1622
THE FIRST AFGHAN EMPIRE IN INDIA
(1451—1526 A.D.)

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PREFACE

This ‘History of the First Afghan Empire in India’ is mainly based on a comparative and critical study of original sources in Persian and Sanskrit. The so-called Afghan historians are very prolific in relating anecdotes and romances which they take delight in interweaving with the general account. An attempt has been made to separate fact from fiction and to exploit even the latter for whatever it may be worth.

In general presentation of material, I have tried to be as objective, straightforward and plain as possible. Besides attempting to present a readable account of the Sultanate of Delhi between 1451 and 1526, I hope I have made some little contribution to historical knowledge by emphasizing the predominance of a secular note in Lodí politics, by elucidating the causes of the defeat of the Sharqís, by giving a fresh interpretation of the religious policy of Sikandar and by presenting an interpretative study of Afghan institutions. While explaining the causes of the downfall of the empire, I have tried neither to condemn nor to absolve Ibrâhîm Lodí uncritically but to present a fair and impartial appraisal of the various factors leading up to that event.

I am deeply indebted to my teachers Dr. Ishwari Prasad, D. Litt, M.L.C (U.P.), and Dr. Banarasi Prasad Saksena Ph.D. (London), Head of the Department of History, Allahabad University for their help and guidance in preparing this monograph. I am also grateful to Shri N. G. Bhattacharya, B. Ed. Artist, Botany Deptt, B. H.U. for preparing the maps.

At the end, I must thank the publishers, Messrs. Bookland Limited for undertaking the publication of this work.

March 5, 1956. A. B. Pandey
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ABBREVIATIONS

Afif — Tārikh-i-Firūzshāhī (Bib. Ind.) by Shams-i-Sirāj Afif, Persian Text.

Ahmad — The Administration of Justice in Medieval India by M. B. Ahmad.

Āin — Aīn-i-Akbarī by Abul Fazl (Translated by Jarrett).

Bad. — Muntakhab-al-Tawārīkh by Abdul Qādir Badānī (Bib-Ind.) Persian Text.

Baranī — Tārikh-i-Firūzshāhī by Zīāuddīn Barānī (Bib.-Ind.) Persian Text.

Basu — Tārikh-i-Mubārakshāhī, Translated into English by K. K. Basu.


Bev. — Bābārnāmā, Translated into English from original Turki by A. S. Beveridge.

Bib-Ind. — Bibliotheca Indica.


CHI — Cambridge History of India.

CISG — Central India States Gazetteer.

Dāūdī — Tārikh-i-Dāūdī by Abdullāh (Allahabad University MS.).

De — Tabqāt-i-Akbarī, Translated into English by B. De.


Dorn — History of Afghāns, Parts I and II by Dorn.

Elliot — History of India as told by its own historians by Elliot and Dowson.

Encyc. — Encyclopaedia.


Fer. — Tārikh-i-Ferishtā. (Persian Text).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fidā Ali</th>
<th>Tārikh-i-Ferishtā, Translated into Urdu by M. Fidā Ali.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Habīb</td>
<td>Sultan Mahmūd of Ghaznīn by Prof. Habīb.</td>
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<td>Habībullāh</td>
<td>Foundation of Muslim Rule in India by Habībullāh.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hodiwala</td>
<td>Studies in Indo-Muslim History by S. H. Hodiwala.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Isāmī</td>
<td>Futūh-us-Salāṭīn by Isāmī Edited by Agha Mehdi Husain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRASB.</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.</td>
<td>Lucknow Text Published by Newul Kishore Press.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med.</td>
<td>Medieval.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MR.</td>
<td>Maāsir-i-Rahīmī by Abdul Bāqī Nahāwandi (Bib.-Ind.) Persian Text.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS.</td>
<td>Manuscript, handwritten or typed.</td>
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<td>Mubārakshāhī</td>
<td>Tārikh-i-Mubārakshāhī by Yahyā (Bib.-Ind.) Persian Text.</td>
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<td>Ojhā</td>
<td>History of Rājpūtānā by Gaurī Shankar Hīrāchand Ojhā.</td>
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<td>Qaraunāh Turks</td>
<td>History of Qaraunāh Turks by Ishwari Prasad.</td>
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<td>Ranking</td>
<td>Muntakhab-ut-Tawārikh, Translated into English by George S. A. Ranking.</td>
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<td>R. Williams</td>
<td>An Empire builder of the Sixteenth Century by L. F. Rushbrooke Williams.</td>
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<td>Sārdā</td>
<td>Mahārānā Sānga, the Hindūpat by H. B. Sārdā.</td>
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<td>Tabpāt-i-Akbarī by Nizāmuṭṭīn Ahmad (Bīd.-Ind.) Persian Text.</td>
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<td>Thomas</td>
<td>The Chronicles of the Pathān Kings of Delhi by E. Thomas.</td>
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TKJL. — Tārikh-i-Khān Jahānī wa Makhzan-al-Afghānī by Niāmatullāh (India Office Library MS.)

Tod — Annals and Antiquities of Rājasthān by Col. J. Tod Edited by Crooke.

Tripathi — Some Aspects of Muslim Administration by R. P. Tripathi.

Vol. — Volume.

I, II etc. — Volume I, Volume II, etc.

Wāqiāt — Wāqiāt-i-Mushtāqī by Rizqullāh Mush-tāqī (British Museum Ms. No. 370, Photograph copy in possession of Dr. Ishwari Prasad).

Yādgār — Tārikh-i-Shāhī or Tārikh-i-Salātīn-i-Afāghīnā by Ahmad Yādgār (Bid.-Ind.) Persian Text.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Early in the 7th century, Arabia had the unique good fortune of becoming the cradle of a great proselytising world religion. Her people were, on its eve, steeped in ignorance, conceit and selfishness. Except for a month in the year, the desert-land was constantly watered by human blood, spilt in senseless tribal feuds, arising at times out of flimsiest provocations but almost always sustained by dogged valour on either side. Not unoften the vendetta raged round the pretended dignity of respective tribal gods represented by idols of various types. Then came Muhammad the Prophet of Allah, with a message of peace—Islam. This new religion was a scheme of social, political and spiritual regeneration, all rolled in one. It affirmed the uncompromising unity of Godhead, rejected idol-worship in every shape and form, emphasized the value of common prayers, disciplined living, and co-equal brotherhood of all Muslims without any distinction of birth or rank. It encouraged education, curbed selfishness and avarice, induced humility and finally diverted the martial skill and overflowing energy of the nomad to the task of carrying God's message far and near. The conceited, desperate tribal fighter was now to fill the armies of the faithful, burning with a passion to reclaim the world from the darkness of irreligion by all possible means. The Arab proselytiser had a burning faith in the rightness of his cause. The messages of peaceful conversion were
often backed up and seconded by feats of arms and it did not matter which of the two proved more efficacious in stamping out irreligion and in planting of the banner of Islam where formerly heathens and unbelievers held sway. Thus the proselytising activities of the early caliphate went hand in hand with the foundation of an ever-widening empire ruled over by a representative of God’s Prophet according to principles enunciated by Himself through the latter’s medium.

Within twelve years of the Prophet’s death the empire of Islam sprawled over greater part of Western Asia and touched the frontiers of this country on the north-western corner beyond the Indus. Siwistān was occupied in 643 and the confederate armies of Makrān and Sindh suffered their first defeat. Before a further onslaught was attempted, Caliph Usmān sent a reconnoitring party under Hakīm bin Jabāla al Abdī who gave the following discouraging report:

“Water is scarce, the fruits are poor, and the robbers are bold; if a few troops are sent they will be slain, if many, they will starve”.

Thus it was that the Arabs were halted at the gateway of India. In the meantime, Northern India had lost its political unity and a number of local dynasties reared their heads on the ruins of the empire of Harsha.

In 711-12, Imāduddin Muhammad bin Qāsim led the first successful attack on the mainland of India because Raja Dāhir of Sindh failed to give a satisfactory reply to Hajjāj’s diplomatic representation regarding the activities of Indian pirates

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1 Al Biladhuri, Elliot, I p. 116.
in the waters of the Arabian Sea. The invasion was planned more as a measure of reprisal than as the spear-head of a campaign of conquest. Imāduddin was backed by the mighty governor of Syria and on his success depended the vindication of Caliphate’s prestige. The soldiers of Islam were confident of success for they had already scored brilliant successes in North Africa, Spain and Western Asia. Cordova, Cairo and Damascus were the centres from which European, African and Asian dominions of Islam were controlled and expanded. Their morale was as high as their experience was varied and their skill in warfare well tried. The task of the invader was rendered all the easier by Dāhir’s evacuation of the western bank of the Indus, disaffection among the Jats and Buddhists, and indifference of other Indian rulers to the fate of one of themselves. Nonetheless, opposition to the Arab advance in Sindh itself was fairly stiff; while the power of the Pratihārs, the Chālukyas and the Rāshtrakūtas made it impossible for them to go further beyond.

But the people of Debal, Brāhmanābād and Multān suffered heavily at the hands of the invader; the family of Dāhir was uprooted; he along with some of his sons was killed and his daughters were carried away as trophies of war. This was, perhaps, sufficient reprisal for the losses of Arab merchants at the hands of alleged Sindhi pirates. Imāduddin, however desired to stay in Sindh and to consolidate the Arab power there. After initial cruelty and iconoclasm, so common in times of war, he settled down to rule the country.

1 Chachnama, Elliot I pp. 166-170.
2 Al Biladhuri, Elliot I pp. 120, 122, 123.
on comparatively tolerant principles. He guaranteed freedom of worship, security of life and protection of temples, and for, political and diplomatic reasons as much as for the sake of smooth working of the administrative machinery he retained in service Brāhmans who possessed the requisite experience and were leaders of society. As the Government of Dāhir had been oppressive, the common man did not find the new domination unduly heavy, despite the burden of the jizyā and discriminatory laws against 'the unbelievers'. It was enough that the state did not actively undertake conversions and that the familiar Brāhmins still manned the government, though in subordination to the Arabs.

Thus the prospect of the Arab power finding stable roots in the new territory appeared to be bright; but the recall of Imāduddin in 715 and the consequent mutual quarrels among Arab chiefs disorganised the conquerors. Moreover Caliphs did not consider the conquest of India feasible, and neglected to take any steps to reinforce the first settlers. Sindh was, therefore, split up into numerous petty Arab colonies.

Even so, it would be unhistorical to describe the Arab conquest of Sindh as a mere "episode in the history of India and of Islam, a triumph without results." Its political and cultural consequences were of far-reaching importance. Under the Abbāsid Caliphs, specially under Hārun and Mansūr, there was a great demand for Buddhist and Brāhman scholars from India. They included philosophers, astrologers, physicians, savants of belles lettres, mathematicians, chemists and others.

1 Lanepòole-Medieval India p. 12.
They interpreted the learning and Science of India to their eager Arab pupils. Thus in the words of Havell “it was India not Greece that taught Islam in the impressionable years of its youth, formed its philosophy and esoteric religious ideals, and inspired its most characteristic expression in literature, art and architecture.” This cultural contact inspired in the Arab respect for the people of India, though his political principles allotted to ‘the unbeliever’ an inferior and degrading status.

On the other hand, the Hindus became acquainted with a new political system and a new religion. The province of Sindh was only lightly held by the Arabs, so that persecuted Muslim sects found here a convenient and safe refuge. Sindh became the homeland of a heterogeneous Muslim population, whose common characteristic was independence, adventure and faith in their own cause. Consequently, Muslim power in Sindh became practically a permanent fixture. From here flowed a stream of Muslim travellers and saints into the interior of the land. Some of them collected valuable information about topography, roads and communications, nature and resources of the country and the character of the people. This survey proved extremely useful to later invaders. It is true that Sindh was not used as the spring board by later Muslim conquerors of India, but certainly it facilitated the future conquest by indirect means.

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1 Aryan Rule in India—p. 256.

2 Sulaimān (Elliot’s Index Vol. I p. 48) and Maṣḥid (Ibid pp. 55-58). The first finished his account about 850 A.D. while the other undertook the voyage in 915 A.D. and died in 956 A.D. Istakhri (Ibid pp. 58-61) early 10th century and Ibn Haukal (Ibid pp. 61-69), written in 977 A.D. or 367 A.H.
The next serious invasion of India was attempted by Mahmūd of Ghaznī who revelled in calling himself the 'breaker of idols'. It was practically three centuries after the Arab occupation of Sindh that Mahmūd annexed the province of the Punjab to his dominions. In the meantime great changes had taken place in and outside India.

From the time of Harsha, Kanauj had become the imperial city of Northern India. Every ambitious militarist sought to occupy it or to appoint a vassal of his own to rule over it. In the 8th and 9th centuries, Pālas of Bengal, Gurjar Pratihārs of Bhinmal and the Rāśtrakūṭas of Mālkhed contended for supremacy. In this triangular contest, the Pālas came off the worst. The Rāśtrakūṭas obtained initial success; but were finally eliminated by the Gurjara-Pratihārs, partly because of the latter's valour but mainly because of the distance from their capital in the south and the political ferment that was going on south of the Vindhyas itself. The Pratihārs thus re-established a certain amount of political unity in Northern India under their aegis. But on the eve of Mahmūd of Ghaznī's invasions, their power was already on the wane and their vassals were asserting their de-facto sovereignty though they outwardly maintained the fiction of nominal dependence. Each of these ambitious vassal dynasties e.g. the Chandels, the Kalchuris, the Tomars, and others was trying to extend its frontiers at the cost of its neighbours. There was thus practically a war of each against all which was not only depleting the fighting personnel but was also making the common man sick of perennial fighting, constant military burdens and ceaseless neglect of the general welfare.
Outside the frontiers of India, the Caliphate was undergoing rapid and revolutionary changes. Under the Umayyads up to 750 A.D. a semblance of unified control was maintained but after their supersession by the Abbāsids, the European, African and Asian territories broke away from the centre. The authority of the Abbāsids soon shrank to their Asian possessions. Then, the character of Caliphate was also changing. The Caliph was no longer looked upon as an ideal Muslim who could fittingly guide his followers in the spiritual sphere. On the contrary, he was just a temporal head though he claimed spiritual powers as well. During the eastward expansion of Islam the Tartars were subdued and converted. A section of them called the Turks were great fighters, they having inherited the martial traditions of the Hāns. The Abbāsids, apprehensive of the intrigues of their courtiers, imported Turks as Guards of the palace and the guardians soon became their rigorous masters. The Perso-Arab hegemony made way for the supremacy of the Turks who secured important assignments in the civil and military administration and established a series of semi-independent kingdoms.

Mahmūd was the master of just one such kingdom and though nominally he was subordinate to the authority of the Caliph, in practice he was powerful enough to browbeat the latter into compliance with his behests. The Turks were thus flushed with success and brimming with ambition while the Rājpūts presented the sorry spectacle of a house divided against itself. The Butshikan led a series of seventeen expeditions

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1 Havell—p. 283, Briggs I, p. 53.
into the land, satiated his greed for gold and his lust for idol-breaking and finally retired to his kingdom, confident of a blissful existence after death.¹

The invasions of Mahmūd made Ghaznī a powerful kingdom because of its acquisition of inexhaustible treasures and a formidable corps of war-elephants. The city itself was adorned with beautiful buildings executed by Indian talent and paid for by the booty from Indian temples. The Punjab was firmly occupied and like Sindh remained a Muslim possession till the time of Mahārājā Ranjīt Singh. The Rājpūts were dazed and dispirited by the valour and might of the iconoclasts. Whatever might be the opinion of fanatical Muslims about Mahmūd’s achievements, the more intelligent of his co-religionists, then and now, can only pity his ignorance of the truer tenets of Islam and rue the consequences of his fanatical behaviour.² The Hindu who had welcomed the early Arab missionary in the South and had provided land and funds for the construction of mosques in order to allow the followers of a new religion to stay in their midst, had received his first shock when the Arabs indulged in fanatical fury in the pursuit of a political reprisal. But he had tried to forget it as the unauthorised excesses of soldiers because the subsequent Arab government had based its administration on principles of religious toleration. Then came the wrangles and disputes between various Arab tribes and contending rival sects which showed the weaknesses

¹ Nāzīm—Mahmūd of Ghaznī pp. 86-122.
² Al Bīrūnī, Sachau I. p. 22. Ḥābib—Mahmūd of Ghaznīn p. 81.
in the Arab system. But he got the greatest shock of his life when he found an apparently devout Muslim king concentrating his energies only on the desecration and spoliation of places of worship and that too in the name of religion. What respect could he have for a religion which excused or rather encouraged such wanton destruction, murder and arson as an aid to its progress for bringing spiritual solace to those in the darkness of irreligion? This was Mahmūd's service to his religion according to his lights. Of such men it has been said, 'God save us from our friends'.

Mahmūd's hammer-blows changed the political make up of India altogether and a new state-system grew up. But there was no essential difference either in the general organisation and mutual relations of these kingdoms or in their anxiety to meet a possible repetition of Mahmūd's exploits. The Rājpūt Rājās were extremely conceited about their power, negligent of their duties, and ignorant of what was happening beyond their frontiers. The usual round of war and revelry went apace while the Ghorian monarchs were planning to overthrow not only the Ghaznavides but also the Rājpūt rulers of India. The story of how Prithvīrāj disdained to pursue the defeated foe in 1191 would have appeared incredible were we not conversant with unique Rājpūt notions of chivalry on the battlefield.

Muizzuddīn Muhammad bin Sām, who during his brother's reign was the governor of Ghazni, was no ordinary free-booting invader. He did not spurn Indian gold nor did he dislike the prospect of becoming a Ghāzī but these were incidental to
his main objective—viz. the establishment of Muslim rule in India. He went about his business cautiously but with unshakable determination. As a prelude to his incursions further afield, he first tried to reduce the chieftains of the Indus valley from Multan and Uchh to Lahore. Then he probed the defences of the Solankis and suffered the first defeat of his career in India. Henceforth he became shy of contacting that monarch again and diverted his attention to the Gangetic valley. The first experience here was worse than in Gujerat but he thanked his stars for the misplaced chivalry of Rāi Pithaurā. He made fresh preparations, heaped humiliation on all those captains who had deserted him in the first battle of Tarāin and when everything was ready for the return bout with the Chauhān king of Delhi and Ajmer, he allowed the same disgraced captains another chance to prove their mettle and to wash off their infamy by heroic exploits against their erstwhile victors. The second battle of Tarāin found the Hindu king comparatively unprepared and though the fight was long and bloody, fortune favoured the invaders. Prithvirāj was captured and killed and a large part of his kingdom was occupied by the Muslims whom he had contemptuously allowed to recoup themselves for another fight, if they so desired.

The success of Muhammad against Prithvirāj had a tremendous influence for good or evil on his followers and on the remaining chiefs of the Gangetic valley. Qutbuddin Aibak the Viceroy at Kuhrām, the Khiljis under Malik Ikhtiyāruddin in Bihar and Bengal and Nāsiruddin Qubāchā in Sindh and Multan carried on the work of their master and liege-lord by consolidating the con-
quests, attempting fresh campaigns against neighbouring kingdoms and by instituting a workable government for the period of transition. Within a dozen years of the defeat and death of Prithviraj, the crescent waved aloft from Sindh and the Punjab in the west to the frontiers of Assam and Bhutan in the East and from the central Gangetic plains to Mahoba and Kalinjar in the South and to Gwalior and Ajmer in the South-West.

It is true that the authority of the Muslims was really confined only to the cities and forts garrisoned by them, while in the countryside and the fastnesses of the jungles the displaced Rajpút chiefs held sway biding their time for a more auspicious moment when they should drive out the invader and avenge the wrongs done to their gods and families. But the time never came, despite the vicissitudes through which the Sultanate of Delhi was to pass before its final dismemberment. Why was it so? The Muslims were after all a foreign people, not quite familiar with the topography of the land. They believed in an alien religion, sometimes indulged in senseless persecution and fanaticism and showed scant regard for the Bráhmin or the Rajpút. The Hindus were natives of the soil, the Rajpúts among them were hereditary and professional fighters who preferred death to dishonour and defeat and they were far more numerous than the invaders. But it is not religion, race, climate or numbers that provides the key to this event. The Rajpút state was a military government in which the needs of the civilian population were subordinated to the exigencies of war—and that, by the way, was unending. The Rajpúts had monopolised political power so com-
pletely that all sense of patriotism was beaten out of their subjects. Military organisation of the Rājpūts put greater premium on reckless valour than on strategy and tactics of war. The Rājpūts fought just for a name—their ruling chief—while their opponents were fired by a religious zeal and greed for conquest. The invaders met with little popular opposition because the people yearned for peace and they felt that the Rājpūts, constantly contending for the title of the chakravartin ruler, were incapable of providing it. The government of the Rājpūts had been neither very efficient nor enlightened, so that the oppressive measures of the new masters did not weigh heavily on them, specially because it was possible to avoid payment of taxes when conditions were not quite normal and the rulers were constantly kept busy in fighting against Hindu rebels, rival chiefs or Mongol invaders. Thus the Muslim dominion in India was finally established, and the Rājpūts though possessed of many admirable personal qualities were dished out for good.

The thirteenth century opened with this epoch-making event in the history of India. Muslim organisation and discipline, though superior in many ways to that of the Hindus, was, by no means, free from defects. We shall revert to these defects a little later. For the present we may follow the progress of Muslim arms and the consolidation of Muslim dominion in India.

Qutbuddin Aibak did not long survive his master but, even within that short period, he was able to found an independent Sultanate of Delhi by securing acquiescence of the Ghorian monarch and by forcing obedience on even the most powerful
Muslim governors in India, like Qubāchā in Sindh and the Khiljīs in Bengal. But he was able to do little more than this.

His slave and son-in-law, İltutmish, found no difficulty in setting aside Arāmshāh whose brief reign had given the signal for a general scramble for power in which both Hindu Rājās and Muslim nobles had repudiated the authority of the Sultan of Delhi. İltutmish first reduced the rebellious nobles in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital. Next he silenced all rival claims for sovereignty by eliminating Yaldoz and Qubāchā and by appointing a nominee of his own to carry on the government in Bengal. At the same time, he maintained a cautious watch over the frontier, avoided a conflict with the Mongols and reduced to submission all refractory Hindu Rājās. As a further proof of his power, he made inroads in Malwa and pillaged the cities of Bhilsa and Ujjain, though it is doubtful if he was able to secure any extension of territory in that region. To give his de facto sovereignty the sanction of acknowledged authority, he secured an investiture from the Caliph of Baghdad.

But it was not mere diplomacy and war that engrossed the attention of the Sultan. He tried to impress upon the subjects that the Muslims had come to stay. To that end he tried to produce a typical Islamic environment in the capital and in the various departments of government. A massive tower of victory—Qutb Minār—begun by Aibak was completed in his reign and the Hindu weakness for ornamentation was severely held in restraint except in forms approved by Islamic traditions. He built a number of mosques in and
outside Delhi with the materials taken out of Hindu temples and at times even on their sites with slight structural modifications.¹ Poets, philosophers, historians and canonists formed the entourage of the Sultan and thus was reproduced the cultural atmosphere of Baghdad.² Purely Arabic coinage replaced the Hindu counterpart current till then and chief posts in all departments of state were manned by Muslims who conducted the administration according to their own principles with slight adjustments to suit local conditions. Muslim saints and scholars were patronized and they carried on the work of peaceful proselytisation.³ The common man gradually reconciled himself to the changed situation because of provision for justice,⁴ maintenance of law and order, and the comparative indifference of the state towards local social customs and local organizations. To impart stability to his dynasty, Iltutmish enrolled the Corps of Forty, the members of which owed their promotion entirely to his favour. To counteract the evils of an uncertain law of succession he nominated his eldest son Nasiruddin Mahmūd (but he died during the lifetime of his father) as heir apparent and on his death commended his daughter Rażiyā to the approval of his nobility.

But despite the Sultan’s vigour, ability and foresight conditions in the kingdom were not quite peaceful. Twice was an attempt made on his life. Both Muslim nobles and Hindu chiefs harboured ambitious designs and were waiting for a favourable

¹ Arāhā din kā Jhonprā, Ajmer.
² Briggs 1 pp. 211-212.
³ E.g. Qutbul-dīn Bakhṭiyr Kākī of Ush.
opportunity. But so long as the Sultan was alive they had little or no prospect of success and so they rendered a grudging obedience to his behests. Even this, gradually, accustomed the people to look upon the Sultan and his family as worthy of special esteem. That is why when Ilutmish died and Ruknuddin failed to hold the sceptre, the powerful grandees of the state tried one prince after another, but none of them could usurp the throne.

This change of sovereigns at the will of the dominant group at the court came to a close with the accession of Nāsiruddin Mahmūd. His reign of twenty years was a period of crisis in the history of the Sultanate. The Mongol empire founded by Changez Khan had reached the frontiers of India and was threatening to engulf the country in the same evil fate as had overtaken the peoples of Central Asia, Persia, and Khwarizm. Selfishness and ambition of the Muslim nobles was threatening a disruption from within. The Hindu Rājās would be only too glad to help in the liquidation of the Sultanate, heedless of what might take its place. But Balban as minister and, later, as Sultan arrested the centrifugal tendencies. During his first tenure of office he quickly suppressed the rebels of the Doab, Katehar, Mewat, and the Khokhar land; overran Bundelkhand; restrained Muslim nobles and beat back the Mongol invaders. After a short interlude of dismissal from Nayabat he returned to power again in triumph and continued to wield supreme authority for over thirty years. As the Naîb Sultan, he could not go as far as he would have liked to, but when he became Sultan in his own right he gave a free rein to his policy of blood and iron. He sealed the frontier
to the savage invaders of Central Asia by instituting elaborate measures of defence. The rebel and the robber was hunted down to his den and wholesale massacres of suspected miscreants established the peace of death. Jungles were cleared, communications improved and outposts of picked soldiers established in the affected areas.

The Muslims were also dealt with firmness. The awe and majesty of the sovereign was maintained by an elaborate court-ceremonial, a revised code of behaviour for the nobility and the grandeur and magnificence that surrounded royalty, whether at court or in camp, on the battlefield as on the hunting ground. Like Iltutmish he also nominated his successor and proceeded to train him thoroughly for that august office. But he was no luckier than his great sire. Prince Muhammad died a year before Balban as Mahmūd had predeceased Iltutmish. Balban died a broken-hearted man and the sagacious statesman might have had a premonition of the impending ruin of his dynasty when his son Bughrā Khan, fought shy of accepting sovereign authority while his grandsons Kai Khusrau and Kaiqubād were still in their teens.

The dynasty of Balban was supplanted by the Khiljīs. This new group of rulers was to carry the arms of Islam to the farthest extremities of India. They also made many novel experiments in the art of government. Jalāluddīn Khiljī who had grown grey in the service of the Ilbarīs and had been a witness to the results produced by Balban’s policy of repression decided to govern the country according to a more humanitarian code of laws. He was an experienced military leader and was able to defeat the Mongols when they led an
invasion into his territory. But he was growing sick of mere bloodshed and wanted to avoid it as far as possible. Hence, though he did not, in any way, relax the vigil on the frontiers, he tried to blunt the edge of Mongol hostility by entering into a matrimonial alliance and by establishing friendly relations with them. Even rebels, robbers and conspirators, were awarded comparatively light punishments with a warning to improve their conduct. It is difficult to say whether this experiment had much chance for success but his nephew and son-in-law exploited the credulity and goodness of the old monarch to plan his assassination with success and made himself the master of Delhi.

Alāuddin Khilji was very different from his predecessor. He was youthful, ambitious, sagacious, practical and absolutely unscrupulous in securing his objective. He was a sound judge of men and was seldom deceived by persons in whom he reposed his confidence. He planned everything on a grand pattern. Though Alāuddin indulged in the pleasures of the flesh, he was no cheap libertine. He raised a large army, manned it by well-trained and well-equipped soldiers and officered it by trusted and valiant generals. It was detailed to conquer the remaining states of Northern India, to defend the capital and to keep an eye on the Mongols whose inroads had become almost an annual calamity. By 1307 practically the whole of Northern India, including Malwa, Rājpūtānā and Gujerat, had been conquered and the Mongols had been defeated so often that their morale deteriorated considerably. Now Alāuddin initiated formal and systematic subjugation of the Deccan, towards
the south and of sending out raiding parties into the Mongol territory, to the north-west. This was the first occasion when the Sultans of Delhi took the offensive against the invaders or attempted the conquest of the South. That Alāuddin could undertake both of these schemes simultaneously speaks volumes in favour of his abilities as a great military strategist.

Besides these great military achievements, the Sultan struck many new lines in the general administration of the country. It was he who for the first time tried to eliminate the domination of the clericals over the civilian authority. Again, it was he who successfully enforced regulation of prices and control of the market despite the conservatism and selfishness of the Indian merchant. He tried to break the power of the nobility by regulating their social activities, by depriving them of all landed property and by keeping a strict watch over the minutest details of their life, through an efficient army of spies. His punishments were fiercer than those of Balban, and the punishment of friends and relations for the faults of their kinsmen was made into a political principle. The Hindus—specially the political leaders among them—were terrorized into submission while a revised scheme of taxation left them little leisure to indulge in rebellion. Above all, Alāuddin was a great realist and was conscious of limits to what he could do. That is why he neither annexed the Deccan, nor attempted the conquest of Mongol territory. Enhanced taxes and market regulations were also for the same reason confined to areas capable of supporting them.

Alauddin Khilji the majesty and power of the Sultanate touched a very high peak.

The Khilji empire began to disintegrate before Alauddin was dead. The incompetence of his sons, his own infatuation for Malik Kafur, the severity of his laws, the personal character of his triumph, all conspired to undermine the foundations of the political structure. Alauddin’s growing ill-health made it impossible for him to supervise affairs of the state. After his death, the crash came almost as rapidly as after the death of Balban. Kafur’s brief span of power caused dissensions and intrigues. Qutbuddin Mubarak was lucky enough to escape assassination and to capture the throne; but he soon lost all self-control and sank to the level of a contemptible debauchee. His misplaced confidence in Khusrau proved fatal and the Barwaris supplanted the house of Alauddin Khilji.

Khusrau’s capture of supreme power might have gone unchallenged, if he had not initiated a policy of persecution against the Muslims. Consequently, while the Rajputs considered him doubly tainted as born in a low caste, and later converted to Islam and therefore unfit for acceptance as a national hero fighting against the foreigners, the Muslims regarded him as a renegade and an enemy of Islam. Ghazi Malik, the celebrated warden of the Marches since the time of Alauddin Khilji, led a movement against the ‘unclean Barwari’ and assisted by a number of second grade nobles defeated Khusrau and killed him.

Out of sincere devotion or politic discretion, he offered to place a representative of Alauddin’s family on the throne. But when none was forthcoming, he assumed sovereignty by common
consent, and within a short time restored such order and infused such vigour in the government that people thought that Alauddin had come back to life again. The Tughluq dynasty, founded by him, proved the longest lived of all the pre-Mughal Muslim dynasties of Delhi. But when its power began to wane, disintegrating forces proved too strong for the later Tughluqs and effective power of the Central Government was confined only to a few central districts.

There were numerous causes which contributed to the disruption of the central power of the Sultanate. In the first place, the Hindus had never been really reconciled to their new masters. They had lost political power, they were subjected to discriminatory laws and had to suffer the humiliation of social degradation. It is true that most of the Sultans neither attempted to secure wholesale conversions nor indulged in fanatical outbursts of religious intolerance; but it is equally true that the civil and political rights of the Hindus, throughout the Sultanate, compared unfavourably with those of the Muslims. There were some rulers like Muhammad bin Tughluq who appointed Hindus to comparatively high posts\(^1\) but even he excluded them from the highest ones and we do not hear of any Hindu being appointed a provincial governor or a departmental chief. Hindu converts to Islam were generally treated as equals and we find Imāuddin Raihan, Malik Kāfūr, and Khān-i-Jahān Maqbul rising to the highest office below that of the Sultan. Nāsiruddin Khusrau was even

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\(^1\) Ratan, Azīm-ūs-Sindh who held Sīhwān (C.H.I. III p. 147) and Bhaīrōn, the officer who held Gulbarga, CHI. III, p. 156.
acknowledged as king. But there were many nobles and a few Sultans like Balban who considered only Turks qualified to occupy high offices. Balban went to the length of punishing even those who recommended the case of a man of low family. Consequently, the Hindus could not feel very enthusiastic about their chances and opportunities. Alauddin Khilji attempted a certain amount of rapprochement by exalting Rām Chandra Deva with the title of Rāy-i-Rāyān and arranging matrimonial alliances with the Hindu ruling families. He even nominated Shihabuddin Umar the son of Rājā Rām Chandra’s daughter as heir to the throne. But this was a solitary example. The other two connections viz. Deval Devi’s marriage with Khizr Khan and his own with Kamaladevi were performed more by force than by consent and therefore could leave behind only bitter memories. Still, if Khizr Khan had been allowed to succeed his father and if he could have at least maintained the policy initiated by him, the sequel might have been different. But that was not to be.

The cumulative effect of this policy of exclusion and discrimination was that the political leaders of the Hindus were always able to secure followers for furthering their ambitions of local intransigence. The resistance of Hindu leadership was almost continuous and the annals of the Sultanate repeatedly refer to risings in the Doab, Katehar, Mewat, Rājpūtānā and the Khokhar land. This then was the first reason why, when the Sultanate showed signs of weakness and had the

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2 Tripathi, p. 50.
misfortune of having a succession of weak kings, disintegration became chronic.

In the second place, the Sultans of Delhi, pressed by the fear of foreign invasion and internal rebellion, remained more or less mere military despots and found little leisure or opportunity for inaugurating ameliorative reforms in the civil administration. Therefore Hindu and Muslim alike had no real reason for attachment to any particular dynasty. This also tended to undermine stability.

In the third place, the Sultanate failed to create any definite law of succession, hereditary nobility or representative institutions which might have stepped in the gap when monarchy failed the state. Each great king created his own order of nobility who rode to fame and distinction over the corpses of their predecessors. There was thus a constant state of flux and instability in which intrigue and conspiracy found a congenial atmosphere. After the death of Firuz Tughluq, mutual rivalries among nobles at the court became so deep-rooted that any stable combination became impossible. It is they who engineered one palace revolution after another and founded a series of independent kingdoms which became rivals to the authority of the Sultanate of Delhi.

Fourthly, the annexation of the Deccan proved ruinous to the empire. Alauddin was right in treating the Deccan as the milch cow that supplied him with gold needed for his various ambitious designs. But he was shrewd enough not to burden himself with the responsibility of its direct government. Even when after Singhana's (or Shankar
deva's)\textsuperscript{1} rebellion Malik Kāfūr tried to establish direct control of the Sultan of Delhi over the kingdom of Devagiri, Alāuddin promptly cancelled the arrangement, ordered him to entrust the government to a representative of the ruling dynasty and to return to the capital at once. But soon after his death, there was another rebellion in Devagiri. Qutbuddin Mubārak had the rebel chief flayed alive and appointed Khusrau as his governor. Thus was initiated the fateful policy of making annexations in the Deccan. Its evil consequences began to show themselves presently. Khusrau found himself in possession of a rich province, protected by distance from close observation by the central government and he began hatching his plans for independence. He was able to form a group of trusted confederates who pledged to sink or swim with him. Consequently, though he was recalled to Delhi, he was able to secure the throne itself with the help of the same confederates. Thus the fall of the Khilji dynasty was intertwined with Deccan politics.

During the regime of the Tughluqs the malady assumed dangerous proportions. Ghiyāsuddin Tughluq sent his son and heir-apparent to the Deccan for reconquest and annexation of Telingānā. While he was there, he was suspected of rebellion because his close associates like Shaikhzādā Damishqī and Obaid circulated a report of the death of the Sultan and exhorted the soldiers to proclaim Muhammad as the rightful king.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} K. S. Lal—Alāuddin Khilji—p. 12 considers Shankar to be incorrect and suggests Singhana Deva as the real name of the son of Rājā Rām Chandra Deva of Devagiri.

\textsuperscript{2} Qaraunāh Turks pp. 30-33, Elliot III pp. 232-33.
plan miscarried because of the unwillingness of other nobles who charged Jūnā Khan with conspiracy and threatened to put him under arrest. Consequently the conquest of Telingānā had to be given up for the time being and the prince was recalled to the capital where those who had buried the Sultan alive in jest were buried alive in earnest. But like Khusrau, Jūnā Khan never disabused his mind of securing the throne. Like him, he too regained the trust of his sovereign, acted as his deputy and ended by engineering his death, though in a less open manner.\(^1\) The death of Ghiyāsuddīn was thus due to ambitions excited in the prince's mind in the Deccan.

Then came Muhammad bin Tughluq who has been described as the wonder of the age. Like a man of experience and learning, he knew that the Deccan had inspired inordinate ambition in the minds of Kāfūr, Khusrau and himself. Devagiri and Telingānā were now directly ruled by the Sultan of Delhi. The example of the Sultan himself might be imitated by another ambitious nobleman. He did not have to speculate for long on its possibility. Bahāuddin Gashasp, the governor of Sāgar, rose in revolt and when defeated sought refuge with the Rājā of Anāgondī who sacrificed everything in his defence and then sent him to the ruler of Dwārsamudra with an appeal for help. Fortunately for Muhammad, this Rājā did not live up to the usual standards of Rājpūt chivalry and surrendered the rebel to the imperialists.

Muhammad's mind was thus thoroughly made up in favour of shifting the capital to the Deccan.

which needed closer attention than the north. Hence the transfer of the capital to Devagiri in 1327 which entailed enormous suffering and made people sceptical about Sultan's wisdom. The introduction of copper coins has also been partly connected with the heavy expenditure incurred in the transfer of the capital. The odium incurred and the losses suffered on that account were therefore, indirectly the result of annexation of the Deccan. The empire of Muhammad was the largest among those of any previous Sultan of Delhi but the honour could hardly bring any solace to the unfortunate Sultan who was reduced to the fate of a weather cock moving from one direction to another as the gale of rebellion affected different parts of his wide dominions. For sometime, he was able to bear the strain. Then things took a turn for the worse. Maibar, in the extreme south was the first to become independent. Vijayanagar, Bengal, and Bahmani kingdoms soon followed suit. Foreign Amirs, a large number of whom had been appointed in the Deccan, Malwa and Gujerat created such a ferment that not only the whole of the Deccan was lost but serious disaffection prevailed in Gujerat and Sindh as well. The Sultan died grappling with these troubles. The Deccan had thus cost three Sultans of Delhi their lives and in the end had greatly endangered peace and order even of the North. Verily, was it the grave of the Sultanate of Delhi, as it was to be later in the case of the empire of the Mughals.

Firuz Tughluq, during his long and weak reign, accelerated the process of disintegration. He was a humane and kind-hearted monarch who over-
looked\(^1\) and even encouraged\(^2\) corruption, tolerated inefficiency in the army,\(^3\) and lightened punishments in his zeal for conformity with the Holy Law. His expeditions to Bengal and Sindh discredited him completely while his enrolment of a huge contingent of slaves and revival of jāgirs to satisfy the nobles, strengthened the potential forces of disorder. During old age he became too feeble to decide anything with firmness and the changes made in nomination of his heir heightened court-intrigues and factiousness. By the time of his death, the Sultanate had lost practically all its vitality and was tottering for a fall.

Then came the invasion of Timūr, which delivered such hectic blows that the Sultanate of the Turks could never be revived again. The Sultan of Delhi who used to demand jizyā from the Hindus to protect their life and property was incapable of defending his own person and was a fugitive to Gujerat. His Wazīr fled into the Doab. The invaders in the meantime looted the country, massacred the people, burnt cities and carried away whomsoever they liked as prisoners of war. For a considerable time, the capital was literally without a king and nothing but pestilence, misery and famine reigned where once Alāuddīn and Balban had held court. The Sultanate was completely discredited. Each provincial governor and every spirited chief established a local kingdom or estate for himself. This went on upto the death of Mahmūd Tughluq.

Khizr Khan Sayyad and his son Sultan Mubārak Shāh tried in vain to salvage the Sultan-

\(^1\) Aftī pp. 344-45.
\(^2\) Ishwarj Prasad, Medl. India. p. 330.
\(^3\) Aftī—p. 303, Elliot III p. 349.
ate from the debris of ruin. When the assassin’s knife relieved Mubārak Shāh of his kingly worries the influence of the Sultan of Delhi reverted to that of the time of Mahmūd Tughluq. The humorists of Delhi in the days of Alāuddīn Ālam Shāh freely chanted:

Bādshāhi-i-Shāh Ālam
Az Delhi tā Pālam.

Politically, then, there was utter distintegration on the eve of the foundation of the Lodi dynasty. In the constitutional sphere also there was a marked difference from conditions prevailing in the 13th and first half of the fourteenth century. The Turks had started as military governors but had soon developed into imperialists with fairly well organised central and provincial governments. Local Hindu chiefs, relics of an old feudal order were either uprooted or ruthlessly suppressed. The Muslim nobility though influential and useful was kept under surveillance and the abler monarchs of Delhi refrained from allowing them fiefs. Even where such grants had been made, the growth of a hereditary feudal order was rendered impossible by periodical murders and supersessions, at the installations of dynasties or even accessions of a new monarch. But from the time of Firūz Tughluq there was a visible change in this arrangement. The idea of having a large empire, though lurking in theory, is given up in practice and the Sultan was more interested in promoting the prosperity and welfare of the people still subject to his authority than in making fresh conquests and annexations.¹ He revived the system of granting fiefs and allowed government offices both high

¹ Cf. his non-annexation of Bengal, Orrissa, and Sindh and his refusal to invade the Bahmanī Kingdom.
and low to be held on a hereditary basis. This was a change fraught with great danger and symptomatic of the weakness of the Central Government. After him the reaction in favour of a hereditary feudal aristocracy became more pronounced and even the first two Sayyad monarchs found it impossible to interfere with it. Their entire career was spent in a round of campaigns to secure payment of royal dues from local officers and chiefs, whose descendants succeeded to their offices more or less as a matter of course. It was, therefore, in an environment of a weak feudal monarchy that the Afghāns had to plan their system of government.

Another remarkable fact that arrests our notice is that no Muslim dynasty of Delhi except the Khiljīs was considered initially unacceptable. We are further told that the dislike of the Khiljīs was mainly due to their suspected Afghān origin. This anti-Afghān sentiment continued almost throughout the pre-Mughal period. Earlier Muslims, both nobles and commoners, had no hesitation in following the lead of a Turkish slave but it touched their pride if an Afghān were to be made their leader. It is probably because of this that we shall find Islām Khan and later on Bahlūl Lodi depending for recruits to their armies mainly on Afghāns and Mughals. It is significant that although among the nobles and chief men of Lodi monarchs there are a few Hindu names, there is

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1 Cf. the appointment of Khān-i-Jahān Maqbul’s son as Wāzīr after former’s death and regulations about the army.
2 For details of their reigns see Mubarakshahi pp. 181-235.
3 Baranī p. 171.
no reference to any friendly Turkish leader. The government of the Afghāns was thus forced, by circumstances, to distrust the Turk, to befriend the native Hindu and to invite the Afghān hillmen from beyond the frontier.

This collaboration with the unconverted Hindu who had so long been treated as an inferior person requires a little further elucidation. In the political context, the Hindu was the natural ally of the Afghān in a war against the Turk who had despised and maltreated both of them, though not for identical reasons. But there was a more fundamental factor at the root of it. The Hindus and the Muslims had lived together in war and peace for over two hundred and fifty years and each had failed to eliminate the other. It was in the logic of facts that if liquidation was impossible reconciliation and understanding should slowly creep in its place. Then, it was not left entirely to chance to shape their respective relationship. There were many great minds which were working at a rapprochement of the two communities. They were preaching a doctrine of love for all creatures of God. The wounds caused by the swords of Muslim imperialists and counter-attacking Hindu chiefs were healed by the loving words of that crop of saints and reformers whom it is customary to lump together as the harbingers and authors of the Bhakti movement. Thus while an average husbandman in the country and the peaceful trader in the town was developing friendly and neighbourly contacts by sheer force of habitual co-existence, the Hindu reformer and the Muslim proselytiser gave a spiritual basis for mutual understanding and co-operation.
CHAPTER II.

FOUNDATION OF THE LODI EMPIRE

There was a time when, following the lead of Dow and Briggs, all the Sultans of Delhi from Qutbuddin Aibak to Ibrāhim Lodi were described as Pathāns or Afghāns. But by the last quarter of the 19th century it was established to the satisfaction of all discriminating authors that the first Pathān or Afghān sovereign of Delhi was Bahlūl rather than Qutbuddin Aibak. Major Raverty in a paper on ‘Who were the Pathān Sultans of Delhi’ has severely castigated the unfounded error of Dow and Briggs. In the same paper he even threw out a challenge to prove that any Afghān held even the post of an Amir during the reigns of the ‘Slave’ kings.¹

Since then it has been generally admitted that the Lodis were the first Afghān ruling family of Delhi. Sir Wolseley Haig, however, does not consider them pure Afghāns and says:

“The Lodis were Khaljīs or Ghilzaīs, Turks by origin but so long resident in Afghanistan that by the 15th century they could be correctly described as Afghāns.”²

Longworth Dames, considers the Lodīs distinct from the Ghilzaīs, though closely allied to them. About the Ghilzaīs he says that though Bellew, Darmestater and others have identified Ghilzaīs with the Turkish tribe, Khalj, yet ‘the actual identification of names is doubtful’. He,

¹ JRASB. 1875 pp. 24-38.
² CHI. III p. 224, f. n. 2.
however, concedes that the Ghilzais have probably absorbed a good deal of Turkish blood.¹

The origin of the Afghans, in general, and of the Lodis, in particular, has been discussed at considerable length by Bellew,² Longworth Dames,³ Raverty⁴ and others. They all agree that the various Persian and Pushto works of Afghān and Indian authors only relate certain traditions about their origin which though different in certain details are on the whole woven round a common pattern. There are some like Bellew who place considerable reliance on the traditional account and adduce circumstantial corroborative evidence in its support while others like Sir Wolseley Haig adopt a non-committal attitude or like Longworth Dames are very sceptical about it.

There are three elements in the controversy: (a) Israeliitish origin of Afghāns (b) the identity of Afghāns with Pathāns, (c) Genealogy of the Lodīs and other tribes.

The best defence of the Hebrew or Israeliitish origin of the Afghāns is provided by Bellew. His arguments may be briefly summarised as follows:—

(i) The Afghān claim of an Israeliitish origin is based only on an ancient tradition but the tradition is very strong, universal and living. This points to a basis in fact though it might have been ‘adulterated and distorted by fiction’.

(ii) The traditions common among them and cherished with pride relate to scriptural traditions associated with Israelites.

¹ Encyc. of Islam I (1913) p. 149.
³ Encyc. of Islam I pp. 149-153.
⁴ JRASB. (1875) pp. 33-37.
(a) The theory of Israeliitish origin.
(iii) They have a close physiognomic resemblance with the Jews, specially in respect of their noses.

(iv) Moral characteristics of the Afghāns are in many respects peculiarly akin to those of the Jews.

(v) Their laws and customs are in some important cases very similar to those of the Jews e.g. stoning to death of blasphemers of their religion and extreme regard for saints and shrines.

(vi) There is no reason why they should falsely perpetuate this claim when “they despise and detest (Jews) as the worst of heretics and infidels.”

On the strength of these arguments he concludes: “And to my own mind, there is no doubt but their claims to such a descent are perfectly just, though at the same time it is not on the strength of their history alone that such an opinion is formed, but on the corroborative evidence already detailed.”

Longworth Dames controverts most of these arguments and feels extremely doubtful of the theory being capable of a historical justification. His views may be stated thus:

(i) “Physically, the Afghān race belongs, in the main, to the Turko-Irānian type, with a considerable admixture of Indian blood among the eastern tribes. . .”

(ii) The tradition, though now so universal has not been mentioned in any chronicle prior to the 15th century. It appears that proud pedigree was found for the Afghāns in the 16th and later
centuries because they had secured royal authority. Such fabrications are, by no means, uncommon.

(iii) Physiognomic resemblance in respect of the nose should make the Kushâns, the Kashmîris, West Punjabis and some neighbours of Afghâns also of Jewish stock. This resemblance, therefore, proves nothing.

(iv) Most of the Muslims have been influenced by Jewish life and customs. There is, therefore, nothing very remarkable in Afghâns having certain customs which bear some resemblance to those of the Jews.

Sir Wolseley Haig (Encyc. Britannica 14th Edition, Vol. I, p. 287) affirms the strength of the tradition in favour of this theory but lightly dismisses it by saying that people have been deceived because of physiognomic resemblance.

Niāmatullâh in the Makhzan-i-Afghânî says:

"Of the prosperous state of the affairs of the Afghan nation, relative to their number, increase of tribes, and conversion to Islamism, nothing at all has hitherto been satisfactorily recorded in any book or history: owing to which circumstance, the links of their genealogy as well as the cause of their transmigration to the countries of Roh and Koh Suleman have remained quite unknown and unnoticed." He accounts for this by two factors; viz. (i) ignorance of the Afghâns in their mountain and desert homes, and (ii) lack of possession of royal power.²

This explains the want of regular ancient history regarding their origin and the existence of considerable variations in different traditions current

² Dorn I p. 2.
among the tribes. It is difficult to specify the time when the theory of the Israelitish origin found its way in literary compositions, or current tradition which lent support to it. That all these chroniclers were perpetuating a common lie may be one possibility; but, in the absence of other evidence, supporting the hypothesis of a deliberate fabrication, it remains a hypothesis only. The only safe conclusion, therefore, in this regard is that despite the strength and universality of the tradition, in the present state of our knowledge, the theory of Israelitish origin can neither be affirmed nor denied.

(b) Afghans and Pathans.

The other aspects of the controversy need not detain us for long because as has been stated above there is no definite historical evidence on which we can base our conclusions. Bellew says that the Durrânîs believe that while they are pure Afghans, Yûsufzais Kâkars, Ghilzais, Afridis etc. are really Pathâns. They are Afghâns only by adoption. He also says that this belief may be due to the earlier conversion of the Afghâns of the plains who in their pride might have invented a genealogy which excludes the above tribes from the descendants of Kais.¹ But he himself concludes later, that despite Afghân accounts, "there are good reasons for believing that these Pathâns are real Afghâns, as much as the descendants of Kais, and their settlement in the country, they now hold was coeval with that of the other Afghâns."² Longworth Dames rightly rejects this distinction as unreal and not well founded.³ The

1 Bellew p. 62
2 Ibid. p. 65.
3 Encyc. of Islam I p. 149.
two terms may, therefore, be taken as appellations of a common people.

"The genealogies recorded in the Makhzan-i-Afghānī are the foundations of those found in more modern works, such as the Hayāt-i-Afghānī. In their later parts, they are historical, in their earlier, they are valuable only as a guide to beliefs, entertained 300 years ago as to the relationship between the tribes."1 Bellew refers to Mullah Akhtar's History of Afghans written in 1741 AD and quoting an extinct or imaginary text Majmu-l-insāb as typical of genealogical accounts2

All of these accounts, however, refer to Kais, Abd-ul-Rashid as the common ancestor of almost all the Afghān tribes. Though there are minor discrepancies in tracing the genealogy of the Lodis from him, the genealogy from Adam to Kais is characterised with greater variety and is more or less mythological.

We shall now attempt to indicate the main outlines of this genealogy as given by Niāmatullāh and others. In the 18th generation after Adam was born Ibrāhīm, the beloved of God, His son Yāqūb had 12 sons who together were the progenitors of tribes, known as the Israelites. One of the descendants of Yāqūb, in the 7th generation after him was Tālūt or Saul. Thus Tālūt was 26 generations removed from Adam and 8 from Ibrāhīm.

Tālūt had two sons, one of whom was named Irmiyā or Jeremiāh. Irmiyā had a son who was named Afghānā. The origin of the name is associated with the circumstances of his birth. It is

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1 Encyc. of Islam I p. 152.
2 Bellew pp. 57-60.
said that his mother experienced great pains before his birth. Therefore, after delivery she remarked with relief 'Afghan' i.e. 'I am free.' Another variant of the legend is that she was crying 'Fighan. Fighan.' which in Persian means 'woe, grief, alas etc.' Hence the child born was named Afghana. Whatever be the origin and historicity of this person, it is he who is supposed to have given his name to the Afghān people.

One of the descendants of Afghāna in the 35th generation after him was Kais, Abd-ul-Rashid. He is said to have been a resident of the hilly tract round the Sulaiman Mountains and was a contemporary of the Prophet Muhammad. One of the companions of the Prophet was Khalid bin Walid whom the Afghān genealogists describe as a kinsman of Kais. It was at his instance that Kais, at the head of a deputation went to meet the Prophet and was converted to Islam and given the name of Abd-ul-Rashid (servant of the wise). The Prophet was very pleased with him and at the farewell meeting, remarked that he hoped he would prove a 'Pathān' (i.e. Keel or rudder of a ship) for his people, and would show them the path of true religion.¹ At the same meeting, he is alleged to have remarked that as all Afghāns were descended from Tālāt (King Saul), they would be known thenceforth as Maliks i.e. descendants of a king. This is how Afghāns and Pathāns are identified and their love for the title 'Malik' is explained.

¹ Dorn I p. 38; Bellew p. 54 suggests that 'Pathān' meant a rudder in the Syrian Language; Longworth Dames, Ibid. p. 150 says that 'Pathān' is not Arabic and is curious to know in which language it means 'Keel' of a ship.
Kais is said to have married a daughter of Khālid who bore to him three sons named Sarban, Batan and Ghurghusht. One of the children of Batan was Bībī Matto who had a romance with a certain Shāh Husain Ghorī, said to have been a representative of the Tajik ruling family of Ghor. The two were ultimately married and had children the eldest of whom was Ghilzoe and another was Ibrāhīm, surnamed 'Lo-e-daey' meaning in the Afghān language, 'he is great or elder'. He is the progenitor of the Lodis, which is a shortened form of his surname. Siāni one of the sons of Ibrāhīm had two sons Pranκī and Ismāīl. Bahlūl was 8 generations removed from Pranκī and was a member of the Shāhūkhel tribe of the Lodis. Ismāīl, on the other hand had two sons named Sūr and Nūh who were progenitors of the Sūr and Nūhānī Afghāns. The account given in the Encyclopaedia of Islam also shows that the Lodis, Sūrs, Nūhānīs and Niāz’s were the common descendants of Bībī Matto and had close family ties.

To sum up, the Lodīs were an Afghān tribe resident in the hilly region of the Sulaiman Mountains whose lateral kinsmen the Sūrs, the Niāzīs and the Nūhānīs were all allied to Ghilzaīs, who in their turn had an admixture of Tajik or Turkish blood in their veins.

The hillmen who occupied the country between Multan and Peshawar in the east and the Sulaiman mountains region up to Ghazni in the west, were living in a state of obscurity and penury almost to the 14th century A.D. They were tall and fair,
strongly built, adventurous, bold and warlike. But they lacked cohesion and the civilizing influence of arts and letters. They lived by tending their flocks and at times supplemented their income by plunder and organized tribal raids against their wealthier neighbours. Their unruly but warlike character attracted the notice of Mahmūd of Ghaznī who, according to Al-Utbi, enrolled them among his retainers. The successors of Mahmūd sometimes plundered and ravaged their territory to overawe them into submission and at others recruited them as irregulars to find an outlet for their overflowing energy.

