STUDIES IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
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WITH A FOREWORD BY
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JAIN CULTURAL RESEARCH SOCIETY
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TO MY GURUS
PANDIT SUKHLALJI SANGHAVI
AND
PROFESSOR SATKARI MOOKERJEE
THIS HUMBLE WORK
IS RESPECTFULLY
DEDICATED
Whatever merit the book may possess belongs exclusively to my gurus and not to myself. Whatever defects there may be in it belong entirely to myself and not to them at all.
PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Sheth Bholabhai J. Dalal and Sheth Premchand K. Kotawala, the Trustee of the P. K. Kotawala Trust, Bombay, offered to the Society a monthly grant of Rs. 200/- for six years from June, 1945. The Executive Committee of the Society gladly accepted the liberal offer and decided to found the Kotawala Research Fellowship. In the beginning, as no qualified scholar was available, the amount was spent for the students of Jaina philosophy at the Banaras Hindu University. But in the last quarter of 1946, Srij Nathmal Tatia, M.A., was appointed Kotawala Research Fellow for research in Jaina philosophy. He prepared his thesis Some Fundamental Problems of Jaina Philosophy (now entitled Studies in Jaina Philosophy) and submitted it to the University of Calcutta for the degree of Doctor of Literature. It is a matter of gratification and pride for us that he has been admitted to the D.Litt. degree by the University of Calcutta. We feel proud to observe that the Society fulfills one of its objectives by publishing the work of Dr Tatia, which sets up a landmark in the field of Jaina logical research.

The scope of the literature produced by the Jaina masters is unlimited. They left no subject worth the name untouched. From the time of the Agamas up to the time of Yasovijaya, it had been the universal custom with the Jaina authors that they should make their own contribution to every possible branch of knowledge. The huge literature known as ‘Jaina Literature’ is so called only because its authors happened to be Jainas. And the Jaina community regard it to be their own only on account of its having been composed by their ancestors. In fact, however, it is nothing but a continuation and expansion of Indian literature as such and intended to promote the well-being of entire mankind. Without this literature, the treasure of India’s literary heritage is bound to remain incomplete and truncated. It has been unanimously admitted by the students of Jainology that numerous problems of India’s history and culture would remain unsolved in the absence of the study of this so-called ‘Jaina Literature.’ And in their opinion the confusion prevailing over a number of historical and cultural issues can be cleared up with the help of the light afforded by this branch. It has, however, to be admitted with regret that the output of systematic research work on Jaina religion, philosophy and culture has been very meagre. The scientific exploitation of this vast literature is even now only in its initial stage. It is a work to be done by not one or two isolated scholars but a task to be performed by a continuous stream of scholars who will dedicate their whole time and energy for the purpose. The result will be the production of a larger number of works of which the present work is a sample and specimen. This work has been adjudged by the highest authorities as a meritorious contribution and I am sure that the field of research on Jainology is so wide that it can give scope for such first-rate researches which can become legitimately the subject of at least a score of D.Litt. theses. The present work, however, sets an
example of assiduous study and analysis of the basic problems, the treatment of which was attempted before only in a scrappy and haphazard fashion. It is hoped that the future research workers will follow the standard set up by the author and apply themselves to the intensive study of individual authors and also of individual problems and thus bring up the results of Jainalogical researches to the same level as has been attained in the field of Vedānta or Nyāya for instance.

It will be dereliction of duty on my part if I do not give an account of the background against which the author had to carry on his researches. There was no such systematic exposition of the meta-physical and epistemological problems of Jaina philosophy, either in English or in Hindi. Of course, the learned and luminous Introductions of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi contain, among many things, the expositions of many a problem of Jaina thought. But nobody else has utilized these accounts in a systematic way and put them in their historical setting. Dr Tatia has not only made full use of these materials but has succeeded in supplying the connecting links from a study of other systems of Indian philosophy, and this makes his work fully representative of the evolution of thought that took place in the adolescent and fruitful period of Indian speculation. This has been made possible by profound penetration into the inner meaning of the philosophical solutions of problems. His work is the outcome of extraordinary industry and broad philosophical outlook, intense reflection and critical appreciation of the fine shades of difference in the approaches of the various schools to the fundamental problems of philosophy.

His treatment of avidyā is by itself an independent contribution. It shows his wide study and deep penetration. It can be claimed that he has not allowed himself to be influenced by sectarian or communal considerations in his appraisal of the logical values of the arguments employed by different schools. His criticism of the Vedāntic and the Buddhist conceptions of avidyā, for instance, is not stereotyped in character, but distinctly original. The student of Indian philosophy, who will compare the author’s exposition with that found in the original texts, will be surprised to find that such abundant light has been shed upon the cryptic texts. His exposition is not philological but philosophical and it will evoke the spontaneous admiration of unbiased votaries of truth that the Jaina philosophers have succeeded in defending themselves against the overwhelming onslaughts of the idealists. It is not only an exposition of the old stand but a new vindication which will strike a student of comparative philosophy with a thrill of surprise for the originality of approach and unperturbed equanimity of philosophical temper. Fortunately the author has not succumbed to the temptation of repeating the vitriolic attacks and vituperations of the mediaeval age. His arguments in defence and criticism of the rival positions are characterized by soberness of temper and expression and detached evaluation which are the outcome of modern culture at its best.

It is an ardent desire of the Society that not one or two scholars like Dr Tatia but a number of scholars should co-operate with it and prove that this field of research is not unworthy and barren. This
can be possible only if the wealthy people also co-operate with us. We cherish the hope that the present publication will draw the attention of the rich. We have ventured to undertake the publication of such a big work, even though the funds of the Society are so scanty, with the hope that public attention would be drawn to the quality of work that is being done by the Society. We consider it a duty to acknowledge our thankfulness to Sheth Bholabhai J. Dalal and Sheth Premchand K. Kotawala, the Trustees of the Kotawala Trust for their liberal encouragement in this respect. As regards the author he regards the Society as his own and has written the work as a part of his duty. We wish that the work receives appreciation of scholars and proves an incentive to the author for the writing of similar valuable works in future.

In conclusion, I place on record, on behalf of the Society, our thankfulness to Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Gopinath Kaviraj for the illuminating Foreword he has written for this book in spite of the multifarious calls on his valuable time.

BANARAS 5
25 October 1951

DALSUKH MALVANIYA,
Secretary,
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FOREWORD

by Mahāmohopādhyāya Dr Gopinath Kaviraj

The following pages embody the results of a wide and systematic study in the field of Jaina philosophy, and deal with certain basic problems of the system. These problems which relate to Jñāna, Ajñāna, Karman, and Yoga have a universal bearing and though an attempt has been made to examine each of them and to determine its value from a particular point of view it is bound to be of special interest to every earnest student of Indian philosophy. As the writer has undertaken to interpret the Jaina viewpoint, it is but natural that he should have approached his subject from this standpoint.

The work begins with a brief enunciation of the general philosophical attitude of Brāhmaṇism, as revealed in the earlier Upaniṣads, described as chiefly monistic, and is followed by a comparison with the Buddhist approach which is rationalistic and the Jaina attitude which is non-absoluteastic.

With this preliminary statement as a preamble the work proceeds to discuss at length each of the four problems mentioned above on the basis of ancient Jaina traditions recorded in works considered as possessed of undisputed authority. There is ample evidence to show not merely that the author’s studies have been wide and varied, but also—and this is very important—that his interpretation is faithful and illuminating. To this rare combination he has added another commendable quality, viz. lucidity of presentation.

His criticisms of some of the doctrines of the rival schools may not be acceptable to the exponents of those schools. But they have a distinct value of their own. It is an established convention that the exponent of a particular line of thought considers it a part of his duty not only to interpret it in its own light and judge it on its own merits but also to bring it into comparison or contrast with other lines of similar thought. In such cases the defence of one line leads usually to the condemnation of the rest. But such condemnation is not necessarily a condemnation if the ultimate postulates of those lines are taken into consideration.

The Jaina theory of knowledge has been dealt with in the chapter on Jaina epistemology. It is based on the Āgamas and had, like the doctrine of Karman, probably its origin in the wisdom of the ancient seers. The fivefold division of knowledge is very old. Knowledge is an essential attribute of the soul, but its rightness or wrongness
depends on the attitude. What is usually known as avidyā implies in fact only a perversion (mithyātva) of the attitude on account of which the purity of knowledge is vitiated. Upāyoga or Consciousness is called jñāna when it is determinate (sākāra) and darśana when it is indeterminate (nirākāra). These two qualities, like vīrya and ānanda, are unlimited and unobscured in the emancipated soul and are clouded by the karmic matter when the soul is in bondage. To a person in ordinary life no two acts of knowledge, in fact no two states of consciousness, are concurrent. Simultaneity, wherever it seems to appear, is erroneous, the error being due to various causes, incompetence of the apprehending faculty to cognize two successive acts together being responsible for the erroneous notion. But when the obscuring karmans veiling the omniscience of the soul are removed omniscience is bound to be manifest.

It is true. But the question is: Do jñāna and darśana occur in succession or simultaneously? The Āgamas are emphatic on the point that simultaneity of jñāna and darśana is not possible before the ghātikarmans are destroyed. On this there is unanimity between the Digambara and the Śvetāmbara schools. But for a kevalin there is no succession of jñāna and darśana according to the Digambaras and also to a section of the Śvetāmbaras.

The question of the possibility of krama in omniscience is as old as it is universal and is also relevant in the context of epistemological problems. So far as normal knowledge is concerned krama is inevitable, as in each case a distinct contact between the self and the mind and between the mind and the sense-organ would be necessary according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or as every act of knowledge represents a distinct modification (parināma) in the mind stuff which is subject to constant flux according to Śāṅkhya-Yoga. But omniscience is a supernormal experience. Patañjali refers to vivekajña-jñāna which arises from a meditation on kṣaṇa and its sequence. It is described as saving knowledge (tāraka-jñāna) and is integral and all comprehending having for its object All in all its aspects. This knowledge is free from krama and corresponds in a sense to the kevala-jñāna of Jainism. It grasps in one sweep everything—past, present and future as well as near and remote. This is pratiṣṭhā-jñāna or pratiṣṭhā.¹ The implication of akrama is that it is not an act in Time (kāla) but in the Moment which is beyond time.² It is said that the Buddha attained to Universal Vision in which he saw all things simultaneously as if reflected in a mirror.³ The Triṣṭuparārahasya⁴ refers to Pratibhā,
which being devoid of all limitations is called Supreme (Parā), as the Essence of the Deity. Utpalācārya, in his Isvārāpratyabhijñā-kārikā, states plainly that Pratibhā or Divinity is above all krama and yet holds within itself the entire krama of the universe associated with the action of the forces of space and time (deśa-kāla-sakti) projected by Divine Freedom. In other words, there is krama in outer appearances while there is no krama in the Inner Mirror of the Ineffable Light which reveals those appearances.\(^1\) This is exactly what the Vaiyākaraṇas say in regard to the Paśyanti Vāk which is conceived as free from krama within, as One, and yet as holding within itself the forces of krama as well.\(^2\) It is equated to Parabrahman, Akṣara, Sabdarūpa, Parā Vāk and Ātman.\(^3\) There is no use multiplying instances to show that the Supreme Omniscience is akrama and yet possesses within itself every form of krama.

The chapter on avidyā, consisting of fifteen sections, is devoted to a careful examination of the problem in all its implications and bearings. The views of other schools viz. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Veda, Buddhism and Saivism have been stated and refuted and the Jaina theory upholding avidyā as identical with triple perversity (mithyātva) has been finally confirmed. The Jaina view of avidyā implies erroneousness not in knowledge only, as usually conceived, but in attitude and conduct as well.

Closely connected with the problem of avidyā is the question of karman which in Jaina literature, as elsewhere in Indian thought, occupies a position of great importance. A separate chapter in four sections is assigned to an elaborate discussion of this topic. The conception of karman as dravya, in addition to its character as bhāva, is unique in Jainism and has received a special treatment in its literature. It has parallels elsewhere indeed, but its importance in Jaina thought cannot be overrated. The conception of āṇava-maṇḍ in dualistic Saivism as a covering substance, which obscures the inner divinity of the self and converts it as it were into a mundane soul subject to the exigencies of various limitations, bears a close resemblance to the Jaina view. It may be of interest to note that the other two malas of the Tāntric dualists would also in some way be partially covered by the Jaina concept of karman. It may be remembered that,

\(^1\) yā cai 'ṣā pratibhā tattatpadārthakrama-rūgītā akramānanta-cidrūpaḥ pramātā sa mahēśvaraḥ.

\(^2\) Cf. pratisahātakramaṇāntaḥ satya apy abhede samāvīṣṭakramasaṅkhyā paśyanti—Sivadṛṣṭi, p. 39. (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies No. LIV, 1934).

\(^3\) Vide ibid., p. 39.

\(^4\) Vide infra, p. 138.
like the *kaṇcukas* of Māya concealing the omniscience, omnipotence, ubiquity, eternity and blissfulness of the soul, the *karmans* in Jainism obscure the purity of the soul. The author has dwelt on the relation of *karmans* with the soul, its classification, and its states and processes.

There is another point which deserves consideration. The Vedāntic *avidyā* has the dual power of obscuration (*āvaraṇa*) and projection (*vikṣepa*). The dawn of self-knowledge removes the former and in special cases—when some more qualifications are added—leads to *jīvanmukti*. The existence of the latter, which is described as *avidyā-leśa*, does not stand in the way of *jīvanmukti*. It is experience (*bhoga*) alone which is held to be capable of exhausting the strength of the latter. This is of course the usual course. The Jaina conception of the basic difference in *karnas* as *ghātin* and *aghātin* brings out the above truth clearly. The *ghāti-karnan* corresponds to the *āvaraṇa* aspect and the *aghātin* to the *vikṣepa* aspect of the Vedāntic *avidyā*. It is well known that the presence of *aghāti-karmans* is not inconsistent with the rise and function of *kevala-jiñāna*, though it is true that in the final state of Beatitude or *Siddhi* even the *aghāti-karmans* which are pure in nature disappear, causing the disintegration of the physical organism itself. First the *kaśāyas* disappear and then in due course the *yoga* (activity), which is followed by *Siddhi*.

The treatment of the problem of *karmans*, like that of *avidyā*, is very elaborate, but it is not, I am afraid, thorough, if looked at from the standpoint of the subject. All the issues relevant to a proper appreciation of the subject have not been, and could not have been, touched. It is true that in a work on Jainism the writer was not in a position to discuss freely points raised in works on Buddhism, Tantras, Yoga Sāstra, and Purāṇas. But it is also true that these aspects of the problem might have been viewed and discussed in the interest of thoroughness from the standpoint of Jaina thought itself. The author, for instance, says nothing of vicarious *karmans*, of transfer of *karmans* and its laws, and of what has been somewhere described as equilibration of *karmans* (*karma-sāmya*). The nature of *vipāka*, its time and its character as *niyata* or *aniyata* together with the laws of karmic fructification required clarification. A clearer statement of the relation between the *ghātin* and *aghātin karmans* would have been very useful to a proper philosophical appreciation of the theory.

We now come to the last chapter which contains some very interesting data on the basic principles of spiritual evolution. The Jaina view of *paramātman* in the role of World Teacher (*tīrthaṇkara*) is akin in some respects to the Sānkhya and Tantric conceptions of īśvara and deserves to be studied in the same context. In each case it is the *human soul* which on complete purification from matter attains to
the level of divine perfection. The pertinent question which occurs in this connection is: Why of all the souls which are similarly gifted a particular soul, and not every one, attains to this phase of perfection. Kaivalya is open to all, whether one is īśvara and possessed of vivekajña or otherwise.¹ So is Siddhi open to all, though the status of īśvara or tīrthaṅkara is reserved for a chosen few only. What the special qualifications of these few are and how they were originally acquired we do not know. The Jaina view seems to point to radical differences inherent in the souls in spite of their essential sameness of qualitative perfection. Apart from the basic difference due to bhavyatā in a soul there are other differences as well, which in fact tend to make each soul unique. The Christian and Mādhva views, together with similar ideas in other schools including Buddhism, point to a similar outlook. In Sāṅkhya an attempt has been made to show that the path of āśvarya at the beginning of a new cycle is consequent on apara-vairāgya minus vivekajña in the earlier cycle, followed by a suspension of cosmic order in pralaya. This status of īśvara is that of kāryēśvara, there being no provision in Kapila’s system for a Supreme Being endowed with Divinity from eternity. In the Tantras also āśvarya ensues to a soul, which has purged itself from the shackles of karman and māyā but has not attained to sufficient maturity in mala-pāka so as to bring down Divine Grace upon it and transform it into an īśvara, in the ensuing cosmic cycle, which is possible only on the attainment of the requisite maturity. The author says rightly that the inward tendency exists in every soul, but it is not awakened in each or not awakened at the same time in all. It may be that in some it is not awakened at all. This explains the difference in the starting point of spiritual evolution which commences with the awakening of this tendency and terminates with the attainment of Siddhi. Thus while the Siddhi is open to all awakened souls the status of tīrthaṅkara or World Teacher is reserved for a select few only. There are certain souls in which the spiritual evolution never takes place—not in the present cycle, nor even in the future. The yathāpravṛttakarana, as explained, is a very interesting factor, which is conceived as an act of unconscious resolution (adhyavasāya) working within from the beginningless past or as a momentary act of self-purification manifested as vairāgya. The life history of a soul consists mainly of four stages: (1) the embryonic stage in the nigoda, (2) the awakening of the inward tendency synchronizing with granthībhedha, (3) the beginning of spiritual evolution marked by numerous gunasthānas, and (4) the perfection or Siddhi. Some souls do not come out into the evolutionary line at all, but those which come out are sure

¹ etasyām avasthāyām kaivalyāṁ bhavatī ’śvarasyā ’nīśvarasya vā vivekajajñāna-bhāgina itarasya vā—Bhāṣya. YD, III. 55.
sooner or later to arrive at perfection. They have, as the earlier Buddhists would say, entered into the stream (srotas) and are destined for final realization.

The section on guṇasthāna is admirably written and contains a mass of valuable information from the source books on the way in which the process of spiritual regeneration sets in and continues. Interesting details are given which remind one of the mysteries involved (i) in the awakening of kundalini or in the act of conversion which transforms a mundane into a supra-mundane citta moving inwards to Nirvāṇa or (ii) in the anugraha-śakti which not only purges but also divinizes the soul. The process is analogous, from one point of view, to the process of the first reclaiming of a prthagjana into an ārya, and then of leading an ārya already in the stream, through gradual eradication of all the fetters that bind him down to the wheel of life, to a state of moral and spiritual freedom. From another point of view it is comparable to the process which generates a bodhicitta and leads it up from stage to stage till it realizes itself as a full grown Buddha. The process begins with right vision (samyag-darśana) in the soul as soon as the coating of relevant karmic matter is removed, at least for a short while, by means of the various karaṇas. Right vision follows on the removal of this veil. Once it is acquired it never leaves until perfection is completed. There may be lapses, but these are at most temporary and bound to disappear.

This shows that the elimination of karman or avidyā is followed by the rise of jñāna. Coats of matter must be removed if right vision is to emerge. Patañjali’s conception of the relation between kriyā-yoga and samādhiyoga is relevant here. Kriyāyoga helps to attenuate the karma-seeds but not to destroy them. They are destroyed only by prasamkhyaṇa which follows from samādhi, thus showing that jñāna alone either rising from samādhi or inspired from above effects the destruction of avidyā and the granthibheda. The belief expressed in the couplet:

bhidyate hṛdayagranthiṣ chidyante sarvasaṃśayāḥ
kṣiyante cā’ṣya’ karmāṇi tasmin drṣṭe parāvare

is on the contrary to the effect that the vision comes first, either as a result of an act of Grace from above or of an act of intense self-effort from within and is followed by granthibheda, saṃśayaccheda and karmakṣaya, and not vice versa.

In the Tantras however we have a synthesis of the two apparently conflicting positions. The counterpart of karmic matter obscuring the soul is, as has been already observed, āṇava-mala or atomic coating.

1 Vide infra, p. 271.

2 MuUp, II. 2. 8.
and the Māyākañcukas which obscure the divinity of the soul and limit omniscience, omnipotence etc. The basic coating has to be removed first before the true vision can arise. When the obscuring matter is mature Grace descends on the soul and by the application of kriyāśaktī in dīkṣā the matter is removed. Thus spiritual ignorance disappears and spiritual knowledge follows. The rise of intellectual knowledge through practice of sādhanas and the removal of intellectual ignorance fall within these two limits.¹

The Foreword has become inordinately long and I do not wish to make further observations on other points or issues raised in the work. The author, as an exponent of Jaina philosophy, has done full justice to the subject and has given unmistakable evidence of a wide acquaintance with and of great labours in the field of early Jaina philosophical speculations. It is desired however that, in the interest of a more comprehensive treatment of the problems concerned from the general viewpoint, the author should compile another work where India’s outlook on these problems may be clearly represented. We have had enough of analytical work attempting to describe the different systems in isolation, taking each as a distinct prasthāna and proceeding along its own line. But time, I believe, has come when scholars should come out from their narrow grooves, take up a synthetic view of things, and try to discover the underlying unity and interpret India’s outlook as a whole. I invite the author, whom I consider to be competent enough, to undertake the work, to come forward as a pioneer in the field, and take upon himself the sacred task of interpreting the message of undivided ancient India to the outside world.

¹ Vide infra, pp. 143-4.
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Jainalogy is a vast subject or rather consists of a number of subjects each of which is immense in its extent and content. It is a matter of gratification that the canonical literature attracted the attention of scholars for the first time and authorized translations of some of the Āgamas in the Sacred Books of the East Series and outside have gone a long way in acquainting the academic world with the basic doctrines and principles of Jaina religion and ethics. The contributions of the later masters in the field of logic, epistemology and metaphysics are literally stupendous. In the field of logic and epistemology the English translation of Hemacandra’s Pramāṇaṃīmāṃsā, a standard authoritative work on the subject, by my revered teacher Professor Dr Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Ph.D., Asutosh Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Calcutta University, and my humble self is expected to enable a modern student of philosophy to have a dependable and fairly comprehensive knowledge of the contribution of the Jaina thinkers. As regards the philosophy of Anekāntavāda, it has received a thorough treatment and exposition in the work The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism of my revered teacher. The paper on Anekāntavāda by Professor K. C. Bhattacharya is an outstanding and illuminating exposition of the fundamental logical attitude of the Jaina philosophers. It was felt by me that a study of Jaina philosophical thought could not be perfect without a knowledge of its evolution from its ancient moorings in the Āgamas, a large number of which is happily still extant. In the present work I have addressed myself to this difficult task. I thought it imperative that a modern scholar should have a fair acquaintance with the spiritual and religious milieu in which Jainism is found to take its rise. It must be admitted that Jainism was not an exotic overgrowth on the soil. It arose in the midst of currents and cross-currents of spiritual and philosophical upheaval which characterized the times when Mahāvīra and Gautama Buddha strenuously engaged themselves in their missionary work. I did not dare to go further back beyond the Āgamas for want of documentary evidence, although it is claimed by the orthodox adherents of the Jaina faith that Mahāvīra only promulgated an ancient doctrine which had been preached by an unbroken succession of śīrṣaṅkaras whose activities were spread over thousands and thousands of years before the last śīrṣaṅkara made his advent.

In the first chapter I have tried to give an estimate of the distinctive trends of thought and attitude of the Vedic seers, the Buddha
and Mahāvira. I have indicated that the later growth of Jaina philosophical thought in the fields of logic, epistemology, ethics and religion has been dominated and influenced by the peculiar philosophical outlook and attitude of Mahāvira. Later writers, in their elaboration of the fundamental problems, have given evidence of their original thinking no doubt. But they have not made a departure from the fundamental tenets which gave Jaina thought their stamp of individuality.

I have shown how Mahāvira's attitude towards experience, sensuous and supersensuous, which provides a sharp contrast with that of the Buddha, has been the prime source of Jaina epistemology which has been dealt with in the second chapter of this work. I have tried to be scrupulously faithful to the celebrated exponents of Jaina thought, and though my treatment is mainly historical in character I have not hesitated to give a critical evaluation on points whereupon the traditional doctors delivered conflicting and divergent views. A study of this chapter will, I hope, throw welcome light on the peculiar epistemology of perception of the Jaina school and will provide a student of the standard works of Jaina logic and epistemology with the necessary background to understand the tangled problem in a clear perspective.

In the third chapter I have dealt with the supreme problem of avidyā in the different schools of Indian thought and have shown how the Jaina conception of avidyā radically differs from that of other schools. I do not know of any systematic and comparative study of this fundamental problem by a predecessor. I have endeavoured my best to be thorough in my treatment and have shown with reference to the original data how the approach to the problem has deeply influenced the philosophical outlook and conclusions of the different schools. I may not be accused of vanity if I modestly claim originality for my treatment of avidyā in Yoga, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Saiva schools. As regards the Buddhistic and the Vedāntic conceptions of avidyā I have given a dispassionate and faithful exposition of the treatment accorded to it by the original exponents without the slightest leaning to weaken their position. I have given as faithful and powerful an exposition of the views of the philosophers as could be expected from an orthodox adherent of these systems. I have shown how the Jaina philosophers have squarely and boldly faced the sledge-hammer blows of the idealistic philosophers and have given their own realistic interpretation of the data from which the idealistic conclusion was deduced. The Vedāntic conception of avidyā has been expounded by modern exponents more or less elaborately. But the Jaina criticism
of it with all its logical strength has not been dealt with by any previous writer so far as my knowledge goes. I have drawn upon original writings of the exponents of both the schools, particularly Śureśvara and Vidyānandi. I have not gone to the later writers such as Madhuvśūdana Sarasvatī as I did not think that it would serve an additional purpose. I have shown the fundamental and irreconcilable difference of the philosophical approach and outlook of the Jaina realist from that of the Vedāntic and Buddhist idealists. The difference is ultimate and each has shown himself at his best and strongest. There can be no capitulation on the fundamentals and ultimate issues. The onslaughts are as powerful and telling as the defence is effective. It can be claimed without betrayal of partisan spirit and zeal of orthodoxy that the Jaina has laid his hands upon the most vulnerable point in the Vedāntist’s armoury of defence. The Jaina philosopher has laid enormous stress upon the Vedāntist’s reliance upon experience in his difference from the Buddhist nihilist Nāgārjuna so far as he is expounded by Candrakīrti and his critics. The Vedāntist has criticized the absolute negativism as sponsored by a school of Buddhist sceptics on the ground of self-contradiction of experience. The Jaina has shown that the charge of self-contradiction is not based upon and cannot be substantiated by pure logic. The contradiction is empirical in character. The Jaina therefore submits that the Vedāntist should not give half-hearted allegiance to experience together with its contents. The Vedāntist’s appeal to the ultimate experience in final realization as an unpolarized simple affirmation does not find favour with the Jaina realist who scents mysticism in this defence. As regards appeal to the Upaniṣadic revelation the Jaina does not repudiate the validity of the Upaniṣadic text, but he has his own interpretation of the same which is radically different from that of the Vedāntic monist. As a matter of fact, if we are to believe in the Jaina tradition as recorded in the authoritative works, Mahāvīra himself accepts the Upaniṣad as an authoritative declaration of ultimate truth. This tradition has paramount significance both to the orthodox adherents of the Jaina faith and to those of the Vedic school. We have not found a single text in the religious and philosophical literature of the Buddhists which accepts the validity of the Vedic revelation in any form or shape. Of course, Mahāvīra and his followers have condemned the sacrificial religion of the Vedas which accepts and approves animal slaughter as a religious act. But not only the Buddhists and the Jainas are sceptical of the purity of animal sacrifice but also the Sāṅkhya-Yoga school explicitly denounces animal sacrifice as an act of demerit. In the Upaniṣads also we find denunciation of sacrificial religion as a vehicle of salvation. Of course the orthodox exponents

1 Cf. Viṣṇu, 1596-1603.
of Vedānta do not regard animal sacrifice as enjoined in the Vedic rites as positively sinful. But they frankly and unreservedly assert that there can be no hope of salvation through performance of sacrifices alone. The renunciation of the world and of the sacrificial religion in the life of a recluse is emphasized as the sole means of cultivating the spiritual perfection which will put an end to worldly life by ushering in final realization of the ultimate truth. We need not be surprised at the denunciation of Vedic ritualism by Mahāvīra or the Buddha if we can put up with the unequivocal condemnation of Vedic ritualism in the Bhagavadgītā. The highest spiritual life is abhorrent of inflicting slightest injury on life and this is happily the unanimous decision of the Upaniṣads and of Mahāvīra and of the Buddha.

I have been drawn, in the fourth chapter, to a discussion of the Jaina theory of karmāṇ which is a highly complicated doctrine with its peculiar conception and interminable shades of difference in the working out of its details. The belief in the inevitability of the Law of Karmāṇ is rather common to all schools of Indian philosophy. It rests upon the fundamental ethical belief of moral responsibility of a living being. It is the prerogative of human life that it has the opportunity to get rid of the burden of the heritage of karmāṇ which it has acquired from beginningless past. Though the Jaina conception of karmāṇ as a physical substance and the theory of the influx and eflux of karmic matter is entirely different from that of the other schools, its difference with regard to the results as psychical and ethical forces is not essential from that of the other schools. It must be admitted that the Jaina theory is highly elaborate and logically consistent. Although several writers such as Dr Glasenapp and before him Mr V. R. Gandhi have written on the Jaina theory of karmāṇ, a philosophical presentation of this important doctrine was a desideratum. Apart from the importance and interest of the Jaina theory of karmāṇ by itself for a student of Jaina thought I was impelled to embark upon the subject in order to make the Jaina theory of avidyā intelligible and complete. It was found in the discourse on Jaina conception of avidyā that it was bound up with the doctrine of karmāṇ. Jaina avidyā is the outcome of karmic veil. And so I had to deal with this important ethico-philosophical doctrine as a matter of internal necessity. Once drawn into the subject I could not avoid going into the essential and salient features of the doctrine though the treatment of the details might have an extra-logical look in it. But as the doctrine is very little known to students of other branches of philosophy and the presentment of it in Mr Gandhi’s work is rather popular, and scrappy in Dr Glasenapp’s thesis, and in view of the possibility of this respectable theory being misunderstood as a crudity or oddity, my treatment ought to be regarded as a contribution of some philosophical value.
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I had to cut through the maze of the tangled literature on karman and had to size it up and present it in a logical shape. A curious student who may feel impelled to pursue the study of this doctrine in Jaina literature will, I hope, now start with a clear perspective which will lighten his labour and save him from confusion of issues of which there is every risk in the unaided study of the original literature.

My last chapter is on yoga. Yoga affirms its faith in the direct realization of the ultimate secrets of existence and the possibility of its achievement for a human being. It may savour of mysticism. But it is mysticism in the noble sense of the term and not in the sense of an illogical or anti-intellectual dogmatic assertion of a fact. Philosophy must culminate in the conviction of truth. But the intellectual resources that are given to a human being, though a valuable possession and asset in the progress of higher life, are found to be inadequate at the end of the journey. Philosophy may give us at best an intellectual conviction which is not and cannot be a substitute for direct intuition. The great teachers of India have unwaveringly affirmed their faith in direct intuition. This direct intuition is transcendental because it emerges only after the senses have exhausted their functions. The Jaina believes that our senses are rather hindrances to the realization of full truth. The knowledge that is achieved by means of the senses is mediate and indirect. The senses are more or less barriers standing between the knower and the truth to be known. Our empirical knowledge including that afforded by reason is bound to be hazy, indistinct and remote, because the self does not envisage the reality as it is face to face. Besides, our senses do not give us a complete picture of the truth but rather, like a prism, they give us a distorted and blurred view. According to the Jaina philosopher consciousness is not a factitious product. It is innate in us and the fact that consciousness comes in contact with reality through a medium and in a graduated scale is rather an accident and a limitation. The power is there, and once the barrier between the conscious knower and the object is removed the full and complete knowledge of reality is bound to materialize. The Jaina has shown and other philosophers may agree that our imperfection of knowledge is the direct consequence of our ethical imperfection imposed by the accumulated burden of karman inherited by the self. The self only inherits what it has acquired in the past. This inheritance, call it karman or avidyā or the Original Sin, has got to be done away with. The best and surest means is ethical perfection and perfect knowledge which can be acquired by a course of spiritual discipline as prescribed by the yogic process. It will be unscientific attitude to condemn it a priori. It stands as a challenge and as an exhortation to make the experiment and to test
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its validity or otherwise. One thing should be a warning against cheap complaisance of attitude and frivolous dismissal of this time-honoured discipline. It is this that the greatest teachers of mankind have pursued it and extolled it and it will be boldness in excelsis to look upon these persons as cranks and faddists. Whatever might be the opinion of a modern scholar he ought to have the charity to accept my treatment as a methodological necessity in order to complete my study of the Jaina philosophy. I do not pretend to be the original promulgator of this doctrine but rather an exponent of it. One thing I may claim to have done. It is this that I have shown how the Jaina conception of yoga is in perfect agreement and harmony with the system which was elaborated by Patañjali. This should be regarded as a welcome addition to our knowledge. Patañjali's philosophy is more or less widely known. The Jaina system of yoga is little known to the modern student and it was an agreeable surprise to me when I found in the course of my study the points of agreement which it presented to the yogic discipline as expounded by Patañjali and the Buddhists. I thought it would be an unpardonable act of dereliction on my part if I withheld the results of my study of this interesting side of Jaina philosophy from the modern student out of fear for being misunderstood.

I now present the results of my prolonged study to the scholars who are interested in philosophical speculations for what they are worth. I felt the need of interpreting the ancient philosophy of the Jainas to the modern mind in a modern language and a modern way. I however assure the reader who will honour my humble contribution with a perusal that I have been scrupulously faithful to the masters whose thoughts I present in this book. In this connection I feel called upon to make a full acknowledgment of my deep gratitude and obligation to my gurus Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Professor Dr Satkari Mookerjee, to whom this work is dedicated, for the unfailing light and guidance received from them during my studies of the original texts and in the composition of the work. I must also place on record my obligation to my friend Pandit Dalsukh Malvaniya of the Banaras Hindu University who has helped me with suggestions and discussion of texts and problems. I am also indebted to Professor Rev. Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, m.a., with whom I read the Pālī Tripiṭaka and the Abhidhamma system of philosophy, for the illuminating guidance I received from him at Banaras.

I take this opportunity of making an acknowledgment of my debt to the departed savant the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Phanibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa who inspired me for the study of Indian philosophy and put me on the right track by placing me at the feet of Pandit Sukhlalji
Sanghavi. It is my misfortune that I cannot make a present of my book to him in this world. It was he who advised me to take to the study of Indian philosophy and predicted my success in this field. I was further fortunate to receive unbounded favour from the great savant Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Gopinath Kaviraj, M.A., D.Litt., the late Principal, Government Sanskrit College, Banaras, who read my work in manuscript and whose suggestions have led to the considerable improvement of my work. I refrain from the futile attempt to praise him as no praise can be adequate and on the contrary it is bound to result in belittling his unimaginable intellectual and spiritual majesty which strikes awe in a scholar who has received instruction from him. My debt of gratitude has incalculably increased on account of his favouring this humble work with his learned Foreword. To Professor Dr P. L. Vaidya, M.A., D.Litt. (Paris), Mayurbhanj Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Banaras Hindu University, I owe a tremendous obligation for the encouragement I received from him. I have always found in him the good Samaritan whose robust goodness had instilled courage into me when my spirits were drooping. He is to me the pattern of a combination of benevolence and scholarship, which is unfortunately becoming rare in these days. To Sir Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan to whom students of philosophy look forward as the beacon light and perennial source of inspiration, the author feels himself bound by an indissoluble tie of gratitude for an act of supreme justice which was conferred by him upon the author in the usual course of his duties as the judge of the merit of all philosophical works.

I shall be failing in my duty and guilty of unpardonable ingratitude if I let slip this occasion of placing on record my debt of gratitude to the late Babu Bahadursingh Singh, the great patron of scholars, who gave me all encouragement for the prosecution of my studies of Jaina philosophy at Banaras under the fostering care and guidance of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi. The author cannot find suitable language to express his gratefulness to the two large-hearted benefactors of Jaina culture Sri Rajendrasingh Singh, B.com., and Sri Narendrasingh Singh, M.S.C., LL.B., M.L.A., the Singh brothers, who are worthy sons of the worthy father, for the immense goodwill and patronage which the author has been receiving at their hands without ceasing. A formal expression of gratitude will be too cold an affair in the context of cordial relationship and intimacy which subsist between them and the author.

I must here express my gratefulness to Dr Syamaprasad Mookerjee who bestowed the P. C. Nahar Research Fellowship upon me when he was the President, Post-Graduate Councils in Arts and Science, Calcutta University. I should also offer my thanks to the authorities
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of the Jain Cultural Research Society, Banaras, for the award of the Punamchand K. Kotawala Research Fellowship which enabled me to complete my work, and also for the provision they made for its publication. I am also much indebted to my esteemed friend Pandit Narendrachandra Vedāntatirtha, M.A., Lecturer in Sanskrit, Calcutta University, for his kindly revising the proofs of this work.

Singhi Park
CALCUTTA 19
31 October 1951

NATHMAL TATIA

PRONUNCIATION

The vowels in Sanskrit are the same as in Italian, except that the sound of a approaches that of a in rural, and ā that of a in father. A vowel with a bar (˘) above it is long; ī, ī are respectively pronounced as ri, li. The consonants are almost as in English, except that g is always hard and the sound of c approaches that of ch in church; ȷ, ȷ etc. (indicated by a dot below) are cerebrals and are the same as t in turn, d in drum, and so on; t, d, n are pure dentals; the aspirated letters kh, gh, ch etc. have the sound of the first letter plus an aspiration; ś is like n in sing; ṣ is like n in tinge; ṣ is like s in sure; ň is a pure aspirate; ṃ is the symbol of a nasal.

For the convenience of the general reader the Sāndkrit alphabet along with their transliterations are given below.

Vowels

अ a, आ ā, इ i, ई ē, उ u, ऊ ū, ए ē, ऐ āi, ओ o, औ ō au.

Consonants

क k, ख kh, ग g, घ gh, ङ ŋ,
च c, छ ch, ज j, झ jh, ञ ŋ,
ट t, ठ th ढ ḍ, छ dh, ण ṇ,
त t, थ ṭ ध ḍh, ध dh, न n,
प p, फ ph, ब b, भ bh, ब m,
य y, र r, ल l, ल[l], लbh lh,
व v, श ś, ष ṣ, झ s, ह h,
ऍ m or M, : h.
ABBREVIATIONS

ADv Anuyogadvāra Śūtra (Vijayakamala Śūrīśvara Jaina Series No. 1).
ĀMī Āpta-mimāṃsā (of Samantabhadra with Aṣṭaśatī and Aṣṭasahasrī, NSP, 1915).
ANī Aṅguttara-Nikāya (PTS).
ĀNīr Āvaśyaka-Niryukti (Vijayadāna Śūrīśvara Jaina Granthamāla No. 16).
ĀŚ Āgamaśāstra (of Gauḍapāda, ed. MM. V. BHattacharya, Calcutta University, 1943).
Aṣṭasahasrī Vide ĀMī.
Aṣṭaśatī Vide ĀMī.
ĀŚū Acāraya Śūtra.
AYV Anya-yoga-vyavacchedikā (of Ācārya Hemacandra).
BAP Bodhicaryāvatāra-Paṇjikā ed. Foussin, Bibliotheca Indica.
BhGī Bhagavadgītā.
BhSū Bhagavatī Śūtra.
BrUp Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
BS Brahmasūtra.
BSŚBh Brahmastūtra-Saṅkara-Bhūṣya (with Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Parimala, NSP, 1938).
Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux By Prof. Dr Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Ph.D. (Calcutta University, 1935).
ChUp Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
DhYānāśatakā By Jīnabhadra with Haribhadra’s commentary. (Śrī Vinaya-bhaktisundaracaracarana Granthamāla No. 3, Jamnagar).
DNī Diṅgaha-Nikāya (PTS).
DOK The Doctrine of Karman in Jaina Philosophy by Dr H. Von Glasenapp. (Published by the Trustees, Bai Vijibai J. P. Charity Fund, Bombay, 1942). Dravyasaṅgraha By Nemicandra Siddhānta-cakraavartin with the Vṛtti of Brahmadeva. (The Sacred Books of the Jinas, Vol. 1, Arrah).
DVKir Nīrāvaṁākāla-Niryukti.
HIP A History of Indian Philosophy (Vol. I) by Dr S. N. Dās Gupta. First Edition.
IU p Iṣṭa-Upaniṣad.
Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism By Prof. Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Ph.D. JBP Jāṇa-bindu-prakaraṇa (of Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya, Singhi Jain Series No. 16).
Jāna-bindu Jāṇabinduprakaraṇa. Vide JBP above.
Jānārāmaṇa By Subhacandra. (Śrī Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā No. 5, 7, 9 bound together, 1927).
JTBh Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā (of Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya, Singhi Jain Series No. 8).
KĀ Kārikā.
KaUp Kaṭha Upaniṣad.
KgI Karmagranthas I to IV of Devendrasūri with his own commentary on I, II and IV, the commentary on III being by somebody else. Ātmānanda Jaina Granthamālā No. 85.
Kg2 Karmagranthas V and VI. The former is the work of Devendrasūri with his own commentary while the latter is a work of Ciraṇaparamarṣī with the Vivaraṇa of Malayāgiri. Ātmānanda Jaina Granthamālā No. 86.
JP—E
Kp Karmaprakṛti with Cūri and the commentaries of Malayagiri and Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya (1937). [Upa=Upaśaamanākaraṇa].
KSS Kashi Sanskrit Series.
KSTS Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.
KV Kathā-vattu.
LA兰kāvatārā Sūtra (ed. Bunyiu Nanjio, Kyto, 1923).
LT Laghīyastraya (Singhi Jain Series No. 12).
Mahāyāna-vibhāga By Nāgārjuna ed. V. Bhattacharya.
MK Madhyamaka-kārikā (ed. Poussin).
MNI Majjhima-Nikāya (PTS).
MuUp Munḍaka Upāniṣad.
MVS Madhyānta-vibhāga-sūtra (of Maitreyanātha, vide MVS BhT).
MVS Bh Madhyānta-vibhāga-sūtra-Bhāṣya (of Vasubandhu, vide MVS BhT).
Nandīvṛtti By Malayagiri (Śrīmatī Āgamodaya Samiti, Bombay, 1924).
NBh Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.
NBhV Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya-Vārttika of Uddyotakara.
NM Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta (KSS No. 106, 1936).
NS Nyāya-Sūtra.
NSP Nirmaya Sagar Press, Bombay.
NSū Nandi-Sūtra (ed. Hastimalla Muni, Candana Jaina Jñānagama Granthamālā No. 2).
NSūV Nandi-Sūtra-Vṛtti of Haribhadra (Ratlam, 1928).
PB Prāṣastapāda-Bhāṣya (with Vyomavati and other commentaries, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1930).
PKM Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa of Prabhācandra (NSP., 1941).
PMI Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā of Ācārya Hemacandra (Singhi Jain Series).
PNT Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra of Vādi-Devasūrī.
PrSū Prajñāpanā-Sūtra.
PS Pañcasātragraha (Upa=Upaśaamanākaraṇa).
PTS Pali Text Society.
RāP Rāya-Paseṇapīya-Sutta.
SāBh Sābara-Bhāṣya.
Sāntipaṃva Mahābhārata, Poona, 1932.
CHAPTER I
THE NON-ABSOLUTISTIC ATTITUDE OF THE JAINAS

Culture presupposes history. Thought presupposes culture. Literature presupposes thought. Language helps thought and thought converts language into literature. Literature is the record of history, culture and thought. Ancient Indian literature, however, is more a record of culture and thought than a record of history. This is why we are comparatively in historical darkness about India. But as regards records of culture and thought, our heritage is second to none. Our Vedic literature can be considered as one of the richest that the ancients of the world could produce. It is a record of the Brāhmaṇical culture and thought of India. Then there are the Buddhist Piṭakas in Pāli and Jaina Āgamas in Prākrit, which are the records of quite a distinct current of culture which may be called Śramanic. These form the basis for the subsequent Brāhmaṇical, Buddhist and Jaina literature that developed in many forms and constitutes today our rich literary heritage. We shall limit our attention only to the study of the philosophical attitude of the ancient thinkers whose experiences have been recorded in the Vedic literature, the Buddhist Piṭakas and the Jaina Āgamas.

THE BRĀHMAṆA ATTITUDE

Speculation on the nature of the ultimate source of the universe is a common characteristic of human intellect. Kuta ājāta kuta īyain visṛṣṭiḥ?—From whence did it spring forth, from whence was born this creation? This is the question that stirs the mind of the sage (ṛṣi) of the Nāsadīya hymn. He starts with the assertion ‘There was then neither what is not, nor what is’, and then speculates whether there was deep abysmal water (ambhaḥ kim āśid gahanaṁ gabhiram)? Philosophical misgivings overburden his heart and he says: ‘There was no death, hence there was nothing immortal.’ But he immediately reasserts ‘That One breathed by Itself without breath, other than It there was nothing.’ There was absolute darkness and a sea without light. ‘That One’ was born by the power of austerity (tapas). ‘The sages (ṛṣis), searching in their heart, discovered in non-existence

1 Rgveda, X. 129. 6.
2 nā ‘sad āśīn no sad āśīt tadānīṁ—Ibid., X. 129. 1.
3 Ibid., X. 129. 2.
4 āṁśīd avārtaṁ svadhīyaḥ tad evaṁ tasmād dhā ‘nyan na paraṁ kiṁcana ’sa.—Ibid.
the connecting bond of existence.' But again his mind is overwhelmed by doubts and he exclaims 'Who then knows, who has declared it here, from whence was born this creation? The gods came later than this creation, who then knows whence it arose? He from whom this creation arose, whether he made it or did not make it, the highest seer in the highest heaven, he forsooth knows, or does even he not know?' Doubt is the starting point of philosophy. Out of the fulness of the heart comes the assertion 'That One breathed by Itself without breath' (ānīt avātāṁ svadhāyā tad ekam). But the human intellect is too weak to grasp the truth. It falls into the clutches of doubt in moments of weakness. The sage rejects the existent (sat) or the non-existent (asat) as the ultimate source of the universe and his heart finds solace in asserting 'That One' which 'breathed though breathless' (ānīt avātāṁ). His deep spiritual experience manifests itself in self-contradictory expressions and points to the fact that the ultimate reality is inexpressible (anirvaciṇiya). In this famous hymn we can thus discern three distinct ways of speculation about creation viz. (1) that which bases it on existence (sat), (2) that which bases it on non-existence (asat), and (3) that which regards the ultimate source as inexpressible (anirvaciṇiya). Of these, the first two are rejected as untenable. The universe did not come out of what we call existent (sat) or what we call non-existent (asat), but out of 'The One' which cannot be expressed in words. How can something come out of the Nought? How can we believe that 'In the earliest age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent'? Is it not, again, unmeaning to say that the existent came out of the existent? What then is the solution of the mystery of existence? This is the question that demanded solution from the seer. The answer comes forth from the depth of his heart though his mind still remains embarrassed.

The selfsame question arises in the mind of yet another sage who asks 'Who has seen the first-born, when he that had no bones bore him that has bones? Where is the life, the blood, the self of the universe? Who went to ask of any who knew?' He finds his questions answered in the realization 'The real is One, the learned call it by various names, Agni, Yama and Mātariśvan.'

In the Upaniṣads we find these speculations in more concrete forms. Sometimes we find that Non-being (asat) was the source of

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1 satō bandhum asati niravindan
hṛdi pratiṣyā kavyayā maniṣā.—Rgveda, X. 129. 4.
2 Ibid., X. 129. 6-7 as translated by Max Müller.
3 devānāṁ pūrvye yuge 'sataḥ sad ajāyata.—Ibid., X. 72. 2.
4 Ibid., I. 164. 4.
5 ekam sad vipra bahudhā vadantī
agnīṁ yamaṁ mātariśvānam āhuḥ.—Rgveda, I. 164. 46.
Being. 'In the beginning this was non-existent. From it was born what exists.' In the Brhadāranyaka also we find 'In the beginning there was nothing here whatsoever. By death indeed all this was concealed.' Again, in the same Upaniṣads, we find that Being (sat) is the ultimate source of existence. How can existence come out of the Nought?

'In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which is, one only, without a second. Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not, one only, without a second; and from that which is not, that which was born.

'But how could it be thus, my dear?' the father continued.

'How could that which is be born of that which is not? No, my dear, only that which is was in the beginning, one only, without a second.'

Without going into further details which can be found lucidly delineated elsewhere we can sum up our enquiry thus: There was controversy regarding the exact nature of the ultimate source of creation, and that some thought it to have come out of Non-being or Nothing while others conceived it to have originated out of Being. There is of course controversy regarding the interpretation of 'Non-being' (asat). According to Śaṅkara, it means, 'what is opposite of one defined by particular name and form', in one word, what is undefined. 'Non-being', according to him, refers to Brahman in its primary unrevealed state. But if this interpretation is correct, what is the necessity of the refutation of the theory 'In the beginning there was that only which is not', which we have quoted above? It is more on the side of fact to admit that there were originally two separate and mutually contradictory ways of thought which were reconciled or rather reinterpreted into a third which regarded reality as inexpressible (anirvacaniya). This third speculation is found in such passages as 'He who knows the bliss of that Brahman, from whence all speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach it, he never fears.' 'The eye does not go thither, nor the organ of speech, nor mind. We do not know, we do not understand, how anyone can teach it. It is different from the known, it is also above the unknown, thus we have heard from those of old, who taught us this. That which is not expressed by speech and by which

1 asad vā idam agra āsit. tato vai sad ajāyata.—TUṛ, II. 7; also see ChUṛ, III. 19. 1.
2 I. 2. 1. 3 ChUṛ, VI. 2. 1-2. SBE translation.
4 Cf. asad iti vyākṛta-nāma-rūpa-viśeṣa-viparītārūpam avikṛtaṃ brahma 'cyate—SBḥ on TUṛ, II. 7; also, asad avyākṛta-nāmarūpam—SBḥ on ChUṛ, III. 19. 1.
5 asad eva 'dam agra āsit.
6 yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha ānandaṃ brahmaṇo vidvān na bibheti kadācana.—TUṛ, II. 4.
speech is expressed, that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here think.¹ We have found the seed of such speculation in the Nāṣadiya hymn of the Rgveda. The thinkers of the Upaniṣad have given it a concrete shape. Later on this became a theory and as such had a deep influence on the development of the philosophical thought of India, Brāhmaṇical, Buddhist as well as Jainas. This will be apparent in the course of our study.

There is a gradual development in the philosophical attitude of the sages of the hymns and the thinkers of the Upaniṣad. The various Vedic gods coalesce into One Sat (Absolute).² Gradually this Sat replaces the conception of fire (tejas), water, ether (ākāśa) etc. as the ultimate elements of creation. It is now regarded as the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. This Sat is infinite, eternal and immutable. It is conscious according to the interpretation of Śaṅkara. It is ubiquitous, immortal and unchanging. The universe which has sprung forth from It is finite, transitory and mutable. The finite self is mortal and changing.

The doctrine of transmigration or rebirth also can be traced in the Vedic hymns. The Vedic people had a belief in the existence of the soul (ātman) as distinct from the body, which after death goes to the other world to reap the fruits of its action. In the Upaniṣad, however, we find a clear development of the doctrine,³ although even there it is not as developed as with the Buddhists and the Jainas. There are scholars who think that the Vedic Āryans had no special doctrines about life after death⁴ and that the suggestions of the conceptions of karman and rebirth belonged to the aboriginal Indian thinkers who had their own distinct culture and philosophy, the remnants of which can still be traced in the non-Brāhmaṇical systems of Jainism and Buddhism. But were original promulgators and systematizers of Buddhist and Jaina doctrines non-Āryans? From tradition we have it that the original Tirthaṅkaras and the Buddhas were Kṣatriya princes who were as influential a part of the Āryan community as the Brāhmins were. The complex doctrine of karman, which is the exponent of ethical freedom of the will and is derived from the theory of law of causation as applied in the moral field, is the outcome of vigorous philosophical thought. We do not find in the autochthonous aboriginal

¹ KUp, I. 3.
² Cf. ekām sad vipra bahudhā vadanti.—Rgveda, I. 164. 46.
³ BrUp, VI. 2. 16.
⁴ Cf. 'The references to transmigration which have been seen in the Rgveda are all of the most improbable character: it is to ignore the nature of poetry to press the wish that there may be long life for man among the gods into the view that it contemplates rebirth..........'—A. B. Keith: The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 32), p. 570.
races of India, who are still alive, any developed philosophical doctrine about moral responsibility which is the foundation of the doctrine of karman. It is entirely speculative to seek to affiliate this important doctrine, which has been the universal principle of all systems of thought, to non-Aryan sources. The development of the doctrine is the work of the Aryan mind and there is no evidence to show that it was borrowed from others. In the philosophical hymns of the Vedas we find highly developed metaphysical conceptions, which have been gathered up into the later speculations. These have been the starting point and fountain of philosophical thought in India. Until indubitable crucial evidence be forthcoming it is safe to hold that the Aryan mind developed these philosophical theories under the stress of circumstances and the urge of the human intellect to find an explanation of the mysteries of the universe. It is safer still to suspend one’s judgment about the original source. To assert even tentatively that the theory of rebirth and the law of karman were the invention of the non-Aryans smacks of dogmatism.

A developed theory of rebirth presupposes a developed theory of karman which again presupposes a developed ethical attitude. The conception of Rta in the Ṛgveda anticipates the Law of Karman and gives an idea of the ethical attitude of the Vedic people. It furnishes us with a standard of morality. Ordered conduct is called a true vow (vrata).¹ Punishment is invoked against a liar, an abuser, a thief, and an adulterer.² Virtues and vices are distinguished. Of course, all this is only treated as a side issue. But it is not very difficult to find that the attitude of the Vedic people was as much ethical and religious as it was secular. They believed as much in the ethical values as in the secular attainments. There were sages among them who devoted their life exclusively to the attainment of spiritual enlightenment. It is, however, only in the Upaniṣads that a radical change takes place on a mass scale. The conception of the fivefold duties of man towards gods, seers (ṛṣis), manes (piṭras), men and lower creation was developed in the Brāhmaṇas. It was, of course, in the Upaniṣads that the Aryan attitude becomes supremely ethical. It is here that the philosophical insight is wedded to ethical wisdom which gradually developed, as we

² Cf. yo mā pākena manasā carantam
abhicaśte anṛtebhir vacobhiḥ

………………………………………
ye vā bhadrāṁ dūṣayanti svadhābhīḥ
………………………………………
yo aśvānāṁ yo gavāṁ yas taṇūnāṁ
ripuḥ stenaḥ steyakṛd dabhram etu
ni śa hīyatāṁ tanvā tanā ca.

—Ṛgveda, VII. 104. 8 et seq.
have said, under the stress of circumstances and the urge of human intellect to find an explanation of the mysteries of the universe. It is here that the search for the covetable (śreyas) completely surrenders to the search for the good (śreyas). Philosophy illumines the goal while ethics shows the pathway leading to it. Philosophy leads to the identification of self with the Absolute (Brahman) which is Truth, Consciousness and Infinite. The ethical sense finds expression in such passages as 'He who forms desires (kāma) in his mind, is born again through his desires here and there. But to him whose desires are fulfilled (paryāpta-kāma) and who is conscious of the true Self (within himself) all desires vanish, even here on earth. The Self cannot be gained by Scripture (pravacana), nor by understanding (medhā), nor by much learning (śruta). He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained. The Self chooses him (his body) as His own. Nor is that Self to be gained by one who is destitute of strength (balahinena), or without earnestness (pramādāt), or without proper meditation (tapaso vā 'py aliṅgāt). But if a wise man strives after it by those means (by strength, earnestness, and proper meditation), then his self enters the home of Brahman. When they have reached Him (the Self), the sages become satisfied with knowledge (jñānatrīptaḥ), they have realized their Self (kṛtālmānak), their passions have passed away (vitarāgāh), and they are tranquil (prasātih). The wise, having reached Him who is omnipresent everywhere, devoted to the Self, enter into Him wholly.' Desire (kāma) has been laid down as the cause of rebirth. Scriptural knowledge, logical understanding and academic learning are rejected as the pathway to spiritual realization. Spiritual strength and vigour, constant vigilance and readiness, and renunciation and asceticism are given as the means to freedom. When freed, the self attains consummation of knowledge, realizes itself and becomes passionless and tranquil. 'When thou hast surrendered all this, then thou mayest enjoy. Do not covet the wealth of any man'—such is the ethical principle of the Upaniṣads. 'Knowing Him, the Self (Ātman), the Brahmins relinquish the desire for posterity, the desire for possessions, the desire for worldly prosperity and go forth as mendicants.' Spiritual emancipation (mokṣa) means identification of the self with the Brahman. In the famous passage of the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, Yājñavalkya describes to his wife Maitreyi the nature of the released soul as one with the highest reality and being not definable in terms of anything else. Emancipation (mokṣa) is as indefinable and ineffable as the Brahman, inasmuch as the former is nothing but the realization of the latter.

1 Cf. KaUp, II. 2. 2 Cf. satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma—TUṭ, II. 1.
3 MuUp, III. 2. 2-5. SBE translation (slightly modified).
4 IUṭ, 1. 5 ByUp, III. 5. 1. 6 IV. 5. 15.
7 Sir S. Radhakrishnan: Gautama the Buddha, p. 57.
To sum up: The Vedic thinkers speculated in more than one way on the ultimate source of the universe—some regarded Sat as the ultimate source, some derived existence from Non-existence, and yet a third group regarded ultimate reality as indefinable. Gradually polytheism gives place to monotheism and monotheism is replaced by monism. Speculation and realization move hand in hand. When logic contradicts itself, spiritual realization comes to its help. Ultimate reality is conceived as Truth, Consciousness and Infinite. Conceptions of karman and rebirth were systematized in the Upaniṣads. Originally the Aryan attitude was more metaphysical than ethical. It becomes supremely ethical only in the Upaniṣads. Asceticism asserts itself at this stage. The conception of spiritual emancipation (mokṣa) finds importance in the Upaniṣads. The state of release is as indefinable as the ultimate reality. The world that we see is the world of change. It is finite existence. Pure Consciousness alone is real. It is eternal and infinite. It is unchanging. Our empirical self is finite and changing. The real self which is Brahman is infinite and unchanging. It is consciousness. It is bliss.

It is to be noticed in this connection that these speculations did not take the shape of rigid theories. They were only free and supple soarings of the philosophical minds. It is only in the hands of later thinkers that they crystallized into rigid doctrines which were in vogue at the time of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. We shall now see how these problems were tackled by these two great personalities.

THE BUDDHIST ATTITUDE

The attitude of the Buddha was out and out rationalistic. He is reported once to have said to the Kālāmas: 'This I have said to you, O Kālāmas, but you may accept it not because it is a report, not because it is a tradition, not because it is so said in the past, not because it is given from (our) basket (or scripture, piṭaka), not for the sake of discussion, nor for the sake of a particular method, nor for the sake of careful consideration, nor for the sake of the forbearance with wrong views, nor because it appears to be suitable, nor because your preceptor is a recluse, but if you yourselves understand that this is so meritorious and blameless, and when accepted, is for benefit and happiness, then you may accept it.' He used also to say to his disciples that in ascertaining truth 'A Bodhisattva rests on reasons (yuktī-saṇḍha) and not

1 ANī, Part I, III. 65. 14. PTS. Also Cf.
tāpāc chedāc ca niṇaṣāt suvaranam īva paṇḍitaṁ
parikṣya bhikṣavo grāhyaṁ madvacō na tu gauravāt.
—Sūtrasātra-samuccaya, 31.
on a person (puḍgalasarana) though things might be explained by an Elder (sthaṇvira), or an experienced man, or Tathāgata or the Order (saṅgha). Thus resting on reason and not on a person he does not move away from the truth, nor does he follow the faith of others."¹ We have referred to the theories that were prevalent and much discussed among thinkers before the advent of the Buddha. The Buddha considered the following problems as unexplainable (avyākata) and refused to answer them either in the affirmative or in the negative: whether the world is eternal or the world is not-eternal; whether the world is finite or the world is infinite; whether the soul and the body are identical or they are different; whether the Tathāgata (soul) exists after death, or he does not exist after death, or whether the Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death, or whether the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.² All these questions are not answerable. There are four kinds of questions: (1) which are ekāṁśa-avyākaraṇiya, i.e., answerable with certainty or categorically, e.g., 'Will every one who is born die?' 'Yes' is the reply; (2) vibhajya-avyākaraṇiya, that which is to be explained by making a division, e.g., 'Is every one reborn after death?' The reply is: 'One free from passions (kleśas) is not reborn, but one who is not so is reborn;' (3) prati-prchoh-avyākaraṇiya, that which is to be explained by putting another question, e.g., 'Is man superior or inferior?' It is necessary here to ask: 'In relation to what?' 'If in relation to animals, he is superior. But if in relation to gods, he is inferior;' (4) sthāpaṇiya, that which is to be set aside, e.g., 'Are the skandhas (aggregates) the same as the living being (sattva)?' This question is not to be answered. For, according to the Buddhists there is nothing known as a living being. And so the question is like the question: 'Is the son of a barren woman black or white?'³ If the question is based on the presumption of what is a fiction, it cannot be answered. It is a defect of metaphysics that, in most cases, it proceeds with absurd hypotheses. Take, for instance, the question of existence. The metaphysical attitude usually tries to imagine the origin of existence in non-existence on the analogy of the commonplace experience of creation. We usually experience that a thing which was non-existent comes into existence, or is brought into existence by some agent. This commonplace experience is responsible for our intellectual unrest which we seek to end by finding out in non-existence the seed of existence. This unrest leads us to metaphysics. Our logical sense finds self-contra-

¹ Bodhisattvabhumi, I. XVII; The Basic Conception of Buddhism, pp. 11-12.
² See MNi, Cūḷamāluṅkya Sutta 63; The Basic Conception of Buddhism, pp. 12-13.
³ See The Basic Conception of Buddhism, pp. 18-19, as well as footnote to p. 19 for reference. Cf. YD, Bhāṣya IV. 33. Mūndaprāṇa, IV. 2. 5.
diction in our imagining in non-existence the seed of existence, and consequently we reject the conclusion, and try to form another which is intended to be logically consistent. We now derive existence from existence. But at this stage we become conscious of the futility of our speculation, because we have reached just the point from which we started. The Buddha was conscious of the absurdity of a priori metaphysical speculations moving in a vacuum, and so rejected the metaphysical vagaries as unanswerable. We shall consider here some such problems and the Buddha’s attitude towards them.

Let us begin with Eternalism (Sassatavāda). The Brahmajāla Sutta assigns the origin of such doctrine to the development of the power of remembering the former births due to some spiritual advancement. Some again arrive at this theory by means of logic and reasoning. It is stated in the Majjhima Nikāya that the self (atā), according to the Eternalists (Sassatavādins), is the speaker, feeler, and enjoyer of the fruits of good and evil actions (kamma), is permanent (nicca), fixed (dhrūva), eternal (sāsata), unchangeable (aparināma-dhamma), and is steadfast like the so-called eternal objects viz. the Sun, Moon, ocean, earth and mountain. Memory of the past is responsible for the idea of persistence or permanence. Abstract logic also sometimes leads to the same conclusion. According to the Ucchedavāda (nihilism), on the other hand, the soul is believed to become extinct after death. The Buddha’s attitude to these problems is clearly expressed in the following dialogue:

‘Is sorrow, Gotama, due to oneself (sayānkatām)?’
‘Not so, O Kassapa.’—Thus said the Lord.
‘Is sorrow then, Gotama, due to another (parakatām)?’
‘Not so, O Kassapa.’—Thus said the Lord.
‘Is then this sorrow, Gotama, due to oneself as well as due to another?’
‘Not so, O Kassapa.’—Thus said the Lord.
‘Is then this sorrow, Gotama, neither due to oneself, nor due to another?’
‘Not so, O Kassapa.’—Thus said the Lord.

1 See Dr. N. Dutt’s Early Monastic Buddhism, Vol. I, p. 49.
2 I, p. 8.
4 Cf., ‘Endow this mind with memory, and specially with the desire to dwell on the past; give it the faculty of dissociating and of distinguishing: it will no longer only note the present state of the passing reality; it will represent the passing as a change, and therefore as a constant between what has been and what is.’—Bergson: Creative Evolution, (1928 edition), p. 310.

JP—2
Then the Buddha expounded the position in the following way:

'If he who suffers is the same as he who does, then, O Kassapa, it is admitted that the sorrow is due to one who was existent, and consequently the agent is admitted as eternal (sassaṭa).

'If again someone does, and someone else suffers, then, O Kassapa, it is admitted that one suffers for what is done by another, and consequently the agent is admitted as extinct (ucchedaṁ etāṁ).

'The Tathāgata, O Kassapa, avoids both these ends and preaches the Law (dhammaṁ) by adopting the middle course (maṇḍhena). Avijjā (ignorance) causes saṅkhāra (tendencies), saṅkhāra causes viññāna (resultant consciousness) and so on. Thus originates this khandha (aggregate) of absolute sorrow. By the total cessation of ignorance tendencies (saṅkhāras) cease. By the cessation of tendencies, viññāna (consciousness) ceases, and so on. Thus the khandha (aggregate) of absolute sorrow ceases (nirūduḥ hoti).”

The Buddha, consistently with his doctrine of the Middle Path, could not give his reply either in the affirmative or in the negative. For, if it were in the former it would be eternalism (sāsvatavāda), while in the latter it would be nihilism (ucchedavāda). But he accepted neither of them, as his doctrine is free from both of them.  

The problem of finiteness and infiniteness of the world is also treated in the same way. It is also regarded as an unanswerable question. The problem arises in the mind due to the absurd presuppositions and imaginary constructions. The imagination gives various dimensions, finite and infinite, limited and unlimited, to the world and consequently our intellect forms various conceptions which do not deserve affirmation or negation. They are only fictions of the mind.

The Buddha’s attitude towards the problem of the relation of body (sarira) and soul (jīva) is revealed from the following dialogue:

'What, O Lord, is jarāmarana (decay-and-death)? Whom again does this decay-and-death belong to?’

'It is not a proper question'—said the Lord.

'If one, O Bhikkhu, would ask 'What is decay-and-death, and whom does this decay-and-death belong to?', and if one, O Bhikkhu, would ask 'Is decay-and-death different, and is one


2 SNṬ, XII. 17. 7-15. Also see Madhyamakakārikā, XII, i.

3 The Basic Conception of Buddhism, p. 15 and the footnotes.
whom this decay-and-death belongs to also different?, both would mean the same thing, differing only in modes of expression. If one, O Bhikkhu, were to maintain that the self is identical with the body, then there would be no use of endeavouring for release (brahmacariyavāso na hoti); and if one were to maintain that the self is different, and the body is different, then also, O Bhikkhu, there would be no use of endeavouring for release. Having avoided, O Bhikkhu, both these two extremes, the Tathāgata preaches the Law by adopting the middle course—depending upon birth (jāti-paccaya) there is decay-and-death.\textsuperscript{1}

The self (or soul) is neither different from nor identical with the body. If it were accepted that the self is identical with the body, then it would mean that the self perishes along with the body. The consequence is unrelieved materialism (or nihilism) which implies all stop to all progress towards release. Again, if the soul were different from the body, decay-and-death would have no effect on the soul. The soul would always remain as it is. This will lead to eternalism which too puts stop to all endeavours for final release. This is the difficulty that led the Buddha to avoid both these extremes. The so-called self or the soul is, according to him, nothing but an aggregate of rūpa (material form), vedanā (feeling), saññā (perception), saṁskāra (coefficients of consciousness), and viññāna (consciousness)—all of which are impermanent (aniccam), full of sorrow (dukkham) and not-self (anattā). This is beautifully expressed in the following dialogue:

'. . . . Now what do you think, O Susima, is the material form (rūpam) permanent or impermanent?'

'Impermanent, O Lord.'

'But is that which is impermanent, sorrow or joy?'

'Sorrow, O Lord.'

'Now that which is impermanent, full of sorrow, and subject to change, is it proper to say of it, 'This is mine, this am I, this is my self?'

'Certainly not, O Lord.'

In the same way the Buddha dealt also with the remaining four viz. vedanā (feeling), saññā (perception), saṁskāra (coefficients of consciousness) and viññāna (consciousness). Then he said:

'Therefore, O Susima, all material forms, that had been in the past, that are to-be in the future as well as that are at present, whether they be internal (ajjhattam) or external, gross or subtle, good or bad, near or distant—are not mine, are not myself, and are not my self. All this should be properly realized as such with true wisdom.'

\textsuperscript{1 SNi, XII. 35. 5.}
The Buddha then spoke the same thing of *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (perception), *sañkhāra* (coefficients of consciousness), and *viññāna* (consciousness).\(^1\)

The so-called self here is demonstrated to be devoid of any essence. It is shown to dissolve into nothing. It is at best an aggregate of *rūpa* (material form), *vedanā* (feeling) etc. which never coalesces into one indivisible entity. The synthetic reference of our perceptions is responsible for the idea of an unchanging substance called soul. But, as has been shown above, there is nothing like soul or what belongs to soul. This leads to the finding that substance is an unreal fiction, in other words, the doctrine of *suñña* (voidity or substancelessness). This will be clear from the following dialogue:

'O Lord,' asked Ānanda, 'It is said—void is the world, void is the world (suñño loka)—Why is it so said, O Lord, that the world is void.'

'As, O Ānanda, (all) this is devoid (suññaṁ) of self (*atena*) or what belongs to self (*atānīyena vā*), so it is said that the world is void. What, Ānanda, is devoid of self or what belongs to self?

'The cakkhu (eye), O Ānanda, is devoid of self or what belongs to self. The *rūpas* (objects of eye) are also devoid of self or what belongs to self. The *cakkhu-viññāna* (eye-consciousness) is devoid of self or what belongs to self. The *cakkhu-samphassa* (eye-contact) is devoid of self or what belongs to self... Whatever feeling, pleasant or painful or neutral, that arises depending upon *mano-samphassa* (mind-contact), that is also devoid of self or what belongs to self.

'As, O Ānanda, (all) this is devoid of self or what belongs to self, so is it said that the world is void.'\(^2\)

When there is no soul, how can there be what belongs to it? And therefore, the sense, the object, the sense-object contact and the resultant consciousness—all these are devoid of essence and as such are void. They are only passing states. But it is absurd to ask 'Whose states?'—a question which it is very difficult to eradicate from the mind once for all. This tendency of the human mind lies at the back of the metaphysics of eternalism which the Buddha was determined to abolish. The word *attā* (Sanskrit *ātmā*), with the Buddha, means something absolutely permanent, immutable and eternal. It is this conception of *attā* that he rejected as absurd.

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\(^1\) SNT, XII, 70. 32-42.
\(^2\) SNT, XXXV. 85 (2). *Attā* here may also be taken in the sense of svabhāva 'nature'.
Now let us see what the Buddha spoke of nirvāṇa (emancipation) from the following dialogue:\footnote{\textit{SNI}, XLIV. 1. 22-34.}

'... Does, O Lord, Tathāgata exist after death?—asked King Pasenadi.

'The question whether a Tathāgata exists after death has been left avyākata (unexplained) by me, O Mahārāja.'
'Does not then, O Lord, Tathāgata exist after death?'
'This too \textit{viz.} whether Tathāgata does not exist after death has been left avyākata (unexplained) by me, O Mahārāja.'
'Does then, O Lord, Tathāgata both exist as well as not exist after death?'
'This too ... has been left unexplained by me, O Mahārāja.'

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Then said the King: 'What is, O Lord, the reason, what the cause of that being left avyākata (unexplained)?'
'I put, O Mahārāja, this question to you yourself, you may answer as you think proper.

'What do you think, O Mahārāja, have you got any such calculator (ganaka), cashier (muddika) or statistician (saṅkhāyaka) as can count the grains of sand of the Ganges and say 'These grains are so many' ... or 'These grains are so many hundred thousands'?'
'Not certainly, O Lord.'

'Have you, again, got any such calculator, cashier or statistician as can measure the water of the great ocean, and can say 'This is equal to so many ālḥakas\footnote{One ālḥaka is equal to two maunds (\textit{Vide Monier-Williams' Sanskrit-English Dictionary}).} of water' ... or 'This is equal to so many hundred thousand ālḥakas of water'?'
'Not certainly, O Lord.'

'What is the reason here?'
'Great indeed, O Lord, is the ocean, deep, immeasurable, unfathomable.'

'Exactly so, O Mahārāja, that form (rūpa) of Tathāgata is totally annihilated, uprooted, made like a tāla (palmyra) tree whose head is cut off (tāḷāvatīthukatāṁ), has gradually reached extinction (anabhāvagatāṁ), made incapable of growing again in future. Being free from the knowledge of rūpa (form), O Mahārāja, the Tathāgata is deep, immeasurable and unfathomable like the great ocean. Thus it is not proper
to say that the Tathāgata exists after death... nor is it proper to say that he does neither exist nor does not exist after death.'

The Buddha spoke the same thing about the annihilation etc. of vedanā (feeling), saññā (perception), sañkhāra (coefficients of consciousness) and viññāna (consciousness) of a Tathāgata who, when freed from all these, becomes deep, immeasurable, unfathomable.

This critical and rationalistic attitude of the Buddha towards metaphysical problems is responsible for the development in later times of a number of mutually conflicting metaphysical doctrines within the fold of Buddhism. The Buddha's attitude, however, was one of strict avoidance of all metaphysics which he considered as futile, because he held that one might die before one gets elucidation of these problems. Nor was there anything esoteric in his preaching. The Buddha, on his deathbed, is reported to have said to Ānanda:

'I have preached the truth without making any distinction between esoteric and esoteric doctrine (anantarāṁ abāhirāṁ katvā) for, in respect of truth, Ananda, the Tathāgata has no such thing as the 'closed fist of a teacher' who keeps something back.'

The Buddha avoided the extremes because the admission of any one of the extremes would involve either nihilism or eternalism—either of which doctrines implies futility of endeavour for final release. The hypothesis of eternalism is as much inconsistent with the idea of final release as the hypothesis of nihilism. Eternalism implies inherent perfection while nihilism implies its impossibility. It is in order to avoid these two undesired consequences that the Buddha adopted the middle course and left these problems avyākata (unexplained). These were time-honoured problems and as such the dogmatic minds could not get rid of them. The absolutely rationalistic mind of the Buddha, however, found absurdities in them and completely got rid of them. The truth is too deep to get expression in words. Then there was every possibility of it being misunderstood. It is due to these reasons that the Buddha did not explain it. Whenever he was asked to explain the truth, he asked the enquirer to endeavour to see it for himself instead of knowing it from him. The truth cannot be expressed in language. It is to be realized. His refusal to explain does not mean that he upheld agnosticism, because he believed in realization and asked the enquirer to realize for himself. He characterized

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1 See the Buddha's dialogue with Māluṅkaputta, MNi, 63.
2 DNi, II, p. 100 (PTS edition).
3 Ibid.
nirvāṇa (emancipation) as deep, immeasurable and unfathomable and as such cannot be a nihilist. His attitude is one of a thorough rationalist who would refuse to enter into enquiries which were self-contradictory on the face of it. To know from others what can only be realized by oneself is absurd. And to express in words what can only be felt is still more absurd. Thought and language have their own shortcomings. If we can think only in terms of subject-object or substance-quality relation, our language also, being only an expression of thought, cannot be free from these. It is the characteristic of our thought and language that they make immobile of what is mobile, static of what is dynamic, eternal of what is evanescent and fleeting.\(^1\) This leads to eternalism. The other extreme is materialism which believes in death as total extinction of personality. It denounces all efforts for final release as absurd and irrational. Self-interest is the only thing worth pursuit. Absence of self-interest means absence of everything else. Annihilation of individuality means annihilation of all. If I cannot remember the past, the past is non-existent. If I cannot keep my individuality of this life intact after death, there cannot be anything beyond death. This is materialism. It can also be called nihilism. Extreme interest in individuality and gross selfishness is the spring of this attitude of mind. It is born of the total disregard of everything unselfish in our attitude. The Buddha avoided both these by keeping aloof from all dialectics. His dialogues are full of philosophical wisdom and quite immune from sophistry and cheap metaphysical quibbles. The Buddha’s dharma (Law) is well said (svākkhāto), the result of it can be realized in this world (sandīṭṭhiko), it is immediate (akāliko), it says ‘come-and-see’ (ahiṭṭhiko), it brings about nivvāṇa or emancipation (opanayiko), it is to be realized by the wise in their own hearts (paccattam veditabbo viññūhi).

The Buddha’s attitude was more ethical than metaphysical. Karman and rebirth were acknowledged as facts. They were axioms with the Buddha. His interest was riveted on finding out the pathway to freedom from this cycle of existence. Metaphysics is allowed as subservient to this end. Psychological analysis is more helpful for the purpose than metaphysical speculation. Suffering and sorrow are universal facts and every individual seeks redemption from them. The Buddha starts from these facts. Perpetual change is also given to our

\(^1\) Cf. ‘Such is the first proceeding of our thought: it dissociates each change into two elements—the one stable, definable for each particular case, to wit, the Form; the other indefinable and always the same, Change in general. And such, also, is the essential operation of language. Forms are all that it is capable of expressing. It is reduced to taking as understood or is limited to suggesting a mobility which, just because it is always unexpressed, is thought to remain in all cases the same.’—Creative Evolution pp. 344-5.
experience. Substance is merely a creation of the staticizing tendency of the human mind which itself, on analysis, is found to be nothing but an ever renewing aggregate of consciousness, feeling, perception (saññā) and coefficients of consciousness (saṁskāra). The evil passions of lobha (greed), dosa (aversion) and moha (delusion), which a human being shares in common with animals, constitute bondage of existence. Rational life is actuated by a-lohiba (absence of greed), a-dosa (absence of aversion) and a-moha (absence of delusion). Emancipation means freedom from evil passions. Life, as it is, is an evil, and to get rid of evil is to get rid of life. In this context emancipation means freedom from all life. Faith in the continuation of pure untainted consciousness after emancipation is as much a heresy as the faith in a permanent substance called soul (ātmā). With the cessation of the tresnā (craving) ceases the vijnāna (consciousness) even as the flame of a lamp is extinguished (by the exhaustion of oil, wick etc.).

The Buddha expounded the four noble truths (cattāri ariyasaccāni) of sorrow (dukkha), causal chain of sorrow (dukkha-samudaya), cessation of sorrow (dukkha-nirrodha) and the path leading to the cessation of sorrow (dukkha-nirrodha-gāminī paññapādā). Birth, decay, disease, death, bewailings etc. are all nothing but sorrow. Non-fulfilment of desires also is sorrow. In brief, the aggregate of rūpa (form), vedanā (feeling) etc., that springs from strong attachment is sorrow. This is the first noble truth of sorrow. The causal chain of avidyā (ignorance), saṁskāra (tendencies), vijnāna (consciousness) etc. explains the origin of the aggregate of sorrow. This is the second truth which finds out the original cause of this sorrowful existence. By the cessation of the cause, the effect naturally ceases. The second truth thus leads to the discovery of the third which is called dukkhanirrodha (cessation of sorrow). When the cause is known, the effect can be eliminated by eliminating the cause. What originates must cease. If suffering is a fact and if it is determined by well-defined conditions, it goes without saying that there must be cessation of suffering. The third truth can thus be considered as only a corollary of the first two. The fourth truth lays down the path to freedom or emancipation. It is called the eightfold path (aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo). It consists of right view (sammā-diṭṭhi), right resolution (sammā-samkappo), proper words (sammā-vācā), proper action (sammā-kammanta), proper means of livelihood (sammā-ājīva), proper exertion (sammā-vāyāma), mindfulness in the right way (sammā-sati) and proper meditation (sammā-samādhi). Of these the first two relate to

1 Cf. viññāṇassa nirodhenā tanhaṅkhexayavimuttimino pājotasseva nibbānāṃ vimokkho hoti cetaso ti.

2 Ibid., III. 61. 6; et seq. —ANi, III. 89. 2 (Pt. I, p. 236, PTS).
paññā (wisdom), the next three to sila (good conduct) and the last three to samādhi (meditation). The Buddha gave equal importance to each of them. 'Abstinence from all evils, acquisition of the good, and purification of one's own mind—this is the teaching of the Buddha.' Attachment and aversion obscure the good tendencies. It is because of this that the teaching (sāsana)—though effectively expounded—has little influence on the mass mind. Self-interest has a blinding effect. It keeps us tied to the past and the static. The common mass rolls downwards. It is necessary to turn the face upward and go against the common flow. It is due to this difficulty that the Buddha hesitated to preach his dhamma (Law). The Buddha, after he had realized enlightenment (bodhi), is reported to have said to himself 'Now it is useless to proclaim what I have attained by strenuous effort, for this dhamma (Law) is not easily understandable by those who are sunk in attachment and aversion. This goes against the current, is subtle, deep, very difficult to realize and atomic. Those coloured with attachment and covered by mass of darkness will not see it.' But this hesitation did not last long. Immense love for the suffering humanity asserted itself and the Buddha heard the voice of Brahmā (a god) 'Rise up, O valiant warrior, thou hast won the war and art free from debt. Travel now in the world. Let the Blessed One teach the dhamma (Law). There will be persons who will understand it.' Love (maitrī), compassion (karuṇā), sympathetic joy (muditā) and indifference (upekṣā) were predominant in his character.

THE JAINA ATTITUDE

Before studying the attitude of Mahāvīra to the metaphysical problems, it will be helpful to begin with his attitude towards life. A major part of Mahāvīra's teaching was concerned with the appeal not to interfere with the lives of others. Sorrow and suffering were as much the facts with Mahāvīra as with the Buddha. To get rid of the cycle of worldly existence was the common end of both of them as of the Upaniṣadic thinkers. The Buddha found everything impermanent and hence sorrowful and substanceless. But Mahāvīra's attitude was

1 sabhapāpassa akaranaṁ kusalassā upasampannā sacittapariyodapanāṁ etam buddhānaṁ sasanāṁ.

—Dhammapada, 183 (XIV. 5).

2 kicchena me adhigatam halaṁ dāni pakāṣṭhāṁ rāgadosaparetehi nīyam dhammo susamubho paṭisotagāmi nipuṇaṁ gambhiram duddasaṁ açuṁ rāgarattā na dakkhanti tamokhandhena āvutā.

—Mahāvagga, I. 5. 3.

3 Uṭṭhehi vīra vijitasaṅgāma satthavāha anapa vicara loke desetu bhagavā dhammaṁ aśñātāro bhavissanti.

—Mahāvagga, I. 5. 7.
not so radical. If the Upaniṣadic thinkers found the immutable reality behind the world of phenomena and plurality, and the Buddha denounced everything as fleeting and sorrowful and pointed to the futility of all speculation, Mahāvīra adhered to the common experience, found no contradiction between permanence and change and was free from all absolutism. Existence is not an evil by itself and so freedom does not mean total cessation of it. With the Upaniṣadic thinkers what is impermanent is sorrowful and only empirical. The reality therefore is what is permanent and blissful. With the Buddha also everything is impermanent and hence sorrowful and substanceless. Freedom, therefore, means total cessation. But Mahāvīra did not believe in absolute permanence or total cessation. If life were accepted as an illusory phenomenon, or if it were accepted as nothing but evil and suffering, absolute permanence or total cessation would be the truth or the desired goal. But with Mahāvīra change was as much real as permanence, and so his position was quite distinct from those of the absolutists. Freedom means freedom from passions only. It is a qualitative change rather than total cessation.

The preaching of ahimsā (non-injury) is the most important task of Mahāvīra’s life. Feeling of immense respect and responsibility for life inspires his activities. Suffering is an evil, and to impose suffering is to impose evil. Unless and until we are conscious of the vicissitudes of the soul, its transmigrations, we are not on the proper path. One who is conscious of these facts is āyā-vā (believer in soul), logā-vā (believer in the world), kammā-vā (believer in karman), and kiriyā-vā (believer in action).1 Repeated births are due to the ignorance of the nature of kamma (actions).2 Suffering is a fact which is too obvious to overlook. ‘The world is afflicted, decrepit, difficult to instruct, and ignorant. In this agonized world, see how the afflicted ones are causing pains, here and there, by various means.’3 Injuruous activities inspired by self-interest lead to evil and darkness. This is what is called bondage (gantha), delusion (moha), death (māra), and hell (naraa).4 To do harm to others is to do harm to oneself. ‘Thou art he whom thou intendest to kill! Thou art he whom thou intendest to tyrannize over!’5 We corrupt ourselves as soon as we intend to corrupt others. We kill ourselves as soon as we intend to kill others. Pramāda (unmindfulness) and attachment to guṇa (sensuous objects)

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1 AS, I. 1. 1 as explained by commentators.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., I. 1. 2.  
4 Ibid.  
5 tumaṁ si nāma tathā ceva jah ‘hantavvah’ ti manṇasi  
tumaṁ si nāma tathā ceva jah ‘ajjāveyavvah’ ti manṇasi. —Ibid., I. 5. 5.

Cf. Your own self is your own Cain that murders your own Abel. For every action and motion of self has the spirit of Anti-Christ and murders the divine life within you.—William Law.
are the spring of violence. To remain attached to sensuous objects is to remain in the whirl. Sensuous objects are the root of worldly existence (sānśāra). The wise should not remain unmindful even for a single moment. The stupid (mandā) and the deluded (mohena pāudā) turn away from the right path, and do not cross on to either side. But those who cross conquer greed by contentment and are not influenced by objects of desire. Penance (tavo), restraint of mind (āumo) and restraintment or moral observances (niyamo) are not possible for one having attachment to life and property. By nature are we fond of life and have repulsion for suffering. It is not possible to cross the ocean of worldly existence (sānśāra) unless the animal instincts are subdued and destroyed. Perpetrators of cruel acts come to grief. They cannot cross the stream of evils (anohantarā) and so cannot cross the sānśāra (world), and go to the other shore (aṭṭirān-gamā). The sense of ‘mine’ is an evil. ‘One who relinquishes the sense of ‘mine’ relinquishes also the thing about which one feels that it is ‘mine’. And one who does not possess anything regarded as ‘mine’ is a sage who has seen the (right) path.’ Property is an evil inasmuch as it cannot be had without causing suffering to others.

The common man is asleep while the ascetic is always awake, suttā amuṇi munino sayayāṁ jāgarantī. He who knows the nature of the sensuous objects is possessed of self (āyā=ātman), knowledge (nāṇa=jñāna), Scripture (veda), Law (dhamma) and Truth (bambha =brahma). The man indeed has many thoughts. Anger, pride and greed are his enemies. ‘The brave should destroy anger and pride. He should look upon greed as a great hell. The hero, therefore, should desist from killing, should give up the agreeable and should move being lightened (of the burden).’ The responsibility of fall or rise rests on the man himself. ‘Man! Thou art thy own friend; why wishest thou for a friend beyond thyself? . . . Man! Restrain thyself, and thou shalt be free from sorrow.’ The freed has destroyed all anger, pride, deceit and greed. This is the doctrine of the Seer.

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1 Cf. je pamatte guṇatṭhi se hu daṇḍe pavuccai.—Ibid., I. 1. 4.
2 je guṇe se āvaṭṭe.—Ibid., I. 1. 5.
3 je guṇe se mūlaṭṭhāne.—Ibid., I. 2. 1.
4 dhīre mubuttam avi no pamāyac.—Ibid.
5 Ibid., I. 2. 2.
6 Cf. savve pūṇa piyāyā, suha-sāya, dukkha-paḍīkūlā.

—Ibid., I. 2. 3.
7 je mamāiya-main jahāi, se jahāi mamāiyaṁ se hu diṭṭhapahe muṇi, jassa natthi mamāiyaṁ.

—Ibid., I. 2. 6.
8 Ibid., I. 3. 1.
9 aṇega-citte khalu ayaṁ purise—Ibid., I. 3. 2.
10 kohāmānaṁ haṇīya ya vīre, lobhassa pāse nirayaṁ mahantaṁ
tamhā hi vīre virao vahāo chindeva sāyaṁ lahubhūya-gāmi.—Ibid.
11 Ibid., I. 3. 3.
One who knows one thing knows all things, and one who knows all things knows one thing. The unmindful apprehends danger from all sides. The mindful has no danger from any quarter. He does not hanker after life.¹ The wise, always mindful and cautious, exerts himself day and night.²

What acts as cause of bondage (āsava) in the case of one can act as the cause of release (parissava) for another and vice versa.³ It is our attitude that counts. The path of the brave is thorny (duranyucaro). It involves mortification of the flesh.⁴ Desires prove heavy on the soul. They lead one to death. To go near death means to recede back from freedom. To the wise life is like a water-drop on the tip of a tossing leaf. It is the stupid who do cruel acts and keep tied to the cycle of births and deaths.⁵ One should not let one’s strength remain concealed (no niṅhavejja viriyāni). Easy life is no life for a spiritual aspirant. For him dhamma (Law) means equanimity. ‘What thou knowest to be equanimity (sanmam), know that to be sagedom (moṇam). What thou knowest to be sagedom, know that to be equanimity. It is inaccessible to the weak, sinning, sensual, ill-conducted and house-inhabiting men.’⁶ The mind of a sage is like a calm and quiet lake full to the brim and lying on an even plane and free from all dust. Meditation is impossible for a wavering mind.⁷ Knowledge of the self and the world is necessary for release. The knower is the self. The self is that by which we know.⁸ The world is a whirlpool. ‘The current (of sin) is said to come from above, from below, and from the sides; these have been declared to be the currents through which, look, there is sinfulness.’⁹ Liberation means freedom from the influence of these currents. It cannot be described by words. ‘All sounds recoil thence. Where speculation has no room, the mind cannot penetrate there.’¹⁰ The liberated soul has no shape, no colour, no smell, no taste, no weight, no touch, no rebirth, no attachment. It is neither male, nor female, nor otherwise. There is no analogy. It is formless existence, arūva sattā.¹¹

The Jainas, like other exponents of asceticism, endorse suicide in case the body fails to fulfil the demands of the spirit. Of course, ‘suicide’ is a misnomer for this kind of death. It is only an abandonment of the body unable to help the spirit in its progress. It is not under the pressure of passions that the death is to be courted. Freedom from passions is the prerequisite of this kind of voluntary death. Complete absence of ill will towards every living creature, and good will for all inspire the life and activities of a true ascetic. He

¹ Ibid., I. 3. 4. ² Ibid., I. 4. 1. ³ Ibid., I. 4. 2. ⁴ Ibid., I. 4. 4. ⁵ Ibid., I. 5. 1. ⁶ Ibid., I. 5. 3. ⁷ Ibid., I. 5. 5. ⁸ Ibid., I. 5. 6. ⁹ Ibid. ¹⁰ Ibid. ¹¹ Ibid.
does neither covet life, nor does he desire death. Attachment to life is as much an evil as attachment to death. If life helps progress of the spirit, it is to be preserved. If by courting death spiritual fall can be checked, it is welcome.

We have reviewed the Jaina position on the basis of the oldest extant record. The main emphasis of Jainism is on *ahimsā*, non-injury. This attitude of Jainism is more due to its rational consciousness than emotional compassion. It is not based on social fellow-feeling, but on individual responsibility. Jainism presumes infinite capacity for spiritual progress in every individual. Infinite knowledge and joy is the innate character of every soul. What is needed is complete non-interference from outside. Given freedom of development, every individual is bound to progress. Interference means spiritual dragging. A truth is not to be forced, but is only to be preached. Individual freedom is more helpful than social pressure. Spiritualism gives more importance to individual perfection than to social progress. Life is not for enjoyment but for exertion. Deep spiritualism was the characteristic of the age of Mahāvīra. It is not for an improved life that exertion is recommended. But it is for a transformed existence that penances are prescribed. Heaven is not the ideal. Freedom from worldly pleasures and sufferings is the end. The Jaina attitude is not in the least pessimistic. It is realistic and optimistic. Suffering is as much an evil as worldly pleasures. But voluntary suffering for the sake of radical transformation is preferable to worldly pleasures. Deep faith in spiritual freedom inspires self-imposed suffering. There is no description of the nature of freed existence. The end is not envisaged. The means stands justified by itself. This is the background whereupon the philosophical superstructure of Jainism was raised.

In consistency with this background, a Jaina *sādhu* (monk) is required to be very cautious about his speech. He is prohibited against making unwarranted categorical assertions or negations. A wise man should not joke, nor should he explain without resort to conditional expressions. He should explain with the help of *vibhajjavāya*, conditional expressions. We have already referred to the *vibhajya-vyākaranīya* problems of the Buddhists. This *vibhajya-vāda* was developed into a full-fledged philosophical doctrine by Mahāvīra. The non-violent and tolerant attitude of the Jainas was

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2. See *ASā*, II. 4.
4. na yā 'vi panne parihāsa kujjā na yā 'sīyāvāya viyāgarejja.—*SaKr*, I. 14. 79. The commentary however gives a different explanation.
responsible for their uttermost carefulness regarding speech which was required to be unassaulting as well as true. Only the merits of a fact should be stressed and not the demerits. One should not hurt the feelings of others. If there are different doctrines, there must be reasons for their origin. It is the duty of a patient thinker to find out the sources of these doctrines. Non-violent search for truth should inspire the enquiries of a thinker. He should not be prejudiced by preconceptions. It is this attitude of tolerance and justice that was responsible for the origin of the doctrine of Non-absolutism (Anekānta). Out of universal tolerance and peace-loving nature was born cautiousness of speech. Out of cautiousness of speech was born the habit of explaining problems with the help of siyāvāya (=syādvāda) or vihājjavāya.\textsuperscript{1} This habit, again, developed into a non-absolutistic attitude towards reality.\textsuperscript{2} Our thought is relative. Our expressions are relative. The whole reality in its completeness cannot be grasped by this partial thought or expression. Nor can it be comprehended by combining these thoughts or expressions. What is required is the radical change in our absolutistic attitude. The error lies with the attitude and not with the thought or expression. Attachment and repulsion are the two great enemies of philosophical thinking. A thinker should not be guided by abstractionist tendencies which are responsible for mutually contradictory systems of thought. These tendencies are born of predilections, more or less inherent. It is as much difficult to get rid of these predilections as to get rid of the other evils of life. Truth reveals itself to an impartial thinker. This origin of the doctrine of Anekānta can be clearly seen from a study of the solutions by Lord Mahāvīra of the problems which were left unexplained by the Buddha as stated above.

Let us begin with the problem of eternalism. The Buddha avoided both eternalism (śāsvata-vāda) and nihilism (uccheda-vāda). But Mahāvīra explained both these attitudes as real with reference to different aspects of the same reality. This will be clear from the following dialogue between Mahāvīra and his disciple Gautama:

'Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal?'
'The souls, O Gautama, are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect.'
'With what end in view, O Lord, is it so said that the souls are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect?'
'They are eternal, O Gautama, from the view-point of substance, and non-eternal from the view-point of modes. And with this end in view it is said, O Gautama, that the souls are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect.'\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. Haribhadra's Dharmasāṅgrahāṇī, gāthā 921 (Bombay 1918 ed.).
\textsuperscript{2} Cf. Ibid., 925.
\textsuperscript{3} BhŚā, VII. 2. 273.
It is our common experience that things persist as well as cease to persist. But if we stick to one side of the experience and reject the other as an illusion, we are led to formulate absolutist doctrines of universal eternalism, and universal nihilism. The Buddha rejected both these ends and left the problem unexplained. Mahāvīra accepted both the ends and explained the puzzle as originating from different mental attitudes, fostered by interests in the different aspects of the selfsame reality.

The problem of finiteness and infiniteness of the world (loka) is explained with reference to substance, space, time and modes. The world is finite as regards its substance and space. Its spatial dimensions are finite. Its substance is finite in space. The world is infinite with reference to its temporal dimension and modal expressions. Thus it can be considered as both finite and infinite. The process of the world has neither beginning nor end, though it is limited in space which, in itself, however, is infinite.

The problem of the relation of body and soul is answered by Mahāvīra in the following way:

'S is the body, O Lord, (identical with) the soul or is the body different from it?'

'The body, O Gautama, is (identical with) the soul as well as it is different from it.'

The relation of body and soul is given as one of identity-cum-difference. The soul suffers from the injuries of the body inasmuch as it is identical with the body. It does not become extinct with the extinction of the body inasmuch as it is different from it as well.

The soul is not absolutely unchanging, and so it is liable to progress or regress. Moral endeavour is not inconsistent with this conception of soul. It is inconsistent with the doctrines of absolute staticity or absolute extinction. But this non-absolutist conception is free from this inconsistency. The Buddha avoided both these absolutist extremes, as we have seen above, in order to justify moral endeavours. Eternalism is as much inconsistent with moral endeavour as nihilism. But the Jaina theory does not endorse either eternalism or nihilism. The Buddha perhaps found self-contradiction in asserting both staticity and change in the selfsame entity with reference to identical space and time. But if experience gives this as a fact, we need not be afraid of accepting this as a truth. It is this finding of Mahāvīra that inspired the whole philosophical development of the Jaina mind. If staticity means incapability of change, then certainly

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1 Loka means the contents of that portion of the space (ākāśa) where the existence and movements of spirit and matter are possible.

2 BhSa, II. 1. 90.

3 BhSa, XIII, 7. 495.
it is self-contradictory to say 'The static entity changes.' But the Jaina conception of staticity is not like this. It is better to use the term 'persistent' instead of 'static'. The Jaina conception of staticity is 'persistent flow'. The substance persists through modes. It is as well as becomes. Being and becoming are not mutually incompatible. One implies the other. Dead staticity is incompatible with change. Absolute being is inconsistent with becoming. If becoming were conceived as a super-addition to being, there would be self-contradiction. Becoming is not related to being in the same way as a pen is related to a table. But becoming means the state of being at a certain instant. Becoming involves and presupposes persistence. Becoming is not a derivative of being but its necessary concomitant. The question 'Why should a thing become and change?' is as absurd as the question 'Why should a thing exist?' Being and becoming are ontologically inseparable though they can be distinguished by logical thought. The thinkers who presume being as absolutely static and conceive becoming as a derivative of being are landed in self-contradiction. They eventually reject either being or becoming or both as illusory.

The Sūtrakrāṭāṅga records a number of old doctrines regarding soul, creation and morality. There were some who regarded soul as an evolute of the five material elements viz. earth, water, fire, air and ether, and regarded it as destroyed along with the dissolution of the elements. Some again held that the intelligent principle (vinnī) appeared in various shapes in the universe. There were again some who regarded soul as the sixth element and contended that both the world and the soul were eternal; furthermore they believed in determinism. Another group believed in five momentary aggregates (skandhas) which were regarded neither as different, nor as identical, nor as caused, nor as uncaused. Suffering, according to some, was neither due to oneself nor due to another; it was due to mere blind chance or fate. There were again some who were suspicious about what was beyond suspicion and unsuspicous about what was actually liable to suspicion. There were sceptics (annāniya, literally agnostics) who did not know anything for certain. As regards creation, again, there were some who regarded the world as created by gods, some who regarded it as created by Bhrahmā; others again regarded it as created by Bhrahma; some again conceived it as derived from pradhāna.

The Samosaraṇajāhayaṇa mentions the doctrines of four types of heretics. These are (1) kiriyam (actionism), akiriyam (non-actionism),

1 Saṅkṣ. I. r. 8. 2 Ibid., I. r. 8. 3 Ibid., I. r. 15-16.
4 Ibid., I. r. 17. 5 Ibid., I. r. 2-3.
6 asaṁkhyāyāṁ saṅkānti saṁkhyāyāṁ asaṁkhyāpa.-Ibid., I. r. 2. 10.
7 nicchayayataṁ na jānanti.-Ibid., I. r. 2. 16.
8 Ibid., I. r. 3. 5-6.
vinayam (non-discrimination), annāṇam (agnosticism). The annāṇiyā (agnosticists or sceptics), though they are able arguers, do not get beyond confusion and doubt (no vitigicchatāṭa). The venaiyā (upholders of vinaya) believe truth to be untruth and exemplify what is good as evil.

The akiriyyāvāi (non-believer in action) does not admit good or evil acts as influencing the future. He believes in the world as futile and fixed (vaśjho niyao kasiñe hū loe). The kriyyāvādins believe in actions, believe in suffering as due to oneself and not due to another, and also admit right knowledge and conduct as leading to liberation.

