THE
BHĀMATĪ OF VĀCASPATI
ON
ŚĀNKARA'S BRAHMASUTRABHĀSYA
(CATUSSŪTRĪ)

AC No 778

EDITED WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
BY
S. S. SURYANARAYANA SAstri
Reader in Philosophy
AND
C. KUNHAN RAJA
Reader in Sanskrit, Madras University

WITH A FOREWORD BY
SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN

THEOSOPHICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE
ADYAR, MADRAS, INDIA
1933
FOREWORD

It is a pleasure to know that Vacaspati's Bhāmati on the first four Sūtras will now be available to students of Indian Philosophy in an edition brought out in the orthodox style, with a critical introduction, Sanskrit text, English translation and notes. All those interested in Indian Philosophy will be deeply grateful to Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and Dr. C. Kunhan Raja of the Philosophy and the Sanskrit Departments of the Madras University for bringing out this very useful work. While Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya is fairly well known among students of Indian Thought, the later thinkers are practically neglected. Vacaspati presents one great section of Advaita Vedānta and his Bhāmati is second in importance only to Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya.

The Introduction, besides dealing with the date of the work and its place in the Advaita tradition, gives a clear and careful account of the central ideas of the Bhāmati: the authoritativeness of scripture and
its compatibility with reason, the nature of Avidyā and its seat, release—ultimate and relative—and Brahman and Is'vara, among others. There are side reflections on similar views in Western Thought which are always interesting. The work will not only add to the reputation of its authors but also help to popularise Vacaspati's views on Advaita Vedānta.

*Andhra University, Waltair*

5th May, 1933

S. R.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed Table of Contents</td>
<td>liii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text and Translation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superimposition</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire to Know</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scripture-source</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Notes</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

I. DATE AND DOMICILE OF VĀCASPATI

On the strength of a reference in the *Nyāyasūcinibandha*, it is now generally admitted that Ācārya Vācaspati Misra belongs to the period round about A.D. 841-842 (898 Vikrama Era).¹ The last verse of the *Bhāmati* refers to a king Nṛga.² While it is held by some that this king has not yet been identified, others³ believe him to have been a king of Mithila, a predecessor of Nānyadeva, who reigned about 1019 Vikrama Era, i.e., A.D. 962; it is said that this predecessor is named in some inscriptions as Kirātadhipati, and Kirātas are well known to be those who had human vehicles. It is in any case certain that there should have been a good interval between him and Udayana (A.D. 984) who wrote the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikāparisuddhi*, as a sub-commentary on Vācaspati's *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā*.

¹ See Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, II, 107.
² Nāres'varā yaccaritā-'nukāram icchanti kartum na ca pārayanti tasmin mahīpe mahāniya-kīrtau s'rimannre 'kāri mayā nibandhaḥ. See also p. 481, under II, i, 33.
³ See Mm. Dr. Ganganath Jha, Sanskrit Introduction to his edition of the *Sānkhyatattvakaumudi*. "Nṛga" means "one who has a human vehicle," and kirātas are well known to be such. The same writer gives many reasons, some fanciful, for holding that Vācaspati was a native of Mithila.
That our author belonged to somewhere in Behar or Bengal would appear to be evident from the repeated reference to mustard oil. It has also been said that in what corresponds to ancient Mithila there is a city called Bhāmā (Bhāmatī) and a tank of the same name.

It may be interesting to note a story current in paṇḍit-tradition about the name “Bhāmatī”. In those days (as even today in parts of Upper India), it would appear to have been customary to hold learned discussions on such occasions as marriages. Vācaspati, who listened to such a discussion on the occasion of his own marriage, was so struck by the vagaries of dialecticians that he resolved straightaway to devote himself to the task of setting forth authoritative expositions of all the darsānas. So great was his zeal, so mighty the task and such the patient and tireless devotion of his wife that the couple had grown old before Vācaspati could write finis to his labours. Then alone did Vācaspati realise the magnitude both of his neglect of his wife and of his wife’s self-sacrifice; and as a tardy measure of reparation, he gave her name to the last and greatest of his works, so that she could live on perpetually in the Bhāmatī, though not in the bodies of children born of her. The story is so picturesque, so typical of the scholar’s neglect and the true scholarly recompense, that it deserves to be true.

II. WORKS

The works of Vācaspati are enumerated in the concluding verses of the Bhāmatī. They are as follows:
the *Nyāyakaṇṭikā* (a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Vidhi-viveka*), the *Brahmatattvasamikṣā* (a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*), the *Tattvabindu* (a discussion of language in its relation to meaning), the *Nyāyavrārtikatātparyāṭikā* (a commentary on Udyotakara's *Nyāyavrārtika*), the *Nyāyasūcinibandha* (perhaps written as a supplement to the *Tatparyāṭikā*), the *Sāṅkhyaśvatavaṃvārumūḍi* (a commentary on Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*), the *Tattvavaisārādī* (a commentary on Vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya*) and the *Bhāmati* (a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Sārīrakāmaghāṭaḥ*).

The *Bhāmati* has itself been commented on by several other works. The most notable of these is the *Vedāntakalpataru* by Amalānanda (13th Century A.D.). This work in turn formed the subject of two commentaries, the *Parimala* of Appayya Dīkṣita (16th Century A.D.) and Ābhoga of Laksminṛṣiminha (17th Century A.D.). The Ābhoga is written in the light of the *Parimala* and sometimes criticises it. Other commentaries on the *Bhāmati* are (1) the *Bhāmatavyākhyā* or the *Rjupakṣikā* by Śrīraṅganātha otherwise known as Akhaṇḍānanda; (2) the *Bhāmatītilaka*; (3) and the *Bhāmati-vilāsa*.

---

1. All the works have been published with the exception of the *Brahmatattvasamikṣā*, not even a manuscript of which has been found so far.

2. This has been published in part at Calcutta by Mahāmahopādhyāya N. S. Anantakṛṣṇa Sūstrī.

3. Manuscripts of this work are found in the Government Oriental Library, Madras.

III. RELATIONS TO OTHER WRITERS

The name of the Bhāmati is identified with one of two main streams of Śaṅkara interpretation. Vācaspati owes the major part of what is distinctive in his teaching to Maṇḍana’s Brahmaśiddhi. But as the views starting with Padmapāda are known as the tenets of the Vivaraṇa-prasthāna, the views that started with Maṇḍana passed current as the tenets of the Bhāmati-prasthāna. Vācaspati draws largely on the Brahmaśiddhi, and sometimes on the Pañcapādikā, wherever necessary or possible. Striking verbal resemblances to the former work are indicated in the notes; a few of the resemblances to the Pañcapādikā are noted here: bhāṣyam prasannagambhiram; (ahaṅkāra as) idam-anidam-rūpaṃ; mithyā-sābdo ’pahnava-vacanaḥ; sārīraṃ eva sārīrakaṃ sārīrake bhavaḥ sārīrako jīvaḥ; bhikṣu-bhayān na sthālyā anadhis'rayaṇam; so 'yam sānti-karmanī vetālo’dayaḥ; anvaya possible even without reference to asti-kriyā as in rājno’yam puruṣaḥ.¹

¹ The references are to pages 1, 18, 4, 40, 63, 91, and 97 of the Pañcapādikā (Visianagaram Sanskrit Series). The statements on pp. 63 and 91 of the Pañcapādikā are well-known proverbial expressions; what is striking is the use of them by both writers in the same context. The interested student will easily find the corresponding pages of the Bhāmati. Some of the criticism in the Bhāmati would seem to be expressly directed against the doctrines of the Pañcapādikā; see the Kalpataru on I, iii, 17 (p. 298) and on I, ii, 26 (p. 264). We owe this reference to Mr. T. R. Chintamanī (Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. III, p. 45).
IV. SRUTI AS PRAMĀṆA

For Vācaspati, as for all adherents of any orthodox school of Indian Philosophy, Revealed Scripture (Sruti) is the final authority in matters of the Spirit. The Spirit (or Intelligence, Consciousness, the Universal Self, Brahman) is that whereby knowledge is possible; it is itself knowledge. It cannot, without losing its self-hood, become an object of knowledge. It is manifest, since but for its manifestation the whole world would be blind. But it is not manifested by another, since that would lead only to an infinite series of the blind leading the blind. It is self-luminous and self-manifest. Perception, which would have no value but for the manifestation of the self-luminous intelligence in and through it, could not have that intelligence itself for its object. Much less can inference make that its sphere, since it is dependent on concomitances between the perceived. Brahman can be known only through intuition and that only by gifted and disciplined souls, whose minds have been purified by Scripture-ordained duties and concentrated on the Scripture-taught reality. Such minds will by first hearing of the only real, one without a second, reflecting on it and refuting all objections to the doctrine, contemplating the real uninterruptedly for a long time and with faith, realise Brahman. The supreme pramāṇa is Scripture, though it may and indeed has to be helped by reasoning, as an auxiliary, in order to remove the doubts that assail the mind. Such reasoning, however, is strictly
subordinated to the explication and substantiation of Scriptural truth and can in no sense be independent.

Several questions naturally arise out of this: (1) Is such an advocacy of Scripture and subordination of reason consistent with a truly philosophical attitude? (2) How can Scripture maintain non-difference to be the truth where it conflicts with perception which cognises a world of plurality and difference? When there is a conflict between the two, should not perception prevail over the other? (3) In any case, is not Scripture cutting at its own basis in denying authoritativeness to perception, since there would be no Scriptural knowledge, if words and their senses were not first perceived? (4) What is the nature of perception, if it does not cognise a world of diversity?

1. Authority is claimed by Vācaspati not for all Scripture as such, but only for purportful Scripture.¹ For, in Scripture itself there are many restatements and explanatory and eulogistic passages, which cannot claim to be authoritative, except perhaps in dependence on other passages which lay down something new and purportful. The marks determinative of purport are well known; they are: the harmony of the initial and concluding passages, repetition, novelty (i.e., not being otherwise made out), fruitfulness, glorification by eulogistic passages or condemnation by deprecatory passages and intelligibility in the light of reasoning. It is clear from an application of these tests that the

¹ tatparyavati hi srutiḥ pratyakṣaḥ balavati, na sruti-mātram; ananya-labyaḥ sabdārthaḥ.
entire Scripture has non-duality for purport. The Chāndogya teaching, for instance, begins with pre-mising the secondless unity of reality and goes on to identify this reality with the self of the pupil instructed, in the words "That Thou art"; the same teaching is repeated nine-fold to show that it is important and that it is the primary purport; nor is this identity something established in ordinary experience, like the heat of fire, in which case the Scriptural declaration would be a mere re-statement; it is a statement of the novel and hence is purportful; it is fruitful, since the knowledge of it helps one to pass beyond transmigration; the knowledge of it is praised suitably and its opposite is condemned; and the identity of the self with the absolute reality is also found to stand to reason.¹ Though the application of reason figures but as one of the marks of purport, it will be seen on closer examination that reason really plays a much more important part. There are disputes even as to which is the introductory passage and which the conclusion. In the vast body of knowledge called Scripture it is possible to choose a beginning anywhere and call that the introductory passage; such a choice may be found to favour a dualist rather than a non-dualist interpretation. As against this the non-dualist has to make out that all such beginnings are intermediate or secondary (avāntara), that the real beginning (paramo-'pakrama)

¹ On advaita as the purport of all Scripture, see the Bhāmati on I, iii, 33 (especially, p. 343, Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstri's edition); mention of creation etc. is not part of the primary intention; see II, i, 34 (p. 482).
is elsewhere, and that this favours non-dualism. Similarly of the conclusion. The interpretation of these in harmony, again, calls for the exercise of reason. And the need of reason will be similarly found in determining what is purportful repetition and what is not, in distinguishing and assigning the fruit, in the ascertainment of the really novel, and in finding out what is glorified and by which passage. So that the authoritarianism of the advaitin is unphilosophical only on the face of it, involving as it does the abundant exercise of reason. True, he says reason finds a place only in so far as it does not conflict with Scripture; but in the end, reason itself has to judge when it conflicts with Scripture and when it does not.

2. But how can Scripture over-ride perception which cognises difference as real? The assumption here is that perception is our first and basic instrument of knowledge; and what is basic may not be rejected. The advaitin replies that no doubt it is first, but it is not basic and unsublatable. Indeed, where there is sublation, it is the earlier that is sublated. The initial statement or cognition has no doubt greater value, because of its position. But there are exceptions to this rule. Where a subsequent cognition arises validly, and it cannot arise except as sublating what goes before, the earlier cognition should necessarily be taken to be sublated; for example, the cognition of nacre could not arise, if the original cognition as silver persisted; hence, the nacre-cognition is admitted to sublate the earlier silver-cognition. Thus, the priority
of perception would of itself be an argument for its sublation by the subsequently resulting Scriptural knowledge, especially when the latter arises without depending on the validity of the former. In any case, as we shall see presently, it is not true that difference is perceived.

3. But surely Scripture is dependent on perception for its very existence! Scriptural knowledge would not be possible except for the prior perception of words and their senses. The reply to this is that all that is required is the existence, the empirical reality, of words and their senses, not their absolute reality. Even in ordinary experience we derive what we treat as valid knowledge from what is not real but is superimposed. Naga means an elephant, while naga means a tree; the difference in the length of the vowel 'a' is a property not of 'a' itself, but of the audible sound (dhvani) which manifests it; and yet the knowledge which results from this superimposed difference is not delusive. Sounds and their senses are but manifesters of knowledge which is eternal. The former need not and indeed cannot be co-eternal with the latter; so long as they exist and manifest knowledge, their function is fulfilled; an insistence on their absolute reality is vain and unreasonable.

4. Does not perception cognise difference? The answer is in the negative. What we know as determinate perception does appear no doubt to cognise difference. But this is preceded by indeterminate perception. All distinctions are introduced later into
the single positive undifferentiated continuum presented by indeterminate perception. Such perception is comparable to the state of feeling mentioned by Bradley, wherein there is a harmony of the that and the what, existence and content; it is broken up because of the very finitude of feeling.¹

For the dialectic on difference, Vācaspati is indebted to Maṇḍana, most of whose arguments are found briefly summarised in the Bhūmatī.² The principal argument, which will bear repetition here, is that difference cannot be real, since it can be neither of the nature of things nor an attribute of them. If difference were of the very nature of things, there would be no things to be different; for, whatever you may say is one thing will immediately break up, because difference is of its nature; similarly of each of its parts; you cannot rest even in the primal atom; there is nothing which can be treated as a unit and in

¹ It is also comparable to what is described in the following lines of Tennyson:

The baby new to earth and sky
What time his tender palm is prest
Against the circle of the breast
Has never thought that “This is I”.
But as he grows he gathers much
And learns the use of “I” and “me”
And finds “I am not what I see
And other than the things I touch”.
So rounds he to a separate mind
From whence clear memory may begin
As through the frame that binds him in
His isolation grows defined.

² On I, i, 4 (pp. 174-179). The notes in that connection may also be consulted.
the absence of any unit there can be no difference either. If, then, difference be said to be an attribute, is this attribute different from its substrate? If not, it is of its very nature, and we have really the former alternative alone. If the attribute is different, then we have three units on our hands, the substrate, the difference which is its attribute and the difference of the attribute from the substrate. And the moment we start inquiring into the relation of this difference to the substrate on the one hand and the attribute on the other, we are launched on an infinite regress. The notion of difference then is unintelligible, and since it pre-supposes the identity at least of a unit that is different, it is reasonable to hold that difference is superimposed on a basis of identity.

May not both identity and difference be real? Do we not indeed find this synthesis abundantly in experience? We do no doubt find their apparent synthesis in experience, but that is no justification for the uncritical acceptance of both. To say that both identity and difference are manifest cannot compel us to say that they are both real, unless all attempt at systematic thinking is to be abandoned. A crown and a bracelet, it is said, are different and yet non-different, different as products, but non-different in respect of their cause, gold. But if they are really non-different, he who wants a crown must be satisfied with the bracelet; if you say that there is difference too between crown and bracelet, then there must be difference between bracelet and gold also, since crown and gold are non-different.
And if, because of the difference between the crown and bracelet, he who wants the first does not want the second, why should it not be that he wants it too, because of their non-difference? Such in bare outline is the criticism of the view of difference *cum* non-difference (bheda-'bheda).\(^1\) Identity may be found only with difference, but philosophy cannot stop with juxtaposing them; either should be taken to be more fundamental than the other, and the advaitin has shown sufficient cause for not treating difference as fundamental.

What, then, is the goal of knowledge? Is it the pre-rational stage of cognition, analogous to feeling in Bradley's system? Obviously, it cannot be, for, on the pre-rational supervenes the rational, introducing its distinctions and doubts. The goal of knowledge cannot be any such unstable harmony. For him who has attained that, there is perfect peace, no more return to the relational world of diversity and distraction. The final cognition, though characterised as perceptual and indeterminate, cannot then be of the same nature as the indeterminate cognition of the child and the deaf-mute. Between the two, there are only two characteristics in common, the immediacy of cognition and its non-attributive nature. All determinate cognition is attributive; the subject is known to possess a name, a class or a quality. In the indeterminate

---

\(^1\) The criticism of bheda-'bheda occurs under I, i, 4 (pp. 175-178). Amalānanda takes it to apply to Bhāskara. The arguments are in substance identical with Maṇḍana's in the *Brahmasiddhi* pp. 63-70; and Maṇḍana is criticising Kumārila.
cognition of the child, there is no distinction of subject and predicate at all. In the final perception, we pass beyond the distinction of subject and predicate, to understand the identity underlying both, not the mere attribution of one with respect to the other. A typical cognition of this character is the recognition "This is that Devadatta". What is asserted is not the possession of an attribute by a subject, but the identity of Devadatta seen at a different time and place with the Devadatta seen here and now. The judgment is essentially an identity judgment not an attributive one. And yet it is not bare identity that is affirmed, but identity as qualified by the differences of time and place. If the differences were really attributes of Devadatta, forming part of his essential nature, the identity would be impossible. It is therefore said that the differences of time and place are upalakṣaṇas, qualifications _per accidens_, and the identity asserted is so qualified. The difference between this and the bare identity of the pre-rational cognition consists in the stability, certitude and freedom from doubt of the former. For it has been mediated; it has passed through doubt and difference and is rich with their significance, though they themselves persist no longer, not being ultimately real. The attributive judgments of determinate cognition have fulfilled their purpose by extending, harmonising and consolidating the original datum of knowledge. What happens at the final stage is the realisation of the unity and identity of the empery of knowledge, a unity no longer liable
to disruption from within or without, as at the pre-rational level. This is the realisation of akhaṇḍārtha, the impartite sense, which is non-relational in nature (sāṃsargā-'navagāhi-jñānam), not because it is infra-relational, but because it has taken up and transcended relations. Nor need one feel that difference and relations have not come in for fair play since they are treated merely as qualifications *per accidens*; for, what matters, the signification, is conserved even in the case of an upalakṣaṇa. The crow on the top of Devadatta’s house serves to identify the house for him who seeks it; the identification is the significance; that is never lost, though the crow may fly away and the attribution of the crow sitting there is only a qualification *per accidens*. It is easy to fall into the error of holding

---

1 There is little discussion of the doctrine of akhaṇḍārtha in the Bhūmati itself. But it is adverted to in the Kalpataru, even in the course of the first four sūtras; and the doctrine is of such vital importance to advaita that at least this passing mention has to be made. The view that the final cognition is characterised by freedom from doubt and delusion and that it is qualified *per accidens* by the differences is elaborated at great length in the Advaitasiddhi. Vācaspati’s failure to discuss akhaṇḍārtha is susceptible of one of the following explanations. For him, as for Maṇḍana, verbal testimony is not of itself the cause of immediate knowledge. The cognition resulting from such testimony has to be contemplated with faith, uninterruptedly and for a long time before the final intuition results. From the sentence there results but a mediate cognition which starts the indispensable process of prasaṅkhyāna; it would therefore seem unnecessary to insist on the sentence too conveying a sense that is impartite. Another possible reason is that, unlike Maṇḍana, Vācaspati does not hold to the sphoṭa-vāda, the doctrine that meaning is one and integral and that it is but revealed gradually in the spoken letters and words. He would seem to have more sympathy with the Associationist and the Behaviourist explanations of the acquirement of meaning than with an explanation like that of the Gestalt psychologist. The juxtaposition of such a doctrine alongside that of akhaṇḍārtha would have appeared, to say the least, incongruous. It is worth noting that the doctrine
that the indeterminate cognition is the pre-rational and the pre-relational, that it is but knowledge of the bare subject without its attributes, the bare stem without its modifications. The relations and the attributes and the modification all count in the final cognition, though they cannot count as such, as independently and absolutely real.

The logical theory of Bradley and Bosanquet is generally identified with the predicative view of judgment. Judgment, according to the former, relates an ideal content to a subject in reality. The aspects of the *that* and the *what*, existence and content, exist harmoniously in feeling, but the harmony is imperfect because of the finitude of feeling. Each aspect tends to outrun or exceed the other. Thought tries to cure the defect by a homeopathic method. It accentuates the separation between the *that* and the *what*, sunders them in order to bring them together more effectively. The *that* thus sundered becomes the logical subject, while the *what* is the logical predicate. But, elsewhere, he holds that reality itself is the logical subject of every judgment. Now, obviously, reality as a whole is not a mere *that*; it is the perfect harmony of the *that* and the *what*. Nor
is the predicate, logically considered, a mere *what*, a bare content. All this mention of sundering and homeopathic treatment seems then wide of the mark, a defect which Bradley himself recognised in the *Essays on Truth and Reality*.¹ What is characteristic of judgment is the presence of an ideal element. If reality alone were present in the judgment, there could be no judgment, since the latter is relational while the former is supra-relational. Such relations as are affirmed must be within reality. But no judgment establishing such relations alone can claim to absolute truth, since the predication in every case would be not of reality, but of what is in reality. In order to approximate to finality, then, the judgment should seek to identify the ideal with the real; the identity appears, as it were, in a relational form, that of predication. The predicate of the judgment is neither something other than the real, nor a single aspect of the real taken in abstraction from existence; it is something less than the real, in that it comprises inadequately harmonised aspects of existence and content. That judgment is most true which

¹ Reference may be made in particular to pp. 316 and 333 of the *Essays on Truth and Reality*. It is not claimed that the view here explained is expressly adopted by Bradley; but it would appear to be in consonance with his metaphysical principles, and favoured by a great part of what he says in his later writings. Of particular interest in this connection are his rejection of the doctrine of "floating ideas" and of the view that the subject is a "mere *that*". For the Bradleian view of error explained in the next paragraph, see *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd edition, pp. 193, 194, particularly the following: "We have crossed the threads of the connection between our 'whats' and our 'thats,' and have thus caused a collision, a collision which disappears when things are taken as a whole." Bradley's anyathākhyāti, like that provisionally accepted by the advaitin, is of a variety consistent with absolutism, not pluralism.
identifies with reality, as the logical subject, a predicate which requires the least amount of readjustment or supplementation. In essence, the function of the judgment is true identification, not the predication of an attribute. Such a view seems more in accord with the fundamental position of Bradley as well as his own expressed dissatisfaction with the theory of judgment formulated by him earlier. And the approximation it makes to the doctrine of akhandārtha is not without interest.

One may note in passing the Bradleian theory of error as a crossed reference and its similarity to the view of error as anyathākhyāti (apprehension as otherwise). It may be remembered that one of the examples Bradley gives of error is the judgment "Roses are green". The error is possible because of a confusion between the flower and the leaf; the leaves are green, while the flowers are red; but the greenness of the former is erroneously referred to the flowers; when our knowledge extends so as to cover both leaf and flower and becomes more precise, so that each colour is referred to its appropriate substrate, the error vanishes.

The anyathākhyāti view, though attributed to the Logicians, has some popularity with Advaitins too in the explanation of sopādhika-bhrama, delusion caused by the presence of an external adjunct. For example, the white crystal seen as red is so seen because the redness of the flower in proximity to it is erroneously referred to it. And the white shell is seen to be yellow, because in the jaundiced person, bile goes forth with
the rays of light from the eyes; and the yellowness of
the bile is erroneously referred to the object apprehend-
ed by those rays of light. This view is so much to the
fore in Vācaspati's account of super-imposition that he
seems to be a supporter of anyathākhyāti. And
Amalānanda has to rescue him from this charge by
pointing to the explanation of the mirage, where at least
we have not a crossed reference, but a pure creation
which is not determinable as either real or unreal.¹

V. PRIMAL NESCIENCE

The stream of indeterminable superimpositions is be-
ginningless, so that it is reasonable to look for the cause
of each superimposition in an earlier superimposition.²
But there must be a fundamental vice, an original sin,
which is responsible for the superimpositions of the
diverse and the relational on the one and the supra-
relational. Granted relating, we can understand the
dependence of one relation on another; granted parti-
culars, we can understand their causal dependence.
Back of the relations there is a relating; back of the
particulars there is a particularising. This original sin
is primal nescience, the ignorance that is the cause
(mūla-'vidyā or kāraṇā-'vidyā). Dependent on this

¹ svarūpeṇa maricymbho mṛṣā vācaspater matam
anyathākhyātir iṣṭā 'sye ' ty anyathā jagrhr janāh.

² In this Vācaspati differs from Padmapāda, who would go
straightaway to primal nescience as the cause of all superim-
positions.
are derivative ignorances (tūlā-'vidyās or kāryā-'vidyās); and individual delusions are products of these. These delusions are sublatable by other appearances of the same grade of reality as themselves; the cognition of a stick may take the place of the cognition of a snake, where in truth there is neither stick nor snake. Derivative ignorances are sublatable by cognition of the objects to which they relate; ignorance about nacre is removable by knowledge of nacre; primal nescience is removable by knowledge of the supreme reality alone; hence it persists up to the realisation of Brahman. Particularising ceases only with true knowledge, the knowledge of the universal, which is, not outside of, but above particulars.

Two difficulties at least may be raised to the conception of mūlā-'vidyā. The brilliant dialectic of advaitins like Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara has shown the unintelligibility of the causal concept. It is not ultimately real. It obtains, if at all, only in the world of appearance. In the phenomenal world of particulars, then, one may be excused for looking to one particular as the cause or effect of another. But what is the sense of asking for a cause of the phenomenal world and postulating primal nescience as that cause? Are we not committing the same fallacy as Kant, who, after confining the applicability of the causal concept to phenomena, proceeded solemnly to affirm things-in-themselves as the causes of phenomena? The difficulty so presented appears serious enough. But this at least should make us pause before we condemn the doctrine;
the cause suggested is not trans-phenomenal, but is itself phenomenal. It is not suggested that nescience is noumenal, while its consequences and products are phenomenal, though degrees of unreality are recognised between the cause and the products, these degrees being distinguished, as stated earlier, according to the nature of the means required for sublation. In setting up the alleged causal relation, then, we are dealing with terms, both of which are phenomenal and therefore susceptible of the said relation. Further, the causal relationship as between tula-vidyā and its products is not of the same kind as that suggested between mūla-vidyā and the tula-vidyās. It is not suggested that mūla-vidyā is a cause in time, so much as the logical ground of the tula-vidyās, for the latter too are said to be beginningless (anādi). Such a relationship is not inconsistent even with the possession of a higher grade of reality by primal nescience; for, is not Brahman the substrate of the entire world-appearance? and is not Brahman the absolute real? The relational world is the world of appearance. It has as its ground the non-relational; but it may also be said to have relating as its more proximate ground. The advaitin believes and rightly believes in progressive development of knowledge. He would concede the doctrine that the effect is pre-existent in the cause, in order to lead the pupil on to deny the separate existence of the effect from the cause. He would concede the doctrine of the concrete universal transforming itself into the particulars, in order to lead the pupil to conceive this transformation as nothing but
an illusory manifestation. He would concede the causing of delusions by a primal nescience in order to lead the pupil to reject finally the concept of cause. The distinction between causal and effected nescience is but relative and there are not sufficient reasons to disagree with it or reject it.

Another and a more serious objection is based on the popular conception of ignorance as mere absence of knowledge. For the traditional advaitin, nescience or ignorance is a positive entity, not a mere negation. And this would well accord with the positive nature of error, which consists not in the mere absence of knowledge, but in the positive assertion of something else as knowledge. It may be thought that it should be a non-dualist's business to reduce the number of entities to one; but this is a misconception. Reality for him is one; but its unity does not conflict with the plurality of phenomenal existents; and it has never been contended that nescience, though primal, is anything but phenomenal. Nor may it be said that in any case there is no justification for ascribing a positive character to what is primarily, if not wholly, negative. For, if ignorance were wholly negative, it could not even be known to exist. Perception would not apply thereto, since what is perceived should be in sense-contact, and a mere negation cannot be in contact with the senses or with anything else. Nor can absence of knowledge

1 vivarta-vādasya hi pūrva-bhūmir
vedānta-vāde pariṇāma-vādaḥ. (Saṅkṣepasārīraka, II. 61.)
2 Pace Y. Subba Rao: Mūlā-vidyā-nirūsa.
be perceived as an attribute of the self, since an attribute can be perceived only in the case of a substrate that is in the sphere of perception; but the self is not in the sphere of perception. Inference, even if it could apply, would give only mediate knowledge, whereas our experience of ignorance is immediate, in the form "I did not know nacre; but now I know" and so on; there is the further difficulty that, being based on perceived concomitance, inference is not possible, where perception is wholly ruled out. Nor is recourse possible to the pramāṇa called non-cognition (anupalabdhi); for, non-cognition again can give only mediate knowledge; further, the self being incapable of perception, its attribute too cannot be perceived, while non-cognition applies only to that of which perception (or some other means of cognition) is possible; truly, there is no cognition of non-existence, except where the substrate of non-existence is capable of being perceived. But we do have experience both of ignorance and of its removal by knowledge. Hence, ignorance (or nescience) is both positive,¹ and indeterminable, even like nacre-silver.

VI. PLURALITY AND LOCATION OF NESCIENCE

A distinctive feature of Vācaspati's advaita is the recognition of a plurality of nesciences. If the

¹ Vācaspati's recognition of the two avidyās is apparent from the very first line of his invocatory verse. There is no specific defence of the conception of mūla-vidyā. Some of the arguments here mentioned are based on the Iṣṭasiddhi, copies of the proofs of which were very kindly supplied by the editor, Mr. M. Hiriyanna (see particularly pp. 65, 66).
world be admitted to be a product of nescience, when nescience is destroyed on the release of a single jīva the world should be destroyed for all other jīvas as well; and there should be no distinction between the bound and the released. One way out of the difficulty would be to affirm the existence of one jīva alone, all other jīvas, the differences of teacher and taught, bound and released, being all alike comparable to the dreams of the single jīva; this jīva has not yet been released; when he is released, the world too would of course cease to exist. But such radical solipsism is unacceptable to the majority of advaitins, who hold that the distinction between the bound and the released may not be ignored, since Scripture declares that certain souls have been released and disbelief in Scripture in such a vital matter as release would necessarily lead to the discrediting of Scripture as such. A plurality of jīvas must be conceded. Our experience even of our finite self-hood is through contact and conflict with other selves. These are no doubt looked upon by the sophisticated mind as mere not-self or inert matter; but primarily the conflict and the contrast is with other selves. That is why the Bhagavatpāda, in speaking of the reciprocal superimposition of the self and the not-self, refers to the latter as the concept "Thou," though one would have expected the author to refer to it as "It" or "That". Vācaspati's own non-dualism will be found to approximate very closely to Berkeleyan idealism, though, perhaps, not to solipsism; and the parallel
will be found to be all the closer in that both the
writers insist on the existence of God and of a plurality
of spirits, however much that may seem to be in
conflict with the idealism they profess. And in so
far as he insists on the reality of other spirits, and of
our duties and obligations in relation to them up to
the stage of final realisation, Vācaspati’s doctrine (as
also that of Maṇḍana from whom it is derived) should
be characterised as realistic rather than idealistic.¹
The stream that culminates in the solipsism of
Prakāśānanda² does not have its source in Maṇḍana
or Vācaspati; its more likely source is the view that
Brahman is both the locus and the content of nescience,
which is but single, and that it is Brahman who
through its own nescience seems bound as it were
and through its own knowledge seems to be released as it
were.³

¹ In a sense, all advaita is idealistic, in that the material world
cannot have absolute and independent reality, on any variety of
advaita. If such a world existed, its very existence could not be
known. In the last resort, knowledge is possible only because
the self is self-luminous and the self is knowledge. If things are
known, it must be because they are not really other than the self,
being super-imposed thereon; see the saṁvid-bhāmiti, pp. 34-38;
also the Brahmasiddhi, p. 7; ekatva eva yam draṣṭr-ṛṣya-bhāvo
vkalpate, draṣṭur eva cidātmānaḥ tathā tathā viparītāmmād
vivartanād vā; nānātve tu vivikta-svabhāvayor asaṁsāra-paras-
para-svarūpavahyā asambhaddhayoha kidrśo draṣṭr-ṛṣya-bhāvah?

² The author of the Vedāntasiddhāntamuktidhavali, the out-
standing representative of Vedānta Solipsism or Drṣṭiśrṣṭi-vāda,
the view that perception of things is either the creation of them
or is simultaneous with their creation; the latter view seems to
have been favoured by Prakāśānanda.

³ Such a view is more in accord with the teaching of Suresvara,
wrongly identified with Maṇḍana. Suresvara was an immediate
disciple of Śaṅkara.
Of the nesciences that constitute the world there should then be as many as there are jīvas. When a particular jīva attains knowledge, his nescience is destroyed and for him the world ceases to be. Other nesciences, however, continue to exist and to bind the souls yet unreleased. It may be possible to explain the distinction on the basis of different capacities (sākta) possessed by a single nescience. Nescience binds every jīva because in respect of each jīva it has a different capacity to bind; and when a particular jīva is released, that particular capacity is lost, though nescience itself persists for other jīvas. Though such an explanation is plausible, the unity of avidyā is a needless complication. It is said for instance that, though the pain in the foot is not a pain in the hand, the hand reaches forth to pluck the thorn from the foot, because both hand and foot are members of a single organism and thus there is community of feeling. There is no such community of feeling between different individuals since there is no common organism of which they are members. That is why Caitra does not feel Maitra’s pain as his own. If the different experiences of Caitra and Maitra were, however, products of a single avidyā, this may discharge the functions of a common organism; and it would be difficult to explain why Caitra does not recall Maitra’s pain as if it were his own.  

1 This is a development of the advaitin’s explanation of non-recollection (anānusandhāna). It must be confessed that that explanation does not appear to be thorough-going, as it apparently ignores the fact of individuals being members of social and other organisms and thereby sharing each other’s joys and sorrows.
The ignorances thus assumed must be located in the jīvas. Brahman who is pure and perfect cannot obviously be the locus of defect; and avidyā, the material cause of all defects, is itself the greatest defect. Apart from this, it is the jīva that is instructed, that strives and acquires the knowledge which destroys nescience. But there can be no relation of destroyer and destroyed except as between what occupy the same locus. The poison drunk by Caitra will not remove the life of Māitra. Hence, nescience must have the same locus as the knowledge which destroys it, i.e., the jīva. But it may be objected that the finitude, transmigration and suffering of the jīva, all that constitute his jīva-hood in short, are the products of nescience; there would be no jīva except as the product of nescience; how then can nescience itself reside in the jīva? The attempted charge of reciprocal dependence will not stand, for the interaction of ignorance and jīva-hood is beginningless. We do not say at any time that ignorance was and the jīva was not, or that the jīva was and ignorance was not. If it be still urged that such dependence is in the last resort unintelligible, we counter it with the question, “why expect intelligibility in the case of nescience?” It is of the very essence of nescience to be unintelligible in the last resort: tad evā ‘vidyānāṁ avidyātvam.

VII. ISVARA AND THE CREATION OF THE WORLD

There being a plurality of nesciences, granted that nescience is the material cause of the world, there
are bound to be a plurality of worlds. In conserving the authoritatively of Scripture, we seem to have sacrificed the claims of empirical usage, which demands a single world common to all souls. The latter demand is, however, not imperative, since all that is needed is no more than the measure of agreement that exists among the different spectators of an illusion. When the rope is seen to be a snake, as it were, by a number of people, the agreement among them does not prove the existence of a single objective snake. What does exist without happens to be interpreted by all of them in the same manner; if the snake existed objectively it should not be possible for some people to mistake it for a garland. The objectivity of the world, then, is no more than the consilience of illusions.

What happens, then, to the view accepted by the Vedanta that God is the Creator of the Universe? Each jiva would appear to be the creator of his world, through and out of the nescience abiding in him; the world is sustained by his nescience, and is destroyed with its destruction. The true creator, sustainer and destroyer would thus appear to be the jiva himself. If the world be considered to be created by a God, that could be no more than an illusion, on a par with the world-illusion itself. The Creator and His Creatorship would both be figments of the creature's imagination. The jiva is enthroned on high and God apparently reduced to nothing. But such a conclusion can hardly be consistent with the true trend of advaita. It is true that for this system even Isvara is not
ultimate; endow Him as we may with the utmost knowledge and power, He still falls short of perfection, since the Perfect is beyond all attributes; greatness is significant only in relation to smallness, while the Absolute is neither great nor small and is above relative predications. All this, however, is very different from the position that Isvara is a figment of the jiva's nescience. On the face of it, Vācaspati would seem to be more idealistic than Berkeley, who conserved the independent reality of God along with that of other souls. And this is all the more difficult to comprehend in the case of Vācaspati, who begins his work with due invocation to Bhava, Kārtikeya and Gaṇapati, and throughout his work betrays little trace of the atheism that is his apparent conclusion. There is no doubt, however, that the possibility of an atheistic conclusion must have struck many of his critics, as the author of the Kalpataru is anxious to make out repeatedly that Vācaspati does recognise Isvara and that they are fools who say there is no place for Isvara in his system. The truth of the matter seems to be this. Ignorance is bi-polar. It is located somewhere, i.e., it belongs to some one; and it has a content. Though the jiva is the locus, the content is Isvara. When ordinarily we use the possessive pronoun 'mine' or 'his,' we imply in the person capacity to control what is referred to. Not so in the case of ignorance; I mean by "my ignorance" the ignorance that is in me, not the ignorance that I can control. The control of avidyā belongs not to me with
my limited powers of knowing and acting, but to the omniscient and omnipotent Being. Is'vara too may be said to be the āśraya of ignorance, if by āśraya is meant the content, but not its locus (ādhāra). When, therefore, it is said that my ignorance creates the universe, it does not follow that I create the universe; rather does it mean that Is'vara, the content of my ignorance, uses the ignorance that is in me and out of that as material cause, evolves the world; the ignorance in me, the māya, the prakṛti is the primal material cause; he who wields it for fashioning the world, the māyin, the arch-juggler, is Is'vara.¹

At no time then do we have Is'vara without the jīvas or the jīvas without Is'vara.² Ignorance is the condition of the existence of both. And when there is ignorance, it must exist somewhere and it must have a content. When this polarity of ignorance is resolved, ignorance itself is transcended and Brahmanhood fully realised. But when ignorance exists, Is'vara is the image which is reflected, as it were, in the various nesciences. The reflections are the jīvas. Vācaspati does not hold that the jīvas are literally reflections,

¹ We are indebted to Mahāmahopādhyāya Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sāstriar, M.A., I.E.S., for considerable help in understanding this part of the doctrine. See further on the same topic, Mahāmahopādhyāya N. S. Anantakṛṣṇa Sāstri's commentary on the Vedāntaparibhāṣā, first edition, Calcutta, pp. 2-3. Reference may be made to the Kalpataru, particularly p. 404.

² Cp. “The personal God of India, Is'vara, issues from the Brahman simultaneously with the ātman, the soul, and both appear together as simultaneous and mutually determined occurrences. It is the same in Eckhart's teaching. Only with and for the soul, with and for the creature, is God, God as person, as subject, and as conscious of objects.”—R. Otto, Mysticism East and West, p. 14.
since there can be reflection only of what is visible and in what is visible; and neither Brahman nor avidyā can be said to possess visible form. But he has no objection to using the analogy of reflection extensively. The diversities of jīvas are compared to the diversities of the reflections of one face in different media, such as a gem, a sword, a mirror. Vācaspati's own conception of the relation of the jīva to Brahman is that of finitisation of the infinite. Ether is infinite and all-pervasive; but it seems to be confined in a pot as it were; and when the pot is moved, though the pot alone is moved, there seems to be a motion of the ether in it as well. In the same way Universal Spirit defined by the internal organ etc., is the jīva; when the defining adjuncts are got rid of, there is no longer any difference between the jīva and Brahman. The finitising is bi-polar; at one pole standsĪśvara and at the other the jīva. It is not that Brahman is first reflected asĪśvara and that the jīvas are reflections of this reflection, or thatĪśvara is a reflection in one medium and the jīvas reflections in another medium.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Vācaspati's position in this question of whether the jīva is an avaccheda or a pratibimba is discussed fully by Appayya Dīksita in the Parimala, at the close of I, i, 4, where he shows that Vācaspati favours the avaccheda-vāda. Some advaitins hold that māyā is different from avidyā, that the former is collective and single while the latter are diverse, or that in the former the sattva constituent is pure, while in the latter it is impure; and they say thatĪśvara is the reflection of Brahman in māyā, while the jīvas are the reflections of Brahman in avidyā. Such a view makesĪśvara very remote and leaves Him little in common with the jīvas. For the various views, see the Siddhāntatantrausaṅgraha, 1st paricchedha, pp. 66-104 (Kumbakonam edition).
Transmigration and its woes being due to nescience, the one way to get rid of them is knowledge, which destroys nescience. But knowledge does not come to all. The ground must be prepared, the mind cleared and the heart made pure for the reception of the truth. Herein lies the use of ritual, the due performance of which purifies the intellect and brings about the desire to know. The fruit of action is non-eternal; hence release can never be attained through ritual. But the desire to know can be brought about through engaging in ritual and this in due course fulfils itself through knowledge and release. It is then as little true that karma has nothing to do with release as that it can of itself bring about release. It is a remote auxiliary (āradupakāraka) and as such requires to be duly observed in season.¹

IX. THE FINAL INTUITION

When the desire to know has been awakened, one hears the highest truths from the Vedānta, reflects on them, reasons about them, refutes all objections to them, and, being finally satisfied about them, begins to contemplate the supreme Brahman that they teach. By uninterrupted meditation practised with devotion for a long time, the seeker of Brahman attains Brahman;

¹ The Vivarāpakāra holds that rituals are contributory to knowledge itself and not merely to the desire to know. See the Siddhāntālasyasaṅgraha, 3rd pariccheda, pp. 350-356.
he obtains, that is to say, an intuition of the one Supreme Intelligence, that is beyond all duality and misery. With that intuition are destroyed nescience and its products; and spirit stands forth having attained the release that was its own essential nature and only seemed to be non-existent, as it were, like the chain round one’s own neck, which one forgets and keeps looking for. The intuition is an act of immediate cognition; for, ignorance that is experienced as immediate can be removed only by knowledge which is also immediate; otherwise, it would be like the case of the fever patient who continues to find sugar bitter, though told it is not so and though himself knowing it is not so. Immediate cognition requires the functioning of a sense-organ, here the mind, the organ of internal sense. And this mental perception is made possible only by long-continued contemplation (prāsaṅkhyaṇa) as in the lover’s perception of the long-lost damsel, whom he constantly contemplates. The latter is, of course, a delusion; but the intuition of Brahman cannot be delusive, for Brahman is taught by Scripture, which is free from defect and cannot mislead; further, Brahman is ex hypothesi all that is; it cannot but exist; and it is identical with the jīva whose existence cannot be doubted; whence then the possibility of delusion?

1 It is held by some that immediate cognition may result even from verbal testimony without the functioning of a sense-organ, internal or external, and that the mind in any case is not a sense-organ. This view is mentioned in the notes, together with Amālānanda’s criticism thereof. The view that verbal
The final intuition is of the conditioned Brahman, not of the Absolute; for there is still the distinction of subject and object. It is analogous to the absolute truth of Bradley, which, he says, is absolute, only because it is intellectually incorrigible. Of the final intuition too it is true that nothing further is needed to correct it. It destroys the entire world of duality and destroys itself with it. When the powder of the clearing nut is mixed with muddy water to precipitate the mud, that powder itself does not require another precipitant.

X. Jīvanmukti

When nescience is destroyed by knowledge, it stands to reason that release is attained straightaway. And this would seem to have the approval of Scripture, which says that, for him who has seen, all karmas (in the plural, not in the dual) cease; ārābdha karma, that which has begun to fructify already, does not seem to be exempted from destruction. When a person attains knowledge, he should become disembodied too. But the position is by no means so simple as that. For one thing, there are Scriptural texts which definitely prescribe physical death as the limit after testimony is not of itself the cause of immediate cognition is part of Vācaspati's heritage from Maṇḍana. For the other view, see the Iṣṭasiddhi, p. 122, the Vedāntaparibhāṣā, pp. 39-41, and the Siddhāntaśāstraṇāraṇa, 3rd pariccheda, pp. 396-398; the consequential discussion as to how verbal testimony can cause immediate cognition goes on from p. 399 to p. 414.
which alone there is release,\textsuperscript{1} or speak of the final release on death of those who have already been released in effect.\textsuperscript{2} Embodiment may, then, continue even after the onset of knowledge. Prārabdha karma is like a missile that has begun to take flight; it will drop only when its force is fully spent; when that happens, the body, which is constituted for the enjoyment of that karma, perishes as well, and there is final release. But there is no diminution in the knowledge that has been realised. And there is this advantage in such persons continuing to be embodied, in that they serve as preceptors. None who is yet short of perfect knowledge can be a preceptor of non-dualism; and if he who has attained such knowledge should be disembodied at the same time, there would be no preceptors at all. The texts which speak of release immediately on the onset of knowledge signify but the close proximity of final release, if by such release we mean release from prārabdha karma and its product, the present body. But it is possible to be released even while in the state of embodiment, in the sense that for such a person there is no more knowledge to be acquired; much less is there anything to be done by him. Such a knower may indeed say on the strength of his experience that he is released, though he continues to appear in the body. As Śaṅkara says:

\textsuperscript{1} tasya tāvad eva ciram yāvan na vimoksye atha sampatsye.
\textsuperscript{2} vimuktas' ca vimucyate.
tasyā 'bhidyānād yojanāt tattva-bhāvāt bhūyas' ca 'nte vis'va-māyā-nivṛttiḥ.
"It should not be disputed whether the Brahman-knowner is embodied for a time or is not embodied. How can one’s own intimate experience of Brahman-knowledge existing together with embodiment be denied by another? 

The position is attractive but hardly clear from the logical point of view. If really there is the persistence of a part or trace of avidyā, (and that is what the continuance of prārabdhā karma means), what is the justification for speaking of that state as one of release? Where nescience continues, how can there be perfect knowledge? To appeal to ‘one’s own intimate experience’ is only to abandon the test of reason, so vigorously insisted on so long, side by side with the appeal to Scripture. The doctrine of Jīvan-mukti does not therefore commend itself to a logical mind like that of Maṇḍana. But his own position is not very clear. On

1 Bhāṣya on IV, i. 15.
2 See the Brahmasiddhi, pp. 129-133. It is possible to make out that Maṇḍana holds to one consistent view on this question, that there is final release only on the dissolution of the body, that though knowledge is attained and avidyā destroyed at an earlier stage we have still an adept alone, not a perfected being, that, in short, there is no Jīvan-mukti. Such an attempt has the merit of simplifying Maṇḍana’s position, while being on the whole faithful to it; but it does not free him from the inconsistency of holding that though avidyā is destroyed its saṃskāra persists. Maṇḍana argues that because of the use of the plural “karmāṇi” (in “ksiyante ca sāya karmāṇi”) even prārabdhā karma should be taken to be destroyed with the onset of knowledge. If that too is destroyed, how can the body persist? If it be said to persist because of saṃskāra, while saṃskāra is admitted to be akineitkara and to have no power to bind, why then should it be said that the sthīta-prajñā is only a sādhaka, not a siddha? Either avidyā persists, in which case the so-called Jīvan-mukta is only a sādhaka, or it does not persist, in
the one hand, he would make out that release comes only with physical death, and that the descriptions in Scripture and traditional lore of those who have passed beyond the guṇas or are well established in wisdom refer to the seeker not the sage, the devotee not the perfected one. On the other hand, however, he seems to admit the possibility of the body continuing for a time even after release, not because of a part of avidyā, but because of the impression (saṃskāra) of avidyā, i.e., what is left over of its original momentum. Avidyā, he says, has the power to bind, not so its bare impression. He, who knows that the image in the mirror is a bare reflection characterised by the defects of the mirror, no longer worries about the defects in the reflection, though by the strength of impression he continues to see the face in that way. To the question whether the released one continues to be embodied, Maṇḍana would thus seem to give two inconsistent answers—one negativising embodiment and another permitting it, but as caused by the impression of nescience, not by nescience itself. And to either position grave objections may be raised.

The description of him who is well established in knowledge (sthitaprajña) cannot apply to a mere adept; for, the latter is still proceeding from stage to
stage of contemplation gaining increased firmness at every stage; he whose knowledge can thus be surpassed by himself cannot be said to be well established. And no one in such a state of growth can be a preceptor of non-dualism. If, on the other hand, it be said that the preceptor is the man of perfect knowledge, who yet continues to be embodied, the difference between us extends only to the cause of such embodiment and your explanation is no better than mine. What is sāmśkāra itself but a trace of avidyā? There is no impression except as produced by some cause; and when the whole notion of cause and effect has been realised to be illusory, how can there be the persistence of an effect? If you say the impression is such that it cannot bind, we say the same of the trace of nescience whose persistence we recognise. We say that when there is perfect knowledge, prārabdha karma can only work itself out and not avail to create any fresh karma or other bondage.

One would seem compelled, therefore, to rest with this unsolved contradiction of the co-existence of bondage and release in the Jīvan-mukta. And this is the position of most advaitins. It is permissible, however, to speculate on a possible solution of the contradiction. The preceptor is he whom the pupil may legitimately regard as qualified to be such, not necessarily he who proclaims himself to be such. When such a person attains perfect knowledge, it may be that he, as an individual, is at that very time released. For him there is neither a trace of ignorance nor the
impression of ignorance. The psycho-physical configuration, however, which was spoken of as his body, may continue to exist and function for a while, shorter or longer, according to the extent of the momentum still left in it. The sāṃskāra of avidyā does exist, but for the body, not for the released spirit. It is this configuration which is spoken of as alive; it is that which is looked up to as the preceptor; it is on the dissolution of that that one speaks of the final release of that jīva. It may, however, be asked legitimately how the inert psycho-physical organism can function in the absence of intelligent guidance. If there is such guidance, is it not provided by the soul whose release is under discussion? If it does provide such guidance, how can we claim to be out of our original difficulty as to the co-existence of bondage and release? The answer we suggest is that there may be intelligent guidance; but the guidance is not by the particular soul, as particular; it is by Is'vāra with whom the released soul has become one. Is'vāra can and does express Himself through all manner of media for showing His Grace to suffering humanity. What more natural than that He should employ this psycho-physical organism which by due discipline and austerities has been perfected as far as it may be?

But with this we pass on to the further question as to the nature of release. If the jīva is a finitisation of Brahman, with the cessation of the adjuncts and of the process of finitisation, one should expect the jīva to become identical with Brahman. And this indeed
seems to be what the Scriptures teach when they say that he who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself. But if it is true that the finitisation is bi-polar, that \( \text{Is} \text{vara} \) at one pole is related to the \( \text{jivas} \) at the other, as if they were reflections of Himself, that the reflection is in the different nesciences each of which is located in a different \( \text{jiva} \), it seems difficult for the \( \text{jiva} \) to become identical with Brahman, when a particular adjunct is removed. When a face is reflected in a number of mirrors, on the removal of a particular mirror, the reflection therein becomes identical with the face-as-reflected not with the face-in-itself. The latter identity can come about only when all mirrors are removed, when there is no further possibility of reflection. Similarly the attainment of Brahmanhood may result only when all nesciences are removed, that is to say, when all \( \text{jivas} \) are released. Up to that time, release can consist only in identification with \( \text{Is} \text{vara} \). Hence it is not impossible that on the release of any particular \( \text{jiva} \), \( \text{Is} \text{vara} \) with whom that \( \text{jiva} \) has become identical may actuate for a time the psycho-physical organism which persists for a while because of the

---

1 The notion of release as attainment of identity with \( \text{Is} \text{vara} \) is dealt with at great length by Appayya Dīkṣita in the concluding pages of the *Siddhāntaśaṅgraha*, as well as in the *Śivādvaita-nirnaya*, sections, 3:2351 to 3:2355. The attainment of identity with pure Brahman can be only on the final release of all. The notion of sarvamukti (release of all) is not elaborated anywhere by Vācaspati, but he does refer to it in the commentary, on II, iii, 40 (p. 617). It is legitimate to infer that the whole superstructure raised by Appayya is not untrue to the foundations in Vācaspati’s own teaching. That Saṅkara himself countenanced such a view is very plausibly made out by Appayya.
strength of its initial momentum. But if avidyā has ceased to exist for the released soul, how can it exist for Is'vāra? The reply is that our conception of Is'vāra is of a pure being standing over against nescience, not bound by it, but certainly limited by it, while yet controlling it. This nescience is in truth neither real nor unreal, being indeterminable. But as we conceive the Lord, He is certainly limited by nescience, though when we become the Lord, on release, it will not be experienced as a limitation. The advaitin's ideal thus conceived cannot breed self-sufficiency; for, salvation is possible for all, and till that consummation is attained, the world-process consisting in the elaboration and manifestation of nescience will not cease; till the final release of all, therefore, release can at best be identity with God, who, for all his omnisci-ence and omnipotence, is yet limited. Nor is the identification with Is'vāra the same as the attainment of lordly powers said to be possible by the contemplation of Brahman in one or other of the saguṇa forms. The latter leads not to absolute lordship but only to the ability to create what is required for one's own enjoyment in heaven. There is no destruction of nescience, and consequently the lordly powers so acquired may be exhausted by exercise, so that a return to the original unlordly condition becomes possible. He who has realised non-duality, however, becomes fully and wholly identical with Is'vāra. He has not only the power to create but also the responsibility to rule and the duty to destroy. For him there is no
more Nescience; hence the declaration of non-return to sarpaśāra.

The thoughtful student of Vācaspati may, perhaps, find little that is original in him. For the distinctive aspects of his teaching, he owes much, as has been said, to Maṇḍana. Where he differs from Maṇḍana, he elects to follow Saṅkara, not, perhaps always wisely. But there have been very few to excel or rival Vācaspati in the versatility and the extent of his scholarship, his vigour of style and clarity of presentation. The thoughts that so far we have been able to trace to Maṇḍana would have remained little known and barren but for Vācaspati’s linking them up with Saṅkara’s teaching. About Maṇḍana’s own advaita doctrines, there has been as much uncertainty and speculation as about his personality, in spite of scraps of information vouchsafed here and there in the course of commentaries on other works. If the publication of the Brahmasiddhi makes us realise Vācaspati’s indebtedness to Maṇḍana, it makes no less clear our own indebtedness to Vācaspati for popularising and keeping alive such a unique line of non-dualist doctrine.

1 For example, in the criticism of sphoṭa-vāda. On this subject see article on “Vācaspati’s criticism of the sphoṭa-vāda,” Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, VI, p. 311.
For the study of the Bhāmati in the first instance one of the editors—Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri—had the able guidance of Vedānta Visārada Paṇḍit K. A. Lakshmana Sastri of the Sanskrit College, Mylapore; the same scholar was of considerable help in going through the Kalpataru and the Rjuparakāsikā; and the editors' grateful thanks are due to him in full measure. For the book as a whole both the editors are responsible; but the translation of the Bhāṣya was done in the first instance by Dr. Kunhan Raja, while the rest was primarily the work of the other editor.¹ Both in manuscript and in proof the book has had the advantage of suggestions and criticisms from several scholars, particularly, Mahāmahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati Darsanakalānidhi Kulapati S. Kuppuswami Sastri of the Presidency College; to him we owe a great debt for the kind permission to use the Brahmasiddhi in proof and for the trouble he took to free the translation from inaccuracies as far as possible; our thanks are also due to Professor K. A. Nilakanta Sastri of the University of Madras, and Professors P. Narasimham and P. P. S. Sastri of the Presidency College, Madras. To these as well as to Sir S. Radhakrishnan, who has been so good as to contribute a Foreword, we take this opportunity of expressing our deep sense of gratitude. The Bhāmati is admittedly a difficult work; and a translation for the first time is almost necessarily tentative

¹ For the text, the Vani Vilas edition of the Catussūtri Bhāmati has been followed for the most part.
and imperfect; despite reasonable care in the first instance, we have had to introduce several alterations and additional explanatory notes. The readers' attention is requested to these in making use of the text and translation. We are thankful to the Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, for undertaking the publication, and to the Vasanta Press for finishing the work so well.
...
DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS

[N.B. The summary in italics relates to the Bhāṣya, and the rest to the Bhāmaṭṭī; the arabic numerals in brackets give the pages.]

A. SUPERIMPOSITION

I. Existence of Superimposition (1).

Invocation (2); Objections to the study: content already known (3); unfruitfulness (4); interpretation of the first section of the Bhāṣya (5); reply to the first objection: true nature of the self is not known (7); scriptural declarations of the true nature of the self are purportful, not secondary or figurative (8); it is valid though opposed to perception, since empirical validity of the latter is not annulled (8); priority of perception not a ground for non-sublation; the apaccheda-nyāya (9); empirical cognition of the self is untrue (9); the word "self" is used not secondarily of the body; conditions of secondary usage (10); self-identity known to the inquirer, not to the man in the street (11); the self is not finite like the body (11); the concept 'I' illusory even for the vijñāna-vādin (12); it is due to reciprocal super-imposition of substrates and of attributes (13); illusory cognition is its cause and empirical usage its fruit (13); non-discrimination as the cause of illusory cognition (14); objection that there are not two realities; reply—"coupling the true with the untrue"
(14); beginninglessness of super-imposition (15); objection: if bodies etc., are manifest they are real; if not, there can be no coupling (15); reply (16).

II. Definition of Superimposition (16).

Explanation of the definition (17); the definition is neither too wide (17); nor too narrow (18); explanation of the superimpositions of yellow shell, the reflected face (18); manifestation alone does not constitute reality (19); even of the unreal there can be manifestation (19); the Mīmāṃsaka view of non-existence as another mode of existence and the criticism of the Buddhist view that cognitions cause the appearance of the unreal (20); cognition can neither be determined by nor invariably linked with the unreal (21); reply to the Mīmāṃsakas (21, 22); the superimposed is like what was formerly seen (22); but really it is indeterminable (23); the purity etc., and reality of the intelligent self (23); different views of superimposition: ātmakahyāti (23, 24); criticism of above by akhyātivādin (25); his criticism of the view that the superimposed is created (25, 26); his view that all cognitions are valid (26); that delusion is but non-apprehension of the distinction between the directly apprehended and the remembered (26, 27); the anyathākhyātivādin—his criticism of akhyāti (28, 29, 30); his view of super-imposition (30, 31, 32); indeterminability recognised in all the definitions (32).

III. Possibility of Superimposition on the inner self (33).

The samvid-bhāmati (34-37); difficulties in the manifestation of the self (34); view that consciousness
is self-manifest, the self being merely its locus (34, 35); refutations of the above (35, 36, 37); light is one, determinate, identical with the self and objects are superimposed thereon (37, 38); difficulty of superimposition on the self which is a non-object (38, 39); reply—non-objectness not invariable (39); appearance of agency, enjoyership, objectness etc. due to defining adjuncts (40); ananda, nityatva etc., not really different from caitanya (40); Jñatva as idam-anidam-rūpa (40, 41); immediacy of realisation of the inner self (42); possibility of superimposition even on what is not manifest: a prāṇḍhi-vāda (42, 43).

IV. Nature of Superimposition (43, 44).

Called Nescience (43); the cause of all evil (44); means of removing it (45); impossibility of its recurrence (46.)

V. Means of valid knowledge have reference to one characterised by Nescience (47).

Means of valid knowledge function only when there is conceit of self in the body, senses etc. (48); without their functioning there would be no empirical usage (48, 49); they cannot function without control (49); control is not possible except by a body on which the nature of the self is superimposed (49); the unattached self, in the absence of superimposition, is not a knower (50); where there is no knowership, the means of valid knowledge do not function (50).

VI. Resemblance of learned persons to beasts etc. (51, 52).
VII. Sacred teaching (other than the Vedānta) relates to one characterised by Nescience (53, 54).

Activity prescribed in sacred teaching requires the self's relation to another world, not its freedom from the migratory cycle (54); these teachings function before the realisation of the self as taught in the Vedānta (55); the karma-kāṇḍa and the Vedānta relate to different spheres; analogy of the śyena sacrifice (55).

VIII. Nature of Superimposition repeated (56, 57).

Superimposition of attributes exemplified (57); superimposition of substrate exemplified (58).

IX. Removal of this beginningless cause of evil is the purport of the entire Vedānta (59, 60).

Etymology of sārīraka-mīmāṃsā (61); summary of prima facie view (61, 62); summary of final view (62).

B. DESIRE TO KNOW

I. First aphorism stated (63); "atha" means "ānantarya," not "adhikāra" (64), nor "auspiciousness" (65); what is it that goes before? (65).

Brahman-knowledge, free from doubt, is the one supreme benefit (63); seems to be unattained because of Nescience; illustration of necklace round one's neck (63); doubt implied as cause of the inquiry (64); primacy of the aphorism justified (64); etymology of mīmāṃsā, sāstra and sūtra (64); primacy of the "desire to know" (65, 66); "jiññāsā" distinguished from "mīmāṃsā" (66); auspiciousness effected by "atha" only when used in another sense (68); "reference to what has
gone before” does not differ in effect from “immediate succession” (68, 69): correct view; there is dependence on what goes before, only where there is a statement of alternative views (69).

II. Succession not to knowledge of ritual (70); no sequence intended nor a relationship of Šeṣa and Šeṣin or of Adhikṛta ’dhikāra (71).

Ritual not subsidiary to apprehension of the sense of the sentence (71); Brahman-intuition results from hearing, reflection and contemplation (72); sacrifices etc. are of service to that contemplation by destroying impurities opposed to beatitude or by purifying the person or because of the discharge of the three obligations (73); the rites may subserve contemplation too by saṁyoga-ṛthaktva (74); refutation of the above prima facie view: Brahman-intuition is not a product or a modification or an attainment (75, 76) or something purified (76, 77); Brahman-intuition is not itself Brahman, nor is free from adjuncts; itself the last adjunct on the brink of destruction (78); not invalid like an imagined idea, because of the immediate experience of the jīva from the first (79); intuition effected by the antaḥkaraṇa aided by the impression consequent on the repetition of the Vedānta Texts; no co-presence between contemplation and ritual (79).

Objection: in spite of knowledge, impressions of Nescience persist; example of the bilious person spitting out sugar; ritual needed to root out these impressions; they may succeed in the task, though
themselves part of Nescience; example of certain poisons, the clearing nut etc. (80).

Reply: impressions of Nescience may continue, but the enlightened one has no faith in ritual; he who has no faith is not eligible to engage in ritual (81); ritual performed by ineligible persons has no fruit (81), and not required for contemplation (82).

Objection: prohibitions too would not apply to the vidvān, and there would be transgressions of the moral law (82).

Reply: Even the jīvanmukta has slight traces of Nescience, though he has no faith in rituals; but faith is required only for doing, not for refraining (82); there can be no transgression of prohibitions (83); ritual not required even in the origination of contemplation (83); rites are remote auxiliaries (83), as generating the desire to know (84). Tapas explained as eating in moderation (84); obligatory rites purify by destroying sin already incurred (84). Saṃyogapṛthaktva unjustifiable, because of prolixity (85). Stages in the functioning of ritual towards the desire to know (85). Ritual unnecessary where non-attachment has already resulted (86). The Jābaḷa text does not intend to declare the presence of a rule of succession (87). Both Scripture and codes intend but an emphasis on non-attachment (88). Nor is sequence established by pāṭha, sthāna, mukhya or pravṛtti, because there is no relationship of subsidiary and principal (88); nor is there the eligibility of a person already eligible for something else (89).
III. *Difference between the two "Desires to know" in respect of content and fruit* (90), in the dependence or non-dependence of the content on observances (90), in the existence or non-existence of their contents (91), in the related texts prompting to activity or merely instructing (91).

Etymology of viṣaya (92); in spite of the apparent injunction "ātmā jñātavyaḥ," there is no directing to activity in respect of Brahman, since it cannot be produced (93); nor in respect of contemplation or knowledge from verbal testimony, since neither is aprāpta so as to call for a scriptural injunction (93).

IV. *The Preliminaries stated* (94).

Discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal, not of the nature of certitude (95), nor of the nature of doubt, but the apprehension of difference between substrates in general, as also between their attributes, as eternal and non-eternal (95); absolute denial of truth impossible (96); non-attachment and how it arises (96); sāma, dama etc. explained (97).

V. *Explanation of "therefore"; perishability of all enjoyment, even that acquired for the hereafter, while Brahman-knowledge bears permanent fruit* (98).

Possibility of non-attachment questioned; pain should be remedied, not pleasure avoided (99); scriptural declaration of the imperishability of heavenly pleasures sublates inference of perishability (99); reply: pain cannot be remedied because of the defects of dependence on external means and diminution persisting in all produced happiness (100); diminution etc. evidenced by
Scripture too in addition to inference; hence texts to the contrary have a secondary sense (100); Brahman-knowledge the supreme human goal (100).

VI. "Brahma-jiñāsā" explained as a sixth case-compound with the sense of object; Brahman does not mean caste etc. (101).

Refutation of the fourth case compound (101, 102); Brahman is that which will be defined later (102); refutation of "the residuary sense" of the sixth case (102, 103), because knowledge requires an object and Brahman is that object (103).

VII. Further refutation of the residuary sense (104).

The objection and the reply imply concealed views (104).

VIII. Further defence of the residuary sense; refutation: acceptance of the principal involves the acceptance of everything dependent on it (105); Scriptural support for Brahman being the object (106); explanation of "jiñāsā" (106); Brahman-knowledge exterminates Nescience and is hence the human goal (106).

Both objector and respondent come out with their real views (105); knowledge culminating in realisation is the object of desire (107); Brahman-realisation is the human goal, though it is incapable of generation, modification, purification, or attainment (107, 108); hence its knowledge is sought (108) and this is possible only with the help of the inquiry into Brahman (109).

IX. Objection: impossibility of desire to know, whether Brahman be known or unknown (109).
Reply: Brahman does exist and is well known as the self (110).

Existence of a general understanding of Brahman even prior to the enquiry (111); the attributes of Brahman (111, 112); etymology of Brahman (112); no one fails to cognise his own self (113); and the self is Brahman (113).

X. Objection: being known, Brahman need not be inquired into (114); reply: conflicting views about its distinctive nature; several such views stated (114, 115); necessity for inquiry into Vedānta aided by reasoning not inconsistent therewith (115).

Conflicting views must have a common basis (115); such views about the denotation of the “thou” (116); similar views about the denotation of “that” indicated (116) and directly stated (117); the basis of such views (117); need for inquiry (118); place of reasoning (118).

C. DEFINITION

I. Definition of Brahman stated (119); explanation and justification of “janmādi” (120, 121); explanation of “this” in “for this” (121, 122); complement of the aphorism (122).

Objection: No definition is possible since no pramāṇa applies (119, 120); reply: tatāstha-lakṣaṇa stated as possible (120); justification for treating Brahman as the cause, not the pradhāna etc. (121, 122); need for intelligence (122), and omniscience and omnipotence (123).
II. Justification for considering only the three; viz., origination, sustentation and destruction (124).

Other modifications of "being" mentioned (124), and shown to be included in the three (125); the mention of these three alone brings to mind the appropriate Sruti about creation etc. (125); else would be brought to mind the Nirukta which does not teach the first cause (125).

III. Pradhāna, primal atoms, chance etc. ruled out (126); origination etc. used by some as grounds for inferring the Lord (126).

IV. Present aphorism not intended to set forth an inference (127), the purpose of these aphorisms being to inquire into and string together Vedānta texts (127), Brahman-realisation being possible by such inquiry alone (128), inference serving only to confirm the sense of the texts (128).

Explanation of "manana" and "yukti" (128).

V. Scripture not the sole authority, but experience etc. too, where applicable (129), since Brahman-knowledge culminates in experience (129), and relates to an existent (130); not a kārya which allows of option (130), and in respect of which prescriptions and prohibitions are purportful (130); a "thing" admits of no options (131); hence knowledge of it depends not on the human intellect (131), but on the thing itself for validity (131).

Reconciliation where there is conflict between prescriptions etc. (132); doubt and error do not introduce option into things, not being dependent on their nature (133).
VI. The existent is open to other means of knowledge besides the Vedānta; contingent non-authoritativeness of the latter (134); reply: Brahman not a content of the senses (134); the aphorism of origination etc. intended not to suggest an inference (135), but to exhibit Vedānta texts (135); the definitive text among these (136).

Objection: Vedāntas would be restatements of inferential knowledge (134); the inner self not an object of the senses (135); sāmānyato dṛṣṭa inference not applicable (135); Brahman’s vivarto-पादानत्वa explained (136).

D. SCRIPTURE-SOURCE

I. Source of Scripture necessarily an omniscient being (137); author necessarily knows more than the content of the work, and Scripture itself is omniscient (138).

How Ṛgveda etc., are Sastras (138); how they are like the omniscient one (139); not all knowledge is expressible though possessed (140); “effortlessness” applied to creation signifies slightness, not absence, of effort (140); words and sentences non-eternal (140, 141); hence creation of these by the Lord is possible though He has no absolute liberty (141, 142); essential nature of the Vedas identical in every creation (142); single authorship not inconsistent with faith in the work (142).

II. Alternative interpretation: Scripture is the pramāṇa for Brahman (143). Possible doubt that
inference is suggested by the second aphorism is removed by the present aphorism (144).

E. HARMONY

I. Brahman not evidenced by Scripture whose purport is ritual (145); Brahman-texts futile or subsidiary to injunction of rituals or injunction of contemplation etc. (146, 148); the existent is in the sphere of other pramāṇas and hence Sruti in relation to it is non-authoritative (147); arthavāda passages find purport in syntactical unity with injunctions (147); statement of the final view (148).

Contingent non-authoritativeness for the Vedāntas, because of failure of non-dependence (145); they can be neither non-authoritative nor unfruitful (146); they teach the agent, deity etc. of ritual or prescribe contemplation etc. (146); no injunction possible, even of an originative nature, in the case of the existent (147); content of the injunction is a becoming (147); application, procedure, eligibility etc., are present even in the originative injunction, though unintended (148).

II. Explanation of "but" and "harmony" in the aphorism (149, 150); purport of the texts not to teach agent, deity, etc. (150); Brahman, though existent, is not the content of perception etc. (150); oneness of Brahman and the self to be known through Śāstra alone (154); Śāstra not futile because of the absence of what is to be rejected or accepted (154); even from the
realisation of Brahman results the attainment of the human goal (154); teaching of Brahman not subsidiary to contemplation (155); for then all duality is quashed (155); and there can be no resurrection thereof (155).

Upakrama and upasamphāra as determinative of the sense of texts (150); illustration from the texts about the upāmsu sacrifice (150); Brahman thus settled to be the purport of the Vedāntas (150, 151); non-authoritativeness cannot be as referring to existent things (152); or as dependent on the human intellect (152); objection: a human origin may be inferred for the Vedas, as referring to existents (152), not if they refer exclusively to what is to be done (152); reply: if by kārya the implied apūrva is meant, apauruṣeyatva would result even for injunctions to worship a Buddhist Caitya (153); if for the latter human origin is seen, it may be inferred for the Vedāntas (153); from Brahman-realisation there is direct attainment of the human goal (155); two varieties of the attained and the abandoned (155): the attained, as it were and the abandoned, as it were (156).

III. Veda relating to the self is authoritative independently of injunctions, since self-knowledge is of itself fruitful (158); authoritativeness not established through inference (159).

Difference of Vedāntas from arthavādas like "he howled" (158); authoritativeness of the Vedānta dependent on generating indubitable knowledge of what is not already known (159); it is intrinsic (159); hence no example is necessary (160).
IV. Objection: Brahman intimated only as the object of contemplation (160); analogy of the āhavaniya fire etc. (163); pravṛtti or nivṛtti the fruit of the Śāstra (163); authority to support this position (164); knowledge of Brahman enjoined for him who desires immortality (165).

Brahman not the purport as the relation of words thereto is not known (160); it is neither to be rejected nor accepted and hence cannot be declared by a prudent man (160); words have for purport what is to be done (161) and not an existent (161); that a word has a certain sense has to be known by inferring the cognition of that sense in another who hears the word, through his pravṛtti or nivṛtti as probans (161); pravṛtti and nivṛtti characteristic of sacred teaching (161); transmigration does not cease with knowing the sense of “That thou art” (162); from hearing, one does not attain the human goal, as reflection and contemplation are also prescribed (162); of the self, as subsidiary to contemplation, there is certitude of existence (163); contemplation cannot be of the superimposed, as it would not be of the self (163); the person eligible for contemplation of Brahman is understood on the rātrisatrasa-nyāya (165).

V. Objection (contd.): though the objects of the two enquiries are different, only as occasioned by an injunction of contemplation is there the quest of Brahman (166); futility of texts not relating to an injunction (167); no resemblance to “this is a rope, not a snake,” as happiness, misery etc. continue even for him who has
heard (168); reflection and contemplation are also enjoined (168).

The intuition (darsaṇa) of the self cannot be the object of an injunction (166, 167); draṣṭavyaḥ etc. are not real injunctions (167).

VI. Reply: ritual and Brahman differ in respect of their knowledge and fruit (169, 170); gradations of happiness consequent on performance of ritual (170, 171); gradations of misery (172); final release not the fruit of religious duty (173), being natural and eternal (173).

Fruit of Religious Duty surpassable and destructible (169); oneness of jīva and Brahman is eternal and unproduced (170); removal of Nescience occurs even with the rise of knowledge, which results naturally for the mind aided by the impressions of reflection and contemplation (170); no apūrva needed (170); analogy of apprehension of musical notes (171); no injunction needed for contemplation, as the latter is even otherwise known to result in intuition (171); nor a niyama-pūrva, as in pounding the paddy (171); hence texts about contemplation etc. are only apparent injunctions (172).

VII. Two kinds of eternity (174): non-embodiment is immutably eternal (174); if subsidiary to a kārya, Brahman would be non-eternal, as also final release (175).

Evolving eternity not absolute (174); view of whole and part as different yet non-different (175, 176); non-difference in the causal aspect, difference in the effect-aspect (176); criticism (176, 177, 178); either
difference or non-difference should be assumptive (179); grounds for holding difference to be assumptive (179).

VIII. *Sruti* shows final release to follow immediately on Brahman-knowledge (180), and excludes anything else to be done in between (181); support from the Preceptor Akṣapāda (182).

Knowledge instrumental to release only as removing two-fold Nescience (180); definition of acārya (181); explanation of the Nyāya aphorism (182).

IX. Knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the self not an imagined identification, nor a superimposition, nor what is due to association with a distinctive mode of activity (184); nor a purification (186); objections to its being sampat etc. (186); Brahman-knowledge dependent on the object, not on the activity of the man (187); no room for activity to enter, not even through Brahman being the object of the knowing or contemplating activity (187); Scripture cited (187, 188); purport of Sāstra to remove difference posited by Nescience (188), not to give demonstrative knowledge of Brahman (188); removal of differences of cogniser, cognised etc. (189); no fear of non-eternity of release (189).

Sampat and adhyāsa explained and distinguished (183, 184); association with a distinctive mode of activity explained (184, 185); in all three, self is subsidiary and contemplation is the principal (185); purification explained (185); refutation of the above possibilities: texts about the self are anārabhyā-dhīta (186); no non-inconstant connection with rites, as for the ladle made of parṇa wood (187); Brahman not the object of
the cognising activity (187); words cannot give demonstrative knowledge even of worldly things, much less of the transcendent (188).

X. Non-eternity of release, if it be a product or a modification (190).

XI. If of the nature of oneself, Brahman is already attained: even if not so, the all-pervasive Brahman cannot be attained: hence no room for activity (191).

XII. Brahman being eternally perfect and pure, no excellence may be added to it or defect removed therefrom; hence release is not the purified and needs no activity (192).

XIII. Release is not manifested through purificatory acts, as the self cannot be the locus of an act (193); otherwise its non-eternity would result (194).

Nescience located in the jīva; hence Brahman is certainly eternally pure (194); assuming impurity, it cannot be purified by an act inherent in another, while no act can inhere in it (194).

XIV. Objection: acts inhering in the body purify the self (195); reply: what is purified is the self as associated with the body (195, 196, 197); purification is of that alone which is made the content of empirically valid pramāṇa (196).

XV. No other channel for activity (198); knowledge the one means (198).

XVI. Objection: knowledge is an act of the mind (198); reply: no; nature of act explained (198, 199); and distinguished from that of knowledge (200, 201).
Acts like contemplation not established prior to an injunction (200); but knowledge of Brahman results from texts for those who can understand them (200); injunction not purportful, as it cannot be effected or not effected or effected in a different way (200, 201); contemplation and culmination in experience not enjoined as they are well known even in the absence of the injunction (201).

XVII. Imperatives found in Scripture about the self have not the enjoined for content (202); but they turn one away from the objects of natural activity (202, 203).

XVIII. With Brahman-realisation, there is destruction of all obligations (205); Brahman not subsidiary to an injunction of contemplation (205).

XIX. The self is understood from the Upaniṣads alone, does not transmigrate, is of the nature of Brahman and occurs in a topic of his own; this self is neither non-existent nor unknown ((206).

*Purportfulness and sāstratva established for the Vedānta, even as teaching the existent (206); words are apprehended in experience in relation to existents (207); because usage with such purport is seen and it is possible to infer cognition of the existent in him who understands the word (207); description of Sumeru (207); an onlooker ignorant of the language, but knowing the cause of the father's happiness infers in the father the cognition of his son's birth as produced by the messenger's words (208); usage of words in relation to the existent is intelligible because of fruitfulness (208); inference as to the Vedāntas having the existent for
content (209); etymology of Upaniṣad (209); grounds for the self not being subsidiary to what is to be done (209, 210); how Brahman can be signified by the Vedānta, through elimination of defining conditions (210); impossibility of removing that which gets so defined (211).

XX. The self is the witness of the denotation of “I” (211): not known through the vidhi-kāṇḍa or through reasoning (211); impossibility of refuting or of subordinating it to an injunction (212): imperishability, eternal purity, intelligence and freedom of the self (212): it is what is principally revealed in the Upaniṣads (212).

All others except the self, being indeterminable and unstable perish; but not the self, the material cause of all these (214); it is immutably eternal (215).

XXI. Purport is declared to be ritual only in the case of prescriptions and prohibitions (215); the existent taught by Scripture cannot be other than existent (215); even what is for the sake of an act is not itself an act, but a thing (216); the self may be taught in the same way (216); such teaching purposeful as leading to cessation of transmigration (216).

Purport of words is not only kārya or what subserves kārya (217); nor is it the sense of each word independently (217); teaching of word-sense an inevitable intermediary to sentence-sense, which is the purport (218); conjunction with other word-senses needed, not with what is to be done (218); even statements related to the activity of being signify not that activity but only a relation (219).
XXII. Prohibitions relate to desisting from an act and that is not an act (224); the negation does not signify anything other than indifference consisting in desisting from what is established by one's own nature (224); indifference is caused by non-existence made known by the negative particle, and it subsides of its own accord, like fire without fuel (225).

Prohibitions do not have for purport what is to be done (220); for kārya depends on the existence of volition, and volition on its determinant, and the determinant must be a doing (220); substance and quality are related to kārya only through the doing (221); when substance and quality fall within the injunction, they do so as complements to the doing (221); connection of material and deity is not the content of prescription in “there is that āgneya etc.,” (222); even in “make a pot,” the substantive is only what is desired, not what is enjoined (222); if prohibitions had kārya for purport, exclusion would have to be understood in all cases, as in the Prajāpati-vrata, and the other function of negation would have to be abandoned (223); cessation is not itself what is to done (224); nor is voluntary effort to desist prescribed (226); what is prohibited is cognised as instrumental to evil, and this is the cognition of its non-existence (226); this cognition is the cause of the perpetuation of indifference (227); the imperative suffix restates what is established even otherwise by passion and shows its instrumentality to evil (228); and this cognition dies out of itself like fire whose fuel has been consumed (229); the Mīmāṁsaka
declaration of futility applies only to such narratives etc., as do not subserve the human goal (230).

XXIII. Statements about the existent are profitable (230); transmigratoriness does not exist as before for him who has realised Brahman (230, 231); illustration from the wealthy man and the man with ear-rings (231, 232); embodiment is due to illusory knowledge, while non-embodiment is eternal (233); embodiment not caused by merit and demerit, because of reciprocal dependence (233); because the self is not an agent, not even indirectly like kings etc. (234).

Brahman-intuition compared to the intuition of musical notes by the mind purified through the hearing and practice of music (232); it removes the presentation of the entire universe and itself therewith (232).

XXIV. Conceit of self in the body is illusory, not secondary (235); for secondary usage depends on the prior apprehension of difference (236); the concept "I" is applied to the body etc. non-figuratively, through non-discrimination, even by learned men (237); hence illusory (237); consequently when this illusion is removed by true knowledge there is jivanmukti (238); support from Sruti and Smyti (238); no transmigratoriness as before for him who has realised (238).

Some unseen cause needed to explain superimposition since valid perception or doubt would be appropriate otherwise (237).

XXV. Brahman is not subsidiary to injunctions of reflection and contemplation, since these too are for the sake of realisation (239); Scripture is the pramāṇa
for Brahman, because of harmony of the texts, not because of Brahman being the content of an injunction (240); hence the commencement of a new Śāstra is justified (240); but not if its purport were an injunction to contemplate (241); all means of valid knowledge terminate in "I am Brahman" (242); they are contentless and non-authoritative on the realisation of the non-dual Brahman (242); support from the verses of a Brahman-knower (242).

No prescription of manana and nididhyāsana, since their culmination in intuition is established by co-presence and co-absence in experience (239); they are not principal rites (239); nor are they subsidiary rites, like purification, since the self is neither used nor to be used anywhere (240), and, as propounded in the Upaniṣads, is opposed to the observance of rites (240); oneness of the self and Brahman not merely different from but opposed to Religious Duty (241); non-authoritative-ness follows at that stage for all pramāṇas (242); explanation of the verses of the Brahman-knower (242); explanation of the secondary and illusory selves (243); dependence of loka-yaṭrā and even enlightenment on these conceits (243); knowership etc., possible only prior to self-realisation (243); the self to be realised is not other than the knower (244); the non-valid yet gives rise to absolutely real experience, up to the ascertainment of the self (244); the intuition which is absolutely real is unproduced (244); short of that there is Nescience and in its producing or destroying other Nescience there is no unintelligibility (245); Isāvāsyopaniṣad cited in support (245).
भामती—चतुःसूत्री
ब्रह्मसूत्रशांकरभाष्यम्

युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोतिष्वयविषयविषयम् सिद्धायाम्, तद्धर्माणामपि सुतरामितेरतभावानुपपति—इत्यतः अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्म-प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां चाह्यास्, तद्रिपयेण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च विवेयव्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम्। तथायन्योत्सिन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योत्सिन्यध-मांश्र अध्यय इतरतार्कावेके अल्पन-विविक्तयोर्धमितामोऽन्योऽन्यार्थमितान्, मिथ्याज्ञानानिनिमित्त:, सत्यानुते मिथ्यनैवूकः, ‘अहम्मदम्, समेदम्’ इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः।
BRAHMASŪTRABHĀSYA
OF S'ĀNKARĀCĀRYA

Of the spheres of the two concepts of "Thou" and "I," the object and the subject, with their natures opposed to each other like darkness and light, when it is established that one cannot intelligibly be of the nature of the other, the more is it unintelligible for their attributes too to be one (in the substrate of) the other; on this account, the superimposition of the object, the sphere of the concept of "Thou," and of its attributes, on the subject, the intelligent self, the sphere of the concept of "I," and (conversely) through an error in respect of that, the superimposition of the subject and its attributes on the object, can properly be only an illusion. Yet, after superimposing on each the nature and the attributes of the other through non-discrimination of each from the other in the case of attributes absolutely distinct (among themselves) as also of substrates (similarly distinct), there is this natural empirical usage like, "I am this," and "this is mine," coupling the true with the untrue, with its cause in illusory cognition.
1. We render obeisance to that immortal Brahman, the immeasurable bliss and knowledge, from whom as Lord with the two kinds of indeterminable Nescience as ministers, there are the illusory manifestations of ether, air, fire, water and the earth—and from whom came forth this universe, movable and immovable, high and low.

2. The Vedas are His breath, His glance the five elements, the (universe) movable and immovable is His smile, His sleep is the final deluge.

3. To the Vedas and to Bhava, which are eternal and associated with six āṅgas as also with manifold imperishable properties (or indeclinables) we render obeisance.

4. We render obeisance to Mārtanda, to Tilakasvāmin, and to Mahāgaṇapati, who are worthy of universal adoration and are the dispensers of all fulfilment.

5. Obeisance to Vyāsa, the secondary Creator, the author of the Brahma-sūtras, the incarnation of the cognitive energy of the Lord Hari.

6. Having rendered obeisance to Saṅkara, of wisdom pure, of grace the ocean, we (proceed to) analyse the clear (yet) deep commentary written by him.

7. As the waters of a highway are purified by falling into the current of the Ganges, even so are the lowly words of those like us, by their conjunction with the work of the Master.
भामति

अन्नवच्याविधाद्वित्यसचिवालय प्रभवातो
विनाई नरेते विद्यानिल्लेजोक्वचनयः

यत्स्मादहृदिः चर्मचर्मचाचाचाचाचिदः
नमःमस्तह्रापरिमितसुखज्ञानमस्तुतम् ॥ १ ॥

निष्ठितमस्य वेदा वीशिष्मकमस्य पञ्च भृतानि
सिमतेतस्य चराचरमस्य च सुसं महापलयः ॥ २ ॥

पञ्चमित्र्कौपेताय विविधायर्यौरि
शास्त्रताय नमस्कृतो वेदाय च भवयाच च ॥ ३ ॥

भारतेणिलक्षांकममहागिर्यपतीन वयम्
विश्ववन्याच्छमर्याम: सर्वसिद्धिविधायिनः ॥ ४ ॥

व्हासुूकतं तस्मै व्यसायापभेधैसे
ज्ञानस्मक्तताराय नमो भगवतो हरे: ॥ ५ ॥

नत्त विगुहुविज्ञानं शालुं कर्णानिधिम्
भाष्यं प्रस्तङ्गम्भीरं तत्त्वीतिनं विभवते ॥ ६ ॥

आचार्यकृतिनिवेशनमश्च्छुतं वचोस्मदादीनामः
रथ्योदक्मित्र दाक्षण्यावहार: पवित्रिति ॥ ७ ॥
अभ्यास:

अथ यदसंदिग्धमप्रयोजनं च न तद्प्रेक्षाका-
प्रतिपितागोचरः, यथा समनकेन्द्रियसंनिकृष्ट:
स्फीतालोकमध्यवर्ती घटः, करटदन्ता वा; तथा
चेदं बहोति व्यापकविरुद्धोपलुभि:। तथा हि—
ब्रह्मचारीवृहणताण्डालेक्ष्यं बहोति गीयते।
स च चायमा
कीपघटनेन आ च देवर्षिभ्यः प्राणभूमानात्रेद्वंका-
रागदेह्यो देहनिर्माणभूतिविषयेऽध्वनिका
‘अहम्’ इत्यसंदिग्धाविधियतापरोक्षानुभवसिद्ध इति
न जिज्ञासायत्वम्। न हि जातु कठिनाद्र सृंगिते
‘अहं वा नाहं वा’ इति। न च विपर्ययति
‘नाहमेव’ इति। न च ‘अहं कृशः, स्थूलः,
गच्छामि’ इत्यादिद्वृथ्यसमानाधिनकरणंदशर्नाहे-
हलम्बनोपयुक्तमहिक इति सांप्रतम।
तदालम्बनते
हि ‘योहं बाल्ये पितारावण्वं स एव स्थाविरे
प्रणष्ठुतूनुभावम्’ इति प्रतिसंख्यं न भवेत्।
न हि बालस्थितिर्योः शरीरोपरित मन्नापारु प्रत्यथिनि
ज्ञानगंधो वैनेकत्तमाध्यवसीयेत। तस्माचेऽपि
व्यावर्तेकं मनोये प्रयुक्तं यद्युत्तते तत्तथे भिनं
यथा गुसुमेश्या
सूत्रम्।
तथा च बालादिर्शीपुरु व्यावर्तेनानेष्च।
Now, that of which there is no doubt or that which is profitless cannot be the sphere of a desire to know on the part of a prudent inquirer, as, for instance, a pot present in bright light and coming into contact with the sense (of sight) along with the mind; or the teeth of a crow. So too, is this Brahman; hence the knowledge of what is opposed to (the presence of) the pervader (of the inquiry, i.e., doubt and profit). It is thus: the self alone is called Brahman, because it is great or it causes to grow. This (self) is known through indubitable, non-erroneous and immediate experience of the nature of "I," as distinct from the body, the organs, the mind, the intellect, their objects, (in short) from whatever may be designated by the term "this"; (this experience exists) in all living beings from the worm and the moth to gods and sages; hence the self cannot be the object of a desire to know. No one indeed doubts "Is this I or not-I?" or makes the mistake "this is not I at all." Nor is it admissible to say that, since judgements like "I am lean, stout," "I go," etc., are seen to be used in apposition with qualities of the body, the body is the substrate of the word "I". If that were the substrate, the recognition "I, who while young enjoyed (the company of) my parents, now, when I am old, enjoy (the company of) my grandchildren" would not come into being. There is not, verily, as between the bodies of youth and old age the slightest trace of recognition, whereby identity could be determined. Hence, that which is constant in whatever is variable, that is different from the latter, as a string from the flowers (strung thereon). So too, the factor which is designated by the word "I" and is constant even in the variations of the bodies of youth, etc., is different from
these. Further, the very person, who in dreams possessed of a divine body enjoys pleasures suitable thereto, seeing himself when awake to be endowed with a human body and saying "I am not divine, but human," experiences the substrate of I-ness, which is distinct from the body and unsublated, though sublated in respect of the divine body. Further, he, who becomes a tiger by his yoga, experiences the self as non-different in spite of differences of the body; hence, the body is not the substrate of I-ness. Hence too, even the organs are not its substrate, since even where the senses are different there is the recognition of the substrate of I-ness, in "I myself that saw now touch it". The distinction of that (self) from objects is but too patent. The intellect and the mind, being but instruments, cannot properly be substrates of a cognition of "I," which reflects the agent (not the instrument). Statements like "I am lean, I am blind," etc., which are made even though there is no non-difference (between the body and the self), are, as we see fit to hold, suitably understood as in some way figurative, like the statement "the galleries shout (meaning that the people in the galleries shout)". Therefore, it is established that the self, which is understood from the exceedingly patent experience of the "I," distinct from the body, the organs, the mind, the intellect, the objects, (in short) from whatever is designated by the term "this," is, because of the absence of doubt, not the object of a desire to know.

