775
BRITISH RELATIONS WITH HYDERABAD
(1798-1843)

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PREFACE

This monograph seeks to present the history of the British relations with Hyderabad from 1798 to 1843. These two dates are important in the history of British relations with Hyderabad. In the former year the Nizam concluded an alliance with the English East India Company, which enabled the latter to crush the French party and establish its influence in Hyderabad. In 1843 Chandu Lal, the minister of Hyderabad, resigned. Since 1809 he had been supported by successive Governors-General; he resigned in 1843 only when he lost that support. During that period whether as a deputy minister or as minister he was the virtual ruler of Hyderabad. To secure British support he did not shrink from any means fair or foul. The Governors-General and the Residents also found in him a channel through which they could exercise their influence over Hyderabad. Lord William Bentinck had intimated to the Nizam in 1829 that he would not interfere in the affairs of Hyderabad. But Bentinck's policy of non-interference could not be followed to the letter so long as Chandu Lal, who looked up to the British Governors-General and the British Residents for favour, was in the official saddle. When, however, Chandu Lal tendered his resignation in 1843, British interference in the affairs of Hyderabad came almost to an end.

There are three important works which deal with the history of the British relations with
Hyderabad from the earliest times down to 1857. They are "The Nizam, his history and relations with the British Government" by H. G. Briggs, "Our Faithful Ally, the Nizam" by H. Fraser and "A history of the Deccan" (Vol. II) by Gribble. These books by eminent British officials in close touch with the administration of Hyderabad are valuable.

Though wide in scope, their treatment has often been cursory, and they have not done full justice to the period under review in the following pages. Neither Briggs nor Gribble has fully utilised the unpublished records in their books. Briggs has mentioned in the Introduction to his book that his is a compilation based upon published books. Fraser has treated the subject with considerable minuteness from 1766 to 1798, but from 1798 to 1838 his treatment of the subject is very scrappy. The history of Palmer & Co. which falls within this period has been treated in a few lines. Gribble's book also suffers from similar lacunae. The Subsidiary Alliance and the consequences which flowed from it have not been discussed in this book, nor has the author dealt with the case of Palmer & Co. in detail.

Lastly, the bibliography will indicate the nature of the sources from which the materials for this monograph have been drawn. Of all the sources the historical documents in English, both published and unpublished, are found to be most useful. Materials from Palmer and Russell papers preserved in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, have been utilised in this monograph. The National Archives of
India have secured microfilms of Palmer papers. Dr. C. C. Davies of Oxford University has published some important excerpts from Russell papers in the "Indian Archives". The librarian of the Bodleian Library has been kind enough to provide me with microfilms of Russell papers. These documents have thrown some new light on the dubious transactions of Palmer & Co. The Persian books and records also have not been overlooked; but it seems that from the nineteenth century Persian records and books as sources of Indian history have very little value. Especially when a subject like the British relations with Hyderabad is concerned, the Persian sources do not yield any useful and dependable material of independent value.

In fine, the writer of these pages acknowledges his debt of gratitude to Dr. I. B. Banerji, the late Ashutosh Professor of Modern History, Calcutta University, under whose inspiration he undertook the work, but who is unfortunately no longer in this land of the mortals. Words fail to express the gratitude which the author owes to Dr. A. C. Banerji, Centenary Professor of International Relations, Calcutta University, who went through this monograph in manuscript and gave valuable suggestions. The author is grateful to Mr. S. M. Hasan, M. A., of National Library, India, for his assistance in verifying the Persian references. The author’s thanks are also due to the University Grants Commission and the Government of West Bengal who have jointly borne all the expenses in connection with the publication of this monograph.
( iv )

Spellings of some well-known places have been retained in their current forms. As for example, the word ‘Haidarabad’ is generally spelt as ‘Hyderabád’ and this spelling has been used in English documents from which numerous excerpts have been quoted in this monograph. To avoid confusion I have adopted the spelling current in English documents.

Some printing mistakes* have crept into the treatise for which I crave the indulgence of the reader.

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Howrah.

N. G. C.

* Read ‘suppressed’ for ‘suppressed’ in page 9 line 2,
‘Mir Jafar’ for ‘Mr Jafar’ in p. 15 line 8,
‘Sir John Shore’s’ for ‘Sri John Shore’s’ in p. 29, line 13
‘Azam-ul-‘Umara’ for ‘Azim-ul-umra’ p. 33, line 28,
‘comparison’ for ‘comparision’ p. 36, line 1,
‘appointment’ for ‘appointmeht’ p. 36, line 30,
‘friendly relations’ for ‘a friendly relations,’ p. 48 line 10,
‘Intiaz-ud-Daulah’ for ‘Imtiaz ul-Daulah’ p. 49, line 6,
‘Akbar Ali Khan’ for ‘Akbar Jah’ p 59 f.n. line 2
‘Jahan Parwar Begam’ for ‘Jahan Puwar Begum’ in
p 59, f. n. line 3
‘Munir-ul-Mulk’ for ‘Manir-ul-Mulk’ p. 108 line 29 &
30, p 145 line 12.
‘Aurangabad’ for ‘Aurangabad, the Head quarters of
Berar’ p. 226 line 20.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>i—iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II Subsidiary Alliance and the establishment of the British protectorate</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III British interference (A) in the succession of the Nizams</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) in the appointment of ministers</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV British interference in the Civil administration</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V Company’s Interference in the military affairs of the Nizam</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI British interference in the pecuniary transactions of Hyderabad (William Palmer &amp; Co.)</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII Reaction of the British influence and interference (A) Mahipatram’s rebellion</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Mubariz-ud-Daulah and the Wahabi conspiracy in Hyderabad</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B (Nizams, Ministers and Residents)</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary of Indian words</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genealogy of the Nizams of Hyderabad</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MAPS

1. Nizam's territories in 1798 — Page 29
2. Nizam's acquisitions from Mysore in 1799 — Page 73
3. Territories ceded to the E. I. Co. by the Nizam in 1800 — facing page 86
4. Nizam's dominions including Berar, 1843 — at the end
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

3. For. Con. — Foreign Consultations
4. For. Mis. — Foreign Miscellaneous
5. To Court — Letter to Court of Directors
6. From Court — Letter from Court of Directors
7. Par. Pap. — Parliamentary papers
8. Mandamus — Proceedings connected with the writ of Mandamus issued by His Majesty's Court of King's Bench etc.
9. Hyd. Pap. — Papers relative to certain pecuniary transactions of Palmer & Co. etc.
10. Aitchison — A collection of treaties, Engagements and sunnuds etc. by Aitchison.
11. Wel. Des. — Despatches, minutes and Correspondence of Wellesley by Martin.
12. Faithful Ally — Our Faithful Ally, the Nizam etc. by Fraser
15. Poona Res. — Poona Residency Cor.
16. Ind. Arch. — Indian Archives
17. Chronology — The chronology of modern Hyderabad
18. Add. Mss. — Additional Manuscripts
19. Hist. India — Political history of India
20. Per. Lett. — Persian letters
21. Gulzar-i-Asafiya — Tarikh-i-Gulzar-i-Asafiya
BRITISH RELATIONS WITH HYDERABAD

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Origin of Hyderabad:

Nizam-ul-Mulk*, one of the great personalities of the Mughal Empire in the first half of the eighteenth century, was the viceroy of the Mughal Deccan for the second time when he was appointed

*The original name of Nizam-ul-Mulk was Qamar-ud-din. He was the son of Ghazi-ud-din Firuz Jang, a noble in the court of Aurangzib and the leader of the Turani party. Qamar-ud-din attracted the notice of Aurangzib when he was quite a young man and received the title of Chin Qilich Khan from the Emperor at the age of twenty (Yusuf Husain, Nizam-ul-Mulk, p. 42). The Mughal Emperor Farrukh-siyar conferred on Chin Qilich Khan the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk, 'the Regulator of the country' when he was appointed the Viceroy of the six Mughal provinces of the Deccan in 1713 (Ibid, pp 65-66). The designation Nizam is a part of the title Nizam-ul-Mulk and it was generally used by the Europeans. The people of Hyderabad called him simply 'Nawab' or 'Bandagani Ali' (the slaves of the Most High). His official designation was the 'Subadar of the Deccan'. The dynasty founded by Nizam-ul-Mulk was known as the Asafia dynasty from his title 'Asaf Jah' (conferred on him by the Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah), which means 'of the rank of Asaf' who is supposed to have been one of Solomon's ministers.

O.P.-168—1
minister by the Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah in 1722. Having made proper arrangements for the administration of the Deccan during his absence, Nizam-ul-Mulk left for Delhi. Two years' experience in the Mughal court was sufficient to make him realise how difficult it was to restore the fast vanishing glory of the Mughal Empire. Disgusted with the intrigues in the Mughal court and the feebleness of his master he set out for the Deccan where he hoped to rule almost like an independent ruler. But his enemies in Delhi were not the men to rest on their oars. They encouraged Mubariz Khan, the Governor of Hyderabad, to prevent Nizam-ul-Mulk from establishing his authority over the Deccan. On reaching Aurangabad, the capital of the Mughal Deccan, he found that Mubariz Khan had already made preparations for resisting his authority and remonstrances and persuasions having proved fruitless, the two armies clashed at Shakarkhelda in Berar on 11 October, 1724. Mubariz Khan with his two sons were killed, his two other sons were taken prisoners and his whole army was routed. To commemorate his victory in Shakarkhelda Nizam-ul-Mulk renamed it Fathkhelada or 'village of victory.'

The battle of Shakarkhelda marked the establishment of Nizam-ul-Mulk's hereditary rule in the Deccan. Three months later in January, 1725, Nizam-ul-Mulk went to Hyderabad and made it his new capital. In making this choice he was guided by two considerations. Hyderabad was farther from the Maratha capital than Auranga-
bad. Here, far from the Maratha capital, he could plan military movements which his powerful enemies the Marathas had the least chance of knowing. Moreover, from Hyderabad he would get easy access to the Carnatic over which he wanted to tighten his grip.

Unable to prevent his minister Nizam-ul-Mulk from establishing his authority in the Deccan the Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah tried to conciliate him by conferring on him the title of Asaf Jah in June, 1725. Thus was laid the foundation of the state of Hyderabad. From now on Nizam-ul-Mulk ruled over the Mughal Deccan almost like an independent ruler. He declared war and made peace without any reference to the Mughal Emperor; he conferred titles on the nobles of his court without any permission from his imperial master. Though he was virtually an independent ruler he never thought of avowing his independence openly. Outwardly he showed his dependence on the Mughal Emperor. In the territories of the Nizam, coins were struck in the name of the emperor and his name in the Khutba was read in all the mosques of the Deccan. Even in his testament he enjoined upon his successors to maintain the relations which he had established between himself and the emperor.*

(1) Yusuf Husain Khan, Nizam-ul-Mulk, p 157, f. n

*The 10th article of his testament runs thus,

"That he (whom-so-ever it may concern) should know that the state of the Deccan depends upon the subservience and service and that he should never allow himself to be remiss in
The battle of Shakarkheda opened a new era in the history of the Mughal Deccan. The rapid succession of viceroys who did not follow any consistent policy except the policy of looking to their own interest at the cost of the common people and the discord between the governors of the six provinces into which the Mughal Deccan was divided, came to an end. The strong arm of Nizam-ul-Mulk brought peace to a country which had not tasted it since the invasion of Aurangzib.

The only thing which caused a headache to Nizam-ul-Mulk was the Maratha menace. Peshwa Balaji Rao, during the reign of Emperor Farrukh-siyar, obtained from Husain Ali, the subadar of the Deccan, sanads for collecting chauth and sardeshmukhi of the six Deccan provinces in 1718. It was not until the accession of Muhammad Shah in 1719 that the imperial confirmation of these sanads was obtained. Nizam-ul-Mulk who had already seen how the whole force of the mighty Mughal Emperor like Aurangzib had failed to

respect due to the Emperor. If he did so, he would be the object of contempt of God and man. When the powerful king of Persia (Nadir Shah) was in Delhi, he offered me one day in his graciousness, the empire of Hindusthan. On this I at once said that I and my ancestors had, from ancient times, been in the service of the king of Delhi and that such impropriety of conduct on my part would make me notorious as one untrue to salt. And the emperor would call me false and treacherous. Since his (Nadir Shah’s) elevated mind could appreciate the significance of my words, he liked my reply and praised me”—(Quoted from Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I by Yusuf Husain Khan, pp 157-58 f. n ).
crush the Marathas, thought it prudent to recognize their claim to levy chauth and sardesh-mukhi in his dominions. But even the recognition of this claim could not deter the Maratha hordes from carrying on depredations in his territories. As Nizam-ul-Mulk was a great general and shrewd diplomat, he could cope with the Maratha hordes so long as he was alive, but after his death a change came over the Deccan under his successors who were inferior to him in both military and diplomatic skill.

**Struggle for succession:**

The weakness of his successors coupled with constant change of ministers ushered in an era of mismanagement of affairs, and the whole administrative structure which had been built up by Nizam-ul-Mulk collapsed. Maladministration caused shrinkage of revenues. Faced with constant deficit, the government could ill afford to pay its troops regularly and the irregularity in payment was followed by mutinies now and then. To meet the demands of the creditors the revenues of the districts were assigned to them. This brought in oppression on the poor peasants. To make the matter worse, struggle for succession invited interference of foreigners in the affairs of the state.

At the time of Nizam-ul-Mulk's death his eldest son Ghazi-ud-din was in Delhi as his father's deputy in the Mughal court. Taking advantage of his absence, Nasir Jang, the second son, seized the viceroyalty of the Deccan. His succession
was disputed by his nephew Muzaffar Jang, a son of Nizam-ul-Mulk's daughter. Muzaffar Jang made an alliance with Chanda Sahib, a claimant to the Nawabship of Arcot. They were supported by Dupleix. The three allies jointly attacked Anwar-ud-din, Nawab of Arcot, at Ambur, defeated and killed him. Nasir Jang who had not understood the significance of the battle of Ambur at first hesitated to participate in a war in the Carnatic when he was invited by the English to do so. But he soon realised that his supremacy in the Carnatic was being assailed by his enemies and that the day was not far off when he might be dislodged from his authority in Hyderabad also. He, therefore, marched to the Carnatic to chastise his nephew and Chanda Sahib. The English supported him. A battle took place near Valudavur in March, 1750. Being deserted by the French officers, Muzaffar Jang threw himself at the mercy of his uncle who put him into prison. On the night of 16 December, 1750, the camp of Nasir Jang was treacherously attacked by a French detachment under La Touche and during the panic that ensued Nasir Jang was shot dead by Himmat Khan, the Pathan Nawab of Kurnul. Dupleix immediately recognised Muzaffar Jang as the Subadar of the Deccan, and Muzaffar Jang in his turn made Dupleix the governor of all territories to the south of the Krishna. But Dupleix's right over these territories was not technically valid as it lacked the confirmation of the Mughal Emperor. Muzaffar Jang knew it well that his enemies would not allow him to settle down peacefully. So, he sought from
Dupleix a French regiment to escort him to Hyderabad and help him in consolidating his position there. Dupleix who thought that with the viceroy of the Deccan under the French control he would be able to settle affairs of the Deccan in his favour, readily agreed to the proposal. Bussy, his ablest general, was selected to escort Muzaffar Jang to Hyderabad. While being escorted Muzaffar Jang was killed in a fight with his Pathan dependants on 13 February, 1751. Bussy immediately proclaimed Salabat Jang, the third son of Nizam-ul-Mulk, as the Viceroy of the Deccan. The prompt action of Bussy not only avoided any break in the succession, but also prevented outbreak of any disorder in Hyderabad. But above all, the influence which the French had obtained over Muzaffar Jang, was maintained. The new Viceroy needed the support of Bussy and his corps, more than his predecessor, to consolidate his power in Hyderabad. So, Bussy accompanied Salabat Jang to Hyderabad and placed him on the masnad. Thus Salabat Jang, a scion of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah, who made himself virtually independent of the Mughal Emperor, became a protege of the French only twenty-seven years after the battle of Shakarkhelda which marked the establishment of the state of Hyderabad.

**Bussy's domination:**

Bussy who was to have gone to Hyderabad escorting Salabat Jang, accompanied him to Auran-gabad which was about nine hundred miles from Pondicherry. In that far off region he not only
maintained himself and his corps against heavy odds but also protected Salabat Jang against his enemies. The Maratha invasions were warded off and peace was restored. Protected by Bussy Salabat Jang consolidated his power.

Bussy was a soldier of no mean order, but in his dealings with the ruler as well as with the people of Hyderabad he showed that he was no less a diplomat. He avoided all interference in the internal administration of the country and yet he dominated over the whole country. The masses did not feel this domination, but the nobles of the court and the minister felt rather uneasy under the domination of a foreigner.

With the fear of the Maratha invasion gone, Ramdas Pandit, the minister, resorted to intrigues with the English and Muhammad Ali, Nawab of Aroot, to free his master as well as the State of Hyderabad from the thraldom of the French. Disgusted with these intrigues Bussy wanted to quit Hyderabad, but Dupleix would not give him permission to leave the Deccan. Aurangabad, where the French Corps was stationed, was nearer to Delhi than to Pondicherry. He was perhaps dreaming of the day when the French influence would extend to the whole of Northern India from Aurangabad. Moreover, with the Subadar of the Deccan under the French control Dupleix expected to protect and consolidate his rights in the Deccan.

After the murder of Ramdas Pandit, Lashkar Khan was appointed minister. Bussy knew that he was not favourably disposed towards the French.
Almost all the nobles had aversion, expressed or suppressed, for the French domination. So Bussy felt that it was better to have a known enemy as minister than an unknown one.  

During the absence of Bussy in Masulipatam where he had gone for recouping his health, Lashkar Khan persuaded the French General Goupil to send his troops in batches to different parts of the country to collect revenues. This was done with the intention of making the French unpopular with the masses. A letter which Lashkar Khan wrote to Saunders, the Governor of Madras, revealed the whole mystery to Bussy. The dispersal of the French troops to the different parts of the country was done under the secret advice of Saunders. The minister also interned two brothers of the Nizam at Daulatabad under the pretext that none of them were loyal to the Nizam. When this internment made him unpopular he gave out that he had done it under the instruction of the French. Behind what had happened in Hyderabad during his absence Bussy discovered that the British intrigue had played a very important role. He decided that he should remain in Hyderabad to undo the intrigues of the English. If he left Hyderabad, the vacuum thus created would be filled in by the English. In that case the French would lose everything, their hold over the Deccan

2. Cammiade, Bussy in the Deccan, p 65.
5. Ibid, P 118
and the Carnatic and their commerce in the South.

Bussy called back the French soldiers who had been sent out to collect revenues. The chief problem that confronted Bussy now was how to remain in a country where the minister and the nobles were intriguing with the English to get rid of him and the ruler was too weak to be relied upon. From now he must rely on his corps and his diplomacy. The Nizam bore the cost of his corps, which amounted to about twenty-six lakhs a year. But the amount proved a heavy burden upon his exchequer and consequently the Nizam was unable to meet the expenses of the French corps regularly. In June, 1753, the pay of the French troops fell in arrears for three or four months. The irregular payment to the troops caused dissatisfaction among them and this was a source of trouble to Bussy. The only solution to this was to secure the assignment of the revenues of some districts for the maintenance of his corps. With this idea in view Bussy proposed to the Nizam for the assignment of the revenues of four districts of the Northern Sarkars. The Nizam and his minister were unwilling to assign the revenues of any district to the French general. But some military display and a few personal contrivances were sufficient to force the Nizam to accept the proposal of Bussy. So, a treaty was concluded in the month of December, 1753, by which it was provided that ‘four districts of Mustafanagar,

Ellur, Rajamahendri and Chicakol (Srikakolam) collectively known as the Northern Sarkars should be made over to the French for the support of the French army so long as a certain strength (was) maintained? Here we find the first instance of Subsidiary Alliance in a rudimentary form. By this treaty Bussy obtained several advantages. The revenues of these districts amounted to thirty-one lakhs of rupees, whereas the expenses of Bussy’s corps was about twenty-six lakhs. Bussy had thus a surplus of about five lakhs annually. Secondly, Bussy no longer depended on the Nizam and his minister for the payment of his troops and thus could act independently of both. Thirdly, the French commander at Mausainpatam could easily look after these sarkars and remit the necessary money for the army.

Thus strengthened in his position Bussy manipulated things in such a way that Lashkar Khan, the minister, had to resign. The next minister Shah Nawaz was not only very learned but also very capable in the management of finance. During the four years of his administration he did away with the insolvency of the state. He was also a shrewd diplomat. Like his two predecessors he felt the domination of Bussy very irksome and realised that Bussy was looking more to the interest of his own nation than to that of the state which had been maintaining him and his corps.

Shah Nawaz persuaded his master to dismiss the French general from his service. Being dismissed Bussy proceeded towards the Northern Sarkars, but on his way some correspondence between Shah Nawaz and Muhammad Ali, the Nawab of Arcot, fell into his hands. This correspondence revealed that Muhammad Ali was to receive the sanad of Arcot from the Subadar of the Deccan, on payment of fifteen lakhs of rupees and the English were to send troops as soon as Bussy left Hyderabad. It was also revealed that Shah Nawaz had made some secret agreement with Balaji Rao. In short, Hyderabad would come under the domination of the English after the departure of Bussy. But Bussy was not the man to make room for the English. So, instead of leaving the Deccan, he halted in the city of Hyderabad where he was joined by a detachment of French and Indian troops under M. Law. He seized the city of Hyderabad and stood at bay. Salabat Jang and Shah Nawaz could not dislodge him from his position however much they tried and at last made peace with him.

Bussy came back to the court of the Nizam and behaved as before, as if nothing had happened in the meantime. Within a year Bussy’s intrigue brought about the downfall of Shah Nawaz. Bussy remained in Hyderabad till June, 1758 when he was recalled by Lally. For seven years Bussy had been the power behind the throne of Salabat Jang and showed how an Indian state

10. Ibid, p 246.
could be dominated by a foreign power without impairing its outward form of independence. This policy of dominating over Hyderabad yet maintaining its outward show of independence was copied from the French by their rivals, the English in the nineteenth century.

After the departure of the French all power of the state passed into the hands of Nizam Ali who imprisoned his brother Salabat Jang in July, 1762, and ascended the musnud of Hyderabad. The emperor of Delhi sanctioned the usurpation of Nizam Ali and appointed him Viceroy of the Deccan with the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah II

Bussy quits making room for the British foothold:

With the recall of Bussy from Hyderabad in 1758, the French influence in Hyderabad came to an end for the time being. The door was now open to the British influence. While Lally was engaged in besieging Madras, the British Colonel Forde was sent from Calcutta to attack the Northern Sarkars so as to divert a portion of the French army from the siege of Madras. With the arrival of Forde in the Northern Sarkars a portion of the French army was sent to oppose the advance of the British army. But the French army was routed and Forde proceeded to besiege the port of Masulipatam. Salabat Jang was requested by the French to help them in the Northern Sarkars. This Salabat Jang did. But after the capitulation of Masulipatam the British became masters
of the Northern Sarkars and Salabat Jang realising his position concluded a treaty with the English East India Company in 1759. By this treaty he agreed to expel the French troops from his dominion and gave to the English East India Company as a free gift the whole of the ‘circar of Masulipatam, with eight districts, as well as the circar of Nizampatam, and the districts of Condavir and Wacalmanner. Sanads in respect of these districts were granted to the English Company in the same manner as had been done to the French.’

This is the first occasion on which the Nizam came into direct relation with the English East India Company.

In 1765 Lord Clive returned to India for the second time and he advised the authorities of the East India Company to apply for a sanad for the whole of the Northern Sarkars. It may be mentioned here that by the treaty of 1759 Masulipatam and some districts which formed a portion of the Northern Sarkars had been given to the English Company as a free gift, and for the remaining portion the Raja of Vizianagram had to pay tribute to the Nizam. Lord Clive desired to acquire the whole of the Northern Sarkars from Shah Alam II, the Emperor of Delhi, without informing the Nizam. Shah Alam II after the battle of Buxar had taken shelter with the English and was lodged by them in the fort of Allahabad. Though the Mughal Empire had ceased to exist and the provincial governors had become virtually

11. Aitchison—Vol V (1864)—Hyderabard, No. 1
independent still he was regarded as their sovereign. Taking advantage of the helpless condition of Shah Alam II, Clive acquired from him the formal grant of the whole of the Northern Sarkars on 12 August, 1765.\textsuperscript{12} This enraged Nizam Ali. The Nizams had all along regarded the Emperor of Delhi as their sovereign. But Nizam Ali who had not been reduced to the position of Mr Jafar of Bengal after the battle of Buxar, considered it unusual for a titular emperor like Shah Alam to grant even a formal \textit{sanad} for districts which were under his jurisdiction. The Madras Government apprehending trouble sent General Calliaud to Hyderabad to settle the matter amicably. This was done and a treaty was concluded on 12 November, 1766, between the Nizam and General Calliaud on behalf of the English East India Company.\textsuperscript{+} By this treaty the English East India Company in return for the 'free gift' of five Sarkars, viz: Sarkars of Ellur, Chicakol, Rajamahendri, Mustafanagar and Murtizanagar (Guntur)* which

\textsuperscript{12} Aitchison, vol V, pp 12-13

\textsuperscript{+}By the farman of Shah Alam II the Company got the Northern Sarkars as free gift and to make this territory as the subject of a treaty with the Emperor's officer, the Subadar of the Deccan, was to acknowledge indirectly the virtual independence of the Nizam.

*Murtizanagar commonly known as Guntur was at that time held by Basalat Jang, the Nizam's brother. The East India Company promised not to take possession of it until it was made over to them by the Nizam or until the death of Basalat Jang. In 1782 when Basalat Jang died it was taken possession of by the Nizam's officers, but was delivered to
constituted the Northern Sarkars, promised to provide the Nizam with a body of troops ‘to settle affairs’ of Hyderabad whenever it was required by the Nizam.\textsuperscript{13} If in any year the assistance of the British troops should not be required, the English East India Company would pay as Peshkash to the Nizam five lakhs of rupees for the three Sarkars of Rajamahendri, Ellur and Mustafanagar and two lakhs each for the two Sarkars of Chicakol and Murtizanagar.\textsuperscript{14} If the Nizam required the services of the troops of the English East India Company, the expenses of such troops should be adjusted with peshkash payable to the Nizam.\textsuperscript{15} By the 13th Article of the treaty it was also stipulated that the Nizam would assist the Company with his troops when required. But nowhere in the treaty was any mention made of the East India Company’s bearing the expenses of the Nizam’s troops to be supplied in accordance with the 13th Article of the treaty. This was something like a subsidiary alliance between the Nizam and the English East India Company.

But this alliance did not last long. In 1767 the Nizam along with an army of the Company invaded Mysore. He was, however, persuaded by Mahfuz Khan, brother and a rival of Muhammad Ali of the Carnatic, to leave the English and join Hyder Ali.

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\textsuperscript{13} Aitchison-Vol V (1864)-Hyderabad, No. II.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, Art 3.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, Art 6.
The defeat which the Nizam and Haidar Ali suffered at the hands of the English opened the eyes of the former. Haidar Ali was soon deserted by the Nizam who again joined the English and entered into 'another treaty of the strictest friendship and alliance' on 26 February, 1768.

The Nawab of the Carnatic was also a party to this treaty. In order to perpetuate the friendship among the three powers it was stated in the treaty that the enemies of any one of them should be regarded as enemies of the other two powers, and the friends of one should be treated as friends of all. The stipulation of the former treaty about mutually assisting each other with their troops when required was omitted in this treaty. The Company, however, was to provide the Nizam with 'two battalions of sepoys and six pieces of artillery, manned by Europeans' whenever he required them if the situation of the Company's affairs would allow such a body of troops to march into Hyderabad. The Nizam was to bear the expenses of the troops so long as they would remain in his service.

The two treaties mentioned above have some common features. First, the troops had to be furnished upon a requisition from the Nizam. Secondly, the troops were to be withdrawn after they had finished the work for which their services were required. Thirdly, there was no fixed subsidy,

17. Ibid
O.P.-168-2
the Nizam was required to pay the actual expenses of the troops.

**Guntur Affairs:**

As already stated† by the treaty of 1766 the Nizam ceded the Northern Sarkars, which included Guntur, to the English Company. Guntur was at that time in the possession of Basalat Jang, the Nizam's brother. So it was stipulated in the treaty that Basalat Jang would be allowed to hold Guntur for life or until the Nizam made it over to the English Company. Guntur occupied a very strategical position, being interposed between the four other Sarkars in the north and the Carnatic and the Mysore in the south. The possession of Guntur was very necessary to the English for connecting their northern possessions with those of the south. For Nizam it was the only outlet to the sea. The possession of it would provide Haidar Ali not only with an outlet to the Bay of Bengal, but also with a strategical position in his war with the English. In order to protect himself against his enemies Basalat Jang maintained a French corps commanded by a French General named De Lallee. The port of Motupalli in his territory not only enabled him to keep regular communication with the French, but offered an easy passage to the French adventurers into his territory. The Madras Government asked Basalat Jang to dismiss the French troops, but as this bore no fruit they requested the Nizam either to compel his brother to

† Vide pp 15-16.
dismiss the French troops from his service or to rent out Guntur to them.\textsuperscript{18} Neither Nizam Ali nor Basalat Jang did anything to comply with the Madras Government’s wishes and the whole matter was shelved till November, 1778, when Pondicherry fell to the English and Haidar Ali was threatening to attack Basalat Jang’s territory. Basalat Jang then sought the protection of the English. A vakil of Basalat Jang approached the Madras Government\textsuperscript{19} for an alliance and the supreme Government at Calcutta was informed of it. The latter permitted the Madras Government to carry on negotiations and conclude a treaty.\textsuperscript{20}

By this treaty concluded in 1779\textsuperscript{21} Basalat Jang rented Guntur to the company on the actual revenue of the Sarkar. The French troops in his service were to be replaced by British troops who were to defend his territory. In case his territory was attacked more troops would be sent, if necessary. The Sarkar of Guntur was to be rented to the Madras Government and the expenses of the troops were to be met out of the rent. The remainder of the rent was to be remitted to Basalat Jang. The Nizam was extremely offended as the treaty with Basalat Jang was concluded without any reference to him. He considered that this alliance with Basalat Jang was a violation of the treaty of 1768 by which the company could take possession.

\textsuperscript{18} Briggs, the Nizam, Vol I, p 185
\textsuperscript{19} A. P, Das Gupta, The central authority, p 66
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, p 67
\textsuperscript{21} Aitchison, Vol V, No. 4 (Hyd)
of Guntur only by a negotiation with the Nizam. He had a further cause to be offended with the English. They had suspended payment of the peshkash of Northern Sarkars for two years and now they proposed to approach the Nizam with a request to remit the peshkash altogether. When this proposal was made the Nizam became extremely agitated. 22

The Supreme Government asked the Madras Government to restore Guntur to Basalat Jang, but this could not be done without delay as the Madras Government in the meantime had rented (Oct., 1779) the same to the Nawab of Carnatic for a certain term. The delay in restoring Guntur by the Madras Government discredited the Supreme Government in the eyes of the Nizam. He had already taken into his service the French troops dismissed by Basalat Jang. He now started negotiations for an alliance with Haidar Ali and the Marathas. 23 As they were at this time at war with the English prospects of negotiation were bright. Alarmed at this the Supreme Government restored Guntur to the Nizam.

With the death of Basalat Jang in 1782, the Sarkar of Guntur ought to have reverted to the Company, but Nizam Ali instead of restituting the Sarkar retained it. Perhaps he was thinking at this time not only of retaining Guntur but also of recovering the other four Sarkars from the English. When France joined the war of American Indepen-

23. S. P. Sen, The French in India, p 18
ENCE on the side of the American states as against
the British, Bussy and Admiral Suffren were sent
by the king of France to drive out the English from
India. Bussy returned to India in 1783 after an
absence of about twenty years. Soon after his
arrival he disclosed to Nizam Ali the intention of
his forming an alliance against the English and of
restoring to the rulers of the Deccan the places
which had been usurped by the English. 24 Bussy
also wrote to Aumont, the French General of Nizam
Ali, to urge his master not to listen to any proposal
which the English might make to him and to take
the field against the English for the recovery of
the other four Northern Sarkars. 25 As the terms of
the alliance were not clearly mentioned in Bussy’s
letter Nizam Ali deputed Aumont to settle the terms
of agreement with Bussy and Suffren. 26 But it
seems nothing came out of the discussion. In 1785
Aumont was appointed a diplomatic agent of
Pondicherry Government in the court of Hydera-
bad by Cossigny, Governor of Pondicherry. 27 He
acted as an intermediary for some years between
the Pondicherry Government and the court of
Hyderabad 28 and tried to maintain a good relation
between the two.

24. Yusuf Husain, Diplomatic correspondence between
Nizam Ali and E. I. Co—A. R. No 7889
25. S. P. Sen, The French in India, p 341
26. Yusuf Husain, Diplomatic correspondence etc. A. R.
No 7891
27. S. P. Sen, The French in India, p 507
28. Ibid, p 508
In June, 1788 Lord Cornwallis deputed captain Kennaway*, one of his aides-de-camp, with a letter to the court of Hyderabad to demand the surrender of Guntur Sarkar to the company according to the terms of the treaty of 1768. He was advised to declare to the Nizam at the time of making the demand that the company’s troops would march into the Sarkar within fourteen days from the date of his audience with the Nizam. This time limit was intended to prevent the Nizam from entering into any intrigue with other powers to foil the attempt of the English Company at acquiring the Guntur Sarkar. It may not be out of place to mention here that about this time Nizam Ali made a proposal through Montigny, the French envoy at the court of Poona, to the Pondicherry Government to cede Guntur to them on condition that they should give him guarantee of protection against the English and Tipu. In view of the peace that prevailed at that time between the English and the French, the latter adopted a non-committal policy and despatched a letter of compliments to the Nizam in reply to his proposal.

It seems that Nizam Ali was not very serious in making the proposal. The formation of an anti-British alliance proposed by Bussy in 1783 did

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* Later on he was appointed Resident at the court of Hyderabad.

29. Ross, Cornwallis correspondence, Vol I, App XX para 3

30. Ibid, Vol I, App XXI, para 17

31. S. P. Sen, The French in India, p. 510
not materialise as the Nizam might have realised by that time that nothing had to be gained by joining an alliance with the French who were not strong enough to do anything against the English. A shrewd diplomat as Nizam Ali was, he must have known that the French had not become stronger in 1788 to give him protection against the English nor could he expect any help from them when they were at peace with the English in 1788. Moreover, if it was the intention of Nizam Ali to retain Guntur in his possession instead of restituting it to the English who could reasonably claim it according to the stipulations of the treaty, what advantage could he derive by ceding it to the French? As for Tipu, Nizam Ali must have known that he could not expect any help from the French against him since there had been a long standing friendship between the two.

Nizam Ali was more afraid of the Marathas than of the English. He could buy the English by the surrender of Guntur but not the Marathas who were always ready to make incursions into his territories on grounds, real or flimsy. Of all his enemies he dreaded the Marathas most and to strengthen his position against them he wanted to form an alliance with Haidar Ali. But Mir Abul Qasim*

* Mir Abul Qasim is better known by his title of Mir Alam. His father Sayid Razee was a Persian by birth. Mir Abul Qasim’s younger brother Zain-ul-Abidin was an officer of Tipu Sultan. Mir Abul Qasim was a man of great talent and attracted the notice of Azam-ul-Umara, the minister of Nizam Ali, who deputed him on various diplomatic missions.
in whom he had great confidence, advised him to rely on the English rather than on Haidar Ali though the latter belonged to the same faith with him. If the Nizam could be asked to fulfil his obligation to the English by restituting the Sarkar of Guntur why should they not be called upon to fulfil theirs on the basis of the same treaty? At this time Nizam Ali was desirous of recovering a portion of his territory which Tipu had seized. So, Abul Qasim advised the Nizam to demand British troops under article 6 of the treaty of 1768. The Nizam deputed Abul Qasim to Calcutta to submit the proposal to Lord Cornwallis.* The Governor-

In 1794 he was deputed to Poona to carry on negotiations regarding the dispute between the two courts over the payment of chauth, but the negotiations proved abortive. He also negotiated peace with Mysore on behalf of Nizam Ali at the end of the Third and the Fourth Mysore Wars. Azam-ul-Umara became jealous of the increasing influence of Mir Alam and prevailed upon Nizam Ali to banish him to his jagir. At the intercession of the British Resident he was allowed to return to the court of Hyderabad in 1803. On the death of Azam-ul-Umara he was appointed minister. Mir Alam is the reputed author of Hadiqat-ul-Alam. (Briggs, the Nizam, Vol I pp. 139-140 ; Nigaristan F 34A-35A).

* At this time Nizam Ali deputed another envoy named Fakir-ud-din Khan to Tipu for proposing an alliance between the two states. Tipu gave two conditions for his acceptance of the Nizam's proposal. One was the cession of Guntur to him and the other was a marriage between the two royal families. But Nizam Ali's family prestige stood in the way of his accepting the marriage proposal and the negotiations between them broke down. (Mohibbul Hasan, Tipu Sultan, pp 181-82)
General felt very much embarrassed when the proposal was made by Abul Qasim, for Pitt's India act of 1784 forbade the company's government to meddle in the affairs of the Indian powers.

The Nizam joins the Triple Alliance:

Accordingly Lord Cornwallis wrote a letter which might be 'deemed equal to a treaty' to the Nizam. In that letter the Nizam was informed that the force guaranteed by the 6th article of the treaty of 1768 would be granted whenever the Nizam would apply for it, making only one exception, viz, that it should not be employed against the allies of the Company. But among the allies mentioned in the letter the name of Tipu did not find place. 32 This omission of Tipu's name from among the allies of the Company did not remain a secret and when Tipu heard of it naturally he thought that the English were harbouring some aggressive design against him. This was one of the causes of the Third Anglo-Mysore War. On the eve of the war Triple Alliance was concluded in 1790 between the English, the Nizam and the Peshwa. The aim of the treaty was to combine the three powers against Tipu. On the conclusion of the treaty a British force of two battalions along with a detachment of the Nizam's army marched against Tipu. In October, 1791 the Nizam's son Sikandar Jah accompanied by the Minister,
Azam-ul-umara,* was sent from Hyderabad to take part in the siege of Seringapatam.\(^3\)

**The Triple Alliance ends: Clash between the Nizam and the Marathas:**

The amity which had been established between the Nizam and the Marathas by the Triple Alliance came to an end with the defeat of Tipu. The dismemberment of his territory and the heavy indemnity which he was required to pay under the Treaty of Seringapatam (1792)\(^+\) crippled the striking power of Tipu for the time being. Relieved of the menace from the side of Mysore the Poona Court revived the claims of chauth and Sardeshmukhi which lay dormant for a pretty long time. The Nizam was not in a mood to

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* The original name of Azam-ul-umara was Ghulam Sayid Khan. His grandfather came from the Punjab and was appointed a commander of a fort in Hyderabad (Nigaristan, F 31A). His father's name was Faroq Nezad Khan. He first secured service under Salabat Jang, but attached himself to the interests of his younger brother Nizam Ali (Briggs, the Nizam, Vol. II, p 138) whom he helped to usurp the masnad. He was also known by the different titles which Nizam Ali conferred on him, viz, Azam-ul-umara, Mashir-ul-Mulk, Aristujah and Main-ud-Daulah. On the assassination of his first minister, Nizam Ali appointed Azam-ul-umara his next minister.


+ Tipu had to cede half of his dominions and pay three crores and thirty lakhs of rupees to the allies (Aitchison, Vol. V, No. XXVII Art. 2
submit to these claims. In rejecting these claims the Nizam was mainly counting upon the British support. The Poona Court too would not forego its claims. The Governor-General eager to maintain the Triple Alliance offered to act as an umpire in the dispute, provided both the parties were agreeable to it. 34 Such an arbitration was not acceptable to the Poona Court. It would not allow the Governor-General to sit in judgment in a dispute with the Nizam whom it considered as one of its tributaries. 35 Matters came to a head when in the course of a discussion of the settlement of claims Azam-ul-umara, the minister of the Nizam, told Govind Rao Kale, the Maratha envoy, that he would not consider the Maratha claims unless Nana Fadnis attended the Hyderabad Court to explain them. The Maratha envoy replied that Nana could not come, as he was pressed for time. As if not satisfied with this, the effigies of the Peshwa and Nana were brought to the Court and were insulted. When this was being done some courtiers boasted that they would attack Poona and send the Peshwa and Nana to Banaras. 36 Though negotiations continued to the last, this insult and menace in an open Court was considered by the Marathas to be a virtual declaration of war.

The two armies met at Kharda on 11 March, 1795. The British Residents at both the

34. Poona Res. Cor.—Vol. IV—No. 81-para 6 (p 100)
35. Ibid—Vol. IV—Introduction p xiii & No. 144
courts were present in the battle-field, Sir C. Malet with the Maratha army and Captain Kirkpatrick* with that of the Nizam. None of them gave any advice to either party. The two battalions of British troops remained at Hyderabad to maintain the internal peace of the state. The battle of Kharda was nothing but a skirmish in which the Nizam’s troops were routed. The Nizam took shelter in the fort of Kharda which was besieged by the Marathas. At last the Nizam had to open negotiations with the Marathas, but they demanded the surrender of Azam-ul-umara before they could open any negotiation. This was done. Azam-ul-umara with all his equipage went to the Maratha camp † where he was given a fitting welcome.37

Azam-ul-umara surrenders to the Marathas:

After the surrender of Azam-ul-umara the

* Captain William Kirkpatrick succeeded Sir John Kennaway as the British Resident at Hyderabad. Before this appointment he had been the British Resident at the Court of Sindhia.

† The author of Gulzar-i-Asafia relates an interesting repartee which took place in the camp between Nana and Azam-ul-umara, after the surrender of the latter. Nana reminded Azam-ul-umara that he had once said that he would send the Brahmin of Poona (Nana) to Kasi (Banaras) with a pot and a loin-cloth. He asked as to what should be done with him when the situation now changed. Azam-ul-umara replied that Nana might send him to Mecca. But Nana said that he would be sent to Mecca, but he (Nana) himself would go to Banaras, so that both of them might earn religious virtue separately. (Gulzar-i-Asafia, p 161).

37. Ait. Lek. San.—Vol IX—No 3606
treaty was concluded. It was stipulated among others that the Nizam should cede to the Marathas territories yielding thirty four and a half lakh of rupees in addition to the payment of three crores and ten lakhs of rupees on account of arrears of revenue and the expenses of the war.\footnote{38} After the conclusion of the treaty Azam-ul-umara accompanied the Peshwa to Poona.\footnote{39} This, the Marathas thought, was a sufficient retribution for the scurrilous remarks Azam-ul-umara had made about the Maratha leaders in the open durbar at Hyderabad.

**Sri John Shore's non-intervention: Rise of Raymond**

The unwillingness of the English to render any

\footnote{38. Poona Res. Cor.—Vol IV—No. 221} \footnote{39. Ait. Lek. San.—Vol IX—No. 3620}
help to the Nizam in the battle of Kharda* and the consequent defeat which the latter suffered at the hands of the Marathas gave rise to an anti-British feeling in the court of Hyderabad. Those who did not like the rising influence of the British in the court of Hyderabad were not slow to take advantage of this anti-British feeling. Moreover, the absence of Azam-ul-umara, a friend of the British, from the court of Hyderabad gave free scope to Raymond, the French Commander of the Nizam, † and Tipu, who was the inveterate enemy of the British, to undermine British influence.

* According to Fubler there was nothing in the existing treaty with the Nizam which bound the Governor-General to support him against the Marathas. What the treaty had contemplated was the joint co-operation of the Nizam, the Marathas and the British against Tipu. In this Tipu was supporting the Marathas. For this reason the Governor-General did not help the Nizam against the Marathas in the battle of Kharda. Sir John Shore's critics are of opinion that the mere threat of British intervention would have held off the Marathas. But it must be remembered that in order to carry out a policy of bluff, it is well to have a line of defence on which to fall back if one's bluff does not succeed. Sir John Shore had no such line of defence. Neither his army nor his finances were ready to stand the strain of war with Tipu and the Marathas. The Third Anglo-Mysore war had exhausted his treasury. The army of Bengal was seething with discontent. Moreover, Sir John Shore had no confidence in the abilities of Sir Robert Abercromby, the Commander-in-Chief of the Company's army.—Fubler, the Private record of an Indian Governor-General, pp 6-8.

† Francois de Raymond was a native of Gascony in France. He came to India in 1775 and obtained employ-
and strengthen their own position in Hyderabad. The Nizam was so incensed against the British for their neutrality in the battle of Kharda that immediately after reaching his capital, he dismissed the two British battalions which had refused to take part in the hostilities and consequently they

ment in the battalion of Chevalier de Lasse, a French Commander of Haidar Ali of Mysore. He was aid-de-camp to Bussy, the renowned French General, for sometime. On Bussy's death he entered the service of Nizam Ali of Hyderabad in 1785. He raised a small corps of three hundred men for the Nizam. From the end of 1791 down to the capture of the French possessions in India by the English, Raymond had been carrying on correspondence with the successive Governors of Pondicherry, asking for arms 'to equip his contingent and pledging loyalty' to his nation. In the Third Anglo-Mysore war he fought for the Nizam against Tipu and for his distinguished service in the war his corps was augmented to 5,000 men and his own pay was increased to Rs. 5000 a month. At this time Lord Cornwallis was so much pleased with Raymond that he allowed him to make 'a selection from the arsenal at Madras of a variety of military stores for the service of Nizam Ali'. Obviously Lord Cornwallis was not aware of the correspondence that Raymond had been carrying on with Pondicherry and hence he was not till then regarded as dangerous by the English. At the battle of Kharda Raymond's corps consisted of 10,840 soldiers and twenty-eight guns. Nizam Ali conferred on him the title of Muthhawarul Mulk Bahadur Azdarud Daula. He died at Lallaguda in Hyderabad on 25 March, 1798.

were removed to the Company’s territory. Raymond, who had fought in the battle of Kharda, took advantage of this strained relations between the Nizam and the English to impress upon the former the usefulness of the services which the French auxiliaries would be able to render him in time of necessity as they had done during the battle of Kharda. The Nizam also realised that he could not rely upon the British battalions for defence in case of an invasion of his territory by the Marathas who, like the Nizam, were friends of the Company. So, he ordered Raymond to increase the numerical strength of his corps. Raymond’s corps gained further strength with the secret arrival of French military officers from Pondicherry which had been captured by the British after the declaration of war against France in Europe.* These officers came to Hyderabad in search of employment and some of them were appointed in Raymond’s Corps and others were employed by powerful jagirdars.¹⁰ Raymond further strengthened his position in Hyderabad by securing assignment on the revenues of some districts for the maintenance of his corps. Till the captivity of Azam-ul-umara, his corps had always been paid either from the treasury of the Nizam or by occasional assignment on the revenues. The only exception was when Azam-ul-umara had granted

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* Pondicherry capitulated in August, 1793

40. (i) Fraser, Faithful Ally-App w-Page 452

(ii) Pol. Con—22 January, 1796—Nos. 37 (para 9) & 43 (paras 3-4)
him a permanent assignment on the revenues of Kummum for the payment of a particular division of Raymond’s Corps known as Suliman Jah’s Rissalah. Soon after the battle of Kharda he secured as jagir for his corps the district of Cuddapah which the Nizam had obtained as his share of spoils of the Third Anglo-Mysore war and which lay on the borders of the English territory in the Carnatic. The despatch of a detachment of Raymond’s Corps to Cuddapah under Baptiste, a French Commander in Raymond’s Corps, caused much uneasiness to Sir John Shore. He received from the Nizam a letter (9 June, 1795) wherein the latter informed the Governor-General that four thousand troops of Raymond’s Corps were being sent to Cuddapah and one thousand and odd hundred of the same corps to Kummum. In his reply to the Nizam, the Governor-General requested him to recall the detachments of Raymond’s Corps as its presence in the frontier districts was fraught with serious danger to the Company’s territory. By the time the Nizam received the Governor-General’s reply an incident took place in the Nizam’s dominion, which necessitated the recall of the detachments.