It is in the context of these doctrines that the attitude of Mahāvīra is to be understood. The Jainas believed in soul as separate from the body and as persisting through different births. They believed in good and bad actions, and also in right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct as leading to final liberation. We have already reviewed the Jaina position. Mahāvīra’s beliefs were opposed to the heretical beliefs enumerated above. Mahāvīra was not a sceptic, nor an agnostic. Nor so was the Buddha. Nor were they materialists. Both of them believed in such transcendental things as morality and final emancipation, however much might they differ about their nature. The Buddha certainly did not believe in a spiritual substance persisting through various births, and surviving in its purest form in liberation. But he believed in the world as suffering, and regarded liberation from this suffering as the only end worth pursuit. Nāma (consciousness) is different from rūpa (material form), and so dissolution of the body does not mean dissolution of the mind. The nāma (consciousness) originates from its own cause, and so its cessation depends upon the cessation of its ultimate cause which is avidyā, ignorance. Belief in final emancipation and means thereto is the peculiarity of all those systems which are opposed to materialism. The sceptic lies in between the believers of such transcendental things as morality and final emancipation and the materialists. And the same is the position of the agnostics. We have seen the nature of the agnostics as described in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga. There we found that those thinkers who doubted everything and believed in nothing were called agnostics or sceptics. We also learn from the Buddhist sources about one Sañjaya Velaṭṭhiputta who, when asked about ultimate problems, refused to give definite answer. He

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1 Ibid., I. 12. 2.  
2 saccaṁ asaccaṁ iti cintayantā asāhu sāhu tti udāharantā. —Ibid., I. 12. 3.  
3 Ibid., I. 12. 4. 4 Ibid., I. 12. 7. 5 Ibid., I. 12. 11.  
6 Cf. dukkham eva hi na koci dukkhito kārako na kiriyyā ca vijjati atthi nibbuti na nibbuto pumā maggam atthi gamako na vijjati. —Visuddhimagga, XVI. 90.  
7 DNi, Sāmaññaphalasutta (No. 2).  

JP—4
was an agnostic or a sceptic. His failure to answer was due to his indecision and all-round scepticism. There are scholars who believe that the *avyākṛta* attitude of the Buddha and the non-absolutistic attitude of Mahāvīra towards the same problems were either influenced by or developed in opposition to this sceptical attitude of Saṅjaya Velaṭṭhiputta. But it is beyond doubt that the respective attitudes of the Buddha and Mahāvīra were characteristic of their natures. The Buddha was a thoroughgoing rationalist and as such did not enter into problems which were beyond the reach of reason. His enquiries were mainly concerned with finding out the cause of suffering and the means to final emancipation, and he rejected as absurd the unnecessary metaphysical speculations. On the other hand, Mahāvīra inherited a number of doctrines from his predecessors and had to reinterpret and revise them in the context of the speculations of his age. In consonance with his immense faith in toleration, and peace-loving nature, he developed a non-absolutistic attitude which enabled him to solve the problems and create conviction among his followers. The whole subsequent Jaina thought is inspired by this attitude, and we shall have many occasions in the course of this work to see the results of this attitude.

CHAPTER II

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE ĀGAMAS

INTRODUCTORY

In the preceding chapter we have shown the difference of attitude of Mahāvīra with that of the Buddha and the Upaniṣads and have stressed his credence in the testimony of experience. He did not fall in the trap of abstract logic because he did not deprecate commonsense interpretation of experience. The logical attitude of Mahāvīra was intimately bound up with his empiricism. It is essential for the understanding of Jaina thought that the epistemology of experience as built up by the Jaina thinkers in consonance with the position of the first systematizer of Jaina thought and religion should be thoroughly understood. Realizing this necessity we now address ourselves to undertake an evaluation and exposition of Jaina theory of knowledge with special reference to experience. It is by no means a simple structure and the complexity of the theory shows that the evolution of the study was spread over a long period.

The theory of knowledge of the Āgamas is very old and perhaps originated in the pre-Mahāvīra period. It is said that Jñāna-pravāda formed a part of the Pārvaśruta\(^1\) which was regarded as very old and had been lost long ago. Karma-pravāda also formed a part of the same Pārvaśruta. The jñāna-theory is closely related to the karma-theory which forms the very basis of Jaina ethics. The karma-theory is as old as Jainism itself, and so we can regard the Jaina theory of knowledge as of great antiquity. There seems to have been no controversy between the followers of Pārśva and Mahāvīra regarding this theory of knowledge, though they differed, and later on compromised, on certain other topics.\(^2\) In the Rāyapaseṇaiya Sūtra, Kesi-Kumāra, a follower of Pārśva, is described as giving the same five divisions of knowledge as are found elsewhere in the Āgamas.\(^3\) This theory, in its basic form, is presupposed by the Jaina doctrine of karman which, in its fundamentals, is beyond doubt pre-Mahāvīra. The Āgamas are unanimous as regards the fivefold division of knowledge, and there is no controversy between the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras regarding it.

For a long time this theory passed more as an article of faith than as a logical doctrine. Samyag-jñāna or the knowledge of a person of right attitude was considered as valid knowledge (pramāṇa). If the

\(^1\) Jinabhādra, in his ViBh, quotes a Pārva-gāthā on jñāna. (ViBh, 128).
\(^2\) Vide BhSū, 1. 9. 76; UŚū, XXIII.
\(^3\) RaP, 165.
attitude is right knowledge is right. If the attitude is wrong knowledge is wrong. A person of perverted attitude (mithyādṛṣṭi) cannot possess right knowledge. His knowledge is wrong knowledge (ajñāna). Non-discrimination between the truth and the non-truth, perverted understanding leading to rebirths, and the absence of self-control which is the consummation of knowledge account for the wrongness of knowledge. Knowledge is inherent in the soul. It does not shine because there is karmic matter to veil it. The knowledge is perfect when this veil is totally removed. It is imperfect when there is only partial removal and subsidence of karmic matter. Absence of knowledge is unnatural to soul even as darkness is foreign to the sun. It is the clouds of the karmic matter that obfuscate the innate knowledge of the soul. Knowledge can be born, or rather emerge, with or without the help of the sense-organs. Of the five classes of knowledge, the mati (sensuous) and the sruta (scriptural) are born with the help of the sense-organs. The avadhi (visual intuition), the manahparyāya (intuition of mental modes) and the kevala (pure and perfect knowledge) are independent of them. The sense-organs, however, are only external instruments, the different states of the soul being the internal, or rather spiritual, counterparts of them. This conception of knowledge inspired the later epistemological enquiries of the Jaina logicians. When the problem of pramāṇa (valid knowledge) presented itself before the Jaina thinkers, the term ‘jñāna’ (knowledge) was replaced by the word ‘pramāṇa’ (valid knowledge). The fundamental basis of the epistemological position of the Jaina logicians can be adequately expressed by the equation pramāṇa = samyag-jñāna (right knowledge). Mati (sensuous) and sruta (scriptural) knowledge were put under paraokṣa (indirect or mediate cognition), and the other three—avadhi (visual intuition), manahparyāya (intuition of mental modes) and kevala (perfect knowledge)—were classified under pratyakṣa (direct or immediate intuition).2 This was but natural. The knowledge is pratyakṣa (direct) or paraokṣa (indirect) according as it is born without or with the help of an external instrument different from the self. But in order to bring their theory of knowledge in line with the theories of other systems of thought, the later Jaina thinkers accorded the status of pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) to the knowledge produced by the sense-organs also.3 Jinabhadra designates as saṁvavahāra-pratyakṣa (empirically direct and immediate) the knowledge produced by the sense-organs and the mind.4 This gradual reorientation was due to

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2 Cf. SthSū, II. 1. 71; TSū, I. 9-12. 3 See ADu, pp. 194-5; NSū, 4.
4 indiyamanopbhavai jñān tath saṁvavahāra-paccakkhām—Viḥ, 95.
the non-absolutistic attitude and its two corollaries *viz.* the doctrines of 'different attitudes' (*nayas*) and 'sevenfold predication' (*saptabhaṅgi*) which formed the nucleus of the development of Jaina thought. The Āgamic thought reveals the working of these principles in full measure. We have attempted to give a short account of it in the first chapter. But the account given is by no means full. Complete account of it requires a separate treatise, and so we have refrained from it. It can be said in general that the Jaina mind was always open to receive the alien thoughts without any distortion and assimilate them with their own. This fact was due to more than one reason. Firstly, the Jaina logical thought had a comparatively late origin, and so the non-Jaina thinkers had already asserted their position even before the Jaina thinkers came to the arena. The Jainas had a lot to learn and assimilate. Secondly, they had to argue their own case before the hostile thinkers with a measure of efficiency and critical outlook before they could hope to get a patient hearing from their opponents who would naturally refuse to listen to their arguments unless they embodied correct appreciation and fair criticism. Thirdly, many of the first-rate Jaina thinkers such as Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka, Haribhadra and others were converts from learned Brāhmins and had first-hand knowledge of the non-Jaina systems of thought. This helped correct estimate and comparative understanding. Lastly—and this is the most important reason—the Jaina attitude was non-absolutistic, and its scope was wide enough to assimilate such theories as were based upon reason and truth.

Along with this comparative understanding, the Jaina thinkers had a critical disposition towards their own theories. The Āgamic position regarding *mati* (sensuous) and *sruta* (scriptural) knowledge, *avādhi* (visual intuition) and *manahparyāya* (intuition of mental modes), and *kevala-jñāna* (perfect knowledge) and *kevala-darśana* (perfect intuition) was reoriented by Siddhasena Divākara. Jinabhadra took great pains to reinstate the Āgamic position. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka and Vidyānandi also were original thinkers and made valuable contribution to the theory. The task of reconciling Siddhasena Divākara and Jinabhadra was left to Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya whose thought also was not without its marks of originality. We shall substantiate these remarks in the course of our study.

Besides this theory of knowledge, the Jaina Āgamas contain also the materials for the logical theory of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra*² divides valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) into

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1 *BhŚā, V. 3. 192; SthŚā, 338.* The former mentions four kinds of *pramāṇas* *viz.* pratyakṣa, anumāna, aupaṃya and āgama. The *Sthānāṅga* mentions the same four categories under the name *hetu.*

2 *ADv, pp. 194-202.*
four categories viz. pratyakṣa (perceptual), anumāna (inferential), avyamya (analogical) and āgama (scriptural) cognition and further gives their subdivisions in detail. It also gives illustrations of the subdivisions of the latter three. The Daśāvākālikaniruṣṭī of Bhadrabāhu deals also with the problem of the number of members of a syllogism.

Let us now deal with the nature of the five-fold knowledge (jñānas) and their subdivisions.

**MATI-JÑĀNA (SENSUOUS COGNITION)**

Mati-jñāna is usually known as ābhinibodhika-jñāna (perceptual cognition) in the Āgamas. It belongs to the category of parokṣa (indirect cognition) inasmuch as it is born with the help of the sense-organs and the mind. Of course, the Anuyogadūra Śūtra and the Nandi Śūtra, as noted above, recognize the knowledge born of the five senses as indriya-pratyakṣa (sensuous direct cognition) and Jinabhadra designates the knowledge born of the senses and the mind as saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa (empirical perception). But that is only by way of concession to popular usage as is clear from the use of the word 'saṃvyavahāra' (empirical) by Jinabhadra. Vācaka Umāsvāti, however, is definitely opposed to this concession. The recognition of indriya-pratyakṣa (sensuous direct cognition) is only a later addition, and this extraneous character of it is proved by the fact that the knowledge born of the senses and the mind is also recognized as mati-jñāna (sensuous cognition) which is always counted under the category of parokṣa (indirect knowledge). The Jaina thinkers are unanimous in ascribing the status of parokṣa (indirect knowledge) to the mati (sensuous cognition) and the śrūta-jñāna (scriptural knowledge). When pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) is subdivided into the categories of indriya-pratyakṣa (sensuous direct cognition) and no-indriya-pratyakṣa (non-sensuous direct knowledge), avadhi (visual intuition), (manah-ṇāyaṇa (intuition of the mental modes) and kevala (perfect knowledge) are put under the latter while the knowledge born of any of the five senses is counted under the former category. One interesting fact should be noticed in this connection. The old Jaina thinkers unanimously and from the very beginning counted knowledge born with the help of any of the five senses as well as manas (mind) as types of mati-jñāna (sensuous cognition). But under indriya-pratyakṣa

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1 *DV*itrī, gathās 49-50; 89 et seq., 137.
2 The term 'mati-jñāna' seems to be older than the terms 'ābhinibodhika'. The karma-theory speaks of mati-jñānāvarāṇa but never ābhinibodhika-jñānāvarāṇa. Had the term been as old as 'mati', the karma-theory which is one of the oldest tenets of Jainism must have mentioned it with reference to the āvaraṇa that veils it.
3 *Vi*Bh, 95.
4 *TSū*, I. 11 and the *Bhāṣya* thereon.
(sensuous direct cognition) they counted only five types of knowledge born of one or other of the five senses. The knowledge born of manas (mind) does not find place under indriya-pratyakṣa (sensuous direct cognition). This fact points to the truth that the Jaina Āgamas contain a faithful record of the ancient views as recorded in the Vaiśeṣika¹ and the Nyāya² Sūtra that there are only five senses. Furthermore, the Jainas themselves recognize manas (mind) as only a quasi-sense (anindriya or no-indriya).³ It is only Vātsyāyana⁴ who contended that the fact of mind being a sense-organ naturally follows from the lack of repudiation as well as enumeration of it as a sense-organ in the works of other schools (tantrāntara). Perhaps the Buddhist thinkers were the first to recognize mind as a sense-organ. Vātsyāyana seems to be indebted to the Buddhists for his awareness of this. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā,⁵ clearly states mind as a sense-organ. And it may be that Vātsyāyana refers to this Kārikā as tantrāntara. The Carakasaṃhitā which is undoubtedly older than the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, however, does not recognize mind as a sense-organ⁶ though it recognizes it as one of the karaṇas (instruments).⁷ In the Mahābhārata also we find manas as separately enumerated from the ten sense-organs in connection with the evolution theory of the Śāṅkhya system.⁸ It is difficult to ascertain whether mind was designated as a sense-organ by the authors of the Yogadāsana and its Bhāṣya.⁹ The Gītā also enumerates mind separately from the other sense-organs.¹⁰ Saṅkarācārya¹¹ says that mind also is included under sense-organs on the authority of Smṛti (text embodying tradition). The Jainas, as we have already mentioned, regarded mind as only a quasi-sense (anindriya or no-indriya). It seems that when the problem whether mind should be designated as a sense-organ presented itself before the non-Buddhist thinkers, they tried to clarify their position by deducing its status of a sense-organ from the implication of their own ancient texts. The Jainas, however, adhered to their old position of regarding mind as anindriya or no-indriya i.e. quasi-sense. Thus whereas Vātsyāyana referred to tantrāntara and Saṅkarācārya to some Smṛti-text, the Jaina thinkers thought it proper to admit it as an anindriya (quasi-sense). This investigation helps us to ascertain the chronological order of the development of philosophical thought. The Śāṅkhya as presented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa is found to be a development of the Śāṅkhya found in the Carakasaṃhitā and the Mahābhārata. Īśvarakṛṣṇa perhaps profited by Buddhist criticism of counting mind as

¹ VS, III. 2. 4. ² NS, I. 1. 12. ³ TSā, I. 14, 19 and Bhāṣya. ⁴ NBh, I. 1. 4. ⁵ SKā, 24, 27. ⁶ Caraka, Sārīra-sthāna, I. 17, 64. ⁷ Ibid., I. 56. ⁸ Sāntiparvan, 204. 10; 210. 29. ⁹ Vide YD, II. 19 and 54 with Bhāṣya. ¹⁰ BhGī, III. 42; XV. 7. ¹¹ SBh on BS, II. 4. 17.
separate from the category of indriyas by the authors of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya Sūtra as well as the old Sāṁkhya thinkers. As regards the Jaina thinkers, it is not possible to ascertain whether their conception of mind as a quasi-sense is indebted to Buddhist criticism. The antiquity of the Jaina conception depends upon the antiquity of their conception of the twenty-eight types of abhinibodhika-jñāna (perceptual cognition) which include no-indriyaja avagraha (quasi-sensuous indeterminate perception), no-indriyaja iñā (quasi-sensuous speculation) etc. Perhaps the Jaina conception of mind as a quasi-sense is as old as the Buddhist conception of mind as a sense-organ. The antiquity of the Jaina conception of manahparyāya-jñāna (intuition of the mental modes) points to the antiquity of the Jaina conception of manas (mind). Of course, the recognition of mind as a separate category by all the systems of Indian thought is as old as the origin of the systems themselves. But the difference lies in their various conceptions and their later developments.

Now a problem arises as to why the different schools took so much pains to win the title of a sense-organ for mind, while the Jainas did not care for it? The non-Jaina schools unanimously agreed that the knowledge born of the contact of the sense-organs with the objects is pratyakṣa (direct cognition). Now when the problem of regarding the cognitions of pleasure, pain etc., which are obviously independent of the sense-organs, as cases of pratyakṣa (direct cognition) presented itself, it was but natural that the mind should be accorded the status of a sense-organ for otherwise the cognition of pleasure, pain etc. would not fall under pratyakṣa-jñāna (direct cognition). Besides this the yogaja pratyakṣa (transcendental perception) was also to be accounted for. In order to meet this contingency, the non-Jaina thinkers had to accord the status of a sense-organ to the mind.¹ But this presented no difficulty to the Jainas who did not regard pratyakṣa (direct cognition) as dependent upon the sense-organ or mind. The soul alone was held responsible for the status of pratyakṣa (direct cognition).

Now let us come to our abhinibodhika (perceptual cognition) or mati-jñāna (sensuous cognition). Bhadrabāhu’s Nirūkta gives the following synonyms of abhinibodhika (perceptual cognition): iñā (speculation), apoha (exclusion), vimarsa (=vimarsa, enquery), maggañā (mārgaṇā, searching), gavesaṇā (gaveṣaṇā, fathoming), sannā (sañjñā, recognition), sañ (smṛti, memory), mañ (mati, sensuous cognition), and pannā (prajñā, wisdom).² The Tatvārthasūtra mentions only mañ (sensuous cognition), smṛti (recollection), cintā (thought), and abhinibodhaka (perceptual cognition) as synonymous.³ The Nandi Sūtra only follows Bhadrabāhu. It is Umāsvāti who gives for the first

¹ Cf. NBh, I. 1. 4. ² See ViBh, 396. ³ TSā, I. 13.
time the definition of *mati-jñāna* (sensuous cognition). Of course, he does not state anything new. He only gathers up the scattered views of the Scriptures in a logical way. He defines *matijñāna* (sensuous cognition) as ‘knowledge caused by the senses and the mind.’ 1 It is rather a statement of the condition of *matijñāna* (sensuous cognition) than a definition proper. But it serves quite well the purpose of a definition. It further states the two varieties of *mati-jñāna* (sensuous cognition) viz. (1) knowledge born of senses and (2) knowledge born of mind, as the author himself informs us in his *Bhāṣya*. 2 The commentator Siddhasenaṇānītī, however, attempts to distinguish three categories of *matijñāna* viz. (1) exclusively due to the sense-organs (*indriya*), (2) exclusively due to the mind (*anindriya*), and (3) due to the joint activity of the senses and the mind. 3 Umāsvāti cites the cognitions of the fivefold sense-data viz. *sparśa* (touch), *rasa* (taste) etc. by the five sense-organs of *sparśana* (touch-sense), *rasana* (taste-sense) etc. as instances of *mati-jñāna* due to sense-organs (*indriya*). Knowledge independent of the activity of the sense-organs is called ‘knowledge due to *anindriya* (non-sensuous).’ Thus knowledge which involves the activity of the mind alone falls under this category. Similarly, instinctive incipient intuitions of the plant world as well as the undeveloped animal organisms, which are independent of both the sense-organs and the mind, also fall under it. 4 The commentator distinguishes an additional category comprising cognitions born of the joint activity of the mind and the senses. But this is also implied in the statement of the *Bhāṣya*. Thus in all there are four categories of *matijñāna* viz. (1) cognition without the help of both mind and senses, (2) cognition due to the activity of the senses alone, (3) cognition due to the activity of the mind alone, and (4) cognition due to the joint activity of the mind and the senses. One fact is to be noticed here. All cognitions are nothing but different states of the soul and as such are only cases of emergence and not origination proper. They depend upon the activity of the soul alone, the senses and the mind being only auxiliary conditions. We shall discuss the problem at some later stage.

Pūjyapāda Devanandi, the author of *Sarvārthaśidāḥ*, does not supplement the synonyms of *mati* as given by Umāsvāti. 5 Akalaṅka supplements the list by *pratibhā* (grasp), *buddhi* (intellect) and

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1 *tad indriyānindriyanimittam—TSū, I. 14.*

N.B. We have translated anindriya by ‘mind’. But strictly speaking it means ‘what is other than a sense-organ’. Knowledge independent of both senses and the mind also falls under knowledge due to anindriya.

2 *Bhāṣya, ibid.*

3 *See Tīkā, ibid.*

4 *Cf. anindriyanimittam manovṛttit orgha-jñānam ca—Bhāṣya on TSū, I. 14.*

5 *See Siddhasenaṇānītī’s Tīkā.*

6 *See SSī on TSū, I. 13.*

**JP—5**
upalabdhi (perception), and refers to others by using the term et cetera (ādī).\(^1\) Vidyānandi in his Tatvārthašlokavārttika,\(^2\) however, adds buddhi (intellect), medhā (retentiveness), āraṇī (reasoning), pratibhā (grasp), abhāva (non-perception), sambhava (probability) and upamiti (analogy) to the synonyms given by Umāsvāti.

In this connection the view of Bhaṭṭa Akaṇṭha deserves special attention. Akaṇṭha, in his Laghiyastraya, divides pramāṇa (valid knowledge) into pratyakṣa (direct) and parokṣa (indirect) and recognizes pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) as twofold viz. mukhya (transcendental) and sāṃvyavahārīka (empirical) also called atinidiya-pratyakṣa (super-sensuous intuition) and indriyānindriya-pratyakṣa (sensuous and quasi-sensuous perception) respectively.\(^3\) Avagraha (perception), ihā (speculation), avāya (perceptual judgment) and dhāraṇā (retention) are subsumed under indriya-pratyakṣa (sensuous perception), while smṛti (memory), saññā (recognition), cintā (discursive thought) and abhinibodha (perceptual cognition) are put under anindriya-pratyakṣa (quasi-sensuous or mental perception). Śrūta (scriptural knowledge), arthāpati (presupposition), anumāṇa (inference), upamāna (analog) etc. are put under parokṣa (indirect knowledge).\(^4\) Mati-jñāna thus is recognized as pratyakṣa. Memory, recognition, discursive thought etc. are cases of mati-jñāna so long as they are not associated with language. They come under śrūta (scriptural knowledge) as soon as they are associated with words,\(^5\) and as such they become parokṣa. No other Jain thinker has tried to subsume memory, recognition, discursive thought etc. under pratyakṣa. Akaṇṭha stands alone in this respect. He has not even a single supporter among his successors who admired him so much. On the contrary some of his successors have attempted to find a different meaning of the statements of Akaṇṭha in this connection.\(^6\)

We shall now state in brief the nature of the subdivisions of mati-jñāna viz. avagraha (perception), ihā (speculation), avāya (perceptual judgment) and dhāraṇā (retention) which are nothing but so many stages of the development of mati-jñāna.

(a) Avagraha (Perception)

The Nādi Śūtra gives these as the synonyms of avagraha—avagrahaṇata (receiving), upadhaṇaṇata (holding), śravaṇaṇata (hearing),

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\(^1\) matiḥ smṛtiḥ saññā cintā 'abhinibodhādaya ityarthāḥ. ke punas te? pratibhā-buddhi-upalabdhyādayaḥ.—TRā on TŚā, I. 13.

\(^2\) Sloka 3 on TŚā, I. 13.

\(^3\) LT, 3 and 4 (also see Viṣṭi on it composed by Akaṇṭha himself).

\(^4\) LT, 61 (with Viṣṭi).

\(^5\) See LT, 10-11 (with Viṣṭi).

\(^6\) Cf. NKC on kārīkā 10 and the first half of kārīkā 11 (pp. 403 et seq.).

\(^7\) For Ācārya Kundakunda’s classification see Pañcaśikāyāsā, 41.
avalambanālā (grasping), and medhā (gradual awareness).\textsuperscript{1} Umāsvāti, however, gives the following synonyms: avagraha (receiving), graha, grahaṇa, ālocana (intuition) and avadhūraṇa (holding).\textsuperscript{2} Avagraha can be of two kinds viz. vyājanāvagraha (contact-awareness) and arthāvagraha (object-perception).\textsuperscript{3} The Nandi Sūtra does not clearly define avagraha, but only clarifies the implication by illustrations. It seems to quote Āvasyakaniruykti of Bhadrabāhu, which defines avagraha as 'cognition of sense-data' (atthānām uggahaṇāni).\textsuperscript{4} It also states that avagraha is instantaneous,\textsuperscript{5} that is, it lasts only for one instant which is an infinitesimal and further indivisible point of time, beyond ordinary human conception. But it is to be understood that this instantaneousness relates to arthāvagraha (object-perception) and not to vyājanāvagraha (contact-awareness) which continues for an asaṁkhhyeya (countless) number of instants, gradually proceeding towards the plane of consciousness.\textsuperscript{6} Suppose, for instance, that a man is asleep and is to be awakened by call. The sound, which the Jaina thinkers regard as composed of material atoms, of the call reaches his ears and he is awakened. But the sound-atoms reach his ears in succession, and countless instants elapse before the ears are sufficiently saturated with these atoms so that the person may be awakened to consciousness. As soon as the person becomes conscious, vyājanāvagraha (contact-awareness) is over as then there occurs arthāvagraha (object-perception) which lasts, as has already been stated, only for one instant. Now the question is whether this object-perception is determinate or indeterminate. Contact-awareness, as we have seen, is only stirring of the consciousness. It is only awakening of consciousness. Of the five sense-organs, the sense-organ of sight is incompetent for contact-awareness inasmuch as there is no physical contact between this sense-organ and its object viz. coloured shape (rūpa). Contact-awareness is possible only when there is physical contact between the sense-organ and its object. On the same ground the mind (manas) is also incompetent for contact-awareness. Thus there can be only four types of it, there being left only four sense-organs viz. ear, taste, smell and touch competent to have contact-awareness.\textsuperscript{7} Object-perception, however, is possible by all the five sense-organs as well as the mind, and consequently can be of six types.\textsuperscript{8} According to Umāsvāti and Jīnabhadra, both of whom are staunch supporters of Āgamic conceptions, avagraha is indeterminate cognition. So far as

\textsuperscript{1} NSā, 30. \textsuperscript{2} TSāBh, I. 15. \textsuperscript{3} NSā, 27 ; TSā, I. 17-18 ; ViBh, 193. 
\textsuperscript{4} NSā, 36 (gāthā 83. Cf. ViBh, 179. We give this number instead of the serial number of the gāthā of the Āvasyakaniruykti for convenience of reference).
\textsuperscript{5} NSā, 36 (gāthā 84). Cf. ViBh, 333.
\textsuperscript{6} See ViBh, gāthās 333-4 with the Siṣyaḥti Bṛhadvaṭṭī. Also see NSā, 35.
\textsuperscript{7} NSā, 28 ; ViBh, 204.
\textsuperscript{8} See NSā, 29.
our knowledge goes, among the later Jaina logicians there has been none to uphold this old position, except Siddhasenanān, the commentator of Umāsvāti's Tattvārtha-sūtra-bhāṣya, and Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya of the seventeenth century, who has only summarized the arguments of Jinabhadra in his Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā. Thus our enquiry will be based on the works of Umāsvāti, Jinabhadra, Siddhasenanān and Yaśovijaya. We shall refer to the works of Pūjyapada Devanandi, Akalanika, Vidyanandi, Vādi-Devasūri and Hemacandra only by way of contrast. In this chapter we are mainly concerned with the Āgamic conception and as such should leave the details of the theories of the later logicians out of account in the present context.

Umāsvāti defines avagraha as 'indeterminate intuitive cognition of their respective objects by the sense-organs.' The avagraha cognizes only the general features of an object. It is indeterminate. The distinctive characteristics of the object are not cognized by it. The object presented in it is indeterminate and free from association with names. The Nandi Sūtra cites the sound-consciousness of a man just awakened from sleep by hearing the sound as an example of arthāvagraha (object-perception) by the sense-organ of ear. The man is conscious of some sound, but he does not cognize the definite nature of the sound at this stage. According to Jinabhadra, the consciousness of such a person has not even taken the form of 'This is sound' inasmuch as the cognition 'This is sound' is determinate and discursive and requires more than one instant for developing such form which is possible only in the third stage called āpāya (perceptual judgment). The arthāvagraha (object-perception), being instantaneous, cannot be considered to have developed such a form. The object of arthāvagraha is some common feature, indefinite and devoid of any individual characteristic, name etc.

What then is the exact nature of arthāvagraha (object-perception)? Object-perception is the consummation of vyānjanavagraha (contact-awareness) and as such can be properly understood only when the nature of the latter is properly understood. Now what is vyānjanā? 'What reveals an object even as a lamp reveals a jar is vyānja. It is the relation of the physical sense-organ with the substance transformed into its sense-data such as sound-(atoms). The vyānjanavagraha is not unconscious inasmuch as it is this that finally develops

1 tatrā 'vyaktaṁ yathāsvam indriyair viṣayāṇam ālocaṇāvadhāraṇam avagrahaḥ—TSaBh, I. 15.
2 Cf. yad viṣṇānam . . sāmānyasya 'nirdeśasya svarūpa-kalpanārahitasya nāmādikalpanārahitasya ca vastunāḥ paricchedakaṁ so 'vagrahāḥ—Tīkā on TSaBh, I. 15.
3 Sā, 35.
4 See ViBh, gāthās 252-3.
5 sāmānṇam anīddesaṁ sarūva-nāmāi-kappanaравhitam—ViBh, 252.
6 ViBh, 194.
into arthāvagraha (object-perception). The consciousness is there from the very instant of inception, though it is not felt due to its undeveloped existence. It is not possible for any ordinary man to know all the contents of the mind even when he is wide awake, inasmuch as a countless number of conscious states emerge during the course of a single day. Let us now come to arthāvagraha (object-perception).

The Nandi Sūtra states that in the last instant of the vyañjanāvagraha (contact-awareness) there emerges a cognition such as 'This is sound' though the exact nature of the sound is not cognized there. This is called avagraha. Jinabhadra interprets this statement as recording only the occurrence of the cognition and not its specific content. The, arthāvagraha (object-perception) lasts only for an instant, and it is not possible that an instantaneous flash should be of the determinate form 'This is sound'. The cognition 'This is sound' is not arthāvagraha (object-perception) but apāya (perceptual judgment) inasmuch as it is determinate cognition having 'the exclusion of everything else other than sound' as its characteristic. Jinabhadra refutes at great length the position of the opponent who regards arthāvagraha (object-perception) as determinate cognition. We do not know of any logical treatise, prior to the Viññāvaśyakabhāṣya of Jinabhadra, which regards avagraha as determinate cognition, except the Sarvārthasiddhi of Pujyapaśa Devanandi, which defines avagraha as 'the first cognition after the instant of the contact of the object and the sense-organ' and further says 'On the contact of the object and the sense-organ, there occurs intuition (darśana) and the cognition of the object thereafter is avagraha, for instance, the cognition 'This is white colour' by the organ of sight is avagraha.' The Sarvārthasiddhi regards vyañjanāvagraha (contact-awareness) as 'indeterminate' and arthāvagraha (object-perception) as 'determinate.' Jinabhadra, however, as an exponent of the Āgamic conceptions, insists on the indeterminateness

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1 Cf. ViBh, 195. Yaśovijaya, however, concedes as an alternative that vyañjanāvagraha is a cognition only by transference of epithet, being the condition of arthāvagraha which is a cognition.—JTbh, p. 3.
2 Cf. ibid., 196.
3 jaganto vi na jāpai chaumaththo hiyayagoyarañ savvān jain tajhavasāñānān jam asamkhejjiān divasepa.—ViBh, 199.
4 Cf. se jahānāme kei purise avvattam soñdama suññijā tepañ saddo tti uggahie, no ce 'va pañ jāpañ ke vesa soñdāi—NSū, 35.
5 Cf. ViBh, 253.
6 Cf. ViBh, 254.
7 viññaya-viññayi-sannipāta-samayānāntarañ ādya-grahañam avagrahañ.
8—SSī, I. 15.
9 viññaya-viññayi-sannipāte sati dārasanāñ bhavati, tadananāntarañ arthasaya grahañam avagrahañ, yathā cañcaṣūṣā śūklañ rūpam iti grahañam avagrahañ.
—Ibid.
10 arthāvagraha-vyañjanāvagrahayor vyaktayvyaktakṛto viññayā.—SSī, I. 18.
of avagraha. He is not prepared to allow the least reference even to a relative particular in avagraha, because even relative particularity is enough to put it into the category of apāya (perceptual judgment). If relative particularity is the criterion of the status of avagraha, then the possibility of apāya (perceptual judgment) will be ruled out inasmuch as in that case any cognition of a particular characteristic will be a case of avagraha, there being always available a cognition of a still more particular characteristic. It is not possible to ascertain all the particulars of an entity even in the course of a very long time. An entity reveals more and more specific characteristics along with the advancement of our knowledge. It is therefore more logical to concede the status of avagraha only to those cognitions which are totally free from even negligible reference to some particular characteristic. The cognition that contains the least particular as its content is apāya (perceptual judgment), and not avagraha. Jīnabhadra quotes the view of some thinkers who held that the avagraha of a new-born child cognizes only the general features while that of a person sufficiently familiar with the objects cognizes the particular characteristics even in one single instant. But he refutes the view on the ground that it will entail the postulation of an indefinite number of avagrahas each varying according to the richness of the knowledge of the cognizer. The richer the knowledge of a person the more will be the number of particular characteristics cognized in his avagraha. But this is certainly a fantastic position. Jīnabhadra further quotes an opinion which regarded avgraaha as bringing up the rear of abocana (intuitional cognition) which cognizes the general feature (śāmānya) and as cognizing its object as excluded from everything else. He criticizes the theory on the grounds already given and says that this abocana (intuitional cognition) cannot be identified with vyāñjanāvagraha (contact-awareness) inasmuch as the latter has none as its object while the former has ‘general feature’ as its object. It can, therefore, be nothing but our arthāvagraha (object-perception) under different nomenclature.

Now avagraha—like īhā (speculation), apāya (perceptual judgment) and dhāraṇā (retention)—has been characterized as ‘cognizing quickly’, ‘cognizing slowly’, ‘cognizing many’, ‘cognizing some’ etc. and this is not possible unless avagraha is regarded as lasting for more than one instant and as cognizing the particular characteristics. Jīnabhadra gets over this difficulty by stating that these are called cases of avagraha only by transference of epithet (upacāreṇa). A genuine (naścayīka) arthāvagraha (object-perception) lasts only for a

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1 Cf. ViBh, 255-6.
2 Cf. ibid., 268-9.
3 See ViBh, 273-7 with the Bṛhadvṛtti.
4 See ibid., 280 with the Bṛhadvṛtti; also see TŚū, I. 16.
single instant and cognizes the general feature alone. It is only by way of metaphor that an *apāya* (perceptual judgment) is called *avagraha* with reference to the succeeding *īhā* (speculation) and *apāya* (perceptual judgment).\(^1\) In the case of genuine *avagraha* only the general feature is cognized. Then through the process of *īhā* (speculation) and *apāya* (perceptual judgment) the cognition becomes determinate. In this determinate cognition which is an *apāya* (perceptual judgment) a particular characteristic is cognized. Thereafter if the cognizer strives for a further specific characteristic, he has to pass through new *īhā* (speculation) to new *apāya* (perceptual judgment). In this case the former determinate cognition which was the starting point of this second process is called *avagraha* by transference of epithet. It can also be called a case of relative *avagraha*. But by no means can it be called a genuine *avagraha*. Siddhasenagaṇin has also raised the same problem and given the same answer in his commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtrabhasya*.\(^2\) Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya has summarized the position of Jinabhadra very excellently in his *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā*.\(^3\)

We have already given the view of Pūjyapāda Devanandi and have also stated that he regards *avagraha* as determinate cognition. It is interesting to note that all the eminent Jaina logicians such as Akalāṅka, Vidyānandi, Vādi-Devasūri and Hemacandra regard *avagraha* as determinate. Akalāṅka defines *avagraha* as ‘determinate cognition of the distinctive nature of an object, following in the wake of intuitive cognition of pure existence, consequent upon the contact of the sense-organ with the object.’\(^4\) On the contact\(^5\) of the sense-organ with the object there arises an intuitive cognition of pure existence (*sanmātra-darsanam*). This intuitive cognition then develops into determinate cognition of the object. This is called *avagraha*.\(^6\) Vidyānandi defines *avagraha* as ‘the cognition of the individuality of a thing, following in the wake of the cognition of thing in general born of the contact of the sense-organ and the object.’\(^7\) Vādi-Devasūri

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\(^1\) See *ViBh*, 282-4.

\(^2\) See *Ṭīkā* on *TSĀBh*, I. 16: nanu cā *vagrāhā ekāsāmayi kā śāstra nirūpito na cā *kasmin samaye cā *vai *kāvagrāhā evānvidho yukto *ipakālatvād iti. ucyate—sātyam evam etat, kintu avagraho dvidhā—naiścayiko vyāvahārikaś ca—etc.

\(^3\) See *JTBh*, p. 4-5.

\(^4\) aksārthayogā satāloko *ṛthākārāvikalpadhūn* avagraha ............................................—*LT*, 5.

\(^5\) Here ‘contact’ does not mean physical contact, but such proximity as is competent for the rise of cognition.

\(^6\) See *Vivṛti* on *LT*, 5.

\(^7\) aksārthayogājād vastumātra-grahaṇa-lakṣaṇāt jātaṁ yad vastubhedasya grahaṇaṁ tad avagrahaḥ. —*TSĪV*, p. 219.
defines avagraha as the first cognition of an object as determined by a secondary common characteristic, born of the intuitional cognition following in the wake of sense-object contact and having pure existence as its object. Acarya Hemacandra defines avagraha as 'the cognition of an object, which follows in the wake of indeterminate intuition due to the contact of the sense-organ with the object.' We thus find that these Jaina thinkers unanimously hold avagraha to be determinate cognition. The Agamic conception of avagraha as indeterminate cognition was not upheld by the Jaina logicians in view of its indefiniteness and lack of pragmatic value. This is apparent from the conception of valid knowledge (pramana) of the Jaina logicians. This subject, however, is not relevant and so we do not discuss it here.

(b) Iha (Speculation)

Iha (speculation) follows in the wake of avagraha (perception). In avagraha, as we have seen, there is only an indeterminate cognition, or an indistinct awareness of the object. In iha the object is known distinctly. For instance, in avagraha (perception) a person simply hears a sound while in iha he cognizes the nature of the sound also. The indistinct awareness of the avagraha (perception) cognizes only a part of the object while iha, being a determinate cognition, cognizes the rest and strives or enquires for a particular characteristic. The process of iha continues for a certain period of time, though it never exceeds one muhurta. The Nandi Sutra gives these five as the synonyms of iha: abhoganata (leaning towards), marganata (searching), gavesaanata (fathoming), cintata (discursive thought) and vimarsa (enquiry). Umavati, however, gives quite different synonyms which are: iha (speculation), tarka (reasoning), pariksha (investigation), vicaranata (thinking) and jijnasa (enquiry). Pujyapada Devanandi defines iha as 'the striving for a specific characteristic of the object cognized by avagraha (perception). The Avasyakaniryuktis defines iha as 'speculation (vicaranam). Jinaahadra, commenting upon it, says 'iha means enquiry for the distinctive feature.' Vyanjanavagraha (contact-awareness) is the beginning of awareness,

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1 PNT, II. 7.  
3 se jaahanmae kei purise avvattam saddam suunjjaa tepana saddo tti uggahie, no ceva naa jana ke vesa saddai, tao ihan pavisi, tao janae amuge esa sadde—NSu, 35.  
4 Cf. avaghtite viyayarthaikadesac cheasanugamanam niiscayavisasa-jijnasa ceesta iha—TSAbh, I. 15.  
5 NSu, 34: ViBh, 333 (Avasyakaniryuktigathaa). One muhurta is equal to forty-eight minutes.  
6 NSu, 31.  
7 TSAbh, I. 15.  
8 SSi, I. 15.  
9 ViBh, 179 (Niryuktigathaa).  
10 bheya-maggaanam ahe 'iha—ViBh, 180.
arthāvagraha (object-perception) is the dawning of awareness, and iḥā is determinate tendency towards the ascertainment of the particular nature of the object. Though iḥā is a kind of speculation, it is to be distinguished from saṃśaya (doubt). Jinabhādra has drawn this very fine line of distinction between saṃśaya (doubt) and iḥā. ‘The mental state which relates to many (mutually contradictory) objects, which is stupefied owing to its incapacity for exclusion (of the false), and which seems to retire into a perfectly supine condition, is non-cognition (ajñāna) of the nature of doubt. And the mental state which strives for the ascertainment of the truth by means of reason and logic, which is destined to be successful, and which tends towards the acceptance of the true and avoidance of the untrue is called iḥā.’

Siddhasenagapāṇī also draws the same line of distinction between iḥā and saṃśaya (doubt).

All the Jain logicians have unanimously given the same view of iḥā and so we do not mention their definitions separately.

(c) Apāya or Avāya (Perceptual Judgment)

After iḥā (speculation) there arises apāya which excludes the non-existent characteristics. Iḥā (speculation) is enquiry about right and wrong. Apāya is ascertainment of the right and exclusion of the wrong. It, therefore, is a determinate cognition of the object. Apāya can be rendered as ‘perceptual judgment’. The Āvaśyakānimāryuktī defines apāya as ‘determinate cognition’. Apāya involves determination of the existent qualities and exclusion of the non-existent qualities. For instance, when on hearing a sound one determines that the sound must be of the conch and not of the horn, because it is accompanied by such qualities as sweetness, it is a case of apāya (perceptual judgment).

The Sarvārthasiddhāṇa defines it as ‘cognition of the true nature on account of the cognition of the particular characteristics’. Jinabhādra quotes an opinion which regarded apāya as only excluding the non-existent characteristics and attributed the function of cognizing the existent characteristics to dhāranā (retention) which brings up the rear of apāya. He criticizes the opinion as absurd and states that

1 Jam anegathālambaṇam apajjudāsaparikūṭhiyaṃ cittaṃ seya iva savappayao taṃ saṃsayarūvam annaṇam.
2 taṃ ciya sayatthaheṇa-vivattivāvratapparamamoham bhūyābhūya-visesāyāna-ccāyābbhimuham iḥā.

—ViBh, 183-84.

3 avaghythe viśaye samyag asamyag iti guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇa-dhyāvasāyamapano 'pāyaḥ—TSāBh, I. 15.
4 vavasāyaṃ ca avāyaṃ—ViBh, 179 (Niryuktigāthā).
5 ViBh, 290.
6 viśeṣa-nirjñānād yathātmyāvagamanam avāyaḥ—SSi, I. 15.
7 ViBh, 185.

JP—6
whether a cognition simply excludes the non-existent characteristics, or simply determines the existent characteristics, or does both the functions, it is *apāya* and nothing else.\(^1\) Umāsvāti gives the following synonyms of *apāya*: *apagama, aparāda, aparavyādha, apeta, apagata, apavidāha, aparunutta* (all these expressions having the same meaning viz. determinate judgment).\(^2\) The *Nandi Sūtra* gives these as the synonyms: *āvartanatā* (limited determination), *pratyāvartanatā* (repeated determination), *avāyā* (determination), *budāhi* (vivid determination), *viṃsana* (determinate cognition).\(^3\) A comparison of these two sets of synonyms leads us to the hypothesis that the above opinion, as quoted and criticized by Jinabhadra on the nature of *apāya*, was upheld by those who regarded the first set as the synonyms of *apāya*. Of course, it is difficult to say whether Umāsvāti himself was a staunch supporter of that view, although we have a glimpse of his predilection for it from the definition of *apāya* given by him in his *Tatvārthasastraḥ-sūtrabhāṣya*\(^4\) which has been quoted above. The synonyms of *dhāraṇā* (retention) as given by Umāsvāti in the same place also deserve consideration in this connection. They support the opinion quoted by Jinabhadra. Jinabhadra, however, is undoubtedly a staunch supporter of the Āgamic conceptions, and it is apparent from the consideration of the synonyms as given by the *Nandi Sūtra* that he agrees with the view of the *Nandi Sūtra*. The problem deserves a closer attention. But as it does not fall within the scope of our present study, we leave it for discussion elsewhere.

(d) *Dhāraṇā* (Retention)

*Apāya* (perceptual judgment) is followed by *dhāraṇā* (retention) which means retention of the perceptual judgment for a number of instants, *samkhhyeya* (countable) or *asamkhhyeya* (countless).\(^5\) The *Nandi Sūtra* gives the following synonyms of *dhāraṇā*: *dhāraṇā* (retention), *dhāraṇa* (holding), *sthāpana* (placing), *pratiṣṭhā* (fixing), and *koṣṭha* (firmly grasping).\(^6\) Umāsvāti defines *dhāraṇā* as ‘final determination of the object, retention of the (resultant) cognition and recognition (of the object on future occasions)’ and gives the following synonyms: *pratipatti* (continued cognition), *avadhāraṇā* (memory), *avasthāna* (retention), *niścaya* (continued cognition), *avagama* (retention) and *avabodha* (cognition).\(^7\) The *Āvaśyakāniruyuktī* also defines

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1 *Vibh*, 186.  
2 *TSūBh*, I. 15.  
3 *NSā*, 32.  
4 I. 15.  
5 Cf. tao dhāraṇām pavasi, tao naṁ dhāreī samkhejjataṁ vā kālaṁ asamkhejjataṁ vā kālaṁ—*NSā*, 35.  
6 *NSā*, 33.  
7 dhāraṇā pratipattir yathāsvaṁ matyavasthānam avadhāraṇām ca. dhāraṇā pratipattir avadhāraṇā ‘vasthānaṁ niścayaḥ avagamaḥ avabodha ity anarthāntaram.—*TSūBh*, I. 15.
dhāraṇā as ‘retention’. *Jinabhadra* says that dhāraṇā means absence of lapse of the perceptual judgment. *This dhāraṇā is threefold according to him. ‘The absence of lapse (avicyuti) of the cognition of the object, the (resultant) emergence of mental trace (vāsanā), and the recollection (anusmaraṇa) of it again in future—all these which follow in the wake of that (viz. perceptual judgment) constitute dhāraṇā’. *Thus avicyuti (absence of lapse), vāsanā (mental trace) and smṛtī (recollection)—these three are included in the conception of dhāraṇā. Siddhasenagāni has accepted this view.*

Pūjyapāda Devanandi defines dhāraṇā as ‘the condition of non-oblivion in future of what has been cognized by avāya (perceptual judgment)’. *Akalaṅka defines it as the condition of recollection, which is called saṁskāra (trace). *Vidyānandi also admits the same definition. This ‘trace’ is not unconscious. It is, like īhā (speculation), of the nature of knowledge, inasmuch as it is the condition of another knowledge called recollection. Vādi-Devasūri criticizes the view of Akalaṅka and Vidyānandi that dhāraṇā is the condition of recollection. He defines it as ‘gradual consolidation and absence of lapse for a certain length of time of the apāya (perceptual judgment) on account of the mindfulness of the cognizer’. Dhāraṇā is only concentrated persistence of the apāya (perceptual judgment) for a certain length of time. It is not by any means the condition of recollection in future, inasmuch as it, being a case of perceptual cognition, cannot last up to the time of recollection. And again if it were to last up to that time, then it would be impossible to cognize anything else during that interval, inasmuch as even the upholders of the said view do not admit the presence of two cognitions simultaneously.*

Vādi-Devasūri does not accept the existence of any ‘trace’ as the condition of recollection. Recollection is attributed to the special

1 dhāraṇāṃ puṇa dhāraṇāṃ—ViBh, 179 (Niryuhtigāthā).
2 tassā ‘vagamo ‘vāo aviccui dhāraṇā tassa.—ViBh, 180.
3 tayanaṃtaraṃ tayatthāviccavaṇāṃ jo ya vasaṇājogo kālāntare ya jaḥ puṇar anusmaraṇaḥ dhāraṇā sā u.—ViBh, 291.
4 See Tīkā on TSābh, I. 15.
5 avetasya kālāntare ‘vismaraṇa-kāraṇaḥ dhāraṇā—SSī, I. 15.
6 dhāraṇā smṛtihetuḥ—LT, 6; smṛtihetur dhāraṇā saṁskāra iti yāvat—Svopajña-Viṣṭī.
7 See TSIV, verse 4 on TSū, I. 15.
9 Cf. sādārasya pramātus tathāvidhipacaya-kramaṇa kūcikīkālам apracyayamāno dhāraṇe ‘ty abhidhīyate—SVR, II, 10.
10 Cf. tathā cet tarhi yasya padārthasya kālāntare smṛtih sā pratyakṣātmikā dhāraṇā tāvatkalam yāvat anuvartata iti syāt. etac ca ‘nupapannam. evaṁ tarhi yāvat patapadārtha-saṁskāra-rūpaṁ pratyakṣaṁ puruṣe bhavet tāvat padārthāntarasya saṁvedanam eva na syāt. ksāyopasamikopagānāṁ yugapadbhāva-virodhasyā ‘bhāyām api pratipannatvāt.—SVR, II, 10.
capacity of the soul to remember past events. He, however, has no objection if this capacity of the soul is given the name of saṁskāra (trace). Besides, if dhāraṇā is considered as a remote cause of recollection, even then he has no grievance, inasmuch as it is only the conception of dhāraṇā as the immediate cause of recollection that he does not support.¹ Hemacandra, however, has followed Vidyānandi.² Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya, following the Bṛhadārṇī on Jinabhadrā’s Viśeṣāvavāyakabhāṣya, admits that vāsanā (trace) in itself is of the nature of non-cognition (ajñānarūpa), but it is recognized as a species of cognition only by transference of epithet. Vāsanā (trace) produces knowledge called recollection and as such the nature of its product is transferred to itself.³

We have now described the main features of avagraha (perception), iḥā (speculation), avāya (perceptual judgment), and dhāraṇā (retention). Each of these four can again be of six types inasmuch as it can be due to any of the five sense-organs or the mind. Thus we get four multiplied by six or twenty-four types. Again, as already stated, there is vyājanāvagraha (contact-awareness) of four types. Thus in all there can be twenty-eight types. Each of these again can have twelve different kinds of data as its objects.⁴ Thus totally there can be twenty-eight multiplied by twelve or three hundred and thirty-six types of abhinibodhika or matijñāna (sensuous cognition).⁵

THE FOUR BUDDHIS

Now, these avagraha (perception), iḥā (speculation) etc. can be either śrutaniśrita (backed by scriptural learning) or aṣṭutaniśrita (not backed by scriptural learning). The Sīhanāṅga Sūtra classifies abhinibodhika (perceptual cognition) into śrutaniśrita and aṣṭutaniśrita and subdivides each of the latter two into arthāvagraha (object-perception) and vyājanāvagraha (contact-awareness).⁶ It does not include iḥā (speculation), avāya (perceptual judgment), and dhāraṇā (retention). But they can be understood as implied, inasmuch as they naturally follow in the wake of avagraha (perception). Besides, the Sīhanāṅga could not have mentioned more than two subdivisions, inasmuch as the chapter which deals with the subject follows, as a rule, the principle of dichotomy.⁷ The Nandi Sūtra, however, does not subdivide

¹ tasmād atmaśakti-visēṣa eva saṁskāra-paraparyāyaḥ smṛter ānantaryeṇa hetuḥ, na dhāraṇā. pāramparyeṇa tu tasyās taddhetutābhidhāne na kīcid dūṣaṇam—SVP, II. 10.
² See PMI, I. 1. 29.
³ Cf. ... vāsanāyaḥ svayam ajñāna-rūpatve 'pi kāraṇe kāryopacāreṇa jñānabhedābhidhānāvirodhāḥ iti—JTBh, p. 6; see also Bṛhadārṇī on ViBh, 189.
⁷ Cf. iḥādayo 'pi śrutaniśritā eva, na tūktāḥ, dvisthānasūri-nurodhāt—Abhayadevasūri’s commentary on SthŚu, 71.
aśrutaniśrīta into arthāvagrahā (object-perception) and vyañjanāvagrahā (contact-awareness), but gives the subdivisions of aṭṭhaṭṭha-buddhi (instantaneous comprehension), vainayikī-buddhi (intellect born of faithful service), karmajā-buddhi (intellect developed by practical experience) and pāriṇāmikī-buddhi (mature intellect).\(^1\) Jinabhadra gives the same view\(^2\) but holds that avagrahā (perception), ihā (speculation) etc. are common to śrutaniśrīta and aśrutaniśrīta.\(^3\) Of course, we do not find anything in the Nandi Sūtra that goes against the statement of Jinabhadra whose view seems to be a consistent development of the view given by the Sthānāṅga Sūtra. The Āvaśyakaniṁuyuktī\(^4\) gives the four kinds of buddhi (intellect) in quite a different context. But there is nothing there which can contradict the claim of these buddhis (intelleccts) to be regarded as aśrutaniśrīta matiṁnāna (sensuous cognitions not backed by scriptural learning). These buddhis are special gifts of nature, and are not due to education or learning\(^5\) and as such their claim to be aśrutaniśrīta (not backed by scriptural learning) is but self-evident. Jinabhadra quotes an opinion which replaced the fourfold vyañjanāvagrahā (contact-awareness) included in the twenty-eight types of mati (sensuous cognition) by these fourfold buddhis (intelleccts) in order to keep the traditional number twenty-eight\(^6\) intact and at the same time to find a suitable place for the fourfold aśrutaniśrīta as well.\(^7\) The Āvaśyakaniṁuyktī, however, does not include the fourfold buddhis (intelleccts) in the twenty-eight types of mati (sensuous cognition).\(^8\) Nor does it recognize them as a separate type of it. The opinion quoted by Jinabhadra seems to be an attempt to accommodate the new comer in the old scheme. Of course, we do not know exactly when this new conception of aśrutaniśrīta mati crept in. But undoubtedly it came after the time of Bhadrabāhu, the author of the Āvaśyakaniṁuyktī. Jinabhadra criticizes the opinion as unnecessary because according to him aśrutaniśrīta is not a separate category but it is only a variety of avagrahā (perception), ihā (speculation) etc. and as such is included in them and consequently does not need separate counting.\(^9\) Abhayadevasūri\(^10\) says that vyañjanāvagrahā (contact-awareness) is not possible in the case of buddhis (intelleccts), inasmuch as they are cases of mental perception.\(^11\) Instances of aśrutaniśrīta vyañjanāvagrahā (contact-awareness), however, are available in the cases of cognitions due to the sense-organs other than sight and mind. For the differentiation of śrutaniśrīta from aśrutaniśrīta Jinabhadra says 'That (cognition) which

\(^1\) NSū, 26.  
\(^2\) See ViBh, 177.  
\(^3\) Cf. ViBh, 303-4.  
\(^4\) ANīr, 932.  
\(^5\) Cf. ANīr, 933.  
\(^6\) Vide supra p. 44.  
\(^7\) See ViBh, 301-302.  
\(^8\) See ANīr, 16.  
\(^9\) See ViBh, 303.  
\(^10\) See his commentary on SthSū, 71.  
\(^11\) We have already given the reason why mind is incompetent for vyañjanāvagrahā on p. 35.
at present is devoid of verbal association and belongs to one whose intellect has been previously trained by the (study of the) scriptures is śrutaniśrita. The opposite of it is anīśrita and comprises the four mātis or intellects (viz. autpātti ki etc.). The śrutaniśrita is so called because the perceptual cognitions that come under it are possessed by those whose minds have been educated by the instructions of others regarding verbal usage and other sources such as scriptures, although the verbal knowledge has no direct bearing and influence upon them. The sensuous intuitions are not generated by the knowledge of language as verbal judgment (śruta) is. The conditions of perceptual cognitions are the same in the case of the instructed as well as the uninstructed, but the knowledge of language and the culture embodied in it enriches the content of perception by implicit or explicit association with linguistic symbols and their suggestive reference and consequently it cannot but have its effects on the capacity of cognition.

The aśrutaniśrita perceptions are those which are devoid of the background of previous education of the perceiver. They fall into two categories according as they are purely mental or cases of sensuous perceptions. The former category comprises the fourfold buddhis (intellects) viz. autpātti ki, vainayikā, karmaṇā and pāriṇāmikā, each having the stages of avagraha (perception), ihā (speculation), avāya (perceptual judgment), and dhāranā (retention), but never vyanāṇavagraha (contact-awareness). The latter category comprises cases of perceptions due to the five sense-organs including vyanāṇavagraha (contact-awareness) also in the cases of the sense-organs other than the eye. This is the finally developed form of the conception of aśrutaniśrita mātī (intellect) and is found in Abhayadevasūri’s commentary on the Sthānāṅga referred to above.

Let us now state in brief the meanings, with illustrations, of these fourfold buddhis (intellects).

The Āvaśyakanirūyuktī defines autpātti ki intellect as ‘the intellection which comprehends instantaneously the true nature of a thing never seen, heard of, or even reported heretofore and is crowned with unhindered success.’ The Nandi Sūtra only quotes the same definitions as those of the Āvaśyakanirūyuktī and so we shall not refer to the Nandi Sūtra in order to avoid repetitions. There are given many illustrations

1 puvvāṁ suvaparikammiya-mattissa jaṁ sarīpayaha suvāyana
2 tāṁ suvanissiyam iyaraṁ puṣa ṣaṭissiyam maicaukkaṁ taṁ.—Vibh, 169.
3 Cf. tatra śrutaṁ saṃketaśālābhāvī paṇopadesāḥ śruta-granthaḥ ca. pūrvaṁ
tena parikarmitamater vyavahārakāle tadanapekṣam eva yad utpadyate tat
śrutaniśritam—Brhadurttī on Vibh, 177.
4 Cf. svasaṃmānakāra-śruta-jānā-hita-vāsanā-prabodha-saṃmānakālīnatve sati
śrutopayogābhāva-kālīnaṁ śrutaniśritam, avagrahādi-caturbhedam.—JBP, p. 6.
5 Cf. ukta-(svasaṃmānakāra-śruta-jānā-hita)-vāsanā-prabodha-saṃmānakālaṁ
catātjaṇaṁ autpattikyādi-caturbhedam aśrutaniśritam.—JBP, p. 7.
6 ANīr, 933.
of each of the intellects (buddhās) but we shall give only one instance in each case. Among the numerous instances of autpatti, given by the Āvāsyakaniryuktī, there is one of ‘kukkuṭa (cock).’ Once Rohaka, the son of Bharata-naṭa was asked by the king of Avanti to make a cock fight alone. Rohaka was quite a boy. But his instantaneous intellect suggested the solution. He put a mirror before the cock, and it began to fight with its image. Jinabhadra refers to this instance, and shows how the mind passes through the stages of avagraha (perception), īhā (speculation) etc. in such a case. ‘How can it fight in the absence of another cock? With the image—this is avagraha (perception). What (sort of image is) most suitable?—this is īhā (speculation). Image reflected in a mirror—this is āpāya (perceptual judgment).’ Here Jinabhadra attempts to give the psychology of solution of problems. It is by a flash of genius that the solution of a difficult problem dawns upon the mind. This is the stage of avagraha (perception). The intellectual application of the solution presents a number of alternatives and consequently there is speculation or inquisitive pursuit—this stage can be called īhā (speculation). Again, there is the final settlement of the mind—this is āpāya (perceptual judgment). Then follows dhāraṇā (retention).

The vainayikī is defined as ‘the intellect which is capable of completing a difficult task, can comprehend the spirit and letter of the trio of dharma (religion), artha (material prosperity) and kāma (sensual pleasure) and is fruitful in this world as well as the world hereafter.’ This buddhi is born of humility and faithful service. The ancient literature of India abounds in stories of acquisition of high knowledge by mere faithful service of the preceptor (guru). This knowledge has been called vinayamasamutha or vainayika (born of humility and service). The Āvāsyakaniryuktī refers to a story of two students of astrology, one of whom became more efficient by faithful service of his preceptor while the other remained stupid in spite of his learning.

The kārmikī or karnasamuthā is defined as ‘the intellect which comprehends the truth due to its attentive consciousness and breadth of vision of both the practical and the theoretical sides of actions (karman) and which has received appreciation of competent critics.’ The intellect developed due to practical experience is called kārmikī. People appreciate such intellect when it is extraordinarily developed. It is not learning that is responsible for the development. But it is practical experience that lies at the back of such intellect. An experienced goldsmith can easily differentiate between pure gold and an alloy, while a layman is easily deceived.

1 See ANīr, 935 and the Tīkā.  
2 ViBh, 304.  
3 ANīr, 937.  
4 ANīr, 940.
The \textit{pāraṁmikī} is defined as ‘the intellection which fulfils (its purpose) by means of inference, reasoning, and analogy, which develops with the maturity of age, and which results in well-being and salvation.’\footnote{ANir, 942.}

The common feature of all these intellects is this that none of them is inspired by learning. They are either due to spontaneous suggestion, or modesty and humility, or practical experience, or natural maturity of the power of reasoning. It is on account of this common characteristic that they are called \textit{aśrutaniśrīta}.

We have now dealt with the types of \textit{matī-jñāna} (sensuous cognition). It is not possible to give all the possible types. Only the most apparent ones can be enumerated. The types vary according to the nature of the perceptual cognition which can be infinitesimal.\footnote{evaṁ bajiha-jjanitara-nimittā-vaiicitāt ta maibahuttām kīcchimmetta-viśeseṣa bhijjamāṣam puṇo ‘nantam.—Vibh, 311.} Perception of the same object varies with each individual, and so its types cannot be enumerated in full.

\textbf{SRUTA-JÑĀNA (SCRIPTURAL OR VERBAL KNOWLEDGE)}

\textit{Sruta-jñāna} originally meant knowledge embodied in the scriptures.\footnote{Cf. SthSū, 71 (21) ; ADv, 3 et seq. ; TSū, I. 20 and the Bhāṣya.} Knowledge of the scriptures was also called \textit{sruta-jñāna}. Umāsvāti says that \textit{sruta-jñāna} is preceded by \textit{mati} (sensuous cognition) and falls into two categories \textit{viz.} \textit{aṅgabāhyya} (other than the original scripture) and \textit{aṅgapravīṣṭa} (included in the original scripture) which again are manifold and twelvelfold respectively and comprise the whole of the \textit{Jaina} scripture.\footnote{See TSūBh, I. 20. For Kundakunda’s classification see Pañcāstikāyasaṇa, 42.} He further says that \textit{mati-jñāna} (sensuous cognition) cognizes only what is present while the \textit{sruta-jñāna} comprehends what is present, past and future.\footnote{Cf. utpānna-vaṇṇaṣṭa-rthagrāhakaṁ sāmpratakālaśayanīm matijñānanīm sruta-jñānaṁ tu trikālaśayanīm utpānnavāṇaṣṭa-nutpānna-rthagrāhakaṁ iti—Ibid.} The \textit{Jainas} regarded their scriptures to contain all the truths, much in the same way as the Brahmins considered their \textit{Sruti} or the Vedas to possess all possible knowledge. Such was the conception of \textit{sruta-jñāna} in the beginning.

The \textit{Āvaśyakaniṁryukti} says that the types of \textit{sruta-jñāna} are as many as the number of letters and their various combinations, and as such it is not possible to enumerate all the types.\footnote{ANir, 17-18.} It then enumerates fourteen salient characteristics of \textit{sruta-jñāna} \textit{viz.} \textit{aṅkara} (alphabet), \textit{samjñin} (discursive or cognitive or scriptural), \textit{samyaṅ} (right), \textit{sādika} (having beginning), \textit{saṁparvaṇitasa} (having end), \textit{gmīka} (containing repetitions) and \textit{aṅgapravīṣṭa} (included in the original scripture) with
their opposites viz. anāksara, asañjñin etc.\(^1\) Inhaling, exhaling, spitting etc. are given as instances of anāksara-śruta\(^2\) so far as they are indices of the mental dispositions of the person. Eight qualities of the intellect are recognized as necessary for the acquisition of śruta-jñāna. They are: desire for hearing, repeated questioning, (attentive) hearing, grasping, enquiry, conviction, retention and right action.\(^3\) The Āvaśyakaniṣṭhā thus recognizes the words as well as other symbols such as physical gestures as śruta and also lays down the means of the acquisition of śruta-jñāna. It, however, does not state the meanings of all the fourteen characteristics. It is in the Nandi Sūtra that we find the meanings clearly stated.\(^4\)

In the Nandi Sūtra, aksaraśruta is given as threefold: samjñākṣara, vyañjanākṣara and labdhyākṣara. The shape of the letter, in other words, the script or alphabet is samjñākṣara; sound of the letter, in other words, the spoken letter is vyañjanākṣara; labdhyākṣara is possessed only by one who is competent to learn alphabet (aṅkara-labdhika) and can be possible through all the five sense-organs as well as the mind.\(^5\) As regards anāksaraśruta, the Nandi Sūtra gives no new information. The first two categories of aṅkaraśruta are only material symbols written or spoken, and as such are called đravya-śruta. The labdhyākṣara is a kind of knowledge, and is śruta-jñāna proper (bhāva-śruta).\(^6\) It can be produced through any of the sense-organs and the mind. If it is a sound that conditions it, then it is produced through the sense-organ of ear. If it is a coloured shape that conditions it, then it is produced through the sense-organ of sight. If it is a smell that conditions it, then it is produced through the sense-organ of smell. And so on. Only those who possess the gift of language can have labdhyākṣara. When one hears a sound or sees a coloured shape, there arises in the wake of the perceptual cognition, a cognition couched in appropriate words composed of syllables (aṅkara) following the conventional vocabulary. This cognition is called labdhyākṣara.\(^7\) Knowledge of the conventional vocabulary and conscious application of it are the conditions of śruta-jñāna. In other words, conscious exercise of the

\(^1\) ĀNīrī, 19.
\(^2\) Ibid., 20.
\(^3\) Ibid., 22.
\(^4\) Haribhadra in his Vṛttī on NSū, 38 (37 according to Hastimalla Muni's edition) says that although the characteristics of aṅkara and anāksara include all other characteristics, yet they are enumerated separately for only the pupils of slow understanding (na ca bheda-dvayād eva 'vyutpammanatāṁ śeṣabhedāvagamaṁ).  
\(^5\) NSū, 38.
\(^6\) Cf. tatra samjñā-vyañjanākṣare đravyaśrutam, labdhyākṣaram punar bhāvaśrutam, labdher jñānarūpatvāt.—NSūVṛt on sūtra 39.
\(^7\) Cf. śabdādigrahaḥ-samanautaram indriya-manonimittam śrutagraṅtānusārāt ūsāṁ tiṣyākṣaraṁ āryāṁ viṣyātāṁ utpadyate, tac ca 'nekaprakāraṁ, tad yathā śrotrendriya-labdhyākṣaram ityādi—NSūVṛt on sūtra 39.
gift of language is the indispensable condition of śrūta-jñāna. The
cognitions which, in spite of their being couched in words, do not
involve conscious attempt on the part of the cognizer at application of
vocabulary, fall in the category of maṭi-jñāna (sensuous cognition) and
not śrūta-jñāna. Of course this distinction was stressed by later
logicians.\(^1\)

The saṁjñī-śrūta is considered in three ways, inasmuch as there are
these three varieties of saṁjñā (cognitive activity)\(^2\): (1) discursive
thinking that takes into account the past, the present and the future,
(2) consciousness that can discriminate between what is to be avoided
and what is to be accepted for the maintenance of life, but cannot
think of the past or the future, and (3) consciousness due to knowledge
of the right scriptures (samyak śrūta). The first is called (dirgha)-
kāliki (lasting for a long time), the second hetāpadeśikī (discriminating)
and the third dṛṣṭivādopadeśikī (backed by scriptural knowledge).
Those who possess these saṁjñās are called saṁjñūṇis. The śrūta-jñāna
possessed by these saṁjñūṇis is saṁjñī-śrūta. The asaṁjñūṇis also
fall in three categories. The mind is the organ of thinking. The
more developed the mind is the more one is capable of thinking. Those
whose mind is weak and incapable of thinking fall in the first category
of asaṁjñūṇis.\(^3\) Those who are totally devoid of mind and live on mere
instincts fall in the second category of asaṁjñūṇis.\(^4\) Again those who
believe in false scriptures and thus possess perverted knowledge fall in
the third category of asaṁjñūṇis.\(^5\) Śrūta-jñāna possessed by the
asaṁjñūṇis is asaṁjñī-śrūta.

The twelvelfold gaṇipīṭaka (scripture compiled by the gaṇapādas)
containing Ācārāṅga, Śūtrakṛtāṅga etc. is samyak-śrūta (right scripture)
while the other books such as Bhārata, Rāmāyaṇa, the Vedas etc. are
enumerated as mithyā-śrūta (false scriptures). It is further said that
the samyaktva (rightness) or mithyātva (wrongness) depends upon the

\(^1\) Cf. sāṅketakālapravṛttatā śrutagrantha-sambandhināṃ và ghaṭādī-śabdām
anuṣṭya vācyā-vācaṅa-bhāvena saṁuṣṭa `ghaṭo ghaṭaḥ' ityādi antarjalpākāram
antaḥsabdolakkhāvitam indriyādininimittāṃ yaj jñānam udeci tac chrutajñānam
iti—Bṛhadāraṇī on Viḍh, 100; see also JBP, p. 6. § 15.

\(^2\) See NSā, 39 and its Vṛtti by Haribhadra. We are giving only the
central idea.

\(^3\) Cf. yasya nāsti iñh `pohō mārgaṇā gāveṣaṇā cintā vimāraṣṭāḥ so `saṁjñjī
ti labhyate, ayaṁ ca sāṁbhūchhima-paścendriya-vikalendriyādī jñeyāḥ, alpa-
mano-labdhitvād abhāvāc ca . . . so `yāṁ kālikyupadeśena—NSāVr on sūtra
40 (39 according to Hastimalla Muni’s edition).

\(^4\) yasya nāsti abhisandhāraṇa-pūrvika karaṇaśaktāḥ so `saṁjñjī `ti labhyate,
ayaṁ caī `kendriya-pthiyādīr avaseyo, manolabdhi-rahitavāt. . . . . . so `yaṁ hētu-`padedeśa—Ibid.

\(^5\) Cf. na hi mithyādṛṣṭeṣ ahaṁ jñānena asti, hitāhitapravṛttī-iveṣṭyabhāvāt.
. . . asaṁjñī-śrutasya kṣayapaśāmena `saṁjñjī `ti labhyate . . . . so `yaṁ dṛṣṭi-
vādopadeśa.—Ibid.
attitude of the knower. If his attitude is right, whatever he knows becomes right and if his attitude is wrong (mithyā), his knowledge also becomes wrong. Similarly if the result of the knowledge of mithyāsruta (false scripture) by a mithyādṛṣṭi (person of perverse attitude) turns out in the end to be the abandonment of the perversity (mithyādṛṣṭi), the mithyāsruta (false scripture) is to be considered as samyak śrūta (right scripture).\(^1\)

The characteristics of sādīka ‘having beginning’ and anādīka ‘having no beginning’—saparyavasita ‘having end’ and aparyavasita ‘having no end’ are considered variously. But the discussion is unimportant for our purpose and so we do not enter into it. It is, however, to be noticed in this connection that the Jaina thinkers held that a soul could never (except when it has attained perfect knowledge) be bereft of mati (sensuous) and śrūta (verbal) knowledge. Even the one-sensed organisms are held to be possessed of these.\(^2\) To be bereft of these is to lose the nature of soul and become non-soul.\(^3\) Now, the one-sensed organism has the feeling of touch and so can have mati-jñāna (sensuous cognition), but how can it possess śrūta-jñāna (verbal knowledge)? This is a difficult problem to answer. Jīnabhadra says that although the one-sensed organisms do not possess dravya-śrūta (symbols—written or spoken) they possess bhāva-śrūta (potential verbal knowledge) which can be likened to the verbal knowledge of a sleeping ascetic (yatī).\(^4\) But even bhāva-śrūta is possible only with those who have the capacity to speak and to hear and with none else, and it is nothing but the mental disposition that precedes a speech or follows a hearing.\(^5\) And as such how can it be possible for the one-sensed organisms who have neither the capacity to speak nor the capacity to hear? Jīnabhadra answers this objection as follows: ‘Even as subtle internal sensuous cognitions are possible in spite of the absence of the external physical sense-organ, so ‘potential verbal knowledge’ is possible even for (the one-sensed) such as the earth-bodied (beings) in spite of the absence of dravya-śrūta.’\(^6\)

\(^1\) NSā, 41.
\(^2\) Cf. egīndiyā nityāmaṁ duśyāntaṁ tārti jāhā—mai-anunāśī ya suya-anunāśī ya—quoted from Āgama in Bhadurātī, ViBh, 101. Also see BhŚa VIII. 2 (317). The mati and śrūta of the one-sensed organisms are, as a rule, called ajñāna ‘perverted knowledge’ insomuch as they are mithyādṛṣṭi and the jñāna of a mithyādṛṣṭi is held to be ajñāna. See Prajakṣaṇāsūtra, pada 29.
\(^3\) Cf. savvajīvanam pi ya jat akkeharaṁ anantabhāgo niccugghādio citthai. jai puṣa so ‘vi āvarijā teṇam jīvo ajvattaṁ pāvijja—NSā, 42.
\(^4\) dvavasuyāṇaḥbhāvāmmi vi bhāvasuyām surta-jāṇo vva—ViBh, 101.
\(^5\) bhāvasuyāṁ bhāsā-soyā-laddhiṁ jujjyā na iyāraṁ bhāsābhimuhassa jayaṁ soṁa ya jaiṁ havejjhi—ViBh, 102.
\(^6\) jaha suhumaṁ bhāvīndiyānaṁ dvavīndiyāvaroḥe vi taha dvavasuyāṁ bhāvasuyāṁ patthivāṛ̠āṁ—ViBh, 103.
organisms have neither the tongue to speak nor the ear to listen, nor have they any symbols of their own. But nevertheless, according to the Jaina thinkers, the one-sensed organisms are capable of potential verbal thinking. Though we are unable to know the exact nature of the process of their thinking, yet we can have some inkling of its nature by the consideration of the external activities of the one-sensed organisms. The Brhadāyātī1 gives a number of instances from the plant world to prove by inference that even the one-sensed plants can hear sound, see colour, smell odour, and experience taste, and says that as in these cases the sensuous functions are carried out by the internal capacity of the organisms even in the absence of the external sense-organs so also can there be possible the existence of bhāvaśruta in the absence of dravya-śruta.2 Dravya-śruta is the exponent of thinking while bhāva-śruta is such thinking itself. The question whether thinking without language is possible is the upshot of our enquiry. The Jaina scriptures recognize ten instincts (sannā) in the one-sensed organisms3—such as the instincts of hunger, fear, sex attraction, possession etc. The Brhadāyātī says that these instincts are impossible without bhāva-śruta ‘internal capacity for verbal thinking’.4 The famous commentator Malayagiri maintains that the instinct is a kind of desire and quotes a passage from the Āvāsyakāśikā, which says that the instinct for food means ‘desire for food’, is born of the feeling of hunger, and is a particular disposition of the soul.5 He further maintains that a desire is a determinate willing for the acquisition of the object of desire. It is of the form ‘such and such object is wholesome for me; it will be good if I can secure it’.6 Of course, in the case of one-sensed organisms the desires are not couched in articulate language. But nevertheless they must have some sort of instrument

1 On ViBh, 103.

2 Cf. tataś ca yathāi ’teṣu dravyendriyāsattve ’pi etad bhāvendriyajanyam jñāṇam sakala-jana-prasiddham asti, tathā dravyaśrutābhāve bhāvaśrutam api bhaviṣyatī—Brhadāyātī on ViBh, 103.

N.B.—Bhāvendriya is the capacity of the soul to have various sensuous experiences, dravyendriya means the external physical sense-organ.

3 kaṭi naṁ bhārāte! egindiyāṇāṁ sannāo pannattāo! goyamā! dasa, taṁ jaḥ aḥārasannā bhaya-sannā mehunāsannā pariggaha-sannā koha-sannā māna-sannā mayā-sannā lobha-sannā oha-sannā loga-sannā ya tti—Quoted in NSūV7 on sūtra 40. Also see BhSū, VII. 8 (295) ; Prajñāpanā, saṁjñāpada (8).

4 na cai ’tah saṁjñā bhāva-śrutam antareṇo ‘papadyante—Brhadāyātī, ViBh, 103.

5 saṁjñā ca abhilāṣa ucyate yata uktam Āvāsyakāṭikāyāṁ—aḥāra-saṁjñā aḥārābhilāṣāḥ kṣudvedaniya-prabhavaḥ khalv ātmapariṇāma-viśeṣaḥ—Malayagiri’s tīkā (p. 140) on NSū.

6 Ibid.
for their formation. This leads us to the postulation of a peculiar capacity of the soul. This capacity is called bhāva-śruta.

The other characteristics viz. gamika and agamika—āṅgapraviṣṭa and āṅgabāhyya refer to peculiar categories of scriptural texts and so, being unimportant for our purpose, are not discussed here.¹

We have now seen how śruti which originally meant ‘scripture’ gradually came to mean any symbol, written or spoken, and finally was even identified with inarticulate verbal knowledge. This development of meaning is not, strictly speaking, chronological. It is the gradual subtlety of speculation that is responsible for this development. The self-same thinker could have started from the conception of śruti as scripture and reached the conception of śruti as inarticulate verbal knowledge. The speculations recorded in Jain scriptures on this subject are so rich, subtle and varied that it is difficult to ascertain the original contributions of the later Jain authors. Almost every idea that we have been dealing with can be traced in the Āgamas in some form or other. Our statement about development is to be judged with this proviso.

We have hitherto based our enquiry on the Āvasyakanirvyakti and the Nandi Sūtra and have referred to the other sources only occasionally for the sake of elucidation. After the Nandi Sūtra we come to the Viśeṣāvasyakabhasya of Jinabhadra. It presents the theory in a developed form as will be apparent from what follows. We shall end our enquiry of the śruti-jñāna by drawing a clear line of demarcation between the māti-jñāna and the śruti-jñāna.

NATURE OF SAMJÑĀ

We have referred to samjñi-śruta and asamjñi-śruta. Here asamjñā does not mean total absence of any samjñā, but only an indistinct presence of it.² The capacity by which one remembers the bygone past and ponders over the coming future is ārdha-kāliki (or simply kāliki) samjñā.³ Only those who have mind⁴ can possess this capacity. A being possessing this samjñā enjoys the capacity for the utilization of all the sense-organs including mind. The human beings as well as the sub-human beings born of wombs (garbhaja) possess this

¹ For information see NSā, 43 et seq. The first Karmagranthu (gāthā 7) records an additional mode of considering śruti-jñāna, which, however, has no epistemological value and so is omitted here.
³ Ibid., 508.
⁴ The mind, according to the Jainas, is an instrument of thinking, which a soul makes for itself out of the groups of material atoms fit for the purpose and becomes capable of thinking through its agency. Of course only the developed souls have the capacity to form minds.
The five-sensed sammūrchanāja beings (i.e. gross-bodied beings born without sex relation) possess this capacity in a very small measure and as such are regarded as asamjñīns in comparison with those possessing a developed capacity. Those beings who can discriminate between the desirable and the undesirable and can act accordingly for the maintenance of their bodies, but cannot think on the past or future, are called hetuvāda-samjñāns. The organisms having two or more sense-organs are included in this category. The comparatively inactive one-sensed organisms such as the earth-bodied beings are called asamjñīns in comparison with the organisms possessing two or more sense-organs. Now we come to the ārṣṭīvādopadeśākī samjñā. A being having right faith and possessed of knowledge due to subsidence-cum-destruction of karmic veil is called samjñīn from the point of view of ārṣṭī (faith); and such being having wrong faith is called asamjñīn. A being possessed of perfect knowledge born of complete destruction of all karmic veil is not samjñīn inasmuch as he, being omniscient, cannot possess the functions of recollection and pondering of future, which constitute samjñā. A being having wrong or perverted faith is mithyādrṣṭi, and is also called asamjñīn, because his samjñā, though competent to discriminate between what is wholesome and what is unwholesome, is, from the point of view of ārṣṭī (faith), perverted or misplaced.

We have thus studied the three types of samjñā. There remains now one more type called ūha or ogha-samjñā. We have translated this samjñā as instinct and have also enumerated its varieties. Jina-bhadra says that this ūha or ogha-samjñā (which belongs to such beings as the earth-bodied) is not to be called samjñā in comparison with the hetuvāda-samjñā; similarly, the hetuvāda-samjñā is not to be called samjñā in comparison with the kālikī-samjñā; and similarly the kālikī-samjñā is not be called samjñā in comparison with the ārṣṭīvāda-samjñā. The samjñīns and asamjñīns are thus to be considered relatively. Jinabhadra gives the following classification of samjñān beings. The five classes of one-sensed organisms possess ūha-samjñā; the organisms possessing two or more sense-organs possess hetu-samjñā; the denizens of heaven and hell as well as the beings born of womb possess kālikī-samjñā; the samjñā of the samyagdrṣṭi chādmastha (a

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1 See Bṛhadārśīti, ViBh, 509.
2 Ibid., ViBh, 511.
3 See ViBh, 515-516 and Bṛhadārśīti.
4 sammadiṭṭhi saṃñi saṁte nāge khauvasamjñayammi asaṃñi micchattami diśṭhīvaṃvaesena.—ViBh, 517.
5 See ViBh, 518.
6 Cf. ViBh, 510-520.
7 Supra p. 52. Ūha or ogha is a particular kind of saṃjñā (instinct). But Jinabhadra uses the term to indicate the ten instincts.
8 ViBh, 522.
being involved in the world but having right faith) is śruta-jñāna (in other words, such a being possesses dṛṣṭivāda-saṁjñā); the kevalins (omniscient beings), however, are free from the function of mati-jñāna (sensusuous cognition) and as such are beyond saṁjñā.1

MATI AND ŚRUTA

As regards the relation of mati and śruta, Uмаśvāti says that śruta is, as a rule, accompanied by mati while it is not necessary that a mati should be accompanied by śruta.2 But the Nandi Śūtra says ‘Where there is ābhinibodhika-jñāna (that is, mati), there is śruta-jñāna, and where there is śruta-jñāna there is ābhinibodhika-jñāna. Both these are mutually involved. But nevertheless the preceptors (Ācāryas) notice this distinction: ābhinibodhika is so called because it perceives directly (abhinibudhyate), while śruta is so called because it hears (śṛṇoti). And as śruta is preceded by mati, mati cannot be preceded by śruta.’3 According to Nandi-Sūtra thus the relation between mati and śruta is one of mutual concomitance. The one is necessarily accompanied by the other. Pujiyapāda Devanandi and his follower Akalaṇka also endorse this view.4 But here the question is whether it is the matyupayoga5 and śrutopayoga that are upheld to accompany each other or it is their labdhis6 that are referred to. We do not get any clear statement on this in the above references. But it is very probable that it is the labdhis that are held to accompany each other. The fact that the Jaina thinkers unanimously maintain the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of two upayogas also lends support to our hypothesis. Moreover, mati and śruta quā labdhis are unanimously held to accompany each other.7 Furthermore, on this hypothesis, the above statement of Uмаśvāti that mati is not necessarily followed by śruta also finds proper explanation, because in that case there would be no objection against admitting that matyupayoga is not necessarily followed by śrutopayoga. It is beyond doubt that Uмаśvāti refers to upayoga and not to labdhi in the above statement.

It will not be out of place in this connection to add a short paragraph on the conception of upayoga and labdhi. The consciousness in

1 ViBh, 523-524.
2 śrutajñānasya matijñānena nityaḥ sahabhāvaḥ tatpurvakatvāt. yasya śrutajñānānaḥ tasya nityaḥ matijñānānaḥ yasya tu matijñānānaḥ tasya śrutajñānānaḥ sāyā na ve ’ti—TSūBh, I. 31.
3 NSū, 24.
4 See SSī, I. 30. Of course, it does not state the view in so many words. But it follows easily from what it states; TRā, I. 9 (vārttika 20) states . . . . yatra matis tatra śrutaḥ yatra śrutaḥ tatra matir iti.
5 Upayoga means ‘active consciousness’.
6 Labdhi means ‘dormant consciousness’.
7 iha laddhimai-suṣyāṁ samakālaṁ na tu ‘vaogo siṁ—ViBh, 108.
its state of dormancy is called labāhi. In other words, the dormant capacity of the soul for knowledge is labāhi. Upayoga, on the other hand, is consciousness in its state of activity. The soul is called upayukta or upayogavān when it is actually engaged in knowing something. Mere capacity for knowledge without actual knowledge is labāhi.

Now we come to the problem of differentiation between mati and śrūta.

DIFFERENTIATION OF MATI AND ŚRŪTA

Siddhasena Divākara, in his Niścayadvāṭirinśikā, maintains that śrūta is not anything over and above mati, because the admission of the separate identity of śrūta is futile and involves undesirable consequences. Among the later logicians it is only Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya who elaborates this position of Siddhasena. We shall deal with this view of Yaśovijaya in the concluding portion of this topic.

Jinabhadra says that the knowledge that is due to the activity of sense-organs and the mind, is couched in proper words (in accordance with conventional usage), and is capable of expressing its object (to others) is bhāvasrūta while the rest is mati. Iḥā (speculation), avāya (perceptual judgment) etc. are also couched in proper words, but nevertheless they fall in the category of mati, inasmuch as there is no deliberate application of language in these cases of knowledge. Simple verbal association is not considered sufficient to raise a cognition to the status of śrūta. In our ordinary perceptions we associate the object with its name as soon as we perceive it. But we do not go any further. But there are cases of perceptual cognitions which do not stop at simple verbal association, but continue further into discursive thought with the help of language. This continuation leads them to the category of śrūta-jñāna. Thus those cognitions of objects, which are totally free from all verbal association or at best are conversant with the mere names of their objects, fall in the category of mati, while their further continuations with the help of the language fall in the category of śrūta. In fact, the versatile knowledge of the objects, that follows in the wake of perceptual cognition of these objects and whose versatility is in proportion to the learnedness of the cognizer is śrūta-jñāna. The more learned a person is the more versatile will be his śrūta-jñāna.

1 vaṭyartheśtiṣṭaṇāsāṃkāḥ pravāṣyāyāḥ na matyābhyaḥ dhikam śrūtām.
—Niścayadvāṭirinśikā, 12.

2 indiśamāṇo-nimittām jaṃ viṃśaṇām suṣyāṇusāreṇa
niyaṃyaṭṭhiṣṭiṣṭ-samathāṇām taṃ bhāvasuṃyām maṃ sesām.—Viṣh, 100.

3 Cf. . . . śrūtām āprūvavīṣayām, ekām ghaṭām āṃdiṣṭānāṃśiṣṭāḥ niścitā yauṃ ghaṭa iti tajjāṭṭyaṃ anyam anekadesa-kāla-rūpādi-vilakṣaṇam āprūvam adhigacchati yat tace rundam, nānā-prakāraṇārũraprāṇaparāṇāṃ yat tad vā śrūtām . . . TRā, I. 9 (vārttika 32).
The śruta-jñāna, according to the Jaina thinker, is as a rule preceded by mati-jñāna. This conception owes its origin perhaps to the old conception of śruti as the knowledge born through the sense-organ of hearing.¹ But in fact the knowledge of the object meant by the sound (word) perceived by the sense-organ of hearing is śruti proper. And it is also admitted to be so. The simple perception by the sense-organ of hearing is a case of mati. It is maintained that all cases of verbal cognitions born through whatever sense-organ are to be regarded auditory perceptions, inasmuch as verbal expressions accompanying these cognitions are by their nature competent to be cognized by the auditory organ. Articulated words are perceived through the auditory organ without doubt. But words, which clothe our thoughts, though not actually perceived by the auditory organ, are also potentially the objects of auditory cognition. The employment of words in thought, therefore, is symptomatic of auditory cognition, and the operation of the auditory organ is more or less an accident.² It is in this sense that every śruta-jñāna is preceded by mati-jñāna of the type of auditory sense-perception. Even pure mental thinking can be considered to be accompanied by such virtual auditory sense-perception, because of the association of words which fall within the province of auditory perception. Jinaabhadrā says 'The knowledge of the speaker or the hearer, that is informed with his previous learning, is śruti. And the knowledge of the self-same person, free from association with language, is mati'.³ Jinaabhadrā quotes an opinion which sought to differentiate mati from śruta on the ground that the latter is associated with words and the former is devoid of them, and refutes it by saying 'If all types of mati were regarded as bereft of association with words there would be lack of āhā (speculation) etc. (which follow in the wake of avagraha and are bound up with verbal association) because without verbal expressions there can be no conceptual thinking which invariably affilates a particular with a class-character. And consequently the discrimination between the characteristics of a post and a man will be an impossibility.'⁴ If all perceptual cognitions were free from verbal association there would be total lack of determine cognitions. The determination of the specific characteristics requires help of language, and as such our perceptions are, as a rule, associated with words when they become determinate. If all perceptions were dumb, they would serve no purpose of life. Jinaabhadrā concludes that with reference to

¹ Cf. soimdiovaladdhī hoi suyaṁ.—ViBh, 117.
² Cf. sābhilāpa-vijñānaṁ ṣeṣendriya-dvāreṇā 'pyutpannam yogyatāya śrotendriyopalabdhir ēva mantavyam, abhilāpasya sarvasyā 'pi śrotendriya-grahaṇayogatvāt—Bhādvyttī on ViBh, 117 ; also see ViBh, 125.
³ bhaṇao suṇao vā suyaṁ tām ātm āhā suyānusāri viññānāṁ donahāpi suvāyāṇām jātm viññānaṁ tayām buddhī.—ViBh, 121.
⁴ ViBh, 162-163.

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words quā concepts (knowledge) the mati can be ‘associated with’ as well as ‘bereft of’ words but with reference to words quā articulated symbols, the mati is, as a rule, bereft of words; the śrūta, on the other hand, whether it is dravya-śruta or bhāva-śruta, can be both sākṣara (associated with words) as well as anākṣara (bereft of words).\footnote{ubhayaṁ bhāvakkharao, apaṅkharāṁ hoja varṇaṇaṅkaṅkharao. — ViBh, 170.} Avagrāha falls in the category of mati bereft of words while ihā etc. fall in the category of mati associated with words quā concepts (knowledge). Articulated symbols are not concepts and thus a fortiori they are excluded from the category of mati-jñāna. Dravya-śruta is sākṣara when it consists of written or spoken words, and it is anākṣara when it consists of physical gestures. The bhāva-śruta is called sākṣara because it contains words quā concepts and it is also called nirākṣara because it does not contain words quā external symbols written or spoken. Jinabhadra further quotes an opinion which distinguished mati from śrūta on the ground that the former, like a dumb person, can reveal its content to the cognizing self alone, while the latter, like a talking man, can reveal its contents to others as well.\footnote{See ViBh, 171.} This reminds us of the position of Pūjyapāda Devanandi who maintains that, as distinguished from other pramāṇas (organs of knowledge), the śrūta serves the twofold purpose of enlightening the cognizing self as well as others—the former function being done on account of its self-revealing nature and the latter through the instrumentality of language. The śrūta quā knowledge reveals its contents to the cognizing self alone while the śrūta quā verbal expression reveals its contents to others as well.\footnote{tatra svārthaṁ pramāṇaṁ śrutavarjyaṁ. śrutam puṇaṁ svārtham bhavati parārtham ca, jñānātmaṁ svārthaṁ vacanātmaṁ parārthham.— SŚ, on TSā, 1. 6.} But Jinabhadra says that both mati and śrūta are essentially cases of knowledge, and as such cannot reveal their contents to others. Of course, śrūta quā words can convey its meaning to others. But Jinabhadra says that physical gestures, which can cause mati, also reveal their meaning to others. These physical gestures stand to mati-jñāna in the same relation as the words stand to śrūta-jñāna, and as such can be compared to the latter. Thus the cause of mati can reveal its meaning to others exactly in the same way as the cause of śrūta does. The above line of demarcation between mati and śrūta thus is proved invalid.\footnote{See ViBh, 173.} But finally Jinabhadra concedes that dravya-śruta is a unique instrument of conveying knowledge to others, that it is designated as śrūta by established convention and that there is nothing known as dravya-mati.\footnote{Ibid., 174.} In view of these considerations it is advisable to accept the line of demarcation. Furthermore, he says that physical
gestures also are words with meanings, because they too convey the intention—and the agent also makes use of them for lack of words in order to convey his intention.\(^1\)

**NON-DIFFERENCE OF MATI AND ŠRUTA**

We have now drawn a line of demarcation between mati and šruta, which is more or less in accordance with the traditional way of thought. But let us now study the logical implications of the traditional conception. We have seen that īhā (speculation) etc., though they are associated with words, fall in the category of mati and not šruta. The ground given is that the scriptures recognize them to be so and, furthermore, that language does not play the determining role of a condition of mati as it does regarding šruta. In īhā etc. there is only the minimum possible association with words, which is rather the outcome than the generating condition. Words come in only in order to make the cognition ‘determinate and firm’. The perceptual character still remains there. The background of cognizer’s learning plays only a silent part. It does not actively influence the cognition like the sense-organ. But this position is not without its weakness. The difficulty can be put thus: Can our cognitions be associated with words, and at the same time remain free from the influence of our previous training in verbal usage? If not, why should not such cognitions as are associated with words be considered as šruta? It is perhaps in order to avoid this difficulty that Akalaṇṭa held the view that our cognitions are mati so long as they are free from verbal association, and fall in the category of šruta as soon as they are associated with words.\(^2\) Pūjyapāda Devanandi says that all organs of valid knowledge excepting šruta are for one’s own self and not for others, inasmuch as they cannot express themselves to others.\(^3\) This statement of Pūjyapāda does not mean to say that all cases of knowledge except šruta are devoid of words. It only means that they are not expressed in language to outsiders and that they fall in the category of šruta when they are so expressed. We can interpret the above statement of Akalaṇṭa in this light. It will then mean that all processes of knowledge, perceptual or otherwise, fall in the category of mati so long as they are not expressed in words, and that they are transformed into šruta as soon as they are so expressed. This meaning follows from the statement of Akalaṇṭa himself as well.\(^4\) Akalaṇṭa thus widens the scope of mati and at the same time distinguishes it from šruta on the ground that mati is confined to the knower himself while šruta reveals its contents to others as well. In one word, mati is subjective and private (svārtha) while šruta is

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\(^1\) *Ibid.*, 175.  
\(^2\) *LT*, 10-11.  
\(^3\) *Cf.* tatra svārthaṁ pramāṇaṁ śrutavarjyam.—SSI on *TŚū*, 1. 6.  
\(^4\) *Cf.* *LT*, 10-11 and *Vivṛti*. 
subjective as well as objective (parārtha), private as well as public. But this line of demarcation is too superficial. It is immaterial whether a knowledge is expressed in words or not. Mere verbal expression cannot be taken to confer a new status on knowledge. To be logical, therefore, all such knowledge should be regarded as mati. This is the logical consummation of Akalanka’s position. And this was anticipated by Siddhasena Divākara when he said, as we have already stated, that there is no śruta over and above mati. Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya has elaborated this position in his Jñānabindu-prakarana. Siddhasena Divākara had asserted that the admission of śruta as separate from mati involves the faults of redundancy (vaiyarthya) and unwarranted extension (atiśrasaṅga). Yaśovijaya only amplifies and illustrates these faults. He says that the conception of śruta as separate from mati is futile inasmuch as the function of the former can be adequately fulfilled by the latter. Moreover, if the non-difference of mati and śruta be admitted, the necessity of the postulation of a separate avagraha for the apāya (perceptual judgment) bringing up the rear of a generic verbal cognition (śabda-jñāna or śruta-jñāna) on account of a further enquiry for a more specific characteristic of the same object is also avoided, because in this new conception the generic verbal cognition itself will serve as the basic avagraha of the whole process which is a case of mati-jñāna. The unity of the process will remain undisturbed even when it becomes intricate due to the entrance of verbal knowledge (śruta-jñāna), because, says Yaśovijaya, when it is acknowledged that there is no disturbance in the unity of the process of śrutopayoga (verbal knowledge) even when it is interspersed with more than one process of mati, what possible harm can there be if the process of mati is conceived to preserve its integrity even when the śrutopayoga follows in the wake of it. Besides, if a separate status were accorded to verbal knowledge on the ground that it is non-perceptual the undesirable consequence of the admission of a respective separate category for inference, recollection, recognition etc. would follow, because these also are non-perceptual. But the Jaina thinkers cannot accept this consequence without throwing overboard their whole theory of knowledge. The Jainas accept inference, recollection etc. to belong to the category of mati. What then is the ground for treating śruta as a separate category from mati? Again, if mati is

1 vaiyarthya-ātiprasaṅgābhyaṁ na matyabhayadhikaṁ śrutam.

_Nīcayadūtrivihīkā, 12._

2 _Cf._ navañās tu śrutopayoga matyapayogān na prthāk, matyapayogena ‘va tatkāryopapatattat tatpārthakya-kalpanāya vyarthavat, ata eva śabdajanyasāmānya-jñānottaram viśeṣa-jijñāsakhyāṁ tanmūlaka-matyapayānāṁ-pravṛttatva na prthāgavagrahakalpanāgauravāṁ śabdassāmānya-jñānasyai ‘va tatra avagrahātvāt, JBP, p. 16.

3 _Ibid._
conceived as twofold viz. (1) perceptual\(^1\) and (2) non-perceptual, and
\textit{avagraha}, \textit{iḥā} etc. are held to fall in the former and inference, recollec-
tion etc. are held to fall in the latter group, then logic will demand
that \textit{śruti} also should be treated as a case of non-perceptual \textit{mati} and
not as a separate category.\(^2\) Thus does Yaśovijaya vindicate the
position of the great logician Siddhasena Divākara whom he often
quotes in his treatises with great veneration, and sometimes refers to
him by the term \textit{navya} (neo-logician).\(^3\) Siddhasena was a great
logical genius and Yaśovijaya, as an inspired admirer of him, gives him
the status of a neo-logician of ancient times in view of his pure logical
speculations that were the characteristic of the age that was to come
after a millennium from his own time.

\textit{AVADHI}

The Jainas believe in the capacity of the soul to know all things
irrespective of temporal and spatial distance. The past as well as the
future can be perceived as vividly as the present. The soul is
inherently capable of perceiving all things with all their characteristics
—past, present and future. But this capacity of the soul is obstructed
by \textit{jñānāvaraṇīya karman} which veils the soul and permits it only an
imperfect comprehension of the world. The nature and extent of the
knowing capacity of a soul, therefore, depend upon the nature of the
veil. But never can the veil obstruct the knowing capacity completely
because in that case the soul would become as good as non-soul. The
knowledge of the soul is never totally obstructed by the veil even as
the light of the sun or the moon is never totally obstructed even by the
darkest clouds.\(^4\) There is always some glimpse of the external world,
however imperfect or sometimes even perverted it may be. For the
sake of systematic investigation, the various states of knowledge,
ranging from the most imperfect and perverted knowledge of the one-
sensed organisms up to the most perfect knowledge of the \textit{kevalin}
(omniscient), have been classified into five categories \textit{viz. mati, śrūta,
avadhi, manākṣārāvyāya} and \textit{kevala}. Of these, we have dealt with \textit{mati}
and \textit{śrūta} which, as we have seen, are dependent upon the help of the
various external organs. But now we come to those categories which
do not depend upon any sense-organ. Of course, even in the case of

\(^1\) \textit{sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa}.
\(^2\) yadi ca avagrahādibhedāḥ sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣarūpasyai \textit{`va mati-
\textit{jñānasya sūtre proktāḥ, anumānādikaṁ tu parokṣa-matijñānam arthataḥ siddham
\textit{itī `ṣyate, tarhi śrutasabdā-vyapadesyāṁ sābda-jñānam api parokṣa-mati-jñānam
evā `ṅgkriyatām. —JB P, p. 16.}
\(^3\) The term \textit{navyāḥ} in footnote 2 page 60 refers to Siddhasena.
\(^4\) jai puṇa so \textit{`vi āvariya tenaṁ jīvo ajivattaṁ pāvijjā—`suṭṭhu vi meha-
samudaye, hoi pabhā caṁda-sūrānāṁ}. —\textit{NSā, 42}.\)
māri and śrūta, the role of the sense-organs is a subordinate one because they only serve to eliminate the veil which envelops the knowledge of the object already there. But nevertheless they have some function of their own, in the absence of which knowledge would be impossible. The other three categories of knowledge, however, are completely free from the dependence upon the sense-organs, and as such, as we have already stated, are called pratyakṣa proper.¹ The conception of these categories will certainly appear dogmatic, but nevertheless it should be borne in mind that the vital source of the Jaina theory of knowledge lies in this conception. If the soul has the capacity to know, it must know independently of any other external condition. Knowledge is not spatial or temporal relation, but is a capacity. Distance, spatial or temporal, is not a hindrance for the soul. It can obstruct physical movement. But on the capacity to know it cannot have any such influence. If the soul cannot penetrate into the past or future, or see through distance, it is due to the delimitation of its knowing capacity by the obstructive veil, and not due to any inherent privation. Knowledge is as independent as existence. As existence does not depend upon some other existence for its existence, so knowledge does not depend upon something else for its knowledge. Knowledge is there in its own right as its objects are there in their own right. No physical contact, direct or indirect, with objects is necessary for the emergence of knowledge. The question of physical contact or limited distance or size comes in only when the inherent capacity is delimited. And this delimitation even is not ultimately due to some extraneous condition. It is due to the soul itself which has acquired the karmic veil by its own activity. Let us now revert to our subject proper.

