THUCYDIDES

II
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOOK III</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOOK IV</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MAPS:**

- Central Greece and Peloponnesus  
  To face p. 171
- Pylos and its Environs  
  Page 219
THUCYDIDES

BOOK III
ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΙ

Γ

I. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγυνημένου θέρους Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀμα τῷ σῖτῳ ἀκμάζοντες ἐστράτευσαν ἐς τὴν 'Αττικὴν (ἡγεῖτο δὲ αὐτῶν 'Αρχιδαμὸς ὁ Ζευξιδάμου, Δακεδαιμονίων βασιλεὺς), καὶ ἐγκαθεξόμενοι ἐδήσαν τὴν γην' καὶ προσβολαὶ, ὡσπερ εἰώθεσαν, ἐγήγονοτο ἅθηναι ἱππεὺς ὁποὶ παρεῖκοι, καὶ τὸν πλείστου ὄμιλον τῶν ψιλῶν εἰργόν τὸ μὴ προεξίοντας τῶν ὀπλών τὰ ἐγγὺς 2 τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν. ἐμμείναντες δὲ χρόνον οὗ εἰχον τὰ σιτία ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

II. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐσβολὴν τῶν Πελοποννησίων εὐθὺς Δέσβος πλὴν Μηθύμνης ἀπέστη ἀπὸ Ἀθηναίων, βουληθέντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου (ἀλλ’ οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ προσεδέξαντο), ἀναγκασθέντες δὲ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπόστασιν πρότερον 2 ἡ διενοῦντο ποιήσασθαι. τῶν τε γὰρ λιμένων τὴν χώσιν καὶ τειχῶν οἰκοδόμησιν καὶ νεῶν

1 Mytilene was an oligarchical state, with dependent towns, Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, only Methymna on the northern coast retaining its democratic constitution and its connection with Athens. For the revolt, cf. Diod. Sic. xii.

2
I. During the following summer, when the grain was ripening, the Peloponnesians and their allies made an expedition into Attica under the leadership of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and settling in camp proceeded to ravage the land. And sallies were made as usual by the Athenian cavalry wherever opportunity offered, thus preventing the great mass of the enemy’s light-armed troops from going beyond their watch-posts and laying waste the districts near the city. The invaders remained as long as their provisions lasted, then withdrew and dispersed to their several cities.

II. Directly after the invasion of the Peloponnesians, all Lesbos, except Methymna, revolted from Athens. The Lesbians had wished to do this even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians had not taken them into their alliance, and even in this instance they were forced to revolt sooner than they had intended. For they were waiting until the work should be finished of blocking their harbours.

45. The complaint of the Mytilenaean was founded on the Athenian attempt to prevent their centralisation. See W. Herbst, Der Abfall Mytilene, 1861; Leithäuser, Der Abfall Mytilene, 1874.
ποίησιν ἐπέμενον τελεσθῆναι, καὶ ὡσα ἐκ τοῦ
Πόντου ἔδει ἀφικέσθαι, τοξότας τε καὶ σίτων,
3 καὶ ἀ μεταπεμπόμενοι ἦσαν. Τενέδιοι γὰρ ὄντες
αὐτοῖς διάφοροι καὶ Μηθυμναιοὶ καὶ αὐτῶν Μυ-
τιληναῖοι ἵδια ἀνδρεῖς κατὰ στάσιν, πρόξειοι
Ἀθηναίων, μηνυταὶ γίγνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις
ὅτι ξυνοικίζουσι τε τὴν Δέσβον ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην
βία καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἀπασαν μετὰ Δακεδαι-
μοιῶν καὶ Βοιωτῶν ξυγγενῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ ἀπο-
στάσεις ἐπείγονται· καὶ εἰ μὴ τις προκαταλή-
ψεται ἤδη, στερήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς Δέσβον.

Π. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι (ἦσαν γὰρ τεταλαιπωρη-
μένοι ὑπὸ τε τῆς νόσου καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἅρτι
καθισταμένου καὶ ἀκμάζοντος) μέγα μὲν ἔργον
ἤγοντο εἶναι Δέσβον προσπολεμώσασθαι ναυ-
τικὸν ἐχοῦσαν καὶ δύναμιν ἀκέραιον, καὶ οὐκ
ἀπεδέχοντο τὸ πρῶτον τὰς κατηγορίας μείζου
μέρος νεμόντες τῷ μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀληθῆ εἶναι·
ἐπειδὴ μὲντοι καὶ πέμψαντες πρέσβεις οὐκ
ἐπείθον τοὺς Μυτιληναίους τὴν τε ξυνοίκισιν
καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν διαλύειν, δείσαντες προκατα-
2 λαβεῖν ἐβούλοντο. καὶ πέμψουσιν ἐξαπιναῖως
tessarákonta ναῦς, αἱ ἐτυχον περὶ Πελοπόν-
νησοῦ παρασκευασμέναι πλεῖν. Κλεῖππιδῆς δὲ
3 ὁ Δεινόν τρῖτος αὐτὸς ἐστρατήγει. ἐσηγγελθὲ
γὰρ αὐτῶς ὡς εἰή Ἐπόλλωνος Μαλὸντος ἐξω

1 The word means literally "public guest," or "friend." Under the condition of entertaining and assisting ambassadors and citizens of the state they represented they enjoyed
building walls, and constructing ships, and until
the arrival of what they needed from the Pontus—
archers and grain, and whatever else they were
sending for. But the people of Tenedos, who
were at variance with them, and of Methymna,
and some of the Mytileneans themselves, men in
private station who were proxeni\(^1\) of the Athenians,
were moved by partisanship to turn informers and
notify the Athenians that the Mytileneans were
attempting to bring all Lesbos into a political union
centred in Mytilene; that all their preparations were
being hurried forward, in concert with the Lacedaemonians and with their kinsmen the Boeotians, with
the purpose of revolting; and that unless someone
should forestall them forthwith, Lesbos would be lost
to Athens.

III. But the Athenians, distressed by the plague
as well as by the war, which had recently broken out
and was now at its height, thought it a serious
matter to make a new enemy of Lesbos, which had
a fleet and power unimpaired; and so at first they
would not listen to the charges, giving greater weight
to the wish that they might not be true. When,
however, the envoys whom they sent could not per-
suade the Mytileneans to stop their measures for
political union and their preparations, they became
alarmed and wished to forestall them. So they sud-
denly despatched forty ships, which happened to be
ready for a cruise around the Peloponnesus, under
the command of Cleippides son of Deinias and two
others; for word had come to them that there was a
certain privileges from that state, and answered pretty nearly
to our Consuls and Residents, though the proxenus was always
a member of the state where he served.
τῆς πόλεως ἐορτή, ἐν ᾗ πανδημεὶς Μυτιληναῖοι ἐορτάζουσι, καὶ ἔλπιδα εἶναι ἐπειδήθεντας ἐπιπεσείν ἀφνοί καὶ ἂν μὲν ξυμβῆ ἡ πεῖρα· εἰ δὲ μὴ, Μυτιληναῖοι εἰπείν ναῦς τε παραδοῦναι καὶ τεῖχη καθελεῖν, μὴ πειθομένων δὲ πολεμεῖν.

καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆς ὕψοντο τάς δὲ τῶν Μυτιληναίων δέκα τριήρεις, αἱ ἐπίθευσιν βοηθοὶ παρὰ σφᾶς κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν παρουσαί, κατέσχον οἱ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ τῶν ἄνδρας ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐς 6 φυλακὴν ἐποίησαντο. τοῖς δὲ Μυτιληναίοις ἀνὴρ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν διαβάζεις ἐς Εὐβοιαν καὶ πεζῆ ἐπὶ Γεραιστῶν ἔλθων, ὅλκαδος ἀναγομένης ἐπιτυχών, πλοῦχ χρησάμενος καὶ τριταιῶς ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἀφικόμενος ἀγγέλει τόν ἐπίπλουν. οἱ δὲ οὕτε ἐς τὸν Μαλόεντα ἐξῆλθον τὰ τέ ἄλλα τῶν τεῖχων καὶ λιμένων περὶ τὰ ἡμιτέλεστα φαράμενοι ἐφύλασσον.

IV. Καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι οὐ πολὺ ὦστερον καταπλεύσαντες ὡς ἐώρον ἀπήγγειλαν μὲν οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα, οὐκ ἐσακονοῦντο δὲ τῶν 2 Μυτιληναίων ἐς πόλεμον καθίσαντο. ἀπαράσκευοι δὲ οἱ Μυτιληναίοι καὶ ἕξαποθυς ἀναγκασθέντες πολεμεῖν ἐκπλουν μὲν τινα ἐποιήσαντο τῶν νεῶν ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ὁλίγον πρὸ τοῦ λιμένος, ἐπείτα καταδιωχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν ὁμοῦ ἢ ἡ προσέφερον τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, βουλόμενοι τάς ναῦς τὸ παραυτίκα, εἰ δύναντο, ὄμολογα τινὶ ἐπιεικεὶ ἀποπέμψα-3 σθαί. καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπεδέ-
festival of Apollo Maloeis 1 outside Mytilene at which the whole populace kept holiday, and that they might hope to take them by surprise if they should make haste. And if the attempt succeeded, well and good; but if not, the generals were to order the Mytilenaecans to deliver up their ships and pull down their walls, and if they disobeyed, to go to war. So the ships set off; and as there happened to be at Athens at the time ten Mytilenaecan triremes serving as auxiliaries in accordance with the terms of their alliance, the Athenians detained them, placing their crews in custody. But the Mytilenaecans got word of the expedition through a man who crossed over from Athens to Euboea, went thence by land to Geraestus, and, chancing there upon a merchantman that was putting to sea, took ship and on the third day after leaving Athens reached Mytilene. The Mytilenaecans, accordingly, not only did not go out to the temple of Apollo Maloeis, but barricaded the half-finished portions of the walls and harbours and kept guard. 2

IV. When not long afterwards the Athenians arrived and saw the state of affairs, their generals delivered their orders, and then, as the Mytilenaecans did not hearken to them, began hostilities. But the Mytilenaecans, being unprepared for war and forced to enter upon it without warning, merely sailed out a short distance beyond their harbour, as though offering battle; then, when they had been chased to shore by the Athenian ships, they made overtures to the generals, wishing, if possible, to secure some sort of reasonable terms and thus to get rid of the fleet for the present. The Athenian commanders accepted

2 Or, with Krüger, "but also guarded the other points after throwing barricades around the half-finished portions of the walls and harbours."
THUCYDIDES

ξαντο, καὶ αὐτοὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ οὐχ ἵκανοι ὅσι
4 Δέσβοι πάση πολεμεῖν. καὶ ἄνοικωξὴν ποιησά-
μενοι πέμπτουσιν ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίας οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι
τῶν τε διαβαλλόντων ἕνα, ἵνα μετέμελεν ἡδῆ, καὶ
ἀλλοι, εἰ πῶς πείσειαν τὰς ναῦς ἀπελθείν ὡς
5 σφῶν οὐδὲν νεωτερούντων. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἀπο-
στέλλουσι καὶ ἐσ ὑπὸ τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις
τρεῖρες λαθόντες τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναυτικόν, ὃ
ὁμοῖον ἐν τῇ Μάλεᾳ πρὸς βορέαν τῆς πόλεως
οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστευον τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προ-
χωρῆσειν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα
tαλαίπωρος διὰ τοῦ πελάγους κομισθέντες αὐτοῖς
ἐπρασσοῦν ὅπως τις βοήθεια ἤξει.

V. Οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν πρέσβεις ὡς οὐδὲν
ήλθον πράξαντες, ἐς πόλεμον καθίσαντο οἱ
Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Δέσβος πλὴν Μη-
θύμης· οὕτως δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐβεβοηθήκασαν
καὶ Ἰμβροί καὶ Λήμνοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγοι
2 τινὲς ἅμμαχοι. καὶ ἔρχον μὲν τινα πανάιαυ
ἐποιήσαντο οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
στρατόπεδον, καὶ μάχη ἐγένετο, ἐν ἦ οὐκ ἔλασσον
ἐχοντες οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι οὐτὲ ἐπηλίσαντο οὐτε
ἐπίστευσαν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ἄλλα ἀνεχόρησαν.
3 ἔπειτα οἱ μὲν ἦσυχαζον, ἐκ Πελοποννήσου καὶ
μετ' ἄλλης παρασκευῆς βουλόμενοι εἰ προσ-
4 γένοιτο τε κινδύνευειν καὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς Μελέας
Λάκων ἀφικνεῖται καὶ Ἐρμαιώνδας Θηβαῖος,
οἱ προαπεστάλησαν μὲν τῆς ἀποστάσεως, φθάσαι
δὲ οὐ δυνάμενοι τῶν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπίπλουν
κρύφα μετὰ τὴν μάχην ὅστερον ἐσπλέουσι
τριήρει, καὶ παρήμην πεμπειν τριήρη ἅλλην καὶ
their proposals, being themselves afraid that they were not strong enough to make war against all Lesbos. So the Mytilenaeans, having concluded an armistice, sent envoys to Athens, among whom was one of the informers who was by now repentant, in the hope that they might persuade them to recall their fleet, on the understanding that they themselves would not start a revolution. Meanwhile they also sent envoys to Lacedaemon in a trireme, which eluded the Athenian fleet lying at anchor at Malea north of the town; for they had no confidence in the success of their negotiations with the Athenians. These envoys, arriving at Lacedaemon after a hard voyage through the open sea, began negotiating for some aid for their countrymen.

V. But when the envoys to Athens returned without having accomplished anything, the people of Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, except Methymna, began war; the Methymnaeans, however, supported the Athenians, as did also the Imbrians, Lemnians, and a few of the other allies. The Mytilenaeans made a sortie in full force against the camp of the Athenians, and a battle occurred in which the Mytilenaeans had the advantage; nevertheless they did not have enough confidence in themselves to bivouack on the field, but withdrew. From this time on they kept quiet, being unwilling to risk an engagement without reinforcements from Peloponnesus and elsewhere. Such reinforcements they expected, for there had come to them Meleas a Laconian and Hermaeondas a Theban, who had been sent out before the revolt, but being unable to arrive before the Athenian expedition, had sailed in secretly after the battle in a trireme, and now advised them to send a second
πρέσβεις μεθ’ ἕαυτῶν καὶ ἐκπέμπουσιν. VI. οἱ
dὲ Ἀθηναίοι πολὺ ἐπιρρωσθέντες διὰ τὴν
tῶν Μυτιληναίων ἵσυχλαν ἐξυμάχους τε προσε-
kάλουν, οἱ πολὺ θάσσου παρῆσαν ὁρῶντες οὐδὲν
ἰσχυρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Λεσβίων, καὶ περιορμισάμενοι
cαι 1 τὸ πρὸς νότον τῆς πόλεως ἐτείχισαν στρα-
tόπεδα δύο ἐκατέρωθεν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοὺς
ἐφόρμους ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς ἀμέσως ἐποιοῦντο.
καὶ τῆς μὲν βαλάσσης εἰργὸν μὴ χρῆσθαι τοὺς
Μυτιληναίους, τῆς δὲ γῆς τῆς μὲν ἀλλὰς ἐκρα-
tουν οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Λεσβίοι
προσβεβοηθηκότες ἦδη, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ στρατό-
pεδα ό πολὺ κατείχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ναύσταθ-
μον δὲ μάλλον ἢν αὐτοὶς πλοῖον καὶ ἀγορᾶς ἡ
Μαλέα. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Μυτιλήνην οὕτως
ἐπολεμεῖτο.

VII. Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτοῦ χρόνον τοῦ θέρους
tοῦτον Ἀθηναίοι καὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον ναῦς
ἀπέστειλαν τριάκοντα καὶ Ἀσώπιον τὸν Φορ-
μίωνος στρατηγόν, κελευσάντων Ἀκαρνάνων τῶν
Φορμίωνὸς τῖνα σφίσι πέμψαι ἢ νῦν ἡ ξυγγενῆ
ἀρχοντα. καὶ παραπλέουσαι αἱ νῆς τῆς Δακω-

3 ν.κῆς τὰ ἐπιθαλάσσια χωρία ἐπόρθησαν. ἔπειτα
tὰς μὲν πλείους ἀποπέμπει τῶν νεὼν πάλιν ἐπ’
οἶκον ὁ Ἀσώπιος, αὐτὸς δὲ ἔχων δώδεκα ἅφικ-

4 νεῖται ἣς Ναύπακτον, καὶ ύστερον Ἀκαρνάνας
ἀναστήσας πανδημεί στρατεύει ἐπ’ Οἰνιάδας καὶ
ταῖς τε ναυσὶ κατὰ τὸν Ἀχελώον ἐπλεύσε καὶ

5 ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς ἐδῆμον τὴν χώραν. ὡς δὲ
προσεχώρουν, τὸν μὲν πεξὼν ἀφίησιν, αὐτὸς δὲ

1 <kal>, so Hude with Steup, as a part of the fleet must
have continued at anchor north of the city.
trireme and some envoys to accompany them. And this the Mytilenaeans did. VI. Meanwhile the Athenians, much encouraged by the inactivity of the Mytilenaeans, summoned their allies, who put in an appearance the more quickly as they saw that no energetic measures were being taken by the Lesbians. They also placed their ships at anchor round the southern part of the town, and established a blockade against both harbours. Thus they excluded the Mytilenaeans from the use of the sea; but as for the land, the Mytilenaeans and the other Lesbians, who had now come to their aid, dominated all the island, except the small strip held by the Athenians in the neighbourhood of their camps, and it was Malea rather than their camps that they used as a station for boats and supplies. Such was the course of the war at Mytilene.

VII. About the same time during this summer the Athenians sent also on a cruise round the Peloponnesus thirty ships with Asopius son of Phormio as commander; for the Acarnanians had requested them to send them as commander either a son or some other kinsman of Phormio's. And the ships as they sailed past ravaged the coast of Laconia. Afterwards Asopius sent most of the ships back home, but had twelve with him when he reached Naupactus. Then later, having called out all the forces of the Acarnanians, he made an expedition against Oeniodae, sailing with the ships up the Achelous, while his army on land ravaged the country. As, however, the inhabitants would not come over to him, he dismissed
Το μὲν καθεστὸς τοῦς Ἑλλησ νόμιμον, ὃς Ἀκεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἰσμεν τοὺς γὰρ ἀφισταμένους ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ξύμμαχίαν τὴν πρὶν ἀπολείποντας οἱ δεξιόμενοι, καθ’ ὅσον μὲν ὅφελοῦνται, ἐν ἦδου ἐχούσι, νομίζοντες δὲ εἶναι προδότας τῶν πρὸ τοῦ φίλων χείροις 2 ἠγοῦνται. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος αὕτη ἡ ἠξίωσις ἔστιν, εἰ τὺχοιεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ τε ἀφιστάμενοι καὶ ἀφ’ ὅν διακρίνοντο ἵσοι μὲν τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπότε καὶ ἐνοία, ἀντίπαλοι δὲ τῇ παρασκευῇ καὶ δυνάμει,
his army, but himself sailed to Leucas and made a
descent upon Nericus. On his way back from
Nericus he and part of his army were slain by the
people of that place, who rallied to its defence, and
by a few guards.¹ The Athenians first stood out to
sea and then later recovered their dead from the
Leucadians under a truce.

VIII. Meanwhile the Mytilenaean envoys who
had been sent on the first ship, having been told by
the Lacedaemonians to present themselves at Olymp-
pia, in order that the other members of the alliance
also might hear them and take counsel, came to
Olympia. It was the Olympiad in which Dorieus² the
Rhodian won his second victory. After the festival
the Peloponnesians met in council, and the envoys
spoke as follows:

IX. "We are not unaware, men of Lacedaemon
and members of the alliance, of the traditional feeling
of the Hellenes towards men who revolt in time of
war and abandon their former alliance: those who
accept them as allies are indeed pleased with them
in so far as they derive advantage, but they regard
them as traitors to their former friends and therefore
think the worse of them. And this estimate is not
unjust, provided that those who revolt and those
from whom they secede held the same political views
and were actuated by the same feeling of good will
toward one another, and were evenly matched in
preparation for war and in power, and provided also

other contests (Paus. vi. vii. 4). He fought in the Decelean
war on the Spartan side (viii. xxxv. 1; Xen. Hell. i. i. 2),
and was captured by the Athenians, but on account of his
fame as an athlete was released without ransom (Xen. Hell.
i. v. 19; Paus. vi. vii. 4, 5).
πρόφασις τε ἐπιεικής μηδεμία ὑπάρχοι τῆς ἀπο-
στάσεως· δι' ἣν καὶ Ἡμίν καὶ Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἦν, μηδέ
τῳ χείρος δόξωμεν εἶναι, εἰ ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ τιμώ-
μενοι ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀφιστάμεθα.

Χ. "Περὶ γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀρετῆς πρῶτον,
ἀλλως τε καὶ χυμμαχίας δεόμενοι, τοὺς λόγους
ποιησόμεθα, εἰδότες οὗτοι φιλίαν ἰδιώταις βέβαιον
γνωμομένην οὗτοι κοινοῦν πόλεσιν ἐς οὐδὲν, εἰ
μὴ μετ' ἀρετῆς δοκοῦσης ἐς ἀλλὴλοις γίγνοιντο
καὶ τὰλλα ὁμοίότροποι εἶεν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ διαλλάσ-
σοντι τῆς γνώμης καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν ἔργων
καθίστανται.

2 "Ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις χυμμαχία ἐγένετο
πρῶτον ἀπολιπόντων μὲν ύμῶν ἐκ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ
πολέμου, παραμεινάντων δὲ ἐκεῖνων πρὸς τὰ
3 ύπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων. χυμμαχοὶ μέντοι ἐγενο-
μεθα οὖκ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἐλλήνων
Ἀθηναίων, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου
4 τοῖς Ἐλλησιν. καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱσοῦ
ἡγοῦντο, προθύμως εἰπόμεθα· ἐπειδή δὲ ἐωρῶμεν
αὐτῶς τήν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνίεντας, τήν
dὲ τῶν χυμμάχων δούλωσιν ἐπειγομένους, 1 οὐκ
5 ἀδεεῖς ἔτι ἥμεν. ἀδύνατοι δὲ οὗτε καθ' ἐν γενό-
μενοι διὰ πολυψηφίαν ἀμύνασθαι οἱ χυμμαχοὶ
6 ἐδουλώθησαν πλὴν ύμῶν καὶ Χίων· ἥμεις δὲ
αὐτόνομοι δὴ οὗτε καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὁνόματι
χυμεστρατεύσαμεν. καὶ πιστοὺς οὔκετι εἰχομεν
ἡγεμόνας Ἀθηναίους, παραδείγμασι τοῖς προγενο-

1 ἐπειγομένους, Ross' conjecture for ἐπαγομένους of the MSS.
that there were no reasonable excuse for their revolt. But these conditions did not obtain between us and the Athenians; therefore, let no one think the worse of us on the ground that we were honoured by them in time of peace and now revolt from them in time of danger.

X. "We will first discuss the question of justice and rectitude, especially as we are seeking an alliance, for we know that neither does friendship between men prove lasting, nor does a league between states come to aught, unless they comport themselves with transparent honesty of purpose towards one another and in general are of like character and way of thinking; for differences in men's actions arise from the diversity of their convictions.

"Now between us and the Athenians an alliance was first made when you withdrew from the Persian war but they remained to finish the work. We became allies, however, not to the Athenians for the enslavement of the Hellenes, but to the Hellenes for their emancipation from the Persians. And as long as they maintained their hegemony on terms of equality we heartily followed their lead; but when we saw them relaxing their hostility to the Persians and eager for the enslavement of the allies, we were no longer without alarm. And the allies, being unable, on account of the number of those who had votes, to unite for self-defence, were all enslaved except ourselves and the Chians; while we shared their campaigns as presumably "independent" and enjoying at least the name of freedom. And we could no longer regard the Athenians as trustworthy leaders, taking as warning examples the
μένοις χρώμενοι· οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἢν αὐτοὺς οὐς μὲν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἐνσπόνδους ἐποιήσαντο καταστρέψασθαι, τοὺς δὲ ὑπολοίπους, εἰ ποτὲ ἀρα δυνηθεῖεν, μὴ δρᾶσαι τούτο.

XI. “Καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτόνομοι ἐτὶ ἤμεν ἄπαντες, βεβαιότεροι δὲν ἡμῖν ἤσαν μηδὲν νεωτερεῖν· ὑποχείριος δὲ ἔχοντες τοὺς πλείους, ἡμῖν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱσοῦ ὁμιλοῦτες, χαλεπώτερον εἰκότως ἐμελλον οὔσειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ πλέον ἦδη εἰκὸν τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐτὶ μόνου ἀντισυμμένου, ἀλλὸς τε καὶ ὅσφ' δυνατώτεροι αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν ἐγώνυντο καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐρημώτεροι. τὸ δὲ ἀντίπαλον δέος μόνου πιστῶν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν· ὁ γὰρ παραβαίνειν τι βουλόμενος

2 τῷ μὴ προὔχων ἄν ἐπελθεῖν ἀποτρέπεται. αὐτόνομοι τε ἔλειφθημεν οὐ δὲ ἄλλο τι ἡ ὁσοῦ αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐπρεπεία τε λόγου καὶ γνώμης μᾶλλον ἐφόδῳ ἢ ἰσχύσ τὰ πράγματα ἐφαίνετο

3 καταληπτά. ἄμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο μὴ ἃν τοὺς γε ἱσοψηφίους ἄκοντας, εἰ μὴ τι ἡδίκουν οἷς ἐπῆσαν, ξυστρατεύειν· εἰν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ τὰ κράτιστα ἐπὶ τε τοὺς ὑποδεεστέρους πρώτους ξυνεπήγον καὶ τελευταία 2 λιπόντες τοῦ ἄλλου περιηρημένου ἀσθενέστερα ἐμελλον ἔξειν. εἰ δὲ ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἢρξαντο, ἐχόντων ἑτὶ τῶν πάντων

1 δυνηθεῖεν, Dobree's conjecture for δυνηθησαν of the MSS.
2 [τὰ] τελευταία: τὰ deleted with Krüger.
events of the past; for it was not likely that they, after subjugating those with whom they had entered into treaty relations together with us, would not do the same to those who were left, if ever they should possibly have the power.

XI. "Again if we had all remained independent we should have had better assurance that they would make no violent change in our status; having, however, the majority under their hands, while still associating with us on an equal footing, they would naturally find it more irksome that our state alone still maintained its equality as compared with the majority that had already yielded, especially since they were becoming more powerful in proportion as we became more isolated. Indeed it is only the fear that arises from equality of power that constitutes a firm basis for an alliance; for he that would transgress is deterred by the feeling that he has no superiority wherewith to make an attack. And we were left independent for no other reason than because they clearly saw that with a view to empire they must get control of affairs by fair-seeming words and by attacks of policy rather than of force. For, on the one hand, they had as evidence in their favour that surely those who have an equal voice with themselves would never have taken part in their campaigns had not those whom they attacked been guilty of some wrong; and on the other hand, they also brought the united strength of the strongest states against the less powerful first, and leaving the former to the last they counted upon finding them weaker when all the rest had been removed from around them. But if they had begun with us, while the whole body of allies were not only still strong in
αὕτων τε ἴσχύν καὶ πρὸς ὁ τι χρῆ στήναι, οὐκ
4 ἂν ὁμοίως ἐχειρώσαντο. τὸ τε ναυτικὸν ἡμῶν
παρεῖχὲ τινα φόβου μὴ ποτὲ καθ' ἐν γενόμενον
ἡ ὡμᾶς ἢ ἄλλω τοῖς προσθέμενον κίνδυνον σφίς
5 παράσχη. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ θεραπείας τοῦ τε
κοινοῦ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν αἰεὶ προστώτων περιεγ-
6 γνώμεθα. οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐδοκοῦμεν
δυνηθῆναι, εἰ μή ὁ πόλεμος ὀδε κατέστη, παρα-
δείγμασι χρώμενοι τοῖς ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους.

XII. "Τίς οὖν αὕτη ἡ φιλία ἐγίγνετο ἡ ἐλευ-
θερία πιστῇ, ἐν ἡ παρὰ γνώμην ἀλλήλους ὑπε-
δεχόμεθα καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες
ἐθεράπευον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ
αὐτὸ ἐποιοῦμεν· ὁ τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μάλιστα εὐνοεῖα
πίστιν βεβαιοί, ἡμῖν τοῦτο ὁ φόβος ἐχυρὸν
παρεῖχε, δέει τε τὸ πλέον ἡ φιλία κατεχόμενοι
ξύμμαχοι ἡμεῖς· καὶ ὁποτέρους θάσουν παράσχοι
ἀσφάλεια θάρσος, οὐτοὶ πρῶτοι τι καὶ παρα-

2 βήσεσθαι ἐμελλοῦν. ὡστε εἰ τῷ δοκοῦμεν ἄδικων
προαποστάντες διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων μέλλησιν τῶν ἐς
ἡμᾶς δεινῶν, αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἀντανακλάντες σαφῶς
3 εἰδέναι εἰ τι αὐτῶν ἔσται, οὐκ ὁρθῶς σκοπεῖ. εἰ
γὰρ δυνατοὶ ἡμεῖς έκ τοῦ ἵσον καὶ ἀντεπιθυμε-
λέσαι, καὶ ἀντιμελησάι τι ἐδει ἡμᾶς έκ τοῦ
ὁμοίου ἐπ' ἐκείνους ἔναι· ἐπ' ἐκείνοις δὲ οὐντος
αἰεὶ τοῦ ἐπίχειρείν καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι δεὶ τὸ
προαμύνασθαι.
their own strength, but also had a leader to rally to, they would not have got the mastery so easily. Besides, our navy caused them some fear, lest it should some day be augmented by being united either with yours or another's and thus become a menace to themselves. To some extent also we owe our salvation to the court we paid to the Athenian people and to the political leaders of the day. But we could not have expected to be able to survive for long, if we may judge by their conduct toward the other allies, unless this war had broken out.

XII. "Was this then a friendship or a freedom to put faith in, where we violated our real feelings whenever we treated each other as friends? They courted us in time of war only because they were afraid of us, while we acted in the same manner toward them in time of peace; and good faith, which in most cases is made steadfast by good will, was in our case made secure by fear, and it was fear rather than friendship that held us both to the alliance; and whichever of us should soonest gain boldness through a feeling of security was bound to be the first to commit some act of transgression also. If, therefore, anyone thinks that, just because they postponed the measures we dread, we do wrong in revolting first, without having waited on our side until we were quite sure that any of our suspicions would come true, he is in error. For if we were in a position to meet their plotting by counter-measures on equal terms with them, it was indeed incumbent upon us on our part to postpone likewise our offensive against them; but since the power of attack is always in their hands, the right of acting betimes in our own defence must necessarily be in ours.
XIII. "Τοιαύτας ἔχοντες προφάσεις καὶ αἰ-
τίας, ὁ Ἀκεδαμίονιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἀπέστημεν,
σαφεῖς μὲν τοῖς ἀκούοντι γρύναι ὡς εἰκότως
ἐδράσαμεν, ἱκανὰς δὲ ἦμᾶς ἐκφοβήσαται καὶ πρὸς
ἀσφάλειαν τινὰ τρέψαν, βουλημένους μὲν καὶ
πάλαι, ὅτε ἔτι ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἐπέμψαμεν ὡς ὑμᾶς
περὶ ἀποστάσεως, ὑμῶν δὲ οὐ προσδεξαμένων
κωλυθέντας, νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ Βοιωτῶι προκαλέ-
σαντο, εὐθὺς ὑπηκούσαμεν, καὶ ἐνομίζομεν ἀπο-
ςτήσεσθαι διπλῶν ἀπόστασιν, ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλ-
λήνων μὴ ἐξὺν κακῶς ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς μετ’ Ἀθη-
ναίων, ἀλλὰ ξυνελευθεροῦν, ἀπὸ τὸ Ἀθηναῖον μὴ αὐτῶν
διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ’ ἑκεῖνον ἐν ὑστέρῳ, ἀλλὰ προ-
ποίησαι. ἡ μέντοι ἀπόστασις ἦμῶν θάσσον
γεγένηται καὶ ἀπαράσκευος; ἡ καὶ μᾶλλον
χρὴ ξύμμαχος δεξαμένους ἦμᾶς διὰ ταχέων
βοηθειῶν ἀποστέλλειν, ἵνα φαίνησθε ἀμύνοντες
τε οἰς δεὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοὺς πολεμίους βλάπ-
τοντες. καὶ ὅσον ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ πρότερον. νόσῳ τε
γὰρ ἔφθαραται Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ χρημάτων δαπάνη,
νῆς τε αὐτοῖς αἱ μὲν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν εἰσὶν
αἱ δ’ ἐφ’ ἦμῖν τετάχαται: ὅστε οὐκ εἰκὸς αὐτοὺς
περιουσίαν νεῶν ἐχεῖν, ἦν ὑμεῖς ἐν τῷ θέρει τὸν
ναυσί τε καὶ πεζῷ ἀμα ἐπεσβάληστε τὸ δεύτερον,
ἀλλ’ ἦν ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἀμυνοῦνται ἐπιπλέοντας ἡ ἀπ
ἀμφωτέρων ἀποχωρήσουντα. νομίσῃ τε μηδείς

1 This has not been definitely stated above, but it is
implied in ch. ii. 3, v. 4.
XIII. "Such were the motives and reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, which led us to revolt, and they are clear enough to convince all who hear them that we had good grounds for our action, and cogent enough to alarm us and impel us to seek some means of safety. This we long ago wished to do while you were still at peace, when we sent envoys to you suggesting that we should revolt, but were prevented from doing so because you would not receive us. But now, when the Boeotians invited us we responded promptly. It was our intention to make at once a double withdrawal—from the Hellenes and thus aid in liberating them instead of joining the Athenians to do them wrong; and from the Athenians, and thus destroy them first instead of being ourselves destroyed by them afterwards. Our revolt, however, has been made prematurely and without preparation; wherefore it is the more incumbent upon you to receive us as allies and quickly send us aid, in order that all men may see that you protect those whom you ought to protect and at the same time harm your enemies. And it is an opportunity such as never has been before. For the Athenians have been ruined by pestilence as well as by heavy expenses. Part of their fleet is cruising about your coasts, part is arrayed against us; so that it is not likely that they have any ships to spare if you attack them this coming summer a second time, by sea as well as by land; but they will either not resist you when you sail against them, or else they will have to withdraw their fleets both from our waters and from yours. And let no one think that he will be incurring a risk

\[^2\] i.e. from the Delian Confederacy.

\[^3\] cf. ch. vii. 2.
αλλοτριας γης περι οἰκεῖον κλίνυνον ἔζειν. ὦ γὰρ δοκεῖ μακρὰν ἀπειναὶ Ἡ Δέσβος, τὴν ὦφελίαν αὐτῷ ἐγγύθεν παρέξει. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος, ὡς τις οἴεται, ἀλλὰ δι' ἦν ἡ Ἐν Ἀττικῇ ὠφελεῖται. ἔστι δὲ τῶν χρημάτων ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἡ πρόσοδος, καὶ ἐτι μείζων ἔσται, εἰ ἡμᾶς καταστρέψωνται οὔτε γὰρ ἀποστήσεται ἀλλος τά τε ἡμέτερα προσγείησται, πάθοιμεν τ' ἄν δεινότερα ἢ οἴ πρὶν δουλεύσοντες. βοηθησάντων δὲ υἱῶν προβόωμος πόλιν τε προσλήψεσθε ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν μέγα, οὔτε υἱῶν μάλιστα προσδεί, καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ῥὰν καθαιρήσετε υφαιροῦντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ξυμμάχους (θρασύτερον γὰρ πᾶς τις προσχωρήσεται), τὴν τε αἰτίαν ἀποφεύξεσθε ἢν εἴχετε μὴ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις, ἢν δὲ ἐλευθεροῦντες φαίνησθε, τὸ κράτος τοῦ πολέμου βεβαιότερον ἔζειν.

XIV. "Αἰσχυνθέντες οὖν τάς τε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐλπίδας καὶ Δία τῶν Ὠλύμπιων, ἐν οὐ τῷ ἱερῷ ἱσα καὶ ἰκέται ἐσμέν, ἐπαμύνατε Μυτιληναίοις ξύμμαχοι γενόμενοι, καὶ μὴ πρόησθε ἡμᾶς, ἵναν μὲν τὸν κλίνυνον τῶν σωμάτων παραβαλλομένους, κοινὴν δὲ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατορθώσαι ὦφελίαν ἀπασι δώσοντας, ἐτι δὲ κοινότεραν τὴν βλάβην, εἰ μὴ πεισθέντων υἱῶν σφαλησόμεθα. γίγνεσθε δὲ ἄνδρες οἱ οὕσπερ υἱῶς οἱ τε "Ἑλλήνες ἄξιοῦσι καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον δέος βούλεται."

1 οὐκ is inserted by Hude.
of his own for the country of another. For though Lesbos seems to him to be a long way off, the help she will bring him will be close at hand. For the war will not be in Attica, as some think, but in those countries from which Athens derives its support. The revenues of Athens come from her allies, and they will be still greater if they shall subdue us; for not only will no one else revolt, but our resources will be added to hers, and we should be treated with greater rigour than those who have long been slaves. But if you give us your hearty support, you will add to your league a state that has a large navy, a thing of which you still stand most in need, and you will find it easier to overthrow the Athenians by gradually drawing their allies away from them—for every one will be emboldened to come over to your side—and you will free yourselves of the reproach under which you have heretofore laboured, of refusing to aid those who revolt from the Athenians. But if you openly play the part of liberators, the more certain will be your victory in the war.

XIV. "Reverencing, then, not only the hopes which the Hellenes place in you, but also that Olympian Zeus in whose temple we are even as suppliants, succour the Mytileneans by entering on this alliance; and do not abandon us when we are hazarding our lives in a risk all our own, but shall bring to all a general benefit if we succeed—and a still more general injury if through your refusal we shall fail. Prove yourselves, therefore, men such as the Hellenes account you and our fears would have you be."

1 i.e. the war will not be decided in Attica.
2 Especially as regards the tribute which would be exacted.
3 cf. i. lxix. 1, 5. 4 cf. ii. viii. 4.
THUCYDIDES

XV. Τοιαύτα μὲν οἱ Μυστιληναῖοι εἴπον. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπειδὴ ἤκουσαν, προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς λόγους ξυμμάχους τε τοὺς Δεσβίους ἐποίησαντο καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολὴν τοῖς τε ξυμμάχοις παροῦσι κατὰ τάχος ἐφράξαν ιέναι ἐς τὸν ἱσθμὸν τοῖς δύο μέρεσιν ός ποιησόμενοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ πρώτοι ἄφικοντο, καὶ ὅλκους παρεσκεύαζον τῶν νεῶν ἐν τῷ ἵσθμῷ ός ὑπεροίσοντες ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου ἐς τὴν πρὸς Ἀθηνὰς θάλασσαν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ἀμα 2 ἐπιώντες. καὶ οἱ μὲν προθύμως ταῦτα ἐπρασσοῦν. οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι βραδεῖς τε ξυνελέγοντο καὶ ἐν καρπῷ ξυγκομιδῇ ἦσαν καὶ ἄρρωστιά τοῦ στρατεύειν.

XVI. Αἰσθόμενοι δὲ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ κατάγνωσιν ἀσθενείας σφόν παρασκευαζόμενοι, δηλῶσαι θυμόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ὅρθως ἐγνώκασιν, ἀλλ’ ὅσοι τε εἰσὶ μὴ κινοῦντες τὸ ἐπὶ Λέσβῳ ναυτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἐπὶ τὸν ῥαδίῳ ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐπλήρωσαν ναὸς ἑκατὸν ἐσβάντες αὐτοὶ τε πλὴν ἒπείνω καὶ πεντακοσιομέδιμων καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι, καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἱσθμῶν ἀναγάγοντες ἐπίδεεξιν τε ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ἀπο- 2 βάσεις τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἡ Δοκοὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἄροντες πολὺν τῶν παράλογον τά τε ὑπὸ τῶν Δεσβίων ῥηθέντα ἥγοντο οὐκ

1 cf. ii. x. 2.
2 Of citizens usually only the θῆτες, who were light-armed troops on land, served in the fleet (vi. xliii); but in critical
XV. Thus spoke the Mytilenaeans. The Lacedaemonians and their allies, after they had heard them, accepted their proposals, and received the Lesbians as allies. Those allies who were there present were directed to assemble with all speed at the Isthmus with two-thirds ¹ of their forces for the purpose of making the proposed invasion of Attica; and the Lacedaemonians themselves arrived first and proceeded to construct on the Isthmus hauling-machines with which to transfer the ships from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side, in order to attack Athens both by sea and by land. They set to work zealously at these things, but the rest of the allies collected slowly, since they were busy gathering in their harvest and were in no mood for campaigning.

XVI. Meanwhile the Athenians, perceiving that the enemy, in making their preparations, were acting upon a conviction of their own weakness, and wishing to show that they were mistaken in their judgment, and that without moving the fleet at Lesbos they could easily ward off the new force coming from the Peloponnesus, manned one hundred ships, the citizens,² except the knights and the highest class—embarking as well as the resident aliens. Then putting out to sea they displayed their strength along the coast of the Isthmus and made descents upon the Peloponnesus wherever they pleased. As for the Lacedaemonians, when they saw how greatly they had miscalculated, they concluded that the reports of the Lesbians ³ were untrue, and regarding the

1 cf. ch. xiii. 3, 4.

VOL. II.
ἀληθὴ καὶ ἀπορὰ νομίζοντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ἐξυμμαχοὶ ἁμα οὐ παρῆσαν καὶ ἡγγέλλοντο καὶ ἀι περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον τριάκοντα νῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὴν περιοικίδα αὐτῶν πορθοῦσαι, ἀνε-3 χώρησαν ἐπὶ οἰκου. ὥστε τοις ναυτικοὺς παρε-σκευαζοῦν ὦ τι πέμψουσιν ἐς τὴν Δέσβων καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἐπηγγελον τεσσαράκοντα νεὼν πλήθους καὶ ναύαρχον προσέταξαν Ἀλκιδαν, ἃς 4 ἐμελλέν ἐπιπλεύσεσθαι. ἀνεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ταῖς ἐκατὸν ναυσίν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνους εἶδον.

XVII. Καὶ 1 κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τούτον ὑπὸ αἱ νῆς ἐπλευσαν ἐν τοῖς πλείσται δὴ νῆς ἁμ’ αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοὶ κάλλει 2 ἐγένοντο, παραπλήσιαι 2 δὲ καὶ ἔτι πλείους ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου. τὴν τε γὰρ Ἀττικὴν καὶ Ἔββοιαν καὶ Σαλαμίνα ἐκατὸν ἐφύλασσον καὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον ἔτεραι ἐκατὸν ἔσαν, χωρὶς δὲ αἰ περὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις χωρίοις, ὅστε αἰ πᾶσαι ἁμ’ ἐγύγυνοντο ἐν ἐνὶ θέρει διακόσιαι καὶ πεντῆκοντα. 3 καὶ τὰ χρήματα τούτο μάλιστα ὑπανάλωσε μετὰ Ποτίδαιας. τὴν τε γὰρ Ποτίδαιαν δίδραχμοι ὀπλίται ἐφρούρουν (ἀὐτῶ γὰρ καὶ ὑπηρέτη δραχμῆν ἐλάμβανε τῆς ἡμέρας), τρισχίλιοι μὲν οἱ πρῶτοι, ὅπις ὕπασαν διεπολιόρκησαν, ἔξακόσιοι δὲ καὶ χίλιοι μετὰ Φορμίωνος, οἱ προαπηλθοῦν νῆς τε αἰ πᾶσαι τὸν αὐτὸν μισθὸν

1 This whole chapter is condemned as spurious by Steup, followed by Hude.
2 Untranslatable in this context: Stahl writes καὶ ἄλλη, van Herwerden ἄλλαι ἄλλη, Cullinan κάλλαι, L. Herbst s’ καὶ λ’.

26
expedition as impracticable, since their allies had not yet arrived, and, besides, word had come to them that the thirty\(^1\) ships which were cruising around the Peloponnese were ravaging their own country districts, they went back home. Later,\(^2\) however, they prepared a fleet which was to be dispatched to Lesbos and sent orders to the allied states for forty ships, appointing Alcidas who was to sail as admiral of this fleet. And when the Athenians saw that the enemy had withdrawn, they also returned home with their hundred ships.

XVII. At the time when these ships were at sea about the largest number the Athenians ever had at once were on active service, though there were as many or even more at the beginning of the war. For one hundred ships were guarding Attica, Euboea and Salamis, and another hundred were cruising off the Peloponnesus, besides those at Potidaea and in other places, so that the number in service at the same time in a single summer was all told two hundred and fifty. It was this effort, together with Potidaea, that chiefly exhausted their resources of money. For in the siege of Potidaea the hoplite received a wage of two drachmas a day, one for himself and one for his attendant; and there were at first three thousand of these, and the number was not less than this throughout the siege, besides sixteen hundred who came with Phormio, but went away before the siege was over; and the sailors on the ships all drew the same pay as the soldiers.

\(^1\) cf. ch. vii. 1. \(^2\) cf. ch. xxv. 1; xxvi. 1.
4 ἔφερον. τὰ μὲν οὖν χρήματα οὕτως ὑπαναλώθη τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ νῆς τοσαῦται δὴ πλείσται ἐπληρώθησαν.

XVIII. Μυτιληναῖοι δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ὄν ὁι Λακεδαιμόνιοι περὶ τὸν ἱσθμὸν ἦσαν ἐπὶ Μῆθυμναν ὡς προδιδομένην ἐστράτευσαν κατὰ γῆν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ οἱ ἐπίκουροι καὶ προσβάλοντες τῇ πόλει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ προσνέρει ἡ προσεδέχοντο, ἀπῆλθον ἐπ' Ἀντίσσης καὶ Πύρρας καὶ Ἐρέσου, καὶ καταστησάμενοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ταύταις βεβαιώτερα καὶ τείχη κρατύντες διὰ τάχους ἀπῆλθον ἐπ' οίκουν. ἐστράτευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Μῆθυμναιοὶ ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν ἐπ' Ἀντίσσαν καὶ ἐκβοηθείας τινὸς γενομένης πληγέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀντίσσαιων καὶ τῶν ἐπικουρῶν ἀπέθανον τε πολλοὶ καὶ ἄνεξώρητοι κατὰ τάχος. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πυγθανόμενοι ταύτα, τοὺς τε Μυτιληναίους τῆς γῆς κρατοῦντας καὶ τοὺς σφετέρους στρατιῶτας οὐχ ἰκανοὺς ὄντας εἰργεῖν, πέμπουσι περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον ἢδη ἀρχομένον Πάχνητα τῶν Ἐπικούροι στρατηγοῦ καὶ χιλίους ὀπλίτας ἑαυτῶν. 5 οἱ δὲ αὐτέρτεις πλεύσαντες τῶν νεῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ περιτειχίζουσι Μυτιλήνην ἐν κύκλῳ ἀπλῶς τείχει φρούρια δ' ἐστιν οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν καρτερῶν ἐγκατοικοδομεῖται. καὶ ἡ μὲν Μυτιλήνη κατὰ κράτος ἢδη ἀμφοτέρωθεν καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης εἰργετο, καὶ οἱ χειμῶν ἤρχετο γίγνεσθαι.

XIX. Προσδεόμενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι χρημάτων ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσενεγκόντες τότε
BOOK III. xvil. 3-xix. 1

It was in this way, then, that their money was exhausted at first, and this was the largest number of ships manned by them.

XVIII. While the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the Mytileneans and their auxiliaries marched with their army against Methymna, which they supposed was being betrayed into their hands; and they assaulted the city, but when their attempt did not succeed as they had expected, they went off to Antissa, Pyrrha and Eresus, and after establishing their interests in these cities on a firmer basis and strengthening the walls, went home in haste. As soon, however, as they had withdrawn, the Methymnaeans in their turn made an expedition against Antissa; but a sortie was made by the inhabitants of Antissa and the auxiliary troops in which the Methymnaeans were defeated and many of them slain, whereupon the rest withdrew in haste. Now when the Athenians learned that the Mytileneans were masters of the country and that their own soldiers were not numerous enough to keep them within their walls, about the beginning of autumn they sent Paches son of Epicurus in command of a thousand Athenian hoplites, who also served as rowers. When they arrived at Mytilene, they encircled it with a single wall, in which forts were built at a number of strong positions. Mytilene was thus at last completely cut off both by sea and land just as the winter set in.

XIX. Now the Athenians, finding themselves in need of additional funds for the siege, having then

1 Foreign mercenaries; cf. ch. ii. 2.
2 The fact of hoplites serving at the oars—evidently for economical reasons (cf. ch. xix. 1)—is especially emphasised. cf. i. x. 4; vi. xci. 4.
πρώτον ἐσφορὰν διακόσια τάλαντα, ἐξέπεμψαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀργυρολόγους ναῦς δώδεκα καὶ Λυσικλέα πέμπτον αὐτῶν στρατηγὸν. 

2 ὁ δὲ ἄλλα τε ἡγυρολόγει καὶ περιέπλει, καὶ τῆς Καρίας ἐκ Μυσόντος ἀναβὰς διὰ τοῦ Μαιάνδρου πεδίου μέχρι τοῦ Σανδίου λόφου, ἐπιθεμένων τῶν Καρῶν καὶ Ἀναίτων, αὐτὸς τε διαφθείρεται καὶ τῆς ἄλλης στρατιάς πολλοῖ.

XX. Τού δ' αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος οἱ Πλαταῖοι (ἐτὶ γὰρ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ὑπὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν) ἐπειδὴ τῷ τε σιτῷ ἐπιλείποντο ἐπιέζοντο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν οὐδεμία ἐλπὶς ἢν τιμωρίας οὐδὲ ἄλλη σωτηρία ἑφαίνετο, ἐπιβουλεύουσιν αὐτοὶ τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων οἱ ξυμπολιορκούμενοι πρώτον μὲν πάντες ἐξελβείν καὶ ὑπερβῆναι τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεμίων, ἢν δύνονται βιώσασθαι, ἐσχησαμένων τὴν πεῖραν αὐτοὺς Θεαίνετο τε τοῦ Τολμίδου, ἀνδρὸς μάντεως, καὶ Εὐπομπίδου τοῦ Δαιμάχου, ὃς καὶ ἐστρατήγηκε ἐπειτα οἱ μὲν ἡμῖν ἀπώκυπτα καὶ τὸν κίνδυνον μέγαν ἠγανάκτησιν, ἐς δὲ ἀνδρὰς διακοσίως καὶ εἰκοσὶ μάλιστα ἐνέμειναν τῇ ἕξῳ ἐθελονταῖ τρόπῳ τοὺς. 

3 τούτω, κλίμακας ἐποιήσατο ἵσας τῷ τείχῃ τῶν πολεμίων ξυμεμετρήσαντο δὲ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τῶν πλίνθων, ὡς ἔτυχε πρὸς σφᾶς ὥς ἔξαληλιμένων τὸ τείχος αὐτῶν. ἡριθμοῦντο δὲ πολλοὶ ἀμα τὰς ἐπιβολάς καὶ ἡμελλον οἱ μὲν τινες.
for the first time resorted to a property tax upon themselves to the amount of two hundred talents, also sent to the allies twelve ships under the command of Lysicles and four others, to collect money from them. He cruised about and collected money at various places; but on his way inland from Myus in Caria through the plain of the Meander, after he had reached the hill of Sandius, he was attacked by the Carians and the Anaeitans and slain, together with many of his army.

XX. During the same winter the Plataeans, who were still being besieged by the Peloponnesians and the Boeotians, began to be distressed by failure of their supply of food, and since there was no hope of aid from Athens nor any other means of safety in sight, they and the Athenians who were besieged with them planned to leave the city and climb over the enemy's walls, in the hope that they might be able to force a passage. The attempt was suggested to them by Theaenetus son of Tolmides, a soothsayer, and Eupompidas son of Daimachus, who was one of the generals. At first all were to take part, but afterwards half of them somehow lost heart, thinking the risk too great, and only about two hundred and twenty voluntarily persisted in making the sortie, which was carried out in the following way. They made ladders equal in height to the enemy's wall, getting the measure by counting the layers of bricks at a point where the enemy's wall on the side facing Plataea happened not to have been plastered over. Many counted the layers at the same time, and while

1 The ἱσθωρᾶ was an extraordinary tax levied only in wartime. See Boeckh, Public Economy, p. 612.
2 For previous discussion of this siege, see ii. lxxi.-lxxviii.
ἀμαρτήσεσθαι, οἱ δὲ πλείους τευχέσθαι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λογισμοῦ, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλάκις ἀριθμοῦντες καὶ ἀμα  οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχοντες, ἀλλὰ ῥάδιως καθαρωμένον ἐς ὃ ἐβούλοντο τοῦ τείχους.

τὴν μὲν οὖν ξυμμέτρησιν τῶν κλιμάκων ὀὕτως ἔλαβον ἐκ τοῦ πάχους τῆς πλάκης εἰκάσαντες τὸ μέτρον.

XXI. Τὸ δὲ τείχος ἦν τῶν Πελοποννησίων τοιοῦτο τῇ οἰκοδομήσει. εἰχε μὲν δύο τοὺς περιβόλους, πρὸς τε Πλαταιῶν καὶ εἰ τες ἐξωθέν ἀπ’ Ἀθηνῶν ἐπίοι, διείχον δὲ οἱ περιβολοὶ ἐκκαίδεκα

2 πόδας μάλιστα ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων. τὸ οὖν μεταξὶ τούτου οἱ ἐκκαίδεκα πόδες 1 τοῖς φυλαξιν οἰκήματα διανειμέμενα ψυχόμεντο, καὶ ἡ ξυνεχὴ 2 ὥστε εἰ φαίνεσθαι τείχος παχὺ ἐπάλξεις ἔχον ἀμφότερος διείχοντα

3 τέρωθεν. διὰ δέκα δὲ ἐπάλξεως πῦργοι ἦσαν μεγάλοι καὶ ἵσπολατεῖς τῷ τείχει, διήκοντες ἐς τὸ τὸ ἐσω μέτωπον αὐτοῦ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὸ ἐξω, ὥστε πάροδον μὴ εἶναι παρὰ πῦργον, 3 ἀλλὰ δ’

4 αὐτῶν μέσων διέμαν. τὰς οὖν νυκτικὰς, ὅπως χειμών εἰς νυτερός, τὰς μὲν ἐπάλξεις ἀπέλειπον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πῦργων ὄντων δὲ ὀλίγων καὶ ἀνωθεν στεγανῶν τὴν φυλακὴν ἐποιοῦντο. τὸ μὲν οὖν τείχος ὃ περιεφρουροῦντο οἱ Πλαταιῆς τοιοῦτον ἦν.

XXII. Οἱ δ’, ἐπειδὴ παρεσκεύαστο αὐτοῖς, τηρίσαντες νῦκτα χειμέριον ὕδατι καὶ ἀνέμῳ καὶ ἀμ’ ἀσέληνον ἐξῆσαν ἤγοντο δὲ οἰσπὲρ καὶ τὴν

1 εἰκάδεκα πόδες deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude
2 ξυνεχὴ with all MSS. except C, which Hude follows.
3 παρὰ πῦργον deleted by Naber, followed by Hude.
some were sure to make a mistake, the majority were likely to hit the true count, especially since they counted time and again, and, besides, were at no great distance, and the part of the wall they wished to see was easily visible. The measurement of the ladders, then, they got at in this way, reckoning the measure from the thickness of the bricks.

XXI. The wall of the Peloponnesians was built in the following fashion. It had two encircling lines, the inner looking towards Plataea, the outer to guard against attack from the direction of Athens, and the two circuits were distant about sixteen feet from one another. This interval of sixteen feet had in building been divided up into rooms assigned to the guards; and the whole structure was continuous,¹ so as to appear to be a single thick wall furnished with battlements on both sides. And at every tenth battlement there were high towers of the same width as the wall, extending both to the inner and outer faces of it, so that there was no passage left at the sides of the towers, but the guards had to go through the middle of them. Now at night when the weather was rainy the guards left the battlements and kept watch from the towers, which were not far apart and were roofed overhead. Such, then, was the wall by which the Plataeans were beleaguered.

XXII. After the Plataeans had finished their preparations, they waited for a night that was stormy with rain and wind and at the same time moonless, and then went forth. They were led by the men

¹ i.e. the two περίβαλλον were joined together by a roof.
πείρας αἵτιοι ἦσαν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν τάφρον
dιέβησαν ἢ περιείχεν αὐτοὺς, ἐπειτα προσέμειξαν
tῷ τείχει τῶν πολεμίων λαθόντες τοὺς φύλακας,
ἀνὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν μὲν οὐ προιδόντων αὐτῶν, ψόφφι
δὲ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ προσιέναι αὐτοὺς ἀντιπαταγοῦντος
2 τοῦ ἀνέμου οὐ κατακοινᾶντον ἀμα δὲ καὶ διέ-
χοντες πολύ ἦσαν, ὅπως τὰ ὅπλα μὴ κρονύμενα
πρὸς ἀλληλα αἰσθῆσιν παρέχοι. ἦσαν δὲ εὐστα-
λεῖς τε τῇ ὁπλίσει καὶ τὸν ἀριστερὸν μόνον πόδα
ὑποδεδεμένοι ἁσφαλείας ἕνεκα τῆς πρὸς τὸν
3 πηλὸν. κατὰ οὖν μεταπύργιον προσέμισγον πρὸς
τὰς ἐπάλξεις εἰδότες ὅτι ἐρημοὶ εἴσι, πρῶτον μὲν
οὶ τὰς κλίμακας φέροντες, καὶ προσέθεσαν· ἐπειτα
ψιλοὶ δώδεκα ἕνῳ ξιφιδίῳ καὶ θόρακε ἀνέβαινον,
ὅν ἡγεῖτο Ἀμμέας ὁ Κοροίζου καὶ πρῶτος ἀνέβη,
μετὰ δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ ἐπόμενοι δὲ ἐφ’ ἐκάτερον τῶν
πύργων ἀνέβαινον· ἐπειτα ψιλοὶ ἄλλοι μετὰ
τούτους ἕνῳ δορατίοις ἑχόρουν, οἷς ἐπερεὶ κατόπιν
τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐφερον, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι βᾶν προσβαί-
νοιεν, καὶ ἐμελλὼν δῶσειν ὅποτε πρὸς τοὺς πολε-
4 μίοις εἶν. ὡς δὲ ἄνω πλείους ἑγέροντο, ἵσθοντο
οἱ ἐκ τῶν πύργων φύλακες· κατέβαλε γὰρ τις τῶν
Πλαταιῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπάλξεων
5 κεραμῖδα, ἡ πεσοῦσα δοῦπον ἐποίησεν. καὶ
αὐτίκα βοή ἦν, τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον ἐπὶ τὸ τείχος
ὁρμησεν· οὐ γὰρ ἤδει ὃ τι ἦν τὸ δειμὸν σκοτεινῆς
νυκτὸς καὶ χειμῶνος ὄντος, καὶ ἀμα οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει
τῶν Πλαταιῶν ὑπολείμμενοι ἐξελθόντες προσέ-
βαλλον τῷ τείχει τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἐκ τούμ-
who were the authors of the enterprise. First they crossed the ditch which surrounded the town, then reached the foot of the enemy's wall unobserved by the guards, who in the all-pervading darkness could not see ahead and could not hear because the clatter of the wind drowned the noise of their approach; and, besides, they kept a good distance apart as they advanced, in order that their arms might not rattle against each other and cause detection. And they were not only lightly armed but also had only the left foot sandalled, for security against slipping in the mud. So they came up to the battlements at a space between two towers, knowing that the battlements were deserted. First came the men with the ladders, who set them against the wall; next came twelve light-armed men, with dagger and corslet only, who mounted the ladders. These were led by Ammeas son of Coroebus, who was the first to ascend, and after him his followers ascended, six men going against each of the adjoining towers. Next after these came other light troops armed with short spears, their shields being borne by another group which followed, that the former might advance more easily; and their shields were to be handed them when they were close to the enemy. Now when several had got up, the sentinels on the towers became aware of their presence; for one of the Plataeans in laying hold of the battlements threw down a tile, which fell with a thud. And immediately there was an outcry, and the garrison rushed to the wall; for they did not know what the danger was, as the night was dark and stormy, and at the same time the Plataeans who had been left behind in the town went out and attacked the wall of the Peloponnesians on the side
THUCYDIDES

παλιν ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεὶς αὐτῶν ὑπερέβαινον, ὡς
6 ἰκιστα πρὸς αὐτούς τῷ νοῦν ἔχοιεν. ἐθορυβοῦντο
μὲν οὖν κατὰ χώραν μένοντες, βοηθεῖν δὲ οὐδεὶς
ἐτόλμα ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φυλακῆς, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀπόρῳ
7 ἦσαν εἰκάσαι τὸ γιγνόμενον. καὶ οἱ τριακόσιοι
αὐτῶν, οἷς ἐτέτακτο παραβοηθεῖν εἰ τι δέοι,
ἐξόρουν ἐξωθεὶν τοῦ τείχους πρὸς τὴν βοὴν,
8 φρυκτό τε ἦροιτο ἐστὶς Θήβαις πολέμου παραβο-
ἰσχοῦ δὲ καὶ οἱ ἔκ τῆς πόλεως Πλαταιῆς ἀπὸ
τοῦ τείχους φρυκτοὺς πολλοὺς πρότερον παρε-
σκευασμένους ἐστὶν τοῦτο, ὡς ἀσαφὴ τὰ
σημεῖα τῆς φυκτορίας τοῖς πολεμίοις ἢ καὶ ἐν
βοηθοῦσιν, ἄλλο τι νομίσαντες τὸ γιγνόμενον εἶναι
ἡ τὸ ὄν, πρὶν σφῶν οἱ ἀνδρεὶς οἱ ἐξιόντες δια-
φύγοις καὶ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς ἀντιλάβοιτο.

XXIII. Οἱ δ' ὑπερβαίνοντες τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἐν
tούτῳ, ὡς οἱ πρῶτοι αὐτῶν ἀνεβεβήκεσαν καὶ
tοῦ πύργου ἐκατέρου τοὺς φύλακας διαφθείραντες
ἐκεκρατήκεσαν, ταῦτα δὲ διόδους τῶν πύργων
ἐνστάντες αὐτῶν ἐφύλασσον μηδένα δι' αὐτῶν
ἐπιβοηθεῖν, καὶ κλίμακας προσθέντες ἀπὸ τοῦ
tείχους τοῖς πύργοις καὶ ἐπαναβιβάζαντες ἄνδρας
πλείους, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων τοὺς ἐπιβοηθοῦν-
tας καὶ κάτωθεν καὶ ἀνωθεν ἔργοι βάλλοντες,
oi δ' ἐν τούτῳ οἱ πλείους πολλὰς προσθέντες
κλίμακας ἁμα καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπώσαντες διὰ
2 τοῦ μεταπυργίου ὑπερέβαινον. οὶ δὲ διακριμοῖ-
μενος αἰεὶ ἱστατο ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους τῆς τάφρου
36
opposite that over which their men were climbing, to distract attention from them as far as possible. Now the sentinels remained at their posts, though in a state of excitement, no one daring to leave his station and lend aid, but all being at a loss to conjecture what was going on. Furthermore, the three hundred, who had been appointed to bring aid wherever it was needed, proceeded outside of the wall in the direction of the outcry, and beacon fires indicating danger from the enemy were flashed towards Thebes. But the Plataeans in the town at the same time raised from their wall many beacons, which had been prepared beforehand for this very purpose, that the enemy's beacon signals might be rendered unintelligible and that the Thebans, thinking that the situation was different from what it really was, might defer bringing aid until the Plataeans who were leaving should have made good their escape and reached safety.

XXIII. Meanwhile, when the foremost of the Plataeans who were scaling the walls had mounted, slain the guards, and got possession of the two towers, they themselves took position inside the towers and guarded the passageways, that no one might come through these against them. Then from the top of the wall they placed ladders against the towers, got up a number of men, and kept all assailants away from the towers, shooting at them from below and above. Meanwhile the others, the main body, had put up a large number of ladders and thrown down the battlements, and were climbing over through the space between the towers. And as each one got over he halted on the edge of the ditch; and

1 i.e. from the tops of the towers and from the wall at their base.
καὶ ἑντεῦθεν ἐτοξευόν τε καὶ ἡκοντίζον, εἰ τις παραβοσθῶν παρὰ τὸ τεῖχος κωλυτῆς γίγνοιτο ἢ τῆς διαβάσεως. ἔπει δὲ πάντες διεπεπεραιώτο, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων χαλεπώς οἱ τελευταίοι καταβαίνοντες ἔχωρουν ἐπὶ τὴν τάφρον, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ τριακόσιοι αὐτοῖς ἐπεφέροντο λαμπάδας 4 ἔχοντες. οἱ μὲν οὖν Πλαταιῆς ἐκείνους ἔωρον μάλλον ἐκ τοῦ σκότους ἐστώτες ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους τῆς τάφρου, καὶ ἐτοξευόν τε καὶ ἑσπέριτον ὡς τὸ γυμνά, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ὄντες ἤσον διὰ τᾶς λαμπάδας καθεστώτο, ὡστε φθάνουσι τῶν Πλαταιῶν καὶ οἱ ὑστατοί διαβάντες τῆς τάφρου, 5 χαλεπῶς δὲ καὶ βιαίως κρύσταλλος τε γαρ εὐπηγεῖ οὐ βέβαιοι ἐν αὐτῇ ὡς εἶπεν, ἀλλ' οίς ἄπηλικτον ἢ βορέου 1 ὑδατώδης μάλλον, καὶ ἡ νῦς τοιούτῳ ἀνέμῳ ὑπονεφρομένη πολὺ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεποιήκει, ο μόλις ὑπερέχοντες ἐπεραιώθησαν. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ ἡ διάφευξις αὐτοῖς μάλλον διὰ τοῦ χειμώνος τὸ μέγεθος.

XXIV. Ὀρμήσαντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τάφρος οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἐχώρουν ἁδρόοι τὴν ὡς Ὄιβας φέρουσαν ὄδοιν ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἱρών, νομίζοντες ἤκιστ' ἀν σφᾶς ταῦταν αὐτοὺς ὑποτοπίσαι τραπέζαι τὴν ἐν τοὺς πολεμούς καὶ ἀμα ἐωρών τοὺς Πελοποννησίους τὴν πρὸς Κιβαίρωνα καὶ Δρυός κεφαλάς τὴν ἐπὶ Ἀθηνῶν 2 φέρουσαν μετὰ λαμπάδων διώκοντας. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ἐξ ἡ ἐπτὰ σταδίους οἱ Πλαταιῆς τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν Ὄιβων ἐχώρησαν, ἐπειδ' ὑποστρέψαντες ἤσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄρος φέρουσαν ὄδον ἐς Ἑρύθρας καὶ 1 ἢ βορέου, deleted by Dobree, followed by Hulse. Poppo would transpose ὑδατώδης μάλλον, or bracket ὑδατώδης.
from there they shot arrows and hurled javelins at any enemy who tried to approach along the wall and interfere with their crossing. And when all these had reached the other side, the men who had held the towers, the last of whom descended with difficulty, advanced toward the ditch; and at the same time the three hundred bore down upon them, carrying torches. Now the Plataeans, as they stood on the edge of the ditch, saw them better out of the darkness, and kept launching arrows and javelins at their uncovered sides, while they themselves, being in the shadow, were rendered less visible by the enemy’s torches. Consequently even the last of the Plataeans got safely across the ditch, though only with difficulty and after a hard struggle; for in the ditch ice had formed that was not firm enough to walk on but mushy, such as is formed when the wind is east instead of north; and since the night, the wind being from that quarter, was somewhat snowy, the water in the ditch had become so deep that they could scarcely keep their heads above it as they crossed. It was, however, chiefly the violence of the storm that enabled them to escape at all.

XXIV. Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans advanced in a body along the road toward Thebes, having on their right the shrine of the hero Androcrites; for they thought that no one would ever suspect them of having taken this road, which led towards their enemies; besides, they saw the Peloponnnesians, torches in hand, taking in pursuit the road toward Cithaeron and Dryoscephalae, which is the road to Athens. And for six or seven stadia the Plataeans proceeded on the road toward Thebes, then turned and followed that leading towards Erythrae and
Τσιάς, καὶ λαβόμενοι τῶν ὀρῶν διαφεύγουσιν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἀνδρεὶς δώδεκα καὶ διακόσιοι ἀπὸ πλευρῶν εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες αὐτῶν οἱ ἀπετράπωντο ἐς τὴν πόλιν πρὶν ὑπερβαίνειν, εἰς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐξω 3 τάφῳ τοξότης ἐλήφθη. οἱ μὲν οὖν Πελο-
ποινήσιοι κατὰ χώραν ἐγένοντο τῆς βοηθείας παυσάμενοι. οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Πλαταιῶν τῶν μὲν γεγενημένων εἰδότες οὐδὲν, τῶν δὲ ἀποτραπο-
μένων σφίσιν ἀπαγγελλάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς περίεστι, κήρυκα ἐκπέμψαντες, ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, ἐσπέν-
δοντο ἀναίρεσιν τοὺς νεκροὺς, μαθόντες δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπαύσαντο. οἱ μὲν δὴ τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἀνδρεὶς οὕτω ὑπερβαίναντες ἐσώθησαν.

XXV. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος τοῦ αὐτοῦ χει-
μῶνος τελευτῶντος ἐκπέμπεται Σάλαιδος ὁ Λακε-
dαιμόνιος ἐς Μυτιλήνην τριήρει. καὶ πλεύσας ἐς Πύρραν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς πεζῇ κατὰ χαράδραν τινὰ, ἡ ὑπερβατὸν ἡ το περιτείχισμα, διαλαθῶν ἐσέρχεται ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην, καὶ ἔλεγε τοῖς προέδροις ὅτι ἐσβολή τε ἁμα ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἔσται καὶ αἱ τεσσαράκοντα νῆς παρέσονται ἀς ἐδει βοηθήσαι αὐτοῖς, προαποπεμφθήναι τε αὐτῶς τούτων ἔνεκα καὶ ἁμα τῶν ἅλλων ἐπιμελή-
2 σόμενος. καὶ οἱ μὲν Μυτιληναῖοι ἐθάρσωσιν τε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠσσον εἴχον τὴν γνώμην ὡς ἐξυμβαίνειν. ὅ τε χειμῶν ἐτελεύτα ὑπός, καὶ τέταρτων ἑτος τῶν πολέμων ἐτελεύτα τόδε ὁν Θουκυδίδης ἐξενέγραψεν.

XXVI. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπιγυμνομένου θέρους οἱ Πελο-
pοινήσιοι ἐπειδὴ τὰς ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην 2 τεσ-

1 Van Herwerden suggests ὑποβατῶν, followed by Hude.
2 δῦν καὶ of the MSS. before τεσσαράκοντα suspected by Krüger and deleted by van Herwerden.
Hysiae, and reaching the mountains escaped to Athens. They were only two hundred and twelve men out of a larger number; for some had turned back to the town without trying to climb the wall, and one man, an archer, had been taken at the outer ditch. The Peloponnesians, then, desisted from the pursuit and returned to their post. But the Plataeans in the town, knowing nothing of what had really happened, but informed by those who had turned back that no one survived, sent a herald at daybreak and asked for a truce that they might take up their dead; on learning the truth however, they desisted. So these Plataeans got over the wall in the manner described and reached safety.\(^1\)

XXV. Toward the close of the same winter, Salae-\(\text{428 B.C.}\) thus the Lacedaemonian was sent in a trireme from Lacedaemon to Mytilene. Landing at Pyrrha and proceeding thence on foot, he followed the bed of a ravine, where the circuit-wall could be crossed, and came undetected into Mytilene. He told the magistrates that there would be an invasion of Attica and that simultaneously the forty ships\(^2\) which were to come to their aid would arrive, adding that he himself had been sent ahead to make these announcements and also to take charge of matters in general. Accordingly the Mytilenaeans were encouraged and were less inclined than ever to make terms with the Athenians. So this winter ended, and with it the fourth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

XXVI. During the following summer the Pelopon-\(\text{427 B.C.}\) nesians first despatched the forty ships which they

---

\(^1\) For the fate of the city and of the Plataeans who remained in it, see chs. lii.–lxviii.

\(^2\) cf. ch. xvi. 3.
σαράκοντα ναύς ἀπέστειλαν ἄρχοντα Ἀλκίδαν, ὃς ἦν αὐτοῖς ναύαρχος, προστάξαντες, αὐτοὶ ἐσ τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐσέβαλον, ὦ πώς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν θορυβοῦμενοι ἤσσον ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην καταπλεοῦσας

2 ἐπιβοηθήσωσιν. ἤγειτο δὲ τῆς ἐσβολῆς ταύτης Κλεομένης ὑπὲρ Παυσανίου τοῦ Πλειστοάνακτος νύεως βασιλέως ὄντος καὶ νεωτέρου ἐτι, πατρὸς ἐκ ἀδελφῶν ὦν. ἐδήσαν δὲ τῆς Ἀττικῆς τά τε πρότερον τετμημένα, ἐκ τι ἐβεβλαστήκειν, καὶ ὦσα ἐν ταῖς πρὶν ἐσβολαῖς παρελέειπτο· καὶ ἡ ἐσβολὴ αὐτὴ χαλεπωτάτη ἐγένετο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις μετὰ τὴν δευτέραν. ἐπιμένοντες γὰρ αἰεὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Λέσβου τι πεῦσεθαι τῶν νεῶν ἔργων ὡς ἦδη πεπεραιωμένων ἐπεξῆλθον τὰ πολλὰ τέμνοντες. ὦς δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἀπέβαινεν αὐτοῖς ὅν προσεδέχοντο καὶ ἐπελελοίπει τὸ σίτος, ἀνεχόρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

XXVII. Οἱ δὲ Μυτιληναῖοι ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς αἱ τε νῆσες αὐτοῖς ὧν ἦκον ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοπονήσου, ἀλλὰ ἐνεχρονίζον, καὶ ὁ σῖτος ἐπελελοίπει, ἀναγκάζοντα χυμβαίνειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διὰ τάδε. ὁ Σάλαθος καὶ αὐτὸς οὗ προσδεχόμενος ἐτι τάς ναύς ὀπλίζει τὸν δήμον πρότερον ψιλὸν ὄντα ὡς

1 καὶ of the MSS. before ετὶ deleted by Dindorf.

1 cf. II. lvii. 2.
2 It is implied that the Lacedaemonians planned this summer, as on previous invasions, to ravage certain districts.
had promised to Mytilene, appointing in command of them Alcidas, who was the Lacedaemonian admiral, and then invaded Attica, themselves and their allies, in order that the Athenians, threatened on both sea and land, might be deterred from sending a force to attack the fleet that was on its way to Mytilene. The leader of this invasion was Cleomenes, regent for his nephew Pausanias son of Pleistoanax, who was king but still a minor. And they ravaged the parts of Attica that had been laid waste before, wherever any new growth had sprung up, as well as those that had been left untouched in the former invasions. And this invasion proved more grievous to the Athenians than any except the second; for the enemy, who were momentarily expecting to hear from Lesbos of some achievement of their fleet, which they supposed had already got across, went on and on, ravaging most of the country. But when they found that nothing turned out as they expected and their food was exhausted, they withdrew and dispersed to their several cities.

XXVII. Meanwhile the Mytileneans, seeing that the fleet had not arrived from the Peloponnesus but was loitering on the way, and that their food was exhausted, were compelled to make terms with the Athenians by the following circumstances. Salaethus, who himself no longer expected the fleet to come, equipped the commons with heavy armour, instead of their former light arms, intending to attack the and then, after hearing of the success of the fleet at Lesbos, to withdraw. But they were kept in Attica longer than they had intended by the delay on the part of the fleet.

3 With shield and spears and breast-plate. The light-armed troops wore no defensive armour and carried spear or bow.
3 ἑπεξεύγαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις· οἱ δὲ ἔπειδὴ ἔλαβον ὀπλα, οὔτε ἦκροδωτό ἔτι τῶν ἄρχοντων, κατὰ ξυλλόγους τε γιγνόμενοι ἢ τῶν σίτων ἐκέλευσαν τοὺς δυνατοὺς φέρειν ἐς τὸ φανερὸν καὶ διανέμειν ἄπασιν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ξυγχωρήσαντες πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐφασαν παραδώσειν τὴν πόλιν. XXVIII. γνώντες δὲ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν οὔτε ἀποκωλύειν δυνατοὶ ὄντες, εἰ τ’ ἀπομονωθῆσον τῇς ξυμβάσεως, κιν- δυνεύσοντες, ποιοῦνται κοινὴ ὀμολογίαν πρὸς τε Πάχητα καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, ὡστε Ἀθηναίοις μὲν ἐξεῖναι βουλεύσαι περὶ Μυτιληναίων ὀποίον ἄν τι βούλωνται καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν ἐς τὴν πόλιν δέχεσθαι αὐτούς, προσβείαν δὲ ἀποστέλλειν ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναῖς Μυτιληναίους περὶ ἔαυτῶν· ἐν ὅσῳ δ’ ἄν πάλιν ἔλθωσι, Πάχητα μήτε δῆσαι Μυτιληναίων μηδένα μηδὲ ἀνδραποδίσαι μήτε ἀποκτεῖναι. ἡ μὲν ξύμβασις αὐτὴ ἐγένετο. οἱ δὲ πράξαντες πρὸς τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους μάλιστα τῶν Μυτιληναίων περιδεεις ὄντες, ὥς ἡ στρατιὰ ἐσῆλθεν, οὐκ ἤνεσχοντο, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοὺς βωμοὺς ὄμως καθίζουσιν. Πάχης δ’ ἀναστήσας αὐτοὺς ὡστε μὴ ἀδικηθῆσαι, κατατίθεται ἐς Τένεδον μέχρι 3 οὐ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τι δόξη. πέμψας δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀντισσαν τριήρεις προσεκτήσατο καὶ τάλλα τὰ περὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον καθίστατο ἡ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει. XXIX. Οἱ δ’ ἐν ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ Πελοποννήσιοι, οὕς ἔδει ἐν τάχει παραγενέσθαι, πλέοντες περὶ τε αὐτὴν τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐνδιέ-
Athenians; but the commons, as soon as they had got arms, would no longer obey their commanders, but gathered in groups and ordered the aristocrats to bring out whatever food there was and distribute it to all; otherwise, they said, they would come to terms with the Athenians independently and deliver up the city. XXVIII. Thereupon the men in authority, realizing that they could not prevent this and that they would be in peril if excluded from the capitulation, joined the commons in making an agreement with Paches and his army. The conditions were that the Athenian state should have the power to decide as they pleased about the fate of the Mytileneans and that the besieging army should be admitted into the city; but it was conceded that the Mytileneans might send an embassy to Athens to treat for terms, Paches, meanwhile, until the return of the embassy, agreeing not to imprison or enslave or put to death any Mytilenean. Such was the agreement. But those of the Mytileneans who had been most involved in the intrigue with the Lacedaemonians were in great terror when the army entered the town, and could not keep quiet, but notwithstanding the agreement took refuge at the altars. Paches, however, induced them to leave the altars, promising to do them no injury, and placed them for safe keeping in Tenedos until the Athenians should reach a decision. He also sent triremes to Antissa and took possession of it, and made such other dispositions with reference to the army as seemed best to him.

XXIX. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who ought to have arrived speedily at Mytilene, wasted time on their voyage round the
τρυψαν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον πλοῦν σχολαίοι κο-
misθέντες τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Ἀθηναίους
λαυθάνουσι, πρὶν δὲ τῇ Δήλῳ ἔσχον, προσμεί-
ξαντες δὲ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῇ Ἰκάρφῳ καὶ Μυκόνῳ πυν-
2 θάνονται πρῶτον ὧτι ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἐάλωκεν. βου-
λόμενοι δὲ τὸ σαφὲς εἰδέναι κατέπλευσαν ἐς
"Εμβατον τῆς 'Ερυθραίας ἡμέραι δὲ μάλιστα
ℏsan τῇ Μυτιλήνη ἑαλωκυία ἐπτὰ ὅτε ἐς τὸ
"Εμβατον κατέπλευσαν. πυθόμενοι δὲ τὸ σαφὲς
ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκ τῶν παρόντων καὶ ἑλεξεν αὐτὸς
Τευτίαπλος ἀνὴρ Ἡλείως τάδε.

XXX. "Ἀλκίδα καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι πάρ-
εσμεν ἄρχοντες τῆς στρατιάς, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πλεῖν
ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Μυτιλήνην πρὶν ἐκπύοστος γενέσθαι,
2 ὡσπερ ἔχομεν. κατὰ γὰρ τὸ εἰκός ἀνδρῶν νεωστὶ
πόλιν ἔχοντων πολὺ τὸ ἀφύλακτον εὐρήσομεν,
κατὰ μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ πάνω, ᾧ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἀνέλ-
πιστοὶ ἐπυγενέσθαι ἂν τινα σφίσι πολέμιον καὶ
ἡμῶν ἡ ἀλκὴ τυγχάνει μάλιστα οὐσα. εἰκός δὲ καὶ
τὸ πεξόν αὐτῶν κατ᾽ οἶκιας ἀμελέστερον ὡς κεκρα-
3 τηκότων διεσπάρθαι. εἰ ὦν προσπέσομεν ἀφνο
τε καὶ νυκτός, ἐλπίζω μετὰ τῶν ἐνδόν, εἰ τὶς ἁρὰ
ἡμῶν ἐστίν ὑπόλοιπος εἶνος, καταληψθήναι ἂν
4 τὰ πράγματα. καὶ μὴ ἀποκυνήσωμεν τοῦ κίνδυνον,
νομίζαντες οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ καίνον τοῦ
πολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὅ εἰ τις στρατηγὸς ἐν τε

46
Peloponnesus and on the rest of the way proceeded leisurely. They were unobserved by the Athenian home fleet until they reached Delos; but when after leaving Delos they touched at Icaros and Myconos they received the first tidings that Mytilene had been taken. Wishing however to know the exact situation they sailed to Embatam in Erythraea; and it was about seven days after the capture of Mytilene that they came to Embatam. Now that they had learned the truth, they took counsel in view of the present emergency, and Tentiplus, an Elean, spoke to them as follows:

XXX. "Alcidas, and you who, like myself, are present here as commanders of the Peloponnesian forces, it seems to me that we should sail to Mytilene before our approach becomes known, without a moment's delay. For in all probability we shall find that men who have but lately come into possession of a city are very much off their guard. At sea, indeed, they will be altogether so, where they have no expectation of any possible hostile attack and our rôle is chiefly to act on the defensive; and on land also their forces are probably scattered among the houses all the more carelessly because they believe that they are victors. If, then, we should fall upon them suddenly and at night, I believe that, in concert with our supporters inside, if any are left, we should find ourselves masters of the situation. And let us not shrink from the danger, remembering that the element of surprise in warfare is precisely of this nature. And if a general guards against such surprises in his own case, and, whenever he

1 Or, "while on our side it is just here that our strength lies."  
2 i.e. dangerous.
THUCYDIDES

αὐτῷ φυλάσσοιτο καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐνορῶν ἐπιχειροῦσῃ, πλείστῳ ἂν ὑπὸ ὀρθοῦτο.

XXXI. Ὅ μὲν τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἐπειθε τὸν Ἀλκίδαν. Ἀλλοι δὲ τινες τῶν ἀπ' Ἰωνίας φυγόνων καὶ οἱ Δέσβιοι οἱ εἰπὼν πόλεων καταλαβεῖν τινα ἢ Κύμην τὴν Αἰολίδα, ὅπως ἐκ πόλεως ὀρμόμενοι τὴν Ἰωνίαν ἀποστήσωσιν (ἐλπίδα δ' εἶναι: οὔδεν γὰρ ἀκουσίως ἄφιξθαι), καὶ τὴν πρόσοδον ταύτην μεγίστην οὖσαν Ἀθηναίων ἵν' υφέλωσι καὶ ἀμα, ἦν ἐφορμῶσι σφίσιν, αὐτοῖς δαπάνη γίγνηται: πείσειν τε ὁ ὀισθαί καὶ Πισσούθυνην ὡστε εὐμπολεμεῖν. ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτα ἐνεδέχετο, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλείστον τῆς γνώμης εἰχεν, ἐπειδὴ τῆς Μυτιλήνης ύστερηκεί, ὅτι τάχιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πάλιν προσμεῖξαι.

XXXII. Ἄρας δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Ἐμβάτου παρέπλει, καὶ προσπὴ χων Μυοννήσῳ τῇ Τηών τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους οὓς κατὰ πλοίων εἰλήφει ἀπέσφαξε τοὺς

1 oι before ξυμπλέοντες added by Madvig, followed by Hude.
2 kal τὴν πρόσοδον ... γίγνηται. The first part of this vexed passage is in accord with the essentially unanimous tradition of the MSS., except that Dobree's conjecture, ἵν' υφέλωσι, is substituted for ἤν υφέλωσι. The second part (kal ἀμα ... γίγνηται) is in agreement with van Herwerden and Müller-Strübing, Thuk. Forsch., p. 97, after Codex M and a Schol. (τὸ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ἀμα ἀναγνωστέον, ἀλλὰ διατετέον, καὶ κατὰ τὸ σφίσιν ὑποστητέον). Most MSS. have ἐφορμῶσι αὐτοῖς (or αὐτοῖς) δαπάνη σφίσι γίγνηται (B γίγνεται); G ἐφορμῶσιν αὐτοῖς σφίσι δαπάνη γίγνηται. Dobree's conjecture (ίνα) not only gives a good construction for υφέλωσι—
sees an opportunity to employ them in the case of the enemy, makes the attempt, he will win the greatest success."

XXXI. Thus he spoke, but could not win Alcidas to his plan. Then some others, exiles from Ionia, and the Lesbians\(^1\) who were with the fleet, advised him, since he feared the risk of this enterprise, to seize one of the cities in Ionia, or Cyme in Aeolia, in order that they might have a city as their base and bring Ionia to revolt (and that there was a prospect of success, seeing that everyone welcomed his coming) and might thus steal from the Athenians this the greatest source of their revenue, and at the same time the Athenians might be put to expense, in case they should attempt to blockade their base. They thought, moreover, that they could persuade Pisistrathnes to join them in the war. Alcidas, however, would not accept these proposals, either, but his chief concern, now that he was too late for Mytilene, was to get back to Peloponnesus as quickly as possible.

XXXII. So he set sail from Embatum and skirted the coast; and putting in at Myonnesus in the country of the Teians he butchered most of the captives whom he had taken on the voyage. Then

\(^1\) The πρέσβεις of chs. iv., v.

without altering the essential meaning of the sentence—but obviates the necessity of making γιγνεται dependent on ἔπος, which is too far off and separated from it by too many subordinate clauses. If ἂν ἔφελον be retained, with most editors, the sense would be: "and if they could steal from the Athenians this the greatest source of their revenue, these might also at the same time, in case they should blockade them [the Peloponnesians], be put to expense."
2 πολλοὺς. καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἐφεσον καθορμισαμένου αὐτοῦ Σαμίων τῶν ἐξ Ἀναίων ἀφικόμενοι πρέσβεις ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτῶν, εἰ ἄνδρας διέφθειρεν οὗτε χείρας ἀνταιρωμένους οὗτο πολεμίους, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ξυμμάχουσι· εἰ τε μὴ παύσεται, ὀλίγοις μὲν αὐτῶν τῶν ἔχθρῶν ἐς φιλίαν προσάξεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ

3 πλείους τῶν φίλων πολεμίως ἔξειν. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐπείσθη τε καὶ Χίων ἄνδρας ὅσους εἰχεν ἐτὶ ἄφηκε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶς ὅραστες ἀρτὰς ναῦς οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὗκ ἐφευγον, ἄλλα προσεχόροι μᾶλλον ὡς Ἀττικαῖς καὶ ἑλπίδα οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην εἰχον μὴ ποτε Ἀθηναίων τῆς θαλάσσης κρατοῦντων ναῦς Πελοποννήσιων ἐς Ἰωνίαν παραβαλείν.

XXXIII. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Ἐφέσου ὁ Ἀλκίδας ἐπλεικατὰ τάχος καὶ πρύμνη ἐποιεῖτο· ὁφθαλμὸν ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τῆς Σαλαμίνας καὶ Παράκολος ἐτι περὶ Κλάρους ἀρμός (αι δε ἀπ' Ἀθηνῶν ἐτυχον πλέουσαι), καὶ δεδιὸς τὴν βιωξίν ἐπλεικ οὐ τοῦ πελάγους ὡς γῆ ἐκούσιος 2 οὐ σχῆσῶν ἀλλὰ ἡ Πελοποννήσῳ. τῷ δὲ Πάχνητι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἡλθε μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐρυθραίας ἀγγελία, ἀφικνεῖτο δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν ἀτείχιστον ἄρα οὕσης τῆς Ἰωνίας μέγα τὸ δέος

1 These were probably the Samians who settled at Anaea, on the coast opposite the island, after the overthrow of Samos in 439 B.C. (cf. 1. cxvii. 3). They are referred to in ch. xix. 2 as "Anaeitans."
he anchored at Ephesus, where he was visited by envoys of the Samians who were settled at Anaea,¹ who said that it was an ill way he had of freeing Hellas, to destroy men who were not lifting their hands against him and were not enemies, but were merely allies of the Athenians under compulsion; and unless he abandoned this course he would win few enemies over into friendship and would turn far more friends into enemies. Alcidas was persuaded, and set free all the Chians whom he still held and some of the others. It should be explained that the people of the coast,² when they saw the Peloponnesian ships, made no attempt to flee, but came near, supposing that they were Athenian ships; and they had not the slightest expectation that while the Athenians dominated the sea the Peloponnesian fleet would ever venture over to Ionia.

XXXIII. From Ephesus Alcidas sailed in haste and took to flight; for while still at anchor near Clarus³ he had been sighted by the Salaminia and Paralus,⁴ which happened to be on a voyage from Athens, and in fear of pursuit he sailed through the open sea, determined that he would not, unless obliged to do so, put into land anywhere except in the Peloponnesus. Reports of him had been brought from Erythraea to Paches and the Athenians, and now kept coming from all quarters. For since Ionia was unfortified, a great alarm arose everywhere lest

² i.e. the Greeks of whom Alcidas had taken so many prisoners.
³ i.e. while on his way from Embatum to Ephesus.
⁴ The two swift Athenian state triremes kept always manned ready for extraordinary service. Alcidas knew that these two boats would notify the main Athenian fleet under Paches of his whereabouts, and that Paches would make pursuit.
ἐγένετο μὴ παραπλέοντες οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, εἰ καὶ δὲς μὴ διενούντο μένειν, πορθῶσιν ἄμα προσπίπτοντες τὰς πόλεις. αὐτάγγελοι δ' αὐτὸν ἰδούσαι ἐν τῇ Κλάρῳ ἢ τε Πάραλος καὶ ἢ 3 Σαλαμινία ἔφρασαν. ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἐποιεῖτο τὴν διώξιν· καὶ μέχρι μὲν Πάτμου τῆς νῆσου ἔπεδίώξεν, ὡς δ' οὐκέτι ἐν καταλήψει ἐφαίνετο, ἐπανεχώρησεν. κέρδος δὲ ἐνόμισεν, ἐπειδὴ οὐ μετεώροις περιέτυχεν, ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ ἐγκαταλήφθεισαν ἡγαγόσθησαν στρατόπεδον τε ποιεῖσθαι καὶ φυλακήν σφίσι καὶ ἐφόρμησιν παρασχεῖν.

XXXIV. Παραπλέων δὲ πάλιν ἐσχε καὶ ὑς Νότιον τὸ Κολοφωνίων, οὐ κατάκηντο Κολοφώνιοι τῆς ἀνω πόλεως ἑαλωκυνίας ὑπὸ Ἰταμάνους καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων κατὰ στάσιν ἱδία ἐπαχθέντων ἐάλω δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὴ ὅτε ἡ δευτέρα Πελοποννησίων 2 ἐσβολὴ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐγένετο. ἐν οἷν τῷ Νοτίῳ οἱ καταφυγόντες καὶ κατοικήσαντες αὐτὸθε αὐθίς στασιάσαντες, οἱ μὲν παρὰ Πισσούθυνον ἐπικούρους Ἀρκάδων τε καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπαγαγόμενοι ἐν διατειχίσματι εἶχον (καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἀνω πόλεως Κολοφωνίων οἱ μηδίσαντες ξυνεσελθόντες ἐπολίτευν), οἱ δὲ ὑπεξελθόντες τούτους καὶ ὄντες φυγάδες τὸν Πάχνητα ἐπάγονται.

1 i.e. since they were only cruising.
2 Such a blockade would not only have been costly, but would also have kept the fleet from carrying on its work at Lesbos.
the Peloponnesians, while following the coast—even if, under the circumstances,\(^1\) they had no intention of remaining—might in passing fall upon their cities and plunder them. And finally the Paralus and the Salaminia brought the news that they had themselves seen him at Clarus. So Paches eagerly undertook the pursuit; and he followed him as far as the island of Patmos, but when it was clear that Alcidas could no longer be overtaken he turned back again. And since he had not come up with the Peloponnesian fleet in the open sea, he considered it a piece of good fortune that they had not been overtaken in some port and compelled to set up a camp there, thus giving the Athenian fleet the trouble of watching and blockading them.\(^2\)

XXXIV. On the way back as he sailed along the coast he put in at Notium, the port of the Colophonians, where the Colophonians had settled when the upper town had been taken by Itamenes and the barbarians,\(^3\) who had been called in on account of party discord by one of the factions. And this place had been taken about the time when the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attica was made.\(^4\) Now those who had fled for refuge to Notium and settled there again fell into sedition. One party called in mercenaries, both Arcadian and barbarian, whom they had obtained from Pissuthnes, and kept them in a space walled off from the rest of the city, and the Colophonians from the upper town who were in sympathy with the Persians joined them there and were admitted to citizenship; the other party had secretly made their escape, and, being

\(^{1}\) i.e. the Persians. Itamenes is otherwise unknown.

\(^{2}\) In the spring of 430 B.C.
3 ὁ δὲ προκαλεσάμενος ἐς λόγους Ἰππίαν τῶν ἐν τῷ διατείχισματι Ἀρκάδων ἀρχοντα, ὡστε, ἦν μηδεν ἄρεσκον λέγῃ, πάλιν αὐτὸν καταστήσειν ἕς τὸ τεῖχος σῶν καὶ υγιᾷ, ὁ μὲν ἐξελθεὶν παρ' αὐτὸν, ὁ δὲ εἰκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν φυλακῇ ἅδεσμῳ εἶχεν, αὐτὸς δὲ προσβάλων τῷ τειχίσματι ἔξαπιναίς καὶ ὦ προσδεχομένων αἱρεῖ, τοὺς τὲ Ἀρκάδας καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ὦσοι ἐνήσαν διαφθείρεις καὶ τὸν Ἰππίαν ἕστερον ἐσαγαγὼν ὃσπερ ἐσπείσατο· ἐπειδὴ ἐνδοὺ ἦν, ἔυλλαμβάνει καὶ κατατοξεύει.

4 Κολοσσαῖος δὲ Νότιον παραδίδωσι πλῆν τῶν μυδίσμων, καὶ ἕστερον Ἀθηναίοι οἰκιστὰς πέμψαντες κατὰ τοὺς ἐαυτῶν νόμους κατάρκισαν τὸ Νότιον, ἐυπαγαγόντες πάντας ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, εἰ ποῦ τις ἦν Κολοσσαῖοι.

XXXV. Ὁ δὲ Πάχης ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Ὑπεραγίαν τὴν τὴν Πύρραν καὶ Ἐρέσσον παρεστήσατο, καὶ Σάλαιθου λαβὼν ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν Λακεδαιμόνιον κεκρυμμένον ἀποπέμπτει ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Τενέδου Μυτιληναίων ἀνδρας ἀμα ὑσ κατέθετο καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος αὐτῷ αἴτιος ἔδοκεν

2 εἶναι τῆς ἀποστάσεως· ἀποπέμπτει δὲ καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τὸ πλέον. τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ὑπομένων καθίστατο τὰ περὶ τὴν Μυτιληνὴν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Λεσβοὺ ᾗ αὐτῷ ἔδοκεν.

XXXVI. Ἀφικομένων δὲ τῶν ἄνδρων καὶ τοῦ Σαλαίθου οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τὸν μὲν Σάλαιθον εὐθὺς ἀπέκτειναν, ἔστων ἀ παρεχόμενον τὰ τ' ἄλλα καὶ ἀπὸ Πλαταιῶν (ἐτὶ γὰρ ἐπολιορκοῦντο) ἀπάξειν
now in exile, called in Paches. And he summoned Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the fortified quarter, to a conference, on condition that if his proposals were unsatisfactory he would restore him safe and sound to the fortress. But when Hippias came out to him, he kept him under guard but unfettered while he himself made a sudden and unexpected attack upon the fortress, captured it, and put to death all the Arcadians and barbarians that were in it. As for Hippias, he afterward took him into the fortress just as he had agreed to do, and as soon as he was inside seized him and shot him down. He then delivered Notium to the Colophonians, excepting, however, the Persian sympathizers. The Athenians afterwards sent a commission and re-colonized Notium, giving it their own institutions, after they had first brought together all the Colophonians from cities where any of them were to be found.

XXXV. After returning to Mytilene Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus, and having caught Salaethus the Lacedaemonian in hiding in the town sent him off to Athens, as also the Mytilenaen men whom he had placed for safe-keeping in Tenedos, and any others who seemed to him to blame for the revolt. He also sent back most of his army; with the rest he remained, and proceeded to settle the affairs of Mytilene and of Lesbos in general as seemed best to him.

XXXVI. When Salaethus and the others arrived at Athens, the Athenians at once put Salaethus to death, although he offered among other things to induce the Peloponnesians to abandon Plataea, which
2 Πελοποννησίους περί δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γ νώμας ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς οὐ τοὺς παρόντας μόνον ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀπαντας Μυτιληναίους ὅσοι ἤβδοσι, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναικὰς ἀνδραποδίσαι, ἑπικαλοῦντες τὴν τε ἄλλην ἀπόστασιν ὅτι οὐκ ἄρχομενοι ὡσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἑποιήσαντο, καὶ προσξυνελίβατο οὐκ ἐλάχιστον τῆς ὁρμῆς αἱ Πελοποννησίων νῆσες ἐς Ἰωνίαν ἑκείνοις βοηθῷ τολμήσασαι παρακιν- δυνεῦσαι: οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ βραχείας διανοίας ἐδόκοντο
3 τὴν ἀπόστασιν ποιήσασθαι. πέμπουσιν οὖν τριήρης ὡς Πάχυτα ἄγγελον τῶν δεδογμένων, κατὰ τάχος κελεύοντες διαχρήσασθαι Μυτιληναίους.
4 καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετάνοια τις εὐθὺς ἢν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς ὧμον τὸ βουλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγνώθαι, τόλιν ὄλην διαφθείραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους. ὡς δὲ ἤσθοντο τοῦτο τῶν Μυτιλη-
5 ναίων οἱ παρόντες πρέσβεις καὶ οἱ αὐτοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐμπράσσοντες, παρεσκεύασαν τοὺς ἐν τέλει ὡστε αὕθες γνώμας προβείναι· καὶ ἐπείσαν βάσον, διότι καὶ ἑκείνος ἐνδηλὸν ἢν βουλό-
6 μενον τὸ πλέον τῶν πολιτῶν αὕθες τινας σφίσιν ἀποδοῦναι βουλεύσασθαι. καταστάσεις δὲ εὐθὺς ἐκκλησίας ἀλλαὶ τε γνώμαι ἃφ' ἐκάστων ἐλέ-
γοντο καὶ Κλέων ὁ Κλεανίτου, ὡσπερ καὶ τὴν προτέραν ἐνενικήκει ὡστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ὅν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαίωτας τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ τε δήμῳ.
was still under siege; as to the others they held a
debate, and under the impulse of anger finally deter-
mimed to put to death, not only the Mytilenaeans who
were there in Athens, but also all who were of adult
age, and to enslave their women and children. The
general charge which they brought against them was
that they had made this revolt in spite of the fact that
they were not held in subjection like the other allies;
and what contributed not least to their fury was that
the Peloponnesian fleet had dared to venture over to
Ionia to their support; for from this they thought
the revolt had been made after long deliberation.
Accordingly they sent a trireme to Paches to an-
ounce what had been determined upon, and bidding
him to despatch the Mytilenaeans with all haste; but
on the very next day a feeling of repentance came
over them and they began to reflect that the design
which they had formed was cruel and monstrous, to
destroy a whole city instead of merely those who
were guilty. And when this became known to the
Mytilenaean
\(^1\)
envoys who were present and their
Athenian supporters, they induced those in authority
to bring the question before the people again; and
they found less difficulty in persuading them because
it was evident to them also that the greater part of
the citizens wished that another opportunity should
be given them to consider the matter. A meeting
of the assembly was held immediately, at which
various opinions were expressed by the several
speakers. One of these was Cleon son of Cleaenetus,
who had been successful in carrying the earlier
motion to put the Mytilenaeans to death. He was
not only the most violent of the citizens, but at that

\(^1\) cf. ch. xxviii. 1.
παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανῶτατος, παρελθὼν αὕτης ἔλεγε τοιαδέ.

XXXVII. "Πολλάκις μὲν ἦδη ἔγογχε καὶ ἀλ-
λοτε ἐγγν ἰημοκρατίαν ὡτὶ ἀδύνατόν ἐστὶν
ἐτέρων ἀρχεῖον, μάλιστα δ’ ἐν τῇ νυν ὑμετέρα
2 περὶ Μυτιληναίοις μεταμελεῖα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ’
ἡμέραν ἄδεες καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους
καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχετε, καὶ ὦ τι
ἀν ἦ λόγῳ πεισθέντες ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἀμάρτητε ἢ
οἰκτῷ ἐνδότε, οὐκ ἐπικινδύνως ἦγείσθη ἐσ ὑμᾶς
καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὴν τῶν ξυμμάχων χάριν μαλακίζεσθαι,
οὐ σκοποῦστε ὅτι τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν
καὶ πρὸς ἐπιβούλευσαντας αὐτὸς καὶ ἀκοντας
ἀρχομένους, οὔ 1 οὐκ ἔξ ὅν ἀν χαρᾶγγοις βλαπ-
τόμενοι αὐτὸι ἀκροδίναν ὑμῶι, ἀλλ’ ἔξ ὅν ἀν
ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἤ τῇ ἐκεῖνοι εὐνοίᾳ περιγεννησθε.
3 πάντων δὲ δεινότατοι εἰ βέβαιοι ἢμῖν μηδὲν
καθεστήσει ὅν ἀν δόξῃ περὶ, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι
χείροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτων χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων
ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἐχούσιν ἀκύρως, ἀμαθία τε μετὰ
σωφροσύνης ὀφελιμότερον ἥ δεξιότης μετὰ ἀκο-
λασίας, οἳ τε φαιλότεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς
τοὺς ξυνετωτέρους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον ἀμείνου
4 οἰκοῦσι τὰς πόλεις. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων
σοφώτεροι βούλονται ἕκινεσθαι τῶν τε αἱεί
λεγομένων ἐς τὸ κοινὸν περιγίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἐν
ἅλλοις μείζοσιν οὐκ ἀν δηλώσαντες τὴν γνῶμην,

1 οἱ wanting in all better MSS., but adopted by Bekker,
Krüger, and Hude.