The incident referred to is the rebellion of Ali Jah, the eldest son of Nizam Ali. Since the battle of Kharda some persons inimical to Azim-ul-umara and the English had been engaged in fomenting an

42. Pol. Con.—15 June, 1795—No. 3
43. Pol. Con.—15 June, 1795—No. 5
O.P.—168—3
insurrection in Hyderabad. They ‘for the purpose of obtaining the authority’ of Ali Jah’s name in raising an insurrection persuaded the prince to join them.44 One night (28 June, 1795) the prince left his residence and set out for the fort of Bidar accompanied by Sadashiv Reddi, a jagirdar of Medak, and other rebels. Raymond with his whole force pursued Ali Jah*. With the approach of the Nizam’s army the rebels left the fort of Bidar and proceeded towards Aurangabad. The Nizam’s army followed hard upon them. The prince sought help from Poona Court, but it was refused.45 Tipu secretly offered his assistance to Ali Jah on condition that, in case he succeeded in dethroning the Nizam, he should make over to Tipu all the territory lying south of the Tungabhadra and the Krishna, which then belonged to the Nizam.46 At this time Mir Alam persuaded the Nizam to call back the British battalions which had by that time reached the hill of Warapali. The Nizam pressed for the instant return of the Company’s battalions. The arrival of these battalions under Major Roberts inspired the Nizam with confidence. With these battalions Mir Alam set out for Aurangabad to

45. *Baptiste’s detachment was withdrawn from Cuddapah and was ordered to proceed towards Bidar to reinforce Raymond.
46. Mir Alam, Hadiqat—Vol. II—p 412
46. Wilks, History of Mysoor, Vol II, p 628
chastise the prince*. The greater part of Ali Jah’s army submitted to Mir Alam. On their journey back to Hyderabad Ali Jah died.47 †

After the surrender of Ali Jah the Company requested the Nizam to dispense with the services of the two regiments under Major Roberts. But the Nizam informed the Resident that as he required the two regiments for the purpose of reducing certain refractory landlords in the Raichur Doab, he would not dispense with their services so early. Major Roberts was ordered to march there on 14 February, 1796. On 8 March, Captain Dalrymple, who was commanding the detachment in the absence of Major Roberts, stormed the fort of Raichur. The Nizam was highly impressed by the valuable service rendered by Captain Dalrymple and many nobles of the Hyderabad Court compared in the presence of the Nizam the valour shown by British regiments with that of Raymond’s Corps and gave out their opinion in favour of the British regiments.48

Though the Nizam spoke highly of the British regiments, the advantage which accrued to the

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* The British troops were to act under the direction of Mir Alam, but were not to join with the troops of Raymond’s Corps nor were they to fight with the Marathas in the event of their espousing the cause of Ali Jah (To Court-31 Oct, 1795 para 15)

47. Mir Alam, Hadiqat—Vol II—p 413

† According to Grant Duff Ali Jah, unable to face his father, committed suicide on the way—Grant Duff, Hist. of the Marathas, Vol III, p 119

48. Fraser, Our Faithful Ally—p 197
Company was insignificant in comparison with that of Raymond's Corps. The important services rendered by the British regiments in connection with the suppression of rebellions in the Nizam's dominions, only helped to revive the link which had subsisted between the Nizam and the Company before the battle of Kharda. But the benefit received by Raymond's Corps for their part in the suppression of Ali Jah's rebellion was greater. The Nizam knew that though the Company's regiments could be entrusted with the preservation of internal peace, they would be of little or no help in the event of external aggression, especially of the Marathas. So long as there was any chance of collision between the Nizam and the Marathas and Sir John Shore was not going to change his attitude of neutrality, the Nizam had no other alternative than to place himself entirely in the hands of Raymond's Corps. If he wanted to safeguard the independence of his state he must strengthen the hands of Raymond. This view, and the feeling of gratitude towards Raymond for having quelled the rebellion of Ali Jah, induced the Nizam to elevate Raymond and his party to a position of importance in his territory. Raymond was elevated to the post of Controller of the Ordnance. The whole of the ordnance department was to be under his direction. The sum appropriated to this department was increased from thirty-five to fifty thousand rupees per month after the appointment of the new Controller. 49 The district of Medak, which was

49. Pol. Con.—4 April, 1796—No. 3—para 4.
formerly a jagir of Sadashiv Reddi, an accomplice of Ali Jah during his rebellion, was transferred to Raymond on a rental basis of sixteen lakhs of rupees per year. The districts of Kummum and Cuddapah from where Raymond’s troops were withdrawn during Ali Jah’s rebellion, were again placed under the charge of the French officers of Raymond’s Corps in spite of remonstrance from the British Resident.  

As these districts were contiguous to the British possessions in the Carnatic, French adventurers and prisoners of war, who were treated with leniency, entered into these districts from Pondicherry and Madras and were entertained by the agents of Raymond. French officers posted in these frontier districts were, perhaps, carrying on intrigues with French prisoners in Madras and once Baptiste, the French Commander of the Kummum district, without any passport or credential either from the Nizam’s Government or the British Resident went to the city of Madras where he was confined by the Madras Government. Neither the person confined nor Raymond could give any satisfactory explanation for this unauthorised entrance. He was, however, released at Mir Alam’s request. Fugitives in groups of three or four entered into these districts through the passes of the Eastern Ghats which were under the control of the French commanders. Representations were made to the Nizam by the British

Resident for preventing the French fugitives from entering into his dominions, but in view of the predominance which Raymond and his party had acquired in Hyderabad, it was vain to expect that the Nizam would ever take any strong measures for intercepting the fugitives. Orders for intercepting these fugitives were no doubt issued to the Governors on the frontier, but to no effect. To a remonstrance which the Resident once made on this score, he received a reply to the effect that 'while the persons in question could continue to baffle the well known vigilance of the English, it was not to be wondered at, if they were also able to elude the watchfulness of his Highness's officers'.

Not only French fugitives from Pondicherry but even deserters, both European and Indian, from the Company's army were entertained by Raymond. The French fugitives who got their entrance into the Nizam's dominions were also employed by powerful jagirdars and all attempts on the part of the British Resident to prevail upon the Nizam to deliver them up were of no avail. Even the principal gainer by the suppression of Raichur rebellion in which the Company's troops played a very important part, was Raymond; for most of the European military officers of the rebellious landlords joined Raymond's party.

53. Pol. Con.—15 April, 1796—No. 32.
55. Ibid—Nos. 37 (para 9) & 43 (paras 3-4).
56. Pol. Con.—15 April, 1796—No. 34—para 5.
INTRODUCTION

Thus by the middle of 1796 Raymond acquired a predominant position in Hyderabad and his assistance was sought by the anti-British parties in the Nizam’s dominions. This became evident during the struggle for succession between the two sons of the Nizam in 1796. The British Resident was aware of the strength which Raymond had gained in Hyderabad and with a view to counterpoising Raymond’s Corps he was trying to introduce into the army of the Nizam British subjects and other Europeans who belonged to nations friendly towards the British. During the residence of Azam-ul-umara in the court of Poona the British Resident, acting under the instruction of the Supreme Government, managed to introduce into the service of the Nizam the Corps of Byod and Finglass. Byod was an American and Finglass a British citizen. As Byod could not pull together with the court of Hyderabad, he soon left the service of the Nizam. Finglass remained in the Nizam’s army.  

But the Resident's attempt at counter balancing Raymond's Corps did not prove to be very successful; for while in February, 1798, just a month before Raymond's death, Finglass's Corps had only 800 men, Raymond's Corps was composed of 10,000 soldiers.

Anti-British intrigue:

The residence of Azam-ul-umara at Poona for two years not only afforded an opportunity to

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Raymond to strengthen his position in Hyderabad but also opened the flood-gate of all sorts of anti-British intrigues in the court of Hyderabad. The mainspring of all these intrigues was Tipu. After the treaty of Seringapatam (1792) Tipu’s relations with the Nizam did not show any sign of improvement. Tipu always expected that the Nizam with an eye to the common interest of Islam should join hands with him against the British. But there was little chance of his expectation being fulfilled so long as Azam-ul-umara was the Minister of Hyderabad. Azam-ul-umara, ignoring the common interest of Islam, had exerted all the influence he possessed over his master, to alienate him from Tipu, and maintain and strengthen the relations between the Nizam and the English. It was no use trying to form an anti-British alliance with the Nizam so long as Azam-ul-umara, a strong supporter of pro-British alliance, was at the helm of affairs in Hyderabad. During the absence of Azam-ul-umara from Hyderabad after the battle of Kharda, an opportunity for alienating the Nizam from the side of the English occurred to Tipu. After the battle of Kharda, the Nizam was satisfied neither with the Marathas nor with the English. When he was in this mood the Rai Rayan* and the virtual successor of Azam-ul-umara

59. Mohibbul Hasan Khan, History of Tipu Sultan—page 279.

60. For. Misc.—No. 348—p 377.

* The name of the Rai Rayan was Renuka Das. He was appointed Peshkar by Nizam Ali and became Rai Rayan
in authority, either with or without the knowledge of the Nizam, solicited Tipu to open correspondence with his master. If the Nizam was not aware of this, he certainly came to know of it when Sakhararam Pandit, the Vakil or representative of Tipu Sultan, came to the court of Hyderabad for negotiating an alliance with the Nizam. He was soon followed by two other envoys, viz, Qadir Husain Khan and Medina Sahib, who were also sent to the court of Hyderabad for the same purpose.  

The ultimate aim of Tipu in sending his agents to the court of Hyderabad and opening correspondence through them was to win over the Nizam from the English influence and to persuade him to join him against the English. The existence of several groups antagonistic to Azam-ul-umara brightened the prospect of such an alliance between the Nizam and Tipu. Imtiaz-ud-Daulah, a nephew of the Nizam by one of his sisters, was the leader of such a group. He had great predilection for Tipu and carried on secret correspondence with him*. For this he had been banished from the court

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in 1785. In 1792 he was honoured with the title of 'Sham Raj'. In 1794 he went to Poona along with Mir Alam to carry on negotiations with the Poona Government. After the battle of Kharda when Azam-ul-umara was sent to Poona as a hostage, the Rai Rayan officiated as minister for two years. Nizam Ali had great confidence in him. (The chronology, p 28).


* In the month of August, 1787, Imtiaz-ud-Daulah once carried on negotiations for a treaty with Tipu, but this was
at the instance of Azam-ul-Umara. But during the absence of Azam-ul-umara at Poona he regained the favour of the Nizam who admitted him to a joint share with the Rai Rayan in the administration of public affairs. Thus regaining his position he tried to dissolve the friendship which had been growing up between the Nizam and the Company so as to provide an opening for an alliance between his master and Tipu.62 Another rival group of Azam-ul-umara was the Paigah.* Azam-ul-umara before his surrender to the Marathas at the battle of Kharda had been trying to weaken its strength. So, the chiefs as well as the horsemen of the

done at the instance of the Nizam (Mohibbul Hasan, Tipu, p 180).

62. Sec. con, 5 Sep, 1796, No. 50, para 4.

* The term 'Paigah' is a Persian word meaning 'stable'. But in the historical documents of Hyderabad the word is used to mean the Nizam's household troops. One Abul Fathe Khan who received the title of Tegh Jang from Nizam Ali, commanded about 10,000 cavalry which formed the nucleus of the Paigah. For the maintenance of the Paigah jagirs yielding an annual income of thirty lakhs of rupees were granted. The title 'Shams-ul-umara' which became the family title, was originally conferred upon Abul Fathe Khan. On the death of Abul Fathe Khan in 1791 his son Fakhruddin Khan, Shams-ul-umara II (born in 1781), became the head of the Paigah. He was so much liked by Nizam Ali that he gave him his own daughter as a second wife in 1800. The Nizam Nasir-ud-Daulah conferred on him the title of Amir-e-Kabir. Shams-ul-umara II died in 1863. Shams-ul-umara's rank was next to that of Minister (Diwan). Henry Russell, the British Resident, says, "when the Nizam is on his musnud the Minister stands or sits in front or on one side of him as he may desire, Shumsool Omrah sits behind him holding a Bunch of Peacock's Feathers to beat away the Flies' (i) H. Russell's report on Hyderabad, Indian Archives, 1955, Vol. IX, p 126 (ii) Briggs, The Nizam, Vol. I, p 121.
*Paigah* considered him as their enemy. They noticed with suspicion his eagerness to bring about an alliance with the Company. For they felt that such an alliance would strengthen the hands of Azam-ul-umara who would then be in a position to deal with them effectively. There was another group, Raymond and his associates, which was not favourably disposed towards Azam-ul-umara. Tipu and his agents could expect support from these groups in their attempt to alienate the Nizam from the British. This could not be achieved all on a sudden and as a preliminary step towards it, accurate views of high ranking nobles of the Nizam’s Court must be ascertained.

The eagerness of the Nizam to get release from the stipulations of Kharda and the reluctance of Sir John Shore to render him any help in case he was attacked by the Marathas on his failure to meet their demands, might have inclined the Nizam to entertain the proposition of Tipu’s agents for a union with Mysore. But it must be mentioned here that though the object of Tipu’s negotiations was inimical to the Company, the Nizam never contemplated an alliance with Tipu hostile to the Company; at least that was the opinion of the Governor-General.

The Nizam knew it well that any alliance with

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64. (i) Sec. Con.—5 Sep. 1796—No. 50 (para 4) G. G’s minute.
   (ii) Ibid—3 Oct. 1796—No. 29 (para 7)—G. G’s minute.
Tipu, the greatest enemy of the British in India, would not be taken in a good light by the Company. Moreover, Tipu's intention in seeking an alliance with the Nizam was to form a coalition against the Company, which was far from the intention of the Nizam. The Nizam would have gladly refused the offer of Tipu for an alliance if he knew that the Company would back him in case he came into any collision with the Marathas. But Sir John Shore would not budge an inch from his policy of non-intervention. So the Nizam could neither reject the offer of Tipu nor accept it; he was only temporizing with him. 65

The disturbance that occurred at Poona after the death of Peshwa Madhav Rao Narayan gave a temporary relief to the Nizam who thought that he would be safe from the Maratha side so long as the disturbance continued. But out of the commotion at Poona emerged Daulat Rao Sindhia as a power potential for striking at the Nizam. He became alarmed when Daulat Rao Sindhia cantoned his army on the border of his kingdom. With Sindhia's army on the border and intrigues inside, the Mysorean envoys found a good opportunity for attracting the Nizam towards their sovereign.

About this time it was rumoured that a French armament consisting of eighteen ships was on its way to India and it was surmised that the expedition was not without the concurrence of Tipu Sultan. The Governor-General also got information that agents had been despatched by the French

to different parts of India. It was reported that a member of the embassy which had been deputed by Tipu to France in 1792 accompanied one of the French agents.  This member of the Mysorean embassy was left behind when the embassy returned to India. All these rumours and stories reached the ears of the Nizam through the agents of Tipu and the courtiers of Hyderabad who were in favour of an alliance between the Nizam and Tipu. With no hope of getting any help from the Company against the Marathas, it was natural that the Nizam would incline towards Tipu who was being supported by the French. Tipu, who was eager to commence hostilities on the arrival of a French fleet in the Indian waters, was trying to detach the Nizam from the British and Sir John Shore apprehended that the Nizam might be led into negotiations with Tipu.

Under these circumstances, Mir Alam approached the Governor-General at different times with four proposals for protecting the Nizam against the Marathas. One of the proposals comprised mediation of Sir John Shore to prevent the attack of the Marathas under Sindhia. But Sir John Shore had a great doubt as to whether Sindhia would agree to his mediation. So, he desired that before he consented to interpose his mediation between Sindhia and the Nizam, he must be given to understand that his mediation would be accepted by both the parties. Nothing came out of the

67. Sec. Con.—5 Sep., 1796—No. 5—para 4.
68. Pol. Con.—27 June, 1796—No. 13—paras 28, 30-31
proposal. The second proposal was for an unlimited defensive alliance between the Company and the Nizam. With regard to this proposal, Sir John Shore had nothing to improve upon what he had said on this subject in his minute of 18 February, 1795, which he drew up before the battle of Kharda. In that minute he argued that without the British support the kingdom of the Nizam would no doubt be destroyed, but helping the Nizam against the Marathas would mean a long and protracted war in which the Marathas could injure them easily. He, therefore, concluded that the dangers of such a connection would far outbalance the benefits of it.69 The third proposition was for a triple alliance between the Nizam, the Company and Tipu as a barrier against the Marathas and the fourth one was for an alliance between the Nizam and Tipu with the same object in view. The last two proposals were not agreeable to the Governor-General as these would be tantamount to an annihilation of the triple alliance contracted between the Marathas, the Nizam and the Company in 1790. But if any treaty should be concluded between the Nizam and Tipu, the Governor-General declared that he should demand the inspection of it to satisfy himself that it contained no stipulations inimical to the Company’s interests or territorial concessions, which might require defensive arrangements for the Company’s security.70 In short, Sir John Shore

69. Pol. Con.—27 June, 1796—No. 13—para 32
70. Ibid—paras 33-38.
would not agree to any alliance in which Tipu should be a party or which had the least chance of involving the Company in a war with the Marathas. Sir John Shore rejected all these proposals of Mir Alam believing that they were the outcome of a fear entertained by the Nizam about the Maratha aggression, which the Governor-General thought would never materialize.\textsuperscript{71} So long as there was no aggression on the part of the Marathas, thought Sir John Shore, the Nizam would not enter into any alliance with Tipu. Moreover, the motives of the Nizam and Tipu in forming an alliance were quite at variance with each other. While the Nizam's motive was to prevent the Maratha aggression, Tipu's intention was to attack the English, which was far from the intention of the Nizam.

This attitude of neutrality on the part of the Governor-General gave free scope to all anti-British parties in Hyderabad, which had succeeded so far in prevailing upon the Nizam to dismiss the British detachment for the second time. Major Kirkpatrick was requested by the Nizam to send back the British detachment to the Company's territory and the detachment was actually marching away when suspicion having arisen in the mind of the Nizam, he requested the British Resident to countermand the march of the detachment.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid—para 40.

\textsuperscript{72} To Court—31 Dec. 1796—para 33.
Release of Azam-ul-Umara, end of anti-British intrigue.

At this period when the anti-British parties were almost successful, the course of events at Poona had led to the release of Azam-ul-umara. The reinstatement of Azam-ul-umara and his return to power counteracted the design of the persons who had endeavoured in his absence, to drive a wedge between the Nizam and the Company and sought to promote a friendly relations between the Nizam and Tipu. Even before the release of Azam-ul-umara 'the influence of the coterie in the Hyderabad Court, which advocated good relations between the Nizam and Tipu against the Company, was apparently on the wane and Mir Alam had been gaining gradually the favour and confidence of the Nizam.' With the release of Azam-ul-umara, this tendency for a closer union with the Company gained ground and the relation between the British Residency and the court of Hyderabad became cordial. This cordiality was fostered by the British Resident by various acts of conciliatory nature. The pro-Mysorean party lost influence in the court of Hyderabad and Medina Sahib, one of the agents of Tipu, who was then at Hyderabad, was found trying 'to conciliate the good will of Azam-ul-umara and obtain his concurrence in their views.'

73. To Court (Pol)—11 Sept, 1797—paras 5-6
74. Sec. Con.—3 Oct, 1796—No. 29—para 7 (Governor-General's minute).
75. To Court (Pol)—31 Dec, 1796—paras 35-37.
very difficult to win over Azam-ul-umara to their views. It may be said that the intrigues between the court of Hyderabad and Tipu, which had been carried to some length during the absence of Azam-ul-umara, came to an end with the arrival of the minister from Poona. Imtiaz-ul-Daulah and other promoters of these intrigues were deprived of all power and influence in the court.\textsuperscript{76}

Azam-ul-umara had no attachment for Raymond and his corps, and the minister became all the more disgusted with the French commander, for he had entered into a conspiracy with Rai Rayan and others to prevent the return of the minister from Poona. He was willing to disband Raymond’s Corps, if he was assured of the Company’s help in case Hyderabad was attacked by Sindhia who had by that time acquired a predominant position not only in the Deccan but in northern India also. Such an opportunity for disbanding Raymond’s Corps occurred when Raymond died in Hyderabad on 25 March, 1798. On the death of Raymond, Azam-ul-umara informed Sir John Shore that it was the most suitable time for disbanding Raymond’s Corps and he was willing to do it provided he was assured of a closer relation between the Nizam and the Company. This closer relation, he intimated to the Governor-General, should be effected before the power and possessions of Raymond were bestowed upon his successor Piron, in which case it would be a very difficult task to disband Raymond’s Corps.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{76} Pol. Con.—9 July, 1798—No. 97—para 12.
\textsuperscript{77} Pol. Con.—9 July, 1798—No. 51.
This time also Sir John Shore could not accept the proposal for closer tie. But the reasons he assigned this time against a closer tie were more explicit than those on former occasions. Sir John Shore could not agree to the proposal on three grounds. First, it would excite the jealousy of the Marathas and they might thereby be driven into an alliance with Tipu. Secondly, it might induce Sindhia to commence hostilities against the Company in northern India. Thirdly, he was not willing to violate the orders of the Court of Directors, which forbade him to enter into any political engagements with the rulers of India.78

The death of Raymond was followed by the resumption of jagirs which the late commander had obtained for the payment of his troops during the absence of Azam-ul-umara at Poona. It also led to dissensions among some of his French officers. The loss of jagir and the dissensions among the officers undoubtedly weakened the French Corps to some extent, but still it had great influence over the government of Hyderabad.79

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CHAPTER II

THE SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE BRITISH PROTECTORATE.

Political Condition of the Deccan in 1798:

So long as Sir John Shore was in India the establishment of the British influence in the court of Hyderabad by disbanding the French corps could not be effected. He would not budge an inch from his policy of non-interference in the affairs of Hyderabad. But his successor Lord Mornington followed quite a different policy. His policy was to subvert the French influence in the court of Hyderabad and to replace it by the British influence. This he followed not only in Hyderabad but in many other states also.

Lord Mornington was appointed Governor-General on 7 October, 1798. Before he started for India he had discussed the political condition prevailing at that period in India with Dundas, the President of the Board. They agreed that the time for giving up Shore’s policy of non-intervention and following an aggressive policy in India had arrived. The complete disintegration of the Mughal Empire and the weakness of the Indian states were expected to afford an opportunity for the expansion of the British Empire in India. Shah Alam II, the Mughal Emperor, was virtually

a prisoner in the hands of Daulat Rao Sindhia. The Maratha confederacy was in a high stage of disintegration after the death of Madhav Rao II. The weakness of the Nizam had been exposed in the battle of Kharda and the internal disorder of his state became apparent during the rebellion of his son Ali Jah. It seemed that the Nizam's government would break down through its own weakness unless it could rely upon a strong prop. Tipu had lost much of his strength in the Third Anglo-Mysore War in which he had to cede half of his territory to the Company and its allies.

The triple alliance formed by Lord Cornwallis before the Third Anglo-Mysore war as a barrier against the aggression of Tipu Sultan had been nullified by Sir John Shore's policy of non-intervention. The Nizam and the Peshwa had been engaged in mutual contests since the conclusion of the Third Anglo-Mysore war. Within the Nizam's dominions Raymond's Corps had acquired great influence. Although after Raymond's death it had lost much of its influence, its military strength had increased to some extent by the improved discipline and by the increase of fighting personnel which was allowed by Azam-ul-umara. It seemed that Azam-ul-umara after his failure to form a closer alliance with the Company wanted to create jealousy in the mind of Sir John Shore so that he might be moved to form a closer alliance with the Nizam. Besides Raymond's Corps there was another corps in Hyderabad commanded by a Frenchman named D' Agincourt in the service of Azim-ud-Daulah, a chief of the Paigah.
This corps consisted of 1,500 men. It may be mentioned here that all the Paigah chiefs were anti-British. Moreover, D' Agincourt, the commander of this corps, was like Raymond and Piron a staunch Jacobin\(^2\). The internal dissensions in the Court of Poona since the death of Madhav Rao II (October, 1795) had weakened the position of the Peshwa. He was held under thraldom by Daulat Rao Sindhia who had acquired a predominant position in the Maratha confederacy. Sindhia's army also was under the Command of a Frenchman named Perron. Thus the military resources of the Nizam and Sindhia were in the hands of Frenchmen. While two members of the triple alliance became weak by their mutual contests and internal dissensions, Tipu had been gathering strength.\(^3\) Lord Mornington was alarmed not only at the growing power of Tipu but also at the infiltration of the French influence into his army.

**Francophobia of Lord Mornington:**

This French influence in the army of Hyderabad or in that of any other state was not really so great and so menacing as it appears from the perusal of Wellesley's despatches. In the background of the French menace to other European countries during the revolutionary wars in Europe


\(^3\) (a) M. Hasan Khan, History of Tipu Sultan—p 291.

and the aggressive policy which he intended to follow in India, every insignificant augmentation of the French influence in the armies of Indian states loomed large in his eyes.

It was for this that Lord Mornington took a very serious notice of some indiscreet actions of Tipu which would have been ignored at other times. Since the Third Anglo-Mysore war Tipu had been looking for an opportunity to recover with help of the French the territories which he had lost to the English. The French officers in Tipu’s army related all sorts of exaggerated stories about the successes of their nation in the revolutionary wars in Europe and assured him of the eagerness of the French to help him in regaining territories which he had lost. This sort of propaganda kept alive the hope of Tipu to secure the French help some day. But since the capture of the French possessions in India and the transference of the capital from Pondicherry to Isle of France in 1793, Tipu had no contact either with France or the Isle of France and he had no means of ascertaining the veracity of these stories. But in the early part of 1797 Tipu got an opportunity of coming in contact with the French government in the Isle of France through an unscrupulous French privateer named Ripaud who had been ship-wrecked near Mangalore, a port in Tipu’s territory. He introduced himself as second-in-Command in the Isle of France and was received with great honour in Seringapatam by Tipu though he was cautioned

by some of his courtiers not to take an unknown French adventurer at his word. Tipu was persuaded by the privateer to send an embassy to the Isle of France for concluding an alliance with France. Two persons deputed by Tipu for the purpose reached the Isle when Ripaud decamped. The representatives of Tipu were received by Malartic, the French Governor-General, who issued a proclamation calling upon the citizens of the Isles of France and Bourbon to join the force which was to be sent for Tipu's help. The response to the proclamation was very disappointing. About one hundred men only joined the force and they reached Mangalore on 26 April, 1798. Tipu would have done better if he had refused to receive the force, but this he did not do. The whole episode was almost like a farce. The volunteers from the Isles of France and Bourbon were not in a position to render any substantial help to Tipu, but Lord Mornington saw in it an attempt on the part of Tipu to join hands with the French against the English. From that time he began his preparation for the invasion of Mysore. But it was not till Napoleon's Egyptian expedition, the news of which reached Calcutta in June, 1798, that Lord Mornington made any serious preparation for the invasion. Napoleon's Egyptian expedition accelerated the preparation for war, which he had commenced after the arrival of the volunteers from the Isles of France and Bourbon.

But before the declaration of war against Tipu

Lord Mornington thought it necessary that the other two powers of the triple alliance—the Nizam and the Peshwa—should be placed in a position to enable them to render effective help to the Company in its war against Tipu.

So long as the Nizam was not freed from the influence of the French party and from the hostilities menaced by Sindhia as well as from the danger of future attack on the part of the Marathas', he could not be of any useful service to the Company in the coming war. So the first step which was necessary to make the Nizam a useful ally in the coming war was to disband the corps which was under the control of the French commanders. For, in the event of a war with Mysore, the corps, instead of assisting the English, might join Tipu and by a sudden blow endeavour to seize the Nizam's dominion*.

Lord Mornington apprehended that the success of such a design might induce Sindhia's commander, Perron, who had under him the most efficient part of Sindhia's

* All the French officers in Raymond's Corps were Jacobins like him. They fought under the French flag and had the Cap of Liberty engraved on their buttons. Raymond corresponded with the French adventurers in Tipu's army and with those in the Maratha service. Raymond died on 25 March, 1798, six months before the disbandment of his corps. He was succeeded by another French adventurer named Piron. He like Raymond was an ardent Jacobin. He sent to Sindhia's French General Perron, 'a silver tree with a Cap of Liberty as a souvenir.' He even openly declared his hostile intentions against the English. S. P. Sen, The French in India, p 541.
army, either to persuade or compel his master to join hands with Tipu. Such a combination of the French commanders with their several corps in the respective services of the Nizam, Sindhia and Tipu might, in the opinion of the Governor-General, endanger the British territory in India.  

This Francophobia of Lord Mornington induced him to draw a picture out of all proportions to the realities of the situation. Piron did not possess that influence upon the Nizam or the court of Hyderabad, which Raymond had possessed during the absence of Azam-ul-umara in Poona. Moreover, whatever power Piron possessed in Hyderabad was being counteracted by the minister who was in favour of forming an alliance with the Company. Perron in Sindhia’s army was not a man of Count de Boigne’s calibre. He was not liked by his Indian subordinates who pressed Daulat Rao Sindhia to remove him from power. Perron was more eager to amass a fortune and retire as soon as possible to Europe than to risk it by joining a coalition of other French officers against the English. In 1802 during the Second Anglo-Maratha war he actually deserted his master and took shelter with the English for the security of his property.

But it must be admitted that though Lord Mornington exaggerated the French menace in India, he sincerely believed in the existence of it in some Indian States. A perusal of his despatches

dealing with this French menace will leave no doubt in the mind of the reader about his sincerity in this matter. The way in which he wanted to wipe away this menace from Hyderabad was followed later on in other states also.

**Treaty of 1798:**

The Governor-General thought that the best way to undermine the French influence in Hyderabad was to disband the French corps in the Nizam’s service. Azam-ul-umara was also in favour of undermining the French influence in Hyderabad. During his absence in Poona Raymond and his French party had joined hands with those who were not favourably disposed towards the minister. Moreover, he had great doubt as to the ability of the French corps in the Nizam’s service to ward off the Maratha invasion if it ever took place in future. If Azam-ul-umara was assured of British protection against the Marathas he would gladly disband the French Corps. But he had got no such assurance from Sir John Shore who had rejected Azam-ul-Umara’s proposal for a closer alliance between the Company and the Nizam. In the event of a closer alliance between the two powers, Azam-ul-umara thought, the Company would come forward to help the Nizam if he was attacked by the Marathas. So, when the new Governor-General expressed his eagerness to accept the proposal for a closer alliance⁸ and seek the assistance of the

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Nizam in the impending war against Tipu, Azam-ul-umara proposed three conditions before he could enter into any negotiation with the Company.

The most important condition was that the Company should support the succession of Sikandar Jah*, the eldest among the surviving sons of Nizam Ali. The Governor-General agreed to the condition, for Sikandar Jah’s claim to the throne was based upon the priority of birth.9 The second condition was that the subsidiary force should be employed for carrying into effect various measures of internal reforms. The last condition was that the Governor-General should arbitrate to settle not only the existing differences between the Marathas and the Nizam but also the differences that might occur in future.10

As regards the second condition the Governor-General made it clear to Azam-ul-umara through the Resident† that the British troops should be employed only in case of serious threat to the ‘person or authority’ of the Nizam and they should ‘not be

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* Sikandar Jah was born on 19 October, 1771 and was named Akbar Jah (Briggs, the Nizam, Vol. I, p 85). He was the husband of Jahan Puwar Begum, the grand-daughter of Azam-ul-umara.

10. Ibid.—No.—XLVII—para 4-6.

† At this time Captain James Achillas Kirkpatrick, the brother of Captain William Kirkpatrick, was the acting Resident at Hyderabad. The adroitness shown by him in disbanding the French crops in the Nizam’s service induced the Governor-General to appoint him permanent Resident at Hyderabad. He was for more than eight years at Hyderabad and during this period he negotiated with the Nizam the important treaties of 1798 and 1800.
employed on trifling occasions, nor like *sebundy* be stationed in the country to collect revenues."

This view of the Governor-General was embodied in the 5th article of the treaty which was concluded with the Nizam on 1 September, 1798. In this article the important cases in which the subsidiary force could be employed were indicated. These included the protection of the person of the Nizam, his heirs and successors, and 'over-awing and chastising all rebels or exciters of disturbance' in the dominions of the Nizam. Though not embodied in the treaty, the Governor-General indirectly hinted in his letter to the Resident that he would not object if the British troops were employed under the direction of the Nizam’s ministers, 'in services connected with the introduction of a system of internal reform' in the Nizam’s dominions. Thus the 5th article of the treaty of 1798 gave a handle to the British Resident to interfere in the internal administration of Hyderabad and jeopardize the internal sovereignty of the state. Azam-ul-umara desired that his name and that of his son Suliman should be inserted in this article along with the Nizam and his heirs as persons to be protected by the subsidiary force, but the Resident could not accept the proposal.

† Sch-bandī (Sebundy) means troops employed in the collection of revenues.

11. Ibid.—(a) No. XXXII (b) XLVII.


As to the third condition of Azam-ul-umara, Lord Mornington opined that if both the Peshwa and the Nizam agreed in accepting the arbitration of the Governor-General in the existing differences between them, he hoped that they would accept his arbitration in future disputes also.\textsuperscript{15} In the 8th Article of the treaty of 1798 it was stipulated that, should differences arise between the two states the Governor-General by interposing his ‘mediation in a way suitable to rectitude, friendship and union’ would try to adjust those differences ‘conformable to propriety, truth and justice.’\textsuperscript{16} Negotiations for a defensive alliance with the court of Poona were being carried on at the same time, but without any success. The Peshwa refused to acknowledge the right of the Company to arbitrate in his disputes with the Nizam and negotiations broke down on this question of arbitration.

Failing in the attempt to settle the disputes with the Marathas by the arbitration of the Governor-General and to introduce a clause in the treaty for the protection of Azam-ul-umara and his son, Mir Alam made a new proposal to the Resident. The new proposal was that the Resident should engage, either by one or two articles or by a letter signed by the Resident, to protect the Nizam’s country against all unprovoked aggression whatever and to guarantee the \textit{Diwani} or minstership of Hyderabad to Azam-ul-umara and his heir.\textsuperscript{17} This proposal was also turned down by the Resident.

\textsuperscript{16} Aitchison—Vol V (1864)—Hyderabad No. VIII—Art 8
\textsuperscript{17} Sec. Con. 18 Sep. 1798—No. 7, para 7.
But the main purpose for which the treaty of 1798 was concluded was to augment the subsidiary force with a view to disbanding the French corps. The augmentation of the subsidiary force was provided by the 3rd article of the treaty. It was stipulated in this article that the British force stationed in Hyderabad should be raised from two battalions to six, each consisting of one thousand sepoys. But Azam-ul-umara and the Resident could not agree as to the way in which the subsidy for the force was to be paid. In order to avoid irregular payment the Resident preferred assignment on revenues to the subsidy being disbursed from the Nizam’s treasury. To this Azam-ul-umara would not accede. At best he was willing to write a letter to the Governor-General assuring him that the subsidy would be regularly paid in instalments. This letter of assurance was considered by the Resident as sufficient security during the life time of Azam-ul-umara. But as the proposed subsidiary engagement was intended to be binding on posterity also it was argued by the Resident that a clause should be inserted ‘providing for the eventual assignment of specific revenues’ in case the mode of discharging the subsidy proposed by the minister proved ‘on trial inadequate.’ Azam-ul-umara agreed to this proposal. Hence it was stipulated that the annual subsidy of Rs.34,17,000 was to be paid in four instalments. Should any

18. Aitchison—Vol V (1864) Hyderabad—No. VIII—Art 3

19. Sec. Con. (For Dept)—18 Sept. 1798—No. 17, para 6
delay occur in the payment of the instalments, assignments should be granted by the Nizam on the revenues of certain districts, the actual revenues of which should be equal to the subsidy.\textsuperscript{20} The 6th article of the treaty stipulated that 'immediately' upon the arrival of the additional subsidiary force at Hyderabad the whole French Corps was to be disbanded and the officers and the troops were to be delivered up to the Resident. It was requested by the minister to substitute the word 'after' for 'immediately'. But the Resident could not agree to it, as the word 'after' was of indefinite latitude, and might be interpreted to mean even years after the arrival of the additional force at Hyderabad.\textsuperscript{21} This desire of the minister to substitute the word 'after' for 'immediately' shows that the minister was perhaps anxious to avert the trouble which might occur at the time of the disbandment of the French corps with the help of the British force. Another point in this article was also objected to by the Nizam. The Nizam opined that the delivery of the French officers and troops 'might tend to injure his reputation in the eyes of mankind at large,' and he, therefore, requested that that portion might be expunged from the main body of the treaty and made a separate article of the treaty. As it appeared immaterial to the Resident whether the particular stipulation was included in the main body or in a separate article, he accepted the

\textsuperscript{20} Aitchison—Nol V (1864) Hyderabad—No. VIII—Art 3

\textsuperscript{21} Sec. Con. (For. Dept)—18 Sept., 1798—No. 17—para 12
suggestion of the Nizam. It was also stipulated in this article that no Frenchman should be appointed in the service of the Nizam nor should he allow his chiefs to appoint them. This article practically sealed the fate of the French party in Hyderabad. The question of deserters from the Company's army and the French fugitives from Pondicherry, which had agitated the mind of the British administrators in the Company's territories, was at last solved by the 7th article of the treaty. It was provided in this article that the French and sepoy deserters from the Company's service, who might have been enlisted in the French corps or any other branches of the Nizam's army should be delivered up to the British Resident and that no deserters from the Company's army should in future be allowed to take shelter in the Nizam's territory. But as this unilateral clause might injure the prestige of the Nizam, it was requested on behalf of the Nizam that a clause might be added to the treaty making 'the apprehension and restitution of sepoy deserters reciprocal in future'. This was agreed to by the Resident and embodied in the 7th article of the treaty.

The treaty of 1798 differed from that of 1768 in respect of number of battalions to be furnished, the nature of service to be rendered by them and the manner of meeting the expenses of the subsidiary force by the Nizam. According to the


treaty of 1768 the Company was to furnish the Nizam, on requisition, a subsidiary force of two battalions provided the internal affairs of the Company's territories permitted them to do so. The Nizam had to bear the expenses of the battalions during the time they were employed in his service. * The Nizam could dismiss them, and actually dismissed them after the battle of Kharda, when he no longer required their services.

But the treaty of 1798 provided for the increase of the battalions from two to six. The battalions were to remain in the Nizam's dominions permanently and the Nizam had to pay a fixed amount annually in four equal instalments. † The treaty of 1798 provided for the disbandment of the French Corps in the Nizam's service and thus paved the way to the elimination of the French influence in the court of Hyderabad, which assumed a tremendous force under Bussy and Raymond. Free from the rivalry of the French, the English entrenched themselves in Hyderabad and undertook to protect the Nizam and his heirs against his rebellious subjects. §

The next treaty of 1800 went a step further as it undertook to defend the state of Hyderabad against all its enemies, internal or external. Thus the treaty of 1798 served as a half-way house between the treaty of 1768 and the treaty of 1800.

* Vide p 17.
† Vide p 62.
§ Vide p 60.
O.P.-168—5
Disbandment of the French Corps:

As already stated, the negotiations with the Peshwa had failed, but this did not deter the Governor-General from the execution of the treaty with the Nizam. A corps of four battalions under Colonel Roberts had been collected on the frontier of the Nizam’s dominions during the negotiations. On 9 October this corps arrived in the vicinity of Hyderabad. On the same day six battalions of the French Corps joined their cantonments. Both these parties were on the right bank of the river Musi, while the two English battalions under Hyndman were stationed at Hyderabad on the left bank of the river. These military movements so much frightened the Nizam that he took shelter in the fort of Golkunda. Azam-ul-umara was also in great alarm. From 9 to 19 October, the Nizam and his minister tried to prevent or at least delay the clash that would happen in case of disbandment of the French Corps.

The Nizam and his minister were made to understand by the British Resident that at that advanced stage of affairs there was no way out of it. The British position and interest in Hyderabad would be jeopardized if the resolution to disband the French Corps, which had been made public, were not given effect to. He was given to understand that the Company’s government was determined to disband the French Corps. At last the Nizam agreed to the proposal. On 20 October at about 10 O’Clock at night the troops of the French Corps were informed that the Nizam had
dismissed their European officers from his service and that the troops had been released from their obedience to these officers. So, if they supported their officers they would be considered as traitors and punished. 24 Piron, the French commander, sent two French officers named Salnari and Proquest to the British Resident to acquaint him that they were ready to deliver themselves up the moment they would be required to do so. They were advised to deliver themselves up on the following day to Colonel Roberts. On 21 October Piron requested the British Resident to send an officer to the French lines, to take charge of articles of public and private property. Captain Malcolm, assistant to the Resident, was accordingly sent. On his arrival in the French lines, Malcolm found that a serious mutiny had broken out among the troops who had confined and maltreated their officers. Even Malcolm would have been roughly handled had he not been saved by some men in the lines, who formerly belonged to his regiment. 25 Mahipatram, the Peshkar* of Piron, who had been deputed by the Hyderabad Court to quell the mutiny, was seized by the mutineers and detained as a prisoner. The reason for mutiny was, perhaps, the arrears of pay which were due to the soldiers. The Resident informed the


* 'Peshkar' means a manager in general for a superior or proprietor—H. H. Wilson, Glossary of Judicial and revenue terms.
minister that British troops should be employed without delay in suppressing the mutiny. The minister after consultation with the Nizam authorized the Resident to employ the British troops.\textsuperscript{26}

On 22 October at about 9 O'Clock in the morning a body of horse belonging to the Nizam and the whole of the British force surrounded the French cantonments. The mutineers were promised payment of all arrears and future employment provided they laid down arms without resistance. They agreed to the proposal. Thus within a few hours a French Corps consisting of fourteen thousand soldiers was disarmed without the loss of a single life. Piron and almost all the French officers had managed to escape on the previous night and those who could not, surrendered themselves to the British general next morning.\textsuperscript{27} Two French Officers named Comeade (alias Agincourt) and Le Tillur belonging to the \textit{Paigah} and one Guyon who commanded the body-guard of Sikandar Jah were also delivered up to the Resident. A few days later, thirty Europeans of the French party attached to the battering train in the fort of Bidar also delivered themselves up to one of the European officers of Hyndman's detachment.\textsuperscript{28} Thus within a few days the whole

\textsuperscript{26} Sec. Con.—5 Nov. 1798—No. 47 paras 6-9.

\textsuperscript{27} (i) Malcolm, Hist. India—f. n. p 209.

(ii) Martin, Wel. Des.—Vol. I—XcIX para 4

\textsuperscript{28} Sec. Con.—23 Nov. 1798—No. 37—para 8 in the postscript.
French party in the Nizam’s dominion was wiped out and the French influence in Hyderabad came to an end. *

The aim of the English fulfilled, but not of the Nizam by the treaty of 1798:

The main aim of the Company’s Government in concluding the treaty of 1798 was to crush the French influence in Hyderabad by disbanding the French Corps and thus enable the Nizam to help the Company in destroying the power of Tipu. But the Nizam’s aim in forming a closer alliance with the British by the treaty of 1798 was to fend off any Maratha aggression and, if possible, to get a release from the payment of chauth and other demands of the Marathas with the help of the Company. The aim of the Company was fulfilled, but not of the Nizam. The treaty of 1798 established the British influence in Hyderabad but did not provide any security to the Nizam against the Maratha attack. It also allowed the Company to interfere in some cases of internal affairs in Hyderabad. The significance of the treaty of 1798 in relation to Hyderabad was clearly expressed by Mir Alam when he remarked, "It (the treaty) would raise the British Government in the scale of

* Lord Mornington tried to justify before Nizam Ali the disbandment of the French troops as a fit retribution for attacking Egypt, a Muhammadan country, by the French troops under Napoleon and committing ‘several sacrilegious acts against the faith of Islam.’—Yusuf Husain, Diplomatic correspondence etc. A. R. No. 7870.
political weight and importance, so would it have a tendency to lower that of His Highness (the Nizam) who would scarcely be numbered any longer among the sovereigns of India but like the Nawabs of Oude and Arcot be considered as a mere dependent of the Company."

Why Mir Alam's proposal of the Company giving protection to Hyderabad against all unprovoked aggression either by a secret article in the treaty of 1798 or by a letter signed by the Resident was not accepted, deserves some consideration. That the protection sought by Mir Alam was mainly against the Marathas is evident. Whether that protection was provided by a secret article in the treaty or by a letter signed by the Resident was not material. The real risk was that it could not have remained a secret for a long time, and if it leaked out it would have made the situation precarious for the Company. In that case the Peshwa, instead of remaining neutral, might have helped Tipu in his war against the British. Secondly, Lord Cornwallis by a letter to the Nizam on 7 July, 1789,—a letter virtually as solemn as a treaty—had informed the Nizam that the Company's force engaged for by the 6th article of the treaty of 1768 should not be employed against the Marathas among others*. Moreover, the Peshwa had been a member of the triple alliance and as such he was to be considered as an ally of the Company. So, the insertion of a clause in the treaty

29. Sec. Con.—1798—1 Sep. No. 7—para 3.
* Vide Chapter I—p 25.
of 1798 providing for engaging the subsidiary force against the Marathas might have been construed by the Peshwa as a sinister design against him. Lastly, the Governor-General had perhaps thought that the confusion which prevailed among the Marathas at the time of the conclusion of the treaty would prevent them from attacking the Nizam and thus no occasion for protecting the Nizam during the continuance of the Anglo-Mysore war would arise.

Peshwa Baji Rao received from Lord Morington a letter on 1 November, 1798, requesting him to join the war against Tipu. He also sent along with the letter a copy of the Subsidiary Treaty concluded with the Nizam on 1 September, 1798, expecting that the Peshwa would also of his own accord conclude a similar treaty with the Company. 30 At that time Tipu also sent his envoys to the court of Poona to request him to come to his help 31 in the impending war against the English. Baji Rao received them cordially. He could not come to any decision at that time, so he only temporized. He believed that the war would continue for a long time and he would join the winning side. But the war had ended before the Peshwa's contingent could actually join the war.

Nizam's territorial acquisitions from Mysore:

The war ended with the death of Tipu at the siege of Seringapatam. The whole of Mysore came

31. Ibid.
under the Company and its ally the Nizam. The Company might have equally shared the whole country with the Nizam, but this would have 'aggrandized the power of the Nizam'. They might have divided the country equally allowing an equal share to the Marathas who had taken no part in the war. This would have effected a considerable aggrandizement of the Maratha State whose power the English dreaded most, at the expense of the Company and the Nizam. But it was thought desirable 'to conciliate their good will' so that they might not grudge over the British attempt to convert Mysore to a protectorate of the Company and if possible, to bring in the Peshwa to the fold of its allies. So, the problem that confronted the Governor-General was how to limit the territory to be offered to the Nizam 'within such bounds of moderation' as would compensate him for the expenses incurred and the exertions made during the war and to win the good will of the Peshwa. The solution to the problem was found in restoring the central portion of Mysore to a scion of the old Hindu family which had been replaced by Haidar Ali and dividing the residue between the Company, the Nizam and the Marathas.

The Nizam claimed an equal partition of the territory reserved for division on the basis of the treaty of 1790*. The Governor-General could not

* This treaty concluded before the Third Anglo-Mysore War provided (by its 6th article) for equal partition of the territory to be acquired between the Marathas, the Nizam and the Company (Aitchison—No. VII, Hyderabad) and the subsequent partition was effected on the basis of this article.
entertain this claim of the Nizam. He was in favour of partitioning the territory on the equitable basis of the expenses incurred and the exertions made by each party during the war and the 'security which each party (was) likely to derive from the assistance of the other in maintaining their common interests and in consolidating the basis of the peace'.

In short, as the Nizam's contribution and exertions in the war were not equal to those of the Company, he could not expect an equal partition with the Company.