During the hegemony of the Ghorides also, the Afghāns remained mere ‘adventurers and hill-rebels’. In the historic fight between Prithvīraj and Muhammad of Ghor, “the Afghāns are represented as fighting on both sides which probably indicates that they were not yet completely converted to Islam.”

The Ilbaris also used Afghān soldiers for garrisoning outposts and subjugating disaffected hill-tracts but it is only in the reign of Muhammad bin Tughluq that an Afghān rises to the office of a provincial chief and even becomes a temporary Sultan at Daulatābād. In the reign of Fīrūz Tughluq, the influence of Afghāns began to increase and in 1379 a certain Malik Bīr Afghān was appointed governor of Bihar. After the death of Fīrūz and particularly after Timūr’s invasion conditions became unusually disturbed. Khizr Khan enrolled a number of Afghāns in his service

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1 Encyc. of Islam I p. 151.
2 Barani p. 514; Isāmi p. 493.
one of whom Sultan Shah Lodi was to have a
distinguished career. At about the same time,
large numbers of Sūrs, Nūhānīs, Niāzīs and Lodīs
appear to have migrated to India.

Daulat Khan was perhaps the first Afgān
to acquire supreme power at Delhi (1412-1414),
though he did not call himself Sultan. In 1405,
he had become Faujdār of the Doab and had
rapidly risen to the position of de-facto ruler of
what had remained of the Sultanate of Delhi.

During the rule of the Sayyads, a large
number of important provinces and iqṭās were
held by the Afgāns. Malik Allāhdād Lodī was
the governor of Sambhal and after his death his
brother Daryā Khan Lodī extended his possessions
almost to the suburbs of Delhi. Qutb Khan
Afgān was the governor of Rapri in the fifties
of the 15th century. Auhadīs of Bayānā have also
been described by Briggs as Lodīs perhaps
because of predominance of the Lodīs during this
period. The Sultanate of Delhi was thus already
dominated by the Afgāns when Bahlūl finally
seized power.

We must now turn to tracing his career. The
Makhzan-i-Afgānī, Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī, Tārīkh-i-
Shāhī and Wāqiyyāt-i-Mushtaqī do not say anything
about Bahlūl’s ancestors, in course of their
general narrative. The Makhzan, while giving

\[1\] Tripathi p. 76 f. n. 20 doubts if he was at all a Lodī,
Fer. (L) I p. 160 describes him as one and on page 202
(L) I cites the authority of old and reliable men in the
Deccan in support of Daulat Khan Lodī the vassal of
Ibrāhīm being a descendant of Daulat Khan the ruler of
Delhi from 1412-1414.

\[2\] Mubārakshāhī p. 239 calls him Malik Allāhdād
Kākā Lodī while Badāoni I, p. 301 calls him Kākā Lodī;
the genealogies of various Afghān tribes says that Malik Bahrām had two sons: Allā and Kālā, the latter of whom also had two sons Muhammad and Bahlūl.¹ Ferishta gives a different but more plausible account. He says that among a large number of Lodīs that came to India for purposes of trade during the time of Sultan Fīrūz Shah, there was one, Malik Bahrām. He entered the service of Malik Mardān Daulat² the governor of Multan. He had five sons whose names were (i) Sultan Shah (ii) Malik Kālā (iii) Malik Fīrūz (iv) Malik Muhammad and (v) Malik Khwāja.

After the death of Bahrām, his sons continued to reside at Multan. When Sultan Fīrūz appointed Khizr Khan governor of that province, Sultan Shah Lodī entered his service and became the leader of a band of Afghāns. The star of Sultan Shah was on the ascendant. Hence in the war between Mallā Iqbāl and Khizr Khan the former was killed by the sword of Sultan Shah (1405 A.D.) Khizr Khan now treated him as one of his closer associates and appointed him, the Governor of Sarhind.

The remaining four sons of Bahrām also lived with their brother. Malik Kālā father of Bahlūl was put in charge of Daurālah.³ While he was there, the roof of his house collapsed and his wife died. As she was expecting an early confinement, the rescuers quickly brought out the baby by an operation and found that it was alive. It was this baby, born under such tragic but

¹ Dorn II, p. 51.
² Fer. (L) I p. 173.
³ It was included in Sarkar Sarhind in Akbar's reign (Vide Aın II p. 296).
miracles in circumstances, who was given the name of Bahlul. Most of the authorities agree that during his childhood Bahlul was called Ballu.

He was still in his infancy when his father died in a battle fought against the Niāzīs. Ballu now came under the guardianship of his uncle, Sultan Shah Lodī who brought him up with great care and affection. Ballu soon became a great favourite of his uncle, who treated him as a son and later married his daughter to him. A story expressive of this affection is related. Once when Bahlul was 7 years old he stepped on the prayer carpet of his uncle to pick up a ball, while other boys fought shy of it. His aunt rebuked him for this, saying that the place for prayer was no place for play. But Sultan Shah intervened in his favour and asked her not to reprimand him because he saw in him marks of future greatness and was sure that he would bring credit to the family. Thus though Bahlul was orphaned early in life, perhaps before he was seven, yet he missed none of the paternal affection and care because of his uncle's fondness for him.

Sultan Shah's success in life paved the ground for Bahlul's future greatness. Ta'rīkh-i-Mubārak Shīhī relates numerous wars and campaigns in which he distinguished himself during the reigns

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1 Fer. (L) I, p. 173.
2 Ibid., p. 173, Dāndī, p. 21 refers to a will of Bahlul to his son Sikandar in course of which he says

\[
\text{دریم نیاپازی} \text{دا اصلا نور کر لیابنی مارد} \text{ای ماله با}
\]

این رحم فتیب \text{لا نگا} \text{ع دن

This might be due to circumstances of his father's death.

3 Yādgār, p. 2; Dāndī p. 2; Fer. (L) I, p. 173; TKJL, p. 75.
4 Yādgār, p. 3, Waqīyat p. 3.
of Rāyāt-i-Āli Khizr Khan and Sultan Mubārak Shāh Sayyad.¹ In recognition of his merit and as a reward for his unflinching loyalty to them, he was honoured with many titles. From a Malik he was raised to a Khan and was styled Islām Khan.² In the reign of Mubārak Shāh his fame and importance continued to rise and he was called Malik-ul-Sharq, Khān-i-Āzam and Majlis-i-Āli.³ It is a little surprising that these titles are mentioned neither by any of the Afghān historians nor by Nizāmuddin Ahmad whom they have generally copied.

Tārikh-i-Dāndī says that Malik Bahlūl had engaged himself in horse-trade during his uncle’s life-time and it goes on to relate a deal between him and Sultan Muhammad Shah Sayyad,⁴ but Tabqāt-i-Akbarī, Māāsir-i-Rahīmī and Makhzan-i-Afghānī categorically deny the truth of this story though they concede that his ancestors may have done so.⁵

Another incident which is mentioned practically by all writers, though with slight variations, relates to a visit to a darwesh. Tārikh-i-Dāndī wrongly states that Bahlūl met him outside India,

² Basu—p. 216, does not give specific date of this award. It is in 1428 in the reign of Sultan Mubārak Shāh that he first mentions it as having been conferred ‘of late’. Yādgār p. 2; Fer. (L) I, p. 173; TKJL, p. 75 and Dāndī p. 3 say that he got it in the reign of Khizr Khan when he was appointed governor of Sarhind.
³ Basu pp. 216, 225, 251 respectively.
⁴ Waqṣāt p. 4, also mentions this incident and adds that Bahlūl was appointed an Amir as a reward.
⁵ Dāndī pp. 3-5; MR I, p. 435; Tab. I, p. 295; TKJL p. 76; Dorn I, p. 43; Elliot V p. 72; Nāma-tulāh and the author of MR do not name the historians who have committed this error.
for all others are unanimous that the darwesh lived at Samana. It is further stated that he had two intimate friends as his companions, that he had gone to that city on some private business and had attended on the darwesh on learning about his mystical powers, and that when the darwesh demanded as to which of the three was willing to purchase the kingdom of Delhi from him for 2,000 tankas, Bahlul had given him all the cash he had, whereupon the saint had accepted the gift and had foretold his rise to kingly authority. His friends are said to have ridiculed it as an act of utter folly. Bahlul defended his conduct thus:

"If this story comes true, I shall have made a very cheap bargain, and if it does not, to do a service to a darwesh is surely not devoid of profit."2

The variations relate to the name of the darwesh, the amount of money actually paid by Bahlul, names of the companions, and the exact words of the blessing pronounced by the darwesh.

Nizamuddin and M. Nahawandi call him Sayyad Ibn or Abban.3 Yadgar says that he was named Fatta.4 Ferishta calls him Shaidah though it may be read also as Sayyad Anam.5 Abdullah gives no name at all while Niamatullah calls him

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1 A similar story is related about Balban by Isami, p. 118.
2 De. p. 333.
4 Yadgar p. 3 (٣)
5 Fer. (L) I, p. 174, Fer. (Bo) I, p. 318 (Vide M. Hidayat Husain's f.n. 2 on page 3 of Tarikh-i-Shahi)
Sayyadain. Makhzan-i-Afghānī alone omits the names of companions while all others state them to be Qutb Khan and Firūz Khan. The sum offered varies from 1300 tankas mentioned by Dādī, Tārikh-i-Khān-i-Jahān Lodī, Maāsir-Rahimi and Tārikh-i-Shāhī to 1600 mentioned by Rizqullāh, Ferichtā and Niz̄āmuddin Ahmad. Dorn mentions 2000 tankas and the editor of Elliot’s Volume V says that all the MSS. of Makhzan have the same figure (Vide f. n. 2, p. 72). In regard to the words of the blessing, while all others confine it to mere “be the empire of Delhi blessed by thee”, Yādgār credits the darwesh with having blessed the empire of Delhi by three generations of his family.

That Bahlūl was marked out for a high destiny had thus been foretold both by a practical man of affairs and by a man of religion, reputed to possess prophetic powers. If, therefore, Bahlūl should have become ambitious and optimistic about his future, there was nothing surprising about it.

Destiny seemed to be creating conditions which should make realization of his dreams

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1 TKJL. p. 76.
2 بسه پیشمت تو پاراشپی دهامی پذرو هدام آبادا
3 اسلام قرمود
4 Yādgār p. 4.

Yādgār’s statement about 3 generations would be interpreted by many as an example of fabrication based on events known to have passed. But in a country like ours it is possible to meet with persons who can foretell things with surprising accuracy even today.

Waqåīt pp. 3-4 says that the Sayyad said to Bahlūl and pointing to the companions added
possible; for when Islam Khan's end drew near, he made a will in favour of Bahlūl's succession though he had able and competent sons.\(^1\) Nizāmuddin Ahmad, Niāmatullāh, Abdūllāh and Yādḡār mention only one son named Qutb Khan. At any rate, it was Qutb Khan alone among the sons of Islam Khan who challenged the aforesaid will and wanted to secure control over Sarhind. Nizāmuddin Ahmad and Niāmatullāh simply say that Bahlūl acquired great power and influence by the assistance of his other uncle Malik Firūz.\(^2\) But Firishtā gives a more detailed account of the war of succession between rival Afghān factions. He says that after Islam Khan's death, the Afghāns were divided in three groups:

(1) Some stood by the will of Islam Khan and remained loyal to the interests of Bahlūl.

(2) Another group favoured Firūz Khan, Bahlūl's uncle because of his seniority in age and higher dignity as a royal commandant in his own right.

(3) The last group favoured Qutb Khan Lodi on grounds of heredity.

The first round was fought between Firūz and Qutb Khan in which the latter was defeated and fled to Delhi to secure royal intervention in his favour. He represented to Sultan Muhammad Shah that Sarhind was becoming a stronghold of the Afghāns which was bound to prove dangerous to his cause unless it was held by a loyal officer.\(^3\) Though Firishtā does not specifically say so, he

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\(^1\) Fer. (L) I, p. 173; Fīdā All II, pp. 124-125.
\(^2\) Tab. I, p. 295; TKJL, p. 76.
\(^3\) Fer. (L) I p. 173, Fīdā All II, p. 125.
must have also stated that as the son of the devoted and faithful Islam Khan, and as a nominee and protege of the Sultan, he would be absolutely loyal to the royal interests and keep the Afghans under control. The Sultan, though not very able or intelligent, must have felt that it would be easier to control the Afghans, divided than when they were united under a single leader. Hence he decided to champion the cause of Qutb Khan to assert his own sovereign power of appointing and dismissing provincial governors. But the fact that Islam Khan had made no reference to him while appointing Bahlul as his successor shows that the governors of provinces were more or less autonomous and tended to be hereditary.

While all other authors mention only one expedition against Bahlul, Firishta mentions two, the details of the second of which alone are corroborated by other writers. It is difficult to say how far Firishta’s version of the first campaign is historical. But, at the same time, prima facie there is no ground for believing that he was indulging in a deliberate fabrication. According to him the first expedition was led by Malik Sikandar Tufta and accompanied by Qutb Khan Lodhi. An attempt was made to rope in the Khokhars, and Jasrath was persuaded to collaborate in the war against the Afghans. Bahlul got information about the plans of the Sultan which he revealed to other Afghan leaders. A council of war seems to have been held in which it was decided to patch up the quarrel between Firuz and Bahlul. It was further agreed that they should retire into Kohistan with women and children. When the Sultan’s forces approached, the Afghans
refused to oblige them by coming into the open. By guile and deceit, Firūz and a few leading men were induced to come to Malik Tuhfā for consultation while Bahlūl and Shāhīn, the son of Firūz stayed back.

On Qutb Khan’s advice, Firūz was made a prisoner while his companions were beheaded. Then the Delhi army took the offensive in which Shāhīn and a large number of Afghāns were killed. But Bahlūl eluded their grasp and became a freebooter. Gradually, he acquired power again, his uncle Firūz managed to escape from prison and joined him and Bahlūl reoccupied Sarhind.¹

If the above campaign did actually take place, it must have convinced the Afghāns in general and, possibly, even Malik Firūz that Bahlūl, and none but Bahlūl, was fit to be their leader and that the will of Islam Khan should be scrupulously respected in future.

When the news of re-capture of Sarhind by Bahlūl reached Delhi, Sultan Muhammad Shah sent another army under the leadership of Hisām Khan Wazīr-ul-mumālik.² In the battle that took

¹ Fer., (L) I pp. 173-174; Fidsa All II pp. 125-126; Brigg’s I p. 537 is very brief.
² The name of this officer was Hājī Shudanī while Hisām Khan was his title. De. I, p. 332 f.n. 3 discusses the variants but prefers the above selection. In the same note it is stated that Ferishtā simply says ‘Hisām Khan’ (which agrees with Lucknow Text I p. 174) but on page 326 in f.n. 4 the same author says that Ferishtā gives the name as حاجي شدنی المشهور بحمص خان. But ‘Sandali’ is mentioned neither in the Lucknow text nor in Fidā Ali’s Urdu Translation. Yādgār p. 4 says simply ‘Hisām Khan’ while TKJL p. 76 and MR.I p. 434 agree with Nizāmuddān Ahmad in describing him as Hājī Shudanī, entitled Hisām Khan. Yādgār calls him ‘Nāib Hazrat’ i.e. Deputy Sultan while other authors refer to him only as one of the nobles. But he seems to have been the chief noble at the court, no matter whether he was officially styled as the Wazīr or the Nāib Hazrat.
place Hisām Khan was defeated and retired to Delhi.\(^1\) Bahlūl returned victorious to Sarhind. Though other authors do not give exact strength of rival armies, Yādgār says that Bahlūl took the field at the head of 500 well-trained, loyal and devoted Afghāns. This is an understatement because Islam Khan is said to have raised an army of 12,000 Afghāns.\(^2\)

The place of battle was Sādhorā, a village in the district of Khizrābād.\(^3\) Our authors give various reading about the name of this village.\(^4\)

After this success, Bahlūl's prestige rose very high. While Qutb Khan had turned traitor and Firūz had failed to avert a great disaster, Bahlūl had not only retrieved the lost ground but had covered himself with fresh laurels. If he could beat back the Sultan's forces early in his career, he could surely carve out a larger and autonomous, if not entirely independent, kingdom for himself, in which the Afghāns would be the chosen people and would exercise such power and influence as they had never exercised before. A budding leader had got an excellent start in life.

But Bahlūl was not the man to rest on his oars. He was determined to press his advantage home. Therefore, after consolidating his power, he wrote a very sly letter to Sultan Muhammad Shah, in which he protested his loyalty and obedience to...

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1 Yādgār is wrong in stating that he was killed (p. 5).
2 Fer. (L) I, p. 173.
3 Both Khizrābād and Sādhorā are mentioned in Ain II p. 296. Each of them was the chief town of a Mahal in Sādhar Sarhind and had a brick fort.
4 Yādgār does not name the village; TKJL, p. 76 calls it 'Kara in the pargana of Khizrābād and Sādhorā. Ferishta calls it 'Garha' in the district of Khizrābād Shahpur. Tab. I, p. 295 and MR. I p. 434 give 'Kadha'.
the Sultan but excused himself from attending on him because of the enmity which Hisām Khan, the Wazīr bore towards him. He charged the Wazīr with violence of temper and pledged to present himself at the court as a faithful servant if he were killed and his office was bestowed on Hamīd Khan.

As Sultan Muhammad was not endowed with practical wisdom, he failed to see the guile underlying the letter; and believing in the sincerity of Bahluīl put the innocent and devoted Wazīr to death. He then appointed Hamīd Khan as his successor. No sooner was this done, than Bahluīl, accompanied by Lodi chiefs, paid a visit to Delhi and offered his homage to the Sultan. Muhammad Shah was over-satisfied and confirmed the Lodis in their fiefs and honoured them with other marks of favour. Bahluīl then retired to Sarhind.¹

This incident added another feather to Bahluīl's cap. He had succeeded in imposing on the Sultan a Wazīr of his own choice. He had seen things at the capital first hand and had established friendly contacts with the beneficiary of his intrigue. His plans of seizing Delhi at some future date had thus advanced a step forward.

¹ Tab I, p. 296; MR. I, p. 435; TKJL. p. 77; Fer. (L) I p. 174 give practically the same account. But Yadgār pp. 5-6 refers it to the reign of Alūddīn which is an obvious error. He gives the name of the victim as Yāmīn Khan and to the offer of allegiance adds a more material bait of reducing forty parganas round Delhi to Sultan's authority. He asserts that 30 such parganas were actually conquered and placed under the Sultan. Daīdī pp. 6-7 and Bad. I, p. 306 also refer the event to Alūddīn's reign.
Then in 844/1440\(^1\) Sultan Muhammad wrote to Bahlūl to come to his rescue against the advancing forces of Mahmūd Khilji of Malwa who had occupied Hisār Firūzā, Hansī and Nāgor\(^2\) and was threatening to capture the capital itself. Bahlūl promptly answered the summons. On the day of battle, he led the vanguard at the head of 20,000 Mughal and Afghān archers.\(^3\) The Sultan of Malwa did not take the field in person and the battle proved inconclusive though the advantage lay with the Delhi army. Because of Muhammad Shah’s pusillanimity, an offer of peace on the basis of *status quo ante bellum* was made and heartily accepted by Mahmūd who had learnt about the invasion of Mandu by Ahmad Shah of Gujerat.

Bahlūl was thus deprived of an opportunity to score a complete victory. But, keeping counsel with himself, he fell on the retreating army of Malwa and captured a large booty which consisted of elephants, cash and war-material.

The Sultan showered favours on him out of gratitude and affection. He called him ‘farzand’ or son and conferred on him the title of Khān-i-Khānān. Bahlūl now retired to his fief, covered with glory, confident of his future and with the morale of his followers considerably higher. He had known and seen enough of Sayyad monarchy and therefore felt no hesitation in helping himself to the parganas of Lahore, Dipalpur, Sunnam, Hisār Firūzā and others. Sultan Muhammad Shah

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\(^1\) Fer. (L) I, p. 171; Tab. III p. 322 has towards the close of 845 H which would mean 1442 A.D. Bad. I p. 303 has 844 H=1440 A.D.

\(^2\) Dorn I, p. 43.

\(^3\) Fer. (L). I, p. 171.
made repeated protests against it but the Khān-i-Khānān evidently required larger territory to satisfy the Khāns below him and therefore paid no heed to what the Sultan said. At last in 1441, the Sultan went to the Punjab and, making a virtue of a necessity, conferred on the Lodis the parganas seized by them.¹

Bahlūl was now virtually an independent ruler of the whole of the Punjab, though he still preserved the sham of allegiance to the Sayyads.

After resting and re-organizing his forces, Bahlūl proceeded to capture Delhi but he failed in the attempt. Nizāmuddin, Ferishtā and Niāmat-ullāh place this event also in the reign of Muhammad Shah but they do not assign any definite date to it. They agree that after this event, Bahlūl called himself Sultan, though he refrained from introducing his name in the khutba and the sikka. Soon after this Muhammad Shah died. Therefore, this attempt on the capital should have been made between 1441 and 1444 A.D.²

After the death of Muhammad Shah, his son became the ruler and assumed the style of Alauddin Ālam Shāh. He did not inherit any large kingdom. Bahlūl Lodī held the Punjab, Dipalpur and Sarhind and all contiguous territory upto Panipat; Ahmad Khan Mewātī held sway over all the land from

¹ Fer. (L) I, p. 174; Tab. I, p. 296; TKJL, p. 77; Yādgār does not mention this event. Dādī p. 6 refers to this war before the murder of Hisām Khan but correctly places it, like others, in the reign of Sultan Muhammad.

Bad. I, p. 304 says that Bahlūl was next ordered to suppress Jasrath Khokhar but the latter made peace with him and incited him to seize Delhi.

² Fer. (L) I, p. 171 gives 849 = 1445-46 as the date of his death but all other authors give 847 = 1443-44.
Mahrauli¹ to Lādo Sarāi,² almost to the proximity of Delhi; Daryā Khan held Sambhal and all lands up to the ford of Khwājā Khizr which approached Delhi from another quarter; Isā Khan Turk held Kol; Qutb Khan s/o Hasan Khan Afghān held the province of Rapri to the city of Bhogāon³ which included Chandāwar⁴ and Etawah also; Rājā Pratāp held Bhogāon, Kampilā⁵ and Patiālī;⁶ Dāūd Khan Auhadi held Bayānā; Gwalior, Dholpur and Bhadauriyās had their own Rājās, while independent sovereigns ruled over Gujerat, Malwa, Jaumpur and Bihar. The territories thus left to Alāuddin included only Delhi, Pālam⁷ and 2 or 3 other parganas so that the humourists of the time said

두할 기왕 국왕 아제르데푸르 Ḥāleem

But Alāuddin’s misfortune was not so much the lack of territory as of administrative skill and knowledge of public affairs.⁸

Bahlāl made a second attack on Delhi but met with no better luck. Although the India office MS.

¹Mahrauli is a village on the Delhi Gurgaon Road, 11 miles distant from Delhi.
²It is an obscure place now but is shown on the Tourists’ Map of Delhi, Survey of India, in close proximity to Delhi.
³27° 17′N 79° 14′E a Tahsilili town in Mainpur District.
⁴27° 7′N, 78° 23′E, a village 3 miles from Firmuzbād in Agra District.
⁵A pargana village 28 miles N.W. of Fatehgarh.
⁶27° 42′N, 72° 5′E, a pargana village in Etah district.
⁷It was a small pargana in the time of Akbar and was included in Sarkar Delhi (Vide Ain I, p. 286).
⁸Fer. (L) I, p. 172; TKJL, p. 77; Yādgār p. 5; Tab. I, p. 296; Dāndī p. 7; MR. I, p. 436, confirm and at places supplement each other regarding partition of the country. Dāndī quotes the above line thus

پاک شامی شاہ عالم امزندی گل پالم

Yādgār has the other variant.
of the Tārīkh-i-Khan Jahān Lodī and other authorities do not mention mediation by anybody, Dorn refers to intervention by Qutb Khan and Rājā Pratāp. These two persons, thus appear to have gained confidence of the Sultan. The latter consulted these persons and Isā Khan Turk about extension of his authority. They advised the arrest of Hamīd Khan and his dismissal from the office of the Wazir. If this were done, they offered to conquer a few parganas and to place them under the direct control of the Sultan. Alāuddīn complied with their suggestion and decided to move towards Bādāṣūn whose climate was particularly liked by him.

While he was there, Isā Khan, Rājā Pratāp and Qutb Khan offered to reduce forty parganas to the allegiance of the Sultan if Hamīd Khan was put to death. Ferishtā, M. Nahāwandī and Niāmatullāh ascribe this conspiracy to the grudge of Rājā Pratāp whose territory had been ravaged and wife seized by Hamīd Khan's father. The Sultan agreed to this proposal also and ordered the execution of Hamīd Khan. But, before it could be enforced, Hamīd escaped from prison, killed the pursuing jailor, and occupied the capital Delhi. Yādgār says that the charge preferred against him was that he was conspiring to invite the ruler of Malwa to occupy Delhi. Other writers do not suggest any such charge.

Once Hamīd was in the capital, he proceeded to secure himself from any future calamity. He

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1 Yādgār p. 6. Per, (L) I p. 172, refers to another Hisām Khan who succeeded Hamīd Khan as Wazir. He was left in charge of the capital while the Sultan moved away to Bādāṣūn. But he does not say whether Hisām Khan made any resistance to Hamīd's seizure of power.
seized the royal treasure, captured the members of the royal family and kept them under strict watch. He needed the help of some powerful ally against his enemies. Various persons were considered. The Sultans of Malwa and Jaunpur were rejected because they were far away and were too powerful to allow Hamid any real share in power. The latter was still more unacceptable because of his matrimonial ties with the Sayyads. The choice was then narrowed down to two persons; Bahlul Lodi and Qiyaam Khan. Hodiwala suggests that Qiyaam Khan is probably an error of the copyist of Tarih-i-Daadi and that it is possible that Hisam Khan might have been meant. But other authorities do not mention Hisam Khan or Qiyaam Khan. There is another difficulty in accepting this suggestion. Qiyaam Khan is reported to have turned back on learning of Bahlul’s arrival at Delhi. This suggests that Qiyaam Khan was not at Delhi but at some distant place. Rizqullah calls him Qiyaam Khan Makri.

While Hamid Khan was thus deliberating, Bahlul marched towards Delhi at the head of his army. He failed to force his entry into the capital but Hamid soon made a compact with him, according to which Bahlul was to become the Sultan.

1 MR. I p. 437 mentions nobody but Bahlul whom Hamid Khan invited. Tab. I p. 298 and De pp. 336-337, Fer. (L) I, p. 172, refer to the rulers of Jaunpur and Malwa being unsuitable and consequent invitation to Bahlul to come to Delhi, Daadi p. 7, and Waqiat p. 5 mention Qiyaam Khan. Hodiwala p. 456, makes an unconvincing suggestion regarding his identity. Ysdegar pp. 6-7 mentions only Bahlul and Mahmud Khilji but does not refer to any invitation. According to his version, Bahlul was allowed to pay respects to Hamid Khan before any definite agreement had been made. A few days after Hamid proposed to him to become the Sultan. TKJL. p. 79 practically confirms Ysdegar except that it mentions Bahlul’s initial failure to force entry into the capital.
while he himself was to retain the substance of power as the Wazir. Yādgār says that Bahlūl feigned great humility and suggested that Hamīd should be the Sultan while he would be content to be the head of the army because he did not have much knowledge of the affairs of government. But Hamīd stuck to his own conditions and Bahlūl was admitted as a nominal Sultan.

Now began a very critical period in the career of Bahlūl. Sultan Alāuddin and the enemies of Hamīd Khan might attack Delhi and if they succeeded, Bahlūl might die a dog’s death. If he continued faithful to the compact, he would remain a mere stooge of Hamīd Khan. This was galling to his pride and suicidal for his ambitions. Hence he must devise a speedy way-out.

His fertile brain soon suggested a plan to him. The leading Afghāns were first taken into confidence. Then a band of trustworthy persons was trained to play the part assigned to it. The plan was very clever indeed. The Afghāns were notorious for vulgarity, lack of manners, and indiscipline. This was to be exploited to cover the plot against the powerful Wazir.

Bahlūl went to Hamīd Khan regularly, and always behaved towards him with great respect and awe. He would often describe himself as a servant of his. When Hamīd invited Afghāns to a feast many of them would indulge in studied vulgarity and would ask for a piece of the carpet for making fillets for their sons, lick away scent, or place shoes in the niche over the head of the Wazir or keep them fastened to their sashes, lest

1 Yādgār, pp. 6-7.
they should be lost. Hamid was thus convinced that the Afgāns were very uncultured people who knew nothing but eating and dying. Then, one day, while Bahlūl was with Hamid Khan, a number of Afgāns mobbed the guards and forced their entry into the palace profusely abusing Bahlūl and protesting their equality with him and devotion to Hamid Khan. The Wazīr overlooked this gross indiscipline and unsuspectingly allowed them to find a place for themselves in the audience hall. The Afgāns jostled and pushed others to find room for themselves in such a way that by the side of each follower of Hamid there were two hefty Afgāns. This done, Qutb Khan the brother-in-law and cousin of Bahlūl asked Hamid to surrender without resistance in which case his life would be spared. Hamid was taken aback but the game was up and he had to submit. He was placed under arrest and we do not hear anything about him after this.¹

Now Bahlūl had to deal with Sultan Alāuddin who had tarried at Badāon on one excuse or the other. He wrote to him a very diplomatic letter in which he protested his loyalty in seizing power after he had lost it, described the arrest of the traitor Hamid Khan and asked for further instruc-

¹Practically all the authors give similar details. Yādgār (pp. 7-9) says that when Hamid asked Bahlūl why the Afgāns behaved in a boorish manner, he said

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\text{"I do not know how they behaved, I was not there."}
\]

The details of the final conspiracy are more copious in his book than in others. They also vary in some respects. Hamid Khan was told that his treachery to Alāuddin had rendered him untrustworthy. Wāqīāt, pp. 6-7.
tions. Alauddin may not have been an efficient ruler—and nobody has asserted that he was—but he was no utter fool. He realised that he could no longer hope to return to Delhi. He, therefore, reciprocated the feelings of affection and regard and wrote back in reply that as his father, the late Sultan, had called him his son, he regarded him as an elder brother and was abdicating the throne in his favour and would be content to retain only Badar for himself. 1 Bahlul could not have desired for anything better. He now had himself crowned on 17th Rabi-ul-awwal 855 AH—Monday 19th April 1451 2 at the auspicious hour suggested

1 Yadgar p. 9 gives the words of these letters thus:

From Bahlul to Alauddin:

نادرةخوئه را كه در زانه، راز خاک برخواسته چرا
سما بود و خویش بگ در خاطر دوالشته اورا در بانکه
ایم و در نیامده شما کرخانه سلطنت را كه قوی
ضعیف شده پر گرفته نیامده و بیان و دل فرمان
بردار شما ایم.

Alauddin's reply.

من از کرمان شامی مانده ام و سما را کشیده، ام
پدر من شما را خواسته دویا بیان ایم و
مستی اکر تفاصل را باشد کار را از پیش بردار.

2 Dastūd pp. 11-12, Yadgar p. 10, gives 27th Muharram
855 AH—Monday March 1, 1451 which is obviously incor-
correct because all other writers mention 17th Rabi-ul-awwal,
855 AH.

Fer. (L) I, pp. 172-173 suggests two coronations, one
before and another after correspondence with Alauddin.
After Hamid's fall, the name of Alauddin was
I, pp. 300-301 and TKJL, p. 80 also suggest retention of
Alauddin's name in the khutba, till the receipt of his
by astrologers and Brāhmīns. He assumed the style of Abū Muzaffar Bahlūl Shāh. His name was now introduced in the khutbah and imprinted on the coins. He received congratulations and presents from his followers while the Sultan made royal gifts to all and sundry. All persons whether they were his partisans or opponents were won over by the influence of his lucky star and even the recalcitrant came to offer their allegiance and placing their head at the foot of his throne stood up with their hands folded along their waists. This is how Yādgār pictures the coronation scene.

The prophecy of the darwesh had thus been realized and the first Afghān monarch was installed on the throne of Delhi. We shall follow the fortunes of this new dynasty in course of the following chapters.

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letter of abdication. But while Tab., MR. & TKJL give the above date of accession as the date of coronation before correspondence with Alīuddin, Firishta gives it as the date of the second coronation after the correspondence was over. It appears that the date of formal and full coronation when all rights of sovereignty were assumed was 17th Rabi I, 855.
CHAPTER III

CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION

(A Under Bahlul)

Hamid Khan's supersession and subsequent treason, coupled with Sultan Alauddin's inactivity and unworthiness had made Bahlul the master of the capital. In one sense, it was the fulfilment of a long cherished desire. In another, it made Bahlul's position far more precarious than it had been ever before. So far his worries had been of a limited and local character. He had been concerned only with the governance of a province and had had to devise measures to defend himself against a suspicious suzerain or jealous neighbours. But he had, by no means, excited the envy of any powerful ruler nor was he called upon to grapple with the ambitions of vassals, aspiring for independence.

Now the position was very different. He had displaced a ruling family whose erstwhile crowned head was still alive and spending his days in obscurity. Those who were moved either by feelings of devotion to him or who had benefited by his weakness, were naturally disinclined to offer fealty to the traitorous usurper who, while pretending loyalty, had not scrupled to seize power by force and fraud. These were one set of enemies whom Bahlul must break or bend into submission.

In the second place, there were friends, relatives and followers of Hamid Khan who had
been recently confined to prison after a brief span of power. They had forsaken loyalty to the Sayyad Sultan to satisfy their ambitions. But they now found themselves superseded by Afghān chiefs. This was a second group of malcontents. Some of its leading members were present in the capital itself. They had bowed before the storm and had sworn allegiance to the Afghān upstart with considerable mental reservations. Bahlūl must cure them of disaffection or render their hostility innocuous.

In the third place, there was the Sultan of Jaunpur, who as a son-in-law of the Sayyad monarch claimed the Delhi Sultanate for himself. He was the master of a settled state whose resources in men, money and war-material were far greater than those of Bahlūl. He could make the war of aggression against Bahlūl assume the form of a humanitarian campaign to redress the grievances of his father-in-law and the latter's subordinates. He could thus mobilise considerable local support to further his ambitions. In the changed circumstances, people were likely to forget that he was only pursuing the traditional dynastic policy of west-ward expansion at the expense of the Sultan of Delhi. On the contrary, he could very well pose as the champion of a counter-revolution intended to throw out the hated and contemptible Afghān usurpers.

Fourthly, while the Turks in India had generally regarded Afghāns as good soldiers and had often recruited them to fill comparatively lower grades of posts in the army, they did not usually consider them sufficiently cultured or enlightened to be entrusted with higher posts in
the state. Contempt for the Afghān was so universal that even after Bahlūl’s accession when
his name was first introduced in the khutba prayer, Mullā Qādan expatiated at length on their
lack of culture and had no hesitation in describing
them as ‘servants of the arch-fiend or arch-fiends
themselves’. It is remarkable that it was done in
the presence of the Sultan who, however, took no
serious notice of it but proposed to the Mullā to
desist from further denunciations for Afghāns also
were the creatures of the same Allāh, whom he
held in reverence. This anti-Afghān sentiment
might create serious handicaps unless Bahlūl’s tact
and ability demonstrated its foundation in igno-
rance and malice. Even so, he would have to
depend largely on the support of the Afghāns for
he could never be sure of other people’s loyalty.

Lastly, Bahlūl’s followers themselves were no
easy team to drive. Afghān love for independence,
his devotion to the tribal leader, his vanity and
lack of discipline, even his reckless courage as his
incapacity for sustained hard work created prob-
lems of no mean order. Faced with enemies from
without and the presence of such explosive
elements within his ranks, Bahlūl needed all his
tact, circumspection, vigilance and firmness to give
his dynasty a solid foundation.

It would thus be readily admitted that Bahlūl’s
problems were of a serious character. Any false
step or wrong move might involve him in calamitous

1 Cf. Raverty’s statement vide Chap. II, p. 30. The
Khiljīs were opposed and disliked by the Turks because
of their supposed Afghān origin, Barani, p. 171.
2 Dāndī p. 12. Elliot IV p. 437 has Mullā Fāzin. Other
authorities except Waqīyat-i-Muṣhtaqī do not refer to this
incident. Waqīyat p. 9 calls him Mullā Qādan.
failure. Bahlūl might well have thought that it was far easier to capture the crown than to keep it over his head. But, while conscious of his difficulties and dangers, he neither lost courage nor faith in himself and proceeded about his business with firmness, born of self-confidence and reliance on God. We would have occasion to notice later that even when their was utter despair and almost certain failure staring him in the face, Bahlūl resigned himself to the Will of God or interceded the favour of saints but did not run away from duty and we shall find that his prayers were generally answered.

He appointed Afghān officers to secure the treasury and royal stores. The stables of horses and elephants were similarly placed under their control and the fort was garrisoned by the pick of Afghān soldiery.1 "The provinces round Delhi, he freed of factious men, confiding them to his adherents. . . ."2 After these precautions had been taken, it became difficult for Hamid Khan's adherents to create trouble inside the capital.

Now he wanted to make sure of the security of his base, viz., the Punjab and the frontier region. As soon as he was able to find some leisure from pressing business of state at Delhi, he proceeded towards Multan, where an insurrection was brewing. Bahlūl wanted to settle the affairs of this province and the neighbouring country.3 He might have also desired enlistment of more Afghāns to his service.

1 Yādgar, p. 8.
2 Dorm—pp. 47-48.
During his absence, the capital was left in charge of the eldest prince Khwājā Bāyazid, Shah Sikandar Sarwānī and Bibī Mastū, the widow of Islam Khan. Just then Mahmūd Shāh of Jaunpur led an army of invasion and laid siege to Delhi. Three reasons may be assigned to explain his conduct. Yādgār says that some nobles of Sultan Alāuddin Sayyad were not reconciled to the rule of Bahlūl and favoured Sultan Mahmūd Sharqī because he had married Sultan Alāuddin's daughter. Abdullāh, Nizāmuddīn, Badāoni, Ferishtā, Nīāmatullāh and Maulānā Nahāwandī specifically mention that these nobles invited the Sharqī ruler to invade Delhi. Though the name of Darya Khan Lodi is not specifically mentioned, circumstantial evidence suggests that he must have been one of these nobles. It is, however, not known why he should not have favoured the Lodi monarch when he himself was a Lodi. But the author of Tārikh-i-Dāndī says that a group of historians opines that the cause of Sultan Mahmūd Sharqī's march towards Delhi was that Bibī Rāji, the daughter of Sultan Alāuddin of Badāon who was married to Sultan Mahmūd said to him:

"The Kingdom of Delhi belongs to my father. What right does Bahlūl have to rule over Delhi? If you do not proceed towards Delhi, I shall arm

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1 Wāqiāt p. 8, calls her 㻾� but Dāndī p. 13 calls her Mastā. Yādgār p. 11 calls her Mattā. Tab., Bad. and MR. say nothing about her. Yādgār p. 10 says that Bahlūl left Delhi in charge of Iskandar Sarwānī and Daryā Khan Lodi.

2 Yādgār, p. 10.
3 Dāndī, p. 13; Tab. I, p. 301; Bad. I, p. 307; Fer. (L.), I, p. 175; MR. I, p. 440; Elliot V, p. 78; TKJL, p. 81.
4 Dorn I, p. 48 calls her a relation of Sultan Alāuddin.
myself with bows and arrows and shall proceed against Bahlūl.”

But Abdullāh does not mention the names of these historians. Other authors except Yādgār do not refer to wife’s taunts as the cause of his invasion. There is, however, nothing very improbable about it. A third cause, though not mentioned by any author specifically, may have been the dynastic ambition of the Sharqīs to make themselves the masters of Delhi.

Abdullāh gives a very full account of the first encounter with the Sharqīs in 856 Ḥ (1452 AD). Yādgār gives practically the same details. According to the former author when Mahmūd Shāh’s intention of invading Delhi became known to Bahlūl, the latter tried to dissuade him from an open conflict by expressing great humility and submissiveness. But Mahmūd paid no heed to this and when Bahlūl was away from the capital, he led a huge army of 170,000 cavalry and infantry and 1,400 war elephants to the siege of the capital.† When Bahlūl received information about this invasion, he turned back from Dipalpur to meet the Sharqī army.

In the meantime, the Afghan garrison at Delhi determined to stand a prolonged siege till Bahlūl came back with a relieving force. In course of the siege many interesting events are reported to have

† Yādgār, p. 11 gives the number of elephants as 1,000. Other authors omit to mention the exact strength of his army though they aver that it was very numerous and well-equipped.

‡ Yādgār, p. 11 alone says Sarhind while Dādī, p. 15, Tab. I, p. 301 and MR. I, p. 440 say Dipalpur which seems to be correct. Abdullah later says that Bahlūl returned from Sarhind via “Deomalpur” which is obviously Dipalpur.
taken place, according to Abdullah and Yâdgâr. A brief summary of the more important ones may alone be given here. Bibi Mastâ dressed up women as men and posted them as guards on the walls of the fort, to give a false impression of the numerical strength of the garrison. Shah Sikan-
dar Sarwâni who was an unfailing shot and used distinctive arrows of a special design which had a range of about 700 yards one day shot an arrow which after piercing the water-bag and the ox on which it was being carried struck the ground. When this was reported to the Sharqi Sultan and his followers, they became very shy of approaching the walls of the fort. But despite clever ruses and desperate valour, the weight of numbers and the use of incendiary missiles ultimately proved effective and the garrison was constrained to negotiate for a surrender.

Sayyad Shamsuddin came to meet Daryâ Khan Lodî\(^1\) one of the great generals of Sultan Mahmûd Sharqi but before entering upon a discus-
sion of the terms of surrender, he had a secret interview with him in which he played upon his racial feelings and succeeded in winning him over to the side of Bahâlî\(^3\). It was finally agreed that the garrison should hold on for a little longer while Daryâ Khan would relieve pressure on them

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\(^1\) Yâdgâr, p. 11.

\(^2\) Waqiat, p. 7 calls him Mubârak Khan Sambhâl. Though it is difficult to explain this divergence in name, it may be hazarded as a mere guess that the original name of Daryâ Khan before his brother Allâhâd Khan got him this title from Sultan Muhammad Shâh Sayyad might have been Mubârak Khan. All other authors support Dâdî’s version.

\(^3\) For details of conversation see Yâdgâr, p. 12 or Dâdî, pp. 14-15.
by diverting the attention of the Sharqīs from Delhi to the camp of Bahlāl. The Sayyad, therefore, hurried back to the fort with its keys still in his possession, while Daryā Khan repaired to the camp of Sultan Mahmūd and told him about the offer of keys which he had declined because he thought it would be improper to allow the garrison to go out and make a junction with Bahlāl. A better plan would be to keep the garrison pinned down to the walls of the fort while a part of the Sharqī army intercepted Bahlāl’s army and crushed it completely. Thus the Sharqīs would eliminate all danger and the fort of Delhi would fall into their hands as a matter of course. Then the garrison could be dealt with fittingly.

Mahmūd Shah accepted the proposal, though he appears to have had some misgivings. It was decided that Fath Khan and Daryā Khan should move away to intercept Bahlūl west of Panipat. They were provided with 30,000 soldiers and 30 elephants\(^1\) Bahlūl lay encamped at Naraila.\(^2\) His army consisted of 14,000 soldiers but he did not despair about the outcome of the struggle. He appears to have been informed about Daryā Khan’s defection by some Afghān courier because when Qutb Khan found him valiantly opposing the Afghān onslaughts and gradually wearing down their attacks, he made an appeal to him in the same words in which Sayyad Shamsuddin had done. Daryā Khan was promised immunity from pursuit whereupon he broke the engagement, turned and fled. Fath Khan was caught com-

\(^1\) Yādgār, p. 12 has 40 elephants.

\(^2\) A railway station on the Delhi Kalka Railway at a distance of 17 miles from Delhi Jn. (Hodiwala, p. 405).
pletely unawares, suffered a heavy defeat, was captured and slain by Rāi Karna whose brother had been killed by Fath Khan. ¹

When Mahmūd Shāh learnt of this disaster, he found himself unable to continue hostilities any further and before anything worse might happen, he beat a hasty retreat to Jaunpur. Bahālūl gave a hot pursuit to the retreating army and captured an enormous booty which consisted of more than 50 elephants, many horses, 100 mams of gold and other war material.² After this victory the affairs of Bahālūl became tranquil and his position became more stabilized. The morale of his troops rose higher and the intriguers in and about the capital were silenced for the time being.

Bahālūl decided to utilize this turn of fortune to its best advantage. He marched his forces against those vassals of the Delhi Sultanate who had thrown off their allegiance after the change of dynasty in 1451. Ahmad Khan tendered submission and offered the services of his uncle Mubārak Khan, as a permanent retainer of the Sultan. Bahālūl deprived him of seven parganas³ and reinstated him in the rest of his iqtā.

He next moved towards Baran. Daryā Khan Lodī, the governor of Sambhal also accepted his suzerainty and surrendered to the Sultan seven

¹ MR. I, p. 441; Tab. I, p. 302 gives the name of the brother as Pithora. Briggs I, p. 553 says Prithwi Ray; Fida Ali II, p. 131 has Pithaura and Fer. (L) I, p. 175, Prithwi Ray.
² Yādgār, pp. 13-14.
parganas.\(^1\) No further action was taken against him though he had been guilty of transferring his allegiance to the Sharqs when Mahmūd Shāh had invaded Delhi. His treachery to the Sharqi ruler during that campaign had mitigated his crime considerably.

From Baran, he went to Kol whose governor Iṣā Khan was allowed to retain the principality in full when he paid homage to the Sultan and swore fealty to him. Mubārak Khan, the Governor of Sakit,\(^2\) Rājā Pratāp the ruler of Kampil,\(^3\) Pataśi and Bhogāon, Qutb Khan son of Hasan Khan Afgān, the governor of Rapri\(^4\) and the governor of Etawah were similarly confirmed in their offices when they had accepted Bahlūl's authority. Of these governors none except Qutb Khan made any show of resistance. He, however, first defied the arms of Bahlūl and stood a siege. He was ultimately persuaded to submit partly by Bahlūl's superiority in arms but largely by Khān-i-Jahān's assurance that he would not be deprived of any part of his holdings, if he acknowledged the authority of the Sultan.

Thus in course of a few months, Bahlūl was able to assert his authority over the entire central territory from the environs of Delhi and Mewat in the west to the frontiers of the Jaunpur kingdom in the east. The Punjab had been subject to his authority even before he captured Delhi.

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1 Briggs I, p. 553 has 7 elephants in place of 7 parganas.
2 It lies on the direct route between Kampilś and Rapri 10 miles SE of Etah town (Vide Ranking, p. 377 f.n. 4 and District Gazetteer of Etah XII, p. 213).
3 It continued to be an important fortress town till the time of Akbar and formed a part of Sarkar Agra (Vide Ain II, p. 183).
During his long reign of over 38 years, Bahlul made sundry conquests, suppressed rebellions, set up a new system of government and did many other less remarkable things. But the most outstanding event of his career as Sultan was a life and death struggle against the Sharqis. The Sharqi dynasty of Jaunpur had been founded by Malik Sarwar in 1394 and he had soon become so powerful as to receive from the ruler of Bengal the tribute due to the Sultan of Delhi. His successor Mubarak Shāh successfully resisted the efforts of Mahmūd Shah Tughluq's Wazir Iqbal Khan to reconquer Jaunpur. The first ruler of this dynasty who tried to acquire Delhi and its dependencies was Sultan Ibrāhim Shāh Sharqī. He fought against Mahmūd Shāh Tughluq and was able to advance as far as Sambhal but before he could make further headway, Khizr Khan Sayyad occupied Delhi and founded a new dynasty. Ibrāhim Shāh did not molest him and devoted his attention to cultural enrichment of Jaunpur. But with the accession of Mubarak Shāh Sayyad, the duel for supremacy began afresh. Ibrāhim Shāh tried his hand at securing Kalpi and Bayana but not with any success. After Mubarak Shāh's death, the Sayyad power, began to decline rapidly and the Sharqīs got the upper hand. They hoped to succeed them at Delhi sooner or later. But before this hope could be realized, Bahlul set aside Alauddin Ālam Shāh and founded a dynasty of his own. This was naturally resented by the Sharqīs and they made all out efforts to displace the Lodis whom they considered as usurpers. Fortune however sided with Bahlūl who ultimately succeeded in driving them out from Jaunpur and in
annexing it to his dominions. But in course of
the struggle there were more occasions than one
*e.g.* in 1452, 1466 and 1478 when he could have
well despaired of saving even his capital. We may
now notice the main events of this struggle, to
the end of Bahlūl’s reign, after a preliminary
examination of its chief causes.

The Lodīs and the Sharqīs were irreconcilable
foes because of a number of historical, geographical
and personal reasons. From the time of the
Tughluqs the Sharqīs had been trying to make
themselves the masters of the imperial city of
Delhi and had been pressing forward in that
direction. The Sayyads had first tried to roll
them back and then to conciliate them by matrimo-
nial alliances. The Sharqīs now claimed the
Sultanate of Delhi on behalf of Sayyad princesses
Bibi Rajī¹ and Bibī Khonza² whom they had
espoused. These ladies were determined to see
the Lodīs driven out of territories that once be-
longed to their forefathers. Then the two kingdoms
lay in close proximity to each other without any
well-defined frontier. Border disputes often
developed into full-scale campaigns. In the third
place, the vassals of the Sayyads, on whom Bahlūl
had recently imposed his authority and whose fiefs
lay between Delhi and Jaunpur frequently changed
sides to secure advantages for themselves. This
also rendered stabilization of frontiers almost
impossible. With these historical and geographical

¹ She has been described by Dāḍī as the daughter
of Sultan Alāuddīn Sayyad. But she was probably his
sister. She was married to Muḥammad Shāh in the reign of
Sultan Muḥammad Shāh Sayyad.

² She was married to Sultan Ḥusain Shāh Sharqī and
was certainly a daughter of Sultan Alāuddīn Alam Shāh.
factors personal sentiments had also got mixed up. The Sharqis had waged an unprovoked war but despite their advantage in numbers, had suffered a heavy and inglorious defeat. The stigma of this defeat could not be removed as long as the Lodis had not been defeated. When the Sharqis concluded a war of vengeance on more honourable terms, they became contemptuous of the power of the Lodis and the exhortations of Sayyad princesses in their harem egged them on to make fresh wars to blot them out of existence. Similarly, the Lodis never forgot how tenaciously the Sharqis had held on to the struggle to destroy them. Consequently, whenever they found a favourable opportunity they too joined the issue on their own account. Besides, the process of integration had always been initiated by the Sultan of Delhi and not by a local provincial chief. Hence Bahlul and his successors regarded themselves as the inevitable agents of that integrating tendency which had been revived by the Sayyads after Timur’s invasion. That was another reason why the Lodis had a natural propensity for eastward and southward expansion. In such circumstances, the only way out of incessant war was the liquidation of one of the two states.

Bahlul had to fight against three Sharqi rulers viz., Mahmud, Muhammad and Husain Shāh. Of these the last was the most powerful and was to prove most formidable. But Mahmud also was in a stronger position as compared to Bahlul. Mahmud waged war from 1452 to 1459. The first war between Bahlul and Mahmud Shāh took place in 1452 A.D. as has already been described. While Bahlul was busy consolidating his power, “Sultan
Mahmūd at the instigation of the first lady of his harem Malkā Jahān, a relation of Sultan Alā'uddin, renewed hostilities against Bahlūl and moved directly upon Etawah.”¹

This war also took place in 856/1452 but probably in its third quarter. Fighting went on for sometime, without any party gaining a decisive advantage. Then Rājā Pratāp and Qutb Khan acted as mediators and a treaty was made on the following terms:—

(a) Bahlūl Lodi should retain the territories held by Sultan Mubārak Shāh Sayyad.

(b) The territories which had belonged to Sultan Ibrāhīm Sharqī² should remain in the possession of Sultan Mahmūd Sharqī.

(c) Bahlūl should restore 7 elephants³ captured during the first war.

(d) Shamsābād⁴ held by Jānā Khan, a vassal of Sultan Mahmūd should be surrendered to a vassal of Sultan Bahlūl.⁵

This was a fairly acceptable arrangement and if the two parties had adhered to it faithfully, there might have been no further quarrel. But when Bahlūl assigned Shamsābād to Rāi Karna and sent him to take possession of it, Jānā Khan refused to respect the terms of the treaty.

¹Dorn I, p. 48.
²Dorn I, p. 48 has ‘Mahmūd’ in place of ‘Ibrāhīm’, but all others including TKJL, p. 82 have ‘Ibrāhīm’ which seems to be more appropriate.
³Dorn I, p. 48, wrongly gives ‘prisoners’ in place of elephants.
⁵MR. I, p. 442 adds ‘after rains’ at the end of this term. This suggests that the war took place sometime after the month of Rajab—July 1452.
Bahlul proceeded to enforce the terms of the treaty at the point of the sword. Juna Khan was forced out and Rai Karna was installed as the governor of Shamsabad. Bahlul anticipated some trouble. Hence he proceeded towards that town. Juna Khan repaired to Jaunpur to report the developments. Sultan Mahmud took umbrage and proceeded at the head of an army to meet Bahlul. When the two armies came face to face near Shamsabad, Qutb Khan and Darya Khan cousins of Bahlul made a night attack. But the horse of Qutb Khan stumbled and fell down so that he was made a prisoner, and sent away to Jaunpur where he remained confined for seven years.

In the meantime, Sultan Mahmud died. The exact date of the death of Mahmud is controversial but numismatic evidence and the fact that Qutb Khan was released after 7 years by Husain Shah soon after his accession which took place less than six months after the death of Mahmud Shah show that he died in 863 H (1459).

Bibi Raji, the widow of Mahmud placed prince Bhikam Khan on the throne with the concurrence of the nobles. He assumed the title of Muhammad Shah. The war between Bahlul and the Sharqis seems to have dragged on throughout this period.