(This is so) also because there is no profit (from the inquiry). It is thus: salvation which consists in the cessation of transmigration is the profit here desired to be set forth. Transmigration has for its cause the non-experience of the true nature of the self, and is to be got
परस्परमहकरारपदमनुवर्तयाम में तेभ्यो भिष्ठते। अपि च समान्ते दिव्यं शरीरमेवमात्याय तदुचितान्मो-गान्धुक्तान एवं प्रतिविद्धेव मनुष्यशरीरमात्यामां पत्यन्। नाहं देवो मनुष्य एव। इति देवशरीरे वायु-मानेन्द्र्यमात्यामवायुमां शरीरशृद्धिः प्रतिपद्यते। अपि च योगवाचः। शरीरमेवेद्वायुमानमभिसिममनु-भवतीति नानाकारार्याः। अते एव नेन्द्रिया-याय्योपस्थालमण्डनम्। इन्द्रियं देशपि ‘योसभोमराश्र एव एवतरहिः स्कृतामि’ इत्यत्तात्याज्ञानयोग अध्यम्बनस्यप्रत्यमि। विषयेः वस्त्रयो विवेकः स्थप्रायानेव। बुद्धिमनोधिथिः करणोऽहमूः। इति करृत-प्रतिमासप्रथायानालम्बनन्त्यायोः। केतरोहमूः। केतरोहमूः। इत्यादिको भोगाः। अस्तप्रभेदे कर्मचित ‘मद्या: कोशलित्’ इत्यादित्रदौपथेरिकव। इति युक्तमुद्यायाः। तस्मादिकरास्येद्वेभ्यो देहेन्द्रियमनोचित्तेवेभ्यो व्यावः। स्कृतराहमनुभवाय आत्मा संहारसावादज्ञाय इति सिद्धम्।

अप्रयोजनवाच। तथा हि — संसारनिर्वाचिसरं भिष्ठते। इह प्रयोजनं विवक्षितम्। संसारथृण्ड आत्माया—
वाच्यासः

स्थाननुभवनिमित्त आत्मायात्मयात्मयानेन निर्वर्तनीयः।
स चेतनयमनादिरनादिना आत्मायात्मयात्मयानेन सहानुभावते, कुतोएस्य निन्त्वतः: अविरोधात्?
कुतःआत्मयात्मयात्मयानुभवः? न हि ‘अहम्’
इत्यनुभववादनयदात्मयात्मयात्मयानमस्ति। न च ‘अ-हम्’
इति सर्वज्ञानीन्द्रणुष्टरानुभवसमर्थित आत्मा
वेदेन्द्रियादिबितिरिक्तः शक्य उपपिन्तवं सहस्रय- 
न्यथयतिमुः, अनुभवविरोधात्। न यागमा:
सहस्त्रमयि घटं परस्तितमाशते। तस्मादानुभव-
विरोधायुपचरितार्थी एवोपिनिषद इति युक्तमृतवस्य इत्यायायवानाश्रु-च परिहरिति—युभमदसमत्रस्थ- 
यगोचरयोः इति।

अतः च युभमदसमत्र इत्यादि: सिद्धेिति
भविष्यनु युक्तं इत्यं: श्रावण्यः। तथापि
इत्यादि: परिहर्यान्त्:। तथापि इत्यसिद्धान्याच्छु- 
ज्ञायं यथपीति पतितव्यम्। इदमस्मत्तवस्वगोचरयो- 
रिति वत्क्त्ये युभमदसमत्तमत्तममेदोपकाष्ठणाथायम्।
यथा विन्दुकार्यप्रतियोगी तवकारो नैचिदिकारः, ‘एते 
वयम्, इमे वयम्, आस्महे’ इति बहुलं
rid of by knowledge of the true nature of the self. If that (transmigration) which is beginningless persists alongside the beginningless knowledge of the true nature of the self, how can there be the riddance of the former, there being no opposition (between the two)? And how can there be non-experience of the true nature of the self? Other than the experience of "I," there is indeed no knowledge of the true nature of the self. Nor can this self, which is other than the body, the organ etc., and which is established by the very patent experience of "I" common to all men, be negatived even by a thousand Upaniṣads, that being opposed to experience. A thousand Scriptures, verily, cannot convert a pot into a cloth. Therefore, because of opposition to experience, we see fit to hold that the Upaniṣads have but a figurative sense. Raising a doubt, with these ideas in mind, (the commentator) answers it (thus): "Of the spheres of the two concepts," etc.

Here, (the text) from "Of the spheres" etc., up to "can properly be only illusion" is the statement of the doubt. (The text beginning) from "Yet" is the statement of the answer. As against the expression "Yet" (of the next sentence), the word "though" has to be supplied in the statement of the doubt. Where the words "of the spheres of the two concepts 'this' and 'I'" should have been used, the word "thou" is used (in the place of "this") to indicate the absolute difference (between the contrasted aspects of experience). The counter-correlate of the word "I" is not the word "this," so much as the word "thou," since there is seen extensive' usage of expressions like "We are this, we
are that "The self of the nature of intelligence is the subject (viṣayin), the non-intelligent intellect, organs, body and objects, are the objects of cognition (viṣayás). For, these bind the intelligent self, that is to say, make it determinable through their own form." As an example of absolute difference, which is the ground of the impossibility of reciprocal super-imposition, (there is mentioned) "like darkness and light". Never indeed, can one understand such utterly different things as light and darkness each to be of the nature of the other. This is stated thus: "when it is established that one cannot intelligibly be of the nature of the other." The one being the other means the one having the nature of the other, that is to say, the identity of the one with the other; this is unintelligible."

Be this so. Let there be no reciprocal identity between different substrates (i.e., the self and the not-self); there may occur yet the reciprocal super-imposition of their attributes, such as inertness and intelligence, eternity and non-eternity etc. Even where substrates are distinguished, there is indeed seen to occur super-imposition of their attributes, e.g., in the crystal though apprehended as different from the flower, yet because of its absolute transparency, there arises the illusion of redness, in the experience "red crystal", generated by the reflection of the hibiscus flower. To this it is said: "for their attributes too." The existence of the attributes of one substrate in the other, i.e., their mutual transfer; this is unintelligible. This is the idea: it is indeed a substance with colour, which, on account of its absolute transparency takes on the reflection of another substance with colour, though
प्रयोगदर्शनानिदित्वा। चित्रभाव आत्मा विषयी, 
जड़स्वभावा बुद्धिन्द्रियधेरिष्या विषया। एते 
हि चिदंत्वास्य विस्मित्वित्त्व अवबधानित; 
स्वेतरूपेण निरूप्णियं कुर्वेन्त्तित्व यावत्। 
परसप्रान्वयासहेतौ 
अप्तान्तेऽक्षणे द्याःप्तः—तमः प्रकाशात्तू इति।
न हि जातु कड्ढि समुदात्तचर्हृतिनि प्रकाशात्तत्मसी 
परसप्रात्तवया प्रतिष्वसुमाहिति। तद्धित्तुस्त्तम— 
इतरतरभवानुपपत्ति इति। इतरतरभावः इतर 
रत्नरत्नम्, नालास्मितिय यावत्; तस्यानुपपत्ता 
मिति।

स्यादेवस्तृत। मा भूद्भिधि: परसप्रावः; 
तद्भिनां तु जात्रूचेत्तन्यनित्यानित्यानि 
इतरतराक्षासो भविष्यति। इतस्ते हि धर्मिनो- 
विवेकालहो पि तद्भिनांमध्याः; यथा कुसमाहेदेन 
गृहालोपे पि स्फटिकमनावतिस्वच्छतया जपाकुसम- 
प्रतिक्ष्योस्त्राहिणि ‘अरुणः स्फटिकः’ इत्या 
हृद्यविभ्रम ह्यत् इद्दुस्त्तम—तद्भिनांमापि 
इति। इतरतरच धर्मिनि धर्मिनां भावो विनिमयः; 
तस्यानुपपत्ति। अयमामिसंबिधि:—रूपबद्धि दृष्य-
अध्यास:

मतिस्वच्छतया रुपातो द्रव्यान्तरस्य तदिवशेषे
गृहामाणस्यापि च्छायां गृहीतान, चिदात्मा तु
नीरुपो विषयी न विषयच्छायामुद्राग्रहितस्यहि
यथाहूँ—

‘ शब्दग्नथरसादीनां कीदशी प्रतिविम्बता ’
इति। तद्विः पारिश्चारिक्षादिष्यविषयिणोर्योन्यायात्
संभेद्धेनेव तद्मोणामापि पर्यत्रसंभेद्धेन विनिमयात्मना
भवितव्यम, तौ चेत्मिणी अत्यन्तात्त्ववेशेन गृहामाण
णवसंभिन्नी, असंभिन्न: मुतरां तयोर्थार्थः, स्वाभाव्यां
व्यवहानेन दूरापेतत्वात। तदिदुत्क्षम—सुतरां
इति। तद्विपर्ययेन इति। विषयविपर्ययेनयेत्यथः।
मिथ्याशब्दः अपहवचनः। एतद्व्रुत्तं भवति—अध्यात
सो मेदाग्रहेन व्यातः, तदिरुल्लचेष्टहरि मेदाग्रहः,
स मेदाग्रहं निवर्त्यंतःद्वासामध्यमासमपि निवर्त्यतीति।
मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तं यथापि तथापीति योजना।

इदमाकृत्तम—भवेदेतदेवं यदि ‘अहम’
इत्यत्त्वं आत्मतत्त्वं प्रकाशोत। न त्वेतद्विति।
तथा हि समस्तोपध्यायचिच्छान्तान्तन्द्रैतत्त्वक–
रसमुदासीनमेकमहितीमामत्तत्त्वं श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहास–
apprehended as different from itself; the intelligent self, however, is the colourless subject and cannot take on the reflection of the object. As they (the Bhātās) say: "Of sound, smell, taste etc., in what way can there be reflection?" Hence it follows by elimination that mutual transfer of the constantly associated attributes of the object and the subject is possible only on the basis of the reciprocal connection of these two. If these two substrates being apprehended as absolutely distinct are unrelated, their attributes are even more clearly unrelated, they being further removed from each other by the interposition of their respective substrates. This is stated thus: "the more," etc. "Through an error in respect of that" means through an error in respect of the object. The word "illusion" signifies concealment. This is what is said: super-imposition is pervaded by non-apprehension of difference; the opposite thereof, i.e., the apprehension of difference, is present here, which, getting rid of that non-apprehension of difference, gets rid also of the super-imposition pervaded thereby. "Though they can properly be only illusion, yet": this is the construction.

This is the underlying idea.—(All) this might be so, if the true nature of the self were manifest in the experience of the "I". This, however, is not so. It is thus: the true nature of the self is declared in Scripture, traditional codes (smṛti), epics (itiḥāsas), and mythologies (purāṇas) as undefined by any limiting conditions, as of the one consistency of endless bliss and intelligence, as indifferent, as one and without a second. Nor can those (statements) which have the purport of teaching the self as of this nature, through their introductory, intermediate and
concluding passages, and through purportful repetition, be made figurative even by Indra. For, from repetition results the eminence of the object, as in "Lo, beautiful, lo, beautiful!", not its littleness; nor even figurativeness (that being) remote indeed. The experience of the "I," exhibiting as it does the self as finite and as confounded by a multitude of griefs and sorrows, how can it have the true nature of the self for its sphere? Or how can it be undeluded (experience)? Nor can it be said that since Scripture is opposed to perception, which is the elder means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa)," the former alone as dependent on the latter should be declared invalid or figurative; for, since that (Scripture) is not of human origin and is free from even the suspicion of any defect, and since its validity is self-revealed by the very fact of its conveying knowledge, it is independent (of any other means of knowledge) in respect of its effect, i.e., valid knowledge. If it be said that though independent in respect of the knowledge (it generates), yet since it is dependent on perception in respect of its origin, and since there is opposition to that (perception), there will be the non-validity of Scriptural teaching, consisting in its non-production,—no (we reply); for, there is no opposition to its origination (by perception). Scriptural knowledge does not indeed annul the empirical validity of perception, whereby it would itself cease to be, because of the non-existence of its cause; rather (does it annul) the absolute (validity of perception). Nor is its cause the absolutely true (perception), since true knowledge is seen to arise from means of knowledge which are empirically though not absolutely
पुराणेण गीयते। न चैतान्युपकरणमण्यांसंहरे:
क्रियासम्भवहरेणेगतमत्तशम्भविद्धति
तत्पराणिनी शाक्यानि शक्रेणायणुपचरितार्थानि कर्तं
अभ्यासे हि भूयस्तम्यक्ष्यभवति यथा ‘अहो
दर्शनीया अहो दर्शनीया’ इति, नाल्युतमपि
प्रागेवोपचरितत्वाभिमिति। अहमनुभवस्तु प्राध्यकृषि
मनेनकविधशोकुः खाद्रिप्रभवोपस्युतमात्मानामानान्धैर्यन
कथमात्मत्तचंगोरः: कथं वानुपहुः? न च
जेष्ठप्रमाणप्रत्यक्षविद्वेदाद्यायस्यैव तद्परेश्चाप्रामाण
प्रमाणपर्यंतार्थविवेति युक्तम, तत्यापौरुषेऽतया
निरस्तसमस्यादोषादुकृष्य, बोधकतया च सवत:सिद्ध
प्रमाणभावस्य स्वकायें प्रमित्वापनपेक्ष्यतः। प्रमित्वां
वेदपेक्षार्यप्रत्यक्षाघचिदिरोदादुतत्व
लक्षणमाणप्रामाणपर्याम्भितं चेत् न, उत्प्राकः
प्रतिद्वनित्वात्। न ह्वाममज्ञानां सौव्यवहारिक
प्रत्यक्षाण प्रामाण्यपहन्ति येन कारणामावास
भवेत्; आपि तु तास्तिकम्। न च तास्तिक
मृयोत्तादकम्, अतास्तिकप्रमाणभोवेभोपि सौ
व्यवहारिकप्रामाण्यस्तत्त्चज्ञातोभिचिदर्शनात्। तथा
अभ्यासः

च वर्णेः हस्तवत्दीर्घतवाद्योद्योत्नः अपि समारोपितः
तत्चप्रतिपत्तिहेतवः। न हि लोकिकः ्'नागः' ्
इति वा 'नागः' इति वा पदालकृत्यं वा तरं वा प्रतिपधमाना
भवति भान्तः। न चानन्यपरं वाक्यं स्वार्थं उपचरितार्थं युक्तम्। ्उरं हि—'न
विधीं पर्: शब्दार्थः' इति। ्येश्वलं च अनपेक्षितत्सकः वाथ्यते हेतु: ्न तु वाध्यक्ते, रज्ज्त्वाश्चर्य
ज्ञायसः शुक्किज्ञानेन कनीयसा वाध्यदर्शनात्।
तदन्पवाधने तदन्पवाधामने ्तश्योत्पात्ततुपते: ्
दर्शितं च तत्स्वच्छप्रमाणभाव्यास्वानपेशितत्तवम्। तथा
च पारमर्थ सूत्रम्—'पौर्वाभ्यं पूर्वेद्वैक्ल्यं प्रकृति-
वन।' इति। तथा च—

पूर्वापातार्थीयस्तवं
तत्र नाम प्रतिवन्ताम्।
अन्योन्यनिरपेक्षां यत्र
जन्म धियाः भवेत्॥—इति॥

अपि च येश्वयंकारास्पद्मात्मानमाच्यिष्ठत
तैरप्यस्य न तन्त्रिकत्वमस्युपेत्तवम्,' अहमि—
valid. Thus, the qualities of short and long, though foreign to letters (belonging as they do to sound: dhvani), being super-imposed thereon, are causes of true apprehension; those who in the world understand by nūga and naga different objects such as elephant and tree are not, verily, deluded people.

Nor may it be said of a word not having any other purport that it is used figuratively in respect of its own sense. It has indeed been said: "The meaning of a word in an injunctive statement cannot be other (than its primary one)." The priority of what is not depended on is a ground for its being sublated, not for its sublating (another means of knowledge), for, it is seen that the earlier cognition of silver is sublated by the later cognition of nacre. If the former were not sublated, the origination of the latter (cognition) whose essence is the sublation (of the former) would not be intelligible. And it has been shown that the absolute validity (of perception) is not depended on. So too the aphorism of the great sage (Jaimini): "Where there is the relationship of earlier and later, the earlier is weaker, as in the case of the archetypal rite (prakṛti)." And to the same effect (is the verse): "The superiority of the later over the earlier is cognised where their cognitions arise not as reciprocally dependent."

Further, those who acknowledge the self as the substrate of I-ness, even by them the truth of that (cognition) cannot be admitted, since in the judgement "I am in this very abode, (but) cognising," the omnipresent self is apprehended as finite, in the same way as to the man
on the ground, big trees on the top of a high peak appear as blades of grass. Nor is it admissible that the experienced finiteness is of the body, not of the self. For then the experience would not be of the form "I (am)," etc.; nor would it be of the form "cognising," if (the word "I" be taken to be used) in a secondary sense (of the body). Further, when it is agreed as between the speaker and the understanding listener that a certain word has the connotation of another, then the use is secondary; it follows in the wake of awareness of difference. It is, indeed, thus: when the word agnihotra, which (ordinarily) denotes the obligatory rite of that name, is used in the statement "he offers the māsa-agnihotra oblation" in another context ascertained to be (of a) different (nature), in connection with an act related to the kuṇḍapāyinūm ayana, the use (of the word agnihotra) based on the similarity of what is to be accomplished (in both cases) is secondary; 19 so too the use of the word "lion" in the case of a pupil who is known from experience to be different from a lion. (Here, however) the primary denotation of the word "I" is not indeed experienced as determinately and specifically other than the body etc., in which case alone that word would have the secondary sense of body etc. Nor may it be understood that, where by long usage a term has a secondary sense, there is no recognition of the sense being secondary, as is the case with taila (lit. sesamum oil) as applied to mustard oil; for, here too, only where difference is established, in respect of viscosity, being extracted from sesamum etc., there is the conceit of mustard oil etc. being primarily
विचारः

हेवास्मि सदं ज्ञानः' इति सर्वेच्यापिनः।

प्रादेशिकत्वेन प्रहणात् उच्चतरगिरितिकर्तितः

महात्स्वः भूमिश्च दूरवाच्यातनिर्माणप्रत्ययचतः।

न चेवं वेहस्य प्रादेशिकत्वमनुभूते न त्यात्मनं

इति सांप्रतः। न हि तदैवं भवति 'अहम्'।

इति, गौणते वा न 'ज्ञानः' इति।

अपि च परशुद्वेष परत्र लक्ष्यमाणगुणयोगेन वर्तते

इति यत्र प्रयोक्तप्रतिपत्तोः संप्रतिपति: स

गौणः। स च भेदप्रत्ययपुरः। तथथा, नैतिमी

कामित्रहोरवच्चोसमिधोरत्वम्। प्रकरणान्तरावृत्तमेते

कुण्डलिनिमायनं कर्मिणि 'मातसमधिहोरत्र

जुहोति' इत्यत्र सावधासायनं गौण:ं, माणवके

चानुभवविद्वेदेते नेहर्वतिसहहुष्टः। न त्यांकारस्य

मुख्योत्तरो निर्मितिग्रहंतः वेदहादिभ्यो भित्तोम्तुतः

भूयते, येन परशुद्वेष: शरीराद्वृंगो गौणो भवेत्।

न चात्यन्त्रनिसृष्टत्यत गौणेण्यपि न गौणतात्विकमात्रः

सार्थादिकृत तैशास्तववदिति वेदित्वम्। तत्रापि

सेहातिलभवादेव सिद्ध एव सार्थादिनां तैशा

शास्त्रवाच्यतात्विकमात्रः, न त्यर्थायोतेलसार्थप्योरः।
भेदाव्यवसायः। तत्ततिम्न गौणत्वमुभयविद्वारिनो
गौणमुच्यविवेकविज्ञानेन व्यासम्, तत्तद्व व्यापक
विवेकविज्ञानं निर्वतमानं गौणतामपि निर्वतेत्ततित।

न च बालस्थविरविद्वारे इत्येकस्यातन: प्रतिसंधानादेहादिभयो भेदेनास्वयमानुभवः
इति वाच्यम्। परीक्षकाणां खलिवं कथा, न
लोककानाम्। परीक्षकाः अपि हि व्यवहारसमये
न लोकसामान्यमयतिर्विषतेन्ते। व्यासतयन्तरसमेव हि
भगवान्महापारकः—पश्चाद्धिमिश्राविशेषात्
इति। बाह्या अप्राहुः—शाशचिन्तका: खल्वेवं
विवेचयनिन्त न प्रतिपचाः। इति। तत्परिश्रेष्ठाचिरी
दातंगोत्समहंकारस् ‘अहमिहास्मि सदने’ इति
प्रयुक्तानो लौकिक: शारीरवेदवर्त्तमातस्
प्रादेशिकत्वमभिमन्यते नभ स हि घटमणिक-
मिष्काचुपायवच्छेदादिति युक्तमुख्यम्याम:।

न चाहिंकारप्रामाण्याय देहाविद्वातामापि प्रा-
देशिक इति युक्तम्। तदा खल्वमणपरिमाणो वा
स्थार्द्धपरिमाणो वा। अणुपरिमाणले स्थूलोस्थम, दीर्घः।
इति च न स्यात्। देहपरिमाणले तु
designated by the word *taila*. It is not however, determined that there is identity between *taila* and mustard oil. It follows then that secondary usage is pervaded by the cognition of the difference between the primary and the secondary by those who know both. Here, the pervader, *viz.*, cognition of difference eliminating (itself) also eliminates the secondary usage.

Nor may it be said that though the bodies of youth and old age are different, yet, from the recognition of an identical self in the judgement "I am he", it follows that there is an experience of the self as different from the body etc. Such a judgement is, verily, that of the critic, not of the man in the street. Even critics do not surpass the generality of men in respect of practical life. Indeed, the revered commentator says this presently in the words: "And because there is no distinction from basis etc." Even outsiders say: "It is, verily, those who reflect on the teaching that make this distinction, not learners." Hence by elimination we see fit to hold that finitude is understood of the self by the man in the street who says "I am in this very abode etc.," in the same way as ether is cognised as limited by pot, ewer, basin etc.

Nor is it meet to say, in order to conserve the validity of (the use of) the word "I," that the self too, like the body etc., is finite. In that case, its size should be that of an atom or that of the body. If that of an atom, there would not be the usage "I am stout, or (I am) tall"; if that of the body, then, as made up of parts, there would result non-eternity, as in the case of the body. Further, on
this view, it must be either the aggregate of parts that intelligises or each part by itself. On the view of each part intelligising by itself, in the absence of a consensus among the many independent intelligences, either the body would be distracted or non-action would result, as the consequence of simultaneous activity in opposed directions. If intelligence be associated with the aggregate, then when one part is injured, the intelligent self too being injured in part would not intelligise. Nor is there seen any fixed relationship of co-existence among the many parts. When any one part is damaged, the aggregate cannot intelligise in the absence of that part.

Even if cognition (vijñāna) be the substrate, the illusoriness of the concept “I” continues the same, for, that (concept) manifests a permanent substance, while cognitions are fleeting. In this way, expressions like “I am fat, I am blind, I go” etc. are explained as due to superimposition.

The concept of “I” having been in this way shown to be (worthless as) a rotten gourd, the revered Scripture may proceed unhindered to remove from the self notions consequent on the experience of “I,” such as agency, enjoyership, happiness, misery, grief etc. Hence, in the words “after superimposing on each,” etc., there are elaborated the nature, cause and result of the concept “I,” whose illusoriness is well-known from all trustworthy Scripture, traditional codes, epics and purāṇas. Superimposing the nature of one of two substrates—the body and the self—on the other,
अभ्यासः

सत्यवादत्वाद् देहवदनिष्ठत्वप्रस्फुटः। किंच अस्मिन्याशः
अवस्यसमुदायो वा चेतयेतु, प्रत्येकं ब्राह्मणं।
प्रत्येकं चेतनत्वपक्षेऽऽहुः चेतनानां साहित्याञ्च-
मेकवाक्यताभावाद्यां चिददिकिष्कत्याः शरीरी-
मुन्मयेत्र, अचिन्त वा प्रसख्येत। समुदायश्रु
चैतन्या चैतन्यायोगो वृक्ष एकस्मिवत्वेऽवः चिदात्मनोपयव-
यो वृक्ष इति न चेतयेतु। न च कृतान्तवार्तानां
परस्मार्थानाभावानिमित्तं दृष्ट। यथा एवपर्यायं यदा
विशेषतत्वतः तददभावे न चेतयेतु।

विज्ञानालम्बनऽवपि अहंप्रलघ्यर्थ आनंततः
तद्वस्थमेव, तस्य चित्तोवस्तुर्विभवास्तवाद्यात्मश्च
विज्ञानानाम। ऐति 'स्थलोहम् अन्धोहम्
गच्छामि' इत्यादियोपि अभ्यासत्वाद् व्यक्तव्यातः।

तद्वस्तुर्वेन क्रेमेन अहंप्रलघ्ये पूर्वकप्रस्फुटिकृते
भगवती श्रुतिः अप्रत्यूहं कर्त्तव्यः कर्मप्रसहस्त्वर्यः
शोकायात्मात्माभवामहत्तुभस्सक्तिमात्रम्भो
निषेधेनहारितैति। तदेवं सर्वप्रवृद्धिश्वस्तिस्मृतितिहासपुराणप्रथित-
मिथ्याभावस्यांहंप्रत्यथः स्वरूपिनिनित्तफलेत्यथा
ेव्यानम्—अन्योन्यर्यस्मिनू इत्यादि। अन्योन्य—
अध्यायः

स्मिन्न्विध्याम्यात्माश्रीराद्वै अन्योन्यात्मकताम्यात्म्य—
अहमिदं शरीरादीति। ‘इदम्’ इति च वस्तुः।
न प्रतीतित:। लोकस्मवाहः: लोकानां स्म्वाहः।
स च ‘अयमहम्’ इति व्यपदेशः। इति—
शब्दसूचितान्तः शरीराधनुकूलं ग्रन्थिकूलं च
प्रमेयजातं प्रमाणेन प्रमाय तदुपादानपरिवर्जनादि:।

अन्योन्यर्मोऽवध्यत्स्य अन्योन्यस्मिन्न्विध्यात्म्यं देहात्मीमात्म्यं जन्ममरणज्ञराव्यायाधीनात्म्यमात्म्यं धर्मिन्यं
अव्यास्तदेहात्मीमात्म्यं समारोप्यं, तथा चैत्याधीनात्म्यमात्म्यं देहात्मार्वस्तालमात्म्यं समारोप्यं
‘समेतं जन्ममरणपुनर्पुनस्त्राव्यादि’ इति व्यवहारो व्यपदेशः।
इति—
शब्दसूचितान्तः तद्नूर्म: प्रश्नायादि:। अत्र
च अध्यासव्यवहारक्रियायां यः कतरी उच्चित:
स समान इति समानकर्त्तक्तवेन ‘अध्यास्य
व्यवहारः’ इत्यप्पलम। पूर्वकालविष्मृतान्तम्यात्म्यात्म्यं
व्यवहारकरणान्तं स्फुटयति—मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः
व्यवहारः इति। मिथ्याज्ञानम्यात्म्य:,
तत्तिमित्तः, तद्नात्मावस्तानुविधानान्तव्यवहारभावाभावोऽर्थिथः।
e.g., "I am this body" etc. The (identification with) "this" (is) a matter of fact, not a matter of knowledge. "Empirical usage (lokavyayahārah)" means the usage of the world; that is designation of the form "I am this". By the word iti (in aham idam iti) there are indicated the acceptance, rejection etc. of what are known by means of valid knowledge to be beneficial or injurious to the body etc.

There is also the super-imposition of the attributes of one substrate on the other, e.g., imposing the bodily attributes of birth, death, old age, disease etc., on the substrate, i.e., the self on whom bodies etc., have been super-imposed, and similarly the attributes of the self such as intelligence etc., on the body etc., on which self-ness has been super-imposed; there is consequently the empirical usage, i.e., the mode of speech "Mine is this—old age, death, son, cow, ownership etc." By iti (in mame'dam iti) is indicated activity etc. suitable to the above experience. The statement "after superimposing (there is) the empirical usage" is intelligible, since the agent that is inferred for the acts of super-imposition and empirical usage is but one and the same. By indicating priority in time for the superimposition, it is made clear that it is the cause of the empirical usage, in the word: "empirical usage with its cause in the illusory cognition" etc. "Illusory cognition" is superimposition; having that as the cause; that is, the existence or non-existence of empirical usage follows on the existence or non-existence of that (superimposition).
Having thus stated the nature of superimposition and its fruit, *viz.*, empirical usage, he states its cause in the words "through non-discrimination of each from the other," *i.e.*, through non-apprehension of (their) distinctness. Now, why should it not be that there is no difference at all? And thus, (if there were none), there would be no superimposition. To this he says: "of the attribute and the substrate which are absolutely distinct." Distinctness from the absolute standpoint means non-identity in the case of substrates, and non-confusion in the case of attributes.

Be this so. The delusion as to identity conditioned by non-apprehension of the difference between two real entities is intelligible, like the delusion of the identity with silver in the case of nacre, because of non-apprehension of their difference. Here, however, there is no real entity like the body, other than the intelligent self, which is the absolute reality. Whence then the non-apprehension of the distinctness of the intelligent self? Whence the delusion of identity? To this he replies: "by coupling the true with the untrue." The construction is: after superimposing because of non-apprehension of distinctness (through coupling the true etc.) The true is the intelligent self; the untrue are the intellect, the organs, the body etc.; coupling these two substrates; coupling means yoking. Because there cannot be any real coupling of the phenomenal with the absolutely real, there is used the *cvi* suffix (*mithunt* instead of *mithunam*), which signifies *what is not that becoming that as it were*. This is what is said: the imposition of what does not appear being impossible, what is required is the *cognition* of what is imposed, not its *real existence*. 
तद्वर्गमध्यस्त्रूपं फलं च व्यवहारसुक्ता
तस्य निमित्तमाह—इतरेताराबिवेकेन इति।
विवेकाग्रहणेनेतर्थः। अथ अविवेक एव कर्मानि
भवति, तथा च नाथ्यास इत्यत आह—
अत्यन्तविविचिक्योर्धमस्थायिणो:। फर्मार्थे
धर्मिन्तार्धात् च विवेकः धर्मां चासंकीर्णिता
विवेकः।

स्यंदेक्तः । विविक्योर्भूस्तर्तोर्भूदाप्रह्निक्षेप
स्तादात्म्यविभ्रमो युज्यते युक्तेर्विर रज्जा
रज्जतात्तथात्म्यविभ्रमः। इह तु फर्मार्थे
चिदात्मनोज्ञक देहाचिति वसुसत्, तत्कत:.
चिदात्मनो भेदाग्रहः कुतः तात्तथात्म्यविभ्रमः इत्यत
आह—सत्यानृते मिथुनिक्रुत्य इति। विवेकाग्र
हाथ्यस्थेष्ठिति योजना। सत्यं चिदात्म, अनृत्यं
बुद्धिन्द्रियवेद्यति; ते हे धर्मिन्न मिथुनिक्रु
युगलक्रुत्यश्च।। न च संप्रतितर्मार्थे
तो: पार्मार्थिकं मिथुनमस्तीत्यभूततत्तत्त्वार्थक्ष्यं
चे: प्रयोगः। पुनरुक्तं भवति—अप्रत्तितस्योपोषणमाद
रोप्यस्य प्रतीतिक्षय्युज्यते न वर्तस्वतः।
स्यादेतत्। आरोप्यस्य प्रतीतौ सत्यं पूर्वद्रश्यस्य
समारोपः समारोपनिकन्तनाः च प्रतीतिरिति दुर्वैरं
परस्पराद्वयत्मिल्यत आह—नैसर्गिक इति।
स्त्राभाविक: अनादिरिं व्यवहारः। व्यवहारनादि-
तया तत्कारणस्याध्यायस्य अनादिन्तोत्ता, ततथः
पूर्वपूर्वमिथ्याञ्जानोपद्वितित्तत् बुद्धीद्रियशारीरादेः:
उच्छराध्यायसयोग ैट्यादितः बीजाधिशुरावच
परस्पराद्वयत्मिल्यथः।

स्यादेतत्। अद्य पूर्वप्रतीतित्तामात्रमुपयुक्ते
आरोपे, न तु प्रतीयमानस्य परमार्थस्तता।
प्रतीतिरेव तु अत्यन्तास्तो गणकमाठ्यिनिकप्तस्य
देहन्द्रियादेः नोपपच्चे। प्रकाशामानंत्रेव हि
चिदालसनोपप सत्यं न तु तत्त्त्तितिकं सत्यासामान्य-
समवायोऽर्थ्यक्रियाकारिता च, दैत्ताप्ते। सत्याय-
श्राब्ध्यक्रियाकारितायाध्य सत्यान्तरार्थ्यक्रियाकारितान्तर-
कल्पने अनवस्थापातत् प्रकाशामान्तेव सत्या
अत्यन्तेत्तव्य। तथा च देहावः प्रकाशामान-
लाभ्यस्ततः चिदालसन: असत्वे च न प्रकाशामानः; तत्कथा
सत्यावृत्योमिक्षुनानामः?
Be this so. When there is cognition of what is superimposed, there is the superimposition of what was formerly seen, while that cognition itself is conditioned by superimposition; thus, (the defect of) reciprocal dependence seems difficult to avoid. To this he says: "natural". This empirical usage is natural, beginningless. Through the beginninglessness of the usage, there is declared the beginninglessness of its cause—superimposition. Hence, of the intellect, organs, body etc., appearing in every prior illusory cognition, there is use in every subsequent instance of superimposition. This (process) being beginningless, like (the succession of) the seed and the sprout, there is no reciprocal dependence; this is the meaning.

Be this so. Certainly, it is only the prior appearance that counts in imposition, not the absolute reality of what appears. But even appearance is unintelligible in the case of the body, the organs etc., which are wholly unreal, and are comparable to the lotus-pond in the sky. The reality even of the intelligent self is but manifestation, and nothing other than that, like the inherence of the class-Being (sattā-sāmānya-samavāya) or practical efficiency (artha-kriyā-kāritā), as (the admission of) these would lead to duality. Further, with the postulation of another Being and another practical efficiency (to determine the reality) of this Being and this practically efficient, we shall have an infinite regress. Hence, manifestation alone has to be admitted as constituting reality. Thus, the body etc., since they are manifest, are not unreal, being like the intelligent self; or else, if unreal, they cannot be manifest; how then can there be the coupling of
SUPERIMPOSITION

It may be asked: what is this thing called superimposition? The reply is: the appearance elsewhere, with a nature like to that of recollection, of what was seen before. Some speak of it as superimposition elsewhere of the attributes of another; but some others say that, when there is the superimposition of one on another, it is a delusion conditioned by the non-apprehension of their distinctness; others, however, say that, when there is the superimposition of one on another, there is an assumption in the latter of an opposite attribute. But in any case, it does not depart from the property of one appearing as having the attributes of another. And this is our experience in the world: nacre appears as if silver; the moon though one appears as if having a second.

the true with the untrue? In the absence of this (coupling) whose difference is it that is not apprehended? and from what? That (non-apprehension of difference) failing, whence the superimposition? With this in mind, the objector says: "What is this thing called superimposition?" The (pronoun) "what" has the sense of an objection. The respondent meets the objection by simply giving the definition of superimposition well-known to the world: "The reply is—the appearance elsewhere, with a nature like to that of recollection, of what was seen before." Avabhūsa is that appearance which is terminated or depreciated. Termination or depreciation is sublation by another cognition; by this, it (avabhūsa) is said to be an illusory cognition.
आह—कोशमध्यासो नामेति। उच्यते—स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वद्विाङ्गमासः। तं केचिदन्त्रायन्यधर्मांध्यासः इति बदन्ति। केचिन्तु यत्र यद्ध्यासस्त्रिब्रेकागहिनिवन्धनो भ्रम इति। अन्ये तु यत्र यद्ध्यासस्त्र-स्येव विपरीतधर्मकल्पनामाचक्षुत इति। सर्वथापि लन्यस्तान्यधर्मंबासतां न व्य-भिचरति। तथा च लोकेनुभवः—शुक्किका हि रजतवदवभासते एकाशन्द्रः सदितीयवदिति।

tadbhāne vā kasya kuto bhedāyah? tadāmbhe kutoścāya? ityādhyāyanāh ahā apāsata—
kosāmyaśasam nama iti. ka ityāsate. saṃādhata lokakāśocāyaśasaścidānāṃchakṣānaḥ etasāmṣeṣe pratiṣṭhite—uchyate—sāmyaśirūpaḥ paratram purva-
dvāṅgaṃbhāṣā iti. aksaṃtaḥ aksamtāḥ vā bhāsā: aksamśaḥ. pratyaṇtaraśāpaḥ aksaṃdoṣaṃmāno vā. etavataḥ mānyājānanāṃtyakṣaḥ bhavati.
तस्येद्वृद्धग्यायाम् ‘पूर्वेक्षय’—‘इत्यादि ।
पूर्वेक्षयावभासः पूर्वेक्षयावभासः । मिथ्याप्रत्ययः
आरोप्तिक्षयारोपणीयमिथ्यावभासः। न भवतीति
पूर्वेक्षयात्मनानूनतारोपणीयस्मृतिपथायति । तस्य च
हस्तत्वात्मत्वमुपयुक्ते न वस्तुनान्तिति द्वाराह्नम् ।
तथापि वर्तमानं हस्तं दर्शिन्न आरोपोपयोगीति पूर्वे—
इत्युक्तम् । तत् पूर्वेक्षयं स्वरूपेण सदस्यारोपणीय-
तया अनिवाच्यमिथ्यमृतम् । आरोपिक्षयं सत्य-
भाश—परस्य इति । परस्य शुक्लिकादी परमार्थसाति ।
तदनेन सत्यानूतिमिथ्यमुक्तम् ।

स्थादेतत् । परस्य पूर्वेक्षयावभास इत्यलंक्षणम्
अनिवाच्यक्षत्रत् । अर्थि हि स्वसमितलया गवि
पूर्वेक्षयं गोत्रस्य परस्य कालअक्ष्यावभासः । अर्थि
च पाणिलिपि पूर्वेक्षयं देवदत्रस्त्य पांश महिष्प-
त्यावभासः ‘समीचीनः’ । अवभासपदं ‘समीचीनं
प्रत्येकेऽपि यथा प्रतिपद्मः, यथा नीस्याव-
भासः पीतस्यावभास इति । अत आह—स्मृतिरूप
इति । स्मृते: शुपाविव रूपमस्थिति स्मृति-
रूपः । अस्मृतिहितविषयतः च स्मृतिरूपम् ।
This is the further commentary on that (definition): "what was seen before" etc. *Pūrva-dṛṣṭa-śabhyāsaḥ* means the appearance of what was seen before. The illusory appearance cannot come about without the coupling of the imposed element with that on which it is imposed; hence what is untrue and superimposed is understood by the words "what was seen before". The word "seen" is used to indicate that it (the superimposed element) counts only as phenomenal not as absolutely real. Even thus, what is now seen is not capable of being imposed; hence the use of the word "before". What was seen before, though real in its own nature, is yet, as superimposed, indeterminable and hence unreal. The locus of imposition, which is real, is stated in: "elsewhere." Elsewhere, in nacre etc., which are absolutely real. Thus is declared the coupling of the true with the untrue.

Be this so. "The appearance elsewhere of what was seen before"—this is no definition, being too wide. There is, verily, in the cow, Kālakṣi, "the appearance of cowness" seen before in the cow, Svastimātī. There is also the appearance elsewhere, at Māhiṣmatī, of Devadatta formerly seen at Pāṭaliputra. (Both these appearances are) valid. The word "appearance (avabhāsa)" is indeed well-known as applied to valid experience, as in "the appearance of blue, the appearance of yellow" etc. To this he says: "of a nature like to that of recollection." Its nature is like the nature of recollection. The non-presence of the object is of the essence of recollection; while recognition, which is valid, is of a present object. Hence, (the definition is) not too wide.
Nor is it too narrow; for, even dream-cognition which is of the same nature as delusive recollection is of this nature (given in the definition). There too, verily, because of the non-presence of the recollected parents etc. not being reflected upon, on account of the defect of sleep, there is here and there the superimposition of the time and place when they were formerly present and seen. Thus, the same definition is to be applied also to (experiences like) "the shell is yellow," "sugar is bitter". It is thus: the yellow, which resides in the bile that is in contact with the exceedingly pure rays going forth from the eye, is experienced in dissociation from the bile; the shell too is experienced (but) with the whiteness concealed by a defect (in the sense-organ); the non-relation of the yellow colour to the shell is not experienced; because of similarity in respect of non-apprehension of non-relationship, the appositional relation previously seen in (experiences) like "yellow mass of gold, yellow bilwa fruit" is imposed on yellow-ness and shell-ness and one speaks of the yellow shell. In this way too may be explained the apprehension "sugar is bitter". Similarly, rays of light from the organ of sight come in contact with the pure mirror or sheet of water facing the cogniser, but they are reflected therefrom by the stronger rays of the Sun's light, and coming into contact with the face, apprehend the face; because of a defect, however, they do not apprehend the face as where it really is, i.e., not facing oneself, but impose on it the property of facing oneself that belongs to the formerly seen mirror or sheet of water. Thus, the definition
ध्यासः

संनिहितविषयं च प्रत्यभिज्ञान समीचीनामिति
नातिव्यासिः।

नाप्रव्यासिः, स्वभजनस्यापि स्मृतिविवर्गमः
रूपस्यांवरुपस्तवात्। तत्रापि हि स्मर्यमाणे पित्रादौ
निद्रोपप्रववशादसनिधानापार्मेशं, तत्र तत्र पूर्ववृद्धि
स्येव संनिहितेदिशाकालक्रमस्य समारोपः। एतम्
'पीत: शाङ्गः' 'तिक्तो गुडः' इत्यवायेत्तांक्षणं
योजनीयम्। तथा हि—भिनिनिर्गच्छदत्तच्छ
नयनरसिमसंप्रदत्तच्छवर्तिनी दीतां पित्तारितां
मनुभवन, शाङ्गं च दोषाच्यादितिषुक्तिमानमनुभवन,
पीतायाश्रम शाङ्गसंबंधमनुभवन, असंक्षायांश्रुतारूप्येन 'पीतं
तपनीयपिन्धम' 'पीतं विच्छलम्' इत्यवै पूर्ववृद्धं सामानाधि
करण्यं पीततशाङ्गत्योरोरोप्याह 'पीत: शाङ्गः'
इति। एतेन 'तिक्तो गुडः' इति प्रत्यो
व्यासिः। एवं विज्ञातपुष्पाभिमुलेच्छार्दशर्दः
कादिपु स्वच्छेदु चाशुंरं तेजो जम्मापि बलीयसाः
सौरेण तेजसा प्रतिश्रौतः: प्रवर्तितं मुखसंयुक्तं मुखं
आह्यतं, दोषवशत्तेशतामनभिमुखतं च मुख्यस्या-
वध्यास: 

श्राह्यते, पूर्वेदुधिअभिमुखादशंकेरक्तेषातामाभिमुख्य
च मुख्यारोपणंतीति प्रतिभिम्बविभ्रमोपि लक्षितो
भवति। एतेन हिंचन्द्रदिश्यमोहात्तरंचक्रान्त्यर्वं
नगरांशोरागादिविभ्रमेष्पि यथासंभवं लक्षणं
योजनीयं ।

एतद्रुभं भवति—न प्रकाशमानतामात्रं
स्मार्तः, येन वेदेन्द्रियादेः प्रकाशमानतया सत्तवो
भवेत। न हि सप्तदिव्यावेन रच्चादयो वा
स्फटिकादयो वा रत्नादिगुणयोगिनो न प्रतिभास्ते,
प्रतिभास्मान वा भवति तदात्मानस्तदार्मिनो
वा। तथा सति मधु मरीचिकानिचर्ममः
‘उच्चावच्चवल्लकुज्जलादिभ्ज्ञातेदायमथ्यावरण्मतीणि
मन्दाकिनी’ इत्यभियोग्य प्रवृत्तः ततोयमापीय
पिपासामुपपश्येत्। तस्मादकामेनापि प्रकाश-
मानस्यारोपितस्य न कस्तुरस्तवमभुणामनीयेः।

न च मरीचिकुश्चे समित्तमवस्तुस्तः स्वरुपेण
तु परमार्थंसदैव वेदेन्द्रियादयस्तु स्वरुपाध्ययस्तत्
इत्यनभवाचरताक्तमारोपयति इति सांपत्तम्;
यतो यथसः नानुभवस्ते: कथं तांहि।
SUPERIMPOSITION

applies to the delusion of reflection too. In the same way are to be explained suitably delusions like the perception of two moons, loss of the sense of direction, the fiery circle, the *fata morgana* (*gandharva-nagara*), the snake seen in the bamboo.

This is what is said: it is not that manifestation alone constitutes reality, in which case, bodies, organs etc., by the very fact of manifestation, would be real. It is not as if ropes etc., do not appear as snakes etc., or crystals etc., as endowed with red colour and so on; nor, as thus appearing, do they really become those objects or endowed with those attributes. If that were so, one would conclude in the case of a mirage that it is the Mandākini which has come down close by, with her garlands of constantly agitated waves high and low, and proceeding (thereto) should be able to quench one's thirst by drinking of that water. Hence, of what is superimposed, even though manifest, absolute reality cannot be admitted, even though this (conclusion) be not desired.

Nor is it admissible to ask thus: "in the mirage, the water is unreal, but in its own nature (as mirage) it is absolutely real; whereas, the body, organs etc., are unreal even in their own nature, and as such cannot be the sphere of any experience; how then can they be superimposed?" For, if what is unreal cannot be the object of any experience, how then do the mirage etc., which are unreal, become the sphere of experience as water etc.? Though real in their own nature, they (the mirage etc.) cannot become real as water etc., as well.
It may be said: there is nothing called non-existence (abhāva) as distinct from existence (bhāva). An existent considered as of the nature of another existent becomes non-existence; but in its own nature it is but existence. As is said: "Non-existence is but another existent considered in relation to something else." Hence, this, which may be explained as another mode of existence, may well be in the sphere of experience. The world, which is absolutely unreal, devoid of any capacity, devoid of any (true) essence, how can it be an object of experience? How, again, can it be superimposed on the intelligent self? Nor is it admissible that, though the objects (of experience) are wholly devoid of any capacity (to appear), the respective cognitions, through the capacity residing in them as cognitions, of themselves give rise to the appearance of the unreal, as a product of a unique nature, and that this capacity (of the cognitions) to make the unreal appear is Nescience. What is this faculty of cognition whereby it makes the unreal appear? What is it that it is capable of? If it is the unreal, is it effected or only made known by it? It cannot be effected, since that is unintelligible in the case of the unreal. Nor is it what is made known, since there is no other cognition known (other than that which makes manifest); further, (what is thus manifested being unreal and requiring its relation to the new cognition to be explained), infinite regress would result. If now, it be said that it is the very essence of cognition to manifest the unreal, what is this relation between the real and the unreal? If it be said that the
मरीच्यादीनामस्ताः तोयादामतयानुभवगोचरतवः?
न च स्वरूपसत्तेन तोयादामनापि सम्तो भवन्ति।
यथृच्छेतर—नामावो नाम भावाद्वन्यः कष्टिद्वस्ति,
आपि तु भाव एवं भावान्तरात्मना अभावः। शेन
रूपेण तु भावः। यथाहुः—
‘भावान्तरमभावो हि क्याचित्तु व्यपेश्या’।
इति। तत्र भावान्तरनोपास्येवत्या अर्थ युज्येऽत
अनुभवगोचरता। प्रश्नस्य पुनर्दश्यन्तासो निरस्त-
समस्तसामस्ययेव निस्तृत्तेऽय कुतो जन्मभवविषयभावः,
कुतो वा चिदात्मन्यारोपः? न च विषयस्य समस्त-
सामस्यविरहेदैपि विज्ञानेऽव तत्त्वारूढः स्वप्रतीत-
समस्तसामस्यारूढात्मानस्सिद्धसामस्यभावमेवमुपजातमस्ततः प्रकाशनम्,
तस्मादस्त्रकाशानशक्तिरेत्वावास्त्रिगति सं-
प्रतम्। यतो येरस्तप्रकाशनशक्तिरेत्वावास्त्रिकसबि पुन-
रस्य: शक्यम्? असाध्यतां चेतुः, किमेतकार्य्यम्,
आहोस्विद्धय ज्ञाप्यम्? न तात्त्वकार्यम्, असत-
स्त्रायुण्यपमतेः। नापि ज्ञाप्यम्, ज्ञानान्तरानुपपत्तेः,
अनवस्थापाताच्छ। विज्ञानस्वरूपमेव असत्: प्रकाश
इति चेतुः, कः पुनरेष दस्तस्तो: संबन्धः?
अस्तद्धीननिरूपणातं सतो ज्ञानस्य असता संबन्ध इति चेत्, अहो वतायमतिनिवृत्त: प्रत्ययतपस्वी यदस्य अस्तापि निरूपणमायते। न च प्रत्ययस्त- त्राध्यते किंचित्, असत् आधारत्वायोगात्। असद्वतेन प्रत्ययो न प्रत्यय इति प्रत्ययस्तेयैैप स्वाभावः न तस्सद्धीनस्य किंचिदिति चेत्, अहो वताय मात्स्यक्षेप: यद्यमतदुस्पति: अतद्वात् च तद्विनाभावनियत: प्रत्यय इति।

tसमाद्वात्तापात: शरीरिन्द्रियाद्यो निस्तत्चा नानुभवस्वप्नया भवितुमहत्तीति।

अत्र ग्रूम:-निस्तत्चं चेत्तानुभवगोचरः, तत्तिकिमिदार्नी मरीचयोपि तोयत्तमना सत्त्चा: यदनुभवगोचरः स्तु:। न सत्त्चा:, तद्वात्त्मना मरीचीनामसत्त्चातु। दिविधं च वस्तुनां तत्त्मम— सत्त्मसच्चं च। तत्र पूर्व स्तुत:, पर्र्तु परतः। यथाहु: ‘स्वरूपपररुपां नित्यं सदसदात्मके।

वस्तुनि ज्ञायते किंचिदिर्मैं श्रीशिक्षितवदाचन॥’

—इति। तत्क मरीचियु तोयनिर्मायप्रत्ययसत्त्च: गोचरः। तथा च समीचीन इति न आत्तो नापि
relation of cognition, which is real, to that which is unreal is that the former is made determinate under the control of what is unreal, lol how very fortunate is this poor cognition that attains to determination even through the unreal. Nor does cognition do anything thereto, since being the support (of any such thing) is inappropriate in the case of what is unreal. If it be said that the cognition is not controlled by the unreal, but that it is of the very nature of cognition not to appear apart from the unreal, lol unfortunate indeed is this partiality for the unreal, whereby cognition is invariably linked to the unreal, though neither originating therefrom nor of the same nature as that. Hence, body, organs etc., which are wholly unreal and have no (true) essence, cannot become objects of experience.

To this we reply: if what has no (true) essence be not within the sphere of experience, are these rays real as water, in such wise that they may come within the sphere of experience? (The pūrvapakṣin says): They have no (true) essence (in the nature of water), since the rays are not of the nature of water. The essence of things is of two kinds, real or unreal, the former in respect of themselves, the latter in respect of things other than themselves. As is said: "The essence of things is grasped by some at some time or other either as real or as unreal in respect of (those things) themselves or in respect of others." (We reply): Is the cognition of water in the rays in the sphere of the true? Then, being valid, it would not
be delusive; nor would it be sublated. (The pûrvapakṣin rejoins): certainly, it would not be sublated, if it apprehended the rays, which truly are not of the nature of water, as not of the nature of water. When apprehended as of the nature of water, however, how can it be non-delusive or non-sublated? Lo! then (we reply) of the rays whose nature is non-waterness, their nature as waterness is not real, since they, being non-different from non-waterness, cannot intelligibly be of the nature of waterness; nor is it unreal; for, it is recognised by you, in the words "Non-existence is existence in another form, not anything else, since no (such thing) is proved," 12 that the unreality of one thing is but another thing. Nor is the imposed form another thing; if it were, it should be either the rays or the water in the Ganges. On the first alternative, the cognition would be of the form "rays," not of the form "water"; on the latter (alternative), it would be of the form "water in the Ganges," not "(water) here". (Further) if the particular place be not recollected, it should be (of the form) "water" (merely), not "here". Nor is it admissible that this is something wholly unreal, a mere falsehood devoid of all existence, since that cannot intelligibly be within the sphere of experience; this has been said earlier. Hence, the water superimposed on the rays has to be recognised to be indeterminable, being neither real nor unreal nor yet real and unreal, this (last) being self-contradictory. Thus, in this way, the superimposed water is like absolutely real water, and for that reason is like what was formerly seen; but really that is
बाध्यत। अद्वा। न बाध्यत यदि मरीचीनं
अतोयात्मतःनतोयात्मना ग्रहीयान। तोयात्मना
तु ग्रहन कथमभान्तः, कथं वा अवाच्यः?
हन्त। तोयाभावतः मरीचीचिं तोयभावतं
तावर्त सतृ, तेषां तोयाभावादेवेन तोय-
भावात्मतानुपप्तेः। नाप्यसत्; वस्तंतरमेव हि
वस्तंतरस्यास्तत्त्वमार्थियेते

‘भावान्तरमाभावोज्यो न कथितदनिस्पर्शनात्’
इति वदुः। न चारोपितं रूपं वस्तंतरम्; तथि
मरीचयो वा भवेत्, गज्जनिगतं तोयं वा। पूर्वस्मि-
न्कले ‘मरीचयः’ इति प्रत्ययं: स्यात्, न ‘तोयम्’
इति। उच्चरिस्तं ‘गज्जयां तोयम्’ इति स्यात्,
न पुनः ‘इह’ इति। देशमेवासरणे ‘तोयम्’
इति स्यात्, न पुनः ‘इह’ इति। न चेद-
मत्यात्मसत् निरस्तसमस्तस्वरूपमलीङमेवात् इति
सांप्रतमस्, तस्यानुभवगोचरवानुपप्तेः, इत्युक्तम्
धस्तात्। तस्मात सत्, नासत्, नापि सदसत्
परस्परविरोधात्, इत्यनिर्वच्यमेवारोपणीं मरीचिषु
तोयमाष्ठेयम्; तदनेन क्रमणाभ्यस्तं तोयं पर-
अध्यासः

मार्थितोयमित्रं, अत एव पूर्वद्यमित्रं; तत्तत्त्वं न तोयम्, न च पूर्वद्यम्; किं तु अनूत्तमं अनिर्वचनं। एवं च देहेन्द्रियादिप्रपश्चोपिः अनिर्वच्यं; अपूर्वोपि पूर्वमिथ्याप्रत्ययोपदशयत् इव परत चिदात्मन्याय्यस्य इति उपपादम्, अन्याासलक्षणंगोगात्। देहेन्द्रियादिप्रपश्चवायनं च उपपादुधिययते। चिदात्मा तु श्रुतिस्मृत्तितिहासपूरणगोचरं तन्मूलतदविविधयानिर्णयितुषुकुशुल-मुक्तभाववं सत्तेनैव निर्वच्यं। अन्याामिता स्वयंकालातैव अस्य सत्ता, सा च स्वरूपमेव चिदासन: न तु तद्विदं सत्तासामान्यसमवायात्मक्यकारिता वा इति सर्वभ्रजताम्।

स चायमेवंलक्षणकोष्यास: अनिर्वचनीयः सर्वेषमेव संमतं फरोषकाणाम्; तेहदेव परं विप्रतिप्तिपितित्यनिर्वचनीयतां दृढ्यितुभासां—तेन कैशितं इति।

अन्यायमया ज्ञानांलक्षेय रजतस्य; ज्ञानाकर्षयस्य यावत्। अध्यासः अन्याया बाधो। सौत्रान्तिकनये तात्वद्यांमस्तं वस्तुसंि्; तत्
not water, nor what was formerly seen; but it is untrue, indeterminable. In the same way, even the universe of bodies, organs etc. is indeterminable; though novel, yet they are superimposed on something other, i.e., the intelligent self, in the same way as what was presented in prior erroneous cognitions. This is intelligible, since the definition of superimposition applies. The sublation of the universe of bodies, organs etc. will be explained later. As for the intelligent self, it is in the sphere of Scripture, traditional codes, epics and purāṇas; as ascertained by reasoning based on and not in conflict with these, it is of the nature of purity, intelligence and freedom, and is determinable as certainly real. Unsublated self-luminosity is its reality; that is of the very nature of the intelligent self, not something other (than this), such as inherence of the class-Being, or practical efficiency. Thus, everything is clear.

Superimposition, which is indeterminable and has been defined as above, is admitted by all inquirers, but there are considerable differences of detail. For this reason, in order to establish its indeterminability firmly, he says: "Some speak of it" etc.

"Of the attribute of another," i.e., of the attribute of the cognition, here, of silver; that is to say, of the form of the cognition. The superimposition is "elsewhere," i.e., outside. According to the Sautrāntika teaching, there is external reality; the imposition thereon of what is of the form of cognition (is superimposition). Even according
to the Vijñānavādins, though there is no external reality, yet there is an external falsehood created by the impressions of beginningless Nescience, and on this there is the imposition of what is of the form of cognition. And this is the justification: there is the general rule that whatever is experienced in a particular form should be accepted in that form, since its being other than that results (only) from a cognition of greater force which sublates it. When the sublating cognition "this is not silver" is intelligible even as sublating the this-element alone, it is not meet to take it to extend to the silver-element. For, if the substrate "silver" were sublated, then, both the silver and its attribute of "this-ness" would be sublated; it would be better to take it that the attribute "this-ness" alone is sublated, not the substrate "silver" as well. Hence it follows that silver which is sublated in respect of externality is by presumption confined to knowledge within us. Thus follows the imposition outside of what is of the form of cognition.

"But some others," i.e., those who are not satisfied with the doctrine of imposition as of the form of cognition, "say that when there is the superimposition of one on another, it is a delusion conditioned by the non-apprehension of their distinctness". They state the reason for their dissatisfaction. That silver etc. are of the form of cognition should be established either by experience (perception) or by inference. Inference in this regard will be refuted later. As for experience, it must be either
अभ्यासः

ज्ञानाकार्यारोपः। विज्ञानेश्वरिनामिषय, यथापि न बाध्यं वस्तुसत्, तथाप्यनाथविद्यामानः गीतागृहीतांकं बाध्यम्; तत्र ज्ञानाकार्यारोपः। उपर्युक्त्य—
यथाद्रश्तमुभवसिद्ध रूपं तत्तत्रार्थाब्य अभ्य-
पेत्रयमित्युत्तरम्; अन्यानलं पुनःरयं वलव-
ह्राधकार्यनबाल; 'नेवं रजतम्' इति
बाध्यक्रयं हिन्दुत्तामाधामान्यमायकृती न रजतमो-
चरतोचिता। रजतस्य धर्मनिषो बाधे हि रजतं
च तत्सं धर्मं हिन्दुत्ता च बाधते भरेताय; तत्तत्रमिदंतेवाय धर्मं बाध्यतं, न पुनः रजतमो
धर्मो; तथा च रजतं बहिंर्याधितमथाद्वान्तः
जाने व्यक्तिष्ठत इति ज्ञानाकार्यं बहिःर्व्यासः
सिद्धति।

केविचितु—ज्ञानाकार्यात्मकमाधिपतिः बदल-
नित्य—यत्र यद्यथासः तद्रवेकःहनिवमन्नो अभम् इति। अपरितोषकारं चाहु—
विद्यामार्तरता, रजतादेसरुभवावह, व्यवस्थापित, अनुमानादा। तत्तत्रात्मानमुपरिशाचितारकीते।
अनुमोदणि परत्प्रत्ययो वा स्थानूः, बाधकार्यो
वा। न तात्र ज्ञातानुभवः। स हि इद्वकार्यपदं रजत्मावेद्यति न ज्ञातस्म। 'अहम्' इति हि तदा स्यान्, प्रतिपत्: प्रत्य्याद्व्यालेकर्काव। भ्रातं विज्ञानं स्वाक्षरमेव बाध्यत्याव्यवस्थिति, तथा च नाहरकार्यपदमस्य गोचरः, ज्ञानाकारता पुनर्ग्रामत्वाभावक्रप्रत्ययमप्रवेदिनीयति चेतः, हन्त बाध्यक्रप्रत्ययमास्त्यतंत्राव्युष्मान्। स किं पुरोवती द्रव्यं रजताहितीच्यति आहो ज्ञानाकार्यायमप्रय स्रव्यति? तत्र ज्ञानाकार्योपर्यं स्वाभाविक-प्रत्ययस्य बुद्धाण: शाखनीयश्रो देवानां प्रियः। पुरोवतित्वप्रतिगुर्ज्रात्यद्वस्य ज्ञानाकार्यते न चेत, न। असंबन्धानायहर्षिनिमेधसंसीनाहितो भवति। प्रतिपत्वायुर्यसंसनिधानं तस्य प्रतिपत्तारस्य कुत्रस्य? न चैष रजतस्य निपेधः, न च इदुलायः, किं तु विबेकाश्रुप्रसक्तिस्य रजत-वास्तवार्य। न च रजत्रेव शुक्तिकायं प्रसम्भितं रजतभ्रानेन। न हि रजतनिर्भासगुरुतिकावलं शुक्तम्, अनुभवविरोधादि। न च च तस्तामात्रेणालब्धनम्, अतिप्रसादान।
the cognition of silver or the cognition that sublates it. It is not the experience of silver (that intimates its nature to be the form of cognition); for, that makes known silver as having for its substrate, the "this," not what is within; for, in that case, because of the non-difference of the cogniser from the cognition, it (the cognition) would be (of the form) "I (am silver)". (The ātmakhyātivādin may say): delusive cognition determines its own form to be external; and thus, its sphere is not the substrate of the word "I"; its being of the form of cognition is to be known from the sublating cognition. If this be said, (we reply): lo! let the long-lived one reflect on this sublating cognition. Does that distinguish from silver the object present before us, or also show of it that its nature is of the form of cognition? The intelligence of that person beloved of the gods,² who says of the sublating cognition that it has the function of making known (the prior experience to have) the form of cognition, is indeed to be praised! If it be said that (its being) of the form of cognition follows by presumption from the negation of the presence (of silver) before us, no (we reply); for, from the denial of the non-apprehension of non-proximity, it would become non-proximate (to the cogniser); whence then the extreme proximity to the cogniser such that it is of his own nature? And this (sublating cognition) denies neither the silver nor the this-ness, but the empirical usage of silver occasioned by the non-apprehension of distinctness. Nor by the cognition of silver is silver itself occasioned in nacre; for, the presentation of silver cannot have nacre as its basis, that being opposed to experience. Nor is it
the basis as existent alone (not as known), since that would be too wide (a basis); for, existentiality being common to all things, it would follow that any of them could be the basis. Nor (is naore the basis) as the cause (of the cognition), for, the senses too are causes. Hence, the meaning of the word "basis" is but manifestation. And since naore is not manifest in the cognition of silver, how can it be the basis? Or if manifestation be admitted, how can there be no opposition to experience? Further, since the senses etc., are seen to have the capacity to generate valid knowledge, how can illusory cognition result from them? If it be said that in conjunction with defects they acquire the capacity to (generate) illusory cognition, no (we reply), since defects can cause only the counter-action of the generative capacity (of a cause); else even from the parched kūtaja seed there would result the springing up of a banyan shoot. Further, if cognitions fail to be constant to their (proper) spheres, there would result loss of confidence in everything. It should, therefore, be recognised that all cognition is valid. Thus, the cognitions—"silver" and "this"—are of two kinds, memory and experience; here, "this" is the apprehension of a mere object in front (of us); because of a defect, the class-nature of naoreity, which is there, is not apprehended; the bare "that," which has been apprehended, calls up, because of similarity, the memory of silver, through reviving the impressions (of the former experience of silver). That (memory) though, of the nature of an apprehension of what has been apprehended, stands as bare apprehension, the element of (the content) having been apprehended being lost through a
अभ्यासः

सर्वेषामर्थानं सत्त्वविशेषादालम्भनत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

नापि कारणतेन, इन्द्रियादीनामपि कारणत्वात्।

तथा च भासमानतैवालम्भनार्थः। न च रजतञ्जः

शुक्तिका भास्ते, इति कथमालम्भनम्? भास-

मानतांस्युपमेव च कथं नानुभविरोऽः। अपि

चेन्द्रियार्द्धा तत्सामीचिन्तामणोपजननसे सामात्म्यमुप-

लिप्रभिति कथमेव्यो मिथ्याज्ञानसंभवः? दोष-

सहितानां तेषां मिथ्याप्रत्येकापि सामात्म्यमिति

चेतुः, न, दोषाणां कार्योपजननसामात्म्यविचारात्माये

हेतुतः; अन्यथा प्रह्यादपि कुटजबीजायह

टाइकुरोपत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। अपि च स्मृतचर्चिन्तारे

विज्ञानानां सर्वशास्त्रार्थास्पदसङ्गात्। तस्मातः

सर्वाकां तत्सामीचिन्तापर्यं। तथा च 'रजतम्',

'इदम्' इति च दे विज्ञाने स्मृत्यनुभवरुपेऽः। तथा

'इदम्' इति पुरोवतितद्वयमात्राध्ययनम्, दोषवृत्तायद्वृत-

शुद्धिर्मानयिश्वाशयस्यप्रहातः तत्मान्त्रं च गृहितं

सद्यश्चा तत्त्वसंध्योक्तेः संक्षरेऽद्वोधक्रमेण

रजते स्मृति जनयति। सा च पुहितप्रहणंमानापि दोषव-

शाह्द्रीतत्त्वांश्चार्योश्च प्रहणमात्रायत्तिष्टे। तथा
च रजतस्मृते: पुरोवतिद्वयमात्राभणस्य च मिथः
स्वरूपतो विषयतश्च मेदायश्च तत्
संनिहित-रजतगोचरज्ञानसारस्येण ‘इदम्’, ‘रजतम्’, इति
हेतु एते अपि ग्रहणस्मरणे अभेद्यवहारं
सामानाधिकरणव्यपदेशं च प्रचंद्यति:। कचिटपुनः
श्रेयः एव मिथः अग्रहीतमेवः, यथा ‘पीतः
शाङ्गः’ इति। अतः हि विनिगर्भश्चर्यरचिपितिनः
पिताध्वस्य कार्यस्य स्वच्छस्य पीतलं गुहाते
पिंि तु न गुहाते। शाङ्गोपि दोषवाच्चुकः
गुणर्हितः स्वरूपमात्रेण गुहाते। तदनयोगुणारोति
गुणिःतसंसारसृष्टिहसारस्यात् पीततपनीयपिण्डप्रत्ययाः
विदेशोपादेशवहारः सामानाधिकरणव्यपदेशश्च।
मेदायसहस्रस्वतिभेद्यवहारवाच्च ‘नेदम्’ इति
विवेकप्रत्ययस्य बाधकस्माध्युणपचते; तदुपपति च
प्राकनस्य प्रत्ययस्य आन्तत्तमपि लोकसिद्धि
सिद्धं भवति। तस्मात्तथाः: सोऽेक विप्रतिपत्ता:
संदेशविभ्रमः, प्रत्यत्तात्, घटादिश्वत्यবतः।
तदिद्मुक्तम्—यत्र यद्व्यास इति। यस्मिन्
शुक्तिकादि यथं रजतादेशव्यास इति लोक-
defect. Thus, there is non-apprehension of the difference between the memory of the silver and the apprehension of the bare object before us, whether in their own nature (as cognitions) or in respect of their contents; hence, because of resemblance to the cognition of silver, where it is actually in (sense-) contact, the two cognitions—"this" and "silver"—though different (in nature) as perception and memory, bring about empirical usage as non-different and appositional designation. In some cases, again, there are but two perceptions whose reciprocal difference is not apprehended as in "the shell is yellow". In that case, as (for instance) in the case of a pure crystal, there is apprehended as present in the rays of light going forth from the eyes the yellowness of the bile, but the bile itself is not apprehended. The shell too, because of some defect, is apprehended as barely existent, but as devoid of the quality of whiteness. Because of similarity in respect of the non-apprehension of the non-relation between the quality and the qualified, there is empirical usage as non-different and appositional designation, in exactly the same way as in the cognition of the yellow mass of gold. (When there is sublation) what is sublated is the empirical usage as non-different occasioned by the non-apprehension of difference; hence is intelligible the sublating nature of the cognition of distinctness in the form "not this"; and this being intelligible, there is also established what is established in the world—the delusiveness of the prior cognition. Therefore, all cognitions doubtful or delusive, about (the nature of) which there is dispute, are true, because they are cognitions, like the cognition of a pot etc. This is the view explained in the words: "when there is the superimposition of one on another."
nacre etc., there is what is well-known to the world as the superimposition of silver etc., that is not conditioned by the cognition as something else, but it is rather a delusion conditioned by the non-apprehension of the distinctness between (on the one hand) silver and the memory of it which by the loss of the element of (the content) having been apprehended stands as bare apprehension, and (on the other hand) the bare object which is present before us as "this" and the cognition thereof. And delusiveness consists in the appositional designation of memory and apprehension with reference to each other, and in the empirical usage as silver etc.

"Others, however," who are not satisfied even with this, "say that when there is superimposition of one on another, there is an assumption in the latter of an opposite attribute". This is the underlying idea: it is (knowledge) common to all that because of the cognition "this is silver," there is for him who seeks silver activity and appositional designation in respect of the substance in front (of him). That cannot come about from the bare failure to apprehend the reciprocal difference between memory and apprehension or their respective spheres; for, how could the activity and speech of an intelligent being, which are conditioned by apprehension, result from bare non-apprehension? Now, it has been said that it results not from bare non-apprehension, but from memory and apprehension, where their difference in respect of their nature and contents is not apprehended; because of the similarity to the valid cognition of silver before us, they give rise to empirical usage as non-different and appositional designation. (To this, the supporter of anyathākhyāti replies:) Now, the similarity of this to the valid cognition
अभ्यासः

प्रसिद्धः नासात्नयाल्याति-निविद्यना, किन्तु गृहीतस्य रज्ज-दस्तत्स्मारणस्य च गृहीततांश-प्रमोदेनं गृहीतमात्रस्य यः 「इदम्」 इति पुरोज्जोऽस्थिताह्व्यादेनाच्याचाच्याचाच्याच्यात् विवेकः, तद-ग्रहणनिविद्यनाथो भ्रमः। भ्रान्ततं च ग्रहण-सम्मरणोरितेतरसामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशो रज्ज-दिव्यवहारश्रेणि।

अन्ये तु —अत्रायपरित्यापतः—यत्र यदि-ध्यासस्तस्येव विपरीतरथमकल्पनामाच्यते। अत्रेदमाकृत्तम् —अर्थं तावद-जलाच्यिन् 「रज्ज-भिद्म्」 इति प्रत्यायानु-रोवतिनि इत्यये प्रवृत्ति: सामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशश्रेणि सर्वज्ञनीनम्। तदः-तत्तच तावद-ग्रहणमादिकरणयोऽस्त्रोऽच्यात् श्रेणि मिथो भेदाग्रहणमाध्य-अवितमार्थ। ग्रहणनिविद्यनों हि चेतनस्य व्यवहारायपदेशोऽथ कथम-ग्रहणमाध्य-अवितमार्थ? ननूनो नाग्रहणमाध्यात। किं तू ग्रहणसम्यक्ये एव मिथ: स्वरूपतो विषयत्वशाग्रहीतमेके, समीचीनपुरः स्थितरज्जवद्यानसाद्ध्वेना-भेदावहारं सामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशं च प्रवर्ततयः।
अथ समीचीन्तज्ञानसारूप्यमनयोग्यामाणं वा व्यवहारप्रत्येकेषु, अग्रहायणं वा सत्तामात्रेण।
गृहामणं धि 'समीचीन्तज्ञानसारूप्यमनयोग्यं रिदिमिति रजतमिति च ज्ञानयो्।' इति ग्रहणम्, अथ
वा 'तथोरूप स्वरूपतो विषयतथा मिथो भेदाग्रहः' इति ग्रहणम्। तत्र न तावसमीचीन्तज्ञान-
सदृशी इति ज्ञानं समीचीन्तज्ञानवद्यवहारप्रत्येकम्।
न हि 'जोगसदृशो गवयः' इति ज्ञानं गतार्थिनं गवये प्रवत्तेयति। 'अनयोरूपे भेदाग्रहः' इति
तु ज्ञानं प्राहतम्; न हि भेदाग्रहे अनयोरिति भवति, अनयोरिति श्रेये भेदाग्रहमिति न भवति।
तस्मात्तसत्तामात्रेण भेदाग्रहः अग्रहीते
एव व्यवहारेतुरितं वक्तव्यम्। तत्र किमयमारो-
पोताक्रमणे व्यवहारेहतु; आहो अनुपरिपुर्णे
एव स्वतं इति? वायं तु पश्याम्:—चेतन-
व्यवहारस्य अज्ञानपूर्वकर्त्तावुपचे: आरोपज्ञानोपाद-
क्रमैव—इति। नन्दु सत्यं चेतनव्यवहारो नाज्ञान-
पूर्वकः, किं तु अविद्यितविवेकग्रहणमस्मपूर्वक
इति। मैथम। न हि रजतप्राप्तिपर्यविर्धमात्रस्मरण
may be the cause of empirical usage either by being apprehended, or by its bare existence, without being apprehended. Even if it be apprehended, the apprehension must be of the form "Of the cognitions 'this' and 'silver' there is resemblance to valid cognition," or of the form "Between those very two no difference is apprehended in respect of their nature or contents". Of these, the cognition "this is like valid cognition" cannot lead to empirical usage in the same way as valid cognition. The cognition "Gavaya is like a cow" does not, verily, induce activity in respect of a gavaya in him who seeks a cow. As for the cognition "non-apprehension of the difference between those very two," that is self-contradictory where there is non-apprehension of difference, it cannot be of the form "between the two"; nor, when there is the apprehension "between the two," can there be non-apprehension of difference. Hence, it must be said that the non-apprehension of difference, not being itself apprehended, is the cause of empirical usage by the bare fact of its existence. Is it, then, the cause of empirical usage through creating an imposition or of itself without creating an imposition? This is how we look at it: since the empirical usage of an intelligent being cannot intelligibly be consequent on ignorance, (it must be effective) only as creating an imposed cognition. Now (it may be objected) it is true that the activity of an intelligent being is consequent not on ignorance, but on apprehension and memory whose distinctness is not known. Not so (we reply); truly, it is not the memory of the bare root-meaning of the word "silver" that causes activity; for, it is undisputed that the activity of one who seeks silver is directed to the substrate of "this-ness".
How can one be active in respect of the substrate of "this-ness" unless one desires it? It is self-contradictory to say that he desires one thing and works for something else. And, not knowing that it is silver which is the substrate of the "this-ness," how can one who seeks silver desire it? If one says (that desire is) due to (the substrate of the "this-ness") not being apprehended as not of the nature of that (silver), that (one) is to be answered thus: since it is not apprehended to be of the nature of that (silver), why is not one indifferent to it? Thus, this intelligent being pulled in opposite directions by acceptance and indifference is unsettled, and is finally settled in the attitude of acceptance by the imposition of silver on the substrate of "this-ness."; thus, the non-apprehension of difference is the cause of the activity of an intelligent being, through creating superimposition. It is thus: because of the non-apprehension of difference the quality of silver is imposed on the substrate of "this-ness"; the fact that what belongs to that class (silver) is advantageous is next brought to mind; that (advantageousness) is next inferred in respect of the silver (imposed) on the substrate of "this-ness," as it belongs to that class; then, he who seeks silver engages in activity in respect of that (imposed silver); thus is the sequence established. The memory of silver in general cannot help one to infer the advantageousness of the substrate of "this-ness," as the probans, silver-ness, would not be known to reside in the subject. Perception (of subject and probans) in the same place is, verily, the cause of inference, not perception in different places. As is said: "(Inference follows) from perception (of probans and subject) in the same place by one who knows the relation
प्रवृत्तचालुपयुक्ते। इदंकारस्यदाभिमुखी रखरू रजताधिना प्रवृत्तिरित्यविवादम्। कथं चाय-
मिदंकारस्य प्रवर्तत यदि तु न तद्विषेषत्?
अन्यदिरिच्छुत्यत्करोतीति व्याहतम्। न चदिविनंका-
राय में रजतरुप जानीया कथं रजताधिना
तद्विषेषत्? यदि अतथात्वेतनाणहणात इति ब्रह्मात्,
स च प्रतिवत्तः, अथ तथात्वेतनाग्रहणात
कस्माचोपेश्यते। सोजयसुपादानोपेश्याभयाभयम्
आकृष्ट्याणशेत्तन: अव्यवस्थित: इदंकारस्य
रजतसमारोपेश्याविकाक्षम एव व्यवस्थाप्ये, इति
मेदाग्रह: समारोपोपायकमे चेतनप्रवृत्तिहेतु:।
तथा हि—मेदाग्रहादिदंकारस्य रजतवं समारोपुः,
तज्जातीयस्योपकार्य्यतुभावमुनुचिन्य, तज्जातीयत—
येदंकारस्ये रजते तमसमय, तदिर्हि प्रवर्तते
इत्यानुपूर्व्य सिद्धम्। न च तत्थस्तरजटस्तपि:
इदंकारस्यस्योपकार्य्यतुभावम्यापोतितमहिति, रज-
तत्वस्य हेतुरक्षयविवादन्। एकदेशदशिर्म खल्लु-
नुमापक्ष न त्वैक्षेत्रदशिर्मम्। यदाहृ—“ज्ञात-
संकन्त्येतादेशदशिर्मात्” इति। समारोपे वेक-
अभ्यासः

देशादर्शनमस्ति। तत्सिद्धम्—एतदिवादाध्यासिंतं
रज्जतादितिनां पुरोवितविवेदिष्यम्, रज्जतार्थिनस्तत्र
नियमेन प्रवर्तक्तवात्; यथादर्थिनयत्र नियमेन
प्रवर्त्यति तज्ज्ञानं तदिष्यं यथोभयसिद्धस्मीचीना-
रज्जतादितानम्; तथा चेदम्; तस्मात्तथा—इति।
यथौक्तम् अनवभासानांतथा न शुक्तिरालम्बन्
मिति, तत्र भवान् प्रस्थो व्याचार्यम्—किं
शुक्तिकालस्य ‘इदं रज्जतम्’ इति ज्ञानं प्रयणा-
लम्बन्तम् आहोसितु द्रव्यात्मकस्य पुर:सिद्धस्य
सिद्धास्तरस्य? यदि शुक्तिकालस्य अनादलम्बन-
तम्, अद्य! उत्तरस्यालम्बनं ज्ञवाणस्य
तत्वेवानुभवविरोधः। तथा हि—‘रज्जतमिदं’
इत्युभवचचन्तुभवता पुरोविति कस्तु अड्गुल्यादिना
निर्द्वशति। द्यं च दुष्टानां कारणानामान्तस्मिका-
कार्यस्यात्मिकन्येन कार्यान्तरोपजननसामथिः, यथा
दावाधिबधानां बेचवनानां कदंकिन्दुक्तनक्तम्य, भक्तः
कुद्रत्स्य चार्यस्य तेजसो बहुभद्वचनमिति।
प्रत्यक्षवाचार्यप्रविशिष्यं च विशेषाणां यथार्थवानु-
मानमानासाः, हुतवहानुण्णवानुमानवत्। यथौक्तः
(vyti)." This perception in the same place occurs in superimposition. Hence is established (the following inference): the subject of dispute, i.e., the cognition of silver etc., has the object before one for its content, since in him who seeks silver etc., it invariably induces activity in respect of that (object in front); that cognition which invariably induces activity in him who seeks a thing has that thing for its content, as in the valid cognition of silver admitted by both of us; this (cognition) is also so; therefore, that is so (i.e., the cognition of silver has the substrate of "this-ness" for its content). As for what was said about nacre not being the basis, since it is not presented, you being questioned will have to explain this: of what is it that you say it is not the basis of the cognition "this is silver"? Is it of the nacreity or merely of the white bright substance in front? If not being the basis belongs to the nacreity, certainly, (we agree). As for the latter not being the basis, you alone who assert it contradict experience. It is thus: he, who has the experience "this is silver," does, while so experiencing, indicate the substance in front with his finger etc. It is also seen that where causes are obstructed by a defect in the production of their normal effects they acquire the capacity to produce other effects; e.g., the seeds of the cane parched by the forest-fire produce plantain-stems; the digestive fire of him whose stomach is affected by bhasmaka can digest a large quantity of food. The inference of the truth of delusions which are deprived of their contents by sublating perceptions is fallacious, like the inference that fire is not hot. As for what was said about the loss of confidence in all
means of valid knowledge if illusory cognitions be said to be inconstant (to their contents), that is met in the Nyāyakarikā by us who declare that (for cognition) there is self-validity through (the very fact of) its conveying knowledge and not through its constancy (to its content); hence it is not dilated on here.39 The criticism of the doctrine of the loss (of the memory-ness) of memory has been stated here only in brief; it is to be learnt in detail from the Brahmatattvasaṃśaya. Hence it is said: "others however say that when there is superimposition of one on another there is an assumption in the latter of an opposite attribute." When on nacre etc., there is imposition of silver etc., there is the attribution of the properties of silver etc., which are opposed to that very nacre etc.: this is the construction.

Now, let there be these differences among inquirers; what of that in the present context? To this he says: "But in any case," etc. The assumption of the attributes of one thing in the case of another, that is untruth (anṛtata); we have explained above that that is indeterminability. From that (it would follow that) in the systems of all inquirers this indeterminable assumption of the attributes of one thing in another has necessarily to find a place; hence this indeterminability is an accepted doctrine in all systems: this is the meaning. The idea is that this must be admitted, though unwillingly, by those who maintain the view of non-apprehension (of difference between memory and apprehension) inasmuch as they favour the invariability of appositional designation and activity.
मिथ्याप्रत्ययस्य व्यभिचारे सर्वप्रमाणेष्वनावःस्थास्य
इति, ततो बोधकवेन स्वतःप्रामाण्यं नायन्यभिचारेरेनेति
व्यवपादविनिर्माणम्: परिहंतं न्यायकणिकायंसामिति
नेहः प्रत्यये। दिःस्मान्त् चास्य स्मृतिप्रमोऽभक्ष्यस्योऽक्षम्। विस्तरस्तु बहात्तत्त्वसमीक्षयामागन्त्य
इति। तदद्विद्मुक्तम्—अन्ये तृ यत्र यद्ध्यासस्तस्येव विपरीतसङ्कल्पनामाचारे इति।
यत्र शुक्लकार्तीय यथा रजतादेशयासस्तस्येव
शुक्लकार्तिकाविपरीतसङ्कल्पान्त्र रजतविधकल्पनान्त्यिने
योजना।

ननु सन्तु नाम परीक्षकाणं विप्रत्यपि
प्रक्रृति तु किमातमिल्यत आह—सर्वथापि
इति। अन्यस्यान्यायसङ्कल्पना अनृत्ता, सा
च अनिवर्चनीयतेष्वधस्तायुपादित्यम्। तेन सर्वाश्चेत
परीक्षकाणं मेते अन्यस्यान्यायसङ्कल्पनान्त्यिने
नीयावश्यंभावतिनीतिनिवर्चनीयता सर्वन्तत्त्वसिद्धान्त
इत्यथः। अस्मात्तितवादिर्मिहिमाप्रि सामान
नाधिकरण्यच्यूदेशप्रवृत्तिनिम्यक्षेत्रहादिदम्युपेयमिति
भावः।
अद्व्यासः

कथं पुनः प्रल्यगतमन्यविषयेः अद्व्यासः विषयतद्दृष्टमाणाः? सर्वः हि पुरोज्वस्थिते
विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति; युष्मत्त्र-ल्यापेतस्य च प्रल्यगतमन्यविषयतवं
ब्रवीषि। उच्यते—न तावदयमेकानेतना
विषयः, अस्मत्प्रयविषयतवात्, अपरोक्ष-
त्वाच प्रल्यगतमप्रसिद्धे। न चाय-
मसि नियमः पुरोज्वस्थित एव विषये
विषयान्तरमध्यसिद्धमिति। अप्रत्यक्षेष्पि
ह्याकारे बालस्तलमधिन्तादध्यस्यनिति।
एवमविरुह्दः प्रल्यगतमन्यप्यनात्मनाम-
अद्व्यासः।

न केवलमियमनृत्ता परीक्षकानां सिद्धा,
आपि तु लौकिकानामपीताः—तथा च लोके
अनुभवः शुक्किका हि रजटवदवभासत
इति। न पुनं रजटमिद्विति शेषः।

स्यादेत्तत्। अन्यस्यान्यात्मताविभ्रमो लोकसिद्धः।
एक्यं तत्त्वज्ञेयं भेदभ्रमो न द्वयं इति कृतः।
Again, how can there be the superimposition of the object and its attributes on the inner self, which is a non-object? For, everyone superimposes an object on another object that is present before him; and you say that the inner self, which is outside the concept of "Thou," is a non-object. The reply is: now, this is not invariably a non-object, because it is the object of the concept "I," and because of the immediacy of the realisation of the inner self. And there is no rule that an object can be superimposed only on another object that is present before one. For, upon ether, though not perceptible, the unthinking superimpose surface, impurity etc. Similarly there is no contradiction in the superimposition of the non-self even on the inner self.

This untruth is established in the case not only of inquirers, but also of the man in the street; hence he says: "And thus is our experience in the world—nacre appears as (if it were) silver." "This, again, is not silver"; this is the complement (to the above sentence).

Be this so. The delusion that one thing is of the nature of another is established in experience; but there is not seen the delusion of difference in the case of what is one and non-different; whence the delusion of difference for the jīvās who are not different from the intelligent
self? To this he says: "the moon, though one, appears as
if having a second."

In the words "Again, how," etc., the superimposition
on the intelligent self is again objected to. This is the
meaning: is this intelligent self manifest or not? If it be
not manifest, how can there be the superimposition of
objects and their attributes thereon? There is not, verily,
the superimposition of silver or its attributes on a non-
manifest substance in front (of us). If this self is
manifest, it does not stand to reason that it is inert, and
manifested in dependence on another, like a pot etc." (The
self that is manifest should be either self-manifest or
manifested by another; it is not the latter; nor can it
be the former.) Verily, the same thing cannot be both
agent and object, because of contradiction. The object is,
indeed, that which can bear the fruit of activity inherent in
another; the knowing activity is not inherent in another
(than the self); how, then, can that (self) be the object there-
of? Nor can the same be both self- and other- (dependent),
because of contradiction. But if inherence (of the knowing
activity) in another self be admitted, the known self would
become a not-self (not being the subject of that activity).
Further, for that (another knowing self would be required,
and) for that (another), so that there is infinite regress.

(He who holds that consciousness is self-manifest,
but not the self, may say:) be this so. The self, though
inert, though manifest in the cognitions of all things, is
agent alone, not object, being, like Caitra, not characterised
by bearing the fruit of activity inherent in another.
In Caitra's reaching a city through activity inherent in
विद्वातीनोभिमानां जीवनां भेदविभागं इत्यत आह—एकश्रन्द्रः सदृशित्यवत् इति।

पुनरूपं विद्वातिन्यं ब्रह्मसामुज्यस्तितिः—कथं पुनः
इति। अयमथः—विद्वातम प्रकाशाते न वा?
न चेतु प्रकाशाते, कथमस्मिन्योऽसो विषय-
तद्भरणाम्। न खल्वपि प्रतिभास्माने पुरोवतिनिः
द्विये रजस्त्रये वा तद्भरणां वा समारोपः संभवति।
प्रतिभास्माने वा न तावद्यमात्मा जशो घटादिनी
वत्सराधीनप्रकाश इति युक्तम्। न खल्लु स एव
कर्ता च कर्म सुभवति, विरोधात। परस्मृवेते-
क्रियाफलशालि हि कर्मः, न च ज्ञानक्रिया
परस्मृवापिनिति कथमहः। कर्मः? न च तदेव
स्वां च परं च, विरोधात्। आत्मानंतरसमवाहायुप-
गमे तु ज्ञेयस्यात्: अनात्मत्वप्राप्तः। एवं तस्य
तत्त्वेत्यनवस्थप्राप्तः।

स्यादेत्तत्। आत्मा जशोपि सत्येष्वञ्जायेत् भास-
मानोपि कर्तवं न कर्मस, परस्मृवेतक्रियाफल-
शालिभावात्, चेत्त्रात्। यथा हि चेत्त्रसमवेते-
क्रियया चेत्त्रगर्भप्राप्तावुभयसमवेतायामापि क्रिय-
अध्यायः

माणायां नगरस्येव कर्मेताः परस्मवेतनक्षियानफृष-शालिनात्, न तु चैत्रश्च क्रियाकलशालिनोपि, चैत्रसमवायानदमनक्षियाया इति।

तथा, श्रुतिविरोधान तः श्रूयते ति 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनं भ्रात' इति।

उपपत्ते च। तथा हि—योजयमर्थप्रकाशः फलं यस्मिद्धर्तं आत्मा च प्रत्येके स कि जडः स्वच्छप्रकाशो वा? जडःस्वा विषयामानावपि जडाविश्व कस्मं कि प्रकाशेत अविशेषात्, इति प्रातयमानव्या शेषस्य जगत्। तथा चाभाणकः—

'अन्ध्रयात्यान्योत्तरस्य विनिधात: पदे पदे' इति। न च निर्लेन्द्रविज्ञानमर्थस्यानान् ज्ञाप्यति चतुरादिविदिति वाच्यम्। ज्ञापनं हि ज्ञानजननम्, जनितं च ज्ञानं जडं सांक्षर-द्वृत्तमतिवत्ततेति। एवस्मुत्तरस्यायं ज्ञानानि जडानीत्यनवश्च। तस्मादपराधीनप्रकाशा संविदु-पेत्या।

तथापि किमायांत विषयायनो: स्वभावचयायो? एतदायात यत्यो: संविदुज्जेति। तत्किं पुनः
himself, though the product inheres in both Caitra and the city, the object-ness belongs to the city alone, since to that belongs the property of bearing the fruit of activity inherent in another, and not to Caitra, though he too bears the fruit of activity, as the act of going is inherent in Caitra (alone).

This is not (sound), because of opposition to Scripture. Scripture, indeed, says: "Truth, knowledge, infinitude is Brahman."

This is intelligible too. It is thus: that fruit, which is the manifestation of the object, that in which the object and the self manifest themselves, is that inert or self-manifest? If that were inert, both the object and the self would be inert; which, then, would be manifest in which, there being no distinction (among the three)? Thus would result non-manifestation for the whole universe. (Nor can the reciprocal dependence of these three be of any avail); and thus the proverb: "As the blind holding on to the blind falls at every step." Nor may it be said that cognition, being itself hidden, (yet) makes known both the object and the self, like the sense of sight etc. (which, themselves unperceived, yet cause perception); for, to make known is to produce cognition, and the cognition that is produced, being inert, would not surmount the above-mentioned defect (of the blind leading the blind). Thus, the subsequent cognitions too being inert, there would be infinite regress. Therefore, consciousness should be acknowledged to be manifested without dependence on another.

Even thus, what is gained (by you) for the object and the self, which (you hold) are both inert by nature? This is the gain. (you may say), that the consciousness of
them is not inert. (But it does not follow that the object and the self, the causes of consciousness, are not inert); in that case, because the son is a scholar, should the father be a scholar too? It is of the very nature of the self-luminous consciousness to be related to the object and the self: if this be said, alas! then, it is equally the nature of the scholarly son to be related to his father. (You may define the relation thus): the manifestation of consciousness is along with the manifestation of the object and the self, never without the manifestation of the object and the self; this is its nature. If this be said, is consciousness, then, different from the manifestation of consciousness (on the one hand), and the manifestation of the object and the self (on the other)? If that were so, then, consciousness would no longer be self-manifest, nor would consciousness be the manifestation of the object and the self. Then, (you may say), the two manifestations, of consciousness and of the object and self, are not different from consciousness; these two are but consciousness. If this be said, then, what is said in "consciousness (goes) along with the object and the self," that (alone) is what is said in "(the manifestation of) consciousness (goes) along with the manifestation of the object and the self" (so that there is no advance in your position)." (Hence), what is desired to be stated by you (that the self, itself inert, is the locus of the self-manifest consciousness) does not result.