By the Partition Treaty of 1799, the Nizam got the districts of Guti and Guramkonda bordering on

the cessions which he acquired by the Treaty of Seringapatam in 1792 together with six taluks of

Raidrug, one taluk of Chitteldrug (Chitradrug) and other tracts of land, the frontier of which ran nearly along the line of fortresses of Chitteldrug, Sera, Nandidrug and Kolar leaving these fortresses to form the frontier of the new state of Mysore. The territory which the Nizam thus acquired yielded an annual revenue of 6,07,332 pagodas, the territory of the Company yielding 7,77,70.33† The territory set apart for the Peshwa was valued at 2,63,957 pagodas.34 As the Peshwa refused to accept the territory reserved for him, it was divided between the Nizam and the Company, the former getting two-thirds and the latter one-third.35

With the acquisition of these territories by the Partition Treaty of 1799, the Nizam's dominions constituted the only barrier between the territories of the Marathas and those of the Company in the Carnatic. Any successful attack on Hyderabad by


† If the charges on the revenues are deducted the net revenue of the Company will be 5,37,170 pagodas and that of the Nizam 5,37,332. Thus, though the Governor-General could not accept the claim of the Nizam to equal division of the revenue in principle, in fact he 'made concessions to the Nizam far exceeding the limits of principle (Aitchison—No. IX, Hyderabad—Schedules A & B, Martin—Wel. Des. Vol. II—No. XXIII, para 2)

34. Aitchison—Vol. V—No. IX, Hyderabad,—Schedule D.

the Marathas, having for its object either the conquest of the Nizam's dominions or the attainment of an influence in his court would not only weaken that barrier, but would at once increase the power of the Marathas. The Company's Government would have to face in that case a formidable and dangerous rival at the frontier of its territories instead of an ally. Thus the Nizam's territorial acquisitions from Mysore by the Partition Treaty of 1799 occupied a very strategical position in relation to the British possessions in the east.

The Maratha menace:

During the continuance of the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War Daulat Rao Sindhia's attitude towards Hyderabad became increasingly menacing and it was apprehended that he might attack Hyderabad either singly or in conjunction with Peshwa Baji Rao II. So, the Resident at Hyderabad had been instructed by the Governor-General to assure the Nizam and his minister of the determination of the Company's Government to support the Nizam against any attack made on his dominion. In order to counteract the apprehended attack on the part of Sindhia an attempt was made on the initiative of the Governor-General to conclude an alliance between the Company, the Nizam and the Raja of Berar. This attempt did not bear fruit. But nothing untoward happened during the war.

36. To Court (secret), 31 Aug., 1800, paras 41-42.
38. Ibid. No. 18
But after the Partition Treaty of 1799 the Maratha menace became serious. The emergence of Daulat Rao Sindhia as the most powerful chief among the Marathas after the death of Nana Fadnis which occurred in March, 1800, became a source of danger to Hyderabad.

The power and the resources of the Peshwaw after the death of Nana passed into the hands of Sindhia and with the increase of his power his means of disturbing his neighbours consequently increased. It was apprehended that he might strike at the Nizam at any moment. It was, therefore, the interest of both the parties, the British and the Nizam, to prevent the aggression of Sindhia and for that purpose they decided 'to enter into a defensive alliance for the mutual guarantee' of their territories against any attack which might be made by Daulat Rao Sindhia.39

**Treaty of 1800:**

With that end in view the Governor-General asked the Resident to enter into negotiations with the minister of the Nizam and gave instructions as to the lines along which he would carry on the negotiations. The Governor-General desired that the augmentation of the subsidiary force was necessary if a powerful Maratha chief like Sindhia was to be prevented from attacking Hyderabad. In order to ensure the regular payment of the augmented subsidiary force, the subsidy should be

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39. (i) To Court—(Secret)—31 Aug. 1800—paras 42-43.
   (ii) Sec. Con.—20 Nov. 1800—No. 1,
commuted for territorial assignment. But though this commutation of subsidy for territorial assignment was 'desirable', the Governor-General thought that 'this was not indispensable' and therefore the Governor-General empowered the Resident 'to waive it if he should judge it expedient' to do so. The Resident was further advised that if he found that the Nizam was not satisfied with the limitation of the protection against attack made by Sindhia alone or in concert with the other Maratha chiefs and pressed for a guarantee of protection against all enemies, in that case the Resident was empowered to give the guarantee. But in extending the guarantee of protection the Resident must not give up the demand for commutation of subsidy for territorial assignment, which he was allowed to do in case of limited protection. The Resident was empowered by the Governor-General to conclude a treaty with the Nizam on the basis of the directions thus given without any further reference to the Governor-General reserving only to the Governor-General in Council the usual power of ratification.  

In pursuance of the advice given by the Governor-General the Resident entered into negotiations with Azam-ul-umara. The minister submitted the draft of a treaty which was not at all acceptable to the Governor-General. Azam-ul-Umara in the draft of his treaty attempted to transform the defensive alliance as proposed by the Resident into an offensive one. But the most

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40. Sec. Con.—20 Nov.—1800—No. 1—paras 6-10.
disagreeable part of the treaty from the British point of view was the 16th article. It was stipulated in that article that an ambassador or agent on the part of the Nizam should be appointed in England.\textsuperscript{41} By this article Azam-ul-umara wanted to show to the other princes of India that the Nizam was equal in rank to the British sovereign and that the Governor-General was inferior to the Nizam in rank.

The treaty as executed by the Resident with the Nizam\textsuperscript{42} was also not ratified by the Governor-General on the ground that the directions given by the Governor-General had not been fully acted upon in concluding the treaty. In it the Nizam was guaranteed a general protection against all enemies without the Resident’s securing from the Nizam unconditional and unqualified assignment of territory in commutation of subsidy. The 4th article of the Resident’s treaty reserved to the Nizam the option of discharging the subsidy either from his exchequer or by an assignment of territory.\textsuperscript{43} If after ratification of the treaty by the Governor-General, the Nizam wanted to pay the subsidy from his exchequer instead of assigning any territory, in that case the Nizam would be the gainer and the Company the loser. For, the Nizam would get the protection of the Company against all enemies including Sindhia, which the earlier treaties had not given him inspite of his obligation

\textsuperscript{41} Sec. Con.—20 Nov. 1800—No. 8.
\textsuperscript{42} Sec. Con.—20 Nov. 1800—No. 11.
\textsuperscript{43} For. Dept.—Con.—20 Nov. 1800—No. 11—Art. 4.
to pay subsidy, but now he would get protection against all enemies by only paying subsidy. This was a fundamental defect of the treaty from the British point of view and hence it was not ratified by the Governor-General in Council.

Lord Wellesley drew up a fresh treaty\(^4^4\) and transmitted it to the Resident for the acceptance of the Nizam. In the consultation which Azam-ul-umara had with Azizullah, the munshi of the Resident, he made it clear that neither he nor the Nizam was fully satisfied with all its articles. So, to accommodate the Nizam, the Governor-General agreed to make some changes in the treaty. This amended treaty was accepted by the Nizam on 12 October, 1800.\(^4^5\)

The treaty which was drawn up by the Governor-General affirms a closer relation between the Nizam and the Company. Like the treaty of 1766\(^*\) this treaty also reiterates that the 'friends and enemies of either shall be the friends and enemies of both'.\(^4^6\) But it goes a step further in the direction of closer relation when it states that both powers have 'become one and the same in interest, policy, friend-

\(^4^4\) Sec. Con. (Foreign)—20 Nov, 1800—No. 25.

\(^4^5\) Aitchison, Vol. V No. X (Hyd.)

\(^*\) In the treaty of 1766 it is stated that the two contracting parties will consider 'the enemies of one the enemies of both, and contrawise, the friends of one the friends of the other'. Aitchison, Vol V, No II, Art I.

ship and honour'. No other treaties with Hyderabad envisage such a close relationship in such an extravagant language. In plain words, the interest of the parties had become identical. With the death of Tipu and the acceptance of the subsidiary alliance by the new ruler of Mysore, the English and the Marathas stood face to face for the supremacy of the Deccan. The Nizam too needed the protection of the English against the Marathas. It was quite natural therefore in their own interests and safety that they should stand united against the Marathas.

Thus identical interests led the contracting parties to stipulate in the treaty mutual protection of themselves and their dependents or allies against 'all unprovoked hostility or aggression' on the part of 'any power or state whatever'. As desired by the Nizam the guarantee of protection was made general, for Sindhia might attack Hyderabad not independently but as one of the subordinates of the Peshwa. Other Maratha chiefs might also do the same thing. But Azam-ul-umara thought that the second article stipulating mutual protection against all enemies had not been 'worded in fuller, clearer and stronger terms'. To satisfy Azam-ul-umara and his master the Nizam, the Governor-

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47. Ibid, preamble.

* The words, 'in interest, policy, friendship and honour' were added to the draft by the Resident under the direction of the Governor-General (Sec. Con. 20 Nov. 1800, No. 68)


49. Sec. Con. 20 Nov. 1800, No. 81.
General added a paragraph* to his draft of the treaty mentioning clearly that the British Government would not allow any power to commit any act of 'unprovoked hostility' against the territories of the Nizam and that in case of such aggression the Nizam's territory would be defended 'in the same manner' as the Company's own territory.  

As the guarantee of a protection against all enemies of the Nizam imposed heavy military responsibility upon the Company, it was necessary that the subsidiary force should also be increased. So it was provided in the treaty that 'two battalions of sepoys and one regiment of cavalry with a due portion of guns and artillery men' should be added 'in perpetuity' to the already existing subsidiary force of six battalions of sepoys and one regiment of cavalry, thus making the whole subsidiary force

* The Governor-General asked the Resident to add the following paragraph to the second of the Public Articles (Sec. Con.—20 Nov. 1800, No. 68.)

The paragraph runs thus, "For more distinct explanation of the true intent and effect of this agreement, the Governor-General in Council, on behalf of the Honourable Company, hereby declares that the British Government will never permit any power or state whatever to commit with impunity any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights or territories of His Highness the Nizam, but will at all times maintain and defend the same, in the same manner as the rights and territories of the Honourable Company are now maintained and defended"—(Sec. Con.—20 Nov., 1800, No. 69.) Two other paragraphs were also added to the secret separate Articles—Ibid.


O.P.—168—6
consist of eight battalions of sepoys and two regiments of cavalry.\(^51\) This augmented subsidiary force, like the one provided for by the treaty of 1798, was to be stationed within the territory of the Nizam.

In the draft of the treaty which had been submitted by the Resident for the ratification of the Governor-General,—but not ratified by him—the charges for the whole augmented force were fixed at Rs. 39,42,800 annually.\(^52\) An option was also given to the Nizam to pay the charges either in cash or by assignment of territories.\(^53\) Moreover, it was not clearly stated in that draft of the treaty whether the assignment was to be a temporary one or was to be made in perpetuity. But in the draft of the treaty which was transmitted by the Governor-General no such option was given. The assignment of territory was to be made in perpetuity. Azam-ul-umara had previously made a proposal to assign the revenues of certain territories to the Company for the payment of the regiments to be added to the subsidiary force.\(^54\) This proposal was not accepted by the Governor-General as the territories Azam-ul-umara proposed to assign could not be managed by the servants of the Company owing to the unsuitability of their positions.\(^55\) Moreover, the Governor-General wanted

\(^{51}\) Aitchison, Vol. V. No. X (Hyd.), Art. 3.

\(^{52}\) Sec. Con. 20 Nov. 1800, No. 11, Art. 4

\(^{53}\) Ibid.


\(^{55}\) Ibid, para 3.
the permanent cession of territories instead of assignment of revenues, which could be withdrawn at any time. Since the conclusion of the Partition Treaty of Mysore (1799), the Governor-General had an eye upon the territories which the Nizam had acquired by that treaty as well as by the Treaty of Seringapatam (1792). These territories occupied a very strategical position for the protection of Company’s possessions in the Carnatic vis-a-vis the Maratha dominions. At the time when the Partition Treaty of Mysore was being concluded the Governor-General wanted to obtain possession of these territories either by payment of pecuniary compensation or by cession of an equivalent territory in some other part of the Company’s dominions. But he avoided opening the question at that time as it might have delayed the final settlement of their conquests. He only waited for the earliest opportunity of getting possession of these territories by a commutation of subsidy.\textsuperscript{56} That opportunity now came.

To ensure the regular payment of the troops of the subsidiary force it was demanded that territories acquired by the Treaty of Seringapatam and the Partition Treaty of Mysore should be made over to the Company in perpetuity.\textsuperscript{57} In the face of regular and punctual payment of subsidy by the Nizam since 1798\textsuperscript{58} this demand

\textsuperscript{56} Martin, Wel. Des., Vol. 11, No. LXXVIII, para 16.

\textsuperscript{57} Aitchison, Vol. V, No. X (Hyd.), Art. 5.

\textsuperscript{58} Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 24—para 57.
might seem unreasonable. But the Governor-General apprehended that with the augmentation of the subsidy to be paid by the Nizam, there might occur some irregularity in the payment of the subsidy, which would undermine the discipline of the subsidiary force.\(^9\) Moreover, this irregularity in the payment of the subsidy might cause bitterness between the two allies.

Azam-ul-umara showed his unwillingness to part with such a large part of the Nizam’s territory in lieu of the subsidy. First, it would reduce the dominion of the Nizam to the size which it had before the Treaty of Seringapatam.\(^0\) This also meant the diminution of the Nizam’s prestige and power. But it was pointed out to Azam-ul-umara by Azizullah, the munshi of the Resident, who carried on the negotiations, that the general protection which the Nizam would receive against all his enemies including the Marathas would rather help to increase his power than decrease it.\(^1\) Secondly, Azam-ul-umara contended that the revenue of the territories to be ceded would far exceed the subsidy charges. According to him the revenue would amount to seventy lakhs, whereas the subsidy-charges would not exceed forty lakhs. But in the munshi’s estimation the subsidy charges would not be less than forty-two lakhs, whereas the revenue of seventy lakhs was quite an ‘ideal’ one\(^2\) thereby implying that the actual revenue

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59. Sec. Con. (For. Dept.), 20 Nov. 1800, No. 24, para 56
60. Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 72.
61. Ibid.
would be less than that.* Thirdly, though not clearly stated it was hinted during the negotiations by the minister and his deputy Raghomat Rao* that they would suffer a loss of their income by the transference of these territories.63 Both of them used to receive a commission on the revenues collected. On that score Azam-ul-umara’s income from these territories was, according to him, three lakhs and that of his deputy ninety thousand. 64 On the advice of the Resident Azizullah hinted that their loss of commission on revenue would be made good by the Company† ‘in the event of the proposed engagement going forward’. 65

* In the draft of the treaty which was not ratified by the Governor-General, the subsidy charges were computed at Rs. 39,42,800. The total revenue of the territorial acquisitions from Mysore (in 1792 and 1799) was C. Pagodas 21,09,968 (Aitchison, Vol. V, p 81) which was equivalent to Rs. 68,29,904 leaving a surplus of Rs. 23,87,104 to cover the charges for collection of revenue and other items, if any.

* Raghomat was the vakil of Nizam Ali in the Court of Poona. Nana Fadnis had great confidence in him. He acted as intermediary between Nana and the Nizam for the release of Azam-ul-umara. As a recognition of his services he was appointed an assistant to Azam-ul-umara in 1797. Later on he became the Deputy Minister (Chronology, Index p 27).

63. Sec. Con., 20 Nov. 1800, No. 81.

† On the conclusion of the treaty Azam-ul-umara was granted a pension of a lakh of rupees per annum by the Company. A similar pension of twenty-four thousand rupees was also granted to Raghomat Rao (Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 138.)

64. Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 84.

Azam-ul-umara's reluctance, if he had any, in ceding these territories was overcome by this promise of compensation. His persuasion, it seems, went a long way in overcoming any objection Nizam Ali might have in ceding the territories. But it was mainly the fear of the Maratha aggression that prompted the Nizam to accept the British protection by ceding the territorial acquisitions from Mysore. In course of his negotiations with Azam-ul-umara Azizullah always harped on the possibility of the Maratha aggression and the protection which he needed to ward off that aggression.

The Nizam ceded to the Company in perpetuity the territories which he had acquired by the treaty of Seringapatam and the Partition Treaty of Mysore. Some of the ceded territories viz. Kopal, Gajendragar, Kanakgiri and others were situated to the north of the river Tungabhadra, while Adoni and other territories in possession of the Nizam lay to the south of the Tungabhadra and the Krishna. From the latter territories hostile forces could carry on depredations into the Company's possessions lying to the south. For the purpose of rendering the Company's frontier well defined and secure against the incursions of depredators from the Nizam's territories, it was thought necessary by the Governor-General to propose to the Nizam to exchange his territories lying to the south of the Tungabhadra and the Krishna with those of the Company lying to the north of the Tungabhadra.

67. Sec. Con. (For Dept.)—Nov. 20, 1800, No. 24, para 62.
The Nizam agreed to the proposal of the Governor-General for exchange of these territories, but he was unwilling to part with Adoni and the peshkash of Kurnul. Moreover, he desired that Muzaffar-ul-Mulk and Mansur-ud-Daulah should be allowed to retain their jagirs of Banganapalli and Chunchunmullah respectively. Adoni was an old heritage of the Asafia family and the residence of many relations of the Nizam. As regards the jagirs of Muzaffar-ul-Mulk and Mansur-ud-Daulah, these were the sole means of subsistence of their families. So, to deprive them of their jagirs would be an act of injustice and cruelty and the Nizam could not be a party to such an act.

The Kurnul peshkash had a long history behind it. Kurnul was given to one Bahadur Khan by Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah as jagir, but in course of time it passed into the hands of Haidar Ali who realised the peshkash from its nawab. After the death of Haidar Ali the peshkash was paid to his son Tipu. At the time of concluding the treaty of Seringapatam Tipu had offered to cede Kurnul to the Nizam, but the latter did not accept it. He took another district yielding the same amount of revenue. This he did to show that Kurnul really belonged to him and Tipu had no right to cede it. In 1792 Ranmast Khan, the nawab of Kurnul, before his death nominated his son Alif Khan as his successor and this was intimated to Tipu as his overlord. After the death of Ranmast

68. Sec. Con., 20 Nov. 1800, No. 81.
69. Sec. Con., 20 Nov, 1800, No, 80,
Khan the succession of Alif Khan was contested by his brother. Tipu supported Alif Khan, while his brother's cause was taken up by Nizam Ali. Lord Cornwallis advised Nizam Ali not to interfere in the affairs of Kurnul and expressed his doubt about the Nizam's claim over Kurnul. The peshkash of Kurnul was transferred to the Nizam by the Partition Treaty of Mysore. The Nizam was unwilling to admit the right of the Mysore state to transfer the Kurnul peshkash as he claimed that the allegiance of the Nawab of Kurnul had always been due to him. The Nawab of Kurnul would not be deprived of what would remain of the revenue after the deduction of peshkash included in the Partition treaty of Mysore. So, there was no question of causing financial difficulties to the Nawab of Kurnul as in the cases of the jagirdars of Banganapalli and Chunchumnulla by the exchange of territories proposed by the Governor-General. But the Nizam would lose the allegiance of Kurnul to him as the transference of the peshkash meant the transference of allegiance to the Company. This was too much to expect from a member of the Asafia family which had been contending with the house of Haider Ali for the allegiance of Kurnul. The family pride of Nizam Ali stood in the way of the transference of Kurnul peshkash to the Company.

But Lord Wellesley insisted on it that all the territories of the Nizam lying to the south of the

70. Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 123.
Tungabhadra and the Krishna should be made over without any condition to the Company. For, if the jagirdars and feudatory chiefs were allowed to retain their territories ‘independent of and uncontrollable’ by the Company ‘in the heart of the Company’s new territories’ they might cause many ‘obstacles to a beneficial and permanent settlement’ of the ceded territories.\textsuperscript{72}

At last the Nizam agreed to the exchange of territories on condition that during the life time of Nizam Ali the peshkash of Kurnul should not be demanded, the nawab being considered ‘as ever continuing in the services’ of the Nizam and that Muzaffar-ul-Mulk and Mansur-ud-Daulah should be allowed to enjoy their jagirs.\textsuperscript{73} This condition, too, had to be modified. The peshkash of Kurnul was to be paid for the first two years by the Nizam to the Company, but after that period the Company was to receive the peshkash from the nawab of Kurnul who would then become a dependant of the Company.\textsuperscript{74} The Company accepted this new proposal of the Nizam regarding Kurnul ‘on condition that no obstruction was to be given to the passage of the Company’s troops’ through Kurnul.\textsuperscript{75} As regards Muzaffar-ul-Mulk and Mansur-ud-Daulah they would be allowed to enjoy their jagirs provided they should ‘not fail in any of the duties of obedience and attachment to the

\textsuperscript{72} Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 87, para 5.
\textsuperscript{73} Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 90.
\textsuperscript{74} Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 123.
\textsuperscript{75} Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 124.
Company. These conditions having been accepted by the Nizam no further difficulty was experienced in exchanging territories.

The Governor-General was so eager to have the territories exchanged that though the value of the territories lying to the north of the Tungabhadra was greater than that of the territories lying to the south of that river and the Krishna, he did not mind the monetary loss he had to suffer as a result of the exchange*. As both the contracting parties compromised their mutual objections, the necessary exchange of territories took place.77

The Governor-General was afraid that the actual revenue of the ceded territories would not be equal to the subsidy payable by the Nizam and charges for the collection of revenues and maintenance of forts in the ceded area. But under the good administration of the Company, it was expected that the actual revenue might in the long run reach the nominal revenue or might even exceed it. So long as the actual revenue would remain below the level of the nominal revenue, the Company might ask the Nizam to meet the deficiency; if it rose above the level the Nizam might demand the refund of the excess.

76. Ibid.

* The value of territories lying to the north of the Tungabhadra was Rs. 8,90,340 (equivalent to C. Pagodas 2,96,780) and the value of the territories lying to the south of the rivers was Rs. 8,34,718. The Company, therefore, had to incur a loss of Rs. 53,622 annually.

77. Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 135.
This would lead to disputes between the two parties and each party might demand the adjustment of accounts of revenue. To avoid such disputes in future it was decided that the cession and exchange of territories stipulated in the 5th and the 6th Articles of the treaty and accounts thereof are to be considered as finally closed.\textsuperscript{78} If the revenues of the ceded territories proved inadequate in future to meet the expenses of the subsidiary force, no demands were to be made by the Company on the Nizam. By ceding territories in perpetuity for the payment of the subsidiary force, the Nizam entered into an alliance which could not be dissolved by either party. For, by ceding territories in perpetuity he had paid and the Company had received in perpetuity for the subsidiary force. The ceded territories were to be under the 'exclusive management and authority of the Company.'\textsuperscript{79}

The treaty of 1800 was intended to be a defensive engagement. In case of aggression against either of the contracting parties or both of them, it was to be met adequately. In the draft of the treaty which was transmitted to the Governor-General by the Resident for ratification (but which was not ratified) it was stipulated that in the event of war breaking out in the Deccan, the Nizam with the exception of two battalions which were to remain near his person at Hyderabad, would send the remainder of the subsidiary force together.

\textsuperscript{78} Aitchison, Vol. V, No. X (Hyd.), Art. 8.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, Art. 7.
with ‘six battalions and nine thousand horse’ of his own army for the purpose of opposing the enemies. 80 But in case the seat of war should be in Northern India, the Nizam was to send there ‘a respectable quota of cavalry and infantry’ to fight along with the forces of the Company. 81 The Governor-General, however, was not in favour of making any such distinction between the forces to be engaged in the Deccan and the forces to be employed in Northern India. The Governor-General was of opinion that the Nizam was more exposed to hostile aggression from various quarters as well as less able to repel it than the Company. So, he thought that no limit as to the number of troops to be employed by the Nizam during the war should be set. Of course the number of troops to be furnished at the commencement of the war could be specified, but it was expected by the Governor-General that the Nizam ‘should be bound in every case of hostility to employ his utmost efforts if required by the nature of war against the common enemy.’ 82 So it was stipulated that in case of war breaking out between either of the contracting parties and any other power, the Nizam, with exception of two battalions which would remain at Hyderabad to protect him, should send the remaining battalions of the subsidiary force with an army of ‘six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse’ of his own army for opposing

80. Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 11, Art. 7.
81. Ibid, Art. 8.
82. Sec. Con. (For Dept.), 20 Nov., 1800, para 28.
the enemies*. If this force proved ineffective in repulsing the enemies the Nizam should 'employ every further effort in his power for the purpose of bringing' his whole force into the field.83

If the Nizam was required to engage his whole force along with those of the Company in wars against their common enemies could he not expect a share of the territorial acquisitions of those wars? Was he not allowed to share the spoils of the last two Anglo-Mysore Wars? Azam-ul-umara knew that expansionist as Lord Wellesley was he was sure to involve the Company in wars with the Marathas. After the acceptance of the subsidiary alliance by the Nizam and the new ruler of Mysore, the only rivals of the English in the Deccan were the Marathas. Sooner or later and sooner rather than later, the English would come to grips with the Marathas in the contest for the supremacy of the Deccan, nay even of Northern India. Though the treaty of 1800 was a defensive one and the Nizam was to co-operate with the Company in defence of their own territories and those of their allies, the line of demarcation between the offensive and defensive wars would fade away in the welter of charges and counter-charges before the commencement of the war. Any kind of war, against the Marathas backed by the English, was welcome

* This provision for sending an army of 6000 infantry and 9000 horse of the Nizam's army formed the basis of the Hyderabad Contingent which in course of time became a heavy burden on the exchequer of the Nizam. Vide Chap. V.

to the Nizam, if there was a prospect of territorial gains. In one of the conferences with the munshi of the Resident, Azam-ul-umara expressed his desire to have an equal share of conquests to the south of the river Narmada and for those to the north he would trust to the generosity of the Governor-General.\textsuperscript{84} The munshi replied that it would not be possible for the Company's government to agree to such a proposal as it would militate against 'every principle of a defensive engagement.'\textsuperscript{85} Further, inclusion of such an article in the treaty avowed to be a defensive one would have aroused suspicion in the minds of the Maratha rulers. Moreover, Lord Wellesley was not agreeable to the equal partition of conquests unless the expenses incurred and the exertions made by the Nizam were equal to those of the Company.\textsuperscript{86} As the resources of the Nizam's government were not equal to those of the Company, it could not be expected that the former would contribute 'equally with the Company to the successful prosecution of a common war.'\textsuperscript{87}

Like the treaty of 1798 the treaty of 1800 also provided opportunity for the Company's Government to interfere in the internal affairs of Hyderabad. There were some zamindars in the Nizam's territories who had also tributary relations with the Maratha Government. Such were the

\textsuperscript{84} Sec. Con., 20 Nov, 1800, No. 81.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 24, para 40.
\textsuperscript{87} Sec. Con., 20 Nov., 1800, No. 68, para 7.
zamindars of Shorapur, Gudwal and others. Over the realisation of tribute from these zamindars there was no end of dispute between the two Governments. But this was not all. This double allegiance gave these zamindars ample scope not only for avoiding the payment of their dues but also disturbing the peace of the country by constant rebellion. These rebellions had their repercussion not only in Hyderabad but also in


* The territory of Shorapur was situated between the Krishna and the Bhima. It was about 45 miles from east to west and about 35 miles from north to south. Originally it was a part of the kingdom of Bijapur and Chup Nayak, the founder of the Shorapur Raj family, was a collector of revenue in Bijapur. During the confusion occasioned by the invasion of the Deccan by Aurangzib he established his authority in Shorapur and was made Raja by the Mughal Emperor. Shorapur was frequently attacked by the Nizam and the Marathas. The Raja maintained its semi-independence by paying an annual tribute to both the Nizam and the Peshwa. In 1802 the tribute to the Nizam was fixed at Rs. 1,45,000, whereas the Peshwa claimed Rs. 85,000 as tribute.

The territory of Gudwal lay in the Doab between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra. It extended about 30 miles from north to south and about 25 miles from east to west. This territory also attained semi-independence under circumstances similar to those of Shorapur. Its relations with the Nizam and the Peshwa were similar to those of Shorapur. The Nizam's claim of tribute from the territory was Rs. 1,20,000, while that of the Peshwa amounted to Rs. 17,500. The Raja belonged to the Kunbi caste (Ref: Russell's Report, Ind. Arch., Vol. IX pp 140-42).
the neighbouring territories. The bad examples set by the Nizam's rebellious subjects were followed by those of the territories which had come into the possession of the Company in consequence of the third and the fourth Anglo-Mysore Wars. Rebellions and other troubles in these territories impeded their settlement in the years 1799 and 1800. So, to wipe out rebellions in Hyderabad it was provided by the 17th article of the treaty of 1800 that in case 'the Shorapore or Gudwall zamindars, or any other subjects or dependants' of the Nizam should withhold the just claims of the Government upon them or excite rebellion or disturbance, the subsidiary force should be employed to subdue them after 'the reality of (their) offence (had been) duly ascertained.' This power bestowed upon the Company no doubt prevented the Marathas from creating troubles in those parts of the Nizam's territory upon which they had also claims, but gave a handle to the Company to interfere in the administration of Hyderabad. This article of the treaty of 1800 together with the 5th article of the treaty of 1798 impaired the internal autonomy of Hyderabad.

Even the external sovereignty was not spared by the treaty of 1800. The 15th article of the treaty stipulated that the Nizam should neither 'commence nor pursue in future any negotiations with any other power whatever without giving previous notice and entering into mutual consultation' with the Company.

89. Aitchison—Vol. V (1864)—Hyderabad, No.X—Art 17
Hyderabad becomes a protectorate:

The treaties of 1798 and 1800 reduced Hyderabad from a virtually independent state to a protectorate. By these treaties the Company became the paramount power in relation to Hyderabad and as a paramount power has a natural tendency to interfere in the internal administration of the country under its paramountcy it was obvious that the Company would try to have a Nizam who would be subservient to the Company, a minister who would be pliant to the British Resident and an army which would be more inclined towards the Company than towards the Nizam. All these meant interference in the succession of the Nizam, in the appointment of ministers and in the organisation of the army. Added to this, some British administrators like Metcalfe claimed on behalf of the Company as paramount power a moral obligation to interfere in the civil administration of Hyderabad to redress the grievances of the ryots who were oppressed by a host of unscrupulous revenue collectors. In short, the subsidiary alliance with the Company paved the way for British interference in the internal affairs of Hyderabad.
CHAPTER III

BRITISH INTERFERENCE IN THE SUCCESSION OF THE NIZAMS AND IN THE APPOINTMENT OF MINISTERS.

A. Interference in the succession of the Nizams.

For the smooth working of the subsidiary alliance the co-operation of the Company and the Nizam was essential. So, it was the aim of the Company to see that succession in Hyderabad should be so regulated as to have on the masnad a Nizam who should be willing to maintain the good relations which had been established by the subsidiary alliance. No subsidiary alliance could last long unless it received a whole-hearted support from the Nizam. Thus the desire to have such a Nizam on the masnad, led the Company’s Government to interfere in the succession.

In Hyderabad the succession of the Nizams was always a complicated affair. The complication was due to the fact that the Muhammadan law does not provide any rule for the succession of sovereigns. The law of primogeniture which prevails among the other sects and nations is not always recognised by the Muhammadan royal families even as a convenient practice. As a result of it the death of a Muhammadan prince is frequently followed by a war of succession among the sons of the deceased prince and the contest is invariably determined by the longest sword. The
succession in Hyderabad was not an exception to this state of affairs. Moreover, the succession in the Nizam’s family was further complicated by the fact that no distinction was made between legitimate and illegitimate sons of a Nizam. Since the death of Muzaffar Jang in 1751 the succession in the Nizam’s family had invariably descended through illegitimate children. Salabat Jang and Nizam Ali were both illegitimate. The complications connected with succession always offered an opportunity to the Company to settle it in favour of the candidate who was likely to support the alliance with the British.

After the battle of Kharda when the anti-British parties in Hyderabad became powerful a contest for succession took place between the two sons of Nizam Ali. On 25 February, 1796, the Nizam was struck with paralysis and though after a few days he recovered to some degree, he was never in good health during the rest of his life. The Nizam’s illness and the absence of Azam-ul-umara, a strong supporter of British alliance, at Poona gave rise to various intrigues respecting succession in the event of his death. Sikandar Jah, the eldest son of Nizam Ali by Tahniath-un-Nisa Begam, * had married Jahan Parwar

* Tahniath-un-Nisa Begam had great influence over Nizam Ali. She was the mother of Sikandar Jah and Akbar Jah. She had the custody of the family jewels which were valued at more than two crores of rupees. She took interest in the affairs of the state and always prevented Nizam Ali from adopting any measures which might be injurious to the state, for she knew that her son Sikandar Jah would succeed her husband one day (Add. Mss. - No. 13,582, Copy No. 51 - para 9).
Begam‡, the grand-daughter of Azam-ul-umara, and as such he was supposed to be a supporter of Azam-ul-umara. All the anti-British parties were naturally averse to his succession, for they thought he would obtain Azam-ul-umara's release from the Marathas and restore him to power in the event of his succeeding to the masnad.¹

The Paigah, in order to secure the succession of their favourite prince, Feridun Jah, paid unusual attention to Raymond whose help in the prospective war of succession was counted upon by all the parties. It seemed the throne would be at his disposal if other powers declined to interfere on the occasion.² The anti-British parties also sought the assistance of Tipu.³ The Company's policy in relation to succession was to prevent, if possible, a contest for succession and to establish British influence over the new sovereign. In case the struggle for succession ensued the services of the Company's battalions were not to be employed in support of any of the claimants under any circumstances whatsoever. According to Sir John Shore's interpretation of the Treaty of 1768, the Company was under no obligation to take part in a contest for succession and the question of

‡ Sikandar Jah married Jahan Parwar Begam in 1214 A.H. She was a talented and pious lady. It is said that she used to recite the name of Allah almost throughout the whole night. She was the mother of Tafazzul Ali khan and died at the age of seventy (Gulzar-i-Asafia - pp. 176-77).

¹. To Court (Pol)—12 May, 1796—paras 64—66.
². Pol. Con—4 April, 1796—No. 3 para 5.
³. Sec. Con, 9 July, 1798—No. 3—para 46.
succession should be settled before any claim be demanded by the Nizam to the services of the British battalions. Moreover, the Governor-General apprehended that interference in determining the succession might expose the Company to the opposition of the Marathas and of Tipu. Perhaps, this apprehension rather than his regard for the treaty obligations compelled Sir John Shore to decide upon neutrality in any eventual contest for the succession. But in the meantime Sikandar Jah declared that he would exclude Azam-ul-umara from all share in the administration in the event of his succession. This declaration was surely a ruse to win over all the anti-British parties which had hitherto been supporting Feridun Jah. The declaration had its effect and soon Rai Rayan who had been a partisan of Feridun Jah, joined hands with Sikandar Jah and began to endeavour to bring over the Paigah to his side. To crown all, Sikandar Jah soon secured the support of Raymond. Thus the probability of a contested succession was diminished to a considerable extent.

With the arrival of Lord Mornington the question of succession was revived. The Governor-General was desirous of making the bonds of alliance between the Company and the Nizam closer and stronger. Azam-ul-umara was also eager for it, but he wanted that the Company should pledge among others that it should support the

4. Pol. Con—4 April, 1796—No. 6
succession of Sikandar Jah to the masnad. Lord Mornington realised that in the interest of the alliance he should lose no time in deciding upon whom the succession should devolve and in supporting that candidate in case of a contest. Of all the sons of the Nizam Sikandar Jah appeared to him to be the fittest candidate from every point of view. Feridun Jah had carried on intrigues with the anti-British parties to oppose the succession of Sikandar Jah during the absence of Azam-ul-umara at Poona, and Jahandar Jah was suspected of endeavouring to enlist the support of the Marathas. Sikandar Jah was the eldest son of the Nizam and although primogeniture was not the only deciding factor in settling the succession in Hyderabad, it was deemed to be the strongest of all titles to the masnad. Moreover, the Nizam had given indications of his choice for Sikandar Jah by entrusting him 'with his seal and empowering him to perform certain acts' which exclusively belonged to the sovereign. But the greatest claim of Sikandar Jah upon the support of the British in case of a contested succession was that he belonged to that small group of personalities of Hyderabad, who supported the British alliance. Lord Mornington had, therefore, no hesitation in supporting the succession of Sikandar Jah, but he was apprehensive that the French and Tipu might exert their influence in case of a contest to exclude Sikandar Jah and place their candidate Feridun.

7. Sec. Con.—1798—16 Aug. No. 14
Jah on the masnad as they had tried to do during the absence of Azam-ul-umara. The Governor-General expected that he would be in a position to place Sikandar Jah easily on the masnad in spite of a contest if the Nizam died after the augmentation of the British force as contemplated in the subsidiary alliance; for the French force would, by that time, be obliterated by the augmentation of the British subsidiary force. In case the contest for succession should ensue on the death of the Nizam but before the contemplated subsidiary alliance, it was decided to direct the Madras Government to station a force near the frontier of Hyderabad so that its services might be requisitioned whenever necessary. This part of the plan, it was decided, should not be disclosed to the minister before the actual contest lest he should avail himself of such a communication to serve his own purpose or Tipu and the Marathas should create troubles.9 Moreover, the disclosure of the intention of the Governor-General to support the succession of Sikandar Jah might excite suspicion in the mind of the Nizam. The Resident was, however, authorised to communicate the intention of the Governor-General to Azam-ul-umara, if he should think that such disclosure would not lead to any danger which the Governor-General apprehended.10

The death of the Nizam did not occur before the destruction of the French power in Hyderabad.

9. Sec. Con—1798—9 July No. 3 para 39—53,
10. Sec. Con—1798—16 Aug. No. 14
As no obligation of the Treaty of September, 1798, bound the Company to support Sikandar Jah in any contested succession, the Governor-General deemed it proper to lay some conditions before the assistance of the Company was given to him in any probable contest for succession. The conditions among other were as follows:

1. The treaty of September, 1798, should be confirmed by Sikandar Jah for himself and his heirs.

2. The subsidiary force should be augmented.

3. The additional force should be subsidized at the same rate as that laid down in the former treaties.

4. A territory selected by the Company and producing a net revenue equivalent to the whole subsidy should be assigned 'to the sole and absolute management of the Company'.

5. Sikandar Jah should engage himself to be guided by the advice of the Company's Government."

The Resident was asked by the Governor-General to prepare a document containing the aforesaid conditions in order that Sikandar Jah might be apprised of the terms on which the Company could support him in case of a contested succession. If he did not agree to the conditions within a specified period, he was to be informed that the Company would place on the masnad one of the younger sons of the Nizam provided that prince

was willing to fulfil all the conditions proposed to Sikandar Jah on his elevation to the masnad. But Sikandar Jah was to be apprised of these conditions when the Nizam should be on the point of death, for the disclosure of this transaction between the Company and Sikandar Jah before the death of the Nizam might lead to many evil consequences.* Nizam Ali died on 6 August, 1803, and Sikandar Jah was immediately proclaimed successor to the deceased Nizam. The accession of Sikandar Jah† was cheerfully acknowledged by the younger sons of Nizam Ali. On 7 August, Sikandar Jah

* On the eve of the Nizam’s death Daulat Rao Sindhia and the Raja of Berar had assembled their troops on the frontier of Hyderabad. Lord Wellesly suspected that they had the intention of disturbing ‘the regular order of succession by affording the aid of their troops in support of the known pretensions of Ferredoon Jah to the masnad of Hyderabad.’ Wellesley thought that the movements of their armies had been checked by the stationing of British troops on the frontier of Hyderabad. Martin, Wel. Des., Vol. III No. XXIII—No. C, Letter to Sec. Com., 25 Sep. 1803—paras 101 & 188.

† Sikandar Jah was the eldest of the surviving sons of Nizam Ali. Russell gave a vivid description of his appearance and attainments in his Report on Hyderabad in 1816. He was tall, melancholy and careworn. His colour was dark for a Muhammadan of his status. He was thirty-two at the time of his accession. Before that he indulged in wine and women and mixed in a society which could not be regarded as respectable. His education was totally neglected and he could neither speak nor write Persian well. He was fond of books on history and medicine which were read out to him. Though British help had secured him the succession to the masnad and he had accepted the British alliance later on he became dissatisfied with the alliance. The British domination appeared so much galling to him that he withdrew from the administration and spent his days in the seclusion of his private apartments (Ind. Arch. Vol. IX, 1955—Russell's Report, pp 21—22.)
took his seat on the masnad to which he was led by the British Resident at Hyderabad. The new Nizam delivered to the Resident an instrument under his seal promising to abide by the treaties subsisting between the Company’s Government and the state of Hyderabad. The Emperor of Delhi also gave assent to his accession and conferred on him all his father’s titles.

The question of succession was again broached by Russell* in 1819. Sikandar Jah had altogether nine sons living in that year. By Jahan Parwar Begam he had one son, Mir Tafazzul Ali, born on 30 November, 1804. By Chandni Begam he had


* Sir Henry Russell was the British Resident at Hyderabad from 1811 to 1820. His father was appointed puisne judge in the Supreme Court of Judicature in Bengal in 1797 and subsequently became the Chief Justice of the same Court. He was created baronet in 1812. Three of his sons, Henry Russell, Charles Russell and Francis Whitworth Russell entered the service of the East India Company. Henry (1783–1852) succeeded to the baronetcy on the death of his father in 1836. He became assistant to N. B. Edmonstone in the Persian translator’s office. In 1800 Lord Mornington appointed him Assistant Secretary to the Resident at Hyderabad. In 1810 he was appointed Resident at Hyderabad and took charge of the Residency on 17 April, 1811. The Nizam conferred upon him the title of Sabit Jang. Sir Henry Russell remained at Hyderabad till 1820 when he returned to England. Vide Preliminary Report on Russell Correspondence by C. C. Davies, Ind. Arch., Vol. VIII, P 59.
three sons of whom Nasir-ud-Daulah, the eldest of the family, was born in or about 1792. The other five sons were by concubines. Jahan Parwar Begam was the legitimate daughter of Saif-ul-Mulk, the only son of Azam-ul-umara. She was betrothed to Sikandar Jah in March, 1794 and the nikah was performed in May of the same year, although the sadi was not celebrated till 1799. Chandni Begam was the illegitimate daughter of a common man by a slave girl. Chandni Begam’s father and all male members of the family died while she was very young. Her mother was employed as a maidservant by Bakhshi Begam,† the adoptive mother of Sikandar Jah. Being pleased with Chandni Begam’s appearance Bakhshi Begam purchased her for two hundred rupees. It was the custom in Nizam Ali’s family, as his sons grew up, and obtained separate establishments, to present two girls to each of them. These girls were called the elder and the younger Khanum.* Raja

* The Muhammadan marriage consists of two parts—Nikah and Sadi. When the Nikah is performed the marriage becomes legal. Sadi is the ceremonial portion of marriage and is not essential for consummation of marriage.

† Bakhshi Begam like Tahniath-un-Nisa had some influence with Nizam Ali and took interest in the affairs of the state. She was in charge of the privy purse of the Nizam. In her old age she refrained from taking interest in the public affairs and spent her days in charity and devotion. (Add. Mss, No. 13,582, Copy No. 51, para 9).

* The word ‘Khanum’ literally means “Lady”, but they were actually ‘concubines.’
Chandulal,* who was the virtual minister at that time and who had always been patronized by Chandni Begam, gave out that she had been married to Sikandar Jah by the nikah.* In 1819 Russell in a letter to Lord Hastings raised the question of succession.† He wanted to prove that Chandni Begam had been married to Sikandar Jah neither by nikah nor by sadi and hence she was a concubine of the Nizam. So her son Nasir-ud-Daulah was the illegitimate son of Sikandar Jah and as such he had no claim on the masnad. He advocated the cause of Jahan Parwar's son Tafazzul Ali, as he was the legitimate son of the Nizam. But in arguing for Jahan Parwar's son Russell did not take into account the fact that there were precedents of illegitimate sons of the Nizam's

* Chandu Lal was the son of Rai Narayan Das of Khetre Mehra tribe. Another son of Narayan Das was Govind Baksh. Chandu Lal was born in 1766. In 1794 he was introduced to Nizam Ali and Azam-ul-umara by Badiullah Khan, Nizam's son-in-law. Raja Chandu Lal was appointed Kurrorah of Maktal and some other districts to the south-west of Hyderabad. In 1797 he resigned the office of Kurrorah and then took charge of Bellary, Guti, Kurpah (Cuddapah) and a large portion of the districts which were subsequently made to the East, India Company in 1800. In 1806 Raja Chandu Lal was appointed peshkar or deputy to Mir Alam on whose death in 1808, Chandu Lal became the virtual minister though Manir-ul-Mulk was appointed Minister. On the death of Manir-ul-Mulk in 1832 Raja Chandu Lal became the minister—Russell's Report, Ind. Arch. Vol. IX, pp 144-45.

† Sec. Con., 28 Aug, 1819—No. 21—paras 6 & 7.

family occupying the masnad of Hyderabad. The Governor-General in council, however, directed Mr. Russell in a most private and secret reply to this letter to acknowledge Nasir-ud-Daulah, if it was found necessary, as the successor of Sikandar Jah in preference to his younger brother, the son of Jahan Parwar.  

In 1826 the question of succession came to a head. In that year the infant daughter of the Nizam died and so violent was the grief of the Nizam that he drew blood from his breast by beating it. Thinking that his death was near at hand, he intimated to Chandni Begam that he would place his brother Akbar Jah on the masnad as his successor. Chandni Begam communicated the intention of the Nizam to Chandu Lal who in his turn communicated it to Martin, the Resident at Hyderabad. What led the Nizam to deviate from the lineal order of succession is very difficult to understand. It is not the dislike for his eldest or any of his sons that urged him to exclude them from the masnad, for no indication of such dislike for at least his eldest son had ever been discerned in his conduct towards him. The British interference in the administration of his country had led him to believe that the independence which was allowed to him was only nominal and that he was no better than a vassal of the Company. This interference on the part of the Company was so galling to him that he gave up taking any interest in the administration of his state and confined

16. Sec. Con—8 Sep.—1826 No. 9.
himself in the harem. The Nizam, perhaps, thought that by placing his brother on the masnad in preference to his eldest son he would show to his subjects and the world at large that he was an independent sovereign.

But the Company could not allow the Nizam to place Akbar Jah on the masnad for two reasons. First, it would be a deviation from the acknowledged lineal order of succession. Secondly, Akbar Jah’s hostility towards the British was well known. This anti-British feeling of Akbar Jah might have been one of the reasons why Sikandar Jah wanted to declare him his successor. Mr. Martin was, however, in favour of maintaining the lineal order of succession and he sought the advice of the Governor-General as to what line of conduct he should follow. He was informed by the Governor-General in Council that as Nasir-ud-Daulah had greater claim to the masnad than any other rivals, he should be supported as against all other candidates.

No trouble in regard to the succession occurred in May 1829 when the Nizam Sikandar Jah died. Just before the death of the Nizam the guard stationed at the palace occupied by Nasir-ud-Daulah was strengthened so as to give him protection. The city was perfectly tranquil when Nasir-ud-Daulah ascended the masnad.

18. Sec. Con—8 Sept. 1826 No. 8 para 11.
B. Interference in the appointment of ministers

The British interference in the succession of the Nizams was actuated by the desire to have on the masnad a Nizam who would maintain good relations between the two powers bound by the subsidiary alliance. The same motive also led the Company to interfere in the appointment of ministers. But there were also other motives. It was needed that the minister should not only be obliging to the Company, but also see that the collection of revenue was properly done without any undue pressure upon the ryots, that unnecessary expenses were curtailed, that the state exchequer had always the capacity to meet the demands of the Company and the administration. In short, the minister should be obliging to the Company and be a good administrator at the same time.

