berlin, 1862-76 and 1875-85, 8 vols., annotated; revised by Steup.
Van Herwerden: Utrecht, 1877-82, 5 vols., text with critical notes.
Hude: Leipzig, 1898-1901, text with critical notes.

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ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΙ

Α

1. Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναίος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς καθισταμένου καὶ ἐπίσης μέγαν τε ἐσεθαί καὶ ἀξιολογῶτατον τῶν προγεγυμνημένων, τεκμαίρομενος ὅτι ἀκμάζοντες τῇ ἡσαν ἐς αὐτῶν ἀμφότεροι παρασκευὴ τῇ πάσῃ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἐλληνικὸν ὅρων ξυνιστάμενον πρὸς ἐκατέρως, τὸ μὲν εὐθὺς, τὸ δὲ καὶ διανοούμενον. κίνησις γὰρ αὐτὴ δὴ μεγίστη τοῖς Ἐλλησιν ἐγένετο καὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡς δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀνθρώ- πων, τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἐτὶ παλαίτερα σαφῶς μὲν εὐρεῖν διὰ χρόνον πληθος ἀδύνατον ἦρ, ἐκ δὲ τεκμηρίων ὅν ἐπὶ μακρότατον σκοποῦντι μοι πιστεῦσαι ξυμβαίνει, οὐ μεγάλα νομίζω γενέσθαι οὔτε κατὰ τοὺς πολέμους οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἄλλα.

II. Φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ νῦν Ἐλλᾶς καλομένη οὐ πάλαι βεβαίως οἰκομένη, ἀλλὰ μεταναστάσεις τε οὕσαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ῥαδίως ἐκαταρτοὶ τὴν

1 The Greek text used for this translation of Thucydides is that of Hude. Variations from his text are indicated in footnotes.
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BOOK I

I. THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war waged by the Peloponnesians and the Athenians against one another. He began the task at the very outset of the war, in the belief that it would be great and noteworthy above all the wars that had gone before, inferring this from the fact that both powers were then at their best in preparedness for war in every way, and seeing the rest of the Hellenic race taking sides with one state or the other, some at once, others planning to do so. For this was the greatest movement that had ever stirred the Hellenes, extending also to some of the Barbarians, one might say even to a very large part of mankind. Indeed, as to the events of the period just preceding this, and those of a still earlier date, it was impossible to get clear information on account of lapse of time; but from evidence which, on pushing my inquiries to the furthest point, I find that I can trust, I think that they were not really great either as regards the wars then waged or in other particulars.

II. For it is plain that what is now called Hellas was not of old settled with fixed habitations, but that migrations were frequent in former times, each tribe readily leaving its own land whenever they were
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ἐαυτῶν ἀπολείποντες, βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τινῶν αἰεὶ
2 πλείονων. τῆς γὰρ ἐμπορίας οὐκ οὔσης οὐδὲ
ἐπιμεγνύτες ἄδεως ἀλλήλοις οὔτε κατὰ τὴν οὔτε
diὰ τὰ ἐκαστοὶ ὅσον ἀποζήν καὶ περιουσίαν χρημάτων οὐκ ἔχοντες
οὔδὲ γῆν φυτεύοντες, ἀδηλὸν ὅν ὅποτε τις ἐπελθὼν,
καὶ ἀτείχίστων ἀμα ὄντων, ἄλλος ἀφαιρή-
σεται, τῆς τε καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς
πανταχοῦ ἄν ἤγοιμενοι ἐπικρατεῖν οὐ χαλεπὸς
ἀπανισταντο, καὶ δὲ αὐτὸ οὔτε μεγέθει πόλεων
3 ἵσχυον οὔτε τῇ ἀλλῇ παρασκευῇ. μάλιστα δὲ
tῆς γῆς ἢ ἀρίστη αἰεὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν οἰκη-
tόρων εἰχεν, ἢ τε νῦν Θεσσαλία καλομένη καὶ
Βοιωτία Πελοποννήσου τε τὰ πολλὰ πλην Ἰρ-
4 καδίας τῆς τε ἀλλῆς ὅσα ἢν κράτιστα. διὰ γὰρ
ἀρετῆν γῆς αἰ τε δυνάμεις τισὶ μείζους ἐγγυγνό-
μεναι στάσεις ἐνεποίουν ἐκ ὧν ἐφθείροντο, καὶ
5 ἀμα υπὸ ἀλλοφύλων μᾶλλον ἐπεβουλεύοντο. τῆν
γοὺν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον διὰ τὸ λεπτό-
γεως ἀστασίαστων οὐσαν ἀνθρώπων ὄχουν οἱ
6 αὐτοὶ αἰεί. καὶ παραδειγμα τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου οὐκ
ἐλάχιστον ἐστὶ διὰ τὰς μετοικήσεις τὰ ἄλλα μὴ
ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος οἱ
πολέμῳ ἡ στάσει ἐκπίπτοντες παρ' Ἀθηναίοις
οἱ δυνατώτατοι ὡς βέβαιοι ἦν ἀνεχόρουν, καὶ
πολίται γιγνόμενοι εὐθὺς ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ μείζω ἐτι

1 So Ullrich: μετοικίας ἐκ Mn.
forced to do so by any people that was more numerous. For there was no mercantile traffic and the people did not mingle with one another without fear, either on land or by sea, and they each tilled their own land only enough to obtain a livelihood from it, having no surplus of wealth and not planting orchards, since it was uncertain, especially as they were yet without walls, when some invader might come and despoil them. And so, thinking that they could obtain anywhere the sustenance required for their daily needs, they found it easy to change their abodes, and for this reason were not strong as regards either the size of their cities or their resources in general. And it was always the best of the land that was most subject to these changes of inhabitants—the districts now called Thessaly and Boeotia, most of the Peloponnesus except Arcadia, and the most fertile regions in the rest of Hellas. For the greater power that accrued to some communities on account of the fertility of their land occasioned internal quarrels whereby they were ruined, and at the same time these were more exposed to plots from outside tribes. Attica, at any rate, was free from internal quarrels from the earliest times by reason of the thinness of its soil, and therefore was inhabited by the same people always. And here is an excellent illustration of the truth of my statement that it was owing to these migrations that the other parts of Hellas did not increase in the same way as Attica; for the most influential men of the other parts of Hellas, when they were driven out of their own countries by war or sedition, resorted to Athens as being a firmly settled community, and, becoming citizens, from the very earliest times made the city still greater in the
εποίησαν πλήθει ανθρώπων τήν πόλιν, ὡστε καί ἔσ Ἰωνίαν ὑστερον ὡς οὐχ ἰκανής οὕσης τής Ἀττικής ἀποίκιας ἑξεπεμψαν.

III. Δηλοὶ δὲ μοι καὶ τοῦτο τῶν παλαιῶν ἀσθένειαν οὐχ ἢκιστα: πρὸ γὰρ τῶν Τρωικῶν οὐδὲν φαίνεται πρότερον κοινῆ ἐργασαμένη ἡ Ἑλλάς: ἄστε καὶ μοι, οὐδὲ τούνομα τούτο ξύμπασα ποιέχειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸ Ἐλλήνως τοῦ Δευκάλλωνος καὶ πάνω οὗ δὲ εἶναι ἡ ἐπικλῆσις αὐτῆς, κατὰ ἑυθὺ δὲ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Πελασγικὸν ἐπὶ πλείστον ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν παρέχεσθαι, Ἐλλήνης δὲ καὶ τῶν παιδῶν αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ Φθιῶτιδι ἱσχυσάντων, καὶ ἐπαγομένων αὐτοὺς ἐπ’ ὠφελία ἐς τὰς ἅλλας πόλεις, καθ’ ἐκάστους μὲν ἡδὴ τῇ ὀμιλίᾳ μᾶλλον καλεῖσθαι Ἐλλήνας, οὐ μὲντοι πολλοὶ γε χρόνον ἐδύνατο καὶ ἅπασιν ἐκινησαί. τεκμηριοὶ δὲ μᾶλλα "Ομηρος, πολλῷ γὰρ ὑστερον ἐτε καὶ τῶν Τρωικῶν γενόμενος οὐδαμοῦ οὔτω τοὺς ξύμπαντας ὀνομασει οὐδὲ ἄλλους ή τοὺς μετὰ Ἀχιλλέως ἐκ τῆς Φθιῶτιδος, οὗτοι καὶ πρῶτοι "Ἐλλήνης ἦσαν, Δαυαῦνος δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐπεσε καὶ Ἀργείους καὶ Ἀχαιός ἀνακαλεῖ. οὐ μὴν οὖδὲ βαρβάρους εἰρήκε διὰ τὸ μηδὲ "Ἐλλήνας πω, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἀντιπαλον ἐς ἐν ὅλοις ἀποκεκρίσθαι. οΐ δ’ οὖν ὡς ἐκαστοι "Ἐλλήνης κατὰ πόλεις τε ὅσοι ἄλληλων ἔπισταν καὶ ξύμπαντες ὑστερον κληθέντες οὐδεν πρὸ τῶν Τρωικῶν δι’ ἀσθένειαν καὶ ἀμειξίαν ἄλληλων ἀθρόου

1 Added by Reiska.
number of its inhabitants; so that Attica proved too small to hold them, and therefore the Athenians eventually sent out colonies even to Ionia.

III. The weakness of the olden times is further proved to me chiefly by this circumstance, that before the Trojan war, Hellas, as it appears, engaged in no enterprise in common. Indeed, it seems to me that as a whole it did not yet have this name, either, but that before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, this title did not even exist, and that the several tribes, the Pelasgian most extensively, gave their own names to the several districts; but when Hellen and his sons became strong in Phthiotis and were called in to the aid of the other cities, the clans thenceforth came more and more, by reason of this intercourse, to be called Hellenes, though it was a long time before the name could prevail among them all. The best evidence of this is given by Homer; for, though his time was much later even than the Trojan war, he nowhere uses this name of all, or indeed of any of them except the followers of Achilles of Phthiotis, who were in fact the first Hellenes, but designates them in his poems as Danaans and Argives and Achaeans. And he has not used the term Barbarians, either, for the reason, as it seems to me, that the Hellenes on their part had not yet been separated off so as to acquire one common name by way of contrast. However this may be, those who then received the name of Hellenes, whether severally and in succession, city by city, according as they understood one another's speech, or in a body at a later time, engaged together in no enterprise before the Trojan war, on account of weakness and lack of intercourse
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ἐπραξαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτην τὴν στρατείαν θαλάσση ἥδη πλείω χρώμενοι ξυνήλθον.

IV. Μίνως γὰρ παλαιότατος δὲν ἀκοῇ ἵσμεν ναυτικὸν ἐκτήσατο καὶ τῆς νῦν Ἐλληνικῆς θαλάσσης ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐκράτησε καὶ τῶν Κυκλάδων νῆσων ἥρξε τε καὶ οἰκιστῆς πρῶτος τῶν πλείστων ἐγένετο, Ἀργας ἐξελάσας καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ἡγεμόνας ἐγκαταστήσας τὸ τε ληστικόν, ὥς εἰκός, καθηρεὶ ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐφόσον ἔδυνατο, τοῦ τάς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἴναι αὐτῷ.

V. Οἴ γὰρ Ἐλληνες τὸ πάλαι καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων οἱ τε ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ παραθαλάσσοι καὶ ὅσοι νῆσους εἶχον, ἐπειδὴ ἥρξαντο μᾶλλον περαιώσθαι ναυσίν ἐπὶ ἀλλήλους, ἐτράποντο πρὸς οἰκεῖους, ἡγουμένων ἀνδρῶν οὐ τῶν ἀδινατωτῶν κέρδος τοῦ σφετέρου αὐτῶν ἴνα καὶ τοὺς ἀσθενεῖσαι τροφῆς, καὶ προσπίπτοντες πόλεων ἀτειχίστους καὶ κατὰ κόμας οἰκομενεῖς ἡρπαξον καὶ τὸν πλείστον τοῦ βίου ἐντεύθεν ἐποίησιν, οὐκ ἔχοντός πω αἰσχύνης τούτου τοῦ ἔργου, 2 φέροντος δὲ τι καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον δηλοῦσι δὲ τῶν τε ἡπειρωτῶν τινας ἐπὶ καὶ νῦν, οἷς κόσμος καλὸς τούτο δράν, καὶ οἱ παλαιὸι τῶν πολεμών τὰς πῦστες τῶν καταπλεύστων παντοχοῦ ὁμοῖος ἔρωταν τε ἐναθαλεῖς ἔσθω, ὡς οὔτε ὅν πυνθάνουνται ἀπαξιοῦντων τὸ ἔργον, οἷς τε ἐπιμελεῖς εἰ ἰ
with one another. And they united even for this expedition only when they were now making considerable use of the sea.

IV. Minos is the earliest of all those known to us by tradition who acquired a navy. He made himself master of a very great part of what is now called the Hellenic Sea, and became lord of the Cyclades islands and first colonizer of most of them, driving out the Carians and establishing his own sons in them as governors. Piracy, too, he naturally tried to clear from the sea, as far as he could, desiring that his revenues should come to him more readily.

V. It should be explained that in early times both the Hellenes and the Barbarians who dwell on the mainland near the sea, as well as those on the islands, when once they began more frequently to cross over in ships to one another, turned to piracy, under the lead of their most powerful men, whose motive was their own private gain and the support of their weaker followers, and falling upon cities that were unprovided with walls and consisted of groups of villages, they pillaged them and got most of their living from that source. For this occupation did not as yet involve disgrace, but rather conferred something even of glory. This is shown by the practice, even at the present day, of some of the peoples on the mainland, who still hold it an honour to be successful in this business, as well as by the words of the early poets, who invariably ask the question of all who put in to shore, whether they are pirates, the inference being that neither those whom they ask ever disavow that occupation, nor those ever

1 e.g. Phoenicians, Carians, and probably Epirota.
2 cf. Homer, γ 73; ι 282.
3 εἰδέναι οὖκ ἀνειδιζόντων. ἐλήξοντο δὲ καὶ κατ' ἡπειρον ἄλληλους. καὶ μέχρι τούτων πολλά τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ νέμεται περὶ τε Δοκρούς τοὺς Ὀξόλας καὶ Λιτωλοὺς καὶ Ἀκαρνάνας καὶ τὴν ταύτην ἡπειρον τὸ τε σιδηροφορεῖ-σθαι τούτω οὕς ἡπειρώταις ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς ληστείας ἐμμεμένηκεν.

VI. Πάσα γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐσιδηροφόρης διὰ τὰς ἀφάρκτους τε οἰκήσεις καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς παρ' ἄλληλους ἐφόδους, καὶ ξυπνῆθη τὴν διαίτην μεθ' 2 ὅπλων ἐποίησαντο ὡσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι. σημείων δὲ ἐστὶ ταύτα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐτε οὕτω νειμένα 3 τῶν ποτε καὶ ἐς πάντας ὁμοίων διαίτημάτων. ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν τε σίδηρον κατέθεντο καὶ ἀνειμένη τῇ διαίτῃ ἐς τὸ τρυφερώτερον μετέστησαν. καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐ- δαιμόνων διὰ τὸ ἀβροδίατον οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐπειδῆ χειτώνας τε λινοὺς ἐπαύσαντο φοροῦντες καὶ χρυσόν τεττίγων ἐνέρσει κρωβίλου ἀναδού- μενος τῶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τριχῶν ἀφ' οὗ καὶ Ιωάννων τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς ἐπὶ 4 πολὺ αὕτη ἡ σκεύη κατέσχεν. μετρίᾳ δ' αὖ ἔσθητι καὶ ἐς τῶν νῦν τρόπον πρῶτοι Δακεδαι- μόνοι ἐχρήσαντο καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς πολ- λοὺς οἱ τὰ μεῖζον κεκτημένοι ἰδοδίαιτοι μάλιστα 5 κατέστησαν. ἐγυμνώθησάν τε πρῶτοι καὶ ἐς τὸ
cen sure it who are concerned to have the information. On the mainland also men plundered one another; and even to-day in many parts of Hellas life goes on under the old conditions, as in the region of the Ozolian Locrians, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and the mainland thereabout. And these mainlanders' habit of carrying arms is a survival of their old freebooting life.

VI. Indeed, all the Hellenes used to carry arms because the places where they dwelt were unprotected, and intercourse with each other was unsafe; and in their everyday life they regularly went armed just as the Barbarians did. And the fact that these districts of Hellas still retain this custom is an evidence that at one time similar modes of life prevailed everywhere. But the Athenians were among the very first to lay aside their arms and, adopting an easier mode of life, to change to more luxurious ways. And indeed, owing to this fastidiousness, it was only recently that their older men of the wealthier class gave up wearing tunics of linen and fastening up their hair in a knot held by a golden grasshopper as a brooch;¹ and this same dress obtained for a long time among the elderly men of the Ionians also, owing to their kinship with the Athenians. An unpretentious costume after the present fashion was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians, and in general their wealthier men took up a style of living that brought them as far as possible into equality with the masses. And they were the first to bare their bodies and, after stripping openly, to anoint

¹ The mode of wearing the hair in a knot on the top of the head with the insertion of a pin in the form of a cicada seems to have persisted long at Athens, a mark of antiquated manners as characteristic as the queue or pig-tail with us.
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φανερῶν ἀποδύντες λίπα μετὰ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι ἡλείψαντο. τὸ δὲ πάλαι καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ ἀγῶνι διαξόματα ἔχοντες περὶ τὰ αἰδοῖα οἱ ἄθλη-
tαι ἡγούμενοι, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἐτής ἐπειδὴ πέπαιν-
tαι ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἔστιν οἷς νῦν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς Ἀσιανοῖς, πυγμῆς καὶ πάλης Ἑ
ἀθλατίσθηται, καὶ διεξομένωι τούτῳ δρόσιν. πολλὰ
δὲ ἀν καὶ ἄλλα τὰς ἀποδείξεις τὸ παλαιὸν Ἑλ-
ληνικὸν ὁμοιότροπα τῷ νῦν βαρβαρικῷ διαιτώ-
μενον.

VII. Τόν δὲ πόλεων ὅσαι μὲν νεώτατα φίλαθρα-
san καὶ ἣδη πλωιματέρων ὅτων περιουσίας μᾶλ-
λον ἔχουσαν χρημάτων, ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς αἰγαλαίοις ἐκτίζοντο καὶ τείχεσά τους ἱσθμοὺς ἀπελάμβανο-
ν ἐμπορίας τε ἐνεκα καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς προσώπους ἐκαστοῖς ἰσχύος: αἱ δὲ παλαιαὶ διὰ τὴν ἁρσελαῖαν
ἐπὶ πολὺ ἄντισχοῦσαν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης μᾶλλον φίλαθραν, αἱ τε ἐν ταῖς νῆσοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡπείροις (ἔφερον γὰρ ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ὅτε σοὶ θαλάσσιοι κατῶ ὄκουν), καὶ μέχρι
tοῦδε ἐτὶ ἀνωτισμένοι εἰσίν.

VIII. Καὶ οὐχ ἡσουν λησταὶ ἦσαν οἱ νησιώται, Κάρες τε ὅτες καὶ Φοίνικες. οὔτοι γὰρ ὅτα
πλείστας τῶν νῆσων φίλησαν. μαρτύριον δὲ: Δήλου γὰρ καθαρομένης ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ἐν τόδε
tῷ πολέμῳ καὶ τῶν θηκῶν ἀναίρεθεισῶν, ὃςαν
ήσαν τῶν τεθνεώτων ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ, ὑπὲρ ἡμίσιν.
themselves with oil when they engaged in athletic exercise; for in early times, even in the Olympic games, the athletes wore girdles about their loins in the contests, and it is not many years since the practice has ceased. Indeed, even now among some of the Barbarians, especially those of Asia, where prizes for wrestling and boxing are offered, the contestants wear loin-cloths. And one could show that the early Hellenes had many other customs similar to those of the Barbarians of the present day.

VII. However, the cities which were founded in more recent times, when navigation had at length become safer, and were consequently beginning to have surplus resources, were built right on the seashore, and the isthmuses were occupied and walled off with a view to commerce and to the protection of the several peoples against their neighbours. But the older cities, both on the islands and on the mainland, were built more at a distance from the sea on account of the piracy that long prevailed—for the pirates were wont to plunder not only one another, but also any others who dwelt on the coast but were not sea-faring folk—and even to the present day they lie inland.

VIII. Still more addicted to piracy were the islanders. These included Carians as well as Phoenicians, for Carians inhabited most of the islands, as may be inferred from the fact that, when Delos was purified by the Athenians in this war and the graves of all who had ever died on the island were removed, over half were discovered to be Carians,

\[1\] i.e. fortified cities were established on peninsulas, connected with the mainland by an isthmus, which was then walled off as Epidamus (ch. xxvi. 5) and Potidaea (iv. exx. 3).

\[2\] In the sixth year of the war, 426 B.C. cf. III. civ.
Κάρες ἐφάνησαν, γνωσθέντες τῇ τε σκευῇ τῶν ὀπλῶν ξυντεθαμμένη καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ὦ νῦν ἐπὶ θάπτουσιν.

2 Καταστάντος δὲ τοῦ Μίνω ναυτικοῦ πλοιομοῖτερα ἐγένετο παρ’ ἀλλῆλους (οί γὰρ ἐκ τῶν υἱῶν κακούργου ανέστησαν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὅτεπερ καὶ τὰς πολλὰς αὐτῶν κατάκιζε), καὶ οἱ παρὰ θάλασσαν ἀνθρωποὶ μάλλον ἤδη τὴν κτήσιν τῶν χρημάτων ποιούμενοι βεβαιότερον ὄκουν, καὶ τινὲς καὶ τεῖχι περιβάλλοντο ὡς πλουσιότεροι ἑαυτῶν γιγνόμενοι ἐφίμενοι γὰρ τῶν κερδῶν οἱ τε ἡσύσσου ὑπέμενον τῶν κρεισσόνων δουλείαν, οἱ τε δυνατώτεροι περιουσίας ἐχοντες προσεποιήσει εὐη-

κόσως τὰς ἐλάσσους πόλεις. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ μάλλον ἤδη ὄντες ὑστερον χρόνῳ ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἐστράτευσαν.

IX. Ἀγαμέμνονος τὲ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν τότε δυνάμει προῦχον καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον τοῖς Τυνδάρεως ὄρκοις κατειλημμένος τοὺς Ἐλένης μνηστήρας ἄγων τὸν 2 στόλον ἄγεραι. λέγοντι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σαφέστατα Πελοποννησίων μνήμη παρὰ τῶν πρότερον δε-δεγμένοι Πέλοπα τε πρῶτον πληθεὶς χρημάτων, ἢ ἡλθεν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας ἔχων ἐς ἀνθρώπους ἀπόρους, δύναμιν περιποιηθαμένον τὴν ἑπιωμείαν τῆς χώ-

ρας ἐπηλθὼν ὄντα ὄμως σχεῖν, καὶ ύστερον τοῖς

1 Hude reads περιβάλλοντο with O.
being recognized by the fashion of the armour found buried with them, and by the mode of burial, which is that still in use among them.

But when the navy of Minos had been established, navigation between various peoples became safer—for the evil-doers on the islands were expelled by him, and then he proceeded to colonize most of them—and the dwellers on the sea-coast now began to acquire property more than before and to become more settled in their homes, and some, seeing that they were growing richer than before, began also to put walls around their cities. Their more settled life was due to their desire for gain; actuated by this, the weaker citizens were willing to submit to dependence on the stronger, and the more powerful men, with their enlarged resources, were able to make the lesser cities their subjects. And later on, when they had at length more completely reached this condition of affairs, they made the expedition against Troy.

IX. And it was, as I think, because Agamemnon surpassed in power the princes of his time that he was able to assemble his fleet, and not so much because Helen's suitors, whom he led, were bound by oath to Tyndareus. It is said, furthermore, by those of the Peloponnesians who have received the clearest traditional accounts from men of former times, that it was by means of the great wealth which he brought with him from Asia into the midst of a poor people that Pelops first acquired power, and, consequently, stranger though he was, gave his name to the country, and that yet greater things choice against all wrong. cf. Isoc. x. 40; Paus. III. xx. 9; Apollod. III. x. 9.
ἐκχύνονις ἐτὶ μείζω ἔννεπεξηθῆναι, Εὐρυσθέως μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὑπὸ Ἡρακλείδῶν ἀποθανόντος, Ἀτρέως δὲ μητρὸς ἀδελφοῦ ὤντος αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπιτρέψαντος Εὐρυσθέως, ὅτ’ ἐστράτευε, Μυκῆνας τε καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὸ οὐκείον Ἀτρέι (τυγχάνειν δὲ αὐτοῦ φεύγοντα τὸν πατέρα διὰ τὸν Χρυσίππου θάνατον), καὶ ὥς οὐκέτι ἀνεχώρησεν Εὐρυσθέως, βουλομένων καὶ τῶν Μυκηναίων φόβῳ τῶν Ἡρακλείδῶν καὶ ἀμα δυνατὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τεθεραπευκότα τῶν Μυκηναίων τε καὶ ὄσων Εὐρυσθέως ἥρχε τὴν βασιλείαν Ἀτρέα παραλαβεῖν καὶ τῶν Περσειδῶν τοὺς Πελοπίδας

3 μείζονις καταστήματι. ἀ μοι δοκεῖ Ἀγαμέμνων παραλαβῶν καὶ ναυτικός δὲ ἀμα ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν ἀλλῶν ἵσχύσας τὴν στρατείαν οὐ χάριτι τὸ πλέον ἡ φόβῳ ξυναγαγόν ποιήσασθαι. φαίνεται γὰρ ναυσί τε πλείσταις αὐτοῖς ἀφικόμενοι καὶ Ἀρκάσι προσπαρασχὼν, ὡς Ὁμηρος τοῦτο δεδήλωκεν, εἰ

4 τῷ ἱκανῷ τεκμηρίωσαν. καὶ ἐν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἀμα τῇ παραδόσει εἰρήκεν αὐτόν τὸν πολλής νήσοις καὶ Ἀργεῖ παντὶ ἀνάσεων φόβω τῶν περιοικίδων (αὐταὶ ὃς ἀν πολλαὶ εἰὲν) ἥπειρότῃς ὁν ἐκратεῖ, εἰ μὴ τι καὶ

5 ναυτικὸν εἶχεν. εἰκάζειν δὲ χρή καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ στρατείᾳ ὑπὸ ἑν τὰ πρὸ αὐτῆς.

1 Chrysippus, his half-brother, son of Pelops and Axioche, was killed by Atreus and Thyestes at the instance of their mother Hippodameia.
fell to the lot of his descendants. For when Eurystheus set out on the expedition that resulted in his death in Attica at the hands of the Heracleidae, Atreus, his mother's brother, who chanced to have been banished by his father for the death of Chryssippus, was intrusted by Eurystheus with Mycenae and the sovereignty because he was a kinsman; and when Eurystheus did not return, Atreus, in accordance with the wish of the Mycenaeans, who feared the Heracleidae, and because he seemed to be a man of power and had won the favour of the multitude, received the sovereignty over the Mycenaeans and all who were under the sway of Eurystheus. And so the house of Pelops became greater than the house of Perseus. And it was, I think, because Agamemnon had inherited all this, and at the same time had become strong in naval power beyond the rest, that he was able to collect his armament, not so much by favour as by fear, and so to make the expedition. For it is clear that he himself brought the greatest number of ships, and that he had others with which to supply the Arcadians, as Homer testifies, if he is sufficient witness for anyone. And he says, in the account of the delivery of the sceptre, that Agamemnon "ruled over many islands and all Argos." Now, if he had not had something of a fleet, he could not, as he lived on the mainland, have been lord of any islands except those on the coast, and these would not be "many." And it is from this expedition that we must judge by conjecture what the situation was before that time.

1 cf. Homer, B 576 and 612.
X. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν Μυκῆναι μικρὸν ἦν, ἢ εἰ τὸν τότε πόλισμα νῦν μῆ ἀξιόχρεων δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀκριβεῖ ἂν τις σημεῖο χρώμενος ἀπιστοῖς μὴ γενέσθαι τὸν στόλον τοσοῦτον ὅσον οἴ τε ποιήσα 
2 εἰρήκασι καὶ ὁ λόγος κατέχει. Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἡ γὰρ εἰ ἡ πόλις ἐρημωθεῖ, λειφθεὶς δὲ τὰ 
τε ἱερὰ καὶ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὰ ἐδάφη, πολλὴν ἄν 
οίμας ἀπιστίαν τῆς δυνάμεως προελθὼν πολλοῦ 
χρόνου τοῖς ἐπειτα πρὸς τὸ κλέος αὐτῶν εἶναι 
(καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοίρας 
νέμονται τῆς τε ξυμπάσης ἤγονται καὶ τῶν ἐξω 
ἐκμαχων πολλῶν ὄμως δὲ, οὐτε ἐκκυκλωθεῖσθα 
τῆς 3 πόλεως οὔτε ἱεροῖς καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυ-
τελέσι χρησαμένης, κατὰ κόμας δὲ τῷ παλαιῷ 
τῆς Ἐλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθείσης, φαίνοθ᾽ ἄν ὑπο-
δεστέρα), Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παθότων 
dιπλασίαν ἄν τὴν δύναμιν εἰκάζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς 
3 φανερῶς ὠφεις τῆς πόλεως ἡ ἔστιν. οὔκοιν ἀπι-
στεῖν εἰκὸς οὔτε τὰς ὠφεις τῶν πόλεως μᾶλλον 
σκοπεῖν ἢ τὰς δυνάμεις, νομίζειν δὲ τὴν στρατεύ 
ἐκεῖνη μεγίστην μὲν γενέσθαι τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς, 
λειπομένην δὲ τῶν νῦν, τῇ Ὀμήρου αἴ τοι ὁ 
τι χρῆ κάνταιβα πιστεύει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον 
μὲν ποιητὴν ὑπερ κοσμῆσαι, ὄμως δὲ φαίνεται 
καὶ οὕτως ἐνδεεστέρα. πεποίηκε γὰρ χιλίων καὶ 
4 διακοσίων υψῶν τὰς μὲν Βοιωτῶν εἰκοσί καὶ 
ἐκάτων ἀνδρῶν, τὰς δὲ Φιλοκτήτου πεντήκοντα,

1 Added by Hude.  4 Added by Stephanus.
X. And because Mycenae was only a small place, or if any particular town of that time seems now to be insignificant, it would not be right for me to treat this as an exact piece of evidence and refuse to believe that the expedition against Troy was as great as the poets have asserted and as tradition still maintains. For if the city of the Lacedaemonians should be deserted, and nothing should be left of it but its temples and the foundations of its other buildings, posterity would, I think, after a long lapse of time, be very loath to believe that their power was as great as their renown. (And yet they occupy two-fifths of the Peloponnesus and have the hegemony of the whole, as well as of their many allies outside; but still, as Sparta is not compactly built as a city and has not provided itself with costly temples and other edifices, but is inhabited village-fashion in the old Hellenic style, its power would appear less than it is.) Whereas, if Athens should suffer the same fate, its power would, I think, from what appeared of the city's ruins, be conjectured double what it is. The reasonable course, therefore, is not to be incredulous or to regard the appearance of cities rather than their power, but to believe that expedition to have been greater than any that preceded it, though falling below those of the present time, if here again one may put any trust in the poetry of Homer; for though it is natural to suppose that he as a poet adorned and magnified the expedition, still even on his showing it was evidently comparatively small. For in the fleet of twelve hundred vessels he has represented the ships of the Boeotians as having one hundred and twenty men each, and those of
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δηλών, ὃς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰς μεγίστας καὶ ἑλαχί-στας ἀλλων γούν μεγέθους πέρι ἐν νεών κατα- λογωθα ὡμ ἐμνήσθη. αὐτερεται δέ ὅτε ἦσαν καὶ μάχιμου πάντες, ἐν ταῖς Φιλοκτήτου ναυσὶ δεδή- λυκεὶ τοχότας γάρ πάντας πεποίηκε τοὺς προσ- κόπους. περίενευς δέ οὐκ εἰκός πολλοὺς ἐμμπλεῦν ἐξώ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τῶν μάλιστα ἐν τέλει, ἀλλως τε καὶ μέλλοντας πέλαγος περαιώσεσθαι μετὰ σκευῶν πολεμικῶν οὐδ' αὐτὰ πλοία κατα- φαρκτα ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ ληστη- δι κότερον παρασκευασμένα. πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας δ' οὖν καὶ ἑλαχίστας ναύς τὸ μέσον σκοποῦντε οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται ἔθοντες, ὡς ἀπὸ πάσης τῆς Ἐλλάδος κοινῆ πεμπόμενοι.

XI. Αἶτιον δ' ἦν οὗν ἡ ὁλγανθροπία τοσούτων διότι ἡ ἀχρηματία. τῆς γὰρ τροφῆς ἀπορία τὸν τε στρατὸν ἐλάσσον ἡγαγὼν καὶ ὅσον ἦλπιζον αὐτὸθεν πολέμουντα βιοτεύσειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν (δὴ οὖν δὲ τὸ γὰρ ἐρυμα τοῦ στρατοπέδου οὐκ ἦν ἐπιχίσαστο), φαίνονται δ' οὖν ἐντάθα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει χρησάμενοι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γεωργίαν τῆς Χερσονήσου τραπόμενοι καὶ λρατεύαν τῆς τροφῆς ἀπορίας. ἤ καὶ μάλλον οἱ Ἰρώτες αὐτῶν διεσπαρμένων τὰ δέκα ἐτη ἀντεῖχον βίᾳ, τοῖς αἰεὶ ὑπολειπομένοις ἀντίπαλοι ὄντες.

2 περιουσίαν δὲ εἰ ἦλθον ἔχοντες τροφῆς καὶ ὄντες
Philoctetes as having fifty, indicating, it seems to me, the largest and the smallest ships; at any rate, no mention as to the size of any others is made in the Catalogue of Ships. But that all on board were at once rowers and fighting men he has shown in the case of the ships of Philoctetes; for he represents all the oarsmen as archers. And it is not likely that many supernumeraries sailed with the expedition, apart from the kings and those highest in office, especially as they were to cross the open sea with all the equipment of war, and, furthermore, had boats which were not provided with decks, but were built after the early style, more like pirate-boats. In any event, if one takes the mean between the largest ships and the smallest, it is clear that not a large number of men went on the expedition, considering that they were sent out from all Hellas in common.

XI. The cause was not so much lack of men as lack of money. For it was a want of supplies that caused them to take out a comparatively small force, only so large as could be expected to live on the country while at war. And when they arrived and had prevailed in battle—as evidently they did, for otherwise they could not have built the defence around their camp—even then they seem not to have used their whole force, but to have resorted to farming in the Chersonese and to pillaging, through lack of supplies. Wherefore, since they were scattered, the Trojans found it easier to hold the field against them during those ten years, being a match for those who from time to time were left in camp. But if they had taken with them an abundant

1 Hom. B 510, 719.
2 The number would be 102,000, i.e. 1,200 ships at 85 men each.
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ἀθρόι ἰτευν ἄρστελας καὶ γεωργίας ξυνεχῶς τὸν πόλεμον διέφερον, ἰδίως ἰν μάρχῃ κρατοῦντες ἕλον, οἷς γε καὶ ὄντι ἀθρόι, ἀλλὰ μέρει τῷ αἰεὶ παρόντι ἀντεἴξον, πολιορκία δ' ἰν προσκαθεξο-μενοί ἐν ἐλάσσονι τε χρόνῳ καὶ ἀπονότερον τὴν Τροίαν ἕλον. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἀχρηματίαν τὰ τε πρὸ τούτων ἀσθενῇ ἦν καὶ αὐτὰ γε δὴ ταῦτα, ὀνομα-στότατα τῶν πρὶν γενόμενα, δηλοῦται τοῖς ἔργοις ὑποδεότερα ὡντα τῆς φήμης καὶ τοῦ νῦν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τοὺς ποιητὰς λόγου κατεσχηκότος.

XII. Ἑπεὶ καὶ μετὰ τὰ Τρωικὰ ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐτε μετανιστατὸ τε καὶ κατορκίζετο, ὡστε μὴ ἡσυχα-2 σασα αὐξηθῆναι, ἢ τε γὰρ αναχώρησις τῶν Ἑλ-λήνων ἐξ Ἡλίου χρονία γενομένη πολλὰ ἐνεόχ-μωσε, καὶ στάσεις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐγκρυντο, ἀφ' ὧν ἐκπέπτουτες τὰς πόλεις 3 ἐκτείζων. Βοιωτοὶ τε γὰρ οἱ νῦν ἐξηκοστῷ ἐτε μετὰ Ἡλίου ἀλωσίν ἐξ Ἀρνης ἀναστάντες ὑπὸ Θεσσαλῶν τὴν νῦν μὲν Βοιωτίαν, πρότερον δὲ Καδμηίδα γην καλουμένην ἤκησαν (เติบ δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποδαμῶς ἐν τῇ γη ταῦτα πρότερον, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ ἐς Ἡλιοῦ ἐστράτευσαν), Δωρίης τε ὑγδοκοστῷ 4 ἐτε ξυν Ἡρακλείδαις Πελοπόννησον ἐσχον. μο-λις τε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἡσυχάσασα ἡ Ἑλλάς ἑβαιῶς καὶ οὐκέτι ἀνισταμένη ἢποικίας ἐξε-
supply of food, and, in a body, without resorting to foraging and agriculture, had carried on the war continuously, they would easily have prevailed in battle and taken the city, since even with their forces not united, but with only such part as was from time to time on the spot, they yet held out; whereas, if they could have sat down and laid siege to Troy, they would have taken it in less time and with less trouble. But because of lack of money not only were the undertakings before the Trojan war insignificant, but even this expedition itself, though far more noteworthy than any before, is shown by the facts to have been inferior to its fame and to the tradition about it that now, through the influence of the poets, obtains.

XII. Indeed, even after the Trojan war Hellas was still subject to migrations and in process of settlement, and hence did not get rest and wax stronger. For not only did the return of the Hellenes from Ilium, occurring as it did after a long time, cause many changes; but factions also began to spring up very generally in the cities, and, in consequence of these, men were driven into exile and founded new cities. The present Boeotians, for example, were driven from Arne by the Thessalians in the sixtieth year after the capture of Ilium and settled in the district now called Boeotia, but formerly Cadmeis; only a portion of these had been in that land before, and it was some of these who took part in the expedition against Ilium. The Dorians, too, in the eightieth year after the war, together with the Heraclidae occupied the Peloponnesus. And so when painfully and after a long course of time Hellas became permanently tranquil and its population was no longer subject to expulsion from their homes, it
πέμπε, καὶ Ἰωνας μὲν Ἀθηναίοι καὶ νησιωτῶν
tοὺς πολλοὺς ὁκίσαν, Ἰταλίας δὲ καὶ Σικελίας
tὸ πλέον Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς τε ἄλλης Ἐλλάδος
ἐστιν ὁ χωρία. πάντα δὲ ταύτα ὑστερον τῶν
Τρωικῶν ἐκτίσθη.

XIII. Δυνατώτερα δὲ γιγνομένης τῆς Ἐλλάδος
καὶ τῶν χρημάτων την κτήσιν ἔτι μάλλον ἢ πρό-
tερον ποιουμένης τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς
πόλεσι καθίσταντο, τῶν προσόδων μειώνουν γι-
γνομένων (πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ρητοῖς γέρασι
πατρικαὶ βασιλείαι), ναυτικά τε ἐξηρτύνετο ἢ
Ἐλλᾶς καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης μάλλον ἀντείχοντο.

2 πρῶτοι δὲ Κορίνθιοι λέγονται ἐγγύτατα τοῦ νῦν
τρόπου μεταχειρίσαστα τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τρεῖ-
ρεις πρῶτον ἐν Κορίνθῳ τῆς Ἐλλάδος ἐνναυτή-

3 ἱπτὰν. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ Σαμίων Ἀμεινοκλῆς
Κορίνθιος ναυπηγὸς ναῦς ποιῆσας τέσσαρας· ἐτη
δ' ἐστὶ μάλιστα τριακόσια ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τούδε
τοῦ πολέμου, ὅτε Ἀμεινοκλῆς Σαμίως ἦλθεν.

4 ναυμαχία τε παλαιότατη διὸ Ἰσμεν γίγνεται Κο-
ρίνθιον πρὸς Κερκυραίους· ἐτη δὲ μάλιστα καὶ
ταύτῃ ἐξήκουνται καὶ διακόσια ἐστὶ μέχρι τοῦ

5 αὐτοῦ χρόνου. οἰκοῦντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν οἱ Κο-
ρίνθιοι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἱσθμοῦ αἰεὶ δὴ ποτὲ ἐμπόριον
eῖχον, τῶν Ἐλλήνων τὸ πάλαι κατὰ γῆν τὰ πλείω
ἡ κατὰ θάλασσαν, τῶν τε ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου
καὶ τῶν ἐξῳ, διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων παρ' ἄλληλους
ἐπιμείγνυτων, χρήματι τε δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, ὡς καὶ
began to send out colonies. The Athenians colonized Ionia and most of the islands; the Peloponnesians, the greater part of Italy and Sicily and some portions of the rest of Hellas. And all these colonies were planted after the Trojan war.

XIII. As Hellas grew more powerful and continued to acquire still more wealth than before, along with the increase of their revenue tyrannies began to be established in most of the cities, whereas before that there had been hereditary kingships based on fixed prerogatives. The Hellenes began to fit out navies, too, and to apply themselves more to the sea. And the Corinthians are said to have been the first of all to adopt what was very nearly the modern plan as regards ships and shipping, and Corinth was the first place in all Hellas, we are told, where triremes were built. And it appears that Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, built four ships for the Samians, also; and it was about three hundred years before the end of the Peloponnesian war that Ameinocles came to the Samians. The earliest sea-fight, too, of which we know, was fought by the Corinthians against the Corecyraeans; and this was two hundred and sixty years before the same date. For as the Corinthians had their city on the Isthmus, from the very earliest times they maintained there a market for the exchange of goods, because the Hellenes within and without the Peloponnesus, in olden times communicating with one another more by land than by sea, had to pass through their territory; and so they were powerful and rich, as has

1 The reference seems to be to the construction of harbours and docks as well as to the structure of the ships, e.g. providing them with decks (ch. x. 4).

2 704 B.C.  3 664 B.C.
τοῖς παλαιοῖς ποιηταῖς δεδήλωται· ἀφενεὶ δὲ ἐπωνόμασαν τὸ χωρίον. ἐπειδὴ τε οἱ Ἐλληνες μᾶλλον ἐπιλαβόν, τὰς ναύς κτησάμενοι τὸ λῃστικὸν καθήρουν, καὶ ἐμπόριον παρέχοντες ἀμφότερα δυνατὴν ἐσχον χρημάτων προσόδῳ τὴν πόλιν. 6 καὶ Ἡσσιν ὑστερον πολὺ γέγνεται ναυτικὸν ἐπὶ Κύρου Περσῶν πρώτον βασιλεύοντος καὶ Καμβύσου τοῦ νιέως αὐτοῦ, τῆς τε καθ’ ἐαυτοὺς θαλάσσης Κύρῳ πολεμοῦντες ἐκράτησαν τινα χρόνον. καὶ Πολυκράτης, Σάμου τυραννῶν ἐπὶ Καμβύσου, ναυτικῷ ἰσχύων ἄλλας τὲ τῶν νῆσων ὕπηκόοις ἐποιήσατο καὶ Ῥήνειαν ἑλὼν ἀνέθηκε τῷ Ἀττικῶν τῷ Δηλίῳ. Φωκαῖς τε Μασσαλίαν οἰκίζοντες Καρχηδόνιον ἐνίκων ναυμαχοῦντες.

Χ. Δυνατότατα γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ναυτικῶν ἡν. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα, πολλαὶ γενεαῖς ὑστερα γεγομένα τῶν Τρωικῶν, τριήρεις μὲν ὀλίγαις χρώμεναι, πεντηκοντάριοι δὲ ἐτὶ καὶ πλοίοις 2 μακροῖς ἑξηκτυμένα ὄσπερ ἐκεῖνα. ὀλίγον τε πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν καὶ τοῦ Δαρείου θανάτου, ὡς μετὰ Καμβύσην Περσῶν ἐβασίλευσε, τριήρεις περὶ τε Σικελίαν τοῖς τυραννοῖς ἐς πλῆθος ἐγένοντο καὶ Κερκυραίους· ταῦτα γὰρ τελευταία πρὸ τῆς Ἐκρήξου στρατείας ναυτικὰ ἀξίολογα ἐν τῇ Ἕλλαδι 3 κατέστη. Αἰγινῆται γὰρ καὶ Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ

2 559-529 B.C.  
3 532-522 B.C.  
4 cf. iii. civ.  
5 Marseilles, founded 600 B.C.
been shown even by the early poets, who called the place "Wealthy Corinth." And when navigation grew more prevalent among the Hellenes, the Corinthians acquired ships and swept the sea of piracy, and offering a market by sea as well as by land, raised their city to great power by means of their revenues. The Ionians, too, acquired a powerful navy later, in the time of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and of Cambyses his son; and waging war with Cyrus they maintained control of the sea about their own coasts for some time. Polycrates, also, who was tyrant of Samos in the time of Cambyses, was strong in sea-power and subdued a number of the islands, Rhenaea among them, which he captured and consecrated to the Delian Apollo. Finally the Phocaeans, when they were colonizing Massalia, conquered the Carthaginians in a sea-fight.

XIV. These were the most powerful of the fleets; and even these, we learn, though they were formed many generations later than the Trojan war, were provided with only a few triremes, but were still fitted out with fifty-oared galleys and the ordinary long boats, like the navies of that earlier time. Indeed, it was only a little before the Persian war and the death of Darius, who became king of the Persians after Cambyses, that triremes were acquired in large numbers, namely by the tyrants in various parts of Sicily and by the Corectaeans; and these were the last navies worthy of note that were established in Hellas before the expedition of Xerxes. As for the Athenians and Aeginetans and any other maritime

*πλοῖα, usually contrasted with war-ships (τριήρεις), but here marked as ships of war by the epithet μακρός, though probably differing little except in size from trading-vessels.

7 485 B.C.
οὗτες ἄλλοι, βραχέα ἐκέκτησατο καὶ τούτων τὰ πολλὰ πεντηκοντέρους· ὦ ἡ τῶν Ἁθηναίων Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐπείσεν Ἀγινήταις πολεμοῦντας. καὶ ἀμα τῶν βαρβάρων προσδοκίμου ὄντος, τὰς ναὺς ποιήσασθαι, αἴσθης καὶ ἑναυμάχησαν· καὶ αὐταὶ οὕτω εἴχον διὰ πᾶσης καταστρώματα.

ΧV. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ναυτικὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοι- αὐτὰ ἦν, τὰ τε παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ύστερον γενόμενα. ἵσχυν δὲ περιποίησαντο ὅμως οὐκ ἐλαχίστην οἱ προσχύόντες αὐτοὺς χρημάτων τε προσόδῳ καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς· ἐπιπλέοντες γὰρ τὰς νήσους κατε- στρέψιτο, καὶ μάλιστα ὦσιν μὴ διαρκῆ εἴχον 2 χώραν. κατὰ γὰρ δὲ πόλεμος, θεν τις καὶ δύνα- μις περιεγένετο, οὔτες ἐξονέστη πάντες δὲ ἦσαν, ὦσιν καὶ ἐγένοντο, πρὸς ὦμοροὺς τοὺς σφετέρους ἐκάστοις, καὶ ἐκδήμους στρατείας πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐπ' ἄλλων καταστροφῆ οὐκ ἔξησαν οἱ Ἑλληνες. οὐ γὰρ ἐξονειστήκεσαν πρὸς τὰς μεγί- στας πόλεις ὑπῆκοι, οὔτε αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσης κοινὰς στρατείας ἐποιοντό, κατ' ἄλληλους δὲ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐκαστοι οἱ ἀστυγείτους ἐπολέμουν. 3 μάλιστα δὲ ἐς τὸν πάλαι ποτὲ γεινόμενον πόλεμον Χαλκιδέων καὶ Ἐρετριῶν καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ᾿Ελληνικὸν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν ἐκατέρων διέστη.

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1 Referring to Xerxes’ invasion. This Aeginetan war is referred to in ch. xli. 2.
powers, the fleets they had acquired were inconsiderable, consisting mostly of fifty-oared galleys; and it was only quite recently that the Athenians, when they were at war with the Aeginetans and were also expecting the Barbarians, built their fleet, at the instance of Themistocles—the very ships with which they fought at Salamis. And these vessels were still without decks throughout their length.

XV. Such were the navies of the Hellenes, both those of early and those of later times; nevertheless those who gave attention to such matters acquired not a little strength by reason both of revenue of money and of sway over others. For they—and especially the peoples whose own territory was insufficient—made expeditions against the islands and subdued them. But by land no wars arose from which any considerable accession of power resulted; on the contrary, all that did occur were border wars with their several neighbours, and foreign expeditions far from their own country for the subjugation of others were not undertaken by the Hellenes. For they had not yet been brought into union as subjects of the most powerful states, nor, on the other hand, did they of their own accord make expeditions in common as equal allies; it was rather against one another that the neighbouring peoples severally made war. But it was chiefly in the war that arose a long time ago between the Chalcidians and the Eretrians, that all the rest of Hellas took sides in alliance with the one side or the other.

3 The war for the Lelantine Plain (cf. Hdt. v. xci.; Strabo, x. i. 11); usually placed in the seventh century, but by Curtius in the eighth (see Hermes, x. pp. 220 ff.).
XVI. Ἐπεγένετο δὲ ἄλλος τε ἄλλοθι κολύματα μὴ αὔξηθήναι, καὶ Ἰωσὶ προχωρησάντων ἐπὶ μέγα τῶν πραγμάτων Κύρος καὶ ἡ Περσικὴ ἔξουσία Κροῖσον καθελοῦσα καὶ ὅσα ἐντὸς Ἀλνος ποταμοῦ πρὸς θάλασσαν, ἐπεστράτευσε καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ ἕπειρῳ πόλεις ἐδούλωσε, Δαρείος τε ὑστερον τῷ Φοινίκων ναυτικῷ κρατῶν καὶ τὰς νῆσους.

XVII. Τύραννοι τε ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς πόλεσιν, τὸ ἐφ’ ἕαυτῶν μόνων προορώμενοι ἐς τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐς τὸ τῶν ἱδίων ὅλον αὔξειν δι’ ἀσφαλείας ὅσον ἐδύναντο μάλιστα τὰς πόλεις ὁκουμ, ἐπράξθη τε οὐδὲν ἀπ’ ἀυτῶν ἐργον ἄξιον μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ εἰ τὸ πρὸς περιοίκους τοὺς αὐτῶν ἐκάστοις. ὁυτὸ πανταχόθεν ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον κατείχετο μῆτε κοινῇ φανερῷ μηδὲν κατεργάζεσθαι, κατὰ πόλεις τε ἀτολμοτέρα εἶναι.

XVIII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἳ τε Ἀθηναῖων τύραννοι καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἅλλης Ἐλλάδος ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ πρὶν τύραννευθείσης οἱ πλείστοι καὶ τελευταίοι πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὑπὸ Δακεδαίμονιν κατελύθησαν· ἢ γὰρ Δακεδαίμων μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν τῶν νῦν ἐνοικοῦντων αὐτήν 2 Δωριῶν ἐπὶ πλείστον ὅν ἰσιμεν χρόνον στασιάσασα ὄμος ἐκ παλαιτάτου καὶ ἑνομήθη καὶ αἰεὶ ἀτυράννευτος ἦν· ἐτῇ γάρ

1 After ἐκάστοις the MSS. have οἱ γὰρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως, for those in Sicily advanced to a very great degree of power, which Wex deletes, followed by most editors. 2 Hude omits with E.
XVI. But different Hellenic peoples in different localities met with obstacles to their continuous growth; for example, after the Ionians had attained great prosperity, Cyrus and the Persian empire, after subduing Croesus, and all the territory between the river Halys and the sea, made war against them and enslaved the cities on the mainland, and later on Darius, strong in the possession of the Phoenician fleet, enslaved the islands also.

XVII. The tyrants, moreover—whenever there were tyrants in the Hellenic cities—since they had regard for their own interests only, both as to the safety of their own persons and as to the aggrandizement of their own families, in the administration of their cities made security, so far as they possibly could, their chief aim, and so no achievement worthy of mention was accomplished by them, except perchance by individuals in conflict with their own neighbours. So on all sides Hellas was for a long time kept from carrying out in common any notable undertaking, and also its several states from being more enterprising.

XVIII. But finally the tyrants, not only of Athens but also of the rest of Hellas (which, for a long time before Athens, had been dominated by tyrants)—at least most of them and the last that ever ruled, if we except those in Sicily—were put down by the Lacedaemonians. For although Lacedaemon, after the settlement there of the Dorians who now inhabit it, was, for the longest period of all the places of which we know, in a state of sedition, still it obtained good laws at an earlier time than any other land, and has always been free from tyrants; for the

\[ \text{546 B.C.} \quad \text{423 B.C.} \]
ἐστι μάλιστα τετρακόσια καὶ ὀλίγῳ πλείω ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦτο τοῦ πολέμου, ἀφ’ ὦ Δακεδαι-
μόνιοι τῇ αὐτῇ πολιτείᾳ χρονίων· καὶ δὴ αὐτὸ δυνάμενοι καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι καθίστα-
σαν. μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὖ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὑστερον καὶ ἡ ἐν 
Μαραθῶι μάχη Μηδών πρὸς Ἀθηναίοις ἐγένετο. 

2 δεκάτῳ δὲ ἔτει μετ’ αὐτὴν αὖθις οἱ βάρβαροι τῷ μεγάλῳ στόλῳ ἔπι τὴν Ἑλλάδα δουλωσόμενος ἤθεν. καὶ μεγάλου κυνηγοῦ ἐπικρεμασθέντος οἱ τοὺς Δακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν ξυμπολεμησάντων Ἑλ-
νήσιον ἡγησαντο δυνάμει προὐχοτες, καὶ οἱ Ἀθη-
ναῖοι ἐπίσταντων τῶν Μηδῶν διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπέων 
τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβάντες ναυτικόν ἐγένετο. κοινῇ τε ἄπωσά-
μενοι τὸν βάρβαρον ὑστερον οὐ πολλῷ διεκρίθη-
σαν πρὸς τε Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Δακεδαιμονίουσι οἱ τε ἄπωστάντες βασιλεῖσι "Ελλήνες καὶ οἱ ξυμπολε-
μήσαντες· δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα μέγιστα διεφάνη· 

3 ἵσχυον γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ναυσίν. καὶ 
ὁλίγον μὲν χρόνον ξυνέμειν ἡ ὁμαίχια, ἔπειτα διενεχθέντες οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ Ἀθη-
ναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς ἄλληλοις, 
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων εἰ τινὲς που διασταίεν, 

πρὸς τούτοις ἣδη ἐχόρουν. ὡστε ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδι-
κῶν ἐς τόνδε αἰεὶ τῶν πολέμου τὰ μὲν σπενδόμενοι,

1 The legislation of Lycurgus, thus placed by Thucydides at four hundred years or more before 404 B.C., would be about 804 B.C. (Eratosthenes gives 884).
period during which the Lacedaemonians have been enjoying the same constitution\(^1\) covers about four hundred years or a little more down to the end of the Peloponnesian war. And it is for this reason that they became powerful and regulated the affairs of other states as well. Not many years after the overthrow of the tyrants in Hellas by the Lacedaemonians the battle of Marathon\(^2\) was fought between the Athenians and the Persians; and ten years after that the Barbarian came again with his great host against Hellas to enslave it. In the face of the great danger that threatened, the Lacedaemonians, because they were the most powerful, assumed the leadership of the Hellenes that joined in the war; and the Athenians, when the Persians came on, resolved to abandon their city, and packing up their goods embarked on their ships, and so became sailors. By a common effort the Barbarian was repelled; but not long afterwards the other Hellenes, both those who had revolted from the King and those who had joined the first confederacy against him, parted company and aligned themselves with either the Athenians or the Lacedaemonians; for these states had shown themselves the most powerful, the one strong by land and the other on the sea. The defensive alliance lasted only a little while; then the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians quarrelled and, with their respective allies, made war upon one another, and any of the rest of the Hellenes, if they chanced to be at variance, from now on resorted to one or the other. So that from the Persian invasion continually, to this present war, making peace at one time, at another time

\(^{1}\) 400 B.C.
τὰ δὲ πολεμοῦντες ἡ ἀλλήλοις ἡ τοῖς έαυτῶι ἐξυμμάχοις ἀφισταμένοις εὐ παρεσκευάσαντο τὰ πολέμια καὶ ἐμπειρότεροι ἐγένοντο μετὰ κινδύνων τᾶς μελέτας ποιούμενοι.

XIX. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Δακεδαιμόνιοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρον τοὺς ἡπαρχίας ἢγούντο, κατ’ ὁλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσιν αὐτῶις μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅτως πολιτεύουσι θεραπεύοντες, Ἀθηναίοι δὲ ναῦς τε τῶν πόλεων τῷ χρόνῳ παραλαβόντες, πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων, καὶ χρήματα τοῖς πάσι τάξαντες φέρειν. καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τῶν πόλεων ἡ ἱδία παρασκευὴ μείζων ἡ ὡς τὰ κράτιστα ποτὲ μετὰ ἀκραίφνοις τῆς ἐξυμμαχίας ἤκοθεσαν.

XX. Τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τουαῦτα ἦν ὅταν, χαλεπὰ ἄντα παντὶ ἐξῆς τεκμηρίῳ πιστεῦσαι. οἱ γὰρ ἀνθρωποί τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν προγεγενήμενων, καὶ ἂν ἐπιχώρια σφίσιν ἢ, ὅμοιοι ἀβασανίστως παρ’ ἄλληλοιν δέχονται. Ἀθηναίοι γοῦν τὸ πλῆθος Ἰππαρχον οὔτοι τῷ Ἀρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτωνος τύραννον οὖν ἀποθανεὶν καὶ οὐκ ἵσασιν ὅτι Ἰππίας μὲν πρεσβύτατος ὁν ἦρχε τῶν Πεισιστράτου νιέων, Ἰππαρχος δὲ καὶ Θεσσαλὸς ἀδελφὸς ἦσαν αὐτοῦ, ὑποτοπήσαντες δὲ τι ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ παραχρῆμα Ἀρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτων ἐκ τῶν ἐξυνειδότων σφίσιν Ἰππία μεμηνύσθαι,

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1 cf. vi. lxxv. 2; vii. lvii. 4.
2 Lost its independence after the revolt of 427 B.C. cf. iii. 1.
3 i.e. as if they took place in some distant land.
fighting with each other or with their own revolted allies, these two states prepared themselves well in matters of war, and became more experienced, taking their training amid actual dangers.

XIX. The Lacedaemonians maintained their hegemony without keeping their allies tributary to them, but took care that these should have an oligarchical form of government conformably to the sole interest of Sparta; the Athenians, on the other hand, maintained theirs by taking over in course of time the ships of the allied cities, with the exception of Chios and Lesbos, and by imposing on them all a tax of money. And so the individual resources of the Athenians available for this war became greater than those of themselves and their allies when that alliance was still unimpaired and strongest.

XX. Now the state of affairs in early times I have found to have been such as I have described, although it is difficult in such matters to credit any and every piece of testimony. For men accept from one another hearsay reports of former events, neglecting to test them just the same, even though these events belong to the history of their own country. Take the Athenians, for example; most of them think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton. They do not know that it was Hippias, as the eldest of the sons of Peisistratus, who was ruler, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were merely his brothers; further, that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting, on that very day and at the very moment of executing their plan, that information had been conveyed to Hippias by one of their fellow-conspirators,

ΤΟΥ ΜΕΝ ἈΠΕΣΧΟΥΝΤΟ ὩΣ ΠΡΟΕΙΔΟΤΟΣ, ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΔΈ ΠΡΙΝ ΞΕΛΛΗΦΘΗΝΑΙ ΔΡΆΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΚΙΝΔΥΝΕΥΩΝ, ΤῸ ἸΤΠΆΡΧῊ ΠΕΡΙΤΥΧΟΝΤΕς ΠΑΡᾆ Τὸ ΔΕΩΚΟΡΕΙΟΝ ΚΑΛΟΪΜΕΝΟΝ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΝΑΘΗΝΑΪΚΗΝ ΠΟΜΠΗΝ ΔΙΑΚΟ-
3 σμόντι ἀπέκτειναν. ΠΟΛΛᾆ ΔΈ ΚΑΙ ἈΛΛᾆ ἘΤΙ ΚΑΙ
 оформлен ὡς ἄντα καὶ οὐ χρόνῳ ἀμνηστούμεναι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι "Ἐλλήνες οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται, ὡσπερ τοὺς τε ΛΑΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΩΝ βασιλεάς μὴ μᾶ ψήφῳ προσ-
tίθεσθαι ἐκάτερον, ἄλλα δυοί, καὶ τὸν ΠΙΤΑΝΑΤΗΝ λόχον αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὡς οúde ἐγένετο πῶποτε. οὕτως ἀταλαιπώρως τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ἕξιτης τῆς ἀλη-
θείας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐτοίμα μᾶλλον τρέπονται.

XXI. Ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τεκμηρίων ὄμως τοιαῦτα ἂν τις νομίζων μάλιστα ἀ διήλθον οὐχ ἀμαρτάνοι, καὶ οὔτε ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον κοσμούντες μᾶλλον πιστεύων,
οὔτε ὃς λογογράφου ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγω-
γότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἡ ἀληθέστερον, οὔτα ἀνεξέ-
λεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνευρικηκότα, ἡράησθαι δὲ ἡγησά-
μενος ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων σημείων ὡς παλαιὰ
2 εἶναι ἀποχρώντως. καὶ ὁ πόλεμος οὔτος, καὶ περ

1 In the inner Ceramicus near the temple of Apollo Patrouς.
2 Herodotus is doubtless one of the Hellenes here criti-
cised. cf. vi. lvii., referring to the two votes; ix. liii.,
where he seems to have applied a term belonging to a deme
(cf. Hdt. iii. iv.) to a division of the army.
held off from him as forewarned, but wishing to do something before they were seized and then take their chances, fell in with Hipparchus, who was marshalling the Panathenaic procession near the sanctuary called Leocorium, and killed him. There are many other matters, too, belonging to the present and not forgotten through lapse of time, regarding which the other Hellenes as well hold mistaken opinions, for example, that at Lacedaemon the kings cast not one but two votes each, and that the Lacedaemonians have the "Pitana company" in their army, which never at any time existed. So averse to taking pains are most men in the search for the truth, and so prone are they to turn to what lies ready at hand.

XXI. Still, from the evidence that has been given, any one would not err who should hold the view that the state of affairs in antiquity was pretty nearly such as I have described it, not giving greater credence to the accounts, on the one hand, which the poets have put into song, adorning and amplifying their theme, and, on the other, which the chroniclers have composed with a view rather of pleasing the ear than of telling the truth, since their stories cannot be tested and most of them have from lapse of time won their way into the region of the fabulous so as to be incredible. He should regard the facts as having been made out with sufficient accuracy, on the basis of the clearest indications, considering that they have to do with early times. And so, even though men are always

2 Public recitation was the ordinary mode of getting the works of the poets and early logographers before the people.
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὧ μὲν ἂν πολεμῶσι τῶν παρόντας
αἰεὶ μέγιστον κρινόντων, πανταμένων δὲ τὰ ἄρ-χαία μᾶλλον θαυμαζόντων, ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔρ-γων σκοποῦσι δηλώσει ὁμοιομείζον γεγενημένος
αὐτῶν.

XXII. Καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγοι εἶπον ἔκαστοι ἢ μέλ-
λοντες πολεμήσειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἐν ὧν,
χαλεπῶν τὴν ἄκριβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λειχθέντων διαμηνυ-σαι ἢ ἐμοὶ τε ὅν αὐτὸς ἢ κούσα καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοθέν
ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς ἐν ἓδοκοιοι μοι ἔκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μᾶλιστ' εἶπεν, ἔχομενοι ὡς ἐγκύπτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώ-

2 μης τῶν ἀληθῶς λειχθέντων, οὕτως εἰρήται τὰ ἐν ἓ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐκ ἐκ
toῦ παρατυχόντος πληθαυόμενος ἡξίωσα γράφειν
οὐδ' ὡς ἐμοὶ ἔδοκει, ἀλλ' οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρὴν καὶ
παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὁς δυνατὸν ἄκριβεια περὶ

3 ἐκάστου ἐπέξελθον, ἐπιστόμως δὴ ἡγεῖται, διότι
οἱ παρόντες τοῖς ἔργοις ἐκάστοις οὗ ταύτα περὶ
tῶν αὐτῶν ἔλεγον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκατέρω εἰς εὐνοίας

4 ἡ μνήμης ἔχει. καὶ ἐς μὲν ἄκροάσιν ἵσως τὸ
μὴ μεθόδος αὐτῶν ἄτερπτεστερον φανεῖται ὅσοι

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inclined, while they are engaged in a war, to judge the present one the greatest, but when it is over to regard ancient events with greater wonder, yet this war will prove, for men who judge from the actual facts, to have been more important than any that went before.

XXII. As to the speeches that were made by different men, either when they were about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said. But as to the facts of the occurrences of the war, I have thought it my duty to give them, not as ascertained from any chance informant nor as seemed to me probable, but only after investigating with the greatest possible accuracy each detail, in the case both of the events in which I myself participated and of those regarding which I got my information from others. And the endeavour to ascertain these facts was a laborious task, because those who were eye-witnesses of the several events did not give the same reports about the same things, but reports varying according to their championship of one side or the other, or according to their recollection. And it may well be that the absence of the fabulous from my narrative will seem
Τὸν δὲ πρῶτον ἔργου μέγιστον ἐπρά-χθη τὸ Μηδικὸν, καὶ τούτο ὁμος δυὸν ναυμαχίαις καὶ πεζομαχίαις ταχεῖαν τὴν κρίσιν ἔσχεν. τού-του δὲ τοῦ πολέμου μηκὸς τε μέγα προβή, παθήματα τε ἐνυπνήσχη γενέσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὧν ὑπήρχε ἐν ἴσον χρόνῳ. οὔτε γὰρ πόλεις τοσαίδε ληφθεῖσαι ἡρμώνωσαν, καὶ μὲν ὑπὸ βαρβάρων, αἱ δὲ ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιπολε-μοῦντων (εἰς δὲ αὐτοῖς ὁκείτοις μετέβαλον ἀλιπόκουμναι), οὔτε φυγαὶ τοσαίδε ἀνθρώπων καὶ φόνος, ὃ μὲν κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν πόλεμον, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν. τὰ τε πρῶτον ἀκοῇ μὲν λεγόμενα, ἔργῳ δὲ σπανίώτερον βεβαιούμενα ὡς ἀπίστα κατέστη, σεισμῶν τε πέρι, οἱ ἐπὶ πλείστον ἀμα-μέρος ὑψὸς καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐπέσχον, ἡλίου τε ἐκλείψεις, αἱ πυκνότεραι παρὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πρῶτον χρόνου μημονευόμενα ξυνέβησαν, αὐχμοὶ τε ἔστε παρ' οἷς μεγάλοι καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ λεμοὶ
less pleasing to the ear; but whoever shall wish to have a clear view both of the events which have happened and of those which will some day, in all human probability, happen again in the same or a similar way—for these to adjudge my history profitable will be enough for me. And, indeed, it has been composed, not as a prize-essay to be heard for the moment, but as a possession for all time.

XXIII. The greatest achievement of former times was the Persian war, and yet this was quickly decided in two sea-fights¹ and two land-battles². But the Peloponnesian war was protracted to a great length, and in the course of it disasters befell Hellas the like of which had never occurred in any equal space of time. Never had so many cities been taken and left desolate, some by the Barbarians,³ and others by Hellenes⁴ themselves warring against one another; while several, after their capture, underwent a change of inhabitants.⁵ Never had so many human beings been exiled, or so much human blood been shed, whether in the course of the war itself or as the result of civil dissensions. And so the stories of former times, handed down by oral tradition, but very rarely confirmed by fact, ceased to be incredible: about earthquakes, for instance, for they prevailed over a very large part of the earth and were likewise of the greatest violence; eclipses of the sun, which occurred at more frequent intervals than we find recorded of all former times; great droughts also in some quarters with resultant famines; and lastly—

¹ e.g. Plataea (iii. lxviii. 3), Thyrea (iv. lvii.).
² e.g. Sollium (ii. xxx.), Potidaea (ii. lxx.), Anactorium (iv. xlix.), Scione (v. xxxii.), Melos (v. cvi.).
καὶ ἡ ὦν ἤκιστα βλάψασα καὶ μέρος τι φθείρασα ἡ λοιμώδης νόσος· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα μετὰ τούθε 4 τοῦ πολέμου ἀμα ξυνεπέθετο. ἦρξαντο δὲ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Πελοποννησίοι λύσαντες τὰς τριακοντάεις σποιδὰς αἱ αὐτοῖς ἐγένοντο μετὰ Εὐ-
5 βοίας ἀλωσιν. δὲ ὁ τι ὤ ἐλυσαν, τὰς αὐτίας προύγραψα πρώτον καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς, τοῦ μη
τινα ἤτησαί ποτε ἐξ ὑτοῦ τοσοῦτο πόλεμος τοῖς
6 Ἔλλησι κατέστη, τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγον τοῦς Ἀθηναίους ἥγουμαι μεγάλους μυρομένους καὶ φόβουν παρέ-
χοντας τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίωι Ἄναγκασαί ἐς τὸ πο-
λέμειν· αἱ δὲ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αὐτίαι αὐτῶ

κατέρω ἡσαν ἐκατέρω, ἀφ' ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σποιδὰς ἐς
τῶν πόλεμοι κατέστησαν.

XXIV. Ἐπιδαμνὸς ἐστὶ πόλει ἐν δεξίᾳ ἐσπλέ-
ατι τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον προσκούσι δ' αὐτὴν
2 Ταυλάντιοι βάρβαροι, Ἰλλυρικῶν ἔδους. ταῦτην
ἀπόκοκισαν μὲν Κερκυραίοις, οἰκιστὶς δ' ἐγένετο
Φαλίος Ἐρατοκλείδου, Κορινθίων γένους, τῶν ἀφ'
Ἡρακλεόνος, κατὰ δὴ τὸν παλαιὸν νόμον ἐκ τῆς
μητροπόλεως κατακληθεῖς. ξυνόκισαν δὲ καὶ
Κορινθίων τινὰς καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου Δωρικοῦ γένους.
3 προελθόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου ἐγένετο ἡ τῶν Ἐπι-
δαμνῶν δύναμις μεγάλη καὶ πολυάνθρωπος.
4 στασιάσατες δὲ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἔτη πολλά, ὡς
λέγεται, ἀπὸ πολέμου τινὸς τῶν προσοικῶν βαρ-
βάρων ἐφθάρμησαν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς πολλῆς
5 ἐστερήθησαν, τὰ δὲ τελευταῖα πρὸ τοῦ δὲ τοῦ
πολέμου ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν ἐξεδίωξε τοὺς δυνατοὺς,
οἱ δὲ ἐπελθόντες μετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἔληξοντο

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the disaster which wrought most harm to Hellas and destroyed a considerable part of the people—the noisome pestilence. For all these disasters fell upon them simultaneously with this war. And the war began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians broke the thirty years' truce, concluded between them after the capture of Euboea. The reasons why they broke it and the grounds of their quarrel I have first set forth, that no one may ever have to inquire for what cause the Hellenes became involved in so great a war. The truest explanation, although it has been the least often advanced, I believe to have been the growth of the Athenians to greatness, which brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and forced them to war. But the reasons publicly alleged on either side which led them to break the truce and involved them in the war were as follows.

XXIV. There is a city called Epidamnus on the right hand as one sails into the Ionian gulf, and its next-door neighbours are a barbarian tribe, the Taulantians, of Illyrian race. The city was colonized by the Coreyaecans, and its founder was Phalius, son of Eratoceleides, of Corinthian stock and a descendant of Heracles, who was invited from the mother-city according to the ancient custom; but some Corinthians and other Dorians joined the Coreyaecans in establishing the colony. As time passed the city of the Epidamnians became great and populous; but civil wars ensued, lasting, it is said, for many years, and in consequence of a war with the neighbouring barbarians they were crippled and stripped of most of their power. Finally, just before the Peloponnesian war, the populace expelled the aristocrats, and they, making common cause with the barbarians and

1 445 B.C.; cf. ch. xxv. 1.
τούς ἐν τῇ πόλει κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖντες Ἑπιδάμνιοι ἐπειδὴ ἐπιέζοντο, πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πρέσβεις ὡς μητρόπολιν οὖσαν, δεόμενοι μὴ σφᾶς περιοράν φθειρομένους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τε φεύγοντας ἐξυγάλλαξαι σφίσι καὶ τῶν τῶν βαρβάρων πόλεμον καταλῦσαι. ταῦτα δὲ ἴκεται καθεξήμονει ἐς τὸ Ἡραίον ἔδεοντο. οἱ δὲ Κέρκυραι τὴν ἱκετεῖαν οὐκ ἔδεξαντο, ἀλλ' ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμψαν.

XXV. Γνώντες δὲ οἱ Ἑπιδάμνιοι οὐδεμίαν σφίσιν ἀπὸ Κέρκυρας τιμωρίαν οὖσαν ἐν ἀπόρῳ εἰχόντο θέσαν τὸ παρόν, καὶ πέμφαντες ἐς Δελφοὺς τὸν θεὸν ἐπηρώτων εἰ παραδοζέναι Κορινθίοις τὴν πόλιν ὡς οἰκισταῖς καὶ τιμωρίαν τινὰ πείρων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι. ὁ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀνείλε παραδοοῦναι καὶ ἕγεμονας ποιεῖσθαι.

2 ἐλθόντες δὲ οἱ Ἑπιδάμνιοι ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον κατὰ τὸ μαντεῖον παρέδοσαν τὴν ἀποκίαιν, τὸν τε οἰκιστὴν ἀποδεικνύσαι σφῶν ἐκ Κορίνθου οὖντα καὶ τὸ χρηστήριον δηλοῦσαν, ἐδεόντο τε μὴ σφᾶς περιοράν φθειρομένους, ἀλλ' ἐπαμύναν.

3 Κορίνθιοι δὲ κατὰ τε τὸ δίκαιον ὑπεδέξαντο τὴν τιμωρίαν, νομίζοντες οὕς ὡς τοὺς ἠευτὸς εἶναι τὴν ἀποκίαιν ἡ Κέρκυρα, ἀμα δὲ καὶ μίσει τῶν Κέρκυραίων, ὦτι αὐτῶν παρημέλουν οὖντες.

4 ἀποικοὶ, οὔτε γὰρ ἐν πανηγύρεσι ταῖς κοιναῖς διδόντες γέρα τὰ νομίζομενα οὔτε Κορίνθιοι ἀνδρι

1 The κοιναὶ πανηγύρεσι are the four great games, here doubtless referring especially to the Isthmian Games held at Corinth. The "privileges" would be places of honour (προεδρίαι), animals for sacrifice presented by the colonies of

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attacking Epidamnus, plundered those who were in the city both by land and sea. These, when they were being hard pressed, sent envoys to Corcyra, as being their mother-city, begging them not to look on and see them destroyed, but to reconcile them with the exiles and to put a stop to the war with the barbarians. This petition they made, sitting as suppliants in the temple of Hera. But the Corecyraeans denied their supplication, and sent them back unsuccessful.

XXV. The Epidamnians, recognizing that no aid was to be had from Corcyra, were at a loss how to settle their present difficulty; so they sent to Delphi and asked the god whether they should deliver up their city to the Corinthians as founders and try to procure some aid from them. The god answered that they should deliver it up to them and make them leaders. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and delivered up the city as a Corinthian colony, in accordance with the oracle, showing that their founder was from Corinth and stating the response of the oracle; and they begged the Corinthians not to look on and see them utterly destroyed, but to come to their rescue. The Corinthians undertook the task, partly on the ground of right, because they considered that the colony belonged to them quite as much as to the Corecyraeans, partly also through hatred of the Corecyraeans, for the reason that these, though Corinthian colonists, neglected the mother-city. For neither at their common festival gatherings would they concede the customary privileges to Corinthians, nor would they begin with a representative of the mother-city, sending of delegates (θεσπολ) to Corinthian festivals, etc.
προκαταρχόμενοι τῶν ἱερῶν, ὅστερ αἱ ἁλλαὶ ἀποικίαι, περιφρονοῦντες δὲ αὐτοὺς κἂν χρημάτων δυνάμει οὐτε κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὁμοία τοῖς Ἐλλήνων πλουσιωτάτοις καὶ τῇ ἐς πόλεμον παρασκευή δυνατώτεροι, ναυτικῷ δὲ καὶ πολύ προύχειν ἐστιν ὅτε ἐπαιρόμενοι καὶ κατὰ τὴν Φαιάκων προενόκησιν τῆς Κερκυρᾶς κλέος ἐχώντων τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς· ἦ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξηρτύνωτο τὸ ναυτικόν καὶ ἦσαν οὐκ ἀδύνατον τριήρεις γὰρ εἴκοσι καὶ ἐκατὸν ὑπῆρχον αὐτοῖς ὅτε ἦρχοντο πολεμεῖν.

XXVI. Πάντων οὖν τούτων ἐγκλήματα ἐχώντες οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐπεμπον ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον ἁσμενοι τὴν ὁφέλλαν, οἰκήτορά τε τὸν βουλόμενον ἦναι κελευθῶν καὶ Ἀμπρακιώτων καὶ 2 Λευκαδίων καὶ έαυτῶν φρουρούς. ἐπορεύθησαν δὲ πεζῇ ἐς Ἀπολλωνίαν Κορινθίων οὕσαν ἀποκινιαν, δειπνοῦντο τὸν Κερκυραίων μὴ κολύσωνται ὑπ’ αὐτῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν περαιούμενοι. Κερκυραίοι δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἦσθοντο τοὺς τε οἰκήτορας καὶ φρουρούς ήκοντας ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον τὴν τε ἀποκινιαν Κορινθίων δεδομένην, ἐξαλέπαινον καὶ πλευρασεντες εὐθὺς πέντε τε καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσὶ καὶ ύστερον ἐτέρῳ στόλῳ τοὺς τε φεύγουσαν ἐκέλευον κατ’ ἐπήρειαν δέχεσθαι αὐτούς (ἡλθον γὰρ ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν οἱ τῶν Ἐπιδάμνων φυγάδες τάφους τε ἀποδεικνύσαντες καὶ ἐνυγγέειαν, ἣν προισχόμενοι ἐδέοντο σφάς κατάγειν) τούς τε φρουροὺς οὖς

1 According to the custom obtaining in Hellenic cities, whereby a stranger could offer sacrifice only through a citizen who acted for him. προκαταρχόμενοι, as the Schol. explains, διδόντες πρότερον (sc. ἦ τοῖς ἀλλοίς) τὰς καταχάες, i.e. giving the hair cut from the victim's forehead to a repre-
Corinth the initial rites at sacrifices,\(^1\) as the rest of the colonies did, but they treated them with contempt. For at that time they were in point of wealth equal to the richest of the Hellenes, and in preparation for war even stronger, while in sea-power they sometimes boasted that they were greatly superior, just because of the former occupation of the island by the Phaeacians,\(^2\) whose glory was in their ships. It was for this reason that they kept on developing their navy, and they were in fact powerful; for they had on hand one hundred and twenty triremes when the war began.

XXVI. So the Corinthians, having all these grounds of complaint, gladly sent the desired aid to Epidamnus, inviting whoever wished to go along as settlers and despatching as a garrison some Ambraciots and Lecadians and a detachment of themselves. They proceeded to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians, going by land through fear of the Corecyraeans, lest they might be prevented by them if they should attempt to cross the sea. But when the Corecyraeans perceived that the settlers and the garrison had arrived at Epidamnus, and that their colony had been given up to the Corinthians, they were indignant. So they sailed immediately with twenty-five ships, and later with a second fleet, and insolently bade the Epidamnians dismiss the garrison sent by the Corinthians and the settlers, and also receive back their exiles; for the exiled Epidamnians had gone to Corecyra, and pointing to the sepulchres of common ancestors and

\(^{1}\) cf. III. lxx., where a sacred precinct of Alcinous in Corecyra is mentioned. The ancient belief that Corecyra was the Homeric Scheria has no support in the *Odyssey.*

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Κορίνθιοι ἐπεμψαν καὶ τοὺς οἰκήτορας ἀποτέμπειν. 4 οἱ δὲ Ἐπιδάμνιοι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὑπῆκοουσαν, ἀλλὰ στρατεύοντο ἐπὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ μετὰ τῶν φυγάδων ὡς κατάξοντες, καὶ τοὺς Ἰλλυρίους προσλαβόντες. 5 προσκαθέζομενοι δὲ τὴν πόλιν προεῖπον Ἐπιδάμνιοι τε τῶν βουλόμενον καὶ τοὺς ξένους ἀπάθεις ἀπείνα: εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὡς πολεμίως χρήσεσθαι, ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἐπείδοντο, οἱ μὲν Κερκυραῖοι (ἐστὶ δ' ἵσθιμος τὸ χωρίον) ἐπολιορκοῦν τὴν πόλιν.

XXVII. Κορίνθιοι δ', ὡς αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς Ἐπιδάμνου ἠλθοῦν ἀγγελοὶ ότι πολιορκοῦνται, παρεσκευάζοντο στρατεύαν, καὶ ἀμα ἀποκιάν ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδάμνου ἐκήρυσσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἱση καὶ ὠμοία τῶν βουλόμενον ἱέναι: εἰ δὲ τις τὸ παραντικὰ μὲν μὴ ἐθέλει ξυμπλεῖν, μετέχειν δὲ βούλεται τῆς ἀποκίας, πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς καταθέντα Κορίνθιος μένειν. ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεόντες πολλοὶ 2 καὶ οἱ τάργυροι καταβάλλοντες. ἐδεήθησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν Μεγαρέων ναυσὶ σφᾶς ξυμπροτέμψαι, εἰ ἄρα κολύοντο ὑπὸ Κερκυραίων πλείων οἱ δὲ παρεσκευάζοντο αὐτοῖς ὁκτὼ ναυσὶ ξυμπλεῖν, καὶ Παλῆς Κεφαλῆνων τέσσαραν. καὶ Ἐπίδαμνῖοι ἐδεήθησαν, οἱ παρέσχον πέντε, ἔρμιον ἡς δὲ μίαν καὶ Τροιζήνιοι δύο, Δεκάδιοι δὲ δέκα καὶ Ἀμπρακίδας ὁκτώ, ὶθβαιοι δὲ χρήματα ἠτησάν καὶ Φλεισίους, Ἡλείους δὲ ναῦς τε κενᾶς

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invoking the tie of kinship had begged the Coreycraeans to restore them. As the Epidamnians paid no heed to them the Coreycraeans proceeded against them with forty ships, accompanied by the exiles whom they intended to restore, and taking along the Illyrians also. And sitting down before the city they proclaimed that the foreigners and any Epidamnians who wished might go away in safety; otherwise they would treat them as enemies. But when the Epidamnians would not comply, the Coreycraeans laid siege to the city, which is connected with the shore by an isthmus.

XXVII. But the Corinthians, when messengers came from Epidamnus announcing the siege, prepared an expedition and proclaimed at the same time a colony to Epidamnus, saying that any who wished might go there on a basis of equal rights for all, and that if anyone was not inclined to sail at once, but wished to have part in the colony, he might make a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmae and remain at home. The number that sailed was large, as also of those who deposited the money. Request was also made of the Megarians to convey them with ships, in case an attempt should be made by the Coreycraeans to prevent their sailing; and these were preparing to accompany them with eight ships, and the Paleans, from Cephallenia, with four. The Epidaurians, of whom a like request was made, furnished five ships, the Hermionians one, the Troezenians two, the Leucadians ten, and the Ambraciotics eight. Upon the Thebans and the Philiasians a demand was made for money, and upon the Eleans

1 The Corinthian drachma was about equivalent to 6d., but of course had greater purchasing power. The Attic drachma = 92d.
καὶ χρήματα. αὐτῶν δὲ Κορινθίων νῆς παρεσκευάζοντο τριάκοντα καὶ τρισχίλιοι ὀπλίται.

XXVIII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπύθοντο οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν παρασκευήν, ἐλθόντες ἐς Κόρινθον μετὰ Δακεδαίμονι καὶ Σικυωνίων πρέσβεων, οὗς παρέλαβον, ἐκέλευον Κορινθίους τοὺς ἐν 'Ἐπιδάμνω φρουροῦς τε καὶ οἰκίτοράς ἀπάγειν, ὡς οὐ μετὸν αὐτοῖς 'Ἐπιδάμνων. εἶ δὲ τι ἀντιποιοῦνται, δίκας ἥθελον δοὺναί ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ παρὰ πόλεισιν αἰς ἀν ἀμφότεροι ἐξυμβολῶσιν ὅποτέρων δ' ἀν δικασθῇ εἶναι τὴν ἀποικίαν, τούτους κρατεῖν ἥθελον δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς μαντεῖῳ ἐπιτρέψαι.

3 πόλεμον δὲ οὐκ εἰδὼν ποιεῖν εἶ δὲ μὴ, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναγκασθῆσθαι ἐφασαν, ἐκείνων βιαζόμενοι, φίλους ποιεῖσθαι οὐδὲ οὐ βούλονται, ἔτερους τῶν

4 νῦν ἄντων μᾶλλον, ὁφελίας ἑνεκα. οἳ δὲ Κορίνθιοι ἀπεκρίναντο αὐτοῖς, ἴν τὰς τα ναῦς καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀπὸ Ἐπιδάμνου ἀπαγάγωσι, βουλεύσεισθαι πρότερον δ' οὐ καλὸς ἔχειν τοὺς μὲν

5 πολιορκεῖσθαι, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ δικάζεσθαι. Κερκυραῖοι δὲ ἀντέλεγον, ἴν καὶ ἔκεινοι τοὺς ἐν 'Ἐπιδάμνῳ ἀπαγάγωσι, ποιήσειν ταῦτα· ἐτοίμοι δὲ εἶναι καὶ ὡστε ἀμφότερους μένειν κατὰ χώραν σπουδᾶς δὲ 1 ποιήσασθαι ἕως ἃν ἡ δίκη γένηται.

1 Hude deletes δὲ, after Poppo.

1 A threat of an alliance with the Athenians, τάς τιν ἄντων referring to the Lacedaemonians and other Peloponnesians, not to the Illyrians (cf. ch. xxvi. 7), as Poppo suggested.
for unmanned ships as well as for money. And the Corinthians themselves, for their part, made ready thirty ships and three thousand hoplites.

XXVIII. When the Corecyraeans learned of these preparations they went to Corinth, with Lacedae-monian and Sicyonian envoys whom they took with them, and bade the Corinthians withdraw the garrison and settlers at Epidamnus, on the ground that they had no part in Epidamnus. But if they made any claim to it they were willing, they said, to submit the matter for arbitration to any states in the Peloponnesus that both should agree upon, and to whichever party the colony should be adjudged to belong, these should have it; and they were willing also to submit the matter to the oracle at Delphi. War, however, they warned them not to bring on; but if it must be, they too would be compelled, if the Corinthians forced the issue, to make friends with those for whom they had no wish, others beyond their present ones, in order to secure assistance. The Corinthians answered that if the Corecyraeans would withdraw their ships and the barbarians from Epidamnus they would consider the matter, but that meanwhile it was not proper for them to be discussing arbitration while the Epidamnians were undergoing siege. Whereupon the Corecyraeans replied that they would do this if the Corinthians on their part would withdraw their forces at Epidamnus; but they were also ready to arbitrate on condition that both parties should remain where they were and that they should make a truce until the decision should be given.

1 i.e. the envoys and the Corinthians.
2 Or, omitting ἀρετῆς, "that they were also ready to make a truce until the decision should be given, on condition that both parties should remain where they were."
XXIX. Κορίνθιοι δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων ὑπήκουον, ἀλλὰ ἐπειδὴ πλήρεις αὐτοὶ ἦσαν αἱ νῆσε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι παρήσαν, προπέμψαντες κήρυκα πρὸ τερον πόλεμον προερύντα Κερκυραίοις, ἀραντες ἐβδομήκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ πέντε δισχίλιοι τε ὀπλίταις ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαμμων, Κερκυραίοις

2 ἐναντία πολεμήσοντες· ἑστρατήγηκε δὲ τῶν μὲν νεών Ἀριστεὺς ὁ Πελλήχων καὶ Καλλικράτης ὁ Καλλίου καὶ Τιμάνωρ ὁ Τιμάνθωνος, τοῦ δὲ πεζοῦ Ἀρχέτιμος τε ὁ Εὐρυτίμων καὶ Ἰσαρχιδᾶς ὁ Ἰσάρχων. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένοντο ἐν Ἀκτίῳ τῆς Ἀνακτορίας γῆς, οὐ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐστίν, ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, οἱ Κερκυραίοι κήρυκα τε προύπεμψαν αὐτοῖς ἐν ἀκατίῳ ἀπερνύτα μὴ πλεῖν ἐπὶ σφαῖς, καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀμα ἐπλήρουν, ζεύγαντες τε τὰς παλαιὰς ὡστε πλοίμοις εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς ἐπισκευάσαντες. ὡς δὲ ὁ κήρυξ τε ἀπήγγειλεν οὐδὲν εἰρηναίον παρὰ τῶν Κορινθίων καὶ αἱ νῆσε αὐτοῖς ἐπεπλήρωσεν οὕτω σφαῖς ὁ οὐδόηκοντα (τεσσαράκοντα γάρ Ἐπίδαμμων ἐπολιόρκουν), ἀνταναγαγόμενοι

3 καὶ παραταξάμενοι ἐναυμάχωσαν· καὶ ἐνίκησαν οἱ Κερκυραίοι παρὰ πολὺ καὶ νάυς πέντε καὶ δέκα διέθεμεν τῶν Κορινθίων. τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ αὐτοῖς ξυνέβη καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἐπίδαμμων πολιορκούντας παραστήσασθαι ὡμολογία ὡστε τοὺς μὲν ἐπιλυδαὶ ἀποδόσθαι, Κορινθίους δὲ δήσαντας ἐχειν ἑως ἄν ἄλλο τι δοξῇ.

XXX. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οἱ Κερκυραίοι τροπαίον στήσαντες ἐπὶ τῇ Δευκίμη τῆς Κερκυραίας ἀκρωτηρίῳ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους οὕς ἔλαβον
XXIX. The Corinthians, however, would not listen to any of these proposals, but, as soon as their ships were manned and their allies were at hand, they sent a herald in advance to declare war against the Corecyraeans; then, setting off with seventy-five ships and two thousand hoplites, they sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to the Corecyraeans. Their ships were under the command of Aristeus son of Pellichus, Callierates son of Callias, and Timanor son of Timanthes; the infantry under that of Arachetimus son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas son of Isarchus. But when they reached Actium in the territory of Anaetorium, where is the sanctuary of Apollo at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, the Corecyraeans sent out a herald, in a small boat to forbid their advance, and at the same time proceeded to man their ships, having previously strengthened the old vessels with cross-beams so as to make them seaworthy, and having put the rest in repair. When their herald brought back no message of peace from the Corinthians and their ships were now fully manned, being eighty in number (for forty were besieging Epidamnus), they sailed out against the enemy and, drawing up in line, engaged in battle; and they won a complete victory and destroyed fifteen ships of the Corinthians. On the same day it happened that their troops which were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus forced it to a capitulation, on condition that the other immigrants \(^1\) should be sold into slavery but the Corinthians kept in bonds until something else should be agreed upon.

XXX. After the sea-fight the Corecyraeans set up a trophy of their victory at Leucimne, a promontory in the territory of Corecyra, and put to death the

\(^1\) i.e. the Ambraciota and Leucadians; cf. ch. xxvi. 1.
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αἰχμαλώτους ἀπέκτειναν, Κορίνθιοι δὲ δῆσαντες
2 εἰχον. ύστερον δὲ, ἐπειδὴ οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ
ξύμμαχοι ἡσσιμένοι ταῖς ναυσιν ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽
οίκου, τῆς θαλάσσης ἀπάσης ἐκράτουν τῆς κατ᾽
ἐκεῖνα τὰ χωρία οἳ Κερκυραῖοι, καὶ πλεύσαντες
ἐς Δευκάδα τὴν Κορινθίων ἀποικίαν τῆς γῆς ἔτε-
μον καὶ Κυλλήνην τὸ Ἡλείων ἐπίνειον ἐνέπρησαν,
3 δὴ ναῦς καὶ χρήματα παρέσχον Κορινθίοις.
τοῦ τε χρόνου τὸν πλείστον μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν
ἐπεκράτουν τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τοὺς τῶν Κοριν-
θίων ξύμμαχους ἐπιπλέοντες ἐφθειρον, μέχρι οὗ
Κορίνθιοι περίοντες τῷ θέρει πέμψαντες ναύς καὶ
στρατιάν, ἔπει σφῶν οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπόνουν, ἐστρα-
topodeúontο ἐπὶ Ἀκτιῷ καὶ περὶ τὸ Χειμέριον
τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος, φυλακὴς ἐνεκα τῆς τε Δευκάδος
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ὅσαι σφίζοι φίλαι ἤσαν.
4 ἀντεστρατοποδεύοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐπὶ
τῇ Δευκάμην ναυσὶ τε καὶ πεζῶ. ἐπέπλεον τε
οὐδέτεροι ἄλληλοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ θέρος τοῦτο ἀντι-
καθεξόμενοι χειμώνος ἢδη ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου
ἐκάτεροι.

XXXI. Τὸν δὲ ἐνιαυτὸν πάντα τὸν μετὰ τὴν
ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὸν ύστερον οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὀργῆ
φέροντες τὸν πρὸς Κερκυραίους πόλεμον ἐναυτη-
γοῦντο καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο τὰ κράτιστα νεῶν
στόλον, ἐκ τε αὐτῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀγείροντες
καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἔρετας μισθῷ πείθοντες.
2 πυρθανόμενοι δὲ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν παρασκευὴν
αὐτῶν ἐφοβοῦντο, καὶ (ὁσιν γὰρ οὐδενὸς Ἑλλη-

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prisoners they had taken, with the exception of the Corinthians, whom they kept in fetters. But afterwards, when the Corinthians and their allies had gone back home with their ships after their defeat, the Coreyraeans were masters of the whole sea in that quarter, and sailing to Leucas, the colony of the Corinthians, they ravaged the country and burned Cyllene, the naval arsenal of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to the Corinthians. And so for most of the time after the sea-fight they had control over the sea; and sailing against the allies of the Corinthians they kept harrying them, until the Corinthians, as the summer was drawing to an end, seeing that their allies were suffering, sent ships and an army and encamped at Actium and near the promontory of Cheimerium in Thessprotis, as a protection for Leucas and the other cities that were friendly to themselves. And the Coreyraeans encamped on the opposite coast at Leucimne with both ships and infantry. Neither side sailed against the other, but they faced each other for the rest of this summer; it was not until winter had come that they each went back home.

XXXI. During the whole year after the sea-fight and the next year the Corinthians, being angrily indignant about their war with the Coreyraeans, kept building ships and preparing a naval armament with all their might, and collected oarsmen from both the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas by the inducement of pay. The Coreyraeans, on the other hand, were alarmed when they learned of their preparations, and since they were without an ally among

1 περιδέτες (as the MSS. read) = περιδέτες. But Ullrich (Beitr. z. Kr. iii. p. 5) explains = ἐν τῷ περιδέτε τοῦ θέρους, "in what remained of the summer." So Boeckh.

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νων ἐνσπονδοὶ οὐδὲ ἑσεχράζοντο ἐαυτούς οὔτε ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίους σπονδὰς οὔτε ἐς τὰς Δακεδαιμονίων) ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἐλθοῦσιν ὡς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐξεμαχοῦς γενέσθαι καὶ ὠφελίᾳ τινὰ πειρᾶσθαι ἀπ' αὐτῶν εὐρίσκεσθαι. οί δὲ Κορίνθιοι πυθόμενοι ταύτα ἠλθοῦν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίας προσβευσόμενοι, ὅπως μὴ σφίσει πρὸς τῷ Ἀρκτον Κερκυραίῳ ναυτικῷ καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν προσγενόμενον ἐμπόδιον γένηται θέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον ἢ βούλονται. καταστάσεσθι δὲ ἐκκλησιὰς ἐς ἀντιλογιὰν ἠλθοῦν. καὶ οἱ μὲν Κερκυραίοι ἔλεγαν τοιάδε.

XXXII. "Δίκαιοι, ὦ Ἀθηναίοι, τοὺς μήτε εὐεργεσίας μεγάλης μήτε ἐξεμαχίας προσβευσόμενος ἠκούσατε παρὰ τοὺς πέλας ἑπεικουρίας, ὅσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς νῦν, δεσποτέων ἀναδιάξας πρὸς τοὺς, μᾶλλον μὲν ὡς καὶ ἐξεμφορα δέονται, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅτι γε σῶκ ἐπεζήμια, ἐπειτα δὲ ως καὶ τὴν χάριν βέβαιον ἔξοισιν εἰ δὲ τούτων μηδὲν σαφές

2 καταστήσωσι, μὴ ὀργίζοντας ἣν ἀτυχώσιν. Κερκυραίοι δὲ μετὰ τῆς ἐξεμαχίας τῆς αἰτήσεως καὶ ταύτα πιστεύοντες ἑχυρά ὑμῖν παρέξουσι ἀπέ-

3 στειλάν ἡμᾶς. τετύχθηκε δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιτήδευμα πρὸς τε ὑμᾶς ἐς τὴν χρείαν ἡμῶν ἄλογον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐξεμφορὰν.

4 ἐξεμαχοὶ τε γὰρ σύνενος πὼ ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ ἐκουσίῳ γενόμενοι νῦν ἄλλοιν τούτο δεσπότεων ἠκομέν, καὶ ἀμα ἐς τὸν παρόντα πόλεμον Κορινθίων ἐρήμου δὲ αὐτὸ καθέσταμεν. καὶ περίεστικέν ἡ δοκοῦσα ἡμῶν πρῶτον σωφροσύνη, τὸ
the Hellenes and had not enrolled themselves in the alliance either of the Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians, they decided to go to the Athenians, become their allies, and try to procure some aid from them. But the Corinthians also, hearing of this, themselves sent envoys to Athens to prevent the accession of the Athenian fleet to that of the Corycraeans, as this would hamper them in settling the war as they wished. And when an assembly was held opposing speeches were made, and the Corycraeans spoke as follows:

XXXII. "It is but fair, citizens of Athens, that those who, without any previous claim on the score of important service rendered or of an existing alliance, come to their neighbours to ask aid, as we do now, should show in the first place, if possible, that what they ask is advantageous, or at least that it is not hurtful, and, in the second place, that their gratitude can be depended on; but in case they establish neither of these things clearly, they should not be angry if unsuccessful. Now the Corycraeans have sent us to ask for an alliance, and in full confidence that they will be able to give you guarantees on just these points. But it so happens that our policy has been at one and the same time inconsistent, as it must seem to you, with our petition, and is also disadvantageous under present circumstances to ourselves; for although heretofore we have freely chosen to be allies of no one, we have now come to ask others for an alliance, and at the same time, in the face of the present war with the Corinthians, we are, because of this very policy, isolated. And so what was formerly fondly imagined to be wise discretion on our part—to enter into no
μὴ ἐν ἄλλη τεχνὴ ἡμῶν ἡ ἡμείς τῇ τοῦ πέλας γνώμῃ ξυγκινδυνεύειν, νῦν ἄβουλία καὶ ἀσθένεια φαι-10 νομένη. τήν μὲν οὖν γενομένην ναυμαχίαν αὐτὸι κατὰ μόνας ἀπεωσάμεθα Κορινθίους· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μείζονι παρασκευὴ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἀλλης 'Ελλάδος ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὄρμηται καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατοι ὄρμεν ὄντες τῇ οἰκείᾳ μόνον δυνάμει περιγενέσθαι, καὶ ἀμα μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος, εἰ ἐσό-15 μεθα ὑπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀνάγκη καὶ ὕμων καὶ ἀλλου παντοῦ ἐπικουρίας δείσθαι, καὶ ξυγγνώμη, εἰ μὴ μετὰ κακίας, δόξης δὲ μᾶλλον ἀμαρτία τῇ πρό-τερον ἀπραγμοσύνη ἐναυτία τολμώμεν.

XXXIII. "Γενήσεται δὲ ὑμῖν πειθομένοις καλή ἡ ξυντυχία κατὰ πολλὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας χρείας, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἀδικουμένοις καὶ οὐχ ἐτέρους βλάπτουσι τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ποιῆσεσθε, ἐπειτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων κινδυνεύοντας δεξά-μενοι ὡς ἂν μᾶλιστα μετ' αἰειμνηστοῦ μαρτυρίον τὴν χάριν καταθήσεσθε, ναυτικόν τε κεκτήμεθα
2 πλὴν τοῦ παρ' ὑμῖν πλεῖστον, καὶ σκέψασθε τής εὐπραξίας σπανιωτέρα ἡ τής τοῖς πολεμίοις λυπηροτέρα, εἰ ἂν ὑμεῖς ἄν πρὸ πολλῶν χρημά-των καὶ χάριτος ἐτιμήσασθε δύναμιν ὑμῖν προσ-γενέσθαι, αὕτη πάρεστιν αὐτεπάγγελτος, ἂνευ κινδύνων καὶ δαπάνης διδοῦσα ἑαυτὴν καὶ προσ-έτε φέρουσα ἐς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀρετῆς, οὐς δὲ ἐπαμνεῖτε χάριν, ὑμῖν δ' αὐτοῖς ἑσθ' ἃ ἐν τῷ
foreign alliance, with the possibility of having to take our share of the danger of our neighbour's policy—has now, in the event, proved want of wisdom and a source of weakness. It is true that, in the sea-fight we have had, we repulsed the Corinthians single-handed; but now that they have set out to attack us with a greater force, drawn from the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas, and we see that we are unable to prevail with our own strength alone, and since, further, our peril will be serious if we come into their power, we are constrained to ask help of you and of everyone else; and it is pardonable if we now, actuated by no baseness, but rather acknowledging an error of judgment, venture upon a course that runs counter to our former policy of avoiding foreign entanglements.