The possession of avadhi-jñāna is a birthright of the denizens of heaven and hell. The avadhi-jñāna in their case is bhava-pratyayya (due to birth).² The avadhi of the human beings as well as of the five-sensed sub-human beings is due to the destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant karmic veil (kṣayopāśama-nimitta).³ It is acquired by merit and is also called guna-pratyayya (due to merit).⁴ The distinction, however, is only apparent. The denizens of heaven and hell are endowed with avadhi by their very birth and hence their avadhi is called bhava-pratyayya. Other beings get it only occasionally and as a

¹ It is interesting to note that Bhūtabali in his Mahābandha (p. 24, Kashi, 1947 edition) admits the instrumentality of manas in manāhparāyāya. But Akālaṇika interprets (in his TRā, p. 58) manas as ātman. So far as my knowledge goes Bhūtabali had no following.

² SthSā, 71 ; NSā, 7 ; TSā, I. 22.
³ SthSā, 71 ; NSā, 8 ; TSā, I. 23 and its Bhāṣya.
⁴ See NSā, gāthā 63 ; also see TRā, I. 20 : dvividho 'vadhir bhava-guṇa-pratyayya-bhedāt. See also ViBh, 572.
result of special merit and hence in their case it is called \textit{kṣayopāsama-nimitta} or \textit{guṇanimitta}. In fact, however, \textit{avadhi} is, as a rule, \textit{kṣayopāsama-nimitta} in all cases. It is necessary in the case of the denizens of heaven and hell because they have secured the destruction and subsidence of the veiling \textit{karman} by the acquisition of requisite merits and only occasional in the case of other beings for the reason already given, and as such is classified into two separate categories.\footnote{Cf. \textit{ViBh}, 574; \textit{TRā}, I. 22. 3.}

By \textit{avadhi-jñāna} one can intuit only those things which have shape or form (\textit{rūpin}).\footnote{Cf. \textit{ANīr}, 45; \textit{NSū}, 16; \textit{TSū}, I. 28.} The intuitions differ in scope and durability with different persons on account of the difference of their merits. One endowed with the highest type of \textit{avadhi} can intuit\footnote{The \textit{NSū} uses both the terms jānai and pāsai in order to distinguish between \textit{avadhi-jñāna} and \textit{avadhi-darśana}. We shall, however, use both 'know' and 'intuit' without discrimination. In fact, the distinction between \textit{avadhi-jñāna} and \textit{avadhi-darśana} is not very essential too in this context.} all the things having form. In point of space his intuition extends over a space that could be occupied by a countless number of space-units of the size of \textit{loka} (the inhabited universe) and as regards time it penetrates countless number of cycles, both past and future. But as regards the modes, it cannot know all. It knows only an infinitesimal part of them though, of course, even this tiny part consists of an infinite number of modes.\footnote{See \textit{ANīr}, 45 (\textit{ViBh}, 685); \textit{NSū}, 16.}

The Jainas conceive infinity as having infinite gradation and as such there is no absurdity in this conception. The lowest type of \textit{avadhi} can extend to a very small fraction of an \textit{aṅgula} and know the infinite\footnote{aṅgulassā asaṁkhijjai bhāgaṁ jānai pāsai. An \textit{aṅgula} is a very small measure.} number of things having form (\textit{rūvi davvāin}) that lie therein. In point of time it can penetrate only a small part of an \textit{āvalikā} (a small measure of time less than a second) and as regards modes it can know an infinite number of them.\footnote{An infinite number of atoms can exist in one point of space according to the Jainas. We shall make the point clear in the next paragraph.}

In this connection it is essential to have some idea of the Jaina conception of the relative subtlety of time, space, matter and modes. The ultimate constituent of time is an infinitesimal indivisible unit called \textit{samaya} 'time-point' or 'instant'. This time-point is beyond human comprehension and can be intuited only by the omniscient. In the same way space is also conceived as having \textit{pradeśas} (space-points) as its ultimate indivisible units. But these space-points are subtler than the time-points. It is conceived that the \textit{number} of space-points of a small space of one \textit{aṅgula} is equal to the \textit{number} of time-
points of a countless number of cycles of time. But an atom of matter is still subtler. An infinite number of atoms can be accommodated in one space-point. Again, every atom has an infinite number of modes and as such the modes are conceived as subtler than the atoms. Thus of a time-point, space-point, a material atom and a mode, the succeeding one is subtler than the preceding one.\(^1\) It, therefore, naturally follows that with the increase of the capacity for penetration into time, there is necessarily an increase in the capacity for extending over space, and comprehending more of matter and modes; but extension in space does not necessarily involve more penetration into time, nor does comprehension of more matter and modes involve necessary spatial extension and temporal penetration.\(^2\) The rationale of the argument can be brought out as follows: A time-point is more extensive as compared with a space-point and so it is held that it is easier to extend over one space-point than to penetrate one time-point. So it is conceived that temporal penetration is necessarily accompanied with spatial extension. But the reverse is not true. Now as each space-point can contain an infinite number of atoms, and each atom has an infinite number of modes, it is conceived that with the increase of scope in space, there is necessarily an increase in the number of things and their modes that are comprehended, but the comprehension of a greater number of things and modes does not necessarily involve more penetration into time and extension in space. Comprehension of a greater number of things and modes may be due to the clarity of the intuition as well and this is another reason why it does not necessarily involve spatial or temporal extension. Similarly, although the highest type of avadhi can comprehend all the atoms of a space-point, it cannot comprehend all their modes because the comprehension of all the modes is possible only on the attainment of the maximum of clarity which materializes only on the dawn of omniscience.

We have stated that by avadhi one can know only those things which have form or shape. The formless things such as the souls, dharma (substance that helps motion) and adharma (substance that helps rest), space and time, are not intuited by avadhi. It is only the rūpin contents of space and time that are known by it. Its scope and durability is determined by the capacity of the person possessed of it. The Avāsyakānirukti gives a detailed description of avadhi from fourteen points of view viz. its varieties, its spatial extension, shape of space it extends over etc.\(^3\) The Nandī Sūtra, however, gives only six varieties of avadhi that are possible in the case of a meritorious homeless mendicant with a few sub-varieties.\(^4\) We do not enter into details

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1 See ANir, 37; also see ViBl, 621-3.
2 See ANir, 36.
3 See ANir, 26-28.
4 See NSū, 9-15; see also TSūBh on I. 23.
in view of the fact that they have little bearing on epistemological enquiry. Besides, they easily follow from what we have already stated, and as such do not afford important information.

**MANAHPARYAYA-JNANA**

In order to understand the nature of the *manaḥparyaya-jñāna* it is necessary that the nature of the stuff of which the mind is made up should be properly understood. The Jainas conceive an infinite number of groups, called *vargaṇās*, of atoms. The first *vargaṇā* is conceived to contain only such atoms as remain alone and solitary and have not formed composite bodies with others. The second group contains composites of two atoms. The third group contains composites of three atoms. And so on. By this process, we arrive at a group which contains composites of an infinite number of atoms, which is fit for the making up of the *audārīka* (gross) body such as of men and animals. This group is followed by an infinite number of groups which are all competent for making the stuff of *audārīka* body. Then follows a number of groups which are incompetent for any kind of body. Again, by the same process we reach an infinite number of groups which are competent to form the stuff of the *vaikriya* (subtle) body such as of celestial beings. And by following the same process, as above, another infinite number of groups are reached which are capable of forming the stuff of *āhāraka* body such as of an ascetic having special powers. Similarly by repeating the same process we obtain groups which are competent for *taijasa* (luminous) body, *bhāṣā* (speech), *ānāpāna* (respiration), *manas* (mind) and *karma* (mind). It is to be noticed in this connection that a composite body of the group that follows consists of greater number of atoms but occupies less space in comparison with a composite body of the group that precedes. Thus a composite body of the *karma-vargaṇā* consists of more atoms but occupies less space in comparison with a composite body of *mano-vargaṇā*, which, again, consists of more atoms but occupies less space in comparison with a composite body of the *ānāpāna-vargaṇā*. And so on. From this description we can have an idea of the constituent stuff of the *manas* (mind).

The *Āvasyakanirvyuktī* says that the *manaḥpajjavanāṇa* (= *manaḥparyaya-jñāna*) is the revealer of the objects thought by the minds of the people, is limited to the *mānusakhīṭta* (abode of human beings), is due to merit and is possessed by one having character (that is, a

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1 We also get the terms *manaḥparyaya* and *manaḥparyava*. Cf. *ViBh*, 83.
2 The Jainas, as we have already stated, conceive an infinite gradation of 'infinity'.
3 See *Ā Nir*, 39. Also see *ViBh*, 631-37 and the *Bṛhadvytti*.
JP—9
homeless ascetic). The Sthānāṅga recognizes two varieties of it viz. rjumati and vipulamati. Umāsvāti distinguishes the former from the latter on the ground that the latter is purer and everlasting (that is, lasts up to the dawn of omniscience), while the former is less pure and sometimes falters too. Distinguishing between avadhi and manah-paryāya, Umāsvāti says 'One possessed of manahparyāya knows only an infinitesimal part of the objects of avadhi. He knows a greater number of states of the material objects that form the contents of the invisible thinking process of the mind and are situated in the region inhabited by human beings.' According to him also, thus, it is the material objects and their states, thought of by the mind of others, that are intuited by manahparyāya. The mind undergoes a process of change while thinking, and the objective contents of this process are intuited by the manahparyāya. Jinaḥdra, however, says that one possessed of such knowledge intuits the states of the mind-substance directly, but knows the external objects thought of by the mind only by way of inference. The Brhaduvṛti argues: 'A thinker may think of a material as well as a non-material object (e.g. a cognition). But it is not possible for one who is not omniscient to intuit directly a non-material object. And, therefore, it follows that one possessed of manahparyāya knows the object thought of (by others) only by way of inference.' Pūjyapāda Devanandi, however, holds a different view. Defining manahparyāya he says: 'Due to its association with the manas (mind), the object of the manas (mind) of others is called manas and the paryayaṇam 'knowledge' of that (object) is manahparyāya. It is not a mati-jñāna because the mind is only an inactive background and does not make any contribution (in such knowledge). It is exclusively due to the potency of destruction-cum-subsidence, although it is designated by means of the manas of oneself or of another (on account of its association with it). The case is on a par with the usage in the proposition 'Behold the moon in the sky' in which the moon is

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1 maṇḍapajjāva-nāpana puṇa jaṇa-maṇa-pari-cintiyatthā-pāyaḍāṇaṁ māṇusu-khitta nibaddhaṁ puṇa-paccayaṁ caṁṭhatavaṁ.—AṆiv, 76.
2 SthSā, 71.
3 See TSāBh on I. 25 and the Ṭīkā.
4 avadhi-jñāna-viśayaśyā nantabhagāṁ manahparyāya-jñāṇī jānīte, ṛūpādhvanyiya manorahasya-viśaṅgaṁ ca māṇusu-kṣetra-paryāpannaṁ viśuddhaṁ tarāṇī ceti.—TSāBh on I. 29.
5 The commentator Siddhasenaṅgaṇin, however, interprets Umāsvāti in the light of Jinaḥdra's conception of manahparyāya as intuiting the mental modes and knowing the objects thought of by the mind by means of inference. See Ṭīkā on TSāBh, I. 24.
6 tenāvabhāsī anu jāṇai bhaṅge 'numāṇeṇaṁ—ViBh, 814.
7 cintaka hi mūrtaṁ amūrtāṁ ca vastu cintayet. na ca chadmattho 'mūrtaṁ sāksat paśyati, tato jñāyate anumāṇād eva cintanīyaṁ vastv avagacchati. Brhaduvṛtti on ViBh, 814.
pointed out by means of the sky.\textsuperscript{1} He thus maintains, like Umāsvāti, that the external object itself is intuited by manahparyāya. Akalaṅkā supports this view and seems to refute the position of Jinaḥbhadra. He says that all the characteristics of a pratyakṣa are present in the manahparyāya inasmuch as it is independent of the sense-organs and the mind, and as such it should not be regarded as an inference (anumāna) which depends upon the instruction of others (for the knowledge of the relation between the probans and the probandum) as well as upon the sense-organs such as the eye.\textsuperscript{2} It is, however, to be noticed in this connection that this contention refers only to the object of manahparyāya and not to the nature of it as pratyakṣa. Both Jinaḥbhadra and Akalaṅkā regard it as pratyakṣa but the contention is whether the external objects are intuited by it. Jinaḥbhadra holds that the external objects are known by inference while Akalaṅkā maintains that they are directly intuited by manahparyāya as they are associated with the mind being thought of by it. Jinaḥbhadra holds that the function of manahparyāya is limited to the intuited of the states of the mind engaged in thinking, while it is the function of inference to know the external things thought of by the mind. Akalaṅkā, following Pūjyapaḍa Devanandi, extends the function of manahparyāya to the intuited of the external things as well, and it is but natural that he has to meet the objection of those who hold that it is confined to the mental states which serve as the ground of inference of external objects. Akalaṅkā explains away the difficulty by asserting that the states of the mind are only the medium through which the external objects are intuited, and as such they need not be given the position of a middle term of an inference. Jinaḥbhadra denied the possibility of the intuited of external objects by admitting that the knowledge of the external objects is a case of inference, but at the same time asserting in clear terms that manahprayāya has a different function, and that function is the intuited of the states of the mind that is engaged in thinking of the external objects. It is but natural that the manahparyāya should be conceived as intuiting the paryāyas (states) of the manas (mind) alone, and not the external objects also. Jinaḥbhadra adhered to this, perhaps original, conception, and when faced with the problem of the knowledge of the external objects thought of by the mind asserted that

\textsuperscript{1} paraikya-mano-gato 'rtho mana ity ucayate sāhacaryāt tasya paryayaṇam parigamanam manahparyayaḥ. mati-jñāna-prasaṅga iti ca na, apeksa-matravat. kṣayopasaṁsa-akti-mātra-vijñamhitam tat kevalam svapara-manobhir vyapadiṣyate. yathā abhre candramaśam paśye 'ti—SSi on TŚā, I. 9.

\textsuperscript{2} TŚā, I. 23, 6-7. Here although Akalaṅkā does not mention the name of Jinaḥbhadra, it is almost certain that he refers to the view of Jinaḥbhadra, because, to our knowledge, there is none among the predecessors of Akalaṅkā, who states so clearly as Jinaḥbhadra does that one possessed of manahparyāya knows the external object only by means of inference.
it is only by inference that one knows the external objects. Akalaṅka, however, takes the position of Pūjyapāda Devanandi and rejects the solution of Jinaabhadrā as unnecessary and uncalled for. It is, however, not possible for want of sufficient relevant pre-Pūjyapāda literature to trace the origin of Pūjyapāda’s position. Maybe he took the suggestion from the Tattvārthabẖāṣya of Umāsvatī. It is also plausible that Pūjyapāda followed the view embodied in the Āvasyakaniriyuktī (gaṁtha 76). We can assert with some measure of certainty that he was familiar with this work, inasmuch as we find him quoting from the work, and as such our conjecture is not totally unfounded.

According to Pūjyapāda, the objects intuited by manahpāryāya include objects of the activities of the sense-organ of speech, body and mind. Distinguishing between ṝjumati and vipulamati he says that the latter knows less number of objects than the former, but knows them more vividly and thoroughly. The vipulamati is more lucid and penetrating than the ṝjumati. The former is infallible while the latter falters. The former is possessed by one who gradually ascends the spiritual ladder while the latter is owned by one who is destined to fall in the grip of passions and go down. Akalaṅka only elucidates the view of Pūjyapāda. Vidyānandi repeats Akalaṅka. It seems that the development of the conception of manahpāraya stopped with Pūjyapāda on the one side and Jinaabhadrā on the other. The later Jaina thinkers only took side with the one or the other, but did not make any further development.

Only human beings are competent to possess manahpāraya. The Nandi Śūtra says that only those uterine human beings who are born in the karmabhūmis (i.e. lands where tīrthaṅkaras are born), possess longevity and have fully developed organs, who are of right faith, self-controlled and free from passions (apramatta) and who are possessed of ṛddhis (extraordinary powers) are entitled to possess this manahpāraya. Even gods are not competent to possess manahpāraya. It is the special privilege of the gifted among the human species. Like avadhi, it has also gradation of spatial extension and temporal penetration.

**AVADHI AND MANAHPRAYAYA**

Now let us see whether there is any essential distinction between avadhi and manahpāraya. Avadhi, as we have seen, intuits the

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1 Vide supra footnote 1, p. 66.
2 He quotes ĀNir, gaṁtha 5 in SSi on TSā, I. 19. Of course, here Pūjyapāda does not mention the specific name of the work but introduces the reference as āgamatas tāvat.
3 See SSi on TSā, I. 23. 4 See SSi on TSā, I. 24. 5 See TRā, I. 23.
6 See NSā, 17. 7 See NSā, 18.
material substance and modes. *Manahparyāya*, as stated above, intuit the modes only of the material substance that constitutes the mind. It is further admitted that the material substance, intuited by *avādhi*, includes the *manodravya* (matter constituting mind) also. Thus we find that both *avādhi* and *manahparyāya* can intuit the states of the material substance that constitutes the mind. The distinction between them, therefore, is only one of scope. *Avādhi* intuits other *vargānās* *viz.* the *audārika, vaikriya* etc. as well, while *manahparyāya* cannot do so. Besides, only a qualified human being can possess the *manahparyāya* while the *avādhi* belongs to the denizens of heaven and hell and sometimes even to the subhuman creatures. But in our opinion these are only superficial points of distinction. They cannot be held as constituting a qualitative distinction. They can at best prove a quantitative difference. The great logician Siddhasena Divākara who, as we have seen, does not recognize the distinction between *mati* and *sruta* has refused to recognize any distinction between *avādhi* and *manahparyāya* as well. The orthodox view is that the *manahparyāya* is limited to the intuition of the minds or the objective contents of the minds of the human beings alone. But Siddhasena objects that the subhuman organisms possessed of two or more sense-organs also are found to strive by means of attraction and repulsion, and thus are possessed of minds and as such it will be proper to extend the scope of *manahparyāya* to the minds or the objects of the minds of them as well, or otherwise it will be improper to postulate *manahparyāya* as a separate category of knowledge. Moreover, the *avādhi* can well serve the purpose of *manahparyāya* and so it is not necessary to admit the latter as constituting a separate category of knowledge. It can at best be considered as a specific type of *avādhi*.

**KEVALA-JNĀNA**

Of the three classes of *pratyakṣa*, we have described the first two, *viz.* *avādhi* and *manahparyāya*. Now we come to *kevala* (omniscience), the consummation of all knowledge.

The total destruction of the *mohanīya* (deluding) *karman* is followed by a short interval lasting for less than a *muhūrta* (forty-eight minutes) after which the *karman* veiling *jñāna* and *darśana* as also the *antarāya* (obstructive) *karman* are destroyed. And then the soul shines in its full splendour and attains omniscience which intuits

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1 See *ANir*, 42; see also *ViBh*, 669 and the *Bṛhadāraṇyka*.
2 See *ANir*, 76 which states that the manahparyāya reveals the object thought of by the jaśatmanā 'human mind'.
3 prārthana-pratīghātābhyaṁ ceṣṭante dvindriyādayaḥ
   manahparyāya-vijñānāṁ yuktam teṣu na ca 'nyathā.
   —*Nīcayadvātiśiṣṭa*, 17 as quoted in *JBP*; also see *JBP*, p. 18.
4 See *TSū*, X. 1 with *Bhāṣya* and *Tīkā*; see also *SthSū*, 226.
all substances with all their modes. Nothing remains unknown in omniscience. Umāsvāti quotes an opinion that maintained that on the emergence of kevala the other four kinds of knowledge viz. mati, śrūta etc. are overpowered much in the same way as the other luminaries of the sky are overpowered on the appearance of the sun in the firmament, but himself supports the view that they are absolutely impossible in the omniscient on the ground that the kevala is due to the total destruction while the other four are due only to the destruction-cum-subsidece of the jñānāvarana-karmam. Total destruction bars the possibility of destruction-cum-subsidece.

The Jainas hold that each and every entity is related to all entities other than itself in the universe in some relation or other. These relations are called paryāyas (modes) of the entity. In order to know an entity completely, these relations or paryāyas are to be completely known. And hence it follows that the complete knowledge of one entity involves the complete knowledge of other entities as well. If the relations are real and if it is also possible to know these relations, it logically follows that omniscience is possible. Omniscience is perfectly consistent with the Jaina conception of emergence of knowledge as the removal of veil. As realists the Jainas believe in relations as objective links that relate each and every entity with all that is other than the entity. Symbolically, the relations are links between A and the contents of not-A. This means that the complete knowledge of A implies the complete knowledge of not-A and this is obviously the knowledge of the whole universe. In other words, the perfect knowledge of one entity means the perfect knowledge of all entities. This has been very characteristically expressed by the Ācārāṅga in the following terms: One who knows one knows all, and one who knows all knows one.

There is no controversy regarding the nature of kevala among the different Jaina thinkers, and so we do not state their views separately.

JÑĀNA AND DARŚANA

Upanyoga (consciousness) is the defining characteristic of a soul. This upanyoga can be sākara 'determinate' as well as anākāra 'indeterminate'. The former is called jñāna and the latter darśana.
We propose to render jñāna as ‘determinate knowledge’ and dārsana as ‘indeterminate intuition’ although we are fully conscious of the inadequacy of the translation. For the sake of convenience we shall sometimes use simply ‘knowledge’ for jñāna and ‘intuition’ for dārsana.

The hoary antiquity of the Jaina conception of jñānāvaraṇa and dārsanāvaraṇa points to the antiquity of the distinction between jñāna and dārsana. The Jaina Āgamas use the terms jñāna and pāsaṇai in order to express the two faculties of the soul. The Prajñāpān Śūtra recognizes a peculiar faculty called pāsaṇayā and in this connection we should notice the contents of its two chapters dealing severally with upayoga and pāsaṇayā (rendered pāṣyatā in Sanskrit). It is recognized that both upayoga and pāṣyatā can be sākāra as well as anākāra. This means that both jñāna and dārsana can belong to both the categories of upayoga and pāṣyatā. Distinguishing between upayoga and pāṣyatā, the commentator Malayagiri says: ‘Sākāra upayoga consists of five classes of knowledge (viz. mati, śrūta, avadhi, maṇḍaparyāya and kevala) and three classes of non-knowledge (viz. mati-ajñāna, śrūta-ajñāna and avadhi-ajñāna or vibhaṅga). Sākāra pāṣyatā, on the other hand, consists only of six classes (out of the eight just mentioned) inasmuch as mati-ajñāna and mati-ajñāna are not included therein. Pāṣyatā is derived from ārṣ and means prekṣaṇa and, by convention, connotes ‘prolonged vision’ with reference to determinate knowledge and ‘clear vision’ with reference to indeterminate intuition. Mati-ajñāna and mati-ajñāna cognize only what is present and cannot be prolonged to what is past or future, and as such cannot possess pāṣyatā. Similarly, anākāra upayoga consists of four classes of dārsana (intuition) viz. caksūrdrdārsana (eye-intuition), acaksūrdrdārsana (intuition by the mind as well as the sense-organs other than the eye), avadhi-dārsana and kevala-dārsana. Anākāra pāṣyatā, on the other hand, consists only of three classes (out of these four), inasmuch as acaksūrdrdārsana being devoid of ‘clear vision’ cannot possess pāṣyatā, and as such is excluded from the category of anākāra pāṣyatā.’

1 PrŚū, padas 29 and 30.
2 sāgāro-vaṇge ya anāgāro-vaṇge ya—PrŚū, pada 29. sāgārapāsaṇayā anāgāra-pāsaṇayā—PrŚū, pada 30.
3 pañca jñānāni trīṇy ajñānāni ‘ty aṣṭavidhaḥ sākāra upayogaḥ sākāra-pāṣyatā tu sādvidhā, matijñāna-matyajñānayoh pāṣyatayoh anabhyupagamāt, kasmād iti cetu, ucyate, iha pāṣyatā nāma pāṣato bhāva ucyate, pāṣato bhāvas ca ‘dṛṣṇ prakṣaṇe’ iti vacanat prakṣaṇam ita rūдhivāsāt sākāra-pāṣyatāyām cintimānāyām pradārgha-kālam anākāra-pāṣyatāyām cintimānāyām prakṛṣṭaḥ pariṣhuṭāpurām ikṣaṇam avaseyam. . . . . . . matijñāna-matyajñāne tu utpannavināṣṭārtha-grāhake sāmpratakāla-viṣaye . . . . . . tathā caksūrdrdārsanam acaksūrdrdāsanan avadhi-dārsanaṁkevala-dārsanam iti caturvihido ‘nākāropayogah, anākāra-pāṣyatā tu trividhā, acaksur-dārsanaśyā nākāra-pāṣyatā-sābda-vācyatvābhavāt, kasmād iti cetu—acaksur-dārsane pariṣhuṭāpurām ikṣaṇam na vidyate—Malayagiri’s Tīkā on PrŚū, pada 30.
Paśyattā thus means 'prolonged vision' or 'clear vision'. It can also be called 'direct vision'. The Prajñāpanā Sūtra gives the divisions and subdivisions but does not clarify the meaning of paśyattā and its difference from upayoga. It is only the commentator Malayagiri who attempts to demarcate the line of distinction between upayoga and paśyattā. As regards the distinction between jñāna and darśana, however, the Āgamas are very clear and definite, and unanimous too. The great Ācārya Kundakunda, however, records a quite original conception. His leaning is towards the absolutist standpoint. He asks, with reference to the omniscient, whether his knowledge reveals the non-self, his intuition reveals self, and his soul reveals both the self and the non-self.¹ He considers the problem from the empirical as well as the transcendental standpoint² and concludes that the ātman, its knowledge, and its intuition (darśana)—all these are identical and hence each can reveal the self as well as the non-self.³ He does not refer to the sākāra-anākāra (determinate-indeterminate) relation, and so it is not possible to ascertain whether he distinguished between jñāna and darśana on that basis. Ācārya Virasena in his commentary called Dhavalā on Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama of Puṣpadanta says 'What comprehends an external object of the nature of the universal-cum-particular is jñāna. And the comprehension of the self of the same nature is darśana.'⁴ Reality consists of universal-cum-particular and as such the valid cognition of it must consist in the comprehension of both these characteristics. Jñāna and darśana are both cases of valid cognition, and so each must be regarded as comprehending both the aspects of reality. Those who hold that jñāna comprehends only the particular features while darśana comprehends only the universal ones are criticized as upholding wrong conception of the nature of jñāna and darśana. A particular without the universal is a figment, and so the knowledge which comprehends a particular bereft of the universal is invalid, nay unreal. Similarly the intuition of a universal without the particular is also unreal.⁵ Virasena thus maintains that each of the two, jñāna and darśana, comprehends reality as it is, that is, a complex of universal-cum-particular, the difference between them consisting in the fact that a jñāna knows the external reality while a darśana intuits the internal

¹ Niyamasāra, 160.
² Ibid., 161-169.
³ This is the implication of Niyamasāra, 170 which runs: appānāṁ viṣṇu pāṇāṁ pāṇāṁ viṣṇu āppago e saṁdeho tamḥa sapatayeṣāṁ pāṇāṁ tabā daṁṣaṁhāḥ hodi.
⁴ sāmānya-viśeṣātmaka-bāhyārtha-grahaṇam jñānam, tadātmaka-svarūpa-grahaṇam darśanam iti siddham.—Dhavalā on Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama, I. 1. 4.
⁵ Cf. na jñānaṁ pramaṇaṁ sāmānya-vyatīriktā-viśeṣasyāṁ rthakriyā-kartṛtvāṁ prayasamarthatvato 'vastuno grahaṇat. na tasya grahaṇam api sāmānya-vyatīriktā višeṣo hy avastuni kartṛkarma-rūpāhāvāt. tata eva na darśanam api pramaṇam. Ibid.
self. Darśana is antarmukha (turned inside, introvert) while jñāna is bahir Mukha (turned outside, extrovert). If the jñāna knows the external world darśana intuits the internal self. The internal reality is as much a complex of universal-cum-particular as an external entity. Thus the object of both a jñāna and a darśana is a complex of universal-cum-particular. Brahmadeva in his Vṛtti on the Dravyasaṅgraha of Nemicandra upholds a similar position. In his commentary on Dravyasaṅgraha, gāthā 43, he recognizes the darśana as intuition of a universal characteristic. But in his commentary on gāthā 44, he distinguishes two views—(1) according to logic (tarkābhiṃprāyeṇa), and (2) according to scripture (siddhāntābhiṃprāyeṇa). The usual view of darśana as intuition of the universal, for instance sattā (existence), is referred to as according to logic.¹ The conception of darśana according to the scripture is given as follows: Awareness or vision of one’s self, consisting in the striving for the genesis of knowledge in its wake, is darśana ‘intuition’ and the subsequent determinate knowledge of the external object is jñāna.² The soul knows as well as intuits much in the same way as fire burns as well as illuminates. The selfsame consciousness is called darśana as well as jñāna with reference to the difference of its object. It is called darśana when it is engaged in intuizing the self, and jñāna when engaged in knowing the non-self. Knowledge would lose its validity if it were admitted that darśana and jñāna are confined to the comprehension respectively of the universal and the particular exclusively. The ground given is the same as already mentioned by us. Now as jñāna and darśana, viewed from the transcendental point of view, are identical with the self, it can be said that the self itself, being of the nature of knowledge free from all doubt, delusion and error, is the ultimate organ of knowledge.³ Darśana and jñāna thus ultimately lose their identity in the self. Brahmadeva gives yet another explanation of this twofold interpretation of darśana. He says that the sāmānya-viśeṣa (universal-particular) relation of darśana and jñāna is for the non-Jaina logicians who are unable to understand the real significance. For those of subtle intelligence, however, the other explanation which is in strict accord-

¹ evaṁ tarkābhiṃprāyeṇa sattāvalokana-darśanaṁ vyākhyātāṁ—Vṛtti on Dravyasaṅgraha, 44.

² atā ūṛdhvaṁ siddhāntābhiṃprāyeṇa kathaye. tathā hi uttara-jñānotpatti-nimittaṁ yat prayatnaṁ taddrūpaṁ yat svasyā 'tmanaḥ pariccchedanam avalokanaṁ tad darśanaṁ bhavyate. tadanantarāṁ yat bahirviṣaye vikalparūpeṇa padārtha-grahaṇāṁ taj jñānam iti vārttikāṁ—Ibid.

³ siddhāntena punar niśayena guṇaṅgūnīno abhinnavatvāt saṁsayavimohā-vibhrama-rahitva-vastu-jñāna-svarūpātmaḥ 'va pramāṇam.—Ibid.

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ance with the scripture is propounded. It is to be noted in this connection that all these proponents of the new conception belong to the Digambara school. So far as our knowledge goes, we do not find any Svetāmbara exponent of this conception. Among the Digambaras also, only the above-mentioned thinkers propound the theory, the other great thinkers unanimously admitting the sākhāra-anākāra (determinate-indeterminate) relation between jñāna and darśana. Of course, it has not been possible for me to examine the whole relevant literature on the subject and so my above remark may be liable to contradiction. But in view of the fact that such great exponents as Pujjayapāda, Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka and Vidyānandi unanimously accepted the conception, we can, with confidence, say that there was little controversy regarding the sākhāra-anākāra (determinate-indeterminate) relation of jñāna and darśana among the Digambara thinkers as well. We do not know whether there is any basic affinity between the upayoga-paśyattā conception of the Prajñāpana Sūtra and the apparently original theory of Kundakunda and others. In spite of the explanation of Malayagiri regarding the distinction between upayoga and paśyattā, we are not sure of the original relation between the two. It is also a problem to be decided whether there is any affinity between paśyattā and darśana. It is a difficult problem and I confess my inability to solve it ad hoc.

Now we come to the problem of the temporal relation between jñāna and darśana. Jñāna and darśana are conscious activities, and it is an Āgamic principle that two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. The Āvaśyakaniṇīyukti says that (even) the kevalins (the omniscient) cannot have two conscious activities simultaneously. The Āgamas, therefore, unanimously admit the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of jñāna and darśana. The later Jaina thinkers also unanimously admitted the impossibility in the case of the ḍhadamastha (non-omniscient) but there is controversy among them regarding the case of the kevalin (omniscient). The Digambara thinkers unanimously hold that the jñāna and the darśana of a kevalin occur

1 Cf. tarke mukhya-vṛttyā para-samaya-vidyākṣayam. tatra yadā ko 'pi parasamayi prcchati jaināgane darśanaṁ jñānaṁ ce 'ti guṇa-dvayaṁ jñayaṁ kathyate tat kathāṁ ghaṭata iti . . . . teṣāṁ pratītyarthāṁ sthūlavīkhyānena bahirvisaye yat sāmānya-parichedanaṁ tasya sattāvalokana-darśana-saṁjñā . . . . siddhānte punaḥ . . . sthūlavīkhyāne . . . ātmagrahanāṁ darśanaṁ vyākhyaṁ ity atrā 'pi doṣo nāsti.—Ibid.

2 savvāsa kevalaisa ṣugavaṁ do nattthī uvaoğā—ANīr, 973. The other reading is kevalissa vi (See Ṭīkā on TŚāBk, I. 31).

3 See BhŚū, XVIII. 8 ; PrŚū, pada 30.

4 Literally chapamastha means 'one involved in the world'. But we write the word 'non-omniscient' for the sake of contradistinction. Besides, a chapamastha is necessarily non-omniscient.
simultaneously. But among the Śvetāmbara thinkers, some stick to the Āgamas, while others go astray and assert either that a kevalin’s jñāna and darsana are simultaneous or even that they are mutually identical and have no separate identity. We shall here briefly refer to the authors of these views.

The Āvaśyaka-niruykṣī, as we have already stated, does not admit the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of jñāna and darsana of a kevalin. Then we come to Umāsvāti who says: ‘The conscious activities manifesting themselves as mati, sruta, avadhī and manah-paryāya occur in succession, and not simultaneously. The conscious activities of the omniscient lord, possessed of integrated jñāna and darsana, however, in respect of ‘pure knowledge’ and ‘pure intuition’—which comprehend all objects and are independent—occur simultaneously in every point of time’. It follows from this quotation that Umāsvāti admitted simultaneous occurrences of jñāna and darsana. The commentator Siddhasena-gaṇin, however, gives a different interpretation in accordance with the Āgamas, although he refers for the sake of refutation to some old commentators, possessed of logical intelligence, who interpreted the relevant statements of the Āgamas otherwise and denied succession of conscious activities of a kevalin. The great Digambara Ācārya Kundakunda clearly states that the jñāna and darsana of a kevalin occur simultaneously even as the light and heat of the sun occur simultaneously. Pūjyapāda Devanandi follows Kundakunda. He says: ‘Jñāna is sākāra ‘determinate’ while darsana is anākāra ‘indeterminate’. They occur in succession in the chaḍmaśtha (i.e. one who is under the influence of the obstructive karmas) while in the nirāvaraṇa (i.e. one who is completely free from the obstructive karmas) they occur simultaneously.’

Now we come to the great logician Siddhasena Divākara who refused to admit the separate identity of jñāna and darsana because of logical difficulties. ‘We can distinguish between jñāna and darsana up to manah-paryāya. Kevala-jñāna, however, quà jñāna and quà darsana is identical.’ According to Siddhasena Divākara, those who,

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1 matijñānādiṣu catuṣṣu paryāyena ‘payogo bhavati, na yugapat. sambhinna-jñāna-darsanasya tu bhaga va kevalino yugapat sarvabhāva-grāhake nirajapeṣe kevala-jñāne kevala-darsane ca anusamayam upayogo bhavati.—TSūBh, I. 31.
2 See Siddhasena-gaṇin’s Tīkā on the passage quoted above.
3 Cf. kecic paṇḍitampanyaḥ sūtraṇy anyathākāram artham ācakṣate tarka-balānuviddha-buddhayo vāraṇvāreṇo ‘payogo nāsti, tat tu na pramāṇapayāmaḥ, yata āmadya bhūyānasi sūtraṇi vāraṇvāreṇo ‘payogam pratiṇādayanti.—Ibid.
4 jugavām vaṭṭai nāṇam kevala-pāṇiṣa dāmasaṇam ca tāhā dīnayara-payāsa-tāpam jaha vaṭṭai taha muṇeyavān.—Niyamaśrā, 159.
5 See SŚi on TSā, II. 9.
6 maṇapajaval-pāṇitāḥ nāṇasa ya dārśanāya ya visesena kevala-pāṇiḥ puna dāmasaṇam tī nāṇam ti ya samānaṁ.—STP, II. 3.
on the authority of the scriptures, maintain that the emancipated one (jīna) does not know and intuit simultaneously make no scruple to flout their śīrthaṅkara. In other words, he finds logical difficulties in the position and asks those who stand by the old position to reinterpret the Āgamic statement and thus remove the inconsistencies. If kevala-jñāna dawns on the complete destruction of the relevant obscuring karman it stands to reason that kevala-darsana also should dawn immediately upon the destruction of the relevant obscuring karman. And as both the destructions are simultaneous, it logically follows that the dawns of kevala-jñāna and kevala-darsana also synchronize. As it is said that there can be no mati-jñāna in the omniscient jīna who has completely destroyed the veil, so (should it be admitted that) there can be no separate darsana in one who has completely destroyed the veil. Moreover, says Siddhasena Divākara, ‘in the scriptures, kevala has been said to have beginning but no end, and those afraid of going against the scriptures should take note of this fact.’ Admission of succession in the occurrence of jñāna and darsana means admission of break of continuity of both of them, and this obviously goes against the scriptures which prescribe non-break (aparyavasitava), that is, continuity of both jñāna and darsana. The jñānāvaraṇa and darsanāvaraṇa are destroyed simultaneously, and the problem arises which of the two, kevala-jñāna and kevala-darsana, should arise first? Logically we cannot give priority to anyone of them. Nor is it possible to admit the synchronous emergence of both, because two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. If an omniscient soul knows all in one instant, he should continue to know all for ever, or otherwise, he does not know all. The contention that jñāna (knowledge) is distinct and determinate while darsana (intuition) is indistinct and indeterminate has no scope in the case of one who has destroyed all karmic veils. The distinction of ‘determinate and indeterminate’, ‘distinct and indistinct’, applies to the knowledge of imperfect beings, and not to that of the perfect ones. And hence there can be no distinction between jñāna and darsana of the omniscient. There are other difficulties as well. Supposing that even in a kevalin the jñāna and the darsana are quite distinct from one another, they must occur either in succession or simultaneously. In the former case, the kevalin could not be held to speak out complete reality, because his statement, being

1 Ibid., II. 4. 2 Ibid., II. 5. 3 bhaṇṇai khitāvaraṇe jaha maṁaṁ jiñe na saṁbhavay taha khitāvaraṇijye visesaō daṁsaṁyaṁ natthi.—Ibid., II. 6. 4 Ibid., II. 7. 5 Cf. ibid., II. 8. 6 Cf. daṁsaṁ-ṇaṁ-vaṇṇa-kkhae saṁsaṁmim kassa pūṭvavaraṁ hohja saṁaṁ uppaṁ haṁdi duve natthi uvaṅgā.—Ibid., II. 9. 7 Cf. ibid., II. 10. 8 Cf. ibid., II. 11.
in strict conformity with his awareness, would exclude the object of 
darsana when it would synchronize with knowledge, and it would 
exclude the object of jñāna when synchronizing with intuition. And 
even in the case of simultaneity of jñāna and darsana, the difficulty of 
simultaneous statement of the contents of both would still remain.¹ 
Omniscience would be only an ill-conceived notion if it were admitted 
that the omniscient arhat intuits the unknown and knows the 
unintuited.² The conception of separate identity of jñāna and darsana 
implies that the object of darsana remains for ever untouched by jñāna 
and the object of jñāna remains for ever untouched by darsana and 
consequently it follows that the whole reality ever remains unknown 
even to the kevalin. The various scriptural statements contradicting 
our position, however, are to be interpreted with reference to various 
standpoints.³ The scriptures do not recognize darsana in the case of 
manahparyāya, inasmuch as the manahparyāya cognizes only particular 
features of the mind-substance of others, and not its universal forms. 
They further recognize only four classes of darsana viz. caksur-darsana, 
acaksur-darsana, avadhī-darsana and kevala-darsana. Siddhasena then 
quotes an opinion which recognized darsana as ‘avagraha, simple and 
pure’, and jñāna as ‘determinate description’ of the form ‘This is a 
jar’, and distinguished darsana from jñāna on the ground that the latter 
can be due to the former while the former can never be due to the 
latter.⁴ He refutes the opinion on the ground that avagraha has been 
recognized as a sub-type of mati-jñāna, and as such if darsana were 
held to be nothing but avagraha, it would follow that darsana is a 
type of mati-jñāna.⁵ Siddhasena then formulates his own definition of 
darsana which runs as follows: ‘Dārśana is jñāna (cognition) of 
external objects untouched by, or unamenable to the sense-organs, 
provided the cognition does not cognize the past and future events by 
means of a liṅga (proban)s’.⁶ The definition does not overextend to 
manahparyāya, because the external objects are not directly known by 
it.⁷ Mati and sruta have no corresponding darsana.⁸ But avadhī can 
have dārśana inasmuch as avadhī intuits objects that are untouched by 
the sense-organs.⁹ The omniscient (kevalin) knows as well as intuits 

¹ additthāṁ appāyāṁ ca kevali eva bhāsai sayāvi 
ega-samayammi hañdi vayaña-vigappo na saññhavai.—Ibid., II. 12.
² Cf. ibid., II. 13. ³ Cf. ibid., II. 18.
⁴ daṁsaṇam uggahamettam ghaḍo tti nivvannya ḍaṅkai nāṇāṁ, etc. 
—STP, II. 21-22; Yaśovijaya, however, gives a quite different explanation of 
gāṭhā 22 (see his JBP, p. 43). 
⁵ Ibid., II. 23.
⁶ nāṇāṁ apuṭṭhe avisaṁ yā atṭhammi daṁsaṇāṁ hoi 
mottuṇā liṅgāo jāṁ aparayāyavisāesu.—Ibid., II. 25. See also the 
commentary of Abhayadeva. 
objects inasmuch as he is aware of all objects irrespective of their amenability or unamenability to sense-organs.\textsuperscript{1} Siddhasena Divākara, therefore, concludes that jñāna and darśana of a kevalin arise simultaneously and last for ever. He further says that this interpretation does not violate the scriptures while the view that jñāna and darśana of a kevalin arise in alternate succession is not faithful to the scriptures and is to be understood as the position of the non-Jainas.\textsuperscript{2}

We have already stated how he proves the non-difference between jñāna and darśana in order to avoid logical difficulties.

Next we come to Jinabhadra, the great upholder of the Āgamic view. He deals with the problem in his Viśeṣanavati\textsuperscript{4} and Višeṣāvasyakabhāṣya.\textsuperscript{4} He mentions all the three positions \textit{viz.} (1) simultaneous occurrence of jñāna and darśana, (2) alternate occurrence of them, (3) non-difference between them.\textsuperscript{5} He records arguments for and against all the three positions. But he supports the alternate occurrence of jñāna and darśana of a kevalin on the basis of scriptural texts. We do not examine his elaborate arguments here, because they do not contain any new speculation. All his objections are based on the scriptural texts and established traditions which unanimously recognize alternate occurrence of jñāna and darśana as we have stated at the outset of our enquiry about their temporal relation.

Akalaṅkā and Vidyānandi, the great Digambara logicians, support simultaneous occurrence of jñāna and darśana in a kevalin. Commenting upon Samantabhadra’s Āptamimāṣa, verse 101, Akalaṅkā says ‘If the jñāna and darśana (of a kevalin) were to occur alternately in succession, his omniscience would be only a contingent occurrence.’\textsuperscript{6} There is no reason why the universal and the particular should not reveal themselves simultaneously to the omniscient who has destroyed all his karmic veils.\textsuperscript{7} Vidyānandi says: ‘Awareness of the universal form is darśana, and the awareness of the particular features is jñāna. Jñānāvaraṇa and darṣanāvaraṇa obscure these faculties. There is absence of kevala-jñāna and kevala-darśana in people like us because of the presence of these two. And it goes beyond understanding why the universal and the particular should be revealed only in alternate succession when it is established that the two (āvaraṇas) are destroyed simultaneously due to a special kind of absolute purification of the soul?’\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. ibid., II. 30.  \textsuperscript{2} Cf. ibid., II. 31.  \textsuperscript{3} Gāthās 184-280.  \textsuperscript{4} Gāthās 3089-3135.  \textsuperscript{5} See Višeṣanavati, 184-5.

\textsuperscript{4} tajjñāna-darśanāyoh kramavṛttai hi sarvajñatvāṁ kādācītkaṁ syāt—\textit{Aṣṭaśāti} on \textit{AMI}, 101.

\textsuperscript{5} sāmānya-viśeṣa-viṣayāyov vigatāvaraṇayov yugapat pratibhāsayaṁ gat prati-bandhakāntaribhāvāt—\textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Aṣṭaśāhasri} on the passage quoted in footnote No. 7.
commenting on Jinadāsagāṇi-Mahattāra’s Cūrṇi on Nandi Sūtra 22, says that Ācārya Siddhasena and others were the upholders of simultaneous occurrence of jñāna and darśana, that Jinabhadrāgāṇi-kṣamāśramaṇa and others were the upholders of the alternate occurrence of these, and that the old Ācāryas upheld non-difference of jñāna and darśana. It is difficult to ascertain from the available Jaina literature as to who this Siddhasena and the old Ācāryas were whom Haribhadra refers to. Siddhasena Divākara, as we have seen, supported the position of non-difference and so cannot be regarded as referred to by Haribhadra as the upholder of simultaneity of both. Besides, we do not know of any old Ācāryas who were the supporters of non-difference between jñāna and darśana. Again, in his commentary on the Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa (II. ro), Abhayadevasūri mentions Jina- bhadra as the supporter of alternate succession, and Mallavādīn as the supporter of simultaneity. This Mallavādīn also is not known to us. The commentator Malayagiri, however, follows Haribhadra in assigning the positions to different authors. This problem of identification of Haribhadra’s Siddhasena and Abhayadeva’s Mallavādīn has been thoroughly discussed by the great savant Pandit Sukhlalji in Jñānabindu-paricaya—the introductory portion (pp. 54-62) of his excellent edition of Yaśovijaya’s Jñānabindu—and we refer to that for fuller information.

In Yaśovijaya we find the last Jaina logician who supported the position of Siddhasena Divākara at great length and practically wrote a commentary on almost the whole of the second Kāṇḍa of his Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa, which deals with the problem. Yaśovijaya refers to the statement of Haribhadra or Malayagiri that Ācārya Siddhasena was the supporter of simultaneity, and says that here only the prima facie position of Siddhasena is referred to. He supplements the arguments of Siddhasena Divākara and strongly supports his position. But what is most striking is the tone of comprehensive reconciliation of conflicting views with which he winds up the discussion. He says: ‘Mallavādīn

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1 The Cūrṇi quotes gāthās from the Viśeṣaṇavati of Jinabhadra already referred to by us. Haribhadra has commented upon these gāthās in his Nandisūtravṛtti.
2 kecana Siddhasenācāryādayaḥ bhaṇānti, kim? yugapad ekasmīn eva kāle jānāti paśyati ca, kaḥ? kevali, na tvanyah, niyāmān niyamena, ane jina- bhadrāgni-kṣamāśramaṇa-prabhātryaḥ ekāntaritaṁ jānāti paśyati ce 'ty evam icchanti . . . ane tu Vṛddhācāryā naiva viśvak pṛthak taddarśanam icchanti—NSāVṛ, p. 52.
3 See Malayagiri’s Nandivṛtti, p. 134.
4 See JBP, pp. 33-47.
5 yattu yugapapadupaplavādītvān Siddhasenācāryaṃ Nandivṛttāu uktān tad abhyupagamavādbhāpiryeṣa . . . kramākramopapoyadvaya-paryanuyogānan- taram eva svapakṣasya Sanmatau udbhāvītatvād iti draṣṭavyam—JBP, p. 33.
(who admitted separate identity of jñāna and darśana but did not admit succession) has resorted to vyavahāra naya (empirical standpoint) which comprehends distinction, the Revered (Jinabhadra) has resorted to pure rjusūtra (analytic standpoint) which lies at (that is, distinguishes) the borderline between cause and effect, while Siddhasena has accepted saṅgraha which tends to obliterate distinction. None of these three positions of the Ācāryas, therefore, are improper.¹

We have now described the main features of the Āgamic epistemology. We do not attempt at a comparative estimate, mainly because the Āgamic conceptions are so peculiar and original that they do not allow themselves to be dovetailed into the scholastic scheme of epistemology. It is only the later systematization of the pramāṇas by the Jaina schoolmen which can lend itself profitably to comparative evaluation. We therefore content ourselves by giving a systematic exposition of the Āgamic scheme trying to throw light on tangled spots with the help of documentary evidence and independent judgment both.

In the beginning of the chapter we adverted to the problem of the validity of knowledge. The Āgamic epistemology, as we have stated, regards the rightness or the wrongness of knowledge as ultimately dependent upon the rightness or the wrongness of the attitude. If the soul is possessed of perverted attitude (mithyātva) its knowledge is necessarily wrong. If it is possessed of right attitude (samyaktva) its knowledge is right. Knowledge is the intrinsic characteristic of the soul. But it is vitiated by mithyātva which is the Jaina equivalent of the principle known as avidyā in the other systems. The mithyātva vitiates, as it were, the very texture of the soul and all the imperfections of worldly existence are ultimately due to it. A comparative estimate of the nature and function of this mithyātva with those of the avidyā of the other systems is necessary in order to understand the fundamental characteristic of the Jaina thought. We shall therefore address ourselves to the comparative evaluation of the principle of mithyātva or avidyā in the chapter that follows.

¹ bhedagrāhi-vyavahṛtinayaṁ saṁśrīto Mallavādī
Pūjyāḥ přayāḥ karāṇa-phalayoḥ śiṁni śuddharjusūtram.
bhedocchedomukham adhigataḥ saṅgrahaṁ Siddhasenäs
tasmād ete na khalu viṣamāḥ sūripakṣas trayo 'pi.—JBP, p. 48.
CHAPTER III
THE PROBLEM OF AVIDYA
I
INTRODUCTORY

India is the land of spiritualism. Nothing bereft of spiritual value could satisfy the Indian mind. Spiritual conviction and a constant urge for the ultimate truth inspired the manifold branches of Indian thought. Science, Arts, Logic, Philosophy—all possible branches of thought—were inspired by one common aim of freedom from worldly bondage. To get rid of spiritual darkness is the end of all science. An art is not an art if it does not give glimpses into the beauty of truth. And it achieves this objective by removing the conflict between the good and the agreeable, between beauty and truth—which conflict is unreal and accidental. It shows that departure from the truth and beauty is nescience and the recovery of the unity is the natural end and consummation. The common end of all arts is to remind us of the supreme state which is beyond this worldly existence. Logic is nothing but an instrument for the interpretation of the spiritual vision. It is a necessary discipline, because there are people who are not prepared to take anything on trust. Logic is the creation of higher minds. It is the expression of the laws of human thought. It is the organ by which the mind discriminates truth from error. No experience, however exalted, will pass for truth unless it is sanctioned by the canons of logical thought. It is unambiguously admitted that logic is rather an instrument of criticism and can never rise to the level of an organ of discovery. But as the human mind is subject to the influence of emotion and habits fostered by unquestioning beliefs, its discovery is liable to be distorted by passions and impulses, dogmatic faith and intellectual inertia which is frightened by a discovery that is calculated to upset one’s vested interests in religion. Indian philosophers have never been remiss in acknowledging supreme value of logic as a corrective of vagaries of dogmatism. In fact, one cannot get rid of logic, however one may decry it. One can hope to convince the other only by means of reasoning. But as reasoning is only an instrument of criticism it can operate only on the data supplied by organs of knowledge. Logic has not been neglected or derided in India, though philosophers were alive to its limitations. Logic cannot find the truth unaided and independently. But it can tell us that a position is not true because it is contradicted. The criterion of logic is non-contradiction in the main. Because the ordinary experience of man is not found to satisfy the intellectual demands of noble minds, as it fails to satisfy the criteria of logic, the necessity of philosophical speculation was felt as imperative. Man has the capacity for finding
the truth, which is attested and approved by logical thought. That is the truth which satisfies the whole man—the rational man in particular. As the emotional and active man in us is liable to be swayed by his ancient habits into untruth, logic comes in to his rescue. Logic clarifies the vision of truth, corrects it of illogical accretions, and purifies our knowledge of reality. Logic is not opposed to spiritual vision, though it is not a direct means to this consummation. The differences among the seers and mystics are rather due to interpretation. A strong logical attitude is thus a necessary propedeutic to the realization of truth. The value of philosophy is enhanced in proportion to its love of logic, which is nothing but the will not to take anything as truth unless the reason is satisfied.

But the majority of mankind is noted for the inertia and incuriosity. They do not feel an urge and inspiration for truth. Why is this difference between the thinking and the unthinking man? Why should there be people who hug their ignorance and make a pet of it? There must be a reason for this.

Confronted with this fundamental fact and in full realization of it, all the systems of Indian philosophy admit, in some form or other, the existence of a principle which acts as hindrance against the apprehension of truth. If the experiences of those who have realized the truth are reliable, what is it that hides the truth from us? There must be some reason or explanation for our common ignorance or perverse knowledge. If the truth is not unknowable, if the records of the experiences of the gifted souls are trustworthy, there must be something which obstructs our innate capacity to know the truth. If this worldly existence is a degradation and a fall because of its hiatus from perfection, there must be some perfect state of existence which we have failed to reach as yet and the realization of which is the ultimate goal and objective of a spiritual aspirant. This again leads to the further enquiry as to what is it that is responsible for the failure. The Indian thinkers are unanimous as regards the cause of this degeneration or descent. It is turning away from the truth. It is looking in the opposite direction. It is going towards the darkness. It is admitted that perfection is integral to the spirit and realization of the same is not a new creation in the sense of emergence of an absolutely unprecedented state. Yet the soul has been hindered from self-realization, which is the same as the discovery of its infinite glory, from eternity. The spirit has been oblivious of itself and has been wandering in the wilderness. The question 'What was the first fall due to?' is avoided by admitting the beginninglessness of the process. The historical beginning of the process is unknown because the spirit is an uncreated entity and exists from the eternal past, but the end is clearly envisaged. The spirit must realize itself. There is no controversy on
this point. The worldly career is sustained and nourished by the ignorance or perverted knowledge of the spirit and it lasts as long as the ignorance or perverted knowledge lasts. It is a wonder why the spirit clings to the fall and deviation from the norm and is so unwilling to look backward to itself. The Indian mind had always been conscious of the innate potentiality of perfection of the spirit and the possibility of realization of self-perfection. It is this consciousness that moulded the culture and thought of India. It is this spiritualism that fostered tolerance and the spirit of mutual understanding in the Indian mind.

The principle which acts as hindrance against the apprehension of truth has been differently conceived in different systems under various names such as avidyā (nescience), mithyātva (perversity), ajñāna (ignorance), mithyā-jñāna (perverted knowledge), viparyaya (perversion), moha (delusion), darsana-moha (delusion of attitude) etc.¹ The fundamental unity of all the conceptions lies in the fact that all of them refer to the principle commonly called avidyā (nescience) or moha (delusion) which hides truth, deludes the spirit and lures it in the wrong direction. The immediate effect of this nescience is to create the soul’s interest in the world process and to make it cling to it as the source of happiness. The spirit sticks to the world due to its influence. This leads to the cycle of rebirths. The common aim of all the systems of Indian thought is to show the way out of this cycle, and this can be done only by showing the means of destroying or getting rid of the nescience. The nature of this nescience is conceived in accordance with the conception of the nature of ultimate reality. The function of nescience is to present reality in a form which it has not, and thereby to misguide the spirit. In order to get rid of this nescience the first thing that is necessary is possession of spiritual conviction. Once this conviction lays hold upon the soul, it turns back and treads upon the right path.

We now address ourselves to the appraisal of the various conceptions of nescience in the well-known schools of Indian thought with particular reference to the Jaina position. In the interest of the convenience of procedure and clarification of relevant issues we propose to undertake an examination of the conception of avidyā system by system.

II

AVIDYĀ IN THE YOGA SCHOOL

This school recognizes two primordial categories viz. puruṣa and prakṛti. Puruṣa is the principle of consciousness which witnesses the

¹ Vide verse 83 and the prose portion as well of TSIV on TSū I. 13; also see Yaśovijaya’s Vṛtti on YD. II. 3. et seq.
world process of which prakṛti is the ground. Puruṣa is draṣṭā (witness) and is pure consciousness (ārṣimātra) and even though it is eternally pure and unchanging it witnesses the transformations of buddhi which is the first evolute of prakṛti and the instrument for presenting the objects to the puruṣa. In the process of witnessing the activities of the buddhi it loses hold of itself and apparently identifies itself with them. The objective world (ādyā) is constituted of the three primal elements or energies, which have been cyclically evolving the subjective and the objective orders of being. These manifest themselves in the subjective plane as pleasure, pain, and dullness-cum-stolidity and in the physical plane as reposeful equilibrium, motion, and inertia. The entire psycho-physical order exists for the enjoyment and final release of the puruṣa according as it succeeds in enlisting his interest by its meretricious charms or in disabusing him by the discovery of its unspiritual character as not-self absolutely unattached to the spirit. The twofold world process is guided by a blind teleology and actually subserves the interests of the puruṣa. The relation between the puruṣa and the prakṛti is one of the enjoyer and the en joyed, the seer and the seen, or the subject and the object. There is no actual relation between them in the ordinary sense of the term. The prakṛti unfolds and presents its processes to the puruṣa through the sense-organs and the buddhi which resembles to a great degree the puruṣa in purity and luminosity. The puruṣa's relation to prakṛti serves to cater for the enjoyment (bhoga) of the former, which consists in illumining and appropriating the world process. And it leads to final release (apavarga) when the puruṣa realizes its natural difference and distinction from the world process by realizing its own inalienable spiritual nature.

This relation between the inherently pure puruṣa and the prakṛti is beginningless and is due to nescience (avidyā) which has been defined to be a perverted knowledge which comprehends non-eternal as eternal, impure as pure, sorrow as pleasure, and non-soul as soul. The Bhāṣya says 'Avidyā (nescience) is neither knowledge nor negation of knowledge. But it is wrong cognition as opposed to true cognition and as such falls in the category of cogni-

1 We shall refer to puruṣa by the pronoun 'it' as well as 'he' according to our convenience.
2 draṣṭā dṛṣimātraḥ suddho 'pi pratyayāṇupasyaḥ—YD, II. 20.
3 prakāśa-kriyā-sthitī-sīlāh bhūtendriyātmakaḥ bhogāpavargārthaṁ dṛṣyam. —YD, II. 18; also cf. tadartha eva dṛṣyasya 'tmā—YD, II. 21.
4 Cf. sva-svāmiśaktyōḥ svarūpapalabdhi-hetuḥ sahvyogaḥ—YD, II. 23. Also cf. Bhāṣya thereon: puruṣaḥ svāmī dṛṣyena svena darsanārthaṁ sahvyuktah, tasmāt sahvyogād dṛṣyasayo 'palabdhir yā sā bhogaḥ, yā tu draṣṭuḥ svarūpapalabdhiḥ so 'pavargāh.
5 Cf. tasya hetur avidyā—YD, II. 24.
6 YD, II. 5.
tion. The buddhi, under the influence of this wrong cognition, cannot comprehend the separate identity of the puruṣa, and repeats its course. It is only when the distinctive identity of the puruṣa is realized that the buddhi reaches consummation of its activity and does not repeat its course. The prakṛti now has fulfilled its purpose and is disengaged from the puruṣa. It now lies disenchanted with the cessation of nescience, and ceases to entangle the puruṣa in the meshes of the world process. And as a result the puruṣa is emancipated. The puruṣa does not witness the world process any more inasmuch as the buddhi that presented it to the puruṣa is not there. This is called mokṣa (emancipation) or kaivalya (self-isolation) which has been defined as either the final reversion of the gunas (elements or energies) to their original ground prakṛti in view of the discontinuation of the service to the puruṣa, or as the self-recovery of consciousness in its intrinsic nature.

In this connection it is necessary to explain in brief the nature of the subject and the object and their relation according to the Yoga school. Buddhi, as we have stated, is an evolute of prakṛti and as such is unconscious in itself. But due to the association with the puruṣa it becomes, as it were, capable of such conscious activities as knowing, feeling and willing. The psychical activities cannot be affiliated to puruṣa, as it is not susceptible to change. Activity is an attribute of matter and consequently the psychical activities are the inherent characteristics of the buddhi. They are as unconscious as the cerebral activities. But they become spiritualized by the reflection of the spirit in the buddhi. The spiritualization is apparent and conditional—an extrinsic determination due to the presence of the puruṣa and to the innate nature of the buddhi which, on account of its luminosity and reposefulness, has the capacity to catch the reflection of the light of the puruṣa. The light belongs to the puruṣa and the buddhi shines in the borrowed light like a satellite of the sun. The sense of personal identity is due to the association of the unchanging

1 avidyā na pramāṇaḥ na pramāṇābhāvaḥ kintu vidyā-viparitaṁ jñānān-
taram avidye 'ti—Bhāṣya, YD, II. 6.
2 viparyaya-jñāna-vāsanā—Bhāṣya, YD, II. 24.

N.B. Avidyā quā vāsanā leads to the world process. Avidyā quā wrong cognition is possible only after the process has taken place. See SPB, I. 55.

3 See Bhāṣya, YD, II. 24.
4 Cf. puruṣārtha-śūnyānāṁ guṇānāṁ pratiprastavaḥ kaivalyaṁ. svarūpa-
pratiṣṭhā vā cīti-śaktir iti—YD, IV. 34.
5 Cf. sarvārthādhyāvasāyakatvāt trigunā buddhis trigunatvād acetane 'ti—
Bhāṣya, YD, II. 20.
spirit with the ever-changing buddhi. The buddhi is a changing identity—a variable constant which maintains its integrity and self-identity in spite of the changes that happen to it. We could dispense with the purusa or the spirit if the buddhi were possessed of intelligence in its own right and conversely we could dismiss the buddhi as an unnecessary and superfluous appendage if the spirit were a dynamic principle. Our personality is a composite entity—a complex of the spirit and the dynamic buddhi. We can account for the intelligence and consciousness by means of the spirit and the growth and evolution and progress of the individuated self by means of buddhi.

We have seen how the Yoga system explains the emergence of the personalized self—the psychic and the logical subject. We are now to consider how the school accounts for the knowledge of the external world. The objects attract the buddhi even as a magnet attracts iron, and modify it. And then citii, the principle of consciousness, which per se is incapable of transference and movement (seemingly) assumes the modifications of the buddhi either by its reflection in the buddhi or by the reflection of the buddhi upon it, and thus occurs the cognition of the modifications of the buddhi. Consciousness remains unmoved. But the buddhi appears to be conscious in its presence. This apparent consciousness of the buddhi is called knowledge. The Bhäsya quotes the following passage which is attributed by Väcaspati to Pañcasikha: 'The enjoyer is immutable and incapable of transferring itself to the buddhi.' But it seems to assume the modifications (of the buddhi) by reason of its reflection upon the latter and appears to transfer itself to it—that is to say—the self seems to transfer its identity to the buddhi and its changes. The activities of the buddhi are then transferred to the purusa (the conscious self) and the purusa seems to own them up as its own functions. Thus the transference of identity is not unilateral. It is a bilateral process. On the side of the buddhi the seeming identification of the buddhi with the purusa is effected by reason of the spiritualization of the changes of the buddhi by the reflection of the spirit upon it. As the processes of the buddhi are not distinguished from the purusa due to the seeming identification of the spirit with it, the activities of the buddhi (intellect) are felt, to all intents and purposes, as the activities of the self. The purusa (spirit) becomes

1 Cf. ayaskanta-maṇi-kalpā viśayā ayaḥ-sadharmākaḥ cittam abhisam-badhyo 'paraśjayanti—Bhäsya, YD, IV, 17.

2 Cf. citer apratisaṅkramayās tadākārāpattau svabuddhi-sanvedanam—YD, IV, 22.

3 aparipāminī hi bhoktr-aktir apratisaṅkramā ca pariṇāminy arthe prati-saṅkrante. 'va tadvṛttim anupatati tasyāḥ ca prāptacaityanyapagraha-rūpāyā buddhivrīrtter anukārāntaratayā buddhivrīrttvaviśiṣṭā hi jñānavṛttir ity ākhyāyate—Bhäsya, YD, II, 20. Our rendering is not literal, but gives only the central meaning.
seemingly identified with the buddhi and the buddhi becomes identified with the spirit. This mutual identification is responsible for the intelligization of the unintelligent changes and for their being not felt as distinct. Thus as a witness of the world process as presented by the buddhi, the puruṣa appears to have a knowledge-modification (jñānavṛtti) in common with the buddhi. ¹ And this knowledge-modification is nothing but the buddhi-modification as intelligized by consciousness of the puruṣa and has clearly these two elements as its constituents: (1) the buddhi-modification, and (2) the apparently transferred consciousness. The second element of ‘apparently transferred consciousness’ has been interpreted by the commentators as the reflection of the puruṣa. Thus commenting upon the passage ‘The spirit (puruṣa) is the witness of the buddhi’,² Vācaspati says ‘The spirit’s witnessing of the buddhi (buddhipratisaṅveditvam) is nothing but the transmission of the image of the spirit to the buddhi-mirror’.³ Vijñānabhinīkṣu, however, holds a radically different view. Let us now make a critical estimate of the Yoga epistemology of perception, which is necessary for the understanding of the problem of bondage and consequent emancipation from it.

The epistemology of perception of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga school is based upon a theory which has been borrowed by the Vivaraṇa School of Śaṅkara Vedānta almost in toto. It is the direct antithesis of the theories sponsored by the Naiyāyikas and the Jainas. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga view may be called the representative theory of perception in contradistinction to the presentative theory of the latter who do not believe that the object is known through the medium of an image. There is, however, no inherent improbability in the buddhi being transformed into a structural form after the pattern of the object, because the buddhi or the mind-stuff is after all a material thing like the external object of cognition. The theory postulates that nothing can be known without a similar transformation of the mind; in other words, the mind can know its own modification directly and immediately and through this the object which is the pattern. According to Vācaspati the modus operandi is rather simple. The buddhi or the mind becomes transformed into the likeness of the object with which it comes in contact. This likeness is called the vṛtti or modification or function. The vṛtti by itself cannot make the object known since it is as blind and unknowing as the material object. The real illumination takes place when the light of the spirit falls upon it. The vṛtti is almost as transparent as the spirit and as such the former is capable of catching

¹ Cf. YD, I, 4; III, 35; also Bhāṣya thereon.
² sa puruṣo buddheḥ pratisaṅvedit—Bhāṣya, YD, II, 20.
³ buddhi-darpanे puruṣa-pratibimba-saṅkrāntir eva buddhipratisaṅveditvam puṃsaḥ.
the image of the latter. This reflection at once illumines the mental modification and this illumination is knowledge. The cognition of an object is thus equivalent to the illumination of the mental modification called vrtti. This cognition is at once objective and subjective and is a unitary act. It may express itself as ‘This is pen’ and ‘I know the pen’ according as the emphasis is put on the reflection or the mental modification. According to Vijñanaabhiṣku, who quotes texts from the Purāṇas and ancient authority in support, knowledge is possible only through mental modification which acts rather as the medium. Knowledge of an external object is possible if the mind is transformed into a structural likeness of it. This mental modification is by itself blind and unknowing. It becomes a cognition when it is reflected on the puruṣa (spirit). The objective judgment e.g. ‘This is pen’ takes place when the mental modification is imaged in the puruṣa. The puruṣa is the locus of the cognition. As for the subjective cognition or self-consciousness ‘I know the pen’ it is a different cognitive act. According to the epistemological postulate a thing can be known if the buddhi is transformed into its shape. The same rule applies to puruṣa also. Puruṣa or the self, in order to be known, must induce a structural modification in the buddhi. This modification of the buddhi after the pattern of the puruṣa is then imaged in the self and self-consciousness, that is, the subjective judgment ‘I know the pen’ takes place. The locus of cognition is always the puruṣa as it is the locus of the image of the mental modification. So according to Vijñanaabhiṣku the objective cognition and the subjective cognition are numerically two different acts and the mental modifications are also two. To sum up, Vācaspati’s theory is that both for the subjective and the objective cognition one mental modification is enough and the cognition takes place always in the mind. It is the spiritual illumination of the mental modification by the reflection of the spirit in it that constitutes cognition. Vijñanaabhiṣku, like the Naiyāyika, thinks that the cognition of the subject and that of the object are two different acts, for which there are two different mental modifications. The cognition is not the illumination of the mental change by the imaging of the spirit upon it as Vācaspati holds. It is when the mental modification is imaged in the spirit that cognition takes place. The determination of the cognition as of an object or of the subject, that is, the puruṣa, is due to the nature of the object. If the object be an external entity it is an objective cognition. If it be the subject, it is subjective. The modus operandi is the same. The mind must be modified into the shape and form of the object and this modification must be imaged in the puruṣa or the self. The cognition always takes place in the puruṣa, whether the object of it is puruṣa or other than puruṣa. There is no departure from the rule that the content of
cognition is always the reflected image of the mental modification in the self even when the object happens to be the puruṣa i.e. the self itself.

After this long digression let us now return to our subject proper. We have stated that the buddhi possessed of the trace of wrong cognition cannot comprehend the separate identity of the puruṣa. We also stated what this wrong cognition or nescience (avidyā) consists in. It essentially consists in mistaking the process for the eternal, the ugly for the beautiful, the evil for the good and the unconscious for the conscious. The fundamental characteristic of nescience, however, consists in mistaking the unconscious for the conscious. The Bhāṣya quotes a passage, attributed to Pāṇḍaśīkha by Vācaspati, which runs as follows: ‘Comprehending the manifest or the unmanifest buddhi as the self (conscious principle), a person revels in its prosperity thinking that the prosperity belongs to the real self, and he mourns over its misfortune thinking that the misfortune belongs to the self. All such is unawakened and unenlightened.’ ¹ Neither the prosperity nor the misfortune belongs to the puruṣa. But, under the influence of nescience, it appears that they belong to him. This nescience (avidyā) is a klesa (affliction), and the root of other klesas at that viz. asmitā (egoism), rāga (attachment), dveṣa (aversion) and abhiniveśa (desire for life).² The Bhāṣya says ‘All the klesas (afflictions) are only the varieties of avidyā inasmuch as avidyā pervades them all. The other klesas relate to the same object which is related to avidyā. They emerge with the emergence of avidyā and are destroyed with the destruction of it.’³ Egoism, attachment, aversion, desire for life or will to survive—all these are essential factors for the sustenance and promotion of the world process, and avidyā is at the root of all these. The world process loses its meaning and purpose when the avidyā is uprooted and the buddhi reverts to its pristine state of prakrti. The evolution of the prakrti is for the enjoyment of the puruṣa and the enjoyment is possible only if the two absolutely separate and distinct principles of puruṣa the enjoiner and buddhi the enjoyed become, though indeed only apparently, identical. This apparent identity of the puruṣa and the buddhi or the principles of the seer and the seen is called asmitā (egoism).⁴ If

¹ vyaktam avyaktam vā sattvam ātmatvenā 'bhīpastitya tasya sampadām anunandatvā atmāsampaḍadāt manvānas tasya vyāpadām anuśocatvā atmāvyāpadaḥ manyamānah sa sarvo 'pratibuddha iti—Bhāṣya, YD, II. 5.
² See YD, II. 4.
³ See Bhāṣya, YD, II. 4.
⁴ Cf. YD, II. 6. Also cf. Bhāṣya: puruṣo dyākṣaktir buddhir darāṇaṣaktir ity etayor ekasvarūpāpattir ivā 'smitā-klesā ucyate, bhokṛty-bhogyaṣaktyor atyanta-vibhaktayor atyantāsāṅkhirnayor avibhāga-prāptāv ivā satyaṁ bhogāḥ kalpate. Also cf. sattapuruṣayor atyantāsāṅkhirnayōḥ pratyayāviśeṣo bhogāḥ. . . .—YD, III. 35.

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avidyā is the seed, asmitā (egoism) is the sprout. We have spoken of the mental trace of avidyā. Asmitā (egoism) can be considered as the actualization of that trace. Rāga (attachment) and dveṣa (aversion) can be viewed as the necessary corollaries of egoism. Abhiniveśa (will to survive) can be taken as the cumulative effect of all the other klesas (afflictions). The klesas work together, help each other, and evolve an ego which would live for ever. This 'will to live for ever' is called abhiniveśa.¹ The klesas nourish one another and perpetuate the world process. The Bhāṣya says: 'The (five) klesas are five viparyayas (perversions). When active, they strengthen the potency of the guṇas (viz. sattva, rajas and tamas—the three fundamental elements constituting primordial prakṛti), inaugurate evolution, originate the causal chain, and produce the fruits of karman (viz. jāti 'birth', āyus 'longevity' and bhoga 'enjoyment'), being subordinate to one another.'² The klesas lie at the root of the world process. The equilibrium of prakṛti is disturbed by the strengthening of the potency of the guṇas i.e. by the elevation of one above another. The evolution begins with the disturbance of the equilibrium. Then originates the causal chain of buddhi or mahat, ahamkāra etc. The whole evolution is for the enjoyment of the puruṣa and buddhi is the instrument which presents the world to the puruṣa. The evolution lasts so long as the separate identity and absolute disinterestedness of the puruṣa is not comprehended. But as soon as the puruṣa is found out to be absolutely untouched and unaffected by the world process, the evolution retraces its steps and becomes quiescent never to evolve again.

Thus we find that according to the Yoga school it is the avidyā or nescience about the fundamental distinction between puruṣa and prakṛti that is responsible for the worldly existence which loses all its meaning and purpose when the truth is realized. The Yoga prescribes various ways for the realization of this truth. But we need not discuss them here in view of their lack of bearing on our enquiry which is strictly restricted to the study of the function of avidyā. Let us now turn to the Sāṅkhya school.

III

AVIDYĀ IN THE SĀṅKHYA SCHOOL

There is no essential difference between the metaphysical positions of the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga as we find them in the Sāṅkhyaśāstra of Iśvarakṛṣṇa and the Yogadarśana of Patañjali. The fact that the two

¹ See YD, II. 9 and Bhāṣya.
² klesā iti. pañca viparyayā ity arthaḥ, te syandamāna guṇādhikāraḥ draḍhayanti, pārahām avasthāpayanti, kāryakāraṇasrota unnamayanti, paraparāṇugrahatantrībhūya karmavipākaṃ cā 'bhininharanti 'ti—Bhāṣya, YD, II. 3.
schools developed a common metaphysic from very early times is attested by such statements of the *Mahābhārata* as 'The adherents of the Śāṅkhya follow the same (principles) as are recognized by the followers of the Yoga. He who sees the Śāṅkhya and the Yoga as one is wise.'

But at the same time the *Mahābhārata* clearly states the difference between their attitudes towards the necessity of spiritual discipline. Thus Bhīṣma, in reply to Yudhiṣṭhira's question about the difference between the Śāṅkhya and the Yoga, says: 'The adherents of the Śāṅkhya extol Śāṅkhya while the adherents of the Yoga extol Yoga. And they give plausible reasons for the establishment of their respective positions.'

He then elaborately states the principles of the two schools in two separate chapters. The main objection of the Yoga against the Śāṅkhya is 'How can one devoid of self-mastery be emancipated?' Emancipation requires perfect control of the physical and the mental forces that hinder the progress towards emancipation. And as this can be achieved only by developing supernormal powers, the Yoga prescribes certain practices for the development of spiritual strength. According to the Yoga, it is only the strong who can be emancipated, the weak are sure to perish. Thus Bhīṣma says: 'As a weak and a meagre flame of fire, O King, is extinguished when covered by a heavy mass of fuel, so does a weak yogin (ascetic) perish, O lord. But as, again, the selfsame fire, O King, when it gathers strength and is accompanied by favourable wind can instantly consume even the whole world, exactly so can a yogin who has gathered strength, manifested potency, and is possessed of supreme power dry up the whole creation even as the sun does at the time of world dissolution.'

The Yoga requires that one should exert oneself and attain superhuman powers of self-control in order to destroy the forces of evil. Otherwise one will share the fate of the weak and helpless creatures, perpetually entangled in a trap. Simple comprehension of truth without the development of adequate strength to cut asunder the trap of bondage is not sufficient to lead to emancipation. The answer of the Śāṅkhya to the Yoga, on the other hand, is stated in the following terms: 'Only one who has comprehended all the processes and is unattached to the objects is indeed emancipated after death. Not otherwise.'

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1 *yad eva Yogāḥ paśyantī Śāṅkhyaśca tad anugamyate ekaṁ Śāṅkhyaṁ ca Yogāṁ ca yaḥ paśyati sa buddhīmān.*

—Śānti-parva, 305. 19; also see 307. 44 & 316. 2-4.

2 Śāṅkhyaḥ Śāṅkhyāṁ praśānti śaśiḥ Yogāḥ Yogāṁ dvijātayaḥ va dastraṁ karaṇāṁ śreṣṭhaṁ svapaksoddbhāvanāya vai.—Ibid., 300. 2.

3 anīśvaraḥ kathāṁ mucuyet—Ibid. verse 3.

4 Cf. abala vā vinaśyayī mucuyante ca balānviṭāḥ.—Ibid., verse 18.

5 Ibid., verses 19-21. 6 Cf. ibid., verses 15-17.

7 viṣādeḥ 'ha gatiḥ sarvāḥ virakto viṣayeṣu yaḥ. ārdhavāṁ sa dehyā svuyaktaṁ vimucyed iti nānayaḥ.—Ibid., verses 4-5.
Sāṅkhya requires that the merits (guna) and the demerits (doṣa) of the various developments of sattva, rajas and tamas should be comprehended for the sake of final emancipation. It gives only a secondary place to yogic practices. The sumnum bonum, however, of both the schools is identical, and both the systems are declared to be equally competent to lead the aspirant to it. Bhīṣma states the points of agreement and difference between the two schools in the following terms: 'Sauca (purification), tapas (austerity), compassion for the living beings, and observance of the vows—all these are common, O sinless (Yudhiṣṭhir), to both of them. But their darśana (attitude) is not identical. If the Yoga believes in the efficacy of yogic practices, the Sāṅkhya lays stress on philosophic understanding. But this difference in the basic attitude did not hinder the attempt at mutual understanding and development of common metaphysics. The Yoga school accepted the philosophical speculations of the Sāṅkhya school while the latter accepted the practical code of the former. This process of mutual engrafting is clearly visible in such statements as we quoted at the outset of this section. The Bhagavadgītā says: 'It is only the ignorant, and not the wise, who consider the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga as mutually opposed. One rightly depending upon the one attains the fruits of both. The Sāṅkhyas and the Yogas attain to the same place. One who sees Sāṅkhya and Yoga as one sees rightly.' If the Yoga had no elaborate metaphysics, the Sāṅkhya had no practical code for spiritual realization. Each borrowed from the other its own requirement, and the result was a fusion of the two. If the Mahābhārata bears testimony to the process of this fusion, the later systematic expositions of the two systems record the fact of their fusion. We find detailed descriptions of the Sāṅkhya speculations and the Yoga practices in the Mahābhārata on more than one occasion. But there we do not find any attempt at systematization of the conceptions. It is only in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the Yogadārśana of Patañjali that we find the two schools in systematic forms. Of course,

1 Ibid., Chap. 301.
2 Cf. ubbe cai 'te mate jñāte nṛpate sīṣṭa-sammate
  anuṣṭhite yathāśāstraṁ nayetāṁ paramāṁ gatim.—Ibid., 300, verse 8.
3 tulyaṁ saucan tapayuktaiṁ dayā bhūteṣu cā 'nagha
  vratānāṁ dhāraṇāṁ tulyaṁ darśanaṁ na samaṁ tayoḥ.—Ibid., verse 9.
4 Cf. for gross exaggeration of this stress:
  hasa piva lala moda nityaṁ viṣayāṁ upabhunija kuru ca mā śāṅkām
  yadi viditaṁ te Kapilamataṁ tat prāpyase mokṣa-saṅkhyaiṁ ca.
  —Māṭhara on SKā, 37.
5 Sāṅkhya—Yogau pṛthag bālaḥ pravandati na paṇḍitaiḥ
  ekam apy āsthitaiḥ samey udbhayor vindate phalam.
  yat Sāṅkhyaiḥ prāpyate sthānaṁ tad Yogair api gamyate
ekaiṁ Sāṅkhyaṁ ca Yogam ca yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati.—BhGī, V. 4-5.
6 Sāntipaṇḍita, Chapters 210 etc.; 300-318; etc.
these finished expositions must have been preceded by other earlier attempts at systematization. But unfortunately they are not available to us. Our enquiry of this section will be based on the Śāṅkhya-kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, the Yukti-dīpiṇī and the commentaries of Māthara, Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati as well as Vijñānavihikṣu’s works.

The Śāṅkhya conception of avidyā is substantially the same as that of the Yoga. But we give a separate treatment to the subject only because of the difference of terminology. The selfsame five klesās viz. avidyā, asmitā, rāga, dveṣa and abhinivesā of the Yoga are respectively called tamas, moha, mahāmoha, tāmisra and andhataṁsra in the Śāṅkhya. The Śāṅkhya-kārikā enumerates tamas, moha etc. as the five varieties of viparyaya while the Yogabhāṣya first enumerates avidyā, asmitā etc. as the varieties of the same and then gives the terms viz. tamas, moha etc. as their respective synonyms. Iśvarakṛṣṇa or even the commentators Māthara and Gauḍapāda do not mention the terms avidyā, asmitā etc. It is only Vācaspati who expressly compares tamas, moha, etc. with avidyā, asmitā etc.

In order to understand the nature of viparyaya (perverted knowledge, elsewhere known as avidyā or nescience) according to Iśvarakṛṣṇa, it is necessary to state in brief the scheme of psychological factors that make up what is called pratyaya-sarga (psychical creation). Mahat or buddhi is the first evolute of prakṛti, and it has eight forms—four sāttvika and four tāmasa. Dharma (what leads to prosperity and emancipation), jñāna (discriminating knowledge), virāga (non-attachment), and aiśvarya (supernormal powers) are the sāttvika forms. The opposites of these viz. adharma, ajñāna, avirāga and anaiśvarya are the tāmasa forms. These eight are called bhāvas or psychical factors. They determine the nature of the buddhi and lead the linga (subtle body) to various forms of existence. These psychical factors produce various psychical complexes which have been classified into four broad categories viz. viparyaya (perverted cognition), asakti (mental disability due to deficiency of sense-organs), tuṣṭi (idle

1 See Skā 48. Cf. avidyā-'smitā-rāga-dveṣa-'bhūnivesāḥ klesā iti etca eva svasaṁjñābhīs tamo mohō mahāmohas tāṁsra 'ndhatāṁsra iti—Bhāṣya, YD, r. 8. Also cf. Yukti-dīpiṇī (p. 154): se 'yam avidyā pañcaparvā.

2 See TKau on Skā, 47-48. The Yukti-dīpiṇī does so only implicitly.

3 Iśvarakṛṣṇa mentions three distinct types of creation viz. līṅgasarga 'subtle physical creation' (Skā, 40-41), pratyaya-sarga (also called bhāva-sarga) 'psychical creation' (Skā, 46, 52), and bhautika-sarga 'gross physical creation' (Skā, 53-54). The psychical, according to the Śāṅkhya, is an evolute of the non-conscious prakṛti, and as such should not be confounded with immutable consciousness. (For an enumeration of nine types of sarga see Sānti-parva, 310. 16-25).

4 dharmo 'bhūyudaya-nihśreyasa-hetuḥ—TKau, Skā, 23. 5 See Skā, 23.

6 Cf. Skā, 43. See also Māthara-vṛtti and TKau. 7 See Skā, 40-45.

8 Māthara defines viparyaya as saṁśayabuddhi 'doubt'—Vṛtti on Skā, 46.
complaisance), and *siddhī* (consummation of knowledge). Of these four, the first three are the hindrances to the attainment of the fourth. Perverted cognition, mental disability and idle complaisance stand in the way of the attainment of consummate knowledge. Fifty sub-categories of these four complexes are noticed in the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*. But we shall not deal with all these inasmuch as they have little bearing on our subject of enquiry, which is concerned only with the nature of *viparyaya*. The *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* notices five sub-categories of *viparyaya* viz. *tamas*, *moha*, *mahāmoha*, *tāmisra* and *anāhatāmisra*. Of these five, again, each of the first two is divided into eight, the third into ten, and each of the last two into eighteen types. The illustrations of these sixty-two types are found in the commentaries. (1) Comprehension of the eight categories of *prakṛti*, *mahat*, *ahāṅkāra* (ego) and the five *tannāṭrās* (subtle elements) as identical with the immutable soul is eightfold *tamas*, and is also called *avidyā*. (2) The gods, on their attainment of eightfold supernormal powers, develop false belief in the immortality of the ego and permanence of their eightfold supernormal powers. This is *moha* and is also called *asmitā*. (3) There are five subtle and five gross objects of enjoyment, the former for the gods and the latter for human and sub-human beings. Attachment to these objects is called tenfold *mahāmoha* or *rāga*. (4) These ten objects together with eightfold supernormal powers constitute eighteenfold objects of *tāmisra*. When an individual fails to achieve these objects, and feels rebuff, he develops anger or hatred for the objects. This hatred is called eighteenfold *tāmisra* or *duṣeṣa*. (5) When one attains the eighteenfold objects mentioned above, and is haunted by the fear of losing all these, one develops a complex called *anāhaṭāmisra* or *abhijnaveṣa* which is eighteenfold due to its reference to the eighteenfold objects. These are the five sub-categories of *viparyaya* which are given in the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*. Vācaspāti recognizes the identity of this fivefold *viparyaya* with the five-knotted *avidyā* of the sage Vārṣaganyā. This fact is also established even by the nature of

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1 Cf. tato 'syā niścaya utpadyate sthāṇur ayam ity eṣā siddhiḥ—*Māṭhara*, *SKā*, 46.
2 Cf. *SKā*, 51.
3 See *SKā*, 46-7.
4 See *SKā*, 48.
5 See *Māṭhara-vtti* and *TKau*, *SKā*, 48.
6 Cf. devañāṁ *śabdādayaḥ* pañca tanmātrākhyā viṣayā aviseṣāḥ kevalānandarūpāḥ . . . evam manusyaṇāṁ bhautekeśārātratayā sukhaduḥkhasampannaḥ . . . ity eṣā daśavidho mahāmohaḥ—*Māṭhara* on *SKā*, 48. Also cf. *sabdādiṣu* pañcasu dihvādyāvatayā daśavidheṣu viṣayeṣu raṇjanīyeṣu rāga āsaktir mahāmohaḥ—*TKau*, *ibid*.
7 See *TKau* on *SKā*, 47. Also cf. se 'yaṁ pañca-parvā bhavaty avidyā.—*Bhāṣya* on *YD*, 1, 8; also see *Tattvavaiśādād* on it. Also cf. tamo moho mahāmohas tāmisro hy anṛda-sañjñākah avidyā pañca-parvai 'sā prādurlḥhūtā mahātmahāḥ.—*Viśvupurāṇa* quoted in *Yogavārttikā*, *YD*, I, 8.
the illustrations of Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda. Vācaspati gives the same illustrations and furthermore supplies the corresponding Yoga terminology.\(^1\) Unfortunately we do not find clear definitions of *tamas*, *moha* etc. in the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* itself, and have to depend upon the commentaries. But we find nothing against our view that the Yoga and the Sāṅkhya do not differ as regards their conception of *viparyaya* or *avidyā*.

Vijñānabhikṣu, however, has attempted to differentiate between the Yoga and the Sāṅkhya conception of *viparyaya*.\(^2\) Thus, commenting on the Yoga aphorism *viz.* *viparyayo mithyājñānam atadrūpa-pratīṣṭham* Vijñānabhikṣu says: ‘In this (Yoga)-śāstra *anyathākhyāti* is the doctrine (of error) and not *avivekamātra* as propounded by the Sāṅkhya’. He quotes the aphorism ‘*Avidyā* consists in the comprehension of non-eternal as eternal, impure as pure, sorrow as joy and non-soul as soul’\(^4\) in order to show that the Yoga conception of *avidyā* implies the doctrine of *anyathākhyāti* which holds that error consists in the cognition of one thing in the character of another, or the superimposition of one thing upon another. He further distinguishes the Yoga *anyathākhyāti* from the Vaiśeṣika *anyathākhyāti* on the ground that in the Yoga doctrine the content of the cognition is held to be superimposed upon the external thing while in the Vaiśeṣika doctrine one external object is superimposed upon another external object.\(^5\) Vijñānabhikṣu further substantiates his position while commenting on the statement of the *Yogabhaṣya*\(^6\) that *avidyā* is neither ‘valid cognition’ nor ‘absence of cognition’, but it is a ‘false cognition’ and as such is a category of cognition. There he says: ‘In this (Yoga) system the term *avidyā* does not mean *aviveka* i.e. non-discrimination in the sense of negation of discrimination as it does with the followers of Sāṅkhya. But it (*viz.* *avidyā*) is a species of determinate cognition or judgment as it is with such schools as the Vaiśeṣika. This follows from both the *Sūtra* and the *Bhāṣya*.\(^7\)

Let us try to understand Vijñānabhikṣu’s conception of *aviveka*, Yoga *anyathākhyāti* and Vaiśeṣika *anyathākhyāti*. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, the absolutely non-existent such as square-circle cannot be the object of knowledge, and so he holds that in such cases as the erroneous cognition of silver in conch-shell, dreams and imaginations, it is the mind-transformation that is the object or content of knowledge,

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1 See Also *Yogavārttika*, *YD*, I. 8.
2 His disciple Bhāvāgānēśa follows him. See his commentary *Dīpikā*, *YD*, I. 8.
3 *YD*, I. 8.
4 *YD*, II. 5.
6 *YD*, II. 5.
7 asmināḥ ca ċa rassāne Sāṅkhyanām ivā ‘viveko na ‘vidyāsabdārthaḥ kiṁ tu Vaiśeṣikādīvad viśiṣṭa-jñānam eva ‘ti *Sūtra-Bhāṣyābhyaṁ* avagantuvaṁ—*Vārttika* on *YD*, II. 5.
and not something absolutely non-existent. Accordingly, he defines *aviveka* as 'knowledge of two things with their difference uncomprehended.' Thus the erroneous cognition of a piece of conch-shell as silver consists in the cognition of both the piece of conch-shell and the mind-transformation with their difference uncomprehended. The mind takes the shape of silver. This mental silver and the piece of conch-shell lying in front are both the objects of the wrong cognition 'This is silver'. The non-comprehension of the difference between the silver as mental content and the external conch-shell is responsible for the error. This is Vijñānabhinīśu's interpretation of *aviveka*. The doctrine of Yoga *anyathākhyāti*, on the other hand, as interpreted by Vijñānabhinīśu would hold that the erroneous cognition 'This is silver' does not refer to two unrelated objects, but it refers to only one object, the related object—the objective substratum with mental content superimposed upon it as the predicate. The mind transformed into the shape of silver is the predicative content of the cognition 'This is silver' in which *this* stands for the real object and *silver* for the mental transformation or the idea. In other words, the judgment 'This is silver' is a complex of an objective fact, which is the subject, and a subjective idea, which is the predicate. The judgment is false because the predicate is not an objective real and so does not belong to it. In the veridical perception, the subject and the predicate are both objective facts and are related by an objective relation. The false judgment or error is one in which the predicate is a mental content which has no true relation with the logical subject (*this*) but still is superimposed upon it. The predicate and its relation are both unreal. The doctrine of Vaiśeṣika *anyathākhyāti*, on the other hand, would hold that it is the piece of silver that exists elsewhere that is superimposed on the subject of the erroneous cognition 'This is silver'. Vijñānabhinīśu seems to criticize this Vaiśeṣika doctrine when, commenting on the *Sāṅkhyaśūtra* viz. *nanyathākhyātiḥ suvacovyāghātāt* (V. 55), he says: 'It is also not proper that one thing should be cognized in the form of another because that would involve contradiction of one's own statement . . . Even the upholders of *anyathākhyāti* admit that the non-existent cannot be cognized. The meaning is this: the non-existence of a thing in front cannot condition the cognition of the existence of the thing elsewhere.'

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1 Cf. . . . . naraṣṭrāgādināṁ abhānāt . . . sukī-rajata-svapna-manorathādau ca maṇaḥ-pariṇāmarūpa evā 'ṛthaḥ pratiyate nā 'tyānta 'sann iti vakṣyati—*SPB*, V. 52.

2 . . . . aviveko 'gṛhitāsaṁsargakam ubhayajñānam—*SPB*, I. 55.

3 anyad vastv anyarūpaṇa bhāṣata ity api na yuktam, svavaco-vyāghātāt . . . asato bhānaḥ-'sambhavasyā 'nyathā-khyāti-vādibhir api vacanād ity arthāḥ. purovartini asattve 'nyatra tatsattāyā bhānāprayajakatvam iti bhāvaḥ—*SPB*, V. 55.
does not criticize the Yoga doctrine anywhere, though he always differentiates it from the doctrine of aviveka of the Sāṅkhya system. And as we have stated above he quotes the Yogasūtra II. 5 in order to show that the Yoga system upholds the doctrine of anyathākhyāti. But there are passages in the Yogabhāṣya which imply the doctrine of aviveka as well.¹ On the other hand, there is a passage² quoted in the Yogabhāṣya and ascribed to the great Sāṅkhya exponent Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati, which can easily be interpreted as implying the doctrine of anyathākhyāti for the Sāṅkhya system. The truth seems to be that both the systems, the Yoga and the Sāṅkhya, had a common theory of error, and that was the theory of aviveka.

Both the systems regard viveka (discrimination) as the condition of emancipation,³ And there is no reason why both of them should not regard aviveka (non-discrimination) as the condition of bondage. Of course, had the doctrine of aviveka gone counter to the fundamental position of the Yoga, it would have been plausible to deduce a different doctrine of error. But when the fundamental position of both the systems is identical, we fail to understand why Vijnānabhinī is so keen on differentiating the Yoga doctrine from the Sāṅkhya one. Vijnānabhinī makes capital out of Patañjali’s definition of avidyā. But from a consideration of the general philosophical position of the Yoga system as found in the Yogasūtra and the Bhāṣya, we can easily establish that the doctrine of aviveka is not inconsistent with the Yoga system. We can also easily interpret the Yoga definition of avidyā as implying the doctrine of aviveka, or at least as not against such interpretation. Let us briefly attempt to see what the Yoga system points to.

According to the Yoga system, as we have already stated, the evolution of the prakṛti is for the enjoyment of the puruṣa, and the enjoyment is possible only if the two absolutely separate and distinct principles of puruṣa and prakṛti become apparently identical. Now what this apparent identity is due to? It is certainly due to avidyā. The function of avidyā thus is found to be ‘to make appear as identical what are not really identical’. And how can this function of avidyā be possible? Avidyā belongs to the buddhi, and so it cannot operate upon the external object. Therefore it follows that avidyā operates

¹ For instance, the passages—(1) य तु कालयां-प्राप्तिः विवेकविषय-निन्नाः सा कल्याणवहि, saṃsāra-prāg-bhāra ‘vivekaviṣaya-nimnā pāpavahā (Bhāṣya, YD, I. 12); (2) buddhitah paraṁ puruṣam ākāra-śīlanā vidyādhiḥ vibhaktam apaśyan kuryāt tatrā ‘tma-buddhiṁ mohene ‘ti (quoted in the Bhāṣya, YD, II. 6)—can easily be interpreted as implying the doctrine of aviveka.

² vyaktam avyaktanā vā sattvam ātmavatā ‘bhipratitya tasya sampadam anunanatā ātmasampadam manvānaḥ . . . sa sarvo ‘pratibuddhaḥ—Bhāṣya, YD, II. 5.

³ See YD, II. 26; SKā, 2, 64-66.

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upon the buddhi in order to produce the appearance of identity. Now this operation can be possible in two ways: (1) by arresting the normal activity of the buddhi and (2) by misguidance of the buddhi. By the first kind of operation, buddhi is thwarted and made incapable of cognizing the difference, and by the second kind of operation the buddhi is made to mistake the one for the other. The Yogasūtra and the Bhāṣya do not affirm one and negate the other of these possible operations of avidyā and so we are at liberty to accept any or both of the two operations. If we admit avidyā as having the capacity of thwarting the buddhi, the doctrine of aviveka will follow. And if we ascribe to the avidyā the capacity of misguiding the buddhi the doctrine of anyathākhyāti will be the logical deduction.

Let us now see what Patañjali’s definition1 would imply. The definition can symbolically be expressed as avidyā = cognition of A as B. Now this definition can imply either (1) that both A and B are the objects of cognition which has failed to cognize their difference and consequently they appear as one, or (2) that only B is the object of cognition and consequently it alone appears. In the first case the doctrine of aviveka is the implication, and in the second the doctrine of anyathākhyāti is implied.

Thus it is established that the doctrine of aviveka is not inconsistent with the Yoga system, and also that Patañjali’s definition of avidyā can be interpreted as implying the doctrine of aviveka as well. Vijñānavādikṣu’s insistence, therefore, that the Yoga accepts the doctrine of anyathākhyāti as distinguished from the doctrine of aviveka of the Sāṅkhya is not based upon valid grounds.

It is beyond doubt that the Sāṅkhya theory of error called aviveka-khyāti or viveka’khyāti is not to be confounded with Prabhākara’s theory. Prabhākara believes that there is no error possible and the proposition ‘This is silver’ does not point to a unitary judgment. ‘This’ stands for the substratum which is real and ‘silver’ is the object of recollection without being felt as recollected. Thus this recollected silver is real because only a perceived fact can be recollected. But ‘this’ which is a perceived fact and ‘silver’ which is the remembered fact are not realized as distinct. The copula ‘is’ in the judgment symbolizes the non-apprehension of unrelatedness. The pseudo-subject and the pseudo-predicate are not felt as unrelated which they are in point of reality. So there is no perversion in the objective plane. And on the subjective plane also there is no confusion which would have arisen had the subject and the predicate been felt as related. There is perception of the substratum and recollection of silver, and these two acts of cognition are not felt as distinct. But mere non-perception of

1 The definition is anityā-śuci-duḥkhā-ṇatmasu nitya-śuci-sukhā-tmakhyātir avidyā—YD, II. 5.
distinction is not tantamount to perception of identity. Thus there is no error because all our cognitions do correspond to objective facts as they are.

There is an unfortunate tendency to interpret the Sāṅkhya theory of error on substantially the same lines with Prabhākara’s theory. There is not the slightest warrant for this supposition. The Sāṅkhya must believe in positive error. In the Sāṅkhya theory, the self (puruṣa), left to itself, is absolutely unattached to prakṛti, and so is unaffected by the vicissitudes of the latter. The self per se whether in bondage or in the emancipated state is absolutely free and pure. That in bondage the self does not feel its freedom is due to the fact that it mistakes the vicissitudes of prakṛti to be the real incidents of its own career. This mistake is cured and corrected by the realization of the absolute distinction of the self from the not-self. In bondage, the self does not and cannot feel its distinction and difference from the not-self (prakṛti and its evolutes), because it identifies itself with the not-self. This identification of self with not-self is due to transcendent illusion which cannot be set down to any historical occasion. The self and not-self are eternal verities, and have a parallel existence. The relation between them is unreal and there is no reason why it should occur at all. But it is a question of fact and not of reason. The illusion of identity, which is called, in the favourite Sāṅkhya terminology, aviveka or non-discrimination, also is an uncaused fact. It is a source of gratification and comfort that it is liable to be destroyed by viveka-khyāti or the realization of difference. The reason for the illusion being called aviveka-khyāti seems to be due to the antithesis between viveka-khyāti ‘the realization of difference’ and the negation of it in illusion. As a matter of fact all who believe in the possibility of error, however variously they may interpret it, must admit that non-discrimination of the subject and the predicate is the condition of it. The illusion of identity is the result of non-discrimination. It is not therefore wide of the mark to describe error as non-discrimination, because without it no error is possible, and because in every case of error it is immanent.