But this interference in the appointment of ministers by the Company was resented by the Nizam. The presence of the subsidiary force in Hyderabad and the influence which the Company’s Government had acquired in consequence of the subsidiary alliance had already created an apprehension in the mind of the Nizam about the sovereignty of his state. So, it was quite natural for the Nizam to harbour suspicion about the intention of the Company’s Government and this led to a hitch between the Nizam and the Company. Azam-ul-umara, who had been once the favourite minister of Nizam Ali, incurred the displeasure of his master; for the latter thought that he was instrumental in establishing the British influence in Hyderabad.
The enemies of the minister in the court availed themselves of this opportunity to persuade the Nizam to believe that the Company's troops were brought to Hyderabad by Azam-ul-umara to carry into effect a plan concerted between him and the British Resident, Kirkpatrick, for immediate elevation of Sikandar Jah to the throne. It was, perhaps, difficult for the Nizam to disbelieve this, as Sikandar Jah had married the grand-daughter of Azam-ul-umara. The Nizam apprehended that the influence which the Company's Government had acquired would one day undermine the sovereignty of his State. This fear which was entertained by the succeeding Nizams caused a misunderstanding between them and the Company's Government. The English were determined to maintain the influence which they had obtained by the treaty in order to prevent other states inimical towards the British from establishing their influence in the court of Hyderabad. For, in that case, the Company's influence over Hyderabad would be at stake. With this purpose in view the Company's Government always wanted to have a minister in Hyderabad, who would support the British alliance. But the Nizam looked with suspicion upon any minister who supported in any way the British alliance or who was supported by the Company's Government. The Company's Government, on the other hand, could not trust a minister who leaned too much upon the Nizam. So, there continued for a long time a tussle between the Nizam and the Company's Government over the appointment of ministers.
When Azam-ul-umara died in 1804, Mir Alam who had been minister for the English affairs for a fairly long time under Azam-ul-umara, was recommended for the post of minister by the Governor-General. The Nizam appointed Mir Alam as minister, though the appointment was not to his liking. It must be said to the credit of Mir Alam that he was the fittest person in Hyderabad to fill the post. But the Nizam's dislike for him was due to the fact that before his appointment he had all along been a strong supporter of the British alliance. After his appointment any appearance of intimacy or of friendship between Mir Alam and the Resident was sufficient to excite the jealousy of the Nizam. Mir Alam was sensible of the necessity of conciliating both the Nizam and the Company and of securing their confidence. But one cannot serve both God and Mammon and Mir Alam soon came to realise that it was impossible to enjoy the confidence of both the parties at the same time; if he relied on one party, he must of necessity lose the confidence of the other. The support which he got from the Company's government at the time of his appointment and his intimacy with the British Resident, worried him much.

There had always been an anti-British party in the Court of Hyderabad since the ascendancy of the British influence in that State. This party of which Raja Mahipatram* was a prominent

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* Mahipatram was the son of Amrit Rao, an inhabitant of Gujarat and a Khetra by race. At first he was in the service O.P.-168—8
leader was in favour of severing the alliance with the English Company. It may be mentioned here that Raja Mahipatram had always been in favour of maintaining the alliance with the English before he became one of the leaders of this anti-British party. Mahipatram was the peshkar of Piron and during the time when the French Corps was being disbanded he sided with the English and tried to quell the mutiny of the French Corps. He was captured and detained as a prisoner by the mutineers.* He had tried to remove from the Nizam’s mind the suspicion which he entertained about the intention of the Company’s government and advised him to cultivate more friendly relations with the Company’s government and its representative at Hyderabad.² It is evident from what has been stated that Raja Mahipatram was not an enemy of the English in the beginning, rather he was a strong advocate of an alliance between the Company’s Government and the Nizam. It was his personal rivalry with Mir Alam that pushed him to the party which opposed Mir Alam’s policy of maintaining the alliance with the British.

of Maqbul Ali Khan, the Arzbeki to Nizam Ali Khan. He was present in the battle of Kharda and accompanied Azam-ul-umara to Poona where he was appointed house-steward (Khan Saman) by the minister. Later on he became the peshkar of Raymond a post which he held under Piron also. (1. Nigaristan, F 77 A, 2. The chronology, P 20.).

* Vide—P 37.

² Sec. Con—14 Nov., 1805—No. 38.
The Nizam was desirous of appointing Raja Mahipatram to the post of peshkar with an extensive political authority so that he might have him always by his side. Mir Alam was jealous of the influence of Mahipatram over the Nizam and he wanted to bestow the situation upon Raja Chandu Lal, Kurrorah, of the city of Hyderabad. But as it was beyond his power to prevent Mahipatram from being appointed peshkar, he sought the help of Russell, the British Resident. He requested Russell to recommend to the Nizam the return of Mahipatram to Berar where he had been in charge of the civil administration. But the British Resident was unwilling to interpose his authority in removing Mahipatram from the capital. He thought, if the Nizam succeeded in getting Mahipatram into the administration of Hyderabad he would promote the interests of the Company's government with more success than any other person who could be selected to fill up the post. Though Chandu Lal was as good a friend of the British as Mahipatram, the former did not possess the confidence of the Nizam as the latter did. As Mahipatram was fortunate in having the confidence of both the Nizam and the Company's government, the Resident was quite agreeable to his appointment as peshkar under Mir Alam. In this position, the Resident thought, Mir Alam and Mahipatram would vie with each other for the favour of the Company's government and each

† Kurrorah was the Head of the Excise Department.
would serve as a check upon the other. But Mir Alam did not like that Mahipatram should be appointed peshkar under him for two reasons. First, Mahipatram had very intimate relations with the Resident and he might in course of time overshadow Mir Alam. Secondly, the Nizam, who was not favourably disposed towards Mir Alam, might remove him and install Mahipatram as his minister. Mahipatram also refused to accept the post of peshkar under Mir Alam. Mahipatram’s refusal to accept the post of peshkar might be due to his ambition of supplanting Mir Alam with the active support of the Nizam and if possible, with the tacit consent of the Company’s government. But Russell, the British Resident, was of opinion that if Mahipatram succeeded in effecting the removal of Mir Alam and getting himself appointed minister, he might incline towards the Nizam, who was not in favour of the British alliance, and thus the British influence in Hyderabad would become precarious. So, it appears from the sentiments of the British Resident as expressed in official despatches that he would have supported Mahipatram, if he remained satisfied with the post of peshkar, but would have opposed him if he aspired after the post of minister by effecting the removal of Mir Alam whose devotion to the cause of the furtherance of the British alliance was above suspicion.

Mahipatram’s influence over the Nizam created for him a number of enemies in the court of

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4. Sec. Con.—9 Jan., 1806 - No. 74.
Hyderabad and Raghottam Rao was one of them. The latter possessed a predominant influence over the begams of the Nizam and was exerting that influence to the prejudice of Mahipatram. Though the begams could not make the Nizam hostile towards Mahipatram, they succeeded in neutralising to a great extent Mahipatram's influence over him. It was an opportune moment for Mir Alam to gain power for himself and remove Mahipatram from Hyderabad. A Wajib-ul-arz defining the authority which the minister required for conducting the affairs of the State, was prepared and carried to the Nizam by the begams. Mahipatram tried his

* "Translation of Wajib-ul-arz which Mir Alam submitted to his Highness the Soubahdar and of the Replies which His Highness was pleased to give in his own hand to the several articles of that paper on the 17th of April 1806.

"Article 1st

"Your servant has submitted the several requests of his Wajib-ool-urg to your gracious notice, with the hope that, in your benign goodness, they may be ratified by the hand of your highness, that, by the divine assistance the mind of your highness, disburthened of the cares of Business, may be engaged in the support of the honour and the dignity of your Throne, and in the undistributed enjoyment of all your wishes, and that it may be relieved from all anxiety and fear of the internal and external enemies of your State.

"Answer

"Praise be to God that my mind reposes the most implicit confidence on that select Descendant of the Prophet. Let him also feel perfectly assured.

"Article 2nd

"As your servant is faithfully attached to your Highness,
best to foil the attempt of Mir Alam to gain power by persuading the Nizam to alter the *Wajib-ul-arz* in such a way as to render the document completely nugatory. But being backed by the *begams* Mir Alam remained adamant, rejected the altered document and insisted that the *Wajib-ul-arz* ‘should be ratified in the terms that he had

and as the arrangement of all affairs and the Increase of the Splendor (sic) and the prosperity of your Highness’ state, are the objects of his most earnest solicitude, your servant is hopeful from your Favour and Kindness, that his Representations, on all matters, relating to the Country, its Finances and its military Establishment, will be approved without unnecessary alteration, and that all which shall be performed and accomplished will be ratified.

“Answer

“All that shall be done by that loyal persons for the good of the State will be approved.

“Article 3rd

“The duties of Finance and of the military Establishment are by the Blessing of God, extensive. It will be difficult that they should be properly conducted without the appointment of a Peshcar according to ancient Custom. I trust from your kindness that that appointment will be conferred on some one, who enjoys the confidence both of your Highness and your servant, and that he will be honoured with the Khillaat of Investiture.

“Answer

“Let a person be recommended from amongst the confidential subjects of the state.

“Article 4th

“It is necessary that a person who is connected with myself, and on whose Secrecy Reliance can be placed, should be appointed to convey my Representations to your Highness,
originally suggested'. The Nizam ultimately agreed to it and ratified the Wajib-ul-arz in its original form as desired by Mir Alam. Having been foiled in his attempt to obtain the post of minister, Mahipatram tried to secure the post of peshkar for himself and this was also opposed by Mir Alam. Eventually Chandu Lal, the nominee of Mir Alam, was appointed to it. Mir Alam urged the Nizam to send Mahipatram to his station in Berar and the British Resident who perhaps thought that the presence of Mahipatram at Hyderabad would be detrimental to the influence of Mir Alam over the Nizam, supported it. During the struggle for influence over the Nizam between Mahipatram and Mir Alam, Sydenham, the successor and to transact business with the Br. Resdt. I am hopeful that a person whom I shall select will receive that appointment.

"Answer

"Let a person be thought of and mentioned to me.

"Article 5th

"Let not the Insinuations of the interested persons be listened to, without being substantiated, and if any one shall make Representation to your Highness let him be immediately be confronted with me, in order that the Truth or Falsehood of such persons, may be made apparent to your Highness, and that no suspicion or doubt may be entertained in the mind either of your Highness or of your servant."

"Answer

"Certainly


of Russell at Hyderabad, came to realise that if Mahipatram succeeded in obtaining the post of minister he would incline more towards the Nizam than towards the British. In that case, Mahipatram might be instrumental in creating a breach between the Nizam and the British. This consideration might have induced the British Resident to support Mir Alam who had proved his faithfulness to the British by supporting the alliance between the English Company and the state of Hyderabad. Mahipatram who had been till then a well-wisher both of the Nizam and the British came to the conclusion that the Company's government would throw him overboard and would neither support him in his attempt to obtain the post of minister, nor allow him even to stay with the Nizam. This conviction perhaps led Mahipatram to join the anti-British party in Hyderabad.

Mahipatram left Hyderabad for Berar where he had been in charge of the civil administration. Even from Berar Mahipatram carried on clandestine correspondence with the Nizam and tried to effect a new breach between the Nizam and his minister by creating in the Nizam's mind a conviction that the Company's government was his worst enemy and that the minister was a mere tool in the hands of an alien power. Mahipatram had his adherents in the court of Hyderabad in the persons of Ismail Yar Jang and others who were also working for the same end. As a result of these machinations Mir Alam again lost the confidence of the Nizam and the British alliance with Hyderabad was on the point of dissolution. Sir George Barlow who
had continued so long the neutral policy of Lord Cornwallis (during his second administration), had to decide whether that policy should be pursued any longer or should be given up. In a masterly minute he reviewed what would have been the consequence if he followed the policy of non-interference in that critical situation of Hyderabad. He says, "No arguments are required to demonstrate the danger of leaving in their present condition of ostensible solidity but real decay the foundations of our alliance with the State of Hyderabad, not only in the event of a renewal of war, when the aid of the resources and forces of that State would be claimable by treaty, would that aid be withheld, but that portion of our troops which constitutes the subsidiary force of Hyderabad would be virtually placed in the country of an enemy, and consequently be exposed to all hazards of such a situation, without the advantages of the occupation of posts, the establishment of depots, or the security of communication with the Company's territory". 6 There were, therefore, two alternatives before him—either to abandon the alliance or to place it again on its just and proper footing.

Sir George Barlow next discussed in the same minute as to whether the Company's government was bound on principle of justice to dissolve the alliance, if the Nizam was averse to its continuance. On this point he remarks, "It was a convention between the two States to combine in perpetuity their interests, to concentrate their strength for the

mutual safety, and for the maintenance of peace and to participate in the hazards, and in eventual advantages of unavoidable war. The provisions of the alliance were not conditional, but absolute. It became interwoven in the system of the respective Governments. It became complicated with the relations which both Governments separately and conjointly bore to the other States, and new relations, new interest, new obligations of public faith, and honour have been engrafted on it and have grown up with it. Each party virtually resigned its rights to abandon the alliance by a separate act of will, because the reverse of this proposition would render either State the arbiter of the interest, the honour and security of the other. 7 But there is nothing whatsoever in the wording of the treaties between the Nizam and the Company’s government to indicate that the alliance between the two parties was absolute and that each party resigned its right to abandon the alliance. In fact, the history of the world affords no example of any treaty in perpetuity. Sir George Barlow was very eager to maintain the alliance in order to further the British imperial interests as also to prevent any weakening of the position of the Company in India.

This motive of Sir George Barlow became very clear in his discussion about the consequences which would follow if the Company agreed with the Nizam in the dissolution of the alliance with Hyderabad. He says, “It cannot be necessary to point out in

7. Ibid.
any detail, the complete change in the whole system of our political position in India, nor the extent and magnitude of the dangers which would follow the dissolution of the alliance with Hyderabad. It appears evident to me, that the very foundation of our power and ascendancy in the political scale of India, would be subverted. It would be the sequel and the instrument for the downfall of the remaining fabric of our political relations. * * * * The power and resources which we have now a right to command for our support and security, would be turned against us. * * * * The territorial acquisitions of the Company under the treaty of Hyderabad must be abandoned." Though the dangers to the Company's territory in India consequent upon the dissolution of the alliance with Hyderabad have been a bit exaggerated, yet there is a kernel of truth in it. If Hyderabad was allowed to sever its alliance with the Company, the other states bearing the same political relations with the Company would demand the same right of withdrawal from the alliance and if their demand was met, the whole edifice of the Company's political ascendancy which was being gradually built up on the basis of subsidiary alliance would consequently collapse. The territorial acquisitions of the Company under the subsidiary alliance had to be given up. The political vacuum thus caused would be filled in by the Marathas who with the resources of Hyderabad and other states at their command could strike

8. Ibid.
hard blows at the Company's territory. Then the whole situation would be fraught with mischief. It was this imperialistic vision which lurked in the mind of Sir George Barlow when he endeavoured to strengthen the slackening alliance with Hyderabad.

Sir George Barlow proposed adoption of 'measures calculated to replace the alliance on its just and proper foundation'. He was aware that the adoption of such measures would mean a deviation from the policy of non-interference in the internal administration of Hyderabad, but that deviation was necessary for preventing a great and impending danger. The mode in which he proposed to intervene, was to request the Nizam to dismiss Mahipatram and his associates and to entrust the management of the state to persons who would support the alliance. But the name of Mir Alam was not to be mentioned as that would be a direct and positive demand upon the Nizam. *

Sydenham,* the British Resident, waited on the Nizam in his palace and presented to him a memorandum of several measures calculated to restore confidence and harmony between the two states. The memorandum consisted of six articles

9. Ibid.

* Mr. Henry Russell who had been officiating as the Resident on the death of Achilles Kirkpatrick, was relieved by Captain Sydenham, the permanent successor. He had been previously the Resident at Poona. Sydenham resigned as he was censured for taking part in the officers' mutiny of 1809—Briggs, the Nizam, Vol. II, pp 16 & 19.
all of which were approved by the Nizam on 4 December, 1806. The measures proposed were as follows:

(i) That Mahipatram should be dismissed and that Ismail Yar Jang, who was the intimate associate of Mahipatram, should be removed from his station and ordered to reside at his native place.

(ii) That persons, who were in the confidence of the Nizam as well as of the Company's government, were to be appointed to the charge of the districts and command of the troops which had been then under the control of Mahipatram.

(iii) That no alteration should be made to the just proposals of the Company and that they should be immediately complied with. This article was ratified by the Nizam with the remark that 'just proposals made in accordance with treaty' would be approved and complied with.

(iv) That all representations and petitions to the Nizam should be conveyed through Mir Alam.

(v) That all acts which might be performed by the minister in accordance with the stipulations of the Wajib-ul-azr, should be ratified by the Nizam. In the event of any difference between the Nizam and his minister, the British Resident would take upon himself to reconcile such difference.¹⁰

Before the approval of the memorandum, a show of resistance to Barlow's attempt to obtain influence over the Nizam, was staged by the anti-

10. Sec. Con.—8 Jan. 1807—No. 2.
British party, but it was foiled by the counter-
movement made by the Resident. He issued secret
orders to the commanding officer of the subsidiary
force to hold himself in readiness for immediate
movement. As soon as the news of this arrangement
reached the ears of the anti-British party, their
tone entirely changed and Ismail Yar Jang came
to Mir Alam to implore his mercy.

After the ratification of the memorandum the
minister requested the Nizam to dismiss Mahipatram
from the governorship of Berar and appoint Govind
Baksh, brother of Chandu Lal, to his post. Raja
Govind Baksh took with him two battalions of the
subsidiary force for the purpose of obtaining
complete possession of Berar. After his dismissal
Mahipatram was banished to Sagar, a town in the
Shahpur taluk of Hyderabad.

Though Mir Alam was always supported by the
Company’s government, he proved a total failure as
an administrator. This was due not so much to
his lack of administrative ability as to the lack of
Nizam’s confidence in him. Sydenham in his
attempt to support a minister in whom the Nizam
had no confidence came to realise that the Nizam’s
confidence in his minister was necessary, if the latter
was to run the administration properly and
efficiently. On the other hand the Company could
not rely for the preservation of the alliance on a
minister who enjoyed the perfect confidence of the
Nizam, but who would not be dependent to some
extent on the Company’s government. Sydenham
wrote, “Some portion of the Nizam’s confidence
is necessary to enable a minister to carry on
Government with moderate success, and no minister will enjoy any share of the Nizam’s confidence, who is forced upon his Highness’s choice.”¹¹ The soundness of this opinion expressed by Sydenham was admitted almost forty years later by Lord Dalhousie who refused on another occasion to force another minister upon the Nizam.

The suppression of Mahipatram’s rebellion* in which the British Resident took an active part, had a sobering influence upon the mind of the Nizam. He gradually realised the hopelessness of resiling from his alliance with the British and ultimately resigned himself to the situation in which he was placed by the treaties with the Company. Both the Company’s government and the Nizam, henceforth, always tried to come to an agreement on the appointment of a minister. The Company’s government would not thrust upon the Nizam a minister not liked by him nor would the Nizam appoint a minister without the previous approval of the Company’s government.

This spirit of compromise was evident in the appointment of a successor to Mir Alam who died on 19 December, 1808. Munir-ul-Mulk†,

¹¹ Pol. Con.—20 Feb., 1809—No. 7—para 8.

* Vide Chap. VII (A).

† The original name of Munir-ul-Mulk was Badi-uzzaman Khan. His father’s name was Ghayur Jang. Little is known about his early life. Munir-ul-Mulk first came into prominence by marrying Mir Alam’s daughter. He was appointed minister in 1809. Captain Sydenham wrote about him in 1809, “Mooneer-oool-Moolk has all the little vices of a man of weak understanding who has been bred up by
Shams-ul-umara and Shahyar-ud-Daulah* were the three candidates for the post of minister. Munir-ul-Mulk was the son-in-law of Mir Alam. Previous to the death of Mir Alam he had not the remotest chance of succeeding his father-in-law. He was so much disliked by the Nizam that he was rather apprehensive about his life and property even during the life-time of Mir Alam. He repeatedly asked the Maulavi of Sydenham whether he could depend upon the British Resident for the safety of his life and he was willing to abandon his property if he was assured of an asylum in the British Residency. But when Mir Alam was on his death-bed, he set on foot an intrigue for securing for him

women and spends most of his time amongst them. ***He has no experience in the Business of any of the principal Departments of the State." (Vide Russell's Report, Ind. Arch., Vol. IX, p 143.) But the author of Gulzar-i-Asafiya gives a different opinion about him. He says that Mir Alam kept him in his house and taught him the work of administration. He was of good temper and mild and had many religious endowments to his credit. (Gulzar-i-Asafiya, pp 178-79.) Russell says about him, "For some years he was the object of the Nizam's most violent hatred. The feeling appeared to originate in his having married Mir Alam's daughter whom the Nizam himself wished to marry. It ran to such a pitch that he was forbidden the durbar, and the Nizam once said that he should like to have him cut in small pieces to feed the crows at the palace gate." (Russell's Report, Ind. Arch., Vol. IX, p 144.)

* His original name was Raunaq Ali Khan. His mother was the daughter of Saif-ul-Mulk, son of Azam-ul-Umara. His father was Shahyar-Mulk who belonged to the jagirdar family of Bangananapalli. After his father's death the title of Shahyar-ud-Daulah was conferred upon him by the Nizam— (Gulzar-i-Asafiya, pp 295-296.)
the post of minister. He procured the support of Tahniath-un-Nisa Begam and Chandni Begam by persuading them to believe that he had secured the approval of the Company's government to his appointment as minister. The begams as well as the Nizam thought that it would be vain to propose any other person but Munir-ul-Mulk for the post as the Company's government would insist upon his appointment. Sydenham who wanted to maintain a neutral attitude regarding the appointment of minister, thought it wiser to disillusion the Nizam and to leave him at liberty in respect of his choice of minister.¹²

In fact, Sydenham was in favour of observing neutrality towards these three candidates, but he was opposed to any attempt that might be made to bring in any person who was hostile to the interests of the alliance with the British. He thought that in case the Nizam sought his advice regarding the appointment of minister, he would request the Nizam to refer the matter to the decision of the Governor-General. It did not matter much to the Resident which of the three candidates was appointed minister, but his desire was that Chandu Lal who was a staunch supporter of the British alliance, should be confirmed in his post.¹³

As soon as the Nizam came to know that Munir-ul-Mulk was not being supported by the Company's government, he developed a liking for him. But

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O.P.-168—9
he was still wavering in his choice between Munir-ul-Mulk and Shahyar-ud-Daulah though with some degree of preference for the former. Shams-ul-Umara, a young man about twenty-eight years old and head of the Paigah, had not then manifested his inclination for the post of minister. But when the Nizam directed his attention towards Munir-ul-Mulk and Shahyar-ud-Daulah, Shams-ul-Umara and his maternal uncle Amjad-ul-Mulk felt jealousy towards them and Shams-ul-Umara was urged by the Paigha to aim at ministership. Amjad-ul-Mulk had appointed Europeans in his service and treated them with kindness.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, Amjad-ul-Mulk gave definite proof of his eagerness to maintain cordial relation with the British by advising the Nizam not to sever connection with them during the struggle between Mahipatram and Mir Alam, in which the British became involved as a supporter of Mir Alam.\textsuperscript{15} In contrast to the behaviour of Munir-ul-Mulk who had intrigued to obtain the post of minister, the behaviour of both Shams-ul-Umara and Amjad-ul-Mulk was frank and this impressed the British Resident very much. Shams-ul-Umara did not stand as a candidate for the post till he had previously ascertained that his candidature would not be opposed by the Resident.\textsuperscript{16}

Under these circumstances, the Nizam sought the opinion of the Resident as to who should be

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Pol. Con.—20 Feb., 1809—No. 7—paras 16-20.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Sec. Con.—8 Jan., 1807—Nos. 1-2,—para (7).
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Pol. Con.—20 Feb., 1809—No. 7—para 17.
\end{itemize}
appointed minister. The Resident, reluctant to give his opinion, advised the Nizam to refer the subject to the Governor-General. Accordingly, the Nizam wrote a letter to the Governor-General soliciting his advice with regard to the appointment of the minister. Being thus invited to give advice, the Governor-General recommended Shams-ul-Umara* for the post, though instructions had been issued earlier to the Resident directing him to recommend Munir-ul-Mulk for the post. The latter had, in the meantime, forfeited the support of the British Government, as has already been stated, by his intrigue to secure the appointment.

After the Nizam had been apprised of the recommendation of the Governor-General, he became anxious to appoint Munir-ul-Mulk as his minister instead of Shams-ul-Umara. He thought that by appointing a minister who was not being supported by the Company’s government he would be able to secure the services of an anti-British and loyal minister.19

On receiving the recommendation of the Governor-General the Resident gave up his attitude of neutrality and desired that the Nizam

17. Sec. Con.—20 Feb.—No. 14.

* Shams-ul-umara was the head of the Paigah which had been anti-British during the reign of Nizam Ali. It is strange that he was supported for the post of minister by Sydenham. It might have been due to the manipulation of Amjad-ul-Mulk that Sydenham gave his support to Shams-ul-umara. With the death of Amjad-ul-Mulk in 1813, Shams-ul-umara gave vent to his anti-British feelings openly. Briggs, The Nizam, Vol. I, pp 146-147.
should appoint Shams-ul-Umara as his minister. The Nizam was not willing to appoint him minister on the following grounds:

First, Shams-ul-Umara was neither a Shia by religion nor a sayyid by birth. Secondly, he had been a supporter of Feridun Jah, the brother of the Nizam, in the struggle for succession which had taken place during the last days of Nizam Ali. Thirdly, he was the head of the Paigah and the post was maintained by the Nizam as a counterpoise to that of minister. If Shams-ul-Umara was allowed to hold both the posts, he would usurp the whole power of the state.

The Resident replied to the first objection that political matters should be regulated by political considerations and not by religious sentiments. The second and the third objections were refuted by replying that the Nizam should not be afraid of his brother or of a powerful minister when the Company's subsidiary force was there to protect him against his enemies.19

But this tangle was solved by Shams-ul-Umara who declared that he would not accept the office of minister without the full consent and confidence of the Nizam. After the withdrawal of Shams-ul-Umara from the contest the Company's government approved the appointment of Munir-ul-Mulk as minister.20

Thus in the appointment of the minister the Governor-General allowed the Nizam the freedom

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18. To Court (Pol.)—19 April, 1809.
20. To Court (Pol.)—19 April, 1809.
of choice, but the Nizam in seeking the advice and approval of the British government, created a precedent for the approval of the Company's government in the appointment of his minister. But in conceding to the wishes of the Nizam in appointing a minister of his own choice, the Company's government were actuated by the sole motive of not jeopardizing their alliance with Hyderabad. It was the instruction of the Governor-General to the Resident that 'the permanence of Chandu Lal's influence and control over the executive branch of the administration, should constitute a fundamental principle of every arrangement for the conduct of affairs in the state of Hyderabad.'

20A He was further instructed to accede to the appointment of that person as minister who would only 'admit Chandu Lal to his confidence and allow him to exercise the authority which was delegated to him by the late minister.'

20B The insistence of the Governor-General in placing Chandu Lal in a position of authority in the new arrangement was based upon his conviction that Chandu Lal was as attached to the British government as Mir Alam had been and that in case Munir-ul-Mulk proved himself an enemy of the alliance, the British government could rely upon Chandu Lal for its maintenance. In accordance with this policy the Resident attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Munir-ul-Mulk and Chandu Lal who was averse to the selection of the former as minister.

The Resident’s attempt for reconciliation was crowned with success. Chandu Lal declared that he would ‘pay the same respect and attention to Munir-ul-Mulk, as he did to Mir Alam,’ and Munir-ul-Mulk declared that he would ‘repose implicit confidence in Chandu Lal, be guided by his advice, allow him the entire control over the executive branch of the Government.’ They exchanged written assurances which were drawn up by them respectively and ‘the originals of those papers, written in their own hands and sealed with their own seals’ were lodged with the Resident.\textsuperscript{20C}

Under this arrangement Chandu Lal, though in name a peshkar, became in fact the minister and would play the same part in relation to the Company’s government, which Mir Alam as minister had played during his life time. Munir-ul-Mulk, thus deprived of all power in the administration of the state, became jealous of Chandu Lal and poisoned the ears of the Nizam against him. The result was that Chandu Lal had to face the same difficulty in the beginning from the side of the Nizam as Mir Alam, and the Company’s government had to deal not only with the Nizam as in the case of Mir Alam but also with Munir-ul-Mulk. When Munir-ul-Mulk had succeeded in poisoning the ears of the Nizam against Chandu Lal, he attempted to grab the powers which had been conferred upon Chandu Lal by the agreement and tried to bring him under his control. The Nizam frequently addressed his orders to Munir-ul-Mulk

\textsuperscript{20C} Ibid, para 14,
instead of Chandu Lal,—orders for recruiting troops were issued without the knowledge of Chandu Lal, information regarding the administration was secured through the help of his subordinates thus upsetting the practice, which was established since Munir-ul-Mulk had been appointed minister. Munir-ul-Mulk, with the purpose of establishing his authority over Chandu Lal, demanded from the latter that he should visit him occasionally with the officers of his department and acquaint him with the public business that was entrusted to him. Thus an attempt was made both by the Nizam and the minister to upset the arrangement which had been made in the presence of the British Resident. Under these circumstances, Henry Russell, the British Resident, came to the conclusion that the best security for the maintenance of the alliance with Hyderabad rested solely upon the preservation of Chandu Lal’s authority in the administration and Chandu Lal was accordingly assured of the Company’s support.  

Russell, the British Resident, called upon the Nizam to have a discussion with him on the subject. In the course of the discussion he told the Nizam that he was bound to uphold the authority of Chandu Lal and the system of administration which had been established with the concurrence of the Company’s government after the death of Mir Alam. The Nizam suddenly woke up to his sense of dignity and prestige and

being irritated at the insistence of the British Resident on maintaining the authority of Chandu Lal told him, "The country is mine, and the troops are mine, and I have a right to do what I choose with them both." When the Resident by way of advice told him that the surest way of maintaining law and order in the state would be to follow some fixed principles which were recognised and adopted by all established governments, the Nizam thinking that the Resident was referring to the principles which were followed in his own country, retorted, "You must remember, you are speaking to a person who is not a native of your own country. You cannot expect me to be acquainted with the principles which obtain in Europe, any more than the languages which are spoken there." The Resident at last sounded a note of warning to the Nizam that 'a perseverance in any measure prejudicial to the interests of the British government would ultimately lead to consequences of the most serious nature.' The stern warning produced the desired effect upon the Nizam who at once veered round and asked the Resident for advice and guidance. The Resident advised the Nizam not to adopt any other administrative measure without consulting Chandu Lal and to treat the latter with that confidence to which he was entitled by the agreement. That the British Resident's visit and his discussion with the Nizam were not liked by the inmates of the Nizam's palace was evidenced by the fact that while he was coming out of the palace, several large stones were hurled at him from the top of one of the private gates of
the palace. 22 Thinking that whatever effect the warning might have produced upon the mind of the Nizam, would not be permanent, the Resident requested Lord Hastings, the Governor-General, to write a letter to the Nizam. 23 A similar letter addressed to the Nizam by Sir George Barlow in October, 1806, had produced upon the Nizam’s mind an impression which was not only strong but had lasted for a long time. Accordingly, a letter was addressed to the Nizam by the Governor-General requesting the former to maintain that relation between the minister and Chandu Lal, which had been established by the agreement between them and to depend upon Chandu Lal for the administration of his dominion. In the same letter the Governor-General assured the Nizam that the Company’s government had not the least desire of impairing his authority and dignity. 24 The warning given by the Resident and strengthened by the letter from the Governor-General produced such an effect upon the Nizam’s mind that the latter never tried to undermine the influence of Chandu Lal in the administration of Hyderabad so long as he was at the helm of affairs.*

It goes to the credit of Chandu Lal that for a period of about thirty years he was able to secure the support of both the Nizam and the Company’s


* Munir-ul-Mulk died in 1832. So long as Munir-ul-Mulk was alive, Chandu Lal was the peshkar though he exercised all the powers of the minister. In 1832 Chandu Lal became minister. Nizam Nasir-ud-Daulah conferred upon him the titles of Raja, Raja-yan-Raja and Maharaja. (Gulzar-i-Assafiya, p 284).
government in spite of an opposition to his administration by an able British Resident like Metcalfe. The Nizam knew it well that any attempt on his part to deprive Chandu Lal of his authority would provoke the resistance of the Company's government. Hence he allowed Chandu Lal a free hand in the administration of Hyderabad. Chandu Lal also knew that in order to maintain his power and position he must oblige both the Nizam and the Company's government. In doing so, he resorted to an almost reckless expenditure of the state money, which depleted appreciably the government treasury and foreshadowed bankruptcy. The finances of the state were in a chronic state of deficit and this brought about his downfall. So long as Russell was the Resident he cajoled him by supplying the money he needed for organising the Hyderabad Contingent. It was arranged by Chandu Lal that the Palmer Company, a British banking concern in Hyderabad, would advance money for payment of the troops and officers of the Contingent in lieu of assignment of revenue of some specified districts. It may be mentioned here that one of the Directors of the company had married a ward of Lord Hastings and some of the officers of the Hyderabad Residency had financial connections with the company. Those who were connected with this company might influence, if they liked, the British government in favour of Chandu Lal. Consequently, Chandu Lal obliged this company by allowing it to advance money on behalf of the Hyderabad government towards the expenses of the Hyderabad Contingent at an interest of 24%. By supporting
the settlement of revenue introduced by Metcalfe, the British Resident, Chandu Lal secured his support at first, but when he fell out with him, he was able to secure the support of Lord Hastings in which, it seemed, he was helped by some of the people connected with the Palmer Company. Taking advantage of a stipulation the government of the Company had entered into with Chandu Lal 'to have no manner of concern with any of His Highness's children, relations, subjects or servants, with respect to whom His Highness was absolute,' Chandu Lal excluded the nobles of the court from having any communication with the Resident. The only person with whom the Resident might communicate, of course with the exception of the Nizam, was the minister.  

25 The Resident was so much isolated from the political life of Hyderabad that subsequently he could not suggest the name of a single person who could be appointed minister after Chandu Lal's resignation. In one of his letters to the Secretary to the Government of India Fraser, the British Resident, wrote, "The minister during his continuance in office, has succeeded in maintaining in as low a state of political thraldom and degradation the whole of the upper Mahomedan as well as Hindu classes of Hyderabad, and in keeping them so absolutely isolated from the Resident, that I am unable at this moment to indicate the name of any individual (...) to fill the post of Dewan".  


Resident from the upper classes of people Chandu Lal obtained the assent of the Nizam who was perhaps persuaded to believe that the system would prevent intrigue and secure the permanence of his authority." But in reality it paved the way for establishing Chandu Lal's absolute authority in the state of Hyderabad by preventing everyone from shaking the confidence which the British government had in him.

In addition to these, Chandu Lal adopted corrupt means in order to maintain himself in office. If we are to believe the statement of the British Resident Fraser, he squandered a great part of the revenues of the state for this purpose. Those nobles of Hyderabad who attended the court of the Nizam and were constant companions of the Nizam, were purchased by Chandu Lal with money and they supported him in every emergency. It is said that in order to get information from Calcutta and to establish his influence there he spent 'seven laks of rupees annually for charges incurred by his Vakils at Calcutta.' Besides these, Chandu Lal spent, if we are to believe the author of *Gulzar-i-Asafiya*, the court-physician of Sikandar Jah and Nasir-ud-Daulah, two thousand rupees every day from the state exchequer in charity to the poor. Be that as it may, the money spent by him directly and indirectly to maintain his position brought the finances of the State to the verge of bankruptcy.

29. Gulzar-i-Asafiya—Chap. III, p 235,
For a long period of about thirty years Chandu Lal wielded absolute power without any hindrance either from the Company's government or from the Nizam. At last the financial embarrassment brought about his downfall. As it has already been stated, money had to be borrowed from the Palmer Company in order to maintain the Hyderabad Contingent and assignment of revenue was made for the purpose. After the Palmer Company had gone into liquidation all the expenses in connection with the Contingent had to be met from the revenue of the state. In addition to the Hyderabad Contingent, the Nizam maintained a vast army of irregular troops for which alone he had to incur an expenditure of Rs. 94,84,790/- out of the net revenue of the state, which amounted to Rs. 1,38,88,078/- in the year 1839.³⁰ Reduction of useless establishments also could not be effected owing to the opposition of the principal nobles of the court including Munir-ul-mulk.³¹ Moreover, Metcalfe's revenue reforms, which lasted for nine years, resulted in the decrease of the revenue of the state. Under these circumstances, the revenue of the state fell short of the expenditure almost every year by an amount of about seven to ten lakhs so long as Chandu Lal was the real minister of Hyderabad.³²

At last the crisis which brought about the downfall of Chandu Lal came to a head. The pay

³¹. Sec. Con.—30 Sept., 1820—No. 1.
of the troops of the Hyderabad Contingent fell into arrears for six months and that of the irregular troops for even a longer period. The whole army of the Nizam was seething with discontent. Even the Nizam’s allowances and the payments due to the various departments of the state were in arrears. The Nizam could not be induced to advance money from his private treasury* even though he had means to do so. It was surmised and the Nizam also indirectly allowed the Resident to perceive that he had near about one crore and fifty thousand rupees in silver coins and gold mohars in his private treasury. 33 If that was the case, it must be admitted that the Nizam wanted to drive out Chandu Lal from his office by taking advantage of his financial embroilment. Finding no other means of getting money he approached the British Resident for a loan of one crore of rupees from the East India Company with an interest at 5% and proposed to liquidate the loan with interest accruing thereon by an assignment of seventeen lakhs of rupees annually. 34

The matter was referred to the Governor-General in Council and the Resident was informed

* It appears from the state diary of Hyderabad that the Nizam Sikandar Jah helped Chandu Lal twice in his financial difficulties. On 8 November, 1825 the Nizam gave him one lakh of rupees and on 22 January, 1826, Rs. 3,60,000 (chronology, pp 177,180). It seems that the Nizam Nasir-ud-Daulah being disgusted with the constant financial troubles of Chandu Lal refrained from helping him any more.

34. Pol. Con.—18 Nov., 1843—No. 74.
in reply that the 'British Government could not under any circumstances consider a loan to a foreign state as purely financial transaction—it could only advance money with a view to political objects.' The minister furnished along with his application for a loan an account of debts, but it was not considered sufficient by the Company's government. The Resident was advised by the Governor-General in Council to inform the minister that he must fully disclose the whole financial position of the Nizam's government before the Governor-General could entertain his request for a loan.\(^{35}\)

On hearing Chandu Lal's request to the Company's government for a loan of a crore of rupees, the Nizam offered to assist him with funds from his private treasury. But the Nizam put off from time to time the fulfilment of his promise and Chandu Lal finding that there was no prospect of receiving any aid tendered his resignation on the ground of his old age. Later on he frankly admitted that the real ground of his resignation was pecuniary embarrassment.\(^{36}\) The Nizam was unwilling to accept the resignation forthwith fearing that Chandu Lal had till then sufficient influence with the British government to come back with their help to his former post. The Nizam, therefore, wanted that the resignation should come through the British Resident.\(^{37}\) On

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a reference to the Governor-General as to what should be done, the Resident was advised by the Governor-General to acquiesce in the retirement of Chandu Lal from the post, but at the same time to insist on the Nizam’s making necessary arrangement for the payment of arrears due to the troops and for the appointment of a minister before the retirement of Chandu Lal.

The Resident was instructed in the event of any loan being asked by the Nizam to propose to him a treaty, the draft of which was transmitted to the Resident. The main clauses of the draft treaty were as follows:

“2nd Clause: The Nizam will delegate to the British Resident as Dewan, or to such other person as the British Government may from time to time select, the whole administration of His Highness’s dominions until such time as the sums so advanced shall be repaid with compound interest at five percent per annum, and the British Government shall be satisfied that His Highness, his heirs and successors can conduct the Government of His Highness’s dominions in such a manner as to avoid the recurrence of embarrassments similar to those which now prevail and to preserve order and peace.

“3rd Clause: It will be the case of the British Government to provide, as far as it may be practicable, the accustomed sums for the support of His Highness and his household.”

38. Pol. Con.—18 Nov., 1843—No. 80—paras 2, 3 & 8.
39. Pol Con.—18 Nov., 1843—No. 81.
Had the Nizam concluded this treaty, he would have been a titular ruler and the real ruler of Hyderabad would have been the British Government during the operation of the treaty. The treaty was not concluded and the Nizam instead of appointing a minister in the place of Chandu Lal informed the Resident that he would keep the principal power in his own hands and for discharging the daily duties of the minister he would appoint a commission of four of his nobles and ten mansabdars.\(^{40}\) It may be mentioned here that Manir-ul-mulk had died before the resignation of Chandu Lal and the latter had been carrying on the duties of the minister since his death. Chandu Lal was informed on 6 September, 1843, by the Resident that the Governor-General in Council acting in concurrence with the Nizam had acquiesced in his retirement from the ministry and that his official relations with the Resident ceased from that date. The Governor-General wrote a letter to Chandu Lal eulogizing his successful endeavour to maintain friendly relations between the Company and Hyderabad during his term of office.\(^{41}\)

With the retirement of Chandu Lal from the post of Minister, ends the career of an administrator regarding whom opinion has varied. The British Resident Russell spoke highly of the virtues of his private life, though he condemned his frailties as an administrator. Metcalfe, the next British Resident, had nothing but contempt for him for

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41. Pol. Con.—8 Nov., 1843—No. 99.
O.P.-168—10
reasons which could not be entirely detached from hostility he had with Palmer Company* and also from the opposition Chandu Lal offered to the execution of Metcalfe's revenue reform.† Chandu Lal was a man of talent and sound culture. He took delight in literature and music and could speak Hindusthani and Persian fluently. He had sound acquaintance with the affairs of every department of the state and was indefatigable in performing his duties. He attended to his duty in the morning by receiving the heads of different departments and continued his work till late at night with a break of three hours at midday for taking meal and rest. After finishing his work at night he spent a few hours in enjoying music and conversing with the learned men.42

He was a man of charitable disposition. If we are to believe the author of Gulzar-i-Asafia he spent indiscriminately from the state exchequer as well as from his private funds. His charity transgressed the bounds of caste and creed and both the Hindus and the Muhammadans enjoyed the benefit of his bounty. On the occasion of religious festivals, he spent large amount of money for making gifts to the mendicants and giving alms to the poor.43 In connection with the janmastami (day on which Lord Krishna was born) of 1825, he spent in one day Rs. 32,000 in distributing alms

* Vide Chapter—VI.
† Vide Chapter—IV.
43. Gulzar-i-Asafia, p 235.
to the Brahmans and others for the whole day and night. For his generosity he was liked by both the Muhammadans and the Hindus. He was free from ostentation and lived a simple life in his family. In his defence against the charge of oppression levelled against him by Metcalfe, he said that whatever he earned as his remuneration was spent 'in the service of God' without amassing anything for his posterity.

Chandu Lal was a strong supporter of British alliance with Hyderabad. He had seen since the conclusion of the treaty of 1800 how the British Residents had been exerting their influence in the internal affairs of the state and how the Nizam felt helpless in the face of the British authority. He was shrewd enough to see that the subsidiary alliance into which Nizam Ali had entered was a permanent alliance and try as much as he could, the Nizam would not be able to shake off the British paramountcy. Under the circumstances he felt that instead of looking to the ruler of Hyderabad for the stability of his position he

44. Chronology, p 173.


* Chandu Lal received his remuneration by way of a commission on the revenues of the state, which amounted (in 1816) annually on an average to Rs. 2,86,390. He had no jagirs of his own. But his son Balaprasad had a personal jagir which rated at Rs. 11,957 and his daughter's jagir was rated at Rs. 3458. (Russell's Report, Ind. Arch., Vol. IX, 1955, p 146). It is true that he could not leave behind much in cash for his son and relations and they were not as well off as the sons and relations of a diwan ought to have been.
should look up to the British Residents. The financial embarrassment into which he led the state of Hyderabad was, as has been pointed out, the outcome of his eagerness to placate the different Residents.

Owing to the lack of firmness in his character he could not follow any independent line of action. In 1829 when the Company announced its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the state, Chandu Lal could have availed himself of the opportunity to follow an independent policy, but instead of doing it he always depended on the Resident for carrying on his administration. Truly the British Resident Russell said of him, "His virtues belong to his private and his faults to the public character." 46

CHAPTER IV

BRITISH INTERFERENCE IN THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

The inevitable came at long last, and the Company steadily constricted its grip upon the Hyderabad state. The interference of the Company did not remain confined within the narrow limit of the succession of the Nizams and the appointment of the ministers. With the gradual infiltration of their power into Hyderabad, the interference of the Company was extended to other spheres also. The extension of the Company’s interference in the civil administration of Hyderabad was a moral obligation, as some high officers of the Company thought, on the part of the Company’s government to protect the rayats against the oppression of the minister and his agents. Before 1798 the common people, especially the rayats of Hyderabad, were not as helpless as they became subsequent to that year when the Company undertook to chastise ‘all rebels or exciters of disturbance in the dominions of’ the Nizam. Formerly the oppression of the Nizam or his officers was followed by the uprising of the people. So, in time of crisis he had to rely on his people and seek their co-operation. This acted as an indirect check upon the irresponsible rule of the Nizam. But having been protected by the Company’s arms the Nizam’s government had no longer any inducement to cultivate the affection of
the people. The result was that the Nizam’s
government became rapacious and despotic.
This rapacity and oppression increased when the
Nizam’s connection with the Company involved
the former in large military expenditure. Azam-ul-
Umara who relied upon the British for protection
against his enemies, was responsible for most of
the abuses which crept into the administrative
machinery of the state. Nizam Ali was extrava-
gant to the extreme and his minister Azam-ul-
Umara was very oppressive and rapacious. He was
so much disliked for his oppressiveness and rapacity
that when he died in 1804 his corpse was followed
to the grave by the insults of the whole populace
of Hyderabad. His successor, Mir Alam, was an
abler man no doubt, but he instead of redressing
the grievances of the cultivators rather aggravated
them. He raised the assessment, already too
heavy, by the further imposition of one anna in
the rupee on the total amount.¹ The bulk of the
revenues realised from the rayats went to meet the
expenses in connection with the extravagance of
the Nizam and the huge emoluments of the
minister. At that time the income of Hyderabad
from revenues amounted to about two crores of
rupees and Azam-ul-umara took three and a half
anna on every rupee as his emolument.* When
Mir Alam became minister after him he reduced

¹. Hyd. Pap., p. 91, From the Resident to Hastings, 24
Nov., 1819,—1st para.

* For every rupee that was levied for the government
an additional 3½ annas was levied for the minister.
his emolument by half an anna per rupee. The common people were groaning under the burden of heavy imposition and still they did not dare raise their little fingers either against the Nizam or his minister who had been protected by the British.

The Nizam and his minister could give some relief to the poor rayats by lessening the burden of taxes upon them if they could curtail their own emoluments and the expenses of the administration. Though Chandu Lal curtailed his own emoluments to some extent it was more than made up by a marked increase in the military expenses. Russell, the British Resident, was responsible to a great extent for this increase. He undertook the reorganisation on European lines of a part of the Nizam’s army. The reorganised and reformed section of the Nizam’s army came to be known as Hyderabad Contingent. The expenses of the Contingent were too heavy for a state like Hyderabad. The expenditure of the state exceeded its income and the financial crisis which reached its climax during the administration of Chandu Lal brought in its train disorganisation in all the departments of the state. A government cannot decline in one respect without declining in all others.

The law-courts and the police administration were in such a disorganised state that they could ill afford to give protection to the rayats against the oppression of landlords and revenue-farmers.

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* Vide Chapter—V.
But such was not always the case. The administrative structure which had been built up by Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I had crumbled down during the turmoil which followed his death. His rule was paternal and he always looked to the interests of his subjects. He stationed troops in different parts of the state to prevent robbers from robbing the travellers of their belongings and depriving the cultivators of their fruits of labour. Cultivation was encouraged by lightening the burden of rent upon the peasants and protecting them from the oppression of the revenue collectors.\(^3\) They were never over-rented.