XXXIII. "For yourselves, if you concede what we ask, by a happy concurrence of events Athens can get both honour and advantage in many ways: first, you will be giving your aid to those who are wronged and not to those who injure others; next, by taking into alliance men whose most vital interests are at stake, you will lay up for yourselves a claim for gratitude with a record which will abide in our memories for ever; and, lastly, we have a navy greater than any but your own. Think of it now, what good fortune could be rarer, more vexatious to your foes, than this—that the power which you would have accounted it worth much money and gratitude to acquire should become yours unbidden, offering itself to you without danger or expense, and bringing you, besides, a good name before the world, gratitude from those who are to receive your help, and enhanced strength for yourselves? To few in all
παντὶ χρόνῳ ὁλίγοις δὴ ἀμα πάντα ξυνέβη, καὶ ὁλίγοι ἦμιμαχίας δεόμενοι οἰς ἐπικαλοῦνται ἀσφάλειαι καὶ κόσμου οὐχ ἦσον διδόντες ἡ ληψόμενοι παραγίγγιον·

3 "Τὸν δὲ πόλεμον, δι’ ἄντερ χρήσιμοι ἄν εἰμεν, εἰ τις ὑμῶν μὴ οἶεται ἔσεσθαι, γνώμης ἀμαρτάνει καὶ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται τοὺς Δακεδαίμονιος φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πολεμησίοντας καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους, δυναμένους παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν ἐχθροῦς ἐντας, προκαταλαμβάνοντας ἡμᾶς νῦν ἐς τὴν ὑμετέραν ἐπιχείρησιν, ἐνα μὴ τῷ κοινῷ ἔχθει κατ’ αὐτοὺς μετ’ ἀλλήλων στῶμεν μηδὲ δυνῶν φθάσαι ἁμάρτωσιν, ἡ κακῶσαι ἡμᾶς ἡ σφᾶς αὐτῶν βεβαιώσασθαι. ἢμέτερον δὲ γὰρ ἐργὸν προτερῆσαι, τῶν μὲν διδόντων, ὑμῶν δὲ δεξαμενῶν τὴν ἁμαμαχίαν, καὶ προεπιβουλευέσθαι αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἡ ἀντεπιβουλεύειν.

XXXIV. Ἡν δὲ λέγοντι ὡς οὐ δίκαιον τοὺς σφατέρους ἀποίκους ὑμᾶς δέχεσθαι, μαθόντων ὡς πᾶσα ἀποκία εὖ μὲν πάσχουσα τιμᾶ τὴν μυτρόπολιν, ἄδικουσσε δὲ ἀλλοτριώτερα ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ δούλῳ, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τοῖς λειπομένοις εἰναι ἐκπέμπονται. ὡς δὲ ἡδίκουν σαφές ἐστιν προκληθέντες γὰρ περὶ Ἐπιδάμνου ἐς κρίσιν πολέμορ μᾶλλον ἡ τῷ ἱσόμεν θητοςαι τὰ ἐγκλήματα μετελθεῖν. καὶ ὑμῖν ἐστο τι τεκμηριωθείν.
history have such opportunities fallen all at the same time, and few are they who, when they beg for an alliance, come offering to those to whom they make their appeal as large a degree of security and honour as they expect to receive.

"Now as to the war which would give us occasion to be of service, if anyone of you thinks it will not occur he errs in judgment, and fails to perceive that the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are eager for war, and that the Corinthians, who have great influence with them and are enemies of yours,1 are making a beginning with us now2 with a view to a subsequent attack upon you, in order that we may not be led by our common hatred to take our stand together against them, and that they may not fail, before we unite, to attain their two objects—to harm us and to strengthen themselves. It is our business, on the other hand, to get the start of them—we offering and you accepting the alliance—and to forestall their schemes rather than to counteract them.

XXXIV. "But if they say that it is not right for you to receive their colonists, let them know that while every colony honours the mother-city so long as it is well treated, yet that if wronged it becomes alienated; for colonists are not sent out to be slaves to those who are left behind, but to be their equals. And that they were in the wrong is manifest; for when challenged to arbitrate the case of Epidamnus they preferred to prosecute their charges by war rather than by equity. And let their present treat-

are eager for war, and that the Corinthians have great influence with them and are enemies of yours, and are making a beginning with us with a view to a subsequent attack upon you...."
THUCYDIDES

μιον ἀ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἦγεγενεῖς δρόσιων, ὡστε ἀπάτη τε μὴ παράγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν δεσμένουσι τε ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέος μὴ ὑπογιγείν· ὁ γὰρ ἐλαχίστας τὰς μεταμελείας ἐκ τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις λαμβάνων ἀσφαλέστατος ἂν διατελοῖ.

XXXV. "Δύσετε δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων σπονδὰς δεχόμενοι ἡμᾶς μηδετέρων ὠντας ξυμμάχους. εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν αὐταῖς, τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων ἢτις μηδαμὸν ξυμμαχεῖ, ἐξεῖναι παρ' οποτέρους ἀν ἀρέσκηται ἐλθεῖν. καὶ δεινὸν εἴ τοισδέ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνσκότων ἔσται πληροῦν τὰς ναῦς καὶ προσέτε καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος καὶ οὐχ ἦκιστα ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑπηκόων, ἡμᾶς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς προκειμένης τε ξυμμαχίας εἰρέσουσι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ποθεν ὑφελίας, εἴτε ἐν ἀδικήματι θήσονται πεισθέντων ὑμῶν ἡ δεόμεθα. 4 πολὺ δὲ ἐν πλείοιν αἰτία ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες ὑμᾶς ἐξομεν. ἡμᾶς μὲν γὰρ κωινανεύοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐχθροῦς ὠντας ἀπώσεσθε, τῶνδε δὲ οὐχ ὅπως κωλυται ἐχθρῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐπιόντων γενήσεσθε, ἄλλα καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἄρχης δύναμιν προσ- λαβεῖν περιώψθεσθε· ἢν οὐ δίκαιον, ἄλλ' ἢ κάκεινων κωλυεῖν τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὑμετέρας μισθοφόρους ἢ καὶ ἡμῖν πέμπειν καθ' ὅ τι ἂν πειθήτε ὑφελίαν μάλιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς δεξαμένους βοήθειν. πολλὰ δὲ, ὀσπερ ἐν ἄρχῃ ὑπείπομεν, τὰ ξυμφέροντα ἀποδείκνυμεν, καὶ μέγιστον ὅτι οἱ τε

1 With the MSS.; Krüger conjectures ὑ, followed by Hude.
ment of us, who are their kinsmen, be a warning to you, that you be not misled by their deceit, or, if they seek aid from you directly, that you may refuse it. For whoever finds fewest occasions to regret doing favours to his opponents will ever remain most secure.

XXXV. "Neither will you be breaking your treaty with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us, who are allies of neither party. For in this treaty it is stipulated that if any of the Hellenic cities is a member of no alliance, it is at liberty to join whichever side it pleases. And it is monstrous if they are to be allowed to recruit their navy, not only from their own allies, but also from the rest of Hellas besides, and particularly from your subjects, but are to debar us from the alliance that should naturally be open to us as well as from aid from any other quarter, and then shall count it a crime if you are persuaded to concede what we ask. Far more shall we hold you at fault if we fail to win your consent; for you will be repulsing us who are in peril and are not your enemies, while as regards these men, who are enemies and aggressors, you will not only not be thwarting them, but will even be allowing them to get fresh forces from your own dominions. To that they have no right; but it is right that you should either prevent them from raising mercenaries in places under your control, or else send aid to us also, on whatever terms you may be induced to make; but it would be best of all for you openly to receive and help us. And many, as we suggested at the outset,¹ are the advantages which we can show you, and the most important of all is this, that the enemies of both of

¹ Ch. xxxiii. 1.
αὐτοὶ πολέμιοι ἴμιν ἴσαν (ὅπερ σαφεστάτη πίστις) καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἀσθενεῖς, ἀλλ’ ἴκανοι τοὺς μεταστάντας βλάψαι. καὶ ναυτικής καὶ οὐκ ἡπειρώτιδος τῆς ξυμμαχίας διδομένης οὐχ ὀμοία ἡ ἀλλατρίωσις, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν, εἰ δύνασθε, μηδένα ἅλλον εἳν κεκτήσθαι ναῦς, εἰ δὲ μη, ὅστις ἐχυρώτατος, τούτων φίλον ἔχειν.

XXXVI. "Καὶ ὅτω τάδε ξυμφέροντα μὲν δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, φοβεῖται δὲ μη δὲ αὐτὰ πεθόμενοι τὰς σπονδὰς λύσῃ, γνῶτω τὸ μὲν δεδιός αὐτοῦ ἱσχὺς ἔχον τοὺς ἐναυτίους μᾶλλον φοβήσων, τὸ δὲ θαρσοῦν μὴ δεξαμένου ἀσθενές ὑπὸ πρὸς ἰσχύοντα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀδείστερον ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἀμα οὐ περὶ τῆς Κερκύρας νῦν τὸ πλέον ἢ καὶ τῶν 'Αθηνῶν βουλευόμενος, καὶ οὐ τὰ κράτιστα αὐτάς προνοῶν, ὅταν ἐσ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ δόσον οὐ παρόντα πόλεμον τὸ αὐτικα περισκοπῶν ἐνδοιαξεῖ χωρίον προσλαβεῖν ὃ μετὰ μεγίστων 2 καὶ ρόν οἰκειοῦται τε καὶ πολεμοῦται. τῆς τε γὰρ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλου κεῖται, ὅστε μήτε ἐκεῖθεν ναυτικῶν ἑσαί. Πελοποννησίους ἐπελθεῖν το τε ἐντεύθεν πρὸς τάκει παρατίνημαι, καὶ ἐς τάλλα ξυμφορώτατον ἐστίν.

1 So ἴσαν seems to mean here, where ἴσα was to be expected; cf. ch. xxxiii. 3.
2 τή τε ξυμφέρει seems to be implied.
3 The thirty-years' truce with Sparta; cf. ch. xxiii. 4.
us are, as we see, the same—which is the surest guarantee of fidelity—and these are not weak, but able to injure those who withdraw from them. And furthermore, when the alliance that is offered is with a maritime and not with a continental power, the alienation of such an ally is not a matter of indifference; on the contrary, you should by all means, if possible, permit no one else to possess ships; but if that is impossible, you should have as your friend him who is strongest therein.

XXXVI. "If anyone thinks that this course is indeed expedient, but fears that if he yields to this consideration he will be breaking off the truce, he should understand that his fear, if backed by strength, will make his enemies more afraid; whereas, if he reject our alliance, his confidence will be unsupported by might and will therefore be less formidable against enemies that are strong. He should understand, furthermore, that he is deliberating upon the interests, not so much of Corecyra, as of Athens, and that he is not making the best provision for her when, in the face of the war that is impending and all but present, he hesitates, through cautious consideration of the immediate chances, to attach to himself a country which is not made a friend or a foe except with the most momentous consequences. For Corecyra is favourably situated for a coasting voyage either to Italy or Sicily, so that you could prevent a fleet from coming thence to join the Peloponnesians, or could convoy thither a fleet from here; and in other respects it is a most advantageous

4 i.e. of themselves breaking the truce.
5 i.e. in the security of the truce.
6 Ancient mariners preferred to hug the coast rather than sail through the open sea.
3 ὑραχυμάτω δὲ ἂν κεφαλαίως, τοῖς τε ξύμπαισι καὶ καθ' ἐκαστὸν, τῷ δ' ἂν μὴ προέσβαι ἡμᾶς μᾶθοιτε· τρία μὲν ὄντα λόγου ἄξια τοῖς "Ελλησι ναυτικά, τὸ παρ' ἦμαν καὶ τὸ ἱμέτερον καὶ τὸ Κορινθίων· τούτων δὲ ἐν περιόψειθε τὰ δύο ἐς ταύτων ἐλθεῖν καὶ Κορίνθιοι ἡμᾶς προκαταλήψονται, Κερκυραίοις τε καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἁμα ταυμαχήσετε· δεξάμενοι δὲ ἡμᾶς ἔξετε πρὸς αὐτούς πλείονει ναυτὶ ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἀγωνίζεσθαι."

4 Τοιαύτα μὲν οἱ Κερκυραίοι εἶπον· οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι μετ' αὐτοὺς τοιάδε.

XXXVII. "Ἀραγκαῖον Κερκυραίων τὸν δὲ οὐ μόνον περὶ τοῦ δέξασθαι σφᾶς τὸν λόγον ποιησαμένων, ἄλλοις ως καὶ ἡμεῖς τε ἀδικοῦμεν καὶ αὐτὸι οὐκ εἰκότως πολεμοῦνται, μηνοθέντας πρώτον καὶ ἡμᾶς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄλλον λόγον ἱέναι, ἴνα τὴν ἅρμ' ἡμὸν τε ἀξίωσιν ἀσφαλέστερον προειδίητε καὶ τὴν τῶνδε χρείαν μὴ ἀλογίστως ἀπώσησθε.

2 "Φασὶ δὲ ἐξωμαχίαν διὰ τὸ σώφρον συνενός πω δέξασθαι τὸ δ' ἐπὶ κακογρία καὶ οὐκ ἀρετὴ ἐπετήδευσαν, ἐξωμαχίαν τε συνένα βουλόμενοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀνεύραντες μέρτυρα ἕχειν οὐδέ παρακαλούντες αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἁμα αὐτάρκη βέσιν κειμένη παρέχει αὐτούς δικαστάς ὃν βλάπτουσι τινα μᾶλλον ἥ κατὰ ἐξουθηκας

1 For οὐδὲ of the MSS., Dobree's conjecture. Hude reads οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ.
place. And by one briefest concluding word, which embraces both the whole issue and all separate facts, you will be convinced that you should not abandon us: The Hellenes have only three fleets that are worthy of mention, yours, ours, and that of the Corinthians; if, now, the Corinthians shall seize us first and you thus let two of these fleets become united, you will have to fight on the sea against both Coreyraeans and Peloponnesians at once; but if you accept us, you will be able to contend against them with your navy augmented by our own."

Thus spoke the Coreyraeans, and after them the Corinthians as follows:

XXXVII. "Since these Coreyraeans have not confined themselves to the question of their admission into your alliance, but have gone further and urged that we are the wrong-doers and they are unfairly attacked, we too must of necessity touch upon both these points before we proceed to our general argument, in order that you may be more definitely forewarned of the nature of the demand we have to make, and may have good grounds for rejecting their petition.

"They say that 'a wise discretion' has hitherto kept them from accepting an alliance with anyone; but the fact is that they adopted this policy with a view to villainy and not from virtuous motives, and because they wished in their misdeeds not to have any ally as witness, or to be put to shame if they invited his presence. Moreover, the insular and independent position of this state causes them to be arbitrary judges of the injuries they do to others instead of being judges appointed by mutual agree-
γένεσθαι, διὰ τὸ ήκιστά ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλας ἐκπλή-
οντας μάλιστα τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνάγκη καταληκτας
4 δέχεσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο τὸ εὐπρεπές ἀσπούνδου ὅυχ
ἐνα μὴ ξυναδικώσιν ἐτέρους προβεβλημένως, ἀλλ’
ὅπως κατὰ μόνας ἀδικοὶ καὶ ὅπως ἐν ὑ μὲν ἂν
κρατῶσι βιάζωσιν, οὐ δ’ ἀν λάθωσι πλέον ἔχω-
σιν, ἢν δὲ ποὺ τι προλάβωσιν ἀναισχυντῶσιν
5 καίτοι εἰ ἦσαν ἀνδρεῖς, ὡστερ φασίν, ἀγαθοὶ, διὸ
ἀληθῶτεροι ἦσαν τοὺς πέλας, τόσο δὲ φανερω-
τέραν ἔζησιν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἁρετὴν διεδοὺσι καὶ δεχο-
μένοις τὰ δίκαια δεικνύοις.

XXXVIII. ἀλλ’ οὗτε πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους οὗτε
ἐς ἡμᾶς τοιοῦτε εἰσίν, ἀποκείαι δ’ ὅντες ἀφεστάι
τε διὰ πᾶντος καὶ νῦν πολεμοῦσι, λέγουτε ὅσ
2 οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κακῶς πᾶσχειν ἐκπεμφθεῖν, ἡμεῖς
δὲ οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ φαμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβρίζε-
σθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι
3 καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι. αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι
ἀποκεία τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ μᾶλιστα ὑπὸ ἀπολείουν
4 στεργόμεθα– καὶ δῆλον ὡτι, εἰ τοῖς πλέοσιν ἄρε-
σκοντες ἔσμεν, τοῖς δ’ ἂν μόνοις οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαρέ-
σκοιμεν, οὐδ’ ἐπιστρατεύομεν ἐκπρεπὼς μὴ καὶ
5 διαφερόντως τι ἀδικοῦμεν. καλὸν δ’ ἦν, εἰ καὶ
ἡμαρτάνομεν, τοῖς δὲ μὲν εἶξα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ὀργῇ,
ἡμῖν δὲ αἰσχρόν βιάσασθαι τὴν τούτων μετρι-
ment; owing to the fact that they resort very little to the ports of their neighbours, but to a very large extent receive into their ports others who are compelled to put in there. And meanwhile they have used as a cloak their specious policy of avoiding alliances, adopted not in order to avoid joining others in wrong-doing, but that they may do wrong all alone; that wherever they have power they may use violence, and wherever they can escape detection they may overreach someone; and if, perchance, they can steal a march on anyone, that they may brazen it out. And yet, if they were really honest men, as they pretend to be, the less liable they were to attack by their neighbours the more clearly they might have demonstrated their virtuous motives by offering and accepting proposals of arbitration.

XXXVIII. "But neither toward others nor toward us have they shown themselves honest men; on the contrary, although they are colonists of ours, they have constantly stood aloof from us, and now they are at war with us, claiming that they were not sent out to be ill treated. But neither did we colonize them to be insulted by them, but to be their leaders and to receive from them all due reverence. The rest of our colonies, at any rate, honour us, and by our colonists we are beloved more than is any other mother-city. And it is clear that, if we are acceptable to the majority, it cannot be on good grounds that we are unacceptable to these alone; nor are we making war upon them in a way so unusual without being also signally wronged. And even if we were at fault, the honourable course for them would have been to make allowance for our temper, in which case it would have been shameful
6 οίτηται: ὑβρεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐξουσία πλούτου πολλὰ ἐς ἡμᾶς ἄλλα τε ἡμαρτήκασι καὶ Ἐπίδαμνον ἤμετέραν οὕσαν κακουμένην μὲν οὐ προσεποιοῦντο, ἐλθόντων δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ ἐλόντες βία ἔχουσιν.

XXXIX. "Καὶ φασὶ δὴ δίκη πρότερον ἔδειξαι κρίνεσθαι, ἢν γε οὗ τὸν προύχουτα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἁσφαλοῦς προκαλούμενον λέγειν τι δοκεῖν δεῖ, ἄλλα τὸν ἢ ἴσον τὰ τε ἔργα ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς 2 λόγους πρὶν διαγωνίζεσθαι καθιστάντα. οὗτοι δὲ οὗ πρὶν πολιορκεῖν τὸ χωρίον, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἤγγισαντο ἡμᾶς οὐ περιόψεσθαι, τότε καὶ τὸ εὐπρεπές τῆς δίκης παρέσχοντο· καὶ δεύρο ἦκουσιν, οὐ τάκει μόνον αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτόντες, ἄλλα καὶ ἡμᾶς νῦν ἁξιώντες οὐ ξυμμαχεῖν, ἄλλα ξυνάδικεῖν καὶ 3 διαφόρους οὐν τας ἡμῖν δέχεσθαι σφαῖς· οὐς χρήν, ὅτε ἁσφαλέστατοι ἦσαν, τότε προσεῖναι, καὶ μη ἐν φήμες μὲν ἡδικήμεθα, οὗτοι δὲ κινδυνεύονσι, μηδ' ἐν φήμες τῆς τε δυνάμεως αὐτῶν τότε οὐ μεταλαβόντες τῆς ὀφελίας νῦν μεταδώσετε καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἀπὸ γενόμενοι τῆς ἀφ' ἡμῶν αἰτίας τὸ ἴσον ἔστε, πάλαι δὲ κοινόσαντας τὴν δύναμιν κοινά καὶ τά ἀποβαίνοντα ἐχειν."

XL. "Ὡς μὲν οὖν αὐτοὶ τε μετὰ προσηκότων ἐγκλημάτων ἔρχόμεθα καὶ οἴδε βίαιοι καὶ πλεο-

1 ἐγκλημάτων δὲ μόνων ἀμετόχους οὕτως τῶν μετὰ τὰς πράξεις τούτων μὴ κοινωνεῖν. "As, however, you have had no share in the accusations, you should not share in the consequences." This clause is omitted by all good MSS. except G, and by all recent editors except Bloomfield.
for us to outrage their moderation; but in the insolence and arrogance of wealth they have wronged us in many other ways, and particularly in the case of Epidamnus, our colony, which they made no claim to when it was in distress, but seized by force the moment we came to its relief, and continue to hold.

XXXIX. "They pretend, forsooth, that they were the first to agree to an arbitration of the issue; but surely it is not the proposals of the one who has the advantage, and occupies a safe position when he invites arbitration, that ought to have weight, but rather those of the one who has made his actions tally with his professions before appealing to arms. These men, however, bring forward their specious offer of a court of arbitration, not before laying siege to the place, but only after they had concluded that we would not permit it. And now, not satisfied with the blunders they have committed themselves at Epidamnus, they have come here demanding that you too at this juncture, shall be, not their allies, but their accomplices in crime, and that you shall receive them, now that they are at variance with us. But they ought to have come to you when they were in no peril at all, and not at a time when we are victims of their injustice and they are consequently in danger, nor when you, without having had the benefit of their power before, will now have to give them a share of your aid, and, though you had nothing to do with their blunders, will have to bear an equal part of the blame we shall bestow. For only if you from the first had shared their power ought you to share the consequences also now of their acts.

XLI. "Now it has been clearly shown that we have come with proper grounds of complaint against


1 i.e. “who will permit peace to be maintained by their new friends if they exercise ordinary discretion.” No new allies should be received who will render ordinary discretion
them and that they are violent and overreaching; but you have still to learn that you have no right to receive them into your alliance. For even though it is stipulated in the treaty that any unenrolled city may join whichever party it pleases, the provision is not intended for those who apply to one side for admission with a view to the injury of the other, but for any one who, without defrauding another state of his services, asks for protection, and any one who to those who received him will not—if they are prudent—bring war instead of peace. But this is precisely what will be your fate if you do not listen to us. For you will not merely become allies to them, but also enemies to us instead of being at truce with us. For it will be necessary for us, if you go with them, to include you when we proceed to take vengeance upon them. And yet the right course for you would be, preferably, to stand aloof from us both,—or else to go with us against them, remembering that you are under treaty with the Corinthians, but have never had with the Corecyraeans even an arrangement to refrain from hostilities for a time,—and not to establish the precedent of admitting into your alliance those who revolt from the other side. Why, when the Samians revolted from you, and the other Peloponnesians were divided in their votes on the question of aiding them, we on our part did not vote against you; on the contrary, we openly maintained that each one should discipline his own allies without interference. If you receive and assist evil-doers, you will surely find that

unavailing to prevent war, as the Corecyraeans are sure to do.

1 440 B.C. cf. ch. cxv.
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ρων οὖν ἐλάσσων ἦμιν πρόσεισι, καὶ τὸν νόμον ἐφ' ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐφ' ὑμῖν δήσετε.

XII. "Δικαιώματα μὲν οὖν τάδε πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐχομεν, ἵκανα κατὰ τοὺς Ἑλλήνων νόμους, παραίσεων δὲ καὶ ἄξιωσειν χαρίτως τοιάνδε, ἣν οὖν ἐχθροὶ οὕτως ὅστε βλάπτειν οὐδ' αὐθ' φίλοι ὡστ' ἐπιχρήσθαι, ἀντιδοθήναι ἦμιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι 2 φαμὲν χρῆναι. νεόν γὰρ μακρὸν σπανίσαντές ποτε πρὸς τὸν Ἀγινητῶν ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικὰ1 πόλεμον παρὰ Κορινθίων εἰκοσι ναῦς ἐλάβετε καὶ ἡ έυρεγεία αὐτῇ τε καὶ ἡ ἐς Σαμίων, τὸ δὲ ἡμῖν Πελοπονησίους αὐτοῖς μὴ βοηθῆσαι, παρέσχεν ὑμῖν Ἀγινητῶν μὲν ἐπικράτησιν, Σαμίων δὲ κόλασιν, καὶ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις ἐγένετο, οἷς μᾶλιστα ἄνθρωποι ἐπ' ἐχθροὺς τοὺς σφετέρους ἴστους τῶν ἀπάντων ἀπερίσπτοι εἰσὶ παρὰ 3 τὸ νικᾶν φίλον τε γὰρ ἤγονται τὸν ὑπουργὸντα, ἢν καὶ πρότερον ἐχθρὸς ἦ, πολέμιον τε τὸν ἀντιστάντα, ἢν καὶ τύχῃ φίλος ὁν, ἐπεῖ καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα χείρων τίθενται φιλονικίας ἔνεκα τῆς αὐτίκα.

XLIII. "'Ων ἐνθυμηθέντες καὶ νεώτερος τις παρὰ προσβυντέρου αὐτὰ μαθὼν ἄξιοντω τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἡμῖν ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ νομίσῃ δίκαια μὲν τάδε λέγεσθαι, ξύμφορα δὲ, εἰ πολεμήσει, 2 ἄλλα εἰσναι. τὸ τε γὰρ ξυμφέρον ἐν ὑ μὲν τὶς

1 ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικά Krüger deletes, followed by Hude.
full as many of your allies will come over to us, and
the precedent you establish will be against yourselves
rather than against us.

XLI. "These, then, are the considerations of right
which we urge upon you—and they are adequate ac-
cording to the institutions of the Hellenes; but we
have also to remind you of a favour and to urge a
claim based upon it; and since we are not your
enemies so as to want to injure you, nor yet your
friends so that we could make use of you, we think
this favour should be repaid us at the present time.
It is this: when once, before the Persian war, you
were deficient in battle-ships for the war you were
waging with the Aeginetans, you borrowed twenty
from the Corinthians. And this service and that we
rendered in connection with the Samians—our pre-
venting the Peloponnesians from aiding them—
enabled you to prevail over the Aeginetans and to
chastise the Samians. Both incidents happened, too,
at a critical time, when men, engaged in assailing
their enemies, are most indifferent to every con-
sideration except victory, regarding any one who
assists them as a friend, even if he was an enemy be-
fore, and any one who stands in their way as an
enemy, even if he happen to be a friend; for they
even mismanage their own interests in the eager
rivalry of the moment.

XLII. "Bearing these favours in mind—let every
young man here be told of them by one who is
older—do you consider it your duty to requite us
with the like. And do not think that this course
is indeed equitable to urge in a speech, but that
another course is advantageous if you come to war.
For advantage is most likely to result when one
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ἐλάχιστα ἀμαρτάνη μάλιστα ἔπεται, καὶ τὸ μέλλων τοῦ πολέμου ὃ φοβοῦντες ὡμᾶς Κερκυραίοι κελεύουσιν ἀδικεῖν ἐν ἀφανεί ἔτι κεῖται, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπαρθέντας αὐτῷ φανερὰν ἔχθραν ἕδη καὶ οὐ μέλλουσαν πρὸς Κορίνθιοις κτήσασθαι, τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχόντος πρῶτον διὰ Μεγαρέας ὑπο-
3 ψία σῶφρων ὑφελεῖν μᾶλλον (ἢ γὰρ τελευταία χάρις καρὸν ἔχονσα, κἂν ἐλάσσων ἢ, δύναται 4 μεῖζον ἐγκλῆμα λύσαι), μηδ’ ὦτι ναυτικὸν ἔμμαχίαν μεγάλην διδόσι, τούτῳ ἐφέλκεσθαι τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἄδικειν τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐχυρωτέρα δύναμις ἢ τῷ αὐτίκα φανερῷ ἐπαρθέντας διὰ κινδύνων τὸ πλέον ἔχειν.

XLIII. Ἡμεῖς δὲ περιπεπτώκότες οίς ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι αὐτόλ προείπομεν, τοὺς σφέτερον τοὺς κολάζειν, νῦν παρ’ ὑμῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀξιοῦμεν κομίζοντας, καὶ μὴ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψήφῳ ὑφελήθεται τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἡμᾶς βλάψαι.

2 τὸ δὲ ἐσών ἀνταπόδοτο, γρόντες τούτων ἑκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καρὸν, ἐν ὁ δ’ τε ὑποργὸν φίλος μά-
3 λειτα καὶ ὁ ἀντιστὰς ἐχθρὸς. καὶ Κερκυραίοις 4 γε τούσδε μητέ εὐμάχους δέχεσθε βία ἡμῶν μητε ἄμωντε αὐτοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν. καὶ τάδε παι-
3 4 ούντες τὰ προσήκοντά τε δράσετε καὶ τὰ ἄριστα βουλεύσεσθε ὑμῶν αὐτοῖς.”

XLIV. Τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον. Ἄθηναιοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἁμφοτέρων, γενομένης
errs least, and the contingency of the war, with which the Corecyraeans would frighten you into wrong-doing, is still uncertain; and it is not worth while for you to be so carried away by it as to acquire an enmity with the Corinthians that will be from that moment on a manifest fact and no longer a contingency. It would be, rather, the prudent course to remove something of the suspicion which has heretofore existed on account of the Megarians; for the favour which comes last, if conferred at the right moment, even though a small one, can cancel a greater offence. Nor ought you to be tempted by their offer of a great naval alliance; for to refrain from wronging equals is a surer strength than to be carried away by present appearances and seek an advantage by incurring dangers.

XLIII. "But we, since events have brought us under the rule which we ourselves proclaimed at Sparta, that each should discipline his own allies, now claim from you in return the same treatment—that you who were then aided by our vote should not injure us by yours. Pay back like with like, determining that this is the supreme moment when assistance is the truest friendship—opposition the worst hostility. We beg you neither to accept the Corecyraeans as your allies in despite of us, nor to aid them in their wrong-doing. And if you do this, you will not only be taking the fitting course, but will also be consulting your own best interests."

XLIV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the Athenians, having heard both sides, held a second

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1 Referring apparently to the exclusion of the Megarians from all harbours within the Athenian dominion and from the market at Athens, ch. lxvii. 4.
καὶ δὲς ἐκκλησίας, τῇ μὲν προτέρα σὺν ἦσσον τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπεδέχατο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέχεισαν Κερκυραίοις ἐυμμαχίαν μὲν μὴ ποιήσασθαι ὅστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἔχθρους καὶ φίλους νομίζειν (εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ Κόρινθον ἐκέλευσαν σφίσιν αἱ Κερκυραίοι ἐμπλεῖν, ἐλύσων ἀν αὐτοῖς αἱ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους σπονδαί), ἐπιμαχίαν δὲ ἐποιήσαντο τῇ ἄλλῃ ὑπερεῖν, εἰσὶν τοις ἐπὶ Κερκυραν ἵνα ἞θηνας ἦ τοὺς τούτων ἐυμμάχους.

2 ἔδοκεν γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμος καὶ ὤς ἐσεσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὴν Κερκυραν ἐβούλοντο μὴ προέσθαι τοῖς Κορινθίοις ναυτικοῖς ἐχουσιν τοσοῦτον, ἐναγκαζοῦν δὲ ὅτι μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἄλλοισι, ἵνα ἀσθενεστέροις υσίαν, ἡν τε δὲ, Κορινθίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ναυτικοῖς ἐχουσιν ἐς πόλεμον καθιστῶνται. ἀμα δὲ τῆς τε Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς ἡ νῆσος ἐν παράπλω κεῖσθαι.

XLV. Τοιαῦτα μὲν γράψας οἱ Ἁθηναῖοι τοὺς Κερκυραίους προσεδέχατο, καὶ τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπελθόντων οὐ πολὺ υστερον δέκα ναῦς αὐτοῖς ἐπέστειλαν βοηθούς· ἐστρατήγηε δὲ αὐτῶν Λακεδαιμόνιος τε ὁ Κλωνός καὶ Διότιμος ὁ Ἀτρομ.

3 βιχοῦ καὶ Πρωτέας ὁ Ἐπικλέους. προείπον δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ ναυμαχεῖν Κορινθίοις, ἵνα μὴ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλέωσι καὶ μέλλωσιν ἀποβαίνειν ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίσων ὅστῳ δὲ κωλύειν κατὰ δύναμιν. προείπον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ μὴ λύειν ἕνεκα τὰς σπονδαίς. 1 Added by Bekker.
session of the Ecclesia; and although at the earlier
one they were rather inclined to agree with the words
of the Corinthians, on the second day they changed
their minds in favour of the Coreyaeeans, and decided,
not, indeed, to make an offensive and defensive
alliance with them, for in that case, if the Coreyaeeans
then asked them to join in an expedition against
Corinth, they would have to break, on their own re-
sponsibility, the treaty with the Lacedaemonians—
but they made a defensive alliance, namely to aid
one another in case anyone should attack Coreya or
Athens or the allies of either. For they believed that
in any event the war with the Peloponnesians would
have to be faced, and they did not wish to give up
Coreya, which had so large a fleet, to the Corinthians,
but hoped to wear them out upon one another as
much as possible, in order that the Corinthians as
well as other naval powers 1 might be found weaker
in case they had to go to war with them. Besides,
the island seemed to them admirably situated for a
coasting voyage to Italy and Sicily. 2

XLV. With these motives the Athenians received
the Coreyaeeans into alliance and sent to their
aid, soon after the departure of the Corinthians, ten
ships commanded by Lacedaemonius son of Cimon,
Diotimus son of Strombichus, and Proteas son of
Epicles. Orders were given to these not to engage
with the Corinthians, unless they should sail against
Coreya and attempt to land there, or to some place
belonging to the Coreyaeeans; but in that case they
were to thwart them if possible. The object of these
orders was to avoid breaking the treaty.

1 Referring especially to those mentioned ch. xxvii. 2.
2 cf. ch. xxxvi. 2.
XLVI. Αἱ μὲν δὴ νῆς ἄφικνονται ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν. οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι, ἐπείδη αὐτοῖς παρε- 
σκευαστο, ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ναυσὶ πεντή- 
kouta kai ekaton. ἦσαν δὲ Ἡλείων μὲν δέκα, 
Μεγαρέων δὲ δώδεκα καὶ Δευκάδιων δέκα, Ἀμ- 
parkíotón δὲ ἐπτά καὶ εἰκοσι καὶ Ἀνακτορίων 
2 μία, αὐτῶν δὲ Κορίνθιων ἑνενήκοντα: στρατηγοὶ 
dé toúton ἦσαν μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἐκάστων, 
Κορίνθιων δὲ Ξενοκλείδης ὁ Ἐυθυκλέους πέμπτος 
3 αὐτῶς. ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσέμειζαν τῇ κατὰ Κέρκυραν 
ἡπείροι ἀπὸ Δευκάδος πλέοντες, ὀρμύζονται ἐς 
4 Χειμέριον τῆς Θεσσαλίας γῆς. ἐστὶ δὲ λιμήν, 
kai pòlis ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν κεῖται ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐν 
tῇ Ἑλλαίατίδε τῆς Θεσσαλίας Ἑφύρη. ἔξερα δὲ 
pár αὐτήν Ἀχερονία λίμνη ἐς θαλάσσαν διὰ 
dὲ τῆς Θεσσαλίας Ἀχέρων ποταμὸς ῥέων 
ἔσβαλλε ἐς αὐτὴν, ἀφ' ὦ καὶ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν 
χαὶ, ρεῖ δὲ καὶ Θάμας ποταμὸς ὀρίζων τῆν 
Θεσσαλία καὶ Κεστρίνην, ὥν ἐντὸς ἡ ἀκρα 
5 ἀνέχει τὸ Χειμέριον. οἱ μὲν δὴν Κορίνθιοι τῆς 
ἡπείρου ἐνταῦθα ὀρμύζονται τε καὶ στρατόπεδον 
ἐποιήσαντο.

XLVII. Οἱ δὲ Κέρκυραιοι ὡς ἐνθοῦτο αὐτῶν 
προσπλέοντας, πληρώσαντες δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν 
nása, ὥν ἤρχε Μικιάδης καὶ Αἰσιμίδης καὶ Εὐρύ- 
βατος, ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἐν μᾶλ τῶν νῆσων αἱ 
kαλοῦνται Σύβωτα, καὶ αἱ Ἀττικαὶ δέκα παρῆσαν. 
2 ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ Δευκάμην αὐτῶν τῷ ἀκρωτηρίῳ ὁ πεζὸς 
Ἀρι ΧακνΗδίων χίλιοι ὀπλίται βεβοθηκότες. 
3 ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς Κορίνθιοι ἐν τῇ ἱπείρῳ πολλοὶ 
tῶν βασιλάρων παραβεβοθηκότες: οἱ γὰρ ταύτῃ 
ἡπείρωται αἰεὶ ποτε φίλοι αὐτοῖς εἰσιν.
XLVI. These ships arrived at Corecyra, and the Corinthians, when their preparations had been made, sailed against Corecyra with one hundred and fifty ships. Of these ten belonged to the Eleans, twelve to the Megarians, ten to the Leucadians, seventeen to the Ambraciots, one to the Anaetorians, and ninety to the Corinthians themselves. The several cities had each its own general, but Xenocleides son of Euthycles and four others commanded the Corinthians. They sailed from Leucas, and when they drew near the mainland over against Corecyra, anchored at Cheimerium in the territory of Thesprotia. It is a harbour, and above it lies a city away from the sea in the Eleatic district of Thesprotia, Ephyra by name. Near it is the outlet into the sea of the Acherusian lake; and the river Acheron runs through Thesprotia and empties into the lake, to which it gives its name. There is also the river Thyamis, which separates Thesprotia and Cestrine, and between these rivers rises the promontory of Cheimerium. It was at this point of the mainland then that the Corinthians cast anchor and made a camp.

XLVII. The Corecyraeans, when they became aware of their approach, manned a hundred and ten ships under the command of Miciades, Aesimides, and Eurybatis, and encamped on one of the islands which are called Sybota, the ten Attic ships being also present. Their land-forces were at the promontory of Leucimne, and also a thousand hoplites of the Zacynthians who had come to aid the Corecyraeans. The Corinthians, also, had the aid of many barbarians who had assembled on the mainland adjacent; for the dwellers on the mainland in that region have always been friendly to them.
XLVIII. Ἐπειδή δὲ παρεσκεύαστο τοῖς Κορινθίοις, λαβόντες τριῶν ἡμερῶν σιτία ἀνήγοντο
2 ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίᾳ ἀπὸ τοῦ Χειμερίου νυκτὸς, καὶ ἀμα ἔφα πλέοντες καθορόστε τὰς τῶν Κερκυραῖων
3 μαῖς μετεώροις τε καὶ ἐπὶ σφῶν πλεούσας. ὡς δὲ καταίδου ἀλλήλους, ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο, ἐπὶ
μὲν τὸ δεξίων κέρας Κερκυραίων αἱ Ἀττικαὶ
νῆσες, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο αὐτοῖ ἐπεῖχου τρία τέλη ποιήσαντες τῶν νεῶν, ὦν ἠρχε τριῶν στρατηγῶν ἐκάστου εἰς. οὕτω μὲν Κερκυραῖοι ἐτάξαντο.
4 Κορινθίοις δὲ τὸ μὲν δεξίου κέρας αἱ Μεγαρίδες
νῆσες εἰχον καὶ αἱ Ἀμπρακιώτιδες, κατὰ δὲ τὸ
μέσον οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ὡς ἐκαστοι, εὐώνυμον
δὲ κέρας αὐτοῖ ὦν Κορινθίοι ταῖς ἀριστα τῶν νεῶν
πλεούσαις κατὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸ δεξίουν
τῶν Κερκυραίων εἰχον.

XLIX. Ἐμμελεύσαντες δὲ, ἐπειδὴ τὰ σημεῖα
ékateroís ἡρθη, ἐναυμάχουν, πολλοὺς μὲν ὀπλίτας
ἐχοντες ἀμφότεροι ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων, πολ
λοὺς δὲ τοξότας τε καὶ ἀκοπτιστάς, τὸν παλαιῷ
2 τρόπῳ ἀπειρότερον ἐτι παρεσκευασμένοιν. ἦν τε
ἡ ναυμαχία καρτερά, τῇ μὲν τέχνῃ οὐχ ὀμοίως,
3 πεζομαχία δὲ τὸ πλέον προσφηρής οὐσα. ἐπειδὴ
γὰρ προσβάλοις ἀλλήλοις, οὐ ῥηόντω ἀπελύνοντο
ὑπὸ τε τοῦ πλήθους καὶ ὄχλου τῶν νεῶν καὶ μᾶλ
λον τε πιστεύουντες τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος
ἀπλίτας ἐς τὴν νίκην, οἱ καταστάντες ἐμάχοντο
μισχαζούσων τῶν νεῶν διέκπλοι δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν,
ἀλλὰ θυμῷ καὶ ρώμῃ τὸ πλέον ἐναυμάχουν ἦ
XLVIII. When their preparations had been made, the Corinthians, taking provisions for three days, put off by night from Cheimerium with the intention of giving battle, and at daybreak as they sailed along they descried the ships of the Corecraeans out at sea and sailing to meet them. And as soon as they saw one another, they drew up in opposing battle lines, the Attic ships on the right wing of the Corecraeans, who themselves held the rest of the line forming three divisions, each under the command of one of the three generals. So the Corecraeans arrayed themselves; but the right wing of the Corinthian fleet was held by the Megarian ships and the Ambracian, in the centre were the other allies with their several contingents, while the left was held by the Corinthians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed to the Athenians and the right wing of the Corecraeans.

XLIX. When the standards were raised on either side they joined battle and fought, both having many hoplites on the decks as well as many archers and javelin-men, for they were still equipped rather rudely in the ancient fashion. And so the sea-fight was hotly contested, not so much by reason of the skill displayed as because it was more like a battle on land. For when they dashed against one another they could not easily get clear, partly by reason of the number and throng of the ships, still more because they trusted for victory to the hoplites on the decks, who stood and fought while the ships remained motionless; and there was no cutting of the line, but they fought with fury and brute strength rather than

1 διασπάνου was a breaking of the line so as to ram the enemy's ship in the flank or astern.
4 ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν πολὺς θόρυβος καὶ παραχώδης ἢν ἡ ναυμαχία· ἐν ἔτι Ἀττικαὶ νῆς παραγχυροῦμενα τοῖς Κερκυραίοις, εἰ πὴ πιέζωντο, φῶβον μὲν παρεῖχον τοῖς ἑαυτῖσιν, μάχης δὲ οὐκ ἦρξαν δεδίωτες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν
5 προρρῆσιν τῶν Ἁθηναίων. μάλιστα δὲ τὸ δεξίου κέρας τῶν Κορινθίων ἐπόνει. οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραίοι εἰκοσὶ τραυτῶν αὐτῶν τρεφόμενοι καὶ καταδίω-
ξαντες σπορᾶδας ἐς τὴν ἡπειρόν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ στρατοπέδου πλεύσαντες αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπεκβάντες ἑπετρῆσαν τε τὰς σκηνὰς ἐρήμους καὶ τὰ χρήματα
6 διήρπασαν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οἱ Κορινθίοι καὶ οἱ ἡμιμαχοὶ ἠσσῶντο τε καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐπε-
κράτουν ὡδὲ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν οἱ Κορινθίοι, ἐπὶ τῷ εὐνύμῳ, πολὺ ἐνίκων, τοῖς Κερκυραίοις τῶν
ἐκοσὶ νεῶν ἀπὸ ἐλάσσονος πλήθους ἐκ τῆς διώ-
7 ξεως οὖ παρουσών. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑράντες τοὺς
Κερκυραίους πιεζόμενους μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπροφα-
σιστῶς ἐπεκύρουν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπεχόμενοι
δι' ἕμβαλλειν τινὶ ἐπείδη δὲ ἡ τροπὴ ἐγένετο λαμπρὸς καὶ ἐνέκειν τοιο σκοῖνοι, τότε
dι' ἔργου πᾶς εἰχετο ἦδη καὶ διεκέκριτο οὐδὲν
ἐτί, ἀλλὰ ἔνεπεσεν ἐσ τοῦτο ἀνάγκης ὡστε
ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἀλλήλους τοὺς Κορινθίους καὶ 'Ἀθη-

ναίους.

1. Τῆς δὲ τροπῆς γενομένης οἱ Κορινθίοι τὰ
σκάφη μὲν οὖν έλλικον ἀναδούμενοι τῶν νεῶν ἂς
καταδύσειαν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐτράποντο
φονεῖσιν διεκπλέουστες μᾶλλον ἢ νιώθειν, τοῖς τε
αὐτῶν φίλοις, οὖν ἱσαθημένοι ὦτί ἕσσηντο οἱ ἐπὶ
2 τῷ δεξίῳ κέρα, ἀγρούντες ἑκτεινοῦν. πολλῶν γὰρ
with skill. Accordingly there was everywhere much tumult and confusion in the sea-fight. The Attic ships, if they saw the Coreyaeeans pressed at any point, came up and kept the enemy in awe; but their generals would not begin fighting, fearing to disobey the instructions of the Athenians. The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most; for the Coreyaeeans with twenty ships routed them and pursued them in disorder to the mainland, and then, sailing right up to their camp and disembarking, burned the deserted tents and plundered their property. In that quarter, then, the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and the Coreyaeeans prevailed; but on the left wing where the Corinthians themselves were, they were decidedly superior, for the Coreyaeeans, whose numbers were fewer to begin with, had the twenty ships away in the pursuit. But the moment the Athenians saw that the Coreyaeeans were being hard pressed, they began to help them more unreservedly, and though they at first refrained from actually attacking an enemy ship, yet when it was conspicuously clear that they were being put to flight and the Corinthians were close in pursuit, then at length every man put his hand to work, and fine distinctions were no longer made; matters had come to such a pass that Corinthians and Athenians of necessity had to attack one another.

L. After the rout of the Coreyaeeans the Corinthians did not take in tow and haul off the hulls of the ships which had been disabled, but turned their attention to the men, cruising up and down and killing them in preference to taking them alive; and they unwittingly slew their own friends, not being aware that their right wing had been worsted. For
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νεῶν οὖσῶν ἀμφοτέρων καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπεχειροῦσῶν, ἐπειδὴ ξυνέμειξαν ἄλληλοις, οὐ γὰρ οὗ ἀναγνώσω ἐποιοῦντο ὁποῖοι ἐκράτησαν ἢ ἐκρατοῦντο: ναυμαχία γὰρ αὕτη "Ελλησὶ πρὸς "Ελλήνας νεῶν πλήθη μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὸ

3 αὕτης γεγένηται. ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατεδώξαν τοὺς Κερκυραίους οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐς τὴν γῆν, πρὸς τὰ ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς σφετέρους ἐτράποντο, καὶ τῶν πλείστων ἐκράτησαν ὡστε προσκομίσαι πρὸς τὰ Σύβοτα, οὐ αὐτοῖς ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατός τῶν βαρβάρων προσέβεβησθῆκεν: ἔστι δὲ τὰ Σύβοτα τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος λιμήν ἐρήμος. τούτῳ δὲ ποιήσαντες αὕτες ἀθροισθέντες

4 ἐπέπλευον τοὺς Κερκυραίους. οἱ δὲ ταῖς πλωίμοις καὶ οὐσαὶ ἤσαν λοιπά μετὰ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντεπέπλευον, δεῖσαντες μὴ ἐς τὴν γῆν

5 σφῶν πειρῶσιν ἀποβαίνειν. ἡδὴ δὲ ἦν ὡσ σὲ καὶ ἐπεταίανιστο αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐς ἐπίπλουν, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔξαπίνης προύμας ἐκρούοντο, κατιδόντες εἰκοσὶ νὰν Ἀθηναίων προσπλεύοσας, ἂς ὑστερον τῶν δέκα βοηθοὺς ἔξεπεσαν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, δεῖσαντες, ὅπερ ἐγένετο, μὴ νικηθῶσιν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι καὶ αἱ σφέτεραι δέκα νῆς ὀλίγαι ἀμύνειν ὡσιν. Λ. ταύτας οὗν προϊδόντες οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ ὑποτοπῆσαντες ἂπτ' Ἀθηνῶν εἶναι, οὐχ ὡσας

2 ἐσώρου ἀλλὰ πλείους, ὑπανεγώρουν. τοῖς δὲ Κερκυραίοις (ἐπέπλευον γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς)

1 Thucydides makes allowance for Salamis, for example, where Greeks had fought against Persians.
since the ships or the two fleets were many and
covered a great stretch of sea, it was not easy, when
they joined in combat, for the Corinthians to
determine just who were conquering and who were
being conquered; for this sea-fight was in number of
ships engaged greater than any that Hellenes had
ever before fought against Hellenes.¹ But as soon
as the Corinthians had chased the Corecyraeans to the
shore, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead,²
and they were able to recover most of them and to
fetch them to Sybota, an unused harbour of Thes-
protia, whither the land forces of the barbarians had
come to their aid. When they had accomplished
this, they got their forces together and sailed once
more against the Corecyraeans. And they, with such
of their vessels as were seaworthy and all the rest that
had not been engaged, together with the Attic ships,
on their part also sailed to meet them, fearing that
they would attempt to disembark on their territory.
It was now late and the pæan had been sounded for
the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly began to
back water; for they sighted twenty Attic ships
approaching, which the Athenians had sent out after
the ten as a reinforcement, fearing just what
happened, namely that the Corecyraeans would be de-
feated and their own ten ships would be too few to
help them. LI. So when the Corinthians sighted
these ships before the Corecyraeans did, suspecting that
they were from Athens and that there were more of
them than they saw, they began to withdraw. For the
Corecyraeans, however, the Athenian ships were sailing
up more out of view and could not be seen by them,

¹ The bodies of the dead which were on the disabled
ships.

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οὔχ ἔωρωντο, καὶ ἐθαύμαζον τοὺς Κορίνθιοὺς πρῶμαν κραυματίζοντας, πρὶν τινές ἱδόντες εἰποὺ ὅτι νῆς ἐκεῖναι ἐπιπλέοντι. τότε δὴ καὶ αὖτοι ἀνεχόμενοι (ξυνεσκόταξε γὰρ ἦδη), καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι
3 ἀποτραπόμενοι τὴν διάλυσιν ἐποίησαντο. οὔτω μὲν ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἐγένετο ἀλλήλων, καὶ η ἕναμαχία
4 ἐτελεύτα ἐς νύκτα. τοὺς δὲ Κερκυραίους στρατο-
πεδευμένους ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ αἰ ἐκοσὶ νῆς αἰ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὐταί, ὅν ἦρχε Γλαύκων τε ὁ Λεώγρων καὶ Ἀνδρόκλης ὁ Λεωνόρρων, διὰ τῶν
νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκυμισθείσα κατέπλευον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον οὗ πολλὸ ὑστερον ἡ ὀφθησαν.
5 οἱ δὲ Κερκυραίοι (ἢ γὰρ νῦς) ἐφοβηθησαν μὴ
πολέμαι ὅσιυ, ἐπείτα δὲ ἐγνωσαν καὶ ὁρμήσαντο.

I.III. Ἡ δὲ ὑστεραία ἀναγαγόμεναι αἰ τε Ἀττι-
καὶ τριάκοντα νῆς καὶ τῶν Κερκυραίων ὅσις
πλοίοι μοι ἤσαν ἐπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς Συβό-
τοις λιμένα, ἐν οἷς οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὕσιον. βούλο-
2 μενοι εἰδέναι εἰ ναυμαχήσουσιν. οἱ δὲ τὰς µὲν
ναύς ἄραντες ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ παρατάξαμενοι
μετεώρους ἴσηχαζόν, ναυμαχίας οὐ διανοοῦμενοι
ἀρχεῖν ἐκόπτες, ὅρωντες προσγεγενημένας τε ναυὸς
ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἀκραίφνεις καὶ σφίζει πολλὰ τὰ
ἀπορὰ ἄυμβαθηκότα, αἰχμαλώτων τε περὶ φυλα-
κῆς, οὐς ἐν ταῖς ναυαῖς ἤχον, καὶ ἐπισκευὴν οὐκ
3 οὕσαν τῶν νεῶν ἐν χωρίον ἔρημων τοῦ δὲ οἰκαδε
πλοῦ μᾶλλον διεσκόπου ὅπῃ κομισθήσονται, δε-
διότει µὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες λελύσθαι τὰς
σπονδαίς, διότι ἐς χεῖρας ἥλθον, οὐκ ἔωςι σφᾶς
ἀποπλείν.

I.III. Ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς ἄνδρας ἐς κελήττον
and so they wondered that the Corinthians were backing water, until some of them caught sight of the ships and said, "Yonder are ships sailing up." Then they too retreated— for it was already getting dark; whereupon the Corinthians put their ships about and broke off the action. Thus they separated, the sea-fight ending at nightfall. And while the Corecyraeans were encamping at Leucimne, the twenty ships from Athens, under the command of Glaucus son of Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras, having made their way through the corpses and the wrecks, sailed down to the camp not long after they were sighted. And the Corecyraeans—for it was night—were afraid they were enemies; but afterwards they recognized them and the ships came to anchor.

LIII. On the next day the thirty Attic ships and as many of the Corecyraean as were seaworthy put to sea and advanced against the harbour at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, wishing to see whether they would fight. But the Corinthians, although they put out from shore and drew up in line in the open sea, kept quiet: for they had no thought of beginning a fight if they could avoid it, as they saw that fresh ships had arrived from Athens and that they themselves were involved in many perplexities, both as regards guarding the captives whom they had in their ships and the impossibility of refitting their ships in a desert place. What they were more concerned about was the voyage home, how they should get back, for they were afraid that the Athenians would consider that the treaty had been broken, since they had come to blows, and would not let them sail away.

LIII. Accordingly they determined to put some
ἐμβιβάσαντας ἄνευ κηρυκείου προσπέμψαι τοῖς Ἑλληναῖοι καὶ πείραν ποιήσασθαι. πέμψαντες τε ἔλεγον τοιάδε: "Δωδεκα, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἐλληναι, πόλεμον ἀρχούτες καὶ σπονδάς λύουσί· ἦμιν γὰρ πολεμίους τοὺς ἡμετέρους τιμωροῦμένοις ἐμποδοῦν ἵστασθε ὅπλα ἀνταίρομενοι, εἰ δὲ ἦμιν γνώμη ἐστὶ κολύειν τε ἦμᾶς ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἡ ἄλλος εἰ πη βουλόμεθα πλεῖν καὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς λυστε, ἦμᾶς τούσδε πρῶτοις λαβόντες χρήσασθε ὡς πολεμίως." οἱ μὲν δὴ τοιαύτα εἰποῦν τῶν δὲ Κέρκυραιών τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον ὅσον ἐπήκοουσεν ἀνέβοσεν εὐθὺς λαβεῖν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι, οἱ δὲ Ἐλληναι τοιάδε ἀπεκρίναντο: "Οὕτε ἄρχομεν πόλεμον, ὁ ἄνδρες Πελοποννησίων, οὕτε τὰς σπονδὰς λύουμεν, Κέρκυραιοις δὲ τούσδε ξυμμάχοις οὐκ ἔχετε βοήθει τὴν ἡλθομεν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοσε ποτε βούλεσθε πλεῖν, οὐ κολύομεν εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλευσεῖσθε ἡ ἐς τῶν ἑκείνων τι χώριων, οὐ περιοψόμεθα κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν."

LIV. Τοιαύτα τῶν Ἐλληνων ἀπεκρίναμένων οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι τῶν τέ πλοῦν τῶν ἐπί οἴκου παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ τροπαίον ἔστησαν ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ Συβότοις: οἱ δὲ Κέρκυραιοι τά τε ναώματα καὶ νεκροὺς ἀνέδυον τά κατὰ σφαῖς, ἐξενεχθέντων ὑπὸ τε τοῦ βοῦ καὶ ἄνεμου, ὡς γενόμενος τῆς νυκτὸς διεσκέδασεν αὐτὰ πανταχώς, καὶ τροπαίον ἀντέστησαν ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Συβότοις ὡς νεικηκότες. γνώμῃ δὲ τοιαύτη ἐκάτεροι τῇ νίκῃ προσεποίησαντο: Κορίνθιοι μὲν κρατήσαντες τῇ

1 To bear a herald’s wand would have been a recognition of a state of war, whereas the Corinthians were anxious not to be regarded as enemies by the Athenians.
men, without a herald’s wand,¹ into a boat and send them to the Athenians, to test their intentions. And these men bore the following message: “You do wrong, men of Athens, to begin war and break a treaty; for by taking up arms against us you interfere with us when we are but punishing our enemies. But if it is your intention to hinder us from sailing against Corecyra or anywhere else we may wish, and you thus break the treaty, first take us who are here and treat us as enemies.” Thus they spoke; and all the host of the Corecyraeans that was within hearing shouted: “Take them and kill them!” But the Athenians made answer as follows: “We are not beginning war, men of the Peloponnesus, nor are we breaking the treaty, but we have come to aid the Corecyraeans here, who are our allies. If, then, you wish to sail anywhere else, we do not hinder you; but if you ever sail against Corecyra or any place of theirs, we shall not permit it, if we are able to prevent it.”

LIV. When the Athenians had given this answer, the Corinthians began preparations for the voyage homeward and set up a trophy at Sybota on the mainland; and the Corecyraeans took up the wrecks and dead bodies² that had been carried in their direction by the current and by the wind, which had arisen in the night and scattered them in every direction, and set up, as being the victors, a rival trophy at Sybota on the island. Each side claimed the victory on the following grounds: The Corinthians set up a trophy because they had prevailed in

¹ Taking up the dead bodies without asking permission of the enemy indicated that the field was maintained, and was therefore a claim of victory.
ναυμαχία μέχρι νυκτός, ὡστε καὶ ναυάγια πλείστα καὶ νεκροὺς προσκομίσασθαι, καὶ ἀνδρας ἔχοντες αἰχμαλώτους οὐκ ἐλάσσονοι χείλων ναῦς τε καταδύσαντες περὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἔστησαν τροπαίων. Κερκυραίοι δὲ τριάκοντα ναῦς μάλιστα διαφθείραντες, καὶ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοι ἦλθον, ἀνελόμενοι τὰ κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ναυάγια καὶ νεκροὺς, καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς τῇ τε προτεραίᾳ πρόμναι κρουόμενοι ὑπεχώρησαν οἱ Κορινθίοι ἰδόντες τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναῦς, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἦλθον οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, οὐκ ἀντεπέπλεον ἐκ τῶν Συβότων, διὰ ταῦτα τροπαίον ἔστησαν. οὕτω μὲν ἐκάτεροι νικάν ἥξιον.

LV. Οἱ δὲ Κορινθίοι ἀποπλέοντες ἐπὶ οἴκου Ἀνακτόριου, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, εἶλον ἀπάτη (ὅν δὲ κοινὸν Κερκυραίων καὶ ἑκείων), καὶ καταστήσαντες ἐν αὐτῷ Κορινθίους οἰκίτορας ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπὶ οἴκου καὶ τῶν Κερκυραίων ὀκτακοσίων μὲν οἱ ἦσαν δοῦλοι ἀπέδοντο, πεντήκοντα δὲ καὶ διακοσίους δήσαντες ἐφύλασσον καὶ ἐν θεραπείᾳ εἶχον πολλῆς, ὅπως αὐτοῖς τὴν Κέρκυραν ἀναχωρήσαντες προσποιήσειαν ἐτύγχανον δὲ καὶ δυνάμει αὐτῶν οἱ πλείους πρῶτοι ὄντες τῆς 2 πόλεως. ἦ μὲν οὖν Κέρκυρα οὕτω περιγίγνεται τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν Κορινθίων, καὶ αἱ νῆσες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀνεχώρησαν ἐξ αὐτῆς. αὐτία δὲ αὐτὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο τοῦ πολέμου τῶν Κορινθίων ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὅτι σφίσιν ἐν σπουδαῖς μετὰ Κερκυραίων ἐναμαχοῦν.

LVI. Μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ εὐθὺς καὶ τάδε ἐξενεβη

1 ἔστησαν τροπαίων bracketed by Hude, following Krüger.
the sea-fight up to nightfall, and had thus been able to carry off a greater number of wrecks and dead bodies, and because they held as prisoners not less than a thousand men and had disabled about seventy ships; and the Corecyraeans, because they had destroyed about thirty ships, and, after the Athenians came, had taken up the wrecks that came their way and the dead bodies, whereas the Corinthians on the day before had backed water and retreated at sight of the Attic ships, and after the Athenians came would not sail out from Sybota and give battle—for these reasons set up a trophy. So each side claimed the victory.

L.V. The Corinthians, as they sailed homeward, took by stratagem Anactorium, which is at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, a place held by the Corecyraeans and themselves in common, and establishing there some Corinthian colonists returned home. Of their Corecyraean prisoners they sold eight hundred who were slaves, but two hundred and fifty they kept in custody and treated them with much consideration, their motive being that when they returned to Corecyra they might win it over to their side; and it so happened that most of these were among the most influential men of the city. In this way, then, Corecyra had the advantage in the war with the Corinthians, and the ships of the Athenians withdrew from it. And this was the first ground which the Corinthians had for the war against the Athenians, because they had fought with the Corecyraeans against them in time of truce.

L.VI. Immediately after this the following events

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1 cf. III. lxx. 1, where the carrying out of this plan of the Corinthians leads to the bloody feud at Corecyra.
γενέσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίους

2 διάφορα ἐς τὸ πολέμειν. τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων πρασσόντων ὅπως τιμωρησοῦνται αὐτοὺς, ὑποτιθάσαντες τὴν ἔχθραν αὐτῶν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι Ποτειδαῖοι, οἱ οἰκούσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἱσθμῷ τῆς Παλλήνης, Κορινθίων ἀποίκουσι, ἐαυτῶν δὲ ξύμμαχοι φόρου ὑποτελείς, ἐκέλευον τὸ ἐς Παλλήνην τείχος καθελεῖν καὶ ὁμήρους δοῦναι, τοὺς τε ἐπιδημοιρούντως ἐκπείμπειν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ δέχεσθαι οὐς κατὰ ἐτος ἐκαστὸν Κορινθίων ἐπεμπον, δείησαντες μὴ ἀποστάσσων ὑπὸ τε Περδίκκου πειθόμενοι καὶ Κορινθίων, τοὺς τε ἅλλους τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης ἐξυπαστησοῦσι ξύμμαχοι.

LVII. Ταῦτα δὲ περὶ τοὺς Ποτειδαῖους οἱ Ἀθηναίοι προπαρεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐν 2 Κερκύρᾳ ναυμαχίαν· οἱ τε γὰρ Κορινθίων φανερῶς ὡς διάφοροι ἦσαν, Περδίκκας τε ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου, Μακεδόνων βασιλεύς, ἐπεπολέμωτο ξύμμαχος πρῶτον καὶ φίλος ὁν. ἐπολεμώθη δὲ, ὅτι Φιλίππῳ τῷ ἐαυτοῦ ἄδελφῳ καὶ Δέρδαι κοινῆ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐναντιομένους οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ξύμμαχιν ἐπολέγατο. δεδιός τε ἐπρασσεῖν ἐς τε τὴν Λακεδαιμονίαν σώματο τοῖς πόλεμοις γένηται αὐτοῖς πρὸς Πελοποννησίους, καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους προσεποίησε τῆς Πολεμικῆς ἐνεκά ἀποστάσεως· 5 προσέφερε δὲ λόγους καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης Χαλκιδεῦσι καὶ Βοττιαῖοις ἐξυπαστησώμενοι, νομίζοντες, εἰ ξύμμαχα ταῦτα ἔχοι, δομὰ δυνα, τὰ χωρία.

1 Son of Alexander, who had been a friend of the Hellenes in the Persian war. Perdiccas, who originally possessed only Lower Macedonia, had deprived his brother Philip of
also occurred, which caused differences between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and led to the war. While the Corinthians were devising how they should take vengeance on the Athenians, the latter, suspecting their enmity, required of the Potidaeans (who dwell on the isthmus of Pallene and are colonists of the Corinthians but tributary allies of the Athenians), to pull down their wall on the side of Pallene and give hostages, and, furthermore, to send away and not receive in the future the magistrates whom the Corinthians were accustomed to send every year. For they were afraid that the Potidaeans, persuaded by Perdikkas and the Corinthians, would revolt and cause the rest of the allies in Thrace to revolt with them.

LVII. These precautions the Athenians took with regard to the Potidaeans immediately after the sea-fight at Coreya; for the Corinthians were now openly at variance with them, and Perdikkas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, who had before been an ally and friend, had now become hostile. And he had become hostile because the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, who were making common cause against himself. Alarmed at this he kept sending envoys to Lacedaemon, trying to bring about a war between Athens and the Peloponnesians. He sought also to win over the Corinthians, with a view to the revolt of Potidaea; and, furthermore, he made overtures to the Chalcidians of Thrace and the Bottiaeans to join in the revolt, thinking that if he had as allies these countries, which bordered on his own, it would be

Upper Macedonia, and now was king of all Macedonia. See, further, ii. xcix. ff.
THUCYDIDES

6 ῥάον ἀν τὸν πόλεμον μετ’ α’τῶν ποιεῖσθαι. ὡν ὦν Ἀθηναίοι αἰσθόμενοι καὶ βουλόμενοι προκαταλαμβάνειν τὸν πόλεων τὰς ἀποστάσεις (ἐτυχον γὰρ τριάκοντα ναύς ἀποστέλλοντες καὶ χιλίους ὀπλίτας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ Ἀρχεστράτου τοῦ Δυκαμίδου μετ’ ἄλλων τεσσάρων στρατηγοῦντος), ἐπιστέλλουσι τοῖς ἀρχοῦσι τῶν νεῶν Ποτειδατῶν τε ὁμήρους λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ τείχος καθελεῖν, τῶν τε πλησίον πόλεων φυλακὴν ἔχειν ὅπως μὴ ἀποστῆσονται.

LVIII. Ποτειδατάι δὲ πέμψαντες μὲν καὶ παρ’ Ἀθηναίους πρέσβεις, εἰ πως πείσειαν μὴ σφόν πέρι νεωτέριζειν μηδέν, ἐλθόντες δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Δακεδαίμονα μετὰ Κορινθίων, ὅπως ἐτοιμάσαντο τιμωρίαν, ἦν δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τε Ἀθηνῶν ἐκ πόλλων πράσσοντες οὐδὲν ηὗροντο ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλ’ αἱ νῆσι αἱ ἐπὶ Μακεδονίαν καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς ὀμοίως ἔπλεον καὶ τὰ τέλη τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων ὑπέσχετο αὐτοῖς, ἦν ἐπὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἵσσειν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἔσβαλειν, τότε δὴ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἀφίστανται μετὰ Χαλκιδῶν καὶ Βοττιαίων κοινῆ ξυνομόσαντες.

2 καὶ Περδίκκας πείθει Χαλκιδέας τὰς ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πόλεις ἐκλιπόντας καὶ καταβαλόντας ἀνοικίσασθαι ἐς Ολυμπίδαν μίαν τέ πόλιν ταύτην ἱσχυρὰν ποιήσασθαι. τοῖς τ’ ἐκλιπόντοι τούτοις τῆς ἐαυτοῦ γῆς τῆς Μυγδονίας περὶ τὴν Βόλβην λίμνην ἔδωκε νέμεσθαι, ἐως ἀν ὁ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πόλει-

1 ἐπρᾶσσον, before ὅπως in all MSS., deleted by Poppe.
easier, in conjunction with them, to carry on the war. But the Athenians became aware of these designs, and wishing to forestall the revolt of the cities, ordered the commanders of their fleet (since they happened to be sending against the country of Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under the command of Archedratus son of Lycomedes and four others) to take hostages of the Potidaeans and pull down their wall, and also to keep a watch upon the neighbouring towns and prevent them from revolting.

LVIII. The Potidaeans, on the other hand, sent envoys to Athens, to see if they could persuade them not to take any harsh measures with reference to themselves; but envoys of theirs went also to Lacedaemon in the company of the Corinthians, with the object of having assistance ready to hand in case of need. From the Athenians, with whom they carried on protracted negotiation, they obtained no satisfactory result, but on the contrary the ships destined to attack Macedonia proceeded to sail against themselves as well, whereas the magistrates of the Lacedaemonians promised them to invade Attica if the Athenians went against Potidaea; so they seized this opportunity and revolted, entering into a formal alliance with the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans. Perdiccas at the same time persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull down their cities on the sea-coast and settle inland at Olynthus, making there a single strong city; and he gave them, when they abandoned their cities, a part of his own territory of Mygdonia around Lake Bolbe to cultivate as long as they should be at war.

* i.e. the Chalcidians of Thrace.
μοσ ἢ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνφοκίζοντο τε καθαιροῦντες τὰς πόλεις καὶ ἐς πόλεμον παρεσκευάζοντο· ΛΙΧ. αἱ δὲ τριάκοντα νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Ὀράκης καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι

2 τὴν τε Ποτείδαιαν καὶ τὰλλα ἀφεστηκότα. νομίσαντες δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀδύνατα εἶναι πρὸς τε Περδίκκαν πόλεμειν τῇ παροῦσῃ δυνάμει καὶ τὰ ἐνυφαστῶτα χωρία, τρέπονται ἐπὶ τὴν Μακε-

δονίαν, ἐφ' ὀπέρ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐξεπέμποντο, καὶ καταστάντες ἐπολέμουν μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν Δέρδου ἀδελφῶν ἀνωθεὶ στρατιὰ εἴσεβεβληκότων.

ΛΧ. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Κορίνθιοι, τῆς Ποτείδαιας ἀφεστηκυίας καὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεόν περὶ Μακε-

δονίαν οὐσῶν, δεδιότες περὶ τῆς χωρίας καὶ οἰκείων τῶν κινδύνων ἤγομενοι πέμπουσιν ἑαυτῶν τε ἐθελοῦντας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων μισθὸ πείσαντες ἑξακοσίους καὶ χίλιους τοὺς πάντας

2 ὀπλίτας καὶ ψυλοὺς τετρακοσίους, ἐστρατηγεῖ δὲ αὐτῶν Ἐρίστευς ὁ Ἀδεμάντου, κατὰ φίλιαν τε αὐτοῦ σὺν ἡκισταί οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐκ Κορίνθου στρατιῶται ἐθελοῦντα διενέεποντο ἦν γὰρ τοῖς

3 Ποτειδαιάταις αἰεὶ ποτὲ ἐπιτήδειοι, καὶ ἀφικνοῦν-

ται τεσσαρακοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ ύστερον ἐπὶ Ὀράκης ἡ

Ποτείδαια ἀπέστη. ΛΧΙ. Ἡλθε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εὐθὺς ἡ ἀγγελία τῶν πόλεων ὑπὶ ἀφεστάσει, καὶ πέμπουσιν, ὡς ἦσοντο καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Ἐρίστεως ἐπιπαρόντας, διαχίλιας ἑαυτῶν ὀπλίτας καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς πρὸς τὰ ἀφεστώτα, καὶ Καλ-

λίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου πέμπτον αὐτῶν στρατηγὸν

2 οἱ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Μακεδονίαν πρῶτον καταλαμβά-
with the Athenians. And so they proceeded to dismantle their cities, move inland, and prepare for war. LIX. But when the thirty ships of the Athenians reached the coast of Thrace, they found Potidæa and the other places already in revolt. Whereupon the generals, thinking it impossible with their present force to wage war with both Perdiccas and the places which had revolted, turned their attention to Macedonia, which was their destination at the start, and when they had got a foothold carried on war in concert with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had already invaded Macedonia from the interior with an army.

LX. Thereupon the Corinthians, seeing that Potidæa had revolted and the Attic ships were in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, were alarmed about the place and thinking that the danger came home to them, dispatched volunteers of their own and such other Peloponnesians as they induced by pay, in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed troops. The general in command was Aristeus son of Adimantus; and it was chiefly because of friendship for him that most of the soldiers from Corinth went along as volunteers; for he had always been on friendly terms with the Potidæans. And they arrived on the coast of Thrace on the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidæa.

LXI. The news of the revolt of the cities quickly reached the Athenians also; and when they learned that troops under Aristeus were also on the way to support the rebels, they sent against the places in revolt two thousand of their own hoplites and forty ships, under Callias son of Calliades with four other generals. These first came to Macedonia and found
νουσι τοὺς προτέρους χιλίους Θέρμην ἄρτη ἡρη
κότας καὶ Πύδναν πολιορκοῦντας, προσκαθε-
ζόμενοι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τὴν Πύδναν ἐπολιορκησάν-
μὲν, ἑπείτα δὲ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι καὶ ξυμ-
μαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκαν, ὡς αὐτοὺς
κατηπειγέν ἡ Ποτείδαια καὶ ὁ Αριστεύς παρέλη-
νυθὼς, ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ
ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν κάκειθεν ἐπὶ Στρέψαν
καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ ὅλοις
ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν
τρισχίλιοι μὲν ὀπλίταις ἐαυτῶν, χωρίς δὲ τῶν
ξυμμάχων πολλοῖς, ἵππευσι δὲ ἑξακοσίους Μακε-
δόνων τοὺς μετὰ Φίλιππον καὶ Παυσανίου ἁμα
δὲ νῆς παρέπλεον ἐβδομήκοντα. κατ’ ὀλγον δὲ
προϊόντες τριταῖον ἀφίκοντο ἐς Πύγωνον καὶ
ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο.

ΛΧII. Ποτείδαια ταὐ δὲ καὶ οἱ μετὰ 'Αριστεύς
Πελοποννήσιοι προσδέχόμενοι τοὺς 'Αθηναίοις
ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο πρὸς 'Ολύμβον ἐν τῷ ἱσθμῷ
καὶ ἀγορὰν ἐξῳ τῆς πόλεως ἐπεποίησαν. στρα-
τηγοῦν μὲν οὐν τοῦ πεζοῦ παντὸς οἱ ξύμμαχοι
ὕρηντο 'Αριστεύα, τῆς δὲ ἱπποῦ Περδίκκαν. ἀπέστη
γὰρ εὐθὺς πάλιν τῶν 'Αθηναίων καὶ ξυνεμάχει
τοῖς Ποτείδαισι 'Ἰόλαυν ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ καταστήσας
ἀρχοντα. ἤν δὲ ἡ γυνώμη τοῦ 'Αριστεύως, τὸ μὲν
μεθ' ἐαυτοῦ στρατόπεδον ἔχοντι ἐν τῷ ἱσθμῷ
ἐπιτηρεῖν τοὺς 'Αθηναίους, ἦν ἐπίσως, Χαλκίδεας
dὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐξῳ ἱσθμοῦ ξυμμάχους καὶ τὴν παρὰ
Περδίκκου διακοσίαν ἱπποῦ ἐν 'Ολύμβῳ μένειν,

1 ἐπὶ Στρέψαν, Pluygers’ certain emendation for ἐπιστρέ-

2 Madvig deletes, followed by Hude.
that the former thousand had just taken Therme and were besieging Pydna; so they also took part in the siege of Pydna. But afterwards they concluded an agreement and an alliance with Perdicas, being forced thereto by the situation of Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus, which compelled them to hasten, and then they withdrew from Macedonia. On their way they came to Beroea and thence to Strepsa,¹ and after an unsuccessful attempt upon this place proceeded overland to Potidaea with three thousand hoplites of their own and with many of their allies besides, and with six hundred Macedonian cavalry, who were under the command of Philip and Pausanias; and at the same time their ships, seventy in number, sailed along the coast. And marching leisurely they arrived on the third day at Gigonus, and went into camp.

LXII. The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus were awaiting the Athenians, encamped on the Olynthian side of the isthmus; and they had established a market outside of the city. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry, and Perdicas of the cavalry; for Perdicas had immediately deserted the Athenians again ² and was now in alliance with the Potidaeans, having appointed Iolaus as his administrator at home. The plan of Aristeus was as follows: he was to hold his own army on the isthmus and watch for the approach of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians and the other allies from outside of the isthmus ³ and the two hundred horse furnished by Perdicas were to

¹ In Mygdonia, north of Therme.
² For his first desertion of the Athenians, see ch. lvii.
³ i.e. the Bottiaeans, who, like the Chalcidians, lived outside the isthmus.
καὶ ὅταν Ἀθηναίοι ἐπὶ σφάς χωρώσι, κατὰ νότον βοηθοῦντας ἐν μέσῳ ποιεῖν αὐτῶν τοὺς πολεμίους.

4 Καλλίας δ' αὐτὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς καὶ οἱ ἕννερχοντες τοὺς μὲν Μακεδόνας ἱππέας καὶ τῶν ἔμμαχων ὁλίγους ἐπὶ 'Ολύνθου ἀποστέπουσιν, ὅπως εἰργασι τοὺς ἐκείθεν ἐπιβοηθεῖν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀναστήσαντες τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν

5 Ποτείδαιαν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τῷ ἱσθμῷ ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον τοὺς ἑναντίονς παρασκευαζομένους ὡς ἐς μάχην, ἀντικαθίσταντο καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ οὐ πολὺ

6 ὑστερον ἔννεμισθον. καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ τοῦ 'Ἀριστέως κέρας καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ἐκείνον ἦσαν Κορινθίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων λογάδες ἐτρεψαν τὸ καθ' ἐαυτοὺς καὶ ἐπεξήλθον διώκοντες ἐπὶ πολὺ τὸ δὲ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον Ποτείδαιατῶν καὶ Πελοποννησίων ἱσσάτο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἐς τὸ τείχος κατέφυγεν.

ΛXIII. Ἐπαναχωρών δὲ ὁ Ἀριστέως ἀπὸ τῆς διώξεως, ὡς ὅρα τὸ ἄλλο στρατεύμα ἡσσημένου, ἡπόρησε μὲν ὁποτέρωσε διακινδυνεύσῃ χωρίσας, ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς 'Ολύνθου ἢ ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν ἐδοξή δ' ὅπως ξυναγαγόντες τοὺς μεθ' ἐαυτοῦ ὡς ἐς ἑλάχιστον χωρίον δρόμῳ βιάσασθαι ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν, καὶ παρῆλθε παρὰ τὴν χελήν διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης βαλλόμενος τε καὶ χαλέπιων, ὁλίγους μὲν τινας ἀποβαλὼν, τοὺς δὲ πλείους σώσας.

2 οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς 'Ολύνθου τοῖς Ποτείδαιαταις βοηθοὶ
remain at Olyanthus; then when the Athenians should move against the forces of Aristeus, the others were to come up and attack them in the rear, and thus place the enemy between their two divisions. But Callias, the commander of the Athenians, and his colleagues sent the Macedonian cavalry and a few of the allies toward Olyanthus, to shut off aid from that quarter, while they themselves broke camp and advanced against Potidæa. And when they arrived at the isthmus and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they took up their position facing them; and soon the two sides joined battle. And the wing led by Aristeus himself, which included the picked Corinthian and other troops, routed the forces opposed to them and pressed on a long distance in pursuit; but the rest of the army of the Potidæans and the Peloponnesians was worsted by the Athenians and took refuge within the walls of Potidæa.

LXIII. When Aristeus returned from the pursuit and saw that the rest of the army was defeated, he was at a loss whether he should try to fight his way through towards Olyanthus or into Potidæa. He determined, however, to bring his own troops together into as compact a body as possible and to force his way into Potidæa on a run. And he succeeded in getting in by way of the breakwater through the sea, with difficulty, indeed, and harassed by missiles; but though he lost a few men, he saved the greater number of them. Now when the battle began and the standards had been raised,¹ the auxiliaries of

¹ These signals were not for battle, but for the Olyanthian auxiliaries to come, and as soon as it became clear, through the speedy success of the Athenians, that their object could not be accomplished, they were lowered.
(ἀπέχει δὲ ἐξήκοντα μάλιστα σταδίους καὶ ἐστὶ καταφανὲς), ὡς ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἡρθη, βραχὺ μὲν τι προῆλθον ὡς βοηθῆσοντες, καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες ἵππης ἀντιπαρετάξαντο ὡς κωλύσοντες· ἐπειδὴ δὲ διὰ τάχους ἡ νίκη τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγένετο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα κατεστάθη, πάλιν ἐπανεχώρουν ἐς τὸ τείχος καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους· ἵππης δ’ οὐδετέρους παρε-γένοντο. μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην τροπαιῶν ἔστησαν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποστόνους ἀπέδωσαν τοῖς Ποτειδαταῖς· ἀπέθανον δὲ Ποτειδατών μὲν καὶ τῶν ξυμμαχῶν ὀλίγων ἐλάσσους τριακοσίων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ αὐτῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ ἐκατόν καὶ Καλλίας ὁ στρατηγὸς.

LXIV. Τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἱσθμοῦ τείχος1 εὕρετο οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἀποτείχισαντες ἐφρούρουν· τὸ δ’ ἐς τὴν Παλλήνην ἀτείχιστον ἦν· οὐ γὰρ ἴκανον ἐνόμιζον εἶναι ἐν τῇ ἱσθμῷ φρονεῖν καὶ ἐς τὴν Παλ-λήνην διαβάτες τείχιζειν, δεδοτες μὴ σφίσιν οἱ Ποτειδαταῖ καὶ οἱ ξυμμαχοὶ γενομένοις δίχα 2 ἐπίθεονται. καὶ πυροβολοῦντο οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλις Ἀθηναίοι τὴν Παλλήνην ἀτείχιστον ὑπὲρ, χρόνῳ ὡστερον πέμποντον ἕξακοσίους καὶ χιλίους ὀπλίτας ἐαυτῶν καὶ Φορμίωνα τοὺς Ἀσωπίους στρατηγοὺς· δ’ ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Παλλήνην καὶ ἐξ Ἀφύτιος ὀρμόμενος προσήγαγε τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ τῶν

1 Classen deletes, followed by Hude.

1 On the Athenian side were 600 Macedonian cavalry (ch. lxii. 4), on the Potidaean side 200 Macedonian cavalry under Perdiccas (ch. lxii. 3).

2 Thucydides omits the loss of the allies of the Athenians.

3 The wall on the isthmus side of the Potidaeans is the
the Potidaeans in Olynthus—which is only about sixty stadia distant and can be seen from Potidaea—advanced a short distance to give aid, and the Macedonian cavalry drew up in line against them to prevent it. But since the Athenians were soon proving the victors and the standards were pulled down, the auxiliaries retired again within the walls of Olynthus and the Macedonians rejoined the Athenians. And so no cavalry got into action on either side.¹ After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy and gave up their dead under a truce to the Potidaeans. There were slain, of the Potidaeans and their allies a little less than three hundred, and of the Athenians alone² about a hundred and fifty, and also their general Callias.

LXIV. The city wall on the isthmus side³ the Athenians immediately cut off by a transverse wall and set a guard there, but the wall toward Pallene was not shut off.⁴ For they thought their numbers were insufficient to maintain a garrison on the isthmus and also to cross over to Pallene and build a wall there too, fearing that, if they divided their forces, the Potidaeans and their allies would attack them. Afterwards, when the Athenians at home learned that Pallene was not blockaded, they sent sixteen hundred of their own hoplites under the command of Phormios son of Asopius; and he, when he arrived at Pallene, making Aphytis his base, brought his army to Potidaea, marching leisurely and ravaging

¹τίχος of ch. lxii. 6; the wall to Pallene is that mentioned in ch. lvi. 2 as τὸ ἐς Παλλήνης τίχος. ²The investment of Potidaea was effected by walling off first the northern and then also the southern city wall by a blockading wall; on the west and east, where the city extended to the sea, the blockade was made with ships.
στρατόν, κατα βραχύ προιόν καὶ κείρον ἀμα τὴν
3 γῆν ὡς δὲ οὐδεὶς ἐπεξεῖς ἢ μάχην, ἀπετείχισε
τὸ ἐκ τῆς Παλληνῆς τεῖχος καὶ οὕτως ἤδη κατὰ
κράτος ἡ Ποτείδαια ἀμφότεροθευ ἐπολιορκεῖτο
καὶ ἐκ βαλάσονς ναυσὶν ἀμα ἐφορμοῦσαι.

LXV. Ἀριστεύς δὲ ἀποτείχισθείσης αὐτῆς καὶ
ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν ἐχον σωτηρίας, ἥν μὴ τι ἀπὸ
Πελοποννήσου ἢ ἄλλο παρὰ λόγου γίνηται,
ξυνεβούλευε μὲν πλὴν πεντακοσίων ἄνεμον τη-
ρήσας τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκπλεῦσαί, ὅπως ἐπὶ πλέον
ὁ στίς ἀντίσχη, καὶ αὐτός ἦθελε τῶν μενῶν
ἐιναι· ὡς δ' οὖν ἔπειθε, βουλομένοις τὰ ἐπὶ τούτως
παρασκευάζειν καὶ ὅπως τὰ ἔξωθεν ἔξει ὡς ἁριστα,
ἐκπλοῦν ποιεῖται λαθῶν τὴν φυλάκην τῶν Ἀθη-
2 νῶν καὶ παραμένων ἐν Χαλκιδεῖσι τὰ τε ἄλλα
ξυνεπολέμει καὶ Σερμυλίων λοχῆςας πρὸς τῇ
πόλει πολλοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἐς τε τὴν Πελοπόννη-
3 σον ἔπρασσεν ὅτη ὁφελία τις γενήσεται. μετὰ
dὲ τῆς Ποτείδαιας τὴν ἀποτείχισιν Φορμίων μὲν
ἐχον τοὺς ἔξακσιοις καὶ χιλίοις τὴν Χαλκιδικήν
καὶ Βοττικῆν ἔδησον καὶ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ πολίσματα
ἐίλεν.

LXVI. Τοῖς δ' Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις
αἰτία μὲν αὐτὶ προσγεγένητο 1 ἐς ἀλλήλους,
toῖς μὲν Κορινθίοις 2 ὑπὲ τὴν Ποτείδαιαν ἑαυτῶν
οὕτων ἀποκιάν καὶ ἄνδρας Κορινθίων τε καὶ

1 Hude reads προσγεγένητο, with BCE.
2 Hude inserts, after Κορινθίοις, the words ὑπὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους,
following Reiske

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the country at the same time. And as no one came out against him to give battle he built a wall to blockade the Pallene wall. And so Potidæa was at length in a state of siege, which was prosecuted vigorously on both sides of it as well as by sea, where a fleet blockaded it.

LXV. As for Aristeus, now that Potidæa was cut off by the blockade and he had no hope of saving it unless help should come from the Peloponnesus, or something else should happen beyond his expectation, he advised all the garrison except five hundred men to wait for a wind and sail out of the harbour, that the food might hold out longer, and he himself was ready to be one of those who should remain. But since he could not gain their consent, wishing to do the next best thing and to provide that their affairs outside should be put into the best possible condition, he sailed out, unobserved by the Athenian guard. He then remained among the Chalcidians, whom he assisted generally in carrying on the war, and especially by destroying a large force of Serrylans, whom he ambushed near their city; and meanwhile he kept up negotiations with the Peloponnesians to see if some aid could not be obtained. Phormio, however, after the investment of Potidæa was complete, took his sixteen hundred troops and ravaged Chalcidice and Botticæ; and he also captured some towns.

LXVI. As between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, then, these additional grounds of complaint had arisen on either side, the Corinthians being aggrieved because the Athenians were besieging Potidæa, a colony of theirs with men in it from
Πελοποννησίων ἐν αὐτῇ ὄντας ἐπολιόρκουν, τοὺς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ὅτι ἐαυτῶν τε πόλιν ξυμμαχία καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῆ ἀπε- στησαν καὶ ἐλθόντες σφίσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐμάχοντο μετὰ Ποτειδατῶν. οὐ μέντοι ὃ γε πόλεμός πω ξυνερρώγει, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἀνοκοκχῇ ἤν ἰδίᾳ γὰρ ταῦτα οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἑπραξάν.

ĽXVII. Πολιορκομένης δὲ τῆς Ποτειδαίας οὐχ ἡσύχαζον, ἀνδρῶν τε σφίσιν ἐνότου καὶ ἀμα περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ δεδιότες. παρεκάλουν τε εὐθὺς ἐς τὴν Λακεδαιμονία τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ κατεβόων ἐλθόντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅτι στόνδας τε λευκότες εἰεν καὶ ἄδικοιεν τὴν Πελοπόννησον.

2 Αἰγυπτίας ἄντε φανερῶς ἦν μὲν οὐ πρεσβευόμενοι, δεδιότες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, κρύφα δὲ, οὐχ ἠκιστὰ μετ' αὐτῶν ἐνήγοι τὸν πόλεμον, λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτῶνοι κατὰ τὰς στόνδας. οἱ δὲ Λακε- δαιμονίοι προσπαρακλάσαντες τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἑι τίς τι ἄλλος ἑφι ἡδικήσατι ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ξύλλογον σφῶν αὐτῶν ποιήσαντες τὸν εἰωθότα

3 λέγειν ἐκέλευον. καὶ ἄλλοι τε παριόντες ἐγκλη- ματα ἑποιοῦντο ὡς ἔκαστοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς, δη- λοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἔτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διάφορα, μάλιστα δὲ λεμένων τε εὑργεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἐλληνικῇ ἄρχῃ καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀγορᾶς παρὰ τὰς στόνδας.

4 παρελθόντες δὲ τελευταίοι Κορίνθιοι καὶ οὕς ἄλλους ἐάσαντες πρῶτον παρεξύναι τοὺς Λακε- δαιμονίους ἑπείπον τοῖας.

ĽXVIII. "Τὸ πιστὸν ἐμᾶς, ὣ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τῆς καθ' ἑμᾶς αὐτοὺς πολιτείας καὶ ὁμιλίας

1 Hude reads τε καὶ with C and some inferior MSS.
Corinth and the Peloponnesus, the Athenians, because the Peloponnesians had brought about the revolt of a city that was an ally and tributary of theirs, and then had come and openly fought with the Potidaeans against themselves. As yet, however, the war had not openly broken out, but there was still a truce for in these things the Corinthians had acted only on their own authority.

lxvii. But when siege was laid to Potidaea they did not take it quietly, not only because Corinthians were in the town, but also because they were in fear about the place; and they immediately summoned the allies to Lacedaemon and, once there, they proceeded to inveigh against the Athenians on the ground that they had broken the treaty and were wronging the Peloponnesus. The Aeginetans also sent delegates—not openly, to be sure, for they feared the Athenians, but secretly—and, acting with the Corinthians, took a leading part in fomenting the war, saying that they were not autonomous as stipulated in the treaty. Then the Lacedaemonians sent out a summons to all the other allies who claimed to have suffered any wrong at the hands of the Athenians, and calling their own customary assembly bade them speak. Others came forward and stated their several complaints, and particularly the Megarians, who presented a great many other grievances, and chiefly this, that they were excluded from the harbours throughout the Athenian dominions and from the Athenian market, contrary to the treaty. Lastly the Corinthians, after they had first allowed the others to exasperate the Lacedaemonians, spoke as follows:

lxviii. "That spirit of trust which marks your domestic policy, O Lacedaemonians, and your relations
ἄπιστοτέρους, ἐσ τοὺς ἄλλους ἢ τι λέγωμεν, καθιστήσων καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ σωφροσύνην μὲν ἑχετε, ἀμαθία δὲ πλέον πρὸς τὰ ἔξω πράγματα χρῆσθε. πολλάκις γὰρ προαγορευόντων ἦμων ἐμέλλομεν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων βλάπτεσθαι, οὐ περὶ ὃν ἐδιδάσκομεν ἐκάστοτε τὴν μάθησιν ἐποιεῖσθε, ἀλλὰ τῶν λεγόντων μᾶλλον ὑπενοεῖτε ὡς ἐνεκα τῶν αὐτῶς ἰδία διαφόρων λέγουσιν καὶ δι' αὐτὸ οὐ πρὶν πάσχειν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐσμέν, τοὺς ξυμμάχους τούσδε παρεκάλέσατε, ἐν όισ προσήκει ἡμᾶς οὐχ ἤκιστα εἰπεῖν ὅσῳ καὶ μέγιστα ἐγκλήματα ἔχομεν, ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ὑβριζό-3 μενοι, ὑπὸ δὲ ὑμῶν ἀμελούμενοι. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀφανεῖς που ὄντες ἡδίκουν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, διδασκαλίας ἃν ως οὐκ εἰδόσι προσέδειν νῦν δὲ τὶ δεῖ μακρηγορεῖν, ὃν τοὺς μὲν δεδουλωμένους ὑμᾶς, τοῖς δ' ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτοὺς, καὶ οὐχ ἤκιστα τοῖς ἡμετέροις ξυμμάχους, καὶ ἐκ πολλοῦ προ-4 παρεσκευασμένους, εἰ ποτε πολεμήσονταί; οὐ γὰρ ἂν Κέρκυραν τὲ ὑπολαβόντες βία ἦμων εἶχον καὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἐπολιόρκον· ὃν τὸ μὲν ἐπικαιρότατον χωρίον πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ Ὁράκης ἀποχρησθεὶς, ἢ δὲ ναυτικόν ἂν μέγιστον παρέσχε τοῖς Πελοποννη-σίοις.

LXIX. "Καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αὐτοὶ, τὸ τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά
with one another, renders you more mistrustful if we bring any charge against others, and thus while this quality gives you sobriety, yet because of it you betray a want of understanding in dealing with affairs abroad. For example, although we warned you time and again of the injury the Athenians were intending to do us, you refused to accept the information we kept giving you, but preferred to direct your suspicions against the speakers, feeling that they were actuated by their own private interests. And this is the reason why you did not act before we got into trouble, but it is only when we are in the midst of it that you have summoned these allies, among whom it is especially fitting that we should speak, inasmuch as we have the gravest accusations to bring, insulted as we have long been by the Athenians and neglected by you. And if they were wronging Hellas in some underhand way, you might have needed additional information on the ground of your ignorance; but as the case stands, what need is there of a long harangue, when you see that they have enslaved some of us¹ and are plotting against others, notably against your own allies, and that they have long been making their preparations with a view to the contingency of war? For otherwise they would not have purloined Corcyra, which they still hold in despite of us, and would not be besieging Potidæa—one of these being a most strategic point for operations on the Thracian coast, while the other would have furnished a very large fleet to the Peloponnesians.

LXIX. "And the blame for all this belongs to you, for you permitted them in the first instance to

¹ Referring especially to the Aeginetans, in the other cases to the Megarians and Potidæans.
κρατύναι καὶ ὑστερὸν τὰ μακρὰ στῆσαι τεῖχη, ἐστὸς τε αἰεὶ ἀποστεροῦντες ο琛 μόνον τοὺς ὑπ᾽ ἐκεῖνων δεδουλωμένους ἐλευθερίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἥδη ξυμμάχους: οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δυνάμενος μὲν παῦσαι, περιορῶν δὲ ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾶ, εἰπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται. μόλις δὲ νῦν γε ἠνεξιλθομεν καὶ οὐδὲ νῦν ἐπὶ φανεροῖς. χρῆν γὰρ οὐκ εἰ ἀδικούμεθα ἐτί σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ὁ τι ἀμυνούμεθα: οἱ γὰρ ἁρώνετε βεβουλευμένοι πρὸς οὐ διεγνωκότας ἡδὴ καὶ οὐ μέλλοντες ἐπέρχονται. καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα οἷα ὁδῷ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὅτι κατ᾽ ὅλον χωροῦσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλας. καὶ λαυθάνειν μὲν οἴμενοι διὰ τὸ ἀναίσθητον ὑμῶν ἡσου θαρσοῦσι, γνώντες δὲ εἰδότας περιορὰν ἱσχυρῶς ἐγκείσονται. ἦσυχα ὑπάρξεται γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλληνῶν, ὁ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινά, ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένη τὴν αὐξήσιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, διπλασιομένην δὲ καταλύοντες. καίτοι ἐλέγεσθε ἀσφαλείς εἰναι, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ λόγος τοῦ ἐργοῦ ἐκράτει, τὸν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἵσμεν ἐκ περάτων γῆς πρῶτερον ἐπὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἔλθοντα ἢ τά

1 oi γὰρ, so MSS.: Hude reads of ye after Classen.

1 See ch. xx. ff. 2 See ch. cxxvii. 1.
2 Referring to the recent increase of the Athenian navy by the accession of the Corcyraean fleet.
strengthen their city after the Persian war,¹ and afterwards to build their Long Walls,² while up to this very hour you are perpetually defrauding of their freedom not only those who have been enslaved by them, but now even your own allies also. For the state which has reduced others to slavery does not in a more real fashion enslave them than the state which has power to prevent it, and yet looks carelessly on, although claiming as its preëminent distinction that it is the liberator of Hellas. And now at last we have with difficulty managed to come together, though even now without a clearly defined purpose. For we ought no longer to be considering whether we are wronged, but how we are to avenge our wrongs. For where men are men of action, it is with resolved plans against those who have come to no decision, it is at once and without waiting, that they advance. We know too by what method the Athenians move against their neighbours—that it is here a little and there a little. And as long as they think that, owing to your want of perception, they are undetected, they are less bold; but once let them learn that you are aware but complaisant, and they will press on with vigour. For indeed, O Lacedaemonians, you alone of the Hellenes pursue a passive policy, defending yourselves against aggression, not by the use of your power, but by your intention to use it; and you alone propose to destroy your enemies' power, not at its inception, but when it is doubling itself.³ And yet you had the reputation of running no risks; but with you, it would seem, repute goes beyond reality. For example, the Persian, as we ourselves know, came from the ends of the earth as far as the Peloponnesus before your forces went
παρ' ύμων ἄξιως προσπαντῆσαι, καὶ νῦν τούς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἔκας, ὡσπερ ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἐγγὺς ὄντας περιοράτε, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπελθεῖν αὐτοὶ ἀμύνεσθαι βούλεσθε μᾶλλον ἐπιώντας καὶ ἐς τύχας πρὸς πολλῷ δυνατωτέρους ἀγωνιζόμενοι καταστήναι, ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτόν περὶ αὐτῆς τὰ πλέον σφαλέντα καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἦδη τοῖς ἀμαρτή-μασιν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἀφ' ύμων τιμωρίᾳ περιγεγενημένους. ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐμέτερα ἐξπίδες ἦδη τιμᾶς ποὺ καὶ ἀπαρασκεύουσι διὰ τὸ πιστεύ-6 σαι ἐφθειραν. καὶ μηδεὶς ύμῶν ἐπ᾽ ἐχθρᾷ τὸ πλέον ἡ αἰτία νομίσῃ τάδε λέγεσθαι· αἰτία μὲν γὰρ φίλων ἀνδρῶν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτανόντων, κατη-γορία δὲ ἐχθρῶν ἀδικησάντων.

LXX. "Καὶ ἀμα, εἴπερ τινὲς καὶ ἄλλοι, νομί-ζομεν ἄξιοι εἶναι τοὺς πέλας ψόγον ἐπενεγκείν, ἄλλως τε καὶ μεγάλων τῶν διαφερόντων καθεστώ-των, περὶ ὧν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡμῖν γε δοκεῖτε οὔδ' ἐκλογίσασθαι πώποτε πρὸς οἶους ύμῶν Ἀθηναίους ὄντας καὶ ὅσον ύμῶν καὶ ὡς πάν διαφέροντας ὁ 2 ἀγὼν ἔσται. οἱ μὲν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπι-νοήσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ἄν ἀν γνώσιν, ύμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σφέξειν καὶ ἐπιγνώσαι μηδέν καὶ ἔργῳ οὔδὲ τάναγκαία ἐξικέσθαι.
forth to withstand him in a manner worthy of your power; and now you regard with indifference the Athenians who are not afar off, as the Persian was, but near at hand, and instead of attacking them yourselves, you prefer to ward them off when they attack, and incur hazard by joining in a struggle with opponents who have become far more powerful. Yet you know that the Barbarian failed mostly by his own fault, and that in our struggles with the Athenians themselves we have so far often owed our successes rather to their own errors than to any aid received from you; indeed, it is the hopes they have placed in you that have already ruined more than one state that was unprepared just because of trust in you. And let no one of you think that these things are said more out of hostile feeling than by way of complaint; for complaint is against friends that err, but accusation against enemies that have inflicted an injury.

LXX. "And besides, we have the right, we think, if any men have, to find fault with our neighbours, especially since the interests at stake for us are important. To these interests it seems to us at least that you are insensible, and that you have never even fully considered what sort of men the Athenians are with whom you will have to fight, and how very, how utterly, different they are from you. For they are given to innovation and quick to form plans and to put their decisions into execution, whereas you are disposed merely to keep what you have, to devise nothing new, and, when you do take action, not to carry to completion even what is indispensable.