In the Sāṅkhyaśūtra\(^1\) error is called sad-asat-khyāti because the predicate is real taken by itself, and the reality of the subject is universally acknowledged; but though both the subject and the predicate are true, the contradiction of the error proves that the predicate is falsely attributed to the subject. In other words, the relation between the predicate and the subject is unreal in the context. The theory seems to be the analogue of the theory of Vācaspati Miśra as propounded by him in the Tātparyātikā. He also regards the terms to be real, though the relation is not so.

\(^3\) V. 56.
As regards the characterization of the Yoga theory of error as anyathākhyāti thinking the predicate to be a mental fact by Vijñānabhiṣṭu we are not quite sure of the correctness, both traditional and logical, of the theory. We must take it as Vijñānabhiṣṭu’s interpretation. The elaborate attempt made by Vijñānabhiṣṭu to prove that it is different from the aviveka-khyāti attributed to the Sāṅkhya school has been shown by us to be not necessarily warranted by the texts. Furthermore, it has been ignored by Vijñānabhiṣṭu that aviveka in the sense of non-discrimination is the universal condition of error and as such can be accepted without prejudice to their metaphysical commitments by all schools of philosophy including the Nyāya realists and the Vedāntist illusionists. We think it safe not to attempt to classify it under any of the recognized theories of error, because the original authoritative works have not expressed their predilection for anyone of them. One thing is certain, namely, that the Sāṅkhya or the Yoga theory of error is not the same as Prabhākara’s theory which denies the very possibility of error.

We have now finished our enquiry about the Sāṅkhya conception of avidyā. When this avidyā disappears knowledge becomes perfect. And this perfect knowledge leads to final emancipation of the soul. The soul then shines in its own splendour. Iśvarakṛṣṇa describes kevala-jñāna (perfect knowledge) and kaivalya (final emancipation) in the following terms: ‘By constant exercise in the knowledge of truth and due to the absence of nescience (viparyaya) there arises such pure (viśuddha), perfect (kevala) and complete knowledge as ‘not am, not mine, not I’. By such knowledge the puruṣa, self-possessed and like an onlooker, witnesses the prakṛti made barren and devoid of the seven forms1 because of the fulfilment of the (twofold) purpose (of the puruṣa). The one i.e. puruṣa is indifferent because of the knowledge ‘She (i.e. prakṛti) has been seen by me’ and the other (i.e. prakṛti) retires because of the knowledge ‘I am seen’. And there is no more the condition of creation even though the two exist side by side. Thus in final realization prakṛti stands disenchanted before the puruṣa who is disabused of his illusion. On dharma etc.2 having been deprived of the conditions (of their existence) because of the attainment of perfect knowledge, the puruṣa remains embodied (for some time) due to the residual traces (of dharma etc.) just like the revolution of a wheel due to impetus (even after the real force has been withdrawn). And with the shuffling off of the mortal coil, the prakṛti retires on the fulfilment of her purpose, and puruṣa attains kaivalya (final emancipation).

1 The seven forms are: dharma, adharma, ajñāna, vairāgya, avairāgya, aśvarya and anaiśvarya. The eighth form is jñāna which disappears last of all.

2 The reference is to the eight bhāvas of dharma, adharma, jñāna, ajñāna, vairāgya, avairāgya, aśvarya and anaiśvarya.
absolute and eternal.\(^1\) The kaivalya or emancipation of the self is rather a rediscovery of its own nature, and not the acquisition of unprecedented condition or the relinquishment of a real limitation.

Let us now turn to the Nyāya conception of avidyā.

IV

**AVIDYĀ IN THE NYĀYA SCHOOL**

This school does not believe in blind teleology of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. The soul itself is responsible for its bondage. Although it is as ubiquitous and eternal as the soul of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, it possesses the non-eternal qualities of consciousness, desire etc. much in the same way as the material substance possesses colour, taste, smell, etc. The Nyāyasūtra enumerates the following as the specific qualities of the soul: desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and knowledge.\(^2\) Besides these, the qualities of dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit), jointly designated as saṁskāra (trace), are also recognized as the uncommon characteristics of the soul. These two accrue respectively from the morally good and bad actions of the organ of speech, mind and body. They inhere in the soul and condition the creation of a new body in the next birth out of the material elements.\(^3\) In addition to these, there are a number of defects (doṣas) that are classified into three groups viz. rāga (attachment), dveṣa (aversion) and moha (delusion).\(^4\) Of these three, moha (delusion) is the most debasing, inasmuch as it is the root of the other two.\(^5\) Moha is mithyā-jñāna (wrong assessment of values).\(^6\) Vātsyāyana says: 'The pleasant thoughts of objects cause rāga (attachment) and the painful thoughts of objects cause dveṣa (aversion). Both these thoughts, being of the nature of wrong assessment of values, are not different from moha (delusion). The two viz. rāga (attachment) and dveṣa (aversion) spring from moha (delusion).’\(^7\) Moha lies at the root of rāga and dveṣa. These three doṣas (defects) goad one to action, good or bad, pleasant or painful. In other words, doṣa leads to pravṛtti (volitional activity),\(^8\) that is, the threefold action of the organ of speech, mind, and body.\(^9\) Dharma (merit) and

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1 SKā, 64-68.
2 icchā-dveṣa-prayatna-sukha-duḥkha-jñānān ātmano liṅgam—NS, I. 1. 10.
3 These characteristics are uncommon signs which prove the existence of soul and as such are considered as the specific qualities of it. See Bhāṣya and Vṛtti.
4 See NS, III. 2. 61 and Bhāṣya.
5 Cf. ibid., IV. 1. 3.
6 See Bhāṣya on NS, IV. 1. 3.
7 viṣayeṣu rañjanīyāḥ saṁkalpā rāga-hetavaḥ, kopaniyāḥ saṁkalpā dveṣa-hetavaḥ, ubhaye ca saṅkalpā na mithyā-pratiṣṭhātī-lakṣaṇatvān mohād anye, tav imau moh-yaṃ rāga-dveṣāv iti—Bhāṣya, NS. IV. 1. 6.
8 Cf. NS, I. 1. 18 with Bhāṣya.
9 See NS, I. 1. 17.
adharma (deMerit) accrue from this pravṛttī. Now this pravṛttī qua dharma and adharma together with the doṣas produce the feelings of pleasure and pain as well as their conditions such as the body, sense-organs, sense-objects and consciousness. These products are repeatedly accepted as well as rejected and the process has no end till the soul is emancipated. The worldly life (loka) is carried on by the current of this ceaseless process of acceptance and rejection.\(^1\) Mithyājñāna (wrong assessment of values), doṣa (defects), pravṛttī (volitional activity), janma (birth) and duḥkha (suffering) are the recurring links of the chain of worldly life (saṁsāra).\(^2\)

Thus the primal and most fundamental condition of the worldly career punctuated by birth and death in unbroken succession is delusion or perverted belief which accepts the evil for the good and rejects the good for the evil masquerading as good. Under the influence of this overpowering passion the soul identifies itself with the psycho-physical organism and the external environment and develops love and hatred, sympathy and antipathy, desire and aversion for whatever is found to be conducive or otherwise to the temporary well-being of its embodied existence. The body may be gross or subtle according as its material varies, but the result is the same \(viz.\) its limitation to the little environment in which it is placed. The besetting sin of worldly career is that the self does not distinguish itself from the body and thus develops an inordinate love for what is pleasant and useful to the body and antipathy for what is harmful and unpleasant. The embodied existence necessarily generates a possessive impulse and goads the soul to acquire the good things of the earth. This love of property eventually leads to faction and feud when a competitor arrives to contest the claim. These worldly activities which absorb all the interest of the person produce in their turn merit and demerit according as the activities are good or bad. Disinterested service of fellow creatures generates religious merit and the opposite course of action produces religious demerit. These again necessitate the fresh birth in a new body and environment which are calculated to produce the consequences of the moral values acquired in the past lives. But as this fresh life again is also the occasion for the acquisition of fresh merit and demerit, it invariably leads to another birth. Birth means enjoyment and suffering, growth and decay, and lastly death which is nothing but the dissolution of the physical body. So the worldly career necessarily entails suffering and pain. It may be disputed whether the balance of happiness is greater than unhappiness. But Indian philosophers have unanimously condemned worldly career, because it is not one of

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\(^1\) See \(NS, I. 1. 20\) with \(Bhāsya.\)

\(^2\) Cf. ta ime mithyājñānādayo duḥkhāntā dharmā avicchedena'va pravarta-mānāḥ saṁsāra iti—\(Bhāṣya, NS, I. 1. 2.\)
unalloyed happiness. Even if it be granted that the proportion of pleasure is greater than that of pain, yet the very fact that pain is unavoidable shows that worldly career cannot be regarded as a perfect condition of life. It is the supreme prerogative of the soul, whether encased in a human or divine body, that it is not satisfied permanently with anything short of a state of existence free from all taint of suffering and pain. It is this divine discontent with the relative values that augurs for the realization of perfection. This perfection free from the shackles of the not-self is the final salvation of the soul, which is achieved when the soul entirely overcomes and transcends delusion (mithyājñāna).

Now what is the nature of this delusion and how is it responsible for the metempsychosis (saṁsāra)? Explaining the nature of this delusion and describing the origin of the metempsychosis, Vātsyāyana says: 'Delusion (mithyājñāna) consists in mistaking the not-self for the self. It is a false belief (moha) of the form 'I am the body'. It is egoism (ahamkāra) which consists in looking upon the not-self as identical with the real self. What are the contents of this ego-consciousness? It is the body, sense-organs, mind, feeling and cognitions, in one word, the psycho-physical appurtenance which is felt as identical with the self. Why is this ego-consciousness, that is to say, the self's identification with what is not-self the cause of the unbroken chain of births and deaths? The soul develops the conviction that it is none other than the body, sense-organs etc. and consequently is constantly obsessed with the fear of self-annihilation on the annihilation of the body and its concomitant organs and faculties. The self cannot think that it is immortal in its own right and because of its identification with the mortal body is perpetually tormented by the fear of death. The soul, therefore, seeks to preserve the body from death by all means. But this clinging to the body in spite of its inevitable end leads to the recurrence of a fresh life in a fresh body and consequent death. The reason for this is that a deep-rooted desire (vāsanā) cannot go unsatisfied. The desire for the body is satisfied not by the preservation of the previous one because of its mortality, but by the acquisition of a fresh body. And this means the perpetuation of the worldly career.'

We have seen that delusion which induces perverted belief is the

fountain-head of worldly career. We have also seen how this primal nescience, like the Christian counterpart of Original Sin, produces all sorts of evils. The supreme evil is the ego-consciousness which works like the hydra-headed monster. It generates love and hatred and lastly delusion which consists in thinking what is unwholesome as wholesome. The ego-consciousness is not confined to the self but embraces not-self as well. It is the outcome of the identification of the self with not-self beginning with the physical organism which encases it and ending with the external objects which produce feelings of pleasure and pain. This mistaken identity with the body and the senses and the objects of experience is made possible by the idea that they belong exclusively to the self. The material objects are thought to be its exclusive property by the deluded self though they are experienced and enjoyed by all persons without distinction. The external objects by themselves are not an evil. It is only when they are invested with false values by the deluded self that they become a potent source of bondage. The self develops love and attraction for the external objects including the body because it is deluded into thinking that they serve to promote its well-being. It is this belief in the intrinsic value of these brute material facts which are neither pleasant nor unpleasant without a self to contemplate them in these terms, that makes them a snare and a trap for the self.\(^1\) They induce attachment when they are believed to be pleasant and useful and produce revulsion and antipathy when they are conceived to be hostile to the self. The utility or hostility of the sense-data is a matter of false belief fostered by a long-drawn delusion which has been the companion of the soul from beginningless time. The delusion can be removed only by the proper appraiseiment of the intrinsic nature of the objects as they are without reference to the psychical reactions they are found to produce. When the self dispassionately contemplates these objects as brute facts which have no emotional or volitional satisfaction then the self will cease to be drawn by them. The body, for instance, is an exceedingly unlovable object. It is a mass of flesh and bones and blood, which should by themselves have no charm. It is subject to illness and decay and is bound to be dissolved into its elements by the operation of inexorable physiological and biological laws. It is impure, unclean and ungainly. This is no less true of one’s own body than of other objects. But the fundamental and basic ignorance which forms, as it were, the original capital of the worldly existence of the self leads it astray and induces it to ascribe false values to things of experience. Beauty is one such value. Thus when a person looks at a member of the opposite sex he does not think that the human body is a mass of flesh and blood and bones. On the contrary he thinks that the person

\(^1\) Cf. doṣānimittam rūpādayo viśayāḥ sañkalpakṛtāḥ—NS. IV. 2. 2.
is a beautiful damsel whose intimate association and friendship will satisfy all his desires and wants. The same is the case with a woman regarding a man. The human body ought to have no charm for a wise man who can size up things and appraise them at their proper value. It is the fool who is deluded into thinking that not only the body of the man or the woman, but even several parts of the same such as the teeth or the nose or the eyes have got a special fascination. But the wise man will analyse the human body into its component parts and will see in it nothing but flesh, blood, bone, tendons, veins, bile, phlegm and excreta. Viewed in this perspective the whole thing appears to be disenchanted and by its sheer ugliness will repel a prospective lover. So ultimately it is the self which is responsible for its station in life, whether it is free or in bondage. The original sin of ignorance which is responsible for so many and various perversities of our beliefs and dispositions and tastes must be got rid of. And the only antidote of this masterful malady is the knowledge of reality of self and not-self in their proper and true character.

Now a question arises. But is knowledge of reality possible of achievement? If knowledge of reality means knowledge of any particular individual thing and if this be regarded as the instrument of salvation, then there will be no living creature in bondage, because everyone has got true knowledge of something or other. It must, therefore, be accepted that knowledge of reality means knowledge of the entire range of reality, that is, of each and every real that may exist. This is a coveted state no doubt. But it is not possible for ordinary mortals with their thousand and one limitations and imperfections to achieve this infinite knowledge. Infinite knowledge presupposes infinite life and unlimited opportunities for self-culture and the compresence of all the conditions of knowledge. But we do not see, however lucky a person may be, he can command all these resources. Our span of life is limited and that even frequently punctuated with illness, worries and various sorts of wants and tribulations which make the pursuit of knowledge an exceedingly difficult task. So we find that only one man is really learned and wise in a million. So knowledge of reality in its entire range and scope is only a counsel of perfection. If, on the other hand, it is conceded that a person acquires true knowledge of a limited number of things, it is possible to argue that he will have no delusion with regard to these objects and he will be free to that extent. Freedom after all is spiritual, and such spiritual and intellectual freedom can be bestowed by knowledge no doubt. But this limited freedom is not true salvation which is the goal and consummation of our aspiration. A person may lose all illusion regarding things he knows. But as regards things unknown, and their name is Legion, he will be subject to delusion and
attachment and aversion, and consequently to the full catalogue of worries and tribulations that are attendant upon ignorance. The remedy prescribed by the philosophers of the Nyāya school thus transpires to be a false hope, the will-o’-the-wisp, which will for ever elude the aspirant. Thus the remedy is more intractable than the disease.

In reply to this formidable criticism, Uddyotakara, following Vatsyāyana, asserts that the difficulty proceeds from a fundamental misconception of the nature of knowledge of reality and of the nature of delusion. Delusion is not equivalent to negation of knowledge, but it means false knowledge and false belief. Now we shall have to consider what sort of delusion is the cause of bondage which is exemplified by worldly life. It is delusion regarding the true nature of a limited number of reals such as the self, the body etc., that is responsible for our bondage. So it is the correct knowledge of these reals and the correct appraisement of their values which will put an end to our ignorance and the consequential emotional and volitional perversions. And thus our worldly career and the ties which bind us down to the miserable condition of life will be snapped asunder. As has been said more than once, the primal source of our misery is our ignorance of the nature of our own self and our perverted identification of the self with the not-self. It is not an impossible task to acquire this knowledge even with the aid of our limited resources.

The worldly career of a soul, therefore, means identification of the soul with the material product such as the body. So long as the soul does not become conscious of this false identification, it remains in bondage. But how can the soul become conscious of its own separate identity? How can it comprehend that the world does not belong to it? In other words, how is the knowledge of truth possible? The Nyāyasūtra says: ‘It is possible by the practice of a particular kind of meditation and ecstasy (by means of the concentration of mind).’ Mere logical disquisition or philosophical understanding is not sufficient for realizing the truth. The soul has to exert itself for its realization. The mind is to be forcibly removed from the sense-organs, and kept in conjunction with the soul with ardent desire to know the truth. This is meditation or ecstasy (samādhi). It is the result of the accumulated strength of endeavours spread over countless number of lives in the past. The soul progressively gains strength and gradually becomes capable of more and more successful meditation and ecstasy. The

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1 samādhi-viśeṣābhyāsāt—NS, IV. 2. 38.
2 Cf. sa tu (samādhi-vesēṣaḥ) pratyaḥṛtasye 'ndriyebhyo manaso dhārakeṇa prayatnena dhāryamāṇasya 'tmanā saṁyogas tattvabubhutsā-viśiṣṭāḥ—Bhāṣya, NS, IV. 2. 38.
3 Cf. pūrvakṛta-phaḷa-'nubandhāt tadvadpitāḥ—NS, IV. 2. 41.
Nyāyasūtra also prescribes mental and physical discipline in the shape of restraint of the external activity of the senses and mind for the purification of the soul.¹ The truth is also to be known from and discussed with the wise by means of questions and answers. It is to be sedulously nurtured and guarded at least in the initial stages from the wanton attacks of sceptics and unbelievers. If the opponents possess superior intellectual resources and if the votary of truth is found unequal to disarm the critic, it is sanctioned by the logical code of the Naiyāyika that the opponent should be gagged into silence even by resort to disputation and wrangling,² though they may not be unexceptionable forms of debate. It is to be understood that these devices are adopted by an elderly person who does not wish that the spiritual career of the neophyte should be upset by the onslaughts of designing persons whose sophistical arguments he finds himself unable to refute. When the truth is thus known and realized, the soul gets rid of nescience or delusion (mithyājñāna). The Nyāyasūtra prescribes the practice of both ecstasy (samādhi) and pursuit of knowledge (jñāna) for the realization of the truth. If the practice in philosophical pursuit illuminates the path, the practice in meditation and ecstasy leads to the attainment of the goal. When the knowledge of truth dawns upon the soul, the nescience or delusion ceases to exist. Describing the process of the cessation of the worldly life, the Nyāyasūtra says: ‘Apa-varga (final emancipation) is attained when of these (factors) viz. duḥkha (suffering), janma (birth), pravṛtti (merits and demerits born of volitional activities),³ doṣas (defects) and mithyājñāna (nescience or delusion)—the preceding one ceases on the cessation of the succeeding one.’⁴ With the cessation of nescience, defects i.e. the evil predispositions such as attachment cease. With the cessation of defects merits and demerits cease. With the cessation of merits and demerits, birth and death cease. With the cessation of birth and death, misery and suffering cease. With the cessation of birth the body ceases and how can the suffering exist when the instrument of suffering and misery viz. the body and the like has ceased to exist? This absolute cessation of suffering and misery is called final emancipation (apavarga).⁵

We have now related in brief the conception of the nature and function of nescience in the Nyāya school. Let us now turn to the Vaiśeṣika school.

¹ See NS, IV. 2. 46.
² See NS, IV. 2. 47-51.
³ Pravṛtti means action, good and bad. But, according to Vātsyāyana, here it means dharma and adharma which accrue from those actions. See Bhāṣya, NS, I. 1. 2.
⁴ duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyā-jñānānāṁ uttarottarāpāyē tadanantarāpāyād apavargaḥ—NS, I. 1. 2.
⁵ tadatyaṇa-vimokṣo ‘pavargaḥ—NS, I. 1. 22.
This school did not develop any separate conception of nescience (avidyā). The Vaiśeṣikasūtra is mainly busy with the examination of the generic and specific characteristics of the categories and refers to the problem of knowledge only incidentally. At the outset it proposes to examine the nature of dharma (religious merit)\(^1\) which it then defines as what conditions the attainment of well-being and final emancipation.\(^2\) The scripture (āmnāya) is held valid because it speaks of dharma.\(^3\) Final emancipation is due to the true knowledge (of the categories), born of dharma.\(^4\) After this brief statement about dharma and its instrumentality for final emancipation through the knowledge of truth, the Vaiśeṣikasūtra suddenly proceeds to divide, define, and examine the categories and their sub-categories. It comes back to the problem of dharma only in the sixth chapter where, very briefly, some features of dharma are considered. Again from the seventh chapter onward it plunges into its main theme of examination of the nature of the categories and the sub-categories and, curiously enough, reverts to the problem of dharma only in the last two sūtras of the last āhnikā (lecture) of the last chapter. The main purpose of the Sūtra thus is not the examination of dharma, although the author pledges at the outset that he would examine dharma. It is difficult to ascertain the reason why the author did not redeem his pledge. The examination of dharma is the subject of the Mīmāṁsā school and it seems anomalous why the Vaiśeṣikasūtra should propose to examine it. This anomaly becomes still more puzzling when we find that the Vaiśeṣikasūtra gives so little attention to the topic of dharma which ought to have been given a very important position in view of the initial enunciation of the Sūtra. But we can hazard a guess. The author of the Sūtra seems enamoured of the Mīmāṁsā conceptions of dharma (religious merit) and adṛṣṭa (unseen religious potency) which he utilizes so frequently for the explanation of apparently unexplainable phenomena, both natural and supernatural.\(^5\) Many controversial metaphysical problems are settled by reference to the Vedas.\(^6\) Such ultimate issues as the initial motion of the atoms and the minds after universal dissolutions

\(^1\) athā ‘to dharmaṁ vyākhyaśyāmaḥ—VS, I. i. 1.
\(^2\) yato ‘bhuyadaya-niḥśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ—VS, I. i. 2.
\(^3\) VS, I. i. 3.
\(^4\) Cf. dharma-viśeṣa-prasūṭād dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavaśā- 
   nāṁ padārthāṁ na sādharmya-vaiddharmyābhivyāṁ tattvajñānāṁ niḥśreyasam—
   VS, I. i. 4.
\(^5\) About adṛṣṭa cf. VS, V. 1. 15 ; V. 2. 2. 7, 13, 17. About dharma cf.
   IV. 2. 7 ; IX. 2. 9.
\(^6\) Cf. VS, II. i. 17 ; III. 2. 21 ; IV. 2. 11 ; V. 2. 10.
and the attainment of the knowledge of truth are held as due to ādṛśta and dharma. ¹ Besides this, the Sūtra refers to some Vedic rites for the acquisition of ādṛśta. ² In view of such importance of the conception of dharma for the exposition of philosophical problems dealt with in the treatise, it was not unnatural that the author should propose dharma as the main theme of it and accept the validity of the Vedic Scripture (āmnāya) that contained it. Religious potency (ādṛśta) lies at the root of creation and if the creation is beginningless, the potency also is beginningless. It is this potency which is responsible for new creations after dissolutions. The Sūtra does not define ādṛśta and this is perhaps due to the fact that its meaning was well known at that time. The Vedic rites have results, immediate or remote, known or unknown. Where the result is not immediate and known it should be regarded as remote and unknown prosperity.⁵ Such performances as ablation, fasting, celibacy, living at preceptor’s house for study of the scriptures, and the like produce religious potency.⁴ These rites and duties of the fourfold stages of life (āśramas), moral degradations and their opposites also produce ādṛśta.⁶ One sets to perform good and bad actions resulting in merit and demerit impelled by desire for gain and hatred for loss.⁶

Both dharma and adharma produce ādṛśta. The terms dharma and adharma are also used in the sense of ādṛśta,⁷ that is, the result produced by dharma and adharma. Dharma and adharma qua cause are respectively identical with the rites and duties prescribed by the Vedic injunctions and their violations while dharma and adharma qua effect are respectively identical with the result of those rites and duties and their violations. In other words, dharma and adharma qua effect are ādṛśta. It is in these senses that the terms ādṛśta, dharma and adharma are used in this treatise. The relevant meanings are to be understood with reference to the context. After this digression let us come to our subject proper viz. the problem of avidyā.

We have stated at the outset that the Vaiśeṣika school did not develop its own theory of avidyā. The Nyāya school had great influence on the development of the Vaiśeṣika school and in later times

¹ VS, V. 2. 13; I. 1. 4. ² VS, VI. 2. 2. ³ Cf. drṣṭāṛṣṭa-prayojanaṁ drṣṭābhāve prayojanam abhyudayāya—VS, VI. 2. 1.
⁴ abhiṣecanopavāsa-brahmacarya-gurukulavāsa-vānaprastha-yajña-dāna - pro-

kṣaṇa-diñnakṣatra-mantrakālaṇyamās cā 'drṣṭāya—VS, VI. 2. 2.
⁵ cāturāśramyam upadhā anupadhās ca, VI. 2. 3. The next sūtra defines upadhā as bhavadoṣa and anupadhā as adoṣa.
⁶.icchā-dveṣa-pūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttīḥ—VI. 2. 14. Upashāra, however, interprets the sūtra in a different way. The interpretation can be summed up as icchā-dveṣa-pūrvikā pravṛttīḥ dharmā-dharmayoḥ kāraṇam.
⁷ See IV. 2. 7; IX. 2. 9.
both the schools coalesced, and consequently developed a common theory. But let us collect together the relevant materials that are in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, and see their implication. The Padārtha-dharma-saṅgṛaha (also known as Praśasta-pādabhāṣya) of Ācārya Praśastapāda is an excellent rearrangement and interpretation of the topics of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, and is of great value for the understanding of the original Sūtra. Our enquiry accordingly will be based on these two works. The enquiry of the whole chapter has limited itself to the most original sources, and as such it is proposed to withstand the influence of the later developments and innovations as much as possible.

The Vaiśeṣikasūtra recognizes two kinds of cognition viz. vidyā (right cognition) and avidyā (wrong cognition). Of these, the right cognition is divided into four sub-classes viz. perceptual (pratyakṣa), inferential (lāṅgika), recollection (smṛti) and supernormal spiritual intuition (ārṣa-jñāna). The wrong cognition, on the other hand, is subdivided into fourfold species viz. doubt (saṁśaya), perverted cognition (viparyaya or avidyā), indecision (anudhyavāsāya) and dream-cognition (svāpna). We shall not discuss the conceptions of all these topics, our main interest being limited to the conception of wrong cognition (avidyā). The Vaiśeṣikasūtra says that avidyā is due to the defects of sense-organs and the perverted influence of the memory-impressions. Praśastapāda refers to avidyā by the term viparyaya which he recognizes to be of two kinds viz. perceptual and inferential. He defines viparyaya as cognition of the form ‘It is A’ with regard to what is other than A, and enumerates the following as the conditions of such erroneous cognition: (1) blurred vision of two objects possessed of many well-known distinctive features by one whose sense-organs are overpowered by the bodily humours in disorder, (2) conjunction of soul and mind accompanied with the (awakened) memory-impression produced (in the past) by the past cognition of an object not present (at the time), and (3) religious demerit (adharma).

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1 VS, IX, 2. 10-12. We are treating the subject on the basis of Praśastapādabhāṣya, although we have referred to the original Sūtra as far as possible.
2 Cf. VS, VIII. I. 4-11; about yogi-pratyakṣa see IX. I. 11-15. For the terms pratyakṣa and lāṅgika see X. r. 3.
3 Cf. IX. 2. 1-5; III. 1. 7-17.
4 IX. 2. 6.
5 IX. 2. 13.
6 See PB, p. 520; see VS, II. 2. 17-20 (saṁśaya); IX. 2. 10 (avidyā); IX. 2. 7 (svāpna).
7 indriyadāsāt saṁskāradaśāc cā 'vidyā'—VS, IX. 2. 10.
8 viparyayo 'pi pratyakṣānumāna-viṣaya eva bhavati—PB, p. 538.
9 atasmirnās tād iti pratyayo viparyayah—PB, p. 538.
10 prasiddhāneka-visēṣayoh pittā-kaphānilopahatendriyasya ayathārthālocanād asannīhita-viṣayajñānaja-saṁskārāpekṣād ātmamanasoḥ saṁyogād adharmaḥ ca—PB, p. 538.
misperception of a cow for a horse. A cow is possessed of many well-known distinctive features that can easily differentiate it from a horse. But due to the defects of the sense-organs, one can have a blurred vision wherein a cow is wrongly intuited as a horse. This intuition is further strengthened by the stimulation of a past memory-impression of a horse, and the result is a full-fledged cognition of a horse. Religious demerit also plays its part in the production of error. This is an instance of perceptual error. The wrong inference of fire from vapour mistaken for smoke is given as an instance of inferential error. Theuiscomprehension of body, sense-organs and mind as the self is also a case of wrong or perverted cognition (viparyaya). In one word, perverted cognition consists in mistaking one thing for another. This conception is identical with the conception of the Nyāya school. We are perhaps beating about the bush. The fact is that the Vaiśeṣikasūtra or even Praśastapāda does not put forth the basic problem in clear terms, although it is clearly implied in their expositions. We have indulged in this apparently irrelevant digression in order to make the background of the Vaiśeṣika thought clear and vivid in order to see its implication. We shall now refer to the statement of Praśastapāda on worldly life and emancipation (apavarga), which will clearly show the Vaiśeṣika attitude towards the problem of ultimate nescience. But before that we shall refer to the very brief account of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra itself about saṁsāra and mokṣa. The Vaiśeṣikasūtra says that one acquires dharma and adharma by one's actions inspired by desire and hatred, and that these dharma and adharma are responsible for the cycle of birth and death.\(^1\) Adṛśa is responsible for the conjunction of soul, sense-organs, mind, and the sense-objects, and this conjunction is responsible for the experience of pleasure and pain,\(^2\) which is an essential factor of worldly life. When the external activity of the mind is stopped and it is in undisturbed union with the soul, there is absence of pain, and this is called yoga which may mean either the arrestation of mental activity or the self-possession of the spirit.\(^3\) But so long as the last vestiges of adṛśa are not destroyed, there cannot be final emancipation. The Vaiśeṣikasūtra says 'Absence of conjunction of the soul with the body, and the non-origination of new body on the exhaustion of adṛśa is mokṣa (final emancipation).’\(^4\) The Sūtra also refers to the transcendental knowledge born of meditation (samādhī).\(^5\) Praśastapāda puts this Vaiśeṣika position tinged of

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1 See VS, VI. 2. 14-15.
2 Cf. ātmendriya-mano-rtha-sannikārṣat sukhaduḥkhe—V. 2. 15.
3 tadanārambha ātmasthe manasi śārīrasya duḥkhaṁ bhavat sa yogah—V. 2. 16.
4 tadabhaṁva saṁyogābhaṁvo prādurbhāvaṁ ca mokṣaṁ.—V. 2. 18.
5 See IX. I. 11-15. See also PB, p. 553: asmadviśīśtānāṁ tu yogināṁ.
course, with Purānic ideas developed in between the time, in the following terms:

'A soul under the sway of nescience (avidyā) and possessed of attachment and hatred gets covetable body, sense-organs, sense-objects, pleasure etc. according to the forces of its past actions (āśaya) in the different worlds of the Creator (Brahman), the gods, the Prajāpati, the manes (piṭras) and human beings, due to abundant creative religious merit1 in conjunction with a little of demerit. On the other hand, due to abundant religious demerit in conjunction with a little of merit, it gets an uncovetable body, sense-organs, sense-objects, pain etc. in the worlds of devils (pretas) and brutes. Thus due to creative merit in conjunction with demerit, the worldly life continues unceasingly with repeated births among gods, men, animals and denizens of hell.

But due to emancipative2 merit acquired with full comprehension (of truth) and without any desire for result, one is born in a pure family, with ardent desire to know the means of ending (all) pain. He approaches a master and is enlightened with the knowledge of the true nature of the six categories. Thus his nescience is eliminated, and he becomes free from attachment. Now because of the absence of attachment and aversion, new dharma and adharma, owing their existence to them, do no more accrue, while the stored ones are exhausted by 'enjoyment'. After this, on the cessation of attachment and the like, the pure emancipatory dharma,3 causing happiness of contentment and non-attachment to the body, itself ceases by producing joy born of the intuition of the supreme reality viz. the soul.4 Then due to the cessation of all merit and demerit, the body and the organs of the self with all the seeds of worldly life parched and exhausted fall apart. And there being no more origination of new body and the like, there is final emancipation much like the final extinction of fire which has consumed all its fuel.5

The soul is now bereft of all its specific qualities which derived their genesis from the conjunction of the soul with the mind, which is the starting point of worldly career. Emancipation is absolute and eternal quiescence.

1 pravartakād dharmāt has been translated as 'due to creative dharma'.
2 nivartaka.
3 nivṛttīlakṣaṇaḥ kevalo dharmaḥ.
4 paramārtha-darsanajam sukhaṁ kṛtvā nivartate. Vyomavati explains this as paramārthaḥ sarvapadarthānām ātmā, taddarśanajātaṁ paramārtha-darsanajam. The Nyāyakandaali says paramārthadarsanajam ātmadarśanajam.
5 PB, pp. 643-44: aviduṣo rāgadveśavataḥ . . . mokṣa iti.
In this section, our enquiry will be confined to the Upaniṣads and the works of Gauḍapāda and Saṅkara. The seeds of the Vedānta conception of avidyā and māyā can be traced in the Upaniṣads, and as such we shall refer to those passages of the Upaniṣads where the traces of the conception are apparent. Gauḍapāda, in his Āgamaśāstra, developed the conception, and finally Saṅkara unfolded its implications and made a consistent theory of it. We shall not refer to the post-Saṅkara developments in view of the limited scope of our enquiry. We shall deal only with the most salient features of the problem and avoid the subtle dialectics on which Saṅkara based his theory. Our treatment thus will in no sense be full or complete, not to speak of its perfection.

Let us begin with the Upaniṣads. The ultimate reality, according to the Upaniṣads, is devoid of all plurality, and it is only perverted outlook that is responsible for our perception of plurality. The Upaniṣads denounced plurality in the strongest possible terms. The Brhadāraṇyaka says ‘By the mind alone is it to be comprehended. There is in it no plurality. He who sees any semblance of plurality in it goes from death to death.’ Plurality is only apparent. One goes from death to death, that is, one is subject to birth and death, so long as one does not cease seeing plurality. The cycle of birth and death ceases only when oneness is realized. The Iṣā Upaniṣad says: ‘But one who sees all things in the self and the self in all things is not repulsed by it because of the realization of truth. When to him, who knows, the self has become all things, how can any more there be delusion and sorrow for him who sees oneness?’ Delusion and sorrow, in one word, the worldly life, can appear only if there is perception of plurality. Worldly life ceases when oneness is realized. But what is responsible for this perception of plurality? What is this perversity of vision due to? The world is a fact and a beginningless fact at that. But what does its nature consist in? Why do we see plurality and not the oneness? Why do we see the world and not the basis that sustains it? The Upaniṣads are fully conscious of the problems, and also the difficulty of formal enunciation of their answers, and it is


2 yas tu sarvāṇi bhūtāṇy ātmasy evā 'nupaśyati sarvabhūteṣu cā 'tmānāṁ tato na vijugupsate. yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāṇy ātmai 'vā 'bhūd vijānataḥ tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ. —IU, 6-7.

JP—15
because of this that sometimes they speak in parables. Speaking of the reason why one sees the world and not the self the Kaṭha Upaniṣad says: ‘Swayambhū (the self-subsistent principle who has all the conditions of self-existence in himself) cut open the out-seeing organs and so one sees outward (parān) and not the self inside (antarātman). A wise man, however, desirous of immortality sees the inside self with his eye turned away from the external world. The stupid, however, follow the external desires. They enter the outspread trap of death. The wise, however, seeing immortality, the eternal among the non-eternal, do not desire (for any thing) in this world.’ Perception of the external and attachment to the world are the legacy handed down by Swayambhū and none is responsible for that. But the legacy is not a perpetuity. Nor is it an ultimate truth. One is only to turn away and turn back to get rid of that legacy. This is the teaching of the Upaniṣads. The face of truth is covered by a golden vessel.

We live in truth and yet are ignorant of it. We tread upon truth and yet do not recognize it. The Chāndogya says: ‘Even as those who are ignorant of the secret contents of the earth do not have access to the hidden store of gold even though they tread upon the surface of it, exactly so all these common people carried away by untruth (amṛṭena pratīyāḏhāh), even though they daily go there, do not have access to the Brahma-loka (region of the Brahman or truth).’ Truth is very near us. We ourselves are truth. One does not know it because one does not care to lift the veil covering it. ‘The stupid, falsely considerign themselves wise and learned, reside within the fold of avidyā, and meet misfortunes running to and fro.’ Avidyā is a knot to be cut asunder, and it is not beyond our power to do so. Realization of oneness of the world with the self dispels all darkness. The world has come from Puruṣa, the Absolute, and so is identical with It. It has no existence of its own, and as such cannot persist for one who has realized the Absolute, or rather become the Absolute. The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad says: ‘The Puruṣa is all this—karman (sacrifice), tatāsa (austerity) and Brahman, the highest immortal. He who knows this as hidden in the cave cuts asunder, O darling, the knot of avidyā even (while living) here (in this world).’

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1 parānci khāni vyatṛṇat swayambhūs
tasmāt parān paśyaṁ nāntarātman.
kaścid dhīrāḥ pratīyāḏhānān aikṣad
āvṛttā-caksur amṛtatvam icchan.
parācāḥ kāmān anuyānti bālās
te mṛtyor yanti vitatasya pāsām
atha dhīrā amṛtatvāṁ viditvā
dhruvam adhruvesv iha na prārthayante.

—KUṛ, II. 4. 1-2.

2 hiraṃmayena pātreṣa satyasya 'pihitaiṁ mukham.—IUṛ, 15.

3 ChUṛ, VIII. 3. 2.

4 KUṛ, I. 2. 5.

5 MuUṛ, II. 1. 10.
Now let us see the Upaniṣadic conception of māyā. In the Ṛgveda, wherever the word māyā occurs it is used only to signify the might or the power. Indra takes many shapes quickly by his māyā. Yet sometimes māyā and its derivatives māyin and māyāvat are employed to signify the will of the demons, and we also find the word used in the sense of illusion or show.¹ The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad conceives māyā as the power of the Almighty God. ‘The Māyin (God) creates all this—the sacred verses, the offerings, the sacrifices, the penances, the past, the future, and all that the Vedas declare—from this (aṅkṣara or the immutable one); and the other (i.e. the individual jīva) is bound up with that (aṅkṣara) through māyā. Know that prakṛti is māyā and Maheśvara (the Great Lord) is the Māyin. The whole world is filled with what are His members.’² This God spreads His trap and lords it over the world by means of His divine powers.³ The world is one Great Māyā. This Cosmic Māyā (viśva-māyā) can be ended by meditating upon, joining, and finally becoming one with that Great God.⁴ This is what we get about the conception of māyā in the Upaniṣads.

To sum up: Avidyā is perversity of vision and attachment to the world. Māyā is the cosmic force that brings forth the world of plurality. If the māyā conditions the universe, avidyā keeps one attached to it. There is māyā because there is avidyā. With the cessation of avidyā, māyā ceases. The existence of a magician and his art depends upon the existence of their dupes. If there is no dupe there is no art of magic. Let us now see the vicissitudes of this conception in later times.

We now come to Gauḍapāda. The Upaniṣadic conception of reality as beyond reach of mind and intellect had much influence on later Buddhist thought. Nāgārjuna developed the seeds of the Upaniṣadic thoughts into full-fledged dialectic, and criticized every metaphysical concept as untenable and self-contradictory. This dialectic had great influence on the philosophy of Gauḍapāda who utilized the art with much ability. He accepts the logic of Nāgārjuna and applies it to the world and the Upaniṣadic texts alike and thus he gives us for the first time the philosophy of the Upaniṣads in the proper sense of the term. He rejected the phenomenal world as illogical and self-contradictory. The doctrine of causality, in all its forms, is found to be untenable and absurd.⁵ We shall not discuss all these problems here, our enquiry being limited to the particular problem of avidyā.

² SUP, IV. 9-10.
³ Cf. ya eko jālavān īśata īśanībhiḥ sarvān lokān īśata īśanībhiḥ.—Ibid., III. 1. Also cf. V. 3.
⁴ Ibid., I. 10.
⁵ See AS, IV from kārikā 3.
and māyā. The Brhadāraṇyaka held that there is neither subject nor object in the state of final realization, and that one can know another, that is, there can be subject-object consciousness only when there is appearance of duality, and also that the ultimate knower cannot become an object of knowledge. 1 This suggestion was developed by Gauḍapāda into a full-fledged Absolutism with the help of Nāgārjuna’s dialectic. It is not that Absolutism was not already there in the Upaniṣads. What the Upaniṣads lacked was a complete critique of the empirical conceptions. Gauḍapāda supplied that critique, and restated the Upaniṣadic finding in the logical background. The Brhadāraṇyaka as well as other Upaniṣads clearly stated Absolute Non-duality as the ultimate reality and duality as only an appearance but they did not give cogent reasons for their position. Gauḍapāda, on the other hand, criticizes all conceptions of duality as absurd and illogical. He maintains the doctrine of non-origination of the Absolute. According to Gauḍapāda the ultimate reality is one, and the plurality is only a false appearance. Whatever is a departure from this monism is accordingly bereft of ultimate validity. Religion is based upon the concept of duality in the shape of the worshipper and the worshipped. And so it has value only in the phenomenal plane. One who thinks that by worship one will realize the ultimate consummation must be declared to be a fool—an object of pity. 2 After all there can be no worshipper and object of worship which presupposes dualism that has been declared to be a false superstition by Gauḍapāda. In order to refute this superstition Gauḍapāda maintains that Brahmaṇ which is the ultimate reality is neither born nor created. It is the eternal reality unborn and uncreated. The worshipper is nothing different from Brahmaṇ in point of reality. But when he thinks that he is born in a certain family and a certain caste, he is entirely deluded, because birth is only an illusion. To demonstrate the absurdity involved in the conception of birth, Gauḍapāda launches upon an elaborate discourse to prove that nothing can really originate or perish.

According to Gauḍapāda creation is a false appearance and the duties and prohibitions in the Vedic scripture are intended only for the ignorant and superstitious people who believe in the reality of birth and progression in the grades of existence, which the conception of heaven and hell presupposes. The self is like space and the plurality of empirical selves is due to the limitations imposed by māyā just like the divisions of space enclosed in jars and the like. 3 It is the limitations

1 Cf. yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati tad itara itaraṁ jighrati, tad itara itaraṁ paśyati . . . yatra vā asya sarvam ātmat ‘vā ’bhūt tat kena kim jighret, tat kena kim paśyet . . . . vijñātāram are kena vijānīyād iti—BrUp, II. 4. 14. Also cf. IV. 5. 15.

2 ĀS, III. 1.

3 Cf. ĀS, III. 3-4.
of the bodily organism and its members which serve to make one eternal self appear as many selves. So when these limitations imposed by the physical organisms are destroyed the seeming plurality of selves is dissolved into the one eternal self, just as the spaces enclosed within the different enclosures are restored to their identity with one eternal space on the cessation of the enclosures. 'As the space occupied by jar (gaṭākāsā) is neither a transformation nor a part of the one homogeneous space (ākāśa) so is always an individual self (jīva) neither a transformation nor a fraction of the eternal self (ātman). As the space appears to be soiled with dirt to the ignorant, so appears the self (ātman), too, with impurities, to those who are not enlightened.' The self exists unaffected amidst death, birth and other movements even as the space remains unaffected by its connections with various things. 'All the saṅghātas (conglomerations of limbs etc.) are like dream, being projected by the māyā of the ātman. There is (therefore) indeed no ground for greatness or smallness among things.'

Gauḍapāda refers to the fivefold kośas of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad and the madhvavidyā of the Brhadāraṇyaka and says that they reveal the supreme Brahman. The Upaniṣads extol absolute identity of the individual self (jīva) and the Absolute (Brahman) and censure all plurality. This is proper only if the Absolute Brahman is postulated. The Upaniṣadic statements about creation are to be understood in the context of the Absolute Brahman. They are all only a means for an introduction to truth. There is no plurality. The dualists are realists, that is to say, they believe in the reality of the empirical world—the world of our senses and understanding. They think that the world is as it appears and it exists even when it is unperceived. In other words, the objective world has got both empirical and metempirical reality. The non-dualists, on the other hand, do not deny the actuality of appearance and accordingly accord to the world an empirical reality, though they deny ultimate metempirical reality to it on account of contradictions. The non-dualist does not contradict experience, but only reinterprets it, while the dualists quarrel among themselves because

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1 nā "kāsasya gaṭākāśo vikārāvayavau visā yathā
nai vā "tmanaḥ sadā jīvo vikārāvayavau tathā.
yathā bhavati bālānāṁ gāganaṁ malinaṁ malaināṁ
tathā bhavaty, abuddhānām ātma 'pi malinaṁ malaināṁ.—ĀŚ, III. 7-8.
2 saṅghāṭāḥ svapnavat sarve ātma-māyā-visarjitaḥ
ādhikye sarvasāmye vā no 'papattir hi vidyate.—ĀŚ, III. 10.
6 Cf. svasiddhānta-yyavasthāsu dvaitino nīścitā drṣṭham
parasparaṁ virudhyante tair ayaṁ na virudhyate.
advaitaṁ paramārtho hi dvaitaṁ tadbheda ucye
teśāṁ ubhayātha dvaitaṁ tenā 'yaṁ na virudhyate.—ĀŚ, III. 17-18.
of their failure to harmonize experience in the light of their prejudiced outlook of duality.

But the problem still remains as to why the non-dual (advaita) appears as dual (dvaita). The non-dual (advaita) is unborn (aja). But why does it appear as born? Why, again, should we not regard duality as real? Gaudapada answers: 'It (i.e. the advaita) becomes different only through maya, as the unborn (non-dual) can in no other way become dual; for if it becomes in reality dual the immortal would become mortal.'

How can the unborn (aja) be born? The unborn is immortal. How can it become mortal? 'The immortal does not become mortal, nor likewise the mortal immortal. In no way can nature change.'

The Upanishads declare creation from the existent as well as the non-existent, but we are to understand the logical implications of the statements. The Vedas unambiguously declare that there is no plurality, that Indra took many shapes through maya, and also that 'He is variously born, though (in fact) he does not take birth'. It, therefore, follows that the unborn is born through maya. The scripture denies the birth as well as the cause of birth of the unborn (aja). It further declares: 'That atman is to be described by means of negation of its opposites. It is not amenable to apprehension, and it is never apprehended like an external object.'

The following, again, points to the unborn nature of the atman. The real can appear to be born only through maya (or illusion). The meaning is that the birth of a real is self-contradictory, because to be born means to come into reality. If a real were again to come into reality it would be useless. So there can be no birth of a real. Real is always unborn. If birth were to be real it must appertain to what is born because birth has been found to be incompatible with the unborn reality. But to affirm the birth of what is already born is to assert an unmeaning nonsense because the possibility of fresh birth of what is already born will involve the incessant repetition of births—a position which is as nonsensical as the assertion of reality superadded to reality.

Origination of the real thus involves self-contradiction, and as such is to be rejected. But even then we cannot dismiss the appearance of origination, and must account for it. Gaudapada holds that the existent appears as born through maya. But then, one may ask, 'Why don't you admit that the non-existent appears as born through maya?' In reply to such an

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1 maya maya bhidyate hy etan na 'nyathah 'jaṁ kathañcana
tattvato bhidyamane hi martyatam amṛtaṁ vrajet.—AS, III. 19.
2 AS, III. 21.
3 AS, III. 24.
4 AS, III. 25 with annotation and footnotes.
5 sa eṣa ne 'ti ne 'ty atma 'grhyo na hi grhyate.—ByU, III. 9. 26.
6 sato hi māyāyā jaṁna yujyate na tu tattvataḥ
tattvato jāyate yasya jātam tasya hi jāyate.
—AS, III. 27.
objection Gauḍapāda says: 'The birth of the non-existent is not reasonable at all through māyā or in reality. The son of a barren woman is not born either through māyā or in reality.'

\[1\] The same māyā as is responsible for the appearance of duality in dream is responsible for the appearance of duality in the waking state. As the mind is indeed advaya (without a second) in dream, exactly so is the mind advaya (without a second) even in the waking state. The dvaita (duality) in whatever form, comprising the movable and the unmovable, is perceived by the mind (manas). But when the mind becomes nonmind (i.e. ceases to exist and function as a mind), duality ceases to be experienced.

\[2\] When the self is realized as the sole reality, the mind ceases to be because then there is nothing external which it can conceive. The mind's occupation is gone with the cessation of what can be apprehended. The meaning seems to be this: 'The mind conjures up various things which it seems to apprehend so long as it fails to realize the ultimate truth which is One Absolute. But when the self is realized to be identical with the Absolute, the multiplicity of phenomena with which the mind occupies itself disappears like the objects of dream. The mind also as distinct from the self disappears like fire without fuel.' In other words, everything that appears as other than the self is false and unreal and is bound to vanish. This is also the case with the mind itself qua other than the self.

\[3\] Gauḍapāda describes the Absolute in the following terms: 'The ultimate reality is the Absolute which has to be realized. It is unborn and eternal. Time has no relation to it. It is the ultimate knowable and this knowledge is bound to dissolve the whole fabric of illusion built by māyā. But the knowledge of the Absolute is equally eternally existent and without birth and death. It is not bipolar like our empirical cognitions. It is pure consciousness without subject-object determination (akalpakam). It is identical with the Absolute—its object. So the realization of the Absolute is effected by eternal unborn consciousness and thus the unborn is said to be known by the unborn.'

\[4\] Reality is one, unborn

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\[1\] asato māyayā janma tattvato naś ‘va yuṣyate
vandhyā-putro na tattvena māyayā va ‘pi āyate.

---AS, III. 28.

\[2\] AS, III. 29-30. It should, however, be noticed in this connection that Gauḍapāda recognizes distinction between the objects of the waking experience and those of dreams (vide AS, II. 13-15). While the objects of waking experience are common to us all, those of the dreams belong exclusively to the dreamer.

\[3\] manodṛṣṭam idāṁ dvaitaṁ yat kiñcit sacarācaram
manaso hy amānībhāve dvaitaṁ naś ‘vo ‘palabhyate.

---AS, III. 31.

\[4\] AS, III. 32.

\[5\] Cf. akalpakam ajaṁ jñānāṁ jñeyābhinnāṁ praracṣate
brahma jñeyam ajaṁ nityam ajenā ‘jaṁ vibudhyate.—AS, III. 33.
and eternal. This state of non-mind is to be distinguished from the state of deep sleep wherein the mind simply falls into a state of oblivion. The state of non-mind is not a lapse of the waking state. It is the condition of the mind subdued and freed from all imaginative constructions in which there is clear distinction of the self and the not-self. It is entirely different from the condition of dreamless sleep in which the mind lapses into perfect inaction. But in the state of realization the mind does not lapse into a supine state but, on the contrary, it becomes thoroughly illuminated with the light of the Absolute and is free from all taint of fear. The mind merges in the Absolute with its separate identity dissolved.¹

From what we have stated above we can easily understand Gauḍapāda’s conception of māyā. Gauḍapāda introduces māyā in order to explain appearance. There can be no mutation of the immutable Brahman. Plurality cannot come out of the Absolute. Phenomena cannot in any way be related to the Eternal. What is the explanation then of the world of experience? What causality stands for? How should we explain the ordered universe? It is in order to bring home the anti-rational character of the phenomenal world that Gauḍapāda introduced the conception of māyā. He based his enquiry on the experiences of the Vedic seers (rṣis). He utilized the dialectic developed by the Buddhist thinkers in order to satisfy the sceptic intellect. He does not accept the findings of the Yogacāras or the Mādhyamikas, but only utilizes their critique. This is in short Gauḍapāda’s conception of the objective world and its prius māyā—the principle of irrationality and negativity.

Now the problem is ‘Why does one have this notion of duality? Why does there occur this relation of subject and object?’ Gauḍapāda says that it is the irrational predilection (abhinivesa) for the phenomenal appearance of duality, in spite of the fact that it does not exist, that is responsible for this notion.² When this predilection goes away the notion of duality along with its associates disappears. Gauḍapāda says: ‘Owing to this false predilection for the unreal the mind occupies itself with the equally unreal phenomena. But as soon as the unreality of the phenomenal world is realized the self with its mind retires to itself alone and unattached to anything external.’³ This predilection for the unreal can be taken as the nescience (avidyā) of Gauḍapāda. If the world appears through māyā, one sticks to the world due to this predilection (abhinivesa). The māyā and abhinivesa of Gauḍapāda stand in the same relation as the māyā and avidyā of the Upaniṣads. If avidyā or nescience be interpreted as the root

¹ AS, III. 34-35.
² Cf. AS, IV. 75: abhūtabhiniveśo 'sti dvayaṁ tatra na vidyate.
³ AS, IV. 79; also cf. IV. 55-56.
principle of subjectivity and to work out its programme through a false belief in and attachment to the not-self and the subjective and the objective world constructed by it, then it can be equated with Gauḍapāda’s concept of abhūtābhikhiniveśa—the bias and predilection of the subject for the unreal plurality. After all it should be thought as subjective when personal as opposed to māyā which may be regarded as the substitute of the Sāṅkhya conception of prakṛti. In other words, māyā is the principle of cosmic illusion and avidyā is rather its product responsible for the creation of different subjects. Let us now turn to Saṅkara.

That the world of plurality and subject-object consciousness is there is a fact too obvious and too apparent to explain away. Scepticism leads to subjectivism, subjectivism to solipsism, and solipsism leads nowhere. Gauḍapāda showed that it is only the existent that can appear. The non-existent cannot appear. Saṅkara examines experience and distinguishes the real from the apparent. Our experience contains truth as well as untruth, reality as well as appearance. The world is an illusion in the sense that it is a compound of truth and untruth. The unreal is superimposed upon the real. This superimposition or adhyāsa, as it is called, is the prius of experience. Saṅkara’s famous Bhāṣya on the Brahmaśūtra opens with a subtle analysis of our common experience. There he says: ‘Object (viṣaya) and subject (viṣayin), having as their province the presentation of the ‘thou’ (yuṣmat) and the ‘I’ (asmat), are of a nature as opposed as darkness and light. The transfer of the object, which has as its province the ‘thou’ (or the not-self), and its qualities to the pure spiritual subject, which has for its province the idea of the ‘I’ (or the self), and, conversely, the transfer of the subject and its qualities to the object, is logically false. Yet in mankind this procedure, resting on false knowledge (mithyājñāna-nimitta), of pairing together the true and the untrue (the subject and the object) is natural (naisargika), so that they transfer the being and qualities of the one to the other.’

Our practical life depends upon this mutual transference or superimposition (adhyāsa). Our common experience is based on this adhyāsa. In ordinary cases of error also something is superimposed upon another, and in this respect there is no difference between the empirical and the transcendental error. The transcendental error can, in brief, be defined as the mutual identification of the not-self and the self. This transcendental error is called avidyā. On the nature and the function of this transcendental error (adhyāsa) Saṅkara says: ‘Adhyāsa we have described as cognition of that in not-that. For

1 SBh, Introduction to BS. This translation has been copied from IP, Vol. II, p. 506.
2 tam etam evaṁlakṣaṇam adhyāṣaṁ paṇḍitā avidyē ‘ti manyante—Ibid. JP—16
instance, one imposes the external attributes upon the ātman (self) when one says 'I am crippled (vikala) or whole (sakala)' when it is only his son or wife that is so; or sometimes the attributes of the body as in 'I am fat', 'I am thin', and so on; or sometimes the attributes of the sense-organs as in 'I am dumb', 'I am one-eyed', and so on; or sometimes the attributes of the mind (antaḥkaraṇa) such as desire, intention, doubt and the like. Thus one superimposes the ego upon the self which is only the transcendental witness of the mind and its activities, and then again reversely superimposes the self, the witness of all, upon the ego. Thus there is this beginningless, endless, natural (naisargika) adhyāsa (superimposition) of the nature of wrong cognition (mithyāpratayārūpaḥ), the cause of agency and enjoyment (of the individual souls) and patent to all.' This beginningless adhyāsa or avidyā, consisting in the mutual identification of the self and the not-self, is the presupposition of all ordinary or scriptural distinctions between means and ends, subjects and objects, in one word, between one thing and another. Even our philosophical and spiritual enquiries presuppose this avidyā.² It is indeed a palpable absurdity to imagine that the not-self is superimposed upon the self and vice versa. But nevertheless it is a fact that our ordinary experience presupposes this identification. Otherwise we cannot explain such experiences as 'I am fat', 'I am dumb' and the like. The object is superimposed upon the conscious subject, and the conscious subject is seemingly superimposed upon the object. The not-self is identified with the self and so is known and expressed, though the not-self has not the capacity to reveal or express itself.

But this identification is not one-sided. Were it so, there would be a complete merger of one in the other. In other words, either it will be the object and the not-self, or the subject and the self. But however intimately the self and the not-self are connected, the self does not become the not-self, and conversely the not-self does not become the self. The two poles exist side by side and because they are related, they must be accepted to become identical or not-different. The not-self is a non-entity. Yet it appears to be an entity because it is felt as identical with the self. And in this act of identification, the self also has to contribute a part. And this contribution consists in the seeming transference of being and manifestation to the not-self

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¹ adhyāso nāma atasmāṁ tadbuddhir ity avocāma... evam ahaṁ-pratyayinam aśeṣa-svaprācāra-sākṣiṇī pratyagātmanī adhyāsa taṁ ca pratyagātmanāṁ sarva-sākṣiṇaṁ tadviparyayaṇaṁ antaḥkaraṇaṁ dve adhyāvasyaṁ. evam ayaṁ anādir ananto naisargiko 'dhyāsō mithyā-pratyayārūpaḥ kartṛtvabhor-kṛtvā-pravartakaṁ sarvaloka-pratyakṣaṁ—Ibid.

² Cf. tam etam avidyākhyam ātmānātmam itaretarādhyāṣaṁ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra laukikā vaidikā ca pravṛttāḥ sarvāṇi ca śāstraṇi vidhi-pratīṣedha-moksaparāṇi—Ibid,
identified with it. It should be borne in mind that though there is mutual identification of the self and the not-self, which is deducible from the fact that the self appropriates the attributes and limitations of the not-self (as is evident in the judgment 'I am fat' and the like) and the not-self appears as existent which means that the not-self, though a non-entity, derives the attribute of appearance and existence from the self, yet the identification or superimposition has not the same ontological status and meaning. The not-self is *per se* (*svārūpena*) superimposed upon the self and all existence it appears to have is derived from the self with which it is identified. It has no being outside the self and as such cannot even *appear* independently. But the identification of the self does not mean the total identification of being, because the self is intrinsically real, and its identification with the not-self only means that the self owns up the not-self and vests it with its own existence. In other words, it only means that the self becomes related (*samsṛṣṭa*) to the not-self. And as relation is not intelligible in terms of difference it is interpreted as identification. There can be no relation between things which are different and also if the two are absolutely identical. If the terms were to be identical, they would forfeit their duality, and if they were as different as two unrelated things are from one another, then also there would be no relation. A relation, therefore, cannot be defined as a case of total identity or total difference. It is said to be a case of non-difference or identity because it is not a case of difference. So though identification is bilateral, the not-self is always a content and a predicate which being unreal cannot even appear outside the context. Appearance means *seeming* existence. And the term can *seem* to exist when the existence is borrowed. The identification of the self with the not-self is necessary to account for the appearance of existence of the content superimposed upon it. How can the attribute of one appear to be the attribute of another unless there be a relation which means identification as opposed to difference? In all cases of error the substratum is real and the predicate is falsely superimposed upon it. We have seen how superimposition presupposes mutual identification. But the identification of the substratum with the content is not the same thing as identification of the content with the substratum. And it is this distinction which accounts for the reality and truth of the substratum and the unreality and falsity of the content.

Even our most abstract thought is not free from this identification (*adhyāsa*). *Adhyāsa* is the very texture of our experience. Śaṅkara drives home this truth very convincingly and with various arguments drawn from natural life. Life presupposes action and action depends upon identification. One cannot act with his body unless one’s self is superimposed upon it. The self, which is only reality *ex hypothesi*, can have no *raison d’être* for performing an action, which presupposes
several distinct factors—the agent, the act and the object and also the purpose and so on. But this plurality is itself an appearance and hence a case of superimposition. Unless the self feels that it is the body it cannot act. Action is possible only for the body, and the self can appear to act or believe itself to be the agent only if it identifies itself with the body. The maxim is that the attribute of one can belong to the other only if there is identity between the two—identity being understood as a relation which is different from difference. Our actions are for the fulfilment of our own purpose. If we could find that we are acting simply for the interests of those that have nothing in common with ourselves, we would forthwith stop functioning. If one realized that one had nothing in common with one's body or the sense-organs, one would at once stop all activities for their preservation. The function of knowing also depends upon the adhyāsa. Śaṅkara says: 'One free from the notions of 'I' and 'mine' with reference to the body, sense-organs etc. is incapable of being a subject of knowledge (pramātā) and thus the activity of knowing is impossible for him. The activity of perception and the like is not possible without the owning up of the sense-organs. Nor are the sense-organs capable of acting without the substratum (viz. the body). Nor can one take to activity without superimposing one's self upon the body. Nor in the absence of all this can an absolutely unrelated self become the subject of knowledge. And without the subject there can be no activity of knowledge. It, therefore, follows, that all such activities as perceptual knowledge and spiritual enquiries are possible only with reference to one possessed of avidyā.'

This transcendental adhyāsa is common to both the animal and the human world, and lasts until the Self (Ātman) is realized and all subject-object relationship disappears. It is this avidyā that is the seed of worldly life. This is Śaṅkara's conception of avidyā. Now let us turn to his conception of māyā.

We have briefly referred to Śaṅkara's critique of the nature of our experience. It was found on analysis that mutual identification of the self and the not-self is the foundation of experience. But now the problem is: Why does this duality of self and not-self appear at all? Is there any separate entity called not-self? The answer of the Vedānta to such a question is well known. Duality is false. There is only One Self without a second. What is then this not-self? Why does it appear? In other words, why is there this world of phenomena? The analysis of experience shows that we refer everything to one constant and abiding Self although mostly we do so unknowingly. We unknowingly identify the Self with the world and the world with

1 dehendriyādiṣv ahaṁ-mamā-'bhimāna-rahitasya ... tasmād avidyāvadviṣayāṇy eva pratyakṣādīnī pramāṇāṁ śāstrāṇi ca—Ibid.
the Self, and this mutual identification is responsible for all our activities. But why is there this process of identification? Before answering this question let us see what is the implication and condition of this process of identification. Suppose the process ceases. What happens? Subject-object consciousness ceases. But why should the process cease at all? It could cease if there were any condition of it, and also if that condition could be removed. We, however, cannot conceive any condition of the beginningless process. Much less can we hope to discover it. It is incomprehensible. But yet we can gauge its nature by other means. There is a strong urge in us for freedom from the world process. The scriptures inform us of the reality of that freedom. Presuming the possibility of freedom, let us imagine what happens of the process when one is free. Suppose one is free, there is now no more process of identification for him. But does this state of freedom imply that the process of identification has ceased because there is now no tendency for it, or does it imply that there is no second to be superimposed upon? In the first alternative the possibility of the repetition of the process would still remain, and moreover freedom would become a farce. Freedom in this alternative means freedom from tendency. But what is this tendency? Why was it there? These ultimate questions remain unanswered. In the second alternative, however, there is no reason for such difficulties. Presuming the possibility of the second alternative, we can equate freedom to Absolute Existence without a second. Now if this is the ultimate state, what is the nature of the not-self and the beginningless process of identification? It was all indeed an illusory appearance. But the problem still remains 'What does this illusory appearance consist in?' It consists in mâyā. Śaṅkara says: 'It is mâyā, pure and simple, that the Great Self (Ātman) appears as the threefold states (viz. waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep) even as a rope appears as a snake and the like', and quotes the following from Gaṇḍapāda’s Āgamaśāstra: 'When the individual self (jīva), sleeping on account of mâyā which has no beginning, is awakened, it realizes the state (of tūrya—the transcendental state of the self called the fourth state in contradistinction to the above three) which is unborn and in which there is neither sleep nor dream, nor duality.'¹ Nāma (name) and rūpa (form)—the elements of the world process—belong to the Lord and are known as His mâyā. Śaṅkara says: 'Belonging to the nature, as it were, of the

¹ māyāmātraṁ hy etad yat paramātmamo 'vasthātryayātmamā 'vabhāsannam rajjvā iva sarpādibhbāvene 'ti. atroktam Vedāntārtha-saṃpradāyāvidbhīr Ācāryaṁ:
anādīmāyāṁ supto yadā jīvāḥ prabudhyate
ajam anidram asvapnam advaītam budhyate tadā.

—SBk, BS, II. 1. 9. See also AS, I. 16.
Omniscient Lord, there are nāma (name) and rūpa (form), the figments of avidyā, indefinable either as identical with or as different from the Lord, the germs of the world process, and known in the scripture (Śruti) and the traditional literature (Smṛti) as māyā, śakti (energy) and prakṛti (the primordial nature) of the Omniscient Lord.\(^1\) Māyā thus is the cosmic force belonging to the Lord. It is nāma and rūpa. It is the appearance of the great Ātman. Or, we can say, māyā is the appearance of Reality. This is Śaṅkara’s conception of māyā.

Now let us end this section with a remark or two on the relation of avidyā and māyā. Śaṅkara does never attempt to draw a line of distinction between avidyā and māyā. But it seems that he postulates māyā mainly for explaining the origination of the world appearance and avidyā for explaining the attachment of the individual to that appearance. If this is the case, then we can say that māyā and avidyā are complements each of the other.

Let us now turn to the Buddhist conception of avidyā.

VII

AVIDYĀ IN THE BUDDHIST SCHOOL

'Just as in a peaked house (kūṭāgaṇa), O Brethren, whatever rafters there are, all converge to the roof-peak, resort equally to the roof-peak, all go to junction there, even so, whatever wrong states there are, all have their root in ignorance, all may be referred to ignorance, all are fixed together in ignorance, all go to junction there.'\(^2\)

'Whatever misfortunes there are here in this world, or in the next, they all have their root in ignorance (avijñāmālaka), and are given rise to by longing and desire.'\(^3\)

The Buddhist chain of pratyāyasamutpāda (dependent origination) begins with avidyā (ignorance) which is considered as the root of the world process.\(^4\) From avidyā (ignorance) originate saṁskāras (pre-dispositions), from saṁskāras originates vijnāna (seed-consciousness), from vijnāna originates nāma-rūpa (mind and body), and similarly saḍāyatana (the six sense-organs), sparsa (contact), vedanā (feeling), trṣnā (craving), upādāna (clinging), bhava (coming to be), jāti (birth) and jārāmaraṇa (old age and death) originate. This process of origination is beginningless, and avidyā (ignorance) and trṣnā (craving) are the parents of this process. Trṣnā (craving) is the mother and

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1 sarvajñasye 'śvarasya 'tmabhūta ivā 'vidyākalpite nāmārūpe tattvāṇyavābhvāyam anirvacanīyā saṁsāra-prapañca-bijabhūte sarvajñasye 'śvarasya māyā śaktiḥ prakṛttir iti ca šrutimānyor abhilapyetē—Ś Bh, BS, II. 1. 14.
2 SNi, XX. 1. Translation by Mrs. Rhys Davids.
3 Itivuttaka (§40), p. 34. The Basic Conception of Buddhism, p. 57.
4 We have referred to this chain in Chap. I, p. 10.
avidyā (ignorance) is the father. Maitreyanātha gives a very impressive idea of the functions of the twelve factors of avidyā, saṁskāra etc. when he says: ‘The world is afflicted due to the obscuration (of the intuition of truth by avidyā), implantation (of the vāsanā or will to live due to the saṁskāras), transference (of the vāsanā-seed to the place of birth by vijavaṇa), the consequent formation (of the nāma-rūpa or body and mind), development (of the śaṭāyatana), the threefold feeling (due to the mutual contact (sparśa) of the senses, the object and the consciousness), enjoyment or suffering (due to vedanā), acquisition (of rebirth due to trṣṇā), tying down (of the vijavaṇa to desires by the upādānas), turning towards (fruition of the past action due to bhava), and sorrow (caused by jāti and jarāmaraṇa).’ Avidyā covers the capacity of intuiting the truth. It is of the nature of adarsana (non-intuition). Avidyā is the cause of perversion (of truth). One under the sway of avidyā mistakes the impermanent for the permanent because of one’s delusion about truth. Saṁskāras (predispositions) can lead to rebirth only if there is avidyā. Otherwise they are unproductive. Saṁskāras implant the seed of rebirth in the vijavaṇa which then takes the seed to the place of rebirth. The mind and body (nāma-rūpa) form themselves. And so the process of origination goes on. The avidyā is also called delusion (moha). Nāgārjuna says: ‘It is due to thinking the things which have no independent nature as eternal, possessed of self, and pleasant (nityā-tma-sukha-saṇji) that this ocean of existence (bhava) appears to one who is enveloped by the darkened attachment and delusion (moha).’ In another place he says: ‘The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from nature (prakṛti), nor from themselves (svabhāvat) nor from Lord (Īśvara), nor yet are they without cause; know that they arise from ignorance (avidyā) and desire (trṣṇā).’ Avidyā ceases when the knowledge of the reality (dhamma) dawns. ‘Even as a man

1 Cf. tatra Mahāmate mātā katamā sattvānaṃ yad uta trṣṇā paunarbhaviki nandirāga-sahagatā māṛtvvenotiṣṭhate avidyā piṛṭvenā ‘yatanagrāmasyo ‘tpattaye, etc.—LA, p. 138.
2 chādanād ropeac cai ‘va nayanāt samparigrahāt pūraṇāt (triparicchedād) upabhogāc ca (saṅgrahāt)
3 nibandhanād abhimukhyād duṭkhato klisyate jagat.—MVS, I. 11-12a-b.
4 avidyāyā yathābhūta-darsana-vilandhanād iti—MVSbh, p. 29.
5 avidyāyā hy adarsanātmakatvād—MVSbht, p. 29.
6 viparyāṣahetur avidyā—MVSbh, p. 35.
7 avidyāgato hi tattvasammohād anityādīn nityādirūpega viparasyati
9 Visuddhimagga, XVII. 293. 8 Mahāyānavimśikā, verse 21.
10 Stanza 50 from Nāgārjuna’s Suhrilekha as translated by Wenzel (PTS, 1886) from the Tibetan translation. Dr. Dasgupta’s A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 144-5.
born blind, and unfamiliar (with the right path), sometimes treads upon the right path and sometimes upon the wrong, so does the fool, ignorant of the world (saṁsāra), sometimes commit puñña (good act) and sometimes āpūñña (bad act) in the world. But when he knows the reality (dhamma) and attains the truth his ignorance ceases, and he roams unperturbed. With the cessation of avidyā, trṣṇā (craving) naturally ceases. If the truth is known desire for the illusory cannot exist. One seeks for permanence so long as the truth of impermanence does not dawn upon him. Ego-centric activity ceases when the falsity of the notion of a static self is comprehended. Desire for happiness disappears when the truth of universal suffering is realized. Avidyā consists in mistaking suffering for happiness, an ever-changing aggregate of vedanā (feeling), viṭṭhāna (consciousness), saṁjñā (coefficients of consciousness) and saṁskāras (predispositions) for an abiding ego, perpetual flow for unchanging staticity. But if this perverted outlook ceases, trṣṇā (craving) naturally disappears. This is the general outlook of Buddhism towards avidyā. But along with the development of thought, it was but natural that the meaning of avidyā should change. Avidyā means ignorance or wrong cognition of truth, and hence its meaning would naturally change along with the change in the conception of the nature of truth. It, therefore, follows that the meaning of avidyā cannot remain constant. Let us now see the nature of avidyā in later Buddhist thought.

We shall begin with the Viṭṭhānaāvādins. The Buddhists distinguish between the saṁsvrti satya (empirical truth) and the paramārtha satya (transcendental truth). The function of saṁsvrti is to cover the knowledge of the truth. Saṁsvrti covers the real nature of truth and reveals it only as covered by itself, and is also called avidyā (ignorance), mohā (delusion), and viprayāsa (perversion). The Buddhists further distinguish three characteristics (lakṣana) or natures (svabhāva) of a thing viz. (1) parikalpita (imagined), (2) paratantra (dependent), and (3) parinipyāpanna (real or true), sometimes briefly called kalpita, tantra and niṣpanna respectively. Vasubandhu gives

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1 Visuddhimagga, XVII. 119.
2 Cf. dve satye samapāśritya buddhānāṁ dharmadeśanā lokasaṁsvrti-satyaṁ ca satyaṁ ca paramārthaḥ.—MK, XXIV. 8. dve saccāni akkhāsi sambuddho vadataṁ varo sammutiṁ paramatthāṁ ca tatṭyaṁ nūpalabbhati. —Quoted by Buddhaghosa in Atthagathā on KV, p. 30. For further references see AS, p. 162, footnote 5.
3 Cf. saṁsvrīyata āvriyate yathābhūtatarījānaṁ svabhāvavaraṇād āvṛta-prakāśanāc ca 'nage 'ti saṁsvṛtīḥ avidyā moho viprayāsa iti paryāyaḥ—BAP, pp. 352 ff.
4 Cf. buddhyā vivecaśāmānaṁ hi na tanatraṁ nā 'pi kalpitam niṣpanno nā 'sti vai bhāvaḥ kathāṁ buddhyā prakalpyate.—LA, X. 374. kalpitaḥ paratantraṁ ca parinipyāpanna eva ca.—MVS, I. 6a-b.
an apt illustration of these three. Suppose one creates an elephant by dint of one’s spell. Now the elephant appears, but that is only a phantom of the elephant, and in no way the elephant itself. Here the *elephant* is *parikalpita* (imaginary), the *form* of the elephant is *paratantra* (dependent), and the *absence* of the elephant is *parināśpanna* (real). An object, according to the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācāras, is *śūnya* i.e. devoid of any intrinsic reality, yet we know it as a particular object. This appearance of it as a particular object is an imagined one (*parikalpita*). Vasubandhu says: ‘Whatever thing is imagined by whatever imagination, all that is only *parikalpita*. That is not the true nature (*svabhāva*) of the real.’ An imaginary (*parikalpita*) object, although, in essence, it is non-existent, yet exists for practical purpose, and as such is said to have a characteristic (*svabhāva*) by way of concession to the practice of the common people who are ignorant of the truth. A dependent (*paratantra*) characteristic is so called because it originates depending upon its cause and conditions. The *parināśpanna* (real) characteristic consists in the true nature of a thing, completely free from all imagined characteristics, and is comprehended by *avikalpa-jñāna* (non-constructive intuition). Let us now come to the Vijñānavādin’s conception of avidyā.

The Vijñānavādins denounce the duality of perceiver and perceived as false. The *Laṅkāvatāra* says: ‘All this is only consciousness (*citta*). The consciousness functions in two ways as perceived and perceiver. There is neither the subject nor what belongs to the subject.’ In another place, it says: ‘There is consciousness alone, there is no external object (*drṣṭya*). The consciousness itself is seen twofold as perceived and perceiver, and is bereft of eternity and annihilation.’ The creation of the external world is due to the influence of *vāsanā*.

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5. kalpitena svabhāvena tasya yā ‘tyantaśānyaratā svabhāvah pariniṃ (spanno ‘vikalpa-jñānagocaraḥ).
(predisposition) which is beginningless. The consciousness becomes twofold, or rather appears as twofold due to its vāsanā. The Laṅkāvatāra says: 'There is no external object as the fools imagine. The consciousness functions as the appearance of objects, being influenced by vāsanā.' The objective world is like an elephant called up by illusion (māyā-hastin). It appears to the consciousness perfumed by ignorance (ajñāna). The things (dharmas) are unborn. They are non-existent. They are like a city of gods appearing in the clouds, a dream, and a creation of māyā. It is the consciousness that functions variously, it is again the consciousness that is emancipated. The consciousness, and none else, is born, and again it is the consciousness that ceases to be. For those who can see through reason, both the perception and the perceived cease. The consciousness moves round the objects even as an iron rotates round a magnet, being ever rooted in and nourished by the vāsanās.

But now, the problem is, why should all this illusion appear at all? What is responsible for this glamorous appearance, this unending dream, this gorgeous sky-flower, this dazzling city in the sky? Of course, such a question is obviously absurd in view of the unreality of the world so frankly admitted by the Viṣṇuavadins. But even then the question could not be avoided. The Buddhist postulation of the threefold characteristics, described above, is an attempt at explanation of the appearance of the gorgeous show. The consciousness ideates and imagines and creates out of itself, and the creations follow definite laws. The creations are imaginary, but nevertheless they abide by certain order and have definite conditions for appearance. They are not haphazard and chaotic. They are praṇitāya-samutpāna (causally determined). Parikalpanā (imagination) lies at the root of creation. But this does not mean that the creation is whimsical. It certainly proceeds in a definite direction and has well-defined causes and conditions. Although the nature of this creation is not definable, yet it is

1 bhāya na vidyate hy artho yathā bālair vikalpyate
  vāsanair luḍitaḥ cīttaṁ arthābhāsaṁ pravartate.—LA. X. 154-155.
2 Cf. māyā-hastī yathā cīttaṁ patraṇi kanakā yathā
  tatha dṛṣṭaṁ nṛṣaṁ khyati citte ajñānavaśite.—LA. X. 126.
3 Cf. anupannaḥ hy amī dharmaṁ na caī 'vai 'te na saṃti ca
  gandharvanagara-svapna-māyānirmana-sādṛṣaḥ.
  cīttaṁ pravartate cīttaṁ cīttaṁ eva vimucye
  cīttaṁ hi jāyate nā 'nyac cīttaṁ eva nirudhyate.—LA. X. 144-5.
4 yuktya vipāṣyamānaṁ grhaḥgrhaṁ nirudhyate.—LA. X. 154.
Maitreyanātha gives the following argument in order to prove the non-
existence of artha and its viṣṇāna:
  arthasattvātma-viṣṇāpti-pratibhāsaṁ praḍāyate
  viṣṇānaṁ nā 'sti cā 'syā 'rthas tadabhāvāt tad apy asat.—MVS, I. 4.
5 Cf. vāsanair brñhitam nītyam baddhāvā mūlaṁ sthirārāyam
  bhramate gocare cīttaṁ ayakānte yathā 'yasam—LA. X. 14.
not independent and groundless. It is paratntra (causally determined) and is the object of empirical perception.1 There is one common defect, a basic fault, that compels the consciousness to project this universe and keeps it tied to it. The process of projection begins with duality. Now there is appearance of subject and object, perceiver and perceived, and all that duality implies. What is that common defect, that basic fault? The Vijnanavadin says that it is abhútaparikalpa, the conjuring up of the imaginary unreal. In answer to Mahamati's question about the nature of the abhútaparikalpa, the Lord said: 'Due to the persistent predilection for the imaginary unreal objects, various and multiform, O Mahamati, the imagination, being active, functions. It functions due to a strong predilection and bias for the perception of external multiform objects as also due to a strong inclination for the subject as well as what belongs to the subject, in the case of those who are strongly rooted in the belief in the reality of the perceived and the perceiver, O Mahamati.'2 Maitreyanatha says: 'The prius of constructive ideation or unreal imagination (abhútaparikalpa) exists (in reality). Duality does not exist there (in the prius). The basis of the negation of duality (śunyaśā), however, exists (in reality). The unreal imagination (somehow) exists even in that (negation of duality).3 Vasubandhu says that all afflictions (saṅklesa) originate from the unreal imagination (abhútaparikalpa).4 Sthiramati explains this abhútaparikalpa as 'the locus or the instrument of the imagination of unreal duality.'5 He further says 'Generically, abhútaparikalpa consists in pure consciousness and its concomitant associates (citta-caitasikas) such as feeling and willing that are liable to metempsychosis; it exists from beginningless time and ends in final emancipation (nirvāṇa). Specifically, it consists in the imagination of the perceived and the perceiver.'6 The abhútaparikalpa quā the prius of unreal imagina-

1 Cf. kalpitaḥ pratayoytpanno 'nabhilāpyaś ca sarvathā
paratntra-svabhāvo hi sūdhahalaukikagocarāḥ.—MVS BhT, p. 19.
2 artha-vividha-vacictryā-'bhútaparikalpā-'bhinivesān Mahāmāte vikalpaḥ
pravartamānaḥ pravartate. niṟgāṁ grāhyā-grāhakā-'bhinivesā-'bhiniṣṭānāṁ ca
Mahāmāte . . . . lāhyā-vicitrāthopalambhā-'bhinivesāt . . . ātmātmīyā-'bhini-
vesāt—LA, p. 150.
3 abhútaparikalpako 'sti dvayaṁ tatra na vidyate
śunyaśā vidyate tv atra tasyām api sa vidyate.—MVS, I. 2.
We have translated the term abhútaparikalpa in a number of ways. Thus
sometimes we have translated it as 'the prius of constructive ideation or unreal
imagination,' sometimes simply as 'unreal appearance' or 'unreal imagination'.
The term conveys all these meanings and therefore we shall select one or the other in accordance with the context.
4 eṣāṁ sarvaḥ saṅkleso 'bhútaparikalpāt (pravartate)—MVS Bh, p. 37.
5 abhùtam asmin dvayaṁ parikalpyate 'nena ye 'ty abhútaparikalpāḥ—
MVS BhT, p. 12.
6 anādiṅkāḷikā nirvāṇaparyavasānāḥ saṁsārānurūpaṁ ca citta-caitasikā nirviṣe-
ṣaṇā 'bhútaparikalpāḥ. viṣeṣas tu grāhya-grāhaka-vikalpaḥ—Ibid.
tion is free from the duality of the perceived and the perceiver. It is called śūnya (void) because it does not contain the duality. It is not śūnya (absolute negation) in itself. The prius of unreal imagination is void (śūnya) of the perceived and the perceiver (grāhya-grāhaka) even as a rope is void of snakeness. It can be defined by existence (sattva) as well as by non-existence (asattva). It exists as well as does not exist. It exists quâ itself. But it does not exist quâ the perceiver and the perceived (grāhya-grāhaka), because there is no duality in it. There is absolute non-existence of duality. But the awareness of duality cannot be denied. This awareness is abhūtapatikalpa quâ unreal imagination or constructive ideation. It cannot but be illusory inasmuch as it is an awareness of the unreal duality. But then the objection naturally arises: Why should not this illusory awareness (bhrānti-vijñāna) itself be condemned to be as unreal as the perceived and the perceiver? Maitreyanātha says that the abhūtapatikalpa quâ unreal imagination cannot be absolutely non-existent because emancipation is held to be due to the destruction of it. If there were no illusion (bhrānti) at all, there would be no afflictions (saṅklesa) and hence no bondage (bandha). Consequently there would be no emancipation because emancipation presupposes bondage. And in that case the reality should be taken as it appears, or it should be condemned as an absolute nothing. The postulation of illusion (bhrānti), therefore, is necessary for the establishment of emancipation. This illusion, as we have said above, consists in the awareness of duality. If the awareness of the duality of the perceived and the perceiver were an absolute reality (paramārtha) there would be eternal afflictions (saṅklesa) and consequently there would be absence of emancipation (nirvāṇa). On the other hand, if that were an absolute non-entity there would be total absence of afflictions (saṅklesa) and consequently eternal freedom from afflictions (uṣavādaṇā). But both these consequences of absence of emancipation and eternal freedom from afflictions are undesirable, because both of them imply futility of all endeavours for emancipation. On these grounds, it is established that the abhūta-

1 (grāhya-grāhaka)-rahitata 'bhūtapatikalpaṣya śūnyatā. na khalv abhūtapa-

2rahamalpa 'pi na bhavati. yathā rajjuḥ śūnyā sarpatvabhāvena tattvabhāvatvā-

3 bhāvāt sarvakālaṁ śūnyā na tu rajjusvabhāvena tatthe 'hā 'pi—Ibid.

4 abhūtapatikalpa 'stī 'ti. tenā 'bhūtapatikalpaṁ sattvam nirdīṣyate ity

5 arthaḥ . . . . . . . . tat punar grāhyagrāhakahabhāvenā 'sattvam yasām abhūtapi-

6 kalpe dvayaṁ nā 'sti tasmād abhūtapatikalpo 'pi dvayātmanā nāsti 'ty uktaṁ


8 kimarthāṁ punas tasya bhrāntī-vijñāṇasyā 'bhāva eva ne 'syate grāhya-

9 -grāhakavat—Ibid., p. 18.

10 na tathā sarvatvabhāvas tatkṣayāṁ muktir iṣyate.—MVS, I. 5c-d.

11 Cf. bhrāntimātre 'py asati saṅklesābhāvād bandho 'pi nāsti, pūrvasmāddhi

12 bandhanān muktir iti muktir api nāsti, kimiti yathā prakhyātis tathā bhāvo

13 ne 'syate, sarvathā vā 'bhāva iti—MVS BhT, p. 18.
parikalpa (awareness of the duality) exists and also that duality does not exist.\(^1\) That there is saṅklesa (afflictions) is a fact too apparent to deny, and it is also a verity that this saṅklesa is due to the awareness of the duality of the perceived and the perceiver. On the cessation of this awareness there is cessation of saṅklesa and consequently there is emancipation. But how can this awareness cease if it is there in its own right? If the awareness of duality is an immutable fact, there is no possibility of emancipation. Again, if this awareness did not exist at all there would be no real existence of saṅklesa. It, therefore, follows that the awareness is neither an immutable fact nor an unreal fiction. It is there quâ basic defect or a fault or abhūtāparikalpa (unreal imagination) as it is called. The logical argument of this position can be put in this form: ‘There is saṅklesa as well as an urge from within to get rid of this saṅklesa and attain mukti (emancipation). The saṅklesa presupposes some defect as its cause. The nature of this cause is deduced from the consideration of the conditions of this sorrowful and miserable existence. There is misery and sorrow so long as there is the awareness of the duality of the perceiver and the perceived, subject and object, I and mine; and if this duality is an immutable fact, there is no reason why the awareness of it should cease to exist. It is, however, established by the evidence of experience as well as logical arguments that there is no duality. Now the awareness of duality remains. This awareness is the ultimate cause of all saṅklesa.’ But then the problem is, why is there this awareness of duality at all? This question has not been dealt with explicitly. But, as is usual elsewhere, the Buddhists took resort to the conception of the beginninglessness of the world and consequently to the beginninglessness of this awareness of duality. But the problem can be answered in yet a different way. The reality is as it is. The world is only an appearance. There is, in reality, neither saṅklesa (afflictions) nor vyavādāna (freedom from afflictions), neither bandha (bondage) nor mokṣa (emancipation). Hence there is also not the awareness of duality. It is as much an appearance as its product viz. the phenomenal universe. The Laṅkāvatāra says: ‘There is neither saṅklesa (impurity) nor śuddhi (purification) because there is non-existence of all things (dharmaś).’\(^2\) ‘There is neither emancipation nor bondage.’\(^3\)

\(^1\) Cf. . . . grāhya-grāhakatvena paśvādeḥ pratibhāso yadi punar evaṁ paramārthataḥ syād evaṁ sati nityaḥ saṅklesaḥ syāt. tathā ca nirvāpābhāvaḥ, evaṁ bhṛntimātrasyāḥ py abhāve saṅklesābhāvo nityaṁ ca vyavādānaṁ prasa-jyate. evaṁ ca ‘bhayathā ‘pi mokṣārthahināṁ vyartho yatnaṁ syāt. ato ‘bhūta-parikalpo ‘sti dvayaṁ ca na vidyata ity avasyam abhyupagantavyam.—Ibid., pp. 18-19.

\(^2\) abhāvāt sarvadhammānāṁ saṅkleso nā ‘sti śuddhi ca.—LA, X. 137a-b.

\(^3\) na mokṣo na ca bandhanam—LA, X. 275.
In this connection, it will not be irrelevant to mention the Vijnānavādin’s conception of twofold āvaraṇa (veils) viz. jñeyāvaraṇa and kleśāvaraṇa on the disappearance of which depends enlightenment. The word jñeya means ‘knowable’ i.e. the dharmas ‘elements of existence’ which are not substantial and thus have no reality.\(^1\) The āvaraṇa ‘cover’ in the form of jñeya is called jñeyāvaraṇa. Sometimes the term jñeyāvaraṇa is also explained as ‘āvaraṇa regarding the knowable’.\(^2\) In this case the knowable (jñeya) is the reality or the things in their true nature. Similarly, kleśāvaraṇa means the āvaraṇa in the form of kleśas.\(^3\) On the question of the purification of these āvaraṇa, the Laṅkāvatārā says: ‘The jñeyāvaraṇa, O Mahāmati, is purified due to a special kind of intuition of dharma-nairātmya or unsubstantiality of things as they appear. The kleśāvaraṇa, on the other hand, is destroyed due to the practice of intuition of pudgala-nairātmya ‘the unreality of the individual ego’.\(^4\) These āvaraṇa are also conceived to be as unreal and illusory as the abhūtāparikalpa (unreal imagination), because the consciousness is pure and luminous (prabhāsvara) by nature.\(^5\)

This is the nature of avidyā of the Vijnānavādins. Let us now study the conception of avidyā in the Tathātā philosophy of Āśvaghoṣa.\(^6\)

Āśvaghoṣa held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished —the aspect as thatness (bhūtatathatā) and the aspect as the cycle of birth and death (samsāra). The soul as bhūtatathatā means the oneness of the totality of all things (dharma-dhātu). Its essential nature is uncreate and eternal. All things simply on account of the beginning-less traces of the incipient and unconscious memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (smṛti) appear under the forms of individuation. If we could overcome this smṛti the signs of individuation would disappear and there would be no trace of a world of objects. All things in their fundamental nature are not namable or explicable. They cannot be adequately expressed in any form of language. They possess absolute sameness (samatā). They are subject neither to

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\(^2\) Cf. jñeyaṁ cā 'vṛtir āvaraṇam . . . jñeyam eva saṁśripatāpatvād āvṛtih—BAP, p. 447. jñeyāvaraṇaṁ api sarvasmin jñeye jñānapratibandha-bhātam akliṣṭam ajñānam—Tk, p. 15.

\(^3\) kleśā evā 'vṛtih—BAP, p. 447.


\(^5\) Cf. prakṛti-prabhāsvarāṁ cītāṁ—LA, X. 750, 753, 754.

\(^6\) This study is based on Dr. Dasgupta’s, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (First edition), pp. 129-138. Dr. Dasgupta’s statements are based on *Awakening of Faith*, an English translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of Sṛddhodāpūdanaśatrā of Āśvaghoṣa.
transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul—thatness (bhūtatathatā).

The soul as birth and death (sāṁsāra) comes forth from the tathāgata womb (tathāgatagarbhā), the ultimate reality. But the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other. Though they are not identical they are not duality either. Thus when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation it is called the all-conserving mind (ālaya-vijñāna). It embraces two principles, (1) enlightenment, (2) non-enlightenment. Enlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it is free from the corruptions of the creative instinctive incipient memory (smṛti). It penetrates all and is the unity of all (dharmadātu). That is to say, it is the universal dharmakāya of all Tathāgatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence. The multitude of people (bahujaṇa) are said to be lacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (avidyā) prevails there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of smṛti (past confused memory working as instinct) from which they have never been emancipated. But when they are divested of this smṛti they can then recognize that no states of mentation viz. appearance, presence, change and disappearance, have any reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation with the one soul, for they are not self-existent. The enlightenment shows itself imperfectly in our corrupted phenomenal experience as prajñā (wisdom) and karma (incomprehensible activity of life). Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are mere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is identical and non-identical with enlightenment; and therefore ignorance is in one sense destructible though in another sense it is indestructible. When the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and clean, is stirred by the wind of ignorance (avidyā), the waves of mentality (vijñāna) make their appearance. These three (i.e. the mind, ignorance and mentality) however, have no existence, and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the essence of wisdom remains unmolested. It is by the touch of ignorance (avidyā) that the truth assumes all the phenomenal forms of existence. Non-enlightenment is the raison d’être of sāṁsāra. In describing the relation of the interaction of avidyā (ignorance), karma-vijñāna (activity consciousness—the subjective mind), viśaya (external world—represented by the senses), and the tathatā (suchness), Aśvaghosa says that there is an interperfuming of these elements. Thus Aśvaghosa says ‘By perfuming we mean that while our worldly clothes (viz. those which we wear) have no odour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they can yet acquire one or the other odour according to the nature of the substance with which they are perfumed. Suchness (tathatā) is
likewise a pure dharma free from all defilements caused by the perfuming power of ignorance. On the other hand ignorance has nothing to do with purity. Nevertheless we speak of its being able to do the work of purity because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness. Determined by suchness ignorance becomes the raison d'être of all forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness and produces smṛti. This smṛti in its turn perfumes ignorance. On account of this (reciprocal) perfuming, the truth is misunderstood. On account of its being misunderstood, an external world of subjectivity appears. Further, on account of the perfuming power of memory, various modes of individuation are produced. And by clinging to them various deeds are done, and we suffer, as the result, miseries mentally as well as bodily. This is Aśvaghoeśa’s idea of the genesis of the world process. Suchness determines ignorance, and this determined ignorance causes all forms of defilement. There is apparent perfuming of suchness by ignorance, and the result is the production of smṛti. This smṛti together with the ignorance then produces misunderstanding of truth by the process of mutual perfuming. This misunderstanding of truth in its turn is responsible for the appearance of the external world of subjectivity. Then follow all sorts of mental and physical miseries, in one word, saṁsāra. But this saṁsāra has to be got rid of. Aśvaghoeśa describes the process leading to nirvāṇa as follows. Suchness perfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming the individual in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death and to seek after the blessing of nirvāṇa. This longing and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn perfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we are enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves of suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and we also recognize that all phenomena in the world are nothing but illusory manifestations of the mind (ālaya-vijñāna) and have no reality of their own. Since we thus rightly understand the truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform those actions which are in accordance with the dharma. We should neither particularize, nor cling to objects of desire. By virtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innumerable (asaṁkhyaṁ) kalpa the ignorant are annihilated. As ignorance is thus annihilated, the mind (ālaya-vijñāna) is no longer disturbed, so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no longer disturbed, the particularization of the surrounding world is annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition of defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all annihilated, it is said that we attain nirvāṇa and that various spontaneous displays of activity are accomplished.1

This is Aśvaghoṣa’s conception of the nature, function and annihilation of avidyā. On the difference of general outlook of the idealism of Laṅkāvatāra and the doctrines of Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna, Dr. Dasgupta says: ‘The Laṅkāvatāra admitted a reality only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas (heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self (ātman). But Aśvaghoṣa plainly admitted an unspeakable reality as the ultimate truth. Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamika doctrines which eclipsed the profound philosophy of Aśvaghoṣa seem to be more faithful to the traditional Buddhist creed and to the Vijñānavāda creed of Buddhism as explained in the Laṅkāvatāra.’

There is nothing peculiar in the conceptions of avidyā of the other schools of Buddhist thought such as the Mādhyamika and the like, and so we do not refer to those schools. Of course, there is difference among them as regards the nature of reality and as such there is consequent difference in their conception of the nature and function of avidyā. But our above enquiry is sufficient to give an idea of the various Buddhist conceptions of avidyā inasmuch as those conceptions are only restatements in some form or other of the conceptions we have already discussed.

Let us now study the Śaiva conception of avidyā.

VIII

AVIDYA IN THE ŚAIVA SCHOOL

There are two schools of Śaiva philosophy: (1) monistic and (2) dualistic. We shall deal with the dualistic school in the beginning and in the end briefly notice the standpoint of the other school.

Dualistic Saivism

Dualistic Śaivism accepts the duality of spirit and matter and also believes in the plurality of spirits (souls). It also believes in the existence of a transcendent Being, known as Paramaśiva (or simply Śiva), Mahēśvara or Paśupati, who is eternally free and is of the nature of pure consciousness and perfect will. Besides this transcendent Being and the plurality of individual souls, there is bindu or mahāmāyā (pure matter) which is the material stuff of the higher and pure order of evolution, and māyā (impure matter) which is the material stuff of the lower and impure order of creation.

The innate nature of every soul is similar to that of Śiva. But it lies obscured and is to be recovered and reinstated. The search for

the ultimate cause of this obscuration leads to the postulation of avidyā which, in Śaivism, is regarded as a positive entity, called mala (taint or contamination), whose essential function is to reduce the inherent powers—such as omniscience, omnipotence, absence of desires and freedom from spatial and temporal limitations—of the soul to their minimum. Under the stress of mala, the soul loses its freedom of consciousness and will and is known as ātu (atomic) because of the reduction of its innate powers to anutvā (atomic measure). It has lost its sivatvā (perfection) and is known as āsū (animal). The mala that reduces the powers of the soul to anutvā (atomicity) is known as ānava-mala. This is the most fundamental form of pāśa (trap that binds the soul to the wheel of worldly existence). There are other forms of pāśa as well. Let us study in brief the nature of these forms.

Let us begin with the mala-pāśa, the fundamental function whereof has been just stated. Mala-pāśa is a unitary entity with manifold powers. It obscures the power of consciousness and the freedom of will. It lies mixed up with the soul. Even as the husk lies mixed up with rice and is the cause of the further production of root, sprout etc. of rice, exactly so the mala lies mixed up with the soul and is the cause of its ever-repeating embodied mundane existence. It can, however, be disentangled from the soul, thereby enabling it to regain its divine nature, even as the dark colour of copper can be removed from it resulting in its restoration to its pristine nature of pure gold.1 Mala is beginningless and is responsible for the paśutvā (animality) of the soul2 which is potentially of the nature of Siva with unlimited consciousness and power. It is the existence of this mala that justifies the Divine Will of Siva to actuate the evolution of the material stuff for the sake of those souls that are associated with it.3 Mala is uncaused, constant and eternal.4 It is one, but because of its varied powers it can cover the different souls so that the emancipation of one soul does not involve the emancipation of all others.5

Next we come to the second form of pāśa called karma-pāśa. The obscured and suppressed omnipotence (sarvakarttvā) of the soul, associated with mala, finds expression in imperfect activities of the body, the sense-organ of speech and mind, which lead to the acquisi-

1 Cf. ekh hy anekaśaktir dṛk-kriyayoḥ chādako mala puṁsām tuṣakambukavaj jñeyas tāmrāśrita-kālimāvad vā.—TP, p. 56.
2 athā 'nādi-malaḥ puṁsām paśutvam parikṛttam.—Sataratnasāṅgraha, p. 36.
3 Cf. evaṁ māya yogī Śivechchāvaśad āvāpasya prasavabhikhamukhabhāvasya kalādi-kāryādeś ca tān-(malarūparān paṁkaṁ) nimittām itī—Ibid.
4 Cf. . . . . . . tasmin na karmavat pravāhānāditvān maṇavasya. kintu kāraṇābhāvād eva 'nāditvān māya-vat—Ibid. (Commentary), p. 37.
5 malayasay 'katve 'pi tadābhāraśaktinām ānunyāt tadāvāryaṁ āpi bhedād nai 'kamukta sarvamuktiprasāṅgah—Ibid. (Commentary), p. 38.
tion of invisible merits (dharma) and demerits (adharma) according as they are good or bad. These merits and demerits constitute karma-pāśa which is responsible for the worldly vicissitudes—the happy and unhappy experiences of the soul. The soul involved in the worldly process has lost its self-contained complacency (āptahāmatva) and is consequently driven into perpetual quest of the good things of the world in order to regain the lost paradise. It gets into possession of these good things in conformity with its deserts. Each soul has its own karma-pāśa which is beginningless in the sense that it had an unbroken continuity in the past and not in the sense that it is an unchanging invariable constant. Karman is ever changing. But its continuity had no break, because that would have resulted in the emancipation of the soul. It cannot be an invariable constant because in that case emancipation would never be possible.\(^1\) Karman matures during the period of dissolution and fructifies during the period of creation. It remains embedded in the principle of māyā (impure matter) during the dissolution and does not suffer attrition or destruction until its effects are experienced by the soul concerned.\(^2\)

The third form of pāśa is known as māyā-pāśa. Māyā (impure matter), as we have said, is the material stuff of the lower order of evolution. The soul ensnared by mala and karman gets entangled in the cosmic order evolved out of māyā. The body and sense-organs and the external world in which it has to live out its predetermined career are all evolved out of māyā which is their matrix. This māyā is not an unreal fiction. It is an eternal real entity which is ultimate and uncaused.\(^3\) It is as real and independent as mahāmāyā (pure matter) which is the material stuff of the higher order of evolution. Māyā is a pāśa (trap) inasmuch as it encases the soul and keeps it enmeshed by itself.