Formerly the administration of justice was on the whole fair. There were two magistrates in the capital, one for administering civil justice and the other for criminal justice. These were the courts of enquiry and their enquiries were referred to the \textit{qazi} whose duty was to interpret the law and pronounce judgment. The judgments given by him were executed by the magistrates. All criminal cases were decided by him according to the Muhammadan law. In civil cases Muhammadan law was applied for the Muhammadans only and civil disputes between the Hindus were decided by the \textit{panchayet} of the Hindus according to their laws and customs.\(^4\)

In the country-side in each \textit{sarkar} there was a \textit{qazi} to whom all cases in which the Muhammadans

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were concerned were referred while all the civil cases in which the Hindus were involved were referred to the panchayets of the Hindus. The post of qazi being hereditary it was held by incompetent men with the result that they came under the influence of revenue farmers who were called taluqdars.\(^5\)

Even this system of administering justice failed when Henry Russell was the Resident. In the country-side as well as in the capital all disputes were settled mainly by force or favour. Russell tells us that for ten years the qazi of the capital city had no criminal case brought before him for seeking his judgment till 1814 when the Resident brought before him some cases of murder requiring capital punishment. The civil court also became ineffective.\(^6\)

The revenue administration also did not fare better. With the introduction of the taluqdari or farming system the old method of collecting revenue fell into disuse. It seems originally revenue was collected by the government with the help of patels, the hereditary village headmen, and deshmukhs who, like their counterparts in the Maratha territories, were heads of the parganas and the agents through whom the government orders were executed.\(^7\) All these local officers lost much of their influence and function in their respective areas with the introduction of the taluqdari system. In some places their functions were entirely set

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5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

aside; in other places they maintained their existence by becoming mere wheels of the taluqdar's machinery of revenue collection.

The revenue administration was so disorganised that it could not but draw the attention of the British Residents like Russell and Metcalfe. Large tracts of lands were farmed out to the highest bidder. These farmers were generally known as taluqdarṣ. Large advances were taken from these farmers in anticipation of their collections. Land-tenure was insecure. There was every chance of a farmer being ousted by another if the latter agreed to pay higher revenue to the government exchequer. It is said that the 'farmers proceeded from the capital to the districts, looking over their shoulders all the way, to see whether other farmers were not following on their heels'. These farmers were supreme in their own jurisdiction. They had the power of life and death and there was no appeal against their oppression either to the law-courts or to the government.8 Below the taluqdarṣ were a class of persons who were known in some parts as zamindars. They had no proprietary rights, as was the case in Bengal, and 'were appointed by the Government for the performance of specific duties' in addition to that of collection of the revenue. They were 'entitled, in consideration of those duties, to the receipt of certain emoluments, the extent of which (was) different in different districts, but which generally (consisted) of a commission of 7½% on the collections besides

8. Sutherland, Sketches etc.—p 55.
a specified Enam and Sere land'. This jurisdiction was generally circumscribed within the limits of one *pargana.* The *taluqdars* spent their days in luxury and idleness in the capital delegating their duty to the *naibs* who spread over the *parganas* with a host of revenue collectors and armed retainers. Settlement of revenue was made with the *zamindars* or *deshmukhs.* Contracts for the realisation of the revenue were made with them. These contracts were honoured more in the breach than in the observance. When the *taluqdar* or his *naibs* broke the contract, demanding more money, there were widespread disturbances. The *zamindars* or *deshmukhs* either demanded in their turn enhanced rate of revenue from the *rayats* or broke out in open rebellion. Russell states in his 'Report on Hyderabad' that the *zamindars* of several districts lying on the right side of the Godavari were 'generally in rebellion'. The rebellion of one such *zamindar* whose name was Kona Rao, took such a serious turn that a large detachment of the subsidiary force had to be employed in 1801 to suppress the rebellion. His elder brother who took a leading part in the rebellion was captured and executed.

The outbreak of rebellions of the *zamindars* for the breaking of contracts by the farmer or his *naibs* became a common feature in the *parganas.* The

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10. Bilgrami Historical and descriptive sketch etc., p 43.
11. Ibid.
ultimate victims of extortion by these hosts of revenue collectors were the poor cultivators from whom the revenue was ultimately collected. Unable to bear the burden of rent the cultivators abandoned their villages and took to brigandage.

The oppression of these revenue collectors knew no bounds. Russell provides us with a vivid description of the miserable condition of the cultivators in his ‘Report of Hyderabad’. He says, “If the season is a bad one the farmer seizes the cattle of the inhabitants to make up their defalcation, and if it is a good one he leaves them only a scanty portion and seizes the remainder for himself. All losses are borne by the cultivator and all profits are engrossed by the farmer who has by prescription a tacit engagement with the government that no complaints against him shall be received. The farmer may be said rather to levy contributions than to collect the revenues of the country. The total want of faith in all Engagements on the side of the stronger party is indeed a main source of the misery which prevails throughout the Nizam’s country.”

The country was infested with robbers. Life and property were insecure. It was even unsafe to travel along the public highways even in daytime except under the protection of armed bodies of men. Even these armed bodies of men were not immune from their attack. Lt. Sutherland of the Nizam’s contingent while travelling on the high

way between Aurungabad and Hyderabad was attacked by armed robbers in broad daylight and his baggage was saved from being plundered by his armed escorts.  

If disorder and maladministration were allowed to continue the day would have come sooner or later when the Company's government would have to take in their own hands the whole administration of the country, which the Court of Directors disapproved at all times. So, the only alternative to the subversion of the state was the introduction of general and comprehensive reform in the state of Hyderabad. Russell who had considerable knowledge about the administration of Hyderabad was of opinion that the measures of reform were to be effected by the minister at the instance of the British Resident. He says, "To give effect to measures of reform, the authority of the executive minister must be strengthened, not impaired and the vigour of that authority now consists in our support.

"If we increase our interference to do any effectual good we must increase it largely *. * *. Nothing short of a close, vigilant and decided control over the internal administration of the country, will be attended with any real or lasting benefit. But this control should be exercised through the medium of advice and influence, and not by direct exertion of authority. * * * * * I would rather enlarge the sphere, than increase the degree of interference. On matters in which we do

14. Sutherland, Sketches etc.—p 56.
interfere, I would not interfere more, but I would interfere in many matters in which we have never yet interfered at all.

"Chandu Lal is the person I would employ as the chief instrument of reform." Herein Russell indicated the extent and nature of the British interference necessary for purging the administration of corruption through the minister. Russell used to receive petitions of complaints from the rayats to transmit them to the minister for redress. He also authorised the European military officers in the Nizam's service to receive petitions and forward them either to the local authorities or to the Resident as the case might require. Thus true to his principles, Russell did not directly interfere in the internal administration of Hyderabad. But his idea of a wide and comprehensive reform to be carried out by the minister under the advice and indirect control of the British Resident did not materialise.

The next Resident, Metcalfe,* who was one of the ablest British administrators in India was imperious by nature and imperialistic in his political


* Charles Metcalfe arrived in India in 1801. He had been Resident at Daulat Rao Sindhia's Court and at Delhi before he was appointed Secretary to the Government in the Secret and Political Department and Private Secretary to the Governor-General in 1819. On the retirement of Russell, Metcalfe was appointed Resident at Hyderabad, and he took charge of his duties in Hyderabad on December, 1820 (Chronology, p 163).
outlook. He did not bother about the niceties of theoretical interpretation of the political relation between the Company and the state of Hyderabad based upon treaties. He was of opinion that the Company's government as the supreme power was responsible for the welfare of the cultivators of Hyderabad. In speaking of this supremacy he stated, "I did not mean to assert a formal supremacy established in all cases by written compact, I allude to the real supremacy which we now universally, and I suppose avowedly, exercise".16 According to him, this real supremacy was established, beyond dispute, by the victory which the Company's army achieved over the Marathas in the third Anglo-Maratha war. But Lord Hastings, the Governor-General, differed from him on this point and this difference became clear during the controversy between them over the revenue settlement in the Nizam's dominions.

Metcalfé like his predecessor Russell realised the necessity of reform in Hyderabad but unlike his predecessor he set himself to the task with determination. The points to which Metcalfé turned his attention were the reduction of the expenditure of the Government within its income and a general settlement of land revenue for a term of years. So far as the first subject was concerned he practically did nothing. On the other hand with the expansion of the Hyderabad Contingent the expenditure of the government rose higher and

   —para 3.
higher till the expenditure exceeded the income of the state by a huge amount. According to Metcalfe the annual expenditure exceeded the income by about ten lacs in 1820.\textsuperscript{17} With the expenditure unreduced it was unwise on the part of Metcalfe to undertake any work of reform of the revenue settlement, one of the aims of which was the reduction of rent from the cultivators.

The main aim of the revenue reform which Metcalfe undertook was to save the poor cultivators from the oppression of the farmers and their hirelings. This he wanted to do by abolishing the taluqdari system of farming the revenue and by making a settlement with the village headmen, patels and muqaddams, for a term of about five years. But where the influence of deshmukhs and zamindars prevailed, the settlement was made with the village headmen through them.\textsuperscript{18}

The amount to be realised from each village was determined by the paying capability of the villages on the basis of the producing capacity of both cultivated and cultivable lands of the villages, the average of the rent the cultivators had paid in the past few years and the means of the people to increase the cultivation in future. On the basis of information gathered on these three points a village settlement was made for about five years.\textsuperscript{19}

In cases where it seemed that the ‘full right of the government’ could not be secured by the

\textsuperscript{17} Hyd. Pap., Metcalfe to Swinton, 24 Feb., 1821—p 151—para 21.

\textsuperscript{18} Hyd. Pap, pp 251-252.

\textsuperscript{19} Sutherland, sketches etc., p 57.
assessment, the settlement was made for a shorter period than five years. In villages where maximum assessment had been reached, the settlement was made for a longer period. The main characteristic of this village settlement was that the potentiality of extended cultivation was taken into consideration and provision was made in the settlement for the annual increment of revenue from the villages. This principle of annual increment of revenue was known as istawa. Hence the settlement which was made under the guidance of Metcalfe was known as the istawa settlement and as it was made with the village community it was also known as the village settlement. Pattas indicating the terms on which the headmen were to hold land were given to them and the kabuliyats embodying a promise to abide by them were also taken from them. Measures were also taken to protect the cultivators from the oppression and extortion of the revenue collectors.

Too much reliance on the villagers to bring under cultivation the cultivable land and thus to extend cultivation, and the fixation of an annual increase of revenue on the village were the vital defects of this system. Under the operation of this the most prosperous villages which had reached the 'mark of their capabilities' suffered much. The less prosperous villages where there was scope for improvement were rising and those where

21. Sutherland, sketches etc., pp 57, 59.
there was little scope for improvement were either stationary or gradually retrograding. The villagers of the once prosperous villages broke their engagements and migrated to the less prosperous villages where lands equally good could be had cheaper. Those who remained behind had to make good the loss due to the migration of people.  

Consequently engagements which the villagers entered into with the government were broken and the estimated revenue could not be realised. Even in those villages where arable lands were brought under cultivation the annual increment of revenue which the villagers, in accordance with the terms of settlement, were bound to pay were not realised. This might have been due either to the fact that the villagers did not understand the principles of the annual increment of revenue and the zamindars who were allowed to collect revenue under the new village settlement ‘embezzled the growing surplus’. For, the balances outstanding at the end of the fifth year of the settlement ‘coincided very nearly with that of the augmented demand’.  

Thus the settlement of Metcalfe did no good to the government.

In the southern part of Hyderabad the settlement

24. For. Mis.—Vol. 201—From Martin to Swiwtton, 26 Jan. 1827—para 11.

* According to Sutherland this balance was due to low price of grain. As a result of Metcalfe’s settlement the yield of the country was so great that the price of grain went down very low. Consequently the cultivators could not pay their rent. (Sutherland, Sketches—p 58).
was effected by the minister. But in other parts this was effected by the British officers. In the northern part of Berar it was done by Captain Seyer while Lieutenant Sutherland was entrusted with this duty in the southern part of Berar. These two officers were in the Nizam's service, as they were attached to the Hyderabad Contingent. Mr. Barnett, who was in charge of the settlement in the western part of Berar, was Metcalfe's second assistant in the British Residency, but as he could not proceed there his place was taken by Mr. Wells, an assistant of the Resident. These British officers were entrusted with the general supervision of the revenue assessment and police, the executive function being left to the Indian officers of the Nizam's government. Metcalfe thought that the Nizam's officers lacked the requisite zeal and integrity necessary for the task of revenue settlement. Hence he entrusted the British officers with this work. Metcalfe was not very happy that the minister was in charge of the settlement in the southern part of the country, but he could not decently object to it.  

The British officers were to work under the direction of the Resident and it was his original intention to avoid all unnecessary interference. The officers engaged in the duty of settlement were not allowed to issue orders. When any Indian officer was found guilty of extortion or other oppression his misconduct was reported to the

government of Hyderabad. It was the aim of Metcalfe to prevent extortion and oppression on the part of the Nizam’s officers without encroaching upon the Nizam’s internal sovereignty.26

Though Metcalfe’s settlement was not beneficial to the Government it was a boon for the common people. With the commencement of the settlement the cultivators knowing that they would not be deprived of the fruit of their labour by the exacting and oppressive revenue collectors, set themselves to the task of increasing the produce of their fields. Capital and labour from other occupations were diverted to agriculture with the consequence that agriculture rapidly extended. As a result of this extended cultivation the greater part of the country was covered with cultivation and inspite of three successive years of draught the price of grain, especially wheat and grain, was very much lower than it had been for several preceeding years. In some places the price went down so low that the cultivators found it difficult to pay the rent in cash.27

Under Metcalfe’s scheme of settlement the heads of the villages were entrusted with the duty of preserving the peace of their respective villages. The villagers most of whom found a new incentive in pursuing their agricultural occupation helped the headmen of their villages in suppressing robbery and brigandage. Formerly under the farming system troops had to be employed ‘in the


27. Sutherland, Sketches etc—p 58.
collection of revenue, or in asserting the rights of the government.' But from the time when the Nizam's country came under the superintendence of British officers under Metcalfe's scheme of settlement no troops had to be employed either for collection of revenue or for asserting the right of the government. The road police instituted under the authority of Metcalfe along the high road from Hyderabad to Jalna and Aurangabad afforded much needed protection to travellers and to the people of the villages lying on either side of the road. Such was the unique result obtained by the road police system that Martin, the successor of Metcalfe, was desirous of extending the system to the road from Hyderabad to Masulipatam. In short, peace and tranquillity prevailed everywhere except in the tracts inhabited by the Bhils and professional plunderers.

The interference in civil administration and the loss of revenue under the new revenue settlement put Chandu Lal in a very difficult situation. He agreed to the revenue settlement proposed by Metcalfe even without any express permission from the Nizam. This he did only to satisfy the Resident whose support he needed most in order to maintain his position against his enemies in the court of Hyderabad. But the Nizam was extremely displeased with Chandu Lal for having taken such

30. Sutherland—Sketches—p 57.
a step without his express permission and Metcalfe himself was not unaware of it.\textsuperscript{31}

But the good relations between Chandu Lal and Metcalfe did not last long. Metcalfe thought that Chandu Lal's co-operation in the work of reform was not at all sincere, for while he gave his consent readily to the scheme, he proved less friendly towards the scheme of reform when it was put into operation.\textsuperscript{32} Truly Chandu Lal acceded to the revenue settlement proposed by Metcalfe thinking, perhaps, that his refusal to accede to the proposal might have exposed him 'to the imputation of thwarting the Resident's view.'\textsuperscript{33} But the subsequent event in connection with the revenue settlement so much alarmed the minister that he could no longer co-operate without endangering his own position. Metcalfe and his British officers who had been employed in the work of revenue settlement, could not remain satisfied with the work of supervision only leaving the executive work to the Indian officers of the Nizam as proposed in the original scheme. The British officers began to exercise extensive power in connection with all matters of revenue and police. In short, they superseded the Nizam's authority.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{31} Hyd. Pap, p 175—Copy of a letter to Barnet Sahib Bahadur.

\textsuperscript{32} Hyd. Pap, p 167, Metcalfe to Swinton, 20 June, 1822—(para 19.)

\textsuperscript{33} Hyd. Pap,—p 310, Governor-General's minute, 19 Dec, 1822

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid—p. 311.
The British officers who were acting under Metcalfe were not only charged with the duty of receiving appeals of the rayats against any extortion by the officers of the Nizam, but they were also authorized and directed to give their attention to the suppression of depredations, robberies and such crimes as affected the safety of the community. It was a direct and active interference in the administration of the Nizam’s government. But this was not all. The British officers assumed so much authority that one of them, Colonel Hislop, annulled the five years’ settlement made by the minister with the rayats and substituted a settlement of his own. The minister having complained to the Resident against this interference in his authority, Hislop’s settlement was cancelled and the original settlement of the Minister was restored. But this restoration of the minister’s settlement could not repair the disgrace which the minister had suffered in the eyes of the public. The Nizam’s authority was also not immune from the encroachment of the Resident. Without the consent of the Nizam or his minister the Resident undertook a tour of inspection of the work that was being done by the officers both Indian and British, in connection with the revenue settlement. Lord Hastings who was Governor-General at that time approved of this tour understanding that the assent of the minister had been obtained by the Resident. With the gradual encroachment on the authority of the Nizam both the Nizam and the public thought that Chandu Lal had given the possession of Hyderabad to the British. Under these circumstances, the minister
sent a letter through William Palmer, one of the partners of Palmer and Company, to the Governor-General wherein he complained against the interference of Metcalfe in the administration of the country and requested him to put an end to the revenue settlement made by Metcalfe. He concludes the letter by stating, "This double government is a source of great loss and detriment to the State." In short, this direct interference of Metcalfe made Chandu Lal realise for the first time that he was a mere puppet in the hands of the British Resident and that the little independence which Hyderabad till then enjoyed, was at stake. To regain his lost position with the help of the Governor-General he joined hands with Palmer and Company who were not getting on well with the Resident at that time and who could influence the Governor-General in his favour through one of their members, who was intimately connected with him.

On receipt of the letter from Chandu Lal, the Governor-General resolved to put a stop to the ever-increasing British interference in the administration of Hyderabad. About one year and a half after the introduction of reforms Metcalfe was apprised by the Secretary of Lord Hastings in a letter dated 25 October, 1822, that his reforms were inconsistent with the treaties. The Governor-General was aware that the reforms introduced by the Resident could not be retracted suddenly without the alteration being attributed to disapprobation by the Supreme Government.

35. Hyd. Pap, p. 177.—Copy of a letter to Barnet Sahib.
As the Governor-General did not like that his confidence in Metcalfe should be doubted, he allowed the arrangement made by the Resident to remain as long as it should be deemed necessary by him desiring that it should be abrogated gradually.\textsuperscript{36}

The disapproval of the revenue settlement made by Metcalfe gave rise to the question of its justifiability. Metcalfe contended that the Company's government as supreme power in India had every right to protect the inhabitants of Hyderabad against the oppression and misrule of Chandu Lal, who was in a sense the real ruler of the state, and who was upheld in his position by the Company's government. But according to Lord Hastings, the Company's government possessing a universal supremacy in India involving such rights in relation to the native states like Hyderabad as described by Metcalfe, was a mistake. The supremacy, according to Lord Hastings, had never been claimed 'in relation to Indian states standing within the denomination of allies of which the state of Hyderabad was one. In his opinion although a virtual supremacy existed in the Company's government from the inability of other states to measure strength with it, 'the making such a superiority a principle, would be to misapply that strength, and to pervert it to tyrannic purposes.'\textsuperscript{37} It is true that Metcalfe was not provided with any specific instruction as to the


\textsuperscript{37} Ibid—p. 224—para 2.
relation he should maintain with Hyderabad when he was appointed Resident. But as he was not only the Secretary to the Government of the Company but also the private Secretary to the Governor-General, he had opportunities of getting himself acquainted with the conception of Lord Hastings regarding the relations to be maintained with the Indian states. Moreover, before his departure for Hyderabad, Metcalfe was instructed by the Governor-General to maintain the same relation with Hyderabad as the Company's government under him had maintained with Oudh. 38

That Metcalfe received some such instructions is evidenced from his own statement. He wrote in one of his despatches, "The most effectual, and perhaps the only sure mode of introducing a reform into the country would be by the appointment of European managers in several districts, but this I consider prohibited by my instructions, and not desirable if it can be avoided." 39 These instructions were, perhaps, imparted verbally by the Governor-General before Metcalfe's departure for Hyderabad. There is no doubt that Metcalfe had gone a bit further than what was warranted by his instructions, but this was the natural consequence of the policy of interference in the internal administration of Hyderabad, which had been followed by the Company's government since the death of Azam-ul-

umara. Their interference in the appointment of ministers and control over a part of the Nizam’s army paved the way for greater interference by Metcalfe. One act of interference led to another till the entire government of Hyderabad was on the point of being superseded by Metcalfe. But this must be said in favour of the Resident that though he regularly kept the Governor-General informed of the progress of reforms as they took place, the Governor-General had never disapproved of the measures of Metcalfe until Chandu Lal preferred to complain against him.

The Court of Directors approved of Lord Hastings’ action in disapproving the active interference of Metcalfe in the administration of Hyderabad. The same body also disapproved the policy of controlling that part of the Nizam’s army which came to be known later on as the Hyderabad Contingent. This policy had been introduced, as has been said, by Russell and was continued during the time of Metcalfe. Lord Hastings was not willing to act on the instructions of the Court of Directors regarding the Hyderabad Contingent. It seems, in disapproving the extended and active interference of Metcalfe in civil administration Lord Hastings was influenced to some extent by the strained relations which had in the meantime developed between them due to their hitch over Palmer and Company. Had that not been the case, he would have discontinued the policy of officering and controlling the Hyderabad Contingent which had been initiated by Metcalfe’s
predecessor, at the time when he asked Metcalfe to give up his own extended interference.

Metcalfe was succeeded by Martin in September, 1825. Though he appreciated some of the good features of Metcalfe’s revenue settlement he was not blind to its defects*. To him the system of augmentation of village revenue on the basis of extended cultivation was one of the causes of failure. Another cause of the failure was the appointment of European superintendents who had no experience of revenue settlement. The third cause according to Martin, was the hasty procedure adopted by Metcalfe in the conclusion of the settlement. Metcalfe himself admitted that the conclusion of the settlement was hasty† and that though the success of his settlement was great, yet it had ‘not in every particular instance equally succeeded.’

* Even Metcalfe was conscious of the partial failure of his revenue system. Mr. Martin informed the supreme Government that his predecessor (Metcalfe) by his letter, dated 19 July, 1825 had apprized the Government that the success of the village settlement in the Northern part of the Nizam’s Dominions, ‘had not entirely corresponded with expectations under which they had been undertaken’ (Pol. Con.—16 March, 1827—No. 33, para 42).


41. Pol. Con.—16 March, 1827—No. 33.

† Metcalfe says, “There are two modes of making settlement * * one very detailed; * * This from the time which it requires in execution, could not have been used with effect in our first settlement in the Nizam’s country.”


42. Pol. Con.—16 March 1827—No. 33 paras 6-9.
After long discussion with the minister and the European superintendents Metcalfe’s scheme of settlement was abandoned in those parganas where the terms of Metcalfe’s settlement had expired. In each of these parganas the total amount of revenue which was in the fifth year of Metcalfe’s settlement had to be collected, was maintained by Martin, only allowing the European superintendents to distribute the total amount of the revenue equitably among the villages included within the parganas.  
But the Resident’s want of confidence in the superintendents impaired the scheme. Soon a wrangle ensued between the Resident and some of the European superintendents over the latter’s alleged injudicious measures. The system did not confer any benefit upon the people of the country. On the other hand the whole government became paralysed, as it were, from the double government of the Nizam and the Resident, and the people did not know ‘to whose authority to look’ for protection.  
This double Government came to an end in 1829. The new Nizam Nasir-ud-Daulah desired that the British interference in the internal affairs of Hyderabad should be discontinued.  
Lord William Bentinck agreed to put a stop to all interference on the part of the Company’s government with the single exception that all revenue

43. Pol. Con.—16 March, 1827—No. 34.
44. Sutherland—Sketches etc—p. 60.
settlements concluded with the cognizance of the British officers, and confirmed by the Nizam's minister, must be maintained till the termination of the period for which the settlements were made. After the expiry of the period the Company's government would not interfere even in the revenue administration. In every other respect, whether in the selection or removal of ministers or other officers, or in the administration of justice, the authority of the Nizam would be absolute.\textsuperscript{46} The policy of non-interference adopted by Lord William Bentinck placed the British relations with the Nizam on a footing which had existed twenty-five years before.

But the cessation of interference in civil administration by the Company's government gave rise to another problem which William Bentinck's government found it very difficult to tackle. When the civil interference was withdrawn at the request of the Nizam Nasir-ud-Daulah, it was expected that he would take interest in the welfare of his subjects, but it was soon found that he practically did nothing and left everything in the hands of the minister. The minister was not simply in charge of the whole administration, every department of it was run by him without the assistance of any executive head. It was not possible for the minister to bear such tremendous pressure of work. If we are to believe his words, he rose before sunrise and worked till midnight.\textsuperscript{47} Under these circumstances,

\textsuperscript{46} Pol. Con.—21 Aug., 1829—Nos. 57 & 58.

\textsuperscript{47} (i) Pol. Con.—9 May, 1836—No. 66 (No. 5)

it was not unnatural that some slackness would creep into the administration, paving the way for disorder in the country. Some zamindars thought that the cessation of civil interference also meant the withholding of troops under British control from supporting the Nizam's government. This idea emboldened them to have recourse to plundering of villages, and the freebooters carried on their depredations unhampered in the country-side. The British Resident was often put to great embarrassment when the services of the troops of Hyderabad Contingent under the British control were requisitioned by the Nizam's government to suppress the rebellious zamindars, even when these zamindars had some real grievances. If the troops under the British control were employed in suppressing the rebellion without redressing the grievances, the Company's government would act like an instrument of oppression in the hands of the Nizam's government. Stewart, the British Resident, suggested that whenever bodies of armed men were assembled for the purpose of plunder, whenever there was rebellion against the Nizam's government, the troops under the British control should be called out to support the government. But if those in rebellion and those assembled for the purpose of plundering submitted without offering resistance to the troops, the Resident should investigate the circumstances of the case and pronounce judgment upon it.48 But Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General, did not consider the suggestion

made by Stewart as entirely satisfactory in as much as it was vague. As to the guilt or innocence, no judgment need be pronounced, the fact of having rebelled against the government being conclusive as to that point. The Governor-General was of opinion that the Resident could have expressed his intention more clearly if he had suggested that he should be allowed to declare his opinion as to the causes of the rebellion and the degrees of punishment to be inflicted. It may be mentioned here that according to the 17th article of the treaty of 1800 the Company's government were bound to help the Nizam in suppressing the rebellions of his subjects by the employment of subsidiary force after the 'reality of offence' had been duly ascertained. The Governor-General, however, sought the opinion of Metcalfe who had considerable experience of affairs in Hyderabad and who was at that time the Vice-President of the Governor-General's Council. In the opinion of Metcalfe the embarrassment to which the Company's government had been put was due to the fact that it had ceased to interfere in the civil affairs of Hyderabad, but continued to interfere in the military concerns of the Nizam's territory. The Court of Directors had advised Lord Hastings to discontinue British interference both in civil as well as in military affairs of Hyderabad. If the advice given by the Court of Directors had been followed there would have been no necessity on the part of the Company to give military support to the Nizam
against his subjects. On the other hand, if the Company's government had not withdrawn from civil interference, these embarrassments would not have existed, because oppression which according to Metcalfe was at the root of all rebellions in Hyderabad, would have been previously checked. Metcalfe put the whole situation in a very pithy sentence when he stated, "The real state of the case is that it is scarcely possible to maintain a military interference, which leads to our taking part against the people in the event of rebellion, and at the same time to abstain altogether from civil interference." In short, Metcalfe was of opinion that either both civil and military interference should remain at the same time or both should be abandoned together. But Bentinck was not willing to restore civil interference nor was he willing to give up military interference on the ground that the abandonment of military interference would probably be productive of the most excessive disorders. As the suggestion of Stewart was not acceptable to the Governor-General on the grounds already alluded to, Metcalfe made the suggestion which may be quoted in his own words.

He said, "I would, therefore, recommend that the troops under our command should never be called out against the people in arms against the Government, on account of supposed grievances, until the Government shall have made over to our Resident the power of listening to complaints and settling the disputes, in concert with the Minister,

50. Pol. Con.—13 Aug., 1832—No. 12,
O.P.—168—12
according to justice. This power having been conferred by the Government, an officer selected by the Resident (.........) might be deputed with the force to be employed, (.........) and, before proceeding to any attack on the insurgents, might communicate to them that he had power to redress their grievances. His subsequent conduct might be regulated according to their behaviour, after receiving that intimation. But if we proceed to attack them, without letting them know (........ ....) we shall become the helpless tools of the most abominable oppression.

"The mode which I have suggested would, I should hope, have a double operation; 1st in preventing our being the active instruments of oppression, (..........) and 2nd in deterring in some degree the Minister from plunging into those acts of inequity, which would render necessary the submission of his cause to our investigation and decision.

"Less than what I have suggested will not prevent our being the tools of extortion, than which I should think a return to our former civil interference far preferable, but both, I hope, may be avoided by the course above described."51

Mr. Blunt, another member of the Governor-General's Council, entirely concurred in the suggestion made by Metcalfe.

It is not known whether the advice of Metcalfe was accepted by the Supreme Government and the Resident was informed of it. No doubt some

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deterioration in the civil administration had set in, especially in the police department. But exaggerated reports of this state of affairs were sent to the Supreme Government in Calcutta from the Hyderabad Residency. The Court of Directors were also apprised of this condition in Hyderabad. They in their despatch of 8 September, 1835, asked the Governor-General in Council to intimate to the Nizam that they 'would not remain indifferent spectators of the disorder and misrule' in Hyderabad and that if the minister failed to provide for better administration the Nizam would be advised to remove him.52

The Nizam was informed of the intention of the Court of Directors by the Resident. In a note to the minister the Resident brought against him four charges. First, the rayats had been groaning under oppression and tyranny of the taluqdar. Secondly, the repeated insurrections of the zamindar had compelled the Resident to move troops to suppress these disturbances. The requisition of these troops sometimes put their European commanders and the Resident in awkward position. Thirdly, in the absence of the tribunals in the country-side the oppressed rayats could not get their grievances redressed in proper courts. The fourth charge against the minister was that theft and robbery had prevailed throughout the country as the police force was inadequate to cope with the situation.53

There is no doubt that with the breakdown of

52. Pol. letter from Court, 8 Sep., 1835—No. 39—para 11.
53. Pol. Con.—9 May, 1836—No. 66. (No. 2.)
the village police-system, as set up by Metcalfe, theft and robbery had increased. But regarding the first charge, it seems that the oppression of the rayats by the taluqdars, since the cancellation of Metcalfe's revenue settlement, had been a bit overcoloured in the reports that were sent from the Hyderabad Residency to Calcutta. From the time of Metcalfe's departure there had been many instances of the Government's realising rent less than what had been settled by kaul. Sometimes the minister granted remission on the kaul.\(^{54}\) It may be that remission like this might have benefitted the taluqdars, yet it proved beneficial to the cultivators also. Certainly these cases of remission and realisation of rent less than what had been settled by the kaul indicate that the rayats were not oppressed by the taluqdars.

On receiving the note from the Resident, the minister informed him that he was willing to accede to any proposition, short of surrendering his control over the revenue, which the Resident might suggest for putting a stop to the maladministration in the country. He even suggested that the Resident might appoint British officers to superintend the judicial administration or appoint, if he liked, Indians of rank to furnish him with reports of oppression of rayats by taluqdars, if any.\(^{55}\)

None of these propositions met with the approval of the Nizam who might have thought that in asking the Resident to appoint these

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54. Ibid—(No. 5).
officers he would invite the British interference which he detested so much. So, it was finally settled by the minister to appoint two amins in each district to check the oppression of taluqdars and to receive complaints from the rayats against them. The minister also promised to put before the Resident all cases of plundering on the part of the zamindars and if they were found guilty the Resident would be requested to send troops under European commanders to chastise them. Police stations had already been in existence along the important highways of Hyderabad. The minister assured the Resident that he would establish police stations along those highways also, which still lacked them.56

Colonel Stewart, the British Resident, could see no bright future for the plan proposed by the minister. He was of opinion that the whole plan would prove a total failure and the Supreme Government would be required sooner or later to take over the whole administration of the Nizam’s dominions. So he was in favour of intervening sooner than later. The amins who had been appointed by the minister were officers of low rank and he thought that they would become mere tools in the hands of the more powerful taluqdars.57 That these amins had been unable to control the taluqdars was also the opinion of Fraser, the successor of Colonel Stewart.58 However, the

56. Pol. Con.—9 May, 1836—No. 66 (No. 4).
58. Pol. Con.—27 July, 1842—No. 172 para 5,
Supreme Government at Calcutta did not approve of the Resident's idea of intervention, but advised him to suggest to the minister improvements, if any, on the plan devised by the latter.\(^59\)

Hardly had a year passed since the appointment of *amins* when Stewart informed the Supreme Government that the country had of late years 'been free from violent disorders, or open and general disturbance of the peace'. The Supreme Government seems to have held the view that the cessation of disorder in the country was due to the fact that the aid of troops under the command of the British officers was withheld in some cases of unjustifiable exactions.\(^60\) In 1838, just two years after the appointment of *amins*, Stewart from his personal observation of the Nizam's territories, which he had the opportunity of making during the two journeys from Hyderabad to the British frontier, formed the impression that the country through which he passed was neither over-taxed nor oppressed. The Resident also asked the European military officers of the Nizam, stationed in different parts of Hyderabad, to send reports regarding the condition of those parts of the country where they had been posted. Some of these reports conveyed similar impressions as that of the Resident, while others gave an impression of a quite different nature. Even conflicting reports were sent by different officers regarding the same place.\(^61\) It is hard to believe that the country which

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60. Pol. Con.—5 June, 1837—No. 88, para 5.
had been the scene of disorder and lawlessness only a year back became a land of peace and plenty after a year and that the taluqdars who had been in the habit of oppressing the rayats abruptly became humane towards them although the amins who had been sent to check their oppression were unable to do so. It seems that the previous reports of Stewart regarding the oppression of taluqdars upon the rayats were exaggerated. Regarding the discrepancy in the reports of the military officers referred to, it may be said that they were simply coloured or overcoloured by the personal bias of different observers.

Fraser, the successor of Stewart, could not find that 'excessive degree of misery and deterioration' which were believed to have existed in Hyderabad. He admitted that the country was susceptible of much improvement and that it might be rendered more prosperous than it had been since its connection with the British, but by that he did not mean 'that the inhabitants of Hyderabad were less happy and contented than those of the Company's territory.' It was the opinion of Fraser that the disorder in the civil administration of Hyderabad had been somewhat exaggerated and it did not exist to such an extent as to invite British interference. This exaggeration was a natural sequel to the deterioration of the civil administration after the abolition of Metcalfe's settlement.

63. Pol. Con.—11 Dec., 1839—No. 44.
CHAPTER V

COMPANY'S INTERFERENCE IN THE MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE NIZAM

The interference of the Company's government was not confined within the limits of civil administration alone. The subsidiary alliance being mainly a military alliance gave the Company an opportunity to meddle in the military affairs of the Nizam. When by the treaty of 1800 the Company undertook to defend the Nizam against his enemies and posted a subsidiary force in his territory, the Nizam allowed the Company to share with him the military duties as well as the military authority of Hyderabad. The Nizam further lost his authority over the military affairs, when a portion of his army organised and reformed by the British officers under the patronage of the British Resident, undertook to perform some military duties of his dominions. The subsidiary force and these reformed troops were almost sufficient for the performance of important military duties of the country. As all the important military duties were required to be performed by the subsidiary force and the reformed troops, the majority of the Nizam's own troops deteriorated rapidly for want of supervision and military work and became a rabble.

The Nizam's military force in 1797 consisted
of 35,680 infantry and 34,447 horse.¹ The cavalry was composed mainly of Muhammadans belonging to different tribes and nationality. These were mainly Mughals, Pathans, especially Ruhelas, Arabs and the Deccanies. The infantry was composed of the Hindus and the Muhammadans and most of them were inhabitants of the Deccan. Some of them were recruited from northern India also.

The Nizam’s artillery was not at all efficient. There was no commander-in-chief in the army. It was divided into several units, each of which was commanded by its own leader. So cohesion, which is the very essence of military efficiency, was wanting in the Nizam’s army. On the eve of any war a number of these units was mobilized and placed under the command of an officer especially appointed for the purpose. Nizam Ali had two battalions of female sepoys of one thousand each which mounted guard in the interior of the palace and accompanied the ladies of the harem. They were present at the battle of Kharada in which they took active part. Nizam Sikandar Jah maintained a reduced establishment of these women troops.²

From the point of view of payment the Nizam’s cavalry was divided into two classes namely, sarkari and jagirdari. The jagirdari troops were paid by grant of jagirs. Sarkari troops were paid from the Nizam’s treasury. Some of the sarkari troops supposed to be paid in cash were really paid by assignment

¹ Pol. Con.—24 February, 1797—No. 7.
of districts although they were not formally granted in *jagir*. The infantry was also divided into two classes—Regular and irregular. The regular troops were also paid from the state exchequer. After the disbandment of the French corps in 1798 the Nizam’s army became practically useless not only for defending his territory against aggression from outside but even for the suppression of the internal troubles also. A thorough reorganisation became imperative for the safety of the state.

In the first decade of the nineteenth century the reform at least of a portion of the Nizam’s army became absolutely necessary. It was stipulated in the 12th Article of the treaty of 1800 that in case a war should break out between the English and any other power the Nizam should send along with the subsidiary force a contingent of six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse of His Highness’s own troops to help the English.  

The contingent which the Nizam furnished during the second Anglo-Maratha war was smaller than the force required to be furnished under the terms of the treaty of 1800 and it did not play a very creditable part in the war as was evident from the various reports of Arthur Wellesley. It was he who suggested for the first time the necessity of reforming and reorganising the contingent so that it might render useful services not only to the Company in time of war but also to the Nizam himself in maintaining tranquillity in

his own territory. At that time there were many powerful zamindars who would not, out of their accord, pay revenue unless they were forced to do so. Evasion and not payment was the order of the day. Revenue collection in Hyderabad was always attended with disorder which required the employment of troops. Most of the Nizam’s troops were disgruntled and hence could not be relied upon to act zealously against the refractory zamindars. So, arose the necessity of organising a small but efficient body of troops for the purpose. Moreover if the subsidiary force was required for the support of the internal government on all occasions, Arthur Wellesley observed that in that case the troops of the subsidiary force were to be doubled at least and the forts of the State of Hyderabad had to be delivered over to the Company’s government. This would mean the annihilation of the internal independence of Hyderabad. Knowing well that the Nizam would not agree to the proposal of maintaining a permanent contingent, Arthur Wellesley thought that the treaty of 1800 had to be amended on this point. As a preliminary to it, he advised Kirkpatrick, the Resident at Hyderabad, that before the Nizam was asked to share the territories ceded by the Marathas, he should impress upon him that he had committed a breach of the treaty of 1800 in not supplying the requisite force during the second Anglo-Maratha war. This would, he thought, prepare the ground for an

amendment of the treaty. He pursued the subject further and gave definite suggestions as to how the Nizam's army should be reformed. In pursuance of the suggestions made by Arthur Wellesley, the Resident made several proposals to the Nizam for reforming his army, but little appears to have been accomplished till the depredations of the Pindaris in the dominions of the Nizam compelled him to accept the proposal of the British Resident. After the second Anglo-Maratha war Bhonsla of Nagpur gave up to the Company his territories in Berar of which he in participation with the Nizam collected revenues. The Company in turn handed over these territories to the Nizam by the Partition Treaty of Hyderabad in 1804. Thus the Nizam acquired the undisputed authority over Berar. But it became a problem with him to protect the inhabitants of the country from the depredations of the Pindaris and the Naikas. But for their predatory habits the Naikas did not differ from other inhabitants of Berar. They generally cultivated lands in their villages, but they neither paid rent to the Nizam nor did they acknowledge his authority. The villages where the Naikas lived were well fortified and the villagers in season of cultivation ploughed their fields and in off season they under the leadership of their Naikas diverted their energy to the more profitable business of


7. Aitchison, Vol. V (1864), No. XIII.
robbing travellers and plundering the country surrounding their villages. There were five principal Naikas each of whom had under him five hundred to two thousand armed men. But more dreaded than the Naikas and their armed men were the Pindaris who plundered towns and villages indiscriminately. Most of the Nizam’s troops consisting of cavalry, infantry and artillery were stationed in Berar, but as they lacked in discipline and military training they could not cope with these disturbers of peace. What was needed were not unskilled men in arms but trained and efficient soldiers. Hence arose the necessity of placing the Nizam’s army upon an efficient footing in Berar. Captain Thomas Sydenham who was the Resident at Hyderabad from 1805 to 1810 set upon himself the task of reforming the sarkari infantry stationed in Berar. With this purpose he sent to Berar a detachment of the subsidiary force from Hyderabad under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton. It was arranged that a detachment of 50 troops from the sarkari infantry should be sent every day to the British lines to take part in the platoon exercises along with the troops of the subsidiary force. The trained troops would afterwards be employed in training the other troops of the sarkari infantry. On Doveton’s withdrawal from Berar he was succeeded by Captain George Sydenham, the

8. Fraser, Reports and returns of the subsidiary force & the Hyderabad Contingent—p 70—paras 2-4.

9. Jones, Papers relating to progress of Br. power etc.—p 120.
brother of the Resident, who carried the reforms initiated by Doveton. These reforms were of very transitory nature. During the long absence of Sydenham from Berar these troops 'entirely lost the benefit of every improvement' which had been introduced among them by Doveton and Sydenham.\(^\text{10}\)

Though the reforms introduced in the Berar infantry did not produce the desired result, they were successful at least in the case of two Sarkari battalions stationed in the city of Hyderabad. The discipline of these battalions had been undermined by the irregular payment which caused mutiny among the troops. Mr. Russell, who had succeeded Sydenham as the Resident of Hyderabad in 1811, realised like Arthur Wellesley that the contingent which the Nizam was bound to supply according to the stipulation of the treaty of 1800 would not serve any useful purpose unless it was placed upon an efficient footing. So, he commenced his work of building an efficient contingent with these battalions. Two things, he thought, were necessary for making the Nizam's army well-disciplined and serviceable; one was the appointment of European officers and the other was regular payment to the troops. Knowing that the Nizam would not agree to the proposal of reforming his whole army at a time, which would entail a heavy burden on the exchequer, the Resident wanted to reform only a section (regular troops) of his army.

\(^{10}\) Fraser, Reports and returns of the subsidiary force & the Hyderabad contingent—p 73—para 17.
He began his work of reform with the first two battalions of the Nizam's *Sarkari* infantry stationed at Hyderabad. In 1813 Russell induced the Nizam's government to allow him to disburse the pay of one of the two battalions from the proceeds of the *peshkash* due to the Nizam in respect of the Northern Sarkars and the same arrangement was later on extended to the second battalion also. These two battalions were placed under Becket who organised them in such a way that they soon became the best unit in the Nizam's army.\(^{11}\) They were allowed to purchase arms and ammunitions from the Company's arsenal at Sikandarabad. After these two battalions had been thoroughly reformed they came to be known as the 'Russell Brigade' in honour of Russell. The total strength of the brigade on its formation in March 1813, was 2,081.\(^{12}\) In April 1814, Lieutenant Hare of the Bombay army was appointed its commander and in course of time other European officers were appointed. These European officers improved the tone of the 'Russell Brigade' and soon it became not only the best unit in the Nizam's army but a model for other battalions also. The soldiers of the 'Russell Brigade' were recruited not from other corps in the Nizam's army but from the Company's territory in India. It was cantoned near the British Residency, captained by English officers and leavened with the British military spirit. It was not allowed to furnish guard in the Nizam's palace

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nor did it, 'except upon actual service', do any duty 'out of its own lines'. The Brigade was armed, dressed, disciplined and equipped in every respect like the Company's army. The soldiers composing it were not allowed to mix with the inhabitants of Hyderabad or with any other branch of the Nizam's army. They were appointed by the European officers of the Brigade and received their pay from them direct. So, they came to look upon these English officers and the British Resident as their masters. Indeed they considered 'themselves as being the troops much more of the Company than of the Nizam.' In short, its expenses alone were borne by the Nizam, in all other respects it was under the control of the British Resident and the Company's military officers. In name it belonged to the Nizam, but in reality it was a Company's brigade maintained at the cost of the Nizam.

Meanwhile the *sarkari* infantry in Berar lost whatever benefit it had derived from the reforms of Colonel Doveton and Captain Sydenham and gradually drifted back to its old habits. But the wonderful achievement of the 'Russell Brigade' encouraged the Resident to try again to reform the Berar establishment of the Nizam's army. Moreover as the *Pindari* depredations in Berar assumed a fearful state the reforms could not be delayed with safety. So the reform of two brigades (each consisting of three battalions) of *sarkari* infantry stationed in Berar was undertaken.

(13) Pol. Con.—28 Feb., 1815—No. 53.
One of the brigades was placed under the command of Elliot and the other under Fraser.

Hitherto no attempt had been made to reform the Nizam’s cavalry in Berar, because it had been entirely under the Indian commanders who had special rights and privileges and they could not be disturbed without creating discontent which might even ferment into disaffection. But the same cause which necessitated the reform of Berar infantry compelled the British Resident to undertake the reform of Berar horse also. The reform of cavalry was more urgent and necessary than Berar infantry, as in repelling the Pindari inroads cavalry would prove more useful than the infantry. In 1816 the scheme for the reform of Berar cavalry was brought to the notice of the Company’s government and received its approval. But when the proposed reform was being carried out, various objections were raised by Chandu Lal and his brother Govind Baksh who was the Governor of Berar, for in case of reform they had to surrender to the European officers the authority which they had hitherto exercised over the Berar cavalry.\(^\text{14}\) After some discussion it was agreed to reform in Berar a body of 5000 horse consisting of 3,000 sarkari and 2,000 of jagirdari troops. Of the sarkari horse to be reformed in Berar, 2,000 were to be taken from those who were in service and 1,000 to be recruited. The jagirdari cavalry was to consist of 1,500 of Salabat Khan’s horse with 500 selected

\(^{14}\) Fraser, Reports and returns of the subsidiary force etc—p78—para 37.

G.P. 168 - 13
from other jagirdars in Berar. One thousand horse were to be brought from Hyderabad to raise the number of Berar horse to 6,000.\(^{15}\) The jagirdari cavalry was to be stationed at Ellichpur under the personal command of Salabat Khan's principal officer, Fateh Jang Khan, with European officers attached to it. The reformed sarkari cavalry was placed under the command of Captain Davies of the Company's army.\(^{16}\) The 'Russell Brigade' and these reformed Berar cavalry and infantry constituted the Hyderabad Contingent and the contingent which the Nizam furnished during the Pindari War consisted of 7,425 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.\(^{17}\)

It has already been stated that the 'Russell Brigade' since its inception was for all practical purposes more a Company's brigade than the Nizam's. The Berar portion of the Hyderabad Contingent i.e., the reformed infantry and cavalry stationed in Berar was also put on the same footing in 1817 by Russell's instructions which were issued to Capt. George Sydenham, the Political Agent in Berar, Davies, the commander of the reformed horse, and Major Pitman, the commander of reformed infantry in Berar. Sydenham was informed that 'the general control and direction of the whole' reformed horse and infantry would remain with him and the exercise of his authority over the Berar portion of Hyderabad Contingent

\(^{15}\) Ibid - p78—paras 38—39.

\(^{16}\) Ibid—pp78-79—paras 39 & 40.