1 Alluding, perhaps to the Thasians (ch. ci.) and the Euboeans (ch. cxiv.).
3 αὖθις δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηται καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευται καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐδελπίδες: τὸ δὲ ύμέτερον τῆς τε δυνάμεως ἐνδεὰ πράξαι τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαιοῖς πιστεύσαι τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδὲποτε οἰεσθαι ἀπολυθή-4 σεθαι. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄρκνυν πρὸς ύμας μελλητας καὶ ἀποδημηται πρὸς ενδημοτάτους; οἶνται γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῇ ἀπασίεα ἄν τι κτάσθαι, ύμεῖς δὲ τῷ 5 ἐξελθείν καὶ τὰ ἐτοίμα ἄν βλάψαι. κρατοῦντες . τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐξέρχονται καὶ 6 νικόμενοι ἐπὶ ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριώτατοι, ύπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρόνως, τῇ δὲ γνώμη ποίησαται ἐς τὸ 7 πρᾶσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς: καὶ ἂν μὲν ἄν ἐπινοή-σαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκεῖον στέρεσθαι ἤγουν-ται, ἢ ὅ τι ἐπελθόντες κτίσανται, οἵ γὰρ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεὶν πράξαντες, ἢν ὅ ἀρα τοῦ καὶ πείρα σφαλωσιν, ἀντεπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρείαν μόνοι γὰρ ἔχουσι τὸ ὀμοῖος καὶ ἐπίτευγον ἅ ἄν ἐπινοήσωσι διὰ τὸ πολεμίαν τὴν 8 ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖσθαι ἤν ἄν γρώσιν. καὶ τάντα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι ὄλου τοῦ αἰώνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύσοντις ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτάσθαι καὶ μήτε ἐορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἤγεισθαι ἤ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πράξαι ξυμ-φοράν τε οὐχ ἤσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ
Again, they are bold beyond their strength, venturesome beyond their better judgment, and sanguine in the face of dangers; while your way is to do less than your strength warrants, to distrust even what your judgment is sure of, and when dangers come to despair of deliverance. Nay more, they are prompt in decision, while you are dilatory; they stir abroad, while you are perfect stay-at-homes; for they expect by absence from home to gain something, while you are afraid that, if you go out after something, you may imperil even what you have. If victorious over their enemies, they pursue their advantage to the utmost; if beaten, they fall back as little as possible. Moreover, they use their bodies in the service of their country as though they were the bodies of quite other men, but their minds as though they were wholly their own, so as to accomplish anything on her behalf. And whenever they have conceived a plan but fail to carry it to fulfilment, they think themselves robbed of a possession of their own; and whenever they go after a thing and obtain it, they consider that they have accomplished but little in comparison with what the future has in store for them; but if it so happens that they try a thing and fail, they form new hopes instead and thus make up the loss. For with them alone is it the same thing to hope for and to attain when once they conceive a plan, for the reason that they swiftly undertake whatever they determine upon. In this way they toil, with hardships and dangers, all their life long; and least of all men they enjoy what they have because they are always seeking more, because they think their only holiday is to do their duty, and because they regard untroubled peace as a far
THUCYDIDES

9 ἀσχολιαν ἐπίθονον ὅστε εἰ τοὺς αὐτὸς ἐπιηθεῖν
φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε αὐτοῖς ἐχεῖν ἥσυχίαν
μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἔαν, ὅρθως ἂν
ἐιποί.

I.XXI. "Ταύτης μέντοι τοιαύτης ἀντικαθεστη-
κυίας πόλεως, ὁ Δακεδαιμόνιος, διαμελλεῖτε καὶ
οἰς τῆς ἡσυχίας οὐ τούτος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ
πλείστον ἀρκεῖν, οὐκ ἂν τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ δίκαια
πράσσωμεν, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ, ἐὰν ἄδικονται, δήλοι
ὡς μὴ ἐπιτρέψωμες, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τοὺς
ἄλλους καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀμυνόμενοι μὴ βλάπτεσθαι
2 τὸ ἐσοφ νέμετε. μόλις δ' ἂν πόλει ὡμοῖα παροι-
κοὼντες ἐτυγχάνετε τοῦτον· ψως δ', ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι
ἐδηλώσαμεν, ἄρχαιοτροπὰ ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα
3 πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔστιν. ἀνάγκη δὲ δόσφερ τέχνης
αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγυνόμενα κρατεῖν καὶ ἡσυχαζοῦση
μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἁριστα, πρὸς
πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἔναι πολλῆς καὶ
τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δει. δι' ὅπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν
Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τῆς πολυπειρίας ἐπὶ πλέον ὑμῶν
κεκαίνωται.

4 "Μέχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦτο ὃρθῳ ὑμῶν ἡ ἄθροι-
τής τῶν ὑμῶν ὑπὸ τοῖς Ποταμώτασι, ὅσπερ
ὑπεδέξασθε, βοηθήσατε κατὰ τάχος ἑσβαλόντες
ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνδρας τε φίλους καὶ
ἐννενεῖς τοῖς ἐχθρίστοις πρόσθετη καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς
ἄλλους ἀθυρία πρὸς ἐτέραν τινὰ ἐνμαχιάν

1 i.e. you attempt to be fair on the principle that it is wise
not to offend others and so run the risk of injury which may

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greater calamity than laborious activity. Therefore if a man should sum up and say that they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to let other men have it, he would simply speak the truth.

LXXI. "And yet, although you have such a state ranged against you, O Lacedaemonians, you go on delaying and forget that a peaceful policy suffices long only for those who, while they employ their military strength only for just ends, yet by their spirit show plainly that they will not put up with it if they are treated with injustice; whereas you practise fair dealing on the principle of neither giving offence to others nor exposing yourselves to injury in self-defence. But it would be difficult to carry out such a policy successfully if you had as neighbour a state just like yourselves; whereas now, as we have just shown, your practices are old-fashioned as compared with theirs. But in politics, as in the arts, the new must always prevail over the old. It is true that when a state is at peace the established practices are best left unmodified, but when men are compelled to enter into many undertakings there is need of much improvement in method. It is for this reason that the government of the Athenians, because they have undertaken many things, has undergone greater change than yours.

"Here, then, let your dilatoriness end; at this moment succour both the Potidaeans and the rest of your allies, as you promised to do, by invading Attica without delay, that you may not betray your friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to seek some other arise in defending yourselves against the attacks you have provoked."
ΤΡΕΨΗΤΕ. ΔΡΩΜΕΝ δ' ἂΝ ἈΔΙΚΟΝ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΟΥΤΕ ΠΡΟΣ ΘΕΩΝ ΤΩΝ ὈΡΚΙΩΝ ΟΥΤΕ ΠΡΟΣ ἈΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΑΙΣΘΑ-
ΝΟΜΕΩΝ ΛΥΟΝΣΑΙ ΓΑΡ ΣΠΟΝΔΑΣ ΟΥΧ ΟΙ ΔΙ' ἘΡΗΜΙΑΝ ἈΛΛΟΙΣ ΠΡΟΣΙΩΝΤΕΣ, ἈΛΛ' ΟΙ ΜΗ ΒΟΗΘΟΥΝΤΕΣ ΟΙΣ ἂΝ
ΞΥΝΟΜΟΣΩΝ. ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΔΕ ὩΜΩΝ ΠΡΟΘΥΜΩΝ
ΕΙΝΑΙ ΜΕΝΟΥΜΕΝ ΟΥΤΕ ΓΑΡ ὍΣΙΑ ἂΝ ΠΟΙΟΙΜΕΝ ΜΕΤΑ-
ΒΑΛΛΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΟΥΤΕ ΞΥΝΗΘΕΣΤΕΡΟΙ ἂΝ ἈΛΛΟΙΣ ΕΥΡΟΙ-
ΜΕΝ. ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑῦΤΕ ΒΟΥΛΕΥΣΘΕ ΕΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΠΕΛΟ-
ΠΟΝΝΗΣΟΝ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΘΕ ΜΗ ἘΛΆΣΘΟ ΕΞΗΓΕΙΘΑΙ Ἡ ΟΙ
ΠΑΤΕΡΕΣ ὩΜῖΝ ΠΑΡΕΔΟΣΑΝ."
alliance. If we took such a course we should be committing no wrong either in the sight of the gods we have sworn by or of men of understanding; for treaties are broken not by those who when left unsupported join others, but by those who fail to succour allies they have sworn to aid. But if you mean to be zealous allies we will stay; for in that case we should be guilty of impiety if we changed our friends, nor should we find others more congenial. In view of these things, be well advised, and make it your endeavour that the Peloponnesian league shall be no weaker under your leadership than when you inherited it from your fathers.”

LXXII. Thus spoke the Corinthians. But there happened to be present at Lacedaemon an embassy of the Athenians that had come on other business, and when they heard the various speeches they deemed it advisable to appear before the Lacedaemonians, not indeed to make any defence on the charges brought by the cities, but to make clear with regard to the whole question at issue that the Lacedaemonians should not decide it hastily but should take more time to consider it. At the same time they wished to show how great was the power of their own city, reminding the older men of what they already knew, and recounting to the younger things of which they were ignorant, in the belief that under the influence of their arguments the Lacedaemonians would be inclined to peace rather than war. Accordingly they approached the Lacedaemonians and said that they also wished, if there was nothing to hinder, to address their assembly. The Lacedaemonians invited them to present themselves, and the Athenians came forward and spoke as follows:
THUCYDIDES

LXXIII. "Ἡ μὲν πρέσβευσις ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀντιλογίαν τοῖς υμετέροις ξυμμάχοις ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἡ πόλις ἐπεμφένει αἰσθανόμεναι δὲ καταβοθὰν οὐκ ὄλγην οὕτων ἡμῶν παρῆλθομεν, οὐ τοὺς ἐγκλήματί τὸν πόλεων ἀντερόντες (οὐ γὰρ παρὰ δικασταῖς ὑμῖν οὕτε ἡμῶν οὕτε τούτων οἱ λόγοι ἀν γίγνοιτο), ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ βαδίως περὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων τοῖς ξυμμάχοις πειθόμενοι χείρον βουλεύσησθε, καὶ ἅμα βουλήμενοι περὶ τοῦ πάντος λόγου τοῦ ἐς ἡμᾶς καθεστώτος δηλώσαι ὅσ οὗτε ἀπεικότως ἔχομεν ἤ κεκτήμεθα, ή τε πόλις ἡμῶν ἀξία λόγου ἐστίν.

2 " Καὶ τὰ μὲν πάνω παλαιὰ τί δεῖ λέγειν, ὅπως ἀκοαὶ μᾶλλον λόγου μάρτυρες ἢ ὅφις τῶν ἀκουσμένων; τὰ δὲ Μηδικὰ καὶ όσα αὐτὸς ξύνιστε, εἰ καὶ δὲ ὄχλος μᾶλλον ἔσται αἰεὶ προβαλλομένοι, ἀνάγκη λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ὅτε ἔδρωμεν, ἑπὶ ὠφελίᾳ ἐκκυνδυνέστερο, ἢς τοῦ μὲν ἐργοῦ μέρος μετέσχετε, τοῦ δὲ λόγου μὴ παντὸς, εἰ τι ὠφελεῖ, 1 στερεισκόμεθα. Ῥηθῆσεται δὲ οὐ παραιτήσεως μᾶλλον ἕνεκα ἢ μαρτυρίου καὶ δηλώσεως πρὸς οἷς ὑμῖν πόλιν μὴ εὐ βουλευομένοις ὁ ἄγων καταστήσεται.

3 "Φαμὲν γὰρ Μαραθῶνὶ τε μόνοι προκυνδυνεύσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ καὶ ὅτε τὸ ύστερον ἠλθεν,

1 ἡφάλει Ε.
LXXIII. "Our embassy did not come here to enter into a dispute with your allies, but on the business for which our city sent us. Perceiving, however, that no small outcry is being made against us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges of the cities (for it can hardly be that either they or we are addressing you as judges), but in order that you may not, yielding to the persuasion of your allies, lightly make a wrong decision about matters of great importance. And at the same time we wish, as regards the whole outcry that has been raised against us, to show that we are rightfully in possession of what we have acquired, and that our city is not to be despised.

"Now, what need is there to speak about matters quite remote,\(^1\) whose only witnesses are the stories men hear rather than the eyes of those who will hear them told? But concerning the Persian War and all the other events of which you have personal knowledge, we needs must speak, even though it will be rather irksome to mention them, since they are always being paraded. For when we were performing those deeds the risk was taken for a common benefit, and since you got a share of the actual results of that benefit, we should not be wholly deprived of the credit, if there is any benefit in that. And our aim in the recital of the facts will be, not so much to deprecate censure, as to show by evidence with what sort of city you will be involved in war if you are not well advised.

"For we affirm that at Marathon we alone bore the first brunt of the Barbarian's attack, and that

\(^1\) The Schol. remarks τὰ πατὰ Ἀμαζόνων καὶ ὸρθῶν καὶ Ἡρακλείδων, favourite themes in eulogies, panegyric speeches, etc.
οὐχ ἴκανοι δυνεῖς κατὰ γῆν ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐσβάντες ἐς τάς ναῦς πανδημεῖ ἐν Σαλαμίνι ξυναυμαχήσαι, ὅπερ ἐσχε μὴ κατὰ πόλεις αὐτὸν ἐπιπλέουσα τὴν Πελοπόννησον πορθεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν ἄν ὄντων 5 πρὸς ναῦς πολλὰς ἀλλήλους ἐπιβοηθεῖν. τεκμηριών δὲ μέγιστον αὐτοῦ ἐποίησεν νικηθεὶς γὰρ ταῖς ναυσὶν ὡς οὐκέτι αὐτῷ ὁμοίας οὐσίας τῆς δυνάμεως κατὰ τάχος τῷ πλέον τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀνεχώρησεν.

LXXIV. "Τοιούτων μέντοι τούτου ξυμβάντων καὶ σαφῶς δηλωθέντος ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πράγματα ἐγένετο, τρία τὰ ὁφελεμώτατα ἐς αὐτὸ παρεσχόμεθα, ἀριθμὸν τε νεῶν πλείστον καὶ ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν ξυνετῶσαν καὶ προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην ναῦς μὲν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγων ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ ἄρχωντα, δε ἀιτιώτατος ἐν τῷ στενῷ ναυμαχῆσαι ἐγένετο, ὅπερ σαφέστατα ἔσωσε τὰ πράγματα, καὶ αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦτο ὑμεῖς ἐτίμησατε μάλιστα δὴ ἄνδρα ἐξών τῶν ὅς ὑμᾶς 2 ἔλθοντων· προθυμίαν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τολμηρότατην ἐδείξαμεν, οὐ γε, ἐπειδὴ ἡμῖν κατὰ γῆν οὐδεὶς ἐβοηθεῖ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδὲ μέχρι ἡμῶν δουλεύοντων, ἠξιώσαμεν ἐκλιπόντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα διαφθειρότατος μηδὸ δώ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων ξυμμάχων κοινὸν προλιπεῖν μηδὲ σκέδασθέντες ἀχρεῶν αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναύς κινδυνεύσαι καὶ μὴ ὀργισθήσαι ὅτι ἡμῖν οὐ

1 Probably a round number for 378 given by Hdt. viii. xlviii., of which the Athenian contingent (200, i.e. 180 + 20 lent to the Chalcidians, Hdt. viii. i.) could be spoken of as

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when he came again, not being able to defend ourselves by land, we embarked in a body on our ships and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis. This prevented his sailing against you city by city and ravaging the Peloponnesus, for you would have been unable to aid one another against a fleet so numerous. And the weightiest testimony to the truth of what we say was afforded by the enemy himself; for when his fleet was defeated, as if aware that his power was no longer a match for that of the Hellenes, he hastily withdrew with the greater part of his army.

LXXIV. "Such, then, was the issue of that battle, and clear proof was given thereby that the salvation of the Hellenes depended upon their ships. To that issue we contributed the three most serviceable elements, namely, the largest number of ships, the shrewdest general, and the most unaltering zeal. Of the four hundred ships our quota was a little less than two-thirds. The commander was Themistocles, who more than any other was responsible for our fighting the battle in the strait, which most surely was our salvation; and on this account you yourselves honoured him above any stranger who ever visited you. And the zeal we displayed was that of utmost daring, for when there was no one to help us on land, since all the rest up to our very borders were already slaves, we resolved to abandon our city and sacrifice all our possessions; yet not even in that extremity to desert the common cause of the allies who remained, or by dispersing to render ourselves useless to them, but to embark on our ships and fight, and not to be angry because you failed to

*See Hdt. viii. cxxiv.; Plut. Them. xvii. 3.*
3 προνεμορήσατε. ὡστε φαμέν οὐχ ἦσον αὐτοὶ ὁφελήσατε ὑμᾶς ἢ τυχεῖν τούτου. ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τε οἰκουμένων τῶν πόλεων καὶ ἑπὶ τῷ τὸ λοιπὸν νέμεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἐδείσατε ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ ο الذى ἡμῶν τὸ πλέων, ἐβοηθήσατε (ὅτε γονὸν ἦμεν ἐτὶ σφ., οὐ παρεγένεσθε), ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τε τῆς οὐκ ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐν βραχείᾳ ἐλπίδα ὀφθαλμῶν κινδυνεύσατε ἐξευθέσαμσαν ὑμᾶς τῷ τῷ μέρος καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. εἰ δὲ προσεχωρήσαμεν πρότερον τῷ Μῆδῷ δείσαντες, ὦσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι, περὶ τῆς χώρας, ἡ μὴ ἐτολμήσαμεν ὄστερον ἐσβῆναι ἐς ταῖς καὶ ως διεθθαρμένως, οὔτε ἂν ἐδει ἐτὶ ὑμᾶς ἡ ἤχος ναὸς ἢ κανές ναυμαχεῖς, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἱστοχῖαν ἂν αὐτῷ προχώρηση τὰ πραγματὰ ἦ βουλεῖτο.

LXXV. "Ἀρ' ἄξιοι ἔσμεν, ὦ Δακεδαλίμοι, καὶ προθυμίας ἔνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώμης ἐξευθεσίας ἀρχής γε ἂς ἦσομεν τοῖς "Ελληστὶ μὴ οὕτως ἐγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακείσαται; καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐθνὸ κακὸν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ' ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελοῦσαν παραμένει πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἐποικών, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν κακονήμαχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεσμῶν ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι. ἦς αὐτῷ δὲ τοῦ ἐργοῦ καταψευδηθεῖς τὸ πρῶτον ἡμᾶς: Hude inserta πρὶς before ὑμᾶς.

1 cf. the taunt of Adimantus (Hdt. viii. lvii. 7), περὶ σοφημὸν ἔτι πατρίδος ναυμαχῆσεις, "You will fight for a country that is no more," and the famous answer of Themistocles.
help us earlier. We therefore maintain that we on our part conferred upon you a benefit at least as great as we received; for whereas the population of the cities from which you brought aid was still undisturbed and you could hope to possess them in the future, and your motive was fear for yourselves rather than for us—at any rate you did not come near so long as we were still unharmed—we on our part, setting forth from a city that was no more,¹ and risking our lives in behalf of one whose future hung upon but a slender hope, bore our part in saving both you and ourselves. But if we had acted as others did, and through fear of losing our territory had gone over to the Persians earlier in the war, or afterwards had lacked the courage to embark on our ships, in the conviction that we were already ruined, it would from that moment have been useless for you, with your inadequate fleet, to fight at sea, but the Persian's plans would have moved on quietly just as he wished.

LXXV. "Considering, then, Lacedaemonians, the zeal and sagacity of judgment which we displayed at that time, do we deserve to be regarded with this excessive jealousy by the Hellenes just on account of the empire we possess? And indeed we did not acquire this empire by force, but only after you had refused to continue to oppose what was left of the barbarian forces, and the allies came to us and of their own accord asked us to assume the leadership. It was under the compulsion of circumstances that

¹(Hdt. vili. lxi. 8), ἅν τῆς καὶ πόλις καὶ γῆ μέζων ἐπερ κελευσί ἵστ' ἄν ἔπισταν νέον σφί έπες πεπληρωμένην, "We have a city and a country greater than yours as long as we have two hundred ships fully manned."
προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐκ τοῦ, μᾶλλον μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὀφελίας, 4 καὶ οὐκ ἄσφαλέως ἦτο ἐδοκεῖ εἶναι, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθημένοις καὶ τινῶν καὶ ἤδη ὑποστάντων κατεστραμμένων, ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων, ἀλλ' ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνεντας κινδυνεύειν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς 5 ὑμᾶς ἐγίγνοντο): πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπιθυμον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων περὶ κινδύνων εὑ τιθεόται.

I.XXXVI. "Τιμεῖς γοῦν, ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὰς ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεις ἐπὶ τὸ ὑμῖν ὀφελῖμον καταστησάμενοι ἐξηγεῖσθε· καὶ εἰ τότε ὑπομείναντες διὰ παντὸς ἀπῆχθησθε ἐν τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, ὅσπερ ἡμεῖς, εὑ ἱσμεν μὴ ἂν ἦσον ὑμᾶς λυπηροὺς γενομένους τοῖς ξυμμάχοις καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ἂν ἡ ἀρχεῖν ἐγκρατῶς ἡ αὐτοῖς κινδυνεύειν. 2 σοῦτων οὐδ' ἡμεῖς θαυμαστῶν οὐδὲν πεποίηκαμεν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπεῖου τρόπου, εἰ ἀρχὴι τοῦ διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνείμεν ὑπὸ τῶν μεγίστων μυκηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὀφελίας, οὐδ' αὐτῷ τοῦ τοιοῦτος ὕπάρξαι, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καβεστῶτος τῶν ἦσον ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατεληγεσθαι, ἄξιοι τὸ ἀμα νομίζοντες εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν δοκοῦντες, μέχρι οὗ τὰ ξυμφέροντα λογιζόμενοι τῷ δικαίῳ λόγῳ νῦν.

1 Hude inserts τρίων before τῶν μεγίστων, with van Herwerden and Weil.
we were driven at first to advance our empire to its present state, influenced chiefly by fear, then by honour also, and lastly by self-interest as well; and after we had once incurred the hatred of most of our allies, and several of them had already revolted and been reduced to subjection, and when you were no longer friendly as before but suspicious and at variance with us, it no longer seemed safe to risk relaxing our hold. For all seceders would have gone over to you. And no man is to be blamed for making the most of his advantages when it is a question of the gravest dangers.

LXXVI. "At any rate you, Lacedaemonians, in the exercise of your leadership over the Peloponnesian states regulate their polities¹ according to your own advantage; and if in the Persian war you had held out to the end in the hegemony and had become unpopular in its exercise, as we did, you would certainly have become not less obnoxious to the allies than we are, and would have been compelled either to rule them with a strong hand or yourselves to risk losing the hegemony. Thus there is nothing remarkable or inconsistent with human nature in what we also have done, just because we accepted an empire when it was offered us, and then, yielding to the strongest motives—honour, fear, and self-interest—declined to give it up. Nor, again, are we the first who have entered upon such a course, but it has ever been an established rule that the weaker is kept down by the stronger. And at the same time we thought we were worthy to rule, and used to be so regarded by you also, until you fell to calculating what your interests were and resorted,

¹ i.e. by setting up oligarchies in them, cf. ch. xix.
χρῆσθε, ὃν οὐδεὶς πω παρατυχῶν ἱσχύι τι κτη-σασθαι προθείς τοῦ μη πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπετο. 3 ἐπαινεῖσθαι τε ἄξιοι, οἵτινες χαρησάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει ὡστε ἐτέρων ἀρχείν δικαιώ-τεροι ἦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν γένονται. 4 ἄλλους γ᾽ ἂν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας ὑπείρας ἢ μάλιστα εἰ τι μετριάζομεν, ἢμῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἀδοξία τὸ πλέον ἢ ἐπαινοῦσον οὐκ εἰκότως περιέστη.

LXXVII. “Καὶ ἐλασσοῦμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐνυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ἐνυμμάχους δικαίοις καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὑμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες 2 τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν. καὶ οὐδεὶς ὑπείρας ἢμῖν αὐτῶν, τοῖς καὶ ἀλλοίῳ ποι ἔχουσιν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἢσσοὺ ἡμῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπηκόους μετρίοις οὔσι δι᾽ ὅ τι τούτω οὐκ ὑπείδιεται: βιάζεσθαι γὰρ οἷς ἂν ἐξῆ, δικάζεσθαι οὐδὲν προσδέονται. 3 οἱ δὲ εἰδήσμενοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἂνομοῦ ὑπαρτία τὸ μη ὑπείρας χρῆναι ἡ γνώμη ἢ δυνάμει τῇ διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ῎πωσον ἐλασσωθῶσιν, οὐ τοῦ πλέονος μὴ στερισκόμενοι χάριν ἔχουσιν, ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς καθεπώτερον φέρουσιν ἢ εἰ ἀπὸ πρώτης ἀποθέμενοι τοῖν νόμον φανερῶς

1 These seem to have been disputes in matters of trade tried before federal courts elsewhere than in Athens; whereas τὰς ἐκλογὰς refers to compulsory jurisdiction which Athens enforced upon her allies in her own courts.
as you do now, to the plea of justice—which no one, when opportunity offered of securing something by main strength, ever yet put before force and abstained from taking advantage. And they are to be commended who, yielding to the instinct of human nature to rule over others, have been more observant of justice than they might have been, considering their power. At least, if others should seize our power, they would, we think, exhibit the best proof that we show some moderation; but in our case the result of our very reasonableness is, perversely enough, obloquy rather than commendation.

LXXVII. "For although we are at a disadvantage in suits with our allies arising out of commercial agreements, and although in our own courts in Athens, where we have established tribunals, the same laws apply to us as to them, we are thought to insist too much upon our legal rights. And none of our allies observes why it is that those who hold dominion elsewhere, and are less moderate than we are toward their subjects, are not reproached on this account. It is because those who may use might have no need to appeal to right. But if ever our allies, accustomed as they are to associate with us on the basis of equality, come off second best in any matter, however trivial, contrary to their own notion that it ought to be otherwise, whether their discomfiture is due to a legal decision or to the exercise of our imperial power, instead of being grateful that they have not been deprived of what is of greater moment, they are more deeply offended because of their trifling inequality than if we had from the first put aside all legal restraints

1 Namely, their equality before the law.
ἐπλεονεκτοῦμεν. ἐκεῖνος δὲ οὐδ' ἂν αὐτοὶ ἀντελεγοῦν ὡς οὐ χρεών τῶν ἦσσω τῷ κρατοῦντι
4 ὑποχωρεῖν. ἀδικούμενοι τε, ὡς ἐοικεν, οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται ἡ βιαζόμενοι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵσου δοκεῖ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι, τὸ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος καταναγκάζεσθαι. ὑπὸ γοῦν τοῦ Μήδου δεινότερα τοῦτων πάσχοντες ἰνεῖχοντο, ἡ δὲ ἠμέτρα ἀρχὴ χαλεπή δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰκότως·
6 τὸ παρὸν γὰρ αἰεὶ βαρὺ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις. ὑμεῖς γ' 
ἀν οὖν εἰ καθελόντες ἡμᾶς ἀρξαίτε, τάχα ἂν τὴν εὔνοιαν ἦν διὰ τὸ ἠμέτρου δέος εἰλήψατε μεταβάλωτε, εἰπερ οἷα καὶ τότε πρὸς τὸν Μήδου δι' ὄλγου ἠγγῇσαμενοὶ ὑπεδείξατε, ὁμοὶα καὶ νῦν γνώσεσθε. ἀμεικτα γὰρ τὰ τε καθ' ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε καὶ προσέτι ἐς ἐκάστος ἐξίων ὀὔτε τούτοις χρήται οὐθ' οἷς ἡ ἄλλη Ἐλλὰς νομίζει.

LXXVIII. “Βουλεύεσθε οὐν βραδέως ὡς οὐ 
περὶ βραχέων, καὶ μὴ ἀλλοτρίας γνώμαις καὶ 
ἐγκλήμασι πεισθέντες οἰκεῖον πόνον πρόσθησθε. 
τοῦ δὲ πολέμου τὸν παράλογον ὅσον ἐστί, πρὶν 
2 ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι προδιάγνωτε· μηκύνωμενος γὰρ 
φιλεῖ ἐς τύχας τὰ πολλά περίστασθαι, δόν ἵσον 
τε ἀπέχομεν καὶ ὄποτέρως ἔσται ἐν ἀδήλῳ κιν-
3 δυνεύεται. ἱόντες τε οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ ἐς τοὺς πολέ-
μους τῶν ἑργῶν πρῶτον ἔχουνται, ἃ χρὴν ὑστερον
and had openly sought our own advantage. In that case even they would not be setting up the claim that the weaker should not have to yield to the stronger. Men, it seems, are more resentful of injustice than of violence; for the former, they feel, is overreaching by an equal, whereas the latter is coercion by a superior. At any rate, they submitted to more grievous wrongs than these at the hands of the Persians, while our rule is hard to bear, as they think; and no wonder, for the present yoke is always heavy to subjects. Certainly you, should you overthrow us and obtain supremacy, would soon lose the good will which you have gained through fear of us—if indeed you mean again to show such temper as you gave a glimpse of at that time when for a little while you had the hegemony against the Persian.\footnote{\textit{e.g.} the conduct of Pausanias described in ch. cxxx.} For the institutions that prevail among you at home are incompatible with those of other peoples, and, besides, each one of you when he goes abroad uses neither these nor those which the rest of Greece is accustomed to.

LXXVIII. "Be slow, then, in your deliberations, for no slight matters are at stake; and do not, influenced by the opinions and accusations of others, burden yourselves needlessly with trouble of your own. Realise before you get into it how great are the chances of miscalculation in war. For when it is long drawn out, it is wont generally to resolve itself into a mere matter of chance; and over chance both sides equally have no control, and what the outcome will be is unknown and precarious. Most men rush into war and proceed to blows first, although that ought to be the last resort, and then,
δράν, κακοπαθοῦντες δὲ ἢδη τῶν λόγων ἀπτοῦνται.
4 ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ πω τοιαύτῃ ἄμαρτίᾳ ὀντες
οὐτ' αὐτὸλ οὖθ' ὑμᾶς ὀρώντες λέγομεν ὑμῖν, ἡως
ἐτὶ αὐθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἡ εὐβουλία, σπονδὰς
μὴ λύειν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὀρκοὺς, τὰ δὲ
5 διάφορα δίκη λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνθήκην, ἡ
θεοὺς τοὺς ὀρκίους μάρτυρας ποιούμενοι πειρασό-
μεθα ἀμύνεσθαι πολέμου ἀρχοντας ταύτη ἢ ἂν
ὑφηγήσθη.”

LXXIX. Τοιαύτα δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἔπει-
δὴ δὲ τῶν τε ξυμμάχων ἡκουσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
τὰ ἐγκλήματα τὰ ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τῶν
Ἄθηναίων ἄ ἔλεξαν, μεταστησάμενοι πάντας
ἐβουλεύοντο κατὰ σφάς αὐτοὺς περὶ τῶν παρόν-
των. καὶ τῶν μὲν πλεονῶν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἱ γνώμαι
ἐφεροῦν, ἀδίκειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡδη καὶ πολε-
μητέα εἶναι ἐν τάχει παρελθῶν δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ
βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν, ἀνὴρ καὶ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι
καὶ σώφρων, ἔλεξε τοιάδε.

LXXX. “Καὶ αὐτὸς πολλῶν ἡδῆ πολέμων
ἐμπειρὸς εἰμί, ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς ἐν
τῇ αὐτῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὅρω, ώστε μήτε ἀπειρίᾳ ἐπιθυμή-
σαι τινα τοῦ ἔργου, ὅπερ ἄν οἱ πολλοὶ πάθοιεν,
2 μήτε ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀσφαλέως νομίζαντα. εὑροίτε δ' ἄν
tὸν ἃ περὶ οὐ νῦν βουλεύεσθε οὐκ ἂν ἐλά-
χιστον γενόμενον, εἰ σωφρόνως τὶς αὐτῶν ἐκλογὴ-
3 ξοιτο. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς
when they are in distress, at length have recourse to words. But since we ourselves are not as yet involved in any such error and see that you are not, we urge you, while wise counsels are still a matter of free choice to both of us, not to violate the treaty or transgress your oaths, but to let our differences be settled by arbitration according to the agreement. But if you refuse, we shall invoke as witnesses the gods by whom our oaths were sworn, and shall endeavour to make reprisals on those who begin the war, following that path in which you have led the way."

LXXIX. Thus the Athenians spoke. And when the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges brought by the allies against the Athenians, and what the latter said in reply, they caused all others to withdraw and deliberated by themselves on the situation before them. And the opinions of the majority tended to the same conclusion, namely, that the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that they must go to war without delay. But Archidamus their king, a man reputed to be both sagacious and prudent, came forward and spoke as follows:

LXXX. "I have both myself, Lacedaemonians, had experience in my day of many wars, and I see men among you who are as old as I am; no one of them, therefore, is eager for war through lack of experience, as would be the case with most men, nor because he thinks it a good or a safe thing. And you would find that this war about which you are now deliberating is likely to prove no trifling matter, if one should reflect upon it soberly. For in a contest with the Peloponnesians or the neighbouring states.

1 By the Peloponnesians Thucydides means the Spartan alliance; the neighbouring states would then be the Peloponnesian states not in the alliance, e.g. Argos.
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ἀστυγείτωνας παρόμοιοι ἡμῶν ἡ ἀλκή, καὶ διὰ ταχέων οἶον τε ἐφ’ ἔκαστα ἐλθεῖν πρὸς δὲ ἄνδρας οὐ γὰρ τε ἐκάς ἔχουσι καὶ προσέτι θαλάσσης ἐμπειρότατοι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασίν ἁριστα ἐξήρτυνται, πλοῦτῳ τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὀπλοῖς καὶ ὄχλῳ ὅσοι οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνὶ γε χωρίῳ Ἕλληνικῷ ἔστιν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ξυμμάχους πολλοὺς φόρον ὑποτελεῖς ἔχουσι, πῶς χρῆ πρὸς τούτους ῥαδίως πόλεμον ἀρασθαι καὶ τίνι πιστεύσαντας ἀπαρασκεύους ἐπειχθῆναι;

4 πότερον ταῖς ναυσίν; ἄλλ’ ἢςσους ἐσμὲν εἰ δὲ μελετήσωμεν καὶ ἀντιπαρασκευασόμεθα, χρόνος ἐνέσται. ἄλλα τοῖς χρήμασιν; ἄλλα πολλῷ πλέον ἔτι τούτῳ ἐλλείπομεν καὶ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν οὔτε ἐτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν.

LXXXI. "Τάχ’, ἂν τις θαρσοῖς ὅτι τοῖς ὀπλοῖς αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ πλῆθει ὑπερφέρομεν, ὡστε

2 τὴν γῆν δηοῦν ἐπιφοιτῶντες. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλῃ γῇ ἐστὶ πολλῇ ἢς ἄρχουσι, καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ὁν

3 δέονται ἐπάξονται. εἰ δ’ αὐ τοῖς ξυμμάχους ἀφιστάναι πειρασόμεθα, δεῦσει καὶ τούτοις ναυσὶ

4 βοηθεῖν τὸ πλέον οὐσὶ νησιώταται. τῖς οὖν ἐσται ἡμῶν ὁ πόλεμος; εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἡ ναυσί κρατήσομεν ἡ τᾶς προσόδους ἀφαιρήσομεν ἂφ’ ὁν τὸ ναυτικὸν

5 τρέφουσι, βλαψόμεθα τὰ πλείω. κἂν τούτῳ οὔδε καταλύεσθαι ἐτὶ καλὸν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ

1 i.e. it is military rather than naval; similar, too, in the matter of wealth, equipment, absence of foreign resources, tributary allies, etc.

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our power is of the same type with theirs and we can be upon them quickly at every point; but when opposed to men whose territory is far away, who besides are beyond all others experienced in seamanship and are best equipped in all other respects, with wealth both private and public, ships, horses, arms and a larger population than is to be found in any other single district in Hellas, who have, moreover, numerous allies subject to tribute—against such men why should we lightly take up arms? In what do we place our trust that we should attack them unprepared? In our ships? But there we are inferior; and if we train and make ourselves ready to encounter them, that will take time. In our wealth then? But in that respect we are still more deficient, neither having money in the treasury of the state nor finding it easy to raise money from our private resources by taxation.2

LXXXI. "Perhaps some of us are emboldened by our superiority in arms and numbers, which enables us freely to invade and lay waste their territory. But there is other territory in plenty over which they hold sway, and they will import by sea whatever they need. And if, on the other hand, we try to induce their allies to revolt, we shall have in addition to protect them with a fleet, since they are chiefly islanders. What then will be the character of the war we shall be waging? Unless we can either win the mastery on the sea or cut off the revenues by which they support their navy, we shall get the worst of it. And, if it comes to that, we can no longer even conclude an honourable peace,

2 The poverty of the Peloponnesians is referred to by Pericles in ch. cxli. 3. The statement is true especially of the Spartans, but also of all the rest except the Corinthians.
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6 δόξομεν ἀρξαί μᾶλλον τῆς διαφορᾶς. μὴ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνη γε τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαιρόμεθα ὡς ταχὺ παυσθῆ-σεται ὁ πόλεμος, ἢν τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν τέμομεν. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισίν αὐτῶν ύπολίπομεν· οὕτως εἰκος Ἀθηναίους φρονήματι μήτε τῇ γῇ δουλεύσαι μήτε ὀσπερ ὑπείρους κατα-πλαγήναι τῷ πολέμῳ.

LXXXII. "Οὖ μὴν οὖδὲ ἀναίσθητος αὐτοὺς κελεύω τοὺς τε ξυμμάχους ἡμῶν εὰν βλάπτειν καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας μὴ καταφωρᾶν, ἀλλὰ ὅπλα μὲν μήπως κινεῖν, πέμπειν δὲ καὶ αἰτιᾶσθαι μήτε πόλεμον ἀγαν δηλοῦντας μήθη ώς ἐπιτρέψομεν, κἂν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερ' αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύνεσθαι ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῆ, καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, εἰ ποθὲν των ἡ ναυτικὸς ἡ χρημάτων δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα (ἀνεπίφθονον δὲ, ὅσοι ὀσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἑλλήνας μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους προσλα-βόντας διασωθήναι), καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἁμα ἐκπορ-2 ξόμεθα. καὶ ἢν μὲν ἐσακούσι τι προσβευομένων ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἄριστα· ἢν δὲ μή, διελθόντων ἐτὸν δύο καὶ τριῶν ἄμεινον ἤδη, ἢν δοκῇ, πεφραγμένοι
3 ἢμεν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς. καὶ ἵσως ὀρῶντες ἡμῶν ἤδη τὴν τε παρασκευὴν καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτὴ ὁμοία ὑπο-σημαινοντας μᾶλλον ἀν εἴκοσιν, καὶ γῆν ἐτι ἀτμη-τον ἔχοντες καὶ περὶ παρόντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὕτω
especially if it is believed that we rather than they began the quarrel. For we assuredly must not be buoyed up by any such hope as that the war will soon be over if we but ravage their territory. I fear rather that we shall even bequeath it to our children, so improbable it is that the Athenians, high spirited as they are, will either make themselves vassals to their land, or, like novices, become panic-stricken at the war.

LXXXII. "Yet assuredly I do not advise you that you should blindly suffer them to injure our allies and allow their plotting to go undetected, but rather that you should adopt the following course: Do not take up arms yet, but send envoys to them and make complaints, without indicating too clearly whether we shall go to war or put up with their conduct; also in the meantime, let us proceed with our own preparations, in the first place by winning allies to our side, Barbarians as well as Hellenes, in the hope of obtaining from some quarter or other additional resources in ships or money (for those who, like ourselves, are plotted against by the Athenians are not to be blamed if they procure their salvation by gaining the aid, not of Hellenes only, but even of Barbarians); and let us at the same time be developing our resources at home. And if they give any heed to our envoys, there could be nothing better; but if not, then, after the lapse of two or three years, we shall at length be better equipped to go against them, if we decide to do so. Or perhaps when they see our preparations, and that our words correspond thereto, they will be more inclined to yield, for they will both have their land still unravaged and their deliberations will concern goods that are still theirs.
4 ἐφθαρμένων Βουλευόμενοι. μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι 
νομίσητε τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν ἢ δύμηρον ἔχειν καὶ οὐχ 
ήσουν ὅσοφ ἀμείον ἔξειργασται ἢς φείδεσθαι 
χρή ὥς ἐπὶ πλείστον, καὶ μὴ ἐς ἀπόνοιαι κατα-
δείσαντας ἀυτοὺς ἀλληπτοτέρους ἔχειν. εἰ γὰρ 
ἀπαράσκευοι τοῖς τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐγκλήμασι 
ἐπείχθέντες τεμοῦμεν αὐτήν. ὅρατε ὅπως μὴ 
αἰσχίον καὶ ἀπορῶτερον τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πράξο-
μεν. ἐγκλήματα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πόλεων καὶ 
ἰδιωτῶν ὅλον τε καταλύσαι πόλεμον δὲ ξύμπαν-
τας ἀραμένους ἐνεκα τῶν ἰδίων, δυ σοὶ ὑπάρχει 
eίδέναι καθ' ὃ τι χωρίσει, ὦ ῥάδιοι εὐπρεπῶς 
θέσθαι.

LXXXIII. "Καὶ ἀναυδρία μηδενὶ πόλλον μὲν 
2 πόλει μὴ ταχὺ ἐπελθεὶν δοκεῖτο εἶναι. εἰςὶ γὰρ 
καὶ ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἔλασσος χρήματα φέροντες 
ξύμμαχοι, καὶ ἔστεν ὁ πόλεμος οὐχ ὄπλων τὸ 
πλέον, ἄλλα δαπάνης, δε' ῥ' τὰ ὅπλα ὤφελει, 
3 ἅλλως τε καὶ ἥπειρότατες πρὸς θαλασσίους. 
πο-
ρισώμεθα οὖν πρῶτον αὐτήν, καὶ μὴ τοῖς τῶν 
ξυμμάχων λόγοις πρότερον ἐπαιρώμεθα, ὦτερ δὲ 
καὶ τῶν ἀποβαίνοντων τὸ πλέον ἐπ' ἀμφότερα 
τῆς αἰτίας ἔξομεν, οὕτω καὶ καθ' ἱσυχίαν τι 
αὐτῶν προϊδομεν.

LXXXIV. "Καὶ τὸ βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον, ὅ μέμ-
φοιται μάλιστα ἡμῶν, μὴ αἰσχύνεσθε. σπεύ-
δοντες τε γὰρ σχολαίτερον ἄν παύσαισθε διὰ τὸ 
ἀπαράσκευοι ἐγχειρεῖν, καὶ ἅμα ἐλευθέραν καὶ 
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and as yet not ruined. For do not regard their land as anything but a hostage for us to hold, and a better hostage the better it is cultivated. You should therefore spare it as long as possible, instead of making them desperate and thus having a more intractable foe to deal with. For if, without adequate preparation, egged on by the complaints of our allies, we shall ravage their territory, beware lest we adopt a course which might rather result in disgrace and difficulties for the Peloponnesus. For complaints, indeed, whether brought by states, or by individuals, may possibly be adjusted; but when a whole confederacy, for the sake of individual interests, undertakes a war of which no man can foresee the issue, it is not easy to end it with honour.

LXXXIII. "And let no man think it pusillanimous that many states should hesitate to attack a single city. For they also have allies not less numerous than ours who pay tribute; and war is a matter not so much of arms as of money, for it is money alone that makes arms serviceable, especially when an inland opposes a maritime power. Let us therefore provide ourselves with money first, instead of being carried away prematurely by the eloquence of our allies; and, just as it is we who shall bear the greater part of the responsibility for the consequences, whether for good or evil, so let it be our task also calmly to get some forecast of them.

LXXXIV. "And so be not ashamed of the slowness and dilatoriness for which they censure us most; for speed in beginning may mean delay in ending, because you went into the war without preparation, and, moreover, in consequence of our policy we have

1 i.e. than the opposite course.
εὐδοξοτάτην πόλιν διὰ παντός νεμόμεθα. κα. δύναται μάλιστα σωφροσύνη ἐμφρον τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι. 2 μόνοι γὰρ δὲ αὐτὸ εὐπραγίας τε οὕκ ἔξυβρίζομεν καὶ ξυμφοραῖς ἤσσον ἑτέρων εἴκομεν, τῶν τε ἔξω ἐπαίνω ἐξοτρυνόντων ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὰ δεινὰ παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐπαιρόμεθα ἡδονῆ, καὶ ἦν τις ἀρὰ Ἰῶν κατηγορία παροξύνη, οὐδὲν δὴ μᾶλλον 3 ἀχθεσθέντες ἀνεπείσθημεν. πολεμικοὶ τε καὶ εὐβουλοὶ διὰ τὸ εὐκροιμον γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν ὅτι αἰῶνως σωφροσύνης πλείστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐφυχία, εὐβουλοὶ δὲ ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι καὶ ἐξ ἀληθῶτητι σωφρονέστερον ἡ ὡστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν, καὶ μή, τὰ ἤχεια ξυνετοὶ ἄγαν ὄντες, τὰς τῶν πολεμιῶν παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομιώς ἔργον ἑπέξειναι, νομίζειν δὲ τὰς τε διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίους εἶναι καὶ τὰς προσπι- 4 πτούσας τέχνας οὗ λόγῳ διαρετάς. αἰεὶ δὲ ὃς πρὸς εὖ ὑβουλομένους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἔργῳ παρασκευα- ξόμεθα: καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἑκείνων ὡς ἀμαρτησομένων ἐχεῖν δεῖ τὰς ἔλπιδας, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀσφα- λῶς προνοομένων, πολὺ τε διαφέρειν οὗ δεῖ

1 The speaker uses εὔκροιμον, rather than βραδύ employed by the critics of Sparta, to suggest the contrast with impulsiveness or undue haste.
ever inhabited a city at once free and of fairest fame. And, after all, this trait in us may well be in the truest sense intelligent self-control, for by reason of it we alone do not become insolent in prosperity or succumb to adversity as much as others do; and when men try to goad us by praise into dangerous enterprises against our better judgment, we are not carried away by their flattery, or, if anyone goes so far as to attempt to provoke us to action by invective, we are none the more moved to compliance through vexation. Indeed, it is because of our orderly temper\(^1\) that we are brave in war and wise in counsel—brave in war, because self-control is the chief element in self-respect, and respect of self, in turn, is the chief element in courage; and wise in counsel, because we are educated too rudely to despise the laws and with too much severity of discipline to disobey them, and not to be so ulteriorly clever in useless accomplishments\(^2\) as to disparage our enemy’s military preparations in brave words and then fail to go through with the business with corresponding deeds, but rather to consider that the designs of our neighbours are very much like our own and that what may befall from fortune\(^3\) cannot be determined by speeches. But it is our way always to make our preparations by deeds, on the presumption that we go against opponents who are wise in counsel; and we ought never to build our hopes on the chance that they are going to make mistakes, but on the belief that we ourselves are taking safe precautions. And we must not believe that man

\(^1\) With a glance at the Athenians’ attention to culture, especially the art of elegant speech.

\(^2\) cf. the Corinthians’ charge, ch. lxxix. 5, that the Spartans trusted to chance.
νομίζειν ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρώπον, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ὅστις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαϊοτάτοις παιδεύεται.

LXXXV. "Ταῦτας οὖν ἂς οἱ πατέρες τε ἡμῶν παρέδοσαν μελέτας καὶ αὐτοὶ διὰ παντὸς ὦφελούμενοι ἔχομεν μὴ παρόμεν, μηδὲ ἐπειχθέντες ἐν βραχεῖ μορίῳ ἡμέρας περὶ πολλῶν σωμάτων καὶ χρημάτων καὶ πόλεων καὶ δόξης βουλεύσωμεν, ἀλλὰ καθὼς ἡσυχίαν. ἔξεστι δ’ ἡμῖν μᾶλλον ἔτε-2 ρων διὰ ἴσχυν. καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πέμπτε μὲν περὶ τῆς Ποτείδαιας, πέμπτε δὲ περὶ ὧν οἱ ξύμμαχοι φασίν ἀδικείσθαι, ἀλλὸς τε καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων αὐτῶν δίκαις δοῦναι· ἔπι δὲ τὸν διδόντα οὐ πρότερον νόμιμον ὡς ἐπ’ ἀδικοῦντα ἰέναι. παρασκευάζεσθε δὲ τὸν πόλεμον ἄμα. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ κράτιστα βουλεύσεσθε καὶ τοῖς ἑναντίοις φοβερώτατα."

3 Καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀρχίδαμος τοιαῦτα εἶπεν· παρελ-θῶν δὲ Σθενελάδας τελευταίος, εἰς τῶν ἐφόρων τότε ὄν, ἐλεξέν τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις ¹ ὅδε.

LXXXVI. "Τοὺς μὲν λόγους τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐ γιγνώσκω· ἐπαινεῖσαντες γὰρ πολλὰ ἑαυτοὺς οὐδαμοῦ ἀντείποιν ὡς οὔκ ἀδικοῦσι τοὺς ἡμετέρους ξυμμάχους καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον· καίτοι εἰ πρὸς τοὺς Μήδους ἐγένοντο ἁγαθοὶ τότε, πρὸς δ’ ἡμᾶς κακοὶ νῦν, διπλασίας ξημίας ἄξιοὶ 2 εἰσίν, ὅτι ἀντ’ ἁγαθῶν κακοὶ γεγένηται. ἡμεῖς δὲ ὁμοίοι καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἔσμεν, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμά-

¹ Hude deletes with Krüger.
differs much from man,¹ but that he is best who is trained in the severest discipline.

LXXXV. "These are the practices which our fathers bequeathed to us and we ourselves have maintained from the beginning to our profit; let us not abandon them, nor allow ourselves in a small portion of one day to be hurried into a decision which involves many lives, much money, many cities and a good name; but let us deliberate at our leisure. And this course is permitted to us more than to the supporters of the other view because of our strength. And send envoys to the Athenians to take up the question of Potidæa, and also to take up the matters wherein our allies claim that they are wronged. The chief reason for this is that they are ready² to submit to arbitration, and it is not lawful to proceed forthwith against one who offers arbitration as though against a wrong-doer. But all the while prepare yourselves for the war. This decision will be best for yourselves and will inspire most fear in your foes."

Thus spoke Archidamus, and finally Sthenelaidas, one of the ephors at that time, came forward and addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows:

LXXXVI. "The long speeches of the Athenians I cannot understand; for though they indulged in much praise of themselves, they nowhere denied that they are wronging our allies and the Peloponnesus. And yet, if they conducted themselves well against the Persians in former times but are now conducting themselves ill toward us, they deserve two-fold punishment, because they used to be good and have become bad. But we are the same now as we were

¹ cf. the Corinthians' praise of Athenian superiority, ch. lxx.
² cf. ch. lxxxvii. 4.
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χοὺς, ἵν σωφρονώμεν, οὐ περιοψόμεθα ἀδικουμένους οὐδὲ μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν· οὶ δὲ οὐκέτι

3 μέλλουσι κακῶς πάσχειν. ἀλλοις μὲν ἡρ χρήματά ἐστι καὶ νῆς καὶ ἵππωι, ἥμιν δὲ ἦμμαχοι ἀγαθοὶ, οὐς οὐ παραδοτέα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἑστίν, οὐδὲ δίκαιος καὶ λόγος διακριτέα μὴ λόγῳ καὶ αὐτοῖς βλαπτομένους, ἀλλὰ τιμωρητέα ἐν τάξει καὶ παντὶ σθένει. καὶ ὡς ἡμᾶς πρέπει βουλευσθαί ἀδικουμένους μηδείς διδασκέτω, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον πρέπει πολὺν χρόνον

5 βουλευόσθαι. ψηφίζεσθε οὖν, ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἥξιος τῆς Σπάρτης τὸν πόλεμον καὶ μῆτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίοις ἑκτε μείζους γίγνεσθαι, μῆτε τοὺς ἐμμαχοὺς καταπροδιδόμενοι, ἀλλὰ ἐξὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπίωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας."

LXXXVII. Τοιαῦτα λέξας ἐπεψήφισεν αὐτὸς ἐφορὸς οὐν ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

2 ο δὲ (κρίνοντες γὰρ βοὴ καὶ οὐ ψήφῳ) οὐκ ἐφή διαγγελόσκειν τὴν βοὴν ποτέρα μείζων, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς φανερῶς ἀποδεικνυμένους τὴν γιῷ μὲν ἐς τὸ πολέμειν μᾶλλον ὀρμήσαι ἔλεξεν: "Ὅτω μὲν ὑμῶν, ὁ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, δοκοῦσι λειύσωμε οἱ σπονδαί καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἀδικεῖν, ἀναστήτω ἐς ἐκεῖνο τὸ χωρίον," δείξας τι χωρίον αὐτοῖς, "ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ δοκοῦσιν, ἐς τά ἐπὶ θάτερα." 3 ἀναστάντες δὲ διέστησαν, καὶ πολλῷ πλείους 4 ἐγένοντο οἰς ἐδόκοιν αἱ σπονδαί λειύσωμε. προσ-

1 Hude deletes, after Fr. Müller.
then, and if we are in our right minds, we shall not permit our allies to be wronged or even put off avenging their wrongs, since they cannot longer put off suffering them. Others, indeed, may have money in abundance and ships and horses, but we have brave allies, and they must not be delivered over to the Athenians; nor must we seek redress by means of legal processes and words when it is not in word only that we ourselves are being injured, but we must avenge them speedily and with all our might. And let no man tell us that it befits us to deliberate when a wrong is being done us; nay, it befits rather those who intend to do us a wrong to deliberate a long time. Vote, therefore, Lacedaemonians, for the war as beseems the dignity of Sparta, and do not permit the Athenians to become too great; and let us not prove false to our allies, but let us with the favour of the gods go against the wrong-doer."

LXXXVII. When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken, he himself, since he was an ephor, put the vote to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians. Now in their voting they usually decide by shout and not by ballot, but Sthenelaidas said that he could not distinguish which shout was the louder, and wishing to make the assembly more eager for war by a clear demonstration of their sentiment, he said: "Whoever of you, Lacedaemonians, thinks that the treaty has been broken and the Athenians are doing wrong, let him rise and go to yonder spot (pointing to a certain spot), and whoever thinks otherwise, to the other side." Then they rose and divided, and those who thought the treaty had been broken were found to be in a large majority. Then they called in the

1 cf. ch. lxxx. 3.
καλέσαντες τε τοὺς ἐποιοῦν ὑπ' οἷον ἤδεουν ὁδοὺς δοκοῦν ἄξιον οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι, βουλεύσασθαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πάντας ξυμμάχους παρακαλέσαντες ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπαγαγείν, ὅπως κοινὴ βουλευσόμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ποιῶντα, ἢν δοκῆν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ' οἷον διαπραξάμενοι ταύτα, καὶ οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι πρόσβεις υστερὸν ἐφ' ἄπερ ἠθοπ ἡμερισίαν.

6 Ἡ δὲ διαγρώμη αὐτή τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ τάς σπονδάς λελύσθαι ἐγένετο ἐν τετάρτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἐτεῖ τῶν τριακοντοτείχων σπονδῶν προκεχώρηκιν, αὐτῷ ἐγενότου μετὰ τὰ Εὐβοίκικα. Λιθογνήμων ἐφησάντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τάς σπονδάς λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι, οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις ὧν φοβοῦμεν τοὺς 'Αθηναίους μὴ ἐπὶ μείζον δυνηθῶσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλά τῆς Ελλάδος ὑποχείρια ἴδη ὄντα.

Λιθογνήμων. Ὡν γὰρ 'Αθηναίοι τρόπῳ τοιῷθεν ἠθοπ ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐν οἷς νυξήθησαν. ἐπειδὴ Μῆδοι ἀνεχθέντες ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης νυκτὸς ἀνέκδοτοι καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ὑπὸ 'Ελλήνων καὶ οἱ καταφυγόντες αὐτῶν ταῖς ναυσίν ἐς Μυκάλην διεβάρησαν. Λεωτυχίδης μὲν ὁ βασίλευς τῶν Λακεδαιμόνων, ὥσπερ ἠγεῖτο τῶν ἐν Μυκάλῃ 'Ελλήνων, ἀπεχώρησεν ἐπ' οἷκον ἔχουν τοὺς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἡμῖν ξυμμάχους· οἱ δὲ 'Αθηναίοι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ

1 τοῦ τάς σπονδάς λελύσθαι, omitted by Hude, following van Herwerden.
allies and told them that, in their opinion, the Athenians were doing wrong, but that they wished to summon the whole body of the allies and put the vote to them, in order that they might all deliberate together and together undertake the war, if it should be so decided. And so the allies who were there went back home, having brought these matters to a settlement, and so did the Athenian envoys later, after they had finished the business on which they had come.

This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year from the beginning of the thirty years' truce, which was made after the Euboean war. And the vote of the Lacedaemonians that the treaty had been broken and that they must go to war was determined, not so much by the influence of the speeches of their allies, as by fear of the Athenians, lest they become too powerful, seeing that the greater part of Hellas was already subject to them.

LXXXIX. For it was in the following manner that the Athenians found themselves face to face with those circumstances in dealing with which they rose to greatness. When the Persians had retreated from Europe, defeated on both sea and land by the Hellenes, and those of them who with their ships had taken refuge at Mycale had perished there, Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was commander of the Hellenes at Mycale, went home with the allies from the Peloponnesus. But the Athenians, together with the allies from Ionia and the

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1 A general convocation of the allies; at this time only part of them had been invited, according to ch. lxvii. See ch. cxix., where the plan is carried out.  
2 445 B.C.  
3 cf. ch. cxiv.  
4 At Salamis, Plataea, Mycale.
The contingents from the islands and the coast of Asia Minor, who, in consequence of the battle at Mycale and the
Hellespont, who were already in revolt from the King, remained at their task and besieged Sestos, which was held by the Persians; and passing the winter there they took it, as it had been deserted by the Barbarians; and after that the contingents of the several cities sailed away from the Hellespont. But the Athenian people, when the Barbarians had departed from their territory, straightway began to fetch back their wives and their children and the remnant of their household goods from where they had placed them for safety, and to rebuild the city and the walls; for of the encircling wall only small portions were left standing, and most of the houses were in ruins, only a few remaining in which the chief men of the Persians had themselves taken quarters.

XC. But the Lacedaemonians, perceiving what was in prospect, came on an embassy, partly because they themselves would have preferred to see neither the Athenians nor anyone else have a wall, but more because their allies urged them on through apprehension, not only of the size of the Athenian navy, which had hitherto not been large, but also of the daring they had shown in the Persian war. So they requested them not to rebuild their walls, but rather to join with them in razing the walls of whatsoever towns outside the Peloponnesus had them standing, giving no indication of their real purpose or of their suspicion with regard to the Athenians, but representing that the Barbarian, if he should attack them again, would not have any stronghold to make his advance of the victors to Abydos, had been received into the Hellenic alliance.

1 Salamis, Aegina, and Troezen; cf. Hdt. viii. xii.
ἀπὸ ἔχυροῦ ποθεν, ὅσπερ νῦν ἐκ τῶν ὸμβῶν, ὀρμᾶσθαι, τὴν τε Πελοπόννησον πάσιν ἐφασαν
3 ἀναχώρησιν τε καὶ ἀφορμήν ικανήν εἶναι. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι Θεμιστοκλέους γνώμη τους μὲν Δακε
dαιμονίους ταύτ' εἰπόντας, ἀποκρινάμενοι ὅτι πέμ
ψουσιν ὡς αὐτοὺς πρέσβεις περὶ ὅν λέγοισιν,
εὕρησιν ἀπῆλλαξαν ἐαυτὸν δ' ἐκέλευεν ἀποστέλ
λειν ὡς τάχιστα ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐς τὴν Δακεδαί
μονα, ἄλλους δὲ πρὸς ἐαυτὸ ἐλομένους πρέσβεις
μὴ εὕρησιν ἐκπέμπτειν, ἀλλ' ἐπισχεῖν μέχρι τοσοῦ
tου ἐως ἄν τὸ τεῖχος ικανὸν ἰρωσιν ὅστε ἀπομα
χεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀναγκαστάτου ὑψος τεῖχιζειν δὲ
πάντας πανδημεί τους ἐν τῇ πόλει,1 καὶ αὐτοὺς
καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παιῶνας, φειδομένους τῇ ἡμέρᾳ
μὴ ἔπεσιν οἰκοδομήματος ὅθεν τῷ ὡφελίᾳ
ἐσται ἐς τὸ ἔργον, ἄλλα καθαροῦντας πάντα.
καὶ ὁ μὲν ταύτα διδάξας καὶ ὑπειπών, τάλλα ὅτι
5 αὐτὸς τάκει πράξει, ἀγέτο. καὶ ἐς τὴν Δακεδαί
μονα ἔλθων οὐ προσῆκε πρὸς τάς ἄρχας, ἄλλα
dιήγη καὶ προμαζίσετο. καὶ ὡς τοῖς αὐτῶν
ἐρωτοῖς τῶν ἐν τελεί ὄντων ὅ τι οὐκ ἔπερχεται ἐπὶ
tὸ κοινὸν, ἐφ' ὅτι ξυμπρέσβες ἀναμένειν, ἄσχο
λίας δὲ τίνος οὕσης αὐτοὺς ὑπολειφθῆναι, προσ
dέχεσθαι μὲντοι ἐν τάχει ἥξειν καὶ θανμάζειν ὡς
οὕτω πάρεισιν.

ΧΣΙ. Οἱ δὲ ἀκούοντες τὸ μὲν Θεμιστοκλεί
ἐπείδοτο διὰ φιλίαν, τῶν 2 δὲ ἅλλων ἀφικνου
μένων καὶ σαφῶς κατηγοροῦντων ὅτι τεῖχιζειν

1 τούτω ἐν τῇ πόλει, Krüger brackets, followed by Hude.
kaí αὐτοῦ ἅ... παῖδα also bracketed by Hude, as not read by
Schol.

2 Hude adopts Shilleto's conjecture αὐστητῶν.
base of operations, as lately he had made Thebes; the Peloponnesus, they added, was large enough for all, both as a retreat and as a base of operations. To these proposals of the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, replied that they would send ambassadors to Sparta to discuss these matters, and so got rid of them without delay. Themistocles then proposed that they should send himself as speedily as possible to Lacedaemon; that they should then choose other ambassadors in addition, but, instead of sending them immediately, should wait until they should have raised the wall to such a height as was absolutely necessary for defence; and that the whole population of the city, men, women, and children, should take part in the wall-building, sparing neither private nor public edifice that would in any way help to further the work, but demolishing them all. After he had given these instructions, and an intimation that, for the rest, he would himself look after matters at Sparta, he departed. And when he came to Lacedaemon he did not present himself to the magistrates, but kept putting it off and making excuses; and whenever any one of those in authority asked why he did not come before the people, he said that he was waiting for his colleagues, who had stayed behind on account of some urgent business; he expected them however to come soon, and wondered that they were not already there.

XCI. And the Lacedaemonian magistrates were disposed to be content with this reply by reason of their friendship for Themistocles; but when everybody who came from Athens declared quite positively
τε καὶ ἡδη ὤψος λαμβάνει, οὐκ εἶχον ὅπως χρὴ
2 ἀπιστήσατι. γνως δὲ ἐκεῖνος κελεύει αὐτοὺς μὴ
lógous μάλλον παράγεσθαι ἢ πέμψαι σφῶν αὐ-
τῶν ἀνδράς οὐτίνες χρηστοὶ καὶ πιστῶς ἀναγγε-
3 λάσι σκεψάμενοι. ἀποστέλλουσιν οὖν, καὶ περὶ
αὐτῶν ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κρύφα
πέμπει κελεύων ὥς ἦκιστα ἐπιφανῶς κατασχεῖν
καὶ μὴ ἀφεῖναι πρὶν ἂν αὐτοὶ πάλιν κομισθῶσιν
(ἢδ' ἡγαρ καὶ ἦκον αὐτῷ οἱ ξυμπρέσβεις, Ἀβρώ-
νιχὸς τε ὁ Λυσικλέους καὶ Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσι-
μάχου, ἀγγέλλουτε ἤχειν ἰκανῶς τὸ τείχος);
ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ μὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι σφᾶς, ὅποτε
4 σαφῶς ἀκούσθαι, οὐκέτι ἄφωσιν. οἱ τε σοῦν
Ἀθηναίοι τοὺς πρέσβεις διασπερ ἐπεστάλη κατεἶ-
χον, καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐπελθὼν τοὺς Λακεδαι-
μονίους ἐνταῦθα δὴ φανερῶς εἶπεν στὶ ἡ μὲν πόλις
σφῶν τετείχισται ἡδὴ ἢςτε ἰκανὴ εἶναι σφίξειν
τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας, εἰ δὲ τι βούλονται Λακεδαι-
μόνιοι ἢ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρεσβεύσθαι παρὰ σφᾶς
ὡς πρὸς διαγνωσκόντας τὸ λοιπὸν ἵναι τά τε
5 σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐξήμφορα καὶ τὰ κοινά. τὴν τε ἡγά-
ρο πόλιν ὅτε ἐδόκει ἐκλιπεῖν ἄμεινον εἶναι καὶ ἐς τὰς
ναῦς ἔσβηναι, ἄνει ἐκεῖνων ἐφασαν1 γυνότες τολ-
μῆσαι, καὶ δόσα αὐ μετ' ἐκεῖνων βουλεύσθαι,
6 οὕδενος ὀστεροὶ οὐνόμη φανήναι. δοκεῖν οὖν σφίς
καὶ νῦν ἄμεινον εἶναι τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν τείχος

1 Hude omits with Lex. Vindob.
2 Deleted by Krüger, followed by Hude.
that the wall was going up and was already attaining height, they did not know how to discredit it. Themistocles, however, when he perceived this bade them not to be misled by reports, but rather to send some trustworthy men of their own number who would see for themselves and bring back a faithful report. They did so, and Themistocles sent word secretly to the Athenians to detain the envoys as covertly as possible and not to let them go until they themselves returned—for by this time his colleagues, Habronichus son of Lysicles and Aristides son of Lysimachus, had joined him, with the news that the wall was high enough—the reason for his precaution being that he was afraid the Lacedaemonians, when they heard the truth, would then refuse to let them go. Accordingly the Athenians detained the envoys as they were directed, and Themistocles, appearing before the Lacedaemonians, at length told them frankly that the city was now walled and therefore in a position to protect its inhabitants, and that if the Lacedaemonians or their allies cared to negotiate any matter with them they must hereafter come to them with the understanding that they were dealing with men who were fully aware of what was for their own and the general interest. For when they thought it best to abandon their city and embark on their ships, they had resolved, said the ambassadors, upon this bold step without the advice of the Lacedaemonians, and again in all matters in which the Athenians took counsel with the Lacedaemonians they had shown themselves inferior to none in judgment. Accordingly in the present instance also it seemed to them best that their city should have a wall, and that this course would be of great
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ἐχειν, καὶ ἰδία τοὺς πολίτας καὶ ἐς τοὺς πάντας 7 ξυμμάχους ὠφελιμώτερον ἐσεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ὅλων τῇ εἶναι μὴ ἀπὸ αὐτιτόλου παρασκευῆς ὁμοίων τῇ ἱσον ἐς τὸ κοινὸν βουλεύεσθαι. Ἡ πάντας οὖν ἀτείχίστοις ἐφ' χρὴναξ ἄμμαχειν ἦ καὶ τάδε νομίζειν ὁρθῶς ἐχειν.

XCII. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀκούσαντες ὁργῆν μὲν φανερὰν οὔκ ἔποιεύντο τοῖς 'Αθηναίοις (οὔδε γὰρ ἐπὶ κοιλήμη, ἀλλὰ γρώμης παραινέσει δῆθεν τῷ κοινῷ ἐπρεσβεύσαντο, ἀμὴ δὲ καὶ προσφυλεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ τότε διὰ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μῆδον προθυμίαν τὰ μάλιστα αὐτῶς ἐτύγχανον), τῆς μέντοι βουλήσεως ἀμαρτάνοντες ἁδήλως ἠχοῦντο, οἳ τε προσβείς ἐκατέρων ἀπῆλθον ἐπ' οἷκον ἀνεπικλήτως.

XCIII. Τούτω τῷ τρόπῳ οἱ 'Αθηναίοι τὴν πόλιν ἔτειχίσαν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, καὶ δὴ λή ἡ οἰκοδομία ἐτελεύτατο, καὶ δήλω ἐστὶν ὅτι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐγένετο. οἱ γὰρ θεμέλιοι παντοίων λίθων ὑπόκεινται καὶ οὐ ξυνεργασμένων ἔστων ἢ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκαστοὶ 1 ποτε προσέφερον, πολλαὶ τε στῆλαι ἀπὸ σηματον καὶ λίθου εἰργασμένου ἐγκατέλεγον. μείζον γὰρ ὁ περίβολος πανταχώ ἐξήκθη τῆς πόλιος.

1 Hude reads ἐκαστον with C.

The remains of the walls now seen around the Peiraeus are not those of the Themistoclean walls, which were destroyed at the end of the Peloponnesian War, but of the walls built by Conon in 393. A small part of these remains,
advantage both to themselves in particular, and to the whole body of the allies; for it was impossible for them, he added, to have equal or similar weight in the general councils of the alliance except on the basis of a military strength that was a match for theirs. Therefore, he concluded, the members of the alliance should either dispense with their walls one and all, or regard this act of the Athenians as justified.

XCII. On hearing this, the Lacedaemonians did not openly show any resentment against the Athenians; for they had sent their embassy to Athens, not to stop the work, but to offer, as they professed, a suggestion in the common interest, and besides, they entertained at that time the most friendly feelings for the Athenians on account of their zeal in opposing the Persians; since, however, they had failed in their purpose, they were secretly vexed. So the envoys on either side returned home without making any formal complaint.

XCIII. It was in this manner that the Athenians got their wall built in so short a time, and even to-day the structure shows that it was put together in haste.¹ For the lower courses consist of all sorts of stones, in some cases not even hewn to fit but just as they were when the several workers brought them, and many columns from grave monuments and stones wrought for other purposes were built in. For the circuit-wall of the city was extended in on the flat ground north of the Peiraeus toward the mainland, answers exactly to Thucydides' description—being of solid stone and over 25 feet thick—but most of the remains are of two outer faces of stone, the intermediate spaces filled in with rubble and earth. On Munychia there is no trace anywhere of a solid wall of the age of Themistocles.
τοῦ ὑπὸ καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ λοιπὰ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν (ὑπήρκτο δ' αὕτου πρώτους ἐπὶ τὴς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς ἦς κατ' ἑναυτὸν Ἀθηναίων ἦρξε), νομίζον τὸ τε χωρίον καλὸν εἶναι λιμένας ἐχον τρεῖς αὐτοφυεῖς, καὶ αὐτοὺς ναυτικοὺς γεγενημένους μέγα προφέρειν ἐς τὸ

κτῆσασθαί δύναμιν (τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστὶ), καὶ τὴν

ἀρχὴν εὕθως ξυγκατεσκεύαξεν. καὶ ψυκοδομησαν τῇ ἐκείνου γρώμη τὸ πάχος τοῦ τεῖχους ὅπερ νῦν ἔτη δηλῶν ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν Πειραιὰν δύο γὰρ ἀμαξίων ἐναντίας ἄλληλαις τοὺς λίθους ἐπήγγον, ἐντὸς δὲ οὔτε χάλιξ οὔτε πηλὸς ἢν, ἄλλα ξυνψυκοδομημένοι μεγάλοι λίθοι καὶ ἐντομὴ ἐγγώνιοι, σιδηρῶν πρὸς ἄλληλους τὰ ἔξωθεν καὶ μολύβδῳ δεδεμένοι, τὸ δὲ ψῆφος ἦμισυ μάλιστα ἐτελέσθη οὔ διενοεῖτο.

ἐβούλετο γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει ἀφιστάναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπίζυμας, ἀνθρώπων τε ἐνομίζειν ὀδύρον καὶ τῶν ἀχρειστάτων ἀρκεσιν τὴν φυλακήν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἑσβησεσθαι.

ταῖς γὰρ ναυσὶ μάλιστα προσέκειτο, ἵδιν, ὡς ἐμὸ δοκεῖ, τῆς βασιλείας στρατιὰς τὴν κατὰ βάλασσαν ἐφοδον εὐπορωτέραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν οὕσων τὸν τε Πειραιᾶ ὀφελιμώτερον ἐνομίζει τῆς ἀνω πόλεως, καὶ πολλάκις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρῆ-

1 The Peiraeus, here in widest sense, is the peninsula, the heart of which is the steep height of Munychia, from which
every direction, and on this account they laid hands upon everything alike in their haste. Themistocles, moreover, persuaded them also to finish the walls of the Peiraeus, a beginning of which had been made during the year in which he was archon of the Athenians; for he considered that the Peiraeus with its three natural harbours was a fine site to develop and that to have become a nation of seamen would be a great advantage to the Athenians themselves, with a view to their acquisition of power—indeed it was he who first dared declare that they must apply themselves to the sea—and so he immediately took the first steps in this undertaking. And following his advice they built the wall round the Peiraeus of the thickness that may still be observed; for two wagons carrying the stones could meet and pass each other. Inside, moreover, there was neither rubble nor mortar, but stones of large size hewn square were closely laid together, bound to one another on the outside with iron clamps and lead. But the wall was completed to only about half of the height he originally intended, for what he wished was to be able to repel the assaults of the enemy by the very height and thickness of the wall, and he thought that a few men, and these the least effective, would suffice to guard it, while all the rest might man the ships. For Themistocles devoted himself particularly to the navy, because, as it seems to me, he had observed that the approach of the King’s forces was easier by sea than by land; and he thought that the Peiraeus would prove more serviceable than the upper city, and often advised the Athenians, if ever they it stretches into the sea like an indented leaf, forming three natural basins—the Peiraeus, Zea, Munychia.

2 Others render: immediately began to help them to lay the foundation of their empire.
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υεί, ἡν ἄρα ποτὲ κατὰ γῆν βιασθῶσι, καταβάντας ἐς αὐτὸν ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς ἀπαντας ἀνθίστασθαι.

8 Ἀθηναίοι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐτείχισθησαν καὶ τὰλλα κατεσκευάζοντο εὔθὺς μετὰ τὴν Μήδαν ἀναχώρησιν.

XCIV. Παυσανίας δὲ ὁ Κλεομβροτος ἐκ Δακεδαίμονος στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἔχεπέμφη μετὰ εἰκοσὶ νεῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου. ξυνέπλεον δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίοι τριάκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων πλήθος. καὶ ἐστράτευσαν ἐς Κύπρον καὶ αὐτῆς τὰ πολλὰ κατεστρέφαντο, καὶ ὡστερον ἐς Βυζάντιον Μήδων ἐχόντων καὶ ἐξεπολιόρκησαν ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ.

XCV. Ἡδὴ δὲ βιαίον ὄντος αὐτοῦ οἶ τε ἄλλοι Ἐλληνες ἠχθοντο καὶ οὐχ ἦκιστα οἱ Ἰωνεῖς καὶ ὁσοὶ ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεωστὶ ἠλευθέρωντο φοιτώντες τε πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἥξιον αὐτῶν ἡγεμόνιας σφῶν ἡγίστησαν κατὰ τὸ ἐξηγεῖν καὶ Παυσανία ἡ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, ἢν που βιάζηται. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι ἐδέξαντο τε τῶν λόγων καὶ προσέχουν τὴν γνώμην ὡς οὐ περιοχόμενοι τάλλα τε καταστησόμενοι ἡ φαίνοντο ἂριστα αὐτῶς. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Δακεδαίμονοι μετεπέμπουντο Παυσανίαν ἀνακρίνοντες ὅν πέρι ἐπιθάνοντο· καὶ γὰρ ἄδικα πολλὴ κατηγορεῖτο αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἐλλήνων τῶν ἀφίκουσιν τῶν, καὶ τυραννίδος μᾶλλον ἐφαίνετο μύησις ἡ.

1 Hude transfers, with Krüger, ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ to ch. xcv., deleting δὲ after ἡδη.

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were hard pressed on land, to go down to the Peiraecus, and resist all their opponents with their fleet. It was in this way, then, that the Athenians got their walls built, and came to be engaged upon their other fortifications, immediately after the withdrawal of the Persians.

XCIV. Meanwhile Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from Lacedaemon in command of the Hellenes with twenty ships from Peloponnesus, accompanied by thirty Athenian ships and a multitude of other allies. They made also an expedition against Cyprus, subduing most of it, and afterwards, at the time of Pausanias' leadership, besieged Byzantium, which the Persians then held, and took it.

XCV. But, since he had already become headstrong, the rest of the Hellenes became disaffected, especially the Ionians and all who had been recently emancipated from the King. So they waited upon the Athenians and begged them in the name of their kinship to become their leaders, and to resist Pausanias if he should attempt to coerce them. The Athenians accepted their proposals and gave full attention to the matter with the determination to endure Pausanias' conduct no longer and to settle all other matters as should seem best to themselves. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias in order to interrogate him about reports they were hearing, for much wrongdoing was charged against him by the Hellenes who came to Sparta, and his behaviour seemed an aping of despotic power rather than the conduct of a general.

1 cf. ch. cxxx. 2.
2 As the mother city; cf. ch. ii. (end).
3 478 B.C.
4 στρατηγία. Ξυνέβη τε αὐτῷ καλεῖσθαι τε ἁμα καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τῷ ἐκείνου ἔχθει παρ' Ἀθηναίους μετατάξασθαι πλὴν τῶν ἀπὸ Πελοπον-
5 νῆσου στρατιωτῶν. ἔθθων δὲ ἐς Δακεδαιμονα τῶν μὲν ἰδίᾳ πρὸς τινὰ ἀδικημάτων ἡθύνθη, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα ἀπολύεται μὴ ἀδικεῖν καθηγορεῖτο δὲ αὐτοῦ ὦν ἡκιστα μηδισμὸς καὶ ἐδόκει σαβε-
6 στατον εἶναι. καὶ ἐκείνου μὲν οὐκέτι ἐκπέμπου-
7 σιν ἄρχοντα, Δόρκειν δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ στρατὰν ἐχοντας οὐ πολλὰν οἷς οὐκέτι
8 ἐφίσαν οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. οἱ δὲ αἰ-
σθόμενοι ἀπηλθοῦν, καὶ ἄλλους οὐκέτι ύστερον
9 ξέπεμψαν οἱ Δακεδαιμονοὶ, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσιν οἱ ἐξίοντες χεῖρος γῆγωνται, ὅπερ καὶ
10 ἐν τῷ Παυσανίᾳ ἑνείδου, ἀπαλλαξίοντες δὲ καὶ
11 τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους νομί-
12 θέτες ἰκανοὺς ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ σφίσιν ἐν τῷ τότε
13 παρόντι ἐπιτηδείους.

XCVI. Παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τὴν
14 ἡγεμονίαν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκόντων τῶν ξυμμά-
15 χων διὰ τὸ Παυσανίου μίσος, ἔταξαν ἃς τε ἐδει
16 παρέχειν τῶν πόλεων χρηματα πρὸς τὸν βάρ-
17 βαρον καὶ ἃς ναύς πρόσχημα γὰρ ἰν ἀμύνεσθαι
18 ὅπως ἔπαθον δηοῦντας τὴν βασιλείας χώραν. καὶ
19 Ἐλληνοταμίαι τότε πρῶτον Ἀθηναίους κατέστη
20 ἅργη, οἱ ἐδέχοντο τὸν φόρον οὕτω γὰρ ὅμωμάσθη

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And it so happened that he was cited before the court at the very time that the allies in vexation at him had gone over to the side of the Athenians, all except the soldiers from the Peloponnesus. And although, on his return to Lacedaemon, Pausanias was held to account for any personal wrongs he had committed against individuals, yet on the principal charges he was acquitted of misconduct; for he was accused most of all of treasonable relations with the Persians, and it seemed to be a very clear case. And they did not again send him out as commander, but Dorcis, together with some others, with an inconsiderable force; but the allies did not entrust these with the chief command. And they, being now aware of the situation, went back home; and the Lacedaemonians sent out no other commanders thereafter, fearing that any who went out might be corrupted, as they saw had happened in the case of Pausanias; they also wanted to be rid of the Persian war, and thought that the Athenians were competent to take the leadership and were friendly to themselves at the time.

XCVI. After the Athenians had succeeded in this way to the leadership over the allies, who freely chose them on account of their hatred of Pausanias, they assessed the amount of their contributions, both for the states which were to furnish money for the war against the Barbarians and for those which were to furnish ships, the avowed object being to avenge themselves for what they had suffered by ravaging the King's territory. And it was then that the Athenians first established the office of Hellenic treasurers, who received the tribute; for so the

1 476 B.C.
Τῶν χρημάτων ἦ φορά. ἦν δ' ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθείς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἐξήκοντα, ταμείῶν τε Δῆλος ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ αἱ ξύνοδοι ἢς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐγίνοντο.

Χευδ. Ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμµάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων τοσάδε ἐπήλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τούτων τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδίκου, ἃ ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμµάχους νεωτέρις ξυνότας καὶ Πελοποννησίων τοὺς αἰεὶ προστυγχά-2 νοντας ἐν ἐκάστῳ. ἐγγραφά δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐποιησάμην διὰ τόδε, ὅτε τοῖς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἀπασίν ἐκλείπεις τούτο ἦν τὸ χωρίον καὶ ἢ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδίκων Ἐλληνικὰ ξυνετίθεσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδίκα τούτων δὲ ὁσπερ καὶ ἤστο ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῆ ἡγγραφῇ Ἐλλάνικος, βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη· ἀμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν οἷῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη.

Χευδ. Πρῶτον μὲν Ἡιώνα τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμώνιοι Μήδων ἐχόντων πολιορκία εἶλον καὶ ἰνδραπό-δισαν Κύμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγοῦντος. 2 ἐπειτὰ Σκύρου τὴν ἐν τῷ Ἀλγαῖῳ νῆσον, ἢν φίλουν 3 Δόλοπες, ἰνδραπόδισαν καὶ φιλοίσαν αὐτοῖς. πρὸς δὲ Καρυστίους αὐτοῖς ἀνευ τῶν ἄλλων Εὐβοῖων πόλεμος ἐγένετο, καὶ χρόνῳ ξυνεβήσαν καὶ θ' 1 Deleted by Hude, after Cobet.
contribution of money was termed. The amount of the tribute first assessed was four hundred and sixty talents, and the treasury of the allies was Delos, where the meetings were held in the temple.

XCVII. Exercising then what was at first a leadership over allies who were autonomous and took part in the deliberations of common assemblies, the Athenians, in the interval between this war and the Persian, undertook, both in war and in the administration of public affairs, the enterprises now to be related, which were directed against the Barbarian, against their own allies when they attempted revolution, and against such of the Peloponnesians as from time to time came into conflict with them in the course of each attempt. And I have made a digression to write of these matters for the reason that this period has been omitted by all my predecessors, who have confined their narratives either to Hellenic affairs before the Persian War or to the Persian War itself; and Hellanicus, the only one of these who has ever touched upon this period, has in his Attic History treated of it briefly, and with inaccuracy as regards his chronology. And at the same time the narrative of these events serves to explain how the empire of Athens was established.

XCVIII. First, then, under the leadership of Cimon son of Miltiades, they took by siege Eion on the Strymon, which the Persians held, and enslaved its inhabitants; then they enslaved Seyros, the island in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopians, and colonised it themselves. And a war arose between them and the Carystians, the other Euboeans taking no part in it, and after a time terms

1 476 B.C.
4 ὁμολογίαιν. Ναξίων δὲ ἀποστάσει μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπολέμησαν καὶ πολιορκίᾳ παρεστήσαντο. πρώτῃ τε αὐτῇ πόλις ξυμμαχίᾳ παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ἐδουλώθη, ἐπειτὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἐκάστῃ ἐξενέβη.¹

ΧΣΗ. Αἰτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι τε ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστάσεων καὶ μέγισται αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεὼν ἐκδεια καὶ λιποστράτων εἰ τῷ ἐγένετο· οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἐπρασσοῦν καὶ λυπηροὶ ἦσαν οὐκ εἰσθάνοι σει ποδε βουλομένοι ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες

2 τὰς ἀνάγκας. ἦσαν δὲ πῶς καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὔτε ξυναπεστάτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱσοῦ ῥάδιον τε προσάγοντες ἢν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀφισταμένους· ὥν αὐτοῖ

3 αἰτίοι ἐγένοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκυνσιν ταύτην τῶν στρατευῶν οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἢν μὴ ἀπ' οίκου δοσὶ, Χρήστατα ἐτάξαντο ἀντὶ τῶν νεὼν τὸ ἱκνούμενον ἀνάλομα φέρειν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις πολεμεῖν τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἦν ἐκείνοι ξυμπερίειν, αὐτοὶ δὲ, ὅποτε ἀποσταίνει, ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἀπειροὶ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθισταντο.

C. Ἐγένετο δὲ μετὰ ταύτα καὶ ἡ ἑπ' Εὐρυμέδοντι ποταμῷ ἐν Παμφυλίᾳ ἔπεζομαχίᾳ καὶ ναυμαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς Μίδος, καὶ ἐνίκων τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀμφότερα Ἀθηναίοι

¹ Deleted by Hude as probably not read by Schol.
² ἐν Παμφυλίᾳ, omitted by Hude and Stahl, with Codex M.
of capitulation were agreed upon. After this they waged war upon the Naxians, who had revolted, and reduced them by siege. And this was the first allied city to be enslaved in violation of the established rule; but afterwards the others also were enslaved as it happened in each case.

XCIX. Now while there were other causes of revolts, the principal ones were the failures in bringing in the tribute or their quota of ships and, in some cases, refusal of military service; for the Athenians exacted the tribute strictly and gave offence by applying coercive measures to any who were unaccustomed or unwilling to bear the hardships of service. And in some other respects, too, the Athenians were no longer equally agreeable as leaders; they would not take part in expeditions on terms of equality, and they found it easy to reduce those who revolted. For all this the allies themselves were responsible; for most of them, on account of their aversion to military service, in order to avoid being away from home got themselves rated in sums of money instead of ships, which they should pay in as their proportionate contribution, and consequently the fleet of the Athenians was increased by the funds which they contributed, while they themselves, whenever they revolted, entered on the war without preparation and without experience.

C. After this occurred at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia the land-battle and sea-fight of the Athenians and their allies against the Persians; and the Athenians were victorious in both on the

1 466 B.C.
2 For this glorious victory of Cimon's, whose date (466 B.C.) is not certain, cf. Diod. xi. 60; Plut. Cim. xii.
θυκυδίδης

Κήμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου σπατηγοῦντος, καὶ ἐξον τριήρεις Φοινίκων καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς πάσας ἐς 2 διακοσίας. χρόνῳ δὲ υστερον ξυνέβη Θασίων αὐτῶν ἀποστήναι διενεχθέντας περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας Θράκη ἐμπορίων καὶ τοῦ μεταλλου, ἀ ἐνέμοντο. καὶ ναυσὶ μὲν ἔπλεον Θάσου πλευράσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ναυμαχία ἐκράτησαν καὶ ἐς 3 τὴν γῆν ἀπέβησαν" ἐπὶ δὲ Στρυμόνα πέμψαντες μυρίων οἰκήτορας αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων, ὡς οἰκιοῦντες τὰς τότε καλουμένας Ἐννέα ὁδοὺς, νῦν δὲ Ἀμφίπολιν, τῶν μὲν Ἐννέα ὁδῶν αὐτοὶ ἐκράτησαν, ὡς εἶχον Ἰδωνοὶ, προελθόντες δὲ τῆς Θράκης ἐς μεσογείαν διεθάρησαν ἐν Δραβησκῷ τῇ Ἰδωνικῇ ὑπὸ τῶν Θρακῶν ξυμπάντων ὡς πολέμων ἦν τὸ χωρίον 1 κτιζόμενον.

Cf. Θάσιοι δὲ νικηθέντες μάχη καὶ πολιορκοῦμενοι Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεκαλούντο καὶ ἐπαμύνει 2 ἐκέλευον ἐσβάλοντας ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν. οἱ δὲ ὑπέσχοντο μὲν κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἐμελλοῦν, διεκολύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ, ἐν φ καὶ οἱ Εἰλοτες αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν περιοίκων Θουρία· ταὶ τε καὶ Αἰθαῖς ἐς Ἰθώμην ἀπέστησαν. πλει-

1 465 π.κ.
2 The Thasians had a gold mine at Skapto Hyle on the Thracian coast, from which they drew rich revenues; cf. Hdt. vi. xlvi. f.
same day under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades, and they took and destroyed triremes of the Phoenicians to the number of two hundred all told. And some time afterwards it came to pass that the Thasians revolted from them, a quarrel having arisen about the trading posts and the mine on the opposite coast of Thrace, of which the Thasians enjoyed the profits. Thereupon the Athenians sailed with their fleet against Thasos, and, after winning a battle at sea, disembarked on the island. About the same time they sent to the river Strymon ten thousand colonists, consisting of Athenians and their allies, with a view to colonising the place, then called Nine Ways, but now Amphipolis; and though these colonists gained possession of Nine Ways, which was inhabited by Edoni, yet when they advanced into the interior of Thrace they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the united forces of the Thracians, to whom the settlement of the place was a menace.

Cl. As for the Thasians, who had been defeated in battle and were now besieged, they appealed to the Lacedaemonians and urged them to come to their aid by invading Attica. This, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do, and intended to keep their promise, but were prevented by the earthquake which occurred at the time when both their Helots and the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea revolted and went to Ithome. Most of the Helots

1 Called "the great earthquake" in ch. cxxviii. 1.
2 464 B.C.
3 The Perioeci were the old inhabitants of the country, chiefly of Achaean stock, reduced to a condition of dependence, i.e. were not citizens, though not state-slaves as the Helots were.
στοι δὲ τῶν Εἰλώτων ἐγένοντο οἱ τῶν παλαιῶν Μεσσηνίων τότε δουλωθέντων ἀπόγονοι· ἢ καὶ
3 Μεσσηνίοι ἐκλήθησαν οἱ πάντες. πρὸς μὲν οὖν
tοὺς ἐν Ἰδώμῃ πόλεμος καθεστικέει Δακεδαι-
μονίας. Θάσιοι δὲ τρίτῳ ἔτει πολιορκούμενοι
ὥμολογήσαν Ἀθηναίοις τείχος τε καθελόντες καὶ
ναῦς παραδόντες, χρήματά τε ὅσα ἐδεί ἀπο-
δοῦναι αὐτίκα ταξάμενοι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν φέρειν,
tὴν τε ἥπειρον καὶ τὸ μέταλλον ἄφεντες.

3. Δακεδαιμονίοι δὲ, ὡς αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἐν
Ἰδώμῃ ἔμηκνυτο ὁ πόλεμος, ἀλλοὺς τε ἐπεκαλέ-
σαντο ξυμμάχους καὶ Ἀθηναίους· οἱ δὲ ἠλθοῦν
2 Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος πληθεὶς οὐκ ὀλίγορ. μά-
λιστα δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐπεκαλέσαντο, ὅτι τειχομαχεῖν
ἐδόκουν δυνατοὶ εἶναι, τῆς δὲ πολιορκίας μακρὰς
καθεστήκως τούτου ἀνδεὰ ἐφαίνετο. Βία γὰρ
3 ἐν εἶλον τὸ χωριόν. καὶ διαφορὰ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς
στρατείας πρῶτον Δακεδαιμονίοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι
φανερὰ ἐγένετο. οἱ γὰρ Δακεδαιμονίοι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ
χωρίον βία ὡς ἢλίσκετο, δείσαντες τῶν Ἀθη-
ναίων τὸ τολμηρόν καὶ τὴν νεωτεροποιάν, καὶ
ἀλλοφύλους ἀμα ἡγησάμενοι, μὴ τι, ἃν παρα-
μεῖνον, ὅπο τῶν ἐν Ἰδώμῃ πεισθέντες νεωτερι-
σοσι, μόνους τῶν εὐμμάχων ἀπέπεμψαν, τὴν μὲν
ὑποψίαν οὐ δηλούντες, εἰπόντες δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν
4 προσδέονται αὐτῶν ἔτι. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐγνώσαν

1 Krüger deletes, followed by Hude.
were the descendants of the early Messenians who had been enslaved of old,¹ and hence were all called Messenians. The Lacedaemonians, then, were involved in war with the rebels on Ithome; and so the Thasians, who were in the third year of the siege, came to terms with the Athenians, pulling down their walls and delivering over their ships, agreeing to pay forthwith whatever sum of money should be required of them and to render tribute in future, and, finally, giving up both the mainland and the mine.

CII. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, when their war with the rebels on Ithome proved a long affair, appealed to their allies in general and especially to the Athenians, who came with a considerable force under the command of Cimon. The principal reason why an appeal was made to them was that they were reputed to be skilful in siege operations, whereas the long continuance of the siege showed their own deficiency in this respect; for otherwise they would have taken the place by assault. And it was in consequence of this expedition that a lack of harmony in the relations of the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians first became manifest. For the Lacedaemonians, when they failed to take the place by storm, fearing the audacity and the fickleness of the Athenians, whom they regarded, besides, as men of another race, thought that, if they remained, they might be persuaded by the rebels on Ithome to change sides; they therefore dismissed them, alone of the allies, without giving any indication of their suspicion, but merely saying that they had no further need of them. The Athenians, however, recognized

¹ Referring to the mythical time of the first Messenian war.
σὺχ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίωνι λόγῳ ἀποπεμπόμενοι, ἀλλὰ τίνος ὑπόπτου γενομένου, καὶ δεινὸν ποιησάμενοι καὶ σὺχ ἡξιώσαντες ὑπὸ Δακεδαιμονίων τούτο παθεῖν, εὐθὺς ἔπειδη ἀνεχώρησαν, ἀφέντες τὴν γενομένην ἑπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἀργείων τοῖς ἐκείνων πολεμίως ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς Θεσσαλοὺς ἀμα ἀμφοτέροις οἱ αὐτοὶ ὄρκοι καὶ ξυμμαχία κατέστη.

CIIII. Οἱ δὲ ἐν Ἰθώμῃ δεκάτῳ ἔτει, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐδύναντο ἀντέχειν, ἐξεβίβασαν πρὸς τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους ἐφ' ὃς ἐξίασιν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπόπτοντο καὶ μηδέποτε ἐπιβίβασονται αὐτῆς. ἴν δὲ 2 τις ἀλίσκηται, τοῦ λαβόντος εἶναι δοῦλον, ἴν δὲ τι καὶ χρηστήριον τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους Πυθικόν πρὸ τοῦ, τὸν ἱκέτην τοῦ Δίως τοῦ Ἰθώμητα ἀφιέ- 3 ναι. ἐξῆλθον δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ παῖδες καὶ γυναικεῖς, καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεξάμενοι κατὰ ἔχοντα ἥδη τὸ Δακεδαιμονίων ἐς Ναύπακτον κατόρθωσαν, ἴν ἐτυχόν ἢρηκότες νεωτέρα Δοκρῶν τῶν Ὀξιλῶν 4 ἔχοντων. προσεγὼρῆσαν δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς Ἀθη- ναίως ἐς ξυμμαχίαν Δακεδαιμονίων ἀποστάντες, ὅτι αὐτοὺς Κορίνθιοι περὶ γῆς ὥρων πολέμῳ κατείχον. καὶ ἔσχον Ἀθηναίοι Μέγαρα καὶ Πη- γάς, καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ὁμοδομῆσαν Μεγαρεύσι

1 455 B.C.
that they were not being sent away on the more creditable ground, but because some suspicion had arisen; so because they felt indignant and considered that they had not deserved such treatment at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, the instant they returned home they gave up the alliance which they had made with the Lacedaemonians against the Persians and became allies of their enemies, the Argives. And an alliance at the same time, on the same terms and confirmed by the same oaths, was concluded by both the Athenians and the Argives with the Thessaliants.

CIII. In the tenth year\(^1\) the rebels on Ithome found that they could hold out no longer and surrendered to the Lacedaemonians on condition that they should leave the Peloponnesus under a truce and should never set foot in it again; and if any of them should be caught there, he was to be a slave of his captor. Moreover, before this time the Lacedaemonians also received a Pythian oracle, which bade them let go the suppliant of Ithomean Zeus. So the Messenians left the Peloponnesus, themselves and their children and wives; and the Athenians received them, in consequence of the enmity to the Lacedaemonians already existing, and settled them at Naupactus, which they happened to have lately taken from its possessors, the Ozolian Locrians. And the Megarians also entered into alliance with the Athenians, revolting from the Lacedaemonians because the Corinthians were pressing them hard in a war about boundaries; and thus the Athenians secured Megara and Pegae,\(^2\) and they built for the Megarians the long walls which run from the city to

\(^{1}\) Pegae was the Megarian harbour on the Corinthian gulf: Nisaea, a nearer one, on the Saronic gulf.
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τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἦσαν καὶ ἐφρούροντο αὐτοὶ. καὶ Κορινθίοις μὲν οὐχ ἦκεστα ἀπὸ τοῦτο τὸ σφοδρόν μῦσος ἦξατο πρῶτον ἐς Ἀθηναίους γενέσθαι.

CIV. Ἰνάρως δὲ ὁ Ψαμμητίχου, Λίβυς, βασιλεὺς Λιβύων τῶν πρὸς Λιγύπτων, ὀρμώμενος ἐκ Μαρείας τῆς ὑπὲρ Φάρου πόλεως ἀπέστησεν Λιγύπτων τὰ πλείον ἕπτος βασιλέως Άρταξέρξου, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρχον γενόμενος Ἀθηναίοὺς ἐπηγάζετο. οἱ δὲ (ἐτυχον γὰρ ἐς Κύπρον στρατευόμενοι διακοσίαι αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων) ἠλθον ἀπολεπόντες τὴν Κύπρον, καὶ ἀναπλεύσαντες ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐς τὸν Νεῖλον τοῦ τε ποταμοῦ κρατοῦντες καὶ τῆς Μεμφίδος τῶν δύο μερῶν πρὸς τὸ τρίτον μέρος οὐ καλεῖται Λευκὸν τεῖχος ἐπολέμουν ἐνήσαν δὲ αὐτὸθε Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων οἳ καταφυγόντες καὶ Λιγυπτίων οἱ μὴ ξυναποστάντες.

CV. Ἀθηναίοις δὲ ναυσὶν ἀποβάσατο εἰς Ἀλίας πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους μάχῃ ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐνίκων Κορίνθιοι, καὶ ὁστερον Ἀθηναίοι ἐναμάχησαν ἐπὶ Κεκρυφαλεία Πελοποννησίων 2 δυναμοῖν, καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναίοι. πολέμου δὲ καταστάντος πρὸς Λιγύπτας Ἀθηναίοις μετὰ ταύτα ναυμαχία γίγνεται ἐπὶ Λιγύπτη μεγάλη Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λιγύπτων (καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐκατέρως παρῆσαν), καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ μας ἐβδομήκοντα λαβόντες αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀπέβησαν καὶ ἐπολυορκοῦν Δεσφράτους τοῦ Στροίβου στρατηγοῦν.
Nisaea and held it with a garrison of their own troops. And it was chiefly because of this act that the vehement hatred of the Corinthians for the Athenians first arose.

CIV. Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan and king of the Libyans who are adjacent to Egypt, setting out from Marcia, the city just north of Pharos, caused the greater part of Egypt to revolt from King Artaxerxes, and then, when he had made himself ruler, he called in the Athenians. And they left Cyprus, where they happened to be on an expedition with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies, and went to Egypt, and when they had sailed up the Nile from the sea, finding themselves masters of the river and of two-thirds of Memphis, they proceeded to attack the third part, which is called the White Fortress. And in this fortress were some Persians and Medes who had taken refuge there, and such Egyptians as had not joined in the revolt.

CV. The Athenians also made a descent with a fleet upon Halicis, where they had a battle with some Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the Corinthians won. And afterwards the Athenians fought a sea-fight at Cecryphalaia with a Peloponnesian fleet, in which the Athenians won. After this war broke out between the Athenians and the Aeginetans, and a great sea-fight occurred between the Athenians and the Aeginetans off Aegina, in which the allies of both sides were present. This the Athenians won and having taken seventy Aeginetan ships they descended upon their territory and laid siege to the city, Leocrates son of Stroebus,
3 τος. ἔπειτα Πελοποννήσων ἀμύνεις βουλόμενοι Λιγνάτας εἰς μὲν τὴν Λιγνάταν τριακοσίων ὀπλίτας, πρότερον Κορινθίων καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίων ἐπικούρους, διεβίβασαν, τὰ δὲ ἀκρᾳ τῆς Γερανείας κατελαβοῦν καὶ ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα κατέβησαν Κορινθίοι μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων, νομίζοντες ἀδυνάτους ἐσεθαί Αθηναίοις βοηθεῖν τοῖς Μεγαρεύσιοι ἐν τῇ Λιγναίῃ ἀπούσῃς στρατιάς πολλῆς καὶ ἐν Λιγνύτῳ ἵνα δὲ καὶ βοηθῶσιν, ἀπ’ Λιγνίνης ἄναστήσεσθαι αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι τὸ μὲν πρὸς Λιγνίνη στράτευμα οὐκ ἐκίνησαν, τῶν δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπολοίπων οἱ τῇ προσβύτατοι καὶ οἱ νεώτατοι ἀφικνοῦσιν ἐς τὰ Μέγαρα Μυρωνίδου
5 στρατηγούντοις. καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἱσορροποῦν πρὸς Κορινθίους διεκρίθησαν ἀπ’ ἅλλης, καὶ ἐνόμισαν αὐτοὶ ἐκάτεροι οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίοι (ἐκράτησαν γὰρ ὅμως μᾶλλον) ἀπελθόντων τῶν Κορινθίων τροπαίων ἔστησαν, οἱ δὲ Κορινθίοι κακιζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει προσβυτέρων καὶ παρασκευασάμενοι, ὡμέραις ὅστερον δώδεκα μέλιστα ἐλθόντες ἀνείστασαν τροπαίον καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅσ νικήσαντες. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἐκβοηθήσαντες ἐκ τῶν Μεγάρων τοὺς τῇ τροπαίον ἱστάντας διαφθείροντο καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβαλόντες ἐκράτησαν. ΟCVI. οἱ δὲ νικώμενοι ὑπεχώρουν, καὶ τι αὐτῶν μέρος οὐκ ὄλγον προσβιασθεῖν καὶ διαμαρτῶν τῆς ὀδοῦ ἑστάζεσθαι ἐς τοῦ χωρίου ἱδιώτου, ὥς ἑτυχεν

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being in command. Thereupon the Peloponnesians, wishing to aid the Aeginetans, sent into Aegina three hundred hoplites, who had previously been assisting the Corinthians and Epidaurians. Moreover, the Corinthians occupied the heights of Geraneia, and made a descent upon the territory of Megara in conjunction with their allies, thinking that the Athenians would be unable to aid the Megarians, since many of their troops were away in Aegina and in Egypt, or if they should attempt it that they would have to withdraw from Aegina. The Athenians, however, did not disturb the army besieging Aegina, but with such forces as were left in the city, consisting of the oldest and the youngest men, marched into Megara, the general in command being Myronides. An indecisive battle was fought with the Corinthians, whereupon they separated, each side thinking they had not got the worst of it in the action. And the Athenians, who had in fact got rather the better of it, when the Corinthians withdrew, set up a trophy; but the Corinthians, being reproached by the older men in their city, made their preparations and about twelve days later came back and set up for themselves a rival trophy, as though they had won. Hereupon the Athenians made a sally from Megara, slew those who were setting up the trophy, and joining battle with the rest defeated them. CVI. The vanquished party now retreated, and a not inconsiderable portion of them, being hard pressed, missed their way and rushed into a piece of land belonging to

1 These performed military service only in extraordinary cases; the former were between fifty and sixty, the latter under twenty years of age.
THUCYDIDES

2 ὅρνυμα μέγα περιείργον καὶ οὐκ ἦν ἔξοδος. οἶ ὅ Ἀθηναῖοι γνώντες κατὰ πρόσωπον τε ἔργον τοῖς ὀπλίταις καὶ περιστήσαντες κύκλῳ τοὺς ψιλοὺς κατέλευσαν πάντας τοὺς ἐσελθόντας, καὶ πάθος μέγα τούτῳ Κορυνθίοις ἐγένετο. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἀνεχώρησεν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐπὶ οἴκου.