Nor is there concomitance with the object in the case of that consciousness which has objects past and future for its sphere (though such concomitance has been assumed in the argument so far). Since there is generated the cognition of rejection, acceptance
पणित इति पितापि पण्डितोऽस्तु। स्वभाव
एष संविदः स्वयंप्रकाशाया यद्याध्यात्मसंबंधितेति चेतु, हन्त पुत्रस्यापि पण्डितस्य स्वभाव
एष यतिःतुसंबंधितेति समानस्। सहार्थात्म-
प्रकाशोऽनं संविद्याशो न लर्थायमप्रकाशां विनेति
तस्या: स्वभाव इति चेतु, तत्किं संविदो
भिन्नसः संविद्यात्मप्रकाशोऽ। तथा च न
स्वयंप्रकाशा संवितः, न च संविदः अर्थात्मप्रकाश
इति। अथ संविद्यात्मप्रकाशोऽ न संविदो
भिन्नेते, संविदेव तौ। एवं चेत् यावदुर्गं
भवति संविदाध्यायौः सहेति तावदुर्गं भवति
संविद्यात्मप्रकाशाः सहेति। तथा च न विविधेन-
तार्थसिद्धिः।

न चाततनागतार्थमोऽचराया: संविद्यात्मेऽसह-
भावोऽपि। तद्हिष्ठानोपाधानोपेक्षावृद्धिजनादर्थ-
सहभाव इति चेतु, न, अर्थसंविदः इव
हानादिबुधीनामपि तद्विषयवाकामिते। हानादिजननादानादिबुधीनामस्यविषयत्वम्, अर्थविषयहानादिबुधजननाच अर्थसंविदस्तिधिष्यतमिति चेत्।
तत्त्वं देहस्य प्रयनवदात्मसंयोगो देहप्रकृतिनिधिविनिष्टेन्हेतुरथं इत्यथप्रकाशकोशस्तु? जात्यादेहात्मसंयोगो नार्थप्रकाशार्थः इति चेत्।
नवयं स्वयंप्रकाशोधपि स्वात्मन्येव खधोत्वत्सकः। अर्थं तु जह इत्यपपादितमः।

न प्रकाशावधाताः विषयः। ते हि विचित्रविधीर्ष्टुतगत्वानुभूतं। प्रकाशावधातां अन्तरोष्टुत्तुरणुपरहस्तोधिविनिष्टे। इति प्रकाशाधि।
तस्मा-चन्द्रस्तुभूयमाने इव हितियशचन्द्रमाः। स्पर्श-काशायुः निर्विन्यमन्य एवैत युक्तसुभस्यामः।
न अस्य प्रकाशायज्ञात: स्तव्यक्षणस्वदोषोनश्यते। न अनिवर्व्यस्यमेव: प्रकाशं निर्वाच्यं भेतुमहत्ति, अतिप्रसञ्जातः। न अर्थानामपि
or indifference relating to that as content, there is concomitance with the object: if this be said, no (we reply); because the cognition of rejection etc., like the consciousness of the object itself, cannot intelligibly have that (past or future object) as content. Because of giving rise to rejection etc., the cognition of rejection etc. too have the object as content; and because of giving rise to the cognition of rejection etc., which have the object as content, the consciousness of the object too has that (object) as content: if this be said, since the conjunction of the body with the self that puts forth effort is the cause of the setting up and cessation of bodily activity in respect of an object, is that (conjunction) too (we ask) a manifestation of the object? Because of its inertness, (you may say), the conjunction of the body and the self is not a manifestation of the object. Now, though this (consciousness) is self-manifest (unlike the afore-said conjunction), its luminosity, like that of a glow-worm, is only in respect of itself; in respect of objects, however, it is inert; this has been explained (by the analogy of the scholarly son's father).

Nor are objects of the very nature of light (i.e., of consciousness, as the Vijñānavādins say); they are experienced as finite, as long or gross, while light manifests itself as internal, neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long. Therefore, we see fit to hold that the object, which is other than the self-manifest, is certainly indeterminable, like the second moon experienced along with the moon. And no natural differentiation is experienced in this light as such (so that there is no obstacle to its identity with the self, which is one). Nor can differences among objects,
which are indeterminable, introduce differences into light, which is determinate, as that would prove too much." It will also be shown later that reciprocal difference does not come in the line of valid knowledge. Therefore, this very light, which is self-luminous, one, immutable, eternal, without parts, is the inner self, *i.e.*, the self that knows the determinate self to be other than the body, organs etc., which are indeterminable.

That self, not being other-dependent for its manifestation, and being without parts, cannot be an object (of cognition). How, then, can there be the superimposition thereon of the attributes of objects, *i.e.*, of bodies, organs etc.? The word "how" (in the commentary) is in the sense of an objection. This superimposition does not stand to reason; this is the objection. Why does it not stand to reason? To this he says: "For, every one superimposes an object upon another object that is present before one." This is what is said: that, whose manifestation is other-dependent and which has parts, appears other than what it is, being apprehended in its general nature, but not apprehended in its specific nature, because of defect in the organs (of cognition). The inner self, however, not being other-dependent for its manifestation, does not require for the knowledge of itself any organs, by defects in which it would itself become defective. Nor has it any parts, in which case, it could be apprehended in some part, but not in others. It cannot, verily, happen that the same (thing) is at the same time and by itself both apprehended and not apprehended; hence on the view of the self-luminosity (of the self) there can be no superimposition. (And) even if it be never manifest, there can
अध्यास:

परस्परं भेदः समीचीनज्ञानपद्धतिमध्याते इत्य-परिष्थापुपादयित्वते । तदर्य प्रकाशा एव स्वयंप्रकाशा एकः कृतश्चो नित्यो निरंशः प्रत्यगत्वा अशाक्यनिर्वचनीये ये वेदे हेन्द्रयादिभ्य आत्मानं प्रतिपं निर्वचनीयमात्वति जानातीति प्रत्यक्ष, सः चास्तिति प्रत्यगत्वा ।

स चापराधीनप्रकाशतात्व अनंतात्वाच अविभयः, तस्मिन्यायासो विशयंमर्मणामु, वेदे हेन्द्रयादिधर्मा-णामु, कथमु? किमाक्षरे । अयुक्तोष्यमूलाय इत्य-क्षरे । कस्माद्यमुक्त इत्यत आह—सवृं हि पुरोज्विस्थिते विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति । एतदुःखं भवति—यतपराधीनप्रकाशमंश्वच तत्सा-मान्यानांहें करणंद्वपश्चाच विशेषांगेहि अन्यथा प्रकाशते । प्रत्यगत्वा तु अपराधीनप्रकाशतया न स्वाजने कारणान्यपेशक्ते, येन तदाध्ययैदौष्ठैघ्येतुः । न चांशवान, येन कस्मिद्यांशो गृहेत, कस्मिच गृहेत । न हि तेव तदानामि देव गृहीतमगृहीतं च संभवतीति न स्वयंप्रकाशातांक्षे अध्यासः । सदानेपुष्यप्रकाशे पुरोज्विस्थित-
अध्यासः

तस्य अपरोक्षत्वस्याभावान्तः अध्यासः। न हि युक्तः अपुरः स्थितायां रजतं मध्यस्थति ‘इदं रजतम्’ इति। तस्माद्यंत्रेऽहे अत्यन्तायहे च नाध्यास इति सिद्धम्।

स्यादेतत्। अविषयते हि चिदात्मो नाध्यासः। विषय एव तु चिदात्मा अस्मात्मत्वस्य, तत्कथं नाध्यास इत्यत् आह—युष्मदत्वत्वापेतत्स्य इति। विषयते हि चिदात्मो चित्तो विषयी भवेत्। तथा च यो विषयी स एव चिदात्मा। विषयस्तु ततो युष्मदत्वगोचरोऽयुष्मत्वपेतत्रम्। अतं एव अविषयस्तम्भास्ते वत्त्यास्य। तथा च नाध्यास इत्यथः।

परिहरति—उच्यते—न तावद्यमेकान्ते नाविषयः। कुतः? अस्मात्मत्वाविषयत्वात्। अयस्यः—सत्यं प्रत्यगत्या स्वयं प्रकाशादशताद्विषयो-नृंसाध्वः। तत्थिष्ठि अनिवृत्तचन्द्रनाथविद्यापरिप्रकल्पित-बुद्धिमन:सूक्ष्मस्थूलशरीरिक्यावच्छेदकमेधेन अनव-चित्तोऽपि वस्तुतोऽवच्छेद्व। इव अभिन्नोऽपि भिन्न।
be no superimposition, since it is not before us, i.e., is not immediately experienced. Silver is not, verily, superimposed in the form "this is silver", when nacre is not present before us. Hence it follows that there can be no superimposition both when there is complete apprehension and when there is total non-apprehension.

Be this so. If the intelligent self were not an object, then indeed, there could be no superimposition thereon; but it is the object of the concept "I". Why then can there be no superimposition? To this he says: "which is ever outside the concept of 'Thou'." For, if the intelligent self were the object, the subject (vīṣayin) would be other than that. And thus, he who is the subject is himself the intelligent self; the object, however, should be admitted to be other than that, and in the sphere of the concept of "Thou". Hence, "being outside the concept of 'Thou'" is (stated) for the purpose of remedying the possibility of non-selfhood (for the self) and of infinite regress; hence it is that not being an object has to be predicated of the self; and thus, there is no superimposition: this is the meaning.

He answers this: "The reply is—now, this is not invariably a non-object." Why (not)? "Because it is the object of the concept 'I'." This is the meaning: true, the inner self being self-manifest is not an object and is without parts; but yet, having attained to the state of the jīva, though not really defined by the particular defining conditions posited by indeterminable beginningless Nescience, such as the intellect, the mind, bodies subtle and gross, and the organs, he appears as if defined; though not different, he appears as if different; though
not an agent, he appears as agent; though not an
enjoyer, he appears as enjoyer; and though not an ob-
ject, he appears as the object of the concept "I"; just
as the ether because of differences defined by adjuncts
such as pot, ewer, basin etc., appears as different and
possessing diverse attributes. Of the self that is but of
the one essence of intelligence, there is not, verily,
anything unapprehended, when the element of intelligence
is apprehended. Bliss, eternality, pervasiveness etc. are
not, indeed, different from its nature as intelligence,
such that they are not apprehended along with the
apprehension of that element. While being certainly
apprehended, yet, because of posited difference, they appear
as if not discriminated, and hence not apprehended. Nor is
the difference of the self from the intellect etc. real, so that
that (difference) too is apprehended, when the intelligent
self is apprehended; for, the intellect etc., being indeter-
minable, their difference (from the self) too is indeter-
minable (and unreal). Thus, it is for the intelligent self
itself, which is self-manifest and undefined, that there is
the condition of the ātman, through non-apprehension of
the difference from the defined intellect etc., and the
(consequent) superimposition of these. Of this, which
partakes of the nature of the "not-this (non-object:
the intelligent self)" and the "this (the inert object)," being the object of the concept "I" is intelligible. It is
thus: the intelligent self appears, in the concept "I,"
as agent and enjoyer. And for that (self) which is
indifferent there cannot occur the capacity either to act or
to enjoy. And for that aggregate of the effect (the body)
and the organs, i.e., the intellect etc., to which belong the
अभ्यास:

इत्य अकर्त्तापि करेऽव अभोक्तापि मोक्षेऽव अविष्योऽसमुपत्यविषय इत्य जीवभावमाप्नः अवभासते, नम इत्य धर्मकालिखामधुपायांचे देहेऽमेवं भित्र-मित्रानेकविगंधर्मनिवेदितं। न हि चित्रेकरसत्यात्मः चिदंशे गृहीते अगृहीतं किचिदिरति। न खलु आनन्दनित्यविभुवायः अस्य चिद्रूपाहरस्तो भिच्यते, येन तद्यथे न गृहेर। गृहीता एव तु कल्पितेन भेदेन न विचेचिता इत्यगृहीता इवामानि। न च आत्मनो बुध्वादिभ्यो भेदस्ताचिव्यः। येन चित्रात्मनं गृह्माणे सोऽपि गृहीता एव भवेत, बुध्वादिनामनिर्वाच्यात्ततं तत्त्वेद्यात्मानि नवेच्छेच्छद्वादिभ्यो भेदात्मात् तद्यथाणेन जीवभाव इति। तत्त्त्वाच चित्रात्मन: न्यायकार्थ्यात् अनवधिक्षतः अवचित्क्षेः बुध्वादिभ्यो भेदात्मात् तद्यथाणेन जीवभाव इति। तत्त्वाच च अनिद्वमिदमात्मन: असम्वित्यविषयत्व-मुप्पच्च। तथा हि—कर्तर्ता भोक्ता चित्रात्मा अहंमये प्रथमामास्ते। न च उदासीनस्य तत्त्व क्रियाविश्वेषमंगणात्मकाः संभवति। यस्य च बुध्वादे:
अध्यायः

कार्यकरणसंघातस्य क्रियामोगशक्ती न तस्य चैतन्यम्। तस्माचिद्वैते कार्यकरणसंघातेन प्राधितो सत्यक्रियामोगशक्तिः स्वयंप्रकाशोपि गुणाद्विद्विष्यविच्छुरणात् कथाचिद्व्यत्त्वयविष्यः अहंकारायपदं जीव इति च जन्तुरिति च श्रेष्ठ इति च आचार्याये। न रखु जीवधिदात्सनो भिचये। तथा हि श्रुति:—‘अनेन जीवनात्मना’ इति। तस्माचिदात्मनोज्ञतिरेकात् जीव: स्वयं-प्रकाशोपि अहंप्रत्येन कर्तृभूमक्तत्वा व्यवहार-योग्य: क्रियत् इत्यहंसत्यायाम्बनपुप्यते। न च अध्यासे सति विषयतं विषयते न अध्यास: इत्यन्योन्यश्रयत्वमिति सांप्रतम्, बीजाकुकरवदनादित्वात्, पर्वतप्राण्डवस्त्रहासानागत्विष्यंकृतस्योऽचराध्यासनिष्यत्वाविश्वरोऽतिदिन्तम्—“नेतर्गि-कोयं लोकववहारः” इति भाष्यप्रत्येन। तस्मात् सुधूतकम्—न तावद्यमेकान्तेनाविष्य इति। जीवो हि निद्रात्मत्या स्वयंप्रकाशतया अविष्योपि औपाधिकेन रूपेन विषय इति भावः।
capacities to act and enjoy, there is no intelligence. Hence, it is the intelligent self that, linked to the aggregate of the effect (the body) and the organs, gains the capacity to act and enjoy; though self-manifest, yet by intermixture with objects like the intellect etc., it somehow becomes the object of the concept "I," the substrate of "I-ness," and is (variously) designated jīva, creature (jantu), or knower of the field (kṣetrajña). The jīva indeed is not different from the intelligent self. For, thus runs Scripture: "in its own nature, as that jīva" etc." Thus, the jīva though self-manifest, because of being non-different from the intelligent self, is yet made by the concept "I" fit for empirical usage as agent and enjoyer; hence it is said to be the basis of the concept "I". Nor is it admissible (to say) that there is reciprocal dependence in that (the jīva) becomes an object if there is superimposition, and there is superimposition if (he) becomes an object; for, the (process) is beginningless, like the (dependence of) seed and sprout, and there is no inconsistency in every subsequent superimposition having for its object that which has been made the content of each earlier superimposition and its impressions; "this has been said in the text of the commentary: "this natural empirical usage." Hence it has been well-said: "now, this is not invariably a non-object." The jīva though not an object, as (non-different from) the intelligent self and as self-manifest, is yet an object in his conditioned form: this is the idea.
Be this so. We do not deny superimposition on the ground that the ātma is not an object, his manifestation not being other-dependent; we maintain rather that the inner self does not shine either of itself or with the help of another, and is hence not an object. Hence on the inner self, which is never manifest, how can there be superimposition? To this he says: "and because of the immediacy of the realisation of the inner self." Prātha is the realisation of the inner self, because of the immediacy thereof. Though, in the inner self, realisation is not something other than that, yet the difference (implied in the words "realisation of the self") is figurative, as in "the intelligence of the self". This is what is said: the intelligent self should necessarily be admitted to be immediately perceived, since from the non-manifestation thereof would follow the non-manifestation of everything and the blindness of the universe; this has been already said. And there is Scripture to this effect: "That shining, all else shines after it; by its light all this shines." 45

Having given this real answer, he states as a prāudhavādin 46 another answer, assuming the mediacy of the intelligent self: "And there is no rule" etc. "Only on another object present before one," i.e., only on what is immediate (directly perceived). Why is there no such rule? To this he says: "For, upon ether, though not perceptible" etc. The (particle) hi means for the reason that. Ether, though a substance, is yet devoid of form and touch;
यद्यपि न वयमपराधीनप्रकाशत्या अविषयतेनायायसमपाकुम्भः, किं तु प्रत्यगात्मा न स्वतो नापि परतः प्रथत इत्यविषय इति गूमः। तथा च सर्वत्रप्रथमाने प्रत्यगात्मनि कुलोच्यास इत्यत आः—अपरोक्षतत्वाच प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः इति। प्रतीच आत्मनः प्रसिद्धिः प्रथा, तस्या अपरोक्षतत्वात्। यद्यपि प्रत्यगात्मनि नान्या प्रथाति तथापि भेदोपचारः, यथा ‘पुङ्खस्य चैतन्यम्’ इति। एतदुर्यूः भवति—अवश्य चिदात्मा अपरोक्षौप्येतव्यः। तदप्रथायां सर्वयसाधायेष ज्ञानावृत्तित्यत्माः। श्रुतिश्चाच भवति—‘तत्त्वे भान्तमु भाति सर्वं तत्त्वं भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति’ इति।

तदेवं परस्यकर्मपरिहारसुक्तः अभ्येत्यापि चिदात्मनः परोक्षां चौद्वान्दित्या परिहारान्तरमाह—न चायामस्ति इति। पुरोक्षस्थित एव, अपरोक्ष एव। कस्मादेन न नियम इत्यत आः—अप्रत्यक्षेष्ठपि इति। हिर्यसादेः। नभो हि इद्वीं सतू रूपस्यदिविरिहात्त बाहेन्दियप्रत्यक्षम्।
अभ्यासः

तत्सत्त्वं वर्णक्षणमध्यासं परिहता अत्रीः श्रेष्ठति मन्यन्ते, तद्विवेकनं च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्यामाहुः। तत्वेवं सति यत्र

नापि मानसं, मनसोसहायत्वं वाहे अपरिश्रुतः; तस्मादप्रत्यक्षम्। अथ च तत्र वाज्ञा अत्रवेक्षनः

पर्वतिनादर्शनं: कदाचित्याधिकच्चक्याम् स्त्यामतामारूपः, कदाचित्चेतजं शुक्लमारूपः, नीलोतप-पत्तशास्त्राश्याममिति वा राजहंसमालायश्चलमिति वा निर्वर्ज्यन्ति। तत्रापि पूर्वद्दर्श्यं तैजस्यं वा तामस्यं वा रूप्यं प्रत्र नभसि स्मृतिलोपोज्जभासं हि।

एवं तदेव तद्भवध्यस्यन्ति अवशेषशुक्ली-भृत्तमहेन्द्रनीलामणिमयमहाकटाहक्तपरिमितियथः। उप-संहरतिः—प्रत्र मूल उत्केषन प्रकारण सर्वायश्चपरिहारानु, अवरुद्धः प्रत्यगातमन्यपन्यनातमनाम—

बुध्याद्विनामं—अभ्यासः।

ननु सति च सहस्रमध्यासाः, तत्कंमर्यममेत्वाध्यास आक्रेषसमाधानां प्रयुतपदित: नाभ्यासं-मात्रमितित आह—तत्सत्त्वं वर्णक्षणमध्यासं
This aforementioned superimposition of this character, wise men hold to be Nescience, and as distinct from that, the determination of the nature of the thing, they call knowledge. Here, such being the case, when hence it cannot be cognised by an external sense. Nor can it be cognised by the mind, since the unaided mind does not act in respect of what is external; hence it is not perceived. Now, in respect of this, "children," i.e., those who possess no discriminative knowledge, those who see what is shown them by others, superimpose sometimes blueness, the colour of the earth, sometimes whiteness, the property of fire, and determine it to be blue like the petals of the nlotpala (blue lily) or white like a row of raja-hamsas (swans). Here too, there is, in the form of recollection, the appearance of the property of the formerly seen brightness or darkness. Thus, even thereon, they "super-impose surface," likening it to a huge inverted bowl made of indranila gems. He concludes thus: "Similarly," i.e., in the manner set forth above, through answering all objections, "there is no contradiction in the superimposition of the not-self," i.e., of the intellect etc., "even on the inner self'.

Now, there are thousands of superimpositions; why should this particular one be expounded through the statement of objection and answer? Why not the general nature alone of superimposition (be expounded)? To this he says: "This afore-mentioned superimposition of this
there is the superimposition of one on another, the latter is not affected, even to the extent of an atom, by the good or bad features produced by the former. It is in the wake of this aforementioned reciprocal superimposition of the self and the not-self, which is designated Nescience, that there proceed all empirical usages of the world relating to valid knowledge and the means thereof, and all the sacred teachings relating to prescription, prohibition and release.

character, wise men hold to be Nescience." It is well-known from Scripture, traditional codes, epics, *purāṇas* etc., that Nescience is the seed of all evil; it will be said later that the Vedānta sets out to remove that Nescience. The superimposition of the not-self on the inner self is alone the cause of all evil, not the delusion of silver etc.; hence that alone is Nescience; since, in the absence of the knowledge of its nature, it cannot be removed, that alone is expounded, not superimposition in general. By the words "of this character" there is declared its being the cause of evil, because of its being of that form. It is the cause of evil, because it makes the non-suffering inner self suffer by imposing the adverse internal organ etc., associated with appetite etc., on the inner self free from appetite etc. Nor is superimposition considered to be such by others too, in which case, there would be no need for the exposition. Hence it is said: "wise men hold" etc.
यद्ध्यास: तत्क्तेन दोषेन गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि स न संबध्यते । तत्मेत-मविचार्यमात्मानात्मनोरितेरताध्यासं पुर-स्कूल सवेन प्रभाण्प्रमेयव्यवहारा लोकिकाः प्रवृत्ता:, सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विभिन्नतिवेधमोक्षपराणि।

पणिद्वता अविद्यते मन्यन्ते । अविद्या हि सर्वानंतर्भीजामिति श्रुतिस्मृतितहासपुराणादिध्व सु- प्रसिद्धम् तदुच्छेदाय च वेदान्ता: प्रवृत्ता इति कक्ष्यति । प्रत्यगात्मन्यतामात्यास एव सर्वानंतेहुः: न पुना रजतादिविभ्रमा इति स एवाविद्या, तत्सर्वपरं चाविज्ञानं न शक्यमुच्छेचुमिति तदेव व्युत्पादं नाभ्यासमाचम् । अत्र च "एवंक्षणम्" इति प्रमुखतया अनथेहुतुश्च । यस्मात्रत्यगात्मन्यदानाय- यादिरहि अदानाययुपेतान्त: करणाहितारोपण प्रत्यगात्मनरमुदः सं दुःखान्तेति, तस्मादनर्थेतुः। न चेतं प्रथमजना अपि मन्यन्ते अच्यासम्, चेत्यन न व्यु- ताधेतेत्तत उत्तम- "पणिद्वता मन्यन्ते" इति।
ननु इत्यनादिनिसिद्धनिविधवासनानुबंधा अविद्या न शक्या निरोहुम, उपायभावान,  
इति यो मन्यते तन्त्र प्रति तत्तचिरोपोण्यामाह—  
तद्विकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपावधाराण्म, निर्विचिकित्सा ज्ञानम्, विद्यामाहुः पण्डिता।  
प्रत्येकमनि श्रीतु अत्यन्तविविधते बुद्धचायाभ्य: बुद्धचायितेन  
मेदाग्रहिनिभि बुद्धचायाचतुर्दशमायासः।  
तत्र श्रवणमनादिनिसिद्धीविवेकविज्ञानं तेन विवेकाय:  
श्रेष्ठं निवर्तते, अभ्यासप्रवाधास्तमकं वस्तुस्वरूपवधाराण्म विद्या चिदास्रलं स्वरूपं व्यवस्थितम्  
इत्यर्थः।  
स्पदेतः। अतिनिसिद्धनिविधवासनानुविद्या  
अविद्या विद्या अपवाधितापि स्ववाधास्तम  
शातुनरुविष्णृपर्वतयितयि च वासनादिकार्थि  
स्त्रोतिमित्यत आह—तत्वावधारणेवत सति, एवंभूतवस्तु  
तत्तचावधारणेवत सति, यत्र यद्यायासः तत्र तेन  
दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि स न  
संवब्ध्यते, अन्त:करणादिदोषेणाशनायादिना चि-
Now, this Nescience associated with impressions, which are beginningless, deep-rooted and dense, cannot be removed, there being no means therefor; to him who thinks so, the means for removing it is declared thus: "and, as distinct from that, the determination," i.e., knowledge not subject to doubt "of the nature of the thing, they," i.e., wise men "call knowledge". It is verily in the inner self, which is wholly distinct from the intellect etc., that, because of the non-apprehension of the difference from the intellect etc., there is superimposition of the nature and attributes of the intellect etc. The non-apprehension of difference being removed by the cognition of difference through hearing (i.e., study of the Vedânta), reflection etc., that which sublates Nescience, viz., the ascertainment of the nature of things," knowledge, which is of the nature of the intelligent self, stands forth in its own nature; this is the meaning.

Be this so. Nescience associated with deep-rooted and dense impressions, though sublated by knowledge, will come up again, because of its own impressions, and bring about results suitable to itself, such as (further) impressions etc. To this he says: "Here, such being the case," i.e., there being this kind of ascertainment of the true nature of things, "when there is the superimposition of one on another, the latter is not, even to the extent of an atom, affected by the good or bad features produced by the
former”; the intelligent self is not affected by the defects of the internal organ etc., such as appetite etc., nor are the internal organ etc. affected by the good features of the intelligent self—intelligence, bliss etc. This is what is said: it is of the very nature of the repetition of the ascertainment of truth that it removes illusory cognition, though beginningless and having deep-rooted and dense impressions. It is, indeed, of the nature of the intellect to be partial to truth. As even outsiders say: “Of the essential nature of things unaffected by error, there is no sublation; for, the intellect, even though making no effort, has a partiality for it.” More particularly (there is the question): “Whence can there be sublation of the wholly internal (intimate) knowledge of the truth, which is of the nature of the intelligent self, by Nescience, which is indeterminable?”

In the statement “coupling the true with the untrue, there is, through non-discrimination of each from the other, the empirical usage ‘I am this,’ ‘this is mine,’” empirical usage in the nature of verbal designation is expressly mentioned. Ordinary empirical usage, indicated by the word iti is shown in the words: “It is in the wake of the afore-mentioned mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self, designated Nescience” etc.; this is self-explanatory.
दाता, चिदात्मनो गुणेन वैतन्यानन्दादिन अन्तः। करणादि न संबध्यते। एतदृक्क भवति—
तत्त्वावधारणाभास्य हि स्वभाव एव स तादतः। यद्वादिनि निःस्वदिनिकिद्वासनमपि मिथ्याप्रत्यय-मपनयति। तत्त्वप्रकाशातः हि स्वभावो धियाम।
यथार्थवाङ्ग्या अपि—

निश्च्यद्वभूतार्थ्वभावाय विषयथे।
न बायोऽवलंक्तव्यस्य बुद्धेस्तत्त्वक्षपालत॥

इति। विशेषतः चिदात्मस्वभावाय तत्त्वज्ञानस्य अत्यन्तान्तरतुलस्य कुतोति निर्वाचायस्य अविधयां
बाध इति।

यदूक्तम् "सत्यानुते मिथुनाकुलः, विवेकाव-प्रहादध्वस्य, 'अहमिदम्' 'ममेदम्' इति लोकप्रवहारः" इति तत्र 'व्यपदेशाद्वंशो
व्यवहारः कप्रोतः। इति वादसुचिं लोक-व्यवहाराद्वंशायकति—तेमतमविधायायम् इति।

निगद्वध्याल्यातः।
कथं पुनरविद्याविद्रिष्टियाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति? उच्यते—
देहेन्द्रियादिष्वहंसमाभिमानहीनस्य प्रमात्रत्वानुपपत्तो व प्रमाणप्रमुखत्वनुपपत्ते।
न हीन्द्रियायण्यनुपपादय प्रत्यक्षादिविद्ववहारः संभवति। न चाचिद्यानमंतरेण इन्द्रियाणां व्यापारः संभवति। न च अनन्त्यस्तात्मभावावेन
देहेन कष्टिक्ष्ठापित्यते। न चेतसिन्न सर्वसिंहस्ताति आत्मनोसन्दृश्य प्रमात्रत्वमुपपत्ते।
न च प्रमात्रत्वमंतरेण प्रमाणप्रमुखत्विरितस्ति।
तस्मादविद्याविद्रिष्टियाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति।

आक्षिपति—कथं पुनरविद्याविद्रिष्टियाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि।
तत्तृत्तिर्रिस्त्वरो हि प्रमा विद्या; तत्साधनानि प्रमाणानि कथमविद्याविद्रिष्टियाणि?
नाविद्यावतं प्रमाणान्त्याविद्याच्यतिः, तत्कार्यत्व्य विद्याया अविद्याविशेषत्वातृ
इति भावः। सन्तु वा प्रत्यक्षादीनि संबृत्यापि
How, again, is it that perception and other means of valid knowledge and sacred teachings have reference to one characterised by Nescience? The reply is: when one devoid of the conceit of "I" and "mine" in one's body, senses etc., cannot intelligibly be a knower, the functioning of the means of valid knowledge is unintelligible. Indeed, empirical usage relating to perception etc. is not possible without the employment of the senses; and the functioning of the senses is not possible without control; nor by a body on which is not superimposed the nature of the self can anything be operated. And when none of these is present, the unattached self cannot intelligibly be a knower. And without a knower, there can be no functioning of the means of valid knowledge. Therefore, perception and other means of valid knowledge and the sacred teachings have reference to one characterised by Nescience.

An objection is raised: "How, again, is it that perception and other means of valid knowledge have reference to one characterised by Nescience?" Valid knowledge or vidyā is, verily, determination of the truth; how can the means of valid knowledge which are instruments thereto have for their locus what is characterised by Nescience? Means of valid knowledge cannot find a locus in what is characterised by Nescience, since their effect, viz., knowledge, is opposed
to Nescience; this is the idea. Or let perception etc. be as you say empirically (valid); but sacred teachings, whose purport is to teach what is beneficial to man, being opposed to Nescience, cannot have reference to what is characterised by Nescience; hence he says: "and sacred teachings." He answers: "The reply is." "When one devoid of the conceit of 'I' and 'mine' in the body, senses etc.," devoid of the superimposition of the nature and attributes of the self, "cannot intelligibly be a knower, the functioning of the means of valid knowledge is unintelligible." This is the meaning: to be a knower is to be an agent in respect of knowledge; and that is independence (in respect of the cognitive act). Independence consists in inciting all causal conditions other than the knower, without being incited by them. By him, therefore, is to be incited the pramāṇa, the means of valid knowledge. Nor can an instrument be incited without activity on one's part. Nor can the immutable, eternal, intelligent self, which is incapable of transformation, be active of itself. Hence, being active by the superimposition of the nature of the intellect etc., which are active, it can control the means of valid knowledge; therefore, the means of valid knowledge have reference to, i.e., are located in the person characterised by Nescience.

Now, let it be that the means of valid knowledge do not function; what do we lose? To this he says: "Indeed, empirical usage relating to perception etc. is not possible, without the employment of the senses etc." Vyavahāraḥ, empirical usage, means fruit, because there is usage on account of that; the fruit of the means of valid knowledge,
यथा तथा; शाखाणि तु पुरवहितानुशासनपराणि अविद्याप्रतिपक्षयत्या नाविद्याव हिंस्याणि भवितु-महेन्तीत्याह—शाखाणि च इति। समाध्यते—उच्छयते इति। देहेन्द्रियाणि अहं भामाभिमानः-हीनस्य, तादास्त्रयतद्वर्मायिस्तहीनस्य, प्रमातुत्वानुपप्त्योत्या सत्यं प्रमाणप्रयुक्त्युपप्त्ये। अयमभवे;
—प्रमातूत्वं हि प्रमाण प्रति कर्तुर्भम्। तच स्वातः
न्यम्। स्वात्मत् च प्रमातूतिरकारकायोज्ययथा समर्तकारकप्रयोक्तुल्लम। तदनेन प्रमाकरणं
प्रमाणं प्रयोजनीयम्। न च स्वायापरमस्तरोणं
करणं प्रयोक्तुमहति। न च कूटस्थानिगो्दिस्तात्मा
अपरिणामी स्वतो व्यापारवान। तस्मात् व्यापार-
वद्धेवाद्विदातात्यात्यायात्यात् व्यापारवत्त्या प्रमाण-
महिषालुमहति ततो भवत्विविद्यावत्तुस्पन्यतमविविधा-
वत्तुस्पन्यत्यतं प्रमाणाणामिति।

अथ मा प्रवर्तिष्ट प्रमाणानि, कि नरिचन्द्र-
मित्यानि—न हीन्द्रियाणिनुपादाय प्रस्थ-
क्षादिव्यवहारं संभवति। व्यवहितेत अने-
नेति व्यवहारं फलम्, प्रस्थादीनां प्रमाणानां
फलमित्यर्थः। इन्द्रियाणि इति इन्द्रियलिङ्गादेः
दीनीति दर्श्यम्, ‘देणिनो गच्छन्ति’ इतिवत्।
एवं हि प्रत्यक्षादि इत्युपपयते। व्यवहारक्रियया
च व्यवहारानेकोषेषपातमानकर्त्तकता। अनुपादवयो
व्यवहार इति योजना।

किमिति पुनः प्रमाता उपाद्ये प्रमाणानि?
�थ स्त्रयेव वसालि प्रवत्तैः इत्यत आह—न
चातुर्यसमन्तरेनेद्वित्रयाणां व्यापारः, प्रमाणां
व्यापारः, संबंधति। न जातु करणान्य
नविन्तितानि कर्ता स्वकर्ता व्यापितं, मा सूक्ति
विन्दुहितेऽयो केमादिः: पत्रसत्तिरिति। अथ देह
एवार्थतात् कस्तावाच भवति। कृतस्मर्यादायासेत्यत
आह—न चातुर्यस्तासमभावेन देहेन काथि
यथापि व्यापितं। सुपुश्चर्णी व्यापारसज्जादिति भावः।

स्यादेत। यथावर्त्यस्तासमभावां केमादिःकृं
कुविन्दे व्यापारयनपत्तयं वर्त्ता, एवमवर्त्यस्तासमभावां
देहेन्द्रियादि व्यापारयन्न भविष्यति तद्भविः। प्रमाता
इत्यत आह—न चैतस्मिस्तसवस्मिन्नु, इतरे
तत्सावस्य इतरेतराधमांवाच्यासे च, असति,
like perception etc., is here meant. "The senses" should be taken to denote the senses, the probans (in inference) etc., like the word "dandin (man with the staff)," (which) in "there go men with staves" (denotes those who possess no staves as well); thus is intelligible the expression ("etc.," in) "perception etc." The verb in "empirical usage" implies the agent; hence a common subject (for "usage" and "without the employment"). The construction is: the empirical usage (which results) without the employment.

Why should the knower employ the means of valid knowledge? Why should they not function of themselves?" To this he says: "and the functioning of the senses," i.e., of the means of valid knowledge "is not possible without control." Never do instruments function in respect of their objects without being controlled by agents, lest cloth should originate from the shuttle etc., without (being controlled by) a weaver. Why, then, should not the body itself be the controller? Superimposition of the self would, then, be superfluous. To this he says: "nor by a body, on which is not superimposed the nature of the self, can anything be operated"; for, otherwise, functioning would result even in (dreamless) sleep; this is the idea.

Be this so. Just as a weaver is an agent in the case of the cloth, without superimposing his nature on the shuttle etc., but by operating them, even so without superimposing his nature on the body, organs etc., but by operating them, he who knows them (the body, organs etc.) may become a knower. To this he says: "And, when none of these," i.e., reciprocal superimposition of nature and attributes "is present, the unattached self," different, in all
ways and at all times, from all attributes and substrates, "cannot intelligibly be a knower". It is the active weaver etc. that control the shuttle etc., and operate them, whereas for the self, whose self-hood has not been superimposed on the body etc., there can be no activity, because of its being unattached: this is the meaning. Necessarily, therefore, the means of valid knowledge are located in superimposition. Thus he says: "And without knowership, there can be no activity of the means of valid knowledge." He, verily, becomes a knower, who is independent in respect of the fruit, valid knowledge. Valid knowledge is a variety of the modification of the internal organ, directed towards the object known, and is of the nature of the intelligence residing in the agent. And how could a modification of the inert internal organ be of the nature of intelligence, if the intelligent self were not superimposed thereon? How, again, could this have the intelligent self as agent, if the functioning internal organ were not superimposed on the intelligent self? Hence, from reciprocal superimposition, there results the fruit called valid knowledge, which resides in the intelligent self as agent; when that results, there results knowership. With this same valid knowledge as content, there ensues the activity of the means of valid knowledge. By the use of the word "knowership," valid knowledge is also implied. If the fruit, valid knowledge, were non-existent, the means of valid knowledge would not be active; and thus the means of valid knowledge would cease to be such: this is the meaning. He concludes: "Therefore, perception and other means of valid knowledge have reference only to what is characterised by Nescience."
अत्मानोसाध्य, सर्वथा सर्वदा सर्वथ्मर्मांगिनियुक्तस्य, प्रमातुत्तमसुपपपयते। व्यापारतो हि
कृत्विन्दादुष्यो वेमादीनिधिष्ठाय व्यापयन्ति, अन्यं
स्ततमभावस्य तु देहादिविशालसनो न व्यापारो-
गोडःकृत्वादितियथः। आत्माध्यायासाध्यायनि प्रमाण-
णीत्याह—न च प्रमातुत्तमन्तरेण प्रमाण-
प्रदृष्टिरस्ति। प्रमायां स्वतः फले स्वतन्त्रः प्रमाता
भवति। अन्तःकरणपरिणाममेद्धश्र प्रमेयप्रवण:
कृत्स्थनिधित्वभाव: प्रमा। कथं च जड़शान्तःकर-
परिणामशिरोऽभवेत, यदि चिदालो तत्र
नाध्यस्य:। कथं चैव चिदालमकर्तृको भवेत, यथान्तःकरणं
व्यापारतमृ चिदालमि नाध्यस्येत।
तस्मादितर्वर्गायासाध्याचिदालमकर्तृकोऽऽ
प्रमाफलं सिद्धाः। तत्सिद्धं च प्रमातुत्तमः। तामेव च प्रमामुर्री-
कृत्य प्रमाणस्य प्रवृत्ति:। प्रमातुत्तमेन च प्रमा
उपलक्ष्यते। प्रमाया: कुलस्याभावे प्रमाणं न
प्रवृत्तेत। तथा च प्रमाणप्रमाणं स्थादित्यः।
उपसंहरति—तस्मादाध्यायावद्धिष्ठायायेव प्रत्य-
क्षादिनी प्रमाणानि।
पश्वादिभिः श्लोकाविशेषः। यथा हि पश्वादयः श्लोकादिभिः। श्रोत्रादीनां सबन्धे सति शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तने, अनुकूले च प्रवर्तने। यथा दण्डोधयकरं पुरुषमातिर्मिहमुखसङ्ग्लभ्य 'मां हन्तुमयिमिच्छाति' इति पलायितुमारभने, हरितत्रपुर्णपाणिमिहाप्राप्तभ्यं तथा प्रति अभिमुक्तीभवने। एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युतप्पचिता, कृयाहीनाक्रोशात्। कढ़गोद्यकरानं वलथत उपालभ्य ततो निवर्तने, तद्विपरीतानुप्रति प्रवर्तने। अतः समानः पश्वादिभिः। पुरुषाणां प्रमाणप्रशेषव्यवहारं। पश्वादीनां च प्रसिद्ध एव अविवेकपूर्वकः।

स्यादेतत्। भवतु पृथ्वीजनानामेवम्। आगमोपतिः प्रतिप्रतिप्राप्तग्राहसमस्तचारान्म प्रख्यानामिप पुंसां प्रमाणप्रशेषव्यवहारं हस्तं इति कथमविद्याविश्वाण्येव प्रमाणानीत्यत आह—पश्वादिभि: श्लोकाविशेषात्। इति। विदतु नाम आगमोपतिः।
And because there is no distinction from beasts etc. Indeed, as beasts etc., when their sense of hearing etc. are brought into relation with sound etc., if there is produced a cognition of sound etc., that is unfavourable, recede from them, and if it is favourable, approach them; and as they, seeing a man approach with a stick held aloft in his hand, begin to run away thinking, "he desires to beat me", but seeing him with his hand filled with green grass, proceed towards him; in the same way, men too, though of cultivated minds, seeing strong men of fierce mien shouting, sword held aloft in the hand, recede from them, but approach them of an opposite character; the empirical usage relating to means and objects of valid knowledge in the case of men is similar to that of beasts. And for beasts etc., it is well

Be this so. Let this be the case in respect of the ignorant ones. Even for those persons, however, who have understood the true nature of the inner self propounded by Scripture and reasoning (thereon), there is seen the empirical usage relating to means of valid knowledge and objects known thereby; how, then, can means of valid knowledge have reference only to one characterised by Nescience? To this he says: "And because there is no distinction from beasts etc." It may be that, through Scripture and reasoning, they know the inner self as different from the body, organs etc.;
known that empirical usage relating to perception etc. always comes in the wake of non-discrimination. And since we see a similarity to them, it is concluded that even in the case of learned men, empirical usage relating to the perception etc. is, for the time being, similar.

in respect, however, of the empirical usage relating to means of valid knowledge and the objects known, they do not rise above the characteristic of beings that merely bear life. The activity even of these learned ones is seen to be of the same nature as the activity of beasts and birds, whose stupidity is undisputed. Because of this similarity, characterisation by Nescience is inferred even for those (learned ones), at the time of empirical usage. The particle "and" has the sense of linking up (this with the reason already given). The meaning is: the aforementioned reasoning together with the above-stated answer to the objection establishes in the case of the means of valid knowledge that they have reference to persons characterised by Nescience. This itself is analysed: "Indeed, as beasts" etc. Here, by the words "when their sense of hearing etc. are brought into relation with sound etc.," there is shown perception as the means of valid knowledge. Its fruit is mentioned in the words: "the cognition of sound etc." "If it be unfavourable" states the fruit of inference. It is thus: after cognising the nature of the sound, and remembering the unfavourable nature of that class of sound, unfavourableness is inferred
अभ्यासः

प्रत्यक्षादिद्वित्ववहारः। तत्सामान्यदर्शीनाभ्युत्पत्तिभूतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिद्वित्वहारस्ततकालः समान इति निष्कृत्यते।

देहेनद्रियादिभ्यो भिन्नं प्रत्यगात्मकम्; प्रमाणप्रमेयवत्तं च तु प्राणभूतान्तर्गतं नातिर्वल्लते।

यद्यो हि पशुशकुन्तलादीनानिमित्ताप्रत्सदमुधभवानां व्यवहारस्तत्तदोहि पुरुषब्रह्मानां पुंसं दश्यते।

तेन तत्सामान्यातेषापि व्यवहारस्य अविना० त्त्वमुमेयम्। चाशब्दः समुच्चये। उत्क्रान्तितर्न-सहिता पुःत्रोत्सरकः। अविविश्वेषेत्वर्णमयं प्रमाणान्साध्यतित्यथः। एतदेव विभज्ञे——यथा

हि पश्चादाय इति। अत्र च शब्दादिभि: 

श्रोत्रादीनां संबन्धे सति इति प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण 

दर्शि० इति तत्सामान्यकम्। 

शब्दादिविज्ञाने इति तत्सामान्यकम्। इति प्रतिकृते इति च अनुमानकल्पम्। तथा हि—— 

शब्दादिविश्वेषेत्वमपरित्वर्णमर्य तज्जातीयस्य प्रतिकृतात्तमानु- 

स्मृत्य तज्जातीयतत्योपत्तंभमानस्य प्रतिकृतात्—
शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यथापि वृद्धिपूर्वकारी नन्दित्वा आतमनः परलोकसंबन्धभाविकित्ये, तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यमशनायाचयतीमतपत्रब्रह्मचारादिमेदसमसं सार्थसत्तमधिकारेपक्ष्यते, अनुपयोगात

मनुसिमल इति। उदाहरति—यथा दुःपद इति। शोभितोरहितार्थम्।

स्थाधित्। भवन्तु यत्त्रादीनयन्त्रेवविचाराधिपत्याणि। शास्त्रं तु 'योहितोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत,' इत्यादि न देहात्माध्यासेन प्रवतात्समहति। अत्र हि आशुभिकाकलोपभोगयोगः अधिकारी प्रतीते। तथा च पारम्पर सूत्रम्—'शास्त्रालं प्रयोक्तरि तत्त्वज्ञानतत्वधात्म्य प्रयोगे स्थाय।' इति। न च देहाति भस्मभूतं परस्परिकाय फलाय कल्यत् इति देहातितरितं कंचिदाद्भासानमधिकारिणमाश्चिमिति शास्त्रमः। तद्रवमध्य विद्या; इति कथमविचाराधिषेधं शास्त्रभिमित्याश्श्रुक्याह—शास्त्रीयेतु इति। तु-शब्दः प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारान्तिनति शास्त्रीयम्। अधिकारः
But in the case of empirical usage relating to the sacred teaching, although no person with forethought, unless he knows the relation of the self to the other world, will consider himself eligible for it, still, the true self that can be known only from the Vedântas, as transcending hunger etc., divested of differentiations like brahmin, ksatriya etc., and non-transmigrating, is not required for eligibility; for, it (the true self) is of no

of what is perceived to belong to that class. This is exemplified: "and, as they, seeing a man with a stick held aloft" etc. The sense of the rest is not obscure.

Be this so. Let it be that perception etc. have reference to one characterised by Nescience. The sacred teaching, however, which teaches that one who desires Heaven should sacrifice with the jyotistoma and so on, cannot induce activity through the superimposition of the body on the self. Here, verily, the eligible person is known to be one who is fit to enjoy fruit in another world. Hence the aphorism of the great sage: "The fruit of (what is enjoined in) the sacred teaching is for the person directed, since it is of that nature (i.e., since it is an injunction understood through verbal testimony, in the form 'He who desires Heaven is to sacrifice with the jyotistoma'); hence, one should oneself engage (in the act enjoined)." Bodies etc., which become ashes, are not fit for (enjoyment) of fruit in another world; hence the sacred teaching postulates by implication some eligible person other than the body etc.; the understanding of it being knowledge (vidyā), how can the sacred teaching have reference to one characterised by Nescience? Raising this objection, he says: "But in the case of empirical
service and is opposed to eligibility. And any sacred teaching that functions before the realisation of the self as of such a nature does not go beyond the reference to one characterised by Nescience. It is thus: texts like, "A brahmin shall sacrifice" function, as based on the superimposition on the self of differentiations like caste, orders of life, age etc.

usage relating to the sacred teaching" etc. The particle but" distinguishes from empirical usage like perception etc., that which relates to the sacred teaching. Indeed, since, in the absence of a relation to another world for the person who desires Heaven, the sacred teaching relating to eligibility cannot carry on, it has to postulate that much alone by implication, not his freedom from the migratory cycle too; for, this is of no service in respect of eligibility; the person propounded in the Upaniṣads, being neither agent nor enjoyer, is, rather, opposed to eligibility. It is the person that engages in action and is, verily, the enjoyer of the enjoyments that are the fruit produced by the acts, that is the person eligible to perform the act, the lord (thereof). How can a non-agent be one who engages in activity? How can a non-enjoyer be the enjoyer of the enjoyments that are the fruit produced by the acts? Hence, the sacred teaching relating to prescriptions and prohibitions sets out in respect of that human being, who has a conceit of agency, enjoyership, brahminhood etc., acquired through beginningless Nescience. Thus, the Vedāntas too have reference only to the person characterised by Nescience; for, there is not the understanding of their sense, in the absence of the distinction of the knower etc. They, instructing the
अधिकारविरोधाय। प्राकृत च तथाभूतात्म-विज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्राद्वित्तेश्वरिणियं नातीवत्ते। तथा हि—'ब्राह्मणो यजेत' इत्वादीनि शास्त्राणां यत्नं वर्णाथ्रमवयो-ज्योतिषविशेषाध्यायसमाधिश्च प्रवर्तन्ते।

शास्त्रं हि स्वर्गकामत्यं पुनः परलोकसंबंधं विना निर्विभेदति तात्वन्मात्रमाक्षिपेत, न तस्यासांसारितमापी; तस्याधिकारके कुष्ठस्य, ज्ञात्व औषधिनिदर्शवर्तश्रेयं अकुरुस्मोक्तुरधिकारविरोधाय। प्रयोत्ता हि कर्मणः कर्मज्ञनितज्ञभोगभागी कर्मण्येवाभारी विश्वामिभवं भवति। तत्र कथमः कर्मणं प्रयोत्ता। कथं च अमोऽ कर्मज्ञनितज्ञभोगभागी। तस्मादनाचविश्वाचारविध्वंसेकात्ममकर्तृत्वाय अप्राणाद्विविषयिन्त्वाभागाधिकारिणि नरसाधिकृत्य विधिनिपेधशास्त्रं प्रवर्तते। एवं वेदान्तं अप्यविधायापुष्पकथिता एव। न हि प्रामाण्यादिविभागार्हे तत्त्वाधिकारम्।

ते लघिविद्यावन्तमनुशास्त्रो निर्मुक्तनिकल्लविचारमनु—
अभ्यासः

शिष्ठ स्वरूपे व्यवस्थापन्तीत्येवतावानेषां विशेषः।
तस्मात्विद्यावत्तप्पशिष्यायेव शास्त्राणिति सिद्धम्।
स्यादेतत्। यद्यपि विरोधानुपयोगायोग्यामौपनिषदः।
पुरुषः अधिकारे नापेक्षये तथाप्यपनिष्टद्योगमन्यमानः।
शक्तित्वमिकारं निरोऽहम्।
तत्तथां परस्परपराह्ताध्येयवेदः।
प्रामाण्यपरमह्यादीत्यत आह—प्राकः च तथा—
भूतात्मा—इति। सत्यमौपनिषदपुरुषाधिग्रहः। अधिकारकारियोति;
तस्मातु परस्पररथ्यक्ष्यविभवः। स्वोच्चितं
व्यवहारमिनिन्त्यते नानुपजातेन व्रह्मजानेन
शक्यं निरोऽहम्। न च परस्परपराह्ति:।
विद्याविद्यावत्तप्पमेद्रेन व्यवस्थोपते:। यथा—
'न हिंस्यातत्वा भूताति'। इति साध्याणानिष्ठेप्रपीति
'यथेनानिविकरूप यजेत' इति शास्त्रं प्रवर्ततामां
'न हिंस्यात्' इत्यनेन न विरोध्यते;
तत्कथा हेतोः। पुरुषेदान्दिति। अवजिताविद्याधारात्यः।
पुरुष निषेधे अधिक्रियन्ते, क्रोधारात्वशीकृताभ्ये
यथेनादिशाश्च इति।
person characterised by Nescience, establish him in the form taught by them, from which all Nescience has been wiped out; this is their distinction (from the teaching of injunctions, which brings about no final establishment). Hence, it is established that the sacred teachings have reference only to persons characterised by Nescience.

Be this so. Though, because of opposition and non-utility, the person propounded in the Upaniṣads is not needed in respect of eligibility, yet as learnt from the Upaniṣads (in the course of the normally prescribed study—adhyāyana), that (person) is capable of standing in the way of eligibility. Thus, because of the sense of each (part) being destructive of that of the other, the whole of the Veda would lose its authority as a means of valid knowledge. To this he says: "And any sacred teaching which functions before the realisation of the self as of such a nature" etc. True, the understanding of the person propounded in the Upaniṣads is opposed to eligibility; but prior to that, the prescriptions of acts bring about suitable empirical usage, and they cannot be counteracted by Brahman-knowledge, which has not yet been generated. Nor is there reciprocal annulment, since a differentiation (of their respective spheres) is intelligible, on the basis of the difference in the persons (to whom they relate) as characterised by knowledge or Nescience. For example: though, in respect of the element of what is to be accomplished, there is the prohibition "Injure not any living being," the sacred teaching which sets forth "He who would kill his enemy (by an evil spell) should sacrifice with the svaṇa" is not contradicted by "Injure not" etc.; wherefore is this?
We have already said that what is called superimposition is the cognition as something of what is not that. This is how when the son, wife etc. are unsound or sound, one superimposes on oneself the attributes of external things, as "I am myself sound or unsound"; similarly the attributes of the body in "I

Because of the difference in the persons (addressed)." The persons who have conquered the enemy—anger—are eligible in respect of the prohibition; those, however, who are under the power of the enemy—anger—(are eligible) in respect of the teaching about the ṣyena etc.

What was said (about the sacred teaching that) it does not go beyond the reference to the person characterized by Nescience, that itself is made clear in: "It is, thus." Superimposition of caste: "The king is to sacrifice with the rajāsūya" etc.; superimposition of orders of life: "The house-holder should obtain a wife of equal status" etc.; superimposition of age: "He whose hair is black is to tend the fires" etc.; superimposition of state: "He whose malady is incurable is to give up his life by plunging into the water etc." and so on. The expression "et cetera" serves to include sins, major and minor, causing intermixture, unworthiness or defilement, and other such superimpositions.

Having thus expounded through objection and answer the reciprocal superimposition of the self and the not-self, and strengthened it by the discourse on the means and objects of valid knowledge, he reminds us of its already declared nature, in order to expound elaborately its being the cause of evil: "We have already said that what is called superimposition
अध्यासो नाम अतस्मस्तहुडिरित्योऽचाम। तथथा—पुत्रभार्यांदिष्टं विकलेषु सकलेषु वा 'अहेमेव विकलः, सकलो वा' इति वाह्यभर्मानाटसम्यःस्यस्यित्; तथा देहे—

अविद्यावस्थाविश्वास्यं नातिवर्तते इति यथुकं तदेव सुध्यति—तथा हि इति। वर्णाध्यासः 'राजा राजसुयेन यजेत' इत्यादि। आध्यात्म्याध्यासः 'गृहस्थ: सदृशीं भार्या विन्दैत' इत्यादि। वैद्याध्यासः 'कुण्डकेशोभानादिभीत' इत्यादि। अध्यात्माध्यासः 'अप्रतिसमाधेयार्याभिनं जलादिः' प्रेमणाय: ' इत्यादि। आदिग्रहणं पातकोपपातकसंकरीकरणापात्रीकरणमलकीकरणाद्याध्यासोपग्रहस्त्यम्।

तदवभार्मानात्मन्नो: परस्याध्यासमाध्रेयसामाध्रानाभ्यासुपपाच प्रमाणप्रमेयायवहार्यार्वतेने च द्वारकाक्ष्यत तत्वान्त्ये घुत्तुत्तुमद्धारणुपप्रेसवेन प्रतिपादण्यतनत्वरुपमुक्तं स्मारयति—अध्यासो नाम अतस्मस्तहुडिरित्योऽचाम। 'स्मृतिरः' परन्
धर्मान् 'स्थूलोहम्, क्षरोहम्, गौरोहम्, 
तिथियमि गच्छामि रहस्यामि च' इति; 
तथेन्द्रियधर्मान् 'मूकः काणः क्रीयो वधि-
रोजिलोहम्' इति; तथान्तः करणधर्मान् 
कामसंकल्पविचित्रितसाध्वसायादीन्। एव-
महंत्रयिनमशेषेश्चारसाक्षिणि प्रय-
गातमन्य्यस्य तं च प्रयगात्मानं सर्व-
साक्षिणं तहिर्पर्ययेयान्तः करणादिश्वध्य-
स्यति।

पूर्वहद्यानमासः' इत्यस्य संक्षेपामिथान्मेति। तत्र 
'अहम्' इति धर्मितादत्मायायासभारम् 'मम' 
इत्यनुपादितधार्मियासं नान्येहितृतिः धर्मायमेव 
ममकारं साध्वशैवनान्यसारसारणानुसारणसार 
नाह—तथथ धृत्रभायाण्डिषु इति। देह-
तादत्मायाध्यास्य देहाभ्ये पुत्रकल्पितादिस्त्रास्य च 
क्रृत्तात्मायाण्डिरोहाय—अहमेव विकळः; सकळः 
इति। स्वस्य खुद साक्षेपयेय स्मायसाक्षेपम् 
स्मामीथरः सकळः संपूर्णो भवति; तथा स्वस्य
am fat," "I am lean," "I am fair," "I stand," "I go," "I jump"; similarly the attributes of the senses in "I am dumb, one-eyed, impotent, deaf, blind"; similarly the attributes of the internal organ, like desire, resolve, doubt, determination. In this way after superimposing the denotation of the concept "I" on the inner self that is the witness of its entire activities, by the reverse of that, one superimposes that inner self, the witness of all, on the internal organ etc.

is the cognition as something of what is not that." This is a summary way of stating what was said earlier, that it is "the appearance elsewhere, with a nature like to that of recollection, of what was seen before". Here, "I," which is the superimposition of the nature of the substrate alone, cannot be the cause of evil without generating the "mine," the superimposition of attributes; hence the superimposition of attributes, the notion of "mine," is alone the direct cause of the entire evil of the migratory cycle; this is elaborately explained in: "It is thus: when the son, wife" etc. Superimposing identity with the body on the self, and superimposing thereon the bodily attribute of the ownership of son, wife etc., in the same way as leanness etc., one says "I am myself unsound or sound." The sense of ownership being complete, when there is a fullness of wealth, the owner (in this case) becomes complete,
perfect; similarly, from the lack of wealth, ownership too becoming incomplete, the owner becomes incomplete, imperfect. The external attributes, like unsoundness which attach to the body through the channel of ownership, these one superimposes on the self: this is the meaning. When this is the case in respect of bodily attributes, like ownership, dependent on external adjuncts, what need be said about bodily attributes, like leanness etc., which do not depend on external adjuncts? In this view, he says: "Similarly, the attributes of the body" etc. He superimposes on the self the attributes of deafness etc., which are the attributes of the senses, which are more intimate than the body, and on which the nature of the self has been superimposed; (he also superimposes on the self) desire, resolve etc., which are attributes of the internal organ, which is even more intimate, and on which the nature of the self has been superimposed: this is the construction.

Having in this exposition stated the superimposition of attributes, he states its basis, the superimposition of the substrate: "In this way, after superimposing the denotation of the concept 'I'" etc. That in which the psychosis, the concept "I," occurs, i.e., the internal organ, that is the denotation of the concept "I" (ahampratyayan); that is superimposed on the inner self, which, on account of its intelligence and indifference, is the witness of the processes of the internal organ. Thus are explained agency and enjoyership. Intelligence is explained: "by the reverse
बैकल्येन स्वाम्येकक्त्यात् रामीर्षरो विकलो-स्तंभों भवति। बाह्रमर्य ये बैकल्याद्यः स्वाम्यप्रणालिकाया संचारिताः सर्विरे तनात्मन्य-च्यस्यतः। यदा च प्रोपाच्ये प्रेषे देहां भवति, तदा केवल कथा अनौपाधिकेषु देहामेशु कुशलादिति इत्याशयवानाह—तथा देहार्थमानो इति। देहार्थप्रस्तुतः आत्मानिर्देशायामानां धर्मान मूल्याद्रीविन, ततोप्रस्तुतः अद्याज्ञान अध्यस्तमट्यावस्थे धर्मान कामसंकल्पादिन आत्मन्ययथात्तित योजना।

तदनेन प्रस्तुव धर्मात्यासमुक्तवा तस्य मूलं धर्मायासमाह—एवम हं प्रत्ययिन्म। अहंप्रस्तुव वृत्तियमिच्छुन्ति: करणादृ, सोयायमहं प्रस्तुतिः। तं स्व-प्रचारसाधकिण, अन्तः करणप्रचारसाधकिण, चै-तन्योदसिनताभ्यं प्रत्यगातमन्ययथ। तदनेन कर्त्तानं बोकुत्वेन उपाधिते। चैत्यस्तिपदयन्ति—तं च प्रत्यगातमानं सर्वसाधकिणं तद्विषयेण, अन्तः करणप्रचारिविषयेण—अन्तः करणान्यचेतनम, तस्य विषये: चैतन्यम, तेन, इत्यंभूतज्ञानः तुती-
अभ्यासः
एवमयमनादिरङ्गन्तो नैसारिकोःध्यासो
मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्त्वत्प्रवृत्तकः
सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः। अस्थानर्थेतोऽश्राणयाय
आत्मक्षतविधियाप्रतिपत्तिः सर्वेऽवेदान्तता
यः — अन्तःकरणादिष्वध्ययस्यति। तद्रेन
अन्तःकरणादिवच्छचः प्रत्यगतमा ह्रदमविन्दरुपश्रेत
नन् कर्ति भोक्ता कार्यकरणाविद्याध्यायाधारोऽहंकाराया-
स्पदं संसारी सर्वसंसर्षेंसर्वभार्यां जीवतमा इतरेत-
राध्यासोपादायः तदुपादानश्राण्या इत्यनादिश्वाः
वीजाकुरवलेरतराध्यत्वअन्तकं भवति।
प्रमाणप्रमेयविज्ञहारादीकृतमेव शिष्यहिताय
स्वरूपाभिवाधानपूर्वकं सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षतया अध्यासं
मुद्दीकरोति—एवमयमनादिरङ्गनः, तत्त-
ज्ञानमंतरेनाधारायसंगमेवः। अनाचननल्ले हेतु-
हुः—नैसारिक इति। मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः
मिथ्याप्रत्ययानां रूपमन्त्रस्वचनीयतमः, तथयस तथार्थः; अनिर्बचनीय इत्यर्।
Thus, this beginningless and endless natural superimposition, of the nature of illusory cognition, which causes agency, enjoyership etc., is directly experienced by the entire world. It is for the removal of this cause of evil, for the attainment of the knowledge of that," by the reverse of the internal organ etc.,—the internal organ etc. are inert, the reverse of that is intelligence; by that; the instrumental case is used to imply "in this wise"—"one superimposes that inner self, the witness of all, on the internal organ etc." This is what is said hereby: the inner self defined by the internal organ etc., the intelligent being compounded of the "this" and the "not-this," is the \( \text{i} \text{n} \text{va} \), the agent, the enjoyer, the support of the two kinds of Nescience—the result and the cause,—the substrate of "I-ness," the transmigrator, the vessel of the entire host of woes, the material cause of reciprocal superimposition; the material cause of that again is superimposition; hence, this being beginningless, like the seed and the sprout, there is not (the defect of) reciprocal dependence.

Superimposition, which has been confirmed by the discourse on the means and objects of valid knowledge, is yet further confirmed for the benefit of the pupil, through a declaration of its nature, this being perceived by the whole world: "Thus, this beginningless, endless" etc. ("Endless" means) not being destructible in the absence of true knowledge. The cause of the beginninglessness and endlessness is stated: "natural." "Of the nature of illusory cognition";
of the oneness of the self, that all the Vedāntas are commenced. How this is the purport of the entire Vedānta, we shall show in this Sārīrakamīmāṃsā.

the nature of illusory cognitions is indeterminability; that to which it belongs is stated here; that means it is indeterminable.

He concludes the topic: "It is for the removal of this cause of evil" etc. Whence the removal of this, in the absence of an opposed concept? To this he says: "for the attainment of the knowledge of the oneness of the self." Pratipattiḥ is attainment; for that purpose, not merely for purposes of incantation nor for engaging in rites. The oneness of the self is entire dissociation from the universe, while existing in the form of bliss. The Vedāntas, which indubitably bring about that attainment, destroy superimposition from its very root. This is what is said: if the concept "I," whose content is the self, were valid, there would be no desire to know Brahman, on the ground of its being known and (the inquiry) being unprofitable. In the absence of that (desire to know), the Vedānta would not be studied for the knowledge of Brahman, but would only serve the unintended purpose of incantation. Then, the Upaniṣadic concept of the self would not, indeed, enjoy validity. Nor would this invalid (concept), though oft repeated, avail to remove the real agency, enjoyership etc., of the self. It is, indeed, an imposed form that is removed by true knowledge, not the real
आर्थ्यन्ते। यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेऽं वेदान्तानामः, तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकः 
मीमांसायां प्रदश्चिप्यामः।

प्रकृतमुपसंहरति—अस्थानर्थेःतो: प्रहाणाय। विरोधिप्रत्यं विना कुतोऽस्य प्रहाणमित्यत 
उक्तम—आलैंकविविधार्थतिपत्ताय। प्रति
पति: प्राति:, तस्ये, न तु जपमालय, नापि 
कर्मसु प्रवर्त्ताय। आलैंकत्वं विगलितिनिर्विकः
पञ्चतमः आनंदः सतं:: तद्वर्तीपरिः 
निर्विचितिकृतः भावण्यं् वेदान्ताः: समुद्रभावतो 
महायात—महायातसम्प्रभान्ति। एतदुर्खं भवति—अस्मतःत्य
स्वतस्विशयस्य समीचीनते सति ब्रह्मणो ज्ञातवा 
कियोजनत्वाच न जिज्ञासा ध्यात; तदभावे 
च न वहाज्ञानाय वेदान्ताः: पद्धोरणः, अहै 
तु अविवक्तियता जयधाने उपयुक्तः। न 
हि तदृपनिष्ठस्मात्प्रत्यः प्रमाणतामवदुः। न 
चासात्प्रमाणभ्यतातोपिः वास्तवं कर्तुच्योक्त्र
त्वाचार्यनोपनेतुमहतः। आरोपितं हि रूपः
तत्त्वज्ञाननापोषयते, न तु वास्तवमतत्त्वज्ञानन। न हि रज्ज्वा रज्जुज्वतं सहस्रमपि सर्पभाराप्रत्यया अफवतितमुसहन्ते। मिथ्याज्ञानप्रसजितं तु रूपं शाक्यं तत्त्वज्ञाननापवदितम्, मिथ्याज्ञानसंस्कारश्रुतेण दृष्टिपि तत्त्वज्ञानसंस्कारेणादृवृत्तं पर्याप्तिप्रदीर्घकालागतेनिर्भिततत्त्वज्ञानायासजन्मनेति।

स्यादेत। प्राणायुपसना अपि वेदांनेषु बहुलमुफलभ्यते। तत्कथं सर्वं वेदान्तानामायिनं कल्पनतापतानमर्थं इत्यत आह—यथा चायथं: इत्यादि। शारीरमेव शारीरकम्; तत्र निवासी शारीरको जीवात्मा। तस्य तुपदान्वितेऽयस्य तत्पदाभिवेयप्रमात्मस्थपत्यो या मीमांसा सा तथोक्त।

एतावानत्राध्यापंक्षेपः—यथपि स्वाध्यायाध्य्यनविधिना स्वाध्यायपदवाच्यर्थ वेदरायोऽफवदर्थाविभोधपरतामापादयत। कर्मविभिन्नपरिधानामामि वेदान्तानामपि स्वाध्यायशवच्चाच्यनां फलवदर्थाविभोधपरतवापादितः, यथपि च 'अविशिष्टतवाक्यत्रथ। इति न्यायान्त मन्त्रानामित्र वेदान्तानामयपत्मात्मर्गिकं, यथपि च वेदांतेश्यः।
by untrue knowledge. The rope-nature of the rope cannot be negated even by a thousand continuous apprehensions of a snake. The form occasioned by illusory cognition, however, can be negated by true knowledge, and the impression of illusory cognition, though strong, by the impression produced through the repetition of true knowledge practised with close application, uninterruptedly and for a long time.

Be this so. The meditations on the vital air (prāṇa) etc. are also largely seen (to be taught) in the Vedānta. Then, how can all the Vedānta texts have the one object of teaching the oneness of the self? To this he says: "That this is the purport of the entire Vedanta" etc. The body (śartra) is itself called śartraka; what resides therein is the śartraka, i.e., the jīva-self. That inquiry is mentioned here whose purpose is to show of that self denoted by the "thou" (in "That thou art"), that his nature is that of the supreme self denoted by the "that".

This is the summary of what is meant here: though (1) by the injunction to study one's own section of the Veda, which makes it follow that the entire Veda denoted by the term "one's own section of the Veda" is directed to the fruitful understanding of the sense, it is also made to follow that the Vedāntas too, like the prescriptions and prohibitions of acts denoted by the term "one's own section of the Veda," are directed to the fruitful understanding of the sense, (2) though, in accordance with the maxim "But the sense of a text is not distinguished (from that of ordinary usage"), the significant nature of the Vedāntas
is universal, as in the case of the hymns (mantras), (3) though from the Vedāntas there comes the understanding of the one inner self unconnected with the universe, who is a mass of intelligence and bliss, and is free from agency and enjoyership, yet these Vedāntas, coming into conflict with the concept "I,"—which is free from doubt and sublation, and comprehends the self as characterised by agency, enjoyership, misery, grief and delusion,—and slipping away from their meaning, either have a figurative significance or serve only in incantations, and thus have a sense other than the one desired to be declared. Hence, the four-chaptered Sūtraka-mīmāṃsā, directed to the inquiry into their sense, is not to be commenced.

Nor is the self, which is patent to all men in the experience of the "I" either doubtful or fruitful, in which case, from the desire to know it, an inquiry would result. This is the prima facie view.

The final view is this: this would be so, if the concept "I" were valid. Since, in the manner stated above, it cannot sublate Scriptural texts etc., and since its validity is not accepted by Scripture etc. and by the systems of all the preceptors, it is but superimposed. Hence the Vedāntas have a sense which is not other than the one desired to be declared or figurative, but is of the character mentioned. The inner self alone is their principal sense. Since in respect of that there is, in the manner to be stated, both doubt and profit, the desire to know is appropriate. In this view, the aphorist expresses the desire to know in aphoristic form: Then therefore the desire to know Brahman.
अभ्यासः

चेतन्यान्निद्धनः कर्तृत्वभोक्त्वतःहितो निष्पर्शे
एकः प्रत्यगत्वा अवगम्ये, तथापि कर्तृ
मोक्तत्वः सङ्कोकमोहमयमात्मानमवगाहमानेनाहं
त्येऽन संदेहवाचविरहिणा विरह्यमाना वेदान्तः
स्वार्थोत्पच्चुता उपचरिता वा जपमारोपयोगिनो
वा इत्यविकाशस्याथः। तथा च तद्वर्षिनी
रात्मिका चतुर्लक्षणी शारीरकरस्मीमांसा नारायण्या।

न च सर्वजनीनाहमनुभवसिद्ध आत्मा संदिभे
वा सप्रयोजनो वा, येन जिज्ञास: सन विचारं
प्रयुक्तात्—इति पूर्वः पक्षः।

सिद्धान्तस्य—भवेदेतदेवं यथं प्रत्ययः प्रमाणम्।
तस्य तु उक्तेन कमेन श्रुत्यादिवाधक्तवा
नुपप्ते:, श्रुत्यादिभिष्म समस्ततिथिक्तक्रियेष प्रामण्या
नस्युपगमान्द्राह्यस्त्वम्। एवं च वेदान्ता नाविका
विक्षिताथः, नापि उपचरिताथः, किं तु उक्तलक्षणः।
प्रत्यगतमेव तेषां मुख्योऽर्थः। तस्य च वक्ष्यमाणेन
कमेन संदिन्धवतः प्रयोजनत्वाच युक्त। जिज्ञासा
—इत्यशय्यवनः सूत्तकाः तजीज्ञासासम्सूत्त्रयत्,
अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा इति।
वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिक्यासितस्येदमादिः सूत्रम्
अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॥१॥

जिज्ञासया च संदेहप्रयोजने सूचयति। तत्र साक्षादिच्छाव्याप्तितविराहजानं कपोतकं प्रयोजनं। न च कर्मज्ञानात्प्राचीनमनुशासनमिव ब्रह्मज्ञानात्प्राचीनं किंचिदर्थित, येनेत्वान्तरप्रयोजनं भवेत। कि तु ब्रह्ममीमांसायत्तकेतिकरत्वात्तात्त्वात्त्विवेदांतोराहितं निर्विचिन्तिकसं ब्रह्मज्ञानमेव समस्तसः खोफशास्म्यमान्यैकादि परं प्रयोजनम्। तमर्यमधिक्रृत्य हि प्रेक्षावन्: प्रवर्त्तनेतरम्। तच्च प्रासम्प्राणाधिचाववाशाशास्त्रसम्बन्धाति प्रेषितं भवति। यथा स्नातकतार्थोऽवैवेकं कुतकतिस्मात्वास्तीति मन्यमां: परेन प्रतिपादितमाशास्त्रमिव प्रामोद्यो। जिज्ञासा तु संशयस्य कार्यमिति वस्तुर्वन संशयं
In the sacred teaching of the Vedānta Enquiry, which is proposed to be explained, this is the first aphorism:

THEN THEREFORE THE DESIRE
TO KNOW BRAHMAN

By the desire to know he indicates (the existence of) both doubt and profit. Here, Brahman-knowledge is the explicitly declared profit, since it is directly pervaded by (i.e., is the object of) desire. Nor, as in the case of observances succeeding to the knowledge of ritual, is there anything succeeding to Brahman-knowledge, in view of which, that (knowledge) would be a secondary benefit. The supreme benefit, rather, is Brahman-knowledge alone, free from all doubt, this (knowledge), which is of the nature of the cessation of all misery and is of the one essence of bliss, being conveyed by the Vedāntas, whose content is known through the mode of argumentation called Brahma-mīmāṃsā. It is in the endeavour towards that end that, verily, the skilled inquirers would more certainly set out. That (end), though already attained, yet becomes an object of desire, as if unattained, because of beginningless Nescience; just as one, who erroneously imagines the necklace round one's own neck to be non-existent, being shown that by another, attains it, as
In this the word then (atha) is accepted as having the sense of "immediate succession," not the sense of "what is begun" (adhikāra); because the desire to know Brahman cannot be what is begun. And if it had not been attained (before). The desire to know, being the result of doubt, indicates doubt as its cause. The doubt makes the commencement of the inquiry worth while. Thus, as indicating the doubt and the benefit that are the causes of the skilled inquirer setting out on this sacred teaching, it is meet that the aphorism should be at the commencement of the sacred teaching; hence, the revered commentator says: "In the sacred teaching of the Vedanta inquiry, which is proposed to be explained", by us "this is the first aphorism." The word mīmāṃsā signifies an inquiry that commands respect. The inquiry commands respect, because it bears the fruit, viz., the ascertainment of that extremely subtle sense, which is the cause of the supreme human goal. Mīmāṃsā-sāstra means the sacred teaching relating to that inquiry, and sāstra is so-called, because it (the inquiry) is taught or truthfully explained by that to the pupils thereof. An aphorism is such, because it indicates much meaning. As is said: "Concise, indicative of (the) senses, composed of few letters and words, replete with sense, such are what the wise ones call aphorisms."

Having thus explained the purport of the aphorism, he explains the first word of it, "then": "In this, the word 'then' is accepted as having the sense of 'immediate succession'." The word "then," occurring among the words of the aphorism, has the sense of immediate succession; this is the construction.
तत्त्र अथाशाख्यं आनन्तर्यांश्च परिश्राह्यते, नाधिकार्थम् ब्रह्मज्ञात्सायम् अनविकार्यं सूचयति। संशयथाऽ मीमांसारम्भं प्रयोजयति। तथा च शास्त्रे प्रेक्षावचारत्वमचिह्यते संशयः प्रयोजनसूचनात् युक्तमयं सूत्रस्य शास्त्रादित्वम्, इत्यहं भगवान्बायकार्—वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिक्यास्तित्रस्य अस्मात्, इदमादिमं सूत्रम्। पूजितविचार्यचनो मीमांसाशाख्यं। परमपुराणशयंत्वभूतसूत्रस्यत्मार्थिनिर्णययत्या च विचारस्य पूजितता। तत्स्या मीमांसाया शाश्वम्, सा हनेन शिष्यते शिष्येभ्यो यथाविधत्रृतिपादत इति। सूत्रं च बह्यसूचनात् भवति। यथाहुः—

लघूनि सुचितार्थानि स्वतःक्यास्तिदानि च।
सर्वते सारभूतानि सूत्रायाःहुर्मनेर्नीपि।। इति।

तदेवं सूत्रतात्मेऽव्याख्याय तस्य प्रथमपरं अथ इति व्याख्ये—तत्राथशाख्यं आनन्तर्यांश्च परिश्राह्यते। तेषु सूत्रपदेः मध्ये योज्यं अथाशाख्य: स आनन्तर्यांश्च इति योजना।
त्थात्। मक्कलस्य च वाक्यार्थें समन्वयाभावात्। अर्थान्तरप्रयुक्त एवं हाथशब्दः
शुल्का मक्कलप्रयोजनो भवति। पूर्वप्रकृता
पेक्षायाथ्य फलत आनन्तराव्यतिरंगितात्।
सति च आनन्तरार्थाचे, यथा भर्मज्ञज्ञास्या
पूर्वकृत्वा वेदाध्ययनं नियमनेनापेश्यते, एवं
ब्रह्मज्ञज्ञासापि यत्पूर्वकृत्वा नियमनेनापेश्यते,
तद्रक्तयम्। खाध्यायानन्तरं तु समानम्।

ननु अधिकारार्योऽपथानदो हृत्यते, यथा
'अथेषप ज्योति:' इति वेदे, यथा वा लोके
'अथ शब्दानुशासनम्' इति, 'अथ योगानु-
शासनम्' इति च; तत्क्रियाधिकाराथी न
गृह्यत् हृत्य आह—नाधिकाराथः। कुतः?
ब्रह्मज्ञज्ञासाया अनाधिकार्यवात्। ज्ञासा
तात्विच सुधे ब्रह्माण्डत् तत्ज्ञानाच शब्दः
प्रधानं प्रतीते। न च यथा 'दण्डी प्रैपानन्वाह'
इत्यत्र अप्रधानमापि दण्डशब्दाय विवक्त्ये
एवमिहापि ब्रह्मत्थाने इति युतम्, ब्रह्ममीमांसा-
"auspiciousness" has no syntactical relation with the meaning of the sentence. Indeed, the word 'athā,' only when used in another sense, can bring about auspiciousness by the mere sound of it. And reference to what has gone before does not in effect differ from immediate succession. And when the meaning is "immediate succession," just as the desire to know Religious Duty relates invariably to the study of the Vedas that has gone before, similarly, there must be stated something which has gone before, to which the desire to know Brahman too invariably relates. Immediate succession to the study of one's own Veda is, however, common.

Now, the word "then" is also seen in the sense of what is begun, as in "Then (i.e., there is begun) this jyotistoma" in the Veda, and in "Then (i.e., there is begun) the treatise on sābda" or "Then (i.e., there is begun) the treatise on yoga" in worldly usage; why then is it not here understood in the sense of what is begun? To this he says: "not the sense of 'what is begun'." Why (not)? "Because the desire to know Brahman cannot be what is begun." In this aphorism, the "desire to know" appears from the wording to be more important than "Brahman" or "knowledge thereof". Nor may it be said that, just as the meaning of the word "baton" is what is intended, though subordinate in the words "The bearer of the baton chants the permission and the reply," "it may be so even here, in the case of Brahman and the knowledge thereof; for, the "desire to know" is alone intended here, as indicating the doubt and the benefit, which are subsidiary
to engaging in the sacred teaching relating to the inquiry into Brahman. If that were not intended, those (subsidiaries) would not be indicated; hence, prudent inquirers would not set out on the inquiry into Brahman any more than on the examination of the teeth of a crow. Then, verily, Brahman and the knowledge thereof could not be the theme and the benefit; for, being opposed to the concept “I,” which is not (known to be) superimposed, in respect of such an object, the validity of the Vedāntas would be unintelligible; as for senses other than the one desired to be declared, such as figurative senses that may serve one’s engaging in rites, or serve in incantations in the same way as (the syllable) hum etc., these are possible of apprehension, even in dependence on the injunction to study one’s own section of the Veda. Hence, the primacy of the “desire to know,” which indicates both doubt and benefit, is here intended both by the words and by the sentence (as a whole). Nor can that (word jijñāsā) signify what is begun, so that the word “then,” which is in proximity thereto, may also be taken to mark what is begun; for, it is not that which is treated (in every section). Brahman-knowledge, which qualifies the desire to know, may, however, be what is begun. And that too does not connect with the word “then,” because there is no primacy for that (Brahman-knowledge). Nor is the desire to know (jijñāsā) the same as inquiry (mīmāṃsā), so that, like the treatise on yoga, it may be what is begun; the word mīmāṃsā,—being derived with the termination san, but not in the sense of desire, according to the (aphorism) mān badha etc., either from the root mān, to measure, with the addition of an “n” or from the root mān, to reverence,—signifies an inquiry that commands respect; while
शास्त्रप्रबंधसंशयप्रयोजनसूचनानाथितेन जिज्ञासाया एवं विवक्षितत्वात्। तद्विवक्षायां तदसूचनेन काकद्वंतपरिशालयामिव न वहामीमांसाया प्रेक्षावंतः प्रवर्तेन। न हि तदानी भवा तज्ज्ञानं च अभित्यप्रयोजने भवितमहत्, अनध्यस्तांप्रत्यय- विरोधेन वेदान्तनामेवंविचेत्यथं श्रामाण्यानुपपत्ते; कर्मप्रवृत्त्यपयोगितायो उपचरितार्थानं च जयोप- योगिनां च 'हुस्य' इत्येवमादीनामितविविधिता- तार्थनामापि स्वाद्यायाय्यनविविधिनिग्रहणत्वस्य संभवात्। तस्मातस्त्रेणप्रयोजनसूचनी जिज्ञासा इह पदतो वाक्यतथा प्राधान्यं विवक्षितत्वात्। न च तत्स्या अधिकार्यत्वं, अप्रशूचिमान्तत्वं, येन तत्सार्थप्रीतितथोपश्रवंदोधिकारराखं स्यात्। जिज्ञासाविशेषणम् तु वहामीमांसामिकार्यं भवेत्। न च तदप्रयत्नशब्दै नवं अस्यं, प्राधान्याभावत्। न च जिज्ञासा मीमांसा येन थोगानुशासनवद्धित्विनित्य नानतवं प्रियुत्ति 'माल्ल माले' इत्यमहां 'मान पूजयाम्' इत्यमहां धातो: 'मानवध- ' इत्यादिना अनिच्छ्वर्थ सनि व्यवादित्तस्य मीमांसायाः।
पदर्थ पूजितविचारवचनन्तरात्; ज्ञानेच्छावाच-कत्वा-जिज्ञासापदर्थं। प्रवर्तिका हि मीमांसायां जिज्ञासा र्यात्। न च प्रार्थनेप्रार्थक्योरैकेयम्, एकत्रे तदार्थातुपते। न च स्वार्थपर्त्योपपत्ति सत्यं अन्यार्थपर्त्यक्त्पना युक्ता, अतिप्रसङ्गात। तस्मातस्युक्तम् ‘जिज्ञासायां अनिधिकार्यत्वात्’

इति।

अथ मार्गार्थायौः पदार्थः कर्माच्छ भवति।
तथा च मार्गेहतुतात् प्रत्यं व्यासज्ञासाकर्तेतेति सूतः: संपात्ति इत्यत् आह—मार्गात् च वाक्यायथे समन्वयाभावात्।
पदार्थं एवैहि वाक्यायथे समन्वीयते, स च वाच्यो रूख्यो वा। न चेह मार्गमथायथार्थ्य वाच्यं वा रूख्यं वा, कि तु मुद्राश्चांह्यानिवद्यार्थार्थ्यवचनात्मकार्यम्। न च कार्यार्थ्योर्वांक्यार्थे समन्वयः:
शाब्दिक्यवहारे हय इत्यथ:। तत्ककिन्द्रानि मार्ग-लार्योथार्थ्य: तेषु तेषु न प्रयोजक्यः। तथा च जोकार्थायथार्थ्य नात्तेती व्रहणः पुरा।
कष्टं भिन्त्या विनियोजतो तस्मान्मार्गाक्षिकावुभू॥
the word "jñāsa" signifies "desire to know". "Desire to know" is indeed what starts one on the "inquiry". Nor can that which starts be identical with that which is started, that relationship (of starter and started) being unintelligible where they are one. Nor is it proper to assume some other sense (for a word) when its own sense is intelligible, as that will be an undue extension. Hence it is well said: "because the desire to know... cannot be what is begun."

Now, why may not the word atha have the sense of auspiciousness? Thus, the aphorism comes to mean that the desire to know Brahman is to be undertaken every day as causing auspiciousness. To this he says: "and 'auspiciousness' has no syntactical relation with the meaning of the sentence." It is the meaning of a word that, verily, has syntactical relation with the meaning of the sentence; and that (former) is either expressed or implied. In this case, auspiciousness is not the sense expressed or implied of the word atha, but something effected on the mere hearing of that word, as on hearing the sound of the drum (mrdanga) or the conch. And in the use of words it is not seen that what is effected or recalled (by a word) has any syntactical relation with the meaning of the sentence: this is the meaning. (Objection): is not the word atha used here and there to signify auspiciousness? And there would also be conflict with the text of the traditional Code, which says: "The two words Om and atha burst out of yore from the throat of Brahman; hence both are auspicious." (Reply): to this he says: "Indeed, the word 'atha,' only when used in
another sense, can bring about auspiciousness by the (mere) sound of it." The word *atha*, used in the sense of immediate succession etc., produces auspiciousness, like the sound of the flute, the lyre etc., by the sound, *i.e.*, by the mere hearing of it, and thus helps to bring about auspiciousness, like the sight of the pitcher of water brought for a different purpose. Thus, there is no conflict with the text of the traditional Code. Therefore, the sense of immediate succession being there, the sense of auspiciousness too (is secured) by the mere hearing: this is the meaning.

Be this so. The word *atha* may depend on an antecedent factor, even without having the sense of "immediate succession". This is how: a question may be raised with reference to this very word *atha*—"Is this word *atha* (used in the sense of) 'immediate succession' or (*atha*) 'what is begun'?" Here, the word *atha* occurring in the interrogative states an alternative view after stating a preliminary view, with reference to the *atha* occurring earlier. Of that (second) word, "immediate succession" is not the sense, since it is separated from the earlier occurring word by the statement of the preliminary view. Nor is there non-dependence on the foregoing (word), for if there were no dependence on that, that (word) would not be the content of this (interrogative), and consequently the disjunction, not referring to the same content, would be unintelligible. Never does it happen (that one asks): "Is the self eternal or is the intellect non-eternal?" Hence, even without the sense of "immediate succession," why should it not be that the word *atha*
विहारसा

इति स्मृतिव्याकोप इत्यत आह—अर्थान्तर—प्रयुक्त एव ध्ययनशाल्द: श्रुत्या महत्त्रचयोजनो भवति। अर्थान्तरेष्यान्तर्विषयादिपु प्रयुक्तः अथाशाल्द: श्रुत्या श्रवणमात्रेण वेणुविणाथविनवनमहतुः कुर्वेन महत्त्रचयोजनो भवति अन्यार्थान्यामीयामानोदः
कुम्भदर्शनवत्। तेन न स्मृतिव्याकोपः। तेन च इह आन्तर्विषयिः सत्: श्रवणमात्रेण महत्त्रचयते तत्।

स्वादेतू। पूर्वप्रकृतप्रकृतोथाशाल्दो भविष्यति चिन्तवान्तर्विषयेऽति। तथासा—हस्मेरवुधाशाल्द प्रकृत्य विमुखते ’किममथाशाल्द आन्तर्विषयः आवादिकैरः’
इति। अतः विशेषक्राक्षापुरुषशाल्द: पूर्वप्रकृतमध्यान्तर्विषयेऽस्मिन महत्त्रप्रकृतयोपनासपूर्वकं पश्चात्तरोपनासे।

न चायान्तर्विषयेऽति, पूर्वप्रकृतस्य प्रथमप्रकृतीप्रातिचलनमाण्यासे।

न च प्रकृतान्तर्विषयः, तदन्तर्विषयः तद्वि

फळाविषयवेशः। अस्मानविषयतया विकल्पानुपपत्ते।

न हि जातु भवत—किं निद्रा आत्मा, अथ अनिद्राया

वृद्धिरिति। तस्मादान्तर्विषय विना पूर्वप्रकृतप्रकृत

इहाथाशाल्द: कर्मचार भवतीतय आह—पूर्वे—
प्रकृतापेशायायश्च फलत आनन्तर्गत्यतिरिक्तू। अस्यार्थः—न वैयमन्तर्यार्थां व्यसनित्या रोचयामहे, किं तु वहाजिज्ञासाहेतुभूतपुर्वप्रकृततस्य। सा च पूर्वप्रकृतापेशापेशातेज्यमकारशाल्वस्य सिद्धतीति व्यर्थे आनन्तर्गत्वाधारणाश्रोहस्माकमिति। तद्विद्वृत्तम् ‘फलतः’ इति। परमार्थस्तथा कल्पान्तरोपन्यासे पूर्वप्रकृतापेशा; न चेह कल्पान्तरोपन्यास इति पारिश्रेप्यादानन्तर्यायेऽवैति युक्तम्।

भवत्वान्तर्यायोऽपि, किमेनं सतीत्यत आहं—सति चानन्तर्यार्थितं इति। न तात्त्वस्य कस्यचिद्रान्तर्यायिते वक्तव्यम्, तस्याभिधानान्तरे शास्त्रानि प्रात्तवादु। अवस्य हि पुरुषः किंचित्कल्याणं किंचित्करोति। न चानन्तर्यार्थात्त्वया हृयमदृश्ये च व प्रयोजनं पद्यम्। तस्मातस्यार्थ्यान्तर्यात्त्वया वक्तव्यं यथिना वहाजिज्ञासाः न भवति, यथिन्द्रस्ति तु भवती भवत्येव। तद्विद्वृत्तम्—यत्पूर्वविद्वां नियमनेपेशकत्त इति।
depends on what goes before? To this he says: "and reference to what has gone before does not, in effect, differ from immediate succession." This is the meaning: we prefer the sense of "immediate succession" not because of eagerness, but rather in order to secure some antecedent factor, which will serve as the cause of the desire to know Brahman. Since that (sense) results even on the view that the word atha is dependent on what goes before, any eagerness of ours to fix the sense of that word as "immediate succession" would be in vain. That is here expressed by the words: "in effect." But, in reality, it is in stating another view, that there is dependence on what goes before; and since, here, there is no statement of an alternative view, by elimination, "immediate succession" alone is left as the sense; this is the correct view.

Let "immediate succession" be the sense; what of it? To this he says: "And when the meaning is 'immediate succession'" etc. Immediate succession is to be declared here not to something or other, since that results even without any statement. A person does something, necessarily after doing something else. Nor do we see any benefit—seen or unseen—from immediate succession alone. Hence, there must be declared immediate succession to that, without which the desire to know Brahman would not be, and in the presence of which it would certainly be generated. That is here mentioned in the words: "something which has gone before to which the desire to know Brahman too invariably relates."
Now, here, what is distinctive is immediate succession to a knowledge of ritual. No; for, even prior to a desire to know Religious Duty, desire to know Brahman, as of the desire to know Religious Duty (dharma), there may be immediate succession to the study of one's own section of the Veda because of compatibility, since Brahman, like Religious Duty, is known on the sole authority of Scripture. That not being known, there does not arise cognition of its own content (i.e., Religious Duty and Brahman); and the apprehension of it (Scripture) follows necessarily even from the rule as to study: "one should study one's own section of the Veda." Hence, immediate succession to the study of the Veda alone is the meaning of the word atha, even in the case of the desire to know Brahman. To this he says: "Immediate succession to the study of one's own Veda is, however, common" to the desire to know Religious Duty as well as to the desire to know Brahman. And here, by the words "one's own Veda" referring to the content, the content thereof, viz., study, is implied. And this (succession) being understood even from the aphorism "Then, therefore, the desire to know Religious Duty," the present aphorism need not be begun at all; for, the word dharma (used in the above sutra) implies the entire sense of the Vedas, and Brahman, like Religious Duty, being equally the sense of the Vedas, the teaching about immediate succession to the study of the Veda applies equally (to both): this is the meaning.