58
time had by far the greatest influence with the people. He now came forward a second time and spoke as follows:

XXXVII. "On many other occasions in the past I have realized that a democracy is incompetent to govern others, but more than ever to-day, when I observe your change of heart concerning the Miletians. The fact is that, because your daily life is unaffected by fear and intrigue in your relations to each other, you have the same attitude towards your allies also, and you forget that whenever you are led into error by their representations or yield out of pity, your weakness involves you in danger and does not win the gratitude of your allies. For you do not reflect that the empire you hold is a despotism imposed upon subjects who, for their part, do intrigue against you and submit to your rule against their will, who render obedience, not because of any kindnesses you may do them to your own hurt, but because of such superiority as you may have established by reason of your strength rather than of their goodwill. But quite the most alarming thing is, if nothing we have resolved upon shall be settled once for all, and if we shall refuse to recognize that a state which has inferior laws that are inviolable is stronger than one whose laws are good but without authority; that ignorance combined with self-restraint is more serviceable than cleverness combined with recklessness; and that simpler people for the most part make better citizens than the more shrewd. The latter always want to show that they are wiser than the laws, and to dominate all public discussions, as if there could never be weightier

1 cf. ii. xxxvii. 2.  2 cf. ii. lsiii. 2.
καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτον τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις: οἱ δὲ ἀπεισοῦντες τῇ ἑξ ἐαυτῶν ξυνέσει ἀμαθέστεροι μὲν τῶν νόμων ἀξιόουσι εἶναι, ἀδυνατώτεροι δὲ τὸν ἑ τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος μέμψασθαι λόγου, κριταὶ δὲ ὅτες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵσου μᾶλλον ἡ ἀγωνισταὶ ὁρθοῦνται τὰ πλεῖον. ὡσ ὅν ἤχη καὶ ἡμᾶς ποιοῦντας μὴ δειμώτητε καὶ ξυνέσεως ἀγώνι ἐπαιρμένον τὰρ παρὰ δόξαν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει παραμένειν.

XXXVIII. "Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς εἰμί τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ θαυμάζω μὲν τῶν προθέσεων αὐθείς περὶ Μυτιληναίων λέγειν καὶ χρόνον διατριβήν ἐμποιήσαντος, ὁ ἐστὶ πρὸς τῶν ἥδικηκότων μᾶλλον (ὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι ἀμβλυτέρᾳ τῇ ὀργῇ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀμύνεθαι δὲ τῷ παθεῖν ὦτε ἐγγυτάτω κείμενον ἀντίπαλον ἢ ἑ ὑδάιστα τὴν τιμωρίαν λαμβάνει"), θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ ὅστις ἐστὰ ὁ ἀντερῶν καὶ ἀξιόων ἀποφαίνειν τὰς μὲν Μυτιληναίων ἁδικίας ἡμῖν ὠφελίμους ὑστας, τὰς δὲ ἑμετέρας εὐπροφάς τοῦ εὐμμάχως βλάβας 2 καθισταμένας. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῷ λέγειν πιστεύσας τὸ πάνυ δοκοῦν ἀνταποφήγην ὡς οὐκ ἐγνωσταί ἀγωνιστὶ ἂν, ἡ κέρδῃ ἐπαιρμένος τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου ἐκπονῆσας παράγειν πειρά- 3 σεται. ἡ δὲ πόλις ἐκ τῶν τοιοῦτος ἀγώνων τὰ μὲν ἄθλα ἐτέρως δίδοσιν, αὐτῇ δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους 4 ἀναφέρει, αἰτιοὶ δ' ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες,
questions on which to declare their opinions, and as a consequence of such conduct they generally bring their states to ruin; the former, on the contrary, mistrusting their own insight, are content to be less enlightened than the laws and less competent than others to criticise the words of an able speaker, but being impartial judges rather than interested contestants they generally prosper. Thus, then, we ought to act and not be so excited by eloquence and combat of wits as to advise the Athenian people contrary to our own judgment.

XXXVIII. "As for me, I have not changed my opinion, and I wonder at those who propose to debate again the question of the Mytileneans and thus interpose delay, which is in the interest of those who have done the wrong; for thus the edge of the victim's wrath is duller when he proceeds against the offender, whereas the vengeance that follows upon the very heels of the outrage exacts a punishment that most nearly matches the offence. And I wonder, too, who will answer me and undertake to prove that the wrong-doings of the Mytileneans are beneficial to us but that our misfortunes prove injurious to our allies. Manifestly he must either have such confidence in his powers of speech as to undertake to show that what is universally accepted as true has not been established, or else, incited by gain, will by an elaborate display of specious oratory attempt to mislead you. But in contests of that kind the city bestows the prizes upon others, while she herself undergoes all the risks. And you are yourselves to blame, for your management or

1 Or, "your absolute resolve has really not been adopted."
οἵτινες εἰόθατε θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι, άκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων, τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἔργα ἀπὸ τῶν εὐ εἰπόντων σκοποῦντες ὡς δυνατὰ γίγνεσθαί, τὰ δὲ πεπραγμένα ἡδή, οὐ τὸ δρασθὲν πιστότερον οὔτε λαβόντες ἢ τὸ ἀκούσθεν, ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων καλῶς ἐπιτιμήσαντων καὶ μετὰ κανόντιτος μὲν λόγον ἀπατᾶσθαι ἀριστοὶ, μετὰ δὲδοκιμασμένου δὲ μῆς ξυνέπεσθαι ἐθέλειν, δουλοὶ ὄντες τῶν αἰεὶ ἄτόπων, ὑπερόπται δὲ τῶν εἰσθότων, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος θουλόμενος δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μῆ, ἀνταγωγίζομενοι τοῖς τοιαύτα λέγοντες μῆς ύστεροι ἀκολουθήσαι δοκεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ, ὡς ἦν τὰ λέγοντος πρὸς αὐτούς, καὶ προαισθῆσαι τε πρόθυμοι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ προνύματε βραδεῖς τα ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποβηθησόμενα, ζητοῦμεν τε ἀλλο τι ὁσ εἰπεῖν ἢ ἐν ὑσιν ξώμεν, φρονούμενοι δὲ αὐτῶν περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἰκανῶς ἀπλως τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῆ ἧσσάμενου καὶ σοφιστῶν θεατῶν ἔοικότες καθημένοι μᾶλλον ἡ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένωι.

ΠΟΠΠΟ. "Τούτων πειρώμενοι ἀποτρέπειν ὑμᾶς ἀποφαίνων Μυτιληναύως μᾶλλον δὴ μίαν πόλιν ἤδικηκότας ὑμᾶς. εἴδω γὰρ, οἵτινες μὲν μὴ δυνατοὶ φέρειν τὴν ἰμετέραν ἀρχὴν ἥ οἵτινες ὑπὸ τῶν πολέμων ἀναγκασθέντες ἀπέστησαν, ξυγγρόμην ἔχων νῆσον δὲ οἵτινες ἔχουσες μετὰ τείχων καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν μόνον φοβούμενοι τους ἰμετέρους πολέμους, ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ αὐτῷ τρεῖροι παρασκευὴ οὐκ ἀφακτοὶ ἦσαν πρὸς αὐτούς,

1 elvai after πρόθυμοι, deleted by Poppo, followed by Hude.
these contests is wrong. It is your wont to be spectators of words and hearers of deeds, forming your judgment of future enterprises according as able speakers represent them to be feasible, but as regards accomplished facts, not counting what has been done more credible, because you have seen it, than what you have heard, you are swayed in judgment by those who have made an eloquent invective. You are adepts not only at being deceived by novel proposals but also at refusing to follow approved advice, slaves as you are of each new paradox and scorners of what is familiar. Each of you wishes above all to be an orator himself, or, failing that, to vie with those dealers in paradox by seeming not to lag behind them in wit but to applaud a smart saying before it is out of the speaker's mouth; you are as quick to forestall what is said as you are slow to foresee what will come of it. You seek, one might say, a world quite unlike that in which we live, but give too little heed to that which is at hand. In a word, you are in thrall to the pleasures of the ear and are more like men who sit as spectators at exhibitions of sophists than men who take counsel for the welfare of the state.

XXXIX. "And it is from these ways that I seek to turn you when I attempt to prove that Mytilene has done you more injury than any single state. I can make allowance for men who resorted to revolt because they were unable to bear your rule or because they were compelled by your enemies to do so; but men who inhabited a fortified island and had no fear of our enemies except by sea, and even there were not without the protection of a force of their own triremes, who moreover were independent and
THUCYDIDES

αὐτόνομοι τε οἰκούντες καὶ τιμώμενοι ἐς τὰ πρότα ὑπὸ ἡμῶν τοιαύτα εἰργάσαντο, τί ἄλλο οὐτοὶ ἣ ἐπεβούλευσάν τε καὶ ἐπανέστησαν μᾶλλον ἣ ἀπέστησαν (ἀπόστασις μὲν γε τῶν βιαίων τι πασχόντων ἐστίν), ἔξητησάν τε μετὰ τῶν πολε- μιωτάτων ἡμᾶς στάντες διαφθέιραι; καίτοι δεινό- τερον ἐστὶν ἢ εἰ καθ’ αὐτοὺς δύναμιν κτώμενοι ἀντεπολέμησαν. παράδειγμα δὲ αὐτοὶς οὔτε αἱ τῶν πέλας ξυμφοραὶ ἐγένοντο, ὥσοι ἀποστάντες ἦδη ἡμῶν ἑχειρώθησαν, οὔτε ἡ παροῦσα εὐδαι- μονία παρέσχεν ὁκνον μὴ ἐλθεῖν ἐς τὰ δεινὰ γενόμενοι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον θρασεῖς καὶ ἐλπί- σαντες μακρότερα μὲν τῆς δυνάμεως, ἐλάσσω δὲ τῆς βουλήσεως, πόλεμον ἡραντο, ἵσχὺν ἄξιω- σαντες τοῦ δικαίου προθείναν· ἐν οὖ γὰρ φήθη- σαν περιέσεσθαι, ἐπέθεντο ἡμῖν οὐκ ἄδικούμενοι.

4 εἰσθαὶ δὲ τῶν πόλιων αἰς ἀν μάλιστα ἀπροσδόκη- τος καὶ δι’ ἐλαχίστου εὐπραξία ἐλθη, ἐς ὑβριν τρέπειν· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ κατὰ λόγον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐτυχοῦσα ἀσφαλέστερα ἡ παρὰ δόξαν, καὶ κακοπραγίαν ὡς εἰπεῖν ρέουν ἀπωθοῦνται ἡ εὐδαι- μονία διασφόξονται. χρὴν δὲ Μυτιληναίους καὶ πάλαι μηδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ὑφ’ ἡμῶν τετιμήθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν τοῦτο ἐξύβρισαν· πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ἀνθρώπος τὸ μὲν θεραπεύουν ὑπερφρονεῖν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὑπείκον θαυμάζειν.

5 “Κολασθέντων δὲ καὶ νῦν ἄξιοι τῆς ἁδικίας καὶ μὴ τοῖς μὲν ὀλίγοις ἡ αἰτία προστεθῇ, τὸν δὲ
were treated by us with the highest consideration, when these men have acted thus, what else is it but conspiracy and rebellion rather than revolt—for revolt is the work of those who suffer oppression—and a deliberate attempt by taking their stand on the side of our bitterest enemies to bring about our destruction? And yet this is assuredly a more heinous thing than if they had gone to war against us by themselves for the acquisition of power. The calamities of their neighbours who had already revolted from us and been subdued proved no warning to them; nor did the good fortune which they enjoyed make them hesitate to take the perilous step; on the contrary, becoming over-confident as to the future, and conceiving hopes which, though greater than their powers, were less than their ambition, they took up arms, presuming to put might before right; for the moment they thought they should prove superior they attacked us unprovoked. And indeed it is the rule, that such states as come to unexpected prosperity most fully and most suddenly, do turn to insolence, whereas men generally find success less precarious when it comes in accordance with reasonable calculations than when it surpasses expectation, and more easily, as it seems, they repel adversity than maintain prosperity. But the Mytilenaeans from the first ought never to have been treated by us with any more consideration than our other allies, and then they would not have broken out into such insolence; for it is human nature in any case to be contemptuous of those who pay court but to admire those who will not yield.

“Let them be punished, therefore, even now, in a manner befitting their crime, and do not put the
δήμου ἀπολύσθητε. πάντες γὰρ ὑμῖν τὰς ὁμοίως ἐπεθετον, οἷς ἦς ἔξην ὡς ἡμᾶς τραπερέοις ὑπὸ πάλιν ἐν τῇ πόλει εἶναι ἄλλα τῶν μετὰ τῶν ὀλίγων κίνδυνου ἠγγήσαμενοι βεβαιότερον ξύναπται ἐστι· πῶς τοῖς τε ἐξευτελίζοντες δὲ τοῖς ἐποιήσατε τὰς αὐτὰς ἐξέστησε, τῶν ὑπὸ βραχεία προφάσει ἀποστῆσαται, ὅταν ἡ κατορθώσαντι ἐλευθερώσεις ἢ ἢ ἢ σφαλέντει μηδὲν παθεῖν ἀνήκεσθον; ἢ μὲν δὲ πρὸς ἐκάστην πόλιν ἀποκεκυκλυθῆσεται τὰ τοῖς ἐξεταῖς 1 προσόδου, δὲ ἢν ἰσχύσειν, τὸ λοιπὸν στερήσεσθε, σφαλέντει δὲ πολεμίους πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ἐξόμεν, καὶ τὸν χρόνον τοῖς νῦν καθεστηκόσι δει ἐχθροῖς ἀνθίστασθαι, τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐξευτελίζοις πολεμήσομεν.

XL. "Οὐκ ὡσὶν δὲ προθεῖναι ἢ ἐπιδίδα ὡς ήρω Γέτην, ὥς καὶ τῷ ἔθεσθαι τῆς ἐπιτείνας ἐπὶ τῷ ἐν διάθεσιν ἀνασταθείναι. Αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔσταται, εἴδοτε δὲ ἐπεβούλεσθαι ἔστη γ' ἐστι τὸ ἀκούσθοιν. ἡμῶν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸτε πρῶτον καὶ τοὺς διαμάχομαι μὴ μεταγενόναι ἐν τὸν προθεινόμενα, μηδὲ τρισὶ τοῖς ἀξιμαθετάσις τῇ ἀρχῇ, οἷκτε καὶ ἡδονὴ λόγων καὶ

---

1 ἐπείτα, Hude adopts ἐπείτα, van Herwerden and H. Weil ἐπείτειον.
2 προθείναι, Hude retains προθείναι, with BC.
blame upon the aristocrats and exonerate the common people. For they all alike attacked you, even the commons, who, if they had taken our side, might now have been reinstated in their city; but they thought there was less risk in sharing the dangers of the oligarchs, and so joined them in the revolt. Consider, moreover, your allies: if you inflict upon those who wilfully revolt no greater punishment than upon those who revolt under compulsion from our foes, which of them, think you, will not revolt on a slight pretext, when the alternatives are liberty if he succeeds or a fate not irreparable if he fails? We, on the other hand, shall have to risk our money and our lives against each separate state, and when we succeed we shall recover a ruined state and be deprived for the future of its revenue, the source of our strength, whereas if we fail we shall be adding fresh enemies to those we have already, and when we should be resisting our present foes we shall be fighting our own allies.

XL. "We must not, therefore, hold out to them any hope, either to be secured by eloquence or purchased by money, that they will be excused on the plea that their error was human. For their act was no unintentional injury but a deliberate plot; and it is that which is unintentional which is excusable. Therefore, I still protest, as I have from the first, that you should not reverse your former decision or be led into error by pity, delight in eloquence, or clemency, the three

1 Referring to what happened in the assembly of the day before, in which, however, he had urged the action that was taken; its reconsideration was not urged till the present meeting.
3 ἐπιεικεῖα, ἀμαρτάνειν. ἔλεος τε γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους δίκαιος ἀντιδίδοσθαι καὶ μῆ πρὸς τοὺς οὔτ' ἀντοικτιούντας ἢ ἀνάγκης τε καθεστῶτας αἰεὶ πολεμίους οἳ τε τέρποντες λόγῳ ῥήτορες ἐξουσιοδοτούμεναι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐλάσσοσιν ἀγῶνα, καὶ μὴ ἐν φῷ ἡ μὲν πόλις βραχέα ἡπθεῖτα μεγάλα ἥμισυ σεται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εὖ εἰπεῖν τὸ παθεῖν εὖ ἀντιλήψονται καὶ ἡ ἐπιεῖκεια πρὸς τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐπιτηδείους καὶ τὸ λαοῦ ἐσεθαι μᾶλλον δίδοται ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους τε καὶ οὐδέν ἢςον πολεμίους ὑπολειπομένους.

4 ἑν τε ξυνελών λέγω πιθόμενοι μὲν ἔμοι τὰ τε δίκαια ἐς Μυτιληναίους καὶ τὰ ξύμφορα ἀμα ποιῆσετε, ἄλλως δὲ γρόντες τοῖς μὲν ὦν χαριεῖσθε, ὑμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον δικαιώσεσθε. εἰ γὰρ οὗτοι ὅρθος ἀπέστησαν, ὑμεῖς ἂν οὐ χρεῶν ἀρχοίτε. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ οὐ προσήκον ὅμως ἀξιοῦτε τοῦτο δρᾶν, παρὰ τὸ εἰκός τοι καὶ τούσδε ξυμφόρως δεῖ κολάξεσθαι, ἡ παιεσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι. τῇ τε αὐτῇ ἥμισυ ἀξιωσία ἀμύνασθαι καὶ μὴ ἀναλητότεροι οἱ διαφυγόντες τῶν ἐπίβουλονσάντων φανήναι, ἐνθυμηθέντες ἢ εἰκός ἢν αὐτοὺς ποιησάται κρατήσαντας ὑμών, ἄλλως τε καὶ προὔπαρξαντας

1 ῥήτορες, deleted by Naber, followed by Hude
influences most prejudicial to a ruling state. For compassion may rightly be bestowed upon those who are likewise compassionate and not upon those who will show no pity in return but of necessity are always enemies. As to the orators who charm by their eloquence, they will have other opportunities of display in matters of less importance, and not where the city for a brief pleasure will pay a heavy penalty while they themselves get a fine fee for their fine speaking. And clemency would better be reserved for those who will afterwards be faithful allies than be shown to those who remain just what they were before and no whit the less our enemies.

"I can sum up what I have to say in a word. If you take my advice, you will do not only what is just to the Mytileneans but also at the same time what is expedient for us; but if you decide otherwise, you will not win their gratitude but will rather bring a just condemnation upon yourselves; for if these people had a right to secede, it would follow that you are wrong in exercising dominion. But if, right or wrong, you are still resolved to maintain it, then you must punish these people in defiance of equity as your interests require; or else you must give up your empire and in discreet safety practise the fine virtues you preach.\(^1\) Resolve also to punish them with the same penalty that has already been voted,\(^2\) and that those who have escaped the plot shall not appear to have less feeling than those who framed it, bearing in mind what they would probably have done to you had they won the victory, especially since they

---

\(^1\) For the thought, *cf.* II. lxiii. 2.

\(^2\) So Steup explains. Most editors explain, "with the same penalty they would have inflicted," following the schol. \(\delta\nu \varepsilon\pi\mu\omicron\nu\rho\omicron\sigma\eta\varepsilon\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \omicron\mu\alpha\varsigma, \\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\gamma\gamma\epsilon\nu\delta\epsilon\nu\mu\epsilon\nu\omega\iota\iota\varsigma\ \omicron\mu\alpha\varsigma.\)
6 άδικιας, μάλιστα δε οι μη ξυν προφάσει τιμά κακώς ποιούντες ἐπεξέρχονται καὶ διολλύναι, τὸν κίνδυνον ὑφορώμενοι τοῦ ὑπολειπομένου ἔχθροῦ ο γὰρ μη ξυν ἀνάγκη τι παθῶν χαλεπώτερος διαφυγὼν τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑση ἔχθροῦ.

7 "Μὴ οὖν προδοταί γένητα ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, γενόμενοι δ' ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῇ γρώμῃ τοὺς πάσχειν καὶ ὅσ πρὸ παντὸς ἄν εἰτίμησασθε αὐτῶν χειροσασθαι, νῦν ἀνταπόδοτε μὴ μαλακισθέντες πρὸς τὸ παρὸν αὐτίκα μὴ δὲ τοῦ ἐπικρεμασθέντος ποτὲ 8 δεινοῦ ἀμμημονύμτες. κολάσατε δὲ ἄξιοι τούτους τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἄμμοχοις παράδειγμα σαφῆς καταστήσατε, δι' ἀν αἴσθηται, θανάτῳ ἡμωσόμενον. τόδε γὰρ ἦν γρώσιν, ἦσσον τῶν πολεμίων ἀμελήσαντες τοῖς ὑμετέροις αὐτῶν μαχεῖσθε ἐμμάχοις."  

XLI. Τοιαύτα μὲν ὁ Κλέων εἶπεν. μετὰ δ' αὐτῶν Διόδοτος ὁ Εὐκράτους, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀντέλεγε μάλιστα μὴ ἀποκτείνῃ Μυτιληναίοις, παρελθὼν καὶ τότε ἔλεγε τοιάδε.  

XLII. "Οὔτε τοὺς προβέντας τῷ διαγράμμῳ αὐθις περὶ Μυτιληναίων αἰτίώμαι οὔτε τοὺς μεμφομένους μὴ πολλάκις περὶ τῶν μεγίστων βουλευόμεθα ἐπαινό, νομίζω δὲ δῦν τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εὐβουλία εἶναι, τάχος τε καὶ ὄργην, ὅν τὸ μὲν μετὰ ἀνοίας φιλὼν τίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ἀπα-2 δεισίας καὶ βραχύτητος γρώμης. τοὺς τε λόγους ὀστίς διαμάχεται μὴ διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμά-  

1 διαλύναι, Stahl's conjecture, followed by Hule and others, for διάλυσαι of the MSS.
were the aggressors. Indeed it is generally those who wrong another without cause that follow him up to destroy him utterly, perceiving the danger that threatens from an enemy who is left alive; for one who has been needlessly injured is more dangerous if he escape than an avowed enemy who expects to give and take.

"Do not, then, be traitors to your own cause, but recalling as nearly as possible how you felt when they made you suffer and how you would then have given anything to crush them, now pay them back. Do not become tender-hearted at the sight of their present distress, nor unmindful of the danger that so lately hung over you, but chastise them as they deserve, and give to your other allies plain warning that whoever revolts shall be punished with death. For if they realise this, the less will you have to neglect your enemies and fight against your own allies."

XLII. Such was Cleon's speech. After him Diodotus son of Eucrates, who in the earlier meeting had been the principal speaker against putting the Mytilenaeans to death, came forward now also and spoke as follows:

XLII. "I have no fault to find with those who have proposed a reconsideration of the question of the Mytilenaeans, nor do I commend those who object to repeated deliberation on matters of the greatest moment; on the contrary, I believe the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion, of which the one is wont to keep company with folly, the other with an undisciplined and shallow mind. As for words, whoever contends\(^1\) that they are not to be guides of our actions is either dull

\(^1\) Directed at Cleon's remarks, ch. xxxviii. 4 ff.
τὸν γίγνεσθαι, ἢ ἀξινετὸς ἔστιν ἢ ἴδια τι αὐτῷ διαφέρει. ἀξινετὸς μὲν, εἰ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἤγείται περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος δυνατοῦ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἔμφανος φράσας, διαφέρει δ’ αὐτῷ, εἰ βουλόμενος τι άισχρὸν πείσαι εὑ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἢ ἤγείται περὶ τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ δύνασθαι, εὖ δὲ διαβαλῶν ἐκπλήξαι ἢν τοὺς τε ἀντεροῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκούσοντας. Χαλεπώτεροι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ χρήματι προκατηγοροῦντες ἐπιδειξῆς τινα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀμαθίαν κατηγοροῦντο, οὐ μὴ πείσας ἀξινετότερος ἢν δόξας εἶναι ἡ ἀδικότερος ἀπεχώρει ἀδικίας ἐπιφερομένης πείσας τοῖς υπόπτοις γίγνεται καὶ μὴ τυχῶν μετὰ ἀξινεσίας καὶ ἀδικος. ἢ τε πόλις οὐκ ὠφελεῖται ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε φόβῳ γὰρ ἀποστερεῖται τῶν ξυμβούλων. καὶ πλεῖστ’ ἀν ὀρθοῖτο ἀδυνάτους λέγειν ἔχουσα τοὺς τοιούτους τῶν πολιτῶν ἔλαχιστα γὰρ ἂν πεισθείησαν

5 ἀμαρτάνειν. Χρῆ δὲ τῶν μὲν ἁγαθῶν πολέμην μὴ ἐκφοβοῦντα τοὺς ἀντεροῦντας, ἄλλῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰσοφαίνεσθαι ἁμείνον λέγοντα, τὴν δὲ σῶφρονα πόλιν τῷ τε πλείστᾳ εὐ βουλεύοντε μὴ προστιθέναι τιμῆν, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔλασσον τῆς ὑπαρχούσης, καὶ τῶν μὴ τυχόντα γνώμης οὐχ ὅπως ἐποίη σημιοῦν, ἀλλὰ μηδ’ ἀτιμάξειν. οὕτω γὰρ δέ τε κατορθών ἦκιστα ἀν ἐπὶ τῷ ἐτειμεῖσθαι παρὰ ἀρμόμενον

1 πεισθείησαν, Hude adopts Maldvig’s conjecture πεισθεὶς ἀμαρτάνειν.
of wit or has some private interest at stake—dull, if he thinks it possible by any other means to throw light on that which still belongs to the dim and distant future; self-interested, if, wishing to put through a discreditable measure, he realizes that while he cannot speak well in a bad cause, he can at least slander well and thus intimidate both his opponents and his hearers. Most dangerous of all, however, are precisely those who\(^1\) charge a speaker beforehand with being bribed to make a display of rhetoric. For if they merely imputed ignorance, the speaker who failed to carry his audience might go his way with the repute of being dull but not dishonest; when, however, the charge is dishonesty, the speaker who succeeds becomes an object of suspicion, whereas if he fails he is regarded as not only dull but dishonest as well. And all this is a detriment to the state, which is thus robbed of its counsellors through fear. Indeed it would prosper most if its citizens of this stamp had no eloquence at all, for then the people would be least likely to blunder through their influence. But the good citizen ought to show himself a better speaker, not by trying to browbeat those who will oppose him, but by fair argument; and while the wise city should not indeed confer fresh honours upon the man whose advice is most often salutary, it certainly should not detract from those which he already has, and as for him whose suggestion does not meet with approval, so far from punishing him, it should not even treat him with disrespect. For then it would be least likely that a successful speaker, with a view to being counted worthy of still greater honours,

\(^1\) Like Cleon, ch. xxxviii. 2; xl. 1, 3.
Τι καὶ πρὸς χάριν λέγοι, ὁ τε μὴ ἐπιτυχῶν δρέγοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ, χαριζόμενός τι καὶ αὐτὸς, προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλήθος.

XLIII. Ὡν ἡμεῖς τὰ λαντια δρόμεν, καὶ προσέτι, ἣν τις καὶ ὑποπτεύηται κέρδος μὲν ἕνεκα, τὰ βέλτιστα δὲ ὅμως λέγειν, φθονήσαντες τῆς οὔ βεβαιον δοκήσεως τῶν κερδῶν τὴν φανερὰν

2 ὁφελίαν τῆς πόλεως ἀφαίρομεθα. καθέστηκε δὲ τάγαθα ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐθέου λεγόμενα μηδὲν ἀνυπποτότερα εἶναι τῶν κακῶν, ὅστε δεῖν ὁμοίως τὸν τε τὰ δεινότατα βουλόμενον πεῖσαι ἅπιτη προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλήθος καὶ τὸν τὰ ἁμείνῳ λέ-

3 γοντα ψευσάμενον πιστὸν γενέσθαι. μόνην τε πόλιν διὰ τὰς περινοιας εὐ ποιήσαι ἐκ τοῦ προ-

4 φανοῦς μὴ ἔξαπατήσαντα ἀδύνατον ὁ γὰρ διδοὺς φανερῶς τὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀνθυποτεῦεται ἀφαῖνος τη

5 πλέον ἔξειν. χρὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἐν τῷ

τοιῷδε ἄξιον τι 1 ἡμᾶς περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας

λέγειν ὑμῶν τῶν δι' ὀλίγου σκοποῦντων, ἀλλως

τε καὶ ὑπεύθυνον τὴν παραίνεσιν ἑχοντας πρὸς

ἀνεύθυνον τὴν ὑμετέραν ἁκρόασιν. εἰ γὰρ ὦ τε

πείσας καὶ ὁ ἐπιστόμενος ὀμοίως ἐβλάπτοντο,

σωφρονέστερον ἄν ἐκρίνετε: νῦν δὲ πρὸς ὀργήν

1 Conjecture of Krüger and Haase, confirmed by ABFM, for the Vulgate ἂξιοντι, with CEG.
would speak insincerely and for the purpose of winning favour and that the unsuccessful speaker would employ the same means, by courting favour in his turn in an effort to win the multitude to himself.

XLIII. But we pursue the opposite course, and, moreover, if a man be even suspected of corruption, albeit he give the best counsel, we conceive a grudge against him because of the dubious surmise that he is corrupt and thus deprive the state of an indubitable advantage. And it has come to such a pass that good advice frankly given is regarded with just as much suspicion as the bad, and that, in consequence, a speaker who wants to carry the most dangerous measures must resort to deceit in order to win the people to his views, precisely as the man whose proposals are good must lie in order to be believed. And because of this excessive cleverness Athens is the only state where a man cannot do a good service to his country openly and without deceiving it; for whenever he openly offers you something good you require him by suspecting that in some way he will secretly profit by it. Yet even so, in view of the very great interests at stake, and in so grave a matter, we who advise must regard it as our duty to look somewhat further ahead than you who give matters only a brief consideration, especially since we are responsible advisers, while you are irresponsible listeners. Indeed, if not only those who gave advice but also those who followed it had to suffer alike, you would show greater prudence in your decisions; but as it is, whenever you meet with

1 It was open to any Athenian citizen to impeach any law or decree, as contrary to some existing law or as unjust or inexpedient, by a proceeding called γραφὴ παρανμων.
δεν είναι τόιχιτε ἐστιν ὅτε σφαλέοτες τὴν τῶν πείσαντος μιᾶν γνώμην ξημιότευ καὶ οὐ τὰς ἤμετέρας αὐτῶν, αἱ πολλαὶ οὐσαί ἠνεξήματον.

ΧΙΛ. IV. "Ἐγὼ δὲ παρῆλθον οὗτε ἀντερῶν περὶ Μυτιληναίων οὗτε κατηγορήσων. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἕκεινων ἀδικίας ἦμιν ὁ ἁγών, εἰ σωφρονούμεν,
2 ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἤμετέρας εὐβολίας. ἦν τε γὰρ ἀποφήμω πάνω ἀδικοῦντας αὐτούς, οὐ διὰ τούτο καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι κελεύσω, εἰ μὴ ξυμφέρον, ἦν τε καὶ ἔχοντας τι ξυγγνώμης, ἔδω, εἰ τῇ πόλει μὴ ἀγαθὸν φαῖνοτο. νομίζω δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἦμιν μᾶλλον βουλεύσθαι ἢ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ τούτο ὅ μαλλιστα Κλέων ἰσχυρίζεται, εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν ξυμφέρον ἐσεθητι πρὸς τὸ ἡσυχην ἂφίνθησθαι θάνατον ξημίαν προθείσι, καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τοῦ ἑς τὸ μέλλον καλῶς ἔχοντος ἁντισχυριζόμενος τὰ-
3 ναντία ἡγιάσκω. καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον ὑμᾶς τῷ εὐπρεπεὶ τοῦ ἕκεινου λόγου τὸ χρήσιμον τοῦ ἑμὸν ἀπώσασθαι. δικαιότερος γὰρ ὄν αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὴν μόν ἣμετέρων ὀργήν ἐς Μυτιληναίους τὰχ' ἀν ἐπισπάσασιτο ἤμειτι δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτούς. ὥστε τῶν δικαιῶν δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως χρησίμως ἔξουσιν.

ΧΛ. V. "Ἐν οὖν ταῖς πόλεσι πολλῶν βανάτων ἤμιατ πρόκειται καὶ οὐκ ἵσων τρόπο, ἀλλ' ἐλασσόνων ἀμαρτημάτων· ὁμοὶ δὲ τῇ ἐλπίδι

1 lár, Lindan's conjecture for der of the MSS.
a reverse you give way to your first impulse and punish your adviser for his single error of judgment instead of yourselves, the multitude who shared in the error.

XLIV. "But I have come forward neither as an advocate of the Mytileneans in opposition to Cleon nor as their accuser. For the question for us to consider, if we are sensible, is not what wrong they have done, but what is the wise course for us. For no matter how guilty I show them to be, I shall not on that account bid you to put them to death, unless it is to our advantage; and if I show that they have some claim for forgiveness, I shall not on that account advise you to spare their lives, if this should prove clearly not to be for the good of the state. In my opinion we are deliberating about the future rather than the present. And as for the point which Cleon especially maintains, that it will be to our future advantage to inflict the penalty of death, to the end that revolts may be less frequent, I also in the interest of our future prosperity emphatically maintain the contrary. And I beg you not to be led by the speciousness of his argument to reject the practical advantages in mine. For embittered as you are toward the Mytileneans, you may perhaps be attracted by his argument, based as it is on the more legal aspects of the case; we are, however, not engaged in a law-suit with them, so as to be concerned about the question of right and wrong; but we are deliberating about them, to determine what policy will make them useful to us.

XLV. "Now the death-penalty has been prescribed in various states for many offences which are not so serious as this is, nay, for minor ones; but
ἐπαιρόμενοι κινδυνεύουσι, καὶ οὐδεὶς τω κατα
gνοὺς ἕαυτον μὴ περιέσθεθαί τῷ ἐπιβουλεύματι
2 ἐλθεν ἐς τὸ δεινῶν. πόλις τε ἀφισταμένη τίς πω
ησοῦ τῇ δοκήσει ἔχουσα τὴν παρασκευὴν, ἢ
οἰκείαν ἢ ἄλλων ἢμμαχία, τούτῳ ἐπεχείρησε;
3 πεφύκασί τε ἄπαντες καὶ ἢδα καὶ ἡμοσία
ἀμαρτάνειν, καὶ οὐκ ἦστι νόμος ὅστις ἀπείρξεί
tούτον, ἐπεὶ διεξελήθησαί γε διὰ πασῶν τῶν
ἐμιδων οἱ ἀνθρώποι προσηθέντες, εἰ πως ἦσσον
ἀδικοῦντο ὑπὸ τῶν κακούργων. καὶ εἰκὸς τὸ
πάλαι τῶν μεγίστων ἄδικημάτων μαλακυτέρας
κεῖσθαι αὐτῶς, παραβαινομένων δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐς
tὸν θάνατον αἱ πολλαὶ ἀνήκουσιν καὶ ταύτα;
4 ὅμως παραβαίνεται. ἡ τούτων δεινότερον τι
tοῦτον δέος εὐφετέων ἐστίν ὁ τόδε γε οὐδέν
ἐπίσχει, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκη τὴν τόλμαν
παρέχουσα, ἡ δ' ἐξουσία υβρεῖ τὴν πλεονεξίαν
καὶ φρονήματι, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἑυτυχεῖαι ὀργῇ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐκάστη τις κατέχεται ὑπὸ ἠνη-
kέστου τινὸς κρείσσους, ἐξαγωγοῦν ἐς τοὺς
5 κινδύνους. ἡ τε ἐλπὶς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντὶ, ὁ
μὲν ἠγούμενος, ἡ δ' ἐφεπομεῖν, καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν
ἐπιβουλὴν ἐκφροντιζόν, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς
τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα πλείστα βλάπτουσι, καὶ ὅπτα
6 ἀφανὴ κρείσσον ἐστὶ τῶν ὁρμένων δεινῶν. καὶ
ἡ τύχη ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔλασσον ἔμβαλλεται
ἐς τὸ ἐπαισρεῖν ἀδοκήτως γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅτε παρι-
stamēν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεετέρων κινδυνεύειν τινά

1 προσθείνετε MSS., Krüger προστιθέντες, followed by Hude.
2 Hude's correction. Or, reading καὶ τοῦτο with the MSS.,
"and still even this is disregarded."
3 ὀργὴ MSS., Stahl ὀργὴ, followed by Hude.
nevertheless men are so inspired by hope as to take the risk; indeed, no one ever yet has entered upon a perilous enterprise with the conviction that his plot was condemned to failure. And as to states, what one that was meditating revolt ever took the decisive step in the belief that the resources at hand, whether its own or contributed by its allies, were inadequate for success? All men are by nature prone to err, both in private and in public life, and there is no law which will prevent them; in fact, mankind has run the whole gamut of penalties, making them more and more severe, in the hope that the transgressions of evil-doers might be abated. It is probable that in ancient times the penalties prescribed for the greatest offences were relatively mild, but as transgressions still occurred, in course of time the penalty was seldom less than death. But even so there is still transgression. Either, then, some terror more dreadful than death must be discovered, or we must own that death at least is no prevention. Nay, men are lured into hazardous enterprises by the constraint of poverty, which makes them bold, by the insolence and pride of affluence, which makes them greedy, and by the various passions engendered in the other conditions of human life as these are severally mastered by some mighty and irresistible impulse. Then, too, Hope and Desire are everywhere; Desire leads, Hope attends; Desire contrives the plan, Hope suggests the facility of fortune; the two passions are most baneful, and being unseen phantoms prevail over seen dangers. Besides these, fortune contributes in no less degree to urge men on; for she sometimes presents herself unexpectedly and thus tempts men
προῶγει καὶ οὖχ ἦσσον τὰς πόλεις, ὅσον περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε, ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς, καὶ μετὰ πάντων ἐκαστος ἀλογίστως ἐπὶ πλέον τι αὐτὸν 7 ἐδόξασεν. ἀπλῶς τε ἄδυνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐηθείας, ὅστις οἶεται, τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὀρμωμένης προθύμως τε πράξαι, ἀποτροπήν τινα ἔχειν ἢ νόμων ἵσχυν ἢ ἄλλοι τῷ δεινῷ.

XLVI. "Οὐκον νὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦ θανάτου τῇ ᾿εἰρείῃ ὡς ἐχεγγύω πιστεύσαντας χείρον βουλεύσασθαι, οὐτε ἀνέλπιστον καταστῆσαι τοῖς ἀποστάσιν ὡς οὐκ ἔσται μεταγνώσαι καὶ ὦτι ἐν 2 βραχυτάτῳ τὴν ἀμαρτίαν καταλῦσαι. σκέψασθε γὰρ ὅτι νῦν μὲν, ἢ τις καὶ ἀποστάσα πόλις γινὼ μὴ περιεσυμένη, ἔλθοι ἄν εἰς ἔνθημας δυνατή οὕσα ἐτὶ τὴν δαπάνην ἀποδοῦναι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ὑποτελεῖν ἐκεῖνος δὲ τίνα οἴεσθε ἦντινα οὐκ ἰμειον μὲν ἢ νῦν παρασκευάσθησαι, πολιορκείς δὲ παρατενεύσθει εἰς τὸ σχάτον, εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ δύνα-3 ταῖς σχολῆ καὶ ταχὺ ἐξυμβῆναι; ἡμῖν τε πός οὐ βλάβῃ δαπαρᾶν καθημένους διὰ τὸ ἐξύμβατον, καὶ ἢν ἔλωμεν, πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην παραλαβεῖν καὶ τῆς προσόδου τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς στέρεσθαι; ἵσχυ-4 ομεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους τόδε. ὅστε οὐ δικα-στὰς ὅντας δεὶ ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον τῶν ἐξαμαρτανόντων ἀκριβεῖς βλάπτεσθαι ἢ ὥραν ὅπως ἐς τὸν ἐπειτα 80
to take risks even when their resources are inadequate, and states even more than men, inasmuch as the stake is the greatest of all—their own freedom or empire over others—and the individual, when supported by the whole people, unreasonably overestimates his own strength. In a word, it is impossible, and a mark of extreme simplicity, for anyone to imagine that when human nature is wholeheartedly bent on any undertaking it can be diverted from it by rigorous laws or by any other terror.

XLVI. "We must not, therefore, so pin our faith to the penalty of death as a guarantee against revolt as to make the wrong decision, or lead our rebellious subjects to believe that there will be no chance for them to repent and in the briefest time possible put an end to their error. Consider now: according to your present policy[^1] if a city has revolted and then realizes that it will fail, it may come to terms while still able to pay the indemnity and to keep up its tribute in the future; but, in the other case, what city, think you, will not prepare itself more thoroughly than now, and hold out in siege to the last extremity, if it makes no difference whether it capitulates quickly or at its leisure? And as for us, how can we fail to suffer loss, incurring the expense of besieging a city because it will not surrender, and, if we capture it, recovering one that is ruined, and losing thereafter the revenue from it—the source of our strength against our enemies? We must not, therefore, be such rigorous judges of the delinquents as to suffer harm ourselves, but we must rather see how for the time to come, by punishing

[^1]: Athens had not been accustomed to treat secession from the alliance as treason punishable with death for the men and slavery for the women and children.
χρόνον μετρώς κολάζοντες ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐξομεν ἐς χρημάτων λόγον ἵσχυοςας χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων τῆς δεινότητος ἄξιον ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἐπιμελείας. 5 οὔ μὲν τοιναντίον δρῶτες, ἢ τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ βία ἀρχόμενον εἰκότως πρὸς αὐτονομίαν ἀποστάντα χειρωσώμεθα, χαλεπῶς οἴομεθα χρήσαι 6 τιμωρεῖσθαι. χρῆ δὲ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους οὐκ ἀφισταμένους σφόδρα κολάζειν, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἀποστῇναι σφόδρα φυλάσσειν καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν ὅπως μηδὲ ἐς ἐπίνοιαν τοῦτον ἔσσει, κρατήσαντας τε ὅτι ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέρειν.

XLVII. "Τμείς δὲ σκέψασθε ὅσον ἂν καὶ τούτο 2 ἀμαρτάνοιτε Κλέωνι πειθόμενοι. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡμίν ὁ δῆμος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν εὑνοὺς ἐστὶ καὶ ἢ οὐ ξυναφίσταται τοῖς ὁλίγοις ἢ, ἐὰν βιασθῇ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασι πολέμιος εὐθὺς, καὶ τῆς ἀντικαθιστάμενης πόλεως τὸ πλῆθος ξύμμαχον ἔχοντες ἢ πόλεμον ἐπέρχεσθε. 3 εἰ δὲ διαφθείρει τὸν δῆμον τὸν Μυτιληναίων, ὡς οὕτε μετέσχε τῆς ἀποστάσεως, ἔπειδῆ τε ὅπλων ἐκράτησεν, ἐκὼν παρέδωκε τὴν πόλιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδικήσετε τοὺς εὐργέτας κτείνοντες, ἐπειτὰ καταστήσετε τοῖς δυνατοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὃ βούλονται μάλιστα· ἀφιστάντες γὰρ τὰς πόλεις τοῦ δῆμον εὐθὺς ξύμμαχον ἔζουσι προδειξάντων ὑμῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ξημίαν τοῖς τε ἀδικούσιν ὁμοίως.
moderately, we may have at our service dependent cities that are strong in material resources; and we must deem it proper to protect ourselves against revolts, not by the terror of our laws, but rather by the vigilance of our administration. At present we do just the opposite: whenever a free people that is forced into subjection revolts, as it naturally will, in order to recover its independence, we think that, as soon as we have subdued it, we must punish it severely. We ought, on the contrary, instead of rigorously chastising free peoples when they revolt, to watch them rigorously before they revolt, and thus foretell their even thinking of such a thing; and when we have subdued a revolt, we ought to put the blame on as few as possible.\footnote{In answer to Cleon’s demand, ch. xxxix. 6.}

XLVII. “And do you consider, too, how great a mistake you would make in another point also by following Cleon’s advice. At the present time the populace of all the cities is well disposed to you, and either does not join with the aristocrats in revolting, or, if forced to do so, is hostile from the beginning to those who stirred up the revolt; and so, when you go to war, you have the populace of the rebellious city as your allies. If, however, you destroy the populace in Mytilene, which took no part in the revolt, and which voluntarily put the city into your hands as soon as it got hold of arms, in the first place you will be guilty of killing your benefactors, and, in the second place, you will bring about what the influential men most wish: the next time they instigate a revolt among our allies they will at once have the populace on their side, because you will have published it abroad that the same punishment
κείσθαι καὶ τοῖς μη. δεῖ δὲ, καὶ εἰ ἡδίκησαν, μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι, ὅπως ὁ μόνον ἡμῖν ἔτι ξύμμαχον ἔστι μη πολέμιον γένηται, καὶ τοῦτο πολλῷ ξυμφορώτερον ἡγοῦμαι ἐσ τὴν κάθεξιν τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐκόντας ἡμᾶς ἀδικηθῆναι ἢ δικαῖος οὐς μὴ δεῖ διαφθείραι καὶ τὸ Κλέωνος τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον καὶ ξύμφορον τῆς τιμωρίας οὐχ εὑρίσκεται ἐν αὐτῷ δυνατὸν ὅν ἄμα γίγνεσθαι.

XLVIII. "Τιμεῖς δὲ γνώντες ἄμεινον τάδε εἶναι καὶ μήτε οἰκτρῷ πλέον νείμαντες μὴτ ἐπιεικείᾳ, οἷς οὖδὲ ἔγω ἐὼ προσάγεσθαι, ἀμ' αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παραινομένων πείθεσθε μοι Μυτιληναῖων οὐς μὲν Πάχης ἀπέτεμψεν ὡς ἀδικοῦντας κρίναι καθ' ἡσυχίαν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους εἀν οἰκεῖν. τάδε γὰρ ἐς τὸ μέλλον ἀγαθὰ καὶ τοῖς πολέμοις ἡδὲ φοβηρὰ ὅστις γὰρ εὐ δουλεύεται πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους κρείσσων ἑστὶν ἡ μετ' ἐργον ἱσχὺν ἀνοίᾳ ἐπιτῶν."

XLIX. Τοιαῦτα δὲ ὁ Διόδωτος εἰπεν, ρή- θεισῶν δὲ τῶν γρωμῶν τούτων μάλιστα ἀντι- πάλοις πρὸς ἄλληλας οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι ἠλθον μὲν ἐς ἀγώνα ὅμως1 τῆς δόξης καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ ἀγχώμαλοι, ἐκράτησε δὲ ἡ τοῦ Διο- 2 ὅτου. καὶ τροίροι εὐθὺς ἄλλην ἀπέστελλον κατὰ σπουδὴν, ὅπως μὴ φθασάσης τῆς πρωτέρας2 εὑρωσι διεθθαμμένην τὴν πόλιν προεῖχε δὲ 3 ἡμέρα καὶ νυκτὶ μάλιστα. παρασκευασάντων δὲ τῶν Μυτιληναίων πρέσβεων τῇ νησί οἴνον καὶ

1 ὅμως, with MSS. Bredow emends to ὅμως, followed by Hude.
2 πρωτέρας, generally adopted, Valla and a few MSS., against δευτέρας or ἐτέρας of other MSS.
is ordained for the innocent and for the guilty. Why, even if they were guilty, you should pretend not to know it, to the end that the only class that is still friendly to us may not become hostile. And it is, I think, far more conducive to the maintenance of our dominion, that we should willingly submit to be wronged, than that we should destroy, however justly, those whom we ought not to destroy. And whereas Cleon claims that this punishment combines justice and expediency, it appears that in such a policy the two cannot be combined.

XLVIII. "Do you, then, recognize that mine is the better course, and without being unduly swayed by either pity or clemency—for neither would I have you influenced by such motives—but simply weighing the considerations I have urged, accede to my proposal: pass sentence at your leisure upon the Mytileneans whom Paches sent here as guilty, but let the rest dwell in peace. Such a course will be best for the future, and will cause alarm among our enemies at once; for he who is wise in counsel is stronger against the foe than he who recklessly rushes on with brute force."

XLIX. Such was the speech of Diodotus. And after these opinions had been maintained with nearly equal force, the one against the other, the Athenians, in spite of the reaction, experienced such a conflict of opinion that in the show of hands they were about equally divided; but the view of Diodotus prevailed. They then immediately despatched a second trireme with all haste, hoping that the first trireme, which had the start by about a day and a night, might not arrive first and the city be found destroyed. The Mytilenean envoys provided wine

1 cf. ch. xl. 4.  
2 cf. ch. xxxv. 1.


Αλφίτα καὶ μεγάλα ύποσχομένων, εἰ φθασειαν, ἐγένετο σπουδὴ τοῦ πλοῦ τοιαύτη ὡστε ἥσθιόν τε ἀμα ἐλαύνοντες οὐρῷ καὶ ἐλαύω ἀλφίτα πεφιγμένα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὑπὸν ἣροῦντο κατὰ μέρος, οἱ δὲ ἠλαύνον. κατὰ τύχην δὲ πνεύματος οὐδένος ἐναντιωθέντος καὶ τῆς μὲν προτέρας νεῶς οὐ σπουδὴ πλεούσης ἐπὶ πράγμα ἀλλόκοτον, ταύτης δὲ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἐπειγομένης, ἡ μὲν ἐφθασε τοσοῦτον ὅσον Πάχητα ἀνεγρωκέναι τὸ ψήφισμα καὶ μέλλειν ὁμαίνει τὰ δεδομένα, ἡ δ' ὕστερα αὐτῆς ἐπικατάγεται καὶ διεκώλυσε μὴ διαφθείρα, παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡ Μυτελήνη ἤλθε κινδύνον.

1. Τούς δ' ἄλλους ἀνόρας οὐς ὁ Πάχης ἀπέπεμψεν ὡς αἰτιωτάτους ὅντας τῆς ὑποστάσεως Κλέωνος γνώμη διέφθειραν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (ὅσαν δὲ ὀλίγῳ πλείους χιλίων), καὶ Μυτηληναῖων τείχη καθείλου καὶ ναῦς παρέλαβον. ὕστερον δὲ φόρον μὲν οὐκ ἔταξαν Λεσβίοις, κλήρους δὲ πολίσαντες τῆς γῆς πλὴν τῆς Μυθηναίων τρισχίλιους, τρισκοσίους μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς ἱεροὺς ἐξείλου, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους σφῶν αὐτῶν κληρούχως τοὺς λαχόντας ἀπέπεμψαν ὀικ. ἀργύρων Λέσβων παξίμανει τοῦ κλήρου ἐκάστου τοῦ ἐναιμένου δύο μνᾶς φέρειν

1 Usually the barley-meal was mixed with water and oil.
2 A crew ordinarily stopped for meals and rested at anchor at night.
3 Paches was accused of shameful deeds of violence toward Lesbian men and women (Agath. Epigr. Ivii.), and when
and barley for the crew and promised a large reward if they should arrive in time; and such was their haste on the voyage that they kept on rowing as they ate their barley-cakes, kneaded with wine and oil,¹ and took turns at sleeping and rowing.² And since by good fortune no contrary wind arose, and the earlier ship was sailing in no hurry on so horrible a business, while the second pressed on in the manner described, although the former did in fact arrive first, so that Paches had just time enough to read the decree and was about to execute the orders, the second put in close after it and prevented the destruction of the city. By just so much did Mytilene escape its peril.

L. The rest of the men, however, whom Paches³ had sent to Athens as chief authors of the revolt, numbering somewhat more than a thousand,⁴ were put to death by the Athenians on the motion of Cleon. They also pulled down the walls of Mytilene and took possession of the Mytilenaean fleet. Afterwards, instead of imposing a tribute upon the Lesbians, they divided all the land except that of the Methymnaeans into three thousand allotments, and reserving three hundred of these as sacred to the gods they sent out Athenian colonists, chosen by lot, to occupy the rest. With these the Lesbians made an arrangement to pay a rental of two minas a year⁵ for each lot, they themselves to cultivate the

brought to trial committed suicide in the presence of his judges.

¹ On the ground that so large a number is incompatible with ch. xxviii. 1, 2; xxxv. 1, Steup conjectures τριακοσια (A' for A).
² The whole rental amounting to 90 talents; £18,000; $87,300.
3 autol eiργάζοντο την γην. παρέλαβον δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ πολίσματα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅσων Μυτιληναίοι έκράτουν, καὶ ὑπήκουον ὅστερον Ἀθηναίων. τὰ μὲν κατὰ Λέσβον οὕτως ἑγένετο.

I.I. Ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θερεὶ μετὰ τήν Λέσβον ἀλώσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Νικίου τοῦ Νικηράτου στρατηγούντος ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Μινώαν τὴν νῆσον, ἣ κεῖται πρὸ Μεγάρων. ἔχρωντο δὲ αὐτῇ πῦργον ἐνοικοδομήσαντες οἱ Μεγαρῆς φρουρίῳ, ἐβούλετο δὲ Νικίας τὴν φυλακήν αὐτόθεν δὲ ἐδάσσονας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ Βουδόρου καὶ τῆς Σαλαμίνος εἶναι, τοὺς τε Πελοποννησίους ὅπως μὴ ποιῶνται ἐκπλους αὐτόθεν λαυθάνοντες τριήρων τε, ὅσον καὶ τὸν πρὶν γενόμενον, καὶ λῃστῶν ἐκπομπαίς, τοῖς τε Μεγαρέωσιν ἄμα μηδὲν ἐσπλείν. ἔλων οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς Νίσαιας πρῶτον δύο πῦργων προῦχοντε μηχαναῖς ἐκ θαλάσσης καὶ τῶν ἐσπλουν ἐς τὸ μεταξὶ τῆς νῆσου εὐευθὺρώσας ἀπετείχιζε καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἡπείρου, ἣ κατὰ γέφυραν διὰ τενάγους ἐπιβοθθεία ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ οὗ πολὺ διεχούσῃ τῆς ἡπείρου. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο ἐξειργάσαντο ἐν ἡμέραις ὀλίγαις, ὅστερον δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ τείχος ἐγκαταλίπων καὶ φρουρᾶν ἀνεχώρησε τῷ στρατῷ.

1 τεῖχος—the text is probably corrupt, the verb being omitted.

1 cf. iv. liii. 3, where they are called δυτικαῖοι πόλεις.
2 Referring to Brasidas' attempt, described ii. xciii., xciv.

88
land. The Athenians also took possession, of all the towns on the mainland which the Mytileneans controlled, and these were thereafter subject to the Athenians. Such was the course of events at Lesbos.

II. In the same summer, after the capture of Lesbos, the Athenians, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the island of Minoa, which lies in front of Megara and was used as a garrison-station by the Megarians, who had built a tower upon it. But Niclas was desirous that the watch which the Athenians kept should be maintained at that point, which would be at closer range for them, instead of at Budorum in Salamis, the purpose of the watch being to prevent the Peloponnesians from using the harbour of Megara as a base from which to send out unobserved either triremes, as they had done once before, or expeditions of privateers, and at the same time to see to it that nothing was brought in by sea for the Megarians. Accordingly, by an attack from the sea he took by means of engines of war two projecting towers—first that on the island opposite Nisaea—and when he had thus cleared the way into the channel between the island and the mainland he walled off also the point on the side toward the mainland, where by a bridge across a morass aid could be brought to the island, which is not far distant from the mainland. And when, after a few days, this work was completed, Nicias built a fort on the island also, left a garrison in it, and then withdrew his army to Athens.

2 This seems to be the sense intended. The passage is very much condensed or corrupt. The two towers seem to have stood on the strait between Minoa and the mainland, one on each side, at the end of dams built out to narrow the strait.
I.II. ἵνα δὲ τοὺς αὐτούς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τούτου καὶ οἱ Πλαταιᾷς οὐκέτι ἔχοντες σῖτον οὐδὲ δυνάμενοι πολιορκεῖσθαι ξυνέβησαν τοῖς

2 Πελοποννησίωις τοιώδε τρόπῳ, προσέβαλον αὐτῶν τῷ τείχῃ, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἀμύνεσθαι. γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἄρχων τὴν ἀσθένειαν αὐτῶν βία μὲν οὐκ ἐβούλετο ἔλειν (εἰρημένοι γὰρ ἦν 1 αὐτῷ ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνος, ὡσπο, εἰ σπονδαὶ γίνοντο ποτὲ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐνυγχωροῖν ὅσα πολέμῳ χωρία ἔχουσιν ἐκάτεροι ἀποδίδοσθαι, μὴ ἀνάδοτος εἶ ἡ Πλάταια ὡς αὐτῶν ἐκόντων προσχωρησάντων), προσπέμπει δὲ αὐτοῖς κήρυκα λέγοντα, εἶ βούλονται παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ἐκόντες τοὺς Λακεδαιμόνιους καὶ δικασταίς ἐκεῖνοις χρήσασθαι, τοὺς τε ἄδικους κολάσειν, παρὰ δίκην

3 δὲ οὐδένα. τοσαῦτα μὲν ὁ κήρυξ εἴπεν· οἱ δὲ (ἤσαν γὰρ ἴδη ἐν τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ) παρέδοσαν τὴν πόλιν. καὶ τοὺς Πλαταιᾶς ἔτρεφον οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἡμέρας τινάς, ἐν δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαιμόνιος δικασταῖ, πέντε ἀνδρεῖς, ἀφίκοντο.

4 ἐξεξοντον δὲ αὐτῶν κατηγορία μὲν οὐδεμία προντεθή, ἡρώτων δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐπικαλεσάμενοι τοσούτων μόνον, εἰ τι Λακεδαιμονίως καὶ τοὺς ἦμιμάχοις ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ καθεστῶτε ἀγαθὸν τι εἰργασ.

5 μένοι εἰσίν. οἱ δὲ ἔλεγον αἰτησάμενοι μακρότερα εἰπεῖν καὶ προτάξαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν Ἀστύμαχον τε τὸν Ἀσώπολαύνο καὶ Λάκωνα τὸν Αἰείμυστον,

1 ἦν, bracketed by Hude, as not read by the Scholast. 90
LII. During this summer and about the same time, the Plataeans, who were now without food and could endure the siege no longer, surrendered to the Peloponnesians. It happened in the following manner. An assault was in progress upon their wall and they were unable to repel it. The Lacedaemonian commander recognised their weakness; but he did not wish to take Plataea by storm, for he had received orders to this effect from Sparta, to the end that, if ever a treaty of peace should be made with the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians should consent that all the places each had taken in war should be given back, Plataea might not have to be given up, on the ground that its inhabitants had gone over to Sparta voluntarily. So he sent a herald to them to say that if they would of their own accord deliver their city into the hands of the Lacedaemonians and submit to their decisions they would punish the guilty, but none contrary to justice. The herald made this proposal, and they, since they were now in the last stage of weakness, surrendered the city. And the Peloponnesians fed the Plataeans for some days, until the judges, five in number, arrived from Lacedaemon. When they came no accusation was brought against the Plataeans, but they were summoned by the judges and asked this single question: "Have you rendered any good service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the present war?" The Plataeans, however, begged to be allowed to speak at greater length, and appointed as their spokesmen Astymachus son of Asopolaus and Lacon son of Aeimnestus, who was a proxenus of the

1 Resuming the narrative from the end of ch. xxiv.
πρόξενον ὄντα Δακεδαιμονίων καὶ ἐπελθόντες ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

LIII. "Τὴν μὲν παράδοσιν τῆς πόλεως, ὁ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, πιστεύοντες ὡμί, ἐποιησάμεθα, οὐ τοιάδε δίκην οἴμενοι ὑφέξειν, νομιμοτέραν δὲ τινὰ ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ἐν δικασταῖς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοις δεξάμενοι, δόσπερ καὶ ἐσμέν, γενέσθαι ἢ ὡμίν,

2 ἠγούμενοι τὸ ἱσον μᾶλιστ' ἀν φέρεσθαι. νῦν δὲ φοβούμεθα μὴ ἄμφοτέρων ἀμα ἡμαρτήκαμεν· τὸν τε γὰρ ἄγωνα περὶ τῶν δεινοτάτων εἶναι εἰκόνως ὑποπτεύομεν καὶ ὡμὰς μὴ σὺ κοινὸι ἀποβήτε, τεκμαίρόμενοι προκατηγορίας τε ἴμων οὐ προγεγενημένης ἢ χρὴ ἄντειπείν (ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ λόγον ἴπτησάμεθα) τὸ τε ἐπερώτημα βραχῦ ὄν, ἂν τὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐναντία γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ

3 ψευδὴ ἔλεγχον ἔχει. πανταχόθεν δὲ ἀποροι καθεστῶτες ἀναγκαζόμεθα καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον δοκεῖ εἶναι εἰπόντας τι κυδυνεύειν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὴ ῥήθεις λόγος τοῖς ὧδ' ἔχουσιν αἰτίαιν ἂν παρά-

4 σχοι ὦσι, εἰ ἐλέγχῃ, σωτῆριος ὅπῃ ἢν. χαλεπῶς δὲ ἔχει ὡμίν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἡ πειθ. ἀγνώτες μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἄλληλων ἐπεσενεγκάμενοι μαρτυρία ὧν ἀπειροὶ ἢτε ὅφελούμεθ' ἂν νῦν δὲ πρὸς εἰδότας πάντα λελέξεται, καὶ δέδιμεν οὐχὶ

1 ὡμίν, bracketed by Hulse, as seemingly not read by the Scholiast.

2 λελέξεται, Hulse reads λέγεται with C.

1 Public host or consul. He had commanded the Plataean contingent at Marathon.
BOOK III. LIII. 5-LIII. 4

Lacedaemonians. These men came forward and spoke as follows:

LIII. "When we surrendered our city, Lacedaemonians, trusting in your good faith, we had no thought that we should have to undergo a trial like this, but supposed it would be a more regular procedure; and when we consented to be on trial before you and you alone as judges, as we now are, we believed that we should be most likely to obtain fair treatment. But now we fear that we have been disappointed in both expectations; for we have good reason to suspect, not only that the issues involved in the trial are of the gravest nature but also that you will not prove to be impartial judges. These inferences we draw from the fact that no accusation was first brought against us requiring a plea in defence, but we have had to ask leave to speak, and that the question which is put to us is so curt that a truthful answer to it is against our interests, while a false one can be exposed at once. But beset as we are with perplexities on every hand, we are forced, as indeed seems to be the safer course, to say something and take the risk; for to men in our condition not to have spoken would cause us afterwards to reproach ourselves with the thought that, had the word been spoken, it would have saved us. A further difficulty in our position is the task of convincing you. For if we were strangers to each other, we might find it to our advantage to introduce evidence on matters with which you were unacquainted; but as it is, anything that we shall say is already known to you, and what we fear is, not that

2 i.e. that their very lives were at stake, whereas they had expected, after capitulation, that in the formal trial there could be no question of capital punishment.
μὴ προκαταγώνιστε ἡμῶν τὰς ἁρετὰς ἠσσούς εἶναι τῶν ύμετέρων ἐγκλήμα αὐτὸ ποιῆτε, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλοις χάριν φέροντες ἐπὶ διεγνωσμένην κρίσιν καθιστώμεθα.

LIV. “Παρεχόμενοι δὲ ὃμως ᾧ χόμιν δίκαια πρὸς τε τὰ Θηβαίων διάφορα καὶ ἐς ύμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας, τῶν εὐ δεδραμένων ὑπόμυνησιν ποιησόμεθα καὶ πείθειν πειρασόμεθα. 2 φαμέν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἐρώτημα τὸ βραχὺ, εἰ τί Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τόθε ἁγαθὸν πεποίηκαμεν, εἰ μὲν ὁς πολεμίους ἐρωτάτε, οὐκ ἀδικεῖσθαι ύμᾶς μὴ εὑ παθόντας, φίλους δὲ νομίζοντας αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν 3 μᾶλλον τοὺς ἡμῖν ἐπιστρατεύσαντας. τὰ δὲ ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸν Μῆδον ἁγαθὸν γεγενήμεθα, τὴν μὲν οὐ λύσαντες νῦν πρῶτοι, τῷ δὲ ξυνεπιθέμενοι τότε ἐς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος μόνοι

4 Βοιωτῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἡπειρῶται τε ὄντες ἑναυμαχήσαμεν ἐπ’ Ἀρτεμισίῳ, μάχῃ τε τῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ γῇ γενομένῃ παρεγνώμεθα ύμῖν τε καὶ Παυσανίᾳ: εἰ τε τι ἄλλο καὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο ἐπικίνδυνον τοῖς Ἑλλησὶ, πάντων παρὰ δύναμιν

5 μετέσχομεν. καὶ ύμῖν, ὃς Λακεδαιμονίοι, ἱδίᾳ, ὀτερερ ὅπερ μέγιστος φόβος περιέστη τὴν Σπάρτην μετὰ τὸν σεισμὸν τῶν ἐς Ἰθώμην Ἐιλώτων ἀπο-

1 Referring to the achievements of the Plataeans in the Persian wars.
2 i.e. the Thebans. With bitter irony the Plataeans ascribe to themselves the evident purpose of the
you have already judged our virtues\(^1\) to be inferior to your own and now make that a charge against us, but that in order to gratify others\(^2\) we are to appear before a court that has already decided against us.

LIV. "Nevertheless, we shall present whatever just claims we have, both as regards our quarrel with the Thebans and as touching you and the rest of the Hellenes, and thus, by reminding you of our public services, shall try to persuade you. In reply to the curt inquiry of yours, whether we have rendered any good service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in this war, if you ask us as enemies, we say that you are not wronged if you did not receive benefit at our hands; but if in asking it you regard us as friends, we reply that you yourselves rather than we are at fault, in that you made war upon us. But in the war against the Persians and during the peace which followed we have proved ourselves good and true men; we have not now been the first to break the peace, and then we were the only Boeotians\(^3\) who rallied to defend the freedom of Hellas. For though we are an inland people, we took part in the sea-fight at Artemisium; in the battle that was fought here in our own land\(^4\) we stood side by side with you and Pausanias; and whatever perils arose to threaten the Hellenes in those days, we bore our part in them all beyond our strength. And to you in particular, Lacedaemonians, at that critical moment when after the earthquake Sparta was encompassed by a mighty terror owing to the revolt of the Helots Lacedaemonians—by standing trial before a prejudiced court they will "do a favour to the Thebans."

\(^3\) Rhetorical inaccuracy, for the Thespians did the same (Hdt. vii. cxxxii.; viii. 1.).

\(^4\) The battle of Plataea, 479 B.C. See Hdt. ix. lxii. ff.
στάντων, τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐξεπέμψαμεν ἐς ἐπικουρίαν· ὅν οὐκ εἰκός ἄμυνομοιν.

LV. "Καὶ τὰ μὲν παλαιὰ καὶ μέγιστα τοιοῦτοι ἡξιώσαμεν εἶναι, πολέμιοι δὲ ἐγενόμεθα ὦστερον. ὑμεῖς δὲ αὐτοὶ· δεομένων γὰρ ξυμμαχίας ὀτὲ Θηβαῖοι ἡμᾶς ἔβιάσαντο, ὑμεῖς ἀπεώσασθε καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκελεύετε τραπέζθαι ὡς ἐγγὺς 2 ὄντας, ὑμῶν δὲ μακρὰν ἀποικούντων. ἐν μέντοι τῷ πολέμῳ οὐδὲν ἐκπρεπέστερον ὑπὸ ἡμῶν οὔτε 3 ἐπάθητε οὔτε ἐμελλῆσατε. εἰ δὲ ἀποστήναι Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἠθελήσαμεν ὑμῶν κελευσάντων, οὐκ ἡδικοῦμεν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἐβοήθουν ἡμῖν ἐναντία Θηβαῖοι ὀτὲ ὑμεῖς ἀπωκνέετε, καὶ προ- δοῦναι αὐτοὺς οὐκέτι ἦν καλὸν, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὐς εὐ παθῶν τις καὶ αὐτὸς δεόμενος προσηγάγετο ξυμμάχους καὶ πολιτείας μετέλαβεν, έναι δὲ ἐς 4 τὰ παραγγελλόμενα εἰκὸς ᾧν προθύμως. ἅ δὲ ἐκάτεροι ἐξηγεῖσθε τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, οὐχ οἱ ἐπο- μενοὶ αὐτοὶ εἰ τι μὴ καλῶς ἐδράτο, ἀλλ' οἱ ἁγιοι ἐπὶ τὰ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντα.

LVI. "Θηβαῖοι δὲ πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἀλλὰ ἡμᾶς ἠδίκησαν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον αὐτοῦ ἔνυστε, δι’ ὅπερ 2 καὶ τὰδε πάσχομεν. πόλιν γὰρ αὐτοὺς τῇ ἡμετέ- ῥαν καταλαμβάνοντας ἐν σπουδαῖς καὶ προσέτη ἱερομηνία ὀρθῶς τε ἐτιμωρησάμεθα κατὰ τὸν πᾶσι νόμον καθεστῶτα, τὸν ἐπίοντα πολέμιον ὅσιον
and their occupation of Ithome, we sent a third part of our citizens to bring aid. These are things you ought not to forget.

LV. "Such was the part we were proud to play in the great actions of the past. It was not until later that we became your enemies, and for this you yourselves were to blame; for when the Thebans oppressed us and we sought alliance with you, you rebuffed us and bade us apply to the Athenians, because they were near, whereas you lived far away. In the course of this war, however, you have neither suffered, nor were ever in danger of suffering, any extraordinary harm at our hands. And if we refused to revolt from the Athenians at your bidding, we were not in the wrong; for they helped us against the Thebans when you held back. After that it would not have been honourable for us to desert them, above all when we were their debtors and when at our own request we had been admitted to their alliance and had shared the rights of citizenship with them. On the contrary, there was every reason why we should heartily obey their commands. And whatever measures either you or they have initiated for your allies, it is not the followers who are to blame for any wrong that has been done, but those who have led them into evil courses.

LVI. "As for the Thebans, they have done us many wrongs in the past, and you yourselves are well aware of this crowning outrage, which has brought us into our present plight. They attempted to seize our city in time of peace, and furthermore on a day of festival; therefore we were justified in punishing them in accordance with the law which has universal sanction, that it is right to repel him who comes
είναι ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ νῦν οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως δι' αὐτοῦς
3 βλαπτοίμεθα. εἰ γὰρ τῷ αὐτικῷ χρησίμῳ ὑμῶν
τε καὶ ἐκείνων πολεμίῳ 1 τὸ δίκαιον λήψεσθε, τοῦ
μὲν ὀρθοῦ φανείσθε οὐκ ἀληθείς κριταὶ ὄντες, τὸ
4 δὲ χυμφέρον μᾶλλον θεραπεύοντες. καίτοι εἰ νῦν
ὑμῶν ὅφελίμοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πολὺ καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ
οἱ ἀλλοί Ἔλληνες μᾶλλον τότε ὅτε ἐν μείζονι
κινδύνῳ ἦτε. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἔτεροις ὑμεῖς ἐπέρχεσθε
δεινοί, εἰ ἐκείνω δὲ τῷ καιρῷ, ὅτε πάσι δουλεύαν
5 ἐπέφερεν ὁ βάρβαρος, οἴδε μετ' αὐτοῦ ἦσαν. καὶ
δίκαιον ἡμῶν τῆς νῦν ἀμαρτίας, εἰ ἄρα ἡμάρτηται
τι, ἀντιθεῖναι τὴν τότε προθυμίαν, καὶ μείζω τε
πρὸς ἐλάσσω εὑρήσετε καὶ ἐν καιροῖς δός σπάνιον
ἡν τῶν Ελλήνων τινὰ ἀρετὴν τῇ Ἐὔρηξον δυνάμει
ἀντιτάξασθαι, ἐπηροῦντο τε μᾶλλον οἱ μὴ τὰ
χύμφορα πρὸς τὴν ἐφοδου αὐτοῖς 2 ἀσφαλείᾳ
πράσσοντες, ἐθέλοντες δὲ τολμᾶν μετὰ κινδύνων
6 τὰ βέλτιστα. δῶν ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι καὶ τιμηθέντες
ἐς τὰ πρῶτα νῦν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέδιμεν μὴ δια-
φθαρῶμεν, Ἄθηναίους ἐλόμενοι δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ
7 ύμᾶς κερδαλέως. καίτοι χρῆ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν ὁμοίως φαίνεσθαι γυγώσκοντας καὶ τὸ
χυμφέρον μὴ ἀλλο τι νομίσαι, ἡ τῶν χυμμάχων
τοῖς ἄγαθοῖς ὅταν αἰεὶ βέβαιοι τὴν χάριν τῆς

1 πολεμίῳ, bracketed by Hude, as derived from a gloss (πολεμίῳ).
2 αὐτοῖς, Bekker and most editors with M, Hude αὐτοῖς.
against you as an enemy; and now we cannot reasonably be made to suffer on their account. For if you shall decide the question of justice by such considerations as your immediate advantage and their hostility, you will show yourselves to be, not true judges of what is right, but rather to be mere slaves of expediency. And yet if the Thebans seem serviceable to you now, we and the rest of the Hellenes were of far greater service to you when you were in greater danger. For now you are attacking others and are a menace to them, but in that crisis, when the barbarian was threatening us all with slavery, these men were on his side. And it is only fair that you should set our present error, if error there has been, over against the zeal we showed then; if you do, you will find, not only that the zeal outweighs the offence, but also that it was shown at a time when it was a rare thing for Hellenes to oppose their courage to the power of Xerxes. At that time the greater praise was given to those who, instead of intriguing in security for their own advantage with reference to the invasion,¹ were ready to hazard the noblest course though fraught with danger. With these we took our stand and were honoured among the foremost; but now, for the same conduct, we fear lest we are to be destroyed, in that we have chosen the Athenians from regard to right rather than you for profit. And yet you ought to show yourselves consistent, giving the same judgment concerning the same things, and to consider your true advantage to be only this—to cherish an ever-enduring gratitude

¹ As the Thebans did. If αὐτοῖς be read, with nearly all MSS., it must be construed with ἐφοδίων, “working to further the invasion of the enemy.”
THUCYDIDES

ἀρετὴς ἔχουσι ¹ καὶ τὸ παραυτικὰ που ὑμῖν ² ὥφελιμον καθίστηται.

LVII. “Προσκέψασθε ³ τε ὅτι νῦν μὲν παρά-δειγμα τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀνδραγάθλας νομίζεσθε· εἰ δὲ περὶ ἡμῶν γνώσεσθε μὴ τὰ εἰκότα (οὐ γὰρ ἀφανὴ κρίνειτε τὴν δίκην τὴνδὲ, ἐπαινοῦ-μενοὶ δὲ περὶ οὐδ’ἡμῶν μεμπτών), ὀρᾶτε ὅπως μὴ οὐκ ἀποδεξώνται ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρι αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους οὕτως ἀπρέπες τι ἑπιγνώναι, οὐδὲ πρὸς ιεροῖς τοῖς κοινοῖς σκῦλα ἀπὸ ἡμῶν τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἡς Ἑλλάδος ἀνατεθήμα. δεινῶν δὲ δόξει εἶναι Πλάταιαν Λακεδαιμονίους πορθήσαν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πατέρας ἀναγράψατε ἐς τὸν τρίποδα τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς δι’ ἀρετὴν τὴν πόλιν, ἡμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἐκ πάντων τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ πανοικίσσα διὰ Ὥβεαιων ἐξαλείψαι.

3 ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἐπιμορὰς προκεχωρήκαμεν, οὕτως Μῆδων τε κρατησάντων ἀπωλλύμεθα καὶ νῦν ἐν ὑμῖν τοῖς πρὶν φιλτάτοις Ὥβεαιοι ᾧ-σώμεθα καὶ δύο ἄγωνας τοὺς μεγίστους ὑπεστήμεν, τότε μὲν, τὴν πόλιν εἰ μὴ παρέδομεν, λιμῷ δια-

4 φθαρήμα, νῦν δὲ λαβάτω δίκη κρίνεσθαι. καὶ περιεσχέμαθα εκ πάντων Πλαταίης, οἱ παρὰ δύναμιν πρόθυμοι ἐς τοὺς Ἑλληνας, ἐρήμουι καὶ ἀτιμῶρητον καὶ σύτε τῶν τότε ἐπιμαχῶν ὦφελεὶ οὐδείς, ἡμεῖς τε, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιου, ἡ μόνη ἐλπίς, δέδηκαν μὴ οὔ Ὥβεαιοι ἑτε.

¹ Heilmann’s correction for ἔχωσι of the MSS.
² Jowett prefers ὑμῖν, with M, in which case the sense would be general: “while (as a matter of course) our own immediate interests are sufficiently secured.” With ὑμῖν there is a return to the particular, i.e. the case of the Lacedaemonians.
³ προσκέψασθε, Meineke’s conjecture for προσκέψασθε of the MSS.

100
toward the best of your allies for their valour, while also securing what may be to your advantage at the present moment.

LVII. "Consider, too, that you are now regarded by most of the Hellenes as an example of uprightness; but if the verdict you give concerning us shall be inequitable, beware (since the case you are deciding here is not obscure, but you the judges are the object of men’s praise and we the defendants are of no mean repute), beware, I say, lest men repudiate an unseemly sentence passed upon good men by men still better and resent the dedication in the common temples of spoils taken from us, the benefactors of Hellas. Monstrous will it seem that the Lacedaemonians should sack Plataea, and that you, whose fathers inscribed the name of our city on the tripod at Delphi in commemoration of her valour, should blot her out, house and home, from the map of Hellas—to please the Thebans! For to this depth of misfortune have we come, we who, when the Persians prevailed, were on the verge of ruin, and now when we plead before you, formerly our closest friends, we are beaten by Thebans; and we have had to face two supreme dangers, at that time of perishing by starvation if we had not surrendered our city, and now of standing trial for our lives. And we have been thrust aside by all, we men of Plataea, who were zealous toward the Hellenes beyond our strength, and are now desolate and undefended. No one of our former allies now aids us, and as for you, Lacedaemonians, our only hope, we fear that you are not steadfast.

1 The reference is to the burning of their city by Xerxes; see Hdt. viii. 1.
LVIII. "Καί τοις ἄξιομένει γε καὶ θεῶν ἐνεκα τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ποτε γενομένων καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς ἐς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας καμφθῆναι ώμᾶς καὶ μετα-γνωνάι εἰ ὅπο Θῆβαιών ἐπείσθητε, τὴν τε δω- 

2 ρειᾶν ἀνταπαίτησαι αὐτοῖς μὴ κτείνειν οὐς μὴ ύμῶν 

3 πρέπει, σώφρονα τε ἀντὶ αἰσχρᾶς κομίσασθαι 

4 χάριν, καὶ μὴ ἠδονὴν δόντας ἄλλοις κακίαν αὐ- 

5 τοὺς ἀντιλαβεῖν. βραχυ γὰρ τὸ τὰ ἡμέτερα 

1 σώματα διαφθεῖραι, ἐπίπονον δὲ τὴν δύσκλειαν 

2 αὐτοῦ ἀφαινόμενον. οὐκ ἔχθρος γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐκκός 

3 τιμωρήσεσθε, ἀλλ' εὐνοῦσ, κατ' ἀνάγκην πολεμη- 

4 σαντας. ὡς καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἄδειαν ποιοῦντες 

5 ὅσα ἂν δικαίωσαι καὶ προνοοῦντες ὅτε ἐκόντας τε 

6 ἐλάβεσθε καὶ χείρας προισχομένους (ὁ δὲ νόμος 

1 τοῖς Ἐλληνικοῖς μὴ κτείνειν τούτους), ἐτε δὲ καὶ 

2 ευθυγινεύοντας διὰ παντῶς. ἀποβλέψατε 

3 γὰρ ἐς πατέρων τῶν ἰματέρων θήκας, οὐς ἀπο- 

4 θανόντας ὑπὸ Μῆδων καὶ ταφέντας ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ 

5 ἐτεμώμενα κατὰ ἐτος ἑκαστον δημοσία ἐσθήμασο 

6 τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, ὅσα τε ἡ γῆ ἡμῶν 

7 ἀνεδίδου όραία, πάντων ἀπαρχὰς ἐπιφέροντες, 

8 εὖνοι μὲν ἐκ φιλίς χώρας, Ἑλληνικοὶ δὲ ὁμαίχ- 

9 μοις ποτὲ γενομέναις. ὃν ὑμεῖς τούνατιν ἂν 

10 δράσατε μὴ ὁρθῶς γρόντες. σκέψασθε δὲ·

1 ἡμᾶς, bracketed by Hude, because omitted in M. 

2 δὲ, Hude reads τε, with C. 

1 The Thebans had demanded that the Plataeans be put 

to death.
LVIII. "And yet we adjure you, for the sake of the gods who of old sanctioned our alliance and for our good service in the cause of the Hellenes, to relent and change your minds, if you have been in any way won over by the Thebans,¹ and in your turn to ask of them the boon not to put to death those whom it ill becomes you to slay, that you may thus receive an honest instead of a shameful gratitude, and may not in giving pleasure to others get in return ignominy for yourselves. It is a simple matter to take our lives, but a grievous task to blot out the infamy of it; for we are not enemies whom you would have a right to punish, but good friends who were forced into war with you. You would, therefore, render a righteous judgment if you guaranteed us security of life and if you bore in mind, before it is too late, that it was in voluntary surrender and with outstretched hands that you received us (and the usage of the Hellenes forbids the slaying of suppliants); and, moreover, that we have always been your benefactors. Turn your eyes upon the sepulchres of your fathers, slain by the Persians and buried in our land, whom we have honoured year by year with a public offering of raiment² and other customary gifts; the first fruits, too, of all that the earth each year has produced have been brought them, the tribute of kindly hands from a friendly land and of allies to those who were once their companions in arms. All this you would reverse by an unjust verdict. Reflect: when Pausanias buried

¹ For garments as offerings to the dead, cf. Soph. El. 452; Eur. Or. 123, 1436; Tac. A. iii. 2. But some understand ιωθωμαί to refer to mourning garments. See also Plut. Aristides, xxi.
σανίσας μὲν γὰρ ἐθαπτεῖν αὐτοὺς νομίζων ἐν γῇ τε φιλία τιθέναι καὶ παρ’ ἄνδρας τουσὸτουσ’ ὑμεῖς δὲ εἰ κτενεῖτε ἡμᾶς καὶ χώραν τὴν Πλαταιῶν Θηβαίδα ποιήσετε, τὶ ἅλυ ἐν πολεμία τε καὶ παρὰ τοὺς αὐθέντας πατέρας τοὺς ὑμετέρους καὶ ἐνογενεῖς ἀτίμως γερῶν ὁν υἱόν ἵσχουσίς καταλείψετε; πρὸς δὲ καὶ γὴν ἐν ἡ ἡλευθερωθησάν
tι Ἐλλήνες δουλώσετε, ἱερὰ τε θεῶν οἵς εὐδα-
μενοι Μῆδων ἐκράτησαν ἔρημοντε1 καὶ θυσίας
tας πατρίως τῶν ἔσσαμένων καὶ κτισάντων
ἀφαιρῆσεσθε.

LIX. "Οὐ πρὸς τὴν ὑμετέρας δόξης, ὁ Λακε-

δαμόνοι, τάδε, οὔτε ὑς τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἐλλήνων
νόμιμα καὶ ὑς τοὺς προγόνους ἀμαρτάνειν οὔτε
ἡμᾶς τοὺς εὐρεγέτας ἀλλοτρίας ἐνεκα ἐχθραὶ
μὴ αὐτοὺς ἀδικήθεντας διαφθείραι, ἑλισαθαι δὲ καὶ
ἐπικλασθήναι τῇ γνώμῃ οἰκτο σώφρονι λαβόντας
μὴ ὅν πεισόμεθα μόνον δεινότητα κατανοοῦντας,
ἀλλ' οἰοὶ τε ἅν ὅντες πάθοιμεν καὶ ὅσ' ἀστάθ-

μητὸν τὸ τῆς ἐμφορᾶς ὅτινε ποτ' ἂν καὶ ἀναξιω

2 ἐμπέσοι. ήμεῖς τε, ὡς πρέπον ἡμῖν καὶ ὅσ' ἡ
χρεία προάγει, αἰτούμεθα ἡμᾶς, θεοὺς τοὺς
ὁμοβωμίους καὶ κοινοὺς τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἐπιβολο־

μενοί, πείσαι τάδε, προφερόμενοι2 θ' ὄρκους οὐς
οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ὄμοσαν μὴ ἀμνημονεῖν ἱκέται

1 ἔρημοντε, Hude adopts Stahl's conjecture ἔρημοντε,
because of the striking present between two futures.
2 θ' after προφερόμενοι is Stahl's conjecture, adopted by
Hude.
them he thought he was laying them in a friendly land and among friends; but you, if you put us to death and make the territory of Plataea a Theban province, will you not be leaving them in a hostile land and among their murderers—these your fathers and kinsmen—and dispossessed of the honours they now enjoy? Nay more, you will be enslaving the very land in which the Hellenes gained their liberty; you will be bringing desolation upon the temples of the gods to whom they prayed when they conquered the Persians; and you will be robbing of their hereditary sacrifices the people who founded and established them.

LIX. "These things are not consistent with your honour, Lacedaemonians, nor can it be so to offend against the common usage of the Hellenes and against your ancestors, or to put us, your benefactors, to death because of the enmity of others, when you have not been wronged yourselves. Nay, your good name demands that you should spare us and be softened in heart, regarding us with a dispassionate pity and bearing in mind, not only how terrible will be our fate, but who we are that must suffer, and how uncertain is fortune, whose strokes sometimes fall even upon the innocent. And we, as befits our condition and as our sore need demands, entreat you in the name of the common gods of the Hellenic race whom we invoke, gods worshipped by us all at the same altars, to listen to our prayers; and at the same time, appealing to the oaths wherein your fathers swore that they would never forget us, we become suppliants

1 The Thebans are called their murderers because they had sided with the Persians against the Hellenic allies.
THUCYDIDES

γυγνόμεθα ὑμῶν τῶν πατρῴων τάφων καὶ ἑπικαλούμεθα τοὺς κεκμηκότας μὴ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Ὑθβαίως μὴδὲ τοῖς ἐχθρίστοις φίλτατοι ὄντες παραδοθήναι, ἡμέρας τε ἀναμμυησκομεν ἐκεῖνης ἡ τὰ λαμπρότατα μετ' αὐτῶν πράξαντες νῦν ἐν τῇδε τὰ δεινότατα κινδυνεύομεν παθεῖν. ὁπερ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον τε καὶ χαλεπῶτατον τοῖς ὅτε ἔχουσι, λόγον τελευτᾷν, διότι καὶ του βίου ὁ κίνδυνος ἐγγὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ, παυόμενοι λέγομεν ἢ ὅτι σὺ Ὑθβαίως παρέδομεν τὴν πόλιν (εἰδομεθα γὰρ ἄν πρὸς τοῦτο τῷ αἰσχίστῳ ὀλέθρῳ λιμῷ τελευτήσαι), ὑμῖν δὲ πιστεύσαντες προσήλθομεν (καὶ δίκαιον, εἰ μὴ πείθομεν, ἐς τὰ αὐτὰ καταστήσαντα τὸν ἐυνυχῶντα κίνδυνον ἐᾶσαι ἦµᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑλάσαται), ἐπισκύπτομεν τε ἀµα µὴ Πλαταιῆς ὄντες, οἱ προθυμότατοι περὶ τοὺς Ἐλλήνας γενόµενοι, Θηβαίοις τοῖς ἡµῖν ἐχθρίστοις ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων χειρῶν καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας πίστεως ἰκέται ὄντες, ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, παραδοθήναι, γενέσθαι δὲ σωτῆρας ἡµῶν καὶ µὴ τους ἄλλους Ἐλλήνας ἐλευθεροῦντας ἦµᾶς διολόσαι."

LX. Τοιαῦτα µὲν οἱ Πλαταιῆς εἶπον. οἱ δὲ Θηβαίοι δείσαντες πρὸς τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν μὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴ ἐνδώσι, παρελθοῦντες ἐφασαν καὶ αὐτοὶ βουλεσθαὶ εἰπείν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκεῖνοι παρὰ γνώµην τὴν αὐτῶν μακρότερος λόγος ἐδῶθη τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἑρώτημα ἀποκρίσεως. ὡς δ' ἐκελεύσαν, ἐλέγον τοιάδε.

LXI. "Τοὺς µὲν λόγους οὐκ ἂν ἂν ἡτησάμεθα

1 παρελθοῦντες, Hude adopts Ullrich's conjecture προσελθοῦντες.
before your ancestral tombs and call upon the departed not to suffer us to come into the power of Thebans or permit us, who were their dearest friends, to be delivered into the hands of their bitterest foes. We also remind you of that day on which we shared with them in the most brilliant deeds, we who now on this day are on the brink of the most awful fate. And now, bringing our plea to an end—and this must be, howbeit for men in our condition it is the hardest thing of all, seeing that with its ending our mortal peril also draws near—we say that we did not surrender our city to the Thebans—in preference to that our choice would have been to die of starvation, the most horrible of deaths—but capitulated to you because we trusted you. And it is but right, if we fail in our plea, that you should restore us to our former position and let us choose for ourselves the danger that shall confront us. And we likewise adjure you, Plataeans that we are, people who were most zealous for the cause of Hellas, and are now your suppliants, O Lacedaemonians, not to deliver us out of your hands and your good faith to the Thebans, our bitterest foes, but to become our saviours, and not, while liberating the rest of the Hellenes, to bring utter destruction upon us.”

LX. Thus the Plataeans spoke. And the Thebans, fearing lest the Lacedaemonians might be so moved by their plea as to yield somewhat, came forward and said that they, too, wished to speak, since, against their own judgment, the Plataeans had been granted leave to speak at greater length than the answer to the question required. And when the judges assented, they spoke as follows:

LXI. “We should not have asked permission to
eἰπείν, εἰ καὶ αὐτοὶ βραχέως τὸ ἐρωτηθέν ἀπεκρι
ναντό καὶ μὴ ἔπι ἡμᾶς τραπόμενοι κατηγορίαν ἐποιήσαντο καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἔξω τῶν προκειμένων καὶ ἀμα οὐδὲ ἦταν ἔναν πολλῆς τῆς ἀπολογίας καὶ ἐπαινοῦν ἂν οὐδεὶς ἐμέμψατο. νῦν δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀντεἰπεῖν δεῖ, τῶν δὲ ἔλεγχον ποιήσασθαι, ἵνα μὴ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ αὐτοῦς κακία ἀφελῇ μήτε ἡ τούτων δόξα, τὸ δ᾿ ἀληθῆς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἀκούσαντες κρίνητε.

2 "Ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς διάφοροι ἐγενόμεθα τὸ πρῶτον ὅτι ἡμῶν κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὑστερον τῆς Ἀλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ' αὐτῆς, ἃ ξυμμείκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἐσχομεν, οὐκ ἥξιον οἵτινες, ἀσπέρ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια, ἐπειδὴ προσημαγκάζοντο, προσεχόρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ μετ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἐβλαπτον, ἀνθ' ὅν καὶ ἀντέπασχον. LXII. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ὁ βάρ-
βαρος ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, φασὶ μόνοι Βοιωτῶν οὐ μηδέσαι, καὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα αὐτοὶ
2 τε ἀγάλλουσατε καὶ ἡμᾶς λοιδοροῦσιν. ἧμεῖς δὲ μηδέσαι μὲν αὐτοὺς οὐ φαμέν διότι οὐδ' Ἀθη-
ναίους, τῇ μέντοι αὐτῇ ἐδει ὑστερον ἔντων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τούς "Ελλήνας μόνους αὐ Βοιωτῶν
3 ἀττικίσαι. καίτοι σκέψασθε ἐν οἷῷ εἶδε τέκάτεροι

1 Strabo mentions Pelasgians, Thracians, Hyantians.
make this speech, if the Plataeans had briefly answered the question, and had not turned upon us and accused us, at the same time setting up a long defence of themselves on matters foreign to the issue and on which no charge whatever had been made against them, and praising themselves where nobody had blamed them. But as it is, we must answer their charges and expose their self-praise, in order that neither our baseness nor their good repute may help them, but that you may hear the truth about us both before you decide.

"The quarrel we had with them began in this way: after we had settled the rest of Boeotia and had occupied Plataea and other places of which we got possession by driving out a mixed population, these Plataeans disdained to submit to our leadership, as had been agreed upon at first, and separating themselves from the rest of the Boeotians and breaking away from the traditions of our fathers went over to the Athenians as soon as an attempt was made to force them into obedience, and in conjunction with the Athenians did us much harm, for which they also suffered in return. LXII. Again, they say that when the barbarians came against Hellas they were the only Boeotians who did not medize, and for this especially they plume themselves and abuse us. We say, however, that the only reason they did not medize was because the Athenians also did not, and that, moreover, on the same principle, when the Athenians afterwards assailed all Hellas, they were the only Boeotians who atticized. And yet consider

---

2 Ever since the Persian war medize and medium had been terms of bitter reproach in Hellas; in the mouths of the Thebans atticize and atticism have a like invidious meaning.
ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ ΘΟΥ

ΤΟΥ ΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘΟΘО
the circumstances under which we each acted as we did. For the constitution of our city at that time was, as it happened, neither an oligarchy under equal laws\(^1\) nor yet a democracy; but its affairs were in the hands of a small group of powerful men—the form which is most opposed to law and the best regulated polity, and most allied to a tyranny. These men, hoping to win still greater power for themselves if the fortunes of the Persian should prevail, forcibly kept the people down and brought him in. The city as a whole was not in control of its own actions when Thebes took the course it did, nor is it fair to reproach it for the mistakes it made when not under the rule of law. At any rate, after the Persian departed and Thebes obtained its lawful government, and when subsequently the Athenians became aggressive and were trying to bring not only the rest of Hellas but also our country under their own sway and, owing to factions amongst us, were already in possession of most of it,\(^2\) pray observe whether we fought and defeated them at Coronea\(^3\) and thus liberated Boeotia, and whether we are now zealously helping\(^4\) to liberate the other peoples, furnishing more cavalry and munitions of war than any of the other allies. Such is our defence against the charge of medism.

LXIII. "We will now try to show that you Plataeans have wronged the Hellenes more than we and are more deserving of any punishment, however severe. You became allies and citizens of Athens

---

\(^{1}\) After the battle at Oenophyta, 458 B.C. cf. I. cviii. 2, 3.

\(^{2}\) 446 B.C. cf. I. cxiii. 2.

\(^{4}\) This is mentioned with a view to influencing Spartan judges.
τέρα τιμωρία, ὡς φατέ, Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι καὶ πολίται. οὐκοῦν χρὴν τὰ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μόνον ὑμᾶς ἐπάγεσθαι αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ἐξουπιέναι μετ’ αὐτῶν ἄλλως, ὑπάρχον γε ὅμως, εἰ τι καὶ ἄκουστε προσήγεσθε ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων, τῆς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τῶν ἔτη ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξυμμαχίας γεγενημένης, ἂν αὐτοὶ μᾶλιστα προβάλλεσθε. ἢκανὴ γε ἡ ἡμᾶς τε ὅμως ἀποτρέπειν καὶ, τὸ μέγιστον, ἁδεῶς παρέχειν βουλεύοιμον. ἀλλ’ ἐκόντες καὶ οὐ βιαζόμενοι ἐτί εἴλεσθε µᾶλλον τὰ Ἀθηναίων. 3 καὶ λέγετε ὡς αἰσχρῶν ἂν προδοῦναι τοὺς εὐεργετάς; πολὺ δὲ γε αἰσχίου καὶ ἀδικώτερον τοὺς πάντας Ἐλλήνας καταπροδοῦναι, οἷς ξυνωμόσατε, ἡ Ἀθηναίωνος µόνον, τοὺς γένες καταδουλουμένους 4 τὴν Ἐλλάδα, τοὺς δὲ ἔλευθερουντας. καὶ οὐκ ἰσην αὐτοὺς τὴν χάριν ἀνταπέδοτε οὐδὲ αἰσχύνης ἀπηλλαγμένην ύμεις μὲν γὰρ ἀδικούμενοι αὐτοὺς, ὡς φατέ, ἐπηγάγεσθε, τοῖς δὲ ἀδικοῦσιν ἄλλους ἐνεργοὶ κατέστητε. καίτοι τὰς ὁμοίας χάριτας μὴ ἀντιδίδοναι αἰσχρῶν µᾶλλον ἡ τὰς µετὰ δικαιοσύνης µὲν ὀφειλθεῖσας, ἐς ἀδικίαν δὲ ἀποδοδομένας.

1 ἢκανὴ γε, Hude reads ἢκανὴ γάρ, with Cod. Graev.

1 cf. ch. lv. 1.
2 The alliance of the Lacedaemonians that is in mind here would seem to be the general league of the Hellenes in the Persian War, in which the Lacedaemonians were leaders; but in ch. lviii. 1 the Plataeans use the words θεῶν τῶν ξυμμαχικῶν ποτὲ γενομένων especially with reference to the compact mentioned in ii. lxxi., where it is said that the allies, at the instance of Pausanias, after the battle of
that you might, as you claim, obtain protection against us. In that case you ought only to have invoked their aid against us, instead of assisting them in their aggressions against others; such a course was certainly open to you, in case you were ever being led on by the Athenians against your will, since the alliance of the Lacedaemonians here had already been organized against the Persians—the alliance of which you are always reminding us. That would have been enough to keep us from interfering with you, and, what is more important, to enable you to take your own counsel without fear. Nay, it was willingly and not now under compulsion that you embraced the Athenian cause. You say, however, that it would have been dishonourable to betray your benefactors; but it was far more dishonourable and wicked to betray to their destruction all the Hellenes, with whom you had sworn alliance, than merely the Athenians, when they were endeavouring to enslave Hellas, the others to liberate her. And the recompense you made them is not equal, nor indeed free from dishonour. For you were being wronged, as you claim, when you invoked their aid, but they were wronging others when you became their helpers. And yet, surely, not to repay favours with like favours is dishonourable; but it is not so when, though the debt was incurred in a just matter, it can only be repaid by wrong-doing.

Plataea, mutually guaranteed the independence of all the Hellenic states, and of the Plataeans in particular.

1 cf. Cicero, de Off. 1. 15. 48, non reddere viro bono non licet, modo id facere possit sine injuria. The whole sentence serves to substantiate the words οὖν αἰσχρὰς ἀπελλαγμένη, the charge τὰς δυνάμεις κράτας μὴ ἀπελλαγμέναι being, according to the Theban speakers, applicable to the Plataeans.
THUCYDIDES

LXIV. “Δήλον τε ἐποίησατε οὐδὲ τότε τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἔνεκα μόνοι σι χρήσισαντες, ἀλλὰ οὐδ’ ἂν ἀξιοῦσιν ταύτα βουλόκειται, τοὺς δὲ τάραντα. καὶ νῦν ἀξιοῦσιν, αἱρ’ ὅν δὲ έτέρους ἐγένεσθε ἄγαθοι, ἀπὸ τούτων ἀφελείσθαι. ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰκός φύστερ δὲ Ἀθηναίους εἴλεσθε, τούτους ἠναγωνίζεσθε, καὶ μὴ προφέρετε τὴν τότε γενομένην ἐνυμομοσίαν ὡς χρή.

3 ἀπ’ αὐτῆς νῦν σφόξεσθαι. ἀπελίπτετε γὰρ αὐτὴν καὶ παραβάντες ἐνυγκατεδούλουσθε μᾶλλον Ἀθηναίητας καὶ ἄλλους τινάς τῶν ἐνυμομοσάντων ἡ διεκκωλύτε, καὶ ταύτα οὔτε ἄκοντες ἐχοντες τε τοὺς νόμους οὐσπερ μέχρι τοῦ δεύτερο καὶ οὐδενὸς ὑμᾶς βιασαμένου, ὄσπερ ἡμᾶς. τὴν τελευταίαν τε πρὶν περιτείχισθαι πρόκλησιν ἐς ἀνυχίαν ἡμῶν, ὡστε μηδετέροις ἁμένειν, οὐκ ἐδέχεσθε.

4 τίνες ἀν οἴνοι ὑμῶν δικαιότερον πάσι τοῖς Ἑλλησίοις μισοίντο, οὕτως ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκείνων κακῷ ἀνδραγαθίαν προ督办θεσθε; καὶ ἃ μὲν ποτε χρηστολ ἐγένεσθε, ός φατε, οὐ προσήκοντα νῦν ἐπεδείξατε, ἃ δὲ ή φύσει αἰεὶ ἐβουλεύτο. εὔηλέγχθη ἐς τὸ ἄληθές· μετὰ γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ἀδικοῦν ὅδον ἴστων ἑχωρησατε. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐς τὸν ἡμέτερον τε ἀκούσιον μηδίσμων καὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον ἐκούσιον ἀττικισμὸν τοιαῦτα ἀποφαίνομεν.

LXV. “Αἱ δὲ τελευταίᾳ φατε ἀδικηθήναι (παρανόμοις γὰρ ἐλθείν ἡμᾶς ἐν σπουδαῖς καὶ

1 ἤμει, with the majority of the best MSS.; Hude reads ἤμει with CG.
LXIV. "You have, therefore, made it clear that even then it was not for the sake of the Hellenes that you alone of the Boeotians refused to medize, but merely because the Athenians also refused while we did not, and you preferred to act with the one party and against the other. And now you expect to be rewarded for the virtuous conduct that was due to the inspiration of others! But that is unreasonable; as you chose the Athenians, continue to fight on their side. And do not keep reminding us of the alliance you made then, and claim that it ought to save you now. For you have abandoned it and in violation of its principles have constantly aided, instead of trying to prevent, the enslavement of the Aeginetans\(^1\) and other members of the alliance; and that, too, not against your will, since you then enjoyed the laws under which you have lived till now and were not, like us, under compulsion by another. Moreover, you refused to accept the last proposal we made you before Plataea was invested\(^2\)—to leave you unmolested if you would aid neither side. Who, then, would more justly be hated by all the Hellenes than you, who displayed your virtue in order to compass their injury? Furthermore, those noble qualities which, as you claim, you once displayed you have now made plain were not properly yours, but your natural longings have been put to the proof and shown in their reality; for you have followed the Athenians when they walked in the way of iniquity. Such, then, is our affirmation regarding our unwilling medism and your willing atticism.