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1 Bad. I, p. 307 says that he was the ruler of Bhogton, in which case, he should be a relation of Raja Pratap.
2 Dast, p. 17, and Elliot V, p. 80 f., n 1 identify this Darya Khan with the governor of Sambhal who had first joined the Sharqis but had later been won over by the Afghans in course of the first war. He had next been deprived of 7 parganas and confirmed in his appointment as a partisan of Bahlul Lodi.
3 Thomas p. 323.
4 Fer. (L) III, p. 308 says that his father died in 842 or 844 and that he himself ruled for 20 years and a few months. That too will place his death approximately in 863 H.
because it is after Muhammad’s accession that the hostilities were formally brought to a close and the two monarchs retired to their respective capitals. Ferishtā, Nizāmuddīn and Nahāwandī say that status quo was the basis of the treaty.¹ But Badāonī says that the treaty was made on the same terms as between Mahmūd and Bahlūl.² Niāmatullāh gives the terms slightly differently. According to this version, Muhammad was to have the territories which belonged to Sultan Mahmūd while Bahlūl was to be content with what had been held by Sultan Alāuddīn. Accordingly, Shamsābād once more passed into the hands of the Sharqīs and Jūnā Khan was restored to its government.³

This war seems to have gone against Bahlūl and it appears that if there had not been a change of monarchs at Jaunpur, he might have suffered more heavily. Despite this apparent weakness, he was soon engaged in fresh hostilities against the Sultan of Jaunpur. Our authorities suggest a very simple explanation for this development and fix the onus of war on the taunts of his wife. They say, in effect, that Shams Khātūn, the wife of Bahlūl and sister of Qutb Khan Lodi did not care what the relative strength of the two parties was. Her concern was to see her brother released from prison. Therefore, when Bahlūl approached the capital he was greeted with a message, the purport of which was that it was unbecoming on his part to return from the campaign in peace while Qutb Khan was still a prisoner. He was stung to the

³ TKJL. p. 83; Elliot V, p. 81.
quick and immediately turned back to renew the war afresh. But subsequent events suggest that a shrewd person like Bahlūl did not revive the struggle merely to oblige a favourite consort. There were weightier reasons in its favour. The new Sultan of Jaunpur had not been accepted by all parties. His violence of temper and suspicious nature made him unacceptable to an important group which wanted to replace him by a more pliant prince. Bahlūl had probably learnt about these factions in the Jaunpur court and wanted to take advantage of them before the new Sultan had consolidated his position. Muhammad Shāh also returned to the offensive and the two armies had a series of skirmishes near Rapri. Bahlūl's influence was on the wane and Rājā Pratāp, Mubāriz Khan and Qutb Khan, the Governor of Rapri went over to the side of the Sharqīs.

Again the star of Bahlūl came to his rescue. In the thick of a war, Muhammad planned the murder of his brothers, one of whom, named Hasan Khan was actually murdered. This infuriated Bibi Rājī, the strong woman of Jaunpur and sowed seeds of suspicion and dissension in the ranks of the Sharqī army. The upshot of it was that Bibi Rājī organized a revolution. Muhammad Shāh was hunted down to his death in a garden near Kanauj and Husain, his younger brother was crowned king of Jaunpur under the style of Sultan Husain Shāh Sharqī. With the details of this conspiracy, we are not directly concerned except in so far as Prince Jalāl Khan, a younger brother of the Sultan while hurrying away from the camp to Jaunpur under cover of darkness mistook Bahlūl's army for Husain's,
rode into its camp and was made a prisoner. This circumstance facilitated cessation of hostilities. Husain Shāh wanted some respite to stabilize his position in his own kingdom and was anxious to secure the release of his brother. Bahlūl was equally anxious to return home after an honourable peace. The two monarchs, therefore, agreed that they should retain what they held, should exchange prisoners and should refrain from aggression for a period of four years. According to this treaty, Shamsābād remained in the hands of the Sharqīs and Qutb Khan Lodī and Prince Jalāl Khan were exchanged. Rājā Pratāp was soon persuaded to transfer his loyalties from the house of the Sharqīs to that of the Lodis.

Bahlūl observed this truce for the stipulated period of four years, after which he reoccupied Shamsābād and handed it over to Rāi Karna. Bahlūl had thus opened hostilities again. In order to secure local Hindu support in a fuller measure and to conciliate Rājā Pratāp who had lately been detached from the Sharqī side, Bahlūl gave the standard and the kettledrums seized from Daryā Khan Lodī to Rāi Bir Singh Deo s/o Rājā Pratāp.

This favour had very dangerous repercussions. Daryā Khan treated it as a personal insult, all the more humiliating because a non-Muslim would keep them as relics of his disgrace. He held counsel with Qutb Khan Afghān and avenged the wrong done to him by murdering Bir Singh, when he came to attend on Bahlūl at Shamsābād. This was an affront to Rājā Pratāp and an insult to the

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king but our authorities do not say what Bahlul did about it. We may only infer that Daryā Khan was dismissed from service and imprisoned or possibly killed because we do not hear anything about him after this event. It is, however, equally likely that no action was taken against him and he passed away due to natural causes.

Rājā Pratāp had a genuine grievance against Bahlūl. He might have even despised him for his failure to maintain his authority. Therefore, when Qutb Khan, the arch intriguer in this region, again advised him to desert to the Sharqīs, he was easily persuaded. Husain Shāh had in the meantime organized the affairs at home and had waged successful wars against the Rājās of Tirhut and Orissa. Joining the service of a rising man, did not require much coaxing. Rājā Pratāp, Qutb Khan and Mubāriz Khan, therefore, joined Husain Shāh. Bahlūl lost heart and retired to Delhi from where he went into the Punjab to suppress a rebellion.

Husain Shāh now got a welcome opportunity to mount the offensive against him. Bahlūl returned from Lahore post haste and the two armies came face to face at Chandwār,¹ where fighting continued for seven days before a three years’ non-aggression pact was made by the intervention of nobles on both sides.

The position of Bahlūl was still critical. His Sixth War vassals were beginning to show lack of faith in his capacity to hold the capital. Ahmad Khan Mewātī was the latest deserter to the Sharqī side.

¹TKJL, p. 86 and Bad. I, p. 308. Chandwār is a village 3 miles S.W. from Firuzabad in District Agra and lies on the left bank of the Jumna (Vide Distt. Gaz., U.P., VIII, pp. 238-239.)
and it was only the presence of Bahlu'l and Khân-i-Khânân's persuasion that induced him to accept the authority of the Sultan of Delhi again. Husain Shâh's power was still on the increase. He repaired the fort of Banaras in 870/1465, made a successful war against the Rājā of Gwalior\(^1\) in 871/1466, and then by persuasion and pressure detached, from allegiance to Bahlu'l, the governor of Etawah, Ahmad Khan Mewāti, Rustam Khan, governor of Kol and Ahmad Khan Jalwâni, the Governor of Bayānā. Husain then raised an army of 100,000 horse and 1,000 elephants to capture Delhi.\(^2\) Bahlu'l met him at Bhatwârā.\(^3\) After heavy casualties on either side, another truce was made and Sultan Husain retired to Etawah.

Fidâ Ali's version of the account of the Sultans of Jaunpur describes the campaign of 871/1466 at great length. Nizâmuddîn Ahmad's account of the rulers of Jaunpur and Malwa while confirming and supplementing this description assigns dates which are difficult to reconcile.\(^4\)

Bahlu'l was greatly unnerved by this attack when his vassals were changing side with impunity. In sheer despair, he sent Shaikh Muhammad Farmuli and Kapûrchand son of

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\(^1\) Fer. (L) II, p. 310 ; Tab. III, p. 284 ; CISG I, p. 232, places it in 1465 A.D.

\(^2\) MR, I, p. 446 ; Tab. I, p. 308 ; Bad. I, p. 308 agree that this attack was made when the three years' truce was over.

\(^3\) Ain II, p. 177 mentions Bharwârā included in Sarkâr Khairabad but its identification with Bhatwârā is not quite certain.

\(^4\) Fidâ Ali IV, pp. 695-696, Fer. (L) II, p. 310 agrees with Tab. III, pp. 284-285, and ascribes the same details to a war in 878/1473 while the details of Bahlu'l's mission to Mâhmûd Khiljî of Malwa are given by Tab. III, pp. 348-349 under date 8th Shaban 873/21st Feb. 1469, just a few months before the latter's death.
Rājā of Gwalior to solicit Mahmūd Khilji's assistance. They delivered to him Bahlūl's message which was worded as follows:

Sultan Husain Shāh Khurshid was given a message of his own. He, Bahlūl's ally, promised to help on the condition that a certain area be handed over to him. Sultan Mahmūd agreed to hand over the area to Bahlūl and promised to help him.

Sultan Mahmūd promised to help the Lodis, but before he could do anything or his reply reached its destination, Bahlūl's position became worse still. Consequently, he determined to buy off Hussain Shāh Sharqī by very liberal terms, viz.,

(a) Husain should have the entire territory of Delhi except the city and its suburbs within a radius of 18 krohs from it.

(b) Bahlūl was to act as a vassal and feudatory of the Sharqī monarch.

Husain in his vanity rejected these terms. Bahlūl had now no alternative but to remain on the defensive and to watch the situation carefully. He was soon to be saved by Husain's lack of foresight and inordinate pride. The Sharqī nobles were deputed to plunder the countryside. When they found little or no resistance, they dared farther and farther from their base. When Bahlūl's scouts informed him of the situation, he effected a surprise crossing of the Jumna at the head of
18,000 hefty Afghans and attacked remnants of Husain’s army in the camp while they were holidaying. The Sharqi troops would not believe their eyes till the Afghans started smiting them swift and hard. They fled in utter confusion and Bahlul by his patience, watchfulness, and daring had snatched a victory out of the jaws of defeat.

In course of pursuit, Bahlul captured a large booty and numerous prisoners, the most distinguished of which was Malikah Jahân, the queen consort. He treated her well and sent her to Husain with due ceremony. But the proud lady would not reciprocate this generosity. On the contrary she egged on her husband to make a fresh war in the following year. Bahlul’s conciliatory attitude was mistaken for weakness and hostilities were pressed on but without any success. Bahlul had thus averted a great danger.

Bahlul now busied himself in strengthening his position on the one hand and conciliating Husain on the other. Therefore, he was always on the defensive upto 883/1478. In the meantime, when Bibi Raji, the mother of Sultan Husain died at Etawah he sent his condolences to him through Qutb Khan Lodhi and Kalyan Mal son of Rajah Kirita Singh of Gwalior. The personnel of the delegation could not have been improved upon for while Qutb Khan was a clever diplomat, he

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1 Tab. III, p. 286, makes a passing reference to four wars between 878/1473 and 883/1478.
2 Tab. I, p. 308.
3 MR. I, p. 447, has Kartab Singh, Dorn I, p. 51 has ‘Kirran’. Pervish does not give the name but simply says Rajah of Gwalior. TKJL, p. 87 says ‘Raj Karan’, but adds a third name Bih Singh whom it wrongly calls the Rajah of Gwalior. CSG Vol. I, p. 232, gives the name of the contemporary raja on the basis of local chronicles as Kirti or Karan Singh (1455-1479).
had also been the recipient of special favours from
the deceased lady. The Rājā of Gwalior was a
person who could easily pose as a sincere well-
wisher of both the princes. Even then it needed
all the finesse and tact of Qutb Khan to secure
his safe return to Delhi.

Bahlūl was now thoroughly convinced of
Husain's inveterate hatred for himself. Then in
883/1478, came the death of Sultan Alāuddīn at
Badāon. Sultan Husain seized the fort from his
brothers-in-law, occupied Sambhal and then at
the head of a large army crossed the Jumna to
lay siege to Delhi. Bahlūl returned to defend the
capital but he found the day going against him.
In utter despair, he proceeded after nightfall to
the tomb of Khwājā Qutbuddīn and prayed for
victory standing before it all night. In the early
hours of the morning, he felt as if somebody gave
him a staff and bade him drive away the cattle
that had strayed there. This convinced Bahlūl
that his prayer had been answered.¹

The next day, Bahlūl made a desperate attack
and caused severe losses to the enemy. Then
Qutb Khan Lodī acted as the mediator. He posed
as a well-wisher of the Sharqi ruler on account of
his late mother's kindness to him. Having won
his confidence, he advised him to retire from the
contest. Husain's failure to storm the fort and
the vigour of Bahlūl's offensive lent support to
Qutb Khan's persuasion and Husain agreed to
have the Ganges as the boundary between the two
kingdoms. He thought that the Afghāns were

¹Yāḍgār, p. 16, has 'after midnight'. Wasīqūṣ, p. 10
gives a fuller name of the Khwājā with titles as Qutb-i-
Alam, Kh. Qutbuddīn Nūr-Ullūh.
sincerely anxious for peace. The presence of an obliged mediator in Bahlül’s army further assured him that the terms would be strictly observed. Therefore, without the least suspicion of treachery, he returned towards Jaunpur leaving the baggage train behind.\(^1\) Bahlül decided to repeat the experiment of 1440 and after plundering the baggage; gave a hot pursuit, in course of which he captured Malikā Jahān, his first consort, Qāzi Samāuddin, entitled Qutlug Khan, his grand Wazīr, and a number of other nobles. Husain’s troops got thoroughly demoralised and retreated in confusion. This enabled Bahlūl to capture a number of parganas such as Shamsābād, Kampilā, Patiāli, Kol, Sakīt, and Jalāli.\(^2\) Driven to bay, Husain gave another battle,\(^3\) was defeated and recognized Bahlūl’s claim to all that he had captured. Dhūpāmau was now made the frontier town between the two kingdoms. Bahlūl then returned to Delhi and Husain Shāh went to Rapri.

At the end of the war Bahlūl sent the consort of Husain Shāh back to him with due honour and ceremony. But the lady neither learnt nor relented and forced Husain Shāh to start another war the following year without making adequate preparations. Bahlūl came to contest his advance and a battle was fought near Sonhār,\(^4\) in which Husain

\(^1\) Bad. I, p. 309.


\(^3\) The place of battle is given by MR. I, p. 448 as Arāmbhajo in Rapri District, Tab. I, p. 310, (Arammahjor) TKJL. p. 88, has Ram Panjwār.

Shāh was defeated and retreated to Rapri while Bahlāl moved to Dhūpāmaū. Bahlāl now marched towards Rapri and Husain Shāh was defeated in another sharp engagement. He crossed the Jumnā in desperate hurry and suffered severe losses in this operation, a large booty falling into the hands of Bahlāl. Husain Shāh now fled towards Gwalior but on the way he was attacked by Bhadwariya Rājpūts and suffered heavy losses.

Rājā Kirti Singh of Gwalior waited on Husain and behaved towards him like a servant. According to Dorn he gave him 80 lakhs of tankas, a number of horses, carriages and other things and then provided him with a safe escort to Kalpi. According to Nizāmuddin’s version he personally accompanied him to that place.

Bahlāl left the fugitive alone for some time. Meanwhile, he dispossessed Ibrāhīm Khan, brother of Sultan Husain of Etawah and settled it on the son of Mubārak Khan Nūhānī. A few parganas of the district were, however, assigned to Rāi Dhāndhā.

Bahlāl now proceeded to Kalpi and a protracted fight lasting for a few months went on.

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2 MR. I, p. 449, and Tab. I, p. 311 mention this event but Abdullah and Yādgār do not refer to it. MR. mentions ‘Hatkānt’ as the place of Bhadwariya attack. Hatkānt is a village in District Agra 26°, 48°N, 78°E. Formerly it had a fort standing among the ravines of the Chambal.
3 Tab. I, p. 311.
5 Lohānī is commonly used, though it would be more correct to say ‘Nohānī’ descendants of ‘Nōh’ Dorn I, p. 53 and Tab. I, p. 311, give the name of the new governor also as Ibrāhīm Khan but Tab. adds after it ‘son of Mubārak Khan’. Dandī, p. 20 says s/o Mubārak Khan but does not name him.
mainly due to the fact that the Jumna divided the two armies and rendered a close engagement impossible. Then Rāi Tilokchand of Baksar\(^1\) showed Bahlul a ford which enabled him to cross the river in force. Husain’s army was completely surprised, broke up its ranks and fled helter skelter. Husain Shāh now retreated to Bhata, whose Rājā provided him a safe escort to Jaunpur.\(^2\) Bahlul pursued him thither and captured Jaunpur while Husain Shāh fled to Kanauj via Bahraich. Bahlul was still at his heels so that he left Kanauj and reached the banks of the Ramganga where Bahlul overtook him and inflicted another defeat. According to the author of Maāsir-i-Rahimi, Bahlul captured after this battle a very rich booty and also Bībī Khānznādah daughter of Sultan Alauddin.\(^3\) But she managed to rejoin Husain subsequently.

Bahlul was now determined to annex Jaunpur. He therefore gave Husain no rest till he fled the territory and sought shelter in Bihar the easternmost part of his possessions. Jaunpur was now put in charge of Bārbakshāh who according to Yādgīr was allowed to have a canopy and

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\(^1\) It is situated on the left bank of the Ganges, 34 miles south east of Unao town and is also referred to as Bagisar.

\(^2\) Shastri, p. 22 gives Bhaidachandra as the name of the Rājā.

\(^3\) The ruins of Bhata or Bhataghor, a corruption of the Virbhānādaya, Kāvya are now to be found near Kherva and Raipur, the last of which lies 14 miles to the east of Karwi in the Banda district. (Shastri pp. 20-21).

\(^3\) MR. I, p. 450. Tab. I, p. 312 gives her name as Bībī Khonzā. Probably this was no name but a mere title like Malika Jahaan. Prof. Hodiwala, p. 494 suggests that it might be a diminutive for ‘Khudawandzā’ or ‘Khudawand-i-Jahān’. He also rejects the suggestion made in CHI. III, pp. 231 & 255 that her name was ‘Jalîa’ because this too might be an honorific meaning ‘exalted’.
dūrbāsh. At the same time, Qutb Khan and a number of other nobles were left at Majhauli, while Bahlūl himself went to Bádāın.

Sultan Husain collected another army and made a fresh attack on Jaunpur. The nobles at Jaunpur were unable to resist him and agreed to evacuate the fort on condition that they were allowed to go away in safety. They now repaired to Majhauli. Bahlūl quickly sent reinforcements and himself followed soon after. He recaptured Jaunpur and reinstated Bārbakshāh, there.

This was the last campaign in which Bahlūl had to fight against the Shārqi. The struggle had been long and bitter and the total losses suffered by both parties were enormous. But Bahlūl ultimately got the upper hand in 883/1478 after which he never allowed Husain sufficient time to recoup his power. By 892/1486 he captured all the

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1Yādgār, p. 16. Dorn I, p. 53 says ‘Mubārak Khān’ was appointed which might be the real name of Bārbakshāh. But MR. I, p. 450 adds ‘Nūḥān’ after the name which makes it very different.


3Dorn I, p. 54 mentions Bārbakshāh for the first time as the leader of re-inforcements. Yādgār, p. 18, on the other hand says that Bārbakshāh was defeated after two or three engagements and Husain Shāh captured not only Jaunpur but also a large booty. He refers later to appointment of Bārbak as governor of Khalpi and return of Husain Shāh to Jaunpur. This last statement, does not appear to be correct and is based on some confusion.

TKJL. p. 90 suggests that Bārbak’s status was higher than that of a Governor, for it says, باركراك (Bārkarak) 1 آتشنبه (Atestan) هوموس (Homos) 1408

4The fact that Bārbak’s earliest coin is dated 892 shows that Husain’s power was destroyed by about that time. This hypothesis is also supported by the fact that the Gwalior campaign occurred in this year. CISG. I, p. 233, Thomas, p. 377.
Sharqi districts except Bihar and appointed trustworthy officers to govern them. Thus in the sequel, this war had proved very advantageous to him. It raised the prestige of Bahlal, it brought fresh territory to his dominions and increased the financial resources of the state. It overawed others and secured allegiance of neighbouring chiefs.

But to the Sharqis it had proved an unmitigated disaster. We have stated earlier\(^1\) that the Sharqi state was more stable and had far greater resources. Its rulers, Mahmud, Muhammad and Husain were deficient neither in personal valour nor in administrative ability. Why then did they fail in a war against a new dynasty still struggling to find its feet? The reasons, though not quite on the surface, are easily discovered.

In the first place, the Sharqis had failed to exploit the loyalist sentiment in favour of the Sayyads. Even in the very first campaign, Mahmud had done nothing to appear as an ally of the dispossessed Sayyad monarch. In 1478, Husain Shah had not scrupled to seize Badon despite the resistance of his brothers-in-law. The war thus assumed the form of a dynastic struggle between the kingdom of Delhi and the kingdom of Jaunpur. The subjects of the erstwhile Sultanaate of Delhi had, therefore, to decide whether they shall become the subjects of a provincial kingdom or retain the glory of belonging to the imperial kingdom of Delhi. The policy of the Sharqis towards the Sayyads, thus, helped Bahlal in securing readier allegiance of his subjects.

\(^1\) P. 60, above.
In the second place, though the armies of both the contestants were racially of a composite character and the fight was political and dynastic rather than racial or tribal, yet the Sharqis suffered considerably because of this accident. The Turks and the Sayyads in the Lodi Camp were generally loyal, except where self-interest made traitors of them. But the Afghans in the Sharqi camp were far less dependable. They usually joined one or the other party purely on grounds of self-interest. This is amply illustrated by the conduct of Daryā Khan Lodi, the governor of Sambhal and Qutb Khan Afghān, the governor of Rapri. But on crucial moments, if an appeal was made to their racial sentiment, they could turn traitors and yet carry an easy conscience, for was it not their duty—they argued—to promote the establishment and strengthening of the first Afghān dynasty in India. Daryā Khan’s treachery in the first war had tipped the balance in Bahālūl’s favour. As the saying goes, well begun is half done, and who could deny that Bahālūl had done extremely well in the circumstances.

In the third place, the Sharqis were definitely and decisively beaten in the game of diplomacy. Never were they able to press their advantage home. On the contrary, they allowed Bahālūl to extricate himself from a vulnerable situation because they were deceived by Afghān diplomacy about the intentions and position of their enemy. Mahmūd Shah patched up a peace after the second war on Qutb Khan Afghān’s intervention. Husain

1 Cf. Isa Khan Turk, governor of Kol and Sayyad Shamsuddin, the Agent of the Afghans who contacted Daryā Khan to win him over to the side of the Delhi Kingdom in 1452.
Shāh was more than once persuaded to retire after a successful war by Khān-i-Jahān, Khān-i-Khānān or Quṭb Khan Lodi. In this respect, Husain Shāh was most to blame for in 1478, he threw discretion to the winds when he trusted an enemy of more than 25 years' standing and left his baggage train behind without adequate protection. He must have regretted the error all his life but he could never make amends for it because of Bahlūl's extreme caution. The Sharqīs were more vain than wise. Bahlūl on the other hand could feign humility or go back on his word as it suited the occasion.

Then the advantage of the Lodis was that while they had continuity of command, the Sharqīs changed horses in midstream twice. In a Muslim state where there is no fixed law of succession, a change of sovereign is often accompanied by factional intrigues. That such was actually the case after Mahmūd Sharqi's death has been noticed earlier. This was a serious handicap when a life and death struggle was going on and the enemy was led by a shrewd commander who seemed to have a quick eye for the weakness of his adversary.

The composition of Bahlūl's army was slightly superior. In none of his wars, was a key position held by a man of doubtful loyalty. The rank and file consisted mainly of Afghans and Mughals who in personal valour and tactics of war were superior to their opponents in the Sharqī camp. The offensive was generally taken by the Sharqīs. This gave them an initial advantage inasmuch as the Lodis were taken by surprise. But the distance between Jaunpur and Delhi, slow means of advance and still slower progress of sieges provided the Lodis
with sufficient time to recover from the shock and to marshal their forces. The initial success of the Sharqīs often deceived their leaders. They thought that Lodi resistance would crumble in a matter of days. Consequently, while the Lodis made preparations and avoided open conflict, their opponents occasionally spent their force in plundering raids. Their success against peaceful citizens made them still more careless. The Lodis all this while bided their time and chose the right moment and place for attack. When they did attack, they put all their vigour into it. The mobility of their horses and the weight of the warriors often gave an exaggerated impression of their actual strength. This sobered the Sharqīs and the work of the sly Afghān diplomats was rendered easy. The Lodis thus showed commendable tact in averting disasters. The Sharqīs were less careful in the hour of defeat than even in the hour of victory. When in 1478, Husain Shāh suffered a defeat and lost many districts, he should not have renewed the war without making the fullest preparations. He took no such precautions. Consequently, each subsequent attack ended in defeat and contributed to progressive demoralisation of his followers. This could end only in his expulsion from his kingdom and the establishment of Lodi dominion in Jaunpur on a firm footing.

The rest of Bahlūl’s warlike activities may be briefly summarised. The Punjab seems to have been none too peaceful and we find that Bahlūl had often to visit that province for restoration of his authority. Reference to these visits has been made in course of his relations with the Sharqīs. But Yādgār refers to a war against Ahmad Khan
Bhattī of Sindh which is not mentioned by any other author. If Yādgār’s sequence of events is reliable, it should have taken place in the 12th or 13th year of his reign i.e. about 1463-64 A.D.¹ The governor of Multan complained against the aggressions of Ahmad Khan and protested his incapacity to hold Multan for long unless reinforcements were sent. Bahlāl sent the eldest prince Khwāja Bāyazīd against him. In the first engagement Bāyazīd defeated Naurang Khan, nephew of Ahmad Khan and his soldiers started celebrating the victory. Then they were surprised by Bhattī troops led by Naurang’s mistress, disguised as Ahmad Khan’s son. Bāyazīd secured reinforcements and finally defeated Ahmad Khan who along with that ‘Joan of Arc’ was put to death. Sindh was annexed to the Delhi Empire.

This is Yādgār’s version; but it is difficult to say how far it is historical. At any rate, the whole of Sindh does not seem to have formed a part of Lodi empire. The only other evidence in favour of Yādgār’s statement is a work on erotics of the 16th century in which an Afghan nobleman named Lād Khan Lodi, is described as the patron of the author and a great warrior whose exploits had flooded the Indus with the tears of widows of his enemies.²

¹ Yādgār, pp. 18-20 says that, (i) Nizām Khan was born in the 7th year of Bahlāl’s reign (ii) that a ’fāl’ was taken for attack on the Rānā of Udypur when Nizām Khan was 5 years old (iii) that after war against the Rānā a campaign was led against Nīm Khār. (iv) that soon after this came the campaign in Sindh.
² Aang-Rang by Kalyān Mal, ed. by Vaidya Jādavji, Trikamji Acharya. In the second Shloka of the book it is said to have been composed for the entertainment of Shri Lād Khan Lodi s/o Ahmad Khan Lodi, author of military exploits in Sindh. The editor in his introduction
Bahlūl did not find leisure for a war against the powerful Hindu kingdom of Gwalior. His contemporaries were Kirti Singh (1455-1479), Kalvān Singh (1479-1486) and Mān Singh (1486-1517). Kirti Singh is also referred to as Rāi Karan. Badāoni describes Rāi Karan, governor of Shamsābād as the Rājā of Bhogaon. Other authors say nothing about it. The name of Qutb Khan’s companion in the condolence party to Etawah is given as Kalyān Singh son of Rāi Karan, Rājā of Gwalior. If this Rāi Karan is identical with Rāi Karan of Shamsābād and the murderer of Fath Khan, it would appear that Bahlūl tried to conciliate the Rājā of Gwalior in the earlier part of his reign and in return for a nominal acceptance of vassalage, assigned to him an important province near the Sharqo-Lodi frontier. This surmise finds partial confirmation in Ferishtā’s statement that Sultan Husain Shāh invaded Gwalior and forced its ruler to make peace with him. This war might have been intended to detach Rājā Kirti Singh (Rāi Karan) from the side of the Lodīs. If Nizāmuddin Ahmad’s version can be relied upon the Sharqī attack on Gwalior in 1466 failed in its

suggests that he might be the son of Mahmod Khan brother of Ibrahim Lodi. But there was one of Bahlūl’s nobles named Ahmad Khan. The book says Ahmad Khan and not Mahmod Khan.

Dāudi pp. 102-103 refers to Khān-i-Azam Lād Khan son of Ahmad Khan Lodi and extols his generosity in very high terms. This description tallies with that given by the author of Anang Rang. Hence the guess of its editor based on the identification of Ahmad with Mahmod must be rejected as erroneous.

Wāqiʿat, pp. 72-75 relates among other things detailed arrangements about the purdah in the Zanana. This suggests that he had collected choice ladies about whose intrigues he was always apprehensive.

It is curious that when Ibrahim annexed Gwalior he assigned to Vikramāditya no other place but this same Shamsābād, See p. 175-180 below.
ultimate objective because when Bahlūl sent envoys to the camp of Mahmūd Khilji of Malwa, Kapūr Chand s/o the Rājā of Gwalior was one of the emissaries chosen. In 1479, when Husain Shāh was defeated and fled to Gwalior, Rājā Kirti Singh gave him monetary and military assistance. This could not have been done unless the Rājā was willing to defy the wrath of Bahlūl and incidentally shows that the rulers of Gwalior were fairly independent in their political affiliations.

It is only in 1486-87 that Bahlūl is specifically mentioned to have led an expedition against Gwalior, whose ruler Rājā Mān was reduced to vassalage and paid a sum of 80 lakhs of tankas. Even this statement of Yādgār, Maʿāsir-i-Rahīmī and Niāmatullāh is perhaps an overstatement. The rulers of Gwalior probably remained independent throughout this period, though they made occasional payments to avoid a conflict.

Yādgār mentions a war against the Rānā of Udaypur.¹ This war is also uncorroborated by other sources. Tod refers to a war between the Rānā and the Sultan of Delhi but the details are absolutely different. According to Yādgār's version, the fighting originally went in favour of the Rānā but Qutb Khan and Khān-i-Khānān Fardullāh soon turned the balance in their favour by their desperate valour. Bahlūl is said to have captured a moderate booty and to have secured a promise of allegiance.² He also mentions raids.

¹ Yādgār, pp. 19-20. He is here guilty of an anachronism for Udaypur was founded later in the reign of Emperor Akbar.
² Elliot, V, p. 4, f. n. 2 suggests that it might have taken place after 1474.
into Malwa where he is said to have secured submission of local chiefs, including the ruler of Ujjain.

After the conclusion of his war against Husain Shāh, Bahlūl seized Kalpi and assigned it to his grandson Azam Humayūn. Next he defeated the Rājā of Dholpur and Iqbāl Khan, the governor of Bārī both of whom paid 100 mans of gold. On his return march, he deprived Shakta Singh s/o Rāi Dhāndhū of the District of Etawah and on the way to Delhi died near the township of Jalāli in 894/1489 after a reign of over 38 years. Badāoni Maāsir-i-Rahimī, Dāādi and Yadgār quote certain lines on Bahlūl’s death expressive of the year of

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1 A town in the Dholpur state 19 miles W. of Dholpur.
3 Tab. I, p. 313 says that he ruled for 38 years 8 months and 8 days. Yadgār p. 28 and 393 gives the date of his death as 17th Rajab, 894/16th June, 1489.

Fer. (L)I, p. 178 says that he ruled for 38 years, 8 months and 7 days. TKJL. p. 91 supports Taḥqīt, But if the date of Bahlūl’s accession was 17th Rabīul-awwal, 855 and that of Sikandar’s accession which immediately followed Bahlūl’s death, 18th Shaban 894, the period of Bahlūl’s reign would be 39 years and 5 months. Yet it is inexplicable why all our authorities should have repeated an obvious error.

The place of his death as given by Tab. I, p. 313 was while Briggs (I. p. 561) calls it Badawly in the Sakit District. Fer. (L) and Fida Alihave Bhadaoni in Sakit District.

TKJL. says that he died at in the pargana of Sakit, on account of unusual heat.

Prof. Hodiwala p. 495 suggests that it might be Malāwaṇi, a village very near Sakit and mentioned in the P.O. Guide.
his demise and helplessness of even the most powerful against death.¹

Bahlūl had begun his public career as the governor of Sarhind and had risen to be the governor of the Punjab before he became the Sultan of Delhi. In 1451, he was already the master of Multan, Lahore, Dipalpur, Samana, Sarhind, Sunnam, Hisar Fīrūza and certain other parganas which have not been named. During his rule as the Sultan of Delhi there was no serious trouble in this region. Occasional disturbances were easily suppressed and this whole region remained firmly in the hands of his Afghan nobles.

To this basic territory, he added towards the east, by stages and after varying fortunes of war, the whole tract of Madhyadesha upto the western fronties of Bihar. It embraced Delhi, Badaon, Baran, Sambhal, Mewat, Rapri, Kampīlā, Patiali, Bhogaon, Etawah, Kalpi, Banares, Jaunpur, Kara Manikpur and Lakhnau, to mention only the more important places. Towards the south, he is said to have exacted tribute from the rulers of Gwalior, Dholpur and Bārī. He probably raided Malwa and defeated the Rājā of Ujjain. But the evidence in this regard as in the case of war against the Rānā of Mewar is not of a conclusive character. According to Ahmad Yādgār he also made a war

¹ Bad. I, p. 313 and others.
against the Bhatts of Sindh and may have succeeded in adding some portion of northern Sindh to the fief of Multan.

Thus at the time of his death, the Lodi empire comprised most of the modern states of East and West Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and a part of Rajasthan. Beyond these limits, he counted some rulers among his vassals but their loyalty was neither sincere nor continuous. He thus left to his successor an empire practically twice as large as that with which he had started in 1451.

Bahlul's career as Sultan reveals him as a highly intelligent and practical ruler. He knew whom he could trust and how to exploit his services to the full. He was conscious of the difficulties that faced him and was determined not to add to them by undue racial discrimination or religious persecution. In his own private life, he was an average Musalman who tried to live up to the simple tenets of his faith. That he was scrupulously orthodox, cannot be asserted for his devotion to saints and their tombs has been referred to in the foregoing pages. The author of Māālsir-i-Rahimī,¹ following Nizāmuddin Ahmad,² credits him, however, with the possession of qualities of righteousness and strict conformity to the teachings of the Shariat. At all events, he was a devout and god-fearing individual. The Wāqiāt-i-Mushtaqi³ says that he said the customary five prayers in company and even on the battlefield, he did not forget to offer his prayers to God and to

¹ MR. I, p. 438.
² Tab. I, p. 299.
³ Wāqiāt, p. 10.
entreat Him to make him the instrument of service to Islam. He showed great respect to the holy and the learned and loved to spend as much of his time in their company as possible. Wāqīyat-i-Mush-taqi relates three incidents which show not only Bahlūl's regard for the Ulemā but also his courtesy, forbearance and accessibility. He first relates how Bahlūl took no more serious notice of Mullā Qādan's strictures on Afghāns at the time of the first khitba prayer than to remark 

قائد عسکر کو ناہ ہو ہے

Later, when Bahlūl had become Sultan, he once noticed a Mullā whose body was very diminutive and whose hair was red. In a lighter vein he said something which was not very complimentary but when the Mullā took offence Bahlūl made amends by offering an apology. The last incident is of a unique type. It is related that a Mullā went to Bahlūl's private chamber who, by coincidence, was just going for ablutions. The Mullā was bold enough to hold the Sultan by his loin cloth lest he should move away to avoid him, and would not be persuaded to relax his hold till Bahlūl had listened to his request and granted it.¹

That he was a man of very simple habits is admitted on all hands. The Wāqīyat says that he did not maintain any personal guards, shared meals with all present at the time and would not sit on a throne in the presence of his nobles. Instead, he would have a long carpet which he would share with all the important tribal leaders. Ferištā confirms these details and adds, "He never dined at home nor did he ride a horse of the royal

¹ Wāqīyat, pp. 9-10.
stables. Each day, one of the nobles sent him his meal and similarly at the time of riding, one of them supplied him with a mount."

His qualities of leadership were of a high order. He knew the material he had to use and moved warily about his business. He treated his nobles and even his soldiers as his brethren. If anybody fell ill he would go to his place to enquire about his health. This won for him implicit loyalty of his followers who neither wavered in their obedience to him nor considered any risks too great when he was present at their head. It was not merely in formal courtesies, that he showed his concern for the Afghān and Mughal soldiery. Fershtā says that when he captured the treasures of the kings of Delhi, he distributed the spoils among his followers and took for himself only a proportionate share. Rizqullāh goes further and says, "Bahlūl was very religious, brave and of a generous disposition. He did not disappoint any supplicant, nor did he collect a treasure. Whatever lands he conquered, he distributed among his followers." He did all this because he realised the imperative need for an army consisting of numerous, satisfied and brave soldiers. He did not hesitate to use local talent wherever practicable and we find the names of Rāi Karna, Rājā Pratāp, Rāi Bir Singh, Rāi Tilokchand and Rāi Dhāndhū among recipients of his favours. There were some persons, however, whom Bahlūl could not permanently win over to his side. Personal ambition, unsettled political conditions, local intrigue and shifting fortunes of war rendered his task difficult. That is why we hear of

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1 Fcr. (L) I, p. 179.
2 Fcr. (L) I, p. 179.
3 Wāqīāt, p. 9.
Qutb Khan, Rājā Pratāp and Ahmad Khan Mewātī changing sides so often. Ahman Khan Jalwānī of Bayānā even had the khutba read in the name of Sultan Husain Shāh Sharqī,¹ when the latter’s star was on the ascendant. But when a balance has been struck between success and failure and due regard is paid to the circumstances in which Bahālū had to act, it would be admitted that his achievement was remarkable. He had begun his career as an orphan, had steadily risen to fame and had not merely captured the throne of Delhi but was regarded by competent contemporary observers, both friendly and hostile, to be marked out for that high destiny. He found the Sultanate of Delhi in the last stages of distintegration. He had arrested the rot, had infused fresh vigour into its bones and the Sultanate of Delhi had begun to show signs of a fresh lease of life and vitality. Refractory chiefs were brought to book, a neighbouring kingdom was virtually liquidated and the dominions were rounded off towards the south and west.

What is more to his credit, he was no mere militarist or warlord. He was a man of humane spirit and wanted to promote public welfare by ensuring law and order, administering justice and refraining from burdening his people with insupportable taxes. To the poor and the indigent, he was always kind and generous. In short, he was a fairly popular and successful monarch.

¹ TKJL, p. 86.
CHAPTER IV,
CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION
(B. Under Sikandar Lodi)

It is not known definitely as to how many sons Bahlul's family survived Sultan Bahlul Lodi. It is however, generally stated that he had nine sons at the time of his accession. They were Khwaja Bayazid, Nizam Khan, Barbakshah, Alam Khan known as Alauddin, Jamal Khan, Miin Yakhub Khan, Fath Khan, Miin Must Khan and Jalal Khan. Ferishta and Nizamuddin Ahmad, give the number as nine but insert Mubarak Khan between Barbakshah and Alam Khan. As none of his other sons has a name ending in 'Shah' and as we know that when Barbak was appointed governor of Jaunpur he was permitted the use of a canopy and durbush, it may be suggested that Mubarak Khan was probably his original name which was changed to Barbak Shah when semi-regal dignities were conferred on him. This would explain the apparent discrepancy of nine sons with ten names given by Nizamuddin and Ferishta.

Perhaps Bahlul married three wives. The first was Islam Khan's daughter Shams Khattan. She was the mother of Khwaja Bayazid, the eldest son of the Sultan. Barbak was also born of an Afghan mother but it was not Shams Khattan, otherwise the fact would have been pointed to when the respective qualifications of the candidates were discussed after Bahlul's death. Yadgar mentions

2 Yadgar p. 17.
how Bahlūl fell in love with a goldsmith’s daughter of Sarhind and married her after his accession to the throne. She gave birth, in the seventh year of the reign, to a son who was named Nizām Khan, because Bahlūl was enjoying an interval of peace at the time of his birth. The name of this lady was Hemā.¹ In the reign of Sikandar, a reference is made to Fath Khan’s mother in connection with a conspiracy against the Sultan. She seems to have been distinct from Shams Khātūn and Hemā. Beyond this, little is known about Bahlūl’s wives and their respective children.

Of the nine sons, Khwāja Bāyāzīd, the eldest had predeceased his father. He was associated during his life-time with the defence of Delhi in 1452 and the invasion of Sindh in 1463-1464.² His son Azam Humāyūn was appointed the governor of Kalpi in 1487-88 and we shall hear more of him subsequently.

Nizām Khan’s early years and youth have received greater attention at the hands of our authorities because he succeeded to the throne. Yādgār says³ that his mother was a peerless beauty and was a great favourite of the Sultan. When she was expecting confinement she saw in a dream that the moon falling from heaven came into her lap.⁴ The next morning, astrologers and interpreters of dreams were consulted. They said that it indicated that she would give birth to a son who will become

¹ Fer. (L.) I, p. 179; has Zeba ¹4⁄2 while Briggs I, p. 563 has ‘Zaina’. It may be suggested, that the Persian equivalent of Hemā would be ‘Zarīn’. ² Chap. III, pp. 63 and 90. ³ Yādgār, pp. 17-19. ⁴ Reference to such a dream is also made with regard to the birth of Timūr and Chāngez Khan.
king, shed lustre on his kingdom and will be a Wali. The Sultan felt very happy and made generous gifts to holy men. In due course, the prophesy turned out to be true.

From his very infancy he became a great favourite of his father, who provided him with a separate residence and appointed Khān-i-Khānān Farīlī as his guardian. Every care was taken to give the prince an all-round education. He was a precocious child and at the age of five took a correct aim and shot through a rose at his father’s bidding. He was assigned the pargana of Sambhal as a personal fief, so that he may suffer no want. After the rose-shooting incident, Bahlāl assigned to him the government of Sarhind and expressed a wish that it might prove as auspicious to him as it had done in his own case.

Nizām Khan had extremely handsome features. Abdullah, Yādgār and Rizqullāh Mushtaqī refer to them in glowing terms.\(^1\) They also relate how a pious and saintly person like Sheikh Hasan,\(^2\)

\(^1\) Dādā̱ p. 28; Yādgār pp. 29-30; Waqīāt pp. 23-24.  

\(^2\) M. Hidayat Husain in a footnote on p. 29 (Yādgār) says that according to Khunānah-ul-sūfiya Vol. I, p. 409, Sh. Hasan came to Delhi from Jaunpur in the time of Sinkandar and according to Akhbar-ul-Akhbar p. 187 and Miraj-ul-Walīyāt he died on 24th Rabi-ul-awwal 909/17th Sep. 1503.

The incident of his falling in love with Nizām Khan has a 'romantic and mystical appearance. The Shaikh by
grandson of Abū-Lālā became extremely enamoured of him.

As to Nizām Khan’s spirit of bravery and enterprise, Yādgār, Abdullah and Rizqullāh refer to his war against Tātār Khan and Saif Khan. Abdullah says that they were powerful nobles of Bahlūl who had seized much territory near their fiefs without permission. Yādgār tells us that Tātār Khan was the governor of Lahore and Saif Khan of Multan. He also refers to their seizure of some territory without permission. But none of these two authors specifically mentions the actual villages or parganas seized by them. Rizqullāh specifies the territory seized by Tātār Khan as the province of Lahore but he does not tell us what fief he held by rightful assignment. All the three, however, agree about the unauthorized seizure of

his spiritual powers eluded the notice of the guards and entered the room of the prince without being formally ushered in. When the prince asked him how he was there, he laconically said, “thou knowest best” and kept gazing at him with unconcealed infatuation. Nizām Khan was deeply offended at this behaviour, caught him by the neck and placed his face over the burning oven. The Shaikh made no resistance and his face was none the worse for the apparent baking it had received. In the meantime, Mubārk Khan Nāhānī came and persuaded the prince to relax his hold by referring to the saintliness of the Shaikh. He even suggested that the prince should really feel proud of the attentions of such a holy person. Nizām Khan had no faith in this humbug and put the Shaikh into prison.

The chroniclers go on to relate that the Shaikh was found, the next day, dancing in the bazaar and when on being summoned before the prince, the latter asked him

قُرُن را عاشقْ ـا مِبِگَرْنْ چَرَأ اَزْ فِقْهٍ مِنِ ابْدِرْ فِتْنَی؟

the Shaikh pleaded innocence and said that Abū Lālā had led him out of it. The prison door was still locked and so the prince was convinced of his spiritual powers or complicity of his own men and left him alone.

This anecdote might testify to the personal attractions of the prince but is a sad commentary on the prevailing moral standards and the life of saints and holy men.
some parganas or villages. Just about this time Prince Nizām also seized certain villages near Panipat, which had been assigned to other nobles. The latter lodged a complaint against the Prince with the Sultan. Bahlūl wrote a threatening letter reprimanding Sh. Saād Fārmuli, Diwān1 of the Prince for whose action he was held responsible. The Sultan added that if the Prince had any pretensions to manly vigour, he should have seized the territory held by Tātār Khan; for encroachment on the territory of one's own father could be no proof of his valour.2 This communication was interpreted by Shaikh Saād to be a virtual nomination of the Prince as heir-apparent, for it was to the exclusion of all other sons, that Bahlūl had assigned such an arduous task to him. The Diwān further emphasized that if the Prince succeeded in this campaign, he would be marked out as the inevitable successor to the throne.

The details of the expedition have been clothed in the garb of a fiction and need not be repeated; but the Prince is credited to have secured a complete victory despite his being outnumbered by 1 to 10 or 1 to 8. Tātār Khan was defeated and killed in an engagement at Ambala and the remnant of his followers were scattered helter skelter. The result of the campaign pleased Bahlūl who sent presents to the Prince. Abdullah says that the Sultan publicly recognized him to be the fittest to succeed him. Yādgār, however, goes further and

1 Wāqīā p. 16, has Feshwā in place of Diwān.
2 Dādī p. 32 has the following expression.

اکر محمد شکری دارد از راهیت لا تار مان بگیرید
راهیت مارا که خواست میکنی احیا کج مادم کنیست؟
says that he issued a farman appointing him as heir-apparent.¹

That Nizâm Khan was Bahlâl’s choice as his successor to the throne finds partial confirmation also in the fact that he was appointed the Sultan’s deputy at Delhi during his absence, roughly from 1486 to the time of his death. Târikh-i-Dâûdî says² that the Sultan had left behind a will addressed to Nizâm Khan. That too shows that Bahlâl’s nominee for the throne was none other than Nizâm Khan. The contents of the will are also interesting:

“First, do not appoint a member of the Sûr tribe as a Khan or an Amir because they are aspirants for royalty.

“Second, never appoint a Niâzî to any office in the state because they are reckless in behaviour and have no sense of loyalty.”³

Besides Nizâm Khan, Bârbakshâh and Bâyazîd, stray references are also made to Fath Khan, Jalâl Khan and Alam Khan. But Mâsû Khan, Yâkûb Khan and Jâmâl Khan⁴ do not figure anywhere.

¹For details of this incident see Yâdgâr pp. 31-34 and Dâûdî pp. 31-35. Wâqîhât pp. 16-19. The expression used by Yâdgâr p. 398 is ﷽ ﷽ ﷽ ﷽ ﷽ ﷽ ﷽ ﷽ while on p. 34 is recorded simply ﷽ ﷽ ﷽ ﷽ ﷽ ﷽ ™
²Dâûdî p. 21.
³Did Bahlâl exclude all Niâzîs because his father had been killed in a war against them?
⁴Yâdgâr p. 34 mentions that Nizâm Khan left Jamâl Khan in charge of Delhi when he proceeded to Jalâl, after receiving news of his father’s death. But Wâqîhât, pp. 12-13 calls him ‘Jamal Khan Sarang Khani’ and gives an interesting anecdote illustrative of his poverty before he entered the select group of the Prince’s followers.
⁵Dâûdî p. 36 describes him as ‘one of his trustworthy nobles’. Besides it might have been indiscreet to leave the capital in the hands of a prince when the question of succession was still unsettled. Therefore Jamâl, the custodian of Delhi must be a noble and not a prince.
prominently. The fact that none of these is mentioned as a governor of any important province shows that they were not men of promise.

We may now revert to the death-scene of Bahlul and the question of succession to the throne. When he died, none of his sons was present in the camp. One of them, viz. Nizam Khan, his Deputy at Delhi was at a distance of some 80 miles from the place of death while another, Bharbakshah was far away at Jaunpur. Azam Humayun, the son of Bayazid, held Kalpi, a province of considerable strategic importance during this period.

It were these three princes whose claims for succession to the throne were considered at the meeting of the nobles in the camp. Ferishta gives a very detailed account of the proceedings preceding Nizam’s election as the ruler. But Nizamuddin Ahmad, Abdullah, Rizquallah, Yadgar, Ni’amatullah and Badoni make no reference to disputed succession. All of them follow the lead of Nizamuddin Ahmad and simply say that when Prince Nizam Khan received the news of his

1Dorn I, p. 55 has a very different version from that given in TKJL. It is stated in the former:

“At the time when Sultan Bahlul took leave of this world, Bahrbakshah the elder son was in Jaunpur and Nizam Khan, a younger son, born of Bibi, lived in Delhi whither he had been sent for his education. Bibi kept Bahlul’s death concealed, but apprised Nizam Khan through a courier of it; adding that if he would come at the present juncture of affairs, he might obtain the throne; if not, Bahrbakshah would have it; all the Omras of Bahlul being unanimously on his side in consequence of his being born of an Afghani mother, and enjoying power and authority. Nizam Khan on account of this occurrence, repairing the next day to Bahlul’s court in the vicinity of Jaunpur ordered the coffin of the deceased to be carried off to Delhi; and Khan-i-Jahan, Khan-i-Khanan Farmult and other Omras, knowing Bahrbakshah to be at so great a distance and out of the way, placed him on the throne on the 7th of the month of Shaban in 894..."
father's death, he hurried to the camp at the head of his army and with the concurrence of Khāن-i-Jahān, Khān-i-Khānān Farmuli and other nobles of his father he was crowned king in Kiosk Fīrūzāh on the banks of the Kāli river near the town of Jalālī.¹

Ferishtā² however introduces many novel details for which he quotes no authority but which seem to be quite plausible. He says that Bahlūl wanted to divide the kingdom among his kinsmen, while the imperial crown was to be worn by Nizām Khan. Accordingly he appointed Bārbakshāh as ruler of Jaunpur; assigned Kara and Manikpur to Alam Khan; Bairahich to his nephew Shaikhzādā Muhammad Farmuli, entitled Kālā Pahār; and Lakhnau and Kalpi to Azam Humāyūn; while Delhī with several districts in the Doab fell to the share of Nizām Khan, who was at the same time declared to be the heir and successor.

Nobody raised any objection to this arrangement at that time; but when Bahlūl fell ill and his end seemed near there was a demand for revocation of his will. They pressed the claims of Azam Humāyūn on grounds of primogeniture and so far succeeded in their designs that Bahlūl signed a farman, asking Nizām Khan to come to him as speedily as possible. Fortunately for the prince, his mother was present in the camp and when she came to know of the motive in summoning her son, she managed to send him an urgent messenger warning him not to come before Bahlūl's death,

¹ Tab. I, p. 314; Dāsādī u. 36; Waqīāt p. 24; Yādgār pp. 34-35; TKJL, p. 91.
because the nobles wanted to put him under arrest
and to secure Bahlul’s forcible approval for Azam
Humayun’s nomination.

Nizam was now in a great fix, for, if he did not
obey the summons he might be declared a rebel
and an outlaw, while, if he complied with it, there
was the warning of his mother and the danger of
arrest. He consulted the Wazir of Jaunpur who
was then confined in a prison at Delhi; and on his
suggestion started making preparations for his
departure at a snail’s pace so that the delay might
be accounted for and the risk of immediate com-
pliance might be avoided. This plan succeeded
and soon he received the news of his father’s
death.

In the meantime, the nobles proceeded to
decide the question of succession. Names of Azam
Humayun and Barbakshah were alone mentioned.
Then Nizam’s mother intervened to press the
claims of her son. But Isa Khan retorted:

“What business have goldsmith’s sons with
the reins of government, since it is proverbial that
monkeys made but bad carpenters?” Upon this
Khain-i-Khann Farmeru protested against casting
reflections on any of the late Sultan’s progeny and
when Isa Khan adopted a defiant attitude, he
declared his adherence to the nomination of Nizam
Khan, left the assembly along with his followers
and carried away the corpse of Bahlul to Jalali.
Meanwhile Nizam Khan had also arrived and he

1 Briggs I, p. 564 has ‘Lohi’ in place of ‘Farmuri’;
Ranking p. 412, fn. 2 quoting Ferishta says ‘Farmuri’
which is correct.
was promptly proclaimed Sultan. He assumed the style of Sultan Sikander Shah.

Yādgār, Abdullāh and Rizqullāh Mushtaqi, as already stated, do not refer to these events, but they all concur that before Nizām left Delhi he saw Shaikh Samāuddān, a very venerable saint of Delhi and secured his blessings on the plea of taking lessons in Arabic from him. Badāoni further says that this was done as a precautionary measure; so that in the event of a rival prince claiming the throne at Delhi, the support of the Shaikh should not be available to him, which in its turn would ensure the loyalty of a large section of the people at Delhi to Nizām Khan whom the saint had wished good fortune in the world here and hereafter.

Rizqullah Mushtaqi is the only author who asserts that Nizām Khan was chosen unanimously. His statement is very clear:

“All the nobles concurred in their choice and summoned Miān Nizām from Delhi for the purpose of raising him to the throne.”

1 TKJL. p. 92, Yādgār pp. 397-398 says that he assumed the style of Sikandar, the second as would appear from the following lines of a poet

शहीदहां जूर दिलपनी हुद इस्लाम रा बानी मसलम हुद आम ब्रोह खतप ईसक्क थानी

2 Dādī p. 36; Yādgār pp. 34-35; Wāqīst p. 24.
3 Badāoni I, pp. 313-314.
4 Wāqīst p. 12

Tab. I, p. 314 and Badāoni I, p. 313 while silent about unanimity of support before Nizām Khan’s arrival at Jalāli do state that he was crowned... with the concurrence of Khān-i Jahan and Khan-i Khanān Farmūl and all the other nobles.
Subsequent events, however, lend confirmation to Ferishtā’s statement of disputed succession. It appears that Bahlūl as well as a majority of the nobles considered Nizām Khan as the most suitable person for the throne. But some sticklers for racial purity did not want to serve a half-Hindu when pure Afghāns were available. Hence they either enunciated the principle of primogeniture to secure Azam Humāyūn’s accession or preferred the claims of Bārbakshāh as the ablest among the truly Afghan sons of Bahlūl. Nizām ultimately succeeded in carrying the day because of many favourable factors:

His opponents were divided as partisans of Azam Humāyūn or Bārbakshāh and therefore could not pull their weight effectively. Besides the basis of their opposition was not quite sound. They wanted to exclude him only because he was born of a Hindu mother. But the Afghan custom while opposed to giving a daughter in marriage to non-Afghāns, did not discriminate between the sons of a common father on grounds of the race of their mothers. Thus according to approved Afghan practice, Nizām Khan was as good an Afghan as any other son of Bahlūl. This aspect of the matter was stressed by Nizām’s partisans and Isā Khan could make no reply to it. Failing in argument he had recourse to abuse which further weakened his case and strengthened the chances of Nizām Khan. Besides Nizām Khan had many positive advantages as against his rivals. Though he too was absent at the time of his father’s death yet his mother was there to safeguard his interests. Then, unlike his rivals, he was not only his father’s nominee for the throne but had also acquired
adequate experience of the central government as the Deputy Sultan during 1486-1489. In this last capacity he had come in close contact with leading men in the State who had been highly impressed by his intelligence, industry and administrative ability. It was the support of these men that proved decisive in the final stages. Finally, he had also distance in his favour. Delhi being very much nearer Jalālī than either Kalpi or Jaunpur, the headquarters of Azam Humāyūn and Bārbakshāh respectively, Nizām Khan reached the place much before either of his rivals could hope to do so. His appearance at the council of the nobles won to his side many a waverer and he was readily proclaimed the Sultan of Delhi almost unanimously and was crowned king on Friday 18th Shaban, 894/17th July 1489.