Now, the objection is raised: "Now, here, what is distinctive" of the desire to know Brahman in relation
नन्विह कर्मवद्वोधानन्तरं विशेषः। न, धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागापि अधीतवदानन्तरस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः। यथा च हृदयायचावदानाः।

स्थादेतत्। धर्मजिज्ञासाया इव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अपि योग्यतात् स्वाध्यायाच्ययनानन्तरस्य, धर्म-वेदांहारणोऽस्मात्यक्षमाणांगम्यतात्। तस्य चादुहितस्य स्वविषये विज्ञानाजननात्, श्रवणस्य च 'स्वाध्यायोऽस्यत्वः,' इत्यथ्यनेनेव नियततवात्। तस्मादेदाध्यायानन्तरस्यमेव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अथ्ययाच्ययनानमुद्यत आह्—स्वाध्यायाच्ययनानं तु समां धर्मजिज्ञासायोः। अत्र च स्वाध्यायेन विषयेन तद्भिषयम्ययानं लक्ष्यति। तथा च 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा,' इत्यनेनेव गतानेव नेवं सुचरावः; धर्मशास्त्रस्य वेदार्थभाष्याच्ययनात् धर्मशास्त्रात्यक्षमाणांगम्यतात्। तथा च 'चोदयत—नन्विह कर्मवद्वोधानन्तरं विशेषः। धर्मजिज्ञासातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः।'
नामान्तरिनियमः क्रमस्य विविधितत्त्वातः, न तथेह क्रमो विवक्षितः; शेषभोजिते अभिक्षुताधिकारे वा प्रमाणाभावात्, धर्म-ब्रह्माज्ञासूयोः।

अस्यार्थः—'विविधिशिष्ठि यज्ञेन' इति तृतीयाः-श्रुत्या यज्ञादीनामात्मकेन ब्रह्माज्ञाने विनियोगात्, ज्ञानप्रेयां कर्मांत इच्छा प्रति प्राधान्यात्, प्रधानसंवर्धिभाषणां पदार्थान्तराः। तत्रापि च न वाक्यार्थज्ञानोत्तरात्मकाभावो यज्ञादीनाम, वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य वाक्यादेवोपयोः। न च वाक्यं सहकारित्या कर्मांप्रेक्षचतुर्विशेष इति युक्तम्; अकृत्कर्मेनापि विविधिपदपदार्थसंवर्धिणां समाहिगतशालिन्यायत्वमां गुणप्रधानभूतपूर्वार्थार्थिकाङ्क्षासंदिग्धियोगतानुसंधानवतामप्रत्यूहं वाक्यार्थ-प्रत्ययोऽत्योपत्योः। अनुसरत्वो वा संप्रदायेऽवाक्यार्थस्य-प्रत्ययविशेषाय तद्यथानुदारानपरिवर्जनाभावाभागसः। तद्वा विद्याध्यात्सु तद्यथानुदारानपरिवर्जने परस्परार्थशयः, सत्तिने सत्तित तद्यथानुदारानपरिवर्जनं तत्तथं तद्वा दृष्टिः
Brahman is intelligible in respect of one who has studied the Vedânta. And there is the rule of immediate succession in respect of the cutting of the heart etc., because, there, the sequence is intended to be declared; but here no similar sequence is intended to be declared; for there is no authority for the relationship of subsidiary and principal or of eligibility of the person (already) eligible as between the desire to know Religious Duty and Brahman.

to the desire to know Religious Duty "is immediate succession to a knowledge of ritual". This is its meaning: through the express statement of the instrumental case "They desire to know by sacrifice" etc., sacrifice etc. are applied to the knowledge of Brahman as its subsidiaries; for, knowledge alone is primary as the object of desire, and other things which are not primary have to be related to what is primary. Even here, sacrifice etc. are not subsidiary to the production of the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, since the latter is produced by the sentence itself. Nor does it stand to reason that the sentence requires ritual as an auxiliary; for, in him who knows the connection of words and their senses, comprehends the true nature of the principles regulating the use of sounds, who keeps in mind the relationships of subsidiary and principal, earlier and later, among things, and the requirements of expectancy, proximity and compatibility, there is seen the unhindered production of the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, even though he has not performed any rites. Or, if it did not arise, there would be no knowledge of the meaning of prescriptive
and prohibitory texts, and there would result the failure of the observances and avoidances, which are the sense of those (texts). If from the knowledge of them arose their observance and avoidance, there would be reciprocal dependence, in that that (knowledge) being existent, there is observance and avoidance of their sense, while from them (the observance and avoidance) there is the knowledge thereof. Nor is it admissible that the Vedānta texts alone depend on ritual for the comprehension of their sense, and not other sentences; for, there is no special cause.

Now, those whose intellects are impure to start with cannot from the first understand the validity of the identity asserted by the text "That thou art" between the ķiva denoted by the "thou," whose nature is that of agent and enjoyer, and the supreme self denoted by the "that," whose nature is eternally pure, intelligent and indifferent, because of the certainty that there is lack of compatibility (between the denotations of the two terms). But those of pure intellect, whose internal impurities have undergone attrition by means of sacrifices, gifts, austerities and fasting, and who are endowed with faith, having understood the compatibility (of "that" and "thou"), will understand their identity. If this be urged, then, of the ascertainment of compatibility, which is the cause of the valid knowledge, do you resolve to say that it comes from ritual, which is itself not a means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), or that ritual too is a means of valid knowledge, in addition to perception etc.? If the ascertainment of compatibility is effected by reasoning unopposed to the Vedānta and based on it, there is no need for ritual. Hence, having apprehended the ūiva's nature to be that of the supreme self, through knowledge of the nature of
जिथष्ठा

इति। न च वेदान्तवाक्यानामेव स्वार्थप्रत्यायने कर्मीपैक्षा न वाक्यान्तराणामिति सांप्रतयम्,
विशेषतेिरभावात्।

ननु 'तत्त्वमसि' इति वाक्यात् लघुदार्श्य कर्मीपैक्षरुपस्य जीवात्मानो नित्यशुद्धुद्धोदा
सीनस्वभावेन तत्पदार्थेन परमात्मनेक्यमशक्यं
द्रागितेव प्रतिपुं आपातततोशुद्धसत्वः
, योग्यताबिरहितविनिकश्यात्। यज्ञदानतपोषणात
कर्मीपैक्षरुपस्य विशुद्धसत्वः श्रद्धाना
योग्यतावगम्यपुरः संत तारात्ममागमित्यन्ततिति चेतुः
, तत्त्वमिर्द्धां प्रमाणकार्यं योग्यतात्वाधारण
प्रमाणकार्यं प्रमाणकार्यं प्रमाण-कर्ममेवं वक्तृमत्यत्रसिद्दिसिद्दिसिद्धिहृतमसिद्दि
, प्रत्यक्षाचतुर्विविकसितिति च न कर्मीपि प्रमाणम्। वेदान्त
विशुद्धतम्मूर्द्धव्यालेवं तु योग्यतात्वाधारणे क्रूतं
कर्मभिः। तस्मात् 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादि: श्रुतयेन
जानेन जीवात्मान: परमात्मना गृहितथा, तन्मूलया
चप्पत्या व्यवस्थाप्या, तदुपासनायं भावनापरिभाषाय
ाया दीर्घकालनेत्रतर्थयतया बहसासाक्तकारकऽयायाः
वज्ञादीनामुपयोगः। यथाः—‘स तु दीर्घकाल:-
नैरंतर्यस्तिकारासेवितो दृष्टभूमि:’ इति। ब्रह्मचर्य:-
तपःश्रेण्यज्ञाद्यक्ष सत्कारः। अत एव श्रुति:—
‘तमेत्र धीरो विज्ञाय प्रज्ञा कुर्वित्वं वाहिणाः:’
इति। विज्ञाय तर्कोपकरणेन शव्दे न प्रज्ञा भावनां
कुर्वित्वत्त्वः। अत्र च यज्ञादीनां श्रेष्ठःपरिपन्नि:-
कल्पणनिविर्धोपयोगं इति केचित। पुरुष:-
संस्कारहरेणेत्यन्ये। यज्ञादिसंकृतं हि पुरुषः
आदर्नैरंतर्यदीर्घकालेिरासेवमानं ब्रह्मावानामनाध:-
विद्यावासनं समूलकारं कष्टवः। ततोस्य प्रत्यगात्मा
मुपसंतः केत्रतो विदेशभवति। अत एव
श्रुति:—
‘महायज्ञेश्वर यज्ञेश्वर ब्राह्मीयं क्रियते तनुः:’
इति, ‘यज्ञेश्वरश्रंचत्त्वारूढितसंस्कारः’ इति च।
अपेक्षा तु ऋणस्ययाप्पकरणेन ब्रह्मज्ञानोपयोगं
कर्मणामाहुः। अति हि समृति:—
‘ऋणानि श्रींयपाकृत्व मनो मोक्षे निवेशयेत्।’
इति। अते तु ‘तमेत्र वेदानुवच्चनेन ब्रह्माणा
hearing texts like "That thou art," and confirmed it by reasoning based thereon, there results intuition of Brahman through the contemplation—otherwise known as bhāvanā—of that (truth), practised for long and uninterruptedly; sacrifice etc. serve in this (contemplation). As is said: "But that (discipline of mental functioning) practised for long, uninterruptedly and with satkāras is the sure means (of realising the truth)" 57 Continence, austerity, faith, sacrifice etc. are the satkāras. Hence it is the Scripture says: "Knowing that alone, the wise brāhmin should perform contemplation (prajñā)." 58 Having known through testimony aided by argumentation, one is to betake oneself to contemplation. Here, some say that for sacrifice etc., there is utility through their destroying impurities that are the foes of beatitude. Others say it is through purifying the person (that they are useful). It is the person purified by sacrifice etc., who, verily, by the contemplation of Brahman practised with devotion and uninterruptedly for a long time, plucks out by the root all the impressions of beginningless Nescience; thence, the inner self becomes clear, pure and bright. Hence it is that the traditional Code says: "One creates the capacity to attain Brahman through the mahāyajñas (brahma-yajña, deva-yajña, pitr-yajña etc.) and through sacrifices," and "He, for whom there have been these forty and eight purificatory ceremonies". Yet others say of ritual that its service to Brahman-knowledge is through the discharge of the three obligations. There is, indeed, the traditional Code to this effect: "Having discharged the three obligations, one is to set one's mind on release." 59 Others, however, say that the various rites, though enjoined with reference to their respective results, yet, because of texts like "That the
brahmins seek to know through the study of the Vedas, through sacrifice etc.," are subsidiary to the contemplation of Brahman, through the relation of *samyoga-prthaktva* (two-in-oneness), just as the *khādira* (ebony) wood, while serving the purpose of the sacrifice (in the capacity of sacrificial stake), serves also to bring about virility (to the sacrificer); for the principle is "when one subserves two ends, (the relation is) *samyoga-prthaktva*." 60 Hence too the aphorism of the great sage (Bādarāyaṇa): "Because of the Scriptural text about sacrifice etc., there is need of all (in the contemplation of Brahman), as in the case of a horse." 61 (The word) "all" means sacrifice, gifts, austerities etc.; there is need of these for the contemplation of Brahman; this is the meaning. Hence, whichever be the authority, Scripture etc., or the aphorism of the great sage, in any case, it is contemplation of Brahman as united to sacrifice etc., and possessed of the three properties (devotion, length of time and non-intermission), that is efficient to bring about intuition of Brahman, otherwise known as release, through the destruction of beginningless Nescience and its impressions; for this purpose, rites ought to be observed. Nor can these be observed, in the absence of the knowledge of the many different forms of rites in respect of their consequences seen and unseen, of things in relation to them as inherent or as remote causes, of the elements which are taught directly or obtained by transfer, of the host of subsidiaries ending with sequence (*krama*), as also of the different persons eligible for the respective rites. 62 Nor does that knowledge result without a critical study of the inquiry into Religious Duty. Hence it has been well said: 'what is distinctive is immediate succession to a knowledge
बिविदिषिति यज्ञेऽ इत्यादिश्रुतिः तत्कस्तताय चोदितानामपि कर्मणां संयोगप्रथक्तवेन 
ब्रह्मावनां प्रत्याभव्या�väमाचक्षते, क्रत्त्वथेत्येव खादिर- 
त्त्स्य वीर्येन्ताम्, 'एकस्य तुभयार्थेते 
संयोगप्रथक्तवेन' इति न्यायान्। अत एव 
पारम्पर सूत्रम्, 'सत्वेपैक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेर्खवाल,' 
इति। यज्ञतपोदानादिव सर्वेऽ, तद्वेदिया ब्रह्मावनेन- 
त्त्थयः। तस्मात् यदि श्रुत्यादयः प्रमाणं यदि बा 
पारम्पर सूत्रान्तः सर्वत्तथा यज्ञादिकर्मसमूहिताः ब्रह्मो- 
पासना विशेषणत्रयवती अनायविचारादसनाः 
समुच्छेदक्रमेण ब्रह्मासाक्षात्काराय मोक्षापनाम्वे 
कर्ष्टत इति तदर्थ कर्मनुप्रेयणानि। न चैतानि 
द्याद्यसामस्मातायिकारादपकारहुत्सूःौपेदिशिकातिदेशिं 
कर्मपर्यन्ताः इवासाहित्यपरस्परविभिन्नकर्मस्वपुतेदाधिकारिकी 
विधिकारिकंदपरिज्ञानं विना शक्यान्युक्तादाः। न 
च धर्ममीमांसापरिशीलनं विना तत्तपरिज्ञानम्। 
तस्मात्सार्वृत्तं 'कर्मवोधानांतर्त्वशिशेप: ' इति। 
कर्मवोधकेन हि कर्मनुप्रेयनसाहित्यं भवति 
वहोपासनाय इत्यतयः।
तदेवतिरिक्रोति—न इति। कुतः? कर्मवदोधानुभाग्येकीतत्वदान्तस्य ब्रह्मज्ञािपासपन्ते।

इदम्लक्ष्यात्—ब्रह्मोपासनया भवनापरस्कीर्भवनया कर्मचर्यापेद्यतत्त्वदुःख्यात्। तत्र गुमः—
कुत्ते पुरस्या: कर्मपैक्षा? किं कार्य यथाभेयादीनं परमपूर्वं चिन्तामैश्वलानुकूले जनयितवं समि
दाच्छेक्षा? स्वरूपे यथा तेषामेव हिरोकू
परोदाशायीद्विग्याभियोजेवताच्छेक्षा? न तावत्कार्ये,
तस्य विकत्यासहत्वात्। तथा हि—ब्रह्मोपासनया
वहस्वस्फासस्कारकार: कार्यममुपये:। स चोत्याचो
वा स्वात् यथा संयवानस् पिण्ड:, विकायों वा
यथाव्यायस्य वीह्य:, संस्कायों वा यथा
प्रोक्षणस्योल्लक्ष्ठायः:। यायो वा यथा दोहनस्य
पव:। न तावत्याचः। न लघु घटादिसास्कारकार
इव जहसाक्षाकेऽ घटादिः भिन्न इन्द्रियाखादेिे
बहस्कारकारो भवनापेये: संभवति, ब्रह्मोपराथीनप्रकारात्त्वा
तत्साक्षाकारस्य तत्साभाभेयस्य नित्यतयोिाथताच्छेक्षा:।
ततो भिकस्य वा
भवनापेयस्य साक्षाकारस्य प्रतिभाप्रत्ययवत्।
of ritual." It is, verily, by the knowledge of ritual that there results for the contemplation of Brahman the co-operation of ritual.

This he refutes: "No." Why (not)? "For, even prior" to the knowledge of ritual, "the desire to know Brahman is intelligible in respect of one who has studied the Vedanta".

This is the underlying idea: it is said that rites are needed for the purpose of Brahman-contemplation, otherwise known as bhāvanā. We ask here "in what way are rites needed?" Is it for the (production of the) effect, just as for the āgneya and other (rites) there is need of the samit (a subsidiary rite) in order to produce the final unseen result (paramā-'pūrva), which is favourable to long-delayed fruit?" Or, is it in respect of its own existence, like the requirement of the material—the puroḍūsa cut into two, and the deity—Agni? Not for the effect, as that cannot stand examination. It is thus: it has to be admitted of the contemplation of Brahman that it effects intuition of the nature of Brahman. That may be a product, as the ball (of flour) is produced by mixing it into a paste; a modification, as rice from pounding; something purified, like the mortar etc. by sprinkling;" something attained, as milk by milking. Firstly, it is not a product. The intuition of Brahman produced by Brahman-contemplation does not, verily, result in the same way as perception of the pot etc., which are produced by the senses etc., different from the pot etc., inert by nature; for, Brahman, not being illumined in dependence on another, the intuition thereof is of its own nature, eternal, and production is not intelligible in that case. Any intuition different therefrom, brought
about by contemplation, is infected with doubt, like an imagined idea, and hence cannot be valid; for, it is seen of that kind (of idea), even with that (contemplation) as accessory, that it is often inconstant. The (apparently) direct experience of a fire with huge flames, as the result of the contemplation of a (wrongly) inferred fire, by one whose body is extremely benumbed with intense cold, does not, verily, accord with other valid knowledge, this non-accord being seen extensively. Hence, since there is not the effect characteristic of valid intuition, ritual is not needed in the generation (of any result) by contemplation. And for Brahman, who is immutably eternal and all-pervasive, modification, purification or attainment cannot result through contemplation.

Be this so. Let not the intuition of Brahman result, in the way of generation etc., from contemplation. Purification, however, may come about through the removal of the veil of the two-fold indeterminable Nescience, as the danseuse concealed by the curtain is manifested through the raising of the curtain by the stage-hand. Herein lies the use of ritual. But there is this much of difference: on the raising of the curtain, the danseuse becomes the object of immediate perception to the audience. Here, however, the bare removal of the veil of Nescience is what is generated, and nothing else, since intuition of Brahman cannot be generated, the nature of Brahman being eternal. Here, we ask: "What is this Brahman-contemplation?" Is it a succession of whatever is apprehended through verbal testimony? or a succession of indubitable cognitions gained through (valid) verbal testimony? If it be a succession of whatever is cognised
संशयाक्रान्ततया प्रामाण्यायोगान्, तद्विद्यय
tतत्सामदृशियेत्व बहुलं व्यभिचारोपलब्धेत। न रचा
अनुमानावगत सिद्ध वचनं भावयतः
शीतार्तय दिशित भरसेन्त्रतरकायाण्डस्य स्फुर-
ञ्जालाजितानलसाधकारः प्रामाण्यान्त्रेण संवा-
चते, विसंवादश्र बहुलमुखपस्मातः। तस्मात्
प्रामाण्यकसाधकारकारकारणकार्यभावाचोपासनाया उ-
लाघेकमिश्वकः। न च कृतस्तुनिष्ठस्य सर्वव्यापितो
वहाण उपासनातो विकारसंकारानातः: संबंधितः।
स्थावेततः। मा भूहसाधकारकार उत्पाधादिरुप
उपासनाया। संरचायेाल अनिवर्णनीयाविधाहयपि-
धानापनयनेन भविष्यति, प्रतिसीरापितान नर्तकीव
प्रतिसीरापनयदारा रूक्ष्यापतेन। तत्र च कर्मणाः
सुप्रयोगः। एतावांस्तु विशेषः—प्रतिसीरापनये
पारित्यताः नर्तकीविशेषः साधकारो भवति।
इति तु अविधापिधानापनयनमाच्रमेव नापसुमाचयमस्ति,
हसाधकारस्य ब्रह्मस्माभावस्य नित्यितेन अनु-
स्थाधितताः। अत्रोच्चते—का पुनार्थी ब्रह्मोपासना?
कं शान्तिज्ञानमात्रसंततिः, आहो निविचिकित्स-
जिझासा

शाब्दज्ञानसंततिः। यदि शाब्दज्ञानमात्रसंततिः, न तत्त्वायमभयस्यमानायप्रविहायं समुच्छेततुमहति। तत्त्वाविनिष्क्रियस्तद्भयायो वा सवासनं विफ्याससमुन्नूत्येन, न संशयाभयाः, सामान्यमात्र- दर्शनाभयाः वा। न हि स्थाणविः पुरुषो वेदिति वा, आरोहप्रिणाहवतु द्रव्यमिति वा शतशोष्पि ज्ञानमभयस्मानं पुरुष एवेति निश्चयाय पर्यायम्, फलंते विशेषदर्शनात्।

ननूकं शृवत्तमयेन ज्ञानेन जीवात्मन: परमात्मभवं गृहीता युक्तिमयेन च व्यवस्थायत इति। तस्मात्त्विधिंचितस्तशाब्दज्ञानसंततिरुपोपासना कर्मसह- करिष्यविचारायोऽच्छेद्देहुः। न चासावनुसारित- ब्रह्मात्मभवं तदुच्छेद्यय पर्यायस। साक्षात्काररूपो हि विफ्यासः साक्षात्काररूपेणैव तत्त्वज्ञानबोधे चतु, न तु प्रोक्तवभासन, दिंडोहालतचकचलक्षमसम- मरीचिसहिलादिविशिष्टमपोहोधाभासभासीपु आप्रोक्तव- मासिमिषेव विद्गदितत्वप्रत्येकान्तिनिर्विचारदर्शनात्। नो खल्वास्तवचननिह्न्यानिहितिदिगुद्धितत्वत नुलिवते। तस्मात् तत्पदार्थस्य तत्पदार्थ-
through verbal testimony, then, even if practised repeatedly it cannot remove Nescience. It is the ascertainment of truth and the repetition thereof that root out error with its impressions, not the repetition of doubt, nor the repetition of the cognition of what is general. The cognition "post or man" or "a tall big object," even if repeated a hundred times, cannot lead to the certitude that it is but a man, unless there is specific cognition.

Now, it has been said that the jīva’s true nature as the supreme self having been apprehended through cognition of the nature of hearing, it is confirmed by (cognition) of the nature of reasoning. Hence, contemplation of the nature of a succession of indubitable cognitions based on (valid) verbal testimony is, as assisted by ritual, the cause of the destruction of the two-fold Nescience. Nor can this achieve that destruction without bringing about experience of Brahman. Error, which is of the nature of immediate experience, can be removed only by true knowledge of the nature of immediate experience, not by a mediate presentation; for, it is seen that immediate presentations like confusion of direction, the circle of fire, the moving trees (as seen when one is oneself moving), and the water in the mirage are removed only by immediate presentations in the nature of true cognitions of the directions etc. Confusion of direction etc. are not, verily, removed by the ascertainment of the directions etc. obtained through verbal testimony, inference etc. Hence, what is to be desired is the intuition of the denotation of the "thou" as of the nature of the denotation of the "that". Only thus and not
otherwise can there be cessation of the intuition of the denotation of the "thou" as subject to suffering, grief etc. This intuition does not, verily, result from verbal testimony, even though accompanied by inquiry, but from perception, that (intuition) being the invariable result of that (perception) alone, as otherwise it would follow that a banyan shoot could grow even from a kutaja-seed. Hence, it stands to reason that the internal organ perfected by the contemplation of the meaning of sentences of indubitable import, manifests, of the immediately experienced denotation of the "thou," its nature as the denotation of the "that," through negating the various conditioned forms of the former. Nor is this experience itself of the nature of Brahman, in which case it could not be generated; rather, it is a particular psychosis (vrtti) of the internal organ itself, having Brahman for its content. Nor with this does Brahman become other-illumined. Because Brahman is illumined by verbal testimony, it does not, verily, become non-self-illumined. Indeed, that which is free from all adjuncts is declared to be self-effulgence, not that which is conditioned too. As the revered commentator, verily, says: "now, this is not invariably a non-object." Nor is there freedom from all adjuncts in the intuition of Brahman, though a psychosis of the internal organ, for, it (the intuition) is known to be an adjunct opposed both to itself and to other adjuncts, being itself on the brink of destruction. Otherwise (i.e., if it were not united to intelligence as an adjunct), of the psychosis of the internal organ, itself non-intelligent, self-illumination would be unintelligible, in the absence of
तथेन साक्षात्कार एष्टित्व:। एतात्त्वा हि तिम्पदार्थसंधृः
किशोरिकित्वादिसाक्षात्कारनिर्वृत्तीः, नान्यथा। न
चैष साक्षात्कारो मीमांसासहितश्रयापि शाव्दःप्रभाणश्च
लुभम्, अपि तु प्रत्यक्षाय, तस्यैव तत्सत्त्व
निन्यमात्; अन्यथा कुटजबीजाद्वि बटाक्कु-
रोजसतिःस्नातः। तस्मातिरिचित्तत्वाव्यायार्थे
भावनापरिपक्षसहितेन: करणं तिम्पदार्थस्यापूर्वोक्ष्यण
तत्तचुप्वयाकारनिर्देशेन तिम्पदार्थतामात्मवर्धितेन
युक्तम्। न चायमुख्यो वहस्वभावो थेन न
जन्येत, अपि तु अतःकरणस्थैया वृत्तिभेदो
वहत्विधयः। न चैतात्त्वा बहाणोपि पराणीन
प्रकाशता। न हि शाब्दज्ञानप्रकाशया यहा स्वयं
प्रकाशं न भवति। सर्वोपाधिविहीनं हि
स्वयंहोतिःसति गीते, न तुपहितमापि। यथाह
सम भगवान्मायकाः—‘ न तावद्यमेकानातेनाविषयः’
इति। न चान्तःकरणब्धावप्यः
साक्षात्कारो सर्वोपाधिविनिमौकः, तस्यैव तत्तचु-
प्वयाकारनिर्देशस्य स्वप्रोपाधिविनोदिनो विधमान
व्यात। अन्यथा चैतन्यव्यायापति विनान्तः’।
करणत्र्वेते: श्यमचेतनाया: श्यामकाशात्वानुपपत्ती साक्षात्कार्त्यायोगावः। न चाचुमितभवितवहितसाक्षात्कार्त्यायोगावः प्रतिभात्वेनायायाप्रामाण्यम्, तत्र विहिस्तत्तत्त्वक्षणस्य परोक्षत्त्वाः। इह तु बहास्व-रूपस्योपाधिकर्त्तितिः स्वात्त्विमथ्यथ जीवस्य प्राग्यपरोक्षत्त्वाः।

न हि शुद्धुद्वताद्वायो वस्तुतस्ततोत्तिरिच्चितः।

जीव एवं हृ तत्त्वापाधिहितः: शुद्धुद्वतादिद्रस्यभावो बहोति गीते। न च तत्त्वापाधीत्रिहोपि ततोत्तिरिच्चितः।

तस्मात् यथा गान्धर्वशास्त्रायेऽज्ञानाध्यायाहि साहित्यसंस्कारसंचितः: श्रोते द्रिष्येण पद्मादिद्रस्रामूर्तनामृदुमय्यक्षमनुभवति, एवं वेदान्तार्थं ज्ञानाध्यायाहि साहित्यसंस्कारोऽजीवः: स्वस्य बहास्वनम्तः: करणेति।

अन्तः करणत्र्वेते: बहास्वाध्यायार्जनयितवे असि तदृपासनाया: कर्मपिश्वेति चेतृः, न, तर्या: कर्मानुश्यानसहभावाभावेन तत्सहारित्वालुपपत्ते। न खलु ’तत्त्वमसि’ इत्यादेवर्ग्याचित्विन्निः शुद्धुद्वतादिद्रस्वभावं अकर्त्तवादगुप्तेतं अपेत-वाहायणवत्ताधिजाति देहाच्यतिरि एकमात्रानं प्रति-
the reflection of intelligence, and hence it could not intuite. Nor is this invalid as an imagined idea, like the intuition of the (erroneously) inferred and contemplated fire, for, there the nature of fire is mediate, whereas here, there is even from the first, immediate experience of the jīva, whose nature is that of Brahman made impure by adjuncts. The attributes of purity, intelligence etc. do not in truth go beyond that (i.e., are not different from that). It is the jīva himself that, when free from adjuncts, is said to be Brahman, whose nature is purity, intelligence etc. Nor is freedom from the respective adjuncts something other than that. Therefore, just as through the sense of hearing, aided by the impressions brought about by the repetition of the knowledge gained from the science of music, one experiences directly the different notes, sādja etc., in their different cadences, even so the jīva through the internal organ, aided by the impressions brought about by the repetition of the meaning of the Vedānta texts, experiences its own nature as Brahman.

If it be said that there is need of ritual for contemplation in respect of the generation of the psychosis of the internal organ, i.e., intuition of Brahman, no (we reply), for, co-operation with ritual is unintelligible, since there is no co-presence of contemplation and the observance of ritual. Nor, verily, can he, who from texts like "That thou art" indubitably understands the one self, other than the body, whose nature is purity, intelligence and indifference, who is endowed with non-agency etc., who is devoid of caste-distinctions like brāhmin etc., understand
eligibility (for himself) in respect of ritual. He who is not fit (to understand such a eligibility), how can he be an agent or (even) an eligible person?

It may be said that though the truth is ascertained, activity conditioned by error is seen to continue; for example, though it is known for certain that sugar is sweet, yet there is the continued experience of bitter taste for him whose sense is affected by bile, for he tastes sugar, spits it out and thus abandons it. Hence, there is the observance of ritual because of the continuance of the impressions of Nescience; and its destruction by that to which knowledge is the auxiliary will therefore be intelligible. Nor may it be asked: "How can ritual, itself of the nature of Nescience, destroy Nescience? And of its destroyer, ritual, whence the destruction?" For, instances are extensively seen of entities which destroy themselves and others of the same class as themselves; for example, (goat's) milk digests itself and other milk, poison cures other poison as well as itself, the dust of the clearing-nut mixed with muddy water precipitates both itself and the mud and makes the water clear; even so, ritual, though of the nature of Nescience, drives away other Nescience and itself departs.

To this it is said: true; through frequently repeated texts beginning with "Existence alone, this was in the beginning, dear one" and ending with "That thou art," as aided by Brahman-inquiry, there is the dawn of true indubitable knowledge of the inner self, as different from the bodies etc., the material
निद्रासा

पद्मान: कर्मस्वभावसशरीरतमहंति। अनेहस्व न कथं कर्ती वाधिकृतता वा।

यदृच्छ्येत निष्ठितेऽपि तत्स्वे सिद्धान्तसन्विक्षणो व्यवहारभूतवर्तमानो दृष्टये, यथा गुड्रश्य माधृये-
विनिस्मर्येऽपि पितोऽपि हेतुप्रत्यायाणां तिक्तवादभासानुवृत्ति:, आर्थाच्य शृदूक्ताय लागात्। तस्माद्रविद्यासंसर-
कारातुःस्वा कर्मनुभावम्, तेन च विद्यासहकारिणात
तत्समुखेद्व उपस्थये। न च—कर्माविद्यासंसर
कथ्यमविद्यासंसरित्निभि, कर्मो वा तदुच्छेदकय
कृत उच्छेद:—हि वाच्यम, सजातियस्वपवि
विरोधिनां भावानां कहुःमुपलग्व्ये:। यथा पयः
पत्रोत्स्तरं जर्यति स्वयं च जीर्यति, यथा
विश्वासरं शास्त्रस्वयं च शास्त्रस्वयं च
यथा च व्रजन्तरो रजोज्ञ्नताराविले पाथसि
प्रक्षितं रजोज्ञ्नतारणि भिन्तत्व विधमोपि भिद्मानादानालिं पाथ: करोति, एवं कर्माविद्यासंसरकारणी
अविद्यासंसराण्यमस्मितु विधमप्रा्ग्यमासि
तीति।

अन्तःस्वप्ने—सत्यम्; ‘सद्वा सोम्येदमप्र
आसीत्’ इत्युपकमालु ‘तत्त्वसि’ इत्यंताच्छेदा-
इद्धमीमांसोपकरणादसक्तुद्ध्यात्मानन्ति सूक्तार्थश्रव्यात्मकं विश्लेषणं जाते
द्रव्यवितरणं देहाथतिरिक्तं प्रत्यागतामतस्वाबोधे जाते।
पि अविद्यासंकारानुवृत्त्यानुवर्तते सांसारिकः।
प्रत्यागतहयवहारश्र, तथापि तान्यप्यं व्यवहार
प्रत्यागमनमिहायति मन्यमानो विद्यान न श्रद्धाना,
पिन्नमहतेन्द्रिय इव गुणं शृतक्षुब्ल्य लज्जापि तत्र
तिरक्ताम् । तथा चायं क्रियाकृतिके तिरितके
व्यतावतिष्ठानं विशिष्टार्थश्रव्यात्मकं विनिधिन्वन वर्धमानं
कथमधिकृतो नाम। विदुषो हाथिकरं। अन्यथा
पशुध्रुद्रार्द्धानामपि अविद्यारो दुर्वारः। स्यात।
क्रियाकृतिधिस्तृष्णुपविभागं च विद्यान्मान इह
विद्यान्मृतलं: कर्मकाण्डे। अत एव भगवान
विनिधिष्ठयतं शास्त्रस्य शास्त्रायं भाष्यकः।
तस्मात्वा राजगतीयाभिमानिकतृती कर्मसूये
न विप्रवैश्यातीयाभिमानिकर्तरं भाष्यकाः।
एवं हि-जातिकृत्वा क्रियाकरणादिद्विभागाभिमानिकायूं गति
न तदनाभिमानिनोभधिविक। न चानिथिकृतेन
समेतेनापि कृतं वैदिकं कर्मं फलायं कल्पेन,
वैश्यस्तोम इव ग्राहणराजन्यायापि। तेन दष्टार्थं
cause of which is beginningless Nescience; in spite of this, there is the continuance of notions of transmigrations and consequent empirical usage, because of the continuance of the impressions of Nescience; yet, the wise one, who holds these empirical usages and notions to be fictitious, does not have faith in them, just as he whose sense is affected by bile does not have faith in the bitterness of sugar, though he spits it out and abandons it. And thus, one who has ascertained that the totality of act, agent, means, modus operandi and fruit is not real, how can he be eligible to act? He who knows them (to be real), he, verily, is the eligible one. Else, it would be difficult to avoid the eligibility even of beasts, śūdras etc. In the section treating of ritual, he who knows the varieties of act, agent etc. is considered to be the man who knows. Hence it is that the revered commentator describes the sacred teaching as having reference to one characterised by Nescience. Therefore, just as in respect of the rājasūya to be performed by those who have the conceit of belonging to the caste of kings, there is no eligibility for those who have the conceit of belonging to the brahmin or vaisya caste, even so in respect of ritual to be performed by those who have the conceit of distinctions like double birth, agent, act, means etc., there is no eligibility for those who have no such conceit. Nor is the Vaidic ritual, performed by one, ineligible though skilled, capable of bearing fruit, any more than the vaisyastoma performed by brahmins or kṣatriyas. Therefore, in respect of rites which have a visible result, he who has capacity and engages therein
may obtain the fruit, that being seen. In respect of rites with an invisible result, however, the fruit which is known only from the sacred teaching cannot go to him who is not eligible; hence, ritual is not required in the performance of contemplation.

Be this so. Just as, in respect of prescribed acts the eligibility for which includes the conceit of being human, there is no eligibility for one devoid of that conceit, even so, in respect of prohibitions, on the ground that those who are eligible are (those that have the conceit of being) human, there would be no eligibility for those devoid of that conceit, as in the case of beasts etc. Hence, such a person observing what is prohibited would not incur sin, any more than the lower animals; thus would result the transgression of the law. (To this objection we reply) not so. This one (who attains realisation even in the present life) is not wholly devoid of the conceit that he is human; rather does that conceit continue in him in slight traces, through the continuance of the impressions of Nescience. It has been said that, considering what continues to be illusory, he has no faith in it (as real). What follows therefrom if this be so? This follows therefrom. He who has faith in prescriptions is eligible, not he who has no faith. Hence, he who has no faith in the conceit of being human etc., is not eligible in respect of the sacred teaching of prescriptions. Hence too the traditional Code says "The oblation or gift offered without faith," etc. The sacred teaching of prohibitions, however, does not stand in need of faith; it functions, rather, only in
कर्मसु शक्त: प्रवर्त्तमान: प्रामोहुतं फलम्,
द्यत्वात्। अद्दश्येपु तु शाख्कजसमधिकस्यं
फलमनधिकारिणि न युज्यते इति नोपातनकार्यं
कमिपिक्षा।

स्यादेतात्। मनुष्याधिमानवदृढिकारि कर्मसु
विहिते यथा तदमिनानरहितस्याधिकारः;,
एवं निपेधविधियोधपि मनुष्याधिकारा इति तदमिनानरहितलोकसूपि नाधिकिरितेन पथादिविन्; तथा
चायं निष्र्दमनुहितन न प्रस्वेयानु तिर्यगादिविदिति भिन्नकर्मेतपात:। भैवम्। न खल्वयं
sर्वथा मनुष्याधिमानरहितः, किं तविचासंस्करानु
बुज्याया मात्राया तदमिनानोदलुतते। अनुवर्तमानं
च मित्येति मन्यमानो न श्रद्धा इत्यत्म।
किमतो यथेपम्? एतदतो भवति—विविष्णु
श्राद्धोधिकारिनाथास्य।। तत्तथ मनुष्याधिमाने
nश्रद्धाध्यानो न विविदशाख्लेषिणिक्रियते। तथा
च स्मृति—

'अश्रुद्धया हुतं द्रतम्'—
इत्यादिका। निपेधशाखं तु न श्रद्धामपेक्षते।
अपि तु निषिद्ध्यामानक्रियोन्मुखो नर इत्येव प्रवत्तिते।
तथा च सांसारिक इव श्रद्धागतः क्षत्रपिपो
निषेधमतिक्रम्य प्रवर्तितमान: प्रत्यवैतीति न
भिन्नकर्मेदर्शनाभ्युपगमः। तस्माच्चोपासनाया:
कार्ये कर्मथिक्षा।

अतं एव नोपासनोपत्राचपि; निर्विचिकित्सानां
शान्तज्ञानोपत्रुत्तरकालमनविकार: कर्मीन्नुत्तमः।
तथा च श्रुति:—

‘न कर्मणान्द्राण्या धनेन
ल्यागेनके अमृतत्वमानशः।’

इति।
तत्किमिदानीमनुष्योग एव सर्वेऽह कर्मणां?
तथा च ’विविधिषिन्त यज्ञेन’ इत्यादा: श्रुतयो
विरःध्येये। न, आराद्धकारकत्वात्कर्मणां यज्ञा-
दीनामू। तथा हि—ततेतमालानं वेदानुवचनेन
नित्यशाख्यायेन, शाहण्ण विविधिषिन्त, वेदितु-
मिच्छन्ति, न तु विद्विन्ति। वस्तुत: प्रधानस्यापि
वेदनस्य प्रकृत्यथर्थं साध्वतो गुणत्वात्, इच्छायाथ
प्रख्यार्थस्यात्या प्राधान्यात्, प्रधानेन च कार्यस्यप्रत्य-
respect of a human being who directs himself to a forbidden act. Hence, even he, who has apprehended the truth about Brahman with faith, as much as he who is bound in the migratory cycle, incurs sin by acting in transgression of prohibitions; therefore, there is not the acceptance of a doctrine involving the transgression of the law. Hence, contemplation does not require ritual in respect of its effect.

Hence too (it is) not (required) even in respect of the origination of contemplation; (for), it has been said that there is no eligibility for ritual after the generation of indubitable knowledge through verbal testimony. Thus too Scripture says: "Not by ritual nor by off-spring nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone do they enjoy immortality."

Are these rites then entirely without any use here? Then would texts like "They seek to know by sacrifice" be contradicted. No (we reply), for, rites like sacrifice are remote auxiliaries. It is thus: that self, by study of the Veda, i.e., by constant study of one's own Veda, the brahmins seek to know, i.e., they desire to know, not that they do know. Though in fact knowledge is primary (as compared with the desire therefor), yet, since in the word, it is the meaning of the stem (as compared with the suffix), it is subsidiary, while desire, being the meaning of the suffix, is primary; and activity relates to what is primary. When one says "Bring the king's man," one does not, verily, bring the king, who,
though primary in fact, is yet subsidiary in the word, as the qualification of "man," but that which is primary in the word, i.e., the man himself. Thus, of sacrifice, as of the study of the Veda, there is prescription as the means to desire. So too of the austerity, which consists in not eating. Not eating as and how one desires, that alone is austerity. He who eats what is good and pure in moderation, in him indeed, there is desire to know Brahman, not in one who never eats, as the latter will but die. Nor does austerity consist in the observance of fasts like the Cāndrāyāṇa since, for that kind of person, disturbance of the equilibrium of humours will result.

The obligatory rites purify the person by destroying sins (already) incurred. Thus too Scripture says: "He, verily, is the ātmayājīn (one who pleases the self) who knows 'by this is purified this part (body) of mine, by this is my body made to grow.'" The words "by this" refer to the sacrifice etc. of the context. The traditional Code too says: "He for whom there have been these forty and eight purificatory ceremonies (sacrifice being included among them)." The following Ātharvaṇa text too shows the rise of knowledge, only in that ignorant person of purified intellect in whom the desire to know has arisen through the attrition of impurities by the observance of rites, obligatory and occasioned: "Being of purified intellect, he, then, sees the partless (Brahman) through contemplation." The traditional Code too says: "Knowledge arises in persons from the consumption of sin through
याता न हि 'राजपुरुषमानय' इत्यूके वस्तुः प्रधानोपि राजा पुरुषविशेषणतया शरदत उपसर्जन आनीयते, अपि तु पुरुष एव, शरद्वस्तस्तस्त सर्वाधान्यात्। एवं वेदान्तवचनस्ये यज्ञस्यापि दाहसाधनतया विधानम्। एवं तपसोल्याशकस्य। कामानशासनेव तप:; हितमितीमेच्याशिनो हि त्राहणि विविधिषा भवति, न तु सर्वत्र अनश्वतः, मरणात्। नापि चान्द्रा-णादि तप:, तच्चीखरः धातुवैष्ठ्यापन्ते।

एतानि च नित्यानि उपाधुरितिनिवर्त्ये पुरुष संकुचितत। तथा च श्रुतिः—'स ह वा आत्मायाः यो वेद इदं मेदनेनाञ्च संकित्यत इदं मेदनेनाञ्च सुप्तीयते' इति। अनेनेति प्रकृतं यज्ञादि परामुक्तिः। स्मृतिः—'यस्येतेदया-चतवारिविख्यातिरस्ततः' इति। नित्यानेमितिकानुरुधान-प्रकृतिपद्मपथ्य च विकृष्टसत्वस्याधिकार एव उपचनिविद्विश्व ज्ञानोत्पत्ति दृष्टियार्थ्यायणी श्रुति:—

'............ विकृष्टसत्त्व-स्ततस्ततुं तं विश्वत निष्कर्तं ध्यायमानः' इति।
निष्ठासा

स्मृतिक्षः ‘ज्ञानसुपथ्य पुस्तानं क्षयात्पापस्य कर्मणां’ इत्यादिकः। कश्चतेनेव च नित्यानां कर्मेण नित्यनित्याहितनोपात्यनुदिनित्यिनिवर्षेण पुरूषसंस्कारं ज्ञानोपात्यन्त्रभावोपपत्ति न संयोगपूण्यक्तीवेण साक्षादक्रममो युक्तः, कल्पनागौरवापपते। तथाहि—नित्यकर्मणामुनुषानागीर्मोद्यादः; तत: पापमा निवर्तते; स हि अनित्याश्चिदुःकर्मेण संसारे नित्यशुचिमुक्त्वच्चित्तमृत्तत्स्मृत्तैण्विशेषेन चित्तसत्तं मिलनयति; अत: पापनिर्व्रताः प्रत्यक्षोपपति-दरापापरणें सति प्रत्यक्षोपपतिभ्यं संसारस्य अनित्याश्चिदुःस्वरूपस्यमप्रत्यूहमवृत्त्ये; ततोज्ज्य अस्मित्तन्मित्तिसंस्य सैरामयमुपज्यते; ततस्तत्जिहासोपचरते; ततो हानोपायं पर्यंते; पर्यंपमान-श्राद्धत्वम्यान्यमस्याय प्रति चित्तसचचुद्ग्यथा कर्मणां युक्तम्। इममेवाद्वमकुवद्विति भगवदीता—
‘आरूक्षोपुनस्य यों कर्म कारणमुच्यते।’ योगारुढस्य सत्येव शास्त्र: कारणमुच्यते’। इति।
rites" etc. It is settled that obligatory rites destroy incurred sin and thereby purify the person; when the subsidiariness of obligatory rites to the generation of knowledge is thus intelligible, it is not proper to make out direct subsidiariness by the principle of two-in-oneness, as that would lead to prolixity of assumptions. It is thus: from the observance of obligatory rites merit is generated; thence sin ceases; it is that (sin) which makes impure the sattva, i.e., the intellect, through errors of the nature of the cognition of eternity, purity, pleasure etc., in the migratory cycle, which by nature is transient, impure and miserable; hence, on the cessation of sin, the door of perception and reasoning being opened, one knows unhindered the impermanence, impurity and misery of the migratory cycle, through perception and inference; thence arises renunciation consisting in non-attachment thereto; thence grows the desire to remove it; thence one seeks the means to remove it; hearing that knowledge of the true nature of the self is the means to be sought, one desires to know that; thence, in the order of hearing (study) etc., one knows it. Thus, it stands to reason that rites are remote auxiliaries in respect of the generation of knowledge, through the purification of sattva, i.e., the intellect. This same sense is repeated in the Bhagavadgītā "For the silent one who wants to achieve yoga, ritual is said to be the cause; for him who has achieved yoga, equanimity is said to be the cause".
This being so, he, who, though not performing rites, is yet of purified intellect, because of rites performed in a prior existence, and has non-attachment generated in him through the realisation of the essential worthlessness of the migratory cycle, for him there is no need for the observance of ritual which serves to bring about non-attachment, that having resulted even through the observance of ritual in a prior existence. It is with reference to such foremost among men that Scripture sets out: "Or, if otherwise, let him renounce even from the student's order of life." That is here said: "even prior" to the knowledge of ritual "desire to know Brahman is intelligible in respect of one who has studied the Vedanta." Hence it is, that for one in the student's order of life, there are no obligations for the discharge of which rites would have to be performed. In conformity with this, the statement "He who is born a brahmin is born with three obligations" should be explained as relating to those who become house-holders. Otherwise the Scripture "Or, if otherwise, from the student's order of life" would be contradicted. The discharge of obligations, even by the house-holder, is only for the purification of the intellect. The statements about what is prescribed when one dies of old age, about being reduced to ashes and about the final rite (antyeṣṭi)" relate to those ignorant ones who are inertly fixed in the observance of ritual, not to those learned ones who know the true self. Hence, the word atha connotes immediate succession to that, in the absence of which
जिज्ञासा

एवं न अनुशिष्ठितकर्मोपि प्रागभवीयकर्मवशात् यो विशुद्धसङ्क ध्वनी व श्रवणसंविप्रायम् निष्प्रायायम् कृतं तत्स्य कर्मानुपश्चात् च वैराग्योविदाऽप्रयोगिना, प्रागभवीयकर्मानुपश्चात् तत्सिद्धि:। इमेव न पुहुण्डोयोक्त्वमेवाधिकृत्य प्रवर्त्ते श्रुति:—‘यदि वेतरथा वहाचर्येदेव प्रवजेत्’ इति।

तदिन्दुरुप्तम्, कर्मच्छोभात्, प्रागप्यथोते-दान्तस्य व्रजजिज्ञासोपपत्तेरिति। अत् एव न वहाचरिण ऋणानि सन्ति येन तदपराकरणार्थ कर्मानुपश्चिद्धि। इति षड्यापायु जयमानो वै व्रजजिज्ञासंस्क्रियेणवा जयते’ इति गृहस्थः संपत्धमान इति व्यास्येयम्। अन्यथा ‘यदि वेतरथा वहाचर्येदेव’ इति श्रुतिसिद्धि।

गृहस्थपायु पि ऋणापकरण सत्त्वशुद्धचर्थेमेव। जारामयवादो भस्मान्तवादोडोषीयेयश्च कर्म-ज्ञानविदुष: प्रति, न त्तामतत्तच्चविदः पपंतितान।

तस्मात्स्यान्तरान्तरम्यथशश्चायथे: यद्विना वहाजिज्ञासा न भवति यस्मिस्तु सति भवति भवतेव।
जिहासा

न चेतं कर्मविवोधः। तस्माच कर्मविवोधानन्तरयमवालोषवादार्थः इति सर्वमवादातमः।

स्यादेतत्। मा भूदभिषोदशन्यवागूपकवादार्थः क्रमः; श्रौतसु भविष्यति; ‘गृही भूतवा वनी भवेत्
वनी भूतवा प्रवेशत्’ इति जावलश्रुतिगृहितश्च ।

हि यज्ञाचतुरं सूचयिते। स्मरन्ति च—
‘अधीय विधिवेद्वेदापूर्णश्रोताधर्मः।’
इत्र च शक्तितो यज्ञनो मोक्षे निवेदयेत्।’
इति। निद्वलिति च—

‘अनधीय हि जो वेदान्नुतपाय तथावजनाः।

अनिष्टा चैव यज्ञश मोक्षमिच्चन्नज्ञयथः।’
इति; आह—यथा च हृदयाधवदानानामान्तरयनियममः। कुत्?
‘हृदयश्वास्वत्वति
अथ जिहाया अथ वक्षः।’ इत्यथश्वादवाय

कस्मात् विविक्षतवात्। न तथेह कमो विवक्षितः;

श्रुत्या तथवान्तरसमतिनियमस्य दर्शितवात्, ‘यदि

वेतरथा वहचयायदैव प्रक्रज्ञेद्वाहा वनाहा।’
इति। एततवता हि वैराग्यमुपलक्ष्यति।
there would be no desire to know Brahman, and in the presence of which that (desire) certainly becomes existent. Nor is knowledge of ritual of this nature. It is, therefore, clear that the word *atha* does not here signify immediate succession to the knowledge of ritual.

Be this so. Let it not be that any sequence is settled by the sense (*artha*), as in the performance of the *aṇiḥhotra* and the preparation of the barley-gruel (therefor); but there is a sequence settled by direct statement (*sruti*; here, the *-ktva* suffix); the following Jābala text “having become a house-holder, one is to become a forest-dweller; having become a forest-dweller, one is to renounce,” verily, indicates the observance of sacrifice etc., by the term “house-holder”. There is also the traditional Code (to this effect): “Having studied the Vedas according to rule, having procreated sons in the manner laid down by Religious Duty, having performed sacrifices to the best of one’s ability, one is to set one’s mind on release.” There are also words of censure like: “The twice-born one who, without having studied the Vedas, procreated progeny and offered up sacrifices, desires release goes down below.” (To this the commentator) says: “And there is the rule of immediate succession in respect of the cutting of the heart” etc. Whence (is this rule)? (The text reads): “One should cut the heart *first, then* the tongue, *then* the sides.” Here, the sequence is intended to be declared by the words *first* and *then*. No such sequence is intended to be declared in the present case, for, the absence of a rule (of succession) is shown later, even by the same Scriptural text: “Or, if otherwise, one is to renounce even from the student’s order of life or from the householder’s or from the forest-dweller's.” By all this,
nonattachment is indicated (as essential). Hence it is that Scripture says: "The day on which there is non-attachment, that very day one is to renounce." The words of censure have in view the person of impure intellect. He of impure intellect desiring release but not setting about the means thereto, because of laziness, verily, fails to observe even the obligatory and occasioned rites characteristic of the house-holder's life, and goes on the downward path with his (load of) sin increasing every instant; this is the sense.

Be this so. Let it be that there is no sequence either by direct statement or by sense; why should there not be a sequence authorised by the text (pāṭha), the position (sthāna) the principal (mukhya) or procedure (pravṛtti)? To this he says: "for, there is no authority for the relationship of subsidiary and principal." Between subsidiaries, like the samit sacrifice, and principal rites, like the āgneya, which are known to contribute towards a single result, which are defined by a single result, which are comprehended by a single procedural text, which are to be performed by a single eligible person, and which are related to the same period—full or new moon, sequence results of necessity, because of the impossibility of their simultaneous performance; and since it is necessary to determine the particular kind of sequence, text, (position) etc. are capable of fixing the variety thereof. Where, however, there is no relationship of subsidiary and principal, nor even definition by a single eligible person, as in the case of the saurya, aryaman, prājāpatya and other such rites, there is no need for any particular sequence; and, hence, text etc. are of no authority as fixing a particular sequence, though some (particular sequence) is
अत एव "यदहोव विरेष्टदहरेव प्रवजेत्" इति श्रुति:। निन्दावचनं च अविश्वसनं यक्ष्याभिमानं। अविश्वसनं हि मोक्ष-मिन्ध्राःःत्स्याचुदपार्वतीयम् प्रवर्त्यमानो गृहस्थाधिकोपि नित्यनैन्नित्यिकमनाचारान्तित्यक्षणसुपचीयमानपापा अ-धोगंति गंभीतिवर्यः:।

स्यादेवतः। मा भूषप्रीत आर्थो वा क्रमः। पाठ-स्थानमुल्यप्रत्रतिप्रमाणकर्तु कस्मात् भवतीत्यत आह—शेषोपेशि वेमाणभावात्। शेषणं समिदारीनां शेषणं चारभयादीनां एकक्षत्वदुपकारो-पनिमधानां एकक्षत्वचित्त्वानां एकक्षत्वचनोप-गृहीतानां एकाधिकारिकृत्त्वानां एक्षोपर्णमायस्यमा-वायकालसंविधानां युगपदेनुष्णानाशके:; सामर्थ्य-तक्षितपातं तहिरोपेशिकायों पाठायवस्त्तेदेनियमाय प्रभवति:। यत्र तु न शेषोपेशिभव: नापेक्षाधिकार-रावचेः: यथा सौर्ययङ्ग्राजापत्यादीनां, तत्र कमेवदपेशाभावात् पाठादि: कमवेशोपनिहे प्रमाणम्, अर्बन्तीयत्या तथ तत्थ्रावगमतवात्।
न चेह धर्मज्ञानज्ञास्योः शेषशोषिभावे
शृष्टिदीनामन्यतमं प्रभाणयमस्तिति।

नन्दु शेषशोषिभावाभावापि क्रमणयमो दृष्टः यथा
गोदोहनस्य पुरुषार्थस्य दार्शिपौर्णमातिकैरकःः सह,
यथा या ‘दार्शिपौर्णमात्याभ्यामिष्टा सोमेन यजेत्’
इति दार्शिपौर्णमात्यासोमयोरशेषशोषिणोरितल आह—
अधिक्षताधिकारे वा प्रभाणाभावात्—इति
योजना। स्वर्गकामस्य हि दार्शिपौर्णमात्याधिकृतस्य
पशुकामस्य सतो दार्शिपौर्णमात्यादर्शभ्यानाथिते
गोदोहने अधिकारः। नो खलु गोदोहन—
दार्शिकापियमाणं साक्षात्शुचं भावयितमहि। न
च व्यापारान्तरविष मूले यतस्तदृशकमतिपि
तेतु; अप्रणयनाथितं तु तत्रतितये, ‘चमसेनापः
प्रणेघोदोहनेन पशुकामस्य’ इति समभियाहारातूः
गोध्वत्वाच्यापां प्रणयं प्रति। तस्मात्तक्तालिकार्थीप्रणयनाथितवाहोदोहनस्य
तत्क्रमेन पुरुषार्थमपि
गोदोहनं क्रमवदिति सिद्धम। श्रृतिनिराकरणेनैव
इष्टसमक्षमवदृपि क्रमोपास्तो वैदित्यः।
unavoidably understood (because of the impossibility of pronouncing all three at the same time). Nor is there any authority such as direct statement or the like for a relationship of subsidiary and principal, as between the desire to know Religious Duty and the desire to know Brahman.

Now, there is seen a rule of sequence, even where there is no relationship of subsidiary and principal, as in the case of the milk-pail (godohana), which secures a human goal, in relation to the subsidiaries of the darsapūrṇamāsa sacrifice, or as in the case of the darsapūrṇamāsa and the soma sacrifice mentioned in "Having performed the darsapūrṇamāsa, one should perform the soma sacrifice," which do not stand in the relationship of subsidiary and principal. To this he says: since there is no authority even for the relationship "of eligibility of the person (already) eligible": this is the construction. It is for the person who, as desiring heaven, is eligible for the darsapūrṇamāsa, that, as desiring cattle, there is eligibility for the milk-pail in connection with the water-sprinkling, a subsidiary of the darsapūrṇamāsa rite. The milk-pail is not, indeed, capable of producing cattle directly without operating in some way. Nor is there Scriptural mention of its entering into any other operation, in which case it would fall outside the order of subsidiaries of that (darsapūrṇamāsa). It does, however, appear as dependent on the water-sprinkling rite, because of its contiguity thereto in "With a cup one is to sprinkle water; with the milk-pail, one who desires cattle," and because of the suitability of that for the sprinkling of water. Hence, because of the dependence of the milk-pail on the watersprinkling, which is a subsidiary to the sacrifice, it is
There is also difference in the fruit and the object of the desire to know. Prosperity is the fruit of the knowledge of Religious Duty, and it depends on observance; but the knowledge of Brahman has beatitude as its fruit; and it does not depend on any other

concluded that, though contributory (only) to a human goal, it belongs to a sequence, through the sequence of that (subsidiary). Such sequence as exists between the soma (sacrifice) and the īṣti (darsaṇamāsa) should be known to have been refuted (in its application to the present case), even by the refutation of direct statement.

Even if the relationship of subsidiary and principal or the eligibility of the person eligible be absent, sequence may be intended, when defined by the same result, as among the six sacrificial rites—āgneya etc.—all defined by the one end, attainment of heaven; or, if Religious Duty be a part of the Brahman desired to be known, then, just as sequence is intended among the four chapters of the Brahma-sūtras, each of which treats of some aspect of the Brahman taught in all the four, which are mutually related by the non-difference of that which is desired to be known, even so, here too, sequence may be intended as between the desires to know Religious Duty and Brahman, because of being objects of a single desire to know. And neither of these (conditions) is here present; thus he says: There is also difference in the fruit and the object of the desire to know.” He analyses the difference in the fruit: “Prosperity is the fruit of the knowledge of Religious Duty.” Since the desire to know is in fact dependent on knowledge (as its content), the
फलजिज्ञासयभेदाच। अभ्यदयफलं धर्मज्ञानम्, तथानुधानापेक्षम्; निश्चयसफलं तु ब्रह्मज्ञानम्, न चानुधानान्तरपेक्षम्।

शेषोष्पेशिवाक्रस्ताधिकारानुसृतं क्रमो विवेचयेत यथोक्ततानुवचेतो भवेत्, यथाक्षेत्रे दृष्टीनां पणामेकस्वरगविलावचिंड्राञ्च। यदि व जिज्ञासय्रहणं: अंशो धर्मः स्थात, यथा चतुर्भुजक्षणीव्युत्पादं ब्रह्म केनचित्तेनचं रोकः लक्षणोऽद्यते, तत्र चतुर्भुजो लक्षणानां जिज्ञासयभेदेन परस्परसंबंधे सति क्रमो विवक्षितः; तथेहेकजिज्ञासयतया धर्मव्रहणोऽजिज्ञासयोः क्रमो विवेचयेत्; न चैतुदय-मय्यस्तीलह—फलजिज्ञासयभेदाच। फलभेदं विभजते—अभ्यदयफलं धर्मज्ञानमू हि। जिज्ञासयाः वस्तुतो ज्ञानतत्त्तवात् ज्ञानफलं जिज्ञासा-फलमिति भावः। न केवलं त्वरत्नः फलभेदः.
भव्यश्र धर्मो जिज्ञास्यो न ज्ञानकालेःस्ति, पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रतवात्। इह तु भूतं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं नित्यवृत्ततवात् पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम्। चोदनाप्रक्षतिमेदाघि। या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणम्, सा स्विषये नियुक्तानेव पुरुषमवोधयति। ब्रह्मचोदनां तु पुरुषमवोधयत्वेव केवलम्; अवबोधयस्य चोदनाजन्यत्वात् पुरुषोवोधेन नियुज्यते। यथा असार्थसनिकेन्द्रणार्थवोधेः, तद्भव।

तदुपद्धातिप्रकारमेदाघी। केवल इत्यह—तच्चानुश्रानापेक्षम्। ब्रह्मज्ञानं च नानुश्रानार्थपेक्षम्। शान्तज्ञानाभ्यसाचानुश्रानार्थपेक्षेः, नित्यनैमिनिककर्मानुश्रानसहभावश्य अपारत्वात्—िति भावः।

जिज्ञासमेदमात्यतिनिकमह—भव्यश्र धर्मं इति। भविता भव्यः; कर्तीर कृत्यः।
observance. Religious Duty, the object of the desire to know, has to come into existence, and does not exist at the time of knowing, because it is dependent on the activity of the person. But here the object of the desire to know is the existent Brahman, which, being eternally existent, does not depend on human activity. There is also difference in the operation of the text. That text, which defines Religious Duty, instructs a person only by engaging him in an activity. The text dealing with Brahman, however, merely instructs the person; since the knowledge is to be produced from the text, the person is not directed (to activity) in respect of knowledge. As in the case of the knowledge of an object produced from the contact of the sense-organ with the object, so (is it here).

words "fruit of knowledge" mean "fruit of the desire to know": that is the idea. Nor is the difference of fruit one of nature alone; there is difference even in the way in which they are brought about; hence he says: "and it depends on observance." The knowledge of Brahman does not need any other observance, except the continued repetition of knowledge from verbal testimony, for, the co-presence of rites, obligatory or occasioned, has already been refuted: this is the idea.

He states the wholesale difference in the objects desired to be known: "Religious Duty ... has to come into existence" etc. Bhavyah is "what has to come into existence"; the kṛtya termination signifies the agent (of the action)."
What comes into existence has to be brought about by the operation of an operator, is dependent on that, and is hence non-existent prior to that, i.e., when it is known. What exists is true; it is invariably real, not unreal at any time; this is the meaning. The difference between the objects desired to be known is not merely because of their nature, but also because of differences in the operation of the respective means which convey knowledge of them. Thus, he says: "There is also a difference in the operation of the text."

The term *cudanā* here signifies Scriptural text (not merely an injunctive text), the general being secondarily implied by what denotes the particular. He analyses the difference in operation thus: "That text which defines Religious Duty" etc. In Scripture, which is of non-human origin, there is no room for commands etc., which are expressions of different forms of the human will; hence *cudanā* here means teaching. Hence it is said "The means of knowing that (dharma) is teaching." And that (teaching) relates to bhāvanā, i.e., human operations that are taught by itself, and also to the content thereof, i.e., sacrifice etc.; sacrifice etc. are the content of bhāvanā, since the operation consisting in effort is determined in dependence on that (sacrifice etc.), and since the word *viṣaya* (content) is derived from the root *ṣīṅ*, to bind (so that the content is what the effort is bound to). (Scripture) makes known Religious Duty such as sacrifice etc., only as directing a person to them as means subserving his desires, through making known that operations and, through their channel, sacrifices are instrumental to what is desired; not otherwise (does Scripture function). The teaching about Brahman, however, merely instructs the person, but does not instruct him as directing him to activity. Why?
भविता च भावक्यापार्निवृत्येत्या तत्त्व
इति ततः प्राग्न्यानकाले नासातित्यथः।
भूतम्, सत्यम्; सदेकान्तसं,
न कदाचिदं
दित्यथः। न केवलं स्वरूपतो ज्ञात्याययोदेशः,
ज्ञापक्ष्रियणप्रवृत्तिभेदादपि भेद इत्याह—
चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदादम्य। चोदनेति वैदिकं
रश्मूमाः, विशेषेन सामान्यस्य लक्षणानि।
प्रवृत्तिभेदं विभजते—या हि चोदना धर्मस्य
इति। आज्जादनां पुरुषाभिमिश्रयेदानामसंभवतात्
अपौलेये बेदेचोदनोपदेशः। अतुपुरुषस्म—
‘तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः’ इति। सा च स्वसाध्ये
पुरुषक्यापारं भावानं तदिष्ये च यागादौः।
स हि भावाविषयः, तद्धीर्म्यनिरूपणत्वात्
प्रयत्नस्य भावानाः, ‘षिन् कर्यने’ इत्यस्मात्
धानोपितस्यपदविपुलस्य। भावायारःतवृद्धारोऽहि
च यागादिरपश्चिमोपायतामवगमयती तत्वेऽविषयासुखिने
पुरुषं नियुक्तानेत्र यागादिचित्रम्मर्मवोधयति नान्यथा।
चोदनास्ते तु पुरुषमवोधयते न केवलं न तु
प्रवर्त्यन्त्यवोधोभयति। कुः॥ अतवोधस्य प्रवृत्तिः-
रहितस्य चोदनाज्ञन्यतात्।

ननु ‘आत्मा ज्ञाति,’ इत्येवर्धिंशिरीवेन्द्रातः।
तद्वेग्वायत्यावभोगे प्रवृत्तप्रक्षिपे पुरुषो ब्रह्माव-
कल्यात् इति समानथं धर्मं चोदनाभिभवेऽचोदनानाम-
मित्यत आह्—न पुरुषोऽवभोभे नियुक्त्यते॥

अयमभिसंधि:—न तात्रहसाक्रामकारे पुरुषो नियोजन्त्वः;
तस्य ब्रह्मस्वाध्ययनं नित्यतात्
अकार्यतात्। नायपुस्मायाम्,
तस्या अशि प्रकः हेतुभावस्यान्यश्चिरेरकसिद्धतया
प्रास्तनाविभेयतात्। नापि शाब्दवेधे,
तस्याय-धीतेदस्य पुरुषस्य विद्वितपदतदयस्य समधि-
गतशाब्दवायत्तत्तचायायत्तूहुमुस्ते:। अश्रैव द्यान-
न्तमाह—यथाक्ष्यः इति। दार्पीतिको योज-
यति—तद्भवु इति। अफि चातमज्ञानविधिपरेषु
बेदानेतु नात्सत्तचायविनिधश्: शाब्दः स्यात्।
न ग्नि तदा आत्मतत्त्वफरस्ते, किं तु तत्तज्ञान-
विभिषिपरा:, यथपरश्च ते त एव तेषामथर्भ।॥
Because knowledge free from the direction to activity is produced by the teaching.

Now, it may be said: a person is taught Brahman by Vedânta texts like "The self is to be known," which purport to be injunctive, only by directing him to the knowing activity, because of syntactical unity with that (apparently injunctive text); hence, there is similarity of the teaching of Brahman to the teaching of Religious Duty. To this he says: "the person is not directed (to activity) in respect of the knowledge."

This is what is intended: a person is not to be directed (to activity) in respect of the intuition of Brahman, for, that, being of the nature of Brahman, is eternal and not to be produced; nor in respect of contemplation, for, that being established, through observation of co-presence and co-absence, to be the cause of excellence in knowledge, cannot be the object of an injunction; nor in respect of knowledge through verbal testimony, since that too arises unhindered in him who has studied the Vedas, knows the words and their senses, and understands the true principles governing knowledge gained through verbal testimony. As an example of this same he says: "as in the case of the knowledge of an object produced from the contact of the sense organ with the object." He links up what is illustrated, in the words: "so (is it here)." Further, in those Vedânta texts, whose purport is to enjoin knowledge of the self, the ascertainment of the true nature of the self cannot be knowledge gained from verbal testimony; for, their purport would then be not the true nature of the self, but injunctions to the knowledge thereof. That which is their purport, that, verily, is
Therefore, something has to be stated, in immediate succession to which the desire to know Brahman is taught. This is the statement: discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal; non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruit here or hereafter; possession in abundance of calmness, equanimity and other such means; and desire for release. Where, indeed, these exist, even prior to a desire to know Religious Duty, and after that too, it is possible to desire to know Brahman and also to know; not in their absence. Therefore, by the word "then" is taught "immediate succession" to possession in abundance of the means stated before.

their significance. Nor does ascertainment of the true nature of what is taught result even from that, the purport of which is something else, on the ground that knowledge depends on what is known and stands in need of it; for, this (dependence) is intelligible even through superimposition (i.e., the knowledge need not be of the true nature of what is known). Hence it is settled that the Vedânta has not for purport an injunction to knowledge.

The present topic is concluded thus: "Therefore, something has to be stated" etc. That in the absence of which there would be no desire to know Brahman, that in the presence of which, however, that (desire) becomes certainly existent: this is the sense. He states it thus: "This is the statement: discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal" etc. The eternal, i.e., the inner self; the non-eternal, i.e., the body, organs, objects etc. If discrimination relating to these
तस्मात्किमापि वक्तुयम्, यदनन्तरं बह्दाजिज्ञासोपदिश्यत इति। उच्यते—नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, इहामुत्सार्थभोगचिरागः, शमदमादिसाधनसंपत्ति, सुमुख्यलं च। तेषु हि सत्सु, प्रागापि धर्मजिज्ञासाया ऊर्ध्वं च शक्यते बह्दा जिज्ञासितुं त्यात्मुं च; न विपर्यये। तस्मात् अथशवदेन यथोक्त-साधनसंपत्यान्तर्यमुपदिश्यते॥

न च बोधस्य बोधनिर्देशार्पिकेशसि इति, अन्यपरेऽपि बोधत्तत्त्वविनिधर्मः, समारोपेणापि तदुपप्ते। तस्मात् बोधविधिपरावेदान्ता इति सिद्धम्।

प्रकृतिसंसंहरति—तस्मात्किमापि वक्तुयम् इति। यस्मिन्नसति बह्दाजिज्ञासा न भवति सति तु भवती भवत्येवेत्ययः। तदाह—उच्यते—नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक इत्यादि। नित्यः प्रत्यगात्मा, अनित्यः देवेन्द्रियविद्याव्युष्टि:। तदिक्ष्यश्रेष्ठे निर्म्य: कृतस्वयः
बहाजिज्ञासया, ज्ञातविद्याह:। अथ तिनेको ज्ञानमात्रम्, न निध्रय:; तथा सति एष विष्यासादन्यः संशयः स्थात्; तथा च न वैराग्यं भाव्येत्; अभाववनक्षमं बहाजिज्ञासा-हेतुः? तस्मादेवं व्यास्येयम्। नित्यानित्य- 
योर्सतीति नित्यानित्यवस्तु तद्वर्मः; नित्यानित्ययोर्भिर्मिणोस्तद्वर्मोऽणां च तिनेको नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः। एतदुःखं भवति—मा भूतं इदं 
कृतं नित्यम्, इदं तदन्तमनित्यमिति धृष्टि- 
विरेष्योविवेकः; धृष्टिमात्योनित्यानित्ययोर्द्वर्म- 
योश्च तिनेकं निष्किनोतद्वेक। नित्यतं सत्यतं 
तत्स्यासि तत्स्यासि सत्यम्; तथा चास्थागोचरः। 
अनित्यात्मसत्यतं तत्स्यासि तदनित्यमृत्तमः; 
तथा चानास्थागोचरः। तद्वितत्नुभूतमानेपुरुषवस्त्रपञ्चायोर्चेपु विष्यविष्यविष्य यद्दं नित्यं 
सुचं व्यस्तस्यते तदस्थागोचरो भविष्यति; 
यत्वनित्यमृतं भविष्यति तापजयसितं तत्स्यासि 
इति सोऽयं नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः प्राप्यवीया- 
दैहिकादः कर्मोऽमुखजस्तवस्य भवित्तुभवोप-
be of the nature of certitude, Brahma being already known, the desire to know Brahma would be superfluous. Then, let it be that discrimination is bare knowledge, not certitude; that being so, it might be doubt, which is other than (truth and) error; that cannot bring about non-attachment; and not bringing that about, how can that be the cause of the desire to know Brahma? Hence it should be explained thus: as residing in things eternal and non-eternal, "things eternal and non-eternal" means their attributes; "discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal" means the discrimination of the substrates which are eternal and non-eternal, as also of their attributes. This is what is said: there need not be specific discriminative knowledge of different substrates, eternal and non-eternal, in the form "this is true, eternal," "this is untrue, non-eternal"; one does determine certainly the difference between substrates in general, as also between their attributes, as eternal and non-eternal. To be eternal is to be true; that in which this is, that is eternal, true; and thus, it is in the sphere of desire. To be non-eternal is to be untrue; that in which this is, that is non-eternal, untrue; and thus, it is not in the sphere of desire. Of these, which are experienced and constitute the spheres of the concepts "Thou" and "I," the object and the subject, that which is established to be true, eternal and pleasant, that comes in the sphere of desire; that, however, which becomes non-eternal, untrue, encompassed by the three-fold misery, that is to be abandoned; this discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal comes to him whose intellect has been purified by the rites performed whether in a prior existence or in this one, as shown by experience and reasoning. Nor may
it be said that there is no such thing as truth; for, in the absence of that, even untruth which has that (truth) as substrate would be unintelligible; further, even for the Nihilists, the Void itself is real. Having thus considered wisely in the light of the experience and reasoning of the foremost among men, having looked at himself, who with the rest of the animate world goes about migrating, constantly being born and dying, "in the worlds from Satyaloka down to Avici, is encompassed by the three kinds of misery and is tossed about helplessly on the waves of the migratory cycle through (all divisions of time from) the instant, the muhārta (about an hour), the yāma (three hours), the day, the night, the fortnight, the month, the season (two months), the half-year, the year, the yuga, the period of four yugas, the period of a Manu, the deluge and the great deluge (when even the primal elements are destroyed) up to the period of a principal creation and the intermediate creation, there arises (for him) a contemplation of the impermanence, impurity and miserable nature of this migratory world.

From the contemplation arising from this kind of discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal, there results for him "non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruit here or hereafter". Artha (literally, thing) means that which is sought, that is to say, fruit. Non-attachment thereto is indifference due to the realisation of it as not worthy of enjoyment. Thence "the possession in abundance of calmness, equanimity and other such means." It is, verily, the mind, which is intoxicated with the wine of passion and other impurities, that directs the organs to their respective objects, high and low, brings about various activities and their fruit in the nature of merit and demerit, and offers up the self as an oblation in the fearful fire of migration, which is a mass
पतिभ्याम। न खलु सत्यं नाम न किंचिद्वस्तीति वाच्यम्। तद्भवे तदुपद्धारंस्यानृतस्याद्यायनप्रपते:।
शृण्यवादिनामपि शृण्यताया एव सत्यतवात।
अथायं पुरुषवैधयस्यनमवःपपतिभ्यामेवं सुनिपुणं
निरुपयत: आ च सत्यलोकात आ
चारीचेः जायस्व तिर्यक्र इति विपरित्तमां
क्षणमुहृत्तेयामाहोराधार्धमासमात्वेयनवनतसः
रुपेऽगवनतरुपालेयमहापलेयमहासर्वात्मसः
गोविन्दिरित्याशुमुहसानम ताफगत्यस्यात्मात्मानं
जीव-तोऽक्ष्चय अस्मिन्सारामपि अनित्या
शुचिदुःवात्मकं प्रसंयानमुपचते।

to shakyabhatiyamityavatvivekaksana tva-
स्थानात् इहामुत्राथ्यभोगविरागः भवति। अध्येते
प्रार्थिति परिः इत्यथः। फलमिति यात्रु। तस्मिन्विरागो
नामानामोगामिकोपेस्वाचुदिः। तत् शमद-
मादिसाधनसंपत्। रागादिक्यायमदिरामचं हि
मनः तेषु तेषु विषयेपूःचावचिन्द्रियाणि प्रवर्तयत्
विविधास्व प्रत्वति: पुष्पापूवयक्ता भावयत्
पुष्यमितिहोर्विविधवृः विविधवृः लक्ष्मालाज्याते संसारहृत्मुजि
जुहोति। प्रसंवाल्याभ्याससलब्ध्यवैराग्यपरिपक्षभवणगादिक्षयमदिरामदं तु मन: पुरुषेनावजीयते वर्षीकियते। सौंप्यसर्व वैराग्यहेतुको मनोविनय: श्रम इति वर्षीकारसंज इति चाल्यायते। विषिं च मनस्तत्त्वविश्वविंश्यगिन्योगयोगयतां नीयते; सौंप्यसर्व योग्यता दम:, यथा दान्तोप्यं वृषभयुवा हर्षशक्तादितिन्द्रहन्योयः कृतं इति गमयते। आदि-प्रत्येकं च विषयतितिक्षातुः-परमतत्त्वश्रुतः संग्रहन्ते। अतं एव श्रुति:—
'तस्मात्तत्त्वो दान्त उपरस्ततितित्वः श्रद्धाविचारो भूतात्मेत्तत्त्वां पर्यंत, सर्वभावाणि पद्यति,'
इति। तद्वैतस्य शामदमादिरूपस्य साधनसर्व संपत, प्रकर्ष:, शामदमादिसाधनसंपत्। तद्वैतस्य संसारकन्यनामुमुशक्षा भवतीतः—मुमुशुरवं च
इति। तस्य च नित्यशुद्धवुद्धस्य समस्यक्ष्यमाहाजानं भोक्ष्य कारणमित्युपश्रुतं तज्जिजासाभाविति
श्रमजिज्ञासाय: प्रागृह्य च; तस्मातेश्चेतपे-नन्तरं न धर्मजिज्ञासाय: हि इत्याह—तेषु हि
इति। न केतुलं जिज्ञासामात्रम्, अपि तु ज्ञान-
of the flames of manifold miseries. That mind, however, in which the intoxication due to the wine of passion etc., has been put an end to by the perfecting of non-attachment gained by the repetition of the contemplation (mentioned above), is subjugated, i.e., is brought under control by the self. This subjugation of the mind occasioned by non-attachment is called calmness (śama) or vaśikāra-samjña. And the subjugated mind is made fit for application in respect of truth (i.e., to the investigation of truth); this its capacity is (dama) equanimity, just as it is understood that the calm young bull is made fit to draw a plough, a cart etc. In the “etcetera” (of the commentary) are included desire to abandon (titikṣā) objects, turning away (uparati) from them, and faith (sraddhā) in the truth. Hence it is that Scripture says: “Hence, having become possessed of calmness, equanimity, turning away (from objects), the desire to abandon (them), and faith, one, seeing the self in the self alone, sees everything in the self.” 63 Sama-damādi-sādhana-sampat is the possession of these means, calmness, equanimity etc., in an abundant degree. Thence arises the desire in him for release from the bondage to the migratory cycle; hence he says: “and desire for release.” For this one, who has heard that the knowledge of the eternally pure, intelligent and free Brahman is the cause of release, there comes the desire to know that even before, and (sometimes) after, the desire to know Religious Duty; hence, the immediate succession is to them alone, not to the desire to know Religious Duty; thus, he says: “when indeed, these” etc. Not
The word "therefore" signifies the reason. Because in the Veda itself, texts, like "Therefore as here the enjoyment acquired by an act perishes, even so, hereafter, the enjoyment acquired through Religious Duty perishes," show that agnihotra etc., which are means to prosperity, have an impermanent fruit; and because it is shown that the supreme goal of man results from the knowledge of Brahman, by texts like "One who knows Brahman attains the supreme"; therefore, in immediate succession to the possession in abundance of the means stated above, there should be the desire to know Brahman.

merely the desire to know, he says, but knowledge itself results therefrom: "and also to know." He concludes: "Therefore" etc.

The word "atah" which comes next in order is explained thus: "The word 'therefore' signifies the reason." This same sense of the reason connoted by "therefore" he explains thus: "Because in the Veda itself" etc. Here, it is asked: true, there comes the desire to know Brahman after the possession in abundance of the means declared. But this itself is unintelligible, since non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruit here or hereafter is unintelligible. Fruit, being characterised as the object of desire, is what is known to be advantageous. There cannot be for him non-attachment to that which (itself) causes attachment. If it be said that there is
अतः शब्दो हेतुवर्थः। यस्मादेद एव अश्रिफोत्रादीनां श्रेयः साधनानामनिम्नलिपतातः
दर्शयति ‘तथेऽह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते एवेवथासूत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते’
इत्यादि।; तथा ब्रह्मविज्ञानादापि परं पुरुषार्थं दर्शयति ‘ब्रह्मविद्यामोति
परस्’ इत्यादि।; तस्मात् यथोकसाधनसंपत्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्यः।

मपीणाह—ज्ञातुं च। उपसंहरति—तस्मात्
इति।

कप्रातात्मतः शवं व्याचेते—अतः शब्दो
हेतुवर्थः। तमेवचारणस्य हेतुस्पर्धमाहं—
यस्मादेद एव इति। अत्रेयं परिचोदये—
सत्यं यथोत्तसाधनसंपत्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा भवति।
संव लक्षणस्य, इहामुत्रस्वादभोगविरागस्यानुपदते:।
अनुकूलवेदनीयं हि फलम्, इश्लक्षणात्तास्करण।
रस्य। न चातुरागहेतावस्य वैरायं भवितुभवित।
दुःखाणुष्कदर्शिनामतुलेक्षष्पि वैराग्यमिति
चेत, हत्त भोः सुखानुपस्मादृशः लोपयतु नागो न कस्मातःवति ? तस्मातः उपादीयमाने दुःखपरिहारे अवज्ञनीत्यतथा दुःखमातमपि परिहार्य सुखमात्रं भोक्ते। तथा —मत्यायाः सरलकाः सक्षायद्यान्तायानपादेषे, स यावदादेः तावदादाय निवर्तेः; यथा वा धान्यायाः सप्ताहानि धान्यायान्याहरति, स यावदादेः तावदादाय निवर्ते। तस्मादृशः दुःखानुकूलवेदनायेक्षीमाहिंकां वामुखिमकं वा सुखं परिलक्षमुचितम। न हि सुग्र: सत्ताति शाल्यो नोप्यन्ते, भिषुक: सत्ताति स्थाल्यो नाधिश्रीवन्ते। अपि च हत्त सुखं चन्द्रविनितादिकित्यज्ञम क्षयितादलक्षणेन दुःलेनाग:—तत्त्वात्मिकीहुः त्वज्ञेतापि, न त्यामुखिमं स्वर्गादि, तस्याविनाशिवात्। श्रूते हि —

‘अपाम सोममयता अभूम’

इति; तथा च ‘अख्यायं ह कै चारुमयस्य—

याजिन: सुकृतं भवति’ इति। न च कृतक्षत्रेतुतं विनाशितानुमानमच संभवति,
non-attachment even to pleasure, because of its association with pain, why, alas, should there not be attachment even to pain, because of its association with pleasure? Hence, one should, in accepting pleasure, endeavour to remedy pain; even if pain should come in unavoidably, it should be remedied and the pleasure alone enjoyed. This is how: he who desires fish brings up the fish along with mosses and thorns, takes what is to be taken and abandons the rest; or, he who desires grain brings the grain with the straw, takes what is to be taken and abandons the rest. Hence, it is not proper to abandon the pleasure here or hereafter which is known to be advantageous, because of the fear of pain. Verily, one does not refrain from sowing because there are beasts of the field or from putting the pot on to cook because there are beggars. Further, even though the very timid may give up visible pleasure, because the pleasure from sandal-paste or women is tainted with pain consisting in its decrease (by consumption), that cannot apply to pleasures hereafter such as (enjoyment in) heaven etc., these being imperishable. Scripture indeed says: "We have drunk soma, we have become immortal"; also "The merit of him who sacrifices with the caturmūsyā cannot, verily, diminish". Nor can there be an inference here as to destructibility on the ground of (its) being produced, since its content is sublated by revelation, like the inference about the purity
of the human skull (by analogy with conches etc.) Hence, the possession of the above-mentioned means being non-existent, it follows that there cannot be the desire to know Brahman. To meet this result, the revered aphorist uses the word "therefore"; and its meaning is explained by the commentator thus: "Because in the Veda itself" etc.

This is what is intended: true, beasts, beggars etc. can be set at nought by agriculturists, cooks etc.; pain, however, which is manifold, produced by various causes, cannot be remedied; for, in the long run, the miseries of being dependent on means (external to oneself) and of diminution are constantly and inseparably attendant on all produced happiness. Not even the best of craftsmen can remove the poison alone from food which is mixed with honey and poison, and eat (the food) in conjunction with the honey alone. In conjunction with the inference as to diminution, the texts like "Therefore, as here the enjoyment acquired by an act" etc., which declare diminution, bring about a secondary sense for texts like "We have drunk soma" etc., because the primary sense is impossible. As the Paurāṇikas say: "Permanence till the dissolution of the primal elements is called immortality."

And here, by the word brahma the valid means of knowledge thereof, i.e., the Veda, is brought to mind. And, because of suitability, such texts as "Therefore, as here the enjoyment acquired by an act" etc. are referred to by the
नरिषिः कपालशौचानुमानवदागमवाधितविषयवतात्।
तस्माच्योक्तीसाधनसंपत्त्यभावाच व्रहजिज्ञासेति प्रापतम्।
एवं प्रासे आह भगवान्सूतकारः 'अतः' इति; तत्त्तथे व्याख्येऽभाष्यकारः—यस्मात्तेद्ध
एव इति।

अयमभिसंधि—सत्सं मूगमिथुकादयः दक्ष्यः
परिहत्व पाँचकक्रुष्णवलादिभि; दुःखं त्वनेक
विधानेनकारणसंपातजमशक्तिपरिहारम्; अन्ततः
साधनपारतन्त्रक्षयतालक्षणयोद्धारः। खयोः समस्त
क्रुसकुश्लाविनाभावनिर्यमात्। न हि मधुविष
संपृक्तमवं विं परियाय मधुमिश्रं शक्यं
शिलिंगेरणापि भोक्तुस। क्षयितानुमानोपेलिभिः
च 'तथ्येह कर्मचितः' इत्यादिवचनं क्षयिताः
प्रतिपाद्यकम्। 'अपाम सोमम्' इत्यादिकं वचनं
मुख्यसंबंधे जगन्यउत्पन्निचितामापादयति। यथाहुः
पौराणिकः—

'आभृतसंख्यं स्थानसंभृततवं हि भाष्यते' इति।
अत्र च व्रह्मपदेन तद्रामानं वेद उपरत्थापितः।
स च योग्यवात् 'तथ्येह कर्मचितः' इत्यादि:
ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा। ब्रह्मच वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणम् ‘जन्माध्यस्य यत्’ इति। अत एव न ब्रह्मशबद्ध्य जात्याच्यर्थान्तरमासिक्षितव्यम्। ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि पष्टी, न शेषे; जिज्ञासास्यापेक्षात्वाजिज्ञासायाः, जिज्ञासायान्तरानिदेशशाश्च।

‘अतः’ इति सर्वानामस्य परामृश्य हेतुप्रम्प्या निदिष्ट्यते।

स्यादेतत। यथा स्वर्गीये कृतक्रय सुक्रयं दुःखानुष्पि: तथा ब्रह्मणोपीयत आह—तथा ब्रह्मविज्ञानादपि इति। तेनायमर्थः—अतः स्वर्गीयाः क्षेत्रानात्तिपादकाः ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य च परमपुरुषार्थानात्तिपादकाः आगमाः यथोक्त-साधनसंपत्तः। ततथा जिज्ञासेति सिद्धम्।

ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापद्व्यायव्यायानमाह—ब्रह्मण इति। षट्ठीसमासप्रदेर्शनेन प्राचां वृत्तिक्रमम् ब्रह्मणे जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति चतुर्थीसमासः परासो वेदित्वः। ‘तादृश्यंस्मासे प्रकृतिविकृतित्वः महर्षीम्’।
Brahma-jijnāsa is desire to know in respect of Brahman. And Brahman is that whose definition will be stated as "That whence for this what begins with origination". For this very reason, for the word "Brahman" there cannot be the doubt of any other meaning like that of caste etc. "Of Brahman" is in the sixth case in the sense of object, not in the residuary sense; because what is desired to be known is needed for the desire to know, and because of the non-designation of anything else as desired to be known.

pronoun "therefore," and indicated as the reason by the fifth case termination (the tas suffix in atah).

Be this so. Just as misery is attendant on produced happiness like heaven etc. even so it may be in the case of Brahman. To this he says: "And because it is shown that the supreme goal of man results from the knowledge of Brahman." This is what is meant thereby: therefore, because of revelation, which declares the diminution of (enjoyment in) heaven etc., and the knowledge of Brahman as the supreme human goal, there results the possession of the above-mentioned means in abundance; and thence it is settled there is the desire to know (Brahman).

The (compound-) word brahma-jijnāsa is thus explained: "Desire to know in respect of Brahman." By showing the compound (to be) of the sixth case, the refutation is to be understood of the explanation of this by earlier commentators as a fourth case compound—brahmāne jijnāsa. For, by the dictum of Katyāyana "In the dative compound, both the basic object and the modification should be
apprehended," it is a rule that there are dative compounds only in respect of a basic object and its modifications, as in the case of wood and the sacrificial stake: where the compounded elements are not related as basic object and modification, that (dative) compound is ruled out; further the possessive compound is clearly laid down in the case of "horse-fodder" etc., in the words "Horse-fodder etc. are sixth case compounds." Even in the possessive compound, the primacy in fact of Brahman (as compared with the verbal primacy of "the desire to know") is intelligible.

Be this so. When it is said "desire to know in respect of Brahman," since "Brahman" is used in many senses, there is this doubt: of which Brahman is there this desire to know? The word "Brahman" is used of the brahmin caste, as in brahmahatti (brahminicide), of the Veda, as in brahmaajjham (forgetting the Veda once studied), and of the supreme self, as in "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself". This doubt he removes: "And Brahman is that whose definition will be stated" etc. Since after premising the desire to know Brahman, he defines the supreme self, in order to bring that to mind, we understand that the desire to know mentioned here is the desire to know the supreme self alone, not the brahmin caste etc.; this is the sense.

Even accepting the compound to be of the sixth case, it is the sixth case not in the sense of object, but in a residuary sense; since the residuary sense signifies relationship in general, not merely that of being the object, when it is said "desire to know in respect of Brahman," it amounts to saying "desire to know (all) that is connected with
कर्तव्यम्  'इति कात्यायनीयविचरनेन गुप्तार्थविद्धेषेव प्रकृतिविकारभूतेषु चतुर्थिसमासनियमात् अप्रकृति
विकारभूते इत्येवमादृ तत्तिथेषात् , ' अश्चः गासादः
पञ्चसिसमासा भविष्यन्ति ' इत्यश्च गासादिनु पञ्ची-
समासशास्त्रतिविधानात् । पञ्चीसमासेषु पि च बहाणो
वास्तवप्राधान्योपपन्नेति ।

स्यादेतत् । बहाणो जिज्ञासेतुके तत्ताने
कार्यविवाहशास्त्रम् संशयः —कस्य बहाणो
जिज्ञासा ? —इति । अर्थ बहाणोनो विप्रमेयतोति,
यथा—कृष्टरूपन्ति । अर्थ च वैदेष, यथा—
महोज्जमिति; अर्थ च स्मरमनि, यथा—
' महा वेद' बहाणो भवति ’ इति । तत्तमं
संशयमपार्कर्तात्—बहा च वक्ष्यमागनालक्षणम्
इति । यतो बहाणजिज्ञासां प्रतिज्ञाय तत्त्वनाय
परमतमलक्षणम् प्रणयति ततोपगच्छाम्: परमात्म
जिज्ञासेतुस्य न विप्रमेयतात्यादिजिज्ञासा, इत्यथः ।

पञ्चीसमासपरिवेच्छेपि नें कर्मश्च, किर सा
शेषलक्षण । संवन्धमात्रं च शेष इति बहाणो
जिज्ञासेतुके बहासंबन्धनिः जिज्ञासेतुस्यं भवति ।
तथा च ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रमाणायुक्तसाधनप्रयोजनजिज्ञासा: सर्व ब्रह्मजिज्ञासार्थी ब्रह्मजिज्ञासयाबवहुस्वयमं भवति, साक्षात् पारम्पर्यं वा ब्रह्मसंवतान्तेः। कर्मणि पश्चात् तु ब्रह्मशास्त्रार्थे: कर्म; स च स्वरूपमेवेति तत्रमाणाद्यो नावशेष्येर्न; तथा चार्यतिज्ञातार्थेऽच्छित्ता प्रमाणादिदुः भवेत्—इति ये मन्यते तान्त्रिकः—ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि इति। अत्र हेतुमाहः—जिज्ञास्य इति। इच्छायाः प्रतिपत्तिनवन्तः ज्ञानम्, ज्ञानस्य च ज्ञेऽयं यद्य। नो रूपते ज्ञानं ज्ञेऽयं विना निःस्तुत्तं, न च जिज्ञासा ज्ञानं विना, इति प्रतिपत्तिनवन्तुर्वत्तवावः प्रथमं जिज्ञासा कर्मेन्त्रापेक्षेऽति, न तु संबन्धितात्मार्गम्, तदन्तरणाय पि सति कर्मणि तत्तिल्पणात्। न हि वचनसमादिषु वोपत्यक्ष्यायमिति संबन्ध्यन्वेषणां भवति। भवति तु ज्ञानमित्युक्ते विप्रथ्यान्वेषणां किंविषयमिति। तस्मात्प्रथमप्रक्षेप-तत्वात् कर्मत्येऽव ब्रह्म संबत्त्ये, न तु संबन्धितात्मार्गेऽति, तत्स्य ज्ञनत्वात्। तथा च कर्मणि पद्ध, इत्यथः।
Brahman”. Thus, the things that serve the desire to know Brahman, such as the nature of Brahman, the valid means of knowing it, reasoning, the means (of attainment) and the fruit, all signified by the name “desire to know Brahman,” are comprehended under the name “desire to know Brahman,” since they are related to Brahman directly or indirectly. In the sixth case with the sense of object, however, what is signified by “Brahman” is the object; that is only the nature (of Brahman); and the means of knowledge etc. would not be comprehended; hence, in respect of the means of knowledge etc., the inquiry would be into what was not premised. To those who think thus, he says: “Of Brahman is in the sixth case in the sense of object.” He states the reason: “because what is desired to be known is needed for the desire to know.” Knowledge is bound up with the attainment of the desire; and for knowledge, what is to be known is Brahman. Knowledge is not, verily, determined in the absence of what is to be known, nor the desire to know in the absence of knowledge; hence, because of being bound up with the attainment (of it), the desire to know primarily needs an object alone, not what is related in general; for, even in the absence of this (latter), that (desire) is determined, when the object exists. Verily, there is not, after seeing the sun or the moon, a search for what is related, in the form “Of what is this”? There is, however, when one says “knowledge”, the search for the object, in the form “What is its object?” Hence, because of being primarily needed, Brahman is related as object alone, not as what is related in general, this (sense) being secondary. And thus, (the compound is in) the sixth case with the sense of object; this is the meaning.
Now, even on the acceptance of the sixth case in the residuary sense, Brahman's being the object of the desire to know is not contradicted; for relationship in general is based on some particular relationship. Even thus, for one who, discarding the direct objectness of Brahman, assumes indirect objectness through the channel of general relationship, the effort is in vain.