LXV. "As to your last charge of wrong-doing on our part—that we unlawfully attacked your city in

---

\(^1\) cf. ii. xviii.; ii. xxvii.
\(^2\) cf. ii. lxxiv. 1.
ιερομηνία ἐπὶ τὴν ὕμετραν πόλιν), οὐ νομίζομεν
2 οὐδὲν τούτων ὑμῶν μᾶλλον ἁμαρτεῖν. εἰ μὲν
γὰρ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ πρὸς τε τὴν πόλιν ἐλθὼν ἔμα-
χόμεθα καὶ τὴν γην ἔθεμομεν ὡς πολέμοι, ἀδι-
kούμεν ὡς δὲ ἄνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήματι
καὶ γένει, βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας
ὑμᾶς παῦσαι, ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν
πάτρια καταστῆσαι, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἐκόντες, τι
ἀδικούμεν; οἱ γὰρ ἄγοντες παρανοοῦσι μᾶλλον
3 τῶν ἐπομένων. ἀλλ’ οὐτ’ ἐκεῖνοι, ὡς ἡμεῖς κρί-
νομεν, οὔτε ἡμεῖς πολιτάτε ὑπέτερ ὑμεῖς
καὶ πλεῖον παραβαλλόμενοι, τὸ ἐαυτῶν τεῖχος
ἀνοίξαντες καὶ ἐς τὴν αὐτῶν πόλιν φιλίους, οὐ
πολεμίους ἱκομίσαντες ἐβουλοῦντο τοὺς τε ὑμῶν
χείροις μηκέτι μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, τοὺς τε ἁμείνους
τὰ ἄξια ἔχειν, σωφρονιστὰ δντε τῆς γνώμης καὶ
τῶν σωμάτων τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἀλλοτριοῦντες, ἀλλ’
ἐς τὴν ξυγγένειαν οἰκείοντες, ἐχθροὺς οὔδενι
καθιστάντες, ἀπασί δ’ ὁμοίως ἐνσπόνδους.

LXVI. “Τεκμήριον δὲ ὡς οὐ πολεμίως ἐπράσ-
σομεν’ οὔτε γὰρ ἡδικήσαμεν οὔδενα, προεπομέν
τε τὸν βουλόμενον κατὰ τὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν
2 πάτρια πολιτεύειν ἴναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὑμεῖς
ἀσμενοι χωρήσαντες καὶ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἵσυχαζε, ὡστερον δὲ κατανοή-

1 φιλίους οὐ πολεμίους, Steup’s correction for φιλίους ἐν
πολεμίως of the MSS.
time of peace and on a day of festival—we do not think that in this matter, either, we are more at fault than you. If it was of our own motion that we went to your city, fought you, and ravaged your land as enemies, we are in the wrong; but if some of your countrymen, the leading men in both wealth and family, wishing to put an end to your alliance with an outsider and to restore you to the traditions of our fathers which are common to all the Boeotians, of their own free will invoked our aid, of what wrong are we guilty? For it is those who lead that break the laws rather than those who follow. But in my judgment neither they nor we did wrong. They, who are just as much citizens as you and had more at stake, opened their gates and conducted into their own city friends, not enemies, because they wished that the baser sort among you should not become still worse, and that the better sort should have their deserts, being the censors of your political principles and not seeking to deprive the state of your persons, but rather bringing you back into a natural union with your kindred, and that without making you an enemy of anyone but restoring you to peace with all alike.

LXVI. “The proof that we acted in no hostile spirit is that we wronged nobody, and made a proclamation that anyone who wished to be a citizen according to the hereditary ways of all the Boeotians should come over to us. And you came gladly, and entering into an agreement with us you kept quiet at first; but afterwards, when you became aware that

\[^{2} συγκεντρωτα,\textit{regulators or censors, those who bring others to a right mind and are a check on vice and lawlessness. It was a technical term applied to magistrates, ten in number, at Athens, who superintended the morals of the youth.}\]
σαντες ἡμᾶς ὅλγους ὄντας, εἰ ἀρα καὶ ἐδοκοῦμεν τι ἀνεπιεικέστερον πράξαι οὐ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους ὑμῶν ἐσελθόντες, τὰ μὲν ὁμοία οὐκ ἀνταπέδοτε ἡμῖν, μὴ τε νεωτερίαί έργον λόγους τε πείθειν ὡστε ἐξελθεῖν, επιθέμενοι δὲ παρὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν, ο dõi μὲν ἐν χερσὶν ἀπεκτείνατε, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἄλγονιμεν (κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δὴ τίνα ἐπασχον), οὓς δὲ χεῖρας προϊσχομένους καὶ ξωγησαντες ὑποσχόμενοι τε ἡμῖν ὑστερον ἔστειν καὶ κτενεῖν παρανόμως διεσθείρατε, πῶς οὐ δεινὰ εἰργασθε; 3 καὶ ταῦτα τρεῖς ἀδικίας ἐν ὅλγῳ πράξαντες, τὴν τε λιθείαν ὁμολογίαν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὸν ὑστερον θάνατον καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν μὴ κτενεῖν ψευδείαν ὑπόσχεσιν, ἣν τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς ὑμῶν ἡ ἀδικώμενα, ὅμως φατε ἡμᾶς παρανομίσαι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀξιοῦτε μὴ ἀντιδοῦναι δίκην. οὐκ, ἣν γε οὐτοί τὰ ὀρθὰ γιγνόσκοσιν πάντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐνεκα κολασθήσεσθε.

LXVII. "Καὶ ταῦτα, ὃ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, τούτου ἐνεκα ἐπεξήλθομεν καὶ ύπερ ὑμῶν καὶ ἡμῶν, ἵνα ὑμεῖς μὲν εἰδήτε καὶ δικαίως αὐτῶν καταγνωσό 2 μενοί, ὑμεῖς δὲ ἐτι ὀσιότερον τετειμωρημένοι. καὶ μὴ παλαιάς ἁρέτας, εἰ τις ἀρα καὶ ἐγένετο, ἀκούντες ἐπικλασθήτε, ἃς χρῆ τοῖς μὲν ἀδικουμένοις ἐπικουροὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ αὐγορῶν τι δρῶσι διπλασίας ξημίας, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ προσηκόντων ἀμαρτάνουσι, μὴ δὲ ὀλοφυρμῷ καὶ οἴκτῳ ὀφελεισθών,

1 ὑστερον μὴ κτενεῖν, Hude transpomos μὴ κτενεῖν ὑστερον, against the MSS.
we were few in number—even supposing we might seem to have acted somewhat inconsiderately in entering your town without the consent of the popular party—you did not repay us in kind, resorting to no act of violence but endeavouring by arguments to induce us to withdraw, but you assailed us in violation of your agreement. Now as to those whom you killed in hand-to-hand conflict we are not so much grieved—for they suffered, we grant you, by a kind of law—but as regards those whom you spared when they stretched out their hands to you, and then, though you afterwards promised us that you would not kill them, lawlessly butchered—was not that an abominable deed? And after committing these three wrongs within a short space of time—the violation of your agreement, the subsequent murder of our men, and the breaking of your promise to us not to kill them if we spared your property in the fields—you nevertheless assert that we were the transgressors, and claim exemption from punishment for yourselves! No, not if these judges decide aright; but for all these crimes you must be chastised.

LXVII. "We have discussed these matters at length, Lacedaemonians, both for your sakes and our own, in order that you, for your part, may know that you will justly condemn them, and we that we have still more righteously exacted vengeance. And let not your hearts be softened when you hear them speak of their ancient virtues, if indeed they ever had any; for virtues might well be a succour to the victims of wrong, but should bring a two-fold penalty upon the authors of a shameful deed, because their offence is out of keeping with their character. And let not their lamentation and pitiful wailing
THUCYDIDES

πατέρων τε τάφους τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐπιβοῶμενοι

καὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἐρημίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἀνταποφαίνομεν πολλῷ δεινότερα παθοῦσαν τὴν ὑπὸ τούτων ἡλικίαν ἡμῶν διεφθαρμένην, ὅν πατέρες οἱ μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τὴν Βωιστίαν ἁγοντες ἀπέθανον ἐν Κορινθείᾳ, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύται λειλεμένοι κατ' ὅλικας ἐρήμουι πολλῷ δικαιοτέραν ὑμῶν ἱκετεύαν

ποιοῦνται τούσδε τιμωρήσασθαι. οἴκτον τε ἁξιότεροι τυγχάνειν οἱ ἀπρεπεῖς τε πάσχοντες τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ δὲ δικαιῶς, ὡσπερ οἴδε, τὰ ἐναντία ἐπίγαρτοι εἶναι. καὶ τὴν ὑπὸν ἐρημίαν δι’ ἐαυτοὺς ἠχουσίων τούς γὰρ ἁμείνους ξυμμάχους ἐκόντες ἀπέφωσαντο, παρενόμησάν τε οὐ προπαθόντες ὄφ’ ἡμῶν, μᾶτει δὲ πλέουν ἡ δίκη κρίναντες, καὶ οὐκ ἀνταποδόντες τὴν ἵσην τιμωρίαν ἐννομα γὰρ πείσονται καὶ οὐχὶ ἐκ μάχης χείρας προσχόμενοι, ὡσπερ φασίν, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ εὐμβάσεως ἐς δίκην σφᾶς αὐτῶν παραδόντες.

ἀμύνατε οὖν, ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τῷ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμῳ ὑπὸ τῶν δεῖ παραβαθέντες καί ἡμῶν ἅνωμα παθοῦσιν ἀνταπόδοτε χάριν δικαίων ὅν πρόθυμοι γεγενήμεθα; καὶ μὴ τοῖς τῶν δὲ λόγοις περιοσθώμεν ἐν ὑμῖν, ποιήσατε δὲ τοῖς Ἑλλησο παράδειγμα οὐ λόγων τοὺς ἁγῶνας προβάλλοντες. ἀλλ’ ἐργον, ὃν ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων βραχεία ἢ

1 κατ’ αἰκίαν, Stahl's emendation for κατ’ αἰκία of the MSS.
2 ἀνταπόδοτε, Dobbie added ὅπο.
3 ἀνταπόδοτε, Hude ἀνταπόδοτε τε, after Gertz.

120
avail them, nor their appeals to the sepulchres of your fathers and their own desolate state. For in answer we too would point out that a far more dreadful fate befell our young men who were butchered by them, of whose fathers some died at Coronea\(^1\) trying to win Boeotia to your cause, while others, left desolate at home in their old age, with far greater justice make supplication to you to take vengeance upon these men. Pity is more worthily bestowed upon those who suffer an unseemly fate, but those who, like these Plataeans, deserve their fate afford on the contrary a subject for rejoicing. As for their present desolation, that also is their own fault; for of their own free will they rejected the better alliance. They acted unlawfully without having received provocation at our hands, but through hatred rather than according to a just judgment, and they could not possibly pay now a penalty equal to their guilt, for they will suffer a lawful sentence; and they are not, as they claim,\(^2\) stretching out supplicant hands on the field of battle, but have delivered themselves up to justice under formal agreement. Vindicate, therefore, Lacedaemonians, the law of the Hellenes which has been transgressed by these men, and render to us who have suffered by their lawlessness a just recompense for the services we have zealously given, and let us not because of their words be thrust aside when we plead before you,\(^3\) but make it plain to the Hellenes by an example that the trials you institute will be of deeds, not words, and that, if the deeds are good, a

\(^1\) As at ch. lxii. 5, a reminder flattering to the Lacedaemonians.

\(^2\) cf. ch. lvii. 3.

\(^3\) Note the mocking quotation of phrases in the speech of the Plataeans, ch. lvii. 3, 4.
άπαγγελιά ἀρκεῖ, ἀμαρτανομένων δὲ λόγοι ἔπεσοι κοσμηθέντες προκαλύμματα γύνονται. ἀλλ' ἦν οἱ ἡγεμόνες, ὥσπερ νῦν ὑμεῖς, κεφαλαίωσαντες πρὸς τοὺς ξύμπαντας διαγνώμας ποιήσησθε, ἵσσον τις ἐπ᾽ ἀδίκοις ἐργοίς λόγους καλοὺς ξητήσει.

LXVIII. Τοιαῦτα δὲ οἱ Θηβαῖοι εἶπον. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δικασταὶ νομίζοντες τὸ ἐπερώτημα σφίσιν ὅρθῶς ἔξειν, εἶ τι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθαι, διὸτι τὸν τε ἄλλον χρόνον ἥξιον δὴθεν αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὰς παλαιὰς Πανσανίου μετὰ τὸν Μήδουν σπονδὰς ἰσυχαίες καὶ ὅτε ὑστερον ἀ πρὸ τοῦ περιτείχίζεσθαι προεῖχοντα αὐτῶς, κοινοὺς εἶναι κατ' ἐκείνας, οὐκ ἔδεξαντο, ἡγούμενοι τῇ ἐαυτῶν δικαίᾳ βουλήσει 2 ἐκσπονδοὶ ἐκδικοὶ υπ' αὐτῶν κακῶς πεπονθέναι, αὐθίς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνα ἐκαστὸν παραγαγόντες καὶ ἑρωτώντες, εἰ τι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀγαθὸν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδρακότες εἰσίν, ὅποτε μὴ φαίεν, ἀπάγοντες ἀπέκτεινον καὶ ἔξα- 3 ρετον ἐποίησαντο οὐδένα. διέφθειραν δὲ Πλαταιῶν μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐλάσσους διακοσίων, Ἀθη- ναίων δὲ πέντε καὶ έκκοσι, οἱ ξυνεπολιορκοῦντο γυναικάς δὲ ἡνδραπόδισαν. τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐνιαυ-

1 κατ' ἐκείνας, Badham’s conjecture for κατ' ἐκείνα ὡς of the MSS.

1 Referring to the ἐπερώτημα βραχὺ of ch. lii. 4; liii. 2. Possibly πρὸς τοὺς ξύμπαντας goes with διαγνώμας ποιήσησθε, “and then as a warning to all pass sentence.”
brief recital of them suffices, but if they are wrong, speeches decked out with phrases are but veils to hide the truth. Nay, if all leaders, like you in the present instance, should first state the facts briefly for all concerned,¹ and then pass sentence, there will be less seeking of fair words after foul deeds."

LXVIII. Such was the speech of the Thebans. And the Lacedaemonian judges decided that their question, whether they had received any benefit from the Plataeans in the war, would be a fair one for them to put; for they had at all other times urged them, they claimed, to maintain neutrality in accordance with the old covenant which they had made with Pausanias after the Persian defeat; and when afterwards, before the investment of Plataea was undertaken, their proposal to the Plataeans that they remain neutral in accordance with the earlier agreement had not been accepted,² they thought themselves thenceforth released from all obligations of the treaty because their own intentions had been honourable, and considered that they had been wronged by the Plataeans. So they caused them to come forward again, one at a time, and asked them the same question, whether they had rendered any good service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the war, and when they said "no" they led them off and slew them, exempting no one. The number of the Plataeans that perished was not less than two hundred, and of the Athenians who had taken part in the siege twenty-five; and the women were sold as slaves. As for the city itself, they gave occupation of

² The text is certainly corrupt. Badham's slight change, adopted by Hude, seems to be the simplest solution of the difficulty.
τὸν μὲν τινὰ Ἔμπρατον ἀνδράσι κατὰ στάσιν ἐκπεπτωκόσι καὶ ὡς τὰ σφέτερα φρονοῦντες Πλαταιῶν περίσσαν ἔδοσαν ἐνοικεῖν. ὦστερον δὲ καθελόντες αὐτὴν ἔς ἐδαφὸς πᾶσαν ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων ὕκοδόμησαν πρὸς τῷ Ἑραίῳ καταγωγίων διακοσίων ποδῶν πανταχῷ κύκλῳ οἰκήματα ἔχον κάτωθεν καὶ ἀνωθεν, καὶ ὁρφαῖς καὶ θυρώμασι τοῖς τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἔχρησαντο, καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ἣν ἐν τῷ τεῖχει ἐπιπλα, χαλκὸς καὶ σίδηρος, κλίνας κατασκευάσαντες ἀνέθεσαν τῇ Ὑρα, καὶ νεῶν ἐκατόμπεδου λίθινου ὕκοδόμησαν αὐτῇ. τὴν δὲ γῆν δημοσιώσαντες ἀπεμίσθωσαν ἐπὶ δέκα

4 ἔτη, καὶ ἐνέμουνο Ἐθβαῖοι. σχεδὸν δὲ τι καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν περὶ Πλαταιῶν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτως ἀποτετραμμένου ἐγένοντο Ἐθβαίων Ἐνέκα, νομίζοντες ἐς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὺς ἄρτι τὸτε καθιστά-

5 μενον ὁφελίμους εἶναι. καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ Πλαταιαν ἔτει τρίτῳ καὶ ἐνενηκοστῷ ἐπείδη Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο οὔτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

LXIX. Αἰ δὲ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες τῶν Πελοποννησίων αἱ Λεσβίοι βοηθοὶ ἐλθοῦσαί, ὡς τὸτε φεύγουσαν διὰ τοῦ πελάγους ἐκ τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιδιωκθεῖσαν καὶ πρὸς τῇ Κρήτῃ χειμασθεῖσαν καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς σποράδες πρὸς τὴν Πελοπόννησον κατηνέχθησαν, καταλαμβάνοντο ἐν τῇ Κυλλήνῃ τρεῖς καὶ δέκα τριήτερα Λευκαδίων καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Βρασίδαν τὸν Τέλλιδος ξύμβουλον

2 Ἀλκίδα ἐπεληλυθότα. ἐβούλοντο γὰρ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὡς τῆς Λέσβου ἡμαρτήκεσαν, πλέον τὸ

1 Ἐθβαῖοι before Μεγαρέων, deleted by Classen.
2 καὶ, omitted by Classen, followed by Hude.

124
it for about a year to some men of Megara who had been driven out in consequence of a sedition, and also to such of the surviving Plataeans as favoured the Lacedaemonian cause. Afterwards, however, they razed it entirely\(^1\) to the ground, and built, in the neighbourhood of the sanctuary of Hera, an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all around, above and below, using for this purpose the roofs and doors of the Plataeans; and with the rest of the material inside the walls, articles of copper and iron, they fashioned couches, which they dedicated to Hera; and they also built for her a stone temple one hundred feet long. But the land they confiscated and leased for ten years, and the Thebans occupied it. Indeed it was almost wholly for the sake of the Thebans that the Lacedaemonians in all their dealings with the Plataeans showed themselves so thoroughly hostile to them, thinking that the Thebans would be serviceable in the war then just beginning. Such was the fate of Plataea, in the ninety-third year after they became allies of Athens.\(^{559}\) a.c.

LXIX. Meanwhile\(^2\) the forty Peloponnesian ships, which had gone to the relief of the Lesbians and were at that time traversing the open sea in flight, after they had first been pursued by the Athenians and had been caught in a storm off Crete, had come straggling back to the Peloponnesus, where they found, at Cyllene, thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot triremes and Brasidas son of Tellis, who had come as adviser to Alcidas. For after they had failed to capture Lesbos the Lacedaemonians wished to strengthen

---

1 Or, taking ἐκ τῶν θεολόγων with φιλαδέλφειαν, as Steup and others do, "they built on the old foundations.”
2 Resuming the narrative interrupted at ch. xxxii. 1.
ναυτικον ποιήσαντες ἐσ τὴν Κέρκυραν πλεύσαι στασιάζουσαν, δώδεκα μὲν ναυσὶ μόναις παρόντων Ἀθηναίων περὶ Ναυπακτοῦ, πρὶν δὲ πλέον τι ἐπιβοηθῆσαι ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ναυτικόν, ὅπως προφθάσωσι, καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο ὁ τε Βρασίδας καὶ ὁ Ἀλκίδας πρὸς ταῦτα.

LXX. Οἱ γὰρ Κέρκυραιοι ἐστασίαζον ἐπειδὴ οἱ αἰγυπτώται ἦλθον αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐκ τῶν περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον ναυμαχίαν ὑπὸ Κορινθίων ἀφεθέντες, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ὠκτακοσίων ταλάντων τοῖς προξένοις διηγηματίαν, ἔργῳ δὲ πεπεισμένοι Κορινθίως Κέρκυραν προσποιήσατο. καὶ ἐπρασσόν οὔτοι ἔκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν μετίππες, ὅπως ἀποστή· 2 σωσίν Ἀθηναίων τὴν πόλιν. καὶ ἀφικομένης Ἀττικῆς τε νεώς καὶ Κορινθίας πρέσβεις ἀγούσων καὶ ἐς λόγους καταστάντων ἐφηφίσαντο Κέρκυραιοι Ἀθηναίοις μὲν ἡμιμαχοὶ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἑνγκείμενα, Πελοποννήσιοι δὲ φίλοι ὅσπερ 3 καὶ πρότερον. καὶ (ἡ γὰρ Πειδίας ἀθελοπρόεεις τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοῦ δῆμου προειστήκει) ὑπάγουσιν αὐτοῖς οὔτοι οἱ ἀνδρὲς ἐς δίκην, λέγοντες 4 Ἀθηναίοις τὴν Κέρκυραν καταδουλοῦν. ὁ δὲ ἀποφυγόν ἀνθυπάγει αὐτῶν τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους πέντε ἄνδρας, φάσκων τέμνειν χάρακας ἐκ τοῦ τε Δίῳ τοῦ τεμένους καὶ τοῦ Ἀλκίνου· ξημία δὲ 5 καθ’ ἐκάστην χάρακα ἐπέκειτο στατήρ. ὄφλοντων

1 cf. i. xlvii.-lv. 2 £160,000, $776,000. 3 The agreement was for a defensive alliance (ἐπιμαχία); cf. i. xlv. 1.

126
their fleet and to sail to Corecyra, which was in the throes of a revolution. The Athenians had a fleet of only twelve ships at Naupactus, and the Lacedaemonians desired to reach Corecyra before a larger fleet could come from Athens to re-enforce them. It was with this end in view that Brasidas and Alcidas set about making their preparations.

LXX. The Corecyreans had been in a state of revolution ever since the home-coming of the captives who had been taken in the two sea-fights off Epidamnus¹ and had been released by the Corinthians. They had nominally been set free on bail in the sum of eight hundred talents² pledged by their proxeni, but in fact they had been bribed to bring Corecyra over to the Corinthian side. And these men had been going from citizen to citizen and intriguing with them, with a view to inducing the city to revolt from Athens. And on the arrival of an Attic and Corinthian ship bringing envoys, and after the envoys had held conferences with them, the Corecyreans voted to continue to be allies to the Athenians according to their agreement,³ but on the other hand to renew their former friendship with the Peloponnesians. Thereupon the returned prisoners brought Peithias, a volunteer proxenus of the Athenians and leader of the popular party, to trial, charging him with trying to bring Corecyra into servitude to Athens. But he, being acquitted, brought suits in turn against the five wealthiest men of their number, alleging that they were cutting vine-poles from the sacred precincts of Zeus and Alcinous, an offence for which a fine of a stater⁴ for each stake was fixed by

¹ If of gold, about 16s.; if the silver Athenian stater, about 2s. 8d.; if the silver Corinthian stater, about 1s. 4d.
δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ ἱκετῶν καθεξομένων διὰ πλήθος τῆς ξημίας, ὡς ταξάμενοι ἀποδόσιν, ὁ Πειθίας (ἔτυγχανε γὰρ καὶ βουλής ὄν) πείθει
6 ὡστε τῷ νόμῳ χρῆσασθαι. οἱ δ’ ἐπείδη τῷ τε νόμῳ ἐξειργοῦντο καὶ ἀμα ἐπυνθάνοντο τὸν Πειθίαν, ἔως ἔτι βουλής ἐστι, μέλλειν τὸ πλῆθος ἀναπείσειν τοὺς αὐτούς Ἀθηναίους φίλουσ τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς νομίζειν, ξυνίσταντο τε καὶ λαβόντες ἐγχειρίδια ἐξαπιναίως ἐς τήν βουλήν ἐσελθόντες τὸν τε Πειθίαν κτείνουσι καὶ ἀλλοις τῶν τε βουλευτῶν καὶ ἱδιωτῶν ἐς ἐξήκοντα. οἱ δὲ τινες τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης τῷ Πειθίᾳ ὁλύγοι ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν τριήμη δατεύφυγον ἑτε παροῦσαν.

LXXXI. Δράσαντες δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἐκγκαλέσαντες Κερκυραίους εἰπον ὅτι ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστα εἰη καὶ ἦκιστ’ ἀν δουλωθείειν ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων, τὸ τε λοιπὸν μηδετέρους δέχεσθαι ἄλλον μὴ νη ἡσυχάζοντας, τὸ δὲ πλέον πολέμιον ἤγεισθαι. ὡς δὲ εἰπον, καὶ ἐπικυρώσα τήν γνώμην.

2 πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας εὐθὺς πρέσβεις περὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων διδάξοντας ὡς ἐξουσίερε καὶ τοὺς ἐκεί καταπεφυγότας πείσοντας μηδὲν ἀνεπιτήδειον πράσσειν, ὅπως μὴ τὸν ἐπιστροφή γένηται. LXXII. ἔλθοντων δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τοὺς

---

1 Or, perhaps, ἐπιστροφή = animadversio, “that no attention should be paid”—by way of punishment for the change in Corecyraean policy.

128
law. When they had been convicted and because of the excessive amount of the fine took refuge at the temples as suppliants, that they might arrange for the payment of the fine by instalments, Peithias persuaded the senate, of which he was also a member, to let the law take its course. The condemned men, seeing that they were debarred by the law from carrying out their proposal and at the same time learning that Peithias, so long as he continued to be a member of the senate, would persist in his attempt to persuade the populace to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the Athenians, banded together and suddenly rushing into the senate with daggers in their hands killed Peithias and others, both senators and private persons, to the number of sixty. A few, however, who held the same political views as Peithias, took refuge in the Attic trireme that was still in the harbour.

LXXI. After they had taken these measures the conspirators called the Corcyraeans together and told them that it was all for the best, and that now they would be least likely to be enslaved by the Athenians; and in future they should remain neutral and receive neither party if they came with more than one ship, regarding any larger number as hostile. Having thus spoken they compelled the people to ratify their proposal. They also sent at once to Athens envoys to explain recent events at Corcyra, showing how these were for the interests of Athens, and to persuade those who had taken refuge there to do nothing prejudicial to them, in order that there might not be a reaction against Corcyra. LXXII. But when the envoys arrived, the Athenians arrested them as revolutionists, and
τε πρέσβεις ὡς νεωτερίζοντας ἔναλλαβόντες καὶ ὅσους ἐπείσαν κατέθεντο ἐς Αἶγιναν.

2 Ἔν δὲ τούτῳ τῶν Κερκυραίων οἱ ἔχοντες τὰ πράγματα ἐλθοῦσι τριήρους Κορινθίας καὶ Δακε- 
δαιμονίων πρέσβεων ἐπιτίθεντα τῷ δήμῳ καὶ
3 μαχόμενοι ἐνίκησαν. ἀφικομένης δὲ νυκτὸς ὃ
μὲν δήμος ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὰ μετέωρα τῆς
πόλεως καταφεύγει καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔναλλαβε ἱδρύθη,
καὶ τὸν Ὀλλαίκον λιμένα είχον· οἱ δὲ τῆς τε
ἀγορᾶς κατέλαβον, οὐπερ οἱ πολλοὶ φίκουν αὐτῶν,
καὶ τὸν λιμένα τὸν πρὸς αὐτὴ καὶ πρὸς τὴν
ἡπειροῦν. LXXIII. τῇ δ' ύστερᾳ ἤκροβολίσαντο
τε ὀλίγα καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἀγροὺς περιέπεμπον ἀμφό-
tεροι, τοὺς δούλους παρακαλοῦντες τε καὶ ἔλευ-
θερίαν ὑπισχυούμενοι· καὶ τῷ μὲν δήμῳ τῶν
οἰκετῶν τὸ πλῆθος παρεγένετο ἕμμαχον, τοῖς δ' ἐτέρως ἐκ τῆς ἡπειροῦ ἔπικουροι ὅκτακόσιοι.
LXXIV. διαλυπούσης δ' ἡμέρας μαχῆς ἀνθίς
γίνεται, καὶ νικᾷ ὁ δήμος χωρίων τε ἱσχύι καὶ
πληθεὶς προύχων· αἱ τε γυναῖκες αὐτοῖς τολμηρῶς
ξυνεπελάβοντο βάλλουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκίων τῷ
κεράμῳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπομένουσαι τὸν θόρυ-

2 Βοι. γενομένης δὲ τῆς τροπῆς περὶ δείλην ὑψίαν
δείσαντες οἱ ὄλγοι μὴ αὐτοβοεῖ ὁ δήμος τοῦ τε
νεωρίου κρατήσειν ἐπελθὼν καὶ σφᾶς διαφθεί-
ρειει, ἐμπιστράτα τὰς οἰκίας τὰς ἐν κύκλῳ τῆς
ἀγορᾶς καὶ τὰς ξυνοικίας, ὅπως μὴ ἦ ἐφοδος,
φειδόμενοι οὔτε οἰκείας οὔτε ἀλλοτρίας, ὡστε καὶ
130
deposited them in Aegina, together with such of the fugitives as they had won over.

Meanwhile the dominant party at Corcyra, on the arrival of a Corinthian trireme with Lacedaemonian envoys, attacked the people and were victorious in the fight. But when night came on the people fled for refuge to the acropolis and the high places of the city, and getting together in a body established themselves there. They held also the Hyllaïc harbour,¹ while the other party seized the quarter of the market-place where most of them lived, and the harbour² adjacent to it which faces the mainland. LXXIII. On the next day they skirmished a little, and both parties sent messengers round into the fields, calling upon the slaves and offering them freedom; and a majority of the slaves made common cause with the people, while the other party gained the support of eight hundred mercenaries from the mainland. LXXIV. After a day's interval another battle occurred, and the people won, as they had the advantage in the strength of their position as well as in numbers. The women also boldly took part with them in the fight, hurling tiles from the houses and enduring the uproar with a courage beyond their sex. But about twilight, when their forces had been routed, the oligarchs, fearing lest the people, if they came on, might at the first onset get possession of the arsenal and put them to the sword, set fire to the dwelling-houses around the market-place and to the tenements,³ in order to prevent an assault, sparing neither their own houses nor those of others. The result was that much merchandise

¹ Probably the present bay Chalikiopulon. ² Now bay of Kastradu. ³ Large buildings rented to several poor families (= insulae at Rome).
ΤΟΥ ΚΟΡΙΝΘΙΑ ΝΑΥΣ ΤΟΥ ΔΗΜΟΥ ΚΕΚΡΑΤΗΚΟΤΟΣ ΥΠΕΞΑΝΣΙΤΕ, ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΩΝ ΟΙ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ ΕΣ ΤΗΝ ΗΠΕΙΡΟΝ ΛΑΘΟΝΤΕΣ ΔΙΕΚΟΜΙΣΘΕΣΑΝ.

LXXV. Τῇ δὲ ἐπιγγυνομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ Νικόστρατος ὁ Διειστέφους, Ἄθηναιῶν στρατηγός, παραγίγνεται βοηθῶν ἐκ Ναυτάκτου δώδεκα ναυσὶ καὶ Μεσσηνίων πεντακόσιοι ὀπλίταις. ξύμβασιν τε ἔπρασσε καὶ πείθει ὅστε ξυγχωρησίᾳ ἀλλήλως δέκα μὲν ἀνδρας τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους κρίναι, οὶ οὐκέτι ἔμειναν, τοὺς δ' ἀλλοὺς οἰκεῖν σπουδᾶς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιησάμενοι καὶ πρὸς Ἄθηναιός ὅστε τοὺς αὐτούς ἔχθρους καὶ φίλους νομίζειν.

2 καὶ ὁ μὲν ταῦτα πράξας ἔμελλεν ἀποπλεύσεσθαι οἱ δὲ τοῦ δήμου προστάται πείθουσιν αὐτὸν πέντε μὲν ναύς τῶν αὐτοῦ σφίσι καταλείπειν, ὡπώς ἤσσον τι ἐν κινήσει ὅσιν οἱ ἐναντίοι, ἱσος δὲ αὐτοὶ πληρώσαντες εἰκ σφῶν αὐτῶν ξυμπέμψειν.

3 καὶ ὁ μὲν ξυνεχώρησεν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἔχθρους κατέλεγον ἐς τὰς ναύς. δείσαντες δὲ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ ἐς τὰς Ἄθηνας ἀποπεμφθῶσι καθίζουσιν ἐς τὸ τῶν

4 Διοσκόρων ἱερῶν. Νικόστρατος δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀνίστη τε καὶ παρεμνῆτι. ὡς δ' οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ὁ δήμος ὀπλισθεὶς ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει ταύτῃ, ὡς οὐδὲν

132
was burned up and that the whole city was in imminent danger of being entirely destroyed if a wind blowing toward the city had sprung up to reinforce the flames. And during the night, after they had desisted from battle, both parties rested but remained on the alert; and now that the people had got the upper hand the Corinthian ship slipped out to sea, and most of the mercenaries were secretly conveyed over to the mainland.

LXXV. On the following day Nicostratus son of Diitrephees, general of the Athenians, came to their assistance from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian hoplites. He tried to negotiate a settlement between the factions, and succeeded in persuading them to come to a mutual agreement: that the twelve men who were chiefly to blame should be brought to trial (whereupon they fled at once) and that the rest should make peace with each other and dwell together, and enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Athenians. When he had accomplished this, he was about to sail away; but the leaders of the people persuaded him to leave them five of his ships, that their opponents might be somewhat less inclined to disturbance, agreeing on their part to man and send with him an equal number of their own ships. He agreed, and they began to tell off their personal enemies as crews for the ships. But these, fearing that they might be sent off to Athens, sat down as suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri. Nicostratus, however, urged them to rise and tried to reassure them. But when he could not induce them to rise, the people took this pretext to arm themselves, interpreting their distrust and refusal to sail
αὐτῶν ὑγιὲς διανοοῦμενων τῇ τοῦ μῆς ξυμπλεῖν ἀπιστίᾳ, τὰ τε ὅπλα αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν οἰκίων ἔλαβε καὶ αὐτῶν τίνας οἷς ἐπέτυχον, εἰ μὴ Νικόστρατος ἐκόλυσε, διέφθειραν ἀν. ὅρωντες δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι τὰ γιγνόμενα καθίζουσιν ἐς τὸ Ἡραιὸν ἰκέται καὶ γίγνονται οὐκ ἐλάσσους τετρακοσίων. οὐ δὲ δήμος δείσας μή τι νεωτερίσωσιν ἀνίστησί τε αὐτοὺς πείσας καὶ διακομίζει ἐς τὴν πρὸ τοῦ Ἡραιοῦ νῆσον καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐκείσε αὐτοῖς διεπέμπτε.  

LXXVI. Τῆς δὲ στάσεως ἐν τούτῳ οὖσης τε- τάρτη ἡ πέμπτη ἡμέρα μετὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐς τὴν νῆσον διακομιδὴν αἱ ἐκ τῆς Κυλλῆνης Πελο- ποινησίων νῆσες, μετὰ τὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἰωνίας πλοίων ἔφοροι οὖσαι, παραγίγνονται τρεῖς καὶ πεντή- κοντα. ἢρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἁλκίδας, ὁσπερ καὶ πρό- τερον, καὶ Βρασίδας αὐτῷ ξύμβουλος ἐπέπλευς. ὁρμοσάμενοι δὲ ἐς Σύβοτα λιμένα τῆς ἥπειρου ἀμα ἐφ ἐπέπλευον τῇ Κερκύρᾳ. LXXVII. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ θορύβῳ καὶ πεφοβημένοι τὰ τ' ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὸν ἐπίπλουν παρεσκευάζοντο τε ἅμα ἐξήκοντα ναῦς καὶ τὰς αἰεὶ πληρομένας ἐξ- πεμπον πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους, παραίνοντων Ἀθη- ναίων σφᾶς τε ἐᾶσαι πρῶτον ἐκπλεύσαι καὶ 2 ὕστερον πάσαις ἀμα ἑκείνους ἐπιγενέσθαι. ὥς δὲ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἦσαν σποράδες αἱ νῆσες, δύο μὲν εὐθὺς ἡπτομόλησαν, ἐν ἔτεραις δὲ ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἐμπλέοντες ἐμάχοντο· ἦν δὲ οὖνδεis

134
with Nicostratus as proof that their intentions were anything but good. Accordingly they took arms from their houses, and would have slain some of the oligarchs whom they chanced to meet, if Nicostratus had not prevented them. The rest, seeing what was going on, sat down as suppliants in the temple of Hera, and they were not less than four hundred in number. But the people, fearing that they might start a revolution, persuaded them to rise and conveyed them over to the island which lies in front of the temple of Hera; and provisions were regularly sent to them there.

LXXVI. At this stage of the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after the transfer of the men to the island, the Peloponnesian ships arrived\(^1\) from Cyllene, where they had been lying at anchor since their voyage from Ionia, being fifty-three in number; and Alcidas was in command of them as before, with Brasidas on board as his adviser. They came to anchor first at Sybota, a harbour of the mainland, and then at daybreak sailed for Coreya. LXXVII. But the Coreyaean,\(^2\) being in great confusion and thrown into a panic by the state of affairs in the city as well as by the approaching fleet, proceeded to equip sixty ships and at the same time to send them out against the enemy as fast as they were manned, although the Athenians urged that they themselves be permitted to sail out first, and that the Coreyaean should come out afterwards with all their ships in a body. But when their ships were near the enemy, scattered here and there, two of them deserted immediately, while in others the crews were fighting one another; and there was no order in anything

\(^1\) cf. ch. lxix. 1.
\(^2\) i.e. the democratic party, now in control.
κοσμὸς τῶν ποιομένων. Ίδόντες δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τὴν ταραχὴν εἰκοσὶ μὲν ναυσὶ πρὸς τοὺς Κερκυραίους ἐτάξαντο, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς πρὸς τὰς δώδεκα ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὃν ἦσαν αἱ δύο Ἡ Ἁλαμνία καὶ Πάραλος.

LXXVIII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Κερκυραίοι κακῶς τε καὶ κατ’ ὁλίγας προσπέπτοντες ἐταλατηρόρουν τὸ καθ’ αὐτοὺς: οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναίοι φοβούμενοι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν περικύκλωσιν ἀθρόιας μὲν οὐ προσέπιπτον οὐδὲ κατὰ μέσον ταῖς ἐφ’ έαυτοὺς τεταγμέναις, προσβαλόντες δὲ κατὰ κέρας καταδύουσι μίαν ναῦν. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κύκλων ταξαμένων αὐτῶν περιέπλεον καὶ ἐπειρώντο θωρυβεῖν.

2 γνόντες δὲ οἱ πρὸς τοὺς Κερκυραίους καὶ δείσαντες μὴ ὅπερ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ γένοιτο, ἐπιβιβαζόμενοι, καὶ γενόμεναι ἀθρόαι αἱ νῆς ἃμα τὸν ἐπίπλον 3 τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐποιούντο. οἱ δ’ ὑπεχώρουν ἡδὴ πρὸς αὐτοὺς προκαταφυγεῖν ὅτι μάλιστα, έαυτῶν σχολή τε ὑποχωροῦντων καὶ πρὸς σφᾶς τεταγμένων τῶν ἐναντίων. ἡ μὲν οὖν ναυμαχία τοιαύτη γενομένη ἐτελεύτα ἐς ἡλίου δύσιν.

LXXIX. Καὶ οἱ Κερκυραίοι δείσαντες μὴ σφάσιν ἐπιπλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ὡς κρατοῦντες οἱ πολέμοι ἢ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νῆσου ἀναλάβωσιν ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τε νεωτερίσωσι, τοὺς τε ἐκ τῆς νῆσου πάλιν ἐς τὸ Ἡραίον διεκόμισαν καὶ τὴν

1 Ἡ added by Krüger.
they did. And when the Peloponnesians saw their confusion they arrayed only twenty ships against the Coreyaecans, and all the rest against the twelve Athenian ships, among which were the two sacred ships, the Salaminia and the Paralos.

LXXVIII. Now the Coreyaecans, since they were attacking in disorder and with few ships at a time, were having trouble in their part of the battle; and the Athenians, fearing the enemy’s superior numbers and seeing the danger of being surrounded, did not attack the whole body together nor the centre of the ships that were arrayed against them, but charged upon one of the wings and sank a single ship. And then, when the Peloponnesians after this move formed their ships in a circle, they kept sailing round the Peloponnesian fleet, trying to throw it into confusion. But those who were facing the Coreyaecans, perceiving this manœuvre and fearing a repetition of what happened at Naupactus,¹ came to the rescue, and the whole fleet, now united, advanced simultaneously upon the Athenians. Thereupon the Athenians began to retire, backing water,² hoping at the same time that the Coreyaecan ships might as far as possible escape into harbour,³ as they themselves retired slowly and the enemy’s attacks were directed only against them. Such then was the course of the battle, which lasted till sunset.

LXXIX. The Coreyaecans, fearing that the enemy, confident of victory, might sail against the city and either take on board the prisoners on the island or commit some other act of violence, transferred these prisoners once more to the temple of

¹ cf. ii. lxxxiv. ² i.e. keeping their faces to the enemy. ³ i.e. with as many ships as possible; as it was they lost thirteen ships.
2 πόλιν ἐφύλασσον. οί δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἑτόλμησαν πλεύσαι κρατοῦντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ, τρεῖς δὲ καὶ δέκα ναῦς ἔχοντες τῶν Κερκυραίων ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον ὅθεν περ ἀνηγάγοντο. 3 τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐπέπλευσον, καῖπερ ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ καὶ φόβῳ ὄντας καὶ Βρασίδου παραινόντος, ὡς λέγεται, Ἄλκιδα, ἱσοψήφου δὲ οὐκ ὄντος: ἑπὶ δὲ τὴν Δευκίμην τὸ ἀκρωτήριον ἀποβάντες ἐπόρθουν τούς ἀγροὺς.

LXXX. Ὁ δὲ δήμος τῶν Κερκυραίων ἐν τούτῳ περιδείχθη γενόμενος μὴ ἐπιπλεύσωσιν αἱ νῆες, τοῖς τε ἱκέταις ὴναν ἐς λόγους καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅπως σωθήσεται ἡ πόλις, καὶ τινὰς αὐτῶν ἐπεισάν ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβῆναι ἐπιλήφθωσιν γὰρ δύος τριά-2 κοντα. 1 οἰ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι μέχρι μέσου ἡμέρας ἀπαύγας τὴν γῆν ἀπέπλευσαν, καὶ ὑπὸ νύκτα αὐτῶς ἐφρυκτορήθησαν ἐξήκοντα νῆες Ἀθηναίων προσπλέουσαι ἀπὸ Δευκάδος. ἂς οἱ Ἀθηναίοι πυθανόμενοι τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὰς μετ' Ἀλκίδου ναῦς ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν μελλοῦσας πλεῖν ἀπέστειλαν καὶ Εὐρυμέδουτα τὸν Θουκλέους στρατηγὸν.

LXXXI. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς νυκτὸς ἐφθὺς κατὰ τάχος ἐκομίζοντο ἐπ' οἴκου παρὰ τὴν γῆν καὶ ὑπερενεγκόντες τὸν Δευκάδον ἱσθμὸν τὰς ναῦς, ὅπως μὴ περιπλέοντες ὀφθάλμων,

1 Some MSS. give προσδεχόμενοι τῶν ἐπιπλουτ after τοιά-κοντα, most editors omit.
Hera and then took measures to protect the city. The Peloponnesians, however, although they were the victors in the naval battle, did not venture to attack the city, but with thirteen Corcyraean ships which they had taken sailed back to the harbour on the mainland from which they had set out. On the next day they were no more inclined to attack the city, though the inhabitants were in a state of great confusion and fear, and though Brasidas, it is said, urged Alcidas to do so, but did not have equal authority with him. Instead, they merely landed on the promontory of Leucimne and ravaged the fields.

LXXX. Meanwhile the people of Corcyra, becoming alarmed lest the ships should attack them, conferred with the suppliants and also with the other members of the opposite faction on the best means of saving the city. And some of them they persuaded to go on board the ships; for in spite of all the Corcyraeans had manned thirty ships. But the Peloponnesians, after ravaging the land till midday, sailed away, and toward night a signal was flashed to them that sixty Athenian ships were approaching from Leucas. These ships had been sent by the Athenians, under the command of Eurymedon son of Thucles, when they learned of the revolution at Corcyra and that the fleet under Alcidas was about to sail thither.

LXXXI. The Peloponnesians accordingly set sail that very night for home, going with all speed and keeping close to the shore; and hauling their ships across the Leucadian isthmus,¹ in order to avoid being seen, as they would be if they sailed around, they got

¹ This isthmus was the ἀκτή Ἰελποῦ of Homer (o 378), now Santa Maura, the neck of land, about three stadia in width, joining Leucas with the mainland.
2 ἀποκομίζονται. Κερκυραῖοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τὰς τε Ἀττικὰς ναῦς προσπλεύσας τὰς τε τῶν πολεμίων οἰχομένας, λαβόντες 1 τούς τε Μεσσηνίους ἐκ τὴν πόλιν ἡγαγον πρότερον ἐξω ὑπνας, καὶ τὰς ναύς περιπλεύσας κελεύσαντες ὡς ἐπλήρωσαν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλαίκου λιμένα, ἐν ὅσῳ περιεκομίζοντο, τῶν ἐχθρῶν εἰ τινὰ λάβοιεν, ἀπέκτεινον καὶ ἐκ τῶν νεῶν ὅσους ἐπείσαν ἐσβήναι ἐκβιβάζοντες ἀπεχρώντο, ἐς τὸ "Ἡραίον τε ἐλθόντες τῶν ἱκετῶν ὡς πεντήκοντα ἀνδρὰς δίκην ὑποσχεῖν ἐπείσαν καὶ κατέγρωσαν πάντων θάνατον. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἱκετῶν, ὅσοι οὐκ ἐπείσθησαν, ὡς ἐόρων τὰ γνωρίμενα, διεφθειρον αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἄλληλους καὶ ἐκ τῶν δένδρων τινὲς ἀπήγχοντο, οἱ δὲ ὅσο ἐκαστοι ἐδύναντο ἀνηλούντο. ἡμέρας τε ἐπτά, ἃς ἀφικόμενοι ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ταῖς ἐξήκοντα ναυὶ παρέμεινε, Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ἐφόνευν, τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέροντες τοῖς τῶν ὅμοιον καταλύουσιν, ἀπέθανον δὲ τινὲς καὶ ἱδίας ἐχθρᾶς ἑνεκά, καὶ ἄλλοι χρημάτων σφίσιν ὀφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων πᾶσα τε ἱδέα κατέστη θανάτου, καὶ οἴον φιλεῖ ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ γιγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν δὲ τι ὦ ἐννέβη καὶ ἐτὶ περαιτέρω. καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ παῖδα ἀπέ-

1 λαβόντες, Hude's conjecture for λαβόντες of the MSS.

1 The 500 whom Nicostratus had brought, the object being doubtless merely the intimidation of the oligarchs.
away. Now the Corcyraeans had no sooner perceived that the Athenian fleet was approaching and that the enemy’s fleet had gone than they secretly brought the Messenians, who had till then been outside the walls, into the city, and ordered the ships which they had manned to sail round into the Hyllaic harbour; then while these were on their way thither they slew any of their personal enemies whom they could lay hands upon. They also put ashore and despatched all those on board the ships whom they had persuaded to go aboard, then went into the temple of Hera, persuaded about fifty of the suppliants there to submit to trial, and condemned them all to death. But most of the suppliants, not having consented to be tried, when they saw what was happening set about destroying one another in the sacred precinct itself, while a few hanged themselves on trees, and still others made away with themselves as best they could. And during the seven days that Eurymedon, after his arrival, stayed there with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans continued slaughtering such of their fellow-citizens as they considered to be their personal enemies. The charge they brought was of conspiring to overthrow the democracy, but some were in fact put to death merely to satisfy private enmity, and others, because money was owing to them, were slain by those who had borrowed it. Death in every form ensued, and whatever horrors are wont to be perpetrated at such times all happened then—aye, and even worse. For father slew son, men were dragged

---

2 The object was that the oligarchs on them might be cut off from their friends in the neighbourhood of the agora and in the temple of Hera,
κτεινε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀπεσπῶντο καὶ πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἐκτείνοντο, οἱ δὲ τινὲς καὶ περιοικοδομηθέντες ἐς τοῦ Διονύσου τῷ ἱερῷ ἀπέθανον.

LXXXII. Οὕτως ὡμή ἡ στάσις προχώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτης ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὕστερον γε καὶ πάν ὃς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἐκαστάχῳ τοῖς τε τῶν δήμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπύγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὅλγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνη ὡς ἀν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδὲ ἐτοίμων παρακαλεῖν αὐτοὺς, πολεμομέμνων δὲ καὶ ξυμμαχίας ἃμα ἐκατέρως τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥάδις αἱ ἔπαγγεῖαι τοῖς νεωτέριζειν τι βουλο-

2 μένοις ἐπορίζοντο. καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γυγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἔως ἃν ἡ αὐτή φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἦ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἰσοτέρα καὶ τοῖς εἰδεσὶ διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἃν ἐκασταί ² αἱ μεταβολαῖ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται. ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνη καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἱ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιοῖς ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκούσιοις ἀνάγκας πίπτειν· ο ἀρ σὲ πόλεμος υφελῶν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ’ ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργάς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοίου.

3 Ἕστασιαζέ τε ὅυν τὰ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύμετε τῶν προγενομένων

---

¹ ἡ στάσις, for στάσις of the MSS., Krüger with Schol.
² ἐκασταί, Hude alters to ἐκάστας.
from the temples and slain near them, and some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and perished there.

LXXXII. To such excesses of savagery did the revolution go; and it seemed the more savage, because it was among the first that occurred; for afterwards practically the whole Hellenic world was convulsed, since in each state the leaders of the democratic factions were at variance with the oligarchs, the former seeking to bring in the Athenians, the latter the Lacedaemonians. And while in time of peace they would have had no pretext for asking their intervention, nor any inclination to do so, yet now that these two states were at war, either faction in the various cities, if it desired a revolution, found it easy to bring in allies also, for the discomfiture at one stroke of its opponents and the strengthening of its own cause. And so there fell upon the cities on account of revolutions many grievous calamities, such as happen and always will happen while human nature is the same, but which are severer or milder, and different in their manifestations, according as the variations in circumstances present themselves in each case. For in peace and prosperity both states and individuals have gentler feelings, because men are not then forced to face conditions of dire necessity; but war, which robs men of the easy supply of their daily wants, is a rough schoolmaster and creates in most people a temper that matches their condition.

And so the cities began to be disturbed by revolutions, and those that fell into this state later, on hearing of what had been done before, carried to
πολὺ ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καὶ ὁ νῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ' ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν πτωμορίου ἀποστιᾶ. καὶ τὴν εἰσοδήμαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὄνομάτων ἐσ τὰ ἔργα ἀντίλλαξαν τῇ δικαίωσε. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλογιστὸς ἀνδρεία φιλεταιρὸς ἐνομίσθη, μελλήσις δὲ προμήθης δειλία εὐπρεπῆς, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἀπαν ἐννετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἄργον τὸ δ' ἐμπληκτῶς ἀξὶ ἀνδρὸς μοιρὰ προσετέθη, ἀσφαλεία δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὐλογος. καὶ ο μὲν χαλεπάνων πιστὸς αἰεί, ο δ' ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὑποττος. ἐπιβουλεύσας δὲ τις τυχῶν ἐννετὸ καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἐτὶ διενότερος: προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μὴ δεν αὐτῶν ἰησει, τῆς τε ἐταιρίας διαλυτῆς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένοις. ἀπλώς τε ὁ φθάσας τὸν μέλλοντα κακὸν τι δρᾶν ἐπηνείτο καὶ ὁ ἐπικελέσας τῶν ἐλ ὑπερβολοῦμενου. καὶ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἐνγεθεὶς τοῦ ἐταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο διὰ το ἐτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὤφελία αἵτὶ τουται ξύνοδοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας πλεονεξί. καὶ τὰς ἐς σφαῖς αὐτοῦ πίστεις ό τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ἡ τῷ κοινῆ τι παρανομήσαι. τὰ τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων καλῶς λιγόμενα ἐνεδεχόμεν προϊει, εἰ προύχοιευν, καὶ οὐ γενναίοτητι. ἀντιτιμώρησασθαι τε τῶν

1 ἀσφαλεία δὲ τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι Hude.
2 ὤφελία, Poppo for ὤφελιας of the MSS.

1 i.e. either of plotting or of detecting plots.
2 Or, "Fair words proffered by their opponents they re.-
still more extravagant lengths the invention of new devices, both by the extreme ingenuity of their attacks and the monstrousness of their revenges. The ordinary acceptation of words in their relation to things was changed as men thought fit. Reckless audacity came to be regarded as courageous loyalty to party, prudent hesitation as specious cowardice, moderation as a cloak for unmanly weakness, and to be clever in everything was to do naught in anything. Frantic impulsiveness was accounted a true man's part, but caution in deliberation a specious pretext for shirking. The hot-headed man was always trusted, his opponent suspected. He who succeeded in a plot was clever, and he who had detected one was still shrewder; on the other hand, he who made it his aim to have no need of such things was a disruptor of party and scared of his opponents. In a word, both he that got ahead of another who intended to do something evil and he that prompted to evil one who had never thought of it were alike commended. Furthermore, the tie of blood was weaker than the tie of party, because the partisan was more ready to dare without demur; for such associations are not entered into for the public good in conformity with the prescribed laws, but for selfish aggrandisement contrary to the established laws. Their pledges to one another were confirmed not so much by divine law as by common transgression of the law. Fair words proffered by opponents, if these had the upper hand, were received with caution as to their actions and not in a generous spirit. To get revenge on some one wasceived, if they had the upper hand, by vigilant action rather than with frank generosity."
περὶ πλείονος ἂν ἢ αὐτῶν μὴ προπαθεῖν. καὶ ὄρκοι εἰ ποὺ ἀρὰ γένοιτο ξυναλλαγῆς, εἷν τῷ αὐτικὰ πρὸς τὸ ἁπορον ἐκατέρφν διδόμενον ἵσχυν, οὐκ ἐχόντων ἀλλοθεὶν δύναμιν εἷν δὲ τῷ παρατυχόντι ὁ φθάσας θαρσήσαι, εἰ ἵδιοι ἀφαρκτον, ἦδιον διὰ τὴν πίστιν ἐτιμωρεῖτο ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανούς, καὶ τὸ τε ἀσφαλὲς ἔλογίζετο καὶ ὁτι ἀπατὴ περιγενὸμενος ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα προσελήμβανεν. ῥάσον δ’ οἱ πολλοὶ κακούργοι ὄντες δεξιοὶ κέκληται ἢ ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοὶ, καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται.

8 Πάντων δ’ αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἢ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν, ἐκ δ’ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐσ τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον. οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετ’ ὀνόματος ἐκατεροὶ εὐπρεποὺς, πλήθους τε ἕσονομας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονοι προτιμῆσει, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἅθλα ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀγωνιζομενοὶ ἄλληλων περιγύγνεσθαι ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα, ἐπεξήγησάν τε τὰς τιμωρίας ἔτι μείζονες, οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῇ πόλει ξυμφόρου προστιθέντες, ἐς δὲ τὸ ἐκατέρως που αἰεὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχουν ὀρίζοντες, καὶ ἦ μετὰ

1 aἰτίον, Hude deletes, with Madvig.
2 ἢ, Hude deletes.
3 προστιθέντες, Dion. Hal. for προστιθέντες of the MSS.

1 Or, omitting ὅτε, “And in general men are more willing to be called clever rogues than good simpletons.”

146
more valued than never to have suffered injury oneself. And if in any case oaths of reconciliation were exchanged, for the moment only were they binding, since each side had given them merely to meet the emergency, having at the time no other resource; but he who, when the opportunity offered and he saw his enemy off his guard, was the first to pluck up courage, found his revenge sweeter because of the violated pledge than if he had openly attacked, and took into account not only the greater safety of such a course, but also that, by winning through deceit, he was gaining besides the prize of astuteness. And in general it is easier for rogues to get themselves called clever than for the stupid to be reputed good,¹ and they are ashamed of the one but glory in the other.

The cause of all these evils was the desire to rule which greed and ambition inspire, and also, springing from them, that ardour² which belongs to men who once have become engaged in factious rivalry. For those who emerged as party leaders in the several cities, by assuming on either side a fair-sounding name, the one using as its catch-word “political equality for the masses under the law,” the other “temperate aristocracy,”³ while they pretended to be devoted to the common weal, in reality made it their prize; striving in every way to get the better of each other they dared the most awful deeds, and sought revenges still more awful, not pursuing these within the bounds of justice and the public weal, but limiting them, both parties alike, only by the moment’s

¹ Or, τὸ πράξαμα, “party-spirit.”
² For the objectionable terms “democracy” (δημοκρατία) and “oligarchy” (αλιγαρχία).
ψήφου αδίκου καταγγέσεως 1 ἡ Χειρικτώμενοι τὸ κρατεῖν ἑτοίμοι ἦσαν τὴν αὐτικὰ φιλονικίαν ἐκπιμπλάναι. ὡστε εὐσεβείᾳ μὲν οὐδέτεροι εὐνομίζον, εὐπρεπείᾳ δὲ λόγου οἷς ἐξιμβαίνει ἐπεφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι, ἁμείνον ἦκουν. τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων ἡ ὁτι ὡς ἔννηπου-ξοντο ἡ φθόνοι τὸν περιείναι διεφθείροντο.

LXXXIII. Ὀδηγός πάσα Ἰδέα κατέστη κακο- τροπίας διὰ τός στάσεις τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ, καὶ τὸ εὑρήθε, οὐ τὸ γενναίον πλεῖστον μετέχει, κατα- γελασθεὶς ἡφανίσθη, τὸ δὲ ἀντιτεᾶθαί ἀλλήλοις 2 τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως ἐπί πολὺ διείνεγκεν οὐ γὰρ ἦν οὶ διαλύσων οὗτε λόγος ἔχυρος οὔτε ὀρκος φο- βερός, κρείσσους δὲ ὄντες ἀπαντες λογισμός ἢ τὸ ἀνελπιστῶν τοῦ βεβαιοῦμη παθεῖν μᾶλλον πρου- 3 σκόπουν ἢ πιστεύσαι ἐδύναντο. καὶ οἱ φαυλό- τεροι γνώμην ώς τὰ πλεῖον περιεγώμοντο, τῷ γὰρ δεδέναι τὸ τα ἀυτῶν ἐνδεῖ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἱνεντὼν, μὴ λόγοις τε ἥσσους ὅσι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πολυτρόπου αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης φθάσωσι προεπι- βουλευόμενοι, τολμηρῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἐξώρουν. 4 οἱ δὲ καταφρονοῦντες καὶ προαισθέουνται καὶ ἔργῳ οὖν δεῖν λαμβάνειν ἡ γνώμῃ ἔξεστιν, ἀφαρκτοί μᾶλλον διεφθείροντο.

1 καταγγέσεως, Hude deletes, with van Herwerden.

1 Or, as Shilleto, “leaning in calculation to considering that security was hopeless, they rather took precautions...” cf. Schol., ἔποιητε δὲ οἱ άγρυπνοι τοῖς λογισμοῖς πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἄλπεις τινά πλοῦτιν καὶ βεβαίωσην.
caprice; and they were ready, either by passing an unjust sentence of condemnation or by winning the upper hand through acts of violence, to glut the animosity of the moment. The result was that though neither had any regard for true piety, yet those who could carry through an odious deed under the cloak of a specious phrase received the higher praise. And citizens who belonged to neither party were continually destroyed by both, either because they would not make common cause with them, or through mere jealousy that they should survive.

LXXXIII. So it was that every form of depravity showed itself in Hellas in consequence of its revolutions, and that simplicity, which is the chief element of a noble nature, was laughed to scorn and disappeared, while mutual antagonism of feeling, combined with mistrust, prevailed far and wide. For there was no assurance binding enough, no oath terrible enough, to reconcile men; but always, if they were stronger,¹ since they accounted all security hopeless, they were rather disposed to take precautions against being wronged than able to trust others. And it was generally those of meaner intellect who won the day; for being afraid of their own defects and of their opponents' sagacity, in order that they might not be worsted in words, and, by reason of their opponents' intellectual versatility find themselves unawares victims of their plots, they boldly resorted to deeds. Their opponents, on the other hand, contemptuously assuming that they would be aware in time and that there was no need to secure by deeds what they might have by wit, were taken off their guard and perished in greater numbers.
THUCYDIDES

LXXXIV. Ἐν δὲ οὖν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν προετολμήθη, καὶ ὅπος ἀν ὑβρεῖ μὲν ἀρχόμενοι τὸ πλέον ἢ σωφροσύνη ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν τιμωρίαν παρασχόντων οἱ ἀνταμνύόμενοι δράσειαν, πενίας δὲ τῆς εἰωθούσας ἀπαλλαξέοντες τινες, μάλιστα δὲ ἄν διὰ πάθους ἐπιθυμοῦντες τὰ τῶν πέλας ἐχειν, παρὰ δίκην γεγυνώσκοιεν, ἄ τε μὴ ἐπὶ πλεονεξία, ἀπὸ ἵσον δὲ μάλιστα ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἀπαιδευσίᾳ ὡργῆς πλεῖστον ἐκφερόμενοι ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπαραιτήτως ἐπέλθοιεν. Ξυνταραχθέντος τε τοῦ βίου ἐς τὸν καιρὸν τούτον τῇ πόλει καὶ τῶν νόμων κρατήσασα ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις, εἰωθούσα καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀδικεῖν, ἀσμένη ἐνδύμασεν ἢκρατὴς μὲν ὥργης οὕσα, κρείσσον δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, τολμεῖά δὲ τοῦ προύχοντος, οὐ γὰρ ἄν τοῦ τε όσίον τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι προντίβεθαν τοῦ τε μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὸ κερδαίνειν, ἐν καὶ μὴ βλάπτουσαν ἵσχυν εἰχὲ τὸ φθονεῖν. Ἀξίουσί τε τοὺς κοινοὺς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων οἱ ἀνθρώποι νόμους, ἀφ’ ὅν ἀπασιν ἔλπις ὑπόκειται σφαλεῖσι κἂν αὐτῶν διασφέσθαι, ἐν ἄλλων τιμωρίαις προκαταλύειν καὶ μὴ ὑπολείπεσθαι, εἰ ποτε ἅρα τις κινδυνεύσας τινὸς δεῖσται αὐτῶν.

1 ὅπος ἀν, Hude's correction for δοκεῖα of the MSS.

2 This chapter is bracketed as spurious by Hude and nearly all recent commentators, because it is condemned by
LXXXIV. It was in Corecyra, then, that most of these atrocities were first committed—all the acts of retaliation which men who are governed with high-handed insolence rather than with moderation are likely to commit upon their rulers when these at last afford them opportunity for revenge; or such as men resolve upon contrary to justice when they seek release from their accustomed poverty, and in consequence of their sufferings are likely to be most eager for their neighbours' goods; and assaults of pitiless cruelty, such as men make, not with a view to gain, but when, being on terms of complete equality with their foe, they are utterly carried away by uncontrollable passion. At this crisis, when the life of the city had been thrown into utter confusion, human nature, now triumphant over the laws, and accustomed even in spite of the laws to do wrong, took delight in showing that its passions were ungovernable, that it was stronger than justice and an enemy to all superiority. For surely no man would have put revenge before religion, and gain before innocence of wrong, had not envy swayed him with her blighting power. Indeed, men do not hesitate, when they seek to avenge themselves upon others, to abrogate in advance the common principles observed in such cases—those principles upon which depends every man's own hope of salvation should he himself be overtaken by misfortune—thus failing to leave them in force against the time when perchance a man in peril shall have need of some one of them.

the ancient grammarians, is not mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and is obelised in Codex F.

2 Or, μᾶλιστα ὥς ἄν διὰ πάθους ἐπιθυμεῖτε, "would be above all men passionately eager for..."
LXXXV. Οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν Κερκυραίων τοιαύτας ὀργαῖς ταῖς πρώταις ἔσεληλους ἔχρησαντο, καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέπλευσαν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὕστερον δὲ οἱ φεύγοντες
2 τῶν Κερκυραίων (διεσώθησαν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐσ πεντακοσίους) τείχη τε λαβόντες, ἄ ήν ἐν τῇ ἱππείρῳ, ἐκράτουν τῆς πέραν οἰκείας γῆς καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ὁμολόγους ἔληξοντο τοὺς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ καὶ πολλὰ ἐβλαπτοῦν, καὶ λίμος ἰσχυρὸς ἐγένετο ἐν τῇ πόλει.
3 ἐπραισβεύοντο δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Δακεδαΐμονα καὶ Κόρινθον περὶ καθόδουν καὶ ὡς οὔδεν αὐτῶν ἐπράσσετο, ὕστερον χρόνῳ πλοία καὶ ἐπικούρους παρασκευασάμενοι διέβησαν ἐς τὴν νῆσον ἔξος
4 σιοι μάλιστα οἱ πάντες, καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἐμπρήσαντες, ὅπως ἀπόγνωσα ἦ τοῦ ἄλλο τῇ ἑ κρατεῖν τῆς γῆς, ἀναβάντες ἐς τὸ ὅρος τὴν Ἰστώνην, τείχος ἐνοικοδομησάμενοι ἐθείρων τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τῆς γῆς ἐκράτουν.
LXXXVI. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος Ἀθηναῖοι εἰκοσι ναῦς ἐστειλαν ἐς Σικελίαν καὶ Λάχητα τὸν Μελανώτον στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν καὶ
2 Χαριόδην τὸν Εὐφιλήτον. οἱ γὰρ Συρακοσίοι καὶ Λεοντίνοι ἐς πόλεμον ἀλλήλους καθέστασαν. ξύμμαχοι δὲ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις ἰσαν πλὴν Καμαριναίων αἱ ἄλλαι Δωρίδες πόλεις, αἴτερ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Δακεδαίμονων τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχομένου τοῦ πόλεμον ξύμμαχον ἔταχθησαν, οὐ μὲντοι ξυνεπολέμησαν γε’ τοῖς δὲ Λεοντίνοις αἱ Χαλκιδικαὶ πόλεις καὶ Καμάρινα τῆς ἤ Ἰταλίας Δοκροί μὲν Συρακοσίων ἰσαν, Ὑπηγινοὶ δὲ κατὰ
3 τὸ ξυγγενὲς Λεοντίνων. ἐς οὖν τὰς Ἀθηναῖς
LXXXV. Such then were the first outbreaks of passion which the Corecyraeans who remained at home indulged in toward each other; and Eurymedon sailed away with the Athenian fleet. Later, however, the Corecyraean fugitives, of whom about five hundred had got safely across to the mainland, seized some forts there, and thus dominating the territory belonging to Corecyra on the opposite coast made it a base from which they plundered the people of the island and did them much harm, so that a severe famine arose in the city. They also sent envoys to Lacedaemon and Corinth to negotiate for their restoration; but since nothing was accomplished by these they afterwards procured boats and mercenaries and crossed over to the island, about six hundred in all. They then burned their boats, in order that they might despair of success unless they dominated the country, and went up to Mt. Istone, and after building a fort there began to destroy the people in the city, exercising dominion over the country.

LXXXVI. Toward the close of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships to Sicily under the command of Laches son of Melanopus and Charoeades son of Euphiletus. For the Syracusans and the Leontines were now at war with each other. In alliance with the Syracusans were all the Dorian cities except Camarina—the cities which at the outbreak of the war had joined the Lacedaemonian alliance, although they had taken no active part in the war—while the Chalcidian cities and Camarina were allies of the Leontines. In Italy the Locrians allied themselves with the Syracusans, and the Rhegians with the Leontines, because they were kinsmen. The Leontines and their allies sent an

\[1\] cf. ch. xx. 2. \[2\] cf. vi. xliiv. 3.
πέμψαντες οι των Λεοντίνων ξύμμαχοι κατά τε πάλαιαν ξυμμαχίαν καί ὅτι Ἰωνεῖς ἦσαν, πείθουσι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πέμψαι σφίσι ναύς· ὕπο γὰρ τῶν Συρακοσίων τῆς τε γῆς ἐϊργοντο καὶ τῆς 4 θαλάσσης. καὶ ἔπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τῆς μὲν οἰκείωτης προφάσει, Βουλόμενοι δὲ μήτε σῖτον ἔσ την Πελοπόννησον ἄγεσθαι αὐτόθεν πρόπειράν τε ποιούμενοι εἰ σφίσι δυνατὰ εὕη τὰ ἐν τῇ 5 Σικελία πράγματα ὑποχείρια γενέσθαι. καταστάντες οὖν ἐσ Ἡγίου τῆς Ἰταλίας τὸν πόλεμον ἐποιοῦντο μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

LXXXVII. Τοῦ δ’ ἔπειγομενοῦ χειμῶνος ἡ νόσος τὸ δεύτερον ἐπέπεσε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἐκλιποῦσα μὲν οὐδένα χρόνον τὸ παντάπασιν, ἐγένετο 2 δὲ τις ὁμοὺς διοκώχη. παρέμεινε δὲ τὸ μὲν ύστερον οὐκ ἐλάσσων ἐνιαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ δύο ἑτη, ὡστε Ἀθηναίους γε μὴ εἶναι ὃ τι μᾶλλον τοὔτον ἐπίσει καὶ ἑκάκωσε τὴν δύναμιν.

3 τετρακοσίων γὰρ ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τετρακισχίλιων οὐκ ἐλάσσως ἀπέθανον ἐκ τῶν τάξεων καὶ τρικοσίων ἱππέων, τοῦ δὲ ἅλλον ὄχλου ἀνεξεύρετος 4 ἀριθμός. ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ σεισμοὶ τότε τῆς γῆς ἐν τε Ἀθηναῖς καὶ ἐν Εὐβοΐᾳ καὶ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς καὶ μάλιστα ἐν Ὀρχομενῷ τῷ Βοιωτίῳ.

LXXXVIII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Ἡγίνοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος τριάκοντα ναυσὶ

---

1 At the head of this embassy was the celebrated rhetorician Gorgias.
2 cf. C.I.A. i. 33 for some fragments of treaties of alliance renewed under the archon Apseudes (433–432 B.C.).
3 cf. II. xlvii. ff.
embassy to Athens and urged them, both on the ground of an earlier alliance and because they were Ionians, to send them ships; for they were being excluded from both the land and the sea by the Syracusans. And the Athenians sent the ships, professedly on the ground of their relationship, but really because they wished to prevent the importation of grain from Sicily into the Peloponnesus, and also to make a preliminary test whether the affairs of Sicily could be brought under their own control. So they established themselves at Rhegium in Italy and proceeded to carry on the war in concert with their allies. And the summer ended.

LXXXVII. In the course of the following winter the plague again fell upon the Athenians; and indeed it had not died out at any time entirely, though there had been a period of respite. And it continued the second time not less than a year, having run for two full years on the previous occasion, so that the Athenians were more distressed by it than by any other misfortune and their power more crippled. For no fewer than four thousand four hundred of those enrolled as hoplites died and also three hundred cavalry, and of the populace a number that could not be ascertained. It was at this time also that the great number of earthquakes occurred at Athens, in Euboea, and in Boeotia, and especially at Orchomenus in Boeotia.

LXXXVIII. The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty

---

4 This statement may have been written without a knowledge of the later events of the war, especially the unhappy issue of the Sicilian expedition (see Introd. p. xiii.)—unless δύναμις be taken to mean "fighting strength," or something narrower than "power."
στρατεύουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς Αἴολου νῆσους καλουμένας: θέρους γὰρ δὲ ἀνυδρίαν ἀδύνατα ἠ̣ έπιστρατεύειν.

2 νέμονται δὲ Διπαραίοι αὐτάς, Κυνίδων ἀγοικοὶ ὄντες. οἴκοισι δ’ ἐν μία τῶν νῆσων οὐ μεγάλη, καλεῖται δὲ Διπάρα: τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐκ ταύτῃς ὀρμώμενοι γεωργοῦσι, Διδύμην καὶ Στρογγύλην

3 καὶ Ἰεράν. νομίζουσι δὲ οἱ ἐκεῖνη ἀνθρωποὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰερᾷ ὡς ὁ Ἡφαιστος χαλκεύει, ὅτε τὴν νύκτα φαίνεται πῦρ ἀναδείχυσα πολὺ καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν κατών. κεῖται δὲ αἱ νῆσοι αὐταὶ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν καὶ Μεσσηνίαν γην, ξύμμαχοι δ’ ἦσαν

4 Συρακοσίων τεμόντες δ’ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν γῆν, ὥσιν προσεχλώσαν, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὸ Ρήγμον. καὶ ὁ χείμων ἐτελεύτα, καὶ πέμπτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷ Ἰωσκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

LXXXIX. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγεγραμμένου θέρους Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ ἱσθμοῦ ἤλθον ὡς ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβαλοῦντες Ἀγίδος τοῦ Ἀρχιδάμου ἄγουμένου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως, σεισμῶν δὲ γενομένων πολλῶν ἀπετράποντο

2 πάλιν καὶ οὐκ ἐγένετο ἐσβολή. καὶ περὶ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους, τῶν σεισμῶν καταχώντων, τῆς Εὐβοίας ἐν Ὠροβίαις ἡ θάλασσα ἐπανελθοῦσα ἀπὸ τῆς τότε σύσης γῆς καὶ κυματοθείας ἐπήλθε τῆς πόλεως μέρος τι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κατέκλυσε, τὸ δ’ ὑπενόστησε, καὶ θάλασσα νῦν ἐστὶ πρότερον οὖσα

1 Strabo names three more, modern geographers eleven or twelve. Strongyle, the modern Stromboli, seat of an active
ships against the islands of Aeolus, as they are called; for it was impossible to invade them in the summer time on account of the lack of water there. These islands are occupied by the Liparaeans, who are colonists of the Cnidians. They have their homes on one of the islands, which is not large, called Lipara, and from this go out and cultivate the rest, namely Didyme, Strongyle and Hiera. The people of this region believe that Hephaestus has his forge in Hiera, because this island is seen to send up a great flame of fire at night and smoke by day. The islands lie over against the territory of the Sicels and the Messenians, and were in alliance with the Syracusans; the Athenians, therefore, laid waste their land, but since the inhabitants would not come over to their side they sailed back to Rhegium. And the winter ended, and with it the fifth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

LXXXIX. In the following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, led by Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, advanced as far as the Isthmus with the intention of invading Attica; but a great many earthquakes occurred, causing them to turn back again, and no invasion took place. At about the same time, while the earthquakes prevailed, the sea at Oropiae in Euboea receded from what was then the shore-line, and then coming on in a great wave overran a portion of the city. One part of the flood subsided, but another engulfed the shore, so that what was land before is

volcano, has recently become especially notable on account of its nearness to Messina and Reggio, where the great earthquake occurred, Dec. 28, 1908.
γῆς καὶ ἀνθρώπων διείσθειρεν ὅσοι μὴ ἐδύναντο
3 φθίναι πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἀναδραμόντες. καὶ
περὶ Ἀταλάντην τὴν ἐπὶ Λοκρῶι τοῖς Ὀπουντίοις
νῆσον παραπλησία γίγνεται ἐπίκλυσις, καὶ τοῦ
τε φρουρίου τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεῖλε καὶ δύο νεῶν
4 ἀνειλικυμένων τὴν ἑτέραν κατέβησε. ἔγενετο δὲ
καὶ ἐν Πεπαρῆθῳ κύματος ἐπαναχώρησις τῆς, οὐ
μέντοι ἐπέκλυσε γε καὶ σεισμὸς τοῦ τεῖχους τὸν
κατέβαλε καὶ τὸ πρωτανεῖον καὶ ἄλλας οἰκίας
5 ὀλίγας. αἰτίων δ’ ἐγογε νομίζω τὸ τοιοῦτον,
ἡ ἰσχυρότατος ὁ σεισμὸς ἔγενετο, κατὰ τὸ τοῦτο
ἀποστέλλειν τῆς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἕξαπίνησι πάλιν
ἐπισπορέμενν. 1 βιαίωτερον τὴν ἐπίκλυσιν ποιείν
ἀνευ δὲ σεισμοῦ οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτο
ξυμβῆναι γενέσθαι.

Χ. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐπολέμουν μὲν καὶ
ἀλλοι, ὡς ἐκάστοις ξυνέβαινεν, ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ καὶ
αὐτοὶ οἱ Σικελιώται ἐπὶ ἄλληλους στρατεύοντες
καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξύνον τοῖς σφετέροις ξυμμάχους:
ἡ δ’ λόγου μάλιστα ἄξια ἡ μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
2 οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπράξαν ἡ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναῖους
οἱ ἀντιπόλεμοι, τούτων μηνηθῶσμαι. Χαροιάδου
γὰρ ἤδη τοῦ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦ τεθνηκότος
ὑπὸ Σιρακοσίων πολέμῳ, Λάχης ἀπασάν ἐγὼν
τῶν νεῶν τὴν ἄρχην ἐστράτευσε μετὰ τῶν ξυμ-
μάχων ἐπὶ Μύλας τὰς Μεσσηνίων. ἐτυχον δὲ

1 Madvig reads ἐπισπορέμενον, after Schol., followed by

Hude.

1 cf. π. xxxii.
2 "Thucydides is pointing out the connection between the
earthquake and the inundation. Where the earthquake was
most violent, there the inundation was greatest. But the
now sea; and it destroyed of the people as many as could not run up to the high ground in time. In the neighbourhood also of the island of Atalante, which lies off the coast of Opuntian Locris, there was a similar inundation, which carried away a part of the Athenian fort there,¹ and wrecked one of two ships which had been drawn up on the shore. At Peparethos likewise there was a recession of the waters, but no inundation; and there was an earthquake, which threw down a part of the wall as well as the prytaneum and a few other houses. And the cause of such a phenomenon, in my own opinion, was this: at that point where the shock of the earthquake was greatest the sea was driven back, then, suddenly returning² with increased violence, made the inundation; but without an earthquake, it seems to me, such a thing would not have happened,

XC. During the same summer war was being waged in Sicily, not only by other peoples as they each had occasion to do so, but also by the Siceliots themselves, who were campaigning against one another, and likewise by the Athenians in concert with their allies; but I shall mention only the most memorable things done by the Athenians in concert with their allies, or against the Athenians by their opponents. After Charoeades, the Athenian general, had been slain in battle by the Syracusans, Laches, being now in sole command of the fleet, made an expedition with the allies against Mylae, a town belonging to the Messenians. It so happened that two divisions

effect was indirect, being immediately caused by the recoil of the sea after the earthquake was over; hence τὴν θάλασσαν, and not, as we might expect, τὸν σείματον, is the subject of ποιεῖν. ἀποστέλλειν either active or neuter,” (Jowett.)
δύο φυλαί ἐν ταῖς Μύλαις τῶν Μεσσηνίων φρουροῦσαι καὶ τίνα καὶ ἐνέδραν πεποιημέναι τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξυμμάχοι τοὺς τε ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας τρέπουσι καὶ διαφθείρουσι πολλούς, καὶ τῷ ἐρύματι προσβαλόντες ἣμαγκασαν ὀμολογία τὴν τε ἀκρόπολιν παραδοῦναι καὶ ἐπὶ Μεσσήνην ἡνιστρατεῦσαι. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπελθόντων οἱ Μεσσήνιοι τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων προσεχώρησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ, ὃμηροι τε δόντες καὶ τὰ ἀλλὰ πιστὰ παρασχόμενοι.

ΧCII. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τριάκοντα μὲν ναῦς ἔστειλαν περὶ Πελοπόννησον, διὰ ἐστρατηγεῖ Δημοσθένης τε ὁ Ἀλκισθένους καὶ Προκλῆς ὁ Θεοδώρος, ἐξῆκοντα δὲ ἐς Μήλον καὶ διοχήτως ὀπλίταις, ἐστρατηγεῖ δὲ αὐτῶν Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου. τοὺς γὰρ Μήλοις ὄντας νησιώτας καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ὑπακούειν οὐδὲ ἐς τὸ αὐτὸν

3 ξυμμαχικὸν ἴδει τοῦ θεού προσαγαγέσθαι. ὅσιστεν αὐτοὶ δησομένης τῆς γῆς οὐ προσεχώρουν, ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Μήλου αὐτοῖ μὲν ἐπλευσαν ἐς ὦρωπον τῆς Γαρίκης, ὑπὸ νῦκτα δὲ σχόντες εὐθὺς ἔπορεύοντο οἱ ὀπλίται ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζῷ ἐς 4 Τάναγραν τῆς Βωστίας. οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πανδημεί  Ἀθηναίοι, Ἰππονίκου τε τοῦ Καλλίου στρατηγοῦντος καὶ Ἐυρυμέδουτος τοῦ Θουκλέους, ἀπὸ σημείου ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ γην ἀπῆρτον. καὶ στρατοπεδευούσαμεν ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐπὶ τῇ Τανάγρα ἐδήμου καὶ ἐνυλίσσαντο. καὶ τῇ ὑστε-
of the Messenians were in garrison at Mylæ, and that these had laid an ambush against the men who had landed from the ships. The Athenians and their allies, however, put to rout the ambushing troops, slaying many of them; then, assaulting the fortification, they compelled its defenders to surrender the acropolis by agreement and march with them against Messene. After this, on the approach of the Athenians and their allies, the Messenians also submitted, giving hostages and offering the other customary pledges of good faith.

XCl. That same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round the Peloponnesus under the command of Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes and Procles son of Theodorus, and sixty ships and two thousand hoplites under the command of Nicias son of Nicera
tus, to Melos. For the Melians, although they were islanders, were unwilling to be subject to Athens or even to join their alliance, and the Athenians wished to bring them over. But when they would not submit, even after their land had been ravaged, the Athenians left Melos and sailed to Oropus in the territory of Graia, and the hoplites, landing there at nightfall, proceeded at once by land to Tanagra in Boeotia. There they were met by the Athenians from the city in full force, who, under the command of Hipponicus son of Callias and Eurymedon son of Thucles, came overland upon a concerted signal and joined them. And after they had made camp they spent that day in ravaging the territory of Tanagra, and also passed the night there. On the next day

1 The Melians and Theraeans, as Laconian colonists (v. lxxxiv. 2), alone in the Cyclades held aloof from the Athenian alliance.
THUCYDIDES

ραία μάχη κρατήσαντες τοὺς ἐπεξελθόντας τῶν Ταναγραίων καὶ ᾿Θηβαίων τινὰς προσβεβοηθηκότας καὶ ὅπλα λαβόντες καὶ τροπαίον στήσαντες ἀνεχώρησαν, οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς 6 ναῦς. καὶ παραπλεύσας ὁ Νίκιας ταῖς ἕξηκοντα ναυσὶ τῆς Δοκρίδος τὰ ἐπιθαλάσσια ἔτεμε καὶ ἀνεχώρησεν ἐπὶ οἴκον.

XCII. Ἔπο τὸ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τούτον Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχυνίᾳ ἀποικίαν καθίσταντο 2 ἀπὸ τοιαῦτα δε γνώμης. Μηλῆς οἱ ἕξμπαντες εἰσὶ μὲν τρία μέρη, Παράλιοι, Ἰερῆς, Τραχυνίους· τούτων δὲ οἱ Τραχυνίοι πολέμῳ ἐφθαρμένοι ὑπὸ Οἰταίων ὀμόρων ὄντων, τὸ πρῶτον μελλόντας Ἀθηναίοις προσθείναι σφᾶς αὐτούς, δεῖσαντες δὲ μὴ οὐ σφίσι πιστοὶ ὡς, πέμπουσιν ἐς Λακε- 3 δάμονα ἐλόμενοι προσβεφθέντι Τεισάμενον. ξυνη- προσβεύοντο δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Δωριῆς, ἡ μητρόπολις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, τῶν αὐτῶν δεόμενοι· ὑπὸ γὰρ 4 τῶν Οἰταίων καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐφθείροντο. ἀκούσαντες δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι γνώμην εἶχον τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐκπέμπειν, τοῖς τε Τραχυνίοις βουλόμενοι καὶ τοῖς Δωρεάσι τιμωρεῖν. καὶ ἀμα τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίων πολέμου καλῶς αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει ἡ πόλις καθίστα- σθαι· ἐπὶ τε γὰρ τῇ Ἐὔβοιᾳ ναυτικὸν παρα- σκευασθῆναι ἀν, ὅστ' ἐκ βραχέως τὴν διάβασιν γίγνεσθαι, τῆς τε ἐπὶ Θράκης παρόδου χρησίμως ἔξειν. τὸ τε ξύμπαν ὀρμήντο τὸ χωρίον κτίζειν. 5 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐν Δελφοῖς τὸν θεὸν ἐπήρουτο, κελεύοντος δὲ ἐξεπεμψαν τοὺς οἰκήτορας αὐτῶν

162
they defeated in battle the men of Tanagra who came out against them, as well as some Thebans who had come to their aid, then taking possession of the arms of the fallen and setting up a trophy they returned, the one party to the city, the other to the ships. And Nicias sailed along the coast with his sixty ships, ravaged the seaboard of Locris, and then returned home.

XCII. It was about this time that the Lacedaemonians established Heracleia, their colony in Trachinia, with the following object in view. The people of Malia, considered as a whole, consist of three divisions, Paraliachis, Hierachiach, and Trachinians. Of these the Trachinians, after they had been ruined in war by their neighbours the Octaeans, at first intended to attach themselves to the Athenians, but, fearing that these might not be loyal, sent to Lacedaemon, choosing Teisamenus as their envoy. And envoys from Doris, the mother city of the Lacedaemonians, also took part in the embassy, making the same request, for they too were being ruined by the Octaeans. After hearing their appeal, the Lacedaemonians were of the opinion that they should send out the colony, wishing to aid both the Trachinians and the Dorians. At the same time, the site of the proposed city seemed to them well adapted for carrying on the war against Athens; for a fleet could be equipped there for an attack upon Euboea and the crossing thus made from a short distance away, and the place would also be useful for expeditions along the coast towards Thrace. In short, they were eager to found the settlement. They therefore first consulted the god at Delphi, and at his bidding sent out the colonists, consisting of both Spartans and
THUCYDIDES

te kai tov periokon, kai tov allov 'Ellinon
ton Boulemeon ekeleoun epesbai plith 'Iwnon
kai 'Akaiwn kai estin oiv alloi esth. oikistai
dei treis Lakedaimonion hgyasanto, Deon kai

6 'Alkidas kai Damaion. katastastes de eiteichisan
tin polein ek kainhs, h vun 'Hrakleia kaleita,
apheousa Theomputlou stadiai maliesta tessa-
rakonta, thei dei thelassis ekosin. neoritai te
paresekuaion kai eirxan to kata Theomputla
kai auta to stenon, opws eufylakta autois

eih.

XIII. Oi dei 'Athenaioi tis poleis tauteis
xynoeikoxemenv to prouton edeisain te kai enomiasan
epi th Euboeia maliesta kathistasaite, ote braxous
estin o diaplos pro to Kинаion tis Euboeias,
epieita muntoi para doxan autois apabhe. ou gar
2 egenveto ap autois deinon oudein. aition dei h
ote Theesaloi en dynamei ointes twn tautei xorion
kai oiv epib th epilekiseto, phosomenvi mi sfisei
megali ioxi paroikiosin, eftheiron kai dia
pantos epolemous anwropono neokatastatois,
exas efstruxasan genemvenous to prouton kai pain
polous (pws gar tis Lakedaimonion oikizonton
3 thessalwes hei, Bevaion nomizion thn polein): ou
menoi vkiesta oi arxontes auton twn Lakedaim-
onion oin afiknoymeno tis pragmatia te eftheiron
kai ex oligantheristian katexestiasan, ekfotheisanthe
164
Perioeci, and they invited any other Hellenes who so desired to accompany them, except Ionians and Achaeans and certain other races. The founders of the colony in charge of the expedition were three Lacedaemonians, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. When they had established themselves they built a new wall about the city, which is now called Heracleia, and is about forty stadia distant from Thermopylae and twenty from the sea. They then proceeded to build dockyards, and in order that the place might be easy to guard fenced off the approach on the side toward Thermopylae by a wall across the pass itself.

XCIII. As for the Athenians, while the colonists were being gathered for this city, they at first became alarmed, thinking it was being established chiefly as a menace to Euboea, because it is only a short distance across from here to Cenaeum in Euboea. Afterwards, however, the matter turned out contrary to their expectations; for no harm came from the city. And the reasons were as follows: the Thessalians, who were the paramount power in those regions and whose territory was being menaced by the settlement, fearing that their new neighbours might become very powerful, began to harry and make war continually upon the new settlers, until they finally wore them out, although they had at first been very numerous; for, since the Lacedaemonians were founding the colony, everybody came boldly, thinking the city secure. One of the principal causes, however, was that the governors sent out by the Lacedaemonians themselves ruined the undertaking and reduced the population to a handful, frightening most of the settlers away by

1 The old inhabitants, chiefly of Achaean stock, who had been reduced to a condition of dependence (not slavery) by the Dorians.
τοὺς πολλοὺς χαλεπῶς τε καὶ ἔστιν ἄ οὐ καλῶς ἐξηγούμενοι, ὡστε ρᾶον ἥδη αὐτῶν οἱ πρόσωποι ἐπεκράτουν.

XCIV. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους, καὶ περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ὃν ἐν τῇ Μήλῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κατείχοντο, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα νεὼν Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ Πελοπόννησον ὑντες πρῶτον ἐν Ἑλλομενῷ τῆς Λευκάδιας φρουρόν τινας λοχήσαντες διέφθει- ραν, ἐπειτα ὑστερον ἐπὶ Λευκάδα μείζον στόλῳ ἠλθον, Ἀκαρνάσι τε πᾶσιν, οἱ πανδημεὶ πλὴν Οἰνιαδῶν ξυνέσποντο, καὶ Ζακυνθίοις καὶ Κεφαλ- λήσι καὶ Κερκυραίοις πέντε καὶ δέκα ναυσιν. 2 καὶ οἱ μὲν Λευκάδιοι, τῆς τε ἔξω γῆς δημομένης καὶ τῆς ἐντὸς τοῦ ἱσθμοῦ, ἐν ἡ καὶ ἡ Λευκάς ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος, πλῆθει βιαζόμενοι ἡσύχαζον οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνάνες ἠξίουν Δημοσθένη τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποτείχίζειν αὐτούς, νομίζουτες ραδίως γ' ἀν ἐκπολιορκήσαι καὶ 3 πόλεως αἰεὶ σφίσι πολεμίας ἀπαλλαγὴν. Δη- μοσθένης δ' ἀναπείθεται κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ὑπὸ Μεσσηνίων ὡς καλὸν αὐτὸν στρατιῶς τοσαύτης ἤπειρεμένης Αἰτωλοὶ ἐπιθέσθαι, Ναυ- πάκτω καὶ τοῦ πολεμίους ὁυσί, καὶ ἢν κρατήσῃ αὐτῶν, ραδίως καὶ τὸ ἀλλο ἡπειρωτικὸν τὸ ταύτη Ἀθη- 4 ναίοις προσποιήσειν. τὸ γὰρ ἔθνος μέγα μὲν

1 This isthmus, which at this time connected the island with the mainland, had been previously cut through by the Corinthians (Strabo, p. 4520); but it had been filled with 166
their harsh and sometimes unjust administration, so that at length their neighbours more easily prevailed over them.

XCVI. During the same summer, and at about the time when the Athenians were detained at Melos, the troops of the thirty Athenian ships that were cruising round the Peloponnesus first set an ambush at Ellomenus in Leucadia and killed some of the garrison, and then, later on, went against Leucas with a greater armament, which consisted of all the Acarnanians, who joined the expedition with their entire forces (with the exception of the people of Oeniadae), some Zacynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen ships from Corycra. The Leucadians, finding themselves outnumbered, were obliged to remain quiet, although their lands were being ravaged both without and within the isthmus, where stands Leucas and the temple of Apollo; but the Acarnanians tried to induce Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to shut them in by a wall, thinking they could easily reduce them by siege and thus rid themselves of a city that was always hostile to them. But just at this time Demosthenes was persuaded by the Messenians that it was a fine opportunity for him, seeing that so large an army was collected, to attack the Aetolians, because they were hostile to Naupactus, and also because, if he defeated them, he would find it easy to bring the rest of the mainland in that region into subjection to the Athenians. The Aetolians, they explained, were, it was true, a great and warlike

sand before the Peloponnesian war, as is evident from constant allusions to hauling ships across. It is clear from the context that the territory of the Leucadians included a part of the mainland of Acarnania.
THUCYDIDES

eίναι τὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ μάχιμον, οἴκον δὲ κατὰ κώμας ἀτείχίστους, καὶ ταῦτας διὰ πολλοῦ, καὶ σκευή ψιλὴ χρώμενον οὐ χαλεπον ἀπέφαινον, πρὶν ξυμβοσθήσαι, καταστραφῆναι. ἐπιχειρεῖν δὲ ἐκέλευον πρῶτον μὲν Ἁποδωτοῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ Ὀφιονεῦσι, καὶ μετὰ τούτους Εὐρυτάσιν, ὅπερ μέγιστον μέρος ἑστὶ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, ἀγνωστότατοι δὲ γλώσσαν καὶ ὁμοφάγοι εἰσίν, ὡς λέγονται. τούτων γὰρ ληφθέντων ῥάδιως καὶ τάλλα προσχωρήσειν.

XCV. Ὁ δὲ τῶν Μεσσηνίων χάριτι πεισθεὶς καὶ μάλιστα νομίσας ἀνευ τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως τοῖς ἥπειρωταῖς ξυμμαχοῖς μετὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δύνασθαι ἅν κατὰ γῆν ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ Βοιωτοῦς διὰ Δοκρῶν τῶν Ὀξολῶν ἐς Κυτίνων τὸ Δωρικὸν, ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχων τῶν Παρνασσόν, ἔως καταβαίνῃ ἐς Φωκέας, οἱ προθύμως ἐδόκουν κατὰ τὴν Ἀθηναίων αἰεὶ ποτὲ φιλίαν ξυστρατεύσειν ἢ κἂν βία προσαχθῆναι (καὶ Φωκεύσιν ἢ δὴ ὁμορος ἡ Βοιωτία ἔστιν), ἀρας οὖν ξύμπαντι τῷ στρατεύματι ἀπὸ τῆς Λευκάδος ἀκόντων τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων παρέπλευσεν ἐς Σόλλιον. κοινώσας δὲ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῖς Ἀκαρνάσιν, ὡς οὐ προσεδέξαντο διὰ τῆς Λευκάδος τὴν οὐ περιτείχισιν, αὐτὸς τῇ λοιπῇ στρατιᾷ, Κεφαλλῆσι καὶ Μεσσηνίος καὶ Ζακυνθίος καὶ Ἀθηναίων τριακοσίοις τοῖς ἐπιβάταις τῶν σφετέρων νεῶν (αι γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα τῶν

168
people, but as they lived in unwalled villages, which, moreover, were widely separated, and as they used only light armour, they could be subdued without difficulty before they could unite for mutual defence. And they advised him to attack the Apodotians first, then the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytanyans. These last constitute the largest division of the Aetolians, their speech is more unintelligible than that of the other Aetolians, and, according to report, they are eaters of raw flesh. If these tribes were subdued, they said, the rest would readily yield.

XCV. Demosthenes was induced to make this decision, not only by his desire to please the Messenians, but chiefly because he thought that, without help from Athens, he would be able with his allies from the mainland, once the Aetolians had joined him, to make an overland expedition against the Bocotians by passing through the country of the Ozolian Locrians to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on the right, until he should descend into Phocian territory. The Phocians would presumably be eager to join the expedition in view of their traditional friendship with Athens, or else could be forced to do so; and Phocis is on the very borders of Boeotia. So he set sail from Leucas with his whole armament in spite of the unwillingness of the Acarnanians and went along the coast to Sollium. There he made his plan known to the Acarnanians, but they would not agree to it because of his refusal to invest Leucas; he therefore set out upon his expedition against the Aetolians without them, taking the rest of his army, which consisted of Cephalenians, Messenians, Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenian marines from his own ships—for
Κερκυραίων ἀπήλθον νῆς), ἔστρατευσεν ἐπ' 3 Αἶτωλοὺς. ὡρμάτο δὲ ἐξ Οἰνεώνος τῆς Δοκρίδος, οἱ δὲ Ὀξόλαι ὦτοι Δοκροὶ ξύμμαχοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἔδει αὐτούς πανστρατιᾷ ἀπαντήσαι τοῖς Ἄθη- ναιοῖς ἐς τὴν μεσόγειαν ὄντες γὰρ ὦμοροι τοῖς Αἶτωλοῖς καὶ ὦμοσκευοὶ μεγάλη ὠφελία ἐδόκουν εἶναι ἐνστρατεύσοντες μάχης τε ἐμπερία τῆς ἐκεί- νων καὶ χωρίων.

ΧCVI. Αὐλισαμενος δὲ τῷ στρατῷ ἐν τοῦ Δίως τοῦ Νεμείου τῷ ιερῷ, ἐν δὲ Ἡσίοδος ὁ ποιη- τὴς λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν ταύτη ἀποθανεῖν, χρησθεὶς αὐτῷ ἐν Νεμέα τοῦτο παθεῖν, ἀμα τῇ ἔρι ἄρας 2 ἐπορεύετο ἐς τὴν Αἶτωλίαν. καὶ οἱ ἐν τῷ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ Ποτίδανία καὶ τῇ δευτέρᾳ Κροκύλειον καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ Τεῖχιον, ἐμενε τοι αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν λεῖαν ἐς Εὐπάλλιον τῆς Δοκρίδος ἀπέπεμψεν τὴν γὰρ γνώ- μην εἰχε τὰ ἀλλα καταστρεψάμενος οὐτως ἐπὶ Ὀφιονέας, εἰ μὴ βούλουντο ξυγχωρεῖν, ἐς Ναύ- 3 πακτον ἐπαναχωρήσας στρατεύσαι ύστερον. τοὺς δὲ Αἶτωλοὺς οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν αὐτὴ ἡ παρασκευή οὔτε ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεβουλεύτο, ἐπειδὴ τε τὸ στρατὸς ἐσεβεβλήκει, πολλὴ χειρὶ ἐπεβοήθουν πάντες, ὅστε καὶ οἱ ἐσχατοι Ὀφιονέων οἱ πρὸς τὸν Μηλιακὸν κόλπον καθήκοντες, Βωμῆς καὶ Καλλῆς, ἐβοήθησαν.

ΧCVII. Τῷ δὲ Δημοσθένει τοιόνδε τι οἱ Μεσ- σήνων παρῆκαν, ὦτε καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀναδιδά- σκοντες αὐτὸν τῶν Αἶτωλῶν ὡς εἰῇ ῥαδία ἡ
the fifteen Coreyraean ships had gone back home. The base from which he started was Oeneon in Locris. The people of this country, Ozolian Locris, were allies, and they with their whole force were to meet the Athenians in the interior; for since they were neighbours of the Aetolians and used the same sort of arms, it was believed that their help would be of great service on the expedition on account of their knowledge both of the Aetolian manner of fighting and of the country.

XCVI. He bivouacked with his army in the precinct of Nemean Zeus, where the poet Hesiod\(^1\) is said to have been killed by the men of that region, an oracle having foretold to him that he should suffer this fate at Nemea; then he set out at daybreak for Aetolia. On the first day he took Potidania, on the second Crocyleum, on the third Teichium. There he remained, sending his booty back to Eupalium in Locris; for his intention was to subdue the other places first, and then, in case the Ophioneans would not submit, to return to Naupactus and make a second expedition against them. But all these preparations did not escape the notice of the Aetolians, either when the design was first being formed or afterwards; indeed his army had no sooner invaded their country than they all began to rally in great force, so that help came even from the remotest tribes of the Ophioneans, who stretch as far as the MaliaC Gulf, and from the Bomians and Callians.

XCVII. The Messenians, however, gave Demosthenes about the same advice as at first: informing him that the conquest of the Aetolians was easy,

αἴρεσις, ἦναί ἐκέλευον ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπὶ τᾶς κῶ-
μας καὶ μὴ μένειν ἔως ἂν ἐξῆκαντες ἄθροισθέντες ἀνατίταξονται, τὴν δ' ἐν ποσίν ἀιεὶ πειρᾶσθαι
2 αἱρεῖν. ὦ δὲ τούτως τε πεισθεὶς καὶ τῇ τύχῃ ἐλπίσας, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ ἦναντίοντο, τοὺς Δο-
κροὺς οὐκ ἀναμείνας οὐδὲ αὐτῷ ἔδει προσβοηθῆσαι
(ψιλῶν γὰρ ἄκοντιστῶν ἑνδεῖς ἡν μάλιστα) ἐχώ-
ρει ἐπὶ Αἰγίτιον, καὶ κατὰ κράτος αἱρεῖ ἐπιών.
ὑπέφευγον γὰρ οἱ ἅθρωποι καὶ ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ τῶν
λόφων τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως· ἦν γὰρ ἐφ' ὑψηλῶν
χωρίων ἀπεχοῦσα τῆς θαλάσσησ ὑγράκοντα
3 σταδίους μάλιστα. οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοὶ (βεβοηθηκότες
γὰρ ἤδη ἦσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Αἰγίτιον) προσέβαλλον τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καταθέουντες ἀπὸ
tῶν λόφων ἄλλοι ἄλλοθεν καὶ ἔσηκοντίζον, καὶ
ὅτε μὲν ἑπίοι τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον,
ὑπεχώρουν, ἀναχωροῦσι δὲ ἑπέκειντο· καὶ ἦν ἐπὶ
πολὺ τοιαύτη ἡ μάχη, διώξεις τε καὶ ὑπαγωγαί,
ἐν οἷς ἀμφιτέροις ἦσσους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι.

ΧCVIII. Μέχρι μὲν οὖν οἱ τοξόται εἰχόν τε τὰ
βέλη αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τῇ ἦσαν χρησθαί, οἱ δὲ
ἀντείχων (τοξευόμενοι γὰρ οἱ Αἰτωλοί, ἄνθρωποι
ψιλοί, ἀνεστέλλοντο): ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦ τε τοξάρχου
ἀποθανόντος οὕτω διεσκεδάσθησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ
ἐκεκρήκεσαν καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῷ αὐτῷ πόνῳ ἔννε-
χόμενοι, οἱ τε Αἰτωλοὶ ἐνέκειντο καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον,
οὕτω δὴ τραπόμενοι ἐφευγοῦν, καὶ ἐστίπτοντες ἐς
tε χαράδρας ἀνεκβάτους καὶ χωρία ὧν οὐκ ἦσαν
172
they urged him to proceed as quickly as possible against the villages, not waiting until they should all unite and array themselves against him, but trying to take the first village in his way. Yielding to their advice and being hopeful because of his good fortune, since he was meeting with no opposition, he did not wait for the Locrians, who were to have brought him reinforcements—for he was greatly in need of light-armed men that were javelin-throwers—but advanced against Aegitium and took it by storm at the first onset. For the inhabitants secretly fled and took post on the hills above the city, which stood on high ground about eighty stadia from the sea. But the Aetolians, who by this time had come to the rescue of Aegitium, attacked the Athenians and their allies, running down from the hills on every side and showering javelins upon them, then retreating whenever the Athenian army advanced and advancing whenever they retreated. Indeed, the battle continued for a long time in this fashion, alternate pursuits and retreats, and in both the Athenians had the worst of it.