\(^{17}\) Ibid—p87—paras 66.
would be regulated by the same principles, which regulated the authority exercised by the Resident over the officers of the subsidiary force. He was further advised 'to keep the troops (of the contingent) as far as possible to themselves,' to persuade Raja Govind Baksh 'to dispense with any guards being furnished by troops of the Contingent' either for his own house or for any other duties in the city. He was reminded that similar measures had also been adopted long before with regard to Russell Brigade. Major Pitman and Captain Davies were instructed that the troops under their command 'should be regulated as far as possible in their discipline and in all their internal arrangement by the same principles' which prevailed in the Company's army. For their guidance in the matter a code of articles of war framed after those of the Company's army and 'sanctioned by the official seal and signature of the Nizam's minister' was sent to them. Even in respect of pay the difference that had hitherto existed between the Russell Brigade and the Berar portion of the contingent was removed by placing troops of the Berar establishments on the same footing with those of Russell Brigade. In order to ensure regular and punctual payment of the reformed horse in Berar, Chandu Lal at the instance of Russell entered into an agreement with Palmer and Company by which they engaged on the security of assignment on the revenues of certain districts in Berar to furnish at

(18) Pol. Con—1817—14 Nov.—No. 64.
(19) Ibid.
Aurangabad the sum of rupees two lakhs per month. 20 By this arrangement Govind Baksh lost his influence over the Berar establishment of the Hyderabad Contingent. In 1819 the whole Berar portion of the Hyderabad Contingent was placed solely under the command of Major Pitman and he was directed to forward all returns and reports regarding the reformed troops in Berar direct to the Resident instead of through the Political Agent which had hitherto been the practice. Thus the Berar portion of the Hyderabad Contingent was placed on the same footing as the Russell Brigade and uniformity as regards discipline, pay and control prevailed in the whole contingent. For payment of the troops of the contingent the minister was ultimately responsible, but he had little control over the contingent. Even no promotion of officers in the contingent could take place without the previous sanction of the Company’s government. 21 Thus what has been said about the Russell Brigade may be said about the whole contingent—it was Nizam’s contingent in name, but for all practical purposes it was a Company’s contingent. As the Resident was concerned with the management and organisation of the contingent and the Nizam with the financing, the former did not bother about the huge expenditure which the unnecessary and costly appointments involved, so long as he could make the Nizam or his minister pay for the contingent regularly. It

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(20) To court; 21 Oct., 1820.—
(21) Pol. Con, 14 Aug. 1829—No. 6-para 17
was a curious instance of the Nizam paying the piper and the Resident calling for the tune. As this system of creating unnecessary posts and paying high salaries to the European military officers of the contingent continued, the sarcastic expression, "Poor Nizzy! Nizzy pays for all", became current among the Europeans in India.

Strict discipline involving severity of punishment, harassing system of drill and above all numerous innovations foreign to the habits and customs of the Indians, produced a feeling of irritation among the Indian soldiers of the contingent. The feeling of irritation inflamed into open mutiny at Mominabad by the indiscreet action of a junior European officer who had a dislike for soldiers wearing beard. On 5 May, 1827, he caused two soldiers of the 3rd cavalry to be forcibly shaved and publicly declared that all soldiers who would not shave their beard voluntarily would be treated in a like manner.

Next morning, the soldiers of the cavalry took up a position on the parade ground with loaded guns in their hands. They demanded their discharge from the services where they had been exposed to such insult. On this Colonel Davies rode up to infuriated men to pacify them. The mutineers signalled him to go away, but Davies had so much faith in his men that he ignored their signal and approached them. While he was thus engaged in pacifying the mutineers, he was at once

(22) Calcutta Review, Vol XI, 1849 (Jan-June), p195
shot through the body by the ring leader, and when he fell down his body was cut to pieces by others. The mutineers were at once charged by other soldiers who had been drawn up near the spot. Some of the mutineers were instantly killed and others took to their heels. Subsequently those who took part in the mutiny were tried by court martial and punished. The officer whose indiscreet action caused this mutiny was immediately discharged from his service.

This mutiny revealed the dark as well as the bright side of the discipline in the Hyderabad Contingent. The Indian soldiers of the contingent who were not accustomed to European discipline, thought that they were being unnecessarily harassed. Some of the officers were not selected with sufficient care and promotion being rapid junior officers without any experience and acquaintance with the customs, habits and language of the Indians were placed in responsible positions which should have been occupied by senior officers acquainted with Indian sentiments and customs. That the majority of soldiers did not participate in the mutiny and that the mutineers were charged and some of them were even killed by others showed that the discipline in the contingent was not bad and that some of the officers were really loved by their soldiers. Since the inception of the Hyderabad Contingent down to the time when it was transferred to the English in 1853, no other outbreak of disorder in the contingent besmeared

its fair name. This shows how well disciplined the contingent was.

Upto 1829 the contingent had been considered by the Residents as a field of patronage. In that year Lord William Bentinck abolished some unnecessary posts and reduced the salary of others, which were considered as too high.*25 In the same year it was ordered that all the European officers, in the Nizam’s service including those of the King’s or Company’s army were to receive from the Nizam ‘the pay and allowances of the rank which they held respectively in his service, according to the rates of pay and allowances assigned to the same rank in the Company’s service’. Staff allowances were to be the same as in the corresponding situations in the Company’s service.26 These reforms were effected with a view to making the services in the Hyderabad Contingent not more attractive than the Company’s services. Reduction of pay and abolition of unnecessary posts effected by Lord William Bentinck went a long way in reducing the expenditure of the Hyderabad Contingent.

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* The posts of medical store-keeper, superintending surgeon, principal commissary of ordnance, judge-advocate (on a monthly salary of Rs.1653/-) were abolished. Privilege of furlough to Europe was discontinued. The Military Secretary’s pay of Rs. 2,000/- per month was considered as “too high” by the Governor-General (Pol. Con—11 Dec., 1829—No. 45).


gent. But still there was further scope for the reduction of expenditure. In 1831 Col. Stewart, the Resident at Hyderabad, suggested to the Supreme Government that the posts of three paymasters could be easily abolished as the whole pay of the contingent was being issued monthly at that time from the treasury of the Residency either 'on cash or Hoondees furnished by the minister'. He wrote to the Supreme Government, "We are in justice bound to reduce all unnecessary expenses in the maintenance of (Hyderabad) contingent as rigidly as if it were paid by the British Government". That there was scope for further reduction of expenses even after the reduction effected by Lord William Bentinck was admitted by Lord Dalhousie who in his minute of 25 September, 1848, stated, "We cause the contingent to become a much heavier burden on the Nizam's finances than it ought to be. The staff in my humble judgment is preposterously large. The pay, allowances and charges of the various kinds are far higher than they ought to be". He even admitted that though the expenses of the Nizam's contingent were proportionately higher than those of the Gwalior Contingent the latter was in no way inferior to the former or the Company's Indian army. That the expenses of the contingent could

*An annual saving of three lakhs of rupees was thus effected.

(27) Pol. Con.—1831—27 May—No. 65.
(28) Pol. letter to Court—No. 40 of 1851.
(29) For. Con.—1853—8 April—No. 79—Dalhousie's Minute, 30 March, 1853.
actually be reduced without any loss of efficiency was proved later on. On the failure of the Nizam to clear off his debt to the Company and to pay the expenses of the Hyderabad Contingent regularly, he was compelled to make over in perpetuity Berar, Raichur Doab and some districts bordering on Ahmednagar and Sholapur to the Company by the treaty of 1853. The Company on its part agreed to maintain the Hyderabad Contingent.\footnote{30} In the treaty of 1800 the numerical strength of the contingent was fixed at six thousand infantry and nine thousand cavalry in time of war only. But in practice the Company insisted on five thousand infantry, two thousand and five hundred cavalry and twenty-four guns at all times, whether in time of peace or war.\footnote{31} In the treaty of September, 1853, the numerical strength was fixed at 'five thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry and four field batteries of artillery' corresponding very nearly to the number which was retained in practice.\footnote{32} But the expenses of the contingent after 1853 was much lower than that of the years previous to 1853. In 1851 the annual cost of the contingent was Rs. 38,30,000, in 1853-54 it stood at Rs. 36,08,213 whereas in 1854-55 it came down to Rs. 17,50,230. In years subsequent to 1853-54 the expenses of Hyderabad Contingent were always lower than those of the years previous to 1853 at

\footnote{30} Aitchison—Vol. VIII (1864) No. XVI—Art 3.
\footnote{31} For. Con, 8 April, 1853—No. 74
\footnote{32} Aitchison—Vol. V (1864) No. XVI, Art 3.
least by eight or nine lakhs of rupees.\textsuperscript{33} This reduction in expenses was effected by the retrenchment of staff officers subsequent to the year 1853-54.

As regards the reduction of expenses in the contingent there was a unanimity of opinion at the Hyderabad Residency, in the council chamber in Calcutta and in Leadenhall street that the cost of the contingent was burdensome and ought to be reduced. It has been shown that the reduction in expenses could have been effected even after 1829. But when in 1835 Chandu Lal after having made some reduction in expenses requested the Company to reduce the expenses of the contingent and thus give him some relief from financial embarrassment, he was informed in reply by the Governor-General in Council that they would co-operate in measures of economy when they would perceive any real disposition on the part of the Nizam's government towards the retrenchment of public expenditure but could not acquiesce in the reduction of the expense in the contingent when money thus saved would be spent on some other items of expenditure.\textsuperscript{34} By some other expenditure the Governor-General in Council meant expenses on the unreformed and irregular troops of the Nizam. They could never encourage the idea of robbing Paul to pay Peter. The Company's Government had always urged the Nizam to disband those irregular troops and was

\textsuperscript{33} Fraser, Reports and returns etc—pp 202—230.
\textsuperscript{34} (i) Pol. Con—23 March, 1835—No. 48
even willing to help him in this matter. But the Nizam was unable to do this for the following reasons, among others.

First, he had to pay off their arrears of pay before they were dismissed. But his exchequer had become so much depleted that he was not in a position to clear their dues.

Secondly, after their dismissal they had to be removed from Hyderabad, otherwise the unemployed soldiers would disturb the tranquillity of the state. Though the Indian soldiers could be removed from Hyderabad without any difficulty, it would not have been so easy to remove the Arabs who formed the bulk of the irregular troops. The Arabs had been living in Hyderabad for several generations and had intermarried with the local people. In short, they had become by adoption the sons of the soil. Moreover, the Arabs had claims upon the government and individuals to the tune of nearly fifty lakhs of rupees. Unless their debts were settled, they could not be removed from Hyderabad.

Lastly, the Nizam was somewhat unwilling to disband these troops. Perhaps he considered that the disbandment of irregular troops would lower his dignity in the eyes of his subjects. He said to Colonel Low, the British Resident, "Two acts on the part of a sovereign are always reckoned disgraceful, one is to give away unnecessarily any part of his hereditary territories, the other is to disband troops."35

(35) For Con—10 June, 1853—No. 87—para 6.
If the Nizam was not in a position to disband his irregular troops was he bound to maintain the contingent? By the 12th Article of the treaty of 1800 it was stipulated that should any war break out between the Nizam and the East India Company on the one hand and any other power on the other, the Nizam should send along with the subsidiary force a contingent of six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse from his own force for the purpose of opposing the common enemy. This contingent of six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse which when reformed came later on to be known as the Hyderabad Contingent, was not, as is evident from the treaty, meant to be a permanent force. The services of these troops were to be requisitioned by the East India Company in times of war only. Successive Residents and Governors-General declared that the Nizam was not bound to maintain the contingent for all times, in peace and war alike. Russell had suggested that as the Nizam's own troops were a rabble and were unable to maintain the internal peace of the country, so the East India Company had the right to require the maintenance of a smaller body of troops under its control and training. To men of Russell's way of thinking Lord Dalhousie's reply was that the 12th Article of the treaty of 1800 did not confer upon the English East India Company such constructive right.  

(36) For Con—1853—8 April,—No. 79.
the sake of maintaining the tranquillity of Nizam's dominions, the services of the Nizam's contingent were not necessary after 1800. By the 5th Article of the treaty of 1798 the subsidiary force was not to be employed on trifling occasions nor for purposes like the collection of revenues. The Article States, "...It (subsidiary force) is not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor, like Sebundy*, to be stationed in the country to collect the revenues thereof." Perhaps in order to remove this inconvenience Russell suggested the maintenance of a regular force for all times under the control and discipline of British military officers. But the restriction imposed on the subsidiary force by the treaty of 1798 was removed by the 17th Article of the treaty of 1800. The article runs, "If in future the Shorapore or Gudwall zamindars, or any other subjects or dependents of His Highness's Government should withhold the payment of the Cincar's just claims upon them, or excite rebellion or disturbance, the subsidiary force, or such portion thereof as may be requisite, after the reality of the offence shall be duly ascertained, shall be ready, in concert with His Highness's own troops, to reduce all such offenders to obedience." This article allowed the subsidiary force to be employed not only in collecting revenues but even in suppressing rebellion or disturbance within Hyderabad. The new duties thus imposed upon the subsidiary force remained with it till they were transferred to the Hyderabad Contingent in

Vide Chapter II—p60
1853. The 3rd Article of the treaty of 1853 states, "...If the rebellion or disturbance shall be excited, or if the just claim and authority of His Highness shall be resisted, the said contingent, after the reality of the offence shall have been duly ascertained, shall be employed to reduce the offenders to submission." At the same time the 2nd Article of the said treaty stipulated that the subsidiary force was not to be employed 'on trifling occasions' like Seh-bandi. So, where was the necessity of maintaining a contingent under the control of the British Resident at the cost of the Nizam during the period intervening between 1800 and 1853? If there was any necessity at all for the maintenance of a separate military force under the British Resident for helping the Nizam in maintaining the internal peace of his kingdom it arose after 1853 and not before it. Moreover, since 1817, when the power of the Marathas and the Pindaris had been crushed, the Hyderabad Contingent was not employed in any war till its services were requisitioned in 1857 for quelling mutiny of the sepoys in Central India. So, neither by treaty stipulation nor by any exigency of war after 1817, the Nizam was bound to maintain the contingent at a huge cost. It may not be out of place to mention here that the Nizam ceded territories under the treaty of 1800, in commutation of subsidy in cash, on the express stipulation that the Company was to maintain the subsidiary force at certain specified strength. But that force was reduced without the Nizam's consent for a long period at a great pecuniary saving to the Company.
The Company was able to reduce the number of troops in the subsidiary force mainly in consequence of services rendered by the contingent.\(^{37}\)

If the Nizam was not bound by any treaty stipulations to maintain the contingent then why did he maintain it? For a clear understanding of it we must remember that the contingent owned its origin and maintenance to the mutual understanding between Henry Russell and Maharaja Chandu Lal. For nearly thirty-five years Chandu Lal was the virtual ruler of Hyderabad and whatever he did was supported by the Company’s government in Calcutta and whatever the latter suggested the former put into practice. So long as Chandu Lal was at the helm of affairs in Hyderabad, the Nizam was a mere figurehead, everything was done by the minister even without caring to know whether his action would meet with the Nizam’s approval or not. Under such circumstances the contingent was organised by Henry Russell with the approval of the minister. That the Nizam had no hand in organising the contingent was evident from a conversation which Low, the British Resident, had with the former in 1853. The British Resident was told by the Nizam that the contingent had been organised by Sabit Jang (meaning thereby Henry Russell), to which the Resident replied that his father must have consented to the engagement, otherwise it could not have been brought into existence. The Nizam retorted, “Don’t say my

\(^{37}\) Fraser, Memoir, and correspondence etc—p360
father, say the Maharaja.'

Chandu Lal gave his consent to its organisation and supplied necessary funds from the exchequer of the state hoping that thereby he would be able to please the Company and secure its support against his enemies in the state.

One feels inclined to ask why the contingent was not disbanded after Maharaja Chandu Lal had resigned his office in 1843. In an interview with Low, the British Resident, in the month of March, 1853, the Nizam once gave a hint as to the direction in which his mind was working regarding the contingent. The Nizam having told the Resident frankly that his father was not at all responsible for the establishment of the contingent asked the Resident why the contingent was retained even after the third Anglo-Maratha War. The Resident was taken aback and posed a counterquestion to the Nizam whether the Arabs, the Ruhelas and other turbulent people of his dominions would allow him to collect revenue if they were not overawed by the presence of the contingent. That was a sufficient hint to set at rest any doubt the Nizam might have had in his mind regarding the utility of maintaining the contingent. After this the Resident asked him whether he desired to reduce the expenses of the contingent and if he so desired the Governor-General would be liberally disposed towards him. The Nizam’s answer, if it

(38) Par. Pap (H. G.)—1854—No 418—
Minute of a private conference with the Nizam—para 8—p95.
could be called an answer at all, was "No, No, they are excellent troops indeed, but I won't trouble you with any more conversation to-day." 

From the conversation just referred to, it seems that the Nizam had some hesitation in disbanding the contingent and that is why he refrained from asking the Company to disband the contingent. The cause of this hesitation is not far to seek. It had been impressed upon his mind by Maharaja Chandu Lal that for preserving the peace and tranquillity of his state, teeming as it was with foreign mercenaries, the presence of the contingent was essential. The Nizam's sense of false prestige also stood in the way of disbanding the contingent.

Had the Nizam been told by the Governor-General or the Resident that the duty of preserving peace and tranquillity within his dominions and of helping him in collecting revenue had devolved upon the subsidiary force since 1800 and that the maintenance of the contingent was not necessary for the purpose, he would have gladly disbanded the contingent. It is doubtful whether the British Government would have allowed the Nizam to disband the contingent even if he wanted to do so. Although paid by the Nizam, the contingent was for all practical purposes a British contingent under the control of the British Resident at Hyderabad and captained by British officers. Lord Hastings was so sanguine about the loyalty of the contingent towards the Company that he thought in any

(40) Par. Pap. (H. C.)—No. 418 of 1845—p89—para 5.
O.P.-168—14
rupture between Hyderabad and the Company, the troops of the contingent would eventually side with the Company against their ostensible master. When the Court of Directors pointed out to the Governor-General in Council that it would be impolitic to extend the European discipline to the armies of Indian Princes, Lord Hastings wrote, "The perfectioning of those troops in military exercise might not have been politic unless their devotion to us were secured by the stipulation that they should receive their pay thro' the European officers from funds furnished for the purpose by the minister to the Resident. The reformed corps became thus in truth a part of your army, tho' inexpensive one, as they are maintained by their ostensible sovereign. Their fidelity to your Government was not a delusive speculation. At the battle of Kerkee the Paishwa's reformed troops fought on our side against their nominal master; and this was merely thro' the influence of their officers". 41 So, he would not allow the Nizam to disband such a useful contingent to the Company on the ground that it was not obligatory on the Nizam to maintain the contingent. 42 In a letter to Henry Russell he wrote that invariable attention to the interests of Chandu Lal and the maintenance of the reformed troops meaning thereby the contingent were essential for the Company. 43 Moreover, the contingent was a

41 Lord Hastings letter to Court, 3 June, 1820 quoted in political letter to Court, 25 Oct., 1825.

42 Hyd. Pap.—p. 31—G. G.'s minute, 10 Nov. 1818.

43 Ibid.—p 89—To Russell, 26 Oct., 1819.
valuable source of patronage to the Governors-General and the British Residents at Hyderabad. British military officers of high rank were appointed in the Hyderabad Contingent with fat salaries and emoluments which they could never expect to receive in the Company’s service.
CHAPTER VI

INTERFERENCE IN THE PECUNIARY TRANSACTIONS OF HYDERABAD (WILLIAM PALMER AND COMPANY)

The maintenance of the Hyderabad Contingent saddled the Nizam, as has been narrated in the previous chapter, with a heavy military expenditure which the Nizam was unable to bear. The heavy military expenditure was an appendage to the subsidiary alliance both in the case of Hyderabad and of Oudh.

The financial embarrassment from which the rulers of these two states had been suffering owing to their extravagance was increased beyond measure by this military expenditure. The British merchants and money-lenders who had been pouring into these states were shrewd enough to exploit this financial embarrassment. These money-lenders lent money to the rulers at a very high rate of interest expecting to realise it with the help of the Supreme Government or the Resident in case the rulers refused to pay them. Some of these money-lenders were connected with the Company’s Residency. In Oudh Mr. Johnstone of the Lucknow Residency, was creditor to the Nawab of Oudh to the tune of Rs. 7,57,000.¹ In Hyderabad this money-lending business was done by “William Palmer and Company” whose partners

included the Residency surgeon and Rumbold*, who, it was believed, could even bring the influence of the Governor-General to bear upon the Nizam if it was thought necessary. The money-lending business resulted in an increasing interference of the Company's Government to protect the interest either of the money-lenders or of the rulers.

William Palmer and Company was established in the wake of the Commercial Treaty which was concluded between the Nizam and the East India Company in 1802. This treaty opened up a prospect for the English firms to extend their trade to Hyderabad.† The firm was founded by William Palmer, the son of General Palmer by his Indian wife. John Palmer, the eldest son of General Palmer by his English wife, was the founder of Palmer and Company in Calcutta. William joined the Nizam's army after it had been purged of the French elements in 1798. He soon rose to the

* William Rumbold had married Lord Hastings' ward who was 'like a daughter' to him. Lord Hastings was a trustee of Lady Rumbold's fortune. William Rumbold accompanied Lord Hastings to India as his household Chamberlain. Lord Hastings appointed him a Calcutta J. P. on a salary of Rs. 1,400 a month (Thompson, Metcalfe, p 193.)

† Article 3 of the Commercial Treaty with the Nizam States:

"There shall be a free transit between the territories of of the contracting parties of all articles being the growth, produce or manufacture of each respectively, and also of all articles being the growth, produce, or manufacture of any part of His Britannic Majesty's dominions".
position of a Brigadier and took part in some military engagements. He remained in the Nizam's service for a period of ten years after which he retired from the Nizam's service and put up in one of the bungalows at the British Residency to carry on a secret private business. Some of the officers of the Residency were secretly connected with this business and so no objection was raised in the establishment of the firm within the precincts of the Residency.

In the beginning this private firm consisted of William Palmer, his brother Hastings Palmer, Bunketty Das, a banker of Gujarat, William Currie and Samuel Russell. William Currie was a surgeon to the British Residency and invested two lakhs of rupees in the business. It may be mentioned here, that William Currie did not violate any rules of his service by becoming a partner of the firm, as the Civil Surgeons of the East India Company were allowed to trade up to 1840. Samuel Russell was an officer in the Corps of Madras Engineers. Lured by the prospect of the business he gave up his career in the army.

When William Palmer and Company started its business secretly in 1811, Chandu Lal was the virtual minister of Hyderabad and was maintained by the government of East India Company (1a). The Nizam was not satisfied with this arrangement and withdrew himself from the administration of the state leaving Chandu Lal practically the ruler.

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1a. Mandamus—Appx to the protest No. 74. App No.x 1 para 1—p 147.
of Hyderabad. On 17 May, 1811, Henry Russell came to Hyderabad as the British Resident.

 Barely two months had passed after the arrival of the new Resident when the transactions of William Palmer with Chandu Lal as minister of Hyderabad commenced on 1 August, 1811. Lured by the high rate of interest which the Resident expected to receive from William Palmer and Company, he lodged some money with the house in the name of his 'old friend' Samuel Russell. His younger brother Charles Russell who was an assistant in the Residency, was also a constituent of Palmer House. In the early part of 1814 a hitch occurred between the Resident and William Palmer. Two cases of extortion practised by an Indian employee of the house were referred by the Resident to William Palmer, but he instead of taking any action against the employee rather supported him. This annoyed the Resident so much that he refused to leave to the house 'the exercise of an influence which was universally considered to proceed' from him. He also asked William Palmer to remove his concern to some place outside the Residency. This was immediately done. Though a coolness sprang up between the Resident and William Palmer, the former did not withdraw his money from the house. But as Samuel Russell withdrew his money at this time, the Resident had also to do the same*.

* Russell had been thinking of withdrawing his money as the rumour was abroad that he was the senior partner of the concern. (Ind. Arch., Vol. VIII, From H. Russell to his father, 26 Aug., 1814, p 144). But Samuel's withdrawal of money compelled him to withdraw his own even earlier.
His brother also followed suit. This sudden withdrawal of money by Samuel, which compelled the Resident to withdraw his own, was not liked by the Resident. Soon after the withdrawal of money by the Russell brothers, John Palmer, a brother of William Palmer and a business magnate of Calcutta, joined the firm as its partner.²

Not expecting to receive any help from the Resident in securing the sanction of the Supreme Government to the establishment of a regular house of business, Palmer brothers tried to secure the support of the Governor-General through Rumbold. With this purpose in view William Palmer formed his connection with Rumbold. In the early part of 1814 Rumbold received through John Palmer a proposal to become a partner of William Palmer and Company of Hyderabad.³ Rumbold consulted Lord Moira about the prudence of accepting the proposal, but was discouraged by the latter.⁴

On 30 March, 1814, William Palmer and Company submitted an application to the Resident desiring the establishment of a mercantile firm at Hyderabad to avail themselves of the provisions of the Commercial Treaty of 1802* and requesting the

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⁴. Ibid.

* The Company proposed in its application to engage in banking and in supplying timber from the forest on the
Supreme Government to 'sanction (their) establishment with its approbation.' If we are to believe the words of the Resident he was not willing to recommend the application to the Governor-General in council, but as the consent of the Supreme Government (Lord Moira ?) to sanction the establishment of the firm had already been obtained through John Palmer's personal influence†, the Resident sent the application with his recommendation. The application of William Palmer and Company was duly forwarded by the Resident to the Political Secretary on 6 April for 'favourable consideration' of the Governor-General in Council.

banks of the Godavari for the purpose of ship-building. It also intended 'to open a navigation of four hundred miles on the Godavari and its tributary' which would facilitate the commercial intercourse between Berar and the coast of the Bay of Bengal.


† That the Resident had been hesitating to recommend the application to the Supreme Government is evident from a letter written about this time by John Palmer to his brother W. Palmer who was at Hyderabad. John Palmer wrote to his brother on April, 1814, "If R (Russell) support your application as he ought the stability of your house will hence forward depend upon yourself and be at no man's mercy, caprice or fears. If he fails to the minutest little of his obligation to recommend your establishment, I shall know how to dispense with the weight of his authority"—Mss. Eng. Lett. C 84 (Bodleian), Palmer Papers, p 39.


On the basis of the recommendation of the Resident the Supreme Government allowed the Resident to lend 'every proper degree of countenance' to the commercial establishment of William Palmer and Company. 8

In the month of January, 1815, only a few months after the sanction to the firm had been given by the Supreme Government, Rumbold went to Hyderabad with a letter from Lord Moira to the Resident. The Resident was requested therein to inform Rumbold 'minutely respecting the state of the House of Palmer and Company in which he (was) invited to become a partner.' 9 The Resident advised and encouraged Rumbold to become a partner of the house.10 In the month of April, 1815, Rumbold signed a deed of partnership. The Governor-General gave Rumbold to understand that the partners of the firm speculated that his association with the firm as a partner would interest him (Governor-General) in the welfare of the House 'to a degree which (might) be beneficial to them' and that their expectation was considered by the Governor-General as 'fair and honest'. He even went so far as to assure Rumbold that no other British firm in Hyderabad would be allowed to compete with William Palmer and Company.11

10. Ibid—p 149—Resident to Lord Moira, Hyd., 8 April, 1815.
This shows the extent to which the Governor-General was willing to go to support the firm for the sake of Rumbold.

There is no doubt that Lord Moira was influenced by John Palmer and the consideration for the welfare of Rumbold in giving sanction to the establishment of the firm. It was the connection of Rumbold with the house of Palmer that induced the Governor-General to take unusual interest in the welfare of the concern even after its establishment as a regular house of business had been sanctioned.

The Resident probably recommended the application of William Palmer and Company to the Supreme Government when he came to know that the sanction to the establishment of the firm had been obtained from the Supreme Government (Governor-General ?). But it is surprising that neither in the forwarding letter nor in the application itself any mention was made of the previous existence of the firm.* This he perhaps did, in order to suppress the fact that the concern had been started within the premises of the Residency and that the Resident himself and his brother were the constituents of the house. Besides this he might have other motives for recommending the application. The new concern which lacked the support of the British Residency in the beginning was not so

* The firm before it received the sanction of the Supreme Government to its establishment as a regular house of business, has been termed as 'old concern' in Hyderabad papers.
prosperous as the old one. But the Resident realised that the house had a bright future when he felt that Lord Moira took interest in it. The Russell brothers were not happy for the withdrawal of their money even after their hitch with William Palmer, it was only when Samuel Russell withdrew his money that the Russell brothers reluctantly withdrew their own.

The Russell brothers intended to leave India after they had amassed a sum sufficient to enable them to spend the rest of their lives easily in England. Henry Russell had a mind to go back to his country in 1818 with a sum of £60,000. This he could have done if he had lodged his money with William Palmer and Company which usually paid a high rate of interest. So, when the Resident realised that with the Supreme Government's countenance the house had a bright prospect and that it would afford him a good place to lodge his money safely and profitably, he recommended the application to the Supreme Government for its favourable consideration.

Only three months after the establishment of the house had been sanctioned, the Resident wrote to his father, "Palmer's concern is prosperous, and he professes to be grateful to me for the support I have given him. We never at any time had much personal intercourse but we are upon very

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good terms and I am one of the constituents of the House". The lodging of money with the house by the Resident so soon after the countenance of the Supreme Government had been given, leads one to suspect that the Resident was guided by self-interest also in recommending the house to the Supreme Government. When he understood that the establishment of the house would be sanctioned by the Supreme Government, he took advantage of this knowledge to serve his own purpose. After the Supreme Government had sanctioned the establishment of the house, the Resident lodged his money with it at an interest of 12%. In the month of August, 1818 the Resident had in the house Rs. 1,70,000 in his own account.*

From 1814 to 1816 the house engaged in complicated dealings with the Nizam's Government regarding the purchase of arms, stores, and other things. The payment thereof was made in assignments on revenues. The difficulty in the realisation of revenues and the consequent delay in discharging the payments reduced the Nizam virtually to the position of a debtor in his account

14a. Ibid.

* The father of the Resident had also lodged some money with the house in the name of Charles Russell. On 30 September, 1815, he had with the house Rs. 1,08,345-8-6 (Ind. Arch.—Vol. VII—p 155, H. Russell to his father, 29 Nov, 1816).
with the firm. The authorities of the firm felt that their pecuniary transactions with the government of Hyderabad might subject them to penalties under an Act of the British Parliament passed during the reign of George III (37th Geo. III Cap, 142, Sec 28)* unless consented to and approved of by the Governor-General in Council in writing. So they applied in 1816 to the Governor-General in Council for exempting them from the operation

*37th Geo. III Cap. 142, Sec. 28, states; “And whereas the practice of British subjects lending money, or being concerned in the lending of the same, or in transaction for borrowing money for, or lending money to, the native Princes of India, has been productive of much mischief, and is the source of much usury and extortion; And whereas the wholesome orders of the Court of Directors of the United Company of Merchants trading to India have not been sufficient to restrain and repress the same; And whereas it is highly desirable that such practices should be prevented in future: Be it therefore enacted, that from and after the first day of December next, no British subject shall, by himself or by any other person, directly or indirectly employed by him, be concerned in the lending any money to any such Native Prince;......without the consent and approbation of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, or the consent and approbation of the Governor-in-Council of one of the said Company’s Government in India, first had and obtained in writing: And every person doing, acting, or transacting, ......contrary to this act, shall be deemed and taken to be guilty of misdemeanour at law, and shall and may be proceeded against and punished as such......before any court ......and all bonds, notes, assignments, or securities for money ......shall be, and the same are hereby declared to be null and void.....” (Hyd. Pap—p. 105).
of the law provided that whatever transactions they might have with the Nizam's government should be such as would be approved of by the Supreme Government. It will not be out of place to mention that the act referred to had been passed to prevent the European subjects of the British Government from acquiring privately too much influence at the courts of the Indian princes and from extorting exorbitant interest from them. The house in its memorial tried to prove its utility by stating the useful service it had rendered to the commerce of Hyderabad by bringing down teak wood from the forest on the Godavari to the sea coast and by having ascertained the navigability of the Godavari up to four hundred miles from the sea coast.\(^\text{16}\)

It may be mentioned here that just as the application seeking the sanction of the Supreme Government to the establishment of the firm in 1814 had received the previous approval of the Supreme Government (Governor-General?) so the memorial of 1816 also, it seems met with the previous approbation of the Governor-General. For, if we are to believe the words of the Resident who had seen the original draft of the memorial before it was submitted to him, a considerable portion of it bore the handwriting of the Governor-General.\(^\text{16a}\) So, the Resident wants us to believe

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(ii) Ibid.—3 Jan., 1824—p 53.
that he recommended the memorial and forwarded it to Calcutta for the consideration of the Governor-General in Council. But it must be remembered that at the time of recommending the application of William Palmer and Company in 1814, Russell was not a constituent of the house though he had been, perhaps, thinking of becoming one; but in 1816 he was a constituent of the house. Hence in recommending the memorial he was, it may be presumed, more actuated by personal interest than on the former occasion.

The Governor-General sought the opinion of the Advocate-General. The Advocate-General expressed the opinion that there was no legal objection to the Governor-General in Council giving their consent and approbation to the house of William Palmer and Company for carrying on such business as would be considered illegal (under the 37th Geo. III Cap. 142, Sec. 28) unless consented to and approved by the Governor-General in Council in writing. Acting on this opinion the Supreme Government granted licence to the house on the condition that the British Resident might satisfy himself regarding the nature and objects of the transactions the house might engage in. This granting of licence to the house was communicated to the Court of Directors in a letter from the Governor-General in Council, dated, 3 January, 1817; but it was not received at the East India House till 1 May, 1818. This appears to be an unaccountable delay. The Court of Directors

17 Hyd. Pap.—p 5.
seemed to have taken no notice of the communication till 24 May, 1820, when a despatch was written disapproving the injudicious use of the Governor-General’s power in granting licence to the House in 1816. They also directed him to revoke and cancel the licence and confine the countenance of the Company’s Government to those objects of commercial nature which the firm originally had in view in 1814. The Court of Directors in the same despatch expressed their doubts as to whether licence given by the Governor-General in Council would be held legal and would be effectual for the protection of the house from being prosecuted by the authorities in England under the Act which had been waived in favour of the house. 18

The despatch of 24 May, 1820, reached India in the beginning of November, 1820. But in the interval two pecuniary transactions with the Government of the Nizam had taken place, which put the Court of Directors in a dilemma.

The first is known as the Berar Horse (Sawar) Account. The sarkari cavalry stationed in Berar were not regularly paid and the irregularity in the payment undermined the efficiency of the troops. This gave rise to a great apprehension in the mind of Russell on the eve of the Pindari War. It was at his instance that William Palmer and Company agreed with Chandu Lal to provide Rs. 52,000/- monthly for the payment of one thousand of these

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18. Ibid—pp 6-8, Pol. letter to Bengal, 24 May, 1820, paras 8, 10 & 12.
O.P.-168-15
sarkari cavalry. The Supreme Government was informed of this arrangement with all the details. The arrangement got the approbation of the Supreme Government. The account of this arrangement known as the Berar Horse Account was kept distinct from the general transactions at Hyderabad.

When the Pindari War commenced, the payment of the sarkari cavalry except the one thousand horse paid by William Palmar and Company under the Berar Horse Account, failed at a critical period owing to the mismanagement of Raja Govind Baksh, the Governor of the province and brother of Raja Chandu Lal. Mr. Russell apprehending danger during the war from the irregular payment of the cavalry induced Chandu Lal to enter into another agreement with the house of William Palmer and Company. By this agreement the house engaged on the security of assignments on the revenues of certain districts of Berar to furnish two lakhs of rupees monthly at Aurangabad, the Headquarters of Berar, for the payment of the remaining three thousand sarkari horse, the four battalions of Nizam's regular infantry and the artillery. The plan had been suggested to William Palmer and Company by Captain George Sydenham, the British Agent in Berar, and the former proposed it to Mr. Russell who induced Chandu Lal to enter into the engagement. The Supreme Government was informed that the bankers of Hyderabad could not provide money for the troops and even if they could, their rate of interest would have been higher than that of William Palmer and Company, as the credit of the Nizam's Government was very
low in his own kingdom. The account of this payment made at Aurangabad was known as Aurangabad account which was kept separate from the other two transactions. The Aurangabad account commenced on 19 May, 1818.

The subject of Aurangabad arrangement was referred to the Accountant-General of the East India Company requesting him to give his opinion as to the expediency of the arrangement from the financial viewpoint, with reference to the interests of the Nizam's Government and ultimately of the Company's own.

The Accountant-General objected to the support which William Palmer and Company sought, although the Resident had been agreeable to the same, as there might be abuse of the support received. He, therefore, regarded the arrangement as highly objectionable unless the most urgent necessity for the arrangement could be shown. From the financial point of view also he could not see any necessity for the arrangement. However, in order to enable the Government to form a judgment on this point, he advised the Governor-General in Council, to obtain statements with detailed facts and figures from the house of William Palmer and Company.20

William Rumbold, who was at that time in Calcutta requested the Secretary to the Government

to favour him with a copy of the items of information sought for. On receiving the same he intimated the Secretary that if the firm of which he was a partner, was required to furnish statements of accounts with its constituents generally regarded as private and confidential that measure would destroy the confidence which the public reposed in the firm. The Governor-General in Council requested Rumbold to attend the council so that the purport of the inquiries might be explained to him. Rumbold attended the council and gave his explanations on points on which he was required to give information in connection with the Aurangabad arrangement. 21 The Resident was informed by the Secretary to the Government that the 'figured statements' of the Aurangabad transactions were no longer necessary. He was further informed that the Governor-General in Council would not take 'cognizance of that (Aurangabad) arrangement, further, than to prevent any interference, on the part of that house, or of any native agents belonging to that establishment, in the collection of the revenues or any other branch of the management of the districts assigned, under the arrangement of the parties.' 22 However, the statements had been despatched through the Resident before the aforesaid letter reached him. The statements were accordingly returned to the Resident in conformity with the spirit of the resolution which had been communicated to him.

22 Hyd. Pap.—p 21—Secretary to Russell, 9 Oct, 1819.
But James Stuart, a member of the Governor-General's Council, could not approve of the manner in which accounts were returned unexamined and of not recording the personal communication of Rumbold made before the Council. Thus the Court of Directors were deprived of the opportunity of hearing Rumbold's explanations as well as of examining the accounts submitted by Palmer and Company. This action on the part of the Governor-General in Council came in for severe criticism by the Court of Directors in whose opinion such a proceeding was 'without parallel in the annals of British Government'.

As against the accusation of Rumbold's explanation not being recorded, Lord Hastings said that his intention of inviting Rumbold to appear before the council was not to hear his explanation about the inquiries but to ascertain the veracity of the rumour, which even Stuart believed, that Russell had been secretly leagued with the house of William Palmer and Company in negotia-


* Russell stoutly denied either having given 'any corrupt support' to William Palmer and Company or 'having acted under the influence of an understanding with the house' in negotiating the Aurangabad loan. He always maintained that Aurangabad loan was necessary to keep the Berar troops in an efficient condition to take part in the Pindari War—Mss. Eng. Lett. C 171—(Bodleian) Russell to Rumbold, Jan. 27, 1824.—p 33.
ting the Aurangabad loan and another of sixty lakhs at a very high rate of interest. Questions were put to Rumbold to that effect before Stuart, and Rumbold having denied any such secret alliance, Stuart requested the Governor-General not to press the matter further. Other questions put to Rumbold being not important the Council considered them not worth reducing to writing.²⁵

The other pecuniary transaction which brought much odium on the administration of Lord Hastings was the sanction given by his government to a loan of Sixty lakhs to the Nizam’s Government by William Palmer and Company. Chandu Lal informed the Resident that he required a sum of sixty lakhs of rupees: first, for discharging the arrears due to the establishments which he was reducing as well as those he intended to maintain; secondly, for advancing taqavi loans to the rayats of such districts as had suffered much either from famine or from the ravages of the war; thirdly, for repaying the debts to the Indian bankers and others, many of which bore a high rate of interest; fourthly, to release the revenue of the heavy assignment which had been granted as security for debts.²⁶

Chandu Lal proposed to borrow the sum from William Palmer and Company. The latter agreed

to lend the sum of sixty *lakhs* for six years on condition of receiving from the Nizam's government assignment of revenue to the extent of sixteen *lakhs* annually.\(^{27}\) The house of Palmer and Company also required the previous sanction of the Resident to the transaction.\(^{28}\)

The Resident at first objected to the loan being given to the Nizam. He thought that the sanction to the loan would not be approved by the Council in Calcutta and if it was approved in Calcutta it 'would meet with serious opposition' in the Court of Directors. For this reason, the Resident declined to forward the minister's application for loan until he 'saw it was Lord Hasting's desire' that he should do so. As it was for the Governor-General to decide whether the loan would be sanctioned or not, the Resident thought that it would be a 'breach of his duty to withhold a set of official papers' which the Governor-General desired he should lay before him. Thinking, moreover, that the money, if properly applied as the minister had promised to do, would be productive of great utility, the Resident forwarded the application for loan to the Supreme Government with his recommendation for favourable consideration.\(^{29}\) When the proposal came up for discussion in the council it was supported by the Governor-

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27. Ibid—p 41, Translation of Wajib-ul-'Arz.


General and Fendall, and was opposed by Stuart and Adam. It was finally decided by the casting vote of the Governor-General that the sanction of the Supreme Government should be given to it.\textsuperscript{30}

Thus there were three categories of transactions between Palmer and Company and the Nizam’s government. The first category includes the transactions for which the intervention of the Company’s Government could in no way be invoked in case the Nizam’s Government refused to liquidate the balances. This category comprised the transactions between William Palmer and Company and Raja Chandu Lal both before as well as after the former began to function publicly in 1814. These transactions were made without the permission, even the knowledge of the Supreme Government in Calcutta.

The second category comprised the Berar Horse and the Aurangabad transactions which were brought to the notice of the Supreme Government after they had been concluded. The Company’s Government made it clear to Palmer and Company that it would not come forward in their favour, should the Nizam, after receiving their money seemed ‘disposed to palter with his engagement.’\textsuperscript{31}

But the new sixty-lakh loan which forms the third category stood on a quite different footing.

\textsuperscript{30} Hyd. Pap—p 55., Governor-General’s minute, 14 July, 1820.

\textsuperscript{31} Hyd. Pap—p 123—From Hastings to Chairman, 20 Oct. 1822.
The loan was contracted under the express sanction of the Supreme Government and it was morally bound to exercise its authority for the realisation of the loan in case the Nizam’s Government refused to pay.

Soon after the conclusion of the sixty-lakh loan Sir Charles Metcalfe succeeded Sir Henry Russell as Resident at Hyderabad in December, 1820. He was Secretary to the Supreme Government in Calcutta before his appointment as Resident and all the correspondence regarding the pecuniary transactions of the house of Palmer and Company with the Nizam’s Government passed through his hands and naturally he became suspicious about the nature of the transactions. On his arrival at Hyderabad he saw the tremendous influence which the firm had acquired not only over the Nizam’s Government but also over the whole Hyderabad State. The Court of Directors had also become suspicious about the transactions of the house long before Metcalfe. They asked the Governor-General in Council to revoke and cancel the licence by which permission had been given to the house to have pecuniary dealings with the Nizam’s Government. They also prohibited the Supreme Government to interpose in any way whatever, the name, authority and influence of the British Government. The despatch conveying the order of the Court of Directors was dated, 24 May, 1820 and

it reached the Governor-General in Council about the beginning of November, 1820.\footnote{Ibid—p 83—Pol. Letter to Bengal, 28 Nov., 1821, para 73.}

But before the arrival of this despatch two transactions, viz., the Aurangabad transaction and the sixty-lakh loan had been concluded. These transactions placed the Court of Directors in a dilemma. They were obliged to tolerate against their will the exercise of the influence of the Supreme Government in Calcutta in regard to sixty-lakh loan, as it had been pledged to the firm. If they restrained the Governor-General from exercising that influence in favour of Palmer and Company, they would, in that case, not only break the pledge, but would ruin the firm as it would be difficult for the firm to realise the loan from the Nizam's Government without the intervention of the Supreme Government. So, in regard to the payment of the loan of sixty-lakh, the Court of Directors asked the Governor-General in Council to instruct the Resident at Hyderabad to strictly confine his official influence within the limits to which it had been pledged. But in regard to the Aurangabad transactions, as no such guarantee of interposition of the Supreme Government had been pledged, the Governor-General in Council was required to bring it to a termination without delay, if it had already not been done at the cancellation of the licence.\footnote{Hyd. Pap—Pol. Letter to Bengal, 28 Nov., 1821— paras 78 & 79 (P. 84).}
and in the despatch of the Court of Directors, the high rate of interest was discussed and commented upon. In the case of sixty-*lakh* loan the Governor-General computed the interest at 16%.*35 When the accounts of the transactions were submitted at a later date it was found that the rate of interest on the sixty-*lakh* loan was at 18% and on the other loans at 24%*35A* The rate of interest charged by William Palmer and Company was considered by Metcalfe as very high. So, in 1821 he proposed to Lord Hastings to raise in Calcutta a six per cent loan guaranteed by the Company’s Government and from the proceeds of this loan to pay off all the Nizam’s debts to the said company. This proposal was turned down by Lord Hastings. In this connection he cited another instance of his turning down a similar proposal of raising a four per cent loan to to pay off a portion of six per cent debt of the Company, because he considered it a ‘cruel procedure’ to compel the bond-holders to receive back their capital ‘when they had no means of employing it.’*35B*

But the alleged high rate of interest charged by the firm paled into insignificance when it was found out that the whole transaction of Sixty-*lakh* loan was fictitious. In 1822 Metcalfe asked Palmer and Company to submit the accounts of all their transactions with Chandu Lal. It was then found

35. Ibid—P. 50—Governor-General’s minute, 9 July, 1820.
that the balances of the old debts amounting about fifty-two lakhs of rupees for which the intervention of the Supreme Government could not be invoked viz., the debt of the Nizam to the ‘old concern’ (of Palmer and Company), debts on account of Berar Horse and the Aurangabad troops all running at an interest of 24%, were transferred to the General Account (current between the firm and Chandu Lal) and subsequently a new loan of sixty-lakh bearing an interest of 18% was contracted in July, 1820 for liquidating the total balances of the General Account. A sum of eight lakhs of rupees was charged out of that sixty-lakh loan as bonus for scaling down the interest from 24% to 18%. *

No payment was made to Chandu Lal on account of this transaction.

In order to explain away this charge of non-payment of the loan Rumbold stated that on being pressed by the minister for money, advances amounting to almost the whole loan were made to the minister in the period intervening between the submission of the proposal to the Supreme Government and the actual contracting of the loan. For accommodating the minister, Rumbold said, the house of Palmer and Company took a great risk in making these advances of money in anticipation of the sanction to be given by the Supreme Government. 36 But this plea of anticipation cannot hold

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* This bonus was to bear an interest of 24%. So, the rate of interest on the loan will actually come up to 33 1/3% instead of 18%. Trade and Finance in the Bengal Presidency, A. Tripathi —p. 185.

water. These advances bore an interest of 24% whereas the sixty lakh loan was to run at an interest of 18%. So, these advances had no connection with the sixty-lakh loan.\footnote{37}

The accounts of William Palmer and Company also revealed how the Nizam's Government was exploited by the firm of Palmer and Company in collusion with Chandu Lal. When the accounts of the house were submitted to Metcalfe, the Resident at Hyderabad, it was found out for the first time that a bonus of eight lakhs of rupees had been granted to the house for accommodating the minister with a loan of sixty lakhs of rupees at a reduced rate of interest. This affair of bonus was not made known to the Governor-General in Council by the contracting parties at the time when the loan was sanctioned. The Governor-General in Council could not even acquit Henry Russell, the then Resident, of neglect of duty in not satisfying himself that the whole amount of the loan was properly appropriated.\footnote{38} But the most objectionable thing was that William Palmer and his brother, Hastings Palmer, two members of the firm, along with the two sons of the former had been enjoying monthly allowances to the amount of Rs. 5,400.\footnote{39} William Palmer contended that the monthly allowance of Rs. 2,000 which he had been enjoying, had been granted to him by the Nizam's Govern-

\footnote{37. Asiatic Journal, 1825 (Jan.-June)—Debate at the E. I. H., Feb. 11—Bosanquet's opinion—pp 337-339.}
\footnote{38. Hyd. Pap.—p. 187, paras 7-9.}
\footnote{39. Ibid—p. 547—Metcalf to Swinton.}
ment for his past services, but no such plea could be urged in the case of his brother or of his sons.