The fourth\(^4\) form of pāśa is constituted by mahāmāyā (pure matter) which is the material stuff of the pure order of creation. Mahāmāyā is pure matter and the bodies formed out of it are luminous. Only those souls which have destroyed their karma-pāśa and māyā-pāśa are entitled to have the luminous bodies evolved out of mahāmāyā, on the maturation of their mala and the consequent descent of the Divine Grace.

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1 Cf. karmā 'nādi pravāharūpena, na ca 'kasyai 'va karmaṇaḥ sarvadā 'vasthānena. tathā sati bhāvarūpasya karmāṇo 'nāditvenā 'tmavan nitya'taya 'nirmokṣaprasaṅgāt—TP (Commentary), p. 58.

2 Cf. svāpe vipākam abhyeti tat sṛṣṭv upayuyyate māyāyāṃ vartate cā 'nte nā 'bhuktām kṣayam eti ca.

—Śataratnasāṅgaraṇa, p. 57.

3 māyā ca vasturūpā mālāṃ viśvasya nityāḥ sa.—TP, p. 58.

4 Sometimes only the above three forms of pāśa are mentioned. But in that case the fourth and the fifth forms of pāśa viz. mahāmāyā and the Lord's rodha-sākṣi, are to be understood by implication. Vide TP (Commentary), p. 32.
The power of obscuration (rodha-śakti) belonging to the Lord Śiva is recognized as the fifth form of pāṣa. Lord Śiva is not responsible for the obscuration of the innate nature of the souls. But obscuration continues in the absence of the descent of His Grace and so the non-descent of Grace, because it apparently imitates the nature of a pāṣa, is conceived as the positive power of obscuration. Thus it is said that although the power of Maheśvara is auspicious and beneficent to all, yet because of its apparent imitation of the functions of mala, it is known as a pāṣa.\(^1\)

These are the five forms of pāṣa recognized in Śaivism. Of these, mala is the most fundamental. It corresponds to the avidyā of the other systems. The soul that is associated with the three pāṣas viz. mala, karman and māyā is known as sakala. The soul that is associated with only the two pāṣas viz. mala and karman is known as pralayākala. And the soul that has transcended the category of māyā and has only the mala-pāṣa is called vijnānākala. The vijnānākala soul, on the maturation of its mala and the consequent descent of the Divine Grace, rises up to the levels of the categories of vidyā (śuddha), īśvara or sadāśiva according to the extent of its spiritual development revealed in the manifestation of its kriyāśakti or the power of action (the manifestation of jñānaśakti or the power of knowledge being uniform in all cases). The consummation of spiritual development is reached on the attainment of śivatva (divine nature). It will not, in this connection, be out of place to relate in brief the way in which the soul gets rid of mala.

On the maturation of the mala and the approach of the termination of the influence of the obscuring power (tirodhāna-śakti) of the Lord, there is descent of Lord's Grace (anugraha-śakti).\(^2\) On the descent of the Grace, the soul begins to take interest in the attainment of emancipation and abhors worldly life.\(^3\) It can now discriminate the self from the not-self. And consequently an inquisitiveness for the nature of truth is born in it. Now the soul easily finds out a competent preceptor (guru) who gives dīkṣā (initiation) which ultimately disentangles it from the pāṣas. Śaivism regards dīkṣā as the most essential condition of emancipation. Pure consciousness and perfect will are inherent in a soul, but on account of its association with mala, these powers suffer obscuration which can be removed only by the Grace of Śiva. It is Śiva who, by means of His Supreme

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1 Cf. tāsāṁ māheśvarī śaktīḥ sarvānuḥśrīḥ śivā
dharmānuvartanād eva pāṣa ity upacaryate.—Sataratnasāṅgraha, p. 38.
2 Cf. tāmah-śakti-adhikārasya nivṛttas tat-paricayutau
vyanakti dṛk-kriyāṁantaryam jagadbhandur anopē Śivaḥ.—Ibid., p. 65.
3 Cf. yeśāṁ sarvāṅgāṁ śaktīḥ pataty avinīrśtaye
teśāṁ tallāṅgam autsukyaṁ muktau dveśo bhavasthitau.
—Ibid., p. 65.
Power (śakti), awakens the soul from its eternal sleep of delusion. And this is done through the instrumentality of a preceptor (guru) during the cosmic process, or directly without any such medium during the cosmic dissolution. The former is called sādhikaraṇa-dīkṣā (initiation through medium), and the latter nirādhikaraṇa-dīkṣā (initiation without medium). Dīkṣā removes the paśutva (animality) of the soul and restores it to its pristine śivatva (divine nature). The corrupting power of mala is destroyed by dīkṣā even as the killing power of poison is destroyed by incantation or antidotes, although the mala quā an innocuous appendage is still there.¹ The karmans accumulated in the past are destroyed and the karmans that might occur in the future are rendered impossible owing to the absence of their conditions. The karmans which are responsible for the present life, however, are to be exhausted by experience. As a potter's wheel goes on revolving, even after the jar has been produced for which it was set in motion, on account of the momentum, exactly so the present body continues to survive on account of the traces of past merits and demerits that are responsible for the present life. And on the fall of the body the soul shines in its eternal and all-comprehensive consciousness as śiva even as a lamp illumines all directions after the jar that covered it has been destroyed.²

Monistic Saivism

In the monistic school of Saivism, the Supreme Reality is Paramaśiva—the Absolute whose nature consists of pure consciousness and freedom.³ This Supreme Principle of free unimpeded consciousness reveals itself in the form of infinite worlds.⁴ By its twofold functions of self-concealment (sva-gopana) and self-limitation (sva-saṅkoca) it conceals its own nature and manifests itself in different forms, both subjective and objective.

In the process of manifestation, sometimes the aspect of consciousness is dominant over self-limitation and sometimes the aspect of self-limitation is dominant over consciousness. The dominance of consciousness, again, can be natural (sahajā) or acquired through effort (samādhi-prayatnopārijīta). The natural dominance of consciousness may, again, be with or without the expression of power (parāmarśa) inherent in it. In the former case, the resultant subject is known as vidyāpramātā. In the latter, it is vijñānākala. When the self-limitation

¹ Ibid., kārikā 87 and commentary (pp. 89-90).
² bhagne ghaṭe yathā dīpāḥ sarvataḥ samprakāśate
dehapāte tathaḥ ca "tām bhātī sarvatra sarvadā.—Ibid., p. 92.
³ Cf. citīḥ svatantrā viśvasiddhi-hetuḥ—Pratyabhijñākhyādaya, p. 2.
⁴ Cf. cid eva bhagavati svacchā-svatantra-rūpā tat-tad-anantajagadātmanā
  sphurati—Ibid., p. 3.
of the *vidyāpramātā* is eliminated to a small extent, the resultant is *īśvara*. When the elimination of self-limitation is carried to a greater extent the resultant is *sadāśiva*. And when the self-limitation is eliminated to the fullest extent, *śivatva* follows. The dominance of consciousness, acquired through effort, leads to the attainment of the different grades of spiritual development in the pure order (*suddhādīvan*). The dominance of self-limitation, on the other hand, results in the formation of lower grades of subjects *viz.* *pralayākala* and *sakala*.

Imperfection in the subject is consequent upon the intermixture of the elements of subjectivity (*ahantā*) and objectivity (*idantā*). Pure subject absolutely divorced from objectivity is *śiva*. Subjectivity and objectivity are mutually antagonistic and can respectively be compared to light and darkness. The supremacy of subjectivity necessarily presupposes subordination of the objective element and *vice versa*. The absolute supremacy of subjectivity, as in the transcendent state of *śiva*, is accompanied with a total negation of objectivity. Similarly, the absolute supremacy of objectivity, as in the case of *pralayākala* and the lower states of the soul, is accompanied with the subordination of pure subjectivity. This antagonism of subjectivity and objectivity is resolved in the state of *Paramāśiva* which is at once transcendent (*viśvottīrṇa*) and immanent (*viśvātmaka*).

Let us now study the genesis of the threefold *mala—āṇava, māyiya* and *kārma*—which is responsible for the worldly career of the soul.

When the Supreme Reality by the free exercise of its own autonomous will elects to submerge its pervasion of identity and adopts differentiation of itself, its powers of will, and the like, though unrestricted, appear to be restricted and it appears in the role of an individuated self caught in the meshes of transmigration. The self-chosen diminution of will-power is the imperfection called *āṇava-mala*—the dirt inducing atomicity. Under its influence the unchecked freedom of will suffers attrition in scope and intensity and induces a sense of incompleteness and imperfection (*apūrṇamanyatā*). When the infinite knowledge-power of the Supreme Reality likewise undergoes progressive contraction and diminution it loses the character of omniscience and deteriorates into a limited capacity for knowledge of limited objects, and the climax is reached when the knowledge-power

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4 Cf. tathā cā 'pratihata-svātantrya-rūpā ichchāśaktih saṅkucitā satī apūrṇamanyatā-rūpam āṇavaṁ malam.—*Ibid.*
is reduced to the status of the inner sense (the mind) and the external senses of cognition. The consequence of this stage is the appearance of objects as numerically different from the subject and this is called māyiya-mala.¹ Similarly when the unlimited power of action suffers a set-back, omnipotence is reduced to the form of motor organs (karmendriya). In consequence of this limitation, performance of deeds (good and evil) becomes possible. This constitutes the kārma-mala.² On the other hand, the limitation of omnipotence, omniscience, self-contained complacency, eternity and ubiquity in the Supreme Self results in the genesis of the five principles of kalā (limited power of action), (aśuddha-) vidyā (imperfect knowledge), rāga (attachment), kāla (time) and niyati (spatial limitation) respectively. This is the process whereby the Supreme Reality imposes upon itself the limitations of worldly life and appears as an imperfect mundane soul devoid of powers (sakti-daridra).³

Of the three forms of mala, ānava-mala is the most fundamental. It corresponds, as we have already noticed, to the principle of avidyā of the other systems. Broadly speaking, the Highest Reality has two aspects, Consciousness and Freedom, which in the supreme state are mutually inseparable and in fact identical. But before the first cosmic process sets in the two are split up so that Consciousness is divorced from Freedom, and Freedom is divorced from Consciousness. Consciousness without Freedom and Freedom without Consciousness are therefore rightly regarded as the two forms of ānava-mala.⁴

Now it is clear that oblivion of true nature of Self as Consciousness-cum-Freedom is ānava-mala. This oblivion is also known as spiritual ignorance (paruruṣa-ajñāna). There is yet another type of ignorance known as intellectual ignorance (bauddha-ajñāna) which originates after the soul has been involved in mundane existence under the influence of kārma-mala and māyiya-mala both of which derive from ānava-mala.⁵ It is the removal of the spiritual ignorance only that leads to emancipation. The spiritual processes such as dīkṣā (initiation) and the like lead to the removal of the spiritual ignorance. In the presence of intellectual ignorance, the removal of spiritual ignorance is unable to produce jīvanmukti or emancipation during life. True emancipation in this case takes place on the fall of the present

¹ Cf. jñānaśaktiḥ . . . . bhinnavedyapratibhāṛupaṁ māyiyaṁ malam
² kriyāśaktiḥ . . . . śubhāśubhānuśṭhānamayaṁ kārmaṁ malam
—Ibid., p. 22.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Cf. svatāntrayāhānir bodhasya svatāntrayasya 'py abodhatā
dvidhā 'ḥavamalam idaṁ svavarūpāpahānītaṁ.
⁵ Vide ibid., pp. 55-57.
body. If, however, in the mean time the intellectual ignorance has disappeared on account of the rise of intellectual enlightenment through yoga and other processes, the soul attains to a sense of its identity with the Supreme Reality and consequent emancipation in that very condition of embodied existence (i.e. jīvanmukti).

Monistic Śaivism has chalked out a number of processes for the attainment of emancipation, which have distinctive originality of their own. But in order to avoid unnecessary prolixity we do not relate them in this connection.

We now come to the Jaina conception of avidyā.

IX

AVIDYĀ IN THE JAINA SCHOOL

‘I am this, this is I, I am of this, mine is this—everything that is non-self, living, non-living or mixed. Mine was all this formerly; I was all this in the past; again will this be mine and I shall again be this. The deluded one (sammūḍha) possesses all these false notions about the self. The undeluded, however, knowing the truth, does not do so.’

In Jainism the term mithyātva (perversity) is generally used to denote the idea of avidyā. The terms mithyādarśana or mithyādrṣṭi (wrong view), darśanamohā (delusion of vision), mohā (delusion) etc. are also used in the same sense. The opposite of mithyātva is samyaktva, also known as samyagdarśana (right view). The soul is associated with various kinds of karmans and darśana-mohā is one of them. The karmans obstruct the various capacities of the soul and keep it tied to the wheel of worldly existence. Thus the jñānāvaraṇa (knowledge-covering) kārman covers the soul’s capacity to know, the darśanāvaraṇa (intuition-covering) kārman covers the capacity to intuit, and so on. The function of darśanamohā is to delude the soul and misguide it. Many wrong notions about truth and reality arise due to its influence. It vitiates the whole outlook and is responsible for the wrong assessment of ultimate values. Mithyātva (perversity of outlook) expresses itself in various ways. Under its influence, one accepts the adharma (wrong religion) as the dharma (right religion), the amagga (wrong path) as the magga (right path), the ajīva (non-soul) as the jīva (soul),

1 Cf. tatra dīkṣādīnā paumāsnam ajñānam dhvāṃsi yadyāpi tathāpi taccharīrante tajjñānam vyajyate spuṣṭam.—Ibid., p. 79.
2 Cf. bauddha-jñānena tu yadā bauddham ajñāna-jrmbhitam vilīyate tadā jīvan-muktri karatala sthitā.—Ibid., p. 81.
3 Kundakunda’s Samayaprābhṛta, 25-27 with commentaries (Kashi, 1914).
4 Videinfra, Chap. IV. Section III, 2nd paragraph.
the asāhu (sinner) as the sāhu (saint), the amulta (unemancipated) as the mutta (emancipated) and vice-versa. Umāsvāti divides mithyā-darśana into two categories viz. abhirghīta (firmly held) and anabhirghīta (lightly held). The acceptance of a wrong view and obstinate tenacity for it is abhirghīta and the opposite of it is anabhirghīta. The difference between the two is determined by the degree of the intensity and tenacity of the adherence to perversity. Kundakunda says that mithyātva (perversion), ajñāna (nescience), and avirati (intense attachment) are the three beginnigless forms of the consciousness informed with moha (delusion). Pūjyapāda Devanandi notices twofold mithyādarsana viz. (1) inborn (naisargika) and (2) acquired from instructions of others (paropadesa-pūrvaka). What is due simply to the rising of the mithyātva (vision-deluding) karman is naisargika (inborn), while there are four varieties of the latter according as it belongs to a kriyā-vādin (believer in moral and spiritual action), akriyā-vādin (non-believer in moral and spiritual action), ajñānin (agnostic), or vainayika (credulous person). Pūjyapāda notices also a different way of classification of mithyādarsana into (1) ekānta, (2) viparīta, (3) saṁśaya, (4) vainayika, and (5) ajñāna. Absolutistic prejudice is ekānta-mithyādarsana. Perverted conviction is viparīta. Scepticism is the third. Indiscriminate faith in every god and every scripture is vainayika. Absence of discrimination between good and bad is ajñānika-mithyādarsana. The fourth Karmagrantha, however, notices these five varieties: (1) abhirghika, (2) anabhirghika, (3) abhiniveśika, (4) saṁśayika, and (5) anābhoja. Obstinate insular attachment to the wrong view is abhirghika-mithyādarsana. The opposite of this, that is, indiscriminate faith in the veracity of each and every view is anābhirghika. Attachment to a view in spite of the knowledge that it is wrong is abhiniveśika. Sceptic attitude even towards what is well established is saṁśayika. What is due to the incapacity of the mind to think and is found in such organisms as have not developed all the sense-organs is anābhoja-mithyādarsana. These different ways of classification do not mean different conceptions. They are at best various modes of illustrating the workings of the self-same mithyātva (perversion). Mithyādarsana (perverse view) lies at the root of all evils, and whatever misery there is in the life of a soul is ultimately due to it. It is the darkest period of a soul’s life when

1 SthŚa, X, 1, 734.  
2 Bhāgya, TSa, VIII, 1.  
3 uvaagassa aparipāma tiṣṇi mohajuttassa micchattah anānaṁ aviradhibhavo ya nādavvo.—Samanāsāra, 96.  
4 SSi on TSa, VIII, 1. Cf. also ŚaKṣ, Samosaraṇajhayāya. In this connection see also the Bhāgya and Siddhasenaganṭi’s Tīkā on TSa, VIII, 1.  
5 Fourth Karmagrantha, 51. See also the svopajṭa commentary.  
6 Cf. saṁsāramāla-bījan micchattaṁ—Bhattapariṇāyaya, IV, 59.  

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there is unhindered working of this mithyātva. The soul gropes in the
darkness, formulates wrong views about truth, and treads upon many
a path, none leading to the region of light. The mithyātva-karman
lies heavy on it, and blockades all paths leading to light. Samyaktva
or samyagdarśana dawns only when the potency of this mithyātva-
karman is reduced and made ineffective to an appreciable extent in
course of time naturally or due to the influence of the instructions
of persons who know the truth. The mithyātva has no beginning in time.
It is there from all eternity. Why a soul is subject to it is a question
too difficult to answer, or rather it is too much to ask because it is a
question of fact and not of reason. And because it is coeval with the
self it cannot be set down to an adventitious condition which is the
usual mode of solution of problems. In one sense, the question is as
absurd as the question ‘Why should the self exist?’ The existence of
the self is an ultimate fact and the existence of delusion coevel with it
is equally an ultimate fact to which no question of origination can be
relevant. The mithyātva is there, and it is not that we do not know
its nature. Its nature and functions are well known. We also know
its conditions. We do not know the beginning because it has no
beginning. Why should we hesitate to accept a fact if our experience
does not contradict it? The Jaina attitude is too realistic to abandon
the verdict of experience, to speculate about possible answers to such
ultimate issues, and as a result to adjust or compromise the facts of
common experience. The Jaina philosophers, in matters of logical
thinking, strictly follow the verdict of experience and do not surrender
experience to abstract reasoning. The mithyātva, therefore, is
accepted as beginningless on the basis of uncontradicted experience and
also because no beginning can be postulated without self-contradiction.
In course of time, the soul attains purification, and the samyagdarśana
(right attitude) dawns upon it. The soul naturally proceeds towards it,
and depends very little upon extraneous help. Of course, sometimes
the progress is hastened due to the influence of the instructions of
others. The main urge, however, comes from within. The dawning
of samyaktva (right attitude) is attended by radical change in the out-
look. The whole horizon changes. Samyagdarśana (right attitude) is
a kind of purified state of consciousness, that enables the soul to realize
and comprehend the things as they are. Samyagjñāna (right knowledge)
presupposes samyagdarśana (right attitude). In the absence of right
attitude, the knowledge cannot be right. How can there be pure know-
ledge if the self that knows is impure? Similarly, samyakcārita (right
conduct) presupposes right attitude and right knowledge. And these
three viz. right attitude, right knowledge, and right conduct constitute

1 See Haribhadra’s Dharmasaṅgrahaṇi, gāthās, 570-575.
the pathway to emancipation. Let us now study the problem more closely.

Mithyā-darśana (perverse attitude), avirati (non-abstinence), pramāda (spiritual inertia), kaśīya (passions), and yoga (activity)—these five are the conditions of bondage. Of these five, the succeeding ones necessarily exist on the existence of the preceding ones, although it is not necessary that the preceding ones should exist on the existence of the succeeding ones. We can also classify the causes of bondage into these three viz. mithyā-darśana (perverse view), mithyā-jñāna (perverse knowledge) and mithyā-cāitra (perverse conduct). The worldly existence is due to the joint working of these three and so it is the destruction of all these three that leads to emancipation. Perverse view or wrong attitude vitiates the whole outlook, and consequently whatever knowledge or action there is becomes vitiated (mithyā). The perversity of knowledge and conduct depends upon the perversity of attitude. The perverse attitude (mithyā-darśana) defiles, as it were, the very texture of the soul, and it is but natural that all the functions of the soul should be defiled. Purification of the attitude (darśana), therefore, is regarded as the sine qua non of the purification of the knowledge (jñāna) and conduct (cāitra). Explaining the reason why the selfsame mati-jñāna, śruti-jñāna and avadhi-jñāna become maty-ajñāna, śrutā-’jñāna and avadhy-ajñāna (or vibhaṅga), Umāsvāti says: ‘These (mati, śruti and avadhi), when informed with mithyā-darśana (wrong attitude), comprehend the thing as it is not, and thus are ajñāna (wrong cognition).’ Even as the knowledge of a mad man is necessarily ajñāna, although by chance sometimes it hits upon the truth, exactly so the knowledge of one whose soul is vitiated by mithyā-darśana (perverse attitude) is of necessity ajñāna in spite of its empirical validity by accident. The knowledge can be right (samyak) only if the attitude or outlook (darśana) is right. Similarly, the rightness of conduct depends upon the rightness of knowledge. On the relation of right attitude (samyag-darśana), right knowledge (samyag-jñāna) and right conduct (samyak-cāitra), Umāsvāti says: ‘Of these, the succeeding one is not necessarily acquired on the acquisition of the preceding one. The acquisition of the preceding one, however, is of necessity there on the

1 samyag-darśana-jñāna-cāitraṇi mokṣa-mārgaḥ—TSū, I. 1.
2 TSū, VIII. 1.
3 Bhāṣya on TSū, VIII. 1.
4 Cf. samyag-darśana-jñāna-cāitraṇi mokṣamārga ity ādyasātra-sāmarthyāt mithyā-darśana-jñāna-cāitraṇi sānasāramārga iti siddheḥ—TSIV, p. 72 (TSū, I. 1.).
5 mithyā-darśana-parigrāhād viparīta-grāhakatvam eṣeṣām. tasmād ajñānāni bhavanti—Bhāṣya, TSū, I. 32. Also see NSū, 25, 41; ViBh, 527, 528, 534.
6 Cf. Bhāṣya, TSū, I. 33; also ViBh, 115.
acquisition of the succeeding one.\(^1\) Siddhasenaṇaṁ records two different interpretations\(^2\) of this statement of Umāsvāti. In the first interpretation, right attitude is regarded as quite distinct and separate from right knowledge. In the second, the right attitude is considered as simply a specific determinate state, of the nature of inclination, of the mati-jiñāna.\(^3\) Accordingly, in the first interpretation, the above statement of Umāsvāti is held as referring to the relation among the three \textit{viz.} (1) right attitude, (2) right knowledge and (3) right conduct while, in the second, it is interpreted as referring to the relation between the two \textit{viz.} (1) right attitude together with right knowledge and (2) right conduct. The first interpretation seems to be more natural and faithful to the text although in view of Umāsvāti’s conception of right attitude the second interpretation is not altogether incompatible. Umāsvāti defines right attitude (samyag-darśana) as śraddhāna for the ‘truth, and explains śraddhāna as prayayāvadhāraṇa, that is, discursive determination.\(^4\) He further characterizes samyag-darśana as ‘invariable grasping of all the objects of the sense-organs and the mind.’\(^5\) Umāsvāti thus clearly admits samyag-darśana as a kind of knowledge. In this connection the view of Siddhasena Divākara that the term darśana is used for the abhinibodhika (i.e. mati-jiñāna) of a person who takes to heart the principles revealed by the omniscient deserves careful notice.\(^6\) Jinabhadra says that samyaktva is to be distinguished from śruta (scriptural knowledge) even as the determinate knowledge (jiñāna) is to be distinguished from indeterminate intuition (darśana). Even as apāya (perceptual judgment) and dharanā (retention) are regarded as knowledge (jiñāna) while avagraha and ihā (relatively) considered as darśana so also samyaktva is to be regarded as predilection for the truth (tattva-ruci) while what grasps that truth should be regarded as jiñāna.\(^7\) Samyag-darśana and samyag-jiñāna are born simultaneously. But even then they are not identical. They are, related as cause and effect. ‘Even as a lamp and its light, though simultaneously born, are separate as cause and effect, so is samyaktva, though simultaneously born, the logical prius, as opposed to chronological priority, of (samyag) jiñāna. The samyaktva, though simultaneously born, purifies

\(^1\)  
\(^2\)  
\(^3\)  
\(^4\)  
\(^5\)  
\(^6\)  
\(^7\)
the jñāna even as the powder of kataka (Strychnos Potatorum) purifies turbid rain-water.\textsuperscript{1} Pūjyapāda Devanandi, admitting the simultaneous emergence of samyag-darśana (right attitude) and samyag-jñāna (right knowledge), says that as soon as the consciousness gets possession of samyag-darśana (right attitude) due to the subsidence, destruction, or subsidence-cum-destruction of the darśana-moha (attitude-deluding karmān), its maty-ajñāna and śrutā-'jñāna disappear and there emerge mati-jñāna and śruta-jñāna just like the emergence of heat and light of the sun on the displacement of the clouds.\textsuperscript{2} Samyag-darśana (right attitude) is superior to samyag-jñāna (right knowledge) inasmuch as the latter derives its appellation ‘samyak’ from the former.\textsuperscript{3} There is unanimity among the Jain thinkers as regards the simultaneous occurrence of samyag-darśana and samyag-jñāna. And we have noticed above the view of Siddhasena Divākara and the alternative interpretation referred to by Siddhasenagaṇin in his commentary on the nature of samyag-darśana and its relation with samyag-jñāna. Samyag-darśana can be considered as that purified state of consciousness which enables it to know the truth as it is. It is the state of freedom from wrong intuition of truth. It is the ground of samyag-jñāna (right knowledge). Then comes samyak-cāritra (right conduct). The Jain philosophers gave as much importance to cāritra (conduct) as to jñāna (knowledge) and darśana (predilection for truth). If samyag-darśana turns the soul in the right direction and samyag-jñāna illuminates the path, samyak-cāritra (right conduct or rectified will) leads to the goal. Let us study the problem of the relation of darśana, jñāna and cāritra in some detail.

The Uttarādhyayana says: ‘One devoid of right attitude (darśana) cannot have right knowledge (jñāna) and there cannot be rectitude of will (carāṇa-guṇa) without right knowledge (jñāna). One devoid of the rectitude of will cannot have emancipation from evil will, and one devoid of emancipation from evil will (induced by karmān) cannot attain final emancipation.’\textsuperscript{4} We have seen how closely samyag-darśana and samyag-jñāna are related. Let us now see the respective functions of jñāna (knowledge) and cāritra (conduct). The Āvaśyaka-niruṅkha says that conduct (carāṇa) is the fulfilment of the scriptural knowledge (śruta-jñāna), while emancipation (nirvāṇa) is the fulfilment

\textsuperscript{1} kāraṇa-kajja-vibhāgo diva-pagāsāṇa jugavajamme vi jugavuppannaṁ pi tathā heśī nāṇassa sammattanā.
jugavaṁ pi samuppannāṁ sammattanā ahigamaṁ visohei jaha kayagamaṁjaṇāi jala-vuṭṭhio visohiṁti.

—Quoted in Brhadṛṣṭṭi on Viṣṇu, 536.

\textsuperscript{2} See SSi on TSū, I. 1.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{4} nā ‘darśanapi nāpani nāṇena vinā na huni carāṇa-guṇā
aguṇissa nattthi mokkho nattthi amokkhasa nivvāṇaṁ.

—UTSū, XXVIII. 30.
of conduct.¹ 'One, even though possessed of scriptural knowledge, does not attain emancipation if one fails to bear the austerities of tapas (penance) and saṁyama (restraint and discipline) which constitute right conduct. Just as a vessel, although having an expert pilot, does not cross the great ocean and reach the shore desired by the trader in the absence of wind, even so a soul-vessel, although competent, being possessed of jñāna (knowledge) as its guide, does not reach the abode of the emancipated in the absence of the wind of spiritual penance and discipline.'² Training and discipline of the intellect without the training and discipline of the will does not lead to freedom. The disciplined will is rather the logical condition of the disciplined reason, and one finds its fulfilment in the other. Without this fulfilment, the mere intellectual culture is a cripple and mere moral culture implied by discipline of the will without intellectual illumination is blind. 'Even as a donkey carrying sandalwood enjoys only the weight and not the sandalwood itself, exactly so does one, possessed of knowledge (jñāna) without will (carāṇa), enjoys only the knowledge and not its consumption viz. emancipation. Futile indeed is knowledge without will (kriyā). Even so is will futile without knowledge. A lame man was burnt in spite of his sight while a blind man caught fire even though fleeing.'³ Knowledge enlightens, penance purifies, and restraint protects.⁴ Even omniscience is not immediately followed by emancipation. Jinasabhadra says that right conduct (cārita) is even superior to right knowledge (jñāna) inasmuch as the soul is not necessarily emancipated immediately after attaining complete and perfect knowledge while it is at once freed on the acquisition of complete and consummate discipline (saṁvara), that is, cārita.⁵ Right knowledge and spiritual discipline (kriyā) are equally necessary for emancipation, although the latter is considered as the immediate condition of it. The soul has to destroy by means of the perfection of discipline (cārita) the residual karmans even when it has destroyed the mohaniya (deluding), jñānāvarana (knowledge-covering), darśanāvarana (intuition-covering) and antarāya (obstructing) karmans, and has attained perfect and pure knowledge and intuition. Thus technically speaking cārita is the proximate condition of emancipation.⁶ This is, in brief, the mutual

¹ tassa vi sāro caraṇaṁ sāro caraṇassa nivvānaṁ.—ViBh, 1126 (ĀNir gāthā).
² ViBh, 1143, 1145, 1146 (ĀNir gāthās).
³ ViBh, 1158-9 (ĀNir gāthās).
⁴ nāṇaṁ payāsayanā sohaba tavo saṁjamo ya guttikaro.—ViBh, 1169 (ĀNir gāthā).
⁵ ViBh, 1131.
⁶ One who has attained perfection of knowledge and has become omniscient is necessarily possessed of right conduct. The conduct, however, has not reached its consummation which is attained only in the last moment of worldly existence, when the soul is in the fourth stage of śukladhyāna. (Vide infra, Chap. V. Section II, last paragraph but three).
relation of samyag-darśana (right attitude towards truth), samyag-jñāna (right knowledge), and samyak-cārītra (right conduct).

We have now seen that, according to the Jaina thinkers, mithyā-darśana (perverse attitude), mithyā-jñāna (perverse knowledge), and mithyā-cārītra (perverse conduct or will) are the conditions of bondage, that is, worldly existence while samyag-darśana, samyag-jñāna, and samyak-cārītra constitute the pathway to emancipation. The soul possesses a number of capacities such as consciousness, vision, knowledge, intuition, energy, bliss and the like, which are obstructed by the different karmans, and the result is worldly existence. These capacities find expression in their mutilated and imperfect forms while the soul is in bondage. On the attainment of emancipation, the soul reveals these capacities in their natural form. When the capacity for right vision (darśana) is obstructed, there is mithyā-darśana. When the capacity for right knowledge is mutilated there is mithyā-jñāna. When there is obstruction of the energy of the soul there is mithyā-cārītra. Bondage, in the ultimate analysis, consists in the obstructed and mutilated condition of the various capacities of the soul. That the soul has these capacities is a matter of common experience. On many an occasion we feel that there is something wrong in our attitude, that there is some flaw in our knowledge, that there is some check on our energy. On many an occasion, again, we become conscious of our capacity for right vision, our competency for infinite knowledge, our strength against the corruptions of the world. On the basis of these experiences, we can postulate different capacities of the soul. And this is what the Jaina thinkers did. The capacities of the soul are obstructed in various ways due to various causes. These capacities can be classified into three groups viz. right (samyak) attitude or predilection (darśana), right knowledge, and right conduct, their corresponding mutilated forms being perverted (mithyā) attitude, perverted knowledge, and perverted conduct. Accordingly, the Jaina thinkers did not accept the view that perverted knowledge (mithyā-jñāna) alone is the cause of bondage. Perverted knowledge is only one of the three causes of bondage, the other two being perverted attitude (mithyā-darśana), and perverted conduct (mithyā-cārītra). We shall now record in brief the objections of the Jaina philosopher against the view that perverted knowledge alone is the cause of bondage.

Vidyānandi sums up the implication of the position of the upholders of knowledge alone as the cause of emancipation as follows: The philosophers who hold that knowledge alone is the sole cause of emancipation must have to admit that the exhaustion, by enjoyment,
of the operative karmān which is responsible for the embodied existence is only an ancillary condition of emancipation.¹ The soul remains embodied for a while even after it has attained the knowledge of the truth (tattva-jñāna) in order to enjoy the fruits of the operative karmāns. The Saṅkhya maintains that the self (puruṣa) remains embodied for some time, even after the attainment of perfect knowledge, due to the residual traces of dharma (religious merit) etc. just like the revolution of a wheel due to momentum even after the actual impetus has been withdrawn.² The Vaiśeṣika upholds that the soul has to exhaust, by enjoyment, the stored merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) before it attains final emancipation on the removal of its nescience (ajñāna).³ The Vedāntins also admit the existence of embodied beings who are free from bondage (jīvanmukta). The Buddhists too have to admit some interval between the dawning of truth and the attainment of emancipation (nirvāṇa). Vidyānandi now asks: 'How is that enjoyment of the fruits of the (operative and stored) karmāns possible? Is it done (automatically) in due time? Or is it due to special effort?'⁴ He who has realized the truth (tattva-jñāna) does not accept rebirth for the enjoyment of the residual karmāns, and therefore he has to enjoy the karmāns in that very life. And this implies capacity for special effort to enjoy the karmāns before time. Otherwise there would be no emancipation in all times to come. The karmāns which generally give fruits in different births are to be enjoyed in this very life, for it is unanimously admitted that one who has realized the truth does not take rebirth for the enjoyment of these karmāns. This enjoyment of fruits before due time presupposes an effort on the part of the soul. And this effort is a type of cāritra. The Yoga admits enjoyment of the accumulated karmāns by a special kind of effort. That special effort is nothing but the practice of samādhi (meditation and ecstasy). Special powers are achieved by samādhi. By these powers, one creates a number of bodies and enjoys the fruits of the accumulated karmāns by means of them.⁵ The Naiyāyika also admits the creation of a plurality of bodies (kāyavyūha) for the enjoyment of the karmāns which is in course of fruition (prārabdha) for the sake of speedy attain-

¹ Cf. phalopabhogena sañcitakarmaṇaṁ prakṣayayaḥ saṁyag-jñānasya muktyut-pattau saha-kāri jñāna-mātrātmaka-mokṣakāraṇavādāṇāṁ iṣṭo na punar anyo 'sādhanaṇaḥ kaścit—TSIV, p. 66. In this passage sañcita should be interpreted as operative (prārabdha) karmān.  
² Vide supra, p. 100.  
³ Vide supra, p. 112.  
⁴ sa ca phalopabhogo yathākālam upakramaviśeṣād vā karmāṇāṃ syāt—TSIV, p. 66.  
⁵ Cf. yasmād upakrama-viśeṣāt karmaṇaṁ phalopbhogo yo yo 'bhimaṅgha sa samādhīr eva tattvataṁ sambhāvyate, samādhāv uttāpā-pita-dharma-jañātiyāṁ ṛddhau nānā-saṅrāti-nirmāṇadwāreṇa sañcita-karma-phalānubhavasye 'ṣṭatvāt—TSIV, p. 66. See also YD, IV. 4 with Bhāṣya.
ment of emancipation (āpavarga). The Brahmāsūtra too admits that the prārabdha-karma is to be destroyed by enjoyment (bhoga).

It is thus admitted by all that the soul remains embodied for some time even after the realization of the truth (tattva-jñāna), and some of them also admit the efficacy of yoga or samādhi to enable one to enjoy the fruits of the karmas before the due time of their fruition. The continued embodiment of the soul even after the realization of the truth implies that there is yet some defect to eradicate. The Jainas maintain that this defect is to be eradicated by samyak-cārita consisting in the third and the fourth stages of sukhādyāna, which corresponds to the final samādhi of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. We are thus led to admit mithyā-cārita—consisting in non-abstinence (avirati), passions (kaśāya), spiritual inertia (pramāda), and activity (yoga)—in addition to perverted cognition (mithyā-jñāna) as the condition of worldly existence.

If perverted cognition were the only condition of worldly existence there must occur final emancipation immediately on the attainment of complete and perfect knowledge. But as the soul continues with its embodied existence for some time even after the attainment of complete and perfect enlightenment, it has got to be admitted, as has been shown, that there was some other defect that did not disappear with the disappearance of the perverted cognition. This defect is the absence of the total stoppage of physical activities (technically known as yoga in Jaina philosophy). The perfect state is to be achieved by the perfection of all the three viz., predilection or attitude (darśana), knowledge (jñāna), and conduct (cārita). The perfect conduct is attained when all the activities cease and the soul attains final emancipation. Until then the bondage exists. Moreover, if the perverted cognition alone were the condition of the worldly existence, there would be no enlightened person to reveal the truth. Vidyānandī says: 'Those who maintain that perverted cognition (viparyaya) is the main cause of worldly existence (bhava) cannot (logically) postulate the existence of the enlightened one living in the world.' How can one exist in the world when the condition of existence therein is not present? Viparyaya or the perverted cognition was the condition, and that condition is not present in the enlightened one. How can he then continue to exist in the world? If it is contended that on the attainment of complete and perfect knowledge there is only further non-origination of new perverted cognition while the past perverted

2 See BS, IV. I. 19. Intra, Chap. V. Section II, last paragraph but three.
3 maulo hetur bhavasye 'ṣṭo yeṣāṁ tāva viparyayahi teṣām udbhātabodhasya ghaṭate na bhavasthitih.—TSIV, p. 72.

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cognition due to past demerit still continues and so the existence in the world is not incompatible with the attainment of perfect knowledge, then it would follow that there yet exist defects (doṣa) originating from the perverted cognition (viparīyaya), unseen potency (adrṣṭa) originating from the defects, birth (janma) originating from the unseen potency, and manifold suffering (duḥkhā) originating from birth. It is again a self-contradiction to say that the past perverted cognition exists and not its consequences such as defects, unseen potency, and the like, because why should the cause continue to exist and not produce its effect without anything to impede its natural function? There were both perverted cognition and its effects present in the past, and how can now there be only the perverted cognition and not its effects too? Of course, a cause can exist without its effects if any of the auxiliaries be absent or an obstructive factor be present to thwart its activities. But it is not true of those causes which are self-sufficient. Perverted cognition (viparīyaya) cannot be conceived to have existence without its effects making up the worldly existence because you cannot point to the absence of an auxiliary condition or the presence of an impediment which can suspend its activity. Perverted cognition and realization of the truth are incompatible and so cannot coexist even as darkness and light cannot coexist. There can be no perverted cognition when there is realization of the truth. It, therefore, follows that the existence in the world even after the attainment of the knowledge of the truth is not due to the perverted cognition. There must be some other condition of it. Vidyānandi says that there are some who distinguish between two kinds of perverted cognition (viparīyaya): (1) the original one possessed of the potency of producing predilection for the untrue, attachment (rāga) etc., and (2) the last or dying one that is devoid of such potency. The original perverted cognition produces defects (doṣa) of the nature of predilection or inclination for the untrue. Defects produce demerit (adharma). Demerit produces birth (janma) which again is responsible for the worldly existence (samsāra) fraught with miseries. The last or the dying perverted cognition, however, is impotent and cannot be the condition of worldly existence. Vidyānandi asserts that this position is not different from that of the Jainas. The upholders of this position have to admit threefold conditions of the worldly existence (bhava).  

1 Cf. samutpanna-tattva-jājanasyā 'pi āṣeṣato anāgataviparīyasyā 'nupat-tir na punah pūrvabhavopātasya pūrvādharma-nibandhanasya, tato 'sya bhava-sthitir ghaṭata eve 'ti sambhāvanāyāṁ . . . tattsthīter eva pramāṇataḥ siddheḥ—TSIV, p. 72.

2 Cf. vitathāgra-ha-rāgā-di-prādurbhāvāna-saktibhṛt maulo viparīyayo nā 'ntyā iti kecit prapedire—TSIV, p. 72.

3 Cf. teṣāṁ prasiddha eva 'yam bhavahetus trayātmakaḥ śaktī-trayātmatapāye bhayahetutvahānitaḥ—TSIV, p. 72.
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(viparyaya), in this view, means what is possessed of the potency of producing perverted predilection (mithyābhinivesa), attachment (rāga) etc., and is the condition of worldly existence. This, when analysed, turns out to be the threefold condition of the nature of wrong attitude (mithyā-darśana), wrong cognition (mithyā-jñāna) and wrong conduct (mithyā-cārita); because the potency of perverted predilection is nothing but the wrong attitude, the perverted cognition itself—being an untrue cognition—is wrong cognition, and the potency for producing attachment (rāga) etc. is wrong conduct.¹ It is thus maintained by the Jainas that all these three—wrong attitude, wrong cognition and wrong conduct—should be regarded as the condition of worldly existence. And the condition of worldly existence being threefold, the condition of emancipation also should be regarded as threefold.² Vidyānandi says that the threefold conditions of the worldly existence, such as wrong attitude (mithyā-darśana), and the like, require threefold antidotes such as right attitude (samyag-darśana) and the like for their cessation. Or, in other words, the unitary condition of worldly existence, having threefold potencies, requires for its annihilation another unitary condition consisting of threefold counter-potencies.³

We have now stated the Jaina conception of the threefold cause of bondage and its threefold antidote. We also recorded the objections of the Jaina against those who maintain a unitary principle as the cause of bondage. Now let us see how far the metaphysical position of those who regard nescience (ajñāna) alone as the cause of bondage is consistent with their conception of nescience. Let us begin with the Sāṅkhya-Yoga.

X

CRITICISM OF THE SĀMKHYA-YOGA CONCEPTION
OF AVIDYA

In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga school the relation between the world process and the puruṣa is not a very concrete one. The world process somehow belongs to the puruṣa who enjoys it though keeping quite

¹ ya eva viparyayo mithyābhinivesa-rāgādyutpadāna-śaktiḥ sa eva bhavahet
nānya iti vadatarā prāsiddho mithyā-darśana-jñāna-cāritrātmako bhavahet
uḥ, mithyā-śhinnivesasakti eva mithyā-darśanatvāt, mithyārtha-grhaṇāsya svayam viparyayasya mithyā-jñānatvāt, rāgād-prādurbhāvavā-sāmārthyasya mithyācārīrātavāt—Ibid.

² Cf. tadvipakṣasya nirvāṇa-karaṇasya trayātmatā—TSIV, p. 74.

³ mithyā-darśanānāṁ bhavahetūnāṁ trayāyāṁ prāmaṇātāt shhitānāṁ nivṛttiḥ pratipakṣabhūtāni samyag-darśanānāṁ tṛṇy apekṣate, anyatamāpāye tadanupapatteḥ; śakti-trayātmatāsva bhavahetor ekasya vinivartanaṁ prati-
pakṣabhūta-śaktitrāyātmaṁ ekam antareṇā no 'papadyata iti yuktā Sūtra-kārasya trayātmatama-mokṣa-mārgopadesanā—TSIV, p. 74.
unaffected by and aloof from it. The school does not attempt at defining the relation between the world process and the puruṣa. Somehow the puruṣa appears to have become one with the prakṛti and to enjoy it. Everything, good or bad, belongs to the prakṛti, and the puruṣa is there only as an indifferent onlooker. The process is conceived as evolving for the interests of the puruṣa, but there is hardly any serious attempt made at showing how the prakṛti establishes its contact with the puruṣa or, alternatively, how puruṣa identifies itself with the prakṛti. Avidyā or nescience is held as the cementing bond between the two. Here again it is left unexplained how avidyā, which belongs exclusively to the prakṛti, can get the puruṣa involved in the process. In the ultimate analysis, avidyā is an indefinable impetus that creates motion in the prakṛti to evolve itself in endless processes for the purpose of the puruṣa. Neither the puruṣa knows how his interests are being fulfilled by these processes, nor does the prakṛti move with the prevision of a well-defined plan. The world is an ordered unfolding with definite designs. But the order and the design is a work of the prakṛti which has neither vision nor any interest of its own. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga fails to account for the ordered movement of prakṛti. The puruṣa does not direct the prakṛti and so the order and the design cannot be held to have come from him. It is a wonder how the movements of the prakṛti are coordinated with the interests of the puruṣa. The relation between the puruṣa and the prakṛti is only a make-believe. It is only an appearance. Avidyā is conceived as a link between the two which can never be linked—a bridge between the two which can never be bridged. It is a principle which keeps the prakṛti in motion with the puruṣa as its witness. The puruṣa appears as involved without being really so. It ever remains as it is. It is the prakṛti that knows, thinks, and wills under the influence of avidyā and it is again the prakṛti itself that retires to the state of eternal motionlessness by destroying the seed of avidyā. If the Sāṅkhya-Yoga gives any importance to the puruṣa as a partner in the world drama, it does so only to give a semblance of reality to the universally accepted fact of bondage of the soul. The whole speculation loses its meaning if the fact of bondage is not admitted. But the fundamental hypothesis of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system does not warrant the acceptance of bondage for the puruṣa. And consequently it becomes impossible for the system to account for the constant urge for emancipation and the means prescribed for the fulfilment of that urge. The Yoga prescribes yogic practices and the Sāṅkhya lays stress on the knowledge of the truth. But is not all this in vain in view of the fact that the puruṣa, in reality, always remains out of the world? Is there any need or justification for

1 Cf. tasman na badhyate na 'pi mucyte na 'pi sarṣārați kaścit sarṣārați badhyate, mucyte ca naṁśrayā prakṛtiḥ.—SKā, 62.
earnest striving for the release of the \textit{prakṛti} which is only an uncon- 
scious instrument of fulfilment of the interests of the \textit{puruṣa}? Moreover, the \textit{prakṛti} remains as it is with reference to other \textit{puruṣas} 
even after it is released with reference to a particular \textit{puruṣa}. What 
then is the meaning of emancipation for the \textit{prakṛti}? It is a self-
contradiction to say that the \textit{prakṛti} is emancipated with reference to 
a particular \textit{puruṣa} while it remains in bondage with reference to all 
others. There is, again, no ground for maintaining that there are as 
many \textit{prakṛtis} as there are \textit{puruṣas}.

There are of course some adherents of Śāṅkhyā who believe in the 
multiplicity of \textit{prakṛtis}, each assigned to each \textit{puruṣa}. But though it 
effects an improvement in the sense that the emancipation of one \textit{puruṣa} 
does not involve the retirement of \textit{prakṛti} from cosmic activity and thus 
the continuity of the world process is not snapped asunder, yet it leads 
to unnecessary complexity. In the first place, the postulation of a 
number of \textit{prakṛtis} is itself a cumbrous hypothesis and the postulation 
of one \textit{prakṛti} answers the requirements of the law of parsimony. In 
the second place, the plurality of the \textit{prakṛtis} cannot be supposed to 
remain unrelated \textit{inter se} as that would rob the objective world of every 
claim to independence. The main ground for believing in the objective 
independence of the material world is that it is public property to which 
all the \textit{puruṣas} have the same or similar relationship. In the third 
place, if a common objective cosmic principle were posited to 
comprehend all these microcosmic worlds within its sweep, the objec-
tions urged against the unitary \textit{prakṛti} as the cosmic prius would 
remain unanswered. In the fourth place, the postulation of the 
plurality of the \textit{prakṛtis} will only be a restatement of the atomic 
pluralism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school which the Śāṅkhyā system 
is supposed to transcend by the postulation of a unitary cosmic principle. 
Though Vijñānabhikṣu has sought to reduce one \textit{prakṛti} to a plurality 
of atoms, it cannot be regarded as the orthodox representation of 
Śāṅkhyā ontology. All the arguments showing the unity of the nature 
of material, that is, unspiritual things as partaking of threefold 
character will be reduced to futility. The argument for the repudia-
tion of atomic pluralism that infinite mass cannot be produced out of 
infinitiesimal atoms and that the material cause must be greater than the 
product in magnitude will lose all meaning if the unitary \textit{prakṛti} were 
nothing but a congeries of atomic units each independent of and 
isolated from the other. Fifthly, the explanation of creation as evolu-
tion as opposed to conglomeration of units which is the position of the 
Vaiśeṣika will have no force and cogency if the world could be deduced 
from a plurality. Lastly, the question would arise whether the infinite 
\textit{prakṛtis} are ubiquitous and infinite in magnitude or not. If each 
\textit{prakṛti} be ubiquitous and all-pervading, it is difficult to conceive how
one prakṛti can coexist with other prakṛtis without clash and collision. If, on the other hand, they are regarded as atomic in magnitude, then the theory of satkārtyavāda which affirms the pre-existence of the effect and denies the possibility of the emergence of an unprecedented fact will have no raison d'être since it will have to be admitted that a big thing can be produced out of small things. The Sāṅkhya has regarded this as an impossibility as the emergence of a bigger magnitude will presuppose the annihilation of smaller magnitude. So the postulation of an infinite plurality of prakṛtis apart from the natural objection due to its cumbersome nature is incompatible with the basic postulates of the Sāṅkhya metaphysics.

There are other technical difficulties in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga view. Avidyā is regarded as the condition of bondage. Bondage lasts as long as the avidyā lasts. Bondage is destroyed when the avidyā is destroyed. And the avidyā can be destroyed only when the knowledge of the truth dawns. The knowledge of the truth thus is the cause of emancipation. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga holds that this knowledge also is absent after emancipation. But is it logically sound to hold that the condition of emancipation should disappear on the attainment of emancipation? Driven to desperation the Sāṅkhya-Yoga holds that the disappearance of the final knowledge of the truth is the condition of emancipation. But then another difficulty crops up. If disappearance of the knowledge of the truth is the condition of emancipation, should it not then be admitted that even the knowledge of the truth is not efficient enough to bring about the emancipation? What then is the difference between ignorance (ajñāna) and knowledge (jñāna) with reference to emancipation? Is not knowledge as much inefficient as ignorance as a means to emancipation? Is not knowledge itself a state of prakṛti in bondage? The Sāṅkhya-Yoga cannot logically maintain that ignorance alone is the condition of worldly existence. Ignorance, knowledge, and everything else are all states of the prakṛti in bondage. None of them can be regarded as the non-condition of worldly existence. Emancipation, in the ultimate analysis, turns out to be an automatic eternal quiescence of prakṛti. And we have stated the difficulties about this quiescence even. The prakṛti, somehow related to puruṣa, is the bondage of existence. Cessation of all relation with the puruṣa is emancipation. Viewed from the side of the puruṣa, emancipation consists in puruṣa existing in its own nature. From the side of prakṛti, emancipation consists in prakṛti in its state of eternal equilibrium. Prakṛti and puruṣa attain this state when the seed of avidyā is completely destroyed. The puruṣa takes interest in the prakṛti so long as there is avidyā. Prakṛti destroys avidyā and becomes enlightened by its own efforts. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga does not define the function of the puruṣa in the attainment of final enlightenment. Puruṣa is inactive
consciousness intelligizing the *prakṛti*. Final enlightenment is a state of the *prakṛti* comprehending the truth of the separate identity of *puruṣa* from itself. On the comprehension of this truth, the *prakṛti* can no more keep the *puruṣa* interested in itself, and consequently stops its processes and retires into the background. The function of the *puruṣa* is simply to intelligize and to this extent he is responsible for emancipation. Intelligizing, however, does not mean any effort on the part of the *puruṣa*. It is automatically effected by the peculiar relation which the avidyā establishes between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. If the *puruṣa* is responsible for anything in the drama, it is this element of intelligizing. We can also ascribe the coordination of the movements of the *prakṛti* with the interests of the *puruṣa* to this element of intelligizing. But we do not find any clear statement of such a conception in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system. The principle of *puruṣa* hangs very loose on the system. Although this *puruṣa* is of the nature of consciousness, the functions of knowing, thinking and willing do not belong to him. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga system intended to preserve the immutable character of the *puruṣa* by keeping him free from all functions whatsoever. But it did so at the cost of a number of other difficulties. Ācārya Hemacandra has summed up some of the weak points of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga as follows: 'Consciousness does not know the objects, the *buddhi* is unconscious. Space and the like evolve out of the subtle elements of sound and the like. Bondage and emancipation do not belong to the *puruṣa*. And what else self-contradictory has not been composed by the stupid (Sāṅkhyas).'

Referring to the non-knowing nature of the *puruṣa*, Vidyānandi says: 'If *puruṣa* is of the nature of non-knowledge, how could Kapila be the instructor (of the truth), even like one in deep sleep. The *prakṛti* also being unconscious, like a jar, cannot do the function of instruction.'

How can consciousness (*citī*) be without knowledge (*jñāna*) and the knowing *buddhi* without consciousness? How can the *puruṣa* enjoy the *prakṛti* if he is absolutely immutable? Haribhadra refers to the following explanation of Vindhyavāsin and Āsuri the famous exponents of the Sāṅkhya school: 'The *puruṣa*, himself remaining immutable, makes the unconscious mind assume its own form because of the proximity, even as a reflection makes a crystal (assume its own form). The enjoyment of the *puruṣa* is said to consist in such transformation of the distinct principle of *buddhi*, just like the appearance of the

1 cid arthaśānyā ca jaḍā ca buddhiḥ
śabdāditanmāitrajam ambārādi
na bandhamokṣau puruṣasya ca 'ti
kiyaj jaḍair na grāhītaṁ virūdhi.—AYV, 15.

2 yady ajñāna-svabhāvāḥ syāt Kapilo no 'padesakṛt
suṣuptavat pradhānaṁ vā 'cetanatvād ghaṭādivat.—TSIV, p. 18.
image of the moon in the transparent water\textsuperscript{1} and records this criticism: ‘In view of the formlessness (of the \textit{puruśa}), even the appearance of his image is not possible. Moreover, if it is conceded that the \textit{puruśa} is imaged in the \textit{buddhi}, this concession should be extended to the emancipated \textit{puruṣas} also. Enjoyment, therefore, is never possible. Nor is it improper to maintain that the emancipated ones should also be imaged, because they have the same nature (as they had before emancipation, since they are immutable). Again, if it were (conceded) that there is difference in their nature, it would necessarily follow that there was change. Moreover, if the \textit{puruśa} is absolutely different from the body, there would nowhere be any occasion for (the sins of) killing and the like. In the absence of (the sins of) killing and the like, there would be no bondage, good or bad, owing to the lack of its cause. In the absence of bondage, there would be no worldly existence or emancipation of the \textit{puruśa}. In the absence of emancipation all (efforts) such as vows and the like would be useless.'\textsuperscript{2} We have thoroughly discussed the problem of reflection of \textit{puruśa} in the \textit{buddhi} while stating the Yoga conception of \textit{avidyā}\textsuperscript{3} and shall not repeat it again. The serious objection against the doctrine of reflection has been recorded by Haribhadra. How can a formless principle reflect itself? Nor can the Sāṅkhya-Yoga avoid the criticism by saying that the conception of reflection is only for the sake of easy understanding and popular illustration, or in other words, only a metaphorical way of stating the fact. Because in that case the world process will turn out to be a magical show devoid of any essence. Either the \textit{puruśa} must have some concrete relation with the \textit{prakṛti} or the whole evolution of the \textit{prakṛti} should be condemned as an illusory nothing. There must be some difference between the emancipated and the unemancipated. But if the \textit{puruśa} be absolutely immutable and unchanging, there can be no scope for difference of states. If emancipation itself be only an appearance there is absolutely no meaning in spiritual endeavours. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga attempts at explaining away the difficulty of the

\textsuperscript{1} puruśo ‘vikṛtātma ‘va svanirbhāsam acetanam
mamaḥ karoti sān nidhyād upādhiḥ sphaṭikāṁ yathā.
vibhaktedṛkparigatau buddhau bhogo ‘syā kathyate
pratibimbodayaḥ svacche yathā candramaso ‘mbhasi.

—\textit{SVS}, 221-2 with Śvopajña Commentary.

\textsuperscript{2} pratibimbodayo ’py asya nā ‘mūrtatvena yujyate
muktair atiprasaṅgac ca na vai bhogaḥ kadācana.
na ca pūrvavabhāvatvāt sa muktānām asaṅgataḥ
svabhāvāntarabhāve ca pariṇāmo ‘nivāritaḥ.
dēhāt pṛthakva evā ‘syā na ca hīmāsādayaḥ kvacīt
tadabhāve ‘nimittatvāt kathāṁ bandhāḥ subhāsubhāḥ.
bhandhād rte na saṁśāro muktir vā ‘syā ‘papadyate
yamādi tadabhāve ca sarvam eva hy apārthakam.—\textit{SVS}, 223-6.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Vide supra}, pp. 85-9.
relation of ātman and prakṛti may appear as high and lofty philosophy to those who are fond of metaphysical speculations, but they have little fascination for the Jaina philosopher who is a staunch realist and has a deep conviction about the reality of his own experience. The Jaina philosopher believes in concrete relation between the soul and the body. And Haribhadra is even reluctant to believe that the great sage Kapila could have propounded that bondage and emancipation belong to prakṛti and not to the ātman. Haribhadra says: ‘The ancient sages have declared emancipation of the ātman in the Tantra.’

Then stating that the Jaina conception of ātman and his relation with karmic matter is not liable to censure, he says: ‘For this reason the (Śaṅkhya) doctrine of prakṛti also should be accepted as true, and also because it has been propounded by Kapila who was a great sage of godly character.’

Haribhadra means to assert that the original doctrine of Kapila was not different from that of the Jainas. The Śaṅkhya-Yoga conception of the condition of emancipation has been reinterpreted by Vidyānandi. Asamprajñāla-samādhi (state of concentration in which self is intuited as it is, free from conceptual constructions) is the ultimate condition of emancipation. The ātman exists in its own state in this samādhi. ‘This samādhi’, says Vidyānandi, ‘which consists in the existence of the ātman in its own state and is the condition of the final emancipation is nothing else than the threefold jewels—samyag-jñāna (right knowledge) being the nature of the ātman, tattvārthāśraddhā (predilection or love for the truth) being the necessary concomitant of it, and the absolute indifference (of the ātman) being the parama-cāritra (consummate conduct).’

And consequently the nature of Śaṅkhya avidyā is also to be interpreted as identical with mithyā-darśana (perverted attitude), mithyā-jñāna (perverted knowledge) and mithyā-cāritra (perverted conduct).

These are in brief the logical difficulties and implications of the Śaṅkhya-Yoga system. Let us now estimate the value of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of avidyā.

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1 ātman prakṛtivedo 'pi vijñeyah satya eva hi Kapiloātvyatvaie 'va divyo hi sa mahāmuniḥ.—SVS, 237.
2 evaḥ prakṛtivādā 'dītā muktiḥ iti Tantre cirantanaḥ.—SVS, 231.
3 yad api draṣṭāt ātmanāḥ svārūpe 'vasthānaṁ dhyāṣaṁ paramamuktīniḥ nibandhanam tad api na ratrātmatmakatāṁ vyabhacaratī samyag-jñānasya punātīpyātā, tasya tatvārthā-śraddhānasaharitaśvātā, paramaddhisānyasya ca parama-cāritrātāt—TSIV, p. 18.

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XI
CRITICISM OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CONCEPTION OF AVIDYĀ

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of avidyā also is vitiated by a number of defects. Knowledge is only a transient quality of the soul, produced by soul-mind contact. Emancipation means permanent destruction of the specific qualities of the soul such as knowledge (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), will (icchā) and the like.1 Wrong cognition (mithyā-jñāna) of the twelvfold objects (prameya) is the condition of worldly existence and the right knowledge of them leads to emancipation.2 In emancipation, however, there is neither wrong cognition nor right knowledge. Right knowledge destroys wrong cognition and disappears itself, being as much a transient quality of the soul as the wrong cognition. The worldly existence lasts so long as there is the delusion of the identity of the soul with the body, sense-organs and the like, and comes to an end when the true nature of the body, the sense-organs etc. is comprehended and the soul loses attachment to them due to the knowledge of its separate identity from the things of the world.3 Wrong cognition causes attachment to the world while right knowledge removes it. Wrong cognition degrades the soul to the status of matter, while the right knowledge reinstates it in its own status. But now the difficulty is: How can a passing quality bring about such momentous result? If knowledge is only a transient quality quite separate and distinct from the soul, is it reasonable to maintain that it is the condition of emancipation? Properly speaking, knowledge has very little to do with the nature of the soul. In spite of the fact that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards the qualities of knowledge, pleasure, pain etc. as exclusively the properties of a soul, it cannot be said that these qualities constitute the nature of the soul. How can what is alienable constitute the nature? What remains if the nature is alienated? Knowledge is not the nature of the soul, because it is alienable from the soul. Wrong cognition and true knowledge quā qualities of the soul have the same status. The latter supersedes the former, and disappears itself when the soul gives up its relation with body and mind and attains emancipation. It is difficult to conceive

1 Vide supra, p. 112.
2 Cf. ātma-śarire-ndriyā-rtha-buddhi-manah-pravṛtti-doṣa-pretyabhāva-phala- duḥkhā-pavargās tu prameyam (NS, I. r. 9). Vātsyāyana, commenting on this sūtra, says: asty anyad api dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyāḥ prameyāṁ tad bhedena cā 'parisaśkhyeyam. asya tu tattva-jñānād apavargo mithyā-jñānāt saṁsāra ity ata etad upadiśṭaṁ viśeṣeṇa iti.
3 Vide supra, p. 106.
how these qualities can be responsible for change of nature. If bondage and emancipation are real facts, it must be conceded that the soul undergoes change of nature. And the qualities of wrong cognition and true knowledge, being not the constituents of nature, cannot be held responsible for the change of nature. If there is real difference between the states of worldly existence and emancipation it must be conceded that the nature of the soul in bondage is different from the nature of the soul which has attained emancipation. But what are the factors that are responsible for this change? The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika answer is that in the state of worldly existence the soul has the specific qualities of knowledge, pleasure etc. while in the state of emancipation it has none of these qualities. But is it a proper explanation? The qualities, as we have stated above, cannot be regarded as constituting the nature of the soul, and as such it is improper to regard their absence alone as change of nature. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika makes capital out of its conception of the relation of inherence (samatvāya). The qualities are related to the substance in the relation of inherence.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika fights shy of admitting the qualities as forming the nature of the substance, and as a result indulges in the conception of inherence which is obviously only a device to avoid the difficulties and not a solution proper of the problem. The doctrine of inherence involves a number of serious difficulties. If a quality is absolutely different from its substance, it is not logical to say that it belongs to the substance. Inherence cannot be considered as the link between the two, because it is not given in experience. Do we cognize inherence as separate and distinct from the quality and the substance? Supposing that the inherence is given in experience and also supposing that a quality inheres in the substance in the relation of inherence, one would naturally ask: In what relation does this inherence subsist in the substance? If the inherence is regarded as subsisting in the relation of another inherence then there will obviously be regressus ad infinitum and the quality will ever remain unrelated to the substance. It is, again, not logical to maintain that the relation of inherence between the inherence and the substance is only a make-believe and not a real one. Ācārya Hemacandra states some of the defects of the doctrine of inherence in the following way: ‘There cannot be the relation of dharma (adjunct) and dharmin (substantive) between two things if there is absolute difference between them. Nor can (the relation) subsist by means of inherence because the trio (of dharma, dharmin and inherence) is not perceived. (If on the basis of the experience ‘A dharma subsists in a dharmin’ it is admitted that there subsists the relation of inherence between them, then this also must be conceded that) there is the experience of ‘It is here’ even with reference to the inherence. (But the opponent cannot concede this in view of the
inevitable contingency of *regressus ad infinitum*). Nor can the difference (between one inherence and another) be only a metaphorical one. There is, moreover, contradiction of the popular usages (such as 'There are threads in a cloth' and the like which do not recognize inherence). This doctrine of inherence furthermore leads the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to a number of other absurd conceptions. A universal (sāmānyā) cannot inhere in another universal, nor can it inhere in the ultimate particulars (viṣeṣas) nor again in an inherence. Accordingly, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that existence (sattā), being a universal, does not belong to the categories of universal, particulars, and inherence. It exclusively belongs to the other categories of substance (dravya), qualities (guna) and actions (karman). Besides this, it is held that knowledge and pleasure, being as much the qualities inhering in a soul as wrong cognition (ajñāna), pain (duḥkha) and the like do not belong to the soul on the attainment of emancipation. How can the transient qualities which are quite distinct and separate from the soul belong to it when it is free from all defiling attributes? Knowledge and joy do not arise in the emancipated soul because there is no soul-mind contact. Vātsyāyana maintains that even as the poisoned sweets are unacceptable, exactly so the joy, invariably being mixed up with pain, is unacceptable. He has to condemn all joy as mixed with pain perhaps in order to explain away the impossibility of the existence of joy in emancipation. Ācārya Hemacandra sums up these defects when he says: 'Even of the existents, only some have existence. Consciousness is only adventitious and absolutely different from the soul. Emancipation is not attended with knowledge and bliss. The heretics have composed excellent system indeed!' The main objection of the Jainas is against the absolutistic attitude. Knowledge, joy etc. cannot be absolutely distinct from the soul. They constitute the nature of the

1 na dharma-dharmitvam ativa bheke
vṛttyā 'sti cen na tritayaṁ ca kākṣi
ihe 'dam ity asti matiś ca vṛttai
na gaṇālhibo 'pi ca lokabdhaḥ.—AYV, 7.

See also *Syādvādamañjari* on it. For detailed criticism of samavāya see *PKM*, pp. 609-623; *SVR*, pp. 965-970.

2 Cf. sad anityaiṁ dravyavat kāraṇaṁ kāraṇaṁ sāmānyā-viṣeṣavad iti dravya-
guna-karmanāṁ aviseṣaḥ—*VS*, I. 1. 8. Also cf. *VS*, I. 2. 7. See also *PB*, p. 121: dravyādīnāṁ trayaṁ api sattāsambhandhaḥ.

3 Cf. sāntaḥ hail āyam sarva-viḍhayogaḥ, sarvoparamo 'pavargaḥ. bahu ca kṛcchraṁ ghoraṁ pāpakaṁ lupyata iti kathāṁ buddhimāṁ sarvaduḥkh-hocchedaṁ sarva-duḥkhāsaṁvidam apavargaṁ na rocaeyo iti. tad yathā, madhu-viṣaṁ prāṇanāṁ anādeyam iti, evāṁ sukhaṁ duḥkhānasaktam anādeyam iti—*Bhāṣya*, NS, I. 1. 2. See also *Bhāṣya*, NS, I. 1. 22.

4 satām api syāt kvacid eva sattā
caitanyam aupādhikam ātmanto 'anyat
na saṁvidanandamayi ca muktiṁ
susūtram āsūtritam atvadyaiḥ.—AYV, 8.
soul. The Jainas admit that they are ever changing and renewing in the state of worldly existence. But that does not mean that the soul can remain without them at any time. According to the Jainas, a quality cannot belong to the substance without becoming its nature and being. Change of quality does not mean destruction of nature. An entity preserves its nature through change. The qualities also preserve their identities through their ever changing modes. The relation between the substance and its qualities is one of identity-cum-difference. The element of identity explains the experience of persistence while the element of difference explains the experience of change. The Jainas thus avoid the difficulty of the status of knowledge and wrong cognition in the making up of the nature of the soul. Knowledge constitutes the nature of the soul while wrong cognition is only a transient mode of it. Wrong cognition \textit{(ajñāna)} passes away when right knowledge \textit{(samyag-jñāna)} dawns. But right knowledge does never pass away, being the nature of the soul.

Consciousness is the very essence of the self, and is integral to it. Though change is integral and inherent in whatever is existent and as such the self also must be perpetually changing, the change in the emancipated state does not connote absolute diversity in such a way as change from consciousness to un-consciousness. In fact, consciousness is the very stuff and texture of the self and is never liable to lapse. Even in the state of bondage there is not a single moment in which the self ceases to be conscious. Bondage only means, according to the Jainas, the limitation of consciousness to what comes through the channel of the senses. The infinite possibility of the expansion of consciousness is always there. It is only the mind and the body and the senses which shut up the self within a prison, and infinite intuition and knowledge are not allowed to materialize, not because consciousness in bondage is incapable of this consummation but because the embodiment serves to intercept the world of reality from the self. The Jainas accordingly do not believe that knowledge is produced by the good offices of the senses, but that it is innate in it. The senses rather are the handicaps than instruments. Ignorance and delusion are not innate but induced by the karmic forces. But whatever be the magnitude and intensity of these obstructive veils, they never succeed in extinguishing the eternal light of consciousness of the self. In emancipation, the self and its consciousness which are inseparable though not interchangeable, are released from these barriers and therefore can function over the whole range of reality. This is called omniscience. What has been said of the cognitive aspect of the self can be affirmed with equal emphasis of the other aspects and powers such as bliss and energy. The self is possessed of infinite energy and bliss as a matter of inalienable right. It is the karmic obstructions
which kept them suppressed. With the disappearance of these external forces, the self recovers its infinite capacity and bliss. The Jainas, however, does not assert that the limitations of bondage are illusory. They are real facts. But they can be overcome and transcended in emancipation. The changes are real changes. The apprehension of the Sāṅkhya that the possibility of change of the self might spell total subversion of consciousness by unconsciousness is regarded by the Jainas as baseless. Change is always limited in scope. Even the Sāṅkhya has to admit that although prakṛti is subject to perpetual change it does not change from existence to non-existence because that would be tantamount to denial of change. Change is possible only if there be continuity behind it. So an existent is never found to be so changed as to become a non-existent fiction. Likewise, the self can never change into a totally unconscious entity because consciousness is as inalienable a characteristic of the self as existence is affirmed to be of matter. It is a question of fact as to what is to be regarded as the inalienable essence of an entity, and what is to be regarded as an evanescent character. So the self, though in perpetual change, can never become not-self. Change is integral to it no doubt, but so also are its existence and consciousness and bliss. It may be asked ‘Does the self change after emancipation?’ The Jainas will answer ‘Yes, it does.’ But as there is no external interfering agent the change is always homogeneous. It may be regarded as an incessant renewal of its perfected being. But as renewal presupposes continuity, there is no lapse from consciousness, existence, bliss and power.

Let us now consider the technical difficulties in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of avidyā.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, like the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, regards wrong cognition (ajñāna) as the cause of bondage. There is emancipation when the wrong cognition is destroyed. But how can the wrong cognition be destroyed in view of the infinitefoldness of the things to be known (jñeya)? Vātsyāyana himself admits the impossibility of knowing all the objects when he says: ‘The knowledge of truth (tattva-jñāna) does not arise with reference to all the objects severally, inasmuch as the objects are infinite. Nor does it arise with reference to some objects (at random), because then delusion (moha) would still exist with reference to those objects that have not been comprehended (by the knowledge) and so there will be the undesirable consequence of existence of the residuum of delusion; and also because it is not possible that the knowledge (tattva-jñāna) with reference to something should remove the delusion with reference to something else. Wrong cognition (mithyājñāna) indeed is delusion (moha). It is not simply the absence of the knowledge of truth (tattvajñāna). And that object, the wrong cognition about which is the seed of worldly existence, is to
be known in its true nature.'

1 The nature of the body, the sense-organs, and the like alone is to be known in order to destroy the attachment to them. Emancipation is attained when the delusion about these things is gone and freedom from the defects (dośa) is achieved. Now the difficulty is if wrong cognition (ajñāna) is the condition of bondage how is it that the knowledge of a limited number of things is efficient enough to destroy the bondage in spite of the existence of wrong cognition about so many other things? Wrong cognition cannot be totally removed because the objects of cognition are infinite. And how can there be emancipation if there is the least of wrong cognition? Wrong cognition is invariably and necessarily accompanied with bondage, and there cannot be total destruction of wrong cognition unless omniscience is achieved. Omniscience, however, cannot be achieved unless all the objects are known. In other words, if wrong cognition is the variable, necessary and unconditional cause of bondage, there can never be emancipation because there can never be omniscience, and without omniscience the bondage cannot be destroyed. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes in wrong cognition as the variable cause of bondage and at the same time does not regard omniscience as the pre-requisite of emancipation. This is responsible for the difficulty of emancipation. Samantabhadra has put this logical difficulty in an aphoristic and pregnant language as follows: 'If bondage is the necessary concomitant of ignorance (ajñāna) there cannot be a being free from bondage because of the infiniteness of the objects (to be known). If the knowledge of all objects is responsible for freedom (from bondage), the vast amount of ignorance (about other objects) is responsible for the reverse.' The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position is not consistent enough with its original proposition. If ignorance or wrong cognition is held as the necessary, variable and unconditional cause of bondage, it is of necessity to be granted that omniscience is achieved before the bondage is destroyed. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit that omniscience is necessary for emancipation. The Jainas, on the other hand, do not regard wrong cognition (ajñāna) alone as the necessary and unconditional cause of bondage. Samantabhadra says: 'Wrong cognition accompanied with delusion (moha) is the cause of bondage. From wrong cognition devoid of delusion, there

1 na tāvad ekalakatra yāvādviṣayam utpadyate jñeyānāṁ ānantyāt. nā 'pi kvacid utpadyate, yatra no 'tpadyate tatra 'nivṛttta moha iti mohāśeṣa-prasāgaḥ, na cā 'nyaviṣayena tattvajñānena 'nyaviṣayō mohāḥ śakyaḥ prati-seddhum iti. mithyājñānaṁ vai khali mohā na tattvajñānasya 'nuttattmimātraṁ tac ca mithyājñānaṁ yatra viṣaye pravartamānaṁ saṁsāra-bījaṁ bhavati sa viṣayās tattvato jñeya iti—Bhāṣya, NS, IV. 2. 1.

2 For detailed information vide supra, pp. 106-7.

3 ajñānāc cet dhruvo bandho jñeyānyānāṁ na kevali jñānastokād vimokṣaś ced ajñānād bahuto 'nyathā—Aptānimāṁśa, 96.
is not bondage (bandha). There can be emancipation from knowledge about a few objects, provided it is devoid of delusion (moha). Bondage depends upon delusion. If there is delusion, there is bondage. If there is no delusion, there is no bondage. Here delusion (moha) means the deluding (mohaniya) karman 2 and not wrong cognition. On the destruction of this deluding karman, bandha (bondage) 3 is no more possible and omniscience necessarily dawns. The Jainas do not give much importance to knowledge in the attainment of freedom from bondage. The soul is to be purified of the mohaniya (deluding) karman, that is, of the karmans that defile and vitiate the attitude and the conduct of the soul. If this purity is attained, knowledge naturally dawns. Knowledge is the nature of the soul, and as such cannot but dawn when the soul is made absolutely clean of the karmans that obstructed the perfect expression of vision and conduct.

We have given a faithful representation of the Jaina’s criticism of the Naiyāyika’s conception of emancipation and the means of its attainment. In fairness to the Naiyāyikas, it must be admitted that they have been fully cognizant of the necessity of moral purification and the purgation of all evil dispositions and volitional tendencies which characterize the impure and imperfect life in bondage. The Naiyāyikas have, however, laid emphasis upon the supreme efficacy of correct knowledge of reality for the achievement of this objective. They think and assert that with the dawn of the knowledge of the true nature of the self, all our volitional perversities and angularities and moral twists will become automatically straightened and corrected and the cessation of bondage will occur without a hitch. The Jaina here differs from the Naiyāyika. He does not deny that true knowledge is an essential condition of salvation, but he asserts that the moral regeneration, which is also recognized by the Naiyāyika to be the condition of salvation, cannot be an automatic product of knowledge. It is necessary to cultivate moral perfection by means of various penances and practices of asceticism to get rid of our immoral and volitional dispositions and perversities. The Jainas make moral discipline and subjugation of the will a coordinate condition of salvation along with knowledge. This seems to be an essential divergence of the Jainas from the Naiyāyikas.

Another point of divergence about the means is that the Jainas stress the necessity of omniscience as the antidote of ignorance and

1 ajñānān mohino bandho nā 'jānād vītamohataḥ
jāna stokāc ca mokṣaḥ syād amohān mohino 'nyathā—Ibid., 98.
2 Mohaniya karman mainly consists in mithyātvā (perversity) and the kaśāya (passions). Vide infra, Chap. IV. Section III, 2nd paragraph.
3 This refers to sthitibandha and anubhāga-bandha which are due to kaśāya. Vide infra, Chap. IV. Section III, 3rd paragraph.
think this to be an essential precondition of final emancipation. We have already given Uddyotakara's defence of the Nyāya position as to how even limited knowledge can be the instrument of salvation. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara both believe that knowledge of all existent things is not possible of achievement with the limited resources at the disposal of the spiritual aspirant. If omniscience were the prerequisite of salvation, it would mean the impossibility of its achievement, because the number of existents being infinite, the knowledge of the same could be achieved only in infinite time, and to insist on this as the condition of salvation would be tantamount to the repudiation of the possibility of emancipation. It is apparent from the line of argument adopted by these writers that they did not believe in the possibility of infinite knowledge accruing from the practice of yogic discipline. It is certain that acquisition of infinite knowledge is impossible in the course of a human life if the spiritual aspirant is to depend on his senses and understanding. But if supernormal vision of truth on the removal of the barriers of knowledge can be achieved by a course of spiritual exercise, then the difficulties apprehended by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara will have to be regarded as based upon ignorance of the hidden powers of the soul. In later writings of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the infinite knowledge by means of yogic powers is admitted as a possibility. The Jaina criticism of the Nyāya standpoint is confined to the views of the earlier exponents of the school. It may not be entirely amiss to hazard the conjecture that the admission of omniscience as the result of yogic discipline by the later writers of the school may have been necessitated by the criticism of the older position by rival philosophers such as the Jaina and the like who not only believe in the possibility of omniscience but also make it a condition of emancipation.

XII

CRITICISM OF THE VEDĀNTA CONCEPTION OF ĀVIDYA

We now come to the criticism of the Vedānta conception of āvidya. That we are subject to ignorance is admitted by all schools of thought. It is equally admitted that the existing condition of the world and of the selves is not perfect and the individual selves are responsible for this. But whereas ignorance and its concomitants—delusion and allied passions and propensities—are usually held to be indirectly and remotely responsible for the objective world order, and are believed to be directly instrumental in the emergence of the imperfect condition of the subjects with their volitional, emotional, and cognitive limitations, the Vedānta has made ignorance the prius of the subjective and the objective order of existence. Ignorance is not only a contributory
condition of the world order but, in association with the eternal Brahman, is the material cause of the world also. Brahman, being limitless existence, consciousness, and bliss with no difference, intrinsic and extrinsic, in its being, is a unity perfect, solid, and simple. The plurality of the phenomenal world, which is experienced by all and sundry, and the existence of which is not liable to be repudiated without blatant self-contradiction, cannot be deduced from the simple homogeneous unity. The Vedāntists accordingly postulate an all-pervading māyā, which is the principle of cosmic illusion, and accord it a timeless status along with Brahman, although it is recognized to be liable to destruction and as such held to be a subordinate adjunct to the Absolute with which it is associated. The Sāṅkhya conception of prakṛti is accepted in toto with this essential reservation that it is held to be subordinate to the Absolute, independently of whom it has no existence, and is again held to be quasi-real in character. It is not real like the Absolute though it is unborn like it, because it is subject to annihilation. But it is not an unreal fiction as it has causal efficiency which a fiction cannot have. Thus it is held to be neither ultimately real nor absolutely unreal and thus eludes logical determination. Logic demands that if A is not real it must be unreal. But māyā as the basis of the cosmos, subjective and objective, is not capable of being classed under either of these exclusive heads. Its existence is not liable to be repudiated because it is a felt fact. Though logically indeterminable as a real, and not capable of being dismissed as an unreal fiction without contradiction of experience, the actuality of the world appearance and consequently māyā as its presupposition has got to be acquiesced in, however offensive it may appear to our logical thought.

The Vedāntist holds that reality must be rational and logically consistent. Only that is real which possesses existence as an intrinsic and inalienable character. The real is that which exists on its own account and in its own right. It cannot be made real by anything external. The real therefore cannot lapse from its reality, and so cannot change, because change implies the cessation of a previous state and the accrual of a novel condition. But as the sole character of a real is its reality, the cessation of any element in it will mean the lapse of reality and the acquisition of a character which was not real before. This means that a real can cease to exist and an unreal can come into being. There is obvious contradiction in this conception and so the Vedāntists affirm that change is not predicatable of the ultimate reality. But change is a felt fact, and has to be accounted for. The Vedāntist asserts that change and all that it connotes do not belong to reality, but they appear in and upon the Absolute owing to its association with māyā which is responsible for the appearance of multiplicity and plurality in spite of the fact that they cannot be real. Reality is again defined to be one
which is not capable of negation in temporal or spatial reference. This proposition is rather the corollary of the basic proposition that a real is possessed of reality on its own account. The logical necessity underlying this conception is the incompatibility of unity with plurality, of reality with change, of the timeless with the temporal. The existence of plurality and of the underlying unity is felt and as they cannot be logically reconciled the plurality is declared to be a false appearance, however unjustifiable its actuality may be from the logical standpoint. The two cannot be real. Either there must be unity or plurality, and as plurality is nothing but plural unities, the concept of unity cannot be got rid of even in the affirmation of plurality. So unity being indispensable is to be asserted as the sole reality when and if we have to clip away one of the pair.

In reply to this contention of the monist, the Jaina asserts that the reality of plurality is not capable of being repudiated as false appearance. The assertion of absolute unity and the denial of plurality are both contradicted by the verdict of experience. It is therefore a dogmatic statement and if a mere ipse dixit were to do duty for truth, then the assertion of plurality as the only reality might also lay claim to the rank of truth. It has however been contended by another school of Vedāntists viz. that of Bhāskara that the plurality of phenomena is not inconsistent with the unitary Absolute because even one entity can appropriate different attributes, as either the difference of time or space may account for the incidence of different qualities and actions in one and the same entity. Therefore the Absolute also need not come in conflict with the appearance of different qualities and actions happening in it. It is just on a par with the cognition of a multi-coloured object, which though diverse in respect of the multiplicity of colour is still felt as a unitary entity. But the question is whether the multiplicity is real or not. If it be real it has to be decided whether it is possessed of a real genesis. It cannot be asserted that the plurality is destitute of origination because that would make the fact of their occasional and contingent appearance unintelligible. A thing which does not originate is not a contingent occurrence. If however origination is admitted, then it must have a cause. If the Absolute be asserted as the cause, then you will have to admit that there are two things viz. cause and effect. It cannot however be maintained that the effect is not different from the cause and so monism is not affected by the assertion of causality, because this assertion is open to twofold objection. Firstly, the identity of the cause and the effect would make the admission of the same thing quā cause as the same thing quā effect inevitable which

\[1\text{ Cf. ... ekam api parabrahma sakala-kriyā-kāraka-bhedātmakatayā na virodham adhyyāste tathāpratibhāsa-vaicitrye 'py ekatvāvyāghatāc citra-jñānavad ity aparāḥ—Āṣṭasahasri, p. 157.}\]
is absurd. Secondly, the identification of the Absolute with the contingent effect would make the former a contingent fact, a position which is denied by the Vedāntist. It may be asserted that the plurality of phenomena derives its genesis from something different from the Absolute. But this would be tantamount to the assertion of dualism, as a cause numerically different from the Absolute is posited. The Vedāntist may contend that this cause of the phenomenal world is nothing but an unreal māyā and the assertion of such an unreal fact does not militate against real monism. But we cannot accept the defence, because an unreal cause is a contradiction in terms. In fact causal efficiency is the criterion of reality. It may be contended that the effect is also unreal appearance and so there is no logical repugnance in the postulation of an unreal cause. But the question may be seriously posed ‘Why should the felt plurality be dismissed as unreal? An unreal fiction is not amenable to experience. It is not found that one fiction produces another fiction on the basis of which we could imagine that the appearance of plurality is produced from unreal māyā. It is not observed that a square circle produces a square triangle.’

The Vedāntist may rejoin ‘Well, what about feats of magic? The magic produces a phantasmagoria which nobody accepts as truth on sober reflection. Yet the appearance deceives the spectator so long as it lasts.’ But the show of magic, whether it be fire or smoke or anything else, is not entirely unreal. At any rate the experience of it is real. If the experience itself were unreal there would be nothing to determine that there was a magical show at all. Nor can it be maintained that the show is unreal quà an existent fact, because even on the admission of the Vedāntist there is no lapse of existence even in false experience. There must be an objective basis even for what is called an unreal appearance. This basis is admitted to be true even by the Vedāntist himself. This shows that however one may dispute the objectivity of the predicative part of the false judgment, the subject at any rate has got to be admitted as real. We cannot even conceive that an unreal fiction can appear as a content of experience. We have never experienced even in dream a square circle.

As regards erroneous perception, neither the subject nor the predicate is absolutely unreal like a square circle. The Vedāntist may contend that he does not affirm that the objective world of plurality is an unreal fiction. But it is not real as it is found to be contradicted by a subsequent experience. But the question is ‘Does not the denial of unreality involve the admission of reality?’ A thing may be either

1 Cf. ... katham akiñcidṛūpasya kāraṇatvāṁ? kāryasya 'py akiñcidṛū- patvād adṛṣa iti cet kim idānāṁ kharaviṣaṇād aśva-viṣaṇaśya jāmnā 'sti—Ibid.
2 ... Nā 'pi bahiṣsaddrayādi-rūpayor māyā-svabhāvatvāṁ vyabhicārivā- bhāvāt—Ibid., p. 158.
real or unreal and there is no *tertium quid* possible because of the Law of Excluded Middle. The Vedāntist has argued that he admits all this. Logically speaking there can be no intermediary stage between two contradictory opposed terms. Regarded in this light, the content of error cannot be dismissed as an unreal fiction because even appearance is possible only of what is real. But the contradiction of the content of error such as silver is not compatible with its reality as this would result in the obliteration of the cleavage between truth and error. The Vedāntist accordingly asserts that the content of error is neither real nor unreal. It is different from both these determinations in spite of its illogicality. Though, logically speaking, nothing but real should appear we have to acquiesce in the proposition that in error at any rate the content cannot be real because it is contradicted and it cannot be absolutely unreal because it appears. It is admitted on all hands, both by the Vedāntic idealist and the realist, that an unreal fiction like a square circle has no appearance. The world of plurality is on the same footing with content of error because it appears and is also contradicted by logical thought.

The Jaina does not accept this interpretation of error as the only possible explanation. The content of error is not an unreal fiction and that shows that it must be real, whatever be the context. The Jaina philosopher, like the Naiyāyika realist, thinks that the predicate of the erroneous judgment ‘This is silver’ is a real entity really felt. The experience is real and so also its content. It is false because it is contradicted by subsequent experience. But contradiction does not prove the unreality either of the subject or of the predicate. Owing to some defect and aberration the two reals existing in different contexts are felt to be related, though they are not so related in the relevant context. The fact cannot be gainsaid even by the Vedāntist that it is exactly analogous to a veridical perception so far as the reality of the terms and also of the relation are taken into account. The relation also is not a fiction, because it is felt, and a fiction cannot be felt. What constitutes the falsity of the judgment then? The answer is that though true in every respect, as the contents including even the relation between them have corresponding objective counterparts, owing to a defect the predicate appears to belong to the subject though in the present context the predicate does not belong to it.

The Vedāntist has however admitted a third term in between real and unreal, which is neither endorsed by logic nor by experience. The Vedāntist has not succeeded in denying that an unreal fiction cannot appear. The logic demands that if the content of error be not unreal, it must be accepted as real. The invention of a *quasi*-real entity is not only uncalled for but also logically contradictory. The Jaina
philosopher does not agree with the Vedântist or with the nihilist in his reading of contradiction in the world of experience and of thought. The Vedântist and so also the arch-nihilist Nâgârjuna think that causality is an irrational principle. They agree that the cause is not identical with the effect as that would annul the distinction between them, and without this distinction nothing can be regarded as a cause or as an effect. The cause again cannot be different from the effect as in that case there would be no determination possible. If the relation of cause and effect be one of otherness, pure and simple, then it passes one's understanding why should oil be produced from mustard and not from sand though both are equally other than the effect. Similarly with regard to the effect. Why should not another effect be produced from a cause different from the accustomed one when there is nothing to determine either the effect or the cause? No specific relation can be affirmed in the absence of identity and otherness which have been found to be unacceptable. Nor can it be regarded as a combination of both as the objections lying against each would apply together against this hypothesis. It is concluded by the sceptics that causality is a logically indeterminate makeshift. It is a device contrived by the human intellect to lull into slumber our logical curiosity. It is an irrational conception which, however, is unquestioningly accepted by the general mass of mankind owing to nescience which blurs the whole outlook. In conformity with this dialectic the Vedântist, in common with Nâgârjuna, thinks that there is irreconcilable antagonism and conflict between plurality and unity. We have seen how the Vedântist conjures away plurality as false appearance and affirms unity as the supreme truth. The nihilist, on the other hand, has declared the whole world as an unmitigated illusion including unity and plurality. The Vedântist argues against Nâgârjuna and men of his ilk that existence and consciousness cannot be denied because the denial of existence itself involves the affirmation of the existence of denial, and the denial of consciousness is possible only if there is consciousness of denial. And this involves, according to the Vedântist, a contradiction on the part of the nihilist who denies consciousness and content with equal emphasis.

But the Jaina would pose a simple question: 'Why should the unqualified denial of existence involve contradiction?' The answer must be that existence of denial is felt in the act of denial. Likewise the denial of consciousness is found to be in conflict with the felt consciousness of denial. The contradiction therefore amounts to not a \textit{a priori} self-contradiction as is involved in the assertion of a square circle, but to a conflict based on experience. Existence and consciousness are experienced facts, and the denial of them involves contradiction of experience and its verdict. So the Vedântist virtually
admits that contradiction is the criterion of truth so long as it does not come in conflict with our indubitable experience and its data. Unity and plurality are equally felt facts, and causality is also a plain deduction from experience. So it is not possible to accept a theory which will contradict the very possibility of the data. As regards the logical difficulty of their relation, the Vedāntist also admits that unity and plurality are felt as related though he demurs to accept it as an ultimate truth on account of the logical contradiction. He however is not prepared to dismiss it as a fiction, because he has the courage of his conviction to assert that an unreality cannot have even an appearance of reality. He accordingly gives it the status of a quasi-reality. But the Jaina avers that this is neither fish, flesh, nor good red herring. The Vedāntist should overcome his diffidence and muster courage to declare that it must be real as it is not unreal. As for the logical incompatibility between unity and plurality, and identity and otherness, it is nothing but the figment of abstract logic which runs away from the reality as revealed in experience. It has been seen that the Vedāntist entirely relies upon experience when he denies the contention of the nihilist that unity is equally a false appearance as it is never felt in dissociation from plurality. The nihilist also denies the reality of consciousness as he denies the reality of its content, because in his view consciousness without a content and a content without consciousness are never felt, and so they must swim or sink together. From the standpoint of abstract logic, the nihilist's argument seems to be unimpeachable. The Vedāntist succeeds in refuting the nihilist's contention only by positing contradiction of experience as the criterion of falsity. The Jaina asks the Vedāntist to go a step further and accept the whole experience as true and admonishes him for accepting the dictates of a priori abstract logic in the interpretation and assessment of experience. When unity and plurality are equally felt, and identity and otherness are equally attested by experience, they should both be regarded as true. The Jaina admits, in common with the Vedāntist, that the effect is not determinable either as identical with or as different from the cause. He agrees with the Vedāntist in his contention that the combination of unity and plurality involves identity and otherness both. He also agrees with the Vedāntist that the relation cannot be both identity and non-identity, otherness and non-otherness, difference and non-difference because of the contradiction involved in it. The Vedāntist asserts that the world of appearance is accordingly indeterminable in terms of identity and difference, but its felt actuality places it in a different category which is not determinable either as identical with or as different from pure existence. The Jaina accepts this interpretation also. He thinks the world of experience involves both identity and difference. But it transcends and synthesizes them in a
separate category which is different from both identity and difference. The actual is real, and because the data of experience are neither identifiable with experience, as the Buddhist subjectivist avers in defiance of the plain verdict of experience, nor can they be regarded as unrelated which the assertion of absolute difference involves, the relation is *sui generis* which is also admitted by the Vedāntist to be the case when he asserts that the data of experience are indeterminate as identical or not-identical. But whereas the Vedāntist would assert that the appearance is false, the Jaina would assert that it is true. The contradiction between identity and difference is not denied. But the Jaina does not think that the relation is of either kind. It is different from both, and its reality cannot be repudiated because it is felt to be actual.

The denial of causality constitutes a flagrant violation of experience. When the Vedāntist asserts that the effect is not produced by itself or by another, and yet cannot blink the actual production of the effect, he fails to render an explanation of it. He thinks that no explanation is possible and the confession of this failure only shows that he only pretends to slip over the problem. Certainly by declaring causality as unreal appearance he proves disloyal to experience. If the nature of reality could be determined by abstract logic, and that again in plain contradiction of experience, then there is no reason why should the Vedāntist refuse to chime in with the Buddhist when he declares that there is no self. The Vedāntist, as we have shown, cannot find flaw in the Buddhist’s argument except by appeal to experience. The Vedāntist appeals to dream experience in support of his position that the unitary self-identical Absolute appears as the plurality of phenomena. He asserts that the appearance of plurality is not impossible even when what exists in reality is the undifferenced unitary existence. It is argued that in dream a plurality of facts is experienced though it is one consciousness that only exists and is felt. It is one consciousness that is felt as many. The Jaina does not agree with this interpretation of dream experience. He asserts that if there be inherent opposition between unity and plurality the appearance of one consciousness as plurality even in dream is not possible. As regards the Vedāntist’s contention that only one consciousness appears as a plurality in dream, the Jaina thinks that it is an assumption unsupported by logic as well as experience. Even in dream as in wakeful experience, the consciousness of action is different from that of the agent. It is admitted even by the Vedāntist that dream contents are produced by different memory-impressions and so the contention that there is no plurality of cognitions though there is plurality of contents in dream experience cannot be accepted to be a true estimate. As regards the appearance of plurality, the Jaina does not find any difficulty in it that a self-identical subject should experience
it. The subject is endowed with an infinite plurality of powers, and by means of these he can experience a plurality of contents both in wakeful and in dream experience.\(^1\) It is found that one identical self is felt to exercise many acts and is felt by another self to be possessed of such manifold activities and attributes. There is no contradiction in it because it is endorsed by valid experience. There is no contradiction in the fact that the potter fashions a jar with his staff and eats his meal with his hand. There is no reason why should these experiences be asserted to be erroneous. The truth is that the difference of act and agent, substance and attribute, is not absolute. They are both different and not-different because this is the logical presupposition of all experience. It has been argued by the Vedāntist that our perceptual experiences are false because they are cognizant of difference just as dream experience is. This inference is vitiated by self-contradiction because the factors of inference such as the probans and the example must in any event be regarded as true. If they are true, their difference also is true. And if all these conditions of inference are false and thus cognition of difference be declared to be false, the inference will not prove the thesis, because no true conclusion can follow from false premises.\(^2\) The Vedāntist might contend that the premises are accepted to be true only on the assertion of the opponent who accepts them to be true, then this would amount to the admission of the truth of the cognition of the opponent as different from the self and thus all cognitions of difference would not be false. It has been contended that consciousness is a unitary principle and its unity is felt by itself. This felt unity contradicts the cognitions of difference and this contradiction proves that the said cognitions are false. Thus the felt plurality is contradicted by the evidence of such false cognitions. This very argument proves the reality of plurality because what contradicts and what is contradicted cannot be identical. Nor can it be contended that the relation between the contradictor and the contradicted is accepted only on the basis of the assertion of others, because that would make contradiction a faked one just like the assertion of the opponent which the Vedāntist believes to be false. And if the unity of consciousness be accepted to be true on the ground of experience, there is no reason why should the plurality of contents be rejected as false, as the verdict of experience is found to impartially attest both the facts. As regards the contradiction between plurality and unity the Jaina does not find any one in the situation because he

\(^1\) \text{jāgrad-daśāyām īva svapnādi-daśāyām api purino 'nekaśaktyātma-kasya kriyā-kāraṇa-viśeṣa-pratibhāsa-vaicitrya-vyavasthiteḥ—Ibid.}

\(^2\) \text{prakṛtānumāne pāksa-hetu-dṛśānta-bhedā-pratibhāsasyā 'mithyātve tenai 'va hetor vyabhicārāt, tanmithyātve tasmād anumānāt sadhyāprasaddeḥ—Ibid.}

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does not believe that things are related either by way of identity or by way of difference. The relation is distinct from both and must be accepted to be true just like identity and difference. If, however, experience be the ultimate exponent of the nature of reality, it must be admitted that pure identity or pure difference is never experienced and as such cannot be real. They are only figments of abstract logic, and no instance can be adduced which exemplifies either of them.

It does not require any logical elaboration to show the absurd consequences that will arise if a person believed in pure monism and consequently denied the reality of society and environment, and the next world and moral and religious laws. There will be no logical justification for the observance of social, moral, and political laws that are prescribed by the scriptures as well as the state. This will mean perfect deadlock and certainly a philosophy which leads to the subversion of all order and tends to destroy the whole fabric of social, moral and religious life and its institutions cannot be safely recommended to mankind. Not only this, there will be no distinction between good and bad action, heaven and earth, truth and error, and even bondage and salvation. The philosophy will defeat its purpose because it cannot induce any enthusiasm and activity for the transcendence of bondage and achievement of salvation which is paradoxically set up as the ultimate objective and goal.¹

The monist would, however, assert that all these charges are advanced against his philosophy only out of ignorance. Though the Vedāntic monist affirms that only the Absolute which is pure existence, consciousness and bliss bereft of all finitude and limitation is the sole reality and plurality is unreal, it does not follow that the plurality does not appear or is not possible. There is not only the plurality of objects but also the plurality of subjects who, under the influence of nescience, believe that they are actually bound by the laws of nature and society and religion. So all these institutions and laws hold good for them, and there is no possibility for lack of moral and religious enthusiasm. The illusion of bondage and belief in the plurality are so much ingrained in mankind that only a philosophical discourse is not enough for their eradication. Unless and until the identity of the individual self with the Absolute is realized there is no chance for getting rid of this illusion. The monist not only believes in the efficacy of rites and ceremonies, of moral and religious discipline, and practice of asceticism, but also asserts that these courses of moral and religious discipline are the condition of the emergence of saving knowledge without which there can be no escape from the meshes of ignorance.

¹ Cf. karma-dvaitaṁ phāla-dvaitaṁ loka-dvaitaṁ ca no bhavet  
vidyāvidyā-dvayaṁ na syād bandha-mokṣadvayaṁ tathā.  
—Āptamimāṁsa, 25.
The Jaina would ask the monist: 'Why should you believe in monism and reduce moral and religious life to provisional validity as a makeshift and device for the achievement of the goal? Both the means and end are asserted by you to be destitute of ultimate reality. It is certainly extremely difficult to subscribe to the view that an unreal means can achieve reality, and falsehood can be the means of attaining truth. Why should ethical and religious life, not to speak of the natural world, be declared to be false? What is the logical justification behind this abnormal position which cuts away the very foundation of higher life and culture? The Vedānta philosophy seems to be a dangerous heresy not less than the Buddhist denial of soul.'