Now, it is true that the desire to know is not determined in the absence of what is desired to be known; but there may be some other object for this desire, while Brahman may be related to it as a residuary. To this he says: "and because of the non-designation of anything else as desired to be known."

With some unrevealed view one asks: "Now, even on the acceptance of the sixth case in the residuary sense" etc.; since relationship in general is not opposed to a particular relationship, and since the determination of the desire to know is intelligible without contradicting (Brahman's) being the object: this is the sense. Himself with an unrevealed view, he criticises: "even thus, for one who discarding the direct objectness of Brahman" etc. Well indeed have you followed the true principles of interpretation in abandoning the relationship of expressed objectness, which is primarily needed by the desire to know, and which is fit to be related primarily, and (adopting) the relationship of what is related in general, which is needed somehow at a later stage, (thus making) the secondary primary and the primary secondary! The designation (of the relationship) as "direct" and "indirect"
ननु शेषष्ठीपरियोऽपि बहःपुरी जिज्ञासाकर्मसंवत् न विरूत्यते; संबन्धसामान्यस्य विशेषनिष्ठत्वात्। एवमापि प्रत्यक्षं बहःपुरीः कर्मेत्रमुस्त्रृव्य सामान्यद्वारेण परोक्षं कर्मेत्रं कल्पयतो व्यर्थः प्रयासः स्यात्।

ननु सत्यं न जिज्ञास्यमन्तरेण जिज्ञासा निरूप्यते; जिज्ञासायांतरं तत्स्या भविष्यति; बहः तु शेषत्या संभन्त्यतं इत्यत आहं—जिज्ञासायांतरैं इति।

निगुटाभिमायश्चौदयति—ननु शेषष्ठीपरियोऽपि इति। सामान्यसंबन्धस्य विशेष-संबन्धाविरोधेन कर्मेत्राय अतिधातेन जिज्ञासानिरूपणोपपच्छिर्येष्यः। निगुटाभिमाय एव दूषयति—एवमापि प्रत्यक्षं बहःपुरी इति। वाच्यं कर्मेत्रस्य जिज्ञासा यथाप्रथमप्रकृतिस्य प्रथमसंबन्धायाः सामान्यपरियागेन पत्रात्क्रमचिन्द-पेशित्य संबन्धिमानस्य संबन्धो, जगन्य: प्रथमं प्रथमस्य जगन्यः, इति मुद्यहातं।
नतु न व्यथः, ब्रह्माश्रितारोषविचारः प्रतिज्ञानार्थत्वादिति चेत्, न, प्रधानपरिष्ठे तदपेक्षितानामप्रथथोक्षिक्षत्वात्। ब्रह्म हि ज्ञानेनान्तुमिदंत्मत्वात्प्रधानम्। तस्मिन्न्यथाने ज्ञानार्थकर्मणि परिग्रहीते, वेदप्राति-ज्ञासातेर्विना ब्रह्म ज्ञासितं न भवति, तान्यथोक्षितान्येवेति न पुर्वसूत्रायितव्यानि। यथा 'राजासो गच्छति' इत्युक्ते सपरिवारस्य राजो गमनस्मुक्ते भवति, तद्वत्। श्रुत्युगममा। 'यतो वा इमानि

न्यायतत्वम्। प्रतिक्षपरोक्षताभिधानं च प्राध्यम्-प्राथ्यमस्फूटतायासुधारभिभाष्यम्।

चोदकः स्वाभिप्राम्यसुद्धार्यति—न व्यथः। ब्रह्माश्रितारोष इति। व्यास्यात्मेतद्धार्यस्र। समाभाता स्वाभिसंधिमुद्धार्यति—न, प्रधान-परिष्ठे इति। वास्तवं प्राधान्यं ब्रह्मण:। शेषं सनिद्धनमस्तिरोहितार्थम्। श्रुत्युगममथार्थिति-रोहितः।
THE DESIRE TO KNOW

Now, it is not in vain, since it would have the purpose of premising inquiry into everything, without residue, that is dependent on Brahman; if this be said, no; because on the acceptance of the principal, whatever is dependent on it will be presumptively implied. Brahman, indeed, being what is most desired to be attained by knowledge, is the principal. That principal one, which is the object of the desire to know, being accepted, those things, without a desire to know which there will not be the desire to know Brahman, will certainly be presumptively implied; hence they are not to be separately stated in the aphorism. Just as when it is said, "Here goes the king," what is stated is the going of the king along with his retinue, so is it here. And it is so, also because of conformity with Scripture. The Scriptural passages beginning with

(in the commentary) is in the sense of "primary" and "non-primary," "manifest" and "non-manifest".

The objector now reveals his view: "not in vain, since it would have the purpose of premising inquiry into everything, without residue, that is dependent on Brahman." This has been explained above. The respondent too reveals his own view: "no; because on the acceptance of the principal" etc. The principal position belongs, in fact, to Brahman (though it is not so in the sentence). The sense of the rest (of the commentary) along with the illustration is not obscure; the support of Scripture too is not obscure in sense.
"That whence these beings originate," in the passage, "Desire the knowledge of that; that is Brahman," quite explicitly show that Brahman is the object of the desire to know. And that will conform to the aphorism, if the sixth case is accepted in the sense of object. Therefore, "Of Brahman" is in the sixth case in the sense of object.

Jijnasa is desire to know. The knowledge culminating in realisation is the object of the desire expressed by the san-suffix; because fruit is the content of desire. Indeed, Brahman is the object desired to be realised through valid knowledge. The realisation of Brahman is, indeed, the human goal, because it exterminates evils, Nescience etc., the seeds of all transmigration whatsoever. Therefore Brahman is what is to be desired to be known.

Having thus established the compound (as of the character) acceptable to him, he states the meaning of the word jijnasa: "jijnasa is desire to know." Be this so. Knowledge is not the content of desire. The attainment of happiness or the remedying of misery is, verily, the sphere of desire, or, through these, the means therefor. Knowledge of Brahman is not such. It is not, indeed, experienced as advantageous or as the cessation of what is disadvantageous. Nor is it a means to those two; for, even when that exists, no special happiness is seen, while the misery that continues does not cease. Hence, merely
भूतानि जायन्ते’ इत्यादः। श्रुतयः ‘तद्विज्ञासस्त्र तद्रह्थ’ इति प्रत्यक्षमेव ब्रह्मणो
जिज्ञासाकर्मेऽं दर्शिण्ति। तत्थ कर्मणि
पश्चाप्ररियेन सूचेणानुगतं भवति। तस्माद्रह्थ
इति कर्मणि पश्चि

जातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा। अवगतिपर्यंत
ज्ञानं सन्नवाच्यया इच्छया: कर्म, फल-
विषयत्वादिच्छया। ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणे-
नावगन्तुमिति ब्रह्म। ब्रह्मागतिः पुरुषांर्थः,
नि: शेषसंसारवीजाविवायानथाननिविघ्नात्।
तस्माद्रह्थ जिज्ञासितव्यम्।

तदेवभविमितं समां व्यतस्थाय्य जिज्ञासा-
पदार्थमह्—जातुम्। इति। स्यादेततः। न
ज्ञानभिच्छाविषयः। सुखदुःखवासिपिरहैरो वा
तदुपयो वा तदृढ़त्तारेणचागोचरः। न चैवं
बह्यज्ञानम्। न खल्वेतदनकृतकिंति वा प्रति-
कृत्तिकृतिवाचन्ते। नापि तयोष्पायः।
तस्मानसत्यपि सुखमेवस्यादर्शनात्, अनुवर्तमानसय
च दुःख्यानिवृच्छिकः। तस्मात् सूत्रकारवचन-मात्रादिष्किमता ज्ञानस्येत्यत आह—अवगति-पर्यन्तमृ इति। न केवलं ज्ञानमिष्यते किं तवगति साक्ष्यत्कारं कुर्वेदवगतिपर्यंतं सन्ताच्याया इच्छाया: कर्म। कस्मात्? फलविषयत्वादिच्छाया: तदुपायं फलपर्यंर्तं गोचरयतीन्तुष्ठिति शेषः।

ननु भवत्वगतिपर्यंतं ज्ञानम्; किमेतावतापींडं भवति। न हानपेष्णीयविषयमवगतिपर्यंतमृपि ज्ञानमिष्यत इत्यत आह—ज्ञातेन हि प्रमाणेनावगतन्तुमिष्यं ब्रह्म। भवतु ब्रह्मावगतिः, पुरुषार्थी। किम्भविदिः? न, किं तु नि:श्रेयसं विगलितिनिकृल्लोः:वानुष्प्रमाणन्त्रधनब्रह्मावगति -वेयरणः। सन्मान इतितैव नि:श्रेयसं पुरुषार्थं इति।

स्यादेवत। न ब्रह्मावगति: पुरुषार्थ।। पुरुषावपारवपायी हि पुरुषार्थ।। न चाचर्या ब्रह्मसच्चार्थभूताय उत्तर्चिविकारसंकाशास्त्रः: सं-भवति, तथा सत्यनित्यतेन तत्त्वाभावायानुपस्ते।। न चोत्सत्वाच्याचावे व्यापारव्यायता।। तस्मात्
because of the aphorist's words, being the object of desire does not result for knowledge. To this he says: "The knowledge culminating in realisation" etc. Not bare knowledge is desired; rather, it is the knowledge, which as bringing about realisation or intuition culminates in realisation, that is the object of the desire expressed by the san-suffix. Why? "Because fruit is the content of desire"; desire has the means for its sphere till the fruit is attained; this is the complement (to be understood).

Now, let it be that knowledge culminates in realisation; does it even then become a desired object? Knowledge of what is not required is not, verily, desired, even if it culminate in realisation. To this he says: "Indeed, Brahman is the object desired to be realised through valid knowledge." Let it be that there is realisation whose content is Brahman; even thus, how is it what is desired? To this he says: "The realisation of Brahman is, indeed, the human goal." Is it prosperity? No; it is, rather, beatitude, which is of the nature of Brahman, the mass of supreme bliss whence has been expelled all taint of misery; hence it is the unexcelled human goal.

Be this so. The realisation of Brahman is not the human goal. For the human goal is what is pervaded by human activity; and to this (realisation), which is of the nature of Brahman, generation, modification, purification or attainment cannot happen, as, being non-eternal in that case, it could not intelligibly be of that nature (of Brahman). And when generation etc. are absent, there is no pervasion by (human) activity. Hence, realisation of Brahman is not the human goal. To this he says:
"because it exterminates evils, Nescience etc., the seeds of all transmigration whatsoever." True, in the realisation of Brahman, which is of the nature of Brahman, generation etc. do not occur; yet, under the influence of the indeterminable beginningless Nescience, the nature of Brahman, though not illumined by another and though shining, appears as if not shining and as if illumined by another; though different from the body, organs etc., it appears as if not different from them; hence, prior to the extermination of the evils, Nescience etc., the seeds of transmigration, it is unattained, as it were, and when that (extermination) exists, it becomes attained, as it were: consequently, being thus sought by men, it is appropriately the human goal.

The word "etcetera" after "Nescience" comprehends the impressions thereof. The cessation of Nescience etc., however, should be known to come from the effect of contemplation, viz., intuition, which is a variety of psychosis of the internal organ. He concludes: "Therefore, Brahman is what is to be desired to be known" by the person who is of the character stated above and desires release. Not, verily, without that knowledge is Nescience, which with its impressions is the primal cause of manifold miseries, destroyed. Nor without its destruction is there the manifestation of the intuition of the jiva as of the nature of Brahman, the mass of bliss whence has been expelled all taint of misery. Hence, by those who desire (to realise) the nature of Brahman, the mass of bliss, the means there-to, i.e., knowledge, should be desired. And that results from the Vedânta texts not of themselves, but as aided by the
बधावगति: पुरुषार्थ इत्यत आह—निःशेषसंसारबीजाविद्याधानरथनीवहंगात। सत्यम्, बधावगतौ बधाश्वभावे नोपवत्याद्यः संभवति; तथापिनिर्मचनीयानायानविद्यावशास्त्र संभावोपराधीनप्रकाशोपि प्रतिभानपि न प्रति-भातीव पराधीनप्रकाश इव देहेन्द्रियादिभोमित्रोपावश्यकधिभि इव भासत इति संसारबीजाविद्याधानरथनीवहंगात्रागसात इव तस्मिनसति प्रात इव भवतीति पुरुषाधार्थमानवातपुरुषार्थ इति युक्तम्।

अविदार्थीद्यादिग्रहे तत्संस्कारोपवस्त्यते। अविदार्थीनित्वतस्तुसवासनार्थकार्यः करणवृततिमे-दातृ साक्ताकारादिति दश्यम्। उपसंहरति—तस्माद्वा जिज्ञासितव्यम् उच्चत्वक्षेत्रन समु-क्षुणा। न खलु तत्ज्ञानं विना सवासनविविधु-रनिवासनमविविधोच्छिड़ते। न च तदुच्छदमत्तरेन विगलिततनितिकल्लुःस्तानुष्ठानन्दधनशहास्मतसाधका-त्त्वाराविभवो जीवस्य। तस्मादनन्दधनशहास्म-तामिल्लछता तदुपयो ज्ञानेतितव्यम्। तच्च
तत्पुनङ्गः प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्; 
यद्य प्रसिद्धं न जिज्ञासितव्यम्; अथा- 
प्रसिद्धं नैव शास्त्रं जिज्ञासितुमिति।

न केवलेभ्यो वेदान्तेभ्य: अपि तु ब्रह्ममांसोप- 
करणेभ्य इति इच्छामुलेन ब्रह्ममांसायां 
प्रवत्ते, न तु वेदान्तेषु तदर्थविविक्षायां वा; 
तत्र फलवद्यवोधस्थताः स्वाच्छयाव्यवहनविधेहि: 
सूत्रयता ‘अथातो धर्मजीज्ञासा’ इत्येनैव 
प्रवत्तततवत्, धर्मश्रवणय न वेदार्थोपपल्लक्षण- 
तेनार्थवद्यवोधस्थताः पुष्पपल्लक्षणतवत्। 
यदापि च 
धर्ममांसायाः वेदार्थमांसायाः ब्रह्ममांसायाः अखोप 
शक्यते, तथापि प्राच्या मीमांसयाः न तद्युत्थऽते, 
नापि ब्रह्ममांसाया अध्ययनमात्रानन्तर्यमिति 
ब्रह्ममांसार्थभाय नित्यानित्यविवेकाधानन्तर्यप्रदर्श- 
नाय चेदं सूत्रमार्शमणीयमित्यपौनसक्तयम्।

स्वाधीनतै। एतेन सूत्रेन ब्रह्मज्ञान यत्यपयता 
मीमांसाया: प्रतिपादत इत्युत्तमः; तद्युत्तमः, 
विकल्पतृष्ठवान्, इति चोद्यति—तत्पुनङ्गः
That Brahman, again, should be either known or unknown. If known, it is not to be desired to be known; if not known, it cannot at all be desired to be known.

inquiry into Brahman; consequently, through desire, one is directed to the inquiry into Brahman, not to the Vedânta texts or to the intention to declare their sense. For, this (latter) is already attained by (the aphorism) "Then, therefore, the inquiry into Religious Duty," which aphoristically expresses the injunction to study one's own Veda, this (study) signifying the fruitful understanding of the sense; and the apprehension of Religious Duty, since it implies the (entire) sense of the Veda, secondarily implies Brahman too, in the same way as (it implies) what is not Religious Duty (adharma). Though, like the inquiry into Religious Duty, the inquiry into Brahman too may be implied by the inquiry into the sense of the Veda, yet, that is not set forth in the earlier inquiry (into dharma). Nor does the inquiry into Brahman follow immediately on the mere study of the Veda. Hence, in order to start the inquiry into Brahman and also to show that it follows immediately on the discrimination of the eternal from the non-eternal etc., this aphorism has to be stated; thus, there is no repetition.

Be this so. By this aphorism, it has been said, instrumentality to the knowledge of Brahman is taught of inquiry; that does not stand to reason, since it cannot bear examination; thus, one asks: "That Brahman, again" etc. From
The reply is: There does exist Brahman who is by nature eternally pure, intelligent and free, omniscient and endowed with all powers. By him who analyses the meaning of the word Brahman, there are cognised the meanings eternal, pure etc., because of conformity with the sense of the root "Bṛḥ". And because of being the self of all, the existence of Brahman is well-known. Everyone, verily, cognises the existence of himself; he does not cognise "I do not exist". If indeed the existence of the self were not well-known, the entire world would cognise "I do not exist". And the self is Brahman.

the Vedānta texts, which as not of human origin are self-evidently valid, (Brahman) should be either known or not known. If it be known, it has been made the content of ascertained knowledge arising out of the Vedānta texts; therefore, it is not to be desired to be known; for, the means which, having produced its fruit, (yet) makes no distinction to its object, transgresses the definition of means. Or else, if it be not known from the Vedāntas, then, since the Vedāntas do not teach it, it would ever be unknown and could not be desired to be known. Desire arises for what has been experienced and liked, not for what has never been experienced before. Nor, even if it were liked, could it be known, there being no means of valid knowledge (in respect thereof). Verbal testimony should
उच्चयं—अस्ति तात्रंहः निन्धशुद्धबुद्ध-
मुक्तस्वभावं सर्वं ज्ञान सर्वाशास्त्रसमन्वितम्।
वृहदशन्दस्य हि वयुत्याधमानस्य निन्ध-
शुद्धतवादयोऽयोः प्रत्ययंते, ब्रह्मतेर्थःको-
र्यमुनगमात्। सर्वस्यात्मत्वाच ब्रह्मसिद्धव-
प्रसिद्धः। सर्वं ह्यामातित्वं प्रत्ययति न
'न अहमस्थि' इति। यदि हि नात्मातित्वा-
स्वसिद्धः स्यात्, सर्वो लोकः 'नाह-
मस्थि' इति प्रत्ययतात्। आत्मा च ब्रह्म।

इति। वेदान्तेऽप्पौल्लेयत्या स्वत: सिद्धार्थ्यायेभ्यः
प्रसिद्धसिद्धः वा स्यात्। यदि प्रसिद्धम्,
वेदान्तवाक्यमुस्मुख्येन निश्चयज्ञानेन विषयीकृतम्;
ततो न ज्ञासितव्यम्, निपिद्धितक्रिये कर्मणि
अतिशोधायिनः साधनस्य साधनव्यायातिपातात्।
अथाप्रिदं वेदात्मेऽथः, ताहि न तद्वेदान्तः
प्रतिपद्ययत्तीति सर्वाशास्त्रसिद्धं नेन शक्यं ज्ञान-
सिद्धम्। अनुभूति हि प्रयो भवतीत्या न
tु सर्वास्तानुभूतपूर्वे। न चेष्यामाणमपि शाक्यं
ज्ञातम्, प्रमाणामात्रात्। शब्दो हि तस्य प्रमाणं वक्तव्यम्। यथा वक्तव्यि ‘शाक्षरीयोनितात्’ इति। स चेत्तचात्वोधयति, कुतस्तस्य तच्च प्रामाण्यम्? न च प्रमाणान्तरं बहाणि प्रक्रमते।
तस्मात्तपि सिद्धस्य ज्ञातं शाक्यरथायोजिज्ञासनात्। अत्र सिद्धयेच्छाया अविष्यत्वात् अशाक्यज्ञानत्वाच न बहा जिज्ञास्यमित्याक्षेष:। परिहरितः—
उच्यते—आसित तावद्रहा नित्यशुच्युर्गुड़—
मुक्कलभाम्। अयंमथः—प्रागवि ब्रह्ममीमां-
साया अध्वितेवलस्य निगमनिरक्त्वयाकरणाचिति—
परिशीलनविदितपदत्वसंस्कारस्य ‘सदेव सोऽम्पुदाम्' आसीत्।’ इत्युपकमात्। ‘तत्त्वमि’ इत्यन्तासां-
दर्भीत् नित्यताच्रुपेतवहारस्वरुपथात्रमस्तांत्रादपातातो
विचारार्थिनायुत। अत्र च ब्रह्मेत्यादिनात्वग्येन
तद्धिष्यव्यागमं लक्ष्यमिति, तदस्तितवस्य सति
विमाये विचारार्थायागानिर्णयं। नित्येषि क्षार्यतावलक्षणं दुःसमुपक्षिति। मुद्धेति वेदाधिृपाधिकमिषि
दुःमयक्षिति। मुद्धेत्यपराधीनप्रकाशायामानवातामां
दर्शीयिति, आनन्दप्रकाशयोरमेदात।।
be said to be the means of knowing it; as will be said: "Because of the sacred-teaching-source." If that does not give knowledge of it, whence then its (the āstira's) Authoritativeness in that respect? Nor does any other means of valid knowledge apply in respect of Brahman. Hence, since in the case of what is known, though it can be known, there is no desire to know, and in the case of what is not known, it is not the object of desire and cannot be known, Brahman cannot be the object of the desire to know; this is the objection. He remedies it: "The reply is: there does exist Brahman, who is by nature eternally pure, intelligent and free." This is the sense: even prior to the inquiry into Brahman, for him, who has studied the Veda, who has by a study of Etymology (nirukta), Grammar (vyākaraṇa) etc., understood the relation of words and their import, there is even without the inquiry a general understanding of the nature of Brahman endowed with Eternality etc. from the string of texts beginning with "Existence alone this was in the beginning, dear one" and ending with "That thou art". Here, by the words "Brahman" etc. (in the commentary) signifying the object of knowledge, there is indicated secondarily the knowledge whose content is Brahman, since the existence of that (Brahman) is not settled prior to inquiry, when there is a doubt. By the word "eternal," misery characterised by diminution is excluded. By the word "pure," misery due to adjuncts like the body etc., is excluded. The word
"intelligent" exhibits it as blissful and not illumined by another, since bliss and effulgence are non-different.

Be this so. If release existed, then would shine forth these, its (qualities) purity etc.; but, prior to that, there is conjunction with misery through the bodily attributes of birth, old age, death etc., due to non-difference from the body etc. To this he says: "free". Always free, always pure, it yet appears so (i.e., non-different from the body etc.), because of delusion due to the influence of beginningless Nescience. Having thus shown the adjunctless form of Brahman, he declares its form as with the adjunct of Nescience: "omniscient and endowed with all powers." By this is shown its being the cause of the universe, since being or not being the cause is dependent on the presence or absence of power and knowledge. Whence, again, the realisation of Brahman as of this nature? To this he says: "By him who analyses the meaning of the word 'Brahman' etc. The realisation of Brahman as of this nature comes not merely from consideration of texts like "Existence alone" etc., taken together with what goes before and after, but the word "Brahman" itself gives us this very sense through its etymology. He gives the derivation: "because of conformity with the sense of the root 'brh'." The root "brh," meaning growth, signifies excellence. This undefined excellence permits of it (Brahman) (the attribution of) eternality, purity, intelligence etc., conveyed through other words: this is the sense.
स्यादेतत्। मुक्ती सत्यामर्थः शुद्धत्वादः प्रथते, तत्तु प्राक् देवार्थमेदेन तद्धर्मजन्मजयां मरणादिनुक्योगादित्यत उक्तम्—मुक्ति इति। सदैव मुक्त्: सदैव केवलोज्ञातविद्यावशाश्चु आन्त्या तथाभासत्त इत्यथः। तदेवम्नौपाधिकं वहाणो रूपं दर्शितवा अविद्यापाधिकं रुपमाह—सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिकसमन्वितम्। तदनेन जग-त्कारणत्तमस्य दृशितम्, शक्तिज्ञानवागावावानु-विधानात्कारणत्तभावाभावो:। कुलं: पुनरेकव-भूतशाखस्रुपावगति: इत्यत आह—ब्रह्मशाबद्धस्य हि इति। न केवलम् 'सदैव सोम्येदम्' इत्यादीनां वाक्यानां पौर्ण्यप्रपर्य्योलोचनया इत्यं-भूतवहारगतिः। अपि तु ब्रह्मपदमपि निर्वचन-सामस्र्यदिममेवार्थ स्वहस्तयति। निर्वचनमाह—ब्रह्मतीर्थादेशत्तोर्नुगमात्। वृक्किकं हि बहुति-चक्षु: रतिश्यान्यं वर्तेत। तत्तथेदमतिशायनमनवचित्रं पदान्तरावगतिं निम्नशुद्धबुद्धताधस्याभ्युजनानाव-क्रमसः।
तदेवं तत्पदार्थस्य शुद्धतादेवः प्रसिद्धिमिबधाय त्वंपदार्थस्याय्याः—सर्वस्यात्मत्वाच ब्रह्मात्मित-लवप्रसिद्धिः। सर्वश्च पांशुतपादकस्य हालिकायापि ब्रह्मात्मित-लवप्रसिद्धिः। कुतः ? आत्मत्वात्।
एतदेव स्फुटयति—सर्वो न हि इति। प्रतीतिमेव अप्रतीतिनिराकारणेन दर्थयति—न न इति।
न न प्रत्येति ‘अहमस्मि’ इति, किं तु प्रत्येक्येवेति योजना। ननु ‘अहमस्मि’ इति च झास्यति मा च झासीदात्मानमित्यत आह—यादि इति।
अहमस्मि न प्रतीयात्। अहंकारपद्वं हि जीवात्मानं चेत्त्व प्रतीयात् ‘अहम्’ इति न प्रतीयादित्यर्थः। ननु प्रत्येतु सर्वो जन आत्मानमहंकारार्थदम, ब्रह्मणि तु किमायातम इत्यत आह—आत्मा च ब्रह्म; तदं तमा सामानाविधिकर्पयात्।
तस्माच्छत्यदार्थस्य शुद्धुद्ध-लवादेवः शब्दतः त्वंपदार्थस्य च जीवात्मन: प्रत्यक्षतः प्रसिद्धेः, पदार्थज्ञानपूर्वकत्वाच वाक्यार्थ:-ज्ञानस्य, त्वंपदार्थस्य ब्रह्मात्मावाच: ‘तत्त्वस्मि’
इति वाक्यादुपपखत इति भावः।
Having thus declared that purity etc. are well-known of the denotation of the word "that," he says also of the denotation of the word "thou": "And, because of being the self of all, the existence of Brahman is well-known." The existence of Brahman is well-known to all, even to the ploughman with his dust-covered feet; whence? Because it is himself. This itself is explained: "Every one, verily" etc. He confirms this cognition itself, by the refutation of non-cognition: "not not" etc.; does not fail to cognise "I exist," but certainly does (so) cognise: this is the construction. Now, one may know "I exist," but may not know the self. To this he says: "If, indeed" etc. He would not have the cognition "I exist". If he did not cognise the jiva-self, which is the substrate of "I-ness," he would not have the cognition of "I"; this is the sense. Now, let it be that all men have the cognition of the self, the substrate of "I-ness"; what of it for Brahman? To this he says: "And the self is Brahman"; because of the appositional relation of "that" to "thou". Hence, the purity, intelligence etc. of the denotation of the "that" being well-known from Scripture, and the jiva denoted by the "thou" being well-known from perception, and since the cognition of the word-significance precedes the cognition of the sentence-significance, it is intelligible that the realisation of the denotation of the "thou" as of the nature of Brahman results from the text "That thou art": this is the idea.
If, then, in the world, Brahman is well-known as the self, in that case, since it is already known, it follows again that it is not to be desired to be known. No; because there are conflicting views as to its particular nature. The ordinary man and the Lokayatikas conceive of the self as the mere body qualified by intelligence. Others hold that the self is only the intelligent sense-organs. Yet others say that it is the mind. Some say that it is mere momentary cognition. Others say that it is the void. Still others say that there is a being different from the body, who migrates, who is agent and enjoyer. Some say that

The objector declares the defect in the first of these alternatives: "If, then, in the world " etc. The "world" means the succession of teacher and taught. If from the text "That thou art," Brahman be well-known to be the self—where one ought to say "The self (be understood) as Brahman," the statement "Brahman as the self" is to be understood (as made) in view of the intention to declare non-difference—(it would again follow that being known it cannot be the object of the desire to know). He answers this: "No." Why not? "Because there are conflicting views as to its particular nature." Such conflicting views are said to be the seeds of doubt, in the absence of any means of valid knowledge to confirm or confute. And because of
यदि ताहि लोकेः ब्रह्म आत्मवेच्ये प्रसिद्धमर्ति, ततो ज्ञातेवेच्येज्ञातुस्मर्तं पुनरापभासम्। न, तद्विशेषे प्रति विप्रतिपते। देहमात्रं चेतन्यविशिष्टमात्मैति प्राकृता जना लोकायतिकाभ्र प्रतिपत्ता। इन्द्रियाण्वेत् चेतनान्यान्यान्यात्परे। मन इति। विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येकै। शून्यमित्येकै। अति देहादिव्यासचिकः संसारिकोऽभोक्तिपरे। भोक्तेव केवलं न कर्ते।

आक्षेता प्रथमकुंवलपथ्रः दोषमाह—यदि ताहि लोक इति। अत्यापायकंतोपरं परमा लोकः। तत्र 'तत्त्वमसि' इति वाक्यायदि ब्रह्म आत्मवेच्ये प्रसिद्धमर्ति। 'आत्मा ब्रह्मवेच्ये' इति वक्तव्ये 'ब्रह्म आत्मवेच्ये' इति अभिवर्णित् विश्वाय गमणितव्यम्। परिहरित—न; कुः? तदविशेषे प्रति विप्रतिपते। तदनेन विप्रतिपति: साधकब्रजकुप्राणामावे सति संशये-बीजमुक्तम्। तत्थथ संशयाज्ञातीज्ञासोपपत्ति इति.
ध्येके। अस्ति तद्वितीर्क ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिरिति केचित्। आत्मा स भोक्तरित्यप्रे। एवं बहवो विप्रतिपद्धता युक्तिवाक्यतदाभाससमाध्या। सन्तः। तत्त्वाचि- चार्य यत्किंचित्तप्रतिपद्धमानो नि:श्रेयसावृत्तिहन्येत, अनर्थ चेयात्। तस्माद्वज्ञासाधिपत्यासुमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदाविरोधितकामकरणा नि:श्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तुत्यते॥

भाषा:। विद्वानाधिकरणं धर्मं सर्वत्रतत्सिद्धान्त- सिद्धोभुप्ये:। अन्यथा अनानुविधा भिन्नार्था वा विप्रतिपत्ति न यथा। विरर्त हि प्रतिपत्ति विप्रतिपत्तः। न चानार्था: प्रतिपत्ति भवन्ति, अनालम्बनलाप्ते। न च भिन्नार्था विरर्त:। न हि। अनित्या बुद्धि:। ‘नित्य आत्मा’ इति प्रतिपत्तिविप्रतिपत्तिः। तस्मात्तपदार्थस्य शुद्धता- वेदवेदांतेम्य: प्रतीति:। तपदार्थस्य च जीवाद्वनातो लोकं सिद्धि:। सर्वत्रतत्सिद्धान्तः। तदाभा-
he is enjoyer alone, not agent. There is, as different from that, the Lord, omniscient and omnipotent, say some. The self he is of the enjoyer, say others. Thus many people hold different views, basing themselves upon reasoning and texts (both sound and) fallacious. Of these, he, who without inquiry accepts any, will fall from beatitude and attain to evil. Therefore beginning with a statement of the desire to know Brahman, there is begun a respectful inquiry into the Vedānta texts, whose auxiliary is reasoning not inconsistent therewith, and whose purpose is beatitude.

that doubt the desire to know is intelligible: this is the idea. The substrate, which is the basis of dispute, should be admitted to be established by the conclusions of all systems; else, there would be no conflicting views, these having either no basis or different bases. "Vipratipattis" are, verily, conflicting views; and views cannot have no basis, as then they would have nothing to rest on. Nor do those (views) conflict which have different bases. The views that the intellect is non-eternal and that the soul is eternal are not, truly, conflicting views. Hence, it is the conclusion of all systems that the purity etc. of the denotation of the "that" are known from the Vedāntas, while the jīva denoted by the "thou" is established by experience. The conflicting views relate merely to their manifestation or non-manifestation and to the various modes thereof. Therefore, since, in respect of the substrate known in a general way, there are conflicting views as to the
particulars (of its nature), doubt in respect of these particulars is reasonable.

Of these, he shows first the conflicting views about the denotation of the "thou," in the words beginning with "The ordinary man" and ending with "enjoyer alone, not agent". Here, on the views of intelligence as body, sense, mind or momentary cognition, the eternality etc. of the denotation of the "that" cannot relate to the denotation of the "thou," because of lack of compatibility. On the nihilist view too, how can that which is incapable of being spoken of and is not a word-sense be the sphere (of denotation) of the "that" and "thou"? Of the forms of agent and enjoyer too, there is certainly lack of consonance with the eternality etc. of the denotation of the "that," because of mutability. On the view that (the self) though not an agent is an enjoyer, there is lack of consonance with eternality etc., because of mutability. On the view that selves though not enjoyers are many, there continues the same lack of consonance with the denotation of the word "that," because of the non-eternality etc. resulting from definition as a plurality and because of the abandonment of non-duality. Through the conflicting views in respect of the denotation of the word "thou," there are shown similar views in respect of the denotation of the word "that"; that is to say, the Lokāyatikas and others who contend that the Vedas are unauthoritative, verily, hold the cognition of the denotation of the "that" to be illusory, while those who maintain the Vedas to be authoritative, hold that the denotation of the "that" is either figurative or not (primarily) intended (as the object of the teaching),
जिञ्ज्ञासा

तत्त्वानामात्वतचिर्हितोपेषु परमत्व विप्रतिपत्य: ।
तस्मात्सामायत: प्रसिद्धे धर्मिणि विशेषतो विप्रतिपत्ती युक्तस्तकिर्हितोपेषु सताय: ।

तत्र तङ्गदार्थेन ताबधिप्रतिपच्चीर्दिशायिते—देहात्मात्रमू इत्यादिना भोकेव केवलं न कर्ता
इत्यत:न। अत्र देहेन्द्रियमानःकणिकविज्ञानचैतन्यपक्षे
न तत्त्वार्थनित्यतालय: तङ्गदार्थेन संवध्यते, योगः
ताविरहत। शुन्यपक्षे दपि सर्वोपह्यारहित्मादार्थः
कथं तत्त्वमोगोचरे: कर्त्तव्यक्त्वावभावयापि
परिणामितया तत्त्वार्थनित्यतालयसंगतिरेव। अकर्तृ
लेखदपि भोक्तुत्पक्षे परिणामितया नित्यतालयसंगति:।
अभोक्तुलेखदपि नानात्मत्वक्षे नानात्वेनावचिच्छः
तत्त्वार्थनित्यतालयसंस्थाप्तात्त्वेतहानाच
तत्त्वार्थसंगति
स्तवस्वै। तङ्गदार्थविप्रतिपच्चा च तङ्गदार्थेन्द्रपि
विप्रतिपच्चीर्दिशिता—वेदार्थापन्नामाण्यवादिनो हि लोँ
कायतिकायवस्तत्त्वार्थप्रत्ययं मिध्येति मन्यते,
वेदार्थार्थान्वणपिंथौप्यांत्वर्चापि तत्त्वार्थमितिविद्वतं
वा मन्यत मृत:। तदेवः तङ्गदार्थविप्रतिपच्चिर्दाहारा
तत्त्वार्थे विप्रतिपच्च सूचयितवा साक्षात्तङ्गदार्थोऽपि

30
विप्रतिपत्तिकिर्मित्र—अस्ति तद्ध्यतितिक्रिएः
सर्वजः सर्वशक्तिकिर्ति केवलः। ततृ इति
जीवात्मा: परस्त्रिधाति। न केवलं शरीरादिभ्यः
जीवात्मयोपि व्यतिरिक्तः। स च सर्वेऽव
जगत् ईते। ऐश्वर्यसिद्धतर्थ्यः स्वाभाविकमयथ
रूपहयनुकृतम् 'सर्वजः सर्वशक्तिः' इति।
तत्थापि जीवात्मयोपि व्यतिरेकात् न तन्त्र
पदार्थिन सामानाधिकरणमभिन्नं स्वमतमाह—
आत्मा स भोक्तुरित्यपर। भोक्तुर्जीः
वात्स्यायविचिपोषेकर्षण स ईश्वरः तत्पदार्थः आत्मा;
तत् ईश्वरादिभिः जीवात्मा, परमात्मादिव
घटकाकाशायै इत्यथः।

विप्रतिपत्तिक्षतसंहरनः विप्रतिपत्तिनिषिद्धमाह—
एवं वहव इति। युक्तः युक्तस्मात्वत्वाक्यायाक्याय
भास्माद्रयः: सम्त इति योजना। नन्तु
सन्तु विप्रतिपत्तः: तत्सन्नित्वं संशयः; तथापि
kमथे श्रावमांसा आरूभ्ये इत्यत आह—
तत्त्वाविचारः इति। तत्त्वज्ञानानाथ निःशेषसाधिगमः,
नात्त्वज्ञानाज्ञितमहितः। अपि च अत्त्व—
Thus, having, through the conflicting views about the denotation of the "thou," indicated the conflicting views about the denotation of the "that," he states the conflicting views directly relating to the denotation of the "that": "There is, as different from that, the Lord, omniscient and omnipotent, say some." "That" relates to the jiva-selves. He is different not merely from the body etc., but also from the jiva-selves. And he is also the ruler of the whole universe. His two natural attributes of omniscience and omnipotence are mentioned to establish rulership. Even this (ruler), being different from the jiva-selves, cannot have an appositional relation with the denotation of the "thou"; hence, he states his own view thus: "The self, he is of the enjoyer, say others." Of the enjoyer, i.e., of the jiva-self conditioned by Nescience, he, the Lord, the denotation of the "that," is the self; hence, non-different from the Lord is the jiva-self, as the pot-ether etc. from the ether at large; this is the sense.

In finishing with the conflicting views, he states the cause of these views: "Thus, many" etc. They base themselves on reasoning, sound or fallacious, and on texts, soundly or unsoundly interpreted; this is the construction. Now, let there be conflicting views, and let doubt be their cause; even so, why should the inquiry into Brahman be commenced? To this he says: "Of these, he, who without inquiry" etc. Beatitude can come from knowledge of the truth, not of untruth. Further, if
because of untrue knowledge there is loss of faith, evil too follows, he says: "and attain to evil" etc. He concludes the purport of the aphorism: "Therefore" etc. The inquiry into the Vedāntas is but reasoning; other reasoning, which does not conflict therewith, such as is mentioned in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and in the Nyāya-sūtras, in discussing the authoritativeness of the Vedas, of perception etc.; that of which these are auxiliaries is thus mentioned. Hence, it is established that the inquiry into Brahman, which brings about the knowledge of Brahman, the means to supreme beatitude, should be commenced.
ज्ञानाभासितक्ये सति अनर्थप्राचिसिरपीत्याह—
अनर्थ च इति। सूत्रतात्त्वसुपसंहरति—
तस्मात् इति। वेदान्तमीमांसा तावत्तके एव,
तदविरोधिनश्च चेष्टन्येषपि तर्कम अथवामीमांसायाः
न्याये च वेदप्रत्यक्षादिद्वामाण्यपिरिशोधनादिपूत्ता:
ते उपकरण यस्या: सा तथोत्तरा। तस्मात्त्वरमिनि:—
श्रेयससाधनव्रहज्ञानप्रयोज्यक्षमामीमांसा आरव्यसी
व्येदित सिद्धम्।
वहा जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तम्। किंतुक्षणं 
पुनस्तद्व्रहा इत्यत आहं भगवान्सूत्रकारः—
जन्मायस्य यतः॥२॥

तद्वैं प्रथमसूत्रेण मीमांसारभमुपपाध वहा- 
मीमांसामारभते—जन्मायस्य यतः। एतस्य 
सूत्रस्य पातनिकामाह भाष्यकारः—वहा जिज्ञासि- 
तव्यमित्युक्तम्; किंतुक्षणं पुनस्तद्व्रहा। 
अत्र यथपि वहास्वरूपज्ञानस्य प्रधानस्य प्रतिज्ञाया 
तदज्ञान्यपि प्रमाणादीनि प्रतिज्ञातानि, तथापि 
श्रवणस्य प्राधान्यात्वेकवैश्वित्य प्रथमं समर्थ्ये। 
तत्र यथावदन्तुभृते तत्सब्य परिभिमितविषुद्भमुदं 
विध्वंसि च; न तेनोपपवेन तदहुल्लर्य 
नित्यशुद्भुद्भवस्मभावस्य वहाणः स्वरूपं शक्यं 
लक्षणित्। न हि जातू कत्रितकृतकतेन 
नित्यं लक्ष्यति। न च तदभरणं नित्यत्वादिना
Brahman, it has been said, is to be desired to be known. What is the definition, then, of this Brahman? To this the venerable aphorist says—

THAT, WHENCE FOR THIS WHAT BEGINS
WITH ORIGINATION

Having thus justified in the first aphorism the commencement of the inquiry, he commences the inquiry into Brahman: That, whence for this what begins with origination. The commentator says by way of introduction to this aphorism: "Brahman, it has been said, is to be desired to be known. What is the definition, then, of this Brahman?" Here, though, from the premising of the knowledge of the nature of Brahman as the principal, its subsidiaries such as the means of valid knowledge etc. are also premised, yet since its nature is the principal, that alone is first established by objection (and answer). Whatever is experienced in any way is limited, impure, non-intelligent and destructible; by the knowledge of these cannot be defined the nature of Brahman, which is opposed to them, being of the nature of eternal purity and intelligence. No one ever defines the eternal by what is produced. Nor can it be defined by its own attributes
What begins with *janma*, *i.e.*, origination; thus it is an adjectival compound indicating its own attribute. The meaning of the compound is: origination, sustentation and destruction. And of origination the primacy depends on both statements of Scripture and the nature of things. It is thus stated in Scripture: "That whence these beings originate." In this passage the such as eternality, since these are not already known. What is well-known is, indeed, a definition, not what is absolutely unknown. And similarly, not even verbal testimony obtains here, since Brahman being absolutely unknown is not the meaning of a word and hence cannot be the meaning of a sentence. Hence, in the absence of a definition, Brahman cannot be desired to be known; this is the view of the objector.

This objection the revered aphorist answers: "That, whence" etc. Let not this experienced universe be the definition of Brahman, either as its attribute or through identity with it; but it may well be (the definition) as originated by the latter, just as the attainment of different localities is (a definition) of the motion of the sun; this is the purport.

He analyses the parts of the aphorism: "what begins with *janma*, *i.e.*, origination" etc. For the sake of parsimony, the aphorist uses the neuter *janmādi*; and the commentator, in order to justify this, gives the *samāhāra-dvandva* (in the neuter): *janma-sthitī-bhaṅgam* (origination, sustentation and destruction).
जन्म उत्पत्ति: आदि: अस्य—इति
तद्हुंसंविज्ञानो बहुत्री:। जन्मास्थिति:
भवं समासारः। जन्मनथादितं श्रुति:
निर्देशापैक्षः वस्तुवृत्तापैक्षः ́। श्रुतिनिर्देशापैक्षः
स्तावत्—‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि
तद्हृत्ये, तस्यानुपलब्ध्यचतवात्। प्रसिद्धि हि
लक्षणं भवति, नात्यन्त्रप्रसिद्धम्। एवं च न
शव्वद्धृत्युत्र प्रकर्मः, अत्यन्त्रप्रसिद्धतेऽग्रह
्योपदर्थ्यायवायायाचतवात्। तस्माद्लक्षणाभवात्
न यहा जिज्ञासित्यमित्यायाक्षेपाभिमिवः।

तत्तमामध्येऽ: भगवान् सूत्रकारः परिहरति—
‘जन्मायथस्य यतः’ इति। मा भूततुभूयतयान्
जगत्वर्तत्येऽ तात्तत्त्वमेऽ वा व्रहणो लक्षणमुः;
तदुपस्त्या तु भविषयति वेदान्तप्रातिरिव
सवितुर्विद्याया इति तत्त्वयथः।

सूत्रायायान विभजते—जन्मोपतप्तिरामादिरस्य
इति। लाघवाय सूत्रकृताऽजन्मादिति नषुःक
प्रयोगः कृतः; तदुपपदनाय समाधारमाह—
जायन्ते' इति, असिन्नवाक्ये जन्मस्थितिप्रलयानां क्रमदर्शनात्। वस्तृवृज्ञा मपि जन्मना लघुसताकस्य धार्मिन्। स्थितिप्रलयसंभवात्। अस्येति प्रलयशादिसनिधापितस्य धार्मिन् इदमा निर्देशः। पश्चात् जन्मादिधर्मसंवन्धाय। यत इति कारणनिर्देशः।

अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेककर्त्त्वभोक्तासंयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियतदेशाकालनिमित्तकियाफलाध्ययस्य मध्यं जन्मस्थितिभझम् इति। जन्मनध्र इत्यादि: कारणनिर्देशः। इत्यत: संवेदभ: निगद्यवायायः।

स्यायेतृतू। प्रधानकालप्रह्लडकालकाविषयः। हेच्छामानाभावेपूणपरिवारस्माने पुत्र जीवोपवधिः सर्वेख्यात्मावें वा जगजन्मादिकारणमिति कुत: संभावनेत्तर आह्-अस्य जगते इति। अत्र नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य इति चेतनभावकर्त्तव्यसंभवनाय प्रधानाच्चेतनकर्त्तिकत्वं नि-
sequence is shown among origination, sustentation and dissolution. And the nature of things is such that sustentation and dissolution occur in respect of a substrate that has become existent through origination. In the expression "for this," by "this" is designated the substrate cognised through perception etc. The sixth case has the sense of relating it to origination etc. "Whence" is the designation of the cause.

Of this universe, differentiated by name and form, containing many agents and enjoyers, the abode of what are definitely regulated in respect of place, time, cause, action and fruit, the nature of whose design cannot even

The passage beginning with "And of origination" and ending with "the designation of the cause" is self-explanatory.

Be this so. When there are so many (likely causes of the universe) floating about, such as primal nature, time, the activity of planetary deities or guardian deities (like Indra, guarding the directions), chance, the nature (of things), and non-existence, why postulate an omniscient and omnipotent Brahman as the cause of the origination etc., of the universe? To this he says: "Of this universe differentiated by name and form" etc. Here, by the qualification "differentiated" etc., causation by an intelligent being is postulated, whereby is ruled out causation by non-intelligent entities like the pradēha or by what
be conceived by the mind, that omniscient and omnipotent cause whence there is the origination, sustentation and destruction—"that is Brahman" is the complement of the sentence (in the aphorism).

is non-existent. That, verily, which is differentiated by name and form, like pot etc. is seen to be caused by an intelligent being. The universe, which is under dispute, is differentiated by name and form; hence, causation by an intelligent being is postulated. The intelligent one, verily, having considered the name and form in his intellect, creates the external pot, with the name "pot," and the form of a narrow neck etc. Hence it is that the pot to be brought into being, only if it exists already in resolve, is the object-causal-condition, in the form "He makes a pot". As they say: "But what is present in the intellect, that is not non-existent." And thus, it cannot be postulated that a non-intelligent entity creates what it cannot consider in the intellect; this is the idea.

Be this so. The intelligent planetary deities or the guardian deities may create the universe, having considered names and forms in their intellects; Brahman of the nature mentioned above is unnecessary. To this he says: "containing many agents and enjoyers," Some are agents like cooks, sacrificial priests (ṛtviks) etc., not
नसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य जन्मस्थितिभिः प्रकरणात् तद्रूपस्य वाक्यश्रेष्ठ।।

रूपाल्यकर्तृकार्थं च व्यासेधित। यत्र नामन रूपम् च व्याक्रियते तथेतनकर्तृकार्थं द्यम्, यथा घटाति। विवादाध्यायानि च जगताम्य रूपम् च व्याकृतम्; तस्मात् तत्तनकर्तृकार्थं संभाव्यते। चेतने हि बुद्धावासिस्य नामरूपे घट इति नामन रूपम् च कम्ब्रुग्रीवादिनां बाहं घटं निष्पादयति। अत्र एव घटस्य निर्विचारस्यायनं:-संकल्पतम्य सिद्धस्य कर्मकारकमयाव: ‘घटं करोडः’ इति। यथाहु:—‘बुद्धिनिविधं तु न तदस्तु’ इति। तथा चेतनेऽहि बुद्धावासिस्य करोडः इति न शक्यं संभाव्यायूषितिः भव:।

स्यादेतत। चेतना प्राप्ता लोकाला वा नामरूपे बुद्धावासिस्य जगजननिर्घेर्कितम्, कृतम् उत्तर्भवेन व्रहणेति आह—अनेककर्तृ-भोजकृतृसंपुष्कृतम् इति। केचित्कर्तिरूरूर्वतीतिः, यथा
सूद्रतिगावः, न भोक्ताः। केचितु भोक्ताः,
यथा श्राद्वेशानपेण्यऽचादिः पितापुत्रादः, न
कर्ताः। तस्मादुभयग्रहः। देशकालतिष्ठितः-
कियाकलानि इतीतेरतरदः। देशादीनि च
तानि प्रतिनियतानि चेति विग्रहः। तदाश्च यो
जगत्; तथ। केचितवल्लु प्रतिनियतेदेशोऽरादः,
यथा कृष्णस्वागः। केचित्रतिष्ठितकालोऽरादः,
यथा कोकिलावः। केचित्रतिष्ठितनिमित्ता,
यथा नवाम्बुद्वाचानाधिनिमित्ता बलाकागभः।
केचित्रतिष्ठितनियतकियाः, यथा ग्राह्यानां याज-
नादः, नेत्रेशः। एवं केचित्रतिष्ठितफलः,
यथा केचितसुविकः केचिहुःविकः, एवं य एव
सुविकस्त एव कदाचिदृढःविकः। सर्वेशुदादा-
कस्मिनकायानिमि याद्चिन्तकेच स्वाभाविकते
चासवेज्जास्वेजकार्यतेच न घटेते, परिमित-
ज्ञानश्चात्मिन्द्रहेलोकपालादिमित्तावर्त्तं
कर्तृ चाराक्यवताः। तदिद्मुतम—मनसाध्यचित्तिवर्णनाः
रूपस्य हि। तदिद्मुतम—मनसाध्यचित्तिवर्णनाः
रूपस्य हि।
enjoyers. Some others, however, are enjoyers, as the fathers in the sr̥uddhas, and the sons in the Vaisvānareśṭi,—not agents. Hence the mention of both. The compound—place-time-cause-act-fruit—is an itaretara-dvandva; and it has to be split up into: place etc., these being defined with respect to each. The abode of these is the universe; of this (universe, the cause etc.). Some, indeed, are created in definite places, e.g., black antelopes etc. Some are created at definite times, e.g., the warbling of the cuckoo etc. Some are occasioned by definite causes, e.g., the impregnation of storks occasioned by the thunder-clap of the early clouds (of the rainy season). Some perform definite acts, e.g., such acts as the performance of sacrifices (for others) belong to brāhmīns alone, not to others. Similarly, some enjoy definite fruit, e.g., some are happy, some are miserable, likewise those who are happy are themselves at other times miserable. All this does not fit in with creation by yadṛcchā, which is another name for chance, or by the nature (of things), or (even) by one who is not omniscient and omnipotent, since the planetary and guardian deities, whose knowledge and capacity are limited, cannot know and produce (the universe). That is thus said: "the nature of whose design cannot even be conceived by the mind." The nature of the design even of a single body cannot be conceived by the mind at any time; remote indeed is (the possibility of conceiving) the design of the universe; how then to
DEFINITION

Of all other modifications of being, there is inclusion even in the three; hence are mentioned here origination, sustentation and destruction. But if what are enumerated by Yaska, namely, "originates," "exists" etc., were taken, since they occur in the period of the world's sustentation, the origination, sustentation and destruction of the world from its primal cause would not be apprehended: this doubt may arise; lest one should doubt so, that origination from Brahman, the cause, and sustentation and dissolution even in that, these alone are apprehended.

create? This is the sense. He completes the text of the aphorism: "that is Brahman" is the complement of the sentence."

Be this so. Why should origination, sustentation and destruction alone be understood here by "what begins with," not growth, transformation and decrease as well? To this he says: "Of all other modifications of being" i.e., of growth etc.. "there is inclusion even in the three". Growth is the increase of parts. Thereby, from that which has few parts, e.g., from two threads, there arises another being, the big cloth; hence, growth is but origination. Transformation, which is of three kinds as defined by dharma-lakṣaṇa,
अन्येषामपि भावविकाराणां त्रिभेवान्तभावं इति जन्मस्थितिनाशानामामह प्रहणम्। यास्कपरिपटितानान् तु 'जायतेतस्ति' इत्यादीनां प्रहणे तेषां जगतः स्थितिकाले संभाव्यमानत्वान्मूलकरणादुपस्थितिस्थितिनाशां जगतो न यथातः स्थुरिताः ध्रुवः तन्मा शाङ्खि इति या उत्पत्तिर्ब्रह्मणः कारणात्, तत्रैव स्थितिः प्रलयश्च, त एव प्रहणते।

प्रागोव जगद्याचारायाः; किम्भु पुनः कर्तुमित्यय्ये। सूत्रवाक्यं पूर्वति—तद्व्रहोति वाक्यरौश।

स्यादतेत्। कर्मस्तुपर्नेत्मस्थितिमिहामात्रमिहा-दिग्रहणेन गृहते न तु वृद्धिपरिणामापक्षाया अपीतत आह—अन्येषामपि भावविकाराणां वृद्धचारानां त्रिभेवान्तभावं इति। वृद्धिस्ताद्व-व्यायोपचयः। तेनाल्पवध्वादवचय्विनो हितत्तुकादेरन्य एव महान्यतो जायत इति जन्मेव वृद्धः। परिणामोपि चिन्दः चर्मस्यक्षणावस्थालक्षणः।
उत्तरीत्रते। धर्मिनो इह हातकादेर्थमेलक्षणः
परिणामः कट्कमुक्ताद्वित पर्योपताच्छिद। । एवं
कटकादरपि प्रत्युपच्छिदावदिक्षणः लक्षणपरिणाम
उत्तरीत्। एवंसरस्थापरिणामो नवपुराणवादिक्षणः
उत्तरीत्। अप्पशयस्तु अवयवहासो नाशा एव।
तस्माजन्मादिधिः यथास्वस्तमन्तर्भूचाहुल्ल्चाद्यः पृथक्कों
नोक्ता इत्यर्थः। अथवेतु वृहथाद्यो न जन्मादिधिधिँमैत्रीः,
तथापुरप्रतिपित्तिभुवत्वमेवोपओपादतः
तत्त्वमः। तथा सति हि तत्प्रतिपादः ‘यतो
वा इमाणि भूतानि’ इति वेदवाक्येऽबुद्धिस्त्रूक्तेऽ
जगन्मूलकारणं बह्य रक्षितं भवति। अन्यथा
तु जायते असि कर्त्ते इलाद्रिनां ग्रहणे
तत्प्रतिपादं नैतकवाक्यं बुधी भवेत्; तच्च
न मूलकारणप्रतिपादनपरम, महासर्वदृढः
स्थितिकालेर्द्रि तद्वायोदितानां जन्माद्रिनां
भावविकारणामुपपत्ते; —इति शास्त्रनिर्मार्कवादः
वेदो हस्तिनिप्रतिपित्तिभुवत्वमेरहणमिल्याह—यास्कपरि
पाठितानां तु इति।
avasthā, and lākṣaṇa, is but origination. For, of the substrate, gold, the dharmā-lākṣaṇa transformation into bracelet, crown etc., is the origination of these. So too, the presentness etc. of the bracelet etc. is lākṣaṇa transformation; that too is origination. Avasthā transformation lies in the distinction of newness, oldness etc. (even in what is present etc.); that (too) is origination. Decrease is the decrease of parts and is but destruction. Thus, being included under various appropriate heads, in origination etc., growth etc. are not mentioned separately; this is the sense. Now, even if these were not included in origination etc., then too origination, sustentation and destruction alone should be mentioned. For, in that case, verily, the Scriptural text teaching these, viz., "That whence these beings originate" etc., is brought to mind, and Brahman as the primal cause of the universe becomes defined. Else, by the comprehension of origination, existence, growth etc., there would come to mind the text of the Nirukta which teaches these; and that (text) does not intend to teach the primal cause, since the modifications of being, such as origination, taught by that text, are intelligible even in the period of sustentation subsequent to the primal creation. In order to remove this objection, there is understood the origination, sustentation and destruction declared in the Veda; thus he says: "But if what are enumerated by Yaska" etc.
Of the universe with the above-mentioned qualities, origination etc. cannot be postulated from the non-sentient Pradhāna, primal atoms, non-existence, a transmigrating being, or (in fact) from anything other than a Lord with the above-mentioned qualities. Nor can it be by its own nature; because here we have to accept particular places, times and causes. This very inference, those, who uphold the causality of the Lord, regard as a proof for the existence etc. of the Lord, distinct from a transmigrating being.

Now, even thus, let origination alone be indicated; therefrom are inevitably understood sustentation and destruction. To this he says: "that origination from Brahman, the cause" etc. By the three, there is indicated its material causality; bare origination, being common to the efficient cause as well, cannot indicate material causality. That is thus said: "even in that" etc.

The purpose served by the special causes and effects mentioned above is now declared: "Of the universe with the above-mentioned qualities," etc. By this (part of the) writing, the postulation has been declared of the content premised, the nature of Brahman, by way of definition (thereof). The means of knowledge thereof
न यथोक्तविशेषणस्य जगतो यथोक्तविशेषणमीश्वरं सुचकं, अन्यत् प्रधानादेचेतनात् अणुभ्यो वा अभावादा संसारिनो वा उत्पत्तादि संभावितं शक्यम्।

न च स्वभावतः, विशिष्टदेशकालीनिमित्तानामिहोपादानात्। एतदेवानुमानं संसारित्वितरं के श्रास्तित्वादि साधनं मन्यन्ते ईश्वरकारणवादिनं।

नन्वेवमपि उत्पत्तिमात्रं सूच्यताम्। तत्तान्तरायकतया तु स्थितिमं गम्यं इत्यत आह्—योतप्तिपर्वेश्च: कारणात् इति। त्रिमिरस्योपादानतं सूच्यते; उत्पत्तिमात्रं तु निमित्तकारणसाधारणमिति नोपादानतं सूच्यते; तद्विस्त-मुक्तम्॥ तत्र इति।

पूर्वोद्दानां कार्यकारणविशेषणानां प्रयोजनमाह्–न यथोक्त इति। तदनेन प्रवर्तेन प्रतिज्ञाविशेषस्य वहस्त्रुपस्य लक्षणादिरेण संभावनोक्त।

तत्र प्रमाणं वक्त्वयम्। यथाहुनैवियषिकः—
नन्विहापि तदेवोपन्यस्तं जन्मादिसूत्रे; न, वेदान्तवाक्यकुसम्प्रथनार्थवात्सूत्राणाम्। वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रेवदाह्य विचार्यन्ते। वाक्यार्थविचारणाध्यवसानानि—

'संभावित: प्रतिज्ञायां पक्ष: साध्येत हेतुना।
न तत्र हेतुमिहाणमुस्ततचेव यो हत:।
यथा च कथ्या जननी' ह्यादिरिति।

इत्यं नाम जन्मादि संभावनाहेतु:। यदन्ये
वैशेषिकाद्य इत एवानुमानादीक्षरविनिश्चयभिच्छन्ति, इति संभावनाहेतुतां द्रढऩितमाह—
एतदेव इति।

चोद्यति—नन्विहापि इति। एतावतेवाचिकि
करणां इत एवानुमानाभिकरणार्थसमन्वणुद्रहस्तावेन परिहरति—न, वेदान्त इति। वेदान्त
वाक्यकुसम्प्रथनार्थतमन्त्र दर्शयति—वेदान्त इति।
विचारस्याध्यवसानं सत्वानाविचाह्योच्छेदः। ततो
हि भ्रामगतेविन्नृत्तिविदिविर्भाष्यः। तत्कं भ्रामणि
Now, here too that same thing has been premised in the aphorism, "That, whence for this what begins with origination". No; because the aphorisms have the purpose of stringing together the Vedânta texts like flowers. For, it is the Vedânta texts that are cited and considered by the aphorisms. Brahman-realisation, has to be declared. As the Naïyâyikas say: "That subject which has been postulated (as possible) in the premise can be established by means of a probans; that which is contradicted even at the moment it arises cannot be saved by means of a probans, e.g., 'the barren woman is a mother'" and so on. Thus, origination etc. are the grounds for postulation. Others, like the Vaisesîkâs, desire to establish Isvara by inference from these very grounds. This, he mentions, in order to strengthen them as grounds for postulation: "This very inference" etc.

He questions: "Now, here too" etc. The subject-matter of the section (adhikaranya) being concluded even with this, he answers the question, in the capacity of a friend, with reference to the subject-matter of the succeeding section: "No; because the aphorisms have the purpose" etc. This very purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Vedânta texts is shown: "For, it is the Vedânta texts" etc. The end of the inquiry is the destruction of the twofold Nescience along with the impressions. Thence, verily, the accomplishment, i.e. manifestation of Brahman, realisation.
indeed, is accomplished at the end of the inquiry into the meaning of the texts, and is not accomplished by other means of valid knowledge like inference. While, however, there are the Vedānta texts which declare the cause of the origination of the universe, in order to confirm the apprehension of their meaning, inference too, such as is not opposed to the Vedānta texts, becomes a means of valid knowledge, and as such it is not avoided; because argumentation is accepted as an auxiliary even by Scripture. It is thus: the Scriptural texts, "It is to be heard, to be reflected on" (*Brh.*, II, iv, 5), and "A learned and intelligent man reaches the Gāndhāra country; even so here, a man knows when he has a teacher" (*Chānd.*, VI, xiv, 2), show of the self that it is helped by the human intellect.

In respect of that Brahman, is no means of knowledge to be followed other than verbal testimony? Then, whence reflection? And whence the intuition which is the experience thereof? To this he says: "While, however, there are the Vedānta texts" etc. Inference should be understood to be of that variety which is not in conflict with the Vedānta and also dependent on it. Discrimination by reasoning, not in conflict with verbal testimony, and dependent thereon, is called reflection. Reasoning is either presumption or inference.
श्रुत्ता हि ब्रह्मवगति:, नानुमानानादिरहमान्तरनिर्दृष्टा । सत्सु लु वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगते जन्मादिकारणवादिषु, तदर्थभ्रण-दार्श्याय अनुमानमापि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं भवतू न निवार्यते, श्रुत्येव च सहाय-त्वेन तर्कस्याप्स्यभुपेतत्वात् । तथा हि—
‘श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः’ इति श्रुति:, ‘पणिद्दतो मंदधावी गान्धारानेवोपसंपयैवतेवमेवेहाचार्ये-वान् पुरुषो वेद’ इति च पुरुषबुद्धिसाहाय्य-मात्मनों दर्शयिति।

शब्दान्तते न मानान्तरमनुसरणीयम् । तथा च कुतो मननम् । कुत्थ्य तदनुभवः साक्ताकारः ।
ह्यत आह—सत्सु लु वेदान्तवाक्येषु इति।
अनुमानं वेदान्ताविरोधि तदपजीविवेच्य प्रस्तव्यम्। शब्दाविरोधिन्यं तदपजेविन्यं च युक्त्या विवेचनं मननम्। युक्तिक्षेत अर्थातिशिं-रत्नमानं वा।
न धर्मजिज्ञासायामित्र श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम्। किं तु श्रुत्यादयोतुभवादयश्च यथासंभवमिह प्रमाणम्। अनुभवावसानत्वाहृतत्वस्तुविषयत्वाच ब्रह्मजानस्य। कर्तव्ये हि विषये

स्यादेतत्। यथा धर्मं न पुरुषुवृद्धिसहायम्। एवं ब्रह्मापि कस्मच भवतीत्व आहं न धर्मजिज्ञासायामित्र इति। श्रुत्यादय इति; श्रुतित्वहस्पुराणस्मृतय: प्रमाणम्। अनुभव: अन्तःकरणवृत्तिमेवो ब्रह्मसाध्वार:। तत्स्य-विद्यानिरुचिहिरेण ब्रह्मस्वरूपाविर्भावः प्रमाण-फलम्। तत्थ फलविव फलमिति गमयित्वम्। यथपि धर्मजिज्ञासायामिपि सामग्रियां प्रत्यक्षार्धीनां व्यापार:। तथापि साक्षात्तति। ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां तु साक्षादनुभवार्धीनां संभोजनुभवार्धी च ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासेत्याह्—अनुभवावसानत्वात्। ब्रह्मानु-भवो ब्रह्मसाध्वारः। परमपुरुषार्थः। निर्माण-निरिल्लुः। च परमानन्दरुप्तवादिति।
DEFINITION

Nor is it that, as in the desire to know Religious Duty, Scripture etc. alone are the authority, in the case of the desire to know Brahman; on the contrary, here Scripture etc., as also experience etc. are means of valid knowledge, as and when applicable, since the knowledge of Brahman culminates in experience.

Be this so. As the human intellect is of no aid in the knowledge of Religious Duty, why should it not be likewise in respect of Brahman also? To this he says: "Nor is it that, as in the desire to know Religious Duty" etc. "Scripture etc.": Scripture, epics, purāṇas and traditional Codes are the means of valid knowledge. Experience is a particular psychosis of the internal organ, viz., the intuition of Brahman; the fruit of that means of valid knowledge is the manifestation of the nature of Brahman through its removal of Nescience. It is to be understood to be the fruit, as it were (since it is not like other fruit created, purified etc.). Though even in the desire to know Religious Duty there is the functioning of the accessories of experience, like perception etc., yet it is not there directly. In the desire to know Brahman, however, experience (i.e., intuition) etc. occur directly; and the desire to know Brahman has experience for its object; thus, he says: "since the knowledge of Brahman culminates in experience" etc. The experience of Brahman, i.e., the intuition of Brahman, is the supreme human goal, being of the nature of supreme bliss whence has been wiped out all misery.
and has an existent object for content. Indeed, in respect of what is to be done, authoritativenss can belong only to Scripture etc., since there is no dependence on experience, and since what is to be done derives its existence in dependence on a person. An action, worldly or scriptural, may be done, or not done, or done in a different way; for example, one goes on horse-back, or on foot, or otherwise or does not go at all. Similarly, "In the Atirātra one should use the sixteenth cup," "In the Atirātra one should not use the sixteenth cup"; "One is to offer oblation after sunrise," "One is to offer oblation before sunrise." And prescriptions and prohibitions would be purportful in these cases, as options or as general rules and exceptions.

Now, let it be that the desire to know has the experience of Brahman for its object; that experience itself is not possible, since Brahman cannot be the object thereof. To this he says: "and (since the knowledge of Brahman) has an existent object for content." The relationship of object and subject is an illusory form of the intuition of (the form indicated by) the absence (of the universe). Not in this way does the knowledge of Religious Duty culminate in experience, since the experience of that is not in itself a human goal, the human goal being realised by the observance of that (duty), and observance being established by mere verbal testimony, even in the absence of experience; this he says in: "Indeed, since, in respect of what is to be done," etc. Nor is it capable of being the content
नानुभवपेश्कास्तीति श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्य स्थात्, पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभमत्वाच कर्तव्यस्य। कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुः शक्यं लोकिकं वैदिकं च कर्मः। यथा अर्थेन गच्छति, पद्मयामः, अन्यथा वा, न वा गच्छतीति। तथा 'अतिरात्रे बोधिनिः गृहाति' 'नातिरात्रे बोधिनिः गृहाति', 'उदिते जुहोति' 'अनुदिते जुहोति' इति। विधिप्रतिषेधाश्च अत्र अर्थवन्तः स्यूः, विकल्पो-  

ननु भवतु ब्रह्माःनमचारी जिज्ञासा; तदनुभव एव तशाक्यः, ब्रह्माण्डस्त्रिपित्यज्ञायोग्यतात् इत्यत आह--भूतवस्तुस्त्रिपित्यज्ञात ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य इति। व्यतिरेकसाधाराकाशय विकल्परूपो विषय-  

न ते वेदं धर्मज्ञानमनुभववाचसाम, तदनुभवस्य स्वयमपुहस्तर्थतात्, तदनुभवान-  
साध्वत्तात्पुरुषर्थस्य, अनुशासनस्य च विनायकसम शाब्दज्ञानमात्रावेव सिद्धे: इत्याह—कर्तव्ये
स्त्रापवादाधारः न तु वस्तु 'एवम्, नैवम्', 'अस्ति, नास्ति' इति वा विकल्पयते। विकल्पनास्तु पुरुषबुद्ध्य-पेशाः। न वस्तुयाथात्मायज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्य-पेशाम। किं तत्ति? वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्त।

न हि स्थाणावेकरसिन् 'स्थाणुर्वा, पुरुषोऽन्यो वा' इति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति। तत्र 'पुरुषोऽन्यो वा' इति मिथ्याज्ञानम्;

'स्थाणुरेव' इति तत्त्वज्ञानम्, वस्तुतन्त्र-ल्वात्। एवं 'भूतस्तुत्वविविधाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतन्त्रम्।

हि इत्यादिनः। न चायं साक्षात्कारविविधतात्योगोपिः, अवर्तमानत्वात्, अवर्त्तमानश्चान-वस्थितवादित्याः—पुरुषाधीन इति। पुरुषाधीन-ल्वमेव लोकिकवैदिककार्याणामह—कर्तुमकर्तुम

इति। लोकिकं कार्यमनवस्थितसुवाहरति—यथा श्रेष्ठे इति। लोकिकेनोदहारणेन सह वैदिक-सुधारणं समुचिनोति—तथातिरत्र इति।
But a thing does not admit of options like, “thus, not thus,” “exists, does not exist.” Options, however, are dependent on the human intellect. The knowledge of the true nature of a thing is not dependent on the human intellect. What then? It depends on the thing itself. Indeed, in respect of one and the same post, true cognition does not arise in the form, “It is a post, or something else, a man”. In this case, “or something else, a man” is an illusory cognition; “It is certainly a post,” is the true cognition, because it depends on the thing. Thus, authoritativeness of what have existent things as content depends on the thing.

of intuition, since it is non-existent in time present, and it is non-existent in time present, not being settled; thus, he says: “and since what is to be done derives its existence in dependence on a person (who acts).” This very dependence of acts, worldly and Vaidic, on a person, he states: many be done or not done etc. He exemplifies the unsettled nature of worldly acts: “e.g., one goes on horse-back” etc. He combines a Scriptural illustration with the one from experience: “Similarly ‘in the atiratra one should use the sixteenth cup’” etc. This illustration is cited to show that it is possible to do or not to do. He gives an illustration of doing in one way or another: “One is to offer oblation after sunrise” etc.
DEFINITION

Be this so. Because of man's freedom in respect of what is to be done, there results the futility of (these) prescriptions and prohibitions, since a person's engaging in and desisting from activity are not dependent thereon. To this he says: "And prescriptions and prohibitions would be purportful in these cases" etc. "One should use" is the prescription; "one should not use" is the prohibition. The offering of oblation is injunctive both when mentioned before dawn and after dawn. Similarly, there is prohibition about touching human bones, as also a prescription to wear them in respect of one who has killed a brahmin. Prescriptions and prohibitions of this kind are purportful. How? To this he says: "as options or as general rules and exceptions." The ca (at the end of the sentence, in the commentary) signifies a reason. Combination being impossible in the case of using and not-using, or of offering before and after dawn, because of their contradiction, and the relation of sublater and sublated being impossible between alternatives which are equally strong, option is inevitable. The prohibited contact of human bones and the wearing of them are opposed to each other, but are not equally strong; hence, there is no option; but of the general rule prohibiting contact, there is sublation by the special rule, the content of the prescription to wear. This is what is said: by prescriptions and prohibitions alone is that unrealised-but-to-be-created thing brought about, whereby there results human freedom even in respect of engaging in and desisting from activity dependent on prescriptions and prohibitions.
कर्तुमकर्तुमिथययेदमुदाहरणमुज्जम। कर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुमिथयोदोदाहरणमाह—उदित इति।

स्यादेतत्। पुरुषवातन्रयात् कर्तेव विधि-प्रतिशयानामान्यथक्यम्। अतद्धीनत्नात् पुरुष-प्रवृत्तिनिविर्योः इतयत आह—विधिप्रतिशयाश्रात्रायथवन्तः। रूपः। गृहातीति विधि:। न गृहातीति प्रतिशेषः। उदितानुदितहोमयोविधि:।

एवं नारासिस्यपर्यन्तनिष्पेयो वा आमश्रव तद्यधेय-विधि:—इत्येवंजातिया विधिप्रतिशयाः अर्थवन्त:।

कुत इतयत आह—विकल्पोत्सर्गापवादावशः।

चो हेतुः। यस्मादृग्रहणाणांणांणांगिरितानुदितहोम-योध विरोधात्। समुद्रघासम्भवेतुत्तवबल्यताः

च वायुवाधकभक्षामावेसतिः अगत्या विकल्पः।

नारासिस्यपर्यन्तनिष्पेयतद्यधेयोश्र विरूढ्योत्तल्य-बल्यताः न विकल्पः। किं तु सामान्यशास्त्रस्य 

स्पर्शनिष्पेयस्य धारणविधिविषयेण विशेषशास्त्रेण 

बाधः। एतदुक्ते भवति—विधिप्रतिशयार्य स 

तादाशो विषयोऽनगातोऽपाचर्यार्य उपनीतः। वेन 

पुरुषवर्ष विधिनिष्पेयाधीनप्रवृत्तिनिविर्योर्थः स्वाः।
तन्त्रं भवतीति। भूते वस्तुनि तु नेयमसि विधा, इत्याह—न तु वस्तेवं नेयम्यं इति।
तदनेन प्रकारविकल्पो निरस्त:। प्रकारिविकल्पं निरेवंति—अस्ति नास्ति इति।

स्यादेतत्। भूतेपि वस्तुनि विकल्पो दृष्ट:, यथा
‘स्थाणृव्वा पुषो वा’ इति। तत्कथं न वस्तु
विकल्पयंते, इत्यत आह—विकल्पनास्ति इति।
पुरुषबुद्धि: अन्तःकरणं; तदपेक्षा विकल्पना:
संशयविपर्ययाः। सत्यामनोमात्रयोनो वा यथा
स्वमें; सत्यामनेन्द्रियमनोयोनो वा यथा ‘स्थाणृव्वा
पुषो वा’ इति स्थाणी संशयः:, ‘पुषव एव’
इति च तिपर्याः; अन्यशब्देन वस्तुः
स्थाणोन्नत्स्य पुरुषस्याभिधानात्। न तु पुरुषतत्वं
वा स्थाणृतत्वं वापेक्षां, समानर्मधमिदर्शनोऽस्मातः
मात्राधीनजनमत्वात्। तस्माद्यथावस्तवो विकल्पना
न वस्तु विकल्पवति वा अन्यथवति वेतयथः।
तच्छानं तु न बुद्धितन्त्रम्, किं तु
वस्तुतन्त्रम्; अतस्तो वस्तुविनिश्चयो युक्त:, न तु
विकल्पनाभ्यं इत्याह—न वस्तुवाचास्त्म्य इति।
But this is not so in the case of existent things; thus he says: "But a thing does not admit of options like 'thus,' 'not thus'." By this is refuted option as to the mode (of being). Option as to the substance itself (lit. the possessor of the mode) is refuted: "'exists,' 'does not exist'."

Be this so. Even among existent things, option is seen, as in "a post or a man." How, then, can it be said that a thing does not admit of option? To this he says: "Options, however" etc. The "human intellect" is the internal organ; options, i.e., doubt and error, are dependent thereon. Either they originate from the mind alone with its impressions, as in dreams; or, they originate from the mind and the senses together with their impressions, as in the doubt about the post whether it is a post or a man, or in the erroneous cognition of it as certainly a man; by the words "something else" (in "or, something else, a man") there is denoted a man, who is in fact other than a post. And they (doubt and error) do not depend on the real man or the real post, since they arise in dependence merely on the perception of substrates with common attributes. Hence, options (doubt, error etc.) which are not of things as they are, do not introduce option into things or change their nature; this is the sense. As for the knowledge of the truth, that is dependent not on the intellect, but on the thing; hence, it is appropriate to ascertain the nature of things therewith, not through doubt etc.; thus, he says: "The knowledge of the true nature of a thing is not" etc.
Then, this being the case, the knowledge of Brahman too depends on the thing itself, because its content is an existent thing. Now, if the content be an existent thing, then Brahman is certainly the object of other means of valid knowledge; and hence a consideration of the Vedānta texts would certainly be purposeless. No, because, not being a content of the senses, the relation is not apprehended. By nature, the senses have objects as their content, and do not have Brahman as their content. Indeed, if Brahman were a content of the senses, there would be the apprehension that this effect is related to Brahman. When the effect alone is

Having made clear in this fashion that the validity of knowledge in respect of existent things is dependent on the things, he declares the objectivity of the knowledge of Brahman: "Then, this being the case" etc. Here, he asks: "Now, if the content be an existent thing" etc. That statement which relates to existent things is, verily, seen to be a re-statement, having an object which is within the sphere of other means of valid knowledge, e.g., "there are fruit on the banks of the river". So too are the Vedānta texts. Hence, these would but re-state what is known through other means of valid knowledge, since they (the texts) refer to existent objects. It has been said that in respect of Brahman, inference with origination etc. of the universe as probans, is another means of valid
तत्त्वें सति ब्रह्मज्ञानमणि वस्तुतन्त्र-मेव, भूतवस्तुविश्वेत्वात्। ननु भूत-वस्तुविश्वेत्वे ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरविश्व-त्वमेवेति वेदान्तवाक्यविचारणा अनार्थ-केव प्राता। न, इन्द्रियविश्वयत्वेन संबन्धायात्मनात्। स्वभावतो विष्यविषया-णीन्द्रियाणि, न ब्रह्मविष्याणि। सति इन्द्रियविश्वयते ब्रह्मणः, इदं ब्रह्मणं संबवं कार्यमिति गृहोत। कार्यमात्रमेव तु गृह-माणं किं ब्रह्मण संबव्यम्, किमंन्येन

एवमुक्तेन प्रकारणेन भूतवस्तुविश्वयाणि ज्ञानां प्रामाण्यस्य वस्तुतन्त्रामाणि प्रसाध्य ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य वस्तुतन्त्र-तामाह—तत्त्वें सति इति। अत्र चोड्यति—ननु भूत इति। यत्किं भूतार्थवाक्यं तत्प्रमाणान्तर-गोचरर्थत्यानुवादकं दृष्टम्, यथा—नन्दास्तीरी फलानि सन्तीति। तथा च वेदान्तः। तस्मात् भूतार्थतया प्रमाणान्तरदृष्टमेवार्थमनुवद्यः। उत्तरं च ब्रह्मणं जगज्ञानार्थितकमनुमानं प्रमाणान्तरम्। एवं च मौलिकं तदेव परीक्षणियम्, न तु वेदान्त-
केनचिद्वा संवध्मू, इति न शक्यं निष्ठेन्तुम्। तस्माजन्मादिसूत्रं नानुमानोपन्यासार्थम्। किं ताहि? वेदान्तवाक्य-प्रदर्शनार्थम्। किं पुनस्त्रेद्रेदान्तवाक्यं यतृ सूत्रेनेव चिन्तक्षयिष्ठितम्?

‘भूगुर्वेव वारणिः: वरुणं पितरमुपससार, अधिहि भगवो बह्द्रोति’ इत्युपक्रमयाह—‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते; चेन जातानि जीवानि; यत्ष्रयव्यभिचारिनिः

तद्रिज्ज्ञासस्व; तदन्त्र्य’ इति। तस्य च

वाक्यानि तद्धीनसत्यतवानीति कथं वेदान्त-

वाक्यश्रव्यनार्थं स्वाभावमित्येषः। परिहरति—

न, इन्द्रियाविषयत्वेन इति। कस्मात्पुनःनेन्द्रिय-

विषयतं प्रतीत इत्यत आह—स्वभावत इति।

अत एव श्रुति—‘पराभिष स्वानि व्यूँवत्वयं-

भृत्तस्मात्पराण पर्यति नान्तरात्म।’ इति।

सति हीन्द्रे इति प्रत्यगातमनस्तविषयतं-मुष-

पादित्म। यथा च सामान्यतो द्यमप्यतुमानं

वहाणि न प्रवर्तिते तथोपिद्यान्तिपुणःतरमुषपाद-
apprehended, it cannot be ascertained whether it is related to Brahman or related to something else. Therefore, the aphorism, "That, whence for this what begins with origination" is not for the purpose of suggesting inference. What then? It is for the purpose of showing the Vedānta texts. What then is that Vedānta text, which is desired to be marked out by this aphorism? "Bṛghu, the son of Varuṇa, approached his father Varuṇa, saying 'Teach me Brahman, Venerable One'"; beginning thus, it is said, "That whence these beings originate, that by which, being originated, they live, that to which they return: desire to know that; that is Brahman." And of

knowledge. Therefore, that (means of knowledge) which is basic is alone to be investigated, not the Vedānta texts, which are true as dependent thereon; how, then, can the aphorisms have the object of stringing together the Vedānta texts like flowers? This is the sense. He answers: "No, because, not being a content of the senses" etc. Again, why is the inner self not a content of the senses? To this he says: "By nature" etc. Hence it is that Scripture says: "The Creator forced the senses outwards; therefore, they see what is without, not the self within." By the words, "Indeed, if Brahman were a content of the senses" etc., there is explained the inner self not being an object of the senses. We shall explain quite clearly later, how even samānyato-dṛṣṭa inference does not apply to Brahman.
this, this is the definitive text. "From Bliss alone, verily, these beings originate; being originated, by Bliss do they live; unto Bliss do they return." There are to be cited other texts too of this class, whose content is by nature eternally pure, intelligent and free, and is a cause omniscient in character.

And it has been explained by us extensively in the Nyāya-kārikās. We shall also explain later how the texts are not restatements merely because of having existent contents. Therefore, everything is clear. And Scripture exhibits origination in "That whence" etc., life or sustentation in "that by which, being originated, they live," and absorption therein in "that to which they return" etc. "And of this, this is the definitive text": there being a doubt as to the content (of the text) being the pradhāna etc., the definitive text is: "From Bliss alone" etc. This is what is said: it is established that just as the stream, which has for its material cause the rope in conjunction with the ignorance of the rope, exists if the rope exists, and is absorbed in the rope itself, even so the universe, which has for its material cause Brahma in conjunction with Nescience, exists in Brahma alone and is absorbed even in that.
निर्णयवाक्यम्—‘आनन्दाद्धेव खलिमानि भूतानि जायन्ते; आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति; आनन्द प्रयन्विभं संविश्वानि’ इति। अन्यान्यप्रेयेवंजातीयकानि वाक्यानि नित्यशुद्धबुद्धस्मृतस्मभावसर्वज्ञरूपकारणविश्वाणि उदाहरतेन्यानि।

विषयमः। उपपादितं चैतदसमाभिविश्वेण न्यायकरणकायम्। न च भूतार्थतामात्रेणानुवादतेतुपरिधापाद्यिषयमः। तस्मात्सर्वंवददातम्। श्रुतिध्व ‘यतो वा’ इति जन्म दर्शयिति, ‘येन जातानि जीवन्ति’ इति जीवनं स्थितिम्, यत्रयन्ति—’ इति तत्तैव लयम्। तस्य च निर्णयवाक्यम्। अत्र च प्रधानादिविश्वत्वसंग्रहं निर्णयवाक्यम्—आनन्दाद्धेव इति। एततुरं भवति—यथा राज्ञ्ञानसहितरज्जुपादाना धाराराज्ञां सत्यासिद्धि राज्ञामेव च लीयते, एवमविद्यासहितायन्त्रोपादानं जगत् भवण्येवासित तत्तैव च लीयत इति सिद्धम्।
जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन सर्वें ब्रह्मेत्युपाक्षितसमू: तदेव द्रह्यवर्गः
शाख्योनित्वात् ॥ ३ ॥

महत् ऋग्वेदादे: शाख्यस्य अनेकविधायानास्यप्रत्येकद्विधायानास्यनित्वस्य प्रदीपवतस्वरथोत्तर:—
वयोति: सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य यो: कारण: ब्रह्मा। न ही द्रह्यस्य शाख्यस्य ऋग्वेदादिकर्णस्य सर्वज्ञगुणानित्वस्य सर्वज्ञात्वन्यतः
संभव्योति। यथाद्रिस्तरार्थ शाख्य यस्मात् पुरुषविशेषाः संभवति, यथा व्याकरणादि

सूत्रान्तरसंवत्तार्थितं पूर्वसूत्रसंगतिमाहं—जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन इति। न केवलं जगधोनित्वादस्य भगवतोः सर्वज्ञता, शाख्योनित्वादापि
बोह्वत्या। शाख्योनित्वस्य सर्वज्ञतासाधनत्वसंसर्यवते—महत् ऋग्वेदादे: शाख्यस्य इति। चातु-
Through the exposition of causality in respect of the universe it has been indicated that Brahman is omniscient. To strengthen this itself, it is said:

BECAUSE OF THE SACRED-TEACHING-SOURCE

Of the great body of sacred teaching comprising the Rgveda etc., supplemented by innumerable disciplines, illuminating all things like a torch, resembling the omniscient, the source, i.e., the cause, is Brahman. Indeed, of such sacred teaching, comprising the Rgveda etc., endowed with the quality of omniscience, the origin can be from nothing but an omniscient being. When a sacred teaching with an extensive theme originates from a particular person, for example, the sacred teaching of Grammar etc. from Panini etc.,

In order to introduce the next aphorism, he states the relationship with the preceding aphorism: "Through the exposition of causality in respect of the universe" etc. The omniscience of the Lord follows not merely from His being the cause of the universe, but is to be understood also from His being the source of the sacred teaching (here, Scripture). He shows how being the source of
although its content be only a part of what is to be known, he possesses more extensive knowledge than that—this is well known in experience. That great being, the source from whom there is, even without effort, on the analogy of sport, like human breath, the origination of that, which is differentiated into various branches, which is the cause of such distinctions as gods, lower animals, men, castes, and orders of life, which is the ocean of all knowledge called the Rgveda etc.,—because of scriptural texts like "Of that great being this is the breath, which is the Rgveda"—is it necessary to say that for that (great being) there is unsurpassed omniscience and omnipotence?