Another member of the Palmer family, settled as a merchant on the Coromondal Coast, also received allowance from the Nizam's Government. Even the Indian dependants of the same family and persons patronized by the house of Palmer and Campany received monthly allowances from the Nizam's Government through the firm. It transpires from the accounts submitted by the firm that the Nizam's Government had to pay as monthly allowances a sum of Rs. 10,867 in the minimum to the members and dependants of the Palmer family and the persons patronized by the firm. It seems that Bunketty Das, the Indian partner of the house, and his nephew also received allowances from the Nizam's Government.40

This shows to what extent William Palmer and Company possessed and exercised influence upon the minister. Chandu Lal also allowed the firm to exploit the Nizam's Government for he wanted to influence the Supreme Government in his favour through some partners of the firm especially Rumbold who was intimately connected with the Governor-General. In this connection mention may be made of Dr. Currie who in addition to his salary as surgeon to the British Residency, used to receive through the firm an allowance of Rs. 1,200 per month for medical attendance at the court of

40. Ibid—pp. 574-576, Metcalfe to Swinton, 15 June, 1823.
the Nizam. 41 His connection with the firm as a partner was known to Sothby, the first assistant of the British Residency, who signed his deed of release from the partnership of the firm in 1819. But Sothby suppressed this fact as well as the fact that he had himself been a partner of the house of Palmer and Company when he attested the affidavit sworn before him by William Palmer and Sir William Rumbold* to the effect that no officer of the Residency nor any one to whom they could look for support or favour had any partnership with the firm. 42 Of course, Sothby paid the penalty for attesting the affidavit by being dismissed from the services of the East India Company. 43

It is very difficult to absolve Lord Hastings from the charge that he had wrongly given his support to Palmer and Company because of Rumbold's connection with the firm. In 1814 he lent the countenance of the Supreme Government to the firm under the influence of John Palmer of Calcutta. In 1816 the house applied to the Governor-General for exempting it from certain restrictions which Governor-General alone under his dispensing power could grant. A major portion of the firm's memorial on this occasion had been

41. Ibid—p. 181—Metcalf to Swinton, 1 August, 1822, para 8.

* The affidavit was signed on 26 June, 1821, (Hyd. Pap.—p 158,) Sothby's connection with the house ceased in February, 1820 (Hyd. Pap—p 581).

42. Ibid—pp. 483, 486, 581 & 158.

drafted by the Governor-General himself. It shows that the Governor-General had already agreed to waive the restrictions in favour of the firm, before the memorial was formally submitted. In sanctioning the sixty-lakh loan Lord Hastings played a very important role. When the Resident had been hesitating as to whether he would recommend for the loan, Lord Hastings asked him to send the application to Calcutta, thus giving a hint that he would get the loan sanctioned in the Council. The loan was actually sanctioned by the casting vote of the Governor-General. Russell had advised Rumbold to abandon the ‘project of the loan’, but he did not pay any heed to his advice. It seems Rumbold had persuaded Lord Hastings to sanction the loan. Lord Hastings was so much won over by Rumbold that in spite of Metcalfe’s representation and the criticism of the members of the Council he blindly supported the firm till September, 1822, when on the disclosure of the clandestine transaction of the house he condemned it in no uncertain terms.

We cannot absolve Henry Russell also from the charge of wrongly supporting the house. He wants us to believe that he was not responsible for the


* The majority of the Directors went so far as to insinuate that Lord Hastings had supported the firm through right and wrong on account of his connection with Rumbold. Canning, the President of the Board, strongly condemned Hastings’s share in the transactions of Palmer and Company. Philips—The East India Company,—p 227.
existence of the house which, to put it in his own words, 'grew up under a protection superior to' his authority. 45 This superior authority referred to was Lord Hastings. But we have seen that the house started its business within the premises of the Residency and the Resident was a constituent of the house. From the beginning of the house down to 1818, if not up to his departure from Hyderabad, he was a constituent of it except for a brief period of a few months. In the circumstances it is hard to believe that the house grew up under the protection of a superior authority alone and that the Resident did not play any part in its growth. It is too much to say that he was not a bit indulgent to the influence of William Palmer. Dr. Currie in a private letter to Charles Russell, brother of the Resident, wrote, "I often said to Palmer when he was wishing for a change in the Residency that he never would meet with any one so favourable to his interest and so indulgent to his influence and interference in the city as your brother". 46 The reason why Russell was so indulgent to the firm was that his self interest was involved in it. As regards the charge that Russell neglected his duty in not satisfying himself that the sixty-lakh loan was properly appropriated, it may be said that he did not remain long in


O.P.-168—16
Hyderabad to see if the loan was properly utilised.\textsuperscript{46A}

The Court of Directors thought of instituting a criminal case against the members of the firm for having conspired to obtain by false representations and for their own private ends, the sanction of the Company's Government to the sixty-lakh loan and sought for this purpose the expert legal opinion of Mr. Copley, the Attorney-General of Great Britain. But Mr. Copley expressed great doubt as to the successful result of the prosecution.\textsuperscript{47} One object of the loan, as stated by Chandu Lal was to discharge among other claims the debt due to William Palmer and Company. So, the firm was entitled to deduct from the sixty-lakh loan the debts due to it by the Nizam's Government. As regards the bonus of eight lakhs of rupees, the Supreme Government did not lay down any condition that no such bonus should be given to the firm. And if the Nizam's Government had granted it to the firm, how could the partners be charged with the violation of contract or breach of trust? For the criminal waste of such a vast amount of money the minister was no doubt primarily responsible, but the Supreme Government also could not be absolved of their responsibility. For, they did not care to inquire as to the amount of debt the Nizam's Government owed to the firm nor did they

\textsuperscript{46A} MSS. Eng. Lett. C 168 (Bodleian)—Russell to Edmonstone, Sutton Park, 3 Jan. 1824—p 54.

\textsuperscript{47} Asiatic Journal—debates at the E. I. H. 11 Feb., 1825—p 338.
require any terms of contract from the firm before the sanction to the loan was given; nor again, did they care to see whether the loan was properly utilised or not.

To save the state of Hyderabad from ruination, it became necessary to relieve it of all debts outstanding at a heavy rate of interest and to terminate all pecuniary dealings between the Nizam’s Government and the house of Palmer and Company. In discharging all the demands of the firm upon the Government of Hyderabad, Lord Hastings intended to follow a principle. This principle was that all claims justly arising out of arrangement sanctioned by the Supreme Government should be liquidated; but arrears of stipends or allowances to the house and demands arising out of credit spontaneously given by the house, either to the Nizam’s Government or to individuals should not be countenanced by the Supreme Government.48

After the departure of Lord Hastings the question of the liquidation of debts owed by the Nizam’s Government was taken up by Adam’s Government. It was decided by the Governor-General in Council to propose to the Nizam to relinquish to the English East India Company the annual payment of seven lakhs of rupees on account of the peshkash of Northern Sarkars in lieu of Rs, 1,16,66,666. The proposal was accepted by the Nizam and Chandu Lal.49 Out of this sum


49. Ibid—P. 825.—Translation of the deed relinquishing the Peshkash.
Rs. 78,70,670-9 went to meet the demands of William Palmer and Company.\textsuperscript{50} It may be mentioned here that in liquidating the debts the principle enunciated by Lord Hastings was not acted upon. Had this principle been acted upon not only the bonus of eight lakhs of rupees and allowances but the balances of Berar Sawar (Horse) and Aurangabad Accounts also would have been disallowed. But instead of doing this only the bonus on the sixty-lakh loan and the amounts of the allowances to the members of the firm and their families, with the interest accrued upon them, were rejected.\textsuperscript{51}

After payment of debts owed by the Nizam's Government to the firm, Sir William Rumbold embarked for England and Mr. Lamb, another English partner, was ordered to quit Hyderabad and repair to England. The Palmer brothers not being Englishmen the same course could not be adopted in regard to them, but it was announced to them and the minister that they were no longer under the protection of the East India Company and that all intercourse between the members of the firm and the Nizam's ministers was prohibited by the Supreme Government.\textsuperscript{52} Further, under the orders of the Court of Directors of 24 May, 1820, the Governor-General in Council prohibited

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid—P. 820.—Statement of payment made to Palmer & Co.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid—Governor-General's minute, 30 July, 1823—p. 703—para 8.

\textsuperscript{52} Hyd. Pap. p 428—From Metcalfe to Swinton—10 Feb, 1823.
the Resident from interposing the name, authority or influence of the Supreme Government for the furtherance of any demand which William Palmer and Company might bring forward.  

After the promulgation of these orders, the firm of William Palmer and Company stopped payment. It may seem an enigma to many as to why the firm went into liquidation within a year of the receipt of Nizam's debt to the tune of about seventy-nine lakhs of rupees.† The trustees of William Palmer and Company appointed after the firm had declared itself insolvent, attributed the bankruptcy of the firm to the interdiction imposed by the Supreme Government upon the intercourse between the partners and trustees of the firm and the ministers.  

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* At a meeting of the creditors of William Palmer & Company held at Hyderabad on 8 June, 1824, the trustees of the firm placed before the meeting a statement of the assets and liabilities of the firm. It appears from the statement that the liabilities of the firm amounted to Rs. 51,24,133-8-0 and the assets amounted to Rs. 65,85,978-0-1, thus leaving a balance of Rs. 14,61,839-0-1 in favour of the firm—Mss. Eng. Lett. C. 171—(Bodleian)—p 68.

† Dr. Currie also could not account for the bankruptcy of the firm after it had received about 79 lakhs of rupees from the Company's treasury. He scented something 'nefarious (in) the report current' at that time that Sir W. Rumbold had brought with him to England from India £150,000 which he had 'secured in the French funds as a sure resource to himself against all results'—Mss. Eng. Lett. C 177—(Bodleian), Currie to Charles Russell—p. 143.

Minister Munir-ul-Mulk and other important nobles of the court, especially the former, owed large sums of money to the late firm. The claims of the firm upon Munir-ul-Mulk alone amounted to twelve lakhs of rupees. This loan was entirely of a private nature between the firm and the minister and was not contracted by him in his official capacity. Moreover, the Resident was not apprised of this loan by the firm till the restriction was imposed upon the intercourse between the ministers and the partners and the trustees of the firm. The main reason for keeping it secret from the Resident was that the partners of the firm were under the impression that they would be able to realise the loan without much difficulty so long as the firm enjoyed the countenance of the Supreme Government. Thus the withdrawal of countenance from the firm and the stoppage of the pecuniary transactions with the Nizam's Government were the main causes of the bankruptcy of the firm. The bulk of the business of the house consisted of giving loans to the Nizam's Government and when this came to an end, the business of the firm dwindled to a great extent. The position of the house became still more precarious when the realisation of loans from Munir-ul-Mulk and other powerful nobles of the court became very difficult owing to the loss of patronage of the Supreme Government. To make matters worse, the private debtors of the house took advantage of the opinion given by the Attorney and Solicitor-General of England and the Company's Counsel regarding the Act 13th, George III, Chapter 13, which limited the rate of
interest on loans at twelve per cent. According to these high legal authorities this restriction extended to loans made to Indian princes, their Governments and subjects, whether the contracts for such loan were made or carried into execution within or beyond the territories under the Government of the East India Company. There is no doubt that some of the debtors whose debt to the Company bore a higher rate of interest than twelve per cent, took advantage of this legal opinion which had been given a wide publicity in Hyderabad. Munir-ul-Mulk who was a principal debtor to the house, wrote to Chandu Lal that he would have fully paid his debt to the firm, if the 'order prohibiting any money transactions with them (the firm) and the proclamation describing the claims as void had not arrived.' Thus three causes brought about the liquidation of the firm: First, the prohibition of further transactions with the Nizam's Government; secondly, the refusal of the Supreme Government to help the firm to realise its loan from the subjects of the Nizam; thirdly, the publication of the opinion of the legal authorities limiting the rate of interest to twelve per cent.

The trustees of the firm alleged that they found it very difficult to realise their claims upon debtors of the firm owing to the non-existence of a tribunal of justice with competent jurisdiction over a

55. Hyd. Pap.—P. 104,—Pol. letter to Bengal, 9 April, 1823.
56. Mandamus—No. 35, P. 42.
matter of that nature. Of course, there were two courts at Hyderabad and Aurangabad; but these courts were also without any power to enforce their decisions upon the powerful nobles. Under these circumstances, the trustees approached the Supreme Government with a prayer. The prayer was that the Supreme Government should either suspend the interdiction upon the intercourse between the trustees and the ministers so that they might secure the help of the ministers in adjusting their claims upon the debtors or direct the Resident to use his authority and influence for recovering the demands of the firm.

In consequence of this prayer the Governor-General in Council issued on 7 October, 1825, modified instructions to the Resident relating to any private claims upon the subjects of the Nizam by the late firm. The Resident was authorised by the modified instructions to refer such claims, if he thought them just and the court of justice had failed to enforce their own decrees, to Chandu Lal for taking such steps as he might consider just and proper, for the realisation of the claims of the firm. The Resident was especially cautioned against giving such advice to the minister in cases where he


was not fully satisfied from the records that the claims of the firm were just. 59

But in the meantime the twelve judges gave the opinion in the House of Lords that under the Act 13th, George III, Chapter 13 a higher rate of interest than twelve per cent might be taken for loans made within the dominions of an independent Indian sovereign by the British subjects. This opinion of the judges altered the stand of the Supreme Government, which it had taken in relation to the claims of William Palmer and Company upon the private individuals in Hyderabad.

Mr. Lamb and Sir William Rumbold, two English partners of the late firm, were permitted by the Court of Directors to return to Hyderabad, subject to certain conditions, for the purpose of helping the trustees in the elucidation and arrangement of the affairs of the late firm. The trustees and the partners of the house were allowed to prosecute their debtors in the courts of Hyderabad for non-payment of their debts. They were also permitted to have access to the ministers for the purpose of recovering their debts, provided such communication did not take place without the sanction of the government and provided also that the Resident or his representative was present* on such occasion.60


* Lamb died in Hyderabad and so Rumbold was left alone to help the trustees in realising the debts. He was permitted by the British Resident Martin to meet the
The opinion given by the twelve judges was given due publicity in Hyderabad. But the Court of Directors at the same time prohibited the Supreme Government from assisting the trustees of William Palmer and Company in the recovery of pecuniary claims upon individuals, whatever might have been the rate of interest. This prohibition practically cancelled the modified instructions issued earlier to the Resident. Under the new circumstances a considerable sum of money including interest at the rate of 24% was realised by the trustees through the instrumentality of the court of justice in the city of Hyderabad. But loans from powerful nobles like Munir-ul-Mulk and others could not be recovered. This was due to the unwillingness of the Supreme Government to interfere in the matter either in favour or against the trustees. Chandu Lal, was also not willing to exert his authority to compel the debtors,

minister. On the first day when he went to the minister he found that the Munshi of the Resident was present there as his representative. Rumbold refused to have any talk with the minister in the presence of an Indian. He proposed another meeting with the minister. The Resident appointed Captain Stokes who was an officer in the Nizam's service, as his representative. This time also Rumbold refused to meet the minister in the presence of Stokes as he did not belong to the Residency. (Rumbold to H. Russell, Mausalipatam, 4, June, 1829. Ind. Arch., vol. XI, 1957—pp. 51-52.


particularly, Munir-ul-Mulk, to pay their debts to the firm. The Resident informed the Supreme Government that no settlement between the parties could be effected without the interference of the Nizam or the Supreme Government and that he would adhere to a line of non-interference until he received instructions to the contrary. As the Governor-General in Council could not sanction the adoption of any measures for compelling the Indian debtors of Hyderabad to pay their debts to the firm without violating the orders of the Court of Directors, the matter was referred to them for decision.

The letters from India to the Court of Directors seeking instructions as to what should be done in respect of adjustment of claims of William Palmer and Company on individual subjects of the Nizam, gave an opportunity to the Board of Control to interfere in the affairs of the late firm. The Board of Control informed the Court of Directors that a despatch containing specific instructions to the Supreme Government in India regarding the adjustment of claims upon the individual subjects of the Nizam should be transmitted. The Court of Directors accordingly drew up a draft of the letter (No. 167) and submitted it for the approval of the Board of Control.


64. Mandamus—XVII.
The Court of Directors admitted in the draft of their despatch that the force of law in Hyderabad was so weak that no decrees awarded by the court of justice would be effective unless it was enforced by the Nizam's Government. But, on the other hand the influence of the Supreme Government upon the Nizam's Government was so strong that the least application of it might become an instrument of extortion. So, the Supreme Government in India was directed not to exert its influence either in favour or against the late firm. In the opinion of the Court of Directors arbitration was the best method of settling the disputes between the trustees of the firm and its debtors. No doubt, the attempt to settle the disputes by arbitration had failed previously, but the failure was due to the way in which the arbitrators proceeded to bring about a settlement between the parties. Certain preliminaries, the Court of Directors thought, must be gone through before the settlement by arbitration was undertaken. First, the Nizam's Government would undertake to enforce the award of the arbitrators, because it would be useless to employ the method of arbitration, if its awards were to remain without execution. Secondly, the parties should come to an agreement regarding the principle according to which the amount of interest due was to be determined. Because, it was due to the difference on this point that all previous conferences between the parties broke off. If this was settled, the course to be pursued would become easy both for the Nizam's Government and the Supreme Govern-
ment. The Court of Directors were of opinion that the claims of William Palmer and Company upon Munir-ul-Mulk and other subjects of the Nizam were mainly of accumulation of interest; and they desired that the accumulated interest should not exceed the principal sum.\textsuperscript{65} It appears from the draft of the despatch that the Court of Directors did not like that the Supreme Government should exercise its influence in helping the firm to realise exorbitant rate of interest from the debtors.

When the draft was submitted to the Board of Control for its approval, they amended the draft so much that it became, for all practical purposes, a new despatch. The instructions of the Board of control as expressed in the amended despatch were as follows:—

(i) The amount justly due, including principal and interest, from Munir-ul-Mulk (it seemed the Board of Control was very anxious to help the firm in realising its claim upon Munir-ul-Mulk) should be ascertained by two methods; either by arbitration or by a commission appointed under the joint authority of the Supreme Government and the Government of the Nizam. In case of arbitration, the number of arbitrators should be limited to three, each party to choose one and the umpire to be nominated by the Governor-General. If a Commission was to be appointed, all the commissioners were to be selected by the Supreme Government in India.

\textsuperscript{65} Mandamus—No. 3 pp. 1-5.
(ii) The Resident should ascertain, first, if the Nizam would enforce the award given by whichever of the two tribunals of reference and that point being settled in the affirmative, the Nizam should be requested next to choose one of the modes of investigation.

(iii) Both the parties should submit their disputes to one or other of the modes of settlement. If the trustees should refuse to submit their disputes, they must be plainly told that they could not expect any further help from the Supreme Government. In case of a demur on the part of Munir-ul-Mulk the Resident should request the Nizam to interpose his authority.

(iv) The question of interest must be left to the tribunal of reference, whether composed of arbitrators or commissioners and that the tribunal would decide it according to the law and usage of the country.

(v) The Resident should be authorized ‘to press on His Highness in terms of urgent recommendation’, the justice and expediency of his agreeing to enforce the award.  

The Court of Directors sent a remonstrance to the Board of Control against alterations in the draft. The Court especially objected to the Board’s proposal for fixing the rate of interest ‘according to the usage of the country’. For, in Hyderabad the risk being great, the rate was proportionately high. When the proposal made by the Board of

Control relieved the trustees from all risks of loss, there was no justification for the Board to authorize the tribunal of reference to fix the interest at the high rate which was prevalent in Hyderabad. The Court of Directors cited the rate of interest which was allowed to Carnatic and Tanjore creditors. When the English East India Company got possession of these two territories, it agreed to discharge the debts of their former possessors out of the revenues of those territories. A commission was constituted to investigate the origin and amount and finally to adjudicate the claims of the creditors. The first duty prescribed to the Commissioners was to trace the original principal sum advanced by the creditors. After such ascertainmen, the commissioners were authorized to add simple interest, at the rate of four, five and six per cent, in the case of the great number of creditors. Only a few were to be allowed twelve per cent, and that was for a very limited period. If in the case of these creditors, the Commissioners were not authorized to fix the rate of interest according to the ‘usage of the country’, why the tribunal of reference to be set up in Hyderabad should be authorized to decide the rate of interest according to the ‘usage of the country’? The Court of Directors also objected to the proposal that ‘the Resident should be authorized to press’ on the Nizam to enforce the final award. This interference on the part of the Resident would not, the Court pointed out, be in keeping with the principles of conduct prescribed for the Supreme Government in India by Mr. Canning, the President
of the Board of Control. In the political despatch to the Bengal (Supreme) Government regarding the claims of Lucknow bankers upon the Nawab of Oudh, dated, 12 February, 1819, Mr. Canning inserted the following passage to which the Court of Directors attached great importance. The passage runs: "We are so much aware of the difficulty of divesting a friendly communication to a weaken power of the character of authority, and are so apprehensive that the consequence of pressing upon the Vizier (the Nawab of Oudh) the consideration of those claims might bring upon him others from various quarters, that we direct you to rest contented with the attempt you have already made, and to abstain from any similar proceedings hereafter, at the instance either of these or any other claimants." How could the Court of Directors authorise the Resident at Hyderabad to press upon the Nizam for enforcing the final award without disregarding the principles of conduct prescribed by a late President of the Board of Control?

As a result of the remonstrance the Board of Control again amended the draft, but there was no material difference between the new alterations and the former ones. Only one paragraph was added to the amended draft. In this paragraph the Board of Control pointed out to the Court of Directors the necessity of the Nizam's exercising his influence to help Palmer Company in realising their debts from persons like Munir-ul-Mulk. The

67. Mandamus—No. 18, PP. 24-25.
Nizam should be urged by the Supreme Government through the Resident to use his influence in inducing Munir-ul-Mulk to concur in the proposed reference. He should also be requested to see that the final award given by the tribunal of reference was executed. The necessity on the part of the Supreme Government in India to call upon the Nizam to interpose his authority rose, according to the Board of Control, out of the injury that had been done to William Palmer and Company by the promulgation of the opinion of law officers of the crown and the Standing Counsel of the Company regarding the construction of the Act which limited the rate of interest to 12%.  

The Court of Directors pointed out in another remonstrance that the despatch as finally amended by the Board of Control, if acted upon, would create an unpleasant situation for the Supreme Government in India. The amendments made by the Board of Control presented a choice between two expedients—arbitration or commission. If a commission was appointed, the commissioners were to be selected by the Governor-General. If arbitration was resorted to, the number of arbitrators should be limited to three, each party choosing one and the umpire to be nominated by the Governor-General. In fact, the two expedients recommended by the Board of Control were the same. The decision in the case of arbitration would depend upon the umpire, a person nominated by the Governor-General and in the case of a commi-

O.P.-168—17
ssion it would depend upon the nominees of the Governor-General. In any case the award given by either of the tribunals of reference would be like an award given by the Supreme Government in India. In other words, the Board of Control wanted that the Supreme Government should interpose its influence and authority in recovering the debts of Munir-ul-Mulk and other subjects of the Nizam to the late firm. As regards the injury done to the interest of the firm by the promulgation of the legal opinion given by the Standing Counsel of the Company and the legal officers of the Crown, the Court of Directors argued that if any one was responsible for that injury it was the ambiguity of the law. Moreover, it may be pointed out that the injury was repaired by the wide publicity given in Hyderabad to the opinion of the twelve judges. In short, the Court of Directors were unwilling to exert their influence with the Nizam's Government in order to enable the trustees of the firm to recover their claims upon the subjects of the Nizam including Munir-ul-Mulk. For, it would be considered by the Nizam's Government as well as by his subjects that the East India Company's Government in India was helping the Englishmen to recover their undue claims upon the subjects of the Nizam. The Court of Directors, therefore, submitted that if instructions could not be framed in such a way as to avoid the interference of the Supreme Government in the realisation of claims, it was better to leave the claimants to the law and the usage of the Nizam's country. 69

In order to end the wrangle between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors the latter passed a resolution in their meeting held on 8 August, 1832, to the effect that as the claims of William Palmer and Company on the subjects of the Nizam did not relate to the 'civil or military government or revenues of the territorial acquisitions in India', it ought not to form the subject of a despatch from the Court of Directors and hence the original draft No. 167, as amended and approved by the Board of Control, should be rescinded.\(^70\)

When this resolution was intimated to the Board of Control it pointed out that the Court of Directors was not entitled to take the step which it had taken. The Court of Directors must either transmit the draft No. 167 as amended and approved by the Board of Control or apply by petition to the king in Council. Under these circumstances, the Board requested the Court of Directors to reconsider their decision of rescinding the draft.\(^71\) The Court of Directors having declined to reconsider their decision, the Board of Control submitted the whole case to the Court of King's Bench with a request to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the Court of Directors to transmit the draft as altered and approved by the Board of Control to India.\(^72\) The case was contested by the

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70. Ibid, No. 31—p. 40—Minute of Court, 8 Aug., 1832.

71. Ibid, No. 48—p. 48; Letter from India Board to East India Co., 30 Oct., 1832.

72. Ibid, No. 56—p. 54—Minute of Court, 28 Nov., 1832.
Court of Directors, but the verdict of the Court of King's Bench went against them and consequently the amended despatch was transmitted to India.\textsuperscript{73}

This is not the only case where the Board of Control and the Court of Directors disagreed as to the principle to be followed in realising the claims upon the Indian princes by their creditors. What had happened in Hyderabad had also happened in Oudh and in other parts of India. About this time the creditors of the Indian princes unable to realise their claims without the interposition of the Supreme Government, sought the help of the Board of Control in the matter. In almost every case the Board of Control desired the interposition of the Supreme Government in favour of the creditors, which the Court of Directors refused to sanction. As in the case of Hyderabad so in the case of Oudh where the creditors were Indians, the Board of Control on the refusal of the Court of Directors to transmit a despatch which had been altered and amended in favour of the creditors by the Board, applied for a writ of mandamus which was granted by the King's Bench.

To return to Hyderabad. In case of claims upon Munir-ul-Mulk who had died in the meantime, no satisfactory result was obtained by the first arbitration of which the members were Captain Welland, acting on behalf of Willam Palmer, and Zainul-abidin on behalf of Munir-ul-Mulk's son

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. No. 68—pp. 117 & No. 69—p119.
Siraj-ud-Daulah. At last the award given by Macleod was given effect to and the debt of Munir-ul-Mulk to the amount of Rs. 7,61,305-5-0 was paid off by the Nizam.
CHAPTER VII

REACTION OF THE BRITISH INFLUENCE
AND INTERFERENCE

The British alliance with Hyderabad was not viewed with satisfaction by an influential section of the people of the state. Nizam Ali did not feel very happy about this alliance and grew suspicious of the intention of Azam-ul-Umara who was mainly responsible for it. When the alliance led to interference in the internal affairs of the state Nizam Sikandar Jah who had been placed on the masnad with the British help, began to nurse ill-feeling against the British. In fact, he wanted the British protection but not the British control and interference. Moreover, there had always been different parties which were actuated by no other motives than their own interest and these parties quarrelled and fought among themselves to have the upper hand in the court. With the advent of the Resident as the representative of the Company into the court politics to support the pro-British parties, a section of the nobles whose interests clashed with those of the British, began to look upon the British as their enemies. Even the lower orders of people were divided over the question of British influence and interference. The Hindus who formed the major community and who were mainly cultivators, were rather favourably disposed towards the British, but the lower orders of the
Muhammadans who belonged to the ruling community and had place in the army and other departments of the government, grumbled against the British interference in Hyderabad. Writing as early as 1816, Henry Russell, the British Resident, tells us that the lower orders of the Muhammadans and the bulk of the population of the capital were to a man hostile to the British.¹ Some disgruntled nobles of the court and some of the sons of the Nizam Sikandar Jah, who were inimical towards the British, exploited this anti-British animus of the people to serve their own purpose. Occasional outbursts of this anti-British sentiment led to many troubles now and then in the capital which was infested with desperadoes belonging to different races.² Only two serious attempts to subvert the British influence in Hyderabad will be noticed in this chapter. The first attempt was made by Mahipatram and the second attempt was made by Mubariz-ud-Daulah, the brother of Nizam Nasir-ud-Daulah, who became the leader of the Wahabi conspiracy in Hyderabad.

(A) Mahipatram's rebellion

It has been related²A that Mahipatram was dismissed from his post. After his dismissal he was banished to Sagar*, a town

¹ Russell Correspondence—The Ind. Arch.—July to Dec., 1955—p. 125.
² Prinsep, Political and military transactions etc. Vol. I —p 262.
²A Vide p. 126.
* Sagar is situated in 16°37' N and 76°48' E,
in the Shahpur taluk of Hyderabad. He was accompanied there by Muhammad Riza Khan Sindhi and Nabi Yar Jang with their troops numbering about two thousand. The two persons were officers of the Nizam in the province of Berar. The minister Mir Alam directed them to return to their duty in Berar, but they paid no heed to the orders of the minister and announced their determination to adhere to the fortunes of Mahipatram and consequently they were dismissed from the service of the Nizam.

The maintenance of these troops became a burden upon the slender resources of Mahipatram and hence he was looking for some means of supporting them. At last Mahipatrm hit upon a clever plan. Near the town of Sagar lay Shorapur, a territory tributary to Hyderabad. Pid Naik was the Raja of Shorapur and Timmapah was his Diwan or minister. Inkuppah was a distant relation of Pid Naik and he had been compelled a long time ago to leave Shorapur on account of some disagreement with Timmapah. After his expulsion from Shorapur Inkuppah collected a band of free-booters and maintained them by depredations on Shorapur and other neighbouring territories. Mahipatram offered his assistance to Inkuppah in placing him in the Diwani of Shorapur provided he would pay off the arrears due to his troops and those of his associates and would appoint Muhammad Riza Khan and Nabi Yar Jang in the service of the Raja of Shorapur. To this proposal Inkuppah agreed and along with Muhammad Riza Khan and Nabi Yar Jang he marched towards Shorapur. A
battle took place in which Shorapur troops were worsted and Timmapah was expelled from Shorapur. After this Inkuppah took the reins of administration in his own hands under the Raja as the titular head. He first sent the Raja to a hill fort and then to Shahpur where he was closely guarded by Mahipatram.

The Nizam was not at all displeased with the change of administration in Shorapur, for the Raja of Shorapur was in arrears in respect of his tribute to Hyderabad. Mahipatram undertook to become security for the regular discharge of his tribute. Moreover, he obtained the Nizam's approval of the change which had been effected in the administration of affairs in Shorapur. So, when the British Resident represented the affairs of Shorapur on behalf of the Raja and his minister to Mir Alam, the minister of Hyderabad, the latter informed him that he had been directed by the Nizam not to take any notice of the event. The minister and the Resident also could not take action in favour of the Raja, as Mahipatram had become security for the regular payment of tribute which the Raja had failed to pay.

But ultimately the Nizam had to interfere. Amjad-ul-Mulk, the maternal uncle of Shams-ul-Umara and manager of the Paigah lands, informed the Nizam that Muhammad Riza Khan and Nabi Yar Jang, two associates of Mahipatram had raided the Gulbarga district and had burnt many villages in the Paigah estates. This information and the representation of the Resident at last moved the vacillating Nizam to take action in the affairs of
Shorapur. Palmer, a military officer in the Nizam’s service, was deputed by Mir Alam to Shorapur for the purpose. Palmer was instructed by Mir Alam to make an agreement with Mahipatram on the following terms:

First, Mahipatram should deliver up the detained members of the family as also the jewels and personal property (held by him) of the Raja of Shorapur and his Diwan Timmapah Naik.

Secondly, he should sever his connection with Inkuppah Naik, Muhammad Riza Khan, Nabi Yar Jang and their adherents.

Thirdly, he should not interfere in the affairs of Shorapur.

Fourthly, he should immediately dismiss all his troops except five hundred.

Fifthly, upon these conditions Mahipatram would be allowed to retain his personal jagirs, to receive Rs. 2,600 per month as an allowance to himself and Rs. 4,500/- per month for the maintenance of five hundred infantry.

Palmer was also instructed by the minister to persuade Inkuppah Naik to sever his connection with the adherents of Mahipatram and return to Hyderabad where he would be allowed to live on a yearly pension of Rs. 22,000.

A detachment of the Nizam’s army under the command of Nizamat Jang and Gordon marched towards Shorapur. But on a request made by

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† This Palmer later on established Palmer & Co. of Hyderabad.
Mahipatram it was settled that the detachment would remain at Narainpett till the conclusion of an arrangement with him. On the arrival of Palmer at Shorapur, Mahipatram entered into a prolonged discussion with Palmer regarding the proposed agreement, with the sole purpose of gaining time to enable Inkuppah Naik and Muhammad Riza Khan who had gone to the Maratha country to reach Shorapur. Even after their arrival Mahipatram sent a petition to Mir Alam proposing to retire to Benaras on a pension of five thousand rupees. Mahipatram even released the son of Pid Naik and the members of the family of Timmapah. But all the discussion about an agreement between Palmer and Mahipatram ended in smoke. Mahipatram assumed an imperious attitude after all his troops had been mobilized. The whole show was a colossal hoax and naturally it ended in a fiasco.

Under these circumstances Mir Alam sent orders to Nizamat Jarg and Gordon to attack Mahipatram. When the situation became critical, Inkuppah escaped from his camp and threw himself at the mercy of Gordon who sent him to Hyderabad. On 10 February, 1808, Mahipatram embraced all his principal officers and they swore to defend one another with their blood. At length, Mahipatram moved out of the camp with his troops. In the fight which took place the whole of the Nizam's cavalry and infantry retreated in confusion and some European generals of the Nizam were either killed or wounded.4 When the Nizam's army was

completely routed, Gordon rode towards Mahipatram who was then at a short distance. On approaching Mahipatram Gordon made obeisance to him. But Mahipatram after using abusive language struck him on the neck with his sword and killed him outright.5

It is difficult to conjecture what motives led Mahipatram to make a direct attack upon the detachment of troops which had been sent against him by the Nizam. According to the British Resident, Sydenham, though Mahipatram was an adept in intrigues and subterfuges, he had neither talent nor courage for war. Shrewd as he was, it was not difficult for Mahipatram to guess at whose instance the detachment was sent and his guess was confirmed when he received a letter from his brother at Hyderabad hinting that the Nizam ‘would not be displeased at any measures which Mahipatram might be reduced to adopt for his own security.’ On receipt of this hint he came to the conclusion that it was Mir Alam and the British Resident who had persuaded the Nizam to send the detachment against him. The British Resident believed that Mahipatram ‘was alarmed at the consequence of placing himself in the power of the minister and was afraid to trust to the clemency and moderation of the persons (the English?) whom he had so often offended’. The peremptory demands of Palmer and the advance of the Nizam’s troops, the British Resident thought, left

5. Pol. Con.—21 March, 1808—No. 76.
him no alternative but abject submission or open rebellion. 6.

The Resident reported to the Governor-General that Mahipatram considered the battle which had taken place at Shorapur as a fight against the Company and its friends, for he gave out that the battle of Shorapur was a 'struggle for superiority between Mir Alam and him or in other words, between the friends of the Company and the friends of the Nizam.' 7 He wanted to use his success in furthering his own ambition—he wanted to dislodge Mir Alam and step into his shoes. But all this was merely a preparatory step to the fulfilment of his more distant design viz, the severance of the alliance between the Company and the Nizam.

It seems that the Nizam was eager for the safety of Mahipatram even after the battle of Shorapur. When the catastrophe which befell the detachment led by Gordon reached the ears of the Resident, he pressed upon the Nizam the necessity of sending a part of the subsidiary force against Mahipatram. But the Nizam hesitated and wanted to negotiate a compromise with Mahipatram. The Resident understood that the Nizam had just after the action at Shorapur received two petitions from Mahipatram, one of which was meant to be shown to the minister and the Resident and the other was for the secret perusal of the Nizam. That which was to be shown to the minister contained a justification of Mahipatram's conduct and

7. Sec. Con.—2 May, 1808—No. 1—para 4.
the declaration of his innocence and willingness to submit to the Nizam. At this the Nizam proposed to the Resident that the subsidiary force should not move until he had ‘tried the effect of persuasion in prevailing upon Mahipatram to submit to any terms which the Resident might think proper’. The Resident summarily rejected the proposal and told the Nizam outright that any further indulgence to Mahipatram would justify his suspicion, which he had been entertaining for some time, of clandestine correspondence between the Nizam and Mahipatram. This was sufficient to frighten the Nizam into submission and he agreed to the proposal of the Resident to send a detachment of the subsidiary force under Colonel Montresor against Mahipatram. Colonel Doveton was ordered to collect all the troops he could at Basam (in Berar) in order to prevent Mahipatram from entering into Berar. On the approach of the subsidiary force Mahipatram fled hurriedly towards the north being pursued by Montresor. The situation to which Mahipatram was reduced by the pursuit of Montresor compelled many of his most intimate friends and nearly all his troops to desert him. This defection naturally left him at the mercy of Muhammad Riza Khan and his troops. The force on which Mahipatram had counted became practically incapable of offering any resistance after he had crossed the Godavari. Under these circumstances he had no other alternative but to quit the Nizam’s territory.

Evading the vigilance of the British forces which were eager to intercept his progress towards the north and capture him, he left the Nizam's dominions and took shelter in the camp of Holkar.

While Mahipatram was being closely pursued by Montresor and was on the point of being captured, the Nizam betrayed great anxiety about his safety. The Resident thought that Mahipatram had many letters of the Nizam, the seizure of which might reveal him in his true colour. The Nizam was relieved of this anxiety when he heard that Mahipatram had managed to escape from the Nizam's territory and had taken shelter in Holkar's camp. Holkar received Mahipatram, his brother Sripatram and Muhammad Riza Khan Sindhi with great favour and distinction. Later on Mahipatram lost his life in a quarrel in Holkar's camp.

It is difficult to believe that the rebellion of Mahipatram was merely a stray episode which had no bearing upon the strained relations between the Nizam and the British. Mahipatram had been a friend of Sikandar Jah long before his accession to the masnad. When Sikandar Jah lost the confidence of his father and was passing his days in disgrace, Mahipatram remained loyal to him. After his accession to the masnad, Sikandar Jah openly re-affirmed his attachment for Mahipatram and expressed his gratitude for his tried friend. Nizam Sikandar Jah wanted to have him always by his side. But this could not be. It has been

10. Sec. Con.—2 May, 1808—No. 1—para 7.
related 11 how Mahipatram’s rivalry with Mir Alam, who was supported by the British, turned him from a friend to a foe of the British alliance. His banishment from Berar to Sagar made the situation still worse.

Though the Nizam declared that he did not act contrary to the wishes of the British Resident and readily agreed to all the measures proposed by the Resident for chastising Mahipatram, 12 it was not unnatural for the Nizam to lend his secret and indirect support to Mahipatram in view of their long-standing friendship. That friendship grew stronger when their policy towards the British became identical. This was apparent from the fact that the Nizam did not express any disappointment or sorrow for either the failure of the expedition or the unfortunate death of Gordon when the news was conveyed to him by the British Resident. 13 His silence was more eloquent than his speech and the Resident rightly suspected that the Nizam carried on secret correspondence with Mahipatram at the time of his rebellion and perhaps even after his flight from the Nizam’s dominions. When Mahipatram had taken shelter with Holkar, he had not given up his hope of regaining his lost power in Hyderabad through the patronage of his friend the Nizam. In a letter which was perhaps intercepted by the British,


13. Pol. Con.—21 March, 1808, No. 72, (No 5) para 50.
Mahipatram informed the Nizam that since his enemy Mir Alam was dead he would now gladly come to the help of the Nizam with a force of fifty thousand foot and horse. But we know that he had no means of mobilising such a large force even if the Nizam had so desired. In this letter he advised the Nizam ‘to retain the directions of all affairs in his own hands.’ But it is extremely doubtful if the letter had reached the Nizam at all. Even if it did, we have nothing to conclude that he had responded to it. Mahipatram’s rebellion was the first and the last armed attempt to sever the British alliance with Hyderabad. With the close of this episode the Nizam realised that he must accept the situation as it was and be reconciled to his fate.

(B) Mubariz-ud-Daulah and the Wahabi Conspiracy in Hyderabad.

While some of the dignitaries of the Nizam’s court like Mahipatram were trying to subvert the British influence, the mob of the city of Hyderabad did not remain idle. They were ready to lend their armed support to any one who would stand against the British. Samsam-ul-Mulk and Mubariz-ud-Daulah, the two sons of Nizam Sikandar Jah, and their cousin Imtiaz-ud-Daulah notorious for

14. Political Correspondence (Persian Correspondence, received) of Lord Minto—Vol. III, No. 64.

Translation copy of a letter from Mahipatram to the Nizam,—4 Feb. 1809.

O.P.-168—18
their excesses in Hyderabad were recognized as the leaders of the mob. The princes were supported in their activities by Tahniat-un-Nissa Begam, the mother, and Jahan Parwar Begam, the wife of the Nizam, Sikandar Jah.¹

In the month of August, 1815, Mubariz-ud-Daulah and his associates seized a servant of the British Resident and kept him confined in Mubariz-ud-Daulah's palace. On a representation made by the Resident to the Nizam, the servant was released by the Nizam who ordered that guards from Captain Hare's brigade should be stationed at the palace of Mubariz-ud-Daulah and his associates to prevent further troubles. While Captain Hare with his troops was advancing towards the palace of Mubariz-ud-Daulah, fire was opened on them from the houses on both sides of the street killing some of the troops of Captain Hare.² A detachment from the subsidiary force was brought into the Capital and peace was restored.³ Mubariz-ud-Daulah, Samsam-ul-Mulk and Imtiaz-ud-Daulah were sent to Golkonda Fort where they were kept in confinement.⁴ They were subsequently released through the intervention of the Begams.

It must be noted that such clashes in which Mubariz-ud-Daulah was involved were not rare.

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¹ Prinsep, Political and military transactions etc.—Vol.I p. 263.
² Sec. Con.—20 Sep., 1815—No. 124.
³ Ibid—No. 117.
⁴ Ibid—No. 127.
They showed clearly the anti-British sentiment of Mubariz-ud-Daulah. But this sentiment was brought to bold relief when he became the leader of a Wahabi* conspiracy.

The fear of an imaginary Russian advance towards Afghanistan led to the outbreak of the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1839. The absence from India of a vast number of British troops who had been sent to Afghanistan encouraged the Wahabis of India to hatch a conspiracy against the Company's Government. The Wahabi conspiracy, though it was an all-India conspiracy, had a local significance in Hyderabad, as it derived its strength there from the widespread disaffection among the local Muhammadans against the British. Mubariz-ud-Daulah who had been on the look out for an opportunity to feed fat his grudge against the British, was not slow to avail it now. He became the leader of the Wahabis and under his leadership Hyderabad became a stronghold of the Wahabis. But it is strange that though the Wahabis considered all the non-Muhammadans,

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* The Wahabism was the name of a puritan movement within Islam. Abdul Wahab, the founder of Wahabi movement or Wahabism, was born in Arabia in 1703 A.D. The followers of the Wahabi persuasion were known as the Wahabis. The Wahabis purported to follow in detail the injunctions of the Prophet and regarded as infidels all those who did not do so. Their enemies were the enemies of the true faith and their every campaign was, therefore, a Jihad (holy war). In India they regarded all the non-Muhammadans including the Hindus, the Sikhs and the Christians as their enemies.
especially those who practised idolatry, as their enemies, their leader Mubariz-ud-Daulah did not disdain to enlist the support of the Hindu princes who had been discontented with the British interference in their territories. It seems he wanted to rope in all those who were dissatisfied with the British, whether they were Muhammadans or Hindus, for the overthrow of the British power in the Deccan, if not in India. It is clear from his policy that there was more of a political opportunist than of a religious fanatic in him. He concentrated his energy mainly in Hyderabad and in the Carnatic which once formed a part of the Nizam’s territory. His aim was to make himself the Subadar of the Deccan by overthrowing the power of the British. It may be mentioned here that an official designation of the Nizam of Hyderabad was the ‘Subadar of the Deccan.’

The existence of this conspiracy was brought to light by Mr. Stonehouse, the Magistrate of Nellore. In the month of October, 1837, it was found many persons from the northern parts of India as well as from Kabul, Egypt and Persia were traversing the Presidency of Madras. In the month of November, 1838, a Sikh in indigent circumstances arrived at Nellore where he remained unobserved for some days; his movements having however excited the suspicion of the police, he was apprehended and brought before Mr. Stonehouse. He was put in prison. Mr. Stonehouse instructed one of his confidential servants to
seduce the prisoner into a disclosure of the object of his visit to that part of India. This ruse had its effect. The servant of Mr. Stonehouse gradually gained the confidence of the prisoner who one day disclosed the real intention of his visit to the Madras Presidency. The Sikh after abusing the English and praising the Persians and the Russians disclosed to his pretending friend that he was an emissary of the Raja of Jodhpur and gave hint of the existence of 'a coalition of some Indian princes, which he stated existed at that moment for the purpose of avowed hostility to the British Government.'

This disclosure led to the arrest of seven other persons whose movements had aroused suspicion in the mind of the police. All of them were Muhammadans (and one of them was in the service of the Nawab of Bhopal). From the depositions of these persons and the nature of the documents found with them it was suspected that a conspiracy hostile to the British interest existed and that the persons arrested were emissaries engaged in obtaining information. There were two classes of emissaries. One class of emissaries was ordinary men and they were employed to collect general and local information. The other class of emissaries was men of rank and they were sent to probe the feelings and obtain the co-operation of the Indian princes. Certain news-writers were stationed near the Krishna which formed the boundary of the Hyderabad territory and to them the emissaries

carried their information. The news-writers in their turn forwarded the information to Mubariz-ud-Daulah, the brother of the Nizam Nasir-ud-Daulah.  

From the depositions of the emissaries it appeared that a widespread conspiracy against the British Government, in which some persons of eminence were involved, was being hatched. The arrested emissaries who made disclosure of the conspiracy, were men of capability if not of rank. But the trustworthiness of the depositions was greatly vitiated by gross exaggerations and hence they were received and acted upon with great caution. Moreover, the Government were not in possession of 'that direct evidence which amounts to a legal degree of proof in any case.' The parties concerned were aware of the necessity of abstaining from written communications. The few documents which were found with the emissaries or were procured contained general principles of Wahabism and exhortation to the Muhammadans to drive the 'infidels' by which they meant the English in India. A letter from the Sharif of Macca to the address of the Nawab of Kurnul was seized from an Arabian emissary. This letter was not intended for the Nawab in particular but for all Muhammadans. It contained an earnest appeal which aimed at exciting the religious passions of the Muhammadans in a common cause. Perhaps the Wahabis

7. Sec. Con.—12 June, 1839—No. 15—paras 14 & 15.
8. Sec. Con.—12 June, 1839—No. 15, paras 58-82.
used some kind of cipher for communicating information. Such a communication was seized from the Sikh emissary of the Raja of Jodhpur. But as the key to the cipher could not be procured the meaning of the communication could not be understood.