The Vedāntist would assert in reply that all this criticism is inspired by sentimentalism and intellectual cowardice which refuses to face reality because it will upset the prejudices and superstitions fostered by nescience from the beginningless time. We cannot determine the nature of reality without having recourse to logic. If all the organs of valid cognition converge upon a particular position and compel us to accept it as the truth, we have to bow our heads to the inevitable. There may be sentimentalists who will shirk their duty to face truth squarely and will try to multiply their ranks by dissuading vacillating people from pursuit of the enquiry of truth. The doctrine of monism is not a figment of diseased imagination. It is proved by inference and authority alike. The Upaniṣadic texts are the records of funded experiences of ancient seers and sages who realized the ultimate mysteries of existence by unerring spiritual intuition. They still stand as compelling evidence and as a challenge. These truths have been realized again and again by persons whose name is Legion. They are public property and if an honest enquirer screws up his courage and elects to undergo the preparatory discipline he can realize that truth exactly in the same way as a student of science can verify the truth of the scientific discoveries in a laboratory. But the appeal to scripture and even unquestioning faith in its validity are not of very much avail except as aid and incentive to experiment by future enquirers of truth. Besides, these texts will not carry conviction to those who are fixed in their beliefs and traditions which they have inherited from the community in which they are born. But scripture is not the only resource with the Vedāntist. The Vedāntist banks upon ratiocination as an equally potent instrument for the realization of truth. The unreality of an independent objective world is deduced from an analysis of even an ordinary empirical judgment. Take for instance the trite experience 'I see the pen.' What is the status of the pen? The pen is felt as an object no doubt. But it is felt as a content of the cognition. It is felt
inside the cognition just as the character of cognitionhood. The realist may contend that the pen is an external object existing independently and is observed from outside. The act of knowing does not make any difference to it so far as its ontological reality is concerned. The pen existed and will exist even when there was and will be no cognizer to apprehend it. The Vedāntist asserts that this attitude bespeaks sheer dogmatism. Certainly there is no ground for postulating the past and future existence of the object, and as regards the present existence of it, it can only be proved by valid cognition. Experience is the only source of knowledge of an existent, internal or external. The realists can affirm that the pen exists only when one is aware of it. Without awareness we have no means of asserting its existence. The contention of the realist that the object of experience stands outside and aloof proceeds from an unreflective attitude which does not care to look into the implications of knowledge. If the object that is cognized is external to cognition just as an uncognized object is, then how can it be determined that a thing is cognized or not cognized. To say that a thing is cognized is to say that it has come into relation with the subject’s consciousness. Certainly there can be no relation between two things existing independently and aloof from each other. The relation therefore cannot be one of otherness. It must therefore be the opposite of it. And this means that the object, whether believed to be internal or external, is felt only as an internal content. The externality of the object is rather a guess and nothing more. It may be the case that the guess is universal. But that does not erect it into the rank of an accredited organ of knowledge. The object cannot be a content unless it somehow enters as an element into the cognition. So the logical analysis shows that the seeming brute existent is only an assumption. At the most optimistic estimate it cannot be more than a postulate.

It might be contended that the object of cognition is different from the act of cognition irrespective of the fact whether it (object) is external or internal. But when it becomes a content of cognition, it seems to be taken inside and integrated with consciousness. But this integration is only a seeming appearance. But appearance is possible only if there be a veridical analogous fact and this is the ground of one thing being felt as another. When, for instance, the poet asserts the face to be the moon itself nobody is deceived by such assertion of identity. The real basis of this assumed identity is the identity of the moon with itself. Here also the identity of the cognition with the self is the basis of the seeming identity of content and cognition. But the Vedāntist would

1 yat pratibhāsa-samanādhikaraṇaṁ tat pratibhāsāntahpraśviṣṭam eva, yathā pratibhāsa-svarūpam—Aṣṭasahasri, p. 159.
2 atha pratibhāsa-vyatiriktaṣya pratibhāsyasya ‘rthasya ‘ntar bahir vo ‘pacārat pratibhāsa-samanādhikaraṇatvavyavasthiteḥ pratibhāsa-svarūpaṣya mukhyatopapatteḥ—Ibid.
observe that this is only the device of the escapist. There can be no relation at all between a cognition and an object unless the object is integrated with the cognition as its internal content. It has been shown that awareness is not possible if consciousness and object elect to preserve their autonomy which was supposed to be the status quo ante. The Vedántist however does not believe in the independent existence of the cognitum as there can be no proof of it. The Buddhist realist of the Sautrāntika school believes in extra-mental reality. But as all existents are fluxional and perish in the immediately succeeding moment, there can be no synchronism between sense-intuition and its object. The object must come into contact with the sense and then intuition will take place. But as the intuition takes place in the second moment, the object cannot be there to be intuited as it has passed out of existence at the time. The Buddhist accordingly affirms that what is intuited is not the external object but its copy which is the content of the cognition. The external object is inferred as the cause of the content just as fire is inferred from smoke. This theory of the Buddhist is thought to be an unwarranted superfluity. There is no ground for believing in the extra-mental reality as a cause of the content and conversely for believing the content to be the effect of it. The external object is bound to remain unperceived in the Buddhist theory. So there is no occasion for observation of concomitance in agreement and difference between a content and the object. Thus how can the relation of causality be established between them? Moreover, the belief that cognition is produced is entirely unwarranted. Consciousness is an eternal fact. To say that it is produced presupposes that there is cognition of concomitance of the cause and effect behind it. So the production or the cessation of cognition can be affirmed only on the admission of another cognition. Cognition as such has got to be admitted as the condition of assertion. There can be no successful denial of consciousness as such, because the denial itself will be a case of consciousness. But it may be contended that though consciousness must be the inevitable condition of all assertion and the denial of it be made impossible by self-contradiction, yet there is no reason to suppose that consciousness is one identical, unitary and eternal reality. The exigency may be satisfied by asserting an uninterrupted stream of consciousness-units one following the other without a gap between them. In fact this is the position of the Buddhist fluxist. But the Vedántist thinks that this theory is absolutely false. What is the ground for distinguishing one cognition from another? A cognition of blue and a cognition of yellow are felt as cognition in spite of the difference of contents. The two acts are believed to be possessed of the common character viz. cognition-hood. So there can be no difference in respect of this cognitional character. The difference is felt only in respect of the contents. But
the Buddhist himself has had to admit that the content is not different from the cognition as they are felt together as a matter of universal necessity. This shows that the content and the cognition are not numerically different. The felt difference therefore is illusory appearance. Certainly the relation cannot be one of absolute identity as in that case the content and cognition should be felt either as cognition or as content. It cannot also be one of absolute difference because in that case there cannot be relation at all. So the relation is neither one of identity nor of difference but something other than both. But as the Law of Excluded Middle rules out the postulation of an intermediate stage between the two contradictorily opposed terms, the felt relation must be accepted to be false appearance. The content thus being incapable of logical determination in terms of identity or difference must be declared to be equally false. The false difference of false contents cannot therefore be supposed to affect the identity of consciousness. The Buddhist admits the uniformity of consciousness acts but does not believe in their identity. He also believes that there has been no occasion in the past in which consciousness could be non-existent because in that case the present consciousness-unit would not be possible. He will also have to admit that there will be no occasion in future when consciousness can become defunct. The unreality of consciousness at any moment will make each and all the conscious units unreal, because an unreal consciousness cannot have a real consciousness as its condition or as its effect. So continuity and uniformity of consciousness have been admitted by the Buddhist. His denial of identity of consciousness is inspired by his belief in the doctrine of soul-lessness. The Vedāntist has asserted that there is no real ground for distinguishing one consciousness from another consciousness, as the only basis of such distinction viz. the plurality of contents has been proved to be unreal appearance. To return to the problem of the relation between cognition and object, the Buddhist theory of the causality of the object and cognition cannot be accepted. The Buddhist would infer the external object from the content of the cognition which he believes to be produced by the former. But as cognition is an eternal entity it cannot be the product of anything. So there will be no ground for inference of the external object.

It has been contended by a school of realists that the external object is the basis of cognition and the two must be different. The Vedāntist observes that this is a gratuitous assumption. It is under dispute whether our cognitions are directly conversant with an external object or not. To say that the external object is the basis of cognition is to assert the very problem in a different language. How do you know that it is the basis? If you answer that it is felt to be the object and
so is regarded as the basis, you will be guilty of circular argument.  
You assert that the external object is the cognitum on the ground of
its being the basis of it, and when pressed with the question 'How do
you know that it is the basis?' you answer 'Well, it is so because it is
the cognitum'. This is clearly a fallacious argument. If one interprets
that the cognitum is what is competent to be the objective basis of
cognition, then we may answer that the basis is not anything different
from the cognition itself. It is admitted by the majority of
philosophers that our cognitions cannot exist uncognized and as an
external cognizer is found to introduce complication, all cognitions are
believed to be self-cognized. So there is no logical necessity for positing
an external object as the content of our cognition. The identity of
cognition and its content proves that there can be no object external to
and numerically different from cognition. It has already been proved
that consciousness is one, identical and eternal entity, and the plurality
of objects has no existence outside consciousness. This constitutes the
proof of the monist's position. It cannot be shown that the argument
which proves the identity of consciousness and its content is inconclusive,
because there is no fallacy in it. It is a felt fact that the contents are
felt as integral determinations of cognitions and this is possible only
if there be no hiatus between them. No instance can be adduced
which can show that an object is cognized without being a content of
the cognition. If you ask 'What is then the subject of the cognition?'
we can only answer that it is the Absolute which is consciousness, pure
and simple, that acts as the subject. The argument is in perfect
agreement with the declaration of the Upaniṣad that all that exists is
the Absolute. The plurality is only a false appearance created by
nescience which, we have shown, is a contemporaneous adjunct of the
Absolute.

As has been observed before, the Vedāntist appeals to authority
not for the establishment of his position but for additional confirmation
of the finding of reflective thought. The monistic position is also
independently established by inference. We have shown how the
relation of cognition and content serves as a logical ground for establish-
ing the identity of consciousness with the cognitum. But it may be
argued that the attempt to establish monism by proving the unreality of
difference is bound to fail because in a logical argument the difference

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1 pratibhāsālambanatvāt pratibhāsyo 'rtho bhavati 'ti cet, kutas tasya pratibhāsālambanatvam? pratibhāsyatvād iti cet parasparāśrayaṇam—Ibid.
2 pratibhāsālambanatvāya-yogatvād iti cet tarhi pratibhāsa-svarūpam eva pratibhāsyām . . . —Ibid.
3 pratibhāsāntar-apraśītaśya kasyacid api pratibhāsa-samāṇadhikaraṇatvā-
yogāt—Ibid., p. 160.
4 nā 'śrayāsiddhir api hetōḥ śaṅkanīyā, sarvasya dharmaṇaḥ para-brahmaṇa
evā 'śrayatvāt—Ibid.
of the subject, the probans, and the probandum is the very condition of the conclusion. So you start with the difference of the probans and the probandum as the premise and seek to deduce the unity of them as the conclusion. If you assert that the difference is only an illusion you cannot make it the ground of a true conclusion. Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that the integration of the cognitum with consciousness proves its unity with the self, yet the difference between the probans and the probandum cannot be repudiated.

The argument of the Vedāntist was: The cognitum is incorporated within consciousness because it is felt as coincident with the latter (sc. consciousness). Now the act of cognition and the content are asserted to be integrated and incorporated with the self and this is the probandum and the fact of the content being coincident with the cognition is made the probans. Even if the validity of the conclusion be allowed, the numerical difference of the probans and probandum remains unrefuted, and this militates against monism. The Vedāntist however asserts in defence that there is no difficulty as the dualism of the probans and the probandum is not presupposed as the condition. The two are identical, and yet they can serve as the probans and probandum just as is the case with existence and momentariness in the Buddhist argument. Things are momentary because they are existent. The probans is existence and the probandum is momentariness. It must be admitted that momentariness and existence are not ontologically different though conceptually they appear to be distinct. Likewise, the Vedāntist does not believe in the ontological difference of the probans and probandum though in empirical thought they are conceived to be different owing to the influence of nescience.

The Jaina realist avers that the assertion of ontological identity between the probans and the probandum has no justification. The Vedāntist seeks to deduce the identity of the content and cognition logically from the felt coincidence of the two. The fact that they are felt as two should have made the Vedāntist pause before he drew the conclusion of their absolute identity. If experience be the determinant of the nature of things it cannot be gainsaid that not only the probans and the probandum are felt as identical-cum-different, but also the conclusion viz. the integration of the content should be regarded as a case of identity-in-difference. Even the probans and probandum (sc. existence and momentariness) in the Buddhist argument are not felt as absolutely identical.1 The fact that one goes with the other necessarily is proof that they are not absolutely distinct and different. But the other fact that one is the probans and the other is the probandum, and as such is felt as distinct from the other should prove that the two are

1 Cf. śabdādau sattvānityatvayor api kathāficit tādātmyāt sarvathā tādātmyāsiddheḥ, tatsiddhau sādhya-sādhana-bhāva-virodhāt—Ibid.
not absolutely identical. From an honest and unbiased reading of the knowledge situation it must be apparent that the probans and the probandum are identical and different together. The exponent of pure logic may scent incompatibility in it, but as pure logic is not endorsed in its findings by experience, it must be corrected and revised in the light of indubitable findings of experience. Accordingly in fidelity to experience it must be admitted that the relation of the probans and probandum is altogether different from identity and difference, though it contains them as moments. The absolute identity of the probans and the probandum on the contrary would make all inference impossible. The inference of identity of content and consciousness by the Vedāntist on the ground of their invariable coincidence must therefore be rejected as *ultra vires*. With the collapse of inference as the proof of monism, the Vedāntist will be deprived of logical proof, and in the last resort will have to fall back upon revelation (*Śruti*) in support of his position. But the question arises whether revelation recorded in the Upaniṣadic text is ontologically different from the Absolute or not. If it be absolutely identical with the Absolute *Brahman* which it seeks to establish, then revelation will be as much an unproved fact as the monistic Absolute which is yet to be established. Certainly the means of proof and the object of proof cannot be absolutely identical as in that case the two will be on the same level so far as they are not established facts. If on the contrary the two are held to be different, this will prove the dualism of revelation and *Brahman* at any rate. The monistic Absolute thus cannot be established either by inference or by appeal to revelation, and it is nothing but an unfounded assumption like the doctrine of absolute voidity of the Śūnyavādīn. Let us now examine the argument of the Vedāntist.

It has been argued that the content must be integral to cognition and incorporated in it, as cognition and content are felt to be coincident. But the felt coincidence, which is made the probans, itself reveals the momentous fact that the two are felt as distinct, and so the content cannot be regarded as absolutely integrated with the cognition. This integration is held by the Vedāntist to be the proof of the negation of independent existence of the content. But this is a hasty interpretation. The fact that the content is felt as distinct from the cognition even when they coincide is a pointer to the truth that the content is not absolutely identical with the cognition. The Jaina agrees with the Vedāntist when he asserts that the object cannot remain absolutely distinct and different from consciousness when it is cognized. The verbal proposition expressing the knowledge situation is of the form ‘The pen is known’. The predicate knownness proves that the pen is not absolutely different from and so unconnected with knowledge. But the negation of absolute difference does not imply that the pen is absolutely made
identical with knowledge. The proposition is entirely on a par with such factual propositions as 'The cloth is white'. In both the propositions e.g. 'The pen is known' and 'The cloth is white', the relation of subject and predicate is one of substance and attribute. The relation cannot be absolute identity as in that case it would be reducible to one of the terms, either the subject or the predicate. The relation is *sui generis* which may be called identity-in-difference for want of a better and more expressive name. It is undeniable that the terms are different though they are held together by a bond of unity. The Vedāntist can at most prove that the content and the cognition are not absolutely different. The Jaina accepts this finding and explains it as a case of identity-cum-difference in which neither identity nor difference is absolute. The Jaina holds the relation between the cognition and the object as equally a case of identity-in-difference. And he thinks that his interpretation is more consistent with truth than that of the Vedāntist.

The coincidence of the content with the cognition is intelligible only if the relation be identity-cum-difference. But what about the judgment 'The cognition *per se* is known by cognition'? Here the content of the cognition is its own self, and so the Jaina position that the relation of cognition and content is one of identity-cum-difference cannot hold in the present case. It is answered that if we look closely it will be found that the relation is one of identity-cum-difference. The content is not the act of cognition as such but its specific character. Cognition has both specific and generic attributes as constitutive of its nature. For instance, cognition is existent and this shows that it has the attribute of existence in common with all other entities. The attribute of cognitionhood is an uncommon characteristic. In the judgment the content is the specific character of cognition which (sc. the specific character) is not absolutely identical with the cognition. There can be no judgment or proposition possible if the terms are absolutely identical or absolutely different e.g. 'gold is gold' and 'the Himalya is the Vindhya' are not logical propositions. As regards the basic argument of the Vedāntist employed to prove the identity of cognition and content, it can be upset by the following argument. 'Whatever is coincident with cognition is somehow different from the cognition concerned e.g. the nature of cognition itself. All the contents, internal and

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external, such as pleasure and the chair are coincident with cognitions. Therefore they must be somehow different from the cognitions concerned.\(^1\) The same probans is found to prove a different conclusion from that intended by the Vedāntist. Nor can monism be established by revelation. The meaning of the proposition ‘All that exists is the Absolute’ is not unqualified monism. In it the subject is ‘all existents’ which are revealed to us in knowledge and thus a known factor. The predicate is unknown. In all judgment the subject is a known fact and the predicate must be unknown. If the predicate were equally known with the subject, it would not be a judgment or a proposition.\(^2\) So the very form of a proposition implies that the subject and the predicate cannot be identical. The Vedāntist therefore cannot establish monism even by appeal to authoritative revelation. It may be contended that the meaning of the predicate is self-identity which is realized by a subject in his own self and this self-identity is asserted of all that appears including self and not-self. The logical implication of the proposition therefore is the negation of the appearance of plurality as real. Thus interpreted the proposition is neither tautologous nor liable to signify dualism. The Jaina would observe that even if the interpretation be accepted to be true, the implication of dualism is inescapable inasmuch as the duality of revelation and the world appearance respectively as the negator and the negated remains uncontradicted.\(^3\) If on the other hand revelation were to be regarded as the essence of the Absolute, that also would not prove their identity as essence and possessor of essence must be numerically different. Nor again can self-intuition be regarded as proof of it because the proof must be different from the object of proof. If the Absolute were believed to be self-proved, why not plurality or voidity or the doctrine of universal illusion be accepted as the ultimate truth? The Vedāntist has failed to advance any ground in support of his position, and his assertion is only dogmatic. If a dogmatic assertion can pass for truth, any other theory, be it of the nihilist or the materialist might claim allegiance.

Suresvara has argued in defence that the Absolute is no other than the self of the individual, yet, owing to delusion, it is regarded as unknown and unperceived. The self is also nothing but the Absolute which is the only reality, yet it appears as a second entity in addition to the Absolute Brahman. The categorical assertion of the Upaniṣad ‘The self is the Absolute’ rebuts the illusion of imperceptibility and duality.

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\(^1\) yat pratibhāsa-samānādhikaraṇaṁ tat pratibhāsāt kathānic arthaṁ arthaṁ yathā pratibhāsa-svarūpam, pratibhāsa-samānādhikaraṇaṁ ca sukha-nilādi sarvam—\textit{Ibid.}, p. 161.

\(^2\) sarvathā prasiddhasya vidhānāyogā—\textit{Ibid.}.

\(^3\) Cf. kvacid ātmavayaktau prasiddhasyai ‘kātmaya-rūpasya brahmaṇtvasya . . . katham advaitasiddhiḥ. . .—\textit{Ibid.}.
But the whole assertion is vitiated by ambiguity. What is the nature of the delusion which is asserted to be the outcome of nescience? Is nescience itself an unreal fiction or a real entity? If it be a fiction it cannot be the cause of illusion of imperceptibility or of duality, because a non-entity cannot have any causal efficiency. If on the other hand it is believed to be real, that amounts to the admission of dualism.¹

So whatever be the line of approach or the angle of vision by which the denial of dualism of spirit and matter and the affirmation of the absolute unity of reality may be sought to be established the result becomes nothing but self-contradiction. If the monist is to prove his position by appeal to an accredited organ of knowledge, he unwittingly affirms the reality of two things: the Absolute and the proof of it. The Jaina refuses to agree with the Vedāntist that truth can be established by falsehood which is the postulate of the Vedāntist when he declares the whole logical and epistemological apparatus to be the figment of illusion.

Furthermore, monism can be established only by the negation of dualism. In fact, Śaṅkara, the founder of the school of monistic Vedānta, has called his philosophy the doctrine of non-dualism. The expression ‘non-dualism’ can convey an intelligible meaning only if dualism be understood. Now ‘dualism’ is a whole expression and stands for a whole concept. It can be asserted as a universal proposition that the negation of a whole concept presupposes the reality of the concept in some other context. Of course, there are such expressions as ‘a square-circle’ which do not stand for anything real, and its negation by such a negative expression as ‘a non-square-circle’ cannot be thought to presuppose the reality of the negatum. But this does not invalidate the universal proposition ‘The negatum is always real’. The rule holds only in the case of whole words and whole concepts. A square-circle is only an attempt at combination of square and circle, and it becomes a fiction because the two concepts are mutually repellent. It is for this reason that the rule is propounded to hold good of whole concepts quâ negata. Now monism quâ negation of dualism is possible only if dualism be a false appearance. But dualism being a whole concept its negation will necessarily presuppose the reality of the negatum (sc. dualism) in some context or other.²

The Vedāntist however is not convinced by such linguistic arguments. Even if dualism is regarded as a concept, its negation cannot be made the ground of its ontological reality. The negation of dualism does not in reality belong to the Absolute. The whole

¹ mohasyā 'vidyārūpasyā 'kīcidrūpavate pāroksya-hetuvāghaṇatāt saddvi-
vātyaratvadarśanā-nibandhanatvāsvamabhavāt, tasya vastu-rūpavte dvaitasiddhi-
prasaktes tata eva 'pāroksya-sadvītātyavayor bādhanāt pumartho niścitaṁ 
śāstram' ity etasyā 'pi dvaita-sādhanatvāt... Ibid.

² See AMīt, 27.
logical apparatus which is the creation of the professional logician is possessed of a provisional value. It is valid until the ultimate truth is realized. Its validity can thus be penultimate at the most optimistic estimate. But what is the necessity of negation of dualism and what again is the reason for the adoption of the logical apparatus for the establishment of monistic position by the Vedāntist? The Vedāntist answers that the whole order of plurality is an unreal show which has deceived the dualist and the pluralist into the belief of its ultimate reality. When the Vedāntist tries to convince the dualist of his error he has to adopt the logical apparatus invented by the logicians of the realistic persuasion. The distinction of self and not-self is equally necessitated by nescience and is not to be mistaken as possessed of ultimate validity.\(^1\) So the charge of self-contradiction urged against the Vedāntist is the outcome of misunderstanding. The Vedāntist has got to employ these logical weapons not out of belief in their ultimate truth and validity, but as the only possible means of carrying conviction. These logical and epistemological devices hold good only on this side of final realization of the ultimate truth. And the Vedāntist also has to offer his allegiance to them so long as he has to deal with the deluded philosophers of rival schools. The whole thing is nescience from beginning to end, and top to bottom.

But what is the nature of nescience? This is the question which perplexes the opponent of monism. It is a real difficulty with him because he fails to understand with all the logical resources at his command why this nescience should be associated with the Absolute which is affirmed to be the only reality by the Vedāntist. Let us now consider the nature and relation of nescience as expounded by Śrīvīra in the Bhādarānyaka-bhāṣya-vārttika.\(^2\) It is possible to conceive that the nescience, if it existed at all, can exist as the content of the Absolute or of the individual or as an independent entity. Now the first alternative is not conceivable. The conception of nescience in the Absolute which is of the nature of cognition and ex hypothesi omniscient involves self-contradiction. Nor can it be supposed to subsist in the individual because the individual is not different from the Absolute and as such is free from all taint of nescience. How can nescience exist in the individual self which also is of the nature of pure cognition? Nor is the third alternative a tenable hypothesis, because nescience being an independent entity, like the Absolute, cannot be supposed to be annihilated by knowledge and so knowledge of the identity of the self and the Absolute which is prescribed to be the condition of salvation, being the eliminator of nescience, will have no purpose to serve.

\(^1\) . . . . na ca sva-para-vibhāgo 'pi tāttvikas tasyā 'vidyāvilāsāsṛyatvāt—
Aṣṭasahasrī, p. 162.

Knowledge of identity is believed to lead to the perfect emancipation of the self, because it is assumed to be destructive of nescience which has induced bondage. But if nescience be an independent entity like the Absolute and be coeval with the Absolute from the beginningless time, it will be as eternal as the Absolute itself. And the bondage also will be an eternal fact. Suresvara answers that the nature of nescience cannot be determined by an organ of knowledge. Nescience is not capable of being determined by logic yet it cannot be denied that it exists. The individual feels that he is ignorant of many things. He is as certain of his ignorance as he is of his own existence. The individual is directly aware that he is a conscious being. So consciousness and existence are inalienable characteristics of the individual self. From the authority of revelation as well as the evidence of logic the self is known to be identical with the Absolute Brahman. And we have seen that nescience is not possible in the Absolute and the individual alike. Suresvara maintains that this is not the correct approach for determining the relation of nescience. To deny the existence of nescience would be contradiction of a felt fact. So, however irrational and illogical the concept of nescience may appear to be, its actual existence has got to be admitted by all. It is true that the conception of nescience as an independent entity is an absurd hypothesis. We find it from our study of the Upanishads that nescience is totally destroyed by knowledge of the reality. This is also the finding of incontestable experience. Our ordinary errors such as the perception of shell for the silver are found to be annihilated when followed by correct knowledge of the reality. This would be impossible and also unaccountable if nescience were an eternal verity. It must be admitted that there is no raison d'être for error. It is possible only when the conditions of knowledge are given a false twist by something superadded to them. It is absolutely unintelligible why should there be a deviation from the normal standard. Certainly this deviation cannot be the normal law as this would make the emergence of correct knowledge and cancellation of the false knowledge preceding it an impossibility. What holds good of nescience operating in the individual must be true of it in its cosmic aspect also. So nescience cannot be an eternal verity like the Absolute. Nor can it be an independent entity as in that case there will be no ground for positing it. It is felt by us all that we are beset by limitations on all sides and we are not satisfied with our present condition. We always try to transcend it as an undesirable obsession. So nescience cannot have an independent existence outside consciousness. That it is an internal fact always felt in association with consciousness is also the finding even of the realists as we have seen in the course of our examination of the views of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya-Yoga schools. It is regarded as a psychical fact and this shows its intimate
relation with consciousness. The Vedāntist believes that consciousness, absolute and undifferenced, is the only reality and is the very stuff and essence of all that exists and appears. The appearance of plurality according to the Vedāntist is erroneous, and as such must have a reason of its own. This reason is found in nescience. And so the nescience is not only subjective but also objective because it is co-pervasive with consciousness in its entire range.

Now the individual is not the seat of ignorance according to Sureśvara for twofold reason. In the first place the individual is nothing different from absolute consciousness in point of reality. And if the individual be regarded as ontologically different from the Absolute, which is not however the position of any section of the monistic school, then also the individual cannot be regarded as the locus of nescience. The individualization of the self is itself the result of nescience and as such cannot be the determinant of the incidence of nescience which is its very presupposition. Nescience must have a local habitation of its own as the possibility of nescience as a floating entity has been found to be absurd. It must then have pure consciousness as its locus and abode and from the evidence of our own experience we find that nescience is a felt fact. This shows that pure eternal consciousness cannot be opposed to nescience. On the contrary it constitutes the only evidence of its being. Opposition is both a priori and empirical. The opposition of being and non-being is felt a priori. But other types of opposition are empirical and as such can be known only from experience. We have found that there is no opposition between pure consciousness and nescience. Pure consciousness means consciousness which is not determined by any objective reference. It is bereft of subject-object polarization. Pure consciousness thus means unpolarized consciousness. It is not relevant to our purpose to prove that unpolarized consciousness is possible though it is stoutly opposed by Rāmānuja and also the realists of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga school and also the Jainas admit the possibility of pure consciousness at least in the final state of emancipation.

Granted that there is no opposition between pure consciousness and nescience. But how to account for the opposition of nescience as error with knowledge? It is felt beyond the shadow of a doubt that our erroneous perception of shell as silver is cancelled and corrected by knowledge of the shell in its true character. Our knowledge of shell is attended with the negative judgment 'It is not silver'. This shows that there is opposition between knowledge and error which is nothing but a species of nescience. This has puzzled many a respectable philosopher and it has been seriously asserted that the Vedāntist is guilty of self-contradiction. But this is due to their failure to distinguish between knowledge and pure consciousness. Pure conscious-
ness is an eternal and transcendental entity. As regards nescience, it is also asserted by the Vedãntist to be associated with the absolute consciousness which is pure and transcendental and undetermined by objective reference. There can be no difference in transcendental consciousness. The difference of one consciousness from another is only possible when it is made specific and particularized by objective reference, in other words, when it is possessed of a specific content and is called knowledge. Knowledge is consciousness in its essence, but it is different as a specific determination is from the genus. The opposition of error is with knowledge and not with pure transcendental consciousness which is rather the proof of it. Error is also a cognition with a distinct content and it is cancelled only by a cognition with an opposite content with reference to the same situation. It is the true cognition which cancels the false cognition. The true cognition is here called knowledge, and the false cognition error. The opposition only holds between them.

It has been argued by the opponent of the monist that there can be no nescience in the Absolute because of the a priori opposition between consciousness and nescience. But the opposition is not a priori, and so the argument has no validity. The very fact that we are conscious of nescience shows that there is no opposition between them. But though a felt fact and uncaused entity existing concurrently with the Absolute, nescience is not regarded as an eternal verity like the Absolute Brahman, because it is liable to be cancelled and corrected by the unerring realization of the nature of the self as identical with the Absolute. It has been shown that nescience is destroyed by knowledge from the example of common error and its correction. The Vedãntist deduces from the fact the conclusion that nescience is not a reality in the true sense of the term. A reality is not capable of death or destruction. Nescience being liable to extinction cannot be regarded as a coordinate reality. But though not a reality, its actual existence is a felt fact and so cannot be denied without self-contradiction. The denial of nescience as well as its assertion is possible only within the limitation of nescience, because they are all judgments and as such have a dualistic reference. Of course, there can be no real relation between the Absolute and nescience. The Absolute is unattached and unrelated to anything within and without. But whatever be the ontological or logical character of the relation of nescience, its actuality cannot be disputed. Even an unreal relation is possible just as an unreal nescience is.

A difficulty has been raised that the Absolute has been described as omniscient and certainly nescience is incompatible with omniscience. Ānandagiri has anticipated this difficulty and given a solution. It is this. Omnescience does not mean empirical knowledge of all things,
but the eternal perennial light of consciousness which makes all knowledge possible. So there is no logical repugnance in the unreal association of unreal nescience with it. By logical thought we can understand that this is not impossible, but the actual nature of it can be realized only by perfect knowledge. When nescience is destroyed by knowledge, it becomes identical with the Absolute. Nescience is a fact which refuses to be determined by logical thought. Nescience cannot be said to exist unless the Absolute quâ transcendental consciousness is known. In other words, nescience cannot be felt without consciousness. But nescience also cannot be intuited as existent if the true nature of the Absolute as pure consciousness is realized. Moreover, who will be the knower of it—the person who suffers from nescience or who has emancipated himself from it? The determination of the nature of nescience is not possible for the person who is subject to its sway, because this will mean that he is not fettered by nescience. As regards the emancipated self, the logical distinctions of the subject, the object, and the act of knowledge have totally vanished for him for ever, and so such determination is not possible. An organ of knowledge is not competent to gauge unreality. It is only the real that can be determined by it. But nescience is ex hypothesi not a real because it does not stand the scrutiny of accredited cognitive organs. Nescience is called nescience because it is incapable of standing critical examination with success. In fact the criterion of nescience is nothing but this incapacity for standing the trial by accepted instruments of knowledge.\(^1\)

But the question may be asked 'Why are we enamoured of such an irrational concept?' You have yourself admitted that it is not capable of being determined by the accredited organs of logic. Why don't you admit that the world is both different and non-different from the Absolute? Both you and myself admit the Absolute and the World, and the relation between them is asserted by us to be identity-cum-difference. The merit of this theory lies in the consideration that it does not entail repudiation of anyone of the felt facts—the world and its cause the Absolute. Why should you postulate an irrational and unreal principle as the cause of the world process?

The Vedāntist answers that after all his theory is the simplest of all. Secondly, it makes the postulation of a large number of irrational entities uncalled for. Thus the opponent who believes in the reality of the world process has to admit that it is both different and non-different from the Absolute. In the second place, he has to posit that bondage, though it is real and also uncaused, is liable to cessation. In the third place, he has to posit that emancipation is the product of

\(^1\) avidyāyā avidyātve idam eva ca laksanam māṇāgāhātāsahisnutvam asādhaśāram śyate.
---Sambandhavārttika, 181. Aṣṭasahāṣṭri, p. 163.

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religious and moral activity and is yet eternal. The monist only affirms nescience as the sole and sufficient condition of all these results. And though it exists from eternity alongside of and together with the Absolute, yet there is no logical difficulty in the fact that it is liable to annihilation, because it is felt to be unreal and so its disappearance does not entail logical contradiction which would be inevitable if it were real. But it might be argued that simplicity is not by itself a recommendation for a theory. If a multiplicity of things is necessitated by logical thought we cannot reject it for the sake of economy alone. But the Vedāntist agrees that simplicity or multiplicity without the sanction of valid cognition is not a compelling consideration in the determination of reality. But if the multiplicity of categories asserted by the opponent is found to be contradicted by accredited sources of knowledge, the postulation of it will be logically indefensible. Now the believer in reality of the world has to assert that the relation between the world and its cause is identity and difference both—a conception which is repugnant to all sources of knowledge. Secondly, he admits that the worldly career is a reality bereft of beginning in time, and to say that it is annihilated by true knowledge is opposed to the universally accepted proposition that a real uncaused and undated is eternal. Thirdly, it asserts emancipation to be the product of moral activity and yet to be eternal. This is opposed by the proposition universally accepted as true that whatever is caused to happen at a particular time cannot but be liable to extinction. These are the major contradictions in the theory of the opponent, and there may be many more, if minor details are to be taken into account. As regards the Vedāntist’s theory, it only postulates nescience and this is not also an unwarranted assumption since it is endorsed by experience and scriptural authority alike.\(^1\)

The Jaina frankly confesses his inability to appreciate the argument of the Vedāntist. In the first place, the postulation of nescience which the Vedāntist himself admits to be incapable of any proof strikes him as an unphilosophical position. It is extremely puzzling that a philosopher should subscribe to a position which is not amenable to test by any accredited organ of knowledge. Whatever may be the subject of dispute, call it truth or untruth, science or nescience, the matter can be finally decided by means of the accredited sources of knowledge available to us.\(^*\) The Jaina does not dispute the existence of nescience, but he insists that this is also a matter of proof. When the Vedāntist asserts nescience as an actual existent, he is certainly aware of its existence. And this awareness must be true and valid. Otherwise he

\(^1\) Cf. tvat-pakṣe bahu kalpyāṁ syāt sarvaṁ māśāvirodhitī ca kalpyā ‘vidyai ‘va matpakṣe sā cā ‘nubhava-saṁśrayā.

—Sambandha-vārttiṣa, 182. Aṣṭasahasṛi, p. 163.
will not be in a position to make the assertion. The Vedāntist had to admit that nescience is a felt fact. But he chooses to call the awareness of nescience an alogical knowledge. The reason seems to be the opposition of nescience with knowledge which is also a felt fact. That we commit error is not open to dispute. That this error is corrected and cancelled by knowledge of the true character of reality such as of the shell as opposed to silver, is not also liable to be disputed. But the cancellation of error, which consists in the proof that the predicate does not belong to the subject in the context in spite of its reality in another context, need not be construed as evidence of the unreality of error or of its content. That we make error is also capable of being established by a veridical knowledge. This is apparent from the consideration that the Vedāntist also cannot deny that we misperceive shell as silver. This misperception is a fact which can be known by an unchallengeable cognition. And this cognition is possible if an organ of cognition operates upon the fact. But the Vedāntist may urge ‘Well, if error be an object of veridical cognition, it will be a real like true cognition. Not only this, it will also have to be admitted that the knowledge of error will be true knowledge, and this will amount to the assertion that there is no difference between error and truth.’

The Jaina does not regard these objections as real difficulties. In the first place, he admits that error is as much a fact and verity as truth. In the second place, he admits that the cognition of error is true cognition. In other words, the Jaina believes that error as a psychical event is a true occurrence, and its cognition is the cognition of a true fact. It has been observed by Akalaṅka ‘A cognition is true in reference to a fact which is not contradicted by another cognition.’ The Vedāntist also endorses the factuality of error as a psychical fact, and he also admits that there is awareness of such error. But he refuses to give this awareness the status of a true cognition, and he thinks the content of error, at least the predicative part of it, as neither real nor unreal, but something logically indeterminable. The reason he advances in support of his position is that it is set aside by a true cognition following upon it. Nobody denies this that error is corrected by a subsequent valid experience. But that does not and should not be interpreted as evidence of the unreality of the cognition or of the content. It may be false cognition but nonetheless it is a cognition, and true so far as its occurrence is taken into consideration. It is regarded as error because the external object is not possessed of

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1 na ca pramāṇānāṁ avidyā-vidyāvatvām ayuktāṁ vidyāvat avidyāyā api kathānicīd vastutvāt. tathā vidyātvaprasāṅga iti ca na kiṃcid aniṣṭam, 'yathā yatṛā 'visarvādās tathā tatra pramāṇātā' ity Akalaṅkadevārūry apy uktatvāt—

Aṣṭasahāṣṭri, p. 163.
the predicate judged to belong to it in error. The contradiction only proves that the predicate does not belong to the subject and nothing more. It has been already explained that the contradiction cannot mean that error did not happen. Error is bound to be admitted as historical event, and to be true so far as it is a real happening. The Vedāntist has affirmed that the awareness of error is effected by pure consciousness, and as such cannot be assigned any logical value. But this seems to be a distinction without a difference. Granted that error is felt by pure consciousness. But why should this awareness be not valid? If the awareness of error be invalid, there will be no possible means of asserting that it is a psychical occurrence. The question of validity or invalidity of a cognition is not capable of being decided by the intrinsic character of the cognition in question. The validity of a cognition can be decided by external evidence, at least in the initial stage. A cognition is regarded as invalid only when it is found to be contradicted by a subsequent cognition showing that the predicate does not belong to the subject. The awareness of error, no matter whether pure or empirical, is not contradicted by any subsequent cognition. The subsequent cognition does not annul the historicity of error as a cognition. It only shows, as we have observed, that the predicate does not belong to the subject. Thus there does not seem to be any logical warrant for questioning the validity of awareness of error as a fact whether it be classed as empirical or metempirical.

As regards the contention of Sureśvara that nescience or error (which means the same thing) is not determinable by a valid cognition or an instrument of it, the Jainā does not think that it is based upon truth. It has been observed that a cognition is proved to be false when it is contradicted by a subsequent cognition having the same reference. The contradicting cognition is held to be true by all even including the Vedāntist. This shows that error is proved by truth which is based upon a true objective datum. The Jainā accordingly thinks that the Vedāntist's interpretation of error as an alogical fact is due to a hasty appraisal of the logical issue. Error as well as truth is always capable of being determined only with reference to reality. When the cognition is found to correspond to the objective situation in all respects it is called truth. When, on the other hand, it fails to conform to reality in any respect it is called false. So nescience as error is always determinable with reference to reality, and that again by means of an accredited organ of knowledge. As for the further contention of Sureśvara that nescience is not possible for a person possessed of knowledge, it is observed that nescience is not possible in a person who is possessed of perfect knowledge and as such is omniscient. But there is no evidence to show that it is not possible for a man whose knowledge is limited. The assertion of Sureśvara
that knowledge is futile in respect of a person free from nescience is also not based upon truth. Freedom from nescience makes perfect knowledge possible, and this knowledge is not futile because everybody will admit that it is covetable for its own sake. So how can knowledge be futile for a person free from nescience? The assertion of Suresvara again that the determination of nescience in a person is possible only so long as he is under the hypnotic spell of nescience is entirely wide of the mark. The differentiation of nescience from truth is possible only when a person discovers the truth. Were a person completely under the spell of nescience such differentiation would not be possible. The truth of the proposition asserted here is borne out by the evidence of dream. The dreaming man cannot distinguish between truth and error, because he is completely enmeshed in nescience in dream.\(^1\) So Suresvara’s categorical affirmation that determination of nescience is possible only under the sway of nescience is entirely opposed to fact. It might be contended that if nescience as error be a true cognition, then there will be no reason for its being contradicted by a subsequent cognition; but the fact that it is so contradicted shows that it is entirely false. But the Jaina asserts that there is no incompatibility in the situation. Error is regarded as a true cognition only in a sectional reference. It is true so far as its reference to the subject is concerned, and also so far as it is felt by the person, that is, with reference to its own being. When the deluded person thinks that he is ignorant or in error, he does not make a false assertion. This shows how a cognition, though true so far as it goes and so far as its particular reference is concerned, can be contradicted by a subsequent experience and thus be false in some particular reference. The dilemma raised by Suresvara that nescience is not intelligible whether the self is known or not known proceeds upon partial appraisal of truth. There is no incompatibility in the fact that a partially illumined person is subject to error and illumination alternately or simultaneously.\(^2\) Nescience is impossible of realization only in the case of perfect knowledge and total ignorance. But the latter alternative is impossible because there is no self which is totally devoid of knowledge, which is the possible outcome of total ignorance. As regards the former alternative the contention is only partially true. A man with perfect knowledge is not subject to nescience. But he realizes and transcends his nescience only with the dawn of such knowledge.

\(^{1}\) na cā ‘vidyāyām eva sthitvā ‘syē ‘yam avidye ‘ti kalpyate, sarvasya vidyāvasthāyām evā ‘vidyetara-vibhāga-niścayāt svapnādyavidyā-daśāyān tad-abhāvāt—\textit{Ibid.}

\(^{2}\) na cā ‘tmanī kathañcid avidite ‘py avidyē ‘ti no ‘papadyate, bādha-virodhat. kathañcid vijñāte ‘pi vā ‘vidye ‘ti nitarāṁ ghañate, vidhitatmanā eva tadbādhakatva-viniścitech kathañcid bādhitāyā buddher mṛṣātva-siddheḥ—\textit{Ibid.}
Again, Sureśvara has asserted without compunction and almost with the sang-froid of a bravado that nescience is an irrational principle and the fact that it eludes all the epistemological resources is rather symptomatic of its true character. But the Jaina would pose a simple question 'How do you know that nescience is not amenable to logical proof? Are you sure that it is so? If so, what is the source of your conviction?' If the Vedāntist confesses that he has no resource which enables him to make such assertion, then he will be guilty of unabashed dogmatism. If, on the other hand, the Vedāntist is sure of the truth of his assertion this will mean that nescience is not altogether incapable of logical determination. At any rate the determination of nescience as alogical principle must be based upon truth and consequently secured by an accredited organ of knowledge.

Sureśvara has claimed that the postulation of nescience as the prīris of the world process makes Vedānta philosophy the simplest of all systems. It may be so. But simplicity by itself is not a compelling consideration for the acceptance of a philosophy. Moreover this simplicity is more apparent than real. The plurality of entities with their infinite diversities is a felt fact. Nescience was posited over and above the absolutely undifferenced transcendental consciousness called the Absolute because it was felt that plurality, even as appearance, cannot be deduced from a simple unity. But if nescience be only another unitary principle, it also will not be competent to produce the appearance of plurality. For this it has been assumed that nescience possesses an infinite plurality of powers. Thus the claim of simplicity is based upon a quibble. It has however been claimed that nescience with its infinite resources and powers is an unreality and so the only reality is pure consciousness. The admission of such an illusory principle does not make reality more than one. But the assertion of unreality of nescience is a puzzle which runs counter to the verdict of experience and logical thought. Why should it be unreal? The Vedāntist answers that it is not real because it exhibits self-contradiction in every stage. The things of the world are subject to constant change and this means the extinction of the old order and emergence of a new one. But if a thing is to be real in its independent capacity and right, it cannot be supposed that it should diminish or increase or cease to be or come into being. Origin and destruction are unpredicable of a real. A real is real always and so must remain constant. The erroneous silver is unreal because it ceases to be when it is contradicted by knowledge of the shell. If a real were capable of origination and cessation like the false silver, there would be no criterion possible for the distinction of real from unreal. It must therefore be admitted, so contends the Vedāntist, that constancy and
continuity and consequently the absence of lapse from uniformity are the true characteristic of a real. But these tests are incapable of being applied to the objects of experience. Things are seen to come into existence and pass out of being and this means that there is neither constancy nor uniformity in them. The conclusion is inevitable that they cannot be real.

The Jaina philosopher has not concealed his surprise at this endeavour of the Vedántist to formulate a conception of reality which is entirely opposed to experience. What is the source of the knowledge of this peculiar nature of reality? The ultimate nature of things can be known by experience alone. Well, what is the ground for our belief that consciousness is existent and also is the proof of the existence of other things? The answer must be that it is felt to be so. Consciousness is its own guarantor and proof of its own reality. As regards unconscious matter, its existence is established by means of consciousness. It cannot be asked why consciousness should be self-evidenced and matter be dependent upon consciousness for the proof of its existence. The question is a question of fact, and not of reason. The nature of thing is inalienable and must be accepted to be what it is. Can anybody answer why fire should be hot and water cold, and not vice versa? No, because it is a question of fact. Similarly the nature of reality is to be deduced from the testimony of experience. The existence of things which are experienced is obvious and self-evident. If you call in question their credentials, the fact of existence and consciousness which are posited by the Vedántist to be the ultimate reality will not also be immune from such doubting interrogation. The result will be unrelieved scepticism or universal negation. The Vedántist had the good sense and sanity not to acquiesce in this suicidal estimation. The Jaina would respectfully and earnestly ask the Vedántist to carry his determination of reality consistently to its natural conclusion. He accepts existence to be the ultimate truth solely on the testimony of experience. But as experience records change as the integral character of existence or rather of things felt to be existent, it beats one's understanding why change should be declared as unreal appearance. The Vedántist has contended that change involves lapse of being into non-being and this is a case of self-contradiction. Reality must not be self-contradictory. But as change is fraught with contradiction, it is to be unceremoniously thrown overboard as an unreal and unjustifiable appearance. The Jaina is a frank realist, and is candid in his confession of faith in the verdict of experience. The Vedántist thinks that there is pure being which is incompatible with pure non-being. But pure being is an abstraction, and we have no experience of it. So also is the case with pure non-being. What we find in
experience, including the principle of consciousness itself, is concrete being which is a unity of different entities. Thus we never come across a pure substance denuded of all qualities and actions. A substance is always a unity with the multiplicity of attributes. Why should the Vedāntist scent contradiction in it? He should take the reality as a whole and the attempt to clip away a part of its character only bespeaks unwarranted zeal for abstract thinking. It is no doubt true that the diversity of reals encountered by experience exhibits existence as their universal trait. But the universality and continuity of this trait and the discontinuity of other traits are facts alike. The former should not be vested with truth and the latter dismissed as appearance.

Similarly one should not read contradiction in the combination of identity and difference when they are endorsed by uncontradicted experience. The Vedāntist accepts the aspect of identity and rejects the aspect of difference, because he thinks that the nature of reality is absolutely simple. But this is only the outcome of his bias for a priori logical thought in preference to and contradiction of experience. We could accept this assessment of reality if the dictates of a priori logic were found to be confirmed even in a single instance of our experience. The Vedāntist is too astute a thinker not to be aware of this weakness in his position. Accordingly he appeals to dreamless experience. He asserts that pure existence is felt in this state. He also appeals to samādhi (ecstasy) in which the spiritual aspirant realizes the reality as a homogeneous simple unity bereft of intrinsic and extrinsic difference. But the state of samādhi is not attainable by all. If a gifted soul experiences it that does not afford any help to men of limited knowledge who are enquirers after truth. So it has no philosophical value. As regards dreamless experience it is not also beyond dispute. So the Vedāntist has to rely upon the revealed texts of the Upaniṣads and upon pure logic. So far as the Upaniṣadic texts are concerned, the interpretation of the monist is not accepted as the last word. There are other interpretations also. It may not be out of place to remark that the Jaina scriptures also have discussed these texts and have offered their own interpretation which is at variance with that of the monist. As regards pure logic, the Jaina attitude towards it has been elucidated in this work with as much clarity and precision as has been possible for us. The consequential objections of Suresvara regarding bondage and emancipation do not cause much difficulty to the Jaina. The Jaina believes that bondage is a real condition of the self, and though existing from the beginningless time as coeval with the individual yet it is liable to be transcended. Emancipation is nothing but the disentanglement of the self from the karmic matter. The karmic matter is not destroyed but only pulled out. The pure nature of the
self with its fourfold infinite characteristics, which is realized in emancipation, is not a new creation in the absolute sense. It was always there. But the karmic matter served to obscure it. The obscuration is ended in the state of emancipation. The Jaina believes in change because it is found to be the universal character of all reals and if it means transition from being to non-being in a sectional reference, the Jaina is not frightened by it. So the objection of Suresvara that emancipation, being a product of a process, will be liable to destruction does not cause any difficulty. It is found that gold in its natural state is associated with the ores from the very emergence of its being, but by a chemical process it is disentangled from them. And this does not involve any logical difficulty. Similar is the case of the self. Though it is associated with karmic matter throughout its past history, its dissociation from the latter cannot be an impossibility. The Vedàntic solution that bondage and emancipation are both illusory cannot be regarded as the only satisfactory explanation as it has been made abundantly clear that the denial of plurality, in defiance of experience, cannot escape from fall into the abyss of universal nihilism or scepticism which Nàgàrjuna and his followers have shown to be the inevitable conclusion of pure logic.

Let us now estimate the value of the Buddhist conception of avidyā.

XIII

CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF AVIDYA

We have seen how avidyā heads the chain of pralityasamutpāda (dependent origination).¹ We have also stated the Vijñānavādin’s conception of vāsanā under whose influence the consciousness (citta) appears as divided into the perceiver and the perceived, and is responsible for the world illusion.² The Buddhist conception of

¹ Vide supra, pp. 126-7. In this connection cf. also: ‘Life in ordinary men is controlled by ignorance (avidyā) which is the reverse of prajñā, but not its mere absence. It is a separate element which can be and, in every ordinary man really is, present at the same time with his dormant faculty of wisdom. But it is not a constant faculty, it can be suppressed (prahīna) and thrown out of the mental stream altogether which then becomes purified or saintly (ārya)’—Stcherbatsky: The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa (Leningrad, 1927), p. 9; vide also p. 134 (footnote 1) of the same work.

² Vide supra, pp. 129-30. Also cf. ‘... The transitional school of the Sautrāntikas coalesced in the fifth century A.D. with the idealistic school of the Mahāyāna and produced India’s greatest philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakirti. With regard to Nirvāṇa it assumed the existence of a pure spiritual principle, in which object and subject coalesced, and along with it, a

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abhūtaparikalpa (constructive ideation or unreal imagination) as found in the Lakāvatāra and the works of Maitreyanātha and his commentators has also been expounded at some length.  

1. Aśvaghoṣa’s doctrine of avidyā has also been noticed.  

2. We have not given separate treatment to the conceptions of the Mādhyamikas and others, because the conceptions already treated are sufficient to give an idea of those conceptions. If there is an illusion, there must be a force that creates it. This force is called avidyā. The conceptions of this avidyā differ according to the conceptions of reality. The criticism of a particular conception of avidyā is ultimately the criticism of the conception of reality presupposed by that particular conception. This is also the justification of our treatment of only a few conceptions leaving many others such as the conception of the Śabdādvaitins and the like out of our enquiry. After criticizing the monism of puruṣa (puruṣādvaita) of the Vedāntins, Vidyānandi says: ‘By this criticism the verbal monism (śabdādvaita) has also been refuted; firstly, because it is also, like the monism of consciousness (vijñānādvaita) and the like, subject to the said defects, there being difference only in procedural methodology; secondly, because that cannot be established; thirdly, because there is the common absence of any proof for itself or against the opponent; fourthly, because it is not self-attested, and fifthly, because there is no other justification possible.’  

3. These defects are common to all absolutisms. We have also not discussed the other conceptions on similar grounds. This is, of course, irrelevant. Our main task here is to record the Jaina philosopher’s estimate of the Buddhist conception of nescience (avidyā) or predisposition (vāsanā) stated above.

The Buddhists, like the other absolutists, when they are faced with the difficulty of explaining the universally attested experience, dismiss the experience as only an imagination born of avidyā or vāsanā which is beginningless. The Jaina philosophers remain true to the universally attested experience and formulate their philosophy accordingly. The facts are never distorted to suit the doctrine. Nor the help of nescience (avidyā) is sought for the evasion of every new problem that may arise. The Jaina doctrine of non-absolutism has been elaborated and systematized on the basis of experience, and if there appears to be any snag or angularity in it, it is ultimately due to that in the nature of things.

force of transcendental illusion (vāsanā) producing the phenomenal world’.—The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p. 61. We have, however, traced these ideas to the Lakāvatāra, probably the oldest work containing Vijñānavāda.

1 Vide supra, pp. 131-3.  


It is not up to the philosopher to question the nature of things and make them behave in the manner of his own conceptions. The things cannot be expected to follow the likes and dislikes of the philosopher. Nor has the philosopher any right to dismiss as inconsistent and illogical the nature of things revealed to his experience. An absolutistic conception presupposes attachment to a particular aspect of reality and ignorance or of indifference to the other aspects of it. And consequently futile attempts are made at explaining away or dismissing only as imaginary constructions the other aspects that refuse to fit in with the absolutistic conceptions. The Buddhists, like other absolutists, make a capital out of the principle of avidyā or vāsanā which is conceived to be as imaginary and unreal as its products. The Jaina criticism of the Buddhist conception of avidyā is substantially the same as that of the Vedāntin’s conception of it. Of course, the Buddhist’s avidyā is only a subjective force while the Vedāntin’s is objective too. But there is essential similarity between the functions of them. We have stated the Jaina’s objection against the Vedāntin’s position. Here we shall state, in brief, his objections against the Buddhist schools.

The Jainas believe that all absolutistic conceptions are vitiatted by some defect or other and that they all go against the verdicts of experience.1 The absolutists, however, dismiss the verdicts of experience as untrustworthy and ascribe the various appearances to beginningless avidyā. Thus the great Buddhist thinker Dharmakirti, while denying the reality of all distinctions of perceiver and perceived given in the universally attested experience and establishing things as devoid of all definable characteristics,2 says ‘Apprehension of unreal distinction (of perceiver and perceived), emerging under the influence of previous conditions and causes, arises in the people whose consciousness is vitiatted by nescience, even as aberrations of vision are conditioned by previous disorders.’3

Belief in the necessity of nescience is almost universal among philosophers. Our errors of judgment and of perception must be due to some condition. It is true that the conditions of normal activity of our intellectual, emotional and volitional constitution cannot be supposed to be responsible for the anomalies and aberrations. It is, for this reason, admitted by philosophers that there must be a tendency and predisposition to give our normal faculties a twist and turn in the opposite direction so that error may be possible. It should be noted

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1 Cf. tvan-matāṃṛta-bāhyānāṁ sarvathāikāntavādīnāṁ āptābhīmāna-dagdhnānāṁ sveṣṭāṁ drṣṭena bādhyste. —AMI, 7 (Aṣṭasahasrī, p. 76).

2 See Pramāṇavārttika, II. 212-216.

3 yathāsvaḥ pratyayāpaksād avidyopaputātmanāṁ vijnaptir vitathākāra jāyate timirādivat.—Ibid., II. 217.
that error is not only privative in character but also positive in its results. And for this an adequate condition must be postulated. This condition is called nescience. It not only obscures and hides the nature of reality but also vests it with a false appearance. It is a positive force as has been advocated by the Vedāntist, the Buddhist, the exponents of the Yoga school and others. The Jaina also agrees with this view. He thinks that it is the association of destructive karmic matter with the self that is responsible for these abnormal intellectual, emotional and volitional aberrations. This karmic matter is a positive fact and force and it has also twofold function. It not only obscures the innate perfect nature of the soul and hinders the full exercise of the powers, but also makes it a prey to illusions in every plane, intellectual, emotional and volitional. This fundamental agreement with the philosophers of other schools does not however solve the various problems that confront a thinking mind. It is a painful fact that the philosophers are at variance with one another in their estimate of the facts of experience and thought. What is this due to? Each school of philosophers has accused the opposite schools of their failure to grasp the true nature of reality. But the philosophers' differences need not throw a damper upon our enthusiasm for the discovery of truth. After all the Law of Contradiction will help a student of philosophy to reject what is false and to adopt what is true. As we have observed repeatedly, the logic must co-operate with experience in its quest for the Holy Grail, the knowledge of ultimate reality. Whenever there is a tendency of either of these resources available to mankind to dominate and subjugate the other, the result has been a tissue of contradictory findings which cannot be all true. The Jaina's approach to this supreme problem is co-ordination of experience and reason. His differences with the rival philosophers are due to the contradictions of the fundamental postulates and axioms which have claimed unqualified allegiance of all noble minds in their quest of truth.¹

Thus belief in the doctrine of karman, which is the natural outcome of the belief in the moral law of causality, is almost universally held by the majority of philosophers in India. Of course the materialists have refused to offer their allegiance to this characteristic doctrine. We do not propose to criticize the materialistic position in the present context. Our concern is now with those schools who believe in the inexorable necessity of the moral law. We shall consider whether their philosophical conclusions are in keeping with this fundamental truth.

Let us take up the position of the absolute nihilist. Nāgārjuna is the archangel of this school. He believes in the Buddhist doctrine of karman, at least on this side of final realization. So also does the

¹ See The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, Chap. I.
Vedāntist. Both these absolutistic schools agree that a man is beset with volitional and emotional tendencies and impulses which lead him to perform good and bad actions. They also believe that they have their natural reactions. The good action produces a happy result and the bad act an unhappy one, not only in this life but also in life hereafter. We have already criticized the Vedāntic position and now address ourselves to the criticism of nihilism. Now, if there be no reality and truth in the moral law how can the nihilist reconcile his faith in the efficacy of the moral law with the utter negation of it? The nihilist of course has contended that the moral law holds good only provisionally so long as the realization of ultimate truth does not happen. But he believes that performance of righteous actions such, for instance, as the practice of universal love and friendship and the avoidance of infliction of injury are the necessary preparation for ultimate perfection. The denial of the ultimate validity of the moral law presupposes an unbridgeable hiatus and breach of continuity of moral life with spiritual life. Is this supposition of unbridgeable gulf between our empirical life and metempirical destiny unavoidable? The Jaina thinks that it is not. He believes that the self in its onward and upward journey towards consummation surrenders and appropriates its previous acquisitions and present conquests. None of these trophies or defeats is unreal. They have a bearing, essential and natural, upon spiritual progress and advance. The nihilist cannot escape the charge of self-contradiction when he makes moral discipline the scaffolding to the final achievement and denies its efficacy and truth. It is true that the man who has ascended the topmost rung of the ladder has no necessity for the lower rungs. It bespeaks not only ingratitude but also perversity. As regards the Sautrāntika fluxist who is not less vocal in his allegiance to the moral law, it will be found on close examination that he too is guilty of self-contradiction nonetheless. He has argued that a permanent cause is an impossibility. A permanent cause will produce a permanent effect which is absurd. Causal efficiency, according to him, is the criterion of existence. He further argues that efficiency is necessarily concomitant with action, and action can be produced in succession or non-succession. But if an entity produces all its actions simultaneously then the question arises whether it persists after the production of effects or not. If it does not persist, it will be momentary. If it persists it will continue to produce all the effects simultaneously. But it is not a fact that all the effects are produced simultaneously. The pen writes. But it is not found that it writes all the letters and words that are written in present, past and future at the present moment. Nor can it be supposed that an entity produces its actions in succession. There is no reason why an entity should defer its
activity when it is possessed of all the powers. Thus causal efficiency is not possible for the non-momentary. So the non-momentary cannot be a real, being bereft of causal efficiency which is the necessary concomitant of reality. But the momentary also has been found to be incapable of exercising causal efficiency either in succession or in non-succession, and as such cannot be real. The Jaina accepts causal efficiency as the criterion of reality which, according to him, presupposes that real should be both permanent and transitory.¹

The Buddhist has denied a permanent self underlying the course of psychical events which happen in different times. But what exists and is possible is only the present momentary unit. The past is defunct, and the present is lost after its turn. This makes the continuity of personal life impossible, and accordingly the continuity of present life into the future and the necessity of the law of karmāṇa that the performer of good or bad act will have to bear the consequences—all these become impossible of explanation. The Buddhist has abolished the permanent soul and replaced it by a series supposed to be governed by the law of causality. The past produces the present and the present produces the future, and in the production the cause communicates its ethico-religious bias into the effect. This seems to be a solvent of the difficulties involved in the breach of continuity. But is causation possible in the absence of a real link between the past and the present? The previous consciousness-unit is dead and defunct when the succeeding unit happens. But how can a defunct and non-existent fact be the cause of anything? Nobody can think that the present occurrence is due to an event which has occurred in the remote past. The reason for this is that the past is not in existence to influence the present event. It might be contended that the immediately precedent event can be the cause of the immediately succeeding one. But how can the effect come into existence in the absence of the cause and yet be due to it? In the Buddhist theory the cause ceases to be when the effect comes into being. How can there be any relation between what is existent and what is non-existent? There can be no distinction between the immediate precedent and the remote precedent when both are equally non-existent at the time of the production of the effect. The determinant of causality is the concomitance in presence and absence of the effect with the cause. But in the Buddhist theory the effect does not happen when the cause is in existence, and it happens only when the supposed cause is non-existent. How can there be concomitance? How can again the Buddhist explain that the effect should happen in immediately succeeding moment and not in remote future or past when the cause has no existence at the time of

¹ The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, pp. 71 et seq.
the effect's occurrence? There can be no difference, as we have said, between a remote past and an immediate past, because the absence of the cause is uniform in both cases. The question comes to be 'How can the non-existent be the cause of the existent?' One might equally affirm that an eternally existent entity might produce an occasional effect. If it is urged that there is no concomitance between an eternally existent fact and an occasional event because the existence of the effect is not concomitant with that of the cause, and the cause is present when the effect ceases to be. But this is also the case with the Buddhist when he affirms that the effect comes into being during the absence of the cause at a particular time and place, but not during the whole period of its absence in the uncounted past and in unending future. And this amounts to the denial of the law of causality¹ which was the corner-stone of the Buddha's religious and philosophical edifice. Not only this, the self-contradiction obtrudes itself most unabashedly when the Buddhist fluxist makes causal efficiency the criterion of reality and ends in the conclusion that the effect is independent of the cause which is deducible from the proposition that the effect comes into being when the cause is absent. Thus causality is as inexplicable in the theory of flux as it is in the theory of eternally unchanging cause.

There is another serious difficulty in the doctrine of flux. It is a matter of universal experience that the continuous indentity of the self as well as of objects is felt by all. This felt identity is asserted to be illusion by the fluxist.² But what is the basis of this illusion? Illusion presupposes a previous cognition. A man who has never experienced silver cannot mistake the shell for silver. Identity is inseparable from continuity. But as there is not real continuity anywhere according to the Buddhist, how can there be such illusion possible? The supposed continuity is said to be formed by discrete moments which come into being and pass out of existence. So there is no real continuity anywhere. It is affirmed by the Buddhist himself that the discrete moments when not felt as distinct create the illusion of identity.³ We have shown that this illusion is impossible. But even admitting for the sake of argument that such an illusion may be possible, the question arises 'How can one continuum be distinguished from another continuum?' Now, it is a felt fact that the chair is different from the table. It is not the discrete momentary chair that is different from the table. But we feel that the table which appears to continue is different from the chair-continuum. There is no difference between the chair and the table so far as the appearance of continuum due to the non-cognition of the difference of the units is concerned. A

¹ Aṣṭasahasra, p. 183.
² Ibid., pp. 190 et seq.
³ santānā eva 'parāmrśta-bhedāḥ santāna iti svayam abhyupagamāt.—Aṣṭasahasra, p. 191.
question arises: 'How can one continuum be felt as distinct from another continuum?' Each member of chair-series is distinct from its other members in the same way as the members of the table-series are from those of the chair-series. Yet the chair-series is felt as distinct from the table-series. What is the reason of this? If the unbroken continuity of the emergence of the table-moments be the reason for its distinction from the chair, the same unbroken continuity is found in all the series. It is difficult to understand firstly, how absolutely distinct entities give rise to the appearance of identity; secondly, how one series can be distinguished from another series when the same absolute difference is found to obtain between them as is found between the members of a particular series. If similarity be held to be an additional reason for this appearance of identity and continuity then why should not the two table-series closely similar be not felt as identical? There is similarity and also unbroken succession between the different units. You may say that one table is felt as distinct from another table and so there is no confusion between them. But the appeal to perception is useless because what is perceived is always the moment and not the series which is an unreal intellectual construction.\(^1\) So again the appeal to recognition cannot be of help, because in the Buddhist theory of flux nothing continues, and there is no identity between the past and the present, which is to be known by recognition. What is felt is always the moment, absolutely distinct and discrete from another moment. So no question of identity of one moment with another moment arises. In fact, a plurality of units without a binding nexus can never account for the unity felt in an entity. If an abiding unity is posited to connect and combine the different units, then recognition and also causality can be explained. This is the position of the Jaina philosopher who asserts that a reality is a permanent unity which runs through the changing moments that appear in it. The criterion of reality is thus continuity and change, that is to say, the flux and influx of states.

As regards the subjectivist idealists, the Buddhist subjectivists hold that the only thing that exists is consciousness and external objects are only false appearances like those of dream experience.\(^2\) But this position can be established only by an organ of knowledge. Without the support of an organ of knowledge, the Buddhist cannot prove the falsity of the theories of rival philosophers who believe in extra-mental reality. Not only this, the subjectivist cannot prove the falsity of the differentiation of cognition into an act and a content. The subjectivist

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1 na ca parassparaḥ vilakṣaṇānām eva kṣaṇānām atyantam anvayāsatvāt 'py antar bahir vā santatayo 'sankṛtā eva pratyakṣataḥ pratītaḥ tasyai 'ka-

kṣaṇa-gocarataya santamānviśayatvāt—Ibid.

2 Āṣṭasahasri, Chap. VII (pp. 240 et seq.).
holds that our cognitions are momentary and self-intuited and that there are other subjects. Certainly all these facts cannot be proved by our intuitions. A cognition may be felt by itself, but it is not felt as momentary or as not cognized by another which is the meaning of self-intuition. Moreover, if the cognition has no veridical reference to a real extra-subjective fact, how can the subjectivist believe in the existence of other subjects? The denial of genuine extra-subjective reference must end in solipsism. If the entire logical apparatus including the difference of probans and probandum and the necessary relation between them be a false creation of nescience, then the subjectivist cannot prove anything including his own position. The subjectivist seeks to establish the identity of content with cognition on the ground of the two being felt together. But this very assertion proves that he believes in the duality of cognition and content. Is this not a case of self-contradiction like the vocal statement of a person 'I am an observer of the vow of silence'? It has however been argued in defence by the subjectivist that this line of attack on the part of the opponent is neither fair nor consistent. How can the charge of a fallacy or a self-contradiction be advanced against the subjectivist when the opponent knows that the former does not believe in the reality of anything other than consciousness? It might be said in defence that these adverse criticisms are not unreasonable or illegitimate so long as the subjectivist has not proved his position. The latter also has recourse to the logical apparatus to prove his position to the satisfaction of the opponent. And he is on the same level with the opponent so far as the belief in the validity of logical weapons is concerned. The use of logic will become superfluous after the ultimate truth viz. the reality of consciousness alone is realized. Dignāga and his followers in spite of their ultimate conviction of the truth of pure consciousness alone have elaborated logical weapons and this is not inconsistent with their philosophical convictions. They have frankly avowed that logic has its place and utility only on this side of realization of the ultimate truth and is necessary to combat the prevailing misconceptions of philosophers. So the charge of self-contradiction or inconsistency is nothing better than argumentum ad hominem.

The Jain philosopher observes that his charges could be ineffective if the Buddhist idealist succeeded in proving that his conclusion was established by an unimpeachable logical ground. Dharmakirti asserts that the 'identity' of cognition and content follows from the 'necessity of their being known together' (sahopalambha-niyamāt). But what is the meaning of the expression 'the necessity of being known together' and of the term 'identity'? The former may possibly be interpreted

1 . . . . sadā mauna-vratiko 'ham ity abhilāpavat sva-vacanavirodhasyai 'va svākaranāḥ—Āṣṭasahasri, p. 242.

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as the absence of separate cognition and ‘identity’ may be understood to mean ‘absence of numerical difference’. In other words, the ‘negation of separate cognition’ may be made the ground for the inference of ‘negation of numerical difference’. But this is not possible because there can be no necessary relation between two negations. As regards such negative inferences as of the ‘absence of smoke’ from the ‘absence of fire’, or the ‘absence of triangle’ from the ‘absence of figure’, they are legitimate only because they derive their cogency from the necessary concomitance between their positive counter-terms. Thus there is necessary concomitance between effect and cause, and so the negation of cause leads to the inference of the negation of effect. Likewise, there is necessary concomitance between ‘figure’ which is the genus and ‘triangle’ which is the species. And so the negation of the former entails the negation of the latter. There is no independent relation possible between two negations. The Buddhist argument could be effective if the positive concomitance between separate cognition and numerical difference were possible. To be explicit, the Buddhist is the last person to assert that a separate cognition of the content from that of the cognition concerned is possible by means of which the numerical difference of the cognition and content can be established; for the admission of the possibility of the cognition of the content, separate and numerically different from that of the cognition will knock out the Buddhist position of identity of cognition and content. The Buddhist therefore is precluded from asserting a logically necessary relation between their corresponding negations as negations have no independent logical relation apart from that of their opposite positives. The result will not be different even if either of the terms be given a positive interpretation. Thus if the probandum be asserted to be positive identity, it cannot be proved from negative probans, because there can be no relation between a positive and a negative term. Causality and identity of essence are recognized to be the two types of necessary relation. But these two relations are found to obtain between positive entities and not non-entities, nor between an entity and a non-entity. The same difficulty will stand in the way if the probans is supposed to stand for a positive fact. But let us see if the Buddhist can establish his position by making the probans and probandum both positive. Thus it may be interpreted that the ‘necessity of being known together’ means ‘identity of the cognition’ and the probandum is ‘identity of the two’. But this interpretation would make the inference a case of tautology because the probans will not be different from the probandum. What the Buddhist seeks to establish by this argument is that the content and the cognition are not different but identical. So ‘identical cognition’ is found to be the probandum and the probans is also
nothing but 'identical cognition'. But the Buddhist may argue that the truth of the identity of cognition is established by means of abolition of the difference between the content and the cognition, because an identical cognition is incompatible with the numerical difference of contents. Thus in every cognition the content is cognized together with the cognition. And the cognition is as much a content of itself as the content is supposed to be. This necessary compresence of the contents in the same cognition is not intelligible without their identity. The felt difference must then be an illusion. The Jaina avers that the necessity of compresence of two or more contents in one cognition proves neither the identity of the contents _inter se_ nor the identity of the contents with the cognition. Thus a substance and its qualities are always perceived together, but this identity of perception does not annul the difference of the contents, nor the difference of the cognition from them.\(^1\) Nor is it our conviction that when many things such as the chair and the table and the other furniture in a room are perceived together, their mutual differences are abolished. But if this association be regarded as accidental, the example of substance and quality will rebut all doubt of falsity of inference. The subjectivist himself admits that the omniscient Buddha cognizes all the different consciousness-centres (which appear as so many subjects). But he does not conclude that all the different subjective centres are really identical with the Buddha.\(^2\) Moreover, we do not find any logical absurdity in the supposition that things may be perceived together and yet be different from one another. Thus, for instance, when any object is seen, it is seen together with light. There can be no visual perception possible for us in darkness. But nobody will conclude from this that light and the jar or the pen are identical. It is quite possible to argue that the relation between cognition and its content is one of illuminer and illumined. And that they are felt together is due to the fact that without the cognition of the one the other cannot be cognized. In other words, the relation may be one of means and end, condition and conditional. The argument of the Buddhist is the prototype of the argument of the Vedântist which we have considered before. The Vedântist has argued from the coincidence of the content and cognition to their necessary identity and integration. We have shown that the Jaina explains this by asserting the relation to be one of identity-indifference. The same conclusion will follow from the Buddhist argument of necessary compresence.

Let us now address ourselves to the examination of the nihilist's

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\(^1\) Cf. _dravyaparyayau hi Jainānām eka-mati-jñāna-grāhyau, na ca sarvathāi katvām pratipadyete_—Ibid., p. 243.

\(^2\) _tathā Yogācārasyā 'pi sakala-vijñāna-paramānavaḥ Sugatajñānena kena grāhyāḥ, na caī katvabhājāḥ—Ibid._
position. The greatest protagonist of negativism as a philosophical doctrine is Nāgārjuna. He has subjected to critical examination all the prevailing concepts and theories and has found particular delight in exposing their self-contradictory nature. Nāgārjuna adopts the attitude of a critic who avows that he has no positive doctrine of his own. The position will be made clear from our study of some concrete problems as dissected by Nāgārjuna.

Let us take up causality. Nāgārjuna asserts that causality is logically indeterminable, yet the constitution of our intellect is such that we cannot jettison it if we are to understand the world order. He asserts that the effect is not produced by itself, that is to say, the effect cannot be its own cause. In other words, the cause and the effect cannot be identical. The cause is the immediate antecedent event. If the effect were self-caused, it would be antecedent to itself. And this means that the effect was existent before. What is then the use of the causal operation which aims at bringing into existence what was not in existence before. It is nonsense to suppose that an existent can be made existent which the advocate of the identity of cause and effect is made to confess on cross-examination. The Sāṅkhya philosopher seeks to explain the causal relation by supposing that the effect is pre-existent in the cause. It is because of pre-existence that causality becomes a relation between two determinates. To the question ‘Why should oil be produced from sesamum and not from sand?’ the Sāṅkhya answer is ‘Because oil is existent in the sesamum and not in the sand’. Nāgārjuna observes that the position is untenable because if oil be already existent, what is the necessity of grinding the sesamum seeds in an oil-press. The Sāṅkhya answers that oil is existent only in a latent form and causal operation is necessary to make it patent. But is not patency a novel phenomenon? If it were also existent there is no point in trying to make it patent because this means that the already existing patency is made patent. Is this not a superfluity? To this question the Sāṅkhya seems to turn a deaf ear. The Sāṅkhya has been constrained to say that the effect was existent not in the form which it assumes after the causal operation. But this means that the effect was existent somehow. To be precise, the effect was existent as cause, and the relation of cause and effect is not one of absolute identity but identity-cum-difference. This is the Jaina position. But the Sāṅkhya has not the courage to assert that this is so. Nāgārjuna’s criticism of the Sāṅkhya theory of causation is unassailable if by identity of the cause and the effect the Sāṅkhya is understood to mean absolute and exclusive identity which is contradictorily opposed to difference.

Let us now examine Nāgārjuna’s criticism of the Nyāya theory of causation. The cause and effect are absolutely different. But
Nāgārjuna asks 'If the relation be entirely and absolutely one of difference why is it that oil is not produced from sands when both the oil-seeds and the sands are equally different from the effect?' Absolute difference is tantamount to absolute negation of relation. If the effect were entirely unrelated to the cause, it passes one's understanding why should the effect be affiliated to a particular class of facts. The Naiyāyika only appeals to experience. He observes that it is a question of fact, and no questioning is relevant or intelligible regarding it. Because oil is found to be produced from oil-seeds and not from sands the former is regarded as the cause and not the latter. This empirical explanation does not satisfy an inquisitive mind. It only puts a gag upon the inconvenient questioner and in this the Naiyāyika seems to occupy the position of an autocrat who demands unquestioning acquiescence in his ruling. Nāgārjuna naturally rebels against this tyranny of the empiricist. Well, if experience be the final arbiter of all disputes, then philosophy will become a seditious activity. Nāgārjuna is not in doubt that oil is actually produced from oil-seeds and not from sands. What he wants to know and understand is the foundation of the ontological necessity of the causal relation. The empiricist quite unjustifiably loses his temper and commands unquestioning allegiance by ruling out all inconvenient questions. This attitude does not seem to be helpful to the understanding of the nature of things and their relation. Nāgārjuna therefore has no hesitation in recording his verdict against this explanation. He thinks that the Nyāya theory only restates the problem and asks the opponent to accept this as the explanation of it. He declares that the theory is unphilosophical, to say the least. Nāgārjuna now asks if causation can be explained by regarding the relation between the cause and the effect as identity and otherness together. This he thinks to be a contradiction in terms. Identity is diametrically opposed to otherness which means non-identity. So this theory is dismissed by him with scant courtesy. The opponent may ask 'Is this not repudiation of causal relation? Is it your position that the effect is produced without the cause?' Nāgārjuna replies 'No, this is not possible.' We cannot think that an event can happen without a cause. What is then the nature of the relation between them? Nāgārjuna replies that the question is unanswerable because no relation can be discovered by logical thought. We cannot explain why a particular class of events should follow another class of events with clockwork regularity; for by means of logical thought we cannot discover any factual basis for it.

This is in brief the survey of the causal relation and of the findings of Nāgārjuna. The Jaina philosopher thinks that the difficulty is the creation of a priori logical thought. In the first place, Nāgārjuna
thinks that there is such a thing as absolute identity. But we have not come across a single instance of any two things being absolutely identical. In the second place, Nāgārjuna asserts that there is such a thing as absolute otherness which is also not endorsed by experience at any rate between a cause and an effect. If we are to closely follow our experience without allowing our logical preconceptions to give a twist to its plain meaning we must admit that there is a close affinity between the cause and the effect though they are not absolutely identical because they are two facts. They are thus different no doubt, but the element of close affinity is also undoubtedly a fact. And affinity is intelligible only if there is a common element in both of them. This common element is identity. This identity is not the pure identity of pure logic which is as much a chimera as pure being or pure non-being. So in allegiance to experience we must admit that the relation of cause and effect is such as not to exclude either identity or difference. It is a sui generis relation which is as ultimate as identity and difference are supposed to be. For want of a more expressive term due to the limitation of human language we have to express this relation as identity-in-difference. And there is no incompatibility in it as it is registered by indisputable and unmistakable experience. The Jaina does not arrogate to himself the prerogative of a judge or a law court, who seeks to cut the Gordian knot by threat of the penalty incident to contempt of court. The Jaina’s attitude is one of persuasion. He does not stifle the natural curiosity of the human understanding. But he only invites the attention of the opponent to the actual fact and only admonishes him if he shuts his eyes to the truth and seeks to determine it by means of a priori considerations. Well, whatever be the merits of the Jaina estimate of this fundamental problem, it must be admitted that he succeeds in avoiding the anomalies that are inevitable in the position of the Sāṅkhyya and the Nyāya philosopher by admitting that there is a relation possible between pure identity and pure difference which wonderfully harmonizes their dispute by a synthesis in a concept which is not a mere summation of the two, as Nāgārjuna thinks, but a different category in which the two elements are combined and transcended at the same time.

Let us take up another case. Experience shows that things have got a distinctive individuality of their own and this individuality is determinable by means of characteristic attributes. This task of determination by means of characteristics is performed by means of definitions in logic. Nāgārjuna calls in question the logical propriety of this procedure. He asks ‘Are the characteristics different from the things or identical with them?’ If they are different from the things to which they are supposed to belong as much as the characteristics
which belong to other entities, then there will be no meaning in the assertion that the characteristics belong to things. If, on the other hand, they are identical, either the attribute or the substantive will be left over. This seems to be incontestable from the standpoint of pure logic. But as pure logic is not found to be obeyed by the facts which are revealed to our experience which again is the only source of our knowledge of the existence and behaviour of things, the Jaina philosopher who is equally attentive to the claims of logic and experience is not convinced by this flourish of pure logic. He asserts ‘Certainly the characteristics are different from the substantives. But because they always go together and are inseparably related, this shows that the relation is not one of absolute difference which obtains between the characteristics of A and B. The characteristics of A are not different from A in the same way as the characteristics of B are. This shows that the relation is also not opposed to identity. This identity is not exclusive of difference. To be precise, the relation is *sui generis* just like that between cause and effect. You may call it identity-indifference because the two elements are felt in it. But it is not exhausted by both of them or analysable into these two elements. The relation is unanalysable though it is distinguishable in thought as consisting of identity and difference as elements. But, as we have observed, the relation is altogether of a different kind from both because while it synthesizes them it is not exhausted by them. It is a relation which embraces identity and difference in its fold, and also transcends them because it is more than an aggregate of the two.’ In this way the Jaina solves all the puzzles and cruxes invented by the votary of pure logic. He asserts that the nature of reality is to be determined not by experience alone, nor exclusively by logic. The two must co-operate. And thus the Jaina is not an adherent of uncritical experience, nor is he enamoured of logic alone. Logic is blind without experience and the latter again is a cripple without the criticism offered by logic. One must be tempered by the other. Thus the Jaina is not a blind empiricist but a critical realist who subjects experience to logic and chastens logic by the unmistakable verdict of experience.

Let us now estimate the value of the Saiva conception of *avidyā*.

**XIV**

**CRITICISM OF THE SAIVA CONCEPTION OF AVIDYA**

The conception of bondage and emancipation is the common property of all Indian systems of thought. It is recognized that the present world and our condition and status are not perfect and there
must be a way of release from this imperfect state. The soul has got an inherent and inalienable right to perfection, though the conception of perfection is not uniform or identical—so far as the positive content of it is understood. But, negatively speaking, it is admitted that there is recovery from unfreedom and the misery of infirmity and limitation of power. The Śaiva schools which we have surveyed are also in agreement with others so far as this fundamental standpoint and attitude are taken into account. It is the common presupposition of all schools of thought that the recovery of the innate nature of the self constitutes the extinction of all pain and suffering, which is the corollary of emancipation. This worldly existence is to be transcended. And human resources are equal to this task. This is the fundamental datum and postulate of philosophical and ethical speculations and the goal of religious disciplines. The nature and content of emancipation therefore are bound up with the metaphysical conception of the original nature of self.

The Śaiva conception of individual self differs from that of other schools and therefore the conception of final emancipation is bound to be different. The Śaiva believes that the self is essentially a conscious principle, and joy and bliss and freedom are integral to its nature. The Jaina philosopher would agree on this point. The belief in the innate power of the self for knowledge, will and action will also be endorsed by the Jaina. It would also be conceded that the relation of power and the possessor of it is one of inseparability. But while the Śaiva insists on asserting it to be a relation of identity the Jaina would interpret it as identity-in-difference. The Jaina also would agree with the Śaiva in regarding the cause of bondage as real and not imaginary or a case of unreal superimposition as the Vedāntist maintains. This cause of bondage is designated by the Śaiva as mala (contamination or taint) as we have seen. Barring the terminological difference the Jaina would have no objection to the conception of karma-pāsa or kārma-mala as the fundamental cause of bondage and as for the other contaminations such as ānava-mala and māyīya-mala the Jaina would regard them as consequential. The association of karman with the soul is responsible for the limitation of its capacity for knowledge, perversion of will and inhibition of powers of enjoyment and self-expression and also assumption of psycho-physical organism. The difference is rather a matter of elaboration and nomenclature and point of view. Omniscience and omnipotence are regarded as necessarily coexistent in Jainism. Here we meet with a difference from the Śaiva point of view. The Śaiva philosopher believes in the possibility of the emergence of omniscience on the dawn of sūdha-vidyā in the soul irrespective of the extent to which the corresponding power of action
(kriyāsakti) may have been evolved. In other words, omniscience and omnipotence are not necessarily coexistent. This may be regarded as a matter of detail, but it indicates a fundamental difference of attitude. The Jaina gives primacy to the correction of will which is invariably and infallibly attended with the perfection of knowledge and power. The Śaiva believes in the possibility of the removal of spiritual ignorance without the emergence of spiritual knowledge. But how can this removal of ignorance be possible without the dawn of knowledge? The Śaiva himself recognizes that the removal of intellectual ignorance is possible only on the dawn of intellectual enlightenment, and therefore it is sheer self-contradiction on his part to assert the possibility of the removal of spiritual ignorance without the emergence of spiritual knowledge.

The monistic Śaiva starts with the assumption that the absolutely perfect Paramāśiva, the Supreme and Sole Reality, somehow elects to assume self-limitation and ultimately degrades itself into the status of an imperfect individual self. This process of self-abasement is conditioned by an act of free will and not any extraneous circumstance. This rather smacks of mysticism. The Jaina would not give his approbation to this theory. If the process of self-abasement be an act of free will, the process of discipline that is necessary for the achievement of emancipation should also be effected by a fiat of will. So no amount of individual exertion would succeed and the line of demarcation between good and evil would also be rendered nugatory. Of course, this difficulty cannot be alleged against the dualistic Śaiva school of thought which asserts the ontological reality of the plurality of selves like Jainas. The monistic Śaiva believes the world order and its evolution to be real. But it presents an insurmountable crux for logical thought. How can real unity of the Absolute be reconciled with real plurality? The Vedāntist believes plurality to be an unreal appearance in and over the unitary Absolute. Whatever may be the objections of other schools of philosophers, it cannot be denied that the Vedāntic position does not give offence to logical thought whereas the Śaiva position of real unity with its concomitant real plurality is logically unthinkable.

In the monistic school the relation of the Absolute (Paramāśiva) with the world order, which is not illusory like the Vedāntic concept of mâyā, is also not logically intelligible. It is held that the relation is one of identity. The identity of two reals of co-ordinate status is unreachable by logical thought. The Jaina doctrine of non-absolutism would rather be more intelligible. It is held in both schools of Saiva philosophy that the self which is innately perfect suffers the vicissitudes of worldly career with the diminution of its powers. But the question

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arises that if this loss and recovery of perfection be real events in the history of the self, does not the self undergo change of nature? If it does undergo a change, the self will be dynamic principle like the soul of the Jaina. But so far as the monistic school is concerned we do not think it warrantable to suppose that the self is believed to be a changing constant. It is affirmed in one breath that the self merely appears to undergo change and that this appearance is real. It is difficult for the logical understanding to be reconciled with this position.

The relation of karma with the individual self is also not intelligible. It is held that the karmas remain embedded and mature in māyā in the period of dissolution, and the self experiences their results only from the time of new creation. It appears that karma does not become integrated with the self's nature. But how can the self be subject to the consequences of karma which remains detached from it? This conception seems to be analogous with that of the Sāṅkhya and we have criticized this conception which makes bondage and emancipation vicarious.

The Śaiva makes emancipation of the self dependent upon Divine Grace. But the Jaina cannot accept this position. He makes the individual the architect of his fortune and the maker of his destiny. The individual is alone responsible for his degraded status and it is up to him to work out his salvation by his unaided efforts. He will of course exploit all the advantages from the śāstras and the instruction of teachers. But ultimately he must depend upon himself for his success or failure. The credit or blame must be taken by him alone. The descent of the Divine Grace cannot be arbitrary. It presupposes a spiritual preparation of the individual self as a condition. The Jaina would have it that this very condition automatically leads to the succeeding stages of spiritual development. If the descent of Divine Grace is interpreted as a necessary result of previous spiritual preparation, the Jaina philosopher would have no objection to this interpretation in spite of its mystical appearance.

XV

CONCLUSION

We have studied the various conceptions of the nature and function of avidyā or nescience in Indian thought. We have also recorded the criticism of those conceptions from the Jaina philosopher's standpoint. We have found that mithyātva or mithyā-dārsana (perverted attitude) is the Jaina equivalent of avidyā quā the fundamental or basic defect responsible for worldly existence. Avidyā quā the conditions of worldly existence consists in the threefold elements of
perverted attitude, perverted cognition (*mithyājñāna*) and perverted conduct (*mithyācāritra*). The Jaina philosopher does not agree with those who regard perverted cognition alone as the condition of worldly existence. He does not also endorse the view which regards perverted cognition as the most fundamental defect responsible for worldly existence. Perverted cognition is only an effect of perverted attitude (*mithyātva*) which is the most fundamental condition of worldly existence. We shall have occasions in the chapters that follow for further elucidation of the conception of the nature of this 'perverted attitude'.

The conception of the nature of *avidyā* depends upon the conception of the nature of reality. It is because of this that we have been led to criticize the various conceptions of reality of the different systems of thought while recording the Jaina philosopher's objections against the different conceptions of *avidyā*. We have shown the Jaina's credence in logical empiricism which regards logic without experience blind and experience without logic a cripple.
CHAPTER IV

THE JAINA DOCTRINE OF KARMA

INTRODUCTORY

Rebirth and karmā are the two most important presuppositions of all schools of Indian Philosophy with the solitary exception of the system of Cārvāka. This is but consistent with their spiritual outlook. India is the birthplace of a galaxy of spiritual leaders throughout its history and it is no wonder that her heritage is so rich with speculations about rebirth and karmā and the pathways leading to emancipation from them. It is not possible to trace the origin of the doctrines in time. The Vedas are the oldest records wherein we can find their rudiments. The outlook of the Vedic people was deeply spiritual and a number of speculations about the origin and destiny of the universe were prevalent.¹ The ideal of sacrifice (yajñā) and penance (tāpas) asserted itself. Robust life affirmation, philosophical wisdom, and religious intuition were the chief characteristics. The spiritual and the religious inspired the secular. The Jaina and the Buddhist attitudes were exclusively spiritual and religious, and more or less neglected the secular. The disproportionate growth of asceticism in Jainism and Buddhism on the one hand and the balanced growth of the religious and the secular in Brāhmaṇism on the other were responsible for the demarcation between the Śramaṇic and the Brāhmaṇic outlook. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Vedānta virtually belong to the same group as the Jaina and the Buddhist. The Mīmāṃsaka belongs to the other group. There were, among the Vedic people,

¹ The doctrine of karmā seems to have developed against a number of other doctrines about creation. Some regarded time (kāla) as the determinant factor of creation. Every event occurs in time and hence is determined by time. Others believed in nature (svabhāva) as the determining factor of creation. Things are determined by their own inherent nature. There is nothing, inside or outside, over and above nature, that determines the course of events. This leads to the doctrine of determinism (niyati-vāda). There were others who believed in the fortuitous and accidental nature of the occurrences of events. There were other doctrines as well. (Vide SvUś, I. 2. ŚVS, II. 52-64). The believers in karmā or the unseen potency (adṛṣṭa), the after-effect of a good or bad action, regarded these theories as inspired by materialistic tendencies and therefore rejected them as untenable. The Jaina philosophers accorded proper place to these doctrines as testified by our experience, while installing karmā in the supreme position. Karmā is the ultimate determinant of the course of events. Even time, nature and niyati are determined by karmā and there is no such thing as fortuitism. These factors, in so far as they are given to experience, are only the expressions of the working of the supreme law of karmā. (Cf. STP, III. 53; ŚVS, II. 79-81).
some who were more contemplative, other-worldly and attracted towards life negation than the ordinary. It is these people who helped the growth of asceticism. But before the development of asceticism there was the natural development of the ideas of rebirth and karman. There was also the development of corresponding metaphysics. If spiritual emancipation is a fact there must be a number of births for its realization. This leads to the doctrine of rebirth. The selfsame fact of emancipation again presupposes corruption of the spirit in the state of worldly existence. But what is this corruption due to? It is due to beginningless nescience about truth. We have studied nescience in the last chapter. According to the Jaina, nescience presupposes the soul's association with karman which is known as unseen potency (adṛṣṭa), predisposition (vāsanā), energy (śakti), trap (pūśa) etc. in other systems. Karman is needed to explain variety and unequality. In this chapter we shall record a few determinant characteristics of the doctrine of karman as found in the Jaina system with comparative reference to other systems. In the preceding chapter we studied the nature of the fundamental factor responsible for the relation between spirit and non-spirit, that is, the world order. But here we shall record the modus operandi of the non-spirit upon the spirit or, more accurately, the process whereby an action (karman) produces its reaction (phala). Among the systematic schools, only the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits God as the necessary condition for the fruition of the action (karman) which remains as an unseen potency (adṛṣṭa) consisting in merit and demerit in the soul. The Yoga admits God only as an object of worship or meditation and not as an agent in the fruition of the karman. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the Jaina and the Buddhist and the Mīmāṃsaka regard the unseen potency itself as competent to produce its fruit in time. Though in the Brahmāsūtra¹ of Bādarāyaṇa the agency of God in the dispensation of the fruits of acts, moral and immoral, is advocated with vehemence it however loses metaphysical validity in the system of Śaṅkara who accords a provisional place to Personal God in his monistic Vedānta. Personal God as the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world order is necessary only so long as māyā holds sway. But māyā is unreal as a metaphysical entity and as such God's place is only provisional and not more than penultimate. The problem how can the unconscious and inactive potency develop into fruition is explained in various ways. The potency is due to karman (action) and as such is also designated by the term karman. The nature of the predispositions (vāsanās) or afflictions (kleśas) or passions (kaśāyās), in one word, the impurity of the spirit determines the character, quantity, duration and intensity of the karman or the

¹ phalam ata upapatteḥ—BS, III. 2. 38.
unseen potency (adrśta). The necessity of the agency of God for the fruition of karman is thus avoided. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also in so far as its early adumbration is taken into account has little necessity for the postulation of God. If we are to believe the Yuktidīpika, an early commentary on Iśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya-kārikā, the introduction of God into the architectonic of the Vaiṣeṣika system is due to the influence of the Pāśupatas. But whatever may be the genesis the conception of an omnipotent God has found place in the system since Vatsyāyana and Praśastapāda. The other systems could well work without Him. The unseen potency or karman, as determined by the conditions and predispositions of the soul, can automatically produce the fruits. We shall study the Jaina conception of the modus operandi of karman in this chapter, stating also, where possible, the corresponding conceptions in other systems.

The relation between the spirit and the non-spirit is responsible for the worldly existence. Apart from the gross body, there is a subtle body which serves as a link between the spiritual and the non-spiritual. This subtle body is the karmic body of the Jainas and the subtle body (liṅga-sarīra) of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. We shall discuss the problem of the relation between the subtle body and the soul later on. The Vedāntin regards the non-spiritual as only an appearance, and yet for him the problem how does the false appearance occur and induce individual selves and the world of plurality is as tough as in the other systems. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsaka regard the unseen potency, as a quality of the soul, responsible for the formation of the gross body with the help of the mind (manas). In Buddhism, the predispositions (vāsanās) or the afflictions (kleśas) relate the conscious (nāma) with the material (rūpa). According to the Jainas, the vibrations (yoga) and the passions (kāśayas) of the soul attract karmic matter and transform it into karmic body. In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the subtle body is formed due to the perversions (vipārayas) or afflictions (kleśas) of the principle of buddhi which is an evolute of the non-spiritual prakṛti. Here we must distinguish between the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the Jaina conceptions. With the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the principle of consciousness (puruṣa) is ubiquitous and immutable and therefore undergoes no change. It is only the unconscious prakṛti and its evolutes—the buddhi and the like—that are ever changing. The afflictions (kleśas) belong to the buddhi and are responsible for the formation of the subtle body which is nothing but a conglomeration of a number of evolutes of the selfsame prakṛti. The position of the Jainas, however, is quite different. The soul, with the Jainas,

1 Cf. Yuktidīpika (p. 88): ... evam Kāṇḍādānām Iśvaro 'stī 'ti Pāśupato-paṇjam etat.
undergoes change every moment, although never losing its identity. The soul has a number of potencies, and each moment of its existence is an integration of those potencies. The nature of the karmic body at any moment is determined by this integrated existence of the soul. The soul is pure and perfect in its intrinsic nature. It is due only to its relation with karman that the soul comes to have passions (kasāyās). And the relation being beginningless, the problem which of the two—the passions and the karman—comes first does not arise. We shall deal with the problem in due course.

The common ground among the different systems is the belief in the intrinsic purity of the self and its capacity to recover its essential nature after a course of moral discipline and philosophical enlightenment. The question why the pure self should come to be invested with the impurity of matter is one of fact as ultimate as its own existence. We find that the soul is not free and perfect which the demands of logic make us accept as the indubitable presupposition. As the soul is immortal and timeless so also is matter—at any rate so far as the first limit is concerned. It is not profitable to question the possibility of a fact. It is there. The question rather is whether this unfreedom and imperfection can be transcended and if so, how. The necessity of the postulation of karmic matter as forming a crust, as it were, on the soul and disturbing its purity is another problem. The complete study of these problems requires also the statement of the various conditions and processes of karman. We shall thus deal with the following four problems in the present chapter: (I) the necessity of postulating the material nature of karman; (II) the relation between soul and karman; (III) the classification of karman; and (IV) the various states and processes of karman. We shall also record, wherever possible and necessary, the corresponding conceptions of the non-Jaina systems.

I

THE MATERIAL NATURE OF KARMAN

The Indian philosophers with the exception of the Cārvākas are unanimous that the worldly status of the self, as it is, is an evil and must be got rid of. They also agree upon the existence of a fundamental defect that conditions the worldly existence. We have seen this in the last chapter. There are, however, radical differences in the soul-conceptions of the different schools, and consequently there are corresponding differences in the expositions of the various evils making up the worldly existence. The Cārvāka does not believe in soul although he believes in empirical consciousness which he regards
only as a peculiar phenomenon born of the combination of elements. The consciousness has no pre-natal history. Nor has it any post mortem. This materialist view of life is vehemently criticized by the believers in beginningless existence and endless continuance of consciousness reaching its consummation in freedom from worldly bondage (called āpavarga or nirvāṇa). Haribhadra, following an old tradition, says that the materialist view indeed was invented by Bṛhaspati only in order to deceive Indra who, however, could not be deceived in view of its utter lack of logical propriety.\textsuperscript{2} Now we pass on to the consideration of the various conceptions of the conscious principle and the defects that vitiate it, stating also the difficulties of these conceptions from the Jaina’s point of view. In the end we shall record the Jaina position.

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga believes in immutable principles of consciousness, unamenable to any corruption, and yet concedes the reality of the corrupt world existence. The world processes and their conditions belong to the prakṛti. In other words, the conscious principle is involved in the evils of the world which does not belong to it. The Jaina philosopher is not prepared to admit the propriety of such position. If the conscious principle is involved in evils, the evils must belong to itself. Moreover, the conception of evil loses all its meaning and purpose unless the conscious principle is really associated with it. The worldly existence is a state of bondage and as such presupposes a fall of the conscious principle. But the Sāṅkhya-Yoga is not prepared to admit any change in the being of the principle of consciousness which he regards as absolutely immutable. We have discussed the difficulties in this position in the last chapter, and shall not repeat them again. The spiritual and the material do never commingle and yet there is the world order which means the mutual sympathy and co-operation of the two. The spiritual is ever kept aloof from the material, and yet attempts are made to establish relation between them by speculative devices which can satisfy the imagination, but can never appeal to the faculty of reason. The gulf between the spiritual and the material ever remains unreconciled in spite of so many attempts by such exponents as Vācaspāti and Viśākhābhikṣu.

The Vedāntin distinguishes between the spiritual and the material. But his distinction is only a make-believe. All plurality, spiritual or material, is false. The world is only empirically true and hence its conditions have also only empirical existence. Karman belongs to the principle of world illusion (māyā) and hence is not something belonging to the spirit. And as the māyā of the Vedāntin is not, to all intents and purposes, different from the prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga,

\textsuperscript{2} Indra-pratāparaśye ‘dasm ca kare kila Bṛhaspatiḥ
do-ṇī yukti-śūnyaḥ yan ne ‘ttham Indraḥ pratāryate.—ŚVS, I. 111.
all the defects of the Sāńkhya-Yoga conception of karman ought to apply equally well to the Vedāntin’s conception.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits that the conditions of bondage viz. merit and demerit belong to the soul, but keeps them quite distinct and aloof from it. The soul is held to be immutable and ubiquitous, and merit and demerit, jointly called unseen potency, inhhere in it as qualities. But how can the qualities of the soul be responsible for the bondage of the soul? And in the absence of the bondage of the soul, it should be admitted that the soul ever remains free from bondage.¹ It may be argued that as the passions of anger, pride etc. condition the bondage of the soul although they are qualities of it, so there should be no difficulty in admitting that the qualities of the soul can be responsible for the bondage of the soul. But the Jaina’s reply to such a contention is: Such changes of the soul as the passions of anger and the like are of the nature of bondage; the changes into anger and the like are indeed the bondage itself of the soul, and not the conditions of the bondage.² The passions constitute the bondage. And their conditions must necessarily be distinct and different from them. And the passions being the qualities of the soul, it follows that the conditions of the passions are something distinct and separate from the qualities of the soul. And so the conditions of the passions and the bondage that they constitute must be sought for in what is material. Creation is a veritable intermixture of the spiritual and the material, a beginningless inter-influencing of the two. There is no bondage without the inter-relation of spirit and matter, and there is no inter-relation of spirit and matter without the bondage. The philosopher of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school also admits the fact. But because of his bias for the absolute immutability of the soul and the absolute separateness of the qualities from its substance, he fails to remain consistent with his realistic position by following the verdicts of uncontradicted and well attested experience. How can the mind relate the body with the soul without itself being really related with both? Even the merit and demerit remain without any real relation with the soul. It is impossible to conceive of any real relation without admitting some kind of identity-cum-difference between the relata—a fact which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is unwilling to accept. According to the Jaina philosopher, the worldly existence is impossible without the admission of the relation of identity-cum-difference between the spiritual and the

¹ Cf. nanu cā "tma-guṇatvāt karmapāṁ kathaṁ paudgalikatvatam ity anye; te 'py aparikṣākāṁ; teśāṁ ātma-guṇatve tat-pāratantrya-nimittatva-virodhāt sarvadā "tmano bandhānupatteḥ sadaīva muktī-prasaṅgāt—PKM, p. 243.