CVII. Ἡρεντὸς δὲ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τοὺς καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη Ἀθηναίοι ἐς θάλασσαν οἰκοδομεῖν, τὸ τε Φαληρόνδε καὶ τὸ ἐς Πειραιὰ.

2 καὶ Φωκέων στρατευοῦμαι ἐς Δωρίδας τὴν Δακεδαιμονίων μητρόπολιν, Βοιῶν καὶ Κυτίνου καὶ Ἐρυνεύον, καὶ ἐλόντων ἐν τῶν πολισμάτων τοῦ τοῦ Κλεομβρότου ὑπὲρ Πλειστούνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου βασιλέως, νέου δὲ τοῦ ἦν, ἥγουμένου ἐβοηθήσαν τοῖς Δωρίζεσιν ἔαυτῶν τε πεντακοσίων καὶ χίλιων ὀπλίταις καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων μυρίων, καὶ τοὺς Φωκέας ὀμολογίᾳ ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν.

3 ἀπεχώρουν πάλιν. καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν μὲν αὐτοὺς, διὰ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου εἰ βούλωτο περαιοῦσθαι, Ἀθηναῖοι ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες ἐμελλον κωλύσεωι. διὰ τῆς Γερανείας ὅπι ἀσφαλές αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνετο Ἀθηναίων ἑχόντων Μέγαρα καὶ Πηγᾶς πορεύεσθαι. 1 δύσοδος τε γὰρ ἡ Γερανεία καὶ ἔφρουρεῖτο αἰεὶ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τότε ἤσθανοντο αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας καὶ ταύτῃ κωλύσεωι. ἐδοξε δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς περιμεῖνας σκέψασθαι ὅτι τρόπω ἀσφαλέστατα διαπορέυσονται. τὸ δὲ τι καὶ ἀνδρεῖς ἐπιγγον αὐτοὺς

1 πορεύεσθαι deleted by Hude as not read by Schol.
some private person, which was enclosed by a great
ditch and had no exit. And when the Athenians
perceived this, they shut them in by barring the
entrance with hoplites, and stationing light-armed
troops all round stoned all who had entered. And
this was a great calamity to the Corinthians; the
main body of their army, however, returned home.

CVII. About this period the Athenians began to
build their long walls to the sea, one to Phalerum,
the other to the Peiraeus. And the Phocians made
an expedition against the land of the Dorians, the
mother-country of the Lacedaemonians, namely the
towns of Boeum, Citinium, and Erineum, one of
which they captured; whereupon the Lacedae-
monians, under the lead of Nicomedes son of Cleom-
brotus, acting for King Pleistoanax son of Pausanias,
who was still a minor, sent to the aid of the Dorians
a force of fifteen hundred hoplites of their own and
ten thousand of their allies, and after they had forced
the Phocians to make terms and restore the city
they began their return homeward. Now if they
wished to take the sea-route and make their passage
by way of the Crisaean Gulf, the Athenians were
sure to take their fleet round the Peloponnesus and
block their way; and to march over the Geranaean
pass appeared to them hazardous, since the Athenians
held Megara and Pegae. Besides, the Geranaean
pass was not easy to traverse and was at all times
guarded by the Athenians, and at this present time,
as the Lacedaemonians perceived, they intended
to block their way. So they decided to wait in
Boeotia and consider how they might most safely
cross over to the Peloponnesus. To this course they
were partly influenced by some Athenians, who were

1 457 B.C.
τῶν Ἀθηναίων κρύφα, ἐλπίσαντες δὴμόν τε κατα-
παύσειν καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη οἰκοδομούμενα.
5 ἐβοήθησαν δὲ ἐπ' αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεῖ
καὶ Ἀργείων χίλιοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων
ὡς ἔκαστοι· ξύμπαντες δὲ ἐγένοντο τετρακις-
6 λιοὶ καὶ μύριοι. νομίσαντες δὲ ἀπορεῖν ὅτι
διέλθωσιν, ἐπεστάτευσαν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τι· καὶ τὸν
7 δήμον καταλύσεως ὑποψία. ἤλθον δὲ καὶ Θεσ-
σαλῶν ἵππης τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχι-
κόν, οὐ μετέστησαν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ παρὰ τοὺς
Λακεδαιμονίους.

CVIII. Γενομένης δὲ τῆς μάχης ἐν Τανάγρα
τῆς Βοιωτίας ἑνίκων Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ οἱ ξύμ-
2 μαχοί, καὶ φόνος ἐγένετο ἀμφοτέρων πολύς. καὶ
Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα ἔθεντες καὶ
δευδροτομήσαντες πάλιν ἀπῆλθαν ἐπ' οἰκου διὰ
Γερανείας καὶ ἱσθμοῦ. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ δευτέρα καὶ
ἐξηκοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐστράτευσαν ἐς
3 Βοιωτοὺς Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ μάχη
ἐν ὘ινοφύτοις Βοιωτοὺς νικήσαντες τῆς τε χώρας
ἐκράτησαν τῆς Βοιωτίας καὶ Φωκίδος καὶ Τανα-
γραίων τὸ τείχος περιεῖλον καὶ Δοκρῶν τῶν
'Οπουντίων ἐκατόν ἀνδρῶν οὐμήρους τοὺς πλου-
σιωτάτους ἔλαβον, τὰ τε τείχη ἐαυτῶν τὰ μακρὰ
4 ἀπετέλεσαν. ὡμολόγησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Αἰγινηταῖς
μετὰ ταῦτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τείχη τε περιελόντες
καὶ ναὸς παραδόντες φόρον τε ταξάμενοι ἐς τὸν
5 ἐπείτα χρόνον. καὶ Πελοπόννησον περεύπλευσαν
Ἀθηναίου Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμαίου στρατηγοῦντος,
BOOK I. CVII. 4–CVIII. 5

secretly inviting them into their country, in the hope of putting an end to the democracy and to the building of the long walls. But the Athenians went out against the Lacedaemonians with their whole force and with one thousand Argives and contingents of the several allies, the whole body amounting to fourteen thousand men. And they undertook the expedition against them because they believed that they were at a loss how to get through, and partly too on a suspicion of a plot to overthrow the democracy. The forces of the Athenians were strengthened by some Thessalian cavalry, who came in accordance with the terms of the alliance, but they deserted to the Lacedaemonians in the course of the action.

CVIII. The battle took place¹ at Tanagra in Boeotia, and in it the Lacedaemonians and their allies were victorious, and there was much slaughter on both sides. The Lacedaemonians then entered the Megarian territory, cut down the trees, and went back home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the Athenians, having made an expedition into Boeotia under Myronides, defeated the Boeotians at Oenophyta, got control of Boeotia and Phocis, pulled down the walls of Tanagra, and took one hundred of the wealthiest men of the Opuntian Loerians as hostages. Meanwhile they completed their own long walls. After this the Aeginetans also capitulated to the Athenians, pulling down their walls, delivering up their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute in future.² And the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, sailed round the Peloponnesus,

¹ 466 B.C. ² 455 B.C.
καὶ τὸ νεώριον τῶν Δακεδαίμονίων ἐνέπρησαν καὶ Χαλκίδα Κορινθίων εἶλον καὶ Σικυώνιοις ἐν ἀποβάσει τῆς γῆς μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν.

CIX. Οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπέμενον, καὶ αὐτοῖς πολλαὶ ἰδέαι 2 πολέμων κατέστησαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐκράτουν τῆς Αἰγύπτου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ βασιλεῖς πέμπτες ἦσαν Δακεδαίμονα Μεγάβαζον ἄνδρα Πέρσην χρήματα ἔχοντα, ὅπως ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβάλειν πεισθέντων τῶν Πελοποννησίων ὁπ' 3 Αἰγύπτου ἀπαγάγοι Ἀθηναίους. ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ προορίζων καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἄλλως ἄνηλευτο, ὁ μὲν Μεγάβαζος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν χρημάτων πάλιν ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀνεκομίσθη, Μεγάβαζον δὲ τὸν Ζωπύρου πέμπτες ἄνδρα Πέρσην μετὰ στρα- 4 τιάς πολλῆς ὡς ἀφικόμενος κατὰ γῆν τοὺς τε Αἰγυπτίους καὶ τοὺς ξύμμαχος μάχῃ ἐκράτησε καὶ ἐκ τῆς Μέμφιδος ἐξῆλασε τοὺς Ἑλλήνας καὶ τέλος ἐς Προσωπίτιδα τὴν νῆσον κατέκλησεν καὶ ἐπολιορκεῖ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ ἐς μῆνας, μέχρι οὗ ἠράνας τὴν διόρυχα καὶ παρατρέψας ἄλλο τὸ ὄχῳ τάς τε ναῦς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἕρωτός ἐποίησε καὶ τῆς νῆσος τὰ πολλὰ ἡπείρου, καὶ διαβὰς εἰλε τὴν νῆσον πεζῇ.

CXX. Οὕτω μὲν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πράγματα ἐφθαίρη ἐξ ἐτη πολεμόθεσαν καὶ ὅλοις ἀπὸ πολλῶν πορεύμονες διὰ τῆς Λιβύης ἐς Κυρήνην 2 ἐσώθησαν, οἱ δὲ πλείονοι ἀπόλοιπον. Αἰγύπτων δὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ βασιλέα ἐγένετο πλὴν Ἑμνηταίου

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burned the dock-yard\(^1\) of the Lacedaemonians, took Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and making a descent upon the territory of the Sicyonians defeated them in battle.

CIX. Meanwhile the Athenians and their allies stayed on in Egypt and the war took on many forms. At first the Athenians had the mastery in Egypt, and the King sent to Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian with a supply of money, in order that the Lacedaemonians might be induced to invade Attica and the Athenians thus be drawn away from Egypt. But when he found that matters did not advance and the money was being spent in vain, Megabazus betook himself back to Asia with the money that was left, and Megabyzus son of Zopyrus,\(^2\) a Persian, was despatched with a large army.\(^3\) He marched thither by land, and defeated the Egyptians and their allies in battle, drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and finally shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he besieged them for a year and six months, then finally, by diverting the water into another course, drained the canal and left the ships high and dry, converting the greater part of the island into mainland; then he crossed over dry-shod and took the island.

CX. Thus this undertaking of the Hellenes came to naught after a war of six years;\(^4\) and but few out of many, making their way through Libya into Cyrene, escaped with their lives; the most of them perished. And all Egypt again came under the King's dominion, except Amyrtaeus, the king of the

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\(^1\) Gytheum, on the Laconian gulf.
\(^2\) Hero of the capture of Babylon, Hdt. iii. clx.
\(^3\) Diodorus gives him with Artabazus 300,000 men (xi. 75) and 300 ships (xi. 77).
\(^4\) 454 B.C.
ΤΟΥ ἘΝ ΤΟῖς ἘΛΕΣΙ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ· ΤΟΥΤΟΝ ΔΕ ΔΙΑ ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ ΤΕ ΤΟΥ ἘΛΟΥΣ ΟΥΚ ἘΩΝΑΝΤΟ ἘΛΕΙΝ ΚΑΙ ἍΜΑ
ΜΑΧΗΜΩΤΑΤΟΙ ΕἴΣΙ ΤῶΝ ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΩΝ ΟΙ ἘΛΕΙΟΙ. 'ἸΝΑ-
ΡΩΣ ΔΕ Ο ΛΕΒΥΟΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ, Ως ΤΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ ἘΠΡΑΞΕ
ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟΥ, ΠΡΟΔΟΣΙΑ ΛΗΦΘΕΙΣ ἈΝΕΣΤΑΥ-
ΡΩΘΗ. ΕΚ ΔΕ ΤῶΝ ἈΘΗΝῶΝ ΚΑΙ Τῆς ἈΛΛΗΣ ΞΥΜ-
ΜΑΧΙΔΟΣ ΠΕΝΤΗΚΟΝΤΑ ΤΡΙΤΕΙΣ ΔΙΑΔΟΧΟΙ ΠΛΕΟΥΣΑΙ
ΕΣ ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟΥ ἘΣΧΟΥΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ ΜΕΝΤΗΣΙΟΝ ΚΕΡΑΣ,
ΟΥΚ ΕΙΔΟΤΕΣ ΤῶΝ ΓΕΓΟΝΟΤΩΝ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΕΚ
ΤΕ ΓΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΕΣΟΝΤΕΣ ΠΕΞΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΚ ΘΑΛΑΣΣΗΣ ΦΟ-
ΝΙΚΩΝ ΝΑΥΤΙΚΩΝ ΔΙΕΦΘΕΙΡΑΝ ΤΑΣ ΠΟΛΛΑΣ ΤῶΝ ΝΕΩΝ,
ΑΙ Δ' ΕΛΑΣΣΟΥΣ ΔΙΕΦΥΓΟΥΝ ΠΑΛΙΝ. ΤΑ ΜΕΝ ΚΑΤΑ
ΤΗΝ ΜΕΓΑΛΗΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΕΙΑΝ ἈΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤῶΝ ΞΥΜ-
ΜΑΧΩΝ ΕΣ ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟΥ ΟΥΤΩΣ ΕΤΕΛΕΥΤΗΣΕΝ.

CXXI. ἘΚ ΔΕ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΙΑΣ ὉΡΕΣΤΗΣ Ὁ ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΙ-
ΔΟΥΝ ΨΙΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΦΕΝΥΩΝ ΕΠΕΙΣΕΝ
ἈΘΗΝΑΙΟΥΣ ΕΑΝΤΟΝ ΚΑΤΑΓΕΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΡΑΛΑΒΟΝΤΕΣ
ΒΟΙΩΤΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΩΚΕΑΣ ΟΥΤΑΣ ΞΥΜΜΑΧΟΥΣ ΟΙ ἈΘΗ-
ΝΑΙΟΙ ΕΣΤΡΑΤΕΥΣΑΝ ΤΗΣ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΙΑΣ ἘΠΙ ΦΑΡΣΑΛΟΝ,
ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΝ ΓΗΣ ΕΚΡΑΤΟΥΝ ὍΣΑ ΜΗ ΠΡΟΙΟΝΤΕΣ ΠΟΛΥ
ΕΚ ΤῶΝ ὈΠΛΩΝ (ΟΙ ΓΑΡ ἸΤΠΗΣ ΤῶΝ ΘΕΣΣΑΛῶν
ΕΙΡΓΟΥΝ), ΤΗΝ ΔΕ ΠΟΛΙΝ ΟΥΧ ΕΙΛΟΝ, ΟΥΔ' ΆΛΛΟ ΠΡΟ-
ΧΩΡΕΙ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΟΥ ΕΝΕΚΑ ΕΣΤΡΑΤΕΥΣΑΝ, ΆΛΛ' ἈΠΕΧΩΡΗΣΑΝ ΠΑΛΙΝ ὉΡΕΣΤΗΝ ἘΧΟΝΤΕΣ ΑΠΡΑΚΤΟΙ.

2 ΜΕΤΑ ΔΕ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΟΥ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ ΥΣΤΕΡΟΥΝ ΧΙΛΙΟΙ
ἈΘΗΝΑΙΟΝ ἘΠΙ ΤΑΣ ΝΑΙΣ ΤΑΣ ἘΝ ΠΗΓΑΙΣ ἘΠΙΒΑΝΤΕΣ
(ΕΙΧΟΥΝ Δ' ΑΥΤΟΙ ΤΑΣ ΠΗΓΑΣ) ΠΑΡΕΠΛΕΥΣΑΝ ἘΣ
ΣΙΚΥΩΝΑ ΠΕΡΙΚΛΕΟΥΣ ΤΟΥ ΞΑΝΘΙΤΤΟΥ ΣΤΡΑΤΗ-
ΓΟΥΝΤΟΣ, ΚΑΙ ἈΠΟΒΑΝΤΕΣ ΣΙΚΥΩΝΙΩΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΙ-
marshes; for the Persians were unable to capture him, both on account of the extent of the marsh and because the marsh people are the best fighters among the Egyptians. Inaros, however, the king of the Libyans, who had been the originator of the whole movement in Egypt, was taken by treachery and impaled. And when fifty triremes, which sailed to Egypt from Athens and the rest of the confederacy to relieve the fleet there, put in at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, quite unaware of what had happened, the infantry fell upon them from the shore and a Phoenician fleet from the sea and destroyed most of the ships, a small number only escaping. So ended the great expedition against Egypt of the Athenians and their allies.

CXI. And now Orestes son of Echeocratidas, king of the Thessalians, who was exiled from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And they, taking along some Boeotians and Phocians who were allies, made an expedition against Pharsalus in Thessaly. And though they made themselves masters of the land, so far as this was possible without going far from their camp—for the Thessalian cavalry hemmed them in—they failed to capture the city and indeed none of the other objects of their expedition was attained, so they went back home again unsuccessful, having Orestes with them.

Not long after this one thousand Athenians, embarking on the ships at Pegae, which was now in their possession, sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, and disembarking defeated in battle the Sicyonians

1 cf. Hdt. ii. cxl.; iii. xv.
2 454 B.C. 3 cf. ch. ciii. 4.
3 Ξαντας μαχη ἐκράτησαν. καὶ εὐθὺς παραλαβόντες Ἀχαίον καὶ διαπλεύσαντες πέραν, τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας ἐς Οἰνώδας ἐστράτευσαν καὶ ἐπολιόρκουν, οὐ μέντοι εἶλόν γε, ἀλλ’ ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπὶ οἴκου.

CXII. "Τστερον δὲ διαλιπόντων ἐτῶν τριῶν σπουδαὶ γύγνονται Πελοποννησίους καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πεντέτεις. καὶ Ἑλληνικοῦ μὲν πολέμου ἔσχον οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, ἐς δὲ Κύπρον ἐστρατεύοντο ναυσὶ διακοσίας αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Κύμωνος στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ ἐξήκοντα μὲν νῆς ἐς Αἰγύπτου ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἐπλευσαν Ἀμυρταίον μεταπέμποντος τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔλεσε βασιλέως, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι Κίτιον ἐπολιόρκουν. Κύμωνος δὲ ἀποθανόντος καὶ λιμῷ γενομένου ἀπεχώρησαν ἀπὸ Κίτιον· καὶ πλεύσαντες ὕπερ Σαλαμίνος τῆς ἐν Κύπρῳ Φοίνιξι καὶ Κυπρίους καὶ Κίλιξιν ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ ἐπεξομάχησαν ἄμα, καὶ νικήσαντες ἀμφότερα ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπὶ οἴκου καὶ αἱ ἐς Αἰγύπτου νῆς πάλιν ἀνελθοῦσαι μετ’ αὐτῶν. Δακεδαιμονίοι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν ἱερὸν καλοῦμενον πόλεμον ἐστράτευσαν, καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ ἐν Δελφοὶς ἱερὸν παρέδοσαν Δελφοῖς· καὶ αὐθις ὡστερον Ἀθηναίοι ἀποχωρήσαντων αὐτῶν στρατεύσαντες καὶ κρατήσαντες παρέδοσαν Φωκεσίων.

CXIII. Καὶ χρόνου ἐγγενομένου μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀθηναίοι, Βοιωτῶν τῶν φευγόντων ἔχοντων Ὀρχομενόν καὶ Χαιρώνειαν καὶ ἀλλ’ ἁττα χωρία τῆς Βοιωτίας, ἐστράτευσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν χιλίοις ὀπλίταις, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ὡς ἐκάστοις ἐπὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα πολέμα ὄντα, Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμαίου στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἐλόντες καὶ
who came out against them. Immediately thereafter, taking along some Achaeans and sailing across the gulf, they made an expedition against Oeniadae in Acarnania and laid siege to it; but failing to take it they went back home.

CXII. Three years afterwards a truce was made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, to last five years. And the Athenians did abstain from warfare against Hellenes, but they made an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty of these ships sailed to Egypt on the summons of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, while the others laid siege to Citium. But Cimon died and a famine arose, and so they withdrew from Citium; and on their way home, when off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought the Phoenicians, Cyprians and Cilicians by sea and on land. Gaining the victory in both battles they went back home, and with them returned the ships that had been in Egypt. After this the Lacedaemonians undertook the so-called sacred war, and getting possession of the temple at Delphi, delivered it to the Delphians; and afterwards, when they had withdrawn, the Athenians made an expedition, got possession of it, and delivered it again to the Phocians.

CXIII. Some time after this the Athenians under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, with one thousand hoplites of their own and the respective quotas of their allies, made an expedition against Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and some other places in Boeotia, which were in the possession of the Boeotian exiles and therefore hostile. And after taking

1 451 B.C.  
2 449 B.C.  
3 447 B.C.
ΤΗΝ ΘΥΚΥΔΙΔΗΣ

άνδραποδίσαντες ἀπεχώρουν φυλακὴν καταστήσαντες. πορευομένοι δὲ αὐτοὶ ἐν Κορωνείᾳ ἐπιτίθενται οἱ τε ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχομενοῦ φυγάδες Βοιωτῶν καὶ Δοκροὶ μετ’ αὐτῶν καὶ Εὐβοῶν φυγάδες καὶ ὁσοὶ τῆς αὐτῆς γυνομηνίας ἡσαν καὶ μάχη κρατήσαντες τοὺς μὲν διεφθείραν τῶν Ἀθη-

ναίων, τοὺς δὲ ξόντας ἐλαβόν. καὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐξέλιπτον Ἀθηναίοι πᾶσαν, σπουδᾶσαν ποιησάμενοι

ἐφ’ οἷς τοὺς ἀνδρας κομίσαντι. καὶ οἱ φεύγοντες Βοιωτῶν κατελθόντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες αὐτὸ-

νομοὶ πάλιν ἐγένοντο.

CXIV. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλῷ ὥστεν Εὐβοια ἀπέστη ἀπὸ Ἀθηναίων. καὶ ἐς αὐτὴν διαβεβηκότος ὦπῃ Περικλέους στρατιὰ Ἀθηναίων ἠγελθην αὐτῷ δι’ Μεγάρα ἀψτήθηκε καὶ Πελο-

πονήσιοι μέλλουσιν ἐσβάλλειν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ οἱ φρονοῦν Ἀθηναίων διεφθαρμένοι εἰςὶν ὑπὸ Μεγαρῶν, πλὴν ὁσοὶ ἐς Νῆσαι ἀπέφυγον ἑπα-

γαγόμενοι δι’ Κορινθίους καὶ Σικυωνίους καὶ Ἐπι-

δαυρίους ἀπέστησαν οἱ Μεγαρῆς. ὁ δὲ Περικλῆς

πάλιν κατὰ τάχος ἐκόμιζε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς

Εὐβοίας. καὶ μετὰ τούτο οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς

Ἀττικῆς ἐς Ἐλευσίνα καὶ Θριόδε ἐσβαλόντες 

ἐδήσαν Πλειστοιάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου βασι-

λεῶς Λακεδαιμονίων ἠγουμένου, καὶ τὸ πλέον

ὑπεκέπερδόντες ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ’ οἴκου. καὶ

Ἀθηναῖοι πάλιν ἐς Εὐβοίαν διαβάντες Περι-

κλέους στρατηγοῦντο κατεστέρωσαν πᾶσαν, καὶ 

tὴν μὲν ἄλλην ὁμολογία κατεστήσαντο, Ἐστιαῖας δὲ ἐξοικίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν ἐσχοῦν.
Chaeroneia and selling its inhabitants into slavery, they placed a garrison in it and departed. But while they were on the march they were attacked at Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, together with some Locrians and Euboean exiles and others who held the same political views, and were defeated, some of the Athenians being slain and others taken alive. Accordingly the Athenians evacuated the whole of Boetia, making a treaty upon the stipulation that they should receive back their prisoners. And so the Boeotian exiles were restored, and they as well as all the rest of the Boeotians again became autonomous.

CXIV. Not long after this Euboea revolted from Athens; and Pericles had just crossed over to the island with an Athenian army when word was brought to him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that all the Athenian garrison had been destroyed by the Megarians except such as had escaped to Nisaea. The Megarians had effected this revolt by bringing Corinthians, Sicyonians and Epidaurians to their aid. So Pericles in haste brought his army back again from Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians, under the command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, advanced into Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria, ravaging the country; but without going further they returned home. Thereupon the Athenians again crossed over into Euboea under the command of Pericles and subdued the whole of it; the rest of the island they settled by agreement, but expelled the Hestiaeans from their homes and themselves occupied their territory.

2 Setting up democracies, etc. cf. C.I.A. iv. 27 a.
ΟΧΥ. Ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἀπ’ Εὐβοίας οὐ πολλῷ ἔστερον σπουδᾶς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Δακε- δαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τριακοντούντες, ἀποδόντες Νίσαιαν καὶ Πηγᾶς καὶ Τροιζήνα καὶ Ἀχαιαν̄ ταῦτα γὰρ εἶχον Ἀθηναίοις Πελοπον- νησίοις.

2 Ἔκτω δὲ ἔτει Σαμίων καὶ Μιλησίων πόλεως ἐγένετο περὶ Πριήνης: καὶ οἱ Μιλησίαις ἔλασ- σούμενοι τῷ πολέμῳ παρ’ Ἀθηναίους ἐλθόντες κατέβουν τοὺς Σαμίων. Ξυπνεῖμαι δὲ καὶ ἕξ αὐτῆς τῆς Σάμου ἀνδρές ἰδοῦσι, νεωτέροις

3 βουλόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν. τινος Ἀθηναίοι ἐς Σάμον ναυσὶ τεσσαράκοντα δημο- κρατίαν κατέστησαν καὶ ὀμήρους ἐλαβον τῶν Σαμίων πεντήκοντα μὲν παῦδας, ὶσους δὲ ἀνδράς, καὶ κατέβηκεν ἐς Δήμουν καὶ φρουρὰν ἐγκατα- λιπόντες ἀνεχόμεναν. τῶν δὲ Σαμίων ἦσαν γάρ τινες οἱ οὐχ ὑπέμειναν, ἀλλ’ ἐφυγόν ἐς τὴν ἤπει- ρον, ξυπνέμονι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τοὺς δυνατο- τάτους καὶ Πισσούθην τῷ Ὁστάσπον ξυμμαχίαν, ὡς εἰχε Σάρδεις τότε, ἐπικούρους τε κυθίδεαν ἐς ἐπτακοσιούς διέβησαν ὑπὸ νύκτα ἐς τὴν Σάμου.

4 καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν καὶ ἐκρά- τησαν τῶν πλείστων, ἐπείτα τοὺς ὀμήρους ἐκ- κλέψαντες ἐκ Δήμου τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπεστήσαν, καὶ τοὺς φρουροὺς τοὺς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας οἱ ἦσαν παρὰ σφίσιν ἐξέδοσαν Πισ- σούθην, ἐπὶ τῷ Μιλητοῦ εὐθὺς παρεσκευάζοντο στρατεύειν. Ξυναπέστησαν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Βυ- ξάντιοι.  

1 τὶν πολείταν seems not to have been read by the Schol., and so is deleted by van Herwerden and Hude.
CXV. Withdrawing their troops from Euboea not long afterwards they made a truce with the Lacedaemonians and their allies which was to last for thirty years, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea; for these were the places belonging to the Peloponnesians which the Athenians then held.

Six years later a war arose between the Samians and the Milesians about the possession of Priene, and the Milesians, who were being worsted in the war, went to Athens and cried out against the Samians. They were seconded in their complaint by some private citizens from Samos itself who wished to revolutionize the government. So the Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy, taking as hostages of the Samians fifty boys and as many men, whom they deposited in Lemnos; then they withdrew from Samos, leaving a garrison behind. Some of the Samians, however, did not stay, but fled to the mainland, first making an alliance with the most influential men who remained in the city and with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, then satrap of Sardis; and collecting mercenary troops to the number of seven hundred they crossed over by night to Samos. First they attacked the popular party and got most of them into their power; then they secretly got their hostages out of Lemnos and revolted from Athens, handing over to Pissuthnes the Athenian officers and garrison that were on the island, and at once set about preparing an expedition against Miletus. And the Byzantines also joined in their revolt.

1 440 B.C.
THUCYDIDES

CXVI. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὡς ἰσθοῦντο, πλεύσαντες ναυσίν ἔξηκοντα ἐπὶ Σάμου ταῖς μὲν ἐκκαἰδεκα τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχρήσαντο (ἐτυχον γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ Καρίας ἐσ προσκοπὴν τῶν Φοινισσῶν νεῶν οἰχόμεναι, αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου περιαγγέλλουσαι βοηθεῖν), τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ναυσὶ καὶ τέσσαρις Περικλέους δεκάτου αὐτοῦ στρατηγοῦντος ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς Τραγία τῇ νῆσῷ Σαμίων ναυσίν ἐβδομήκοντα, διὸ ἔσαν αἱ εἰκοσὶ στρατιώτιδες (ἐτυχον δὲ αἱ πάσαι ἄτῳ Μιλήτου πλέ-2 ουσαί), καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναίοι. ὑστερον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐβοηθησαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν νῆσες τεσσαράκοντα καὶ Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων πέντε καὶ εἰκοσι, καὶ ἀποβάντες καὶ κρατοῦντες τῷ πεζῷ ἐπολιόρκουν τρισὶ τείχει τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἁμα. 3 Περικλῆς δὲ λαβὼν ἔξηκοντα ναυὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐφορμουσῶν φῶςτο κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ Καῦνου καὶ Καρίας, ἐσαγγελθέντων ὅτι Φοινισσαὶ νῆσες ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πλέουσιν, φῶςτο γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πέντε ναυσὶ Ἀσημογόρας καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας.

CXVII. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Σάμοι ἔξαπιναῖοι ἐκπλουν ποιησάμενοι ἀφάρκτῳ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἐπιπεσόντες τὰς τε προφυλακίδας ναῦς διεθρείραν καὶ ναυμαχοῦσας τὰς ἀνταναγομένας ἐνίκησαν, καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης τῆς καθ’ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκράτησαν ἡμέρας περὶ τέσσαρας καὶ δέκα καὶ ἐσεκομίσαντο 2 καὶ ἐσεκομίσαντο ἀ ἐβούλοντο. ἔλθοντος δὲ Περικλέους πάλιν ταῖς ναυσὶ κατεκλήσθησαν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ὑστερον προσεβοήθησαν.
CXVI. But when the Athenians heard of this they sailed for Samos with sixty ships. Sixteen of these, however, they did not make use of on this enterprise, for these had already gone, some toward Caria to keep watch upon the Phoenician ships, others towards Chios and Lesbos to summon aid; but with forty-four ships, under the command of Pericles and nine others, they fought a sea-fight at the island of Tragia against seventy ships of the Samians, of which twenty were transport-ships, the whole fleet being on the way back from Miletus; and the Athenians were victorious. Later, having received a reinforcement from Athens of forty ships and from the Chians and Lesbians of twenty-five, they disembarked, and being superior to the Samians with their infantry proceeded to invest the city with three walls, at the same time blockading it by sea as well. But Pericles took sixty ships away from the blockading fleet and departed in haste towards Caunus in Caria, a report having come that a Phoenician fleet was sailing against his forces; for Stesagoras and others had gone from Samos with five vessels to fetch the Phoenician ships.

CXVII. Meanwhile the Samians suddenly made a sally and fell upon the Athenian naval station, which was unprotected by a stockade, destroying the guard-ships and defeating in a sea-fight the ships that put out against them. And for about fourteen days they were masters of the sea off their coast, bringing in and carrying out whatever they wished; but when Pericles came they were again blockaded by sea. And afterwards a reinforcement came from Athens

1 Sophocles was on the fleet, as one of the ten generals of the year.
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tesatarákonta méν aì méta Θουκυδίδου καὶ "Αγ-
νώνος καὶ Φορμύωνος νῆς, εἴκοσι δὲ aì méta
Tlnpolémon καὶ 'Antikléous, ēk δὲ Χίου καὶ
3 Δέσβου τριάκοντα. καὶ ναυμαχίαν méν τινα
βραχείαν ἑποιήσαντο οἱ Σάμιοι, ἀδύνατοι δὲ
οὕτε ἀντίσχειν ἐξεπολεμηθῆσαν ἐνάτῳ μηνὶ
cαὶ προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογία, τεῖχος τε καθε-
lόντες καὶ ὀμήρους δόντες καὶ ναίς παράδοντες
καὶ χρήματα τὰ ἀναλωθέντα ταξάμενοι κατὰ
χρώνους ἀποδοῦναι. ἤνεβησαν δὲ καὶ Βυζάντιων
ὡσπερ καὶ πρότερον ὑπῆκοι εἶναι.

CXVIII. Μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἢδη γίγνεται οὐ
πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὑστερον τὰ προειρημένα, τά τε
Κερκυραϊκα καὶ τα Ποτειδαιακα καὶ ὡσα πρό-
2 φασις τοῦτο τοῦ πολέμου κατέστη. ταῦτα δὲ
ξύμπαντα ὡσα ἔπραξαν οἱ Ἑλληνες πρὸς τε
ἀλλήλους καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον ἐγένετο ἐν ἔτεσι
πεντήκοντα μᾶλιστα μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ἑρέβου ἀνα-
χωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦτο τοῦ πολέμου ἐν
οἷς οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι τὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐγκρατεστέραν
κατεστήσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχωρήσαν
dυνάμεως. οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι οὔτε
ἐκώλυνον εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ βραχὺ, ἠσύχαζον τὸ τὸ πλέον
τοῦ χρόνου, οὕτε μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχίζ
ἰέναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, ἢν μὴ ἀναγκαίωσεται, τὸ
δέ τι ¹ καὶ πολέμους οἰκεῖοις ἔξειργόμενοι, πρὶν δὴ
η δύναμις τῶν 'Αθηναίων σαφῶς ἤρετο καὶ τῆς

¹ τῷ δὲ τί, so MSS.: τότε δ' ἦτε is read by Hude, after
Reiske (Dion. H. τότε δὲ τί).

¹ Possibly the historian, as some have thought; others
explain as the son of Melesias and opponent of Pericles;
still others as the poet from the deme of Acherdus.
of forty ships under the command of Thucydides,¹ Hagnon and Phormio, twenty under Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. Now the Samians did indeed put up a sea-fight for a short time, but they were unable to hold out, and in the ninth month ² were reduced by siege and agreed to a capitulation, pulling down their walls, giving hostages, delivering over their ships, and consenting to pay back by instalments the money spent upon the siege. The Byzantines too came to terms, agreeing to be subjects as before.

CXVIII. It was not many years ³ after this that the events already narrated occurred, namely the Coreclyraean affair,⁴ the Potidaean,⁵ and all the other incidents ⁶ that furnished an occasion for this war. And all these operations of the Hellenes, against one another and against the Barbarian, took place in the interval of about fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war.⁷ It was in this period that the Athenians established their rule more firmly and themselves advanced to great power. And the Lacedaemonians, though aware of their growing power, made no attempt to check it, except to a trifling extent, remaining indifferent the greater part of the time, since they had never been quick to go to war except under compulsion, and in this case were in some degree precluded from interference by wars of their own.⁸ But at last the power of the Athenians began clearly to exalt itself and they were

² 439 B.C.
³ Hardly four years, since the naval battle between the Coreclyraeans and Corinthians seems to have occurred 435 B.C.
⁴ Chs. xxiv–lv.
⁵ Chs. liv–lvi.
⁶ The transactions in the Spartan assembly, chs. lxvii–lxxxviii.
⁷ 479–432 B.C.
⁸ The Helot rebellion, ch. ci et seq.
ushed.  

3 Αὐτοῖς μὲν οὖν τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις διέγνωστο λελύσθαι τε τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀδικεῖν, πέμψαντες δὲ ἐς Δελφοὺς ἐπηρώτων τὸν θεὸν εἰ πολεμοῦσιν ἀμείνων ἔσται. ὡ δὲ ἀνείλεν αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, κατὰ κράτος πολεμοῦσι νίκην ἔσεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἕφη ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἀκλητος. CXIX. Αὐθίς δὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους παρακαλέσαντες ψήφον ἔβουλοντο ἐπαγαγεῖν εἰ χρὴ πολεμεῖν, καὶ ἐλθόντων τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπὸ τῆς ξυμμαχίας καὶ ξυνόδου γενομένης οἱ τῇ ἄλλῳ εἰπον ἃ ἔβουλοντο, κατηγοροῦντες οἱ πλείους τῶν Αθηναίων καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀξιοῦντες γίγνεσθαι, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι δεηθέντες μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις πρῶτον ἐκάστων ἴδια ὡστε ψηφίσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον, δεδομένης περὶ τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ μῆ προδιαφθαρῆ, παρόντες δὲ καὶ τότε καὶ τελευταῖοι ἐπελθόντες ἐλεγον τοιάδε.

CXII. "Τοὺς μὲν Δακεδαιμονίους, ὥς ἄνδρας ξύμμαχοι, οὕτων ἔτει αἰτιασάμεθα ὡς οὗ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐψηφίσμενοι τὸν πόλεμον εἰσὶ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐς τούτο νῦν ξυνήγαγον. χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἤγεμονας τὰ ἱδια ἔξ ἵσου νέμοντας τὰ κοινὰ προσκοπεῖν, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐκ πάντων προτιμοῖνται.
laying hands upon their allies. Then the Lacedaemonians could bear it no longer, but determined that they must attack the Athenian power with all zeal and overthrow it, if they could, by undertaking this war.

The Lacedaemonians themselves, then, had decided that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were in the wrong, and sending to Delphi they asked the god if it would be advisable for them to go to war. The god answered them, as it is said, that if they warred with all their might, victory would be theirs, and said that he himself would help them, whether invoked or uninvoked. CXIX. But they wished to summon their allies again and put to them the question whether they should go to war. And when the envoys from the allies had come and an assembly was held, the others said what they wished, most of them complaining of the Athenians and demanding that the war should be entered upon, and especially the Corinthians. They had already, before the meeting, privately begged the allies city by city to vote for the war, fearing lest Potidæa would be destroyed before help came, and now, being also present at this meeting, they came forward last of all and spoke as follows:

CXX. "Men of the allies, we can no longer complain of the Lacedaemonians that they have not both themselves voted for the war and also brought us together for this object. And that is right; for it is the duty of leaders, while equitably considering their particular interests, to have special regard for the general weal, just as in other matters they are

1 Resuming the narrative interrupted at the end of ch. lxxxviii.
2 ἡμῶν δὲ ὅσοι μεν Ἀθηναίοις ἦδη ξυνηγιλάγησαν οὐχὶ διδαχῆς δέονται ὡστε φυλάξασθαι αὐτούς· τοὺς δὲ τὴν μεσόγειαν μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ ἐν πόρῳ κατωκημένους εἰδέναι χρὴ ὅτι, τοῖς κάτω ἦν μὴ ἀμύνωσι, χαλεπωτέραν ἔξουσι τὴν κατακομβὴν τῶν ὁραίων καὶ πάλιν ἀντίληψιν δὲν ἡ θάλασσα τῇ ἡπείρῳ δίδωσι, καὶ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων μὴ κακοὺς κριτᾶς ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων εἶναι, προσδέχεσθαι δὲ ποτε, εἰ τὰ κάτω πρόσωπο, κἂν μέχρι σφῶν τὸ δεινὸν προελθεῖν, καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐχ
3 ἡσσον νῦν βουλευεσθαί. δὲ ὅπερ καὶ μὴ ὅκνειν δεῖ αὐτοὺς τὸν πόλεμον ἀντ’ εἰρήνης μεταλαμβάνειν. ἀνδρῶν γὰρ σωφρόνων μὲν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῦντο, ἑσυχάζειν, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ἀδικομένους ἐκ μὲν εἰρήνης πολεμεῖν, εὖ δὲ παρασχοῦν ἐκ πολέμου πάλιν ἑμβῆναι, καὶ μῆτε τῇ κατὰ πόλεμον ἑπαύξει ἐπάρεσθαι μῆτε τῷ ἡσύχῳ τῆς εἰρήνης
4 ἡδόμενον ἀδικεῖσθαί· οὐ τε γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὅκνουν τάχιστ’ ἄν ἀφαιρεθῇ τῆς ῥαστώνης τὸ τερπνὸν δὲ ὅπερ ὅκνει, εἰ ἑσυχάζοι, οὐ τε ἐν πολέμῳ εὐτυχία πλεονάζων οὐκ ἐντεθύμηται
5 θράσει ἄπιστῳ ἐπαιρόμενος. πολλὰ γὰρ κακῶς ὑγιωθέντα ἀβουλοτέρων τῶν ἐναντίων τυχόντα κατωρθώθη, καὶ ἐτὶ πλεῖον καλῶς δοκοῦντα βουλευθῆναι ἐς τοῦναντίον αἰσχρῶς περιέστη.

1 εἰ ἑσυχάζοι deleted by Hude, after Lehner.
honoured above all. Now those of us who have had dealings with the Athenians in the past do not need to be taught to be on our guard against them. But those who dwell more in the interior and away from any trade-route should be warned that, if they do not aid those who are on the seaboard, they will find it more difficult to bring the products of the land down to the sea and to get in return what the sea gives to the mainland; and that they should not be careless judges of what is said here, as though it were no concern of theirs, but should expect that, if they abandon the seacoast to its fate, the danger may possibly some day reach them, and that they are deliberating upon their own interests no less than upon ours. They ought not, therefore, to hesitate a moment to adopt war in place of peace. For though it is the part of men of discretion to remain tranquil should they not be wronged, it behooves brave men, when wronged, to go from peace to war, but when a favourable opportunity offers to abandon war and resume peace again, allowing themselves neither to be elated by success in war nor to be so enamoured of the quiet of peace as to submit to wrong. For he who for the sake of his comfort shrinks from war is likely, should he remain tranquil, very speedily to forfeit the delights of ease which caused him to shrink; and he who presumes upon his success in war has failed to reflect how treacherous is the confidence which elates him. For many enterprises which were ill-planned have succeeded because the adversary has proved to be still worse advised, and yet more, which to all appearances were well advised, have turned out the opposite way and brought disgrace. For no one ever carries out a
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ἐνθυμεῖται γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὁμοία. 1 τῇ πίστει καὶ ἔργῳ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀλλὰ μετ’ ἀσφαλείας μὲν δοξάζομεν, μετὰ δὲ άνθρώπων. Ὅμως δὲ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐλλείπομεν.

CXXI. "Ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν καὶ ἀδικοῦμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ἐγείρομεν καὶ ἱκανὰ ἔχοντες ἐγκλήματα, καὶ ὅταν ἀμυνόμεθα Ἠθναίων, καταθνεόμεθα αὐτῶν ἐν καιρῷ. κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατήσαι, πρῶτον μὲν πλῆθει προὐχοντας καὶ ἐμπειρία πολεμικῆ, ἐπειτα ὁμοίως πάντας ἐς τὰ παραγγέλλομενα ἑόντας, ναυτικοῖς τε, ὦ ἰσχύος, ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχοῦσης τε ἐκάστουσιν ὁμοίως ἐξαρτυσόμεθα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Ὀλυμπίας χρημάτων. δάνεισμα γὰρ ποιησάμενοι ὑπολαβέειν οἷοι τ’ ἔσμεν μισθῷ μείζονι τούς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας. ὡνητῇ γὰρ ἡ Ἠθναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἡ οἰκεία. ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἦσον ἄν τούτο πάθοι, τοὺς σώμασι τὸ πλέον ἰσχύοσα ἡ τοῖς χρήμασιν. μιᾷ τε νίκη ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀλεσκοῦται· εἰ δ’ ἀντίςχουειν, μελετήσομεν καὶ ἥμεῖς ἐν πλέον χρόνῳ τὰ ναυτικά, καὶ ὅταν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐς τὸ ἱσον καταστήσωμεν, τῇ γε εὐνυχίᾳ δῆτον περιεσώμεθα· ὁ γὰρ ἥμεῖς ἔχομεν φύει ἀγαθόν, ἐκεῖνοις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο δίδαξην, ὃ

1 Reiske’s correction for ὅμοια of the MSS.

1 cf. ii. xiii. 4, where Pericles suggests a similar resource. The Delphic oracle favoured the Peloponnesians, according to ch. cxviii. 3.
plan with the same confidence with which he conceives it; on the contrary we form our fond schemes with a feeling of security, but when it comes to their execution, we are possessed by fear and fall short of success.

CXXI. "And so now in our own case, it is because we are suffering wrongs and have ample grounds for complaint that we are stirring up this war, and as soon as we have avenged our wrongs upon the Athenians we will bring the war to an end when occasion offers. And for many reasons we are likely to prevail: first, because we are superior in point of numbers and in military experience; secondly, because we all with one accord obey the word of command; and, thirdly, on the sea, where their strength lies, we shall be able to equip a fleet, not only with the means which we severally possess, but also with the funds stored up at Delphi and Olympia.¹ For by contracting a loan we can use the inducement of higher pay to entice away from them their mercenary sailors; for the forces of the Athenians are made up of hirelings rather than of their own citizens, whereas ours, whose strength lies more in the quality of the men than in the pay they get, would be less subject to such defection. And so, if we win a single victory at sea, in all probability they are defeated.² If, however, they should still hold out, we on our part shall have more time for practice in seamanship, and as soon as we have brought our skill to a parity with theirs, in courage, assuredly, we shall be superior. For the excellence that nature has given us cannot become theirs through instruction, whereas

¹ Through the mercenary sailors flocking to the Peloponnesian side for higher pay.
δ’ ἐκείνοι ἐπιστήμη προύχουσι, καθαιρετῶν ἡμῶν.

5 ἵστι μελέτη. χρήματα δὲ ὡστε ἔχειν ἐς αὐτά, οἴσομεν ἥ δεινόν ἂν εἰ ὦ κεῖ ἐς μὲν ἐκείνων ἐξώμαγοι ἐπὶ δουλεία τῇ αὐτῶν φέροντες οὐκ ἀπερούσιν, ἡμεῖς δ’ ἐπὶ τῷ τιμωροῦμεν τοὺς ἐκθροῦσὶ καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀμα σφέζεσθαι οὐκ ἀρα δαπανήσομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὅπερ ἐκείνων αὐτὰ ἀφαιρεθέντες αὐτοῖς τοῦτοις κακῶς πάσχειν.

ΟΧΧΙ. "Τοπάρχουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ὀδοι τοῦ πολέμου ἡμῖν, ξυμμάχων τε ἀπόστασις, μάλιστα παραίρεσις οὕσα τῶν προσόδων αἰς ἱσχύοντο, καὶ ἐπιτειχισμός τῇ χώρᾳ, ἄλλα τε ὅσα οὐκ ἂν τις νῦν προίδοι. ἦκιστα γὰρ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ρητὸς χωρεί, αὐτὸς δὲ ἅφε αὐτοῦ τὰ πολλά τεχνάται πρὸς τὸ παρατυχικὸν ἐν ὧδε ὁ μὲν εὐρυγῆτος αὐτῷ προσομολήσας βεβαιώτερος, ὁ δ’ ὀργισθεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ οὖκ ἐλάσσοι πταίει.

2 "Ενθυμώμεθα δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ἡμῶν ἡσαν ἐκάστοις πρὸς ἀντιπάλους περὶ γῆς ὅρων αἰ διαφοραλ, οἰστόν ἂν ἂν νῦν δὲ πρὸς ξύμπαντας τε ἡμᾶς Ἀθηναῖοι ἰκανοὶ καὶ κατὰ πόλιν ἔτι δυνατότεροι ὡστε, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἄθροοι καὶ κατὰ ἐδύνη καὶ ἐκαστὸν ἄστυ μᾶ ἡμών ἀμνούμεθα αὐτοὺς, δίξα γε ὅντας ἡμᾶς ἀπόνως χειρώσονται. καὶ τὴν ἡσαν, εἰ καὶ δεινὸν τῷ ἀκούσαι, ἵστω οὖκ

¹ καθαιρετῶν, which Hude adopts from C and G (ex corr.), against καθαιρετῶν of the other MSS., is confirmed by the echo in Dio C. xiii. 11, τὸ μὲν γὰρ κτητὸν διὰ βραχίως τοίς τῶν νῦν αὐτῷ προσέχουσι καὶ καθαιρετῶν μελέτη ἐλίναι.

² Dobree's correction for αὐτῶν of nearly all MSS.
the advantage they have in skill can be acquired by us through practice. And as to the money we need to accomplish all this, we shall provide it by contributions; or strange were it, if their allies should never fail to pay tribute to ensure their own slavery, but we, to secure at once vengeance upon our enemies and safety for ourselves, shall prove unwilling to spend money, aye, and that we may not be robbed of that very wealth and withal have it used to our destruction.

CXXII. But we have other ways also of waging war—inducing their allies to revolt, which is the best means of depriving them of the revenues in which their strength consists, the planting of forts in their territory, and all the other measures which one cannot now foresee. For war least of all conforms to fixed rules, but itself in most cases has to form its plans to suit the occasion as its own resources allow; when, therefore, a man keeps his temper cool while dealing with war, he is more likely to be safe, while he who loses his temper over it makes more blunders.

"And let us reflect also that, if we individually were involved in a dispute about mere boundary-lines with an enemy who was no more than our equal, that might be borne; but as the case stands, the Athenians are quite a match for us all together, and still more powerful against us city by city. Hence, unless all of us together, every nation and town, with one accord resist them, they will easily overpower us because we shall be divided. And as to defeat—even though this is terrible to hear, let it

1 Or, reading σοτοτ with the MSS., "makes blunders through his own fault as much as anything," i.e. "the man who loses his head has only himself to blame for his disasters."
3 ἂλλο τι φέρουσαν ἢ ἀντικρυς δουλείαν· δ καὶ λόγῳ ἐνδοιασθήματι αἰσχρὸν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ πόλεις τοσάδε ὑπὸ μᾶς κακοπαθεῖν. ἐν δὲ ἡ δικαίως δοκοῖμεν ἂν πάσχειν ἢ διὰ δειλίαν ἀνεχθαι καὶ τῶν πατέρων χείρον φαίνεσθαι, οἱ τὴν Ἐλλάδα ἡλευθέρωσαν· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βεβαιούμεν αὐτό, τύραννον δὲ ἐδώμεν ἐγκαθεστάναι πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν μιᾷ μονάρχους 

4 ἄξιούμεν καταλύειν. καὶ οὐκ ἴσχει ὅπως τάδε τριῶν τῶν μεγίστων ἕμφορόν ἡπίλλακται, ἄξυνεσίας ἢ μαλακίας ἢ ἀμελείας. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πεφευγότες αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὴν πλείστους δὴ βλάψασαν καταφρόνησιν κεχωρήκατε, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πολλοῦς σφάλλειν τὸ ἐναντίον ὄνομα ἄφροσύνη μετωνο-μαστὶ.

CXXIII. “Τὰ μὲν οὖν προγεγενημένα τί δει μακρότερον ἢ ἐς ὅσον τοῖς νῦν ἔμψυχοι αἰτιά-σθαι; περὶ δὲ τῶν ἑπείτα μελλόντων τοῖς παροῦ-

si βοηθοῦντας χρὴ ἐπιταλαιπωρεῖν (πάτριον γὰρ ἡμῖν) ἐκ τῶν πόλων τᾶς ἀρετὰς κτᾶσθαι), καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἔθος, εἰ ἀρα πλούτῳ τε νῦν καὶ ἐξοντιξ ὀλίγον προφέρετε (οὐ γὰρ δικαίον ἄ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐκτήθη τῇ περιουσίᾳ ἀπολέσθαι), ἀλλὰ ἀρασοῦντας ίέναι κατὰ πολλὰ ἐς τῶν πόλεμον, τοῦ τε θεοῦ χρήσαντος καὶ αὐτοῦ ὑποσχομένου

1 With C, the other MSS. have ἦμιν.

1 καταφρόνησι is that proud and haughty spirit which precedes and invites a fall. It seems impossible to reproduce in
be well understood that it brings nothing else than downright slavery. That such an outcome should even be spoken of as a possibility, or that so many cities might suffer ill at the hands of one, is a disgrace to the Peloponnesus. In such a case men would say of us, either that we deserved our fate, or that through cowardice we submitted to it, and that we were clearly degenerate sons of our fathers, who liberated Hellas, whereas we, so far from making this liberty secure, should be allowing a city to be established as a tyrant in our midst, though we claim the reputation of deposing the monarchs in single states. We know not how such a course can be acquitted of one of the three gravest errors, stupidity or cowardice, or carelessness. For I cannot suppose that, escaping those errors, you have reached that most fatal spirit of proud disdain which has ruined so many men that it has taken on a new name, that of despicable folly.

CXXIII. "With regard, however, to what is past and done, what need is there to find fault at length, except in so far as that is profitable for what is present? But with a view to what shall be hereafter, we should devote every effort to the task in hand— for to win virtue by toils is our heritage—and make no change of custom because you now have a slight superiority in wealth and power; for it is not right that attributes which have been won through poverty should be lost through prosperity. Nay, you should go into the war with confidence, and for many reasons: the god has spoken through his oracle and promised that he

English the assonance of the words καταφρόνησις ἄφροσόνη. Thucydides was fond of paronomasia; cf. ch. xxxiii. 4.

2 Or, "the rewards of virtue"—honour, renown.
Ξυλλήψεσθαι, καὶ τής ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσης ἡπαγωγιομένης, τά μὲν φόβη, τά δὲ ὁφελία. 2. σπουδάς τε οὐ λύσετε πρότεροι, ὡς γε καὶ ὁ θεὸς κελεύων πολεμεῖν νομίζει παραβεβάζει, ἠδικημέναις δὲ μᾶλλον βοηθήσετε λύωςι γὰρ ὦχι οἱ ἀμυνόμενοι, ἀλλ' οἱ πρότεροι ἐπιόντες.

OXXIV. "Ὡστε πανταχόθεν καλῶς ὕπάρχον ὑμῖν πολεμεῖν καὶ ἡμῶν κοινῆ τάδε παρανοούντων, εἴπερ βεβαιώτατον τὸ ταῦτα ἡμιφέροντα καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις εἶναι, μὴ μέλλετε Ποτειδαῖοι τε ποιεῖσθαι τιμωρίαν οὔσι Δωριέσι καὶ ὑπὸ Ἰώνων πολιορκουμένως, οὐ πρότερον ἢν τούναντίον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετελθεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὡς οὐκετί εἰνδέχεται περιμένοντας τοὺς μὲν ἢδη βλάπτεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ, εἰ γνωσθησόμεθα ξυνελθόντες μὲν, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ ἀτολμώντες. 2. μὴ πολὺ ύστερον τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν ἀλλὰ νομίσαντες ἐς ἀνάγκην ἰσώτικα, ὡς ἄνδρες ἡμίμαχοι, καὶ ἀμα τάδε άριστα λέγεσθαι, ψηφίσασθε τῶν πόλεμον μὴ φοβηθέντες τὸ αὐτικὰ δεινὸν, τῆς δ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ διὰ πλείονος εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμήσαντες ἐκ πολέμου μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνη μᾶλλον βεβαιώνται, ἀφ' ἄρσην δὲ μὴ πολεμῆσαι σὺν όμοίως ἰκλίνουν. καὶ τὴν καθεστηκυιαν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι πολὺ τυραννὸν ἡγησίμενοι ἐπὶ πᾶσιν όμοίως καθεστᾶναι, ὡστε τῶν μὲν ἢδη ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ

1 So Hude, after Reiske (tau'ta F, ταῦτα γρ.α); ταῦτα ABCEGM.
himself will help you; all the rest of Hellas will join you in the struggle, partly through fear and partly through self-interest; and, finally, you will not be the ones to break the treaty, inasmuch as the god, in bidding you go to war, considers it to have been transgressed already, but you will be going to the defence of a treaty that has been violated. For it is not those who fight in self-defence that break a treaty, but those who attack others unprovoked.

CXXIV. "So then, since from every quarter a favourable opportunity offers itself to you to go to war, and since we recommend this course in the common interest—if it be true that identity of interest\(^1\) is the surest policy for states and individuals to follow—make haste to succour the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and besieged by Ionians—the reverse of what used to be—and to recover the liberty of the rest; since it will no longer do for us to wait, when some are already being injured, and others, if it shall become known that we have had a meeting and dare not defend ourselves, will soon suffer the same fate. On the contrary, men of the allies, recognize that we are now facing the inevitable, and at the same time that this proposal is for the best; and vote for the war, not fearing the immediate danger, but coveting the more enduring peace which will result from the war. For peace is more firmly established when it follows war, but to refuse to go to war from a desire for tranquillity is by no means so free from danger. And so, in the conviction that the state which has set itself up as a tyrant in Hellas is a menace to all alike, ruling over some already and

\(^1\) Or, reading τάυτα, "if it be most certain that this course (i.e. declaration of war) is advantageous for states as well as individuals."
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dιανοεῖσθαι, παραστησώμεθα ἐπελθόντες, καὶ
αὐτοὶ τε ἀκινδύνως τὸ λοιπὸν οἰκόμεν καὶ τοὺς

νῦν δεδουλωμένους Ἑλλήνας ἑλευθερώσωμεν.

CXXV. Τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον. οἱ
dὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπείδη ἀφ' ἀπάντων ἥκουσαν
gνώμην, ψῆφον ἐπήγαγον τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀπασιν

ὅσοι παρῆσαν ἔξις καὶ μείζονι καὶ ἐλάσσονι πός-

2 λει: καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμεῖν. δεδογ-
mένον δὲ αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς μὲν ἀδύνατα ἢ ἐπιχειρεῖν
ἀπαρασκευούς ὤσιν, ἐκπορίζεσθαι δὲ ἐδόκει ἐκά-

ςτοις ἃ πρόσφορα ἦν καὶ μὴ ἦν μελλησιν.
ὀμοι δὲ καθισταμένοις ὃν ἔδει ἐναντὸς μὲν οὐ
διετρίβη, ἐλασσον δὲ, πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν

'Ἀττικὴν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀρασθαί φανερῶς.

CXXVI. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐπρεσβευόντο τῷ χρόνῳ
πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι,
ὅπως σφίσω ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εὖ τοῦ πολε-

2 μεῖν, ἢν μὴ τι ἐσακούσιν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν

πρέσβεις πέμψαντες οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευσιν

3 τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ ἄγος ἐλαύνειν τῆς θεοῦ. τὸ

δὲ ἄγος ἦν τοιόνδε. Κύλων ἢ Ἀθηναῖος ἀνὴρ

'Ολυμπιονίκης τῶν πάλαι εὐγενής τε καὶ δυνατὸς·

ἐγεγαμήκει δὲ θυγατέρα Θεαγένους Μεγαρέως

ἀνδρός, ὃς κατ' ἐκεῖνον τῶν χρόνων ἑτυράννει

4 Μεγάρον. χρωμένῳ δὲ τῷ Κύλωνι ἐν Δελφοῖς

ἀνείλεν ὁ θεὸς ἐν τοῦ Δίως τῇ μεγίστῃ ἐορτῇ

5 καταλαβεῖν τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἀκρόπολιν. ὁ δὲ παρὰ

τε τοῦ Θεαγένους δύναμιν λαβὼν καὶ τοὺς φίλους

ἀναπέλαγος, ἐπειδῆ ἐπήλθεν Ὄλυμπια τὰ ἐν

Πελοποννήσῳ, κατέλαβε τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ὡς ἐπὶ

τυραννίδι, νουῶς ἐορτὴν τε τοῦ Δίως μεγίστην.
designing to rule over others, let us attack and reduce it, and henceforth dwell in security ourselves and set free those Hellenes who are already enslaved.”

CXXV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the Lacedaemonians when they had heard the opinions of all, put the vote in succession to all the allied states which were present, both great and small; and the majority voted for war. But though the decision was made it was impossible for them to take up arms at once, as they were unprepared; it was determined, however, that the several states should make the fitting preparations and that there should be no delay. Nevertheless, in providing themselves with what was needed there was spent, not indeed a full year, but somewhat less, before they invaded Attica and took up the war openly.

CXXVI. During this interval they kept sending embassies to the Athenians and making complaints, that they might have as good a pretext as possible for making war, in case the Athenians should refuse to consider them. And first the Lacedaemonian envoys bade the Athenians drive out the “curse of the goddess.” The curse was as follows: There was an Athenian in days of old named Cylon, a victor at Olympia, of noble birth and powerful; and he had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, who was at that time tyrant of Megara. Now Cylon consulted the oracle at Delphi, and the god in answer told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens “at the greatest festival of Zeus.” So he obtained a force from Theagenes and, persuading his friends to help, when the Olympic festival in the Peloponnesus came on he seized the Acropolis with a view to making himself tyrant; for he thought that the
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ἐίναι καὶ ἐαυτῷ τε προσήκειν Ὄλυμπια νενεκτικότε. εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἡ ἄλλοθι ποῦ ἡ μεγίστη ἑορτὴ ἑτήτῳ, οὕτε ἐκείνος ἡτὶ κατενόησε τὸ τε μαντεῖον οὐκ ἐδόθην (ἐστι γὰρ καὶ Ἀθηναίων Δίασια, ἃ καλεῖται, Διὸς ἑορτὴ Μειλιχίου μεγίστη, ἕξω τῆς πόλεως, ἐν ἡ πανθημεὶ θύουσι, πολλοὶ 1 οὐχ ἱερεία ἄλλα θύματα ἐπιχώρια), δοκῶν δὲ ὅρθως γυγνώσκειν ἐπεχείρησε τῷ ἔργῳ.
7 οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐβοήθησαν τε πανθημεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄγρων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς καὶ προσκαθέ.
8 ξόμενοι ἐπολιορκουν. χρόνου δὲ ἐγγυγνωμένου οἵ Ἀθηναίοι τυχόμενοι τῇ προσεδρίᾳ ἀπῆλθον οἱ πολλοὶ, ἐπιτρέπαντες τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας, τὴν φυλακὴν τὲ καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτοκράτορος διαθείναι ἃ ἂν ἄριστα διαγιγνώσκοισιν τότε δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ἐπρασσον.
9 οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Κύλωνος πολιορκοῦμενοι φιλαῦρος
10 εἰχον σίτου τε καὶ υδατος ἀπορία. ὦ μὲν οὖν Κύλων καὶ ὁ ἄδελφος ἐκδιδράσκοισιν οἱ δ΄ ἄλλοι ὡς επιέζοντο καὶ τίνες καὶ ἀπέθυμησον ὕπο τοῦ λιμοῦ, καθίζοντες ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ ἰκέται τὸν ἐν τῇ

1 πολλοί: Hude adopts C. F. Hermann's conjecture πολλά, and, after Malvig, inserts ἄγγια before θύματα.

1 On this first attempt to establish a tyranny in Athens, see also Hdt. v. lxii; Plut. Solon, xii. It was not a rising of the people against the nobles, but the attempt of an ambitious man who aspired to royal power, supported only by a few friends and a body of Megarian soldiers. To the mass
Olympic festival was not only the greatest festival of Zeus, but also in a manner was connected with him as having won an Olympic victory. But whether the oracle meant the greatest festival in Attica or somewhere else he did not go on to consider, and the oracle did not make it clear. For, in fact, the Athenians also have a festival in honour of Zeus Meilichius, the Diasia, as it is called, a very great festival celebrated outside the city, whereat all the people offer sacrifices, many making offerings peculiar to the country instead of victims. But Cylon, thinking that he was right in his opinion, made his attempt. And the Athenians, when they were aware of it, came in a body from the fields against them and sitting down before the Acropolis laid siege to it. But as time passed the Athenians grew weary of the siege and most of them went away, committing the task of guarding to the nine Archons, to whom they also gave full power to settle the whole matter as they might determine to be best; for at that time the nine Archons transacted most of the public business. But Cylon and those who were being besieged with him were in hard straits through lack of food and water. So Cylon and his brother escaped; but the rest, when they were in great distress and some of them were even dying of hunger, sat down as suppliants at the

of the people it seemed to portend subjection to Megara, so they flocked in to crush the movement, not, as Cylon hoped, to support it.

2 A scholiast suggests cakes (πλυματα) made in the forms of animals.

3 i.e. before the legislation of Solon; from that time the power of the Archons decreased, and was restricted chiefly to judicial functions.
11 ἀκροπόλεις. ἀναστήσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακήν, ὡς έώρον ἀποδημοῦσκοντας ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐφ’ ᾧ μὲν κακῶν ποιήσουσιν, ἀπαγαγόντες ἀπέκτειναν καθεξομένους δὲ τινὰς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σεμνῶν θεῶν τοῖς βωμοῖς ἐν τῇ παράδεισῳ ἀπεχρήσαντο. καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐναγεῖς καὶ ἀληθήριοι τῆς θεοῦ ἐκείνοι τε ἐκαλοῦντο καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ ἀπ’ ἐκείνων. ἦλασαν μὲν σὺν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τοὺς ἐναγεῖς τούτους, ἦλασε δὲ καὶ Κλεομένης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ὤστερον μετὰ Ἀθηναίων στασιαζόντων, τοὺς τε ξώνας ἐλαύνοντες καὶ τῶν τεθνεότων τὰ ὀστά ἂν ἐλέοντες ἐξέβαλον κατῆλθον μέντοι ὤστερον, καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν ἐτε ἐστιν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

CXXXVII. Τούτῳ δὲ τὸ ἀγός οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευσον ἐλαύνειν δήθεν τοὺς θεοὺς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες, εἰδότες δὲ Περικλέα τὸν Πανθέιππον προσεχόμενον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μητέρα καὶ νομιζόντες ἐκπεσόντος αὐτοῦ μέσον ἀν’ σφίζει πρὸς 2 χωρεῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἠπείξον παθεῖν ἀν αὐτῶν τούτο ὅσον διαβολὴν οἴσειν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἢς καὶ διὰ τὴν 3 ἐκείνου ἡμιφόραν τὸ μέρος ἐσται ὁ πόλεμος. ὁν

1 Added by Stahl.

1 Of Athena Polias.
2 The sanctuary of the Eumenides, which lay between the Acropolis and the Areopagus.

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altar on the Acropolis. And the Athenians who had been charged with guarding them, when they saw them dying in the temple, caused them to arise on promise of doing them no harm, and leading them away put them to death; and some who in passing by took refuge at the altar of the Awful Goddesses they dispatched even there. For this act both they and their descendants were called accursed and sinners against the Goddess. Accordingly the accursed persons were driven out not only by the Athenians but also at a later time by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, with the help of a faction of the Athenians, during a civil strife, when they drove out the living and disinterred and cast out the bones of the dead. Afterwards, however, they were restored, and their descendants are still in the city.

CXXVII. It was this "curse" that the Lacedaemonians now bade the Athenians drive out, principally, as they pretended, to avenge the honour of the gods, but in fact because they knew that Pericles son of Xanthippus was implicated in the curse on his mother's side, and thinking that, if he were banished, they would find it easier to get from the Athenians the concessions they hoped for. They did not, however, so much expect that he would suffer banishment, as that they would discredit him with his fellow-citizens, who would feel that to some extent his misfortune would be the cause of the

1. Chiefly the Alemaeonidae, whose head was Megacles, Archon at the time of Cylon's attempt.
2. Pericles was a descendant in the sixth generation from Megacles, his mother Agariste being niece of the Alemaeonid Cleisthenes (Hdt. vi. cxxx.).
3. As belonging to the accursed family.
γὰρ δυνάτωτατος τῶν καθ' ἕαυτόν καὶ ἄγων τήν πολιτείαν ἦναντιοῦτο πάντα τοῖς Λακεδαίμονίοις, καὶ οὐκ εἰς ὑπείκειν, ἀλλ' ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ὀρμᾶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.

CXXVIII. Ἀντεκέλευνον δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τοὺς Λακεδαίμονίους τὸ ἀπὸ Ταινάρου ἄγος ἐλαύνειν. οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαίμονοι ἀναστήσαντες ποτὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ Ποσειδώνος ἀπὸ Ταινάρου1 τῶν Εἰλώτων ἱκέτας ἀπαγαγόντες διέθειραν δὲ δὴ καὶ σφίσων αὐτοὺς νομίζουσι τὸν μέγαν 2 σεισμὸν γενέσθαι ἐν Σπάρτῃ. ἐκέλευνον δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Χαλκιόκου ἄγος ἐλαύνειν αὐτούς· ἐγένετο δὲ 3 τοιόντε. ἐπειδὴ Παυσανίας ὁ Λακεδαίμονιος τὸ πρῶτον μεταπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Σπαρτιατῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἐν Ἑλλησπόντω καὶ κριθεὶς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀπελύθη μὴ ἀδικεῖν, δημοσίᾳ μὲν οὐκέτι ἐξεπέμφθη, ἵδια δὲ αὐτὸς τριήρη λαβὼν Ἐρμονίδα ἀνευ Λακεδαίμονίων ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἑλλησπόντου, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ἐπὶ τῶν Μηδικῶν πόλεμον, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ τὰ πρὸς βασιλέα πράγματα πράσσειν, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησεν, ἐφιέμενος τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀρχῆς. εὐνεργείαν δὲ ἀπὸ τούδε πρῶτον ἐς βασιλέα κατέθετο καὶ τοῦ παντὸς 4 πράγματος ἀρχῆν ἐποιήσατο. Βυζάντιον γὰρ

1 Van Herwerden deletes, followed by Hude.

1 cf. ch. ci. 2.
war. For being the most powerful man of his time and the leader of the state, he was opposed to the Lacedaemonians in all things, and would not let the Athenians make concessions, but kept urging them on to the war.

CXXVIII. The Athenians answered with the demand that the Lacedaemonians should drive out the curse of Taenarus. For the Lacedaemonians had on one occasion caused some suppliants Helots to leave their refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, then had led them off and put them to death; and the Lacedaemonians believe that it was because of this sacrilege that the great earthquake¹ befell them at Sparta. And the Athenians also bade them drive out the curse of Athena of the Brazen House.² And this is the way it was incurred. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the Spartans, on the first occasion,³ from his command on the Hellespont, and on trial had been acquitted of wrong-doing, he was never again sent out in a public capacity, but privately and on his own account he took a trireme of Hermione without authority of the Lacedaemonians and came to the Hellespont, to take part, as he pretended, in the Persian war, but in reality to carry on an intrigue with the Great King—an enterprise to which he had set his hand in the first instance also, his aim being to become master of all Hellas. He had namely first laid up for himself with the King a store of gratitude in the following circumstances, and thus had begun the whole affair. When he was in that quarter before, after

¹ So called from her temple or shrine in the citadel at Sparta. Pausanias says (III. xvii. 2) both temple and statue were of bronze.
² 477 B.C. cf. ch. xcv. 3.
ἐλών τῇ προτέρᾳ παρουσία μετὰ τὴν ἐκ Κύπρου ἀναχώρησιν (εἰχον δὲ Μίδοι αὐτὸ καὶ βασιλέως προσήκοντές τινες καὶ ἐγγυγεινες, οἱ ἐάλωσαν ἐν αὐτῷ τότε) τούτους οὕς ἐλαβεν ἀποτείμπει βασιλεῖ κρύφα τῶν ἄλλων εὐμμάχων, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ἀπέδρασαν αὐτῶν. ἔπρασσε δὲ ταύτα μετὰ Γογγύλου τοῦ Ἐρετρίως, ὕπερ ἐπέτρεψε τὸ τε Βυζάντιον καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους. ἐπεμψε δὲ καὶ ἐπιστολὴν τὸν Γογγύλου φέροντα αὐτῷ. ἐνεγέγραπτο δὲ τάδε ἐν αὐτῇ, ὡς ὑστερον ἀνηρέθη.

"Παυσανίας ὦ ἡγεμόν τῆς Σπάρτης τούσδε τέ σοι χαρίζεσθαι Βουλόμενον ἀποτείμπει δορὶ ἐλών, καὶ ἡμῶν ποιοῦμαι, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ, θυγατέρα τε τὴν σήν γῆμαι καὶ σοὶ Σπάρτην τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα ὑποχείριον ποιῆσαι. δυνάτος δὲ δοκῶ εἶναι ταύτα πρᾶξαι μετὰ σοῦ Βουλόμενον. εἰ ὧν τὶ σε τούτων ἄρεσκει, πέμπτε ἀνδρὰ πιστὸν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν δὲ ὅτῳ τὸ λοιπὸν τοὺς λόγους ποιησόμεθα." τοσαῦτα μὲν ἡ γραφὴ ἐδήλου.

CXXIX. Ἐξέρχεται δὲ ἡσθή τε τῇ ἐπιστολῇ καὶ ἀποστέλλει Ἀρτάβαζον τὸν Φαρνάκου ἐπὶ θάλασσαν καὶ κελεύει αὐτὸν τὴν τε Δασκυλίτων σατραπείαν παραλαβεῖν Μεγαβαταίν, ἀπαλλάξαντα, ὃς πρότερον ἤρχετε, καὶ παρὰ Παυσανίαν ἐς Βυζάντιον ἐπιστολὴν ἀντεπείδει αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα διαπέμψαι καὶ τὴν σφραγίδα ἀποδείξαι, καὶ ἦν τι αὐτῷ Παυσανίας παραγγέλλῃ περὶ τῶν ἀυτοῦ πραγμάτων, πράσσειν ὡς ἄριστα καὶ 2 πιστῶτα. οὐ δὲ ἄφικόμενος τὰ τε ἄλλα ἐποίησεν

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the return of the Hellenic fleet from Cyprus, he had taken Byzantium, then in the possession of the Persians, and certain connections and kinsmen of the King were captured in the place when the city fell. These prisoners he sent back to the King without the knowledge of the allies in general, whom he gave to understand that they had escaped from him. And he was carrying on this intrigue in concert with Gongylus the Eretrian, the very man whom he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the captives. And he also sent a letter by Gongylus to the King, in which the following was written, as was afterwards discovered:

"Pausanias, the Spartan commander, wishing to do you a favour, sends you back these men whom he took with the spear. And I make the proposal, if it seems good to you also, to marry your daughter and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to you. And I am able, I think, to accomplish these things with the help of your counsel. If any of these things pleases you, send a trusty man to the sea, and through him we shall in future confer." So much the letter disclosed.

CXXIX. Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and sent Artabazus son of Pharnaces to the sea, commanding him to take over the satrapy of Dascylion, superseding Megabates, who was governor before; and he charged him with a letter in reply to Pausanias, bidding him transmit it to him in Byzantium as quickly as possible and to show him the seal, and if Pausanias should give him any direction about the King's affairs, to execute it with all care and fidelity. And he on his arrival did

1 cf. ch. xciv. 2.
διάπερ εἰρήτο καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν διέπεμψεν. ἀντενεγέγραπτο δὲ τάδε.

3 "‘Ωδε λέγει βασιλεὺς Ἐξέρξης Παυσανίας· καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὓς μοι πέραν βαλάσσας ἐκ Βυζαντίου ἔσωσας κεῖσται σοι εὐεργεσία ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ ἐς αἰεὶ ἀνάγραπτος, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρέσκομαι. καὶ σε μήτε νῦξ μήθ’ ἡμέρα ἐπισχέτω ὡςτε ἀνείναι πρᾶσσειν τι ὅν ἔμοι ὑπισχνεῖ, μηδὲ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου δαπάνη κεκόλυσο μηδὲ στρατιάς πλήθει, εἰ ποι δέ οἱ παραγγέλουσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετ’ Ἀρταβάζου ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ὅν σοι ἐπεμψα, πρᾶσσε θαρσῶν καὶ τὰ ἔμα καὶ τὰ σὰ ὁπη κάλλιστα καὶ ἀριστα ἔξει ἀμφοτέροις.

CXXX. Ταῦτα λαβὼν ὁ Παυσανίας τὰ ἡγάμματα, ὅν καὶ πρότερον ἐν μεγάλῳ ἡξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν Ἐλλήνων διὰ τὴν Πλαταίαν ἰγκεμονίαν, πολλῷ τότε μᾶλλον ἦρτο καὶ οὐκέτι ἐδύνατο ἐν τῷ καθεστώτε ἐπόπῳ ἔπεισεν, ἀλλὰ σκεύας τὸ Μηδικᾶς ἐνδυμάνον ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ἔξεις καὶ διὰ τῆς Θράκης πορεύμαντο αὐτῶν Μῆδων καὶ Αἰγύπτων ἐδορυφόρουν, τράπεζαν τὰς Περσικῆς παρεῖσθε καὶ κατέχειν τὴν διάνοιαν οὐκ ἐδύνατο, ἀλλ’ ἔργοις βραχέως προσδίδολον ἄ τῇ γυνῇ.

2 μεῖζονός ἐς ἐπειτὰ ἐμμέλλε πρᾶσειν. δυσπροσοδῶν τα αὐτῶν παρῄει καὶ τῇ ὄργῃ οὗτο χαλέπῃ ἐχρῆτο ἐς πάντας ὁμοίως ὡςτε μηδένα δύνασθαι προσιέναι· δι’ ὅτε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἤκιστα ἡ ἐμμαχίᾳ μετέστη.

CXXXI. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι τὸ τε πρῶτον δι’ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀνεκάλεσαν αὐτῶν, καὶ
other things as he was told and transmitted the letter. And this reply of the King ran as follows:

"Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias: As touching the men whom thou didst save for me out of Byzantium beyond the sea, a store of gratitude is laid up for thee, of record, in our house forever, and with thy words also I am pleased. And let neither night nor day stay thee to make thee remiss in performing aught of what thou dost promise me; and let nothing hinder thee, either expense of gold and silver or number of troops, if there be need of their presence anywhere; but with Artabazus, a good man, whom I have sent to thee, transact with confidence my business and thine as shall be most honourable and best for both of us."

CXXX. When Pausanias received this letter, although even before this he had been held in high consideration by the Hellenes because he had led them at Plataea, he was then far more elated and could no longer bring himself to live in the usual manner of his people, but clad himself in Persian apparel whenever he went forth from Byzantium, and when he travelled through Thrace a body-guard of Medes and Egyptians attended him; he had his table served in Persian style, and indeed could not conceal his real purpose, but by such trifling acts showed plainly what greater designs he purposed in his heart to accomplish thereafter. And so he made himself difficult of access, and indulged in such a violent temper towards everybody that no one could come near him; and this was one of the chief reasons why the allies went over to the Athenians.

CXXXI. Now it was just this conduct that had caused the Lacedaemonians in the first instance to
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ἐπείδὴ θῇ Ἐρμονίδη υπὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἐκπλεύσας οὐ κελευσάντων αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα ἐφαίνετο ποιῶν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου βιά ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐκπολιορκηθεὶς ἐσ μὲν τὴν Ἐπάρτην οὐκ ἐπανεχώρει, ἐς δὲ Κολωνᾶς τὰς Τρφάδας ἱδρυθεὶς πράσσων τε ἐσηγγελλεῖτο αὐτῶς ὡς τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ οὐκ ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τὴν μονὴν ποιούμενος, οὕτω δὴ οὐκέτι ἐπέσχον, ἀλλὰ πέμψαντες κήρυκα οἱ ἐφοροί καὶ σκυτάλην εἴπον τοῦ κήρυκος μὴ λειτεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, πόλεμον αὐτῷ Σπαρτιάτας προαγορέων.

2 ὁ δὲ βουλόμενος ὡς ἡκιστα ὑποπτος εἶναι καὶ πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολὴν ἀνεχώρει τὸ δεύτερον ἐς Σπάρτην. καὶ ἐς μὲν τὴν εἰρκτὴν ἐσπιτπεῖ τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων (ἐξεστὶ δὲ τοῖς ἐφόροις τῶν βασιλεάδες δράσαι τούτῳ), ἐπεῖτα διαπραξάμενος ὑπτερον ἐξῆλθε καὶ καθιστησιν ἑαυτὸν ἐς κρίσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐλέγχειν.

CXXXII. Καὶ φανερὸν μὲν εἶχον οὐδὲν οἱ Σπαρτιάται σημεῖον, οὔτε οἱ ἔχθροι οὔτε ἡ πᾶσα πόλις, ὅτως ἑν πιστεύσαντες βεβαιῶς ἐτιμωροῦντο ἄνδρα γένους τε τοῦ βασιλείου οὔτα καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τιμῆν ἔχοιτα (Πλείσταρχον γὰρ τὸν Λεωνίδου οὔτα βασιλέα καὶ νέον ἐτί ἀνεψίος ὁν 2 ἐπετρόπευεν), ὑποψίας δὲ πολλὰς παρεῖχε τῇ τε

1 The σκυτάλη was a staff used for writing dispatches. The Lacedaemonians had two round staves of one size, the one kept at Sparta, the other in possession of commanders.
recall Pausanias, when they learned of it; and when this second time, on his sailing away in the ship of Hermione without their authority, it was evident that he was acting in the very same manner—when, after being forcibly dislodged from Byzantium by the Athenians, instead of returning to Sparta, he settled at Colonae in the Troad and was reported to the ephors to be intriguing with the Barbarians and tarrying there for no good purpose—then at length they held back no longer, but sent a herald with a skytale-dispatch, in which they told him not to lag behind the herald, or the Spartans would declare war upon him. And he, wishing to avoid suspicion as far as possible, and confident that he could dispose of the charge by the use of money, returned the second time to Sparta. And at first he was thrown into prison by the ephors, who have the power to do this in the case of the king himself; then, having contrived after a time to get out, he offered himself for trial to any who might wish to examine into his case.

CXXXII. There was, indeed, no clear proof in the possession of the Spartans, either his personal enemies or the state at large, on the strength of which they could with entire confidence proceed to punish a man who was of the royal family and held high office for the time being—for as cousin of Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, who was king and still a minor, he was acting as regent for him; but he, by his disregard of propriety, and particularly by abroad. A strip of paper was rolled slantwise round the staff and the dispatch written lengthwise on it; when unrolled the dispatch was unintelligible, but rolled slantwise round the commander's skytale it could be read.
παρανομία καὶ ξηλώσει τῶν βαρβάρων μὴ ἴσος
βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παροῦσι, καὶ τὰ τε ἄλλα
αὐτοῦ ἀνεσκόποιν εἰ τί ποὺ ἐξεδεδήνητο τῶν
καθεστώτων νομίμων καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸν τρίποδά
ποτε τὸν ἐν Δελφοὶς, ὃν ἀνέθεσαν οἱ Ἑλληνες
ἀπὸ τῶν Μῆδων ἀκροβίνιοι, ἥξιωσεν ἐπιγρα-
ψασθαι αὐτὸς ἵδια τὸ ἔλεγεν τόδε.

Ἑλλήνων ἀρχηγὸς ἐπεὶ στρατὸν ὀλεσε Μῆδων,
Παυσανίας Φοίβῳ μνῆμ· ἀνέθηκε τόδε.

3 ἃ μὲν οὖν ἔλεγεν οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἐξεκόλαψαν
εὐθὺς τότε ἀπὸ τοῦ τρίποδος τοῦτο καὶ ἐπέγραψαν
ὀνομαστὶ τὰς πόλεις ὅσαι ξυγκαθελοῦσαν τῶν
βαρβάρων ἔστησαν τὸ ἀνάθημα· τοῦ μέντοι
Παυσανίου ἁδίκημα καὶ τοῦ ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπεῖ
γε ἐν τούτῳ καθεστήκει, πολλῷ μᾶλλον
παρόμοιον πραχθῆναι ἐφαίνετο τῇ παροῦσῃ δια-

4 νοίᾳ. ἐπυνθάνοντο δὲ καὶ ἐς τοὺς Εἰλώτας
πράσσειν τι αὐτῶν, καὶ ἢν δὲ οὖτως ἐλευθέρωσιν
τε γὰρ ὑπισχεῖτο αὐτῶς καὶ πολιτείαν, ἤν
ξυνεπαναστῶσι καὶ τὸ πᾶν ξυγκατεργάζονται.

5 ἀλλ' οὖν ὅσον εὐδε τῶν Εἰλώτων μηνυταίς τις
πιστεύσαντες ἥξιωσαν νεώτερον τι ποιεῖν ἐς

1 Added by Ullrich.

A golden tripod set upon a three-headed bronze serpent (Hdt. ix. lxxxi.). The gold tripod was carried off by the Phocians in the Sacred War (Paus. x. xiii. 5), but the bronze pillar, eighteen feet high, of three intertwined snakes, was removed by the Emperor Constantine to Constantinople.
his aping of the Barbarians, gave them much ground for suspecting that he did not want to remain an equal in the present order of things at Sparta. And they went back into his past and scrutinized all his other acts, to see if perchance he had in his mode of life departed from established customs, and they recalled especially that he had once presumed, on his own authority, to have inscribed on the tripod at Delphi, which the Hellenes dedicated as first fruits of the spoils they had won from the Persians, the following elegiac couplet:

"When as captain of the Hellenes he had destroyed the Persian host, Pausanias dedicated this memorial to Phoebus." 2

Now the Lacedaemonians had immediately chiselled off these verses and inscribed on the tripod by name all the cities which had had a part in overthrowing the Barbarians and had together set up this offering. The act of Pausanias, however, was felt at the time to have been a transgression, and now that he had got into this further trouble, it stood out more clearly than ever as having been but a prelude to his present designs. They were informed also that he was intriguing with the Helots; and it was even so, for he was promising them freedom and citizenship if they would join him in a revolt and help him accomplish his whole plan. But not even then, nor relying on certain Helots who had turned informers, did they think it best to take harsh measures against him; they and placed in the hippodrome, the modern Atmeidan, where it still is. It contains the names of thirty-one Greek states which took part in the Persian War.

2 The distich was composed by Simonides.
αὐτῶν, χρόμενοι τῷ τρόπῳ ὑπερ εἰώθασιν ἐς σφᾶς αὐτούς, μὴ ταχεῖς εἶναι περὶ ἀνδρὸς Σπαρτιᾶτον ἀνεὐ ἀναμφισβητήτων τεκμηριῶν βουλεύσαι τι ἀνήκεστον, πρὶν γε δὴ αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, ὁ μέλλων τὰς τελευταίας βασιλεία ἐπιστολὰς πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον κομιεῖν, ἀνὴρ Ἀργίλιος, παιδικά ποτὲ ὁν αὐτοῦ καὶ πιστῶτατος ἐκείνῳ, μηνυτὴς γίγνεται, δείσας κατὰ ἐνθύμησιν τινα ὅτι οὐδεὶς πώ τῶν πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἄγγελων πάλιν ἀφίκετο, καὶ παρασημηναμένος, ἤνα, ἦν ἰευσθῇ τῆς δόξης ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνος τῷ μεταγράψαι αἰτήσῃ, μὴ ἐπιγνῷ, λύει τὰς ἐπιστολὰς, ἐν αἷς ὑπονοήσας τῷ τοιούτῳ προσεπεστάλθαι καὶ αὐτῶν ἦρεν ἐγγεγραμμένον κτείνειν.

CXXXIII. Τότε δὴ οἱ ἑφόροι δειξάντος αὐτοῦ τὰ γράμματα μᾶλλον μὲν ἐπίστευσαν, αὐτήκοι δὲ βουληθέντες ἦτι γενέσθαι αὐτοῦ Παυσανίου τῷ λέγοντος, ἀπὸ παρασκευῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ Ταίναρον ἱκέτου οἰχομένου καὶ σκηνωσαμένου διπλήν διαφράγματι καλύβῃ, ἐς ἦν τῶν ἑφόρων ἔντος τίνας ἐκρυψε, καὶ Παυσανίου ὡς αὐτοῦ ἐλθόντος καὶ ἐρωτώντος τὴν πρόφασιν τῆς ἕκτειας ἥσθοντο πάντα σαφῶς, αἰτιωμένου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὰ τε περὶ αὐτοῦ γραφέντα καὶ τάλλῳ ἀποφαίνοντος καὶ ἐκαστον, ὡς οὐδὲν πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς βασιλεὰ διακοσίαις παραβάλοντο, προτιμηθεὶς δὲ ἐν ἰσφ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν

1 τῶν τε ἑφόρων in the MSS.; Poppo deletes τε.
adhered to their usual method in dealing with men of their own class—not to be hasty, in the case of a Spartan, in adopting an irrevocable decision unless they had indisputable proofs. But at last, as it is said, the man who was to take to Artabanus Pausanias' last letter to the King, a man of Argilus who had once been a favourite of his and had hitherto been most loyal to him, turned informer. For he took fright when he called to mind that no previous messenger had ever come back again; and so, having made a counterfeit seal, in order that his act might not be discovered, in case he should be wrong in his suspicion or in case Pausanias should ask to make some alteration in the letter, he opened the letter and in fact found written therein, as he suspected he should find something of the sort to have been directed, an order for his own death.

CXXXIII. At this point the ephors, when the man showed them the letter, were at last more nearly convinced, but they wished besides to hear with their own ears some word from Pausanias' own lips; so in accordance with a prearranged plan the man went as a suppliant to Taenarus and put up there a hut divided by a partition. In the inner room of the hut he concealed some of the ephors, and when Pausanias visited him and asked the reason of his taking the position of a suppliant, they heard clearly everything that was said: they heard the man accuse Pausanias of having written the order about himself, reveal the other items of the plot in detail, and protest that, though he had never yet compromised Pausanias in his errands to the King, the special honour awarded him was no better than that which the common run of his servants

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διακόνων ἀποθανεῖν, κἀκεῖνον αὐτὰ τε ταῦτα ἤννομον ὑμολογοῦντος καὶ περὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἠώντος ὄργιζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πίστιν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ διδόντος τῆς ἀναστάσεως καὶ ἄξιοντος ὡς τὰ-χιστα πορεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὰ πρασόμενα διακω-λύειν.

CXXXIV. Ἀκούσαντες δὲ ἀκριβῶς τότε μὲν ἀπῆλθον οἱ ἔφοροι, βεβαιῶς δὲ ἡ ἡδή εἰδότες ἐν τῇ πόλει τήν ἔνθησιν ἐποιοῦντο. Λέγεται δ' αὐτῶν μέλλοντα ἔνθησιμοντος ἐν τῇ ὀδῷ, ἐνὸς μὲν τῶν ἔφορων τῷ πρόσωπῳ προσιόντος ὡς εἶδε, γυναίκα ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἔχωρει, ἅλλου δὲ νεώματι ἄφανείς ἥρσαμένου καὶ δηλώσαντος εὐνοία, πρὸς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Χαλκείου ἡρόπορος ὀρῶς καὶ προκαταφυ-γεῖν ἄν δ' ἠγγίξε τὸ τέμενος. καὶ ἐσ οἰκήματά ὑμᾶς μέγα δ' ἦν ταῦτα ἐσθελήσατο, ἣν μὴ ὑπαίθριος ταλαιπωροῦσα, ἡ σύχαζεν. οἱ δὲ τὸ παραντική μὲν ὑστῆραν τῇ διώξει, μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ τοῦ τε οἰκή-

καὶ καίρων, καὶ μέλλοντος αὐτῶν ἀποψόχειν ὡσπερ εἰρήνως ἐν τῇ οἰκήματι, αἰσθάνομεν ἐξαγωνιζόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐπὶ ἐμπυγνοῦτα, καὶ εἰς τοῦ Καιάδαν, οὐπερ τοὺς κακούργους, ἐσ-

1 ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ deleted by Hude, after Krüger.

1 The temple would have been polluted if he had been allowed to die there.

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received—to be put to death; and they heard Pausanias acknowledge these same things, urge the man not to be angry with him this time, offer him a guarantee that he might leave the temple in safety, and finally request him to go on his way with all speed and not frustrate the negotiations.

CXXXIV. When the ephors had heard all the details they went back home for the present, but inasmuch as they now had certain knowledge, they were planning to make the arrest in the city. And the story goes that when Pausanias was about to be arrested in the street, he saw the face of one of the ephors as he was approaching and realised for what purpose he was coming, and that another ephor out of friendship warned him by giving a covert nod, whereupon he set off on a run for the temple of Athena of the Brazen House, and reached the refuge first, as the sacred precinct was near by. Entering then into a building of no great size belonging to the temple, that he might not suffer from exposure under the open sky, he kept quiet. For the moment then the ephors were distanced in their pursuit, but afterwards they took the roof off the building and, watching until he was inside and shutting off his retreat, walled up the doors; then they invested the place and starved him to death. And when he was about to expire, imprisoned as he was in the building, they perceived his condition and brought him out of the temple still breathing; but when he was brought out he died immediately. It was their first intention to cast him into the Caeadas, where

2 A cleft in the mountains not far from the city, probably near the modern Mistra, into which in early times prisoners, in later, corpses of criminals, were thrown; cf. Strabo, viii. v. 7; Paus. iv. xviii. 3.
θάλλειν ἐπείτα ἐδόξη τιτηρόντο που κατορθάζαι. ὁ δὲ θεὸς ὃ ἐν Δελφοῖς τῶν τε τάφων ὑστερον ἔχοισε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις μετενεγκαίναι οὕσανε (καὶ νῦν κεῖται ἐν τῷ προτεμενίσματι, δὴ γραφῇ στῆλαι δηλοῦσι), καὶ ὁς ἀγὸς αὐτοῖς ὃν τὸ πεπραγμένον δύο σώματα ἀνθ' ἐνος τῆς Χαλκιόκεφ ἀποδούναι. οἱ δὲ ποιητάμενοι χαλκοὺς ἀνδριάντας δύο ὡς ἀντὶ Παυσανίου ἀνέθεσαν.

CXXXV. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι, ὡς καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγὸς κράνατος, ἀντεπέταχαν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἑλαῖεν αὐτὸ.

2 Τοῦ δὲ μηδίσμου τοῦ Παυσανίου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρέσβεις πέμψαντες παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ξυνεπετίωντο καὶ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα, ὡς πάρεισκον ἐκ τῶν Παυσανίου ἐλέγχων, ἤξιον τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς κολάζεσθαι αὐτῶν. οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες (ἐτυχε γὰρ ὡστρακισμένοι καὶ ἔχουν δίαιταν μὲν ἐν "Ἀργεί, ἐπιφοιτῶν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον) πέμπουσι μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐτοίμων ὁντων ξυνιδιώκειν ἀνδράς οἴς εἰρητο ἀγειν ὅπου ἂν περιτύχωσιν.

CXXXVI. Ὁ δὲ Θεμιστοκλῆς προαισθόμενος φεύγει ἐκ Πελοπόννησου ἐς Κέρκυραν, δὸν αὐτῶν εὐεργήτης. δεδείναι δὲ φασκόντων Κέρκυραιῶν

1 cf. ch. cxxviii. 1.
2 εὐεργήτης, benefactor, a title of honour bestowed upon him, either because he took the part of the Corcyraeans in a dispute with Corinth (Plut. Them. xxiv), or because he had
they throw malefactors; but afterwards they decided to bury him somewhere near the city. But the god at Delphi afterwards warned the Lacedaemonians by oracle to transfer him to the place where he died (and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, as an inscription on some columns testifies), and that they should recompense Athena of the Brazen House with two bodies in place of one, since their act had brought a curse upon them. So they had two bronze statues made and dedicated them to Athena to be a substitute for Pausanias.

CXXXV. Thus it was that the Athenians,\(^1\) in response to the demand of the Lacedaemonians, ordered them to drive out the curse of Taenarum, seeing that the god also declared it to be a curse.

But when Pausanias was thus convicted of treasonable dealings with Persia, the Lacedaemonians sent envoys to the Athenians and accused Themistocles also of complicity in the plot, in accordance with discoveries they had made in connection with their investigation about Pausanias; and they demanded that he be punished in the same way. The Athenians agreed, but as he happened to have been ostracised, and, though living in Argos, frequently visited other parts of the Peloponnesus also, they sent some men, accompanied by the Lacedaemonians (who were quite ready to join in the pursuit), with instructions to arrest him wherever they chanced to find him.

CXXXVI. But Themistocles, forewarned, fled from the Peloponnesus to Corecyra, since he was a benefactor\(^2\) of the Corecyraeans. As they, however, alleged that they were afraid to keep him and thus excused their absence (Schol.) in the Persian war (Hdt. viii. cxv). Themistocles relied upon the right of asylum, which had doubtless been decreed him as ἀμφιβάστης.
ἐχειν αὐτὸν ὡστε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἀπεχθέσθαι, διακομίζεται ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν
2 ἥπειρον τὴν καταντικρὺ. καὶ διωκόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν προστεταγμένων κατὰ πύστιν ἢ χωρόη,
ἀναγκάζεται κατὰ τι ἀπορον παρὰ Ἀδμήτου τὸν
Μολοσσῶν βασιλέα ὁντα αὐτῷ ὡς φίλον κατα-
λύσαι. καὶ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἔτυχεν ἐπίδημον, ὁ δὲ τῆς
γυναικὸς ἱκέτης γενόμενος διδάσκεται ὑπ' αὐτῆς
τὸν παίδα σφὸν λαβῶν καθέξεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν
4 ἐστίαν. καὶ ἔλθοντος οὐ πολὺ ύστερον τοῦ
Ἀδμήτου δήλοι τε ὃς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἄξιοι, ἐι τι
ἀρα αὐτὸς ἀντείπειν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναίων δεομένοι,
φεύγοντα τιμωρεῖσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ὑπ' ἑκείνου
πολλῷ ἀσθενεστέρους ἐν τῷ παρόντι κακῶς πά-
σχευ, γενναίον δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἰσον τιμωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀμα αὐτὸς μὲν ἑκείνῳ
χρείας τινὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὸ σώμα σφέζεσθαι ἐνα-
τιωθῆναι, ἑκείνου δὲ ἄν, εἰ ἕκδοιχ ἀὐτὸν (εἰπὼν
ὐφ' ὦν καὶ ἐφ' ὧ διώκεταί), σωτηρίας ἃν τῆς
ψυχῆς ἀποστερῆσαι.

CXXXVII. ὡς ἀκούσας ἀνίστησι τε αὐτὸν
μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ νίεος (ὕστερ καὶ ἔχων αὐτὸν
2 ἐκαθέζετο, καὶ μέγιστον ἦν ἱκέτευμα τοῦτο) καὶ
ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ τοῖς τε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ
Ἀθηναίοις ἔλθοις καὶ πολλὰ εἰποῦσιν οὐκ
ἐκδίδοσιν, ἀλλ' ἀποστέλλει βουλόμενον ὡς βασι-
λέα περευθῆναι ἐπὶ τήν ἐτέραν θάλασσαν πεζῇ
2 ἐς Πύδναν τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου. ἐν ὧν ὀλκάδος τυχών

1 The reading of nearly all the better MSS.; Hude and
many other recent editors adopt the correction of Graevianus
ἀσθενεστέρους.
2 Hude deletes, as not read by the Scholiast.

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incur the enmity of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, he was conveyed by them across to the mainland opposite. And being pursued by those who had been appointed to the task, according as they could learn the course he was taking, he was forced in some strait to take lodging with Admetus, king of the Molossians, who was not friendly to him. Admetus happened not to be at home, but Themistocles approached his wife as a suppliant and was instructed by her to take their child and seat himself on the hearth. And when Admetus returned after a short time, Themistocles declared who he was and urged that, if he had ever opposed any request Admetus had made to the Athenians, he ought not to take vengeance on him when a fugitive; for in his present plight he might come to harm at the hands of a far weaker man than Admetus, whereas the noble thing to do was to take vengeance on fair terms upon equals. Besides, he added, he had opposed Admetus merely in the matter of a petition and not of his personal safety; whereas Admetus, if he gave him up to his pursuers (telling who these were and what the charge against him), would deprive him of the salvation of his life.