His coronation at Jalālī took place on Friday 18th Shaban 894/17th July, 1489. The date given by most of the authorities is 17th Shaban but it was not a Friday. Elliot IV, p. 444 in an extract from Tārikh-i-Dāūdī says that it was the 7th of Shaban which Prof. Hodiwala considers unacceptable because 7th of Shaban was not a Friday. Besides, the Allahabad University MS. of Tārikh-i-Dāūdī (p. 36) has Friday 17th of Shaban and not 7th. It may therefore be concluded that the correct date of his accession, to the throne was not 7th of Shaban and that Elliot’s mistake was either due to a defective copy or the error of a抄ist.

8 Hodiwala—p. 468. One part of his statement is difficult to accept viz. that the 7th Shaban 894=6th July 1489 which was a Monday while 17th Shaban=17th July was a Friday. The doubt raised is that if 7th Shaban was 6th July, 17th Shaban would be 16th and not 17th July and if 6th was a Monday, 16th would be a Thursday which would not agree with the text.
Abdullah and Yadgar, specifically mention that Sikandar's age at the time of accession was 18 years.¹ But there are two difficulties in accepting this version. Yadgar himself² asserts that he was born in the 7th year of his father's reign. Hence at the time of his accession he should have been over thirty one years of age. In the second place, almost all authors state that at the time of accession he had six sons.³ Abdullah's list in order of seniority has the same names as Maasir-i-Rahimi or Tabqa't-i-Akbari, viz. Ibrahim Khan, Jalal Khan, Ismail Khan, Husain Khan, Mahmud Khan and Zam Humayun. But Abdullah does not say that they had been born prior to Sikandar's accession. He makes a very non-committal statement: "It is related that Sultan Sikandar had six sons." But even he gives these names in the same order as other authors. Therefore, Sikandar's age

¹ Daddi p. 36; Yadgar p. 35. The anecdote relating to Sikandar's visit to Sh. Samuddin to invoke his blessings on the pretext of taking lessons from him in Arabic would suggest that he must still be in his teens or else the device would have failed. It is also stated by Nisamullah that Sikandar (Nisam) had been sent to Delhi for his education. But these facts cannot definitely prove his young age. He could maintain his interests in studies even in thirties and might begin study of Arabic at that age.

² It appears that Yadgar and Abdullah want to heighten the effect of Sikandar's achievements by pointing out that he was very young and yet he did so many remarkable things. This suspicion is strengthened by Abdullah's statement on p. 53. "These words were spoken by Sultan Sikandar at the early age of 18 or 19 years."

³ The wise words referred to in this comment relate to Sikandar's rebuke to Mubarak Khan Nahi when he was pressing for the pursuit of Sultan Husain after his defeat. Sikandar had then remarked that Husain's defeat was due not to Mubarak's valour but to God's pleasure; etc.

⁴ Tab. I, p. 314 gives the names of Sikandar's sons but wrongly calls them sons of Bahool. This is very possibly due to the copyist's error; MR. I, pp. 452-453; Daddi p. 43.
at the time of accession should have been, as Yādgār suggests, over thirty-one years. By that time he must have become mature in judgement and should have acquired considerable experience of civil and military administration.

All this experience and his native intelligence were presently to be put to a severe test for the problems that faced him at the time of his accession were of an intriguing and heterogeneous character. In the first place, he had to conduct himself in such a manner that he should appear as devout a Muslim and as much of an Afghān in habits and temperament as anybody else. This was the only means by which the stigma of being a half-Hindu and that too of the goldsmith class could be removed. The religious policy of Sikandar appears to have been largely coloured by this circumstance. Secondly, he had to put an end to all opposition to his authority. The royal princes who had been assigned by Bahlūl important provinces in fief and, specilly, Āzām Humāyūn and Bābābakhshī who had been mentioned by some as better qualified to rule over the Afghāns, might still harbour contumacious designs. Having failed to realize their ambition by peaceful argument they might now seek the arbitrament of war. They must receive Sikandar's immediate attention, lest greater leisure should find for them more numerous allies and should impart vigour to their schemes of rebellion. Thrown in, with such princes were nobles like Isā Khan who had shown more zeal than discretion in opposing the will of Bahlūl, to secure their succession to the throne. Most of them had paid homage to Sikandar at the time of his accession. But it could not be safely
assumed that their allegiance was spontaneous and without mental reservations. They will have to be watched carefully and precautions taken that they do not get a chance to combine in a treasonable conspiracy.

But this was not all. He had also to reckon with foreign danger of a serious nature. Sultan Husain Shāh Sharqī had been expelled to Bihar but he had, by no means given up the hope of returning in triumph to his ancestral dominions. It would suit his plans to provoke a civil war among the Afghāns, to stir up local risings of Hindu Zamindars in the Jaunpur region and then to plan a counter offensive while the new Sultan's energies were engrossed in consolidating his power. That might undo the work of Bahlīl and bring in jeopardy the hard-earned fruits of a thirty five years' war. The newly conquered province of Jaunpur would thus claim insistent and close attention from the new Sultan and he will need to complete the work of Bahlīl by depriving Husain Shāh of all capacity for mischief.

Then there was some danger also beyond the southern frontiers of the kingdom. The Muslim governor of Bayānā had to be subdued if expansion of authority towards Gwalior and Dholpur was seriously contemplated. The Hindu Rājās of these two states were vassals only in name. The former was so powerful that he could not he expected to remain loyal or peaceful if the Lodī monarchy should show any signs of weakness. Then there was the Baghela ruler of Bhata Gahorā who had aided Husain Shāh Sharqī against Bahlīl and whose territories extended to the southern banks of the Jumnā near its confluence with the Ganges, at
Prayāg. He must be made to realize the evil consequences of siding with the enemies of the monarch of Delhi. If this were not done in time, his example might prove infectious.

The internal and external problems of Sikandar were further complicated by his lack of adequate funds. Bahlūl is said to have distributed all treasures and lands among his followers, because of his generosity. Whether it was this moral quality or the exigencies of war against a determined enemy that drained the resources of the Lodi monarchy, the comparative depletion of treasury can hardly be disputed. Sikandar's task was thus made still more arduous. He had to establish peace and order with lightning speed, so that raising of taxes and collection of royal dues could proceed unhampered. He must also effect whatever economies he could and keep a reserve for emergencies which, in the nature of things, could be neither few nor infrequent.

Immediately after his accession, he held a magnificent darbar and conferred upon the nobles honorary dresses and other suitable gifts. Also their ranks were raised a stage higher, while the soldiers were allowed two to four months' salary in advance as a special reward. The Sultan was particularly kind to all his old servants who were enrolled among the nobility and were granted lands in fief.¹ These acts of liberality and graciousness secured to him the attachment and loyalty of the army as well as of the leading men in the state.

Next, he proceeded to stamp out disaffection from the realm. He first marched against Ālam,

¹ Yadgar, p. 35 and 398.
Khan who stood a siege at Rapri and Chandwâr.¹ But when he found further resistance impossible, he escaped to Patiâli where he joined forces with Isâ Khan Lodi. Sikandar appointed Khân-i-Khânân Nâhâni² as governor of Rapri.

From Rapri he went to Etawah and stayed there for 7 months resting and re-organizing his forces and developing further plans of action. Though none of the authorities specifically says so, he appears to have made an offer of peace to his brother Ālam Khan. Its terms were that he should acknowledge the authority of the Sultan and abjure all relations with Āzam Humâyûn and his partisans, in return for which his past misdemeanours would be forgiven and the province of Etawah would be assigned to him in fief. We are not informed as to who carried this offer to Ālam Khan. Nor do we know the reasons why the latter was permitted to return from Patiâli and to wait on the Sultan at Etawah. But whatever might have been the circumstances of the case, it was undoubtedly a great diplomatic success and created a serious breach in the ranks of the rebels in the east.³

This was just the time to exert pressure against Isâ Khan Lodi to whose indiscretion of opposing the Sultan’s succession in a most offensive form was now added the crime of offering protection to a rebel against his authority. Isâ Khan appears to have realised the gravity of his offence. Consequently, though he must have known the

futility of opposition, he chose to die fighting rather than to make a humiliating surrender. The battle went against him and he was brought before the Sultan severely wounded. Sikandar knew how to appreciate valour, however misguided, and graciously forgave him, on promise of good behaviour in future. But Isā Khan never recovered from the effects of his wounds. A fresh governor had to be appointed in his stead. Sikandar had still to deal with his brother Bārbakshāh at Jaunpur who had refused to grasp the hand of friendship held out to him. Sikandar, therefore, started angling for deserters from his camp. Rāi Ganesh the Rājā of Patiālī¹ and a partisan of Bārbakshāh was offered the bait of the new governorship, fallen vacant after Isā Khan’s death, and he deserted Bārbakshāh to join his more enterprising brother.

Sikandar wanted to avoid civil war as far as possible because he knew of the dangers lurking in it. It was for this reason that he had adopted such a generous attitude towards Ālam Khan, Isā Khan and, as we shall see presently, even towards Bārbakshāh who had declared himself an independent ruler and had introduced his name both in the khutba and on the coinage. Thomas refers to a coin of Bārbakshāh dated 892/1486 the legend on which suggests that Bārbakshāh had been issuing coins as an independent Sultan even in the life-time of his father.²

¹ Bad. I, p. 314 calls him Rājā of Patiālī. His name is also given as Kishan (Dorn I, p. 56), and Kilan. The last of these is rather an unusual name; while in Persian script it is possible to confound ‘Ganesh’ with ‘Krishan’. Fer. (L) I, p. 180 has ‘Gilan’.

² Thomas, p. 377—One side بار اک شاہ سلطان in the centre, the other side—

نايب امیر المومنین بشیر حونیت رضٴ
After securing the submission of Alam Khan, Sikandar had sent Ismail Khan Nuhani\(^1\) to induce Barbakshah to introduce the name of Sikandar before his own in the khatba. If this were done, the Sultan promised to confirm him in the possession of Jaunpur. But Barbak refused to accept the suggestion. Sikandar was, therefore, constrained to use force. He could make out a case that while he was willing to be generous, Barbak was the villain of the piece who was playing into the hands of the enemy. Sikandar thus secured for himself fuller support of the Afghans against Barbakshah, than would otherwise have been possible.

There was no time to be lost. Ismail Khan Nuhani had already informed him of Barbak’s war-like intentions. Besides, his own prestige would be compromised if he did not enforce his claim for suzerainty. Hence he marched towards Jaunpur. Barbakshah also started to meet him practically about the same time and the two armies fought their first engagement near Kanauj. Ferishta\(^2\) says that in course of fighting, Shaikhazada Muhammad Farmuli, Kalah Pahar, was captured by Sikandar’s men. The Sultan went to meet him and diplomatically won him over to his side by soft words. Consequently, Kalah Pahar started attack-

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\(^1\) Dasti, p. 48 says that the Sultan had returned to Delhi from Bayhana when he got the report that Barbakshah was marching at the head of an army. He sent Ismail Khan to persuade him to go back while he himself proceeded to meet him, subduing Ismail Khan of Patilani on the way. But this sequence of events does not appear to be convincing.

\(^2\) Fer. (L) I, p. 180; Ranking p. 413 f.n. 13 quoting Bombay Text p. 331; Elliot IV, p. 456, gives the same version in a footnote but does not mention Ferishta as the source.
ing Bārbak’s forces, which got demoralised because they suspected desertion by the entire division commanded by him. This led to Bārbak’s defeat who fled to Badāon,¹ stood a siege there and finally surrendered. Yādgār says that Bārbak was captured after the first engagement and was taken to Badāon which seems improbable. He also refers to a conversation at Badāon between the two brothers, in the course of which Sikandar said to him “What had I done to you that you behaved thus towards me?” Bārbakshāh expressed regret for his past conduct and promised to be faithful in future.² He was then reinstated at Jaunpur, but Sikandar was unwilling to run any further risk. Therefore he assigned ‘estates in that quarter to trusty persons’ and nominated faithful officers as advisors to Bārbakshāh so that he may be restrained from contemplating sedition or if he should do so, the trouble may be nipped in the bud.³

After restoring his authority in the central and eastern regions, Sikandar turned his attention towards the south. Āzam Humāyūn, the governor of Kalpi was replaced by Mahmūd Khan Lodī.⁴ None of the authorities says anything about the fate of Āzam Humāyūn. If Ferishta’s version of the disputed succession be correct, Sikandar

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¹ Tab. I, p. 316 and MR. I, p. 454, make no reference to Kāli Pāhār but mention the capture of Mūbraḵ Khan. Bad. I, p. 314 adds ‘Nāhānī’ after his name while Fer. (L), I, p. 180, calls him ‘Shāhzāda Mūbraḵ Khan’ and Elliot makes of it ‘Mūbraḵ Khan s/o Bārbakshāh’. The correct reading appears to be Mūbraḵ Khan Nāhānī.

² Yādgār, pp. 37-38.

³ Dorn. I, p. 56 ; Tab. I, p. 316 ; MR. I, p. 454 ; TKJL. p. 93; Dāndī, p. 48.

⁴ Dāndī p. 49; Tab. I, p. 316.
should have had the greatest misgivings about him. He did not attack him outright. He had considerably weakened his power by winning over Alam Khan and eliminating Isa Khan. His prestige was considerably higher after his recent success against Barbakshah. He had all along been generous towards rebels and opponents. It is, therefore, unlikely that he should have singled out Azam Humayun for the exhibition of his wrath. It is possible that either Azam Humayun died fighting against him or that he was transferred to some other less-known district and ended his days in obscurity.

After Kalpi, Sikandar proceeded towards Gwalior via Jahtarah.\(^1\) Tatar Khan, the governor of the latter place showed implicit loyalty and was confirmed in his appointment. Sikandar’s next objective was Gwalior. Rajah Man was a powerful prince and Gwalior was almost an impregnable fort. Sikandar did not want to waste his time and strength over capturing it, if another course consistent with his dignity, were open to him. He, therefore, assumed that Man Singh was loyal and that his failure to send in his congratulations was accidental rather than deliberate. Consequently, he sent him a Khilat and a horse. Rajah Man was by no means eager to embroil his state in needless suffering. He, therefore, accepted the gift with due ceremony and honour and sent his nephew

\(^{1}\text{Ranking and De have failed to locate this place. The latter in f.n. 3, p. 356 and f.n. 2, p. 358, gives the various alternative readings. Fida Ali, Vol. II, f.n. 92, on page 23 of the notes suggests an identification which appears to be correct. He says that in Akbar’s reign there was a pargana or taluqa near Gwalior bearing this name, and included in the Sarkar of Indur. (Vide Ain-i-Akbar II, p. 188). But the place is not traceable now.}\)
with 1,000 horse for the service of the Sultan. Sikandar was satisfied with this acknowledgment of his suzerainty and proceeded to Bayānā.¹

The governor of Bayānā was Sultan Sharf s/o Ahmad Khan Jalwānī who had removed Bahlīl’s name from the khutba. Sultan Sharf was overawed by the power of the Sultan and was willing to accept his suzerainty. But he had expected that Sikandar would allow him to retain Bayānā. The Sultan, on the other hand, was prepared to overlook his past but was determined to allow him no scope for mischief in future. Therefore, when Sultan Sharf waited on him he was asked to surrender the province and fort of Bayānā. In its place, he was to receive Chandwār and Sakīt.² Sultan Sharf accepted the terms offered to him.

Umar Khan Sarwānī³ was appointed to relieve Sultan Sharf who promised to hand over to him the keys of the fort. But when he reached the city he changed his mind, strengthened the defences of the fort and determined to stand a siege. Umar Khan reported the new developments to the Sultan who proceeded to lay siege to the fort. Sultan Sharf appears to have expected to stir up a serious rising against the Sultan and he possibly hoped that the Rājā of Gwalior might stand by him. Haibat Khan Jalwānī, a vassal of Sharf and the

¹ CISG. I, p. 233 gives 1492 as the date of this event. Dorn’s date for the capture of Bayānā is 896H which would place the Gwalior incident in 1492.
² Dorn. I, p. 56 mentions only these two places while MR. I, p. 455, adds Jalesar and Mārahrah also. Fer. (L) I, p. 180, agrees with MR.
³ Mārahrah is a pargana town in Etah district 27°.44’N 78°.35’E. (Vide Distt. Gaz., U.P., XII, p. 187).
⁴ It is written both as شریع and as شریع
governor of Agra, followed his master. Sultan Sharf was, however, brought to his knees and Bayânā was assigned to Khān-i-Khānān Farmūli in 897H. Sultan Sharf was banished and sought shelter with the Rājā of Gwalior while Sikandar returned to Delhi.

Within about three years of his accession, Sikandar had taken the wind out of the sails of all his rivals, had stamped out disaffection from the realm, and had brought Bayânā and its dependencies under his control. He could, therefore, consider himself entitled to some repose. But he had stayed at Delhi only for 24 days when disquieting news from Jaunpur found him on the saddle again.

Ferishtā in the account of the Sharqī kings says that after Bahlīl’s death, Husain revived the affray and instigated Bārbak to seize Delhi. But he was defeated. This upset Husain’s schemes for the reconquest of his last dominion. Sikandar had given such an impression of strength and vigilance that Husain did not risk an engagement at that time. But when Sikandar had moved away from the east, towards the southern part of his dominions, Husain’s agents became active again. This time they tried to stir up the Hindu Zamindars of that region. They succeeded in the attempt mainly because of three reasons—(a) absence of

1|The city of Agra was founded by Sultan Sikandar very much later. It appears that there was another place near the modern city of Agra which was the headquarters of a district.

2|This is the version of MR. I, p. 455, Tab. I, pp. 316-317 and Bad. I, p. 315 but Dorn has 898 H. TKJL. p. 93, does not mention the place of Sharf’s refuge. None of the authors except Ferishtā mentions the fate of Hābat Khan Jalwān. Fer. (L) I, p. 180, says that Agra was also captured.

8 Fer. (L) II, p. 310.
Sikandar from the east and his pre-occupation in Bayānā and Gwalior, (b) divided counsels at Jaunpur because of Bārbak’s virtual supersession by officers who were formally his subordinates but who were expected to keep watch over his movements, and (c) readiness on the part of the Hindu Zamindars to avail of every opportunity to secure local autonomy.

The movement started well from Husain’s point of view. The leader of Bachgoṭī Rājpūts\(^1\) raised an enormous army of 100,000 horse and foot, defeated Mubārak Khan Nūhānī, the governor of Karā\(^2\) and killed his brother Sher Khan.\(^3\) Mubārak Khan crossed the Ganges at Jhāsti\(^4\) but was captured by boatmen of that place who handed him over to Rājā Bhaidachandra of Bhata. The latter was an old ally of Husain Shāh and was willing to co-operate with him in liquidating the power of the Lodis so that he might annex contiguous territory from Prayāg to Kāshi.

Bārbakshāh had lost courage and had fled from Jaunpur to Daryābād\(^5\) to hold consultations

\(^1\) Dādī, p. 48, has 但 zu but on p. 51 it has 但 zu

Yadgar p. 38, has 但 zu. But ‘Chaukā’ is almost an impossible Hindu name. Elliot IV p. 457 supports Joga. Prof. Hodiwala p. 470 rejects both these readings and suggests that Abdullah has failed to decipher Bachgoṭī and has arbitrarily converted it into ‘with or by Jaga or Jala’.

\(^2\) De. p. 359, f.n. 3; Dorn I p. 57 calls him the governor of Jaunpur, while Dādī p. 48 wrongly calls him ‘Lodi’ in place of ‘Nūhānī’.  

\(^3\) Yadgār, p. 38, f.n. 1.

\(^4\) It is a small town lying across the Ganges opposite Allahabad.

\(^5\) 26° 53’ N. 81° 33’E formerly seat of a district is now the capital of a pargana and lies on the road from Nawābganj to Fyzabad (Vide Distt. Gaz. U.P., XLVIII pp. 197-198).
with Muhammad Khan Farmuli—known as Kālā Pahār. Sikandar in the meantime, had left Delhi and when he reached Dalmaū,¹ he was joined by Bārbak and his nobles.² Rājā Bhaidachandra was over-awed by Sikandar’s strength and sent back Mubārak Khan Nūhānī to conciliate the Sultan. Sikandar now proceeded against the rebels and defeated and dispersed them. According to Abdullāh the rebels fled without fighting and left behind a huge booty. Sikandar now proceeded to cross the Jumnā.³ The account of our authorities is rather confusing and it is difficult to be certain of the sequence of events. It may be suggested as a mere guess that there were possibly two fronts on which the Zamindars had risen. One group under Bachgotīs and Rājā Bhaidachandra was active in the Karā and Prayāg region. It is the defeat of this group that is described in Dāddi. It is likely that the plan of the Sharqīs was to entice away the Sultan first towards the south and when he had strayed far enough, the rebels of that quarter were to form a junction with the rebels in the east near Chunar and were to drive out the Lodi agents from Jaunpur territory. Sikandar appears to have moved more swiftly than

¹ 26° 3'N 81° 2'E is a fair sized town of great antiquity and is situated on the bank of the Ganges on the road from Rai Bareli to Fatehpur.

² Tab. I, p. 317 places it in 897 While Dorn has 899 H.

³ Dāddi p. 50 grows romantic and says that though Sikandar attacked with only 500 men while Jogā had 300,000 foot and 15,000 horse, the latter was frightened out of his wits and ran away, leaving even their clothes behind. The place of the fight is uncertain. Tab. I, p. 317 has ‘Katehar’, while Dorn I p. 57 has ‘Kotra’. But it ought to be some place south of the Jumnā rather than in the Doab or the region now called Rohilkhand. Shāstri pp. 24-25 refers to a ‘Kotra’ on the banks of the Jumnā in the Banda District which might be the same as the place mentioned here.
was expected and therefore the southern rebels failed to detain him and fled away in confusion. After this event Karā must have been re-conquered, and it was re-assigned to Mubāрак Khan Nūhānī.

Soon after this Sikandar moved north and defeated the Zamindars of the Jaunpur area. This rendered restoration of Bārbakshāh feasible. Husain Shāh had not found time to move his forces yet.¹ Sikandar felt that the trouble was over and so he proceeded back towards the capital. But he was still in Awadh when he received information that the Zamindars were once again proving too strong for Bārbakshāh.

Sikandar now decided to set aside his brother. Muhammad Khan Farmūli, Ā zam Humāyūn, Khān-i-Jahān and Khān-i-Khānūn Lodi proceeded towards Jaunpur via Awadh, while Mubāрак Khan Nūhānī proceeded from the side of Karā. Bārbakshāh was captured and was put in charge of Umar Khan Sarwānī and Haibat Khan Sarwānī.

We may pause for a while to consider why Bārbak’s failure was punished with imprisonment and why such elaborate arrangements were made for his arrest. Bārbakshāh had held Jaunpur from 1486 to 1492 without any serious difficulty. But

¹ Dāndī pp. 50-54, and Yadgār pp. 38-40, refer to a war against Husaīn Shāh Sharqī immediately after the defeat and flight of Jogū. Dāndī gives a very graphic account of the exchange of messages and the aftermath of Husein’s defeat and flight into Bihar. The final defeat of Husaīn and his expulsion from Bihar is described by Dāndī on pp. 58-60 after Bārbak’s restoration, deposition and imprisonment and the operation against the Rājā of Bhātā. The circumstances of the second war are in conformity with other authors. But the first war is not mentioned by others. Yadgār does not refer to occupation of Bihar in the way it is done by other authors.
when Sikandar was engaged elsewhere and there was a local rising, he had done nothing better than desertion of his post. Again, after his restoration the Zamindars had become active. At the same time some amirs of Husain Shāh were operating near Chunar. Sikandar seems to have suspected that Bārbak was probably secretly allied with the rebels and might have made a compact with them that they should combine to depose Sikandar after which Husain Shāh was to be restored at Jaumpur while Bārbakshāh was to become the ruler of Dehli. It is this suspicion of duplicity which obliged Sikandar to move against him in such a manner that his defection to Husain Shāh or the Rājā of Gahorā and the Bachgotis should be impossible. He did not want to allow the rebels to use the name of a rival claimant to the throne for furthering their own designs.

I am persuaded to hazard this explanation because Bārbakshāh had once been instigated into a civil war by Husain shāh and because soon after his deposition, Sikandar had to move against Sharqi nobles of Chunar and the adjoining region.

These chiefs were defeated but when they shut themselves inside the fort, Sikandar left them alone and moved against Kantit, a dependency of Bhata. Its ruler, Rājā Bhaida submitted and was allowed to retain it. Sikandar now took the Rājā with him and moved towards Arail and Prayāg. Arail was at that time a holiday resort and a place

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1 Kantit—Its chiefs are now known as Rājās of Bijapur. It is situated in the district of Mirzapur on the banks of the Ganges near the boundary of modern Bihar. (See also Fīdā Ali II, f.n. 96 p. 23 of the notes).

2 Arail—It is situated on the right bank of the Ganges near Naini Railway station and opposite to Allahabad.
of pilgrimage for the Rājās of Bhata. Rājā Bhaida could not divine the motive of Sikandar in going towards Arail when he had already made his submission. He therefore slipped away from the camp under cover of darkness. When Sikandar was apprised of this he seized his baggage and on reaching Arail gave the city to plunder.  

After this, he went to Dalmaū via Karā and married the widow of Sher Khan Nūhānī for she was one of the most beautiful and intelligent women of the age. He then spent more than six months in cleaning up the disaffected elements in the parganas of Sambhal, Shamsābād and Wazīrābād.

After this he moved against Rājā Bhaida-Chandra of Bhata. The Rājā deputed his son to meet the advancing army of the Sultan. He was defeated and was forced to retreat. But he took his defeat so much to heart that he retired into Sarguja and probably committed suicide. The name of this prince is given as Bīr Singh or Nar Singh by Persian historians. But Vīr-bhāmidaya Kāvyā by Mādhava gives his name as Vāharārāya. The Kāvyā further says that Rājā Bhaida-chandra did not long survive the shock of the death of his eldest son. After his death his

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1 Dorn I, pp. 57-58; MR. I, p. 457 says that though his baggage was sent to the Rājā, Arail was plundered and devastated. This combination of generosity and cruelty is rather curious. It would be more reasonable to suppose that the baggage was seized and the city plundered. TKJL, p. 95, and Elliot V p. 94, agree with MR.

2 Elliot V, p. 94 and TKJL, p. 95; MR. I, p. 457.

3 Vīr Singh was the name of the grandson of Bhaida and he was a contemporary of Bāhar who appears to have befriended him (Shlokā 63 and 67, Canto II, pp. 31-32). As Vāharārāya is described in the Kāvyā as a very brave prince who was a great favourite of Bhaida and who pre-deceased him, it is more reasonable to suppose that
second son Shālivāhan became ruler. Sikandar is said to have penetrated to Phaphānd but he was obliged to return to Jaunpur on account of scarcity of provisions, opium, salt and oil. In consequence of difficulties about food and fodder, he lost 90% of his horses.\footnote{Vāhrārāya and not Vir Singh was the leader of the army defeated by Sikandar. Reference to Vāhrārāya’s prowess and death is made in Shlokas 63-64, Canto I, p. 12. TKJL. p. 95, gives 900/1494-1495, as the date of this war.}

Rājā Lakshmi Chand, son of Rājā Bhaida and other Zamindars informed Husain Shāh of the weakness in Sikandar’s position. He appears to have been waiting for such a report and needed no time for making preparations. He seems to have gone to Chunar where some of his nobles had previously defied the arms of Sikandar. Abdullāh says that Jogā had fled to Jūnd where Sultan Husain was already encamped. It appears that he is really referring to the fort of Chunar.

Sikandar’s position was rather critical at this time. The entire body of Hindu Zamindars in the Jaunpur territory was in a rebellious mood. He had failed to capture Chunar and to subjugate the Rājā of Bhata. He had recently suffered heavy losses in horses for which he could not disown responsibility. His stock must have gone lower with his people. It is in this background that subsequent events become fully intelligible.

Phaphānd is now a small village (24°N. 81°9'E). (Vide note by D. B. Jānkī Prasad Chaturvedi—p. 27 of the analysis by Dr. H. N. Shāstrī).
The first thing that he did was to win over the Rājā of Bhata. Khān-i-Khānān was sent to Rājā Shālivāhan the son and successor of Rājā Bhaida and he secured his active support in the war against Husain Shāh. Shālivāhan appears to have accepted this proposal probably because he was afraid that the success of Husain Shāh might mean placing of Lakshmi Chand, his own brother and an ally of the Sharqī ruler, on the throne of the Bhata kingdom. In his own interest, therefore, he was willing to acknowledge the authority of the Lodī Sultan and to collaborate with him in the defeat of his rival’s protagonist.

After Shālivāhan’s arrival in Sikandar’s camp the Sultan was assured that there would be no diversion in the Prayāg region. He now wanted to make sure of a maximum effort by his own followers. He, therefore, harangued them, reminding them of their signal services to his father and exhorting them to leave nothing to chance in the first critical war of his reign. The vanity of the nobles was tickled by the Sultan’s appreciative remark and they pledged to do all that lay in their power. Sikandar could now have a reasonable hope for success.

But he does not seem to have been absolutely certain. Therefore he tried to postpone the conflict by diplomatic moves. He sent a messenger to Husain Shāh conveying to him his sentiments of affection and regard and asking him to forget the past and either to punish the infidel rebels himself or to leave them to be dealt with by him. If this were done, he promised to leave him alone in his possessions. Sultan Husain, as usual, over-estimated his own power and according to
Abdullāh sent back a very offensive and insulting reply.¹

Sikandar utilized this affront to excite his followers still further. His preparations were already complete. Hence he lost no further time, crossed the Ganges at Kantit and defeated Husain Shāh near Banaras with the assistance of Shālivāhan.² Sultan Husain fled from the field of battle to Bihar but Sikandar was constantly at his heels and within a few months he occupied the whole of Bihar and Husain Shāh was fugitive at Kahlgāon³ in the territory of Sultan Alāuddin of Bengal. Sikandar appointed his own officers to the various districts of Bihar and finally sealed the fate of Husain Shāh by making a treaty with the ruler of Bengal by which both agreed neither to interfere in each other's territory nor to give any support to their respective enemies.⁴

¹ Daḍḍī pp. 50-51. Though it refers these events to an earlier war before Bārbak's deposition yet they appear more pertinent in the context related above. Yādgār pp. 38-40 and Waqīyat pp. 20-23, however, support Daḍḍī's version.

² For the service rendered by Shālivāhan, Sikandar proposed to reward him suitably. He was, therefore, told that the Sultan would espouse his daughter. The Rājā looked upon this not as an honour but as a stigma of dishonour. Hence he declined to accept the proposal. Sikandar considered his refusal not only ungrateful but also insulting. Consequently an army was led into his territory (in 904 H/1498 A.D. according to MR. I, p. 459). The Sultan's army indulged in frightful terror to bring round the Rājā and all our authors agree that so much devastation was caused that not a trace of cultivation was left. Shālivāhan was, however, undismayed and carried on the struggle from inside the fort of Bāndho. Sikandar failed to capture it and was obliged to leave the Rājā alone. Never again did he try to break his head against the impregnable walls of this fort. (Daḍḍī p. 60; Tab. I, p. 321; MR. I, p. 459; TKJL. p. 97).

³ 25° 13' N, 27° 17' E about 23 miles E. of Bhagalpur, (Bengal).

⁴ Daḍḍī pp. 58-60 ; TKJL, pp. 96-97 and Tab. I, p. 319 are more concise but matter of fact.
Sikandar returned to Jaunpur after making necessary arrangements for proper government of Bihar. Azam Humayun, son of Khān-i-Jahān was appointed governor of Darweshpur, Daryā Khan Nūhānī was appointed Governor of Bihar and the chiefs of Sīran and Tirhut were deprived of large parts of their lands which were assigned to Afghāns. By 1495 he had thus succeeded in finally settling the affairs of his eastern dominions and had added Bihar to what he had inherited from his father. In course of this, he had secured the allegiance of the Rāja of Bhata, had consolidated his power in the Jaunpur kingdom and had considerably cleaned up seditious and unruly elements.

He could now devote himself to other conquests with an easy mind. This brings one period of his reign to a close and introduces another. So long his position had not been quite secure and at times, he had to spend anxious moments but after this, there would be no such dangers. There would be rebellions, conspiracies and wars but the authority and prestige of the Sultan would be never called in question as it had been done during the first seven years of his reign.
CHAPTER V.

THE EMPIRE AT ITS ZENITH

The last twenty years of Sikandar’s life were spent in making further additions to the empire. During this period, he was able to make minor annexations and to assert his authority over vassal chiefs more effectively. One such was the Rājā of Gwalior. We have referred earlier in the foregoing pages to relations of the Lodīs with this chief.¹ It has been noticed that the state was very powerful during this period and its rulers Kīrti Singh (1455-1479) and Mān Singh (1486-1517) were very able and shrewd administrators. They had generally avoided conflict and had tried to humour the Sultan of Delhi by maintaining the formality of vassalage and by making occasional payments of tribute. But they did not pay any regular tribute either to Bahālūl or to Sikandar. It was only when the Delhi ruler knocked at the gates of their capital that they bought him off by handsome payments and feigned humility.

Sikandar had not found time to reduce the state to strict obedience because of more pressing pre-occupation in other parts of his kingdom. After the final defeat of Husain Shāh Sharqī, he contemplated taking action against Rājā Mān of Gwalior. The latter sensed the coming danger and to avert it he sent Nehāl with presents to the Sultan. The choice of the agent was rather unfortunate, because when Sikandar made certain

enquiries about the Rājā, he gave such tactless and provocative replies, that the Sultan dismissed him in rage, threatening the capture of Gwalior. There was another reason also why Sikandar decided to chastise the ruler of Gwalior. The former had recently banished a group of disaffected nobles who found shelter with Rājā Mān. This was an act of defiance and discourtesy. Besides, for the last two or three years, there had been no fighting and during the interval Afghāns had shown signs of restiveness and sedition. An aggressive war would provide a convenient rallying ground and would find an outlet for Afghān exuberance and energy.

Sikandar planned to reduce the Gwalior territory in a systematic manner. Dholpur was, at this time, a dependency of Gwalior and was under Rājā Vināyakdeva. This was nearest the frontier of the Lodī Empire. Hence Ālam Khan Mewātī, Khān-i-Khānān Nīhānī and Khawas Khan were directed to occupy Dholpur. Rājā Vināyakdeva put up a stubborn resistance and caused severe losses to the Sultan’s army. Khwājā Ben, one of the most gallant warriors was also killed. When Sikandar received this report at Sambhal, he promptly left for Dholpur on 6th of Ramzan 909 H/22nd. Feb. 1504. No sooner was the news of Sultan’s arrival conveyed to the Rājā than he retreated to Gwalior, leaving a garrison in the fort. The presence of Sikandar at the head of reinforcements and the depleted strength of the garrison whose leader had failed to return with a relieving

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1 TKJL, pp. 99-100; Elliot V, p. 97; Fer. (L) I, p. 183; MR. I, p. 462; Tab. I, p. 323; Dāndī, p. 68.

The date of the expedition that followed is uncertain. TKJL puts it in 906 H while Fer. refers it to 907 H.
force, made it impossible for the fort to stand a long siege. The Rājpūts held on for some days but finally left it by night and Sikandar's soldiers occupied the fort. Abdullāh and Nahāwandi state that the troops of Sikandar indulged in plunder, rape and devastation. Abdullāh further says that a garden which extended over an area of 7 kos was uprooted, temples were destroyed and mosques were built on their sites.¹

Sikandar stayed at Dholpur for a month, making arrangements for its defence and government. Ādam Lodi, says Maāsir-i-Rahīmi,² was put in charge of the fort and a number of nobles were left behind to assist him. The Sultan now proceeded against Gwalior. He crossed the Chambal and encamped on the banks of the Asī or Mendaki³ for a period of two months. Then there was an outbreak of epidemic owing to impurity of the river water. In the meantime, Rājā Mān sent his son Vikramāditya with rich presents and profuse apologies for his past conduct. He assured the Sultan of his loyalty in future and as a further evidence of his faithfulness he drove out Saēēd Khan, Bābū Khan, Rāi Ganesh and others whom he had given shelter, when Sikandar had banished them.

The Sultan thought it wise to suspend hostilities for the time being and returned to Agra via Dholpur which was restored to Rājā Vināyakdeva.⁴

¹ Daādi, p. 68 ; MR. I, p. 463 ; Tab. I, p. 324.
² MR. I, pp. 463-464.
³ TKJL. p. 101, supports MR. in this respect.
⁴ Asī is probably the modern Asan flowing west of Gwalior (Vide De. f.n. 5, pp. 370-371).
⁴ MR. I, p. 464 ; Elliot V, p. 98 ; TKJL. p. 101.
Though he was going to Agra, he stopped short at Bayānā¹ and spent the rains there.

These operations appear to have dragged on for over two years. The operations against Dholpur had started in 906-907. Niāmatullāh says that the Sultan stayed at Sambhal from 905 to 909 H (1499-1504).² Therefore the visit of the Sultan to Dholpur should have taken place in 909 H at the earliest. Besides, he also says that after his return from Dholpur, he once more started against Gwalior and Mandrail, from Bayānā at the conclusion of the rains, and he places this event in 910 H/1504-05.³ As the Sultan had returned to Bayānā only after about 3 to 4 months of his arrival at Dholpur it is obvious that he reached Dholpur for the first time only in 909 H. This shows that Rājā Vināyakdeva had defied the arms of the Delhi monarch for over two years. This would give an idea of the sustained valour displayed by this prince. It would also explain why the Rājā of Gwalior was so readily forgiven and his own tributary was restored at Dholpur.

The Sultan was determined to redeem his vow of annexing Gwalior. Therefore, in 910 H/1504, he started again and fixed his head-quarters at Dholpur. Advance parties were sent against Gwalior and Mandrail.⁴ The garrison at Mandrail surrendered the fort in all humility.⁵ But it did

¹ TKJL. p. 101 adds “which was the capital at that time”. MR. I, p. 464, however, says that the Sultan spent the rains at Agra.
² TKJL. p. 99; Daśāi, p. 60; Fer. (L) I, p. 182.
⁴ Mandrail is in Karauli State at a distance of about 12 miles, S.S.-E. of Karauli Town. It was the chief town of a Sarkar in Suba Agra in the time of Akbar. It also had a fort which stood on a hill on the northern bank of the Chambal. Ain. I (Tr), p. 190; Hodiwala p. 498.
⁵ TKJL. p. 101.
not save them either from humiliation or loss of property. Tabqāt-i-Akbari and Maāsir-i-Rahimi relate that the Sultan ordered destruction of temples and building of mosques in their place. Miān Makhan, agent of Mujāhid Khan was left in charge of the fort; while the Sultan indulged in pillaging the land, razing the houses to ground, destroying gardens and killing and capturing the people at will.¹ He then turned back and halted at Dholpur for a while. Sikandar felt that the presence at Dholpur of such a valiant and devoted vassal of Rājā Mān as Vināyakdeva was not quite safe. For the reduction of Gwalior, Dholpur served as an advance base. Hence loyalty of its governor to the cause of the Sultan must be absolutely certain. Rājā Vināyakdeva had probably shown luke-warm interest in the recent campaign against Gwalior. Sikandar therefore replaced him by Qamaruddin. He also strengthened the fort. He could now return to his capital with an easy mind.² Niāmatullāh says that the troops of the Sultan suffered heavily on their way to the capital owing to heat strokes.³

The Sultan had by now annexed a good part of Gwalior territory and had caused its people considerable suffering, but the liquidation of the state as a separate entity was still a far cry. Sikandar, therefore, returned to the fray again towards the close of the year 911 H/1506. The first major halt was at Dholpur. He stayed there for 1½ months refitting and resting his army. He then

¹ MR. I, p. 464; Tab. I, p. 325.
² Tab. Dāndī and MR. say that he returned to Agra while TKJL. says that he returned to Bayān.
moved on to the banks of the Chambal and encamped there for several months. This delay could not have been deliberate. The Rājā of Gwalior contested the advance of the Sultan’s army and pinned him down to the banks of the Chambal. Failing to cross the river, the Sultan left the major part of his army on its bank while he himself started terrorising and plundering the countryside. The Gwalior people appear to have followed the scorched earth policy so that despite these plundering raids, supplies ran short. Though the Rājpūt forces were not strong enough to roll back the invaders, they were lacking neither in boldness nor in vigilance. Consequently, they prevented the banjārās from reaching the royal camp; and when Āzam Humāyūn was specially deputed to bring corn and other necessary articles, he was attacked, though he managed to escort the party in safety to the royal camp. On another occasion, while the Sultan was having a stroll, Rājpūt scouts surprised him and but for the valour of his companions and coming up of the main body of his army, he might have paid with his life for his negligence. Sikandar had now realized that Gwalior was too hard a nut to crack. He, therefore, once more returned to his capital as unsuccessful in the main objective as ever. This was another Rājpūt state which Sikandar had tried to obliterar but in vain. He had caused losses to its people and captured some territory but that was all. If the Rājpūts had received some hard knocks, they too had delivered some sharp and clean punches and could claim that military honours were even.

Sikandar had suffered in prestige because of his failure against the Rājā of Gwalior. Recom-
pense for this must quickly be found in other regions lest the gale of insurrection and sedition should overtake him again. Ferishtā says that the Sultan, despairing of reducing Gwalior moved towards Awantgarh\(^1\) in 912 H/1506-07. The Sultan halted at Dholpur and sent Imād Khan and Mujāhid Khan with 10,000 horse and 100 elephants for purposes of reconnaissance. When they had made their report, the Sultan left Mujāhid Khan at Dholpur and himself proceeded to the banks of the Chambal where he encamped for a while. Awantgarh was reached on the 23rd of Ramzan 912 (6th Feb. 1507).\(^2\) A vigorous siege was started and the Sultan himself led the attack at an auspicious hour. The royalists wormed themselves into the defiles of the fort like ants and locusts. But the garrison put up an equally determined opposition. Superiority in numbers gradually wore down their resistance. As their numbers were depleted and a breach was made in the wall of the fortress, the Rājputs determined to perform Jauhar. They barricaded each house, killed or burnt their women and children and died fighting to a man. Their desperate valour had considerably thinned the ranks of the Delhi army and Malik Alāuddin, one of the bravest leaders, whose energy and drive had

\(^1\) Awantgarh lies 28 miles S.W. of the town of Karaulī at the southern mouth of the Panmār Pass which is between Narwar and Gwalior 26° 6' N, 77° 0' E.

The place has been variously named in our authorities but the correct name is Awantgarh. For details about its location and identification, see De f.n. 2, p. 374; Fidā Alt f.n. 104, p. 24 of the footnotes; Hodiwala p. 497; Cunningham Arch. Sur Rep. II. pp. 328-330; Ain-i-Akbarī II (Tr.) p. 190; and CISG. I, p. 243.

For details about the war refer to MR. I, pp. 466-467; Tab. I. pp. 327-28; Bad. I, p. 320; TKJL. pp. 103-104; Fer. (L) I, p. 184.

\(^2\) Tab. and TKJL. give 23rd. while MR says 26th. of Ramzan.
made a breach in the defences of the fort possible, was blinded in one eye. The reprisals were, therefore, extremely bloody. All requests for mercy were turned down and the civilian population was subjected to a heartless massacre. The Sultan also ordered destruction of temples and founding of mosques on their sites.

The fort was put in charge of Makhan and Mujahid Khan. But it was soon learnt that the Raja of Awantgarh had bribed Mujahid and the latter had agreed to persuade the Sultan to relinquish it. This greatly infuriated the Sultan, because, he considered such an act not merely highly treasonable but also contrary to his policy for he wanted to use Awantgarh as a base for the conquest of Gwalior. Hence Mullā Jumman a partisan of Mujahid was immediately put under arrest on 16th Muharram 913 H (28th May, 1507) and was entrusted to the custody of Malik Tājuddin Kamboh. At the same time, he sent urgent orders to the nobles at Dholpur to arrest Mujahid Khan.

He then started for Agra via Dholpur, passing through the latter city on the 27th or 28th of Muharram 913 H (8th or 9th June 1507). But on the way to Dholpur his army suffered heavy losses because of uneven and narrow road and extreme scarcity of water which sold at 15 tankas per cup or pitcher. The total casualties on this account were 800.³

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¹ MR. says only Mujahid Khan while Ferishtä says Bhikam s/o Mujahid Khan. TKJL. agrees with Tab. ² Fer. (L), I, p. 184. ³ Daudî p. 69 also refers to these losses though it is not clear whether they happened after 911 campaign against Gwalior or after the expedition against Awantgarh.
Having spent the rains at Agra, the Sultan initiated an expedition against Narwar which was a strong fort in the province of Malwa.\textsuperscript{1} Jalāl Khan,\textsuperscript{2} the governor of Kalpi was ordered to invest the fort. Abdullāh explains\textsuperscript{3} the procedure followed by Sikandar when he himself was not the leader of an expedition. Niāmatullā\textsuperscript{4} says that Jalāl was instructed to ask for a peaceful surrender but if this was not accepted by the garrison, he was to press the siege with all possible vigour.

The Rājpūts determined to hold the fort. Hence a siege was laid. When the Sultan learnt that the siege might be protracted, he also left the capital and joined Jalāl Khan. As he went out inspecting the operations, he was frightened a little by the strength of forces under Jalāl’s command and decided to destroy his power gradually. Niāmatullāh and Nahāwandi follow Nizāmuddin Ahmad in regard to the details of Jalāl’s disgrace. They relate that the Sultan first won over Jalāl’s

\textsuperscript{1} CISG, pp. 272-273, says that the history of Narwar has been closely connected with that of Gwalior. After 1398, it fell into the hands of the Tomars who held it until 1506 when it was captured by Sikandar Lodi after a twelve month’s siege. (Narwar was included in the Gwalior state even till recently when the state itself was merged in the Madhya Bharat Union).

In Akbar’s time it was the headquarters of the Sarkar of Narwar, included in the Suba of Malwa and lay on the route from Agra to the Deccan.

Sikandar assigned the fort in December 1508 to Rāja Singh, a Kachhwāha prince whose ancestors had once held it and whose descendants retained control over it till the Sindhia seized it in the 19th century.

De f.m. 3 p. 376 says that it lies half-way between Dhar and Gwalior.

\textsuperscript{2} Tah. I, p. 327 calls him the son of Mahmūd Khan Lodi. TKJL. p. 105, calls him brother of the Sultan which is correct. The son of Mahmūd Khan had been removed from office earlier than this.

\textsuperscript{3} Dādī p. 69.

\textsuperscript{4} TKJL. p. 105; also MR. I, p. 468.
best soldiers by promises of favour. Next, his faithful adherents were dispersed and finally, Jalāl Khan and Sher Khan were arrested and imprisoned at Awantgarh under strict supervision.\(^1\)

The Sultan now carried on siege operations with an easy mind. But all attempts to capture the fort by a direct assault proved costly failures, and it was only by cutting off supplies that the Rājpūts were obliged to surrender. Even then, they had to be allowed to remove their families in safety. That indicates, the weakness in the position of the Sultan who was deprived of the opportunity to take reprisals. He stayed at Narwar for six months during which period he replaced temples by mosques, settled there ulemā and students to whom stipends were granted, and built another fort\(^2\) for the better protection of the main citadel, because Sikandar had noticed that if the fort of Narwar fell into the hands of the enemy, it would constitute a serious danger to his plans of further conquest. This done, he retired from that town in 914 H/1508-1509, leaving it in the hands of Rāja Singh, a Kachhwāhā price.\(^3\)

After this war, Sikandar made no further annexations by conquest though he secured some extensions of territory by diplomacy and tact. Before we turn to these events, a word might be

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\(^1\) Fīdā Alī II, pp. 154-155 and Fer. (L) I, pp. 184-185, ascribe Jalāl’s arrest not merely to jealousy but also to suspicion of treachery. It was said that Jalāl and Sher Khan Nūḥān were in correspondence with the garrison. The suspicion was confirmed when the garrison was allowed to repair the breach caused in the walls of the fort.

\(^2\) TKJL. p. 106; MR. I, p. 469; support the above version, Dādī p. 70 says that the Sultan razed its walls to the ground but Elliot IV p. 467 says that he built a wall round it which appears to be a mistranslation.

\(^3\) CIGS. I, p. 273; MR. I, p. 469 gives 26th Shaban 914=20th Dec. 1508.
said about the net result of fighting from 906 to 914. During this period, the real object of the Sultan was to bring the state of Gwalior under his direct control. He had failed to realise it in full. But he had certainly nibbled at Gwalior territory and had occupied Dholpur, Mandrel and Narwar. The Rājā of Awantgarh might also have been his ally or vassal. He too was dispossessed. Thus Sikandar had made useful progress towards the liquidation of the power of the Tomars and had paved the ground for annexation of Gwalior by his son and successor Ibrāhīm Lodi.

On his return from Narwar, he passed through Hatkānt and cleaned up the disaffected Bhadwarīyā Rājpāts. He also posted garrisons at suitable points to keep watch over them.

It was in course of this march that Sikandar met Nīmat Khātūn, widow of Qutb Khan Lodi at Lahār. On her recommendation, Prince Jalāl Khan one of the sons of Sikandar was appointed

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1 A town in Gwalior State, 6 miles east of the right bank of Sindh. It is about 50 miles west of Kalpi, 85 miles S.E of Agra and 50 miles E of Gwalior (Vide Hodiuvala p. 498).

2 Many Jalāl Khans were associated with the government of Kalpi. First was the son of Mahmūd Khan Lodi. His claims were disputed by his brothers. On that account, they were all summoned to meet the Sultan. Next, he seems to have appointed his younger brother. After his arrest and imprisonment, Jalāl Khan, the Sultan’s son was appointed. The government of Kalpi during this period appears to have been under an evil star. zam Humāyūn, the son of Bāyazīd was the first important holder of this office. He was removed by Sikandar and his name was lost into oblivion after that event. Mahmūd Khan Lodi was more fortunate but did not long survive his appointment. His son Jalāl seems to have been superseded by the Sultan’s brother within a few months. The last was disgraced in the hour of his triumph. His successor was his namesake and nephew. He became a fugitive from the wrath and jealousy of his brother but was captured and put to death.
THE FIRST AFGHAN EMPIRE IN INDIA

governor of Kalpi. Then on 10th Muharram 915/30th April 1509, he left Lahār.¹

Sikandar secured some accession of territory by taking advantage of dissensions in the ruling family of Malwa. Malwa had been associated with the prosperity of the Lodis since the time of King Muhammad Shāh Sayyad. It was in his reign in 1440 that Bahālīl had shot into prominence after his victory over Mahmūd Khilji. Then for some time nothing happened. In 1451, it was the might of the ruler of Malwa which inclined Hamīd Khan to favour Bahālīl’s candidature for the throne of Delhi. During the Lodī-Sharqī duel, Bahālīl had once been constrained to seek the assistance of the king of Malwa but ultimately he had been able to extricate himself from a dangerous situation without the help of that ruler.

Sikandar first came in contact with the ruler of Malwa after his return from the east about 902H/1496. Yādgār says that the Sultan proceeded against Mahmūd Khilji of Māndū. The latter showed humility and an agreement was made according to which he promised to send to the Lodī monarch a fixed number of elephants every year.² Upto 914 Sikandar had been engaged in

¹ Tab. I, p. 330.
² Yādgār, p. 41. He also adds at the end:

“Thus the extent of Sikandar’s Empire and authority became very large. From Jaalalbād near Kabul to Māndū and from Udaypur to Patna his Sikka and Khāka was in force and there was none to dispute or share his authority”.

But Mahmūd Khilji II ascended the throne on 2nd May 1511 (Tab. III, p. 373). Therefore it could not have occurred in the early part of Sikandar’s reign. No other historian refers to this incident.

With considerable modifications in detail it may refer to Buhīj Khan’s defection about the year 1511-1512.

Yādgār’s statement also suffers from an error of anachronism for, as Prof. Hodiyala (p. 471) says, neither Udaypur nor Jaalalbād had been founded till then.
quarrels nearer home. It was his desire to annex Gwalior which had forced him far into Central India almost to the frontiers of the Malwa Kingdom. Hence those royal princes who were dis-satisfied for one reason or another with the government at Mándâ sought the aid of the Lodi monarch. Thus was provided the opportunity for extension of Sikandar’s influence further to the south at the cost of the kingdom of Malwa.

The state of Malwa began to decline just after the death of Mahmûd Khilji I. He was succeeded by Sultan Ghiyâsuddîn (1469-1501) whose chief interest lay in the harem where he had collected thousands of peerless beauties from all parts of the world.¹ His son and successor Nâsir-uddîn (1501-1511) was suspected of parricide² so that dissensions in the state began to arise. Shihâbuddîn, the son of Sultan Nâsiruddîn secured the support of some of the favourite nobles of his grandfather and rose in rebellion. When Nâsir-uddîn found him persisting in rebellion, he disinherited him. Shihâbuddîn now felt the need of securing foreign assistance to safeguard his interests. He had learnt that Sikandar had recently reduced the fort of Narwar. The trend of Sikandar’s conquests since 1505 had been towards the frontiers of Malwa. Shihâbuddîn, therefore, thought that he could be secured as a convenient ally in setting aside Nâsiruddîn or in forcing him to do justice by his son. Consequently,

¹ Tab. III, pp. 349-357 ; Fer. (L), II, pp. 255-257.
² Tab. III, p. 357 ; Fer. (L) II, p. 258.
³ Tab. I, p. 330 ; MR. I, p. 469. Fer. (L) II, p. 262 refers to Shihâb’s desire to go to Delhi in 1510 but says that he was unable to do so. This probably refers to a subsequent development.
he waited on Sikandar in 1509, while the latter was encamped on the banks of the Sipri. Sikandar received him well and promised to use his good offices for bringing about a reconciliation between the father and the son. But he demanded surrender of Chanderi as its price. The prince did not agree to it and went back to his headquarters. Thus one opportunity for aggrandisment had been lost by the Sultan’s unwillingness to pick up a quarrel without the assurance of a definite advantage.

Sometime after this, another Khilji prince\(^1\) sued for protection. He was at that time staying at Chanderi but feared that the wrath of Sultan Nāsiruddin would soon overtake him there. Sikandar was anxious not to lose this opportunity. Consequently, he ordered Prince Jalāl Khan, the governor of Kalpi to see that the King of Malwa did not molest him at Chanderi. Sikandar had already built a fort near Chanderi. A contingent of his army was now sent probably to this fort so that while the Sultan may be technically within his own frontiers, he may yet be in a position to help his protege effectively when an opportunity should arise.\(^2\) This action on the part of Sikandar brought the fort of Chanderi within the sphere of influence of the Lodi monarch without any bloodshed.