² Cf. na ca krodhādibhir vyabhicārāḥ; teśāṁ jīva-paripāmānāṁ pāratantrya-svabhāvatvāḥ; krodhādi-paripāmā hī jīvasya pāratantryāṁ na punaḥ pāratantrya-nimittam—PKM, pp. 243-4.
material, and, therefore, it is maintained that the soul and the matter become somehow identical in the state of worldly existence. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit any sort of identity between spirit and matter, and yet regards merits and demerits as qualities of the soul, born of various activities of the material body and mind. This is certainly un-understandable.

The Buddhist regards nescience as the cover on consciousness (viśñāna) and as such the seed of worldly existence. Nescience is as formless (amūrtā) as the consciousness, for, according to the Buddhist only the formless can affect the formless. The material (rūpa) cannot cover the conscious (nāma). But the Jaina contention is that if the seed of worldly existence lies within the consciousness itself and is of the same nature and is not dependent upon the material, emancipation will not be possible at any time. If the condition of world process lies within and is integral to consciousness irrespective of anything external, what reason can there be for emancipation from it? Nature is inalienable from the thing. If fire can forfeit its nature and assume the nature of water, fire will cease to be fire. The Yogācāra Buddhist avoids the difficulty by asserting the unreality of the material world itself. But the Jaina as a realist is not prepared to accept the unreality of the worldly career which is as much a fact as the existence of the spirit. The Jaina does not believe in the difficulty of the material (mūrti) affecting the spiritual (amūrti). Consciousness which is spiritual is certainly found to be affected by intoxicating drugs which are material. The worldly existence means concrete association of the spiritual and the material. Impossibility of co-operation between spirit and matter, in the Buddhist terminology between nāma (the conscious) and rūpa (the material), means impossibility of the world order. Those who do not believe in concrete association or co-operation are finally led to reject the material as illogical and unnecessary. The Jaina philosopher, as a staunch realist, is not prepared to proceed on abstract logic and reject what is so unambiguously given in experience.

The Jaina avoids all these absolutist conceptions of the nature of karman. He avoids the Śaṅkhya-Yoga difficulty of relation between the immutable prarūṣa (principle of consciousness) and the mutable prakṛti by admitting real modification of the soul and its concrete association with karmic matter. The soul is ever changing by its own nature and, in the state of worldly existence, this change is determined by the nature of the karmic matter that is associated with it. The nature of the associated karmic matter (karma-prakṛti) is determined by the nature of the passions (kaśāyas) of the soul and the nature of the passions is determined by the nature of the karmic matter. This mutual determination has no beginning in time, and this explains the apparent difficulty of the first beginning of the process. The Jaina
does not blink the difficulty by admitting beginninglessness, but only asserts a fact which is admitted by all the other schools. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika leaves the initiative in the hands of God, and yet he has to admit that God only gives the fruits of the past actions and cannot determine anything of His own accord. The Jaina does not believe in any Divine Power taking interest in the destiny of the universe. This is of course a digression. In contrast with the concrete mutual co-operation of the soul and the karmic matter, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga envisages only an apparent relation between immutable consciousness and prakṛti. The Jaina, as a thoroughgoing realist, smells grounds for refutation of realism itself in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga conception. Once we are unfaithful to our experience and tread the path of absolutist logic, we are sure to enter the pitfall of subjectivism or, worse than that, nihilism. The Jaina philosopher goes so far as to say that, in the state of worldly existence, the soul possesses, in common with the karmic matter with which it is associated, material form (mūrtatva) which is regarded as only a characteristic of the material things. The Buddhist conceives the condition of the world order as lying exclusively in the consciousness. But the Jaina considers this as another untenable extreme exactly like the counter-extreme of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga who regards the condition as lying exclusively in the prakṛti. We have already recorded the objections against the position. The Jainas distinguish between the material kārman called dravya-kārman, and its spiritual counterpart called bhāva-kārman. The former is also called āvaraṇa (cover) and the latter doṣa (defects). The defects are the passions or privations and perversions of the capacities of the soul while the covers are constituted by karmic matter that brings about those privations and perversions. The material kārman and its spiritual counterpart are mutually related as cause and effect, each of the other. This is possible only if the worldly existence is accepted to be without beginning. And the Jaina, like all the other schools, finds no difficulty in admitting it.

1 Cf. ahāvā ñeganto 'yañ saṁsārī savvahā amutto 'tti jam anādi-kamma-santati-parināmāvanna-rūvo so.

—Dharmaśāṅkrahārī, gāthā 626.

2 Vide Aṣṭasahasri on AMi, 4 (pp. 50-51).

3 Gommañfāsāra, however, regards the potency of the material kārman as the bhāva-kārman—Karmakāṇḍa, 6. But this view is not very appealing and logical.


5 Cf. jīvasya bhāvāsavo . . . kaśyādidiḥ . . . sa ca karna-bandhānusārato 'neka-prakāro . . . karma punar nṛṇām anekaprabhārāṁ kaśyā-vaśēṣād bhāva-karmanā iti hetu-phalavyavasthā. paraparāśrayaṁ na tadvavasthe 'tu cēn, na, bijāṅkuravad anādītvāt kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvasya, tatra sarvēśāṁ sampratipattet ca—TSIV, p. 447.
Now, in Jaina terminology, we can say that the Sāṅkhya-Yoga (the Vedāntin also included) admits only material *karmāṇ* and not its spiritual counterpart as well while the Buddhist admits only the spiritual counterpart and not the material *karmāṇ*. *Karmāṇ*, in the ultimate analysis, is a link between spirit and matter, and lasts as long as the worldly existence lasts. It co-ordinates the mutual changes of the spirit and the matter associated with the spirit. In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga view, *karmāṇ* belongs exclusively to the *prakṛti* and hence it is only the *prakṛti* that is bound or emancipated. In the Buddhist view, the *karmāṇ* belongs exclusively to the consciousness and it is only the consciousness that is bound and emancipated. But the Jaina philosopher is not satisfied with this unilateral view of the worldly existence. Worldly existence means bondage of both spirit and matter, in relation to one another. Emancipation means emancipation of both spirit and matter. If the various states of passions make up the bondage of the spirit the change of the material atoms into karmic matter makes up the bondage of matter. The freedom of a soul from the passions and their effects means also the freedom of karmic matter from association with the soul. The difficulty in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position has already been stated.

So far we have considered the problem only as it crops up at the most developed level of our thought. But it will be profitable to throw a historical glance at the development at this stage of our enquiry. We found that the Sāṅkhya-Yoga (the Vedāntin also included), the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist keep spirit or consciousness quite aloof from matter, while the Jaina attempts to establish concrete relation between them. It is necessary, if possible, to trace the origin of this difference between the Jaina and the non-Jaina views. For this purpose we are to travel back to hoary past of our thought, and to reconstruct, from the scanty materials that are still available, the structure of the thought of that age. Let us make an attempt.

The Vedic thinkers had a clear intuition of the unity of the multifold expressions of the universe. They saw unity in diversity. How, why, and when this intuition of unity dawned upon the Vedic mind is a problem too difficult to solve. One unitary principle, *Sat* or *Asat*, is regarded as the ground of all creation, conscious and unconscious. The conscious ego is as much an evolute of *Sat* or *Asat* as the unconscious elements. Different theories of evolution were developed on the basis of the recognition of this unitary principle which was further called *Brahman* as well as *Prakṛti*. The conception of *Sat*, *Asat*, *Brahman*, or *Prakṛti* as the ultimate ground of creation was the most important consummation of the Vedic thought. This ultimate ground is ubiquitous, subtle and unnamable to any sense-organ. It is the ground of everything and has no further ground. On the other
side, there were thinkers who believed in an infinite number of unchanging material atoms along with an infinite number of souls of variable size as constituting the contents of the universe. The conception of immutability did not appear as yet. It appeared only when the conception of eternal emancipation came in. This we shall see presently. There were yet others who believed in consciousness as only a temporary evolute of the combination of material atoms. They were the materialists. It is not possible to ascertain the chronological priority among these three. We can, of course, imagine a time when all these three flourished side by side. The materialists remained throughout as they were. There was, however, multilateral change in the other two groups which gradually gave rise to a number of others. Let us study, in brief, the history of this change and development.

Although it is not possible to ascertain when and how the ideal of eternal spiritual emancipation asserted itself, yet it is without doubt that the ideal necessitated a number of relevant changes in the thought-structure of India of prehistoric times. Rebirth and kārmaṇ had already asserted themselves. The nature of eternal emancipation gradually drew the attention. There was a steady demand for clarification of the issue. The upholders of one unitary principle as the ground of conscious egos had to adjust their speculations in favour of the admission of an infinite number of ubiquitous, eternal and unchanging conscious principles (puruṣas) side by side with the ever-evolving unitary principle of Prakṛti which had already been conceived as constituted of the threefold moments of luminosity (sattva), energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas). The other alternative to this adjustment was to reinterpret the unitary ever-evolving principle as a ubiquitous, eternal and immutable conscious principle and to reject its evolutes as false appearance. The first type of orientation gave rise to what is known as the Śāṅkhyā-Yoga metaphysics, while the second reinterpretation could easily give rise to such system as the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. On the other side, the believers in material atoms and variable souls conceived a state of the soul, which is absolutely pure and eternal. Worldly existence is an association of material atoms with the souls, and emancipation is soul in its state of absolute purity and freedom from all association with matter. The soul, being of variable size and amenable to changes, is conceived as changing even in the state of emancipation. But the change in emancipation is uniform and does not mean change into different kinds of states. Such thoughts made up the foundation of the Jaina system. Originally, it seems, the soul was conceived as a quasi-material principle. This is apparent from such synonyms of jīva (soul) as sattva, prāṇa (breath) and bhūta. The names could well be applicable to the above-mentioned conscious egos as evolved from the Prakṛti as well. The affinity of these two
types of conceptions is quite obvious. There is, however, no doubt
that one was developed on the background of Prakṛti and the other in
consonance with the atomistic conception of the physical world. The
Buddha constructed his metaphysics or rather his critique of metaphy-
sics at a period when these various conceptions were fully developed.
The conscious (nāma) and the material (rūpa) were conceived on the
pattern of buddhi and tanmātras (subtle elements) of the Sāṅkhya-
Yoga. They were kept as afoof as the soul and matter of the Jainas or
rather as puruṣa (the conscious principle) and prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya-
Yoga. There were thinkers who accepted the immutable conscious
principle of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga but transferred, perhaps for the sake
of logical consistency, the function of knowing, feeling, and willing
which belonged to the material evolve buddhi, to the conscious
principle as its qualities. They further accepted the atomistic
conception with important modifications. The Vaiśeṣika system seems
to have originated in the hands of such thinkers. The logical school
of Gautama joined the Vaiśeṣika.

This, in brief, seems to be the historical evolution of the Indian
metaphysical thought. It is certainly nothing but a tentative sugges-
tion. In the absence of indubitable records all our speculations into
the genesis of philosophical and religious doctrines in the prehistoric
past are bound to remain in the plane of conjectural reconstructions.
But history is not so very fundamental to the determination of the
plausibility or validity of a philosophical conclusion. It is enough if
we can show that the conclusion is not incompatible with the given
data of experience and the canons of logical thought. In the absence
of the latter all the conclusions and doctrines of a school will be convicted
of dogmatism. History is important for the satisfaction of our
psychological interest how one thought has given rise to another
thought or how one school has influenced another school in its
development. But the logical and philosophical validity of a doctrine
can be established only by means of logical weapons which are eternal
and inevitable laws of thought and as such not subject to historical
evolution at any rate in respect of their logical cogency. The evolution
consists in the explicit formulation of these laws which, with the growth
of logical clarity, come to be expressed with progressively greater preci-
sion. But we feel that they are our own modes of thought and not
imposed upon us from outside. These laws are so fundamental and so
primitive and so spontaneous that they are incapable of being repudiat-
ed—although their interpretation has been different in conformity with
the different philosophical predilections of thinkers.

But this historical speculation may help us to understand the reason
why the Sāṅkhya-Yoga (the Vedāntin also included), the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist had to keep spirit or consciousness quite aloof from matter, while the Jaina could conceive of the inter-influencing of the soul and the karmic matter. The conception of the immutability of soul dominated, in some form or other, the evolved systems, and was responsible for their insistence on the absolute aloofness of spirit from matter. Even the Buddhists who believed in radical momentary change could not escape from the influence of this conception, inasmuch as they do not admit as concrete a relation between the conscious and the material as do the Jainas between soul and karmic matter. The Jainas, on the other hand, were faithful to their thoroughly realistic tradition building up itself on the uncontradicted verdicts of experience. The Jaina conception of the co-operative association of spirit and matter and the postulation of the material counterpart of the spiritual states of passions owe their origin to this faithfulness to the original realistic and empirical attitude.

Now we come to the problem of relation between soul and karman.

II

RELATION BETWEEN SOUL AND KARMAN

The problem of relation occupies a very important place in metaphysical thinking. The Jainas, as realists, did not hesitate to accept whatever was given in uncontradicted experience, and moulded their logic in accordance with such experience. Substance and its modes (qualities also included) are given as identical as well as different in experience and as such the relation of identity-cum-difference was posited. Substance without modes or modes without substance can never be experienced. Both their identity and difference are equally given in experience. The dictum of abstract logic *viz.* ‘What are different cannot be identical and what are identical cannot be different’ is not accepted as universal and necessary because experience records cases where this dictum does not hold good, for instance, in the case of substance and its modes. The relation of spirit and matter is another problem. We have already referred to it on more than one occasion. The Jaina believes in concrete identity between the soul and the karmic matter in the state of bondage while the non-Jaina schools are reluctant to admit any real relation between spirit and matter and consequently have felt called upon to invent a number of devices to explain the fact of bondage. We have recorded in detail the positions of the various systems of Indian thought and their criticism from the Jaina standpoint. The karmic matter, according to the Jainas, mixes with the soul much in the same way as milk mixes
with water or fire with iron. In the state of bondage the soul is infected with a kind of susceptibility to establish relation with the non-soul. This susceptibility finds expression in the passion-states of the soul. In the ultimate analysis, this susceptibility is but a state of the soul in conjunction with matter. We have already sought to explain the problem. Next we turn to the topic of classification of karman.

III

CLASSIFICATION OF KARMAN

The soul in its pure state possesses a number of characteristic attributes which are obscured and distorted in the defiled state of bondage. This obscuration and distortion find expression in the imperfect existence of the soul. In the state of perfection, the soul has infiniteness of knowledge, intuition and bliss as well as freedom from delusion, delimited longevity, embodied existence, difference of status and obstruction of energy. The karmic matter obscures or obstructs these characteristics of the soul and keeps it away from its supreme state of existence. The soul, under the influence of passions (kaśāyas) and possessed of yoga (that is, the vibrations of body, vocal organ, and mind) attracts karmic matter (karma-pudgala) which then is inseparably mixed up with the soul. The resultant state is bondage (bandha).  

"Even as a lamp by its temperature draws up the oil with its wick and, after drawing up, converts the oil into its body (viz. glow), exactly so does a soul-lamp, with the attributes of attachment and the like, attract the material aggregates by the wick of its activities and, after attracting, transforms them into karman." The karman, as we have stated above, obscures as well as distorts the attributes of the soul, and is classified into eight main types. The types that obscure knowledge and intuition are respectively called knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraṇa) and intuition-covering (ārāmāvaraṇa). The type of karmic matter that holds up the natural bliss and produces earthly pleasure and suffering is called feeling-producing (vedanīya) karman. The type that effects delusion, theoretical and practical, metaphysical and ethical, is deluding (mohaniya) karman. The type that breaks up the immortal continuity of existence into so many mortal fragments

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1 Vide supra, p. 65 for the conception of karma-vargaṇā.
2 TSū, VIII. 2-3.
3 ṛṣma-guṇāḥ san dīpāḥ snehāṁ vartyā yathā samādätte ādāya śaṅratāyā pariṇamayati cā 'pi taṁ sneham. tadav rāgādī-guṇāḥ svayoga-vartyā "tmadipa ādatte skandhān ādāya tathā pariṇamayati tāṁś ca karmatayā.

—TSūbh Ṭīkā, Part I, p. 343.
consisting of short or long spans of life is longevity-determining (āyuṣka) karmāṇa. The embodiment of the bodiless is the working of the type called body-making (nāma)-karmāṇa. What produces difference of racial, social or genealogical status in what are naturally without difference, in other words, what conditions gradations in the ungraded, is called status-determining (gotra) karmāṇa. The type that obstructs the infinite energy of the soul and causes handicaps in the enjoyment of wealth and power is called obstructive (antarāya) karmāṇa. These are the eight main types of karmāṇa. There are numbers of sub-types of each main type. Let us here notice them in brief without going into their details for want of philosophical interest.

There are five categories of knowledge\(^1\) and hence there are five sub-types of the knowledge-covering karmāṇa that veils them.\(^2\) There are nine sub-types of intuition-covering karmāṇas. Of these, the first four are respectively the covers of eye-intuition (cakṣur-dāransa), non-eye-intuition (acakṣur-dāransa), visual intuition (avadhiñār-dāransa) and pure and perfect intuition (kevala-dāransa). The effects of the remaining five intuition-covering karmāṇas are felt respectively in sleep with easy awakening (nindrā),\(^3\) sleep with difficult awakening (nindrā-nindrā),\(^4\) sleep while seated or standing (pracalā),\(^5\) sleep while walking (pracalā-pracalā)\(^6\) and sleep accompanied by superhuman deeds (styaṇa-grāhī or styaṇār-dārhī).\(^7\) The feeling-producing karmāṇa has two sub-types viz. (1) what, by its rise, causes pleasant feeling (sadveda or sātavedaniya), and (2) what, by its rise, causes unpleasant feeling (asadveda or asātavedaniya). The deluding karmāṇa is primarily divided into two groups: (I) what deludes the right vision (dārśana-mohaniya) and (II) what deludes the right conduct (cārita-mohaniya). The first group has three sub-types viz. (1) what, by its rise, makes the soul lose vision of truth and see a thing as it is not (mithyātva-vedaniya), (2) what is a state of purity of the first sub-type (and is called samyaktva-vedaniya), and (3) what is a mixed state of purity-cum-impurity of the same sub-type.\(^8\) The second group is subdivided into two sub-groups viz. (1) whose rise is accompanied by the reign of passions (kaśāya-vedaniya), and (2) whose rise is accompanied by the reign of quasi-passions (no-kaśāya-vedaniya). The first sub-group has sixteen sub-types giving rise to the sixteen kinds of passions viz. anger

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\(^1\) Vide supra, p. 28.
\(^2\) TSā, VIII. 7.
\(^3\) svāpo nindrā sukha-pratibodha-lakṣaṇā—TSā Bh Tikā, Part II, p. 134.
\(^4\) duḥkha-pratibodha-lakṣaṇā nindrā-nindrā—Ibid., p. 135.
\(^5\) ārdhva-sāyana-lakṣaṇā pracalā—Ibid.
\(^6\) caṅkramaṇam ācaratāḥ śayanan pracalā-pracalā—Ibid.
\(^7\) We have not followed the derivative meaning for which see ibid. See also Kgr, I. 12 with svopajñā Tikā.
\(^8\) Ibid., pp. 137-9. See also Kgr, I. 14-15.
(krodha), pride (maña), deceit (māyā) and greed (lobha)—each again being of four types viz. (1) what obscures the right vision and leads to ‘endless’ worldly existence (anantānubandhin), (2) what arrests even the aptitude for partial renunciation (apratyākhyaṇāvarana), (3) what arrests only the aptitude for complete renunciation (pratyākhyaṇāvarana), and (4) what afflicts the spiritually advanced soul only occasionally and blocks only the perfect type of conduct (saṁjvalana). The second sub-group has nine sub-types giving rise severally to the nine kinds of quasi-passions viz. laughter, addiction, dissatisfaction, bewailing, fear, disgust, hankering after women, hankering after men and hankering after both the sexes. The quasi-passions are so called because they coexist with the passions and also are inspired by them. The longevity-determining karmān has four sub-types whose rise severally determines the life-span in hell, plant and animal world, human existence and celestial world. Next we come to the body-making (nāma)-karmān which has a great number of sub-types accounting for various forms of embodied existence. Thus the rise of various gatiṇāman accounts for the various forms of existence in hell, plant and animal world, human world, as well as celestial region. The jati-nāman accounts for the various classes of living organisms one-sensed, two-sensed and the like. The rise of sarira-nāman accounts for the creation of various bodies such as the gross (audārika), the subtle (vaikriya) and the like. In the same way various functions are allotted to the rise of the organ-building, joint-building, structure-building and such other nāma-karmans. We do not enumerate them for lack of relevant interest. The rise of the status-determining karmān is responsible for high or low status of an individual. The obstructive karmān has five sub-types viz. what obstructs the inclination for making gifts and charities, what obstructs the occasion of gain, what prevents the enjoy-

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1 Ibid., pp. 140-1. See also Kgr, pp. 34-5.

The anantānubandhin is the most virulent type of passion. Such anger, pride, deceit and greed are respectively compared to a split in mountain rock, a mountain-column, a bamboo-knot and a lac-stain, which are so difficult to eradicate. The apratyākhyaṇāvarāṇa is a little milder. Such anger etc. are compared respectively to a soil-split, a bone-column, a ram-horn and a mud-stain, which can be affected by a little less effort. The pratyākhyaṇāvarāṇa is still milder, and such anger etc. are respectively compared to a sand-split, a wood-column, a go-mutrikā (cow’s urine), and a safflower-stain. The saṁjvalana is still more mild and such anger etc. are respectively compared to a water-split, a straw-column, a carpenter’s scratch and a turmeric stain. (Cf. TSāBh, VIII. 10).

2 Cf. kaśāya-sahavartitvāt kaśāya-preranād api hāsyādi-nakavakṣya ‘ktā no-kaśāya-kaśāyatā.

—TSāBh Ṭīkā, Part II, p. 141.

3 TSāBh, VIII. 12.

4 Ibid., VIII. 13.
ment of things that last only for the period of enjoyment, what prevents the enjoyment of things that last for some time and lastly what prevents the free expression of energy. These are, in brief, the types and sub-types of *karmans*.

We have stated that karmic matter is attracted and bound due to vibrations (*yoga*) and passions (*kāśāya*). Here it is necessary to distinguish between the functions of vibrations and passions. The length of duration (*sthiti*) and intensity of fruition (*anubhāga*) of the bondage between the soul and the karmic matter attracted depend upon the nature of the passions of the soul. The stronger the passions the lengthier and intenser are the duration and fruition of the bondage. This rule, however, applies only to the bondage of inauspicious or sinful (*aśubha* or *pāpa*) *karmans*, that is, *karmans* whose fruition causes suffering. In the case of the bondage of auspicious or virtuous (*subha* or *punya*) *karmans*, although the length of the duration varies directly as the strength of the passions, the intensity of fruition varies inversely as the strength. And this is but logical. The greater the defilement of the soul the less is its purity, and the less the purity the looser is the bondage of the inauspicious *karmans*. And, therefore, the greater the defilement of the soul, the less is the intensity of the fruition of the auspicious *karmans*. In other words, the intensity of fruition of auspicious *karmans* varies inversely as the strength of the passions. As regards the relation between the length of duration and the intensity of fruition of *karmans*, in the case of the inauspicious *karmans* the intensity of fruition varies directly as the length of duration, while in the case of auspicious *karmans* the intensity of fruition varies inversely as the length of duration. There are interesting speculations about the measure of the maximum and minimum length of duration and intensity of fruition of the various *karmans*. The maximum lengths of duration are measured in years whose number is beyond

2 It is also called anubhāva or rasa. Cf. *Kg2*, p. 63: anubhāgo raso 'nubhāva iti paryāyāḥ.
3 Cf. thī anubhāgaṁ kāśāya kuṇapī.—Śivaśārmasūri’s *Satakaharmagrantha*, gāthā 99. See also *Kg2*, p. 120 (*Karmagrantha V*, gāthā 96).
4 Cf. kāśāya-vṛddhāv anubhāgo 'subha-prakṛṭīnāṁ eva vardhate subhānāṁ tu parihīyata eva, kāśāya-mandatayā tu subha-prakṛṭīnāṁ eva 'nubhāgo vardhate 'subha-prakṛṭīnāṁ tu hiyata iti na kāśāyam anuvartate. sthitayās tu subhānāṁ aśubhānāṁ ca prakṛṭīnāṁ kāśāya-vṛddhau niyamād vardhante, taddacaye tv apacyānta iti—*Kg2*, p. 51.
5 The three subha-karmans viz. those leading to the plant and animal life, human life and divine life are excepted. In their case the intensity of fruition varies directly as the length of duration.
6 Cf. yathā yathā subha-prakṛṭīnāṁ sthitir vardhate tathā tathā subhānu-bhāgas tatsambandhi hiyate. aśubha-prakṛṭīnāṁ tu sthitivṛddhāv aśubha-raso 'pi tatsambandhi vardhata eva.—*Kg2*, p. 51.
ordinary conception of number. Thus, for instance, the maximum length of duration of the knowledge-covering, the intuition-covering, the feeling-producing and the obstructive karman is thirty sāgaropama-koṭi-koṭi years, of the deluding karman is seventy, of the body-making and the status-determining twenty, and of longevity-determining thirty-three sāgaropama years.\(^1\) The minimum lengths are measured in units of forty-eight minutes (imuhūrta).\(^2\) As regards the measure of the intensity of fruition, the Jainas adopt a special device. The intensity of a karman is the depth of enjoyment or suffering with which the fruition of the karman is accompanied. There is infinite gradation in the depth. The intenser the fruition of an inauspicious karman, the deeper is the suffering. The intenser the fruition of an auspicious karman the deeper is the enjoyment. The infinite gradation of intensity is conceived as falling into four groups called the first degree (eka-sthānīka), the second degree (dvi-sthānīka), the third degree (tri-sthānīka) and the fourth degree (catuḥ-sthānīka) group.\(^3\) The intensity of fruition (anubhāga) is conceived as divisible into infinite number of indivisible parts which cannot be further divided. Each one of such indivisible parts is called ‘indivisible unit’ (avibhāga-palicheda).\(^4\) Even the single atom of an aggregate of karmic matter (karma-skandha) possessed of the least intensity has an infinite number of such indivisible units. Let us imagine a group (vargaṇā) consisting of such atoms as are possessed of the least intensity. Then there is another group consisting of such atoms as are possessed of one more unit of intensity (rasa-bhāga).\(^5\) Then there is a group consisting of such atoms as are possessed of two more intensity-units, and so on up to the group which is not followed by a group consisting of atoms with the next consecutive number of units. An infinite\(^6\) number of ‘consecutive groups’ are obtained in this way. The totality of these groups is called the first intensity-class (sparādha). The first group of the

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1 See TSā, VIII. 15-18. About the conception of sāgaropama see TSāBh, IV. 15. For the conceptions of palyopama and other numbers see Karmagratha IV, gathās 71-86 with Devendra’s Commentary (Kg1, pp. 199-213).

2 See TSā, VIII. 19-21.

3 Cf. uktah saukleśa-viśuddhi-vaśād aśubha-sūbha-prakṛtināṁ tīvra mandaś ca 'nubhāgaḥ, ayaṁ tv eka-dvi-tri-catuḥ-sthānīka-bhedāc caturdhā bhavati—Kg2, p. 64.

4 Cf. kevali-prajñāyā chidyamāno yaḥ parama-nikṛṣṭo 'nubhāgaṁśo 'tisūkṣmatayā 'ṛddhaṁ na dadāti so 'vibhāga-palicheda ucyate. uktah ca: buddhi chijjamāno aṣubhāgaṁśo na dei jo addhāṁ avibhāga-palicheda so iha aṣubhāga-bandhammi.—Kg2, p. 63.

5 The term rasabhāga (unit of intensity) is used as the synonym of avibhāga-palicheda.

6 We have already stated in Chap. II (p. 63) that there is infinite gradation of infinity, and our statements in the present context are also to be read with this conception of infinity at their back.
next intensity-class consists of such atoms as are possessed of intensity-units of which atoms are infinite times greater in number than the intensity-units of an atom of the last group of the first intensity-class. The totality of another infinite number of consecutive groups, obtained exactly as before, constitutes the second intensity-class. Similarly we get the third intensity-class. And so on. In this way we can obtain an infinite number of intensity-classes consisting of groups possessed of different consecutive numbers of intensity-units. These intensity-classes are conceived as divided into four groups. The first group, called ‘first degree group’ (eka-sthānika), consists of those intensity-classes (rasa-spardhakas) whose groups are possessed of atoms of infinitely less intensity-units than the atoms of the groups constituting the second group, called ‘second degree group’ (dvisthānika), of intensity-classes. The ‘second degree group’, the ‘third degree group’ (tri-sthānika) and the ‘fourth degree group’ (catuḥsthānika) are similarly conceived in relation to one another. As is apparent from our description, each group consists of infinitely graded intensity-classes of varying intensity-units (rasabhāgas). The most virulent type of passions (anantānubandhin) leads to the bondage of the ‘fourth degree group’ of intensity-classes of all the inauspicious types of karmic matter, the second type of passions (apratyākhyānāvaraṇa) leads to the bondage of the ‘third degree group’ of intensity-classes and the third type of passions (pratyākhyānāvaraṇa) to the ‘second degree group’. The fourth type of passions (sainjvalana), however, leads to the bondage of the ‘first degree group’ of only these seventeen types of inauspicious karmic matter: the five obstructive karmans, the first four knowledge-covering karmans, the first three intuition-covering karmans, the karman that generates hankering for the male sex and the four karmans giving rise to the fourth type of passions (sainjvalana).

The reverse is the case with the bondage of the auspicious karmic matter. The third and the fourth types of passions lead to the bondage of the ‘fourth degree group’ of intensity-classes of the auspicious types of karmic matter. The second type of passions leads to the bondage of the ‘third degree group’ of intensity-classes of the

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1 Cf. Kg2, p. 63: tatra ca itaika-karma-skandhe yañ sarvajaghanyasasrah paramañúḥ... yavid anantāni rasa-spardhakānī uttiṣṭhante.

2 Cf. asūbhānāṁ nimbopama-vīryo ya eka-sthāniko rasas tasmād ananta-guṇa-vīryo dvi-sthānikah, tato 'py ananta-guṇa-vīryas tri-sthānikah, tasmād apy ananta-guṇa-vīrṣyaḥ catuḥsthānika iti parasparaṁ supraśītam eva 'nanta-guṇa-rasatvam iti... etat sarvāṁ Pañcasāṅgrahodhiprayatvā vyākhyāyati—Kg2, p. 67.

3 We have translated asūbha-prakṛti as inauspicious type of karmic matter. The asūbha-prakṛtis are those karmans whose nature it is to produce painful fruition.

4 Karmagrantha V, gāthā 64 (Kg2, pp. 64-5).
auspicious *karmans*. The first type of passions (*anantānubandhin*) leads to the bondage of the ‘second degree group’ of the auspicious *karmans*, there being no bondage of the ‘first degree group’ of intensity-classes in the case of the bondage of the auspicious *karmans*. The greater the impurity of the soul, the less intense is the bondage of the auspicious *karmans*. We have elaborated the point beforehand. These details about the bondage of intensity (*anubhāga-bandha*) are essential for the understanding of the Jaina doctrine of *karman*. This much do we state about the function of the passions in the bondage of karmic matter. Now let us state something about the function of the activity or vibrations (*yoga*) of the soul.

The space occupied by souls is densely filled up with karmic matter, and there is incessant influx (*āsrava*), from all sides, of it into the souls which are ever involved in activity (*yoga*). The influx is not stopped for a single moment till the soul is completely freed from all activity. The volume of the karmic matter attracted varies directly as the measure of the activity of the soul. In other words, the more the activity or vibrations of the soul the greater is the influx of matter attracted. The bondage with reference to the volume of matter attracted and the space of the soul occupied by it is called space-bondage (*pradesa-bandha*). The one function of activity, therefore, is to condition space-bondage. The other function that is attributed to activity is type-bondage (*prakṛti-bandha*), that is, determination of the nature and type of the bondage such as knowledge-covering, intuition-covering and others. Of course, the nature of the activity itself of the soul is determined by the passions and their various effects such as the predispositions created by them, and consequently, in the ultimate analysis, the determination of the nature and type of the bondage depends upon the passions and none else, yet because of the apparent comitance in agreement and in difference of type-bondage exclusively with the activity (*yoga*), it is held that activity (*yoga*) is the condition of type-bondage as well. Although the

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1 See *Kg2*, p. 65.
2 *Cf.* *Karmagrantha* V, p. 121.
3 *Cf.* *Pañcasāṅgha*, gāthā 432—*Kg1*, pp. 4-5.

The term pradesa is explained by Devendrasūri as: prakṛtāḥ pudgalastikāyadesāḥ pradesāḥ, karma-vargaṇāntah-pātīnāḥ karma-skandhāḥ—(*Kg2*, p. 121).
totality of perversity (mithyātva), non-renunciation (avirati), passions (kaśāya) and activity (yoga) is generally held to be the condition of bondage, yet even in the absence of the first three, the type-bondage and the space-bondage of the feeling-producing (vedaniya) karman are found to occur simply due to activity in such stages of spiritual development as are accompanied by complete subsidence of the deluding (mohaniya) karman. In the absence of activity, however, no kind of bondage can take place. And hence it is held that the activity alone is the condition of type-bondage and space-bondage.¹

Of the eight main types of karman, the four viz. the knowledge-covering, the intuition-covering, the deluding and the obstructive are obscuring (ghātin), and the remaining four are non-obscuring (aghātin). Of the obscuring types, again, some are ‘completely obscuring’ (sarpa-ghātin) and others are ‘partially obscuring’ (deśa-ghātin). A brief description of the nature of the obscuring and the non-obscuring categories of karman is very essential for the understanding of the states and processes of karman, the topic which we shall take up in the next section.

The innate qualities of the soul are crippled and distorted by the obscuring karman. Love of truth (samyaktva)² is the innate characteristic of the soul. But it remains fully obscured by the perversity-karman (mithyātva). Omnisience also is natural to a soul. But this also remains completely obscured by the karman that covers the pure and perfect knowledge (kevala-jñāna). The full intuition of the truth remains obscured by the karman that covers the pure and perfect intuition (kevala-dārśana). The five ‘sleeps’ also cover the intuition of objects. The first three types of passions³ (numbering twelve) also obscure their objects completely. These twenty sub-types are ‘completely obscuring’, that is, they obscure in full their respective objects. But this does not mean that there is absolute non-existence of all love of truth (śraddhāna), knowledge (jñāna), intuition (dārśana) and ‘abstention from harmful acts’ (virati). If that were the case, the soul would lose its soulness. If the soul were bereft of all these characteristics, there would be nothing left to distinguish the soul from the non-soul. The soul must needs have at least an infinitesimal

¹ Cf. yadyāpi Śaḍaśīṣta-śāstre mithyātvā-‘virati-kaśāya-yogāḥ sāmānyena karmāṇaḥ bandha-hetava uktās tathāpy ādya-kāraṇaprayābhāve ‘py upāsānta-mohādi-guṇasthānakeṣu kevalayoga-sadbhāve vedaniya-lakṣaṇa prakṛtis tat-pradesāḥ ca badhyante, ayogavasthāyāṁ tu yogabhāvante na badhyante ity anvaya-vyatirekābhāyan jālayate prakṛti-pradesā-bandhayor yoga eva pradhānāṁ kāraṇam—Kg 2, p. 121.
² tattva-ruciḥ samyaktvam—TSābh Tīkā, II. 3.
³ They are anantānubandhin, apratýākhyañāvaraṇa and pratýākhyañāvaraṇa types of anger, pride, deceit and greed.
fragment of the pure and perfect knowledge ever uncovered.\textsuperscript{1} Even as a cloud, however dense and dark, cannot completely cover the lustre of the sun or the moon, exactly so the karman covering the pure and perfect knowledge cannot cover the whole knowledge of the soul, because that would mean the conversion of the spirit into matter.\textsuperscript{2} The remainder knowledge is variously covered by the other four sub-types of knowledge-covering karman. But a ray of knowledge still remains uncovered even in the lowest form of existence called nigoda-state where the soul’s physical organism is the least developed.\textsuperscript{3} The function of the karman covering pure and perfect knowledge is to cover the wholeness or fullness of knowledge while the function of the other four sub-types of the knowledge-covering karman is to effect privation of the remainder knowledge. Pure and perfect knowledge is never possible when the karman covering it is in the rise, while the other types of knowledge are possible even when there is the affecting rise (upākodaya) of the karmans covering them. It is in view of this fact that the karman covering pure and perfect knowledge is regarded as ‘completely obscuring’ (sarva-ghātin) while the other sub-types of the knowledge-covering karman are considered only as ‘partially obscuring’ (desaghātin). Similar is the case of the karman covering pure and perfect intuition and its relation with the other three sub-types of the intuition-covering karman. The five ‘sleeps’ are also ‘completely obscuring’ in the sense that they cover the perception of things, and not in the sense that they cover perception itself. There is of course some sort of consciousness even in the state of sound sleep. The example of dark and dense cloud applies equally well in the case

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. iha kevala-jñānāvaraṇāsya svāvāryāḥ kevala-jñāna-lakṣaṇo guṇāḥ, sa ca yadāyapi sarvātmanā ‘vriyate tathāpi sarva-vajñānāṁ kevala-jñānasya ‘nanta-bhāgo ‘nāvṛta eva ‘vatiṣṭhate, tādāvāreṇa tasya sāmarthyābhiḥvāt. yad āhuḥ śrī-Dēvardhivācakavaraḥ: savva-juvānaṁ pi ya naṁ ākharassā aṇanta-bhāgo niccugghādī ciṣṭhāi (Nandisūtra)—Kg2, p. 12.


\textsuperscript{3} Cf. so ‘pi ca ‘vaśiṣṭo ‘nanta-bhāgo jaladharā ‘nāvṛta-dinakara-kara-prasara iva kāṭa-kutyaśibhir mati-śrutā-‘vadhi-manaḥparyāya-jñānāvaraṇāṁ āvriyate, tathāpi kācid nigodāvasthyaṁ api jñāna-mātra ‘vatiṣṭhate—Kg2, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{4} The three sub-types are: ca-kṣur-ḍarśanāvaraṇa, a-ca-kṣur-ḍarśanāvaraṇa and avadhī-ḍarśanāvaraṇa.
of 'sleeps' as well. The first three types of passions also completely obscure respectively the predilection for truth (samyaktva), the capacity for partial renunciation (deśavirati-cārita), and the capacity for full renunciation (sarvavirati-cārita). But the fact of the abstinence from unwholesome food and the like observed even at the time of the rise of the most virulent type of passions is to be explained on the analogy of the existence of the lustre of the sun and the moon even on the rise of dark and dense clouds.\(^2\) The predilection for the untruth (mithyātva) completely obscures the love of truth (samyaktva). But still the love and capacity for the ascertainment of the truth about ordinary things of practical utility remains unobscured, and this also is to be explained on the analogy of clouds.\(^3\) The idea behind the admission of the remainder of the fundamental qualities of the soul even in the most undeveloped stage of existence is to bring home the undeniable fact of the existence of the rudiments of love of truth, knowledge of truth, and spiritual striving which when cultivated lead the soul to the ultimate goal. The absolutely non-existent can never come into existence. The soul cannot be imagined to have absolutely lost all these characteristics. It can never lose itself. This has to be accepted by all those who believe in final emancipation. The Jainas insisted on this from the very inception of their thought. This is clear from such statement of the Nandi Śūtra as 'The infinitesimal part of the pure and perfect knowledge ever remains, as a rule, uncovered in any form of existence of the soul\(^4\) which is, beyond doubt, as old as the Jaina thought.

Now we come to the types of 'partially obscuring' (deśaghāṭin) karmans, which are totally twenty-five viz. the remaining four sub-types of the knowledge-covering karan, the three sub-types of intuition-covering karan, the fourth type of the four passions, the nine quasi-passions, and the five sub-types of the obstructive karan.

1 Cf. nīdrā-pañacakam api sarvam vastvavabodham āvṛṣṭi 'ti sarva-ghāti, yat punah svāpāvasthāyām api kīñcī cetayati tatra dhārādhara-nidārsanān vācyām—Kg③, p. 12.

2 Cf. tathā 'nāntānu-bandhino 'pratyākhyānāvaranāḥ pratyākhyānāvaranās ca pratyekaṁ catvāro yathākramaṁ samyaktvaṁ deśavirati-cāritaṁ sarvavirati-cāritaṁ ca sarvam eva ghantī 'ti sarva-ghātino dvādaśa 'pi kaṣāyāh, yat punas teṣāṁ prabalodaye 'py ayogyāhāra-vīramaṇaṁ upālabhyate tatra vārāhādṛṣṭāṁ vācyāh—Kg③, p. 13.


4 savva-jīvāṁ pi ya ṇāṁ akkharassa aṇaṇantamo bhāgo niccugghādio cīśthem—NSū, 42.

5 They are cakṣurāndarāṇāvarana, cakṣurāndarāṇāvarana and avadhīdarāṇāvarana.
The four sub-types of the knowledge-covering *karman* are ‘partially obscuring’ because they obscure only that part of the knowledge which is left uncovered by the *karman* that covers the pure and perfect knowledge.\(^1\) The three sub-types of the intuition-covering *karman* also do the same with reference to the part left uncovered by the *karman* covering pure and perfect intuition. The fourth type of the four passions and the nine quasi-passions obscure only a part of the good conduct already attained, and so are ‘partially obscuring’.\(^2\) The five sub-types of the obstructive *karman* also are ‘partially obscuring’. One is not competent to accept and possess all the contents of the universe. One can at best have the contents of a particular small part (*desa*) of the vast space, and so the obstructive *karman* whose function is it to obstruct the use and enjoyment of them is ‘partially obscuring’.\(^3\) The *karman* obstructing the free expression of energy (*vīryāntarāya*) also is ‘partially obscuring’ inasmuch as it does not obscure the whole energy of the soul.\(^4\) The least developed organisms (*nigodas*) too have the requisite energy for the processes of metabolism and movement to different births due to the subsidence-cum-destruction (*kṣayopāśama*) of the energy-obstructing *karman*, even though there is the full rise of the *karman* in their case.\(^5\) In brief, those types of *karman* whose subsidence-cum-destruction is possible even when they have affecting rise (*vīpākodaya*) are ‘partially obscuring’. This characteristic of the types of the ‘partially obscuring’ *karman* can be clearly understood from what we have already stated. We do not elaborate the point any further in view of the limited scope of the topic in our enquiry.\(^6\)

We now come to the types of the non-obscuring (*aghātin*) *karman*, which comprise all the sub-types of the four main types of *karman*

\(^1\) mati-jñānāvaraṇādi-catuṣkām kevala-jñānāvaraṇā'-nāvṛtaṁ jñāna-desaṁ hanti ‘ti desaṅhāti ’dam ucyate—Rg. 2, p. 13.

\(^2\) Cf. tathā saṁjñayā ca labdhasya cāritrasya desaṁ eva ghantī ‘ti desaṅhātinahi—Ibid.

\(^3\) Cf. dānāntarāyādīni paśca antarāyāpy api desa-ghāṭīny eva. tathā hi dāna-lābha-bhogo-‘pabhogānāṁ tāvad grahaṇa-dhārana-yogāny eva dravyāṇi viṣayaḥ, tāni ca samasta-pudgalastikāyasya ‘sannitā-bhāga-rūpe desa eva vartante, ato yadudayāt tāni pudgalastikāya-desa-vartini dravyāṇi yad dātum labdhum bhoktum upabhoktum ca na śaknoti tāni dāna-lābha-bhogo-‘pabhogāntarāyāṇi tāvad desa-ghāṭīny eva—Ibid.

\(^4\) vīryāntarāyam api desaṅhāty eva, sarvāvīraṁ na ghāṭayaṭ ‘ti kṛtvā—Ibid.

\(^5\) sūkṣma-nigodasya vīryāntarāya-karmaṇo ‘bhyudaye vartamānasāya ‘py āhāraparipamana-karmadalikagrahaṇa-gatyanantaragamanādi- viṣaya etāvān vīryāntarāya-karma-kṣayopāśamo vidyate . . . . . .—Ibid.

\(^6\) For elaborate discussion of the problem see Yaśovijaya’s commentary on *Karma-prakṛty* (Bandhana-karaṇa, pp. 13-14).
The types of karman are also classified as ‘virtuous types’ and ‘sinful types’, also known as ‘auspicious types’ and ‘inauspicious types’. We have already noticed this. As we have stated above, those types whose fruition leads to enjoyment of pleasure are virtuous or auspicious, and those whose fruition leads to suffering are sinful or inauspicious. Now, as the nature of the fruition of the bondage is determined by the nature of the activities of the soul, which may be virtuous as well as sinful, the nature of the karmic types also depends upon the nature of the activities that lead to their bondage. The infinitefold activities of the soul lead to the infinitefold bondage which, for the sake of systematic treatment, is classified in various ways. The classification into ‘virtuous’ and ‘sinful’ is only one such way. The Jainas, like others, regard the five moral virtues of non-injury (ahiṃsa), truth (satya) etc. as the norm for the ascertainment of the nature of the activities. The perfect state, however, is realized on the cessation of all activities. The virtuous and moral activities are as much to be avoided as the sinful ones. Of course, the virtuous and moral activities lead to the bondage of the auspicious types of karman while the sinful ones lead to the bondage of the inauspicious types. But nevertheless they are on the same footing with reference to the sumnum bonum which is cessation of all activities. The activities are threefold inasmuch as they can belong to the body or the organ of speech or the mind. They are technically known as yoga which is also called āsrava (inflow), being the cause of the inflow of karmic matter into the soul.

In order to complete the enquiry of this section, it is necessary to record some similar speculations on the scheme of classification and other relevant topics as found in the other schools of Indian thought. The Jaina thought was not an isolated movement and as such could not but influence and be influenced by the speculations of the other schools. Of course, it is not possible to accurately apportion the mutual influence. But nevertheless our foregoing study has clearly shown how the different schools influenced each other and helped the

1 Cf. etāḥ prakṛtayā 'ghātīnayāḥ, na kaścana jīvāṇādī-guṇāṁ ghātayanāti 'ti kṛtvā, kevalāṁ sarvadeśa-ghātinībhīḥ saha vedyamāṇāṁ tatsatrāya 'nubhūyante —Kg2, p. 14.

2 Vide supra, p. 235.

3 TSā, VI. 1-2. See also the sūtras that follow for the detailed statements about the conditions of the inflow of sinful and virtuous types of karman.
development of a superstructure unparalleled perhaps in the whole history of human thought. Let us come to our topic proper.

Let us begin with the Yoga school. The term ‘accumulated traces of actions’ (karmāsaya) of this school corresponds to the term karman of the Jainas. The merits and demerits constitute the traces. These traces fructify either into enjoyment or into suffering. The traces fructifying into enjoyment are the merits, and the traces fructifying into suffering are the demerits. The passions of lust, greed, delusion and anger produce those traces.¹ The traces can fructify either in this very life or in the life to come hereafter.² The traces of merit which are produced by virtuous deeds without the least hankering for their results generate traces which produce their wholesome effect in this very life. Similarly the sinful deeds of intense cruelty also can generate traces producing their baneful effect in the same life. The virtuous deeds done with absolute non-attachment generate traces ending in emancipation. Deeds done under the influence of attachment and hatred generate traces which fructify in various births into various effects. The accumulated traces of actions (karmāsaya) thus are classified into (1) those that are produced by virtuous or moral deeds (puṇya-karmāsaya), and (2) those that are produced by sinful or immoral deeds (pāpa-karmāsaya)—each of which, again, is subdivided into (1) those that produce their effect in this very life (drṣṭājanma-vedanīya) and (2) those that produce their effect in some life to come hereafter (adṛṣṭājanma-vedanīya). It can be said that, in the Jaina system, the karmans whose bondage and fruition, on account of the termination of the period of non-fruition (abādhākāla), occur in this very life correspond to those which produce their effects in this very life (drṣṭājanma-vedanīya), while those whose period of non-fruition terminates in the future births correspond to those which produce their effects in some life to come hereafter (adṛṣṭājanma-vedanīya). The various processes of the karman work jointly and produce manifold effects that determine the nature of the soul during its worldly career. The Yoga and the Jaina systems, as the other Indian systems, are unanimous in this respect. Their metaphysical differences about karman we have already discussed. We shall here state the peculiarity of the Yoga conception as regards the classification of karman and compare it with the Jaina conception.

The Yoga classifies karman (accumulated traces) into fourfold categories which are based on the consideration of the nature of the activity that produces it.³ Thus the cruel activities of an individual

¹ Cf. tatra puṇyāpuṇya-karmāsayaḥ kāma-lobha-moha-krodha-prasavaḥ—Bhāṣya, YD, II, 12.
² sa drṣṭājanma-vedanīyaḥ ca 'drṣṭājanma-vedanīyaḥ ca—Ibid.
³ See YD, IV. 7 with Bhāṣya.
under the sway of passions generate traces which fall in the category called ‘dark’. The cruel-cum-merciful activities generate traces which fall in the category called ‘dark-cum-white’. The category called ‘white’ is constituted by traces generated by such moral activities as penances, study of the scriptures, and meditation. The fourth category called ‘neither white nor dark’ is constituted by traces generated by such activities as are neither inspired by egoism nor performed with any worldly purpose in view. Only the ascetics who have renounced everything and have removed all their passions are possessed of this category of traces. The first three categories of traces lead to the worldly life which consists in various births (jāti) such as the human, the sub-human, and the divine, different spans of life (āyus), and enjoyment and suffering (bhoga). The nature of the accumulated desires (vāsanās) awakened are in accordance with the nature of the career of the individual. The accumulated traces work together and determine the nature of the worldly career of an individual. The awakening of the accumulated desires strictly follows the nature of the worldly career. Thus if the accumulated traces led to the human life, the accumulated desires of the human life would be awakened. The fourth category of traces lead to emancipation. The white (sukla) and the dark (kṛṣṇa) categories can respectively be compared with the moral (puṇya) and immoral (pāpa) or auspicious (subha) and inauspicious (asubha) categories of the Jainas. The conception of ‘neither white nor dark’ category can be compared with the Jaina conception of the karmāna of the ascetics who are completely free from passions and desires. This Yoga classification corresponds to the Jaina classification of the inflow (āsrava) of karmic matter into auspicious and inauspicious categories.

There is yet another mode of classification of karmāna according to the nature of the fruition. The various traces, informed with passions and accumulated during a lifetime, work together and determine the nature of the next life. This working or fruition of the traces express itself in a number of forms. These forms are given as three: (1) various kinds of births such as the human, the sub-human and the

1 kṛṣṇā durātmanām—Ibid.
2 śukla-kṛṣṇā bahih-sādhana-sādhyā, tatra para-piḍānugraha-dvāreṇa karmā-śayapracayāḥ—Ibid.
3 śuklā tapāh-svādhyāya-dhyānataṃ, sā hi kevale manasy āyatatvād abahih-sādhanādhiñā na parān piḍāyitvā bhavati—Ibid.
4 asuklā-'kṛṣṇā saṁnyāsināṁ kṣina-kleśānāṁ carama-dehānām iti tatrā 'suklaṁ yogina eva phalasamnyāsāt, akṛṣṇāṁ ca 'nupādānāt, itareṣāṁ tu bhūtaṁnaṁ pūrvaṁ eva trividham iti—Ibid.
5 Cf. tatas tadviśpākānuganānām eva bhivyaktir vāsanānām—YD, IV. 8. See also Bhāṣya.
divine, (2) different spans of life, (3) various enjoyments and sufferings of life.\footnote{1} These three roughly correspond to the working or fruition of the *gatīnāma*-\textit{karman} (which is a sub-type of the body-making \textit{karman}), the longevity-determining \textit{karman}, and the feeling-producing \textit{karman} of the Jainas. It can be noticed that in this Yoga classification, the workings of the non-obscuring \textit{karmans} of the Jainas have been enumerated. The nescience (\textit{avidyā}) of the Yoga can be compared with the belief-deluding (\textit{ādāśana-moha}) \textit{karman} of the Jainas, and the other four afflictions\footnote{2} of the Yoga can be compared with the character-deluding (\textit{cāritra-moha}) \textit{karman} of the Jainas. The cover on the faculty of illumination or discrimination\footnote{3} of the Yoga can be compared with the knowledge-covering and intuition-covering \textit{karmans} of the Jainas. The nine obstructions\footnote{4} of the Yoga correspond roughly to the energy-obstructing (\textit{vīryāntarāya}) \textit{karman} of the Jainas. The similarities point to the intimate association of the Yoga and the Jain system in matters of ethical interest.

The Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Vedānta did not develop separate conceptions on these subjects and so do not need any comparative study. We next come to the Buddhist conceptions. Although there is very little similarity between the Buddhist and the Jaina conceptions of \textit{karman}, yet we state the Buddhist view in order to complete our survey of the conceptions of \textit{karman} in the various systems that developed side by side. Moreover, there is much affinity between the Buddhist and the Yoga system, and our study will not be futile if we can show the fact. Before stating the Buddhist classification of the types of \textit{karman}, it is necessary that we should understand the Buddhist conception of consciousness and its different planes as well as the various planes of life that the consciousness can attain to. We shall therefore at the outset describe in brief the nature of consciousness, the different planes of consciousness, and the various planes of life. And finally we shall state the Buddhist way of classification of \textit{karman} according to different principles and the points of its similarity with the Yoga conception\footnote{5}.

The Buddhists believe in consciousness as a complex of a number of psychic factors which determine the nature of the consciousness and are nothing but forces created by the tendencies of greed (\textit{lobha}),

1 \textit{sāti māle tadvipāko jāty-āyur-bhogāḥ—YD, II. 13.}
2 \textit{Vide supra, p. 234.}
3 For the enumeration of the five afflictions \textit{vide supra,} p. 89.
4 \textit{prakāśāvaraṇa or viveka-jādāṇa-varaṇīya-karman—YD, II. 52 and Bhāṣya.}
5 \textit{antarāyāḥ—YD, I. 30.}
6 The enquiry that follows is based on the \textit{Abhidhammatthasanghā} of Anuruddhācārya. I have utilized profusely \textit{The Abhidhamma Philosophy} by Rev. J. Kashyap, M.A.
hatred (dosā) and delusion (mohā) and their opposites viz. self-sacrificingness (alobha), good will (adosa) and insight (amohā). The worldly existence is rooted in these tendencies. The consciousness is an integration of the threefold process of knowing (saññā), feeling (vedanā) and willing (cetanā) and is classified into three categories viz. good (sobhana), bad (akusala) and neutral (avyākata). The good consciousness quā willing is called moral (kusala). The moral consciousness is accompanied by the good tendencies of self-sacrificingness, good will and insight. The good consciousness quā passive states of knowing and feeling and as determined by the past good tendencies is called the resultant (vīpāka) consciousness. The consciousness of an arhat, though active, does not produce any resultant and so is called kiriyā (barren and inoperative). Thus we can distinguish these three subclasses of the category of good consciousness: (1) moral (kusala), (2) resultant (vīpāka), and (3) barren and inoperative (kiriyā). Ethically considered, the resultant and the kiriyā-consciousness are non-moral (avyākata) inasmuch as the former, being passive, is devoid of any active willing which is the essential condition of moralness while the latter, though active, yet, being free from the will to live, does not produce any resultant which also is an essential condition of moralness. The bad consciousness is that which is accompanied by any of the three bad tendencies viz. greed, hatred and delusion. Ethically, such consciousness is immoral (akusala). The resultant of the immoral consciousness, however, is not immoral, but non-moral, inasmuch as it is passive and devoid of any willing which is an essential factor of the moral aspect of consciousness. The third, that is, the neutral category of consciousness is that which is not accompanied by any of the good or bad tendencies. It is, therefore, neither moral (kusala) nor immoral (akusala), but is non-moral (avyākata). It is also called conditionless (ahetuka) being devoid of all the six conditioning tendencies of greed, hatred and delusion and their opposites. All active (javana) consciousness, that is, consciousness quā willing is determined by condition (sahetuka). But the innocent smile (hasil-uppāda citta) of the arhat is an exception. It is active yet not determined by any condition (ahetuka). The arhat is absolutely free from the will to live, yet he has immense compassion for all and actively wills the well-being of one and all. The immaculate smile is the index of the actively compassionate consciousness. Such consciousness, however, is not moral, but is non-moral (avyākata) being devoid of any end in view. And being incapable of producing resultant, it is kiriyā (inoperative and barren). A consciousness quā knowing and feeling is the resultant of past actions, good and bad, and is neither moral nor immoral. It is only the consciousness quā willing that is moral or immoral. When such consciousness is accompanied by the
good tendencies, it is moral, and when it is accompanied by bad tendencies it is immoral.

The Buddhists further distinguish three planes of consciousness viz. (1) the plane of weak consciousness (paritta bhūmi), (2) the plane of higher grade of consciousness (mahaggata bhūmi), (3) the supra-mundane plane (lokuttara bhūmi). The consciousness that is weak and fickle, wavering and unsteady, and roams in the world of desires (kāmāvacara) belongs to the first plane. Such consciousness cannot realize emancipation (nibbāna). Spiritual progress begins only with the training and practice of the mind in exercise of self-mastery and steadfast meditation. Such practice is called yoga and the practitioner is called yogāvacara. The practitioner begins by meditating upon a suitable object which is associated with the idea of form. Gradually the consciousness becomes capable of the different stages of ecstasy (jhāna) in which it becomes perfectly concentrated on its object. Such consciousness is called the ecstasy-consciousness of the form (rupāvacara citta). The practitioner (yogāvacara), intending to rise higher, gives up all ideas of forms also, and attains an ecstatic state where he meditates upon such formless objects as infinity of space (anantākāsa), infinity of consciousness (ananta-viññāna), nothingness (ākāśa-viññāna) and a state wherein the cognition is so very subtle that it cannot be said whether it is or is not (neva saññā nāsaññā). Such consciousness is called the ecstasy-consciousness of the formless (arūpāvacara citta). These two types of ecstasy-consciousness constitute the second plane called the higher grade of consciousness (mahaggata bhūmi). The consciousness in this plane, however, is not free from fall in spite of its high steadfastness and power of deep concentration. It can be amenable to the bad tendencies when it returns to the normal state after the ecstasy. One is required to meditate upon the impermanent (anicca), miserable (dukkha), and substanceless (anattā) nature of all existence before one can be capable of the ecstatic meditation upon desirelessness (nibbāna). Once the truth of impermanence, misery, and substancelessness is grasped and realized, the consciousness is capable of meditation upon desirelessness (nibbāna). It then destroys the first three of the ten fetters and attains the first stage of the highest plane of consciousness called the supra-mundane plane (lokuttara bhūmi). The consciousness at this stage is called sotāpanna, that is, one which has come in the stream leading to emancipation (nibbāna). It is now sure to become arhat within the course of seven births. When the consciousness succeeds in weakening the next two

1 The ten fetters are (1) ignorance of identity, (2) doubt, (3) wrong belief that external rituals lead to purity, (4) sensual desire, (5) ill will, (6) attraction for rūpa-existence, (7) attraction for arūpa-existence, (8) conceit, (9) distraction, and (10) nescience.
fetters of sensual desire and ill will, it attains to the second stage of the supra-mundane plane and is called sakadāgāmin (once-returner). After this it is born only once in this world and attains emancipation (nibbāna). When the consciousness succeeds in totally uprooting these two fetters, it attains to the third stage of the supra-mundane plane, and is called anāgāmin or one who is sure to obtain emancipation (nibbāna) in that very life. When it destroys the remaining five fetters as well, it becomes an arhat and fully realizes the summus bonum (nibbāna).

As regards the planes of life, the Buddhists distinguish four such planes viz. (r) the plane of misery (apāya-bhūmi), (2) the better plane of the world of desires (kāmasugati-bhūmi), (3) the plane of the form (rūpāvacara-bhūmi), and (4) the plane of the formless (arūpāvacara-bhūmi). There are again various subclasses in each plane. Thus the plane of misery has four subclasses viz. (r) hell, (2) animal kingdom, (3) the world of ghosts, and (4) the host of demons; the better plane of the world of desires has seven subclasses viz. (r) men, (2) the cātummahārājika gods, (3) the tāvatiṁsa gods, etc. These eleven subclasses constitute what is called the kāmāvacara-bhūmi or the plane of beings whose consciousness is restless under the influence of diverse worldly desires. The third plane of life, rūpāvacara-bhūmi, has sixteen grades which are distributed among the four stages of ecstatic concentration (jhāna) that are possible in the plane. The fourth plane of life, arūpāvacara-bhūmi, has four grades viz. (r) the sphere of the conception of infinite space, (2) the sphere of the conception of infinite consciousness, (3) the sphere of the conception of nothingness, and (4) the sphere of the subtlest consciousness. The consciousness is reborn in the various planes of life in accordance with its resultant state of existence at the time of death. Thus the type of consciousness—which is not rooted in the tendencies (ahetuka), is the resultant of immoral actions (akusalavipāka), is accompanied by indifference (upekkhā-sahagata), and is an investigating consciousness (sanīrana)—connects this life, at the time of death, to a life in the plane of misery; the type of consciousness—which is not rooted in the tendencies (ahetuka), is the resultant of moral actions (kusalavipāka), is accompanied by indifference (upekkhā-sahagata) and is an investigating consciousness—connects this life, at the time of death, to the life of one born blind (or dumb or idiot) or to that of a demon living on earth; the eight types of mahāvipāka consciousness function as only the condition of birth in the better plane of the world of desires; the resultant consciousness of the first stage of ecstatic concentration conditions birth in the plane of the first stage of concentration (i.e. brahmāloka); and so on. The same consciousness that determines birth (paṭīsandhi) in a particular plane of life determines continuation of life (bhavaṅga)
the same plane as well as the passing away (cuti) from the same after the due period. The consciousness of different planes has different life-terms. The higher the plane of life, the longer is the life-term.

With this background in mind let us study the Buddhist way of classification of karmā. The Buddhist substitute for a permanent soul is an everchanging consciousness which, as we have seen, is an integration of a number of psychic factors. The consciousness quā willing is determined by various psychic factors, moral and immoral. The passive consciousness, that is, consciousness quā knowing and feeling is the resultant of past actions, good and bad. It is non-moral. The nature of the resultant consciousness at the time of death determines the plane of life it enters in the next birth. This conception compares favourably with the Yoga conception of all the accumulated traces of past actions working together and determining the nature of the next life. The Buddhists classify these past actions (karmā) in four ways based on four different principles. Thus these are the types of karmā according to the functions they perform: (1) karmā which conditions birth after death (janaka), (2) karmā which sustains (upatthambhaka) other karmā but does not itself cause rebirth, (3) karmā which thwarts (upāpiṣaka) and thus weakens other karmā, and (4) karmā which overpowers (upaghātaka) the other weak karmā and produces its own effect. The following are the types of karmā according to the priority of the fruition (pāṭhānāpāriyāyena): (1) karmā which is very serious (guruka) such as the killing of one’s own mother, (2) karmā which is done just before death (āsanna), (3) karmā which is repeatedly done (ācīṇa), and (4) karmā which is of a light kind (kaṭattākamma). Of these types, the succeeding type fructifies only in the absence of the preceding one. The reason is quite obvious. The strength of the karmā determines the priority of its fruition. The following classification is according to the time of fruition: (1) karmā which gives its effects in this very life (dīṭṭhadhammavedaniya), (2) karmā which gives its effect in the next life (upāpaṭṭivedaniya), (3) karmā which gives its effect in some life after this (aparāpāriyavedaniya), and (4) karmā which is ineffective (ahosikamma). The following are again the types of karmā according to the plane of life of their fruition: (1) immoral (akusaḷa) karmā which produces its effect in the plane of misery (āpāya-bhūmi), (2) moral (kusala) karmā which produces its effect in the better plane of the world of desires (kāmavacara-bhūmi), (3) moral karmā which produces its effect in the plane of the form (rūpavacara-bhūmi), and (4) moral karmā which produces its effect in the plane of the formless (arūpavacara-bhūmi). In these ways of classification, again, we find much affinity with the Yoga conception. The Buddhist conception of the
upapiṭaka and the upaghaṭaka karmā can be compared with the Yoga conception of the more powerful karmā which absorbs within itself or overpowers the weaker karmā. The Buddhist conception of the guruka karmā can be compared with the Yoga conception of the karmā which is produced by the repeated harm done, under intense passion, to those who are afraid, diseased and afflicted and who have placed their confidence, to the virtuous and the honest, and to the ascetics. The Buddhist conception of dīṭṭhadhammaavedaniya is identical with the Yoga conception of dṛṣṭajaranmavedaniya. The two types of upapiṭajavedaniya and aparāpaṇiḥjavedaniya are included, in the Yoga system, in the one type called dṛṣṭajaranmavedaniya. The conception of ahośikamma can be compared with the Yoga conception of the karmā which lies overpowered for ever by a more powerful karmā. The Buddhist as well as the Yoga system gave supreme importance to the practice of meditation and ecstasy, and it is no wonder that they developed common ideas of spiritual progress. An individual can pass from the lower to the higher plane of life by means of yogic practices according to both the Buddhist and the Yoga school. Thus the fourth mode of classification of karmā according to the plane of life where it produces its effect can be compared with the Yoga conception of the efficacy of yogic practices which enable the practitioner to attain to the higher planes of psychic life, which end in final emancipation of the self (purusa).

This is about the doctrine of karmā in the Pāli or Southern school of Buddhism. The doctrine of karmā in the Vaibhāṣika school of Buddhism is excellently depicted in the Abhidharmakośa of Acārya Vasubandhu. We do not deal with the doctrine for lack of bearing on our topic. One feature of Mahāyāna Buddhism, however, deserves careful notice in this connection. This is the distinction between the ḷīyāvarāṇa and the klesāvarāṇa. The consciousness becomes free from bondage when the klesāvarāṇa is destroyed. But still it has not become omniscient. Attainment of omniscience is possible only on the destruction of the ḷīyāvarāṇa. The consciousness is luminous and omniscient by nature. It is ḷīyāvarāṇa that hides the things from it. The Buddhists of the school of Dignāga and Dharmakirti also

1 Cf. pradhānakarmanī avāpāgamaṇanī vā, niyatvapāka-pradhānakarmanī bhibhūtasya vā ciram avasthānam—Bhāṣya, YD, II, 13.
2 Cf. tathā tivrakleśena bhīta-vyādhita-kṛpaneṣu viśvāsopagatēṣu vā mahānu-bhāveṣu vā tapasvīṣu kṛtaḥ punah punar apakāraḥ, sa cā pī pāpa-karmāsāyaḥ sadya eva paripacyate—Ibid., II, 12.
3 Cf. niyatvapāka-pradhāna-karmanī bhibhūtasya vā ciram avasthānam—Ibid., II, 13.
4 See fourth Nīrdeśa called Karma-nīrdeśa.
5 Vide supra, p. 134.
recognized the luminosity of consciousness, but did not clearly distinguish between the jñeyāvaraṇa and the kleśāvaraṇa, though the distinction can be easily derived from their general conception of consciousness. The Mahāyāna conception of jñeyāvaraṇa can be compared with the jñānāvaraṇa of the Jainas. The kleśāvaraṇa is not much different from the cāirāmohaniya of the Jainas.

IV

THE STATES AND PROCESSES OF KARMAP

The karmā is related with the soul, as we have seen, on account of its passions and vibrations. We have also differentiated between the respective functions of the passions and the vibrations. There are states of the soul where the passions are totally calmed down or destroyed. But the vibrations or the activity of body, sense-organ of speech, and mind still remain and consequently the influx and bondage of karmā as well. This bondage, however, does not last for more than an instant. The influx in this case is technically known as ‘non-affecting’ (īryāpatā), the corresponding bondage also being known by the same term. The influx and bondage due to activity accompanied with passions are both known as ‘affecting’ (sāmparāyika). The influx and bondage, as a matter of necessity, require some energy on the part of the soul for their origination. This energy is known as vīrya. The activity (yoga) is nothing but an imperfect expression of this energy. The various states and processes of the karmā, which we shall describe in this section, are due to this energy of the soul. The nature of the energy, again, is determined by the nature of the dispositions, actual and potential, of the soul. The soul, at any instant of its worldly existence, is an integrated whole of the dispositions, actual and potential. The infinite energy which is inherent in it finds only an imperfect and partial expression which is responsible for the accretion of the karmic matter on the soul. This imperfect and partial, or rather perverted, expression of the energy is responsible for the various processes of the karmic matter. The perfection of energy is realized when the soul is free from all activity (yoga) and is no more liable to association with any kind of karmā, that is, when there is absolute emancipation. Of course, the energy of one who has absolutely dissociated the energy-obstructing karmā, but has not absolutely stopped all activities, is also perfect. But this energy is

1 See TSū, VI. 5 with Bhāṣya and Ṭīkā.
2 The Pañcasāṅgraha (721) defines yoga as salesyam vīryam. This will be clear from what follows.
accompanied with coloration' (saleśya)\(^1\) and as such is to be distinguished from the former which is absolutely free from such coloration (aleśya). There is not any difference of nature between these two energies. The difference is only in respect of the souls that possess them. One is possessed by a soul which has stopped all activities and so is free from coloration and is on the threshold of emancipation or in emancipation itself. The other is possessed by one who is engaged, of course disinterestedly, in activities and therefore is not free from the coloration, although it has absolutely destroyed the energy-obstructing karman. The energy, accordingly, has been classified into two categories: (1) accompanied with coloration (saleśya), and (2) not accompanied with coloration (aleśya). The second class of energy is possessed, as we have just stated, by those souls that have stopped all activities and are on the threshold of emancipation or by those that are already emancipated. This is the most perfect expression of the energy. The energy accompanied with coloration is possessed by all the other souls that have been classified into three categories: (1) those that are possessed of passions, (2) those that have absolutely calmed down or destroyed their passions, and (3) those that have absolutely destroyed all the obscuring (ghātin) karmans (a fortiori the energy-obstructing karman), and have attained omniscience, but have not till now absolutely stopped all activities. The energy accompanied with coloration, moreover, is either voluntary (abhisandhija), that is, born of self-conscious effort, or involuntary (anabhisandhija), that is, born automatically without any conscious effort. The automatic involuntary physiological processes and the like are the workings of the involuntary (anabhisandhija) energy while the voluntary (abhisandhija) energy finds expression in such self-conscious efforts as the voluntary movements.\(^2\) Before we come to the study of the states and processes of karman, it is essential that we should understand the exact nature of the expression of the energy of the soul and its relation with passions and coloration. Let us elaborate the point.

\(^1\) Leśyā is a transformation of the soul, dependent upon the activity of the mind. There is leśyā so long as there is association of the soul with the mind. The soul has infinitesimal transformations due to the infinitesimal activities of the mind associated with it. But these transformations are classified, for the sake of convenience, into six main types which are known as krṣā-leśyā, niśa-leśyā, kāpota-leśyā, tejo-leśyā, padma-leśyā and sukl-leśyā. They are thus nothing but the states of the soul brought about by the various conditions of the mind. Cf. liśyanta iti leśyāḥ, manoyogāvastambha-janīta-parināmaḥ... anekatve 'pi parināmasya paristhūra-katipaya-bheda-katham eva sujñānatvāt kriyate, na tv āseṣa-parināma-bhedākhyānam aṣākhyatvāt...—TSābh, Šūkā, II. 7. See also DOK, pp. 47-49 with footnotes.

\(^2\) For the above classification of virya see Kp, Bandhanakaraṇa, gāthā 3 with Commentaries (pp. 19-21).
The infinite energy of the soul is circumscribed by the energy-obstructing kārman. It is defiled by the passions. And the coloration (leśyā), which forms the colour-index of the embodied existence of the soul, is regarded as defining the energy of the soul in worldly existence inasmuch as it indicates a transformation of the soul in consonance with the transformation of the mind-stuff, which, again, is in consonance with the influence of the passions on the soul. In the ultimate analysis, the passions determine the nature of the coloration. Of course, there is coloration even in the state of the total absence of the passions. But it can be said that the footprints of the bygone passions are still there to give a coloration to the soul. And perhaps it is not without this implication that the Jainas regarded the coloration of the soul free from passions as pure white. The passions darken, as it were, the soul. And the more the soul is free from passions the less dark is the coloration of the soul. The consummation is reached in the pure white coloration (leśyā) which also disappears in the state of final emancipation. The disappearance of coloration is attended with the perfect expression of the energy. The energy of the soul in worldly existence is delimited and defiled. This delimited and defiled energy is called activity (yoga). Or, to be more accurate, the energy as defined by coloration (leśyā) is yoga.¹ Now let us come to our subject proper.

The karmic matter undergoes various processes due to the various conditions of the activities (yoga) which vary infinitely. The infinite variations of the activities are due to the manifold processes of the energy, which have been classified into eight types, technically known as karaṇas (processes of the energy), viz. (1) bandhana (bondage) ‘the condition of the energy responsible for bondage’, (2) saṁkramaṇa (transformation) ‘the condition of the energy responsible for transformation’, (3) udvartanā (increased realization) ‘the condition responsible for increased realization’, (4) apavartanā (decreased realization) ‘the condition responsible for decreased realization’, (5) udīrana (premature realization) ‘the condition responsible for premature realization’, (6) upaśamanā (subsidence) ‘the condition responsible for calming down or subsidence’, (7) niṣkāti or the condition that is capable of making the karmans incapable of all the processes (karaṇas) other than ‘increased realization’ and ‘decreased realization’, and (8) nīkācanā ‘the condition that is responsible for making the karmans incapable of all the processes’. These processes of the energy (karaṇas) lead to the corresponding karmic processes known by the same terms. Every change in the soul synchronizes with the corresponding change in the kārman and vice versa. This is one of the most fundamental principles

¹ Cf. Pañcasaṅgraha, 721 where yoga is defined as salesyāṁ viśyām.
of the doctrine of karmāṇa. A process of the karmāṇa presupposes a process of the energy, and similarly a process of the energy presupposes a process of the karmāṇa. Besides these processes of the karmāṇa, there are certain states of the karmāṇa such as ‘endurance of the karmāṇa for a certain period of time’ (sattā), ‘endurance without producing the effect’ (abādhā), and ‘coming into effect’ (udaya). Let us describe, in brief, these states and processes.

About bondage we have already spoken in detail. The energy (vīrya) that is needed to attract the karmic matter for bondage is the process of the energy called ‘bondage’.

The soul attracts karmic matter at every instant of its worldly career, and assimilates it into so many types of karmāṇa, which mature into fruition in due course. There is thus incessant inflow of the karmic matter into the soul, and the consequent bondage leading to various deformations and disabilities of the soul which by itself is so pure and immune from all defilement. This process of bondage is without beginning, but not endless. It stops with the stoppage of the activity (yoga) of the soul. The stoppage of the activity is attended by the release of the undefined infinite energy. Association with the karmic matter delimits the energy, and the delimited energy effects the association with karmic matter. Thus the process goes on. The other details about the process of bondage can be known from what we have already stated.

Next comes the process of ‘transformation’ (saṅkrāmaṇa) which means the transformation of one karmāṇa into another. ‘Transformation is a process whereby the soul transforms the nature, the duration, the intensity, and the numerical strength of one kind of karmic matter into those of another which it is binding at the time by means of the manifestation of a particular kind of potency.’

The soul is perpetually undergoing metamorphosis leading to the various processes of karmāṇa. Transformation is one such process. By it, the soul either deposits a formerly bound karmāṇa into one which it is binding at the time and then transforms it into the latter, or of the many kinds of karmic sub-types that it is binding, one karmic sub-type is transformed into another.

Thus, for instance, the soul can deposit a previously

1 badhyate ājīvapradesāṁ saha nyonyānugati kriyate śṭapakāraṁ karma yena vīrya-viśeṣeṇa tad bandhanam—Kp, Bandhanakaraṇa, p. 19 (1).

2 saṅkramyante nyakarmarūpatayā vyavasthitāḥ prakṛti-sthitī-anubhāga-pradesāṁ anyakarma-rūpatayā vyavasthitayante yena tat saṅkramaṇa—Ibid.

Also cf.

so saṅkāma tē vuccai jaṁ bandhaṇa-paṁpaṇa paṁpoṇaṁ pagayaṁtarattha-daliyaṁ pariṇamaṁ tayānubhāve jaṁ.

—Kp, Saṅkramakaraṇa, gathā x.

Cf. badhyamāṇaḥ prakṛtiṣu madhye abadhyamāṇa-prakṛti-dalikaṁ prakṛtiṣya badhyamāṇa-prakṛti-rūpatayā yat tasya pariṇamaṁ, yac ca vā badhyamāṇaṁ prakṛtiṁ dalika-rūpasye taretara-rūpatayā pariṇamaṁ tat sarvaṁ saṅkramaṇaṁ ity ucyate—Ibid., p. x (2).
bound suffering-producing (asāta-vedaniya) karmā into the enjoyment-producing (sālavedaniya) karmā that it is binding at the time and transform it into the latter. Or, it can transform one of the two, say the first and the second sub-type of the knowledge-covering karmā, that it is binding at the time into the other. In the case of the three sub-types of the belief-deluding karmā, however, transformation is possible even in the absence of bondage. A person of right belief (samyag-dṛṣṭi) transforms the perversity-producing (mithyāṭva) karmā into the two karmās that produce respectively right-cum-wrong belief (samyag-mithyāṭva) and right belief (samyaktva), even though the latter two are never bound.¹ Similarly he transforms the karmā that produces right-cum-wrong belief into one that produces right belief. It is, however, to be noted that any karmā cannot be transformed into any other. There is not mutual transformation between the belief-deluding (darṣana-moha) and the conduct-deluding (cārītra-moha) karmā as well as between any two among the four sub-types of the longevity-determining karmā as also between any two types from among the eight main types of karmā.² In other words the transformation is possible only between any two sub-types of the same main type with the above exceptions. It is also to be noticed that a person of perverted belief (mithyā-dṛṣṭi) cannot transform his perversion-karmā (mithyāṭva) into the karmā that produces right-cum-wrong belief or into one that produces right belief; nor can a person of right belief transform his karmā producing right belief into one that produces right-cum-wrong belief or wrong belief.³ The reason is obvious. Transformation requires energy, and the nature of this energy is determined by the degree of the purity of the soul. A person of wrong belief is not pure enough to be capable of the energy required to transfer his karmic matter of wrong belief to the karmic matter of

¹ Samyagmithyāṭva and samyaktva are only the two particular states of purity of the mithyāṭva-pudgala (i.e. the karmic matter producing perversity). The soul can bind only the karmā that produces perversity (mithyāṭva). It does not bind the karmā producing samyagmithyāṭva or the karmā producing sammaktva, but only purifies the mithyāṭva-karmā into samyagmityāṭva and sammaktya. Cf. iha mithyātvasayai 'va bandho na sammaktva-samyagmityāṭvayoḥ, yato mithyāṭva-pudgala eva madanakodrava-sthāniyā anādhibhi-viśeṣa-kalpena aupasānika-samyaktvāṅgatena visodhi-sthānena tridhā kriyante, tad yathā: suddhā ardhā-viśuddhā aviśuddhāḥ ca. tatra viśuddhāḥ sammaktvam, ardhaviśuddhāḥ samyagmityāṭvam, aviśuddhā mithyāṭvam. tatra viśuddha-samyag-dṛṣṭiḥ samyaktya-samyagmityāṭvayor bandhaḥ vinā 'pi tatra mithyātvaṁ saṅkramayati, samyagmityāṭvam ca sammaktva iti—Ibid., p. 2 (2).

² mohadugā-'uga-mūlapagatiṁ na paropparāṁ na saṅkamanam.

—Ibid., gāthā 3a-b.

³ Cf. yasmin darṣana-mohanīye yo jantur avatīṣhate sa tad anyatra na saṅkramayati, yathā mithyādṛṣṭiḥ mithyātvaṁ samyagmityādṛṣṭiḥ samyagmityāṭvam, samyagdṛṣṭiḥ sammaktvam—Ibid., p. 3 (2).
right-cum-wrong belief or right belief and transform it into them. Similarly, a person of right belief is not impure enough to be capable of the energy required to transfer the karmic matter of right belief to the karmic matter of right-cum-wrong belief or wrong belief, and transform it into them. Similar is the case of the soul possessed of the karmic matter of right-cum-wrong belief.

Next we come to ‘increased realization’ (udvartanā) and ‘decreased realization’ (āpavartanā) which are nothing but the transformation (sāṅkramaṇa) of the length of duration (sthiti) and intensity of fruition (anubhāga) of a karmā. The energy whereby the soul increases the length of duration and the intensity of fruition of a karmā is the process called ‘increased realization’ (udvartanā-karana). And the energy whereby the soul decreases them is ‘decreased realization’. The processes of the karmā due to these energies are also known by the same terms. These processes, like others, are very complicated ones and there is every possibility of losing sight of the very essence of the processes if we once enter the labyrinth of description as found in the Jaina works on karmā. We, therefore, rest satisfied with the statement of the central ideas of the processes. The doctrine of karmā attempts at explaining the various states of the soul by postulating the corresponding processes of karmic matter. This interplay of spirit and matter is described in its numerous aspects, and the complicated doctrine of karmā is formulated. There is, however, very little of philosophical interest in the description of the various processes. Now we come to the process called ‘premature realization’ (udirana).

The karmā does not yield fruit as soon as it is bound. It remains inactive for some time before producing its result. This period of inactivity is called ‘the period of non-production’ (abādhākāla). The karmā comes into rise (udaya) in order to give its fruit after this period of non-production is over. This rise continues uninterrupted till the end of the fruition. At any instant of rise (udaya) the order of the groups of karmic aggregates (karma-dalika) that are to rise into fruition in the following instants making up one avalikā is arranged beforehand. The avalikā referred to in this context is called udayāvalikā. By the process of ‘premature realization’ the soul attracts back the group of karmic aggregates that were to rise into fruition after the passing away of the udayāvalikā in question, and places them into the udayāvalikā so that they may fructify earlier. The special kind of

1 Cf. . . . . sāṅkramaṇam. tadbhedāv evo ’dvartanāpavartane, te ca karmāpānī sthityanubhāgasye—Kp, Bandhanakaṇa, p. 19 (2).
2 tatro ’dvartyete prabhūtikriyete sthityanubhāgau yayā vīryaparinayā sa udvartanā. apavartyete hrasvikriyete tau yayā sa ’pavartanā—Kp, Bandhana-
kaṇa, p. 19 (2).
3 An avalikā is a very small measure of time.
energy that is requisite for the process is called the process of premature realization (*udīraṇā-karāṇa*). In brief, ‘premature realization’ is the process by which a *karman* is made capable of premature fruition. The process necessarily involves ‘decreased realization’. Next we come to the process called ‘subsidence’ (*upaśamanā*).

The ‘subsidence’ is a process which holds up the processes of ‘rise’ (*udaya*), ‘premature fruition’, *nidhatī* and *nikācanā* of the karmic matter. The manifestation of the requisite energy is called the process of subsidence (*upaśamanā-karāṇa*). We have stated on more than one occasion that the world process is considered to be without beginning. It is also admitted that everyone is striving in his own way for the realization of the ultimate state of emancipation. The striving becomes a self-conscious effort only when a measure of purity has been achieved by the soul. The processes of the deluding *karman* play a very important part in the making up of the worldly existence, and it is only the holding up (*upaśamanā*) of this karman that gives the soul a glimpse of the truth of reality. The soul develops its inherent love of truth into a definitive self-conscious predilection which illumines the spiritual journey leading to the ultimate goal. The process of ‘subsidence’ thus occupies a very important place in the spiritual speculations of the Jainas. We shall have occasion in the next chapter to describe the process in some detail. The subsidence (*upaśamanā*) is only a temporary holding up of the deluding *karman*. The antithesis of it is total dissociation (*kṣaya*) which means total disintegration of the karmic matter from the soul. Then there is the process of dissociation-cum-subsidence (*kṣayo-paśama*) wherein some portion of karmic matter is held up, some portion is exhausted by fruition, while some is in rise (*udaya*). Thus, for instance, at the time of perceptual cognition (*matijñāna*), which is a state of dissociation-cum-subsidence of the relevant sub-type of the knowledge-covering karman, some ‘partially obscuring intensity-classes’ (*deśagāti-spardhakas*) of the said karman are held up, some such are exhausted by fruition, while others are in rise. Dissociation (*kṣaya*) and dissociation-cum-subsidence (*kṣayo-paśama*) are not treated separately from subsidence (*upaśama*) in view of their lack of any peculiarity of nature. Dissociation is the state of absence of the karman and as such needs no description. Dissociation-cum-subsidence is a complex of dissociation (*kṣaya*), subsidence (*upaśama*), and rise (*udaya*) and so can be understood if the latter three are

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2 *Nidhatī* and *nikācanā* will be defined immediately after the description of the process in question.

understood, and so needs no separate explanation. Next we come to
nidhatti and nikācanā.

Nidhatti is a process whereby a karman is made incapable of all processes (karaṇas) except the two viz. ‘increased realization’ and ‘decreased realization’. The manifestation of energy responsible for such process is nidhatti-karaṇa. Under particular dispositions, the soul binds karman in such a way that the latter is so irrefrangibly pasted with the soul that it becomes incapable of all possible changes except the two. In nikācanā, however, even these two are impossible. This is the difference between nidhatti and nikācanā. It follows, therefore, that the manifestation of energy which is responsible for such bondage with the karman as has its nature, duration, intensity and numerical strength unalterably fixed from before, in other words, whose course of fruition is predetermined from the very time of bondage, is
nikācanā-karaṇa.

As regards the states of ‘existence’ (sattā), ‘period of non-production’ (abādhā), and ‘rise’ (udaya) of a karman, it is perhaps not necessary to explain their meanings which follow from the etymological meaning of the terms themselves. A karman is regarded to be in existence unless and until its last particle has fallen off from the soul. This whole existence of the karman is called sattā. ‘Period of non-production’ and ‘rise’ we have already explained. We can here distinguish between affecting rise (vipākodaya) and non-affecting rise (pradeśodaya). The affecting rise of a karman is attended with the effect of the karman on the soul while the non-affecting rise is fruition without any effect on the soul. The soul can, by manifestation of requisite energy, lessen the intensity of fruition, and when the lessening is so great that the karman almost loses all its effect on the soul, the fruition of that karman is non-affecting. Let us now record some comparative remarks on these processes and states of karman.

It is of course not possible to find exact parallels of these states and processes in the non-Jaina systems. It is, however, possible to interpret some ideas of the Yoga school in terms of the Jaina conceptions. And this has been done by the great Jaina scholar of modern times Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya. He has suggested such comparisons in his brief Commentary on Patañjali’s Yogadārśana. Thus, in his

1 nidhiyate udvartanāpavartanā-’nya-śeṣa-karaṇāyogatvena vyavasthāpyate yayā sā nidhattih—Ibid., p. 19 (2).
2 nikācayate sakala-karaṇāyogatvenā ‘vaśyavedyatayā vyavasthāpyate karma jīvena yayā sā nikācānā—Ibid.
3 This Commentary has been edited by the great savant Pt. Sukhlalji. The reader is requested to go through the learned introductory portion of the edition which was published by Shri Atmanand Jain Pustako Pracharak Mandal, Roshan Muhalla, Agra, (1922).
Commentary on *Yogādṛṣṭāṇa* II. 4, Yaśovijaya says that the five afflictions of nescience, egohood, attachment, repulsion and will to live are the particular states of rise (*udāya*) of the deluding *karma*. He interprets the dormant (*prasupta*) state of these afflictions as the period of non-production (*abādhiḥkāla*) of the Jainas. The incipient (*tanu*) state is interpreted as the state of subsidence (*upaśama*) or dissociation-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) of the Jainas. The interrupted (*vicchinnā*) state is interpreted as the interruption of a particular *karma* on account of the rise of a *karma* of the opposite nature. The operative (*ūdāra*) state is interpreted as the state of rise (*udāya*) of the Jainas.\(^1\) The Yoga school recognizes some traces of *karma* whose fruition is not certain (*aniyata-viśāka*) inasmuch as such traces may perish before the time of their fruition, or may merge into a more powerful *karma*, or they may remain ineffective for ever being overpowered by the more powerful *karma*.\(^2\) This Yoga conception can be roughly compared with the Jaina conception of the process of transformation (*saṅkramaṇa*). The *karma* with unfailing fruition (*niyataviśāka*) of the Yoga can be compared with the *nīkācita karma* of the Jainas.

The Jaina conception of the *karmas* in the period of non-production (*abādhiḥkāla*) compares with the conception of stored (*saṅcita*) *karmas*, and the conception of the *karmas* in rise (*udāya*) corresponds to the conception of fruitifying (*prārabhā*) *karmas*. The conception of the *karma* that is being done (*kriyāmaṇa*) can be compared with the Jaina conception of the *karma* that is being bound (*badhyamāna*).

\(^1\) Cf. atrā 'vidyādayo mohanīyakarmanā audayīka-bhāva-viśesāh. teṣāṁ prasuptatvaṁ tajjanakakarmano 'bādhiḥkālāparikṣayeṇa karma-niṣekābhāvaḥ. tanutvam upaśamaḥ kṣayopaśamo vā. vicchinnatvaṁ pratipakṣa-prakṛtyudayā- dinā 'ntaratvatvaṁ. udāratvaṁ co 'dayāvalikā-śrūptatvam ity avaseyam—Yaśovijaya’s Commentary on *YD*, II. 4.

\(^2\) yo hy adṛṣṭajnānvedanīyo 'niyataviśākas tasya trayī gatiḥ—kṛtasyā 'vipakvasya nāśaḥ, pradhānakarmano āvāpagamanānā tāḥ, niyataviśāka-pradhānakarmanā 'bhībhūtasya vā cirām avasthānam—*Bhāṣya* on *YD*, II. 13.
CHAPTER V

JAINA YOGA

INTRODUCTORY

In the first chapter we studied the fundamental nature of the Jaina attitude. We found that the Jaina is a thoroughgoing realist who would not let a single element given in experience be rejected as false on the verdict of abstract logic. In the second chapter we studied the Agamic conception of the nature of experience which the Jainas consider as the ultimate organ of the determination of the nature of reality. The experience of one who is not omniscient is imperfect and vitiated. In the third chapter we studied the nature of the fundamental defect that vitiates the experience of imperfect souls and is the ultimate condition of worldly existence. In this connection we studied also the various conceptions of the basic defect in the other systems of Indian thought and also recorded their criticism from the Jaina standpoint. We were then naturally led to the consideration of the Jaina doctrine of karman which attempts at explaining the various expressions of the worldly existence conditioned by the basic defect. The Indian systems of philosophy are not mere speculations on the nature of things but, with all sincerity and earnestness at their command, dive deep into the mysteries of the universe in order to find the way out of the limitations of the worldly existence vitiated by perversities and crippled by various privations and disabilities. The perfect unfolding of the potentialities of the self is the object aimed at. The pursuit of truth must culminate in the realization of the truth. And the pathway or the process leading to the discovery of truth must be made a public property so that anyone who would care to tread upon or practise the same might discover and realize the truth. The systems of Indian philosophy therefore have chalked out their respective paths of spiritual realization. The ordinary sources of knowledge are found to be inadequate to the discovery of the ultimate truth, being subject to the limitations imposed by the senses. The intellect, though possessed of a superior status in that it organizes the data of experience into a system, is also not immune from the limitations of the senses and has been found to record varying and conflicting conceptions which cannot all be true. Kant has proved the erratic tendencies of intellectual understanding when it is allowed to wander in the unchartered regions which are beyond the jurisdiction of senses. Our reason is a valued instrument but its services are bound to be negative. It can enable us to determine that the ultimate reality cannot be of this or that sort.
But it is undependable so far as the positive nature of it is concerned. For this we must fall back upon another organ and this organ is meditation free from the visitations of the extraneous influences. Self-meditation is common to all, and is a process of supreme importance to all the Indian systems. Meditation on the nature of self is the only means of realizing the truth. One cannot grasp the truth unless one meditates upon it, and one cannot realize it unless one grasps it. The aspirant should pin his faith on whatever system he might have been initiated into and should see for himself at the end of the process whether he started with a right postulate. A skeptic has no place in the path of realization. How can one realize the truth unless one exerts oneself for it? And why should one exert oneself for the truth unless one has implicit faith in it and the possibility of its realization? One must have either unflinching faith in the authority of one’s preceptor (guru), or else one must have a direct glimpse of the truth itself before one can proceed in the path of realization. Implicit faith in the truth, whether born with the help of the preceptor or fostered by a spontaneous intuition of the truth, is the starting point of the path of spiritual realization. There are various processes of leading oneself from this stage of implicit faith in the truth to the stage of final realization of the truth. The processes have a common term for them, and that term is *yoga.*¹ In Jainism the term *cāritra* (conduct) is the exact equivalent of the general term *yoga.* But we have selected the term for the headline in order only to suggest the unanimity of Indian

¹ The term yoga has a chequered history. ‘The word ‘yoga’ occurs in the earliest sacred literature of the Hindus in the *Rgveda* (about 3000 B.C.) with the meaning of effecting a connection. Later on, in about 700 or 800 B.C. the same word is used in the sense of yoking a horse. In still later literature (about 500 or 600 B.C.) it is found with the meaning of controlling the senses, and the senses themselves are compared with uncontrolled spirited horses. The word probably represents a very old original of the Aryan stock, which can be traced also in the German *joch,* OE. *geoc,* Latin *jugum,* Greek *zugon.* Dasgupta: *Philosophical Essays, Calcutta University,* 1941, p. 179. 'In Pañjini's time the word yoga had attained its technical meaning, and he distinguished the root *yuṭ samādhau* (√*yuj* in the sense of concentration) from *yuṭ yoge* (√*yuṭir* in the sense of connecting).’—*HIP,* Vol. I, p. 226. It is, so far as my knowledge goes, only Haribhadra who defined the term yoga in the sense of ‘what leads one to emancipation’ for the first time in the history of Jaina thought. (Cf. mukkheṣa joyaṇāo joga savvo vi dhama-vāvāro—Haribhadra’s *Yogaviṇīśīka, kārikā 1.*). This meaning of the term is unanimously accepted in the post-Haribhadra Jaina literature. Of course, the term yoga was used in the general sense of subduing the senses and the mind and the processes of concentration and ecstasy even in the earlier stages of the Jaina thought as well as in the early Buddhist thought. But the terms jhāna (dhyāna) and samādhi were more in vogue than the term yoga. It is only in the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali that we find the proper location of dhyāna in the whole process called yoga for the first time.
systems regarding the processes leading to self-realization. If there is any difference it is only one of emphasis and not of essence. This will be apparent from the study.

Before we come to the central theme we must have some understanding of the general scheme of the Jaina doctrine of conduct (cārītra). In the last chapter we have spoken about the inflow of karmic matter and bondage. Here we shall enquire about the means of stoppage (samāvara) of the inflow of new karmic matter and also the means of dispersion or dissociation (nirjarā) of the accumulated karmic matter from the soul. We have seen in the last chapter that the inflow and bondage of the karmic matter are due to the activities and passions of the soul, and so it naturally follows that the eradication of the activities and passions is the means of the stoppage of the inflow and fixation or bondage of new karmic matter. The inflow of karmic matter is due to the threefold activities of the mind, the sense-organ of speech and the body, and hence the first condition of the stoppage of inflow is the control (gupti) of thought, speech and physical movements. There are other conditions needed for the consummation. They are: (1) the fivefold regulation (samiti) of the five main activities for the maintenance of life; (2) the tenfold moral virtues (dharma) of consummate forbearance, modesty, straightforwardness, contentment, truth, self-restraint, austerity, renunciation, non-attachment and celibacy; (3) contemplation (anupreksā) of these twelvefold objects viz. the fleeting nature of things, the helplessness of one involved in the worldly existence, the nature of the world itself as fraught with misery and suffering, the loneliness of the worldly sojourn, the transcendental nature of the self as distinct and separate from the body, the impure character of the body, the conditions of the inflow of karmic matter and the consequent misery and suffering, the nature of the condition of the stoppage of karmic inflow, the nature of the condition of the dissociation of karmic matter from the soul, the nature of the constituents of the universe, the difficulty of the attainment of enlightenment, and the rightness of the path of righteousness one has selected to tread upon; (4) the patient endurance of the twenty-two afflictions (parīṣahās) and their conquest for the sake of steady persistence in the path of righteousness as well as for the dissociation of karmic matter; and

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1 samyag-yoga-nigraho guptih—TSū, IX. 4.
2 Cf. Iryā-bhāsa-‘ṣaṇā-‘dānaniṣēpo-‘tsargāḥ samitayah—TSū, IX. 5.
4 anityā-‘ṣaraṇa-saṁśāreikavā-‘nyatvā-‘śucitvā-‘srava-saṁvara-nirjarā - lokabhidhurlabha-dharmasvākhyaatavā-‘nucintanam anupreksāḥ—TSū, IX. 7.
5 For enumeration See TSū, IX. 9.
6 mārgācyava-nirjarārthaṁ pariṣṭhavyāḥ pariṣahāḥ—TSū, IX. 8.
(5) the fivefold conduct (cārita) viz. desisting from all harmful activities (sāmāyika), re-initiation (chedopasthāpana) after the rectification of the activities due to carelessness (pramāda), austerity which is possible only for one who has attained special purity and has thorough knowledge of the rules of conduct as well as the energy to observe them in life (pariharaviśuddhi), conduct which is attended by the rise of only the subtlest type of passions (sūkṣmasamparāya), and lastly the conduct which is perfect (yathākhyāta).\(^1\) The above six viz. (1) self-control (gupti), (2) self-regulation (samiti), (3) moral virtues (dharma), (4) contemplation (anupreksā), (5) conquest of afflictions (pariṣahajaya) and (6) conduct (cārita) constitute the means to the stoppage (saṅvara) of inflow of new karmic matter.\(^2\) Apart from these six, the Jainas admit austerity (taṇas), both physical and mental or external and internal, which effects stoppage (saṅvara) of the inflow as well as the dissociation (nirjarā) of the accumulated karmic matter. Each of the external and the internal types of austerity has six subclasses. Thus fasting, decreased diet, fixing the type of diet by the exclusion of all other types, giving up of strong and delicious diet, selection of a lonely and peaceful habitat, and various types of physical postures that enhance the strength of endurance are the six subclasses of the external austerity.\(^3\) These forms of external austerity, when rightly followed, result in non-attachment, lightness of body, conquest of the senses, protection of self-control, and lastly the dissociation of karmic matter.\(^4\) The following six are the subclasses of internal austerity: (1) ninefold expiation (prāyaścitā) such as confession of a sin, repentance and the like; (2) fourfold humility (vinaya) such as one observed in the presence of a person who is superior in the purity of attitude or knowledge or conduct and the like; (3) respectful service (vaiyāvṛttya) of these ten viz. the supreme preceptor (ācārya), the preceptor (upādhyāya), an ascetic (taṇasvin), an ascetic student (śaikṣa), an alling ascetic (glāna), the descendant group (gaṇa) of disciples of a sthavira, the descendant group (kula) of disciples of a famous ācārya, the fourfold community (saṅgha) of monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen, ascetics (sādhu) and the associates (samanojña); (4) the fivefold ‘study’ (svādhyāya) of the scriptures viz. teaching, enquiry, contemplation, correct reading and preaching of their contents;

\(^{1}\) TSā, IX. 18.

\(^{2}\) sa gupti-samiti-dharma-nupreksā-pariṣahajaya-cāritis-taṇas—Ibid., IX. 2.

\(^{3}\) anaśanā-vamaudarya-vrttiparisaṅkhyaṇa - rasaparītyāga - viviktaśayāsana-kāyaklesa bāhyāṃ taṇaḥ—TSā, IX. 19.

\(^{4}\) Cf. samyak-prayuktāni bāhyāṃ taṇaḥ. asmāt śaḍvidhā api bāhyat tapasaḥ sangatya-gaśāraśālāgava'-ndriyavijaya-saṃyamarakṣaṇa-karmanirjārā bhavanti—Bhāṣya, TSā, IX. 19.