CXXXVII. Admetus, hearing this, raised him up, together with his own son, even as he still sat holding him, this being the most potent form of supplication. And when, not long afterwards, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians came and made urgent demands for him, Admetus would not give him up, but, since he wished to go to the King, gave him an escort overland to Pydna on the other sea, the capital of Alexander. There he found a

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1 The Aegean. 2 King of Macedonia.
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ἀναγομένης ἐπὶ Ἰωνίας καὶ ἐπιθαυμαστεὶ καταφέρεται χειμῶν ἐκ τὸ Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον ὁ ἐπολεόρκει Νάξον. καὶ (ἡν γὰρ ἄγνως τοῖς ἐν τῇ νυσὶ) δείσας φράζει τῷ ναυκλήρῳ ὅστις ἦν καὶ διὰ ἄφεσιν, καὶ εἰ μὴ σώσει αὐτὸν, ἔφη ἐρεῖν διο ἄρημασι πεισθεῖς αὐτὸν ἀγεί τὴν ὅ τε ἄσφαλείαν εἶναι μηδένα ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τῆς νεώς μέχρι πλοῦς γένηται πειθομένω δ' αὐτῷ χάριν ἀπομνήσεσθαι κἂν ἄξιαν. ὁ δὲ ναύκληρος ποιεῖ τε ταύτα καὶ ἀποσαλεύσας ἥμεραν καὶ νύκτα ὑπὲρ τοῦ στρατο-πέδου ὑστερον ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἑφεσον. καὶ ὁ Ἐθεμιστοκλῆς ἐκεῖνον τε ἐθέράπευσε χρημάτων δόσει (ὅλθε γὰρ αὐτῷ ὑστερον ἐκ τῆς Ἀθηναίων παρὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐξ Ἀργοῦς ἐν ὑπέξεκεῖτο), καὶ μετὰ τῶν κατω Περσῶν τινος πορευθές ἂνω ἐστέμπει γράμματα πρὸς Βασιλέα Ἀρταξέρξην τὸν Ξέρχου νεωστὶ βασιλεύσατα. ἔδηλον δὲ ἡ γραφὴ ὅτι "Ἐθεμιστοκλῆς ἦκω παρὰ σέ, διὸ κακὰ μὲν πλείστα Ἑλλήνων ἐγράφας τὸν ὑμέτερον οἶκον, ὅσον χρόνον τοῦ σὸν πατέρα ἐπιόντα ἐμὸι ἀνάγκῃ ἡμινόμην, πολύ δ' ἐτὶ πλεῖον ἀγαθά, ἐπιείδη ἐν τῷ ἄσφαλεὶ μὲν ἐμὸι, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἐν ἐπικινδύνῳ πάλιν ἡ ἀποκομιδὴ ἐγίνετο. καὶ μοι εὐεργεσίᾳ ὀφείλεται (γράφας τὴν τε ἐκ Σαλαμίνος προάγγελσι τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν γεφυρῶν, ἢν ψευδώς προσεποιήσατο, τότε δ'
merchant vessel putting off for Ionia, and going on board was driven by a storm to the station of the Athenian fleet which was blockading Naxos. Themistocles became afraid and told the captain who he was (for he was unknown to those on board) and why he was in flight, adding that if he did not save him he would tell the Athenians that he had been bribed to give him passage; their only chance for safety, he explained, was that no one be allowed to leave the ship until the voyage could be resumed, and he promised that if he complied with his request he would make a fitting return for the favour. The captain did as he was bidden, and after riding out the gale for a day and a night just outside the Athenian station, duly arrived at Ephesus. And Themistocles rewarded him handsomely with a gift of money (for he soon received from his friends in Athens and from Argos the funds which he had deposited for safekeeping); then proceeding into the interior with one of the Persians who dwelt on the coast, he sent on a letter to King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes, who had lately come to the throne. And the letter ran as follows: "I, Themistocles, am come to you, who of all Hellenes did your house most harm so long as your father assailed me and I was constrained to defend myself, but still greater good by far when, his retreat being in progress, I was in security and he in dire peril. And there is a kindmess due to me (here he related the timely warning to retreat given at Salamis, and the failure of the Hellenic fleet to destroy the bridges at that time, which he falsely

1 For Themistocles' advice given to Xerxes to retreat before it was too late and his claim about the non-destruction of the bridges, cf. Hdt. viii. cviii-ex.
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αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν, καὶ νῦν ἔχων σε μεγάλα ἁγαθὰ δρᾶσαι πάρειμι διωκόμενος ύπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν σὴν φιλίαν. Βούλομαι δὲ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπισχῶν αὐτὸς σοι περὶ δὲν ἦκω δηλώσαι.”

CXXXVIII. Βασίλειος δὲ, ὥς λέγεται, ἔθαυμασέ τε αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ἐκέλευε ποιεῖν οὕτω. οὐδὲν τὸν χρόνῳ δὲν ἐπέσχε τῆς τε Περσίδος γλώσσης ὅσα ἐδύνατο κατενόησε καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηθεμάτων τῆς χώρας· ἀφικόμενος δὲ μετὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἀγίτηται παρ’ αὐτῷ μέγας καὶ ὅσον ὀυδεὶς ποι Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν προσπάρχουσαν ἀξίωσιν καὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἔλπιδα ἦν ὑπετίθει αὐτῷ δουλώσειν, μάλιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πειράματος ἐξενεθεὶς. ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς, βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἵσχυν δηλώσας, καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἐτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάσαι οἰκεία γὰρ ἐξυνέσει καὶ οὕτε προμαθῶν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὕτ’ ἑπιμαθῶν, τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δὲ ἐλαχίστης θουλής κράτιστος γυνῶν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστων τοῦ γεννησιμένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής· καὶ ἀ μὲν μετὰ χειρὰς ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἶος τε, ὅν δ’ ἀπειρός εἶη, κρίναι ἵκανως οὐκ ἀπῆλλακτο, τὸ τε ἀμείνου ἢ χείρον ἐν

1 Or, as some take it, “character.” cf. Plut. Them. xxviii τὸ φρόνημα καὶ τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ, the boldness of his spirit.

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claimed to have been due to his own efforts), and now I am here, having it in my power to do you great good, being pursued by the Hellenes on account of my friendship to you; and my desire is to wait a year and then in person explain to you that for which I am come."

CXXXVIII. The King, it is said, marvelled at his purpose¹ and bade him do as he desired. And Themistocles, in the interval of his waiting, made himself acquainted, as far as he could, with the Persian language and with the customs of the country; but when the year was ended he came to the King and became more influential with him than any of the Hellenes ever had been before, both because of the reputation he already enjoyed and of the hope which he kept suggesting to him that he would make all Hellas subject to him, but most of all in consequence of the insight he manifested, of which he gave repeated proofs. For indeed Themistocles was a man who had most convincingly demonstrated the strength of his natural sagacity, and was in the very highest degree worthy of admiration in that respect. For by native insight, not reinforced by earlier or later study,² he was beyond other men, with the briefest deliberation, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present and wise in forecasting what would happen in the most distant future. Moreover, he had the ability to expound to others the enterprises he had in hand, and on those which he had not yet essayed he could yet without fail pass competent judgment; and he could most clearly foresee the issue for better

¹ i.e. without knowledge acquired either before or after the occasion for action had arisen.
τῷ ἀφανεὶ ἐτὶ προεώρα μάλιστα. καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτησε δὲ βραχύτητι κράτιστος δὴ οὕτως αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο.

4. Νοστιμαὶ δὲ τελευτᾶ τῶν βλούν λέγοντι δέ τινες καὶ ἐκούσιον φαρμάκων ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ αὐτῷ ὑπέσχετο. μηνεῖον μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ ἐν Μαγνησίᾳ ἐστὶ τῇ Ἀσιανῇ ἐν τῇ ἁγορᾷ ταύτης γὰρ ἤρχεται τῆς χώρας, δόντος βασιλέως αὐτοῦ Μαγνησίαν μὲν ἄρτον, ἡ προσέφερε πεντήκοντα τάλαντον τοῦ ἑμιαυτοῦ, Λάμψακου δὲ οἴνου (ἐδόκει γὰρ πολυοικότατον τῶν τότε εἶναι), Μνοῦντα δὲ ὄψιν.

5. τά δὲ ὡστά φασὶν κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσηκοντες οὐκαδὲ κελεύσαντος ἔκεινου καὶ τέθηναι κρύφα Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσία φεύγοντος. τά μὲν κατὰ Παυσανίαν τὸν Δακεδαίμονιον καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τὸν Ἀθηναίον λαμπροτάτους γενομένους τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτοὺς Ἑλλήνων οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

CXXXIX. Δακεδαίμονιοι δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς πρῶτης προσβείας τοιαύτα ἐπέταξαν τε καὶ ἀντικελεύσθησαν περὶ τῶν ἐναγών τῆς ἐλάσεως ὡστερον δὲ φοιτῶντες παρὰ Ἀθηναίους Ποτειδαίας τε ἀπανώτατος ἐκέλευσαν καὶ Αἰγίναν αὐτόνομον ἄφιναν, καὶ μάλιστα γε πάντων καὶ ἐνδηλύτατα προϊόν το περὶ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθελοῦσι.
or worse that lay in the still dim future. To sum up all in a word, by force of native sagacity and because of the brief preparation he required, he proved himself the ablest of all men instantly to hit upon the right expedient.

He died a natural death, an illness taking him off, though some say that he put an end to his own life by poison when he realised it to be impossible to fulfil his promises to the King. There is a monument to him at Magnesia in Asia, in the marketplace; for he was governor of this country, the King having given him, for bread, Magnesia, which brought in a revenue of fifty talents a year, for wine, Lamprocus, reputed to be the best wine country of all places at that time; and Myus for meat. But his bones, his relations say, were fetched home by his own command and buried in Attica unknown to the Athenians; for it was not lawful to bury him there, as he had been banished for treason. Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and of Themistocles the Athenian, the most distinguished of the Hellenes of their time.

CXXXIX. The Lacedaemonians then had on the occasion of their first embassy directed the Athenians, and received a counter-demand from them, to take such measures about the expulsion of the accursed. Later, however, they frequently repaired to Athens and bade them withdraw from Potidaea, and give Aegina its independence, and above all they declared in the plainest terms that they could avoid war only by rescinding the decree about the

1 For the various accounts, see Cic. Brut. xi. 43; Plut. Them. xxxi.; Diod. xi. 58; Ar. Eq. 83.
2 Taking up the narrative from ch. cxxvi.
μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι πόλεμον, ἐν φὲ ἐξηρτο αὐτοὺς μὴ χρῆσθαι τῶν λεμέσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ
2 μηδὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἀγορᾷ. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι οὔτε τάλλα ὑπήκουον οὔτε τὸ ψῆφισμα καθήρουν ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργαζαίν Μεγαρεύσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀσοίστου καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχήν
3 τῶν ἀφισταμένων. τέλος δὲ ἀφισμοῖν τῶν τελευταίων πρέσβεων ἐκ Δακεδαίμονος, Ῥαμφίῳ τε καὶ Μελησίππου καὶ Ἀγγανδροῦ, καὶ λεγόντων ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ὡς πρῶτερον εἰώθεσαν, αὐτὰ δὲ τάδε ὅτι “Δακεδαίμονοι βούλονται τὴν εἰρήνην εἶναι, εἰσὶ δὲ ἂν, εἰ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας αὐτούμονον ἄφειτε,” ποιήσαντες ἐκκλησίαν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι γνώμας σφίσιν αὐτοῖς προτίθεσαν, καὶ ἐδόκει ἀπαξ πειράἀπάντων ἰ vehementes ἀποκρίνεθαι. χάρισιν τοις τοῖς τὴν τοιαύτην θέλεσαν ἐπεξετάσσεαν, καὶ παρῴκες ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ ἐλέγον, ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα ναγρόμενοι ταῖς γνώμαις καὶ ὡς χρή πολυμεῖν καὶ ὡς μὴ ἐμπύρδιον εἶναι τὸ ψῆφισμα εἰρήνης, ἀλλὰ καθελεῖν, καὶ παρελθὼν Περικλῆς ὅ Ἐπανθπποῦ, ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐκείνῳ τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πρᾶσσειν δυνατότατος, παρῆνε τοιάδε.

CXL. “Τῆς μὲν γνώμης, δὲ Ἀθηναίοι, αἱ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι μὴ εἰκεῖν Πελοποννησίους, καὶ περ εἰδώς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς ὀργῆ ἀναπειθόμενους τε πολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ πράσσοντας, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ξυμφορὰς καὶ τὰς γνώμας τρεπομέ-

1 εἰώθεσα deleted by Hude.

See ch. lxvii. 4, and the references in Ar. Acharn. 520-3 and 533 f. The date of the decree must have been near the outbreak of the war (432).
Megarians, in which they were forbidden to use any of the ports in the Athenian empire or even the Athenian market. But the Athenians would pay no heed to their other demands and declined to rescind the decree, charging the Megarians with encroachment upon the sacred land and the border-land not marked by boundaries, and also with harbouring runaway slaves. But at last a final embassy came from Lacedaemon, consisting of Ramphias, Melesippos, and Agesander, who said nothing of the demands they had hitherto been wont to make, but only this: "The Lacedaemonians desire peace, and there will be peace if you give the Hellenes their independence." Whereupon the Athenians called an assembly and gave their citizens an opportunity to express their opinions; and it was resolved to consider the whole question and then give their answer once for all. And many others came forward and spoke, in support of both sides of the question, some urging that war was necessary, others that the decree should not stand in the way of peace, but should be rescinded; and finally Pericles son of Xanthippus, the foremost man of the Athenians at that time, wielding greatest influence both in speech and in action, came forward and advised them as follows:

CXL. "I hold, men of Athens, to the same judgment as always, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are not as a rule moved by the same spirit when they are actually engaged in war as when they are being persuaded to undertake it, but change their judgments in

* The reference is, first, to the tillage of land dedicated to the Eleusinian goddesses; second, to land still in dispute between Athens and Megara, and therefore unmarked.
νους. ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὅμοια καὶ παραπλήσια ἔμφοβολεντέα μοι ὄντα, καὶ τοὺς ἀναπειθομένους ὑμῶν δικαίω τοῖς κοινῷ δόξασιν, ἣν ἄρα τι καὶ σφαλλόμεθα, βοηθεῖτε, ἢ μηδὲ κατορθοῦντας τῆς ἀξιότισσας μεταποιεῖσθαι. ἐνδεχεται γὰρ τὰς ἥμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπὸ ἢσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρήσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοιάς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· δὲ ὅπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅσα ἀν παρὰ λόγου ἐξωθή, εἰσώθαμεν αἰτιῶσθαι.

2 "Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πρότερον τε δῆλοι ἦσαν ἐπιβουλεύοντες ἡμῖν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἤκιστα. εἰρημένον γὰρ δίκας μὲν τῶν διαφόρων ἀλλήλοις διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, ἔχειν δὲ ἐκατέρος ἢ ἔχομεν, οὔτε αὐτοὶ δίκας πῶς ἤτησαν οὔτε ἡμῶν διδόντων δέχονται, βούλονται δὲ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγους τὰ ἐγκλήματα διαλύεσθαι, καὶ ἑπιτάσσουσες ἦδη καὶ οὐκέτι αἰτιώμενοι πάρεισιν. Ποτειδαῖος τε γὰρ ἀπανίστασθαι κελεύοντι καὶ Αἰγίναν αὐτονόμον ἀφίεναι καὶ τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθαιρεῖν· οἱ δὲ τελευταίοι οἶδε ἢκοντες καὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας προαγορεύουσιν αὐτονόμους ἀφιέναι.

3 ὑμῶν δὲ μηδείς νομίζῃ περὶ βραχέος ἀν πολεμεῖν, εἰ τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα μὴ καθέλοιμεν, ὅπερ μάλιστα προὔχονται εἰ καθαρεθείη μὴ ἀν γίγνεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον, μηδὲ ἐν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰτιῶν ὑπολίπησθε ὡς διὰ μικρὸν ἐπολεμήσατε. τὸ γὰρ βραχῦ τι τούτω πᾶσαν ὑμῶν ἔχει τὴν βεβαιώσεως.
accordance with events. And now also I see that I must give you the same or nearly the same advice as in the past, and I demand that those of you who are persuaded by what I shall say shall support the common decisions, even if we should in any way fail, or else, in case of success, claim no share in the good judgment shown. For it is just as possible for the course of events to move perversely as for the plans of men; and it is for that very reason that we commonly lay upon fortune the blame for whatever turns out contrary to our calculations.

"As for the Lacedaemonians, it was perfectly clear before that they were plotting against us, and it is now clearer than ever. For whereas it was expressly stipulated that we should submit our differences to arbitration, each side meanwhile keeping what it had, they have never yet asked for arbitration themselves nor do they accept it now when we make the offer. What they want is to redress their grievances by war rather than by discussion, and they are here dictating already and no longer expostulating. For they order us to raise the siege of Potidaea, restore the independence of Aegina, and rescind the Megarian decree; and these men that are just come boldly proclaim that we must give all the Hellenes also their independence. But let no one of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifling matter, if we should refuse to rescind the Megarian decree—the thing they especially insist upon, saying that there will be no war if it is rescinded—and do not let there remain in your minds any self-reproach that it was a small matter for which you went to war. For this trifling thing involves nothing less than the
καὶ πείραν τῆς γνώμης, οὐς εἰ ξυγχωρήσετε, καὶ ἄλλο τι μεῖξον εὐθὺς ἐπιταχθήσεσθε ὡς φόβῳ καὶ τοῦτο ὑπακούσαντες· ἀπισχυρισάμενοι δὲ σαφὲς ἂν καταστήσατε αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵσον ὑμῖν μᾶλλον προσφέρεσθαι. ΣΧΙ. αὐτόθεν δὴ διανοήθητε ἢ ὑπακούειν πρὶν τι βλαβήναι, ἢ εἰ πολεμήσομεν, ὡσπερ ἔμοιν ἀμείνων δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μεγάλη καὶ ἐπὶ βραχεία ὁμοίως προφάσει μὴ εἴξοντες μηδὲ ἔιν φόβῳ ἔξοντες ἢ κεκτῆμεθα. τὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν δύναται δοῦλωσιν ἢ τε μεγίστη καὶ ἡ ἐλαχίστη δικαιώσις ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων πρὸ δίκης τοῦς πέλας ἐπιτασσομένη.

2 "Τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῶν ἐκατέρως ὑπαρ-χόντων ὡς ὅπικ ἀσθενέστερα ἐξομεν γνώτε καὶ

3 ἐκαστοῦν ακούντες. αὐτοῦργοι τε γὰρ εἰσι Πελο-πονήσιοι καὶ οὔτε ἰδία οὔτ' ἐν κοινῷ χρήματα ἐστιν, ἐπειτὰ χρονίων πολέμων καὶ διαποντίων ἀπειροὶ διὰ τὸ βραχεῖς αὐτοὶ ἐπ' ἀλλήλους ὑπὸ

4 πενίας ἐπιφέρειν. καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὔτε ναῦς πλη-ροῦν οὔτε πεζὰς στρατιὰς πολλάκις ἐκπέμπειν δύνανται, ἀπὸ τῶν ἱδίων τε ἄμα ἀπόντες καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν δαπανῶντες καὶ προσέτι καὶ θαλάσσης

5 εἰργόμενοι· αἱ δὲ περιουσίαι τοὺς πολέμους μᾶλλον ἢ αἱ βίαιοι ἐσφόρατι ἀνέχουσιν. σώμασι τε ἐτοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ

1 i.e. by the superior navy of the Athenians.
vindication and proof of your political conviction. If you yield this point to them you will immediately be ordered to yield another and greater one, as having conceded this first point through fear; whereas by a downright refusal you will give them clearly to understand that they must be more disposed to deal with you on terms of equality. CXLI. So make up your minds, here and now, either to take their orders before any damage is done you, or, if we mean to go to war,—as to me at least seems best—do so with the determination not to yield on any pretext, great or small, and not to hold our possessions in fear. For it means enslavement just the same when either the greatest or the least claim is imposed by equals upon their neighbours, not by an appeal to justice but by dictation.

"But as regards the war and the resources of each side, make up your minds, as you hear the particulars from me, that our position will be fully as powerful as theirs. For the Peloponnesians till their lands with their own hands; they have no wealth, either private or public; besides, they have had no experience in protracted or transmarine wars, because, owing to their poverty, they only wage brief campaigns separately against one another. Now people so poor cannot be manning ships or frequently sending out expeditions by land, since they would thus have to be away from their properties and at the same time would be drawing upon their own resources for their expenses, and, besides, are barred from the sea as well.¹ Again, it is accumulated wealth, and not taxes levied under stress, that sustains wars. Men, too, who till their own lands
χρήμασι πολεμεῖν, τὸ μὲν πιστὸν ἔχοντες ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων κἂν περιγενέσθαι, τὸ δὲ οὐ βέβαιον μὴ οὐ προαναλώσειν, ἄλλως τε κἂν παρὰ δόξαι, ὁπερ εἰκός, ὁ πόλεμος αὐτῶς μηκύνηται. μάχῃ μὲν γὰρ μᾶ πρὸς ἀπάντας Ἐλληνας δυνατοὶ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀντίσχειν, πολεμεῖν δὲ μὴ πρὸς ὁμοίαν ἀντιπαρασκευὴν ἀδύνατοι, οὕτως ἕκαμενοι παραχρήμα τι ὀξέως ἐπιτελώσι πάντες τε ἱσόψηφοι οὗτος καὶ οὐχ ὁμόφυλοι τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκατός σπεύδῃ, ἐξ ὑπ' χρόνοις μηδέν ἐπιτελέσις γίγνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὃς μᾶλλον τιμωρήσασθαί τινα βούλονται, οἱ δὲ ὃς ἢκιστα τὰ οἰκεῖα φθείραι. ἡ ἐκαστος οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν οἴεται βλάψειν, μέλειν δὲ τινι καὶ ἀλλω ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ τι προϊδεῖν, ὡστε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπὸ ἀπάντων ἰδίᾳ δοξάσματι λαυθάνειν τὸ κοινὸν ἀθρόον φθειρόμενον. CXLII. μέγιστον δὲ, τῇ τῶν χρημάτων σπάνει κωλύσονται, οὕτων σχολῆς αὐτὰ ποριζόμενοι διαμέλλωσιν τοῦ δὲ πολέμου οἱ καῖροι οὐ μενετοὶ.

2 "Καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἑπιτείχισις οὐδὲ τὸ ναυτικὸν.
are more ready to risk their lives in war than their property; for they have confident hope of surviving the perils, but no assurance that they will not use up their funds before the war ends, especially if, as may well happen, the war is protracted beyond expectation. Indeed, although in a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are strong enough to withstand all the Hellenes, yet they are not strong enough to maintain a war against a military organisation which is so different from theirs, seeing that they have no single general assembly, and therefore cannot promptly put into effect any emergency measure; and as they all have an equal vote and are of different races they each strive to advance their own interests. In such circumstances it usually happens that nothing is accomplished. And indeed it could scarcely be otherwise, for what some of them want is the greatest possible vengeance upon a particular enemy, others the least possible damage to their own property. And when after many delays they do meet, they give but a scant portion of their time to the consideration of any matter of common concern, but the larger portion to their own individual interests. And each one thinks no harm will come from his own negligence, but that it is the business of somebody else to be provident on his behalf; and so, through all separately cherishing the same fancy, universal ruin comes unperceived upon the whole body. CXLII. And what is most important, they will be hampered by scarcity of money, seeing that providing it slowly they are subject to delays; but the opportunities of war wait for no man.

"Moreover, neither the planting of forts in our
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3 αὐτῶν ἀξιόν φοβηθήναι. τὴν μὲν γὰρ χαλέπτων καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόλει ἀντίπαλον κατασκευάσασθαι, ἢ ποιήσω καὶ εἰς πολεμία τε καὶ οὐχ ἠσσον ἐκεῖνοι
4 ἡμῶν ἀντεπιτετειχισμένων φρούριοι δ' εἰ ποιήσωνται, τῆς μὲν γῆς βλάπτοιεν ἂν τι μέρος καταδρομαίς καὶ αὐτομολίαις, οὐ μέντοι ἰκανόν γε ἔσται ἐπιτειχίζειν τε κωλύειν ἡμᾶς πλεύσαντας ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων καὶ, ἢπερ ἰσχύομεν, ταῖς ναυσίν
5 ἀμύνεσθαι. πλέον γὰρ ὅμως ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν τοῦ κατὰ γην ἐκ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐμπειρίας ἢ 'κεῖνοι
6 ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἢπειρον ἐς τὰ ναυτικά. τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας γενέσθαι οὐ ῥαδίως αὐτῶς
7 προσεγγίσεται. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς, μελετώντες αὐτὸ εὕθυς ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν, ἐξείργασθε πως πῶς δὴ ἄνδρες γεωργοὶ καὶ οὐ θαλάσσοι, καὶ προσέτιον οὐδὲ μελετήσαι ἐασόμενοι διὰ τὸ ὦν ἡμῶν πολλαῖς ναυσίν αἰεὶ ἐφορμεῖσθαι, ἀξιον ἂν τι θρόνον;
8 πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ὅλης ἐφορμοῦσας καὶ διακινοῦσειν πληθεὶς τὴν ἀμαθίαν θρασύνοντες, πολλαίς δὲ εἰργόμενοι ἠσυχάσουσι, καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετώντε ἄξινεωτότεροι ἐσονται καὶ δι' αὐτὸ
9 καὶ ὅκυρότεροι. τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν τέχνης ἐστίν, ὅσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδεχεται, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἐκ παρέργου μελετᾶσθαι, ἄλλα μᾶλλον μὴ δὲν ἐκεῖνο πάρεργον ἄλλο γίγνεσθαι.

1 cf. ch. xxxii. 1.

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territory need cause us to be afraid, nor yet their navy. For as regards the first, it is a difficult matter even in time of peace to construct here a city that will be a match for ours, to say nothing of doing this in a hostile country and at a time when we have fortifications quite as strong to oppose them. But suppose they do establish a fort; although they might injure a part of our territory by making raids and receiving our deserters, yet that will not be sufficient to prevent us from sailing to their land and building forts there, or making reprisals with our fleet, wherein our strength lies. For we have gained more experience of operations on land from our career on the sea than they of naval operations from their career on land. As for their acquiring the art of seamanship, that is an advantage they will not easily secure; for even you, who began practising it immediately after the Persian war, have not yet brought it to perfection. How then could men do anything worth mention who are tillers of the soil and not seamen, especially since they will not even be permitted to practise, because we shall always be lying in wait for them with a large fleet? For if they had to cope with only a small fleet lying in wait, they might perhaps risk an engagement, in their ignorance getting courage from their mere numbers; but if their way is blocked by a large fleet, they will remain inactive, their skill will deteriorate through lack of practice, and that in itself will make them more timid. Seamanship, like any other skill, is a matter of art, and practice in it may not be left to odd times, as a by-work; on the contrary, no other pursuit may be carried on as a by-work to it.
CXLIII. "Εἰ τε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυμπίασιν ἢ Δελφοῖς χρημάτων μισθῶν μείζονοι πειρώντο ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν, μὴ ὄντων μὲν ἡμῶν ἀντιπάλων ἑσβάντων αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν μετοίκων δεινὸν ἂν ἦν· νῦν δὲ τόδε τε ὑπάρχει καὶ, ὅπερ κράτισσόν, κυβερνήτας ἐχομεν πολίτας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν πλείον καὶ ἁμείσινος ἢ ἁπάσα ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κυνδύνων οὔδεὶς ἂν δέξαιτο τῶν ξένων τὴν τε αὐτῶν φεύγειν καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἡσσονός ἀμα ἐλπίδος ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν ἕνεκα μεγάλου μισθοῦ δόσεως ἑκείνοις ἐξυναγωγίσεσθαι.

3 "Καὶ τὰ μὲν Πελοποννησίων ἐμοιγε τοιαῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια δοκεῖ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἡμέτερα τούτων τε ὄντων ἑκείνων ἐμεμψᾶμην ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἢσου μεγάλα ἰχθεῖν. ἦν τε ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἡμῶν πεζῆ ἱσοιν, ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἑκείνων πλευσοῦμεθα, καὶ σκέπτετο ἐκ τοῦ ὀμοίου ἐσται Πελοποννήσου τε μέρος τε τιμηθήναι καὶ τὴν 'Ἀττικήν ἄπασαν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἔξουσιν ἄλλην ἀντιλαβεῖν ἀμαχεί, ἡμῶν δὲ ἐστὶ τῇ πολλῇ καὶ ἐν νήσοις καὶ κατ' ἤπειρον μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς

5 θαλάσσης κράτος. σκέψασθε δὲ· εἰ γὰρ ἦμεν υποιότατοι τίνες ἂν ἀληττότεροι ἦσαν καὶ νῦν χρή ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτον διανοηθέντας τὴν μὲν ἡμῖν καὶ οἰκίας ἀφεῖναι, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης καὶ

1 The mercenaries drawn from the states of the Athenian confederacy; no one of those who had taken part with the Peloponnesians would be allowed to return to his native city.
CXLIII. "Then again, if they should lay hands upon the money at Olympia or Delphi and try to entice away the mercenaries among our sailors by the inducement of higher pay, that indeed might be a dangerous matter if we were not a match for them, assuming that both citizens and our resident aliens have manned our ships. But as a matter of fact we are a match for them, and, what is of the highest importance, we have citizens for pilots, and our crews in general are more numerous and better than those of all the rest of Hellas. And no one of our mercenaries,¹ when it came to facing the risk, would elect to be exiled from his own land and, with a lesser hope of victory at the same time, fight on their side because of the offer of a few days' high pay.

"Such, as it seems to me at least, or approximately such, is the situation as far as the Peloponnesians are concerned; as regards our own, I believe we are free from the defects I have remarked upon in them, and that we have in other respects advantages which more than counterbalance theirs. If they march against our territory, we shall sail against theirs; and the devastation of a part of the Peloponnesus will be quite a different thing from that of the whole of Attica. For they will be unable to get other territory in its place without fighting, while we have an abundance of territory both in the islands and on the mainland. A great thing, in truth, is the control of the sea. Just consider: if we were islanders, who would be more unassailable? So, even now, we must, as near as may be, imagine ourselves such and relinquish our land and houses, but keep watch over the sea and the city;
πόλεως φυλακήν ἐχειν, καὶ Πελοποννησίους ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὀργισθέντας πολλῷ πλέοσι μὴ διαμάχεσθαι (κρατήσαντες τε γὰρ αὐθείς οὐκ ἐλάσσοσι μαχού- μεθα καὶ ἦν σφαλῶμεν, τὰ τῶν Ἐυμμάχων, ὃθεν ἰσχύομεν, προσαπόλλυται. οὐ γὰρ ἠνυχάσουσι μὴ ἰκανῶν ἡμῶν ὄντων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς στρατεύειν), τὴν τε ὀλόφυρσιν μὴ οἰκίων καὶ γῆς ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν σωμάτων οὐ γὰρ τάδε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλ' οἱ ἄνδρες ταῦτα κτώνται. καὶ εἰ ᾧ μνη πείσει μιᾶς, αὐτοὺς ἂν ἐξελθόντας ἐκέλευον αὐτὰ δημοσιεύει καὶ δείξαι Πελοποννησίους οτι τούτων γε ἐνεκα οὕχ ὑπακούσεσθε.

OXLIV. "Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι, ἣν ἐθέλητε ἀρχὴν τε μὴ ἐπι- κτάσθαι ἃμα πολεμοῦντες καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαυ- ρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι: μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἀμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοιῶς. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ἃμα τῶν ἔργων δηλωθήσεται: τοῦ δὲ τοῦτοι ὁπο- κρινόμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν. Μεγαρέας μὲν ὅτι ἐάσο- μεν ἀγορὰ καὶ λεμέσι χρῆσθαι, ἢν καὶ Λακεδαιμό- νιοι ἐννηλασίας μὴ ποίωσι μῆτε ἡμῶν μῆτε τῶν ἡμετέρων Ἐυμμάχων (οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνο κωλύει ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς ὦτε τόδε), τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτο- νόμους ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχομεν ἐσπεισάμεθα καὶ ὅταν κάκεινοι ταῖς ἐαυτῶν

1 ἐν deleted by Hude, after Dion. H.
and we must not give way to resentment against the Peloponnesians on account of our losses and risk a decisive battle with them, far superior in numbers as they are. If we win we shall have to fight them again in undiminished number, and if we fail, our allies, the source of our strength, are lost to us as well; for they will not keep quiet when we are no longer able to proceed in arms against them. And we must not make lament for the loss of houses and land, but for men; for these things do not procure us men, but men these. Indeed, had I thought that I should persuade you, I should have urged you to go forth and lay them waste yourselves, and thus show the Peloponnesians that you will not, for the sake of such things, yield them obedience.

CXLIV. “Many other considerations also lead me to hope that we shall prove superior, if you will consent not to attempt to extend your empire while you are at war and not to burden yourselves needlessly with dangers of your own choosing; for I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy’s plans. But these matters will be explained to you on some later occasion¹ when we are actually at war; at the present time let us send the envoys back with this answer: As to the Megarians, that we will permit them to use our markets and harbours, if the Lacedaemonians on their part will cease passing laws for the expulsion of aliens so far as concerns us or our allies (for nothing in the treaty forbids either our action or theirs); as to the states in our confederacy, that we will give them their independence if they were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon as they on their part

¹ cf. II. xiii.
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ἀποδώσει πόλεσι μὴ σφίσιν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔπειτεδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶς ἐκάστοις ὡς βούλονται δίκας τε ὅτι ἐθέλομεν δοῦναι κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας, πολέμου δὲ οὐκ ἄρξομεν, ἄρχομένους δὲ ἀμυνούμεθα. ταῦτα γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πρέποντα ἀμα τῆδε τῇ πόλει ὑποκρίνασθαι.

3 εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη πολέμειν (ἢ δὲ ἐκούσιοι μᾶλλον δεχόμεθα, ἢσον ἐγκεισομένους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἔξομεν), ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων ὅτι καὶ πόλει καὶ ἱδιωτῇ μέγισται τιμαὶ περίγφρονται. οἱ γοῦν πατέρες ἕμων ὑποστάντες Μῆδους καὶ οὔκ ἀπὸ τοσοῦτο ὁρμόμενοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐκλειπόντες, γνώμη τε πλέον ἡ τύχη καὶ τόλμη μείζον ἡ δυνάμει τῶν τε βάρβαρον ἀπεσάντο καὶ ἐς τάδε προῆγαγον αὐτά: ὁν οὐ χρὴ λείπεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τε ἐχθροὺς παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ τούς ἑπιγνωμένους πειρᾶσθαι αὐτὰ μὴ ἐλάσσω παραδοῦναι."

CXLV. 'Ο μὲν Περικλῆς τοιαῦτα εἶπεν. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι νομίσαντες ἁριστὰ σφίσι παραίνειν αὐτὸν ἐγκρίνασαν ἅ ἐκέλευε, καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀπεκρίναντο τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ, καθ' ἐκαστά τε ὅς ἐφράσε καὶ τὸ ἔγραμπα, οὐδὲν κελεύομενοι ποιήσειν, δίκη δὲ κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας ἐτοίμων εἶναι διαλύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἐπὶ ἑσθ καὶ

1 Deleted by Hude, following Schol.
grant the states in their alliance the right to exercise independence in a manner that conforms, not to the interest of the Lacedaemonians, but to the wishes of the individual states; and as to arbitration, that we are willing to submit to it in accordance with the treaty, and will not begin war, but will defend ourselves against those who do. This answer is just and at the same time consistent with the dignity of the city. But we must realise that war is inevitable, and that the more willing we show ourselves to accept it, the less eager will our enemies be to attack us, and also that it is from the greatest dangers that the greatest honours accrue to a state as well as to an individual. Our fathers, at any rate, withstood the Persians, although they had no such resources as ours, and abandoned even those which they possessed, and by their resolution more than by good fortune and with a courage greater than their strength beat back the Barbarian and advanced our fortunes to their present state. And we must not fall short of their example, but must defend ourselves against our enemies in every way, and must endeavour to hand down our empire undiminished to posterity."

CXLV. Such were the words of Pericles: and the Athenians, thinking that he was advising them for the best, voted as he directed, and answered the Lacedaemonians according to his bidding, both as regards the particulars as he set them forth and on the whole question, to the effect that they would do nothing upon dictation, but were ready in accordance with the treaty to have all complaints adjusted by arbitration on a fair and equal basis. So the
ομοίς. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ’ οἶκου καὶ
οὐκέτι ὅστερον ἐπρεσβεύοντο.

CXLVI. Αἰτίαι δὲ αὐταὶ καὶ διαφορὰ ἐγένοντο
ἀμφοτέροις πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου, ἀρξάμεναι εὐθὺς
ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἑπιδάμνῳ καὶ Κερκύρᾳ. ἐπεμύγνυντο
δὲ ὅμως ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ’ ἄλληλοις ἐφοίτων
ἀκριβίστως μὲν, ἀνυπόπτως δὲ οὐ· σπουδῶν γὰρ
ξύγχυσις τὰ γεγονόμενα ἢν καὶ πρόφασις τοῦ
πολέμεων.
Lacedaemonian envoys went back home and thereafter came on no further missions.

CXLVI. These were the grounds of complaint and the causes of disagreement on both sides before the war, and they began to appear immediately after the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless the two parties continued to have intercourse with one another during these recriminations and visited each other without heralds, though not without suspicion; for the events which were taking place constituted an actual annulment of the treaty and furnished an occasion for war.

1 *i.e.* without the formalities which are indispensable after war is declared.
I. "Ἀρχεται δὲ ὁ πόλεμος ἐνθέντε ἦδη Ἀθηναίων καὶ Πελοποννησίων καὶ τῶν ἑκατέρως ξυμμάχων, ἐν ὃ οὐτε ἐπεμίγνυτο ἢ τι ἀκηρυκτὶ παρ’ ἅλλη- λους καταστάντες τε ξυνεχῶς ἐπολέμουν, καὶ γέγραπται ἐξῆς ὡς ἑκαστὰ ἐγγύνετο κατὰ θέρος καὶ χειμῶνα.

II. Τέσσαρα καὶ δέκα μὲν ἔτη ἐνέμειναν αἱ τριακοντούτεις σπουδαί αἱ ἐγένοντο μετ’ Εὐβοίας ἄλωσιν τῷ δὲ πέμπτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει, ἐπὶ Χρυσίδος ἐν" Ἀργεῖ τότε πεντήκοντα δυοῖν δέοντα ἐτῆς ἵερομένης καὶ Αἰνησίου ἐθίορον ἐν Σπάρτῃ καὶ Πυθιόδωρον ἦτο τέσσαρας μῆνας ἀρχοντος Ἀθηναίοις, μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ μάχην μηνὶ ἕκτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ, ἀμα ἢ ἄρχομένῳ Θηβαίοιιν ἄνδρες ὀλίγοι πλείους τριακοσίων (ήγουντο δὲ αὐτῶν βοιωταρχοῦτες Πυθάγγελος τε ὁ Φυλείδου καὶ Διέμπορος ὁ 'Ορητορίδου) ἑσήλθον περὶ πρῶ- τον ὑπὸν ἐν ὑπολοις ἐς Πλάταιαν τῆς Βοιωτίας.

1 Hude's correction for ἐκτε καὶ ἄμα of the MSS. Lipsius suggested ἐκτε <καὶ δεκάτῳ> καὶ.

1 The mode of reckoning customary in the time of Thucydides, and continued long afterwards. In such a scheme the summer included the spring and the winter the autumn:
BOOK II

I. At this point in my narrative begins the account of the actual warfare between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and their respective allies. While it continued they ceased having communication with one another except through heralds, and when once they were at war they waged it without intermission. The events of the war have been recorded in the order of their occurrence, summer by summer and winter by winter.¹

II. For fourteen years the thirty years' trace which had been concluded after the capture of Euboea remained unbroken; but in the fifteenth year, when Chrysis was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood ² at Argos, and Aenesias was ephor at Sparta, and Pythodorus had still four months to serve as archon at Athens, in the sixteenth month after the battle of Potidaea, at the opening of spring, some Thebans, a little more than three hundred in number, under the command of the Boeotarchs Pythangelus son of Phyleidas and Diem- porus son of Onetoridas, about the first watch of the night entered under arms into Plataea, a

the summer period was equal to about eight months, the winter to about four.

¹ The commencement of the war is fixed according to the forms of reckoning customary in the three most important Hellenic states.

² 431 B.C.
2 οὖσαν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχία. ἐπηγάγοντο δὲ καὶ ἀνέφεκαν τὰς πύλας Πλαταιῶν ἄνδρες, Ναυκλείδης τε καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ, βοηλόμενοι ἵδιας ἐνεκα δυνάμεως ἄνδρας τε τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς σφίσιν ὑπενεντίους διαφθεῖραι καὶ τὴν πόλιν
3 Ὁθηβαιοὶς προσποιήσαντές ἑπραξαν δὲ τιτὰ δι' Ἐυρυμάχου τοῦ Δεοντιάδου, ἄνδρος Θηβαιῶν δυνατωτάτου, προϊόντες γὰρ οἱ Θηβαιοὶ ὅτι ἕσοιτο ὁ πόλεμος, ἐβούλοντο τὴν Πλάταιαν αἰεὶ σφίσι διάφορον οὖσαν ἔτι ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ τοῦ πολέμου μῆπο φανερὸν καθεστῶτος προκαταλαβεῖν. ἢ καὶ ράον ἔλαβον ἐπελθόντες, φυλακής οὐ προκαθεσθηκνίας. θέμενοι δὲ ἐς τὴν ἄγοραν τὰ ὅπλα τοῖς μὲν ἐπαγαγομένοις οὐκ ἑπείθοντο ὅστε εὐθὺς ἔργου ἔχεσθαι καὶ λέναι ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας τῶν ἑχθρῶν, γνώμην δὲ ἐποιοῦντο κηρύγμασὶ τε χρήσασθαι ἐπιτηδείας καὶ ἐς ξύμβασιν μᾶλλον καὶ φιλίαν τὴν πόλιν ἄγαγεῖν (καὶ ἀνέπευ τὸ κήρυξ, εἰ τις βουλεῖται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχεῖν, τίθεσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦς τὰ ὅπλα), νομίζωντες σφίσι βραδίως τοῦτο τῷ τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τὴν πόλιν.

III. Οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς ὅσον ὄσθοντο ἐνδοὺ τὸν Θηβαίον καὶ ἐξαπιναίος κατειλημμένη τὴν πόλιν, καταδείκτος καὶ νομίζοντες πολλῷ πλείους ἐσελήλυθεν (οὐ γὰρ ἔφορων ἐν τῇ νυκτί) πρὸς ξύμβασιν ἐχώρησαν καὶ τὸν λόγον δεξα-

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town of Boeotia which was in alliance with Athens. They had been invited over by some Plataeans, Naucleides and his partisans, who opened the gates for them, intending, with a view to getting power into their hands, to destroy the citizens who were of the opposite party and make over the city to the Thebans. And they had conducted their intrigue through Eurymachus son of Leontiades, a man of great influence at Thebes. For, as Plataea was always at variance with them, the Thebans, foreseeing that the war\(^1\) was coming, wished to get possession of it while there was still peace and before the war had yet been openly declared. And so they found it easier to make their entry unobserved, because no watch had been set to guard the city. And when they had grounded their arms in the market-place, instead of following the advice of those who had invited them over, namely to set to work at once and enter the houses of their enemies, they determined rather to try conciliatory proclamations and to bring the city to an amicable agreement. The proclamation made by herald was that, if anyone wished to be an ally according to the hereditary usages of the whole body of the Boeotians, he should take his weapons and join them. For they thought that in this way the city would easily be induced to come over to their side.

III. And the Plataeans, when they became aware that the Thebans were inside, and that the city had been taken by surprise, took fright, and, as it was night and they could not see, thinking that a far greater number had come in, they concluded to make terms, and, accepting the proposals

\(^1\) i.e. the war between Athens and Sparta.
μενοι ἱσύχαζον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς οὐδένα
2 οὐδὲν ἐνεστερίζον. πράσσοντες δὲ πως ταῦτα
κατενόησαν οὐ πολλοὺς τοὺς Θηβαίους ὄντας καὶ
ἐνόμισαν ἐπιθείμενοι ῥαδίως κρατήσειν· τῷ γὰρ
πλῆθει τῶν Πλαταιῶν οὐ βούλομένῳ ἢν τῶν
3 Ἀθηναίων ἀφίστασθαι. ἐδόκει οὖν ἐπιχειρήτεα
εἶναι καὶ Ἑυπελέγοντο διορύσσοντες τοὺς κοινοὺς
τοίχους παρ’ ἄλληλους, ὅπως μὴ διὰ τῶν ὀδῶν
φανεροὶ ὄσιν λόντες, ἀμάξας τε ἁνευ τῶν ὑπο-
ζυγίων ἐς τὰς ὀδοὺς καθίστασαν, ἵνα ἀντὶ τείχους
ἡ, καὶ τάλλα ἐξηρτυοῦ ἡ ἕκαστον ἐφαίνετο πρὸς
4 τὰ παρόντα ξύμφορον ἔσεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὡς ἐκ
τῶν δυνατῶν ἑτοῖμα ἢν, φυλάξαντες ἔτι νύκτα
καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ περιορθὸν ἐχώρουν ἐκ τῶν οἰκίων
ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς, ὅπως μὴ κατὰ φῶς θαρσαλεωτέροις
οὐσι προσφέροντο καὶ σφίσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἱσοῦ γί-
γνωται, ἀλλ’ ἐν νυκτὶ φοβερότεροι ὄντες ἴσοιν
ὡς τῆς σφετέρας ἐμπειρίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν.
προσέβαλον τε εὐθὺς καὶ ἐς χείρας ἤσαν κατὰ
τάχος.

IV. Οἱ δ’ ὡς ἐγνώσαν ἐξηπατημένοι, Ἑυπελετρέ-
2 φοντό τε ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῦς καὶ τὰς προσβολὰς
ἡ προσπίπτοιεν ἀπεσθοῦντο. καὶ διὸς μὲν ἢ τρις
ἀπεκρούσαντο, ἔπειτα πολλῷ θορύβῳ αὐτῶν τε
προσβαλόντων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν
ἄμα ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκίων κραυγῇ τε καὶ ὀλονηῷ
χρωμένων λίθους τε καὶ κεράμῳ βαλλόντων, καὶ
νετού ἄμα διὰ νυκτὸς πολλοῦ ἐπιγενομένου, ἐφο-
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made to them, raised no disturbance, especially as the Thebans did no violence to anyone. But, as it happened, while they were negotiating the terms they perceived that the Thebans were few in number, and thought that by an attack they might easily overpower them; for it was not the wish of the majority of the Plataeans to withdraw from the Athenian alliance. So it was determined to make the attempt, and they began to collect together, reaching each other's houses by digging through the party-walls that they might not be seen going through the streets, and they placed wagons without the draught-animals in the streets to serve as a barricade, and took other measures as each appeared likely to be advantageous in the present emergency. And when all was ready as far as they could make it so, waiting for the time of night just before dawn, they sallied from their houses against the Thebans, not wishing to attack them by day when they might be more courageous and would be on equal terms with them, but at night when they would be more timid and at a disadvantage, in comparison with their own familiarity with the town. And so they fell upon them at once, and speedily came to close quarters.

IV. The Thebans, when they found they had been deceived, drew themselves up in close ranks and sought to repel the assaults of the enemy wherever they fell upon them. And twice or three times they repulsed them; then when the Plataeans charged upon them with a great uproar, and at the same time the women and slaves on the house-tops, uttering screams and yells, kept pelting them with stones and tiles—a heavy rain too had come on
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βιθήσαν καὶ τραπόμενοι ἐφευγὼν διὰ τῆς πόλεως, ἀπειροὶ μὲν ὄντες οἱ πλεῖοι ἐν σκότῳ καὶ πηλῷ τῶν διόδων ἢ χρῆ σωθῆναι (καὶ γὰρ τελευτῶντος τοῦ μηνὸς τὰ γυνόμενα ἢν), ἐμπείρους δὲ ἔχοντες τοὺς διάκοντας τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν, ὡστε διεφθεί- 

3 ροτο πολλοί. τῶν δὲ Πλαταιῶν τις τὰς πύλας ἢ ἐσηλθοῦν καὶ αὔτερ ἦσαν μόναι ἀνεφγμέναι, ἐκλήσε στυρακίῳ ἀκούσων ἀντὶ βαλάνου χρησά- 

μενος ἐς τὸν μοχλὸν, ὡστε μηδὲ ταύτη ἔξοδον ἔτι 

4 εἰναι. διωκόμενοι δὲ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οἱ μὲν τινὲς αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀναβάντες ἐρρύσαν ἐς τὸ ἔξω σφάς αὐτοὺς καὶ διεθάρησαν οἱ πλεῖοι, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πύλας ἐρήμους γυναικὸς δούσθης πέλεκνι 


λαθόντες διακόπαντες τὸν μοχλὸν ἐξῆλθον 

οὐ πολλοὶ (ἀισθησις γὰρ ταχεῖα ἐπεγένετο), ἀλλοὶ δὲ ἀλλη τῆς πόλεως σποράδες ἀπώλευαντο. 

5 τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον καὶ ὅσον μάλιστα ἢν ἑυνεστραμ- 

μένου εὐπίπτουσιν ἐς οἰκήμα μέγα, ὡς τοῦ τεῖχους καὶ αἱ ὀφραὶ ἀνεφγμέναι ἔτυχον αὐτοῦ, οἰόμενοι πύλας τὰς θύρας τοῦ οἰκήματος εἶναι 

6 καὶ ἀντικρὺς διόδον ἐς τὸ ἔξω. ὀρῶντες δὲ αὐ- 

τοὺς οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἀπειλημμένους ἐβολεύοντο 


εἴετε κατακαύσωσιν ὡσπερ ἐχουσίν, ἐμπρήσαντες 

7 τὸ οἰκήμα, εἴετε τὸ ἄλλο χρῆσονται. τέλος δὲ

1 οὗ τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν Hude deletes, after van Herwerden. 
2 kal of MSS. after laðóntes deleted by van Herwerden. 
3 So Hude with CG; αὶ πλησίον θύραι ABEFm. Didot and 

Haase would transpose thus: τοῦ τεῖχους πλησίον καὶ αἱ θύραι. 

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during the night—they became panic-stricken and turned and fled through the city; and since most of them were unfamiliar with the thoroughfares by which they must save themselves amid the darkness and mud—for these things happened at the end of the month—, whereas their pursuers knew full well how to prevent their escape, many of them consequently perished. One of the Plataeans, moreover, had closed the gates by which they had entered—the only gates which had been opened—using the spike of a javelin instead of a pin to fasten the bar, so that there was no longer a way out in that direction either. And being pursued up and down the city, some of them mounted the wall and threw themselves over, most of these perishing; others succeeded in getting out by an unguarded gate without being observed, cutting through the bar with an axe which a woman gave them—but not many, for they were soon discovered; and others got isolated in various parts of the city and were put to death. But the greater number, those who had kept more together than the others, rushed into a large building abutting upon the wall whose doors happened to be open, thinking that the doors of the building were city-gates and that there was a passage right through to the outside. And the Plataeans, seeing that they were cut off, began to deliberate whether they should set fire to the building and burn them up without more ado or what other disposition they should make of them.

1 When there would be no moon.
2 Or, as most MSS. read, "a large building ... whose doors near by happened to be open"; with Didot and Haase, "a large building near the wall whose doors ..."
οὕτως τε καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τῶν Ὑθβαίων περιήγησαν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν πλανώμενοι, ἔνεβησαν τοὺς Πλαταισίους παραδοῦναι σφάς τε αὐτούς καὶ τὰ ὁπλα κρησσασθαι ὃ τι ἂν βούλωνται.

V. Οἱ μὲν δὴ ἐν τῇ Πλαταιᾷ οὕτως ἐπεπράγησαν. οἴ δὲ ἄλλοι Ὑθβαίοι οὓς ἔδει ἐτί τῆς νυκτὸς παραγενέσθαι παντρατιᾷ, εἰ τι ἄρα μὴ προχώροισιν τοῖς ἐσελήνυσιν, τῆς ἀγρείλιας ἁμα καθ' ὁδὸν αὐτῶν ῥηθείσης περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων ἐπε-

2 βοήθοιν. ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Πλαταια τῶν Ὑθβαίων σταδίους ἐβδομήκοντα, καὶ τὸ ὕσσω τὸ γεγενομένον τῆς νυκτὸς ἐποίησε βραδύτερον αὐτούς ἐδείχνον γὰρ Ἀσσωτὸς ποταμός ἐρρύῃ μέγας καὶ οὐ

3 ῥαδίως διαβατός ἦν. πορευόμενοι τε ἐν ὑπέρ καὶ τῶν ποταμῶν μόλις διαβάντες ὑστέρον παραγένοντο, ἑδὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν μὲν διεφθαρμένων,

4 τῶν δὲ ἕχμων ἐγερόμενον. ώς δὲ ἠσθοντο οἱ Ὑθ-

βαίοι τὸ γεγενημένον, ἐπεβούλευον τοῖς ἔξω τῆς

πόλεως τῶν Πλαταιῶν (ἂναν γὰρ καὶ ἀνδροποι

κατὰ τούς ἁγροὺς καὶ κατασκευὴ, οὐα ἀπορροδο-

κίτου τοῦ1 κακοῦ ἐν εἰρήμη γεγενομένου) ἐβού-

λοντο ὑσρὶ σφίσιν, εἰ τινα λάβοιεν, ὑπάρχειν 

ἀντὶ τῶν ἄνδον, ἢν ἄρα τύχωσί τινος ἐξωγρημένοι.

5 καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα διενοῦντο· οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς έτι 

diabouleuménon autón ὑποτοπίσαντες τοιαύτων 

ti ἐσεθαί καὶ δείσαντες περί τοῖς ἔξω κῆρυκα 

ἐξεπέμψαν παρὰ τοὺς Ὑθβαίους, λέγοντες ὦτι 

ὑπέ τά πεποιημένα ὁσία δράσειαν ἐν σπουδαῖσ 

σφών πειράσαντες καταλαβεῖν τὴν πόλιν, τά 

τέ ἔξω ἔλεγον αὐτοῖς μὴ ἀδικεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ αὐτοί 

ἐφασαν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀποκτενεῖν οὐδὲ ἔχουσι

1 Added by Bredow and Baumeister.
BOOK II. iv. 7–v. 5

But finally these and the other Thebans who survived and were wandering up and down the city came to an agreement with the Plataeans to surrender themselves and their arms, to be dealt with in any way the Plataeans wished.

V. The Thebans in Plataea had fared thus; but the main body of the Thebans, who were to have come in full force while it was still night, on the chance that things might not go well with those who had entered the city, received while on the way news of what had happened and were now hastening to the rescue. Now Plataea is about seventy stadia distant from Thebes, and the rain that had come on during the night delayed their coming; for the river Asopus was running high and was not easy to cross. And so, marching in the rain and crossing the river with difficulty, they arrived too late, some of their men having already been slain and others taken captive alive. And when the Thebans learned what had happened, they began to plot against the Plataeans who were outside the city—there were, of course, men in the fields and household property, as the trouble had come unexpectedly in time of peace—for they desired to have such men as they could lay hands on as hostages for those within, in case any of them had chanced to be taken captive. Such then were their plans; but the Plataeans, while the Thebans were still deliberating, suspected that something of the sort would be done, and fearing for those outside sent out a herald to the Thebans, saying that they had done an impious thing in trying to seize their city in time of peace, and they bade them do no injury outside the walls; if they did, they on their part would put to death
θυσίας ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ πάλιν ἐκ τῆς γῆς
6 ἀποδώσειν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄνδρας. Θηβαῖοι μὲν
tαῦτα λέγουσι καὶ ἐπομόσαι φασίν αὐτοὺς.
Πλαταῖοι δ’ οὐχ ὤμολογοῦσι τοὺς ἄνδρας εὐθὺς
ὑποσχέσθαι ἀποδώσειν, ἀλλὰ λόγον πρῶτον
gενομένων ἦν τι ξυμβαίνωσι, καὶ ἐπομόσαι οὐ
7 φασίν. ἐκ δ’ οὖν τῆς γῆς ἄνεχώρησαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι
οὐδὲν ἀδικήσαντες· οἱ δὲ Πλαταῖοι ἐπειδή τὰ ἐκ
tῆς χώρας κατὰ τάχος ἐσεκομίσαντο, ἀπέκτειναν
tοὺς ἄνδρας εὐθὺς. ἦσαν δὲ ὡγοδέκκοντα καὶ
ἐκατόν οἱ ληφθέντες, καὶ Εὐρύμαχος αὐτῶν ἦν,
πρὸς δὲ ἔπραξαν οἱ προδιδόντες.

VI. Τούτο δ’ ποιήσαντες ἐς τὰς 'Αθηναίας
ἀγγελον ἑπεμποῦν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους
ἀπέδοσαν τοῖς Θηβαίοις, τά τε ἐν τῇ πόλει
καθισταντό πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἦ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς.
2 τοῖς δ’ 'Αθηναίοις ἠγγέλθη εὐθὺς τὰ περὶ τῶν
Πλαταιῶν γεγενημένα, καὶ Βοιωτῶν τε παρα-
χρῆμα ἄμειλαβον ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν τῇ 'Αττικῇ καὶ
ἐς τὴν Πλάταιαν ἑπεμψαν κήρυκα, κελεύοντες
eἰπεῖν μηδὲν νεώτερον ποιεῖν περὶ τῶν ἄνδρῶν οὐς
ἔχουσι Θηβαίων, πρὶν ἄν τι καὶ αὐτοὶ βουλευ-
3 σώσαι περὶ αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἠγγέλθη αὐτοῖς ὅτι
tεθνηκότες εἰεν. ἀμα γὰρ τῇ ἐσόδῳ γεγομένη
τῶν Θηβαίων ὁ πρῶτος ἀγγελος ἔχει, ὁ δὲ δεύ-
tερος ἄρτι νεωτικημένων τε καὶ ἕνεκικημένων, καὶ
τῶν ὑστερον οὐδὲν ἤδεσαν. οὕτω δὴ οὐκ εἰδότες
οἱ 'Αθηναίοι ἐπέστελλον· ὁ δὲ κήρυξ ἀφικόμενος
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the men whom they held captive, but if the Thebans withdrew from their territory they would restore the men to them. Now this is the account which the Thebans give, and they allege that the Plataeans confirmed their promise with an oath; the Plataeans do not admit that they promised to restore the men at once, but only that they would do so in case they should come to an agreement after preliminary negotiations, and they deny that they swore to it. At any rate, the Thebans withdrew from their territory without doing any injury; but the Plataeans, as soon as they had hastily fetched in their property from the country, straightway slew the men. And those who had been taken captive were one hundred and eighty in number, one of them being Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had negotiated.

VI. When they had done this, they sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the dead under a truce to the Thebans, and settled the affairs of the city as seemed best to them in the emergency. The report of what had been done in Plataea was made to the Athenians promptly; and they instantly apprehended all the Thebans who were in Attica and sent a herald to Plataea, bidding him tell them to take no extreme measures regarding the Thebans whom they held captive until they themselves should have taken counsel about them; for the news had not arrived that the men had been put to death. For the first messenger had set out at the time the Thebans were entering the city, the second immediately after their defeat and capture, and the Athenians knew nothing of later events. Consequently the Athenians sent their orders without knowing the facts; and the herald on his
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4 ηύρε τοὺς ἀνδρας διεφθαρμένους. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα οἱ Ἀθηναίοι στρατεύσαντες ἐς Πλάταιαν συνὸν τε ἐσήγαγον καὶ φρουροὺς ἐγκατέλειπον, τῶν τε ἀνδρῶν τοὺς ἄχρειοτάτους ξὺν γυναιξὶ καὶ παισίν ἐξεκόμισαν.

VII. Γεγενημένων δὲ τοῦ ἐν Πλάταιαις ἔργων καὶ λευμένων λαμπρῶς τῶν σπονδῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς πολεμήσοντες, παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαίμονες καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, πρεσβείας τε μέλλοντες πέμπτειν παρὰ βασιλέα καὶ ἄλλοσ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, εἰ ποθὲν των ὁφελίαν ἦλπιζον εἰκάτεροι προσλήψεθαι, πόλεις τε ξύμμαχίδας ποιούμενοι δοσιν ἦσαν ἐκτὸς τῆς 2 ἐαυτῶν δυνάμεως. καὶ Λακεδαίμονες μὲν πρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχοῦσαις ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τάκεινοι ἑλομένους ναῦς ἐπετάχθησαν ¹ ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἐς τὸν πάντα ἀριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἐσομένων, καὶ ἀργύριοι ῥητοὶ ἑτοιμάζειν, τὰ τε ἄλλα ἡσυχαζοῦντας καὶ Ἀθηναίους δεχομένους μιὰ νη ἔσος 3 ἀν ταῦτα παρασκευασθῇ. Ἀθηναίοι δὲ τὴν τε ὑπάρχουσαν ξυμμαχίαν ἐξήταζον καὶ ἐς τὰ περὶ Πελοπόννησον μᾶλλον χωρία ἐπρεσβεύοντο, Κέρκυραν καὶ Κεφαλληνίαν καὶ Ἀκαρνάνας καὶ Ζάκυνθον, ὀρώντες, εἰ σφίσι φίλη παύτε ἐις

¹ ἵσταχθη δικαστεῖς Hude, with Herbst (ιστάχθη τ').

² Referring, in the one case, to the unsuccessful embassy of the Lacedaemonians to the King mentioned in ch. Ixvii.;
arrival found the men slain. After this the Athenians, marching to Plataea, brought in food and left a garrison,\(^1\) taking away the least efficient of the men along with the women and children.

VII. Now that the affair at Plataea had occurred and the treaty had been glaringly violated, the Athenians began preparing for war, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies also began; both sides were making ready to send embassies to the King and to the barbarians of any other land,\(^2\) where either of them hoped to secure aid, and they were negotiating alliances with such cities as were outside of their own sphere of influence. The Lacedaemonians, on their part, gave orders to those in Italy and Sicily who had chosen their side\(^3\) to build, in proportion to the size of their cities, other ships, in addition to those which were already in Peloponnesian ports, their hope being that their fleet would reach a grand total of five hundred ships, and to provide a stated sum of money; but as to other matters, they were instructed to remain inactive and to refuse their ports to Athenians if they came with more than a single ship, until these preparations had been completed. The Athenians, on the other hand, began to examine their existing list of allies and also sent embassies more particularly to the countries lying about the Peloponnesus—Corecyra, Cephalenia, Aecarnania, and Zacynthus—perceiving that if they were sure of the friendship of these

in the other, to the connection of the Athenians with the Odrysian court mentioned in chs. xxix. and lxvii.

\(^{1}\) Referring to the Dorian colonies in Italy and Sicily (cf. iii. lxxxvi. 2), which, however, contributed no ships till 412 B.C. (cf. viii. xxvi. 1).
βεβαιώς, πέριξ τὴν Πελοπόννησον καταπολεμήσουσαν.

VIII. Ὅλιγον τε ἐπενόουν οὔδὲν ἀμφότεροι, ἀλλ' ἔρρωντο ἐς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἀπεικότως ἀρχόμενοι γὰρ πάντες οὕτερον ἀντιλαμβάνονται, τότε δὲ καὶ νεότης πολλὴ μὲν ὅσα ἐν τῇ Πελο-


ποννήσῳ, πολλὴ δ' ἐν ταῖς Ἀθηναῖαις οὐκ ἀκουσίως ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἔπτετο τοῦ πολέμου. Ἡ τε ἄλλῃ Ἑλλάς ἀπασά μετέωρος ἦν ξυνιουσῶν τῶν πρῶ-


tων πόλεων. καὶ πολλὰ μὲν λόγια ἐλέγετο, πολλὰ δὲ χρησιμολόγου ἤδον ἐν τε τοῖς μέλλουσι

3 πολεμήσειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν. ἢτι δὲ Δήλος ἐκινήθη ὁλίγον πρὸ τοῦτων, πρότερον οὔτω σεισθείσα ἀφ' οὐ Ἑλληνες μέμνηνται. ἐλέγετο δὲ καὶ ἔδοκει ἐπὶ τοῦς μέλλουσι γενή-


σεσται σημῆναι; εἰ τὲ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτοτροπον ἔνοψῃ γενέσθαι, πάντα ἀνεξηγέτο.

4 Ὅν δὲ εὔνοια παρὰ πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Δακεδαμιόνους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προεπόντων ὅτι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν. ἔρρωτο τε πᾶς καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις εἰ τι δύνατο καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐνεπιλαμβάνειν αὐτῶς; ἐν τούτῳ τε κεκολυσθαι ἔδοκει ἐκάστῳ τὰ πράγ-

5 ματαὶ δ' ἡ μή τις αὐτῶς παρέσται. οὔτως ἐν' ὁργῇ εἶχον οἱ πλείους τοὺς. Ἀθηναίοις, οἱ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπολυθῆναι βουλόμενοι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀρχήσων

φοβοῦμενοι.

1 Added by Stephanus.
places they would be able to encircle the Peloponnesus and subdue it.

VIII. There was nothing paltry in the designs of either side; but both put their whole strength into the war, and not without reason, for men always lay hold with more spirit at the beginning, and at this time, in addition, the young men, who were numerous both in the Peloponnesus and in Athens, were unfamiliar enough with war to welcome it. All the rest of Hellas was in anxious suspense as its foremost cities came into conflict with each other. And many were the prophecies recited and many those which oracle-mongers chanted, both among the peoples who were about to go to war and in the Hellenic cities at large. Moreover, only a short time before this, Delos had been shaken, although it had not before been visited by an earthquake within the memory of the Hellenes.¹ This was said and believed to be ominous of coming events, and indeed every other incident of the sort which chanced to occur was carefully looked into.

The general good-will, however, inclined decidedly to the side of the Lacedaemonians, especially since they proclaimed that they were liberating Hellas. Every person and every state was strongly purposed to assist them in every possible way, whether by word or by deed, and each man thought that wherever he could not himself be present, there the cause had suffered a check. To such an extent were the majority of the Hellenes enraged against the Athenians, some wishing to be delivered from their sway, others fearful of falling under it.

¹ Probably an intentional contradiction of Hdt vi. xcviii., where it is stated that an earthquake occurred shortly before the battle of Marathon, but none later.
IX. Παρασκευή μὲν οὖν καὶ γνώμη τοιαύτη ὁρμητο. πόλεις δὲ ἐκάτεροι τάσδε ἔχοντες ξυμ-2 μάχοις ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο. Λακεδαιμο-νίων μὲν οἶοι ξύμμαχοι· Πελοποννήσιοι μὲν οὶ ἐντὸς ἱσθμοῦ πάντες πλὴν Ἀργείων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν (τούτοις δὲ ἐς ἀμφοτέρους φιλία ἦν· Πελληνίης δὲ Ἀχαίων μόνοι ξυνεπολέμουν τὸ πρῶτον, ἐπειτα δὲ ὕστερον καὶ ἀπαντεῖς), ἐξω δὲ Πελοποννήσου Μεγαρῆς, Βοιωτοῦ, Δοκροῦ, Φωκῆς. Ἀμπρακιῶταί, 3 Δευκάδιοι, Ἀνακτόριοι. τούτων ναυτικὸν παρεί-χουστο Κορίνθιοι, Μεγαρῆς, Σικυώνιοι, Πελληνῆς, Ἡλείων, Ἀμπρακιῶταί, Δευκάδιοι, Ἰππεῖας δὲ Βοιωτοῦ, Φωκῆς, Δοκροῦ, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλεις 4 πεζῶν παρείχον.1 αὕτη μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμαχία: Ἀθηναίων δὲ Χῖοι, Λέσβιοι, Πλα-ταιῆς, Μεσσήνιοι οἱ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ, Ἀκαρνάνων οἱ πλείους, Κερκυραίοι, Ζακύνθιοι, καὶ ἄλλαι πόλεις αἱ υποτελεῖς οὕσι ἐν ἐθνεὶ τοσοῦτος, Καρία ἢ ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ, Δωρίδας Καρσί πρόσοικοι, Ἰωνία, Ἐλλησποντος, τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης, νῆσοι οὕσα ἐντὸς Πελοποννῆσου καὶ Κρήτης πρὸς ἤλιον 5 ἀνίσχοντα·2 πλὴν Μήλου καὶ Θήρας. τούτων ναυτικὸν παρείχοντο Χῖοι, Λέσβιοι, Κερκυραίοι, 6 οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι πεζῶν καὶ χρήματα. ξυμμαχία μὲν αὕτη ἐκάτεροι καὶ παρασκευὴ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἦν. 5 πλὴν Μήλου καὶ Θήρας. τούτων ναυτικὸν παρείχοντο Χῖοι, Λέσβιοι, Κερκυραίοι, 6 οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι πεζῶν καὶ χρήματα. ξυμμαχία μὲν α巯τὴ ἐκάτεροι καὶ παρασκευὴ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἦν. 7. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοι μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλαταιῶν εὕθως περιήγησθαν κατὰ τὴν Πελοποννῆσον καὶ

1 Herbst deletes, followed by Hude.
2 Before πάντα Ο gives τάσια oι Κυκλάδες, the other MSS. τάσια oι ἄλλα Κυκλάδες. Deleted by Dobree.
IX. Such were the preparations and such the feelings with which the Hellenes went into the conflict. And the states which each side had as its allies when it entered the war were as follows. These were the allies of the Lacedaemonians: all the Peloponnesians south of the Isthmus with the exception of the Argives and Achaeans (these latter had friendly relations with both sides, and the Pellenians were the only Achaeans who at first took part in the war with the Lacedaemonians, though eventually all of them did), and outside of the Peloponnesus the Megarians, Bocotians, Locrians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of these, the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians furnished ships, while cavalry was contributed by the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, and infantry by the other states. These were the allies of the Lacedaemonians. Those of the Athenians were: the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians of Naupactus, most of the Acrarnanians, the Corcyraeans, the Zacynthians, and in addition the cities which were tributary in the following countries: the seaboard of Caria, the Dorians adjacent to the Carians, Ionia, the Hellespont, the districts on the coast of Thrace, and the islands which lie between the Peloponnesus and Crete toward the east, with the exception of Melos and Thera. Of these, the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyraeans furnished ships, the rest infantry and money. Such were the allies of each side and the preparations they made for the war.

X. Immediately after the affair at Plataea the Lacedaemonians sent word around to the various
τὴν ἐξω ξυμμαχία δια στρατιῶν παρασκευάζεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ τε ἐπιτίθενται οἷα εἰκὼς ἐπὶ ἔξοδον ἐκδημον ἔχειν, ὡς ἐσβαλοῦντες ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν.

2 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκάστους ἑτοίμα γίγνοιτο, κατά τὸν χρόνον τὸν εἰρημένον ξυνησαν τὰ δύο μέρη ἀπὸ τὸ στράτευμα ξυρηλειμμένον ἦν, Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὡσπερ ἥγετο τῆς ἔξοδου ταύτης, ξυργαλέσας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων πασῶν καὶ τοὺς μάλιστα ἐν τέλει καὶ ἀξιολογοποιεῖν τοιάδε.

XI. "Ἀνδρέας Πελοποννησιοι καὶ ξυμμαχοι, καὶ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν πολλᾶς στρατεύσεως καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ ἐξω ἐποίησαντο, καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οἱ προσβύτεροι οὐκ ἀπειροὶ πολέμων εἰσίν, ὡς δὲ τήσδε οὕτω μείζονα παρασκευὴν ἔχοντες ἔξηλθομεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πόλιν δυνατον ἑπιτεῦτων τῶν ἐρχομένων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πλείστοι καὶ ἢμᾶς ἐπινοοῦμεν, οὐκον χρή, εἴ τι καὶ δοκοῦμεν πλήθει ἐπιέναι καὶ ἀσφαλεία πολλῆ εἶναι μὴ ἃν ἔλθειν τοὺς ἐναντίον ἡμῶν διὰ μάχης, τούτων ἔνεκα ἀμελεστέρον τι παρεσκευασμένους χωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεως ἐκάστης ἥγεμόνα καὶ στρατιώτην τὸ καθ' αὐτῶν αἰεὶ προσδέχεσθαι ἐς

1 Sintenis' correction for παρείναι τοῖς' ἐξεν of the MSS.
states in the Peloponnesus and their confederacy outside the Peloponnesus to make ready such troops and supplies as it was appropriate they should have for a foreign expedition, their intention being to invade Attica. When everything was ready in the several states, two-thirds of the contingent of each state assembled at the appointed time at the Isthmus. And when the whole army was assembled, Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, who was to be the leader of this expedition, called together the generals of all the states as well as the chief officials and the most notable men, and exhorted them as follows:

XII. "Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both in the Peloponnesus and beyond it, and the elder men also amongst us do not lack experience in warfare, yet never before have we taken the field with a greater armament than this; but though we were never more numerous and puissant, it is also a very powerful state we now go against. It is but right, therefore, that we neither should show ourselves worse men than our fathers nor wanting to our own fame. For all Hellas is stirred by this enterprise of ours, and fixes her gaze upon it, and being friendly to us on account of their hatred of the Athenians hopes that we shall succeed in carrying out our designs. Therefore, even if some of us may think that we are going against them with superior numbers and that in all likelihood the enemy will not risk a pitched battle with us, we must not on that account be a whit less carefully prepared when we advance, but rather must officer and soldier of every state for his own part be always expecting to encounter
THUCYDIDES

4 κίνδυνον των ἡζειν. ἀδηλα γὰρ τὰ τῶν πολέμων, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου τὰ πολλὰ καὶ δι' ὀργῆς αἱ ἐπι-
χειρήσεις γίγνονται: πολλάκις τε τὸ ἔλασσον πλήθος δεδιός ἁμείνον ἡμίνατο τοὺς πλέονας διὰ
5 τὸ καταφρονοῦντας ἀπαρασκεύουσας γενέσθαι. χρὴ
dὲ αἰεὶ εἰν τῇ πολεμίᾳ τῇ μὲν ὑγώμῃ θαρσαλέους
στρατεύειν, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ δεδομένας παρεσκευάζει.
οὕτω γὰρ πρὸς τε τὸ ἐπίειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις
εὑρυχότατοι ἂν εἴεν, πρὸς τε τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖσθαι
ἀφαλέστατοι.

6 "Ἡμεῖς δὲ οὖν ἐπὶ ἀδύνατον ἀμύνεσθαι οὕτω
πόλιν ἐρχόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πᾶσιν ἰδίωτα παρε-
σκευασμένην, ὡστε χρὴ καὶ πάνω ἐλπίζειν διὰ
μάχης ἱέναι αὐτοὺς, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν ὑμήνται εἰν
ὡς οὕτω πάρεσμεν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐν τῇ γῇ ορῶσιν
7 ἡμᾶς ὑδροῦντας τε καὶ τάκεινοι φθείροντας. πᾶσι
γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν τῷ παραντικά ὀρῶν
πάσχοντας τι ἄνθες ὄρη προσπέπτει, καὶ οἱ
λογισμὸς ἐλάχιστα χρόμενοι θυμῷ πλεῖστα ἂς
8 ἔργου καθίστανται. ᾿Αθηναίους δὲ καὶ πλέον τἰ
τῶν ἄλλων εἰκὸς τοῦτο δρᾶσαι, οἱ ἄρχειν τε τῶν
ἄλλον ἀξίοντο καὶ ἐπιώντες τὴν τῶν πέλας ἰδοὺν
9 μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν αὐτῶν ὀρῶν. ως οὖν ἕπι τοσαῦτῃ
πόλιν στρατεύοντες καὶ μεγίστην δόξαν σιδόμενοι
toῖς τε προγόνοις καὶ ύμῶν αὐτοὺς ἐπ' ἀμφότερα
ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, ἐπεσθε ὅπῃ ἁν τις ἡγήται,
κόσμον καὶ φυλακὴν περὶ παντὶς ποιούμενοι καὶ
tὰ παραγγελλόμενα ὅξεως δεχόμενοι· κάλλιστον

1 οὕτω deleted by Hude, after Madvig.
some danger. For the events of war cannot be foreseen, and attacks are generally sudden and furious; and oftentimes a smaller force, made cautious by fear, overmatches a larger number that is caught unprepared because it despises the foe. One should, however, when campaigning in an enemy's country always be bold in spirit, but in action cautious and therefore prepared. For thus men will be most valorous in attacking their opponents and most secure against assault.

"And we are going against a city which is not so powerless to defend itself as some may think, but is perfectly prepared in all respects; we have therefore every reason to expect them to risk a battle, if they have not already set out before we are yet there, at any rate when they see us in their territory laying it waste and destroying their property. For with all men, when they suffer an unwonted calamity, it is the sight set then and there before their eyes which makes them angry, and when they are angry they do not pause to think but rush into action. And the Athenians are even more likely than most men to act in this way, since they are more disposed to claim the right to rule over others and to attack and ravage their neighbours' land than to see their own ravaged. Realising, then, how powerful is the city against which you are taking the field, and how great is the fame, for better or for worse, which you are about to win for your ancestors and for yourselves from the outcome, follow wherever your officers lead you, regarding good order and vigilance as all-important, and sharply giving heed to the word of command; for this is the fairest as well as the safest thing—for
γὰρ τὸδε καὶ ἀσφαλέστατον πολλοὺς ὄντας ἐνί κόσμῳ χρωμένους φαίνεσθαι.

ΧΙΙ. Τοσαύτα εἰπὼν καὶ διαλύσας τὸν ξύλλο-
γον ὁ 'Αρχιδαμος Μελήσιππον πρωτον ἀποστέλλει
ἐς τὰς Ἀθηνᾶς τῶν Διακρίτου, ἀνδρὰ Σπαρτιά-
την, εἰ τι ἀρα μᾶλλον ἐνδοίειν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ὁρῶν-
2 τες σφᾶς ἤδη ἐν ὀδῷ ὄντας. οἱ δὲ οὐ προσεδέ-
ξαντο αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν πόλιν οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἡν
γὰρ Περικλέους γνώμη πρώτερον νεικηκτείνα κή-
ρικα καὶ πρεσβείαν μὴ δέχεσθαι Λακεδαιμονίων
ἐξεστρατευμένων. ἀποπέμπουσιν οὐν αὐτὸν πρὶν
ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἐκέλευον ἐκτὸς ὅρων εἰναι αὐθημερον,
τὸ τε λοιπὸν ἀναχωρήσαντας ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα
αὐτῶν, ἢν τε βούλωνται, πρεσβεύσατο. Ξυμ-
πέμπουσι τε τῷ Μελησίππῳ ἀγωγοῖς, ὅπως
3 μήδειν ξυγγένῃται. ὁ δὲ ἑπειδὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρίοις
ἐγένετο καὶ ἐμελλε διαλύσεσθαι, τοσόνδε εἰπὼν
ἐπορεύετο ὅτι "Ηδε ἡ ἡμέρα τοῖς Ἐλλησι μεγά-
4 λων κακῶν ἄρξεί." ὡς δὲ ἀφίκετο ἐς τὸ στρατό-
πεδον καὶ ἐγὼ ὁ 'Αρχιδαμός ὅτι οἱ Ἀθηναίοι
οὐδέν πω ἐνδώσουσιν, οὕτω δὴ ἄρας τῷ στρατῷ
τοὺς προσχωρεῖ ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ μέρος
μὲν τὸ σφέτερον καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας παρεῖχον Πελο-
πονησίσιοι ἔξεστρατεύειν, τοῖς δὲ λεπτομένοις
ἐς Πλάταιαν ἐλθόντες τὴν γῆν ἐδῆνον.

ΧΙΤ. Ἐτε δὲ τῶν Πελοπονησίων ἐξυλλεγομέ-
a great host to show itself subject to a single discipline."

XII. With these words Archidamus dismissed the assembly. He then first sent Melesippus son of Diocritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in the hope that the Athenians, when they saw that the Lacedaemonians were already on the march, might be somewhat more inclined to yield. But they did not allow him to enter the city, much less to appear before the assembly; for a motion of Pericles had already been carried not to admit herald or embassy after the Lacedaemonians had once taken the field. They accordingly dismissed him without hearing him, and ordered him to be beyond their borders that same day; and in future, they added, the Lacedaemonians must first withdraw to their own territory before sending an embassy, if they had any communication to make. They also sent an escort along with Melesippus, in order to prevent his having communication with anyone. And when he arrived at the frontier and was about to leave his escort, he uttered these words before he went his way, "This day will be the beginning of great evils for the Hellenes." When he came to the army, and Archidamus had learned that the Athenians would not as yet make any concession, then at length they broke camp and advanced into Athenian territory. And the Boeotians not only supplied their contingent and the cavalry to serve with the Peloponnesians, but also went to Plataea with their remaining troops and proceeded to ravage the country.

XIII. While the Peloponnesian forces were still

1 i.e. two-thirds of their full appointment; cf. ch. 2.

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νών τε ἐς τῶν ἰσθμῶν καὶ ἐν ὀδῷ όντων, πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν, Περικλῆς ο Ἑαυθίππος ὁ, στρατηγὸς διὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δέκατος αὐτές, ὡς ἔγνω τὴν ἐσβολήν ἐσομένην, ὑποτοπήσας, ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ἔνοικον ὕπνου ἐν τῷ ἐν χρήσεσθαι τοὺς ἀγροὺς αὐτοῦ παραλίῳ καὶ μὴ δημόσῃ, ἢ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων κελευσάντων ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γένηται τούτῳ, ὄσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄγαθα ἑλαύνειν προεύποι ἑνεκα ἐκείνου, προηγορευε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μὲν οἱ ἔνοικοι εἰς, οὐ μεντοι ἐπὶ κακῷ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο, τοὺς δὲ ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οἰκίας ἢν ἄρα μὴ ὅρωσωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι ὅσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀφίησιν αὐτὰ δημόσια εἶναι, καὶ μηδεμίων οἱ ὑποψίαιν κατὰ ταῦτα γέγρεσθαι. παρίνει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἄπερ καὶ πρῶτερον, παρασκευάζεσθαι τε ἐς τῶν πόλεων καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐσκομίζεσθαι, ἐς τε μάχην μὴ ἐπεξείναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν πόλειν ἐσελθόντας φυλάσσειν, καὶ τὸ ναυτικόν, ἦπερ ἰσχύσωσιν, ἐξαρτύσθαι, τὰ τῶν ἐνεμάχων διὰ χειρός ἔχειν, λέγων τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι τῶν χρημάτων τῆς προσόδου, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τῶν πολέμου γρώμῃ καὶ 3 χρημάτων περιουσία κρατεῖσθαι. θαρσεῖν τε
collecting at the Isthmus and while they were on the march but had not yet invaded Attica, Pericles son of Xanthippus, who was one of the ten Athenian generals, when he realised that the invasion would be made, conceived a suspicion that perhaps Archidamus, who happened to be a guest-friend of his, might pass by his fields and not lay them waste, doing this either on his own initiative, in the desire to do him a personal favour, or at the bidding of the Lacedaemonians with a view to creating a prejudice against him, just as it was on his account that they had called upon the Athenians to drive out the pollution.  

1 So he announced to the Athenians in their assembly that while Archidamus was indeed a guest-friend of his, this relationship had certainly not been entered upon for the detriment of the state; and that in case the enemy might not lay waste his fields and houses like the rest, he now gave them up to be public property, and asked that no suspicion should arise against himself on that account. And he gave them the same advice as before  about the present situation: that they should prepare for the war, should bring in their property from the fields, and should not go out to meet the enemy in battle, but should come into the city and there act on the defensive; that they should equip their fleet, in which their strength lay, and keep a firm hand upon their allies, explaining that the Athenian power depended on revenue of money received from the allies, and that, as a general rule, victories in war were won by abundance of money as well as by wise policy. And he bade them be of good courage, as on

1 cf. 1. cxxvii. 1.
2 cf. 1. cxxviii.
ἐκέλευε προσιόντων μὲν ἐξακοσίων ταλάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φόρον κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων τῇ πόλει ἀνευ τῆς ἄλλης προσόδου, ὕπαρχόντων δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀκρόπολει ἐτί τὸτε ἄργυρίον ἐπισήμου ἐξακοσίων ταλάντων (τὰ γὰρ πλείοντα τριακοσίων ἀποδέοντα μύρια ἐγένετο, ἀφ’ ὅν ἐσ τὰ προπύλαια τῆς ἀκρόπολεως καὶ τάλαντα οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἔσ Ποιείδαιαν ἀπανηλώθη), 4 ἣ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀσκήτων καὶ ἄργυρίου ἐν τῆς ἀναθήμασιν ἱδίως καὶ δημοσίως καὶ ὑψά ἑρᾶ σκευὴν περὶ ταῦτα πορμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ σκύλα Μηδικᾶ καὶ ἔτ’ τι τοιοῦτότροπον, οὐκ 5 ἐλάσσονος ἡ πεντακοσίων ταλάντων. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἱερῶν προσελθεῖτε χρήματα οὐκ ὅλγα, οἳ χρησεθήναι αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἧν πᾶν ἐξείρησεν πάντων, καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς θεοῦ τοῖς περικειμένους χρυσίος ἀπέφαυν ὃ ἔχον τὸ ἀγαλμα τεσσαράκοντά ταλάντα σταθμὸν χρυσίαν ἀπέφθη καὶ περαιτέρω ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἀσύνετος εἶναι ἄπαν. χρυσάμενος τε ἐπὶ σωτηρία ἔφη χρῆμα μὴ ἐλάσσονο

1 ἡν of the MSS., after ἐλάσσονος, deleted by Abresch.

1 About £120,000, or $583,200. The original amount at the institution of the Confederacy of Delos was 460 talents (L. xcvii. 2). The figure here given is an average amount, because the assessment was revised every four years at the Panathenaen.

These figures, and all other equivalents of Greek financial statements, are purely conventional, inasmuch as the purchasing power of money was then very much greater than now.

2 The ordinary revenue, apart from the tribute, consisted of customs duties, tax on sales, poll tax on resident aliens,
an average six hundred talents\(^1\) of tribute were coming in yearly from the allies to the city, not counting the other sources\(^2\) of revenue, and there were at this time still on hand in the Acropolis six thousand talents\(^3\) of coined silver (the maximum amount had been nine thousand seven hundred talents, from which expenditures had been made for the construction of the Propylaea\(^4\) of the Acropolis and other buildings,\(^5\) as well as for the operations at Potidæa). Besides, there was uncoined gold and silver in public and private dedications, and all the sacred vessels used in the processions and games, and the Persian spoils and other treasures of like nature, worth not less than five hundred talents.\(^6\) And he estimated, besides, the large amount of treasure to be found in the other temples. All this would be available for their use, and, if they should be absolutely cut off from all other resources, they might use even the gold plates with which the statue of the goddess herself was overlaid.\(^7\) The statue, as he pointed out to them, contained forty talents' weight of pure gold, and it was all removable.\(^8\) This treasure they might use for self-preservation, but they must replace as much as they

\(^{1}\) About £1,940,000, or $9,428,400.

\(^{2}\) Completed about 432 B.C.

\(^{3}\) Such as the Parthenon, the Odeum, and the Telesterion at Eleusis (see Plut. Per. xiii.).

\(^{4}\) About £100,000, or $486,000.

\(^{5}\) The chryselephantine statue of Athena by Phidias in the Parthenon.

\(^{6}\) According to Plut. Per. xxxi., Phidias, by the advice of Pericles, laid on the gold in such a way that it could all be removed and weighed.
6 ἀντικαταστῆσαι πάλιν. Χρήματι μὲν ὅποι ὁ οὕτω ἔθαρσυνεν αὐτοὺς· ὀπλῖται δὲ τρισχιλίους καὶ μυρίους εἶναι ἀνευ τῶν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις καὶ τῶν
7 παρ᾽ ἐπαλξίν ἐξακισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων. τοσοῦτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσον τὸ πρῶτον ὅποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐσβάλοιεν, ἀπὸ τε τῶν πρεσβυτάτων καὶ τῶν
νεωτάτων καὶ μετοικῶν ὅσοι ὀπλῖται ἦσαν. τοῦ
τε γὰρ Φαληρικοῦ τείχους στάδιοι ἦσαν πέντε
καὶ τριάκοντα πρὸς τὸν κύκλον τοῦ ἀστείως καὶ
αὐτοῦ τὸν κύκλον τὸ φυλασσόμενον τρεῖς καὶ
tεσσαράκοντα (ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ δ καὶ ἀφύλακτον
ἡν, τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε μακροῦ καὶ τοῦ Φαληρικοῦ),
τὰ δὲ μακρὰ τείχη πρὸς τὸν Πειραιά τεσσαρά-
κοντα στάδιον, ὅν τὸ ἔξωθεν ἑτηρεῖτο, καὶ τοῦ
Πειραιῶς ἔτι Μουνιχία ἐξήκοντα μὲν στάδιων ὁ
ἄπας περίβολος, τὸ δ᾽ ἐν φυλακῇ ὃν ἦμισθ τοῦ-
tου. ἰππεὰς δὲ ἀπέφαινε διακοσίους καὶ χίλιους
ἔτι ἰπποτοξόταις, ἐξακοσίους δὲ καὶ χίλιους
tοξότας, καὶ τριήρεις τὰς πλωίους τριακοσίας.
9 ταῦτα γὰρ ὑπήρχεν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ οὐκ ἐλάσσω
ἐκαστὰ τούτων, ὅτε ἡ ἐσβολή τὸ πρῶτον ἐμελλε
Πελοποννησίων ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθί-
σταντο. ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα διάπερ εἰώθει Περι-
κλῆς ὡς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περίεσθαι τῷ πολέμῳ.
XIV. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἀνεπείδοιτό
tε καὶ ἐσεκομιζοῦσι ἐκ τῶν ἄγρων παῖδας καὶ
gυναικάς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην κατασκευὴν ἢ κατ᾽ οίκον
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took. As to their resources in money, then, he thus sought to encourage them; and as to heavy-armed infantry, he told them that there were thirteen thousand, not counting the sixteen thousand men who garrisoned the forts and manned the city walls. For this was the number engaged in garrison duty at first, when the enemy were invading Attica, and they were composed of the oldest and the youngest¹ citizens and of such metics as were heavily armed. For the length of the Phalerian wall was thirty-five stadia to the circuit-wall of the city, and the portion of the circuit-wall itself which was guarded was forty-three stadia (a portion being left unguarded, that between the Long Wall and the Phalerian); and the Long Walls to the Peiraeus were forty stadia in extent, of which only the outside one was guarded; and the whole circuit of the Peiraeus including Munichia was sixty stadia, half of it being under guard. The cavalry, Pericles pointed out, numbered twelve hundred, including mounted archers, the bow-men sixteen hundred, and the triremes that were seaf worthy three hundred. For these were the forces, and not less than these in each branch, which the Athenians had on hand when the first invasion of the Peloponneseans was impending and they found themselves involved in the war. And Pericles used still other arguments, as was his wont, to prove that they would be victorious in the war.

XIV. After the Athenians had heard his words they were won to his view, and they began to bring in from the fields their children and wives, and also

¹ The age limits were eighteen to sixty, those from eighteen to twenty (πενήντα) being called on only for garrison duty within the bounds of Attica. The age of full citizenship was twenty.
ἐχρόντω, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν οίκειων καθαιροῦντες τὴν ἥξυλωσιν πρόβατα δὲ καὶ ὑποζύγια ἐς τὴν Εὐβοιαν διεπέμψαντο καὶ τὰς νῆσους τὰς ἑπικεφαλές μένας. χαλεπῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ εἰσωθέναι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς διαπέτασθαι ἢ ἀνάστασις ἐγίγνετο. XV. ξυνεβεβήκει δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάνυ ἄρχαίου ἑτέρων μᾶλλον Ἀθηναίων τούτο ἐπὶ γὰρ Κέκροπος καὶ τῶν πρῶτων βασιλεῶν ἡ Ἀττικὴ ἢ Θησέα αἰεὶ κατὰ πόλεις ὄκείτο πρυτανεία τε ἐχούσας καὶ ἄρχοντας, καὶ ὅπως μὴ τι δείχειν, οὐ ξυνῆσαν βουλευσόμενοι ὡς τῶν βασιλέων, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ ἐκαστοὶ ἐπολίτευον καὶ ἐβουλεύοντο· καὶ τίνες καὶ ἐπολεμήσαν ποτὲ αὐτῶν, δόσσερ καὶ Ἐλευσίνιοι μετ' Εὐμόλπου πρὸς

2 Ἐρεχθέα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεύς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνάτος τὰ τε ἀλλὰ διεκόσμησε τὴν χώραν καὶ καταλύσας τῶν ἀλλων πόλεων τὰ τε βουλευτήρια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐς τὴν νῦν πόλιν οὖσαν, ἐν βουλευτήριον ἀποδείξας καὶ πρυτανείον, ξυνήσασι πάντας, καὶ νεομένους τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάστους ἀπερ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἡνάγκασε μᾶ πόλει ταύτῃ χρῆσθαι, ἢ ἀπάντων ἦδη ξυντελοῦντων ἢ αὐτὴν μεγάλη γενομένη παρεδόθη ὑπὸ Θησέως τοῖς ἑπείτα· καὶ ξυνοίκια ἐξ ἐκείνου Ἀθηναίοι ἔτει καὶ νῦν τῇ θέβῃ ἐορτῇ δημοτελῇ ποιοῦσιν.

3 Τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἡ ἄκροπολις ἢ νῦν οὖσα πόλις

1 Others render: “since all were now counted as belonging to it.”

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their household furniture, pulling down even the woodwork of the houses themselves; but sheep and draught-animals they sent over to Euboea and the adjacent islands. And the removal was a hard thing for them to accept, because most of them had always been used to live in the country. XV. And this kind of life had been the characteristic of the Athenians, more than of any other Hellenes, from the very earliest times. For in the time of Cecrops and the earliest kings down to Theseus, Attica had been divided into separate towns, each with its town hall and magistrates, and so long as they had nothing to fear they did not come together to consult with the king, but separately administered their own affairs and took counsel for themselves. Sometimes they even made war upon the king, as, for example, the Eleusinians with Eumolpus did upon Erechtheus. But when Theseus became king and proved himself a powerful as well as a prudent ruler, he not only re-organized the country in other respects, but abolished the councils and magistracies of the minor towns and brought all their inhabitants into union with what is now the city, establishing a single council and town hall, and compelled them, while continuing to occupy each his own lands as before, to use Athens as the sole capital. This became a great city, since all were now paying their taxes to it, and was such when Theseus handed it down to his successors. And from his time even to this day the Athenians have celebrated at the public expense a festival called the Synoecia, in honour of the goddess.

Before this what is now the Acropolis was the

1 "Feast of the Union," celebrated on the sixteenth of the month Hecatombaeon.
2 i.e. before the Synoecismus, or union of Attica under Theseus.
ΤΗΝ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΨΩ' ΑΥΤΗΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΝΟΤΟΝ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ΤΕΤΡΑΜ.
ΜΕΝΟΝ. ΤΕΚΜΗΡΙΟΝ ΔΕ' ΤΑ ΧΑΡ ΙΕΡΑ ΕΝ ΑΥΤΗ ΤΗ
ΑΚΡΟΠΟΛΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΛΛΩΝ ΘΕΩΝ ΕΣΤΙ, ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΕΞΩ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΤΟ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΕΩΣ ΜΑΛΛΟΥ ΥΔΡΥΤΑΙ,
ΤΟ ΤΕ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΟΣ ΤΟΥ 'ΟΛΥΜΠΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΠΥΘΙΟΝ ΚΑΙ
ΤΟ ΤΗΣ ΓΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΤΟΥ ΕΝ ΛΙΜΝΑΙΟΙ ΝΙΟΥΣΟΥΝ, ΦΕ
ΤΑ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΣ ΕΡΑ ΔΙΟΥΣΙΑ ΤΗ ΔΩΔΕΚΑΤΗ ΠΟΙΕΙΤΑΙ
ΕΝ ΜΗΝ 'ΑΝΘΕΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ, ΟΣΠΕΡ ΚΑΙ ΟΙ ΑΠ' 'ΑΘΗ-
ΝΑΙΩΝ ΙΩΝΕΣ ΕΓΙ ΚΑΙ ΒΗΝ ΒΟΜΠΖΟΥΣΙΝ. ΥΔΡΥΤΑΙ ΔΕ
ΚΑΙ ΑΛΛΑ ΙΕΡΑ ΤΑΥΤΗ ΑΡΧΑΙΑ, ΚΑΙ ΤΗ ΚΡΗΨΗ ΤΗ
ΒΗΝ ΜΕΝ ΤΩΝ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΩΝ ΟΥΤΩΣ ΣΚΕΥΑΣΙΝΤΟΝ 'ΕΝ-
ΝΕΑΚΡΟΥΝΙ ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΗ, ΤΟ ΔΕ ΠΑΛΑΙ ΦΑΝΕΡΩΝ ΤΩΝ
ΠΙΓΩΝ ΟΥΣΩΝ ΚΑΛΛΙΡΡΟΗ ΑΝΟΜΑΣΜΕΝΗ ΕΚΕΙΝΟΙ ΤΕ
ΕΓΓΥΣ ΟΥΣΗ ΤΑ ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΥ ΆΞΙΑ ΕΧΡΩΝΤΟ, ΚΑΙ ΒΗΝ
ΕΓΙ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΥ ΠΡΟ ΤΕ ΓΑΜΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΣ ΑΛΛΑ
ΤΩΝ ΙΕΡΩΝ ΒΟΜΠΖΕΤΑΙ ΤΟ ΨΩΤΕ ΧΡΗΣΑΙ. ΚΑΛΕΙΤΑΙ
ΔΕ ΔΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΛΑΙΑΝ ΤΑΥΤΗ ΚΑΤΟΙΚΗΣΙΝ ΚΑΙ Η ΑΚΡΟ-
ΠΟΛΙΣ ΜΕΧΡΙ ΤΟΥΔΕ ΕΓΙ ΨΩ' 'ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΣ.

XVI. ΤΗ 8 ΟΥΝ ΕΠΙ ΠΟΛΥ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΧΩΡΑΝ
ΑΥΤΟΝΟΜΩ ΟΙΚΗΣΕΙΟ ΟΙ 'ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΙ, ΚΑΙ ΕΠΕΙΔΗ
ΞΥΝΟΙΚΙΣΘΗΣΑΝ, ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΕΘΟΣ ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΑΓΡΟΙΣ ΟΜΟΣ
ΟΙ ΠΛΕΙΟΙΣ ΤΩΝ ΤΕ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΒΟΤΕΡΟΝ

1 Added by Cobet.
2 τη δωδεκάτη deleted by Hude, after Torstrik.
3 μετέχον, in the MSS. before αλ Αθήναιoi, deleted by Dreissen.

1 It is taken for granted that these temples were ancient foundations.
city, together with the region at the foot of the Acropolis toward the south. And the proof of this is as follows: On the Acropolis itself are the sanctuaries of the other gods as well as of Athena, and the sanctuaries which are outside the Acropolis are situated more in that quarter of the city, namely those of Olympian Zeus, of Pythian Apollo, of Earth, and of Dionysus in Limnae, in whose honour are celebrated the more ancient Dionysia the twelfth of the month Anthesterion, just as the Ionian descendants of the Athenians also are wont even now to celebrate it. In that quarter are also situated still other ancient sanctuaries. And the fountain now called Enneacrunus, from the fashion given it by the tyrants, but which anciently, when the springs were uncovered, was named Callirrhoe, was used by people of those days, because it was close by, for the most important ceremonial; and even now, in accordance with the ancient practice, it is still customary to use its waters in the rites preliminary to marriages and other sacred ceremonies. And, finally, the Acropolis, because the Athenians had there in early times a place of habitation, is still to this day called by them Polis or city.

XVI. Because, then, of their long-continued life of independence in the country districts, most of the Athenians of early times and of their descendants down to the time of this war, from force of habit, even after their political union with the city, continued

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2 A lacuna in the text is generally assumed; Classen would supply καὶ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔθει, and I translate this.
3 The Anthesteria, contrasted with the Lenae, which was also an ancient festival, but of less antiquity. The city Dionysia was of comparatively recent origin.
4 Enneacrunus, Nine Conduits; Callirrhoe, Fair Stream.
THUCYDIDES

μέχρι τούτου τού πολέμου πανοικησία τε καὶ οἰκήσαντες, οὗ βάδιος τὰς ἀναστάσεις ἐποιοῦντο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄρτε ἀνειληφότες τὰς 2 κατασκευὰς μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ· ἐβαρύνοντο δὲ καὶ χαλεπῶς ἐφερον οἰκίας τε καταλείποντες καὶ ἱερὰ ἀ διὰ παντὸς ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πολιτείαν πάτρια, διαίτην τε μέλλοντες μεταβάλλειν καὶ οὐδέν ἄλλο ἤ πόλιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολείπων ἑκαστὸς.

XVII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὸ ἁστυ, ὀλγοὺς μέν τισιν ὑπῆρχον οἰκήσεις καὶ παρὰ φίλων τινῶς ἡ οἰκείων καταφυγή, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τὰ τε ἐρήμα τῆς πόλεως ὄκησαν καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ ἡρῴα πάντα πλὴν τῆς ἀκροπόλεως καὶ τοῦ Ἐλευσινίου καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο βεβαιῶς κληστὸν ὣς τὸ τε Πελαργικὸν 2 καλοῦμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὁ καὶ ἐπάρατον τε ἢν μὴ οἰκείν καὶ τι καὶ Πυθικοῦ μαντείου ἀκροτελεύτιον τοιόνδε διεκόλυνε, λέγον ὅς "Τὸ Πελαργικὸν ἀργὸν ἁμείνων," ὅμως 2 ὑπὸ τῆς παραχρήμης ἀνάγκης ἐξορκίζη. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ μαντείον τοῦναντίον χυμβήναι ἡ προσε- ἰχόντο, οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν παράνομον ἐνοίκησιν αἰ χυμφοραί γενέσθαι τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν πόλε-
to reside, with their households, in the country where they had been born; and so they did not find it easy to move away, especially since they had only recently finished restoring their establishments after the Persian war. They were dejected and aggrieved at having to leave their homes and the temples which had always been theirs,—relics, inherited from their fathers, of their original form of government—and at the prospect of changing their mode of life, and facing what was nothing less for each of them than forsaking his own town.

XVII. And when they came to the capital, only a few of them were provided with dwellings or places of refuge with friends or relatives, and most of them took up their abode in the vacant places of the city and the sanctuaries and the shrines of heroes, all except the Acropolis and the Eleusinion and any other precinct that could be securely closed. And the Pelargicium,¹ as it was called, at the foot of the Acropolis, although it was under a curse that forbade its use for residence, and this was also prohibited by a verse-end of a Pythian oracle to the following effect:

"The Pelargicium unoccupied is better," nevertheless under stress of the emergency was completely filled with buildings. And the oracle, as it seems to me, came true, but in a sense quite the opposite of what was expected; for it was not on account of the unlawful occupation of the place that the city was visited by the calamities, but it was on

¹ A fortification built by the "Pelasgiains" on the west side of the Acropolis, the only side accessible to an enemy. It was to the space below and above this fortification that the curse attached.
μον ἡ ἀνάγκη τῆς οἰκήσεως, δι' ουκ ὅνωμάζον τὸ μαντεῖον προῆδει μὴ ἔπι ἀγαθῷ ποτε αὐτῷ κατοίκησιν. 