Scripture establishes omniscience: "Of the great body of sacred teaching comprising the Rg-veda etc." Rg-veda etc. are sūstras (sacred teachings) inasmuch as they teach disciples the procedure in regard to all obligatory, occasioned and optional rites belonging to the four castes and four orders, from impregnation to cremation, (all acts) to be performed from the hours of dawn to those of the evening, as also the truth about Brahman; hence too, since they relate to great themes, they are great. Nor is their greatness due merely to the greatness of the themes, but also to their having many añgas and upañgas as subsidiaries; hence he says: "supplemented by innumerable disciplines." Purāṇa, reasoning (nyāya), inquiry (mīmāṃsā) etc. are the ten disciplines; supplemented by them in their respective ways.
पाणिन्यादेः, ज्ञेयकेदेशार्थमपि, स ततो-पञ्चधिकतरविज्ञान इति प्रसिद्धं लोके। किमु वकळयम्—अनेकशास्त्रामेदभिग्नस्य देवतिर्यञ्जनूष्यवर्णांश्रमादिप्रतिभागहेतोः। श्रुगवेदार्थस्य सर्वज्ञानाकरस्य अप्रयोजनेव ठीलान्यायेन पुरस्निः श्रासवत् यस्मान महतो भूतात्तै योः: संबवः—‘अस्य महतो भूतस्य नि:श्रासितमेतत् यहगवेदः’ इत्यादिषुह्रैते:—तत्स्य महतो भूतस्य निरातिक्षायं सर्वज्ञात्वभं सर्वशाक्षिकाल्पं चेति।

वर्ष्येष्य चातुराश्रम्येष्य च यथायथं निषेकादिविशंशान्ताघु स्राहस्सुहृत्तिप्रकर्मप्रदोपपरिसमाप्नीयाः। निलनैमित्तिककामि कर्मपदित्वृप्तु च ब्रह्मत्त्वे च शिश्याणां शासनात् शालस्मुगवेदादि; अत एव महाविषयव्यायां महत्। न केवलं महाविषयव्यायां महत्वम्, अपि त्यनेकादिराज्ञमोकरणत्यापीत्याः। अनेकविधास्थानोपवृंहितस्य। पुराणन्यायमीमंसायम दश विधास्थानानि; तै: तथा
तथा दारोपकृतस्य। तदनेन समस्तशिष्टजनपरि-
प्रहेणाप्रामाण्यशास्त्रामुखप्रकृताः। पुराणादिश्रीणेतारो
हि महर्षयः शिष्यः; तैः तथा तया हारा वेदान
व्याचर्काणीस्तदृश्च चादि-राणानुतिष्ठिनः: परिग्रहितो
वेदः इति। न चायमननववोधको नायप्यपस्यवोधको
येनाश्रमां स्थादित्याः—प्रदीपवतस्वर्थार्थव्ययो-
तिनः। सर्वधर्मजातं सर्वधाराववोधयन् नानववोधको
नायप्यपस्यवोधक इत्यथः। अत एव सर्वज्ञकृतस्य
सर्वज्ञसद्वारस्य। सर्वज्ञस्य हि ज्ञानं सर्वविषयं
शाख्यसायण्यभिधानं सर्वविषयाचिनि सादद्भयम्।
तदविमलन्यमुक्तता व्यतित्तिमहाः—न हीदशा-
स्य इति। सर्वज्ञस्य गुणः सर्वविषयात्; तदनिति
शाख्यम्, अस्यापि सर्वविषयात्। उत्तरः निष्ठ
प्रमाणस्य—यथदिर्गतराय शाख्य यस्माद
स्यथुपरिवरीशास्त्रभवति स पुरुषविशेषः। ततोपि
शाख्यत: अधिकतरविज्ञानः इति योजनः।
अयत्त्वंप्रथमदादिभियस्मीचीनार्थविषयं शाख्यं विर-
चते तत्रास्तां वक्तृत्वाः वाक्यावृत्तामधिकार-
विषयम्। न हि ते ते असाधारणमः अनुभूयः।
Thereby is removed even the doubt as to its (Scripture's) authoritiveness, because of its being recognised by all worthy men (siṣṭas). Worthy men, verily, are the great sages, the authors of the purāṇas etc.; by them who elaborated the Vedas through their respective (teachings) and practised with devotion the sense taught therein, (the authoritiveness of) the Veda is accepted. Nor does this fail to instruct or instruct but not clearly, in which case its authoritiveness would be suspect; thus he says: "illuminating all things like a torch." Illuminating all things in all ways, they are neither non-instructive nor not-clearly-instructive: this is the sense. Hence it is they are sarvajña-kalpa, i.e., like the omniscient one. The knowledge of the omniscient one extends to all things; the subject-matter of the sacred teaching extends to all things; hence the likeness. Having thus stated the co-presence (of cause and effect) he states their co-absence: "Indeed, of such sacred teaching" etc. The attribute of the omniscient one is knowledge of all themes; that attribute pertains to Scripture, since all themes belong to that too. He proves the said sense: "When a sacred teaching with an extensive theme originates from a particular person, he," that particular person, "possesses more extensive knowledge than that" sacred teaching: this is the construction. Even to-day, when those like us declare a body of sacred teaching which contains valid sense, there is knowledge of more themes in us, the speakers, than in
our expressions. The distinctive attributes of various things cannot, indeed, be declared, though experienced. The difference in the sweetness of sugar-cane, milk and jaggery cannot, verily, be given expression to even by Sarasvati. The use of the word "extensive" is to indicate that though the sense of a statement may be extensive, yet its content is not equal to that of the knowledge of him who makes it. He declares the conclusion along with the application (upitera): "Is it necessary to say" etc. That great being, from which source there is the origination of the Veda, what need be said of the unsurpassed omniscience and omnipotence of that great being, Brahman? That is the construction. "Of that which is differentiated into various branches": the application (upitera) is from "Of that differentiated" up to "origination": the conclusions begins with "of him, that great being" and ends with "omnipotence". "Even without effort": i.e., with very slight effort, as when one says: "The barley porridge is saltless." What divine sages too cannot compass even with great effort, He effects that with very slight effort, as if in sport; thus are declared His unsurpassed omniscience and omnipotence. For His creation of the Vedas without effort there is cited Scripture: "Of this great being" etc.3 Even by those who recognise the eternality of letters (the Mīmāṃsakas), the non-eternality of words and sentences should be admitted. A word is, indeed, composed of letters differentiated by sequence. A sentence is composed of words differentiated
माना अपि शाक्य वक्तुम्। न खल्विश्वशुकीर-गुढादीनां मधुरसम्भेदः। शाक्यः सरस्वत्याम्याया-तुम्। विस्तराध्यमपि वाक्यं न वक्तुज्ञानेन तुत्य-विषयमिति कथयितुं विस्तरस्थ्राणम्। सोपनयं निगमनमाहल—किमु वक्तिव्यम् इति। वेदस्य यस्मात् महतो भूतात् योने: संभवः। तस्य महतो भूतस्य श्रद्धाणो निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञतं सर्वशक्तित्वं च किमु वक्तिव्यमिति योजना। अनेकशाखा इति। अत्र च अनेकशाखामेदमिन्नस्य इत्यादि: संभव इत्यन्तं उपनय:। तस्य इत्यादि रस्यशक्तित्वं च इत्यन्तं निगमनम्। अप्रयजनेनैव इति। ईष्टप्रयजनेन, यथा ‘अलंकण यवानुः’ इति। वेदस्यो हि महा-परिश्रमेणापि यत्राशाक्ता। तद्यमित्यप्रयजनेन हीलमैव करोतीति निरतिशयमस्य सर्वज्ञतं सर्वशक्तित्वं चोतकं भवति। अप्रयजनेनस्य वेदकतृत्वे श्रुतिह्या ‘अस्य महतो भूतस्य’ इति। येनपि तावत् वर्णानां नित्यमास्तरिष्टत है तेर्पि पदवायादीनामनित्यमभुपेयम्। आनुपूर्वीमेदवंतो हि वर्णा: पदम्। पदानि चानुपूर्वीमेदवंति वाक्यम्। व्यक्ति—
धर्मशानुपूर्ति न वर्णधर्मः, वर्णाणां नित्यानां विभृनां च कालतो देशातो वा पौर्णिपायोगात्। व्यक्तिशानित्येति कथं तदुपग्रहीतानां वर्णाणां नित्यानामपि पद्ता नित्या ? पदानित्यतया च वाक्यादीनामप्यनित्यात् व्याख्याता। तस्मान्नुत्तरकरणवत् पदानुत्करणमपि। यथा हि यादशं गात्रचलनादि नर्तकः करोति तादशमेव शिख्यमाणानुकरोति नर्तकी, न तु तदेव व्यन्तकं, एवं यादश्रीमानुपूर्वी वैदिकाणां वर्णपदादीनां करोत्यायापथिता तादश्रीमेवानुकरोति माणवकः, न तु तामेवोचारयति, आचार्यव्यक्तिभ्यो माणवकः-व्यत्रीनामन्यत्वात्। तस्मात्तिष्ठत्वनित्यं वर्णवादिनां न लोकेक्वैदिकपदवाक्यादिपौष्पेयते विवादः; केवलं वेदवाक्येषु पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यस्वातन्त्र्ये विप्रतिपित्ति। यथाहुः—'यतव प्रतिपेध्या न: पुष्पाणां स्वतन्त्रता' इति। तत्र सृष्टिप्रलयमनिन्नतो जैत्याय वेदवाक्यां प्रत्येकादिगुरुप्रत्येकक्रम-विभिन्नानादिमानाचक्षते। वैयासिकं तु मनवर्त्तमानः: श्रुतिस्मृत्तितिहासादिसिद्धसृष्टिप्रल-
by sequence. Sequence, which is a property of manifestation, is not a property of letters, since for letters, which are eternal and all-pervasive, there can be no relationship of before and after, in respect of time or space. Manifestation being non-eternal, how can word-ness be eternal, though the manifested letters be eternal? By the non-eternity of words, the non-eternity of sentences etc. is also explained. Hence the repetition of words etc. is like the (imitative) repetition of dancing. Just as the danseuse, who is instructed, performs movements and gestures like to those performed by the dancing instructor, and does not exhibit the very same gestures, even so the pupil follows the same sequence among the letters, words etc. of the Veda as that adopted by the instructor, but does not pronounce the very same (sequence); for, the manifestations (the sounds) of the pupil are different from the manifestations (sounds) of the teacher. Thus, there is no dispute between those who uphold the eternity or non-eternity of letters as to the creation of words and sentences, whether ordinary or Scriptural; there is difference of view only with reference to the (absolute) liberty of man in respect of Scriptural sentences. As they say: "With effort should we refute (only) the (absolute) liberty of man." The Jaiminiyas, who do not believe in a creation or destruction, teach a beginningless and uninterrupted study of the Veda, through a succession of teachers and pupils like ourselves. But those who follow the teaching of Vyāsa say that, though, according to the doctrine of creation and destruction established in
Scripture, the traditional Code, epics etc., the supreme self, who because of His association with beginningless Nescience is omnipotent and omniscient, is the creator of the eternal Vedas, He is not entirely free in respect of them, since He creates their sequence in such manner as to conform to the earlier ones; (this is) in the same way as sacrifice and brähminicide, which, though illusory effects of Brahman, do not change their nature in a fresh creation, in respect of their leading respectively to good and evil. Not in any creation is brähminicide the cause of good nor the horse-sacrifice the cause of evil, any more than fire can wet or water burn. Just as, in this creation, the study of the Veda in the settled sequence is the cause of prosperity and beatitude, and (studied) otherwise is the cause of evil even as a verbal thunder-bolt,¹⁰⁴ even so does it happen in another creation; hence, the creator, who, though omniscient and omnipotent, creates the Vedas in accordance with what they were in earlier creations, has not a free hand. The Jaiminiyas too prefer to understand by “not being of human origin (apauruseyatva)” the absence of entire freedom for the person (who creates). That is common to us too, with a different purpose.

Nor is it proper (to urge) that, if revealed by one person, there would be no faith (in Scripture). What is revealed even by many persons,—ignorant or wise, yet affected by some defect—is, indeed, not worthy of faith; that revelation, however, is worthy of faith which is made by him, who possesses knowledge of the truth and from whom all defects
यानुसारे अनाधिविचारपहलवानस्वरूपविशेषतःसर्वश्चारणस्यापि परमात्मनो नित्यश्र केदारां योनेरपि न तेषु स्वातन्त्र्यम्, पूर्वपूर्वसर्गानुसारे तादशानुपूर्व्यतिरिच्छन्; यथा हि यागादि-ब्रह्महत्यायोग्योंथानथेहतो ब्रह्मविवर्ती अपि न सर्गान्ते विपरितिन्ति। न हि जातु कचित्संगे ब्रह्महत्याथेहुतरथेहतुश्चारणेऽवो भवति, अभिर्ण कृद्यति, आपो वा दहनति, तहत्। यथान्तर सगुर्ण मियतानुपूर्वते वेदाध्ययनम्युदयति:श्रेयस्तेहतु:, अन्यथा तद्वै वायुवंतयानथेहतु:, एवं सर्गान्त-राज्यपीति तदनुरोधात सर्वज्ञापि सर्वश्चाचतिरिपि पूर्वपूर्वसर्गानुसारे वेदाध्ययनचतु स्वतन्त्रः। पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यमां चापोषेऽयं रोचनले जैमिनिया अपि। तत्त्वस्माकमपि समानम्, अन्यत्रभिन-निवेशात।

न चैकस्य प्रतिभाने अनाधास इति युक्तम्। न हि बहुनामप्रज्ञानं विज्ञानं वा आश्यदोषवत्ता प्रतिभाने युक्त आधासः; तत्त्वज्ञानवत्रस्वपात्समस्तदोषयोश्चायपि प्रतिभाने
अथ वा यथोक्तस्मृतिमेवदादिशाभ्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणमस्य भ्रामणो यथावस्तव-रूपाधिगमे। शाख्रादेव प्रमाणात् जगतो जन्मादिकारणं भ्रामाधिगम्यत् इत्यभिप्रायः। शाख्रमुदाहरं पूर्वसूत्रेश्—‘यतो वा इमानि सूतानि जायन्ते’ इत्यादि। किमथं तस्यं तत्त्र सूत्रम्, यावते पूर्वसूत्रेणैव एवजातीयं शाख्रमुदाहरं शाख्रयो-नित्वं भ्रामणो दर्शितम्? उच्यते—तत्र सूत्राक्षरेन सप्तं शाख्रस्यानुपादानां—

युक्त एवाध्यायः। सर्गादिभुवं च प्रजापतिदेववर्षीं धर्मे जनात्सैर्यैर्युपसिद्धानासुपपद्धं तत्त्र-रूपाधाराम्; तत्त्रत्येन चाॅर्चीनानामि पत्र संप्रत्ययं इत्युपपलं भ्रामणं: शाख्रयोनित्वम्, शाख्रस्य चापौरुषेय्य्त्वम्, प्रामाण्यं चेति। इति प्रथमवर्णेकम्।

वर्णकालंतरममिहः—अथ वा इति। पूर्वेणाधिकारणेन भ्रामसर्पस्पल्यनासंभवास्माञ्च ग्युदस्य
Or else, the sacred teaching comprising the Rgveda etc., as described above, is the source, i.e., the cause or the authority for understanding correctly the nature of this Brahman. It is only from the sacred teaching as authority that Brahman is understood to be the cause of the origination etc. of the universe: this is the idea. In the previous aphorism has been cited the sacred teaching beginning with "That whence these beings originate". Then for what purpose is this aphorism, inasmuch as in the previous aphorism itself the source of Brahman was shown to be the sacred teaching, through the citation of sacred teachings of this class? The reply is: there, the sacred teaching has not been have been banished, even though he is but one. In the case of those who existed at the first creation, like Prajāpati and the divine sages, who possess in abundance virtue, wisdom, non-attachment and lordly power, the ascertain- ment of His nature is intelligible; through their faith follows the faith of later ones; hence, Brahman's being the sacred-teaching-source is intelligible, as also the non-human origin and validity of the sacred teaching. This is the first explanation (of the aphorism).

He begins another explanation: "Or else" etc. In the previous section, the impossibility of a definition of Brahman's nature was refuted and the possibility of a definition stated. Of that same definition the doubt is removed,
explicitly stated in the words of the aphorism; so it may be doubted that in the aphorism "That, whence for this what begins with origination" mere inference was suggested; to remove such a doubt, this aphorism sets out "Because of the Sacred-Teaching-Source."

that by this may be inferred (the existence of Brahman, e.g., on the analogy of products within our experience which require a creator), and it is said that in respect of Brahman taught by revelation Scripture is the (only) means of valid knowledge. The meaning of the text (of the commentary) is not obscure.
जन्मादिसूत्रे तेषामुनामसुपन्यस्तमित्याश्रयेतः तामाश्वाभा निर्वर्त्तथितुमिदं सूत्रं प्रवद्वृते 'शास्त्रयोगनित्वान्' इति।

लक्षणसंभव उकः। तत्स्येव तु लक्षणस्यांनेन अनुमानत्वार्थाः स्मापकत्व आगमोपद्वर्णनेन वहति शास्त्रं प्रमाणमुक्तम्। अक्षरार्थस्तु अतिरोहितः।
कथं पुनरेभ्यः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुच्यते,
यावता ‘आपायस्य क्रियार्थवादानर्थक्य-
मतदर्थानाम’ इति क्रियापरवं शास्त्रस्य

शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुर्चं व्रज्ञं: प्रतिज्ञामात्रेण;
तदनेन सुकृतेन प्रतिपादनीयम्; इत्युत्त्रं पूर्वपक्ष-
मार्गत्यति भाष्यकारः—कथं पुनः इति। किम्
आक्षेपे—शुद्धबुद्धिदासीर्वभावतया उपेक्षणीयं
वह भूतमभिध्यतं वेदान्तानामपर्यथारोप्येदिशि-
नामप्रयोजनत् लाभातः; भूतार्थतेन च प्रत्यक्षादिद्विमः
समानविषयतया लोकिकात्वक्यतचर्यानुवादक्तेनाना-
प्रामाण्यस्यकः। न केवल लोकिकानि वाक्यानि
प्रमाणांतरविषयस्यमर्थतमवभोध्यति स्वतः: प्रमाणम्;
एवं वेदान्ता अपीत्यनपेक्षात्वलक्षणं प्रामाण्येशां
व्याहन्येत। न च तैरप्रमाणेनेकेविं युक्तम।
न चाप्रयोजनेन: स्वाध्यायाध्ययनविव्याहारिति-
How, again, can Brahman be said to have the sacred teaching as authority, inasmuch as sacred teachings are shown to refer to rituals in "Since Scripture is for the purpose of ritual, there is futility for whatever has not that purpose"? Therefore, there is futility for

That the sacred teaching is the means of valid knowledge in respect of Brahman has been but premised (in the second explanation of the last aphorism); that is to be taught by the present aphorism; hence, the commentator prefaces the aphorism with a statement of the *prima facie* view: "How, again" etc. "How" signifies an objection: because there would result non-utility for the Vedântas, which teach what is not the human goal, declaring (as they do) the existent Brahman, which, being pure, intelligent and indifferent by nature, should be treated with indifference; and because there would result non-authoritativeness for them (the Vedântas) since, having existent objects for their content, they have the same content as perception etc., and are consequently but re-statements, like worldly statements. Worldly statements, which teach the same content as other means of valid knowledge, are not, verily, of themselves authoritative; similarly of the Vedântas too; hence, their authoritativeness consisting in their non-dependence (on any other means of valid knowledge) would be destroyed. Nor is it meet that they should become unauthoritative. Nor unfruitful, for, it is
the Vedântas since they are not for the purpose of ritual; or they may be subsidiaries to the injunction of rituals with the purpose of making known the agent, the deity etc., or they may have the purpose of prescribing other acts like contemplation etc. Indeed, there cannot possibly be the teaching of the nature of already existent things, because a thing already existent is the content of perception etc.; and in the teaching thereof, settled that they have the fruit brought about by the prescription to study one's own Veda. Hence, they subserve acts, their only purport being the teaching of agent, deity etc., required by the respective prescribed rites. If, however, that purport be not accepted, because of non-proximity, then of the Vedântas, there is at least reference to acts like contemplation etc., which are proximate. Thus, indeed, as having for its sphere what is not understood by perception etc., and hence as not dependent on those (pramânas), validity and utility result (for the Vedântas): this is the sense intended (by the objector). The citation of the aphorism of the great sage (Jaimini) is for strengthening the prima facie view (and making clear the necessity to refute it, not for creating faith in it as the final view).

"Futility" means non-utility and non-generation of valid knowledge, being dependent (on other pramânas), because of being re-statements. From "therefore" up to "or, they may have the purpose of prescribing other acts like contemplation etc.," is the compendious statement (of this view). The analytical commentary on this begins with "Indeed, there cannot" and ends with "or is intelligible".
प्रदर्शितम्। अतो वेदान्तानामानर्थ्यक्यम्, अक्रियार्थ्यवात्; कर्तृदेवतादिप्रकाशनार्थः
त्वेन वा क्रियाविधिक्रेष्टम्, उपासनादिक्रियान्तरविधानार्थवत् वा। न हि परिनिषिद्धवस्तुस्वरूपप्रतिपादम् संभवति, प्र
व्यक्तादिविश्यत्वात्यपरिनिषिद्धवस्तुः; तत्प्र

प्रयोजनवत्वचनियमाः। तस्मात्चकिर्लितमपेश्चकिर्लित
कर्तृदेवतादिप्रतिपादनपरस्तनेव क्रियार्थवत्। यदि
त्वसाधनात्मवत् न रोचयते, तत: संनिहितो
पासनादिक्रियार्थवत् वा वेदान्तानाम। एवं
हि प्रत्यक्षचनियानिगतगोचरत्वेनानपेक्षतत्या प्रामाण्य
व प्रयोजनवत्वतं च सिद्धतीति तत्पर्ययः। पारम्पर
सूत्रोपन्यासस्तु पूर्वपक्षदार्ज्जय।

आन्यर्थक्यं च अप्रयोजनवत्, स्वपक्षतत्या
प्रमानुत्पादकतत्वं चानुवादकत्वाविद्यति। अतः
इत्यादि चान्तं प्रहणकन्यक्यम्। अस्य विभागभाष्यं
न हि इत्यादि उपपासा वा इत्यन्तम्।
तिपादने च हेयोपादेयरहिते पुरुषार्थभावात। अत एवं ‘सोलोरोदीत्’ इत्येव-मादीनामानार्थक्यं मा मूर्दिति ‘विधिना लेकवाक्यतवात्स्तुल्यंहेतु विधीनां स्तुः’
इति स्तावकतवेनार्थवत्तमुक्कम। मन्त्राणां
च ‘इषे तव’ इत्यादीनां क्रियात्तसाधनाभिधायकतवेन कर्मसमवायित्वमुक्कम। न कचिदपि वेदवाक्यानां
विधिसंस्पर्शमंतरेनार्थवत्ता हृद्या उपपश्चा
वा। न च परिनिष्ठिते वस्तुस्वरूपे
विधि: संभवति, क्रियाविषयत्वादिधि:।

स्यादेतत। अंत्रियार्थ्येंपि वहस्वरूप-विधिपरा वेदान्ता भविष्यति; तथा च
‘विधिना लेकवाक्यतवात्—’ इति राज्यान्त-
सूर्मयोग्यतिः। न स्वक्ष्यप्रद्वृत्तविवर्तनमेव विधि:;
उपत्तिविधेरज्जातज्ञापनार्थत्वात्; वेदान्तानां चाजावतं वहे ज्ञापयतं तथाभावात्, इत्यत आहं
न च परिनिष्ठित इति। अनागतोत्याद-
there being nothing to be rejected or accepted, there is no human goal. For this very reason, lest there be futility in the case of "He howled" etc., they are stated to be purposeful as being praises, (in the aphorism), "But by syntactical unity with an injunction, they may have the purpose of praising the injunction". And Mantras like "Thee for food" etc. are said to be related to ritual, mentioning as they do rituals or the instruments therefor. (Therefore), nowhere has the purposefulness of the Vedic sentences without association with an injunction been seen or is intelligible. And in respect of the nature of a thing already existent there can be no injunction, because an injunction has ritual as

Be this so. Though not subserving acts, the Vedāntas have for purport an injunction in respect of Brahman's nature; that is favoured by the aphorism stating the final view (for the Mīmāṃsakas): "But by syntactical unity with an injunction" etc. Verily, not that alone is an injunction which induces activity where there was none before; for, the originative injunction has the purpose of making known what was unknown; and the Vedāntas, which make known the unknown Brahman, have this nature. To this he says: "And in respect of the nature of a thing already existent" etc. All injunctions are admitted to have for content only a becoming which is not yet existent and is to be originated; for, the various forms of injunction—the qualificatory (stating the fruit), the applicatory (showing the subsidiariness of the rite to the
content. Therefore, the Vedántas are subsidiary to injunctions of rituals, illuminating as they do the nature of the agent, the deity etc. required by ritual. If now because of the fear that the context is different (from that of ritual), this be not accepted, even then they have for purport the act of contemplation present in their own sentences. Therefore for Brahman the sacred teaching cannot be the source. When this results, the reply is:

BUT THAT, BECAUSE OF THE HARMONY

fruit), the procedural, and the originative (showing the form, i.e., the material and the deity for the rite)—are inseparable one from another, and they do not occur in respect of the existent. But they differ in respect of the purport of the respective statements. For example, the statement "he is to perform the agnihotra" is a statement which is only originative in significance, since by the statement "he who desires heaven is to sacrifice with the agnihotra" there are obtained the eligible person, the application, and the procedure. Nor is it that the application etc. are not present there (in "he is to sacrifice with the agnihotra"); though present, they are merely unintended, being otherwise obtained. Hence, an injunction, which has a volition for its content, cannot result in the case of an existent object. He concludes: "Therefore" etc.
तस्मात्कर्मपीक्षितकर्तृदेवतादिस्रूपप्रकाशनेन क्रियाविधिशोषतं वेदान्तानाम।
अथ प्रकरणान्तरभयांशैतदभृयुपगम्येते, तथापि स्वाक्ष्यगतोपासनादिकर्मपरत्वम्।
तस्मान ब्रह्मण: शाश्वयोनिलिपिति प्राते, उच्यते—

तत्तु समन्वयात् ॥ ४ ॥

भावविषय एव हि सर्वं विचिन्दिपेय, अधिकार-
विनियोगप्रयोगोपतिकपाणा परस्परमविनाभवात्
सिद्धे च तेषामसंभवात्। तदाक्यानां लैंडपर्यं
भिच्ये यथा ‘अभिहोत्रं जुहुयात्वर्गमं’
इत्यादिभ्योधिकारविनियोगप्रयोगाणं प्रतिलभ्यात्
‘अभिहोत्रं जुहोति’ इत्युपतिमानयं वाक्यम्।
न लत्र विनियोगाद्यो न सन्ति; सन्तोषपतयो
लघ्यतात्केतवतमतिविचिन्ता। तस्मात् भावविषयो
विचिनं सिद्धे वर्तुनि भवितमहतीति।
उपसंहरति—तस्मात् इति।
तुरंतः पूर्वपक्षवात्यतथं। तदृशा सर्वं सर्वशक्ति जगदुपचिस्थितिलियकारणं वेदान्तशास्त्राद्वगम्यते। कथम्?
समन्वयत। सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि।

अत्माचिकारणमुक्तव वक्तव्यां पुसंसंक्षमते—
अथ इति। एवं च सति उक्तसूत्रे भ्राह्मणि
शब्दस्यात्यात्यात् प्रभावान्तरणे यादृशमस्य रूपं
व्यवस्थिते न तच्छब्देन विध्यते; तस्योपासना
प्रवतातु, समारोपेण चोपासनाया उपपत्ते रिति।
प्रकृतसंस्कृतरिति—तस्मानः इति।
सूनेण सिद्धान्तरिति—उच्चतं इति।
तवेदद्राच्चे—तुरंत स्री। तविद्युतस्मृति
प्रकृती मित्रजानं विभज्जे—तदृश हृति। पूर्वपक्षी
कर्कशाश्वयः प्रच्छिति—कथम् इति। कु: प्रकार
दिशित्यथि। सिद्धान्ती स्चपके हेतु प्रकार-
मेध्माह—समन्वयात्। सम्यगन्वयः समन्वयः;) 
तस्मात्। एतदेव विभज्जे—सर्वेषु हि
वेदान्तेषु हृति। वेदान्तान्माल्यात्मान्यात् श्रवणः।
The word "but" is to exclude the *prima facie* view. That Brahma, omniscient and omnipotent, the cause of the creation, sustentation and dissolution of the universe, is understood from the sacred teaching, the Vedanta (alone). How? Because of the harmony. Indeed, in all the Vedantas, the sentences run together as having for

Stating the cause of dissatisfaction with that, he ends with another view: "If, now" etc. This being the case, since verbal testimony has no purport in respect of Brahma of the nature declared, that form thereof which has been established by other means of valid knowledge cannot be contradicted by verbal testimony; for, that (verbal testimony) relates to contemplation, and contemplation is compatible even with superimposition. He concludes the present topic: "Therefore, for Brahma" etc. Beginning with "The reply is," he states the final view through the aphorism.

He explains this: "The word 'but'" etc. The word *tat* (in the aphorism) premises the final view; this he analyses: "That Brahma" etc. The upholder of the *prima facie* view, whose mind is hard (and impenetrable), asks: "How?" i.e., "In what way?" The upholder of the final view states the ground of his own view, which is the particular way (demanded by the opponent): "Because of the harmony." Right (full) relation is harmony (*samanvaya*); thereby (is the reference to Brahma established). This itself he analyses: "Indeed, in all the Vedantas" etc. He cites many texts, in the desire to declare that the Vedantas refer solely to Brahma:
purport the teaching of this sense: "Existence alone, dear one, this was in the beginning" (Chänd., VI, ii, 1); "One alone without a second"; "The Self, verily, existed in the beginning as one alone" (Ait., II, i, 1 (i)); "Such this Brahman without an earlier and a later, without an inside and an outside" (Brh., II, v, 19); "This Self is Brahma, the experiencer of all" (Mund., II, ii, 11); "Brahman alone, the immortal in front";

"Existence alone" etc. As for the text "That, verily, whence these beings originate" etc., that was cited earlier and refers to the cause of the origination, sustentation and destruction of the universe; since it will be thus recalled here, it is not mentioned (again). Indeed, that with which a statement begins and that with which it ends, that alone is considered to be the meaning of the statement, by those who understand the nature of the knowledge resulting from verbal testimony. For example, in respect of the text about the upâmsu sacrifice, it is acknowledged to be injunctive of that novel upâmsu sacrifice, on the strength of the syntactical unity with the injunction of the upâmsu sacrifice, preceded by the statement of the defect of apathy (occasioned by) the continuous (oblation of) purodâsa, as also with the concluding (part stating) the remedying of that (defect).; even so, here too, because of the text "Existence alone, dear one, this was" etc., commencing with Brahman, and the text "That thou art" concluding with Brahman as the self of the jiva, the (whole) text has that alone for purport. In the same way it is to be
समन्वय:

तात्पर्येणैतस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादकलेव समनुगतानि—'सदेव सोम्येदमः आसीत्', 'एकेवंवाहितीयमू', 'आत्मा वा इदमेक प्रवाह आसीत्', 'तदेत्यत्राश्चपुर्वभूमनपरमन्तरस्वादामः', 'अयामालम्ब्रह्म सर्वान्नम्भूः', 'ब्रह्मविदेशमूः। इत्या-

यहतामाचिस्यार्थस्य वाक्यान्युदाहरिति—सदेव-हृति। 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि' इति तु वाक्यं पूर्वसुमद्राहं जगदुस्तिष्ठितिनाश-कारणमिति चेह स्मारितभिति न पदितम्।

येन द्रव्यांक्रेती येन चोपसंहितो वर्द्ध वाक्यार्थ इति शान्द्रः। यथोपशुयाज-वाक्येनुचोऽ पुरोडाशायोर्जीमितादोपासंकीतपूर्व-कोपशुयाजविधानेन तद्युत्सविताधानोपसंहरे नापुरोपशुयाजकमेवविविधपा एकवाक्यताबलावाताश्रिता, एवमान्त्रयि 'सदेव सोम्येदमः' इति ब्रह्मोपकबामात्

'तत्त्वासि' इति च जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मनोत्संहारात्

तत्त्वातः वाक्यस्य। एवं वाक्यान्तराणामपि
दीनि। न च तद्वतानां पदानां ब्रह्मनिरपेक्षविषये निश्चिते समन्तवेषवगीतमाने
अर्थान्तरकल्पना युक्ता, श्रुतान्त्यश्रुतकल्पनाप्रसंक्तः। न च तेषां कर्त्ता
देवतादीस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरं अवसीयते, 'तत्केन कं पद्येत्' इत्यादिक्रियाकारक
फलनिराकरणशुद्धः।

न च परिनिष्ठतवस्तुस्वरूपप्रति
प्रत्यक्षादिविषयतः ब्रह्मण: ; 'तत्वमसि'
इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य शास्त्रमन्तरेणानि

पौर्वार्थार्थलोचनाया ब्रह्मपरतमानगत्वम्। न
च तत्तत्वस्य दृष्टिः सति संबंधान्तर्यात्रा
अद्यतन विकुटा कल्पित्तमू, अतिप्रसंक्तः।
न केवलं कर्त्तारं तेषामदृश्य, अनुपपत्ता
चेलाह—न च तेषामू इति।

सांपेक्ष्यतेनाद्यायायं पूर्वपक्षवीजं समारधितवा
दृष्टांति—न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपप्रति
इति। अयमभिसंधि:—पुनःक्यनिदर्शनेन हि
and so on. Nor, when for the words in these texts the ascertained harmony is understood to have for content the nature of Brahman, is it proper to assume any other content; for there would result the abandonment of what is directly stated and the assumption of what is not directly stated. Nor may one conclude that their purport is to teach the nature of the agent, the deity etc.; because there are scriptural texts like, “Then by what and whom could one see?” (Brh., II, iv, 13) which refute action, causal condition and result.

Nor is Brahman, though of the nature of an already existent thing, the content of perception etc.; because, that Brahman is the self, as stated in “That thou art” (Chānd., VI, viii, 7), cannot be understood understood, through the consideration of what goes before and after, that other texts too have Brahman for purport. Nor, when there is the possibility of a seen purport in reference thereto, is it proper to posit an unseen purport in reference to something else, that being an undue extension. Their purport in reference to agents is not merely unseen, but also unintelligible; thus he says: “Nor may one” etc.

Recalling the cause of the prima facie view about unauthoritativeness due to dependence, he condemns it: “Nor is Brahman, though of the nature of an already existent thing” etc. This is what is intended: it is, indeed, on the analogy of human statements, that, as referring to existent things, the dependence of the Vedāntas (on other pramāṇas) is suspected. Here, you being questioned will
have to explain this: is the dependence of human statements because of their reference to existent things or because of their being human? If because of the reference to existent things, then would result non-authoritativeness even for perception etc., as reciprocally dependent; for, they too certainly refer to existent things. If now human statements are dependent as due to the human intellect, then, of the Vedāntas not due to that, though referring to existent things, there is no non-authoritativeness, as for perception etc., (which are valid) as generated by constant causes like the senses, the probans etc.

It may be said: if, indeed, non-human origin were established, then, for the Vedāntas as non-dependent, validity would result; but that itself is not established, because of the reference to existent things; for, since of an existent thing a person can have knowledge, without depending on verbal testimony, through other means of knowledge, the making (of a statement about such a thing) as due to the intellect is intelligible; and the inference as to the human origin of the Vedas can arise unhindered, the probans being (their being composed of) sentences etc. (which are artificial combinations of letters etc.). Hence, dependence is unavoidable, on the ground of human origin, but not on the ground of referring to an existent thing. In the case, however, of that which refers to what is to be done, since what is to be done is novel and not the sphere of any other means of knowledge, and since what has never been experienced before cannot enter the human intellect, either in its own nature or as superimposed, for the Vedāntas signifying this, there can be no creation, and consequently no human origin; hence results (for them) authoritativeness
भूतार्थत्यां वेदान्तानां सापेक्षत्वमावशेषै:।
तत्रैवं भवन्ति प्रौढो व्याच्यातः कि पुनःक्रयानां
सापेक्षता भूतार्थ्येन, आहो पौरहस्येन? यदि
भूतार्थ्येन तत: प्रत्यक्षार्द्धीनामपि परस्परा-
पेक्षत्वेनारामाण्यप्रक्ष्यपः; तात्पत्यं हि भूतार्थण्येव।
अथ पुरुषुडिपूर्वकत्या पुनःक्रयं सापेक्षम, 
एवम तत्वं अत्तूर्वकाणां वेदान्तानां भूतार्थोनामपि
नारामाण्यं प्रत्यक्षार्द्धीनामिव नियतेन्द्रियालिङ्गादि-
जन्मनामम्।

यद्युधेष्टये सिद्धे किलङ्गपौर्हेयते वेदान्तानां
मनपेक्षत्या प्रामाण्यं सिद्धेष्ट। तदेव तु
भूतार्थ्येन न सिद्धिति; भूतार्थ्यशयन्वार्पेषोण
पुरुषेण मानान्तरत: शक्यञ्जानत्वादूलुढिपूर्वं
विचर्चनोपपत्ते; वाक्यतवादिलिङ्गक्ष्य वेदपौर्हे-
यवतानुमानस्याप्रत्यूहस्वप्ते। तस्मात्पौर्हेयतेन सा-
पेक्षत्वं दुर्बरस्म, न तु भूतार्थ्येन। कार्यार्थ्येवे
तु कार्यार्थ्यापूर्वक्य मानान्तरागोचरतया अख्ततान-
नुभूतार्थ्ययो तत्त्वं समारोपेन वा पुरुषुडिद्वारः।
समन्वय:

समारोहात् तद्दृष्टानां वेदान्तानामशक्यरचनात्या पौर्णेयत्वाभावावधानपेक्षा प्रभावण्त् तिथ्यतीति प्रामाण्याय वेदान्तानामपि कार्यसत्त्वात्मातिद्वामहे।

अत्र भूमः—कि पुनरिदं कार्यसम्मितमायुष्मतः यद्यक्ष्म पुरुषेण ज्ञातम्? अपूर्वमिति चेत्, हत्त कुतस्तमथ सिंहाचर्यर्चम्? तेनालोकिकेन संगतिसंवेदनविरहात्; लोकानुसारः क्रियया एव लोकिक्याः कार्यतया सिंहादेवसमात्।

‘स्वर्गकामो यजेत’ इति साध्यस्वर्गविशिष्टो नियोजयो समग्रम्यते; स च तेऽव कार्यमवच्छति यज्ञस्वर्गानुकूलम्। न च क्रिया क्षणभूमार्गामाध्यमकार्यस्वर्गय चक्षु इति परिशोष्यादेत एवापूर्वः कार्यं लिङ्गदीनां संस्कृत्त्राह इति चेत्, हत्त चैत्यवन्दनादिवार्तयोऽपि स्वर्गकामादिपद्वसंवेदनाध्यायपूर्वकार्यत्वसः।; तथा च तेक्याक्ष्य्यशक्यरचनात्यानापौर्णेयत्वापातः। स्पष्टदृष्टेन पौर्णेयार्ते वा तेक्यामपूर्त्तार्थितस्य वाक्यत्वादिना लिङ्गैन वेदान्तानामपि पौर्णेयत्वमनुमितिमित्वः।
without dependence; therefore, in order to secure authoritativeness, we recognise even of the Vedāntas that their purport is what is to be done.

To this we say: what, again, O long-lived one!, is this which is to be done, which cannot be known by man? If it be said to be the unseen potentiality (apūrva), how, alas, does it come to be the significance of the imperative suffix (liṅ) etc.? For, that (apūrva) being trans-experiential, there is no knowledge of the relation (of the word) to that; in conformity with ordinary language, from the imperative suffix etc. there are understood only acts within experience, as what is to be done.

(It may be said that) from the statement "He who desires heaven is to sacrifice," the one, who is qualified by heaven which is to be attained, is understood to be the one directed; and he understands that alone has to be done which is beneficial in securing heaven. Nor are acts, which are destroyed momentarily, capable of securing heaven hereafter; hence, by elimination, it is only from the Veda that there is understood the relation of the imperative suffix etc. to the unseen potentiality, (which is) what is to be done. If this be said, it would follow, alas, that even in texts enjoining obeisance in a caitya (a Buddhist shrine), there is, because of relation to such words as desire for heaven etc., the unseen potentiality (which is) to be done; and thus, creation even of these being impossible, non-human origin would result (for them too). Or, if because their human origin is clearly seen, their signifying an unseen potentiality be denied, then, since human origin may be inferred of the Vedāntas too, (their being composed of) sentences etc. being the probans, (for them too) there
except by sacred teaching. As for what has been said that, being devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted, the teaching is futile, there is not this defect; for, even from the realisation of the self as Brahman, which is devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted, there results, through the destruction of all hindrances, the attainment of the human goal. But of that which teaches the deity etc., there is no opposition even to its subserving the contemplation mentioned in its own text.

cannot be the signification of an unseen potentiality. If the inference from (being composed of) sentences etc. is shown to be fallacious on some other ground, (that ground itself will do, and) the justification (of non-human origin) on the ground of an unseen potentiality being signified is superfluous. And non-human origin has been expounded by us in the Nyāyakanikā; here, however, it is not set forth for fear of prolixity. 109

Non-human origin being thus established, there is not for the Vedāntas, though referring to existent things, any detriment to their authoritativeness on the ground of dependence (on other means of knowledge). Nor is it that there is not the understanding of what has not been understood, in which case, there would be no authoritativeness; for, the jiva’s being Brahman is not otherwise understood. That is thus said: “Nor is Brahman, though of the nature of an existent thing” etc.

Recalling the second cause of the prima facie view, he condemns it: “As for what has been said that, being devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted” etc. From the understanding of the sense of injunctions the attainment
वगम्यमानत्वात्। यत्र हेयोपादेयरहिततवादुपदेशानर्थक्यमिति, नैष दोषः; हेयोपादेयशुन्यब्रह्मात्मतावगमादेव सर्व-केशप्रहाणातपुरुषार्थसिद्धे। देवतादिप्रतिपादनस्य तु स्ववाक्यगतोपासनार्थत्वेष्वे।

पूर्वार्थता न स्यात्। अन्यतब्बृक्तवादार्धीनामनुमानामभास्वस्थोपपादने कृतमपूर्वार्थतेनेत्र तदुप-पादेकेन। उपपादितं चापौषेयन्तसमस्मामिन्यायन-कणिकायाम; इह तु विस्तरसवायार्टम्।

तेनापौषेयते सिद्धे भूतार्थोनामापि वेदान्तायं न सापेक्षत्या प्रामाण्यविधात। न चानाधिगतगतस्वं नारित येन प्रामाण्य न स्यात्, जीवन्य क्राक्ततया अन्यतोनन्धिगमात्। तत्वः-सुक्तम्—न च परिनिधित्ववस्तुस्वरूपपतेष्वे।

हतीयं पूर्वार्थक्षीमं स्मारित्वा दूषयति—यत्र हेयोपादेयरहितत्वात् इति। विध्यार्थ-वगामात् चछु पार्येयेण पुरुषार्थप्रतिलिम्भः।
न कष्टिरिद्रोहः। न तु तथा ब्रह्मण उपासनाविभिषेषतः संभवति, एकत्रे हेयोपादेयश्रूण्यतया क्रियाकारकादिदैत्विज्ञानोपमदृष्टिपठते। न हि ब्रह्मौक्तविज्ञानेनोनमथितस्य वैतविज्ञानस्य पुनः संभवोस्तितः, येनोपासनाविभिषेषतः ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादेयत्।

इह तु ‘तत्त्वमसि’ इत्यवगतिपर्यन्तहार्दाक्यार्थेज्ञानात् बाधानुष्ठानायासानपेशख्तसाक्षादेव पुरुषार्थप्रतितिम्, ‘नायं सर्पं रजुरियम्’ इति ज्ञानादिवैतिकसान सौरजमस्य विभयर्ज्ञानात् प्रकर्षः।

एतदुरं भवति—दिविधं हृदपितं पुरुषं; किंचिदप्राप्तम्, यथा रामादि; किंचित्पुनः प्रासमपि अभमवशादश्रामसम्यगंतम्, यथा स्वत्राकाव्यानं प्रेतेयकम्। एवं जिहासितमपि दिविधम्; किंचिदहीनं जिहासित, यथा वल्यितचरणं फणिनम्; किंचित्पुनहीनं मेव जिहासित, यथा चरणाभरणे नूपरे फणिनमारपितम्। तत्राद्।
It does not, however, happen thus in the case of Brahman that it is subsidiary to the injunction of contemplation; because, being one and devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted, it is intelligible that all cognition of duality such as action, causal condition etc. is quashed. And for the cognition of duality once crushed by the knowledge of the oneness of Brahman, there cannot be a resurrection, in which case there may be taught for Brahman subsidiariness to the injunction of contemplation.

of the human goal is, verily, indirect. Here, however, from the understanding of texts like “That thou art” culminating in realisation, there is, without dependence on the effort of any external observance, the direct attainment of the human goal, as from the knowledge “This is not a snake, but a rope”. This is its superiority to the knowledge of the sense of injunctions.

This is what is said: what is desired by man is, indeed, of two kinds—some unattained, e.g., a village etc.; others, again, which, though attained, yet under the influence of delusion are understood to be unattained, e.g., the necklace round one’s own neck. Similarly, what would be abandoned is also two-fold—some which not already got rid of are desired to be got rid of, e.g., the snake encircling one’s feet; others, again, which having been already got rid of are desired to be got rid of, e.g., the snake superimposed on the anklet adorning the feet. Here, since the attainment of the unattained and the
abandonment of the unabandoned result from the
observance of extrinsic means, there is, subsequent to the
true knowledge of these means, the need for their
observance. Never does knowledge alone remove a thing.
Even a thousand rope-cognitions cannot, indeed, alter the
character of the really present snake. In the case,
however, of those, which being superimposed are desired to
be either attained or abandoned, it is possible to attain
as it were or abandon as it were, by the mere intuition of
the truth, without dependence on any extrinsic observances.
For, they exist by the superimposition alone; and
intuition of the truth plucks out the superimposed by the
root and destroys it. Thus, here too, in the bliss of
Brahman, which through the superimposition due to
Nescience has attained the state of the jīva, which is in
reality devoid of grief, misery etc., this state conditioned
by superimposition is removed by the true knowledge of
the sense of the text "That thou art" culminating in
realisation. On the removal of that, the blissful nature,
though (eternally) attained, becomes attained, as if not
attained (already); grief, misery etc., though (eternally)
abandoned, become abandoned, as if unabandoned (already).
This is said thus: "for, even from the realisation of the
self as Brahman", though the removal in an eminent
degree of all the hindrances of the jīva, i.e., of error together
with its impressions,—that, verily, hinders beings; hence
it is the hindrance—"there is the attainment of the human
goal" characterised by the removal of misery and the
attainment of happiness.
समन्वयः

प्रात्यानुमौले चात्मकल्याणे च बाह्योपायानुष्ठानसाध्यत्वात् तदुपायतत्त्ववादादर्शित पराचिनानुष्ठानापेशा। न जातु ज्ञानमार्कं वस्त्रपनयति।

न हि सहस्रपि रजुप्रत्यथा वस्तुस्तं फणिमन्यथितिमीशते। समारोपिते तु प्रेषितजिसिते तताचारकारमार्केण बाह्यानुष्ठानानेश्वरे शक्यते प्रापुमिव हातुमिव। समारोपमार्क्याविते हि ते;

समारोपितं च तस्त्वाचारकार: समूल्यात्ममुफ्‌

नीति। तथेहार्थविवासमारोपितजीवभावे बाह्य-प्याण्यन्दे वस्तु: शोकेस्वाच्चर्थि समारोपितनिक्षनस्तत्त्वावः ‘तत्त्वस्य’ इति वाक्यार्थः

तत्त्वाचारकाराद्वैगतिपर्यन्ततास्तितेति। तत्त्वाचार्यः प्रास-मय्यानन्दरुपमःमातिम्व प्रासं भवति; लक्ष्मणेश्व शोकेस्वाच्चर्थी मन्त्रेः भवति। तदिद-मुक्तम—ब्रह्मचार्याग्रमादेव जीवस्य सर्वंशेष्य सवासत्स्य विपर्यत्स्य—स हि क्रियाति

जन्तुनात: क्रेशाः—तस्य प्रक्षेपण हनात्

पुरुषार्थस्य, दुःखित्वेतिसुवालित्वक्षणस्य सिद्धे:

इति।
समन्वयः

यथौ 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत्', 'आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत्' इत्युपासाताव्यक्तविद्वातादिप्रतिपदनेनोपासनापरतं वेदान्तानामाशुकं तद्धूलयति—
देवतादिप्रतिपदनस्य तु आत्मेत्येवोपासाताव्यक्तस्य स्ववाक्यगतोपासनार्थेतेष्वपि न कष्ठिद्रिष्टीरोधः। यदि न विरोधः, सत्तु तर्के वेदान्ता देवतादिप्रतिपदनदारणोपासनाबिधिपरा एवेश्यत आह—न तु तथा ब्रह्मण इति। उपायो-पासकोपासनादिभेदसिद्धियोगोपासना न निरस्त-समस्तमेविध्वपेक्षायोपासनादेवान्तिहि संभवतीति 
नोपासनाबिधिरोषतं वेदान्तानां तद्भवित्वात्

इत्यथः।

स्वादेति। यदि विचित्रितहेतुपि वेदान्तानां प्रामाण्यम्, हन्त तर्के 'सोरोदीत्' इत्य- 
द्वीपाद्यमस्तु स्वतंत्रायामेवोपेक्षायियाथ्यान्त प्रामाण्यम्; न हि हानोपादानवुद्धी एव प्रमाणस्य 
फले, उपेक्षाबुद्धेरिस्मि तत्कलितेऽव प्रामाणिकेत्रस्य- 
पेत्त्वात्; इति कृतम् 'वहिंषिषु रजतं न
As for what has been said about the Vedāntas having contemplation for purport, because of the teaching of the deity etc., in such texts about contemplation as “Contemplate as the self alone,” “contemplate the self alone, as the true enjoyment” etc., he condemns it: “But of that which teaches the deity etc.,” i.e., of the word “self” alone, “there is no opposition even to its subserving the contemplation mentioned in its own text”. If there is no conflict, let it be, then, that the Vedāntas have only injunctions to contemplation for purport, through the channel of teaching the deity. To this he says: “It does not, however, happen thus in the case of Brahman” etc. Contemplation, which depends on the establishment of differences of the contemplated, the contemplator, the contemplation etc., cannot occur in the case of Brahman, which is devoid of all kinds of difference and is to be known only through the Vedānta; hence, the Vedāntas cannot be subsidiary to the injunctions to contemplation, being opposed thereto; this is the sense.

Be this so. If there be authoritativeness for the Vedāntas, though not of the nature of injunctions, alas, then, even for texts like “he howled” etc., which refer of themselves (independently of linking up with any injunction) to things to which one should be indifferent, let there be authoritativeness; for, the determination to reject or accept is not alone the fruit of valid knowledge, since the determination to be indifferent is also admitted to be the fruit thereof, by those who know the means of valid knowledge; hence the reference of these (texts) to
Though in other places Vedic statements are not seen to be authoritative except in association with an injunction, yet, since the knowledge of the self culminates in the fruit, the authoritative nature of the sacred teaching with that as content cannot be denied. And not prohibitions like "silver is not to be given (as daksină) in the barhis (sacrifice)" is superfluous. To this he says: "Though, in other places, Vedic statements" etc. It is, indeed, understood that the entire Veda is a means to the human goal, because of its being apprehended in consequence of the injunction to study one's own Veda. Not a single letter of it may fail to contribute to the human goal; what, then, of such a combination of words as "he howled" etc.? And no human goal is seen to follow from the very comprehension of their sense, as from the (comprehension of the) Vedāntas. Hence, such combinations of words, desiring to generate a human goal, are certainly expectant (of something else to complete them). The prohibition too "silver is not to be given (as daksină) in the barhis (sacrifice)" is expectant of the censure of what is prohibited by itself; for, not otherwise is it possible to turn away an intelligent being therefrom. Hence, if no (text conveying) censure be available, even at a distance (from itself), the prohibition itself would create for itself a two-fold capacity, in respect of the prohibition of silver and in respect of the censure, like (the injunction of) the darvi-homa. Thus, of the two combinations of words "he howled" and "silver is not to be given (as daksină)
चाचन्यंत्र वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमः मन्त्रे त्राणम् न हृद्धम्, तथाप्ताम् विज्ञानस्य फलपर्यंतत्तवाम् तद्विशयस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं शक्यं प्रल्याश्यात्मुत्म। न

dेयम् इत्यादिनिषेधविधिपतते वेदादिनेतिशामित्यत आहयथापि इति: स्वाध्यायविचारधीनग्रहणतया हि सर्वो वेदरासि: पुरुषार्थतन्त्र इत्यवगतम्।

tवेयकनापि वणेन नापुरुषार्थेन भविष्यं युक्तम्।

cि पुरायिता ‘सोप्रोदीत’ इत्यादिनार पुष्पकण्येन। न च वेदान्ते इव तद्विशयमात्राद्वेय तद्विशयाय केदित्यप्रवर्ध्य उपलभ्येत। तेनेत्य पुष्पकण्येन साकाक्ष्क: एवार्ते पुरुषार्थमुदीक्षाद्गामण:।

‘वर्णिपि रज्जते न देयम्’ इत्यमापि निषेधविधिः स्वनिषेधविध्येष्य निन्दा: निन्तस्मेकते; न हान्यथा तत्त्वेत: शक्यो निन्तस्मेकतः। तदवै दूषटोपी न निन्दामाफ्यप्यस्तो निषेधविधिर्वेत: रज्जतनिषेध्येष्य च निन्दायां च दृष्टिहोमवत्स्य सामाय्येह्यक्षात् कल्यायिन्यः। तदस्यास्तोऽपि ‘सोप्रोदीत’ इति
समन्वय:

चानुमानगम्यं शास्त्रप्रामाण्यम्, चेनान्यत्र दृष्टं निदर्शनमपेश्ये। तस्मात्सिद्धं ब्रह्माण: शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वम्।

च 'वशंषि रजतं न देयम्' इति च पदसंदर्भों शरक्ष्माणनिन्दाहरौण नष्टाश्चवदधरथचत् परस्फं समन्वयः। न तेवं वेदान्तेपु द्वारपार्श्ववै, तदर्थवागमाद्वानपेश्यात्शरस्वलाभादिक्यतम्।

नन्न विभ्यसंसर्पिशिनो वेदस्यान्यस्य न प्रामाण्यं दृष्टमिति कथं वेदान्तानां तदर्थशां तदमेत्यत आहाः च चानुमानगम्यं

इति। अत्रभिरितानविद्वारासों दिघभोधजनकं हि प्रमाणत्वं प्रमाणानाम्; तच्च स्वतं इत्युपपादितम्।

यथापि चैवामीद्भोधजनकं कार्यार्थोपपितिसंधि-गम्यम्, तथापि तद्भोधजनने मानान्तरं नापेश्यं नापीमामेंिर्थार्थोपपितिम्, परस्फरस्यसज्जंगितिम् स्वतं

इत्युत्तम्। इत्युपपादितम् च कार्यं इव चिन्नाम्, च चेनान्यस्य च इव ब्रह्माण्यस्तिति दृष्टान्ताभास्याण्य: रजतं न देयम्।
through inference is understood the authoritative nature of the sacred teaching, in which case there would be the need for an example seen elsewhere. Therefore it is established that the authority for Brahman is the sacred teaching.

in the barhis (sacrifice)," which are on fire as it were (to be completed each by the other), there is, through the channel of the censure implied secondarily, mutual syntactical relation, as between the horseless (chariot) and (the horse) whose chariot has been burnt. Not thus, however, is there dependence on the human goal in the Vedāntas, since, from the very comprehension of their sense, without dependence (on any thing else), the supreme human goal is attained; this has been said.

Now, since authoritativenss is not seen for any other part of the Veda, which is not related to an injunction, how could this (authoritativenss) occur for the Vedāntas, which are not related thereto? To this he says: "And not through inference is understood" etc. For, the authoritativeness of the means of valid knowledge consists in their generating knowledge which is unsublated, not already understood, and indubitable; and that, it has been explained, is intrinsic (not made known by anything else, e.g., inference based on practical efficiency). Though the generation of this kind of knowledge is known by presumptive implication from the nature of the effect, yet, in the generation of that knowledge, they do not depend on any other means of valid knowledge, not even this presumptive implication, as (otherwise) reciprocal dependence would result; hence it is said to be intrinsic. The generation of
Here some others confront us: even though the authority for Brahman is the sacred teaching, yet Brahman is intimated by the sacred teaching only as the content of the injunction of contemplation; just as this kind of knowledge, like that of injunctions in respect of what is to be done, exists for the Vedāntas too in respect of Brahman; hence results their authoritativeness in respect of Brahman, without the need of an example. Otherwise, since it is not seen that colour is manifested by any other sense, (it would follow that) the sense of sight too could not manifest colour. He concludes the present topic: "Therefore" etc.

He sets up the view of some of the preceptors: "Here some others confront us" etc. It is thus: "The ascertainment of Brahman is from that whose purport is what is to be done, because of the relation (to what is signified) not being known, because of its being sacred teaching, because of its being purposeful, and because of reflection etc. being cognised (as enjoined in connection therewith)." Verily, the Vedāntas cannot have the existent Brahman for purport, their relation thereto (as the signified) not being known. That with reference to which words are not used by a worldly wise person, the relation of them thereto is not apprehended. Nor does the prudent inquirer desire to declare some form alone, which is neither to be rejected nor accepted, as that is not desired to be cognised. In conveying knowledge of that, the cognition of which is not desired, there would be detriment to his prudence. Hence, this worldly wise person, desiring to declare that which is desired to be known, would declare
समन्वयः ।

अन्तरापरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते—यथापि शास्त्रप्रमाणांकं ब्रह्म, तथापि प्रतिपतितिविभेदि-विषयत्यैव शास्त्रेण ब्रह्म सम्पर्य्ये।

नपेश्वं तेषां ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यं सिद्धं भवित। अन्यथा नेन्द्रियान्तराणां रूपंप्रकाशां दर्शितं चक्षुपि न रूपं प्रकाश्येदिति। प्रकृतसुप-संहरति—तस्मात् इति।

आचार्यके देशीयाणां मतसुत्पायति—अन्तरापरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते इति। तथा हि—अन्तरसिद्धित्वं शास्त्रेनार्थवचन्तया।

मननानि प्रतित्या च कार्यार्थो द्वानिर्भवः।। न खळु वेदान्ता: सिद्धंब्रह्म-परं भवितमहन्ति, तत्राविदितं संगतित्वात्। यत्र हि शब्दा लोकेन न प्रयुज्यते न तत्र तेषां संगतिग्रह:। न चाहेतमनुशास्त्रं रूपमांकं क्षितिजिक्षति प्रेक्षावान, तस्यार्थबुद्धित्वात्। अवभूतितत्वाभोजने च प्रेक्षावचारविद्यात्: स्यात्। तस्मात् प्रतिपितितं प्रतिपिदयित्वं लोकः प्रत्रतिमित्राच्छेदुभूत—
मेनार्थ प्रतिपाद्येत, कार्य चारगतं तदेतरिति

तदेव बोधयेत। एवं च वृद्धप्रयोगात पदानं

कार्यपर्यतमवगच्छित। तत्र किंचितसङ्कल्प

कार्याभिधायकम्, किंचितु कार्यारूपस्वतांभि-

धायकम्; न तु भूतार्थपरता पदानाम। अषि च नरान्तरस्य

व्युत्पन्नस्यार्थप्रत्ययमनुमायाय

तस्य च पदार्थमन्वादावाणुविधानमन्वगम्य शब्द-

स्य तदहिस्यवोधकं निश्चेतव्यम्। न च

भूतार्थप्रमात्रप्रथमपरं परन्तरतिनि किंचिद्विमति।

कार्यप्रत्यये तु नरान्तरतिनि प्रवृत्तिनिःस्ती

स्तो हेतु इत्यज्ञातसंगतित्वाश ब्रह्मरूपपरा वेदान्ता।

अषि च वेदान्तानां वेदवाच्चाक्षत्रप्रसिद्धि-

रसित। प्रवृत्तिनिःस्तिप्रचरणां च पदसंदर्भाणां

शाखतम। यथाहु:—

प्रवृत्तिवा निवृत्तिवा नित्येन कृतकेन वा।

पुंसं येनोपदित्येत तच्चाक्षरमभिधीयेते॥

इति। तस्माच्चाक्षत्रप्रसिद्धचा व्याहतमेषां रसृप-

पर्यतम्॥
that thing alone which is the cause of engaging in or desisting from activity, and, since what is to be done when known is the cause thereof, would teach that alone. And thus, from the usage of elderly persons one understands of words that they have for purport what is to be done. Of these, some are directly expressive of what is to be done, while some, however, express their own sense as subsidiary to what is to be done; but (in any case) words do not have for purport an existent thing. Further, it has to be ascertained in the case of a word that it conveys knowledge of a content, by inferring the cognition of the sense in another man who knows the meaning (of the word), and by understanding the concomitance of that (cognition) with the existence or non-existence of the word. And there is not any probans in respect of a cognition existing in another man and relating to the bare form of an existent thing. In the case, however, of the cognition of what is to be done, existing in another man there are probans, viz., the engaging in or the cessation from activity; hence, because of the relation (to the signified) not being known, the Vedântas do not have the form of Brahman for purport.

Further, of the Vedântas, as part of the Veda, it is well known that they constitute sacred teaching. And the character of sacred teaching belongs to such combinations of words as have the engaging in or cessation from activity for their purport. As is said: "Engaging in or cessation from activity in respect of the obligatory or the occasioned, that by which these are taught to men is called a sacred teaching." Therefore, their having for purport the (bare) nature (of Brahman) is annulled by their well-known character of being sacred teaching.
Further, we do not see any purposefulness for these, whose purport is the teaching of the nature of Brahman. Nor, just as, from the ascertainment, somehow through secondary implication, of the true sense of the sentence "this is a rope, not a snake," there is the cessation of fear, trembling etc., is there, similarly, from the understanding of the sense of the text "That thou art," the cessation of the attributes of transmigration; for, there is continuance as before of those (attributes) even for the person who has heard the sense of the text.

Further, if for him who has heard of Brahman there occurs the cessation of the attributes of transmigration, why is it, then, that on top of the hearing, reflection etc. are found declared? Hence, because of this too, that there would result their futility, the Vedántas have not the nature of Brahman for purport, but have for purport what is to be done, whose content is the contemplation of the self. And this which is to be done as enjoining him who is enjoined in respect of itself is called an injunction (niyoga), and, as not seen through any other means of knowledge, it is called the unseen (apūrva). And since that cannot result without the practice of its content (contemplation), for the sake of its own establishment, that very thing to be done implies the practice of contemplation of the self, which is its content and instrument. Just as the thing to be done, since it has to be determined in dependence on its own content, is determined by that content—contemplation, even so, since contemplation cannot be determined without its content—the self, for the sake of its determination, this very thing
अपि च यदि श्रुतवक्ताणि भवति सांसारिक-धर्मनिर्वृत्ति: कस्मात् पुनः श्रवणस्योपि मननादयः शृणुन्ते? तस्मात् वैयथ्यप्रसंवधादिपि न ब्रह्मसूतपरा वेदान्ताः, किं त्वात्मप्रतिपत्तिविषयकार्यः? तच् कार्यं स्वात्मिनि नियोज्यं नियुक्तमां नियोगं इति च मानान्तरपूर्वत्यापूर्वंमिति चालियाते। न च विषयनुसारं विना तत्तत्सिद्धिरिति स्वसिद्धस्य तदेव कार्यं स्वविषयस्य करणस्यात्मज्ञानस्य नुसारमाधक्षिणिति। यथा च कार्यं स्वविषयार्थीननिर्बृत्तमिति ज्ञानं विषयेन निरूप्यते, एवं ज्ञानमपि स्वविषय-
यथा गूपाध्याय नीपाटी दोकर्तनिक्यान्यप्रि विभिन्नोंतया शाख्यन निर्देशानि समर्प्यन्ते, तद्वपू. कृत एतत्? प्रश्निनिद्धृतिथिर्योजनपर्यथाच्छादस्य । तथा हि शाख्यात्यपर्यविदा-

मात्रान्मन्त्रं रेणाः प्रक्ष्यनिरुपणमिति तत्तत्त्रप्रणाय ताहां मात्रामन्त्राक्षरिण्यस्य निरुपणाय सरस्य सत्ताविनिधिर्निति। आरोपिततदात्यस्य तन्त्रस्य निरुपकल्पे तेन तत्तत्त्रस्य निरुपकरं न स्यात्। तस्मातागात्वस्त्रिपतिनिद्धित्वप्रयोगविधिमाण्यो वेदात्मी: तागात्वस्त्रिपनिधिर्निति। तदेकधर्मांह—यथापि इति। विधिप्रयोगमे परतत्तवविनिधिर्निति इति निदर्शनमुक्तम्—यथा युप्य इति। 'युप्य पल्लु बल्काति,' इति वन्धनाय
the sacrificial post, the ahavanīya fire etc., even though they are supra-mundane, are intimated by the sacred teaching (only) as subsidiary to an injunction. Whence is this? Because the sacred teaching has for purport the fruit of engaging in an activity or desisting therefrom. So indeed is the quotation from those who know the purport to be done implies that kind of self. As is said: "But that, which is accepted, i.e., implied for the establishment of that (other, which is enjoined), that too is enjoined; this is the usage of the tantra (the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra)." And for knowledge, the content of the injunction, injectiveness consists in the practice of it, in the sense of contemplation; for the self, however, as the content of that (contemplation), (injectiveness consists in) the certitude of its own existence.

(Objection: it has been said that contemplation may be of what is superimposed; how then can there be the certitude of the existence of what is contemplated?)

(Reply): that on which the nature of that (self) has been superimposed would be the determinant of another (knowledge); hence that (knowledge of the self) would not be determined thereby. Hence, through the Vedāntas which have for purport the injunction of the contemplation of that kind of self, there is the ascertainment of that kind of self. All this he says in "even though" etc. In the matter of the ascertainment of the true nature of a thing, even from those which have an injunction for purport, an example is given: "just as the sacrificial post" etc. In
of the sacred teaching, "Its purport is indeed seen to be what is called the teaching of ritual" (Sa.-Bh., I, i, 1); "An injunction is a statement which prompts to action" (Sa.-Bh., I, i, 2); "Of this the knowledge comes from an injunction" (PM., I, i, 5); "Of (words) denoting those (existent things), there is relation with that whose purport is ritual." (PM., I, i, 25.) "Since Scripture is for the purpose of ritual, there is futility for whatever has not that purpose." (PM., I, ii, 1.) Hence the sacred teaching is purposeful as prompting a man to a particular object and respect of the stake enjoined for the tying up in "he is to tie up the beast to the stake," since it is out of the ordinary, there is the question "what is this stake (in substance and shape)?"; from the texts "khudira (ebony) becomes the stake," "he fashions the stake," "he is to make the stake octagonal" etc., though having for purport the injunction of acts of carpentry, it is understood that a particular kind of wood purified and fashioned in a particular shape is the stake. Similarly are to be understood the ahavaniya etc. The character of sacred teaching belongs to that whose purport is engaging in or cessation from activity, not to that whose purport is the nature (of an existent); the relation (of a significant word) is only to what is to be done, not to the nature; these two grounds are explained by the words of the commentary beginning with "Because the sacred teaching has for purport" etc., and ending with "And because of similarity thereto, for the Vedantas too, there can be purposefulness only in the same
मनुक्रमणम्—'द्यो हि तत्स्यः कर्मचक्रबोधनं नाम' इति; 'चोदनेति क्रियाया: प्रवर्तकं वचनम्', 'तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः', 'तद्दृढ़तानं क्रियार्थम् समाप्ताय', 'आश्चयस्य क्रियार्थव्याख्यातयथायर्थक्यमतद्व्याख्यानम्' इति च। अतः पुरुषं कचिद्रिष्यविशेषं प्रवर्त्यक्कृताण्तऽद्धित्रिष्यविशेषाऽपि विशेषाऽपि तद्यथाचार्थः।

विनियुक्ते युष्मे, तत्स्यालोकिकतानकोसौ युष्म इत्यपेक्षिते 'खादिि युष्मे भवति', 'युष्मं तक्षति', 'युष्ममयाश्रीरकोति' इत्यादिमिर्गवृक्ष्यस्तक्षणादितिलिपिपर्वपि संस्काराविं सििहिष्ठं विशेषबं संस्थानं दान युष्मं इति गम्यते। एवमाहनीयाद्योपक्षयवग्नतः। प्रवृत्तिनिर्वृत्तिपरस्य शास्त्रवं न स्वरूपस्य, कार्यं एवं च शक्षाद्वो न स्वरूपः, इति हेतुद्वं भाष्याक्येयोपपादितम्—प्रवृत्तिनिर्वृत्तिप्रयोजनतात्तु इत्यादिना तत्समान्यात्मेदान्तानामपि तथ्यावर्त्त्यतं स्य्रात् इत्यतनो न च स्वतन्त्रं कार्यं न्योज्यमधिकारिणः।
चछाब्रमः। तच्छेष्टया चान्यदुपयुक्तम्।
तत्सामान्यादेदान्तानामपि तथेवार्थवत्तं
स्यात्। सति च विधिपरत्वे, यथा
स्वर्गादिकामस्याणिहोवालादिसाधनं विधी-
यते, एवमृतत्वकामस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं विधीयत
इति युक्तम्।

मनुःतारमन्तरेणेति नियोज्यभेदमाह—सति च
विधिपरत्वे इति। 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मवेद भवति,'
इति सिद्धवर्त्तावानादवात्स्यापि व्रह्मवनस्य
नियोज्यविशेषाकाष्ठायां ब्रह्म वुभृशोभिनियोज्य-
विशेषस्य राजस्त्रत्वन्यायेन प्रतिरूपः। पिण्ड-
पितृयज्ञायेन तु स्वर्गकामस्य नियोज्यस्य
कल्पनायामर्थवाच्याद्वासमवद्यात्तथात्तात्त्यत्तन्तरोक्षा वृत्ति:
स्यादिति। ब्रह्मावपश्चामृतत्वमिति अमृतत्व-
कामस्य इत्युन्मुः। अमृतत्वं च अमृतत्वादेव
न कृत्तक्षेन शक्यमनित्यमनमुत्सुः, आगम-
विरोधादिति भावः।
as withholding him from a particular object. Others are useful as subsidiary thereto. And because of similarity thereto, for the Vedântas too, there can be purposefulness only in the same way. And there being purport in respect of an injunction, just as for him, who desires heaven, agnihotra etc. are enjoined as the means, similarly for him, who desires immortality, the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined: this stands to reason.

And since what is to be done is not independent of him who is enjoined, the eligible person who is to practise, he states the particular class of the person enjoined: "And there being purport in respect of an injunction" etc. Becoming Brahman is present as already established in the eulogistic passage "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself"; yet, because of the expectancy of the particular class of person enjoined for this (becoming) there results, on the analogy of the râtrisatâra,\textsuperscript{111} the particular class of person enjoined, viz., he who desires to become Brahman. For, if, on the analogy of the piṇḍa-pitr-yajña,\textsuperscript{112} the person enjoined be assumed to be he who desires heaven, that would be the signification of the absolutely remote, as being a sense not related to the eulogistic passage. And since to become Brahman is to be immortal, it is said (in the commentary) "For him who desires immortality". And immortality, even because of its being immortality, cannot be inferred to be non-eternal on the ground of being effected, because of conflict with Scripture (otherwise); this is the idea.
Now, here the distinctness of what is desired to be known has been stated: in the ritual section Religious Duty, which is to come into being, is what is desired to be known; but here Brahman, which is existent, which is eternally fulfilled, is what is desired to be known. Of these, the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman should be distinct from the fruit of the knowledge of Religious Duty, which requires an observance.

It cannot possibly be thus; because Brahman is taught only as occasioned by an injunction about something to be done. "The self verily is to be seen" (Brh., IV, iv, 5); "That self whose sins are destroyed he is to be sought for, he is to be desired to be known" (Chānd., VIII, vii, 1); "Contemplate as the self alone" (Brh., I, iv, 7); "Contemplate the self alone as the true enjoyment" (Brh., I, iv, 15); "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself" (Mund., III, ii, 9); there being such injunctions, when there is a desire to know, "Who is this self?", "What is that Brahman?", the entire

Through the aforementioned difference in nature between the desires to know Religious Duty and Brahman, he raises the question of (the latter) not being the content of injunctions: "Now, here" etc. He answers: "It cannot possibly be thus" etc. And here, the intuition of the self is not what is enjoined. For, that, because of the verb "see," signifying cognition, should be of the nature of
नन्विन्ह जिज्ञास्यवैलक्षण्यसुक्तम्—
kर्मकाण्डे भव्यो धर्मो जिज्ञासयः; इह
तु सूतं निलंनिर्द्वं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यमिति
तत्र धर्मज्ञानफलादनुप्रमाणसापेक्षादिलक्षणं
ब्रह्मज्ञानफलं भवितुमहि

नाहिलेवं भवितुम्, कार्यविधिप्रयुक्त-
स्येव ब्रह्माण्: प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात्। ‘आत्मा
वा अरे द्रष्ट्वः’, ‘य आत्मापहत-
पाप्मा... सोन्वेभवः स विजि-
ज्ञासितवः’, ‘आत्मेऽवोपासीत’, ‘आ-
त्मानंमेव लोकमुपासीत’; ‘ब्रह्म वेद
बह्नेव भवित’ इत्यादिषु विधानेषु
सत्यु, ‘कोंसावतामः’, ‘किं तद्रहः?’

उत्तेन धर्मज्ञानजिज्ञास्योर्वलक्षण्यन्वि-
विप्यत्वं चोद्यति—ननु इति। परहरति—
नाहिलेवम् इति। अत्र चालमवर्ष्यं न विप्रेयम्।
तद्धि द्रष्टोपनिष्ठवचनत्वात् श्रावणं वा स्वात्
प्रत्यक्षं वा। प्रत्यक्षमपि लौकिकमहंप्रत्ययो
इत्याकाव्यां तत्स्वरूपसमर्पणेन सर्वे वेदान्ता उपयुक्ताः—निल्यः सर्वजः सर्वगतो निल्यत्तो निल्युद्दधुद्वबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावो विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म इलेवमादयः। तदुपासनाच शास्त्रद्योग्योऽमोकः पल्लुऽभविष्यितः। कर्तात्यविभ्यवनुप्रवेशो तु वस्तुरातु कथने हानोपदानासंभवात् ‘सस्दीपा वसुमती’, ‘राजासो गच्छति’ इत्यादि वाक्यवेदेदान्तवाक्यानामन्यथक्यमेव स्यात।

वा, भावनाप्रकर्ष्यते तजः वा। तत्र श्रावण न विचेष्यते, स्वाध्यायविधिनेत्राय प्राप्तितत्वां, कर्मश्रावणतु। नापि लौकिकं प्रत्यक्षम, तस्य नैसर्गिकत्वाः। न चौपनिषदातविष्यं भावनाप्रेयेयश्च विचेष्यते, तस्योपासनाविधिवादेव वाजिनवददुनिपादितत्वाः। तस्मादौपिनिषदातमोपासना अमृतत्वकां नियोज्यं प्रति विचित्रायते।

‘द्रष्टव्यः’ इत्यादयस्त विविस्रूपा न विवेय इति। तददिक्षुः—तदुपासनाच इति।
Vedânta is useful in intimating its nature—that Brahman is eternal, omniscient, all-pervasive, eternally contented, eternally pure, intelligent and free by nature, knowledge, bliss and so on. And from the contemplation thereof there will result the invisible fruit, final release, as seen from the sacred teaching. If, however, they do not enter into an injunction of something to be done, and if they be the mere statements of fact, since there can be neither rejection nor acceptance, there would only be futility for the Vedânta texts, as for the statements, "The earth has seven islands," "Here goes the king".

hearing or of perception. And perception too should be either the concept "I," found in ordinary experience, or that which is produced when contemplation attains excellence. Of these, hearing cannot be the object of an injunction, since that, like hearing in respect of rites, is established even by the injunction to study one's own Veda. Nor (can) perception found in ordinary experience (be the object of the injunction), since that is natural. Nor may the object of the injunction be that clarity brought by contemplation to its content, the self propounded in the Upaniṣads, since that (clarity) follows as a by-product even from the injunction of contemplation, like whey. Therefore, the contemplation of the self propounded in the Upaniṣads is prescribed in respect of him who desires immortality, who is the person enjoined. As for the texts "is to be seen" etc., they are what have the appearance of injunctions, not (real) injunctions. This is thus said: "And from the contemplation thereof" etc.
Now, even in the case of a mere statement of fact, as in "This is a rope, this is not a snake" etc., purposefulness is seen through the removal of fear generated by delusion. Similarly, here too by the statement of the fact of the self not being a transmigrator, there may be purposefulness through the removal of the delusion of his being a transmigrator.

This would be so, if the delusion of his being a transmigrator could be removed by merely hearing about the nature of Brahman, like the delusion of snake by merely hearing about the nature of the rope. But it is not so removed; because even for him who has heard of Brahman there are found the attributes of a transmigrator, like happiness and misery, as before, and because there is found the injunction of reflection and contemplation subsequent to hearing, in "He is to be heard about, to be reflected on, to be contemplated." Therefore, Brahman should be acknowledged to have sacred teaching as authority only as the content of an injunction of realisation.

"Because of its being purposeful, and because of reflection etc. being cognised": the elaboration of this in the rest (of the commentary) is self-explanatory.
ननु वस्तुमात्रकथनेषुपि ‘रज्जुरियमू नायं सर्पं’ इत्यादि भ्रान्तिजननिभावनीतिनिवर्तने नार्थवत्तं हृद्धम्। तथेहाप्यसंसार्यतः त्वमवस्तुकथनेन संसारतिवह्रान्तिनिवर्तने-नार्थवत्तं स्यात्।

स्यादेतदेवम्, यदि रज्जुवरुपाभ्रवण-मात्रेनेव सर्पाभ्रान्ति:, संसारित्वअभ्रान्ति-व्रह्मस्वरुपाभ्रवणमात्रेन निवर्तेन। नु निवर्तेन; श्रुतव्रह्मणोपि यथापूर्व सुखदः-वादिसंसारिधिर्ममेदर्शनात्, ‘श्रीतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः’ इति च अवणोत्तरकालयोर्मन्ननिदिध्यासनयोविषिधि-दर्शनात्। तस्मात्प्रतिपरिविधिविषयत्वत्येव शास्त्रप्रमाणं ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति।

अर्थवत्तया मन्ननामितात्या चेतत्तत् शेषः प्रपञ्चो निगद्व्यास्यात्।
समन्वयः

अत्राभिधीयते—न, कर्मचार्याचार्याचार्याणां यों वै लक्षणयात। शारीरं वाचिकं मानसं च कर्म भूतिस्त्रृतिसिद्धं धर्मार्थयम्, यद्विषया जिज्ञासा ‘अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा’ इति सूत्रिता। अधर्ममेव हिन्दादि प्रतिलेखाधो-दनालक्षणराजज्ञातय: परिहाराय। तयोऽश्रोदनालक्षणयोररथानरथानयोरधर्माधर्मयोऽफळे।

तद्वेकदेशितमं दूषयति—अत्राभिधीयते—न एकदेशितम। कुत:? कर्मचार्याचार्याचार्याणां यों वै लक्षणयात। पुण्यपुण्यकर्मयोऽफळे सुलखः। तत्र मनुष्यलोकमारभ्य आ ब्रह्मलोकसुखस्य तारतम्यमधिकाधिकोत्पक्षः। एवं मनुष्यलोक-मारभ्य दुःखतारतम्यम चार्मितलोककात। तत्सवे कार्यं च बिनाधिष्ठि च। आत्मनिकं तत्तथारत्नमनानश्यं स्वभावसिद्धतया नित्यम- कार्यमात्मज्ञानस्य फलम्। तदि फलमिव फलम्। अविधापनसनमात्रेणाविभिन्नवातः। एतदुःखं भवति—त्यापन्यपुसनाविभिधिरत्वं वेदान्तानामस्युपमगच्छता।
To this it is replied: no, because of the difference in nature between ritual and Brahman, in respect of their knowledge and fruit. Ritual performed by the body, speech or mind is what is called Religious Duty, as established by Scripture and traditional Codes, and the desire to know this object is declared in the aphorism "Then therefore the desire to know Religious Duty". Vices too like killing are to be desired to be known for rejection, being defined by prohibitory injunctions. The fruit of this injunction-defined

This view of some he condemns: "To this it is replied: no," the view of some (is not sound); why not? "Because of the difference in nature between ritual and Brahman in respect of their knowledge and fruit." The fruits of action, meritorious or sinful, are (respectively) happiness and misery. Of these, there are gradations of happiness, rising in degrees of superiority, from the world of men up to that of Brahmā. Similarly, there are degrees of misery, from the world of men down to the hell known as Avici. And all that is both produced and destructible. The fruit of the knowledge of the self, however, is final, unembodied, unsurpassable, and, being naturally established, it is eternal and unproduced. That, verily, is fruit, as it were, because it is manifested even with the bare removal of Nescience. This is what is said: by you too, who admit the injunction of contemplation as the purport of the Vedāntas, there is recognised what is understood from the Vedānta, viz., the jīva naturally being of the nature of Brahman, eternally pure, intelligent etc. And that is not the fruit of an injunction whose content is contemplation,
good and evil, religious duty and vice, are perceptible happiness and misery, which are experienced through the body, speech and the mind, generated by the association of sense-organs with objects, and are well-known from Brahmā down to the immovable objects. In all corporeal beings starting from man and rising to Brahmā, the gradation of happiness is scripturally declared. And therefrom is understood the gradation of its cause, viz., merit. From the gradation of merit follows the gradation of the eligible persons. And the gradation of the eligible persons brought about by desire for fruit, capacity, learning etc. is well-known. Thus, only those who perform

since it is eternal and unproduced. Nor (is the fruit of the injunction) the removal of the veil of beginningless Nescience, since that happens even with the rise of its opposite, viz., knowledge. Nor is the rise of knowledge (the fruit), since that too results for the mind even from its being aided by the impressions produced by contemplation preceded by hearing and reflection. Like the impression of the contemplation, the unseen result of the contemplation too is an auxiliary to the mind; it is, verily, seen that of what is enjoined there is fruit even here (not in a hereafter alone), for example, the fruitfulness even here of the injunctions to the Citrā and Kārīri sacrifices, whose fruits are respectively undefined and defined (in respect of time); if this be said, no (we reply); for, like (the capacity) of the impressions of the contemplation of the meaning of the science of music to produce the intuition of the notes ṣadja etc., without the need for an
प्रत्येक सुखुळेले शरीरवाच्याने भर्तीमान विषयेनिद्रियसंयोगजने वाद्यादिः
स्थावरान्तेजु प्रसिद्धे। मनुष्यतादारभ्य
ब्रह्मान्तेजु देहवरसु सुखतात्तममनुःत्रये।
तत् च तद्वस्तोंधर्मस्थ्यपि तारतम्यं गम्ये।
धर्मतात्त्तम्यादिधिकारितात्तम्यम्। प्रसिद्धं
चार्थिक्रसमर्थ्यविद्धतादिकृतमधिकारितार-
नित्यशुद्धवर्द्धावदिरूपवहामाता जीवश्य स्वाभाविकी
वेदानत्माहस्येऽर्थीयें। सा चोपासना
विषयव्यक्तिनविठ्ठनं फलं, नित्यवादार्थतां ।
नायणाधविजविज्ञानांपनयः, तत्स्य स्विरोधि
विच्छोद्यादेव भवात्। नापि निमिद्यादः
तत्स्यपि श्रवणमनन्यूक्तकोपासनाज्ञितसंस्कारसंविचारेदेव
चेतसो भवात्। उपासनासंस्कारवर-
दुपासनापूर्वस्मापि चेतः महारिः; दृष्टं च खलु
नैत्योगिकं फलमेहिकमापि, यथा चित्राकार्ययादिनियो
गोगानामनियततनियतफलानमेहिककोठतेति चेतः
न; गान्धवेशभाच्याऽपासनावसानाया इयापूर्वान:-
तम्यम्। तथा च यागाधनुशाश्चिनामेव विद्यासमाभिविशेषादुत्तरेण पथा गमनम्, केवलेऽरिष्यावृत्तेऽद्साधनेन्ति समादिकेमेण दक्षिणेण पथा गमनम्, तत्रापि सुखातरं तम्यम्, तत्साधनतारं च शाक्षात् ‘यातं तं पात-मुषित्वा’ इत्यसादस्येते। तथा मनुष्यादिर्श स्थानवराण्नेषु सुसात्तरथ्योदेशाद्नात्क्षणर्थमसाध्ये पवेति गम्यं तारतम्येऽवर्तमानः।

पेशाया: पहुँचाविषाकरो वेदान्तारथा आसनाया जीवसंग व्रह्मावसाश्चिनाको न पेशाया एव सामर्थ्यात्। तथा चामूर्तिभावं प्रत्ये-हेतुत्वादासनपुरूषसं, नामहत्वकामरस्तवार्यमथ्वों- महति। अन्यदिच्छायन्यत्करोतीति हि विप्रतिशिष्यस। न च तत्काम: क्रियामेव कार्यमवग-भिष्यति नापूर्वमिति सांप्रतमः; तस्य भानान्तरां देव तत्साधनतारसिद्धींतविद्वेष्यथ्यात्। न च चार्धातादि-विखितुल्यता, तत्रापि नियमापूर्वस्य नाय्यास्तो जन्तवते:। न च व्रह्मावसाश्चिनायद्मृत्तमार्थवादिकं किचिदिरिः,
sacrifices etc., can go by the northern path on account of the excellence of knowledge and meditation; through the instrumentality afforded by mere offerings, works of public utility and alms-giving, there is passage along the southern path in the order of smoke etc. Here too the gradation of happiness and the gradation of means thereto are understood from this sacred teaching "After living there till there is consumption". Similarly it is understood that the smallest happiness is possible for beings starting from man down to the inanimate beings only from Religious Duty defined by injunctions, and that it exists in gradations. In the unseen potentiality, there is, for the impressions of the contemplation of the meaning of the Vedānta, the capacity to produce the intuition of the jiva being of the nature of Brahman, even without the need (of an unseen potentiality). And thus, since, for the unseen potentiality of the contemplation, there is no causality in respect of immortality, it is not meet that he who desires immortality should learn that (apārva) as what is to be done. Desiring one thing, he (yet) works for another; this is, indeed, a contradiction. Nor is it admissible to say that he who desires that will understand the act (of contemplation) itself as what is to be done, not its unseen potentiality; for, since the instrumentality of that (contemplation) thereto is cognised even through other means of knowledge, the injunction would be futile. Nor is there parallelism to the injunction to pound (the paddy) etc., since even here the unseen potentiality consequent on the restriction is not understood from any other (text). And there is not any
same way, for corporeal beings, starting either upwards or downwards, since there is found a gradation of misery, there is understood a gradation in respect of its cause, *viz.*, vice, as defined by prohibitory injunctions, and also in respect of those who practise them. Thus in the case of those who have the defect of Nescience etc., gradations of happiness and misery, which are brought about by the gradations of merit and demerit, which are generated in the wake of embodiment, and which are non-eternal and of the nature of transmigration, are well-known from Scripture, traditional Codes and reasoning. And thus the Scripture, immortality taught by an eulogistic passage, other than the becoming Brahman, whereby he who desires it would be eligible for contemplation. In assuming, however, on the analogy of the *visvajit* sacrifice, heaven (as the fruit), because of its surpassability and liability to decrease, there will be no permanent fruit of contemplation. Since, therefore, becoming Brahman is manifested even with the removal of the veil of Nescience, since the removal of Nescience occurs even with the knowledge of the sense of the Vedānta culminating in realisation, and since the causing of an impression by contemplation and the impression being an auxiliary to the mind in producing an intuition are established by other means of knowledge, the text "contemplate but as the self" is not an injunction; but it is only what has the appearance of an injunction; just as, for example, texts like "Viṣṇu is to be sacrificed with the *upāmsu*" are what have the appearance of injunctions, but are not injunctions; this is the sense intended.
तथोधर्मगतेष्वभोगतेषु च देहवत्सु दुःखतारतम्यदर्शनात्तत्तदेऽत्थर्धमस्य प्रतिषेध्चोदनालक्षणस्य तदनुशायिनां च तारतम्य गम्यते। एतमविधादिदोषवतां धर्माधर्मतारतम्यनिमित्तं शरीरोपादानपुर्वं सुख-\[\text{...} \]}

येन तत्काम उपासनायामधिक्रियेत। विश्वजिन्यायेन तु स्वर्गक्षयनां तथ्य सतिशाश्यतं क्षणिगतं चेति न नित्यप्रस्तुतमुपासनायाः। तस्मादहथभृत्याविधापिधापिधानापपवनमात्रेणाविभिन्नता, अविधापनरस्य च वेदान्तार्थविज्ञानावद्गतिपर्वतावेद संभवत्, उपासनाया: संकारहेतुभावस्य संकारस्य च साक्षात्कारोपजनने मनःसचिवयर्म च मानान्तरसिद्धातू, 'आत्मेवेऽवापसित' इति न विधिः; अपि तु विधिसिद्धत्वम; यथोऽपि शुभाजनक्ये 'विष्णुहायं यथव:,' इत्यादयो विधिसिद्धम न विधय:—इति तात्पर्यः।
सतशरीरस्य तस्मातः प्रियाप्रियोरपहतिरस्ति
इति यथावर्ण्यं संसाररूपमनुनवदति।
'अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पुष्टः'
इति प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिशेषाचोदनालक्षणधर्मकार्येन योक्ष्माभ्यस्याशरीररत्नस्य
प्रतिविध्यते इति गम्यते। धर्मकार्येन
हि प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिशेषे नोपप्यमेव।
अशरीरत्वमेव धर्मकार्यमिति चेतु, न;
तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वाद्—'अशरीरं शरीरेषु
अनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम्। महान्त्वं विशुमात्मानं
मत्वा भीरो न शोचति', 'अप्राणो ब्रम्नाना:
शुश्रृं', 'असज्जो हयं पुरुषः' इत्यादि
श्रुतिभ्यं:। अत एवानुष्ठितकर्मफलविन्धक्षण
मोक्षान्यमशरीररत्नं निलामिति सिद्धम्।

श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायप्रसिद्धम् इत्यक्तम्। तत्र श्रुति
दर्शयति—तथा च श्रुति: इति। न्यायमाह—
अत एव इति। यथि तत्कालिनं तन्त्रितम्,
यथा चेतन्यम्; स्वाभाविकं चेतम्; तस्माचितम्।
HARMONY

Not verily for him who exists as embodied can there be the destruction of what is pleasing and non-pleasing," restates the nature of transmigration as described above. "Him verily who is non-embodied, what is pleasing and not pleasing do not touch" (Chand., VIII, xii, 1); since here there is the denial of the touch of what is pleasing and not pleasing, it is understood that for the non-embodiment called final release, there is denied its being the fruit of Religious Duty defined by injunctions. Indeed, if it were the fruit of Religious Duty, the denial of the touch of what is pleasing and not pleasing would be unintelligible. If it be said that non-embodiment itself is the fruit of Religious Duty, no, because it is natural, as understood from Scriptures like "The intelligent one, knowing the self as non-embodied in the body, as permanent in the transient, as great and all-pervasive, does not come to grief" (Katha., II, 22); "Indeed he is without breath, without mind, pure" (Mund., II, i, 2); "Indeed this self is non-attached." (Brh., IV, iii, 15.) Hence it is that the non-embodiment called final release, which is distinct from the fruit of ritual to be observed, is established to be eternal.

It has been said: "well known from Scripture, traditional Codes and reasoning." Of these, he cites Scripture: "And thus the Scripture" etc. He states the reasoning: "Hence it is" etc. Verily, that which is natural is eternal, for example, intelligence; and this is natural; therefore, it is eternal.
Of these, some may be eternal in evolution, in which though subject to transformation, the cognition "This is but that" is not destroyed; for example, earth etc., for those who uphold the universe to be eternal, or, for example, the constituents (guṇas), for the Saṅkhyaśas. This, however, is absolute, Immutable, all-pervasive like the ether, devoid of all modifications, eternally contented, without parts, self-luminous by nature, which merit and demerit together with their fruit do not approach, nor the three times. This is the non-embodiment called final release, because of Scriptures like, "Other than

Others, indeed, mention two kinds of eternity—the immutable eternity and the evolving eternity. When (immortality) is said to be eternal, lest it be taken to be eternity of the evolving kind, he says: "Of these, some" etc. For, evolving eternity is not absolute. It is thus: does it evolve as a whole or in part? If it evolve as a whole, how can there be no destruction of its nature? If it evolve in part, is that part different from it or non-different? If it be different, how can the transformation be of that (eternal entity)? Indeed, when one thing is transformed, a different thing is not also transformed, as that would be an undue extension. Or, if it be non-different, how can the transformation be not of the whole?
तत्र किंचित्यपरिणामिनित्र्यं स्थातु, यस्मिन्निविक्रियमाणेपि तदेवेदभीति बुद्धिनं विहान्यते; यथा प्रथियादि जगशिल्पत्व-वादिनाम, यथा वा सांस्कृतयां सुणा:।

इदं ल पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थनिल्यं व्योमवत्सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहितं नित्यतृं निरवयं स्वयंज्योतिः स्वभावम्, यत्र धर्मी-

परे हि इत्री नित्यतामाहु:—कूटस्थनित्यां परिणामिनित्यां च। तत्र नित्यभिभुत्ते मा भृद्योप परिणामिनित्यशेय्याह—तत्र किंचित्तै इति।

परिणामिनित्यात हि न पारमार्थिकी। तथा हि—तत्तत्त्त्वात्त्मना वा परिणाते एकदेशन वा?

सर्वत्त्मना परिणामे कथं न तत्त्वायत्तिः?

एकदेशापरिणामे वा स एकदेशास्तो मिहो वा अभिन्नो वा? भिग्नक्रेतः कथं तत्त्व परिणाम:?

न ह्यान्यसिद्धः परिणाममानोन्य: परिणामति, अतिप्रसज्जात। अभीदे वा कथं न सर्वत्त्मना परिणाम:?
धर्मामेव सह कार्येन कालप्रयं च नोपावतेते।
तदेवतदशरीरतः मोक्षशुद्धम् ‘अन्यं
धर्मादन्यत्राध्यर्मादन्यत्राशस्मातक्ताक्ततात्।
अन्यत्र भूताच्छ भव्याच्छ’ इत्यादिशुद्धित्वं।
अतस्तदुःखा, यस्येव जिञ्जासा प्रस्तुता।
तथादि कर्तृक्यशेषत्वेनोपदशितेष्येत्, तेन च
कर्तृथेयच साध्वशेषमोक्षोसभ्यपगम्येत्यतनिश्च एव स्थाय।
तैवेन सति यथोक्त-कर्मफलेष्वेव तात्रमयावस्थितेष्वनिलेखुषु
कश्चिदतिशयो मोक्ष इति प्रस्तयेत।
विश्व मोक्षः सवैमोक्षवाददिभिरभ्युप
gम्येत। अतो न कर्तृविशेषत्वेन ब्रह्मो-
pदेशो युक्तः।

भित्तामित्रं तदिति चेत्; तथा हि—तदेव
कारणात्मनाभिमित्रम्, भिनं च कार्यते, कटकाद्य
इत्रामित्राः हार्तकात्मनाभिमित्र कटकाचायम। न
च भद्राभद्रायोऽविरोधायामैत्र समवाय इति युक्तम्।
विहृदमिति नः के संप्रतयः? यत्प्रमाणविपर्ययः
virtue, other than vice, other than this that is done and not done, other than what has been and what is to be" (Katha., II, 14.) Therefore such is Brahman, the desire to know which is here the context. If that be taught as subsidiary to something to be done, and if final release be acknowledged to be something to be accomplished by that which is to be done, then it would be certainly non-eternal. Then, this being the case, the result would be that final release is only an excellent stage among the graded non-eternal fruits of ritual described above. And final release is acknowledged to be eternal by all who uphold a doctrine of final release. Therefore the teaching of Brahman as subsidiary to what is to be done does not stand to reason.