The internal situation of Malwa enabled Sikandar to acquire further extension of his authority in that quarter. Sultan Nāsiruddin died

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But Tab. III, p. 382 suggests that the real name of this prince was Sāhib Khan and that he assumed the style of Muhammad Shah when he declared his independence.

\(^2\) Dorn I, p. 63.
in 1511 and was succeeded by Mahmūd Khilji II (1511-1531). He had failed to subdue Shihābuddin and Sāhib Khan. Before he left this world, he had created a fresh complication by disinheriting Shihābuddin and nominating Mahmūd as his successor. Shihāb who had refused to bow before his father could not be expected to submit to his brother, specially when he happened to be a weak-willed person like Mahmūd. Nāsiruddin's act had thus made a civil war inevitable.

During Mahmūd II's reign (1511-1531) the Kingdom of Malwa was a constant prey to warring factions at home and ravenous neighbours abroad. But Malwa's calamity was its neighbours' opportunity. The Lodis utilized this situation to further their own interests. During the first four months of Mahmūd's reign, his chief opponent was his own brother Prince Shihābuddin. But he did not ask for foreign aid in the civil war. After his death in July 1511,1 his supporters set up Hushang as another rival against Mahmūd. When this prince was also defeated, a fresh rival appeared in the person of Prince Sāhib Khan who assumed the title of Muhammad Shāh, seized the capital and drove the Sultan to Ujjain.2 Mahmūd now sought the aid of Buhjat Khan, the then governor of Chanderi and when the latter made an evasive reply, he was advised to apply to Sikandar for assistance.3 Either he did not ask for Sikandar's

1 Tab. III, p. 380; Fer. (L), II p. 264.
2 Fer. (L) II, p. 263, says that the quarrel between Mahmūd and Muḥāfiz Khen, Khwāja-sarū, led to a disturbance which frightened the former out of the capital. Muḥāfiz then brought Sāhib Khan out of the prison and placed him on the throne.
3 Tab. III, p. 383.
aid, or the latter refused to support him against a person with whom he had been in alliance ever since 1509. Sikandar was provided with a fresh opportunity to renew this alliance in 1512 when Muhammad, driven out from Mândā and despairing of help from any other quarter, formed a junction with Buhjat Khan and applied to Sikandar for assistance against Mahmūd. Buhjat Khan gave his solicitation a communal colour by emphasizing that Mahmūd, under the influence of Medini Rāi whom he had appointed as his Wazīr and commander-in-chief, was encompassing the ruin of Islam. Lest Sikandar should not be taken in by an appeal to mere religious sentiment, an attractive bait was simultaneously offered. He promised to introduce Sikandar’s name in the Khutba and the Sikka, if he sent an army to assist them in placing Sāhib Khan on the throne.¹

Sikandar seized the opportunity with alacrity and sent Imādulmulk and Saūd Khan Lodī at the head of a strong force. The presence of these troops impressed Sultan Mahmūd so much that he agreed to assign Rāisīn, Bhilsā and Dhamoni² to

¹Medini Rāi was one of the vassal chiefs of Malwa. He was to play a very vital role in the history of this kingdom. By his valour and sagacity, he first saved it from internal and external enemies and concentrated all power in his own hands as the head of the civil and military administration. But he aroused Sultan’s suspicions by his appointment of Rājpūts to key posts and was ultimately driven out in exile. He sought the aid of Rāṇī Sāngā of Chitor while Mahmūd Kiliji leaned on the support of the ruler of Gujerat. Pressure on Malwa territory by the rulers of Chitor and Gujerat ultimately weakened it so much that provincial governors became independent or autonomous and the liquidation of Khilji’s rule became a matter of time only.

²Tab. III, p. 388; Also MR. I, p. 471, Fer. (L) II, p. 264.

³Ain II, p. 199 mentions it as one of the parganas of Sarkar Rāisīn.
Prince Muhammad and to offer a free pardon to his confederates. This reconciliation enabled Buhjat Khan to go back on his word and to repudiate the compact with Sultan Sikandar Lodi. Sikandar had to withdraw his troops temporarily but when Buhjat Khan and Muhammad quarrelled among themselves and the latter fled to the camp of Sikandar he sent Shaikh Jamāl, Saʿād Khan Lodi, Khizr Khan, and Rāi Ugrasen Kachhwāhā who occupied the territory and assumed powers of government on behalf of Muhammad. Bujhat had no alternative but to submit to this arrangement. Thus the authority of the Sultan was firmly established over Chanderi.

In 922H/1516 Ali khan Nāgorī, governor of Shivapur opened negotiations with Prince Daulat Khan, the governor of Ranthambhor and succeeded in detaching him from allegiance to Malwa. The prince agreed to hand over the fort to Sultan Sikandar. He even came to meet him at Bayānā where he was so impressed by the Sultan's power and affability that he made a free offer of allegiance and invited the Sultan to Ranthambhor.

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2 Tab. III, p. 391, CISG. I, pp. 210-211; Fer. (L) II, p. 265.
3 Tab. III, pp. 392-393.
4 Tab. I, pp. 332-333; MR. I, p. 471; Fer. (L), I, p. 185; Prof. Hodiwala p. 472, suggests that he was probably a Khichi, a branch of the Chashāns.
6 Shivpur, 25°-40'N, 76°-44'E, stands on the right bank of the river Sip and except for Ferishta other Muhammadan historians refer to it as Suisipur near Awantgarh and subject to the Rājā of Gwalior. CISG. I, p. 287. Prof. Hodiwala's notes p. 498 on the authority of Thornton p. 885, tell us that Shivpur was a small Rājpūt principality till 1816 when it was absorbed by Daulat Rāo Sindhia.
The Sultan was mightily pleased at this unexpected good fortune and lavished favours on the prince and called him 'a son'. But the Sultan showed no special favour to the author of this move, viz. Ali Khan. Consequently, when Prince Daulat Khan was returning back to Ranthambhor, he advised him to go back on his word. The Sultan was sorely disappointed to hear of this unfortunate development but he could do nothing to vindicate his dignity beyond the supersession of Ali Khan by his brother Abū Bakr. The Sultan did not survive for more than a year and, therefore, he could not pursue this point any further.

This sketch of Sikandar's relations with the rulers of Malwa shows that he was not very successful in seizing his opportunities. Twice was an advantage rendered unfruitful of results because of Sultan's lack of caution or tactless moves. It was lucky that he was able to secure the strong fort of Chanderi along with its contiguous lands. Even this success was due not so much to Sikandar's power or shrewdness as to the weakness of the ruler of Malwa and the chronic dissensions in his family.

Sikandar secured the allegiance of Muhammad Khan the governor of Nāgor in very intriguing circumstances. Ali Khan and Abū Bakr two of his adherents plotted to murder him. Muhammad Khan got scent of their designs and decided to execute them for high treason. But, before this could be done, they fled to the camp of Sikandar.

Nāgor submits to Sikandar
915 H/1509.

1 Nāgor is an important station on the Bikaner State Railway and joins Bk.S.R. to Jodhpur Railway. The date of its conquest as given by Ferishtā is 915 H/1509. Tab. gives no date but refers to it after Sultan's extension of authority over Chanderi in 915 H/1509.
This frightened Muhammad Khan so much that he introduced the name of Sultan Sikandar on the coinage and in the Khutba and sent him urgent messengers with rich presents and solemn assurances of his allegiance. The Sultan heartily accepted this offer and sent suitable gifts to Muhammad Khan in recognition of his loyalty.

This brings to a close the account of Sikandar’s conquests and annexations. To the territory inherited from his father, he had added Bayānā, Bihar, Tirhut, Dholpur, Mandrail, Awantgarh, Shivpur, Narwar, Chanderi and Nāgor. He had liquidated the power of the Sharqīs completely, had considerably weakened the state of Gwalior and had helped in the dismemberment of the kingdom of Malwa.

But there is another side to the shield as well. The achievements of Sikandar were not in proportion to his ambitions or to the expectations of his admirers. It is for this reason that Abdullah states as an apology that he avoided wars and disputes with his contemporary rulers and contented himself with the territory he had inherited from his father.1 He was not good at sieges for he failed to capture Chunar and Bāndhogarh, while the reduction of Narwar, Dholpur and Awantgarh took a very long time. Nor did he always take sufficient precautions about the safety of his communications or adequate supply of commissariat wants of the army. He was at times, more audacious than discreet in venturing into unknown territory. On account of these short-comings his army suffered heavily on

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1 Dābulī, p. 44.
a number of occasions. As compared to Bahlūl, he was not quite successful in his diplomacy. It is true that he has a number of diplomatic successes to his credit but his relations with Gwalior and the dependencies of Malwa compare unfavourably with Bahlūl’s record of uniform diplomatic success.

Despite the lavish praise that he has received at the hands of Muslim historians, he did not command as much respect and popularity as his father. Bahlūl had serious difficulties to face but his own followers did not add to them. By tact and ability, he carried them with him through thick and thin. The same cannot be asserted of Sikandar, though the fault was not entirely his. His Hindu origin, disputed succession, greater security, and machinations of interested parties taxed the loyalties of some of his followers to a breaking point. Consequently, there were numerous occasions of rebellion, dis-obedience, conspiracy or sedition. A few leading instances may be here recounted. In 1500 when the Sultan was at Sambhal, Asghar the Governor of Delhi rebelled but when Khwās Khan, the governor, of Machhīwārāh\(^1\) was deputed to arrest him and send him to court, he himself proceeded to Sambhal to ask for the Sultan’s forgiveness. He was put under arrest and Delhi was put in charge of Khwās Khan. Just before this 22 nobles had conspired to depose Sikandar and to place Fath Khan on the throne because they were dis-

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Machhīwārāh is a town in the Ludhianā District in the Punjab at a distance of 27 miles from Ludhianā—Imp. Gaz. XVI, p. 224.
satisfied with the haughty nature of the Sultan. The conspiracy was discovered only because Fath Khan proved chicken-hearted and his advisors counselled confession. We are told by Badāoni that the Sultan was too weak to punish them and the only thing he could do was to transfer them to distant provinces on one excuse or the other, but not on the charge of conspiracy. It was in this very year or early next year that the Sultan had to exile a number of his nobles who found a ready asylum at Gwalior. Just about this time Khān-i-Khānān Farmuli, the governor of Bayānā died and the Sultan appointed his sons Imād and Sulaimān as his successors. But they did not obey the orders of the Sultan and left Bayānā, without permission, to request the Sultan to appoint them to some other district. This was an act of insubordination and negligence, for Bayānā was an important frontier outpost and yet Sikandar had to overlook their fault and to appoint Khawās Khan and Safdar Khan as the governors of Bayānā and Agra respectively. The Sultan obliged the errant nobles by granting them fiefs of Shamsābād, Jalesar, Kampilā etc. During Awantgarh and Narwar campaigns, Mujāhid Khan, Jalāl Khan and Sher Khan Nūhānī had been won over by the enemy. In 1509, Ahmad Khan the governor of Lakhnaū had become so conciliatory to the Hindus that he was suspected of apostasy and had to be dismissed on that ground. The same year Miān Sulaimān s/o Khān-i-Khānān

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1 Bad. I, p. 317.
2 Tab. I, p. 323.
3 TKJL, p. 100.
4 Tab. I, p. 331.
Farmuli\(^1\) was ordered to go to the frontiers of Awantgarh and Shivpur to assist Hasan Khan (formerly Rāi Dūngar) but he declined to go on the plea that he would not like to go far from the camp of the Sultan. Sulaimān was dismissed from service but the fief of Indari\(^2\) was still assigned to him for his maintenance.\(^3\) In 1516, Ali Khan Nāgorī, the governor of Shivpur had deprived the Sultan of the prospect of seizing Ranthambhor. The punishment for this treasonable conduct was that his own brother Abū Bakr was appointed in his stead.\(^4\) It would thus appear that as a tactician, a general, a diplomat, or a leader of men, Sikandar does not compare favourably with his father.

After Sikandar’s return to Agra in 923H/1517, his health began to decline. Niāmatullāh says that for some time the Sultan concealed this fact and kept attending to public business as before. This aggravated his malady still further. At last a stage was reached when he could neither eat nor drink, and finally even breathing became impossible and the Sultan died on Sunday 7th Zi-Qada, 923H,\(^5\) (21st November 1517). He was buried

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\(^1\) Tab. I, p. 331; and Fīdā All II, p. 156. MR. I, p. 471, calls him son of Khān-i-Jahān which does not appear to be correct. He was the same person who had once been accommodated despite his dereliction of duty.

\(^2\) Indari was situated on the banks of the Jumna near Karnāl (Fīdā All II, f.n. 112, p. 25 of the notes).

\(^3\) Tab. I, pp. 331-332.

\(^4\) P. 148 above.

\(^5\) TKJL. p. 108. Daṣāt pp. 96-99 details the circumstances of Sultan’s illness. It says that Ḥāji Abdul Wahāb exhorted him to grow a beard, so that it may serve as an example to his subjects. The Sultan was however adamant although the Ḥāji promised to satisfy all conditions for doing so. The Sultan was irritated by such insistence and on his departure is reported to have said that the Ḥāji presumed a little too much and forgot that if he put even his slave in a palanquin, the nobles would
near his father's tomb, inside the garden laid out by himself. The exact nature of his illness is not mentioned but it appears that it was akin to diptheria. Abdullāh, Yādgār and Rizqullāh Mushtāqī, however, relate it to a curse by Hāji Abdul Wahāb. It may or may not be true but this must be admitted that the entire band of eminent physicians, gathered by Mīān Bhuā failed to give the Sultan any relief. The cause of this illness is equally uncertain. It is, however, more than likely that the strain of constant campaigning had worn down the iron frame of the Sultan. He might have caught infection from impure food or water during these campaigns. The failure of the physicians to diagnose the disease and to cure it seems to have strengthened belief in the theory of Hāji Abdul Wahāb's curse.

All the authorities speak in superlatives about his physical charms. Quite a number also add that he was equally adorned with excellences of head and heart.\(^1\) He is credited with great intelligence, discernment and moderation. He was a fair judge of men and none of his highest officers played him false. Rizqullāh calls him magnanim-

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\(^1\) MR. I, p. 473 ; Tab. I, p. 335.
ous, religious, brave and just. Numerous anecdotes are recorded about his generosity. A certain Shaikh Muhammad of Ajodhan discovered a treasure-trove in one of his fields. He was even willing to part with a portion of the find but the Sultan declined to accept anything, though the law permitted it. A similar story is related about the discoverer of a jar containing 5,000 gold pieces. Twice a year, "he had a list of the indigent and meritorious of his empire handed over to him, to each of whom he allotted a suitable allowance." Abdullah also mentions distribution of clothes and shawls among the mendicants every winter. Reference is also made to distribution of cooked and uncooked food, coined money and other articles on Fridays, in the month of Ramzan, on the Barawafat, and on the 10th day of Muharram. If we can trust Abdullah and other Afghan historians, provision for such charities was made throughout the empire and a body of God-fearing persons was deputed to make enquiries at the spot and to satisfy the wants of poor and godly people. Almost all the Afghan historians relate anecdotes about the character and life of Sikandar's nobles, in course of which they record marvellous instances of liberality. It is further stated that the Sultan gave preferment to those who were free with their money in helping the poor and the needy. Consequently, it is asserted,

1 Waqiat, p. 13.
2 Yadgar, p. 36; Waqiat, pp. 42-43; Elliot IV, pp. 452-453.
3 Dorn I, p. 66.
4 Tab. I, p. 337; MR. I, p. 476. Yadgar pp. 60-62 relates that Daulat Khan Farnuli complained to the Sultan that Hussain Khan was wasting his money over lavish gifts. The Sultan rebuked Daulat and praised
that there was a keen competition among the wealthy persons of the day to outdo each other. Even when allowance is made for exaggeration, it must be admitted that Sikandar was neither greedy nor miserly and that the fruits of his liberality were shared not merely by a select group of courtiers and metropolitans but that his charity was broad-based and was intended to alleviate the sufferings of people as a whole.

He was also a great patron of learning and loved the company of learned men. His benevolence and patronage attracted them to his court from Persia, Arabia and different parts of India. Rizqullah Mushtaqi, a contemporary and an admirer of Sikandar was an author of repute both in Hindi and Persian. Mi‘an Bhu‘a, the Wazir of Sikandar had collected round him a band of able physicians and doctors of medicine who compiled a highly authoritative work called Tibb-i-Sikandar Shahi or Mahā-ayuvaidualik. He had also got together a group of calligraphists and learned men who were continually employed in copying and compiling books on every science. Rizqullah describes some marvels of craftsmanship of Mi‘an Tahir, who is painted as almost a walking encyclopaedia for he was proficient not only in medicine, poetry, religious lore, and other subjects of study but also gifted with craftsmanship of a very high

Husain's conduct as worthy of bringing credit to himself. He also raised his mansab and granted him two additional parganas.

1 Elliot, IV p. 446.
2 Akhbar-ul-Akhbar p. 174 gives 897-989 (1491-1581) as the period of his life.
order. Abdullah says that the Sultan described him as a thousand craftsmen rolled in one. Sikandar himself was well-acquainted with Persian literature and wrote verses under the pen-name of Gulrukhi. Yadgar says that when the Sultan heard about Shaikh Jamāl Dehlawi’s return from his travels through Iraq, Arabia, Ajam, Rum, Syria and Egypt and Mawar-un-nahr he invited him to court and requested him to send his book ‘Mahr-wa-māh’. The letter to the poet was composed in verse. It may be quoted as an example of Sikandar’s compositions:

ام سخن کام لا یزالی و زدگا فاضلاع حال ملاط
العمد که چه میکت یازاد نر مینزل چرب رشد بالاخره
هر لحظه خیال تو بیارم زرد آلبی ریبخن بوسی شادر
کر ای آسمان تو باشد اعمال کر سیر رسیده گیسی سال
بهرته که كتاب صبر و صائم بفرسختی یدن جوا که خواه

Nišmatullāh says that when Shaikh Jamāl arrived at the court, he stayed with the Sultan for 2 years.

Badāoni also quotes a few lines by Sikandar and refers to poets and learned men with whom the Sultan was associated. One of these poets and critics was a Brāhmin, named Dūngar. Another was Sheikh Abdullah Tulumbī among whose disciples were included Shaikh Lādan, Shaikh Jamāl Dehlawi, Miān Shaikh Gwāliori, Mihran Sayyad Jalāl Badāoni and others. Badāoni also says that the Sultan would often organise

1 Waqīyat pp. 133-137.
2 Dādū pp. 60-63.
4 TKJL, p. 99.
discussions among well-balanced parties of learned men.\(^1\)

It would, therefore, be readily admitted that Sikandar had a genuine taste for learning and that his encouragement of the learned and interest in their work must have contributed to its progress. Sikandar was fond of healthy exercises and manly sports. He snatched what leisure he could for hunting, travelling and strolls in gardens and spots of natural beauty, and we are often told how he relaxed himself while playing polo. Though like Bahlul Sikandar was also superstitious and had faith in astrology and the blessings

\(^1\) Bad. I, pp. 323-326; Ranking pp. 425-430.

 Rankings's Translation of the above lines by Sikandar.
“... That cypress whose robe is the jasmine, whose body the rose, 
Is a spirit incarnate whose garment the body provides 
What profits the Khatna-i-musk? all the Kingdoms 
of Chin 
Are conquered and bound in the chains of her clustering 
curls 
In the eye of her eyelash’s needle, the thread of my soul 
I’ll fasten and swiftly repair every rent in her robe 
Could Galrugh essay to discover the charms of her teeth 
He would say they are water-white pearls of the ocean of speech.”
of saints, he had a greater reputation for orthodoxy and strict observance of the teachings of Islam. But even his admirers have recorded facts which militate against such a belief. He did not grow a beard although Háji Abdul Waháb remonstrated with him.¹ He drank wine, though it is said in his defence that he used to do so only in private and that too for reasons of health.² He was so fond of music that expert musicians were invited to give their performance every night at the palace gate.³ When he was dying, possibly as a result of Háji Abdul Waháb's curse, he paid expiation money for shaving the beard, drinking wine, slitting off noses and ears of culprits, and occasional neglect in rozā and Namāz.⁴ But judged by contemporary standards of royalty, he was certainly a devout and orthodox Muslim. Normally, he said his prayers regularly and in company. He kept the fast in the month of

¹ Dāndī pp. 96-99; Yadghär, pp. 62-63.
² Dāndī, p. 37; Elliott IV, p. 446.
³ Yadghär, p. 48; Dāndī p. 41; Waqīat, p. 51. All these authors agree that 'Shahnāi' was played in his presence. Yadghär's version is still more damaging from point of view of orthodoxy.

"He had four slaves whom he had purchased for 1500 dinārs. Their voice was so life-giving that their music brought the dead to life and from the living life departed. They were besides extremely handsome. Sometimes their music affected the beautiful saqī girls so much that they lost consciousness and forgot to send wine."

⁴ Dāndī, p. 99; Waqīat, p. 52. The latter says that he asked his Imam Miān Lādan Dānishmand:

کُغَفَاتُ نَفَّازُ وَ رُوَّزَةُ وَ کُغَفَاتُ رَئَشُ تَرَاهْيَدَ
وَ کُغَفَاتُ مَيْ خُوُرَ دَیَ رُکَغَافَاتُ اَنْکَهَ کُوشُ رَبَّنِیَ... ِ
وَ رَیْبَةُ بَابَشُ کُغَفَاتُ بَفْرِسَتْبُ

When this information was received chroniclers of his daily diary were ordered to collect instances of each lapse and to calculate the total amount of expiation money.
Ramzan and spent a good part of his time at night in religious study and meditation. He was always accompanied by a select group of seventeen theologians whom he consulted, whenever necessary, to ensure strict conformity with the holy law. He avoided pomp and show, led a frugal life and did not draw heavily on the state-funds for ministering to his bodily comforts or for maintaining a magnificent court.\(^1\) He made handsome gifts to the Shaikhs and recluses, built and endowed mosques, destroyed a number of Hindu temples and indulged in occasional fits of fanatical persecution.\(^2\) To the Muslims of the 16th and the 17th centuries this was very commendable conduct specially when royalty was often associated with profligacy and debauchery. Respect for Sultan's religiosity was so great that many credulous persons credited him with miraculous and super-natural powers. To these they traced the general tranquillity and prosperity of his subjects. The Sultan had a great respect for veracity and it is commendable that he had truthfully recorded in his diary all his moral lapses. It is a pity that no part of that diary has come down to us.

As a ruler, more will be said of him in a later chapter. Suffice it to say at this stage that though he was at times consumed with jealousy, restrained by timidity or deceived by soft words,

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\(^1\) Ibid.

\(^2\) Tab. I, p. 335 and MR. I, p. 474

مراجعات

١ یکی از اسناد

٢ تاب. I، p. 335 و MR. I، p. 474
he was on the whole a better and a greater administrator than either his father or his son. He improved the administration of justice; reduced the power of the nobility by transfers, audits and personal supervision; enhanced the prestige of the sovereign; and ministered to the general welfare and happiness of his subjects. Sikandar was, thus, quite remarkable both as a man and as the head of a growing empire, and even a conservative estimate would rank him among the greatest Muslim rulers of Delhi, in the Sultanate period.
CHAPTER VI

DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE

Shortly before his death, Sultan Sikandar had invited his nobles to meet him at the capital. He probably wanted to make a final attempt to conquer Gwalior. But before he could plan it, he breathed his last. At the time of his death, Princes Ibrāhīm and Jalāl were present by the side of their father. They were both born of the same mother and were more capable than others. Ibrāhīm was not only the elder of the two, but he had also been favoured with prepossessing countenance and had made his mark as a brave and courageous person. During Sikandar's absence from the capital, he had probably acted as his deputy. Ordinarily, therefore, he should have been accepted by the nobles as a suitable successor to the throne.

But a peaceful and undisputed succession was rendered impossible by a number of reasons. The law of succession was by no means definite. Consequently it was possible for brothers and even other kinsmen of Ibrāhīm to aspire for royalty. Prince Jalāl, his own younger brother had filled the office of the governor of Kalpi with distinction and Sikandar had allowed him, more or less, viceregal powers over Chanderi. But he was present at the capital at the head of his followers and could back up his claims to the throne with arms, if necessary. Unless Jalāl was willing to submit to the choice of his elder brother as the

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1 Chap. V, p. 144.

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sovereign, there was an imminent danger of a war of succession. But it was not merely the ambition of Jalāl that stood in the way of Ibrāhīm. Far more dangerous was the attitude of the powerful nobles at the court. A section of the nobles had been disaffected even towards Sikandar. They had resented the increasing rigidity of control exercised by him. There were many selfish nobles who wanted to aggrandise themselves at the expense of the growing Lodi imperialism. After Sikandar's death, they wanted to weaken the central government in order to revive the former privileges and pretensions of the nobility. They seem to have held a secret conference to mature their plans and to chalk out a suitable line of action. It was probably at this conference that the short-comings of Ibrāhīm were magnified. It was pointed out that he was a man of irritable temper. He was charged with having treated the nobles as a master treats his servants. This was described as contrary to the custom of his father and grandfather and was interpreted as galling to the pride of the nobility. They could pass over the claims of Ibrāhīm altogether. But that was fraught with the danger of a serious civil war and bloody reprisals in the event of his succession. Besides, there could be no certainty that another prince would not develop absolutist tendencies, once he

1 Tab. I, p. 341; MR. I, p. 478.
2 Dorn I, p. 70.
3 Ferišṭā, (I.), I, p. 188; Fidā Asf II, p. 163.

Ferišṭā is slightly confused and suggests that Ibrāhīm indulged in such behaviour after his accession and that this instigated the nobles to conspire for partition. It would be more plausible to suppose that Ibrāhīm's behaviour as a Prince was made the cause of discontent against him and served as an excuse for the proposed partition.
was firmly installed as an undisputed sovereign. In that case, their motive of self-aggrandisement would remain unfulfilled. Hence they thought of a more efficacious plan. It was decided that Ibrāhīm should succeed his father as the head of the state at Delhi. But his authority should extend only to the western boundary of the former Jaunpur Kingdom. Prince Jalāl should rule over the former Sharqī Kingdom as an independent sovereign with his headquarters at Jaunpur. The pros and cons of this arrangement appear to have been thrashed out at length and all dissidents seem to have been convinced of its usefulness at the secret session. For if this had not been so, all the great nobles of the realm would not have unanimously supported the scheme, as they are said to have done, at the open session of the nobles' meeting, nor would they have changed their stand so readily later when Khān-i-Jahān Nūhānī condemned their move in strong terms.

We may now detail the arguments which made acceptance of partition apparently unanimous. The main argument was, of course, self-interest. The presence of rival sovereigns at Jaunpur and Delhi, none subordinate to the other and descended from common parents would lead to mutual jealousy and suspicion. Each one of them would, therefore, be forced to placate the Afghān nobles. This would allow the latter a free hand in their own fiefs for realizing and furthering their personal ambitions. This blatant self-interest could easily be masked under a garb of patriotism. An agreed partition, it could be said, would

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1 Tab. I, p. 341; Dāndī p. 104; Yādgār p. 66.
2 Waqīfi p. 81; Dāndī p. 104.
3 P. 166, below.
satisfy both the princes and would avert the danger of a fratricidal war. Thus Afghān power would remain intact. Nay, it might even increase as a result of mutual exertions of the two sovereigns in their respective spheres of influence. It was by such specious arguments that treason to the state was camouflaged as concession to the conflicting claims of almost equally qualified contestants for the throne.

This done, the nobles met in an open assembly at which the two princes were also present. It was proposed that Ibrāhīm, as the elder of the two princes, should be the master of the western and central dominions of the Lodī empire with its headquarters at Delhi and Agra. Prince Jalāl was to receive the former Sharqī kingdom, with Jaunpur as the seat of his government. Both were to be independent rulers, with a free right to introduce their names in the Khutba and the sikka and to adopt every other insignia of royalty. It was further proposed that the nobles and officers in the respective zones should render obedience to their local sovereigns and should be confirmed in their offices.¹

The general body of the nobles approved these terms without any discussion because they had been already canvassed in their favour by the leading conspirators. Ibrāhīm Lodī could not have liked this arrangement but when faced by a united demand of the nobles present at the meeting, he had no alternative but to submit to it. Opposition on his part would have tilted the balance in favour of his rival and it was likely that he might be altogether excluded and put

¹ TKJL. p. 119; Dorn I, p. 70; Dīādī, p. 104.
under arrest. Consequently, he accepted partition, perhaps with considerable mental reservations. Jalāl could be only thankful for this windfall in his favour. Hence he too gave his assent. Other sons of Sikandar also acquiesced in the arrangement because they were also suitably provided.\(^1\) Partition of the empire had thus been mooted, approved and enforced.

At the end of the meeting, Jalāl, along with the nobles of the Jaunpur region went away thither. Ibrāhīm, on his part, acquired sovereign powers in the western region. According to Niāmatullāh his coronation took place on the 8th Ziqada 923 (Sunday 22nd November, 1517) i.e. the very next day after Sikandar's death.\(^2\) But he along with Ferishtā mentions a second coronation on the 15th Zīhijjah 923 (29th December, 1517) and places it after repudiation of the partition by Ibrāhīm. Nizāmuddīn Ahmad and Mullā Nahāwandī support the second date but make no reference to two coronations. Abdullah on the contrary gives it as the date of Jalāl's coronation but reproduces the same details as given by Nizāmuddīn in describing the accession of Ibrāhīm.\(^3\) It may, therefore, be safely concluded that though Ibrāhīm secured sovereign authority soon after his father's death, his formal and second coronation as the Sultan of the undivided dominions of the Lodis took place more than a month

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\(^{1}\) TKJL. p. 119.

\(^{2}\) Ibid.

\(^{3}\) TKJL. p. 121; Fīdā Ālī II, p. 179; Tab. I, p. 343; MR. I, p. 480; Dāndī p. 107.

Yādār p. 66 has 10th Zīhijjah 923 (24th December, 1517) while in some Mss. it is 7th Zīhijjah 923 (21st December 1517).
later on the 15th Zihijjah, 923 (29th December, 1517).

Let us now detail the circumstances leading to this development. Though a majority of Sikandar's nobles were present by his side at the time of his death, there were many others who had been absent. Now that he was dead and another king had taken his place, these absentees started coming to the capital to congratulate their new sovereign. One of these was Khān-i-Jahān Nūhānī, the governor of Rapri. ¹ When he was ushered in, the Sultan was in the hall of audience. Khān-i-Jahān condemned the act of partition as the height of unwisdom and severely castigated the conduct of those who had proposed it. None of the nobles present made a reply and took censure with apparent sense of guilt. This shows that, at least some of these must have been only luke-warm supporters of the plan of partition. As departure of Jalāl and his followers had thinned the ranks of more active supporters of that plan, they too kept quiet.

A fresh council of chief officers and grandees of the state was quickly convened to review the situation afresh. The same people who had formerly approved partition without a dissentient
voice now unanimously decided against it. It was further agreed that as Jalāl had neither consolidated his position nor assumed sovereignty after a formal coronation, he could be easily overpowered if he could be persuaded to return to the capital. Therefore, a farman, ‘expressive of every respect and amicable distinction’ was drafted. It exhorted Jalāl to return to the capital at once to discuss certain urgent matters of state. Haibat Khan Gurg-andāz, who was reputed to possess a very persuasive tongue was chosen as the emissary.

Jalāl Khan gave a courteous reception to Haibat Khan but suspected foul play. The more insistent was the envoy, the greater became the prince’s suspicions. More messengers were sent to reinforce the arguments of Haibat Khan but they met with no better luck and finally all of them returned to Ibrāhīm’s camp. When stratagem had failed, more overt action became inevitable. With the approval of the nobles, Ibrāhīm sent farmans to vassals and officers of Jaunpur region directing them not to obey the commands of Prince Jalāl and informing them that their confirmation in their posts would depend on their compliance with royal instructions. These farmans were also couched in a conciliatory language. As a concession to the vanity of the more important nobles like Daryā Khan Nūhānī of Bihar, Nasīr Khan Nūhānī of Ghazipur and Shaikhzādā Muhammad Farmuli of Awadh and Lakhnaū, separate farmans were sent together with valuable royal gifts. This move met with

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1 Ibid. I, p. 326 says that they were also instructed to arrest Jalāl and to send him to court.
greater success, for all these nobles assured allegiance to İbrâhîm and repudiated the authority of Prince Jalâl.¹

Ibrâhîm’s position had now undergone a great change. Except for the province of Kalpi, the entire dominions of Sikandar had now passed under his control. Jalâl had found his position in the east untenable and had retired to Kalpi. İbrâhîm could reasonably hope that he had taken the wind out of the sails of his rival and that his submission could not be long delayed. In this changed atmosphere, a fresh coronation, proclaiming his authority over all the Afghân dominions in India, was necessary. Hence he had a throne studded with jewels and diamonds made, and placing it in the hall of audience on Friday 15th Zihijjah 923² seated himself on it. At the same time, he held a grand darbar, in which he offered khilâts, belts, daggers, horses, elephants, and titles to his followers, soldiers, and grandees of the state, in accordance with their status and dignity. He made gifts also to the poor, the mendicants and men of religion. This secured for him their loyalty and support.³

On his departure from Agra, Jalâl appointed Fath Khan Sarwânî as his chief minister but before he could consolidate his position at Jaunpur, the nobles of that quarter repudiated his authority and became openly defiant and hostile.

¹ Darâdî p. 107 does not name any nobles. Instead, it says that the nobles commanding 30,000 and 40,000 soldiers received special attention, as given above.

² TKJL. p. 120 gives names as well as the strength of their following.

³ This date would correspond to 29th Dec. 1517 but it was a Tuesday and not a Friday.

³ Darâdî pp. 107-108 wrongly ascribes these details to the accession of Prince Jalâl.
He had therefore retired to Kalpi, his original fief. There were now only two courses open to him. He could either acknowledge the suzerainty of his brother and secure a reconciliation with him, or he could defy his authority and claim independent sovereignty on the basis of the original compact. Prudence would have recommended the first course. But the nobles in his camp were primarily interested neither in his welfare nor in the peace of the realm. Their object was self-aggrandisement, and this could be secured only if Jalāl could be invested with regal authority. Therefore, they dissuaded him from seeking a rapprochement with his brother and advised assumption of sovereignty in order to gain more adherents. Jalāl, therefore, had himself crowned at Kalpi and assumed the style of Jalāluddin.¹

Ibrāhīm did not, in the first instance, take any serious notice of his brother’s act of defiance perhaps under the impression that, having been deprived of the loyalty and support of the fiefholders of the eastern provinces, his fangs had been taken out and that his submission to him was only a question of time. That is why, instead of sending an army against him, he renewed the struggle against Gwalior which had been prematurely interrupted by the death of Sikandar. Ibrāhīm was thus inclined to give his brother time for retracing his steps.

But the nobles in Jalāl’s camp wanted a civil war to increase their privileges, by promising

¹ The date of his accession is not given by any author except Aḥmad ibn Aḥmad Shāhī, who, as has been pointed out earlier has confused Ibrāhīm’s second coronation with accession of Jalāluddin, pp. 107-108.

Tab. I, pp. 343-344, and Bad. I, p. 326, give the event a very brief notice.
support to the highest bidder. They had first taken the initiative in promising partition, though successfully posing as impartial judges of the respective claims of the two brothers. This was mischievous enough. But their counterparts in Ibrāhīm’s camp advised unilateral repudiation of the compact and arrest of Prince Jalāl. This suited the designs of disaffected nobles admirably because they could use it as a lever for promoting bitterness between the two brothers. The attitude of eastern nobles came as a great damper to the designs of Jalāl’s more unscrupulous followers. But they were determined not to give in easily. Hence they egged him on to declare his independence. When this too failed to draw out Ibrāhīm’s wrath, they advised Jalāl to take the initiative in starting hostilities. “Having made the necessary arrangements relative to the army, artillery, retinue and attendants, and other requisites for the campaign, he (Jalāl) gained over the Zamindars and thus acquired power and strength.” When Jalāl’s preparations had been made, it was decided to gain fresh adherents by diplomacy and war.

Jalāl with a strong detachment of his troops moved towards Gwalior which Āzam Humāyūn Sarwānī was besieging. He despatched to him a letter, in which he protested his innocence in the matter of his estrangement from his brother Ibrāhīm, and accused the latter of repudiating a compact which had been unequivocally accepted

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1 TKJL. p. 122; Dorn I, p. 71.
2 Elliot V, p. 10, f.n. 1.
3 TKJL. p. 122 and Dorn I, p. 71, wrongly say ‘held the fort of Gwalior’. Other authors mention ‘Kalinjar’ in place of ‘Gwalior’ but the latter seems to be more probable.
by all parties. He tickled the vanity of Āzam, Humāyūn by styling him as his uncle or even his father and appealed to him to take up his cause on the grounds of justice and chivalry.

Āzam Humāyūn did not take long to decide his line of action. Duty demanded that the invitation of Jalāl should be firmly declined, that the siege should be pressed with vigour and that the Sultan should be requested to rush up reinforcements. But self-interest recommended treason. If he went over to the side of Jalāl he would escape being sandwiched between the valiant Rājpūts of Gwalior and the disappointed Afghāns under Jalāl. He would also be able to avoid the unhappy situation of fighting against his own son Fath Khan, the Wazīr of the prince. Besides it would be a convenient means of feeding the grudge that he bore against the Sultan. Above all, the humility of Jalāl held out a promise of greater honours than Ibrāhīm had conferred on him. He therefore, chose the path of treason, shamelessly pretending that he was prompted by chivalry in championing the cause of the oppressed and the just. Thus an important and senior noble of Sikandar had contributed his share to weakening the authority of his successor at Delhi.

1 TKJL, p. 122 says that he had power and strength to oppose the prince. Details about this episode are given by other authorities also: Dāstān pp. 108-109; Tab. I, p. 344; MR. I, pp. 480-481; Yadgār p. 69; Fer. (L) I, pp. 188-190.

2 Dorn 1, p. 72 notes his lack of confidence to withstand Jalāl's solicitations. Though Dorn does not specifically say so, Āzam Humāyūn must have calculated that the Afghāns would launch a furious attack against him if they were disappointed in their move to detach him from the side of Ibrāhīm.

3 Dorn 1, p. 72.
in order to satisfy his own lust for power and prestige.

The rebels held a council of war and it was agreed that they should first seize Awadh, then turn east and reduce the whole of Jaunpur territory to obedience. When this had been done, they would meet again to consider the next move. The attack on Awadh was made with such speed that its governor Saq̣īd Khan s/o Mubārak Khan Lodi was taken completely by surprise and sought safety in a precipitate retreat to Lakhnaū.¹

The civil war was now in full swing. The advisers of Jalāl, the followers of Ibrāhīm and, last of all, Āzam Humāyūn had conducted themselves in such a manner that the two brothers were forced into an armed conflict. Such a conflict might be ruinous to one or both the princes but the nobles would gain in power and influence in either case. The civil war was thus not so much the outcome of conflicting ambitions of royal princes, as of wily machinations of disaffected nobility.

When Ibrāhīm was informed of the turn the events had taken, he had no option but to pick up the gauntlet. As a precautionary measure, he sent his brothers, whom he had previously imprisoned at the capital, to Hānsī under proper guard, but he made adequate arrangements for their normal physical comforts.² He then concili-

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¹ Dādā, p. 109; Tab. I, p. 344; MR, I, p. 481; Yādgār, p. 70 has 'Karā' in place of 'Lakhnaū' which appears less likely.
² Dorn I, p. 72, MR, I, p. 481 and Tab. I, p. 344 have the following names: Ismā'īl Khan, Husain Khan, Mahmūd Khan, and Daulat Khan, TKJL, p. 122 has 'Farid Khan' in place of 'Mahmūd Khan'. Bad. I,
ated the nobles in his camp by gifts and promotions, and secured the loyalty of the army by ordering payment of one month's salary in advance.¹

The Sultan now proceeded towards Jaunpur on Thursday 24th Zihijjah 923² (7th January 1518) and reached Bhogāon by forced marches. From here he made a dash to Kanauj. He was still on the way when news was brought that Ā zam Humayūn and his son Fath Khan had deserted Jalāl Khan and were coming to meet the Sultan. Ibrāhīm was very happy to learn of this breach in the ranks of the rebels and he made elaborate arrangements for the reception of the deserters. This double treachery by Ā zam Humayūn yielded a distinct advantage to Ibrāhīm in so far as the credit and morale of Jalāl began to decline rapidly, while faith in the Sultan's might increased correspondingly. He might have also realized how unscrupulous and undependable some members of the older nobility had become. For the present, however, the Sultan kept his feelings secretly concealed in his own heart.

Jalāl Khan was not in a position now to try conclusions in an open engagement. He there-

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¹ Yādgār, p. 70.
² Dorn I p. 72 has Thursday 25th Zihijjah but TKJL p. 123 has 24th which is correct because 25th was a Friday and not Thursday. Dāndī also has the same date. Yādgār p. 70 has Rabi ul Akhir in place of Zihijjah.

p. 326 names only Ismāil and Husain and covers the rest by the expression 'others'.

If we check up this list with the names of Sikandar's sons as given in Chapter IV p. 111, it is found that 'Farid' and 'Daulat' have not been mentioned therein. Probably on that account De (fn. 1 p. 397) suggests that Daulat Khan might be the jailor, but Yādgār p. 70 makes Muhammad Khan the jailor. Dāndī p. 109 mentions comforts provided to the prisoners.
fore retreated to Kalpi. This impressed the nobles of the east as well. Consequently, Saēd Khan, Shaikhzādā Muhammad Farmulī and most of the other nobles of Jaumpur came to wait on Sultan Ibrāhīm at Kanauj.

Ibrāhīm now deputed Āzam Humāyūn Lodi, Āzam Humāyūn Sarwānī, and Nasīr Khan Nūhānī to pursue Jalāl and to capture Kalpi. They were provided with a large army and trained war elephants. But before they reached there, Jalāl had left for Agra, leaving some of his trusted lieutenants like Imād-ul-mulk and his foster-mother Niāmat-Khātūn to defend Kalpi. The garrison carried on an unequal fight for some time but finally surrendered. The nobles of Ibrāhīm ordered a general sack of the fort and the town and a large booty fell into the hands of the imperialists.

Jalāl had already reached Agra and was laying siege to it when he was informed of the trend of events at Kalpi. In a spirit of retaliation, he wanted to destroy and plunder the capital of Ibrāhīm. But the latter had already sent Malik Ādam Kākar for its defence. When this officer

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1 In the meantime, there was a rising in Jartautl in the Paragana of Kol. The leader of this rebellion was Khan Chand or Mūn Chand. Niāmatulīh does not mention the name of this leader but says that he was defeated and killed by Umar who after this waited on the Sultan at Kanauj. Nizāmuddīn, who is followed by the author of Maṣūr-i-Rahīm, says that Umar Khan was defeated and killed by the Hindu rebel chief while he himself was defeated and killed by Qāsim Khan, Governor of Sambhal. This also raised the morale of Ibrāhīm’s followers. Tab. I, p. 344; MR. I, pp. 481-482; TKJL. p. 123; Dorn I, p. 72; Elliot V, p. 104 n. 2.

Jartautl is perhaps Jarauli of Aligarh. (Distt. Gaz. VI, p. 263.) It is now a large village 27°, 49° N, 78°, 13E, owned by Rajpūts.

2 TKJL. p. 123; Tab. I, p. 345; Dāndī p. 110. MR. I, p. 482 leaves out ‘Āzam Humāyūn Sarwānī’.
reached the capital, he found that Jalâl’s power was superior. But he did not imitate Āzam Ḥumâyûn Sarwâni’s conduct at Gwalior. On the contrary, he sent a very urgent messenger to the Sultan for rushing in reinforcements without any delay. At the same time he put off Jalâl Khan by tactful messages.

But when he had received adequate reinforcements, he changed his tone and sent to the enemy a virtual ultimatum for surrender. Terms of surrender offered to Jalâl.

Jalâl was asked ‘to abstain from further pretensions to sovereignty and give up the parasol, fan, the retinue, trumpet, kettledrum and other insignia of royalty, and adopt the conduct of the Omras’. In return he was promised the government of Kalpi. Jalâl accepted these terms not merely because he was lacking in wisdom and perseverance, as is observed by Nîâmatullâh, but also

1 Yadgar pp. 71-72 says that 1,800 soldiers and 50 war elephants were sent to reinforce Ādam Kâkar.

Dorn I, p. 73, Tab. I, p. 346 and MR. I, pp. 482-483, name Malik Ismâ‘îl Jalwâni, Kabîr Khan Lodî and Bahâdur Khan Nûhâni as the leaders of reinforcements.

While Dâudi p. 110 and Tab. and, MR. specifically ascribe the ultimatum to Malik Ādam’s initiative, Dorn I, p. 73, makes it a joint undertaking in which the new arrivals also collaborated.

2 Dâudi’s version of the ultimatum and its acceptance:

3 TKJL. p. 124; Dorn. I, p. 73.
because he now realised the hopelessness of his cause and foolishly believed that his brother might still be persuaded to overlook his past.

When these terms were communicated to Ibrāhīm, he was encamped at Etawah, on his way back to the capital. He refused to ratify them. Most of our authorities castigate Ibrāhīm for this, more or less, in the following words:—

"But owing to his unlimited pride, violent temper, and youthful temerity, he not only entirely disapproved the treaty but issued orders to annihilate Jalāluddīn...."\(^1\)

This is again a garbled statement. It was not merely vanity, temerity and haughtiness that made Ibrāhīm take such a decision. There were weightier reasons of state for it. Ibrāhīm knew that his authority could never be fully stabilized as long as the nobles could look to another prince as a possible rival to the throne. The conduct of some of them at least had caused him serious misgivings and he was determined to allow them no further rope. Exigencies of the state demanded it, history sanctioned it and past experience supported it, for had not Bārbak's restoration after the rebellion been proved unwise in the sequel.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Dorn. I, p. 73.
\(^2\) Yadgār pp. 72-73 says that Jalāl had 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers and 50 to 160 war-elephants when he was asked to surrender. His nobles protested against his decision to submit thus:—

"What cowardice is this. The Sultan will, by no means, let you remain alive. We have been in your service for the last ten years. Have courage so that your devoted followers may have a chance of serving you even at the risk of their lives. The giver of the victory is Allāh. Sultan Ibrāhīm is a man of a haughty temper. He is bound to maltreat his father's nobles. At last, all these men will flock under thy banner."

Ibrāhīm seems to have sensed this danger in the event of his attempt to root out indiscipline among the Afghāns.
Ibrāhīm therefore ordered the arrest of Jalāl Khan. When the latter heard this, he fled to Gwalior whose Rājā gave him shelter. He might have hoped that Jalāl’s presence in his camp would sow seeds of dissension in the ranks of the Afghān army and nobility so that it would be easier for him to defy the authority of the Sultan of Delhi if and when the latter attacked his territory.

Mān Singh the Rājā of Gwalior did not have to wait for long for the attack. Ibrāhīm sent ʿĀzam Humāyūn Sarwānī at the head of 30,000 horse and 300 war elephants to capture the fort of Gwalior.1 There were many reasons why Ibrāhīm ordered invasion of this state. After Jalāl’s flight from Agra and the Sultan’s arrival there, most of the rebellious nobles who had formerly sided with Jalāl expressed repentance and acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan.2 This strengthened his position and he could safely renew the war against Rājā Mān. In the second place, if he was successful in annexing Gwalior it would considerably enhance his prestige because even his illustrious father had failed to do it. But, as Dādī says, the strongest reason was his desire to capture Prince Jalāl. Subsequent events3 suggest that there was an additional reason also. He wanted to have an early opportunity to test the honesty of his new adherents and to punish them

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1 Dādī, p. 111. MR. I, p. 483 and Tabqāt I, p. 347 correctly describe him as Sarwānī and the governor of ‘Karā’ while Dādī wrongly states ‘Agra’ in place of Karā.
2 Yādgār, p. 73; TKJL. p. 125.
3 Viz. the appointment of the erstwhile rebels as the leaders of the attack on Gwalior; arrest and imprisonment of ʿĀzam Humāyūn and his son Fath Khan; etc.
suitably should they be found wanting in loyalty or valour.

As soon as Jalāl learnt about the approach of the Sultan’s army he fled from Gwalior to seek the help of Mahmud Khilji of Malwa. The latter had some personal grouse against the Sultan of Delhi but he was neither very warlike nor charitable enough to treat Jalāl well. Consequently, the latter left his territory and proceeded towards Garha Katangā1 where he was captured by Gonds who surrendered him to Sultan Ibrāhīm. The Sultan sent him to Hansi, and had him killed on the way.2

The death of Prince Jalāl relieved Ibrāhīm of a great anxiety. He now sent fresh reinforcements to press the siege of Gwalior.3 Fortunately, for the Sultan, Rājā Mān died just about this time and was succeeded by his son Vikramāditya. In spite of heavy losses, the Sultan’s forces captured one gate after another. At last, Bādalgahr which had been constructed by Rājā Mān for the better defence of the main citadel, was captured by mining the walls.4

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1 Dāddī, p. 112; Tab. I, p. 348 and MR. I, p. 484 support the above reading.
2 Yādgār p. 74 gives Ahmad Khan as the name of the assassin.
3 Dāddī says that he sent reinforcements under 14 other nobles. But Tab. I, p. 347; MR. I, pp. 483-484 and TKJL. p. 126 give only the following names:—
4 Inside the walls a metallic statue of a cow was found. It made an automatic bleating. When it was sent to Agra, the Sultan was much amused and ordered it to be placed on the Baghdad gate at Delhi. Nizāmu’dīn
The loss of Bādalgarh was a great disaster and it made further resistance difficult. Vikramāditya carried on a desperate struggle for sometime longer. Ibrāhīm, on his part, was determined to press his advantage home and to force a decision. He suspected the bona fides of Ḍāmān Ḥumāyūn and therefore recalled him to the capital.¹ Instead of weakening the operations, it hastened the fall of Gwalior. Ibrāhīm treated the valiant Tomar chief with generosity and though he deprived him of the strong fort of Gwalior which was entrusted to the care of royal agents, he assigned to him the fief of Shamsābād.² This touched the heart of Rājā Vikramāditya so much that he remained firmly attached to the Lodi monarch and died fighting in his cause in 932 H/1526 A.D.³

Another important war of Ibrāhīm's reign was his struggle against the Rānā of Mewār. Rānā Sangrām Singh the Sisodiya King of Mewār had inherited a great military tradition and a growing kingdom. Nature had endowed him with uncommon physical strength, mental vigour and capacity

Ahmad and Badāoni both claim to have seen it with their own eyes. Badāoni saw it at Fatehpur Sikri where it had been sent in 1584. It was later melted to make gongs, bells and implements out of it.

¹ Yadgir pp. 83-86 and Wāqiāt pp. 81-82 while detailing the circumstances of his recall do not associate any other person in his disgrace.
² MR. I, p. 485 says that his son Fath Khan was also recalled.
³ Dādī p. 113 makes a general statement saying that the nobles who were on the point of capturing Gwalior were recalled and imprisoned.

All these authors insinuate whimsicality on the part of Ibrāhīm but the real motive of the Sultan was to speed up the action and to remove men of doubtful loyalty. We shall review this case at length when discussing Ibrāhīm's relations with the nobles.

¹ C. S. G. I, p. 234.
² Fer. (L) I, p. 205.
for leadership both in peace and war. He had made himself the master of practically the whole of Rājasthān and was constantly engaged in wars against his neighbours. One of these was the ruler of Malwa. Sultan Mahmūd Khilji II first appointed Medini Rāi as his chief minister but when the minister became very powerful, he sacked him. Rānā Sangrām Singh took up the cause of Medini Rāi to further his scheme of territorial aggrandisement against the decadent state of Malwa.

The Lodis had also been casting longing looks on the territories of this state. They had already occupied Chanderi and Narwar. They had missed acquisition of Ranthambhor by a narrow margin. Thus both the Lodis and the Sīsodiyās wanted to help themselves at the cost of the Khiljis. It was, therefore, inevitable that they should come into conflict.

It is not quite clear as to who initiated the struggle. Rājpūt sources suggest that it was the Rānā who had started annexing Delhi territory from the time of Sikandar Lodi.\(^1\) But they give no details about the Delhi-Mewār relations before the accession of Ibrāhīm Lodi. Nizāmuddīn Ahmad and Ferieshī, however, state in course of their narrative of the history of Malwa that when Mahmūd Khilji regained his capital by the help of Medini Rāi and his Rājpūt followers Buhjat Khan and Muhāfiz Khan sought the aid of Sultan Sikandar in favour of Sāhib Khan in order to destroy the influence of Rājpūts in Malwa. Medini Rāi rose equal to the occasion and defeated not

\(^1\) Ojhā II, p. 663.
merely the confederates of Sāhib Khan but also the Gujerat army which had tried to fish in troubled waters. It is likely that when Medini Rāi found himself pressed by the armies of Gujerat and Delhi, he exhorted the premier Rājpūt ruler—Rānā Sāngā—to aid him. The Rānā may have then created a diversion by attacking Lodī territory, which might have induced Sikandar to withdraw his forces temporarily from the contest. But though it would not be reasonable to accept the view that, while Sāngā was annexing Delhi territory, Sikandar was unable to resist him because of his weakness, yet some frontier incidents might have occurred which strained the relations between these two kingdoms.

After the death of Sikandar, the Lodī monarchy Khātolī was faced with a serious civil war. This was a suitable opportunity for the Rānā to aggrandise himself at the cost of the Delhi territory. Ibrāhīm Lodī was busy consolidating his power “when news of Sāngā’s encroachments reached him.” Ibrāhīm promptly proceeded against the Rānā and a battle was fought at Khātolī on the borders of Hārīwātī. It was a severely contested engagement in which although the Rājpūts scored a victory and captured a prince of the Lodī family, the Rānā ‘lost his left arm by a sword cut and an arrow made him lame for life.’

1 Tah., III, pp. 383-392; Fer. (L) II, pp. 263-265; Sārdā, pp. 66-68.
2 Such a view has been expressed by Pt. Gaurīshankar Hīrachand Ojha, p. 363.
3 Sārdā, p. 56.
4 Sārdā, p. 56; Ojha II, p. 663. Wazīrat p. 118, has mixed up the events of two separate wars.
Khātolī was included in Sarkar Gwalior in the time of Akbar and it had a fort (Vide Ain II, p. 187).
The circumstances of this war made renewal of hostilities inevitable. The Mahārāṇā felt very crest-fallen because of his physical disabilities and even offered to vacate the throne. Consequently, it was natural that he should seek to rehabilitate his dignity by another war against the Lodi monarch. For Ibrāhīm, renewal of hostilities was still more urgent. The royal prisoner in the Rājpūt camp could be used as a rival claimant for the throne and the disaffection among some of the older Afghān nobles might be easily exploited to this end. Hence Ibrāhīm initiated the next war in 1518 as soon as he had suppressed the rebellion of Islam Khan.

The Afghān army contained many experienced leaders like Miān Husain Farmuli, the governor of Sāran and Champāran, Miān Maārīf Farmuli, and Khān-i-Khānān Farmuli. But the commander in-chief was a comparatively young man, Miān Makhan who was, however, very loyal and devoted to the Sultan, while his seniors were exceedingly vain and suspected of hostility towards Ibrāhīm.