κατασκευάσαντο δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πύργοις τῶν τειχῶν πολλοὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐκαστὸς που ἐδύνατο οὐ γὰρ ἔχωρησε ξυνελθόντας αὐτοὺς ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ὑστερον δὴ τὰ τε μακρὰ τείχη ἔφησαν κατανειμάμενοι καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ πολλὰ. ἀμα δὲ καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἡπταντο, ξυμμάχοις τε ἁγείροντες καὶ τῇ Πελο-

ποννήσῳ ἐκατὸν νεῶν ἐπίπλοιον ξερατύνοντες. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τούτῳ παρασκευής ἦσαν.

XVIII. Ὁ δὲ στρατὸς τῶν Πελοποννησίων προῆδει ἀφίκετο τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Οἰνόν πρῶτον, ἦπερ ἐμέλλον ἐσβάλειν. καὶ ὡς ἐκαθέζοντο, προσβολὰς παρασκευάζοντο τῷ τείχει ποιησό-

μενοι μηχαναῖς τε καὶ ἄλλοι τρόποι ἡ γὰρ Οἰνόη ὅπσα ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ Βοιωτίας ἐτετείχιστο καὶ αὐτῷ φρονίμῳ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἔχρωντο ὅποτε πόλεμος καταλάβοι. τάς τε οὖν προσβολὰς ήπτρηπέζοντο καὶ ἄλλως ἐνδιέτριψαν 

χρόνον περὶ αὐτὴν. αἰτίαι δὲ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην Ἀρχίδαμος ἐλαβεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, δοκῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ξυναγωγῇ τοῦ πόλεμον μαλακὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτήδειοι, οὐ παραίνων προθύμως πολεμεῖν ἐπειδὴ τε ξυνελέγετο ὁ στρατὸς, ἡ τε ἐν τῷ ἱσθμῷ ἐπιμονὴ γενομένη καὶ κατὰ τὴν

1 cf. I. Ixxx.-Ixxxv.
account of the war that there was the necessity of its occupation, and the oracle, although it did not mention the war, yet foresaw that the place would never be occupied for any good. Many also established themselves in the towers of the city walls, and wherever each one could find a place; for the city did not have room for them when they were all there together. But afterwards they distributed into lots and occupied the space between the Long Walls and the greater part of the Peiraeus. And while all this was going on, the Athenians applied themselves to the war, bringing together allies and fitting out an expedition of one hundred ships against the Peloponnesus. The Athenians then, were in this stage of their preparations.

XVIII. Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing and the first point it reached in Attica was Oenoe, where they intended to begin the invasion. And while they were establishing their camp there, they prepared to assault the wall with engines and otherwise; for Oenoe, which was on the border between Attica and Boeotia, was a walled town, and was used as a fortress by the Athenians whenever war broke out. So the Lacedaemonians went on with their preparations to assault the place, and in this and other ways wasted time. And it was for his conduct here that Archidamus was most severely censured, though it was thought that in the levying of the war, too, he had been slack and had played into the hands of the Athenians when he did not advise the Peloponnesians to make war with vigour.¹ Again, when the army was being collected, he was criticized for the delay which occurred at the Isthmus, and afterwards for the leisurely way in
ἀλλην πορείαν ἡ σχολαιότης διέβαλεν αὐτὸν, 4 μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ ἐν τῇ Οἰνώῃ ἐπίσχεσις. οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐσεκομίζοντο ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, καὶ ἐδόκουν οἱ Πελοποννησίωι ἐπελθόντες ἀν διὰ τὰ χοῦν πάντα ἔτι ἦσαν καταλαβεῖν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τὴν 5 ἑκείνου μέλλησιν. ἐν τοιαύτῃ μὲν ὄργῃ ὁ στρατὸς τοῦ Ἀρχιδάμου ἐν τῇ καθέδρᾳ εἴχεν. ὁ δὲ, προσδεχόμενος, ὡς λέγεται, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς γῆς ἔτι ἀκραίου σύνθες ἐυδώσειν τι καὶ κατοκήσειν περιόδειν αὐτῷ τιμηθεῖσαν, ἀνείχεν.

XIX. Ἐπεδῆ μέντοι προσβαλόντες τῇ Οἰνώῃ καὶ πᾶσαν Ἰδέαν πειράσαντες οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἔλειν, οἱ τῇ Ἀθηναίοι οὐδέν ἐπεκηρυκεῖντο, οὔτω δὴ ὁρμήσαντες ἀπ' αὐτῆς μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλαταίᾳ1 γενόμενα ἡμέρα ὁγδοηκοστῆ μᾶλιστα, θέρους καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἀκμάζοντος, ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ὑγεία ὃς Ἀρχιδάμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμος, Λακεδαι- 2 μονίων βασιλεὺς. καὶ καθεξήμονες ἔτεμνων πρώ- τον μὲν Ἐλευσίνα καὶ τὸ Θρίασιον πεδίον καὶ τρισπή τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἵππεον πέρι τοὺς ἶπτους καλουμένους ἐποιήσατο ἐπείτα προ- χώρουν ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ Διόσλεων ὀρος διὰ Κρωπίας ἐς ἀφίκοντο ἐς Ἀχαρνᾶς, χωρίον μέ- γιστον τῆς Ἀττικῆς τῶν δήμων καλουμένων, καὶ καθεξήμονες ἔς αὐτὸν στρατόπεδον τε ἐποιήσαντο χρόνων τε πολὺν ἐμείναντες ἔτεμνων.

XX. Γνώμη δὲ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τῶν Ἀρχιδάμου 1 τῶν ἐπελθόντων Θηβαίων, in the MSS. after Πλαταίῃ, deleted by Cassius.
which the march was made, but most of all for the halt at Oenoe. For in the interval the Athenians continued to bring their property into the city and the Peloponnesians believed that but for his procrastination they could have advanced quickly and found everything still outside. Such was the resentment felt by the army toward Archidamus while they were sitting still. But the reason, it is said, why he kept holding back was that he expected the Athenians would make some concession while their territory was still unravaged and would be loath to see it laid waste.

XIX. When, however, after assaulting Oenoe and trying in every way to take it they were not able to do so, the Athenians meanwhile making no overtures, then at length they set off from there, about eighty days after the events at Plataea, when it was midsummer¹ and the corn was ripe, and invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. Making a halt they proceeded to ravage, first of all, the territory of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, and they routed the Athenian cavalry near the streams called Rheiti; then they advanced, keeping Mount Aegaleos on their right through Cropia,² until they came to Acharnae, the largest of the demes of Attica, as they are called. Halting in the town they made a camp, where they remained for a long time ravaging the country.

XX. And it is said that the motive of Archidamus

¹ The reference is to the Attic summer, which included spring. The date was about the end of May, the average time for cutting grain in Attica.
² A deme between Aegaleos and Parnes.
περὶ τὴν ταξιαράμενον μείναι καὶ ἐστὶν τὸ πεδίον ἐκεῖνη τῇ ἐσβολῇ οὗ κατα-βῆναι τοὺς γὰρ Ἀθηναίους ἦλπίζειν, ἀκμαῖοτάς τε νεότητες πολλῆς καὶ παρεσκευασμένοις ἢ πόλε-μον ὡς σύνω πρότερον, ἵσως ἄν ἐπεξελθεῖν καὶ τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἂν περιμεῖν τμηθῆναι. ἔπειδη οὖν αὐτῷ ἢ Ἐλευσίνη καὶ τὸ Ὄρισιον πεδίον οὐκ ἀπήμνησαι, πεῖραν ἐποιεῖτο περὶ τὰς Ἀχαρνάς καθήμενος εἰ ἐπεξίασιν ἀμα μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ χώρος ἐπιτήδειος ἐφαίνετο ἐνστρατοπεδεῦσαι, ἀμα δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀχαρνηΐσης μέγα μέρος ὅντες τῆς πόλεως (προσχίλιοι γὰρ ὀπλίται ἐγένοντο) οὐ περισσεῖσθαι ἔδοκον τὰ σφέτερα διαφθαρέντα, ἀλλ' ὀρμήσειν καὶ τοὺς πάντας ἢ μάχην. εἰ τε καὶ μὴ ἐπεξ- ἐλθοιν ἐκεῖνῃ τῇ ἐσβολῇ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδε- ἐστερον ἢδη ἢ τὸ ὑστερον τὸ τε πεδίον τεμεῖν καὶ ἢ αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν χωρίσεσθαι τοὺς γὰρ Ἀχαρνέας ἐστερημένους τῶν σφέτερων συχνοὶ ὁμοίως προβόμοις ἐσεσθαί ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων κινδυ-νεύειν, στάσιν δ' ἐνεσθαί τῇ γνώμη. τοιαύτῃ μὲν διανοίᾳ ὁ Ἀρχίδαμος περὶ τὰς Ἀχαρνὰς ἦν.

XXI. Ἀθηναίοι δὲ μέχρι μὲν οὐ περὶ Ἐλευσίνη καὶ τὸ Ὅρισιον πεδίῳ ὁ στρατὸς ἦν καὶ τῶν ἐπιδέχοντες αὐτοὺς μὴ προϊνεῖν, μεμιμέοι καὶ Πλαστούνακτα τῶν Παυσανίου Δακεδαμονίων, βασιλέα, ὅτε ἐσβαλῷ τῆς Ἀττι-κῆς ἢ Ἐλευσίνη καὶ Ὅρισίζε στρατῷ Πελοπον-νησίων πρὸ τούδε τοῦ πολέμου τέσσαρες καὶ δέκα ἐτεσίω ἀνεχόμησε πάλιν ἢ τὸ πλέον οὐκέτι.
in waiting about Acharnae with his troops ready for battle, instead of descending into the plain during this invasion, was as follows: He cherished the hope that the Athenians, who were at their very best as regards the multitude of their youth and prepared for war as never before, would perhaps come out against him and not look on and see their land ravaged. So when they did not come to meet him at Eleusis and in the Thriasian plain, he settled down in the neighbourhood of Acharnae, to make a test whether they would come out; for not only did that seem to him a suitable place for his camp, but also the Acharnians were an important part of the state, their hoplites numbering three thousand, and he thought that they would not look on and see their fields ravaged, but would urge the whole people also to fight. And even if the Athenians should not come out against him during this invasion, he would thenceforward proceed with less apprehension to ravage the plain and even advance to the very walls of the city; for the Acharnians, once stripped of their own possessions, would not be as eager to incur danger as before in behalf of the lands of the rest, and so a division would arise in the counsels of the Athenians. It was with this design that Archidamus stayed at Acharnae.

XXI. Now so long as the Peloponnesian army remained in the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, the Athenians retained hope that they would not advance nearer; for they remembered that Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, when fourteen years before this war he had invaded Attica with an army of Peloponnesians and proceeded as far as Eleusis and Thria, had advanced
ΤΗ ΣΟΡΡΟΤΗΣ ΔΟΞΑΝΤΙ ΧΡΗΜΑΤΙ ΠΕΙΟΒΗΝΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΆΝΑΧΩ-
2 ΕΠΙΕΙΔΗ ΔΕ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΧΑΡΝΑΣ ΕΙΔΟΝ ΤΩΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΥ
ΕΧΙΚΟΝΤΑ ΣΤΑΔΙΟΥΣ ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΕΩΣ ΑΠΕΧΟΝΤΑ, ΟΥΚΕΤΕ
ΑΝΑΧΕΤΟΝ ΕΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΟ, ΑΛΛ' ΑΥΤΟΙΣ, ΌΣ ΕΙΚΟΣ, ΓΗΣ
ΤΕΜΝΟΜΕΝΗΣ ΕΝ ΤΩ ΕΜΦΑΝΕΤΙ, Ο ΟΥΠΟ ΕΟΡΑΚΕΣΑΝ ΟΙ
ΓΕ ΝΕΩΤΕΡΟΙ, ΟΥΔ' ΟΙ ΠΡΕΣΒΥΤΕΡΟΙ ΠΛΗΝ ΤΑ ΜΗ-
2ΔΙΑ, ΔΕΙΝΟΝ ΕΦΑΙΝΕΤΟ ΚΑΙ ΕΔΟΚΕΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΤΕ ΆΛΛΟΙΣ
ΚΑΙ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ΤΗ ΝΕΟΤΗΤΗ ΕΠΕΞΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΜΗ ΠΕΡΙ-
3 ΟΡΑΝ. ΚΑΤΑ ΧΥΣΤΑΣΕΙΣ ΤΕ ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΕΝ ΠΟΛΛΗ
ΕΡΙΔΗ ΉΣΑΝ, ΟΙ ΜΕΝ ΚΕΛΕΥΟΝΤΕΣ ΕΠΕΞΕΙΝΑΙ, ΟΙ ΔΕ ΤΙΝΕς
ΟΥΚ ΕΩΝΤΕΣ. ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΛΟΓΟΙ ΤΕ ΗΔΟΝ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΥΣ
ΠΑΝΤΟΙΟΥΣ, ΟΝ ΑΚΡΟΑΣΘΑΙ ΟΣ ΕΚΑΣΤΟΣ ΟΡΜΗΤΟ.1
ΟΙ ΤΕ ΑΧΑΡΝΗΣ ΟΙΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΠΑΡΑ ΣΦΙΣΙΝ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΟΥΚ
ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΗΝ ΜΟΙΡΑΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ 'ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ, ΌΣ ΑΥΤΩΝ Η
ΓΗ ΕΤΕΜΕΝΤΟ, ΕΝΥΓΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ ΕΞΟΘΟΥΝ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ. ΠΑΝΤΙ
ΤΕ ΤΡΟΠΟ ΆΝΥΡΈΘΙΣΤΟ Η ΠΟΛΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΠΕΡΙΚΛΕΑ
ΕΝ ΟΡΓΗ ΕΙΧΟΥΝ, ΚΑΙ ΩΝ ΠΑΡΗΜΕΣΕ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΕΜΕ-
ΜΗΝΤΟ ΟΥΔΕΝ, ΑΛΛ' ΕΚΑΚΙΖΟΝ ΟΤΙ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΣ ΩΝ ΟΥΚ
ΕΠΕΞΑΓΟΥΝ, ΑΥΤΩΝ ΤΕ ΣΦΙΣΙΝ ΕΝΟΜΙΖΟΝ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΩΝ
ΕΠΑΣΧΟΥΝ.

XXII. ΠΕΡΙΚΛΗΣ ΔΕ ΟΡΑΝ ΜΕΝ ΑΥΤΟΥΣ ΠΡΟΣ
ΤΟ ΠΑΡΟΝ ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΟΝΤΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΟΥ ΤΑ ΆΡΙΣΤΑ ΦΡΟ-
2ΝΟΥΝΤΑΣ, ΠΙΣΤΕΥΩΝ ΔΕ ΟΡΘΩΝ ΓΗΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ
ΜΗ ΕΠΕΞΕΙΝΑΙ, ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑΝ ΤΕ ΟΥΚ ΕΠΟΙΕΙ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΟΥΔΕ
ΞΥΛΛΟΓΟΝ ΟΥΔΕΝΑ, ΤΟΥ ΜΗ ΟΡΓΗ ΤΙ ΜΑΛΛΟΥ Η ΓΝΩΜΗ
ΕΥΝΕΛΘΟΝΤΑΣ ΕΞΑΜΑΡΤΕΙΝ, ΤΗΝ ΤΕ ΠΟΛΙΝ ΕΦΥΛΑΣΣΕ

1 With CEG; ἔργητο ΑΒΜ.
no farther but had gone back again. (And indeed this was the cause of his banishment from Sparta, since he was thought to have been bribed to retreat.) But when they saw the army in the neighbourhood of Acharnae, only sixty stadia from the city, they thought the situation no longer tolerable; on the contrary, it naturally appeared to them a terrible thing when their land was being ravaged before their eyes, a sight which the younger men had never seen, or even the older men except in the Persian war; and the general opinion, especially on the part of the younger men, was that they ought to go forth and put a stop to it. They gathered in knots and engaged in hot disputes, some urging that they should go out, others opposing this course. Oracle-mongers were chanting oracles of every import, according as each man was disposed to hear them. And the Acharnians, thinking that no insignificant portion of the Athenian people lived at Acharnae, insisted most of all upon going out, as it was their land that was being devastated. Thus in every way the city was in a state of irritation; and they were indignant against Pericles, and remembering none of his earlier warnings they abused him because, though their general, he would not lead them out, and considered him responsible for all their sufferings.

XXII. Pericles, however, seeing them exasperated at the present moment and that their intentions were not for the best, and convinced that his judgment was right about refusing to go out, would not convoke a meeting of the assembly or any gathering whatever, for fear that if they got together there would be an outbreak of passion without judgment that would end in some serious
καὶ δὲ ἴσησικὸς μάλιστα ὅσον ἐδύνατο εἶχεν. 2 ἵππεας μέντοι ἐξεπεμπεν αἰεὶ τοῦ μῆ προδρόμους ἀπὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐσπίπτοντας ἐς τοὺς ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν καὶ ἰππομαχία τις ἐγένετο βραχεία ἐν Φρυγίων τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων τέλει ἐν τῶν ἵππεων καὶ Θεσσαλῶν καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς Βουωτῶν ἵππεας, ἐν ἂ, οὐκ ἐλάσσον ἐσχον οἱ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Θεσσαλοὶ μέχρι οὐ προσβῆσάντων τοῖς Βουωτῶν τῶν ὀπλιτῶν τροπῆ ἐγένετο αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπέθανον τῶν Θεσσαλῶν καὶ Ἀθηναίων οὐ πολλοὶ, ἀνείλοντο μέντοι αὐτοὺς αὐθημερὸν ἀσπόνδους. καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τροπαῖον τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐστησαν. 3 ἦ δὲ βοήθεια αὐτῆ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν ξυμμαχικὸν ἐγένετο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ἀφίκοντο παρὰ αὐτοὺς Λαρισαίοι, Φαρσάλιοι, Κραννώνιοι, Πυράσιοι, Γυρτώνιοι, Φεραῖοι ληγοῦντο δὲ αὐτῶν ἐκ μὲν Λαρίσης Πολυμήδης καὶ Ἀριστόνοις, ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως ἐκάτερος, ἐκ δὲ Φαρσάλου Μένων ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ πόλεις ἄρχουτες. ΧΧ.ΧΙ. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπείδη οὐκ ἐπεξήγαν αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἐς μάχην, ἀραντες ἐκ τῶν Ἀχαρνῶν ἐδήσουν τῶν δήμων τινάς ἄλλους τῶν μεταξὺ Πάρυνθος καὶ Βριλησσοῦ ὄρους. 2 ὁμών δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἀπέστειλαν τὰς ἐκατόν ναῦς περὶ Πελοπόννησον ἄσπερ παρασκευαζόντο καὶ χιλίους ὀπλίτας ἐπὶ αὐτῶν

1 Παράσιοι, in MSS. after Φαρσάλιοι, deleted by Heringa.
mistake; moreover he guarded the city, and as far as he could kept it free from disturbances. He did, however, constantly send out detachments of cavalry to prevent flying parties from the main army from raiding the fields near the city and ravaging them; and there was a cavalry skirmish at Phrygia between a company of Athenian horsemen, assisted by some Thessalians, and the Boeotian cavalry, in which the Athenians and Thessalians fully held their own, until their heavy infantry came to the support of the Boeotians, when they were routed. A few of the Thessalians and the Athenians were killed, but their bodies were recovered the same day without a truce; and on the next day the Peloponnesians set up a trophy. This auxiliary force of the Thessalians was sent to the Athenians in accordance with an ancient alliance, and those who came were Larisaeans, Pharsalians, Crannonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. And their leaders were, from Larissa, Polymedes and Aristonous, each representing his own faction, and from Pharsalus Menon; and the others had their own commander city by city.

XXIII. The Peloponnesians, on the other hand, when the Athenians did not come out to do battle with them broke up their camp at Acharnae and ravaged some of the demes which lie between Mt. Parnes and Mt. Brilessus. But while they were still in their territory the Athenians sent out on an expedition round the Peloponnesus the hundred ships which they had been equipping, and on

1 cf. i. cii. 4.
2 More generally known as Pentelicus, so called from the deme Pentele on its southern slope.
3 cf. ch. xvii. 4.
καὶ τοξότας τετρακοσίους· ἐστρατήγηε δὲ Καρρίκως τε ὥ Ξενοτήμου καὶ Πρωτέας ὥ Επικλέους
καὶ Σωκράτης ὥ Άντιγένους. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄραντες τῇ παρασκευῇ ταύτῃ περιέπλεον, οἱ δὲ Πελο-
πονήσιοι χρόνου εμμείναντες ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὅσον εἶχον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἀνεχὼρησαν διὰ Βοιωτῶν, ὡν ἦ-
περ ἐσέβαλον· παρῴντες δὲ Ὡρώποι τὴν γῆν τὴν Γραῖκὴν καλουμένην, ἦν νέμονται Ὡρῶποι ὁ
Ἀθηναίων ὑπῆκουσιν, ἐδήσασαν. αἱκόμενοι δὲ ἐς Πελοπόννησον διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις ἐκαστοῖς.

XXIV. Ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ Ἀθη-
ναίοι φυλακὰς κατεστήσαντο κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ
θάλασσαν, ὡσπερ δὴ ἡμέλλον διὰ παντὸς τοῦ
πολέμου φυλάξειν καὶ χίλια τάλαντα ἀπὸ τῶν
ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει χρημάτων ἑδοξέν αὐτοῖς ἐξαίρετα
ποιησαμένοις χωρὶς θέσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀναλοῦν, ἀλλ
ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολεμεῖν· ἦν δὲ τις εἶπη ἡ ἐπί-
ψηφίας κινεῖν τὰ χρημάτα ταύτα ἐς ἄλλο τι
ἡμῖν ὡς πολέμου νηύτη στρατῷ ἐπιπλέωσι τῇ
πόλει καὶ δὲρ ἀμύνασθαι, θάνατον ξημίαν ἐπέ-

2 θεντο. τριήρεις τε μετ’ αὐτῶν ἑξαιρέτους ἐποιή-
σαντο κατὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκατὸν τῶν βελτίστας
καὶ τριηράρχους αὐταῖς, ὡν μὴ χρῆσθαι μηδεμία
ἐς ἄλλο τι ἤ μετα τῶν χρημάτων περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
κινδύνου, ἦν δὲ.

1 Named after the ancient town of Graia (Hom. B 408).

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them a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers; and the generals in command were Carcinus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes. So they set sail with this force and began their cruise; the Peloponnesians, on the other hand, remained in Attica for as long a time as they were provisioned and then withdrew through Boeotia, taking a different route from that by which they had entered Attica. They passed by Oropus and laid waste the district called Graice,¹ which the Oropians occupy as subjects of the Athenians.² Then on their return to the Peloponnesus they were dismissed to their several cities.

XXIV. After the retreat of the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians set guards to keep watch both by land and sea, their purpose being to maintain a like guard throughout the war. They decided also to set apart one thousand talents³ of the money stored on the Acropolis as a special reserve fund, and not to spend it, but to use the rest to carry on the war; and if anyone should make or put to vote a proposal to touch this money except in the one case that the enemy should attack the city with a fleet and they should have to defend it, death was to be the penalty. And along with this sum of money they set apart for special service each year one hundred of the very best triremes, appointing trierarchs to command them, and no one of these ships was to be used in any other way than in connection with this particular fund in dealing with the same danger should the emergency arise.

¹ This was written before 412/11, when Oropus was captured by the Boeotians.
² About £200,000, or $972,000. This was part of the 6,000 talents stored on the Acropolis (ch. xiii. 3).
XXV. Οἱ δ’ ἐν ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσὶ περὶ Πελο-
πόννησον Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Κερκυραῖοι μετ’ αὐτῶν
πεντήκοντα ναυσὶ προσβεβοηθηκότες καὶ ἄλλοι
tινὲς τῶν ἔκει ξυμμάχων ἄλλα τε ἑκάκουν περι-
πλέουσιν καὶ ἐς Μεθώνην τὴς Δακονικῆς ἀπο-
βάντες τῷ τείχει προσέβαλον, ὡστὶ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ
2 ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἐνότυνων. ἔτυχε δὲ περὶ τοὺς
χώροις τούτοις Βρασίδας ὁ Τέλλιδος, ἀνὴρ
Σπαρτιάτης, φρούραν ἔχον, καὶ αἰσθόμενος ἔβοη-
θεὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ χώρῳ μετὰ ὅπλιτῶν ἑκατον,
διαδραμὼν δὲ τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον,
ἐσκεδασμένον κατὰ τὴν χώραν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τείχος
πετραμμένον, ἐσπίπτει ἐς τὴν Μεθώνην καὶ ὀλί-
gους τινὰς ἐν τῇ ἐσθρομῇ ἀπολέσας τῶν μεθ’
αὐτοῦ τὴν τε πόλιν περιποίησε καὶ ἀπὸ τούτοις
τοῦ τολμήματος πρῶτον τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον
3 ἐπηνέθη ἐν Σπάρτῃ. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι ἄραντες
παρέπλεου, καὶ σχόντες τῆς Ἡλείας ἐς Φειάν
ἐδηκοῦν τὴν γῆν ἐπὶ δύο ἡμέρας καὶ προσβοηθη-
ςάντας τῶν ἐκ τῆς κοίλης Ἡλίδος τριακοσίων
λογάδας καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ἐκ τῆς περιοικίδος
4 Ἡλείων μάχη ἐκράτησαν. ἀνέμου δὲ κατόπτοις
μεγάλον χειμαζόμενοι ἐν ἀλιμένῳ χωρίῳ, οἱ μὲν
πολλοὶ ἐπέβησαν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ περεόπλεον
tῶν Ἰχθῶν καλούμενον τὴν ἄκραν ἐς τὸν ἐν τῇ
Φειά λιμένα, οἱ δὲ Μεσσήνιοι ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἅλλοι
tινές, οἳ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπιβῆναι, κατὰ γῆν χωρῆ-
5 σάντες τὴν Φείαν αἱροῦσιν. καὶ ύστερον αὐτὲς
νῆς περιπλέυσασαι ἀναλαμβάνουσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ
ἐξανάγονται ἐκλείποντες Φείαν, καὶ τῶν Ἡλείων
ἡ πολλὴ ἢδη στρατιὰ προσεβεβοηθήκει. παρα-
XXV. Meanwhile the Athenians who had been despatched in the hundred ships around the Peloponnesus, together with the Corecyraeans, who had reinforced them with fifty ships, and some of their other allies in that quarter, were pillaging various places as they cruised about, and in particular disembarked at Methone in Laconia and assaulted its walls, which were weak and without adequate defenders. But Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in that neighbourhood with a guarding party, and seeing the situation he set out with one hundred hoplites to relieve the garrison. Dashing through the army of the Athenians, which was scattered over the country and was occupied solely with the fortress, he threw his force into Methone, losing a few of his men in the rush, and thus saved the city. This daring exploit, the first of the kind in the war, was acknowledged at Sparta by a vote of thanks. The Athenians then weighed anchor and continued their cruise along the coast, and putting in at Pheia in Elis ravaged the land for two days, defeating in battle a rescue-party of three hundred picked men gathered from the lowlands of Elis and from the immediate neighbourhood of Pheia. But a heavy gale of wind arose, and since they were exposed to the storm in a harbourless region, most of them embarked on their ships and sailed round the promontory called Ichthys into the harbour at Pheia. Meanwhile the Messenians and some others, who could not get on board, marched overland and took Pheia. Afterwards, when the fleet had rounded the promontory, it took up these men, abandoned Pheia, and put out to sea, for meanwhile the main body of the Eleans had come to the rescue. The Athenians now resumed their voyage.
πλεύσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ ἄλλα χωρία ἔδοχον.

XXVI. Ἡτῶ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων τούτων Ἀθηναῖοι τριάκοντα ναῦς ἐξέστησαν περὶ τὴν Δοκρίδα καὶ Εὐθοίας ἡμεῖς φυλακήν ἐστρατήγησαν δὲ αὐτῶν Κλεόπομπος ὁ Κλεισίος. καὶ ἀποβάσεις ποιησάμενος τῆς τε παραθάλασσίου ἐστὶν ἡ ἐδώσαμεν καὶ Ὁρῶν οἴκεια, ὅμορφος τε ἐλαβεν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν Ἁλόπη τοὺς βοηθήσαντας Δοκρῶν μάχη ἐκράτησαν.

XXVII. Ἀνέστησαν δὲ καὶ Αλιγινήτας τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τούτῳ ἡ Ἀλιγίνη, Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐτοὺς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας, ἑπικαλέσαντες οὕς ἦκεντα τοῦ πολέμου σφίσων αὐτοὺς ἐλευθεροῦσαν καὶ τῆν Αλιγινήν ἀσφαλέστερον ἐβαίνετο τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐπικειμένην αὐτῶν, πέριψαντας ἐποίκους ἐχειν, καὶ ἐξέστησαν ὑστερον οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ οἰκήτωρας ἐκπεσοῦσι δὲ τοὺς Αλιγινήτας τις Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐδοσαν Θυρέαν οἰκεία καὶ τὴν γῆν νέμεσθαι, κατὰ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων διάφορον καὶ ὅτι σφών εὐρεγέται ήσαν ύπὸ τῶν σεισμῶν καὶ τῶν Εἰλώτων τὴν ἐπανάστασιν. ἡ δὲ Θυρεώτις ἡ μεθορία τῆς Ἀργείας καὶ Λακωνικῆς ἐστὶν, ἐπὶ θάλασσαν καθήκουσα. καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ἑνταῦθα ὕψησαν, οἱ δὲ ἐσπάρησαν κατὰ τὴν Ἀλλην Ἑλλάδα.

XXVIII. Τοῦ δὲ αὐτοῦ θέρους νομιμίας κατὰ σελήνην, ὀσπερ καὶ μόνον δοκεῖ εἶναι ἱγνωσθαῖ

1 καὶ read by Hude, after Madvig.
along the coast, and visiting other places made depredations.

XXVI. About this same time the Athenians sent out thirty ships to operate around Locris and at the same time to serve as a guard for Euboea. These were under the command of Cleopompus son of Clinias, who made descents upon various places along the seacoast and ravaged them, captured Thronium, some of whose inhabitants he took as hostages, and at Alope defeated in battle the Locrians who came to the defence of the town.

XXVII. In the course of this summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans from Aegina, together with their wives and children, making it their main charge against them that they were responsible for the war in which they were involved; besides Aegina lay close to the Peloponnesus, and it was clearly a safer policy to send colonists of their own to occupy it. And indeed they soon afterwards sent thither the settlers. As for the Aeginetan refugees, the Lacedaemonians gave them Thyrea to dwell in and its territory to cultivate, moved to do this not only by the hostility of the Aeginetans towards the Athenians but also because the Aeginetans had done them a service at the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots.¹ Now the district of Thyrea is the border country between Argolis and Laconia, extending down to the sea. There some of the Aeginetans settled, while some were scattered over the rest of Hellas.

XXVIII. During the same summer at the beginning of a lunar month² (the only time, it seems, when

¹ cf. i. 2.
² August 3rd, 431 B.C.
δυνατόν, ὁ ἡλιος ἔξελιπτε μετὰ μεσημβρίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀνεπληρώθη, γενόμενος μνυσείδης καὶ ἀσ- 
τέρων τινῶν ἐκφανέντων.

XXIX. Καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει Νυμφόδορον τὸν 
Πόθεων, ἀνδρὰ 'Αδηνίτην, οὐ εἶχε τὴν ἀδελφὴν 
Σιτάλκης, δυνάμενον παρ' αὐτῷ μέγα οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι 
πρότερον πολέμιον νομίζοντες πρὸς ἐποίη- 
σαντο καὶ μετεπέμψαντο, βουλήμενοι Σιτάλκην 
σφίσι τὸν Τήρεων, Ἡρακλῆν βασιλέα, ξύμμαχον 
2 γενέσθαι. ὁ δὲ Τήρης οὗτος ὁ τοῦ Σιτάλκουν 
πατὴρ πρῶτος Ὀδρύσαις τὴν μεγάλην βασιλείαν 
ἐπὶ πλέον τῆς ἄλλης Ἡράκλης ἐποίησεν πολὺ 
3 γὰρ μέρος καὶ αὐτώνομόν ἔστι Ἡρακλῶν. Τηρεῖ δὲ 
τῷ Πρόκυπνῃ τὴν Πανδίλωνος ἀπ’ 'Αθηνῶν σχοντὶ 
γυναῖκα προσήκει ὁ Τήρης οὗτος οὐδὲν, οὐδὲ 
tῆς αὐτῆς Ἡράκλης ἐγένοντο, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἐν Δαυλία 
tῆς Φωκίδος νῦν καλομένης γῆς ὁ Τήρεως۱ ἤσκει, 
τότε ὑπὸ Ἡρακλῶν οἰκουμένης, καὶ τὸ ἔργον τὸ 
περὶ τὸν ʻἸτυν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ 
ἐπραξαν (πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ἀγδόνος 
μνήμῃ Δαυλίας ἡ ὄρνις ἐποιομασται), εἰκός τε 
καὶ τὸ κῆδος Πανδίλωνα εὖναφασθαὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς 
διὰ τοσοῦτον ἐπ’ ὀφελία τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλοι 
μάλλον ἡ διὰ πολλῶν ἠμερῶν ἐς Ὀδρύσας ὁδῇ. 
Τήρης δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα ἐχὼν βασιλεὺς۲

۱ Deleted by Hude, after van Herwerden, as not read by 
the Scholiast. 
۲ τε, in the MSS. after βασιλεὺς, deleted by Classen.

۱ i.e. their representative to look after Athenian interests 
in the country of Sitalces and Tereus. The latter had violated
such an occurrence is possible) the sun was eclipsed after midday; it assumed the shape of a crescent and became full again, and during the eclipse some stars became visible.

XXIX. In this summer, too, Nymphodoros son of Pythes, a man of Abdera, whose sister Sitalces had to wife, and possessing great influence with Sitalces, the Athenians made their proxenus\textsuperscript{1} with that king, although they had hitherto regarded him as an enemy; and they summoned him to Athens, wishing to gain Sitalces, son of Teres and king of the Thracians, as their ally. Now this Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first to found the great kingdom of the Odrysians, which extended over the larger part of Thrace; for a considerable portion of the Thracians are independent. This Teres is not in any way connected with Tereus who took from Athens to be his wife Procris the daughter of Pandion, nor indeed did they come from the same Thrace. Tereus dwelt at Daulia in the land now called Phocis, which was then occupied by Thracians, and it was in that land that the women\textsuperscript{2} perpetrated their deed upon Itys. In fact many of the poets, when they refer to the nightingale, call it the bird of Daulia. Besides it was natural for Pandion to contract the marriage alliance for his daughter at so short a distance as Daulia with a view to mutual protection, rather than among the Odrysians, who are many days' journey distant. Teres, however, whose name was not the same as the other's, was the first king to attain Philomela, sister of Procris, and cut out her tongue to prevent her telling of it; but she revealed it by weaving the story into a piece of tapestry.

\textsuperscript{1} The women, i.e. Procris and Philomela, who murdered Itys, son of Procris.
THUCYDIDES

4 πρώτος ἐν κράτει Ὀδρυσῶν ἐγένετο. οὗ δὴ ἄντα
tὸν Σιτάλκην οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξύμμαχον ἔποιοῦντο,
βουλόμενοι σφίζε τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης χωρία καὶ
5 Περδίκκαν ξυνεξελείν αὐτῶν. ἔλθον τε ἐς τὰς
Ἀθηναὶς ὁ Νυμφόδωρος τὴν τε τοῦ Σιτάλκου
ξυμμαχίαν ἐποίησε καὶ Σάδοκον τὸν νιῶν αὐτοῦ
Ἀθηναίον, τὸν τε ἐπὶ Θράκης πόλεμον ὑπεδέχετο
cαταλύσειν πεσεῖν γὰρ Σιτάλκην πέμπτειν στρα-
tιὰν Θράκιαν Ἀθηναίοις ἱππῶν τε καὶ πελ-
tαστὼν. Ξυνεβίβασε δὲ καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τοῖς
Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Θέρμην αὐτῷ ἐπεισεν ἀποδοῦναι;
ξυνεστράτευσε τε ἐνδῶς Περδίκκας ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας
6 μετὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Φορμίδωνος. οὗτοι μὲν Σιτάλ-
κης τε ὁ Τήρεως, Θρακῶν βασιλεὺς, ξύμμαχος
ἐγένετο Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Περδίκκας ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου,
Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς.

XXX. Οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἐκατὼν ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίοι
ἐτι ὄντες περὶ Πελοπόννησον Σόλλιον τε Κοριν-
θίων πόλισμα αἰρόντοι καὶ παραδίδοσι Παλα-
ρέσιν Ἀκαρνανών ἁμονί, τὴν γην καὶ πόλιν
νέμεσθαν καὶ Ἀστακόν, ὡς Εὐαρχος ἄτυράννει,
λαβόντες κατὰ κράτος καὶ ἐξελάσαντες αὐτῶν τὸ
7 χωρίον ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προσεποίησαντο. ἐπί
tε Κεφαλληνίαν τὴν νήσου προσπλεύσαντες
προσηγάγοντο ἀνευ μάχῃς. κεῖται δὲ ἡ Κεφαλ-
ληνία κατὰ Ἀκαρνανίαν καὶ Δαυκάδα τετράπολις
οὔσα, Παλίης, Κράμιοι, Σαμαίοι, Πρώνιοι. ὤστε-
ρον δ’ οὐ πολλῷ ἀνεχόρησαν αἱ νῆσες ἐς τὰς
Ἀθηναὶς.

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great power among the Odrysians. And it was his son, Sitalces, whom the Athenians wanted to make their ally, wishing him to help in subduing the places on the coast of Thrace and Perdiccas. So Nymphodorus came to Athens, brought about the alliance with Sitalces, and got Sadocus son of Sitalces made an Athenian citizen; and he promised also to bring the war in Thrace to an end, saying that he would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a Thracian force of cavalry and targeteers. Moreover, he brought about a reconciliation between Perdiccas and the Athenians, whom he persuaded to restore Therme\(^1\) to him. Perdiccas immediately joined forces with the Athenians under Phormio\(^2\) and took the field against the Chalcidians. It was in this way that Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, became an ally of the Athenians, and also Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians.

XXX. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships, who were still operating on the Peloponnesian coast, took Sollium, a town belonging to the Corinthians, which they then handed over, the territory as well as the city, to the people of Palaerus in Acarnania, for their exclusive occupation. They also stormed Astacus, which Euarchus ruled as tyrant, drove him out, and incorporated the place in their confederacy. Sailing then to the island of Cephal lenia, they brought it over to their side without a battle. Now Cephal lenia lies over against Acarnania and Leucas and is a union of four communities, the Paliens, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronnians. And not long afterwards the ships withdrew to Athens.

\(^1\) cf. i. lxi. 2. \(^2\) cf. i. lxiv. 2; lxv. 3.
XXXI. Περὶ δὲ τὸ φθινόπωρον τοῦ θέρους τούτου Ἀθηναίων πανδημεί, αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι, ἐσέβαλον ἐσ τὴν Μεγαρίδα Περικλέους τοῦ Ξευθυποῦ οστραγοῦντος. καὶ οἱ περὶ Πελοποννησοῦ Αθηναίοι εν ταῖς ἕκατον ναυσίν (ἐτυχον γὰρ ἥδη ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ὄντες ἐπ᾽ οίκου ἀνακομίζομενοι) ὡς ἢσθοντο τούς εκ τῆς πόλεως πανστρατιά ἐν Μεγάροις ὄντας, ἐπλευσαν παρ' 2 αὐτοὺς καὶ ξυνεμείχθησαν, στρατόπεδον τε μέγιστον δὴ τούτο ἄθροὸν Ἀθηναίων ἐγένετο, ἀκμαξοῦσης ετὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ οὕτω νεοσηκνίας· μυρίων γὰρ ὄπλιτῶν οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἦσαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι (χωρὶς δὲ αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐν Ποιείδαιᾳ τρισχίλιῳ ἦσαν), μετακοι δὲ ξυνεσέβαλον οὐκ ἐλάσσους τρισχιλίων ὄπλιτῶν, χωρὶς δὲ οὖ πάλι 3 ὀμμοὶ ψελῶν οὐκ ὰλίγος. δροσαντες δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῆς γῆς ἄνεχώρησαν. ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ύστερον ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ ἐτὸς ἕκαστον ἐσβολαὶ Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα καὶ ἰππέων καὶ πανστρατιά, μέχρι οὐ Νίσαια ἐάλω ὦν Ἀθηναίων.

XXXII. Ἐτειχίσθη δὲ καὶ Ἀταλάντῃ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων φρούριον τοῦ θέρους τούτου τελευτώντος, ἡ ἐπὶ Δοκροίς τοῖς Ὀποουντίοις νήσοις, ἐρήμη πρότερον ὄνσα, τοῦ μὴ λησταὶ ἐκπλέοντας ἐξ Ὀποουντος καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Δοκρίδος κακουργεῖν τὴν Εὔβοιαν. ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ θέρει τοῦτο μετὰ τῆς Πελοποννησίων ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀναχώρησαν ἐγένετο.

XXXIII. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπειγραμμένου χειμῶνος Εὐαρχός ὁ Ακαρνάν, βουλόμενος ἐς τὴν Ἀστακῶν
XXXI. Toward the autumn of this year the Athenians with all their military forces, drawn both from the citizens and the resident aliens, invaded Megaris under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, who was general. 1 The Athenians of the fleet of one hundred ships operating around Peloponnesus, who happened to be at Aegina on their way home, when they heard that the whole military force of the city was at Megara, sailed over and joined them. This was the largest army of Athenians that had ever been assembled in one body, for the city was still at the height of its strength and not as yet stricken by the plague; the Athenians themselves numbered not less than ten thousand heavy infantry, not including the three thousand at Potidæa, and there were three thousand heavy-armed aliens who took part in the invasion, and, besides, a considerable body of light-armed troops. After they had ravaged most of the Megarian country they retired. Later on in the course of the war still other invasions were made by the Athenians into Megaris every year, both with the cavalry and with the whole army, until Nisaea was captured. 3

XXXII. Towards the end of this summer the Athenians also fortified and garrisoned Atalante, the island which lies off Opuntian Locris and had hitherto been unoccupied. Their object was to prevent pirates sailing from Opus and the other ports of Locris and ravaging Euboea. These were the events which took place during this summer after the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Attica.

XXXIII. But in the ensuing winter, Euarchus the Acarnanian, wishing to return to Astacus, persuaded

1 i.e. one of the ten generals elected annually.
2 cf. 1. lxi. 4.
3 IV. lxvi.–lxix.
κατελθεῖν, πείθει Κορινθίους τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ πεντακοσίοις καὶ χίλιοις ὀπλιταῖς ἑαυτὸν κατάγειν πλεύσαντας, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικούρους τινὰς προσεμισθῶσατο. ἦρχον δὲ τῆς στρατιὰς Ἐυ-φαμίδας τε ὁ Άριστωνύμου καὶ Τιμόξενος ὁ
2 Τιμοκράτους καὶ Ἐμμαχὸς ὁ Χρύσιδος. καὶ πλεύσαντες κατήγαγον καὶ τῆς ἀλλῆς Ἀκαρ-νανίας τῆς περὶ θάλασσαν ἐστὶν ἀ χωρία βουλό-μενοι προσποιήσασθαι καὶ πειραθέντες, ὡς οὐκ
3 ἐδύνατο, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπ’ οἴκου. σχόντες δ’ ἐν τῷ παράπλω ἐς Κεφαλληνίαν καὶ ἀπόβασιν ποιή-
σάμενοι ἐς τὴν Κρανίων γῆν, ἀπατηθέντες ἦπ’
αὐτῶν ἐξ ὀμολογίας τινὸς ἀνδρᾶς τε ἀποβάλλουσι
σφῶν αὐτῶν, ἐπιθεμένων ἀπροσδοκήτως τῶν
Κρανίων, καὶ βιαίτερον ἀναγαγόμενοι ἐκομίσθη-
σαν ἐπ’ οἴκου.

XXXIV. Ἐν ὃ ἐτῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι Ἄθηναιοι
τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ χρόμενοι δημοσίᾳ ταφὰς ἐποιή-
σαντο τῶν ἐν τῷ τοῦ πολέμῳ πρῶτων ἀποθανόν.
2 τῶν τρόπῳ τοιῷδε. τὰ μὲν ὡστὰ προτίθενται
τῶν ἀπογεγομένων πρῶτων σκηνὴν ποιῆσαντες,
καὶ ἐπιφέρει τῷ αὐτοῦ ἔκαστος ἢν τι βούληται.
3 ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ ἐκφορὰ ἦ, λάρνακας κυπαρισσίνας
ἀγούσιν ἀμαξάι, ὁ φυλὴς ἐκάστης μίαν ἐνεστὶ δὲ
τὰ ὡστὰ ἦς ἔκαστος ἢν φυλῆς. μία δὲ κλίνη
κενὴ φέρεται ἐστρωμένη τῶν ἀφανῶν, οἷ ἀν ἢ
4 εὐρεθῶσιν ἐς ἀναίρεσιν. ξυνεκφέρει δὲ ὁ βουλό-
μενος καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων, καὶ γυναῖκες πάρεισιν
αἱ προσήκουσι ἐπὶ τῶν τόφων ὀλοφυρόμεναι.

1 Hude inserts δέκα, following Gertz.
the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen hundred heavy infantry and restore him to power, and for this purpose he himself hired some mercenaries. The commanders of the expedition were Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. They did in fact sail over and restore him; and wishing to acquire some other places along the seacoast of Acaeania they made the attempt but failed, and thereupon sailed for home. As they skirted the coast they touched at Cephalenia, where they made a descent upon the territory of the Cranians; here deceived by the inhabitants through some sort of agreement they lost a few of their men by an unexpected attack of the Cranians, and finally, after they had got out to sea with considerable difficulty, managed to get back home.

XXXIV. In the course of the same winter the Athenians, following the custom of their fathers, celebrated at the public expense the funeral rites of the first who had fallen in this war. The ceremony is as follows. The bones of the departed lie in state for the space of three days in a tent erected for that purpose, and each one brings to his own dead any offering he desires. On the day of the funeral coffins of cypress wood are borne on wagons, one for each tribe, and the bones of each are in the coffin of his tribe. One empty bier, covered with a pall, is carried in the procession for the missing whose bodies could not be found for burial. Any one who wishes, whether citizen or stranger, may take part in the funeral procession, and the women who are related to the deceased are present at the
5 τιθέασιν οὖν ἐς τὸ δημόσιον σήμα, δ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ καλλίστου προαστείου τῆς πόλεως καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν αὐτῷ θάπτουσι τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων πλὴροι γέ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶιν ἐκεῖνον δὲ διαπρεπὴ τὴν ἀρετὴν κρίναντες αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐποίησαν.  
6 ἔπειδαν δὲ κρύψωσι γῆ, ἀνὴρ ἡρμηνέος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὡς ἀν γνόμη τε δοκῇ μὴ ἄξιόντος εἶναι καὶ ἄξιόσει προήκη, λέγει ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς ἐπαινοῦν  
7 τὸν πρέποντα· μετὰ δὲ τούτο ἀπέρχονται. ὁδὲ μὲν θάπτονσι καὶ διὰ πάντος τοῦ πολέμου,  
8 ὡπότε εὐμβαίνει αὐτοῖς, ἐχρώντο τῷ νόμῳ. ἐπὶ δ' οὖν τοῖς πρῶτοις τοῖς Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθῖπποι ἡρέθη λέγειν. καὶ ἔπειδὴ καίρος ἑλάμβανε, προελθὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ σήματος ἐπὶ βῆμα υψηλὸν πεποιημένου, ὅπου ἀκούοιτο ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ ὄμιλου, ἔλεγε τοιάδε.  
XXXV. "Οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἢδη εἰρηκότων ἐπαινοῦσι τὸν προσθέντα τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον τόνδε, ὡς καλὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων θαπτομένων ἀγορεύεσθαι αὐτόν. ἐμοὶ δὲ ἄρκοι ἄν ἐάν οὕτως εἶναι ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐργοὺς θεομένων ἐργῷ καὶ δηλοῦσθαι τὰς τιμὰς, οία καὶ νῦν περὶ τὸν τάφον τόνδε δημοσίᾳ παρασκευασθέντα ὀράτε, καὶ μή ἐν ἐνι ἄνδρι πολλῶν ἀρετὰς κινδυνεύεσθαι εὖ τε καὶ χείρον εἰπόντε πιστευθῆναι.  
9 χαλεπὸν γὰρ τὸ μετρίος εἰπεῖν ἐν ὧδε μόλις καὶ ἦ

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1 The Outer Cerameicus, just outside the Dipylon gate. This street was to Athens what the Appian Way was to Rome.
burial and make lamentation. The coffins are laid in the public sepulchre, which is situated in the most beautiful suburb of the city; there they always bury those fallen in war, except indeed those who fell at Marathon; for their valour the Athenians judged to be preëminent and they buried them on the spot where they fell. But when the remains have been laid away in the earth, a man chosen by the state, who is regarded as best endowed with wisdom and is foremost in public esteem, delivers over them an appropriate eulogy. After this the people depart. In this manner they bury; and throughout the war, whenever occasion arose, they observed this custom. Now over these, the first victims of the war, Pericles son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. And when the proper time came, he advanced from the sepulchre and took his stand upon a platform which had been built high in order that his voice might reach as far as possible in the throng, and spoke as follows:

XXXV. "Most of those who have spoken here in the past have commended the law-giver who added this oration to our ceremony, feeling that it is meet and right that it should be spoken at their burial over those who have fallen in war. To me, however, it would have seemed sufficient, when men have proved themselves brave by valiant acts, by act only to make manifest the honours we render them—such honours as to-day you have witnessed in connection with these funeral ceremonies solemnized by the state—and not that the valour of many men should be hazarded on one man to be believed or not according as he spoke well or ill. For it is a hard matter to speak in just measure on an occasion where it is with difficulty that belief in the speaker's
δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας βεβαιοῦται. ο τε γὰρ εὐνειδῶς καὶ εὐνοοὺς ἀκρατῆς τάχι ἀν τι ἐνδε-
εστέρως πρὸς ἅ βουλεταί τε καὶ ἐπίσταται νομι-
σειε διηλοῦσθαι, ο τε ἀπειρος ἔστιν ἂ καὶ
πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον, εἰ τε ὑπὲρ τὴν αὐτοῦ
φύσιν ἀκούοι, μέχρι γὰρ τούτῳ ἀνεκτοι οἱ ἐπαίνοι
εἰσὶ περὶ ἐτέρων λεγόμενοι, ἐς δόσον ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς
ἐκαστος οὕτη τι ἱκανος εἶναι δράσαι τε ὑπὸν ἥκουσεν
τῷ δὲ ὑπερβάλλοντι αὐτῶν φθονούντες ἢδη καὶ
3 ἀπιστοῦσιν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς πάλαι οὕτως ἐδο-
kιμάσθη ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν, χρὴ καὶ ἐμὲ ἐπόμενον
τῷ νόμῳ πειρᾶσθαι ὑμῶν τῆς ἐκάστου βουλήσεως
τε καὶ δόξης τυχεῖν ως ἐπὶ πλείστον.

XXXVI. "Ἀρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων πρῶτον
dικαίον γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ πρέπον δὲ ἀμα
ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε τὴν τειμὴν ταύτην τῆς μνήμης
dιδοσθαι. τὴν γὰρ χώραν οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ οἰκούντες
διαδοχὴ τῶν ἐπιγενομένων μέχρι τοῦτο ἔλευ-
2 θέραν δὲ ἀρετὴν παρέδοσαν. καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἄξιοι
ἐπαίνον καὶ ἐτὶ μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἥμων κτησά-
μενοι γὰρ πρὸς οὓς ἐδέξαντο ὅσην ἔχομεν ἄρχη
3 οὐκ ἀπόνως, ἡμῖν τοῖς νῦν προσκατέλειπον. τὰ
dὲ πλεῖον αὐτῆς αὐτοὶ ἡμεῖς οἴδα οἱ νῦν ἔτε ὀντες
μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ καθεσθενίᾳ ἡλικίᾳ ἐπηνεξίσαμεν,
kαὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς πάσι παρεσκευάσαμεν καὶ ἐς
4 πόλεμον καὶ ἐς εἰρήνην αὐταρκεστάτην. ὃν ἔγω

1 Those enumerated by Pericles in ch. xii. — money, army
and navy.
accuracy is established. For the hearer who is cognizant of the facts and partial to the dead will perhaps think that scant justice has been done in comparison with his own wishes and his own knowledge, while he who is not so informed, whenever he hears of an exploit which goes beyond his own capacity, will be led by envy to think there is some exaggeration. And indeed eulogies of other men are tolerable only in so far as each hearer thinks that he too has the ability to perform any of the exploits of which he hears; but whatever goes beyond that at once excites envy and unbelief. However, since our forefathers approved of this practice as right and proper, I also, rendering obedience to the law, must endeavour to the best of my ability to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of each of you.

XXXVI. "I shall speak first of our ancestors, for it is right and at the same time fitting, on an occasion like this, to give them this place of honour in recalling what they did. For this land of ours, in which the same people have never ceased to dwell in an unbroken line of successive generations, they by their valour transmitted to our times a free state. And not only are they worthy of our praise, but our fathers still more; for they, adding to the inheritance which they received, acquired the empire we now possess and bequeathed it, not without toil, to us who are alive to-day. And we ourselves here assembled, who are now for the most part still in the prime of life, have further strengthened the empire in most respects, and have provided our city with all resources, so that it is sufficient for itself both in peace and in war. The military exploits whereby
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tά μὲν κατά πολέμους ἔργα, οἷς ἔκαστα ἔκτηθη, ἢ εἰ τι αὐτοὶ ἢ οἱ πατέρες ἤμων βάρβαρον ἢ "Ελληνα πόλεμον ¹ ἐπιόντα προθύμως ἡμινάμεθα, μακρηγορεὶν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος, ἐάσω: ἀπὸ δὲ οίας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἠλθομεν ἐπ' αὐτὰ καὶ μεθ' οίας πολιτείας καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οίων μεγάλα ἐγένετο, ταῦτα δηλώσας πρῶτον εἴμι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἐπαίνων, νομίζων ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντι οὐκ ἂν ἀπρεπὴ λεχθῆναι αὐτὰ καὶ τὸν πάντα ὁμιλοῦν καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ἐκείνων ἔμφορον εἶναι ἐπακούσαι αὐτῶν.

XXXVII. "Χρώμεθα γὰρ πολιτεία οὐ ξηλούση τοὺς τῶν πέλας νόμους, παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ δυτεῖς τισιν ἢ μμούμενοι ἐτέρους. καὶ ὅμοια μὲν διὰ τὸ μή ἐσ τούς ἀλλης ἡμέρας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται, μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἄδικα διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἱσον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἄξιωσιν, ὡς ἔκαστος ἐν τῷ εὐδοκιμεῖ, οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ πλέον ἐσ τὰ κοινά ἢ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς προτιμᾶται, οὐδ' αὐτὰ πενίαι, ἔχων δὲ τι ἀγαθὸν δρασάται τὴν πόλιν, ἄξιόματος ἀφανεία ² κεκώλυται. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύουμεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἄλλης τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαι, οὐ δὲ ὀργῆς τῶν πέλας, εἰ καθ' ἑδονὴν τι δρᾶ, ἔχουσε, οὔδ' ἀξιομεθανεῖν ἢ.

¹ πόλεμον, Hude adopts Haase's conjecture πολέμον.

¹ Alluding to the Spartans, whose institutions were said to have been borrowed from Crete; in fact, throughout the whole speech the contrast is with Spartan conditions.

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our several possessions were acquired, whether in any case it were we ourselves or our fathers that valiantly repelled the onset of war, Barbarian or Hellenic, I will not recall, for I have no desire to speak at length among those who know. But I shall first set forth by what sort of training we have come to our present position, and with what political institutions and as the result of what manner of life our empire became great, and afterwards proceed to the praise of these men; for I think that on the present occasion such a recital will be not inappropriate and that the whole throng, both of citizens and of strangers, may with advantage listen to it.

XXXVII. "We live under a form of government which does not emulate the institutions of our neighbours\(^1\); on the contrary, we are ourselves a model which some\(^2\) follow, rather than the imitators of other peoples. It is true that our government is called a democracy, because its administration is in the hands, not of the few, but of the many; yet while as regards the law all men are on an equality for the settlement of their private disputes, as regards the value set on them it is as each man is in any way distinguished that he is preferred to public honours, not because he belongs to a particular class, but because of personal merits; nor, again, on the ground of poverty is a man barred from a public career by obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do the state a service. And not only in our public life are we liberal, but also as regards our freedom from suspicion of one another in the pursuits of every-day life; for we do not feel resentment at our neighbour

\(^1\) Possible allusion to the embassy sent from Rome in 454 B.C. to examine the laws of Solon (Livy, iii. 31).
μίους μέν, ουρηράς δὲ τῇ ὁψεὶ ἀχθηδόνας προστιθέμενοι. ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἑδαί προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημοσία διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπὶ ὁφελία τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖται καὶ ὅσοι ἀγραφοὶ ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὀμολογομένην φέρουσι.

XXXVIII. “Καὶ μὴ καὶ τῶν πόλων πλείστας ἀναπαύλας τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπορισάμεθα, ἀγώτι μέν γε καὶ θυσίαις διετησίοις νομίζοντες, ἱδίαις δὲ κατασκευαῖς εὐπρεπεσίν, ὄν καθ’ ἡμέραν ἡ τέρψις ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἔκπλησσεν. ἐπεσέρηκει δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ἐκ πάσης γῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ ξυμβαίνει ἡμῶν κατὰ ὁμοιότερα τῇ ἀπολαῦσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γεγονόμενα καρποῦσθαι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.

XXXIX. “Διαφέρομεν δὲ κὰν ταῖς τῶν πολεμικῶν μελέταις τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς δεῖ, τὴν τέ γὰρ πόλιν κοινὴν παρέχομεν καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε ἐξηλασίας ἀπείροις τῶν ἡ μαθήματος ἡ θεάματος, δὲ μὴ κρυφθὲν ἀν τις τῶν πολεμικῶν Ἰδῶν ὀφεληθείσῃ, πιστεύοντες οὐ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς τῷ

1 Referring especially to the contests at the chief festivals, like the Panathenaea and Dionysia, which by their artistic setting and performance were recreations of mind and spirit quite as much as physical exercises.

2 Thucydidides refers to the spiritual no less than to the physical products which the greatness of Athens attracts to her, to the poetry, music, and art which find there a con-
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if he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour looks which, though harmless, are painful to behold. But while we thus avoid giving offence in our private intercourse, in our public life we are restrained from lawlessness chiefly through reverent fear, for we render obedience to those in authority and to the laws, and especially to those laws which are ordained for the succour of the oppressed and those which, though unwritten, bring upon the transgressor a disgrace which all men recognize.

XXXVIII. "Moreover, we have provided for the spirit many relaxations from toil: we have games and sacrifices regularly throughout the year and homes fitted out with good taste and elegance; and the delight we each day find in these things drives away sadness. And our city is so great that all the products of all the earth flow in upon us, and ours is the happy lot to gather in the good fruits of our own soil with no more home-felt security of enjoyment than we do those of other lands."

XXXIX. "We are also superior to our opponents in our system of training for warfare, and this in the following respects. In the first place, we throw our city open to all the world and we never by exclusion acts debar any one from learning or seeing anything which an enemy might profit by observing if it were not kept from his sight; for we place our dependence, not so much upon prearranged devices to

genial home as well as to articles of commerce. On these latter compare a passage in the pseudo-Xenophonitic Constitution of Athens (ii. 7), written somewhat earlier than this portion of Thucydides' history: "Whatever desirable thing is found in Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, the Pontus, the Peloponnesus, or anywhere else, all these things are brought together at Athens on account of her mastery of the sea."
πλέον καὶ ἀπάταις ἡ τῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐς τὰ ἐργα εὐθύχως καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνοι ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὀντες τὸ ἀνδρείαν μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνεμένως διατώμενοι οὐδὲν ἁσσοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἱσοπαλείς κυνύνους χωροῦμεν.

2 τεκμήριον δε' ούτε γὰρ Δακεδαλόμοιοι καθ' ἐαυτούς, μεθ' ἀπάντων δε' ἐς τὴν ἡμῶν στρατεύουσι, τὴν τε τῶν πέλας αὐτοί ἐπελθόντες οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ τοὺς περὶ τῶν οἰκείων ἀμφοτέρως μαχόμενοι τὰ πλεῖόν κρατοῦμεν.

3 ἀθρόα τε τῇ δυνάμει ἡμῶν ὑδεῖς πως πολέμοις ἐνέτυχε διὰ τὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τε ἀμα ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιπεμψιν· ἢν δὲ ποιοὶ τοῖς προσμείζοντες, κρατήσαντες τοῖς τινας ἡμῶν πάντας αὐχοῦσιν ἄπεωθαι καὶ νικηθέντες ὡς ἀπάντων ἁσσοῦσθαι.

4 καίτοι εἰ ῥαθυμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἡ πόλη μελέτῇ καὶ μὴ μετὰ νόμων τὸ πλέον ἡ τρόπων ἀνδρείας ἔθελομεν κυνύνειν, περιγύρεται ἡμῖν τοὺς τε μέλλονσιν ἀλγευσῖς μὴ προκάμμενι, καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ ἔλθοντι μὴ ἀτομμόσεις τῶν μία μοχθοῦντων φαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὴν τόλμην ἄξιαν εἶναι θαυμαζεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ ἐν ἀλλοις.

XL. "Φιλοκαλούμεν το γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἀνευ μαλακίας πλούτῳ τε ἐργού μᾶλλον καταφῇ ἡ λόγου κόμπορ χρώμεθα, καὶ τὸ

1 Pericles here hints at his policy, outlined in ch. xiii. 2, of always acting on the defensive when the enemy forces are distinctly superior.
deceive, as upon the courage which springs from our own souls when we are called to action. And again, in the matter of education, whereas they from early childhood by a laborious discipline make pursuit of manly courage, we with our unrestricted mode of life are none the less ready to meet any equality of hazard. And here is the proof: When the Lacedaemonians invade our territory they do not come alone but bring all their confederates with them, whereas we, going by ourselves against our neighbours' territory, generally have no difficulty, though fighting on foreign soil against men who are defending their own homes, in overcoming them in battle. And in fact our united forces no enemy has ever yet met, not only because we are constantly attending to the needs of our navy, but also because on land we send our troops on many enterprises; but if they by chance engage with a division of our forces and defeat a few of us, they boast that they have repulsed us all, and if the victory is ours, they claim that they have been beaten by us all. If, then, by taking our ease rather than by laborious training and depending on a courage which springs more from manner of life than compulsion of laws, we are ready to meet dangers, the gain is all ours, in that we do not borrow trouble by anticipating miseries which are not yet at hand, and when we come to the test we show ourselves fully as brave as those who are always toiling; and so our city is worthy of admiration in these respects, as well as in others.

XL. "For we are lovers of beauty yet with no extravagance and lovers of wisdom yet without weakness. Wealth we employ rather as an opportunity for action than as a subject for boasting;
πένεσθαι οὖν ὁμολογεῖν τινι αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ
2 διαφεύγειν ἑργῳ αἰσχρον. ἐνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς
οἰκεῖοι ἀμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ έτέρους1
πρὸς ἑργὰ τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς
γυναι· μόνοι γὰρ τὸν τε μηδὲν τῶν διεκχοντα
οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ' ἀχρείον νομίζομεν, καὶ
αὐτοὶ 2 ἦτοι κρίσιμομὲν γε ἐνθυμούμεθα ὁρθῶς τὰ
πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἑργοῖς βλάβην
ηγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ
3 πρότερον ἡ ἐπὶ ἀ δεῖ ἑργῳ ἑλθεῖν. διαφερόντως
γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν ἄστε τολμᾶν τε ὁ αὐτός
μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι:
ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν βράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ
ἐκνον φέρει. κράτιστοι δὲ ἀν ψυχῆν δικαίως
κριθείν οἱ τὰ τε δεινα καὶ ἠδεα σαφέστατα
γυνώσκοντες καὶ διὰ ταύτα μὴ ἀποτρεπόμενοι
4 ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων. καὶ τὰ ἐς ἀρετήν ἐννυτιώμεθα
τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ πάσχοντες εῦ, ἀλλὰ δρόντες
κτῶμεθα τοὺς φίλους. βεβαιότερος δὲ ὁ βράσας
τὴν χάριν ὡστε ὄφειλομένην δι' εὐνοίας ὁ δέδωκε
σωζε:ν· ὁ δὲ ἀντοφέιλων ἀμβλύτερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ
ἐς χάριν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὄφειλημα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδόω-

1 ἔτεροι <ἐτερα>, Hude. 2 Hude reads οἱ αὐτοῖ.

1 As contrasted with the Spartans, whose officials made the most important decisions.
and with us it is not a shame for a man to acknowledge poverty, but the greater shame is for him not to do his best to avoid it. And you will find united in the same persons an interest at once in private and in public affairs, and in others of us who give attention chiefly to business, you will find no lack of insight into political matters. For we alone regard the man who takes no part in public affairs, not as one who minds his own business, but as good for nothing; and we Athenians decide public questions for ourselves or at least endeavour to arrive at a sound understanding of them, in the belief that it is not debate that is a hindrance to action, but rather not to be instructed by debate before the time comes for action. For in truth we have this point also of superiority over other men, to be most daring in action and yet at the same time most given to reflection upon the ventures we mean to undertake; with other men, on the contrary, boldness means ignorance and reflection brings hesitation. And they would rightly be adjudged most courageous who, realizing most clearly the pains no less than the pleasures involved, do not on that account turn away from danger. Again, in nobility of spirit, we stand in sharp contrast to most men; for it is not by receiving kindness, but by conferring it, that we acquire our friends. Now he who confers the favour is a firmer friend, in that he is disposed, by continued goodwill toward the recipient, to keep the feeling of obligation alive in him; but he who owes it is more listless in his friendship, knowing that when he repays the kindness it will count, not as a favour bestowed, but as a debt

1 This must be the meaning of the Greek clause, but something is perhaps wrong with the text.
5 σων. καὶ μόνοι οὐ τοῦ ξυμφέροντος μᾶλλον λογισμῷ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῷ ἀδεῶς τινα ὁφελοῦμεν.

XLI. "Εὐνελών τε λέγω τὴν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παύεισιν εἶναι καὶ καθ' ἐκαστὸν δοκεῖν ἃν μοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄνδρα παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστ' ἃν εἰδὴ καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ' ἃν εὔτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὐταρκεῖς παρέχεσθαι. καὶ ὡς οὐ λόγων εὖ τῷ παρόντι κόμπος τάδε μᾶλλον ἡ ἐργών ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια, αὐτή ἡ δύναμις τῆς πόλεως, ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν τῶν τροπῶν ἐκτησάμεθα, 3 σημαίνει. μόνη γὰρ τῶν νῦν ἄκοις κρείσσων ἐς πείραν ἔρχεται, καὶ μόνη οὔτε τῷ πολεμίῳ ἐπελθόντι ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει ὑφ' οίων κακοπαθεί, οὔτε τῷ ὑπηκοῷ κατάμεμψιν ὡς οὐχ υπὸ ἄξιον 4 ἄρχεται. μετὰ μεγάλων δὲ σημείων καὶ οὔ δὴ τοῦ ἀμάρτυρον γε τὴν δύναμιν παρασχόμενοι τοῖς τε νῦν καὶ τοῖς ἑπείτα θαυμασθησόμεθα,1 οὐδὲν προσδεόμενοι οὔτε ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτου οὔτε ὀστίς ἑπείτη μὲν τοῦ αὐτίκα τέρψει, τῶν δ' ἐργῶν τῆς ὑπόνοιαν ἡ ἀλήθεια βλάψει, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν μὲν θύλασαν καὶ γῆν ἐσβάτον τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τόλμῃ καταναγκάσαντες γενέσθαι, πανταχοῦ δὲ μνημεῖα 5 κακῶν τε κάγαθὸν ἄδια ἔνωκατοικίσαντες. ψετὶ τοιαύτης οὖν πόλεως οἴδε τε ἑνναίως δικαιοῦντες

1 καὶ, before oïdēn in the MSS., deleted by Krüger.
repaid. And, finally, we alone confer our benefits without fear of consequences, not upon a calculation of the advantage we shall gain, but with confidence in the spirit of liberality which actuates us.

XLI. "In a word, then, I say that our city as a whole is the school of Hellas, and that, as it seems to me, each individual amongst us could in his own person, with the utmost grace and versatility, prove himself self-sufficient in the most varied forms of activity. And that this is no mere boast inspired by the occasion, but actual truth, is attested by the very power of our city, a power which we have acquired in consequence of these qualities. For Athens alone among her contemporaries, when put to the test, is superior to the report of her, and she alone neither affords to the enemy who comes against her cause for irritation at the character of the foe by whom he is defeated, nor to her subject cause for complaint that his masters are unworthy. Many are the proofs which we have given of our power and assuredly it does not lack witnesses, and therefore we shall be the wonder not only of the men of to-day but of after times; we shall need no Homer to sing our praise nor any other poet whose verses may perhaps delight for the moment but whose presentation of the facts will be discredited by the truth. Nay, we have compelled every sea and every land to grant access to our daring, and have everywhere planted everlastling memorials both of evil to foes and of good to friends. Such, then, is the city for which these men nobly fought and died, deeming it their duty not to let her attended with ill consequences for these (e.g. Orea, and later Aegina) or good (e.g. on the Thracian coast)."
μὴ ἀφαιρεθῶναί αὐτὴν μαχόμενοι ἐτελεύτησαν, καὶ τῶν λειτομένων πάντα τινὰ εἰκὸς ἐθέλειν ὕπερ αὐτῆς κάμνειν.

XLII. "Δι’ ὅ δῆ καὶ ἐμὴκυνα τὰ περὶ τῆς πόλεως, διδασκαλίαν τε ποιούμενος μὴ περὶ ἑσύν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀγώνα καὶ οἷς τῶν δὲ μηδὲν ὑπάρξει ὁμοίως, καὶ τὴν εὐλογίαν ἁμα ἐφ’ οἷς νῦν λέγω

2 φανερὰν σημείον καθιστάς. καὶ εἰρήται αὐτῆς τὰ μέγιστα: ἢ γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ἔμεινα, αἰ τῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν τοιώνυμοι ἄρεται ἐκόσμηται, καὶ οὐκ ἄν πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἰσόρροπος ὀσπερ τῶν δὲ ὁ λόγος τῶν ἔργων φάνειν. δοκεῖ δὲ μοι δηλοῦν ἀνδρός ἁρετὴν πρώτη τε μηνύουσα καὶ τελευταία

3 βεβαιοῦσα ἢ νῦν τῶν δὲ καταστροφῆς. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς τάλλα χείρος δικαίου τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολέμους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἄνδραγαθίαν προτίθεσθαι ἀγαθοὶ γὰρ κακὸν ἀφανίσαντες κοινὸς μᾶλλον

4 ἀφέλησαν ἢ ἔκ τῶν ἰδίων ἐθλαψαν. τῶν δὲ ὑπὲρ πλοῖτον τίς τὴν ἐτε ἀπολαυσιν προτιμήσας ἐμαλακίσθη ὑπὲρ πενίας ἐλπίδα, ὡς καὶ ἐτε διαφυγὼν αὐτὴν 1 πλουτίσθειν, ἀναβολὴν τοῦ δεινοῦ ἐποίησατο τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τιμωρίαν ποθευτέραν αὐτῶν λαβόντες καὶ κινδύνων ἁμα τῶν καλλιστῶν νομίσαντες ἐβουλήθησαν μετ’ αὐτοῦ

1 αὐτῆς: Hude brackets.
be taken from them; and it is fitting that every man who is left behind should suffer willingly for her sake.

XLII. "It is for this reason that I have dwelt upon the greatness of our city; for I have desired to show you that we are contending for a higher prize than those who do not enjoy such privileges in like degree, and at the same time to let the praise of these men in whose honour I am now speaking be made manifest by proofs. Indeed, the greatest part of their praise has already been spoken; for when I lauded the city, that was but the praise wherewith the brave deeds of these men and men like them have already adorned her; and there are not many Hellenes whose fame would be found, like theirs, evenly balanced with their deeds. And it seems to me that such a death as these men died gives proof enough of manly courage, whether as first revealing it or as affording its final confirmation. Aye, even in the case of those who in other ways fell short of goodness, it is but right that the valour with which they fought for their country should be set before all else; for they have blotted out evil with good and have bestowed a greater benefit by their service to the state than they have done harm by their private lives. And no one of these men either so set his heart upon the continued enjoyment of wealth as to become a coward, or put off the dreadful day, yielding to the hope which poverty inspires, that if he could but escape it he might yet become rich; but, deeming the punishment of the foe to be more desirable than these things, and at the same time regarding such a hazard as the most glorious of all, they chose, accepting the hazard, to be avenged.
τούς μὲν τιμωρείσθαι, τῶν δὲ ἄφεσθαι, ἐπιλέξα
μὲν τὸ ἀφανὲς τοῦ κατορθώσειν ἐπιτρέψαντες,
ἐργῷ δὲ περὶ τοῦ Ἧδη ὄρωμένου σφάσιν αὐτοῖς
ἀξιοῦντες πεποιθέναι καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ἁμύν
νεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν κάλλιον ἡ γησάμενοι ἡ τὸ ἐνδόντες σφάξεσθαι, τὸ μὲν αἰσχρόν τοῦ λόγου
ἐφυγον, τὸ δ' ἐργον τῷ σώματι ὑπεμείναν, καὶ δι' ἐλαχίστον καὶρὸν τύχης ἀμή ἁμή τῆς δάξης
μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ δέους ἀπηλλάγησαν.

XLIII. "Καὶ οὕτω μὲν προσηκόντως τῇ πόλει
tοιοίδε ἐγένοντο, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς χρή ἀσφα-
λεστέραν μὲν εὑχεσθαι, ἀτομοτέραν δὲ μηδὲν
ἀξιοῦν τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους διάνοιαν ἔχειν,
σκοποῦντας μὴ λόγῳ μόνῳ τὴν ὁφελίαν, ἥν ἁν
tις πρὸς οὔδεν χείρον αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς εἰδότας μη-
κόνοι, λέγων ὅσα ἐν τῷ τοὺς πολεμίους ἁμύνεσθαι
ἄμαθα ἔνεστιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως
dύναμιν καθ' ἠμέραν ἐργονς θεωμένους καὶ ἔραστάς
γεγομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη δόξῃ
ἐναι, ἐνθυμομένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γγνώ-
σκόντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐργοῖς αἰσχυνόμενοι
ἀνδρεῖς αὐτὰ ἐκτίσαντο, καὶ ὅποτε καὶ πείρα τοῦ
σφαλείαν, ὡς οὖν καὶ τὴν πόλειν γε τῆς σφετέρας
ἀρετῆς ἄξιοῦντες στερίσκειν, κάλλιστον δὲ ἐρανον

1 So most MSS. Hude reads τῷ with CG.
2 καί: Hude brackets.
3 Dobree's correction for μᾶλλον of the MSS. Hude inserts
dév and retains μᾶλλον.
Δ Deleted by Hude.
4 ὑμᾶς: Hude brackets.
upon the enemy and to relinquish these other things, trusting to hope the still obscure possibilities of success, but in action, as to the issue that was before their eyes, confidently relying upon themselves. And then when the moment of combat came, thinking it better to defend themselves and suffer death rather than to yield and save their lives, they fled, indeed, from the shameful word of dishonour, but with life and limb stood stoutly to their task, and in the brief instant ordained by fate, at the crowning moment not of fear but of glory, they passed away.

XLIII. "And so these men then bore themselves after a manner that befits our city; but you who survive, though you may pray that it be with less hazard, should resolve that you will have a spirit to meet the foe which is no whit less courageous; and you must estimate the advantage of such a spirit not alone by a speaker's words, for he could make a long story in telling you—what you yourselves know as well as he—all the advantages that are to be gained by warding off the foe. Nay rather you must daily fix your gaze upon the power of Athens and become lovers of her, and when the vision of her greatness has inspired you, reflect that all this has been acquired by men of courage who knew their duty and in the hour of conflict were moved by a high sense of honour, who, if ever they failed in any enterprise, were resolved that at least their country should not find herself deserted by their valour, but freely sacrificed to her the fairest offering." It was in

1 *Iphor*, a joint contribution, the regular term for a contribution made for mutual benefit, *e.g.* to a common meal, to a benevolent society, etc. Demosthenes (cont. Mid. 27) represents the state as a sort of benefit society to which every citizen owes a contribution.
THUCYDIDES

2 αὐτῆς προϊμενοι. κοινὴ γὰρ τὰ σώματα διδόντες ἵδια τὸν ἀγήρων ἐπαινοῦ ἐλάμβανον καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐπισημότατον, οὐκ ἐν ὧν κείμεται μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ ἐν ὧν ἡ δόξα αὐτῶν παρὰ τῷ ἐντυχόντι αἰεὶ καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔργον καιρῷ αἰείμοντος κατα-

3 λείπεται. ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος, καὶ οὐ στηλῶν μόνον ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ σημαίνει ἐπι-

γραφή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ μή προσηκούσῃ ἀγραφῷ μνήμη παρ' ἑκάστῳ τῆς γνώμης μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ

4 ἔργου ἐνδιατάται, οὐς νῦν ὑμεῖς ἤξιοὶ σχηματίζετε καὶ τὸ εὐθαμον τὸ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ 6 ἐλεύθερον τὸ ἐνυφυχον κρίναντες, μὴ περιοράσθε τοὺς πολέμι-

5 κοὺς κινδύνους. οὐ γὰρ οἱ κακοπραγοῦντες δικαιο-

τερον ἀφειδοῖν ἀν τοῦ βίου, οἷς ἐλπίζειν οὐκ ἔστω ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλὰ οἷς ἡ ἐναντία μεταβολὴ ἐν τῷ ζήν ἐτὶ κινδυνεύεται καὶ ἐν οἷς μάλιστα μεγάλα τὰ

6 διαφέροντα, ἢν τε πταίσωσιν. ἀλγεινοτέρα γὰρ ἀνδρὶ γε φρόνημα ἔχοντι ἢ μετὰ τοῦ 1 μάλα-

κισθήμερα κάκωσις ἢ ὁ μετὰ ρώμης καὶ κοινῆς ἐλπίδος ἀμα γεγνόμενος ἀναίσθητος θάνατος.

XLIV. “Δι’ ὅπερ καὶ τοὺς τῶν τῶν νῦν τοκέας, ὅσι πάρεστε, οὐκ ἀλοφύρομαι μᾶλλον ἢ παρα-

μυθήσομαι. ἐν πολυτρόποις γὰρ ἔμφοραις ἐπι-

στανται πρατέντες τὸ 6 εὐτυχές; 2 οὐ ἦν τῆς εὐπρεπεστάτης λάχωσιν, ὅπερ οἴδε μὲν νῦν, τελευτᾷ, ὑμεῖς δὲ λύπης, καὶ οἶς ἐνυδαιμονήσατε τε ὁ βίος ὑμῶν καὶ ἐπελευτήσατε ξυνεμετρήθη.

1 ἐν τῷ, in some MSS. before, in others after, μετὰ τοῦ, deleted by Bredow.

2 Hude reads τῶν εὐτυχές, following Abresch.
their power to give. For they gave their lives for the common weal, and in so doing won for themselves the praise which grows not old and the most distinguished of all sepulchres—not that in which they lie buried, but that in which their glory survives in everlasting remembrance, celebrated on every occasion which gives rise to word of eulogy or deed of emulation. For the whole world is the sepulchre of famous men, and it is not the epitaph upon monuments set up in their own land that alone commemorates them, but also in lands not their own there abides in each breast an unwritten memorial of them, planted in the heart rather than graven on stone. Do you, therefore, now make these men your examples, and judging freedom to be happiness and courage to be freedom, be not too anxious about the dangers of war. For it is not those that are in evil plight who have the best excuse for being unsparing of their lives, for they have no hope of better days, but rather those who run the risk, if they continue to live, of the opposite reversal of fortune, and those to whom it makes the greatest difference if they suffer a disaster. For to a manly spirit more bitter is humiliation associated with cowardice than death when it comes unperceived in close company with stalwart deeds and public hopes.

XLIV. "Wherefore, I do not commiserate the parents of these men, as many of you as are present here, but will rather try to comfort them. For they know that their lives have been passed amid manifold vicissitudes; and it is to be accounted good fortune when men win, even as these now, a most glorious death—and you a like grief—and when life has been meted out to them to be happy in no less than to
2 χαλεπτον μεν ουν οίδα πείθειν ον, διν και πολλάκις ἔξετε ύπομνήματα ἐν ἄλλων εὐτυχίαις, αἷς ποτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἡγάλλεσθε καὶ λύπη οὐχ οὐν ἰν τις μὴ πειρασάμενος ἄγαθῶν στερίσκηται, ἀλλ' οὖ ἀν
3 ἐδας γενόμενος ἀφαιρεθῇ. καρτερείν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ἄλλων παίδων ἑλπίζει οἷς ἐτὶ ἡλικία τέκνωσιν πουείσθαι: ἱδίᾳ τε γὰρ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων λήθη οἱ ἐπιμνημόμενοι τισιν ἐσονται, καὶ τῇ πόλει διεχόθη, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐρημοῦσθαι καὶ ἀσφαλεία, ξυνοίσει οὐ γὰρ οἶον τε ἢ ἰς τῇ δίκαιον βουλευόμεθα οὐ ἀν μὴ καὶ παίδας ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου παραβάλλόμενοι
κινδυνεύονσιν. ὅσοι δὲ αὖ παρηβήκατε, τόν τε πλέονα κέρδος οὐν ἡτυχεῖτε βίον ἠγείσθε καὶ τόνδε βραχὺν ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τῇ τῶνδε εὐκλείᾳ κοψίζεσθε. τὸ γὰρ φιλότιμοι ἀγήρων μόνων, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄχρειφ τῆς ἡλικίας τὸ κερδαῖνειν, ὡςπερ τινὲς φασί, μᾶλλον τέρπει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι.

XLV. "Παισί δὲ αὖ ὅσοι τῶνδε πάρεστε ἢ ἀδελφοίς ὁρῶ μέγαν τὸν ἁγώνα (τὸν γὰρ οὐκ ὄντα ἀπας εἰσθεν ἐπαίνειν), καὶ μόλις ἀν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς οὐχ ὁμοίοι, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγοι χείρους

1 No one could be a member of the Boule or Senate till he was thirty, when he was almost certain to be married; and, according to Deinarchus (§ 71), no man was allowed to speak in the Assembly until he had legitimate male issue (Zimmern).
2 e.g Simonides. cf. Plut. Moral. 786 b: ἠμωρίδηκε ἢλεγχ
πρὸς τοὺς ἑγκαλοῦντας αὕτη φιλαργυρίαν, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἀπε-
die in. It will be difficult, I know, to persuade you of the truth of this, when you will constantly be reminded of your loss by seeing others in the enjoyment of blessings in which you too once took delight; and grief, I know, is felt, not for the want of the good things which a man has never known, but for what is taken away from him after he has once become accustomed to it. But those of you who are still of an age to have offspring should bear up in the hope of other children; for not only to many of you individually will the children that are born hereafter be a cause of forgetfulness of those who are gone, but the state also will reap a double advantage—it will not be left desolate and it will be secure. For they cannot possibly offer fair and impartial counsel who, having no children to hazard, do not have an equal part in the risk. But as for you who have passed your prime, count as gain the greater portion of your life during which you were fortunate and remember that the remainder will be short; and be comforted by the fair fame of these your sons. For the love of honour alone is untouched by age, and when one comes to the ineffectual period of life it is not 'gain' as some say, that gives the greater satisfaction, but honour.

XLV. "But for such of you here present as are sons and brothers of these men, I see the greatness of the conflict that awaits you—for the dead are always praised—and even were you to attain to surpassing virtue, hardly would you be judged, I will not say

στερημένοι διὰ τὸ γῆρας ἡδωνὺς ὥπε μᾶς ἔτι γεροβοσκεῖται, τῆς ἀνὸς τῶν κερδαίων, Simonides replied to those who charged him with love of money, that, deprived by old age of other pleasures, he is still comforted by one, that of gain."
κριθείτε. φθόνος γὰρ τοὺς ξῶσε πρὸς τὸ ἀντι-παλον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐμποδῶν ἀναταγωνιστῷ εὐνοίᾳ τετίμηται.

2 "Εἰ δὲ μὲ δεὶ καὶ γυναικείας τι ἄρετής, ὀσαι νῦν ἐν χρησίᾳ ἑσονται, μην ἐπὶ, βραχείᾳ παραινέσει ἀπαν σημανῶ. τῆς τε γὰρ ὑπαρχοῦσης φύσεως μὴ χείροσι γενέσθαι ὕμων μεγάλη ἡ δόξα καὶ ἢς ἂν ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἄρετής πέρι ἡ ψόγον ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεις κλέος ἡ.

XLVI. "Εἰρήται καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγοι κατὰ τὸν νόμον ὅσα εἰχον πρόσφορα, καὶ ἐργῷ οἱ θαπτο-μένου τὰ μὲν ἡδὴ κεκόσμηται, τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν τοὺς παίδας τὸ ἀπό τούδε δημοσία ἡ πόλις μέχρι ἡδὴς θρέψει, ὦφελιμον στέφανον τοῖς δὲ καὶ τοῖς λειτουργοῖς τῶν τοιώνυμον ἀγώνων προτιθείσα; ἀθλα γὰρ οἷς κεῖται ἄρετής μέγιστα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ 2 ἄνδρες ἀριστοὶ πολιτεύονσιν. νῦν δὲ ἀπολο-φυράμενοι δυν προσήκει ἐκάστῳ ἄπιτε."

XLVII. Τοιόσοδε μὲν ἐν τῷ τάφῳ ἐγέρετο ἐν τῷ χειμώνι τούτῳ καὶ διελθόντος αὐτῶν πρῶτον 2 ἔτος τοῦ πολέμου τούτου ἐτελεύτα. τοῦ δὲ βεροῦσ εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου Πελοποννήσοι καὶ οἱ ξύμαχοι τὰ δύο μέρη ἄσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν (ὁγεῖτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξίδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς), καὶ καθέ.
3 ξόμενοι ἐδόμεν τῆν γῆν. καὶ ἀντων αὐτῶν οὐ

1 πρὸς τὸ ἀντίπαλον, the reading of ABFM[G]: τῶν ἀντι-παλον CE. Hude reads τῶν ἀντίπαλον, after Croiset.
their equals, but even a little inferior. For there is envy of the living on account of rivalry, but that which has been removed from our path is honoured with a good-will that knows no antagonism.

"If I am to speak also of womanly virtues, referring to those of you who will henceforth be in widowhood, I will sum up all in a brief admonition: Great is your glory if you fall not below the standard which nature has set for your sex, and great also is hers of whom there is least talk among men whether in praise or in blame.

XLVI. "I have now spoken, in obedience to the law, such words as I had that were fitting, and those whom we are burying have already in part also received their tribute in our deeds; besides, the state will henceforth maintain their children at the public expense until they grow to manhood, thus offering both to the dead and to their survivors a crown of substantial worth as their prize in such contests. For where the prizes offered for virtue are greatest, there are found the best citizens. And now, when you have made due lament, each for his own dead, depart."

XLVII. Such were the funeral ceremonies that took place during this winter, the close of which brought the first year of this war to an end. At the very beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and establishing themselves proceeded to ravage the country. And before they had been many days in

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1 i.e. the honours shown them throughout the rest of the ceremony, described in ch. xxxiv, as contrasted with the words of the eulogist. 2 cf. ch. x. 2.
πολλάς πω ἡμέρας ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἡ νόσος πρῶτον ἦρξατο γενέσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, λεγόμενον μὲν καὶ πρότερον πολλαχόσε ἐγενέτεσθη ψαι καὶ περὶ Ἀγάμου καὶ ἐν ἀλλοις χωρίοις, οὐ μεντοῦ τοσούτος γε λοιμὸς οὔδέ φθορά οὔτως ἀνθρώπων σύνδεμοι ἐμνημονεύετο γενέσθαι. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατροὶ ἢρκουν τὸ πρῶτον θεραπεύοντες ἁγνοία, ἄλλοι αὐτοῖ μάλιστα ἔθνηκον ὦσο καὶ μάλιστα προσήγασαν, οὔτε ἄλλη ἀνθρωπείᾳ τέχνῃ οοδεμίᾳ ὡσα τὰ πρὸς ἱεροῖς ἱκέτευσαν ἡ μαντείας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἔχρησαντο, πάντα ἀνωφελῆ ἕνεκεν τελευτώτες τα ἄνωτάν ἀπέστησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ νικωμενοι.

XLVIII. ἦρξατο δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡς λέγεται, ἐξ Αἰθιοπίας τῆς ὑπὲρ Ἀγάμου, ἐπείτη δὲ καὶ ἐξ Ἀγάμου καὶ Διός κατέβη καὶ ἐς τὴν βασιλείας ἡν τὴν πολιν. ἐς δὲ τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν ἐξαπεισίως ἐνέπεσεν, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἦργατο τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὡστε καὶ ἔλεχθη ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὡς οἱ Πελοποννησιαίοι φύρμακα ἐσβεβλήκουσαν ὡς τὰ φρέατα: κρήναι γὰρ ὕσπο ἦσαν αὐτοθι. ὑστερον δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλιν ἀφίκετο καὶ ἔθνηκον πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐδη. λεγέτω μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἐκαστὸς γνωρίσκει καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ ἰδιώτης ἢ τοῦ εἰκὸς ἢ ἦν γενέσθαι αὐτὸ, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἀστινας νομίζει τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς ἕκαστος εἶναι ὡς ἐγὼ δὲ οἶνον τε ἐγίγνητο λέξω καὶ ἄφ ὁ ὁν ἀν τις σκοπῶν, εἰ ποτὲ καὶ αὐθής ἐπιπέσοι.

1 ἢν: Hude deletes.
2 δίνων ἐς τὸ μεταφέρει σχέδιο, in the MSS. after εἰσα, deleted by Genner; Hude deletes ἐκαστὸς εἰσα and ἐς τὸ μεταφέρει, with F. Mueller.
Attica the plague\(^1\) began for the first time to show itself among the Athenians. It is said, indeed, to have broken out before in many places, both in Lemnos and elsewhere, though no pestilence of such extent nor any scourge so destructive of human lives is on record anywhere. For neither were physicians able to cope with the disease, since they at first had to treat it without knowing its nature, the mortality among them being greatest because they were most exposed to it, nor did any other human art avail. And the supplications made at sanctuaries, or appeals to oracles and the like, were all futile, and at last men desisted from them, overcome by the calamity.

XLVIII. The disease began, it is said, in Ethiopia beyond Egypt, and then descended into Egypt and Libya and spread over the greater part of the King's territory. Then it suddenly fell upon the city of Athens, and attacked first the inhabitants of the Peiræus, so that the people there even said that the Peloponnesians had put poison in their cisterns; for there were as yet no public fountains there. But afterwards it reached the upper city also, and from that time the mortality became much greater. Now any one, whether physician or layman, may, each according to his personal opinion, speak about its probable origin and state the causes which, in his view, were sufficient to have produced so great a departure from normal conditions; but I shall describe its actual course, explaining the symptoms, from the study of which a person should be best able,

\(^1\) It is perhaps impossible to identify the plague of Athens with any known disease. Grote describes it as an eruptive typhoid fever. It has perhaps more symptoms in common with typhus than with any other disease.
μάλιστ' ἂν ἔχοι τι προειδῶσι μὴ ἀγροσεῖν, ταῦτα δηλῶσοι αὐτός τε νοσήσῃς καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλοις πασχοντας.

XLIX. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτος, ὥς ὀμολογεῖτο ἐκ πάντων, μάλιστα δὴ ἐκεῖνο ἀνοσον ἐστὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθενείας ἑτύχχανεν δι' ἐλεύθερον καὶ προύκαμινε.

2 τι, ἐς τούτῳ πάντα ἀπεκρίθη. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀπ' ωδεμάς προφάσεως, ἀλλ' ἐξαιρεῖσθαι ἄντεις πρῶτον μὲν τής κεφαλῆς θέρμαι ἵσχυρα καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθήματα καὶ φλόγωσις ἑλάμβανε, καὶ τὰ ἑντὸς, ή τε φάρυξ καὶ ἡ γλώσσα, εὐθὺς αἰματωδῆς ἦν καὶ πνεύμα ἄτοπον καὶ δυσῶδες.

3 ἤφει: ἔπειτα ἔξ ἀυτῶν πταρμῶς καὶ βράγχως ἐπεγρίφτο, καὶ ἐν οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατέβαινεν ἐς τὰ στήθη ὁ πόνος μετὰ βηθώς ἵσχυρον· καὶ ὅπως ἔστη τὴν καρδίαν στηρίζειεν, ἀνέστρεφε τε αὐτὴν καὶ ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πάσαι δοσαι ὑπὸ ἱατρῶν.

4 ἀνομασμέναι εἰσὶν ἐπήσαν· καὶ αὐταὶ μετὰ ταλαιπωρίας μεγάλης, λύγξ τε τοῖς πλείσσι σεν ἐνέπιπτε κενή σπασμον ἐνδεδούσα ἱσχυρον· τοῖς μὲν μετὰ ταῦτα λωφήσαντα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ πολλῷ ὑπερβολῶν.

5 καὶ τῷ μὲν ἔξωθεν ἀποτήμησον τὸ 1 σώμα ὅπ' ἄγνωσίν μην σωτερον, ἀλλ' ὑπέρμαχον, πελετόν, διακαίρων μικράς καὶ ἐκκενίσει ἐξηπεξηκός: τὰ δὲ ἑντὸς ὕστως ἐκαίετο ὡστε μήτε τῶν πάντων λεπτῶν ἰματίων καὶ σινδόνων τῶν ἐπιβολῶν μὴ ἄλλο τι ἡ γυμνοῦ ἀνέχεσθαι, ἡδοτὰ τε ἄν ἐς ὑδωρ ψυχρόν σφάζα αὐτοὺς ῥίπτειν (καὶ πολλὶ τούτῳ τῶν ἡμελημένων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐδρασάν ἐς φρέατα) τῇ διψῇ ἀπαύστῳ ἐμνεχόμενον· καὶ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ καθεστήκει τὸ τε πλέον καὶ ἑλάσσον πο-

1 Added by Hude.
having knowledge of it beforehand, to recognize it if it should ever break out again. For I had the disease myself and saw others sick of it.

XLIX. That year, as was agreed by all, happened to be unusually free from disease so far as regards the other maladies; but if anyone was already ill of any disease all terminated in this. In other cases from no obvious cause, but suddenly and while in good health, men were seized first with intense heat of the head, and redness and inflammation of the eyes, and the parts inside the mouth, both the throat and the tongue, immediately became blood-red and exhaled an unnatural and fetid breath. In the next stage sneezing and hoarseness came on, and in a short time the disorder descended to the chest, attended by severe coughing. And when it settled in the stomach, that was upset, and vomits of bile of every kind named by physicians ensued, these also attended by great distress; and in most cases ineffectual retching followed producing violent convulsions, which sometimes abated directly, sometimes not until long afterwards. Externally, the body was not so very warm to the touch; it was not pale, but reddish, livid, and breaking out in small blisters and ulcers. But internally it was consumed by such a heat that the patients could not bear to have on them the lightest coverings or linen sheets, but wanted to be quite uncovered and would have liked best to throw themselves into cold water—indeed many of those who were not looked after did throw themselves into cisterns—so tormented were they by thirst which could not be quenched; and it was all the same whether they drank much or little.
καὶ ἡ ἀπορία τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχάζειν καὶ ἡ ἀγνυπνία ἐπέκειτο διὰ παντός. καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὅσον περὶ χρόνον καὶ ἡ νόσος ἀκραίζοι, οὐκ ἐμπαινεῖτο, ἀλλὰ ἀντείχε παρὰ δόξαν τῇ ταλαίπωρίᾳ, ὡστε ἡ διεθέραντο οἱ πλείστοι ἐναταῖοι καὶ ἐβδομαίοι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντὸς καῦματος, ἕτενες τις δυνάμεως, ἢ εἰ διαφύγοις, ἐπικατίστατος τοῦ νοσήματος ἐς τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ ἐλκώσως τε αὐτὴ ἦς χυρᾶς ἐγγυνομένης καὶ διαρροίας ἁμα ἀκράτους ἐπιπιπτούσης οἱ πολλοὶ ὑστερόν διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν διεθέραντο.

καὶ ἔξεζε γὰρ διὰ παντός τοῦ σώματος ἀνωθεν ἀρξάμενον τὸ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ πρῶτον ἱδρωθὲν κακὸν, καὶ εἰ τις ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων περιγένευτο, τῶν ἀκρωτικῶν ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ ἐπεσήμανεν κατήκυπτε γὰρ καὶ ἐς αἴδοια καὶ ἐς ἀκρας κεφαλῆς καὶ πώδας, καὶ πολλοὶ στερισκόμενοι τούτων διεφευγοῦν, εἰς δὲ οἱ καὶ τῶν ὁφθαλμῶν. τοὺς δὲ καὶ λήθη ἐλαβεῖ τὸ παραντικα ἀναστάντας πάνων ὀμοίως καὶ ἣνυόρθων σφᾶς τε αὐτοῦς καὶ τοὺς ἐπειθεῖσθαι.

1. Γενόμενον γὰρ κρείσσον λόγου τὸ εἴδος τῆς νόσου τά τε ἀλλα χαλεπωτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν προσέπιπτεν ἐκάστωρ καὶ ἐν τῶν ἐκδήλωσε μάλιστα ἀλλο τῶν ἐνυπόκοσμων τε ἔτι γὰρ ὀρνης καὶ τετράποδα οὐκ ἂν ἥριστον ἐπεται πολλῶν ἀτάφων γενομένων ἢ οὗ προσήχη ἢ 2 γευσάμενα διεθέραστο. τεκμήριον δὲ τῶν μὲν
They were also beset by restlessness and sleeplessness which never abated. And the body was not wasted while the disease was at its height, but resisted surprisingly the ravages of the disease, so that when the patients died, as most of them did on the seventh or ninth day from the internal heat, they still had some strength left; or, if they passed the crisis, the disease went down into the bowels, producing there a violent ulceration, and at the same time an acute diarrhoea set in, so that in this later stage most of them perished through weakness caused by it. For the malady, starting from the head where it was first seated, passed down until it spread through the whole body, and if one got over the worst, it seized upon the extremities at least and left its marks there; for it attacked the privates and fingers and toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, though some lost their eyes also. In some cases the sufferer was attacked immediately after recovery by loss of memory, which extended to every object alike, so that they failed to recognize either themselves or their friends.

Indeed the character of the disease proved such that it baffles description, the violence of the attack being in each case too great for human nature to endure, while in one way in particular it showed plainly that it was different from any of the familiar diseases: the birds, namely, and the four-footed animals, which usually feed upon human bodies, either would not now come near them, though many lay unburied, or died if they tasted of them. The evidence for this is that birds of this kind became

1 Evidently as the result of gangrene, due to stoppage of circulation. This after-effect of typhus was of common occurrence in the outbreak in the Balkans in 1915.
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τοιούτων ὀρνίθων ἐπίλειψις σαφῆς ἐγένετο, καὶ
οὐχ ἐστὶν ὅτε ἄλλως οὔτε περὶ τοιούτον οὐδέν
οί δὲ κύνες μᾶλλον αἰσθήσει παρεῖχον τοῦ ἀπο-
βαίνοντος διὰ τὸ ξυνδιαίτασθαι.

II. Τὸ μὲν οὖν νόσημα, πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα παρα-
λαμάντα ἀτοπίας, ὡς ἐκάστη ἐτύχακα τι διαφε-
ρότως ἐτέρῳ πρὸς ἐτερον γυνόμενον, τοιοῦτον ἐγά-
πί παν τὴν ἰδέαν. καὶ ἄλλο παρελύπει κατ’
ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον οὐδὲν τῶν εἰσώστον ὅ ἐδὲ καὶ
2 γένοιτο, ἐς τοῦτο ἐτελεύτα. ἐθνησκον δὲ οἱ μὲν
ἀμελεία, οἱ δὲ καὶ πάνυ θεραπευόμενοι. ἐν τε
οὐδὲν κατέστη ἰαμά ὡς εἰστείν ὅ τι χρή προσφέ-
ροτας ὁφελεῖν (τὸ γάρ τοι ξυνενεγκόν ἄλλον
3 τοῦτο ἐβλαπτε), σώμα τε αὐταρκες ὅν οὐδὲν διε-
φάνη πρὸς αὐτὸ ἵσχυς πέρι ἡ ἀσθενείας, ἄλλα
πάντα ξυνηρεῖ καὶ τὰ πάση διαίτη θεραπευόμενα.
4 δεινότατον δὲ παντὸς ἦν τοῦ κακοῦ ἡ τε ἀθυμία,
ὅποτε τις αἰσθητο κάμνων (πρὸς γάρ το ἀνέλ-
πιστον εὐθὺς τραπόμενον τῇ γυνῷ πολλῷ μᾶλ-
λον προεῖντο σφᾶς αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅλῳ ἀντεῖχον), καὶ
ὅτι ἐτέρους ἀφ’ ἐτέρου θεραπεία ἀναπαυμπλάμενοι
ἀσπερ τὰ πρόβατα ἐθνησκον καὶ τὸν πλείστον
5 φθόρον τοῦτο ἐνεποίει. εἴτε γάρ μὴ ἥθελοιν δε-
διότες ἀλλήλοις προσείναι, ἀπόλλυντο ἐρῆμοι,
καὶ οἰκίαι πολλαὶ ἐκενώθησαν ἀπορία τοῦ θερα-
πεύστοντος: εἴτε προσίοιευ, διεφθείροντο, καὶ μά-
noticeably scarce, and they were no longer to be seen either about the bodies or anywhere else; while the dogs gave a still better opportunity to observe what happened, because they live with man.