\(^{5}\) prāyaścitā-vinaya-vaiyāvṛttya-svādhyāya-vyutsarga-dhyānānāy uttaram—TSā, IX. 20.
(5) the renunciation (vyuṣṭsarga) of the not-self such as the external possession as well as the quasi-self such as the body, the mind, the sense-organs and the passions; and (6) lastly concentration (āhyanā) which we propose to deal with in detail in view of its supreme importance in the scheme of the processes leading to emancipation. This long prescription of the rules of conduct, objects of contemplation and varieties of austerity is symptomatic of the supreme importance that Jainism gives to the moral life of a spiritual aspirant. Of course, this is true of all the branches of Indian culture. But Jainism lays special stress on mortification of the flesh for the regeneration of the spirit. This is also apparent from the fact that Jainism gives so much importance to the difficult vow (vratā) of non-violence (ahimsā). The whole Jaina code of moral and spiritual virtues is inspired by the one great principle of non-violence. The other four vows of truthfulness, non-stealing, celibacy and non-possession of property are nothing but the accessories which help the fulfilment of the vow of non-violence. A number of minor vows known as śīla and classified under the two categories of guṇavrata and śikṣā-vrata¹ are also prescribed for the householders in order to enable them to observe the five primary vows. But we do not enumerate them in order to avoid unnecessary elaboration. We also desist from stating the classification of various activities which lead to the transgression (aticāra) of these vows² for the same reason. It is however to be noticed that the selfsame five vows, which, when undertaken to be observed completely as is done by the Jaina ascetics (sādhus), are called mahāvratas (great vows), are known as aṇuvratas (small vows) when they are undertaken only to be partially observed, as is done by the Jaina laity. The Jainas prescribe a number of ways and means for the preservation of these vows.³ They are called bhāvanās (literally contemplations). Thus, for instance, regulation of movement (īryāsamiti), control of thought (manogupti) and the like are prescribed for the preservation of the vow of non-violence; avoidance of indignation and greed, courage, and the like are prescribed for the preservation of the vow of truthfulness; and so on. Furthermore, one must always be conscious of the bad effects, both spiritual and secular, of the acts of violence, falsehood, stealing, intemperance and accumulation of property.⁴ It should also be understood that everything that helps the perpetuation of worldly existence is ultimately a condition of suffering and pain.⁵ What is, however, of supreme importance is the preservation of equanimity, consciousness of the evil nature of worldly existence, and uttermost indifference to

¹ See TSā, VII. 16 with Bhāṣya and Tikā.
² TSā, VII. 19-31.
³ TSā, VII. 3 with Bhāṣya.
⁴ Cf. hiṃsādīvī ihā 'mutra cā 'pāyadarśanam—TSā, VII. 4.
⁵ Cf. duḥkham eva vā—Ibid., VII. 5.

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the things of the world. For the preservation of equanimity one should cultivate friendship (maitri) with all creatures, appreciation (pramoda) for the superior, compassion and sympathy (kārṇya) for the afflicted, and indifference (mādhayasthya) for the unruly.\(^1\) Contemplation of the nature of the world and the body generates fear (saṁvega) and indifference (vairāgya)\(^2\) for the worldly existence and therefore is to be earnestly pursued. These are in brief the main features of the Jaina doctrine of conduct. Let us now study the essential characteristics of the Jaina conception of the pathway to emancipation, in other words, Jaina yoga.

The trio of right attitude, right knowledge and right conduct constitutes, according to the Jainas, the pathway to final emancipation.\(^3\) We have studied the nature and mutual relation of these three in the third chapter.\(^4\) Right attitude or samyag-darśana is the predilection or love for truth. Every soul has such predilection in some measure. But unless and until it develops into a self-conscious pursuit of truth, it does not help spiritual progress. It is only at the stage of self-conscious effort for spiritual advancement that this love of truth is called samyag-darśana. The soul is conceived as groping in darkness before it acquires this love of truth in an appreciable measure. And it has to undergo a number of processes before the acquisition of this characteristic.\(^5\) After the acquisition of this characteristic the soul passes through a number of stages of spiritual development, technically known as guṇasthānas. This is a very important doctrine of the Jainas. Once the soul succeeds in acquiring the samyag-darśana, it is bound to attain emancipation sooner or later. The nature of this samyag-darśana and its condition viz. the purity of the soul we have already described on more than one occasion and shall have again an occasion to do so while dealing with the doctrine of guṇasthāna. The attainment of right attitude (samyag-darśana) is followed by the attainment of right knowledge (samyag-jñāna) and right conduct (samyak-cārītra). The soul acquires more and more power for self-concentration.

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\(^1\) maitri-pramoda-kārṇya-mādhayasthya-sattva-guṇādhaika-kliṣyamānā-‘vineyocu—Ibid., VII. 6.

\(^2\) jagat-kāyasvabhāvau ca saṁvega-vairāgyarthau—TSū, VII. 7.

\(^3\) samyagdarśana-jñāna-cārītraśi mokṣamārgaḥ—TSū, I. 1.

\(^4\) Vide supra, pp. 146-151.

\(^5\) There are souls who do never acquire this characteristic and, therefore, are never released from worldly bondage. These souls are called abbavya (incapable of release). The Jainas do not give any ultimate reason for this endless bondage. We find similar conception in Buddhism as well. Cf. varṣatya api hi pariṣyate nai ‘vā ‘bijaṁ prarohati samutpāde ‘pi buddhānāṁ na ‘bhavyo bhadrām aśnute.

—Abhisamayālaṅkāra, VIII. 10, quoted in Bu-Ston (Part II, p. 138 footnote).
(āhyāna) along with the increase of its purity and consequent attainment of the corresponding stages of spiritual development. We shall describe the nature of this concentration after we have discussed the doctrine of gunasthāna. It is generally believed that the Jainas, from the very outset, put their whole stress on physical austerity and more or less neglected the aspect of meditation and self-concentration. But this belief is not true. Physical austerity is only an index of spiritual detachment.¹ The identification of the soul with the body is the root evil to be got rid of. And this is possible only if one practises detachment from the body. The natural consequence of this practice of detachment is indifference towards it. The practice of detachment is incompatible with the care for its well-being. The works of Ācārya Kundakunda, Pūjyapāda and Jinabhadra contain elaborate instructions in self-meditation and concentration of mind. The works of Hari-bhadra record a number of different doctrines of yoga and their comparative evaluation. The Jñānānyaya of Subhacandra and the Yogaśāstra of Hemacandra are valuable works on yoga. Upādhyāya Yasovijaya revived the study of Haribhadra's works on yoga. The Jaina mind was always conscious of the efficacy of meditation for the achievement of final emancipation. But it abhorred the acquisition of supernormal powers by means of the yogic processes. Self-realization was the only aim to be fulfilled by yoga. It is unanimously believed by Indian mystics that the yogic practices are attended by supernormal powers which bring about the fall of the practitioner if utilized for selfish purposes. The Jaina ascetics devoted themselves absolutely to the purification of the soul and acquisition of the power of detachment, and the result was that they were indifferent to everything else, even to their bodies. But with the ebb of spiritual fervour and earnestness in the late mediaeval and modern times, the Jaina ascetics exhausted all their energy in the observance of external austerity. The original tradition of mortification of the flesh for the regeneration of the spirit was lost in the labyrinth of formal austerities signifying nothing but spiritual bankruptcy. We have proposed to deal with the Jaina doctrine of āhyāna in detail in order to bring to light the almost absolutely forgotten tradition of self-meditation that had a very important place in the scheme of Jaina yoga. We shall also record the Jaina conception of Godhead while dealing with the problem of the first attainment of samyag-darsana (right attitude) in the life history of a soul. Thus our enquiry will fall under these three heads: (I) the

¹ Cf. bāhyātā tapaḥ paraṃ-duṣcaram ācaraṁs tvam
dhṛtvātmikasya tapasam parābhīṣanāpārtham
dhyānām nirasya kalusadvayam uttarasmin
dhyānadvaye vāvṛtīte 'tisayopapanne.
—Samantabhadra's Bhūkhatsvayambhūstotra, 83.
doctrine of gunasthāna including the conception of Godhead and the first attainment of samyag-darśana, (II) the doctrine of dhyāna as contained in the Āgamas and the works of Umāsvāti, Kundakunda, Pūjyapāda, Jinabhadra, Haribhadra, Śubhacandra and Hemacandra, and (III) Haribhadra's comparative study and evaluation of various yoga-doctrines.

I

THE DOCTRINE OF GUNASTHĀNA

The soul has inherent capacity for emancipation. But this capacity remains dormant and inactive unless and until it gets an opportunity for expression. The soul is roused to active spiritual exertion when it is reminded of the great mission that it has to fulfil. The reminder sometimes comes from the instructions of those who have realized the truth and revealed it to the public. Sometimes the soul gets hold of the truth automatically without any outside help. The Jainas do not believe either in the eternal revelation of the truth like the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins, or in its revelation by a Supreme Divinity like the Yoga and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. But they believe in the inherent capacity of the soul to realize the truth even in the absence of any revelation. The capacity to reveal and effectively preach the truth, however, does not belong to all the enlightened and omniscient souls. It is only those rare souls, who have acquired the potency of revealing the truth and establishing a religious community (tīrtha-kṛttva) by their moral and virtuous activities\(^1\) of the past life, that are capable of revealing the truth and preaching it to the world at large on their attainment of omniscience (kevalajñāna). Such souls become the tīrthaṅkaras, founders of religion, who are the embodiment of the best and the highest virtues that the human mind can conceive of, the fullest expression of the potentialities of embodied existence. This is the Jaina conception of Godhead. God, according to the Jainas, is the symbol of all that is good and great, moral and virtuous. But he is not the creator or the preserver or the destroyer. He is not in any sense responsible for the destiny of the universe or the individual. Nor is he capable of granting grace to any individual. Nor is he himself eternally free, but has worked out his own freedom exactly in the same way as the others do. The difference between the ordinary omniscient

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\(^1\) For enumeration of such activities see TSā, VI. 23: darśanaviśuddhir vinayasampannatā ślavratēṣv anaticāro bhikṣuṣaṁ jāñnapayoga-saṁvegau śakti-
tas tyāgatapaśi saūga-sādhu-samādhi-visyāvṛtttyakaraṇam arhadācārya-bahu-
śruta-pravacanabhaktir āvaśyakāparihānir mārgaprabhāvanā pravacanavatsala-
tvam iti tīrtha-kṛttvasya.
and a _tirthan̄kara_ is this that the latter can reveal and preach the truth and found a religious community while the former cannot. The worldly career of a soul destined to be a _tirthan̄kara_ is purer and much more spiritually elevated than that of an ordinary soul destined to be emancipated. The _tirthan̄kara_ is a spiritual leader and an inspirer and a founder or reviver of a religion which is destined to last for an appreciable period of time. The worldly existence is beginningless and there has been an infinite number of cycles of creation, and it is held that the first founder of culture and civilization of each cycle is the first _tirthan̄kara_ of that cycle. It is only the _tirthan̄kara_ who can reveal the truth and inspire the masses. This is the Jaina conception of Godhead.

After this brief digression to the idea of Godhead in Jainism, let us revert to our original problem of the first awakening of the predilection for truth (_sanyāgārśana_). There is always a tendency in the soul to run away from the circle of world existence. But this centrifugal tendency is thwarted by a centripetal force that keeps the soul tracing the circumference of the world process. The centripetal force consists in the passions of attraction (_rāga_) and repulsion (_dveṣa_) or rather their root _viz._ perverted attitude (_mithyātva_) towards truth. The centrifugal tendency is that part of the characteristic potency of the soul which still remains unhindered or unobstructed. This remaining part of the potency we have referred to in the last chapter.¹ It is this centrifugal tendency that ultimately leads the soul to the right path. The problem 'Why should this tendency develop into a patent force in one soul, and remain only a dormant virtue in another' is not regarded as needing solution. It is a fact of common experience that different individuals have different degrees of power manifest in them. And this is an ultimate fact of experience incapable of being accounted for by further ultimate facts. The soul, during the course of its eternal wanderings in various forms of existence, sometimes is possessed of an indistinct vision of its goal and feels an impulse from within to realize it. This impulse is the work of the eternal centrifugal tendency already mentioned.² The impulse is a kind of manifestation of energy, technically known as _yathāpravṛttakaraṇa_.³ It is not always effective, and

¹ _Vide supra_, p. 241.
² How the soul happens to develop this tendency is illustrated in a number of ways on the analogy of the experience of common facts. For these illustrations see _ViBh_, 1204-1217.
³ Sometimes the eternal tendency itself is stated as the _yathāpravṛttakaraṇa_. _Cf._ anādikālāt karmakṣaṇapraṇāvṛttvato 'dhyavasāyaviśeṣop yathāpravṛttakaraṇam ityarthaḥ—_Bhādavyātīti_, _ViBh_, 1202. But generally and almost unanimously the _yathāpravṛttakaraṇa_ is identified with the temporary impulse lasting for less than a _muhūrta_ (forty-eight minutes) wherein the soul achieves such purification as causes it to feel uneasiness with the worldly existence. This _yathāpravṛttakaraṇa_
sO does not always invariably lead to spiritual advancement. But sometimes it is so strong and irresistible that it goads the soul to come to grips with the centripetal force and to weaken it to an appreciable extent in the struggle that ensues. Here the soul is face to face with what is known as *granthi* or the Gordian knot of intense attachment and repulsion.\(^1\) If the impulse is strong enough to cut the knot, the

is known as *aṭhāpravṛttakaraṇa* or *adhaḥpravṛttakaraṇa* in the Digambara works (TRā, p. 317; *Labdhisāra*, 35). The original common Prākṛti term was *adhaḥpavatā* (*PS*: *Upa*, 5; *Kp*: *Upa*, 8; *Labdhisāra*, 35) which was equated to a number of Sanskrit terms expressing different meanings. The *Labdhisāra* distinguishes four stages of the achievement (labdhi) of purification before the soul reaches the *adhaḥpravṛttakaraṇa*. They are: (1) a certain measure of dissociation-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopāśama*) of the karmic matter, (2) the consequent purification (*viśuddhi*), (3) the opportunity of getting the instructions (*deśanā*) of the enlightened sages, and (4) prāyogya or the reduction of the duration of all the types of karman except the āyuḥ-karman to less than koṭākoṭi years as well as the reduction of the intensity of the inauspicious karmans. The fifth labdhi comprises the three karaṇas of which the first is *adhaḥpravṛttakaraṇa*.—*Labdhisāra*, 3-7. The *Karma-prakṛti* also recognizes these labdhis. (See *Kp*: *Upa*, 3 with *Cūrṇi*. The second labdhi is not mentioned explicitly, but it is indubiously implied). As regards the state of the physical organism of the soul when it is competent to undergo such processes it is said that the organism must be five-sensed and possessed of mind as well as fully developed. Furthermore, at the time of such processes the soul is possessed of determinate knowledge and anyone of the threefold activities of body, the sense-organ of speech and mind. The soul enjoys purification even from before the actual setting in of the processes. And on account of the purification, during the *antarmuhūrta* (a period of time less than forty-eight minutes) preceding the process of *yathāpravṛttakaraṇa*, the soul binds only such duration as is less than a koṭākoṭi sāgaropama years, and binds only the second degree of intensity of inauspicious karmans while it binds the fourth degree of intensity of the auspicious karmans. Similarly the soul reduces the duration of the already existing karmans to less than one koṭākoṭi sāgaropama years and the fourth degree of intensity of the inauspicious karmans to the second degree while increasing the second degree of intensity of the auspicious karmans to the fourth. It, however, cannot bind the āyuḥ-karman being too pure to do so. Nor can the soul effect reduction of the duration of the already bound āyuḥ-karman, because such reduction is an impossibility. This is, as we have said above, called prāyogya labdhi. Then follow the three processes during the next three antarmuhūrtas. And during the fourth antarmuhūrta that follows these three, the soul enjoys absolute subsidence of the vision-deluding karman. This period is called upaśāntādhan, the period of the absolute subsidence of the vision-deluding (mithyātva) karman. For other details see *Kp*: *Upa*, 3-8.

\(^1\) *Cf.* gaṇṭhi ‘tī sudubbeho kakkaṇaṇa-gaṇṭha-gaṇṭha gaṇṭhi vva jivassa kamma-janō gana-raṅga-dosa-paṇiṇāmo.—*ViBh*, 1195.

The soul is confronted with this knot when the remaining duration of each of the eight types of karman except the āyuḥkarman is one sāgaropama koṭākoṭi years minus a fraction of a palyopama number of years. *Cf.*

antima-koṭākoṭile savvakarmanām āvajjāgaṁ paliyāsāṁkhijjaime bhage kihī bhavai gaṇṭhi.

—*ViBh*, 1194; see also *Brhadvaṛtti*. 
soul is successful in the struggle and is now bound to be emancipated sooner or later within a limited time. The struggle consists in the twofold processes known as *apūrvakarana*¹ and *anivṛttikarana* (also known as *anivartikarana*). Let us study, in brief, their nature.

By the *yathāpārvitakarana* the soul is confronted with the concentrated force of the passions, and the other two *karaṇas* enable the soul to overpower and transcend the force. The force of the passions was there from all eternity. But it is only on some occasions that the soul is feelingly conscious of this force. Such consciousness means coming face to face with the knot (*granthi*). This consciousness is the work of the process called *yathāpārvitakarana*. During this process the soul undergoes progressive purification every instant, and binds the karmic matter of appreciably less duration. Furthermore, there is increase in the intensity of the bondage of auspicious *karmans* accompanied with the decrease in the intensity of the bondage of inauspicious *karmans*. And as a result the soul gets an indistinct vision of the goal of its tiresome journey. This, we think, is the implication of the conception of *granthi* and the soul's coming face to face with it. Originally the soul lies in a state of spiritual slumber. Gradually it awakens and becomes self-conscious. Moral and spiritual consciousness dawns only when it is sufficiently conscious of and confronted with the force that has eternally been keeping it ensnared and entrapped. But this consciousness alone is not sufficient to enable the soul to overcome the force. A more powerful manifestation of energy is necessary for the purpose. And the souls that lack in this requisite energy fail to fulfil their mission and withdraw before the force. It is only the souls having the requisite energy who can overcome the force. Such souls manifest the requisite energy by way of the two processes of *apūrvakarana* and *anivṛttikarana* at the end of which the soul develops such spiritual strength as is destined to gradually develop and lead it to the final emancipation. In the process of *apūrvakarana* which, like the *yathāpārvitakarana*, lasts only for less than forty-eight minutes (*antarmuhūrta*), the soul passes through such states as it never experienced before (*apūrva*). The soul had considerably reduced the duration and intensity of the *karmans* in the process of *yathāpārvitaka-* *karaṇa*, and reduces them still further in the *apūrvakarana*. The *karaṇas* are spiritual impulses that push the soul to fulfil its mission and realize the goal. And this is possible only if the soul can reduce the duration and intensity and also the mass of the karmic matter associated with it. What the soul did automatically without any moral or spiritual effort until now, it now does consciously with spiritual exertion. During the process of *apūrvakarana* the soul undergoes such

¹ It is called nivṛttikarana in *PS: Upanīta, 5.*
purification as has colossal effect on the duration and intensity of the bondage of new karmanas as well as the accumulated ones. This is made possible by the following four sub-processes which begin simultaneously from the very first instant of the main process: (1) destruction of duration (sthitīghāta), (2) destruction of intensity (rasaghāta), (3) the construction of a complex series (gunaśreni) of the groups of karmic atoms, arranged in geometrical progression with an incalculable common ratio, transplanted from the mass of karmic matter that would have come to rise after an antarmuhūrta\(^2\) for the sake of their premature exhaustion by fruition, and (4) an unprecedented type of bondage of small duration (apūrva-sthitībandha) whose length is much smaller than that of the duration hitherto bound.\(^3\) The soul undergoes yet another (5) sub-process known as transference of karmic matter (guna- saṁkrama). By this process a portion of the karmic matter of the inauspicious types of karman is transferred to some other types of karman. The mass of karmic matter thus transferred increases every moment until the end of the apūrvakarana process.\(^4\) There are thus five characteristic sub-processes in the process of apūrvakarana. At the end of this process the knot (granthi) is cut never to appear again. The first process of yathāpravṛttakarana leads one face to face with the knot, and the second process of apūrvakarana enables one to cross it, while the third process of anivṛttikarana leads the soul to the verge of the dawn of the first enlightenment that comes like a flash on account of the absolute subsidence of the karmic matter of the vision-deluding (mithyātvamohaniya) karman.\(^5\) The nature of this enlightenment we shall describe later on. The soul undergoes the same five sub-processes, described above, in the process of anivṛttikarana also. But here there occurs a new process called antarakarana whereby the soul divides into two parts the karmic matter of the vision-deluding karman that was to come into rise after the anivṛttikarana. The first of the two parts the soul forces into rise during the last few instants of anivṛttikarana while the rise of the second part is postponed for an antarmuhūrta during which no karmic matter of the vision-deluding karman is allowed to rise and produce its effect on the soul. Thus at the end of the process of anivṛttikarana the vision-deluding karman has no effect on the soul for an antarmuhūrta. This antarmuhūrta is the period when the soul

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\(^1\) See Kp: Upa, 12.

\(^2\) This is equivalent, as already stated, to a period which is less than forty-eight minutes.

\(^3\) For a detailed description see Kg2, pp. 125-6.

\(^4\) Kg2, p. 126.

\(^5\) jā gaṅgāḥ tā paḍhamaṁ gaṅgāḥ samadchao apiṣvam tu anivṛttikaranaṁ puna samattapurakkhahe jive.—ViBh, 1203.

Also Cf. anādikālād ārabhya yāvad grāntihānāṁ tävat prathamaṁ yathāpravṛttakaranaṁ bhavati . . . . . . . tata eva viśuddhatamādhvyavasāya-rūpād anantaraṁ samyaktvābhāt—Bṛhadvytti on the above gāthā.
enjoys the first dawn of enlightenment or the spiritual vision (samyaktva or samyag-darśana). It is necessary in this connection to state in brief the nature of this enlightenment or spiritual vision that now brings about a colossal change in the career of the soul.

As we have stated above, there is absolute subsidence of the vision-deluding karmic matter for one antaraksana at the end of the process of anivrttikarana. The function of the vision-deluding karman is to delude the soul's right attitude towards or predilection for truth. But now as there is no effect of this karman on the soul, the vision of truth dawns upon it. This is enlightenment. The soul realizes its own nature during the vision, and it does no more fall into the darkness that it was in until now. Of course, the vision does not last long. But it leaves such indelible impress on the soul as does ever keep it above the previous depth of darkness. The soul may again fall in the darkness. But the darkness is never so deep as before, and that even the soul is sure to get rid of in due course. It is said that on the attainment of the vision the soul attains an insight which it had never attained before. Even as a person born blind can see the world as it is on the sudden acquisition of the eyesight so can a soul having experienced the vision can see the truth as it is. Even as a person suffering from long-drawn disease experiences extreme delight on the sudden disappearance of the disease so does a soul eternally bound to the wheel of worldly existence feel spiritual joy and bliss on the sudden dawn of the enlightenment.\(^1\) This enlightenment is called aupāśamiṣa samyaktva because it is due to the upāśama (subsidence) of the karman that deludes the samyaktva (right vision). The vision-deluding karman, as we have seen in the third chapter, is nothing but what is known as avidyā in the other systems. We can therefore say that the enlightenment dawns on the subsidence of avidyā. And this is a very simple truth. The enlightenment is only temporary and the soul attains such enlightenment on more than one occasion during its spiritual career leading to the final eternal enlightenment. Let us come back to the main problem and see what happens after the enlightenment.

We have stated that the vision-deluding karmic matter is divided into two parts by the process of antaraksana. The first part has already come into rise in the last part of the anivrttikarana. The second part, the rise whereof was postponed for the duration of enlightenment, is now to come into rise. The content of this part is placed into three heaps according to the difference of intensity during

\(^1\) Cf. jātayandhasya yathā punaḥ caśuśralābhe sūbhodaye saddarsanām tathā ʿvā ʿsyā samyaktve sati jāyate. ānando jāyate ʿtyantam tāṭtviko ʿsyā mahātmānaḥ sadvyādhypagame yad vā vyādhitasya sadauṣadāhāt.

—Quoted in Malayagiri's Tīkā on Kp: Upa, 18.
the last instant of the anivṛtti-karaṇa, that is, the instant just preceding the enlightenment. Of these three heaps, one is pure (that is, does not obscure samyaktva 'right vision' by its rise), the second is semi-pure (that is, obscures the right-vision only partially), and the third is impure (that is, obscures the right vision completely).\(^1\) Then from the very first instant of the period of enlightenment the soul begins, by the process called guṇa-saṁkrāma, transforming the content of the impure heap into pure as well as semi-pure matter and depositing them into the corresponding heaps. The quantity of matter thus transformed increases every moment, the quantity transformed into semi-pure matter being always greater than the quantity transformed into pure matter.\(^2\) Now in this way at the end of the period of enlightenment the soul is confronted with three qualitatively different heaps of vision-deluding karman which was originally homogeneous before the enlightenment. Anyone of these three can come into rise after the period of enlightenment. If it is the pure heap that comes into rise on account of the persistent purity of the soul, then the soul attains purity of character also and attains to a higher stage of spiritual development. But if it is the semi-pure heap that comes into rise then the soul feels rebuff and gradually falls back to the lowest stage. And if it is the impure heap that comes into rise the soul at once finds itself in the lowest stage.

We have now seen how the soul attains the first spiritual vision on account of the subsidence of the karmic matter responsible for the basic defect called perversity of attitude (mithyātva). This spiritual vision, however, is only temporary and disappears within a very short time. The soul now attempts in a number of ways to recapture the vision, and make it a permanent possession. The processes that the soul has to undergo for the purpose are quite analogous to the processes already described with slight variation in their details which are not very important. Moreover, the processes follow quite easily from an analysis of the conditions of bondage. There are five conditions of bondage viz. perversity of attitude (mithyātva), non-abstinence (avirati), spiritual inertia (pramādā), passions (kaśāya), and the threefold activities (yoga) of the body, the sense-organ of speech, and the mind.\(^3\) The passions are four viz. anger, pride, deceit, and greed each of which again can be of four types viz. 'lifelong' (anantānubandhin), that which obscures the energy for even partial abstinence (pratyākhyānāvaraṇa), that which obscures only the energy for complete abstinence (pratyākhyānāvaraṇa), and that which is very fickle and meagre and is effective only occasionally (saṁjñivalana). We have stated these types in the last chapter also. We shall refer to these four types respectively

\(^{1}\) Kp: Upa, 19 with Tīkā. \\
\(^{2}\) Ibid., 20 with Tīkā. \\
\(^{3}\) mithyādarśanā-‘virati-pramāda-kaśāya-yogā bandhahetavah—TSū, VIII. 1.
as the first, the second, the third, and the fourth type in the following enquiry as we did in the last chapter too. For the final consummation the soul has to remove all these five conditions. The soul has weakened the hold of the perversity of attitude but has not practised abstinence from evil and immoral deeds. This it has to do by increasing its purity and augmenting its energy for right willing and right conduct. Then the soul has to secure immunity from the spiritual inertia (pramāda). But all this is only preliminary activity. The most important activity for spiritual progress, however, is the subduing of the passions. And this is possible only by the repetition of the threefold processes of yathā-pravṛtthakarana, apūrvakarana, and anivṛttikarana. There are now two ways open for the soul. It may climb up the spiritual ladder by suppressing the passions or it may climb it up by totally annihilating them. The former mode of spiritual progress is known as upaśamaśrenī (ladder of subsidence) and the latter as kṣapakaśrenī (ladder of annihilation). The fifth condition of bondage viz. the threefold activities lasts up to the final stage of spiritual ascent, and its absolute elimination is immediately followed by the disembodied emancipation of the soul. It will be helpful for the understanding of the stages of spiritual development (guṇasthāna) if we give a brief description of the twofold ladders at this stage of our enquiry.

While climbing up the ladder of subsidence, the soul suppresses, by undergoing the three processes of yathā-pravṛtthakarana etc., the four ‘lifelong’ passions at the outset and then the three vision-deluding karmanas. The soul then attains such purification as enables it to rise up from spiritual inertia. But the progress is not steady. The soul repeatedly gets up to the stage of spiritual vigour and falls back to the stage of spiritual inertia. It fluctuates between the state of spiritual vigour and the state of spiritual inertia a hundred times before it reaches the state of steady progress through the repetition of the three processes and begins the gradual suppression of the following sub-types of the conduct-deluding (cāritramohaniya) karman: the nine quasi-passions1; the second, the third, and the fourth types of anger; the same three types of pride; the same three types of deceit; and the second and third types of greed. Then the soul suppresses the fourth type of greed and attains a state where all the twenty-eight sub-types of the deluding karman are completely suppressed.2 The soul’s minimum stay at this stage of absolute suppression of the deluding karman is for one instant and the maximum for an antarātmukhā. After this stay the soul invariably falls down to the lower stages on the rise of the suppressed passions. The stronger the rise of the passions, the lower is the fall. A soul can climb up this ladder of subsidence only twice in the same life. But the soul which has climbed up the

1 Vide supra, p. 234.
2 See Kṛt, p. 73.
ladder twice cannot climb up the ladder of annihilation in that life and so cannot attain emancipation in the same life. The soul which has climbed up the ladder of subsidence only once has the chance of climbing up the ladder of annihilation and thus attaining final emancipation in that very life.

The ladder of annihilation also is climbed up in almost the same way. Only the souls encased in a strong body can climb up this ladder. By the three processes the soul annihilates at the outset the four ‘lifelong’ passions. Then the three sub-types of the vision-deluding karman are annihilated. If the individual dies at this stage after the annihilation of the above seven sub-types of karman, it has to experience three or four more births before it attains emancipation. ¹ Otherwise, the soul proceeds further for the gradual annihilation, by means of the threefold processes, of the second and third types of passions, the nine quasi-passions, and the fourth type of anger, pride and deceit. Then last of all the soul annihilates the fourth type of greed and attains a state where all the sub-types of the deluding karman have been annihilated.² This is the summit of the ladder of annihilation. The soul is now free from passions and immediately attains omniscience and reaches a stage which is known as the state of embodied freedom (jīvanmukti).

With this background in mind, let us study the conception of the stages of spiritual development (guṇasthāna).³ The soul passes through an infinite number of states while reaching from the lowest to the highest stage of spiritual development. These states have been classified into fourteen stages of spiritual development called guṇasthānas. The lowest stage is the state of perversity of attitude towards truth (mithyādṛṣṭi-guṇasthāna). The soul has the minimum possible degree of right vision at this stage. It has only a very indistinct enlightenment, the minimum that the soul can have, and we have stated on more than one occasion why the soul cannot be absolutely bereft of the enlightenment. Even those souls which have cut the knot (granthi) and experienced the spiritual vision on account of the absolute suppression and subsidence (upāśama) of the vision-deluding karman can fall down to this stage on the rise of the relevant karman. But such souls do not sink down to the depth where the souls which have not cut the knot exist. Next we come to the second stage called sāsvādana-samyagdṛṣṭi. The soul does not pass on to the second stage from the first, but only halts at it while falling down from some higher stage of spiritual development. Thus if at the end

¹ Cf. athocyeta—kṣiṣṇasaptako gatyantaram saṅkramaṇa katitame bhave mokṣam upayāti? ucyate—tṛṣṭye caturthe vā bhave—Malayagiri’s Tīkā on Kṛ: Upa, 32.
² See Kgī. p. 74.
³ This study is based on Kgī, pp. 67-77.
of the period of the dawn of the first enlightenment there is the rise of the 'lifelong' passions, the soul falls down from that enlightenment to this stage of śāsvādana-samyagdrṣṭi. Sometimes the soul climbing up the ladder of subsidence also falls down to this stage. And the souls falling down to this stage necessarily fall back to the first stage. Then we come to the third stage of right-cum-wrong attitude (samyagmīthya-dṛṣṭi). If after the end of the period of the dawn of the first enlightenment there is the rise of the semi-pure heap of the vision-deluding kārman, the soul sinks down to this stage for an antarmuhūrta, and afterwards either falls back to the first stage or rises up to a higher stage of right vision. The fourth stage of spiritual development is called right vision without abstinence (avirata-samyagdrṣṭi). The soul has acquired right vision, but is lacking in spiritual strength, and so, in spite of the knowledge and the will it cannot abstain from the wrong path. It has steady vision, but is lacking in the capacity for spiritual self-control in conformity with the vision. The right vision at this stage may be the vision due to the absolute subsidence of the vision-deluding kārman (aupāsamika) or it may be the vision due to the subsidence-cum-dissociation of the relevant kārman (kṣayopaśamika) which occurs on the rise of the pure heap of the vision-deluding kārman, or it may be the vision due to the annihilation of the four 'lifelong' passions and the three sub-types of the vision-deluding kārman (kṣāyika-samyagdrṣṭi). For spiritual development the soul must develop the strength of all these three—vision, knowledge, and self-control. At this stage the soul lacks in self-control. It has the requisite vision and knowledge and wisdom. It has the right will. But the energy for self-control is wanting. The soul can rise to the next stages only if it can fulfil this want.

Next we come to the fifth stage of right vision with capacity for partial abstinence (deśavirata-samyagdrṣṭi). At this stage the soul is not capable of complete abstinence from immoral deeds on account of the rise of the third type of passions which obscure the capacity for total abstinence. There is only a partial expression of the energy for self-control at this stage. The soul overcomes this weakness in the next stage. But even there the energy of the soul is not fully expressed. The spiritual inertia (pramāda) is still there. This is the stage of self-control with spiritual inertia (pramatta-saṁyata). The spiritual inertia is overcome in the next, the seventh, stage of self-control with freedom from spiritual inertia (apramatta-saṁyata).

Next we come to the eighth stage called apūrvaśarana (or niyulṭi). Here the soul attains special purification and is capable of reducing the duration and intensity of the previously bound kārmans and binds

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1 The Prākrit equivalent is niyatī.—See Kgr, p. 67 (gāthā 2).
new karmans of reduced duration and intensity. At this stage the soul does the processes of sthitīghāta (destruction of duration), rasaghāta (destruction of intensity), guṇaśreṇī (arrangement of series), guṇasam-
krama (transformation of karmic matter), and āpūrvavasthitibandhā (bondage of an unprecedented kind of duration)—already described—more vigorously and increases its purity more rapidly. The stage is so called because the soul performs these processes with a vigour and rapidity unprecedented (āpūrva) in its history. The soul’s maximum stay at this stage is for one antarmuhūrtā. The soul performs the process of āpūrvakarana, while climbing up either of the two ladders, at this stage. The soul climbing up the ladder of subsidence remains in the minimum one instant and in the maximum an antarmuhūrtā at this stage, while the soul climbing up the other ladder remains there, as a rule, for an antarmuhūrtā. The next, the ninth, stage of development is anivrtti-bādara-samparāya. The soul performs the process of anivrttikarana at this stage while climbing up either of the ladders. There is still the possibility of the attack of even the gross passions (bādara-samparāya) and hence the name of the stage. The tenth stage is called sūkṣma-samparāya because in it only the subtle (sūkṣma) greed of the fourth type can disturb the soul now and then. At this stage the soul is free from the influence of all the passions except very subtle greed. This subtle greed can be interpreted as the subconscious attachment to the body even in the souls which have achieved great spiritual advancement. The soul which has advanced by only suppressing the sub-types of the deluding karanam, that is, the soul which has climbed up the ladder of subsidence goes up to the eleventh stage of suppressed passions (upāśāntakaśāya). The subtle greed that was active in the previous stage is also suppressed in this stage and the soul is free from the rise of all types of passions. The soul even at this stage has not freed itself from the enveloping influence (chādman) of the karmans other than the deluding karanam and hence is ‘enveloped’ (chādamasthā). It has suppressed attachment and hence is known as free from attachment (vitarāga) at this stage. The full designation of this stage therefore is upāśāntakaśāya-vitarāga-
chādamasthā. The soul stays at this stage for one instant in the minimum and for an antarmuhūrtā in the maximum, after which it invariably falls down to some lower stage on the rise of the suppressed passions. The soul which, however, has advanced by gradually annihilating the sub-types of the deluding karanam, that is, the soul which has climbed up the ladder of annihilation goes up from the tenth to the twelfth stage of annihilated passions (kṣīnakaśāya). The other characteristics of the twelfth stage are identical with those of the eleventh stage. This stage is the summit of the ladder of annihilation as the former is the summit of the ladder of subsidence. The soul
remains for one antarmuhūrta in this stage. In the last instant of this stage all the sub-types of the knowledge-covering, intuition-covering and the obstructive (antarāya) karman are annihilated, and the soul is now absolutely free from all the four types of obsuring (ghātin) karman. The soul now is in the thirteenth stage of spiritual development. This stage is the equivalent of what is known as the jīvanmukta stage in other Indian systems. The Jaina name for this stage is sayoga-kevali-guṇasthāna. Of the five conditions of bondage viz. perversity, non-abstinence, spiritual inertia, passions, and activity, the first four are now totally annihilated. The last one however still remains, and hence it is sayoga (with activity). The soul is now omniscient (kevalin). It has now attained full and perfect intuition. There is now perfect expression of spiritual energy. There is however still the rise and existence of the four non-obsuring types of karman viz. feeling-producing (vedaniya), longevity-determining (āyus), body-building (nāman), and the status-determining (gotra). The soul is not freed from the embodied existence until it reaches the end of the life term already determined by the āyuḥkarman. There is also the threefold activity of the body, the sense-organ of speech and the mind. But there is no new bondage leading to worldly life. A soul remains in this stage for one antarmuhūrta in the minimum and for somewhat less than a pūrvakoṭi in the maximum. Before entering into the last and the final, the fourteenth, stage of absolute motionlessness which lasts only for a very short time and is immediately followed by final emancipation, the soul prepares for the stoppage of all activity, gross and subtle. The stoppage of an activity requires another activity as the instrument. And so the soul first stops the gross activities of the sense-organ of speech and the mind by the gross activity of the body. Then it stops the gross activity of the body as well as the subtle activities of the sense-organ of speech and the mind by the subtle activity of the body. The soul then enters the third stage of śukla-dhyāna which is ‘accompanied with subtle vibration’ (sūkṣmakriya) and steady (anivartin), and stops the subtle bodily activity by means of the activity itself for there is none other than itself. Due to the above dhyāna the soul contracts and fills the cavities created in embodied state. It is now reduced. Then it enters the fourth stage of the śukla-dhyāna which is bereft of all vibration (samucchinnakriya) and infallible (apratīpātin). It is now as motionless as a mountain rock (śailēsa). Here all the remaining karmans are annihilated. This state of absolute motionlessness is the fourteenth stage of ayoga-kevalin. The state lasts only for the period of time required to pronounce five short syllables at the ordinary speed. At the end of this period the soul attains unembodied emancipation.

1 Vide infra, p. 292.
It is to be noticed in this connection that the length of the āyuḥkarman of a soul attaining emancipation cannot be reduced or increased. And in case the length of any of the other three karmans is greater than that of the āyuḥkarman, the soul reduces the former length in order to make it equal to the latter. This equalization is possible by a certain process called samudghāta. It is a rule that the omniscient must enjoy in full the fruits of the four karmans viz. vedaniya, nāman, gotra and āyus. It is again usual that the length of the vedaniya karman of an omniscient is greater than the length of his āyuḥkarman.\(^1\) The lengths of the said three karmans are to be equalized by the process of samudghāta. This process lasts only for eight instants, and is an indispensable means of the premature fruition and the consequent exhaustion of the karmans of longer durations.\(^2\) The karmic matter is forced to fructify earlier than the scheduled time by this process. There is a number of types of samudghāta. We are, however, concerned with the process of the samudghāta of a kevalin (omniscient). The soul in the thirteenth stage performs this process just an antarmuhūta before its final emancipation. In the first instant of the process the soul stretches itself vertically both ways and touches the zenith as well as the nadir of the inhabited universe (loka), the thickness of this vertical column being the same as that of the body. In the second instant the soul expands itself in the forward and the backward directions up to the end of the loka. In the third instant the soul expands sidewise both ways up to the end of the same. The soul now has divided the loka into four parts. In the fourth instant the soul expands in the remaining gaps and thus fills up the whole loka. Then in the next four instants the soul retraces the steps and returns to its original condition in the eighth instant. Now the soul has equalized the length of the other karmans with that of the āyuḥkarman.\(^3\) It now prepares for the fourteenth stage of absolute motionlessness in the way described above.

\(^1\) See Kg1, p. 159.

\(^2\) Cf. samudghātagato jīvaḥ prasahya karmacudgalān kālantarānubhāvāhāb api kṣapayati drutam.

—Lokaprabhāsa, Dravya, III. 13.

\(^3\) Even as a wet cloth dries up sooner when it is fully stretched out, so is the intensity (rasa) and consequently the duration (sthitī) dried up by the utmost expansion of the soul in the process of samudghāta. Cf.

ārdṛāṃbara-"śuṣoṣavad ātma-visāraṇa-visuṣṭka-samakarmā.

—Ṭīkā on TSūBh, IX. 41 (p. 276).
THE DOCTRINE OF DHYĀNA

Jainism, like the other systems of Indian thought, attaches supreme importance to dhyāna (concentration of mind) as a means to spiritual realization. Along with its purification, the soul develops the capacity for self-concentration.¹ Before coming to the topic of dhyāna proper it is necessary to understand the fundamental motive that inspired the whole Jaina outlook towards dhyāna. The Jainas, like others in the field, put stress on self-realization. The materialist view of the self as identical with the body is the first thing that one is to get rid of in order to tread the path of spiritual realization. For this purpose one is required to turn inward and concentrate upon the self as distinct and separate from the body. When one is fully convinced of the distinction between self and not-self, one is required to rise still higher and concentrate upon and realize the transcendental self which is free from all the limitations of the empirical self. Ācārya Kundakunda and, following him, Pūjyapāda and Yogindudeva have very thoroughly discussed this method of self-realization in their respective works viz. Mokṣaprabhūta, Samādhitantra and Paramātmaprakāśa. They distinguish three states of the self viz. the exterior self (bahirātman), the interior self (antarātman), and the transcendental self (paramātman). The self with the deluded belief that it is none other than the body is the exterior self. The self that clearly discriminates itself from the body and the sense-organs is the interior self. The pure and perfect self free from all limitations is the transcendental self. The exterior self becomes the transcendental self by means of the interior self. Or, in other words, the transcendental self is the self-realization of the exterior self through the intermediary stage of the interior self. The self or the soul is intrinsically pure and perfect. Its limitations are due to its association with karmic matter. Considered from the point of view of gunāsthāna, the soul before it cuts the knot (granthi) and experiences the first dawn of the spiritual vision is the exterior self,

¹ We leave out of account the habit of the self to concentrate upon a particular object or a theme out of attachment or hatred, love or fear, anger or greed. The Jainas classify such concentration into two types viz. (1) ārta-dhyāna (mournful concentration) of mind which occurs when one experiences or apprehends the loss of one's beloved object, or when one is suffering from anguish, or when one contemplates upon one's unsatisfied desires; (2) raudra-dhyāna (cruel concentration) which occurs when one contemplates to attack one's enemy, to do an act of injustice, to misappropriate someone's property or to protect one's own. These dhyānas are the features of 'animal' life and therefore are left out of account. For further information one may refer to Sthān, IV. 1. 247; TSā, IX. 31-36 with Bhāṣya and Īṭkā; Jinaradha's Dhyānasāvataka, 6-27.

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and the soul after the vision and before the attainment of omniscience is the interior self. On the attainment of omniscience the self becomes the transcendental self. One is to eradicate the interior as much as the exterior self in order to realize the transcendental self. This process of eradication is yoga. Self-concentration leads to self-realization. But such concentration is too abstract and as such too difficult to achieve for the beginner. And so a number of yogic practices is prescribed for the purpose. These practices are more of the nature of contemplation than of the nature of concentration. One is required to ever remain conscious of the nature of the world and its sufferings. And for this purpose one must initiate oneself into a certain system of thought. One must start with firm belief in the rightness of the system and should earnestly try to realize the truth advocated by it. The practices prescribed fall into two categories called dharma-dhyāna and śukla-dhyāna. They lead to final emancipation. Let us see the nature of these dhyānas as found in the Jaina literature—the Āgamas as well as the later works.

The Jainas define dhyāna as ‘the concentration of the thought on a particular object’. Our thought and its instrument, the mind, are ever restless. The regulation and concentration of these on a particular object is dhyāna. The mind is capable of the threefold functions of concentration (bhāvanā), contemplation (anupreksā) and thought (cintā). Dhyāna consists in the concentration of the mind on a particular object for a certain length of time which in no case can be greater than a muhūrta or forty-eight minutes. The mind does not become motionless in concentration. But it is regulated and canalized. It thinks in a particular way on a particular object. Dhyāna is con-

1 Cf. evam tyaktvā bairivācaṁ tyajed antar ašeṣataḥ esa yogah samāsena pradīpaḥ paramātmanaḥ.—Samādhitantra, 17.
2 . . . ekāgra-cintā-nirūdho dhyānam—TSā, IX. 27.
3 Cf. jaṁ thiram ajjhavasaśaṁ taṁ jhāṣaṁ jaṁ calaṁ tayaṁ cittaṁ taṁ hojja bhāvaṁ vā aṇupehā vā ahava cintā. antomuhutamettāṁ cittāvatthāṇaṁ egavatthūnmi chaumaththāṇaṁ jhāṣaṁ joganirhoṁ jināpaṁ tu.—Dhyānaśataka, 2-3.

The Jainas believe that the mind cannot remain concentrated on a particular object for more than a muhūrta (forty-eight minutes). Of course, it can re-concentrate upon the same object after the period. This is true in the case of the imperfect beings (chadmaśtha). But in the case of those who have achieved omniscience, the problem of concentration of mind does not arise at all. The omniscient need not apply his mind and think. It is therefore held that in the case of the omniscient, the function of dhyāna is to stop his physical activity, both gross and subtle, during the last few moments of his worldly existence which are immediately followed by final emancipation. Total stoppage of activity leads to the total stoppage of the inflow of new karmic matter and the soul, on the total dissociation, during the few moments, of all karmic matter bound in the past attains final emancipation.
centration of thought, and not of perception. Now, as one can canalize one’s thought for an evil as well as a good purpose, the dhyāna is broadly classified into two categories viz. inauspicious or evil (apraśasta) and auspicious or good (praśasta). What leads to the inflow and bondage of bad karmic matter is inauspicious concentration, and what leads to the dissociation or destruction of karmic matter is auspicious concentration. We shall leave out of account the first category of dhyāna in view of its lack of bearing on our topic. The second category of dhyāna is divided into two types viz. dharma-dhyāna and śukla-dhyāna. Each of these types are again considered in a number of ways. Let us begin with the dharma-dhyāna which is the primary condition of spiritual development.

(a) Dharma-dhyāna

The Sthānāṅgasūtra expounds dharma-dhyāna in these fourfold aspects viz. (1) its objects, (2) the signs (lakṣaṇa) of a soul possessed of this dhyāna, (3) its conditions (ālaṃbana), and (4) its afterthoughts. The immaculate and infallible nature of the revelation (ājñā), the fact of universal suffering (apāya) and its conditions, the nature of the fruition (vipāka) of various karmans, and the structure (samsīthāna) of the universe are the four objects of the dharma-dhyāna. The concentration of thought on account of the meditation (vicaya) on these objects is called dharma-dhyāna. The characteristic sign of a soul capable of this type of concentration is its natural love for and faith in the path it has selected to tread upon and the system of thought which it has been initiated in. Exposition (vācanā), critical enquiry (pratipracchanā), repeated study (parivartanā), and reflection (anuprebhā) are the conditions that lead to such concentration of mind. The mind muses upon the following subjects when it retires to the normal state after the concentration: the loneliness of the self in its wanderings, the fleeting nature of the worldly things, the absence of spiritual well-being in the world of mortality, and the nature of the world as an

1 See SSī on TSū, IX. 28. Śubhacandra distinguishes three categories of dhyāna: (1) praśasta, (2) asat, and (3) śuddha.—Jñānārṇava, pp. 65-7 (verses 29-31).
2 Vide supra, footnote 1, p. 281.
3 The Prākrit term is dhāmma. Some commentators have rendered it as dharmya.
4 SthSū, IV. 1. 247.
5 The SthSū mentions these four characteristic signs: (1) predilection for the revelation (ājñāruci), (2) natural predilection for truth (nīsarga-ruci), (3) predilection for the scriptures (sūtaruci) and (4) predilection for the deep study of the scriptures (avagāḍha-ruci).—SthSū, IV. 1. 247.
endless motion (saṁsāra). Jinabhadra expounds this dhyāna from a few other standpoints as well.\footnote{Dhyānasātaka, 28-29.} Thus, for instance, he states the four prerequisite practices—(1) the regular study (jñāna) for the achievement of steadiness and purification of the mind, (2) the purification of the attitude (darśana) for the sake of removing the delusion (moha), (3) the right conduct (cāritra) for the purpose of stopping the inflow of new karmic matter and the destruction of the accumulated one, and (4) non-attachment (vairāgya) for acquiring steadfastness—for qualifying oneself for dharma-dhyāna.\footnote{Ibid., 30-34.} For the beginner it is necessary that he should select a lonely place for his concentration. For those who have achieved control over themselves by the practice of the above four factors, there is no necessity of selection of place.\footnote{Ibid., 35-36.} As regards the proper time one may select any according to convenience.\footnote{Ibid., 36.} One may select any posture (āsana) according to one’s convenience.\footnote{Ibid., 39.} One can attain the highest state of concentration in any place at any time and in any posture. From the viewpoint of the stage of spiritual development (guṇasthāna), the dharma-dhyāna is possible only in the seventh stage where there is absolute absence of spiritual inertia (pramāda) and the full expression of self-control, or in the still higher stages up to the twelfth.\footnote{Ibid., 63; TSā, IX. 37-8.}

Umāsvāti defines dharma-dhyāna as the collection of scattered thought (smṛti-samanyavāhāra,\footnote{Pūjyapāda interprets it as (well regulated) thought stream (cintāprahandha).} literally collection of the memory) for the sake of meditation upon the revelation, suffering, karmic fruition, and the structure of the universe.\footnote{SSi, TSā, IX. 30.} Akalaṅka, following Pūjyapāda, holds quite a different view from the one given above regarding the stages of spiritual development wherein the dharma-dhyāna is possible.\footnote{TSā, IX. 37.} According to him this dhyāna is possible from the fourth up to the seventh stage. The ground given is that when the soul has attained right vision (samyaktva) in the fourth stage there is no reason why it should not be capable of this dhyāna. This dhyāna is not possible in the eighth and the higher stages because it is held that it is not possible in either of the two ladders (śreṇis). It is not possible to give any independent judgment on this controversy in view of the peculiar character of the problem which can be solved only by reference to scriptural texts. But as the texts of the one party are not acceptable to the other, it is not possible to solve the problem

\footnote{Pūjyapāda interprets it as (well regulated) thought stream (cintāprahandha).}
DOCTRINE OF DHYĀNA: DHARMADHYĀNA

without doubt. Next we come to Siddhasenagapin the commentator of Umāsvāti’s Bhāṣya on the Tattvārthasūtra. Siddhasenagapin seems to have summarized the contents of the Dhyānasūtra already referred to.¹ He further quotes a number of verses which excellently reveal the function of the dharma-dhyāna in leading the soul to higher spiritual stages. When an individual strives to rise higher than the seventh stage, he collects his thought and concentrates it on the self and withdraws his senses and the mind from the worldly things. He aims at final emancipation, and begins to practise the dharma-dhyāna in order to destroy the deluding karmans. He has the requisite mental strength on account of his robust physical structure. He meditates upon the four objects and rises up.² Next we come to the Jñānānāvav of Subhasandra and the Yogaśāstra of Hemacandra.

Subhasandra prescribes the practice of fourfold virtues of maitri (friendship with all creatures), pramoda (appreciation of the merits of others), karunā (compassion and sympathy), and mādhyasthīya (indifference for the unruly) as the prerequisite condition of dharma-dhyāna.³ The slumber of delusion disappears and the quiescence of ecstasy (yoga) sets in, and finally the truth reveals itself, when one has perfectly practised these virtues.⁴ As regards the selection of a proper place, it is held that one should be very careful about it, and avoid the bad places.⁵ Concentration of mind should be practised in the holy places that have been purified by great saints. Or one may select a beautiful place that is peaceful and soothing.⁶ A number of postures (āsana) is also prescribed. One should select such posture as is the most suitable one for one’s concentration. The most important condition of success in concentration however is the robust structure of the body, and the requisite purification of the soul. One can attain the highest state of concentration in any posture provided

¹ See Tīkā on TSūBh, IX. 38 (pp. 271-2).
² tasmād athā ’pramatta-sthānāt sa viśodhim uttamaṁ prāpya
       jāeyam akhilam vividiśam adhitīṣṭhāmāṁ ca mokṣavidhīm akhilam
       sandhāya śrūtām ātmāni kiṃcid upāvartya dṛṣṭiṁ svām.
       viśayebhya indriyāṇi pratyavahṛtya ca manas tathā tebhyaḥ
dhārayati mānaḥ svātmāni yogaṁ prāṇidhāya mokṣāya.
dhārayatī mantraḥ sa dharmyaṁ bhikṣur vicinoti moha-nāśāya
       uttama-samaḥana-balaḥ kṣapaka-śreṇīṃ upayiyāsan.—Ibid., pp. 272-3.
³ Jñānānāva, XXVII, 4-15.
⁴ yoganīdrā sthitīṁ dhatte mohanīdrā ’pasarpāti
       āśu samyak prāṇitāsu syān munēs tattva-nīscayaḥ.—Ibid., XXVII. 18.
⁵ Ibid., XXVII. 22-34.
⁶ Ibid., XXVIII. 1-11.
one has the requisite strength, physical, moral, and spiritual.\(^1\) There is no special time prescribed for concentration. One can practise it at any time provided one’s mind is cool and collected. According to Subhacandra, only one who is in the seventh stage of spiritual development is properly qualified for such concentration. One in the sixth stage is only secondarily qualified for it.\(^2\) The person fully qualified for such concentration must be free from spiritual inertia (apramatta),\(^3\) should possess well-proportioned body (susānisthāna), and must have strong physical structure (vajrakāya). He must have full control over the senses and steadfastness. He should be well-versed in the scriptures, self-controlled, and perfectly patient.\(^4\) Subhacandra says that the scriptures recognize the capability for this dharmā-dhyāna even in those who are deficient in scriptural knowledge and belong to the lower stages.\(^5\) He also mentions the view that all the stages beginning from the fourth up to the seventh are suitable for this dhyāna.\(^6\) Subhacandra seems to compromise this difference of views by accepting gradation among the persons qualified for such dhyāna. We have noticed above the two mutually opposed views regarding the persons qualified for the dharmā-dhyāna. Subhacandra also is conscious of this opposition and attempts at a happy compromise which is very much appealing. As regards the yogic postures, Subhacandra says that the conquest of posture (āsanajaya) helps the practitioner in keeping steadfast even in the face of adventitious obstacles.\(^7\) He draws a very beautiful picture of a yogin engrossed in self-concentration.\(^8\) The yogin in self-concentration dives deep into the ocean of sympathy and love for all creatures and is absolutely free from attachment to the world. He keeps his body straight and erect and becomes as motionless as a painted figure. His mind is purified by the waves of the ocean of enlightenment. Subhacandra admits the necessity of the various processes of breath-control (prānāyāma) as well for the development of the power of concentra-

\(^1\) Cf. vajrakāya mahāsattvā niśkampāḥ susṭhirāsanāḥ sarvāvasthāv alāṁ dhyātvā gatāḥ prāg yogināḥ śivam.
—Ibid., XXVIII. 13.

\(^2\) Cf. mukhyopacārabhedena dvau munī svāminau matau apramatta-pramattākhya bhāshayai 'tau yathāyathāham.
—Ibid., XXVIII. 25.

\(^3\) This is possible only in the seventh stage of spiritual development.

\(^4\) Cf. apramattaḥ susānāsthāno vajrakāyo vaśī sthirāḥ pūrvavaiḥ saṅvīto dhīro dhyātā sahaṃprāṇā-lakṣaṇāḥ.—Ibid., XXVIII. 26.

\(^5\) Ibid., verse 27.

\(^6\) Ibid., verse 28.

\(^7\) krītāsaṇa-jayo yogī khedito 'pi na khidyate.—Ibid., XXVIII. 32.

\(^8\) Ibid., XXVIII. 34-40.
tion. He also prescribes the withdrawal (pratyāhāra) of the mind along with the sense-organs from the external objects, and its concentration (dīrgha) on some place of the body, for instance, the forehead (lalāta). Such process is held to be more useful than the regulation of breath which sometimes leads to unnecessary pain and uneasiness. Moreover the processes of breath-control lead to the acquisition of various supernormal powers which are detrimental to the spiritual well-being. The most important factor that inspires one for self-concentration and self-realization is the consciousness that the difference between the empirical self and the transcendental self is only one of non-manifestation and manifestation, both being intrinsically possessed of the same attributes which are unmanifest or less manifest in the empirical self, and fully manifest in the transcendental spirit. One must be conscious of one’s latent powers before one can develop them. And when one has been sufficiently conscious of them one must be determined to realize them and exert to the utmost of one’s capacity. When one becomes conscious of the eternal nescience that has stifled one’s soul one must exert to overcome it and attain enlightenment, now and here. Only those who have such determination can practise the dharma-dhyāna. Matter and spirit with the threefold nature consisting in continuity, origination and disappearance as well as the pure and perfect emancipated spirit, both embodied and disembodied, are held to be objects of this dhyāna. The consummation is reached when the formless self, pure and perfect, is concentrated upon. The yogī loses his identity and becomes one with the pure self when such concentration is achieved. This is the state of equality (samarasībhāva) and unification (ekikaraṇa) where the self merges into the transcendental self and becomes non-different from it. Subhacandra distinguishes three states of the soul viz. the exterior self, the interior self, and the transcendental self in the same way as we have already noticed. One should run away from the exterior self and concentrate upon the

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1 Ibid., XXIX (whole).
2 Subhacandra has enumerated ten such places.—Ibid., XXX. 13.
3 Cf. vāyōḥ sañca-cāturyam āpiṁādya-āgasādhanam prāyaḥ pratyāhābijaṁ syān muner muktim abhīpsataḥ. —Ibid., XXX. 6.
4 Cf. mama śaktyā guñagrāmo vyaktya ca paramesṭhinaḥ etāvān āvayor bhedaḥ śakti-vyakti-svabhāvataḥ. —Ibid., XXXI. 10.
5 Cf. mayā 'dyai 'va vinīśceyaṁ svasvarūpaṁ hi vastutaḥ chitvā 'py anādi-sambhūtam avidyā-vaivairī-vāgurām.—Ibid., XXXI. 15.
6 Cf. so 'yaṁ samarasībhāvas tadeśkarajaṁ smṛtam aprthaktvamena yatrā 'tmā liyate paramātmāna.—Ibid., XXXI, 38.
transcendental self by means of the interior self.¹ One can achieve the concentration on the transcendental self by the constant practice in the awareness of the truth of one’s identity with it.² Such practices are, according to Subhacandra, common to both the dharma and the śukla-dhyāna, there being difference only in the measure of their perfection.³ The concentration of thought on the revelation (ājñā), suffering (apāya), karmic fruition (vipāka), and the structure (sāṃsthāna) of the universe is also accepted as dharma-dhyāna.⁴

Subhacandra records furthermore the four types of dhyāna viz. piṇḍastha, padastha, rūpastha and rūpātita,⁵ which it has not been possible for me to trace anywhere in the Jaina works earlier than the Jñānarṇava. Of course, we find these types elaborately treated in the Yogaśāstra of Hemacandra. But scholars think that the Yogaśāstra has borrowed these ideas from the Jñānarṇava which is held to be decidedly an earlier work. In the piṇḍastha, one is required to concentrate upon five imaginary objects in the following way. (1) One should imagine a vast ocean as big as the world inhabited by animal life (ṭiryagloka) with a thousand-petalled golden lotus as big as the Jambūdvipa. He should then imagine himself comfortably seated on a white throne situated on the lotus. Then he should imagine himself as getting ready to destroy all the karmans. This is called pārthivī dhāraṇā.⁶ (2) Then follows the āgneyī dhāraṇā wherein he is required to imagine fire rising up from the mantric syllables in a lotus situated in the navel and burning the eight-petalled lotus situated in the heart, representing the eight karmans. Then he should imagine fire situated outside and burning the external body as well as the lotus situated in the navel. When all these are burnt to ashes the fire is automatically extinguished. (3) After this has taken place one is to imagine a devastating whirlwind which carries away all the ashes left by the fire. This is svasanā dhāraṇā. (4) Then follows the vārṣṇī dhāraṇā wherein one is to imagine heavy rainfall which is to wash away all the remaining ashes of the consumed body. (5) Then follows the fifth dhāraṇā called tattvarūpavatī wherein the yogin imagines himself as devoid

¹ Cf. āpāya bahirātmānāṁ sūsthireṇāṁ ntarātmanāṁ dhyāyed viśuddham ātyantuṁ paramātmānāṁ avyayam.
⁻Ibid., XXXII. 10.

² Cf. sa evāḥ sa evāḥ ity abhyasyaṁ anāraṁ vāsanāṁ draḍhayann eva práptoti ātmānāṁ avasthitih.
⁻Ibid., XXXII. 42.

³ Cf. iti sādhāraṇaṁ dhyeyāyaṁ dhyānayor dharma-sūklayaṁ viśuddhi-svāmi-bhedena bhedāḥ sūtre nirūpitaḥ.—Ibid., XXXII. 104.

⁴ Ibid., XXXIII- XXXVI.

⁵ Ibid., XXXVII-XL.

⁶ We give only a rough sketch in order to give some idea of these conceptions.
of the seven elements, as possessed of a lustre as pure as the full moon, and as great as the omniscient. This is the nature of the pindastha dhyāna. In the padastha, one is required to practise concentration with the help of mantric syllables. Subhacandra mentions a number of processes of such concentration with the help of mantras (incantation) and refers to many supernormal powers achieved by the practice of such processes. But we shall not deal with these in view of their lack of relevant interest. In the rūpaṭha one is required to concentrate his mind on the omniscient arhats with all their glory and extraordinary powers, and thus seek inspiration for spiritual endeavour. In the rūpāṭika one is to meditate upon the self as full of consciousness and bliss, pure and formless, supreme and infallible.

Now we come to Ācārya Hemacandra. Let us begin with Hemacandra’s conception of yoga. Yoga, according to him, is the cause of final emancipation and consists in the threefold jewels of right knowledge, right attitude and right conduct. Hemacandra has discussed in detail the nature of right conduct. But then what is the ultimate nature of right knowledge, right attitude, and right conduct? Hemacandra says that it is the self of the ascetic that is right knowledge, right attitude and right conduct. They are nothing but the comprehension of the self in the self by the self on account of the disappearance of the eternal delusion. Emancipation is nothing but the conquest of the passions and the senses. One cannot conquer the passions unless one conquers the senses. And the conquest of senses is dependent upon the purification of mind. One should conquer the tendencies of attachment and hatred for the purification of the mind. And these tendencies can be conquered by equanimity (samatatva). Equanimity however is possible only if one has completely given up the sense of mineness. And one should take resort to the

1 saptadhātu-vinirmuktāṁ pūrṇacandrāmalaśvāṁ
sarvajñākalpam ātmānāṁ tataḥ smarati saṁhyām.—Ibid., XXXVII. 28.

2 Cf. padāny ālambya puñyānyā yad vidhiyate
tat padasthaṁ mataṁ dhyānaṁ vicitra-naya-paṁgāṁi.
—Ibid., XXXVIII. 1.

3 cīlānanda-mayaṁ suṣuddham amūrttaṁ paramākṣaram
smarēd yatra ṭmanā ‘ḥtmanāṁ tad rūpāṭitaṁ iṣyate.—Ibid., XL. 16.

4 Cf. catuvargo ‘graṇīr mokṣo yogas tasya ca kāraṇam
jñāna-sraddhāna-cārita-rūpaṁ ratna-trayaṁ ca saṁ.
—Yogaśāstra, I. 15.

5 Ibid., I-III.

6 ātmān ‘vadārāṇa-jñāṇa-cāritaṁ athavā yateḥ.—Ibid., IV. 1.

7 Cf. ātmānām ātmānāṁ vetti moḥatyagād ya ātmani
tad eva tasya cāritaṁ taj jñāṇāṁ tac ca dārāṇam.—Ibid., IV. 2.

8 manāḥ-suṣuddhyai ca kartavyo rāga-dveṣa-vinirjayaṁ.—Ibid., IV. 45.

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twelvefold contemplation\(^1\) in order to conquer the sense of mineness.\(^2\) One should practise dhyāna after one has attained equanimity, because without equanimity one would try in vain to achieve concentration of mind (dhyāna).\(^3\) Concentration of mind leads one to the knowledge of the self, and the knowledge of the self leads to the destruction of the karmans, which means emancipation.\(^4\) Hemacandra then classifies dhyāna as dharma and sukla. The four virtues of friendship (maitrī), appreciation (pramoda), sympathy (kārmiyā) and indifference (mādhyaasthyā) are recognized as the sustainers of dharma dhyāna. Hemacandra also deals with the questions of the selection of proper place, postures,\(^5\) regulation of breath (prānāyāma),\(^6\) withdrawal (pratyāhāra) of the mind with the senses, and fixing (dharana)\(^7\) of the mind on different places. In these matters he closely follows Subhacandra, and therefore we do not state his views because that would be only repetition of what we have already stated. Hemacandra also recognizes the types of piṇḍastha, pādastha, rūpastha, and rūpātita dhyāna.\(^8\) The other particulars about the dharma-dhyāna are as they are usually found elsewhere.

Hemacandra states some facts about dhyāna on the basis of his own experience. He distinguishes four kinds of mental states viz. scattered (vikṣipta), scattered-cum-collected (yatāyāta), collected (śīṣta), and merged (sulīna).\(^9\) The scattered mind is ever restless. The scattered-cum-collected can sometimes concentrate itself and experience spiritual joy. The third kind is capable of greater concentration and spiritual joy. The mind reaches the fourth state when it becomes perfectly steady and enjoys supreme bliss. Hemacandra also recognizes three distinct selves viz. the exterior, the interior, and the transcendental, and prescribes the rejection of the exterior, and concentration upon the transcendental by the interior.\(^10\) He insists upon the help and guidance of a competent guru (preceptor) for the revelation of truth.\(^11\) He also insists upon the supreme importance of the practice of detachment and indifference. He discourages forcible withdrawal of the mind and the senses, but asks to control them by

\(^1\) Vide supra, p. 263.

\(^2\) sāmyānā syān nirmamatvena tatkrte bhāvanāḥ śrayet.—Ibid., IV. 55. The bhāvanās are also known as anupreksās (contemplations).

\(^3\) samatvam avalambbyā 'tha dhyānaṁ yogī samāśrayet vina samatvam ārabdhe dhyāne svātmā viḍāṃbyate.—Ibid., IV. 112.

\(^4\) Cf. mokṣāḥ karmakṣayād eva sa cā 'tmā-jñānato bhavet dhyānāsādhyāyan mataṁ tac ca tad dhyānaṁ hitam ātmānaḥ.

\(^5\) Ibid., IV. 123-33.

\(^6\) Ibid., V. 1-273.

\(^7\) Ibid., VI. 6-8.

\(^8\) Ibid., VII-X. Hemacandra uses the word śārīrastha for piṇḍastha.

\(^9\) Ibid., XII. 4.

\(^10\) Ibid., XII. 6.

\(^11\) Ibid., XII. 13-17.
means of the practice of indifference. When the soul ceases to impel the mind, the mind has no reason to impel the senses. And the senses being inactive, the worldly things lose all charm and fascination. Gradually the mind ceases to exist. With the cessation of the mind the truth reveals itself to the soul.

(b) Sukla-dhyāna

Forbearance, humility, straightforwardness, and freedom from greed are the conditions of the sukla-dhyāna.¹ In the dharma-dhyāna, the mind concentrates upon the general features of worldly existence. But in the sukla-dhyāna, the mind gradually shortens its field of concentration. The mind now concentrates upon atom and becomes steady and motionless. And on the attainment of omniscience, the functions of mind are completely annihilated.² Even as the poison that has spread all over the body is first brought back and collected at the point of bite by a mantra (incantation) and then totally removed by a more powerful mantra, exactly so is the mind wandering all over the universe first concentrated on an atom by means of yoga, and finally its functions are destroyed by the omniscient soul.³ The sukla-dhyāna has four types. The function of the first two types is to collect and concentrate the mind on the minutest possible entity. When one has achieved perfection in this and has lost all attraction for the worldly things, one attains pure and perfect enlightenment. The functions of the mind are now no more there. There is now no more conceptual thinking. The function of dhyāna at this stage is not the concentration of thought because there is now no thought. The soul is now omniscient. The dhyāna is now utilized for the purpose of stopping the activities of the sense-organ of speech and the body. This is done by the last two types of the sukla-dhyāna.⁴ The last type of sukla-dhyāna is immediately followed by final emancipation. Let us now see the nature of the four types of sukla-dhyāna.

Conceptual thinking based on scriptural knowledge, technically called vītarka,⁵ is the background of the first two types of sukla-dhyāna. Accordingly both these types are savitarka.⁶ In the first type, the mind concentrates upon the thought of the various modes such as origina-

¹ Cf. aha khaṇṭi-maddava-‘jjava-muttaśa jñāmaya-pahāṅgā
alambānāṁ jehīṁ sukka-jjhāṇaṁ samāruhari.—Dhyānāsataka, 69; vide also SbSū, IV. 1. 247.
² Dhyānāsataka, 70.
³ Ibid., 71-72.
⁴ Ibid., 76.
⁵ Cf. TSā, IX. 45 with Bhāṣya.
⁶ Cf. TSā, IX. 44.
tion, continuity and disappearance of a particular entity from a number of standpoints. In other words, the mind concentrates upon the aspect of difference (prthaktya) of the objects of conceptual thinking (vitarka). Moreover, in this type there is vicāra, that is, movement from one aspect of the entity to another, from one verbal symbol to another as well as from one kind of activity to another.¹ Accordingly this type is known as prthaktya-vitarka-savicāra.² In the second type there is no vicāra (movement). Nor does the mind concentrate upon the various aspects of an entity. The mind, in this type, concentrates upon a single mode (ekatva) of an entity. And hence this is known as ekatva-vitarka-’vicāra.³

The third type of sukla-dhyāna is known as sūkṣma-kriyā-’nivartin⁴ (accompanied with subtle physical movement and infallible). This dhyāna, as we have already stated,⁵ is resorted to by the omniscient a few minutes before his final emancipation. In this dhyāna all the activities, gross and subtle, of the mind and the sense-organ of speech as also the gross activities of the body are absolutely stopped. There are, however, present the subtle activities of the body such as the physiological processes. Moreover, this dhyāna is infallible (anivartin) because one does not return to the previous state when this dhyāna is over, but rises up to the last type which is immediately followed by emancipation. And hence this type of sukla-dhyāna is known by the above term.⁶ In the last type of sukla-dhyāna even the remaining subtle activities are stopped (vyavacchinn). And moreover there is no fall (pratipāta) from it because it is immediately followed by final emancipation. Accordingly it is known as vyavacchinnakriyā-’pratipātin.⁷ In this dhyāna the self becomes as motionless as a rock being devoid of all movements of mind, the sense organ of speech, and the body. This is the consummation of sukla-dhyāna.⁸

The knowledge of the scriptures is an essential qualification of the first two types of sukla-dhyāna. One must have, moreover, a good physical structure (samahanana) and be at least in the seventh stage of spiritual development. The first two types are possible only up to the twelfth stage of spiritual development. In the thirteenth and the

¹ TSū, IX. 46. Cf. also saṅkrāntir arthaḥ arthaḥ yad vyaḥjanād vyaḥjanām tathā yogac ca yogam ity esa vicāra iti vā mataḥ.—Ṭīkā on TSū Bh, IX. 43.
² Dhyānasatāka, 77-78; SthŚū, IV. 1. 247.
³ Dhyānasatāka, 79-80.
⁴ It is also called sūkṣmakriyā-’pratipātin. See TSū, IX. 42.
⁵ Vide supra, p. 279.
⁶ Dhyānasatāka, 81.
⁷ It is also known as vyuparatākriyā-’nivartin.—TSū, IX. 42.
⁸ Dhyānasatāka, 82.
fourteenth stages, only the last two types are possible.¹ The time
when the omniscient soul takes resort to these dhyānas, and their
purpose and necessity, we have already stated.

The first two types of sukladhyāna are followed by the contempla-
tion (anupreksā) of these four objects: (1) suffering and its conditions,
(2) the evil nature of worldly existence, (3) the endless continuity of
the world, and (4) the impermanence of all things.² Freedom from
fear, freedom from delusion, discrimination, and absolute renunciation
and detachment are the characteristic signs of the sukladhyāna.³

Akalaṅka’s Tattvārtha-rājavārttika, Vidyānandi’s Tattvārthaśloka-
vārttika, Subhacandra’s Jñānārṇava⁴ and Ācārya Hemacandra’s
Yogaśāstra⁵ give elaborate description of sukladhyāna. But there is
no essential deviation from the old scheme, and so we do not advert
to these works as this will involve reduplication.

III

HARIBHADRA’S COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN YOGA

Haribhadra made a very valuable contribution to the comparative
study of yoga. He composed a number of works on the subject. His
Yogabindu and Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya are very valuable works. The
Yogavimśikā and the Śoḍaśakas also deserve notice. We are dealing
with these works in a separate section in view of their supreme
importance and unique character in the Jaina literature on yoga. We
have already stated that Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya revived the studies
of Haribhadra. We shall therefore advert to his works as well for the
sake of better understanding of Haribhadra’s works. We shall begin
with the Yogavimśikā and the Śoḍaśakas, and then come to the
Yogabindu and the Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya. We shall refer, where
necessary, to the other works of Haribhadra as well.

All spiritual and religious activities that lead towards final emanci-
pation are considered by Haribhadra as yoga. But special importance
should be attached, he says in his Yogavimśikā, to these five kinds
of activities: (1) practice of proper posture (sthāna), (2) correct
utterance of sound (ūrṇa), (3) proper understanding of the meaning
(artha), (4) concentration on the image of a tīrthaṅkara in his full
glory (ālambana), and (5) concentration on his abstract attributes
(anālambana). Of these five, the first two constitute external spiritual

¹ Ibid., 64 ; TSū, IX. 40-41.
² Dhyānasātaka, 88. See also SthŚu, IV. 1. 247.
³ Dhyānasūtaka, 90-92. See also SthŚu, IV. 1. 247.
⁴ Prakāraṇa, XLII.
⁵ Prakāśa, XI.
activity (karmayoga) and the last three internal spiritual activity (jñānayoga). These activities can be properly practised only by those individuals who have attained to the fifth or a still higher stage of spiritual development (guṇasthāna). One reaches the consummation of these activities in the following order. At the outset one develops an interest in these activities, and comes to have a will (icchā) for practising them. Then he takes an active part in them, and begins actual practice (pravṛtti). Gradually he becomes steadfast in them and achieves stability (sthairya). Finally he gains mastery (siddhi) over the activities. Each of the five activities is mastered in this order. First of all one is to master the posture (sthāna), then correct utterance (ūrṇa), then the meaning (artha). After that one should practise concentration upon an image (ālambana), and finally one should attempt at mastery over the concentration upon the abstract attributes of an emancipated soul. This is a full course of yogic practice. One may practise these spiritual activities either out of love (priti), or reverence (bhakti), or as an obligatory duty prescribed by scriptures (āgama or vacana), or without any consideration (asaṅga).

When a spiritual activity is done out of love or reverence it leads to worldly and other-worldly prosperity (abhyudaya). And when it is done as a duty or without any consideration whatsoever it leads to final emancipation. Of the fivefold activities mentioned above, the last two viz. concentration of the mind upon the image of a ārthaṅkara, or upon the abstract attributes of him are the most important. We shall therefore deal with them in some detail.

When one has practised posture (sthāna), correct utterance (ūrṇa), and the correct understanding of the meaning, one is qualified for concentration (āhyāna). The beginner is to practise concentration on an image of a ārthaṅkara in his full glory and splendour. When one has perfected this practice and has achieved steadfastness, one begins the practice of concentration on the abstract attributes of a ārthaṅkara. This concentration is known as anālambana inasmuch as its object is not a concrete entity perceptible by a sense-organ. The soul at this stage concentrates upon the abstract attributes which are not the objects of empirical perception. By this time the soul has reached the seventh stage of spiritual development (guṇasthāna). The concentration is however only in its primary stage even in the seventh guṇasthāna.

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1 YV, 1-2; SP, XIII. 4; for sālambana and nirālambana yoga see SP, XIV. 1.
2 YV, 4.
3 YV, 18; SP, X. 1.
4 SP, X. 9.
5 The word anālambana does not mean 'devoid of any ālambana (object)' but only 'devoid of a concrete ālambana'. The prefix a(n) here means 'abstract' or 'subtle' (sūkṣma). Cf. sūkṣmo 'tīndriyaśīlayatvād anālambano nāma yogā. —Yaśovijaya's Tīkā on YV, 19; also cf. SP, XIV. 1.
The soul develops an irresistible urge for the realization of the transcendent self and reaches the eighth stage of spiritual development on the ladder of annihilation (kṣapakāśreni). The concentration becomes more steadfast at this stage. The soul has now achieved full detachment from the world, and earnestly proceeds onwards to the realization of the truth. It now does not rest until it has reached the consummation. The soul is then in the ninth guṇasthāna and is pressing forward to the twelfth on the ladder of annihilation. It has now revealed its full capacity (sāmarthyayoga) for spiritual development and is bound to reach the twelfth stage and attain the knowledge of the transcendental self. In this state the soul attains concentration on the abstract attributes. Of course, it has not realized those attributes. But it has an ardent spiritual urge for the realization of them. This is anālambana yoga.² The soul is detached from the world and is on the verge of realizing the self. It has not yet realized the self, but is only striving for it. And so it is not concentrated on any object whatsoever at this stage. This is the reason why the concentration is without any object.³ The soul is here compared with an archer, the ladder of annihilation with bow, the realization of the self with the target and the concentration with the arrow. The anālambana yoga lasts until the arrow is shot. The arrow is sure to pierce the target. The soul immediately attains realization of the self as the consummation of the concentration.⁴ The soul, as we have stated, concentrates upon the abstract formless (arūpin) attributes of the transcendental self in the anālambana dhyāna. The distinction therefore between the sālambana and the anālambana yoga is this that in the former one concentrates upon an object having form (rūpin) while in the latter on a formless object (arūpin).³ Yaśovijaya, following Haribhadra, says that this anālambana yoga is known as samprajñāta samādhi in another (that is, Patañjali's) system.⁶ The consummation of this anālambana concentration is omniscience which, according to Yaśovijaya, is the state of asamprajñāta samādhi of Patañjali's system. The functions of the mind and the sense-organs cease when omniscience is achieved, and so there is annihilation of all the transformations of the mind

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¹ It is a technical term for the meaning whereof vide infra, p. 300.
² Cf. sāmarthyayogato yā tatra didṛkṣe 'ty asaṅgasatyaśāhyā saḥ 'nālambanayogāḥ praktaś taddarśanam yāvat.—SP, XV. 8.
³ Cf. trāṣāṃṣhito 'yaḥ yataḥ pravṛttas ca tattvatas tatra ....... tenā 'nālambano gītaḥ.—SP, XV. 9.
⁴ Cf. drāg asmāt taddarśanam iṣupāta-jñāta-mātrato jñeyam etac ca kevalāṃ taj jālanaḥ yat tat paraṃ jyoṭiḥ.—SP, XV. 10.
⁵ Cf. rūpi-dravyaviṣayānām dhīyānaṁ sālāmānaṁ arūpiviṣayānām ca nālāmānaṁ iti—Yaśovijaya's Tīkā on YV, 19.
⁶ eṣa eva samprajñātaḥ samādhis tirthāntarīyair giyate—Ibid., YV, 20.
(aśeṣavṛttinirodhā). And so it is not improper to compare the state of omniscience with the asamprajñāta samādhi of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga.¹ There is however another higher stage of this samādhi. The soul attains that stage in the fourteenth gunasthāna² where, as we have already stated, all the activities, gross and subtle, are totally stopped. The soul is now devoid of all vibrations caused by its association with matter. It has now annihilated all the residual karmans and immediately attains final emancipation. This stage of concentration, says Yaśovijaya, corresponds to the dharmamegha of Patañjali’s system, to amrtātman of yet another system, to bhavaśatrū of a third system, to śivodaya of yet another, to sattvānanda of yet others, and to para of a still another school.³

The above study is mainly based on the Yogaviṃśikā. Now we come to the Šoḍaśakas. There are some primary defects of the mind which are to be removed before practising the yogic processes. The minds of the common people (prthajjanacita) are vitiated by these defects. Haribhadra enumerates them as eight viz. inertia (khetā), anxiety (udvega), unsteadiness (kṣepa), distraction (utthāna), lapse of memory (bhrānti), attraction for something else (anyamud), mental disturbance (ruk), and attachment (āsaṅga).⁴ The mind of a yogin should always be free from these defects. It should be calm and quiet (śanta), noble and great (udāta). It should be free from all impurities and intent on the well-being of others (parārthaniyata).⁵ Such minds are capable of concentration of the highest order, and are known as pravṛttacakra⁶ (engaged in yogic practices day and night). Gradually by practising the concentration of mind the soul realizes itself. This self-realization is known as ‘supreme bliss’ (paramānanda) and freedom from nescience (in the Vedānta); it is known as freedom from the specific qualities (in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system); it is the extinguished lamp (vidhmālapa) of the Buddhists; it is extinction of animality (pasutvavigama), end of suffering (duḥkhānta), and detachment from the elements (bhūtavigama).⁷ Haribhadra thus tries to show the unanimity of the conceptions of final self-realization of all the systems of thought. He then asks the enquirers to keep their

¹ Cf. kevalajñāne 'ṣeṣavṛtttyādī-nirodhā labdhātma-svabhāvasya mānasaviṃśa-vaikalyād asamprajñātatvasiddhiḥ—Ibid.
² ayaṁ ca 'samprajñāta-samādhīr dvīḍhā—sayogikevalībhāvī ayogikevalībhāvī ca. adyo manovṛttitām vikalpa-jānanarpaṇām atyantocchedat sampadyate, anyaṣ ca parispandarūpaṇām—Ibid.
³ ayaṁ ca dharmamegha iti Patañjalair ghyate, amṛtātme 'ty anyair bhavaśatrū ity aparāih, śivodaya ity anyaiḥ, sattvānanda ity ekaiḥ, paraś ce 'ty aparāih—Ibid. See YBi, 422.
⁴ SP, XIV. 2-3.
⁵ SP, XIV. 12.
⁶ For the technical meaning of the term see YDS, 210.
⁷ SP, XVI. 1-4.
minds open and investigate the truth with perfect detachment and freedom from prejudices. For this purpose he enumerates eight virtues which are necessary for the pursuit of truth. They are: freedom from prejudice (adveṣa), inquisitiveness (jī[v]āsā), love for listening (suṣrūṣā), attentive hearing (śravana), comprehension (bodha), critical evaluation (mimāṁsā), clear conviction (pārisuddhā pratipatti), and earnest practice (pravṛtti) for self-realization.¹

Now we come to the Yogānātha. The object and purpose of yoga is the realization of truth. And as there is no controversy about this object and purpose of yoga there should be none regarding the nature of yoga as well.² The worldly existence is a fact accepted by all. And freedom from it is the sumnum bonum of every spiritual system. The problem before us is only the means to that end. Haribhadra says that the same principle is expressed by different terms in different systems. Thus the selfsame principle of consciousness is known as puruṣa in the Vedānta as well as the Jaina system, as kṣetra in the Śāṅkhya system, as jñāna in the Buddhist school. Similarly the fundamental ground of worldly existence is known as avidyā in the Vedānta and the Buddhist system, prakṛti in the Śāṅkhya school, and karma in the Jaina system. Moreover, the relation between matter and spirit is known as bhārati in the Vedānta and the Buddhist system, pravṛtti in the Śāṅkhya school, and bandha in the Jaina system.³ There is thus fundamental unity among all the apparently conflicting systems of thought. There ought to be no real controversy among them about the fundamental things. Truth is truth. It is our different ways of looking at it that is responsible for the building up of different systems. Haribhadra does not attempt at cheap and superfluous compromise, but only tries to show the fundamental unity of all thought. Every earnest student of philosophy has his own way of looking at the truth. And the result is the origination of different systems. Haribhadra asks us to see unity in difference. At least for a spiritual aspirant it is necessary to avoid controversy and strive for self-realization. About the path of self-realization there is absolutely no controversy among the otherwise mutually conflicting systems. Haribhadra lays down these five steps as a complete course of yoga: adhyātma or contemplation of truth accompanied by moral conduct, bhāvanā or repeated practice in the contemplation accompanied by the steadfastness of the mind, dhyāna or concentration of the mind, samālā or equanimity, and vṛttisamkṣaya or the annihilation of all the traces of karma.⁴ But one is not capable

¹ SP, XVI. 14.
² Cf. molāṣahetur yato yogo bhidyate na tataḥ kvacit
sādhyābhedaḥ tathābhāve tū 'ktibheda na karaṇam.—YBi, 3.
³ YBi, 17-18 with Svopajñāvṛtti.
⁴ YBi, 31.
of this yoga until and unless one has worked out the requisite purification of the self. The soul, as we have already stated, naturally moves towards emancipation. It is because of this inherent capacity that the soul comes face to face with the knot and cuts it asunder. We have stated the process of cutting the knot. The worldly existence of a soul falls into two periods viz. dark (kṛṣṇa), and white (śukla). The soul in the period preceding the cutting of the knot is known as belonging to the dark period (kṛṣṇapāksika), and it is known as belonging to the white period (śuklapāksika) when it has cut asunder the knot. The duration of the white period is much shorter in comparison with that of the dark period. Only a soul belonging to the white period and following the moral conduct is capable of the first stage called adhyātma. From the viewpoint of the stages of spiritual development, only the souls in the fifth or some higher stage are capable of it. But the problem is why should a soul cross into the white period at all? Or, why should not all the souls do so? Haribhadra says that it is all due to the inherent nature of things. He also refers to the view of an exponent of the Śāṅkhya system, named Gopendra, which holds that the puruṣa, the principle of consciousness, does not even enquire about the path of realization unless and until the prakṛti has turned her face from him. It is the nature of the spirit to get disentangled from matter. But this disentanglement is possible only when its conditions are fulfilled. However pious and virtuous and spiritually advanced one may appear to be, one is not capable of yoga unless one has cut the knot and attained the requisite purification of the soul. After such state has been achieved the soul is fit for the preliminary preparation (pūrvasevā) for yoga. This preliminary preparation consists in the worship of the preceptor and the like, good conduct, austerity, and absence of hatred for the final emancipation. The soul now attains right attitude and becomes a bodhisattva. All the characteristics of a bodhisattva are present in such soul. Thus the soul henceforth does no more fall to the depth wherein heretofore it had been. A bodhisattva does not commit an evil act from the depth of his heart, but if he does so at all he does only physically. There is no more spiritual degeneration. The soul which has cut the

1 The length of the white period is only less than even one pudgalaparāvarta while the length of the dark period covers an infinite number of such pudgalaparāvartas. A pudgalaparāvarta is the time required by a soul to absorb as karmam at least once all the atoms of the universe and release them after they have come to fruition.

2 YBi, 72.
3 Cf. YBi, 77.
4 Ibid., 100-101.
5 pūrvasevā tu tantrajñair gurudevādipājanam sadācāras tapo muktyadveṣaś ca 'ha prakṛttitā.—YBi, 109.
6 YBi, 270.
7 Cf. ibid., 271.
knot fulfils this characteristic. It now takes interest exclusively in the well-being of others, acquires wisdom, treads upon the right path, becomes noble, and appreciates merits.\(^1\) It has now attained enlightenment (bodhi). But if the conception of a bodhisattva is narrowed down and made to include only those rare souls who are destined to redeem the world from sin and suffering, Haribhadra says that the Jaina conception of a ārya āryakara fulfils that ideal.\(^2\) There are some souls who are naturally inclined towards universal well-being and are destined to be ārya āryakaras (founders of religion). Such souls are bodhisattvas in the true sense of the term.

In this connection Haribhadra distinguishes three categories of souls destined to be emancipated. The first category comprises such souls who, as soon as they experience the first dawn of enlightenment on the annihilation of the knot, make determination to redeem the world from its suffering by means of the enlightenment and work strenuously in accordance with the determination. These souls are destined to become ārya āryakaras.\(^3\) The second category comprises those souls who are intent upon the well-being of only a limited circle of relatives by means of the enlightenment. These souls become gaṇadharas (literally the possessors of the gaṇa ‘group’ of virtues of transcendent intuition, knowledge and the like), that is, the chief disciples of the ārya āryakaras.\(^4\) The third category comprises those souls who strive for the well-being of themselves with little care for others. These souls are destined to become ordinary (munda) kevalins.\(^5\)

Let us revert to the topic of preliminary preparation for yoga. After this preparation the soul becomes fit for the first stage of yoga called adhyātma. The soul now observes the five vows and meditates upon the truth. It now cultivates universal friendship, appreciates merits of others, develops sympathy for the suffering, and remains indifferent to the wicked. By these practices the soul overcomes the karmans, reveals its spiritual energy, improves its power of self-concentration, and becomes wise.\(^6\) It then becomes fit for the second stage called bhāvanā. This stage is the consummation of the first. The soul now maintains steady progress. Its power of concentration increases. It now desists from bad habits and develops good ones.\(^7\) The third stage is dhyāna. We have already described it. Then we come to the fourth stage of equanimity (samatā). Here the soul makes correct estimate of the nature and value of things, and consequently loses attachment for them. The soul is now disillusioned and does

\(^1\) Cf. ibid., 272.  
\(^2\) Ibid., 274.  
\(^3\) Ibid., 284-8.  
\(^4\) Ibid., 289.  
\(^5\) Ibid., 290.  
\(^6\) Ibid., 358-59.  
\(^7\) Ibid., 360-1.
not attach any importance to the supernormal powers that it might have acquired by means of the yoga.\(^1\) Then it reaches the fifth stage called annihilation of the residual karmans (vr̥ttisaṁkṣaya). It now gradually destroys the accumulated karmans once for ever. On the annihilation of the obscuring (ghātin) karmans, the soul attains omniscience. Then in due time it attains final emancipation.\(^2\) This is in brief the plan of the Yogabindu.\(^3\)

Next we come to Haribhadra's famous work Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya. The author here distinguishes eight stages of yogic development. The work records a quite novel plan of classification of yogic stages. The most important feature of spiritual development is acquisition of samyagdṛṣṭi (love of truth). The soul undergoes gradual purification and along with the purification its dṛṣṭi (love of truth) becomes progressively steady and reaches consummation in the realization of the truth. This gradual development of the dṛṣṭi has been classified into eight stages viz. mītrā, tārā, balā dēprā, śhīrā, kāntā, prabhā, and parā. Before coming to the description of these dṛṣṭis we shall refer in brief to the threefold yoga with the description of which the Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya opens.

A qualified yogic practitioner passes through a number of stages before he reaches the consummation of the practice. Sometimes even in spite of his knowledge and will he falters in his practice on account of spiritual inertia (pramāda). This faltering practice is called icchāyoga.\(^4\) The practice of one who has revealed spiritual energy and does never falter in his yogic practices, strictly follows the scriptural injunctions, and has developed penetrating insight is called śāstrayoga.\(^5\) The practice of one who has fully mastered the scriptural injunctions and has developed the power to transcend them is called sāmarthya-yoga.\(^6\) This latter yoga, again, is of two kinds viz. (1) that which is accompanied by the dissociation of all the acquired virtues (dharma-saṁnyāsa), and (2) that which effects the stoppage of all activity (yoga-saṁnyāsa).\(^7\) The first kind occurs at the time when the soul undergoes the process of apūrvavakaraṇa for the second time in the ninth stage of spiritual development while the second occurs in the last stage of spiritual development immediately after which the soul attains final emancipation.\(^8\) These viz. icchāyoga, śāstrayoga, and sāmarthya-yoga are the three broad divisions of all the possible stages of yoga.

\(^1\) Ibid., 364-5.  
\(^2\) Ibid., 366-7.  
\(^3\) Upādhīyāya Yaśovijaya has followed this plan in his Dvāṭīrīṃśikās No. 12 to 18 as contained in the Ovāṭīrīṃśal-dvāṭīrīṃśikā published by Śrī Jaina-Dharma-prasāraka Sahbhā, Bhāwnagar.  
\(^4\) YDS, 3.  
\(^5\) Ibid., 4.  
\(^6\) Ibid., 5.  
\(^7\) Ibid., 9.  
\(^8\) Ibid., 10.
eight drṣṭis which we shall now describe are only the elaboration of these three.¹

Drṣṭi means attitude towards truth. This attitude is wrong and perverse so long as the soul has not cut the knot and attained purification. The perverse attitude is known, as we have stated on more than one occasion, as darśanamohā or mīthyātuva or avidyā. The attitude of the soul which has not cut the knot is known as oghadrṣṭi (literally commonplace attitude). The opposite of this is yogadrṣṭi or the attitude of the spiritually advanced soul. It is also known as saddṛṣṭi, that is, right attitude. The oghadrṣṭi is held to be responsible for the origination of the mutually conflicting systems of thought.² The eight drṣṭis that we have enumerated above are yogadrṣṭis and not oghadrṣṭis. Of course, of these eight the first four belong to those who have not cut the knot. But even then they are not oghadrṣṭis in view of the fact that they are destined to lead to the yogadrṣṭis. It is only those souls who are destined to cut the knot and attain final emancipation that are capable of these drṣṭis. The eight drṣṭis have respectively been compared to the sparks of straw-fire (trṇāgni), cow-dung fire, wood fire, the light of a lamp, the lustre of a gem, the light of a star, the light of the sun, and the light of the moon.³ The first four drṣṭis are unsteady and fallible. The last four are steady and infallible.⁴ The eight drṣṭis respectively correspond to the eight famous stages of yoga viz. vows (yama), self-control (niyama), posture (āsana), regulation of breath (prāṇāyāma), withdrawal of the senses (pratyāhāra), fixing of the mind (āhāraṇā), concentration (āhyāna), and samādhi (ecstasy), as found in the system of Patañjali. They are respectively free from inertia (kheda), anxiety (udvega), unsteadiness (kṣeṣpa), distraction (uṭhāna), lapse of memory (bhūṃti), attraction for something else (anyamud), mental disturbance (rūk), and attachment (āsaṅga). They are respectively accompanied with freedom from prejudice (ādveṣa), inquisitiveness (jijñāsā), love for listening (śuṣrūṣā), attentive hearing (śravaṇa), comprehension (bodha), critical evaluation (mīmāṃsā), clear conviction (pariṣuddhā pratīpiṭti), and earnest practice (pravṛtti).⁵

This is about the general features of the drṣṭis. Now let us state in brief the specific characteristics of them one by one.

In the first drṣṭi called mitrā the soul achieves very faint and indistinct enlightenment. It here accumulates the seeds of yoga

¹ Ibid., 12.
² Ibid., 14 with Svopajñāvṛtti: ... etannibandhano 'yāṁ darśanabheda iti yogācārayāḥ.
³ Ibid., 15.
⁴ Ibid., 19.
⁵ Ibid., 16 with Svopajñāvṛtti. Haribhadra here refers to the concensus of opinion of a number of authors regarding the stages of yoga.
(yogabija) which eventually fructify into emancipation. The soul is now attracted towards the founders of religion and worships them with reverence. It now earnestly and sincerely does the service of its preceptors and other sincere ascetics. The soul now develops fear for worldly existence. It now performs great and noble deeds. It develops sympathy for the suffering multitude. The soul is now free from the envy of the meritorious. It now gets good opportunities for spiritual development. The soul is now just in front of the knot (granthi) and is undergoing the process of yathāpravrtytakahāraṇa.

Now we come to the second drṣṭi known as tārā. The enlightenment becomes a bit distinct here, and the soul is capable of some sort of self-restraint as well. It now attains some sort of steadiness in spiritual activity, and becomes inquisitive about truth. It now develops steady love for the discussions in yoga and has respect for the yogins. The soul is now not so much desperate and does not indulge in evil activities so frequently. It now aspires for spiritual progress and is conscious of its shortcomings. The soul is now earnestly anxious to get rid of the worldly existence.

Next we come to the drṣṭi called balā. Here the enlightenment becomes more distinct. There is now strong desire for hearing the truth. The evil desire automatically disappears at this stage and the soul gains control over posture.

In the fourth drṣṭi called dīprā one gets control over breath and is free from the lapse of yoga. One has now heard about the truth but has not developed the power of understanding its subtlety. The individual at this stage regards his religion dearer than his life and is always ready to give up his life in order to save his religion.

Real spiritual progress however has not yet set in. The truth has not dawned as yet. The soul is only trying to capture the image of the truth instead of the truth itself. The knowable has not yet been known. The above four drṣṭis thus are ‘not attended with the knowledge of the truth’ (avedyasamvedyapada). It is only the next four drṣṭis that are ‘attended with the knowledge of the truth’ (avedyasamvedyapada). The avedyasamvedyapada is to be transcended by means of the companionship of the virtuous and the study of the scriptures. One makes various conjectures about truth until one sees it face to face. This leads to a number of speculative systems based on fallacious logic (kutarka). Haribhadra, in conformity with our ancient tradition, asks us to realize the truth by means of all these three organs viz. the scripture, the logical argument, and the practice of yoga. One must utilize the store of knowledge inherited

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1 Ibid., 22.
2 Ibid., 22-40.
3 Ibid., 41-48.
4 Ibid., 49-50.
5 Ibid., 57-58.
6 Ibid., 67.
7 Ibid., 85.
8 Cf. ibid., 90-98.
from one’s ancestors, one’s own logical understanding, and the vision 
gained by spiritual discipline and culture for the ascertainment of truth. The truth is one. It cannot be many. There is only the difference of 
terminology. The state of final realization is known as sadāśiva in 
one system, as parabrahman in another, as siddhālma in the third, 
and as tathatā in yet another system. There can be no controversy 
when the truth has been realized. If it is a fact that those who have 
revealed the truth had realized it, then there is no reason why there 
should be controversy among them. The various revelations therefore 
are to be understood in their relevant contexts. They can in no way 
be considered as false assertions. The enlightened souls have revealed 
the truth in accordance with the needs of the spiritual aspirants. The 
selfsame revelation appears as different to different persons. It is 
necessary to understand a revelation in its proper context. One should 
cultivate faith in spiritual revelations. This is most necessary for 
spiritual progress. This faith is wanting in all the four ārṣṭi described 
above. It is only when the soul has properly cultivated this faith 
that it cuts the knot (granthi) and comes to possess the fifth ārṣṭi known 
as sthirā.

The soul has now cut the knot. The enlightenment has now 
dawned. It is now infallible (nitya). The soul is now capable of 
subtle thinking and sinless conduct. It now looks upon the worldly 
things as the toys made of sand. The world now appears to be a 
worthless show.

Next we come to the sixth ārṣṭi known as kāntā. Here the individual develops personality and attracts others. He is now engrossed 
in spiritual contemplation and has his mind firmly concentrated on 
the virtues. The world now loses all attraction for him.

The seventh ārṣṭi is known as prabhā. The soul has now developed 
the capacity for self-concentration and is free from all mental distur-
bances. It has now achieved peace of mind (śama). The soul has 
now fully developed the power of discrimination. It now practises 
spiritual discipline without any ulterior motive (asaṅgānuṣṭhāna). It 
is now in the seventh stage of spiritual development and is preparing 
to rise up to the eighth stage on the ladder of annihilation. The soul 
is now marching on the great path (mahāpāthaprayāna) which leads 
to the place from which one does never return (anāgāmipadāvaha). 
Haribhadra remarks that this ārṣṭi is known as praśāntavāhītā in the 
Śāṅkhya system, as visabhāga-parikṣeya in the Buddhist school, as 
śivavartman in the Śaiva system, and as āhūrvādhuṣaṇ according to the 
Mahāvratikas.
We now come to the eighth ḍṛṣṭi called parā. The soul is now completely free from all attachment to the world. It now achieves ecstasy (samādhi), the consummation of dhyāna. The activities of the soul in this stage are free from all transgressions of the vows, and as such are pure and perfect. The soul now dissociates itself from all the acquired virtues and has its purpose fulfilled. This occurs in the ninth stage of spiritual development. The soul then gradually attains omniscience on the annihilation of all the obscuring karmans. Now the final emancipation is attained by means of the last yoga known as ayoga.

Haribhadra distinguishes four types of yogins viz. gotrayogin, kulayogin, prāvṛttacakrayogin, and niṣpannayogin. The yogins of the first type are not capable of emancipation. The yogins of the fourth type have already achieved their objective and so do not need any instruction in yoga. It is only the yogins of the second and the third type that need instruction.

1 Ibid., 179.
2 Ibid., 184. Here ayoga refers to ayogakevali-guṇasthāna for which vide supra, pp. 279-280.
3 Ibid., 206-7 with Svapajñavṛtti. About the definitions of these types see ibid., 208-210.
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1 The numbers indicate pages and n refers to footnote.

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