XCVIII. Now so long as their bowmen had arrows and were able to use them the Athenians held out, for the Aetolian troops were light-armed and so, while they were exposed to the arrows, they were constantly driven back. But when the captain of the archers had been killed and his men scattered, and the hoplites were worn out, since they had been engaged for a long time in the unremitting struggle and the Aetolians were pressing them hard and hurling javelins upon them, they at last turned and fled, and falling into ravines from which there was no way out and into places with which they were unacquainted,
ἐμπειροὶ διεφθεῖροντο· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἡγεμὼν αὐτοῦς τῶν ὁδῶν Χρόμων ὁ Μεσσήνιος ἔτυγχανε τεθνη-
2 κός. οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ τροπῆ κατὰ πόδας αἱροῦντες, ἀνθρω-
ποί ποδώκεις καὶ ψιλοί, διεφθείρον, τοὺς δὲ πλείους τῶν ὁδῶν ἀμαρτάνοντας καὶ ἐς τὴν ὕλην ἐσφερομένους, ὅθεν διέξοδοι οὐκ ἦσαν, πῦρ κομν-
3 σάμενοι περιπετεύομαι· πᾶσα τε ἱδέα κατέστη
tῆς φυγῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀλέθρου τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μόλις τε ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τῶν Ὀλυνόων τῆς Δοκρίδος, ὅθενπερ καὶ ὁμολήθησαν,
4 οἱ περιγενέμοι κατέφυγον. ἀπέθανον δὲ τῶν τε ἅμμαῖων πολλοὶ καὶ αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων ὀπλῖται
περὶ εἰκοσι μάλιστα καὶ ἕκατον. τοσοῦτοι μὲν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἥλικία ἡ ἀυτῆ ¹ οὐτοὶ βέλτιστοι δὴ ἀνδρεῖς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ ἐκ τῆς Ἀθηναίων
πόλεως διεφθάρησαν· ἀπέθανεν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐτερος
5 στρατηγὸς Προκλῆς. τοὺς δὲ νεκροὺς ὑποστόη-
δους ἀνελόμενοι παρὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ ἀνα-
χωρῆσαντες ἐς Ναύπακτον ὑστεροῦσαν ἔς ταῖς Ἀθήνας
ταῖς ναυσιν ἐκομίσθησαν. Δημοσθένης δὲ περὶ
Ναύπακτον καὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα ὑπελείφθη τοῖς
πεπραγμένοις φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.

XCIX. Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους καὶ οἱ
περὶ Σικελίαν Ἀθηναῖοι πλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Δοκ-
ρίδα ἐν ὑποβάσει τε τῶν τοὺς προσβοηθήσαντας
Δοκρῶν ἐκράτησαν καὶ περιπόλοιν αἱροῦσιν ὁ ἦν
ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀληκτοπαμφ. ²

C. Τοῦ δὲ αὐτοῦ θέρους Αἰτωλοὶ προπέμψαντες
πρὸτεροῦ ἐς τῇ Κόρινθῳ καὶ ἐς Δακεδαίμονα
πρέσβεις, Τόλοφόν τε τῶν Ὁφιονέα καὶ Βοριάδην

¹ ἡ αὐτή, Hude ἡ ῥώτη.
they perished; for Chromon, the Messenian, who had been their guide on the way, had unfortunately been killed. The Aetolians kept plying their javelins, and being swift of foot and lightly equipped, following at their heels they caught many there in the rout and slew them; but the greater number missed the roads and got into the forest, from which there were no paths out, and the Aetolians brought fire and set the woods ablaze around them. Then every manner of flight was essayed and every manner of destruction befell the army of the Athenians, and it was only with difficulty that the survivors escaped to the sea at Oeneon in Locris, whence they had set out. Many of the allies were slain, and of the Athenians themselves about one hundred and twenty hoplites. So great a number of men, and all of the same age, perished here, the best men in truth whom the city of Athens lost in this war; and Procles, one of the two generals, perished also. When they had received back their dead from the Aetolians under a truce and had retreated to Naupactus, they were afterwards taken back by the fleet to Athens. Demosthenes, however, remained behind in Naupactus and the region round about, for he was afraid of the Athenians because of what had happened.

XCIX. About the same time the Athenian forces over in Sicily sailed to Locris\(^1\) and disembarking there defeated the Locrians who came against them and took a guard-house which was situated on the river Halex.

C. During the same summer the Aetolians, who had previously sent three envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon, namely Tolophus the Ophionean, Boriades

\(^1\) i.e. the territory of the Epizephyrian Locri, north of Rhegium in Italy.
τὸν Εὐρυτάνα καὶ Τείσανδρον τὸν 'Ἀποδωτόν, πείθουσιν ὅστε σφύσῃ πέμψαι στρατιὰν ἐπὶ Ναῦ-
πακτον διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγήν. καὶ ἔξεπεμψαν Δακεδαίμονιοι περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον
τρισχιλίους ὀπλίτας τῶν Ἑυμάχων. τούτων ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι ἐξ Ἡρακλείας, τῆς ἐν Τραχίν
πόλεως τοτε νεοκτίστων οὐσῆς. Σπαρτιάτης δὲ ἦρχεν Εὐρύλοχος τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ Ἐυνηκολού-
θον αὐτῷ Μακάριος καὶ Μενεδάιος οἱ Σπαρ-
τιάται. Ζ. ξυλλεγέντος δὲ τοῦ στρατεύματος
ἐς Δελφοὺς ἐπεκηρυκεύετο Εὐρύλοχος Δοκροῖ,
τοῖς Ὀξόλαις: διὰ τούτων γὰρ ἡ ὁδὸς ἦν ἐς Ναῦ-
πακτον, καὶ ἀμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐβούλετο ἀπο-
2 στῆσαι αὐτοῦ. Ἐξυπερασσον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτῷ
τῶν Δοκρῶν Ἀμφισσῆς διὰ τὸ τῶν Φωκέων
ἐχθὸς δεδιότες· καὶ αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι δόντες ὁμήρους
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπείσαν δούναι φοβουμένους τῶν
ἐπιόντα στρατόν, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς ὁμήρους
αὐτοῖς Μυονέας (ταύτη γὰρ δυσεσβολωτάτος ἡ
Δοκρίς), ἐπείτα Ἰπνέας καὶ Μεσσαπίων καὶ
Τριταίας καὶ Χαλαίους καὶ Τολοφωνίους καὶ
'Ησσίους καὶ Οιανθεάς. οὕτω καὶ Ἐυνεστράτευον
πάντες. Ὁλπαιοὶ δὲ ὁμήρους μὲν ἔδοσαν, ἡκολού-
θουν δὲ οὕτως καὶ Ὁλπαιοὶ οὐκ ἔδοσαν ὁμήρους 
πρὸ 
αὐτῶν ἐξ ἔναν κώμην Πόλιν ὄνομα ἔχουσαν.
CIII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο πάντα καὶ 
τοὺς ὁμήρους κατέθετο ἐς Κυτίνιον τὸ 
Δωρίκον, ἔχορει 
τῷ στρατῷ ἐπὶ 
τὴν Ναυπακτον 
διὰ τῶν 
Δοκρῶν, 
καὶ 
πορεύομενος Οἰνεόνα 
aiρεῖ 
αὐτῶν 
καὶ 
Εὐ-
2 πάλιν 
οὐ 
γὰρ 
προσεχόρησαν. 
γενόμενοι δὲ ἐν 
τὴ 
Ναυπακτία 
καὶ 
οί 
Αἰτωλοὶ ἀμα 
η 
προσβε-
the Eurytian, and Teisander the Apodotian, urged them to send an army against Naupactus because this city had brought the Athenians against them. So towards autumn the Lacedaemonians sent three thousand hoplites of their allies, among whom were six hundred from Heracleia, the city which had recently been founded in Trachis. The commander of the expedition was Eurylochus a Spartan, who was accompanied by the Spartans Macarius and Menedeïus, CI. And when the army was collected at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Ozolian Locrians; for the road to Naupactus lay through their territory, and he also wished to induce them to revolt from Athens. Of the Locrians the people of Amphissa co-operated with him chiefly, these being afraid on account of their enmity to the Phocians; and after these had taken the lead in giving him hostages they persuaded the rest, who were afraid of the invading army, to do likewise—first their neighbours the Myoneans, who held the country from which Locris was most difficult of access, then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritaeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians and Oeantheans. All these tribes also took part in the expedition. The Olpaeans gave hostages, but did not take the field with the others; and the Hyaeans refused to give hostages until a village of theirs, Polis by name, was taken.

CII. When all preparations had been made, and the hostages had been deposited at Cytinium in Doris, Eurylochus advanced with his army against Naupactus through the Locrian territory, taking on his march two of their towns, Oeneon and Eupalium, which refused to yield. And when they reached the territory of Naupactus, the Aetolians meanwhile
Βοηθηκότες, ἐδήμου τήν γῆν καὶ τὸ προάστειον ἀτείχιστον ὅν εἶλον ἐπὶ τε Μολύκρειον ἐλθόντες, τὴν Κορινθίων μὲν ἀποικίαν, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπῆκοον, αἰροῦσιν. Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος (ἤτι γὰρ ἑτυγχανεν ὃν μετὰ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας περὶ Ναυπακτον) προαισθόμενος τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ δεῖσας περὶ αὐτῆς, ἔλθὼν πείθει Ἀκαρνάνας, χαλεπῶς διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος ἀναχώρησιν,

4 Βοηθῆσαι Ναυπακτώ. καὶ πέμπουσι μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν χιλίων ὀπλίτας, οἳ ἐσελθόντες περιποίησαν τὸ χωρίον δεινὸν γὰρ ἤν μη, μεγάλου ὅντος τοῦ τείχους, ὀλίγων δὲ τῶν ἀμυνομένων,

5 οὐκ ἀντίσχωσιν. Εὐρύλοχος δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ὡς ἔσθοντό τὴν στρατιὰν ἐσεληλυθυῖαν καὶ ἀδύνατον ὅν τὴν πόλιν βιά ἔλειν, ἀνεχώρησαν οὐκ ἐπὶ Πελοποννήσου, ἀλλ' ἐς τὴν Αἰολίδα τὴν νῦν καλουμένην, Καλυδώνα καὶ Πλευρῶνα καὶ ἐς τὰ ταύτη χωρία, καὶ ἐς Πρόσχιον τῆς Αἰτωλίας.

6 οἱ γὰρ Ἀμπρακιῶται ἐλθόντες πρὸς αὐτοὺς πείθοσιν ὅστε μετὰ σφῶν Ἀργεί τε τῷ Ἀμφιλοχικῷ καὶ Ἀμφιλοχία τῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπιχειρῆσαι καὶ Ἀκαρνανία ἀμα, λέγοντες ὦτι, ἢν τούτων κρατήσωσι, πάν το ἡπειρωτικοῖ Δακεδαμονίους ἔμψιμοι.

7 μαχὸν καθεστῆξει. καὶ οὐ μὲν Εὐρύλοχος πεισθεὶς καὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλούς ἀφεῖς ἤσυχαζε τὸ στρατό περὶ τοὺς χώρους τούτους, ἐως τοῖς Ἀμπρακιῶταις ἐκστρατευσαμένους περὶ τὸ Ἀργος δέοι βοηθεῖν. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

---

1 i.e. the fleet of the Acarnanians themselves; the thirty Athenian ships, which Demosthenes had commanded, had
having come to their support, they ravaged the land and took the outer town, which was not fortified; and advancing against Molycreium, a colony founded by the Corinthians but subject to Athens, they took it. But Demosthenes the Athenian, who happened to have remained in the neighbourhood of Naupactus after his retreat from Aetolia, got information of the expedition, and fearing for the town went and persuaded the Acarnanians, though with difficulty on account of his withdrawal from Leucas, to come to the aid of Naupactus. And they sent with him on board the fleet one thousand hoplites, who entered the place and saved it; for there was danger that they might not be able to hold out, since the walls were extensive and the defenders few in number. Eurylochus and his men, perceiving that the army had entered and that it was impossible to take the town by storm, now withdrew, not to the Peloponnesus, but to the district of Aeolis, as it is now called, to Calydon, namely, and Pleuron, and the other towns of that region, and to Proschium in Aetolia. For the Ambraciots came and urged him to join them in an attack upon Amphilocharian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia, and at the same time upon Acarnania, saying that if they got control of these places all the mainland would be brought into alliance with the Lacedaemonians. Eurylochus was persuaded, and dismissing the Aetolians remained inactive, keeping his army in these regions until the Ambraciots should take the field and the time should come for him to join them in the neighbourhood of Argos. And the summer ended.

returned to Athens (ch. xcviii. 5), while those mentioned ch. cv. 3 did not come till later.
CIII. Οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦ ἐπιγγενο-
μένου χειμῶνος ἐπελθόντες μετὰ τῶν Ἕλληνων ἐξυμ-
μάχων καὶ ὁσι Σικελῶν κατὰ κράτος ἀρχόμενοι
ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων καὶ ξύμμαχοι ὄντες ἀποστάντες
αὐτοῖς ξυνεπολέμουν, ἐπ’ Ἰνησσαν τὸ Σικελικὸν
πόλισμα, οὔ τιν ἀκρόπολιν Συρακόσιοι εἴχον,
προσέβαλλον, καὶ όσι οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἔλειν, ἀπῆσαν.

2 ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀναχωρήσει ύστεροι Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς
ξυμμάχους ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐπιτίθενται οἱ ἐκ τοῦ
τειχίσματος Συρακόσιοι, καὶ προσπεσόντες τρέ-
pουσι τε μέρος τι τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ ἀπέκτειναν

3 οὐκ ὀλίγους, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ὁ
Λάχης καὶ οἱ 'Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Δοκρίδα ἀποβάσεις
τινὰς ποιησάμενοι κατὰ τὸν Καϊκίνου ποταμὸν
τοὺς προσβοθοῦντας Δοκρίδον μετὰ Προξένου τοῦ
Καπάτωνος ὡς τριακοσίων μάχη ἐκράτησαν καὶ
ὅπλα λαβέστες ἀπεχώρησαν.

CIV. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Δήλον ἐκα-
θηραν Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ χρησμὸν δὴ τινὰ. ἐκάθηρε
μὲν γὰρ καὶ Πεισίστρατος ὁ τύραννος πρὸ τερον
αὐτήν, οὐχ ἀπασαν, ἀλλὰ ὦσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱεροῦ
ἐφεωρᾶτο τῆς νῆσου τότε δὲ πᾶσα ἐκαθάρθη

2 τοιῶδε τρόπω. θήκα ὁσι ἄσαν τῶν τεθνεῶτων
ἐν Δήλῳ, πάσας ἀνείλον, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν προείπον
μὴτε ἐναποθησκεῖν ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ μῆτε ἐντίκειν,
ἀλλὰ ἐς τὴν 'Ῥήνειαν διακομίζεσθαι. ἀπέχει δὲ
ἡ 'Ῥήνεια τῆς Δήλου οὕτως ὀλίγον ὡστε Πολυ-
κράτης, ὁ Σαμίων τύραννος, ἴσχυσας τινὰ χρόνον
ναυτικό καὶ τῶν τε ἄλλων νῆσων ἀρξας καὶ τὴν
'Ῥήνειαν ἑλὼν ἀνέθηκε τῇ 'Απόλλωνῃ τῷ Δήλῳ

1 ἀπὸ Συρακοσίων after αὐτοῖς, deleted by van Herwerden.
CIII. The following winter the Athenians in Sicily, with their Hellenic allies and such of the Sicels as had been unwilling subjects and allies of the Syracusans but had now revolted from them and were taking sides with the Athenians, attacked the Sicel town Inessa, the acropolis of which was held by the Syracusans, but being unable to take it they departed. On their retreat, however, the allies, who were in the rear of the Athenians, were attacked by the Syracusan garrison of the fort, who fell upon them and put to flight part of the army, killing not a few of them. After this Laches and the Athenians took the fleet and made several descents upon Locris; and at the river Caicinus they defeated in battle about three hundred Locrians who came out against them, under the command of Proxenus son of Capato, took the arms of the fallen, and returned to Rhegium.

CIV. During the same winter the Athenians purified Delos in compliance with a certain oracle. It had been purified before by Peisistratus the tyrant, not indeed the whole of the island but that portion of it which was visible from the temple; but at this time the whole of it was purified, and in the following manner. All the sepulchres of the dead that were in Delos they removed, and proclaimed that thereafter no one should either die or give birth to a child on the island, but should first be carried over to Rheneia. For Rheneia is so short a distance from Delos that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who for some time was powerful on the sea and not only gained control of the other islands but also seized Rheneia, dedicated this island to the Delian Apollo,
THUCYDIDES

άλυσει δήσας πρὸς τὴν Δήλον, καὶ τὴν πεντετηρίδα τότε πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐποίησαν
3 οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. ἦν δὲ ποτε καὶ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλη ξύνοδος ἐς τὴν Δήλον τῶν Ἰώνων τε καὶ περικτικῶν νησιωτῶν: ξύν τε γὰρ γυναῖξί καὶ παισίν ἑθεώρουν, ὡσπερ υἱὸν ἐς τὰ Ἐφέσια Ἰωνες, καὶ ἄγων ἐποιεῖτο αὐτῶθι καὶ γυμνικός καὶ μουσικός,
4 χοροῦς τε ἀνήγγειν αἰ πόλεις. δηλοὶ δὲ μάλιστα ὁμηρὸς ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἐπεσι τοῖς, ἂ ἐστιν ἐκ προοιμίου Ἀπόλλωνος·

ἀλλοτε Δήλῳ, Φοῖβε, μάλιστα γε θυμὸν ἐτέρφης,
ἐνθα τοι ἐλκεχίτων Ἰώνες ἠγερέθουνται σὺν σφοίσιν τεκέσσις γυναῖξί τε σὴν ἐς ἀγνιαν· ἐνθα σε πυγμαχίη καὶ ὀρχιστὶ καὶ αοιδὴ μνησάμενοι τέρπουσιν, ὅταν καθέσωσιν ἄγωνα.

5 ὅτι δὲ καὶ μουσικῆς ἄγων ἦν καὶ ἄγωνιούμενοι ἐφοίτων ἐν τοῖς ἂν δηλοί, ἂ ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προοιμίου. τὸν γὰρ Δηλιακὸν χορὸν τῶν γυναι-

1 τὰ Δήλια, after οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.
2 ἄλλοτε, Camerarius’ conjecture, now generally adopted, for the Vulgate ἄλλ’ ὅτε, which Hude retains.

1 “As a symbolical expression of indissoluble union” (Curtius).
2 i.e. celebrated every fifth year.
3 Homer is clearly regarded by Thucydides as the author of the hymn here cited. How definite a personality he was
and bound it with a chain to Delos. It was at this time, after the purification, that the Athenians first celebrated their penteteric festival in Delos. There had indeed in ancient times been a great gathering at Delos of the Ionians and the inhabitants of the neighbouring islands; and they used to resort to the festival with their wives and children, as the Ionians now do to the Ephesian games; and a contest was formerly held there, both gymnastic and musical, and choruses were sent thither by the cities. The best evidence that the festival was of this character is given by Homer in the following verses, which are from the hymn to Apollo:

"At other times, Phoebus, Delos is dearest to thy heart, where the Ionians in trailing robes are gathered together with their wives and children in thy street; there they delight thee with boxing and dancing and song, making mention of thy name, whenever they ordain the contest."

And that there was a musical contest also to which men resorted as competitors Homer once more makes clear in the following verses from the same hymn. After commemorating the Delian chorus of

to Thucydides is shown by the words "in which he also mentions himself."

\[\text{προοιμιον, poem or introduction. In connection with epic poems the hymns were called προοιμια, because they were sung before other poems, i.e. by the rhapsodists as preludes to their rhapsodies. Schol. έξ ουνου τοις γαρ ουνους προοιμια έκαλουν. The question has been raised whether the hymn was a prelude to the rhapsodies or was, as e.g. here, in itself a rhapsody. The citations here made by Thucydides are from the Hymn to the Delian Apollo, 146 ff. and 165 ff.} \]
κών ὑμνήσας ἐτελεύτα τοῦ ἐπαίνου ἐς τάδε τὰ ἔπη, ἐν οἷς καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπεμνήσθη.

ἀλλ᾽ ἄγεθ', ἵλικοι μὲν Ἀπόλλων Ἀρτέμιδι ξύν, χαίρετε δ᾽ ὑμεῖς πάσαι. ἐμείο δὲ καὶ μετόπισθε μνήσασθ', ὀπτότε κέν τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων ἐνθάδ' ἀνείρηται ταλαπείριος ἄλλος ἐπελθὼν. "Ὡς κοῦραι, τὸς δ᾽ ὑμᾶι ἄνηρ ἡδιστος ἀοίνῳ ἐνθάδε πωλείται καὶ τέφρ τέρπεσθε μάλιστα;" ὑμεῖς δ᾽ εὐ μάλα πάσαι ὑποκρίνασθαι εὐφήμως! "Τυφλὸς ἄνηρ, οἶκεὶ δὲ Χίῳ ἐνι παιπαλοέσσῃ." 6

Τοσαῦτα μὲν "Ομήρος ἐτεκμηρίωσεν ὅτι ἦν καὶ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλη ξύνοδος καὶ ἐορτὴ ἐν τῇ Δήλῳ. ὕστερον δὲ τοὺς μὲν χοροὺς οἱ νησιώται καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μεθ᾽ ἱερῶν ἐπεμπον, τὰ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀγώνας καὶ τὰ πλείστα κατελύθη ὑπὸ ξυμφορῶν, ὡς εἰκός, πρὸν δὴ οἱ Ἁθηναίοι τότε τὸν ἀγώνα ἐποίησαν καὶ ἐπιποδρομίας, δὲ πρῶτον οὐκ ἦν.

CV. Τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Ἀμπρακιόταται, ὑστερ ὑποσχόμενοι Εὐρυλόχω ἡν την στρατιάν κατέσχον, ἐκστρατεύονται ἐπὶ Ἀργος τὸ Ἀμφιλοχικὸν τρισχιλίον ὑπύλαιας, καὶ ἐσβάλοντες ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν καταλαμβάνουσιν Ὀλπας, τεῖχος ἕπὶ λόφον ἱσχυρὸν πρὸς τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὁ ποτε Ἀκαρνάνες χεισχάμενοι κοινῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἐχρώντο· ἀπέχει δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀργείων πόλεως

1 εὐφήμως, Hude ἄφημως.
women he ends his praise of them with the following verses, in which he also mentions himself:

"Come now, let Apollo be gracious and Artemis likewise, and farewell, all ye maidens. Yet remember me even in after times, whenever some other toil-enduring man, a dweller upon the earth, shall visit this isle and ask: 'O maidens, what man is the sweetest of minstrels to you of all who wander hither, and in whom do you take most delight?' Do you make answer, all with one accord, in gentle words, 'The blind man who dwells in rugged Chios.'"

Such is Homer's testimony, showing that in ancient times also there was a great concourse and festival in Delos. And in later times the people of the islands and the Athenians continued to send their choruses with sacrifices, but the contests, and indeed most of the ceremonies, fell into disuse in consequence, probably, of calamities, until the Athenians, at the time of which we now speak, restored the contests and added horse-races, of which there had been none before.

CV. During the same winter the Ambraciots, fulfilling the promise by which they had induced Eurylochus to keep his army there, made an expedition against Amphilochian Argos with three thousand hoplites, and invading its territory took Olpae, a stronghold on the hill near the sea, which the Acarnanians had fortified and had at one time used as a common tribunal of justice; and it is
Thucydides

ἐπιθαλασσίας οὖσης πέντε καὶ εἰκοσι σταδίους
2 μάλιστα. οἱ δὲ Ἄκαρνανεὶς οἱ μὲν ἐς Ἀργος
ξυνεβόησον, οἱ δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιλοχίας ἐν τούτῳ τῷ
χωρίῳ ὁ Κρήναι καλεῖται, φυλάσσοντες τοὺς
μετὰ Εὐρυλόχου Πελοποννησίους μὴ λάθωσι πρὸς
τοὺς Ἀμπρακιώτας διελθόντες, ἐστρατοπεδεύ-
3 σαντο. πέμπτους δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ Δημοσθένη τὸν ἐς
τὴν Αἰτωλίαν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγήσαντα, ὅπως
σφίσιν ἕγερμὼν γίγνεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς εἰκοσί ναῦς
Ἀθηναίων αἱ ἑτυχοῦν περὶ Πελοπόννησον ὁδοῖς,
ὡν ἤρχεν Ἀριστοτέλης τε ὁ Τιμοκράτους καὶ
4 Ἰεροθῶν ὁ Ἀντιμηνίστου. ἀπέστειλαν δὲ καὶ
ἀγγείον οἱ περὶ τὰς Ὁλπας Ἀμπρακιώται ἐς
τὴν πόλιν κελεύοντες σφίσι βοηθεῖν πανδημεία,
δεδομένος μὴ οἱ μετ’ Εὐρυλόχου οὐ δύνονται διελ-
θεῖν τοὺς Ἀκαρνάνας καὶ σφίσιν ἡ μονωθεῖσιν
ἡ μάχη γένηται ἡ ἀναχωρεῖν βουλομένους οὐκ ἦ
ἀσφαλές.

CVI. Οἱ μὲν οὖν μετ’ Εὐρυλόχου Πελοπο-
nήσιοι ὡς ἧσθοντο τοὺς ἐν Ὁλπας Ἀμπρακιώτας
ηκοντας, ἀραντες ἐκ του Προσχίου ἐβοήθουν κατὰ
tάχος, καὶ διαβάντες τοῦ Ἀχελῶν ἐχώρουν δι’
Ἀκαρνανίας οὐσης έρήμου διὰ τὴν ἐς Ἀργος
βοίθειαν, ἐν δεξίᾳ μὲν ἐχοντες τὴν Στρατίων
πόλιν καὶ τὴν φρουράν αὐτῶν, ἐν ἀριστερὰ δὲ τὴν
2 ἀλλήν Ἀκαρνανίαν. καὶ διελθόντες τὴν Στρα-

1 After the return of the thirty ships (ch. xcviii. 5), these twenty had been sent out again round the Peloponnesus.
about twenty-five stadia from the city of Argos, which is by the sea. Meanwhile some of the Acarnanian troops came to the relief of Argos, while the rest encamped at a place in Amphilochia which is called Crenae, keeping guard to prevent the Peloponnesians with Eurylochus from passing through unobserved to join the Ambraciots. They also sent for Demosthenes, who had led the army of the Athenians into Aetolia, to come and be their leader, as well as for the twenty Athenian ships which happened to be off the coast of Peloponnesus under the command of Aristotle son of Timocrates and Hierophon son of Antimnestus. A messenger was also sent by the Ambraciots at Olpae to the city of Ambracia with a request that all the forces of the town should be dispatched to their aid, for they feared that Eurylochus and his troops might not be able to make their way through the Acarnanians, and, in that case, that they themselves would either have to fight single-handed, or, if they wished to retreat, would find that unsafe.

CVI. Now the Peloponnesian forces under Eurylochus, when they learned that the Ambraciots had arrived at Olpae, set out from Proschium with all speed to reinforce them, and crossing the Acheloüs advanced through Acarnania, which was without defenders because of the reinforcements which had been sent to Argos, and as they advanced they had the city of Stratus with its garrison on their right, and the rest of Acarnania on their left. Then traversing the territory of the Stratians they advanced through

Their real goal was Naupactus (ch. cxiv. 2), but answering the appeal of the Acarnanians they turned aside for the moment to the Ambracian Gulf (ch. cvii. 1).
τιων γην ἐχώρουν διὰ τῆς Φυτίας καὶ αὐθις Μεδεὼνος παρ' ἐσχατα, ἐπειτα διὰ Λιμναίας; καὶ ἐπέβησαν τῆς Ἀγραίων, οὐκέτι Ἀκαρναίας, 3 φιλίας δὲ σφίσιν. λαβόμενοι δὲ τοῦ Ἐνάμον ὄρους, ὃ ἐστιν Ἀγραίκων, ἐχώρουν δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ κατέβησαν ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν νυκτὸς ἦδη, καὶ διεξελθόντες μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ἀργείων πόλεως καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ Κρήναις Ἀκαρνάνων φυλακῆς ἔλαθον καὶ προσεμείζαν τοὺς ἐν Ὁλπαις Ἀμπρακιώτας.

CVII. Γενόμενοι δὲ ἄθροι ἀμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καθίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν Μητρόπολιν καλουμένην καὶ στρατόπεδου ἐποιήσαντο. Ἀθηναίοι δὲ ταῖς εἰκοσι ναυσιν οὐ πολλῷ υστερον παραγίγονται ἐς τὸν Ἁμπρακικὸν κόλπον βοηθοῦντες τοῖς Ἀργείοις, καὶ Δημοσθένης Μεσσηνίων μὲν ἔχων διακοσίους ὀπλίτας, ἐξήκουτα δὲ τοξότας Ἀθη-

2 ναίων, καὶ αἰ μὲν νῆς περὶ τὰς Ὁλπας τὸν λόφον ἐκ θαλάσσης ἐφώμουν· οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνάνες καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων ὁλίγοι (οἱ γὰρ πλείους ὑπὸ Ἁμπρακιωτῶν βίᾳ κατείχοντο) ἐς τῷ Ἀργος ἦδη ξυνεληλυθότες παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς μαχούμενοι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, καὶ ἤγεμόνα τοῦ παντὸς ἐξερρικοῦ αἴρονται Δημοσθένη μετὰ τῶν σφετέρων στρατηγῶν. ὁ δὲ προσαγαγὼν ἐγγύς τῆς Ὁλπης ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο· χαράδρα δ' αὐτοῦ μεγάλη διείργεν. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν πέντε ἡσύχαζον, τῇ δ' ἐκτῇ ἐτάσσοντο ἀμφότεροι ὡς ἐς μάχην. καὶ (μεῖζον γὰρ ἐγένετο καὶ περιέσχε τὸ τῶν Πελο-

3 πονησίων στρατόπεδου) ὁ Δημοσθένης δείσας

1 Ἀγραίκων, for ἀγροῖκων or ἀγριοῖκων of the MSS., corrected by O. Mueller.
2 τοῦ λόφου, deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.

188
Phytia, from there skirted the borders of Medeon, and then passed through Limnaea; and finally they reached the country of the Agraecians, being now outside of Acarnania and in a friendly country. Arriving next at Mt. Thyamus, which belongs to the Agraecians, they went through the pass over it and came down into Argive territory after nightfall, whence they succeeded in passing unobserved between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian guard at Crenae, finally joining the Ambraciot at Olpae.

CVII. After the two armies had effected a junction, at daybreak they took post at a place called Metropolis and made camp. Not long afterwards the Athenians with their twenty ships arrived in the Ambracian Gulf, reinforcing the Argives; and Demosthenes also came with two hundred Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen. The ships lay at sea about the hill of Olpae, blockading it; but the Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians—for most of these were kept from moving by the Ambraciotshad already gathered at Argos and were preparing for battle with their opponents, having chosen Demosthenes to command the whole allied force in concert with their own generals. And he, leading them close to Olpae, encamped; and a great ravine separated the two armies. For five days they kept quiet, but on the sixth both sides drew up in order of battle. Now the army of the Peloponnesians was larger than that of Demosthenes and outflanked it; he, therefore, fearing that he
μὴ κυκλωθῇ λοχίζει εἰς οδόν τινα κοίλην καὶ λοχμώδη ὀπλίταις καὶ ψιλοῦς ἐυναμφοτέρους ἐς τετρακοσίους, ὅπως κατὰ τὸ ύπερέχον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐν τῇ ἕυνόδῳ αὐτῆ ἐξαναστάντες οὕτωι κατὰ νώτου γίγνωνται. ἐπεὶ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο ἀμφοτέροις, ἦσαν ἐς χεῖρας, Δημοσθένης μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχων μετὰ Μεσσηνίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὀλίγων· τὸ δὲ ἄλλο Ἀκαρνάνες ὡς ἔκαστοι τεταγμένοι ἐπείχον καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων οἱ παρόντες ἀκουσταί. Πελοποννήσιοι δὲ καὶ Ἀμπρακίωται ἀναμίξα τεταγμένοι πλῆν Μαντινεῶν οὕτωι δὲ ἐν τῷ εὐωνύμῳ μᾶλλον καὶ οὐ τὸ κέρας ἀκρον ἔχοντες ἀθρόοι ἦσαν, ἀλλ' Ἐυρύλοχος ἔσχατον εἰχε τὸ εὐωνύμον καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ, κατὰ Μεσσηνίους καὶ Δημοσθένην.

CVIII. Ὁς δ' ἐν χερσὶν ἦδη ὄντες περιέσχον τῷ κέρα ὦι Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ἐκυκλοῦντο τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ἐναντίων, οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας Ἀκαρνάνες ἐπιγενόμενοι αὐτοῖς κατὰ νώτου προσπίπτουσι τε καὶ τρέπουσιν, ὡστε μῆτε ἐς ἀλκήν ὑπομείνας φοβηθέντας τε ἐς φυγήν καὶ τὸ πλέον τοῦ στρατεύματος καταστήσαι ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἴδον τὸ κατ' Ἐυρύλοχον καὶ ὁ κράτιστον ἦν διαφθειρόμενον, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐφοβοῦντο. καὶ οἱ Μεσσηνίοι ὄντες ταύτη μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους τὸ πολὺ τοῦ 2 ἐργοῦ ἐπεξῆλθον. οἱ δὲ Ἀμπρακίωται καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἐνίκων τὸ καθ' ἐαυτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὸ Ἀργος ἐπεδίωξαν ἕπεδίωξαν. καὶ γὰρ μαχιμώτατοι

1 ἐπεδίωξαν, for ἐπεδίωξαν of the MSS., Haase's conjecture.
might be surrounded, stationed in a sunken road overgrown with bushes an ambush of hoplites and light-troops, about four hundred all together, his purpose being that in the very moment of collision these troops should leap from their hiding-place and take the enemy in the rear at the point where his line overlapped. When both sides were ready they came to close quarters. Demosthenes with the Messenians and a few Athenian troops had the right wing; the rest of the line was held by the Acarnanians, arrayed by tribes, and such Amphi-lochian javelin-men as were present. But the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were mingled together, except the Mantineans; these were massed more on the left wing, though not at its extremity, for that position, which was opposite Demosthenes and the Messenians, was held by Eurylochus and the troops under him.

CVIII. When finally the armies were at close quarters and the Peloponnesians outflanked with their left the right wing of their opponents and were about to encircle it, the Acarnanians, coming upon them from their ambush, fell upon their rear and routed them, so that they did not stand to make resistance and in their panic caused the greater part of their army to take to flight also; for when they saw the division under Eurylochus, their best troops, being cut to pieces, they were far more panic-stricken. And it was the Messenians, who were in this part of the field under the command of Demosthenes, that bore the brunt of the battle. On the other hand, the Ambraciots and those on the enemy’s right wing defeated the troops opposed to themselves, and pursued them to Argos; and indeed
τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνα τὰ χωρία τυγχάνουσιν ὅντες.

3 ἐπαναχωροῦντες δὲ ὡς ἐώρων τὸ πλέον νευκηκέμενον καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀκαρνάνες σφίσι προσέκειντο, χαλεπῶς διεσέσκοντο ἐς τὰς Ὀλπας, καὶ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν, ἀτάκτως καὶ οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ προσπίπτοντες πλὴν Μαντινέων ὦτοι δὲ μάλιστα ἔχυντες ἄγεμον τοῖς στρατοῖς ἀνεχώρησαν. καὶ ἥ μὲν μάχῃ ἔτελεύτα ἐς ὅψῃ.

CIX. Μενεδάιος δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ Εὐρυλόχου τεθνεώτος καὶ Μακαρίου αὐτὸς παρειληφὼς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἀπὸ ὅψευς μεγάλης τῆς ἤσος γεγεινεμένης ὅτω τρόπῳ ἡ μένων πολυορκήσηται, ἐκ τε γῆς καὶ ἕκθαλάσσης ταῖς Ἀττικαῖς ναυσὶν ἀποκεκλημένοις, ἡ καὶ ἀναχωρῶν διασωθήσεται, προσφέρει λόγον περὶ στουνδῶν καὶ ἀναχωρήσεως Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς Ἀκαρνάνων στρατηγοῖς καὶ 2 περὶ νεκρῶν ἁμα ἀναίρεσεσι. οἱ δὲ νεκροὺς μὲν ἀπέδοσαν καὶ τροπαῖον αὐτοῦ ἔστησαν καὶ τοὺς ἐαυτῶν τριακοσίους μάλιστα ἀποθανόντας ἀνείλλω τί ἀναχώρησιν δὲ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ προφανοῦς οὐκ ἐσπείσαντο ἀπασί, κρύφα δὲ Δημοσθένης μετὰ τῶν ἐυστατής ὑμῶν τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων σπένδονται Μαντινεύσι καὶ Μενεδάιῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρχουσι τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ ὅσοι αὐτῶν ἠσαν ἀξιολογότατοι ἀποχωρεῖν κατὰ τάχος, Βουλιόμενος ψιλῶσαι τοὺς Ἀμπρακίωτας τοῖς καὶ τῶν μισθοφόροις ὄχλοι, μάλιστα δὲ Λακεδαι-
these are the best fighters of all the peoples of that region. When, however, they returned and saw that their main army had been defeated, and the victorious division of the Acarnanians began to press hard upon them, they made their escape with difficulty to Olpae; and many of them were killed, for they rushed on with broken ranks and in disorder. All except the Mantineans, who kept their ranks together during the retreat better than any other part of the army. And it was late in the evening before the battle ended.

CIX. On the next day, since Eurylochos and Macarius had been slain, Menedaus had on his own responsibility assumed the command, but the defeat had been so serious that he was at his wit's end how, if he remained, he could stand a siege, blockaded as he was by both land and sea by the Athenian fleet, or, if he retreated, could get away safely. He therefore made overtures to Demosthenes and the Athenian generals regarding a truce for his retreat and also about the recovery of his dead. And they gave back the dead, set up a trophy themselves, and took up their own dead, about three hundred in number. They would not, however, openly agree to a retreat for the whole army, but Demosthenes with his Acarnanian colleagues secretly agreed that the Mantineans and Menedaus and the other Peloponnesian commanders and the most influential men among them might go back home, if they did so speedily. Their object was to isolate the Ambraciots and the miscellaneous crowd of mercenaries,¹ and above all to

¹ Opinions differ as to who are meant. They were probably mercenaries from the neighbouring Epirote tribes in the pay of the Ambraciots.
μονίους καὶ Πελοποννησίους διαβαλεῖν ἐς τοὺς ἐκείνην χρήζων "Ελλήνας ὡς καταπροδότες τὸ ἐαυτῶν προυργιαίτερον ἐποιήσαντο. καὶ οἱ μὲν τοὺς τε νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο καὶ διὰ τὰχους ἔθαπτον, ὡσπερ ὑπήρχε, καὶ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν κρύφα οἰς ἐδέδοτο ἐπεβούλευν.

CXL. Τῷ δὲ Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς Ἁκαρνανῖσιν ἀγγέλλεται τοὺς Ἀμπρακιώτας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πανδημεί κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐκ τῶν Ὀλπῶν ἀγγελίαν ἐπιβοθεῖν διὰ τῶν Ἀμφιλόχων, βουλομένους τοῖς ἐν Ὀλπαις ξυμμείξαι εἴδοτας οὐδὲν τῶν γεγενημένων. καὶ πέμπει εὐθὺς τοῦ στρατοῦ μέρος τι τὰς ὄδους προλοχιούντας καὶ τὰ καρτερὰ προκαταληψομένους, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ ἀμα παρεσκευάζετο βοηθεῖν ἐπὶ αὐτοὺς.

CXI. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Μαντινῆς καὶ οἳς ἐσπειστὸ πρόφασιν ἐπὶ λαχανισμὸν καὶ φρυγάνων εὐλογίαν ἐξελθόντες ὑπανήσαν κατὰ ὀλύγους, ἀμα εὐλλέγοντες ἐφ᾽ ὡς ἐξῆλθον δὴθεν προκεχωρικότες δὲ ἡ ἀπώθεν τῆς Ὀλπης θάσσου ἀπεχὼρουν. οἱ δὲ Ἀμπρακιώται καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι μὲν ἐτύγχανον οὕτως ἄθροοι ἐξενελθόντες, ὡς ἐγνωσαν ἀπίόντας, ὀρμησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἔθεν 3 ὄρομον, ἐπικαταλαβεῖν βουλόμενοι. οἱ δὲ Ἁκαρνάνους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον καὶ πάντας ἐνόμισαν ἀπιέναι

1 Hude reads ὅσοι μὴ ἐτύγχανον τούτοις ἄθροοι ἐξενελθόντες.

1 As distinguished from the Ambraciots who after the battle were shut up in Olpae (ch. cxii. 2).
2 The text is most probably corrupt. Classen offers the best remedy: οἱ δὲ Ἀμπρακιώται καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι μονούμενοι ἐτύγχανον οὕτως, ἔθροι ἐξενελθόντες ὡς ἐγνωσαν.

194
discredit the Lacedaemonians and the Peloponnesians with the Hellenes of this region, on the ground that they had committed an act of treachery through preference for their own selfish interests. Accordingly the Peloponnesians took up their dead and hastily buried them as best they could, while those who had permission began secretly to plan their retreat.

CX. Word was now brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the inhabitants of the city of Ambracia, in response to the first message that came from Olynth, were marching in full force through the Amphipolician territory, wishing to join the forces in Olynth, and that they were quite unaware of what had happened. So he immediately sent a part of his army to forestall these troops by setting ambuscades along the roads and occupying the strong positions, and at the same time began preparations to lead the rest of the army against them.

CXI. In the meantime the Mantineans and the others who were included in the agreement, leaving camp on the pretext of gathering pot-herbs and firewood, stole away in small groups, gathering at the same time what they pretended to have gone to seek; then when they had already got some distance from Olynth they quickened their pace. But the Ambraciots and all the others who happened to have come together in a body, when they realized that these were taking their departure, also set out themselves and ran at full speed, wishing to overtake them. But the Acarnanians at first thought that all the fugitives were going away without covenant.

ἄπιόντας ἐρμήσων καὶ αὐτόλ...: "But the Ambraciots and all the others who chanced to be left came together in a body, and when they realised that they were taking their departure set off also themselves..."
ἀστόνδους ἡμοίως καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ἐπε- δίωκον, καὶ τινὰς αὐτῶν τῶν στρατηγῶν κωλύ- οντας καὶ φάσκοντας ἐσπείρατο αὐτοῖς ἡκόντισε τις, νομίσας καταπροδίδοσθαι σφῆς. Ἐπείτα μέντοι τοὺς μὲν Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς Πελοπον- νησίους ἀφίεσαν, τοὺς δὲ Ἀμπρακιώτας ἐκτείνον.
4 καὶ ἦν πολλή ἔρις καὶ ἄγνοια εἰτε Ἀμπρακιώτης τις ἐστίν εἰτε Πελοποννήσιος. καὶ ἔς διακοσίους μὲν τινὰς αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν οἱ δ' ἄλλοι διε- φυγόν ἐς τὴν Ἀγραίδα ὄμορον ὅταν, καὶ Σαλύ- θιος αὐτοὺς ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἀγραίων φίλος ὅν ὑπεδέξατο.

Ως δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Ἀμπρακιώται ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπ' Ἰδομενίν. ἔστον δὲ δύο λόφων ἦ Ἰδομενίη ὑψηλῶς τούτων τὸν μὲν μείζω νυκτος ἐπιγενομένης οἱ προαποσταλέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ Δη- μοσθένους ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἔλαθον τε καὶ ἔφθασαν προκαταλαβόντες, τὸν δ' ἐλάσσω 1 ἔτυ- χον οἱ Ἀμπρακιώται προαναβάντες καὶ ηὔλι- 2 σαντο. ο δὲ Δημοσθένης δειπνήσας ἐχὸρει καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στρατεύμα ἀπὸ ἐσπέρας εὐθὺς, αὐτὸς μὲν τὸ ἱμαῖν ἔχον ἐπὶ τῆς ἑσβολῆς, τὸ δ' ἄλλο 3 διὰ τῶν Ἀμφιλοχικῶν ὄρων. καὶ ἀμα ὀρθρο ἐπιπίπτει τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ἐτι ἐν ταῖς εὐναίς καὶ οὐ προσθημένοις τὰ γεγενημένα, ἀλλὰ πολὺ 4 μᾶλλον νομίσασι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν εἶναι καὶ γὰρ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους πρῶτος ἐπίτηδες ὁ Δημοσθένης προύταξε καὶ προσαγορεύειν ἐκέλευε, Δωρίδα τε γλῶσσαν ἵντας καὶ τοῖς προφύλαξι πίστιν παρε- χομένους, ἀμα δὲ καὶ οὐ καθορωμένοις τῇ ὁψει 1 ἐσ is inserted before τὸν δ' ἐλάσσῳ by Hude, following Krüger.

196
or truce and therefore set off in pursuit of the Peloponnesians; and when some of the generals tried to prevent this, saying that a truce had been made with them, someone hurled javelins at them, believing that they had been betrayed. Afterwards, however, they let the Mantineans and Peloponnesians go, but began to kill the Ambraciots. And there was much dispute and uncertainty as to whether a man was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. About two hundred of the Ambraciots were slain; the rest of the fugitives escaped into the neighbouring country of Agraeia, and were received by Salynthius the king of the Agraeans, who was friendly to them.

CXII. Meanwhile the troops from the city of Ambracia arrived at Idomene. Now it consists of two lofty hills, and of these the higher had already been seized unobserved during the night by the troops which Demosthenes had sent forward from his main army; but the lower had previously, as it chanced, been ascended by the Ambraciots, who spent the night there. After dinner Demosthenes and the rest of the army set out immediately after nightfall, he himself with half of them making for the pass, while the rest took the road through the Amphilochian mountains. And at dawn he fell upon the Ambraciots, who were still in their beds and had no knowledge at all of what had previously happened. On the contrary, they supposed these troops to be their own men, for Demosthenes had purposely put the Messenians in front and directed them to accost the enemy in the Doric dialect, thus getting themselves trusted by the outposts; besides, they were indistinguishable to the sight, since it was still dark.
5 νυκτὸς ἔτη οὐσίς. ὡς οὖν ἐπέπεσε τῷ στρατεύματι αὐτῶν, τρέπουσι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς αὐτοῦ διέφθειραν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ κατὰ τὰ ὄρη ἐστὶν φυγήν ὀρμήσαν. προκατειλημμένων δὲ τῶν ὀδῶν, καὶ ἀμα τῶν μὲν 'Αμφιλόχων ἐμπείρων ὄντων τῆς έαυτῶν γῆς καὶ ψυλῶν πρὸς ὀπλίτας, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων καὶ ἀνεπιστημόνων ὑπὲρ τράπων ταῦτα, ἐσπίπτοντες ἐστὶ τὰς χαράδρας καὶ τὰς προλέο-7 χισμένας ἐνέδρας διεφθειρόντο. καὶ ἐστὶ πᾶσαν ἢδεάν χωρήσαντες τῆς φυγῆς ἐτράποντο τινὲς καὶ ἐστὶ τῆς θάλασσαν οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχουσαν, καὶ ὡς εἰδόν τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναῦς παραπλεούσας ἠμα τοῦ ἔργου τῆς ξυμνικίας, προσένευσαν, ἐγγυσάμενοι εἰν τῷ αὐτικὴ φόβῳ κρείσησον εἶναι σφίσον ὕπο τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν, εἰ δεῖ, διαφθαρήναι ἢ ὕπο τῶν 8 βαρβάρων καὶ ἑχθέστων 'Αμφιλόχων. οἱ μὲν οὖν 'Αμπρακιώται τοιοῦτος τρόπῳ κακωθέντες ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐσώθησαν ἐν τῇ πόλιν. 'Ακαρνάνες δὲ σκυλεύσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τροπαία στήσαντες ἀπεχώρησαν ἐστὶ Ἀργος.

CHIII. Καὶ αὐτοῖς τῇ ύστερᾳ ἡλθε κήρυξ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐστὶ Ἀγραῖοις καταφυγόντων ἐκ τῆς Ὀλυπῆς Ἀμπρακιώτων, ἀναίρεσιν αἰτήσων τῶν νεκρῶν οὖς ἀπεκτέιναν υστερον τῆς πρῶτης μάχης, ὅτε μετὰ τῶν Μαντινέων καὶ τῶν ὑποστόν-2 δῶν ξυμνεῖσαν ἀσπονδοί. ιδὼν δ' ὁ κήρυξ τὰ ὅπλα τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως Ἀμπρακιώτων ἔθαυμαζε τὸ πλῆθος· οὐ γὰρ ἤδει τὸ πάθος, ἀλλ' ὡδο
So they fell upon the army of the Ambraciots and put them to rout, slaying the majority of them on the spot; the rest took to flight over the mountains. But as the roads had already been occupied, and as, moreover, the Amphilochians were well acquainted with their own country and were light infantry opposing heavy-armed troops, whereas the Ambraciots were ignorant of the country and did not know which way to turn, under these circumstances the fleeing men fell into ravines and into ambushes which had previously been set for them and perished. And some of them, after resorting to every manner of flight, even turned to the sea, which was not far distant, and seeing the Athenian ships, which were sailing along the coast at the very time when the action was taking place, swam toward them, thinking in the panic of the moment that it was better for them to be slain, if slain they must be, by the crews of the ships than by the barbarian and detested Amphilochians. In this manner, then, the Ambraciots suffered disaster, and but few out of many returned in safety to their city; the Acarnanians, on the other hand, after stripping the dead and setting up trophies, returned to Argos.

CXIII. On the next day a herald came to the Athenians from the Ambraciots who had escaped from Olpae and taken refuge among the Agraeanls, to ask for the bodies of those who had been slain after the first battle, at the time when unprotected by a truce these attempted to leave Olpae along with the Mantineans and the others who were included in the truce. Now when the herald saw the arms taken from the Ambraciots who came from the city, he was amazed at their number; for he did not know of the recent disaster, but thought that
τῶν μετὰ σφῶν εἶναι. καὶ τις αὐτῶν ἥρετο ὁ τι θαυμάζοι καὶ ὁπόσοι αὐτῶν τεθνᾶσιν, οἴομενος
αὐ ὁ ἐρωτῶν εἶναι τῶν κήρυκα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰδο-
μεναῖς. ὁ δ' ἐφή διακοσίων μάλιστα. ὑπολα-
βῶν δ' ὁ ἐρωτῶν εἶπεν· "Οὐκοιν τὰ ὀπλα ταυτὶ
dιακοσίων\(^1\) φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλέον ἡ χιλίων." 
αὕρις δὲ εἶπεν ἐκεῖνος· "Οὐκ ἀρα τῶν μεθ' ἡμῶν
μαχομένων ἐστίν." ὁ δ' ἀπεκρίνατο· "Εἴπερ γε
ἡμεῖς ἐν Ἰδομενή χθές ἐμάχεσθε." "Ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς
γε οὐδενὶ ἐμαχόμεθα χθές, ἀλλὰ πρόην ἐν τῇ
ἀποχωρήσει." "Καὶ μὲν δὴ τούτων γε ἡμεῖς
χθές ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως βοηθήσασι τῆς Ἀμπρακιω-
5 τῶν ἐμαχόμεθα." ὁ δὲ κήρυξ ὡς ἤκουσε καὶ
ἐγνω ὅτι ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως βοήθεια διέφθαρται,
ἀνοιμώξας καὶ ἐκπλαγείς τῷ μεγέθει τῶν παρόν-
των κακῶν ἀπῆλθεν εὐθὺς ἄπρακτος καὶ οὐκέτι
6 ἀπῆτει τοὺς νεκροὺς. πάθος γὰρ τοῦτο μιᾷ θέ-
λει Ἐλληνίδι ἐν ἰσαίς ἡμέραις μέγιστον δὴ τῶν
catat τῶν πόλεων τόνδε ἐγένετο. καὶ ἀριθμῶν
οὐκ ἐγράφα τῶν ἀποθανόντων, ἐιτοὶ ἀπιστοῦ τὸ
πλῆθος λέγεται ἀπολέσθαι ὡς πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος
tῆς πόλεως. Ἀμπρακίαν μέντοι οἴδα ὅτι, εἰ
ἐβουλήθησαν Ἀκαρνάνες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι Ἀθη-
ναίοις καὶ Δημοσθένει πειθόμενοι ἐπελθεῖν, αὐ-
τοβοεῖ ἂν εἰλον· νῦν δ' ἐδεισαν μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι

\(^1\) διακοσίων, added by Krüger.
the arms belonged to the men of his own division. And someone asked him why he was amazed, and how many of his comrades had been slain, the questioner on his part supposing that the herald had come from the forces which had fought at Idomene. The herald answered, “About two hundred.” The questioner said in reply, “These arms, though, are clearly not those of two hundred men, but of more than a thousand.” And again the herald said, “Then they are not the arms of our comrades in the battle.” The other answered, “They are, if it was you who fought yesterday at Idomene.” “But we did not fight with anyone yesterday; it was the day before yesterday, on the retreat.” “And it is certain that we fought yesterday with these men, who were coming to your aid from the city of the Ambraciots.” When the herald heard this and realized that the force which was coming to their relief from the city had perished, he lifted up his voice in lamentation and, stunned by the magnitude of the calamity before him, departed at once, forgetting his errand and making no request for the dead. Indeed this was the greatest calamity that befell any one Hellenic city in an equal number of days during the course of this whole war. The number of those who fell I have not recorded, seeing that the multitude reported to have perished is incredible when compared with the size of the city. I know, however, that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had been willing to hearken to the Athenians and Demosthenes and had made an attack upon Ambracia they would have taken it at the first onset; but as it was, they were afraid that the Athenians, if they
ἐχουντες αυτὴν χαλεπώτεροι σφίσι πάροικοι ὑσιν.

CXIV. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτα τρίτον μέρος νείμαντες τῶν σκύλων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὰς πόλεις διείλοντο. καὶ τὰ μὲν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πλέοντα ἕαλω, τὰ δὲ νῦν ἀνακείμενα ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ἱεροῖς Δημοσθένει ἐξηρέθησαν τριακό- σιαι πανοπλίαι, καὶ ἀγὼν αὐτὰς κατέπλευσεν· καὶ ἐγένετο ἀμα αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Λίτωλίας ξυμφορὰν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πράξεως ἀδεεστέρα ἡ 2 κάθοδος. ἀπῆλθον δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐν ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυ- σίν Ἀθηναίοι ἐς Ναύπακτον. Ἀκαρνάνες δὲ καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Δημοσ- θένους τοῖς ὡς Σαλυνθίουν καὶ Ἀγραίους καταφυ- γοῦσιν Ἀμπρακιώταις καὶ Πελοπονησίοις ἀνα- χώρησιν ἐσπείσαντο ἐξ Οινιαδῶν οἴπερ καὶ μετα- 3 ἐστήσαν παρὰ Σαλυνθίου. καὶ ἐς τὸν ἑπετά χρόνον σπουδᾶς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἐποίησαντο ἕκα- τον ἐτη Ἀκαρνάνες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι πρὸς Ἀμπρα- κιώτας ἐπὶ τὸι ὁδὸς, ὡστε μήτε Ἀμπρακιώτας μετὰ Ἀκαρνάνων στρατεύειν ἐπὶ Πελοπονησίοις μήτε Ἀκαρνάνως μετὰ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ἐπὶ Ἀθη- ναίους, βοηθεῖν δὲ τῇ ἄλληλῳ, καὶ ἀποδοῦναι Ἀμπρακιώτας ὀπόσα ἡ χωρία ἡ ὁμήρους Ἀμφι- λόχων ἔχουσι, καὶ ἐπὶ Ἀνακτόριου μὴ βοηθεῖν 4 πολέμιον ὁν Ἀκαρνάσιν. ταῦτα ξυνθεμενοι διέ- λυσαν τὸν πόλεμον. μεγὰ δὲ ταύτα Κορίνθιοι

202
had the town in their possession, would be more troublesome neighbours than the Ambraciots.

CXIV. After this the Acarnanians apportioned a third of the booty to the Athenians and distributed the rest among their cities. The portion which fell to the Athenians was captured from them on the voyage home; but the dedicatory offerings now to be seen in the Athenian temples, consisting of three hundred panoplies, were set apart as Demosthenes' share, and were brought home by him when he returned. Furthermore, his return could now, in consequence of this exploit, be made with less apprehension after his earlier misfortune in Aetolia. The Athenians in the twenty ships also departed, returning to Naupactus. As for the Acarnanians and Amphilochnians, after the Athenians and Demosthenes had gone home, they concluded a truce with the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthius and the Agraecans, allowing them to withdraw from Oeniadae, whither they had gone after leaving Salynthius. The Acarnanians and Amphilochnians also concluded for the future a treaty of alliance with the Ambraciots to last for one hundred years, on the following terms: The Ambraciots were not to join the Acarnanians in any expedition against the Peloponnesians; nor were the Acarnanians to join the Ambraciots against the Athenians, but they were to give aid in defence of one another's territory; the Ambraciots were to restore all places or hostages belonging to the Amphilochnians which they now held; and they were not to give aid to Anactorium, which was hostile to the Acarnanians. On these terms of agreement they brought the war to an end. But
THUCYDIDES

φυλακὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐς τὴν Ἀμπρακίαν ἀπέστειλαν ἐς τριακοσίους ὀπλίτας καὶ Ξενοκλέιδαν τὸν Εὐθυκλέους ἀρχονταί. οἱ κομιζόμενοι χαλεπῶς διὰ τῆς ἱππεῖρου ἀφίκοντο. τὰ μὲν κατ' Ἀμπρακίαν οὕτως ἐγένετο.

CXV. Οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Σικελία Ἀθηναίοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος ἐς τῇ Ἰμεραίαν ἀπόβασιν ἐποιήσαντο ἐκ τῶν νεῶν μετὰ τῶν Σικελῶν τῶν ἀνωθεν ἐσβεβληκτῶν ἐς τὰ ἔσχατα τῆς Ἰμεραίας καὶ 2 ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰόλους νῆσους ἐπλευσαν. ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἐς Ρήγμων Πυθόδωρον τοῦ Ἰσολόχου, Ἀθηναίον στρατηγόν, καταλαμβάνουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς 3 ναῦς διάδοχον ὅν ὁ Δάχης ἦρχεν. οἱ γὰρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ξύμμαχοι πλεύσαντες ἐπεισαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βοηθεῖν σφίσι πλείσι ναυσίν τῆς μὲν γὰρ γῆς αὐτῶν οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐκράτουν, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης ὀλίγαις ναυσίν εἰργόμενοι παρεσκευάζοντο ναυτικῶν ἑυναγείροντες ὃς οὒ περι- 4 ὁψόμενοι. καὶ ἐπλήρουν ναῦς τεσσαράκοντα οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ὡς ἀποστελοῦντες αὐτοῖς, ἀμα μὲν ἡγούμενοι βάσσου τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον καταλυθῆσθαι, ἀμα δὲ βουλόμενοι μελέτην τοῦ ναυτικοῦ 5 ποιεῖσθαι. τὸν μὲν οὖν ἑνα τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπέστειλαν Πυθόδωρον ὀλίγαις ναυσί, Σοφόκλεα δὲ τὸν Σωστρατίδου καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους 6 ἐπὶ τῶν πλειώνων νεῶν ἀποπέμψεις ἐμελλον. ὁ δὲ Πυθόδωρος ἡδὲ ἔχων τὴν τοῦ Δάχητος τῶν νεῶν ἀρχὴν ἐπλευσε τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος 204
BOOK III. cxiv. 4–cxv. 6

after this the Corinthians sent to Ambracia a garrison of their own troops, consisting of about three hundred hoplites, under the command of Xenocleidas son of Euthycles, who, making their way with difficulty across the mainland, finally reached their destination. Such was the course of events at Ambracia.

CXV. During the same winter the Athenians in Sicily made a descent from their ships upon the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels from the interior who had invaded the extreme border of Himeraea; and they also sailed against the islands of Aeolus. Returning thence to Rhegium, they found that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, an Athenian general, had come to succeed Laches in command of the fleet. For their allies in Sicily had sailed to Athens and persuaded them to aid them with a larger fleet; for though their territory was dominated by the Syracusans, yet since they were kept from the sea by only a few ships they were collecting a fleet and making preparations with the determination not to submit. And the Athenians manned forty ships to send to them, partly because they believed that the war in Sicily could sooner be brought to an end in this way, and partly because they wished to give practice to their fleet. Accordingly they despatched one of their generals, Pythodorus, with a few ships, and were planning later on to send Sophocles son of Sostratidas and Eurymedon son of Thucles with the main body of the fleet. Pythodorus, now that he had taken over the command of Laches' ships, sailed toward the end of the winter against the Locrian fort which

1 i.e. toward the interior.
ἐπὶ τὸ Δοκρῶν φρούριον ὁ πρῶτος Λάχης εἶλεν· καὶ νικηθεὶς μάχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν Δοκρῶν ἀπεχώρησεν.

CXVI. Ἐρρύη δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἑαρ τούτο ὁ ῥύαξ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τῆς Αἴτυνης, ὡσπερ καὶ πρῶτον. καὶ γῆν τινα ἐφθειρε τῶν Καταναίων, οἳ ὑπὸ τῇ Αἴτυνῃ τῷ ὁρεὶ οἰκοῦσιν, ὑπὲρ μέγιστὸν

2 ἑστὶν ὄρος ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ. λέγεται δὲ πεντηκοστῷ ἔτει ῥυήναι τοῦτο μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον ρέωμα, τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν τρὶς γεγενήσθαι τὸ ρέωμα ἅφ' οὗ

3 Σικελία ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων οἰκεῖται. ταῦτα μὲν κατὰ τὸν χειμῶνα τοῦτον ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῶδ' ὑπὸ Θουκυδίδης ἐξηγεῖται.

1 cf. ch. xcix.

2 The eruption of Aetna mentioned in the Parian Marble, lli. 67 f., as contemporaneous with the battle of Plataea (479 B.C.); so that the expression “fiftieth year” is not quite exact. From his form of expression in what follows, it
Laches had previously captured;\textsuperscript{1} but he was defeated in battle by the Locrians and returned to Rhegium.

CXVI. At the beginning of the following spring\textsuperscript{425 B.C.} the stream of fire burst from Aetna, as it had on former occasions. And it devastated a portion of the territory of the Catanaeans who dwell on the slope of Mount Aetna, the highest mountain in Sicily. This eruption took place, it is said, fifty years after the last preceding one;\textsuperscript{2} and three eruptions all told are reported to have occurred since Sicily has been inhabited by the Hellenes.\textsuperscript{3} Such was the course of events in this winter, and therewith ended the sixth year of this war of which Thucydides composed the history.

is clear that Thucydides, when he wrote this passage, could have had no knowledge of an eruption later than 425 B.C. He must therefore have died before that of 396 B.C. or, if he lived after that date, never revised this passage.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{i.e.}, since the eighth century; see the account at the beginning of Book vi.
Δ

1. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους περὶ σίτου ἐκβολῆς Συρακοσίων δέκα νῆες πλεύσασαι καὶ Λοκρίδες ἔσαι Μεσσηνὴν τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ κατέλαβον, αὐτῶν ἐπαγαγομένων, καὶ ἀπέστη Μεσσηνὴν

2 Ἀθηναίων. ἔπραξαν δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ὀρῶντες προσβολὴν ἔχον τὸ χωρίον τῆς Σικελίας καὶ φοβοῦμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ εὗ αὐτοῦ ὀρμώμενοι ποτε σφίσι μείζοι παρισκευὴ ἐπέλθωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λοκροὶ κατὰ ἑχθος τὸ Ῥηγίων, Βουλόμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν αὐτοὺς καταπολεμεῖν. καὶ ἐσεβεβλήκεσαν ἀμα ἐς τὴν Ῥηγίων οἱ Λοκροὶ πανστρατία, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιβοήθῳσι τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, ἀμα δὲ καὶ ξυνεπαγόντων Ῥηγίων φυγάδων, οἱ ἤραν παρ’ αὐτοῖς τὸ γὰρ Ῥήγιον ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἑστασίαζε καὶ ἅδυνατα ἤν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοὺς Λοκροὺς ἀμύνεσθαι, ἤ καὶ

3 μᾶλλον ἐπετίθεντο. δημαστὼς δὲ οἱ μὲν Λοκροὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἀπεχώρησαν, αἱ δὲ νῆες Μεσσηνῆν ἐφρούρουν, καὶ ἄλλαι 1 πληροῦμεναι ἐμελλον τοῖσε ἑγκαθορμυσάμεναι τῶν πόλεμον ἐντεῦθεν ποιήσεσθαι.

4 1 αἱ, in the MSS. before πληροῦμεναι, deleted by Classen, followed by Hude.

210
BOOK IV

I. The next summer, about the time of the earing of the grain, ten Syracusan and as many Locrian ships sailed to Messene in Sicily and occupied it, going thither on the invitation of the inhabitants; and Messene revolted from Athens. The chief reason for this act, on the part of the Syracusans, was that they saw that the place offered a point of attack upon Sicily and were afraid that the Athenians might some time make it a base from which to move against Syracuse with a larger force; the motive of the Locrians was their hostility to the Regians, whom they desired to subdue by both land and sea. And, indeed, the Locrians had at this same time invaded the territory of the Regians with all their forces in order to prevent them from giving any aid to the Messenians; and, besides, some Regians who were living in exile among the Locrians also urged them to make the invasion; for Rhegium had for a long time been in a state of revolution, and it was impossible at the moment to make any defence against the Locrians, who were consequently the more eager to attack. The Locrians first ravaged the country and then withdrew their land forces, but their ships continued guarding Messene; and still other ships were now being manned to be stationed at Messene and to carry on war from there.
II. Ὄτι δε τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ ἡρος, πρὶν τὸν σῖτον ἐν ἀκμῇ εἶναι, Πελοποννησίου καὶ οἱ ἔξυμμαχοι ἔσεβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν (ἠγείτο δὲ Ἀγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασίλευς), 2 καὶ ἐγκαθεξόμενοι ἔδησον τὴν γῆν. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τὰς τε τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς ἐς Σικελίαν ἀπέστειλαν, ὡσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ στρατηγοὺς τοὺς ἐπιλοίπους Εὐρυμέδουν καὶ Σοφοκλέα. Πυθόδωρος γὰρ ὁ τρίτος αὐτῶν ἦδη προαύθετό ἐς Σικελίαν. εἶπον δὲ τούτοις καὶ Κερκυραίων ἀμα παραπλέοντας τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιμεληθήναι, οἱ ἐληστεύοντο ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὅρει φυγάδων καὶ Πελοποννησίων αὐτῶσε νῆσις ἔξηκοντα παρεπεπλεύκεσαν τοῖς ἐν τῷ ὅρει τιμωροὶ καὶ λιμοῖ δυναλοῦ ἐν τῇ πόλει νομίζοντες κατασχῆσει τὰ πράγματα. Δημοσθένει δὲ ὁντε ἐντα ἕτοι τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τὴν ἐς Ἀκαρνανίας αὐτῷ δεχόμενοι εἶπον χρῆσθαι ταῖς ναυσὶ ταῦταις, ἦν βουλήται, περὶ τὴν Πελοποννησίου.

III. Καὶ ὃς ἐγένοντο πλέοντες κατὰ τὴν Δακωνικὴν καὶ ἐπυγάνυντο ὑπὸ τοὺς Πελοποννησίων, ὁ μὲν Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἤπειροντο ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν, ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Πύλον πρῶτον ἐκέλευε σχόντας αὐτοὺς καὶ πράξαντας ἀ αυτῶν ποιεῖσθαι ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ κατὰ τύχην χειμῶν ἐπιγενόμενοι κατήνευκε τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ τὴν Πύλον. 2 καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης εὐθὺς ἦξιον τειχίζεσθαι τὸ
II. About the same time that spring, before the grain was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies made an invasion of Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians; and encamping there they ravaged the land. But the Athenians despatched the forty ships\(^1\) to Sicily, as they had previously planned, together with the two remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles, who were still at home; for Pythodorus, the third general, had already arrived in Sicily. These had instructions, as they sailed past Corycyna, to have a care for the inhabitants of the city, who were being plundered by the exiles on the mountain,\(^2\) and the Peloponnesians with sixty ships had already sailed thither, with the purpose of aiding the party on the mountain and also in the belief that, since a great famine prevailed in the city, they would easily get control of affairs. Demosthenes also, who had retired into private life after his return from Acarnania,\(^3\) now, at his own request, received permission from the Athenians to use the forty ships at his discretion in operations about the Peloponnesus.

III. Now when the Athenians arrived off the coast of Laconia and learned that the Peloponnesian fleet was already at Corycyna, Eurymedon and Sophocles were for pressing on to Corycyna, but Demosthenes urged them to put in at Pylos first, do there what was to be done, and then continue their voyage. They objected; but a storm came on, as it happened, and carried the fleet to Pylos. And Demosthenes at once urged them to fortify the place, as it was for

\(^1\) cf. III. cxv. 4.  
\(^2\) cf. III. lxxxv. 4.  
\(^3\) cf. III. cxiv. 1.
THUCYDIDES

χωρίου (ἐπὶ τούτῳ γὰρ ξυνεκπλεῦσαι), καὶ ἀπε- 
φαίνει πολλὴν εὐπορίαν ξύλων τε καὶ λίθων καὶ 
φύσει καρτερὸν ὅν καὶ ἐρήμον αὐτὸ τε καὶ ἐπὶ 
πολὺ τῆς χώρας· ἀπέχει γὰρ σταδίους μάλιστα ἡ 
Πύλος τῆς Σπάρτης τετρακοσίους καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ 
Μεσσηνίᾳ ποτὲ οὐσή γῇ, καλοῦσι δὲ αὐτὴν οἱ 

3 Δακεδαιμόνιοι Κορυφάσιοι. οἱ δὲ πολλὰς ἔφα- 
σαν εἰναι ἀκρας ἐρήμους τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ἣν 
βούληται καταλαμβάνων τὴν πόλιν δαπανάν. 
τῶ δὲ διάφορον τι ἔδοκεν εἰναι τούτῳ τὸ χωρίου 
ἐτέρου μᾶλλον, λιμένοι τε προσόντος καὶ τοὺς 
Μεσσηνίους οἰκείους οὐτας αὐτῷ τὸ ἀρχαῖον καὶ 
ὀμοφώνους τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις πλεῖστ' ἄν βλάπ- 
τειν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὀρμωμένους καὶ βεβαιοῦς ἀμα τοῦ 
χωρίου φύλακας ἐσεσθαί.

IV. Ὁς δὲ οὐκ ἐπειθεὶ αὐτοῖς πολυταχοῦς 
οὐτε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς 
οὔτε τοὺς στρατιώτας, ὥστε ἔτοι ταξιάρ- 
χοις κοινώσας, ἡσύχαζον ὑπὸ ἄπλοιας, μέχρι 
αὐτοῖς τοὺς στρατιώτας σχολάζουσιν ὀρμή ἐνέ-

2 πεσε περιστᾶσιν ἐκτείχίσαι τὸ χωρίον. καὶ 
ἔγχειρήσαντες εἰργάζοντο, σιδήρια μὲν λιθουργά 
οὐκ ἔχοντες, λογάδην δὲ φέροντες λίθους, καὶ 
ξυνετίθεσαν ὡς ἐκαστὸν τι ξυμβαίνων· καὶ τοῖ 
πηλῶν, εἰ ποῦ δέοι χρῆσθαι, ἀγγείων ἀπορίᾳ ἐπὶ 
τοῦ νότου ἑφερον ἐγκεκυφότες τε, ὡς μάλιστα 
μέλλοι ἐπιμένειν, καὶ τῶ χείρε ἐς τούπισσω ξυρ-
this purpose that he had sailed with them; and he showed them that there was at hand an abundance of wood and stone, that the position was naturally a strong one, and that not only the place itself but also the neighbouring country for a considerable distance was unoccupied; for Pylos is about four hundred stadia distant from Sparta and lies in the land that was once Messenia; but the Lacedaemonians call the place Coryphasmium. The other generals said there were many unoccupied headlands in the Peloponnesus, which he could seize if he wished to put the city to expense. Demosthenes, however, thought that this place had advantages over any other; not only was there a harbour close by, but also the Messenians, who originally owned this land and spoke the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, would do them the greatest injury if they made this place their base of operations, and would at the same time be a trustworthy garrison of it.

IV. But Demosthenes could not win either the generals or the soldiers to his view, nor yet the commanders of divisions to whom he later communicated his plan; the army, therefore, since the weather was unfavourable for sailing, did nothing. But at length the soldiers themselves, having nothing to do, were seized with the impulse to station themselves around the place and fortify it. So they set their hands to this task and went to work; they had no iron tools for working stone, but picked up stones and put them together just as they happened to fit; and where mortar was needed, for want of hods, they carried it on their backs, bending over in such a way as would make it stay on best, and clasping both hands behind them to prevent it from falling
3 πλέκοντες, ὃς μὴ ἀποπίπττοι. παντὶ τε τρόπῳ ἥπειροντο φθίναι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὰ ἐπιμαχώτατα ἐξεργασάμενοι πρὶν ἐπιβοηθῆσαι. τὸ γὰρ πλέον τοῦ χωρίον αὐτὸ καρτερὸν ὑπῆρχε καὶ οὐδὲν ἔδει τείχους. V. οἱ δὲ ἔορτὴν τινα ἔτυχον ἄγοντες, καὶ ἂμα πυνθανόμενοι ἐν ὀλυγωρίᾳ ἐποιοῦντο, ὡς, όταν ἔξελθωσιν, ἢ οὐχ ὑπομενοῦντας σφᾶς ἢ ῥάδιως ληψόμενοι βίας καὶ τί καὶ αὐτοὺς ὁ στρατὸς ἔτι ἐν ταῖς Ἀθηναῖς δὲν ἔπεσχεν.

2 τειχίσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦ χωρίου τὰ πρὸς ἥπειρον καὶ ἀ μάλιστα ἔδει ε ἤμεραις ἔς τὸν μὲν Δημοσθένη μετὰ νεῶν πέντε αὐτοῦ φύλακα καταλείπουσι, ταῖς δὲ πλεῖσι ναυσὶ τὸν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πλοῦν καὶ Σικελίαν ἥπειροντο. VI. Οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ 'Αττικῇ ὀντες Πελοποννησίων ὡς ἐπύθοντο τῆς Πύλου κατειλημμένης, ἀνεχώρουν κατὰ τάχος ἐπ' οἰκου, νομίζοντες μὲν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀγιος ὁ βασιλεὺς οἰκεῖον σφύσι τὸ περὶ τὴν Πύλον ἁμα δὲ πρὸ ἐσβαλόντες καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἐτὶ χλωροῦ ὀντος ἐσπάνιζου τροφῆς τοῖς πολλοῖς, χειμών τε ἐπιγενόμενοι μείζων παρὰ τὴν καθεστηκυίαν ὡραν ἐπίσετη τὸ στράτευμα. 2 ὡστε πολλαχόθεν ξυνέβη ἀναχωρῆσαι τε θάρσουν αὐτοὺς καὶ βραχυτάτην γενέσθαι τὴν ἐσβολήν ταύτην ἡμέρας γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα ἐμειναν ἐν τῇ 'Αττικῇ.
off. And in every way they made haste that they might complete the fortification of the most vulnerable points before the Lacedaemonians came out against them; for the greater part of the place was so strong by nature that it had no need of a wall. V. As for the Lacedaemonians, they happened to be celebrating a festival when they got word of the undertaking, and made light of it, thinking that the Athenians would not await their attack when they got ready to take the field, or, if they should, that they could easily take the place by force; and the fact also that their army was still in Attica had something to do with their delay. The Athenians in six days completed the wall on the side toward the land and at such other points as most needed it, and left Demosthenes there with five ships to defend it; they then took the main body of the fleet and hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

VI. But the Peloponnesians who were in Attica, when they heard that Pylos had been occupied, returned home in haste; for King Agis and the Lacedaemonians thought that the Athenian operations at Pylos were a matter of deep concern to them. And at the same time, since they had made their invasion early in the season when the grain was still green, most of them were short of food, and bad weather, which came on with storms of greater violence than was to be expected so late in the spring, distressed the army. Consequently there were many reasons why they hastened their retirement from Attica and made this the shortest of their invasions; for they remained there only fifteen days.

1 Each division had its own commissariat, and some were better provisioned than the main body. Classen explains, "were short of food for so large an army" (τοῖς πολλοῖς).
THUCYDIDES

VII. Κατὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνου Σιμωνίδης Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς Ἁιώνα τὴν ἔπει Θράκης Μενδαίων ἀποικίαν, πολεμίαν δὲ οὖσαν, ξυλλέξας Ἀθηναίους τε ὀλίγους ἐκ τῶν φρουρίων καὶ τῶν ἐκείνη ἡμιμάχων πλῆθος προδοδομήν κατέλαβεν. καὶ παραχρήμα ἐπιβοηθησάντων Χαλκιδέων καὶ Βοττιαίων ἐξεκρούσθη τε καὶ ἀπέβαλε πολλοὺς τῶν στρατιωτῶν.

VIII. Ἀναχώρησάντων δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς Πελοποννησίων οἱ Σπαρτιάται αὐτοὶ μὲν καὶ οἱ ἐγγύτατα τῶν περιοίκων εὐθὺς ἐβοήθουν ἐπὶ τὴν Πύλου, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Λακεδαιμονίων βραδυτέρα ἐγένετο ἡ ἔξοδος, ἀρτι ἀφιγμένων ἂφ' ἔτερας στρατείας. περιήγγειλον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Πελοπόννησον βοήθειν ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπὶ Πύλου καὶ ἐπὶ τάς ἐν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ ναῦς σφῶν τὰς ἐξήκουτα ἐπεμψαν, αἱ ὑπερενεχθεῖσαι τὸν Δευκάδιων ἱσθμὸν καὶ λαβοῦσαι τὰς ἐν Ζακύνθῳ Ἀττικὰς ναῦς ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ Πύλου· παρῆν δὲ ἢδη καὶ ὁ πεζὸς στρατός. Δημοσθένης δὲ προσπλεύτων ἐπὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ὑπεκέπτευτε φθάσας δύο ναῦς ἀγγεὶλα Εὐρυμέδοντι καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναύσιν ἐν Ζακύνθῳ Ἀθηναῖοι παρεῖναι ὡς τοῦ χωρίου κινδυνεύοντος. καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆς κατὰ τάχος ἔπλεον κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους· οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς τὸ τείχισματι προσβαλοῦντες κατὰ τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἐλπίζοντες ῥάδιως αἱρήσειν οἰκοδόμημα διὰ ταχέων εἰργασμένον καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγων.
VII. About the same time Simonides, an Athenian general, getting together a few Athenians from the garrisons in Thrace and a large force from the allies in that neighbourhood, got, by the treachery of its inhabitants, possession of Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendaenians and hostile to Athens. But succour came promptly from the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans and he was driven out with the loss of many of his soldiers.

VIII. On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the Perioeci who were in the neighbourhood of Pylos at once came to its relief; but the other Lacedaemonians were slower in coming, since they had just got back from another campaign. Word was also sent round to the states of the Peloponnesus, summoning them to come to the relief of Pylos as quickly as possible, and also to the sixty ships that were at Coreya. These were hauled across the Leucadian isthmus, and without being discovered by the Attic ships, which were now at Zacynthus, reached Pylos, where their land forces had already arrived. But before the Peloponnesian fleet had yet reached Pylos, Demosthenes managed to send out secretly ahead of them two ships which were to notify Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus to come at once to his aid, as the place was in danger. And so the fleet proceeded in haste in compliance with Demosthenes' summons; meanwhile, however, the Lacedaemonians were busy with their preparations to attack the fortification both by land and by sea, and they thought that they would have no difficulty in capturing a structure which had been built hastily and was occupied by only a few

\[1\text{ cf. ch. ii. 3.}\]
5 εὐόντων. προσδεχόμενοι δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Ζακύνθου τῶν ᾿Αττικῶν νεῶν βοήθειαν ἐν νῷ εἴχον, ἢν ἄρα μὴ πρότερον ἔλατο, καὶ τοὺς ἔσπλους τοῦ λιμένος ἐμφάρξαι, ὅπως μὴ ἢ τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ἐφορμίσασθαι ἐς αὐτὸν.

6 ᾍ γὰρ νήσος ἡ Σφακτηρία καλομένη τὸν τε λιμένα, παρατείνουσα καὶ ἐγγὺς ἐπικειμένη, ἐχυρῶν ποιεῖ καὶ τοὺς ἔσπλους στενοὺς, τῇ μὲν δυοῖν νεοῖν διάπλουν κατὰ τὸ τείχισμα τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων καὶ τὴν Πύλου, τῇ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην ἥπειρον ὀκτὼ ἡ ἐννέα· ὑλώδης τε καὶ ἀτριβής πάσα ὑπ’ ἐρμίας ἦν καὶ μέγεθος περὶ πέντε καὶ δέκα σταδίων μάλιστα. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἔσπλους ταῖς ναυσίν ἀντιπρόφοροι βύζην κλησειν ἐμέλλουν τὴν δὲ νῆσον ταύτην φοβοῦμενοι μὴ ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸν

1 The harbour of Pylos is regarded by Classen and nearly all recent commentators as identical with the modern Bay of Navarino, the ἐσπλοὶ τοῦ λιμένα being the entrances north and south of Sphacteria or Sphagia. But the entrance to the harbour of Navarino south of Sphagia is now—and must have been in Thucydides' time—a channel more than three-quarters of a mile wide, and deep all the way across, so that it does not answer to Thucydides' description of a passage only wide enough to admit eight or nine triremes; rather, as Arnold says, "a hundred Greek ships might have found room to sail abreast quite as easily as eight or nine." Clearly, then, Thucydides could not have been personally acquainted with the scene, and was misinformed as to the breadth of the harbour's mouth, as Leake supposed. Or we must assume that the dimensions of the entrances mentioned by Thucydides were rather of those north and south of Coryphasium, the modern Palaeo-Kastro, and the "harbour" was not the Bay of Navarino, as Thucydides sup-
men. But since they expected the Athenian fleet to arrive soon from Zacynthus, it was their intention, in case they should fail to take the place before these came, to block up the entrances to the harbour and thus make it impossible for the Athenians to anchor inside and blockade them.

Now the island called Sphacteria stretches along the mainland, lying quite close to it, and thus makes the harbour safe and the entrances to it narrow; on one side, opposite the Athenian fortifications and Pylos, there is only room for two ships to pass through, on the other side, next to the other part of the mainland, there is room for eight or nine. The whole island was covered with timber and, since it was uninhabited, had no roads, its length being somewhere near fifteen stadia. Now it was the intention of the Lacedaemonians to close up the entrances tight by means of ships placed with their prows outward; and as for the island, since they were afraid that the Athenians would use it as posed, but the Lagoon or Lake of Osmyn Aga, north of the bay, and now cut off from it by a sandbar. This is the view of Grundy—who in August, 1895, spent fourteen days there making a survey—as to the lower entrance. The upper entrance, he thinks, was closed already in Thucydides' time, and the historian seems never to have apprehended that fact. Grundy's view as to the lagoon being the harbour meant by Thucydides is accepted by Steap, but he does not approve of Grundy's assumption that Thucydides, without personal knowledge of the region, following at different points reports of different informants, confused statements with reference to the harbour of Pylos and as to the bay as referring to one and the same. See Arnold in App. to Book iv. on Sphacteria; Grundy, "Investigation of the Topography of the Region of Sphacteria and Pylos," in Journal of Hellen. Studies, xvi. 1-54; Steap, App. on iv. viii. 6.
πόλεμον σφίσι ποιώνται, ὁπλίτας διεβίβασαν ἐς αὐτὴν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἥπειρον ἄλλους ἔταξαν.

8 οὕτω γὰρ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὴν τε νῆσου πολεμίαν ἔσεσθαι τὴν τε ἥπειρον ἀπόβασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν (τὰ γὰρ αὐτῆς τῆς Πύλου ἔξω τοῦ ἔσπλυν πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος ἄλμενα ὁντα οὐχ ἔξειν οθεν ὀρμώμενοι ὥφελήσουσι τοὺς αὐτῶν), σφεῖς δὲ ἀνευ τε ναυμαχίαν καὶ κινδύνου ἐκπολιορκήσειν τὸ χωρίον κατὰ τὸ εἰκός, σίτου τε οὐκ ἐνόντος καὶ δὲ ὅλης

9 παρασκευῆς κατελημμένον. ὡς δ' ἐδοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ διεβίβαζον ἐς τὴν νῆσον τοὺς ὀπλίτας ἀποκληρώσαντες ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν λόχων. καὶ διέβησαν μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι πρῶτοι κατὰ διαδοχήν, οἱ δὲ τελευταῖοι καὶ ἐγκαταληφθέντες εἰκοσὶ καὶ τετρακόσιοι ἦσαν καὶ Εἰλώτες οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν· ἥρχε δ' αὐτῶν Ἐπιτάδας ὁ Μολόβρου.

IX. Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁρῶν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μέλλοντας προσβάλλειν ναυσὶ τε ἀμα καὶ πεζῷ, παρεσκευάζετο καὶ αὐτὸς, καὶ τὰς τριήρεις αἱ περιήγαν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῶν καταλείφθεισῶν ἀναστάσας ὑπὸ τὸ τείχισμα προσεσταύρωσε, καὶ τοὺς ναύτας ἐξ αὐτῶν ὀπλίσει ἀσπίδιον 1 φαύλαις καὶ οἰσινίαις ταῖς πολλαῖς· οὐ γὰρ ἤν ὀπλα ἐν χωρίῳ ἔρημῳ πορίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἕκ

1 τε, after ἀσπίδιο in the MSS., deleted by Hude as not read by Suidas.

1 i.e., north of the entrance, on the western side.

2 Only three: five had been left him (ch. v. 2), but two of these he had sent to warn the squadron at Zacynthus.
a base for carrying on the war against them, they conveyed some hoplites across, at the same time posting others along the mainland. By these measures, they thought, the Athenians would find not only the island hostile to them, but also the mainland, since this afforded no landing-place; for there were no harbours along the shore of Pylos itself outside the entrance,¹ on the side toward the sea, and therefore the Athenians would have no base from which they could aid their countrymen. Consequently the Lacedaemonians believed that, without running the risk of a battle at sea, they could probably reduce the place by siege, since it had been occupied on short notice and was not supplied with provisions. As soon as they reached this conclusion they proceeded to convey the hoplites over to the island, drafting them by lot from all the companies. Several detachments had before this time crossed over, one group relieving another; the last to do so—and this is the force that was captured—numbering four hundred and twenty, besides the Helots who accompanied them, and they were under the command of Epitadas son of Molobrus.

IX. Meanwhile Demosthenes also, seeing that the Lacedaemonians intended to attack him by sea and by land at the same time, set about making his preparations. He drew ashore, close up under the fortification, the triremes ² remaining to him out of those which had been left in his charge and enclosed them in a stockade; he then armed their crews with shields—poor ones, indeed, most of which were made of plaited willow; for it was not possible to procure arms in an uninhabited country, and such
ληστρικής Μεσσηνίων τριακοντέρου και κέλητος ἐλαβον, οὐ ἔτυχον παραγενόμενοι. ὀπλίται τε τῶν Μεσσηνίων τούτων ὡς τεσσαράκοντα ἐγέ-2 νοτο, οἷς ἔχρητο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων. τοὺς μὲν οὖν πολλοὺς τῶν τε ἀόπλων καὶ ὁπλισμένων ἐπὶ τὰ τετειχισμένα μάλιστα καὶ ἔχυρα τοῦ χωρίον πρὸς τὴν ἤπειρον ἔταξε, προειπτὼν ἀμύνασθαι τοῦ πεζοῦ, ἣν προσβάλη αὐτὸς δὲ ἀπολεξάμενος ἐκ πάντων ἐξήκοντα ὀπλίτας καὶ τοξότας ὀλγους ἐχώρει ἐξω τοῦ τείχους ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, ἣ μάλιστα ἐκεῖνος προσδέχετο πειράσειν ἀποβαίνειν, ἐς χωρία μὲν χαλεπὰ καὶ πετρώδῃ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τετραμμένα, σφίσι δὲ τοῦ τείχους ταύτη ἀσθενεστάτου ὄντος ἔσβιασασθαι 1 αὐτοῦς 3 ἡγεῖτο προθυμήσεσθαι· οὗτε γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἐλπι-ζοντες ποτὲ ναυσὶ κρατήσεσθαι οὐκ ἵσχυρὸν ἐτείχιζον, ἐκείνοις τε βιαζομένους τὴν ἀπόβασιν 4 ἀλώσιμον τὸ χωρίον γίγνεσθαι. κατὰ τοῦτο ὁὐν πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν θάλασσαν χωρῆσας ἔταξε τοὺς ὀπλίτας ὡς εὐρξών, ἣν δύνηται, καὶ παρεκελεύ-σατο τοιάδε.

X. "Ἀνδρες οἱ ξυναράμενοι τοῦδε τοῦ κινδύ-νου, μηδεὶς ύμων ἐν τῇ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ξυνετὸς βουλέσθω δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐκλογιζόμενος ἃπαν τὸ περιεστὸς ἡμᾶς δεινόν, μᾶλλον ἡ ἀπερισκέπτως εὐελπὶς ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοὺς ἐναντίον καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄν περιγενόμενος. ὅσα γὰρ ἐς ἀνάγκην

1 ἔσβιασασθαί: so Hude, after Leeuwen, for ἐπισπάσασθαι.
as they had they took from a thirty-oared privateer and a light boat belonging to some Messenians who chanced to come along, and included among them about forty hoplites, whom Demosthenes used along with the rest. He then posted the greater part of his troops, the unarmed as well as the armed, at the best fortified and strongest points of the place, on the side toward the mainland, giving them orders to ward off the enemy's infantry if it should attack. But he himself selected from the whole body of his troops sixty hoplites and a few archers, and with them sallied forth from the fort to the point on the seashore where he thought that the enemy would be most likely to attempt a landing. The ground, indeed, was difficult of access and rocky where it faced the sea, yet since the Athenian wall was weakest at this place the enemy would, he thought, be only too eager to make an assault there; in fact the Athenians themselves had left their fortification weak at this spot merely because they never expected to be defeated at sea, and Demosthenes knew that if the enemy could force a landing there the place could be taken. Accordingly he posted his hoplites at this point, taking them to the very brink of the sea, determined to keep the enemy off if he could; and then he exhorted them as follows:

X. "Soldiers, my comrades in this present hazard, let no one of you at such a time of necessity seek to prove his keenness of wit by calculating the full extent of the danger that encompasses us; let him rather come to grips with the enemy in a spirit of unreflecting confidence that he will survive even these perils. For whenever it has come, as now
άφικται ὦσπερ τάδε, λογισµόν ἡκιστὰ ἐνδεχό-
2 μενα, κινδύνου τοῦ ταχίστου προσδείται. ἐγὼ δὲ
καὶ τὰ πλεῖῶ όρῶ πρὸς ἡµῶν ὅντα, ἢν ἐθέλωµέν γε
μείναι καὶ µὴ τῷ πλήθει αὐτῶν καταπλαγέντες
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἡµῶν κρείσσω καταπροδοῦναι.
3 τοῦ τε γὰρ χωρίου τὸ δυσέµβατον ἡµέτερον
νοµίζω, δὲ 1 µενόντων µὲν ἡµῶν ξύµµαχον γίγνε-
tαι, ὑποχωρήσασι 2 δὲ καίπερ χαλεπὸν ὃν εὑ-
πορον ἔσται µηδενὸς κωλύοντος, καὶ τὸν πολέµον
δεινότερον ἔξοµεν µὴ ράδιας αὐτῷ πάλιν οὕσης
τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως, ἢν καὶ ύφ' ἡµῶν βιάζηται· ἐπὶ
γὰρ ταῖς ναυσὶ βαῖστοί εἰσιν ἀµύνεσθαι, ἀπο-
4 βάντες δ' ἐν τῷ ἑσφ ἡδη. τό τε πλῆθος αὐτῶν οὐκ
ἄγαν δεὶ φοβεῖσθαι· κατ' ὀλέγον γὰρ µαχεῖται
καίπερ πολὺ δὴν ἀπορία τῆς προσορµίσεως, καὶ
οὐκ ἐν γῇ στρατός ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ ὠµοίου µείζων,
ἀλλ' ἀπὸ νεῶν, αἰς πολλὰ τὰ καίρια δεὶ ἐν τῇ
5 θαλάσσῃ ξυµβῆναι. ὡστε τὰς τούτων ἀπορίας
ἀντιπάλους ἠγούµαι τῷ ἡµετέρῳ πλήθει, καὶ ἀµα
ἀξίω ὑµᾶς, Ἀθηναίους ὄντας καὶ ἐπισταµένους
ἐµπειρία τῆς ναυτικῆς ἐπ' ἄλλους ἀποβασίων ὅτι,
εἰ τις ὑποµένων καὶ µὴ φόβῳ ροθίον καὶ νεῶν
δεινότητος κατάπλου ὑποχωροῦσιν, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ
βιάζοντο, καὶ αὐτοὺς νῦν µείναι τε καὶ ἀµυνοµέ-

1 8, Dion. Hal., MSS. omit.
2 ὑποχωρήσασι, the genitive was to be expected after
µενόντων, and Poppo conjectures ὑποχωρησάντων. It is
dative of relation.

226
with us, to a case of necessity, where there is no room for reflection, what is needed is to accept the hazard with the least possible delay. However, as I see the matter, the odds are on our side, if we are resolved to stand our ground and are not so terrified by their numbers as to sacrifice the advantages we possess. As regards the position, the difficulty of approach I regard as in our favour, since if we stand firm that becomes a support, but once we give way, even though the ground be rugged it will be easy of access when there is none to resist; and we shall then find the enemy more formidable, since it will be no easy matter for them to turn and retreat, if they should be hard-pressed by us; for though very easily repelled while on board their ships, when once they have landed they are on an equal footing with us. And, as regards their numbers, we need have no very great fear; for however numerous they are, they will have to fight in small detachments on account of the difficulty of bringing their ships to shore. And we have not to deal with an army, which, though superior in numbers, is fighting on land under like conditions with ourselves, but fighting on ships, and these require many favouring circumstances on the sea.¹ I therefore consider that their disadvantages counterbalance our inferiority in point of numbers. At the same time I call now upon you, who are Athenians and know by experience that it is impossible to force a landing from ships against an enemy on shore, if the latter but stand their ground and do not give way through fear of the splashing oars and of the awe-inspiring sight of ships bearing down upon them—I call upon you, in your turn to stand your

¹ e.g. a fair wind, space for manœuvring, etc.
νος παρ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ῥαχίαν σφέζειν ύμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ χωρίον.”

XI. Τοσαῦτα τοῦ Δημοσθένους παρακελευσαμένου οἱ 'Αθηναίοι ἐθάρησαν τε μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπικαταβάντες ἔταξαντο παρ’ αὐτὴν τὴν θάλασσαν. Οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἄραντες τῷ τε κατὰ γῆν στρατῷ προσέβαλλον τῷ τειχίσματι καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀμα ὀύσας τεσσαράκοντα καὶ τρισὶ, ναύαρχος δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπέπλευ Θρασυμηλίδας ὁ Κρατησικλέως, Σπαρτιάτης, προσέβαλλε δὲ ἑπερὸ Τημοσθένης προσεδέχετο. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν, ἐκ τε γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης, ἠμόνυμον. οἱ δὲ κατ’ ὀλίγας ναῦς διελόμενοι, διότι οὐκ ἦν πλείσοι προσσηκοί, καὶ ἀναπαύοντες ἐν τῷ μέρει τοὺς ἐπίπλους ἐποιοῦντο, προθυμία τε πάση χρώμενοι καὶ παρακελευσμῷ, εἰ πῶς ὦσάμενοι ἔλοιευ τὸ τείχισμα. πάντων δὲ φανερῶς Ἡρακλῆς ἔγενετο. τριφόρας τοῦ χώριος χαλεποῦ ὄντος τοὺς τριφόρας καὶ κυβερνήτας, εἰ που καὶ δοκοῖ δυνατον εἶναι σχεῖν, ἀποκούοντας καὶ φυλασσομένους τῶν νεῶν μὴ ξυντρίψωσιν, ἐβόα λέγων ὡς οὐκ εἰκός εἰ ἄν γεμών φιλαδέλφοις τοὺς πολεμίους ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ περιδείειν τείχος πεποιημένους, ἀλλὰ τὰς τε σφετέρας ναῦς βιαζομένους τὴν ἀπόβασιν καταγρύγναι ἐκέλευε καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μὴ ἀποκνηῆσαι ἀντὶ μεγάλων ἐνεργεσιῶν τὰς ναῦς τοὺς Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐπιδοῦναι, ὀκείλαντας δὲ καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀποβάντας τῶν τε ἀνδρῶν καὶ
ground, and, warding off the foe at the very water’s edge, to save both yourselves and the stronghold.”

XI. Thus encouraged by Demosthenes, the Athenians became yet more confident and going still nearer the water took up their position at the very brink of the sea. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, moved forward, and attacked the fortification at the same time with their land-army and with their ships, of which there were forty-three, the admiral in command of them being Thrasymeridas son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he attacked just where Demosthenes expected. The Athenians, on their part, proceeded to defend themselves in both directions, by land and by sea; but the enemy, dividing their ships into small detachments, because it was impossible for a larger number to approach the shore, and resting by turns, kept charging upon the Athenians, showing no lack of zeal and cheering each other on, in the hope that they might force the enemy back and take the fortification. Brasidas showed himself most conspicuous of all. Being captain of a galley, he noticed that the captains and pilots, because the shore was rocky, were inclined to hesitate and be careful of their ships, even when it seemed to be practicable to make a landing, for fear of dashing them to pieces. He would therefore shout that it ill became them through being thrifty of timber to allow their enemy to have built a fort in their country; nay, he urged, they must break their own ships so as to force a landing; and the allies he bade, in return for great benefits received from the Lacedaemonians, not to shrink from making them a free gift of their ships in the present emergency, but to run them aground, get ashore in any
THUCYDIDES

τοῦ χωρίου κρατήσας. XII. καὶ ὁ μὲν τοὺς τε ἄλλους τοιαύτα ἐπέσπερχε καὶ τὸν ἐαυτοῦ κυβερνήτην ἀναγκάσας ὄκείλα τὴν ναῦν ἔχωρει ἐπὶ τὴν ἀποβάθραν· καὶ πειρώμενος ἀποβαίνειν ἀνεκόπτη ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τραυματισθεὶς πολλὰ ἐλπισφύχησε τε καὶ πεσόντος αὐτοῦ ἐσ τὴν παρεξειρεσίαν ἢ ἀσπίδας περιερρύη ἐσ τὴν θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐξενεχθείσης αὐτῆς ἐσ τὴν γῆν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἀνελόμενοι ύστερον πρὸς τὸ τροπαῖον ἔχρισαντο ὅ ἐστησαν τῆς προσβολῆς ταύτης.

2 Οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι προθυμούντο μὲν, ἀδύνατο δ’ ἦσαν ἀποβῆναι τῶν τε χωρίων χαλεπότητι καὶ τῶν

3 Ἀθηναίων μενόντων καὶ οὐδὲν ὑποχωρούντων. ἔσ τούτῳ τε περιέστη ἢ τύχη ὅστε Ἀθηναίοις μὲν ἐκ γῆς τε καὶ ταύτης Δακωνικῆς ἀμύνεσθαι ἐκείνους ἐπιπλέοντας, Δακεδαιμονίους δὲ ἐκ νεὼν τε καὶ ἐς τὴν ἐαυτῶν πολεμίαν οὕσαν ἐπ’ Ἀθηναίοις ἀποβαίνειν· ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίει τῆς δόξης ἐν τῷ τότε τοῖς μὲν ὑπειρώταις μάλιστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ πεξα κρατίστως, τοῖς δὲ θαλασσίοις τε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ πλείστον προὔχειν.

XIII. Ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τῆς ύστεραίας μέρος τι προσβολὰς ποιησάμενοι ἐπέπαυντο· καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ ἐπὶ ξύλα ἐς μηχανὰς παρέπεμψαν τῶν νεῶν τινας ἐς Ἀσίνην, ἐπιζύοντες τὸ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα τεῖχος ύψος μὲν ἔχον, ἀπο·

2 βάςεως δὲ μάλιστα οὕσης ἔλειν ἂν μηχανὰς. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Ζακύνθου νῆσες τῶν Ἀθηναίων

1 &v added by Madvig.
way they could, and master both the men and the place. XII. And he not only urged on the rest in this way, but, compelling his own pilot to beach his ship, he made for the gangway; and in trying to land he was knocked back by the Athenians, and after receiving many wounds fainted away. As he fell into the forward part of the ship his shield slipped off into the sea, and, being carried ashore, was picked up by the Athenians, who afterward used it for the trophy which they set up in commemoration of this attack.

The crews of the other Peloponnesian ships showed no lack of zeal, but were unable to land, both by reason of the difficulty of the ground and because the Athenians stood firm and would not give way at all. In such fashion had fortune swung round that the Athenians, fighting on land, and Laconian land at that, were trying to ward off a Lacedaemonian attack from the sea, while the Lacedaemonians, fighting in ships, were trying to effect a landing upon their own territory, now hostile, in the face of the Athenians. For at this time it was the special renown of the Lacedaemonians that they were a land power and invincible with their army, and of the Athenians that they were seamen and vastly superior with their fleet.

XIII. After making attacks that day and part of the next the Peloponnesians desisted. On the third day they sent some of the ships to Asine for wood with which to make engines, hoping that by means of engines they should be able to take the wall opposite the harbour in spite of its height, since here it was quite practicable to make a landing. Meanwhile, the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus arrived,
THUCYDIDES

παραγίγνονται πεντήκοντα· προσεβοῆθησαν γὰρ τῶν τε φρουρίδων τινὲς αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐκ Ναυπάκτου καὶ Χίαυ τέσσαρες. ὡς δὲ εἶδον τὴν τῇ ἡπειροῦν ὀπλιτῶν περιπλευν τὴν τῇ νῆσον, ἐν τε τῷ λιμένι οὖσας τὰς ναῦς καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλεοῦσας, ἀπορήσαντες ὅπῃ καθορμίσωνται, τότε μὲν ἐς Πρωτὴν τὴν νῆσον, ἢ οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχει ἐρήμος οὖσα, ἐπλευσαν καὶ ἠάλισαν τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραῖα παρασκευασάμενοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ἀνήγγειλον, ἢ μὲν ἀντεκπλεῖν ἐθέλωσι σφίσω ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, εἰ δὲ μῆ, ὡς αὐτὸ ἐπεσπλευσοῦμενοι.