LI. Such, then, was the general nature of the disease; for I pass over many of the unusual symptoms, since it chanced to affect one man differently as compared with another. And while the plague lasted there were none of the usual complaints, though if any did occur it ended in this. Sometimes death was due to neglect, but sometimes it occurred in spite of careful nursing. And no one remedy was found, I may say, which was sure to bring relief to those applying it—for what helped one man hurt another—and no constitution, as it proved, was of itself sufficient against it, whether as regards physical strength or weakness,¹ but it carried off all without distinction, even those tended with all medical care. And the most dreadful thing about the whole malady was not only the despondency of the victims, when they once became aware that they were sick, for their minds straightway yielded to despair and they gave themselves up for lost instead of resisting, but also the fact that they became infected by nursing one another and died like sheep. And this caused the heaviest mortality; for if, on the one hand, they were restrained by fear from visiting one another, the sick perished uncared for, so that many houses were left empty through lack of anyone to do the nursing; or if, on the other hand, they visited the sick, they perished,

¹ i.e. "no constitution was of itself strong enough to resist or weak enough to escape the attacks" (Jowett).
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λιστα οἱ ἀρετῆς τε μεταποιούμενοι· ἀイスχύνη γὰρ ἠφείδουν σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐστίντες παρὰ τοὺς φίλους, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰς ὀλοφύρσεις τῶν ἀπογιγνομένων τε- λευτῶντες καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι ἥκεκαμυν ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ
6 κακοῦ νικὸμενοι. ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ ὁμοὶ οἱ διαπε- φευγότες τὸν τε θυρήσκοντα καὶ τὸν πονούμενον ἑκτίζοντο διὰ τὸ προειδέναι τε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἦδη ἐν τῷ θαρσαλεῖ εἶναι: διὸς γὰρ τὸν αὐτόν, ὧστε καὶ κτείνειν, οὐκ ἐπελάμβανεν. καὶ ἐμακαρίζοντο τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλλων καὶ αὐτοὶ τῷ παραχρήμα περι- χαρεῖ καὶ ἐς τὸν ἐπείτα χρόνον ἐπίδιος τι εἶχον κούφης μηδ' ἀν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου νοσήματος ποτε ἔτι διαφθαρήναι.

Γ.ΙΙ. Ἐπίσεθε δ' αὐτοῦς μᾶλλον πρὸς τῷ ὑπάρ- χοντι πόνοι καὶ ἡ ἄνυγκομιδὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐς τὸ
2 ἀστυ, καὶ οὐχ ἰδέον τοὺς ἐπελθόντας. οἰκίων
-γὰρ οὐχ ὑπαρχουσῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν καλύβαις πνευματι- δρα ἐτους διαιτωμένων ο θόρος ἐγίγνετο οὐδεὶς
κόσμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ νεκροὶ ἐπὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀποθη-
-σκοντες ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλυπθόντο καὶ
-περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἀπάσας ἤμθητες τοῦ θοδατος
3 ἐπιθυμία, τά τε ἵερα ἐν οῖς ἐσκήνωσαν νεκρῶν
πλέα ἦν, αὐτοῦ ἐναποθησκόντων· ὑπερβιαζο-
-μένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἀνθρώποι, οὐκ ἔχοντες
-δὲ τε γένομεν, ἐς ὁλγορίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν
4 καὶ οἰσίων ἔρωτες· νῦν οἱ πάντες ἐνευταρά-
-χθησαν οἰς ἐχρῶντο πρότεροι περὶ τὰς ταφάς,
especially those who made any pretensions to goodness. For these made it a point of honour to visit their friends without sparing themselves at a time when the very relatives of the dying, overwhelmed by the magnitude of the calamity, were growing weary even of making their lamentations. But still it was more often those who had recovered who had pity for the dying and the sick, because they had learnt what it meant and were themselves by this time confident of immunity; for the disease never attacked the same man a second time, at least not with fatal results. And they were not only congratulated by everybody else, but themselves, in the excess of their joy at the moment, cherished also a fond fancy with regard to the rest of their lives that they would never be carried off by any other disease.

LII. But in addition to the trouble under which they already laboured, the Athenians suffered further hardship owing to the crowding into the city of the people from the country districts; and this affected the new arrivals especially. For since no houses were available for them and they had to live in huts that were stifling in the hot season, they perished in wild disorder. Bodies of dying men lay one upon another, and half-dead people rolled about in the streets and, in their longing for water, near all the fountains. The temples, too, in which they had quartered themselves were full of the corpses of those who had died in them; for the calamity which weighed upon them was so overpowering that men, not knowing what was to become of them, became careless of all law, sacred as well as profane. And the customs which they had hitherto observed regarding burial were all thrown into confusion, and
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ἐθαπτον δὲ ὡς ἐκαστὸς ἐδύνατο. καὶ πολλοὶ ἐσ ἀναίσχυντος θήκας ἐτράπουντο σπάνει τῶν ἐπιτηδείων διὰ τὸ συχνὸς ἤδη προτεθύναι σφίσιν· ἐπὶ πυρᾶς γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας φθάσαντες τοὺς νήσαντας οἱ μὲν ἐπιθέντες τὸν ἑαυτῶν νεκρῶν ὑψήττον, οἱ δὲ καἱομένου ἄλλου ἐπιβαλόντες ἀνωθεν διὰ φέροιεν ἀπήσαν.

LIII. Πρῶτον τε ἡρξε καὶ ἐς τὰλλα τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ πλέον ἀνομίας τὸ νόσημα. ῥὰν γὰρ ἐτόλμα τις ἀ πρότερον ἀπεκρύπτετο μὴ καθ' ἱδονῆν ποιεῖν, ἀγχίστροφον τὴν μεταβολὴν ὀρῶν τῶν τε ευδαιμόνων καὶ αἰφνιδίως θυσικόντων καὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρότερον κεκτημένων, εὐθὺς δὲ τάκεινον 2 ἔχοντων. ὡστε ταχείας τὰς ἐπαυρέσεις καὶ πρὸς τὸ τερπνὸν ἥζουν ποιεῖσθαι, ἐφήμερα τά τε σῷ-3 ματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ὁμοίως ἡγούμενοι. καὶ τὸ μὲν προσταλαιπωρεῖν1 τῷ δόξαντι καλὸν οὐδεὶς προ-θυμος ἦν, ἀδηλον νομίζων εἰ πρὶν ἐπὶ αὐτὸ ἐλθεῖν διαφθαρήσεται, ο τι δὲ ἥδη τε ἥδυ πανταχόθεν τε ἐς αὐτὸ κερδαλέον, τούτο καὶ καλὸν καὶ χρήσιμον 4 κατέστη. θεῶν δὲ φόβος ἡ ἀνθρώπων νόμος οὐ-δεὶς ἀπείργη, τὸ μὲν κρίνοντες ἐν ὁμοίῳ καὶ σέβειν καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρῶν ἐν ἵσῳ ἀπολλυμένους, τῶν δὲ ἀμαρτημάτων οὐδεὶς ἐλπίζων μέχρι τοῦ

1 With CE, the other MSS. προσταλαιπωρεῖν.

1 i.e. they concealed the fact that they were acting after their own pleasure (the μὴ being induced by the negative idea in ἀπεκρύπτετο).
they buried their dead each one as he could. And many resorted to shameless modes of burial because so many members of their households had already died that they lacked the proper funeral materials. Resorting to other people’s pyres, some, anticipating those who had raised them, would put on their own dead and kindle the fire; others would throw the body they were carrying upon one which was already burning and go away.

LIII. In other respects also the plague first introduced into the city a greater lawlessness. For where men hitherto practised concealment, that they were not acting purely after their pleasure,¹ they now showed a more careless daring. They saw how sudden was the change of fortune in the case both of those who were prosperous and suddenly died, and of those who before had nothing but in a moment were in possession of the property of the others. And so they resolved to get out of life the pleasures which could be had speedily and would satisfy their lusts, regarding their bodies and their wealth alike as transitory. And no one was eager to practise self-denial in prospect of what was esteemed honour,² because everyone thought that it was doubtful whether he would live to attain it, but the pleasure of the moment and whatever was in any way conducive to it came to be regarded as at once honourable and expedient. No fear of gods or law of men restrained; for, on the one hand, seeing that all men were perishing alike, they judged that piety and impiety came to the same thing, and, on the other, no one expected that he

¹ Or, reading προστάλαλωρεῖν, “to take trouble about what was esteemed honour.”
δίκην γενέσθαι βίοις ἃν τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀντιδοῦναι, πολὺ δὲ μείξῳ τὴν ἴδῃ κατεψηφισμένην σφόν ἐπικρεμασθῆναι, ἢν πρὶν ἐμπεσέων εἰκὸς εἶναι τοῦ βίου τι ἀπολαύσαι.

LIV. Τοιούτῳ μὲν πᾶθει οἱ Ἄθηναιοί περιπεσόντες ἐπείξοντο, ἀνθρώπων τ' ἐνδον θυσικῶτοιν 2 καὶ γῆς ἐξιο δημομένης. ἐν δὲ τῷ κακῷ οἷα εἰκὸς ἀνεμφόθησαν καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐποιεῖτο, φάσκοντες οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πάλαι ἀδεσθαί "Ἡξεὶ Δωρικὸς πό-3 λεμος καὶ λοιμὸς ἀμ' αὐτῷ." ἐγένετο μὲν οὖν ἐρις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ λοιμὸν ὁφομάσθαι ἐν τῷ ἐπεὶ ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀλλὰ λιμῶν, ἐνίκησε δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἰκότως λοιμὸν ἐρήσθαι οἱ γὰρ ἀνθρω-ποι πρὸς ἄ ἐπασχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιοῦντο. ἴν δὲ γε οἶμαι ποτὲ ἄλλοις πόλεμος καταλάβῃ Δω-ρικὸς τοῦτο ὑστερος καὶ ξυμβῇ γενέσθαι λιμῶν, 4 κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς οὕτως ἄσονται. μνήμη δὲ ἐγένετο καὶ τοῦ Δακεδαιμονίων χρηστηρίου τοῖς εἰδόσιν, ὅτε ἐπερωτώσαν αὐτοὺς τὸν θεὸν εἰ χρῆ πολεμεῖν ἀνείλε κατὰ κράτος πολεμοῦσι νῖκην ἐσεσθαί, καὶ 5 αὐτὸς ἐφὶ ξυλλήψεσθαι. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ χρη- στηρίου τὰ γνησίαμεν ἱκαζόν ὁμοία εἶναι ἐσβε-βληκότων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἡ νόσος ἦρξετο εὐθὺς. καὶ ἐς μὲν Πελοπόννησον οὐκ ἐσήλθεν, ὁ τί καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, ἐπενείματο δὲ 'Αθήνας μὲν

1 cf. 1. cxviii. 3.
would live to be called to account and pay the penalty of his misdeeds. On the contrary, they believed that the penalty already decreed against them, and now hanging over their heads, was a far heavier one, and that before this fell it was only reasonable to get some enjoyment out of life.

LIV. Such then was the calamity that had befallen them by which the Athenians were sore pressed, their people dying within the walls and their land being ravaged without. And in their distress they recalled, as was natural, the following verse which their older men said had long ago been uttered:

"A Dorian war shall come and pestilence with it."

A dispute arose, however, among the people, some contending that the word used in the verse by the ancients was not λοιμός, "pestilence," but λυμός, "famine," and the view prevailed at the time that "pestilence" was the original word; and quite naturally, for men's recollections conformed to their sufferings. But if ever another Dorian war should visit them after the present war and a famine happen to come with it, they would probably, I fancy, recite the verse in that way. Those, too, who were familiar with it, recalled that other oracle given to the Lacedaemonians, when, in answer to their inquiry whether they should go to war, the god responded that if they "warred with all their might victory would be theirs," adding that he himself would assist them.¹ Now so far as the oracle is concerned, they surmised that what was then happening was its fulfilment, for the plague broke out immediately after the Peloponnesians had invaded Attica; and though it did not enter the Peloponnesus to any extent, it devastated Athens most of all, and next
μάλιστα, ἕπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τὰ πολυανθρωπότατα. ταύτα μὲν τὰ κατὰ τὴν νόσον γενόμενα.

LV. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπειδὴ ἔτεμον τὸ πεδίον, παρῆλθον ἐς τὴν Πάραλον γῆν καλουμένην ἡκρι Λαυρείου, οὐ τὰ ἀργύρεια μεταλλὰ ἐστὶν Ἀθηναίοις. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἔτεμον ταύτην ἡ πρὸς Πελοπόννησον ὀρᾶ, ἐπειτὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς

2 Ἐυβοιαν τε καὶ Ἀνδρον τετραμμένην. Περικλῆς δὲ στρατηγὸς ὄν καὶ τότε περὶ μὲν τοῦ μή ἐπεξε- ἔναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην εἰχεν ὦσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐσβολῇ.

LVI. "Ετε 3 δ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ ὄντων, πρὶν ἐς τὴν παραλίαν ἔλθειν, ἐκατὸν νεῶν ἐπίπλουν τῇ Πελοπόννησῳ παρεσκευάζετο, καὶ ἐπειδὴ

2 ἐτοίμα ἦν, ἀνήγετο. ἢ γ' ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν ὀπλίτας Ἀθηναίων τετρακισχίλιους καὶ ἵππας τρικαλα- σίους ἐν ναυσὶν ἰππαγωγοῖς πρῶτον τότε ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν νεῶν ποιηθεῖσας. ξυνεστράτευοντο. δὲ

3 καὶ Χίοι καὶ Λέσβιοι πεντήκοντα ναυσίν. ὅτε δὲ ἀνήγετο ἡ στρατιά αὐτὴ Ἀθηναίων, Πελοπο- νήσιοι κατέληπον τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὄντας ἐν τῇ

4 παραλία. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον τῆς Πελο- ποννήσου ἔτεμον τῆς γῆς τὴν πολλήν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν προσβαλότες ἐς ἐπίδα μὲν ἠλθον

5 τοῦ ἑλείν, οὐ μέντοι προσωρυσθέν χεὶς. ἀναγαγό- μενοι δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἐπίδαυρου ἔτεμον τῆς τε Τροξη- νίδα γῆν καὶ Ἀλιάδα καὶ Ἐρμιόνίδα. ἐστὶ δὲ ταύτα πάντα ἐπιθαλάσσει τῆς Πελοπόννησου.

6 ἄραντες δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἄφικοντο ἐς Πρασιάς, τῆν
to Athens the places which had the densest population. So much for the history of the plague.

LV. The Peloponnesians, after ravaging the plain, advanced into the district called Paralus as far as Laurium, where are the silver mines of the Athenians. And first they ravaged that part of this district which looked towards the Peloponnesus, and afterwards the part facing Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, who was general, still held to the same policy as during the earlier invasion, insisting that the Athenians should not take the field against them.

LVI. But before they had left the plain and entered the Paralus, Pericles had begun to equip a fleet of a hundred ships to sail against the Peloponnesus, and when all was ready he put to sea. He took with him on the ships four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry in horse-transport, then employed for the first time, which had been made out of the old galleys. The Chians and Lesbians also took part in the expedition with fifty ships. And when this armament of the Athenians put to sea, the Peloponnesians whom they left in Attica were already in the Paralian district. On reaching Epidaurus in the Peloponnesus the Athenians ravaged most of that land; they also attacked the city, but, though they at first had hopes of taking it, they did not succeed. Then, leaving Epidaurus, they went to sea again, and ravaged the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, which are all on the Peloponnesian coast. Sailing next from this region they

1 The plain referred to was that about Athens, while the Paralian district was the sea-coast, or south-eastern part, terminating in the promontory of Sunium.
Λακωνικῆς πόλισμα ἐπιθαλάσσιον, καὶ τῆς τε γῆς ἑτέμου καὶ αυτὸ τὸ πόλισμα εἶλον καὶ ἐπορθησαν. ταῦτα δὲ ποιήσαντες ἔπνεικον ἄνεχώρησαν, τοὺς δὲ Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι κατέλαβον ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὅντας, ἀλλ’ ἀνακεχωρηκότας.

LVII. "Οσον δὲ χρόνου οἱ τε Πελοποννησίου ἰσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι εστράτευον ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν, ἡ νόσος ἐν τῇ στρατίᾳ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐφθειρε καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὡστε καὶ ἐλέχθη τοὺς Πελοποννησίους δεισάντας τὸ νόσημα, ὡς ἐπιυσάνοντο τῶν αὐτομόλων ὅτι ἐν τῇ πόλει εἶναι καὶ θάπτοντας ἀμά ἡσθάνοντο, 2 ὅσσον ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐξελθεῖν. τῇ δὲ ἐσβολῇ ταύτῃ πλείστον τε χρόνου ἐνέμειναι καὶ τὴν γῆν πᾶσαν ἑτέμουν· ἡμέρας ἔρη τεσσαράκοντα μᾶλιστα ἐν τῇ γῇ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἐγένοντο.

LVIII. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους "Ἀγρων ὁ Νικίου καὶ Κλεόπομπος ὁ Κλεινίου, εὐστράτηγοι ὄντες Περικλέους, ἤλαβότες τὴν στρατιὰν ἦπερ ἐκείνος ἐχρήσατο εστράτευσαν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Ἡράκλης καὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἔτι πολιορκομένην, ἀφικόμενοι δὲ μηχανᾶς τε τῇ Ποτείδαιᾳ προσέ—

2 Φερον καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιερώντο ἐλείν. προνοχωρεῖ δὲ αὐτοῦς ὡτὲ ἢ αἰρεῖσι τῆς πόλεως οὕτε τάλλα τῆς παρασκευῆς ἀξῖοις ἐπιγενομένη γὰρ ἡ νόσος ἐνταῦθα δὴ πᾶν ἐπίσει τοὺς Ἀθηναίοις, φθείρουσα τὴν στρατιὰν, ὡστε καὶ τοὺς προτέρους στρατιῶτας νοσῆσαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τῆς ξίνω "Ἀγρων στρατιάς ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ

1 On the expedition against the Peloponnesian coasts, cf. ch. lvi. 2 cf. l. lxiv.
came to Prasiae, a town on the coast of Laconia, where they not only ravaged parts of the country, but also captured the town itself and pillaged it. After they had completed these operations they went back home, where they found that the Peloponnesians were no longer in Attica but had retired.

LVII. During this entire period, while the Peloponnesians were in Attica and the fleet of the Athenians was on the expedition, the plague was making havoc among the Athenians, both in their fleet and in the city. The statement was therefore made that the Peloponnesians left Attica in haste because they were afraid of the disease, since they not only heard from deserters that it was in the city, but also could see them burning their dead. In this invasion, however, they remained in Attica longer than at any other time, and also ravaged the entire country; indeed they were in Attica almost forty days.

LVIII. In the same summer Hagnon son of Nicias and Cleopompus son of Clinias, colleagues of Pericles, taking the armament which he had employed, at once set out on an expedition against the Chalcidians in Thrace and against Potidæa, which was still under siege, and on their arrival they brought siege-engines to bear upon Potidæa, and tried in every way to take it. But no success commensurate with the appointments of the expedition attended their efforts, either in their attempt to capture the city or otherwise; for the plague broke out and sorely distressed the Athenians there, playing such havoc in the army that even the Athenian soldiers of the first expedition, who had hitherto been in good health, caught the infection

3 The 3,000 soldiers of the first expedition; cf. ch. xxxi. 2 and 1. lxi. 4.
χρόνος ἤγαίνοντας. Φορμίων δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐξακόσιοι
3 καὶ χίλιοι οὐκέτι ἦσαν περὶ Χαλκιδέας, ὥς
μὲν οὖν Ἀγγον ἀνεχώρησε ταῖς ναυσίν ἐς τὰς Ἀθῆ-
νας, ἀπὸ τετρακισչιλίων ὀπλιτῶν χιλίους καὶ
πεντήκοντα τῇ νόσῳ ἀπολέσας ἐν τεσσαράκοντα
μάλιστα ἡμέραις; οἱ δὲ πρότεροι στρατιώται
κατὰ χώραν μένουσι ἐπολιόρκοιν τὴν Ποτε-
δαίαν.

LIX. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἑσβολήν τῶν
Πελοποννησίων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἦ τε γῆ αὐτῶν
ἐτέτμητο τὸ δεύτερον καὶ ἡ νόσος ἐπέκειτο ἀμα
2 καὶ ὁ πόλεμος, ἠλλοιοντο τὰς γνώμας, καὶ τὸν
μὲν Περικλέα ἐν αἰτία εἶχον ὡς πείσαντα σφᾶς
πολεμεῖν καὶ δὲ ἐκείνου ταῖς ἔμφοραις περι-
πεπτωκότες, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ὄρ-
μηντο Ἰμυκορεῖν καὶ πρέσβεις τινὰς πέμψαντες
ὡς αὐτοὺς ἀπρακτοὶ ἐγένοντο. πανταχόθεν τε
τῇ γνώμῃ ἄποροι καθεστηκότες ἐνέκειντο τῷ
3 Περικλεὶ. ὃ δὲ ὅρων αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὰ παρόντα
χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ πάντα πασοῦντας ἀπερ αὐτὸς
ἥλπιξε, ξύλλογον ποιήσας (ὅτι δὲ ἐστρατήγησε)
ἔβαλεν ἑλεύθερα καὶ ἰταῖς ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὄργισμον
τῆς γνώμης πρὸς τὸ ἡπιώτερον καὶ ἀδε-
ἐστερον καταστήσει παρελθὼν δὲ ἔλεξε τοιάδε.

LX. "Καὶ προσδεχομένως μοι τὰ τῆς ὀργῆς
μὲν ἐς με γεγένηται (αισθάνομαι γὰρ τὰς αἰτίας)
καὶ ἐκκλησίαν τούτου ἔνεκα ξυνήγαγον, ὅπως
ὕπομνήσω καὶ μέμψωμαι εἰ τι μὴ ὅρθως ἢ ἐμοὶ
360
from Hagnon's troops. Phormio, however, and his sixteen hundred men, were no longer in Chalcidice. Accordingly Hagnon took his fleet back to Athens, having lost by the plague in about forty days one thousand and fifty out of a total of four thousand hoplites; but the soldiers of the former expedition remained where they were and continued the siege of Potidæa.

LIX. After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians the Athenians underwent a change of feeling, now that their land had been ravaged a second time while the plague and the war combined lay heavily upon them. They blamed Pericles for having persuaded them to go to war and held him responsible for the misfortunes which had befallen them, and were eager to come to an agreement with the Lacce- daemonians. They even sent envoys to them, but accomplished nothing. And now, being altogether at their wits' end, they assailed Pericles. And when he saw that they were exasperated by the present situation and were acting exactly as he had himself expected, he called a meeting of the assembly—for he was still general—wishing to reassure them, and by ridding their minds of resentment to bring them to a milder and less timorous mood. So he came forward and spoke as follows:

LX. "I have been expecting these manifestations of your wrath against me, knowing as I do the causes of your anger, and my purpose in calling an assembly was that I might address to you certain reminders, and remonstrate if in any case you are either angry

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1 cf. i. lxiv. 2. Phormio's departure must have occurred before the events described in ch. xxxi. 2, but is nowhere mentioned.
2 χαλεπαίνετε ή ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς εἴκετε. ἕγὼ γὰρ ἐγὼ γὰρ ἴγονον πόλιν πλεῖον ξύμπασαν ὅρθομομένην ὅφεινεῖν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ καθ' έκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν
3 εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἀθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην. καλῶς μὲν γὰρ θεόμενος ἀνήρ τὸ καθ' ἐαυτὸν διαφθειρο-μένης τῆς πατρίδος οὐδὲν ἴσσουν ξυμπόλλυται, κακοτυχῶν δὲ ἐν εὐσμοῦσῃ πολλῷ μᾶλλον
4 διασφάζεται. ὅποτε οὖν πόλις μὲν τὰς ἰδίας ξυμφορὰς οὔτε τε φέρειν, εἰς δὲ ἐκαστὸς τὰς ἐκείνης ἄδυνατος, πῶς οὗ χρῆ πάντας ἁμῶνειν αὐτῇ, καὶ μῆ οὐν ὑμεῖς δρᾶτε, ταῖς καὶ οίκους κακο-πραγίας ἐκπεπληγμένου τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας ἀφίεσθαι, καὶ ἐμὲ τὰ παρανείπατα πολεμεῖν καὶ υμᾶς αὐτούς οὐ̇ς ξυμένωτε δι' αἰτίᾳς ἔχετε.
5 καῖτοι ἐμοὶ τοιοῦτο ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθαι δὴ οὐδενὸς ἴσσουν οἴομαι εἰναι ἵνωναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα, φιλότυλος τε καὶ χρημάτων
6 κρείσσων. ὅ τε γὰρ γυνώς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἰσφι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθης ὁ τε ἔχων ἀμφότερα, τῇ δὲ πόλει δύσσονς, οὐκ ἄν ὁμοίως τι οικεῖως φράξῳ προσόντος δὲ καὶ τούδε, χρήμασι δὲ νικωμένου, τὰ ξύμπαντα τούτου ἐνὸς ἄν πωλοῖτο.
7 ὡστὶ εἴ μοι καὶ μέσως ἥγοομενοι μᾶλλον ἐτέρων προσεῖναι αὐτὰ πολεμεῖν ἐπείσθητε, οὐκ ἄν εἰκότως νῦν τοῦ γε ἄδικεῖν αἰτίαν φεροῦμην.
with me or are giving way to your misfortunes without reason. For in my judgment a state confers a greater benefit upon its private citizens when as a whole commonwealth it is successful, than when it prospers as regards the individual but fails as a community. For even though a man flourishes in his own private affairs, yet if his country goes to ruin he perishes with her all the same; but if he is in evil fortune and his country in good fortune, he is far more likely to come through safely. Since, then, the state may bear the misfortunes of her private citizens but the individual cannot bear hers, surely all men ought to defend her, and not to do as you are now doing—proposing to sacrifice the safety of the commonwealth because you are dismayed by the hardships you suffer at home, and are blaming both me who advised you to make war and yourselves who voted with me for it. And yet I, with whom you are angry, am as competent as any man, I think, both to determine upon the right measures and to expound them, and as good a patriot and superior to the influence of money. For he who determines upon a policy, and fails to lay it clearly before others, is in the same case as if he never had a conception of it; and he who has both gifts, but is disloyal to his country, cannot speak with the same unselfish devotion; and if he have loyalty also, but a loyalty that cannot resist money, then for that alone everything will be on sale. If, therefore, when you allowed me to persuade you to go to war, you believed that I possessed these qualities even in a moderate degree more than other men, it is unreasonable that I should now bear the blame, at any rate, of wrongdoing.
LXI. "Καὶ γὰρ ὁι μὲν αἰρεσίς γεγένηται τάλλα εὐτυχοῦσι, πολλῇ ἄνοιᾳ πολεμήσαι· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἡ εἰξάντας εὐθὺς τοῖς πέλας ὑπακούσαι ἢ κινδυνεύσαντας περιγενέσθαι, ὁ φυγὼν

2 τῶν κινδυνοῦν τοῦ ὑποστάντος μεμπτότερος. καὶ ἔγω μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι· ὑμεῖς δὲ μεταβάλλετε, ἐπειδὴ ξυνέβη ὑμῖν πεισθῆναι μὲν ἀκεραίοις, μεταμέλειν δὲ κακομένοις, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον ἐν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἀσθενεῖ τῆς γνώμης μὴ ὀρθῶν φαίνεσθαι, διὸτι τὸ μὲν λυποῦν ἔχει ἢ ἔτη τῆς αἰσθησιν ἐκάστῳ, τῆς δὲ ὀφελίας ἀπεστίν ἔτι ἡ δήλωσις ἀπασί, καὶ μεταβολῆς μεγάλης, καὶ ταύτης ἐξ ὀλίγου, ἐμπεσοῦσιν ταπεινὴ ὑμῶν

3 ἡ διάνοια ἔγκαρτερεῖν ἢ ἐγνώτε. δουλοὶ γὰρ φρόνημα τὸ αἰφνίδιον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον παραλόγον ξυμβαίνον· ὃ ἦμιν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐχ ἦκιστα καὶ κατὰ τὴν νόσον γεγένηται.

4 ὁμοὶ δὲ πόλεων μεγάλην οἰκουντας καὶ ἐν ἡθεσιν ἀντιπάλους αὐτῇ τεθραμμένους χρεῶν καὶ ξυμφοραῖς ταῖς μεγάστας ἐθέλειν ὑφίστασθαι καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν μὴ ἄφανίζειν (ἐν ὦσο γὰρ οἱ ἀνθρώποι δικαιοῦσι τῆς τε ὑπαρχοῦσης δόξης αἰτίασθαι ὅστις μαλακᾶ ἐλλείπει καὶ τῆς μὴ προσηκούσης μεσίν τὸν θρασύτητι ὄρεγόμενον), ἀπαλγήσαντας

1 Described by Pericles in the Funeral Oration, chs. xxxvii–xlii.
LXI. "For though I admit that going to war is always sheer folly for men who are free to choose, and in general are enjoying good fortune, yet if the necessary choice was either to yield and forthwith submit to their neighbours' dictation, or by accepting the hazard of war to preserve their independence, then those who shrink from the hazard are more blameworthy than those who face it. For my part, I stand where I stood before, and do not recede from my position; but it is you who have changed. For it has happened, now that you are suffering, that you repent of the consent you gave me when you were still unscathed, and in your infirmity of purpose my advice now appears to you wrong. The reason is that each one of you is already sensible of his hardships, whereas the proof of the advantages is still lacking to all, and now that a great reverse has come upon you without any warning, you are too dejected in mind to persevere in your former resolutions. For the spirit is cowed by that which is sudden and unexpected and happens contrary to all calculation; and this is precisely the experience you have had, not only in other matters, but especially as regards the plague. Nevertheless, seeing that you are citizens of a great city and have been reared amid customs which correspond to her greatness, you should willingly endure even the greatest calamities and not mar your good fame. For as all men claim the right to detest him who through presumption tries to grasp a reputation to which he has no title, so they equally claim a right to censure him who through faintheartedness fails to live up to the reputation he already enjoys. You should, rather, put away your grief for private ills
Τὴν δὲ πόνον τὸν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, μὴ γένηται τε πολὺς καὶ οὔδὲν μᾶλλον περιγενέω-μεθα, ἀρκεῖτο μὲν ὑμῖν καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐν οἷς ἄλλωτε πολλάκις γε δὴ ἀπέδειξα οὐκ ὁρθῶς αὐτῶν ὑποπτευόμενον, δηλώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε, ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε οὔτ' αὐτοῖ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθήσαίναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους πέρι ἐς τὴν ἄρχην οὔτ' ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις· οὔθ' ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους

2 ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκός ἑώρων. οἶδες μὲν γὰρ τῶν ξυμμάχων μόνων ἄρχειν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποφαίνω δύο μερῶν τῶν ἐς χρήσιν φανερῶν, γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης, τοῦ ἐτέρου υμᾶς παντὸς κυριώτατος οὖντας, ἐφ' ὃσον τε νῦν νέμεσθε καὶ ἢν ἐπὶ πλέον βουληθήσετε· καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις τῇ ὑπαρχοῦσῃ παρασκευῇ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ πλέοντας ὑμᾶς οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἔθνος τῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κωλύσει.

3 ὅστε οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῶν οἰκιῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς χρείαν, ὥν μεγάλων νομίζετε ἑστερηθῆσαι, αὕτη ἢ δύναμις φαίνεται· οὔθ' εἰκὸς χαλεπῶς φέρειν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ οὗ κηπίον καὶ ἐγκαλλώπισμα πλούτου πρὸς ταύτῃ νομίσαντας διλογορήσαι καὶ γνῶναι ἐλευθερίαν μὲν, ἢν ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι αὐτῆς διασώσωμεν, βαδίως ταῦτα ἀναληψομένην, ἄλλων δὲ

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1 cf. ch. xiii and 1. exl–exlív.
and devote yourselves to the safety of the commonwealth.

LXII. "As to the hardships involved in this war, and your misgivings lest they prove very great and we succumb after all, let those arguments suffice which I have advanced on many other occasions in order to convince you that your fears are groundless. But there is one point I propose to lay before you on which, I think, you have never yourselves as yet reflected, in spite of the advantage it gives you as regards your empire and its greatness, and which I have never previously dealt with in my speeches, and should not have done so now—for it makes a somewhat boastful claim—had I not seen that you are unreasonably dejected. You think that it is only over your allies that your empire extends, but I declare that of two divisions of the world which lie open to man's use, the land and the sea, you hold the absolute mastery over the whole of one, not only to the extent to which you now exercise it, but also to whatever fuller extent you may choose; and there is no one, either the Great King or any nation of those now on the earth, who will block your path as you sail the seas with such a naval armament as you now possess. This power, therefore, is clearly not to be compared with the mere use of your houses and fields, things which you value highly because you have been dispossessed of them; nor is it reasonable that you should fret about them, but you should make light of them, regarding them in comparison with this power as a mere flower-garden or ornament of a wealthy estate, and should recognize that freedom, if we hold fast to it and preserve it, will easily restore these losses, but let
υπακούσας καὶ τὰ προσεκτημένα φιλεῖν ἐλασ- 
σοῦσθαι, τῶν τε πατέρων μὴ χείρως καὶ ἀμφό-
tερα φανῄναι, οἱ μετὰ πόνων καὶ οὐ παρ' ἄλλων 
δεξάμενοι κατέσχον τε καὶ προσέτε διασώσαντες 
παρέδοσαν ύμῖν αὐτά (αἰσχίνον δὲ ἔχοντας ἀφαι-
ρεθῆναι ἡ κτωμένους ἀτυχῆσαι), ἰέναι δὲ τοὺς 
ἐχθροῖς ὀμόσε μὴ φρονήματι μόνοιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
kαταφρονήματι. οὐχίμα μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀμα-
θίας εὐτυχοὺς καὶ δειλῶ τινὶ ἐγγίγνεται, κατα-
φρόνησις δὲ ὡς ἄν καὶ γνώμη πιστεύῃ τῶν ἐναντίων 
περιέχειν, ὡς ἴμων ὑπάρχει. καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ἀπὸ 
τῆς ὀμοίας τύχης ἡ ἐξέσεις ἐκ τοῦ ὑπέρφρονος 
ἐχυρωτέραν παρέχεται, ἐλπίδι τε ἡ σος πιστεύει, 
ἡς ἐν τῷ ἀπόρῳ ἡ ἱσχύς, γνώμη δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπα-
χόντων, ἡς βεβαιώτερα ἡ πρόνοια.

LXIII. "Τῆς τε πόλεως ύμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμω-
μένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ ἀπαντεῖς ἀγάλλεσθε, 
βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους ἡ μηδὲ 
tὰς τιμᾶς διώκειν. μηδὲ νομίσαι περὶ ἐνὸς μόνου, δού-
λειας ἃν τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ, ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
ἄρχης στερῆσεσαι καὶ κινδύνου ὅν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἀπῆ-
χεθείς. ἢς οὖν ἐκστὴν ἐτὶ ύμῖν ἐστίν, εἰ τις 
καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδώς ἀπραγμοσύνη

1 So most editors with Gmc2; all other MSS. προσεκτη-
μένα except M προσκεκτημένα.
men once submit to others and even what has been won in the past has a way of being lessened. You must therefore show yourselves not inferior in either of these two respects to your fathers, who by their own labours, and not by inheritance, not only acquired but also preserved this empire and bequeathed it to you (and it is a greater disgrace to let a possession you have be taken away than it is to attempt to gain one and fail); and you must go to meet your enemies not only with confidence in yourselves, but with contempt for them. For even a coward, if his folly is attended with good luck, may boast, but contempt belongs only to the man who is convinced by his reason that he is superior to his opponents, as is the case with us. And, where fortune is impartial, the result of this feeling of contempt is to render courage more effective through intelligence, that puts its trust not so much in hope, which is strongest in perplexity, as in reason supported by the facts, which gives a surer insight into the future.

LXIII. "You may reasonably be expected, moreover, to support the dignity which the state has attained through empire—a dignity in which you all take pride—and not to avoid its burdens, unless you resign its honours also. Nor must you think that you are fighting for the simple issue of slavery or freedom; on the contrary, loss of empire is also involved and danger from the hatred incurred in your sway. From this empire, however, it is too late for you even to withdraw, if any one at the present crisis, through fear and shrinking from action does indeed

1 Or, reading τὰ προσεκτημένα, "freedom and all that freedom given" (= πρὸς τὴν ἄκακην κεκτημένα, as Poppo explains).
ΤHUCYDIDIES

ἀνδραγαθίζεται· ὁς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἦδη ἔχετε αὐτὴν, ὗν λαβέων μὲν ἀδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι 3 δὲ ἐπικινδύνου, τάχιστ' ἂν τε πόλεις οἱ τοιούτοι ἑτέρους τε πείσαντες ἀπολέσειαν καὶ εἰ που ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν αὐτὸν μοι οἰκήσιαν τὸ γὰρ ἀπραγ- μομὲνον ὁμοί γέζεται μὴ μετά τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγ- 

LXIV. "Τμεῖς δὲ μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν τοιουτῶν πολι- 

tῶν παράγεσθε μήτε ἔμε δι' ὡργῆς ἔχετε, ὁ καὶ 

αὐτὸι ξυνιδείγνωτε πολεμεῖν, εἰ καὶ ἐπελθοῦντες οἱ 

ἐναντίοι ἐδρασάν ἀπερ εἰκὸς ἡ μὴ ἑθελοσάντων 

ὑμῶν ὑπακούειν, ἐπιγεγένηται τε πέρα ὑπὸ προσ-

εδεχόμεθα ἡ νόσος ἤδε, πράγμα μόνον δὴ τῶν 

πάντων ἐλπίδος κρείσσων γεγενημένων. καὶ δι' 

αὐτὴν οἴον ὅτι μέρος τι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ μικρόμενοι, οὐ 

δικαίωσι, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὅταν παρὰ λόγον τι εὗ πράξητε 

2 ἐμοὶ ἀναθίσετε. φέρειν δὲ χρή τὰ τε δαιμόνια 

ἀναγκαῖός τὰ τοῦ ἄπο τῶν πολεμίων ἀνδρείων 

ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἔθει τῇ τῇ πόλει πρότερον τε ἦν 

3 νῦν τε μὴ ἐν ὑμῖν κωλυθῇ. γνώτε δὲ ὅνομα μέγι-

στον αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν ἐν ἀπασιν ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὸ 

ταῖς ξυμφορᾶς μὴ εἴκειν, πλείστα δὲ σώματα καὶ 

πόνους ἀνηλωκέναι πολέμω, καὶ δύναμιν μεγίστην 

δὴ μέχρι τοὐδε ἐκτημένην, ἢς ἐς αἴδιον τοῖς ἐπὶ-

1 Dobree deletes, followed by Hude.
seek thus to play the honest man; for by this time the empire you hold is a tyranny, which it may seem wrong to have assumed, but which certainly it is dangerous to let go. Men like these would soon ruin a state, either here, if they should win others to their views, or if they should settle in some other land and have an independent state all to themselves; for men of peace are not safe unless flanked by men of action; nor is it expedient in an imperial state, but only in a vassal state, to seek safety by submission.

LXIV. "Do not be led astray by such citizens as these, nor persist in your anger with me,—for you yourselves voted for the war the same as I—just because the enemy has come and done exactly what he was certain to do the moment you refused to hearken to his demands, even though, beyond all our expectations, this plague has fallen upon us—the only thing which has happened that has transcended our foresight. I am well aware that your displeasure with me has been aggravated by the plague; but there is no justice in that, unless you mean to give me also the credit whenever any unexpected good fortune falls to your lot. But the right course is to bear with resignation the afflictions sent by heaven and with fortitude the hardships that come from the enemy; for such has been the practice of this city in the past, and let it find no impediment in yourselves. And realize that Athens has a mighty name among all mankind because she has never yielded to misfortunes, but more freely than any other city has lavished lives and labours upon war, and that she possesses to-day a power which is the greatest that ever existed down to our time. The memory of
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γιγνομένους, ἂν καὶ νῦν ὑπενδώμεν ποτε (πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι), μνήμη καταλείπεται, ἔλληνων τε ὁτι Ἐλλήνων πλείστων δὴ ἦρξαμεν καὶ πολέμως μεγίστοις ἀντέχομεν πρὸς τε ξύμπαντας καὶ καθ' ἐκάστους, πόλιν τε τοὺς πάσιν εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μεγίστην φοίησαμεν. καὶ τοι ταῦτα ὁ μὲν ἀπράγμων μέμψαι ἄν, ὁ δὲ δράν τι καὶ αὐτὸς βουλόμενος ξηλώσει· εἰ δὲ τις μὴ κέκτηται, φθονήσει. τὸ δὲ μισεῖσθαι καὶ λυπηροῦς εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι πάσι μὲν ὑπήρξε δὴ ὅσοι ἔτεροι ἐτέρων ἤξιωσαν ἀρχεῖν· ὅστις δὲ ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τὸ ἐπίφθονοι λαμβάνει, ὄρθως βουλεύεται. μᾶς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντέχει, ἢ δὲ παραντικά τε λαμπρότης καὶ ἐς τὸ ἐπειτα δόξα αἰείμνηστος καταλείπεται. ὑμεῖς δὲ ἐς το τὸ μέλλον καλὸν προγνώτες ἐς τὸ τὸ αὐτίκα μὴ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἦδη προθύμω ἀμφότερα κτήσασθε, καὶ Δακεδαίμονίοις μήτε ἐπικηρυκεύσεις μήτε ἐυνήλατο ἐστε τοὺς παροῦσι πόνους βαρυνόμενοι, ὡς οὕτως πρὸς τὰς ξυμφορὰς γυνώμη μὲν ἦκιστα λυποῦνται, ἔργῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἀντέχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ πόλεως καὶ ἰδιωτῶν κράτιστοι εἰσίν."

LXV. Τοιαῦτα ὁ Περικλῆς λέγον ἐπειράτο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῇς τέες ἂν αὐτόν ὀργής παραλύσω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντος δεινῶν ἀπάγεω τὴν γυνώ-2 μὴν. οἱ δὲ δημοσία μὲν τοὺς λογοὺς ἀνεπείδουν καὶ οὕτε πρὸς τοὺς Δακεδαίμονίοις ἔτι ἐπεμπότο ἐς τὸ τῶν πόλειον μᾶλλον ὀφειλότο, ἰδιαὶ δὲ
this greatness, even should we now at last give way a little—for it is the nature of all things to decay as well as to grow—will be left to posterity forever, how that we of all Hellenes held sway over the greatest number of Hellenes, in the greatest wars held out against our foes whether united or single, and inhabited a city that was the richest in all things and the greatest. These things the man who shrinks from action may indeed disparage, but he who, like ourselves, wishes to accomplish something will make them the goal of his endeavour, while every man who does not possess them will be envious. To be hated and obnoxious for the moment has always been the lot of those who have aspired to rule over others; but he who, aiming at the highest ends, accepts the odium, is well advised. For hatred does not last long, but the splendour of the moment and the after-glory are left in everlasting remembrance. Do you, then, providently resolving that yours shall be honour in ages to come and no dishonour in the present, achieve both by prompt and zealous effort. Make no overtures to the Lacedaemonians and do not let them know that you are burdened by your present afflictions; for those who in the face of calamities show least distress of spirit and in action make most vigorous resistance, these are the strongest, whether they be states or individuals."

LXV. By such words Pericles endeavoured to cure the Athenians of their anger toward him, and to divert their minds from their present ills. And as regards public affairs they were won over by his arguments, sending no further envoys to the Lacedaemonians, and were more zealous for the war; but
τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐλυποῦντο, ὁ μὲν δῆμος ὅτι ἀπ’ ἐλασσόνων ὀρμώμενος ἐστέρητο καὶ τούτων, οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίας τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες, τὸ δὲ μεγιστοῦ, πόλεμον ἀντ’ εἰρήνης ἔχοντες, οὐ μέντοι πρῶτον γε ὁι ξύμπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὄργῃ ἔχοντες αὐτῶν πρὶν εξιμίωσαν χρήμασιν. ὕστερον δ’ αὐθεὶς οὐ πολλῷ, ὁπερ φιλεῖ ὁμιλοὶ ποιεῖν, στρατηγὸν ἐνέλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν, ὅποι μὲν περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕκαστος ἥλγεν ἅμβλυτεροι ἢδη ὄντες, ὃν δὲ ἡ ἄγαμεν πόλες προσεδείτο πλείστου ἀξίων νομίζετε. οὐδεὶς εἰναι. ὅσον τε γὰρ χρόνον προέστη τῆς πόλεως ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ μετριῶς ἐξιγγείτο καὶ ἄσφαλῶς διεφύλαξεν αὐτήν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἐπ’ ἐκείνου μεγίστη, ἐπειδὴ τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προχνὸς τὴν δύναμιν.

6 Ἐπεβίω δὲ δύο ἡμέρας καὶ ἔπειδὴ ἀπάθανεν, ἐπὶ πλέον ἔτη ἐγνώσθη ἡ πρόνοια αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐστὶ τῶν πολέμων. ὁ μὲν ἀρχικὸν καινωποῦν τε καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν θεραπεύοντας καὶ ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένον εἰς τῷ πολέμῳ μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἐφ’ ἐπιστρεφθήσεται οὐ δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς πάντας εἰς τοῦντιν ἐπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἕξος τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἰναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδιὰς φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἰδια κέρδη κακῶς ἐς τε σφᾶς αυτοὺς καὶ τοὺς

1 Hude inserts ἐ with Madvig.

1 Eighty talents, according to Diod. xii. xlv.; but according to Plut. Per. xxxv. estimates varied from fifteen to sixty
in private they were distressed by their sufferings; for the commons, having less to start with, had been deprived even of this, while the upper classes had lost their beautiful estates in the country, both buildings and costly furniture, and above all they had war instead of peace. Indeed one and all they did not give over their resentment against him until they had imposed a fine upon him. But not long afterwards, as is the way with the multitude, they chose him again as general and entrusted him with the whole conduct of affairs; for they were now becoming individually less keenly sensible of their private griefs, and as to the needs of the state as a whole they esteemed him invaluable. For so long as he presided over the affairs of the state in time of peace he pursued a moderate policy and kept the city in safety, and it was under him that Athens reached the height of her greatness; and, after the war began, here too he appears to have made a far-sighted estimate of her strength.

Pericles lived two years and six months beyond the beginning of the war; and after his death his foresight as to the war was still more fully recognized. For he had told the Athenians that if they would maintain a defensive policy, attend to their navy, and not seek to extend their sway during the war, or do anything to imperil the existence of the state, they would prove superior. But they not only acted contrary to his advice in all these things, but also in matters that apparently had no connection with the war they were led by private ambition and private greed to adopt policies which proved injurious both talents. The charge was embezzlement, according to Plato, Gorg. 576 a.

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ΤΟ ΖΩΤΟΝ Δ' ἦν ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι μὲν δυνατός ὁ τῷ τῇ ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γρώμῃ χρημάτων τῇ διαφανώς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος κατείχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθερωμένος, καὶ οὐκ ἦγετο μᾶλλον ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὗ προσηκότων τῇ δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονὴν τὴ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐχών ἐπ' ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὅργῃ τῇ αντειπείν. ὅποτε γοῦν αἰσθητῷ τι αὐτοῦ παρὰ καὶ ὑβριθεὶς αρσοῦντας, λέγον κατέπλησσεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὐτὸ ἀλλόγως ἀντικαθίστην πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. ἐγένετο τε λόγος μὲν δημοκρατία, ἐργῷ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρῶτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχῆ, οἱ δὲ υπερον ἵσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁντες καὶ ὅτι ἐκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἐτράποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι. ἐξ ὅν ἀλλα τε πολλά, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἔχοντας, ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐν Σικελίαν πλοὺς, δὴ οὐ τοικοῦν γρώμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὐς ἐπήσεαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμφαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς ὀικομένοις ἐπηγγεγονότον, ἀλλ' κατὰ τὰς ἱδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ

1 The reference is especially to the Sicilian expedition; the pernicious results were seen in the Decelean war.

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as to themselves and their allies; for these policies, so long as they were successful, merely brought honour or profit to individual citizens, but when they failed proved detrimental to the state in the conduct of the war.¹ And the reason for this was that Pericles, who owed his influence to his recognized standing and ability, and had proved himself clearly incorruptible in the highest degree, restrained the multitude while respecting their liberties, and led them rather than was led by them, because he did not resort to flattery, seeking power by dishonest means, but was able on the strength of his high reputation to oppose them and even provoke their wrath. At any rate, whenever he saw them unwarrantably confident and arrogant, his words would cow them into fear; and, on the other hand, when he saw them unreasonably afraid, he would restore them to confidence again. And so Athens, though in name a democracy, gradually became in fact a government ruled by its foremost citizen. But the successors of Pericles, being more on an equality with one another and yet striving each to be first, were ready to surrender to the people even the conduct of public affairs to suit their whims. And from this, since it happened in a great and imperial state, there resulted many blunders, especially the Sicilian expedition,² which was not so much an error of judgment, when we consider the enemy they went against, as of management; for those who were responsible for it, instead of taking additional measures for the proper support of the first troops which were sent out, gave themselves over to personal intrigues for the sake of

¹ For the history of this expedition, see Books vi and vii.
δήμου προστασίας τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμφιτετραπέζιον καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. σφαλέντες δὲ ἐν 
Σικελία ἀλλη τε παρασκευὴ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τῷ πλέον μορίῳ καὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἤδη ἐν στάσει οὖν ὑπὸ δέκα μὲν ἐτή ἀντείχον τοῖς 
τοῖς πρὸτερον ὑπάρχουσι πολεμίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σικελίας 
μετ’ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἔτι τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀφεστηκόσι, Κύρῳ τε υστερον βασιλέως παιδι 
προσγενομένοι, δὲ παρεῖχε χρήματα Πελοπο 
νησίοις ἐς τὸ ναυτικόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἔνεδοσαν 
ἡ αὐτὸι ἐν 2 ὑφίστην αὐτοῖς κατὰ ταῖς ἰδίαις δια 
φορᾶς περίπεροντες ἐσφάλησαν. τοσοῦτον τῷ 
Περικλεὶ ἐπερισσευσε τοτε αὖ ὁν αὐτῶν προέγγ 
καὶ πάνυ ἃν βαδίως περιγενέσθαι τὴν πόλιν 
Πελοποννησίον αὐτῶν τῷ πολέμῳ.

I. X. VI. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξυμμάχοι 
tοῦ αὐτῶν βέρουσι εστράτευσαν ναυσὶν ἐκατὼν ἐν 
Ζάκυνθῳ τὴν νῆσον, ἡ κεῖται ἀντιπέρας Ἡλιοῦ 
eἰς δὲ Ἀχαιῶν τῶν ἐκ Πελοποννησοῦ ἀποικοι 
2 καὶ Αθηναίων ξυνεμάχουν. ἐπέπλεον δὲ Λακε 
δαιμονίων χίλιοι ὄπλιται καὶ Κυήμος Σπαρτιάτ 
ς ναυαρχὸς. ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐς τὴν τὴν ἐδίωσαν τὰ 
pολλά, καὶ ἐπειδὴ οὐ ξυνεχόρουν, ἀπεπλέουσα 
ἐπ’ ὁικο.

I. X. VII. Καὶ τοῦ αὐτῶν βέρους τελευτῶν 
τῶν Ἀριστείων Κορίνθειοι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις 
Ἀνήριστος καὶ Νικόλαος καὶ Πρατόδαμος καὶ 

1 MSS. read τρία, but Hude follows Hascke in reading δέκα. So also van H., Cl., Stahl, F. Mueller, Croiset, Marchant. ἄκτω is preferred by Shilleto, Aem. Mueller. 
2 Deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.
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gaining the popular leadership and consequently not only conducted the military operations with less rigour, but also brought about, for the first time, civil discord at home. And yet, after they had met with disaster in Sicily, where they lost not only their army but also the greater part of their fleet, and by this time had come to be in a state of sedition at home, they nevertheless held out ten years not only against the enemies they had before, but also against the Sicilians, who were now combined with them, and, besides, against most of their allies, who were now in revolt, and later on, against Cyrus son of the King, who joined the Peloponnesians and furnished them with money for their fleet; and they did not finally succumb until they had in their private quarrels fallen upon one another and been brought to ruin. Such abundant grounds had Pericles at that time for his own forecast that Athens might quite easily have triumphed in this war over the Peloponnesians alone.

LXVI. During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies made an expedition with a hundred ships to the island of Zacynthus, which lies over against Elis. The Zacynthians are colonists of the Achaeans in the Peloponnesus and were in alliance with the Athenians. On board the ships were one thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites, and Cnemus a Spartan was admiral. And making a descent upon the land they ravaged most of it; but as the inhabitants would not come to terms they sailed back home.

LXVII. And at the end of the same summer 432 B.C. Aristeus a Corinthian, three Lacedaemonian envoys, Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodamus, also Timagoras...
Τεγεάτης Τιμαγόρας καὶ Ἀργείος ἤδη Πόλλης, πορεύομενοι ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ὡς βασιλέα, εἰ πως πείσειαν αὐτὸν χρήματα τε παρασχεῖν καὶ ξυμπολέμειν, ἀφικνοῦνται ὡς Σιτάλκην πρῶτον τὸν Τήρεων ἐς Ἐράκην, βουλόμενοι πεῖσαι τε αὐτὸν, εἰ δύναιτο, μεταστάντα τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἐμμαχίας στρατεύσαι ἐπὶ τὴν Πολείδαιαν, οὐ ἢν στρατεύμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων πολιορκοῦν, καὶ ἵπτε ὄρμητο, δὴ ἐκείνου πορευθήναι πέραν τοῦ Ἐλλησπόντου ὡς Φαρνάκην τὸν Φαρναβάζου, δὴ αὐτοὺς ἐμμελεῖν ὡς βασιλέα ἀναπέμψειν. παρατυχόντες δὲ Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις Δεάρχος Καλλιμάχου καὶ Ἀμεινάδης Φιλῆμονος παρὰ τῷ Σιτάλκην πείθοντο τὸν Σάδοκον τὸν γεγενημένον Ἀθηναίον, Σιτάλκου υἱόν, τῶν ἀνδρᾶς ἐγχειρίσατο σφίσιν, ὅπως μὴ διαβαίνεις ὡς βασιλέα τὴν ἐκείνου πόλιν τὸ μέρος βλάψωσιν. ὃ δὲ πείσθεις πορευομένους αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν Θράκην ἐπὶ τὸ πλοῖον ὃ ἐμμελεῖν τὸν Ἐλλησπόντον περαίωσειν, πρὶν ἔσβαινειν ἤμβαλεν, ἄλλους δὴ ξυμπέμψας μετὰ τοῦ Δεάρχου καὶ Ἀμειναίδου, καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἐκείνοις παραδοῦναι, οἱ δὲ λαβόντες ἐκόμισαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίας. ἀφικομένων δὲ αὐτῶν δεῖσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῶν Ἀριστεία μὴ αὖθις σφᾶς ἐπὶ πλεῖον κακουργῆ διαφυγόν, ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τούτων τὰ τῆς Πολείδαιας καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης πάντα ἐφαίνετο πρᾶξας, ἄκριτους καὶ βουλομένους ἐστὶν ἐπὶ εἰπεῖν αὐθημεροῦν ἀπέκτειναν πάντας καὶ ἐς φάραγγα

1 Because Argos was a neutral state; cf. ch. ix. 2.
2 Then satrap of Dascylium; cf. r. xxix. 1.
3 cf. ch. xxix. 5.
of Tegea and Pollis of Argos, the last acting in a private capacity,¹ set out for Asia to the King's court to see if they might persuade him to furnish money and join in the war. On their way they came first to Sitalces son of Teres in Thrace, their desire being to persuade him, if possible, to forsake the Athenian alliance and send a force to relieve Potidæa, where an Athenian army was conducting the siege; and also, in pursuance of their object, with his help to cross the Hellespont to Pharnaces² son of Pharnabazus, who was to escort them up the country to the King. But two Athenian envoys, Learchus son of Callimachus and Ameiniades son of Philemon, who chanced to be visiting Sitalces, urged Sadocus son of Sitalces, who had been made an Athenian citizen,³ to deliver the men into their hands, that they might not cross over to the King and do such injury as might be to his adopted city.⁴ To this Sadocus agreed, and sending some troops to accompany Learchus and Ameiniades, seized them as they journeyed through Thrace before they embarked on the boat by which they were to cross the Hellespont. They were then, in accordance with his orders, delivered to the Athenian envoys, who took them and brought them to Athens. When they arrived, the Athenians, in fear that Aristeus might escape and do them still more harm, because he had evidently been the prime mover in all the earlier intrigues at Potidæa and along the coast of Thrace, put them all to death on that very day without a trial, though they wished to say something in their own defence, and threw their bodies into a

¹ Possibly τὴν ἐκείνου τιθην τὸ μέρος means "a city in a measure his own."
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ἐσέβαλον, δικαίοντες τοὺς αυτοῖς ἀμώνεσθαι ὀίσπερ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπήρξαν, τοὺς ἐμπόρους οὐς ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐν ὀλκάσι περὶ Πελοπόννησον πλέοντας ἀποκτείναντες καὶ ἐσ φαραγγας ἐσβαλόντες, πάντας γὰρ δὴ κατ’ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὁσοὺς λάβοιεν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὡς πολεμίους διέφθειρον, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ξυμπολεμοῦντας καὶ τοὺς µηδὲ µεθ’ ἑτέρων.

LXVIII. Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αυτοὺς χρόνους, τοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος, καὶ Ἀμπρακιότατοι αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων πολλοὺς ἀναστήσαντες ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Ἀργος τὸ Ἀμφιλοχίκον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἀμφιλοχίαν. ἔχθρα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους ἀπὸ τοῦδε αὐτοῖς ἦρξατο πρῶτον γενέσθαι.

Ἀργος τὸ Ἀμφιλοχίκον καὶ Ἀμφιλοχίαν τὴν ἄλλην ἐκτισε μὲν μετὰ τὰ Τρωικὰ οἰκαδε ἀναχωρήσας καὶ ὅπου ἀπεσκόμενος τῷ Ἄργας καταστάσει Ἀμφιλοχὸς ὁ Ἀμφιἄρεως ἐν τῷ Ἀμπρακικῷ κόλπῳ, ὁμώνυμον τῇ αὐτοῦ πατρίδι Ἀργος ὀνομάσας (καὶ Ἦν ἡ πόλις αὐτὴ μεγίστη τῆς Ἀμφιλοχίας καὶ τοὺς δυνατωτάτους ἐσχῆν οἰκή- 

τοράς), ὑπὸ ἐμφορῶν δὲ πολλαῖς γενεαῖς ὑστερον πιέκόμενοι Ἀμπρακιότατος ὅμορους δυτας τῇ Ἀμφιλοχίκῃ ξυναίκους ἐπηγάγοντο, καὶ ἕλληνισθεῖσαν τὴν νῦν γλῶσσαν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀμπρα-

1 Alemaeon, the elder brother of Amphilochus, had slain their mother Eriphyle (cf. ch. cii. 5). The foundation of 382
pit, thinking it justifiable to employ for their own protection the same measures as had in the first instance been used by the Lacedaemonians when they killed and cast into pits the traders of the Athenians and their allies whom they caught on board merchantmen on the coast of the Peloponnesus. For at the beginning of the war all persons whom the Lacedaemonians captured at sea they destroyed as enemies, whether they were fighting on the side of the Athenians or not even taking part on either side.

LXVIII. About the same time, as the summer was ending, the Ambraciots themselves, with many of the barbarians whom they had summoned to their standard, made an expedition against the Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia. And enmity between them and the Argives first began from the following circumstance. Amphilochos son of Amphiaraus, when he returned home after the Trojan war, was dissatisfied with the state of affairs at Argos, and therefore founded Amphilochian Argos on the Ambracian gulf, and occupied the country of Amphilochia, calling the town Argos after the name of his own fatherland. And this city was the largest in Amphilochia and had the wealthiest inhabitants. But many generations later the Amphilochians, under the stress of misfortunes, invited in the Ambraciots, who bordered on Amphilochia, to share the place with them, and these first became Hellenes and adopted their present dialect in consequence of their union with

Amphilochian Argos is ascribed by other authors (Strabo, vii. 326 e; Apollod. iii. 7) to Alemaeon or to his son Amphilochos.
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κιστῶν ἔννοικησάντων οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἀμφίλοχοι
6 βάρβαροι εἰσιν. ἐκβάλλουσιν οὖν τοὺς Ἀργείους
οἱ Ἀμπρακιώται χρόνῳ καὶ αὐτοῖς ἵσχυσι τὴν
7 πόλιν. οἱ δὲ Ἀμφίλοχοι γενομένου τούτου δίδο-
ασιν εὐαυτοὺς Ἀκαρνάσι, καὶ προσπαρακάλεσαν-
tες ἀμφότεροι Ἀθηναίοις, οἱ αὐτοῖς Φορμίωνα
τε στρατηγὸν ἐπεμψαν καὶ ναῦς τριάκοντα,
ἀφικομένου δὴ τοῦ Φορμίωνος αἵροῦσι κατὰ κρά-
tος Ἀργος καὶ τοὺς Ἀμπρακιώτας ἥδραπόδισαν,
κοινῇ τε ὀκίσαν αὐτῷ Ἀμφίλοχοι καὶ Ἀκαρνάνες.
8 μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ ἡ Ξυμαχία πρῶτον ἐγένετο Ἡθ-
9 ναίοις καὶ Ἀκαρνάσιων. οἱ δὲ Ἀμπρακιώται τὴν
μὲν ἐχθραν ἐς τοὺς Ἀργείους ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρα-
pοδισμοῦ σφῶν αὐτῶν πρῶτον ἐποίησαν, ὡστε-
ρον δὲ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τήδει τὴν στρατείαν
ποιοῦσαν ἐαυτῶν τε καὶ Χαόνων καὶ Ἀλλων
τινῶν τῶν πλησιωχόρων βαρβάρων ἐλθόντες δὲ
πρὸς τὸ Ἀργος τῆς μὲν χώρας ἐκράτειν, τὴν δὲ
πόλιν ὡς οὐκ ἐδύνατο ἔλειν προσβάλοντες,
ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ’ οἰκού καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ ἐθν.
tοσαυτά μὲν ἐν τῷ βέρει ἐγένετο.

LXIX. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγενομένου χειμῶνος Ἡθ-
nαίοι ναύς ἐστελλαν εἰκοσὶ μὲν περὶ Πελο-
πόνθησον καὶ Φορμίωνα στρατηγὸν, δι’ ὀρμώ-
μενος ἐκ Ναυ-
pάκτου φυλακῆν εἰχὲ μὴ ἐκπλεῖν ἐκ Ἀργο-
ὑπέρ τοῦ Κρίσανυον κάλπον μηδένα μὴ ἐκπλεῖν,
έτερας δὲ ἐξ ἐκ Κάριας καὶ Λυκίας καὶ Μελί-
σανδρον στρατηγὸν, ὅπως ταύτα τε ἀργυρολογῶσι
καὶ τὸ ληστικὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων μὴ ἔσοι
αὐτὸδεν ὀρμώμενον βλάπτειν τῶν πλοίων τῶν
ὁλκάδων τῶν ἀπὸ Φασίλιδος καὶ Φωικῆς καὶ

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the Ambraciots; but the rest of the Amphiloichians are still barbarians. Now in course of time the Ambraciots expelled the Argives and themselves seized the city. But the Amphiloichians, when this happened, placed themselves under the protection of the Acarnanians, and together they called in the Athenians, who sent to them Phormio as general with thirty ships. On the arrival of Phormio they took Argos by storm and reduced the Ambraciots to slavery, and Amphiloichians and Acarnanians settled there together. It was after this that the alliance between the Athenians and the Acarnanians was first established. The Ambraciots first conceived their enmity toward the Argives from this enslavement of their own countrymen; and afterwards in the course of the war they made this expedition, which consisted, besides themselves, of Chaonians and some of the other barbarian tribes of the neighbourhood. And when they came to Argos, although they dominated the country, they were unable to take the city by assault; they therefore went home and the several tribes disbanded. Such were the events of the summer.

LXIX. During the ensuing winter the Athenians sent twenty ships round the Peloponnesus under the command of Phormio, who, making Naupactus his base, kept watch there, so that no one might sail either out of Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf or in; and six other ships were sent to Caria and Lycia, under Melesander as general, to collect arrears of tribute in these places and to prevent the Peloponnesian privateers from establishing a base in these regions and molesting the merchantmen sailing from Phaselis and Phoenicia and the mainland in that
2 τής ἐκείθεν ἥπειρον. ἀναβάς δὲ στρατιάς Ἀθηναίων τε τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς τὴν Δυκίαν ὁ Μελήσανδρος ἀποδιήγησε καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς μέρους τε διέφθειρε νικηθείς μάχη.

LXX. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος ὁ Ποτειδαῖς ἐπειδὴ οὐκέτι ἐδύνατο πολιορκούμενοι ἀντέχειν, ἀλλ’ αἱ τε ἐσβολαὶ ἐς τὴν Ἄττικὴν Πελοποννήσιων οὑδὲν μάλλον ἀπανίστασαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὁ τε σῖτος ἐπεδελοῖτε, καὶ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἐπεγεγένητο αὐτὸθε ἡδ θρόσεως περὶ ἀναγκαίας καὶ τινές καὶ ἄλληλον ἐγέχειν, οὐτω δὴ λόγους προσφέρουσι περὶ ξυμβάσεως τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς ἐπὶ σφίζει τεταγμένους, Ἐνοφόντει τε τῷ Εὐριπίδου καὶ Ἐστιοδώρῳ τῷ Ἀριστοκλέειδο καὶ Φανομάχῳ τῷ Καλλιμάχῳ.

2 οἱ δὲ προσεδέξαντες, ὄροντες μὲν τῆς στρατιᾶς τῆς ταλαιπωρίας ἐν χωρίῳ χειμερινῷ, ἀνηλοκούιας δὲ ἡδῆ τῆς πόλεως δισχέλια ταλαντα ἐς τὴν 3 πολιορκίαι. ἐπὶ τούσδε οὐν ξυνέβησαν, ἔξελθεν αὐτοῦς καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐπικούρους ξυν ἐν ιματίῳ, γυναικῶς δὲ ξυν δυνοῦν, καὶ 4 ἀργυρίον τι θητον έξοντας ἐφόδιον. καὶ οἱ μὲν ύπόσπονδοι ἐξῆλθον ἐς τε τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν καὶ ἦ ἐκαστὸς ἐδύνατο Ἀθηναίοι δὲ τοὺς τε στρατηγοὺς ἐπηρίασαν ὅτε ἀνευ αὐτῶν ξυνέβησαν (ἐνόμιζον γὰρ ἄν κρατήσαι τῆς πόλεως ἦ ἐβούλοντο), καὶ ύστερον ἐποίκους ἐπεμψαν εὐαυτῶν ἐς 5 τὴν Ποτείδαιαν καὶ κατῴκισαν. ταύτα μὲν ἐν τῷ
quarter. But Melesander, going inland into Lycia with a force of Athenians from the ships and of allied troops, was defeated in battle and slain, losing a number of his troops.

LXX. During the same winter the Potidaeans found themselves no longer able to endure the siege; and the raids which the Peloponnesians made into Attica did not cause the Athenians to raise the siege any more than before. Their grain had given out, and in addition to many other things which by this time had befallen them in their efforts to get bare subsistence some had even eaten their fellows. In this extremity they made proposals for a capitulation to the Athenian generals who were in charge of the operations against them, namely Xenophon son of Euripides, Hestiodorus son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus son of Callimachus. And the generals accepted their proposals, seeing the distress which the army was suffering in an exposed place, and taking into consideration that Athens had already spent two thousand talents on the siege. So a capitulation was made on the following terms, that the Potidaeans, with their children and wives and the mercenary troops, were to leave the city with one garment apiece—the women, however, with two—retaining a fixed sum of money for the journey. So they left Potidaea under a truce and went into Chalcidice or wherever each was able to go. The Athenians, however, blamed the generals for granting terms without consulting them—for they thought they could have become masters of the place on their own terms; and afterwards sent settlers of their own into Potidaea and colonized it. These things

1 cf. I. lviii. 1.  2 £400,000, $1,944,000.  3 cf. I. lx. 1.
χειμώνι ἐγένετο, καὶ δεύτερον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ Ἐοφυκίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

LXXI. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπιγγυμνομένου θέρους οἱ Πελο-

πονήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔσταν μὲν τὴν Ἀττικὴν

οὐκ ἑσέβαλον, ἑστάτευσαν δὲ ἐπὶ Πλάταιαν

ήγειτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξίδαμος, Λακεδαι-

μόνιοι βασιλεῦσης καὶ καθίσας τὸν στρατὸν ἐμελλε

ὁρώσειν τὴν ἡμέραν οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς εὐθὺς προσβείτες

πέμψαντες παρ᾽ αὐτῷ ἔλεγον τοιάδε:

2 "Ἀρχίδαμε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὓς δικαίως

ποιεῖτε οὐδὲ ἄξια οὗτε ὑμῶν οὗτε πατέρων ὑμῶν ἐστε, ἐστὶν τὴν Πλαταιῶν στρατεύσεις. Παυ-

σαίας γὰρ ὁ Κλεομβρότου, Λακεδαιμόνιος, ἔλευ-

θερώσας τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀπὸ τῶν Μῆδων μετὰ

Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἑθελοντῶν ἤμασθαι τὸν κίν-

δυνὸν τῆς μάχης ἢ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, θύσαι ἔν

ty Πλαταιῶν ἁγοραί ἱερὰ Δίω ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ

ξυγκαλέσας πάντας τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀπειθεῖ ρ Πλαταιῶς ὑπὸ καὶ πόλιν τὴν σφετέραν ἔχοντας

ἀυτοῦ καὶ οἰκείω, στρατεύσατε τε μηδένα ποτὲ

ἄδικως ἐπὶ αὐτοὺς μηδὲ ἔπληκτος: εἰ δὲ μή,

ἀμύνειν τοὺς παρόντας ξυμμάχους κατὰ δύναμιν.

3 τάδε μὲν ἡμῖν πατέρες οἱ υμετέροι ἔδοσαν ἀρετῆς

ἐνεκε καὶ προθυμίας τῆς ἐν ἑκείνους τοῖς κινοῦ-

νοις γενομένης, ἡμεῖς δὲ τὰν αὐτὰ δράτε μετὰ

γὰρ Θηβαίων τῶν ἡμῶν ἐχθρίστων ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῇ

4 ἡμετέρα ἤκτεν, μάρτυρας δὲ θεοῦ τοὺς τε

ορκίους τούς γενομένους ποιομένους καὶ τοὺς υμε-

τέρους πατρίσίους καὶ ἡμετέρους ἐγχώριους, λέ

γομεν ὑμῶν ἡμῶν τὴν Πλαταιῶδα μὴ ἄδικεὶν μηδὲ

1 τὸ δεύτερον in the MSS.; τὸ deleted by Poppo.
happened in the winter, and so ended the second year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

LXXI. In the ensuing summer the Peloponnesians and their allies did not invade Attica, but made an expedition against Plataea. Their leader was Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and when he had encamped his army he was about to ravage the land; but the Plataeans straightway sent envoys to him, who spoke as follows:

"Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, you are acting unjustly, and in a manner unworthy either of yourselves or of the fathers from whom you are sprung, when you invade the territory of the Plataeans. For Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedaemonian, when he had freed Hellas from the Persians, together with such of the Hellenes as chose to share the danger of the battle¹ that took place in our territory, offered sacrifice in the market-place of the Plataeans to Zeus Eleutherius, and calling together all the allies restored to the Plataeans their land and city to hold and inhabit in independence, and no one was ever to march against them unjustly or for their enslavement; but in that case the allies then present were to defend them with all their might. These privileges your fathers granted to us on account of the valour and zeal we displayed amid those dangers, but you do the very contrary; for with the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, you are come to enslave us. But calling to witness the gods in whose names we then swore and the gods of your fathers and of our country, we say to you, wrong not the land of Plataea nor violate your oaths, but suffer

¹ The battle of Plataea, 479 B.C.
παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρκους, ἑαυτὸν ἰοικεῖν αὐτονόμους καθάπερ Παυσανίας ἑδικαίωσεν.”

LXXII. Τοσαῦτα εἶπόντων τῶν Πλαταίων Ἀρχιδαμος ὑπολαβὼν εἶπεν:

“Δίκαια λέγετε, ὃ ἄνδρες Πλαταιῶς, ἡν ποιήτε ὀμοία τοῖς λόγοις. καθάπερ γὰρ Παυσανίας ὑμῶν παρέδωκεν, αὐτοὶ τε αὐτονομείσθε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνελευθεροῦτε ὃσοι μετασχόντες τῶν τότε κινδύνων ὑμῶν τε ξυνώμοσαν καὶ εἰσὶ νῦν ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίως, παρασκευὴ δὲ τοσίδε καὶ πόλεμος γεγένηται αὐτῶν ἔνεκα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑλευθερώσεως. ὡς μάλιστα μὲν μετασχόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμμείνατε τοὺς ὅρκους· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀπερ καὶ πρότερον ἡ σφοινικαλεσάμεθα, ἥν τι χώραν ἀγατε νεμόμενο τὰ ύμετέρα αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐστε μηδὲ μεθ’ ἑτέρων, δέχεσθε δὲ ἀμφότεροις φίλους, ἐπὶ πολέμῳ δὲ μηδέτερους, καὶ τάδε ἡμῖν ἀρκέσει.”

2 'Ο μὲν Ἀρχιδαμος τοσαῦτα εἶπεν· οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῶν πρέσβεις ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα ἐσῆλθον ἐς τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῷ πλῆθει τὰ ῥηθέντα κοινωσαντες ἀπεκρίναντο αὐτῷ ὅτι ἀδύνατα σφίσιν εἰς ποιεῖν ἀ προκαλεῖται ἄνευ Ἀθηναίως (παίδες γὰρ σφῶν καὶ γυναῖκες παρ’ ἐκείνους εἰς), δεδιναὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῇ πάσῃ πόλει μὴ κεῖνον ἀποχωρισαντῶν Ἀθηναίωι ἐλθόντες σφίσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρέπωσιν, ἡ Θηβαίωι, ὡς ἐνορκοὶ ὄντες κατὰ τὸ ἀμφότερος δέχεσθαι, αὕτως σφῶν τὴν πόλιν

3 πειράσωσι καταλαβεῖν. ὁ δὲ θαρσύνων αὐτῶν πρὸς ταῦτα ἔφη:

“Τμεῖς δὲ πόλιν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας ἡμῖν παράδοτε

1 Omitted by Hude, with Lex. Vindob.
us to live independent, according as Pausanias granted that to us as our right."

LXXII. When the Plataeans had so spoken, Archidamus answered and said:

"What you say is just, men of Plataea, if what you do is consistent with your words. For according as Pausanias bestowed that privilege upon you, so do you assert your own independence and help us to set free the others also who, having shared in the dangers of that time, swore the same oaths with you, and are now in subjection to the Athenians; for it is to recover their freedom and that of the rest that these great preparations for war have been made. Therein you should take part, if possible, and yourselves abide by the oaths; otherwise keep quiet, as we have already proposed, continuing to enjoy your own possessions; take part with neither side, receive both sides as friends but for hostile purposes neither. And this will be satisfactory to us."

Thus spoke Archidamus; and the Plataean envoys, on hearing him, went into the city, and after reporting to the people what had been said, answered him, that it was impossible for them to do what he proposed without the consent of the Athenians—for their children and wives were in Athens1—adding that they feared for the very existence of the state; for after the departure of the Lacedaemonians the Athenians would come and veto the plan, or else the Thebans, claiming that they were included in the stipulations about receiving both sides, would try again to seize their city. But he, endeavouring to reassure them with regard to these matters, said:

"You need only consign the city and your houses

1 cf. ch. vi. 4.
τοῖς Ἀλκεδαιμονίοις καὶ γῆς ὀροὺς ἀποδείξατε καὶ δένδρα ἀριθμῷ τὰ ύμέτερα καὶ ἄλλο εἰ τι δυνατόν ἐς ἀριθμὸν ἔλθειν: αὐτοὶ δὲ μεταχωρή-σατε ὅποι βούλεσθε, ἐώς ἃν ὁ πόλεμος ἢ ἐπειδὰν δὲ παρέλθῃ, ἀποδώσομεν ὑμῖν ἢ ἃν παραλά-βωμεν. μέχρι δὲ τούτῳ ἐξομεν παρακαταθήκην, ἐργαζόμενοι καὶ φορὰν φέρουτε ἢ ἃν ὑμῖν μέλλῃ ἰκανῇ ἔσεσθαι.

LXXIII. Οἱ δ' ἀκούσαντες ἐσῆλθον αὕτης ἐς τὴν πόλιν, καὶ βουλευσάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους ἐλεξαν ὅτι βούλονται ἀ προκαλεῖται Ἀθηναίοις κοινόσαπ πρῶτον καὶ, ἂν πείθωσιν αὐτούσ, ποιεῖν ταύτα: μέχρι δὲ τούτου σπείσασθαι σφίσιν ἐκε-λευν καὶ τὴν γῆν μὴ δηνων. ὃ δὲ ἡμέρας τε ἐσπείσατο ἐν αἰς εἰκός ἢ κοιμισθηκαί καὶ τὴν γῆν

2 οὐκ ἔτεμνεν. ἐλθόντες δὲ οἱ Πλαταιησ πρέσβεις ὡς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ βουλευσάμενοι μετ' αὐ-

τῶν πάλιν ἠλθον ἀπαγγέλλοντες τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει

3 τοιῶδε: "Οὔτ' ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνῳ, ὁ ἄνδρες 

Πλαταιης, ἥπ' οὗ ξύμμαχοι εγενόμεθα, Ἄθηναιοι 

φασίν ἐν οὐδενὶ υμᾶς προέσθαι ἀδικουμένους οὔτε 

νῦν περιψεσθαι, βοηθήσειν δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν. 

ἐπισκήπτουσί τε υμῖν πρὸς τῶν ὅρκων ὅσι οἱ 

πατέρες ὁμοσαν μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν περὶ τὴν 

ξυμμαχίαν."

LXXIV. Τοιαῦτα τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπαγγελάν-

των οἱ Πλαταιης ἐβούλευσαντο Ἀθηναίοις μὴ 

προδίδοναι, ἀλλ' ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ γῆν τεμνομένην, 

ei die, ὀρῶντας καὶ ἄλλο πάσχοντας ὃ τι ἄν
to us, the Lacedaemonians, pointing out to us the boundaries of your land and telling us the number of your trees and whatever else can be numbered; then as for yourselves migrate to whatever place you please, remaining there while the war lasts; but as soon as the war is over we will give back to you whatever we have received; until then we will hold it all in trust, working the land and paying you whatever rent will satisfy you.”

LXXIII. With this answer the Plataean envoys went again into the city, and after they had conferred with the people replied that they wished first to communicate his proposals to the Athenians, and if they could gain their consent would do what he proposed; but meanwhile they requested him to grant them a truce and not to ravage the land. And so he made a truce for the number of days within which their representatives could be expected to go and return, and did not lay waste their land. But the Plataean envoys went to the Athenians and after consulting with them returned with the following message to the people at home: “The Athenians assure you, Plataeans, that as in times past, since you became their allies,1 they have never on any occasion deserted you when you were being wronged, so now they will not suffer you to be wronged, but will assist you with all their might. They therefore adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to break off the alliance.”

LXXIV. When the envoys reported this answer, the Plataeans determined not to betray the Athenians, but to endure even to see their lands laid waste, if need be, and to suffer whatever else might happen;

1 About 520 B.C. cf. III. lxviii. 5.
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ξυμβαίνη· ἐξελθεῖν τε μηδένα ἐτι, ἀλλ' ἀπό τοῦ τείχους ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι ἀδύνατα σφίσι ποιεῖν
2 ἡστὶν ἄ Δακεδαιμόνιοι προκαλοῦνται. ὡς δὲ ἀπεκρίναντο, ἐντεύθεν δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐς ἐπιμαρ-
τυρίαν καὶ θεῶν καὶ ἱρών τῶν ἐγχωρίων Ἀρχί-
3 δαμος δ' βασιλεὺς κατέστη λέγον ὅδε: "Θεοὶ
ὁσοι γὰρ τὴν Πλαταιῶδα ἔχετε καὶ ἥρως, ξυnc-
ίστορεῖς ἦστε ὅτι οὔτε τὴν ἀρχήν ἄδικως, ἐκλυπό-
των δὲ τῶν ἄρματος τὸ ξυνώμοτον, ἕπλ γῆν
τῆριδο ἥλθομεν, ἐν ἦ ποινᾶς ἢμῶν ἐφάμενοι
μὴν Μήδων έκρατήσαν καὶ παρέσχετε αὐτὴν
εὖμενὴ ἐναγωνίσασθαι τοῖς "Ελλησιν, οὔτε νῦν,
ἡν τι ποιῶμεν, ἄδικησιν μὲν προκαλέσαμενοι γὰρ
πολλὰ καὶ εἴκοτα οὐ τυγχάνομεν. ξυγγνώμονες
δὲ ἦστε τῆς μὲν ἄδικιας κολάζεσθαι τοῖς ὕπαρ-
χουσί προτέροις, τῆς δὲ τιμωρίας τυγχάνειν τοῖς
ἐπιφέρουσι νομίμως."

LXXV. Τοσάττα ἐπιθειάσας καθίστη ἐς πόλε-
μον τῶν στρατῶν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν περιεσταύρω-
σαν αὐτοὺς τοῖς δένδρεσιν ἄ ἐκοψαν, τοῦ μηδένα
ἐπεξεῖναι, ἐπειτὰ χῶμα ἔχουν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν,
ἐλπίζοντες ταχίστην τὴν' αἴρεσιν ἐσεθαί αὐ-
2 τῶν στρατεύματος τοσοῦτον ἐργαζομένου. ξύλα
μὲν οὖν τέμνοντες ἐκ τοῦ Κιθαιρώνος παρφικοδο-
μουν ἐκατέρωθεν, φορμῆδον ἄντι τού χωμαν τιθέντες,
ὅπως μὴ διαχέωτο ἐπὶ πολὺ τὸ χῶμα. ἐφόρουν

1 Added by Classen.
further, that no one should thereafter leave the city, but that the answer should be given from the walls that they found it impossible to do what the Lacedaemonians proposed. And when they had made answer, thereupon king Archidamus first stood forth calling the gods and heroes of the country to witness in the following words: "Ye gods and heroes who protect the land of Plataea, be our witnesses that we did no wrong in the beginning, but only after the Plataeans first abandoned the oath we all swore did we come against this land, where our fathers, invoking you in their prayers, conquered the Persians, and which you made auspicious for the Hellenes to fight in, and that now also, if we take any measures, we shall be guilty of no wrong; for though we have made them many reasonable proposals we have failed. Grant therefore your consent, that those be punished for the wrong who first began it, and that those obtain their revenge who are seeking to exact it lawfully."

LXXV. After this appeal to the gods he began hostilities. In the first place the Lacedaemonians, using the trees which they had cut down, built a stockade round Plataea, that in future no one might leave the place; then they began raising a mound against the town, hoping that with so large an army at work this would be the speediest way of taking it. So they cut timber on Cithaeron and built a structure alongside the mound on either side of it, laying the logs like lattice-work to form a sort of wall, that the mound might not spread too much. Then they

1 A frame was made like lattice-work or mat-work, the timbers crossing each other at right angles (###).
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δε ὑλην ἐς αὐτὸ καὶ λιθοὺς καὶ γῆν καὶ εἰ τὶ ἄλλο
3 ἀνύτειν μέλλων ἐπιβαλλόμενον. ἡμέρας δὲ ἔχουν ἐβδομήκορτα καὶ νύκτας ξυνεχῶς, διηρημένοι κατ’ ἀναπώλας, ὡστε τοὺς μὲν φέρειν, τοὺς δὲ ὑπνον τε καὶ σίτον αἱρεῖσθαι. Δακεδαιμονίων τε οἱ ἕσεναγολ ἐκάστης πόλεως ξυνεπεστῶτες.\\n4 ἡνάγκαζον ἐς τὸ ἔργον. οἱ δὲ Πλαταιής ὀρὸντες τὸ χῶμα αἱρόμενον, ξύλων τεῖχος ξυνθέετε καὶ ἐπιστήσαντες τῷ ἐαυτῶν τείχει ἤ προσέχοντο, ἐσφυκοῦμον ἐς αὐτὸ πλῆθος ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς οἰ-
5 κιών καθαρώντες. ξύνδεσμος δ’ ἦν αὐτοῖς τὰ ξύλα, τοῦ μὴ υψηλὸν γιγρόμενον ἀσθενεῖ εἶναι τὸ οἰκοδόμημα, καὶ προκαλύμματα εἰς ἐρέσεις καὶ διφθέρας, ὡστε τοὺς ἐργαζόμενους καὶ τὰ ξύλα μίτῃ πυρόφοις οὐστοὶς βάλλεσθαι ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ
6 τε εἰναι. ἦρετο δὲ τὸ υψός τοῦ τείχους μέγα, καὶ τὸ χῶμα οὐ σχολαίτερον ἀντανήθη αὐτῷ. καὶ οἱ Πλαταιής τοιῶν τε ἐπινοοῦσιν διελόντες τοῦ τείχους ἤ προσέπιπτε τὸ χῶμα ἑσεφόρουν τὴν

LXXVI. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐν ταρσοίς καλάμων πηλὸν ἐνδελουτες ἐσέβαλλον ἐς τὸ διηρήμενον, ὅπως μὴ διαχεόμενον ὄσπερ ή τῇ
2 φοροῦτο. οἱ δὲ ταύτῃ ἀποκλημένοι τούτῳ μεν ἐπέσχον, ὑπόνομον δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὁρύζαντες καὶ ξυνεπεκμηράμενοι ύπὸ τὸ χῶμα υφεῖλκον αὐθις παρὰ σφᾶς τὸν χοῦν καὶ ἐλανθανον ἐπὶ πολὺ

1 With ABEFM and Suid. Hude reads, with CG, οἱ ἕσεναγολ καὶ ἐκάστης πόλεως <οἱ> ἐφεστῶτες.
brought and threw into the space wood and stones and earth and anything else which when thrown on would serve to build up the mound. And for seventy days and nights continuously they kept on raising the mound, divided into relays, so that while some were carrying others might take sleep and food; and the Lacedaemonian commanders of auxiliaries together with the officers in charge of the contingents from the several cities kept them at their task. But the Plataeans, seeing the mound rising, put together a framework of wood which they set on top of their own wall at the point where the mound was being constructed, and inside this frame they put bricks which they took from the neighbouring houses. The timbers served to hold the bricks together, preventing the structure from becoming weak as it attained height, and they were protected by coverings of skins and hides, so that the workmen and woodwork might be safe and shielded from incendiary arrows. The wall was mounting to a great height, and the opposing mound was rising with equal speed, when the Plataeans thought of a new expedient. They made an opening in that part of the city wall where the mound came into contact with it, and began to draw the earth in.

LXXVI. But the Peloponnesians became aware of this, and threw into the breach clay packed in reedmats that it might not filter through like the loose earth and be carried away. But the besieged, thwarted in this direction, gave up that plan and dug a mine from the town, and, guessing when they had got beneath the mound, once more began to draw away the earth to their side, this time from underneath; and for a long time they worked
τούς ἔξω, ὡστε ἐπιβάλλοντας ἦσσουν ἀνύτειν ὑπαγομένου αὐτοῦ κατώθεν τοῦ χώματος καὶ ἰξάνων· τοις αἰεὶ ἐπί τὸ κερούμενον. δεδιότες δὲ μὴ οὐδ' οὔτω δύνωνται ὄλγοι πρὸς πολλοὺς ἀντέχειν, προσεπεξήνυρον τόδε τὸ μὲν μέγα οἰκοδόμημα ἑπαύσαντο ἑργαζόμενοι τὸ κατὰ τὸ χώμα, ἐνθεν δὲ καὶ ἐνθεν αὐτοῦ ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ βραχέους τείχους ἐκ τοῦ ἐντὸς μηροειδές ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐσφ- κοδόμουν, ὅπως, εἰ τὸ μέγα τείχος ἀλήκοιτο, τούτ' ἀντέχοι, καὶ δέοι τοὺς ἐναντίονς αὐθις πρὸς αὐτὸ χοῦν, καὶ προχρονώντας ἐσω διπλάσιον τε πόλον ἔχειν καὶ ἐν ἀμφιβολῷ μάλλον γίγνεσθαι. ἀμα δὲ τῇ χώσει καὶ μηχανάς προσήγον οἱ Πελο- ποννησίοι τῇ πόλει, μίαν μὲν ἡ τοῦ μεγάλου οἰκο- δομήματος κατὰ τὸ χώμα προσαχθείσα ἐπὶ μέγα τε κατέσεισε καὶ τοὺς Πλαταιαῖς ἐφόβησεν, ἄλλασ δὲ ἀλλῃ τοῦ τείχους, ἃς βρόχους τε περιβάλλον- τες ἀνέκλων οἱ Πλαταιής, καὶ δοκούς μεγάλας ἀρτίσαντες ἀλύσεια μακραὶ σιδηραὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τομῆς ἐκατέρωθεν ἀπὸ κεραίων δύο ἐπικεκλιμένων καὶ ὑπερτεινουσῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τείχους ἀνεκλύσαν- τες ἐγκαρσίας, ὅποτε προσπεσείσθαί πη μέλλοι ἡ μηχανή, ἀφίεσαν τὴν δοκοὺς χαλαρὰς ταῖς ἀλύ- σει καὶ οὐ διὰ χειρὸς ἑχοντες, ἡ δὲ ρύμη ἐμπι- πτοῦσα ἀπεκαύλιξε τὸ προῦχον τῆς ἐμβολῆς.

LXXVII. Μετὰ δὲ τούτο οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ὡς αἳ τε μηχαναὶ οὐδὲν ὡφέλουν καὶ τῷ χώματι
unnoticed by those outside, so that in spite of what they heaped on these made less progress, because their mound, as it was sapped from below, constantly kept settling down into the hollow space. But fearing that even so they would not be able to hold out, few as they were against a multitude, they devised this further expedient: they stopped working on the high structure opposite the mound, and starting at the low part of the wall on either side of it they began building a crescent-shaped rampart on the inward or city side of it, in order that, if the high wall should be taken, this might offer resistance; the enemy would thus have to raise a second mound to oppose the new rampart, and as they advanced and came inside the crescent they would not only have their labour twice over, but would also be more exposed to attack on both sides. But the Peloponnesians, while going on with their mound, also brought up engines against the city: one was moved forward over the mound, and shook down a great part of the high structure, terrifying the Plataeans, while others were brought to bear at different parts of the wall. But the Plataeans threw nooses over these and pulled them up. They also suspended great beams by long iron chains attached at either end to two poles which rested on the wall and extended over it; then they hauled up the beams at right angles to the battering-ram and when it was about to strike anywhere let go the beam by allowing the chains to run slack and not keeping hold of them; whereupon the beam would fall with a rush and break off the head of the battering-ram.

LXXVII. After this, the Peloponnesians, seeing that their engines were doing no good and that the

1 i.e. parallel to the wall.
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τὸ ἀντιτείχισμα ἐγίνετο, νομίζοντες ἀπορον εἰ

ναι ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἑλεῖν τὴν πόλιν

2 πρὸς τὴν περιτείχισιν παρεσκευάζοντο. πρῶτο-

ρον δὲ πυρὶ ἐδοξεῖν αὐτοὶς πειράσαι εἰ δύναντο

πνεύματος γενομένου ἐπιφλέξαι τὴν πόλιν οὕσαι

αὐ μεγάλην πάσαν γὰρ ὑπὸ ἰδέαιν ἐπενῶν, εἰ πως

σφίζων ἀνευ δαπάνης καὶ πολυορκίας προσαχθεῖν.

3 φοροῦντες δὲ ὕλης φακέλους παρέβαλον ἀπὸ

τοῦ χώματος εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ πρῶτον τοῦ τείχους

καὶ τῆς προσχώσεως, ταχὺ δὲ πλήρους γενομένου

dia πολυχειρίαν ἐπιπαρένησαν καὶ τῆς ἀλλης πό-

λεως ὅσον ἐδύναντο ἀπὸ τοῦ μεταφόρου πλείστον

ἐπισχεῖν, ἐμβαλόντες δὲ πῦρ ἔνν θείῳ καὶ πύσῃ

4 ἦσαν τὴν ὕλην. καὶ ἐγένετο φλόγξ τοσαύτη ὅσην

οὐδεὶς πῶς ἐς ἑκεῖνον τῶν χρώνων χειροποιήτου

eidein. ἤδη γὰρ ἐν ὅρεσιν ὑλὴ τριφθείσα ὑπὶ ἀνέ-

μων πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου πῦρ καὶ φλόγα

5 ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀνήκεν. τοῦτο δὲ μέγα τε ἦν καὶ τοὺς

Πλαταιαίς τάλλα διαφυγόντας ἐλαχίστου ἐδέχεται

diaφθείραν· ἐντὸς γὰρ πολλοῖς χωρίου τῆς πόλεως

οὐκ ἦν πελάσαι, πνεῦμα τε εἰ ἐπεγένετο αὐτῇ

ἐπίφορον, ὀπερ καὶ ἥλπιξον οἱ ἐναντίοι, οὐκ ἂν

6 διέφυγον. νῦν δὲ καὶ τόδε λέγεται ξυμβῆναι,

δύωρ πολὺ καὶ βροντάς γενομένας σβέσαι τὴν

φλόγα καὶ οὕτως παυσθῆναι τὸν κίνδυνον.
counter-wall was keeping pace with the mound, and concluding that it was impracticable without more formidable means of attack to take the city, began to make preparations for throwing a wall about it. But before doing that they decided to try fire, in the hope that, if a wind should spring up, they might be able to set the city on fire, as it was not large; indeed, there was no expedient they did not consider, that they might if possible reduce the city without the expense of a siege. Accordingly they brought faggots of brushwood and threw them down from the mound, first into the space between the wall and the mound; and then, since the space was soon filled up by the multitude of workers, they heaped faggots also as far into the city as they could reach from the height, and finally threw fire together with sulphur and pitch upon the wood and set it afire. And a conflagration arose greater than any one had ever seen up to that time, kindled, I mean, by the hand of man; for in times past in the mountains when dry branches have been rubbed against each other a forest has caught fire spontaneously therefrom and produced a conflagration. And this fire was not only a great one, but also very nearly destroyed the Platacans after they had escaped all earlier perils; for in a large part of the city it was not possible to get near the fire, and if on top of that a breeze had sprung up blowing toward the city, which was precisely what the enemy were hoping for, the Platacans would not have escaped. But as it was, this also is said to have happened—a heavy thunder-shower came on and quenched the flames, and so the danger was checked.
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LXXVIII. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπειδή καὶ τοῦτον διήμαρτον, μέρος μὲν τι καταλιπόντες τοῦ στρατοῦ, τὸ δὲ πλέον ἀφέντες περιετείχησον τὴν πόλιν κύκλῳ διελόμενοι κατὰ πόλεις τὸ χωρίον τάφρος δὲ ἐντὸς τε ἦν καὶ ἠξωθεν ἐξ ḳ’ ἐπιλυθεύ-2 σαντο. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πάν ἐξείργαστο περὶ ἀρκτού-ρου ἐπιτολάς, καταλιπόντες φυλακὰς τοῦ ἡμίσεως τείχους (τὸ δὲ ἦμισιν Βοιωτοὶ ἐφύλασσον) ἀνεχώ-ρησαν τῷ στρατῷ καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

3 Πλαταιὸς δὲ παίδας μὲν καὶ γυναικῶς καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους τε καὶ πλήθος τὸ ἀχρεῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρότερον ἐκκεκομισμένοι ἦσαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναῖας, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ἐγκαταλελείμ-μένοι τετρακόσιοι, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ ὀγδόηκοντα, γυ-4 ναῖκες δὲ δέκα καὶ ἐκατόν σιτοποιοῖ. τοσοῦτοι ἦσαν οἱ ξύμπαντες ὅτε ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν καθι-σταντο, καὶ ἀλλος οὐδεὶς ἦν ἐν τῷ τείχει οὔτε δοῦλος οὔτ' ἔλευθερος. τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ Πλαταιῶν πολιορκία κατεσκευάσθη.

LXXIX. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους καὶ ἀμα τῇ τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἐπιστρατεύσας Ἀθηναῖοι διοικήσας ὀπλιτάς ἐαυτῶν καὶ ἐπιπεῦσα διακοσίοις ἐπιστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης καὶ Βοττιαῖους ἀκμάζοντος τοῦ σῖτον ἐπιστράτηγει δὲ 2 Ξενοφῶν ό Εὐρυπίδου τρότος αὐτός. Ἐλθόντες δὲ ὑπὸ Σπάρτωλον τὴν Βοττικὴν τὸν σῖτον διέθησα-ραν. ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ προσχωρήσειν ἡ πόλις ὑπὸ
LXXVIII. When the Peloponnesians had failed in this attempt also, they dismissed the larger part of their army, leaving only a portion of it, and proceeded to throw a wall around the city, apportioning the space to the several cities; and there were ditches both inside and outside the wall, out of which they had taken the clay for the bricks. And when the wall was entirely finished about the time of the rising of Arcturus,¹ they left a guard to watch one half of the wall (the Thebans guarded the other half), and withdrew the main army, the troops dispersing to their several cities. But the Plataeans had previously had their children and wives, as well as the oldest men and the unserviceable part of the population, removed to Athens, and the men left behind to undergo the siege were only four hundred of their own number and eighty Athenians, besides one hundred and ten women to prepare the food. This was the number all told when the siege began, and there was no one else within the walls, slave or freeman. Such were the conditions under which the siege of the Plataeans was established.

LXXIX. During the same summer, when the corn was in full ear,² while the expedition against Plataea was in progress, the Athenians with two thousand hoplites of their own and two hundred cavalry marched against the Chalcidians in Thrace and the Bottiaeans, under the command of Xenophon son of Euripides and two others. And coming to Spartolus in Bottice they destroyed the grain. It was believed, moreover, that the city would be delivered over to them by a party inside the town which was

¹ About the middle of September.
² In the month of May.
θυκυδίδης

τινών ἐνδοθεν πρασσόντων προπεμψάντων δὲ ἐς Ὀλυμπον τῶν οὗ ταυτὰ βουλομένων ὁπλίται τε ἥλθον καὶ στρατιὰ ἐς φυλακὴν ἂς ἐπεξελθοῦσις ἐκ τῆς Σπαρτῆς ἴσα μάχην καθίσταται οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπ' αὐτὴ τῇ πόλει. καὶ οἱ μὲν ὁπλίται τῶν Χαλκιδῶν καὶ ἐπίκουροι τίνες μετ' αὐτῶν νικῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐς τὴν Σπάρτην, οἱ δὲ ἵππης τῶν Χαλκιδῶν καὶ ψευδὶ νικῶσι τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἵππεας καὶ ψευδῷ.

εἰχον δὲ τινὰς οὐ πολλὰς πελταστὰς ἐκ τῆς Κρουσίδος θής καλουμένης. ἀρτι δὲ τῆς μάχης γεγενημένης ἐπιβοηθοῦσιν ἀλλοι πελτασταί ἐκ τῆς Ὀλυμπον. καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σπαρτῆς ἴπποι ὡς εἶδον, θαρσήσαντες τοὺς τε προσγεγραμμένους καὶ ὡς πρότερον οὐχ ἦσσιντο, ἐπειδῆθεν ταῖς μετά τῶν Χαλκιδῶν ἵππεων καὶ τῶν προσβοηθησάντων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ἀναχωροῦσι πρὸς ταῖς δύο τάξεις ὡς κατέλησαν παρὰ τοὺς σκευο-

φόροις. καὶ ὅπως μὲν ἐπίσειν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐνεδίδοσαν, ἀναχωρούσι δὲ ἐνέκειτο καὶ ἑσκόρτιζον. οἱ τε ἵππης τῶν Χαλκιδῶν προσπιπεύουσις ἐδοκοί ἐσέβαλλον, καὶ οὐχ ἦκα στα τοβάμεντες ἐτρεφαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐπεδίωξαν ἐπὶ τοὺς. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίοι ἐς τὴν Ποσείδιαν καταφευγοῦσι, καὶ ὡςπερον τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποστούντος κομμαμένους ἐς τὰς Ἀθηνας ἀναχωροῦσι τῷ περιόντι τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀπέθανον δὲ αὐτῶν τριάκοντα
negotiating with them; but the opposite faction forestalled this by sending word to Olynthus, and some hoplites and other troops arrived to garrison the place. Now when these made a sally from Sparta, the Athenians were drawn into a battle with them under the very walls of the city, and although the hoplites of the Chalcidians and some mercenaries with them were defeated by the Athenians and retreated into Sparta, the cavalry of the Chalcidians and the light-armed troops defeated the Athenian cavalry and light-troops; for the Athenians had a few targeteers from the land called Crousis, and just after the battle was over another force of targeteers came from Olynthus to the help of the garrison. And when the light-armed troops in Sparta saw them, emboldened by these accessions and because they had not been worsted before, they again, assisted by the Chalcidian cavalry and those who had newly come to their support, attacked the Athenians, who now fell back upon the two companies which they had left with their baggage. And whenever the Athenians advanced, they gave way, but when the Athenians retreated they kept close at their heels, hurling javelins at them. Then the Chalcidian cavalry, riding up, kept charging the Athenians wherever opportunity offered, and throwing them into utter panic routed them and pursued them to a great distance. The Athenians took refuge in Potidaea, and afterwards, having recovered their dead under a truce, returned to Athens with what remained of their army; and they had lost three hundred and thirty

1 This is evidently a remark in explanation of the presence of light-troops with the Athenians, for there had come from Athens only heavy-armed infantry and cavalry; cf. § 1 above.
καὶ τετρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ πάντες. οἱ δὲ Χαλκείδης καὶ Βοττιάιοι τροπαῖοι τε ἐστησαν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀνελόμενοι διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

I.XXX. Τοῦ δ' αυτοῦ θέρους, οὐ πολλῷ ὑστερον τούτων, Ἀμπρακιώται καὶ Χαόνες, θυμόμενοι Ἀκαρνανίαν τὴν πάσαν καταστρέφασθαι καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἀποστῆσαι, πείθουσι Λακεδαιμονίους ναυτικοὺς τοὺς παρασκευάσαι ἐκ τῆς ξυμμαχίδος καὶ ὀπλῆς χιλίων πέμψαι ἐπὶ Ὁμηρον, λέγοντες ὅτι, ἢν ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῶν ἀμαμμεῖας, ἀνυματῶν ὄντων ξυμβοηθεῖν τῶν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης Ἀκαρνανίων ρᾴδιως Ἀκαρνανίαν σχοίνος καὶ τῆς Ζακύνθου καὶ Κεφαλαληνίας κρατήσωσι, καὶ ὁ περὶ πλους ὅπκετε ἐσωτερ Ἀθηναίας ὀμοίως περὶ Πελοπόννησον.