No doubt there were many exaggerations in the disclosures made by the emissaries who had been arrested at Nellore, but there were some particulars which were common in their disclosures. Some of these particulars were corroborated by the facts revealed in the investigation carried on in Hyderabad by Malcolm. From these particulars an idea of the Wahabi conspiracy can be gained. It was expected by the Wahabis of India that the Russian and the Persian forces would appear on the Indus and on their arrival the Wahabis and some Indian princes would rise simultaneously and the important posts in the Company's territories would be forcibly seized. It may sound strange that the Wahabis counted much on the

10. This cipher was seized from the emissary of the Raja of Jodhpur (Sec. Con.—12 June, 1839—No. 15—App. B). The figures in the cipher were written in Persian.

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(Signed) J. V. Stonehouse,  
Magistrate, Nellore,
support of the Hindu Rajas of Satara and Jodhpur. The Sikh emissary of Jodhpur disclosed that any information received by Mubariz-ud-Daulah from his emissaries was transmitted to the Maratha Raja of Satara who in his turn communicated the same to the Raja of Jodhpur. It may be mentioned here that the incapacity and misrule of Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur compelled the Company’s Government to interfere in the administration of Jodhpur. In the year 1834 the banditti of Jodhpur secretly encouraged by Man Singh attacked and plundered the residence of a British medical officer. In order to chastise the banditti and Man Singh a British force was assembled at Ajmir. In September, 1839, a British force actually occupied Jodhpur for five months. The Raja of Satara had been carrying on correspondence with the Portuguese Government at Goa, in the hope of winning their armed support for a combined attack on the British power. For this purpose he corresponded with Appa Sahib, the banished Raja of Berar, who had taken refuge with the ruler of Jodhpur. He also made treasonable overtures to the Indian officers and men of a sepoy regiment of the company stationed in Bombay. As is well known for this treasonable act he was deposed in August, 1839, under a proclamation issued by Lord Auckland. It is probable that Mubariz-ud-

12. Trotter, Earl of Auckland (pp 30-32).
Daulah was trying to take advantage of the discontent of these two Hindu princes and use their support in his design against the British government. If we are to believe the words of the Sikh emissary of Jodhpur, 'the Sattara Raja (aimed) at the Paishwaship and re-establishment of the Mahratta Dominion in its pristine state, and Moobariz-odd-doulah (was) to be the Soobadar of the Deccan in the room of his brother. Sattara Rajah (was) to attack different posts in the Mahratta country, and Moobariz-ood-doulah (was) destined to play the same part in the Hyderabad country.'

Two obstacles stood in the way of Mubariz-ud-Daulah's achieving his object. One was that Mubariz-ud-Daulah had no troops and the other obstacle was the 'want of a chief of sufficient rank in the Carnatic to be entrusted with the conduct of an insurrection in that part of the country.' Mubariz-ud-Daulah wanted to remove the first obstacle by tampering with Indian troops of the subsidiary force stationed at Sikandarabad and by overpowering the Hyderabad army. As for the removal of the second obstacle he sent emissaries to the Carnatic to sound the different Muhammadan Chiefs. The Nawabs of Kurnul and the jagirdar of Udaigiri agreed to help Mubariz-ud-Daulah and his followers. The fort of Udaigiri was selected by them 'as the fittest place for laying up stores and rice for the army.'

14. For. Sec. Con.—12 June, 1839—No. 25.
15. For. Sec. Con.—12 June, 1839—No. 25.
It was settled that after overpowering the Hyderabad force ‘the insurrectionary army was then to proceed to Madras for which purpose it (was) deemed essential to form a depot at Oodeeagerry (Udaigiri)’ where the inhabitants were almost entirely Muhammadans. If India could be recovered from the English it was to be tributary to the King of Persia and Mubariz-ud-Daulah was to be the ‘Subadar of the Deccan’ in the place of his brother.

Though no direct evidence amounting to legal proof of the conspiracy could be procured from the emissaries, one can arrive at the following conclusions:

First, a conspiracy inimical to British interests in India had been planned and partially formed, though no overt act of hostility had been committed.

Secondly, a great suspicion was aroused regarding Mubariz-ud-Daulah, the brother of the Nizam, as the leading character in the conspiracy acting under the influence of certain intriguing advisers near his person.

Thirdly, neither the Nizam nor his minister Chandulal was in any way concerned with the conspiracy.

Fourthly, Khan-i-Alam Khan, the grandson of Mahafuz Khan (the elder brother of the Nawab of Carnatic), Abbas Ali Khan, jagirdar of Udaigiri

17. For. Sec. Con.—12 June, 1839—No. 25.
and his son, and the Nawab of Kurnul were some way or other implicated in the conspiracy.

Fifthly, none of the Hindu Chiefs in the Madras Presidency had any part in the conspiracy.\textsuperscript{18}

On receiving information from the Madras government about Mubariz-ud-Daulah’s connection with the \textit{Wahabi} conspiracy, Fraser, the Resident of Hyderabad, entrusted his assistant Captain Malcolm with the task of adopting such measures as he might deem necessary for gathering information regarding the design of Mubariz-ud-Daulah. Malcolm engaged secret agents for the purpose and the information thus gained corroborated in the main the particulars elicited from persons arrested at Nellore. Moreover, the enquiries made in Hyderabad threw some new light on the conspiracy. It was gathered from the enquiries that Mubariz-ud-Daulah was under such an influence of one Maulavi Saleem, a native of Lucknow and supposed to be one of the disciples of the famous \textit{Wahabi} leader Sayyid Ahmed, ‘as to induce him (Mubariz-ud-Daulah) openly to embrace the tenets of \textit{Wahabism}.’ Saleem acquired so complete an ascendency over the mind of Mubariz-ud-Daulah that the ‘entire management of his affairs was left in his hands.’\textsuperscript{19} It was believed that Mubariz-ud-Daulah was in communication with Nasir-ud-din and other Muhammadans of high rank in Sind. Nasir-ud-din was the leader of the \textit{Wahabis} in Sind and his activities in the early part of the year 1838

\textsuperscript{18} Sec. Con.—12 June, 1839—No. 15—para 65.
\textsuperscript{19} Sec. Con.—12 June, 1839—No. 15—App. D.
had attracted the attention of the Company's government. The *Wahabis* in India were under the guidance and control of several religious chiefs or *Khalifas* who had been selected by their followers on account of their sanctity and local influence. Nasir-ud-din of Sind was such a leader of the *Wahabis*. Mubariz-ud-Daulah wanted to be the acknowledged head of the *Wahabis*, but previous to his assuming that position it was necessary that the consent of the *Wahabis*, especially of Nasir-ud-din, was necessary. By the time Malcolm was engaged in the investigation, the *Khalifas* had agreed to the assumption by Mubariz-ud-Daulah of title indicative of his being the acknowledged head of the *Wahabis* in India and it was believed that Mubariz-ud-Daulah had a seal engraved with the title of "*Rais-ul-muslimin*'. Malcolm's enquiry also revealed that the *maulvis* of the *Wahabi* sect had been engaged in making proselytes from among the Indian soldiers of the subsidiary force stationed at Sikandarabad and that a Hindustani poem calling on the Muhammadans in general to carry on a war of extermination against the Kafirs was being widely distributed among them.\(^{20}\) The situation now grew grave and became fraught with potential mischief.

The Nizam and his minister were quite ignorant of what was going on while Malcolm was engaged in gathering information regarding Mubariz-ud-Daulah's connection with the *Wahabis*. But the Resident was biding his time and abstained from

\(^{20}\) *For. Sec. Con.*—12 June, 1839—No. 25.
adopting any decisive measures until Mubariz-ud-Daulah caused a seal to be engraved in which he assumed the title of ‘Rais-ul-muslimin’ (Head of the Muhammadans). Matters now came to such a pass that they could no longer be ignored with safety to the British interest. So the Resident thought that it would be improper to allow the Nizam to remain in ignorance of the conspiracy in which his brother had taken such a prominent part. When the Nizam and his minister were informed of the activities of Mubariz-ud-Daulah by the Resident they sought the advice of the latter. The Resident advised him that it was of primary importance that ‘the letters which Mubariz-ud-Daulah had been in habit of receiving for some months past, together with his newly engraved seal, and certain papers to which the impression of this seal was known to (have been) affixed, should be seized.’ The minister proposed that the palace in which Mubariz-ud-Daulah was residing should be surrounded with troops so as to prevent the escape of any person from it and that some officers of the Nizam should enter into the palace to seize any incriminating papers that might be found there. The Nizam agreed to the proposal of surrounding the palace but disagreed to the proposal of seizing the papers. For, he apprehended that if any attempt was made to seize the papers Mubariz-ud-Daulah would resist and that in the conflict which might ensue, he would perhaps lose his life. Ultimately the Nizam’s proposal was carried into effect. On

20A. Sec. Con.—12 June, 1839—No. 23
15 June, 1839, the palace of Mubarez-ud-Daulah was stormed by the Arab and the Afghan soldiers under orders of the Nizam and he was taken prisoner. He was imprisoned in the fort of Golkonda and his dangerous associates were confined. It was estimated by Fraser that at the time of imprisonment of Mubarez-ud-Daulah, there were nearly twenty thousand Wahabis in the state of Hyderabad.

On the basis of depositions made by the arrested persons at Nellore and the enquiry made by Malcolm at Hyderabad, Lord Auckland opined, “There is some distinct evidence of local plots and combinations of a mixed religious and political character among the Mahamedans at Hyderabad and to the southward, who profess the tenets of a peculiar and I believe an increasing sect. The principal parties in these proceedings ought to be carefully watched and overt act of turbulence or disaffection or otherwise dangerous tendency ought to be promptly and vigorously repressed. Full authority for the purpose has been given to the officiating Resident at Hyderabad in regard to the Nawab Mubarez-ud-Daulah, the principal leader of the party, and the Madras Government may be empowered to adopt the measures which may be thought necessary for punishing misconduct or check unauthorized equipments on the part of such chiefs as the Nawab of Kurnool or the Jageerdar of Woodiagherry. * * * I am not

20B. Chronology—p. 216.
one of those who believe that there exists any universal and active spirit of aversion in India to the British Supremacy."22

When Fraser got proof of Mubariz-ud-Daulah’s complicity in the conspiracy, he proposed to the Nizam the necessity of holding an investigation into the conduct of the persons apprehended in Hyderabad on the charge of having been engaged in seditious designs. He wanted to institute a Board of Commission consisting of both the English officers of the East India Company and the Muhammadan Sardars of Hyderabad for the purpose on the following among other grounds:

First, the offences that were to constitute the subject of inquiry had been committed in Hyderabad. Moreover, the Nizam’s brother and some of his associates who were subjects of Hyderabad were involved in the conspiracy. Under the circumstances the Nizam might have ‘objected to an investigation in which the officers of his Government had no part.’

Secondly, the people of Hyderabad would have looked with distrust upon the findings of the Board of Commission if the Resident had proposed to establish a Board of Commission constituted of British members only, to investigate this conspiracy.

The investigation of the Board of commission confirmed what had already been disclosed by the inquiry of Malcolm. Moreover, it was ascertained

22. Sec. Con.—12 June, 1839—No. 12.
by the Board of Commission that Mubariz-ud-Daulah had been 'deeply engaged in the treasonous conspiracy with the Nawab of Kurnul, and had attempted to open negotiations with the Nawab of Tonk, the Nawab of Rampur, and many other Muhammedan Princes and Chiefs, with hostile intent' against the British Government. It was also proved during the investigation that Mubariz-ud-Daulah with the help of Wahabi Maulavis who visited the lines of the Company's Indian Regiment at Sikandarabad, and in some cases resided there, 'had been tampering with the loyalty of Muhammedan Sepoys'.

The commission's verdict regarding the part played by Mubariz-ud-Daulah and his Wahabi associates in the conspiracy is quoted below:

"With the evidence before us we find it extremely difficult to come to any definite conclusion as to the exact nature of the designs contemplated by Mubariz-ud-Daulah, their scope and tendency, or the mode in which they were to be effected but sufficient (sic) has, we apprehend, been brought to light in course of our enquiry in connection with his correspondence with the Jageerdar of Woodeea-gerry (Udaigiri) and others, the attempt of his agents to create a spirit of discontent among the company's troops and the influence he has established with the Wahabi leaders to warrant a belief approaching almost to conviction that the prince has lent himself to projects inimical to the interests of the British... and that time and

23. Fraser, Memoir & Correspondence—pp 61 & 62.
opportunity were alone wanting for their being carried into execution." 24

Even before the establishment of the Board of Commission Fraser had come to the following conclusion. "I think it will appear that if absolute proof of treason has not been obtained, there is yet abundant ground for coming to the conclusion that a very extended spirit of disaffection towards the British Government has prevailed, and that Mubizarz-ud-Daulah and other native chiefs have been engaged in designs of a dangerous nature, which if not detected and provided against, would no doubt have been exhibited sooner or later in overt acts." 25

After the submission of the proceedings of the Board of Commission to the Government of India, Fraser recommended that Mubazarz-ud-Daulah and his associates in custody should be detained as state prisoners, 'until the perfect tranquillity of the country as well as the cessation of the external war' should admit of their being liberated. 24 Mubazarz-ud-Daulah remained a prisoner in the fort of Golkonda till his death. Some of the Wahabi associates were also kept in confinement. 27

25. From Fraser to the Secretary to the Government—28 May, 1840—Sec. Con.—29 June, 1840—No. 92.
27. Ibid.
O.P.-168—19
CONCLUSION

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century there were three important Indian powers in the Deccan viz., the Marathas, Tipu and the Nizam. Of these three powers the Nizam was the weakest. The formidable power of Tipu in the south perpetually menaced the territory of the Nizam and filled the latter's Court with intrigues. With the annihilation of the power of Tipu in 1799, the Nizam was completely relieved of anxiety from the side of Mysore. But still the Maratha menace was there. After the battle of Kharda in which the Nizam was worsted in spite of the help rendered by Raymond and his corps, it was apprehended that the Nizam's territory would be overrun by the Maratha hordes and Hyderabad would sooner or later form a part of the Maratha territory. It was the fear of Maratha aggression that urged the Nizam and his minister Azam-ul-Umara to enter into the Subsidiary Alliances of 1798 and 1800. Without the British protection it would not have been possible for the Nizam to prevent the Marathas from annexing Hyderabad to their territory. But in seeking the protection of the Company against the Marathas the Nizam lost a substantial portion of his independence and with the passing of time as the successive British Residents began to exert their influence over Hyderabad, it lost all the traits of de facto sovereignty and remained a dependent state till the last days of the British rule in India.
CONCLUSION

The British domination ushered in by the Subsidiary Alliance was not felt at first by the Nizams. Lord Wellesley just after the disbandment of the French corps in 1798 advised the British Resident Kirkpatrick not to make any display of the power which the British had acquired by their alliance with the Nizam. He cautioned the Resident to avoid all interference 'in the internal arrangements' of the Nizam's Government. He knew that under the Subsidiary Alliance the British domination was sure to be felt by the Nizams in course of time. So, the only thing needed was to move cautiously in the initial stage. When the domination began to be felt after 1800 different sections of the people of Hyderabad took it in different light. Nizam Ali who was in the fag end of his life had been cursing his minister Azam-ul-Umara* for making alliance with the British. His son Sikandar Jah became alarmed at the growing domination of the British and gave up all hopes of restoring the house of Asafya to its former glory. His alarm


* Nizam Ali imputed some sinister motive to Azam-ul-Umara for bringing the subsidiary force and the misunderstanding between the two rose to such a pitch that the minister sought permission from the Nizam either to go on a pilgrimage to Macca or to retire altogether from public business (Sec. Con.—24 April, 1800, No 20). The Resident Kirkpatrick with a Bible placed on his head assured the Nizam that the subsidiary force was stationed in Hyderabad for his protection and the chastisement of the rebels. The Bible was presented to the Nizam who kept it as a memento. (Sec. Con.—24 April, 1800, No. 21).
increased with the circulation of a prophecy that he was to be the last reigning prince of the Asafya dynasty.² Realising that it was impossible to shake off the British thraldom he desisted from taking any interest in the affairs of the state and confined himself in the inner apartments of the palace. The Muhammadans of upper class, who had much to lose by the establishment of the British paramountcy became disgruntled. The lower orders of the Muhammadans abused the British as they were Christians and were powerful. The cultivators, most of whom were the Hindus, the merchants and the artisans liked the British domination as they expected protection from the powerful British against the turbulent. A few men of rank with power of deliberation admitted that there was no other alternative of preserving the state of Hyderabad against the Maratha invasion than by an alliance with a powerful nation like the English.³

The Subsidiary Alliance not only prevented the Marathas from gradually annexing Hyderabad but also brought in territorial as well as monetary gains to the Nizam. At the end of the third and the fourth Anglo-Mysore wars in which the Nizam joined the English, he shared with the English the territories which Tipu had to surrender to the English and their allies. Of course the Nizam had to cede these territories valued at Rs. 63,29,904 to the Company in 1800 in commutation for the money which he had to pay for the maintenance of

². Sec. Con.—9 May, 1808, No. 1, para 15.
³. Ibid, para 17.
the subsidiary force. The last two Anglo-Maratha wars in which the Nizam sided with the English but rendered little effective help, were no less profitable to him than the last two Anglo-Mysore wars. By the treaty of Surji Anjangaon (December, 1803) Daulat Rao Sindhia ceded all his territories situated between the Ajanta hills and the Godavari to the English East India Company and its allies. By the Partition Treaty of Hyderabad with the Nizam in 1804 these territories were transferred to the Nizam in perpetual sovereignty. But the greatest gain which the Nizam obtained in the second Anglo-Maratha war was the establishment of his absolute authority in Berar. Since 1724 when Mubariz Khan, Governor of Hyderabad, was defeated in the battle of Shakarkhelda by Asaf Jah, the first Nizam, Berar had always been nominally subject to the Nizam. But the Bhonsla Rajas of Nagpur posted their officers all over Berar, they occupied it with their troops and they collected more than half of the revenue; but the Nizam maintained his title as de jure ruler of the province with the exception of some parganas. In 1803 after the defeat of the Marathas at Assaye and Argaon the Bhonsla Raja ceded in perpetual sovereignty to the English East India Company and its allies all the territories of which he had collected revenues in participation with the Nizam and those of which he might have been in doubtful possession. All these territories which constituted the province of Berar were ceded by the English East India Company to the Nizam in perpetual sovereignty by the Partition Treaty of
Hyderabad in 1804. Apart from these territorial gains, the Nizam's alliance with the Company enabled him to get rid of the vexatious demands of Chauth on the part of the Peshwa. The Peshwa-ship was abolished in 1818 and the Peshwa's territory and demands of Chauth upon Hyderabad passed off to the Company. The Company released the Nizam in perpetuity from the payment of all Chauth due to the Peshwa.

But the benefit which Hyderabad derived from the Subsidiary Alliance was more than counter-balanced by its evil effects. To maintain the alliance as well as to establish influence over Hyderabad, the Company thought it essential that the Nizams and their ministers should be pliant to the wishes of the Governor-General and the British Residents. This led them to interference in the succession of the Nizams and in the appointment of ministers. In the succession of the Nizams, the Company did not face any difficulty but in the appointment of ministers troubles arose. It was the British policy in Hyderabad to make the Nizam a figure-head entrusting the minister of the British choice with the responsibility of carrying on the administration. Nizam Sikandar Jah, who had seen only a few years back his father Nizam Ali appointing ministers of his own choice, could not surrender this power with equanimity. So a tussle arose over the appointment of ministers, in which the Nizam yielded the palm. Even when the Nizam was allowed to appoint a minister of his own choice, as in the case of Munir-ul-mulk, the deputy minister Chandu Lal, who was pro-
British, had to be entrusted with the real power and he was supported by the Resident not only against the minister but even against the Nizam. When a minister was forced upon the Nizam against his will he was looked upon with suspicion by the Nizam and his actions were counteracted. A minister could not function if he did not command some amount of the confidence of the Nizam. Matters came to such a pass that neither the Nizam nor the Resident would agree to the appointment of a minister if it was suspected that he had the support of the other party.

British interference in the appointment of ministers brought about chaos in the administration and led to a feeling of estrangement between the Nizam and the Company. The system of entrusting administration to ministers chosen or supported by the Resident, introduced a kind of dual government with a kind of divided and undefined responsibilities. Under this system it was difficult to apportion the blame for the introduction, operation and failure of a measure as in the case of revenue settlement introduced by Metcalfe. In the case of Hyderabad Contingent it is difficult to say whether the Nizam had anything to do with the origin of the Contingent. The monetary transaction of Palmer and Co. with the Nizam’s government was so mysteriously and conjointly done that to apportion the blame between the Governor-General, the Resident and the minister was not an easy task for a long time.

The protection given to the Nizam by the Company against his external and internal enemies
had its evil effects too. Under the terms of the treaties the Nizam’s government had a large amount of independence in internal affairs. But as time passed the Nizam’s government began to rely too much upon the Company’s government with the result that it lost all initiative for work or exertion. In the words of Henry Russell who had been British Resident at Hyderabad for ten years, ‘the habit of going upon crutches deprived the Nizam of the use of his own limbs.’ Sir John Malcolm who had forty years’ acquaintance with Hyderabad echoed the very same sentiment of Russell. Too much reliance on a foreign government gradually benumbed all powers of the Nizam’s government till Hyderabad lost not only the form but also the substance of independence.

Though under British tutelage the Nizam’s government practically ceased to do any good to the people, it acquired a notoriety for extortion and rapacity. At no time before the Nizam entered into the Subsidiary Alliance with the English, had his government the reputation of being humane. But extortion and rapacity was not practised at that time to the extent as it was after the alliance. Under the constant pressure of wars with the neighbouring countries and frequent visitations of the Maratha hordes, the Nizam had felt the necessity of conciliating his subjects for strengthening himself against his enemies. More-

5. Ibid—Malcolm’s evidence, p. 29.
over, at that time any undue or unjust claims upon them were resisted with all the might they could command. But the whole picture changed after the English had taken the Nizam under their protection. Emboldened by British protection the Nizam developed fresh tendencies of mischief, defied his subjects with impunity, and the people had to submit sheepishly to his oppression under the shadow of the potential support of the British government. Indeed the treaty was twice cursed; it cursed the Nizam into an irresponsible ruler, it cursed the people into an emasculated race. In course of time the increasing misrule and rapacity began to tell upon the people in the countryside. The population in the villages was 'becoming scanty and their poverty was increasing'. In the opinion of Sir John Malcolm this 'increasing rapacity and misrule of the government' was to some extent due to the fact that 'the persons composing it were of one religion, while the people were of another (Hinduism).

The sense of moral obligation on the part of the paramount power to improve the condition of the common people, led Metcalfe to interfere in the revenue settlement of Hyderabad. He had to court failure there. The inherent defect in the settlement was responsible to some extent for the failure of the settlement, but Chandu Lal's refusal to co-operate in the last stage of the settlement was no less responsible for its failure.

Interference in the internal affairs of Hyderabad

6. Ibid—p. 14,
without impairing its sovereignty was not possible. There were two alternatives. One was to take over the whole of the Nizam’s state under the sole and exclusive management of the Company’s Government for a definite period during which the necessary reforms should have been carried out ignoring all sorts of objection that might come from the side of the Nizam and his minister and then to restore the state to the Nizam on condition that the Resident would interfere whenever necessary to prevent the possibility of the country ever reverting to a state of anarchy and lawlessness. The other alternative was to refrain from all sorts of interference in the internal administration of the country. The former alternative could not be adopted without a violent shock to the British relations with Hyderabad. It would have meant the loss of even the outward show of independence which Hyderabad possessed. Hence it was not acceptable to the Company. So, the other alternative had to be accepted in 1829. But even this alternative of complete non-interference in the internal administration could not be followed. The control over the Hyderabad Contingent was not given up and this led to an undesirable interference on the part of the Company. The Nizam and his minister often requisitioned the services of the Hyderabad Contingent for the suppression of the rebellions of the *rayats* and the *zamindars*, which were often the outcome of the oppression of the revenue farmers. The lending of the Hyderabad Contingent under the command of the British officers for the suppression of these
rebellions amounted in fact to lending support to the oppression of the *rayats* by the revenue farmers. So, neither alternative was completely followed. The result was that not only no improvement was made in the internal administration of Hyderabad since 1798 but no opportunity was given to the people to oppose the oppression of the government and thus mend its evil ways.

But the most injurious effect of the Subsidiary Alliance was that it saddled Hyderabad with a military expenditure disproportionate to the revenues of the State. Besides the subsidiary force the Nizam had to maintain the Hyderabad Contingent. Over and above these forces, he maintained a big army of irregular troops. The maintenance of the subsidiary force cost the Nizam the territories which he had acquired as his share of the spoils of the third and the fourth Anglo-Mysore wars. In order to pay off the arrears of the Hyderabad Contingent and to ensure its regular payment the Nizam had to cede Berar to the Company. In the Hyderabad Contingent, scales of pay offered to the European officers were not only high, but even equipage and other military paraphernalia were too costly for the revenues of Hyderabad. The major portion of the revenues was utilised to maintain the Hyderabad Contingent and the irregular troops and what remained after this military expenditure, was not sufficient to meet the expenses of the civil administration. Thus the Nizam was always under the necessity of borrowing money from money-lenders or extorting money from revenue-farmers who
ultimately realised it from the rayats. Though the subsidiary force and the Hyderabad Contingent cost the Nizam some portions of his territory and the latter remained a crushing burden till 1853, they served a very useful purpose so far as the Company's interests were concerned. They were for all practical purposes British forces maintained without burden upon the Company's exchequer and stationed beyond the Company's territory in a central position in the Deccan to be hurled against the enemies of the Company in time of emergency.

The influence which the East India Company had acquired over Hyderabad in consequence of the Subsidiary Alliance encouraged William Palmer to establish his firm there. Palmer and Company was not slow to take advantage of the financial embarrassment in which the Nizam had been placed in consequence of heavy military expenditure. The firm was fortunate in having Rumbold as a partner, for he could persuade even Lord Hastings to support the firm whenever necessity arose. Henry Russell both from his connection with the firm and perhaps under some mild pressure from Lord Hastings supported the firm. Had the firm not been supported by Lord Hastings and Russell, it would not have been possible for Palmer and Company to exploit the financial embarrassment of the Nizam. Chandu Lal was also a party to all the clandestine transactions of the firm. This was natural for him, for he owed his position to the support of the Governors-General and the Residents. Hence he looked more to the interest of Palmer and Company which had the
support of the Governor-General than to the interest of the Nizam.

The British influence, which had been established as a result of the Subsidiary Alliance, and the interference, which that influence led to, had baulked the political or military ambition of a set of people who ultimately became the deadly enemies of the Company. Among them were Mahipatram and a good number of the paigah chiefs. Again, the British influence was irksome to the Muhammadans as a class. Mubariz-ud-Daulah and other high ranking Muhammadan leaders who did not like the the British influence over Hyderabad found numerous followers among these dissatisfied Muhammadans whenever they tried to give vent to their ill-feeling. It was this dissatisfaction against the British influence that made Hyderabad a centre of Wahabi conspiracy in the thirties of the nineteenth century.

In short, the British relations with Hyderabad did not confer unmixed blessings upon the dominions of the Nizam. Hyderabad was saved from total extinction by the powerful British. The presence of the subsidiary force and the Hyderabad Contingent served as deterrent to turbulence of the unruly elements in the state. The assassination of rulers, murder of ministers and their dismissal by violent methods ceased as soon as Hyderabad came under the British protection. Even during the domination of Bussy Hyderabad had not enjoyed such tranquillity as it did under the British protection. Comparative tranquillity and the preservation of the state from total annihilation by war
with neighbouring states were the two blessings of the British relations with Hyderabad. In other respects, as has already been stated, the British relations did no good to the state. On the other hand, the Subsidiary Alliance was a boon to the British as it helped them to strengthen their position and extend their dominions in the Deccan.
APPENDIX A

(1)

(Pol. Con.—21 Aug., 1829.—No. 57.)

From the Governor-General to The Nizam-written 21st August 1829.

Mr. Martin has reported the desire expressed by your Highness, for the removal of the Gentlemen employed under the Resident in checking exaction and protecting the cultivators in your country.

I have great pleasure in complying with your wish, as I regard it as a pledge, that you will yourself protect your subjects against all exaction and oppression.

When those Gentlemen were appointed for the duty above-mentioned much exertion and misrule pervaded the country.

In consequence of the arrangement then adopted cultivation has been extended, prosperity has increased, order has been established on the Highways and murders, Robberies, and such like heinous crimes have diminished.

Nevertheless, as your Highness entertains the desire worthy of a great Prince, to take the Government of your country into your own hands, I have most readily ordered the Resident to withdraw all interference on his part.

Only it will be necessary, that the agreements which have been issued, with the cognizance of
British Officers and the confirmation of your Minister, be maintained inviolate—This is required by Good Faith.

In every other respect, your authority will be absolute, whether in the selection or removal of Minister, or other officers and servants of the state, or in the administration of justice, or in revenue affairs, or in any other branch of the Government of your country—There shall be no interference on the part of this Government in your Highness’s Affairs.

I trust that your Highness is aware, that to cherish the people is the Chief duty of a Prince, and that excessive exaction is the ruin of a State—I cordially hope that prosperity and happiness ever increasing may attend your Highness’s Rule—“By all means do not wound the Hearts of your People”. (Persian Verses)

“If you do you will dig up your own root.

Government is a sin (or misplaced) in the hands of those.

From whose hands (i.e. from whose acts) hands are raised (in distress) to God.

The Ryyut is a tree, if you nourish it you will enjoy fruit to the hearts content of your friends.

Protect the villager for your own sake.

For a light hearted labourer does the better work.

In the Regions of the Earth who is more happy than He

who exercises the Government of his Dominions with justice.”
Political letter from Court, 21st Jany., 1824
Vol. 28

Para 75. In many of the general observations contained in the Minute of the Marquis of Hastings, dated, the 19th December, 1822, we are disposed to concur, but we cannot help observing that the objections so forcibly urged by his Lordship against a direct interference in the civil administration of the Nizam, apply with equal justice to the measures which have been adopted for some years past with the view of improving the discipline and efficiency of His Highness's Army, measures which notwithstanding the disapprobation of them expressed in the Despatch from our Secret Committee of the 3rd April, 1815, have been persevered in and extensively applied both at Hyderabad & Nagpore and were defended in your Political Letter, dated 3rd June, 1820, on the ground that the reformed corps, as they are called, "become in effect part of our Army."

Para 77. In our view of the matter the policy of disciplining and officering the Nizam's Army is as much part of the question now before us as the settlement of His Highness's Land-revenue undertaken by Sir Charles Metcalfe, and we regard both measures as open to the most serious objections.
APPENDIX B

Nizams

1. Nizam-ul-Mulk —1724 — 1748 (May)
2. Nasir Jang —1748 — 1750 (Dec)
3. Muzaffar Jang —1750 — 1751 (Feb)
4. Salabat Jang —1751 — 1762
6. Sikandar Jah —1803 — 1829 (21 May)
7. Nasir-ud-Daulah—1829 — 1857 (16 May)

Ministers

1. Azam-ul-Umara — 1778 — 1804
2. Mir Alam — 1804 — 1808
3. Munir-ul-Mulk — 1809 — 1832
4. Raja Chandu Lal — 1832 — 1843

Residents

4. Mr. H. Russell (Officiating)—Oct., 1805—
   Dec., 1805.
6. Capt. Russell (officiating) June, 1810—
   March, 1811.
7. Mr. H. Russell— 1811 Dec.,—1820.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mr. Martin</td>
<td>Sept., 1825</td>
<td>Aug., 1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mr. Ravenshaw (Officiating)</td>
<td>Aug., 1830—1830</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Col. Stewart</td>
<td>Nov., 1830</td>
<td>Jan., 1838</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Major Cameron (officiating)</td>
<td>Jan., 1838—May, 1838</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Brigadier Tomkyns</td>
<td>May, 1838</td>
<td>Sept., 1838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Col. Fraser</td>
<td>Sept., 1838</td>
<td>Jan., 1853</td>
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</tbody>
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Glossary of Indian Words*

Amil—A collector of revenues.
Amin—A Commissioner, an officer of Government employed in the revenue department to take charge of an estate.
Arzbegi—An officer appointed to receive and present petitions.
Begam—Lady.
Bigha—A measure of land equal to about one third of an acre.
Chauth—One fourth of the revenue.
Darbar—The court of a sovereign.
Deshmukh—The chief of a pargana.
Diwan (Dewan)—Minister.
Diwani (Dewani)—The work of a Diwan.
Durg (Droog)—A rock fortress.
Inam (Enam)—Gift; an inam land means a land given as a gift.
Farman—A mandate.
Hundi—Bill of exchange.
Istawa—Rent levied at progressively increasing rates.
Istawa-kaul—A lease of wasteland at a rent progressively increasing for a term of years, when it becomes fixed.
Jagir—A tenure in which the public revenues of a tract of land were made over to a servant of the state for the maintenance of troops.

* Prepared on the basis of "Glossary of judicial and revenue terms" by H. H. Wilson and Glossary in the 'chronology of modern Hyderabad.'
Jagirdari—Relating to jagir.
Khan-i-saman (Khansaman)—A house-steward.
*Kurrorah (Karori)—Head of the excise (Vide H. Russell's report on Hyderabad, Ind. Arch. 1955, Vol IX, p 144). But the word Kurrorah seems to be a variant of Karori which means revenue-collector.
Kafir—Infidel, a non-muhammadan.
Kaul (Cowl)—An agreement or contract.
Khilat—A dress of honour.
Lakh (lac)—One hundred thousand.
Masnad—throne.
Maulavi—A learned man in Islamic lore.
Mansabdar—A noble holding a mansab or military rank.
Mohar—a gold coin.
Munshi—A letter-writer or secretary.
Muqaddam—A village headman.
Naib—A Deputy.
Paigah—Household troops of the Nizam.
Panchayet—An assembly of five persons, an assembly of village elders.
Pargana—A tract of country comprising many villages.
Patil (Patel)—The headman of a village.
Patta—A document given by the receiver of revenue to the cultivator specifying the condition on which the land is held and the rent to be paid.

* In English documents Chandu Lal has been designated as Kurrorah (Head of the excise) of Maktal (Russell's Report on Hyderabad, Ind. Arch., Vol IX, pp 144-145) and the city of Hyderabad (Sec. Con.—14 Nov, 1805—No 38, para 8). But in Nigaristan-i-Asafi (F 75 A) he has been styled as Karori.
Peshkar—Under the Asaf Jahi administration the Peshkar was an administrative officer and ranked next to the minister.
Peshkash—Tribute.
Qabuliyat (Kabuliyat)—A deed expressing the consent to pay the rent assessed upon the land.
Qazi—A Muhammadan judge.
Rayat (Ryot)—A tenant.
Rairayan—The chief treasurer of the exchequer; literally means ‘prince of princes’
Risala (Ressalah)—A troop of horse.
Sanad—A charter, a grant.
Sarkar—Government, a district, a subdivision of a suba.
Sarkari—Relating to government.
Sardeshmukhi—An additional levy of ten per cent besides chauth.
Sawar—Cavalry.
Seh-bandi (Sebundy)—Troops employed in the collection of revenue.
Sepay (Sepoy)—An Indian soldier.
Sere (land)—Arable land originally excluded from the village assessment.
Subadar—Governor of a suba or province.
Taluqdar—Holder of a taluq, a contractor for the revenue of a taluq.
Taqavi—Money advanced to a rayat by the Government to carry on his cultivation and recoverable with or without interest.
Vakil—A representative.
Wajib-ul-arz—A written petition.
Zamindar—Land-lord.
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(vi) Secret letters from Court
(vii) Political letters to Court
(viii) Political letters from Court

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II. Russell Papers. (Do)

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(B) Parliamentary papers:


(ii) House of Commons—No. 418 (1854)—Vol. 47. This consists of papers relating to cession of Berar and the Hyderabad Contingent.
(iii) House of Commons—No. 55 (1806)—Vol. 15
Contains accounts of Oudh loans.

(C) Other authoritative published records:

(i) Papers relative to certain pecuniary transactions of Palmer & Co. (Printed in conformity to the resolutions of the Court of Proprietors of East India Company)
It is generally known as Hyderabad papers. Though it mainly consists of documents in connection with Palmer & Co. upto 1823, it provides also various information regarding the administration of Hyderabad. It is a mine of information and the most useful book.

(ii) Proceedings connected with the writ of Mandamus issued by His Majesty's Court of King's Bench against the Court of Directors of the East India Company for the transmission to India of the Bengal Political draft No. 167 of the season of 1832 on the subject of the affairs of Messrs. William Palmer and Company (1833).
It contains much useful information regarding Palmer & Co. not only after it went into liquidation but also before its liquidation. It is as useful as Hyderabad papers.

All the treaties between the Government of Hyderabad and the East India Company are to be found in this book.

(iv) Despatches, minutes and correspondence of Wellesley. Vols. I—V by Martin, R. M. (1836-37)
These volumes are valuable to those who want to investigate the political conditions of India during the time of Lord Wellesley. Many important documents relating to Hyderabad contained in these volumes have proved to be of great help to me.

(v) Correspondence of Cornwallis, edited by Ross (3 Vols.)
The third volume contains many important documents relating to the second administration of Lord Cornwallis.

(vi) A selection from Despatches, treaties and other papers of Marquess Wellesley by Sidney J. Owen. (1877)

(vii) Selections from Wellington's Despatches by J. Gurwood, MDCCCXL1.

(viii) Poona Residency Correspondence—Vols I—XIV, General Editor—J. N. Sarkar.
The documents contained in these volumes have thrown much light on the relations between the Nizam and the Marathas from 1798 onwards.

(D) *Old and rare books* :

1. A history of Nizam Alee Khaun by William Hollingbery. (1806)

   Only the last few pages relate to my subject. The book is not useful for my purpose.

2. Life and correspondence of Metcalfe, 2 vols. by John William Kaye. (1858)

   Relevant Chapters of Vol. I.

   Chapter XIV—This Chapter describes the condition of Hyderabad just before the arrival of Metcalfe. It also gives a brief account of the measures of revenue reform introduced by Metcalfe.

   Chapter V—This Chapter deals with Palmer & Co. and the tension between Metcalfe and Lord Hastings over the subject.

3. The Nizam; his history and relations with the British Government (in two volumes) by H. G. Briggs. (1861)

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   A brief but useful account of the British relations with Hyderabad upto 1822 is given in the book.

5. Our Faithful Ally, the Nizam being an historical sketch of events showing the value
of the Nizam’s alliance to the British Government in India—by Hastings Fraser. (1865)
The period up to the treaty of 1798 is treated with considerable minuteness; the subsequent events up to 1838 are very scrappy. The author has not done much justice to “Cession of Berar” and the insurrection of 1857 as was expected of him; for he was appointed Assistant Resident at the Court of Nizam in 1859 and served for twenty-seven years continuously in various departments.

6. Historical and descriptive sketch of His Highness the Nizam’s dominions (2 vols)—compiled by Bilgrami and Willmott. (1884)
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15. Sketches of the relations subsisting between the British Government in India and the different native states—by J. Sutherland. (1837)
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21. European military adventurers of Hindusthan—by H. Compton. (1892)
It gives a brief account of Raymond’s career.

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2. Bussy in the Deccan, by Dr. Miss A. Cammiade, Pondichery, 1941.
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   Contains useful information regarding some correspondence which Nizam Ali and his French officers had with Pondichery.


14. The Earl of Auckland (Rulers of India) by Capt. L. J. Trotter. 1893

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year. It also contains biographical notes on the important personalities of Hyderabad. It has been compiled from a collection of calendars preserved in the Central Records Office, Hyderabad.

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AZAM-UL-UMLA, MIR ALAM, MUNIR-UL-MULK AND CHANDU LAL.

(B) Old and rare books:

(i) Tarikh-i-Gulzar-i-Asafiya (printed in 1308 A. H.) by Ghulam Hussain Khan. The author's father was the family physician of Nizam Ali Khan. The author himself was also the physician in the Court of Sikandar Jah and Nasir-ud-Daulah. This book contains short life sketches of the wazirs and high officers of Hyderabad. In this book Chandu Lal has been highly eulogised for his benevolence. In the Khatima the author only hints that H. Russell in collusion with Chandu Lal did many things which the Nizam did not like.

(ii) Tarikh-i-yadgar by Makhan Lal. This book was written on the advice of Metcalfe, the British Resident at Hyderabad. Chapter II—deals with the nobles (Muhammadan)—Chapter III—contains short sketches of important Hindu officers of the Nizam. This book like other Persian books mentioned above does not throw any new light on the subject of this monograph.

(iii) Tarikh-i-Rashid-ud-din—by Ghulam Imam Khan. Chapter II—gives a brief account of Mir Alam's appointment as Prime Minister on the recommendation of the Governor-General. This book also does not throw
any new light on the subject of this monograph.

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III. Marathi:

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   (i) Madhav Rao Narayan Rao—Vols—IV, VI, & VIII.
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INDEX

Abdul wahab, 275
Abul Fathe Khan (Tegh Jang), 42
Abul Qasim (Mir Alam), 23, 24, 25, 113-120, 125-128, 130, 133-135, 264-269, 272
Adam, 232
Akbar Jah, 99, 109, 110
Ali Jah, 34, 35, 36, 37, 52
Alif Khan, 87, 88
Amjad-ul-Mulk, 130, 131, 265
Amrit Rao, 113
Anwar-ud-din, 6
Appa Sahib, 280
Auckland, Lord, 280, 286
Aumont, 21,
Aurangzib, 1, 4, 95
Azim-ud-Daulah, 52
Azizullah, 79, 84, 85, 86
Badiullah Khan, 108
Bahadur Khan, 87
Baji Rao II, Peshwa, 71, 75
Bakhshi Begam, 107
Balaji Rao, 4, 12
Balaprasad, 147
Baptiste, 33
Barlow, Sir George, 120-122, 124-125, 137
Barnet, Mr., 163
Basalat Jang, 15, 19, 20
Beckett, 191
Bentinck, Lord William, 173-175, 177, 199-200
Blunt, Mr., 178
Bunketty Das, 214, 238
Bussy, 7-13, 21-22, 31, 65
Byod, 39
Calliaud, General, 15,
Canning, 240, 255, 256
Chanda Sahib, 6
Chandni Begam, 107-109, 129
Chevalier de Lasse, 31
Chup Nayak, 95
Clive, (Lord), 14-15
Copley, 242
Cornwallis Lord, 22, 24-25, 31, 52, 70, 88, 121
Currie, William, 214, 238, 241, 245
D'Agincourt (Comeade), 52, 53, 68
Dalhousie, Lord, 127, 200, 204
Dalrymple, Captain, 35
Davies, Captain, 194-195, 197
Doveton, Lieutenant, Colonel, 189, 190, 192
Dundas, 51
Dupleix, 6-8
Elliot, 193
Fakir-ud-din Khan, 24
Farrukh-Siyar, 1, 4
Farooq Nezad Khan, 26
Fateh Jang Khan, 194
Fendall, 232
Feridun Jah, 100-102, 132
Finglass, 39
Forde, Colonel, 13
Fraser, 181, 183, 193, 287, 289,
George III, 222
Ghazi-ud-din, 5
Ghazi-ud-din Firuz Jang, 1
Gordon, 268, 272
Govind Baksh, 108, 126, 193, 195, 196, 226
Govind Rao Kale, 27
Goupil, General, 9
Grant Duff, 35
Haidar (Hyder) Ali, 16-17, 20
23-24, 31, 72, 87
Hare, Captain, 274
Hastings, Lord, (Moira, Lord)
108, 137, 139, 159, 167, 168,
169, 171, 209-210, 213-214
216-218, 220, 229-231,
235, 216, 218-220, 239-241,
243, 300
Himmat Khan, 6
Hislop, Colonel, 167
Husain Ali, 4
Hyndman, 68
Imtiyaz-ud-Daulah, 41, 49, 273
-274
Inkupah Naik, 264-267
Ismail yar Jang, 120, 125-126
Jahan Parwar Begam, 59, 99-100, 108-109, 274
John Kennaway, Sir, 28
John Shore, Sir, 29-30, 33, 36,
43-47, 49-52, 58, 100-101
Johnstone, 212
Khan-i-Alam Khan, 282
W. Kirkpatrick, Captain, 28,
47, 59,
J. Kirkpatrick, Captain, 59,
112, 187, 291
Kona Rao, 155
Lally, 12-13
Lamb, 244, 249
Lashkar Khan, 8-9, 11
La Touche, 6
Le Tillur, 68
Low, Colonel, 203
Macleod, 261
Madhav Rao Narayan
(Madhav Rao II), Peshwa,
44, 52-53
Mahfuz Khan, 16
Mahipatram, Raja, 67, 113-
117, 119-120, 124-127, 130,
263-273, 301
Malartic, 55
Malcolm, Captain, 67, 279,
283-284, 286-287, 296-297
Malet, C, Sir, 28
Mansingh, Raja, 280
Mansur-ud-Daulah, 87, 89
Martin, 109-110, 172-173
Medina, Sahib, 41, 48
Metcalf, Sir Charles, 97, 138-
139, 141, 145-147, 154, 158
-173, 176-178, 180, 183, 233,
235, 237, 240, 295, 297
Montresor, Colonel, 270, 271
Mornington, Lord (Wellesley, Lord) 51, 53-57, 61, 69, 79, 88, 93, 94, 101-102
Mubariz Khan, 2, 293
Mubariz-ud-Daulah, 263, 273-276, 278, 280-289, 301
Muhammad Ali, 8, 12, 16
Muhammad Shah, 1-3
Nadir Shah, 4
Nana Fadnis (Phadnis), 27, 76, 85
Napoleon, 55
Narayan Das, Rai, 108
Nasir Jang, 5-6
Nasir-ud-Daulah, 42, 108-110, 137, 140, 142, 173-174
Nasir-ud-din, 283
Nizam-ul-Mulk, Asaf Jah I, 1-7, 87, 152
Nizamat Jang, 267
Palmer, General, 213
Palmer, Hastings, 214, 237
Palmer, John, 213, 216-217, 219, 239
Perron, 53, 56-57,
Pid Naik, 264, 267
Piron, 49, 53, 57, 67-68
Pitman, Major, 194-196
Pitt, 25
Proquest, 67
Raghotam Rao, 85
Ramdas Pandit, 8
Ranmast Khan, 87
Raymond, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35-39, 43, 49, 52-53, 57, 65, 100-101, 290
Ripaud, 55
Riza Khan Sindhi, 264, 265, 267-271
Roberts, Major, Colonel, 34-35, 66-67,
Rumbold, William, 213, 216, 218-219, 225-230, 233, 237, 238-240, 244, 249, 258, 263, 296, 300
Russell, charles, 106, 241
Russell, Francis Whitworth, 106
Russell, Samuel, 214-216, 220
Sadashiv Reddi, 34, 37
Sakharam Pandit, 41
Saif-ul-Mulk, 107, 128
Salabat Jang, 7-8, 12-14, 99
Salabat Khan, 193, 194
Saleem, maulavi 283
Salnari, 67
Samsam-ul-Mulk. 273-274
Saunders, 9
Sayyid Ahmed, 283
Seyer, Captain, 163
Shah Alam, II, 14-15, 51
Shah Nawaz, 11-12
Shahyar-ud-Daulah, 128, 130
Siraj-ud-Daulah, 261
Sothby, 239
Stewart, Colonel, 175-176, 181, 183, 200
Stonehouse, 276-277

Suffren, 21
Suliman Jah, 33, 60
Sutherland, Lieutenant, 156, 163
Sydenham Thomas, 119, 124, 126, 129, 268
Sydenham, George, 189, 190
Tafazzul Ali (Saif-ul-Mulk), 108
Tahniath-un-Nisa Begam, 99, 129, 274
Tipu, Sultan, 22-23, 25-26, 30, 34, 40-41, 43, 46, 48-50, 52-57, 59, 69-71, 80, 87, 100, 102-103, 290
Timmappah, 265
Welland, Captain, 260
Wellesley, Arthur, I86-I88, 190
Wells, 163
Zainul-Abidin, 260

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Government of India,
New Delhi.