4 Καὶ οἱ μὲν οὕτε ἀντανήγγοντο οὔτε ἀ διενοῆθησαν, φάρξα τοὺς ἐσπλους, ἔτυχον ποιήσαντες, ἡσυχάζοντες δ᾽ ἐν τῇ γῇ τὰς τε ναῦς ἐπλήρουν καὶ παρασκευάζοντο, ἡν ἐπλέγη τις, ὡς ἐν τῷ λιμένι ὄντι οὐ σμικρῷ ναυμαχάζοντες. XIV. οἱ δ᾽ 'Ἀθηναῖοι γυνόντες καθ᾽ ἐκάτερον τὸν ἐσπλοὺν ὀρμησαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς, καὶ τὰς μὲν πλεῖους καὶ μετεώρους ἱδη τῶν νεῶν καὶ ἀντιπρόφορους προσπεσόντες ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν, καὶ ἐπιδιώκοντες ὡς διὰ βραχεός ἐτρωσαν μὲν πολλὰς, πέντε δὲ ἐλαβον καὶ μίαν τούτων αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν· ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς ἐν τῇ γῇ καταπεφευγηκαί ἐνέβαλλον. αἱ δὲ καὶ πληροῦμεναι ἐτι πρὶν ἀνάγεσθαι ἐκόπτοντο· καὶ τινὰς καὶ ἀναδούμενοι κενὰς εἴλκου τῶν ἀν-2 δρῶν ἐς φυγὴν ὀρμημένων. ἀ ὀρῶντες οἱ Λακεδαι-
now numbering fifty ships, for it had been reinforced by some of the ships on guard at Naupactus and by four Chian vessels. But they saw that both the mainland and the island were full of hoplites, and that the Lacedaemonian ships were in the harbour and not intending to come out; they therefore, being at a loss where to anchor, sailed for the present to Prote, an uninhabited island not far from Pylos, and bivouacked there. The next day they set sail, having first made preparations to give battle in case the enemy should be inclined to come out into the open water to meet them; if not, they intended to sail into the harbour themselves.

Now the Lacedaemonians did not put out to meet the Athenians, and somehow they had neglected to block up the entrances as they had purposed; on the contrary, they remained inactive on the shore, engaged in manning their ships and making ready, in case any one sailed into the harbour, to fight there, since there was plenty of room. XIV. As for the Athenians, when they saw the situation, they rushed in upon them by both entrances and falling upon their ships, most of which were by now afloat and facing forward, put them to flight, and since there was only a short distance for the pursuit, not only damaged many of them but also captured five, one of them with all her crew; the rest they kept on ramming even after they had fled to the shore. Yet other ships were being cut to pieces while still being manned, before they could put to sea; and some they took in tow empty, their crews having taken to flight, and began to haul them away. At this sight the

1 Or, "giving chase so far as the short distance allowed, not only damaged . . ."
THUCYDIDES

μόνιοι καὶ περιαλγοῦντες τῷ πάθει, ὀτιπερ αὐτῶν οἱ ἄνδρες ἀπελαμβάνοντο εἰν τῇ νήσῳ, παρεβοήθησαν καὶ ἐπεσβαίνουντες ὡς τὴν θάλασσαν ἐξίν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς ἄνθείλκου ἐπιλαμβανόμενοι τῶν νεῶν· καὶ εἰν τούτῳ κεκολύσθαι ἔδωκεν ἐκαστὸς ὁ μῆς τίνι καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργον παρῆν. ἐγένετο τε ὁ θόρυβος μέγας, καὶ ἀντηλλαγμένου τοῦ ἑκατέρων τρόπου περὶ τὰς ναῦς· οἱ τε γὰρ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπὸ προθυμίας καὶ ἐκπλήξεως ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἦ ἐκ γῆς εναυμάχουν, οἱ τε Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦντες καὶ βουλόμενοι τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστου ἐπεξελθεῖν ἀπὸ νεῶν ἐπεζομάχουν. πολλοὶ τε πόνον παρασχόντες ἀλλήλοις καὶ τραυματιζόντες διεκρίθησαν, καὶ οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς κενᾶς ναῦς πλῆν τῶν τὸ πρῶτον ληφθείσον διέσωσαν. καταστάντες δὲ ἑκάτεροι ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον οἱ μὲν τροπαίοι τε ἑστησαν καὶ νεκροὺς ἀπέδοσαν καὶ νεκρογίως ἐκράτησαν, καὶ τὴν νῆσον εὕθυς περιέπλεον καὶ ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχον, ὡς τῶν ἄνδρῶν ἀπειλημμένων· οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων ἥδη βεβοηθηκότες ἔμενον κατὰ χώραν ἐπὶ τῇ Πύλῳ. ΧV. Ἐκ δὲ τὴν Σπάρτην ὡς ἤγγελθη τὰ γεγενημένα περὶ Πύλου, ἐδοξεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ ξυμφορᾶ μεγάλῃ τὰ τέλη καταβάντας ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον βουλεύειν παραχρῆμα ὁρῶντας ὃ τε ἦν ἤδη. καὶ ὃς εἶδον ἅδυνατον ὑπὸ τιμωρεῖν τοῖς ἄνδράσι καὶ 234
Lacedaemonian soldiers on the shore, beside themselves with grief at the impending calamity, in that their comrades were being cut off on the island, rushed to the rescue, and going down into the sea in full armour took hold of the ships and tried to drag them back. Indeed, each man felt that no progress was being made where he himself was not at hand to help. The tumult that arose was great, especially since in this battle for the ships each side adopted the other’s manner of fighting; for the Lacedaemonians in their eagerness and excitement were virtually waging a sea-fight from the land, while the Athenians, who were winning and wanted to follow up their success to the utmost while their good fortune lasted, were fighting a land-battle from their ships. Finally, after causing each other great distress and inflicting much damage, they separated, the Lacedaemonians saving all their empty ships except those which had been taken at first. Both sides then returned to their camps. The Athenians thereupon set up a trophy, gave back the dead, secured possession of the wrecks, and immediately began to sail round the island and keep it under guard, considering that the men on it were now cut off; on the other hand, the Peloponnesians on the mainland, and the reinforcements that had now arrived from all directions, remained in position at Pylos.

XV. At Sparta, when they received the news of what had happened at Pylos, regarding it as a great calamity they decided that the magistrates should go down to the camp, see the situation for themselves, and then determine on the spot what should be done. Now when these saw that no help could be given to the men on the island, and at the same
κινδυνεύειν οὐκ ἐβούλοντο ἣ ὑπὸ λιμόν τι παθεῖν αὐτούς ἢ ὑπὸ πλήθους βιασθέντας κρατηθῆναι, ἐδοξοῦν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγούς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἥν ἐθέλωσε, σπουδαῖς ποιησαμένους τὰ περὶ Πύλον ἀποστείλατε τὰς Ἀθηναῖς πρὸς σβείς περὶ ξυμβιάσεως καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ὡς τάχιστα πειράσθαι κομίσασθαι.

XVI. Δεξαμένων δὲ τῶν στρατηγῶν τῶν ἱέρων ἐγγύνοντο σπουδαί τοιαίοι: Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν τὰς ναύς ἐν αἰσ ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Δακωνικῇ πάσας, ὡσαί ἦσαν μακραί, παραδοῦναι κομίσαντας ἐν Πύλον Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν τῷ τείχισματι μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε κατὰ θάλασσαν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἄνδρας σιτον ἐὰν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐσπέμπειν τακτὸν καὶ μεμαγμένου, δύο χρώσις ἐκάστῳ Ἀττικὰς ἑλίτων καὶ δύο κοτύλας οἶνον καὶ κρέας, θεράπωντι δὲ τοῦτων ἡμίσεα: ταῦτα δὲ ὅρωντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐσπέμπειν καὶ πλοίον μηδὲν ἐσπλέειν λάθρα: φυλάσσειν δὲ καὶ τὴν νῆσον Ἀθηναίους μηδὲν ἦσον, δος μη ἀποβαίνοντας, καὶ ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν τῷ Πελοποννησίων στρατῷ μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε κατὰ 2 θάλασσαν. δὲ τι δὲ ἂν τούτων παραβαίνωσιν ἑκάτεροι καὶ ὅτι οὐν, τότε λελύσθαι τὰς σπουδαίς. ἐσπείσθαι δὲ αὐτῶς μέχρι οὕ ἐπανέλθωσιν οἱ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πρὸςβείς ἀποστείλατε δὲ αὐτοὺς τριήρει Ἀθηναίους καὶ πάλιν κομίσαι. ἐλθόντων δὲ τὰς τε σπουδὰς λελύσθαι ταῦτας καὶ τὰς ναύς ἀποδοῦναι Ἀθηναίους ὀμολογοῦσιν οἰασπερ ἀν

1 κρατηθῆναι, CG, ἡ κρατηθῆναι, ABFM.
time were unwilling to run the risk of their being starved to death or forced to succumb to superior numbers, they decided, so far as Pylos was concerned, to conclude a truce with the Athenian generals, if they should consent, and to send envoys to Athens to propose an agreement, and thus try to recover their men as quickly as possible.

XVI. The generals accepted the proposal and a truce was concluded upon the following terms: The Lacedaemonians were to surrender to the Athenians the ships in which they had fought the battle, and were to bring to Pylos and deliver to them all the other ships of war which were in Laconia, and they were not to attack the fortification either by land or by sea. The Athenians were to permit the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send flour to the men on the island, a fixed amount and already-kneaded, for each soldier two quarts of barley-meal and a pint of wine and a ration of meat, and for each servant half as much; and they were to send these things to the island under the supervision of the Athenians, and no boat was to sail thither secretly. The Athenians were to go on guarding the island as before, but without landing on it, and were not to attack the army of the Peloponnesians either by land or sea. If either party should violate this agreement in any particular whatsoever, the truce should forthwith be at an end. The truce was to hold good until the Lacedaemonian envoys should get back from Athens; and the Athenians were to conduct them thither in a trireme and bring them back. On their return this truce was to be at an end, and the Athenians were then to restore the ships in as good condition as when

1 The choimix was about two pints, dry measure; the cotyle, about half a pint.
3 παραλάβωσιν. αἰ μὲν σπονδαὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγένοτο, καὶ αἰ νῆσις παρεδόθησαν οὔσαι περὶ ἐξήκοντα, καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀπεστάλησαν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς τὰς Ἀθῆνας ἔλεγαν τοιάδε.

XVII. Ἔπεμψαν ἡμᾶς Δακεδαμίνιοι, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ ἀνδρῶν πράξεων ὑμῖν τι ἄν ὑμῖν τε ὀφέλιμον ὅποι τὸ αὐτὸ πείθομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐς τὴν εὐμφορίαν ὃς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων 2 κόσμου μάλιστα μέλλῃ οἴσειν. τοὺς δὲ λόγους μακροτέρους οὐ παρὰ τὸ εἰσόθινο μηκυνούμεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιχώριον ὃν ἡμῖν οὐ μὲν βραχεῖς ἀρκώσει μὴ πολλοῖς χρῄσθαι, πλείοντι δὲ ἐν ὃ ἄν καιρὸς ἦ διδάσκως τι τῶν προύργου λόγως τὸ δέον 3 πράσσειν. λάβετε δὲ αὐτοὺς μὴ πολεμίως μὴ δὲ ἄξυνετοι διδασκόμενοι, ὑπόμνησιν δὲ τοῦ καλῶς 4 βουλεύσασθαι πρὸς εἰδότας ἡγησάμενοι. ἦμῖν γὰρ εὐτυχίαι τὴν παροῦσαν ἔξεστι καλῶς θέσθαι, ἐχουσί μὲν ὃν κρατεῖτε, προσλαβοῦσι δὲ τιμῆν καὶ δόξαν, καὶ μὴ παθεῖν ὅπερ οἱ ἀνὴροι τὰ ἀγαθὰ λαμβάνοντες τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἰεὶ γὰρ τοῦ πλέονος ἑλπίζει δρέγονται διὰ τὸ καί τὰ παρόντα 5 ἀδοκίτως εὐτυχήσαι. οἷς δὲ πλείστατι μεταβολαὶ ἐπ' ἀμφότερα εὐμβεβήκασι, δίκαιοι εἰσὶ καὶ ἀπιστότατοι εἶναι ταῖς εὐπραγίαις· δὲ τῇ τε ὑμετέρᾳ πόλει δὲ ἐμπειρίαν καὶ ἡμῖν μάλιστ' ἐν ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος προσεῖν.

1 ἐς τὴν εὐμφορίαν, bracketed by Hude.
they received them. The truce was concluded on these terms, the ships, sixty in number, were delivered up, and the envoys dispatched. When they arrived at Athens they spoke as follows:

XVII. "The Lacedaemonians, men of Athens, have sent us to arrange, in behalf of our men on the island, such terms as we may show to be at once advantageous to you and also most likely under present circumstances, in view of our misfortune, to bring credit to ourselves. If we speak at some length we shall not be departing from our custom; on the contrary, though it is the fashion of our country not to use many words where few suffice, yet, whenever occasion arises to expound an important matter and thereby to accomplish by speech the end we have in view, we use words more freely. And do not receive what we say in a hostile spirit, nor feel that you are being instructed as though you were without understanding, but regard our words as merely a reminder to men who know how to come to a good decision. For it is in your power to turn your present favourable fortune to good account, not only keeping what you have got, but acquiring honour and reputation besides. You may thus avoid the experience of those who achieve some unwonted success; for these are always led on by hope to grasp at more because of their unexpected good fortune in the present. And yet those who have most often undergone a change of fortune for better or for worse have best reason to be distrustful of prosperity; and this would naturally hold true of both your state and ours in an exceptional degree, in view of our past experience.
XVIII. "Τρώτε δὲ καὶ ἐστὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας υἱόν ξυμφορὰς ἀπιδόντες, οὕτως ἀξϊόμα μέγιστον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔχοντες ἡκομεν παρ’ υμᾶς, πρότερον αὐτοὶ κυριώτεροι νομίζοντες εἶναι δούναι ἐφ’ ἃ νῦν ἂν τὰ καὶ νῦν ἂν ἄφιγμένῳ υμᾶς αὐτούμεθα. καίτοι οὕτε δυνάμεως ἐνδεία ἐπάθομεν αὐτὸ οὕτε μείζονος προσγεγεμένης ὑβρίσαυτες, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχόντων γνώμη σφαλέντες, ἐν ὃ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει. ἂν οὐκ εἰκὸς υμᾶς διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν υἱὸν ῥώμην πόλεως τε καὶ τῶν προσγεγεμένων καὶ τῆς τύχης οἰεσθαί αἰεὶ μεθ’ υμῶν ἐσεσθαί. σωφρόνων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οὕτως τάγαθα ἐς ἀμφίβολον ἄσφαλῶς ἐθεντο (καὶ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς οἱ αὐτοὶ εὐξυνετότερον ἀν προσφέροντο), τὸν τε πόλεμον νομίσωσι μὴ καθ’ ὅσον ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μέρος βούληται μεταχειρίζεται, τούτω εὑνεῖναι, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἂν αἱ τύχαι αὐτῶν ἢγήσωνται, καὶ ἐλάχιστ’ ἂν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πταίοντες διὰ τὸ μὴ τῷ ὀρθομενῷ αὐτοῦ πιστεύοντες ἐπαίρεσθαί ἐν τῷ εὐτυχεῖν ἂν μάλιστα καταλύσωντο. ὃ υἱὸν υμῶν, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι, καλῶς ἔχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς πράξαι, καὶ μὴποτε ὑστερουν, ἢν ἀρα μὴ πειθομενοι σφαλῆτε, ἄ πολλὰ ἐνδέχεσται, νομισθήναι τύχῃ καὶ τὰ νῦν προχωρῆσαντα κρατῆσαι,

1 ἀμφίβολον, MSS.; Hude reads ἀναμφίβολον.

1 Or, “make sure of their advantages having regard to changes of luck.”

240
XVIII. "To be convinced of this, you need only look at our present misfortunes. We who of all the Hellenes formerly were held in the highest consideration have come before you, although we have been wont to regard ourselves as better entitled to confer such favours as we have now come to beg of you. And yet it was neither through lack of power that we met with this misfortune, nor because our power became too great and we waxed insolent; nay, our resources were what they always were and we merely erred in judgment—a thing to which all are alike liable. Accordingly there is no reason why you, because of the strength both of your city and of its new acquisitions at the present moment, should expect that the favour of fortune will always be with you. Prudent men take the safe course of accounting prosperity mutable 1—the same men, too, would deal more sagaciously with misfortunes—and consider that when anyone is at war he may not limit his participation to whatever portion of it he may choose to carry on, 2 but that he must follow where his fortune leads. Such men are least likely to come to grief, since they do not allow themselves to become elated by overconfidence in military success, and are therefore most likely to seize the moment of good fortune for concluding peace. And this, Athenians, is the policy which it is good for you to adopt towards us to-day, and not at some future time, should you perchance through rejecting our overtures incur disaster—and of this there are many possibilities—be credited with having won even your present successes through good fortune, when it is possible to

1 i.e. in warfare one cannot accept only the successes and avoid the reverses by stopping before the latter set in; one is in the hands of fortune.
έξον ἀκίνδυνον δόκησιν ἵσχύος καὶ ξυνέσεως ἐς τὸ ἑπείτα καταλιπεῖν.

XIX. "Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς σπονδᾶς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλήν καὶ οἰκείοτητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν, ἀνταὐτούντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας, καὶ ἀμείων ἡγούμενοι ἀμφοτέρους μὴ διακινδυνεύεσθαι, εἰτέ βία ἀν εἰς διαφύγοιεν παρατυχούσης τινὸς σωτηρίας εἰτε καὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντες μᾶλλον ἂν χειρωθεῖεν.

2 νομίζομεν τε τὰς μεγάλας ἔχθρας μάλιστ' ἄν διαλύεσθαι βεβαιῶς, οὐκ ἂν ἀνταμυνόμενος τις καὶ ἐπικρατήσας τὰ πλείω τοῦ πολέμου κατ' ἀνάγκην ὅρκους ἐγκαταλαμβάνων μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱσοῦ ξυμβῆ, ἀλλ' ἂν, παρὸν τὸ αὐτὸ δρᾶσαι πρὸς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ ἀρετὴ αὐτὸν νικῆσας παρὰ δὲ

3 προσεδέχετο μετρίως ξυναλλαγῆ. ὅφειλον γὰρ ἣδη οἱ ἑναντίος μὴ ἀνταμύνεσθαι ὡς βιασθεῖσ, ἀλλ' ἀνταποδοῦναι ἀρετήν, ἐτοιμότερος ἔστιν

4 αὐσχύνη ἐμμένειν οἱ ξυνέθετο. καὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τοὺς μειζόνως ἔχθροὺς τούτο δρῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς μέτρια διενεχθέντας· πεφύκασι τε τοῖς μὲν ἐκουσίως ἐνδούσιων ἀνθησάσθαι μεθ' ἠδονής, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ὑπεραυχοῦντα καὶ παρὰ γνώμην διακινδυνεύειν.

1 ἀν, Krüger's conjecture.
leave to posterity an unhazardous reputation at once for strength and sagacity.

XIX. "The Lacedaemonians therefore invite you to accept terms and bring the war to an end, offering you peace and alliance, and apart from this the maintenance of hearty friendship and intimacy one with the other; and asking on their side merely the return of the men on the island. They think it better for both parties not to take the risk either of the besieged making their escape in spite of you, should some chance of safety present itself, or of their being reduced by siege to a still harder lot. We believe, too, that a permanent reconciliation of bitter enmities is more likely to be secured, not when one party seeks revenge and, because he has gained a decided mastery in the war, tries to bind his opponent by compulsory oaths and thus makes peace with him on unequal terms, but when, having it in his power to secure the same result by clemency, he vanquishes his foe by generosity also, offering him terms of reconciliation which are moderate beyond all his expectations. For the adversary, finding himself now under obligation to repay the generosity in kind, instead of striving for vengeance for having had terms forced upon him, is moved by a sense of honour and is more ready to abide by his agreements. Furthermore, men are more inclined to act thus toward their more serious enemies than toward those with whom they have had but trifling differences. And, finally, it is natural for men cheerfully to accept defeat at the hands of those who first make willing concessions, but to fight to the bitter end, even contrary to their better judgment, against an overbearing foe."
XX. "Ἡμῖν δὲ καλῶς ἔπερ ποτὲ, ἔχει ἀμφο-
tέροις ἡ ἤμναλλαγή, πρὶν τε ἀνῆκεστον διὰ μέσου
γενόμενον ἡμᾶς καταλαβεῖν, ἐν ὧν ἀνάγκη ἁίδιον
ἡμῖν 1 ἔχθραν πρὸς τῇ κοινῇ καὶ ἴδιαν ἔχειν.
2 ὡς 2 δὲ στερηθῆραι ὑν ὧν προκαλούμεθα. ἔτι
ὁ ὄντων ἀκρίτων καὶ ὡς μὲν δόξης καὶ ἡμετέρας
φιλίας προσγιγνομένης, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸ ἀισχροῦ
τινος τῆς ξυμφορᾶς μετρίως κατατεθημένης διαλ-
λαγόμεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ τε ἀντὶ πολέμου εἰρήνης
ἔλομεθα καὶ τοῖς ἰλλοις Ἔλληνισιν ἄναπαυσι
κακῶν ποιήσωμεν ὦ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡς αἰτιω-
tέρος ἡγησόμεθα. πολεμοῦνται μὲν γὰρ ἁσαφῶς
ὁποτέρων ἀρξάντων καταλύσεως δὲ γενομένης,
ἥς ὡς ὑμεῖς τὸ πλέον κύριοι ἔστε, τὴν χάριν
3 ὡς προσθήσουσιν. ὧς τε γρῶτε, Δακεδαι-
μονίοις ἔξεστιν ὡς μὲν φίλους γενέσθαι βεβαιῶς,
αὐτῶν τε προκαλεσαμένων χαρισαμένοις τε μᾶλ-
4 ὀν ἢ βιασαμένοις. 3 καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὰ ἐνότα
ἄγαθα σκοτεῖτε ὅσα εἰκός εἶναι ἡμῶν γὰρ καὶ
ὡς ταῦτα λεγόντων τὸ γε ἀλλο Ἐλληνικοῦ
ἴστε ὅτι ὑποδέστερον ὑν τὰ μέγιστα τιμήσεις."

XXI. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Δακεδαιμόνιοι τοσαῦτα
eἰπον, νομίζοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῷ πρὶν
χρόνῳ σπουδῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν, σφῶν δὲ ἐναν-
tιούμενον καλύεσθαι, διδομένης δὲ εἰρήνης ἀσμέ-

1 ἡμῖν, with E. Haase and Claessen; Hude retains the MSS.
reading ὡς, with Stahl, following the Scholiast.
2 Hude reads ὡς, with O.
3 Hude reads βιασαμένοις, with O.

Or, reading ἄλλον ὡς... ἡμῖν δὲ, as Hude does, "you
Athenians would have our undying hatred... and we
Spartans would be deprived of the advantages we now offer."
XX. "Now, if ever, reconciliation is desirable for us both, before some irreparable disaster has come upon either of us and prevented it; should that befall, we shall inevitably cherish toward each other an undying personal hatred, over and above that which we now feel as public enemies, and you will be deprived of the advantages we now offer. While, therefore, the issue of the war is still in doubt, while your reputation is enhanced and you may have our friendship also, and while our disaster admits of a reasonable settlement and no disgrace as yet has befallen us, let us be reconciled; and let us for ourselves choose peace instead of war, and give a respite from evils to all the other Hellenes. And they will count you especially the authors of the peace; for although they were drawn into the war without knowing which of us began it, yet if a settlement is effected, the decision of which at this time rests chiefly with you, it is to you they will ascribe their gratitude. And so, if you decide for peace, it is in your power to win the steadfast friendship of the Lacedaemonians, which they freely offer and you may secure by acting, not with violence, but with generosity. Pray consider all the advantages which may well be involved in such a course; for if you and we agree be assured that the rest of the Hellenic world, since it will be inferior to us in power, will pay us the greatest deference."

XXI. Such were the words of the Lacedaemonians. They thought that, since the Athenians had at an earlier period been eager to end the war and had been prevented by the opposition of Sparta, they

\[ i.e. \] peace, alliance, intimate friendship (ch. xix. 1).

\[ i.e. \] after the plague and the second invasion of Attica, in 430 B.C. cf. ii. lix.
THUCYDIDES

νος δὲξεσθαί τε καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀποδώσειν. 2 οί δὲ τὰς μὲν σπονδὰς, ἔχουσας τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ, ἢδη σφίσιν ἐνόμησον ἐποίμους εἶναι, ὡσποταν βουλουνται ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς, τοῦ δὲ πλέονος 3 ὠρέγοντο. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνήγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεανίτενος, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὁν 1 τῷ πλήθει πιθανότατον καὶ ἔπεισεν ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς χρῆ τὰ μὲν ὁπλα καὶ σφάς αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ παραδόντας πρῶτον κομισθῆναι Ἀθηναῖς, ἐλθόντων δὲ ἀποδόντας Λακεδαιμονίους Νέσταιαν καὶ Πηγᾶς καὶ Τροξῆνα καὶ Ἀχαιαν, ἀν ὁ πολέμῳ ἔλαβον, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῆς προτέρας ἔμβασεως Ἀθηναίων ἔναρξης σάντων κατὰ ἔναρξης καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε δεομένων τι μᾶλλον σπονδῶν, κομίσασθαι τοὺς ἀνδρας καὶ σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι ὑπόνοιν ἤν δοκηχ χρόνον ἀμφοτέροις.

XXII. Οἱ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀπόκρισιν οὐδὲν ἀντείπον, ξυνέδρους δὲ σφίσιν εκέλευον ἔλεσθαι οἵτινες λέγοντες καὶ ἀκούοντες περὶ ἐκάστου ἔμβασισται κατὰ ἴσην λοιμὴν ὁ τι ἄν πείθωσιν 2 ἄλλης ὁ Κλέων δὲ ἐναύδα δὴ πολὺς ἐνέκειτο, λέγων γιγαντικὸν μὲν καὶ πρότερον οὐδὲν ἐν μῶς ἔχοντας δικαιο αὐτοὺς, σφίσις δὲ εἶναι καὶ νῦν, οἵτινες τῷ μὲν πλήθει οὐδὲν ἔθελον εἰπεῖν, ἄλλος δὲ ἀνδρας ξυνέδροι βούλουται ἐγκρίνειν εἰπεῖν, ἔλεγοι δὲ ἀνδρασι ξυνέδροι βούλουται ἐγκρίνειν ἀλλ’ εἰ τι ὑγίες διανοοῦνται, λέγειν εκέλευσεν 3 ἄπασιν. οἵτινες δὲ οἱ Ἀκαδαιμονίοι οὕτε σφίσιν οίον τε ὁν ἐν πλήθει εἰπεῖν, εἰ τι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς

1 καί, before τῷ πλήθει, deleted by Krüger.
2 Hude inserts ἐν before ἐκέλευσεν, with Cobet.
would, if peace were offered to them, gladly accept it and give up the men. But the Athenians believed that, since they held the men on the island, peace could be theirs the moment they cared to make it, and meanwhile they were greedy for more. They were urged to this course chiefly by Cleon son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader at that time who had very great influence with the multitude. He persuaded them to reply that the men on the island must first give up themselves and their arms and be brought to Athens; on their arrival, the Lacedaemonians must give back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea, which had not been taken in war but had been ceded by the Athenians¹ in an agreement made some time before as a result of misfortunes, when they were somewhat more eager for peace than now. They could then recover the men and make a treaty which should be binding for as long a time as both parties should agree.

XXII. To this reply the envoys said nothing, but they requested the appointment of commissioners who should confer with them, and after a full discussion of all the details should at their leisure agree upon such terms as they could mutually approve. Thereupon Cleon attacked them violently, saying that he had known before this that they had no honourable intention, and now it was clear, since they were unwilling to speak out before the people, but wished to meet a few men in conference; he bade them, on the contrary, if their purpose was honest, to declare it there before them all. But the Lacedaemonians, seeing that it was impossible to announce in full assembly such concessions as they

¹ cf. i. exv. 1.
THUCYDIDES

Ξυμφορᾶς ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ἔννοια ἡμαῖρ᾽, μη ἐς τοὺς ἐφιστηθῶσιν εἰπότες καὶ οὐ τυχόντες, οὔτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ μετρίους ποιήσοντας ἀ προκαλοῦντο, ἀνεχόρησαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἄπρακτοι.

XXIII. 'Αφικομένων δὲ αὐτῶν διελέμνωτο ἐνθὺς αἱ σπονδαὶ αἱ περὶ Πύλου, καὶ τὰς ναῦς οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπήτουν, καθάπερ ξυνέκειτο· οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐγκλήματα ἐχοντες ἐπιδρομὴν τῇ τῷ τειχίσματι παράσπονδον καὶ ἄλλα οὓς ἀξιόλογα δοκοῦντα εἶναι οὓς ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἱσχυρίζομενοι ὅτι ὅτι εἴρητο, εἀν καὶ οἰσιν παραβαθῆ, λεύσθαι τὰς σπονδίς. οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἀντέλεγον τὰ καὶ ἄδικα ἐπικαλέσαστα τῷ τῶν νεῶν ἀπελθόντως ἐς πόλεμον καβιστάντο, καὶ τὰ περὶ Πύλου ὅπ' ἀμφοτέρων κατὰ κράτος ἐπολεμεῖτο, Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν δυνοῖν νεών ἐναντίαις αἰτεῖ τὴν νῆσον περιπλέουσας τῆς ἡμέρας (τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς καὶ ἀπασαι περιώρμουν, πλὴρ τὰ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος, ὅποτε ἀνεμος εἰς καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὐτοῖς ἐκκοσμεῖ νῆσε ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὴν φυλακὴν, ὅστε αἱ πάσαι ἐβδομήκοντα ἐγένοντο), Πελοποινήσιοι δὲ ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ στρατοπεδεύσαντο καὶ προσβολὰς ποιούμενοι τῷ τείχει, σκοποῦντες καὶ ἐντὸς αὐθέντας ὅστε τοὺς ἄνδρας σῶσαι.

XXIV. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Συρακοσίαι καὶ οἱ ξύμαχοι πρὸς ταῖς ἐν Μεσσηνῇ φρουροῦσαι ναυσὶ τῷ ἄλλο ναυτικὸν ὰ παρεσκευάζοντο προσκομίσαντες τὸν πόλεμον ἐποιοῦντο ἐκ

1 With Cobet, for διελέμνωτο of the MSS.
2 of of the MSS., before ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, deleted by Hude.
might think it best to make in view of their misfortune, lest they might be discredited with their allies if they proposed them and were rebuffed, and seeing also that the Athenians would not grant their proposals on tolerable conditions, withdrew from Athens, their mission a failure.

XXIII. When they returned, the truce at Pylos was terminated at once, and the Lacedaemonians demanded the return of their ships according to the agreement; but the Athenians accused them of having made a raid against the fort in violation of the truce, and of other acts that do not seem worth mentioning, and refused to give up the ships, stoutly maintaining that it had been stipulated that, if there should be any violation of the truce whatsoever, it should be at an end forthwith. The Lacedaemonians contradicted this, and after protesting that the detention of the ships was an act of injustice went away and renewed the war. And so the warfare at Pylos was carried on vigorously by both sides. The Athenians kept sailing round the island by day with two ships going in opposite directions, and at night their whole fleet lay at anchor on all sides of it, except to seaward when there was a wind; while to assist them in the blockade twenty additional ships came from Athens, so that they now had seventy in all. As for the Peloponnesians, they were encamped on the mainland, and kept making assaults upon the fort, watching for any opportunity which might offer of rescuing their men.

XXIV. Meanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans and their allies, having reinforced the ships which were keeping guard at Messene by bringing up the other naval force which they had been equipping, 1 were

1 *cf. ch. i. 4.*
2 τῆς Μεσσήνης (καὶ μάλιστα ἐνήγγον οἱ Δοκροὶ τῶν Ῥηγίνων κατὰ ἔχθραν, καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐσεβεβλή-
3 κεσαν πανδημεῖ ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν), καὶ ναυ-
μαχίας ἀποτειράσθαι ἐβουλοῦτο, ὁρῶντες τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰς μὲν παρούσας ναύς ὀλίγας, ταῖς
dὲ πλείοσι καὶ μελλούσαις ἥξειν πυθανόμενοι
4 τὴν νῆσον πολιορκεῖσθαι. εἰ γὰρ κρατήσειαν
tῷ ναυτικῷ, τὸ Ῥηγίου ἡλπίζον πεζῇ τε καὶ
ναυσίν ἐφορμοῦντες βαδίως χειρώσεσθαι, καὶ ἤδη
σφῶν ἱσχυρὰ τὰ πράγματα γίγνεσθαι. Ξύνεγγυς
γὰρ κειμένου τοῦ τε Ῥηγίου ἀκρωτηρίου τῆς
Ἰταλίας τῆς τε Μεσσήνης τῆς Σικελίας, τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις 1 οὐκ ἄν εἶναι ἐφορμεῖν καὶ τοῦ
πορθμοῦ κρατεῖν. ἔστι δὲ ὁ πορθμὸς ἡ μεταξὺ
Ῥηγίου θάλασσα καὶ Μεσσήνης, ἢπερ βραχύ-
tατον Σικελία τῆς ὑπείρου ἀπέχειν καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ
Χάρυβδις κληθεῖσα τούτῳ, ἡ Ὄδυσσεος λέγεται
dιαπλέουσα. διὰ στενότητα δὲ καὶ ἐκ μεγάλων
πελαγῶν, τοῦ τε Τυρσηνικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Σικελικοῦ,
ἐσπίπτουσα ἡ θάλασσα ἐς αὐτὸ 2 καὶ ῥοώδης
οὐσα εἰκότως χαλεπὴ ἐνομίσθη.

XXV. Ἐν τούτῳ οὖν τῷ μεταξὺ οἱ Συρακόσιοι
cαὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ναυσίν ὀλίγῳ πλείοσιν ἡ τριά-
kοντα ἠγακάσθησαν ὅφει τῆς ἡμέρας ναυμαχήσαται
περὶ πλοίον διαπλέοντος, ἀντεπαναγόμενοι πρός
τε Ἀθηναίων ναύς ἐκκαίδεκα καὶ Ῥηγίνας ὀκτώ.
2 καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τάχους
ἀπέπλευσαν ὡς ἐκαστοὶ ἔτυχον ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα στρα-

1 τε, after Ἀθηναίοις in all MSS. except Cod. Danicus, is
bracketed by all later editors.
2 αὐτό the MSS.; Hude emends to ταύτα.

250
carrying on the war from Messene. To this they were instigated chiefly by the Locrians on account of their hatred of the Rhegians, whose territory they had themselves invaded in full force. The Syracusans wanted also to try their fortune in a sea-fight, seeing that the Athenians had only a few ships at hand, and hearing that the most of their fleet, the ships that were on the way to Sicily, were employed in blockading the island of Sphiacteria. For, in case they won a victory with the fleet, they could then invest Rhegium both by land and by sea and, as they believed, capture it without difficulty; and from that moment their situation would be a strong one, since Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy, and Messene in Sicily are only a short distance apart, and so the Athenians would not be able to keep a fleet there¹ and command the strait. Now the strait is that arm of the sea between Rhegium and Messene, at the point where Sicily is nearest the mainland; and it is the Charybdis, so called, through which Odysseus is said to have sailed. On account of its narrowness and because the water falls into it from two great seas, the Etruscan and the Sicilian, and is full of currents, it has naturally been considered dangerous.

XXV. Now it was in this strait that the Syracusans and their allies were compelled one day toward evening to fight for a vessel which was making the passage; and with thirty odd ships they put out against sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian ships. They were defeated by the Athenians, and hastily sailed back, each contingent as best it could, to their own

¹ i.e. in case Rhegium were taken by the Syracusans.
τὸπέδα μίαν ναῦν ἀπολέσαντες· καὶ νῦν ἐπεγέ-3 νητο τῷ ἔργῳ. μετὰ δὲ τούτο οἱ μὲν Δοκροὶ ἀπῆλθον ἐκ τῆς Ῥηγίνων, ἔπὶ δὲ τὴν Πελοπίδα τῆς Μεσσήνης ξυλεῖγεσαι αἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων νῆς ὁρμοῦν καὶ ὁ πεζὸς αὐτός
4 παρῆν. προσπλεύσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Ῥηγίνων ὄροις τὰς ναῦς κενὰς ἐνεβαλον, καὶ
χειρὶ σιδῆρα ἐπιβληθείσῃ μίαν ναῦν αὐτὸν ἀπώ-
5 λεσαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀποκολομβησάντων. καὶ μετὰ τούτο τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐσβάντων ἐς τὰς ναῦς καὶ
παραπλεύτων ἀπὸ κάλω ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην, αὕτης
προσβαλὼντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀποσιμωσάντων ἐκεῖνον καὶ προεμβαλόντων, ἐτέραν ναῦν ἀπολ-
6 λύουσιν. καὶ ἐν τῷ παράπλω καὶ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ
tοιοτοτρόπῳ γενομένῃ οὐκ ἑλάσσον ἐχοῦτες οἱ
Συρακοσίοι παρεκκομίσθησαν ἐς τὸν ἐν τῇ Μεσ-
σήνη λιμένα.
7 Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι, Καμαρίνης ἀγγελθείσης
προδίδοσθαι Συρακοσίως ὑπ’ Ἀρχίου καὶ τῶν
μετ’ αὐτῶν, ἐπελευσαν ἐκεῖς· Μεσσήνῳ δ’ ἐν
tούτω πανδημεὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ ταῖς ναυσιν ἅμα
ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Νάξον τῆν Χαλκιδικὴν ὁμορον
8 οὕσαν. καὶ τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τειχῆρες ποιῆ-
σαντες τοὺς Νάξιους ἐδόσουν τὴν γῆν, τῇ δ’ ὑστε-
ραῖς ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες κατὰ τὸν
Ἀκείσινην ποταμὸν τὴν γῆν ἐδόσουν, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ
9 πρὸς τὴν πόλιν προσβαλλον. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ
Σικελοὶ ὑπέρ τῶν ἄκρων πολλοὶ κατέβαινον

1 τὸ το ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ῥηγίνῳ, in the MSS.
2 For ἐσβάλλον of the MSS., Poppo’s correction, accepted
after στρατεύθα, rejected by Hude, after Stahl and van
after most editors.
Herwerden.
camps, having lost one ship; and night came on while they were in action. After this the Locrians left the territory of the Rhegians; and the ships of the Syracusans and their allies assembled at Peloris in Messene, where they anchored and were joined by their land-forces. The Athenians and the Rhegians sailed up, and seeing that the Syracusan ships were unmanned attacked them; but they themselves lost one ship, which was caught by a grappling-iron cast upon it, the crew having leaped overboard. After this the Syracusans embarked and their ships were being towed along the shore by ropes toward Messene when the Athenians attacked again, but lost another ship, since the Syracusans made a sudden turn outwards and charged them first. In the passage along the shore, then, and in the sea-fight that followed in this unusual fashion, the Syracusans had the best of it, and at length gained the harbour at Messene.

But the Athenians, on the report that Camarina was to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his faction, sailed thither. The Messenians meanwhile took all their land-forces and also the allied fleet and made an expedition against Naxos, the Chaleidian settlement on their borders. On the first day they confined the Naxians within their walls and ravaged their lands; on the next day, while their fleet sailed round to the river Acesines and ravaged the land there, their army assaulted the city of Naxos. Meanwhile the Sicels came down over the heights in

\[ 2 \text{ o' before } \delta \nu \delta, \text{ Krüger's suggestion following a scholium (\(\delta νι του \text{ o'} \delta κι των } \delta καπαν } \delta τει κ.\text{.τ.\.)} \text{, is adopted by Hude.} \]
θυσιώνετε ἐπὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους. καὶ οἱ Νάξιοι ὡς ἔδον, θαρσῆσαντες καὶ παρακελευόμενοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὡς οἱ Λεοντῖνοι σφίζει καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἑλληνες ξύμμαχοι ἐς τιμωρίαν ἐπέρχονται, ἐκ- δραμόντες ἄρφω ἐκ τῆς πόλεως προσπέπτουσι τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, καὶ τρέψαντες ἀπέκτειναν τε ἑπερ χιλίους καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ χαλεπῶς ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ’ οἴκου καὶ γαρ οἱ βαρβαροὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐπιπεσόντες τοὺς πλείστους διέφθειραν. καὶ αἱ νῆες σχοῦσαί ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην ὑστερον ἐπ’ οἴκου ἐκασται διεκρίθησαν. Λεοντῖνοι δὲ εὐθὺς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην ὡς κεκακωμένην ἑστράτευον, καὶ προσβάλλοντες οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίοι κατὰ τὸν λιμένα ταῖς ναυσίν ἐπει- ρων, ὃ δὲ πεζὸς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. ἐπεκδρομὴν δὲ ποιησάμενοι οἱ Μεσσηνίους καὶ Λοκρῶν τινὲς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοτέλους, οἱ μετὰ τὸ πάθος ἐγκατελείφθη- σαν φρουροὶ, ἔξαπεναίως προσπεσόντες τρέπονται τοῦ στρατεύματος τῶν Λεοντίνων τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἀπέκτειναν πολλοὺς. Ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ ἀποβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἐβοήθουν, καὶ κατεδίωκαν τοὺς Μεσσηνίους πάλιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, τε- τραγμένοις ἐπιγενόμενοι καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαν- τες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὸ Ρήγην. μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Σικελία Ἑλληνες ἀνευ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατὰ γῆν ἑστράτευον ἐπ’ ἀλλήλους.

XXVI. Ἔν δὲ τῇ Πύλῳ ἐτι ἐπολιόρκουν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Δακεδαιμονίους οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ στρατόπεδον τῶν Πελοποννησίων 2 κατὰ χώραν ἐμενεν. ἐπίπονος δ’ ἦν τοῖς Ἀθη- ναίοις ἡ φυλακὴ σίτου τε ἀπορία καὶ ὑδατος: οὗ
large numbers to help in resisting the Messenians. When the Naxians saw them coming, they took heart, and calling to each other that the Leontines and their other Hellenic allies were approaching to defend them rushed suddenly out of the city and fell upon the Messenians, putting them to flight and killing over a thousand of them. The rest got back home with difficulty; for the barbarians attacked them in the roads and killed most of them. And the allied fleet, after putting in at Messene, dispersed to their several homes. Thereupon the Leontines and their allies, in company with the Athenians, immediately made an expedition against Messene, believing it to be weakened, and attempted an assault upon it, the Athenians attacking with their ships on the side of the harbour, while the land forces moved against the town. But the Messenians and some of the Locrians, who, under the command of Demoteles, had been left there as a garrison after the disaster at Naxos, made a sortie, and falling suddenly upon them routed the larger part of the army of the Leontines and killed many of them. Seeing this the Athenians disembarked and came to their aid, and attacking the Messenians while they were in disorder pursued them back into the city; they then set up a trophy and withdrew to Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in Sicily, without the cooperation of the Athenians, continued to make expeditions against one another by land.

XXVI. At Pylos, meanwhile, the Athenians were still besieging the Lacedaemonians on the island, and the army of the Peloponnesians on the mainland remained in its former position. The blockade, however, was harassing to the Athenians on account of the lack of both food and water; for there was only
THUCYDIDES

γὰρ ἦν κρήνη ὅτι μὴ μία ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει τῆς Πύλου καὶ αὕτη οὐ μεγάλη, ἀλλὰ διαμόρφωσε τὸν κάγχηκα οἱ πλείστοι ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἔπινον

3 οἴον εἰκὸς ὕδωρ. στενοχωρία τε ἐν ὀλύγῳ στρατοπεδευμένοις ἐγίγνετο, καὶ τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἔχουσῶν ὄρμων αἱ μὲν σίτον ἐν τῇ γῇ ἱρόντο κατὰ μέρος;

4 αἱ δὲ μετέωροι ὄρμουν. ἀθυμίαν τε πλείστην ὁ χρόνος παρεῖχε παρὰ λόγων ἐπιγιγμένους, οὗς ἕφυτο ἡμερῶν ὀλύγων ἐκπολιορκήσειν, ἐν νῆσῳ τε

5 ἑρήμη καὶ ὑδατὶ ἀλμυρῷ χρωμένους. αὐτικὸν δὲ ἦν οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι προεπόντες ἐς τὴν νῆσον ἔσαγεν σίτον τε τῶν βουλόμενον ἀληθεμένου καὶ σίτον καὶ τυρίν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλο βρῶμα, οὗ ἔστω ἐκ πολιορκίας ἀργυρίου πολλοῦ καὶ τῶν Εἰλῶτος τῷ ἐσαγαγόντι ἐλευθερίαν ὑπ’

6 σχυνόμενοι. καὶ ἐσῆγον ἄλλοι τε παρακεντόνες καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Εἰλώτες, ἀπαίροντες ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ὁπόθεν τῦχον καὶ καταπλέοντες ἐτί νυκτὸς ἐς τὰ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τῆς νῆσον.

7 μάλιστα δὲ ἐγῆρον ἀνέμφω καταφέρεσθαι ὑδάτων γὰρ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν τρίηρων ἐλάνθανον, ὡστε πνεύμα ἐκ ποιήτου εἰς ἀποροθανυμάρ γὰρ ἐγίγνετο περιορμεῖν, τοῖς δὲ ἰφείδης ὁ κατάπλους καθειστήκειν ἐπόκελλον γὰρ τὰ πλοία τετειμημένα χρημάτων, καὶ οἱ ὁπλίται περὶ τὰς κατάρσεις τῆς νῆσον

1 The reference is to the ships which kept up a patrol round the island. There was no anchorage near the shore
one spring, high up on the acropolis of Pylos, and a small one at that, and the soldiers for the most part scraped away the shingle upon the beach and drank water such as one might expect to find there. And there was scant room for them, encamping as they did in a small space, and since there was no anchorage for the ships, the crews would take their food on land by turns, while the rest of the fleet lay at anchor out at sea. Very great discouragement, too, was caused by the surprisingly long duration of the siege, whereas they had expected to reduce the enemy in a few days, since they were on a desert island and had only brackish water to drink. But the cause of their holding out was that the Lacedaemonians had called for volunteers to convey to the island ground corn and wine and cheese and other food such as might be serviceable in a siege, fixing a high price and also promising freedom to any Helot who should get food in. Many took the risk, especially the Helots, and actually brought it in, putting out from any and every point in the Peloponnesus and coming to shore during the night on the side of the island facing the sea. If possible they waited for a wind to bear them to the shore; for they found it easier to elude the guard of triremes when the breeze was from the sea, since then it was impossible for the ships to lie at their moorings off the island, whereas they themselves ran ashore regardless of consequences, as a value had been set upon the boats which they drove upon the beach, and the hoplites would be on watch for them at the landing-
on the seaward side (ch. viii. 8); so at meal-times the crews of one part of the fleet would make a landing somewhere and eat, while the other part would be out at sea on guard.
ἀφύλασσον. ὃσοι δὲ γαλήνῃ κινδυνεύσειαν, ἠλί-

8 σκοντό. ἐσένεον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα κολυμ-

βητᾶς ὕψυχοι, καλωδίων ἐν ἄσκοις ἑφέλκοντες

μήκωνα μεμελετωμένην καὶ λίνου σπέρμα κεκομ-

μένου ὁν τὰ πρῶτον λανθανόντων φυλακὰ

9 ὕστερον ἐγένοντο. παντὶ τε τρόπῳ ἐκάτεροι

ἐτεχνώντο, οἱ μὲν ἐσπέρμεπεν τὰ σιτία, οἱ δὲ μὴ

λανθάνειν σφάς.

XXVII. Ἔν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθηναῖς πυρβανόμενοι

περὶ τῆς στρατιάς ὅτι ταλαιπωρεῖται καὶ σίτος

τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ὅτι ἐσπλεῖ, ἦπόρουν καὶ ἐδεδοῖ-

κεσαν μὴ σφῶν χειμῶν τὴν φυλακὴν ἐπιλάβοι,

ὁρῶντες τῶν τε ἐπιστηδεῖον ἐπὶ τὴν Πελο-

πόνησιν κομιδὴν ἀδύνατον ἐσομένην, ἀμα ἐν

χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν θέρει οἷοι τε ὄντες ἰκανὰ

περιπέμπειν, τῶν τε ἐφορμῶν χωρίων ἀλμένων

ὅντων οὐκ ἔσομενον, ἀλλὰ ἡ σφῶν ἀνέντων τὴν

φυλακὴν περιγενήσεσθαι τοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἢ τοῖς πλοῖ-

οις ὁ τῶν σιτῶν αὐτοῖς ἤχει χειμῶνα τηρήσαντας

2 ἐκπλεύσεσθαι, πάντων τε ἐφοβοῦντο μάλιστα

toῖς Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅτι ἐχοντάς τις ἵσχυρὸν αὐ-

toῖς ἐνόμιξον οὐκέτι σφίσιν ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι· καὶ

3 μετεμέλουν τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ δεξάμενοι. Κλέων

de γυνῶν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐς αὐτὸν ὑποψίαν περὶ τῆς

καλύμης τῆς ξυμβάσεως οὐ τάληθη ἔφη λέγειν
toῖς ἑξαγγέλλοντας. 1 παραινοῦντων δὲ τῶν ἀφυγ-

1 So the MSS.: Hude adopts Krüger's conjecture, ἐσπερ-

ῥέοντας.
places on the island. All, on the other hand, who made the venture in calm weather were captured. At the harbour, too, there were divers who swam to the island under water, towing after them by a cord skins filled with poppy-seed mixed with honey and bruised linseed; at first they were not discovered, but afterwards watches were set for them. And so both sides kept resorting to every device, the one to get food in, the other to catch them doing it.

XXVII. At Athens, meanwhile, when they heard that their army was in distress and that food was being brought in to the men on the island, they were perplexed and became apprehensive that the winter would overtake them while still engaged in the blockade. They saw that conveyance of supplies round the Peloponnesus would be impossible—Pylos being a desolate place at best, to which they were unable even in summer to send round adequate supplies—and that, since there were no harbours in the neighbourhood, the blockade would be a failure. Either their own troops would relax their watch and the men on the island would escape, or else, waiting for bad weather, they would sail away in the boats which brought them food. Above all they were alarmed about the attitude of the Lacedaemonians, thinking that it was because they had some ground for confidence that they were no longer making overtures to them; and they repented having rejected their proposals for peace. But Cleon, knowing that their suspicions were directed against him because he had prevented the agreement, said that the messengers who had come from Pylos were not telling the truth. Whereupon these messengers advised, if their own
μένων, εἰ μὴ σφίσει πιστεύουσι, κατασκόπους τινὰς πέμψαι, ἡρὰθη κατάσκοπος αὐτὸς μετὰ
4 Θεσείους ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων. καὶ γνοὺς ὅτι ἀναγκασθῆσεται ἢ ταὐτὰ λέγειν ὅσι διέβαλλεν ἢ τά


5 πλέον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνδρας. καὶ ἐς Νίκιαν τὸν Νικηράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἀπεσήμαινεν, ἔχθρος ὅν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν, ῥάδιον εἶναι παρασκευὴ, εἰ ἄνδρες εἰπέν οἱ στρατηγοὶ, πλεύσαντος λαβέων τοὺς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ, καὶ αὐτὸς γ' ἂν, εἰ ἤρχε, ποιήσαι τούτο.

XXVIII. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων τι ὑποθορυβησάντων ἐς τὸν Κλέωνα, ὅ τι οὐ καὶ νῦν πλεῖ, εἰ ῥάδιον γε αὐτῷ φαίνεται, καὶ ἀμα ὅρῳν αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμῶντα, ἐκέλευεν ἤρτινα βούλεται δύ-


3 τολμῆσαι ὑποχωρῆσαι. αὕτες δὲ ὁ Νικίας ἐκέ-


1 So all MSS. except B (γενόμενοι): Hude adopts, with Krüger, Rauchenstein's conjecture φανήσεται.
reports were not believed, that commissioners be sent to see for themselves, and Cleon himself was chosen by the Athenians, with Theagenes as his colleague. Realizing now that he would either be obliged to bring the same report as the messengers whose word he was impugning, or, if he contradicted them, be convicted of falsehood, and also seeing that the Athenians were now somewhat more inclined to send an expedition, he told them that they ought not to send commissioners, or by dallying to let slip a favourable opportunity, but urged them, if they themselves thought the reports to be true, to send a fleet and fetch the men. And pointing at Nicias son of Niceratus, who was one of the generals and an enemy of his, and taunting him, he said that it was an easy matter, if the generals were men, to sail there with a proper force and take the men on the island, declaring that this was what he himself would have done had he been in command.

XXVIII. The Athenians thereupon began to clamour against Cleon, asking him why he did not sail even now, if it seemed to him so easy a thing; and Nicias, noticing this and Cleon's taunt, told him that as far as the generals were concerned he might take whatever force he wished and make the attempt. As for Cleon, he was at first ready to go, thinking it was only in pretence that Nicias offered to relinquish the command; but when he realized that Nicias really desired to yield the command to him, he tried to back out, saying that not he but Nicias was general; for by now he was alarmed, and never thought that Nicias would go so far as to retire in his favour. But again Nicias urged him to go and offered to resign his command of the expedition
τυρας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐποιεῖτο. οἱ δὲ, οἱνὸν ὥρας
φιλεὶ ποιεῖ, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ Κλέων ὑπέφευγε τὸν
πλοῦν καὶ ἔξανεξορέ τὰ εἰρημένα, τόσῳ ἐπεκεκ-
λεύντο τῷ Νικίᾳ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἁρχὴν καὶ
4 ἐκείνῃ ἐπεβῶν πλείω· ὥστε οὐκ ἔχων ὅπως τοὺς
εἰρημένους ἐπὶ ἐξαπαλλαγῆ, ὑφίσταται τὸν πλοῦν,
καὶ παρελθὼν οὔτε φοβεῖσθαι ἐφι Λακεδαιμονίους
πλεύσεσθαι τε λαβῶν ἐκ μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὐδένα,
Λημυσίους δὲ καὶ Ἰμβρίους τοὺς παρόντας καὶ
πελταστὰς ὦ ἢ σαν ἐκ τοῖς Λίνον βεβοηθήκοτες καὶ
ἀλλοθεὶν τοξότας τετρακοσίοις· ταῦτα δὲ ἔχων
ἐφῆ1 πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πύλῳ στρατιῶτας ἐντὸς ἡμερῶν εἰκοσι ἢ
5 ἄξειν Λακεδαιμονίους ζωντας ἢ
αὐτοῦ ἀποκτενεῖν τοὺς δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνεπεσε
μὲν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῇ κουφολογίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ἁσμένοις δὲ ὁμος ἐγίγνετο τοῖς σωφροῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
λογιζομένοις δυοῖν ἀγαθῶν τοῦ ἐτέρου τεῦξεσθαι,
ἡ Κλέως ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι, δ μᾶλλον ἠλπιζον,
ἡ σφαλεῖσι γνώμης Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώ-
σεσθαι.2

XXIX. Καὶ πάντα διαπραξάμενος ἐν τῇ
ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ψηφισμένων Ἀθηναίων αὐτῷ τῶν
πλοίων, τῶν τε ἐν Πύλῳ στρατηγῶν ἦν προσελο-
μενος. Δημοσθένη, τὴν ἀναγωγὴν διὰ τήκους
2 ἐποιεῖτο, τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη προσέλαβε πυρηνάν
μενος τὴν ἀπόβασιν αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν νῆσον διανοεῖ-
σθαι. οἱ γὰρ στρατιώται κακοπαθοῦντες τοῦ
χωρίου τῇ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ μᾶλλον πολιορκοῦμενοι ἢ
πολιορκοῦντες ὀρμητὸν διακινδυνεύσαν, καὶ αὐτῷ

1 Omitted by Hude, following M.
2 χειρώσεσθαι ABFM.
against Pylos, calling the Athenians to witness that he did so. And the more Cleon tried to evade the expedition and to back out of his own proposal, the more insistently the Athenians, as is the way with a crowd, urged Nicias to give up the command and shouted to Cleon to sail. And so, not knowing how he could any longer escape from his own proposal, he undertook the expedition, and, coming forward, said that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians, and that he would sail without taking a single Athenian soldier, but only the Lemnian and Imbrian troops which were in Athens and a body of targeteers which had come from Aenos, and four hundred archers from other places. With these, in addition to the troops now at Pylos, he said that within twenty days he would either bring back the Lacedaemonians alive or slay them on the spot. At this vain talk of his there was a burst of laughter on the part of the Athenians, but nevertheless the sensible men among them were glad, for they reflected that they were bound to obtain one of two good things—either they would get rid of Cleon, which they preferred, or if they were disappointed in this, he would subdue the Lacedaemonians for them.

XXIX. When he had arranged everything in the assembly and the Athenians had voted in favour of his expedition, he chose as his colleague Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, and made haste to set sail. He selected Demosthenes because he had heard that he was planning to make his landing on the island. For his soldiers, who were suffering because of the discomforts of their position, where they were rather besieged than besiegers, were eager to run all risks. And Demosthenes himself had also
THUCYDIDES

ἐτὶ ρώμην καὶ ἡ νῆσος ἐμπρησθεὶσα παρέσχεν.

3 πρότερον μὲν γὰρ οὕσης αὐτῆς ὕλώδους ἔπι τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἄτριβοις διὰ τὴν αἰεὶ ἐρημίαν ἐφοβεῖτο καὶ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων τούτῳ ἐνόμιζε μᾶλλον εἶναι πολλῷ γὰρ ἂν στρατοπέδῳ ἀποβάντι ἐξ ἄφανος χωρίου προσβάλλοντας αὐτοὺς βλάπτειν. σφίζει μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἐκείνου ἀμαρτίας καὶ παρασκευὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ὑλῆς οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως δὴλα εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ αὐτῶν στρατοπέδου καταφανῆ ἂν εἶναι πάντα τὰ ἁμαρτῆματα, ὡστε προσπίπτειν ἂν αὐτοὺς ἀπροσδοκήτως ἢ βούλωντο· ἐπὶ

4 ἐκείνους γὰρ εἶναι ἂν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν. εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς χωρίον βιῶσιτο ὁμόσε εἶναι, τοὺς ἐλάσσους, ἐμπείρους δὲ τῆς χώρας, κρέισσους ἐνόμιζε τῶν πλεούνων ἀπείρων· λαυθάνει τε ἂν τὸ ἐαυτῶν στρατόπεδον πολὺ ὃν διαφθειρόμενον, οὐκ οὕσῃ τῆς προσόψεως ἢ χρήν ἀλλήλους ἐπιβοηθεῖν.

XXX. Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Ἀἰτωλικοῦ πάθους, ὅ διὰ τὴν ὑλὴν μέρος τε ἐγένετο, οὐχ ἤκιστα αὐτὸν 2 ταῦτα ἔσχει. τοὺς δὲ στρατιωτῶν ἀναγκασθέντων διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν τῆς νῆσου τοῖς ἐσχάτοις προσίσχοντας ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι διὰ προφυλακῆς καὶ ἐμπρήσαντος τινος κατὰ μικρὸν τῆς ὑλῆς ἀκοντος καὶ ἄπο τούτου πνεύματος ἐπιγενομένου 3 τὸ πολὺ αὐτῆς ἔλαβε κατακαυθέν. οὕτω δὲ
been emboldened by a conflagration which had swept
the island. For hitherto, since the island was for
the most part covered with woods and had no roads,
having never been inhabited, he had been afraid to
land, thinking that the terrain was rather in the
enemy's favour; for they could attack from an un-
seen position and inflict damage upon a large army
after it had landed. To his own troops, indeed, the
mistakes and the preparations of the enemy would
not be equally clear by reason of the woods, whereas
all their own mistakes would be manifest to their
opponents, and so they could fall upon them un-
expectedly wherever they wished, since the power
of attack would rest with them. If, on the other
hand, he should force his way into the thicket and
there close with the enemy, the smaller force which
was acquainted with the ground would, he thought,
be stronger than the larger number who were un-
acquainted with it; and his own army, though large,
would be destroyed piece-meal before he knew it,
because there was no possible way of seeing the
points at which the detachments should assist one
another.

XXX. It was especially owing to his experience
in Actolia,¹ when his reverse was in some measure
due to the forest, that these thoughts occurred to
Demosthenes. But the soldiers were so cramped in
their quarters that they were obliged to land on the
dge of the island and take their meals under cover
of a picket, and one of their number accidentally set
fire to a small portion of the forest, and from this,
when a breeze had sprung up, most of the forest was
burned before they knew it. Thus it happened that

¹ cf. III. xcvii., xcviii.
τούς τε Δακεδαιμονίους μᾶλλον κατιδών πλείους ὄντας, ὑπονοοῦν πρότερον ἐλάσσοσι τῶν σίτων αὐτούς ἐσπέρμπειν, τὴν τε νῆσον εὐαποβατωτέραν οὕσαν, τὸτε ὡς ἐπ’ ἀξιόχρεων τοὺς Ἁθηναίους μᾶλλον σπουδὴν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιχειρησιν παρεσκευάζετο, στρατιάν τε μεταπέμπων ἐκ τῶν ἐγγύς ξυμμάχων καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐτοιμάζων.

4 Κλέων δὲ ἐκείνῳ τε προπέμψας ἁγγελοῦν ὡς ἥξων καὶ ἔχων στρατιᾷν ἢν ἠτόσατο, ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Πύλον. καὶ ἀμα γενόμενοι πέμπουσι πρὸτον ἐς τὸ ἐν τῇ ἕπειρῳ στρατόπεδον κήρυκα, προκαλοῦμενοι, εἰ βουλοῦμο, ἀνεν κινδύνου τοὺς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ ἄνδρας σφίσι τὰ τε ὅπλα καὶ σφαῖς αὐτοὺς κελεύειν παραδοῦναι, ἐφ’ ὅ φυλακῇ τῇ μετρίᾳ τηρήσονται, ἐως ἂν τι περὶ τοῦ πλέονος ἅμμαθή. XXXI. οὐ προσδεξαμένων δὲ αὐ μίαν μὲν ἠμέραν ἐπέσχον, τῇ δ’ ύστεραι ἀνηγάγοντο μὲν νυκτὸς ἐπ’ ὅλιγας ναῦς τοὺς ὀπλίτας πάντας ἐπιβιβάσαντες, πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἐω ὅλιγον ἀπέβαινον τῆς νῆσου ἐκατέρωθεν, ἐκ τοῦ τε πελάγους καὶ πρὸς τοῦ λιμένος, ὀκτακόσιοι μάλιστα ὄντες ὀπλίται, καὶ ἐχώρουν δρόμῳ ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον 2 φυλακτήριον τῆς νῆσου. ὥδε γὰρ διετελάχατο· ἐν ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ φυλακῇ ὡς τριάκοντα ἦσαν ὀπλίται, μέσον δὲ καὶ ὀμαλώτατον τε καὶ

1 Bekker’s conjecture for αἰτεῖ of the MSS. Hude reads αἰτεῖσθα, with Krüger
2 Hude deletes, with Krüger.

266
Demosthenes, who could now get a better view of the Lacedaemonians, found that they were more numerous than he had thought; for he had previously suspected that the number for which they were sending provisions was smaller than they stated. He also found that the island was less difficult to make a landing upon than he had supposed. He now, therefore, believing that the object in view was well worth a more serious effort on the part of the Athenians, began preparations for the attempt, summoning troops from the allies in the neighbourhood and getting everything else ready.

Cleon, meanwhile, having first sent word to Demosthenes that he would soon be there, arrived at Pylos, bringing the army for which he had asked. As soon as they had joined forces, they sent a herald to the enemy's camp on the mainland, giving them the option, if they wished to avoid a conflict, of ordering the men on the island to surrender themselves and their arms, on condition that they should be held in mild custody until some agreement should be reached about the main question. This offer being rejected, the Athenians waited for one day, but on the next day while it was still dark they embarked all their hoplites on a few vessels and put off, landing a little before dawn on both sides of the island, on the side toward the open sea and on that facing the harbour, their number being about eight hundred, all hoplites. They then advanced at a run against the first guard-post on the island. For the forces of the enemy were disposed as follows: in this, the first post, there were about thirty hoplites; the central and most level part of the island, near their

1 cf. ch. xvi. 1. 3 i.e. a general peace.
perὶ τὸ ύδωρ οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν καὶ Ἡσυχάδας ὁ ἄρχων εἶχε, μέρος δὲ τε οὖ πολὺ αὐτὸ 1 τὸ ἐσχατὸν ἐφύλασσε τῆς νῆσου τὸ πρὸς τὴν Πύλον, ὃ ἦν ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης ἀπόκρημνον καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἤκιστα ἐπίμαχον καὶ γὰρ τε καὶ ἔρυμα αὐτοῦ ἦν πολαῖον λίθων λογάθη πεποιημένον, ὃ ἐνόμωσεν σφίσσει ὀφέλιμον ἄν εἴη, εἰ καταλαμβάνοι ἀναχώρησις βιαοτέρα. οὕτω μὲν τεταγμένοι ἤσαν.

XXXII. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς μὲν πρῶτους φύλακας, οὓς ἐπέδραμον, εὐθὺς διαφθείρονσιν, ἐν τε ταῖς εὐναῖς ἔτε καναλαμβάνοντας τὰ ὀπλα καὶ λαβόντες τὴν ἀπόβασιν, οἰομένους αὐτῶν τὰς ναῦς κατὰ τὸ ἔθος ἐς ἐφορμὸν τῆς νυκτὸς πλεῖν. 2 ἂμα δὲ ἐφ ὑγνομενή καὶ ὁ ἄλλος στρατὸς ἀπέβαινον, ἐκ μὲν νεῶν ἐξομίκουτα καὶ ὀλίγη πλειόνων πάντες πλὴν θαλαμὼν, ὡς ἔκαστοι ἐσκευασμένοι, τοξόται δὲ ὀκτακόσιοι καὶ πελτασταὶ οὐκ ἐλάσσους τούτων, Μεσογίων τε οἱ βεβοηθηκότες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δοσιν περὶ Πύλου κατείχον πάντες πλὴν τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους φυλάκων. 3 Δημοσθένους δὲ τάξαντως διέστησαν κατὰ διακόσιος καὶ πλείους, ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ ἐλάσσους, τῶν χωρίων τὰ μετεωρότατα λαβόντες, ὅπως ὅτι πλείστη ἀπορία ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις πενταχόθεν κεκυκλωμένοι καὶ μὴ ἔχωσι πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἀντιτά-

1 αὑτῶ, Bauer's correction; MSS. αὑτῷ.

---

1 cf. ch. xxvi. 4.
2 Νot hewn, but brought just as they picked them out.
3 cf. ch. xxiii. 2.
4 The θαλαμῖται, or oarsmen of the lowest tier. At this
water supply, was held by the main body of troops, under the command of Epitadas; and a small detachment guarded the very extremity of the island where it looks toward Pylos. This point was precipitous on the side toward the sea and least assailable toward the land; there was also here an old fortification, built of stones picked up, which the Lacedaemonians thought would be useful to them in case they should have to retreat under strong pressure. Such, then, was the disposition of the enemy's forces.

XXXII. As for the Athenians, they immediately destroyed the men of the first post, upon whom they charged at full speed, finding them still in their beds or endeavouring to snatch up their arms; for they had not noticed the Athenians' landing, supposing that the ships were merely sailing as usual to their watch-station for the night. Then as soon as day dawned the rest of the army began to disembark. These were the crews of somewhat more than seventy ships (with the single exception of the rowers of the lowest benches), equipped each in his own way, besides eight hundred archers and as many targeteers, and also the Messenians who had come to reinforce them, and all the others who were on duty about Pylos except the men left to guard the fort. Under Demosthenes' direction they were divided into companies of two hundred more or less, which occupied the highest points of the island, in order that the enemy, being surrounded on all sides, might be in the greatest possible perplexity and not know which
time a trireme was manned by fifty-four ἀλαμβάνας, fifty-four σωκώτα (occupants of the middle bank), sixty-two ἱκανίτα (upper bank), and thirty περίσευ (reserve oarsmen), including ἔπηρτα and ἑπιβάται.
ΤΗΥΚΥΔΙΔΗΣ

ξωνται, ἀλλ' ἀμφίβολοι γίγνονται τῷ πλῆθει, εἰ μὲν τοὺς πρόσθεν ἔπιοιεν, ὑπὸ τῶν κατόπιν βαλλόμενοι, εἰ δὲ τοὺς πλαγίους, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκατέρωθεν παρατεταγμένων. κατὰ νότου τε αἰεὶ ἔμελλον αὐτοῖς, ἡ χωρήσειαν, οἱ πολέμιοι ἔσεσθαι ψιλοῖ, καὶ οἱ ὑπορώτατοι, τοξεύμασι καὶ ἀκοντίσις καὶ λίθοις καὶ σφενδόναις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἔχοντες ἄλκην τις μηδὲ ἐπελθεῖν οίνον τε ἡνφεύγοντες τε γὰρ ἐκράτουν καὶ ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐπέκειντο. τοιαύτη μὲν γυνῶμη ὁ Δημοσθένης τὸ τε πρῶτον τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἐπενόει καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐταξεν.

XXXIII. Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν 'Επιτάδαν καὶ ὅπερ ἦν πλεῖστον τῶν ἐν τῇ νησῷ, ὡς εἶδον τὸ τε πρῶτον φυλακτήριον διεφθαρμένον καὶ στρατὸν σφίσιν ἐπίοντα, ξυνετάξαντο καὶ τοῖς ὑπόλειται τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπήσαν, βουλόμενοι εἰς χείρας ἐλθεῖν ἐξ ἐναυσίας γὰρ οὕτωι καθευστήκεσαν, ἐκ τοῦ πλαγίου δὲ οἱ ψιλοὶ καὶ κατὰ νότου. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ὑπόλειται οὐκ ἐδυνήθησαν προσμαίειν οὐδὲ τῇ σφετέρᾳ ἐμπειρίᾳ χρήσασθαι: οἱ γὰρ ψιλοὶ ἐκατέρωθεν βάλλοντες ἐίργον, καὶ ἀμα ἔκεινῳ οὐκ ἀντεπῆσαν, ἀλλ' ἰσύχαζον. τοὺς δὲ ψιλοὺς, ἦ μάλιστα αὐτοῖς προσβέοντες προσκέοιτο, ἐτρεπον, καὶ οἱ ὑποστρέφοντες ἡμύνοντο, ἀνθρώποι κούφως τε ἐσκευασμένοι καὶ προλαμβάνοντες.
attack to face, but be exposed to missiles on every side from the host of their opponents—if they attacked those in front, from those behind; if those on either flank, from those arrayed on the other. And they would always find in their rear, whichever way they moved, the light-armed troops of the enemy, which were the most difficult to deal with, since they fought at long range with arrows, javelins, stones, and slings. Nay, they could not even get at them, for they were victorious even as they fled, and as soon as their pursuers turned they were hard upon them again. Such was the idea which Demosthenes had in mind when he devised the plan of landing, and such were his tactics when he put this into effect.

XXXIII. Now when the troops under Epitadas, constituting the main body of the Lacedaemonians on the island, saw that the first outpost was destroyed and that an army was advancing against them, they drew up in line and set out to attack the Athenian hoplites, wishing to come to close quarters with them; for these were stationed directly in front of them, while the light-armed troops were on their flank and rear. They were not able, however, to engage with the hoplites or to avail themselves of their own peculiar skill in fighting; for the light-armed troops kept attacking them with missiles from either side and thus held them in check, and at the same time the hoplites did not advance against them, but remained quiet. They did, however, put the light-armed troops to flight wherever they pressed most closely upon them in their charges; and then these latter would wheel about and keep fighting, being lightly equipped and therefore finding it easy.
THUCYDIDIDES

ραδίως τής φυγῆς χωρίων τε χαλεπότητι καὶ ύπὸ τής πρίν ἐρημίας τραχέων ὄντων, ἐν οἷς οἱ Δακεδαίμονιοι οὐκ ἐδύναντο διώκειν ὄπλα ἔχοντες.

XXXIV. Χρόνων μὲν οὖν τινα ὀλίγον οὕτω πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἥκροβολίσαντο· τῶν δὲ Δακεδαίμονίων οὐκέτι ὄξεως ἐπεκθεῖν ἡ προσπίπτοιεν δυνάμενων, γνώτες αὐτοὺς οἱ ψιλοὶ βραδυτέρους ἢδη ὄντας τῷ ἀμύνασθαι, καὶ αὐτὸι τῇ τε ὅψει τοῦ θαρσείν τὸ πλεῖστον εἰληφότες πολλαπλάσιοι φαινόμενοι καὶ ἔννειθεισμένοι μᾶλλον μηκέτι δεινοὺς αὐτοὺς ὁμοίως σφῖσε φαίνεσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ εὔθὺς ἄξια τῆς προσδοκίας ἐπετόθεσαν, ὅσπερ ὅτε πρῶτον ἀπέβαινον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Δακεδαίμονίους, καταφρονησαντες καὶ ἐμβοηθεσαντες ἄθροι ὁρμησαν ἐπὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐβάλλον λίθους τε καὶ τοξεύμασι καὶ ἰκοντίσιος, ὡς ἐκαστός 2 τι πρόχειρον εἴχειν. γενομένης δὲ τῆς θοις ἁμα τῇ ἐπίδρομῃ ἐκπληξίᾳ τε ἐνέπεσεν ἀνθρώπως ἀίθησι τοιαύτης μάχης καὶ ὁ κονιορτὸς τῆς ὅλης νεωτί κεκαυμένης ἐχώρει πολὺς ἄνω, ἀπορόν τε ἦν ἱδεῖν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν τοξευμάτων καὶ λίθων ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων μετὰ τοῦ κονιορτοῦ 3 ἀμα φερομένων, τὸ τε ἔργον ἑνταῦθα χαλεπὸν τοῖς Δακεδαίμονίοις καθίστατο. οὕτε γὰρ οἱ πίλοι ἔστεγον τὰ τοξεύματα, δοράτια τε ἐναπε-
to take to flight in good time, since the ground was
difficult and, because it had never been inhabited,
was naturally rough. Over such a terrain the Lace-
daemonians, who were in heavy armour, were unable
to pursue them.

XXXIV. For some little time they skirmished thus
with one another; but when the Lacedaemonians
were no longer able to dash out promptly at the point
where they were attacked, the light-armed troops
noticed that they were slackening in their defence,
and also conceived the greatest confidence in them-
selves, now that they could see that they were
undoubtedly many times more numerous than the
enemy, and, since their losses had from the outset been
less heavy than they had expected, they had gradu-
ally become accustomed to regarding their opponents
as less formidable than they had seemed at their first
landing when their own spirits were oppressed by
the thought that they were going to fight against
Lacedaemonians. Conceiving, therefore, a contempt
for them, with a shout they charged upon them in a
body, hurling at them stones, arrows or javelins,
whichever each man had at hand. The shouting
with which the Athenians accompanied their charge
caused consternation among the Lacedaemonians,
who were unaccustomed to this manner of fighting;
and the dust from the newly-burned forest rose in
clouds to the sky, so that a man could not see what
was in front of him by reason of the arrows and
stones, hurled, in the midst of the dust, by many
hands. And so the battle began to go hard with
the Lacedaemonians; for their felt cuirasses afforded
them no protection against the arrows, and the points
of the javelins broke off and clung there when the
κέκλαστο βαλλομένων, εἰχόν τε οὐδὲν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι ἀποκεκλημένοι μὲν τῇ ὁψεὶ τοῦ προορᾶν, ὡπὸ δὲ τῆς μείζονος βοής τῶν πολεμίων τὰ ἔν αὐτοῖς παραγγελλόμενα οὐκ ἐσακούοντες, κινδύνου τε πανταχόθεν περιεστῶτος καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα καθ’ ὦ τι χρῆ ἀμυνομένους σωθῆναι.

XXXV. Τέλος δὲ τραυματιζομένων ἦδη πολλῶν διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ἐνγκλήσαντες ἐχώρησαν ἐς τὸ ἔσχατον ἔρμα τῆς νῆσου,

2 οὐ πολὺ ἀπείχε, καὶ τοὺς ἐαυτῶν φύλακας. ὁς δὲ ἐνέδοσαν, ἐνταῦθα ἦδη πολλῷ ἔτι πλέον ἔρημοι τεθαρσηκότες οἱ ψυλοὶ ἐπέκειντο, καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὅσοι μὲν ὑποχωροῦντες ἐγκατελαμβάνοντο, ἀπέδυναροι, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ διαφυγόντες ἐς τὸ ἔρμα μετὰ τῶν ταύτης φυλάκων ἐτάξαντο

3 παρὰ πάν ὡς ἀμυνούμενοι ἦπερ ὡς ἐπίμαχοι. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιστόμην περίοδον μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ κύκλωσιν χωρίον ἵσχύ οὐκ εἶχον, προσιόντες δὲ ἐξ ἐνεργίας ὁσασθαί ἐπειρῶντο, καὶ χρόνον μὲν πολὺν καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας τὸ πλείστον ταλαιπωροῦμενοι ἀμφότεροι ὑπὸ τε τῆς μάχης καὶ δύσης καὶ ἦλιον ἀντείχον, πειρώμενοι οἱ μὲν ἐξελάσασθαι ἐκ τοῦ μετεώρου, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐνδούναι· ἥξιον δ’ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἡμύνοντο ἡ ἐν τῷ πρᾶς, οὐκ οὕσης σφόν τῆς κυκλώσεως ἐς τὰ πλάγια.

XXXVI. Ἕπειδη δὲ ἀπέραντον ἦν, προσελθὼν ὁ τῶν Μεσσηνίων στρατηγὸς Κλέωνι καὶ Δημο-
men were struck. They were, therefore, quite at their wits’ end, since the dust shut off their view ahead and they could not hear the word of command on their own side because the enemy’s shouts were louder. Danger encompassed them on every side and they despaired of any means of defence availing to save them.

XXXV. At last when they saw that their men were being wounded in large numbers because they had to move backwards and forwards always on the same ground, they closed ranks and fell back to the farthermost fortification on the island, which was not far distant, and to their own garrison stationed there. But the moment they began to give way, the light-armed troops, now emboldened, fell upon them with a louder outcry than ever. Those of the Lacedaemonians who were intercepted in their retreat were slain, but the majority of them escaped to the fortification, where they ranged themselves with the garrison there, resolved to defend it at every point where it was assailable. The Athenians followed, but the position was so strong that they could not outflank and surround the defenders. They, therefore, tried to dislodge them by a frontal attack. Now for a long time, and indeed during the greater part of the day, in spite of the distress from the battle, from thirst, and from the heat of the sun, both sides held out, the one trying to drive the enemy from the heights, the other merely to hold their ground; the Lacedaemonians, however, now found it easier than before to defend themselves, since they could not be taken in flank.

XXXVI. But when the business seemed interminable, the general ¹ of the Messenians came to Cleon ¹ Named Comon, according to Paus. iv. xxvi. 2.
σθένει ἄλλως ἡπὶ πονεῖν σφάς· εἰ δὲ βούλονται ἐαυτῷ δοῦναι τῶν τοξοτῶν μέρος τι καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν περιέναι κατὰ νότου αὐτοῖς ὁδὸν ἢ ἂν αὐτὸς εὐρη, δοκεῖν βιάσασθαι τῆν ἐφόδουν. 2 λαβὼν δὲ ἡ ἡτήσατο, ἐκ τοῦ ἁφανοῦς ὀρμήσας ὁστε μὴ ἱδεῖν ἑκείνους, κατὰ τὸ αἰεὶ παρεῖκον τοῦ κρημνώδους τῆς νῆσου προβαίνων καὶ ἢ οἱ Δακεδαίμονες χωρίον ἱσχύι πιστεύσαντε σὼκ ἐφύλασσον, χαλεπῶς τε καὶ μόλις περιελθὼν ἔλαβε, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μετεώρου ἔξαπιν ἀναφανεὶς κατὰ νότου αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν τῷ ἄδοκῃ ἐξεπληξε, τοὺς δὲ ἀ προσεδέχοντο ἢδοντας πολλῷ 3 μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωσεν. καὶ οἱ Δακεδαίμονες βαλλόμενοι τε ἁμφοτέρωθεν ἦδη καὶ γυγνόμενοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐμπτώματι, ὡς μικρὸν μεγάλω εἰκάσαι, τῷ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις (ἐκεῖνοι τε γὰρ τῇ ἀτραπῇ περιελθῶν τῶν Περσῶν διεφθάρησαν οὕτωι τε), ἁμφίβολοι ἦδη δυτε σὐκετί ἀντεἴχον, ἄλλα πολλοῖς τε ὀλίγοι μαχόμενοι καὶ ἀσθενεία σωμάτων διὰ τὴν σιτο δείαν ὑπεχώρουν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκράτουν ἦδη τῶν ἐφόδων.

XXXVII. Γροῦς δὲ ὁ Κλέων καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης, εἰ καὶ ὀποσονοῦν μᾶλλον ἐνδώσουσι, διαφθαρησομένους αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς σφετέρας στρατιᾶς, ἐπαυσαν τὴν μάχην καὶ τοὺς ἐαυτῶν ἀπείρξαν, βουλόμενοι ἁγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις ἔνωτας, εἰ

1 As the MSS.; Hude ἐπάσεσθαι, after Madvig.
and Demosthenes and said that their side was wasting its pains; but if they were willing to give him a portion of their bowmen and light-armed troops, so that he could get round in the enemy's rear by some path or other which he might himself discover, he thought that he could force the approach. Obtaining what he asked for, he started from a point out of the enemy's sight, so as not to be observed by them, and advanced along the precipitous shore of the island, wherever it offered a foothold, to a point where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to the strength of the position, maintained no guard. Thus with great difficulty he barely succeeded in getting round unobserved and suddenly appeared on the high ground in the enemy's rear, striking them with consternation by this unexpected move, but far more encouraging his friends, who now saw what they were expecting. The Lacedaemonians were now assailed on both sides, and—to compare a small affair with a great one—were in the same evil case as they had been at Thermopylae; for there they had perished when the Persians got in their rear by the path,¹ and here they were caught in the same way. Since, then, they were now assailed on both sides they no longer held out, but, fighting few against many and withal weak in body from lack of food, they began to give way. And the Athenians by this time were in possession of the approaches.

XXXVII. But Cleon and Demosthenes, realizing that if the enemy should give back ever so little more they would be destroyed by the Athenian army, put a stop to the battle and held back their own men, wishing to deliver them alive to the Athenians

¹ cf. Hdt. vii. 213.
πως τοῦ κηρύγματος ἀκούσαντες ἐπικλασθεὶεν τῇ ὑμώμην ἡσσθεὶεν τοῦ παρόντος δεινοῦ, ἐκήρυξάν τε, εἰ βούλονται, τὰ ὁπλα παραδοῦναι καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὡστε βουλεῦσαι ὅ τι ἂν ἐκεῖνοις δοκῇ.

XXXVIII. Οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες παρεῖσαν τὰς ἀσπίδας οἱ πλείστοι καὶ τὰς χείρας ἀνέσεισαν δηλοῦντες προσεῖσθαι τὰ κεκηρυγμένα. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα γενομένης τῆς ἀνοκωχῆς ξυνὴλθον ἐς λόγους ὁ τε Κλέων καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ ἐκείνων Στῦφων ὁ Φάρακος, τῶν πρότερον ἄρχοντων τοῦ μὲν πρῶτου τεθυκότος, Ἐπιτάδου, τοῦ δὲ μετ' αὐτῶν Ἰππαγρέτου ἐφηρημένου ἐν τοῖς νεκροῖς ἐτε ξόντος κειμένου ὡς τεθυκτος, αὐτὸς τρίτος ἐφηρημένος ἂρχειν κατὰ νόμον, εἰ τε ἐκεῖνοι πάσχοιεν. ἔλεξε δὲ ὁ Στῦφων καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτὸν ὧτι βούλονται διακηρυκεύσασθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ Λακε- 

daimonious τι χρῆ σφᾶς ποιεῖν. καὶ ἐκείνων μὲν οὐδένα ἄφιετων, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καλοῦντων ἐκ τῆς ἡπείρου κηρυκας καὶ γενομένων ἐπερωτήσεων δις ἡ τρίς, ὁ τελευταῖος διαπλεύσας αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἡπείρου Λακεδαιμονίων ἀνὴρ ἀπήγγειλεν ὅτι "Λακεδαιμόνιοι κελεύουσιν ύμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ύμῶν αὐτῶν βουλεῦσθαι μηδὲν αἰσχρῶν ποιοῦντας." οἱ δὲ καθ' ἐαυτοὺς βου- 

dενάμενοι τὰ ὁπλα παρέδοσαν καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς.

1 After τῇ γνώμη the MSS. have τὰ ὁπλα παραδοῦναι, which most recent editors delete, after Krüger.
and in hopes that possibly, when they heard the herald’s proclamation, they would be broken in spirit and submit to the present danger. Accordingly, they caused the herald to proclaim that they might, if they wished, surrender themselves and their arms to the Athenians, these to decide their fate as should seem good to them.

XXXVIII. When the Lacedaemonians heard this, most of them lowered their shields and waved their hands, indicating that they accepted the terms proposed. An armistice was then arranged and a conference was held, Cleon and Demosthenes representing the Athenians and Styphon son of Pharax the Lacedaemonians. Of the earlier Lacedaemonian commanders the first, Epitadas, had been slain and Hippagretas, who had been chosen as next in succession, now lay among the fallen and was accounted dead, though he was still alive; and Styphon was third in succession, having been originally chosen, as the law prescribed, to be in command in case anything should happen to the other two. He then, and those with him, said that they wished to send a herald over to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to ask what they must do. The Athenians, however, would not let any of them go, but themselves summoned heralds from the mainland; then, after interrogatories had been exchanged two or three times, the last man who came over to them from the Lacedaemonians on the mainland brought this message: “The Lacedaemonians bid you decide your case for yourselves, but do nothing dishonourable.” So they took counsel with one another and then surrendered themselves and their arms. During
καὶ ταῦτην μὲν τὴν ἥμεραν καὶ τὴν ἐπιούσαν νύκτα ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχον αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι· τῇ δ᾿ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαίον στήσαντες ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ τάλλα διεσκεύαζοντο ὡς ἐς πλούν καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς τριηράρχους διέδοσαν ἐς φυλακῆς, οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι κήρυκα πέμψαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς διεκομίσαντο. ἀπέθανον δ᾿ ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ καὶ ζώντες ἐλήφθησαν τοσοίτωσα· εἶκοσι μὲν ὀπλίται διέβησαν καὶ τετρακόσιοι οἱ πάντες· τούτων ζώντες ἐκομίσθησαν ὁκτὼ ἀποδέοντες τριακόσιοι, οἱ δὲ ἀλλοι ἀπέθανον. καὶ Σπαρτιάται τούτων ἦσαν τῶν ζώντων περὶ εἴκοσι καὶ ἐκατόν. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὦ πολλοὶ διεφθάρησαν· ἡ γὰρ μάχη οὐ σταδία ἦν.

XXXIX. Χρόνος δὲ ὁ ξύμπας ἐγένετο ὅσον οἱ ἄνδρες ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ ἐπολιορκήθησαν, ἀπὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας μέχρι τῆς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ μάχης, ἑβδομήκοντα ἡμέραι καὶ δύο. τούτων περὶ εἴκοσι ήμέραις, ἐν αἷς οἱ πρεσβεῖς περὶ τῶν σπουδῶν ἀπήγαγον, ἐσιτοδοτοῦντο, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τοὺς ἐσπλέουσι λάβρα διετρέφοντο· καὶ ἦν σίτιος τις ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ καὶ ἄλλα βρώματα ἐγκατελήφθη· ὁ γὰρ ἄρχων Ἔπιτάδας ἐνδεεστέρως ἐκάστῳ παρέιχεν ἥ πρὸς τὴν ἔξουσιαν.

3 Οἱ μὲν δὴ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἀνεχόρησαν τῷ στρατῷ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου ἐκάτεροι ἐπὶ οἰκου καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος καὶ περι μανιῶδης ὑστα ἡ ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη· ἐντὸς γὰρ εἶκοσι ἡμερῶν ἤγαγε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ὀσπερ ὑπέστη. XL. παρὰ γνώμην τε δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτο τοὺς Ἑλλησίων ἐγένετο· τοὺς γὰρ
that day and the following night the Athenians kept them under guard; but on the next day, after setting up a trophy on the island, they made all their preparations to sail, distributing the prisoners among the trierarchs for safe-keeping; and the Lacedaemonians sent a herald and brought their dead to the mainland. The number of those who had been killed or taken alive on the island was as follows: four hundred and twenty hoplites had crossed over in all; of these two hundred and ninety two were brought to Athens alive; all the rest had been slain. Of those who survived one hundred and twenty were Spartans.\footnote{i.e. citizens of Sparta, the rest being from the neighbouring towns of the Perioeci; cf. ch. viii. 1.} Of the Athenians, however, not many perished; for it was not a pitched battle.

XXXIX. The time during which the men on the island were under blockade, from the sea fight up to the battle on the island, amounted all told to seventy-two days. For about twenty of these days, the period during which the envoys were absent negotiating the truce, they were regularly provisioned, but the rest of the time they lived on what was smuggled in. And indeed some grain was found on the island at the time of the capture, as well as other articles of food; for the commander Epitadas was accustomed to give each man a scantier ration than his supplies would have allowed.

The Athenians and Peloponnesians now withdrew from Pylos and returned home with their respective forces, and Cleon’s promise, mad as it was, had been fulfilled; for within twenty days he brought the men as he had undertaken to do. XL. Of all the events of this war this came as the greatest surprise to the Hellenic world; for men could not conceive that the
Δακεδαιμόνιος οὔτε λιμῷ οὔτε ἀναγκῇ οὐδεμιᾷ ἥξιον τὰ ὅπλα παραδόναι, ἀλλὰ ἔχοντας καὶ 2 μαχητέρως ἐώς ἐδύνατο ἀποθυμήσειν, ἀπιστοῦντες 1 μή εἰναι τοὺς παραδόντας τοῖς τεθνεωσιν ὁμοίως. καὶ τινὸς ἐρωμένον ποτὲ υστερον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμάχων δε ἀχθηδόνα 2 ἐνα τῶν ἐκ τῆς νῆσου αἵμαλωτῶν εἴ οἱ τεθνεότες αὐτῶν καλοὶ κάγαθοι, ἀπεκρίνατο αὐτῷ πολλῶν ἃν ἄξιον εἰναι τὸν ἄτρακτον, λέγων τὸν οίστον, εἰ τοὺς ἄγαθος διεγγέρωσκε, δῆλωσιν ποιούμενος ὅτι ὁ ἐντυγχάνων τοῖς τε λίθοις καὶ τοξεύμασι διεφθείρετο.

XLI. Κομισθέντων δὲ τῶν ἄνδρῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβούλευσαν δεσμοῖς μὲν αὐτοὺς φυλάσσειν μέχρι ὅτε τι εἰμιβῶσιν, ἢν δ' οἱ Πελοποννησίοι πρὸ τοῦτον ἕς τὴν γῆν ἐσβάλλωσιν, ἐξαγαγόντες 2 ἀποκτεῖναι. τῆς δὲ Πύλων φυλακήν κατεστήσαντο, καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου Μεσσήνων ὡς ἐς πατρίδα ταύτην (ἐστεγαρ ἡ Πύλος τῆς Μεσσήνας ποτὲ οὔσης γῆς) πέμψαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοῦσά τοὺς ἐξεκινοῦντες τῇ Δακονίκῃν 3 καὶ πλείστα ἐβλαπτοῦν ὁμόφωναν ὅντες. οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἀμυθεὶς ὅντες ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ λῃστεῖς καὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτον πολέμου, τῶν τε Εἰλότων ἀὐτομολούντων καὶ φοβοῦμενοι μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ μακρότερον σφίσει τι νεωτερισθῇ τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν, ὥρας ἐφεροῦν, ἀλλὰ, καὶ περὶ οὗ βουλόμενοι ἐνδήλωι εἰναι τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοις, ἔπρεσ.

1 So Hude, with M; most other MSS. ἀπιστοῦντες τε.
2 δ' ἀχθηδόνα, deleted by Hude, after Rutherford.
Lacedaemonians would ever be induced by hunger or any other compulsion to give up their arms, but thought that they would keep them till they died, fighting as long as they were able; and they could not believe that those who had surrendered were as brave as those who had fallen. And when one of the Athenian allies sometime afterwards sneeringly asked one of the captives taken on the island, whether the Lacedaemonians who had been slain were brave men and true, the answer was, that the shaft, meaning the arrow, would be worth a great deal if it could distinguish the brave, intimating that it was a mere matter of chance who was hit and killed by stones and bow-shots.

XLI. When the captives were brought to Athens, the Athenians determined to keep them in prison until some agreement should be reached, but if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their territory, to bring them out and put them to death. They also placed a garrison in Pylos, and the Messenians at Naupactus, regarding this territory as their fatherland—for Pylos belongs to the country that was once Messenia—sent thither such of their own number as were best fitted for the task and proceeded to ravage the Laconian territory, and they did a great deal of damage, since they were men of the same speech as the inhabitants. As for the Lacedaemonians, they had never before experienced predatory warfare of this kind, and therefore, when the Helots began to desert and there was reason to fear that the revolutionary movement might gain still further headway in their territory, they were uneasy, and, in spite of their desire not to betray their alarm

1 Implying that the survivors were not.
THUCYDIDES

4 καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομίζεσθαι. οἱ δὲ μετέξονον τὸν ἱεροῦντο καὶ πολλάκις φοιτώντων αὐτοὺς ἀπράκτος ἀπέπεμπον. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Πύλον ἔγνωμεν.

XLII. Τού δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους μετὰ ταύτα εὐθὺς Ἀθηναίοι ἐς τὴν Κορινθίαν ἐστράτευσαν ναυσὶν σχυδικοῦντα καὶ δισχιλίοις ὀπλίταις ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐν ἰππαρχοῦσι ναυσὶ διακόσιοι ἱππεύσιν ἱκολοῦθον δὲ καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Μιλήσιοι καὶ Ἀνδριω καὶ Καρύστιοι, ἐστρατήγει δὲ Νικίας 2 ὁ Νικηφάτου τρίτος αὐτὸς. πλέοντες δὲ ἀμα ἐφ ἔσχον μεταξὺ Χερσονήσου τε καὶ 'Ρεῖτου ἐς τὸν αἰγιαλὸν τοῦ χαῖρον ὑπὲρ οὗ ὁ Σαλούγειος λόφος ἔστιν, ἐφ’ δὲν Δωρίης τὸ πάλαι ἰδρυθέντες τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει Κορινθίως ἐπολέμουν οὕσιν Αἰολεύσιν καὶ κάμη νῦν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ Σαλούγεια καλομένη ἔστιν. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ τούτου ἐνθά αἱ νῆες κατέσχον ἡ μὲν κόμη αὐτὴ δώδεκα σταδίους ἀπέχει, ἡ δὲ Κορινθίων πόλεως ἐξηκοῦντα, ὁ δὲ 3 ἵσθμός εἶκοσι. Κορίνθιοι δὲ προπυθόμενοι ἐξ Ἀργοὺς ὅτι ἡ στρατιὰ ἦξεῖ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκ πλείονος ἐβοήθησαν ἐς ἰσθμὸν πάντες πλὴν τῶν ἐξω ἰσθμῶν· καὶ ἐν Ἀμπρακία καὶ ἐν Δευκάδι ἀπῆραν αὐτῶν πεντακόσιοι φρουροί· οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι πανδημεῖ ἐπετήρουν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ κατα-

1 At the time when the Dorians, under the leadership of the Heracleidae, got possession of the Peloponnesus (cf. L. xii. 3). See Busolt, Gr. Gesch. i. 208.
to the Athenians, kept sending envoys to them in the endeavour to recover Pylos and the prisoners. But the Athenians constantly made greater demands and the envoys, although they came again and again, were always sent home unsuccessful. Such were the events at Pylos.

XLII. During the same summer and directly after these events the Athenians made an expedition into Corinthian territory with eighty ships and two thousand Athenian hoplites, together with two hundred cavalry on board horse-transports; allied forces also went with them, namely Milesian, Andrian, and Carystian troops, the whole being under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus and two others. These sailed and at day-break landed midway between the peninsula Chersonesus and the stream Rheitus, at a point on the beach over which rises the Solygeian hill—the hill where the Dorians in olden times established themselves when they made war upon the Corinthians in the city, who were Aeolians; and there is still on the hill a village called Solygeia. From this point on the beach where the ships put in to shore this village is twelve stadia distant, the city of Corinth sixty, and the Isthmus twenty. But the Corinthians, having previous information from Argos that the Athenian army would come, had long before occupied the Isthmus with all their forces, except those who dwelt north of the Isthmus and five hundred Corinthians who were away doing garrison duty in Ambracia and Leucas; all the rest to a man were now there, watching to see where the Athenians

³ Three hundred of these had been sent the previous winter to Ambracia, which was a Corinthian colony; cf. iii. exiv. 4.
4 σκίσουσιν. ὡς δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔλαβοι μυκτὸς καταπλεύσαντες καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτῶν ἤρθη, καταλιπόντες τοὺς ἡμῖνες αὐτῶν ἐν Κρηστεῖα, ἤν ἄρα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τῶν Κρομμυόνα ἰσωσιν, ἐβοήθειον κατὰ τάχος.

XLIII. Καὶ Βάττος μὲν ὁ ἐτερος τῶν στρατηγῶν (ὅπο γὰρ ἦσαν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ οἱ παρόντες) λαβὼν λόχον ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Σαλύγειαν κώμην φυλάξων ἀτείχιστον οὐσαν, Δυκόφρων δὲ τοῖς

2 ἄλλοις ζυνέβαλεν. καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τῷ δεξιῷ κέρα τῶν Ἀθηναίων εὐθὺς ἀποβεβηκότει πρὸ τῆς Χερσονήσου οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐπέκειντο, ἐπείτα δὲ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατεύματι. καὶ ἦν ἡ μάχη καρτερὰ

3 καὶ ἐν χερσὶ πάσα. καὶ τῷ μὲν δεξίων κέρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Καρυστίων (οὕτω γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι ἦσαν ἔσχατοι) ἐδέχαντο τε τοὺς Κορινθίους καὶ ἔσωστο μόλις οἱ δὲ ὑποχρησαντες πρὸς αἰμασιν (ὅπο γὰρ τὸ χωρίον πρόσαντες πάν) βάλλοντες τοῖς λίθοις καθύπερθεν ὄντες καὶ παιανίσαντες ἐπῆςαν αὖθις, δεξαμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν χερσὶν ἦν πάλιν ἡ μάχη.

4 λόχος δὲ τῆς τῶν Κορινθίων ἐπιβοσθιᾶσας τῷ εὐνούμῳ κέρα ἐαυτῶν ἐτρεψε τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ δεξίων κέρας καὶ ἐπεδίωξεν ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν πάλιν δὲ ὀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀνέστρεψεν οἱ τε Ἀθηναίοι καὶ οἱ Καρυστίοι. τὸ δὲ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐμάχετο ζυνεχῶς, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ δεξίου κέρας τῶν Κορινθίων, ἐφ᾽ ὧν ὁ Δυκόφρων

1 The Corinthian eastern haven, seventy stadia from the city.
2 The chief place on this coast-line between the Isthmus.
would land. But when the Athenians eluded them by making their landing by night and the Corinthians were notified by the raising of fire-signals, these left half of their troops at Cenchraeae, in case the Athenians should after all go against Crommyon, and in haste rushed to the defence.

XLIII. Thereupon Battus, one of the two Corinthian generals present at the battle, took a company and went to the village of Solygeia, which was unwalled, to guard it, while Lycophron attacked with the remainder of their troops. Now at first the Corinthians assailed the right wing of the Athenians, which had just disembarked in front of Chersonesus, and afterwards engaged the rest of the army also. The battle was stubbornly contested throughout and fought at close quarters. The Athenian right wing, at whose extremity were stationed the Carystians, received the charge of the Corinthians and drove them back, though with difficulty; but the latter retreated to a stone fence and, since the ground was everywhere a steep slope, pelted the Athenians with stones, being on higher ground, and then, raising the paean, charged a second time. The Athenians received the charge and the battle was again waged at close quarters. Then a company of the Corinthians, reinforcing their own left wing, routed the right wing of the Athenians and pursued it to the sea; but again upon reaching the ships the Athenians and Carystians rallied. The other divisions of the two armies were continuously engaged, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron was in command against the and Megara, some 120 stadia from Corinth, known as the haunt of the wild boar killed by Theseus (Paus. i. xxvii. 9; ii. i. 3).
ὅν κατὰ τὸ εὐώνυμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡμύνετο· ἥλπιζον γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν Σολύγειαν κόμην πειράσειν.

ΧLIIV. Χρόνος μὲν οὖν πολὺν ἀντείχον οὐκ ἐνδεδούντες ἀλληλοις· ἐπείτα (ἡσαν γὰρ τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοις οἰ ἱππῆς ὥφελιμοι ἐξεμμαχόμενοι, τῶν ἐτέρων οὐκ ἔχοντων ἵππους) ἐτράποντο οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ ἔπεχορῆσαν πρὸς τὸν λόφον καὶ ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα 2 καὶ οὐκέτι κατέβαινον, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχαζον. ἐν δὲ τῇ τροπῇ ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸ δεξιόν κέρας οἱ πλείστοι τε αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον καὶ Δυκόφρων ὁ στρατηγός. ἢ δὲ ἀλλη στρατιὰ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ οὐ κατὰ δίωξιν πολλὴν οὐδὲ ταχείας φυγῆς γεγομένης, ἔπει εὕμισθη, ἐπαναχωρήσασα πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἱδρύθη. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι, ὡς οὐκέτι αὐτοῖς ἐπῆσαν 3 ἐς μάχην, τοὺς τε νεκροὺς ἐσκύλευον καὶ τοὺς ἕαυτῶν ἀνηροῦντο, τροπαῖον τε εὐθέως ἐστησαν. 4 τοῖς δ᾽ ἡμίσει τῶν Κορινθίων, οἱ ἐν τῇ Κεγχρείᾳ ἐκάθηντο φύλακες, μὴ ἐπὶ τὸν Κρομμυόνα πλευσσομείη, τούτοις οὐ κατάδηλος ἢ μάχη ἢν ὕπο τοῦ ὀροῦ τοῦ Ὀνείου κοινοτρότον δὲ ὡς εἰδοὺ καὶ ὡς ἐγνωσαν, ἐβοήθουν εὐθὺς. ἐβοήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πρεσβύτεροι τῶν Κορινθίων αἰσθό-5 μενοὶ τὸ γεγενημένον. ιδόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἄμπαντας αὐτοὺς ἐπιόντας καὶ νομίσαντες τῶν ἐγγὺς ἀστυγειτώνων Πελοποννησίων βοήθειαν ἐπιέναι, ἀνεχώρουν κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, ἔχοντες τὰ σκυλεύματα καὶ τοὺς ἕαυτῶν νεκροὺς πλὴν δυνών, οὕς ἐγκατέλιπον οὐ δυνάμενοι εὐρεῖν.
Athenian left and kept it in check; for they expected the Athenians to make an attempt against the village of Solygeia.