It may be said to be different and non-different; it is thus: that itself, in its causal aspect is non-different, and is different in the effect-aspect, like bracelets etc., which are non-different in respect of their nature as gold, and different in respect of their nature as bracelets etc. Nor is it meet to say that, because of the opposition of difference and non-difference, there cannot be the inherence of the two in one. Where is it that we have the right cognition of opposition? (In that) which is opposed to the means of valid knowledge.
But that which is understood through the means of valid knowledge, for that that nature alone (is true). In the appositional cognition "This ear-ring is gold," both difference and non-difference are clearly manifest; it is thus: if non-difference were absolute, there would result the appearance of one twice (as subject and as predicate); and if difference were absolute, there would be no apposition, any more than between cow and horse; there is no apposition, where there is a relationship of support and supported or of having the same locus; the pot is never (said to be) the cherry (therein); nor is it said of Caitra and Maitra present on one seat that "Caitra is Maitra"; and it is this unsubstated, indubitable, universal appositional cognition that establishes difference and non-difference between the effect and the cause; and thus, since the effects are of the nature of the cause, and since of the cause, whose nature is existence, there is persistence everywhere, there is in the aspect of existence non-difference of the effect, the universe (from the cause); in the effect-aspect as cow, pot etc., there is difference. As is said: "In the effect-aspect, there is difference; non-difference in the causal aspect; for example, in the gold-aspect there is non-difference, in the aspect of ear-ring etc., there is difference."

To this the reply is: what, then, is this which is called difference, which should exist along with non-difference in one place? If it be said to be reciprocal non-existence, does this exist or not between effect and cause, bracelet
यथै यथा प्रमाणानावगम्यते तस्य तथाभवं एव। 'कुण्डलविकं सुवर्णम्' इति सामानाधिकरणप्रत्येक्ये व्यति मेद्रामेद्रौ चकारतः; तथा हि—आत्मनिति:मेद्रेकुण्डलयस्य विरासायसं; मेद्र चात्मनिति: न सामानाधिकरण्य गतवाश्चत; आधराधिनेयभावे एकाशश्चते या न सामानाधिकरण्य: न हि भवति कुण्डल बधरमिति; नायेकासनस्यथोऽधैवमेच्छ्योऽधैव मैत्र इति; सोऽसु ममाधिक्षोऽसंगिधः सर्वाजनी: सामानाधिकरणप्रत्येक्य पुव कार्यकारणायेव मेद्रामेद्रौ व्यवस्थापनिति; तथा च कार्याणां कारणात्मित च कारान्य च सदृपस्य सर्वातानुगमातु, सदृपेना- मेद्र: कार्यस्य जगतः; मेद्र: कार्यरूपेण गोघटादिनेति; यथाय:—
कार्यरूपेण नानात्ममेद्र: कारणात्मनः।
हेमात्मनाम् यथाभवेदः कुण्डलाचात्मनाम् भिदा॥ इति।
अत्रोच्चतेन—कः पुनर्यं मेद्रो नाम, य: सहमेद्रेकन्तक भवेत्? परस्पराभाव इति चेत्, किमयं कार्यकारणो: कटकहाटकयोत्सिति न
वा? न चेत, एकत्मेवार्थति, न च भेदः। असित चेतृ भेद एव, नामेदः। न च भावाभावन्योऽर्थोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽस्त्रोऽ
and gold? If not, there is oneness alone, not difference. If it does exist, there is difference alone, not non-difference. Nor is there no opposition between existence and non-existence, as their co-existence is impossible. Or, if it were possible, there would result non-difference as such between the bracelet and the *vardhamāna,* difference not being opposed to non-difference. Further, the bracelet being non-different from gold, just as, in the gold-aspect, bracelets, crowns, ear-rings etc. are not different, so even in the bracelet-aspect they should not differ, because of the non-difference of the bracelet from gold. And thus, gold alone is real, not the bracelet etc., since of the difference there is no manifestation.

Now, (it may be said) only as gold is there non-difference, not as bracelet; as that (bracelet), however, there is but difference from ear-ring etc.

(We ask in reply) if the bracelet is non-different from gold, how is it that this (former) does not recur in ear-ring etc.? And if it does not recur, how is the bracelet non-different from gold? For, those, which are variable when something is recurrent, are certainly different from that, as the different flowers from the string. And though goldness is recurrent, ear-ring etc. are not recurrent; hence, they too are certainly different from gold. If, because of the recurrence of existentiality, all things were non-different, there would be no distinctions like "this is here, not that," "this is from this, not that," "this is now, not that," "this is so, not that" etc., because of the non-existence of any ground for discrimination of anything, in
any place, at any time, in any manner. Further, when from a distance it is understood to be gold, its particularities, as ear-ring etc., would not be desired to be known, because of their non-difference from gold, and because of the latter being known.

Now, since there is difference too of ear-ring etc. from gold, even when gold is known, they are unknown.

Now, since there is non-difference too, why are they not known? On the contrary, knowledge alone is appropriate in their case; for, the absence of the effect (knowledge), in the absence of the cause (non-difference), is the general rule; and that is set aside (here) by the existence of the cause. And since in non-difference there is the existence of the cause, when gold is known, ear-ring etc. are certainly known; hence the desire to know them and the cognitions of them would be futile. Therefore, that which on the apprehension of another is not (itself) apprehended is different from that (other); for example, when the camel is apprehended, the ass, which is not apprehended, (differs) from the camel. And when gold is apprehended from a distance, its particularities, ear-ring etc., are not apprehended; therefore they are different from gold.

How, then, is there the apposition "ear-ring (is) gold"? If this be asked, it has been said that there is no apposition, where there is a relationship of support and supported or of having the same locus. Then, how (to explain) the distinction of recurrence and variability, and the desire to know ear-ring etc., even when gold is known?
न स्यात्, कस्यचिं संकोचित कथाचित कर्मचित्विभिन्नकेरोभावात्। अपि च दूरातकनकमित्वगते न तस्य कुण्डलादयः विशेषं जिज्ञासयेर्, कनकासंखेत्याम, तस्य च ज्ञातत्वात्।

अथ भेदोऽप्यति कनकात कुण्डलादीनामिति कनकागमेवप्यज्ञातार्थात्।

नन्वेदोऽप्यस्तीति कि न ज्ञाताः? प्रत्युत्त ज्ञानमेव तेषां युक्तम्; कारणाभवे हि कार्याभवां औसत्तिकः; स च कारणसत्ताय अपोचते। असित्च च भवेदे कारणसत्ताति कनके ज्ञाते ज्ञाता एव कुण्डलादयः इति तज्ज्ञासाज्ञानानि चान्तर्थकानि स्यूः।

तेन यस्मिन् ग्रहमाणे यज्ञ ग्रहयते तत्ततो भिघ्यते; यथा कर्मेऽग्रहमाणे्यज्ञामाणे रासभ: कर्भात्।

ग्रहमाणे च दूरतो हेष्टि न ग्रहयते तस्य भेदः कुण्डलादयः; तस्माते हेम्नो भिघ्यते।

कथं तांहि हेम कुण्डलभिति सामानाधिकरण्यम्

इति चेत्, न ह्याधारार्थेवभवे समानाथ्रयते वा सामानाधिकरण्यिन्युक्तम्। अथानुवृत्तिवावृत्तिवर्ष्या च हेम्नि ज्ञाते कुण्डलादिजिज्ञासा च कथम्?
न खल्चमेवे एकान्तिकेनैकान्तिकेचैतुभयमुपपधे इत्युक्तम्। तस्मादेवंद्योर्न्यतरसिध्यध्येवेदेवंदे-
पादानेव मेदकल्पना, न मेदोपादानामेदकल्पनेति
युक्तम्। भिधमानल्लनत्वाधोऽवत्त्र, भिधमानानं च
प्रत्येकमेकवतः, एकाभावेच चानायथर्यस्य मेदर्या-
योगात्, एकत्वः च मेदाधीनत्वात्, नाय-
मयं इति च मेद्गरह्सृ प्रतियोगिग्रहसपेक्षत्वात्,
एकत्रग्रह्सृ चान्यापेक्षत्वात्, अमेदोपादानेवा-
निर्वचनीयमेदकल्पनेति साम्प्रतम्। तथा च
श्रुति: 'मुच्चिकेत्येव सत्यम्' इति। तस्मात्
कृतस्थानित्वेतः पारमार्थिकी, न परिणामिनित्येति
सिद्धम्।

व्योमवत् इति च द्यान्त: परस्यः,
अस्माते तस्यापि कार्येत्तेनान्यज्ञाताः। अत्र च
कृतस्थानित्यम् इति निर्विभाकर्मवतामपराकरोति।
सर्वविवापि इति प्राप्यकर्मवतम्। सर्वविक्षिप्ता-
रहितम् इति विकार्यकर्मवतम्। निरवयववम् इति
संस्कार्यकर्मवतम्। व्रीहाणां खङ्ग प्रकृतेन सर्वकारा-
स्यांज्ज्ञे यथा जन्यते, नैवं व्राहाणि कथिरिदंशः:
It has been said that these two, verily, are not intelligible, if there be non-difference, absolute or non-absolute (i.e., *cum* difference). Therefore, one of the two, difference and non-difference, having to be abandoned, it is on the basis of non-difference that there is the positing of difference; it does not stand to reason that non-difference is posited on a basis of difference. For, difference is dependent on what is differentiated; those which are differentiated are each one; if there were not one, there could be no difference because there would be no locus; and of unity there is no dependence on difference; the apprehension of difference, in the form "not this, (but) this," has need of the apprehension of the counter-correlate, while the apprehension of unity has no need of anything else: for these reasons it is admissible that only on a basis of non-difference is there the positing of indeterminable difference." So too Scripture: "only as clay is this true." Hence, immutable eternity alone is absolute, not evolving eternity; this is established.

The illustration "like the ether" is according to the doctrine of others, since in our system that too, being produced, is non-eternal. And here, by the words "*immutably eternal," he refutes its being an object of achievement; by the words "*all-pervasive," its being an object of attainment; by the words "*devoid of all modifications," its being an object of change; by the words "*without parts," its being an object of purification. Just as, verily, for the rice-grains there is generated, by the sprinkling, an element called purification, not thus is there any element in Brahman, produced by (ritualistic) action, since it has no members (*avayavas*); that is to say, since it has no parts.
Further, there are scriptural texts which, showing final release to follow immediately on the knowledge of Brahman, exclude anything else to be done in between: "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself" (Mund., III, ii, 9); "And his actions perish when he, the higher and the lower, is seen" (Mund., II, ii, 8); "He who knows the bliss of Brahman has no fear from anywhere" (Taitt., II, 9); "Verily thou hast, oh Janaka, reached fearlessness" (Brh., IV, ii, 4); "Therefore, one knew only the self in the form, 'I am Brahman'; from that all this sprang" (Vājasaneyibrāhmaṇopaniṣad,

He states its being the human goal: "eternally contented." By contentment is implied happiness devoid of misery. Contentment, indeed, is happiness conjoined with the cessation of the misery of appetite. And happiness, if not cognised, cannot be a human goal; to this he says: "self-luminous."

Having thus shown through Scripture etc., that the fruit called release, in his own view, is eternal, he elaborates the non-eternity of the release achieved by action: "If that be taught" etc. Nor is there sublation by Scripture, since there is intelligibility of Scripture, in the manner mentioned. Further, there are numerous texts, which stand in the way of the view that release, as generated by the unseen potentiality born of knowledge, is consequent on an injunction; thus, he says: "Further, there are Scriptural texts" etc. The instrumentality of knowledge in respect of release consists only in the removal of the hindrance of the two kinds of Nescience, not in itself, nor
अपि च 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मवेद भवति', 'क्रीयन्ते चायस्य कर्मोऽन्ति तस्मिन्नः परावरे', 'आनन्दं ब्रह्माणो विद्राह्न बिभेति कुतथन', 'अभयं वै जनक प्रासोऽसि', 'तदात्मानमेचवेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति तस्मात्

कियाधेयोऽसि, अनवयवत्वा; अनशताविद्यर्थः।
पुरुषार्थसामाह—निल्यतुसम् इति। तस्या दुःखं
रहितं सुखमपक्षयंति। श्रुदुःखानिन्द्रियसहितं हि
सुखं तुसि।। सुखं चाप्रतीययमां न पुरुषार्थ इत्यत
आह—स्वयंज्योति: इति।

तदेव स्मरतेन मोक्षायं फलं नितं श्रुत्यादि—
भिन्नपाय कियानिष्पादय तु मोक्षयानित्यलं
प्रस्तयति—तथादि इति। न चागमवाय:, आग-
मयोक्तेन प्रकारणोपपते:। अपि च ज्ञानज्ञाया-
पूर्वेनितं मोक्षा नैयोगिक इत्यार्थस्य सन्ति
भूयस्य: श्रुत्यो निवारिका इत्यह—अपि च
ब्रह्म वेद इति। अविचाद्यप्रतिविज्ञापनयमात्रेण च
विधाया मोक्षसाधनत्तम, न स्वतोपूवस्यादेन वा
ल्स्वमभवत्, 'तत्र को मोहः कः शोक 
एकत्वमनुपद्धतः' इत्येवमाध्य: श्रुतयो 
ब्रह्मविद्यान्तरसङ्ग मोक्षं दर्शयन्त्यो मध्ये 
कार्यान्तरं चार्यन्ति। तथा 'तत्तैत्तर- 
इत्यन्तरपित्रामदेवः प्रतिपदेर्द्वं मनुरभवं 
सूर्यश्च' इति ब्रह्मदर्शनसर्वत्मभावयोमेध्ये 
कर्त्तव्यांतरवारणायोदाहार्यम्, यथा 'तिष्ठ- 
न्यायति' इति तिष्ठतिगायलयोमेध्ये तत्कर्त्तैकं 
कार्यान्तरं नास्तीतिः गम्यते। 'तं हि न: 
पिता योस्माकमविद्याया: परं पारं तार- 
यसि', 'श्रुतं हेव मे भगवदृशोभ्यस्तरति 
शोकमात्मविदिति; सोऽहं भगव: शोचामि;

इत्यत्रापि श्रुतीश्वदाहरति—तं हि न: पिता इति। 
न केनिलसमस्त्रयं श्रुतयादयः, अपि तत्क्रियावाचर्य- 
सूत्रमपि न्यायसूत्रस्तितयाः—तथा चाचार्ये- 
प्रणीतम् इति। आचार्येश्वोक्तक्षणं पुराणे— 
आचिनोति च शाख्यार्थमाचारे स्थापत्यपि। 
स्थायमाचरते यस्मादाचार्यस्तेन चोच्यते॥
I, iv, 10); "Then, what delusion is there, what sorrow is there, for one who has uniformly seen this oneness?" (Īṣa., 7) etc. Similarly the following may be cited in order to exclude anything else which has to be done in between the sight of Brahman and becoming the self of all: "Verily, the sage Vāmadeva, seeing him, realised, 'I became Manu and the sun'" (Brh., I, iv, 10); just as in "standing, he sings," one understands that between standing and singing there is nothing else for him to do. "Thou indeed art our father, thou who carriest us to the other shore of ignorance" (Pr., VI, 8); "I have indeed heard from those like Your Reverence that one who knows the self crosses sorrow; Your Reverence, I am one in grief; this me, may Your Reverence take across sorrow" (Chānd., VII, i, 3); "To him whose sins are squeezed out, in the production of an unseen potentiality; for this too, he cites Scriptures: "Thou indeed art our father" etc." To this effect, there are not merely Scripture etc., but also the aphorism of the preceptor, Akṣapāda, based on reasoning; thus he says: "Similarly, there is the aphorism" etc. And the preceptor is he who has been thus defined in the purāṇa: "Because he explains the meaning of the sacred teaching, confirms (his pupils) in the observances, and himself conforms to those observances, he is called preceptor." By such a one has been formulated this
the revered Sanatkumāra shows the other side of darkness" (Chānd., VII, xxvi, 2); these and other scriptural passages show the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman to be merely the cessation of the obstacles to final release.

Similarly there is the aphorism written by the preceptor and supported by reasoning "Of misery, birth, activity, defect and illusory knowledge, by the destruction of each subsequent one, there is the destruction of each earlier one, and consequently final release." And the destruction of illusory knowledge results from the cognition of the oneness of Brahman and the self.

aphorism: "Of misery, birth, activity, defect and illusory knowledge, by the destruction of each subsequent one, there is the destruction of each earlier one, and consequently final release." In the order of mention, the cause is the subsequent, the effect the earlier; on the destruction of the cause there is the destruction of the effect, as when phlegm is destroyed, the fever generated by phlegm is destroyed. On the destruction of birth, there is the destruction of misery; on the destruction of activity, the destruction of birth; on the destruction of defect, the destruction of activity; on the destruction of illusory knowledge, the destruction of defect. And illusory knowledge, which is Nescience, is the primal cause of transmigration, even in the visible manner of generating desire etc.
तं मा भगवान्ज्ञोकस्य पारं तारयतुः,
तस्मै सुद्धिकषणाय तमां पारं दर्शयति भगवान्सनकुमारः। इति चैवमाया: शृवत्यो मोक्षप्रतिवन्धनिप्रवृत्तिमात्रेनवाल्मज्ञानस्य फलं दर्शयति।

तथा च आचार्यप्रणीतं न्यायोपबंधितं सूत्रम्——दु:खज्ञमप्रप्रवृत्तिदोषमिश्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोपरायाये तदन्तरापायादपवर्गः।
इति। मिश्याज्ञानापायश्रु ब्रह्माकैकतविज्ञानान्तवर्गः।

इति। तेन हि प्रणीतं सूत्रम्——दु:खज्ञमप्रप्रवृत्तिदोषमिश्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोपरायायाये तदन्तरापायादपवर्गः।
इति। पाठपेशया कारणमुत्तरस्, कार्यं च पूर्वम्; कारणापाये कार्यापाय:, कार्यापाये इव कार्योक्तिवर्ग ज्ञर्यापायः। जन्मापाये दु:खापायः; प्रवृत्तिपाये जन्मापायः; दोषापाये प्रवृत्तिपायः; मिश्याज्ञानापाये दोषापायः। मिश्याज्ञानं चाविची रागारु-
पजननक्रमेन देशेनेव संसारस्य परम निदानम। सा।
चत्तचज्जनेन ब्रह्मात्मकत्वज्ञानेनेवावगतिपर्यंतेन
विरोधिना निवर्तते। ततोविद्यानित्वृत्या ब्रह्मस्व-
रूपाविर्भितायो मोक्षः। न तु विद्याकार्यशरस्मिनिर्तपूर्व-
कायो वा—इति सूत्राथः। तत्त्वज्जनानिमित्याज्जनानापाय
इत्येतावनात्रेण सूत्रोपन्यासः। न त्वक्षपादसंगमतं
तत्त्वज्जनानमिह संमतम। तदनेनाचार्यान्तरसंवादे-
नायमध्ये हद्दीकृतः।

स्थादेतत्। नेत्तविज्ञानं यथावस्थितवस्तु-
विषयम्। येन मित्याज्ञानं भेदाभासं निवर्त्यल।
विधिविपयों भवेत्। अपि तु संपदादिरूपम्। तथा
च विधे: प्रागप्राप्तं पुरुषेच्छयं कर्तव्यं सत्य। विधि-
गोचरों भविष्यति। यथा बृत्त्यन्ततेन मनसो
विशेषेदेवसमायादिश्वान्द्रवान्नमसि संपाच मन आल-
म्बनमविद्यामानसं कृत्वा प्राधान्येन संपादानां
विशेषामेव देवानामतुचित्तनम्, तेन चान्तलोक-
प्राप्ति:। एवं चिद्रूपसाम्याजीवे ब्रह्मारूपं संपाच
जीवमात्मकमानविद्यामानसं कृत्वा प्राधान्येन ब्रह्मानु-
And that is removed only by its opposite, viz., knowledge of the truth, the cognition of the unity of Brahman and the self, culminating in realisation. Hence, release is the manifestation of the nature of Brahman, through the removal of Nescience; but it is not the effect of *vidyā* (i.e., contemplation) or the effect of an unseen potentiality generated thereby; this is the meaning of the aphorism. The citation of the aphorism is only to this extent—that from knowledge of the truth there is the destruction of illusory knowledge; that, however, which is acceptable to Akṣapāda as knowledge of the truth, is not here acceptable. Hereby, i.e., by the accord of another preceptor, this sense is confirmed.

Be this so. The cognition of unity does not have for content a thing as it exists, in which case, it would remove illusory knowledge, i.e., the presentation of difference, and itself not be the content of an injunction; but it is of the nature of an imagined identification etc. And thus, being non-established prior to an injunction, and to be accomplished through the desire of the person, it would become the sphere of an injunction; for example, because of the likeness of the mind, through the infinity of its modifications, to the All-gods, the latter are imagined in the mind, the mind which is the support is ignored as if not cognised, and the imagined All-gods alone are principally contemplated, infinite worlds being attained thereby; similarly, because of likeness in the nature of intelligence, the nature of Brahman is imagined in the *jīva*, the *jīva* which is the
Nor is this cognition of the oneness of Brahman and the self of the nature of an imagined identification, as in the case of "Mind verily is infinite, the All-gods are infinite; therefore he conquers an infinite world ". Nor is it of the nature of superimposition as in the case of "Contemplate the mind as Brahman," "The sun is Brahman: this is the teaching," where there is superimposition of the contemplation of Brahman in the mind, the sun etc. Nor is it caused by association with a distinctive mode of activity, as in the case of "The air is the devourer," "The vital air is the devourer". It is not also of the nature of purification subsidiary to a ritual like the glance at the ghee. If the cognition support is ignored as if not cognised, and Brahman is contemplated principally, the fruit of immortality being attained thereby. In superimposition, however, the support being the principal, there is contemplation of that as having the nature superimposed; for example, "Contemplate the mind as Brahman," "The sun is Brahman, this is the teaching"; similarly, in respect of the jīva, who is not Brahman, "Contemplate but as Brahman".

Or (the meditation may be) from the association with a distinctive mode of activity; for example "The air, verily, is samvarga," "The vital air, verily, is samvarga"; the external air-deity is, indeed, the samvarga; that, indeed, devours fire etc.; for, at the time of the final
न चेदं ब्रह्मात्मकविज्ञानं संपूर्णम्
यथा ‘अनतं वै मनोभन्तरं विष्णु देवो
अनन्तस्वे तदन्तः तदाभ्यस्ति’ इति।
न चाध्यासर्पम्, यथा ‘मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत’
‘आदिलो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः’ इति च
मनुआदिलवथिषु ब्रह्मेत्यस्माद्।
नापि विशिष्टक्रियायोगनिमित्तम् ‘वायुवाच संवर्गः’;
‘प्राणो वाव संवर्गः’ इति इति।
नायायाज्ञवेश्वरादिकर्मविकासान्स्कारुः।

चिन्तनम्, तेन चामृतस्वेतफलप्राप्तः। अध्यासे त्वालः
मनस्वयम् वाहिन्यनारोपितद्वाननुचिन्तनम्
यथा ‘मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत’, ‘आदिलो ब्रह्मेत्या
तेदेशः’; एवं जीवमशह च ‘ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत’
इति।

क्रियाविशेषयोगादा, यथा ‘वायुवाच संवर्गः’;
‘प्राणो वाव संवर्गः’; वाहा रक्तु वायुदेवताः
संवर्गः; स हि वायुवाचिनं संवृक्के; महाप्रत्ययसमये।
हि वायुर्भवग्राहींसंपृत्य संहत्यामानिः स्थापयति।
यथाः द्रविडानाथः—‘संहरणाहा संहरणाहा
स्वामीभावानादाहुः संवर्गः इति। अथ्यासं च प्राणः
संवर्गः इति; स हि सत्ताणि ग्राहारीनि संवृढङ्कैः
प्रायणकाले हि स एव सर्वार्थनिद्रयाणि संगृहोक्तस्मतीति।
सेवं संवर्गेद्विष्वायो प्राणे च दुशाशागातं जगहर्षयति यथा,
एवं जीवत्मानि
बुधक्रियया बहुदाहिष्टसमस्ताय फलायं कल्पत
इति। तदेतेषु श्रीपणो पशुष्यात्मदर्शनोपासनाद्यः
प्रधानक्रमाणि, अपूर्वविपथयताः, स्तुतश्वरयात;
आत्मा तु द्रव्यं कर्मणि गुणं इति। संस्कारे
वातमनो दर्शानं विधीयते। यथा दर्शोपर्णोमासप्रकरणे
‘पत्येक्षितमायं भवति’ इति समाम्नात्मसः
प्रकरणिना च गृहीतमुपांशुयागायक्षभूतायां
संस्कारतथा, अवेक्षण गुणक्रमं सिध्यते, एवं करूप्तेन
कल्पितभूते आत्मनि ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्यः’
इति दर्शिनं गुणक्रमं सिध्यते, ‘चेतु द्रव्यं
विचित्रविश्लेषं गुणसम्भूतत्र प्रतीयते’ इति न्यायताः।
अत आह—न चेदं ब्रह्मालमेकतविज्ञानम्।
deluge, it devours fire etc., destroys them and establishes them in itself. As the Dravidacarya says: “Because by destruction or by devouring it makes (all things) into itself, the air is samvarga.” And the internal vital air is samvarga; that, indeed, devours all, speech etc.; for, at the time of death, it is that alone, which goes forth collecting together all the organs in itself. Just as the meditation on the air or the vital air as samvarga reveals the universe in all ten directions, even so, the meditation of the jiva as Brahman, because of the (former’s) act of causing to grow, is capable of (producing) the fruit of immortality. On all these three views, contemplation etc. in respect of the intuition of the self, are principal acts, since they have an unseen potentiality for content, like the stutis and sastras;[12] but the self is a substance subsidiary to the act. Or, intuition may be prescribed as a purification of the self. For example, in the topic concerning the darsapurgamasa, the glance, which is mentioned in “Ghee is that which has been glanced at by the (sacrificer’s) wife”, and which is required by the subject of the topic as a purification of the material, ghee, an accessory of the upamsu sacrifice, is prescribed as a subsidiary rite; even so, in respect of the self, which as agent is an accessory to the rite, intuition is enjoined as a subsidiary rite, in the words “The self, verily, is to be seen,” because of the principle[13] “Those by which the principal substance is desired to be purified, in respect of that (substance), subsidiariness is cognised for them”. Hence, he says: “Nor is this cognition of the oneness of the Brahman and the self” etc. Why not? “If the cognition of the oneness of
of the oneness of Brahman and the self were to be admitted to be of the form of an imagined identification etc., then in the case of statements like "That thou art", "I am Brahman," and "This self is Brahman" violence would be done to the syntactical relation of words whose purport is to declare the fact of the oneness of Brahman and the self. There would be contradiction of scriptural passages like "The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are resolved" (Munḍ., II, ii, 8), which declare the fruit, viz., the cessation of Nescience. If it were of the nature of an imagined identification etc., the statements of one becoming Brahman in "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself" (Munḍ., III, ii, 9) would not be satisfactorily intelligible. Therefore the cognition of the oneness of Brahman and the self is not of the nature of an imagined identification etc.

Brahman and the self were admitted to be of the form of an imagined identification etc." and so on. Indeed, of the glance at the ghee mentioned in the topic of the darsapūrṇa-māsa, it is meet that it should be a purification of the ghee, which is an accessory thereto. And texts like "The self, verily, is to be seen" are not mentioned in any particular topic. The text "He, for whom the ladle is of parṇa-wood" etc., is not mentioned in the course of any particular topic; yet the word "ladle" recalls the sacrifice by the sentence, through the channel of the ladle, which has a non-inconstant connection with the sacrifice, (and thus)
पम्। संपदादिरूपेपि हि ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेः भयुपगम्यमाने, 'तत्वमसि', 'अहं ब्रह्मासि', अयमात्मा ब्रह्म 'इत्येवमादीनां वाक्यानां ब्रह्मात्मैकत्ववस्तुप्रतिपादनपरः पदसमन्वयः पीड़येत; 'भिचते हृदय-प्रतिचित्तव्यथते सर्वसंशयाः' इति चैव-मादीन्यविद्यानिविन्दितविद्विशवर्णामयेपुरुषे -रन्; 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मवेद भवति' इति चैवमादीनि तद्धावापत्तिवचनानि संपदादिरूपवेन सामअस्येनोपपवेन। तस्मान्न संपदादिरूपं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानम्।

इति। कुतः? संपदादिरूपेपि हि ब्रह्मात्मै-कत्वविज्ञाने इति। दर्शपूर्णमायास्पर्कने हि समानमात्मायावेशक्षणं तद्भवत्सायसंस्कारं इति युक्ते। न च 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्ट्वः' इत्यादि क्षयकिर्तिप्रकरणे समानमात्मः। न चानार-भ्याधीतमापि 'यस्य पर्मयी जुह्न्मैवति' इत्य-व्यविचारितकुसंबन्धजुहूदीरेण जुहूपदं कतुं स्मार-
अतो न पुरुषव्यापारत्नन्त्रा ब्रह्मविचार।
किं ताहो? प्रत्यक्षास्तिप्रमाणाःविषयवस्तुज्ञानावद्वस्तुतन्त्री।
एवंमूत्स्त ब्रह्मस्त्तज्ञानस्य: च न कयाचिच्युक्ता शास्त्र: कार्यानुप्रयोगः: कल्पयतिम्।
न च विदिक्रियाकर्मण्येन कार्यानुप्रयोगोऽथ ब्रह्मण:,'अन्यदेवततदिविदताद: अविदिताद: भागी इति विदिक्रियाकर्मण्यविधिकेन्द्रियः:।
'येनेदं सर्व

यदाक्षेत्रे यथा परितात्त: कतुरेषभावमपापद्यति,
नैवमात्मायायःभविष्यतिकतुसंबन्धः। येन तद्वर्णां
कतवः सदासामान्यते संकृतयोत। तेन यथेऽयूऽ
विन्यः, तथापि 'सुर्वावण्ड विरायम्' इति तत्
विन्योगभूतेन प्रथाकर्मेन, अपूर्विविषयतवाः, न
गुणकेति स्थायित्वस्यतदुप्रसाननमनविधाय सर्वस्पर्शी
साधारां दूषणमुक्तम्। तद्विनिरोहितार्थततवा न
व्यायायम्।

किं च ज्ञानक्रियाविषयतविध्यनमस्य कहुक्रुतिविद्यमिया—न च विदिक्रियः।
For this reason, the knowledge of Brahman is not dependent on human activity. What then is it? It is dependent on the thing alone, like the knowledge of things which are the content of valid cognitions like perception etc. And, of Brahman of this nature and of the cognition thereof, it is not possible by any reasoning to assume entrance into (the field of) what is to be done. Nor as the object of the act of cognition does Brahman enter into what is to be done; because there is the denial of its being the object of the act of knowing in "It is different from the known, also from the unknown" (Kena., I, 3) and brings about subsidiariness to the sacrifice for being-made-of-parṇa-wood. There is not similarly a non-inconstant connection of the self with the sacrifice, whereby the intuition thereof, being subsidiary to the sacrifice, would purify the self for the sake of the sacrifice. Therefore, though this be an injunction, yet because of the failure of the application, as in "Bright gold is to be worn,"¹² and because of having unseen potentiality as its content, this is only a principal rite, not a subsidiary rite (like purification etc.); this criticism being too patent is not stated, only the criticism common to all the positions being stated. Since its sense is not obscure, it is not commented on.

Further, its being an injunction with the act of cognition as content is opposed to numerous Scriptural texts; thus he says: "Nor as the object of the act of
"By whom one knows all this, how can one know him?" (Bṛh., II, iv, 14). Similarly, there is also the denial of its being the object of the act of contemplation: after premising the non-objectness of Brahman in "That which is not expressed by speech, by which speech is expressed," (Scripture says), "Know then that alone to be Brahman, not this which is contemplated." (Kena., I, 4). If it be said that if Brahman be not an object, the sacred teaching cannot intelligibly be the source thereof, no; for the sacred teaching has for purport the cessation of the difference posited by Nescience. Indeed, the sacred teaching does not intend to declare its content, Brahman, as "this". What then? It declares Brahman to be a non-object, as being the inner self, cognition etc. He objects: "If Brahman be not an object" etc. And thence it would be as if an evil spirit arose in the midst of a ceremony to appease (evil spirits); this is the idea. He refutes this: "No." Why not? "Since the sacred teaching has for purport the cessation of the difference posited by Nescience." Indeed, all sentences are not capable of making known differences among things as "this" or "this". For, the differences of sweetness among sugar-cane, milk and jaggery cannot be expressed in words. It must be seen to be similar in all other cases too. Hence, if, even in respect of worldly things established by other means of valid knowledge, this be the fate of words, what then need be said in respect of the inner self, which is transcendent? As for the predication, somehow, in a
विज्ञानति तं केन विज्ञानीयात्' इति च। तथोपात्मकत्वाकर्ममेवप्रातिवेशेऽपि भवति, 'यद्वाचान्भुदितं येन वागभूतं हयते' इत्यविषयतं ब्रह्मण उपन्यासय, 'तदेव ब्रह्म तदं विच्छि, नेदं यदिदं सुपासते' इति। अविषयते ब्रह्मण: शास्त्रयोगित्वानुपपत्तितिः चेतु, न; अविद्यालिपत्वेदनिद्रालिपत्वाच्छाद्य। न हि शास्त्रमिदंतया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिप्राप्तपद्यिषाति। किं ताहि? प्रथ-शङ्करे—अविषयते इति। तत्तथ शास्त्रिकर्मणि बेतालोद्य इति भावः। निराक्रोति—न। कुतः? अविद्यालिपत्वेदनिद्रालिपत्वाच्छाद्य इति। सर्व-मेतः हि वाक्यं नेदंतया वक्तुभेदं बोधयितमहि। न हीदेह्वुरुगुडालिन्यं मधुरस्मेदः शक्य आश्वातः। एवमन्त्रापि सर्वं दृष्ट्यम्। तेन प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धे लोकिके एवश्रेष्ठ यदा गतिरिदशी शाब्दं, तदा कैव कथा प्रस्मातसन्यलौकिके।
गात्मकवेनाविषयतया प्रतिपाद्यतू अविचारकलिपिं वेधवेदित्वेदनादिभेदमपनयति। तथा च शास्त्रम्—‘यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः। अविज्ञातं विज्ञातं विज्ञातविज्ञानतामु् ‘न हृद्धेर्द्धारं पद्यनि शुरुः श्रोतारं श्रूणुया न मतेर्मन्तारं मन्वीथा न विज्ञातेविज्ञातारं विज्ञानीयाः' इति चेत्तमादि। अतोविचारकलिप्तसंसारित्वनिवर्तनेन नित्यमुक्ताकामस्वरूपसमर्पणान्ना मोक्षस्यानिवित्तवदोषः।

अद्वैतविप्रकर्षणं तु कथंचत्रप्रतिपाद्यनमिहापि समानम। लंपदाव्या हि प्रभाता प्रभाणाधीनया प्रभुत्या प्रभुत्या घटादि व्यामोतित्वविचारितसितम। तदस्य अविष्कार्यमहुर्तोदसादीनतदार्थप्रत्यगतसामानाविकरण्येन प्रभातत्वभावात् तत्किर्त्व तस्मानाद्यतिश्रो विधा निवर्तते। न हि पक्तुवस्तुवे पाक्यपक्रपनानि वस्तुसन्तः मग्निमहँतति। तथा हि—
and removes differences like the known, knower, and knowledge posited by Nescience. And thus the sacred teaching: "Conceived of by him by whom it is not conceived of; he, by whom it is conceived of, does not know it; not known to them who (say they) know; known to them who (say they) do not know." (Kena., II, 3); "Thou canst not see the seer of sight, canst not hear the hearer of hearing, canst not think the thinker of the thought, canst not know the knower of the knowledge" (Brh., III, iv, 2) and so on. Therefore through the cessation of migratoriness posited by Nescience, there is the restoration of the nature of the self eternally free; hence for final release there is not the defect of non-eternity.

manner not too remote, that holds equally here. That the denotation of the "thou," the cogniser, through valid knowledge dependent on the means of valid knowledge, pervades the object of knowledge, the pot etc.—this is a manifestation of Nescience. Being in apposition with the inner self, the denotation of the "that," which is not an object and is indifferent, there cannot be cognisership for it; hence, on the cessation of that, there cease the threefold distinctions of the means of valid knowledge etc. Verily, when the cook is unreal, the object, the result and the process of cooking cannot be real." It is, indeed, thus that there is a verse occurring elsewhere: "When, of the word
But, for him to whom release is something to be produced, it stands to reason, there is the need for something to be done, mental, verbal or physical. So too, if it be a modification. For these two views the non-eternity of release is a certainty. In the world, neither modifications like curd etc., nor things produced like a jar etc. are found to be eternal.

'that,' cured of its external reference, there is identity of significance with the word 'thou,' then, the word 'thou' too, getting the same significance as 'that,' i.e., the pure intelligent self, abandons all the impurities, such as agency, that affect the true substance." To the same effect he cites Scriptures: "And thus the sacred teaching: 'Conceived of by him'" etc. He concludes the present topic: "Therefore, through the cessation of the migratoriness posited by Nescience" etc.

He deduces the non-eternity of release on the opponent's view: "But, for him to whom" etc. What is to be done, i.e., the unseen potentiality, is generated by the operation in respect of sacrifice etc.; that, release needs for its origination. "For those two views," i.e., for the two (views) of achievement and modification. That the momentary cognition is the self, say the Baudhhas. And thus, since the origination of a pure cognition is release, release is what is achieved. For others, however, the
यथस्य तृत्यादो मोक्षः; तस्य मानसं वाचिकं कायिकं वा कार्यमपेक्षत्व इति युक्म। तथा विकार्यते च। तयोऽपक्षयोमोक्षस्य ध्रुवमनिल्यत्म। न हि दध्यादि विकार्यम्, उत्पाध्य वा घटादि निल्यं हष्टं लोके।

बिगलितपरायण्यं नितः पद्यस्य तदस्तदा
लिमिति हि पदेनकार्यते लिमित्यपि यत्प्रम।
तदुपि च तदा गलेकार्य्यं विशुद्धविचारात्मां
त्यजः सकलान्तर्तृतादीन्या देवमलाच्यिजान।
इत्यान्तर्वृकः। अन्तःवृत्तः श्रुतीशाक्तिः,—तथा
च शास्त्रम्—यस्यामतम् इति। प्रकृतमुपोपसृष्टिः—अतोविचाराक्षितं इति।
परपक्षे मोक्षायनित्यतामापायतः—यस्य तु
इति। कार्यमपेक्षं यागादिविराज्जन्यं; तदपेक्षते
मोक्षः स्त्रोताचारी। तयोऽपक्षयोऽपि इति;
निर्वाचिकार्ययोः। क्षणिकं विज्ञानमात्मिति बौद्ध।
तथा च विशुद्धविज्ञानोत्पादो मोक्ष इति निर्वचियाः
न च आप्यतेनापि कार्यापेक्षा; खातम-क्षरुपत्वे सत्यानायत्वात्; खातम-धर्मापरिकते-प्रि ब्रह्मणो नायत्वम्; सर्वगतत्वेन नित्यास्तहुरुपत्वात्सर्वेण ब्रह्मण आकाशर्येव।

मोक्षः। अन्येन्तु संसारस्वप्नस्यापहाय या केवल्यावस्थावासिरामः स मोक्ष इति विकारियो मोक्षः; यथा पयस: पूर्वस्थापहानेनावस्थान्तर-प्रार्थिविकारो द्विभवम्। तद्विद्योः पक्षेऽऽन्तरात्मा मोक्षस्य, कार्यत्तात्, दुधिघटादिविशत्।

‘अथ यद्तः परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्ते’ इति शुक्लेष-हमाणो विक्रुताविक्रुतःदेशबाध्यार्गाद्विक्रुतःदेश-वहाप्रास्पृस्तान्त्रिविक्रियायां भविष्यति; तथा च प्राप्यकर्म स ब्रह्मण इत्यत आहं—न चाप्यवेनापि इति। अन्येन्तु विक्रुताविक्रुतःपरिहाण्याविक्रुत-देशं प्राप्ते। तथापोपेतेन जलधिरितिभवलचपल-क्षोलमालपरस्मार्तकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानकल्लेशपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुखस्तेनपुष्पस्वरस्मानमुक्तः। मये तु प्रशान्तसकल्क्षोलेपस्य: स्त्राच्छ: स्थितयाविक्रुतः; तस्य मध्यमविक्रुतं
Nor even as what is to be attained is there the need for something to be done; for if it be of the nature of one's own self, it is not what is to be attained; even if different from one's own nature, Brahman is not what is to be attained; because, being all-pervasive, Brahman by nature is eternally attained by all, like the ether.

self's attainment of the state of isolation, after getting rid of the state of transmigration, is release; hence, release is a modification; for example, for milk, the attainment of another state by the abandonment of the former state, is the modification, curd. On these two views, there is no eternality for release, because of (its) being produced, like curd, pot etc.

From the scriptural text "Then, the light which shines beyond the heavens," etc., there are understood of Brahman differences of place, where it is modified and where it is unmodified; hence, the reaching to that place where Brahman is unmodified might become what is to be done by the injunction of contemplation etc.; and thus, there is for Brahman object-ness in respect of attainment. To this he says: "Nor even as what is to be attained" etc. By means different from oneself, one abandons the place where there is modification and reaches that where there is none. Thus, for example, the sailor in his boat (leaving behind him) the shores of the sea, which are subject to modification, being characterised by groups of foam produced by the
Nor is final release the purified, in which case there would be the need for an activity. Indeed what is called purification may be either by the addition of merits to what is to be purified, or by the removal of defects. Now, it cannot be by the addition of merits, since final release is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added; nor by the removal of defects, since final release is of the nature of Brahman eternally pure.

dashing of countless waves, reaches the central portion, which, untroubled by any waves, is calm, pure, steady and consequently unmodified. Since, however, the jīva is but Brahman, what is to be attained and by what means? For, attainment is based on difference; this is the meaning.

If, now, the jīva be different from Brahman, even then, Brahman is not attained, since Brahman, because of his pervasiveness, is eternally attained; thus he says: "even if different from one's own nature" etc.

He refutes the object-ness in respect of purification: "Nor is final release the purified" etc. Purifiedness is, indeed, of two kinds: (i) either by the addition of merits; for example, the colouring of the citron flower with the juice of the lac; the flower being purified thereby gives rise to fruit of the same colour as lac; (ii) or by the removal of defects; for example, the impure surface of a mirror becomes purified and bright through being rubbed with powdered brick. Of these (ways), there cannot be any addition of merits to Brahman. For, is this
नापि संस्कार्यों मोक्षः, चेन व्यापार-मपेखेतः। संस्कारो हि नाम संस्कार्यस्य गुणाधानेन वा स्वातः, दोषापनयनेन वा। न तावदुग्नाधानेन संभवति, अनाधेयाति-शयाब्रह्माक्रृपत्वन्मोक्षस्य; नापि दोषापनयनेन, नित्यशुद्धाक्रृपत्वन्मोक्षस्य।

पौराणिकः पोतेन प्रामोति। जीवस्तु ब्रह्मावति किं केन प्राप्यताम्? भेदाश्रयत्वाधारस्तिरियथः।

अथ जीवो ब्रह्माणो भिन्नस्तथापि न तेन व्रह्मायेते, ब्रह्माणो विभुतेन नित्यप्रासृत्वादित्यहं—स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तवेदेपि इति।

संस्कारकृम्वंतामपाकरोति — नापि संस्कार्ये इति। त्रयी हि संस्कार्यं, गुणाधानेन वा, यथा बीजपूरकसुमस्य लाङ्कार्यसावस्येकः; तेन हि तक्षसुम संस्कृतं लाङ्कार्यस्त्रवण्यं फलं प्रसुते; दोषापनयने वा; यथा मलिनमार्दितलं निष्पृष्टमित्काचौर्णोज्ज्ञानित्वस्वतं संस्कृतं भवति। तत्र न तावद्रह्माणि गुणाधानं संभवति। गुणो हि ब्रह्माण: स्वाभावो
समन्वयः

स्वात्मधर्मं एव सन् तिरोभूतो मोक्षः
क्रियायामानि संस्क्रियमाणेः समिभव्यज्ञते, यथा
आदर्शं निघर्षणेन क्रियया संस्क्रियमाणे
भाखरत्वं धर्मं इति चेत्, न; क्रिया-
अर्थव्यतानुपप्तते दातमः। यदाध्रयं क्रिया,
तमविकुर्वति नैवात्मानं उभते। यथात्मा

वा भिन्नो वा? स्वभावक्रेत् कथमाणेः, तस्
नित्यवात्। भिन्नाते तु कार्येन मोक्षस्यानित्यत्व-
प्रसङ्गः। न च भेदे धर्मरमिभावः, गवाधवत्।
भेदाभेदः व्युक्तः, विरोधात्। तदनेनाभिसंपन्न
नोक्तम—अनाधेयातिशयव्रहस्पतान्नोक्तमो-
क्षस्य इति। हृतियं वृल्प्रतिक्षिप्ति—नापि
दोषानुपननेन इति। अशुचि: सती दृष्टे
निवर्तते; न तु वहाणि असती निवर्तनीया,
नित्यनिवृत्तत्वादित्यथः।

शाहूते—स्वात्मधर्मं एव इति। वहास्वभाव
एव मृत्तोनाथविचारलोकान्ति उपासनादिक्रियायामानि
संस्क्रियमाणेः समिभव्यज्ञते, न तु क्रियते। एतदर्न
If it be said, "Final release, being of one's own nature, yet having been obscured, becomes manifest on the purification of the self through acts, as, for example, when a mirror is purified through the act of rubbing, its attribute of lustre (becomes manifest)," no; because of the unintelligibility of the self being the locus of an act. That which is the locus of an act, not without modifying it, does that act get its being. If the self were merit of the nature of Brahman or different? If it be of its nature, how can it be added, that being eternal? If, however, they be different, then, because of being produced, there would result non-eternity for release. Nor can there be the relation of attribute and substrate between different, like cow and horse. And difference cum non-difference has been refuted as contradictory. Because of these considerations, it is said: "since final release is of the nature of Brahman to which no excellence can be added." He refutes the second alternative: "Nor by the removal of defects" etc. Impurity, being present in the mirror, is removed; but not being present in Brahman, it cannot be removed, being eternally removed (therefrom): this is the sense.

He objects: "final release, being of one's own nature" etc. Release, which is of the very nature of Brahman, being enveloped by beginningless impurity, Nescience, is manifested when the self is purified by acts of contemplation.
to be transformed through any act having that as the locus, non-eternity of the self would result. Statements like "This is spoken of as non-transformable" would be sublated. And that is unacceptable. Therefore for the self, there cannot be an act having that as the locus. And since the self is not the object of an act having some other locus, it is not purified thereby.

etc.; but it is not produced. This is what is said: eternal purity is not established of the (individual) self, that being defiled by Nescience in the state of transmigration. He refutes the objection: "no." Why not? "Because of the unintelligibility of the self being the locus of an act." Nescience is located not in Brahman, but in the jiva; but that has been said to be indeterminable; hence, Brahman is certainly eternally pure. Admitting impurity, however, he condemns (the view of) its being purified by an act. Indeed, an act may purify Brahman either as inherent in Brahman, just as the rubbing (consisting in) the extensive conjunction and disjunction of brick powder is always inherent in the surface of the mirror; or, as inherent in another. The act is not an attribute of Brahman, since, that (act) being the cause of modification in its locus, there would be destruction of Brahman's eternity. As for what is inherent in another, how can that be of service to something else, since there
समन्वयः

स्वाभाविक्रिया विक्रियेत, अनित्यत्वमात्रनः प्रसज्येत। "अविकार्योऽयुमुच्यते" इति चैवमादीनि वाक्यानि वाध्येरनु। तत्त्वानिष्ठम्। तस्मान स्वाभाविक्रिया क्रिया आत्मनः संभवति। अन्याभ्रायायास्तु क्रियाया अविषयत्वान्नत तयात्मा संस्क्रियेते।

भवति—नित्यशुद्धत्वमात्रनोदसिद्धम्, संसारशास्त्रायामविचारमलिन्तवादिति। शास्त्रां निराकरोति। कुंतिः। क्रियाभ्रायत्वानुपपत्ते। नाविधिः वहाण्यायं, कि तु जीवे; सा तत्विन्द्रचन्द्रयत्युक्तम्। तेन नित्यशुद्धमेव बहा। अन्यपैति तवशृव्विं क्रियासंस्कार्यवं दूष्यते। क्रिया हि बहानमवेता वा बहा संस्कृयान्, यथा निर्धरणमिष्कार्यवृत्तीययोगविभागप्रच्यो निर्मति आदर्शसत्तसम्बेत:। अन्यसम्बेता वा। न तावाहारम्: क्रिया, तस्या: स्वाभायविकारहेतुलेन बहाणो नित्यत्वायाधारतात्। अन्याभ्राय तु कथमन्यस्योपकरोति, अतिप्रसुज्ञात। न
समन्वय:

ननु देहाध्रयया ख्यानाचमनयंजेशपत्रीतथारणादिकया कियया देही संस्क्रियमाणो द्यषः। न; देहादिसंहतस्येवाविश्वयंश्रोतस्यात्मनः संस्क्रियमाणात्वात्। प्रत्यक्षं हि ख्यानाचमनादेदेहसमवाधित्वम्। तया देहाध्रयया तत्संहत्त एव कश्चिदविद्यायालमलेन परियष्ठीत: संस्क्रियत इति युक्तम्। यथा देहाध्रयचिकित्सानिमित्तेन धातुसाम्येन तत्संहतस्य तद्भिमानिन आरोग्यफलम्, ‘अहमरोगः’ इति यत्र हि दर्पणे निद्रध्यमाणे मणिविशुद्धो द्यषः। तब निद्रितम् इति। तदा बाधयं परमांशति। अत्य व्यभिचारं चोद्यति—ननु देहाध्रयया इति।

परिहरति—न देहसंहतस्य इति। अनाचनिर्व्याचिदोपधानानेव व्रहणो जीवं इति च श्वेत्रज इति चाचक्षते। स च श्वेतसूक्ष्मशारीरिन्द्रियादि।
Now, by acts having the body as their locus, such as bathing, sipping, wearing of the sacred thread etc., the embodied is seen to be purified. No; because what is purified is only that self which is associated with the body etc., which is caught hold of by Nescience. Indeed, it is a matter of perception that bathing, sipping etc. inhere in the body. It stands to reason that what is purified by the act having the body as its locus is something which is associated with that (body), and is apprehended as the self through Nescience. Just as through the equilibrium of the humours brought about by treatment having the body as the locus, there is the fruit of health for that which is associated with that body, and has the conceit (in itself) of that (body), where there arises the cognition "I am free from

would be undue extension? When the mirror is rubbed, the gem is not, indeed, seen to be purified. "And that is unacceptable": by the "that" he refers to the sublation.

He raises the question of an inconstancy here: "Now, by acts having the body as their locus" etc.

He answers: "No." It is only the conditioning of Brahman by beginningless indeterminable Nescience that is called the jīva or the knower of the field (kṣetrajña). And that
disease," similarly, that wherein, through bathing, sipping, wearing of the sacred thread etc., there arises the cognition "I am clean, purified," that (alone) is purified. And that is certainly associated with the body. It is only by him who has the conceit "I," who is the object of the concept "I," who is the knower, that all the actions are fulfilled. And their fruit he alone enjoys, because there is the Mantra passage, "One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other, not eating, looks on" (Rv., I, 164, 20—Mund., III, i, 1),

is associated with bodies, subtle and gross, with organs etc.; it is placed in the midst of their aggregate; through non-difference therewith, it is made the content of the concept "I"; therefore, the purification of the body etc., though the attribute of the body etc., may apply to the self, because of the determination of non-difference therewith; just as the fragrance of the cosmetics is predicated of the damsel. Therefore, here too, the purification is of that alone which is made the content of empirically valid means of knowledge, not of anything else; hence there is no inconstancy. In truth, however, there is neither act nor purification. Since the rest (of the commentary) along with the illustration has been explained even in (explaining) the commentary on superimposition, it is not explained here. "One of them eats the sweet fruit": one
बुद्धिस्तृपथ्यते, एवं स्नानाचमनयज्ञोपवीत-धारणादिकिया 'अहं शुचः संस्कृतः' इति यत्र बुद्धिस्तृपथ्यते, स संस्कियते। स च देहेन संहत् एव। तेनेव अहंकर्ता अहं-प्रत्ययविषयेण प्रत्ययिना सर्वा: क्रिया निर्वर्त्यन्ते। तत्कलं च स एवाभावति, 'तयोरऽन्यः पिप्पलं खाद्यति अनश्वरन्यो-भिमिखाकशीति' इति मन्त्रवर्णैतः। 'अ-

सङ्क्रातस्तकांतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतमञ्चतम忸

तेनात्रापि यदाधिक्तिक्रिया संबंधवहारिकप्रमाण-विषयेक्रृतार्थस्त नरस्त्रसावने नान्यायेति न व्यविचारः। तत्तवत्त्वः न क्रिया न संस्कृत इति। सनिद्धिर्मं सुना शोभमञ्चाभस्माष्टये एव क्लूपत्याश्यामधमिनि नेह व्यास्मातः। तयोरऽन्यः पिप्पलः
समन्वयः
त्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेनाहुर्मन्नीपिणः ’ इति च। तथा ’ एको देवोऽसर्वभूतेषु गृहः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा। कर्मध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साशी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्र’ इति, ’स पर्यगच्छलकमकायम् सर्पणसदृशारिं शुचिमपपविद्धम् ’ इति च; ऐतौ मन्त्रावनाधेयातिशयतां नित्यशुचितां च ब्रह्मणो दर्शयति। ब्रह्माभवश्च मोक्षः। तस्मात्स्पर्श संस्कायोपिणि मोक्षः।

इति। अन्यो जीवात्मा। पिपलं कर्मफलम्। अनन्तन्यं इति। परमात्मा। संहतत्यैव भोक्तृत्वमाह मन्त्रवण:—आत्मेन्द्रियं इति। अनुप्रित्युद्भज्ञाब्राह्मज्ञाग्य्यदर्शनपरिय मन्त्रो पठिते—एको देवोऽर्थे इति। शुचिं द्वितीयः। अवरणं दुःखरहितम्। अस्वारिं अविग्नितम्। अविनाशिति यावन्। उपसंहरति—तस्मातुं इति।
also "(The self) as associated with the body, the organs, and the mind, the wise men call the enjoyer". (Kātha., I, iii, 4). Similarly, "The one God, concealed in all beings, pervading all, the inner self of all beings, the watcher of acts, living in all beings, the witness, the intelligent, alone and free from attributes" (Śvet., VI, 11), "He pervaded all, he who is effulgent, non-embodied, free from misery, indestructible, pure and non-afflicted by sin" (Īṣa., 8): these two Mantras show that Brahman cannot have any excellence added to it and that it is eternally pure. And becoming Brahman is final release. Therefore, final release is not also the purified.

is the jīva-self; "fruit" is the fruit of karma. "The other not eating" etc.; the supreme self. The words of the hymn (mantra) declare enjoyership only of what is associated (with the body etc.): "The self, as associated with the organs, the mind" etc. He cites two hymns which have the object of showing the unassociated Brahman of pure nature: "The one god" etc. Sukram means effulgent; avraṇam means free from misery; asnāvīram means undissolved, that is to say, indestructible. He concludes: "Therefore" etc.
Other than these, no one can point out any channel through which an act may enter into final release. Therefore, apart from the one (means) knowledge, there cannot intelligibly be any entrance here even for the shadow of an act.

Now, what is called knowledge is a mental act. No; because of difference. Indeed that is what is called an act, wherein there is an injunction even without regard to the nature of the thing, and in dependence

Now, let there not be one of the four forms of object-ness like being achieved etc.; there may be some fifth way in which the object-ness of release may be explained. To this he says: "Other than these" etc. Other than these modes, there is no mode, whereby action may come in to (secure) release. This is what is said: being the fruit of action is pervaded by one among the four forms; and this (pervasion), being excluded from release because of the pervader not being seen, excludes (the possibility of) release being the fruit of action. Is there, then, in release no action at all? In that case, all sacred teaching for that purpose and all engaging in activity for that purpose would be futile. To this he says by way of conclusion: "Therefore, apart from the one (means), knowledge" etc.
अतोद्द्वन्मोक्षं धर्ति कियानुप्रवेशादार्यं
न शाक्यं केनचिह्दर्शन्यितम्। तस्माज्ज्ञानमेकं
मुक्तवा कियाया गन्धमात्रस्यायप्यनुप्रवेश
इह नोपपच्छे।

ननु ज्ञानं नाम मानसी किया। नज
बैलुक्षण्यात्। किया हि नाम सा, यत्र
वस्तुस्वरूपानिरपेक्षेऽव चोच्यते, पुरुषाचिच्यते।

ननु मा भूमिर्वेर्यौदिकर्मताचूतुश्यि; पवभमी
तु काचित् विद्या काविष्णि, यथा मोक्षस्य कर्मता
घटिष्ठत्वा इत्यत आह—अतोद्द्वत् इति। एत्य:
प्रकरणेयो न प्रकारान्तरस्यायितः, यथो मोक्षस्य
कियानुप्रवेशो भविष्यति। एतदुर्भधति—
चतुर्ग्राम विधानां मध्येन्त्यततमतया कियाफलं
व्यासम्; सा च मोक्षायचार्यार्थमाणा व्याकानुप-
पलव्या मोक्षस्य कियाफलं व्यावर्त्तयतीति।
तत्कतः मोक्षेषु क्रियेत् नानिः। तथा च तद्यथानि
शाल्पाणि तद्यथाशः प्रदुर्योगनर्थकानीतयं उपसंहार-
व्याजेनाह—तस्माज्ज्ञानमेकम् इति।
समन्वयः

व्यापाराधीना च। यथा 'यस्ये देवतायेपति हविर्हीतं स्थातो मनसा ध्यायेद्रष्टः करिष्यन्।' इति, 'संध्यां मनसा ध्यायेत्।' इति चैवमादिदिः। ध्यानं चिन्तनं यथापि मानससम्, तथापि पुरुषेण कर्तुषकर्तु-मन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यम्, पुरुषत्त्रत्वत्।

अथ ज्ञानं किया मानसी कस्मच विधिगोचरः? कस्मच तस्या: फलं निर्विर्यादिष्वत्न्यं न मोक्षं? इति चोद्यति—ननु ज्ञानम् इति। परिहरति—न। कुः? वेदज्ञानात्। अयमर्थः—सत्यम्, ज्ञानं मानसी किया; न तिथं ब्रह्माणि फलं जनायतमहि, तस्य स्वयंप्रकाशतथा विदिक्रियाकर्मभावानुपपत्तिर्निर्देशम्। तदेद्वित्रिक्वेदज्ञाने स्थिते एव वेदज्ञानस्तरमाह—किया हि नाम सा इति। यत्र विषये वस्तुस्वरूपनिरपेक्षैव चोद्यते—यथा वेदतासंप्रदायनकहिनिरेद्ध्वे वेदतावस्तुस्वरूपान्येश्वरा वेदताच्यायनकिया; यथा वा योषिति अभिवर्त्तनपेशाभिबृद्धिः—या सा किया हि नाम
on the mental activity of a person. For example, in cases like "That deity for whom there should be taken up the oblation, that one should contemplate in mind, uttering the word, 'vaṣṇt'" (Ait. Brāh., III, viii, 1), "The Evening (deity), one should contemplate in mind" and so on. Contemplation, i.e., thinking about, even though this is mental, still since it is dependent on a person, it may be effected, or not effected, or effected in a different way, by the person. Knowledge, however, is

Now, how can it be that knowledge, which is a mental act, is not the sphere of an injunction? And how can it be that its fruit, release, is not one of those achieved etc.? Thus he asks: "Now, what is called knowledge" etc. He answers: "No." Why not? "Because of difference." This is the sense: true, knowledge is a mental act; but this cannot generate fruit in (the nature of) Brahman, since, being self-luminous, that (Brahman) cannot intelligibly be in the relation of an object to an act of cognition; this has been said before. Even when there is this difference, he mentions another difference: "Indeed, that is what is called an act" etc. "Wherein," in respect of a content, "there is an injunction even without regard to the nature of the thing"—for example, while taking up the oblation intended for the deity who is to receive it, there is no regard for the true nature of the deity in the act of contemplating it; or, in the meditation of fire in (relation to) woman, there is no regard for the real fire—"indeed that is what is called an act"; this is
generated by a means of valid knowledge. And a means of valid knowledge has for its content the thing as it exists. Therefore, knowledge cannot be effected or not effected or effected in a different way; it is dependent purely on the thing; it is not dependent on an injunction, nor is it dependent on a person. Therefore, for knowledge, though mental, there is great difference in nature (from an act). In cases like "Man verily is fire, Gautama", "The woman verily is fire Gautama" (Chānd., V, vii, and viii, 1), there arises the cognition, which is mental, of fire in respect of man

the construction. The meditation on the deity is not, verily, established prior to the injunction "To whichever deity the offering is made, let him meditate on that, when he is about to say vaṣṭā". ¹³⁷ But, for him who has studied the Vedānta, who knows words, their sense and the relation (between the two), and understands the true principles relating to verbal testimony, there does result a knowledge of Brahman as the self, from the discourse beginning with "Existence alone" etc., and ending with "That thou art," because of the capacity of testimony to convey valid knowledge, just as from the capacity of the contact between sense and object, there is for the man of attentive mind the experience of the jar present in bright light. This, which is generated by the capacity of its own (causal) aggregate, cannot, verily, be effected in a different way or not effected, at the will of man, like the meditation on the deity, in which case an injunction would be
ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम्। प्रमाणं च यथा-भूतवस्तुविषयम्। अतो ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तु-मन्यथा वा कर्तु न शक्यम्। केवलं वस्तु-तन्त्रमेव तत्। न चोदनात्न्त्रम्, नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम्। तस्मान्मानसत्वेनि ज्ञानस्य महैलक्ष्यन्यम्। यथा च 'पुरुषो वाव गौतमार्शि'; 'योषा वाव गौतमार्शि'; इत्यत्र योषितपुरुष्योरमिनित्यिन्द्रिमानसी भवति।

इति योजना। न हि 'ययैैं देवतायं हरिमूहिनं स्यातं व्यायेह्यक्षरिणु।' इत्यस्मादिधे: प्रादेवताध्यां प्रासम। प्रासं तद्विद्वमानस्य विदितिपदतद्रथ-संबन्ध्याविगतशाह्दन्यायतत्तव्यक्तिव तदेवं सोम्येदम्' इत्यदे: 'तत्वमसि' इत्यन्ततात्संधुऽतु वहास्म-भावज्ञानम्, शाल्द्वप्रमाणसामयायातु, इन्द्रियार्थ-सन्निकर्षामयायादिव प्रणिहितमनस: स्फीतालोक-मध्यवास्तिकम्मातुभवतः। न हस्तो स्वसाम्रीववर्धनव-जन्मा मनुजेष्यायणवकर्तुमकर्तु वा शक्यः, देव-तात्त्वानवत्, येनार्थवानत्र विधि: स्यात्। न
केवलचोदनाजन्यतवातु क्रियेक्षा पुरुष-तन्त्रा च। या तु प्रसिद्धसाधारणभिबुद्धिः, न सा चोदनातन्त्रा; नापि पुरुषतन्त्रा। किं ताहि? प्रत्यक्षशक्तिवस्तुतन्त्रेति ज्ञानमेवेतु; न क्रिया। एवं सर्वप्रमाणविषय-वस्तुभु भेदितत्वम्।

चोपासना वातुभवण्यतंतरा वास्तु विधेयोचरः, तयोर्न्यथव्यतिरेकाध्युतसामस्य्योऽ: साक्षात्कारे वा अनावैविध्यपन्ये वा विधिमन्त्यन्त्र प्रासत्त्वेन पुरुषे-पुरुषायशायनष्कृतुम् वा अशक्त्यतात्। तस्मादहार्जानं मानसी क्रियापि न विधिगोचरः। पुरुषच्चिकित्वा-पराधीनायातु क्रियाया वस्तुस्वस्तूपिनिरपेक्षिता कवित्विरोधी, यथा देवताध्यानक्रियाया:। न द्य वस्तुस्वस्तूपेन कवित्विरोधः। कविद्वस्तुस्वस्तूपिरोधी, यथा योगिपुरुषयोगिभिबुद्धि:—इत्येतावता मेवेद्व निर्देशनमीत्युतंदयोपयायस:। क्रियेक्षा इत्येव-करे: पुरुषतन्त्रान्वत्तमपाक्रोति।
and woman. This, however, is only an act, dependent on a person, because it is generated solely by an injunction. But the cognition of fire in respect of the well-known fire, that is not dependent on an injunction, nor is it dependent on a person. What then? Being dependent only on the thing which is the content of perception, it is certainly knowledge; it is not an act. One should understand the same in respect of things which are the contents of all means of valid knowledge.

purportful here. Nor is contemplation nor its culmination in experience the sphere of the injunction, since intuition or the removal of beginningless Nescience is established through the capacity of these two (contemplation and culmination in experience) as ascertained by co-presence and co-absence, even in the absence of an injunction, and consequently they cannot be effected in a different way or not effected, at the will of man. Hence, the knowledge of Brahman, though a mental act, is not the sphere of an injunction. Of acts dependent on the functioning of the mind of man, the non-regard for the nature of things, is sometimes not opposed (to that nature), as in the case of the meditation on the deity; there is not, indeed, any opposition here to the nature of the thing; sometimes it is opposed to the nature of the thing, like the meditation of fire in man and woman. Because of this much of difference, there are cited the two pairs
This being the case, even the knowledge, whose content is Brahman and the self as they really are, is not dependent on an injunction. Although, in respect of that content, imperatives etc. are found used, yet as having for content that which cannot be enjoined, they become blunt like the edge of a razor etc. applied to a stone etc.; because the content is a thing which cannot be rejected or accepted. For what purpose then are there such passages like, "The self verily, should be seen, heard about," etc., which are shadows of injunctions? We say that they are for the purpose of turning one away from the objects of natural of illustrations. By the word "only" in "this is only an act" he denies dependence on the thing.

Now, there are declared injunctions like "Contemplate but as the self". They are not deluded declarations; for, whatever is handed down by successive tradition is alike (in authority); hence, they must be injunctive. To this he says: "Although in respect of that content imperatives etc." and so on. True, imperatives etc. are used; they are not, however, those whose content is the enjoined (vidhi-visayat), as, if they referred to those, there would result non-authoritativeness. An injunction is, indeed, that whose content is what is to be rejected or accepted. And that alone is what is to be rejected or accepted, which a person can effect or not effect or effect in a different way. And it is he, who is capable in respect of that, that becomes
तत्रेवं सति गथाभूतब्रह्मात्मविषयमपि
ञानं न चोदनातन्नः। तद्विशये लिङ्गाद्यः
श्रूयमाणा आपि अनियोज्यविषयत्वात्कुण्ठी
भवनिति उपल्लादिषु प्रयुक्ताभुत्तेत्वादिवर्त्,
अहयानुपादेयवस्तुविषयत्वात्। किमभाष्यानि
तर्हि ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः: श्रोतव्यः’
इत्यादि: निधिभ्रमायानि वचनानि? स्वाभाविकप्रदृढ़तिविषयविषयविमुखीकरणार्धानि इति

ननु ‘आत्मेत्येनोपसितं’ इत्यादियो विधयः
श्रूयन्ते। न च ते प्रमचगीताः; तुल्यं हि सांप्रदायिकम्;
तत्साधिथेवेनात्र भविष्यविभिन्नत आह——
तद्विशये लिङ्गाद्य इति। सत्यं श्रूयन्ते
लिङ्गाद्यः; न तमि विधिविषयः, तद्विपत्तेवत्रान
माण्यप्रसङ्गान्त। इत्योपदेयविषयो हि विधिः। स
एव च हेयं उपादेयो वा, यं पुरुषं कर्तृमकर्तृमन्यथा
वा कर्तु शाक्षोति। तत्रेव च समर्थः कर्ताचिंकृतो
ब्रूमः। यो हि वहिसूखः प्रवत्तिते पुरुषः: 'इदम् मे भूयात्, अनिदिष्ट मा भूत्, इति, न च तत्राव्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थ लभते, तमाव्यन्तिक- पुरुषार्थवादिन्नं स्वाभाविककार्यकरणसंग्रह- तप्रवृत्तिगोचरार्थियमुखीक्रुष्य प्रत्यगात्मस्त्रो- तस्तया प्रवर्तयन्तित् 'आत्मा व अरे द्रग्वव्:' इत्यादिनि। तत्त्वात्मानवेषणाय प्रस्वतस्याह्यमनुपादेयं चाचमत्तत्त्वमुपादि- इत्यते 'इदं सर्वं यद्यमात्मा', 'यत्र त्वस्य सर्वभावमैवामृतलक्षण कं पद्यते ... केन कं विजानीयात् ... 'विज्ञातारसरे केन विजानीयात्', 'अयमात्मा श्रद्धा' इत्यादिर्भि:।

नियोज्योभवति। न चैवभूतान्यासश्रवणमनो- पासनदर्शनानीति विषयतदनुष्ठात्रोविविधिव्यापकत्वोर- भावादिश्यमेव इति प्रयुक्ता अपि लिङ्गादयः प्रवर्तनायामसमर्थी उपल इत्र भुतेक्ष्यं कुष्टम-
activity. That extrovert, the person who engages in activity saying, "Let me have pleasant things, let me have no unpleasant things," and does not attain therewith the final human goal, him, who desires the final goal, passages like "The self verily is to be seen," turn away from the objects of natural activity, namely the assemblage of effect and cause (i.e., objects and sense-organs) and make him active along the current of the inner self. And for him who engages in the activity of the quest of the self, there is taught by the following passages the true nature of the self, as what cannot be rejected or accepted: "All this, which is that self" (Brh., II, iv, 6), "But when all of this is only the self, then by what and whom shall one see . . . by what and whom shall one know? . . . The knower, by what shall one know?" (Brh., IV, v, 15), "This self is Brahman" (Brh., II, v, 19) etc.

the agent, the eligible person, the person enjoined. And since the hearing, reflection, contemplation and intuition of the self are not of this nature, there is non-existence of the content and the person who observes, which are the pervaders of an injunction; hence, there is the non-existence of the injunction; hence, the imperative suffix etc., though used, are not capable of impelling to activity, and become non-authoritative, as the edge of a
razor (applied) to a stone becomes blunt. "As having for content that which cannot be enjoined": he, indeed, who is capable, is the agent, the eligible person, the person enjoined; but where there is no capacity, there is no agency; hence, he is not eligible, and consequently not the person enjoined; this is the sense.

If, because of the non-existence of an injunction, these are not injunctive statements, for what purpose, then, are these statements, which are the shadows of injunctions? Thus he asks: "For what purpose, then" etc. Nor is it meet that they should be futile, as their purport being apprehended in consequence of the injunction to study one's own Veda would, then, be unintelligible; this is the idea. The reply is: "We say" etc. It is, indeed, the otherwise established hearing etc., that are re-stated by texts which have the appearance of injunctions. Nor is it, though a re-statement, fruitless, since it produces excellence of activity. It is thus: he, whose heart is distracted by the desire to obtain or avoid what is pleasant or unpleasant, and who is (thus) an extrovert, cannot fix his mind calmly on the inner self. Damming up the current of the mind towards objects by the texts about hearing of the self etc., which have the appearance of injunctions, he opens up the current towards the inner self; hence, for re-statements there is the production of excellence of activity; they being consequently fruitful, their being apprehended in consequence of the injunction to study one's own Veda is certainly intelligible.
समम्बयः

प्रमाणिभवन्तीति। अनियोज्यविषयत्वातूः इति; समथः हि कर्ताधिकारी नियोज्यः; असामध्येन तु न कर्तृता; ततो नाधिकृतः, अतो न नियोज्य

इत्यथै।

यदि विश्वेषभावाद्व विधिवचनानि, किमथानि

ताहि वचनान्येतानि विधिच्छायानीति प्रच्छति—

किमथानि इति। न चानर्थकानि युतानि,

स्वाभ्यायविद्याधीनग्रहणत्वानुपप्पतिरति भावः। उत्तरम्—स्वाभाविक इति। अन्यतः प्राप्त एव हि

श्रवणाद्वयो विधिसर्पैवाच्येष्टुनुयाद्। न चानु-

वादोप्रयोजनः, प्रत्रूचिविशेषकर्तवत। तथाहि—

तत्चद्यानिधिविधिप्रेष्याजिहासापहत्वहमतः यथा बहि-

मुखो न प्रत्यगात्मक नमः समाधातुमहति। आत्म-

श्रवणादिविधिसर्पैतु वचनेमैत्त्वो विषयस्रोतः

स्विस्व्रूप प्रत्यगात्मस्रोतः उद्धारः इति प्रत्यूचिवि-

विशेषकर्ता अनुवादानामस्तीति सप्रयोजनत्वाया

स्वाभ्यायविद्याधीनग्रहणत्वापदत् इति।
यद्यप्यकर्त्तव्यप्रधानमात्मज्ञानं हानायो-पादानाय वा न भवतीति, तत्तथेऽवेल्यभ्यु-पगम्यते। अलंकारो द्ययमस्माकम्, यद्रहात्मवचत्सौ सत्यं सर्वकर्त्तव्यताहानि: कुतकुल्यता चेति। तथा च श्रुति: 'आल्मानं चेदिजानीयाद्ययमस्मीति पूरुषः। किमिच्छनकस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंजवरेत्' इति। 'एतहुथा बुद्धिमान् स्थाकृतकुल्यक्ष्मेऽभारत' इति च स्मृतिः। तस्मात् प्रतिपत्तिविनिरोपत्यथा ब्रह्मणः समर्पणम्।

यच् चोदितमात्मज्ञानमनुशानानन्दवादपुरुषार्थं इति तद्युक्तम्; स्वतोऽस्य पुरुषार्थ्येऽसि यदनुशानानां तद्धृष्णं न दृष्णमित्याह— यदापि इति। अनुसंज्वरेत् शरीरं तप्यमानस्मु-तप्येत्। सुगममन्यत्। प्रकृतस्मृपसंहरति—तस्मात् प्रतिपत्ति इति।
Again, as for the statement that the knowledge of the self, not relating primarily to what is to be done, serves neither for acceptance nor rejection, this is acknowledged to be even so. This is indeed an ornament to us, that, when there is the realisation of Brahman, there is the destruction of all obligations and the accomplishment of everything that is to be accomplished. So too says Scripture: "If a person should know the self as 'I am that,' desiring what, for the sake of what, should he suffer in sympathy with the body (that suffers)?" (Brh., IV, iv, 12). And there is the traditional Code: "Knowing that, one can become the knower and one who has accomplished all that is to be accomplished, Oh Bhārata." (Gītā, XV, 20.) Therefore, not as subsidiary to the injunction of contemplation is there the intimation of Brahman.

As for what was objected that the knowledge of the self, not being subsidiary to an observance, is not a human goal, that does not stand to reason; its being a human goal being established in its own right, its not being subsidiary to an injunction is a merit, not a defect; thus he says: "Again, as for" etc. Anuṣaṇjvaret, will suffer in sympathy with the body that suffers. The rest is easily understood. He concludes the present topic: "Therefore, not as subsidiary to the injunction of contemplation" etc.
That too which some say, "There is no portion of the Veda, which deals with bare things, other than injunctions for engaging in and desisting from activity and what is subsidiary thereto," that is not so; for the self propounded in the Upaniṣads is not subsidiary to anything else. Of that self, understood from the Upaniṣads alone, who does not transmigrate, who is of the nature of Brahman, who is distinct from the four kinds of substances, i.e., the produced etc., who occurs in a topic of his own, who is not subsidiary to any other, it cannot be said that such a one does not exist or that he is not known; because there is the word "self" in "That self is not this, not that," (Brh., III ix, 26), and because it is not possible to deny the self; for, even he who denies, even for him there is self-hood.

In order to establish the subject of the topic (i.e., the authoritativeness of the Vedānta in respect of what is existent), he restates the view of some to condemn it: "That too which some say" etc. He condemns it: "that is not so." This is the underlying idea: "Just as activity is the probans in the knowledge of what is to be done, even so are pleasure etc. in the knowledge of what is existent; thus is purportfulness (for the Vedānta); there is the character of sacred teaching since it teaches what is beneficial." If the capacity of words in respect of the expression of what is to be done or the expression of their own
यदपि केचिदाहुः, प्रवृत्तिनिद्रात्मिविधि-तत्सिद्धव्यतिरेकेन केवलवस्तुवादी वेदभागो
नास्तीति, तन्न ; औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्यान-न्यशेषत्वात् । योऽसातुपनिषत्वेवाधिगतः
पुरुषोसंसारी ब्रह्मस्वरूपः उत्पाधादिचतु-विधबधव्यविलक्षणः स्वप्रकरणस्योन्यन्यादेशः
नासौ नास्तीति नाधिगम्यत् इति वा शक्यं वदितमः ; 'स एष नेति नेत्यास्माः'
इत्यामशुन्नदातु , आत्मनः प्रलयाय्यातुम-शक्यत्वात् ; य एव निराकर्तां तस्येवा-
सम्भवात् ।

प्रकृतिसिद्धार्थमेकदेशितम् दूष्पयितमनुभाषेत्—
यदपि केचिदाहुः : इति । दूष्पयित—तन्न इति ।
इदमत्राकृतम्—
कार्योर्जो यथा चेष्टा चिन्द्र हर्प्षद्यस्तथा ।
सिद्धोर्जोर्जवेवचेतां शास्त्रं हितशासनानां ॥
यदि हि पदानां कार्यविधाने तद्विर्यार्था-
भिधाने वा नियमेन वृद्धव्यतः सामार्थ्यविश्वतः
भेवत्, न भवेदःहेयानुपादेयभूततचाहात्मतापरतवसुपनिषदाम्; तत्राविदितसाम्यसत्यतापदानां लोके,तपूर्वकत्वाच बैद्यकार्यप्रतीते। अथ तु मूलविध्यां पदानां लोके शाक्यः संगतिश्राहः, तत उपनिषदां तपतर्वं पौर्वपर्यप्योलोचनयावगम्याचारममप्रहुनुयं न कार्यपर्वं शक्यं कल्याणितम्, श्रुतान्यश्रुतकल्याणाप्रसङ्कात्। तत्र तावदेवमकार्येयं न संगतिश्राहः; यदि तपर् प्रयोगो न लोके दश्येत्, तत्रत्ययो वा व्यत्प्रायोजेतुं न शक्येत्। न तावचत्तपर्: प्रयोगो न दश्येत् लोके, कुन्तुहलवभयानिन्दित्वक्यथा कार्येयपराणं पदसंद्धारिणां प्रयोगस्य लोके वहुतमुपरस्वेय्:। तथाच—आसवंद्यादिलोकपालचक्रवालाधिनित्वति: सिद्धविवाहरगन्धार्यापसः—परिवरो बहालोककार्तिले मन्दाकिनीपाठः प्रवाहप्राप्तधौतकल्यात्मयशिलालो नवनादिप्रमद्रात्वनविहारिनिम्नमयशकुन्तकमनीयिनिनदमपोहरः: पवेत्तराजः सुमेहः सि्:। नैष मुख्णो रज्जुरियविद्यादि:। नापि भूतार्थवृद्धिसुचिं पुरुषपुरुषवती न शक्या समुच्चेतुः, हृददिश्यत्यन्ते: संभवत्। तथा हि—अविदितार्यः—
subsidiary to that (which is to be done) were settled as a rule in the usage of elderly persons, then, the Upaniṣads would not have for purport Brahman as the self, which is not what is to be rejected or accepted; for such capacity is not known of words in experience, and the cognition of Vaidic sense is preceded by that (i.e., the cognition of their sense in experience). If, however, there can be in experience the apprehension of the relation of words even to existent things, then, in the case of the Upaniṣads, it will not be possible to conceal their having for purport that (existent) as understood from the consideration of what goes before and after, and assume for purport what is to be done; for, thence would result the abandonment of what is directly declared and the assumption of what is not so declared. First, then, there would be no apprehension of a relationship in respect of a sense which is not to be done, (only) if there were not seen in experience any usage with that purport, and if it were not possible to infer the cognition of that in the case of him who knows (the meaning of words).139 It is not the case that the usage with that as purport is not seen in experience, since there is extensively seen in experience the usage of combinations of words, which have the purpose of (creating) joy or the cessation of fear etc., but have not for purport what is to be done. This is how: the king of mountains, Sumeru, is the abode of the host of guardians of the world, beginning with Indra, together with the retinue of siddhas, vidyādharas, gandharvas and apsaras, is composed of rocks of gold washed by the torrent of waters of the Mandākinī falling down from Brahmāloka, and is attractive with the notes of crystalline birds playing in the pleasure gardens like Nandana; (or) this is not a snake, this is a rope; and so on. Nor is it that
there cannot be inferred in the person who knows (the meaning of words) the cognition of an existent thing, since there do occur joy etc., the grounds of inference. It is thus: a Dravidian ignorant of the meaning of the Āryan language, and intent on going to the city, is seated in the house of Devadatta, near the highway; he knows the birth of a son which is a cause of delight to the father; he goes with the herald to Devadatta in the city; he hears the herald say "May thy prosperity increase, Devadatta, a son is born to thee," after making the offering of the paṭa-vāsa (a cloth dipped in saffron water in which the infant's feet have been washed); he sees at once the hairs (of Devadatta) stand on end, the eyes and the face bloom like the fully blown lotus; he infers the joy generated in Devadatta and also (infers) of the joy, which was non-existent earlier but arises immediately after hearing these words, that it is caused thereby; he understands that a sense has been stated which is the cause of joy, since this (statement) is not capable of creating joy without teaching a sense which is the cause of joy; and since no other cause of joy is cognised, while the birth of a son as a cause thereof is understood, he determines that that alone was declared by the herald. Similarly are to be exemplified fear, grief etc. And thus because of its being fruitful, the usage of that which expresses the existent thing even by the prudent inquirer is intelligible. This being so, because the knowledge of the nature of Brahman is the cause of the supreme human goal, and because, though not teaching a person's engaging in or desisting from activity, the Vedāntas do teach what is beneficial to man, the character of being sacred teaching is established (for them). Thereby is this established: the texts about which there is dispute have for content what
समन्वय:  २०८

जनमाणाथों द्रविड़ो नगरगम्योऽतो राजमाणाथोऽयं
वेदत्रां मन्दिरमध्यासीन: प्रतिपद्धा जनकानन्दनिनिवन्धना
पुत्रजन्मा वाराहऽरेण सह नगरस्येवेदत्रां भावाओऽगतः
पत्रासोपायनार्यपुरः सर्व, 'दिष्टथा वर्षसे देवद्रा
पुत्रस्य ज्ञातः' इति वाराहार्याहारश्रवणसमन्तर
मुप्जातोमाशकक्षुंक विकसिततनयनोत्तस्मितस्मु
रक्षमहोत्तमवलोक्य देवद्रात्मुत्तज्ज्ञादयमुमिक्षीतोऽ
प्रमोदस्य च प्रागभूस्तस्य तद्वाहारश्रवणसमन्तर
स्मरणस्तेष्ठरत्ताम; न चायमप्रतिप्रायन हृष्टेतुत
मघ्य हृष्ट वर्तित इत्यने हृष्टेतुर्व उक्त इति
प्रतिपथते; हृष्टेतुतरस्य चायमतीते: पुत्रजन्मस्या
शत्तीतोवर्गमाणात्तेव वाराहऽरेणाभावायिते निधिः
नोति। एवं भयोरकाव्योऽपूण्याहायः। तथा
च प्रयोजनवत्वत्या भूतार्थसविधानस्य प्रेक्षावत्यो
गोप्युपक्षः। एवं च वहारस्यप्रजानस्य परम
पुज्यस्यहृष्टेतुभावाद्दनुपदिशतामपि
पुज्यप्रवृत्तितिनिवृत्ती
वेदान्तानु पुज्यहितानुशासनाच्छादवतं सिद्धभवति।
तत्तत्स्मृततः—विवाह्यासितानि वचनानि भूतार्थ
विविधयाणि, भूतार्थविविधयप्रमाजनक्तवात्; यथा—
समन्वयः

दिष्यप्रभाषणं तत्तदृष्यं, यथा रूपादिविषयं
चक्रवर्तकनां तथा चैतानि; तर्भाच्यं च।
तस्माततुष्टत्तम—तन्न; औपनिषदं श्वष्यानन्य-
शेषत्वात् इति। उपनिषदां सदैव विषयार्थसौक्रियनी
पनिषत्वं व्युत्पादितम्, उपनोदयं अद्यं ब्रह्म सस्तन-
नामवियां हिन्नंतति ब्रह्मविचारमाह; ततेवतता
हेदानं अप्युपः पुरुष; 

एतदीव विभजने—योगसावपनिषतस्वेभ इति।
अहंप्रस्थ्यविषयान्तनि—असंसारी इति। अत
एव कियारिहितत्वाचतुर्ध्वविविष्क्रणः। अतः
चतुर्पाश्रविविष्क्रणो यदन्यशेषः। अन्यशेषं
हि भूतं द्रव्यं चिकरिष्यान्त सवुपस्त्याचारां संभवति,
यथा ‘यूपे तक्षति’ इत्यादि। यस्युन्नन्यशेषं
भूतभास्यपोगरहितम, यथा ‘सुवर्ण भार्यम्’,
‘सक्तुन जुहोति’ इत्यादि, न तस्योपस्त्याचार्य्यता।

कस्मात्युन्नन्यन्योपस्त्याचार्य्यता अह— यतः
क्षामकरणथः। उपनिषदांमनार्थ्याधीतानां पैराफे
पर्याप्प्योहळं यथा पुरुषप्रतिपादनपरत्वेन पुरुषयायेव
is existent, because of their generating valid knowledge about existent things; that which generates valid knowledge about an object has that (object) for its content, for example, the sense of sight etc., having colour etc. for content; so too are these (texts); hence they are so. Therefore, it has been well said: "that is not so, since the self propounded in the Upanisads is not subsidiary to anything else." The word "Upaniṣad" is derived from sat, with upa and ni as prefixes meaning destruction and a kvip suffix; it declares the knowledge of Brahman, since, taking the non-dual Brahman near (one), it destroys Nescience together with its impressions; because of being the cause thereof, the Vedāntas too are Upaniṣads; he who is known therefrom is the person propounded in the Upaniṣads.

This itself he analyses: "of that self, understood from the Upanisads alone" etc. He distinguishes it from the content of the concept "I": "who does not transmigrate." For that very reason, being devoid of activity, he is distinct from the four kinds of substances (the generated, the modified etc.). And therefore, that which is distinct from the four kinds of substances is not subsidiary to anything else. For, it is the existent substance that is subsidiary to another, which, being desired to be done, may be what can be attained (i.e., accomplished) by generation etc., for example, "He fashions the stake" etc. That, again, which is not subsidiary to another, is of the nature of the existent, and devoid of use, for example, "Gold is to be worn," "He is to offer flour (as an oblation)" etc., for that there is no attainment (i.e., accomplishment) by generation etc.

For what other reason, (again), is it not a subsidiary to another? To this he says: For the reason that he "occurs in a topic of his own". Of the Upaniṣads which occur
not in the course of any particular topic (other than their own), (it being seen) through the consideration of what goes before and after that the purport is propounding the person, this topic is principally that of the person alone. And it has been explained that there is not for the person, as in the case of the ladle, a non-inconstant relation with sacrifice. Therefore, it is not possible to say of this one, who occurs in his own topic, who is of that nature (non-transmigrating etc.), who is cognised through Upaniṣads, that he does not exist; this is the sense.

Be this so. Of Brahman, as not the sphere of other means of knowledge, the relation (to words) is not apprehended; hence it is not the meaning of a word; hence, it cannot intelligibly be the meaning of a sentence; how, then, can it be the significance of the Upaniṣad? To this he says: "because there is the word 'self' in 'that self is not this, not that'." Though for the self there is not, as for cow etc., being the sphere of other means of knowledge, yet, being, as it is, the luminous self, it is possible to indicate it as the significance of the sentence, through the destruction of the respective adjuncts, in the same way as gold through the destruction of bracelets, ear-rings etc. It is not, verily, that the luminous self-consciousness does not shine; nor is it that even the aggregate of body and organs which is the defining condition (does not shine). Hence, through the destruction of the respective adjuncts, because of the text "that self is not this, not that," this self-luminous one, because of its greatness and pervasiveness, can be indicated by the sentence as Brahman and the self (Ātmā); this is the sense.

Now, like the refutation of the adjunct, why is there not also refuted the existence of the self that gets conditioned?
प्राधान्येनेदं प्रकरणम्। न च जुहादिविव्यभिचरितक्तुसंबन्धः पुष्प इत्युपपादितम्। अतः 
स्वप्रकरणस्थः सोऽवयं तथाविध उपनिषधः प्रतीयमानो न नास्तीति शक्यो वक्तुमित्यथः।

स्यादेत्। मानान्तरागोचरलेनाग्रहीतसंगतित 
तया अपदार्थस्य बहाणो वाक्यार्थवाणूपण्ये: कथमु
पनिषधितेत्यत आह—स एष नेति नेयात्मेन्यात्म शान्तवत। यथापि गवाधिनमानान्तरागो

चर्कामात्मनो नास्ति, तथापि प्रकाशात्मन एव 
सतसततत्तुपाधिप्रिहाय्या शायं वाक्यार्थवेन निरु
पणम्, हारकस्येव कटकुकुण्डलादिप्रिहाय्या। 

न हि प्रकाशः स्वसंबेणो न भास्ते; नापि तद-
वच्चेदकः कार्यकरणसंबादः। तेन 'स एष नेति 
नेयात्मा' इति तत्तद्वच्चेदप्रिहाय्या बृहस्तव 

dापनात्म च स्वयंप्रकाशः शक्यो वाक्यात् बहेति 


चार्मेति च निरुपयत्यमित्यथः।

अथोपधिनिरास्वदुपहितम्यात्मरूपं कस्मात 

निरस्यत इत्यत आह—आत्मनाथ प्रत्या-

व्यात्मश्चक्यत्वात्। प्रकाशः हि सर्वस्यात्मा
नन्वात्मा अहंप्रत्यायविषयत्वादुपनिषतस्वेते विज्ञायत इत्यनुपपप्रभम। न, तत्साक्षितेन प्रत्यक्षतः। न हांहंप्रत्यायविषयकर्त्तव्य-तिरक्ष्रेयं तत्साक्षी सर्वभूतस्थः सम एकः कूटस्थनिः पुरुषो विधिकाण्डे तर्कसमरे वा केनचिद्धिगतः सर्वस्यात्मा। अतः स
tadvidhyāntācch prapavibhimaśya। न चाधिहिनाभावे विभमो भवितमहति; न हि जातु राज्ञिमावे राज्यां भुज्जकः इति वा धारते वा विभमो द्वद्वर्जः। अपि चातमः प्रकाशवयं भासा प्रप्रभस्य प्रभा।
tथा च श्रृति: ‘तमेव भान्तमनु भाति सर्वी
tथ्य भासा सर्विद्वं विभाति’ इति। न चातमः प्रकाशवयं प्रत्यालयाने प्रप्रभस्य प्रभा। तस्मादातमः प्रत्यालयानायोगादेवान्तेः। प्रमाणान्त-रागोचरस्वरूपाधिरिहितवहस्वस्वावगतिसिद्धिरिथः।

उपनिषतस्वेतावगत इत्यवधारणमस्मृयमाण आक्षिपति—नन्वात्मा इति। सर्वजनीनाहंप्रत्याय-
विषयो ह्यात्मा कतरि भोक्ता च संसारी, तत्त्रेव
Now, since the self is the content of the concept "I," it is unintelligible that he can be understood from the Upaniṣads alone. No, because, as the witness thereof, this has been refuted. Indeed, as distinct from the agent who is the content of the concept "I," the witness thereof, that self which is present in all, equal, one, immutably eternal, which is the self of all, has not been understood by anyone either through the liturgical portion (of the Veda) or through ratiocination.