In the initial skirmishes, the advantage probably lay with the Rājpūts led by the Rānā in person, because the Afghāns did not act as a team. Makhan placed responsibility for failure on the dis-affection of Husain and Maārīf while the latter shifted all blame to Makhan’s incompetence. A

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1 Sārdā, pp. 58-59.
2 Sārdā pp. 60-61; Ojha II, pp. 663-664.
3 Dāndī, p. 121.
4 Yādgār, p. 78; Elliot V, p. 16.
5 Dāndī, p. 116 mentions that these people resented their supersession by Makhan. Waqīyat p. 118 says that Makhan had instructions to arrest Husain and Maārīf and to send them to the capital.
crisis was reached when Miān Husain deserted to the Rānā and the Afghāns were so greatly demoralized by mutual dissensions and recriminations that they suffered a heavy defeat near Dhulpur and lost a large number of soldiers in killed and wounded, as they retreated to Bayānā.  

When the Sultan heard of this disaster, he proceeded from Agra and reached the banks of the river Kaner by forced marches. The presence of the Sultan in person raised the morale of his followers and frightened the traitorous and the disaffected. Miān Husain retraced his steps to the royal camp, soon followed by other deserters to the Rānā. The Afghāns probably fought an indecisive engagement and the Rānā retreated for the time being. But when Husain, who was appointed governor of Chanderi was killed, the Rānā made a fresh attack and seized Chanderi. 

Thus Ibrāhīm Lodi's position became weaker after this war. He had suffered a reverse even according to Muslim historians. He had lost Chanderi and his relations with the older nobility had become much worse than before. It was this mounting tension between the Sultan and the nobles which was ultimately to cost him his life and ushered in a new foreign dynasty. 

The duel between monarchy and nobility had begun as early as in the time of Sikandar. As we have seen earlier, he had to face conspiracies, rebellions and insubordination. Ibrāhīm was an

1 Yadgar, p. 81. 
2 Dādī, p. 118. Tod (Crooke) I, p. 349 refers to 18 pitched battles of the Rānā and this might be one of them. 
intelligent and youthful ruler. He had seen at close quarters the developments in his father's reign. He was determined to enhance the dignity of the crown and to treat all his subjects whether Afghan or otherwise, noble or commoner, as equal in the eyes of the Sultan of Delhi. The nobles on the contrary, still dreamt of sticking to the privileges which Bahlul and Sikandar had allowed them. They wanted to be treated as co-partners in a tribal confederacy. Bahlul's meekness and humility had pampered them. Sikandar, while trying to be more firm and authoritarian had carefully respected their susceptibilities and showed consideration for age and rank. Ibrāhīm's reign, had begun under a cloud of mutual distrust. The nobles were alarmed because he had said 'Kingship knows no kinship' and had made them stand before his magnificent throne with hands folded across their breast. They had, therefore, conspired to weaken him by partitioning the empire. This gave such a shock to Ibrāhīm that he could never reconcile himself to the old nobility, which, while protesting loyalty to the best interests of the Afghan empire, had planned to give it such a deadly blow only to satisfy their vanity and selfishness. A struggle between the two was, therefore, inevitable unless either party honestly resiled from the course which it had set itself, regardless of the reactions of the other.

As misfortune would have it, there was no sincere change of outlook on either side. Consequently, misunderstanding went on increasing. The cases of Miān Bhūa, Āzam Humāyūn Sarwānī and Miān Husain Farmūlī complicated the situation so badly that a reconciliation became
impossible. A review of these cases would reveal how either party contributed to the worsening of the situation.

Ā zam Humāyūn Sarwānī was one of the most distinguished nobles of Sikandar. He, however, did not like Ibrāhīm and bore a personal malice towards him. Though he had acknowledged the authority of the new Sultan, he had deserted to Jalāl at a critical moment. It is true that he had repented later and had forsaken his new love but the mischief had been done. The conquest of Gwalior was delayed; the losses suffered in the siege had been an utter waste and the prestige of the Sultan had been considerably undermined. A civil war had been forced on the people and it was after a few months of suspense that the Sultan could once more feel secure. If Ibrāhīm held Ā zam Humāyūn responsible for all these setbacks and disorders, he was not far wrong. It is possible to suggest that Ā zam Humāyūn had committed treason in a fit of generosity. The fact, however, remains that Ibrāhīm had done nothing till then to justify Ā zam Humāyūn’s treachery against him.

But once Ibrāhīm’s suspicions had been aroused he never sincerely forgave him. He welcomed him back to his service for diplomatic reasons but kept him constantly on trial. He sent him against Kalpi to test his sincerity of devotion to his cause. As Kalpi fell without a serious resistance, there was hardly any scope for Ā zam Humāyūn’s treachery, even if he had wished it. Prince Jalāl had fled to Gwalior from Agra and the Sultan sent Ā zam Humāyūn on the twofold errand of reducing Gwalior and bringing Jalāl a prisoner.
He failed to prevent Jalāl's escape into Malwa but he pressed the siege of Gwalior with vigour.

Ibrāhīm now determined to round up all suspects, no matter how exalted their position. He, therefore, sent heavy reinforcements, strong enough not merely to force the Rājpūts to surrender but also to overpower Āzam Humāyūn, in case he should disregard the royal summons to capital. Abdullāh suggests\(^1\) that though his sons and followers persuaded Āzam Humāyūn not to walk into the death trap by going to Agra and that though the ulemā also sanctioned his assumption of the Khutba and the Sikka in his own name, yet he was so faithful and loyal that he preferred death to rebellion. But this is a very distorted view of things. Ibrāhīm's precautions had left Āzam Humāyūn no other course except compliance to the farman. He might have even entertained the hope that his meekness and humility might win for him a more lenient treatment. It is possibly for this reason that he himself warned the Sultan about the rebellion by his son Islam Khan. It is, therefore, wrong to suggest that while Āzam Humāyūn was the very embodiment of virtue, his master was a virtual demon, consumed by jealousy and dead to all noble sentiments. But Ibrāhīm was neither wise nor statesmanlike in disgracing Āzam Humāyūn in the very hour of his victory which to a certain extent had offset his previous errors in the public eye. The conduct of the Sultan was liable to be represented as vindictive and ungracious. It was partly this

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\(^1\) Dāndī pp. 126-127; See also Yādgār pp. 83-86; Wāqīat pp. 81-82.
indiscretion on the part of the Sultan which won
for Islam Khan so many adherents.¹

The case of Miān Husain Farmūli was worse
still. He too was one of the most powerful nobles
of the time of Sikandar. But he was more vain
than was good for him. He quarrelled with Miān
Makhan, the supreme commander,² while the
Rājpūts were waiting for an attack. When he
discovered that the Sultan had taken a serious
view of his conduct and had ordered his arrest, he
deserted to the enemy and when the latter inflicted
a crushing defeat on the Afghāns, he claimed that
it was due to the difference caused by his crossing
over to the other side.³

When the Sultan came up with reinforcements,
Miān Husain trembled for fear of retribution.
Hence he sent his brother Miān Tāhā to the
Sultan with a message that he had deserted only
to show his worth, and that as he was really loyal
to the Sultan, he was quite willing to return to
his service if Sayyad Khan and Fath Khan Sar-
wānī were released by the Sultan and sent to meet
him. Ibrāhīm could not have liked such a brazen-
faceted defence of treachery, but he wanted to pull
himself out of a difficult situation, and he was
anxious to finish the war with the Rānā. Hence he
complied with the demands of Husain and sent the
aforesaid nobles to him. Even this gesture of
goodwill was not enough to win over Husain
Khan.

¹ See below pp. 190-192.
² Dādžī p. 116.
³ Yādgār p. 82 states that Husain did not take part
in the fight but Dādžī p. 118 says that he led the Rānā's
forces while Wāqfī p. 119 says that he did it half-heartedly.
Rānā Sangrām Singh had in his camp a descendant of Bahlīl as a prisoner of war.\(^1\) He was now crowned as the rival Sultan of Delhi and assumed the style of Ghiyāsuddin. Miān Husain ultimately left the camp of the Rānā only because Sayyad Khan was treated by the latter with greater regard and Miān Husain felt slighted by it, especially when his messenger Miān Tāhā was not even admitted to the conference in which the Rānā, Sayyad Khan and others were engaged.\(^2\)

Miān Husain thus had no political future in the camp of the Rānā. Consequently, Miān Tāhā was once more on his march to the Sultan, this time with apologies of Miān Husain. The Sultan allowed him to come back and promised him the government of Chanderi. On Husain’s decision to desert the Rānā, other Afghāns also found their position precarious and therefore most of them joined him. Ibrāhīm felt that he had been humiliated only because of the treachery of these vain-glorious nobles. Yādgār says that Miān Husain and Miān Maāruf had joined forces during the night following the defeat of the Lodi army, had made a night attack on the Rājpats, causing severe losses to them and had then joined Ibrāhīm who lavished favours on them.\(^3\) If this statement of Yādgār were true—though it is extremely doubtful—Ibrāhīm should have all the more ascribed his first defeat to their treachery. Consequently, if he should have decided to punish Miān Husain, the arch-conspirator, his conduct would not be indefensible. Miān Husain was appointed governor of Chanderi on his own choosing and was

\(^1\) Waqīat, p. 120.
\(^2\) Waqīat, p. 122; Dāndī, p. 121.
\(^3\) Yādgār, pp. 82-83.
murdered by the Shaikhzâdâs. Abdullâh charges Ibrâhîm with planning his murder by hiring assassins. But Rizqullâh fixes partial responsibility for the murder on the cruelties of Shaikh Dâd, Husain’s Dîwân and Officer-in-charge of Justice.¹

In this case again, the fault lies mainly with Miân Husain. He was guilty of desertion and conspiracy against the Sultan. He had advanced the designs of the Rânâ to depose Ibrâhîm and place another kinsman of his on the throne of Delhi. The losses suffered by the Sultan both in prestige and material resources were heavy. Miân Husain’s only redeeming feature was his desertion of the Rânâ. But even that had been preceded by irritating conditions which the Sultan had to accept. Ordinarily, therefore, this was a fit case for the infliction of the capital punishment. But murder by assassins smacks of weakness and malice and even if Ibrâhîm was not guilty of murder—though we have no definite evidence to absolve him of it—the general atmosphere of suspicion and distrust lent confirmation to such a theory.

The last of the more important cases of Miân Bhuâ’s alleged maltreatment of nobles by Ibrâhîm was that of Miân Bhuâ, the Wazîr of Sîkandar. He was superseded and his son was appointed in his place. Even Abdullâh who condemns Ibrâhîm’s policy towards the older nobility says that Miân Bhuâ, contrary to his past record of loyalty, had begun to show signs of disobedience.² Niâmatullâh tells us that the old man was not only indifferent to-

¹ Dândî, pp. 122-125; Wâqîât pp. 125-128.
² Dândî pp. 113-114.
wards pleasing the Sultan, but was also unfit for his judicial office because of old age, infirmity of limbs and failing eyesight.\(^1\) Dismissal of Miān Bhuā was, therefore, quite proper. But it is difficult to see why it should have been necessary to manacle his feet and to put him into prison and under an officer who had been his subordinate. The old Wazīr would not have nursed any serious grievance even after his compulsory retirement when the beneficiary of such an act was his own son. Therefore, in this case also though the dismissal was justified but the manner of doing it was ungracious and likely to cause misgivings among other nobles. The old man later on died in prison. Evil-minded people found no difficulty in carrying on a whispering propaganda that the old man had really been murdered. Ibrāhīm’s action was thus tactless, vindictive and ill-advised.\(^2\)

Other events, illustrative of nobles’ opposition are mere offshoots of these cases. The first serious rising which Ibrāhīm had to face was headed by Islam Khan son of Āzam Humāyūn Sarwānī. When he heard about his father’s disgrace, he seized his property and started collecting troops in Karā and Manikpur. As Islam Khan held Karā on behalf of his father who was already in disgrace and because Āzam Humāyūn himself had warned the Sultan against Islam Khan’s rebellion,\(^3\) Ibrāhīm hurried to appoint a successor, in the

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\(^1\) TKJL, p. 125; Elliot V, p. 14 f.n. 1.
\(^2\) Tab. I, p. 347; Bad. I, p. 327 and MR, I, p. 483 give practically the same details.
\(^3\) Yadgār pp. 75-76 has a story that Bhuā along with a number of other imprisoned nobles were blown to pieces by mining the floor of the room in which they were invited to meet for suggesting ways of meeting Islam Khan’s rebellion.
person of Ahmad Khan. But when the latter reached Karā, Islam Khan gave him battle and defeated him. This was a dangerous portent.

Ibrāhīm was planning to fit a large army to suppress this rising. Just then he had another shock, for he was told that Āzam Humāyūn Lodi, Saād Khan Lodi and a number of other great nobles had fled to Lakhnāū without the Sultan’s permission¹ and had joined their forces with those of Islam Khan.² Ibrāhīm had to be extra cautious now. He raised a large army and deputed a number of trusted nobles, many of whom belonged to the new order of young men which Ibrāhīm had built-up as a counterpoise to the old guard.³

When this army reached Bāngarmaū⁴ near Kanauj, Iq̄bāl Khan, Khasah Khail of Āzam Humāyūn Lodi made a surprise attack, at the head of 5,000 horse and hundred elephants and inflicted heavy losses.⁶ The Sultan now issued a stern warning to the nobles that so long as they had not exterminated the rebel forces and had recovered the lost provinces they would not be admitted to

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¹ Daādi, p. 114 ; Tab. I, p. 349 ; MR. I, p. 485 ; Yādgār p. 76.
² TKJL, p. 128.
³ Daādi p. 114 says that there were 12 of them. TKJL, p. 128 gives 9 names only viz. Ahmad Khan brother of Āzam Humāyūn Lodi ; Majlis-Āli Shaikh-
⁴ Daādi, p. 114 ; Bāngarmaū lies half-way on the road joining Unao and Hardoi (Vide Road Map of India, Sheet B).
⁵ Yādgār, p. 76 ; MR. I, p. 485.
⁶ Daādi, p. 114 ; Tab. I, p. 349 has Mohd. in place of Mahmād), Ali Khan, Khān-i-Jahān Farmūl (Khān-i-
⁵ Yādgār, p. 76 ; MR. I, p. 485.
⁶ TKJL, p. 128.
⁷ Daādi, p. 114 ; Tab. I, p. 349 has Mohd. in place of Mahmād), Ali Khan, Khān-i-Jahān Farmūl (Khān-i-
⁸ TKJL, p. 128 gives 9 names only viz. Ahmad Khan brother of Āzam Humāyūn Lodi ; Majlis-Āli Shaikh-
⁹ TKJL, p. 128 gives 9 names only viz. Ahmad Khan brother of Āzam Humāyūn Lodi ; Majlis-Āli Shaikh-
° TKJL, p. 128 gives 9 names only viz. Ahmad Khan brother of Āzam Humāyūn Lodi ; Majlis-Āli Shaikh-
royal audience. At the same time, he also rushed reinforcements to raise the morale of his troops.

The rebel forces numbered 40,000 horse and 500 elephants. Actual combat might have occasioned heavy casualties. To avoid this mutual killing, Shaikh Rājū Bokhārī intervened as a mediator. The rebels agreed to leave the Sultan’s dominions if Āzam Humāyūn Sarwānī was released. When Ibrāhīm was informed of these terms he rejected them and ordered the nobles of the east viz. Daryā Khan Nūhānī of Bihar, Nasīr Khan Nūhānī of Ghazipur and Shaikhzādā Muhammad Farmūlī to attack the rebels from that side.

The battle that now ensued has been graphically described by Niṣmatullāh, Yādgār and Abdullāh. It lasted the whole day. Both sides suffered heavy casualties ranging from 4,000 to 10,000. Islam Khan was killed while Sačēd Khan and a number of other rebel chiefs were captured by the followers of Daryā Khan Nūhānī. When the Sultan was informed of his success, he celebrated the victory with great rejoicings and lavished praises and gifts on those who had taken part in suppressing the rebellion.

Ibrāhīm who was already suspicious of the older nobility became all the more bitter because of the rebellion of Islam Khan, the defection of Āzam Humāyūn Lodi and Sačēd Khan Lodi, and lack of enterprise shown by the first batch of officers sent against them. There was another evil consequence also. People’s faith in the resources

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1 Dorn, I p. 75.
2 Dāndī, p. 115, wrongly puts the figure at 5,000. MR. I, p. 486, and Yādgār, p. 77.
3 Tab. I, p. 350.
of the Sultan was considerably shaken and the nobles of the eastern districts became exceedingly vain, because they thought that, but for their timely succour, the rebellion might have assumed alarming proportions.

A little later was announced the death of Miān Bhūā and Āzam Humāyūn. This was followed by the removal of Miān Husain Farmūli at Chanderi. Many people suspected the Sultan of foul play. The circumstances surrounding their death, specially of Miān Husain were plausible enough to fix the blame on the Sultan. Other older nobles were already suspect. In full appreciation of the situation they too became disaffected in their behaviour and sentiments.¹ This led to the imprisonment and death of a number of them. Thus tension continued to mount up in all directions. In the frontier regions, discontent spread more widely and deeply.

Daryā Khan Nāhānī, the governor of Bihar thought that the Sultan’s anger would next fall on him. He arrived at this conclusion by a tendentious reasoning. As the author of the victory against Islam Khan and his confederates, he had risen in people’s estimation. The Sultan might therefore consider him dangerous. As the Sultan was by nature distrustful of able men he would desire to put him to death. Besides, Daryā Khan had criticised the policy of Ibrāhīm sometime in the past. He, therefore, proposed not to meet the Sultan but to go back to Bihar and to raise an army for his defence.² He discussed the matter

¹ TKJL. p. 130.
² Dorn I. p. 76.

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with Muhammad Khan Sūr and other nobles who concurred with his opinion.

The attitude of Daryā Khan must have exasperated the Sultan and it is no wonder that he began to feel that most of the older nobility was disaffected towards him. Considering prevention to be better than cure, he seized as many of them as showed any signs of sedition or contumely. A vicious circle had thus been formed. In course of time, the power of Daryā Khan Nūhānī considerably increased and he began to behave more or less like an independent chief. After his death, his son Bahādur Khan became openly defiant. He assumed the title of Muhammad Shāh, issued the coins and recited Khutba in his own name, raised an army of 100,000 soldiers and reduced to submission the entire tract of land from Bihar to Sambhal. Niāmatullāh says that Ibrāhīm sent Nasir Khan Nūhānī of Ghazipur against him; but he was defeated, and he deserted to the rebels. Other nobles in the eastern parts were also disaffected and flocked to the banner of Muhammad Shāh. It was mainly for this reason that his triumphal march to Sambhal was so rapid and unh hampered.

Ibrāhīm could hope for assistance only from the west. When his grandfather Bahālūl was hard-pressed by the Sharqīs, he had sent out an appeal to the tribesmen of Roh and it was their ready response that had helped him to withstand the fury

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1 Elliot V, p. 22, f.n. 4.
2 MR. I, p. 487. Yādzgār p. 87 wrongly calls him 'Shahbāz Khan'. According to him the total strength of his followers was 80,000. Fer. (L) I, p. 191 agrees with MR. Also Dāntī p. 128 and TKJL., pp. 130-131.
3 Dorn I. p. 76; TKJL, p. 130.
of the Jaunpurī army. Bahīlūl had also warned Sikandar against employment of Sīrs and Nīyāzīs. Ibrāhīm had found the Nāhānīs, the Farmulis and even some Lodis seriously disaffected. In his new order of nobility he had, therefore, recruited all those who had been previously excluded or who were younger representatives of the senior nobles of Sikandar.¹

Daulat Khan Lodi was the governor of the Punjab. He had so far done nothing to displease the Sultan. His clannish pride might be touched if he were asked to co-operate in a war against the rebellious Nāhānīs in order to resuscitate the crumbling power of the house of the Lodis. Ibrāhīm, therefore, sent him urgent summons calling him to the court. Unfortunately he did not convey to the Lodī chief the reason underlying the summons. As most of the older nobles, during this period, were guilty of certain lapses and as Daulat Khan was in arrears he suspected treachery. The Sultan was usually favourable to younger men. Therefore he sent his son Dilāwar Khan to the court with a message that as soon as he recovered from illness, he would follow, bringing the treasure² with him. The Sultan was highly incensed at this act of covert disobedience and in his rage, he was indiscreet enough to exclaim that if Daulat Khan did not come soon, he would suffer the same fate as the other contumacious nobles had done. Dilāwar Khan was taken to the royal prison where he saw ghastly scenes of nobles hanged, encased in masonry or undergoing tortures. He was terribly frightened and while professing

¹ Tripathi, p. 91.
² Yādgār, p. 87.
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humility and devotion, ran away from the capital as quickly as possible and informed Daulat Khan of Sultan's temper and of the sufferings of the nobles in disgrace. This report completely unhinged the mental balance of Daulat Khan who, in league with a group of other nobles, invited a foreign prince to defend his skin, little suspecting that it would be disastrous not only to the ruling family at Delhi but also to himself.

Zahiruddin Muhammad Bābar, the ruler of Kabul and Qandahar who was thus invited to invade India had had a very romantically adventurous career ".......He appears before us in the diverse roles of ruler, warrior, sportsman, craftsman, author, penman and devoted student of Nature; and as we turn the pages of the priceless Memoirs, in which he frankly discloses his hopes and fears, his thoughts and deeds, we realize that we are in the presence of one of the most human and attractive personalities that ever graced an Asiatic throne."¹ Born on 14th February, 1483 he had succeeded his father Umar Sheikh, as king of Farghānā at the early age of eleven in 1494 and "inherited his father's quarrels as well as his insecure throne".² He was, however a born general and was endowed with indomitable courage, supreme self-confidence and tactical acumen. Though he was soon faced with powerful enemies, he not only retained his patrimony but in November 1497 captured Samarqand, the seat of government of his great ancestor Amīr Timūr. The boy-king of fourteen retained the prized city

¹ Edwards—Bābar, Diarist and Despot, p. 15
² Sir E. Denison Ross in CHI IV, p. 4.
for a brief span of 100 days but even that was an unusually remarkable achievement.

Bābar soon lost not only Samarqand but also most of Farghānā, This neither dismayed his youthful mind nor damped his military ardour and within three years he not only recovered Farghānā, but was also powerful enough to seize Samarqand from the Uzbegs (1500). This time he retained control over it for over a year after which Shaibānī Khan, the Uzbeg leader drove him out. From 1502 to 1504, he passed through many vicissitudes of life but in October 1504 at the age of 21 he captured Kabul. Destiny seemed to be taking him to the south towards India, though Bābar’s imagination was still fired by a desire to reoccupy the celebrated metropolis of the Timūrids. In 1511, with the assistance of the Safawid ruler of Persia he seated himself on the throne of Samarqand for the third and the last time, because after his expulsion by the Uzbegs in 1512 he never got a chance to repeat the exploits of his youth and to satisfy one of the most cherished ambitions of his life which he carried to the grave.

Bābar’s life during this period (1483-1512) bristles with instances of reckless courage, audacious enterprise and exemplary leadership. But when he was invited to take up the cudgels on behalf of the disgruntled nobility against the imperious Afghān king of Delhi, he did so only after making adequate preparations and carefully calculating the chances of his success. Although between 1504 and 1519 he had been mainly interested in Central Asian politics, yet he had occasionally turned towards the Indian frontier
and had established preliminary contacts with the political and topographical environment obtaining in the lands, west of the Indus.¹ Bābar, himself writes, "From the year 910 Hijra (1504 A.D.) when I obtained the principality of Kabul, up to the date of the events I now record, I had never ceased to think of the conquest of Hindustan. But I had never found a suitable opportunity for undertaking it, hindered as I was, sometimes by the apprehensions of the Begs, sometimes by disagreements between my brothers and myself. Finally all these obstacles were happily removed. Great and small, Begs and Captains, no one dared say a word against the project.

"So in 925 Hijra (1519) I left at the head of an army and made a start by taking Bajaur. . . . From this time to 932 Hijra (1526) I was always actively concerned in the affairs of Hindustan. I went there in person, at the head of an army five times in the course of seven or eight years."²

These five expeditions to which we shall refer presently, as well as the first sentence of the statement quoted above show that Bābar's invasion of India was a certainty whether he had received an invitation or not. The fact of the invitation and the political situation in Northern India only made his task easier. To advert to the five expeditions, it should be noted that in 1519 he captured the forts of Bajaur and Bhīrā though the latter was lost a few months after.³ In 1520 he

¹ Sharma, Mughal Empire in India I, pp. 30-31; CHI. IV, pp. 5-6; Bev. I, pp. 229-235; 341-343. (Jan. March 1505) and (Sept. 1507).
² Bev. II, pp. 478-479.
first chastised the Yūsufzaīs and then penetrated into the Punjab upto Sialkot and beyond.\(^1\) The order that Bābar gave to his soldiers after the capture of Bhīrā also shows his strong desire to conquer Northern India.\(^2\) In March 1519, he had sent Mullā Murshid as an envoy to Sultan Ibrāhīm, asking for the cession of those “countrieś which from of old had depended on the Turk”.\(^3\) Ferishtā gives a more detailed version of the message thus:

“As this region has usually been held, by the descendants or partisans of Amīr TIMĪR, therefore it would be better for Ibrāhīm to hand over to Bābar, Bhīrā and the adjoining territory, so that the rest of the possessions of the Sultan of Delhi may be safe from his invading army.”

Bābar in his memoirs says that Mullā Murshid was given not only written messages for Daulat Khan and Ibrāhīm Lodi but also oral instructions. Daulat Khan Lodi regarded the messenger detrimental to his own interests. Therefore, he neither allowed him to proceed to Delhi nor did he grant him an audience himself. The Mullā, therefore, returned from Lahore without securing a reply from any quarter. All the same, the mere fact of his despatch to Agra is an eloquent testimony of Bābar’s aims.

The second and third expeditions of Bābar were interrupted by troubles at home. But by

\(^2\) Bev. I, p. 380; “I pictured them (Bhīrā etc.) as my own ‘Hence the order, “Do no harm or hurt to flocks and herds of these people, nor even to their cotton ends and broken-needles.”
\(^3\) Bev. I, pp. 384-385; Fer. (L), I p. 201.
1522, Bābar's position was strong enough to warrant a more ambitious and sustained attack on Hindustan. His life-long enemy Shaibānī Khan had been killed in the battle of Merv. The Arghuns who had been a thorn in his side had been finally expelled from Qandahār in 1522 and Bābar could now feel secure about his possessions west of the Hindu-Kush. While the Arghuns and the Uzbegs were thus rendered harmless, the rising kingdom of Persia was a friendly ally. He had also secured the services of Ustād Ali Quli and Mustafā Rūmī who were expert artillery leaders. Bābar made Ustād Ali the master of Ordnance and took good care to improve his artillery, so that it became comparable with that of the Ottoman Sultan of Turkey and the Safawis of Persia. Bābar had tried his artillery to conspicuous advantage in his first expedition in the Bajaur and Swāt valleys and had noticed the scare that it had caused among the enemy. Bābar had stamped out disaffection and indiscipline from the ranks of his followers. His military achievements, no less than his character and ability inspired them with implicit loyalty and ungrudging devotion.

He began to turn in his mind plans for the conquest of India. Just then events in that country shaped themselves to his advantage. Ibrāhīm Lodi, the monarch of Delhi had provoked serious opposition among the nobility by playing the king a little too thoroughly. As has been noticed above, all the nobles from Sambhal to Bihar had disowned allegiance to him and had

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1 Bev. I, p. 350 and f.n. 1.
acknowledged the authority of Bahādur Khan Nūhānī entitled Muhammad Shāh. The governor of the Punjab had refused to obey the summons to the capital and was eager to fly into the arms of even a foreigner in the fond hope of retaining his fief. Towards the south of his territory, Rānā Sangrām Singh of Mewār was delivering quick and sharp blows on his neighbours, Hindu and Muslim alike, and had built up a powerful Rājpūt Kingdom which embraced practically the whole of Rājasthān. He had begun to conjure the dream of establishing his authority even over Delhi by expelling the Turk and the Afghān alike. His strength and ambitions would seriously distract the monarch of Delhi. Other rulers of Northern India were neither very powerful nor capable of organizing a united front against a foreign invader. This itself was enough to tempt a warrior of Bābar’s calibre into the plains of India.

But that was not all. His work was to be rendered easier still by the foolish and short-sighted policy of Ibrāhīm’s vassals and rivals. The lacuna in the Memoirs makes it difficult to fix the chronology of events between 1522 and 1524. According to Abdullāh, when Dilāwar Khan fled from Agra, he went straight to the court of Bābar without any reference to his father Daulāt Khan, who in his turn decided in favour of inviting Bābar only after learning of the happenings at the capital.1 Nizāmuddīn Ahmad, Rizquallah Mushtāqi and the author of Māsir-i-Rahimī2 assert that Daulāt Khan himself went to Bābar. Yādgār, Badāoni and Firishtā say that it was a son of

1 Dāādī, p. 129.
2 Tab. I, pp. 351-352; Wazīrī, p. 84; MR. I, p. 487.
Daulat Khan who was sent to Bābar. Dilāwar Khan’s relations with Bābar during his Indian campaign show that he had certainly met Bābar before. We may, therefore, state with reasonable assurance that the first nobleman to visit Bābar with a message for invading India was none other than Dilāwar Khan. He probably went to Kabul about 1522-23.

Just about this time some of Sikandar’s nobles invited Prince Ālam Khan son of Sultan Bahlūl from Muzaffar’s court in Gujarat and set him up as Sultan Alāuddīn. But Ibrāhīm was still quite strong to deal with them. It was therefore proposed that he should also go to Bābar to seek his assistance.² Alāuddīn was unable to stand on his own legs despite the discontent against Ibrāhīm because he was not considered quite suitable for the office of the Sultan.³ He also seems to have met Bābar about the time of Dilāwar’s visit to Kabul i.e. about the year 1522-23. Badāoni Nīmatullāh and Mullā Nahāwandī state that Ālam Khan was sent to Bābar as a mouthpiece of the nobles of the Punjab.⁴ This was a further inducement to Bābar to come to India, for he could pose

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² Badāoni, pp. 129-130.
³ Bev. I, p. 440; Erskine I, pp. 421-422.
⁴ Bad. I, p. 331, Dorn 1, p. 77; MR. I, p. 496 has the following statement:

دیدگار بهم و دیگر امراء کبار سلطان ابراهیم اتفاق امورد عرشه داشت مقتضی بر تمام تعریف ... فرورد مکانی بهنده مصحب عام حال

لودی فرستا لکه.
as the deliverer of its people from the misrule of a tyrant. At the same time, he could choose his own terms in giving them aid. Daulat Khan and other nobles of the Punjab had already promised to come under his banner as his vassals. A pretender to the throne of Delhi was now eager to regularise this extension of Bābar’s authority by a formal treaty according to which Bābar was to help Alāuddin to depose Ibrāhīm and in return for this was to hold in full sovereignty the whole of the Punjab upto and including Lahore.¹

Though the date is uncertain, Bābar also received an envoy from Rānā Sangrām Singh of Mewār. According to Bābarnāmā which is the only source for this piece of information, the Rānā “had sent an envoy to testify to his good wishes and to propose this plan: If the honoured Pādshāh will come to near Delhi from that side, I from this will move on Agra.”² This statement of Bābar, though unsupported by other evidences and unconfirmed by Rānā Sāngā’s later behaviour, does not appear to be a fabrication. The plan suggested by the Rānā has been cryptically stated. Yet it is sufficiently clear to indicate that the Rānā proposed joint collaboration in conquering and partitioning the Lodi empire between them. The Rānā was to acquire and to hold the eastern territories with Agra as the westernmost point while Bābar was to advance upto Delhi and to seize territories to the west of that town. This was perhaps a more valuable offer than any that Bābar had yet received. It pledged to him the

¹ CHI, IV, p. 11 has a slightly different sequence of events but cites no authority for it. Fer. (L) I, p. 204, lends partial support to this sequence.
² Bev. II, p. 529.
support of a powerful and experienced military leader who could easily mobilise considerable local support in his favour. At the same time it covered Bābar’s march upto Delhi and promised to free him from all worry on account of the Afghān chieftains in the east.

Bābar thus had a very favourable opportunity for the conquest of Northern India. After he had made adequate preparations, he marched into the Punjab in 930 (1524). Ibrāhīm in the meantime had not been idling. He had sent a strong army under Miān Mustafā, Miān Bāyazīd and Firuz Khan to overcome the rebels in the east. There had been considerable fighting in which the advantage generally lay with the rebels but the latter suffered a serious set-back. Given a little more time, Ibrāhīm would have overcome this trouble. But when he learnt that Bābar was planning to invade Hindusthan and that the nobles of the Punjab under Daulat Khan’s leadership had promised him support, he had to suspend hostilities in the east and to switch off his attention towards the west. He sent in 930 (1524) an army under Bihār Khan, Mubārak Khan Lodi and Bhikam Khan Nihānī to comb out the rebels of the Punjab. On the approach of this army, Daulat Khan fled from Lahore so that it easily fell into its hands.

But this triumph was very short-lived, because Bābar had in the meantime crossed the Indus and had appeared before Lahore. A bloody engagement took place in which the Afghāns were ultimately defeated and Bābar occupied Lahore.

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1 Waqīṭ pp. 83-84.
3 Erskine I, p. 418.
and Dipalpur. At both the places he indulged in certain excesses involving arson and massacre probably to make an example to other towns. It was at Dipalpur that Daulat Khan waited on Bābar along with his sons. Bābar gave him Jullundar and Sultanpur in fief which Daulat Khan accepted, though he was mightily offended on not being restored at Lahore. He, therefore, turned hostile and but for the treachery of his own son, Dilāwar Khan might have succeeded in way-laying Bābar, with consequences none can tell. Bābar promptly put Daulat Khan under arrest, though he released him later. But this was a serious breach in his line of communications. Just then, his presence was also needed in Kabul to defend Balkh. Therefore Bābar decided to call a halt to further advance till his position had been more stabilized. During the interval Ālam Khan’s resources were to be exploited for what they were worth.

From 1524 to November 1525 when Bābar started on his last expedition to India, the political situation in the Punjab was rather fluid. Bābar had left a strong garrison in the Punjab. Abdul Aziz held Lahore, Bābā Qashqā Mughal and Ālam Khan Lodi held Dipalpur while Khusrau Kokultāsh and Muhammad Alī Tājīk held Sialkot and Kalānaur respectively. But as soon as Bābar’s back was turned Ibrāhīm sent another army into the Punjab. Daulat Khan Lodi once again appeared on the scene, won over a part of Ibrāhīm’s army and occupied Dipalpur. The garrison at Sialkot was also pressed hard. Alāuddin Ālam Khan had fled to Bābar and had returned with a

1 Its date of capture was mid Rabi-ul-āwwal 930 H (22-1-1524) vide Bev. I, p. 441.
farman to the nobles at Lahore that they should help him in capturing Delhi.¹

Ghāzī Khan and some other nobles now tried to detach Ālam Khan from the side of Bābar and by a ruse secured their objective. But the attack on Delhi did not succeed, although the rebel army numbered 40,000.² Ghāzī Khan attacked Kalānaur³ and occupied it so that Bābar’s position in the Punjab was becoming increasingly untenable. Bābar must step in boldly to stop the rot or forego the ambition of founding an empire in India. A man of his courage and enterprise could choose only the first alternative. Therefore, in November 1525 he started on his last campaign for the conquest of India.

On Friday the 1st of the month of Safar 932 (November 17, 1525) Bābar started from Kabul.⁴ Humāyūn was ordered to join at the head of picked soldiery of Badakhshān. His arrival was a little delayed for which he was severely reprimanded.⁵ Khwājā Kalān also came along with the Ghazni army. Bābar now marched cautiously for he had been informed that Daulat Khan and Ghāzī Khan, with a force of 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers were on war path.⁶ Yādgār says that Ibrāhīm tried to win over Daulat Khan to his side by pointing out to him the folly of inviting a foreigner and by assuring him on the oath of the Holy Book that he bore him no ill-will. But according to the same author, Daulat Khan was unrepentant and

¹ Fer. (L) I, pp. 202-203.
² See Dāndī, pp. 130-131, for details.
³ It is at a distance of 15 miles from Gurdaspur (vide Punjab Distt. Gaz. XXIA, p. 33).
⁵ Bev. II, p. 447.
⁶ Ibid., p. 453.
preferring countercharges against the Sultan, concluded his letter with the words "... it is not I but improper acts of yours that have brought the Mughals into this country."1

On Bābar's arrival, Daulat Khan shut himself in the fort of Mālot but was soon forced to surrender and to suffer humiliation.2 His son Ghāzī Khan escaped and joined Sultan Ibrāhīm but his army had been practically annihilated. Daulat Khan did not long survive his disgrace and died a disappointed man. His son Dilāwar Khan joined Bābar who now proceeded to meet the main army of the Afghāns under Ibrāhīm Lodi. Before the two armies came face to face on the historic battle-field of Panipat a few minor incidents and skirmishes had taken place. Humāyūn defeated Hamīd Khan governor of Hisār Fīrūzā which was assigned to him together with Jalandhar in fief.3 Some of the nobles of Ibrāhīm led by Biban Jalwānī went over to the side of Bābar.4 A sharp engagement took place between Ibrāhīm's vanguard under Dāād Khan and Hātim Khan and Bābar's troops under Mahdī Khwājā, Muhammad Sultān Mirzā, Adil Sultān and others. This also resulted in a victory for Bābar.5

Bābar now moved towards Panipat and on the way collected 700 carts. He reached the plain near that town on 29th Jumād-ul-sāni 932 (12th April 1526). Bābar entrenched his position care-

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1 Yādgār, pp. 92-93.
3 Bev. II, pp. 465-466.
4 Ibid., p. 466.
5 Ibid., pp. 467-468; Fer. (L) I, p. 204.
fully. To the right of his army lay the town of Panipat, to the left ditches were dug out and filled with branches of trees, while the centre was protected by stringing together 700 carts with 5 or 6 mantlets between each two carts. At fixed intervals, gaps were left out for 100 to 200 horsemen to sally out. Behind the carts and the mantlets matchlock-men and infantry were to take their positions while the horsemen were to be on the flanks. Within 7 or 8 days of waiting at Panipat, Bābar perfected his defences and plan of battle.¹

Ibrāhīm marched from Delhi and encamped near Panipat. Ahmad Yādgār and Abdullah say that he consulted astrologers about the outcome of the fight. They gave a very equivocal reply² but Ibrāhīm interpreted it in his favour. He waited for Bābar to start the offensive but there was no sign of his doing it. What Bābar did was that he sent out small parties to swoop down on Ibrāhīm's massed troops, to rain arrows on them and then to return to camp. Ibrāhīm's army consisted of about 100,000 soldiers and 1,000 elephants.³ According to Yādgār, Ibrāhīm held a magnificent Darbar on the eve of the battle, distributed all the jewellery and treasure among his nobles and soldiers and addressed to them the following words:

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¹ Bev. II, pp. 468-471.
² Dāndī, p. 132. 
³ Bev. II, p. 470; Dāndī p. 134; Fer. (L) I, p. 204; support the above version.

Dorn I, p. 78, has 5,000 elephants in place of 1,000. Gulbadan Begum (Tr) pp. 93-94 has 180,000 horse and 1,500 elephants. Yadger p. 95 has 50,000 horse and 2,000 elephants.
"Comrades, tomorrow is the day when we shall be engaged in a contest against the Mughals. If victory comes to me I shall try to satisfy you (by presents and rewards) and if it is otherwise, you shall be reconciled to me for what I am doing now".¹

If this speech has any foundation in fact, it betrays a lack of confidence and grave doubts about the outcome of the battle. Bābar's own troops were, by no means confident of success and Bābar explains in his memoirs the cause of their nervousness.² But while Bābar utilised his leisure to advantage, Ibrāhīm did nothing but make himself an easy target for the enemy.

If he had been at all clever, he would have at least tried to find out the nature of the enemy's defences. Cutting off the supplies to the foreigner was another matter that should have attracted his notice. Nor did he attempt to mobilise the support of Rānā Sāngā or the Afghan chiefs of the east by timely concessions and tactful overtures. As Yādgār points out, even his numerical superiority—for Bābar is said to have possessed only about 12,000 effectives—was neutralized by the general discontent among his followers. We have not been informed why Ibrāhīm initiated the fight. This was a serious tactful blunder because the strength of Bābar's army lay in its defences. Ibrāhīm allowed the enemy to fight out the battle on terms of his choosing. Ibrāhīm's scouts appear to have been utterly incompetent, for, we are told that his army was temporarily paralysed when it encountered Bābar's defensive system.

¹ Yādgār, pp. 94-95.
² Bev. II, pp. 469-470.
Bābar had planned every little detail. He had kept the front restricted to eliminate the enemy's advantage in superior numbers. As Ibrāhīm's army moved forward for attack and found itself cramped, its flanks began to press on the centre which created a certain amount of disorder and confusion. Bābar's right and left flanks advanced to engage the enemy. The matchlock-men rained fire on the centre of the enemy. The wheeling parties turned round to make the *tulugmā* attack and pressed in the Afghāns from all sides to their centre. This created serious congestion. The Afghāns found no room for manoeuvre, while the enemy was getting at them from all sides. The force of his cavalry, the deadly shower of his archers and the demoniac discharge of his firearms created dismay in their hearts. Ibrāhīm was trying to lead them only by display of desperate valour but that was hardly a general's business. Bābar on the contrary watched the movement carefully, reinforced each weak spot in his own army and quickly took advantage of any weakness or mistake noticed in the ranks of the Afghāns. By midday, the battle was over. Ibrāhīm though advised to leave the field died in the thick of the fight.¹ Bābar's superior generalship, scientific technique, and use of a new arm had won for him a victory which had more than once brought to the victor also the crown of Delhi.²

The deaths of Ibrāhīm, Daulat Khan and Darya Khan had left the Afghāns without an

¹ Bev. II, pp. 474-475; Yādgār pp. 96-97.  
² Technique and strategy of Bābar as well as names of his officers are given in detail in his memoirs (Bev. II, pp. 468-474). Afghān historians show no clear comprehension of either of them.
acknowledged leader. Rānā Sāngā’s inactivity and the swiftness of Bābar’s movement towards Delhi and Agra forced the capital cities to surrender without serious resistance. Thus the empire of the Lodís which Bahlul and Sikandar had gradually built up made way during Ibrāhīm’s reign for the empire of the Chaghtāís, miscalled the Mughals. The date of Ibrāhīm’s death was 20th April 1526 (Friday 8th Rajab 932). 1

We may now recount in brief the causes of Ibrāhīm’s defeat. Rushbrook Williams 2 ascribes it mainly to Bābar’s artillery. He says “If there was one single material factor, which more than any other, conduced to his (Bābar’s) ultimate triumph in Hindustan it was his powerful artillery.” Bābar himself does not emphasize the role of artillery so much as that of archery coupled with

1 Bev. II, p. 472; Yadgār p. 95; Dāḍī p. 134; Gulbadan Begum p. 94 give 8th Rajab 932. TKJL, p. 133 has 7th Rajab while Foc. (L) I, p. 204, has 10th Rajab. Elliot V, p. 28, f.n. 3 says that Bābar is not certain whether it was 7th or 8th Rajab. Dāḍī p. 135 has a Hindi quatrain which runs thus:

नौ से जमर होता बतिया । पानीपत में भारत दिया ॥
सातो रजव भागत दहा । बाबर जीता बाह्रिम हुरा ॥

Another variant quoted by Prof. M. A. Ghani p. 61 is

नौ से जमर था बतिया । पानीपत में भारत दीसा ॥
अठनें रजव मुक्तभारा । बाबर जीता बाह्रिम हुरा ॥

Yadgār pp. 97-98 quotes another variant of the same though it does not support its date in the text.

नौ से जमर बख्ता बतिया । पानीपत मई भारत दीसा ॥
चौथी रजव मुक्तभारा । बाबर जीता बाह्रिम हुरा ॥

The correct date was 8th Rajab because that alone and not 4th, 7th or 10th Rajab, fell on Friday.

2 R. Williams. p. 111.
Ibrahim's utter incompetence as a general so that he neither moved nor halted according to plan. Yadgar finds in the disaffection of the Afghans the key to Ibrahim's defeat and death. All these views partially explain the event. Other factors which contributed to Babar's success were treachery of Ibrahim's nobles, his own freedom from Central Asian troubles, and his scientific methods of warfare and seasoned generalship in contrast to Ibrahim's outmoded tactics, handicapped as they were by the presence of too many soldiers and elephants that caused confusion in their own ranks when pressed back by a deadly fire.

Ibrahim, the last of the Lodis of Delhi was in some respects like his father and grandfather. He too was intelligent, courageous and brave. He too had some reputation for piety and orthodoxy and had faith in astrology. Like his father, he was interested in music. But he did not stop at that and maintained a troupe of dancing girls as well, whom Babar later on distributed among his sons. As a man, Ibrahim was generous and kind. But as a ruler, he had many shortcomings which were heightened by the adverse circumstances in which he was placed. He had a certain amount of vanity and demanded more implicit obedience than was customary among the Afghans. He was relentless in tracking down all those whom he suspected of treachery or disaffection. In political dealings, he neither forgave nor forgot so that he often appeared vindictive and ungracious. His treatment of the older nobility, though defensible to a certain extent, was on the whole tactless and indiscreet. He could make enemies but could not convert men of doubt-
ful loyalty into devoted servants by kinglly magnanimity. He attached too great an importance to discipline, obedience and humility among his subordinates and did not sufficiently ponder over the best means of securing them. His policy was thus calculated to provoke opposition and rebellion, specially when the nobles were so proud. He was also lacking in qualities of generalship and seldom took the field himself. Even when he did so, he gave little evidence of anything other than courage and determination. His spies and scouts were far less vigilant than they had been under Sikandar. Consequently, he was often surprised by rebels and enemies. He imparted more vigour to the central administration but he failed to maintain his authority over local officers and provincial governors. He began his career well and despite initial difficulties not only overcame all rivals to the throne but also conquered Gwalior which had defied the arms of even his illustrious father. But his decline set in just after this success. Āzam Humāyūn’s disgrace led to rebellion of Islam Khan and a general wave of disaffection gradually crept over the entire eastern regions. In the meantime, Miān Bhuā was dismissed. This made the older nobles still more suspicious. Soon after came the loss of Chanderi and the death of Miān Husain in suspicious circumstances. Discontent went on increasing. The Sultan was annoyed by evidence of disaffection and proceeded to eradicate it by dismissal, imprisonment, torture and death. This met with some success but on the whole it created more problems than were solved. By 1526 he was surrounded by enemies on all sides. The eastern provinces had become independent, the Punjab was held by the Mughals, the Rānā of Mewār had
occupied Chanderi and was planning to seize Bayānā and Agra. Ibrāhīm’s own followers in the central region were not quite loyal. The totality of these circumstances as well as the defects of his own policy and character brought about the end of the dynasty which Bahlūl and Sikandar had reared up. The first Afghān empire in India had ended.
CHAPTER VII

AFGHAN INSTITUTIONS

The Lodí Sultans of Delhi not only founded a new dynasty but introduced certain changes in the institutions of the Sultanate as well, though, in the main, they continued the general edifice of government, as it had evolved during the preceding two hundred and fifty years of Turkish rule in India. Their conception of kingship was, in many respects, different from that of their Turkish forbears. While the Turks under Balban and Alàuddin had evolved a highly centralized monarchy and had clothed the monarch with a halo of supreme majesty, dignity and awe, the Afghán introduced in its place a tribal monarchy of a confederal character, though they soon discovered its weaknesses and proceeded by degrees to approximate it to the Turkish ideal.

The Afghán made this departure from Turkish practice chiefly on grounds of expediency. The Afghán were strongly wedded to tribal organisation of society. The free mountain air of their habitat and absence of a strong centralized government in their home regions had accustomed them to the tribal form of government. The tribal chief, though highly respected, was just one of themselves and was looked upon as chief among equals. Hence the attitude of various tribal leaders towards their own chief could not be very submissive and they could not easily accept the

1 Afzâl-i-Shâhân-i-Hind Br.M.f. 13 V (Vide Tripathi p. 81) refers to Malik Kàhn’s sharing the throne with 30 to 40 leading Afgháns.
concept of master and servant. Afghān sentiment was, thus, the first reason which necessitated a change in the conception of sovereignty. Besides, the Afghāns were generally regarded as contemptible boors, unfit to hold high offices. The Lodis could, therefore, expect neither help nor co-operation from the Turks, the Mughals or the Muslims of Hindustan. Hence they could not afford to ride roughshod over Afghān sentiments and to run the risk of alienating their sympathies. If Afghān vanity would be tickled only by a share in the government, the Lodī aspirants for power must pamper their pride and suffer them as colleagues. When Bahālūl became the Sultan of Delhi, he had such tremendous difficulties to face that he could hope for success only by ensuring the fullest and most ungrudging co-operation of his followers. This could be best secured by letting the Afghāns feel that in advancing the power of Bahālūl they correspondingly raised themselves to higher and still higher dignities. In the case of Bahālūl therefore, expediency demanded that the loyalty of the Afghāns, should be accepted virtually on their own terms. This meant setting the seal of official approval on the tribal conception of kingship.

Consequently, we find Bahālūl treating his nobles with studiously feigned humility. He would not make a parade of the paraphernalia of royalty. He would not sit on the throne in the presence of his nobles and would say that it was enough that the world knew him to be the Sultan. He constantly maintained the fiction that it was the general assembly of the nobles that ordered

1 Chap. III, p. 60.
2 Fer. (L.) I, p. 179; Waqīṭ p. 9.
affairs of the state and that each one of its members occupied an exalted position. It is for this reason that when it came to the knowledge of Bahlūl that a certain nobleman was dis-satisfied with him, he would go to his residence and placing the sword before him would say, "If you do not consider me fit for this office appoint someone else in my stead and assign to me any other duty you think proper."\(^1\) This made the nobles feel that they were members of a ruling oligarchy which could make or unmake its head, at pleasure. Similarly, when Bahlūl referred to his nobles as Masnad-i-Ali, they felt that their status was really very high. Thus under Bahlūl, Afghan sentiment, political exigency and his distaste for ostentation combined to give monarchy the appearance of tribal chieftaincy.

Our authorities do not warrant the supposition that Bahlūl had a well-organised central government. They are equally silent about the exact relationship between the head of the state and the local fief-holders. In praise of Bahlūl's lack of greed, it has been stated that he distributed all land and treasure among his followers, retaining nothing for himself.\(^2\) This suggests that the fief-holder either paid no tribute at all or it was a very nominal amount. It also implies that the Afghan nobility held Indian dominion in common with the monarch. Their chief bond of union was their obligation to render military service to the head of the state, whenever he should demand it. Consequently, the fief-holders must have enjoyed more or less complete local autonomy, while Bahlūl, and

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\(^1\) \textit{Wṣiqāt}, p. 9.
\(^2\) \textit{Chapter III}, p. 97.
the Central Government over which he presided, controlled only a few common functions like the foreign affairs, defence, currency,¹ and possibly justice. This made the government, virtually, confederal in character.

But there were certain serious defects in this arrangement. It was prone to develop fissiparous tendencies which might threaten the very existence of the state. It exalted the nobles into semi-monarchs while it dragged down the head of the state to the level of a chief nobleman. It was thus calculated to cut at the very root of authoritarian government which, by the way, was the only possible means of securing order and efficiency when popular democratic sentiment did not exist and aristocracy lacked both in enlightenment and patriotism.

If Bahlül had not been so busy with war and rebellion, he might have himself initiated a change in this arrangement. But that was not to be. His son and successor had greater leisure and more fondness for the spectacular aspect of royalty. The behaviour of some of the nobles at the time of his accession must have also impressed on his mind the dangers of autonomous and unrestrained nobility.² Sikandar, therefore, inaugurated a policy of consolidating his power by circumscribing the privileges of the nobility. He maintained a court, and he had no hesitation to sit on the throne. He brought the nobles under a more thorough discipline. When one of them misbehaved in the chaugan affair, he had him kicked

¹ During his last years, Bahlül shared this privilege with his son Barbakshān Chap. IV, p. 116.
² Chap. IV, p. 107.
publicly.\textsuperscript{1} He introduced a ceremonial about the farman which also exalted the position of the monarch. The person to whom a farman was sent had to go forward 4 to 6 miles to meet the royal messenger and his retinue. When the party arrived at the headquarters of the officer, the messenger stood up over a raised platform and the officer standing below received it from him. He then placed the farman over his head and eyes and then read it out in the presence of the people assembled or in private, according to instructions.\textsuperscript{2} Sikandar usually did not disturb fiefholders in their possessions, but when the interests of the state demanded it he transferred, reduced, banished or dismissed them.\textsuperscript{3} He also organised the Finance Department on a more efficient basis and each fiefholder had to submit to regular audit and had to pay a specified amount to the Central Government.\textsuperscript{4} He gradually acquired such ascendancy that he was convinced that if he placed one of his slaves in a palanquin and ordered the nobles to show respect to him, they would do it unhesitatingly.\textsuperscript{5}

In spite of these changes, he could not completely undo the work of Bahlul. The tribal organization in the rank and file still continued. Some of the offices were made hereditary or were allowed to retain such character.\textsuperscript{6} The number of

\begin{enumerate}
\item Dādi, p. 66; MR. I, p. 460; Fer. (L) I, p. 182.
\item Chap. V, pp. 151-152.
\item Chap. V, p. 152 f.n. 5.
\item Mîn Bhuâ succeeded his father Khawâs Khan as Wazir; Imad and Sulaimân succeeded Khân-i-Khânân Faruqî at Bayâna, Jalî Khan, S/O Mahmud Khân Lodî succeeded him at Kalpi. There are numerous other instances also.
\end{enumerate}
high-sounding titles like the Khān-i-Jahān, Khān-i-Khānān, Āzam Humāyūn, Khān-i-Āzam etc. was multiplied, so that they could be conferred on the leading nobles of each important clan, viz. the Lodis, the Farmūlis and the Nūhānīs. He allowed the chief nobles the privilege of informal relations with the Sultan on the playground, during the chase, and on the march. If expediency demanded it, he would even overlook conspiracy, insubordination and disobedience.¹ Monarchy under Sikandar was, thus, a compromise between Turkish centralized autocracy and Bahlīl’s tribal confederacy.