XLIV. For a long time they held out, neither side yielding to the other. Then as the Athenians had an advantage in the support of their cavalry, whereas the other side had no horses, the Corinthians turned and retired to the hill, where they halted, and did not come down again but remained quiet. In this repulse it was on their right wing that most of the Corinthians that were lost were killed, among them Lycophron the general. But the rest of the Corinthian army retired in this manner—there was no long pursuit nor hasty flight, but when it was forced back, it withdrew to the higher ground and there established itself. As for the Athenians, when the enemy no longer came against them and offered battle, they stripped the corpses, took up their own dead, and straightway set up a trophy. Meanwhile the other half of the Corinthian forces, which was stationed at Cenchraeae as a garrison to prevent the Athenians from making a descent upon Crommyon, were unable to see the battle because Mt. Oncium intervened; but when they saw the cloud of dust and realized what was going on, they rushed thither at once, as did also the older men in the city of Corinth when they perceived what had happened. But the Athenians, seeing the whole throng advancing and thinking it to be a detachment of the neighbouring Peloponnesians coming to assist the Corinthians, withdrew in haste to their ships, having their spoils and the bodies of their own dead, except two, which they left behind because they were not able to find them.
THUCYDIDES

6 καὶ ἀναβάντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπεραιώθησαν ἐς τὰς ἐπικειμένας νῆσους, ἐκ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπικηρυκευόμενοι τοὺς νεκροὺς οὗς ἐγκατέλειπον ὑποσπόνδους ἀνέιλοντο. ἀπέθανον δὲ Κορινθίων μὲν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ δώδεκα καὶ διακόσιοι, Αθηναίων δὲ ὀλίγηρο εἶλαντον πεντήκοντα.

XLV. Ἀραντες δὲ ἐκ τῶν νῆσων οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἐπελεύσαντο ἀυθαμμεροῦ ἐς Κρομμυδώνα τῆς Κορινθίας· ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς πόλεως οἰκοσι καὶ ἐκατον σταδίους. καὶ καθορμισάμενοι τὴν τε γῆν ἐδήσσαν 2 καὶ τὴν νύκτα ἡλίσσαντο. τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ παραπλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Ἑπιδαύριαν πρῶτον καὶ ἀπόβασιν τινα ποιησάμενοι αφίκοντο ἐς Μέδανα 1 τὴν μεταξὺ Ἑπιδαύρου καὶ Τροχίων, καὶ ἀπολαβώντες τὸν τῆς χερσονήσου ἰσθμοῦ ἐτείχισαν ἐν ἦ ἢ Μέδανα ἐστὶ. καὶ φρούριον καταστησάμενοι ἐλήστευον τὸν ἐπειτὰ χρόνον τὴν τε Τροχίαν γῆν καὶ Ἀλιάδα καὶ Ἑπιδαύριαν. ταῖς δὲ ναυσίν, ἐπειδὴ ἐξετείχισαν τὸ χωρίον, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ οἰκον.

XLVI. Κατὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων, καθ' ὄντα 2 ταῦτα ἐγίγνετο, καὶ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Σοφοκλῆς, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου ἀπήραν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ναυσίν Ἀθηναίων, αφικόμενοι ἐς Κέρκυραν ἐστράτευσαν μετὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὄρει τῆς Ἰστώνης Κερκυραίως καθιδρυμένους, οἳ τοῦτο μετὰ τήν στάσιν διαβάντες ἐκράτουν τε τῆς 2 γῆς καὶ πολλὰ ἐβλαπτον. προσβαλόντες δὲ τὸ

1 MSS. give Μέδανα, but Strabo states that the true name is Μέδανα. Lower down the MSS. read ἐν ἦ ἢ Μέδανα ἐστὶ, which many editors bracket. If it is retained, ἐν ἦ must be read for ἐν ἦ, as Μέδανα lay, not on the Isthmus, but on the west coast of the peninsula.

2 καθ' ὄν, with O.G.M., omitted by AB-EF.
So they embarked and crossed over to the adjacent islands, and sending thence a herald recovered under truce the bodies which they had left behind. There were slain in this battle two hundred and twelve of the Corinthians, and of the Athenians somewhat fewer than fifty.

XLV. Setting out from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to Crommyon in Corinthian territory, which is distant a hundred and twenty stadia from the city, and coming to anchor ravaged the land and bivouacked during the night. The next day sailing along the coast they came first to the territory of Epidaurus, where they made a landing, and then to Methana, between Epidaurus and Troezen, where they walled off the neck of the peninsula on which Methana lies. Here they left a garrison, which afterward occupied itself with marauding excursions into the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Epidaurus. But the fleet sailed back to Athens as soon as the fortifications at Methana had been completed.

XLVI. It was at this time, while these events were occurring, that Eurymedon and Sophocles, setting sail from Pylos for Sicily with an Athenian fleet, arrived at Coreclyra. There they took part with the men from the city in an expedition against the Coreclyraeans who had established themselves on Mt. Istone, and who at this time, after crossing over thither subsequently to the revolution, were dominating the country and doing a great deal of damage. The stronghold was taken by assault, but the men in

1 cf. ch. viii. 3; xxix. 1.
2 The democrats who had held the city since 427 B.C. (cf. iii. lxxxv.).
μὲν τείχισμα εἶλον, ὦ εἰ δὲ ἀνδρεὶς καταπεφευγότες ἄθροοι πρὸς μετέωρον τὸ ξυνεβήσαν ὡστε τοὺς μὲν ἑπικούρους παραδούναι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν τὰ ὄπλα παραδόντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων δήμου διαγινόναι. 3 καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐς τὴν νῆσον οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν Πτυχίαν ἐς φυλακὴν διεκόμισαν ὑποσπόνδους, μέχρι οὗ Ἀθῆναςε πεμφθῶσιν, ὡστ' ἐάν τις ἀλῷ ἀποδιδόσκων, ἀπασὶ λειψθαι τὰς σπονδάς. οἱ δὲ τὸν δήμου προστάται τῶν Κερκυραίων, δεδιότες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τοὺς ἔλθοντας οὐκ ἀποκτείνωσι, μη- 5 χανόνται τοιόντες τι τῶν ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ πεῖθουσί τινας ὀλίγους, ὑποπέμψαντες φίλους καὶ διδάξαντες ὡς κατ' εὐνοιαν δὴ λέγειν ὅτι κράτιστον αὐτοῖς εἰς ὡς τἄχιστα ἀποδράναι, πλοίον δὲ τι αὐτοὶ ἐτοιμάσειν μέλλειν γὰρ δὴ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων παραδώσειν αὐτοὺς τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Κερκυραίων. XLVII. ὡς δὲ ἐπείσθησαν καὶ μηχανησάμενοι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκπλέουσες ἔληφθησαν, ἐλέυντό τε αἱ σπονδαὶ καὶ τοῖς Κερκυραίοις 2 παρεδίδοντο οἱ πάντες. Ἐξυπελάβοντο δὲ τοῦ τοι- ὁύτου οὐχ ἤκιστα, ὡστε ἄκριβῇ τὴν πρόφασιν γενέσθαι καὶ τοὺς τεχνησαμένους ἀδεέστερον ἐγχειρῆσαι, οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατά- δηλοὶ ὄντες τοὺς ἀνδρας μὴ ἄν βούλεσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλων κομισθέντας, διότι αὐτοὶ ἐς Σικελίαν ἐπλεοῦν, τὴν τιμήν τοῖς ἄγουσι προσποίησαί. 3 παράλαβόντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐς οἶκημα

292
it fled in a body to some high ground and there capitulated, on condition that they should surrender their mercenary troops and give up their arms, leaving it to the Athenian people to decide upon their own fate. The generals accordingly conveyed the men under truce to the island of Ptychia\(^1\) to be kept under custody there until they should be sent to Athens, and the understanding was that if anyone should be caught trying to run away the truce should be regarded as broken for them all. But the leaders of the popular party at Coreyra were afraid that the Athenians would not put them to death on their arrival at Athens, and therefore resorted to the following stratagem. They first tried to persuade a few of the men on the island to run away, by secretly sending thither friends who were instructed to say, with a show of good will, that the best course for them was to do this with no loss of time, and promising to have a boat ready; for the Athenian generals, they explained, were intending to deliver them up to the Coreyaean populace. XLVII. And when the men had been persuaded, and were caught sailing away in the boat which the others had provided, the truce was broken and the whole party was delivered up to the Coreyaeans. But what chiefly contributed to such a result, so that the pretext seemed quite plausible and that those who devised the scheme felt little fear about putting it into effect, was the fact that the Athenian generals showed that they would not be willing, as they were bound for Sicily themselves, to have the men conveyed to Athens by others, who would thus get the credit for conducting them. Now the Coreyaeans took over the prisoners and shut them

---

\(^1\) cf. III. lxxv. 5; now called Vido.
μέγα κατείρξαν, καὶ ύστερον ἔξαγοντες κατὰ εἶκοσι ἄνδρας διήγον διὰ δυὸν στοιχοῦ ὀπλιτῶν ἐκατέρωθεν παρατεταγμένων, δεδεμένους τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ παιομένους καὶ κεντομένους ὑπὸ τῶν παρατεταγμένων, εἰ πού τίς τίνα ἴδοι ἐχθρὸν ἑαυτοῦ μαστιγοφόροι τε παρώντες ἐπετάχυνον τῆς ὀδοῦ τοὺς σχολαίτερον προϊόντας.

XLVIII. Καὶ ἐς μὲν ἄνδρας ἐξήκοντα ἔλαθον τοὺς ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔξαγαγόντες καὶ διαφθείραντες (φώντο γὰρ αὐτοὺς μεταστήσοντάς ποι ἄλλοσ' ἐξάγειν)· ὃς δὲ ἤσθοντο καὶ τις αὐτοῖς ἐδήλωσε, τοὺς τε Ἀθηναίους ἐπεκαλοῦντο καὶ ἐκέλευον σφᾶς, εἰ βούλονται, αὐτοὺς διαφθέειρεῖν, ἐκ τοῦ οἰκήματος οὐκέτι ἠθέλον ἐξίεναι, οὔτε ἐσίεναι ἔφασαν κατὰ δύναμιν περί-

2 ἰεσθαὶ οὐδένα. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι κατὰ μὲν τὰς θύρας οὗτοι αὐτοὶ διενοῦντο βιάζεσθαι, ἀναβάντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ τέγον τοῦ οἰκήματος καὶ διελόντες τὴν ὀροφήν ἐβαλλον τῷ κεράμῳ καὶ ἐτόξευον κάτω.

3 οἱ δὲ ἐφυλάσσοντο τε ὡς ἑδύναντο καὶ ἀμα οἱ πολλοὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διεφθείρον, οἰστοὺς τε οὖς ἀφίεσαν ἐκεῖνοι ἐς τὰς σφαγὰς καθίεντες καὶ ἐκ κλινῶν τινῶν, αἱ ἐτυχον αὐτοῖς ἐνοῦσαι, τοῖς σπάρτοις καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἰματίων παραιρήματα ποιοῦντες ἀπαγχόμενοι. παντὶ τε 1 τρόπῳ τὸ πολὺ τῆς νυκτὸς (ἐπεγένετο γὰρ μυᾷ τῷ παθήματι) ἀναλοῦντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ βαλλόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν

1 τε added by Poppeo.
up in a large building; afterwards they led them out in groups of twenty and marched them down between two lines of hoplites stationed on either side, the prisoners being bound to one another and receiving blows and stabs from the men who stood in the lines, if any of these perchance saw among them a personal enemy; and men with scourges walked by their sides to quicken the steps of such as proceeded too slowly on the way.

XLVIII. In this manner about sixty men were led out and killed without the knowledge of the men who remained in the house, who supposed that their companions were being led out in order to be transferred to some other place. But when they perceived what was going on, or were told by somebody, they appealed to the Athenians and urged them, if they wished to kill them, to do so with their own hands; and they refused thenceforth to leave the house, and declared that they would not allow anyone to enter if they could prevent it. Nor had the Corcyraeans themselves any intention of trying to force their way in by the doors, but climbing on to the top of the building and breaking through the roof they hurled tiles and shot arrows upon them from above. The men inside tried to defend themselves as best as they could, and at the same time most of them set to work to destroy themselves by thrusting into their throats the arrows which the enemy had shot or by strangling themselves with the cords from some beds that happened to be in the place or with strips made from their own garments. Thus for the greater part of the night—for night fell upon their misery—dispatching themselves in every fashion and struck by the missiles of the men on
4 ἀνώ διεφθάρησαν. καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι, ἐπείδη ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, φορμηδόν ἐπὶ ἁμάξας ἐπιβαλόντες ἀπήγαγον ἔξω τῆς πόλεως. τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας, ὅσαι ἐν τῷ τειχίσματι ἔαλωσαν,
5 ἡνδραποδίσαντο. τοιούτω μὲν τρόπῳ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ὄρους Κερκυραῖοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου διεφθάρησαν, καὶ ἡ στάσις πολλή γενομένη ἔτελευτήσειν ἐς τούτο, ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἦν
6 ὑπόλοιπον τῶν ἔτερον ὁ τι καὶ ἀξιόλογον. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὑπαίτερ τὸ πρῶτον ὄρμηντο, ἀποπλεύσαντες μετὰ τῶν ἐκεῖ ἄμμωτος ἐπιλέμουν.

XLIX. Καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Ναυτάκτῳ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Ἀκαρνάνες ἀμα τελευτῶντος τοῦ θέρους στρατευσάμενοι Ἀνακτόριον Κορινθίων πόλιν, ἢ κεῖται ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, ἔλαβον προδοσίαν καὶ ἐκπέμψαντες Κορινθίους 1 αὐτοῖς Ἀκαρνάνες οἰκήτορας 2 ἀπὸ πάντων ἐσχῶν τὸ χωρίον. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

L. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπιγυμνωμένου χειμῶνος Αριστείδης ὁ Ἀρχιππος, εἰς τῶν ἀργυρολόγων νεῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, αὐτὸ ἐξεπείρασαν πρὸς τοὺς ἐμμάχους, Ἀρταφέρη, ἀνδρα Πέρσην, παρὰ βασιλέως πορευόμενον ἐς Λακεδαιμονα ἔμφημαν 2 εἰς Ἡμοῖν τῇ ἐπὶ Στρυμών. καὶ αὐτοῦ κομισθέντος οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τὰς μὲν ἐπιστολὰς μεταγραφάμενοι ἐκ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων γραμμάτων ἀνέγραψαν, ἐν αἰσ πολλῶν ἄλλων γεγραμμένων κεφάλαιοι ἢν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους οὗ γυνώσκειν ὅ τι βουλοῦται: πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρέσβειων οὐδένα ταύτα

1 Hude deletes Κορινθίους, after Dobree.
2 Hude reads οἰκήτορας, with CE.
the roof, they perished. When day came the Coreyaeansto loaded the bodies on wagons, laying them lengthwise and crosswise, and hauled them out of the city; but the women who had been captured in the fort were sold into captivity. In such fashion the Coreyaeansthe mountain were destroyed by the popular party, and the revolution, which had lasted long, ended thus, so far at least as this war was concerned; for there were no longer enough of the oligarchs left to be of any account. But the Athenians sailed for Sicily, whither they had set out in the first place, and proceeded to carry on the war in conjunction with their allies in the island.

XLIX. At the end of the same summer the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made a campaign, and took by the treachery of its inhabitants Anactorium, a city belonging to the Corinthians which is situated at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf; and the Acarnanians, expelling the Corinthians, occupied the place with colonists drawn from all their tribes. And the summer ended.

1. During the following winter Aristides₁ son of Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian ships which had been sent to the allies to collect the revenues, arrested at Eion on the Strymon Artaphernes, a Persian, who was on his way from the King to Lacedaemon. He was conveyed to Athens, and the Athenians caused his letters to be transcribed from the Assyrian characters and read them. Many other matters were touched upon therein, but the most important, with reference to the Lacedaemonians, was that the King did not know what they wanted; for though many envoys had come to him, no two

₁ Mentioned again ch. lxxv. 1 as general in these waters.
λεγειν· εἰ ὄν τι βούλονται σαφὲς λέγειν, πέμψαι
3 μετὰ τοῦ Πέρσου ἀνδρᾶς ὡς αὐτοῦ. τὸν δὲ Ἀρτα-
φέρη ὥστερον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποστέλλουσι τριήρει
ἐς Ἐφεσον καὶ πρέσβεις ἂμα· οἱ πυθόμενοι αὐτόθι
βασιλέα Ἀρτοξέρξην τὸν Σέρξου νεωστὶ τεθνη-
κότα (κατὰ γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἔτελεύτησεν)
ἐπ’ οἴκου ἀνεχόρησαν.

II. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Χίοι τὸ τείχος
περιέλθον τὸ καινὸν κελευσάντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ
ὑποπτευσάντων ἐς αὐτοὺς τὶ νεωτερεῖν, ποιη-
σάμενοι μέντοι πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πίστεις καὶ
βεβαιότητα ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν μηδὲν περὶ σφᾶς
νεωτερον βουλεύσειν. καὶ ὁ χειμών ἔτελεύτα, καὶ
ἐβδομον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἔτελεύτα τὸ δὲ ὃν
Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψε.

III. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς τοῦ τε
ἡλίου ἐκλιπέσ τι ἐγένετο περὶ νουμηνίαν καὶ τοῦ
2 αὐτοῦ μηνὸς ἰσταμένου ἔσεισεν. καὶ οἱ Μυτι-
ληναῖοι φυγάδες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Λεοβίων, ὀρμώ-
μενοι οἱ πολλοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἡπείρου καὶ μισθωσάμενοι
ἐκ τε Πελοποννήσου ἐπικουρικῶν καὶ αὐτόθεν
ξυναγείραντες, αἱροῦσι Ροῖτειον, καὶ λαβόντες
δισχιλίους στατήρας Φωκαίτας ἀπέδοσαν πάλιν,
3 οὐδὲν ἀδικήσαντες· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ Ἀντανδρον
στρατεύσαντες προδοσίας γενομένης λαμβάνουσι
τὴν πόλιν. καὶ ἴνα αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὰς τε ἄλλας

---

1 After a reign of forty years (465–425 B.C.).
told the same tale; if therefore they had any de-
finite proposal to make, they should send men to
him in company with the Persian. As for Arta-
phernes, the Athenians afterwards sent him to
Ephesus in a trireme, together with some envoys;
these, however, hearing there of the recent death
of King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes—for he died about
that time—returned to Athens.

LI. The same winter the Chians demolished their
new wall at the bidding of the Athenians, who
suspected them of planning an insurrection against
themselves; they, however, obtained from the Athen-
ians pledges and such security as they could that
they would adopt no harsh measures against them.
And the winter ended, and with it the seventh year
of this war of which Thucydides composed the
history.

LII. At the very beginning of the next summer a
partial eclipse of the sun took place at new moon,
and in the early part of the same month an earth-
quake. Also the citizens of Mytilene and of the other
cities of Lesbos who were in exile, the majority of
them setting out from the mainland, hired some
mercenaries from the Peloponnesus, gathered still
others on the spot, and took Rhoetium; but they
restored it again without having done any damage,
on receiving two thousand Phocaean staters. After
this they made an expedition against Antandros and
took the city through treachery on the part of the
inhabitants. It was, in fact, their plan to free the

3 The Phocaean stater was notorious for the badness of the
gold (or rather electron); cf. Dem. xi. 36. It was worth about
twenty-three silver drachmas. See Hultsch, Gr. und röm.
Metrologie, 184.
πόλεις τάς Ἀκταίας καλομένας, ὡς πρότερον Μυτιληναίων νεομομένων Ἀθηναίοι εἶχον, ἐλευθεροῦν, καὶ πάντων μάλιστα τὴν Ἀυτανδροῦ καὶ κρατυνόμενοι αὐτήν (ναῦς τε γὰρ ἑυπορία ἦν ποιεῖσθαι, αὐτόθεν ἔσυλων ὑπαρχόντων καὶ τῆς Ἰδης ἐπικειμένης, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σκεύη) ῥαδίως ἀπ᾿ αὐτῆς ὑμμώμενοι τὴν τε Δέσβουν ἐγγύς οὖσαν κακώσειν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἱππείρῳ Αἰολικὰ πολίσματα.

4 χειρόσεσθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα παρασκευάζεσθαι ἐμελλον.

LIII. Ἀθηναίοι δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει ἐξήκοντα ναυὸι καὶ δισεκίλειοι ὀπλίταις ἱππεύσι τε ὀλύγοις καὶ τῶν ἐμμάχων Μιλησίων καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἄγοντες ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Κύθηρα· ἐστρατήγηε δὲ αὐτῶν Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ Νικόστρατος ὁ Διευτέρφους καὶ Ἀυτοκλῆς ὁ Τολμαῖος. τὰ δὲ Κύθηρα νήσος ἐστιν, ἐπίκειται δὲ τῇ Λακωνικῇ κατὰ Μαλέαν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ εἰσὶ τῶν περιοίκων, καὶ κυθηροδίκης ἀρχῇ ἐκ τῆς Σπάρτης διέβαινεν αὐτόσε κατὰ ἔτος, ὀπλιτῶν τε φροντιναὶ διεσπευσαν αἰεὶ καὶ πολλῆν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο.

3 ἂν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν τε ἀπὸ Ἀιγύπτου καὶ Διβύς ὁλκάδων προσβολή, καὶ λησταὶ ἀμα τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἥσουν ἐλύσουν ἐκ θαλάσσης, ἦπερ μόνον οἶον τε ἂν κακουργεῖσθαι πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνέχει πρὸς τὸ Σικελικὸν καὶ Κρητικὸν πέλαγος. LIV. κατασχόντες οὖν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τῷ στρατῷ δέκα

1 i.e. of the ἄκτη or promontory of the mainland north of Lesbos. These had been taken from Mytilene by Paches (cf. iii. 1. 3). They are mentioned also C.I.A. i. 37.

2 i.e. if Cythera were well guarded.
rest of the cities known as the Actaean cities,\textsuperscript{1} which had hitherto been in the possession of the Athenians, though inhabited by Mytilenaeans, and above all Antandros. Having strengthened this place, where there was every facility for building ships—timber being available on the spot and Ida being near at hand—as well as for providing other equipments of war, they could easily, making it the base of their operations, not only ravage Lesbos, which was near, but also master the Aeolic towns on the mainland. Such were the plans upon which they were preparing to embark.

LIII. During the same summer the Athenians with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, and a small detachment of cavalry, taking with them also some Milesians and others of their allies, made an expedition against Cythera. In command of the expedition were Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus. Now Cythera is an island adjacent to Laconia, lying off Malea; its inhabitants are Lacedaemonians of the class of the Perioeci, and an official called the Bailiff of Cythera used to cross over thither once a year from Sparta; they also used regularly to send over a garrison of hoplites and paid much attention to the place. For it served them as a port of call for merchant ships from Egypt and Libya, and, moreover, pirates would be less likely to annoy Laconia from the sea,\textsuperscript{2} on which side alone it could be harmed; for the whole coast runs out towards the Sicilian and the Cretan seas.\textsuperscript{3} LIV. So then the Athenians, putting in at Cythera with their armament, consisting of ten

\textsuperscript{1} Others take ῥάρα of the island, which forms as it were a bastion "running out into the Sicilian and Cretan seas."
μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ δισχιλίοις Μιλησίων ὀπλίταις τὴν ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πόλιν Σκάνδειαν καλουμένην αἰροῦσι, τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ στρατεύματι ἀποβάντες τῆς νῆσου ἐς τὰ πρὸς Μαλέαν τετραμμένα ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπὸ θαλάσσῃς 1 πόλιν τῶν Κυθηρίων, καὶ ήπρον εὐθὺς αὐτοὺς ἐστρατευμένους ἀπαντᾷς. καὶ μάχης γενομένης ὀλίγου μὲν τινα χρόνον ὑπέστησαν οἱ Κυθηριοί, ἔπειτα τραπόμενοι κατέφυγον ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλιν, καὶ ἑστερον ξυνέβησαν πρὸς Νικίαι καὶ τοὺς ξυνάρχοντας Ἀθηναίους ἐπιτρέψαι περὶ σφῶν 3 αὐτῶν πλὴν θανάτου. ἦσαν δὲ τινὲς καὶ γενόμενοι τῷ Νικίᾳ λόγοι πρὸτερον πρὸς τινας τῶν Κυθη- ριῶν, διὸ καὶ θάσσον καὶ ἐπιτηδειότερον τὸ τε παρατικά καὶ τὸ ἐπείτα τὰ 2 τῆς ὀμολογίας ἐπράξθη αὐτοῖς ἀνέστησαι γὰρ ἀν 3 οἱ Ἀθηναίοι Κυθηρίους, Λακεδαιμονίους τε ὅντας καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ 4 Λακωνικῇ τῆς νῆσου οὕτως ἐπικειμένης. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ξύμβασιν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τὴν τε Σκάνδειαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ λιμένι πόλισμα παραλαβόντες καὶ τῶν Κυθήρων φυλακὴν ποιησάμενοι ἐπλευσαν ἐς τε Ἀσίνην καὶ Ἐλος καὶ τὰ πλέον τῶν περὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἀποβάσεις ποιοῦμενοι καὶ ἑναυλε- 1 Stahl's conjecture for ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ of the MSS., which is deleted by Hude, following Krüger. 2 τὰ, omitted by the best MSS. 3 ἀν, added by Heilmann.

1 An incredibly large number. In viii. xxv. 2, where they are in their own land, the Milesians can oppose to the enemy only 800 hoplites. Nor would ten ships suffice for so many epibatae. Perhaps there is a confusion in the numerical sign, due to a copist. 2 The haven of Cythera, some ten stadia distant from that city.
ships and two thousand Milesian hoplites, took the
city by the sea called Scandeia; then, with the rest
of their forces landing on the part of the island
which looks toward Malea, they advanced against
the city of Cythera which is away from the sea, where
they found that all the inhabitants had im-
mediately established themselves in camp. A fight
ensued, in which the Cytherians stood their ground
for some little time, then turned and fled to the
upper town, but afterwards capitulated to Nicias
and his colleagues, agreeing to leave the question of
their own fate, except as to a penalty of death, to
the arbitration of the Athenians. Some negotiations
between Nicias and certain of the Cytherians had
already taken place, and for this reason the settlement
of the terms, both for the present and the future,
was arranged more speedily and with better advan-
tage to them; for otherwise the Athenians would
have expelled the inhabitants, since they were Lac-
demonians and the island lay in that position on
the coast of Laconia. After the capitulation the
Athenians took possession of Scandeia, the town at
the harbour, and having taken precautions for
guarding Cythera, then sailed to Asine, Helus, and
most of the other towns on the seacoast; here they
made raids or bivouacked at whatever place they

3 It seems necessary to adopt Stahl’s conjecture ἀριθ. δαλάς-
ση, or delete ἄριθ. δαλάςση. “One division of the Athenian
force landed at Scandeia, another, disembarking on the
N.E. coast, marched on the capital. The second force found
the Cytherians prepared to meet them; in the battle which
ensued the Cytherians were routed, and fled to the upper
city, i.e. the capital. This explanation is borne out by
existing remains. See Frazer’s Pausanias, iii. 385, 386; also
Well in Mittheil. d. Arch. Inst. in Athen. v. 224–243.” (Spratt.)
ξόμενοι τῶν χωρίων οὔ καρδὸς εἰη ἐδήσον τὴν γῆν ἡμέρας μάλιστα ἐπτα.

LV. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἰδόντες μὲν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὰ Κύθηρα ἔχοντας, προσδεχόμενοι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν σφῶν ἀποβάσεις τοιαύτας ποιῆσον, ἀθρόᾳ μὲν οὐδαμοῦ τῇ δυνάμει ἀντετάξαντο, κατὰ δὲ τὴν χώραν φρουρᾶ τεῖπεμψαν, ὅπλιτῶν πλῆθος, ὥς ἐκασταχόσε ἐδει, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν φυλακῇ πολλῇ ἦσαν, φοβοῦμενοι μὴ σφίσι νεώτερόν τι γενηται τῶν περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν, γεγενημένου μὲν τοῦ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πάθους ἀνελπίστου καὶ μεγάλου, Πύλου δὲ ἐχομένης καὶ Κυθηρών καὶ πανταχόθεν σφᾶς περιεστῶτος πολέμου.

2 ταχέος καὶ ἀπροφυλάκτου, ὡστε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς ἐπῴεις τετρακοσίους κατεστήσαντο καὶ τοξότας, ἐς τὰ πολεμικά, εὐπερ ποτὲ, μάλιστα δὴ ὁκνηρότεροι ἐγένοντο ξυνεστῶτες παρὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν σφῶν ἱδέαν τῆς παρασκευής ναυτικῆς ἀγώνι, καὶ τούτῳ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, οἷς τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειροῦμενον αἰέλ ἐλλιπῆς ἦν τῆς δοκῆσως τι πράξειν.

3 καὶ ἀμα τὰ τῆς τύχης πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ ξυμβάντα παρὰ λόγον αὐτοῖς ἐκπληξὶς μεγίστῃν παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐδείσαν μὴ ποτὲ αὐθίς ξυμφορά τις προς περιτύχη σοῦ καὶ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ἀτολμότεροι δὲ δι' αὐτὸ ἐς τὰς μάχας ἦσαν καὶ πάν ὃ τι κινήσειαν φύστο ἀμαρτησοθεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν γνώμην ἀνεχέγγυον γεγενηθῆθαι ἐκ τῆς πρὶν ἀνθείας τοῦ κακοπραγεῖν.
found convenient, and ravaged the land for about seven days.

LV. The Lacedaemonians, though they saw the Athenians in possession of Cythera and expected them to make such descents upon their own territory, nowhere massed their forces to oppose them, but sent garrisons here and there throughout the country, determining the number of hoplites by the strength needed at each point, and otherwise were very watchful, fearing lest some revolution should take place which would affect their constitution; for the calamity which had befallen them at the island of Sphacteria had been great and unexpected, Pylos and Cythera were occupied, and on all sides they were encompassed by a war which moved with a swiftness which defied precaution. Consequently they organized, contrary to their custom, a force of four hundred cavalry and bowmen, and in military matters they now became more timid than at any time before they were involved in a naval struggle which was outside their own existing scheme of military organisation, and that too against Athenians, with whom an attempt foregone was always so much lost of what they had reckoned on accomplishing.1 Besides, the reverses of fortune, which had befallen them unexpectedly in such numbers and in so short a time, caused very great consternation, and they were afraid that some time a calamity might again come upon them like that which had happened on the island; and on this account they showed less spirit in their fighting, and whatever move they might make they thought would be a failure, because they had lost all self-confidence in consequence of having been hitherto unused to adversity.

1 cf. i. lxx. 7.
LVI. Τοὺς δὲ 'Αθηναίους τότε τὴν παραθαλάσσιον δηούσε τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἡσύχασαν, ὡς καθ' ἐκάστην φρουράν γύρωντο τες ἀπόβασις, πλήθει τε ἐλάσσως ἐκαστοί ἠγούμενοι εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ μία δὲ φρουρὰ, ἢπερ καὶ ἡμύνατο περὶ Κοτύρταν καὶ Λαφροδίτιαν, τὸν μὲν ὄχλον τῶν ψιλῶν ἐσκεδασμένον ἐφόβησεν ἐπίδρομη, τῶν δὲ οπλιτῶν δεξαμένων ὑπεχώρησε πάλιν, καὶ ἀνδρές τε τινες ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν ὀλίγοι καὶ ὑπλα ἐλύθη, τροπαίον τε στήσαντες οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι ἀπέπλευσαν.

2 ὡς Κύθνηρα. ἔκ δὲ αὐτῶν περιέπλευσαν ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον τὴν Λιμηρᾶν, καὶ δηούσαντες μέρος τί τῆς γῆς ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ Θυρέαν, ἢ ἔστε μὲν τῆς Κυνουρίας γῆς καλουμένης, μεθορία δὲ τῆς Ἀργείας καὶ Λακωνικῆς. νεμόμενοι δὲ αὐτὴν ἔδωσαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Αἰγινηταῖς ἐκπεσοῦσιν ἐνοικεῖν διὰ τὰς υπὸ τῶν σεισμῶν σφῖσε γενομένας καὶ τῶν Εἰλώτων τήν ἐπανάστασιν εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπακούοντες ὅμως πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων γρώμην αἰεὶ ἐστᾶσιν.

LVII. Προσπλεύστων οὖν ἔτι τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ Αἰγινηταὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν θαλάσση ὧν ἐτυχον οἰκοδομοῦντες τεῖχος ἐκείπουσιν, ἐς δὲ τὴν ἀνω πόλιν, ἐν ἡ ὕκονν, ἀπεχώρησαν ἀπεχωσαν σταδίους μάλιστα δέκα τῆς θαλάσσης.

2 καὶ αὐτοῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰ μία τῶν περὶ τὴν χώραν, ἢπερ καὶ ξυνετείχίζει, ξυνεστελθεῖν μὲν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος οὐκ ἠθέλησαν δεομένων τῶν Αἰγινητῶν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς κίνδυνος ἐφαίνετο ἐς τὸ τεῖχος κατακλησθαι ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μετέωρα ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζον ἄξιομα-

3 χοι εἶναι, ἡσύχαζον. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι

306
LVI. Accordingly, while the Athenians were at that time ravaging their seaboard, they generally kept quiet when any descent was made upon any particular garrison, each thinking itself inferior in number and there being such depression. One garrison, however, which offered resistance in the region of Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, frightened the scattered crowd of light-armed troops by a charge, but when it encountered hoplites retreated again, a few of their men being killed and some of their arms taken; and the Athenians, after setting up a trophy, sailed back to Cythera. From there they sailed to Epidaurus Limera, and after ravaging some part of the land came to Thyrea, which belongs to the district called Cynuria, on the border between the Argive and Laconian territories. This district the Lacedaemonians who occupied it had given to the expelled Aeginetans to dwell in, on account of the kind services shown themselves at the time of the earthquake and the uprising of the Helots, and because they had always sided with their policy, in spite of being subject to the Athenians.

LVII. While, then, the Athenians were still sailing up, the Aeginetans left the fort by the sea which they happened to be building and withdrew to the upper town, where they dwelt, at a distance of about ten stadia from the sea. Now a detachment of the Lacedaemonian troops which were distributed in garrisons about the country was assisting the Aeginetans to build this fort. But they refused to enter the fort with them, as they requested, since it seemed to them dangerous to be cooped up in it; but retreating to high ground they kept quiet, thinking themselves no match for the enemy. Meanwhile the
κατασχόντες καὶ χωρίσαντες εὐθὺς πάση τῇ στρατιᾷ αἱροῦσι τὴν Θυρεάν. καὶ τῆν τε πόλιν κατέκαυσαν καὶ τὰ ἐνῶντα ἐξέτορθησαν, τοὺς τε Ἀιγινήτας, ὡστὶ μὴ ἐν χερσὶ διεφθάρησαν, ἀγοραστὲς ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὰς Ἄθηνας καὶ τὸν ἄρχουτα δὲ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἦν τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων, Τάνταλον τὸν

4 Πατροκλέους ἐξογρήθη γὰρ τετρωμένος. ἦγοι δὲ τινὰς καὶ ἐκ τῶν Κυθηρῶν ἀνδρὰς ὀλίγους, οὓς ἐδόκει ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα μεταστῆσαι. καὶ τούτους μὲν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβουλεύσαντο καταβέβαις ἐς τὰς νῆσους, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Κυθηρίους οἰκοῦντας τὴν ἕαυτῶν φόρον τέσσαρα τάλαντα φέρειν, Ἀιγινήτας δὲ ἀποκτείνατο πάντας ὡσοὶ ἐάλωσαν διὰ τὴν

5 προτέραν αἰεὶ ποτὲ ἔχθραν, Τάνταλον δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ Δακεδαιμονίους καταδίσαν.

LXVIII. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ βέρους ἐν Σικελία Καμαριναίους καὶ Γελόφους ἑκεχειρία γίγνεται πρῶτον πρὸς ἄλληλους εἶτα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Σικελιώται ἐμπεθοῦντες ἐς Γέλαν, ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων πρέσβεις, ἐς λόγους κατέστησαν ἄλληλους, εἰ πως ἐναλλαγεῖν. καὶ ἄλλαι τε πολλοὶ γρώμαι ἐλέγοντο ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα, διαφερομένων καὶ ἔξωοντων, ὡς ἐκαστοὶ τε ἐλασσόωσθαι ἐνόμιζον, καὶ Ἡρμοκράτης ὁ “Ερμώνος Συρακόσιος, ὁσπερ καὶ ἐπείσε μάλιστα αὐτούς, ἐς τὸ κοινὸν τοιοῦτος δὴ λόγους εἶπεν.

LIX. “Οὔτε πόλεως ὅν ἐλαχίστης, ὁ Σικελιώται, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσομαι οὔτε πολυμένης μάλιστα τῷ πολέμῳ, ἐς κοινὸν δὲ τὴν δοκοῦσαν

1 τοὺς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ, Hude deletes, after van Herwerden.
Athenians landed, and advancing straightway with their whole force took Thyrea. They burned the city and pillaged what was in it; but they carried to Athens all the Aeginetans who did not perish in the action, together with their Lacedaemonian commander who was present, Tantalus son of Patrocles, who was wounded and taken prisoner. They brought also a few men from Cythera, whom they thought best to remove for the sake of safety. These the Athenians determined to place for safe-keeping on the islands, and to permit the rest of the Cytherians to occupy their own territory on payment of a tribute of four talents,¹ but to put to death all the Aeginetans who had been captured, because of their former inveterate enmity, and to imprison Tantalus along with the other Lacedaemonians captured on the island of Sphaecia.

LVIII. During the same summer, in Sicily, an armistice was first concluded between the Camarinaeans and Geloans; then representatives from all the other Sicilian cities came together in Gela and held a conference, to see whether they might not become reconciled. Many opinions were expressed for and against, the several envoys disputing and making demands according as they believed that their own rights were being prejudiced; and among the rest Hermocrates son of Hermon, the Syracusan, whose word proved to have the greatest weight with the others, spoke in the general interest ² words to this effect:

LIX. "The city which I represent, Siceliots, is not the weakest, nor is it suffering most in the war; but I propose to speak in the general interest, declaring

¹ £800, $3,840. ² Or, "before the meeting."
μοι βελτίστην γνώμην εἶναι ἀποφαινόμενος τῇ
2 Σικελίᾳ πάση, καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ὡς
χαλεπὸν τί ἂν τις πᾶν τὸ ἐνὸν ἐκλέγων ἐν εἰδόσι
μακρηγοροῖ; οὖδεις γὰρ οὔτε ἡμαθία ἀναγκά
ζεται αὐτὸ δρᾶν, οὔτε φόβῳ, ἢν οὐ οἶνται τι πλέον
σχῆσειν, ἀποτρέπεται. Ξυμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν
τὰ κέρδη μείζω φαίνεσθαι τῶν δεινῶν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς
κινδύνους ἐθέλουσιν ύφίστασθαι πρὸ τοῦ αὐτίκα
3 τι ἐλασσοῦσθαι αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰ μὴ ἐν καιρῷ
τόχουεν ἐκάτεροι πράσσοντες, αἱ παραινέσεις
4 τῶν ξυναλλαγῶν ὁφέλειμοι. ὃ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ
παρόντι πειθομένοις πλείστον ἄν ἀξιον γένοιτο:
tὰ γὰρ ἱδια ἐκαστοὶ εὖ βουλόμενοι δὴ θέσθαι τὸ
τε πρῶτον ἐπολεμήσαμεν καὶ νῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους
δὲ ἀντιλογίων πειρώμεθα καταλαλάγημα καὶ, ἢν
ἀρα μὴ προχωρήσῃ ἵσον ἐκάστῳ ἔχοντι ἀπελθεῖν,
πάλιν πολεμήσουμεν.

LX. "Καίτοι γρῶναι χρή ὅτε οὐ περὶ τῶν
ἰδίων μόνον, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἡ ξύνοδος ἔσται,
άλλι ἐι ἐπιβουλευομένη τὴν πάσαν Σικελίαν,
ὡς εὖ κρίνω, ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων δυνησόμεθα ἔτι
διασώσαι, καὶ διάλλακτάς πολὺ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων
ἀναγκαιοτέρους περὶ τῶν Αθηναίων νομίσαι,
οἱ δύναμιν ἔχοντες μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλλήνων τάς

310
the opinion which seems to me the best for Sicily as a whole. As for the miseries which war entails, why should one by expressly stating all that can be said make a long harangue in the presence of those who know? For no one is either forced to make war through ignorance of what it is, or deterred from making it by fear, if he thinks he will get some advantage from it. What really happens is this, that to one side the gains appear greater than the terrors, while the other deliberately prefers to undergo the dangers rather than submit to a temporary disadvantage; but if it should turn out that these two lines of action are both inopportune, each for the side which adopts it, then some profit may come from exhortations which advise a compromise. And so with us at the present time, if we could be persuaded of the wisdom of this course it would be to our great advantage; for each of us began the war in the first place because we desired to promote our private interests. So now let us endeavour by setting forth our conflicting claims to become reconciled with each other; and then, if we do not after all succeed in securing, each of us, what is fair and just before we part, we shall go to war again.

LX. "And yet we should recognise the fact that the subject of our conference will not, if we are wise, be our private interests merely, but rather the question whether we shall still be able to save Sicily as a whole, for it is against it, in my judgment, that the Athenians are plotting; and we must consider that we have an argument far more cogent to bring us together on these matters than my words, namely, the Athenians, who possess a military power greater than that of any other Hellenic state and are now at
ΤΗ ΆΜΑΡΤΙΑΣ ἩΜῶΝ ΤΗΡΟÚΣΩΝ ὌΛΥΓΑΙΣ ΝΑΟΥΣΙ ΠΑΡΆΝ-
ΤΕΣ, ΚΑΙ ὩΝΟΜΑΤΕ ἘΝΝΟΜΩΡ ΞΥΜΜΑΧΙΑΣ ΤΟ ΦΥΣΕΙ
ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥΝ ΕΥΠΡΕΠΕΩΣ ΕΣ ΤΟ ΞΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΤΑΙ.
2 ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥΝ ΓΑΡ ΑΙΡΟΜΕΝΩΝ ἩΜῶΝ ΚΑΙ ἘΠΑΓΟΜΕΝΩΝ
ΑΥΤΟΥΣ, ἈΝΔΡΑΣ Οἳ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΜΗ ἘΠΙΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΙΣ
ΑΥΤΟΙ ἘΠΙΣΤΡΑΤΕΥΟΝΤΟΣ, ΚΑΚΏΣ ΤΕ ἩΜΑΣ ΑΥΤΟΥΣ
ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥΝΤΩΝ ΤΕΛΕΣΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΟΙΚΕΙΟΙΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ἈΡΧΗΣ
ΑΜΑ ΠΡΟΚΟΠΤΟΝΤΩΝ ΕΚΕΙΝΟΙΣ, ΕΙΚΟΣ, ὙΣΤΑΙΝ
ἡμᾶς ΤΕΤΡΥΧΩΜΕΝΟUS, ΚΑΙ ΠΛΕΟΥΙ ΠΟΤΕ ΣΤΟΛΗ
ἘΛΘΟΝΤΑΣ ΑΥΤΟΥΣ ΤΑΔΕ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΑΣΘΑΙ ὩΠΌ
ΣΦΑΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ.

LXI. “ΚΑΙΤΟΙ ΤΗ ΕΑΥΤΩΝ ΕΚΑΣΤΟΥΣ, ΕΙ ΣΩΦΡΟ-
ΝΟΥΜΕΝ, ΧΡΗ ΤΑ ΜΗ ΠΡΟΣΗΚΟΝΤΑ ΕΠΙΚΤΩΜΕΝΟUS
ΜΑΛΛΟΝ Η ΤΑ ΕΤΟΙΜΑ ΒΛΑΠΤΟΝΤΑΣ ΞΥΜΜΑΧΟUS ΤΕ
ἘΠΑΓΕΣΘΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΚΙΝΔΥΝΟΥΣ ΠΡΟΣΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ,
ΝΟΜΙΣΑΙ ΤΕ ΣΤΆΣΙΝ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ΦΘΕΙΡΕΙΝ ΤΑΣ ΠΟΛΕΙΣ
ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΣΙΚΕΛΙΑΝ, ἩΣ ΓΕ ΟΙ ᾽ΕΝΟΙΚΟΙ ΞΥΜΠΑΝΤΕΣ ΜΕΝ
2 ἘΠΙΒΟΥΛΕΥΟΜΕΘΑ, КΑΤΑ ΠΟΛΕΙΣ ΔΕ ΔΙΕΣΤΑΜΕΝ.
Α ΧΡΗ ΓΡΟΝΤΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΙΔΙΩΤΗΝ ΙΔΙΩΤΗ ΚΑΤΑΛΛΆΓΗΝ
ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΕΙΝ ΠΟΛΕΙ, ΚΑΙ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΘΑΙ ΚΟΙΝΗ ΣΦΩΣΙΝ ΤΗΝ
ΠΑΣΑΝ ΣΙΚΕΛΙΑΝ, ΠΑΡΕΣΤΑΝΑΙ ΔΕ ΜΗΔΕΝ ΏΣ ΟΙ
ΜΕΝ ΔΩΡΙΗΣ ἩΜῶΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΙ ΤΟΙΣ ἈΘΗΝΑΙΟΙΣ, ΤΟ
3 ΔΕ ΧΑΛΚΙΔΙΚΟΥ ΤΗ ΙΔΑΙ ΞΥΛΓΕΝΕΙΑ ἈΣΦΑΛΕΣ. ΟΥ
ΓΑΡ ΤΟΙΣ ἘΘΝΕΙΝ, ΩΣΙ ΔΙΧΑ ΠΕΦΥΚΕ, ΤΟΥ ΕΤΕΡΟΥ
ΕΧΘΕΙ ΕΠΙΑΣΙΝ, ἈΛΛΑ ΤΟΝ ἘΝ ΣΙΚΕΛΙΑ ἈΓΑΘΩΝ
4 ΕΦΙΕΜΕΝΟΙ, Α ΚΟΙΝΗ ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΘΑ. ΕΘΗΛΩΣΑΝ ΔΕ ΒΝ
ἘΝ ΤΗ ΤΟΥ ΧΑΛΚΙΔΙΚΟΥ ΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΠΑΡΑΚΛΗΣΕΙ ΤΟΙΣ
ΓΑΡ ΟΥΔΕΠΟΙΤΕ ΣΦΙΣΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ ΞΥΜΜΑΧΙΚΟΝ
312
hand with a few ships watching for our mistakes, and under the lawful name of alliance are speciously trying to turn to their own advantage our natural hostility to them. For if we begin war and call them in—men who of their own accord are ready enough to intrude their forces even on those who do not ask for their intervention—and if we spend our own revenues in doing hurt to ourselves, and at the same time pave the way for their supremacy, we may well expect them, when they see that we are worn out, to come sometime with a larger armament and try to bring everything here under their sway.

LXI. "And yet, if we are prudent, we ought, each of us in behalf of his own state, to call in allies and incur dangers only when we are seeking to win what does not belong to us and not when we imperil what is already ours; and we should remember that faction is the chief cause of ruin to states and indeed to Sicily, seeing that we her inhabitants, although we are all being plotted against, are disunited, each city by itself. Recognizing these facts, we must be reconciled with each other, citizen with citizen and state with state, and join in a common effort to save all Sicily. And let no one imagine that only the Dorians among us are enemies of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians, because of their kinship with the Ionians, are safe. For it is not through hatred of one of the two races into which we are divided that they will attack us, but because they covet the good things of Sicily which we possess in common. They have just made this clear by their response to the appeal which the people of Chalcidic stock made to them; 1 for to those who have never given them aid

1 cf. III. lxxxvi. 3.
προσβοηθήσασιν αυτοί τὸ δίκαιον μᾶλλον τῆς
5 ξυνθήκης προθύμως παρέσχοντο. καὶ τοὺς μὲν
Ἄθηναίους ταῦτα πλεονεκτεῖν τε καὶ προνοείσθαί
πολλῆς ξυγγνώμης, καὶ οὐ τοῖς ἀρχεῖν βουλευομένοις
μέμφομαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπακούειν ἐτοιμοτέροις
οὕσιν· πέφυκε γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον διὰ παντὸς
ἀρχεῖν μὲν τοῦ εἰκονος, φυλάσσεσθαι δὲ τὸ
6 ἐπὶον. οὐσι δὲ γυγνώσκοντες αὐτὰ μὴ ὅρθως
προσκοποῦμεν, μηδὲ τοῦτο τις πρεσβύτατον ἦκει
κρίνας, τὸ κοινῶς φοβερὸν ἀπαντᾷ εὐθέαθαί,
7 ἀμαρτάνομεν. τάχιστα δὲ ἂν ἀπαλλαγῇ αὐτοῦ
γένοιτο, εἰ πρὸς ἅλληλους ξυμβαίμεν' οὐ γὰρ
ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῶν ὀρμῶνται Ἀθηναίοι, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς
8 τῶν ἐπικαλεσαμένων. καὶ οὔτως οὐ πόλεμος
πολέμω, εἰρήνη δὲ διαφοραὶ ἀπραγμόνις παῦ-
ονται, οὐ τ' ἐπίκλητοι εὐπρεπῶς ἄδικοι ἐλθόντες
εὐλόγως ἀπρακτοὶ ἀπίασιν.

LXII. "Καὶ τὰ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους
τοσοῦτον ἀγαθὸν εὐ βουλευομένοις εὑρίσκεται:
2 τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ πάντων ὀμολογομένην ἀριστον εἶναι
εἰρήνην πῶς οὐ χρή καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιή-
σασθαι; ἡ δοκεῖ γε, εἰ τῷ τι ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ἢ εἰ
τῷ τὰ ἐναντία, οὔχ ἠσυχία μᾶλλον ἢ πόλεμος τὸ
μὲν παῦσαι ἄν ἐκατέρφο, τὸ δὲ ξυνδιασώσαι, καὶ
τὰς τιμὰς καὶ λαμπρότητας ἀκινδυνοτέρας ἔχειν
τὴν εἰρήνην, ἀλλὰ τε ὅσα ἐν μῆκει λόγων ἂν τις
314
according to the terms of their alliance they of their own accord have fulfilled an ally’s obligations with a zeal exceeding their compact. That the Athenians entertain these designs of aggrandisement is quite pardonable; and I have no word of blame for those who wish to rule, but only for those who are too ready to submit; for it is an instinct of man’s nature always to rule those who yield, but to guard against those who are ready to attack. If any of us, knowing how matters really stand, fails to take proper precautions, or if anyone has come here not accounting it of paramount importance that we must all together deal wisely with the common peril, we are making a mistake. The speediest relief from this peril would be gained by our entering into an understanding with one another; for the base from which the Athenians propose to move is not their own territory, but that of the people who asked them to intervene. And if we follow this course, war will not end in another war, but without trouble quarrels will end quietly in peace, and those who have been invited to intervene, having come with a fair pretext for injustice, will depart home with a fair plea for failure.

LXII. “So far, then, as the Athenians are concerned, this is the great advantage we win if we are well advised; but as to the question of peace, which all men agree is a most desirable thing, why should we not make it here among ourselves? Or, think you, if one person now enjoys a blessing and another labours under adversity, it is not tranquillity far more than war that will put an end to the latter and perpetuate the former? And has not peace its honours and less hazardous splendours, and all the
THUCYDIDES

diελθοι δόστερ περὶ τοῦ πολεμείν;1 ἀ χρὴ σκέψα-

μένους μὴ τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους ὑπεριδεῖν, τὴν δὲ

αὐτοῦ τινα σωτηρίαν μᾶλλον ἀπ’ αὐτῶν προίδειν.

καὶ εἰ τις βεβαιῶς τι ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ βίᾳ πράξεω

σίται, τῷ παρ’ ἐλπίδα μὴ χαλεπῶς σφαλλέσθω,

γροῦ ὁτι πλείους ἦδη, καὶ τιμωρίας μετιόντες

τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ ἐλπίσαντες ἐτεροὶ δυνάμει τὶ

πλεονεκτήσειν, οἱ μὲν οὐχ ὅσον οὐκ ἡμύναντο

ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἑσώθησαν, τοὺς δ’ ἀντὶ τοῦ πλέον ἔχειν

προσκαταλιπεῖν τὰ αὐτῶν ξυνέβη. τιμωρία γὰρ

οὐκ εὐτυχεῖ δικαίως, ὅτι καὶ ἀδικεῖται οὐδὲ ἴσχυς

βέβαιον, διότι καὶ εὐέλπι. τὸ δὲ ἀστάθμητον τοῦ

μέλλοντος ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστον κρατεῖ, πάντων τε

σφαλερώτατον ὅν ὄρμος καὶ χρησιμώτατον φαίνε-

ται. ἐξ ῥή τὸ φαρ δεδιότες προμηθία μᾶλλον ἐπ’

ἀλλήλους ἐρχόμεθα.

ⅠXIII. “Καὶ νῦν τοῦ ἀφανοῦς τε τούτου διὰ τὸ

ἀτέκμαρτον δέος καὶ διὰ τὸ ἥδη, φοβεροῦς παρόν-

τας Ἀθηναίων, κατ’ ἀμφότερα ἐκπλαγέντες, καὶ

τὸ ἐλλεπίς τῆς γνώμης ὅν ἔκαστος τι φήθημεν

πράξεω ταῖς κωλύμαις ταύταις ἰκανοῖς νομίζοντες

εἰργῆμα, τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας πολεμοῦσι ἐκ τῆς

χώρας ἀποπέμπωμεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἐς

ἀίδιον ἐξυμβώμεν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, χρόνον ὡς πλείστον

σπεισάμενοι τὰς ἱδίας διαφορὰς ἐς αὖθις ἀνα-

1 δόστερ περὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, deleted by Hude, after Krüger.

1 i.e. “most of our plans are baffled by the uncertainty of

the future.”

316
other advantages on which one might dilate as easily as on the horrors of war? Considering these things, you should not overlook my advice, but should rather look forward each to his own salvation thereby. And if any of you cherishes the confident belief that he can gain anything either by insisting on his rights or by an appeal to force, let him not, through the baffling of his hopes, suffer a grievous disappointment; for he knows that many men ere now, whether pursuing with vengeance those who have wronged them, or in other cases, hoping to gain some advantage by the exercise of power, have, on the one hand, not only not avenged themselves but have not even come out whole, and, on the other hand, instead of gaining more, have sacrificed what was their own. For revenge has no right to expect success just because a wrong has been done; nor is strength sure just because it is confident. But as regards the future, it is uncertainty that for the most part prevails,¹ and this uncertainty, utterly treacherous as it is, proves nevertheless to be also most salutary; for since both sides alike fear it, we proceed with a greater caution in attacking one another.

LXIII. "So let us now, taking alarm on account of both these things—the vague fear of this hidden future and the immediate fear of the dread Athenian presence—and charging to these obstacles, as effectually blocking our way, any failure in the plans which any one of us had hoped to realize, let us dismiss from the country the enemy who is at our gates, and if possible let us make peace among ourselves for evermore; but if that may not be, let us conclude a truce for the longest practicable period, and put off our

317
THUCYDIDES

2 βαλόμεθα. τὸ ξύμπαν τε δὴ γνώμεν πιθόμενοι μὲν ἐμοὶ πόλιν ἐξοντες ἐκαστὸς ἐλευθέραν, ἄφ' ἦς αὐτοκράτορες δύνας τὸν εὐ καὶ κακῶς ὀρῶνα ἔξ ἱσον ἄρετὴ ἀμυνούμεθα, ἦν δ' ἀπίστησαντες ἄλλοις ὑπακούοντεν, σοὶ περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τίνα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁγαν εἰ τυχοῖνεν, φίλοι μὲν ἂν τοῖς ἐχθίστοις, διάφοροι δὲ οἷς οὐ χρὴ καὶ ἀνάγκη γνώμεθα.

LXIV. "Καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν, ἀπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενος εἰποὺν, πόλιν τε μεγίστην παρεχόμενος καὶ ἐπιόν τῷ μᾶλλον ἡ ἀμυνόμενος ἔξιον προϊδόμενοι αὐτῶν ἐγνημωρεῖν, καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐναντίους οὔτω κακῶς δράν ὡστε αὐτοὺς τὰ πλεῖον βλάπτεσθαι. μηδὲ μορία φιλονικικὸν ἤγείσθαι τῆς τε οἰκείας γνώμης ὁμοίας αὐτοκράτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἃς οὐκ ἂρχω τύχης, ἀλλ' ὅσον εἰκός ἦγοσσαθαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δικαιῶ ταύτῳ μοι ποιῆσαι, ὡφ' ὕμων αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων τοῦτο παθεῖν

3 οὐδὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν οἰκείων οἰκείων ἡγοσσαθαι, ἡ Δωρίδα τινα Δωρίδος ἡ Χαλκίδα τοῖς ἐγνημωροῖς, τὸ τε ξύμπαν γείτονας ὀντας καὶ ἐγνήμων μᾶς χῶρας καὶ περιπέτει αὐτοῖς ἓν κεκλημένοις Σκισθῶτας. τὶ πολεμησομεν τε, οἶμαι, ὅταν ἐμβῆ, καὶ ἐγνημωροσσαθαι γε πἀλιν καθ' ἡμᾶς

4 αὐτοὺς λόγοις κοινῶς χρώμενοι τοὺς δὲ ἄλλοι φύλους ἐπέλθοντας ἀθροὶ αἰε καὶ οὐφρονόμεν, ἀμυνόμεθα, εἰπερ καὶ καθ' ἐκαστοὺς βλαπτόμενοι ξύμπαντες κινδυνεύομεν, ξυμμάχους δὲ

1 ἀμυνόμενος, Hude followed by Steup, for ἀμυνοόμενος of the MSS.
2 προϊδόμενος... ὡστε αὐτὸς, Reiske and Dobree, for προϊδούμενος... ὡστε αὐτὸς of the MSS.
private differences to some other day. In fine, let us feel assured that if my advice is followed we shall each keep our city free, and from it, since we shall be arbiters of our own destiny, we shall with equal valour ward off both him who comes to benefit and him who comes to harm. But if, on the other hand, my advice is rejected and we give heed to others, it will not be a question of our taking vengeance on anybody, but, even if we should be never so successful, we should perforce become friends to our bitterest foes and at variance with those with whom we should not be.

LXIV. "As for me, as I said in the beginning, although I represent a most powerful city and am more ready for attacking another than for self-defence, I deem it my duty, with these dangers in view, to make concessions, and not to harm my enemies in such a way as to receive more injury myself, or in foolish obstinacy to think that I am as absolutely master of Fortune, which I do not control, as of my own judgment; nay, so far as is reasonable I will give way. And I require of the rest of you to follow my example and submit to this, not at the hands of the enemy, but of yourselves. For there is no disgrace in kinsmen giving way to kinsmen, a Dorian to a Dorian or a Chalcidian to men of the same race, since we are, in a word, neighbours and together are dwellers in a single land encircled by the sea and are called by a single name, Siceliots. We shall go to war, no doubt, whenever occasion arises—yes, and we shall make peace again by taking common counsel among ourselves; but when alien peoples invade us, we shall always act in concert, if we are prudent, and repel them, seeing that any injury suffered by one of us brings danger to us all; but never
οὐδέποτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπαξόμεθα οὐδὲ διαλλακτάς.
5 τάδε γὰρ ποιοῦντες ἐν τῇ πῇ παρώντες δυνών ἀγαθοὶν οὐ στερησομεν τὴν Σικελίαν, Ἄθηναιῶν τε ἀπαλλαγῆμαι καὶ οἰκεῖον πολέμου, καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτῶν ἐλευθέραν νεμοῦμεθα καὶ ὑπὸ ἄλλων ἦσον ἐπιβουλευομένην.

LXV. Τοιαύτα τοῖς Ερμοκράτοις εἰσόντος πειθόμενοι οἱ Σικελιώται αὐτοὶ μὲν κατὰ σφαῖρας αὐτοὺς ξυνηνέχθησαν γνώμη ὅστε ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι τοῦ πολέμου ἔχοντες ἢ ἐκαστοι ἔχουσι, τοῖς δὲ Καμαριναῖοις Μοργαντίνην εἶναι ἀργύρων τακτὸν 2 τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἀποδοῦσιν οἱ δὲ τῶν 'Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι παρακαλέσαντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ἑν τέλει ὅντας εἶπον ὃτι ξυμβῆσονται καὶ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἔσονται κάκαινοι κοιναί. ἐπαινεσάντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἑποιοῦντο τὴν ὁμολογίαν, καὶ αἱ νῆς τῶν 'Ἀθηναίων ἀπέπλευσαν μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκ Σικελίας. 3 ἔλθοντας δὲ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει 'Ἀθηναίοι τοὺς μὲν φυγῇ ξυμίωσαν, Πυθοδώρου καὶ Σοφοκλέα, τῶν δὲ τρίτων Εὐρυμέδουτα χρήματα ἐπράξαντο, ὡς ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐν Σικελίᾳ καταστρέφασθαι ὅφειρες πεισθέντες ἀποχωρησείαν. οὗτο τῇ γε παρούσῃ εὐτυχία χρωμενοί ἥξιοι σφίσει μηδὲν ἐναντιοῦσαθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ ἐν ἑσο καὶ τὰ ἀπορώτερα μεγάλη τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐνδεεστέρα παρασκευή κατεργάσεσθαι. αἵτια δ’ ἦν ἡ παρὰ λόγον τῶν πλειῶν ἐνυπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτιθεῖσα ἱσχύν τῆς ἐλπίδος.

LXVI. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους Μεγαρῆς οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει πειξόμενοι ὑπὸ τε 'Ἀθηναίων τῷ πολέμῳ,
henceforth shall we ask outsiders to intervene, either as allies or as mediators. If we follow this policy, we shall at the present time not rob Sicily of two desirable things—getting rid of the Athenians and escaping from civil war—and for the future we shall dwell here by ourselves in a land that is free and less exposed to the plotting of others.”

LXV. After Hermocrates had spoken to this effect the Sicelions, accepting his advice, came to an understanding among themselves. They agreed to end the war, each city keeping what it had, except that the Camarinaeans were to have Morgantina on payment of a stated sum of money to the Syracusans. The Sicilian allies of the Athenians then summoned the Athenian generals and said that they proposed to make peace and that the treaty would also include them. And when the generals assented, they proceeded to make the agreement, whereupon the Athenian fleet sailed away from Sicily. But when it arrived at Athens, the Athenians sentenced to exile two of the generals, Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon, the third, on the charge that when it had been in their power to subdue Sicily they had been bribed to withdraw from it. To such an extent, because of their present good fortune, did they expect to be thwarted in nothing, and believed that, no matter whether their forces were powerful or deficient, they could equally achieve what was easy and what was difficult. The cause of this was the amazing success which attended most of their undertakings and inspired them with strong confidence.

LXVI. The same summer the people of the city of Megara, being harassed in the war by the Athenians,
THUCYDIDES

αἰεὶ κατὰ ἔτος ἔκαστον δις ἐσβαλλόντων παν-
στρατιὰ ἐς τὴν χώραν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σφετέρων
φυγάδων τῶν ἐκ Πηγῶν, οἱ στασιασάντων ἐκ-
πεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ πλῆθους χαλεποί ἦσαν λη-
στεύοντες, ἐποιοῦντο λόγους ἐν ἀλλήλους ὡς χρὴ
δεξαμένους τοὺς φεύγοντας μὴ ἀμφοτέροθεν τὴν
2 πόλιν φθείρειν. οἱ δὲ φίλοι τῶν ἐξω τῶν θροῦν
αἰσθόμενοι φανερῶς μᾶλλον ἡ πρότερον καὶ αὐτοὶ
3 ἤξιοιν τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἔχεσθαι. γνώντες δὲ
οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται οὐ δυνατὸν τὸν δήμον
ἐσόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶν μετὰ σφῶν καρτερεῖν,
ποιοῦνται λόγους δείσαντες πρὸς τοὺς τῶν Ἀθη-
ναίων στρατηγοὺς, Ἰπποκράτη τε τῶν Ἀρίφρονος
καὶ Δημοσθένη τῶν Ἀλκισθένους, βουλόμενοι
ἐνδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ νομίζουντες ἐλάσσον σφίζι
τῶν κίνδυνον ἡ τοὺς ἐκπεσόντας ὑπὸ σφῶν κατελ-
4 θείων. ἐξυνέβησάν τε πρῶτα μὲν τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἔλειν
Ἀθηναίους (ἤν δὲ σταδίων μάλιστα ὁκτὼ ἀπὸ τῆς
πόλεως ἐπὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν τὸν λιμένα αὐτῶν), ὅπως
μὴ ἐπιβοσθήσωσιν ἐκ τῆς Νίσαιας οἱ Πελοπο-
νήσιοι, ἐν ἡ αὐτοῖ μόνοι ἐφρούρουν βεβαιότητος
ἐνεκα τῶν Μεγάρων, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀνω πόλιν
πειράσεσθαι ἐνδοῦναι ῥᾶν ὁ ἦδη ἐμελλὼν προσ-
χωρήσειν τούτου γεγενημένου.

LXVII. Οἱ οὖν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐπειδὴ ἀπὸ τε τῶν
ἔργων καὶ τῶν λόγων παρεσκεύαστο ἀμφοτέροις,
ὑπὸ νῦκτα πλεύσαντες ἐς Μινώαν τὴν Μεγαρέων
νῆσον ὀπλίταις ἔξακοσίοις, ὃν Ἰπποκράτης ἦρ-
322
who regularly invaded their country in full force twice every year, and also by their own exiles in Pegae, who had been expelled in a revolution by the popular party and kept annoying them by raiding the country, began to say to one another that they ought to receive the fugitives back, so that the city should not be exposed to ruin from both directions at once. And the friends of the exiles, noticing the murmuring of the people, all began more openly than before to urge that this proposal be adopted. But the leaders of the popular party, realizing that the populace under the pressure of their distress would not be able to hold out with them, became frightened and made overtures to the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, proposing to surrender the city to them; for they thought that this course would be less dangerous to themselves than the restoration of the citizens whom they had banished. They agreed, in the first place, that the Athenians should take possession of the long walls (the distance between the city and the harbour at Nisaea was about eight stadia), in order to prevent the Peloponnesians from sending reinforcements from Nisaea, where they formed the sole garrison to keep their hold on Megara, and, in the second place, that they would do their best to hand over to them the upper-town as well, believing that, as soon as this was done, their fellow-citizens would more readily go over to the Athenian side.

LXVII. So, then, as soon as due preparations, both in word and act, had been made by both parties, the Athenians sailed under cover of night to Minoa, the island which lies off Megara, taking six hundred hoplites under the command of Hippocrates, and took
χεν, ἐν δρύγματι ἐκαθέζοντο, ὥθεν ἐπλίνθευον τὰ
2 τείχη καὶ ἀπείχεν οὐ πολὺ· οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ
Δημοσθένους τοῦ ἔτερου στρατηγοῦ Πλαταίης
τε ψυλοὶ καὶ ἐτεροὶ περίπολοι ἐνήδρευσαν ἐς τὸ
Ἐνυάλιον, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐλασσον ἀπώθεν. καὶ ἦσθετο
οὐδεὶς εἰ μὴ οἱ ἀνδρεὶς οίς ἐπιμελεῖς ἦν εἰδέναι τὴν
3 νύκτα ταῦτην. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔως ἔμελλε γέγνεσθαι,
οἱ προδιόντες τῶν Μεγαρέων ὁ ὑπὸ τοιὸνδε
ἐποίησαν. ἀκάτιον ἀμφηρικὸν ὡς λήσται, ἐκ
πολλοῦ τεθεραπευκότες τὴν ἀνοιξιν τῶν πυλῶν,
εἰώθεσαν ἐπὶ ἀμάξη, πεῖθοντες τὸν ἄρχοντα, διὰ
τῆς τάφρου κατακομίζειν τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν
θάλασσαν καὶ ἐκπλεῖν· καὶ πρὶν ἡμέραν εἶναι
πάλιν αὐτὸ τῇ ἀμάξῃ κομίζαντες ἐς τὸ τείχος
κατὰ τὰς πύλας ἐσθήσον, ὅπως τοῖς ἐκ τῆς Μινύας
Αθηναίοις ἀφανὴς δὴ εἶν ἡ φυλακὴ, μὴ ὄντος
4 ἐν τῷ λιμένι πλοίου φανεροῦ μηδενὸς. καὶ τότε
πρὸς ταῖς πύλαις ἢδη ἢν ἡ ἀμάξα, καὶ ἀνοιχ-
θεισῶν κατὰ τὸ εἰσώθης ὡς τῷ ἀκατίῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι
(ἐγίγνετο γὰρ ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος τὸ τοιοῦτον)
ἰδόντες ἔθεον δρόμῳ ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας, βουλόμενον
φθάσαι πρὶν ξυγκλησθῆναι πάλιν τὰς πύλας
καὶ ἔως ἐτι ἡ ἀμάξα ἐν αὐταῖς ἢν, κόλλῳ οὕσα
προσθείναι· καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀμα καὶ οἱ ξυμπράσσοντες
Μεγαρῆς τοὺς κατὰ πύλας φύλακας κτείνουσιν.
5 καὶ πρῶτον μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημοσθένην Πλαταίης
τε καὶ περίπολοι ἐσέδραμον οὐ νῦν τὸ τροπαίον
ἐστι, καὶ εὕθες ἐντὸς τῶν πυλῶν (ἡσθοῦτο γὰρ
1 οἱ προδιόντες τῶν Μεγαρέων, deleted by Hude.
cover in a ditch, not far from the town, where bricks had been made for the walls. A second company consisting of light-armed Plataeans and frontier-patrols under the command of the other general, Demosthenes, set an ambuscade at Enyalium, which is somewhat nearer. And all that night no one perceived what was going on except the men whose business it was to know. Then, at the approach of dawn, these would-be Megarian traitors began their work as follows. For a long time before this they had been carefully preparing for the opening of the gates by regularly assuming the guise of pirates and taking a sculling boat, drawn on a cart, through the ditch and down to the sea, where they would put out. This they did every night, first securing the consent of the commander.\(^1\) Then before daybreak they would cart the boat back into the fortifications, taking it in by way of the gates, their object being, as they pretended, to keep the Athenian garrison, which was stationed at Minoa, in the dark, as no boat would be visible in the harbour. On the night in question the cart was already at the gates, and when these were opened as usual as if to let the boat pass through, the Athenians, who were acting throughout in accordance with an agreement, seeing it, ran at top speed from their ambush, wishing to get there before the gates were closed again and while the cart was still in the passage, thus forming an obstacle to the shutting of the gates; and at the same time their Megarian accomplices killed the guards at the gates. And first the Plataeans and the patrols under Demosthenes' command rushed into the place where the trophy now stands, and as soon as they were inside the gates the Plataeans engaged with the

\(^1\) *i.e.*, of the Peloponnesian garrison.
οἱ ἐγγύταται Πελοποννήσιοι) μαχόμενοι τοὺς προσβοηθοῦντας οἱ Πλαταιὴς ἐκράτησαν καὶ τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὀπλίταις ἐπιφερομένοις βεβαιοὺς τὰς πύλας παρέσχον. LXVIII. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἦδη ὁ αἰεὶ ἐντὸς γιγνόμενος χωρεῖ

2 ἐπὶ τὸ τείχος. καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι φρούροι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντισχόντες ἡμῖνοντο ὀλίγοι, καὶ ἀπέθανον τινες αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ πλείους ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν, φοβηθέντες ἐν νυκτὶ τε πολεμίων προσπεπτοκότων καὶ τῶν προδιόντων Μεγαρέων ἀντιμαχομένων νομίσαντες τοὺς ἅπαντας σφάς

3 Μεγαρέας προδεδωκέναι. ξυνέπεσε γὰρ καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκα ἀφ' ἐαυτοῦ γνώμης κηρύξας τὸν βουλόμενον ἵνα Μεγαρέων μετὰ Ἀθηναίων θησόμενον τὰ ὅπλα. οἱ δ' ὡς ἤκουσαν, οὐκέτι ἀνέμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι νομίσαντες κοινῆ

4 πολεμεῖσθαι κατέφυγον ἐς τὴν Νίσαιαν. ἀμα δὲ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἡ饮品 τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πόλει Μεγαρέων θορυβουμένων οἱ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίοις πράξαντες καὶ ἀλλο ἐμὲ τῶν πλήθος, ὃ ξυνήθει, ἐφασαν χρῆναι ἀνοίγειν τὰς

5 πύλας καὶ ἐπεξεῖναι ἐς μάχην. ξυνέκειτο δὲ αὐτοῖς τῶν πυλῶν ἁνοιχθεισῶν ἐσπίπτειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, αὐτοὶ δὲ διάδηλοι ἐμελλόν ἐσεθαι (ἵπτα γὰρ ἀλείψεσθαι), ὅπως μὴ ἀδικώνται. ἀσφάλεια δὲ αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἐγώγετο τῆς ἁνοίξεως· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐλευσίνος κατὰ τὸ ξυγκείμενον τετράκισχίλιοι ὀπλίται τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ

326
reinforcements which came up—for the nearest Peloponnesians had become aware of what was going on—and defeated them, thus securing the gates for the onrushing Athenian hoplites. LXVIII. After that every Athenian who got inside immediately made for the wall. A few of the Peloponnesian garrison at first stood their ground and defended themselves, some of them being killed, but most of them took to flight, being seized with panic, both because the enemy had attacked them at night, and also because they thought the Megarian traitors were fighting against them; and they supposed that all the Megarians had betrayed them. For it so happened also that the Athenian herald, acting on his own responsibility, made a proclamation that any Megarian who so desired might espouse the cause of the Athenians. When the garrison heard this proclamation it no longer held out, but, verily believing that a concerted attack was being made upon them, fled to Nisaea. And at daybreak, when the walls had already been taken and the Megarians in the city were in a tumult, those who had negotiated with the Athenians, and a large number besides who were privy to the plot, expressed the opinion that they ought to open the gates and go out to battle. It had, in fact, been agreed between them and the Athenians, that as soon as the gates were opened the Athenians should rush in, and, in order that they might themselves escape injury, they were to be distinguished from the rest by being anointed with oil. They were also to have additional security in thus opening the gates, since the men who according to the compact were to march by night from Eleusis, four thousand Athenian
ιππης ἐξακόσιοι οἱ τὴν νύκτα πορευομένοι 1
6 παρῆσαν. ἀληθιμένων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ οὖντων ἦδη
περὶ τὰς πύλας καταγορεύει τις ξυνείδως τοῖς
ἐτέροις τὸ ἐπιβουλεύμα. καὶ οἱ ξυστραφέντες
ἀθρόοι ᾧθον καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν χρήναι οὔτε
ἐπεξέναι (οὔδε γὰρ πρότερον πω τοῦτο ἰσχύοντες
μᾶλλον τολμῆσαι) οὔτε ἐς κίνδυνον φανέρον τὴν
πόλιν καταγαγεῖν. εἰ τε μὴ πείσεται τις, αὐτοῦ
tὴν μάχην ἔσεσθαι. ἔδηλον δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι ἰσασί
tὰ πρασσόμενα, ἀλλὰ ὡς τὰ βέλτιστα βουλεύ-
οντες ἰσχυρίζοντο, καὶ ἀμα περὶ τὰς πύλας
παρέμενον φυλάσσοντες, ὡστε οὐκ ἐγένετο τοῖς
ἐπιβουλεύονσι πρᾶξαι ὃ ἐμελλῶ.

LXIX. Γνώτες δὲ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ
ὅτι ἐναντίωμα τι ἐγένετο καὶ τὴν πόλιν βλα ὦν
οίοι τε ἔσονται λαβεῖν, τὴν Νίσαιαν εὐθὺς περιε-
teιχίζον, νομίζοντες, εἰ πρίν ἐπιβοηθήσαι τινας
ἐξέλοιν, θᾶσσον ἄν καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα προσχωρή-
2 σαι (παρεγένετο δὲ σίδηρος τε ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν
tαχὺ καὶ λιθουργοί καὶ τάλλα ἐπιτήδεια)· ἀρξά-
μενοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους δὲ ἐξόν καὶ διοικοδομη-
σαντες τὸ πρὸς Μεγαρέας, ἀπ’ ἐκεῖνον ἐκατέρωθεν
ἐς θάλασσαν τῆς Νίσαιᾶς 2 τάφρον τε καὶ τείχῃ
dιελομένη ἤγεν 3 ὁ στρατιά, ἐκ τε τοῦ προαστείου
λίθως καὶ πλίνθοις χρώμενοι, καὶ κόπτοντες τὰ
dένδρα καὶ ὑλῆν ἀπεσταύρουν εἰ πη δέοιτο τι·

1 πορευομένοι, Rutherford’s conjecture for πορευόμενοι of the MSS.
2 Hude deletes τῆς Νίσαλας, after Stahl.
3 ἤγεν added by Stahl and Rauchenstein.

328
hoplites and six hundred cavalry, were now at hand. But after they had anointed themselves and were already near the gates, an accomplice divulged the plot to the other party. And they, gathering in a body, came and declared that they ought neither to march out to fight—for they had never ventured to do such a thing before, even when they were stronger—nor to bring the city into manifest danger; and, they added, should anyone refuse to obey, the fight would take place on the spot. But they gave no signs whatever that they were aware of the plot which was going on, but stoutly maintained that their advice was for the best, and at the same time stayed about the gates keeping watch, so that the plotters had no opportunity to carry out their intentions.

LXIX. The Athenian generals, however, saw that some obstacle had arisen and that they would not be able to take the city by force, and therefore at once began to invest Nisaea with a wall, thinking that, if they could take this town before any succour came, Megara also would soon capitulate. A supply of iron quickly arrived from Athens, as well as stonemasons and whatever else was needed. Beginning then at the part of the fortification which they already held and building a cross-wall on the side of it facing Megara, from that point they built out on either side of Nisaea as far as the sea, the army apportioning among them the ditch and the walls and using stones and bricks from the suburbs. Moreover, they cut down fruit-trees and forest-wood and built stockades

1 Or, retaining παρευμόμενοι with the MSS. and rejecting of before τὴν νῦκτα, "since the men from Eleusis, four thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred cavalry, according to the compact had marched all night and were now at hand."
καὶ αἱ οἰκῖαι τοῦ προαστείου ἐπάλξεις λαμβάνουσαι αὐταὶ ὑπῆρχον ἔρυμα. καὶ ταύτην μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὀλην εἰργάζοντο. τῇ δὲ ύστερᾳ περὶ δείλην τὸ τείχος ὅσον οὐκ ἀπετετέλεστο, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Νίσαιᾳ δείσαντες, σίτου τε ἀπορία (ἐφ’ ἡμέραν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἀνοί πόλεως ἔχρωντο) καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ὡνομίζουσεν ταχὺ ἐπιβοηθήσειν, τοὺς τε Μεγαρέας πολεμίους ἤγομενοι, ξυνέβησαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίοις ῥητοὶ μὲν ἔκαστον ἀργυρίον ἀπολυθῆναι ὑπλα παραδόντας, τοὺς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους, τῷ τε ἅρχοντι καὶ εἰ τις ἀλλος ἐνήν, χρῆσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὃ τι ἂν βούλωνται. ἐπὶ τούτων ὁμολογήσαντες ἐξῆλθον. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἀπορρίζαντες ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως καὶ τῆς Νίσαιαν παραλαβόντες τάλλα παρεσκευάζοντο.

LXX. Βρασίδας δὲ ὁ Τέλλιδος Λακεδαιμόνιος κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἐτύγχανε περὶ Σικυώνα καὶ Κόρινθον ὄψιν, ἐπὶ Θράκης στρατεύαν παρεσκευάζομενος. καὶ ὡς ἢσθετο τῶν τείχῶν τὴν ἀλωσίν, δείσας περὶ τε τοῖς ἐν τῇ Νίσαιᾳ Πελοποννησίους καὶ μὴ τὰ Μέγαρα ληφθῆ, πέμπει ἐς τοὺς Βουωτοὺς κελεύων κατὰ τάχος στρατιὰ ἀπαντῆσαι ἐπὶ Τριποδίσκον (ἐστὶ δὲ κόμη τῆς Μεγαρίδος οἴνου τοῦτο ἔχουσα ὑπὸ τῷ ὁρεὶ τῇ Γεραιείᾳ), καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων ἠλθεὶν ἐπτακοσίους μὲν καὶ δισχίλιους Κορινθίων ὀπλίτας, Φλειασίων δὲ τετρακοσίους, Σικυωνίων δὲ ἕξακοσίους καὶ τοὺς
wherever they were needed; and the houses of the suburbs with the addition of battlements of themselves furnished a rampart. They worked the whole of this first day, but on the next day toward evening when the wall was all but finished the garrison of Nisaea, becoming alarmed by the shortage of food, seeing that they received provisions from the upper-city for only a day at a time, and not anticipating any speedy relief from the Peloponnesians, and believing the Megarians to be hostile, capitulated to the Athenians on condition that they should give up their arms and pay a ransom of a stipulated amount for each man; as for the Lacedaemonians in the garrison, the commander or anyone else, they were to be disposed of as the Athenians might wish. On these terms they came to an agreement and marched out. The Athenians then made a breach in the long walls in order to separate them from the wall of the city of Megara, took possession of Nisaea, and proceeded with their other preparations.

LXX. At this time Brasidas son of Tellis, a Lacedaemonian, happened to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, preparing a force for use in the region of Thrace. And when he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing for the safety of the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and apprehensive lest Megara should be taken, he sent to the Boeotians requesting them to come in haste with an army and to meet him at Tripodiscus, which is the name of a village in the district of Megara at the foot of Mount Geraneia. He himself set out with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian hoplites, four hundred from Phlius, seven hundred from Sicyon, and such troops
μεθ' αὐτοῦ ὅσοι ἦδη ξυνειλεγμένοι ἦσαν, οἷομενος 2 τὴν Νίσαιαν ἐτί καταλήψεσθαι ἀνάλωτον. ὡς δὲ ἐπύθετο, (ἐτυχε γὰρ νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τῶν Τριποδίσκου ἐξελθὼν) ἀπολέξας τριακοσίους τοῦ στρατοῦ, πρὶν ἔκπυστος γενέσθαι, προσήλθε τῇ τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλει λαθὼν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὄντας περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, Βουλόμενος μὲν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἄμα εἰ δύνατο ἐργῷ τῆς Νίσαίας πειρᾶσαι, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τὴν τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλιν ἐσέλθων βεβαιώσασθαι. καὶ ἦς᾽ον δὲξασθαὶ σφᾶς λέγων ἐν ἐπίδει εἶναι ἀναλαβεῖν Νίσαιαν. ΛXXI. αἰ δὲ τῶν Μεγαρέων στάσεις φοβούμεναι, οἱ μὲν μὴ τοὺς φεύγοντας σφίσιν ἐσαγαγόντων αὐτοὺς ἐκβάλῃ, οἱ δὲ μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁ δήμος δεῖσας ἔπιθηται σφίσι καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐν μάχῃ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν ὃντας ἐγγὺς ἐφεδρεύοντων Ἀθηναίων ἀπόληται, οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφότερος ἐδόκει ἡσυχάσασι τὸ μέλλον 2 περιδεῖν. ἦλπιζον γὰρ καὶ μάχην ἐκάτεροι ἔσεσθαι τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν προσβοηθη- σάντων, καὶ οὕτω σφίσιν ἀσφαλεστέρως ἔχειν, οἷς τις εἶν ἐννοοῦν, κρατήσασι προσχωρῆσαν ὃ δὲ Βρασίδας ὥς οὐκ ἐπειδὴν, ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐς τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα.

ΛXXII. Ἀμα δὲ τῇ ἐφ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ παρῆσαν, διανεοημένοι μὲν καὶ πρὶν Βρασίδαν πέμψαι βοηθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ Μέγαρα, ὡς οὐκ ἄλλοτρίου ὄντος τοῦ κινδύνου, καὶ ἦδη ὄντες πανστρατιαὶ Πλα- ταιᾶσιν ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἤλθεν ὁ ἄγγελος, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐρρώσθησαν, καὶ ἀποστείλαντες διακο-
of his own as had already been levied, thinking that he would arrive before Nisaea had been taken. But when he learned the truth—for he happened to have gone out by night to Tripodiscus—he selected three hundred of his own army, and before his approach was known reached the city of Megara unobserved by the Athenians, who were down by the sea. His plan was, ostensibly—and really, too, if it should prove possible—to make an attempt upon Nisaea, but most of all to get into the city of Megara and secure it. And he demanded that they should receive him, saying that he was in hopes of recovering Nisaea. LXXI. But the rival factions of Megara were afraid, the one that he might bring in the exiles and drive them out, the other that the populace, fearing this very thing, might attack them, and that the city, being at war with itself, while the Athenians were lying in wait near at hand, might be ruined. They, therefore, did not admit Brasidas, both parties thinking it best to wait and see what would happen. For each party expected that there would be a battle between the Athenians and the relieving army, and so it was safer for them not to join the side which anyone favoured until it was victorious. So then Brasidas, when he could not persuade them, withdrew once more to his own army.

LXXII. At daybreak the Boeotians arrived. They had intended, even before Brasidas summoned them, to go to the aid of Megara, feeling that the danger was not alien to them, and were already at Plataea with all their forces; but when the summons actually came, they were greatly strengthened in their purpose, and sent on two thousand two hundred hoplites
σίους καὶ δισχιλίους ὀπλίτας καὶ ἵππεας ἔξακο-
2 σίους τοῖς πλείοσιν ἀπῆλθον πάλιν. παρόντος
dὲ ἡδὴ ξύμπαντος τοῦ στρατεύματος, ὀπλιτῶν
οὐκ ἠλάσσον ἐξαισχύλιων, καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
tῶν μὲν ὀπλιτῶν περὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν ὅτων καὶ
tὴν θάλασσαν ἐν τάξει, τῶν δὲ ψιλῶν ἀνὰ τὸ
πεδίον ἑσκεδασμένων, οἱ ἵππησι οἱ τῶν Βοιωτῶν
ἀπροσδοκήτους ἐπιπεσόντες τῶν ψιλῶν ἐτρεψαν
ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν (ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρὸ τοῦ ὀυδέμια
βοήθεια πω τοῖς Μεγαρέσιων οὐδαμόθεν ἐπῆλθεν).
3 ἀντεπεξέλασαντες δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐς
χειρὰς ἦσαν, καὶ ἔγενετο ἱππομαχία ἐπὶ πολὺ, ἐν
4 ἡ ἀξιωσών ἐκάτεροι οὐχ ἦσουσι γενέσθαι. τῶν
μὲν γὰρ ἱππαρχὸν τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς
οὐ πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν Νίσαιαν προσελά-
sαντας 1 οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ἀποκτείναντες ἐσκύλευ-
sαν, καὶ τῶν τε νεκρῶν τούτων κρατήσαντες
ὑποστόνδους ἀπέδοσαν καὶ τροπαίον ἐστησαν
οὐ 2 μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παντὶ έργῳ βεβαιῶς οὐδέτε-
ροι τελευτήσαντες ἀπεκρίθησαν ἀλλὰ 3 οἱ μὲν
Βοιωτοὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔαυτόν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν.

LXXIII. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Βρασίδας καὶ τὸ
στράτευμα ἔχωρουν ἐγγυτέρω τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ
tῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως, καὶ καταλαβόντες
χωρίον ἐπιτήδειον παραταξάμενοι ἥσυχαζον,
οἰόμενοι σφίσιν ἐπιέναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς
Μεγαρέας ἐπιστάμενοι περιορωμένους ὀποτέρων ἡ
2 νίκη ἔσται. καλῶς δὲ ἐνόμιζον σφίσιν ἀμφότερα
ἐχειν, ἀμα μὲν τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν προτέρους μηδὲ

1 Portus' correction for προσελάσαντες of the MSS.
2 Hude adopts Rutherford's conjecture οὐδέν.
3 ἀλλ', Hude deletes, as not translated by Valla.
and six hundred cavalry, returning home with the larger part of their army. Then, finally, when their whole army was at hand, consisting of not less than six thousand hoplites, and the Athenian hoplites were in line about Nisaea and the sea, while the light-armed troops were scattered up and down the plain, the Boeotian cavalry fell upon the latter and drove them to the sea. The attack was unexpected, for hitherto no reinforcements had ever come to the Megarians from any quarter. But the Athenian horsemen charged upon them in turn and a prolonged cavalry action ensued, in which both sides claimed to have held their own. The Athenians did succeed in killing the commander of the Boeotian cavalry and a few others who had charged to the very walls of Nisaea and despoiled them, and having got possession of their bodies they gave them back under a truce and set up a trophy; in the action as a whole, however, neither side finally gained a decisive advantage, and so they separated, the Boeotians going to their own army, the Athenians to Nisaea.

LXXIII. After this Brasidas and his army advanced nearer to the sea and the city of Megara, and there, taking up an advantageous position, they drew up their lines and kept quiet, thinking that the Athenians would come against them, and feeling assured that the Megarians would wait to see which side would be victorious. And they thought that matters stood well with them in both of two respects: in the first place, they were not forcing an
μάχης καὶ κινδύνου ἐκοντας ἀρξαὶ, ἐπειδὴ γε ἐν
φανερῷ ἔδειξαν ἐτοίμου ὄντες ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ
αὐτοῖς ὁσπερ ἀκοντὶ τὴν νίκην δικαίως ἀνατίθε-
σθαι· ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρέας
3 ὄρθῳς ξυμβαίνειν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὄψθησαν
ἔλθόντες, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ χη γίγνεσθαι σφίων, ἀλλὰ
σαφῶς ἂν ὁσπερ ἑσπερίευτον στραθηκόντος
τῆς πόλεως· νῦν δὲ καὶ τυχεῖν αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίους
μὴ βουληθέντας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ὡστε ἀμαχῆτι ἂν
περιγενέσθαι αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ ἕνεκα ἥλθον. ὅπερ καὶ
4 ἐγένετο. οἱ γὰρ Μεγαρῆς, ὡς οἱ Ἀθηναίοι
ἐτάξαντο μὲν παρὰ τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη ἔξελθόντες,
ἡσύχαζον δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἐπιότονων, λογιζόμενοι
καὶ οἱ ἐκεῖνων στρατηγοὶ μὴ ἀντίπαλον εἶναι
σφίσι τῶν κινδύνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πλεῖον αὐτῶν
προσκεκρήκειν, ἀρξαὶ μάχης πρὸς πλείονας
αὐτῶν ἡ λαβεῖν νικήσαντας Μέγαρα ἡ σφαλέντας
τῷ βελτίστῳ τοῦ ὀπλιτικοῦ βλαβθῆναι, τοῖς δὲ
ξυμπάθεις τῆς δυνάμεως κάλ τῶν παρόντων μέρος
ἐκαστον κινδυνεύειν εἰκότως ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν,
χρόνον δὲ ἐπισχόντες καὶ ὡς ὅπερ ἂν ἐκατέρων
ἐπεχειρητό, ἀπῆλθον πρὸτεροὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἐς
τὴν Νίσαιαν καὶ αὕτης οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ὃθεν περ
ωρμήθησαν· οὕτω δὴ τῷ μὲν Βρασίδα αὐτῷ καὶ

---

1 Apparently there is an anacoluthon, the sentence be-
ginning as if τῷ Βρασίδα ἀναλέγουσι τὰς πῦλας were to be the
predicate, but after the long parenthesis the subject is
resumed in partitive form, αἰ τῶν φευγόντων φίλοι Μεγαρῆς.

336
engagement and had not deliberately courted the risk of a battle, although they had at least plainly shown that they were ready to defend themselves, so that the victory would justly be accredited to them almost without a blow; and at the same time they thought that things were turning out right as regards the Megarians also. For if they had failed to put in an appearance there would have been no chance for them, but they would clearly have lost the city at once just as though they had been defeated; but by this move there was the possible chance that the Athenians themselves would not care to fight, with the result that they would have gained what they came for without a battle. And this is just what happened. For the Megarians did what was expected of them.\(^1\) When the Athenians came out and drew up their lines before the long walls, they too kept quiet, since the Peloponnesians did not attack, and their generals also reckoned that they were running an unequal risk, now that almost all their plans had turned out well, to begin a battle against larger numbers, and either be victorious and take Megara, or, if defeated, have the flower of their hoplite force damaged; whereas the Peloponnesians would naturally be willing to risk an engagement which would involve, for each contingent, only a portion of the entire army or of the troops there at hand.\(^2\) Both armies therefore waited for some time, and when no attack was made from either side, the Athenians were the first to withdraw, retiring to Nisaea, and next the Peloponnesians, returning to the place from which they had set out. So then, finally, the Megarians who were friends of the exiles

\(^2\) The text is clearly corrupt, but the general sense seems to be that given above.
τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ἀρχοὺσιν οἱ τῶν φευγόντων φίλοι Μεγαρῆς, ὡς ἐπικρατήσαντι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐκέτι ἐθελησάντων μάχεσθαι, θαρ-σοῦτες μᾶλλον ἀνοίγουσί τε τὰς πύλας καὶ δεξάμενοι καταπεπληγμένων ἦδη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πραξάντων ἐς λόγους ἔρχονται.

LXXIV. Καὶ ὑστερον ὁ μὲν διαλυθέντων τῶν ἕμμαχῶν κατὰ πόλεις ἐπανελθὼν καὶ αὐτῶς ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον, τὴν ἐπὶ Ὄρακης στρατεύσαι παρέ-2 σκεύαζεν, ἵναπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὠρμητο· οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει Μεγαρῆς, ἀποχωρησάντων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπ’ οίκου, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μάλιστα μετέσχουν, εἰδότες ὅτι ὥφθησαν εὐθὺς ὑπεξηλθοῦν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι κοινολογησάμενοι τοῖς τῶν φευγόντων φίλοις κατάγοντες τοὺς ἐκ Πηγῶν, ὀρκώσαντες πίστευσι μεγάλας μηδενὶ μνησικάκησεωι, βουλεύσαντες δὲ τῇ πόλει τὰ 3 ἄριστα. οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγένοντο καὶ ἐξέτασιν ὅπλων ἐποιησάντο, διαστήσαντες τοὺς λόχους ἐξελέξαντο τῶν τε ἐχθρῶν καὶ οἱ ἐδόκουν μάλιστα ξυμπρὰξαι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀνδρὰς ὡς ἐκατον, καὶ τούτων περὶ ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον ψῆφον φανερὰν διενεγκεῖν, ὡς κατεγνώσθησαν, ἔκτειναν, καὶ ἐς ὀλυγαρχίαν τὰ 4 μάλιστα κατέστησαν τῇ πόλιν. καὶ πλείστουν δὴ χρόνον αὐτὴ ὑπ’ ἐλαχίστων γενομένη ἐκ στά-σεως μετάστασις ξυνέμειν.
plucked up courage, and opened the gates to Brasidas and the commanders from the various cities, in the feeling that he had won the victory and that the Athenians had finally declined battle. And receiving them into the town they entered into a conference with them, the party which had been intriguing with the Athenians being now quite cowed.

LXXIV. Afterwards, when the Peloponnesian allies had been dismissed to their several cities, Brasidas went back to Corinth and began preparations for the expedition to Thrace, whither he had originally been bound. But when the Athenians also returned home, all the Megarians who had been most implicated in the negotiations with the Athenians, knowing that they had been detected, immediately withdrew secretly from the city, while the rest, communicating with the friends of the exiles, brought them back from Pegae, after first binding them on their oath by strong pledges not to harbour ill-will, but to consult for the best interests of the city. But as soon as these men attained office and had made an inspection of arms, separating the companies they selected about one hundred of their personal enemies and of those who seemed to have had the largest part in the negotiations with the Athenians, and compelling the popular assembly to take an open vote concerning these, when they had been condemned, slew them, and established an extreme oligarchy in the city. And there was never a change of government, effected by so small a number of men through the triumph of a faction, that lasted so long.

1 Or, adopting Rutherford's conjecture, ἔθελησόντων, "and that the Athenians would not care to fight again."
LXXV. Τοῦ δ᾿ αὐτοῦ θέρους τῆς Ἀντάνδρου ὑπὸ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὦστερ διεισόντω, μελλούσης κατασκευάζεσθαι, οἱ τῶν ἄργυρολόγων Ἀθηναίων νεῶν στρατηγοὶ, Δημόδοκος καὶ Ἀριστείδης, ὄντες περὶ Ἐλλησποντοῦ (ὁ γὰρ τρίτος αὐτῶν Δάμαχος δέκα ναυσίν ἐς τὸν Πόντον ἐσεπεπλεύκει) ὡς ἱσθάνουσί τιν παρασκευήν τοῦ χωρίου καὶ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς δεινὸν εἶναι μὴ ὦστερ τὰ Ἀναία ἐπὶ τῇ Σάμῳ γέννηται, ἐνθα οἱ φεύγουντες τῶν Σαμίων καταστάντες τοὺς τε Πελοποννησίους ὅφελον ἐς τὰ ναυτικά κυβερνήτας πέμποντες καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλι Σαμίων ἐς ταραχὴν καθίστασαν καὶ τοὺς ἔξοντας ἐδέχοντο. οὗτο εἰ ἥξυναγείραντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἕξμυμάχων στρατιῶν καὶ πλεύσαντες, μάχη τε νικήσαντες τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἀντάνδρου ἐπεξελθόντας, ἀναλαμβάνουσι τὸ 2 χωρίον πάλιν. καὶ οὐ πολὺ ύστερον ἐς τὸν Πόντον ἐσπευσάς Δάμαχος, ἐν τῇ Ἡρακλεώτιδι ὀρμίσας ἐς τὸν Κάλητα ποταμὸν ἀπὸλυσι τὰς ναῦς ὑδατός ἀνωθεν γενομένου καὶ κατελθόντος αἱφνιδίου τοῦ βέματος. αὐτὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ πεζῆ διὰ Βιθυνῶν Ὁρακῶν, οἱ εἰσὶ πέραν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ, ἀφικνεῖται εἰς Καλχηδόνα, τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ στὸματι τοῦ Πόντου Μεγαρέων ἀποκλαίαν.

LXXVI. Ἔν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει καὶ Δημοσθένης Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσίν ἀφικνεῖται εἰς Ναύπακτον, εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς 2 Μεγαρέως ἀναχώρησιν. τῷ γὰρ Ἰπποκράτει καὶ ἑκείνῳ τὰ Βοιώτια πράγματα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν
LXXV. During the same summer, when Antandros was about to be strengthened\(^1\) by the Mytileneans as they had planned, the generals in command of the Athenian ships which were collecting the tribute, namely, Demodocus and Aristides, who were in the neighbourhood of the Hellespont—for Lamachus, their colleague, had sailed into the Pontus with ten ships—heard of the fortification of the place and thought that there was danger of its becoming a menace to Lesbos, just as Anaea was to Samos\(^2\); for the Samian exiles, establishing themselves at Anaea, kept aiding the Peloponnesians by sending them pilots for their fleet, and also brought the Samians who lived in the city into a state of turmoil and continually offered a refuge to those who were sent into exile. The Athenian generals, therefore, collected an army from among the allies, sailed thither, defeated in battle those who came out against them from Antandros, and recovered the city. And not long afterwards Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus and anchored in the river Cales in Heraclean territory, lost his ships in consequence of a rain which fell in the uplands and brought down a sudden flood. He and his army, however, going by land through the Bithynian Thracians, who were on the other side, in Asia, arrived at Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

LXXVI. During the same summer, immediately after the Athenians retired from Megara, Demosthenes, the Athenian general, arrived with forty ships at Naupactus. For he and Hippocrates were engaged in negotiations about affairs in Boeotia, at the

---

\(^{1}\) cf. ch. lii. 3.  \(^{2}\) cf. III. xix. 2, xxxii. 2.
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐπράσσετο, βουλομένων μετα-
στῆσαι τὸν κόσμον καὶ ἔσ δημοκρατίαν ὦσπερ
οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἡρέστειοι καὶ Πτοιοδώρου μάλιστ' ἀνδρὸς φυγάδος ἐκ Θηβῶν ἐσηγουμένου τάδε
3 αὐτοῖς παρεσκευάσθη. Σίφας μὲν ἐμελλόν τινες
προδώσειν (αἱ δὲ Σίφαι εἰσὶ τῆς Θεσπικῆς γῆς ἐν
τῷ Κρῆσαι κόλπῳ ἐπιθαλασσίδιοι). Χαιρόνειαν
dὲ, ἢ ἐσ Ὑρχομενὸν τὸν Μινυείον πρὸτετερον καλοῦ-
μενον, νῦν δὲ Βοιωτιον, ξυντελεῖ, ἀλλοι εἴ Ὑρχο-
μενον ἐνεδίδοσαν, καὶ οἱ Ὑρχομενίων φυγάδες
ξυνέπρασσον τὰ μάλιστα καὶ ἀνδρὰς ἐμισθοῦντο
ἐκ Πελοποννήσου (ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ Χαιρόνεια ἐσχατον
τῆς Βοιωτίας πρὸς τῇ Φανοτίδι τῆς Φωκίδος), καὶ
4 Φωκέων μετείχον τινες. τοὺς δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἐδεί
Δήλιον καταλαβεῖν, τὸ ἐν τῇ Ταναγραίᾳ πρὸς
Ἐύβοιαν τετραμμένον Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερόν, ἀμα δὲ
ταῦτα ἐν ἡμέρα ῥητῇ γύγνεσθαι, ὅπως μὴ ξυμβο-
θήσωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον οἱ Βοιωτοὶ ἀθρόοι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν ἐκαστοὶ κινούμενα. καὶ εἰ
κατορθοῖτο ἡ πείρα καὶ τὸ Δήλιον τελείωθη,
ῥάδιως ἡλπίζου, εἰ καὶ μὴ παραντικα νεωτερίζω
τι τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς, ἐχο-
μένων τούτων τῶν χωριῶν καὶ ληστευομένης τῆς
γῆς καὶ οὐσίας ἐκαστοὶ διὰ βραχέος ἀποστροφῆς,
οὐ μενεῖν κατὰ χώραν τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ
τῶν Ἀθηναίων μὲν προσιόντων τοῖς ἀφεστηκόσι,
1 ὦσπερ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, bracketed by Hude, after Rutherford.
instance of certain men in several cities who wished to bring about a change in their form of government and to transform it into a democracy, such as the Athenians had. The leading spirit in these transactions was Ptoeodorus, an exile from Thebes, through whom Demosthenes and Hippocrates had brought about the following state of affairs. Siphae, a town on the shore of the Crisaean Gulf in the territory of Thespiae, was to be betrayed by certain men; and Chaeronea, a city which is tributary to Orchomenus—the city which was formerly called Minyan, but is now called Boeotian—was to be put into the hands of the Athenians by others, the fugitives from Orchomenus, who also took into their pay some Peloponnesians, being especially active in the conspiracy. Some Phocians also had a share in the plot, Chaeronea being on the borders of Boeotia, and adjacent to Phanotis, which is in Phocis. The Athenians were to occupy Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo which is in the territory of Tanagra and opposite Euboea; and all these events were to take place simultaneously on an appointed day, in order that the Boeotians might not concentrate their forces at Delium, but that the several states might be occupied with their own disaffected districts. And if the attempt should succeed and Delium should be fortified, they confidently expected, even if no immediate change occurred in the constitutions of the Boeotian states, nevertheless, so long as these places were in their possession, from which Boeotian territory could be ravaged and where everyone might find a convenient place of refuge, the situation would not remain as it was, but in time, when the Athenians should come to the support of the rebels and the forces of the
τοῖς δὲ οὖς οὖσις άθρόας τῆς δυνάμεως, κατα-
στήσεων αὐτὰ ἐς τὸ ἐπιτήδειον.