2 ἑλπίδας δ' εἶναι καὶ Ναυπακτον λαβεῖν. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πεισθέντες Κυήμον μὲν ναύαρχον ἐτὶ ὅτα καὶ τοὺς ὀπλῆς ἐπὶ ναυσὶν ὀλίγας ἐκδοῦν πέμποντος, τῷ δὲ ναυτικῷ περιήγειαν παρασκευασμένον ὡς τάχιστα πλεῖν εἰς Λευκάδα.

3 ἦσαν δὲ Κορίνθιοι ξυμπροθυμοῦμενοι μάλιστα τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ἀποκοίμως οὐσιν. καὶ τὸ μὲν ναυτικὸν ἐκ τῷ Κορίνθου καὶ Σικυῶνος καὶ τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦν, τῷ δ' ἐκ Λευκάδος καὶ Ἀνακτορίου καὶ Ἀμπρακίας πρῶτον ἀφικόμενον ἐν Λευκάδι περιέμενεν. Κυήμον δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ χίλιοι ὀπλῆς ἐπειδὴ ἐπεραιώθησαν λαβόντες Φορμίωνα, δὲ ἦρχε τῶν εἰκοσι
men and all their generals. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans set up a trophy, and then, after they had taken up their own dead, dispersed to their several cities.

LXXX. During the same summer, not long after these events, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, wishing to subdue the whole of Acarnania and detach it from Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to fit out a fleet from the countries of the Doric alliance and to send a thousand hoplites against Acarnania, saying that, if they joined forces with them, bringing ships and infantry, it would be an easy matter first to occupy Acarnania since the Acarnians on the seacoast would be unable to aid those inland, and then to make themselves masters of Zacynthus and Cephallenia also: after that the Athenians would no longer be able to sail round the Peloponnesus in the same way as before; and there was a chance of taking Naupactus also. The Lacedaemonians agreed and at once despatched Cnemus, who was still admiral, and the hoplites on a few ships, and sent round orders to the allied fleet to make their preparations and sail as soon as possible to Leucas. And the Corinthians were especially eager to support the enterprise of the Ambraciots, who were colonists of theirs. The contingent of the fleet to come from Corinth and Sicyon and the places in that quarter was still under preparation, but that from Leucas and Anactorium and Ambracia, arriving first, waited at Leucas. As for Cnemus and the thousand hoplites, as soon as they had succeeded in crossing over without being detected by Phormio, who was in command of the

1 i.e. because of the presence of the Peloponnesian fleet along their coast.  
2 cf. ch. lxi. 2.
νεῶν τῶν Ἀττικῶν αἱ περὶ Ναύπακτον ἐφρούρουν, εὔθὺς παρεσκευᾶσθον τῇν κατὰ γῆν 5 στρατείαν, καὶ αὐτῶ παρῆσαν Ἑλλήνων μὲν Ἀμπρακιῶται καὶ Ἀνακτόριοι καὶ Λευκάδιοι καὶ οὗς αὐτῶς ἔχων ἦλθε χίλιοι Πελοποννησίων, βάρβαροι δὲ Χαόνες χίλιοι ἄβασιλευτοί, ὃν ἡγούμενο ἐπετησίῳ προστατεῖα ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους Φώτιος καὶ Νικάνωρ. ξυνεστρατευόντο δὲ μετὰ Χαόνων καὶ Θεσπρωτοί ἄβασιλευτοί.

6 Μολοσσοὺς δὲ ἤγα καὶ Ἀτινώνας Σαβύλινθος ἐπίτροπος ὡν Θάρυπτος τοῦ βασιλέως ἐτὶ παιδῶν ὀντος, καὶ Παραναίων Ὄροιδος βασιλεύων. Ὄρεσται δὲ χίλιοι, ὃν ἔβασιλευεν Ἀντίοχος, μετὰ Παραναίων ξυνεστρατεύσατο Ὄροιδώ Ἀν-

7 τιόχου ἐπιτρέψαντος. ἐπεμψε δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων χίλιοι Μακεδόνων, οἱ 8 ὑστερον ἦλθοι. τοῦτο τῷ στρατῷ ἐπορευέτο Κνῆμος οὐ περιμείνας τὸ ἀπὸ Κορίνθου ναυτικόν, καὶ διὰ τῆς Ἀργείας ἴωντες Διμναίαν, κόμην ἀτείχηστον, ἐπόρθησαν. ἀφικνοῦνται τε ἐπὶ Στράτου, πόλιν μεγίστην τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας, νο-

μίζωντες, εἰ ταύτην πρώτην λάβοιεν, ῥάδιως σφίζοι τάλλα προσχωρήσειν.

LXXXI. Ἀκαρνανίας δὲ αἰσθόμενοι κατὰ τε γῆν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἐσβεβληκυῖαν ἐκ τε θαλάσσης ναυσίν ἀμα τοὺς πολεμίους παρεσο-

μένους, οὔτε ξυνεβοήθουσιν ἐφύλασσον τε τὰ αὐτῶν ἑκαστοί, παρὰ τε Φορμίωνα ἐπεμπὸν κελεύοντες ἀμύνειν· ὃ δὲ ἀδύνατος ἔφη εἶναι ναυτικόν ἐκ Ἐκ "Κορίνθου μέλλουτος ἐκπλεῖν Ναύπακτον ἐρήμην

2 ἀπολιπεῖν. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμα-
twenty Athenian ships that were on guard off Naupactus,¹ they began at once to prepare for the expedition by land. He had with him, of Hellenic troops, some Ambraciots, Anactorians and Leucadians, and the thousand Peloponnesians whom he himself brought; of barbarians, a thousand Chaonians, who, having no king, were led by Photius and Nicanor of the ruling clan who had the annual presidency. With the Chaonian contingent were also some Thesprotians, who likewise have no king. A force of Molossians and Atintanians were led by Sabinthus, the guardian of king Tharyps, who was still a boy, and of Paravaeans by their king, Oroedus. With the Paravaeans were a thousand Orestians whose king, Antiochus, had entrusted them to Oroedus. And Perdiccas also sent, without the knowledge of the Athenians, a thousand Macedonians, who arrived too late. With this army Cnemus set out, not waiting for the fleet from Corinth; and as they passed through the territory of Argos ² they sacked Limnaea, an unwalled village. Finally they arrived at Stratus, the largest city of Acarnania, thinking that if they could take this first, the other places would readily come over to them.

LXXXI. Now when the Acarnanians perceived that a large army had invaded them by land and that the enemy would soon be at hand with a fleet by sea as well, they did not attempt combined resistance, but guarding severally their own possessions they sent to Phormio urging him to aid them. But he said that he could not leave Naupactus unprotected, as a hostile fleet was about to sail from Corinth. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians and their

¹ cf. ch. lxix. 1. ² Amphilochian Argos; cf. ch. lxviii. 1.
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χοι τρία τέλη ποιήσαντες σφών αυτῶν ἐξώρουν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Στρατιῶν πόλιν, ὅπως ἐγγύς στρατοπεδεύσαμενοι, εἰ μὴ λόγῳ πείθοιεν, ἔργῳ πει-

3 ρὼντο τοῦ τείχους. καὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν ἔχοντες προσήκαν Χαόνες καὶ οἱ ἅλλοι βάρβαροι, ἐκ δεξιὰς δ᾿ αὐτῶν Δευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀνακτόριοι καὶ οἱ μετὰ τούτων, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δὲ Κνῆμος καὶ οἱ Πελοποννησιοί καὶ Ἀμπρακίωται· διείχον δὲ πολὺ ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἠστὶν ὅτε οὐδὲ ἔωρωντο.

4 καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἑλληνες τεταγμένοι τε προσήκαν καὶ διὰ φυλακῆς ἔχοντες, ἔως ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἐν ἐπιτηδείω· οἱ δὲ Χαόνες σφίσε τε αὐτοῖς πιστεύουντες καὶ ἄξιοί μενούν ὑπὸ τῶν ἑκείνης ἡπειρωτῶν μαχιμώτατοι εἶναι οὕτε ἐπέσχου τοῦ στρατόπεδου καταλαβεῖν, χωρίσαντες τε ῥύμη μετὰ τῶν ἄλ-

5 λων βαρβάρων ἐνόμισαν αὐτοθείναι ἀν τὴν πόλιν ἔλειν καὶ αὐτῶν τὸ ἔργον γενέσθαι. γνώντες δ᾿ αὐτοὺς οἱ Στράτιοι ἔτι προσιόύντας καὶ ἡγησά-

6 μενούι, μεμονωμένοι εἰ κρατήσειαν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι σφίσε τοὺς Ἑλληνας ὁμοίως προσέλθειν, προλο-

7 χίζουσι δὴ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐνέδρας, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγγύς ἦσαν, ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὁμόσε χωρισάντες 

καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεδρῶν προσπίπτουσιν. καὶ ἔσ-

φόβου καταστάντων διαφθείρονταί τε πολλοὶ τῶν 

Χαόνων, καὶ οἱ ἅλλοι βάρβαροι ὡς εἶδον αὐτοὺς ἐνδόντας, οὐκέτι ὑπέμειναν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς φυγὴν κατέ-

στησαν. τῶν δὲ Ἑλληνικῶν στρατοπέδων οὐδέ-

τερον ἦσθετο τῆς μάχης, διὰ τὸ πολὺ προελθεῖν 

αὐτοὺς καὶ στρατόπεδον οἰηθὴναι καταληψομέ-

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allies, dividing their troops into three divisions, advanced towards the city of the Stratians, their purpose being to encamp near by, and then, if they could not prevail upon them by parleying, to assault the wall. As they advanced, the centre was held by the Chaonians and the other barbarians, while on their right were the Leucadians and Anactorians and those who accompanied them, and on the left Cnemus with his Peloponnesians and the Ambraciot; and the divisions were far apart from each other, sometimes, not even in sight. And the Hellenic troops as they advanced maintained their ranks and were on their guard until they encamped in a suitable place; but the Chaonians, who were not only confident of themselves but were also recognised as very excellent fighting men by the inhabitants of that part of the mainland, did not halt to make camp, but advanced with a rush along with the other barbarians, thinking that they could take the town at the first assault, and thus gain the glory for themselves. But the Stratians noticed that they were still advancing, and thinking that, if they could overcome them while isolated, the Hellenes would no longer be as ready to attack them, set ambushes in the outskirts of the town, and as soon as the barbarians were close at hand, closed in upon them from the city and from the ambushes and fell upon them. Thrown into a panic, many of the Chaonians were slain, and the other barbarians, seeing them give way, no longer held their ground, but took to flight. But neither of the Hellenic divisions was aware of the battle, because their allies had gone far ahead of them, and they thought that they were
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8 νους ἐπείγεσθαί. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐνέκειντο φεύγοντες οἱ βάρβαροι, ἀνελάμβανον τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ξυναγά- γόντες τὰ στρατόπεδα ἢσύχαζον αὐτοῦ τὴν ἡμέ- ραν, ἐς χεῖρας μὲν οὔκ ἱόντων σφίσθοι τῶν Στρατίων διὰ τὸ μῆπω τοὺς ἄλλους 'Ακαρνάνας ξυμβεβο- θηκέναι, ἀπωθέν δὲ σφενδονώντων καὶ ἐς ἀπορίαν καθιστάντων ὁ γὰρ ἦν ἀνευ ὅπλων κινηθήναι. δοκοῦσι δὲ οἱ 'Ακαρνάναις κράτιστοι εἶναι τούτο ποιεῖν. LXXXII. ἐπειδὴ δὲ νῦξ ἐγένετο, ἀνα- χωρῆσας ὁ Κνῆμος τῇ στρατιᾷ κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀναπτον ποταμῶν, ὃς ἀπέχει σταδίους ὀγδοη- κοντα Στράτου, τοὺς τε νεκροὺς κομίζεται τῇ ὑποτεραίᾳ ὑποστόνδους καὶ Οἰνιάδων ξυμπαρα- γενομένων κατὰ φιλίαν ἀναχωρεῖ παρ’ αὐτοὺς πρὶν τὴν ξυμβοθείαν ἐλθεῖν. κἀκεῖθεν ἔπο- οικον ἀπῆλθον ἐκαστοί. οἱ δὲ Στράτιοι τροπαίοι ἐστησαν τῆς μάχης τῆς πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους.

LXXXIII. Τὸ δ’ ἐκ τῆς Κορινθίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου ναυτικῶν, ὃ ἐδεί παραγενέσθαι τῷ Κνῆμῳ, ὅπως μὴ ξυμβοθόσιν οἱ ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἄνω 'Ακαρνα- νεῖς, οὐ παραγίγεται, ἀλλ’ ἡγακάσθησαν περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας τῇ ἐν Στράτῳ μάχῃ ναυμαχή- σαι πρὸς Φορμίωνα καὶ τὰς ἐκκοσι ναύς τῶν

2 Ἀθηναίων αἰ ἐφρούροιν ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ. ὁ γὰρ Φορμίων παραπλέονται αὐτοὺς ἔξω τοῦ κόλπου ἐτήρει, βουλόμενος ἐν τῇ εὐρυχωρίᾳ ἐπιθέσθαι.

3 οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπλευόν μὲν οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχία, ἀλλὰ στρατιωτικῶτερον παρε- σκευασμένοι ἐς τὴν 'Ακαρνανίαν καὶ οὐκ ἀν ὀί- μενοι πρὸς ἐπτὰ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς τὰς σφετέρας τομῆσαι τοὺς 'Αθηναίους εἰκοσι ταῖς

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pressing on in order to find a camp. But when the
barbarians in their flight broke in upon them, they
took them in and uniting their two divisions kept
quiet there during the day, the Stratians not coming
to close quarters with them, because the rest of the
Aeamanians had not yet come to their support, but
using their slings against them from a distance and
distressing them; for it was not possible for them to
stir without armour; and indeed the Aeamanians are
famous for their excellence in the use of the sling.
LXXXII. But when night came on, Cnemus hastily
retreated with his army to the river Anapus, which
is eighty stadia distant from Stratus, and on the
following day took up his dead under a truce; and
since the Oeniiadæ had joined his expedition in token
of their friendly feelings, he withdrew to their
country before the combined forces of the Aeamanians
had arrived, and from there they returned
severally to their homes. As for the Stratians, they
set up a trophy of their battle with the barbarians.
LXXXIII. Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and
from the other allies on the Crisaean Gulf, which
was to have joined Cnemus in order to prevent the
Aeamanians on the sea-coast from aiding those in the
interior, did not arrive, but was obliged, about the
day of the battle at Stratus, to fight with Phormio
and the twenty Athenian ships which were on guard
at Naupactus. For Phormio was watching them as
they sailed along the coast out of the gulf, pre-
ferring to attack them in the open water. Now the
Corinthians and their allies on their way to Aeamania
were not equipped for fighting at sea, but rather for
operations on land, and they had no idea that the
Athenians with their twenty ships would dare to
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εαυτών ναυμαχίαν ποιήσασθαι· ἐπειδή μὲντοι ἀντιπαραπλέοντάς τε ἐν ῥωίν αὐτοῦς, παρὰ γὰρ 
σφῶν κομιζομένων, καὶ ἐκ Πατρῶν τῆς Ἀχαίας 
πρὸς τὴν ἀντιπέρας ἦπειρον διαβάλλοντες ἐπ' Ἀκαρνανίας κατείδου τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς 
Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Ῥήμνου ποταμοῦ προσπλέοντας 
σφίζει καὶ οὐκ ἔλαθον υπκτὸς ἀφορμισάμενοι, 
οὕτω δὲ ἀναγκάζονται ναυμαχεῖν κατὰ μέσον τῶν 
πορθμῶν. στρατηγοὶ δὲ ἦσαν μὲν καὶ κατὰ 
πόλεις ἐκάστων οἳ παρεσκευάζοντο, Κορινθίων 
δὲ Μαχάων καὶ Ἰσοκράτης καὶ Ἁγαθαρχίδας. 
καὶ οἱ μὲν Πελοποννησίοι ἐτάξαντο κύκλων τῶν 
νεών ὡς μέγιστον οἷοί τ' ἦσαν μὴ διδόντες διέκ-
πλουν, τὰς πρῷρας μὲν ἔξω, ἐσω δὲ τὰς πρώ-
μνας, καὶ τὰ τε λεπτὰ πλοῖα ἃ ξυνέπλει ἐντὸς 
ποιοῦνται καὶ πέντε ναῦς τὰς ἂριστα πλεοῦσας, 
ὅπως ἐκπλέοιεν διὰ βραχέος παραγγελεῖν, εἰ 
πὴ προσπιττοίεν οἳ ἐναντίοι.

LXXXIV. Οἱ δ' Ἀθηναίοι κατὰ μίαν ναῦν 
tεταγμένου περιέπλεον αὐτοῦς κύκλῳ καὶ ξυνή-
γον ἐς ὀλύγον, εὖ χρῷ αἰεὶ παραπλέοντες καὶ 
δόκησιν παρέχοντες αὐτίκα ἐμβαλεῖν προείρητο 
δ' αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ Φορμίωνος μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν πρὶν ἂν 
2 αὐτῶς σημῆνη. ἦλπιζε γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐ μενεῖν τὴν

1 Bloomfield's correction for ὄφορμισάμενοι of the MSS.

1 Or, retaining ὄφορμισάμενοι, "they had tried to anchor under cover of night, but had been detected."
bring on an engagement with their own forty-seven. When, however, they saw that the Athenians kept sailing along the opposite coast as long as they themselves continued to skirt the southern shore, and when, as they attempted to cross from Patrae in Achaia to the mainland opposite, making for Acarnania, they observed that the Athenians were bearing down upon them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and finally when, during the night, they had tried to slip their moorings and get away but had been detected, under these circumstances they were forced to fight in the middle of the channel. Their fleet was commanded by generals from the several states which contributed contingents, the Corinthian squadron by Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians drew up their ships in as large a circle as they could without allowing the enemy an opportunity to break through, prows outward, sterns inward; and inside the circle they placed the light boats which accompanied them, and also five of their swiftest ships, in order that they might have only a short distance to sail out and bring support at any point where the enemy attacked.

LXXXIV. As for the Athenians, drawn up in single column they kept sailing round the Peloponnesian fleet in a circle, hemming it into a narrower and narrower space, always just grazing by and giving the impression that they would charge at any moment. But orders had been given by Phormio not to attack until he should give the signal; for he hoped that the enemy's ships would not keep in line,

1 i.e. in the open water between Patrae and the mouth of the Evenus, as opposed to the regions along the shore of the Gulf, where their fleet might run into a harbour.

2 See note on 1. xlix. 3.
τάξιν, ὅσπερ ἐν γῇ πεζήν, ἀλλὰ ξυμπεσείσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ταραχὴν παρέξειν, εἴ τ᾽ ἐκπνεύσειν ἐκ τοῦ κόλπου τὸ πνεῦμα, ὅπερ ἀναμένον τε περιέπλετε καὶ εἰώθει γίγνεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἔω, οὕτων χρόνον ἥσυχασεν αὐτοὺς· καὶ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἐφ᾽ αὐτῷ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, ὁπόταν βούληται, τῶν νεῶν ἄμεινον πλευρ-σῶν, καὶ τότε καλλίστην γίγνεσθαι. ὡς δὲ τὸ τε πνεῦμα κατήμενοι καὶ αἱ νῆσες ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἢδη οὕσαι υπ' ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ τα ἀνέμου τῶν τε πλοίων, ἅμα προσκειμένων ἐταράσσοντο, καὶ ναῦς τε ἡ προσέπιπτε καὶ τοῖς κοντοῖς διεσθόοντο, βοῦ τε χρώμενοι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀντιφυλακῆ τε καὶ λοιδορία οὐδὲν κατήκουν οὔτε τῶν παραγγελλόμενων οὔτε τῶν κελευστῶν, καὶ τὰς κώπας ἁδύνα-τοι ὄντες ἐν κλύδωι ἀναφέρειν ἀνθρωποὶ ἀνεπεη τοῖς κυβερνήταις ἀπειθεστέρας τὰς ναῦς παρεῖ-χον, τότε δὴ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον σημαινεῖ, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προσπεσόντες πρὸς τοῦ μὲν κατα-δύοσι τῶν στρατηγίδων νεῶν μίαν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς ἤ χωρῆσθαι διέφθειρον, καὶ κατέστη-σαν ἐς ἀλκην μὲν μηδένα τρέπεσθαι αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ταραχῆς, φεύγειν δὲ ἐς Πάτρας καὶ Δύμην 4 τῆς Ἀχαιάς. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι καταδιώξαντες καὶ ναῦς δῶδεκα λαβόντες τοὺς τε ἁνδρας ἢ αὐτῶν τοὺς πλείστους ἀνελομενοὶ ἐς Μολύκρειον ἀπέ-πλεον, καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ῥώ τε καὶ ναῦν ἀναθέντες τῷ Ποσειδώνι ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς 5 Ναύπακτον. παρέπλευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Πελοπον-
like infantry on land, but would fall foul of one another, and also be thrown into confusion by the small boats, and then if the breeze for which he was waiting while he sailed round, which usually blew from the gulf towards dawn, should spring up, they would not remain steady for any length of time. As for the attack, he thought that was in his power whenever he chose, since his ships were better sailors, and that then was the most favourable moment for it. So when the wind began to come up, and the ships, already hemmed in a narrow space, were being thrown into confusion both by the violence of the wind and the pressure of the small boats, when ship was dashing against ship and the crews were trying to push them apart with poles, all the while keeping up such shouts and warning cries and abuse of one another that they could not hear either the word of command or the coxswains’ calls, and, finally, when the inexperienced rowers, unable to get their oars clear of the water in a heavy sea, were rendering the ships less obedient to the helmsmen, then at this critical moment Phormio gave the signal. Thereupon the Athenians fell upon them; first they sank one of the admirals’ ships, and then destroyed the rest as well wherever they came upon them, reducing them to such straits that in their confusion no one turned for defence, but all fled to Patrae and Dyne in Achaia. But the Athenians gave chase, and after they had captured twelve ships and had taken on board most of their crews sailed away to Molyereum; then they set up a trophy on Rhium, dedicated a ship to Poseidon, and returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians also
νήσιοι εἰδὺς ταῖς περιλοίποις τῶν νεῶν ἐκ τῆς Δύμης καὶ Πατρῶν ἐς Κυλλήνην τὸ Ἡλείων ἐπί-
νειον καὶ ἀπὸ Δευκάδος Κυήμος καὶ αἱ ἐκεῖνων
νήσει, ἂς ἐδὲ ταύτας ξυμμειξαῖ, ἀφικνοῦντα μετὰ
tὴν ἔν Στράτῳ μάχην ἐς τὴν Κυλλήνην.

LXXXV. Πέμπονσι δὲ καὶ οἱ Δακεδαίμονιοι
tῷ Κυήμῳ ἡμιβοῦλους ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς Τιμοκράτη
cαὶ Βρασίδαν καὶ Δυκόφρονα, κελεύοντες ἀλλήν
ναυμαχίαν βέλτιον παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὑπ’
2 ὀλίγων νεῶν εἰργεσθαι τῆς θαλάσσης. ἔδοκεν γὰ
ρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως τε καὶ πρῶτον ναυμαχίας πειρασι-
μένοις πολὺς ὁ παράλογος εἶναι καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτο
φῶς τὸ ναυτικὸν λείπεσθαι, γεγενήσχαι
dé tina malakían, óuk ãntetíthente tīn 'Athenaiōn
ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐμπειρίαν τῆς σφητέρας δι’ ὀλίγου
3 μελέτης. ὀργὴ οὐν ἀπέστελλον. οἱ δὲ ἀφικό-
µενοι μετὰ τοῦ Κυήμου ναῦς τε προσπεριήγγειλαν
κατὰ πόλεις καὶ τὰς προϋπαρχούσας ἔξηρτόντο
4 ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν. πέμπει δὲ καὶ ὁ Φορµίων ἐς
τὰς 'Athenas τὴν τε παρασκευὴν αὐτῶν ἀγγελοῦν-
tas καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἢν ἐνίκησαν φρόσον-
tas καὶ κελεύον τοῦ ναῦς ὅτε πλείστας διὰ
τάχους ἀποστεῖλαι, ὡς καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐκάστην ἐλ-
5 πίδος οὐσῆς αἰεί ναυμαχήσειν. οἱ δὲ ἀποπέµ-
pousai eἴκοσι ναῦς αὐτῶ, τῷ δὲ κομίζοντι αὐτὰς
προσπεέστειλαν ἐς Κρήτην πρῶτον ἀφικέσθαι.
Νικίας γὰρ Κρής Γορτύνιος πρόξενος ὃν πείθει
sailed away immediately with the ships that were left, proceeding from Dyme and Patrae along the coast to Cyllene, the shipyard of the Eleans; and Cnemus likewise, coming from Leucas together with the ships from that quarter¹ which were to have joined the Corinthian fleet, came to Cyllene after the battle at Stratus.

LXXXV. The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron as advisers to Cnemus, directing them to make better preparation for another sea-fight, and not to be driven off the sea by a few ships. For the issue of the recent battle seemed to them utterly incomprensible, especially since this was their first attempt at a sea-fight, and they could not believe that their fleet was so greatly inferior, but thought that there had been cowardice somewhere, failing to take into account the long experience of the Athenians as compared with their own brief practice. In a rage, then, they dispatched the advisers. And these on their arrival, acting in conjunction with Cnemus, sent round a call to the allied cities for additional ships, and set about equipping those already at hand, with a view to a sea-fight. And Phormio on his part sent messengers to Athens to give information of the enemy’s preparations and to tell about the battle which they had won, urging them also to send to him speedily as many ships as possible, since there was always a prospect that a battle might be fought any day. So they sent him twenty ships, but gave the commander in charge of them special orders to sail first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was a proxenus² of theirs, persuaded

¹ The contingents from Leucas, Anaactorium, and Ambracia, ch. lxxx. 2, 3.
² See ch. xxix. 1, note.
καὶ οἱ μὲν λαβὼν τὰς ραύς ὄψετο ἐς Κρήτην καὶ 
μετὰ τῶν Ποληκτίτων ἔδησε τὴν γῆν τῶν Κυδω- 
νιατῶν, καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνέμων καὶ ἀπλοῖας ἐνδιέτριψεν 
οὐκ ὀλίγον χρόνον.

LXXXVI. Οἱ δ’ ἐν τῇ Κυκλήγῃ Πελοποννήσιοι 
ἐν τούτῳ, ἐν οἷς Ἀθηναίοι περὶ Κρήτην κατεί- 
χοντο, παρεσκευασμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν παρέ- 
πλευσαν ἐς Πάνορμον τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, οὕτε οὗτοι 
ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς τῶν Πελοποννησίων προσ- 
εβεβοηθήκει. παρέπλευσε δὲ καὶ ὁ Φορμίων ἐπὶ 
τὸ Ρίον τὸ Μολυκρίκων καὶ ὀρμίσατο ἐξω οὗτοῦ 
ναυσίν εἰκοσὶ, αἰστέρ καὶ ἐναυμάχησεν. ἦν 
δὲ τούτῳ μὲν τὸ Ρίον φίλων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τὸ δ’ 
ἐπερον Ρίον ἐστὶν ἀντιπέρας τὸ ἐν τῇ Πελοπο- 
nῆσιν διέκειτο δὲ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων σταδίους μᾶλιστα 
ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης, τοῦ δὲ Κρισίαν κόλπων 
στόμα τούτο ἐστὶν. ἐπὶ οὖν τὸ Ρίο τῷ Ἀχαϊκῷ 
οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἀπέχοντι οὐ πολὺ τοῦ Πανόρ- 
mον, ἐν οἷς αὐτοῖς ὁ πεζὸς ἦν, ὀρμίσατο καὶ αὐτοῖς 
ναυσίν ἐπτὰ καὶ ἐβδομάκουτα, ἐσειδή καὶ τοὺς 
Ἀθηναίους εἰδον. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ἔξ ἡ ἐπτα ἡμέρας 
ἀνθώρμον ἄλληλος μελετῶντες τε καὶ παρα- 
sκευαζόμενοι τὴν ναυμαχίαν, γνώμην ἔχοντες οἱ 
μὲν μὴ ἐκπλεῖν ἐξω τῶν Ρίων ἐς τὴν εὔρυχοραν, 
φοβοῦμεν τὸ πρότερον πάθος, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐσπλεῖν 
ἐς τὰ στενά, νομίζοντες πρὸς ἐκεῖνον εἶναι τὴν ἐν 
ὀλίγον ναυμαχίαν. ἐπειτα ὁ Κυήμως καὶ ὁ Βρασί- 
dας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν Πελοποννησίων στρατηγοὶ, 
βουλόμενοι ἐν τάχει τὴν ναυμαχίαν ποιῆσαι πρὶν
them to sail against Cydonia, a hostile town, promising to bring it over to the Athenians; but he was really asking them to intervene to gratify the people of Polichne, who are neighbours of the Cydonians. So the officer in charge took the ships, went to Crete, and helped the Polichnitans to ravage the lands of the Cydonians, and by reason of winds and stress of weather wasted not a little time.

LXXXVI. Meantime, while the Athenians were detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, equipped and ready for a battle, sailed along the coast to Panormus in Achaia, where the land-forces of the Peloponnesians had come to their support. And Phormio also sailed along the coast to the Molycerian Rhium and anchored outside with the twenty ships with which he had fought before. This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians, and opposite is the other Rhium, that in the Peloponnesus; and the distance between them is about seven stadia by sea, constituting the mouth of the Crisaean Gulf. Accordingly the Peloponnesians, when they saw the Athenians come to anchor, likewise anchored with seventy-seven ships at the Achaian Rhium, which is not far from Panormus, where their land-forces were. And for six or seven days they lay at anchor opposite one another, practising and preparing for battle, the one side resolved not to sail outside the two Rhia into the open water, fearing a recurrence of their disaster, the other not to sail into the straits, thinking that fighting in a narrow space was in the enemy’s favour. At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian commanders, wishing to bring on the engagement
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ti kai apto tov 'Athnovn epiBosehsai, xynveka-leasan tovov stratemiwtas prouton, kai orwntes autov tovov pollovs dia tηn protener asasan phosoumenvos kai ou prothumous uputai parkeleus-santo kai elexan toiside.

LXXXVII. "H mevn geonomenv vnavamia, o andres Pelooponnhsios, e tic argv dia authn wmov phosueita tηn mellosan, ouchi dikaian exeis tek-
2 marasv to ekrbojsai. th te gar paraskeuni evdeis egenveto, oster esto, kai ouchi eis vnavami-xian malkon h epi stratetian eplesmono. Xynvebhe de kai tα apto tηs thchns ouk oliga evantemibhsai, kai poi tι kai h uperias prouton vnavamounas
3 esphlen, oster ou kata tηn metera kaniai to hpsasvai prossegeneto, oude dikaion tηs gnwmihs to mh kata kratos nukthev, exov de tina en autw antillogia, tηs ge xymforis tov apobanti am-
blisvtheia, nomisa de tais men tuchais evdechesvai sfalllesvai tovs anthrwpos, tais de gnwaias tovs autous aiei orhdoi1 andreious einai, kai mh uperias tov andreion paroontos proballoimenvos
4 ekotonos an en tina kakoiv genetvai. wmov de oud h uperia tosouton leipetai osou tolvmi pro-
chete tovnde de h episthme, hnu malstoi fo-
bewith, andrelan men exousa kai monymi exei en tov deino epiteleiv a emathse, aneu de euwnhia oudevia tecynh prs tov kivdunos iskhvi, fobos gar mwnymen ekplhsse, tecynh de aneu alkihs ou.

1 Hudo writes orhdoi and deletes andrelous (with Badham).
soon, before reinforcements came from Athens, first called their soldiers together, and seeing that most of them were frightened on account of their previous defeat and not eager for battle, encouraged them and spoke as follows:

LXXXVII. "The recent sea-fight, Peloponnesians, if possibly it has caused any man among you to be afraid of the one before us, affords no just grounds for your alarm. For our preparation was deficient, as you know, and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as operations on land; and it happened, furthermore, that not a few of the chances of war were against us, and doubtless also our inexperience had something to do with our failure in the first sea-fight. It was not then our cowardice that brought about defeat, nor is it right that the spirit, which force cannot conquer, but which has in it something defiant, should be dulled and blunted by the outcome of mere chance; rather you ought to reflect that although men may suffer reverse in their fortunes, yet in their spirit brave men are rightly considered always brave, and when courage is present no inexperience can properly be urged as an excuse for being cowards under any circumstances. And, after all, your inexperience is more than counterbalanced by your superiority in daring; and though the enemy's skill, which you particularly dread, will indeed, so long as bravery goes with it, have the presence of mind in the moment of danger to put into effect the lessons it has learned, yet without valour no amount of proficiency avails against such dangers. For fear drives presence of mind away, and skill without
5 δὲν ὁφελεῖ. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐμπειρότερον αὐτῶν τὸ τολμηρότερον ἀντιτάξασθε, πρὸς δὲ τὸ διὰ τὴν ἡσαν δεδιέναι τὸ ἀπαράσκευοι τότε τυχεῖν. 6 περιγίγνεται δὲ ἡμῶν πλήθος τε νεῶν καὶ πρὸς τῇ γῇ οἰκεία οὐσία ὀπλιτῶν παρόντων ναυμαχεῖν τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τῶν πλεόνων καὶ ἀμείῳν παρασκευασ- 7 μένων τὸ κράτος ἔστιν. ὅστε οὐδὲ καθ’ ἐν εὐρί- σκομεν εἰσότως ἂν ἡμῖν σφαλλομένους· καὶ ὡσα ἡμάρτομεν πρότερον, νῦν αὐτὰ ταύτα προσγενό- 8 μενα διδάσκαλιαν παρέξει. θαρσοῦντες οὖν καὶ κυβερνήται καὶ ναύται τὸ καθ’ ἐαυτὸν ἐκαστος ἐπεσθε, χώραν μη προλειπόντες ἢ ἂν τις προσ- ταχθῇ. τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἠγεμόνων οὐ ξέρον τὴν ἐπιχειρήσιν ἡμεῖς παρασκευάσομεν καὶ οὐκ ἐνδο- σομεν πρόφασιν οὔθεν κακῷ γενέσθαι· ἢν δὲ τις ἁρα καὶ βουληθῇ, κολασθήσεται τῇ πρεπούσῃ ξημίᾳ, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τιμῆσονται τοὺς προσήκουσιν ἁδύοις τῆς ἁρετῆς.”

LXXXVIII. Τοιαῦτα μὲν τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις οἱ ἄρχοντες παρακελεύσαντο. ὁ δὲ Φορμίων διείδως καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὄρρωδιαν καὶ ἀισθόμενος ὅτι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεῶν κατὰ σφάς αὐτοὺς ξυνιστάμενοι ἐφοβοῦντο, ἐβούλετο ἐνγκαλέσας θαρσοῦν τε καὶ παραίσσεσιν ἐν τῷ 2 παρόντι ποιήσασθαι. πρότερον μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ αὐτοῖς ἔλεγε καὶ προπαρασκεύαζε τὰς γνώμας ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς πλῆθος νεῶν τοσοῦτον, ἢν ἐπιπλέγῃ, ὃ τι οὐχ ὑπομενετέον ἐστί, καὶ οἱ στρατιώται ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀξίωσιν ταύτην

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intrepidity is of no avail. Therefore, against their greater experience set your greater daring, and against the fear caused by your defeat set the accident of your being at the moment unprepared. You have the advantage, both in number of ships and in fighting close to the land, which is friendly to us, and you are supported by hoplites; and victory is generally on the side of those who are the more numerous and better prepared. There is accordingly not a single reason that we can find why we should fail; and as to our earlier mistakes, the very fact that they were made will teach us a lesson. Be of good courage, then, and let each man, both helmsman and sailor, follow our lead as best he can, not leaving the post to which he may be assigned. We shall prepare for the attack at least as well as your former commanders, and shall give no one an excuse to act like a coward; but if anyone should be inclined that way, he shall be punished with the penalty he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with rewards such as befit their valour."

LXXXVIII. With such words the Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men. But Phormio, being himself also uneasy about the apprehension felt by his troops, and observing that they were gathering in knots amongst themselves in alarm at the superior number of the enemy's ships, wished to call them together in order to hearten them and make an exhortation to suit the present emergency. For in the past he had always told them, by way of bracing their minds, that there was no number of ships, however great, whose attack men such as they could not withstand; and his sailors had long since held among themselves the conviction that they,
εἰλήφθησαν μηδένα ὅχλον Ἀθηναῖοι ὑμεῖς Πελο-
3 πονησίων νεών ὑποχωρεῖν· τότε δὲ πρῶς τὴν
παρούσαν ὅψειν ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς ἀδυμοῦντας ἐβού-
λετο ὑπόμνησιν ποιήσασθαι τοῦ θαρσεῖν, καὶ
ξυγκαλέσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

LXXXIX. "Ὅρον ὑμᾶς, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς στρατιῶται,
πεφοβημένοι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἔξωκά-
λεσα, οὐκ ἄξιόν τα ἔτι δεινά ἐν ὥρρῳδίᾳ ἔχειν.
2 οὗτοι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ προνεκιήσθαι καὶ
μηδ' αὐτοὶ οἰεσθαί ὁμοίων ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος
τῶν νεῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵσου παρεσκευάσαντος
ἐπειτα φ' ἀλλοτρία πιστεύσαντες προσέρχονται, ὡς
προσήκουν σφίσιν ἀνδρείοις εἶναι, οὐ δὲ ἄλλο τι
θαρσοῦσιν ἡ διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ πεζῷ ἐμπείρια τὰ
πλεῖον κατορθοῦντες καὶ οὔνται σφίσαι καὶ ἐν τῷ
3 ναυτικῷ ποιήσει τῷ αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου
ἡμῶν μᾶλλον νῦν περιέσται, ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτοις ἐν
ἐκείνῳ, ἐπεὶ εὐφυχίᾳ γε οὐδὲν προφέρουσι, τῷ δὲ
ἐκάτεροι τι εἶναι ἐμπειρότεροι θρασύτεροι ἐσμέν.
4 Λακεδαιμόνιοι τε ἤγομένοι αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν σφε-
τέραν δόξαν ἄκοιντας προσάγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς
ἐς τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐνεχεῖρησαν
5 ἡσσοθέντες παρὰ πολὺ αὕτης καμαχεῖν. μὴ δὴ
αὐτῶν τὴν τόλμην δείσητε. πολὺ δὲ ὑμεῖς ἐκεί-
νοις πλεῖω φόβον παρέχετε καὶ πιστοτέρον κατά
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being Athenians, must never give ground before any number of Peloponnesian ships. But at this time, seeing that they were dispirited by what they saw before their eyes, and wishing to remind them of their old-time confidence, he called them together and spoke as follows:

LXXXIX. "Observing that you have become alarmed, soldiers, at the numbers of the enemy, I have called you together, because I do not want you to be in dread of imaginary dangers. For, in the first place, it is just because these men have been beaten before, and do not even themselves believe that they are a match for us, that they have provided themselves with this large and disproportionate number of ships; then, too, as regards their courage,—the thing on which they chiefly rely when they come against us, as if it were their peculiar province to be brave,—the only reasonable ground they have for confidence is that their experience in fighting on land has generally brought them success, and so they think this will achieve the same result for them at sea as well. But in all reason the advantage to-day will rather be ours, if they on their side have it on land; for in valour assuredly they are nowise superior, but we are both more confident just as in any way we have more experience. Besides, since the Lacedaemonians lead their allies for their own glory, the majority of them have to be dragged into battle against their will, for otherwise they would never, after their decisive defeat, have attempted to fight a second time at sea. Hence you need not fear their daring. On the contrary, you inspire in them a dread far greater and better justified, both because you have already
Τε τὸ προνενικηκέναι καὶ δὴ οὐκ ἂν ἔγονται μὴ μέλλοντάς τι ἄξιον τοῦ παρὰ πολὺ πράξειν ἄνθρωποι ἡμῶν ἐπέρχονται. ἀντίπαλοι μὲν γὰρ οἱ πλείους, ὡσπερ οὗτοι, τῇ δυνάμει τὰ πλέον πιστοὶ ἡ τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπέρχονται οὐ δὲ ἐκ πολλῷ ὑποδεικτέρων καὶ ἁμα οὐκ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, μέγα τι τῆς διανοίας τὸ βέβαιον ἔχουσιν ἀντιτολμῶσιν. ἡ λογικὸμενοι οὕτως τῷ οὐκ εἰκότι πλέον πεφόβηται ἡμᾶς ἡ τῇ κατὰ λόγου παρασκευῆ. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ στρατόπεδα ἡδη ἐπέσεν ὑπ' ἐλασσόνων τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ, ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ καὶ τῇ ἀτολμίᾳ· διὸ οὐδετέρου ημεῖς νῦν μετέχομεν. τὸν δὲ υγόνα οὐκ ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ ἐκὼν εἶναι ποιήσομαι οὐδ' ἐσπλεῦσομαι ἐς αὐτῶν. ὡς γὰρ οὗτος πολλὰς ναῦς ἀνεπιστήμων ὑπὸ γαυνή ἐμπέριοις καὶ ἄμεινον πλεούσας ἡ στενοχωρία οὐ ξυμφέρει. οὕτε γὰρ ἂν ἐπιπλεύσεις τις ὁς χρη ἐς ἐμβολήν μὴ ἔχων τὴν πρόσοψιν τῶν πολεμίων ἐκ πολλῷ, οὔτε ἂν ἀποχωρήσεις ἐν δέοντι πιεζόμενος· διεκπλοὶ τε οὐκ εἰσίν οὐδ' ἀναστροφαί, ἀπερ νεὼν ἄμεινον πλεούσων ἔργα ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη ἂν εἰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν πεξιμαχίαν καθίστασθαι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ αἱ πλείους νῆσες κρέασους γίγνονται. τοῦτον μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ

1 Huile adopts Madvig’s conjecture § for αὐ.
defeated them and because they think that you
would not be facing them at all unless you ex-
pected to achieve a result commensurate with the
very great odds. For most men, when, like our
present opponents, they are equal to their foes, rely
more upon their strength when they advance to the
attack than upon their resolution; whereas those
who dare oppose them with greatly inferior num-
ers, and at the same time without being compelled
to do so, must possess in a high degree the quality
of unwavering resolution. Taking all these things
into consideration, our enemies have come to fear
us more on account of what is amazing in our con-
duct than they would if our preparations were less
out of proportion to their own. Furthermore many
an army has before now been overthrown by smaller
numbers through its own want of experience, and
some too through a deficiency of daring, and at this
moment we can be charged with neither. As for
the contest, I will not risk it in the gulf if I can
help it, nor will I sail into the gulf. For I am
aware that a confined space is not an advantage to a
fleet of a few ships which are better sailors and
have experienced crews, when it is opposed to a
large number of ships which are badly managed.
For one cannot charge properly upon an enemy ship
to ram her side, through not having a clear view of
her a long way off, nor can one retire at need when
hard pressed; and there is no chance for such
manoeuvres as breaking through the line or whirling
around to ram, though these are precisely the
proper tactics of fast sailing ships, but the sea-fight
would have to be turned into a land-battle, and in
that case it is the larger fleet that wins. For these
ἐξω τὴν πρόνοιαν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὑμεῖς δὲ εὐτακτοὶ παρὰ ταῖς ναυαλ μένοντες τά τε παραγγελλόμενα ὁξέως δέχεσθε, ἀλλωσ τε καὶ δε ὀλίγου τής ἐφορμησεως ούσης, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐργῳ κόσμον καὶ σιγὴν περὶ πλείστου ἡγεῖσθε, ὁ ἐς τε τὰ πολλά τῶν πολεμικῶν ἐμμέτρει κἂν ναυμαχίᾳ ὑπὸ ἤκιστα, ἀμίνεσθε τε τούσδε ἄξιοις τῶν προεργασμένων. ὁ δὲ ἀγὼν μέγας ὑμῖν, ἡ καταλλεσαι Πελοποννησίων τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἡ ἐγγυτέρω καταστήσαι Ἀθηναίοι τὸν φόβον περὶ τῆς θαλάσσης, ἀναμμηνησκῳ δ' αὐ ὑμᾶς ὅτι νευκόκατε αὐτὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἱσσημένων δὲ ἄνδρῶν οὐκ ἔθελον αἱ γυναικὶ πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς κινδύνους ὁμοίαι εἰναι’.

Χ. Τοιόντα δὲ καὶ ο Φορμίων παρεκελεύσατο, οἱ δὲ Πελοποννησίων, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοὶς οἱ Ἀθηναιοὶ οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενὰ, βουλομένων ἰκοντας ἐςω προαγαγεῖαν αὐτούς, ἀναγαγόμενοι ἄμα ὡς ἐπέπλεον, ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξίμενοι τὰς νάυς, παρὰ 2 τὴν ἕαυτῶν γῆς ἐςω ἐπὶ 3 τοῦ κόλπου δεξιῷ κέρα ἱγουμένων, ὑπὸ περὶ καί ὀρμών: 2 ἐπὶ δ’ αὐτῷ εἴκοσι ἐταξάν τὰς ἀριστὰ πλεύσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἀρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ὅ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτῶς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτῃ

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1 Hude reads πολεμίωσε, with C.
2 With CG; the other MSS. and the Schol. ἐπί.
3 Hude deletes ἐπί, after Krüger.

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1 In the first sea-fight the Peloponnesians had forty-seven ships (ch. lxxxiii. 3) against Phormio's twenty (ch. lxxxiii. 1); in the second battle the Peloponnesians had seventy-seven ships (ch. lxxvii. 4). Since the Peloponnesians lost twelve ships in the first battle (ch. lxxxiv. 4), the expression "most of them" is not quite exact here.
matters, however, I shall make provision to the best of my ability. As for you, keep good order, stay near your ships, give heed sharply to the word of command, especially since the two fleets are at watch so near one another; and when it comes to action, regard discipline and silence, which are generally advantageous in warfare, but especially so at sea, as all important, and ward off the enemy yonder in a manner worthy of your past exploits. The contest is a momentous one for you—whether you are to shatter the hopes which the Peloponnesians have in their fleet, or to bring closer home to the Athenians their fear about the sea. Once more I remind you that you have beaten most of them already; and when men have once suffered defeat, their spirit is never the same as before if they are called upon to face the same dangers.

XC. Such were the words with which Phormio also encouraged his men. And the Peloponnesians, when the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows to meet them, wished to draw them in against their will; so they put out to sea at dawn, and, after lining up their ships four deep, sailed along their own shore towards the inner part of the gulf, in the same order as they had lain at anchor, their right wing leading the way. Upon their right wing they had placed their twenty best sailing ships, in order that, if Phormio got the impression that their objective was Naupactus

2 Or, as some take it, "in a column four abreast."
3 Only now the four ships which had lain at anchor one behind the other sailed, after the turn to the right, abreast.
4 Or, retaining παραίτησις instead of παράθετος, "after lining up their ships four deep against their own shore (i.e. with it at their backs), sailed toward the inner part of the gulf..."
παραπλέοι, μὴ διαφύγοιειν πλέοντες τῶν ἐπιπλουν
σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, ἀλλ' 3
αὐταὶ αἱ νῆες περικλήσειαν. οὔ δέ, ὅπερ ἐκεῖνοι
προσεδέχοντο, φοβηθεῖς περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ ἑρήμῳ
ὄντι, ὡς ἐόρα ἀναγομένους αὐτούς, ἀκών καὶ κατὰ
σπουδὴν ἐμβιβάσας ἔπλευ παρὰ τὴν γῆν καὶ ὁ
πεζὸς ἀμα τῶν Μεσσηνίων παρεβοῦσει. Ἰδόντες
δὲ οἱ Πελοποννησιοὶ κατὰ μίαν ἐπὶ κέρως παρα-
πλέοντας καὶ ἥδη ὄντας ἐντὸς τοῦ κόλπου τε
καὶ πρὸς τῇ γῇ, ὅπερ ἐβούλοντο μάλιστα, ἀπὸ
σημείου ἔνος ἄφω ἐπιστρέφαμε τὰς ναῦς μετ-
ωπηδὸν ἔπλευν ὡς εἰχέ τάχους ἐκαστὸς ἐπὶ τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἠπεὶξεν τάσας τὰς ναῦς ἀπολή-
5 ψευταὶ. τῶν δὲ ἕνδεκα μὲν τινες αὐτὸν ἤγοντο
ὑπεκφεύγουσι τὸ κέρας τῶν Πελοποννησιῶν καὶ
τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας
ἐπικαταλαβόντες ἐξέωσάν τε πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὑπο-
θενοῦσας καὶ διέφθειραν, ἀνδρὰς τε τῶν Ἀθη-
ναίων ὑπέκετειν ὅσοι μὴ ἐξένευσαν αὐτῶν. καὶ
τῶν νεῶν τινας ἀναδούμενοι εἶλκον κενὰς (μίαν
dὲ αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶχον ἥδη), τὰς δὲ τινας οἱ
Μεσσηνοὶ παραβοθησάντες καὶ ἐπεσβαινοῦσι
ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐπιβάντες
ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων μαχόμενοι ἀφείλοντο
έλκομενας ἥδη.
ΧΣ. Ταύτη μὲν οὖν οἱ Πελοποννησιοὶ ἐκρά-
tουν τε καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναῦς· αἱ δὲ
ἐλκοσὶ νῆες αὐτῶν αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως ἐδι-
ωκον τὰς ἕνδεκα ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων αὕτερ
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and should, following the coast, sail in that direction to its aid, the Athenians might not be able to escape their attack by sailing outside their wing, but might be enveloped by these ships. Now he did just what they expected him to do; when he saw them put to sea, fearing for the safety of the place, which was unprotected, he reluctantly and in haste embarked his crews and sailed along the coast, the Messenian army moving along the shore to support him. And when the Peloponnesians saw that they were skirting the coast in single file and were already inside the gulf and close to shore, which was just what they most desired, at one signal they suddenly veered about, bore down with ships in line as fast as each could upon the Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships. But eleven of these, which were in the lead, got past the Peloponnesian wing, as it swung round, and escaped into the open water; but the rest were overtaken, driven ashore as they attempted to escape, and disabled, and all the Athenians on them who did not succeed in swimming ashore were slain. Some of the ships they made fast to their own and proceeded to tow away empty—though they had already captured one with its crew—but some others, which were already in tow, were taken from them by the Messenians, who came to the rescue, rushed armed as they were into the sea, boarded the ships, and fought from their decks.

XCI. In this quarter, then, the Peloponnesians were victorious and had disabled the Athenian ships; but the twenty ships covering their right wing were pursuing the eleven Athenian ships which had got
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ὑπεξέφυγον τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν. καὶ φθάνουσιν αὐτοῦς πλὴν μιᾶς νεῶς προκατα-
φυγοῦσαι πρὸς τὴν Ναύπακτον, καὶ σχούσαι ἀντίπροφοι κατὰ τὸ Ἄπολλώνιον παρεσκευά-
ζουτο ἀμυνούμενοι, ἦν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐπὶ σφᾶς
2 πλέοσιν. οἱ δὲ παραγενόμενοι ύστερον ἐπιμα-
νυζόν τε ἀμα πλέοντες ὡς νεικηκότες, καὶ τὴν
μίαν ναῦν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὴν ὑπόλοιπον ἐδίωκε
3 Δευκαδία ναῦς μία πολὺ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων. ἔτυχε
δὲ ὅλκας ὀρμόουσα μετέωρος, περὶ ἦν ἢ Ἀττικῆ
ναῦς φθάσασα καὶ περιπλεύσασα τῇ Δευκαδίᾳ
4 διωκούσῃ ἐμβάλλει μέση καὶ καταδύει. τοῖς μὲν
οἷς Πελοποννησίως γενομένου τούτου ἀπροσδο-
κήτου τε καὶ παρὰ λόγων φόβος ἐμπίπτει, καὶ
ἀμα ἀτάκτως διώκοντες διὰ τὸ κρατεῖν αἱ μὲν
τινές τῶν νεῶν καθεῖσαι τὰς κόπτας ἐπέστησαν
τοῦ πλοῦ, ἀξύμφορον δρόωτες πρὸς τὴν ἐς ὀλίγον
ἀντεξόρµησιν, βουλόμενοι τὰς πλείους περιμείναι,
αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς βραχέα ἀπειρία χωρίων ὀκεῖλαν.

XCl. Τοὺς δ' Ἀθηναίοις ἰδόντας ταῦτα γιγνό-
μενα θάρσος τε ἔλαβε καὶ ἀπὸ ἐνὸς κελεύσματος
ἐμβοηθοῦσαντες ἐπ' αὐτοῦς ὀρμησαν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰ
ὑπάρχοντα ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀτα-
ξίαν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον ὑπέμειναν, ἐπειτα δὲ
ἐτράποντο ἑς τὸν Πάνορμον, θεινερ ἀνηγάγοντο.
2 επιδιώκοντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τὰς τε ἐγγύς οὕσας
μάλιστα ναῦς ἔλαβον ἐξ καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀφεὶ-
λοντο ἃς ἑκεῖνοι πρὸς τῇ γῇ διαφθείραντες τὸ

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past them as they swung round and had escaped into the open water. And all the eleven except one reached Naupactus ahead of them, and riding at anchor off the Temple of Apollo, prows outward, made ready to defend themselves if the enemy put in toward the shore to attack them. When the Peloponnesians came up they were singing the paean as they rowed as if they were victorious already, and one Leucadian ship, far ahead of the rest, was chasing the single Athenian ship which lagged behind. But, as it chanced, a merchantman was lying at anchor in deep water and this the Athenian ship succeeded in reaching first and, sailing round it, rammed the pursuing Leucadian vessel amidships and sank her. At this unexpected and amazing feat consternation fell upon the Peloponnesians, who were, moreover, pursuing in disorder because they had the upper hand; on some of their ships the rowers sank their oars into the water and checked the headway of their vessels, intending to await the main body of their fleet—a serious mistake to make in the face of an enemy lying near and ready for the charge—while others, unfamiliar with the waters there, ran aground in the shallows.

XCII. As for the Athenians, when they saw what was happening, they took courage, and at a single word of command gave a shout and dashed at them. But the Peloponnesians had made so many mistakes and were at present in such disorder, that, although they resisted a little while, they soon turned and fled to Panormus, whence they had put to sea. The Athenians gave chase, and not only captured the six ships that were nearest, but also recovered their own ships which the enemy had disabled in the beginning.
πρώτον ἀνεδήσαντο· ἀνδρας τε τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειν.
3 ναῦν, τινὰς δὲ καὶ ἐξώγρησαν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Λευκα-
δίας νεώς, ἢ περὶ τὴν ὀλκάδα κατέδυ, Τιμοκράτης
ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πλέων, ὡς ἡ ναῦς διεφθείρετο,
ἐσφαξεν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ ἐξέπεσεν ἐς τὸν Ναυπακτίων
4 λιμένα. ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τροπαίων
ἔστησαν οἴκεϊν ἀναγαγόμενοι ἐκράτησαν, καὶ τοὺς
νεκροὺς καὶ τὰ νανάγια ὁσα πρὸς τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἦν
ἀνείλοντο, καὶ τοὺς ἑναντίοις τὰ ἑκεῖνων ὑπό-
5 σπουδὰ ἀπέδοσαν. ἔστησαν δὲ καὶ Πελοπο-
νήσιοι τροπαίων ὡς νεωκηκότες τῆς τροπῆς, ἅς
πρὸς τῇ γῇ διεφθείραν ναῦς· καὶ ἤπερ ἐλαβον
ναῦν, ἀνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Ῥίον τὸ Ἀχαϊκὸν παρὰ τὸ
6 τροπαίων. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα φοβοῦμενοι τὴν ἀπὸ
τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν ὕπο νῦκτα ἐσέπλευσαν
ἐς τὸν κόλπον τῶν Κρισαίων καὶ Κόρινθον ἄπαντες
7 πλὴν Λευκαδίων. καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Κρήτης Ἀθη-

ναιοὶ ταῖς εἰκοσι παντὶν, αὕς ἔδει πρὸ τῆς ναυ-
μαχίας τὸ Φορμίων παραγενέσθαι, οὐ πολλῷ
ὕστερον τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως τῶν νεῶν ἀφικνοῦνται
ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον. καὶ τὸ ἥρος ἐτελεύτα.

XCI. Πρὶν δὲ διαλύσαι τὸ ἐς Κόρινθον τε
καὶ τὸν Κρισαιὸν κόλπον ἀναχωρήσαν ναυτικῶν,
ὁ Κυῆμος καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄρχοντες
τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἀρχομένοι τοῦ χειμῶνος
ἔβούλουντο διδαξάντων τῶν Μεγαρέων ἄποπεί-
ράσαι τοῦ Πειραιῶς τοῦ λιμένος τῶν Ἀθηναίων·
ἣν δὲ ἀφύλακτος καὶ ἀκλης τος εἰκότως διὰ τὸ
of the fight near the shore and taken in tow; and of the men they killed some and took others alive. But Timocrates the Lacedaemonian, who was on board the Leucadian ship which was sunk near the merchantmen, slew himself when he saw that his ship was lost, and his body was washed up in the harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians now withdrew and set up a trophy at the place from which they had set out and won the victory; and they took up their dead and such of the wrecked ships as were close to their own shore, giving back to the enemy under a truce those which belonged to them. But the Peloponnesians also set up, in token of victory, a trophy for the defeat of the ships which had been disabled near the shore. And the ships which they had taken they dedicated on the Achaeian Rhium by the side of the trophy. And after this, fearing the reinforcements expected from Athens, they sailed under cover of night into the Crissaean Gulf and to Corinth, all except the Leucadians. And not long after their retreat the twenty Athenian ships from Crete, which were to have joined Phormio in time for the battle, arrived at Naupactus. And so the summer ended.

XClIII. However, before dispersing the fleet which had retired to Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf, at the beginning of the winter Cnemus and Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian commanders, instigated by the Megarians, wished to make an attempt upon the Peiraeus, the port of Athens; for it was unguarded and unclosed, and quite naturally, since the Athen-

1 The point is not certain; either near the Molyorean Rhium (ch. lxxxvi. 2), or off the Apollonium (ch. xci. 1).
2 cf. ch. lxxxvi. 6.
3 cf. ch. lxxxv. 5.
2 ἐπικρατεῖν πολὺ τῷ ναυτικῷ. ἐδόκει δὲ λαβόντα τῶν ναυτῶν ἐκαστὸν τὴν κόπην καὶ τὸ ἰσπρέσιον καὶ τὸν προπωτῆρα πεζῆς ἔναι ἐκ Κορώνθου ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἀθηνᾶς θάλασσαν, καὶ ἀφικομένους κατὰ τέχνος ἐς Μέγαρα καθελκύσαντας ἐκ Νίσσαις τοῦ νεφρίου αὐτῶν τεσσαράκοντα ναυών, αἱ ἐτυχοὶ αὐτοὶ οὖσαι, πλεύσαε εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ. οὐτὲ γὰρ ναυτικὸν ἄρα προφυλάσσον ἐν αὐτῷ οὖν ὑπὲρ ὑπὲρ προσδοκία συνεμία μὴ ἄν ποτὲ οἱ πολέμιοι ἐξαπιναῖοι οὕτως ἐπιπλευσείαν, ἐπεὶ οὔτ' ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς τολμῆσαι ἂν, καθ' ἴσως χλαῖν θ' εἰ διανοοῦντο, μὴ οὐκ ἄν προασθήσθαι.

3 ὁς δὲ ἐδοξῆσαν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἔχωσαν εὐθὺς· καὶ ἀφικομένοι νυκτὸς καὶ καθελκύσαντες ἐκ τῆς Νίσσαις τὰς ναύς ἔπλεουσαν ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Πειραιά ὅρκοτι, ὕσπερ διενοῦντο, καταδείσαντες τὸν κίνδυνον (καὶ τις καὶ ἄνεμος αὐτοῖς λέγεται κωλύσαι), ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Σαλαμίνος τὸ ἀκρωτήριον τὸ πρὸς Μέγαρα ὅροι καὶ φρούριον ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ ἄν καὶ νεὼν τριῶν φυλακὴ τοῦ μὴ ἐσπλείνειν Μεγαρεύσοι μὴ δὲ ἐκπλεῖν μηδὲν. τὸ τε φρουρίῳ προσέβαλον καὶ τὰς τριήρεις ἀφείλκυσαν κενὰς, τὴν τε ἀλλήν Σαλαμίνα ἀπροσδοκήτως ἐπιπεσόντες ἐπόρθουσαν.

XCIV. Ἐσ δὲ ταῦτα Ἀθηνᾶς φρυκτοί τε ἦρετο πολέμοι καὶ ἐκπληξὶς ἐγένετο συνεμίας τῶν κατὰ τὸν πολέμον ἐλώσων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστυ ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ὡς τοὺς πολέμιους ἐσπευσίασθαι ἤδη, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ Πειραιᾷ τὴν τε Σαλαμῖνα γρῆσατι καὶ παρὰ σφαῖς ὅσον οὐκ ἐσπλεῖν αὐτοῖς·

1 So Hude, adopting Madvig's conjecture D for D8 and punctuating after τολμῆσαι αὐτοῖς.
2 Hude inserts γὰρ after φρούριον, with van Hovenbergen, and includes in parentheses φρουρίον...μηδέν.
ians were decidedly superior at sea. And it was determined that each sailor, taking his oar and cushion and oar-loop, should go on foot from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side and hastening to Megara should launch from the docks at Nisaea forty ships of theirs which chanced to be there, and then sail straight for the Peiraeus. For there was no fleet on guard in the harbour, nor was there any expectation that the enemy would ever suddenly attack it in this way, since they would not dare such a thing openly, and if they should plan it secretly they would not fail to be detected in time. But once they had determined upon the scheme they set to work immediately. Reaching Nisaea at night they launched the ships and sailed, not now to the Peiraeus as they had intended, since they were appalled by the risk—and a wind, too, is said to have prevented them—but to the promontory of Salamis that looks towards Megara. There was a fort here and a guard of three ships to prevent anything from entering or leaving the harbour of the Megarians. This fort they assaulted, towed away the triremes without their crews, and ravaged the rest of Salamis, falling on the inhabitants unawares.

XCIV. Meanwhile fire-signals indicating a hostile attack were flashed to Athens, where a panic was caused as great as any in this war.\(^1\) For the inhabitants of the city thought that the enemy had already entered the Peiraeus, and those of the Peiraeus that they had taken Salamis and were all but sailing into their own harbour—as

\(^1\) This must refer to the so-called Decelian War (or last ten years of the Peloponnesian War), for in \textit{viii.} xevi. i we read that a panic occurred greater than any before (τοι \textit{Ἀθηναίοι... ἡκατηος μεγίστη ὅτα τῶν πρὸ παρίστη).
ὁπερ ἂν, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν μὴ κατοκηθῆσαι, ἑδίκως ἐγένετο· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀνεμος ἐκώλυσεν. Βοσθήσαντες δὲ ἀμὴ ἡμέρα πανδημεῖ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ναῦς τε καθεῖλκον καὶ ἐσβάντες κατὰ σπουδὴν καὶ πολλῷ θορύβῳ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶν ἐπὶ τὴν Σαλαμῖνα ἐπλεον, τῷ πεζῷ δὲ φυλακᾶς τοῦ 3 Πειραιῶς καθίσταντο. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ὡς ἡσθάνωτο τὴν Βοιθείαν, καταδραμόντες τῆς Σαλαμίνος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λείαν λαβόντες καὶ τὰς τρεῖς ναῦς ἐκ τοῦ Βουδόρου τοῦ φρουρίου κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τῆς Νισαιάς ἀπέπλεουν ἐστὶ γὰρ δὲ τῇ καὶ αἱ νῆσε αὐτῶν διὰ χρόνου καθελκυσθείσαι καὶ οὐδὲν στέγουσαν ἐφόβουν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἔς Μέγαρα πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς Κορίνθου 4 ἀπεκάθρησαν πεζῷ· οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι συκέτει κατα- λαβόντες πρὸς τῇ Σαλαμῖν ἀπέπλευσαν καὶ αὐτοῖ· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο φυλακῆν ἤδη τοῦ Πειραιῶς μᾶλλον τὸ λοιπὸν ἐποιοῦντο λιμένων τε κλῆσει καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπιμελείᾳ.

XCV. Τιπ δὲ τοὺς αὐτούς χρόνους, τοῦ χει- μῶνος τοῦτον ἀρχομένου, Σιτάλκης ὁ Τήρεως ὁ Ὀδρύσης, Θερακῶν βασιλεύς, ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Περδίκκαν τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου, Μακεδονίας βασι- λέα, καὶ ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Ὄρακης, δύο ὑποσχέσεις τῆς μὲν βουλόμενος ἀναπράξαι, τὴν 2 δὲ αὐτῶς ἀποδοῦναι. δὲ τῷ γὰρ Περδίκκας αὐτῷ ὑποσχόμενος, εἰ Ἀθηναίοις τε διαλλάξειεν ἑαυτῶν κατ’ ἀρχὰς τῷ πολέμῳ πιεζόμενον καὶ Φίλιππον

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indeed might easily have happened if the enemy had resolved that there should be no flinching; and no mere wind would have prevented them. But at dawn the Athenians hastened down to the Peiraeus with all their forces, launched ships, and embarking in haste and with much confusion sailed with the fleet to Salamis, setting their land-forces to guard the Peiraeus. The Peloponnesians had already overrun most of Salamis and had taken prisoners and booty and the three ships at the fort of Budorum, when they saw the relief expedition coming, whereupon they sailed in haste toward Nisaea; to some extent too there was apprehension about their own ships, which had not been drawn down into the sea for a long time and were anything but water-tight. On reaching Megara they withdrew on foot to Corinth, and the Athenians, finding them no longer at Salamis, likewise sailed back. After this they kept stricter guard over the Peiraeus, closing up the harbour\(^1\) as well as taking other precautions.

XCV. About the same time, at the beginning of this winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, a son of Teres, king of the Thracians, made an expedition against Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and against the Chalcidians of Thrace, wishing to exact fulfilment of one promise and to make good another. For when Perdiccas was being hard pressed at the beginning of the war he had made Sitalces a promise on condition that he should reconcile him to the Athenians and should not bring back his brother Philip, who was

\(^1\) i.e. by prolonging the walls at the entrance so as to leave only a narrow passage in the centre, which could be closed by a chain.
τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ πολέμιον ὅντα μὴ καταγάγοι ἐπὶ βασιλεία, ἢ ὑπεδέξατο οὐκ ἔπετελεί· τοὺς τε Ἀθηναίους αὐτὸς ὁμολογήκει ὅτε τὴν ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιεῖτο τὸν ἐπὶ Θράκης Χαλκείδικον πόλεμον 3 καταλύσειν. ἀμφοτέροις οὖν ἔνεκα τὴν ἔφοδον ἐποιεῖτο καὶ τὸν τε Φιλίππου νῦν Ἀμύνταν ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλεία τῶν Μακεδόνων ἤγε καὶ τῶν Ἐλληναῖον πρέσβεις, οἱ ἐτυχοῦν παρόντες τούτων ἔνεκα, καὶ ἠγγέλα "Ἀγνώσα: ἔδει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ναυσὶ τε καὶ στρατιᾷ ὡς πλείστη ἐπὶ τοὺς Χαλκείδεας παραγενέσθαι.

ΧCVI. Ἀνίστησιν οὖν ἐκ τῶν Ὁδρυσῶν ὀρμῶ- μενος πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ἐντὸς τοῦ Αἰμοῦ τε ὅρους καὶ τῆς Ῥοδόπης Θράκας ὅσων ἢρχε μέχρι θα- λάσσης ἐς τὸν Ἐπεξεινόν τε πόντον καὶ τὸν Ἐλλησποντον, ἐπειτα τοὺς ὑπερβάντε Αἰμοῦ Γέτας καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα μέρη ἐντὸς τοῦ Ἰστρού πο- ταμοῦ πρὸς θάλασσαν μᾶλλον τὴν τοῦ Ἐπεξεινοῦ πόντου κατοίκητο· εἰς θ' οἱ Γέται καὶ οἱ ταύτη ὄμοροι τε τοὺς Σκύθας καὶ ὄμοςκενοι, πάντες 2 ἵπποτόξαται. παρεκάλει δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρεινῶν Ὁρακῶν πολλοὺς τῶν αὐτονόμων καὶ μαχαιρο- φόρων, οἱ Δίοι καλοῦνται, τήν Ῥοδόπην οἱ πλει- στοι οἰκούντες· καὶ τοὺς μὲν μισθῷ ἐπείδευν, οἱ 3 ἐθελοῦνται ἐξυπηκολούθουν. ἀνίστη δὲ καὶ Ἀγριά-

1 ἔν... Ἐλλησποντον deleted by Hude and others as not read by the Schol. (μέχρι θαλάσσης, ἐς τοῦ Ἐπεξεινοῦ πόντου καὶ τοῦ Ἐλλησποντοῦ). Classen understands the Schol. to support the text reading.
hostile, to make him king; but Perdiccas would not fulfil his promise. On the other hand, Sitalees had made an agreement with the Athenians,\(^1\) at the time he entered into the alliance with them, to bring to an end their war with the Chalcidians in Thrace. For both these reasons, then, he now began the invasion, and he took with him Philip's son, Amyntas,\(^2\) with a view to making him king of the Macedonians, as well as some Athenian envoys who had come to see him on this business, and Hagnon as commander\(^3\); for the Athenians were to furnish a fleet and as large an army as possible\(^4\) for the war against the Chalcidians.

XCVI. Sitalees, accordingly, beginning with the Odrysians, summoned to his standard, first the Thracians under his sway between the mountains Haemus\(^5\) and Rhodope\(^6\) and the sea,—as far as the shores of the Euxine and the Hellespont,—then, beyond Haemus, the Getae, and all the other tribes that are settled south of the river Ister\(^7\) in the general direction of the seaboard of the Euxine sea; and the Getae and the people of that region are not only neighbours of the Scythians but are also equipped like them, all of them being mounted archers. And he summoned also many of the mountain Thracians who are independent and wear short swords, who are called Dii, most of them inhabiting Rhodope; and some of these were won to his service by pay, while others came along as volunteers. He called out, further, the

\(^1\) cf. ch. xxix. 4. \(^2\) Philip died meanwhile. 
\(^3\) As commander of expected Athenian troops, which however failed to come (ch. ci. 1). 
\(^4\) cf. ch. ci. 1. \(^5\) The modern Balkans. 
\(^6\) Now Despotodagh. \(^7\) Danube.
νας καὶ Δαιαίως καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα ἔβνη Παιονικά, ὃν ἠρχεν καὶ ἐσχατοῖ τῆς ἄρχής οὗτα ἦσαν μέχρι γὰρ Δαιαίων Παιῶνων καὶ τοῦ Στρυμόνος ποταμοῦ, δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Σκόμβρου ὄρους δὲ Ἁγριά- 

νων καὶ Δαιαίων ἤει, ὥριζετο ἡ ἄρχη τὰ πρὸς 

4 Παιῶνας αὐτοῦ ὄνομος ἤδη, τὰ δὲ πρὸς Τριβαλ- 

λούς, καὶ τούτους αὐτοῦ ὄνομος, Τρηπες ὥριζεν 

καὶ Τιλαταῖοι: οἰκούσι δ' οὕτοι πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ 

Σκόμβρου ὄρους καὶ παρῆκουσι πρὸς ἥλιον δύσιν 

μέχρι τοῦ Ὄσκειον ποταμοῦ. ἤει δ' οὕτοι ἐκ τοῦ 

όρους οἴκητον καὶ ὁ Νέστος καὶ ὁ Ἐβρος ἐστι δὲ 

ἐρήμων τὸ ὄρος καὶ μέγα, ἐχώμενον τῆς Ῥοδόπης. 

XCVII. Ἑγένετο δὲ ἡ ἄρχη ἡ Ὄδρυσων μέ- 

γεθος ἐπὶ μὲν θάλασσαν καθήκουσα ἀπὸ Ἀβ- 

dήρων πόλεως ἐς τὸν Ἐβρειον πόντον μέχρι Ἐσ- 

τροὺς ποταμοῦ ἀυτὴ περίπλους ἐστιν ἡ γῆ 

tὰ ξυντομῶτατα, ἣν αἰεὶ κατὰ πρύμναι ἵστηται 

τὸ πνεῦμα, νη στρογγύλη τεσσάρων ἡμερῶν καὶ 

ἐσων νυκτῶν ὅδω δὲ τὰ ξυντομῶτατα εἴ Ἀβ- 

dήρων καὶ Ἐστροὺ ἀνήρ εὐξῶνος ἐνδεκαταιος τελεῖ. 

2 τὰ μὲν πρὸς θάλασσαν τοσαίτη ἢν, ἐς ἢπειρον 

dὲ ἀπὸ Βυζαντίου ἐς Δαιαίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 

Στρυμόνα (ταυτή γὰρ διὰ πλεῖστον ἀπὸ θα- 

lάσης ἄνω ἐγώνυμο) ἡμερῶν ἄνδρε εὐξῶνο τριῶν 

3 καὶ δέκα αὐσταὶ. φόρος τε ἐκ πάσης τῆς βαρ- 

βάρου καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων ὀσωπερ 

1 εἰ, in the MSS. before ὥριζετο, deleted by Arnold.

1 Paeanian tribes that dwelt in the mountain regions bordering on Macedonia, watered by the Upper Strymon and the Axios; most of them were afterwards subject to Macedonia.
Agrianians and Laeaeans, and all the other Paeonian tribes which were under his sway. These peoples were at the outer limits of his empire; for the bounds of his empire extended, on the side towards the Paeonians, who are independent, as far as the Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which flows from mount Scombrus through the country of the Agrianians and the Laeaeans. On the side toward the Triballi, who also are independent, the boundary is formed by the Treres and Tilataeans; and these dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and extend toward the west as far as the river Oscius. This river has its source in the same mountains as the Nestus and the Hebrus—a mountain range of great extent and uninhabited that is adjacent to Rhodope.

XCVII. Now the empire of the Odrysians, in respect to its size extended along the sea-coast from the city of Abdera to the Euxine Sea as far as the river Ister. This stretch of coast constitutes a voyage for a merchant-vessel, if the shortest course is taken and the wind keeps steady astern, of four days and as many nights; but the journey by land from Abdera to the Ister can be accomplished by an active man, taking the shortest route, in eleven days. Such was its extent on its seaboard; but inland the distance from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and the river Strymon—for this was its inland point farthest distant from the sea—it is possible for an active man to cover in thirteen days. As for the tribute which came in from the barbarian territory and from all the Hellenic cities over which the

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ἡρξαν ἐπὶ Σεῦθου, ὃς ὀστερον Σιτάλκου βασιλεύσας πλεῖστον δὴ ἐποίησε, τετρακοσίων ταλάντων ἀργυρίου μᾶλιστα δύναμις, ἄ χρυσός καὶ ἄργυρος ἦεὶ καὶ δῶρα οὐκ ἔλασσο τούτων χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργυροῦ προσθέρετο, χωρὶς δὲ ὅσα ὑφαντᾶ τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευὴ, καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς παραδυνάστευσαι τε καὶ γενναίοις Ὀδρυσών. κατεστήσαντο γὰρ τούναυτίων τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας τῶν νόμον ὄντα μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Θρᾳκὶ λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἡ διδόναι (καὶ αἴσχους ἢν αἰτηθέντα μὴ δοῦναι ἢ αἰτησάντα μὴ τυχεῖν), ὅμως δὲ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῷ ἐχρήσαντο· οὐ γὰρ ἦν πρᾶξιν οὐδὲν μὴ διδόντα δῶρα.

5 ὅστε ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ βασιλεία ἠλθεν ἰσχυός. τὸν γὰρ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ὅσιν μεταξὺ τοῦ Ἰονίου κόλπου καὶ τοῦ Εὐξείνου πόλισαν μεγίστη ἐγένετο χρημάτων προσόδορ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἰσχύι δὲ μάχης καὶ στρατοῦ πλῆθει πολὺ δευτέρα

6 μετὰ τὴν Σκυθῶν. ταύτῃ δὲ ἀδύνατα ἐξισούσθαι οὕς ὅτι τὰ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ 'Ἀσίᾳ ἔθνος ἐν πρὸς ἐν οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ τι δυνατῶν Σκύθων ὁμογενῶμονοισι πᾶσιν ἀντιστηραι. οὐ μὴν οὐδ'
Odrysians acquired sway in the time of Seuthes—
who, succeeding Sitalces on the throne, brought
the revenues to their maximum—its value was about
four hundred talents in coin, and was paid in gold
and silver; and gifts equal in value to the tribute,
not only of gold and silver, but besides these all
manner of stuffs, both embroidered and plain, and
other articles for household use, were brought as
offerings to the king, and not for him only, but also
for the subordinate princes and nobles of the Odry-
sians. For these kings had established a custom
which was just the opposite of that prevailing in the
kingdom of the Persians, namely, to take rather
than to give; indeed it was more disgraceful for a
man not to give when asked than to ask and be
refused. This custom was observed among the
other Thracians also; but the Odrysian kings, as
they were more powerful, followed it more exten-
sively; indeed it was not possible to accomplish
anything without giving gifts. Consequently the
kingdom attained to a great degree of power. For
of all the kingdoms in Europe between the Ionian
Gulf and the Euxine Sea it was the greatest in
revenue of money and in general prosperity; but
as regards the strength and size of its army, it was
distinctly inferior to the Scythian kingdom. With
that not only are the nations of Europe unable to
compete, but even in Asia, nation against nation,
there is none which can make a stand against the
Scythians if they all act in concert. However, with

4 Contradicting Hdt. v. iii.: Ἐρημίκων δὲ ἔθνος μέγιστών ἔστι
μετὰ γε ἰυνόσι πάντων ἀνθρώπων· εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἐνὸς ἀρχείου ἢ φρονείοι
κατὰ τῶν τῶν, ἐπαχον τ' ἀν ἐλευθερία καὶ πολλῆς κράτιστον πάντων
ἐθνῶν κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν.
ἐς τὴν ἄλλην εὐβουλίαν καὶ ξύνεσιν περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἐς τὸν βίον ἄλλοις ὁμοιοῦνται.

ΧCVIII. Σιτάλκης μὲν οὖν χώρας τοσαύτης βασιλεύων παρεσκευάζετο τὸν στρατὸν. καὶ ἑπεὶ δὴ αὐτῷ ἑτοίμα ἦν, ἄρας ἐπορεύετο ἐπὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς, ἑπεὶ διὰ Κερκίνης ἐρήμου ὄρους, ὃ ἐστὶ μεθόριον Σιντῶν καὶ Παιώνων. ἐπορεύετο δὲ δὲ αὐτοῦ τῇ ὁδῷ ἦν πρὸ τοῦ αὐτῶς ἐποιήσατο τεμών τὴν ὕλην, ὅτε ἐπὶ Παιώνας ἐστράτευσεν.

2 τὸ δὲ ὄρος ἐξ Ὀδρυσῶν διώνυσεν ἐν δεξιὰ μὲν εἶχον Παιώνας, ἐν ἀριστερὰ δὲ Σιντῶν καὶ Μαίδους. διελθόντες δὲ αὐτῷ ἄφικοντο ἐς Δό-

3 βηρον τὴν Παιονίκην. πορευομένῳ δὲ αὐτῷ ἀπε-

4 καὶ δέκα μυριάδων γενέσθαι καὶ τοῦτοῦ τὸ μὲν πλέον πεζὸν ἦν, τριτημόριον δὲ μάλιστα ἐπιπίκον. τοῦ δ’ ἐπιπίκοι τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοῖς Ὀδρύσαι παρείχοντο καὶ μετ’ αὐτῶν Γέται. τοῦ δὲ πεζοῦ οἱ μαχαίροφοροι μαχιμῶτατοι μὲν ἦσαν οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ῥοδόπης αὐτόνομοι καταβάντες, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ὁμι-

ΧCIX. Ξυνθροῖσοντο οὖν ἐν τῇ Δοβήρῳ καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο ὅπως κατὰ κορυφὴν ἐσβαλοῦσιν ἐς τὴν κάτω Μακεδονίαν, ὡς ὁ Περδίκκας ἦρχεν.

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reference to wise counsel and intelligence about the things that belong to the enrichment of life the Scythians are not to be compared with other nations.

XCVIII. Such then was the extent of the country over which Sitalees ruled at the time when he was preparing his army. But when everything was ready, he set out for Macedonia, proceeding first through his own territory, then through the desolate range of Cercine, which lies between the Sinti and Paeonians. And he passed over this mountain by the road which he himself had constructed before, when he made an expedition against the Paeonians, cutting a path through the forest. As his army crossed the mountain, leaving the country of the Odrysians, they had the Paeonians on the right and on the left the Sinti and Maedi; and when they came out on the other side they arrived at Doberus in Paeonia. On the march his army suffered no loss, except from sickness, but rather was augmented; for many of the independent Thracians joined the expedition unsolicited, in the hope of plunder, so that the whole number is said to have been not less than a hundred and fifty thousand, the greater part being infantry, about one-third cavalry. Of the cavalry the Odrysians themselves furnished the largest contingent, and next to them the Getae; while of the infantry the sword-wearers, independent tribes that came down from Mount Rhodope, were the best fighters, the rest of the army that followed, a miscellaneous horde, being formidable chiefly on account of its numbers.

XCIX. So Sitalees' army was being mustered at Doberus and preparing to pass over the mountain crest and descend upon lower Macedonia, of which
2 τὸν γὰρ Μακεδῶνον εἰςὶ καὶ Δυνάκηται καὶ Ἔλιμποταί καὶ ἄλλα ἐθνη ἐπάνωθεν, ἄ ξυμμαχα μὲν ἀστεῖοι καὶ ὑπήκοα, βασιλείας δ’ ἔχει
3 καθ’ αὐτά. τὴν δὲ παρὰ θάλασσαν νῦν Μακε-
δονίαν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Περδίκκακον πατήρ καὶ οἱ
πρόγοινοι αὐτοῦ Τημενίδαι τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἄντες ἐξ
Ἀργοῦς πρώτοι ἐκτῆσαν καὶ ἐβασίλευσαν ἀναστήσαντες μάχη ἐκ μὲν Πιερίας Πέρας, οἱ
ὑστεροὶ ὑπὸ τὸ Πάγγαλον πέραν Στρυμὼνος
φύκησαν Φάργαρτα καὶ ἄλλα χωρία (καὶ ἔτι καὶ
νῦν Πιερίκος κόλπος καλεῖται ἦ ὑπὸ τὸ Παγγαῖο
πρὸς θάλασσαν γη), ἐκ δὲ τῆς Βοττίας καλομε-
νης Βοττιάους, οἱ νῦν ὁμοίω παλαιάδεων οἰκοῦ-
4 σιω τὴς δὲ Παιονίας παρὰ τὸν Ἀξίον ποταμὸν
στενὴν τινα καθήκονς ἄνωθεν μέχρι Πέλλης
καὶ θαλάσσῃς ἐκτῆσαντο, καὶ πέραν Ἀξίου μέχρι
Στρυμῶνος τὴν Μυγδονίαν καλομενήν Ἦδώνας
5 ἐξελάσαντες νέμονται. ἀνέστησαν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς
νῦν Ἑορδίας καλομενήν Ἑορδοῦς, ων οἱ μὲν
πολλοὶ ἐφθάρσαν, βραχύ δὲ τι αὐτῶν περὶ
Φύσκαν κατόκηται, καὶ ἐξ Ἀλμωπίας Ἀλμωπᾶς.
6 ἐκράτησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν οἱ Μακεδόνες
οὕτω ἄ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔχουσι, τῶν τε Ἀνθεμοῦντα
καὶ Γρηστωνίαν καὶ Βισαλτίαν καὶ Μακεδόνων
αὐτῶν πολλῆν. τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν Μακεδονία καλεῖ-
ται καὶ Περδίκκας Ἀλεξάνδρου βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν
ἡν ὁτε Σιτάλκης ἐπήει.
Perdiccas was ruler. For the Macedonian race includes also the Lyncestians, Elimiotes, and other tribes of the upper country, which, though in alliance with the nearer Macedonians and subject to them, have kings of their own; but the country by the sea which is now called Macedonia, was first acquired and made their kingdom by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his forefathers, who were originally Temenidae from Argos. They defeated and expelled from Pieria the Pierians, who afterwards took up their abode in Phagres and other places at the foot of Mount Pangaeus beyond the Strymon (and even to this day the district at the foot of Mount Pangaeus toward the sea is called the Pierian Valley), and also, from the country called Bottia, the Bottiaeans, who now dwell on the borders of the Chalcidians; they acquired, further, a narrow strip of Paeonia extending along the river Axius¹ from the interior to Pella and the sea; and beyond the Axius they possess the district as far as the Strymon which is called Mygdonia, having driven out the Edonians. Moreover, they expelled from the district now called Eordia the Eordians, most of whom were destroyed, but a small portion is settled in the neighbourhood of Physca; and also from Almopia the Almopians. These Macedonians also made themselves masters of certain places, which they still hold, belonging to the other tribes, namely, of Anthemus, Grestonia, Bisaltia, as well as of a large part of Macedonia proper. But the whole is now called Macedonia, and Perdiccas son of Alexander was king when Sitalces made his invasion.

¹ Now Vardar.
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C. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες οὗτοι ἐπίοντος πολ- λοῦ στρατοῦ ἀδύνατοι δυντεῖς ἀμύνεσθαι ἐς τὸ τὰ καρτερά καὶ τὰ τεῖχη ὅσα ἦν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἐσεκο-
2 μίσθησαν. ἦν δὲ οὐ πολλά, ἀλλὰ ὑστεροῦ Ἀρχέ-
λαος ὁ Περδίκκου νῦν βασιλεύς γενόμενος τὰ
νῦν οὖν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φιλοδομήσας καὶ ὅσον εὐθεῖας ἔτεμε καὶ τάλλα διεκόσμησε τὰ ἕκατὸ τῶν
πόλεμον ἔπειν καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ τῇ ἀλλῃ παρα-
σκευῇ κρεῖσσον ἡ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἀλλοί βασιλῆς
3 ὅκτω οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι. ὁ δὲ στρατὸς τῶν
Θρακῶν ἐκ τῆς Δοβηροῦ ἐσέβαλε πρῶτον μὲν ἐς
τὴν Φιλίππου πρότερον οὐσίαν ἀρχήν, καὶ εἶλεν
Εἰδομενήν μὲν κατὰ κράτος, Γορτυνίαν δὲ καὶ
Ἀταλάντην καὶ ἄλλα ἄτα χωρία ὁμολογία διὰ
τὴν Ἀμφίτου φιλίαν προσχωροῦντα, τοῦ Φιλί-
πποῦ νῦες, παρόντος. Εὐρωπὸν δὲ ἐπολιόρκησαν
4 μὲν, ἔλειν δὲ οὐκ ἐδύναντο. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν
ἀλλήν Μακεδονίαν προνέφει τὴν ἐν ἀριστερᾷ
Πέλλης καὶ Κυρροῦ. ἔσω δὲ τούτων ἐς τὴν
Βοττιαίαν καὶ Πιερίαν οὐκ ἀφίκοντο, ἀλλὰ τὴν
tοῦ Μυγδονίαν καὶ Γρηστονίαν καὶ Ἀλβέμωντα
5 ἐδήμουν. οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες πεζῶ μὲν οὐδὲ διενοῦν-
tο ἀμύνεσθαι, ἔπινοι δὲ προσμεταπεμψάμενοι
ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω ξυμμάχων, ὅπῃ δοκοῦν, ὅλιγοι πρὸς
πόλλους ἐσέβαλλον ἐς τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Θρα-
6 κῶν, καὶ ἣ μὲν προσπέσοιεν, οὐδεὶς ὑπέμενεν
ἀνδράς ἔπειν τὰς ἀγάθους καὶ τῆς ῥακεισμένους,
ὑπὸ δὲ πλήθους περικλημένου αὐτοὺς πολλα-
1 τέ, in the MSS. after τά, deleted by Haacke.
C. The Macedonians of this region, unable to defend themselves against so great an invading army, betook themselves to the strong places and fortresses that were in the country. These were not many; but subsequently Archelaus son of Perdiccas, when he became king,¹ built those that are now in the country, and cut straight roads, and in general organized his country for war by providing cavalry, arms and other equipment beyond anything achieved by all the eight kings who preceded him. But the Thracian army, advancing from Doberus, invaded first the province which before had belonged to Philip, and took Idomene by storm; but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places capitulated voluntarily out of friendship for Amyntas son of Philip, who accompanied Sitalces; moreover they laid siege to Europus, but were unable to take it. Next they advanced into the other part of Macedonia, which is to the west of Pella and Cyrrhus. Beyond these places, however, into Bottiaeæ and Pieria, they did not penetrate, but ravaged Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians, on the other hand, did not even think of defending themselves with infantry, but calling upon their allies in the interior for additional cavalry, though few against many, they dashed in among the Thracian army wherever they chose. And wherever they charged no one could withstand them, for they were good horsemen and protected by euirasses; but since they were constantly being hemmed in by superior numbers and found themselves

¹ 413-389 B.C. He was as famous for the splendour and success of his reign as for the crimes by which he obtained the throne.
πλασιώ τῷ ὁμίλῳ ἐς κινδυνον καθίστασαν ὡστε τέλος ἁσχίσαν ἢγον, οὐ νομίζοντες ἵκανολ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πλέον κινδυνεύειν.

Cipher. Ὡ δὲ Σιτάλκης πρὸς τε τῶν Περδίκκαν λόγους ἐποιεῖτο ὡν ἔνεκα ἐστράτευσε, καὶ ἐπειδῆ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι οὐ παρῆσαν ταῖς ναυσίν ἀπιστοῦντες αὐτόν μὴ ἤξειν (δόρα δὲ καὶ πρέσβεις ἐπεμψαν αὐτῷ), ἐς τε τοὺς Χαλκιδεὰς καὶ Βοττιαίους μέρος τι τοῦ στρατοῦ πέμπτε, καὶ τειχήρεις ποιήσας ἐδῶ τῇ γῆ την γῆν. καθημένου δ' αὐτοῦ περὶ τοὺς χώρους τούτους οἱ πρὸς νότων οἰκοῦντες Θεσσαλοὶ καὶ Μάγνητες καὶ οἱ άλλοι υπήκοοι Θεσσαλῶν καὶ οἱ μέχρι Θερμοπυλῶν Ἑλλήνες ἐφοβήθησαν μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ σφάς ὁ στρατὸς χωρήσῃ, καὶ ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦσαν. ἐφοβήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ πέραν Στρυμόνος πρὸς βορέαν Ὀρῆκες ὡσοι πεδία ἔλχον, Παυσίων καὶ Ὅδομαντοι καὶ Δρὸς καὶ Δερσάιοι αὐτόνομοι δ' εἰσὶ πάντες. παρέσχε δὲ λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πολεμίους Ἑλλήνας μὴ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀγόμενοι κατὰ τὸ ξύμλομαχον καὶ ἐπὶ σφάς χωρήσωσιν. ὡ δὲ τῇ τε Ἑλληνικῇ καὶ Βοτικῇ καὶ Μακεδονικῇ ἕπεγχων ἐφθείρε, καὶ ἐπειδῆ αὐτῷ οὐδὲν ἐπράσπετο ὡν ἔνεκα ἐσέβαλε, καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ σιτόν τε οὐκ εἶχεν αὐτῷ καὶ ὑπὸ χειμῶνος ἑταλαϊτώρει, ἀναπείθεται ὑπὸ Σεύθου τοῦ Σπαραδόκου, ἀδελ-
imperilled by the horde that was many times their own number, they finally desisted, thinking that they were not strong enough to fight with the larger force.

Cl. Sitalces now began to hold parleys with Perdiccas about the matters for which he had undertaken the expedition; and since the Athenians (who did not believe that Sitalces would come, though they sent gifts and envoys to him) had not arrived with their promised fleet, he despatched part of his army into the territory of the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up within their walls ravaged their lands. But while he was staying in the neighbourhood of these places, the peoples which dwell to the south—the Thessaliens, the Magnesians and other subjects of the Thessaliens, and the Hellenes as far south as Thermopylae—became frightened lest the host should come against them also, and so were making preparations. The same alarm was felt also by the Thracians who inhabit the plain beyond the Strymon to the north, that is, the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and Dersacans, independent tribes. He gave occasion also to a rumour which spread even to the Hellenes hostile to Athens, that the Thracians might be led on by the Athenians in accordance with the terms of their alliance and come against them too. But meanwhile Sitalces kept on ravaging at one and the same time Chalcidice, Bottice, and Macedonia; and then, since none of the original objects of his invasion was being accomplished, and his army was without food and was suffering from the winter, he was persuaded by Seuthes son of Sparadocus, a
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φιδοῦ ὅντος καὶ μέγιστον μεθ’ ἑαυτὸν δυναμένου, ὅστι’ ἐν τάχει ἀπελθεῖν. τὸν δὲ Σεῦθην κρύφα Περδίκκας ὑπωσχόμενος ἀδελφὴν ἑαυτοῦ δώσειν καὶ χρήματα ἐπ’ αὐτὴ προσποιεῖται. καὶ ο μὲν πεισθεὶς καὶ μείνας τριάκοντα τὰς πάσας ἡμέρας, τούτον δὲ ὁκτὼ ἐν Χαλκιδεύσιν, ἀνεχώρησε τῷ στρατῷ κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ οἴκου. Περδίκκας δὲ ὑστερον Στρατονίκην τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδελφήν δίδωσι Σεῦθη, ὡσπερ ὑπέσχετο. τὰ μὲν σὺν κατὰ τὴν Σιτάλκου στρατείαν οὖτως ἐγένετο.

CII. Ὅλ’ δὲ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ Ἄθηναιοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμώνος, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναυτικὸν διελύθη, Φορμίωνος ἡγουμένου ἐστράτευσαν, παραπλεύσαντες ἐπ’ Ἀστακοῦ καὶ ὑποβάντες ἐς τὴν μεσόγειαν τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας τετρακοσίως μὲν ὑπλίταις Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, τετρακοσίως δὲ Μεσσηνίων, καὶ ἐκ τῆς Στρατοῦ καὶ Κορώντων καὶ ἄλλων χωρίων ἄνδρας οὐ δοκοῦντας βεβαιούς εἶναι ἐξήλασαν, καὶ Κύνητα τῶν Θεολύτου ἐς Κόρωντα καταγαγόντες ἀνεχώρησαν 2 πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. ἐς ὅμως Οἰνιάδας αἰεὶ πουτε πολεμίους ὅντας μόνους Ἀκαρνάνων οὐκ ἔδοκε δυνατὸν εἶναι χειμώνος ὅντος στρατεύειν· ὁ γὰρ Ἀχελώος ποταμός ἐρῶν ἐκ Πίνδου ὄρους διὰ Δολοπίας καὶ Ἀγραίων καὶ Ἀμφίλοχον καὶ διὰ τοῦ Ἀκαρνανίκου πεδίου, ἀνατρεπὲι μὲν παρὰ Στράτον πόλιν, ἐς θάλασσαν ὡς εἴεις παρ’ Οἰνιάδας καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς περιλεμνάξων, ἀποροὺς ποιεῖ.
nephew and next to him in power, to go back home at once. Now Seuthes had been secretly won over by Perdiccas, who had promised to give him his sister in marriage and a dowry with her. So Sitaleces yielded, and after a stay of only thirty days in all, eight of which had been spent among the Chaleidians, returned home with his army with all speed. And Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such, then, is the history of the expedition of Sitaleces.

CII. During the same winter the Athenians in Naupactus, after the Peloponnesian fleet had been disbanded, made an expedition under the command of Phormio. They first skirted the coast in the direction of Astacus, and then, disembarking, invaded the interior of Acarnania with four hundred Athenian hoplites from the ships and four hundred Messenian. And after they had expelled from Stratus, Coronta, and other places such men as were regarded as disloyal, and had restored Cynes son of Theolytus to Coronta, they returned again to their ships. For it seemed impracticable in winter to make a campaign against Oeniadac, whose inhabitants alone of the Acarnanians were always hostile; for the river Acheleans, which rises in Mount Pindus and flows through the country of the Dolopians, Agracans, and Amphilocheians and then through the Acarnanian plain, passes by the city of Stratus high up the stream, but by Oeniadac empties into the sea, where it surrounds the city with marshes, thus rendering military operations there impossible in

1 Sadoecus, Sitaleces' own son, who had been received into Athenian citizenship (ch. xxix. 5; lxvii. 2), must have died before this time. The nephew Seuthes succeeded to the throne in 424 B.C. (iv. ch. 4).
3 ύπο τοῦ ὑδάτος ἐν χειμῶνι στρατεύειν. κεῖνται δὲ καὶ τῶν νῆσον τῶν Ἐχινάδων αἵ πολλαὶ κατανυκροῦ Ὀινιάδῶν τοῦ Ἀχελώου τῶν ἐκβολῶν οὐδὲν ἦπέχουσαι, ὡστε μέγας ὁ ποταμός προσχῶι αἰεὶ καὶ εἰσὶ τῶν νῆσων αἱ ἤπειρωνται, ἐπὶς δὲ καὶ πᾶσας οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ ἀν χρόνῳ
4 τοῦτο παθεῖν τὸ τε γὰρ ἰεύμα ἐστὶ μέγα καὶ πολύ καὶ δὴορόν, αἱ τε νῆσοι πυκναί, καὶ ἀλλήλαις τῆς προσχώσεως τὸ μὴ σκεδάνυσθαι ἑκύνθεσοι τῆς προσχώσεως τὸ μὴ σκεδάνυσθαι, παραλλάξαι καὶ οὐ κατὰ στοίχον κεῖμεναι, οὐδὲ ἐχοῦσαι εὐθεῖας διόδους τοῦ ὑδάτος
5 ἐς τὸ πέλαγος. ἐρήμου δὲ εἰσὶ καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀλκμέων τῷ Ἀμφιάρεω, ὅτε ὁ ἀλάσθαι αὐτῶν μετὰ τὸν φόνον τῆς μητρός, τὸν Ἀπόλλων ταῦτην τὴν γῆν χρῆσαι οἶκεῖν, ὑπειπόντα οὐκ εἴναι λύσιν τῶν δειμάτων πρὸν ἀν εὔρων ἐν ταύτη τῇ χώρᾳ κατοικίστηται ἢτες ὅτε ἐκτείνε τὴν μητέρα μῆτῳ ὑπὸ ἦλιον ἑωράτο μηδὲ
6 γῆς ἡν, ὅς τῆς γε ἀλλής αὐτῶς μεμιασμένῃς. ὁ δὲ ἀπόρος, ὡς φασί, μόλις κατενόησε τὴν πρόσωσιν ταῦτην τοῦ Ἀχελώου, καὶ ἔδοκει αὐτῷ ἰκανή ἀν κεχώσθη διαίτα τῷ σώματι ἢφ' οὐπερ κτείνας τὴν μητέρα οὐκ ὀλέγου χρόνου ἔπλανατο. καὶ κατοικισθεὶς ἐς τοὺς περὶ Ὀινιάδος τόπους ἑδυναστευσε μὲ καὶ ἀπὸ Ἀκαρνάνος παιδὸς ἕαυτού τῆς χώρας τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐγκατέλειπεν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἀλκμέων τοιαῦτα λεγόμενα παρελάβομεν.

1 Hude brackets τὸ μὴ σκεδάνυσθαι, following Stahl.
winter by reason of the water. Besides, most of the Echinades islands lie opposite to Oeniadae at no great distance from the mouths of the Achelous, so that the river, which is large, keeps making fresh deposits of silt, and some of the islands have already become part of the mainland, and probably this will happen to all of them in no great while. For the stream is wide and deep and turbid, and the islands are close together and serve to bind to one another the bars as they are formed, preventing them from being broken up, since the islands lie, not in line, but irregularly, and do not allow straight channels for the water into the open sea. These islands are uninhabited and not large. There is a story that when Alemæon son of Amphiaraus was a wanderer after the murder of his mother, Apollo directed him by oracle to inhabit this land, intimating that he would have no release from his fears until he should find and settle in a country which at the time he killed his mother had not yet been seen by the sun, and was not even land then, for all the rest of the earth had been polluted by him. And he, in his perplexity, at last, as the story goes, observed this sand-bar formed by the Achelous, and he surmised that during the long time he had been wandering since he had slain his mother enough land would have been silted up to support life in. So he settled there in the region of Oeniadae, founded a principality, and left to the country its name Acarnania, after that of his son Acarnan. Such is the tradition which we have received concerning Alemæon.

1 Eriphyle.
THUCYDIDES

ΣΠ. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὁ Φορμίων ἀραντες ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὴν Ναυ-πακτον ἦρα κατέπλευσαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, τοὺς τε ἐλευθέρους τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἐκ τῶν ναυμαχιῶν ἄροντες, οἱ ἀνὴρ ἀντὶ ἀνδρός ἐλύ-2 θησαν, καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἄς ἔλησον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα ὁὔτος, καὶ τρίτον ἐτος τῶν πολέμων ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὑπὸ Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

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CIII. The Athenians and Phormio set out from Acarnania and arrived at Naupactus, and later, at the beginning of spring, sailed back to Athens, bringing with them the captured ships and also the prisoners of free birth whom they had taken in the sea-fights. These were exchanged man for man. And this winter ended, concluding the third year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.
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