When Sikandar’s mantle fell on his imperious son Ibrāhīm, the process of approximating Afghān monarchy to the Turkish ideal was suddenly speeded up. He silenced all claims of intimacy with the Sultan by proclaiming that kingship knows no kinship. When the nobles came to meet him in the hall of audience, he kept them standing with their hands folded across their breast.² The Afghāns considered it too galling to their pride; but Ibrāhīm was relentless in securing obedience to his regulations, even though it might throw his vassals into the arms of a foreigner. While Sikandar had sometimes overlooked even conspiracy, Ibrāhīm punished even suspected sedition with imprisonment and torture. He cast into prison Miān Bhuā, the tallest of them simply because he did not implicitly carry out the Sultan’s orders³ and was careless about forms. Under him the dignity of the Sultan rose so high that the

¹ Chap. V. pp. 151-152.
² Chap. VI, p. 184.
³ Afsānā 45v. quoted by Tripathi, p. 193 refers to Miān Bhuā’s disinclination to pay a few lacs of tankas to the son of Rājā Mān, although the Sultan had issued orders to that effect.
royal tent itself was considered as worthy of respect and homage.\footnote{Dāndī, p. 117.}

The policy of Ibrāhīm led to very serious consequences. The nobles would not readily submit to the relationship of master and servant. A disputed succession and the proposal of partition gave a lever to their contumacious designs. Blinded by self-interest and offended by Sultan's haughtiness, they fomented disaffection, organised rebellion and finally had recourse to treason, when they invited a foreigner to depose the Sultan, little suspecting that the newcomer would crush all vanity and arrogance out of them. Ibrāhīm's policy thus proved ruinous to himself and to the Afghāns but it left behind a salutary example which in more tactful hands was to yield better results, under Sher Shāh and his son.

The Afghāns introduced some changes also in the theory of succession to the throne. The Turks had followed no uniform practice and had elevated to the throne, slaves and freemen; minors and adults; males and females; converted Hindus, half-Muslims or Turks of pure lineage. Election, nomination, successful revolution or heredity had found support at one time or the other. But there was a general preference for adult males belonging to the family of the last monarch or closely related to him. Nomination often improved the chances of a candidate while the formality of election was respected in the form of acquiescence by the insertion of the name of the new monarch in the khutba. In this regard, therefore, Turkish tradition provided no definite guidance. Consequently, here again the Lodīs fell back upon their own
customs and experiences. In the tribal area of Afghanistan the adult members of a tribe were accustomed to electing a leader out of the members of a select family or a group of families. It is practically the same pattern that they followed in choosing the Sultan of Delhi.

When Islam Khan died, he had left behind a will in favour of Bahlul being made the leader of the Afghans and the ruler of Sarhind. But the Afghans did not submit to this dictation. They freely discussed the merits of respective candidates, and when peaceful solution became impossible, they even resorted to war and finally approved of Bahlul as the most suitable person, by the method of trial and error.

Bahlul, in his turn, left a will in favour of his son Nizam Khan. But he made a serious mistake if he desired that while Nizam Khan should hold Delhi and the Doab, he should not unduly interfere in the internal affairs of other provinces which had been assigned to members of the ruling family. He committed a more serious indiscretion in allowing Barbakshah, the ruler of Jaunpur, certain regal powers. This was tantamount to sanctioning partition of the empire. Once more, the nobles asserted their right of free choice of a suitable successor; and they imposed on themselves no restraints in castigating the short-comings of Bahlul's nominee. As we have noticed before, Nizam's succession to the throne, though facilitated by a number of other factors, was mainly due to the support of a majority of the nobles.¹

Sikandar left behind no will to guide the order of succession. He does not seem to have intended

¹ Chap. IV, pp. 109-110.
the partition of the empire; because none of his sons was allowed any extraordinary powers or privileges. Members of the royal family were just on par with members of the nobility. On his death the nobles had an unfettered choice. Whatever arrangement they made, had to be accepted by the princes though Ibrāhīm, at least, could not have relished the idea of partitioning the empire. It may, therefore, be concluded that the Afghān nobility, while confining the choice of the Sultan to the ruling family, were generally free to select whom they considered most suitable. Purity of blood, primogeniture and nomination coloured their opinions but did not necessarily bind their hands.

It is not specifically mentioned whether Bahālūl had a chief minister. Possibly, he was his own Wazīr. That he had a well-organised central government is also doubtful. His reign is so full of wars that other things have attracted no notice at the hands of our authorities. The Afghān historians have repeated fanciful and romantic anecdotes, but have found no space for delineating the administrative set up. But some sort of central government must have existed. It was the function of the Sultan to guide and to control it. As Bahālūl was often absent, he left one of his sons in charge of the capital where the offices of the central government were located. In the earlier part of his reign, Khwāja Bāyazīd the eldest son deputised for his father, while in later years after Bāyazid's

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1 cf. the treatment meted out to Bārbak, Ālam Khan, Āzam Humayūn and Jalāl Khan. Chap. IV, pp. 115-119 and Ch. V, pp. 139-140.
2 cf. Opposition to Qutb Khan and Nizām Khan because of being born of Hindu mothers.
3 cf. preference for Āzam Humayūn and Ibrāhīm.
death the honour was conferred on Prince Nizām Khan. Beyond this, he was unable to do much.

It was under his son and successor Sikandar that we get a clearer picture of the central government. Sikandar's first Wazir was Khwās Khan. Waqīāt-i-Mushtaqī\(^1\) records a conversation between the Sultan and his Wazir when the latter was in the grip of a mortal disease. The conversation shows that he had been appointed Vakil-i-mutlaq, that he had issued certain orders without previous consultation with the Sultan and that he was not quite sure if he was free from the guilt of misappropriation. The Sultan is reported to have washed out all records which the Wazir had brought with him for handing over charge and for calculating sums due from him. This incident shows that even when a minister was appointed Vakil-i-mutlaq, he was not let alone, but that the Sultan was expected to accord his previous sanction to all orders issuing from his office. It also suggests that the finances of the state were not efficiently administered, so that even the Vakil was not sure if his hands were quite clean. His successor was Miān Bhuā. He presided over the departments of finance and justice.\(^2\) The Sultan liked his Wazir not so much for his efficiency as for his piety and literary tastes. Consequently though he retained him in office throughout the rest of his reign, he closely supervised his work and called for daily reports.\(^8\) Under Ibrāhīm

\(^{1}\) Waqīāt pp. 62-63.

\(^{2}\) Waqīāt pp. 28-32 and Dāndī pp. 82-86; Yādgār p. 75 describes Miān Bhuā also as Vakil-i-Mutlaq and adds that he had held that high office for 28 years before he was dismissed by Ibrāhīm.

\(^{8}\) Elliot IV, p. 450; Dāndī p. 42.
also the office of the Wazir was continued and when Miān Bhuā was imprisoned, his son was appointed in his place. But throughout this period, the Wazir was rather weak and was easily dominated by the Sultan.

The Wazir maintained an up-to-date account of revenue returns of villages, parganas and iqtās. When a fief was granted to an officer, the office of the Wazārat informed him with regard to its net revenue, and the amount he was expected to pay to the Central Exchequer. He was also informed, specially in the time of Sikandar, of all assignees who held free-hold property in that region and was strictly warned not to encroach upon their rights.¹ So long as he made regular payments, he was allowed to retain his fief. But if he was guilty of embezzlement, he was not only dismissed but was also debarred from holding any appointment in future.² In order to discover cases of embezzlement or short payment, the accounts of local fief-holders were strictly audited.³ Naturally, the establishment of this department must have been fairly large.

Nothing is definitely known about the agrarian policy of the Lodīs, except what may be gleaned from a few stray references. Bahlāl had divided the dominion into iqtās; and it was for the fiefholders to devise their own methods to collect suitable revenue. Sikandar introduced a uniform system of measurement, a yard equal to 41½

¹ Dādī p. 40; Elliot IV, pp. 447-448; Waqīyat p. 15. ² Waqīyat p. 50; Dādī p. 41. ³ Cf. the case of Mubārak Khan Lodī of Jaunpur who was forced to pay all arrears though the nobles urged the Sultan to write them off.
diameters of the standard Sikandarī coin. It approximated to about 30 inches. Measurement and cash payment was generally preferred. Dādī and Waqīāt-i-Mushtaqī record the cases of Malik Badruddin and Miran Sayyad Fazlullah Kolwī and state that the lands assigned to them yielded an annual rental of 7 lakh and 5 lakh tankas respectively. In the latter case a certain person offered to pay 5 lakhs to the Sayyad and 3 lakhs to the state treasury if the assignment was made in his favour. In course of an enquiry into his allegations the land was measured and it was calculated that its rental should be 15 lakh tankas a year. But while the assessment was supposed to be based on measurement actual measurement of arable land was not always made because when the Sultan asked the revenue officers to explain how an area yielding 15 lakhs had been shown to be worth 5 lakhs only, it was said that the assignment had been made on the basis of old records, and this satisfied the Sultan.

Another important measure of Sikandar’s reign was the abolition of Zakāt on corn. Abdullah and Niāmatullāh say that in 901H (1495-1496), there was great scarcity of corn and its price rose rapidly. The Sultan with a view to alleviate the distress of his subjects remitted Zakāt on corn throughout his dominions. This

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1 Ain (Jar) II, p. 61; Thomas pp. 370-371.
2 Dādī p. 46.
3 Waqīāt p. 50.
4 Dādī p. 60; TKJL, p. 97; Dorn I, p. 59. Dorn describes ‘Zakāt-i-ghallā’ as duty on corn; Elliot IV, p. 462 simply says that he exempted his subjects ‘from furnishing the usual Zakāt of corn . . . ’ De in fn. I, p. 365, considers ‘Zakāt-i-ghallā’ as a poor rate in grain
led to a general lowering of prices and it is said that grain, clothes and other articles were so cheap during his reign that even persons of modest incomes could live in happiness and contentment.¹

During Ibrāhīm’s reign the only change recorded in the agrarian system is the realization of land revenue in kind.² The effect of this was that grain became very cheap and people of modest means could also live in reasonable comfort.³ As Dr. Tripathi points out,⁴ exceptions to this rule must have been made in the case of greens and perishables. The reasons for introducing this change have not been stated. But, as Thomas points out,⁵ there was great scarcity of precious metals and considerable paucity of the circulating media. Payment of land revenue in cash, would,

and points out that Ranking is not quite correct in calling it customary tribute in grain, while he declares Briggs to be quite wrong in calling it the ‘transit customs on grain.’

Zakāt is used both in the sense of customs duties and the Sadaqā payable by Muslims on their income and property. As a part of the empire was affected by famine, distress would be relieved primarily by ensuring free flow of corn from the surplus area into the affected region. This would necessitate removal of ‘transit customs on grain’, as Briggs has suggested. The release from Sadaqā is, strictly speaking, not within the competence of the ruler because its payment is enjoined by holy law. Besides, such release could relieve the sufferings only of those Muslims who were engaged in agriculture on non-kharājī land, which was limited in area in our country.

¹ Elliot IV, p. 448; Dāndī p. 46.
² Dāndī p. 137 makes a very categorical statement:
³ One Bahālī fetched 10 mds. of corn, five seers of oil and 10 yds of cloth. (Vide Dāndī p. 137).
⁴ Tripathi p. 294.
⁵ Thomas pp. 435-436.
therefore, entail great difficulty. It was largely to meet this inconvenience that the order was issued. The Sultan may have, however, also been influenced by its relative advantages to the cultivator. In the absence of insufficient coins, much of local trade must have been carried on through the system of barter. This would bring large quantities of grain in the market. The officials of the government would compete with each other in garnering minted money as early as possible. This would further flood the market with grains. When supply was abundant and continuous the price of corn was bound to be very low. Thus the cheapness of corn was mainly the effect of lack of sufficient currency rather than of the introduction of payment in kind. In fact, payment in kind was itself the result of insufficiency of currency.

In the Turkish currency the silver tankah was equivalent to mixed pieces which were multiples of 2 up to the maximum of sixty four. In its place, they reverted to the older system in which the silver tankah was equal to 40 pieces. Bahlūl Lodi introduced a copper issue called Bahlūli which remained the standard coin for a considerable time. It was equal to five copper tanks of 32 ratis or 56 grains and corresponded with the double ‘Kārsh’. Sikandar Lodi strengthened the change still further by minting a new issue called the ‘Sikandari’ which was double the Bahlūli in value but which did not correspond with any real or imaginary coin value in the ‘Kāni’ system of the Turks. Besides these two standard coins, pieces of lower denomination were also issued. One corresponding with the ‘Kārsh’ or half Bahlūli was quite common. Another, though rare at this
time, weighed about 84 grains and was issued by Ibrāhīm Lodi. It was equal in value to 1½ copper tanks.

Another characteristic of their coinage was that they preferred alloy to pure metals. The metallic value of the coin approximately corresponded with its face value; but the proportion of silver both in the Bahlūlī and the Sikandari was so small that clipping for purposes of extracting silver was not likely to be a profitable undertaking. That 'secured for it a permanency in its coined form which pure silver and gold could never have commanded.' At the same time, the presence of some silver in the coin reduced its weight substantially (64 grains of copper being equivalent in value to 1 grain of silver). This made it easily portable.

The only serious defect in their currency was inadequacy of supply, specially in the time of Ibrāhīm Lodi. In regard to the coins of this monarch there are two interesting features which deserve notice. The first is that the legend on one of his coins (No. 321, copper, weight 110 grs. vide Thomas p. 377) runs thus:

لسلطان بن إلسطمان إبراهيم شاه لودي بن سكندر

It is the only coin, noticed by Thomas, which mentions the tribal surname, all the rest simply stating, Bahlāl Shāh, Sikandar Shāh, Bārbakshāh or Ibrāhīm Shāh. Secondly, this same piece resembles the Malwa square type which is uncommon among the Lodī currency.¹

In the administration of justice, the Lodī monarchs of Delhi have a number of achieve-

¹ Thomas, pp. 357-377.
ments to their credit. Bahlūl was so greatly devoted to administration of justice that he heard the petitions of his people himself instead of leaving it to the care of the Wazīr.\(^1\) Sultan Sikandar's solicitude for doing justice is highly commended by practically all authors. Yādgār says that in administering justice, he was ideal.\(^2\) Abdūlāh says that he treated the weak and the strong alike and was constantly engaged in settling disputes, deciding complaints, and looking to affairs of state. He further says that he had instructed his Vakīl Daryā Khan Nāhānī to be present in the seat of justice every day till the first quarter of the night and to receive petitions and complaints.\(^3\) Almost all our chroniclers credit him with great intelligence, resourcefulness, moderation and respect for law. The reign of Ibrāhīm was short and stormy and the punishments during this period tended to be more severe than formerly; but he maintained the judicial machinery devised and improved by his father.

The Lodīs did not introduce many changes in the general organization of law-courts. The more important courts in the time of Sultan Sikandar were the following:—\(^4\)

(a) The Royal Court—It was presided over by the Sultan himself who was assisted when necessary by a Qāżī and twelve learned theologians who were constantly in attendance.\(^5\) It had original

\(^1\) Dādī, p. 11.
\(^2\) Yādgār, p. 42.
\(^3\) Dādī, pp. 46-47.
\(^4\) Shyam Bihāri Srivastava—Administration of Justice (A. U. Ms.), pp. 218-221.
\(^5\) Dādī, p. 47.
and appellate jurisdiction of a very comprehensive nature and tried cases involving breach of the common and canonical law as well as those relating to the revenue and the ecclesiastical departments. It was thus the supreme court of the realm and combined the functions of the former court of the Sultan and of that of the Qāzi-ul-Quzāt and the Sadr-i-Jahān.

(b) **The Chief Justice's Court**—It was presided over by the Wazīr and had jurisdiction over revenue, ecclesiastical and common law cases. This was also an omnibus court with wide powers, comparable to those of the Royal Court though in status and authority it ranked below it. Some of the powers of the court of Sadr-i-Jahān, specially those relating to religious endowments and assignments, were enjoyed by this court. But when it sat in judgment over revenue cases it was called the Diwān-i-Wazārat. It sometimes acted also as a court of enquiry to aid the Sultan in discharge of his judicial prerogatives.1

(c) **The Governor's Court**—It was presided over by the provincial governor and exercised jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. Though there is no definite evidence, it is likely that this court may have heard appeals from lower courts, as in the past. Its original jurisdiction was, however, very comprehensive and within the provincial sphere it was almost a replica of the Sultan's court at the capital.

(d) **The Court of the Provincial Diwan**—It was presided over by the provincial head of the revenue department and tried revenue cases.

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Appeals from its decisions lay before the court of the High Diwān at the capital.

(e) The Court of the Qāzi—Such a court was located in all the important towns within the kingdom and specially at the seats of the central and provincial governments. Its presiding officer was the Qāzi who was often assisted by Muftīs, who were jurists of repute.

Besides these important courts some judicial functions were assigned also to certain important civil and military officials such as the Kotwāl, the commanders of tribal armies and district or pargana officers. We are also told that Sikandar had appointed Miān Bhuā as Mīr Adl. The status and powers of this judicial officer have not been specified by contemporary authors. Mr. M. B. Ahmad opines that “he did not possess all the powers of a Qāzi, but, it seems, had jurisdiction to try civil cases” of a petty nature and that appeals against his decisions lay to Qāzi-i-Sābāh. But he does not state the authority on which he bases his conclusions. On the contrary, on page 115 of his work, he lists Qāzi Miān Bhuā among the chief justices of the Sultans of Delhi. This would imply that though as Mīr Adl he was subordinate to even the provincial Qāzi, he was at the same time the superior of the latter as the Chief Justice of the Realm. Such an arrangement would be highly unsatisfactory. It would be, therefore, more reasonable to suppose either that Mīr Adl in the time of Sikandar was a synonym

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2 M. B. Ahmad, Administration of Justice in Medieval India, p. 127.
3 Ibid., p. 121.
for the chief judge at the capital or that Miān Bhuā did not hold the office of the Chief Judge at all. The latter supposition will, however, run counter to almost unanimous account of our authorities which refer to him as the Chief Judge at the capital.¹

Besides the appointment of a new officer called the Mir Adl, Sikandar introduced certain other novel features also. He strengthened the Sultan's Court at the expense of the court of the Chief Justice and thus brought about concentration of highest judicial authority in his own hands. We do not find mention of Dād-bāks or courts with exclusive mazālim jurisdiction. He had also made elaborate arrangements for detection of crimes, apprehension of criminals, prompt redress of grievances, adjudication according to law and moderation in inflicting punishments. Above all, he personally supervised the administration of justice and took every precaution to ensure speed, efficiency and respect for law.

Sikandar depended for detection of crimes on the local police, secret spies and the dāk chaukīs. Throughout the empire, there were local officials whose main function was maintenance of law and order. In the towns, this was entrusted to the Kotwāl or in his absence to the head of the administration in that quarter. Malik Ādām Kākar was perhaps the head of the Police and Jail Departments in the reigns of Sikandar and Ibrāhīm.² Quite a number of day to day crimes

¹ Tab. I, pp. 338-339; Dāndī pp. 82-86; Waqīāt pp. 28-33.
² Dāndī pp. 74-78, Waqīāt pp. 36-37 and Yādgār pp. 44-46 relate an incident in which a couple bound for Agra was met by two soldiers who took a fancy for the
were detected by the ordinary civil police. But as the officers in charge of maintaining law and order had other duties as well, it was necessary to reinforce their efforts by the employment of a corps of secret agents. These secret agents and local officials had to forward their reports to the Sultan with great promptness. For speedy transmission of these reports the Sultan maintained Dāk Chaukīs where fresh horses and couriers were maintained. It worked so smoothly and efficiently that the Sultan received reports of occurrences from the remotest parts of his empire every day.¹ News travelled so fast that the Sultan was able to inform Sheikh Lādan Dānishmand of the landing of Hājī Abdul Wahāb on the same day.² The reports sent by the Sultan’s spies were of such an intimate and detailed character that he was kept posted up-to-date even about the most trivial incidents.³ Abdullah says that the Sultan was so well posted about the affairs of his subjects, soldiers and nobles that the Sultan knew if there was anything in particular in anybody’s home and whatever one uttered in one’s house was sure to be communicated to the Sultan. Some people, he goes on to add, believed

woman, devised a clever stratagem for murdering the husband and made away with his pretty bride. She was however rescued by Sikandar and Malik Adam Kākar. This suggests that Malik Adam was in charge of the Police Department.

In the reign of Ibrāhīm, Malik Adam was charged with the custody of Mīrān Bhuā (Vide Dānd, p. 113, and Bad, I, p. 327). This too suggests that he was at the head of the Police and Jail Departments.

¹ Dānd, p. 37.
² Waqīāt, p. 36; Dānd, p. 74.
³ Cf. Sultan’s rebuke to Bhikan Khan Lodī for not keeping a servant at night and personally removing his cot to protect himself against rain (Vide Waqīāt p. 27, Yādgār, p. 43, and Dānd, p. 73).
that the Sultan was informed about the affairs of his state by a jin who was in his service. Ahmad Yādgār also refers to a belief in certain quarters that the Sultan was mysteriously informed about all happenings by the ‘Jins’ in his service. But Yādgār refers to another belief that the Sultan was a ‘Wali’ and his omni-science was just a proof of his being a ‘Wali’. All this goes to show that Sikandar’s secret service was very efficient. Consequently, it must have been quite easy for him to detect crimes and to apprehend criminals for bringing them to book.

‘Justice delayed is justice denied’ is a popular adage. Sikandar took special care to prevent needless delays. At the headquarters of the Capital, he had ordered his Vakil to be present in his seat from early morning to the first quarter of the night to receive all complaints. As soon as they had been recorded steps were taken to investigate them fully and a verdict was issued. When the Sultan was on his march or going through a city in procession, any aggrieved person could approach him with his plaint. But before the Sultan took any action, the representatives of his iqṭādārs and governors would take him aside and give him satisfaction lest their masters should come to grief on account of the Sultan’s displeasure. This too contributed to prompt redress of grievances. The Sultan had also ordered that he should be kept informed of the proceedings of the Chief Justice’s Court at each stage and we are told that when Miân Bhuā failed to report on

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1 Dāndī, p. 73. Also Tab. I, p. 337.
2 Yādgār, p. 44.
3 Dāndī, pp. 40-41.
the case of Sayyad of Arwal Vs. Miān Māleh though more than two months had elapsed, he ordered the court of enquiry not to disperse till its business had been concluded and he himself kept awake till the third quarter of the night, when the court’s recommendations were finally submitted to him for confirmation and orders.¹ This shows that the Sultan was easily accessible and that his constant supervision and control ensured prompt redress of grievances and quick disposal of cases.

Sikandar usually showed respect for the ‘Shara’ but he did not hesitate to supplement it by his own regulations and orders where he found the former deficient or unsuited to Indian conditions. He took all possible care to make available to the judge expert legal advice. With this object in view he had appointed Muftis—men deeply learned in law—to assist the Qāzis. He also maintained at the camp and at the headquarters of the government a select group of theologians whom he could consult on any legal issue, as it arose.²

The historians of Sikandar’s reign have recorded a number of cases illustrative of Sultan’s intelligence and impartiality. In the Banker Vs. two bad characters the Sultan ordered that the purse in dispute would be restored when both of them came together to ask for it and this set the

¹ Dārāj, pp. 47-48. The details of the case were that Miān Māleh the sief-holder of the district of Arwal (on the Son, 44 miles SW of Patna) had seized the lands assigned in free gift to a Sayyad which was contrary to standing orders of the Sultan. When Miān Māleh’s guilt was proved, the Sultan dismissed him from service.
² Dārāj, p. 47.
matter at rest. In the soldier Vs. Banker it was Sultan's intuition alone which suggested to him a means of discovering the fraud of the latter. Similarly in the Boatman Vs. Traveller, the Sultan satisfied both the parties by pinning down the former to the literal meaning of his statement and thus allowing him only 100 gold pieces out of a purse containing 1,500. Various other cases like Sayyad of Arwal Vs. Miān Māleh Subject Vs. the Governor of Sambhal, and the Governor of Lahore and Dipalpur Vs. Shaikh Muhammad reveal utter impartiality of the Sultan in dealing with his subjects, irrespective of their rank and status. In all these cases the Sultan's decision was in favour of the private citizen and the officials in question were reprimanded for improper conduct. Thus Sikandar not only took care to appoint efficient and capable judges but also saw that the laws to be applied should be equitable and just and should make no discrimination between one person and another howsoever great the disparity between their status and social rank may be.

Sikandar had made some improvements also in regard to procedure at law-courts. All plaints were to be filed with a special officer who was then to refer them to various courts at the capital according to their nature and importance. Sometimes the Sultan ordered investigation to be made by the Wazir or Mir Adl and delivered judgment

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1 For details see Daādī pp. 86-87 and Waqīṭ pp. 48-49.
2 Yādgār pp. 42-43; Waqīṭ pp. 33-35.
3 Waqīṭ pp. 32-33.
4 Daādī pp. 47-48.
5 Daādī p. 44; Yādgār p. 35.
6 Daādī pp. 45-46; Waqīṭ pp. 42-43.
only after investigation report had been filed. All disputed cases of fact were settled by reference to eye-witnesses. Testimony of respectable persons was generally accepted without any attempt at cross-examination. Thus in the Wife Vs. Husband and His Brother the testimony of gamblers dressed as Brāhmins was unhesitatingly accepted by Miān Bhuā and the plaintiff received no redress. When she went in appeal to the Sultan’s court, Sikandar tried the case de novo and discovered the witnesses to be false by asking them to make a ruby of wax of the size delivered to the lady. As none of them had actually seen the gem and as they were prevented from consulting each other or the brothers, there was disparity in the size of their handicraft and they were obliged to make a confession that they had been hired for giving false evidence. Though appeals could be made to the court of the Sultan there was perhaps either no provision for appeals in the provinces or the courts at the capital had concurrent powers of hearing appeals from the lowest courts without any reference to intermediary ones. It was also possible to transfer cases from one court to another. The governor of Lakhnāū referred the case of Budhan Brāhmin to the Sultan’s court at Sambhal because of a difference of opinion among local jurists.

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1 Dorn I, p. 68; Dāndī pp. 82-86; Waqīt pp. 28-32. The case may be briefly summarised as follows:—The younger of two brothers returning home from a campaign did not deliver to his sister-in-law the ruby sent to her by the elder brother. On the return of the latter, the younger brother charged the lady with concealing the ruby and advised use of violence. She then complained to Miān Bhuā and finally appealed to the Sultan.

Under Bahlul punishments were generally moderate. Sikandar was also inclined to be lenient in most cases. Thus if a person showed repentance and the local jailors sent a favourable report he was granted a remission of his sentence except when he was guilty of embezzlement of government funds¹ or when he happened to be a Hindu.² But there were occasions when he could be severe. Thus Miyan Maleh was dismissed from office for disregarding Sultan’s explicit orders in relation to ‘imlāk’ and ‘Wazāif’. Budhan was sentenced to death for merely asserting that Islam was true but his own religion was not less so. The false witnesses in the case of Wife Vs. Husband and his Brother had to rub their noses and lips against the ground till the rising of the court. In the reign of Ibrāhīm Lodí punishments tended to become increasingly severe, specially if the crime in question was sedition, disaffection or conspiracy.

Despite the handicap of distance and slow means of communication, Sikandar maintained rigid control over local law-courts. General rules for their guidance were issued from time to time. All irregularities were promptly pointed out and fresh instructions were rushed to them through the agency of the dāk chaukīs. Appeals against the decisions of lower courts in the different provinces of the empire could be preferred in the

¹ Dāndī p. 40 says that such jail deliveries took place four times a year, “On the Ids, 10th day of Muharram and the death anniversary of the Prophet.”
² Dāndī pp. 79-82; Waqīst pp. 25-27 refer to the case of a Hindu convicted of theft of a horse and confined into prison for over 7 years. He was finally released on promising to accept Islam.
courts at the capital. That also enabled the Sultan to keep a strict supervision over the working of the entire judicial machinery. The existence of espionage also helped him in the discharge of this important function. In effect, the administration of justice during the regime of the Lodí monarchs had touched a high watermark of efficiency.

In the Central Government the king occupied the most important position. He was the highest executive and judicial officer of the realm. Except where the canon law seriously stood in the way, his will was law and he was free to promulgate any rules or orders that he considered necessary. He was also the commander-in-chief of his forces and was expected to lead them to battle on crucial occasions. Orders of appointments, dismissal, promotion, transfer, suspension etc. were also passed under his authority. He personally supervised the working not merely of the Central Government but was also expected to keep a strict and vigilant eye over subordinate officers and vassals in the provinces and districts. In order to perform this last function efficiently Sikandar had devised a fairly satisfactory scheme. All important offices were assigned by the Sultan after he had assured himself about the integrity and high family of the candidates. The network of secret agents, spread over the whole of the empire, kept him posted up-to-date about even the minutest details.¹ The Sultan also maintained

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¹ The following may be cited as typical illustrations:

(a) Bhíkan Khan Lodí who had himself removed his cot inside the room was rebuked by the Sultan the next morning for his greed in not keeping even one servant during night.

(b) The report of Haji Abdul Wahab's landing was given to Sh. Ladan Danishmand the same day.
a regular system of dāk-chaukis. At fixed intervals, relays of horses were maintained and news-carriers galloped at full speed with instructions and reports from and to the capital.\textsuperscript{1} The Sultan looked into these reports and if he found anything amiss or contrary to his directions he immediately issued fresh orders to set things right.\textsuperscript{2} Sikandar also changed his headquarters temporarily—though the change in the case of Agra proved permanent—to areas needing more constant attention. Thus he stayed at Shamsābād and Sambhal when the eastern part of his dominions was disturbed by conspiracies, rebellions and wars. When he had to deal with the Rāja of Gwalior and the ruler of Malwa, he shifted his headquarters first to Bayānā and then to Agra, which remained the seat of government till the end of his reign.

The daily routine of Sikandar as given by Abdullah may not be literally true but even when some allowance is made for exaggerated flattery,\textsuperscript{3} it would be conceded that he was pretty hard worked, so that sometimes he said all the five prayers at the same spot because pressure of state-business pinned him down to it from early morning till late in the evening. It was thus a Herculean or rather an impossible business to perform the functions of royalty with uniform success,

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\textsuperscript{1} Fer. (L.) I. p. 187; Tab. I, p. 337; MR. I, p. 476.
\textsuperscript{2} Dāsdi, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{3} cf. for instance his statement that the Sultan had a nap in the noon but did not sleep in the night at all. (Dāsdi p. 37; Waqīṭ p. 49).
for illness, military campaigns, or local troubles would often distract the attention of the monarch from day-to-day supervision. Besides, it made the government too much of a personal affair. If a Sultan was negligent, incompetent or tyrannical it would not work, and disruption of the empire would be its inevitable result. The Afghāns, however, even under Sher Shāh, failed to remove this defect and it was left to the Mughals to devise a better plan of work.

Success of the Afghān government very largely depended upon the co-operation of the nobles with the Sultan of the day. Their importance did not lie merely in the fact that they were military commanders and recipients of all high offices in the state. The nobles claimed, in addition, an inalienable right of confederal autonomy. They were fully satisfied when Bahlāl conceded it, they were restive when Sikandar circumscribed it but when Ibrāhīm flatly rejected it they rose in open rebellion. The nobles claimed descent from a common ancestor with the Sultan and, therefore, claimed that they should be treated as brethren. As the Sultans had to face serious difficulties at the hands of the Turks, the Rājpūts and the Khokhars, they allowed their governors to keep dangerously large armed forces. Thus at the accession of Ibrāhīm Lodi there were many Afghān nobles like Daryā Khan Nūhānī, Āzam Humāyūn Sarwānī and Nasīr Khan Nūhānī, who were commanders of 30,000 or even 40,000 soldiers. Rebellion in such cases was bound to be a more serious affair than in former days.

1 Waqīyat p. 69, says that he had 45,000 soldiers and 700 elephants under him.
In the qualities of head and heart, the nobles did not attain a very high standard. Some of them like Miân Bhuā were finished scholars. Others like Miân Zainuddin⁴ or Miân Maāruf Farmuli² might be men of piety and religion. Some like Ahmed Khan³ might be very punctual and methodical. But a majority of them were superstitious, careless about money and addicted to pleasures of the flesh. Some of them were great ignoramuses.⁴ Vanity, selfishness and pride were vices from which few were free. But they were not altogether devoid of good qualities. They were all fond of manly sports, treated their dependents and guests with kindness and generosity⁶ and had a healthy zest for life. They were often sincere, jovial and informal in their dealings. To Afghān authors they appear, on the whole, very esteemable and popular.

As administrators, the Afghān nobility was only a moderate success. They retained authority

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¹ Wāqīāt pp. 55-58.
² Dāndī pp. 138-139.
³ Wāqīāt pp. 70-72.
⁴ Khān-i-Azām Lād Khan did not know even numbers but maintained a huge seraglio. Wāqīāt pp. 72-74.
⁵ Numerous anecdotes of extravagant liberality are recorded by Afghān historians:
(a) Syed Khan’s gift to a courtier of 3 precious stones worth 3, 5, and 7 lakh tankas respectively, though he wanted only one of them.
(b) He also gave away 7 lakh tankas to his soldiers, because pack animals were galled.
(c) Khān-i-Azām Lād Khan passed on all presents sent to him to the person in attendance at the time of their receipt.
(d) Dīlāwar Khan daily spent 500 tankas in purchasing roses for his harem. (Dāndī pp. 99-103).
(e) Bhīkam Khan distributed 500 tankas among the faqirs every day. (Yādgār, pp. 58-59).
(f) Miân Gādār Farmuli, governor of Kanauj distributed halwa free of cost to all the nobles and chiefmen of the army when he accompanied it on a march. (Wāqīāt p. 66).
in their respective fiefs more by military force than by enlightened measures of public welfare. They were tolerated by the masses partly because they did not govern quite thoroughly and partly because the previous governments had been hopelessly weak and incompetent to provide any protection from disorder and lawlessness. The Afghāns were inefficient financiers, were prone to pick up quarrels on petty issues and were careless about details of administration. The downfall of the Lodī empire was, thus, largely due to inadequacy of the ruling hierarchy.

Military organization of the Lodis was none too efficient. The army consisted mainly of cavalry, elephantry and infantry. Lodī horsemen were excellent riders and fine archers. They had also learnt some of the Mongol tactics viz. lying in ambush, luring away the enemy far from its strong base; sending out scouts before engaging the enemy and avoiding a pitched battle when conscious of their own weakness. But they knew nothing about the famous flanking movements—the tulughmā—of which Bābar made such a masterly use against Ibrāhīm and Rānā Sangrām Singh. Individually, Afghān horsemen were brave, energetic and bold. But they lacked in discipline and orderliness. The entire force was more of a conglomeration of fighting men than a compact unit in which each tribal contingent and local levy had a definite post. It was thus a cumbersome machine which jerked and jolted as it moved into action. In the face of a disciplined and determined enemy, it soon lost even the semblance of cohesion and order and was reduced to the status of a mere melee of distracted men. The Sultans neither
maintained a large standing army at the capital, adequate for the needs of the state nor imposed any uniform scheme of training and equipment. The provincial governors and district officers were members of Afghān nobility one of whose obligations towards their sovereign was the supply of a fixed quota of soldiers when demanded. The army was thus a feudal or tribal levy and suffered from all the defects peculiar to such armies.

The corps of elephants was prized more as a symbol of one’s dignity than as an efficient and properly integrated unit in the army as a whole. Its utility was limited and at times dubious. Elephants were mainly used in siege operations and in dispersing an army, disorganised by a heavy cavalry charge. Infantry was not much thought of and served mainly as a recruiting base for the cavalry.

The Afghān army, besides being tribal and feudal in character, was outmoded in its general equipment and technique. It was utterly ignorant of the use of gunpowder and was scared out of its wits when Bābār used artillery against it. It was very ineffective in sieges and both Bahlūl and Sikandar failed to capture many a fort except when they succeeded in starving or brow-beating it into surrender. Chunar, Narwar, Bāndhogarh, Gwalior and Dholpur bear testimony to Afghān incapacity for siege operations. The Lodī Sultans were not efficient organizers of commissariat wants of their troops. In the reign of Sikandar reference has already been made to a number of failures attributed to this shortcoming. Mutual rivalries and jealousies among Afghān nobles seriously handi-
capped the efficiency of the army. The Sultans had to allow local officers to maintain dangerously large contingents because of disturbed conditions of those days. These large and local armies, under proud Afghān nobles, hyper-sensitive about their dignity, could be turned to the greatest dis-service of the state in the event of rebellion or general disaffection, as it happened in the reign of Ibrāhīm Lodi. This too contributed to the fall of the Afghān monarchy.

That the Lodi monarchs were generous and considerate towards Muslims in general and men of piety and religion in particular, may be readily conceded. It has been already mentioned how Bahlāl and Sikandar, as well as their nobles made gifts to Muslim saints, scholars, mendicants and orphans. They showed preference to Afghāns in appointments to higher and key posts while in other ranks they retained the status quo. Among the vassals of Bahlāl, Rāi Karna, Rājā Pratāp, Rāi Tilokchand and Rāi Dhāndhū have been mentioned. Rāi Karna was almost a favourite with him. His relations with Rājā Kirti Singh and Mān Singh of Gwalior were also friendly. He had married a Hindu wife and had nominated her son as successor to the throne, to the exclusion of his sons and grandsons of purer Afghān lineage. He had favoured Bīr Singh even to the supersession of a Lodi Afghān1 and had been guided in his alliances and concessions purely by political expediency.

His son and successor pursued a slightly different policy. It is true that he also made friends

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1 cf. Bahlāl’s gift to him of kettledrums and the standard captured from Daryā Khān Lodi.
with Rājā Bhaidachandra and his son Śālivāhan when his position was critical. But he spared no efforts to ruin the latter completely when he refused to dishonour himself by offering his daughter in marriage to the Sultan. Similarly, though he was generous towards Rājā Mān and Vināyakdeva when his position was weak, yet the moment he had consolidated his power and reorganized his forces, he removed the one and engaged the other in a life and death struggle. His policy towards his Hindu allies and vassals was, thus, far less generous than that of his father. When he led his armies against Arail, Dholpur, Narwar, Mandrail or Awantgarh, the chroniclers always remind us that after the victory temples were replaced by mosques. This might apparently suggest that Sikandar’s wars were coloured by his religious opinions and he was intent not so much on extension of territory as on making a ‘jehād’ against the ‘unbelievers’. To give further support to this view, instances of Sikandar’s fanaticism within his own realm are quoted. Before we examine his religious policy in relation to his Hindu subjects, it may at once be stated that there is hardly any justification for importing religion to explain the wars of Sikandar against his southern neighbour, viz. the Rājā of Gwallor. We have discussed earlier the causes of this war. Whether Sikandar really indulged in iconoclastic fury, to rest on the testimony of those uncritical admirers who considered it a praiseworthy undertaking. But even if we accept their statement, it is at least equally tenable

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1 A. Halim I. H. C. (1947) p. 306, describes Sikandar Lodī as 'a champion of orthodoxy bordering on iconoclasm'. 
to suggest that it was mainly intended to overawe the defeated Rājpūts and to goad his own followers into greater exertions by making them believe that they were earning religious merit. It was thus due to political ambition rather than to religious bigotry that he made these wars.

From the events of his reign of over 28 years, 3 instances have been picked out to suggest that he was very fanatical. Another incident relates to his early years when he was stationed at Delhi as the deputy of his father. To begin with the last, Sikandar desired that when countless Hindus assembled at Kurukshetra for a holy dip, they should be attacked and the temple and the tank held in veneration by them should be desecrated. When he mooted out this proposal, one of his courtiers advised previous consultation with the ulemā. An assembly of theologians was therefore convened and the question was referred to it. This assembly chose Malik ul-ulemā Miān Abdullah of Ajodhan as its leader and spokesman. This learned man’s ruling was that as the temple was an ancient one and the bath in the tank had been allowed by previous Muslim Sultans, it was improper and contrary to law to interfere with either of them. This enraged the prince so much that he charged Miān Abdullah with supporting idolators and threatened to begin by killing him before he proceeded against the Hindus. Miān Abdullah made a spirited protest saying that it was strange that his legal opinion should have been taken when the Prince did not mean to follow it. As to the threat to his life he said that when he came to a tyrant he had done so fully prepared for such a risk. This silenced Sikandar but even as he bowed to
this ‘fatwā’, he remarked “If sanction had been given many thousand Musalmāns would have been benefited”—ostensibly by the loot. Ahmad Yādgār approvingly comments, ¹

الغرض نب آغا جوا ني إدن جذين نر فبئه نس إن إسلم
متعصب بوره.

After his coronation, when he was staying at Sambhal (i.e. between 1499 and 1503 AD), Āzam Humāyūn the Governor of Lakhnāū sent to the Sultan a Brāhmin who had affirmed in the presence of some Musalmāns that Islam was a true religion but his own religion was equally acceptable to God, ² and on whose guilt the opinions of Qāzī Pyārā and Shaikh Badr, the local theologians, were divided. The Sultan convened an assembly of learned theologians, hailing from different parts of the empire and reinforced by the Ulemā, present at the court. This assembly found the Brāhmin guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment at the first instance. After a period of probation, he was to be invited to embrace Islam but if he declined to do so he was to be executed. ³ The Brāhmin

¹ Yādgār, p. 31.

² The name and residence of the Brāhmin has been variously stated by our authorities. Wilson ( Asiatic Researches Vol. XVI, p. 55) considers him to be a disciple of Kāṣār while Prof. Hodiwała (p. 471) throws out a suggestion that he might be Bhawānand, one of the twelve disciples of Rāmānand.

The statement of this Brāhmin (named Lodhan or Bodhan) as recorded in Tabqāt pp. 322-323 is

إسلم حق سعد راين من لاه ترضي سخف


³ This is a strange case in which the exact crime has not been stated though the death penalty was imposed. Perhaps the Brāhmin was found guilty of apostasy for which death-penalty is provided. His admission before
was ultimately executed because he would not abjure his faith.

Abdullāh and Niāmatullāh mention desecration of Hindu temples at Mathura and the proscription of Hindu religious rites on the banks of the Jumnā in that town as another evidence of his staunch devotion to Islam. Abdullāh makes a very sweeping statement that all the Hindu temples within the empire were destroyed but he does not specify any particular place except Mathura. The same author, supported by others, says that he prohibited the annual procession of the spear of Sālār Masūd throughout his dominions and forbade women from making pilgrimages to tombs of saints.¹

Prima facie the evidence cited above establishes that Sikandar was scrupulously devoted to the doctrines of his faith and that sometimes he went even to the length of persecuting non-Muslims in order to win religious merit.

We have, however, shown earlier² that his orthodoxy and devotion to Islam did not prevent him from shaving the beard, enjoying music, bibbing wine and inflicting torture prohibited by the holy law. His conversation with Miān Abdullāh Ajodhāni also shows that he was not so anxious to follow the holy law as to secure the seal of orthodoxy—even by argumentum ad baculum—

Muslims that Islam was true was treated as conversion to that faith while reference about Hinduism made him an apostate. His conversion to Islam would have rectified his lapse and he could be forgiven but as he was adamant he was punished with death for persisting in apostasy.

¹ Dāḏī pp. 39-40; Dorn I, p. 66.
² Chap. V, p. 158.
for profitable plundering. The way he treated Shaikh Hasan, the infatuated admirer of his youth, and Háji Abdul Waháb, the presumptuous clerical of later days leaves no doubt about his genuine sentiments towards theologians. In his court, he maintained a select group of 17 theologians who were in constant personal attendance and who seem to be distinct from the 12 Ulemā attached to the court of justice. But when the Sultan dined, he never allowed them to eat in his presence. Though they were served with food along with the Sultan, they squatted on the ground while the Sultan sat on a couch and had to wait in silence and in hunger till the Sultan had finished. Even then, they were not allowed to dine in the royal apartments but had to carry the plates home like ordinary servants.¹ This item of daily routine, as well as his general treatment of other theologians shows that he used them for what they were worth, just as he used other servants.

Sikandar was a very shrewd despot. He wanted no opposition to his will within his own camp. He knew that his Hindu origin might make him unacceptable to Muslims in general and to Afghāns in particular. He must have, therefore, been anxious to curry favour with Muslims by making a display of his devotion to Islam and contempt for Hinduism. The latter was more important than the former because it was that alone which could convince people of his freedom from the taint of inherited infidelity. This explains his behaviour in relation to Mián Abdullāh, for, otherwise a man of Sikandar's intelligence-

¹ Yādgar pp. 41-42; Waqīāt p. 49; Dāndī pp. 36-37.
would not have quarrelled about spilt milk. He was eager to appear more orthodox and anti-Hindu than even the theologians, who always erred only on the side of bigotry. The execution of the Brāhmin and the destruction of temples was intended to prop up the authority and popularity of the Sultan which had reached its nadir when 22 nobles sought to replace him by Fath Khan. With Sikandar, therefore, religion was a mere handmaid of politics. He was neither fanatical nor strictly orthodox but he was quite prepared to make a pretence of one or the other in order to realize his ambitions and to further his schemes of conquest and consolidation. Consequently after the unhappy experience of his youth, he never took a risk of consulting the ulemā without being assured of their dittoing his point of view. The best way to do it was to hire the services of pliant theologians who were to remain constantly under the Sultan’s thumb as his attendants and courtiers. We find confirmation of this hypothesis in the way Sikandar secured the conviction of the Brāhmin of the province of Lakhnaū. A number of theologians were summoned from different parts of the country but they were deluged by the throwing in of the ulemā at the court. When they had delivered a judgment after the Sultan’s heart, they were rewarded for the service. This is how Sikandar supported his despotism by making the church subservient to his will. All the same, the fact remains that under Sikandar the condition of his Hindu subjects was not as good as under his father.

Ibrāhīm had no motive for masquerading as an orthodox person. He, therefore, added to the
musicians a party of dancing girls to relieve the monotony of official tedium. His relations with Rājā Vikramāditya of Gwalior who died fighting for him on the battlefield of Panipat remind us more of his grand-father Bahlāl than of his father Sikandar. The religious policy of the Lodi Sultans was thus generally of tolerance except when special circumstances recommended a deviation from the general rule.

That a rapprochement between the Hindus and Muslims had taken place is pretty obvious from the general review of political history of this period. But for this happy development credit is due not so much to monarchs as to another class of persons. The Lodīs at Delhi or the Khiljis at Māndā utilized the services of Hindu chiefs not so much by choice as by necessity, though even that grudging co-operation has significance of its own. The saints and reformers of this period, on the contrary, approached the problem from an altogether different angle. Miān Abdūlāh Ajodhānī’s fatwā regarding the Kurukshetra fair was based on the recognition of a fundamental right of all individuals to worship God according to their own lights. Men like Rāmānanda, Kabīr, Nānak and Chaitanya were exerting their own influence to wash away the traditional contempt of the Hindu for the religion of his fierce sovereigns. They counted among their votaries men of both the faiths and their influence sought to bridge the gulf yawning between the two religious communities. It is strange, that none of the historians of the Lodi dynasty makes a reference to these great teachers who emphasized the equality of all created beings as the children of the same God and who
taught their followers to worship Him by developing love and forbearance for his creatures. Ahmad Khan, the governor of Lakhnau charged with forming a league with the infidels was only one of those who had been influenced by the teachings of these great reformers.¹

But, though we have next to no information about the relations of these leaders of Bhakti movement with the contemporary crowned heads of northern India, there is ample evidence available which shows that ‘Bhakti’ or devotion to Almighty was definitely preponderant both among the Hindus and the Muslims. Reference has already been made to Bahlul’s gift of his fortune to a sanit of Samanā, as a price for his blessings. How he solicited the blessings of dead saints and showed consideration for theologians has also been mentioned earlier.² Sultan Sikandar was extremely fond of the company of saintly persons and reference is made to his association with Shaikh Samāuddin of Delhi, Shaikh Jamāli of Kamboh, one of the disciples of the former, Bābar Qalandar, and a certain pīr who resided in some secluded forest. These men of piety did much to give a devotional turn to the mind of the Sultan. They exercised very wide influence both on the Hindus and on the Muslims. The fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries thus witnessed a reconciliation between the two communities and it stands to the credit of their religious leaders that they helped in ushering it into existence by emphasizing devotion to a common God and love for the human race.

¹ Tab. I, p. 331; MR. I, p. 470.
² Chap. II, p. 43 and Chap. III, pp. 81, 96.
We may close this chapter with a general review of Afghān institutions. Their ideal of kingship though convenient and advantageous in the beginning was unsuited to meet the requirements of monarchy in the 15th and 16th centuries and it was an attempt to conform it to the needs of the hour which contributed to general discontent among the Afghāns. The Afghāns were not efficient administrators. Though Sikandar tried to organise the central government with special reference to administration of justice, finance and control over local governments, yet the success attained in these directions was only limited. The reforms in currency and measurement were of a comparatively abiding value. Their treatment of their Hindu subjects did not compare unfavourably with the record of their Turkish forbears but they failed to control the Afghān nobility or to find a better substitute for it. It were these shortcomings in their administrative system which contributed to the fall of their empire.
CHAPTER VIII

SOCIO-RELIGIOUS RAPPROCHEMENT

The Background:

(a) Political.—The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in the history of our land were a period of great stress and storm. They witnessed a violent struggle in the political as well as social, moral, religious and spiritual planes. A society, possessing political and religious institutions which could trace their origin to a hoary past and which had the distinction of a continuity of growth and of traditions of cultural leadership of its neighbours, came in a headlong collision with a people who had recently been fired by a new faith and were consumed by ambition to secure a place in the sun within the shortest possible time. The Indian people had all the grit and strength of a society, proud of its glorious past. But in its constitution there had appeared withal many defects and drawbacks in course of time. It was a titan which was tottering for a fall because of failure to resolve inner conflicts intime. The invading Turks wanted to impose their domination by strength of the sword and by greater internal cohesion. But the former was not so weak as to allow a tame walk-over. The Indian people, even in spite of their shortcomings, gave a tough, determined and prolonged fight to the invader. Even when they were defeated on the field of battle they continued the struggle in all phases of life. Submission to the victor did not come even grudgingly. A state of
strife, opposition and non-co-operation continued for long. It was one of the main reasons why Turkish dynasties of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were so short-lived and their career was so full of wars and insecurity. The Sultanate of Delhi had thrown up many capable administrators and accomplished generals. But their administrative and military talents produced nothing better than personal and temporary triumphs. Gradually, the strength and virility of the Turk was practically spent up and by the end of the fourteenth century a stage is reached when in the absence of any strong central power a sort of political chaos sets in. The fifteenth century, as we have noticed in the foregoing chapters, initiated a process of integration.

(b) Social and Religious.—In the social and religious sphere also, there was a like tendency in operation. In the first two centuries of Turkish domination, there is a violent clash, there is mutual distrust and mutual contempt, leading to the development of a psychological temper which was antagonistic to a state of rapprochement. But it seems that this temper had also gone to its tether by the end of the fourteenth century and in these two spheres also is initiated a move for solidarity, understanding and friendly give and take. It is in this peculiar background that the distinctive work of the religious reformers and saints of the fifteenth century has to be viewed.

Scope of the Chapter:

It being impossible to do full justice to all the saints and mystics of the fifteenth and early sixteenth century within the compass of a mere
chapter, an attempt will, therefore, be made to select only the most leading and representative actors in the field of religious and social rapprochement in Northern India and to confine attention only to delineation of their general tendencies and distinctive features. These saints may be grouped under the following heads:

(a) Vaishnavas (i) Rāmāite, (ii) Krishnāite,
(b) Hindū Saints of the so-called Nirguna Panth,
(c) Sāfī Saints.

Ramananda’s Ramaite Vaishnavism:

The earliest among them was Rāmānanda. His chronology is very uncertain but there is good reason for believing that he dominated the spiritual world in Northern India at least during the earlier part of the fifteenth century. Kabīr, Raidās, Senā, Dhannā, Pipā etc. are counted among his chief disciples. According to tradition, Rāmānanda was originally the disciple of a Shankaran Advaitist. But he was soon attracted by Rāghavānanda who was a reputed member of Shri Sampradāya of Rāmānuja. The influence of Rāghavānanda was of a decisive character. Although both Rāmānuja and Madhva have advocated worship of Lakshmī-Nārāyana yet there are some scholars who have suggested that Rāmānuja had recommended devotion to Rāma, son of Dashratha also and had emphasized his character as the Avatar of Vishnu. This group is of opinion that in the South Rāma-Bhakti existed in Shri Sampradāya in a secret or clandestine fashion. But in the North it was more openly proclaimed and Rāmānanda is the man who made the first serious attempt to popularise Rāmāite
Vaishnavism. There are many Rāmānandīs who minimise the influence of Rāmānuja on the ideas of Rāmānanda and are keen to assign to him the more distinguished role of the founder of a fresh sect of his own, distinct from the Shrī Sampradāya proper.

Rāmānanda spent the best part of his life as a religious teacher at Banāras. Although Rāmānanda did not oppose caste as a social institution, regulating marriage, interdining, and social intercourse in general, he did not consider caste as a barrier to spiritual advancement. He had noticed how lower caste Hindus were being converted to Islam because not only the path of knowledge and action but even of devotion was closed to them while Islam promised at least theoretical equality of status to all Muslims.

Rāmānuja had allowed members of the lower castes only the path of ‘Self-surrender’ or Prapatti. There were occasions when even a saintly person like Nāmadeva was turned out of a temple because he was a calico printer by birth. The Gorakhpanthis had tried to check conversion of lower castes by accepting low caste men as disciples but in Gorakhpantha there was great emphasis on Hath Yoga and severe moral discipline as an aid to spiritual advancement. This was not a very attractive scheme of things for all and sundry. Hence a new scheme more after the heart of the people had to be devised. It should be simple enough to be intelligible to the average mind, it should appeal more to the heart than to the head because the common man is more emotional than rational, it should recognize worth of human per-
sonality irrespective of accidents of birth and it should be capable of being interpreted as in no way inferior to rival schemes.

The Teachings of Ramananda:

Rāmānanda appears to have performed this task with eminent success. It is unfortunate that we have very little literary material which may be indisputably assigned to him. Consequently, for delineation of his ideas we have to fall back upon what his immediate chief disciples said and what his followers later claimed to be his teachings. Treading this comparatively uncertain ground with fortitude, circumspection and discrimination, we can build up a plausibly correct edifice of his thought by piecing together the scattered bits lying strewn here and there. What is the picture thus arrived at?