LXXVII. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιβουλή τοιαύτη παρε-
σκευάζετο· ὁ δὲ Ἰπποκράτης αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως δύναμιν ἔχων, ὡπότε καιρὸς εἶη, ἐμελλε
strateυεῖν ἐς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς, τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη
προαπέστειλε ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσῖν ἐς τὴν
Ναύπακτον, ὡποὺς ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν χωρίων στρατῶν
ξυλλέξας Ἀκαρνάνων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνεμ-
μάχων πλέοι ἐπὶ τὰς Σίφας ὡς προδοθησομένων·
ἡμέρα δ' αὐτοῖς εἰρήτῳ ἦ ἐδει ταῦτα πράσσειν.

2 καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης ἀφικόμενος, Οἰνιάδας δὲ
ὕπτω τε Ἀκαρνάνων πάντων κατηγακασμένους
καταλαβὼν ἐς τὴν Ἀθηναίων κυμμαχίαν καὶ
αὐτὸς ἀναστήσας τὸ κυμμαχικὸν τὸ ἐκείνη πᾶν,
ἐπὶ Σαλὼνθιον καὶ Ἀγραίως στρατεύσας πρῶτον
καὶ προσποιησάμενος τὰλλα Ἑτοιμάζετο ὡς ἐπὶ
tὰς Σίφας, ὅταν δὲν, ἀπαντησόμενος.

LXXVIII. Βρασίδας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον
τοῦ θέρος πορευόμενος ἐπτακοσίοις καὶ χίλιοις
ὀπλίταις ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης ἐπείδῃ ἐγένετο ἐν
Ἡρακλεία τῇ ἐν Τράχιν καὶ, προτέμψαντος
αὐτοῦ ἄγγελον ἐς Φάρσαλον παρὰ τοὺς ἐπιτη-
δείους ἀξιούντος διάγειν ἐαυτὸν καὶ τὴν στρατιῶν,
ἔλθον ἐς Μελίτειαν τῆς Ἀχαιᾶς Πάναρος τε καὶ
Δώρος καὶ Ἰππολοχίδας καὶ Τορύλαος καὶ Στρό-
φακος πρόξενος ὧν Χαλκιδέων, τότε δὴ ἐπορεύτο

2 ἦγον δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Θεσσαλῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκ Λαρί-
oligarchs were scattered, they could settle matters to their own advantage.

LXXVII. Such was the plot which was then under way. It was the purpose of Hippocrates, when the proper moment should arrive, to take troops from Athens and in person make an expedition into Boeotia; meanwhile he was sending Demosthenes in advance with a fleet of forty ships to Naupactus, in order that he should first collect in this region an army of Acarnanians and of other allies of Athens and then sail to Siphae, in expectation of its being betrayed; and a day was agreed upon between the two generals for doing these two things simultaneously. Upon his arrival at Naupactus, Demosthenes found that Oeniadae had already been forced by all the rest of the Acarnanians to join the Athenian alliance; he himself then raised all the allied forces in that district, and after first making an expedition against Salynthius and the Agraean{s} and securing these, proceeded with his other preparations so as to be present at Siphae when needed.

LXXVIII. About the same time in the course of this summer, Brasidas, who was on his way to Thrace with one thousand seven hundred hoplites, reached Heracleia in Trachis and sent forward a messenger to his friends at Pharsalus requesting them to conduct him and his army through. Accordingly he was met at Meliteia in Achaia by Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaüs, and Strophacus, who was proxenus of the Chalcidians, and then proceeded on his march. He was conducted by several Thessalians also, among whom were Niconidas of Larisa, a

1 cf. III. cxi. 4; cxiv. 2.
σης Νικονίδας Περδίκκα ἐπιτήδειος ὄν. τὴν γὰρ Θεσσαλίαν ἄλλως τε οὐκ εὐποροῦν ἦν διέναι ἀνεύ ἀγωγοῦ καὶ μετὰ ὀπλῶν γε δή, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσι γε ὀμοίως Ἐλλησιν ὑποπτοῦν καθειστήκει τὴν τῶν πέλασ μὴ πείσαντας διεναι τοῖς τε Ἀθηναίοισ αἰεὶ ποτε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εὐνοῦν ὑπηρ.χεν. ὡστε εἰ μὴ δυναστεία μᾶλλον ἢ ἱσονομία ἑχρῶντο τὸ ἐγχώριον 1 οἱ Θεσσαλοὶ, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ προῆλθεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸτε πορευομένῳ αὐτῷ ἀπαντήσαντες ἀλλοι τῶν τάναντια τοῦτοι βουλομένων ἐπὶ τῷ Ἔνιπει ποταμῷ ἐκώλυνοι καὶ ἀδικεῖν ἐφα- σαι ἀνευ τοῦ πάντων κοινοῦ πορευόμενον. οἱ δὲ ἄγοντες οὔτε ἄκοντων ἐφασαν διάξειν, αἰφνίδιον τε παραγενόμενον ξένοι οὔτε κομίζειν. ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Βρασίδας τῇ Θεσσαλῶν γῇ καὶ αὐτοῖς φίλοις δὲν ἴεναι καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πολέμιοις οὔσι καὶ οὐκ ἐκεῖνοι ὅπλα ἐπιφέρειν, Θεσσαλοὶς τε οὐκ εἰδέναι καὶ Δακεδαμονίους ἑξῆραν οὕτων ὡστε τῇ ἄλλῃ γῇ μὴ χρήσθαι, νῦν τε ἄκοντων ἐκεῖνων οὐκ ἂν προελθεῖν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι), οὐ 5 μέντοι ἄξιοιν γε ἐϊργεσθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄκούσαντες ταύτα ἀπῆλθον· ὁ δὲ κελεύοντων τῶν ἀγωγῶν, πρίν τι πλέον ἔπιστήνη tale σκωλύσου, ἐχώρει οὐδὲν ἐπισχῶν δρόμῳ. καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἢ ἐκ

1 τὸ ἐγχώριον, Hude changes to ἐγχώριφ, after τῷ ἐγχώριφ of Dion. Hal.
friend of Perdiccas. Indeed, Thessaly was not in any case an easy country to traverse without an escort, and especially with an armed force; and among all the Hellenes alike to traverse the territory of neighbours without their consent was looked on with suspicion. Besides, the common people of Thessaly had always been well disposed to the Athenians. If, therefore, the Thessalians had not been under the sway of a few powerful men, as is usual in that country, rather than under a free democracy, Brasidas would not have made headway; even as it was, he was confronted on his march, when he reached the river Enipeus, by other Thessalians belonging to the opposite party. These tried to stop him, warning him that he was doing wrong in proceeding without the consent of the whole people. But his conductors reassured them, saying that, if they were unwilling, they would not conduct him further, and that they were merely playing the part of hosts in escorting an unexpected visitor. Brasidas himself explained that he came as a friend to Thessaly and its inhabitants and was bearing arms against the Athenians, who were enemies, and not against them; moreover, he was not aware of any such hostility between the Thessalians and the Lacedaemonians as to debar them from access to each other's territory, but if in this instance they were unwilling, he would go no further, nor indeed could he do so; he hoped, however, that they would not bar his progress. On hearing this the Thessalians departed; but Brasidas, taking the advice of his escort, before a larger force could be collected to hinder him, set out at full speed and without making any halt. In fact, he finished the journey to Pharsalus.
Τῆς Μελιτείας ἀφόρμησεν, ἐς Φάρσαλον τε ἐτέλεσε καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο ἐπὶ τῷ 'Απιδανῷ ποταμῷ, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐς Φάκιον, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐς Περραιβίαν.

6 ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου ἦδη οἱ μὲν Θεσσαλῶν ἀγωγοὶ πάλιν ἀπῆλθον, οἱ δὲ Περραιβῶν αὐτοῦ, ὑπήκουν ὀντες Θεσσαλῶν, κατέστησαν ἐς Δίον τῆς Περδίκκου ἀρχῆς, ὃ ὑπὸ τὸ Ὀλύμπῳ Μακεδονίας πρὸς Θεσσαλοὺς πόλισμα κῆται.

LXXIX. Τούτω τῷ τρόπῳ Βρασίδας Θεσσαλίαν φθάσας διέδραμε πρὶν τινα κωλύειν παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ ἀφίκετο ὡς Περδίκκαι καὶ ἐς 2 τὴν Χαλκιδικήν. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ὡς τὰ τῶν 'Αθηναίων ἦττυχεν, δείσαντες οἱ τε ἐπὶ Θράκης ἀφεστῶτες 'Αθηναίων καὶ Περδίκκας ἐξήγαγον τὸν στρατὸν, οἱ μὲν Χαλκιδής νομίζοντες ἐπὶ σφᾶς πρῶτον ὀρμήσειν τοὺς 'Αθηναίους (καὶ ἀμαί πλησιόχωροι πόλεις αὐτῶν αἰ δὲν ἄφεστηκυια ξυνητήγον κρύφα), Περδίκκας δὲ πολέμουσι μὲν οὐκ δὲν ἐκ τοῦ φαινοῦ, φοβοῦμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ παλαιὰ διάφορα τῶν 'Αθηναίων καὶ μάλιστα Βούλομενος Ἀρράβαιον τῶν Δυνη-

3 στῶν βασιλέα παραστήσασθαι. ξυνέβη δὲ αὐτοῦ ὡστε ρᾶν ο ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στρατὸν ἔξαγα-γεῖν, ἡ τῶν Δακεδαίμονιῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κακο-

LXXX. Τῶν γὰρ 'Αθηναίων ἐγκειμένων τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ οὐχ ἦκιστα τῇ ἐκείνων γῇ, ἥλπιζον ἀποτρέψειν αὐτοὺς μάλιστα, εἰ ἀντι-παραλυποίεν πέμψαντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους
on the same day on which he had set out from Meliteia, and encamped on the river Apidanus; thence he proceeded to Phacium, and from there to Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian escort at length turned back, and the Perrhaebians, who are subjects of the Thessalians, brought him safely to Dium in the dominions of Perdiccas, a small town in Macedonia at the foot of Mt. Olympus, facing Thessaly.

LXXIX. It was in this manner that Brasidas succeeded in rushing through Thessaly before anyone could get ready to hinder him and reached Perdiccas and the Chalcidian peninsula. The reason why the peoples in Thrace who had revolted from Athens had, in conjunction with Perdiccas, brought this army all the way from the Peloponnesus was that they were filled with alarm at the success of the Athenians. The Chalcidians thought that the Athenians would take the field against them first, and the cities in this neighbourhood which had not yet revolted nevertheless took part secretly in inviting the Peloponnesians to intervene. As for Perdiccas, although he was not yet openly hostile to Athens, he also was afraid of the long-standing differences between himself and the Athenians, and above all he was anxious to reduce Arrhabaeus, the king of the Lyncestians. A further circumstance which rendered it easier for them to procure an army from the Peloponnesus was the evil fortune which at the present time attended the Lacedaemonians.

LXXX. For since the Athenians kept harassing the Peloponnesians, and especially the territory of the Lacedaemonians, the latter thought that the best way of diverting them would be to retaliate by sending an army against their allies, especially since
αὐτῶν στρατιῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἑτοίμων ἄντων τρέφειν τε καὶ ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει σφᾶς ἐπικαλου-2 μένων. καὶ ἀμα τῶν Εἰλωτῶν βουλομένων ἢν ἐπὶ προφάσει ἐκπέμψαι, μὴ τι πρὸς τὰ παρόντα
3 τῆς Πύλου ἐχομένης νεωτερίσωσιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸδε ἔπραξαν φοβούμενοι αὐτῶν τὴν νεότητα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος (αἰεὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Δακεδαιμονίους πρὸς τοὺς Εἰλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι μάλιστα καθε-στηκεν), προεῖπον αὐτῶν ὅσοι ἄξιοι οὖν ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις γεγενήθαι σφίσιν ἀριστοὶ, κρίνεσθαι,
ὡς ἐλευθερώσουτες, πείραν ποιούμενοι καὶ ἡγού-
μένοι τούτους σφίσιν ὑπὸ φρονήματος, οὔπερ καὶ ἡξίωσαν πρῶτος ἐκαστὸς ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, μάλιστα
4 ἀν καὶ ἐπιθέσθαι. καὶ προκριβάντων ἐς δισχῖλιους
οἱ μὲν ἑστεφανώσαντό τε καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ περιήλθον ὡς ἡλευθερωμένοι, οὶ δὲ οὐ πολλῷ ὑστερον ἡμα-
σάν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ οὔδεις ἤσθετο ὡς τρόπῳ
5 ἐκαστὸς διεφθάρη. καὶ τότε προθύμως τῷ Βρασίδᾳ
αὐτῶν ἀνεπέμψαν ἐπτακοσίους ὀπλίτας, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μυσθῷ πείσας ἑξή-
γαγεν.

LXXXI. Αὐτὸν τε Βρασίδαν βουλόμενον ἡ
μάλιστα Δακεδαιμονίου ἀπέστειλαν (προθυμή-
θησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς), ἀνδρὰ ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ

1 βουλόμενον, with the MSS. Hude reads βουλόμενοι.
these allies were ready to maintain an army and were calling upon the Lacedaemonians for help in order that they might revolt. Furthermore, the Lacedaemonians were glad to have an excuse for sending out some of the Helots, in order to forestall their attempting a revolt at the present juncture when Pylos was in the possession of the enemy. Indeed, through fear of their youth and numbers—for in fact most of their measures have always been adopted by the Lacedaemonians with a view to guarding against the Helots—they had once even resorted to the following device. They made proclamation that all Helots who claimed to have rendered the Lacedaemonians the best service in war should be set apart, ostensibly to be set free. They were, in fact, merely testing them, thinking that those who claimed, each for himself, the first right to be set free would be precisely the men of high spirit who would be the most likely to attack their masters. About two thousand of them were selected and these put crowns on their heads and made the rounds of the temples, as though they were already free, but the Spartans not long afterwards made away with them, and nobody ever knew in what way each one perished. So, on the present occasion, the Spartans gladly sent with Brasidas seven hundred Helots as hoplites, the rest of his forces being drawn from the Peloponnesus by the inducement of pay.

LXXXI. As for Brasidas himself, the Lacedaemonians sent him chiefly at his own desire, though the Chalcidians also were eager to have him. He was a man esteemed at Sparta as being energetic in

1 Most MSS. read νεότης, B σκαλιότης, but some word meaning "boldness" or "recklessness" seems to be required. Hude adopts Widmann's conjecture καυβότης.
δοκοῦντα δραστήριον εἶναι ἐς τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐπεὶ δὴ ἔξηλθε πλείστου ἄξιον Λακεδαιμονίων γενόμενον. 2 τὸ τε γὰρ παρατίκα ἕτερον παρασχὼν δίκαιον καὶ μέτριον ἐς τὰς πόλεις ἀπέστησε τὰ πολλὰ, τὰ δὲ προδοσίᾳ εἶλε τῶν χωρίων, ὡστε τοῖς Λακε-
δαιμονίοις γέγνεθαι εὐμβαίνειν τε Βουλομένοις, ὅπερ ἐποίησαν, ἀνταπόδοσιν καὶ ἀποδοχὴν χωρίων καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου λόφησιν· ἐς τὸν χρόνῳ ὑστερον μετὰ τὰ ἔκ Σικελίας πόλεμον ἡ τότε Βρασίδου ἀρετὴ καὶ ἱσύνεσις, τῶν μὲν πείρας ἀισθομένων, τῶν δὲ ἀκόη νομισάντων, μάλιστα ἐπιθυμόμεν ἐνεποίη τοῖς Ἀθηναίων ξυμ-
3 μάχοις ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. πρῶτος γὰρ ἔξελ-
θὼν καὶ δόξας εἶναι κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθὸς ἐντείχι ἐγκατέλιπτε βέβαιον ός καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι εἶσιν.

LXXXII. Τότε δ’ οὖν ἀφικομένου αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης οἱ Ἀθηναίοι πυθόμενοι τὸν τε Περ-
δίκκαν πολέμιον ποιοῦνται, νομίσαντες αὕτιον εἶναι τῆς παρόδου, καὶ τῶν ταύτης ἐξουσίας φυλακῆς πλέονα κατεστησάντο. LXXXIII. Περ-
δίκκας δὲ Βρασίδαν καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν εὐθὺς λαβὼν μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως στρατεύει ἐπὶ Ἀρ-
ράβαιον τὸν Βρομεροῦ, Δυνκηστῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλέα, ὃμορον ὄντα, διαφορὰς τε αὐτῷ οὕσης ἐτὸς καὶ Βουλομένος καταστρέψασθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο τῷ στρατῷ μετὰ τοῦ Βρασίδου ἐπὶ τῇ ἐσβολῇ τῆς

352
everything he did, and indeed, after he had gone abroad, he proved invaluable to the Lacedaemonians. For, at the present crisis, by showing himself just and moderate in his dealings with the cities he caused most of the places to revolt, and secured possession of others by the treachery of their inhabitants, so that when the Lacedaemonians wished to make terms with Athens, as they did ultimately,\(^\text{1}\) they had places to offer in exchange for places they wished to recover and were able to secure for the Peloponnesus a respite from the war; and in the later part of the war, after the events in Sicily, it was the virtue and tact which Brasidas had displayed at this time—qualities of which some had had experience, while others knew of them by report—that did most to inspire in the allies of the Athenians a sentiment favourable to the Lacedaemonians. For since he was the first Lacedaemonian abroad who gained a reputation for being in all respects a good man, he left behind him a confident belief that the other Lacedaemonians also were of the same stamp.

LXXXII. On the arrival of Brasidas in Thrace at the time referred to,\(^\text{2}\) the Athenians, on hearing of it, declared Perdiccas an enemy, regarding him as responsible for his coming, and they established a stricter watch over their allies in that region. LXXXIII. But Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, and made an expedition against his neighbour Arrhabaeus, son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians; for he had a quarrel with him and wished to subdue him. But when he and Brasidas arrived with their combined armies at the pass leading

\(^1\) 421 B.C.; cf. v. xvii. \(^2\) cf. ch. lxxix. 1.
THUCYDIDES

Δύνκου, Βρασίδας ἐσ λόγους ἡ φη βούλεσθαι πρῶτον ἐλθὼν πρὸ πολέμου Ἀρράβαιον ξύμμαχον

3 Δακεδαίμονίων, ἢν δύνηται, ποιήσαι. καὶ γὰρ τι καὶ Ἀρράβαιος ἐπεκηρυκεύετο, ἐτοίμος ὁ Βρασίδας μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπεις καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδέων πρέσβεις ξυμπαρόντες ἔδιδασκον αὐτὸν μὴ ὑπεξ-ελείν τῷ Περδίκκα τὰ δεινά, ἵνα προθυμοτέρω

4 ἔχοιεν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἔαυτῶν χρήσθαι. ἀμα δέ τι καὶ ἐφήκεσαν τοιούτων οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Περδίκκου ἐν τῇ Δακεδαίμον, ὡς πολλὰ αὐτοῖς τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν χωρίων ξύμμαχα ποιήσοι, ὡστε ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου κοινῆ μάλλον ὁ Βρασίδας τὰ τοῦ Ἀρράβαιον

5 ἦξίου πράσσειν. Περδίκκας δὲ οὔτε δικαστὴν ἐφή Βρασίδαν τῶν σφετέρων διαφορῶν ἀγαγεῖν, μάλλου δὲ καθαίρετην ὡς ἀν αὐτῶς ἀποφαίνῃ πολεμίων, ἀδικήσειν τε εἰ αὐτοῦ τρέφοντος τὸ ἡμίσυ

6 τοῦ στρατοῦ ξυνεστάται Ἀρράβαιῳ. ὁ δὲ ἄκοντος καὶ ἐκ διαφορᾶς ξυγγίζεται, καὶ πεισθεὶς τοῖς λόγοις ἀπήγαγε τὴν στρατιὰν πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν χώραν. Περδίκκας δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο τρίτου μέρους ἀνθ' ἡμίσεος τῆς τροφῆς ἐδίδον, νομίζουν ἀδικεῖσθαι.

LXXXIV. 'Εν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει εὐθὺς ὁ Βρασίδας ἔχων καὶ Χαλκιδέας ἐπὶ Ἀκανθον τὴν Ἀνδρίων ἀποκινῶν ὅλιγον πρὸ τρυγήτου ἐστρά-

2 τινεσέν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ δέχεσθαι αὐτῶν κατ'

1 ἐσ λόγους, van Herwerden's correction for λόγοι of the MSS.

354
to Lynceus, Brasidas said that he wished, before appealing to arms, to have a conference with Arrhabaeus and make him an ally of the Lacedaemonians, if he could. For it seemed that Arrhabaeus had made some overtures and was ready to submit the question at issue to Brasidas’ arbitration; the Chalcidian envoys who were present also kept urging him not to remove the difficulties from the path of Perdiccas, since they wished to have in him a more zealous helper in their own affairs. Furthermore, the envoys of Perdiccas, when they were at Lacedaemon, had given a hint to the effect that he would bring many of the places in his neighbourhood into alliance with the Lacedaemonians; consequently Brasidas was inclined to insist upon having a freer hand in dealing with Arrhabaeus. But Perdiccas said that he had not brought Brasidas to be a judge of their quarrels, but rather to be a destroyer of any enemies whom he himself might designate, and that Brasidas would do wrong if, when he himself maintained half the army, he should parley with Arrhabaeus. But Brasidas, in spite of Perdiccas and after a quarrel with him, held the conference, and finding the king’s arguments convincing, withdrew his army without invading his country. After this Perdiccas contributed only a third instead of one-half of the maintenance, considering himself to be aggrieved.

LXXXIV. Immediately afterwards during the same summer and a short time before the vintage season, Brasidas took some Chalcidians in addition to his own force and made an expedition against Acanthus, the colony of the Andrians. But on the question of admitting him the Acanthians were
άλληλους ἐστασίαζον, οἳ τε μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδέων ἔννεπάγοντες καὶ ὁ δήμος. Ὑμως δὲ διὰ τοῦ καρποῦ τὸ δέος ἔτι ἔξω ὑντὸς πεισθέν τὸ πλήθος ὑπὸ τοῦ Βρασίδου δέξασθαι τε αὐτῶν μόνων καὶ ἀκούσαντες βουλεύσασθαι, δέχεται καὶ καταστάσει τὸ πλήθος (ὥν δὲ οὐδὲ ἀδύνατος, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιος, εἰπεῖν) ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

LXXXV. "Ἡ μὲν ἐκπεμψίς μου καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὁ Ἀκάνθιοι, γεγένηται τῇ αὐτίαν ἐπαληθεύουσα ἡν ἀρχόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου προείπομεν, Ἀθηναίοις εὐερεθρόντες 2 τῆς 'Ελλάδας πολεμήσειν· εἰ δὲ χρόνῳ ἐπήλθομεν, σφαλέντες τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰκεῖ πολέμου δόξης, ἦ διὰ τάχους αὐτοῦ ἄνευ τοῦ ύμετέρου κινδύνου ἡπίσαμεν Ἀθηναίοις καθαιρῆσειν, μηδεὶς μεμφῆ γνώριμο, ὅτε παρέσχεν, ἀφιγιμένοι καὶ μετὰ ύμῶν πειρασόμεθα κατεργάζεσθαι αὐτοὺς. 3 θαυμάζω δὲ τῇ τε ἀποκλήσει μου τῶν πυλῶν καὶ 4 εἰ μὴ ἀσμένοις ύμῖν ἀφίγιμαι. ἦμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οἴομεν τε παρὰ ξυμμάχους, καὶ πρὶν ἔργῳ ἀφικέσθαι, τῇ γοῦν γνώμη ἦξειν καὶ βουλομένοις ἐσεθῶς, κινδύνων τε τοσόνδε ἄνερριψαμεν διὰ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ὀδὸν ἰόντες καὶ πάν τοῦ πρόθυμον παρεσχόμεθα. 1 5 ύμεῖς δὲ εἰ τὸ ἄλλο ἐν νῷ ἔχετε ἢ εἰ ἐναυτιώσεσθε τῇ τε ύμετέρα αὐτῶν ἐλευθερία καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

1 Rutherford's correction for παρεχόμενοι of the MSS.
divided among themselves, on the one side being those who, in concert with the Chalcidians, asked him to intervene, and on the other side the popular party. However, when Brasidas urged them to admit him unattended and then, after hearing what he had to say, to deliberate on the matter, the populace consented, for they had fears concerning the grapes, which had not yet been gathered. So he came before the people—and indeed, for a Lacedaemonian, he was not wanting in ability as a speaker—and addressed them as follows:

LXXXV. "Citizens of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me and my army to prove the truth of what we proclaimed at the beginning to be the cause of the war, when we said that we were going to war with the Athenians for the liberation of Hellas. But if we have arrived late, disappointed as we have been with regard to the war at home, where we had hoped to destroy the Athenians quite speedily, by our own efforts and without involving you in the danger, do not blame us; for we are here now, having come as soon as opportunity offered, and together with you we shall try to subdue them. But I am amazed at the closing of your gates against me, and that my coming has been unwelcome to you. For we Lacedaemonians, thinking, even before we actually came, that we should find ourselves among men who were allies in spirit at least and that we should be welcomed, have hazarded the great danger of travelling a journey of many days through an alien territory and have shown all possible zeal. But if you have aught else in mind, or intend to stand in the way of your own freedom and that of the rest of the Hellenes, that would be

357
6 Ἐλλήνων, δεινὸν ἄν εἴη. καὶ γὰρ οὐχ ὅτι αὐτοῖς ἀνθίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἄν ἐπῆ, ἦσον τὸς ἐμὸν πρόσεισι, δυσχερὲς ποιοῦμενοι εἰ ἐπὶ οὐς πρῶτον ἠλθον ὑμᾶς, καὶ πόλιν ἁξίοχρεων παρεχομένως καὶ ξύνεσιν δοκοῦντας ἔχειν, μὴ ἐδέξασθε, καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐ δόξοι 1 πιστὴν ἀποδεικνύοι, ἀλλὰ ἡ ἄδικον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐπιφέρειν ἢ ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀδύνατος τιμωρῆσαι τὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίων, ἢν ἐπίσωσιν, ἀφίχθαι. καίτοι στρατιὰ γε τῇ ἡν χρ. ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν ἐμοῦ βοηθήσαντος οὐκ ἡθέλησαν Ἀθηναίοι πλέονες ὄντες προσμεῖξαι, ἦστε οὐκ εἰκὸς νηίτη 2 γε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἐν Νισαίᾳ 3 στρατῷ ἵσον πλῆθος ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς ἀποστεῖλαι.

LXXXVI. “Αὐτὸς τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ’ ἐλευθερώσει δὲ τῶν Ἐλλήνων παρελήλυθα, ὅρκωσι τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίων καταλαβῶν τὰ τέλη τοῖς μεγίστοις ἢ μὴ οὐς ἄν ἐγὼ προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους ἐσεθαί αὐτούμοιος, καὶ ἀμα οὐχ ἐναξυμμάχους ὑμᾶς ἐχομεν ἡ βία ἡ ἀπάτη προσλαβόμενες, ἀλλὰ τούναντιν υμῶν δεδουλωμένους ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων

2 ξυμμαχήσοντες. οὕκουν ἄξιῶν οὐτ’ αὐτὸς ὑποτεύεσθαι, πίστεις γε δίδους τὰς μεγίστας, οὔτε τιμωρὸς ἀδύνατος νομισθῆναι, προσχωρεῖν δὲ υμᾶς διερήσαντας.

3 “Καὶ εἰ τις ἵδια τινὰ δεδιώκ αρα, μὴ ἐγὼ τοις προσθῶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀπρόθυμός ἐστι, πάντων

1 Sauppe's correction for οὐχ ἔξω of the MSS.
2 So the MSS.; Hude emends to νηίτην.
3 For ἐν Νισαίᾳ Hude adopts ἐκεῖ, with E, against the other MSS.

358
monstrous. For it is not merely that you yourselves oppose me, but that all to whom I may apply will be less inclined to join me, raising the objection that you to whom I first came, representing as you do an important city and reputed to be men of sense, did not receive me. And it will seem that the reason which I give for your refusal is not to be believed, but that either the freedom I offered you is not honourable, or that when I came to you I was powerless and unable to defend you against the Athenians if they should attack you. And yet when I brought aid to Nisaea with the very army which I now have, the Athenians were unwilling, though superior in numbers, to engage us, so that they are not likely to send against you by sea a number equal to the armament they had at Nisaea.

LXXXVI. "As for myself, I have come here not to harm but to liberate the Hellenes, having bound the government of the Lacedaemonians by the most solemn oaths that in very truth those whom I should win as allies should enjoy their own laws; and further, we are come, not that we may have you as allies, winning you over either by force or fraud, but to offer our alliance to you who have been enslaved by the Athenians. I claim, therefore, that I ought not either myself to be suspected, offering as I do the most solemn pledges, or to be accounted an impotent champion, but that you should boldly come over to me.

"And if anyone, possibly, being privately afraid of somebody is half-hearted through fear that I may put the city into the hands of some party or

1 Or, reading ῥῶς ἔκλω, "And I shall have to submit to the charge of not being able to give a reason for your refusal that can be believed, but of offering, etc."
4 μάλιστα πιστευσάτω. οὐ γὰρ ξυστασιάσων ἢκω, οὔδὲ ἂν σαφῆ ¹ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, εἰ τὸ πάτριον παρεῖς τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς πάσι δουλώσαιμι.

5 χαλεπώτερα γὰρ ἂν τὴς ἀλλοφύλου ἀρχῆς εἶη, καὶ ἢμιν τοῖς Δακεδαιμόνιοις οὐκ ἂν ἄντι πόνων χάρις καθίστατο, ἀντὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης αὐτία μᾶλλον· οἶς τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήμασι καταπολεμοῦμεν, αὐτοῖ τὰν φαινοίμεθα ἐχθίονα.

6 ἢ ὁ μὴ ὑποδέξασα ἀρετὴν κατακτώμενοι. ἀπάτη γὰρ εὐπρεπεῖ αἶσχιν ² τοῖς γε ἐν ἀξιώματι πλεονεκτῆσαι ἢ βία ἐμφανεῖ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἵσχυς δικαίωσε, ἢν ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν, ἐπέρχεται, τὸ δὲ γνώμης ἀδίκου ἐπιβουλὴ. LXXXVII. οὔτω πολλὴν περιοπὴν τῶν ἡμίν ³ ἐς τὰ μέγιστα διαφόρων ποιούμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείζω πρὸς τοῖς ὦρκοις βεβαιῶσιν λάβοιτε, ἢ ⁴ οἰς τὰ ἔργα ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἀναθρούμενα δόκησιν ἀναγκαίαν παρέχεται ὡς καὶ ἔξυμφέρει ὀμοίως ὡς εἶπον.

2 “Εἰ δ’ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα προϊόσχομένου ἄδυνατοι μὲν φήσετε εἶναι, εὖν οἱ δ’ ὀντες ἄξιώσετε μὴ κακοῦλων διωθεῖσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν μὴ ἀκίνδυνον ὑμῖν φαίνεσθαι, δίκαιον τε εἶναι, οἷς καὶ δυνατὸν δέχεσθαι αὐτὴν, τούτοις καὶ ἐπιφέρειν, ἀκοντα δὲ

¹ ἂν σαφῆ, Bauer's correction for ἂσαφῆ of the MSS.
² Hude writes αἰσχιν τι, after Stobaeus.
³ Hude writes ὑμῖν, with Stahl. ⁴ Deleted by Hude.

360
other, \(^1\) let him most of all have confidence. For I am not come to join a faction, nor do I think that the freedom I am offering would be a real one if, regardless of your ancestral institutions, I should enslave the majority to the few or the minority to the multitude. That would be more galling than foreign rule, and for us Lacedaemonians the result would be, not thanks for our pains, but, instead of honour and glory, only reproach; and the very charges on which we are waging war to the death against the Athenians we should be found to be bringing home to ourselves in a more odious form than the power which has made no display of virtue. For it is more shameful, at least to men of reputation, to gain advantage by specious deceit than by open force; for the one makes assault by the assertion of power, which is the gift of fortune, the other by the intrigues of deliberate injustice. LXXXVII. Consequently we Lacedaemonians use great circumspection as regards matters that concern us in the highest degree \(^2\); and you could not get better security, in addition to our oaths, than where you have men whose actions scrutinized in the light of their professions furnish the irresistible conviction that their interests are indeed exactly as they have said.

"But if you meet these offers of mine with the plea that you cannot join us, but, because you are well-disposed to us, claim that you should not suffer by your refusal, and maintain that the liberty I offer seems to you to be not without its dangers, and that it is right to offer it to those who can receive it but not to force

\(^1\) i.e. the dreaded \(\delta\lambda\gamma\omicron\).  
\(^2\) Referring to Sparta's reputation for justice.
μηδένα προσαναγκάζειν, μάρτυρας μὲν θεούς καὶ ἦρως τοὺς ἐγχωρίους ποιήσομαι ὡς ἔπει ἀγαθῷ ἦκων οὐ πειθω, γῆν δὲ τὴν ὑμετέραν δῆον πειράζειν, καὶ οὐκ ἄδικεῖν ἔτι νομιό, προσεῖναι δὲ τί μοι καὶ κατὰ δύο ἀνάγκας τὸ εὐλογον, τῶν μὲν Δακεδαιμονίων, ὅπως μὴ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ εὐνῷ, εἰ μὴ προσαχθήσεσθε, τοῖς ἀπὸ ὑμῶν χρήμασι φερομένοις παρ' Ἀθηναίοις βλάπτωνται, οἱ δὲ "Ελληνες ἵνα μὴ κωλύωνται ὑφ' ὑμῶν δουλείασ ἀπαλλαγὴν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἰκότως ἡ ἄρη τάδε πράσσομεν, οὔδὲ ὁφείλομεν οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι μὴ κοινοὶ τίνος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτία τοὺς μὴ βοηλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν, οὐδ' αὐ ἀρχής ἐφιέμεθα, παῦσαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐτέρους σπεῦδοντες τοὺς πλείους ἀν ἄδικοίμεν, εἰ ἔμπασιν αὐτονομίαι ἐπιφέροντες ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐναντιομένους περιόδοιμεν.  

πρὸς ταῦτα βουλεύσασθε εὖ, καὶ ἀγωνίσασθε τοῖς τε Ἐλλησίων ἀρξαί πρῶτοι ἐλευθερίας καὶ ἀίδιον δόξαν καταθέσαι, καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰ τε ἱδια μὴ βλαφθῆναι καὶ ἕμπαρση τῇ πόλει τὸ κάλλιστον ὄνομα περιθεῖναι.

LXXXVIII. ὁ μὲν Βρασίδας τοσάττα εἶπεν. οἱ δὲ Ἀκάνθιοι, πολλῶν λεχθέντων πρότερον ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, κρύφα διαψηφίσαμεν, διὰ τὸ ἐπαγωγὰ εἰπεῖν τὸν Βρασίδαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ καρποῦ φόβῳ ἐγνωσαν οἱ πλείους ἀφίστασθαι Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ πιστώσαντες αὐτῶν τῶν ὀρκοὺς οὐς τὰ τέλη τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων ὁμόσαντα αὐτῶν ἐξέπεμψαν, ἡ μὴ ἔσεσθαι ἐμμάχοις αὐτούμοις
it on anyone against his will, I shall make the gods and heroes of your country my witnesses that, though I come for your good, I cannot persuade you, and I shall try, by ravaging your territory, to compel you; and in that case I shall not consider that I am doing wrong, but that I have some justification, for two compelling reasons: first, in the interest of the Lacedaemonians, that with all your professed goodwill toward them they may not, in case you shall not be brought over, be injured by the money you pay as tribute to the Athenians; secondly, that the Hellenes may not be prevented by you from escaping bondage. For otherwise we should not be justified in acting thus, nor are we Lacedaemonians bound, except on the plea of some common good, to confer liberty on those who do not wish it. Nor, again, are we seeking after empire, but rather we are eager to stop others from acquiring it; and we should do wrong to the majority, if, when we are bringing independence to all, we permitted you to stand in the way. In view of these things, deliberate wisely, and strive to be the first to inaugurate freedom for the Hellenes and to lay up for yourselves undying fame; thus you will save your own property from injury and confer upon your whole state the fairest name."

LXXXVIII. Such was the speech of Brasidas. But the Acanthians, after much had been said on both sides of the question, took a secret vote, and, on account of Brasidas' impassioned words and their fears about the harvest, the majority decided to revolt from the Athenians; then having bound him with the oaths which the authorities of the Lacedaemonians swore when they sent him out, namely, that those
οὖς ἂν προσαγάγηται, οὕτω δέχονται τὸν στρατὸν.
2 καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον καὶ Στάγμος Ἀνδρίων ἀποικία ξυναπέστη. ταύτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ θέρει τοῦτῳ ἐγένετο.

LXXXIX. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγυνημένου χειμώνος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου, ὡς τῷ Ἰπποκράτει καὶ Δημοσθένει στρατηγοῖς οὕσιν Ἀθηναίων τὰ ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς ἐνεδίδοτο καὶ ἔδει τοὺς μὲν Δημοσθένη ταῖς ναυσίν ἐς τὰς Σίφας ἀπαντῆσαι, τὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον, γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐς ὡς ἔδει ἀμφότεροι στρατεύειν, ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης πρὸς τοὺς Πλεύσας πρὸς τὰς Σίφας καὶ ἔχων ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν Ἀκαρνάνως καὶ τῶν ἐκεί πολλοὺς ξυμμάχων, ἀπρακτός γίγνεται μηνυθέντος τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύματος ὑπὸ Νικομάχου, ἀνδρὸς Φωκέως ἐκ Φανοτέως, ὁς Δακεδαμονιός εἶπεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ 2 Βοιωτοῖς· καὶ βοηθείας γενομένης πάντων Βοιωτῶν (οὐ γὰρ τῷ Ἰπποκράτης παρελύπει ἐν τῇ γῆ ὄν) προκαταλαμβάνονται αἳ τε Σίφαι καὶ Ἡ Χαιρώνεια. ὡς δὲ ἀσθοντο οἱ πράσαυστες τὸ ἀμάρτημα, οὐδὲν ἐκίνησαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

XC. Ὁ δὲ Ἰπποκράτης ἀναστήσας Ἀθηναίους πανδημεῖ, αὐτοῦς καὶ τοὺς μετοικοὺς καὶ ξένων ὅσοι παρῆσαν, ὕστερος ἀφικνεῖται ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον, ἦδη τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀνακεχωρηκτῶν ἀπὸ τῶν Σιφῶν· καὶ καθίσας τὸν στρατὸν Δήλιον ἐτείχιξε 2 τοιῷδε τρόπῳ. 1 τάφρον μὲν κύκλῳ πέρι τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν ἱερὸν ἐσκαπτοῦν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὄρυγματος ἀνέβαλλον ἀντὶ τείχους τῶν χοῦν, καὶ σταυρόισ

1 τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος, after τρόπῳ in the MSS., deleted by Dobree.
BOOK IV. LXXVIII. 1–XC. 2

whom he might win over should be autonomous allies, they finally received the army. And not long afterwards Stagirus,¹ a colony of the Andrians, joined in the revolt. Such then, were the events of that summer.

LXXXIX. At the very beginning of the following winter,² when the places in Boeotia were to be delivered to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, Demosthenes was to have been present with his ships at Siphae, the other general at Delium. But a mistake was made as to the days when both were to start, and Demosthenes sailed too soon to Siphae, having Acarnanians and many allies from that region on board, and so proved unsuccessful; for the plot had been betrayed by Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians. Accordingly succour came from all the Boeotians—for Hippocrates was not yet in their country to annoy them—and both Siphae and Chaeroneia were occupied in advance; and the conspirators, learning of the mistake, attempted no disturbance in the towns.

XC. Meanwhile Hippocrates levied all the forces of Athens, both citizens and resident aliens, and such foreigners as were in the city. But he arrived at Delium too late, after the Boeotians had already withdrawn from Siphae. Then, after settling his army in camp, he proceeded to fortify Delium in the following manner. They dug a ditch round the temple and the sacred precinct and threw up the earth from the ditch to serve for a wall, fixing stakes along

¹ About twelve miles north of Acanthus, known also as Stageira, the birthplace of Aristotle.
² Resumption of the narrative of ch. lxxix.
παρακαταπηγνύντες ἁμπελοῦ κόπτοντες τὴν περὶ
tὸ ἱερὸν ἐσέβαλλον καὶ λέθους ἁμα καὶ πλυνθοῦν
ἐκ τῶν οἰκοπέδων τῶν ἔγγυς καθαροῦντες, καὶ
παυτὶ τρόπῳ ἐμετεώριζον τὸ ἔρυμα. πύργους τε
ξυλίνους κατέστησαν ὡς καίρος ἤν καὶ τὸν ἱερὸν
οἰκοδόμημα οὐδὲν ὑπῆρχεν ἡπερ γὰρ ἤν στοὰ
3 κατεπετώκει. ἡμέρα δὲ ἀρξάμενοι τρίτη ὡς
οἰκοθεν ὄρμησαν ταύτην τε εἰργάζοντο καὶ τὴν
4 τετάρτην καὶ τῆς πέμπτης μέχρι ἄριστου. ἑπειτα,
ὡς τὰ πλεῖστα ἀπετετέλεστο, τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον
προσεχώρησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Δηλίου οἶνον δέκα
σταδίους ὡς ἐπ’ οἶκον πορευόμενον, καὶ οἱ μὲν
ψιλοὶ οἱ πλείστοι εὐθὺς ἔχωρουν, οἱ δὲ ὄπλαι
tέμενοι τὰ ὅπλα ἥσυχαζον. Ἡπτοκράτης δὲ
ὑπομένων ἐτε καθίστατο φυλακάς τε καὶ τὰ περὶ
τὸ προτείχισμα, ὡς ἦν ὑπόλοιπα, ὡς χρῆν
ἐπιτελέσαι.

ΧΣΙ. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ταῦταις
ξυνελέγοντο ἐς τὴν Τάναγραν καὶ ἑπειδὴ,
ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων παρῆσαν καὶ ὑσθά-
νυντο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους προχωροῦντας ἐπ’ οἴκου,
tῶν ἄλλων Βοιωταρχῶν, οἱ εἰσὶν ἑνδεκα, οὐ
ξυνεπαυνοῦντων μάχεσθαι, ἑπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν τῇ
Βοιωτία ἐτε εἰς (μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς
Ὀρωτίας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὤσαν, ὅτε ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα),
Παγώνδας ὁ Αἰολάδου βοιωταρχὸς ἐκ Ἐθῆδων
μετ’ Ἀριανθίδου τοῦ Δυσιμαχίδου καὶ ἥγεμονίας
οὗσης αὐτοῦ βουλομένος τὴν μάχην ποιήσαι καὶ
νομίζων ἁμείναι κινδυνεύσαι, προσκαλῶν
ἐκάστους κατὰ λόχους, ὅπως μὴ ἄθροι ἐκλίπωιν
tὰ ὅπλα, ἑπειθε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἴναι ἐπὶ τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸν ἄγώνα ποιεῖσθαι, λέγων τοιάδε.
it; and cutting down the grape-vines round the sanctuary, they threw them in, as well as stones and bricks from the neighbouring homesteads which they pulled down, and in every way strove to increase the height of the fortification. Wooden towers, too, were erected wherever there was occasion for them and no temple-structure was ready to hand; for the cloister that once existed had fallen down. Beginning on the third day after they started from home, they worked that day and the fourth and until dinner-time on the fifth. Then, when most of it had been finished, the main body withdrew from Delium about ten stadia on their way home; and most of the light-armed troops went straight on, while the hoplites grounded arms and halted there. Hippocrates, however, remained behind and was busy posting pickets and arranging to complete whatever was unfinished about the outwork.

XCI. But during these days the Boeotians were gathering at Tanagra; and when they had come in from all the cities and perceived that the Athenians were going home, the rest of the eleven Boeotarchs disapproved of fighting, as the enemy were no longer in Boeotia—for the Athenians were just about on the borders of Oropia when they halted. But Pagondas son of Aeolidas, who, with Arianthidas son of Lysimachidas, was Boeotarch from Thebes and then in chief command, wishing to bring on the battle and thinking it was better to take the risk, called the men by companies one after another, that they might not leave their arms all at once, and tried to persuade the Boeotians to go against the Athenians and bring on the contest, speaking as follows:
THUCYDIDES

ΧΣΠ. "Χρήν μέν, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Βοιωτοῖς, μηδ' ἐστὶ
ἐπίνοιαν τινὰ ἡμῶν ἔλθειν τῶν ἀρχόντων ὡς οὐκ
εἴκος Ἀθηναίοις, ὃν ἄρα μὴ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ ἔτη
καταλάβωμεν αὐτοὺς, διὰ μάχης ἔλθειν. τὴν
γὰρ Βοιωτίαν ἐκ τῆς ὁμόρου ἔλθοντες τείχος
ἐνοικοδομησάμενοι μέλλουσι φθείρειν, καὶ εἰς
dήπον πολέμοι ἐν ὧ τε ἦν χωρίῳ καταληφθὼσι
2 καὶ ὅθεν ἐπελθόντες πολέμια ἔδρασαν. νυνὶ δὲ
εἰ τῷ καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ἔδοξεν εἶναι, μετα-
γνωτόν. οὐ γὰρ τὸ προμηθὲς, οἷς ἂν ἄλλος ἐπίθη,
περὶ τῆς σφετέρας ὁμοίως ἐνδέχεται λογισμὸν καὶ
όστις τὰ μὲν ἐαυτὸν ἔχει, τοῦ πλείονος δὲ ὀρεγώ-
3 μενος ἐκῶν τινὶ ἐπέρχεται. πάτριον τε ύμῖν
στρατὸν ἀλλόφυλον ἐπελθόντα καὶ ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ
καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πέλας ὁμοίως ἀμύνεσθαι Ἀθη-
ναίους δὲ καὶ προσέτι ὁμόρους ὄντας πολλῶ
4 μάλιστα δει. πρὸς τε γὰρ τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας
πάσι τὸ ἀντίπαλον καὶ ἔλευθερον καθίσταται, καὶ
πρὸς τούτους ἕνεκα δὴ, οἷς καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐγγὺς, ἄλλα
καὶ τοὺς ἀποδεχόσαντες δουλοῦσθαι, πῶς οὐ
χρή καὶ ἔπι τὸ ἐσχατὸν ἀγώνοις ἔλθειν (παρά-
δειγμα δὲ ἐξομεν τοὺς τὰς ἀντιπέρας Εὐβοῖας καὶ
τῆς Ἀλλης Ἔλλαδος τὸ πολὺ ὡς αὐτοῖς διάκειται),
καὶ γνώναι ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις οἱ πλησιόχωροι
περὶ γὰρ ἄρον τὰς μάχας ποιοῦνται, ἡμῖν δὲ ἐς
πᾶσαν, ἣν νικηθῶμεν, εἰς ὁροὺς οὐκ ἀντιλεκτος
παγήσεσθαι ἐπελθόντες γὰρ βία τὰ ἡμέτερα
5 ἐξουσιών. τοσούτῳ ἐπικινδυνοτέραν ἐπέρων τὴν

1 Duker's correction for τούτους of the MSS.
BOOK IV. xiii. 1–5

XCII. "It should never, men of Boeotia, have even entered the mind of any of us who are in command that we ought not to come to battle with the Athenians unless we should overtake them while still on Boeotian soil. For it was to ravage Boeotia that they came from across the frontier and built a fort in our territory, and they are assuredly equally our enemies wherever they may be caught, and especially on that soil from which they advanced to do the work of enemies. But as matters stand, if anyone did indeed think that course safer, let him change his mind. For where men are attacked prudence does not admit of such nice calculation regarding their own land as is permitted to those who, secure in their own possessions, in their greed for more wantonly attack others. Furthermore, it is hereditary with you when an alien army comes against you to ward it off, alike in your own land and in that of your neighbours; and most of all when the invaders are Athenians and moreover upon your borders. For in dealing with neighbours, it is always equality of force that guarantees liberty; and when the contest is against men like these, who are trying to enslave not only those near by but those far away, is it not necessary to fight to the very last? We have as a warning example their policy toward the Euboeans across the strait as well as toward the greater part of Hellas, and must realize that, whereas others make war with their neighbours about territorial boundaries, for us, if we are conquered, one boundary beyond dispute will be fixed for our whole land; for they will come and take by force all that we have. So much more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians
παροίκησιν τούνδε ἔχομεν. εἰώθασί τε οἱ ἰσχύοι ποι θράσει τοῖς πέλας, ὡσπερ Ἀθηναίοι νῦν, ἐπίοντες τὸν μὲν ἁσυχαζοῦντα καὶ ἐν τῇ έαυτοῦ μόνον ἀμυνόμενον ἀδεεστερον ἐπιστρατεύειν, τὸν δὲ ἔξω ὅρων προαπαντώντα καὶ, ἢν καιρὸς ἦ, 6 πολέμου ἁρχοῦντα ἥσσον ἐτοίμος κατέχειν. πείραν δὲ ἔχομεν ἡμεῖς αὐτοῦ ἐς τούσδε νικήσαντες γὰρ ἐν Κορωνείᾳ αὐτούς, ὅτε τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν στασιαζοῦντων κατέσχον, πολλὴν ἀδειαν τῇ 7 Βοιωτία ἡμέρα τοῦτο κατεστῆσαμεν. ὡν χρή μηνθεώνας ἡμᾶς τούς τε προσβυτέρους ὅμοιο- θήναι τοῖς πριν ἔργοις, τοὺς τε νεοτέρους πατέρων τῶν τότε ἁγαθῶν γενομένων παῖδας πειραζέων μὴ αἰσχῦναι τὰς προσηκούσας ἀρετάς, πιστεύσαντας δὲ τῷ θεῷ πρὸς ἡμῶν ἐσεθεῖν, οὐ τὸ ἱερὸν ἀνόμως τειχίσαντες νέμονται, καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἡ ἡμῶν ὑπαμένων καλὰ φαίνεται, ὁμοίως χωρὶς τοῖς δὲ δείξαι ὅτε ὁ μὲν ἐφίενται πρὸς τοὺς μὴ ἀμυνόμενους ἐπίοντες κτάσθων, οἷς δὲ γενναίον τὴν τε αὐτῶν αἰεὶ ἐλευθεροῦν μάχη καὶ τὴν ἄλλων μὴ δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως, ἀναπάγωνιστοι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπίασιν.”

XCIPII. Τοιαῦτα ὁ Παγώνδας τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς παρανεσάς ἐπεισεν ἵναι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. καὶ κατὰ τάχος ἀναστήσας ἢγε τὸν στρατόν (ἤδη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ὅψε ἦν), καὶ ἐπειδὴ προσε- μείξαν ἐγγὺς τοῦ στρατεύματος αὐτῶν, ἐς χωρίον καθίσας ὀθεὶν λόφου ὅντος μεταξὺ οὐκ ἐθέωρουν ἄλληλους, ὑτασσέ τε καὶ παρεσκευάζετο ὡς ἐς

370
than that of others. Besides, people who in the confidence of strength attack their neighbours, as the Athenians now do, are wont to march more fearlessly against one who keeps quiet and defends himself only in his own land, but are less ready to grapple with him who meets them outside of his own boundaries and, if opportunity offers, makes the first attack. We have a proof of this in these Athenians; for at Coronea, 1 when owing to our internal dissensions they had occupied our land, we defeated them and won for Boeotia great security which has lasted to this day. Remembering these things, let the older men among us emulate their former deeds, and the younger, sons of fathers who then were brave, try not to disgrace the virtues which are their heritage. Trusting that the god whose sanctuary they have impiously fortified and now occupy will be on our side, and relying on the sacrifices, which appear to be propitious to us, who have offered them, let us advance to meet them and show that if they would get what they covet they must attack those who will not defend themselves, but that men whose noble spirit impels them always to fight for the liberty of their own land and not to enslave that of others unjustly will never let them depart without a battle."

XCIII. With such exhortations Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to attack the Athenians, then quickly broke camp and led on his army, for it was already late in the day. When he drew near their army he halted at a place from which, because of an intervening hill, the two armies could not see each other, and there drew up and prepared for battle.

1 447 B.C.; cf. i. cxiii. 2; iii. lxii. 5.
2 μάχην. τῷ δὲ Ἰπποκράτει ὁντι περὶ τὸ Δήλιον ὡς αὐτῷ ἡγγέλθη ὅτι Βοιωτοὶ ἐπέρχονται, πέμπει ἐς τὸ στράτευμα κελεύων ἐς τάξιν καθίστασθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐπῆλθε, καταλαμψὼν ὡς τριακοσίους ἵππες περὶ τὸ Δήλιον, ὅπως φύλακες τε ἀμα εἶεν, εἰ τις ἐπί οὐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς καὶ τῷ φυλάξαντες ἐπιγένοντο ἐν τῇ
3 μάχῃ. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ πρὸς τούτους ἀντικατέστησαν τοὺς ἀμνομένους, καὶ ἔπειδη καλῶς αὐτοῖς εἴχεν, ὑπερεφάνησαν τοῦ λόφου καὶ ἔθεντο τὰ ὁπλα τεταγμένοι ὡσπερ ἐμελλον, ὡπλιται ἐπτακισχίλιοι μάλιστα καὶ ψυλοὶ ὑπὲρ μυρίων ἵππης ὀ μίλιοι καὶ πελτασταί πεντακόσιοι.
4 εἴχον δὲ δεξιῶν μὲν κέρας Θηβαίοι καὶ οἱ ξύμπιροι αὐτοῖς· μέσοι δὲ ᾽Αλιάρτιοι καὶ Κορωναίοι καὶ Κωπαεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄλοι οὶ περὶ τὴν λίμνην· τὸ δὲ εὐφώνιον εἴχον Θεσπιῆς καὶ Ταναγραίοι καὶ Ὁρχομενοί. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ κέρα ἐκατέρῳ οἱ ἵππης καὶ ψυλοὶ ἔσαν. ἐπὶ ἀσπίδας δὲ πεντε μὲν καὶ εἰκοσὶ Θηβαίοι ἐτάξαντο, οἱ δε ἄλλοι ὡς 5 ἐκαστοί ἐτυχον. αὕτη μὲν Βοιωτῶν παρασκευὴ καὶ διάκοσμος ἦν.

XCIV. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ οἱ μὲν ὡπλιται ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ πάν τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐτάξαντο οὔτε πλήθει ἵσταλεῖ τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἵππης δὲ ἐφ' ἐκατέρῳ τῷ κέρα. ψυλοὶ δὲ ἐκ παρασκευῆς μὲν ὡπλισμένοι οὔτε τὸ τα παρῆσαν οὔτε ἔγενοντο τῇ πόλην· οὔπερ δὲ ἐνεσέβαλον, οὔτε πολλαπλάσioi τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀοπλοὶ τε πολλοὶ ἠμιλουθησαν, ἀτε πανδρατίας ἔσων τῶν παρόντων ἢν.

1 Hude inserts ἦτι before οὗτι, with Rutherford, and deletes αὐτῷ before ἡγγέλθη, with Krüger. 2 Deleted by Hude.
Meanwhile Hippocrates, who was at Delium, on being informed that the Boeotians were coming on, sent orders to the army to fall in line, and himself not long afterwards joined them, leaving about three hundred cavalry at Delium, to guard it in case of attack and also to watch for an opportunity to fall upon the Boeotians in the course of the battle. But the Boeotians set a detachment to ward these off. Then when everything was ready they appeared over the hill and halted, drawn up in the order in which they were to fight, about seven thousand hoplites, over ten thousand light-armed troops, one thousand cavalry, and five hundred peltasts. On the right were the Thebans and their allies; in the centre the Haliartians, Coroneans, Copaeans, and the other people around the lake;¹ on the left the Thespians, Tanagraeans and Orchomenians. On either wing were the cavalry and the light-armed troops. The Thebans were marshalled in ranks twenty-five shields deep, the rest as chance directed in each case. Such were the preparations of the Boeotians and their order of battle.

XCV. On the Athenian side the whole body of hoplites, who were equal in number to those of the enemy, were marshalled eight deep, and the cavalry on either wing. But light-armed troops, regularly armed, were neither then present, nor did the city possess any; but such lighter forces as had joined in the invasion, while they were many times more numerous than the enemy, followed in large part without arms, as there had been a levy in mass of strangers that were in Athens as well as of citizens;

¹ Lake Copais.
καὶ ἀστῶν γενομένης, καὶ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὁμηρήσαν
2 ἐπ' οἶκου, οὐ παρεγένοντο ὅτι μὴ ὅλγοι. καθε-
στῶτοι δὲ ἐς τὴν τάξιν καὶ ἦδη μελλόντων
ξυνιέναι, Ἰπποκράτης ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπιταρών τὸ
στρατόπεδον τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεκκελεύετο τε καὶ
ἐλεγε τοιάδε.

XCV. "Ὄ Αθηναῖοι, δι' ὅλγων μὲν ἡ παραί-
νεσις γίγνεται, τὸ ἱσον δὲ πρὸς ὑπὸ τῶν ἁγαθῶς ἀνδρῶν
dύναται καὶ ὑπόμνησιν μᾶλλον ἐξει ἡ
2 ἐπικελευσιν. παραστῇ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑμῶν ὡς ἐν τῇ
ἀλλοτρίᾳ οὐ προσήκου τοσόνδε κίνδυνον ἀναρρι-
pτούμεν. ἐν γὰρ τῇ τούτων ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ὁ
ἀγῶν ἔσται καὶ ἢν νυκήσωμεν, οὐ μὴ ποτὲ ὑμῖν
Πελοποννησίου ἐσ τὴν χώραν ἀνευ τῆς τῶν
tίππου ἐσβάλωσιν, ἐν δὲ μᾶ ἁ χάγα τής τε
προσκάσθε καὶ ἐκείνην μᾶλλον ἔλευθερούτε.
3 χωρήσατε οὖν ἄξιως ἐς αὐτούς τῆς τε πόλεως,
ἡν ἐκαστος πατρίδα ἔχων πρώτην ἐν τοῖς Ἐλλη-
νίσιν ἀγάλλεται, καὶ τῶν πατέρων, οἱ τοῦς μᾶχῃ
κρατοῦντες μετὰ Μυρωνίδου ἐν Οἰνοφύτου τῇ
Βοιωτίαν ποτὲ ἔσχον."

XCVI. Τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἰπποκράτους παρακε-
λευμένον καὶ μέχρι μὲν μέσου τοῦ στρατοπέδου
ἐπελθόντος, τὸ δὲ πλέον οὐκέτι φθάσαντο, οἱ
Βοιωτοὶ, παρακελευμένοι καὶ σφίσιν ὡς διὰ
tαχέων καὶ ἐνταῦθα Παγόνδου, παιανίσαντες
ἐπῆσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου. ἀντεπῆσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ
2 Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ προσέμειζαν δρόμω. καὶ ἔκατον
τῶν στρατοπέδων τὰ ἐσχάτα ὁμ ἠθεῖν ἐς χεῖρας,
ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπαθεῖν ῥύκακες γὰρ ἐκώλυσαν.
τὸ δὲ ἄλλο καρτερὰ μάχῃ καὶ ὥθισμῳ ἄσπιδων
3 ξυνειστήκει. καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον τῶν Βοιωτῶν
374
and, having once started homewards, they were not present at the action, except a few. When they were arranged in line and were about to engage, Hippocrates the general, passing along the Athenian line, exhorted them and spoke as follows:

XCV. “Men of Athens, my exhortation will not be long, but to brave men it will mean as much, and will be a reminder rather than an appeal. Let none of you think that because we are on foreign soil it is without cause that we are hazarding this great danger. For though the contest is on Boeotian soil, it will be in defence of our own; and, if we win, the Peloponnesians, deprived of the Boeotian cavalry, will never again invade your territory, and in one battle you not only win this land but make more sure the freedom of your own. Advance to meet them, therefore, in a spirit worthy both of that state, the foremost in Hellas, which every one of you is proud to claim as his fatherland, and of the fathers who under Myronides vanquished these men at Oenophyta,¹ and became at one time masters of Boeotia.”

XCVI. Hippocrates was thus exhorting his men and had got as far as the centre of the army, but no further, when the Boeotians, after they too had again been briefly harangued by Pagondas, raised the paean and came on from the hill. And the Athenians also advanced against them and met them on a run. The extremities of the line on either side never came to close quarters, for both had the same difficulty—they were hindered by swollen torrents. The rest were engaged in stubborn conflict, with shield pressed against shield. And the Boeotian left, as

¹ 456 B.C.
καὶ μέχρι μέσου ἡσσάτο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἁθηναίων, καὶ ἐπιέσαν τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταύτη καὶ οὐχ ἦκιστα τοὺς Θεσπιᾶς. ὑποχωρησάντων γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν παρατεταγμένων καὶ κυκλωθέντων ἕν ὀλίγῳ, οὕτε διεξήγαγαν Θεσπιῶν, ἐν χεραὶ ἀμφό- μενοι κατεκόπησαν· καὶ τίνες καὶ τῶν Ἁθηναίων διὰ τὴν κύκλωσιν παραχθέντες ἡγνόθεν τε καὶ ἀπέκτειναν ἀλλήλους. τὸ μὲν οὖν ταύτη ἡσσάτο τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μαχόμενον κατέφυγε, τὸ δὲ δεξιόν, ἥ εἰ Θηβαίοι ἦσαν, ἐκράτει τῶν Ἁθηναίων καὶ ἡσσάμενοι κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ πρὸτον ἐπηκολούθουσαν. καὶ ξυνέβη, Παγώνδου περπέμ- ψαντος δύο τέλη τῶν ἰππέων ἐκ τοῦ ἁφανοῦς περί τὸν λόφον, ὡς ἔπονε τὸ εὐώνυμον αὐτῶν, καὶ ὑπερφανεῖνων αἰφνιδίως, τὸ νικών τῶν Ἁθηναίων κέρας, νομίσαν ἀλλο στρατεύματα ἐπιέναι, ἐς φόβον καταστήματε καὶ ἀμφοτέρως παῖ θητη, ὑπὸ τε τοῦ τιούτου καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων ἐφεσμένων καὶ παραρρηγηφής, φυγῇ καθει- στήκει παντὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ τῶν Ἁθηναίων. καὶ οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὸ Δηλίων τε καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν  ἄρρησαν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὀρωποῦ, ἄλλοι δὲ πρὸς Πάρνηθα τὸ ὄρος, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐκαστοὶ τινα εἶχον ἀλλήλους. τὸ μὲν οὖν ταύτη ἡσσάτο τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ Θῆσπιαν καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ὄρρησαν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὀρωποῦ, ἄλλοι δὲ πρὸς Πάρνηθα τὸ ὄρος, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐκαστοὶ τινα εἶχον ἔπιδα σωτηρίας. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ ἐφεσμένοι ἐκτείνουν, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἱππητέοι τε αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ Δοκρός, βεβοηθηκότες ἠρτι θῆς τροπῆς γεγομένης· νυκτὸς δὲ ἐπιλαβοῦσα τὸ ἐργὸν ῥαῦν το θλῆθος τῶν φευγόντων διεσώθη· καὶ τῇ ὑστερὰ οἱ οἱ εἰς τὸν Ὀρωποῦ καὶ οἱ οἱ Δηλίου φαινὴν ἐγκαταλιπόντες (εἶχον γὰρ αὐτὸ ὁμοὶς ἐτί) ἀπεκομίσθησαν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπ’ οἶκον.

1 Krüger’s correction for κυκλωθέντων of the MSS.
far as the centre, was worsted by the Athenians, who pressed hard upon all the rest in that quarter, and especially upon the Thespians. For when they saw that the ranks on either side had given way and that they were surrounded, those of the Thespians who perished were cut down fighting hand to hand. And some also of the Athenians, getting into confusion owing to their surrounding the enemy, mistook and killed one another. Here, then, the Boeotians were defeated and fled to the part of their army which was still fighting; but the right wing, where the Thebans were, had the better of the Athenians, and pushing them back step by step at first followed after them. It happened also that Pagondas, when their left was in distress, sent two squadrons of cavalry round the hill from a point out of sight, and when these suddenly appeared, the victorious wing of the Athenians, thinking that another army was coming on, was thrown into a panic. At this time, consequently, owing both to this manœuvre\textsuperscript{1} and to the Thebans following them up and breaking their line, a rout of the whole Athenian army ensued. Some hastened to Delium and the sea, others toward Oropus, others to Mt. Parnes, others wherever each had any hope of safety. And the Boeotians, especially their cavalry and that of the Locrians who had come up just as the rout began, followed after and slew them; but when night closed down upon the action the mass of the fugitives escaped more easily. On the next day the troops from Oropus and those from Delium, leaving a garrison at the latter place, which they still held, were conveyed home by sea.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} i.e. the attack of the two squadrons of cavalry.

\textsuperscript{2} It is interesting to know that Socrates fought in the battle of Delium and saved Alcibiades’ life (Plato, \textit{Symp.} 221 e).
ΧCVII. Καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοί τροπαίουν στῆσαντες καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀνελόμενοι νεκροὺς τοὺς τε τῶν πολεμίων σκυλεύσαντες καὶ φυλακὴν καταληκτὸν ἄνεχῶρησαν ἐς τὴν Τάναγραν, καὶ τῷ 2 Δηλίῳ ἐπεβούλευον ὡς προσβαλόντες. ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυξ πορευόμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἁπανταὶ κήρυκε Βοιωτῷ, ὃς αὐτὸν ἀποστρέψας καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐδὲν πράξει πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸς ἀναχώρησῃ πάλιν, καταστὰς ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τὰ παρὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν, ὅτι οὐ δικαίως δράσειαν παραβαινοντες τὰ νόμιμα τῶν 3 Ἐλλήνων πάσι γὰρ εἶναι καθεστηκὸς ἱόντας ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἰερῶν τῶν ἔνοικων ἀπέχεσθαι, Ἀθηναίους δὲ Δηλίου τειχίσαντας ἕνοικεῖν, καὶ ὥσα ἀνθρωποι ἐν βεβήλῳ δρῶσι πάντα γίγνεσθαι αὐτῶθι, ὡδὲ τε ὅ ἢν ἁγαυστὸν σφίσι πλὴν πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ χέρνιβι χρῆσθαι, ἀνασπάσαντας ὑδρεύ- 4 εσθαν ὡστε ύπέρ τε τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἑαυτῶν Βοιωτῶν, ἐπικαλουμένους τοὺς ὁμοχέτας δαίμονας καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλων, προαγορεύειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀπίοντας ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν.

ΧCVIII. Τοσαῦτα τοῦ κήρυκος εἴποντος οἱ Ἀθηναίοι πέμψαντες παρὰ τοὺς Βοιωτῶν ἑαυτῶν κήρυκα τοῦ μὲν ἱεροῦ οὔτε ἀδικήσαι ἔφασαν οὐδὲν οὔτε τοῦ λοιποῦ ἐκόντες βλάψειν οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἄρχην ἐσελθεῖν ἐπὶ τούτω, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοὺς 2 ἀδικοῦντας μᾶλλον σφᾶς ἀμύνωνται. τὸν δὲ
XCVII. The Boeotians set up a trophy and took up their own dead; then, having stripped the dead of the enemy and left a guard over them, they retired to Tanagra, and there planned an assault upon Delium. Meanwhile a herald from Athens, coming to ask for their dead, met a Boeotian herald, who turned him back, telling him he would accomplish nothing until he himself returned. The latter then came before the Athenians and gave them the message from the Boeotians: that they had not done right in transgressing the usages of the Hellenes; for it was an established custom of them all, when invading one another’s country to abstain from the sanctuaries therein, whereas the Athenians had fortified Delium and now dwelt in it, doing there whatsoever men do in a profane place, even drawing for common use the water which was untouched by themselves except for use in lustrations connected with the sacrifices. Wherefore the Boeotians, in behalf of the god and of themselves, invoking the deities worshipped at the common altars and also Apollo, gave them notice to come out themselves from the temple and carry off what belonged to them.

XCVIII. When the herald had spoken, the Athenians sent a herald of their own to the Boeotians, saying that they had done no injury to the temple, and would not damage it wilfully in the future; for they had not entered it at the outset with any such intent, but rather that from it they might defend themselves against those who were wronging them. And the law of the

1 i.e. to the Boeotian camp from the Athenian, to which he was carrying a message.  
2 i.e. their dead.
νόμον τούς Ἐλλησίων εἶναι, ὧν ἂν ἦ τὸ κράτος τῆς γῆς ἐκάστης, ἦν τε πλέονος ἦν τε βραχυτέρας, τούτων καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τρόποις θεραπευόμενα οἷς ἂν πρὸ τοῦ εἰωθοῦσι καὶ δύνωνται. καὶ γὰρ Βοιωτοῦς καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἐξαναστήσαντές τινα βία νέμονται γῆν, ἄλλοτροίς ἱεροῖς τὸ πρῶτον ἐπελθόντας οἰκεία νῦν κεκτήσαντες. καὶ αὐτοῖ, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον δυνηθῆναι τῆς ἑκείνων κρατῆσαι, τούτ' ἂν ἐχεῖν· νῦν δὲ ἐν φ' μέρει εἰσίν, ἐκόντες εἶναι ὡς ἐκ σφετέρου οὐκ ἀπιέναι. ὤδηρ τε ἐν τῇ ἀνάγκῃ κινῆσαι, ἦν οὐκ αὐτοὶ ύβρει προσθέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἑκείνους προτέρους ἐπὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἐλθόντας ἀμυνόμενοι βιάζονται χρῆσθαι. πάντως εἶναι ὅτι τὸ πολέμῳ καὶ δεινῷ τυπὶ κατειργόμενον ζύγγυμον τι γύγνεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ. καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων καταφυγῆ εἶναι τοὺς βωμοὺς, παρανομίαν τε ἐπὶ τοῖς μη ἀνάγκῃ κακοῖς ὄνομασθήναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνυμφορῶν τι τολμήσασιν. τοὺς τε νεκρόν πολὺ μειζόνως ἑκείνους ἀντὶ ἱερῶν ἄξιούντας ἀποδιδόναι ἄσεβεῖν ἢ τοὺς μὴ ἐθελοῦν· ταῖς ἱεροῖς τὰ πρέποντα κομίζονται. σαφῶς τε ἑκέλευον σφίσων εἰπεῖν μὴ ἀπιούσων ἐκ τῆς

1 Stahl's conjecture for πρὸς τοῖς of the MSS.

380
Hellenes was, they said, that whosoever had dominion over any country, be it larger or smaller, to them the sanctuaries also always belonged, to be tended, so far as might be possible, with whatsoever rites had hitherto been customary.\footnote{Or, reading ποις τοῖς εἰσωθησί with the MSS., "to be tended, besides the usual rites, with such others as they might be able to use."} Indeed the Boeotians, and most others who had driven out any people and taken forcible possession of their country, had at first attacked the temples as alien but now possessed them as their own. And they themselves, if they had been able to conquer more of the Boeotian territory, would have held it; but as it was, they would not depart from that portion in which they were, at least of their free will, considering it their own. The water, moreover, they had disturbed in their sore need, which they had not wantonly brought upon themselves; they had been forced to use the water while defending themselves against the Boeotians who had first invaded their land. And anything done under the constraint of war and danger might reasonably meet with some indulgence, even from the god. For altars were a refuge in cases of involuntary misdeeds, and transgression was a term applied to those who do evil without compulsion and not to those who are driven by misfortunes to some act of daring. Moreover, the Boeotians in presuming to give up the bodies of the dead in return for temples were impious in a much higher degree than they who refused by the exchange of temples to procure that which they had a right to recover. And they bade the Boeotians plainly tell them they might take up their dead, not
THUCYDIDES

Βοιωτῶν γῆς (οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων ἦτι εἶναι, ἐν ᾗ δὲ δορὶ ἐκτήσαντο), ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τοὺς νεκροὺς σπένδουσιν ἀναἱρεῖσθαι.

XCIX. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπεκρίναντο, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ εἰσίν, ἀπίόντας ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα, εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων, αὐτοὺς γιγνώσκειν τὸ ποιητέον, νομίζοντες τὴν μὲν Ὀρωπίαν, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς μάχης γενομένης κεῖσθαι ξυνέβη, Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὸ υπόκομον εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αὐτοὺς βιά σφῶν κρατήσαι αὐτῶν (οὔτ' αὖ ἐσπένδουτο δήθεν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων 1) τὸ δὲ "ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν" εὐπρεπὲς εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι "ἀπίόντας καὶ ἀπολαβεῖν ἃ ἀπαιτοῦσιν." ὁ δὲ κήρυξ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄκουσας ἀπῆλθεν ἀπρακτὸς.

C. Καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ εὐθὺς μεταπεμφάμενοι ἐκ τε τοῦ Μηλιῶς κόλπου ἀκοντιστᾶς καὶ σφενδονήτας, καὶ βεβοηθηκότων αὐτοῦς μετά τὴν μάχην Κορινθίων τε δισχιλίων ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἑκ Νισαίας ἑξεληλυθῶν Πελοποινῆσιών φρουρῶν καὶ Μεγαρέων ἀμα, ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον καὶ προσέβαλον τῷ τείχισματι, ἀλλὰ τῇ τρόπῳ πειράσαντες καὶ μηχανῆ προσήγαγον, ἤπερ εἶλεν αὐτό, τοιάνδε. 

2 κεραίαν μεγάλην δίξα πρίσαντες ἐκοίλαναν ἀπασαν καὶ ξυνήρμοσαν πάλιν ἀκριβῶς ὡσπερ αὐλόν, 2 καὶ ἐπὶ ἀκραν λέβητα τε ἡρτησαν ἀλύσει καὶ ἀκροφύσιον ἀπὸ τῆς κεραίας σιδηροῦν ἐς αὐτὸν νεόν καθεῖτο, καὶ ἐσεσιδήρωτο ἐπὶ μέγα

1 Parenthetical according to Poppo.
2 ὡσπερ αὐλόν, deleted by Hude.
"on condition of quitting Boeotia"—for they were no longer in Boeotian territory, but in land which they had won by the spear,—but "on making a truce according to ancestral custom."

XCIX. The Boeotians made answer, if they were in Boeotia, they might carry off their dead on quitting their land; but if they were in their own territory, they could determine themselves what to do. For they thought that though Oropia, in which the bodies happened to be lying—for the battle occurred on the boundaries—belonged to the Athenians by right of its subjection, yet that they could not get possession of the bodies without their leave (nor indeed were they going to make a truce, forsooth, about territory belonging to the Athenians); but they thought it was fair to answer, "when they had quitted Boeotian territory they could get back what they asked for." And the herald of the Athenians, on hearing this, went away without accomplishing his object.

C. The Boeotians sent off at once for darters and slingers from the Malia Gulf, and with two thousand Corinthian hoplites, who reinforced them after the battle, as well as the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisaea, and some Megarians also, made an expedition against Delium and attacked the fortification. After trying other forms of assault they took it by bringing up an engine made in the following manner. Having sawed in two a great beam they hollowed it throughout, and fitted it together again nicely like a pipe; then they hung a cauldron at one end of it with chains, and into the cauldron an iron bellows-pipe was let down in a curve\(^1\) from the beam, which was itself in great part plated

\(^1\) i.e. it was bent into the cauldron.
καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ἤλιου. προσήγου ἓκ πολλοῦ ἀμάξας τῷ τείχει, ὡς μάλιστα τῇ ἀμπέλῳ καὶ τοῖς ἤλιοις ὕκοδόμητοι καὶ ὅπως εἴη ἐγγὺς, φύσας μεγάλας ἐσθέντες ἐς τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτῶν ἄκρον
4 τῆς κεραίας ἐφύσων. ἦ δὲ πυθή ἰόνσα στεγανῶς ἐς τὸν λέβητα, ἔχοντα ἀνθρακάς τε ἡμένους καὶ θείον καὶ πίσσαν, φλόγα ἐποίει μεγάλην καὶ ἤψε τοῦ τείχους, ὥστε μηδένα ἐτὶ ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ μεῖναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπολιπόντας ἐς φυγῆν καταστήματι
5 καὶ τὸ τείχισμα τούτῳ τῷ τροπῷ ἀλώναι. τῶν δὲ φρουρῶν οἱ μὲν ἀπέθανον, διακόσιοι δὲ ἐλήφθησαν· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὸ πλήθος ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβάν ἀπεκομίσθη ἐπὶ οἴκου.

Cf. Τοῦ δὲ Δηλίου ἐθύμη καὶ δεκάτη ἡμέρα ληφθέντος μετὰ τὴν μάχην καὶ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκος οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένου τῶν γεγενημένων ἐλθόντος οὐ πολὺ υστερον αὖθις περὶ τῶν νεκρῶν, ἀπέδοσαν οἱ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ

2 οὐκέτι ταῦτα ἀπεκρίναντο. ἀπέθανον δὲ Βοιωτῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ ὁλίγῳ ἐλάσσους πεντάκοσίων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὁλίγῳ ἐλάσσους χελίων καὶ Ἡπποκράτης ὁ στρατηγὸς, ψιλῶν δὲ καὶ σκευοφόρων πολὺς ἀριθμὸς.

3 Μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην ταῦτην καὶ ὁ Δημοκλῆς ὁ διλήγω ὑστερον, ὡς αὐτῷ τότε πλεύσαντε τὰ περὶ τὰς Σίφας τῆς προδοσίας πέρι αὐτοῦ προχώρησεν, ἔχων τὸν στρατὸν ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν τῶν τε Ἀκαρνανίων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ Ἀθηναίων τετρακοσίων ὀπλίτας, ἀπὸ βασιν ἐποίησατο ἐς τὴν Σικυονίαν.

4 καὶ πρὶν πάσας τὰς ναύς καταπλεύσαι βοηθήσαντες οἱ Σικυώνιοι τοὺς ἀποβεβηκότας ἠτρέψαν καὶ κατεδόξαν ἐς τὰς ναūς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπέ-

1 Krüger’s correction for ἐπτακαδεκάτη of the MSS.
with iron. This engine they brought up from a distance on carts to the part of the wall where it was built chiefly of vines and wood; and when it was near, they inserted a large bellows into the end of the beam next to them and blew through it. And the blast passing through the air-tight tube into the cauldron, which contained lighted coals, sulphur, and pitch, made a great blaze and set fire to the wall, so that no one could stay on it longer, but all left it and took to flight; and in this way the fortification was taken. Of the garrison some were slain, and two hundred were captured; but most of the rest got on board their ships and were conveyed home.

Cl. So Delium was taken seventeen days after the battle, and when the Athenian herald, who knew nothing of what had happened, came back not long after to ask for the dead, the Boeotians did not again make the same answer but gave them up. And there were slain in the battle, of the Boeotians a little more than five hundred, of the Athenians a little less than one thousand, including Hippocrates their general, besides a great number of light-armed troops and baggage-carriers.

Not long after this battle Demosthenes, since he had failed in his negotiations about the betrayal of Siphae, when he sailed thither at the time mentioned above, took on his ships his force of Acarnanians and Agraeans and four hundred Athenian hoplites and made a descent upon the territory of Sicyon. But before all his ships had come to shore the Sicyonians came to the rescue, and routing those who had disembarked pursued them to their ships,

1 cf. ch. lxxix. 1.
κτειναν, τοὺς δὲ ξώντας ἔλαβον. τροπαῖον δὲ στήσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποστόνδους ἀπέδοσαν.
5 Ἀπέθανε δὲ καὶ Σιτάλκης ὁ Οδρυσῶν βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τὰς αὐτάς ἡμέρας τοῖς ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, στρατεύσας ἐπὶ Τριβάλλους καὶ νικηθεὶς μάχῃ. Σεῦθης δὲ ὁ Σπαραδόκων ἀδελφιδοὺς ὡς αὐτοῦ ἔβασιλευσεν ὁ Οδρυσῶν τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ὄρακης ἥσπερ καὶ ἑκείνος.

CII. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Βρασίδας ἔχων τοὺς ἐπὶ Ὄρακης ἡμιμάχους ἐστράτευσεν ἐσ Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι ποταμῷ Ἀθη-2 ναίων ἀποικίαν. τὸ δὲ χωρίον τούτο ἐφ’ οὗ ὑνὶ πόλις ἦστιν ἐπέδρασε μὲν πρότερον καὶ Ἀρίσταγερας ὁ Μιλήσιος φεῦγον βασιλέα Δαρείου κατοικίσαι, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ Ἡδώνων ἐξεκρούσθη, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτεσι δύο καὶ τριάκοντα ὑστεροῦν, ἐποίκους μυρίων σφῶν τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν Βουλόμενον πέμψαντες, οἳ διεφθάρησαν ἐν Δραβησκῷ ὑπὸ Ὅρακῶν. καὶ αὖθις ἔνοι δέοντι τριακοστὸ ἔτει ἐλθόντες οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, "Ἀγωνός τοῦ Νικίου οἰκιστοῦ ἐκπεμφθέντος, Ἡδώνας ἐξελάσαντες ἐκτισαν τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο, ὅπερ πρότερον Ἑννέα ὀδόν ἐκαλοῦντο.

4 ὠρμώντω δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἡιόνος, ἣν αὐτὸι εἴχαν ἐμπόριον ἐπὶ τὸ στόματι τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπιθαλάσσιον, πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι σταδίους ἀπέχου ἀπὸ τῆς νῦν πόλεως, ἣν Ἀμφίπολιν "Ἀγων δύναμεν, ὅτι ἐπὶ ἄμφοτερα περιρρέοντος τοῦ Στρυμόνος τείχει μακρῶ ἀπολαβὼν ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐσ ποταμῶν

1 διὰ τὸ περιέχειν αὐτὴν ("with a view to enclosing it") in the MSS. after Στρυμόνος, deleted by Dobree.
killing some and taking others alive. Then setting up a trophy they gave up the dead under truce.

Sitalces,\textsuperscript{1} too, king of the Odrysians, was killed about the same time as the events at Delium, having made an expedition against the Triballi,\textsuperscript{2} who defeated him in battle. Scuthes\textsuperscript{3} son of Sparadocus, his nephew, now became king of the Odrysians and of the rest of Thrace over which Sitalces had reigned.

CII. During the same winter, Brasidas, with his allies in Thrace, made an expedition against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon. This place, where the city now stands, Aristagoras\textsuperscript{4} the Milesian had tried to colonize before,\textsuperscript{5} when fleeing from the Persian king, but he had been beaten back by the Edonians. Thirty-two years afterwards the Athenians also made another attempt, sending out ten thousand settlers of their own citizens and any others who wished to go; but these were destroyed by the Thracians at Drabescus. Again, twenty-nine years later, the Athenians, sending out Hagnon son of Nicias as leader of the colony, drove out the Edonians and settled the place, which was previously called Ennea-Hodoi or Nine-Ways. Their base of operations was Eion, a commercial seaport which they already held, at the mouth of the river, twenty-five stadia distant from the present city of Amphipolis,\textsuperscript{6} to which Hagnon gave that name, because, as the Strymon flows round it on both sides, he cut off the site by a long wall running from one point of the river to another, and

\textsuperscript{1} cf. II. lxvii., xciv., cit. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{2} cf. II. xcvi.
\textsuperscript{3} cf. II. ci. 5. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{4} cf. Hdt. v. 126. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{5} 497 B.C.
\textsuperscript{6} The name means "a city looking both ways."
περιφανὴ ἐσθάλασσάν τε καὶ τὴν ἥπειρον ὄκισεν.

CIII. Ἐπὶ ταύτην οὖν ὁ Βρασίδας ἀρας ἐξ Ἀρνών τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς ἐπορευτο τῷ στρατῷ καὶ ἀφικόμενος περὶ δείλην ἐπὶ τῶν Αὐλώνα καὶ Βρομίσκου, ἤ ἦ Βόλβη λύμην ἐξῆσθιν ἐς θάλασσαν, καὶ δειπνοποιησάμενος ἐχώρει τὴν νύκτα.

2 χειμῶν δὲ ἦν καὶ ὑπένειφεν ἤ καὶ μᾶλλον ὀρμήσε, βουλόμενος λαθείν τοὺς ἐν τῇ 'Αμφι-

3 πόλει πλὴν τῶν προδιδότων. ἦσαν γὰρ 'Αργίλων τε ἐν αὐτῇ οἰκητορεῖς (εἰδὶ δὲ οἱ 'Αργίλων 'Ανδρίων ἀποικοὶ) καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ ἕνωσασθοὶ ταῦτα, οἱ μὲν Περδίκκα πειθόμενοι, οἱ δὲ Χαλκί-

4 δεύσιν. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ 'Αργίλων, ἐγγὺς τε προσφι-

κοῦντες καὶ αἰεὶ ποτὲ τοῖς 'Αθηναίοις ὀντεῖ ὑποπτοὶ καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τῷ χωρίῳ, ἐπειδὴ παρέτυχεν ὁ καιρός καὶ Βρασίδας ἦλθεν, ἐπραξάν τε ἐκ πλείονος πρὸς τοὺς ἐμπολιτεύοντας σφῶν ἔκει ὅπως ἐνδοθήσεται ἡ πόλις, καὶ τότε δεξάμενοι αὐτὸν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀποστάντες τῶν 'Αθηναίων ἐκείνη τῇ νυκτὶ κατέστησαν τὸν στρατὸν πρὸ ἐω ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ (ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πό-

5 λιμα πλέον τῆς διαβάσεως), καὶ οὐ καθεῖτο τείχῃ ὡσπερ νῦν, φυλακὴν δὲ τις βραχεία καθεῖ-

στήκει, ἦν βιασάμενος ῥάδιως ὁ Βρασίδας, ἀμα μὲν τῆς προδοσίας οὐσῆς, ἀμα δὲ καὶ χειμῶνος ὄντος καὶ ἀπροσδόκητος προσπεσῶν, διέβη τὴν γέφυραν, καὶ τὰ ἔξω τῶν 'Αμφιπολιτῶν οἰκοῦντων κατὰ πᾶν τὸ χωρίον εὐθὺς εἶχεν.

388
so established a city which was conspicuous both seaward and landward.

CIII. Against this place Brasidas marched with his army, setting out from Arnae in Chalcidice. Arriving about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe has its outlet into the sea, he took supper and then proceeded by night. The weather was bad and somewhat snowy, and for this reason he made the more haste, wishing to escape the notice of the people in Amphipolis, except those who were to betray it. For there were in the place some settlers from Argilus, an Andrian colony; these and some others were his accomplices in this intrigue, some instigated by Perdikeas, others by the Chalcidians. But the chief plotters were the Argilians, who dwelt near by, were always suspected by the Athenians, and were secret enemies of the place; now that opportunity offered and Brasidas had come, they had some time before negotiated with their countrymen who resided in Amphipolis with a view to the surrender of the place. So at this time they received Brasidas into their town, revolted from the Athenians that same night, and before dawn brought his army down to the bridge over the river, which is some distance from the town and not connected with it by walls as now. Brasidas easily forced the small guard stationed at the bridge, partly because there was treachery, partly because he had fallen upon them in stormy weather and unexpectedly; and as soon as he had crossed the bridge he was at once master of the property of the Amphipolitans outside the walls; for they had houses all over the neighbourhood.

1 According to tradition, the scene of the death of Euripides.
THUCYDIDES

CIV. Τῆς δὲ διαβάσεως αὐτοῦ ἀφω τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει γεγενημένης, καὶ τῶν ἔξω πολλῶν μὲν ἀλησκομένων, τῶν δὲ καὶ καταφευγόντων ἐς τὸ τεῖχος, οἱ Ἀμφιπολίται ἐς θόρυβον μέγαν κατέστησαν, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ὑποπτοὺς ὄντες. καὶ λέγεται Βρασίδαν, εἰ ἢθέλησε μὴ ἐφ’ ἀρπαγήν τῷ στρατῷ τραπέσθαι, ἀλλὰ εὔθὺς χωρῆσαι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, δοκεῖν ἂν ἔλειν. νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν ἰδρύσας τὸν στρατὸν, ἐπεὶ ἐξω ἐπέδραμε καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔνδον ὡς προσεδέχετο ἀπέβαινεν, ἡσύχαζεν· οἱ δὲ ἐναντίοις προδιδοῦσι, κρατοῦντες τῷ πλήθει ὡστε μὴ αὐτίκα τὰς πύλας ἀνοίγεσθαι, πέμπουσι μετὰ Εὐκλέους τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, δς ἐκ τῶν Ἄθηνῶν παρῆν αὐτοῖς φύλαξ τοῦ χωρίου, ἐπὶ τὸν ἐτερὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης, Θουκυδίδην τὸν 'Ολόρου, δς τάδε ἐνεγραψεν, ὄντα περὶ Θάσου (ἐστι δὲ ἡ νήσος Παρίων ἀποικία, ἀπέχουσα τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως ἡμύσος ἡμέρας μᾶλιστα πλοῦν), κελεύοντες σφίσει βοηθεῖν, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκούσας κατὰ τάχος ἐπτα ναυσίν αἱ ἐνυχὶν παροῦσαι ἐπλεῖ, καὶ ἐβούλετο φθάσαι μᾶλιστα μὲν ὁμί την Ἀμφιπόλιν, πρίν τι ἐνδοῦναι, εἰ δέ μή, τὴν Ἡλίαν προκαταλαβῶν.

CV. Ἔν τούτῳ δὲ ὁ Βρασίδας δεδίως καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἡλίας τῶν νεῶν βοήθειαν καὶ πυθανόμενος τοῦ Θουκυδίδην κτήσιν τε ἐχειν τῶν χρυσεῖν μετάλλων ἐργασίας ἐν τῇ περὶ ταύτα Θράκη καὶ ἄπ’ αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις τῶν ἡπειρωτῶν, ἡπείγετο προκατασχεῖν, εἰ δύναιτο, τὴν πόλιν, μὴ ἄφικνουμένου αὐτοῦ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν, ἐλπίσαν ἐκ θαλάσσης 1 εἰσι, with F and (ex corr.) C; other MSS. εἰσι.
CIV. His crossing had surprised the people inside the city, and of those outside many were captured, while others took refuge within the walls; hence the Amphipolitans were thrown into great confusion, especially as they were suspicious of each other. Indeed the general impression was, it is said, that if Brasidas, instead of turning to pillage with his army, had decided to march straight against the city, he could have taken it. But as it was, when he had overrun the country outside and found that none of his plans were being carried out by his friends within the city, he merely settled his army in camp and kept quiet. Meanwhile the opponents of the traitors, being numerous enough to prevent the gates being opened to him at once, acting in concert with Eucleus the general, who had come from Athens as warden of the place, sent to the other commander of the Thracian district, Thucydides son of Olorus, the author of this history, who was at Thasos, a Parian colony, about a half-day’s sail from Amphipolis, and urged him to come to their aid. And he, on hearing this, sailed in haste with seven ships which happened to be at hand, wishing above all to secure Amphipolis before it yielded, or, failing in that, to seize Eion.

CV. Meanwhile, Brasidas, fearing the arrival of the ships from Thasos, and hearing that Thucydides possessed the right of working the gold-mines in that part of Thrace and in consequence had influence among the first men of the mainland, made haste to seize the city if possible before he should come; for he was afraid that, if Thucydides should arrive, the popular party in Amphipolis, in the expectation that
THUCYDIDES

Συμμαχικῶν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἡράκης ἀγείραντα αὐτὸν
2 περιποιήσειν σφάς, οὐκέτι προσχωροίη, καὶ τὴν
ξύμβασιν μετρίαν ἐποιεῖτο, κήρυγμα τὸδε ἀνεί-
πών, Ὅμφιππολίτων καὶ Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἑνόντων
tὸν μὲν βουλόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοὶ τῆς ἱσης καὶ
ὀμοίας μετέχοντα μένειν, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐθέλοντα
ἀπείνα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκφερόμενον πέντε ἡμερῶν.

CVI. Οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀλλοιότεροι
ἐγένοντο τὰς γνώμας, ἄλλως τε καὶ βραχὺ μὲν
Ἀθηναίων ἐμπολιτευόν, τὸ δὲ πλέον ξύμμεικτων,
kαὶ τὸν ἐξ' ληθέντων συχνοὶ οἰκεῖοι ἐνδοὺ
ήσαν καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα πρὸς τὸν φόβον δίκαιον
eῖναι ἔλαμβανον, οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίοι διὰ τὸ ἁμένοι
ἀν ἐξελθεῖν, ἤγοντος οὐκ ἐν ὁμοίῳ σφίσι τὰ
δεινὰ εἶναι καὶ ἀμα οὐ προσδεχομένου βοήθειαν
ἐν τάχει, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ὅμοιος πόλεως τε ἐν τῷ
ἴσῳ οὐ στερισκόμενοι καὶ κινδύνου παρὰ δοξα
2 ἀφιέμενοι, ὡστε τῶν πρασσόντων τῷ Βρασίδᾳ
ηδὴ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ διαδικασίων τῶν αὐτά,
ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἑώρων τετραμμένον καὶ τοῦ
παρόντος Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦ οὐκέτι ἀκροφί-
μενον, ἐγένοτο ἡ ὄμολογία καὶ προσεδέξαντο ἐφ
3 οἷς ἐκήρυξεν. καὶ οἱ μὲν τὴν πόλιν τοιοῦτο
τρόπῳ παρέδοσαν, ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης καὶ αἱ νῆς
tαυτή τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὧς κατέπλεον ἐς τὴν Ἡιόνα.
4 καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἄμφιππολιν Βρασίδας ἀρτί εἴχε, τὴν
dὲ Ἡιόνα παρὰ νύκτα ἐγένετο λαβέιν ἐν γὰρ
μὴ ἐβοηθησαν αἱ νῆς διὰ τάχους, ἀμα ἐφ ἄν
εἴχετο.

392
he would collect an allied force from the islands and from Thrace and relieve them, would refuse to yield. Accordingly, he offered moderate terms, making proclamation to this effect, that any citizen of Amphipolis or any resident Athenian, if he chose, might remain there, retaining possession of his own property and enjoying full equality; but that anyone who was not inclined to stay might go away within five days and take his property with him.

CVI. On hearing this the majority became irresolute, especially as few of the citizens were Athenians, the greater number being a mixed multitude, and a considerable number of those who had been captured outside had relatives inside the city. As compared with their fears they conceived the proclamation to be fair—the Athenians, because they were only too glad to be able to leave, since they realized that their share of the dangers was greater, and besides, did not expect any speedy relief; the general multitude, because they were not to lose their civil rights but to retain them as before and also, contrary to their expectation, were to be released from peril. And so, as the partisans of Brasidas were already quite openly justifying his proposals, since these saw that the populace had changed its attitude and no longer hearkened to the Athenian general who was in the city, the capitulation was made, and Brasidas was received on the terms of his proclamation. In this way they gave up the city, and on the evening of the same day Thucydides and his ships sailed into Eion. Brasidas had just got possession of Amphipolis, and he missed taking Eion only by a night; for if the ships had not come to the rescue with all speed, it would have been taken at dawn.
CVII. Μετά δὲ τούτο ὁ μὲν τὰ ἐν τῇ Ἰθώνι καθιστατο, ὅπως καὶ τὸ αὐτίκα, ἦν ἐπὶ τὸ Βρασίδας, καὶ τὸ ἐπειτὰ ἀσφαλῶς ἔσει, δεξίμενος τὸν ἐθελήσαντας ἐπιχωρήσατε ἀνωθεν κατὰ τὰς 2 σπονδάς· ὁ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν Ἰθώνα κατὰ τὲ τὸν ποταμὸν πολλοῖς πλοίοις ἀφνω καταπλεύσας, εἰ πως τὴν προύχουσαν ἀκραν ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους λαβὼν κρατοῦν τὸν ἔσπλου, καὶ κατὰ γῆν ἀποπειράσας ἀμα, ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀπεκρούσθη, τὰ δὲ 3 περὶ τὴν 'Αμφίπολιν ἐξηρτύστεο. καὶ Μύρκινος τὲ αὐτῷ προσεχώρησεν, Ἡδωνικὴ πόλις, Πιττακοῦ τὸν Ἡδώνων βασιλέως ἀποθανόντος ὑπὸ τῶν Γιακίους παιδῶν καὶ Βραυροῦς τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ Γαληψὸς οὗ πολλῷ υστερον καὶ Οἰσύμη εἰσὶ δὲ αὐταὶ Θασίων ἀποικίαι. παρὸν δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἄλωσιν ξυγκαθίστη ταῦτα.

CVIII. 'Ἐχομένης δὲ τῆς 'Αμφιπόλεως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς μέγα δέος κατέστησαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅτι ἡ πόλις ἦν αὐτοῖς ωφέλιμος ξύλων τε ναυπηγοῦσιμων πομπῆ καὶ χρημάτων προσόδω, καὶ ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Στρυμόνος ἦν πάροδος Θεσαλῶν διαγόντων ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους σφῶν τῶν Δακεδαιμονίως, τῆς δὲ γεφύρας μη κρατοῦτων, ἀνωθέν μὲν μεγάλης ὀψις ἐπὶ πολὺ λίμνης τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς Ἰθώνα τριήρεσι τηρουμένων, οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι προελθεῖν· τότε δὲ

1 Hude emenda to τηρουμένων.
CVII. After this Thucydides proceeded to arrange matters at Eion, in order to insure its safety for the present, if Brasidas should attack, and also for the future, receiving those who chose to come thither from the upper town according to the terms of the truce.¹ And Brasidas suddenly sailed down the river to Eion with many boats, in the hope that by taking the point which juts out from the wall he might gain command of the entrance, and at the same time he made an attempt by land; but he was beaten back at both points, and then proceeded to put matters in order at Amphipolis. Myrcinus also, an Edonian town, came over to him, Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, having been killed by the sons of Goaxis and his own wife Brauro; and not long afterwards Galepsus and Oesyne, colonies of the Thasians, also came over. Perdiccas,² too, came to Amphipolis directly after its capture and joined in arranging these matters.

CVIII. The Athenians were greatly alarmed by the capture of Amphipolis. The chief reason was that the city was useful to them for the importation of timber for ship-building and for the revenue it produced, and also that, whereas hitherto the Lacedaemonians had possessed, under the guidance of the Thessalians, access to the Athenian allies as far as the Strymon, yet as long as they did not control the bridge—the river for a long way above the town being a great lake and triremes being on guard in the direction of Eion—they could not have advanced further; but now at last the matter

¹ cf. ch. cv. 2.
² Now evidently reconciled with Brasidas, with whom he had quarrelled (ch. lxxxi. 3); cf. ch. ciii. 3.
θάδια¹ ἦδη γεγενήσθαι.² καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους
2 ἐφοβοῦντο μὴ ἀποστώσιν. οὗ γὰρ Βρασιδᾶς ἐν
tε τοῖς ἄλλοις μέτριοι ἐαυτῶν παρεῖχε καὶ ἐν
tοῖς λόγοις πανταχοῦ ἔδηλου ὡς ἐλευθερώσων
3 τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐκπεμφθείη. καὶ αἱ πόλεις πυν-
θανόμεναι αἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι³ τῆς τε
Ἀμφιπόλεως τὴν ἀλοσίν καὶ ἡ παρέχεται, τὴν
tε ἐκείνου πραύτητα, μάλιστα ἤ ἐπηρθήσαν ἐς
τὸ νεωτερίζειν, καὶ ἐπεκηρυκέντρῳ πρὸς αὐτὸν
κρύφα, ἐπιπαρίειαν τε κελεύοντες καὶ βουλόμενοι
4 αὐτοὶ ἔκαστοι πρῶτοι ἀποστῆναι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ
ἀδεία ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς, ἐψευσμένοις⁴ μὲν τῆς
Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὴ ύστερον
dιεφάνη, τὸ δὲ πλέον βουλήσει κρίνοντες ἀσαφεῖ
ἡ προνοία ἀσφαλεί, εἰωθότες οἱ ἀνθρώποι οὐ μὲν
ἐπιθυμούσιν ἑπὶ δὲ ἀπερσκέπτω διδόναι, ὃ δὲ
μὴ προσένεια πλογησῶ ἀυτοκράτορι διωθείσιν.
5 ἀμα δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς νεωστὶ
πεπληγμένων καὶ τοῦ Βρασιδᾶον ἑφολκα καὶ οὐ τὰ
ὅντα λέγοντος, ἀλλ’ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν τῇ ἐαυτοῦ
μόνῃ στρατιᾷ⁵ οὐκ ἠθέλησαν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἤμι-
βαλεῖν, ἑθάρσουν καὶ ἐπιστέφουν μηδένα ἀλλ’
6 σφάς ἀναθήσαι. τὸ δὲ μέγατον, διὰ τὸ ἡδονῆν
ἐχον ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα καὶ ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαι-
μονίων ὁργώντων ἔμελλον πειρᾶσθαι, κιν-
δυνεύειν παντὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἐτοίμο ἦναν. ὥν αἰσθανό-

¹ Kistemacher's correction for ἡδία or ἡδία of the MSS.
² Supply in thought here εἴσωμεν before γεγενήσθαι. Most MSS. have ἐγερμένεν (Vulg. ἁρμίζετο); Kistemacher deletes.
³ ἀὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι, Hude deletes.
⁴ Hude reads ἐψευσμένοι, with E.
⁵ Linwood, followed by Stahl and Hude, inserts ἀναθήσαι, as indeed seems to have been in the mind of the author.
had become easy. And they feared, too, the revolt of their allies. For Brasidas in other things showed himself moderate, and in his declarations everywhere made plain that he had been sent out for the liberation of Hellas. And the cities that were subject to Athens, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and the assurances that were offered, and of the gentleness of Brasidas, were more than ever incited to revolution, and sent secret messengers to him, urging him to come on to them, and wishing each for itself to be the first to revolt. For it seemed to them that there was little ground for fear, since they estimated the Athenian power to be far less great than it afterwards proved to be, and in their judgment were moved more by illusive wishing than by cautious foresight; for men are wont, when they desire a thing, to trust to unreflecting hope, but to reject by arbitrary judgment whatever they do not care for. Furthermore, because of the recent defeat of the Athenians in Boeotia and the enticing but untrue statements of Brasidas, that the Athenians had been unwilling to engage him when he came to the relief of Nisaea with only his own army, they grew bold, and believed that nobody would come against them. Above all, they were so moved by the pleasurable anticipations of the moment, and by the fact that they were now for the first time going to have a proof of what the Lace- daemonians would do when on their mettle, that they were ready to take any risk. Being aware of

1 Or, retaining ἐπισταί of the MSS and the Vulgate reading ἐνομίζετο, “but now the access was thought to have become easy.”

2 cf. ch. lxxiii.; lxxxv. 7.
μενοι οί μὲν Ἀθηναίοι φυλακάς, ὡς ἔξ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν χείμωνι, διέσεμπτον ἐς τὰς πόλεις, ὁ δὲ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαιμονία ἐφιέμενος στρατιάν τε προσαποστέλλειν ἐκέλευε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Στρυμώνι
7 ναυτηγίαιν τρυῆρον παρασκευάζετο. οί δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων ἀνδρῶν ὑπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ καὶ βουλόμενοι μᾶλλον τοὺς τε ἀνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νῆσος κομίσασθαι καὶ τὸν πόλεμον καταλύσαι.