As he had originally sat at the feet of a Shankaran Advaitist and as among his chief disciples of the Nirguna Panth, monistic pantheism is an accepted belief, it must have found an integral place in Rāmānanda’s thought. But because he was initiated later by Rāghavānanda a Vishishtādwaitist, he must have come to adopt the position that Shankara’s ideas were too intellectual to make an appeal to the woe-scarred heart of the then Indian community. Hence he adopted a theistic attitude and conceived of a personal God. Before him Rāmānuja and Mādhva had conceived of this supreme benignant deity as Lord Nārāyan whose abode is Vaikuntha. Thus although He was given attributes like bliss, mercy and love, He was too divine to descend to the plane of man. Then there were teachers like Nimbārka and Vidyāpati who
had offered their devotion not to the four-armed Nārāyan but to the two-armed Gopāl Krishna, son of Vasudeva and reared up by Nanda and Yashodā at Gokula. These teachers had laid the greatest emphasis on Madhur-rati which, as in the Sahajiyā sect, might assume a grossly sensual form. Rāmānanda did not consider this variety of devotion appropriate for the average man. Even according to the Bhāgwata Purāṇa only specially advanced souls who were capable of detachment from worldly pleasures and who were competent to view the union as absolutely free from carnal associations and possible only on a higher plane of consciousness were eligible for entering the path of ‘madhur-rati’. Rāmānanda therefore chose Rāma, son of Dashratha as the incarnation of God. In the Indian religious and literary traditions, Rāma had already assumed a divine role. He was besides Maryada Purushottam, the ideally perfect man who had the benefaction of His subjects or devotees very close to His heart. Rāmānte Vaishnavism was thus moving within the ambit of a strictly moral scheme of life. Rāma was supposed to have endeared Himself not only to great sages like Vashishtha, Vishwāmitra and Bharadwāja but had also fraternized with Vibhishana, Sugriva, Jāmbvant and the Nishād. Here was, therefore, a God who in His conduct had represented an unaffected love and regard for even the most lowly in the then Indian society. Rāmānanda chose Him, therefore, as the embodiment of Supreme Reality and he sought to bring together people of all castes and classes on a common platform of devotion to Rāma and recommended particularly the Dāsya-rati. Swāmī Rāghavānanda is said to have saved the life of
Rāmānanda by his Yogic powers. Krishnadās Payahāri, the founder of Galatā (Aīmer, Rājputānā) Math of Rāmānandis and a disciple of Anantānanda, disciple of Rāmānanda, is said to have driven the Nāthpanthis out of Galatā by demonstrating superior yogic feats. In the Nirguna Panth also Yoga has a place. Consequently, it has been inferred that Rāmānanda taught certain yogic practices also to his more advanced disciples by perfecting which they could meet the challenge of Nāthpanthis and Muslim saints who used to win followers by exhibition of the so-called miracles.

Estimate of His Work:

Thus Rāmānanda fulfilled a pressing need of the times. The Hindū of the thirteenth and fourteenth century had been stunned by the violence of the Turkish impact. At places, he had become depressed and dejected when he noticed unrestrained desecration of his temples and wilful degradation of the Hindū in the social and political spheres. He had also been charmed or bewildered by the miraculous feats of Muslim saints and the simplicity and directness of their teachings. Rāmānanda set up a system which could instil faith and self-confidence and which could cure the social malaise of chronic depression. The path of devotion to Rāma was flung wide open to all and even a Muslim weaver like Kabīr was accepted as a disciple. Rāmānanda thus initiated the process of revival, consolidation and reform.

But there were limits which even he did not cross. The study of the Vedas remained the monopoly of the higher castes even in his system. The path of knowledge was still forbidden land for
the Shādra because it involved study of the scriptures which required a technical initiation called the ‘Upnayana’ samskār for which the Shādra was ineligible. As indicated above, he had also retained caste as a scheme of social organization. Rāmānanda had thus conceded equal opportunities to all only in respect of spiritual discipline, leading to development of devotion for the divinity. In spite of these limitations, this innovation was of a revolutionary significance. The lower castes gained a status of equality in the spiritual plane and in case of higher intrinsic spiritual merit even men of higher castes came to them as disciples. Consequently, the stigma of an inalienable inferiority was done away with and the basic worth of human personality was redeemed. In relation to inter-communal harmony also, he took a bold step when he admitted Kabīr in the fold of his disciples. According to the Bhavishya Purāṇa he also reconverted to Hindūism certain new Muslims. They were called Sanyogis and are found to be residing near Ayodhyā at present. Thus on the spiritual plane, he attached importance mainly to sincerity of devotion, purity of conduct and zeal for self-realization. If the core was sound, he did not bother about the outer complexion of the kernel.

Kabīr:

His message made a wide appeal in Northern India and many new sects came into existence which traced their basic inspiration to him. Among these sects one of the most powerful in respect of popularity and appeal was the Kabīr Panth. The founder of this Panth was Kabīr. Although there is a great controversy regarding the exact dates of
Kabir's birth and death, he is credited at all hands with a long life and a distinguished spiritual career. Magahar and Banaras figure most prominently in his biography though he is reputed to have travelled to Jaunpur, Mainikpur, Jhansi etc. also in quest of saints and mystics. Kabir had received no formal education. May be, he was utterly illiterate. But he was endowed with a remarkable genius for assimilating philosophical ideas and weaving them together into a refreshingly unique pattern. He had a keen and penetrating intellect and he particularly excelled in incisive wit, discriminating reason and tearing asunder all shams of superstition, ignorant beliefs, and hypocritical orthodoxy. He preached his message in the form of Sakhis, Shabdas, Ramainis etc. which were compiled by his disciples later. But many lines of doubtful authenticity have also been smuggled into the genuine compositions of the master by sectarian followers for furthering sectarian interests, as understood by them. The lines that are generally regarded as the composition of Kabir when subjected to a searching analysis reveal their author to be a great mystic saint who had imbibed through audition the main currents of the Upanishads, the Vedanta, the Shakta Tantra, the Nath Panth and the ancient Hindu scriptures and mythology. His familiarity with Hindu philosophical ideas and Puranic lore was certainly secured by association with Ramananda and the general atmosphere at Banaras. But it has given rise to a myth concerning Kabir's parentage. According to this myth, a young Brahmin widow was mistaken by Ramananda for a married lady whose husband was still living and labouring under this false impression he blessed her with the
birth of a son. By sheer force of this blessing, the lady became a mother and gave birth to Kabir by immaculate conception as Jesus had been born. Because of birth from a Brähmin mother, it is claimed, he turned out to be such a great sage and seer. Perhaps, it is more reasonable to believe that Kabir was a Muslim both by birth and upbringing and that he was attracted towards Hinduisim originally because of Nath Panthis who had an important hold in the eastern districts of modern Uttar Pradesh and was later initiated, formally or informally, as a disciple of Ramananda who was organising a band of ascetics, called the Vairagis, for the propagation of his message. As we shall see later, Kutban, Manjhan and Jayasi who also flourished more or less about this time and whose works evince intimate familiarity with Hindu philosophical ideas and modes of expression had been able to acquire this knowledge from the prevailing atmosphere of give and take between the Hindu and Muslim saints and scholars of the time without having been born of obscure Brähmin widows.

Mission of Kabir:

Kabir attempted to achieve something more ambitious than what his great preceptor had been able to realize. He thought it was not enough for the Hindu or the Muslim saint to be willing to guide spiritual advancement of votaries drawn from both the communities. Mere personal magnetism was not enough to bring the two communities as close as Kabir desired. His aim was to demonstrate the utter hollowness of the belief that Hinduisim and Islam were two antagonistic or irreconcilable religions. He tried to show that
Hindūism and Islām differed mainly in externals and in the employment of differing terminologies. But the essence of both the religions was the same. Those who were ignorant or incapable of probing into the depth of ceremonies and practices prescribed by the two religions erected walls of separatism to shut themselves. But men of discernment and vision would not fail to recognize the essential unity of them both. If one goes to the letter of either the Vedas or the Qurān and fails to enter into the spirit of their true message he will not know the true faith. If one takes only a gross physical view, the mosque and the temple and the namāz and the pājā will appear distinct and different. But a real sage like Kabīr sees crystal clear that Rāma and Rahīm are the same. There is only one God Whom both Hindūs and Muslims, nay the entire created beings, worship. He had chosen neither the mosque nor the temple as His special abode. He is partial neither to Kāabā nor to Kāśi. On the contrary to whatever side you turn you will see Him alone, provided your vision is clear. The names, of course, of this Supreme Reality are countless but variety in name should not lead to their separate deification, for plurality of Gods, says Kabīr, is an impossibility. Kabīr is out and out a revolutionary as far as the externalia of religions are concerned. He makes hectic and telling attacks against all ceremonies. He exhorts a real seeker after truth to abandon the form and to seize at the spirit, to abstain from show and advertisement and to aim at self-realization by introvert methods. Idol-worship, recitation of holy mantras, repetition of the name mechani-
ally, use of the rosary, indulgence in intricate religious ceremonies, esoteric or mystical practices for securing sense satisfaction or occult powers for miracle-showing are all rejected as born of ignorance and leading to depravity and degeneration. He describes both traditional pandits and orthodox ulema as utterly ignorant of Truth, he pours cold scorn on them and exhorts them to listen to his words of wisdom in a receptive frame of mind. At times, he assumes great airs of superiority and condemns the leaders of virtually all the prevailing sects and creeds. The only person or persons to whom he has referred with respect or approval are ‘Guru’, ‘Rāmānanda’ and ‘Sādhu’ also equated with ‘Vaishnava’. The persons who are the targets of his most venomous attacks are the Shāktas, Pandits and Qāzīs.

Nature of His Message:

What is then the positive or constructive message of Kabīr? No sound scholar or thinker now suggests that Kabīr’s ideas are a mere motley assemblage and that discerning a system or philosophy in them is more an act of imposition of an interpreter’s own prejudices than an objective delineation of ideas as they are. Yet a certain amount of variety of opinion even in fundamentals is sometimes traced in his writings. That is why while one author declares him to be a Vishishtā-dwaitist, another calls him a Bhedabhedist. But the view now generally accepted is that he was essentially a monist though we cannot equate his monism with that of Shankar in every little detail. Dr. Barthwal accounting for apparent diversity of thought in Kabīr says, “To describe the Absolute
fully, one has to take all possible side-views also but they have ultimately to be transcended. This is what the perfect Adwaitins like Kabir have also done...”1 Perhaps a more rational view would be that there are stages of varying realizations. Lines composed either at the time of these realizations or enshrining the memory of those realizations wear the aspect of variety. It may also be possible that there was no absolute or final realization of any sort. It was all a matter of conviction but on a higher plane of consciousness, Kabir being no finished philosopher or scholar, the language used by him is not as precise and exact as a philosopher would make it. Further, it should be remembered that Kabir’s audiences were largely, though not exclusively, drawn from the unlettered masses. Consequently, even if he was capable of employing more scientific terminology, he abstained from it in order to make himself intelligible. The only hurdle in subscribing to this last thesis is the existence of many paradoxes and obscure passages which defy all interpretation.

God, Soul and the Universe:

If one takes a total view of his writings and regards the more frequently and more insistently recurring ideas as representative of the man, a system of thought is clearly visible. He believed that there was only one God, though man has called him by different names. 2 He is the only true Reality, the only real substance in the visible

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1 Nirguna Panth p. 35.

2. दूर जगदीश कही ते आये, कहु कौने भरमाया। अहम्म, राम, करीमा, केसी, हरि, इजरत नाम घराया॥ (K. S. IV p. 75).
universe of diverse appearances. God in fact is indescribable in words because all perceptual knowledge presupposes distinction of subject and object while in the conception of God there is no distinction of any type. In truth, in the ultimate analysis, God has no attributes and yet attributes of love, justice and grace are imputed to Him by the seeker. The attributeless God can really be given no name. But if a name must be given, he would prefer to call him Rāma. But he is anxious to insist that he did not believe in the theory of incarnation. To make his position absolutely clear, he positively recounts all incarnations and then pronounces them to be different from God, the Absolute. Kabir says that all creation has evolved from God. While in all objects in the universe substance is identical with God, the appearance, being the gift of nescientic māyā is false. God and soul are thus identical, irrespective of credal distinctions. But the soul has forgotten his essential nature because of diverse sheaths of ignorance acquired during the process of evolution from the Supreme Being. Idols and Avatārs are all gross and existent within the framework of māyā. So are temples and mosques, Kāśā and Kāshī. Hence they in their apparent form have no reality. They cover from our ken the true aspect of the real Substance. Hence they are positively harmful. Viewed in correct perspective, they are only the manifestations of one Absolute God who is not only immanent in all creation but also transcends it. The aim of spiritual endeavour is to experience the Real concealed in the false.

1 Nirguna Panth. p. 65.
Process of Self-realization:

(i) Intuition—This cannot be done by mere-intellectual approach. Philosophy cannot unravel the nature of the Absolute. But each man regardless of caste or creed has a higher faculty than reason. This is intuition. This again is of different levels of subtlety. It is by employing the highest type of intuition that the Absolute can be realized.

(ii) Attachment for the Lord—In order to be able to make use of intuition, one has to transcend the plane of physical consciousness, associated with senses of the body. But the body is not to be crushed by privations or torture. Here Kabir approves the Buddhistic middle course. He recommends the life of a householder as the proper place for Sādhanā. According to him, wife and progeny, wealth and riches are, in themselves, no impediment to spiritual progress. One should remain in the midst of temptations but should not succumb to them. This is the heroic path. Passions and desires, thought Kabir, could neither be mastered by flight into the seclusion of forests nor by rigorous austerities. On the contrary, they have to be given a new orientation, a new direction. Turn them towards Rāma. For the longing for worldly pleasures and satisfaction, substitute love for Rāma. When this love for Rāma has assumed the form of a passionate longing for union, thought of worldly pursuits will have no temptation. Then one will perform worldly duties only out of a sense of duty. All love and attachment is offered to God. The seeker should love him, with the wife’s passion for her husband, with
the innocence of a child’s love for his parents and with the devotion of a faithful servant for his master, all rolled in one. In this characterisation of love for the Lord, Kabir has tried to combine Vaishnava conception of Bhakti with Islamic conception of devotion to the mighty Allah.

(iii) Association with Sadhus—Kabir thought that love for God is natural to man but he forgets it because of worldly entanglements. For a beginner, therefore, it is desirable to seek the company of Sādhus. A real Sādhu should be distinguished from mere impostors. He is not swayed by worldly desires and is above praise and slander. He can put up with equanimity physical strain as well as even wilful indignities. He seeks no monetary gain because he is in the company of the giver of all gifts. He is humble, courteous and loving and has no fondness for collecting disciples. A saint of this description, of whatever caste or creed, is like a centre of spiritual radiation. Thus Kabir recommends what he himself had done viz., seeking the company of saintly persons, whether they were Hindus or Muslims, Brāhmins or Chândālas.

(iv) Importance of Guru—But this general inspiration alone is not enough. One must seek a spiritual preceptor from among these Sādhus. A Guru is that Sadhu who has already secured union with God, knows the perils and joys of the journey by personal experience and is capable of inspiring faith and confidence in the disciple. Relations between the Guru and the disciple should be frank and very cordial. The disciple should
consider the Guru as important as God or even in one sense superior to Him.¹

(v) Self-Realization—The disciple should be indifferent towards all ceremonials and practices and should confine himself merely to what the Guru prescribes. The name suggested by the Guru should be repeated in the prescribed manner and the yogic exercises recommended by him should be performed under his supervision till they have been mastered. The disciple, acting under the guidance of such a Guru will gradually break the successive sheaths of ignorance by concentrating his attention on the grace and love of God. Thus with the help of this Saguna God the gross maya will be transcended. Then by further Sadhana it would be apparent that God Absolute is the only true substance and that language can describe Him neither by negation nor by assertion. He would thus be able to transcend that Relative idea of God as well and the identity of himself with the Absolute will then burst upon his consciousness as the sun appears in all its resplendent glory when the thin layer of cloud disappears.

Estimate of Kabir’s Achievements:

It will thus appear that there is no place for scriptures, pilgrimages, idol-worship, incarnations, ritualism or austerity in this scheme of spiritual enlightenment. It is a process of self-realization by transcending one limiting sheath after another with the help of the Guru and the Grace of God Himself. In its original form the doctrines are

¹. कबीर ते नर अंबों हैं; गुह को कबहों और। इर गँठे गुह और हैं; गुह गँठे नहं और। (Kabir Granthavali, p. 2, 4).
non-sectarian and fairly rational. But his followers soon imported all that Kabir had castigated against. A ritual was gradually developed, the image of Kabir was shown reverence as any idol is worshipped by the Hindüs, and Kabir was deified as an incarnation.

Kabir's place in Indian history is determined by the influence that he exerted to bridge the yawning gulf between the Hindüs and the Muslims and to obliterate distinctions between man and man based on the accident of birth. But Kabir did not meet with success proportionate to his zeal. Even his own followers are broadly divisible into two groups, one regarding him as a Muslim saint, initiated into the mystical discipline by Shaikh Taqi and the other looking upon him as a Hindũ avatar, born by immaculate conception of a childless widow and inspired by Ramananda. Kabir's attacks failed to make either the Brähmins or the Ulamā conscious of their faults to the extent of reforming them. The average Brähmin Pandit considered his attacks scurrilous and born of ignorance. Hence they had more contempt than esteem for him. Consequently, the reaction was not favourable. Yet, the lower castes had now a plank for attacking the superiority of the Brähmins and this gave them a sense of their own worth. The only unfortunate feature was that many Kabir-Panthis became drunk with vanity and pride. The Muslims also thought that he was corrupted by contact with Hindüs and according to tradition Sikandar tried to persecute him. The hostile Brähmin also misrepresented him as a veiled Muslim trying to win Hindũ con-
verts to Isām by shattering the faith of the Hindū in the truth of his religion. Even the followers of Kabīr did not always become more moral or spiritual than the average Indian of his day.

Causes of his Success being Partial:

Why did Kabīr fail to produce more abiding influence on the leaders of the two communities? Perhaps his social status and lack of education was one great handicap. His method of reform was also to fault. Nobody likes to be told that all that he does or thinks is absolutely wrong and that his scriptures do not convey the sense which he and his forbears have till then understood and that a mystical faqīr without any pretension to learning is the only right interpreter of their true meaning. Kabīr thus caused irritation and provoked opposition but failed to touch the chord of sympathy among those whose social status and economic interest he was sapping at the base. The rank and file were perhaps drawn by his moral fervour, simple living, and the mode of expression. But they found it difficult to destroy all their current practices and abjure all religious convictions to catch up the true spirit of his teachings. Consequently, either they remained indifferent in practice or even if they became his disciples they brought with them some of their old habits and prejudices and to that extent helped to drag down the nobility of the master’s message from its elevated heights. After Kabīr had passed away, people judged the truth of his doctrines by reference to his followers and when a suave and popular religious reformer like Tulsidās started
making veiled attacks on Kabir and his kind without mentioning them by name, the higher castes in general and the intelligentsia in particular were weaned away from Kabir's influence. To many, the doctrines of Kabir appeared more intellectual than emotional and consequently they failed to touch their hearts. The institution of caste is so strongly embedded in Hindu society that it survives all sorts of onslaughts. Even within the Panth, caste exists as a scheme of social organization for the lay followers. For the renunciates, however, the distinction of caste has no place.

His Main Contribution:

The net result of Kabir's efforts thus was that for those who were seeking a common platform for bringing together the two communities or who were conscious of the need for some means of escape from the state of mutual dislike and hatred among the Hindu and the Muslim, a spiritual basis was provided for rapprochement. Those who cared to use reason as the torch of discrimination and conduct, Kabir provided a plan of escape from superstition and empty ritualism. Ramana's plan of resuscitating the Hindu community by reclaiming the lower castes to a plane of spiritual equality was carried to its apotheosis and for those who were touched by the fire of his message, all sense of inferiority or superiority except on grounds of moral and spiritual advancement was obliterated. He also provided a new approach to a problem which is of universal interest, viz., the process of self-realization. He imbibed the moral tone and discipline of Vaishna-
vism but steered clear of idol-worship, avatārhood and ritualism. He adopted the Sūfic idea of love for Allah but kept it free from all carnal associations and sublimated emotion by engrafting on the loving and lovable God of the Sūfi the monistic conception of the Absolute. It is for these reasons that Kabīr continues to enjoy high esteem and wide popularity even to this day.

Nanak (1469-1538):

Kabīr’s importance lies also in inspiring many contemporary and later sects. The Sikhism as established by Guru Nānak owes much to the doctrines of Kabīr and the Sikhs recognize it for they have included in the Adi Granth—the Veda of their Sect—many lines, composed by Kabīr. Nānak’s chronology is fairly certain and exact. He was born in the year 1469 at Talwandi near Lahore in the family of a Punjabi Khatri. He was successively tried at school, in commerce and in service but he was destined for a different calling. Hence he went out on a pilgrimage seeking the company of all those who might help to satisfy his spiritual hunger and his hankering after truth. His own meditations and intercourse with the saints of the day fixed his ideas and he proceeded to broadcast them far and wide, though his influence was paramount in the Punjab.

The Problem before Him:

While Kabīr caused offence by his airs of superiority, Nānak won the hearts of people by his transparent sympathy, characteristic humility and infinite forbearance. The milk of human kindness continued to gush forth from him as long as he breathed and has been enshrined for poste-
rity in poems which he used as vehicles of his message. In Nānak’s days influence of Islām on the Punjabis was daily increasing. There was grave apprehension of the whole province embracing Islām almost to a man. Nānak bore no ill-will to any religion or sect but he could see no reason why the Hindūs of the Punjab should embrace a religion, foreign to the soil of India when their own ancestral religion gave scope for infinite variety and contained a message which with appropriate adjustments and emendations could satisfy their needs. It was to bring this truth home that Nānak strove all his life. Nānak’s ideas have been interpreted in three different ways. He has been painted by some as a Hindū saint preaching Islāmic doctrines through and through. Others see in him a Hindū reviverist rescuing the masses of the Punjab from the fold of Islām by organizing a movement of reform within the Hindū society. Still others regard him as working for inter-communal amity by combining the essentials of both the systems into a new spiritual order. It is the Upanishads and the Vedānta from which he draws his chief ideas but it cannot be gainsaid that he had been influenced by Islām. Like Kabīr, he too rejects idol-worship and the theory of incarnations and demonstrates the futility of traditional forms of worship in which the form was emphasized at the cost of the spirit. He too is an anti-ritualist and concedes equality of opportunity to all true seekers, irrespective of distinctions of birth.

Kabīr’s Influence on Nanak:

But his views are in many respects distinct from those of Kabīr. While Kabīr is a monist,
Nānak is a Bhedābhedist. He regards God not so much as Nirguna as Nirankār. He believes that though a full description of God cannot be given in words, yet it cannot be denied that he has certain attributes. The individual soul, says Nānak, has all the properties of God but it is only a part of God and not the whole of it. On securing salvation, soul loses its separate entity and gets lost in the Absolute. This is like Nirvana of the Buddhists or fana of the Sūfis. While Kabir regards the universe shrouded with maya but as an evolute from God, Nānak considers it as created by God out of Himself. Like Kabir and the Muslim saints of the day he too does not consider renunciation as essential for spiritual advancement. He too is in favour of sublimating the passions rather than suppressing them.

Sikhism:

Among the disciples of Nānak there were both Hindūs and Muslims. He laid great emphasis on moral purity, humility of temper, unaffected faith in the Guru and loving devotion to Nirankār or the True Lord. We may regard him as a fellow-traveller of Kabir on the path of mysticism. But like Kabir he too has been deified and his nine apostolic successors have been regarded as embodying his own spirit which has been making one Guru after the other an instrument of its expression. The followers of Nānak also have come to form a sect called the Sikhs. In course of time, Sikhism became a militant church and the Sikhs have covered themselves with glory as great fighters in the cause of Hindūism and Indian freedom. This, however, came much later. During the period under review, the influence of
Nānak was largely confined to arresting the Islamisation of the Punjab and to organising a socio-spiritual order which rose above the narrowing concepts of caste and class. His native sweetness and all-embracing love won for him the respect of both Hindus and Muslims alike and thus made him another centre for bringing the two communities together in fraternal embrace. But from the beginning of the 17th century Sikhs acquired politico-military ambitions partly because of the personality of their Gurus and partly because of religio-political persecution suffered at the hands of the Mughal Emperors of the day. The challenge was met by Guru Govind Singh, since whose days the Sikhs have come to be dreaded and hated by the Muslims as their inveterate foes. Thus the followers of Nānak also have come to occupy with lapse of time a position which, in many respects, is just the reverse of what their founder had desired.

**Sufi Saints:**

Muslim counterparts of Nānak and Kabīr were Sufi saints, like Kutban, Manjhan and Jāyasi. Kutban is said to have been a contemporary of Sultan Husain Shāh Sharqi. The age of Manjhan is uncertain but he certainly preceded Jāyasi. Jāyasi was certainly a contemporary of Sher Shāh Sūr but he might have begun to come in the limelight even much earlier for, according to one interpretation, he started writing his poem ‘**Padmawat**’ about 1526-1527 A.D. These Sufis had drunk deep at the fountain of Indian religious lore and they were greatly impressed by Yoga and Vedānta. They composed allegories for representing spiritual
journey of the soul to the Absolute. They probably wrote in Persian script but the language employed is literary Hindi. Kutban’s ‘Mrigāwati’, Manjhan’s ‘Madhu Mālāti’ and Jāyasi’s ‘Padmāwat’ are representative of a class of literary composition which had probably been developing since the beginning of the 15th century or even earlier. These Sūfis were writing these poems for mixed audiences in which the Muslims preponderated and yet they have used terminology of Hindu metaphysics for delineating the progress of the individual on the path of spiritual advancement in the face of obstacles and pitfalls of different types and varying potency. This must have engendered in their Muslim followers a healthy respect for the Hindu. They must have come to feel that the emotional content and approach of the Hindu is identical with that of the Muslim and that on the road to mystical union with the Almighty they are subject to similar experiences as they. This must have helped to blunt the edge of Muslim arrogance and vanity in relation to the Hindu and to forge a feeling of solidarity and brotherhood.

The Sufistic Path:

The distinctive feature of the Sūfis was their emphasis on love for God. The traditional Islamic conception of dread of Allāh is not characteristic of the Sūfī. He pictures God both as immanent and transcendent in nature. He takes up even a pantheistic stand. But the glory, blissfulness, luminousness and beauty and grace of God exercise their imagination most. They prescribe a path by which love for God has to be developed to blazing brightness and they set forth fana or baqa as the
goal of their spiritual journey. To some Sufis fana, i.e. absorption in the divine element is the highest goal while to others fana is only a stage on the road. They hold that fana is the realization of absolute identity or union without difference. But this is only a temporary phase. When the seeker recovers his poise after the shock of union, he transcends this state and raises to the state of baqa in which he retains consciousness of his separate entity though in constant union with the Divine and eternally enjoying the sight of His effulgent glory and Supreme beauty. Thus the Sufis also lay emphasis on love or Bhakti and they recite songs of great esoteric potency to induce a state of temporary union with the Divine. This is called ecstacy. They thus made an appeal mainly to the heart of the devotee, though they lay down rules of moral discipline as well. Many of these Sufis had Hindū followers whom they offered spiritual guidance without insisting on conversion as a condition precedent. Consequently, their influence was also exercised mainly in favour of popularising the cult of devotion and in bridging the gulf between the Hindūs and the Muslims.

Chaitanya (1486-1533):

The doctrine of the individual's love for the divine was carried to its apotheosis by Chaitanya who was born in a Vaidik Brāhmin family of Navadwipa (Nudea) in 1486. He did not have a long life for he died at the comparatively early age of 48. Among the eminent religious leaders of our period, he had the shortest life. But the span of his life is no index to the influence that he exercised either on his contemporaries or the posterity.
When Chaitanya was born, the state of religion in Bengal was far from satisfactory. Most people offered their prayers to Mangal Chandi and the Manasā. Use of wine and women in the name of religion was rampant in an influential section of the people. Tāntricism had been debased by sensuous votaries. Thus there was considerable moral degeneracy and spiritual bankruptcy.

**Turns a Vaishnava Preacher:**

Chaitanya began his public career as the head of a tol and soon made his mark as an excellent teacher. At the age of 22, he went to Gaya where he met Ishwar Puri, a disciple of Mādhava Puri whose miracles and high attainments as a Vaishnava devotee are reverentially described in Chaitanya Charitāmrta. Ishwar Puri initiated Chaitanya into the Bhakti-cult and when he returned home, he was an entirely changed man. Love of Krishna now became a constant passion with him and he was obliged to close down his school. His time was spent in singing the name of Hari and reciting songs speaking of His sports, experiencing tremor, thrill, ecstasy and excruciating agony. He would dance in frenzied ecstasy, roll-down on earth in a semi-unconscious state or will drop down as if in a swoon. The way he did *sankirtan* made such an impression that many kindred souls were attracted towards him. Among them the most notable were Nityānanda and Adwaita Acharya. His pupils also joined him in *sankirtan*. In order to reclaim people to a life of morality, love and devotion, Chaitanya organized mobile *sankirtan* parties during early hours of the day. He himself led it dancing. This roused
people from their sleep and some of the worst voluptuaries like Jagai and Madhai took great umbrage at this interference in their rest. But the sankirtan went on even in the face of violence by opponents. Chaitanya embraced all with that tenderness of heart and that divine glow on his face that almost all were converted to Vaishnavism. Some Brähmin logicians, however, would not listen to him. He then turned a Sanyasin, being initiated by Keshava Bhārati. On his mother’s pleadings, he decided to spend most of his days at Puri so that she should be able to meet him occasionally. He toured through Northern India upto Vrindāban, passing through Banāras and Allahabad on the way. To the South, he went upto Rāmeshwaram, winning a large number of converts wherever he went. Chaitanya won people to the path of Bhakti not by learned discourses or rhetorical effects but by the purity of his conduct, liquid sweetness of his nature, his personal magnetism and the frenzied ardour of his passion for God.

Literature of Chaitanyaism:

Among Chaitanya’s disciples were Rūp (d. 1554) and Sanātan (d. 1554) who at the behest of their master settled down at Vrindāban. They along with their nephew Jīva Goswāmī (1511-1596) composed erudite works on Vaishnavism in general and on Chaitanya’s teachings in particular. Their works were all in Sanskrit. Krishnadās Kavirāj (1517-1582) first a disciple of Rūp Goswāmī and then of Raghunāth Dās (d. 1583), a personal attendant of Chaitanya at Puri, wrote Chaitanya Charitāmrita in Bengali verse. It is on the basis
of these works that the philosophy of Bhakti, as taught by Chaitanya has been expounded.

His Death (1533):

According to tradition, he died as a result of an ecstatic fit which had become a constant feature of his life during the last twelve years of his earthly existence. Perhaps the body was too feeble to stand the emotional and mental strain of extreme violence resulting from a succession of varying moods of great intensity.

Brahma and Shri Krishna:

Like all Vedântists, Chaitanya also speaks of Brahma with the highest esteem. But he says that Brahma is not without attributes. These attributes and powers of Brahma are manifested in the most attractive form in Shri Krishna, who may thus be taken as Brahma at His best. Krishna is a loving God. He inspires love in others and feels attraction for His devotees. He loves to engage in sports and pastimes in their company and confers supreme beatitude on all His companions, according to their distinctive temperaments. These temperaments have been classified as (i) Dâsya, (ii) Sakhyâ, (iii) Vâtsalya and (iv) Madhur or Kântâ.

Man's Hankering for Abiding JOY:

An analysis of human life shows that all men desire happiness. But pursuit of happiness generally gives only transient satisfaction because our desires get attached to perishable and worldly objects. This hunger for pleasure or bliss, however, continues unabated despite drawbacks, failures and transience of satisfaction. Chaitanya says that both human soul and God have anand
or bliss as their substance. The aim of human life is to assure to oneself constant enjoyment of this eternal bliss by transferring one's attachment from mundane objects to the feet of Shri Krishna. Communion with Him alone can ensure real and abiding happiness.

How to Realize it?

In the Bhāgwat Purāna is described the manifest līla of Shri Krishna at Vṛndāvan. It is the duty of each devotee of Krishna to decide for himself in which role he would seek the company of Krishna. He should next imagine himself in the midst of that class of companions of Krishna at Vṛndāvan during the manifest līla. He should clothe his desire with a spiritual body and should mentally picture that he is actually enjoying Krishna's company at Vṛndāvan. As the intensity of his passion increases, his attachment for worldly objects will slacken and when he has completely transcended the charm of māyā, he will secure salvation by liberating the soul from all bondages.

To realize this supreme object, Chaitanya recommended—

1. Association with the devotees of Krishna,
2. Chanting the name of Krishna,
3. Listening to the recital of Krishna's pastimes,
4. Residing at Vṛndāvan physically, if possible, or mentally in any case, and
5. Worshipping His image, firmly believing that it is Krishna Himself.

Each and everyone of these has to be done solely with a view to pleasing Krishna. The devotee may practise one or more of the above, with
hope of success in realizing communion with Krishna at the end. Chaitanya thought that for people of the Kali era, chanting of the Lord’s name was the simplest and the most efficacious. Hence the emphasis on sankirtan.

A Resume of his Work:

Chaitanya thus preached a doctrine which went straight to the heart of the people. His was a recipe which men of all classes and creeds and of all levels of intellectual development could use as a balm for their sufferings. Here was scope both for an orthodox Hindū who wanted to follow the Shāstric injunctions regarding ceremonial worship as for one who rejected all ritual and ceremonial as unessential overgrowth. His own conduct showed how the nectar of divine love could transfigure a person in the experience of ecstatic joy. It is to the credit of Chaitanya that although he advocated love for God, he laid equal emphasis on segregation of the sexes and scrupulous regard for purity of conduct, humility of temper and consideration for others. The effect of his doctrine was magical and a large number of people in Bengal, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh adopted recital of Krishna’s name with or without music as a form of devotion. Some Muslims also joined the ranks of his followers. The most memorable name in this group is that of Yavan Haridāś who lies buried at Puri.

But his practice of love for Krishna had an aspect of reckless abandon and frenzied behaviour. This upset the mental poise of many a follower and there are some critics who suspect Chaitanya
himself of dying of a sort of epileptic fit, born of over-wrought nerves.

Influence of the Bhakti Cult:

This brief review of the life and teachings of religious reformers and saints of the fifteenth and early sixteenth century reveals certain common features. They are all imbued with a spirit of devotion to God and they regard Bhakti as the best form of self-realization. In the second place, they were of a cosmopolitan frame of mind and tried to bring together men of different castes, classes and creeds on a common platform as the devotees of the same deity. Further, they lay emphasis on moral qualities and sublimation rather than on suppression of human passions and desires. Collectively, they succeeded to a considerable extent in uplifting the moral tone of the community and in bridging the gulf between the Hindu and the Muslim in particular and between man and man in general.

Limits to its Efficacy:

But we must not overstate their contribution to the evolution of the general pattern of our society. We have indicated in course of the foregoing pages how the aims and objectives with which a particular leader started his work came to be modified or even falsified by their own followers. We have also noticed some other shortcomings in relation either to the objective itself or concerning the procedure adopted for its realization. Conservatism and orthodoxy of the people also created barriers which they could not always demolish with complete or enduring success. Old ways of thought, old superstitions and
practices never really died and reared up themselves again and again with varying strength and vitality. All this suggests that there was something wanting in the very fundamentals.

**Nature of Dharma Proper:**

They are often described as leaders or founders of new religious orders or systems. But the Indian term ‘Dharma’ is not quite the same thing as religion. Dharma in its richness and uniqueness of content is incapable of being expressed in a single word of a language foreign to Indian environment. Even in India, the term Dharma has often been misused for distinctive ways of good life and spiritual endeavour. The religious leaders of the fifteenth and early sixteenth century appear to be working towards a common sociological goal though there is difference in emphasis and detail and the angle of vision is seldom identical. This does not make them prophets of Dharma. True Dharma is really that which is beyond disfigurement by human intellect. It is not a matter of speculation and varying vision. It is a direct living realization of the supreme reality in all its nakedness and comprehension in its divinely unifying and divinising aspect. It is unitive and all-embracing. But though the idea of a single Dharma for the entire mankind for all ages has recurred again and again, so far it has not been translated into practice. Its recurrence symbolizes man’s vague recollection of his own true nature. It is man alone who launches into contemplation and unravelling of the divine on the one hand and of the lower creations on the other. He thus occupies an intermediate state between the divine
and the beastly. In this scheme of creation, therefore, he alone is capable of making the idea of Dharma a reality of bone and flesh.

Need for a different Approach:

What has so far been done by the founders of various religions or systems is that they have tried to elevate humanity by a masterly analysis of the evils from which the society suffered and by devising a scheme of moral and spiritual discipline which according to their vision of perfect or good life was suited to the time and place and was in consonance with the environment in which they worked. They have thus been inspired by the highest possible motives. But it must be conceded that even the greatest and the noblest among them were after all presenting only a scheme of life which was necessarily coloured by the environment in which it was devised. It had also the impress of the personality of the founder. The likes, aptitudes and proclivities of man vary from individual to individual. Hence no humanly devised religion can satisfy all men and women of all times and climes. Perhaps the most natural thing in the present imperfect state of things would have been that each individual should have had his own distinctive religion. But this so-called rational being is not always prepared to use his intelligence effectively. Hence he does the second best thing practicable. He chooses to be the follower of that particular way of life which is most satisfying or, negatively speaking, which offends least against his citadel of accustomed habits and modes of behaviour. Thus the followers of a particular religion are, really speaking, a motley group who have
been thrown together not because of identity of views but because of a certain highest common factor. The religion that has attracted the largest number and has lasted longer has been supposed to possess a comparatively richer content of divine truth. But, speaking objectively, it would be readily agreed that most societies believe that, despite the myriads of religious reformers and saints, society today has morally and spiritually degenerated rather than progressed. The inevitable inference, therefore, is that a really true and elevating way of life has not yet been devised or if devised has not been duly comprehended by man. Logically, however, it is difficult to reconcile to the view that man who has the potentiality of realizing his divine nature will fail to react responsively to a truly divine scheme of life. It may thus appear that as far as the realization of true human destiny is concerned, it has yet to come and that the various sects and creeds embody only gropings in the dark. The omniscient perfect teacher with an integrated vision is perhaps not there or else instead of decrying the flesh and emphasizing realization of bliss after death, an effort should have been made to keep the soul and body together eternally, to conquer death and to realize immortality not of the soul in vacuum, as it were, but of the body as the Seat of the Soul and as the instrument of its expression.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

BahluL, though born in tragic circumstances and orphaned early in life had grown up under the benevolent influence of a lucky star and an affectionate uncle. To his native genius for leadership, organization, tact and dissimulation were joined capacity for hard and sustained work, valour on the field of battle and skill in the art of war. His ambition was roused early in his youth by the opinion of his uncle, the blessings of a saint and the decadent state of Sayyad monarchy. His genial temperament, resourcefulness and ability secured for him a large following and he exploited his opportunities with all the adroitness of a clever Afghan to found an empire in India with Delhi as the capital. Possessed of the crown, he laboured ceaselessly to retain it, now combating a dangerous rival, next subduing internal rebels and at other times humouring and conciliating the proud Afghan aristocracy. It was thus that BahluL firmly implanted the empire of a race which had never enjoyed the privilege of royalty in historical times.

BahluL bequeathed to his son a much more extensive dominion than what the Sayyads had ever possessed. Sikandar inherited not only his father’s administrative capacity and martial prowess but also his mother’s beauty. He continued the work of expansion and consolidation of the empire with unremitting energy. Consequently, when he died, the Lodis empire included the
whole of the Punjab, Multan, Nāgor, practically the whole of the kingdom of Gwalior, Chanderi, Narwar, Awantgarh and the Gangetic plain up to the confines of Bengal. The last Lodi monarch, Ibrāhīm, was equally anxious to carry the work of political unification of northern India a stage further. He succeeded in annexing Gwalior and in restraining for a time the advance of Rānā Sāngā; but the inherent weaknesses of Afghan government, coupled with the Sultan’s tactless severity, opened the way for internal rebellion and foreign invasion which ultimately destroyed Afghan monarchy and ushered in the rule of the Timūrids. The three Lodi monarchs had held sway for just three quarters of a century, so that among the pre-Mughal royal dynasties of Delhi, they had ruled the longest except for the Tughluqs.

Their achievements, notwithstanding their shortcomings, are quite creditable. They had founded an empire in the teeth of Turko-Hindu opposition. They had demonstrated by their example, that the prejudice against their race was not quite well-founded. Inspite of these handicaps, they overcame the Turks, befriended the Hindus and resuscitated the empire of Delhi which in the hands of the last two Sayyads had all but died. The process of political unification with Delhi as the centre was begun with energy and vigour. Before the Lodis passed on the mantle to their successors, the authority and prestige of Delhi monarchy had risen considerably high. They had liquidated the Sharqīs, had overrun Central India and had initiated the dismemberment of the
Kingdom of Malwa. They were thus the pre-cursors of the Mughals in the task of establishing an all-India empire.

But it is not merely in the physical limits of their dominion that their main success lies. They also evolved a new set of political principles which served as an example and a warning to their successors. They realized quite early in their career that in the chaotic conditions of mid-fifteenth century India, they could hope for success only if they were assured of unstinted support by their fellow-tribesmen. Consequently they offered them offices, fiefs, titles and even a share in sovereignty itself. The establishment of a confederal tribal sovereignty was thus largely the outcome of the peculiar circumstances preceding the birth of the Lodi empire. In their treatment of the Hindus, they were far more liberal than their predecessors and made politics rather than religion their guiding principle in evolving their policy towards Hindu chiefs and rājās. Consequently, the roots of their empire went deeper than would have been otherwise possible. The seed of Hindu-Muslim amity, sown by the Lodis was to bear a rich crop during the regime of the Mughals.

Their solicitude for public welfare, their interest in quick and efficient administration of justice, their anxiety to prevent oppression by local officials, and their readiness to listen to grievances of all and sundry won for them much wider popular support than had been vouchsafed to their predecessors. Their faith in astrology and blessings of saints, their geniality and candour and above all a healthy zest for life, gave them that
hall-mark of humanity which endeared them to their followers and subjects. They had a flair for religiosity and one of them was considered to be a “Wali”. They were thus peculiarly fitted to make an appeal to the Indian mind.

But their shortcomings were equally worthy of note. Afghān love for independence and equality verged on indiscipline and senseless vanity. Their tribal organization had in it the germs of local autonomy which was bound to come into conflict with the centralizing tendency of their monarchs. The nobility that had been pampered in the days of Bahlāl because of political exigencies of the time, was bound to resent the authoritarian attitude adopted by his successors. When Ibrāhīm quickened the pace of authoritarian centralization, half-subdued murmurs of the time of Sikandar burst into open rebellions. If the Afghān nobility had been less vain or the Sultan more tactful the situation might not have assumed disastrous proportions which it ultimately did. This was one of the main causes of the downfall of the empire.

Besides, medieval monarchy largely depended on an efficient army and a full treasury. The Afghān army might hold its own against other Indian armies but its organization and equipment was very inferior to that of the best armies of Western Asia. It was utterly ignorant of the use of firearms, it was deficient in the art of sieges and it was lacking in cohesion and discipline. The military machine of the Lodis was thus much below the mark and in the time of the last monarch of that dynasty it deteriorated still further.
Finance had never been the strong point of the Afghāns. Comparative local autonomy of subordinate officers, Afghān distaste for details of administration and a state of almost continuous war had kept the financial resources of the Central government at a low ebb. Consequently, the Sultans had always to depend on the levies of their subordinates and could never maintain under their direct control a large standing army, capable of shouldering the responsibilities of a growing empire. The Lodi Empire thus had serious internal weaknesses and it were these rather than the superiority of the Mughals which brought about its collapse in 1526.

The change of dynasty was so sudden that the Mughals largely inherited intact the beneficent effects of the Lodi monarchy. Their efforts, from a larger point of view, were thus not quite wasted. Their short-comings served as a warning to the founder of the second Afghān empire of Delhi, so that Sūr monarchy escaped many a pitfall inherent in Afghān character and Afghān institutions. The Lodis thus had quite a remarkable share in shaping the destinies of 15th and 16th century India, and that is no mean achievement.
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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

622-632 Kais Abd-ul-Rashīd meets the Prophet Muhammad, is exhorted to be a Pathān to his people who are described as worthy of calling themselves Malik, being descendants of King Tālūt (Saul).

634 First military contact of Arabs with India.

712 Occupation of Sindh by Muhammad bin Qāsim and foundation of an Islamic state in India.

1000-1030 Sultan Mahmūd of Ghaznī recruits Afghāns in his army.

1192 Afghān mercenaries fight on both sides at the battle of Tarain.

1200-1300 Conversion to Islām of practically all the Afghāns; their appointment as garrison personnel in the Khokhar land, Mewāt and Doāb.

1347 Malik Iṣmāīl Makh Afghān is elected ruler at Daulatabād but abdicates later in favour of Hasan Kāngū.

1351-1389 Afghāns pour into India in large numbers' generally as traders but often settle down in the country and enter the army.

1377. Malik Bīr Afghān, appointed governor of Bihar.

1394 Foundation of the Sharqī Kingdom by Malik Sarwar.

1398-1399 Timūr's invasion of India; Khizr Khan appointed his deputy in the Punjab.

1399 Malik Sarwar dies; Qaranfal, nephew of Khizr Khan Sayyad and adopted son of
Malik Sarwar ascends the throne at Jaunpur under the style of Sultan Mubarak Shāh.

1402 Ibrāhīm Shāh Sharqī ascends the throne at Jaunpur.

1405 Sultan Shah Lodi appointed governor of Sarhind by Khizr Khan.

1412 Daulat Khan (Lodi ?) becomes supreme at Delhi.

1414 Rāyāt-i-Ali Khizr Khan acquires Delhi and founds his dynasty.

1421 Sultan Mubarak Shāh Sayyad succeeds Khizr Khan at Delhi.

1428 (? ) Sultan Shah receives the title of Islām Khan from Sultan Mubarak Shah Sayyad in recognition of his loyalty and merit.

1434 Muhammad Shāh Sayyad succeeds Mubarak Shāh at Delhi.

1435-1439 Islām Khan nominates Bahlūl as his successor; Islām Khan’s death; civil war among the Afghāns of Sarhind; Muhammed Shāh Sayyad’s intervention on behalf of Qutb Khan s/o Islām Khan; Bahlūl becomes master of Sarhind; defies the might of the Sayyad Sultan; secures Hisām Khan’s murder and appointment of Hamid Khan in his place; meets the Sultan at Delhi and is confirmed as governor of Sarhind.

1436 Mahmūd Shāh Sharqī succeeds Ibrāhīm Shāh at Jaunpur.

1436-1440 Marriage of Bibi Rājī, a Sayyad princess, with Mahmūd Shāh Sharqī.
1440 Bahlul answers royal summons to fight against Sultan Mahmud Khilji of Malwa; gets the title of Khan-i-Khanan and is addressed by the Sultan as 'Farzand'.

1441 Muhammad Shāh confirms Bahlul in possession of Lāhore, Dipālpur, Sunnam and Hisār Firūzā, forcibly seized by him in 1440.

1444 Bahlul assumes the title of Sultan after extending his authority to Panipat. Daryā Khan Lodī held Sambhal as a Sayyad Vassal. Qutb Khan S/o Hasan Khan Afghān held the siefs of Rāpri and Etāwāh. Sultan Alāuddīn Alam Shāh succeeds Muhammad Shāh at Delhi.

1447 Sultan Alāuddīn retires to Badāon.

1451 Plot against Hamid Khan; Hamid Khan welcomes Bahlul as the Sultan of Delhi to depose Alāuddīn Alam Shāh, who later abdicates the throne in favour of Bahlul.

1452 Sharqo-Lodi duel begins: Mahmud Shāh Sharqī invades Delhi but retires after suffering a defeat. Bahlul enforces his authority over Sambhal, Mewāt, Rāpri, Etāwāh, Kol, Sakīt, Kampilā, Patīlī and Bhogāon. Second Sharqo Lodi War; Shamsābād to be ceded to Bahlul. Jūnā Khan's refusal to hand over Shamsābād leads to a third war; Qutb Khan Lodī captured by the Sharqīs and imprisoned at Jaumpur.

1458 Birth of Prince Nizām Khan.
1458-1459 Muhammad Shāh Sharqi succeeds Mahmūd Shāh at Jaunpur. Fourth Sharqo-Lodi War; Shamsābād passes into Sharqi hands. A revolution at Jaunpur: Muhammad Shāh killed at Kanauj; Husain Shāh Sharqi succeeds him.

Four years' Non-aggression Pact between Husain Shāh and Bahlūl and release of Qutb Khan Lodi who rejoins Bahlūl.

1463 Sarhind assigned to Nizām Khan; Khan-i-Khanan Farmūlī appointed as his Guardian and Deputy.

Fifth Sharqo-Lodi War; Bahlūl captures Shamsābād but is weakened by defection of Rājā Pratāp, Qutb Khan and Mubāriz Khan to Husain Shāh. Bahlūl goes to Lahore to suppress a revolt; Truce for 3 years.

1465 Husain Shāh strengthens the defences of Banāras.

1466 Husain Shāh defeats the Rājā of Gwalior; Sixth Sharqo-Lodi War. Governors of Etawah, Kol and Bayānā submit to Husain Shāh.


1466-1478 Husain Shāh Sharqi acquires great power; Bahlūl seeks aid of Malwa. Defeat of Husain Shāh in a surprise attack; Bibi Khonzā captured by Bahlūl. Bahlūl sends Qutb Khan Lodi and Kalyān Mal of Gwalior to condole the death of Bibi Rājī at Etawah.
1478 Death of Alāuddīn Alam Shāh at Bādāon. Husain Shāh captures Bādāon and Sambhal and lays siege to Delhi but retreats after a truce; Bahlūl plunders the baggage train, captures many notables along with Bibi Khonzā and secures submission of Shamsābād, Kampīla, Patīlī, Kol, Sakīt and Jālīlī.

1479 Death of Kīrtī Singh at Gwalior and accession of Kalyān Singh; Husain Shah attacks the Lodis again but suffers defeat and flies to Gwalior whose Rājā provides him with safe escort to Kalpī.

1483 Birth of Bābar.

1486 Husain Shāh retires to Bihar after successive defeats and loss of Etāwāh, Kalpī, Kanauj, Bahrāich, Jaunpur and Majhaulī. Bārbakshāh appointed governor at Jaunpur. Nizām Khan appointed Bahlūl's deputy at Delhi during the latter's absence.

Rājā Mān succeeds Kalyān Singh at Gwalior Birth of Chaitanya at Navadvipa.

1487 Rājā Mān submits to Bahlūl.

1489 Sikandar succeeds Bahlūl.

1489-1492 Governors of Rāpri, Etāwāh, Patīlī, Shamsābād, Bayānā and Jaunpur acknowledge Sikandar's authority; Rivals and rebels suppressed. Rājā Mān renews submission to Lodi monarchy.

1494 Bābar succeeds Umer Shaikh as the ruler of Farghānā.

1495 Final defeat of Husain Shāh Sharqī who
seeks refuge in Bengal while Sikandar annexes Chunär, Tirhut, Saran and Bihar. Sikandar abolishes Zakāt-i-ghallā to relieve food-shortage.

1497 Bābar captures Samarqand for the first time.
1495-1499 Sikandar stays at Jaunpur.
1500 Rebellion of Asghar at Delhi; Conspiracy by 22 nobles to depose Sikandar.
Death of Husain Shāh Sharqī in Bengal.
Bābar captures Samarqand a second time.
1501 Ghiyāsuddin of Malwa is succeeded by Nāsiruddin.
1504 Sikandar captures Dholpur; War against Rājā Mān. Bābar captures the Kingdom of Kabul.
1505 Sikandar captures Mandrāel.
1506 Fresh War against Rājā Mān; Sikandar ambushed by Gwalloris in the ravines of Chambal but escapes disaster.
1506-1507 Fall of Awantgarh.
1507 Conquest of Narwar.
Chaitanya meets Ishwar Purī at Gaya.
1507-1508 Sikandar stays at Narwar.
1509 Ahmad Khan, the governor of Lakhnaū dismissed for apostasy. Bhadwariyās suppressed; Nāgor submits to Sikandar; Shihābuddin s/o Nāsiruddin of Malwa waits on Sikandar Sulaimān s/o Khan-i-Khanan Farmulī dismissed for refusal to go to Awantgarh.
1510 Chaitanya becomes a Sannyāsin.
1511 Mahmūd Khilji II succeeds Nāsiruddin of

1512 Prince Sahīb Khan and Buhjat Khan seek Sikandar’s aid against Mahmūd Khilji; Sikandar acquires control over Chanderi. Bābar loses Samarqand for good.

1516 Ali Khan Nāgori’s insincerity in efforts to secure Ranthambhor for Sikandar; his dismissal and replacement by Abū Bakr.


1518 Jalāl initiates Civil War; fails, flees and finally dies a prisoner. Azam Humāyūn Sarwānī’s double treachery; disgraced while besieging Gwalior.

Fall of Gwalior; Vikramāditya appointed governor of Shamsābād. Rebellion of Islām Khan suppressed. Lodi-Sisodiya War renewed.

1519 Bābar captures Bajaur and Bhīrā; sends Mullā Murshid as envoy to Ibrāhīm.

1520 Bābar chastises the Yūsufzais and advances upto Sialkot.

1522 Bābar occupies Qandahar.

1522-1523? Dilāwar Khan Lodi goes to Bābar at Kabul.

1523? Compact between Bābar and Alāuddin Lodi.

1524 Ibrāhīm defeats the rebels in the Punjab. Bābar occupies Lahore and Dipālpur.
Daulat Khan’s treason and imprisonment.

1525 Ghāzi Khan s/o Daulat Khan wins over Alāuddin Lodi. Ibrāhīm defeats the confederate army.

Lodi rebels capture Dipālpur and Kalānaur. Bābar starts on his last campaign to India.

1526 Defeat and death of Ibrāhīm at Panipat.

1533 Death of Chaitanya.

1538 Death of Nānak.
Genealogical Tables

Genealogy of the Lodi Afghans

Adam
   └── Ibrāhīm (18th generation from Adam)
       ├─ Talāt or Saul (8th generation from Ibrāhīm)
       │   └── Irmīyā
       │       └── Afghānā
       │           └── Kais Abd-ul-Rashid (35th generation from Afghānā)
       │                   └── Sarban
       │                           └── Bat-an
       │                               └── Ghurghast
       │                                   └── Bībī Matto + Shāh Husani Ghori
       │                                           └── Ghilzoe
       │                                               └── Ibrāhīm surnamed Loedaey
       │                                                   └── Ismā'il
       │                                                       └── Sūr
       │                                                               └── Nūh
       │                                                                   └── Malik Bahlāl
       │                                                                      (8th generation from Frankī)
The First Afghan Dynasty of Delhi and Agra

Malik Bahram

Bibi Mastu + Sultan Shah (Isam Khan) | Malik Kala | Firuz | Muhammad | Khwaja

Qutb Khan | Shams Khatan + Bahlul (1451-'89) + Hem or Zarina

Bayazid | Mubarak | Nizam Khan | Alam Khan | Yaqub | Musa | Jalal Khan

(Barbak Shah?) | (Sikandar 1489-1517) | Jamal | Fath Khan

Azam Humayun Lodi

Ibrahim (1517-1526) | Jalal Ismail | Hasan Mahmud (Pretender 1526-'32) | Azam Humayun
Relationship between Sayyads of Delhi and Sharqis of Jaumpur

Sayyads

Salimān

Khizr Khan (1414-1421) [Brother]

Mubārak Shāh (1421-1434)

Qaranfal = Mubārak Shāh (1399-1402)

Farid

Muhammad Shāh (1434-1444)

Alāuddin Alam Shāh (1444-1451)

Sharqis

Malik Sarwar (1394-1399)

ADOPTED SONS

Shamsuddin Ibrahim Shāh (1402-1436)

Muhammad Shāh Hasan 1459 ?

Jalāl

Bibi Khonzā + Husain Shāh (1459-1495)
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