CIX. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Μεγαρῆς τε τὰ μακρὰ τείχη, ἢ σφόν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι εἶχον, κατέσκαψαν ἐλόντες ἐς ἔδαφος, καὶ Βρασίδας μετὰ τὴν Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀλώσιν ἔχον τοὺς ἐξιμμάχους
2 στρατεύει ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀκτὴν καλουμένην. ἦστι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως διορύγματος ἐσῶ προύχουσα, καὶ ὁ Ἀθως αὐτῆς ὄρος ψηλὸν τελευτᾷ ἐς τὸ
3 Αἰγαίον πέλαγος. πόλεις δὲ ἔχει Σάννη μὲν Ἀνδρών ἀποικίαν παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν διώρυχα, ἐς τὸ πρὸς Εὐβοίαν πέλαγος τετραμένην, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Θυσσόν καὶ Κλεωνᾶς καὶ Ἀκροθόους καὶ
4 Ὀλύφυξον καὶ Δίον· αἱ οἰκοῦνται ἐξειμείκτοις ἑθνεσι βαρβάρων διγλώσσων, καὶ τι καὶ Χαλκιδικὸν ἐνι βραχύ, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον Πελασγικόν, τῶν καὶ Δημώνον ποτε καὶ Ἀθήνας Τυρσηνῶν οἰκησάντων, καὶ Βισαλτικόν καὶ Κρηστωνικόν καὶ Ἡδώνες· κατὰ δὲ μικρὰ πολίσματα οἰκούσιν.
5 καὶ οἱ μὲν πλείους προσεχώρησαν τῷ Βρασίδα, Σάνη δὲ καὶ Δίον ἀντέστη, καὶ αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν ἐμμείνας τῷ ὁ τρατῷ ἔδησον.

398
these things, the Athenians, so far as was possible at short notice and in the winter season, sent out garrisons among the cities; while Brasidas sent to Lacedaemon and urgently begged them to send him reinforcements, and was himself making preparations for building ships in the Strymon. The Lacedae-monians, however, did not comply with his request, partly on account of the jealousy of the foremost men, partly also because they wished rather to recover the men taken on the island and to bring the war to an end.

CIX. The same winter the Megarians took and razed to the ground their long walls\(^1\) which the Athenians had held; and Brasidas, after the capture of Amphipolis, made an expedition with his allies against the district called Acte. It is a promontory projecting from the King's canal\(^2\) on the inner side of the isthmus, and its terminus at the Aegean Sea is the lofty Mt. Athos. Of the cities it contains, one is Sane, an Andrian colony close to the canal, facing the sea which is toward Euboea; the others are Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoï, Olophyxus and Dium, which are inhabited by mixed barbarian tribes speaking two languages. There is in it also a small Chalcidic element; but the greatest part is Pelasgic—belonging to those Etruscans that once inhabited Lemnos and Athens\(^3\)—Bisaltic, Crestonic, and Edonian; and they live in small towns. Most of these yielded to Brasidas, but Sane and Dium held out against him; so he waited there with his army and laid waste their territory.

\(^1\) cf. ch. lxxix. 4.  \(^2\) Xerxes' canal; cf. Hdt. vii. 22 ff.  
\(^3\) According to Herodotus (vi. 137 ff.), they were expelled from Attica, and afterwards, by Miltiades, from Lemnos.
THUCYDIDES

CX. Ὦς δ' οὖν ἐσήκουν, εἰς ὑστε στρατεύει ἐπὶ Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικήν, κατεχομένην ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων καὶ αὐτῶν ἀνδρεὶς ὅλγοι ἐπίγγοντο, ἐτοίμων ὄντες τὴν πόλιν παραδοῦναι. καὶ ἀφικόμενοι νυκτὸς ἐτὶ καὶ περὶ ὀρθρόν τῷ στρατῷ ἐκαθέζετο πρὸς τὸ Διοσκόρειον, ὃ ἀπέχει τῆς 2 πόλεως τρεῖς μᾶλιστα στάδιως. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἄλλην πόλιν τῶν Τορωνιῶν καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τοὺς ἐμφρουροῦντας ἔλαθεν: ὦ δὲ πράσσοντες αὐτῶν εἴδοτες ὅτι ἤξοι, καὶ προελθόντες τινὲς αὐτῶν λάθρα ὅλγοι ἐτήρουν τὴν πρόσοδον, καὶ ἡς ἔσθοντο παρόντα, ἐσκομίζουσι παρ' αὐτοὺς ἐγχειρίδια ἔχοντας ἀνδρας ψυλους ἐπτά (τοσοῦτοι γὰρ μόνοι ἀνδρῶν εἰκοσι τὸ πρῶτον ταχθέντων οὐ κατέδεικαν ἐσελθεῖν ἥρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Δυσίστρατος Ὀλύνθιος), οἷς διαδόντες διὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τεῖχος καὶ λαθόντες τοὺς τε ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνωτάτῳ φυλακτήριον φρουροῦς, οὕσης τῆς πόλεως πρὸς λόφον, ἀναβάντες διέφθειραν καὶ τὴν κατὰ Καναστραίων πυλίδα διήρουν.

CXI. Ὅ δὲ Βρασίδας τῷ μὲν ἄλλῳ στρατῳ ἡσύχασεν ὅλγοι προελθόντω, ἐκατὸν δὲ πελταστάς προπέμπει, ὅπως, ὅποτε πῦλαι τινὲς ἀνοιχθεὶς καὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἀρθείῃ ὃ ξυνέκειτο, πρῶτοι 2 ἐσδράμοιεν. καὶ οἱ μὲν χρόνου ἐγγεγυμνοῦντο καὶ θαυμάζοντες κατὰ μικρὸν ἐτυχον ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως προελθόντες· οἱ δὲ τῶν Τορωνιῶν ἐνδοθεὶν παρασκευάζοντες μετὰ τῶν ἐσεληλυ...
CX. Since, however, they would not yield he marched at once against Torone,¹ in Chalcidice, which was held by the Athenians; for a few men, who were ready to betray the town, had invited him over. Arriving with his army toward dawn, but while it was still dark, he encamped near the temple of the Dioscuri, which is about three stadia distant from the city. The rest of the town of Torone and the Athenians of the garrison were unaware of his approach, but his partisans, knowing that he would come, and some few of them having secretly gone forward to meet him, were watching for his approach; and when they perceived that he was there, they introduced into the town seven light-armed men with daggers, under the command of Lysistratus an Olynthian, these men alone of the twenty first assigned to the task not being afraid to enter. These slipped through the seaward wall and escaping the notice of the guard at the uppermost watch-post of the town, which is on the slope of a hill, went up and slew these sentinels, and broke open the postern on the side towards the promontory of Canastraeum.

CXI. Meanwhile Brasidas, having gone forward a little, kept quiet with the rest of his army, but sent forward one hundred targeteers, in order that as soon as any gates were opened and the signal agreed upon was raised they might rush in first. These now, as time elapsed, were wondering at the delay and had come up little by little close to the town. Meanwhile the Toronaeans inside who were co-operating with the party which had entered, when the postern

¹ The chief town on the Sithonian peninsula. See Map at i. lvi.
θότων, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἦ τε πυλὶς διήρητο καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν πύλαι τοῦ μοχλοῦ διακοπέντος ἀνεφο-
γοντο, πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὴν πυλίδα τινὰς 
περιαγαγόντες ἐσεκόμισαν, ὡποῖς κατὰ νῶτον καὶ 
ἀμφοτέρωθεν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει οὐδὲν εἰδότας 
ἐξαιπνήσαν φοβήσειαν, ἔπειτα τὸ σημεῖόν τε τοῦ 
πυρὸς, ὡς εἰρήτο, ἀνέσχον καὶ διὰ τῶν κατὰ τὴν 
ἀγορὰν πυλῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς ἢδή τῶν πελταστῶν 
ἐσεδέχοντο. ΧΞΠ. καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας ἴδων τὸ 
ἐλύθημα ἔθει δρόμων, ἀναστήσας τὸν στρατὸν 
ἐμβοηθοῦτας τε ἄθροον καὶ ἐκπλήξιν πολλὴν 
2 τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει παρασχόντας. καὶ οἱ μὲν κατὰ 
τὰς πύλας εὕθως ἐσέπιπτον, οἱ δὲ κατὰ δοκοὺς 
tετραγώνους, αἰ ἔτυχον τῷ τείχει πεπτωκότι 
κάνοικοδομομεμέφι πρὸς λίθων ἀνολκὴν προσκεί-
3 μεναί. Βρασίδας μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εὕθως 
ἀνω καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ μετέωρα τῆς πόλεως ἐτράπετο, 
βουλόμενος κατ' ἀκρας καὶ βεβαιῶς ἐλείν αὐτήν· 
ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ῥυμὸς κατὰ πάντα ῥυμοῖς ἐσκεδά-
νυντο.
ΧΞΠΙ. Τῶν δὲ Τορωναίων γιγνομένης τῆς 
ἀλώσεως τὸ μὲν πολὺ οὐδὲν εὕθως ἐθορυβεῖτο, οἱ 
δὲ πράσσοντες καὶ οἱς ταύτα ἱππακε κατὰ τῶν 
2 ἐσελθόντων εὕθως ἔσαν. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι (ἔτυχον 
γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ὀπλῖται καθεύδοντες ὡς 
πεντήκοντα) ἐπειδὴ ἱππότο, οἱ μὲν τὶνες ὄλγοι 
diaφθειρόνται ἐν χερσὶν αὐτῶν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν οἱ 
mὲν πεζῷ, οἱ δὲ ἐς τὰς ναίς, αἰ ἐφρούρον δυὸ, 
καταφυγόντες διασώζονται ἐς τὴν Δήκυθον τὸ 
φρούριον, ὁ εἰχὼν αὐτοῖ καταλαβόντες, ἄκρον τῆς 
πόλεως ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἀπειλημμένον ἐν στενῷ
had been broken down and the gates near the market-place had been opened by cutting the bar, first brought some men around to the postern and let them in, in order that they might take the townsmen unawares by a sudden attack in their rear and on both sides and throw them into a panic; after that they raised the fire-signal agreed upon and received the rest of the targeteers through the gates near the market-place. CXII. Brasidas, on seeing the signal, set off at a run, calling up his force, and they with one voice raised a shout and caused great dismay to the townsmen. Some burst in immediately by the gates, others over some square beams which chanced to have been placed, for the purpose of drawing up stones, against the wall that had fallen in and was now being rebuilt. Brasidas, then, and the main body made at once for the high points of the town, wishing to make its capture complete and decisive; but the rest of the multitude\(^1\) scattered in all directions.

CXIII. While the capture was being effected, most of the Toronaeans, who knew nothing of the plot, were in a tumult, but the conspirators and such as were in sympathy with the movement at once joined those who had entered. When the Athenians became aware of it—for about fifty of their hoplites happened to be sleeping in the market-place—though some few of them were slain in hand-to-hand conflict, the rest fled, some by land, others to the two ships which were on guard, and got safely into the fort of Lecythus, which had been occupied and was held by their own men. It is the citadel of the city, projecting into the sea—a separate section\(^2\) on a

\(^1\) Macedonian and Thracian irregulars.
\(^2\) There was probably a wall across the isthmus.
κατέφυγον δὲ καὶ τῶν Τορωναίων ἐς αὐτοὺς ὅσοι ἦσαν σφίσιν ἐπιτήδειοι.

CXIV. Γεγεννημένης δὲ ἡμέρας ἡδὴ καὶ βεβαίως τῆς πόλεως ἐχομένης ὁ Βρασίδας τοῖς μὲν μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Τορωναίοις καταπεφυγόσι κήρυγμα ἐποιήσατο τὸν βουλόμενον ἐπὶ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ ἐσελθόντα ἀδεῶς πολιτείαν, τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις κήρυκα προσπέμψας ἐξεϊναι ἐκέλευεν ἐκ τῆς Δημότου ὑποστόνδους καὶ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ ἔχοντας ὡς

2 οὐσῆς Χαλκιδέων. οἱ δὲ ἐκλείψεωι μὲν οὐκ ἔφασαν, σπείρασθαι δὲ σφίσιν ἐκέλευον ἡμέραν τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀνελέονταί. οὶ δὲ ἐσπείσατο δύο. ἐν ταύτας δὲ αὐτοῖς τε τὰς ἐγγύς οἰκίας ἐκρατύν

3 νατο καὶ Ἀθηναίοι τὰ σφέτερα. καὶ ξύλλογον τῶν Τορωναίων ποιῆσας ἐλέει τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἁκάνθῳ παραπλησία, ὅτι οὐ δίκαιον εἴη οὔτε τοὺς πράξαντας πρὸς αὐτὸν τὴν λήψιν τῆς πόλεως χείρους οὐδὲ προδότας ἥγεισθαι (οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ δουλεία οὔτε χρήματι πεισθέντας δρᾶσαι τούτῳ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἀγάθῳ καὶ ἔλευθερίᾳ τῆς πόλεως), οὔτε τοὺς μὴ μετασχόντας οἰεσθαι μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τεύξεσθαι: ἀφίκθαι γὰρ οὗ διαφθερῶν οὔτε πόλιν οὔτε ἴδιω- τήν οὐδένα. τὸ δὲ κήρυγμα ποιῆσασθαι τούτου ἐνεκά τοῖς παρ' Ἀθηναίους καταπεφυγόσιν, ὡς ἠγούμενοι οὔδὲν χείρους τῇ ἐκείνων φιλίᾳ: οὔδ' ἄν σφῶν πειρασαμένους αὐτοὺς τῶν Δακεδαι- μονίων ἐδοκεῖν ἡσσον, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ὅσφ

1 τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων, deleted by Cobet, followed by Hude.
narrow isthmus. And such of the Toronaeans as were friendly to the Athenians took refuge there also.

CXIV. When day had come and the town was securely in his possession, Brasidas made proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the Athenians, that whoever wished might return to his property and exercise citizenship without fear; but to the Athenians he sent a herald, ordering them to come out of Lecythus under truce, bringing all their property, as the place belonged to the Chalcidians. They, however, refused to leave, but requested him to make a truce with them for a day, that they might take up their dead. He granted a truce for two days, during which he himself fortified the houses near by and the Athenians strengthened their defences. Then calling a meeting of the Toronaeans, Brasidas spoke to them much as he had done to the people at Acanthus.¹ He said that it was not just either to regard as villains or as traitors those who had negotiated with him for the capture of the town—for they had done this, not to enslave it, nor because they were bribed, but for the welfare and freedom of the city—or to think that those who had not taken part would not get the same treatment as the others; for he had not come to destroy either the city or any private citizen. He explained that he made his proclamation to those who had taken refuge with the Athenians for the reason that he thought none the worse of them for their friendship with these; and when they had proved his countrymen, the Lacedaemonians, they would not, he thought, be less but rather far more kindly disposed toward them than toward the

¹ cf. chs. lxxxv.—lxxxvii.
THUCYDIDES

δικαιότερα πράσσοσιν, εύνους ἂν σφίσῃ γενέσθαι.
5 ἀπειρίᾳ δὲ νῦν πεφωβηθησθαί. τοὺς τε πάντας παρασκευάζεσθαί ἐκέλευεν ὡς βεβαιοῦσ τε ἐσο-
μένους ἐξυμάχους καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε ἦδη ὃ τι ἂν
ἀμαρτάνοσιν αἰτίαν ἔξοντας: τὰ δὲ πρότερα οὐ
σφεῖς ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνοις μᾶλλον ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων
κρεισσόνων, καὶ ἔγγραφήν εἰναι εἰ τι ἠναντιοῦντο.

CXV. Καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαῦτα εἰπὼν καὶ παραθαρ-
σύνας διελθούσων τῶν σπουδῶν τὰς προσβολὰς ἐποιεῖτο τῇ Δηκύῳ. οἵ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι ἡμύνοντό τε
ἐκ φαύλου τεχνάσματος καὶ ἀπ᾽ οἰκίων ἐπάλξεις
ἐχοῦσων, καὶ μίαν μὲν ἡμέραν ἀπεκρούσαντο·

2 τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ μηχανῆς μελλούσης προσάξεσθαι
αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἂφ᾽ ὃς πῦρ ἐνῆσειν
dιενούσθη ἐς τὰ ξύλων παραφράγματα, καὶ
προσιόντος ἡδὲ τοῦ στρατεύματος, ἦ φῶντο
μάλιστα αὐτοὺς προσκομίσει τῷ μηχανή καὶ ἦν
ἐπιμαχώτατον, τύργον ξύλων ἐπ᾽ οἰκήμα ἀντε-
στησαν, καὶ ὄδατο λαμφεῖας πολλοῦ καὶ πίθους
ἀνεφόρησαν καὶ λίθους μεγάλους, ἀνθρωποὶ τε

3 πολλοὶ ἀνέβησαν. τὸ δὲ οἰκήμα λαβὸν μεῖζον
ἄχθος ἐξαπίνης κατερρήγη καὶ ψόφου πολλοῦ
γενομένου τοὺς μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ ὁρῶντας τῶν
Ἀθηναίων ἐλύπησε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐφόβησεν, οἵ δὲ
ἀπωθεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ διὰ πλεῖστον, νομίζοντες
ταύτη εἰλοκόται ἢδη τὸ χωρίον, φυγῇ ἐς τὴν
θάλασσαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ὁμήρουσαν.

CXVI. Καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας ὡς ἠθετε αὐτοὺς
ἀπολείποντας τε τὰς ἐπάλξεις καὶ τὸ γεγονόμενον
406
Athenians, inasmuch as their conduct was more just; whereas now they had been afraid of them through inexperience. Moreover, he told them all to prepare to show themselves staunch allies and to be held responsible for whatever mistakes they might make from this time on; as to their former actions, it was not the Lacedaemonians who had been wronged by them, but the Toronaeans rather by others ¹ who were stronger, and it was pardonable if the Toronaeans had made any opposition to him.

CXV. Having said such things and encouraged them, when the truce expired he proceeded to make assaults upon Lecythus; but the Athenians defended themselves from a paltry fort and from such houses as had battlements, and beat them back for one day. On the next day, however, when the enemy were about to bring against them an engine from which it was intended to throw fire upon the wooden defences, and the army was already coming up, they set up a wooden tower on a house at the point where they thought the enemy most likely to bring up his engine and where the wall was most assailable, and carried up many jars and casks of water and big stones, and many men also ascended. But the house, being over-weighted, collapsed suddenly and with a great noise, annoying rather than frightening the Athenians who were near and saw it; but those who were at a distance, and especially those furthest off, thinking that in that quarter the place had already been taken, set off in flight for the sea and their ships.

CXVI. When Brasidas perceived that they were leaving the battlements and saw what was going on,

¹ The Athenians.
ὁρῶν, ἐπιφερόμενος τῷ στρατῷ εὐθὺς τὸ τείχισμα λαμβάνει, καὶ ὅσους ἐγκατέλαβε διέφθειρεν. 2 καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίοι τοῖς τε πλοίοις καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκλιπόντες τὸ χωρίον ἐς Παλλήνην διεκομίσθησαν· ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας (ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τῇ Δηλίῳ Ὁθηναίας ἱερόν, καὶ ἔτυχε κηρύξας, ὅτε ἐμελλε προσβάλλειν, τῷ ἐπιβάντι πρῶτῳ τοῦ τείχους τριάκοντα μνάς ἀργυρίου δώσειν) νομίσας ἄλλω τινὶ τρόπῳ ἢ ἀνθρωπεῖ τὴν ἀλώσιν γενέσθαι, τὰς τε τριάκοντα μνᾶς τῇ θεῷ ἀπέδωκεν ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὴν Δήλουν καθελὼν καὶ ἀνασκευάσας τέμενος ἀνήκεν ἀπαν. 3 καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ χειμῶνος ἁ τε εἰς τῶν χωρίων καθίστατο καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπεβούλευεν· καὶ τοῦ χειμῶνος διελθόντος ὄγδοον ἔτος ἐτελεύτα τῷ πολέμῳ.

ΟΧΥΒ. Δακεδαλίμονιοι δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίοι ἄμα ἵνα τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς ἐκεχειρίᾳ ἐποίησαντο ἐναύσιον, νομίσαντες Ἀθηναίοι μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὸν Βρασίδαν σφῶν προσαποστήσαι οὐδὲν πρὶν παρασκευάσαντο καθ' ἱσυχίαν, καὶ ἄμα, εἰ καλῶς σφίσιν ἔχοι, κἂν ἐξυμβῆναι τὰ πλεῖον, Δακεδαλίμονιοι δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠγούμενοι ἀπερ ἐδέδισαν φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ γενομένης ἄνοικχής κακῶν καὶ ταλαιπωρίας μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμήσειν αὐτοὺς πειρασμένους ἐξυπάλληλοι τε καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρασ φήσιν ἀποδόντας σπουδᾶς
he bore down at once with the army and took the fort, destroying all that he found in it. And so the Athenians left the place in their small boats and ships and were thus conveyed to Pallene. Now there is a temple of Athena in Lekyll, and it chanced that Brasidas, when he was on the point of making the assault, had proclaimed that he would give thirty minas in silver to him who first mounted the wall; but thinking now that the capture had been effected by some other means than human, he paid the thirty minas to the goddess for the temple, and after razing Lekyll and clearing the ground consecrated the whole place as a sacred precinct. Then for the rest of the winter he proceeded to set in order the affairs of the places that he held and to plot against the other towns; and with the conclusion of this winter ended the eighth year of the war.

CXVII. But at the opening of spring in the following summer season, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians at once concluded an armistice for a year. The Athenians believed that Brasidas would thus not be able to cause any more of their allies to revolt and they meanwhile could make preparations at their leisure, and at the same time that, should it be to their advantage, they might make further agreements; the Lacedaemonians, on their part, thought that the Athenians were moved by precisely the fears which actuated them, and that, when once they had enjoyed a respite from troubles and hardships, they would, after such an experience, be more anxious to be reconciled, restore their men and make

1 £122, $580.
2 i.e., if an armistice did not intervene, Brasidas might detach still other allies from them.
2 ποιησασθαι καὶ ἐς τὸν πλεῖω χρόνον. τοὺς γὰρ δὴ ἀνδρᾶς περὶ πλείονος ἐποιοῦντο κομίσασθαι, ἐως ἐτὶ Βρασίδας ἦτυχεὶ. καὶ ἐμελλὼν ἐπὶ μεῖζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα κατα- στήσαντος τῶν μεν στέρεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι κινδυνεύειν, εἰ καὶ κρατήσειαν.

3 γίγνεται οὖν ἐκεχειρία αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ξυμ- μάχοις ἗δεν.

CXVIII. "Περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαντεῖου τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθίου δοκεῖ ἡμῖν χρήσαντα τὸν βουλόμενον ἀδόλως καὶ ἀδεῶς κατὰ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους. τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους ταῦτα δοκεῖ καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς παρόυσιν. Βουςτοὺς δὲ καὶ Φωκέας πείσειν φασίν ἐς δύναμιν προσκη- ρκευόμενοι.

3 "Περὶ δὲ τῶν χρημάτων τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιμέ- λεσθαι ὅπως τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἐξευρήσομεν, ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαῖως τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρώμενοι καὶ ἕμεις καὶ ἕμεις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ βουλόμενοι, τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρώμενοι πάντες. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦτων ἐδοξέ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις κατὰ ταύτα.

"Τάδε δὲ ἐδοξέ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις, ἐὰν σπουδᾶς ποιῶνται οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῶν μένειν ἐκατέρους ἔχοντας ἀπερ νῦν ἔχομεν, τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ Κορυφασίῳ ἐντὸς τῆς Βουφράδος καὶ τοῦ Τομέως μένοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἐν

1 ἐως, so Hude and van Herwerden from schol. on Ar. Pax 479; MSS. ἐως.
2 εἰ καὶ κρατήσειαν, Madvig's conjecture, for καὶ κρατήσειαν of the MSS.

410
a truce for a longer time. For it was their men they made a special point of recovering, while Brasidas was still in good luck. If he were still further successful and established the contending forces on an even footing, the likelihood was that they would still be deprived of these men, and it would be doubtful whether, fighting on equal terms, they could prevail with the remainder. Accordingly an armistice was concluded for them and their allies on the following terms:

CXVIII. "Concerning the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we agree that whosoever will shall consult it without fraud and without fear, according to the usages of our forefathers. These things seem good to the Lacedaemonians and the allies that are present; and they promise to send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians and persuade them so far as they can.

"Concerning the treasure of the god we agree to take care to find out all wrong-doers, rightly and justly following the usages of our forefathers, you and we and all others that wish to do so, all following the usages of our forefathers. Concerning these things, then, it is so agreed by the Lacedaemonians and the rest of the confederates on such terms.

"The following agreements also are made by the Lacedaemonians and the rest of the confederates, that in case the Athenians make a treaty, we shall each of us remain on our own territory, keeping what we now have: the Athenian garrison in Coryphasion ¹ shall keep within Buphras and Tomeus;

¹ The Lacedaemonian name of Pylos (ch. iii. 2). Buphras and Tomeus were two high points on the coast.
Κυθήρους μὴ ἐπιμισγομένους ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, μὴ τε ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς μὴ τε αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τοὺς δ' ἐν Νισαίᾳ καὶ Μινώα μὴ ὑπερβαίνοντας τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ Νίσου ἔπι τὸ Ποσειδώνιον, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Ποσειδώνιου εὐθὺς ἔπι τὴν γέφυραν τὴν ἐς Μινώαν (μηδὲ Μεγαρέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὑπερβαίνειν τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην), καὶ τὴν νῆσον, ἡπέρ ἐλαβον οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, ἔχοντας, μηδὲ ἐπιμισγομένους μηδετέρους μηδετέρως, καὶ τὰ ἐν Τροζῆν, ὀσαπερ νῦν ἔχουσι καθ' ἄ  ἔμνεθεντο πρὸς Ἀθηναίους.

5 "Καὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ χρωμένους, ὅσα ἂν κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, Δακεδαῖοντος καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους πλεῖν μὴ μακρὰ νηῦ, ἀλλὰ δὲ κατηρεῖ πλοῖον ἐς πεντακόσια τάλαντα ἀγοντι μέτρα.

6 "Κύρικι δὲ καὶ πρεσβεῖα καὶ ἀκολούθους, ὁπόσοις ἂν δοκῇ, περὶ καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου καὶ δικῶν ἐς Πελοπόννησον καὶ Ἀθήνας σπουδᾶσ εἶναι ἰσοῦ καὶ ἀπιστοῦ, καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν.

7 "Τοὺς δὲ αὐτομόλους μὴ δέχεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, μὴτε ἐλεύθερον μὴτε δοῦλον, μὴτε ἡμᾶς μὴτε ἡμᾶς.

8 "Δίκαι τε διδόναι ὑμᾶς τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς ὑμῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, τὰ ἁμφιλογα δίκη διαλύνοντας ἀνευ πολέμου.

1 M reads ἀπὸ τοῦ Νισαίου.
2 Kirchhoff's correction for καὶ ὅλα of the MSS.

1 cf. chs. liii., liv. 2 cf. ch. lxix.
3 cf. iii. li.; iv. lxvii.
4 Lit. "the gates leading from the shrine [or statue, as παρά might indicate] of Nisus."
that in Cythera\(^1\) shall have no communication with the territory of the Lacedaemonian allies, neither we with them nor they with us; that in Nisaea\(^2\) and Minoa\(^3\) shall not cross the road leading from the gates of the shrine of Nisus\(^4\) to the Poseidonium, and from the Poseidonium straight to the bridge\(^5\) at Minoa (nor shall the Megarians or their allies cross this road); as to the island \(^6\) which the Athenians took, they shall retain it, and neither party shall communicate with the other; and finally, in the territory of Troezen,\(^7\) the Athenians shall retain whatever they now have in accordance with the agreements which the Troezenians have made with the Athenians.

"As to the use of the sea, in so far as they use it along their own coast and along that of their confederacy, the Lacedaemonians and their allies may sail, not with a ship of war, but with any rowing-vessel up to five hundred talents burden.\(^8\)

"There shall be safe conduct for herald and envoys and their attendants, as many as shall seem proper, on their way to the Peloponnesus and to Athens for the purpose of bringing the war to an end and for the arbitration of disputes, both going and coming, by land and by sea.

"DeserTERS shall not be received during this time, whether freemen or slaves, either by you or by us.

"You shall give satisfaction to us and we to you according to our ancestral customs, settling disputed points by arbitration without war.

---

\(^1\) Connecting Minoa with the mainland; cf. iii. ii. 3.
\(^2\) Probably Atalante is meant; cf. iii. lxxxix. 3; v. xviii. 7.
\(^3\) The Athenian fortification on the isthmus of Methana; cf. ch. xlv. 2.
\(^4\) About 12\(\frac{1}{2}\) tons.
"Τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξύμμαχοις
9 ταῦτα δοκεῖ εἰ δὲ τι ὑμῖν εἰτε κάλλιον εἰτε
dικαιότερον τοῦτον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἱόντες ἐς Λακε-
dαιμονα διδάσκετε, οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἀποστήσονται,
ὅσα ἂν δίκαια λέγητε, οὔτε οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
10 οὔτε οἱ ξύμμαχοι. οἱ δὲ ἱόντες τέλος ἔχουντες
ἱόντων, ἡπερ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμᾶς ἐκελεύετε. αἱ δὲ
σπονδαὶ ένιαυτὸν ἐσονται."
11 Ἑδοξέν τῷ δῆμῳ. Ἀκαμαντῖς ἐπρυτάνευε,
Φαίνιππος ἑγραμμάτευε, Νικιάδης ἐπεστάτει.
Δάχξης εἶτε, τυχή ἀγαθή τῇ Ἀθηναίων, ποιεῖσθαι
tὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, καθ᾽ ἐξυγχωροῦσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι
cαι οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν καὶ ὡμολόγησαν ἐν τῷ
dήμῳ τῆν ἑκεχειρίαν εἶναι ἐνιαυτὸν, ἄρχειν δὲ
τῆνδε τῆν ἡμέραν, τετράδα ἐτπ δέκα τοῦ Ἐλαφη-
13 βολιῶνος μηνὸς. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἱόντας ὡς
ἀλλήλους πρέσβεις καὶ κήρυκας ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς
λόγους, καθ᾽ ὅ τι ἔσται ἡ κατάλυσις τοῦ πολέμου.
14 ἐκκλησίαν δὲ ποιήσαντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ
τοὺς πρυτάνεις 2 πρῶτον περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης βουλεύ-
sασθαι Ἀθηναίων καθ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν ἐσίη 3 ἡ πρεσβεία
περὶ τῆς καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου. σπείρασθαι
dὲ αὐτίκα μᾶλα τὰς πρεσβείας ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ τὰς
παρούσας ἡ μὴν ἐμμενεῖν ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς τῶν
ἐνιαυτῶν.

CXIX. Ταῦτα ξυνέθεντο Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ
1 Hude inserts δ', after Kirchhoff.
2 The change of subject implies a relative clause; something like ἐν ἤ may have dropped out.
3 Hude reads ἂν ἐσίη, after Kirchhoff.
4 καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοῖς
Vulg. καὶ ὡμολόγησαν (Vulg. καὶ ὡμολόγησαν) deleted by Hude, after Kirchhoff.
BOOK IV. cxvii. 8-cxix. 1

"To the Lacedaemonians and their allies these things seem good; but if anything seems to you fairer or juster than these things, come to Lacedaemon and set forth your view; for neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies will reject any just proposal you may make. And let those who come come with full powers, as you also desired of us. And the truce shall be for a year."

1 Decreed by the people. The tribe Acamantis held the prytany, Phaeinippus was clerk, Niciades was president. Laches, invoking good fortune for the people of Athens, moved to conclude the armistice according to the terms to which the Lacedaemonians and their allies had consented; and it was agreed in the popular assembly that the armistice should be for a year, and should begin on that day, the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion. During this time envoys and heralds were to go from one state to the other and discuss proposals looking to the termination of the war. And the generals and prytanes were to call an assembly in which the Athenians should deliberate first of all about peace, on what terms the Lacedaemonian embassy for ending the war should be admitted. And the embassies now present should pledge themselves at once, in the presence of the people, to abide by the truce for the year.

CXIX. These agreements the Lacedaemonians and their allies made with the Athenians and their allies

1 The prescript of the Athenian decree which ratified the truce is quoted verbatim (italics above).
ξυμμάχους μηνὸς ἐν Λακεδαιμονίῳ Γεραστίου
2 δωδεκάτη. ἧνοτέθεντο δὲ καὶ ἐστενδοντο Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν οίδε. Ταῦρος Ἐκετιμίδα, Ἀθηναῖος Περικλείδα, Φιλοχαρίδας Ἐρυξιλάδα. Κορινθίων δὲ Αἰνέας Ὡκυτῶν, Εὐφαμίδας Ἀριστονύμου. Σικυωνίων δὲ Δαμότιμος Ναυκράτος, Ὀνάσιμος Μεγακλέους. Μεγαρέων δὲ Νίκασος Κεκάλου, Μενεκράτης Ἀμφιδώρου. Ἐπιδιαρίων δὲ Ἀμφίας Εὐπαιλίδα. 1 Ἀθηναῖον δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ Νικόστρατος Διειστέροις, Νικίας Νικηράτου, Αὐτοκλῆς Τολμαίου.
3 Ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐκεχειρία αὐτὴ ἐγένετο, καὶ ξυνησαν ἐν αὐτῇ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων σπουδῶν διὰ παντὸς ἐς λόγους.

CXX. Περὶ δὲ τὰς ἡμέρας ταύτας αἰσ ἐπηρχόντο Σκιώνη ἐν τῇ Παλλήνῃ πόλει ἀπέστη ἀπ’ Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Βρασίδαν. φασὶ δὲ οἱ Σκιώναιοι Πελληνῆς μὲν εἶναι ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, πλέοντας δ’ ἀπὸ Τροίας σφῶν τοὺς πρώτους κατενεχθῆναι ἐς τὸ χωρίον τούτῳ τῷ χειμῶνι ὃ ἐχρήσαντο
2 Ἀχαιοὶ, καὶ αὐτοῦ οἰκήσαι. ἀποστάσι δ’ αὐτοῖς ὁ Βρασίδας διέπλευσε νυκτὸς ἐς τὴν Σκιώνην, τριήρει μὲν φιλία προπλεούση, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν κελητηρίῳ ἀπωθεὶ ἐφεπόμενος, ὑπὸ δὲ μὲν τῳ τῶν

1 Hude’s conjecture; Bekker Εὐπαιλίδα, for Εὐπαιλίδα of most MSS.

1 Grote is probably right in assuming that the twelfth of Gerastius corresponded to the fourteenth of Elaphebolion.
2 These consisted of formal libations.
and ratified them by oath at Lacedaemon on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius. And those who concluded and ratified the truce on behalf of the Lacedaemonians were the following: Taurus son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus son of Pericleidas, Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas; on behalf of the Corinthians, Aeneas son of Ocytus, Euphamidas son of Aristonymus; on behalf of the Sicyonians, Damotimus son of Naucrates, Onasimus son of Megacles; on behalf of the Megarians, Nicasus son of Cecalus, Menocrates son of Amphidorus; on behalf of the Epidaurians, Amphias son of Eupalidas; on behalf of the Athenians, the generals Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes, Nicias son of Niceratus, Autocles son of Tomaeus.

Such, then, were the terms on which the armistice was concluded, and during its continuance they were constantly conferring about a truce of longer duration.

CXX. About the very time when they were performing the rites of confirmation, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians and went over to Brasidas. The Scionaeans assert that they came originally from Pellene in the Peloponnesus, and that the first settlers in Scione were driven to this place on their way back from Troy by the storm which the Achaeans encountered, and settled here. On their revolt, Brasidas crossed over by night to Scione, a friendly trireme sailing ahead and he himself following in a skiff at some distance behind. His idea was that, if he should meet with any boat

3 Pellene was in Achaea, near Sicyon; the people are mentioned as allies of Sparta in II. ix. 2.
4 Referred to again in VI. ii. 3. 5 i.e. from Torone.
κέλητος μείζονι πλοίῳ περιτυχάνοι, ἢ τριήρης ἀμύνοι αὐτῷ, 1 ἀντιπάλου δὲ ἄλλης τριήρους ἐπιγενομένης οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἔλασσον νομίζου τρέψεσθαι, ἄλλη ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ 3 αὐτὸν διασώσειν, περαιωθεὶς δὲ καὶ ξύλον ποιήσας τῶν Σκιωναίων ἐλέγεν ἃ τε ἐν τῇ Ὄλυμβῳ καὶ Τορώνῃ, καὶ προσέτει πάντων 2 ἡξιωτάτους αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐπαίνου, οὕτως τῆς Παλα- λήνης ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ὑπειλημμένης ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων Ποτείδαιων ἐχόντων καὶ οὐνες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ νησίωτα ἀντεπάγγελτοι ἐχώρησαν πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ σὺν ἀνεμειναν ἀστολία ἀνάγκην σφίσι προσγενέσθαι περὶ τοῦ φανερὸς οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ σημείον τ' εἶναι τοῦ καὶ ἄλλο τε ἀν αὐτοῦς τῶν μεγίστων ἀνδρείως ὑπομειναί· εἰ τε 3 τεθήσεται κατὰ νοῦν τὰ πράγματα, πιστοτάτους τε τῇ ἁλθείᾳ ἡγήσασθαι αὐτοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων φίλους καὶ τάλλα τιμήσειν.

CXXI. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Σκιωναίοι ἐπήρθησαν τε τοῖς λάγοις καὶ ἀρασήσαντες πάντες ὑμοίως, καὶ οἷς προτεροῦν μὴ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρασσόμενα, τὸν τε πόλεμον διενούσι προθύμοις οἰσειν καὶ τὸν Βρασίδαν τὰ τ' ἄλλα καλῶς ἐδέξαντο καὶ δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν ὡς ἐλευθεροῦντα τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἱδίᾳ δὲ ἐταινίων τε καί 2 προσήρχουσα δύστερ ἄθλητη, ὃ δὲ τοῦ τε παραντικα μυλακῆς τινα αὐτοῖς ἐγκαταλειπὼν διεβῆ πάλιν καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ στρατιῶν πλείω.

1 The corrected reading of two minor MSS.; all the better MSS. aorh. Hude deletes, after Poppe.
2 παῖσας, Hude adopts Krüger's conjecture, ϕάσκων.
3 τε added by Krüger.

418
larger than a skiff, the trireme would protect him, but if another trireme of equal strength should come along it would turn, not against the smaller boat, but against the ship, and in the meantime he could get safely across. He succeeded in crossing, and having called a meeting of the Scionaeans repeated what he had said at Acanthus and Torone, adding that their own conduct had been most praiseworthy of all because, when Pallene was cut off at the isthmus by the Athenians who held Potidaea and when they were nothing but islanders, they had not supinely awaited the compulsion of necessity in a matter that was manifestly for their own good, but had of their own free will taken the side of freedom; and that, he said, was a proof that they would endure like men any other peril however great; and if things should be settled according to his wish, he would consider them in very truth most loyal friends of the Lacedaemonians and would honour them in other respects.

CXXI. The Scionaeans were elated at his words, and all alike, even those who before were not satisfied with what was being done, took courage and determined to carry on the war with spirit. Brasidas they not only welcomed with other honours but publicly crowned him with a golden crown as liberator of Hellas, and privately decked him with garlands and made offerings as for a victor in the games. And he, leaving them a guard for the present, crossed back, but not long afterwards he led over a
ἐπεραίωσε, βουλόμενος μετ’ αὐτῶν τῆς τῆς Μένδης καὶ τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἀποπειράσαι, ἡγούμενος καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βοηθῆσαι ἃν ὡς ἐς νῆσον καὶ βουλόμενος φθάσαι καὶ τι αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπράσετο ἐς τὰς πόλεις ταύτας προδοσίας πέρι.

CXXII. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐμελλεν ἐγχειρῆσεν ταῖς πόλεις ταύταις ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τριήρει ὁ τὴν ἐκεινείαν περιαγγέλλοντες ἀφικνούνται παρ’ αὐτὸν, Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν Ἀριστώνυμος, Δακεδαϊ-2 μοῖνοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι. καὶ ἡ μὲν στρατιὰ πάλιν διέβη ἐς Τορώνην, οἱ δὲ τῷ 1 Βρασίδα ψηλλότου τὴν ξυνθήκην, καὶ ἐδέξαντο πᾶντες ὁ ἐπὶ Θράκης 3 ξύμμαχοι Δακεδαιμονίων τὰ πεπραγμένα. Ἀρι-στώνυμος δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κατήκει, Σκιο-ναίοις δὲ αἰσθόμενος ἐκ λογισμοῦ τῶν ἡμερῶν ὧτι ὤστερον ἀφετήριοι, οὐκ ἔφη ἐνσπόντιοι ἔσεσθαί. Βρασίδας δὲ ἀντέλεγε πολλά, ὡς 4 πρότερον, καὶ οὐκ ἀφίει τὴν πόλιν. ὡς δ’ ἀπῆγ-γελλεν ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναὶς ὁ Ἀριστώνυμος περὶ αὐτῶν, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εὐθὺς ἔτοιμοι ἦσαν στρα-τεύειν ἐπὶ τὴν Σκιώνην. οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμονίοι πρέσβεις πέμψαντες παραβῆσθαι ἐφάσαν αὐ-τοὺς τὰς σπονδαῖς, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀντεποιοῦντο Βρασίδα πιστεύοντες, δίκη τε ἔτοιμοι ἦσαν περὶ 5 αὐτῆς κρίνεσθαι. οἱ δὲ δίκη μὲν οὐκ ἡθέλον κινδυνεῖν, στρατεύειν δὲ ὡς τάχιστα, ὅργην ποιούμενοι εἰ καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς νῆσοις ἡδὴ ὄντες ἀξιούσι σφόν ἀφίστασθαι, τῇ κατὰ γῆν Δακε-6 δαιμονίων ὁχύρῳ ἀνωφελεῖ πιστεύοντες εἶχε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια περὶ τῆς ἀποστάσεως μᾶλλον ἦ

1 τῇ deleted by Hude, after Stahl.
larger army, wishing in concert with them to make an attempt upon Mende and Potidaca; for he thought the Athenians would bring succour to Pallene as though it were an island, and he wished to anticipate them; besides, he was negotiating with these towns with a view to their betrayal.

CXXII. So he was about to attack these towns; but in the meantime those who were carrying round the news of the armistice arrived at his headquarters in a trireme, Aristonymus from Athens and Athenaeus from Lacedaemon. Whereupon his army crossed back to Torone; and the messengers formally announced the agreement to Brasidas, and all the Thracian allies of the Lacedaemonians acquiesced in what had been done. Aristonymus assented for the other places, but, finding on a calculation of the days that the Scioneans had revolted after the agreement, he said that they would not be included in the truce. Brasidas, however, earnestly maintained that they had revolted before, and would not give up the city. Whereupon Aristonymus sent word to Athens about these matters, and the Athenians were ready at once to make an expedition against Scione. But the Lacedaemonians sent envoys, saying that the Athenians would be violating the truce, and trusting the word of Brasidas they laid claim to the town and were ready to arbitrate about it. The Athenians, however, were inclined, not to risk arbitration, but to make an expedition as quickly as possible, being enraged to think that even the inhabitants of the islands now presumed to revolt, relying on the strength which the Lacedaemonians had on land, useless though it was to them.\(^1\) Moreover, the truth about the

\(^1\) Because the Athenians commanded the sea.
οί Ἀθηναίοι ἐδικαίουν διό γὰρ ἰμέραις ὑστερον ἀπέστησαν οἱ Σκιωναῖοι. ψῆφισμά τ' εὐθὺς ἐποιήσαντο, Κλέωνος γνώμης πεισθέντες, Σκιώναιος ἐξελείν τε καὶ ἀποκτείναι, καὶ τάλλα ἡσυχάζοντες ἐς τοῦτο παρεσκευάζοντο.

CXXIII. Ἔν τούτῳ δὲ Μενδὴ ἀφίσταται αὐτῶν, πόλις ἐν τῇ Παλλήνῃ, Ἐρετρίδῶν ἀποικία, καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐδέξατο ὁ Βρασίδας, οὐ νομίζον ἄδικείν, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκεχειρίᾳ φανερῶς προσεχώρησαν ἐστὶ γὰρ ἃ καὶ αὐτὸς ἑνεκάλει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παραβαινεῖν τὰς σπουδὰς. δὲ δὲ οἱ Μενδαῖοι μᾶλλον ἔτολμοντο, τὴν τε τοῦ Βρασίδου γνώμην ὁρῶντες ἐταίμην, τεκμαίρομενοι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Σκιώνης ὅτι οὐ προωδίου, καὶ ἁμα τῶν πρασοντῶν σφίσιν ὅλων τὲ ὅντων καὶ ὡς τότε ἐμέλλησαν, συκέτι ἀνεντο, ἀλλὰ περὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς φοβουμένων τὸ κατάδηλον καὶ καταβιασμένων παρὰ γνώμην τοὺς πολλοὺς.

3 οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι εὐθὺς πυθόμενοι, πολλῷ ἐτι μᾶλλον ὀργισθέντες παρεσκευάζοντο ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρως τὰς πόλεις. καὶ Βρασίδας προσδεχόμενος τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὐτῶν ὅπεκκομίζει ἐς Ὅλυνθον τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας τῶν Σκιωναίων καὶ Μενδαῖων, καὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων αὐτῶν πεντακοσίων ὁπλίτας διεπεμψε καὶ πελταστὰς τριακοσίων Χαλκιδῶν, ἀρχοντά τε τῶν ἀπάντων Πολυδαμίδων. καὶ οἱ μὲν τὰ περὶ σφὰς αὐτοὺς, ὡς ἐν τάχει παρεσομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων, κοινῇ ἡμτρετήζοντο.

CXXIV. Βρασίδας δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας ἐν τούτῳ στρατεύουσιν ἁμα ἐπὶ Ἀρράβαιον τὸ δεύτερον σφᾶς, Krüger deletes, followed by Hude.
revolt was rather as the Athenians claimed; for the Scionaeans revolted two days after the agreement. The Athenians, then, immediately passed a vote, on the motion of Cleon, to destroy Scione and put the citizens to death. And so, keeping quiet in other matters, they made preparations for this.

CXXIII. Meanwhile Mende revolted from them, a city in Pallene, and an Eretrian colony. And Brasidas received them, thinking they were not doing wrong in coming over to him, though clearly it was in the time of the armistice; for there were some points in which he himself charged the Athenians with breaking the truce. Wherefore the Mendaeans also became more bold, for they saw the resolute attitude of Brasidas, and also inferred it from the fact that he did not give up Scione. Moreover, the conspirators among them were few in number, and, once they had formed the design, from that moment showed no slackness, but were in fear of their lives in case of detection and coerced the multitude even against their will. But the Athenians, when they heard the news, were far more enraged, and straightforward made preparations against both cities. And Brasidas, expecting their coming, conveyed away to Olynthus in Chalcidice the women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans, and sent over to protect them five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, with Polydamidas as commander of the whole. And the two cities together made preparations for their defence, in the belief that the Athenians would soon be at hand.

CXXIV. Brasidas and Perdiccas meanwhile marched together a second time\(^1\) to Lynceus against

\(^1\) cf. ch. lxxxiii.
ἐς Δύνκον. καὶ ἤγον ὁ μὲν ὁκράτει Μακεδόνων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων Ἑλλήνων ὀπλίτας, ὁ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς αὐτού τεριλούτοις τῶν Πελοποννησίων Χαλκιδεάς καὶ Ἄκανθίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ δύναμιν ἐκάστων. ξύμπαν δὲ τὸ ὁπλιτικὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τρισχίλιοι μάλιστα, ἵππης δ’ οἱ πάντες ἤκολούθουν Μακεδόνων ἐξ Ἐλληνοῦ ὁμόγειος, καὶ ἄλλος ὁμόλος τῶν βαρβάρων πολύσ. ἐσβαλόντες δὲ ἐς τὴν Ἀρραβαίον καὶ εὐρόντες ἀντεσσαριστοτευνίκας αὐτοῦ τοὺς Λυγκηστάς, ἀντεκαθέζων καὶ 3 αὐτοῖ. καὶ ἐχόντων τῶν μὲν πεζῶν λόφων ἐκατέρωθεν, πεδίον δὲ τοῦ μέσου ὄντος, οἱ ἵππης ἐς αὐτὸ καταδραμόντες ἰππομάχησαν πρώτα ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπείτα δὲ καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ ὁ Περδίκκας, προελθόντων προτέρων ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου μετὰ τῶν ἵππεων τῶν Λυγκηστῶν ὀπλιτῶν καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων μάχεσθαι, ἀντεπαγαγόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄνωθεν καὶ ἐτρέψαν τοὺς Λυγκηστάς, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν διέφθειραν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ διαφυγόντες 4 πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ὀσῦχαζον. μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ τροπαίον στάσαντες δύο μὲν ὡς τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἐπέσχον, τοὺς Ἰλλυριουσ μένουτες, οἱ ἐτυγχον τῷ Περδίκκῃ μισθοῦ μέλλοντες ἤξειν. ἐπείτα ὁ Περδίκκας ἐβούλετο προϊέναι ἐπὶ τᾶς τοῦ Ἀρραβαίου κόμως καὶ μὴ καθήσθαι, Βρασίδας δὲ τῆς τῇ Μένδης περιορώμενος, μὴ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προτέρου ἐπιπλευσάντων τι πάθη, καὶ ἀμα τῶν Ἰλλυρίων οὐ παρόντων, οὐ πρόθυμος ἦν, ἄλλα ἀναχωρεῖν μᾶλλον.

CXXV. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ διαφερομένων αὐτῶν ἠγγέλθη ὅτι καὶ οἱ Ἰλλυριοὶ μετ' Ἀρραβαίου,
Arrhabaeus. The latter led the force of the Macedonians, over whom he held sway, and a body of Hellenic hoplites resident among them; the former led not only the Peloponnesian troops which were left in the country, but also such forces from Chalcidice, Acanthus and the other towns as they could each furnish. The total Hellenic force was about three thousand; the cavalry that went with them, Macedonians and Chalcidians, were all told a little less than one thousand, and there was besides a great multitude of barbarians. Invading the country of Arrhabaeus and finding the Lyncestians encamped against them, they also took up a position facing them. The infantry occupied a hill on either side, with a plain between, while the cavalry of both armies at first galloped down into the plain and engaged in battle; then Brasidas and Perdiccas, after the Lyncestian hoplites had come forward from the hill in conjunction with their own cavalry and were ready to fight, advanced also in their turn and joined battle, routing the Lyncestians and destroying many, while the rest escaped to the high places and kept quiet. After this they set up a trophy and halted for two or three days, awaiting the Illyrians, who had been hired by Perdiccas and were momentarily expected. Then Perdiccas wished, on their arrival, to go forward against the villages of Arrhabaeus instead of sitting idle; but Brasidas was solicitous about Mende, fearing that it might suffer some harm if the Athenians should sail there before his return; and, besides, the Illyrians had not appeared, so that he was not eager to go on, but rather to retreat.

CXXV. Meanwhile, as they were disputing, it was announced that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas.
ΤΗΡΟΠΤΕΩΝ ΠΕΡΔΙΚΚΑΝ, ΓΕΓΕΝΗΤΑΙ, ΩΣΤΕ ΗΔΗ ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ ΜΕΝ ΔΟΚΟΥΝ ΑΝΑΧΩΡΕΙΝ ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΔΕΟΥΣ ΑΥΤΟΥΝ, ὄΝΤΩΝ ἈΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ ΜΑΧΙΜΩΝ, ΚΥΡΩΘΕΝ ΔΕ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΕΚ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑΣ ΟΠΗΝΙΚΑ ΧΡΗ ΟΡΜΑΣΘΑΙ, ΝΥΚΤΟΣ ΤΕ ἘΠΙΓΕΝΕΜΕΝΗΣ, ΟΙ ΜΕΝ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΠΛΗΘΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΒΑΡΒΑΡΩΝ ΕΥΘΟΣ ΦΟΒΗΣΑΝΤΕΣ, ΩΣΠΕΡ ΦΙΛΕΙ ΜΕΓΑΛΑ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΑ ἈΣΑΦΩΣ ΕΚΠΛΗΓΝΥΣΘΑΙ, ΚΑΙ ΝΟΜΙΖΑΝΤΕΣ ΠΟΛΛΑΠΛΑΣΙΟΥΣ ΜΕΝ Ἡ ΗΛΙΟΝ ΕΠΙΕΙΚΑ, ὍΣΟΝ ΔΕ ΟΥΤΩ ΠΑΡΕΙΝΑΙ, ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΝΕΙΣ ἙΣ ΑΙΦΝΙΔΙΟΝ ΦΥΓΗΝ ἘΧΩΡΟΥΝ ἘΠΙ ΟΙΚΟΥ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΠΕΡΔΙΚΚΑΝ ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΟΥΚ ΑΙΣΘΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ, ΏΣ ἘΓΝΩ, ἩΝΑΓΚΑΣΑΝ ΠΡΙΝ ΤΟΝ ΒΡΑΣΙΔΑΝ ἸΔΕΙΝ (ΑΠΩΘΕΝ ΓΑΡ ΠΟΛΥ 2 ἈΛΛΗΛΩΝ ΕΞΕΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΕΥΟΝΤΟ) ΠΡΟΑΠΕΛΘΕΙΝ. ΒΡΑΣΙΔΑΣ ΔΕ ἈΜΑ ΤΗ ἘΩ ΩΣ ΕΙΔΕ ΤΟΥΣ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΑΣ ΠΡΟΚΕΧΩΡΗΚΟΤΑΣ,1 ΤΟΥΣ ΤΟΝ ἩΛΙΟΥΥΝΙΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ἈΡΡΑΒΑΙΟΝ ΜΕΛΛΟΝΤΑΣ ΕΠΙΕΙΝΑΙ, ΞΥΝΑΓΑΓΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΣ ΕΣ ΤΕΤΡΑΓΩΝΟΝ ΤΑΞΙΝ ΤΟΥΣ ὈΠΛΙΤΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΨΙΛΟΝ ὈΜΙΛΟΝ ΕΣ ΜΕΣΟΝ ΛΑΒΘΩΝ, ΔΙΕΝΟΕΙΤΟ ἈΝΑ- 3 ΧΟΡΕΙΝ. ΕΚΔΡΟΜΟΥΣ ΔΕ, ΕΙ ΤΗ ΠΡΟΣΒΑΛΛΟΙΕΝ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ, ἘΤΑΞΕ ΤΟΥΣ ΝΕΩΤΑΤΟΥΣ, ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΑΔΑΣ ἘΞΟΝ ΤΡΙΑΚΟΣΙΟΝ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΟΝ ΓΝΩΜΗΝ ΕΙΧΕΝ ὙΠΟΧΡΟΡΟΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΤΟΝ ἘΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΠΡΩΤΟΙΣ ΠΡΟΣΚΕΙΣΟ- 4 ΜΕΝΟΙΣ ΟΝΘΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΟΙ ΑΜΥΝΕΣΘΑΙ. ΚΑΙ ΠΡΙΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΛΕΜΙΟΥΣ ΕΓΝΗΣΙΕΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΩΣ ΔΙΑ ΤΑΧΕΩΝ ΠΑΡΕΚΕΛΕΥ- ΣΑΤΟ ΤΟΙΣ ΣΤΡΑΤΙΩΤΑΙΣ ΤΟΙΔΕ. 

CXXXVI. "ΕΙ ΜΕΝ ΜΗ ὙΠΩΠΤΕΥΟΝ, ΑΝΘΡΕΣ ΠΕΛΟΠΟΝΝΗΣΙΟΙ, ΥΜΑΣ ΤΟ ΤΕ ΜΕΜΟΝΩΘΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΟΤΙ ΒΑΡΒΑΡΟΙ ΟΙ ΕΠΙΩΝΤΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ ᾿ΕΚΠΛΗΞΕΙΝ ἘΧΕΙΝ, ΟΥΚ ΛΟΙ ΟΜΟΙΩΣ ΔΙΔΑΧΗΝ ΑΜΑ ΤΗ ΠΑΡΑΚΕΛΕΥΣΕΙ

1 Hude adopto van Herwerden's conjecture, προανακηρυκότας.
and taken sides with Arrhabaeus; consequently, because of their fear of these people, who were warlike, both generals now agreed that it was best to retreat. But in consequence of their dispute nothing had been determined as to when they should set out; and when night came on the Macedonians and the mass of the barbarians immediately took fright, as large armies are wont to be smitten with unaccountable panic, and thinking that the advancing enemy were many times more numerous than they really were and were all but on them, betook themselves to sudden flight and hastened homewards. Perdiccas, who at first was not aware of their movement, was compelled, when he did learn of it, to go away without seeing Brasidas; for they were encamped far away from each other. But at daybreak, when Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had already decamped and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were about to come against him, he formed his hoplites into a square, put the crowd of light-armed troops in the centre, and was himself intending to retreat. He so stationed the youngest of his troops that they might dash out against the enemy, in case they attacked at any point, and proposed to take himself three hundred picked men and, bringing up the rear, to make a stand and beat off the foremost of the enemy whenever they pressed him hard. And before the enemy were near he exhorted his soldiers, so far as haste allowed, in the following words:

CXXVI. "Did I not suspect, men of Peloponnesus, that you are in a state of panic because you have been left alone, and because your assailants are barbarous and numerous, I should not offer you
THUCYDIDES

ἐποιούμην· νῦν δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀπόλειψιν τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων βραχεῖ ὑπομνῆματι καὶ παρανέσει τὰ μέγιστα πειρά
tὸ σομαῖ πείθειν. ἀγαθοὶς γὰρ εἰναι ὑμῖν προσῆκε τὰ πολέμια οὐ διὰ ἐνυμμάχων παρουσίαν ἐκά
στοτε, ἀλλὰ δι’ οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβήσθαι ἑτέρων, οὖν μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολεμεῖων
τοιούτων ἤκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ 1 πολλοί ὄλγων ἁρ
χοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἠλάσσουν, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχό
3 μενοι κρατεῖν. Βαρβάρους δὲ οὐδὲ νῦν ἀπειρία
dέδιτε, μαθεῖν χρῆ, ἐξ ὧν τε προηγώνισθε τοῖς
Μακεδόσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀφ’ ὧν ἔγω ἐλκάζων τε καὶ
4 ἄλλων ἀκοῆ ἐπίσταμαι, οὐ δεινοὺς ἐσομένους. καὶ
γὰρ ὅσα μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἁσθενῆ ὀντα τῶν πολεμίων
δόκησιν ἔχει ἀρχύος, διδαχὴ ἀληθῆς προσεγγισμένη2
περὶ αὐτῶν ἑθάρσουν μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀμνομένους·
οἵ δὲ βασιάως το πρόσεχον ἀγαθῶν, μὴ προειδός
5 τις ἂν αὐτοῖς τολμηρότερον προσφέροιτο. οὐτοὶ
dὲ τὴν μέλλῃσιν μὲν ἑχοὺς τοῖς ἀπείροις φο
βεράν καὶ γὰρ πλῆθει ὄψεως δεινοὶ καὶ βοής
μεγέθει ἀφόρητοι, ἢ τε διὰ κενῆς ἐπανάσεισις
τῶν ὅπλων ἔχει τινὰ δῆλωσιν ἀπειλῆς. προσ
μεῖξαι δὲ τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὰ οὐχ ὀμοίοι· οὔτε

1 οὐθ, Hude deletes, after Stephanus.
2 Hude adopts προσεγγισμένη, after Bekker.
instruction combined with encouragement. But as it is, in view of our abandonment by our allies and of the multitude of our opponents, I shall try by a brief reminder and by advice to impress upon you the most important considerations. For it is proper that you should be brave in war, not because of the presence of allies each and every time, but because of innate valour; nor should you be afraid of any number of aliens, you who do not come from states like theirs, but states in which, not the many rule the few, but rather the minority rule the majority, having acquired their power by no other means but superiority in fighting. And as for the barbarians, whom now in your inexperience you fear, you ought to know, both from the contest you have already had with the Macedonians among them,¹ and may gather from the knowledge I gain by inference and from reports of others, that they will not be formidable. For whenever the enemy's power conveys an impression of strength, but is in reality weak, correct information about them, when once it has been gained, tends rather to embolden their opponents; whereas, when the enemy possesses some solid advantage, if one has no previous knowledge of it, one would be only too bold in attacking them. Now as for these Illyrians, for those who have had no experience of them, the menace of their attack has terror; for their number is indeed dreadful to behold and the loudness of their battle-cry is intolerable, and the idle brandishing of their arms has a threatening effect. But for hand to hand fighting,

¹ i.e. the Lyncestians, who, according to ch. lxxxiii. 1 and II. xexi. 2, belonged to the Macedonians, and had been beaten, as stated in ch. cxxiv. 3.
γὰρ ταξιν ἔχοντες αἰσχυνθεὶν ἣν λιπεῖν τινα χωρὰν βιαζόμενοι, ἢ τε φυγή καὶ ἢ ἐφόδους αὐτῶν ἵσην ἔχουσα δόξαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρείων ἔχει (ἀυτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχη μάλιστ' ἂν καὶ πρόφασιν τοῦ σφέσθαι τινι πρεπόντως πορίσῃ), τοῦ τε ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν πιστότερον τὸ ἐκφοβήσειν ἕμας ἀκινδύνως ἡγοῦνται· ἐκείνο γὰρ ἂν πρὸ τοῦτον ἑχρῶντο. σαφῶς τε πάν τὸ προὔπάρχον δεινόν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὀρᾶτε ἔργῳ μὲν βραχὺ δυν, ὅφει δὲ καὶ ἄκοθ κατασπέρξον. ὁ ὑπομείναντες ἐπιφέρόμενον καὶ, ὅταν καρδός ἦ, κόσμῳ καὶ τάξιν αὕτω υπαγαγόντες, ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς βάσσον ἀφίξεσθε καὶ γνώσθησθε τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὄχλοι τοῖς μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἐφόδουν δεξαμένοις ἀποθεῖν ἀπειλᾶς τὸ ἀνδρείον μελλῆσαι ἐπικομποῦσιν, οὐ δ' ἂν ἐξῶσιν αὐτοῖς, κατὰ πόδας τὸ εὑψικοῦ ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεὶ ὄξεις ἐνδεικνυται."  

CXXVII. Τοιαύτα ὁ Βρασίδας παρανέσας ὑπήγα τὸ στράτευμα. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ἱδόντες πολλῆ βοὴ καὶ θορύβῳ προσέκειντο, νομίζοντες φεύγειν τε αὐτῶν καὶ καταλαβόντες διαφθειρεῖν. 2 καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς αἳ τε ἐκδρομαί ὅπη προσπότης ἀπήντων, καὶ αὐτῶς ἔχων τοὺς λογάδας ἐπικειμένους ὑφίστατο, τῇ τε πρώτῃ ὀρμῇ παρὰ γνώμην

1 Hulse emends to ἐκφοβήσειν, after Torstrick.
if their opponents but endure such threats, they are not the men they seem; for having no regular order, they would not be ashamed to abandon any position when hard pressed; and since flight and attack are considered equally honourable with them, their courage cannot be put to the test. Besides, a mode of fighting in which everyone is his own master will provide a man the best excuse for saving himself becomingly. They think, too, that it is a less risky game to try to frighten you from a safe distance than to meet you hand to hand; otherwise they would not have taken this course in preference to that. And so you clearly see that all that was at first formidable about them is but little in reality, startling merely to eye and ear. If you withstand all this in the first onrush, and then, whenever opportunity offers, withdraw again in orderly array, you will the sooner reach safety, and will hereafter know that mobs like these, if an adversary but sustain their first onset, merely make a flourish of valour with threats from afar in menace\(^1\) of attack, but if one yields to them, they are right upon his heels, quick enough to display their courage when all is safe."

CXXVII. After such words of admonition, Brasidas began to withdraw his army. On seeing this the barbarians came on with a mighty shouting and uproar, thinking that he was fleeing and that they could overtake and destroy his army. But the troops who had been selected to dash out met them wherever they charged, and Brasidas himself with his picked men sustained their attack; and so the Peloponnesians to their surprise withstood their first

\(^1\) Possibly μελάχοςει = "without coming to action."
THUCYDIDES

άντέστησαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπιφερομένους μὲν δεχόμενοι ἡμῖνοντα, ἡσυχαζόντων δὲ αὐτοῖς ὑπεχώ-
ρουν, τότε ὅς τῶν μετὰ τοῦ Βρασίδου Ἑλλήνων ἐν τῇ εὐρυχωρίᾳ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπέ-
σχοντο, μέρος δὲ τι καταλείποντες αὐτοὺς ἐπακο-
λουθοῦν προσβάλλειν, οἱ λοιποὶ χωρίσαντες δρόμοι ἐπὶ τὲ τοὺς φεύγοντας τῶν Μακεδόνων ὡς ἐντύχοιεν ἑκτείνουν καὶ τὴν ἐσβολήν, ἡ ἔστι μεταξὺ δυὸν λόφων στενῇ ἐς τὴν Ἀρραβαίον, ἡθάνει μετακατέλαβον, εἰδότες ὡς ὅσιαν ἅλλην τῷ Βρασίδᾳ ἀναχώρησιν. καὶ προσωπικοῦ ἄυτοῦ ἐς αὐτὸ ἡδὲ τὸ ἀπορον τῆς ὀδοῦ κυκλοῦται ὡς ἀποληψόμενοι.

CXXVIII. 'Ὁ δὲ γροῦς προείπε τοῖς μεθ' αὐτοῦ τριακοσίοις, ὅτι ἥτιον μᾶλλον ἀν ἔλειν τῶν λόφων, χωρίσαντας πρὸς αὐτὸν δρόμῳ ὡς τάχιστα ἐκαστὸς δύναται ἀνευ τάξεως, πειράσαι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκρούσαι τοὺς ἧδη ἑπόντας ὑμῖν ἄρα ταράττον ἔστιν τόκος, ἵνα ταράττον ὑμὶν σφῶν αὐτόσε 2 προσμείζατε. καὶ οἱ μὲν προσπεσόντες ἐκράτησαν τε τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ λόφου, καὶ ἡ πλείων ἡδὲ στρατιά τῶν Ἑλλήνων ῥάθων πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐπορεύοντο: οἱ γάρ βαρβάροι καὶ ἐφοβιζόμενοι, τῆς τροπῆς αὐτοῖς ἑνταῦθα γενομένης σφῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ μετεωροῦ, καὶ ἐς τὸ πλέον οὕκετ' ἐπηκολούθουν, νομίζοντε καὶ ἐν μεθορίοις εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἡδὲ καὶ διαπεφε-

3 γέναι. Βρασίδας δὲ ὅσα ἀντελάβετο τῶν μετεω-
ρων, κατὰ ἀσφάλειαν μᾶλλον ἑων αὐθημεροῦν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς 'Αρμισαν πρῶτον τῆς Περδίκκου

4 ἀρχῆς, καὶ αὐτοὶ ὀργίζομενοι οἱ στρατιῶται τῇ προαναχωρήσει τῶν Μακεδόνων, ὡς εἴνετυχον

1 Poppo's correction for ξιόστα of the MSS.
onset and continued to receive their attacks and repulse them, but when they ceased, themselves retired. Thereupon most of the barbarians refrained from attacking the Hellenes under Brasidas in the open country, and leaving a portion of their force to follow and harass them, the rest, advancing on the run after the fleeing Macedonians, slew them as they came upon them, and getting ahead of them occupied the narrow pass between two hills which led into the country of Arrhabaeus, knowing that there was no other way of retreat for Brasidas. And just as he was coming to the most difficult part of the road, they began to encircle him with a view to cutting him off.

CXXVIII. But he perceived their intention and told his three hundred to break ranks and go at a run, each as fast as he could, to that one of the hills which he thought could be taken more easily and try to dislodge the barbarians already there before the larger outflanking body could come up. They accordingly attacked and overcame the men on the hill, and so the main body of the Hellenes now more easily made their way to it; for the barbarians, finding that their own men had been dislodged from the high ground, became alarmed and followed no further, thinking that the enemy were already on the frontier and had made good their escape. Brasidas, however, when he had gained the heights, proceeded in more security and arrived the same day at Arnisa, the first town in the dominions of Perdiccas. As for his soldiers, they were enraged at the Macedonians for having gone ahead in retreat, and whenever they came upon any ox-teams of
κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ξεύγεσιν αὐτῶν θησεκὼς ἦ εἰ τινι σκεύει ἑκπεπτωκότι, οὐ ἐν νυκτερινῇ καὶ φοβερᾷ ἀναχωρήσει εἰκὸς ἢν ξυμβῆναι, τὰ μὲν ὑπολυ- ντες κατέκοπτον, τῶν δὲ οἰκείωσιν ἐποιοῦντο. 5 ἀπὸ τούτου τε πρῶτον Περδίκκας Βρασίδαν τε πολέμιον ἐνόμισε καὶ ἐς τὸ λαοῦ τὸν Πελοποννησίων τῇ μὲν γυναῖκὶ δεί Αθηναίους οὐ ξύνθες μίσος εἰχε, τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων ξυμφόρων δια- ναστάς ἐπρασσεν διὸ τρόπῳ τάχιστα τοῖς μὲν ξυμβῆσεται, τῶν δὲ ἀπαλάξεται.

CXXIX. Βρασίδας δὲ ἀναχωρήσας ἐκ Μακε- δονίας ἐς Τορώνην καταλαμβάνει Αθηναίους Μένδην ἥδη ἐχοντας, καὶ αὐτοῦ Ἧσυγχαζον ἐς μὲν τὴν Παλλήνην ἀδύνατος ἥδη ἐνόμιζεν εἴναι δια- βας τιμωρεῖν, τὴν δὲ Τορώνην ἐν φυλακῇ εἰχεν. 2 ὑπὸ γὰρ τὸν αὐτῶν χρόνον τοῖς ἐν τῇ Λυγκῷ ἐξέπλευσαν ἐπὶ τε τὴν Μένδην καὶ τὴν Σκιώνην οἱ Αθηναῖοι, ὀσπερ παρεσκενάζοντο, ναυσὶ μὲν πεντήκοντα, ὃν ἦσαν δέκα Χῖαι, ὀπλίταις δὲ χιλίοις ἑαυτῶν καὶ τοξόταις ἔξακοσίοις καὶ Θραξί- μυθωτοῖς χιλίοις καὶ ἀλλοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν ξυμ- μάχων πελτασταῖς ἐστρατήγη ὁ Νικιάς ὁ Νικόστρατος ὁ Διεστρέφους. 3 ἄραντες δὲ ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ σχοντες κατὰ τὸ Ποσειδώνιον ἐχώρουν ἐς τοῖς Μενδαίους, οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ Σκιώναι τριακόσιοι βεβοη- θηκότες Πελοποννησίων τε ὁ ἐπίκουροι, ἔμπαν- τες ἐπτακόσιοι ὀπλίται, καὶ Πολυδαμίδας ὁ ἄρχων αὐτῶν, ἐτυχον ἐξεστρατοπεδευμένοι ἐξω τῆς

1 Hulse adopts Madvig's correction, τε δὲ ἀναγκαίῳ ξυμφόρῳ διαστά, "However, such was the urgency of his situation that he stood aside and began to devise how..."

2 δὲ, in the MSS. after ἐμπαντες, deleted by Krüger.
therein in the road or upon any baggage that had been dropped, as was likely to happen in a retreat made by night and in a panic, of their own accord they loosed the oxen and slaughtered them, but appropriated the baggage. And from this time Perdiccas began to regard Brasidas as an enemy, and thenceforth he cherished a hatred of the Peloponnesians, which was indeed not consistent with his feeling against the Athenians. However, disregarding his own urgent interests, he was devising how he might in the quickest way come to terms with the latter and get rid of the former.

CXXIX. Returning from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas found the Athenians already in possession of Mende; and thinking it now impossible to cross over to Pallene and give aid, he remained quiet where he was, but kept watch over Torone. For about the same time as the events in Lynceus the Athenians had sailed against Mende and Scione, as they had been preparing to do,¹ with fifty ships, of which ten were Chian, and with one thousand hoplites of their own, six hundred bowmen, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and in addition targeteers from their allies in that neighbourhood. They were under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus and Nicostratus son of Diitrephes. Setting out with the fleet from Potidaea and putting in at the temple of Poseidon, they advanced into the country of the Mendaeans. Now these and three hundred Scioneans who had come to their support, and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred hoplites in all, with Polydamidas as their commander, had just

¹ cf. ch. cxxii. 6; cxxiii. 3.
4 πόλεως ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ. καὶ αὐτοῖς Νικίας μὲν, Μεθωναιόις τε ἔχων εἰκοσι καὶ ἐκατον ψιλῶν καὶ λογάδας τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὀπλιτῶν ἐξῆκοντα καὶ τοὺς τοξότας ἀπαντας, κατὰ ἄτρατον τινά τὸν λόφον πειρώμενος προσβήναι καὶ τραυματιζόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔδυνηθεν βιάσασθαι. Νικόστρατος δὲ ἀλλὰ ἐφόδῳ ἐκ πλείωνος παντὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατοπέδῳ ἐπιδών τῷ λόφῳ ὁπεῖ δυσπροσβατῶ καὶ πάνυ ἔθορυβζῃ, καὶ ἐς ὅλιγον ἀφίκετο πάν τῷ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων νικηθῆναι. καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ὡς οὐκ ἐνέδοσαν οἱ Μενδαῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἀναχωρήσαντες ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, καὶ οἱ Μενδαῖοι νυκτὸς ἐπελθοῦσις ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἀπῆλθον.

CXXX. Ἡ δ’ ὑστεραία οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίοι περιπλεύσαντες ἐς τὸ πρὸς Σκιώνης τὸ τε προαίστειον ἔλθουν καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἀπασαν ἐδήσαν τὴν γῆν οὕδενος ἐπεξιόντος (ἢν γὰρ τι καὶ στασιασμὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει), οἱ δὲ τρικόσιοι τῶν Σκιώναιῶν τῆς ἐπιουσίας νυκτὸς ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ’ ὀίκου. καὶ τῇ ἐπινεγμομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ Νικίας μὲν τῷ ἡμέρας τοῦ στρατοῦ προϊστών ἀμα ἐς τὰ μεθόρια τῶν Σκιώναιῶν τὴν γῆν ἐδήσου, Νικόστρατος δὲ τοὺς λουπίς κατὰ τὰς ἀνοί πυλας, ἐπὶ Ποτειδαίας ἐρχονταῖ, προσ-

3 εκάθεντο τῇ πόλει, ὁ δὲ Πολυδαμίδας (ἐτυχε γὰρ ταύτῃ τοῖς Μενδαῖοις καὶ ἐπικουροῖς ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους τὰ ὅπλα κείμενα) διατάσσει τῇ ὠσ ἐς μάχην καὶ παρήνει τοῖς Μενδαῖοις ἐπεξείναι. καὶ τινὸς αὐτῶ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμίου ἀντεύπτος κατὰ τὸ στασιωτικὸν ὅτε οὐκ ἐπέξειον οὐδὲ δέωμο πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὃς ἀντεύπεν ἐπισπασθέντος τε τῇ
encamped outside the city in a strong position on a hill. Nicias tried to reach them by a path up the hill, having with him one hundred and twenty light-armed Methoneans, sixty picked men of the Athenian hoplites, and all the bowmen, but his troops suffered in the attempt and he was unable to carry this position. Nicostratus, however, with all the rest of the army, advancing against the hill, which was difficult of access, by another and longer route, was thrown into utter confusion, and the whole Athenian army narrowly escaped defeat. So on this day, as the Mendaeans and their allies did not yield, the Athenians withdrew and encamped, and the Mendaeans, when night came on, returned to the city.

CXXX. On the next day the Athenians sailed round to the side of the town facing Scione and took the suburb, and all that day they ravaged the land. No one came out against them, as there was some sort of uprising in the town; and during the following night the three hundred Scioneans returned home. On the next day Nicias with half of the army advanced as far as the boundary of the Scioneans and ravaged the land, while Nicostratus with the rest sat down before the city at the upper gates, on the road leading to Potidaea. But it chanced that in that quarter of the town, inside the walls, the arms of the Mendaeans and their auxiliaries were deposited, and Polydamidas was there drawing his troops up for battle and exhorting the Mendaeans to make a sortie. Some one of the popular party mutinously answered him that he would not go out and had no use for war, but no sooner had he answered than Polydamidas seized
χειρὶ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ θερυβηθέντοις, ὁ δὴ μος εὐθὺς ἀναλαβὼν τὰ ὄσπλα περιφρήγης ἐξώρει Ῠπὶ τῇ Πελοποννησίᾳ καὶ τὸν τὰ ἐναντία σφίσει μετ’ 5 αὐτῶν πράξαντας. καὶ προσπεσόντες τρέπουσιν ἀμα μὲν μάχῃ αἰφνιδίῳ, ἀμα δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τῶν πυλῶν ἀνοιγμένων φοβηθέντων ἀφήνησαν γὰρ ἀπὸ προερημένου τινος αὐτοῦς τὴν ἐπιχείρη-
6 σίν γενέσθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὅσοι μὴ αὑτίκα διεφθάρησαν, κατέφυγον, ἤπειροι καὶ τὸ πρότερον αὐτοὶ εἶχον οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι (ἡδὴ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἐπαναστρέψας πρὸς τῇ πόλις ἤν) ἐσπε-
σόντες ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἃ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἀκρόπολει ἀπετει-
χον ἐκατέρωθεν τείχει ἐς θάλασσαν καὶ φυλακὴν ἐπικαθίσαντο. επειδὴ δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν Μένδη
κατέσχον, ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐκκύρων ἐχώρουν.

CXXXI. Οἱ δὲ ἀντεπεξελθόντες αὐτοὶ καὶ Πελοποννησίοι ἱδρύθησαν ἐπὶ λόφον καρτεροῦ πρὸ τῆς πέλεως, ὃν εἰ μὴ ἔλοιπον οἱ ἐναντίοι, οὐκ
2 ἐγύρνετο σφῶν περιτείχισις. προσβαλόντες δ’ αὐτῶν κατὰ κράτος οἱ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ μάχη ἔκκρου-
σαντες τοὺς ἐπόντας ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο τε καὶ ἐς τὸν περιτείχισμὸν τροπαίον στήσαντες παρα-

1 θερυβηθέντοι, Hude καταθρυβηθέντοι.
2 τὴν Μένδην πόλιν, MSS.; Dobree deletes Μένδην.
3 Poppe's correction for ἐπικαθίσαντο of the MSS.
4 Dobree’s correction for ἐπόντας of the MSS.
him with violence and roughly handled him; whereupon the populace in great anger at once caught up their arms and advanced upon the Peloponnesians and the opposite party who were in league with them. Falling upon them they put them to rout, partly by the suddenness of their onslaught, partly because the others were terrified when the gates were opened to the Athenians; for they thought that the attack had been made upon them by a preconcerted agreement. Those of the Peloponnesians who were not killed on the spot took refuge on the acropolis, which they already had possession of; but the Athenians—for Nicias had already turned back and was near the city—burst into the city with their whole force, and, as the gates had been opened without an agreement, plundered the city as though they had taken it by storm; and the generals with difficulty kept them from destroying the inhabitants also. They then directed the Mendaeans henceforth to retain their former constitution, and bring to trial among themselves any whom they thought guilty of the revolt; but the men on the acropolis they fenced off with a wall extending on either side down to the sea, and set a guard over them. And when they had thus secured Mende, they proceeded against Scione.

CXXXI. The Scioneans and the Peloponnesians had come out against them and taken position on a strong hill before the city, which had to be taken by the enemy before the city could be invested with a wall. So the Athenians made a furious assault upon the hill and dislodged those that were upon it; they then encamped and, after raising a trophy, prepared
3 σκευάζοντο. καὶ αὐτῶν οὐ πολὺ ύστερον ἦδη ἐν ἔργῳ ὄντων οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ἐν τῇ Μένδῃ πολιορκοῦμενοι ἐπίκουροι βιασάμενοι παρὰ θάλασσαν τὴν φυλακὴν νυκτὸς ἀφικνοῦνται, καὶ διαφυγόντες οἱ πλείστοι τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ Σκιώνῃ στρατόπεδον ἐσῆλθον ἐς αὐτὴν.

CXXXII. Περιτείχισμένης δὲ τῆς Σκιώνης Περδίκκας τοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῖς ἐπικυριεύσαμενος ὁμολογίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διὰ τὴν τοῦ Βρασίδου ἔχθραν περὶ τῆς ἐκ τῆς Δύνκου ἀναχωρῆσεως, εὐθὺς τὸτε ἄρξάμενος πράσσειν, καὶ ἐτύγχανε γὰρ τότε Ἰσχαγόρας ὁ Δακεδαμόνος στρατιῶν μέλλων πεζῆ πορεύσειν ὡς Βρασίδαν, ὁ δὲ 1 Περδίκκας, ἀμα μὲν κελεύοντος τοῦ Νικίου, ἐπειδὴ ἐνυβεβήκει, ἐνδοῦ λοι τι ποιεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις βεβαιώτητος πέρι, ἀμα δ' αὐτὸς οὐκέτι βουλόμενος "Πελοποννησίους ἐς τὴν αὐτὸν ἀφίκνεισθαι, παρασκευάσας τοὺς ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ ξένους, χρώμενος αἰεὶ τοῖς πρώτοις, διεκόλυσε τὸ στράτευμα καὶ τὴν παρασκευήν, ὡστε μηδὲ πειρᾶσθαι Θεσ-
3 σαλῶν. Ἰσχαγόρας μέντοι καὶ Ἀμεινίας καὶ Ἀριστεὺς αὐτοὶ τε ὡς Βρασίδαν ἀφίκοντο, ἐπιδεῖκνυμενοῖς περικυκλώσας Δακεδαμονίων τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῶν ἡμῶν ἀντίκυκλως ἀνδρὰς ἐξῆγον ἐκ Σπάρτης, ὡστε τῶν πόλεως ἀρχοντῶς καθίσταναι καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἐντυχώσιν ἐπιτρέπειν. καὶ Κλεαρίδαν μὲν τὸν Κλεωνίκου καθίστησιν ἐν Ἀμφιτόλει, Πασιτελίδαν 3 δὲ τὸν Ἡγησάνδρου ἐν Τορώνῃ.

1 δὲ, deleted by Hude, following Dobree.
2 αὐτῶν, Hude reads αὐτοφ, after Stahl.
3 Dobrec's correction for 'Επιτελίδαν of the MSS.; cf. v. 3.
for the circumvallation. But not long afterwards, when they were already at work, the auxiliaries who were besieged on the acropolis of Mende forced their way by night along the shore through the guard and reached Scione; and most of them escaped through the besieging army and got into the city.

CXXXII. While the circumvallation of Scione was in progress, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian generals and made an agreement with them; he was moved to this by the hatred he bore Brasidas for his retreat from Lyneus, at which time indeed he had begun his negotiations. Now it happened at that time that Ischagoras, the Lacedaemonian, was on the point of taking an army by land to join Brasidas, but Perdiccas, partly because Nicias urged him, since he had made terms with the Athenians, to give them some token of his sincerity, partly also because he himself no longer wished the Peloponnesians to enter his territory, now worked upon his friends in Thessaly, with the foremost of whom he was always on good terms, and effectually stopped the army and the expedition, to such a degree that they did not even try to obtain permission from the Thessalians. Ischagoras, however, with Ameinias and Aristeus, came by themselves to Brasidas, having been commissioned by the Lacedaemonians to look into the situation. And they brought from Sparta, contrary to custom, some of their young men, intending to place them as governors over the cities instead of entrusting these to anybody that might chance to offer. Accordingly, they placed at Amphipolis Clearidas son of Cleonymus and at Torone Pasitelidas son of Hegesander.

1 cf. ch. cxxviii. 5.
CXXXIII. 'Εν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει Θῆβαιοι Θεσπιῶν τείχος περιείλον ἐπικαλέσαντες ἀπτικησμόν, βουλόμενοι μὲν καὶ αἰεί, παρεστήκος δὲ βάσων ἐπεειδὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους μάχῃ ὁ τι 2 ἦν αὐτῶν ἔνθες ἀπολώλει. καὶ ὁ νεῶς τῆς Ἡρας τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐν Ἀργείῳ κατεκαύθη, Χρυσίδος τῆς ἱερείας λύχνων τινὰ θείας ἦμμενον πρὸς τὰ στέμματα καὶ ἐπικαταδαρθούσης, ὡστε ἐλαθεν 3 ἀφθέντα πάντα καὶ καταφλεξθέντα. καὶ ἡ Χρυσίς μὲν εὐθὺς τῆς νυκτὸς δείσασα τοὺς Ἀργείους ἐς Φλειοῦντα φεύγει· οἱ δὲ ἄλλην ἱερείαν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ προκειμένου κατεστήσαντο Φαεινίδα ὅνομα. ἦτη δὲ ἡ Χρυσίς τοῦ πολέμου τοῦδε ἐπέλαβεν ὅκτῳ καὶ ἑνατὸν ἐκ μέσου, ὡτε ἐπε- 4 φεύγει. καὶ ἡ Σκιώνῃ τοῦ θέρους ἢδη τελευτῶντος περιετετείχιστο τε παντελῶς, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπ' αὐτῆς φυλακῆς καταλυπόντες ἀνεχόρησαν τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατῷ.

CXXXIV. 'Εν δὲ τῷ ἐπιτόντι χειμῶν τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δακεδαιμονίων ἡσύχαξε διὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ Τεγεάται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐκατέρως ξυνέβαλον ἐν Δαοδοκείῳ 1 τῆς Ὀρεσθίδος, καὶ νῦν ἀμφιδήριτος ἐγένετο· κέρας γὰρ ἐκάτεροι τρέψαντες τὸ καθ' αὐτοὺς τροπαία τε ἀμφότεροι ἔστησαν καὶ σκύλα ἐς Δελφοὺς 2 ἀπέπεμψαν. διαφθαρέντων μέντοι πολλῶν ἐκατέρως καὶ ἀγχωμάλου τῆς μάχης γενομένης καὶ

1 Bursian's correction for Δαοδοκείῳ of the MSS.
CXXXIII. In the same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians, accusing them of favouring the Athenians. Indeed they had always wished to do this, but now found it easier, since the flower of the Thespians had perished in the battle with the Athenians. In this same summer, too, the temple of Hera at Argos was burned down, Chrysis the priestess having placed a lighted torch near the garlands and then gone to sleep, so that the whole place took fire and was ablaze before she was aware. And Chrysis that very night, in fear of the Argives, fled to Phlius; but they appointed another priestess according to the custom prescribed, Phæainis by name. Chrysis had been priestess during eight years of this war and half of the ninth when she fled. Toward the close of the summer Scione was at length completely invested, and the Athenians, leaving a guard there, withdrew with the rest of their army.

CXXXIV. In the following winter, on account of the armistice, matters were quiet with the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians; but the Mantineans and the Tegeans with their respective allies fought a battle at Laodiceum in the district of Oresthis. The victory was disputed; for each side routed the wing opposed to themselves, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi. Certain it is at any rate that after many had fallen on both sides and night had cut short the action, the issue of battle being

1 At Delium; cf. ch. xciii. 4; xcvi. 3.
2 The same who in 431 B.C. had held her office forty-eight years; cf. II. ii. 1.
3 It seems that the Mantineans and Tegeans each defeated the other’s allies, which were on the left wings of the opposing armies.
Ἀφελομένης νυκτὸς τὸ ἔργον οἱ Τεγεάται μὲν ἐπηνυλίσαντό τε καὶ εὐθὺς ἐστησαν τροπαίον, Μαντινῆς δὲ ἀπεχώρησάν τε ἐς Βουκολιῶνα καὶ ὕστερον ἀντέστησαν.

ΟΧΧΧΒ. Ἀπεπείρασε δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας τελευτῶντος καὶ πρὸς ἐαρ ἦδη Ποτειδαίας. προσελθὼν γὰρ νυκτὸς καὶ κλίμακα προσοδεῖς μέχρι μὲν τούτου ἔλαθεν τοῦ γὰρ κώδωνος παρενεχθέντος οὕτως ἐς τὸ διάκενον, πρὶν ἐπανελθεὶν τὸν παραδιδόντα αὐτὸν, ἢ πρόσθεσις ἐγένετο: ἐπείτα μὲντοι εὐθὺς αἰσθομένων, πρὶν προσβήναι, ἀπήγαγε πάλιν κατὰ τάχος τὴν 2 στρατιὰν καὶ οὐκ ἀνέμειν ἡμέραν ἑγέσθαι. καὶ ὁ χειμῶν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἐνατὸν ἐτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷ δὲ ὁν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.
still undecided, the Tegeans bivouacked on the field and set up a trophy at once, while the Mantineans retreated to Bucolion, and afterwards set up a rival trophy.

CXXXV. Toward the close of the same winter, when spring was near at hand, Brasidas made an attempt on Potidaea. He came up by night and placed a ladder against the wall, up to this point escaping detection; for the ladder was planted precisely at the interval of time after the bell had been carried by and before the patrol who passed it on had come back. The guards, however, discovered it immediately, before an ascent could be made, and Brasidas made haste to lead his army back again, not waiting for day to come. So ended the winter and with it the ninth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

1 It appears that the bell was passed from one sentinel to the next. Another, and probably more common, way of testing the watchfulness of the sentinels was to have a patrol with a bell make the round, each sentinel having to answer the signal.
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
RICHARD CLAY AND COMPANY, LTD.,
BUNGAY, SUFFOLK
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

VOLUMES ALREADY PUBLISHED

Latin Authors

AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. (2nd Imp. revised.)

APULIUS: THE GOLDEN ASS (METAMORPHOSES). W. Adlington (1566). Revised by S. Gaselee. (7th Imp.)


ST. AUGUSTINE, SELECT LETTERS. J. H. Baxter. (2nd Imp.)

AUSONIUS. H. G. Evelyn White. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

Bede: J. E. King. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

Boethius: TRACTS and DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIAE. Rev. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand. (5th Imp.)

Caesar: CIVIL WARS. A. G. Peckett. (5th Imp.)

Caesar: Gallic War. H. J. Edwards. (10th Imp.)

Cato: De RE RUSTICA; Varro: De RE RUSTICA. H. B. Ash and W. D. Hooper. (2nd Imp.)

Catullus. F. W. Cornish; Tibullus. J. B. Postgate; Perspicillum Veneris. J. W. Mackail. (12th Imp.)

Celsius: De MEDICINA. W. G. Spencer. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp. revised, Vols. II. and III. 2nd Imp.)

 Cicero: Brutus, and ORATOR. G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. Hubbell. (3rd Imp.)

 Cicero: De FATO; PARADOXAE STOICORUM; DE PARTITIONE ORATORIA. H. Rackham. (With De Oratore, Vol. II.) (2nd Imp.)

 Cicero: DE FINIBUS. H. Rackham. (4th Imp. revised.)

 Cicero: De INVENTIONE, etc. H. M. Hubbell.

 Cicero: De NATURA DEORUM and ACADemia. H. Rackham. (2nd Imp.)

 Cicero: De OFFICIIS. Walter Miller. (6th Imp.)


 Cicero: De REPUBLICA and De LEGIBUS. Clinton W. Keyes. (4th Imp.)

 Cicero: De SENECTUTE, De AMICITIA, De DIVINATIONE. W. A. Falconer. (6th Imp.)

 Cicero: In CATULNAX, PRO FLACCO, PRO MURENA, PRO SULLA. Louis E. Lord. (3rd Imp. revised.)

 Cicero: Letters to Atticus. E. O. Winstedt. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 6th Imp., Vols. II. and III. 4th Imp.)

Cicero: Philippicks. W. C. A. Ker. (3rd Imp. revised)
Cicero: Pro Caecina, Pro Lege Manilia, Pro Cluentio, Pro Rabirio. H. Grote Hodge. (3rd Imp.)
Cicero: Pro Quinctio, Pro Roscio Amerino, Pro Roscio Comoedo, Contra Rullum. J. H. Freese. (2nd Imp.)
Cicero: Tusculan Disputations. J. E. King. (4th Imp.)
Claudian. M. Platnauer. 2 Vols.
Florus. E. S. Forster, and Cornelius Nepos. J. C. Rolfe. (2nd Imp.)
Frontinus: Stratagems and Aqueducts. C. E. Bennett and M. B. McElwain. (2nd Imp.)
Fronto: Correspondence. C. R. Haines. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
Gellius. J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
Horace: Odes and Epodes. C. E. Bennett. (14th Imp. revised.)
Horace: Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica. H. R. Fairclough. (8th Imp. revised.)
Jerome: Selected Letters. F. A. Wright. (2nd Imp.)
Juvenal and Persius. G. G. Ramsay. (7th Imp.)
Lucan. J. D. Duff. (3rd Imp.)
Lucretius. W. H. D. Rouse. (7th Imp. revised.)
Minor Latin Poets: from Publilius Syrus to Rutilius Namatanus, including Grattius, Calpurnius Siculus, Nemesianus, Avianus, and others with "Aetna" and the "Phoenix." J. Wight Duff and Arnold M. Duff. (2nd Imp.)
Ovid: The Art of Love and Other Poems. J. H. Mozley. (3rd Imp.)
Ovid: Fasti. Sir James G. Frazer. (2nd Imp.)
Ovid: Heroïdes and Amores. Grant Showerman. (5th Imp.)
Ovid: Metamorphoses. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 9th Imp., Vol. II. 7th Imp.)
Ovid: Tristia and Ex Ponto. A. L. Wheeler. (3rd Imp.)
Petronius. M. Heseltine; Seneca: Apocolocyntosis. W. H. D. Rouse. (8th Imp. revised.)
PLINY: LETTERS. Melmoth’s Translation revised by W. M. L. Hutchinson. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 6th Imp., Vol. II. 4th Imp.)


PROPERTIUS. H. E. Butler. (6th Imp.)

PRUDENTIUS. H. J. Thomson. 2 Vols.

QUINTILIAN. H. E. Butler. 4 Vols. (3rd Imp.)


SALLUST. J. C. Rolfe. (3rd Imp. revised.)


SÉNECA: APOCOLOCYTONOSIS, Cit. Petronius.

SÉNECA: EPISPULAE MORALES. R. M. Gummere. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vols. II. and III. 2nd Imp. revised.)

SÉNECA: MORAL ESSAYS. J. W. Basore. 3 Vols. (Vol. II. 3rd Imp., Vols. I and III. 2nd Imp. revised.)

SÉNECA: TRAGEDIES. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp. revised.)


SILIUS ITALICUS. J. D. Duff. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp.)

STATIUS. J. H. Mozley. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

SUETONIUS. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 7th Imp., Vol. II. 6th Imp. revised.)

TACITUS: DIALOGUS. Sir Wm. Peterson. AGRICOLA and GERMANIA. Maurice Hutton. (6th Imp.)


TERENCE. John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. (7th Imp.)


VALENIUS FLACCUS. J. H. Mozley. (2nd Imp. revised.)

VARRIUS: De Lingua Latina. R. G. Kent. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp. revised.)

VÆLECIUS PATERCULUS and RES GESTAR DIVI AUGUSTI. F. W. Shipley.

VIRGIL. H. R. Fairclough. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 17th Imp., Vol. II. 12th Imp. revised.)

VITRUVIUS: De Architectura. F. Granger. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)
Greek Authors

ACHILLES TATIUS. S. Gaselee. (2nd Imp.)

AENEAS TACTICUS, ASCLEPIODOTUS and ONABANDER. The Illinois Greek Club. (2nd Imp.)

AESCHINES. C. D. Adams. (2nd Imp.)

AESCHYLUS. H. Weir Smyth. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 6th Imp., Vol. II. 5th Imp.)

ALCIPHRON, AElian, PHILOSTRATUS LETTERS. A. R. Benner and F. H. Fobes.

ANDOCIDES, ANTIPHRON. Cf. MINOR ATTIC ORATORS.

APOLLONIUS RHODIUS. R. C. Seaton. (4th Imp.)

THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. Kirnopp Lake. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 8th Imp., Vol. II. 6th Imp.)

APPIAN: ROMAN HISTORY. Horace White. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vols. II., III. and IV. 2nd Imp.)

ARATUS. Cf. CALLIMACHUS.

ARISTOPHANES. Benjamin Bickley Rogers. 3 Vols. Verse trans. (Vols. I. and II. 5th Imp., Vol. III. 4th Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: ART OF RHETORIC. J. H. Freese. (3rd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, EUDEMIAN ETHICS. VICES AND VIRTUES. H. Rackham. (3rd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: GENERATION OF ANIMALS. A. L. PECK. (2nd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: METAPHYSICS. H. Tredennick, 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: METEOROLOGICA. H. D. P. Lea.


ARISTOTLE: NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. H. Rackham. (5th Imp revised.)

ARISTOTLE: OECOonomica and MAGNA MORALIA. G. C. ARMstrong; (with Metaphysics, Vol. II.). (3rd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: ON THE HEAVENS. W. K. C. Guthrie. (3rd Imp revised.)

ARISTOTLE: ON THE SOUL, PARVA NATURALIA, ON BREATH. W. S. Hett. (2nd Imp. revised.)

ARISTOTLE: ORGANON. H. P. Cooke and H. Tredennick. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: PARTS OF ANIMALS. A. L. Peck; MOTION AND PROGRESSION OF ANIMALS. E. S. Forster. (3rd Imp revised.)


ARISTOTLE: POETICS and LONGINUS. W. Hamilton Fyfe;

DEMETRIUS ON STYLE. W. Rhys Roberts. (5th Imp. revised.)

ARISTOTLE: POLITICS. H. Rackham. (4th Imp. revised.)

ARISTOTLE: PROBLEMS. W. S. Hett. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp. revised.)

ARRIAN: History of Alexander and Indica. Rev. E. Blyffe Robson. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)


St. Basil: Letters. R. J. Deferrari. 4 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

Callimachus and LycoPhron. A. W. Mair; Aratus. G. R. Mair. (2nd Imp.)

Clement of Alexandria. Rev. G. W. Butterworth. (3rd Imp.)


Daphnis and Chloe. Thornley's Translation revised by J. M. Edmonds; and Parthenius. S. Gaselee. (3rd Imp.)

Demosthenes I: Olynthiacs, Philippics and Minor Orations I.—XVII. and XX. J. H. Vince. (2nd Imp.)

Demosthenes II: De Corona and De Falsa Legatione. C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince. (3rd Imp. revised.)


Demosthenes IV—VI: Private Orations and In Nearchus. A. T. Murray. (Vol. IV. 2nd Imp.)


Dio Cassius: Roman History. E. Cary. 9 Vols. (Vols. I. and II. 2nd Imp.)


Diogenes Laertius. R. D. Hicks. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp.)

Dionysius of Halicarnassus: Roman Antiquities. Spelman's translation revised by E. Cary. 7 Vols. (Vols. I—IV. 2nd Imp.)

Epictetus. W. A. Oldfather. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)


Galen: On the Natural Faculties. A. J. Brook. (4th Imp.)


Greek Elegy and Iambus with the Anacreon. J. M. Edmonds. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)

The Greek Bucolic Poets (Theocritus, Bion, Moschus). J. M. Edmonds. (7th Imp. revised.)

Greek Mathematical Works. Ivor Thomas. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
HERODES. Cf. THEOPHRASTUS: CHARACTERS.
HESIOD AND THE HOMERIC HYMNS. H. G. Evelyn White. (7th Imp. revised and enlarged.)
HIPPOCRATES AND THE FRAGMENTS OF HENACLEITUS. W. H. S. Jones and E. T. Withington. 4 Vols. (3rd Imp.)
HOMER: Iliad. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (6th Imp.)
HOMER: Odyssey. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (7th Imp.)
ISOCRATES. George Norlin and LeRue Van Hook. 3 Vols.
ST. JOHN DAMASCENE: BARLAAM AND IOASAPH. Rev. G. R. Woodward and Harold Mattingly. (2nd Imp. revised.)
JOSEPHUS. H. St. J. Thackray and Ralph Marcus. 9 Vols. (Vol. V. 3rd Imp., Vol. VI. 2nd Imp.)
JULIAN. Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp.)
LYCOPHRON. Cf. CALLIMACHUS.
LYRA GRAECA. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Imp., Vol. II. revised and enlarged, and Vol. III. 3rd Imp.)
LYSIAS. W. R. M. Lamb. (2nd Imp.)
MANETHO. W. G. Waddell; PTOLEMY: TETRAHIBLLOS. F. E. Robbins. (2nd Imp.)
MARCUS AURELIUS. C. R. Haines. (4th Imp. revised.)
MENANDER. F. G. Allinson. (3rd Imp. revised.)
NONNOS: DIONYSIACA. W. H. D. Rouse. 3 Vols. (Vol. III. 2nd Imp.)
OPPION, COLLUTUS, TRYPHIODORUS. A. W. Mair.
PARNASSUS. Cf. DAPHNIS AND CHLOE.
PHILO: two supplementary Vols. (Translation only.)
PHILOSTRATUS: IMAGINES; CALLISTRATUS: DESCRIPTIONS. A. Fairbanks.
PHILOSTRATUS AND EUNAPIUS: LIVES OF THE SOPHISTS. Wilmer Cave Wright. (2nd Imp.)
PINDAR. Sir J. E. Sandys. (7th Imp. revised.)
Plato: Chryssus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias. H. N. Fowler. (4th Imp.)
Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito. Phaedo, Phaedrus. H. N. Fowler. (9th Imp.)
Plato: Theaetetus and Sophist. H. N. Fowler. (4th Imp.)
Polybius. W. R. Paton. 6 Vols.
Quintus Smyrnaeus. A. S. Way. Verse transl. (2nd Imp.)
Strabo: Geography. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. (Vols. I. and VIII. 3rd Imp., Vols. II., V., and VI. 2nd Imp.)
Theophrastus: Characters. J. M. Edmonds; Heroides, etc. A. D. Knox. (3rd Imp.)
Theophrastus: Enquiry into Plants. Sir Arthur Hort, Bart. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
Thucydides. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Imp., Vol. II., III. and IV. 3rd Imp. revised.)
Xenophon: Cyropaedia. Walter Miller. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.)
Xenophon: Memorabilia and Econometricus. E. C. Marchant. (2nd Imp.)
Xenophon: Scripta Minora. E. C. Marchant. (2nd Imp.)
IN PREPARATION

Greek Authors
Aristotle: De Mundo, etc. D. Furley and E. M. Forster.

Latin Authors
St. Augustine: City of God.
[Cicero]: Ad Herennium. H. Caplan.
Phaedrus. Ben E. Perry.

DESCRIPTIVE PROSPECTUS ON APPLICATION

London
Cambridge, Mass.

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borrower No.</th>
<th>Date of Issue</th>
<th>Date of Return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sri A.N. Krishna</td>
<td>26/7/54</td>
<td>40/1/54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aniyangre</td>
<td>26/1/76</td>
<td>26/1/76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.P. Joshi</td>
<td>26/1/76</td>
<td>26/1/76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>