To this he says: "and because it is not possible to deny the self." Luminosity is, indeed, the self of all, since the world-delusion has that for its substrate. Nor can there be a delusion when the substrate is non-existent; never when the rope is non-existent is there seen the delusion as to the rope that it is a snake or a stream. Further, by the light of the self's luminosity is there light for the world. And thus says Scripture: "That shining, all else shines after it; by its light all this shines." Nor when the luminosity of the self is denied, is the manifestation of the world appropriate. Therefore, because of the impossibility of denying the self, there results from the Vedāntas the realisation of the nature of Brahman, which is not the sphere of other means of valid knowledge and is devoid of all adjuncts; this is the sense.

He who cannot put up with the restriction that it is understood from the Upaniṣads alone objects: "Now, since the self" etc. The self is, indeed, the content of the
Therefore, him it is not possible for anyone to refute, nor to link up as subsidiary to an injunction. And even because of being the self of all, he is not what is to be rejected or accepted. The entire host of perishable modifications, up to the self, does indeed perish. The self, indeed, because of the non-existence of a cause for perishing, is imperishable; and because of the non-existence of any cause for modification, it is immutably eternal; for this very reason, it is by nature eternally pure, intelligent, free; therefore in (texts like) "There is nothing higher than the self, that is the limit, that is the highest goal", (Katha, I, iii, 11), "But I ask about that self propounded in the Upanisads" (Brh., III, ix, 26), the qualification "propounded in the Upanisads" is intelligible (only) when the self is what is revealed principally in the Upanisads. Therefore, the statement that there is no part of the Veda which deals with existent things is mere rashness.

The concept "I" common to all people; it is agent, enjoier and transmigrator; for, it is only in this (sense) that the word "self" is used both by the man in the street and by inquirers. The words which are used in experience, the same are used in the Veda too, and the meanings are the same (in both cases); hence, the word "self" in the Upanisads too should apply in that (sense) alone, not in any other sense opposed to it; this is the sense.
न केनचित्र्यास्यांतु शक्यः, विधिशेषांतवा नेतुम। आतमवादेव च सर्वेषां, न हेयो नायुपादेयः। सर्वस्त्र हि विनित्यदिकारजातं पुरुषान्तं विनिधयति। पुरुषो हि विनाशेहलत्वमानादविनाशिः; विक्रियाहेतुलभमावाचकूटस्थनित्यः; अत एव नित्यशुद्धबुद्ध-मुक्तस्वभावः; तस्मात् 'पुरुषाय परं किंचित्ता काद्वा सा परा गति:', 'तं लोपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छासि' इति चौपनिषद्विविधेशाणि पुरुषस्योपनिषद्वित्तु प्राधान्येन प्रकाश्यमानतत्वे उपपथते। अतो भूतवस्तु-परो वेदवागो नास्तीति वचनं साहस-मात्रम्।

च लौकिकपरीक्षकानामात्मपद्योगात। य एव लौकिकः साह्वः, तेषां एव चैदिकः, तेषां एव च तेषामयं इत्योपनिषदस्यात्मपदं तत्रेत्र प्रवर्ततुमहति, नार्थ्यान्ते तद्धिरिते इतिरथः।
समाधानः — न अहंप्रत्ययविषय औपनिषदः पुरुषः। कुतः? तत्साक्षितः — अहंप्रत्ययविषयोऽधिकार्यकरणसंघातोपहितो जीवात्मा — तत्साक्षितः, परमात्मनोऽहंप्रत्ययविषयविषयत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षकालः। एतदुःख मनः — यथापि 'अनेन जीवेनात्मना' इति जीवपरमात्मनोऽपरामार्थिकामक्यम्, तथापि तस्योपहितं रूपं जीवः; गुरूं तु रूपं तस्य साक्षिः; तच्च मानान्तराधिगतसुपनिपद्योऽर इति। एतदेव प्रपञ्चायति — न हाहंप्रत्ययविषय इति। विविद्येशतः वा नेतुं न शक्यः। कुतः? आत्मत्रादेव। न द्वारा अन्याः। अन्यतु सर्वात्मार्थम्। तथा च शुरुतः 'न वा अरे सर्वेश्व कामाय सर्वे प्रियं भवति आत्मानस्तु कामाय सर्वे प्रियं भवति' इति। अपि चातः सर्वेश्वात्मत्वादेव न हेयो नायपादेयः। सर्वेश्व हि प्रपञ्चजातस्य वहेत्वं तत्त्वात्मा; न च स्थावो हेय:, अशक्यान्तरात्म; च चोपादेयः, उपात्तात। तस्मादेवपादेयविषयो विविद्येशाति न तहिरितमात्मतत्वं विषयकृत्त इति सर्वेश्व प्रपञ्चजातः।
HARMONY

He answers: "No"; the Person of the Upaniṣads is not the content of the concept "I". Why not? "Because as the witness thereof"—he who is the content of the concept "I," the agent, he who is conditioned by the aggregate of body and organs, the jīva-self,—as the witness of this, the supreme self's "this," being the content of the concept "I", has been refuted. This is what is said: though in the words of the text "Having entered in its true nature as the jīva, the self" etc., the identity of the jīva and the supreme selves is absolute, yet its conditioned form is the jīva; but the pure form is its witness; and this, not being understood through other means of knowledge, is the sphere of the Upaniṣad. This itself he elaborates: "Indeed, as distinct from the agent who is the content of the concept 'I'" etc.

It is not possible "to link (it) up as subsidiary to an injunction". Why not? "Even because of being the self." The self, indeed, is not for the sake of another, but all others are for the sake of the self. And thus says Scripture: "Verily, not for the love of everything is everything dear, but for the love of the self is everything dear." Further, for that very reason of being the self of all, it is not what is to be rejected or accepted. Indeed, of the entire universe, Brahman alone is the true self; nor is one's nature what is to be rejected, since it cannot be rejected; nor is it what is to be accepted, being already attained. Hence, prescriptions and prohibitions, whose contents are what are to be rejected or accepted, do not have the true nature of the self, which is opposed to that,
as their content; consequently, of the entire universe, the self alone is the truth. This he explains: "The entire host of perishable modifications up to the self does, indeed, perish." This is the sense: the self, indeed, is absolutely real, being established by Scripture, traditional Code, epics, purāṇas and reasoning not opposed to these; the world, however, which is exhibited by beginningless Nescience, is not absolutely real. And that which is absolutely real is the material cause of this, as the real rope is of the modification, viz., the delusion of the snake. Hence it is that there is the perishing of this, which, as indeterminable, is of unstable nature. The self, however, is absolutely real; nor can this be made unreal even by a thousand causes. Not even a thousand craftsmen can make a cloth of a pot; this has been said. Therefore, there is the perishing of all modifications stopping the imperishable self, just as there is the perishing of the silver and the snake stopping at the real nacre and rope. The self, indeed, is the sole truth of the entire host of modifications in the universe. Nor for the self is there perishability, for the reason that it is infinite. To him who says that there may be destruction, he says: "The self, indeed, because of the non-existence of a cause for perishing" etc. Indeed, even a thousand causes are not capable of turning one thing into another; this has been said. Now, let not the self in its own nature be what is to be rejected or accepted; but some attribute thereof may be rejected, and some may be accepted; to this he says: "And because of the non-existence of any cause for modification, it is immutably eternal." It has been said that not one
समन्वयः

स्यात्मैव तत्त्वमिति। ऐतदुपपाद्यति—सर्वं हि
विनश्यदिकारजातं पुरुषान्तं विनश्यति।
अयामर्थः—पुरुषो हि श्रुतिस्मृतातिः पुराणानन्दः
विद्यायव्यवस्थापितात्त्वारमार्थसन; प्रपञ्चव्यायानः
नाचविचोपदशिष्टोपरमार्थसन। यथा यददमार्थसन
असौ प्रकृति: रज्जुत्तचिमिव सर्वविभमणस्य विकारस्य।
अत् एवायान्यार्थिव्यत्तेनाइतद्वभावव्यस्य
विनाश:।
पुरुषस्तु परमार्थसन। नातो कारणसहस्रेणाप्यसन
शक्यः कत्वम्। न हि सहासमपि विलिनो घरं
परियतमिन्त इत्युत्कम्। तस्माद्विनाशिशुपुरुषान्तो
विकारविनाश: शुक्लरज्जुत्तचान्त इव रज्जुभज्जः
विनाशः। पुरुष एव हि सर्वस्य प्रपञ्चविकारजातस्य
तत्त्वम्। न च पुरुषस्त्रास्य विनाशो यतोउपन्त:।
विनाशः स्यादित्यत आह—पुरुषो हि विनाशस्य
हेतुभभावावात् इति। न हि कारणानि सहस्रमवयः
न्यदयत्तचिमिशात इत्युत्कम्। अथ सा भूतवरूपेण
पुरुषो हैय उपादेयो वा; तददयस्तु कथिक्ष्रिमो
हस्यते, कथिचोपदासरस्य इत्यत आह—विक्रियाहेतुभभाववाच कूटस्थनित्यः। त्रिविरोधपि
यदि शास्त्रतार्थविद्माननुक्रमणम्
'हिस्यो हि तत्सार्थः कर्मोवोधनम्' इत्येवः
मादि, तत् धर्मजिज्ञासाविश्वयत्वादिधिश्रुति-
पेघशास्त्राभिमृत्रय द्रष्ट्यन्यम्। अपि च 'आ-
प्रायस्य क्रियाेत्वादानर्थक्यमतद्वर्थानाम्'
इत्येवेदेकान्तेनाभ्युपगच्छतां भूतोपदेशाः
नामानर्थक्यप्रसंस्कः। प्रद्विविनिृविद्विष्टिन
रेखाेण भूतं चेदर्स्तूपिदिशाति भव्यार्थत्वेन,
कृत्स्नालिं भूतं नोपिदिशातिति को हेतुः?
न हि भूतसुपदिश्यमानं क्रिया भवति।

धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामललक्ष्णो विकारो नास्तीयुक्तम्।
अपि चात्मः परमर्थस्तो धर्मोपि परमर्थ्यस्तिति
न तस्यास्त्रवदन्यात्त्वात् कारणे: दक्ष्यं कर्तुम्।
न च धर्मन्यथात्तत्तदन्यो विकारः। तद्विद्विकम—
विक्रियाेहितवभावातू इति। सुगममन्यत।

यत्युनेरक्रेदेशिना शास्त्रविहिषचन्म साश्चित्यना-नु-
कान्तं तद्विन्योपपाद्यति—यदि शास्त्रतार्थवि-
दामनुक्रमणम् इति। 'हिस्यो हि तत्सार्थः.
That quotation too from those who know the purport of the sacred teaching, "Its purport is indeed seen to be the teaching of rituals" and so on, that has to be understood to refer to sacred teachings of prescriptions and prohibitions, since the content is the desire to know Religious Duty. Further, for those who accept invariably the text, "Since the purpose of the Scripture" etc., there would result the futility of the teaching about existents. If, besides the engaging in and desisting from activity, it teaches existent things, as for the sake of what is to come into being, what is the cause for saying that it does not teach the immutably eternal existent? Indeed the existent that is taught does not turn out to be an act. If it be said that of the three kinds of modification—consisting of dharma, laksana, and avastha—exists here. Further, since of the absolutely real self the attribute too is absolutely real, the alteration of that, as in the case of the self, cannot be effected by any cause. Nor is there any modification other than the alteration of the attribute. Hence, this is said: "because of the non-existence of any cause for modification." The rest is easily understood.

That statement, again, of those who know the sacred teaching, which was cited by some as evidence (of their position), that he explains otherwise: "That quotation too from those who know the purport of the sacred teaching." Where it ought to be said "Its purport is, indeed, seen to be the fruitful teaching of the sense," since
since, though not an act, the existent is instrumental to an act, the teaching about an existent is only for the sake of an act, this is not a difficulty; even though for the sake of an act, there is certainly taught the thing which has the capacity to accomplish an act; that it is for the sake of an act is, however, its purpose; with this much alone, the thing does not turn out to be untaught. If it be said to be taught, what (good) will that be to you? The reply is: the teaching about the unknown self-substance too certainly deserves to be of that kind. By the knowledge thereof there results the profit, the cessation of illusory knowledge which is the cause of transmigration; hence there is no difference, from the teaching of objects that are instrumental to an act, in respect of purposefulness.

the desire to know Religious Duty constitutes the topic, and since Religious Duty is of the nature of rites, it is said "the teaching of rites". But it (the statement cited) does not stand in the way of the function of teaching the existent Brahman. Indeed, when Soma Sarman constitutes the topic, the expression of his good qualities does not exclude Viṣṇu Sarman's possession of good qualities. The sacred teaching of prescription has for content the rites prescribed, and the sacred teaching of prohibition has for content the rites prohibited; thus, both have for purpose the teaching of rites. Further, there is the statement of the author of the sacred teaching (Jaimini) that "Since
अक्षयात्वेपि भूतस्य क्रियासाधनत्वालिका-यार्थ एव भूतोपदेश इति चेत, नेष दोषः; क्रियार्थवेपि क्रियानिर्वर्तनश्रंकिम- द्वस्तुपदित्वमेव; क्रियार्थवेपि तु प्रयोजनं तस्य; न चेतावता वस्त्वनुपदिरिण्यं भवति। यदि नामोपदिष्टं किं तव तेन स्यादिति। 

यदि नामोपदिष्टं किं तव तेन स्यादिति। 

उच्चि—गनवगतात्मवस्तुपदेशश्च तथेऽव 

बहितुमहति; तद्वगत्या मिथ्याज्ञानस्य 

संसारहेतोतोर्निगुणि: प्रयोजनं क्रियम् इत्य- 

विशिष्टमथवतं क्रियासाधनवस्तूपदेशेण।

प्रयोजनवद्धार्योक्षोधनम्' इति वक्तव्ये, धर्मजिज्ञासाया: प्रकृतत्वार्द्धस्य च कर्मात्वात् 'कर्मव- 

बोधनम्' इत्युत्कम। न तु सिद्धस्तप्रवहारवोधन- 

व्यापारं वेदस्य वायति। न हि सोमशर्मणि 

प्रकृते तद्वनाभिनां परिसंच्चिते विषुर्सर्वानुपुरुण- 

वचनम्। विविषां विधीयमानकर्मविषयम्; प्रतिप- 

षेषशास्त्रं च प्रतिष्ठितव्याख्यानकर्मविषयमित्यभवमपि 

कर्मवोधनपरम्। अपि च 'आप्नायस्य क्रियार्थे-
त्वात् इति शास्त्रकृत| तत्तार्थग्रहणं यथभिविभेयतः| ततो भूतार्थों द्रव्यगुणकर्मणामान्यक्यमनभिरायतं| प्रस्तयत्| न हि ते क्रियार्थं| इत्यत आहं| आपि चाचास्यायस्य| इति| यथुच्छेत्| न हि क्रियार्थं क्रियाभिविभेयतम्| अपि तु क्रियाप्रयोजनत्तमः| द्रव्यगुणश्चवदानं च क्रियार्थवेनेत्र| भूतद्रव्यगुणाभिधानम्| न स्वानिष्ठतया| यथाः| शास्त्रविद्: 'चोदना हि भूतं भवतः' इत्यादि| उत्तुरं भवतिः| कार्यमर्थमवगमयन्ती| चोदना तद्दर्थं| भूतादिकप्रथ्यं| गमयति|—ततः—प्रस्तुतिः| निवृत्तितिव्यतिरेकेण| भूतं चेतु| इति| अयमभिद्धार्यशः|—न नात्तकार्यार्थं एव स्वार्थं पद्धानं संगतिः| श्रीस्मो| नान्यार्थं इत्युपादितं भूते|प्रथ्यं व्युत्ति| दर्शयति|। नापि स्वार्थमात्रपरतेत्र| पद्धानं|। तथा सति| न वाक्यार्थप्रत्ययं| स्यात्| न हि| प्रत्येकं श्रवणमात्रा क्षणभ्रंशावरहितावाक्यायं| दयाम्| तस्मात्पदानं स्वार्थमिन्त्रद्वितावेक| प्रयोजनत्तद्वितस्तर्यावक्यायं।| तथा च| तद्| द्वितीयतिरिशिष्टेक्वाक्यार्थगत्यं| उपप्यतो| भवति।
Scripture signifies rites” etc. Here, if the use of the word “signification (artha)” expressed what is denoted, thence would result for substance, quality and action (the defect of) meaninglessness consisting in not being denoted; for, they do not signify what is to be done. To this he says: “Further, for those who accept invariably the text” etc. It may be said: to be significant in relation to what is to be done is not to denote what is to be done, but to be of service to that which is to be done; and words relating to substances and qualities denote existent substances and qualities only as subsidiary to what is to be done, not as abiding in themselves. So those who know the sacred teaching say: “An injunctive statement can, indeed, make known the already existent, that which exists, that which will come into being and others of this class.” This is what is said (thereby): an injunctive statement, while making known the thing that is to be done, makes known for the sake of that even objects already existent etc. To this he says: “If, besides the engaging in and desisting from activity, it teaches existent things” etc. This is what is intended: it has been taught by those who have shown the meaning of words even with reference to existent things that the apprehension of relation (of word to sense) is not in respect of that sense alone of its own which subserves what is to be done, and not in any other sense. Nor is the purport of words only in respect of their own sense (unrelated to that of other words). If that were so, there would be no cognition of the sense of a sentence. For, syntactical unity is not seen among those which are each independently primary and are devoid of the relation of primary and secondary (among themselves). Hence, there is syntactical unity for words, which express their own
sense, through their having for purport a common fruitful word-significance. And thus becomes intelligible the cognition of the single sentence-significance, which is qualified by each respective significance (of the words). As is said by those who know the sacred teaching: "Though the letters directly effect the teaching of the word-significance, yet they do not terminate there fruitlessly; in their activity towards valid knowledge of the sentence-significance, the teaching of the word-significance is an inevitable (intermediary), like the flame of the fuel in cooking." 133

And thus, the cognition of the sentence-significance being intelligible even with words having for purport the conjunction with other significances, there is no rule as to their having for purport the conjunction with what is to be done. And this being the case, there is no defect even in having for purport the nature of the immutably eternal Brahman.

_Bhavyam_ (what is to come into being) is what is to be done. Now, that existent which is taught for the sake of what is to come into being, that is not an existent, since, in the form of what is conjoined to what is to come into being, that is also what is to come into being. To this he says: "Indeed, the existent that is taught" etc. Conjunction does not consist in identity; it is, rather, a relation with what is to be done, in the form of what is brought about (the fruit) and that which brings it about. With the process of becoming, however, which has that (relation) for content, (the relation) of existent things is of the form of (that between) activity and causal agent; hence, for existent things there is not the nature of activity; this is the sense.

He objects: "though not an act" etc. And thus there is the unintelligibility of the teaching of Brahman, which does not subserve activity and is immutably eternal; this
यथाः: शास्त्रविदः—
साक्षादाचपि कुर्बन्ति पदार्थप्रतिपादनम् ।
वर्णोत्सत्यापि नैतसिन्धूवसर्वयति निष्केले ॥
वाक्यार्थ्यस्मिते तेषां प्रत्युत्तरो नान्तरीयकम् ।
पाके ज्वालेव काढानां पदार्थप्रतिपादनम् ॥
इति। तथा चार्यांतरसंसर्गपरतात्मात्रेण वाक्यार्थः
प्रत्ययोपाचारो न कार्यसंसर्गपरत्वनियमः पदानाम् ।
एवं च सति कृतस्थनित्यवहारपरत्वेष्वदोष ॥
भविष्य कार्यम्। ननु यहार्थेः भूतमुद्गितायें
न तत्त्वम्, भव्यसंसरिणा रूपेण तस्यापि भव्य-
त्वादिव्यत आह—न हि भूतमुद्गितायेमानम्
इति। न तात्त्वक्यलक्षणः संसरिण: । किं तु कार्येन
सह प्रयोजनप्रयोजनात्वक्यः । तद्हीत्येन तु
भावार्थेन भूतार्थोऽन्त्रिक्यासताः क्रियाकारकलक्षण
इति न भूतार्थाः क्रियासतास्मित्यथः।

शाक्ते—अक्रियावेशपि ॥ एवं चार्यार्थः
कृतस्थनित्यवहारशास्त्रानुपत्तिः भावः। परिहर्ति—नैष दोषः । क्रियार्थवेशपि ॥
हि क्रियार्थं भूतमुद्गितायेमानमभृतं भवति, अथि तु
क्रियानिर्वातनयोयं भूतमेव तत्। तथा च भूतेऽत्वं व्यक्तिशात्रयं: शब्दः: कार्यसंविनिष्ठक्षमतिविषयं दश्यमाना भूतः शीतोः वा न क्यंतिक्रियानिष्ठतं गमयित्वानिष्ठत:। न हुपिहितं शतशो दश्यमनपहितं क्वचिहृतसम्मद्यं भवति। तथा च वर्तमानावर्णकाद्यो लोके वहुलमुपपृष्ट्यं। एवं क्रियानिष्ठ अपि संबन्धितात्माक्ष्यसत्साधिन्:; यथा “कर्षेष पुरुषः” इति प्रश्ये उच्चरं “राजः” इति। तथा प्रातिपदि-कार्यमात्रनिष्ठा:; यथा “कीर्तिशास्त्रवः” इति प्रश्ये उच्चरं “फलिनः” इति। न हि प्रच्छ्य पुरुषस्य वा तर्कां अविस्त्रतातिविषये प्रतिपित्ते; किं तु पुरुषस्य स्वामिवेदस्तर्कां च प्रकारभेदः। प्रत्युक्तितं चाचक्षान: स्वामिवेदेमेव प्रकारभेदेमेव च प्रतिविकि, न पुनरस्तितम्, तस्य तेनाप्रतिपितस्तत्वात। उपादिता च भूतेऽत्वं व्यक्ति: प्रयो-जनवाति पदा: नामान्।

चोद्यति—यदि नामोपदिष्ठं भूतं किं तत्व, उपदेशः श्रवतः प्रयोजनं स्वातू? तस्मात्—
is the idea. He answers: "this is not a difficulty; even though for the sake of an act" etc. Indeed, the existent, taught as for the sake of activity, does not become other than existent; rather is this, which is capable of achieving the activity, certainly existent. And thus, words, which have been determined to signify existent things, which are seen in some cases to have for content the existent abiding in itself (i.e., without syntactical relation to an act), cannot properly be tortured to signify somehow relation to activity. Verily, though the conditioned be seen a hundred times, the unconditioned seen somewhere does not become unseen (as it were). And thus are extensively seen in experience statements of what is existent, conditioned by the activity (only) of being, though not subservient to activity, such as descriptions of forests etc. Thus, even those which are related to activity terminate with (signifying) a relation alone; for example, to the question "Whose is this man?" the reply is "The king's." Similarly, there are those which are related to the significance of the stem alone; for example, to the question "Of what kind are these trees?" the reply is "Fruit-bearing"." Indeed, the existence or non-existence of the man or the trees is not desired to be known by the questioner; rather is it the particular master of the man and the particular kind of the trees. And he who knows what is desired by the questioner replies only as to the particular master or the particular kind, not as to existence, that not being desired to be known by him. And it has been explained that for words there is significance even in respect of fruitful existent things.

He questions: "If it" the existent "be said to be taught, what" good "will that be to you" whether teacher or
listener? Therefore, only that existent which is fruitful should be taught, not that which is fruitless; and Brahman is fruitless, since to that which is indifferent, as devoid of all activity, no serviceability can belong; this is the idea. He answers: "The reply is: the teaching of the unknown self-substance too certainly deserves to be of that kind," i.e., certainly fruitful. The word "and (ca)" has the sense of "too (api)". This is what is said: though Brahman is indifferent, yet knowledge from verbal testimony relating to that content, such knowledge culminating in realisation, cuts away its opposite, Nescience, the primal cause of transmigration, and is thus fruitful; this is the sense.

Further, even by those who recognise in the case of all words that their purport is what is to be done, it is not possible to recognise in the case of (statements like) "A brahmin is not to be killed," "Liquor is not to be drunk" etc., that they have for purport what is to be done. That which is to be done, having its limits defined by volition, is pervaded by volition, and ceases on the cessation of that, like sinsapa-ness on the cessation of tree-ness. Volition, indeed, is human effort; and that is determined in dependence on the content. And its content, being of the nature of something to be accomplished, must be a process of becoming, which has an earlier and a later, and helps to bring about something else; (it can be) neither a substance nor a quality. For, the content of volition is that which is directly pervaded by volition; and of substance and quality, which are existent, there is no pervasion by volition. Therefore it is that the author of the sacred teaching says: "Verbs have the sense of becoming; through them is activity to be known." Though for words signifying substance and
भूतमपि प्रयोजनवदेवोपदेश्यव नाप्रयोजनम्; अप्रयोजनं च ब्रह्म, तत्योदासीनः सर्वस्मिन्याहिततवेनानुकारकत्र्वात् इति भवः। परिहरित्ति—उच्चयतं इति। अनवगतात्मवस्तूपदेशः तथेऽव प्रयोजनवानेव भवितमहि। अय्यर्थश्चाकारः। एतद्वर्तं भवति—यथापि ब्रह्मोदासीनम्, तथापि तत्त्वं शास्त्रज्ञानमवगतिस्यं विदा स्वविवेचनेन संसारमूलनिद्रामबिधायमुचित्यूपप्रयोजनवदिलयः।

अपि च येदपि कार्यपर्यं सर्वं पदार्थस्य स्मारकस्य तैरापि ‘श्राह्यो न हस्तव्यः’, ‘न सुरा पातव्यः’ इत्यादिनं न कार्यपर्यं शक्यां आस्थातुम। कृत्यप्रहितमां च हि कार्ये क्लेश्व व्यासं तज्जन्तस्य नित्याते, शिष्यपालभिच वृक्षतविवृत्तो। कृतिहि पुष्पप्रयलः; स च विष्याधीननिरुष्पणः। विष्याधीन साधवस्त्रभावतया भावार्थे एव पूर्वार्थस्य भूतोन्योपचारातुकृतो भवितमहि, न द्रव्यगुणः। साहसकृत्यायायो हि कृतेविष्यः; न च कृतेविष्य:। सिद्धोदकं कृतिविष्यायः। अत एव शास्त्रकृत्यः—'भावार्थे: कर्मशिवादार्तेऽभ्ये: क्रिया
प्रतीयेतः इति। द्रव्यगुणावर्त्तानां नैस्मिचिकव- 
स्यायां कार्यवाचकर्त्त्वमिडः, भावव्य स्वतः द्रव्यगुण- 
वार्त्तानां तु भावयोगालकार्यवाचकर्त्तव्यं इति भावार्थेष्य 
एवापूर्वविगतः, न द्रव्यगुणवाक्षेप्यं इति। न च 
‘द्वा जुहोति’, ‘संततमाणायति’ इत्यादिधिः 
द्रव्यादिनां कार्यविनियमतः; तथापि हि होमावार- 
भावार्थविशेषमेव कार्यम्। न चैतावतः ‘सोमेन 
यजेत’ इतिवतः दधिसंतत्त्यादिविशिष्ठाः होमावार- 
विगत्तता, ‘अविहोतां जुहोति’, ‘आघारमाणायति’ 
इति तदनुवादः। यथाप्राप्तः भावार्थविशेषमेव 
कार्यम्, तथापि भावार्थोन्वन्वन्वत्या द्रव्यगुणाव- 
विशेषत्वापि विधीयेत्। भावार्थों हि कारक्यापार- 
भावार्थविशिष्टः कारकविशेषण द्रव्यादिनां 
विशेषत्व इति द्रव्यादिस्वत्तदनुवादः। तथा 
च भावार्थ के विधीयमाने स एव सानुवन्नो 
विधीयत्व इति द्रव्यगुणावचित्तविशेषापि तदनुवन्वत्या 
विहितो भवतः। एवं च भावार्थस्नानिल- 
काय द्रव्यादिसंबंधन्तो विधिगौरवादुविशेषत्वविशेष 
चायत: प्रातास्या तदनुवादेन तदनुवन्नीभूतः-
quality there is relation to what is to be done in the stage when they are occasioned, yet, since there is for becoming, of itself, the relation to what is to be done, while for words signifying substance and quality that is only through their conjunction with becoming, the understanding of the novel (rite etc.) is only through words signifying becoming, not through words signifying substance or quality. Nor is it that curds etc. are the contents of what is to be done in (statements like) "He is to offer oblation with curds," "He is to sprinkle continuously"; for, even there, what is to be done has for its content only the process of becoming—the offering of oblation or the sprinkling. Nor with this does it follow that, because of the prescription of the oblation as qualified by curds and the sprinkling as qualified by continuity, as in "He is to sacrifice with soma (-juice)," the statements "He is to offer the agnihotra oblation," "He is to sprinkle with ghee" become re-statements thereof. Though here too what is to be done has certainly for content the process of becoming, yet substance and quality, even though not contents, are prescribed as complementary to the process of becoming. Indeed, the process of becoming, uncharacterised as being the bare operation of a causal condition (kūraka), is characterised (i.e., defined) by particular causal conditions, such as substance etc.; hence, substance etc. are complementary to that. And thus, when the process of becoming is prescribed, that itself is prescribed together with its complements; hence, substance and quality, though not contents, get prescribed as complements thereto. And thus, the prescription attaches to substance and quality through the channel of the process of becoming; and because of the fear of
prolixity, its own content being otherwise established. through a re-statement thereof it comes to have for purport substance etc., which are complements thereto; consequently, in all cases, prescription has for content the process of becoming alone.

Hereby is refuted the view that in "That āgneya (rite) which is on eight potsherds" etc., the prescription has for content the connection (of the rite with its material and deity). Now, the object of prescription cannot be the process of becoming; for, if the agent of the becoming is existent, then, that which has its existence accomplished cannot be an agent in respect of the becoming; verily, the sky does not become; nor, if (the agent is) non-existent, since an injunction cannot be laid on what is non-existent, like a sky-flower; therefore the object of the prescription is the operation of the productive agent, that which brings about, this (operation) being implied by the becoming, the operation of what is brought about; and this operation is productive force (bhāvanā), volition, effort; of this, if contentless, there can be no cognition; hence, because of the need for a content, it is only the connection with material and deity brought to mind by the word āgneya that is its content. Now, how can human effort which has an operation for content have for its sphere a connection not of the nature of an operation? Indeed, even in "Make a pot," human effort has not for its sphere the pot which is the direct significance of the noun; rather does it operate the staff etc. through the hand etc. Therefore, that (sentence) declares only that volition which has for content the operation and is for the sake of the pot, but not that which has directly the pot as content. The pot is there (in the volition) as
समन्वयः

द्रव्यादिपरो भवतीति सर्वत्र भावार्थविश्वेत् एव विधिः।

एतेन ‘यदाभ्योष्टाकपालो भवति’ इत्यतं संबंधविश्यो विचिरितिः परास्तम्। ननु न भवायथिः विचेषः; सिद्धे भविति लव्यहरस्य भवनं प्रत्यक्तौत्तात्; न खलु गगनं भवति; नाप्यसिद्धे, असिद्धान्तियोज्यतात्, गगनकुलकूलवत्; तस्मात्वनेन प्रयोज्यव्यापरेणाधिक्षितः: प्रयोजकस्य भावितुव्याप्तारो विचेषः; स च व्यापरस्य भावना, कृतिः, प्रयत्न इति; निर्विश्वासात्साधक्यविश्वासप्रतिपत्तिः; अतो विश्वा-पेश्यायामामोहश्रवंदोपस्थापितो द्रव्यदेवतासंबंधं पुराणविश्वं विचेषः। ननु व्यापरविश्वं: पुरुषप्रयत्नः कथम-व्यापरस्या संबंधं गोचरयत्? न हि ‘घर्तं कुरो’ इत्यत्रापि साक्षात्मार्थं घर्तं पुरुषप्रयत्नो गोचरयति; अथि तु दुर्दासि हस्तादिनां व्यापरयति। तस्मादधी-रथी कृतिः व्यापरविश्वयावेव प्रतिपच्ये, न तु स्वरूपं घटविश्वाम्। उदेश्यत्या त्वरायमिति घटे न तु विश्यत्या। विश्यत्या तु हस्तादिव्यापर एव। अत् एव ‘आयमः’ इत्यत्रापि
समन्वयः

इद्भवेतांसंवन्यायान्ति यजिनेऽव कार्यविषयो विधेयः।
किमुक्तं भवति “आपेयो भवति” इति ? आपेयेन यागेन भावेयेदैति। अत एव ‘य एवं विहानं
पौर्णमास्यां यजेत’, ‘य एवं विहानमास्यां यजेत’
इत्यतुवादो भवति ‘यद्वाभयः’ इत्यादिचिह्नितस्य
यागस्तक्षयः। अत एव च चिह्नितानूदितस्य तस्यात
‘दर्शीपूर्णमासाभ्यं स्वर्गकामो यजेत’ इत्यधिकार-
संबंधः।

तस्मातस्वेत्र कृतिप्रणालिकाया भावार्थविषय
एव चिह्नितियेकान्तः। तथा च ‘न हन्यात्’,
‘न पिबेत्’ इत्यादिपु यदि कार्येभ्युपेते,
तत्सद्यायिन्या कृतिभयुपेतत्वाः, तद्धचापक्ष
भावायो विषयः। एवं च प्रजापतिवत्नयायेन
पर्युदासवृत्त्याहननापानसंकल्पपक्षाः
तदिष्ट्याः
विधि: स्थान। तथा च प्रस्तुत्वतिषयो दृश
जलाक्षिल: प्रसज्येत। न च सति संभवे लक्षण
न्यायः। ‘नेत्रेतोधन्तस्मृ’ इत्यादितु ‘तय
वत्सः’ इत्यधिकाराराजसूत्यप्रतिषेधासाम्भवे
पर्युदास-
वृत्त्यानीक्षणसंकल्पपक्षः युक्तः। तस्मात् ‘न
what is intended, but not as the content. As content, however, there is only the operation of the hand etc. Hence it is that even in "That āgneya" etc., what is enjoined is only the thing to be done, viz., the sacrifice implied by the connection with material and deity. What is it that is said in "That āgneya which is offered" etc.? (What is said is) "One should bring about (what is desired) through the āgneya sacrifice". Hence it is that the statements "He who, knowing thus, performs the full moon sacrifice," "He who, knowing thus, performs the new moon sacrifice" become re-statements of the six sacrifices prescribed in "That āgneya" etc. Hence it is that only for this re-statement of what is enjoined is there the connection with the fruit in "He who desires heaven is to sacrifice with the new moon and full moon sacrifices".

Hence it is invariable that in every case the injunction has for content the operation alone, through the channel of volition. And thus in "Kill not," "Drink not" etc., if there be admitted something to be done, then, its pervader, volition, would have to be admitted, as also the becoming which pervades that (volition) as content. And thus, on the analogy of the Prajñāpati-vrata, the injunction would, as signifying exclusion through the implication of the resolve not to kill or not to drink, have that (resolve) as content. And thus it would follow that the final obsequies have been performed for (that function of negation which consists in) the denial of that for which there is an occasion. Nor when there is a possibility (of direct significance) is implication proper. In the case, however, of "See not the rising sun" etc., since they commence with "His vow," there is not the possibility of the denial of that for which
Further by statements like "A brahmin is not to be killed," desisting from activity is taught. Nor is that an act, nor even a means to an act. If the teaching of those which are not for the sake of an act be purposeless, there would result the futility of teachings of desisting from activity like "A brahmin is not to be killed". And that is not acceptable. Nor is it possible to assume for the negative particle the signification of a non-established act, as distinct from the indifference consisting in desisting from the act of killing, because of the connection with the sense of killing that is established through one's own nature. And this is the 

there is an occasion; hence, it is proper, through the signification of exclusion, to imply the resolve not to see. Therefore, in "Kill not," "Drink not" etc., which are denials of what there is an occasion for, since the process of becoming is non-existent, volition pervaded thereby is non-existent; and that being non-existent, there is non-existence of what is pervaded thereby, viz., what is to be done; hence there is no rule that all statements have for purport what is to be done; thus he says: "by statements like 'A brahmin is not to be killed'" etc.

Now, why does not cessation itself become what is to be done, or the means to that (cessation)? To this he says: "Nor is that an act." The word "act" expresses what is to be done. This itself he analyses: "If the teaching of those which are not for the sake of an act" etc.
अपि च 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः' इत्येव-माया निद्र्रस्तिः पदिष्यते। न च सा क्रिया, नापि क्रियासाधनम्। अत्र क्रियार्थोनामुपदेशोन्नर्थकः, 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः' इत्यादिनिरूत्तपदे श्रान्नार्थवर्थम् प्राप्तम्।

तद्भावितम्। न च सब्जायम् शत्वार्थयुनुगाणेन नजः शक्यम्प्रात्तक्रियार्थीम् कल्प्यितुं हननक्रियानिरूपृयोदासीन्यचतिरेकेः। नज्यशैष्ट संहावः, यत्संवचनिधि-हन्यात्, 'न पिवेत्' इत्यादिम प्रस्याप्रतिलिपेन भावार्थोभावाचह्यातायः कृतेऽभावः; तदभावे च तद्भावस्थेः कार्यस्याभावः इति न कार्यप्रत्युपितम्। सर्वं वाक्ये इत्याः—ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्य इत्येवमाया इति।

ननु कस्मां निर्तितेऽव कार्य न भवति, तत्साधनं वेषति आह—न च सा क्रिया इति। क्रियाशब्दः कार्यचन्दः। यत्तेव विभजने—अक्रियार्थोनाम् इति।
समन्वयः

नोभावं बोधयतीति। अभावुच्छिद्रौदासिन्ये कारणम्। सा च दुःगेन्धनाभिवत्त्वमेवोपशाम्यति। तस्मात् प्रसक्रियानिवृत्यौदासिन्यमेव 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तवः'। इत्यादिषू प्रतिषेधार्थ मन्यामहे, अन्यत्र प्रजापतितविनादिभ्यः। तस्मात् पुरुषार्थोनुपयोग्यपाल्यानादिमूलतार्थवादविशयमानस्तः। क्याभिधानं द्विषयम्।

स्यादेतस्त। विडितिभिंक्षुणात्स्तति तावद्दत्र प्रतीते। तच्छ न भावार्थमन्त्तरेण; न च रागः। प्रवृत्तस्य हननपानावकसङ्गादासिन्यमुपपादते विना विद्यार्कप्रयत्नम्। तस्मात् स्तु प्रवृत्तस्य अवनान्नामोऽवनान्नामविद्यारः। प्रयत्नो निषेधविद्यिगोचरः। क्रियेति नान्त्रियापरमितां वाक्यं किंचिद्धर्मीति आह्। न च हननक्रियानिवृत्यौदासिन्यतिरेकः। नजः। शक्यमप्रसादक्रियार्थ्यतं कल्पयितम्। ने न हतुमा न शक्यमितल आह्। शख्रावप्रसाद-हन्त्यार्थानुरागेण नाजः। अय्यर्थः। — हननपानपरो।
nature of the negative particle, that it makes known the non-existence of that to which it is related. And the cognition of non-existence is the cause of indifference. And that subsides of its own accord like the fire whose fuel has been consumed. Therefore, it is but the indifference consisting in the desisting from activity for which there is occasion, which we consider to be the meaning of the prohibition, "A brahmin is not to be killed" etc., in all cases other than the Prajāpati-vow etc. Therefore, the declaration of futility is to be understood to have for content such praises of the existent, in the form of narratives etc., as do not serve the human goal.

Be this so. Because of the injunctive suffix being heard, there is cognised here what is to be done; and that cannot be without a process of becoming; nor in the case of him who because of passion engages in killing, drinking etc., is indifference intelligible by chance, without voluntary effort; therefore, that voluntary effort of the mind, speech and body intent on engaging in activity is the act which is the sphere of the prohibitory injunction; hence, there is no statement whatsoever which does not have an act for purport. (To this) he says: "Nor is it possible to assume for the negative particle the signification of a non-established act, as distinct from the indifference consisting in desisting from the act of killing." For what reason is it not possible? To this he says: "because of the connection" of the negative particle "with the sense of killing that is established through one's own nature". This is the sense: indeed, the injunctive suffix cognised as having
for purport killing and drinking prescribes them alone; this is the general rule. And these cannot be prescribed, since they result (even) from passion. Nor is there enjoined the denial, by the negative particle, of that for which there is occasion, since of that too, whose nature is indifference, there is establishment as already existent (in the form of antecedent non-existence, prāg-abhūva). Nor is voluntary effort (what is to be enjoined), since that, not being expressly mentioned, would have to be implied, since where there is a possibility (of direct signification) implication is not proper, and since that (effort) cannot be the content of the injunction, because of the injunctive suffix being a re-statement of the activity that results from passion. Therefore, what is restated as "one might drink or kill," and is prohibited in the form "that is not (to be done)", its non-existence (i.e., unprofitable nature) is brought to mind; but the sense of the negative particle is not prescribed. And since non-existence is determined by the existent that is opposed to itself, and takes on the colour of the existent, it appears as if existent in the case of the existent, and as if to be accomplished in the case of what is to be accomplished; hence, the sense of the negative particle, whose content is what is to be accomplished, appears as if itself to be accomplished; hence the delusion that the sense of the negative particle is something to be done. This he says thus: "And this is the nature of the negative particle" etc.

Now, let the negative particle make known the non-existence of what is related to itself (as counter-correlate); but, for the mind, speech and the body intent on activity, how can there be the desisting therefrom by chance?
हि विधिप्रत्य: प्रतीयमानं एव विधचे इत्युत्सर्गे।
न चैते शक्ये विधातुम्, रागत: प्रासत्वात्।
न चात्र नजः प्रसत्यप्रतितिपेक्षो विधेयः; तत्स्यायौ-
दासीन्यरूपस्य सिद्धतया प्रासत्वात्।
न च विधा-
रकः प्रयतः; तत्स्याहृत्ततन्व लक्ष्ममाण्तवात्,
सति तेषां च लक्षणाय अन्यायत्वात्; विधिविंत्ते
रागत: प्राक्रत्यनवादकत्वने विधिविषयत्वाः
योगात्। तत्स्याचतुर्वेदः नवम्बेत्तद्युः
तत्तति निषेध्ये, तदभावो जाप्ये; न तु नायगो विधीये।
अभावः स्वविद्विभावनिरततया भावच्छायानु-
पातीति सिद्धे सिद्धवत्, साध्ये च साध्यवक्र्तात
इति साध्यविषयो नार्थः: साध्यवक्र्तात इति
नार्थः: कार्यः इति अभमः। तदिद्वाह—नवश्रीण
संभाव इति।

ननु बोधयतु स्वसंविनोभावं नाष्; प्रवृत्तु-
स्मुखां तु मनोवादेहानां कुतौक्षमसमाधिरितिस्त
आह — अभाववृल्यिद्वौदासीन्य-परिलालन -
कारणम्। अयमभिप्रायः—‘जरिति: फ़्यम-श्रीयात्’, ‘न सर्पायास्गुलिं दचात्’ इत्यादिवचन-श्रवणसमन्तरं प्रयोज्यव्रृद्धयः प्रश्नाने प्रवृत्तिः भुजगाङ्गुलिंदानोनस्य च ततो निवृत्तिमुपत्रस्य बालो व्युपितः प्रयोज्यव्रृद्धयः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः हि-इच्छादेशायनुविदम्। तथा हि—इच्छादेशेशेषुके वृद्धयः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः, स्वतंत्रप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः, मद्विस्तर्नस्वतंत्रप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः। कर्त्तव्येते-कार्यसं-वेदेश्यनियोज्यसाधनभावावगमपूर्वकों चार्येचदेशो, प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः हेतुभूतेचदेशेश्चतवात्, मत्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः हेतुभूतेचदेशेश्चतवात्। न जातु मम शाब्दतदहचापार-पुष्पशायेनकाल्यानविच्छल्लभावनापूर्वकप्रत्यपूर्वविष-चदेशेश्चमूलाम्। अपि तु भूयो भूय: स्वगत-मालोचयत उत्काृरणपूर्वविवत प्रत्यभासेते। तस्माद्रूढक्य स्वतंत्रप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती इच्छादेशेशेषों कर्त्तव्येते-कार्यसंवेदेश्यनियोज्यसाधनभावावगमपूर्वविविभयं-नपूर्यं सिद्धः कार्यकारणभाव इतीशानियोज्यसाधन-
To this he says: "And the cognition of non-existence is the cause" of the perpetuation "of indifference". This is the idea: on hearing the words "Diet yourself when there is fever," "Offer not your finger to the serpent," the elderly person so addressed starts to put himself on diet, or, if intent on offering his finger to the serpent, desists therefrom; the infant, i.e., the learner, on seeing this, infers for the elderly person addressed the causes of engaging in and desisting from activity, viz., desire and aversion. It is thus: the elderly person's engaging in and desisting from activity have desire and aversion for cause, since they are independent acts of engaging in and desisting from activity, like my own independent acts of engaging in and desisting from activity. And his desire and aversion are preceded by the understanding of the instrumentality to what is desired or not desired inherent in the same thing as the obligation, since they are desire and aversion which are causes of engaging in and desisting from activity, like the desire and aversion which are causes of my own engaging in and desisting from activity. Never do desire and aversion result for me as preceded (only) by the cognitions of the word, its operation, the intention of the person (who speaks), and the unseen potentiality of an injunction, as undefined by the three times; rather do they appear on repeated introspection as preceded by the above-mentioned causes alone. Therefore, the elderly person's independent engaging in and desisting from activity, as also his desire and aversion, are pervaded by the understanding of the instrumentality to what is desired or not desired, inherent in the same thing as the obligation; because of this sequence, the relation of cause and effect is established; hence, it is established that the elderly person's engaging
in and desisting from activity are from the understanding of the instrumentality to what is desired or not desired. And this understanding, which was non-existent earlier and is generated immediately after the hearing of the word, has the hearing of the word for its cause; hence in statements like "He is to sacrifice," which prompt to activity, it is the word itself, which, making known the operation that is to be done and that is instrumental to what is desired, also makes known its instrumentality to what is desired and the obligation to do it; for, these two are not otherwise obtained, and what is not otherwise obtained is the sense of the word. Where, however, the obligatoriness is obtained even otherwise, as in "Kill not," "Drink not" etc., since engaging in killing and drinking are obtained even from passion, there, the imperative suffix etc., associated with the negative particle, re-state this and make known only the causality of the two in respect of evil, which (causality) is not otherwise established. Indeed, their instrumentality to what is desired, is directly known, as otherwise they could not be objects of desire. Therefore, statements like "Kill not," "Drink not", have for purport the making known of the instrumentality to evil, through re-stating the obligatoriness established by passion etc., but they do not have obligatoriness for purport; hence it has been well said that prohibitions are not related to what is to be done. It is the cognition of the instrumentality to evil in the case of what are prohibited that is the cognition of the non-existence of what are prohibited. Thus, indeed, this intelligent being, though seeing what is superficially attractive, yet considers the future, cognises the
समन्वयः

तावगमात्योज्यव्रंप्रवृत्तिनिश्चिती इति सिद्धम्।
स चावगमः प्रागभृतः शब्दश्रवणानन्तरसुपजायमानः
शब्दश्रवणेहृतक इति प्रवत्केकुष चाक्षेपु 'यजेत' इत्यादिषु
शब्द एवं कर्त्त्वविद्यसाधनं व्यापारमात्यन्त्येवसाधनान्तः कर्त्त्वत्तां
चावगमयति। अन्यत्रह्यतादुभयोः, अन्यत्रह्यत्य च शब्दार्थे
त्वात्। यत्र तु कर्त्त्वतान्यत्तैव रथयते, यथा
'न हन्यात्', 'न पिवेत्' इत्यादिषु, हननपानाम
प्रवत्त्यो रागतः प्रतिलम्भात्, तत्र तदनुवादेन
नयंसमाभिन्याहता लिङ्गाविविभक्तिन्यथोऽप्रासामन
योगर्थेदुभावसाधनमात्यगमयति। प्रत्यक्षं हि तयो-
स्थाप्तानामभावोऽवगम्यते, अन्यथा रागविषयतः
योगात्। तस्मादगादिद्विग्राहोकर्त्त्वतान्यातनाक्षर
साधनांध्यापनपरस्म 'न हन्यात्', 'न पिवेत्'
इत्यादिवाक्यम्, न तु कर्त्त्वतापरमिति सुमृत्वरम
कार्यनिष्ठं निषेधानाम। निषेधानां चार्थे
साधनांत्युपदिरूप निषेधाभावावलवः। तथा खल्वतः
चेतन आपाततो रमणीयतां पद्यवच्यायतिमालोऽयः
समन्वयः

प्रवृत्तयमानगुणित्विचलकुष्यनिवर्तते। औदासीन्यमातमनोवस्थापणयतीति यावत्।

स्यादेतत्। अभावबुधिःकेदौदासीन्यस्थापनकारणम्, यावदौदासीन्यमनुवर्तते; न चानुवर्तते; न हुदासीनोपि विषयान्तरव्यासेऽद्विचरसद्भावबुधिमान; न चावस्थापककारणाभावे कार्यवस्थानं दृष्टम्; न हि स्तम्भावपाते प्रासादोर्जोतिष्ठते। अत आह—सा च दृष्टेन्नाग्नििवस्थायमेवोष्णपशाम्यति। तावैव खल्वियं प्रवृत्तिसुखो न यावदस्त्यानंनिहुतभावमहिमगच्छति। अन्धेहुतलाभिष्कृतमोक्षय समुःलोहिं दृष्टेन्नाग्निवस्थायमेवोष्णपशाम्यति। एतदुःखं भवति—यथा प्रासादवस्थानकारण स्तम्भो नैवमौदासीन्यवस्थानकारणमभावुद्धि; अपि त्वाग्नििवस्थायमेवोष्णपशाम्यति, यथा कमठगुप्तनिधि: किन्तु राज्याः: झाडप्रहारग्रामः राजञ्जीवस्थानहतः। न च कत्रापामे च असति च झाडः प्रहोरे, राजञ्जीवनाश इतिः। उपसंहरति—

tस्तम्भारुसक्रियानिवृत्यौदासीन्यमेव इति।
non-existence of activity, which is desisting from activity, and desists; that is to say, he establishes himself in an attitude of indifference.

Be this so. If cognition of non-existence be the cause of establishment in indifference, that should persist so long as there is indifference; but that does not persist; for, he who, though indifferent, has a mind strongly attached to other objects, is not one who cognises their non-existence; nor, in the absence of the cause which establishes, is there seen the establishment of the effect; not, verily, when the pillar has fallen does the top floor stand. Therefore he says: "And that subsides of its own accord, like the fire whose fuel has been consumed." This being is intent on activity only so long as he does not understand its instrumentality to evil. The understanding of its instrumentality to evil plucks out activity by the root, and itself subsides like the fire whose fuel has been consumed. This is what is said: the cognition of non-existence is the cause of the establishment in indifference not in the same way as the pillar (is the cause) of the stability of the top floor; rather is it the cause of establishment, as protecting from adventitious causes of destruction, just as the armour impenetrable as tortoise-shell is the cause of the stability of the warrior's life by protecting him from the attack of missiles. And it is not that there is loss of the warrior's life, when the armour is removed and there is no attack of missiles. He concludes: "Therefore, it is but indifference consisting in the desisting from activity for which there is occasion" etc. Since indifference exists even in the absence of knowledge (of instrumentality to evil), it is distinguished by the upalakṣaya, \textit{viz.},
As for that too which has been said, that the bare thing mentioned without entry into an injunction of what is to be done would be futile, like the statement "The Earth has seven islands" etc., that has been refuted; because profit is seen even in the statement about a bare object "This is a rope, this is not a snake". Now, it has been said that since, even for him who has heard (the texts relating to) Brahman, transmigratoriness is seen as before, there is not purposefulness as in the case of the statement about the nature of the rope. To this the reply is: not in the case of him who has realised Brahman as the self is it possible to show transmigratoriness desisting from an activity for which there is occasion. Is the view then of the Jaiminiyas wholly absurd, (the view) which suspects futility because of non-subsidiariness to what is to be done and makes out (the existence of) subsidiariness to what is to be done? (Raising this question), he answers it by way of conclusion: "Therefore, the declaration of futility is to be understood" etc. The *prima facie* and final views based on non-subsidiariness and subsidiariness to what is to be done have for content narratives etc., which do not serve the human goal; but they do not have the Upaniṣads for content, since the Upaniṣads lead up to the realisation of Brahman, which is of itself the human goal; this is the sense.

"As for that too which has been said" by those who think the knowledge of the self propounded in the Upaniṣads not to be the human goal, (in the words) "the bare thing mentioned without entry into an injunction of what is to be
यद्यपि उपनिषदात्मानमप्रुषस्य मन्यमानेन उक्तम्—कर्तेन्यविध्यनुप्रवेशमन्तरेण ॥

समन्वयः

यद्यपि कर्तेन्यविध्यनुप्रवेशमन्तरेण वस्तुमात्रसुच्यमानमन्तरेण स्यात्, 'सत्सृष्टिपा वसुमती' इत्यादिविदिति, तत्तपरिणतम्; 'रज्जुरुप्यु, नायं सर्पः' इति वस्तुमात्रकथनेषु प्रयोजनस्य हस्तक्ष्यात्। ननु श्रुतव्यायोऽऽ्रुपे यथापूर्व संसारित्वदर्शनात्र रज्जुस्वरूपकथनेषु वस्त्रमित्युक्तम्। अतोस्यते—नावगत्वहास्तमैव्वस्य यथापूर्व संसारित्वं शक्यं।

औदासीन्यमानातोऽऽऽप्यस्तिति प्रसंस्कृयानिवृत्त्योपकश्य विशिष्टति। तत्किम्किर्यार्थेतेनार्थक्यमात्रपूर्व निर्मातिक्यार्थेतोपविपर्वायुं जैनिन्यसम्भवस्मि तुपत्सृष्टिवायजने परिहरति—तस्मात्पुरुषस्य इति। पुरुषार्थोऽप्युपयुस्मातिनिवृत्त्यात्रक्ष्यार्थतत्व निर्मातिक्यार्थेत्या क्रियार्थतया च पूर्वांतरप्रक्षाः न नुपातिक्षिप्ताः। उपनिषदां स्वरूपं पुरुषस्वप्नवधारगमनपर्यंवासान्तिदित्यः।

यद्यपि औपनिषदात्मानमप्रुषस्य मन्यमानेन उक्तम्—कर्तेन्यविध्यनुप्रवेशमन्तरेण इति,
दर्शायितम्, वेदप्रमाणजनितव्याहारतमभवविरोधात्। न हि शरीरायात्माभिमानिनो दुःखभयादिमतं दश्यामिति, तस्येव वेद-प्रमाणजनितव्याहारागमेव तदभिमाननिद्रूतों तदेव मिथ्याज्ञाननिर्मितं दुःख-भयादिमतं भवतीति शक्यं कल्पितम्। न हि धनिनो ग्रहस्थस्य धनाभिमानिनो धनापहारनिर्मितं दुःखं दश्यामिति, तस्येव प्रभाजितस्य धनाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव धनापहारनिर्मितं दुःखं भवति। न च

अत्र निगृहोपशिष्ठः पूर्वांकं परिहारं स्मारयति—तत्तपरिहृतम् इति। अत्राक्षेता स्वोक्तमर्थ स्मारयति—ननु श्रुतव्याहारोपि इति। निगृहोपशिष्ठः समाधातोद्घात्यति—अन्त्रोच्छते—नावगतब्याहारतमभवस्य इति। सत्यं न वहासाध्यात्रात्र सांसारिकथर्मेनिवृत्तिकारणमं, अपि तु साधारितार्थंत्म। बहसाध्याकार्यंश्वातु: करण—ग्रुतिमेदः: श्रवणम्यननादिजनितसंस्कारसनिम्बो—
as before; because it is opposed to (the knowledge of) Brahman-as-the-self generated by the Veda as the means of valid knowledge. Indeed, because in respect of a man, who has the conceit of self in his body etc., there is found possession by misery, fear etc., it is not possible to assume that, in respect of the same man, when, in consequence of the realisation of Brahman as self produced by the Veda as the means of valid knowledge, there is the cessation of such a conceit, there continues the same possession by misery, fear etc., caused by illusory knowledge. Verily, because for the rich householder, having the conceit of wealth, there is found fear caused by the (possible) theft of the wealth, there does not continue for the same man, when he renounces and becomes freed from the conceit of wealth, the same fear caused by the (possible) theft of the wealth. Nor, 

done' etc., here, with a concealed view, he recalls the answer mentioned earlier: "that has been refuted." Here, the objector recalls the sense mentioned by himself: "Now, it has been said that since even for him who has heard (the texts relating to) Brahman" etc. The respondent reveals the concealed view: "To this the reply is: not in the case of him who has understood Brahman as the self" etc. True, not the knowledge alone of Brahman is the cause of the cessation of the attributes of transmigration, but rather its culmination in intuition. And the intuition of Brahman is a
because for a man having ear-rings there is seen happiness
in the conceit of having ear-rings, is there for the same
man, when he gives up the ear-rings and is freed from
the conceit of having ear-rings, happiness in having
ear-rings. This is declared by Scripture, "Him, verily,
who is non-embodied, pleasure and pain do not touch."
(Chānd., VIII, xii, 1). If it be said that when the body
is destroyed, there may be non-embodiment, not when

particular psychosis of the internal organ, generated in the
mind as aided by the impressions produced by hearing,
reflection etc., like the intuition of the different notes,
ṣadja etc., whose source is the mind purified by the hearing
and practice of the science of music. And this, while
rooting out the perception of the stupendous magical
presentation of the entire universe, roots itself out as
well, not being distinct from that universe; this has been
explained above. Hence, it is established that there is but
similarity to the declaration of the true nature of the
rope (as rope, not snake). And here, being based on the
Veda as the means of valid knowledge, it is spoken of as
"generated by the Veda as the means of valid knowledge".
In this very matter, he mentions two examples, divided
into the non-origination of happiness and of misery:
"Verily, because for the rich house-holder" etc. He cites
Scripture to this effect: "This is declared by Scripture" etc.
He asks: "when the body is destroyed" etc. He
answers: "no; because being embodied is caused" etc. If
कुण्डलिनि: कुण्डलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं द्हार्मिति, तस्येव कुण्डलवियुक्तस्य कुण्डलित्वाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव कुण्डलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं भवति। तदुक्तं श्रुत्या ‘अशरीरं वाद सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पर्शत:’ इति। शरीरे पतितेःशरीरर्त्वं स्थातू, न जीवतं इति चेत, न;

जन्मा, पद्मादिभेदसाक्षात्कार इव गान्धर्वशाख्त-श्रवणायामसंसंस्कृतमनोयोगी:। स च निरिक्तप्रपञ्चमेदन्ता:ऽजालसाक्षात्कारं समूल्मुन्मूलयचात्मानमपि प्रपञ्चताविशेषादु:न्मूल्यतीत्यपपादितमभरतात्। तस्मादज्जन्तुस्वरूपकथनतुल्यतैवात्रेति सिद्धम्। अत्र च वेदप्रमाणमूलतथा वेदप्रमाणाणजनितं इत्युक्तम्। अत्रात्र सूक्तं:कान्तयादिभेदेन निर्दर्शनवदयमह—

न हि धनिनं इति। श्रुतिमनोदाहरितं—

तदुक्तं इति।

चोद्यति—शरीरे पतिते इति। फरिहति—

न; सशरीरर्त्वस्य इति। यदि वास्तवं
सत्यर्थस्य मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात्। न व्याख्यानः शरीरारम्भाभिमानस्कृत्य ज्ञानं सुक्तवा अन्यतं। सत्यर्थस्य शक्यं कल्पयितम्। निद्ध्वमशरीरस्त्वम्, अकर्मणिमित्तवात् इत्यवचा। तत्कीर्तदर्थप्रभास्तिनिमित्तं सत्यर्थस्तवो मिति चेतु, न; शरीरस्वनर्थस्यस्थासिद्धत्वात्, धर्माध्ययोरात्रत्तुत्तितवा सिद्धे, शरीरस्वनर्थस्य धर्माध्ययोस्तत्तत्त्वस्य चेतरेतार्थान्यत्त्वप्रस्त्रात्। अन्धपरम्परेभसत्यर्थस्य भवेत्, न जीवताः सत्त्विवर्तेत्। मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तं तु तत्। तत्प्रक्षतत्वभज्ञानेन जीवतापि शक्यं निर्विर्त्तितम्। यत् युनरस्तर्थस्य तदस्य स्वभाव इति न शक्यं निर्विर्त्तितम्, स्वभावहल्लेन भावविनाशस्त्रकार्ध्वाद्याहं—निन्यत्तमाध्यर्थस्त्वम् इति। स्मादेतत्। न मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तं सत्यर्थस्त्वम्। अपि तु धर्मित्तस्तितिनिमित्तम्। तत् स्वकारणधर्मं धर्मित्तस्तितिमन्तरेन न निवर्तेत्; तत्त्वत्र्वा च प्रायमेवेति न जीवितोशस्त्रर्थस्तवो मिति श्रद्धे—
alive, no; because being embodied is caused by illusory knowledge. Indeed, in respect of the self, it is not possible to assume its being embodied in any other way than through illusory knowledge, consisting in the conceit of self in the body. Non-embodiment is eternal, because it is not caused by an act: so we have said. If it be said that being embodied is caused by the merit and demerit acquired by that, no; because relation (of that) to a body is not established, because it is not established that merit and demerit are acquired by the self, and because there would result reciprocal dependence between the relation to a body and the acquisition of merit and demerit by that. The assumption of beginninglessness in this is (like) a chain of the

being embodied were real, that would not cease during life; it is, however, caused by illusory knowledge; and that can be removed even during life by the rise of true knowledge. As for non-embodiment, since that is of his nature, it cannot be removed, as by destruction of nature there would result destruction of existence; thus he says: "Non-embodiment is eternal" etc.

Be this so. Being embodied is not caused by illusory knowledge, but caused by merit and demerit; and it cannot cease except with the cessation of its causes, merit and demerit; and on the cessation of these, there is but death;
blind. And because there is no inherence of activity in
the self, agency is unintelligible. If it be said that by
mere proximity there is agency for kings and others,
no; because their agency is intelligible through the
relationship to servants procured through payment of
money etc. Not for the self, however, is it possible to
assume anything like the payment of money etc. as the
cause of the relationship of master and servant with
reference to the body etc. Illusory conceit, however, is
the perceived cause of the relation. By this is explained
the self being the sacrificer.

hence there is no non-embodiment during life; thus he
objects: "If it be said that being embodied is caused by the
merit and demerit acquired by that" etc. "That" relates to
the self. He refutes this: "no, because relation to a body"
etc. Not directly can the self acquire merit and demerit,
for, those two, which arise from the exertion of speech, the
intellect and the body, do not occur when there is no
relation to a body; he who desires (to establish) being
embodied (as resulting) from them lands clearly in the
defect of reciprocal dependence; that is thus said:
"because there would result reciprocal dependence between
the relation to a body" etc. It may be said: "True, there is
reciprocal dependence, but it is not a defect, because of
beginninglessness, as between seed and sprout." To this
he says: "The assumption of beginninglessness in this is (like)
षा अनादित्वकल्पना। क्रियासमवायाभावाचात्मनः कर्तृत्वानुपपत्ते। संनिधानाचार्यं राजप्रशस्तीनां द्वारं कर्तृत्वामिति चेतु, न; धनदानाध्युपार्जितवृत्तिसंबन्धित्वाचार्यां कर्तृत्वोपपत्ते; न चात्मनो धनदानादि-वच्छरीरार्धिभि: ख्यामिभावसंबन्धनमिचिं किंचित्तथं कर्पणितम्। मिथ्याभिमानस्तु प्रयक्षः संबन्धेतु:। एतेन यजमानत्व-मात्मनो व्याख्यातम्।

तत्कुट्ट इति। तत्र इत्यात्मां फरामुशाति। निराकरोति—न; शरीरसंबन्धस्य इति। न तावदाल्मा साक्षार्ध्मार्धमौ कर्तुमहिति, वामुद्धि-शरीरराम्भजनितौ हि तौ नासति शरीरसंबन्धे भवतः; ताम्यां तु शरीरसंबन्धं रोचयमानो व्यक्तं परस्पराश्रयवं दोषमाहति; तद्विद्वाह—शरीरसंबन्धस्य इति। यथैवचेत सत्यमस्ति पर-स्पराश्रयतम्, न लेष दोष; अनादित्वात्, बीजाद्कुरवत्। इत्यत आह—अन्धपरस्परेषानादित्वः।
अत्राहुः — देहादिव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनः
आत्मीये देहादावहमभिमानो गौणः, न
मिथ्येति चेत, न; प्रसिद्धवस्तुमेवदस्य
गौणत्वमुख्यत्वप्रसिद्धे। यस्य हि प्रसिद्धो

कल्पना। यस्य मन्यते—नेयमन्यथपरम्परातुल्या
अनादिता; न हि यतो धर्माधर्मभेदाच्य आत्म-
शरीरसंवक्पन्धेदस्तत्त्व एव शरीरसंवक्प्दात्रूवरे-
धर्माधर्मभेदान:; किं तेष पूर्वसमादात्सरीरसंवक्प्दात्सूत्रवरे-
धर्माधर्मभेदाधजनम:; एव त्वात्मशरीरसंवक्प्दोऽन्यसामा-
धर्माधर्मभेदात्—इति, तं प्रत्यह—क्रियासम-
वायाभावात् इति। शाश्वते—संनिधानमार्गेन
इति। परिहरति—न इति। उपार्जनं स्वर्णकरणम्।
न तिथं विद्यामनीत्याह—न त्वात्मम् इति।
येतु देहादावात्मभिमानो न मिथ्या, अपि तु
गौण:; माणवकादाविच सिंहभिमान इति मन्यते,
तन्त्रतपञ्चस्य दूष्यति—अत्राहुः इति। प्रसिद्धो
वस्तुमेवदस्य यस्य पुहुष्य स तथोक्तः। उपार्जितं
चेतदस्माभिरव्यासभाष्य इति नेहोपपायते। यथा
Here they say: in respect of the self that is distinct from the body etc., the conceit of "I" in its own body etc., is secondary, not illusory; if this be said, no; for, secondariness and primariness are well-known to him to whom the difference between the things is well-known. For him to whom the difference between the things is a chain of the blind." One may think thus: "This beginninglessness is not like a chain of the blind; when from a particular merit and demerit, there is a particular relation between a self and a body, it is not, indeed, from that same relation to a body that there result that particular merit and demerit; rather do these (merit and demerit) result from a prior relation of the self to the body, which had its rise from earlier merit and demerit; while this relation of the self to the body results from another merit and demerit"; to this one he says: "because there is no inherence of activity" etc. He objects: "If it be said that by mere proximity" etc. He answers "no." "Procuring" is making one's own. That is not the case, he says, with the self: "Not for the self, however" etc.

As for those who think that the conceit of the self in the body etc. is not illusory, but is secondary, like the conceit of the lion in the pupil etc., he introduces their view and condemns it: "Here they say" etc. That person to whom differences between things are well-known, he is thus mentioned (in the words: prasiddha—vastubhedah). And since this has been explained by us under the commentary on superimposition, it is not explained here. In the twilight, in respect of a thing not apprehended
well-known—for example, if a certain thing possessing a mane etc., and having a particular configuration is established through co-presence and co-absence as the principal signification of the word and concept “lion,” and another, a man, established as possessing cruelty, courage etc., which are the ordinary qualities of a lion—for that one, the word and concept “lion” have secondary signification in respect of that man, not for him to whom the difference between the things is not well-known. For this (latter) one, however, (the use of) one word and concept in the place of another can be caused only delusively, not secondarily; for example, in respect of that whose particularity has not been apprehended in twilight, in the form “This is a post,” the word and concept of “man” have the post as content; or for example, in the nacre, the word and concept which for some unknown reason are determined in the form “This is silver”. In the same way, how can the word

as distinct from a man in the form “this is a post,” the word and the concept of a man due to doubt have the post for content; there, indeed, the attribute of being a man, though not certain, is but superimposed. Having thus illustrated the superimposition of the uncertain in cases of doubt, he illustrates (the superimposition of) the certain in cases of erroneous cognition: “or, for example, in the nacre” etc. When for the white shining substance in front, there is similarity to nacre and silver, while there is the ascertainment of silver, why is there not the
वस्तुभेदः—यथा केरसरादिमानाकृतिविदेशोवन्यवद्यतिरेकाभ्यां सिंहशंक्प्रत्यभाद्मुख्योऽन्यः सिद्धः; तत्तथान्यः पुरुषः प्रार्थिकेः कौर्यशोष्यादिभिः सिंहगुणः संपन्नः सिद्धः—तस्य तत्सिन्यपुरुषे सिंहशंक्प्रत्यभाद्मुख्योऽन्यः गौणो भवतः, नाप्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य।

tasya va nityatave yena vacana\ndhatr\n
तस्य लवन्यतान्यशंक्प्रत्यभाद्मुख्योऽन्यः भ्रान्तिनिमित्तावेव भवतः, न गौणो; यथा मन्दान्धकारे स्थायुर्मित्ययुक्तमाणाविशेषद्रुपशंक्प्रत्यभाद्मुख्योऽन्यः स्थायुर्विशेषः; यथा vrata\n
मन्दान्धकारे स्थायुर्मित्ययुक्तमाणाविशेषाय वस्तुनि पुरुषात् सांश्चिको पुरुषशंक्प्रत्यभाद्मुख्योऽन्यः स्थायुर्विशेषः; ततः हि पुरुषत्वसिद्धसिद्धत्वमयी समारोपितमयी। एवं संश्ये समारोपितनिमित्तमुदाहरणे निमित्तमुदाहरणे—यथा वा शुक्किकायाम्

इति। शुक्किकायाम् द्रव्यस्य पुर्वम्स्थितस्य सति शुक्किकायारज्यसाधारण्ये यावदत्र रज्जविनिधयो
शब्दप्रत्ययों, तद्देहादिसंघाते अहं इति निरुपचारेण शब्दप्रत्ययावात्मानात्माविवेकनेतृपथ्यमानौ कथं गौणो शक्यो वदितुम्? आत्मानात्माविवेकिनामापि पण्डतानामजाविपालानामिवाविविवकौ शब्दप्रत्ययों भवतः। तस्मादेहादिव्यतिरिक्तमास्तित्तववादिनां देहादावहंप्रत्ययो भि-

भवति तावत्कस्माच्छुत्तित्विविनिश्चय एव न भवति? संशयो वा हेथा युक्तः; समानस्मरणिमानो दर्शनात उपलब्धयुनपलब्ध्यवस्थात:। विशेषद्वयस्मृतेश्च संस्कारोनेमेषहे:। साहवस्य हिक्षितेनो-भयं तुल्यमेतदिति। अत उक्तम्—अक्षमात्र

इति। अनेन दृष्ट्य हेतो:। समानवेशपद्यं हेतुक्तम्। तच्च कार्येदर्शनोपेक्षात्तेनासाधारानमस्यिति भावः। आत्मानात्माविवेकिनामाम् इति। श्रवणात्ननकुशलतामालेण पण्डितानाम्। अनुपलब्ध्यसाधारानामात्मकारणमिति यावत्। तदुक्तम्—पश्चादिभिध्वाविशेषातुः। इति। शेषमितिरोहितार्थम्।
and concept of "I," which arise in respect of the assemblage of the body etc., non-figuratively through the non-discrimination of the self and the not-self, be said to be secondary? Even by the learned men who have discriminative knowledge of the self and the not-self, the word and the concept fail to be discriminated, just as by shepherds and goatherds. Therefore for those who maintain that there is a self distinct from the body etc., the concept of "I" in respect of the body is but illusory,

ascertainment of nacre itself? Or there may be doubt, which is appropriate in two ways; for, there is seen a substrate with common attributes, while there is absence of cognition or non-cognition (i.e., of any means of valid knowledge, favourable or unfavourable); also because there is memory of both particulars, since similarity, which arouses the impressions, being located in both, is common to both. Therefore it is said: "for some unknown reason." Though the seen cause is common, there is hereby mentioned an unseen cause; and since that has to be inferred from the perception of its effect, it is not common (to both): this is the idea. "Even by the learned men who have discriminative knowledge of the self and the not-self"; for those who are learned, merely in respect of their proficiency in hearing and reflection; that is to say, for those in whom the intuition of the truth has not risen. That has been said; "And because there is no distinction from beasts" etc. The sense of the rest is not obscure.
not secondary. Hence, since "being embodied" is caused by illusory knowledge, it is established that for the wise one, even while alive, there is non-embodiment. And thus there is Scripture whose content is the Brahman-knower: "Therefore, as the slough of a snake lies dead and cast off on the ant-hill, in the very same way lies this body; then that non-embodied, immortal life, is Brahman alone, light alone" (Brh., IV, iv, 7); "Having eyes but without eyes as it were, having ears but without ears as it were, having speech but without speech as it were, having mind but without mind as it were, having breath, but without breath as it were." There is the traditional Code also, "What is the language of him who is firm in knowledge?" (Gita, II) etc., which, while declaring the distinctive marks of one firm in knowledge, shows that for the wise one there is no relation with engaging in any activity. Therefore, not in the case of him who has realised Brahman as the self, is there transmigratoriness as before; he, however, who has transmigratoriness as before, has not realised Brahman as the self; this is faultless.

And in the matter of non-embodiment during life for the wise one, he cites Scripture and traditional Code: "And thus" etc. This is easily understood. He concludes the present topic: "Therefore, not in the case of him who has realised Brahman as the self" etc.
धैव, न गौणः। तस्मानिमेंत्याप्रत्येकः
निमित्तत्वात्सारिरात्मकः सिद्धं जीवतोपि
विदुषोपा शरीरात्मम्। तथा च ब्रह्मविद्विषयं
श्रुतिः। ‘तदथाहिनिनिर्वचनी चल्लीके मृता
प्रस्तता शायते तेवेदेव शारीरं हेते अथाय-
यमशारीरोप्यस्तः। प्राणो ब्रह्मेव तेज एव
इति; ‘सच्छुरच्छुरिव सकरोक्षवणं इति
सवागवावगिव समना अम्ना इति स-प्राणोप्राणं
इति’ इति च। स्मृतिरपि
‘स्थितप्रजायस का भाषा’ इत्यादि स्थित-
प्रजायस उक्तान्याचक्षणा विदुषः सर्व=
प्रवृत्त्यसंबन्धं दर्शयति। तस्मानावगत-
ब्रह्मात्माभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारितविः
यस्य लु यथापूर्वं संसारितं नासावगत-
ब्रह्मात्माभाव इत्यनवादम्।

जीवतो विदुषोपा शरीरले च श्रुतिस्मृती उदा-
हरतः—तथा च इति। सुनोधम। प्रकृतसम-
संहरति—तस्मानावगतब्रह्मात्माभावस्य इति।
यथपुनरुक्तं अव्रणात्पराचीनयोर्मननिदिध्यासनयोर्दैवानादिपिशेिशत्वं ब्रह्मण्; न स्वरूपपर्यथसायित्वमिति, तन्न; अव्रणावदवगत्यथान्यानमननिदिध्यासनयोऽ। यदि ह्यवगतं ब्रह्मान्यत्र विनियुज्येत, भवेत्रदा विधिशेषत्वम्; न तु तदस्ति, मनननिदिध्यासनयोरपि अव्रणावदवगत्यन्नूक्तं शरि जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वात्वगतिरेव सांसारिकथममिनिघृघितेः; हंत मनननिदविधानानर्थक्यम्; तस्मात्तत्तपतिपशिष्ठिकिरा बेदान्त इति, तदज्ञभाष्य द्रष्टवत्—यथपुनरुक्तं अव्रणात्पराचीनयोऽ। मनननिदिध्यासनयोरपि न विधि:, तयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धसाश्चात्कारसिद्धसायित्वविधिस्पैर्चनेत्रवादात्; तद्विदः—अवगल्यथ्यथात् इति। ब्रह्मासाश्चात्कारोवगति; तदर्थवतं मनननिदिध्यासनयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धमित्यथः। अथ कस्मानमननादिविधिरेव न भवतीत्यत आह—यदि ह्यवगतम् इति। न तार्तमनननिदिध्यासने
Again, as for the statement that since reflection and contemplation are seen subsequent to hearing, Brahman is subsidiary to an injunction and does not stop with its own existence, that is not so; because, like hearing, reflection and contemplation are for the purpose of realisation. If the realised Brahman were employed elsewhere, then there would be subsidiariness to an injunction; but it is not so; because reflection and contemplation too are, like hearing, for the purpose

Now, it has been said "If the jiva's realisation of Brahman as the self were alone the cause of the cessation of the attribute of transmigration, there would be, alas! the futility of the prescription of reflection etc.; hence, the Vedântas have for purport the injunction of contemplation"; restating this, he condemns it: "Again, as for the statement" etc. Even of reflection and contemplation there is no prescription, since of these two which are established by co-presence and co-absence to have the fruit of intuition, there is (but) re-statement by sentences which have the appearance of injunctions; that is thus said: "because they are for the purpose of realisation." Intuition of Brahman is realisation; the subsidiariness thereto of reflection and contemplation is established by co-presence and co-absence; this is the sense. Why, then, should it not be an injunction alone in respect of reflection etc.? To this he says: "If the realised Brahman" etc. That reflection and contemplation are not principal rites with an unseen content, viz., the fruit of immortality, has been stated above.
of realisation. Therefore Brahmaṇ does not come to have the sacred teachings as the means of valid knowledge in virtue of being the content of an injunction of contemplation; and for this reason it is established that Brahmaṇ even independently has sacred teaching as the means of valid knowledge, because of the harmony of the Vedānta texts. And this being the case, the commencement of a distinct sacred teaching dealing with that, in the form "Then therefore the desire to know Brahmaṇ," is intelligible. If it had for purport an

Therefore, there remains for them the character of subsidiary rites, like pounding, sprinkling etc.; that too is unsuitable, since to the self does not belong (the attribute of) having been used or being about to be used elsewhere; for (the self propounded in) the Upaniṣad, in particular, there is opposition to the observance of rites: this is the sense. He concludes the present topic: "Therefore" etc.

And thus, the Upaniṣads having for purport the existent Brahmaṇ, since Brahmaṇ, the object of the sacred teaching, is other than Religious Duty, and since through difference of content there is difference in the sacred teaching, the commencement of the sacred teaching "Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahmaṇ" is intelligible; thus he says: "And this being the case" etc. If, however, it were otherwise, it would be but the desire to know Religious Duty, not another sacred teaching; consequently, there would not be the commencement of another sacred teaching; thus he says: "If it had for purport an injunction
थत्वात्। तस्माद् प्रतिपत्तिविभिन्निषयत्या शास्त्रप्रमाणकतं भ्रमणः संभवतीत्यतः खतन्त्रस्मेव ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकम्, वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयादिति सिद्धम्। एवं च सति ‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’ इति तददिषयः पृथक् शास्त्रारम्भ उपपयते।

प्राधानकिर्मीणि अपूर्वविशेषे अमृतस्फले इत्युत्कर्मरस्तात्। अतो गुणकर्मेऽतमनंतरगर्भगतेऽप्रक्षणादिवस्तरिशिष्योऽत्; तदप्युक्तम, अन्यन्रपुयुक्तप्रयोक्ष्यमाणवामावादात्मनः; विशेषतवौपनिषद्यक्षमाणवामाधात्—इत्यथै। प्रकृतसिद्धसंहरिति—

तस्माद् इति।

एवं च सिद्धस्फुतजारिहारस्य उपनिषदायु, भ्रमणः शास्त्रार्थस्य धर्मदन्त्यतात्, भिन्नविशेषलेन शास्त्रभेदात्, ‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’ इत्यस्य शास्त्रारम्भतसि। उपपयतेत्तस्य इत्याह—एवं च सति इति। इतरस्तु धर्मजिज्ञासैवेति न शास्त्रान्तरसम्मति न शास्त्रान्तरसां स्वादिश्याह—प्रतिपत्तिविभिंमन्तः
समन्वय:

प्रतिपत्तिविधिपर्वते हि 'अथातो धर्म-जिज्ञासा' इत्येवारुद्धतवान पृथकू शाख-मारभेत। आरभ्यमानं चैवमारभेयत
'अथात: परिशिष्टधर्मजिज्ञासा' इति 'अथात: कल्वर्थपुरुषार्थोजिज्ञासा' इति। व्रह्मात्मेक्यावगतिस्वप्रतिज्ञातते तत्
दृश्यं युक्त: शाखारम्भ: 'अथातो व्रह्म-
जिज्ञासा' इति। तस्मात् 'अहं व्रह्मासिम' इत्येदद्वस्या एव सर्वो विधय: सर्वाणि चेतराणि प्रमाणानि। न व्रह्मेयानुपादे-

इति। न केवलं सिद्धरूपत्वाद्व्रह्मात्मेक्यास्य धर्माव-
दन्त्यतम, अपि तु तद्विरोहादपैतुपसंहारव्याजेनाह—
tसमादं छ्रह्मासिम इति। इतिकरणेन ज्ञानं प्रामुश्चति। विधयो हि धर्मं प्रमाणम।
ते च साध्यसाधनेनिति कर्त्तव्यतामेदाधिश्च धर्मो-
त्पादिनश्च तद्विश्च न व्रह्मात्मेक्ये सति प्रभ-वनि,
विरोधातु इत्यथः। न केवलं धर्मप्रमाणस्य शाखाये गति:। अपि तु सर्वं प्रमाणानामि-
injunction of contemplation, a distinct sacred teaching would not be commenced, that (study) having been commenced even with "Then therefore the desire to know Religious Duty". And if it had to be begun, it would have been begun thus: "Then therefore the desire to know the rest of the Religious Duty," like "Then therefore the desire to know what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice and what subserves the goal of man". (PM, IV, i, 1.) The realisation of the unity of Brahman and the self is not premised (in that sacred teaching); hence it stands to reason that (another) sacred teaching is begun for that purpose in the form "Then therefore the desire to know Brahman". Therefore, "I am Brahman": in this alone terminate all

of contemplation" etc. Not merely because of being of the nature of an existent is the oneness of Brahman and the self other than Religious Duty, but also because of opposition thereto; thus he says by way of conclusion: "Therefore, 'I am Brahman': in this alone" etc. By the word "this" he refers to the knowledge. Injunctions, indeed, are the means of valid knowledge in respect of Religious Duty. And these, which are based on (i.e., have as content) differences of end, means, and modus operandi, and give rise to Religious Duty (through teaching it), cannot, when there is oneness of Brahman and the self, be based on those (differences), because of opposition; this is the sense. This is the fate not alone of the sacred teaching that is the
injunctions and all other means of valid knowledge. Not, indeed, when there is the realisation of the non-dual self, which is to be neither rejected nor accepted, can those which are contentless and are devoid of a knower be fit to be means of valid knowledge.

Further, they say: When the secondary and the illusory selves are non-existent, then, because of the sublation of son, body etc., how can the thing to be done, the enlightenment that I am of the nature of the real Brahman, come about? Prior to the cognition of the self that is to be sought, there is knowership for the self. What is to be sought is the knower alone, as free from sin, defect etc. As the cognition of the self in the body is assumed to be valid knowledge, even so is this empirically valid knowledge (assumed to be valid) up to the ascertainment of the self.

means of valid knowledge in respect of Religious Duty, but of all means of valid knowledge; thus he says; "and all other means of valid knowledge." Why? "Not, indeed, when there is the realisation" etc. In non-duality, indeed, there is not the relationship of object and subject; nor agency, since there is nothing to be done; nor instrumental-ity, for the same reason. That is thus stated by the "and" in "and which are devoid of a knower".

To this very effect he cites the verses of a Brahman-knower: 128 "Further, they say" etc. The conceit of the self in son, wife etc., is secondary. As one feels miserable by
यादृच्छिकतात्मकता सत्यम्, निर्विस्मयाभ्याम प्रमात्मकाणि च प्रमाणानि भवितमहेन्तीति।

अपि चाहु—

'गौणमिथ्यात्मनोसत्तेजु पुत्रदेहादिवाधनात्।
सद्यात्मामहिमियेन बोधि कार्यं कथं भवेत्॥
अन्वेषणात्यात्मविज्ञानात्राय प्रमात्मत्वात्मसत्।
अन्विष्टं स्यात्मप्रातं पापसदोषार्थविरजित॥
देहार्थस्तिप्तं यद्रक्षमाणं तलितं।
लौकिकं तद्रेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिध्ययात्॥'

इति।

लाह—सर्वाणि चेतराणि प्रमाणानि इति।
कुत्? न हि इति। अहेतु हि विषयविषयिभावो नाशित; 
न च कर्तृत्वम्, कार्यभावात्;
न च करणत्वम्, अत् एव। तद्विदेशसम्—
अप्रमात्मकाणि च इति चकरेन।

अत्रेव वहविविदं गाथा उदावरति—अपि
चाहु: इति। पुत्रदारादिकात्माभिमानो गौण:। यथा
समन्वयः

स्वदुःखनुढ़ः, यथा स्वसुखनुढ़ः, तथा पुणादिगतेनापीति सोज्यं गौणः। न लेक्ताभिमानः;
भेद्यानुभवसिद्धात्। तस्मात् ‘गौरवाहिकः’
इतिवदौः। देहेन्द्रियादिपु तमेदानुभवाच गौण
आत्माभिमानः; किं तु शुक्री रजतज्ञानवस्मिथ्या।
तदेवं दिविजोश्यात्माभिमानो लोकयात्रा वहति।
तदाते तु न लोकयात्रा, नापि व्रहालै
क्त्यानुभवः, तदुपायस्य श्रवणमननादेशभावात्।
तदिन्द्रमाह—पुत्रेदेहादिविधानात्। गौणात्मको
सत्येव पुत्रकल्त्यादिविधानम्; ममकाराभाव इति
यावत्। मिश्यात्मनोसत्येव देहेन्द्रियाविधानम्
श्रवणाविधानम् च। ततथा न केवलं लोकयात्रा
समुच्चेदः; सदृशाहिमित्येवं बोधि बोधवेरि
यत् कार्यम्, अद्वैतसाक्तात्कार इति यावत्, तदपि
कथं भवेत्? कुल्लसंस्मृववस्तुतं आहं—
अन्वेषेत्यार्थविज्ञानात्मकप्रमाणात्वमभामः।
उपलक्ष्यं चैतन्त; प्रमाणप्रमेरविषयविभाग इत्यति
दृष्ट्यम्। एतदुरं भवति—एष हि विभागोऽहित—
one's own misery, and happy by one's own happiness, so too does one (feel) by what is present in the son etc.; hence it is secondary. But there is not the conceit of oneness, since difference is established in experience. Hence, it is secondary (figurative) as in "The Vāhūka (the inhabitant of a country of that name) is an ox". But the conceit of the self in the body, organs etc., is not secondary, because of the experience of non-difference (from them); it is an illusion, rather, like the cognition of silver in nacre. Thus, it is this twofold conceit of the self that sustains the march of the world. If that, however, were non-existent, there would be no march of the world, nor even the experience of the oneness of Brahman and the self, because of the non-existence of the means thereto, viz., hearing, reflection etc. That is thus said: "because of the sublation of son, body etc." When the secondary self is non-existent, there is sublation of son, wife etc.; that is to say, the non-existence of the sense of "mine". When the illusory self is non-existent, there is the sublation of body, organ etc., as also the sublation of hearing etc. And thence, there is not alone the destruction of the march of the world; "the enlightenment that I am of the nature of the real Brahman, this thing to be done" which is of the nature of an awakening, that is to say, the intuition of non-duality, that too, "how can (it) come about"? Whence its impossibility? To this he says: "Prior to the cognition of the self that is to be sought, there is knowership for the self." This (knowership) is a synecdoche; the distinction
of valid knowledge, object of valid knowledge and means of valid knowledge is also to be understood. This is what is said: this distinction, indeed, is the cause of the intuition of non-duality, since it invariably precedes it; therefore, when that is non-existent, the effect is not produced. Nor is the self to be sought other than the knowing self; thus he says: "What is to be sought is the knower alone, as free from sin, defect etc." The illustration of the necklet round one's neck has, indeed, been stated.

Be this so. From what is non-valid, how can there be the origination of the absolutely real experience of non-duality? To this he says: "As the cognition of the self in the body is assumed to be valid knowledge, even so is this empirically valid knowledge (assumed to be valid)." The terminus of this he states: "up to the ascertainment of the self"; up to the intuition of the nature of Brahman; this is the sense. This is what is said; even by those who maintain the absolute reality of the world, it must be said that the conceit of the self in the body etc. is illusory, since it is sublated by valid knowledge. And of this it should be admitted that it is the cause of all valid knowledge, and that it sustains the real march of the world. This is the mode for us too in respect of the intuition of non-duality. Nor is this intuition of non-duality, a particular psychosis of the internal organ, absolutely and invariably real. As for that intuition which is real, that is not something to be done, since it is of the nature of Brahman. As for Nescience,
साक्षात्कारकारणम्, ततो नियमेन प्राप्भावात्; तेन तद्भवे कार्यो नोपधात इति। न च प्रमातरुत्रातनोज्वैष्यम् आत्मान्य हि—अन्विष्टः स्वाध्यात्मातैव पाप्मदेषाधिवर्जितः। उत्तम हि श्रीवास्त्वगैर्यकनिर्दर्शिनम्।

स्यादित्। अभ्रमाणां कथं पारमाधिकाहै— तातुन्भोगतिरित्य अह— देहात्मप्रत्यो यदद्यामाणतवेन कलिपत्। लौकिकं तद्रेवेदं प्रमाणं तु। अस्यावधिमाह—आ आत्मनिश्चयात्; आ ब्रह्मस्वरूपसाक्षात्कारादित्यस्य:। एतदुर्फ भवति—पारमाधिकप्रभवचादिभिरपिदेहादिपहामामिमानो मिजयेति वक्तव्यम्, प्रमाणबाध्यतवात्। तस्य च समस्त्प्रमाणकारणां भाविकलोकयात्रावाहितिं चाभुपेयम्। सेयमसमाकमप्तिहैंतसाक्षात्कारो विभा भविष्यति। न च यामहैंतसाक्षात्कारोपयतः–करणवत्तिभेदेः एकान्ततः परमार्थः। यस्तु साक्षात्कारो भाविकः; नासौ कार्यः; तस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपतवात्। अविदा तु
यथविधासुचिन्ह्याज्ञनयेदा, न तत्र काचिदनुपति:। तथा च श्रुति:—
विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तहेद्वेभम्य सह।
अविद्यया मृत्युं तीव्रो विद्यामृत्मद्यन्ते॥

इति। तस्मात्सर्वनवदातम्॥

इति चतुःसूत्री समासा।
whether it destroy or generate (other) Nescience, there is no unintelligibility whatever. So too says Scripture:
"Knowledge and Nescience, he, who knows both together, passing byond death by Nescience, enjoys immortality through Knowledge." Therefore, everything is clear.

HERE ENDS THE CATUḤ-SŪTRĪ-BHĀMATĪ
NOTES

PAGE 2

1. Vācaspati, like Padmapūda, the author of the Pañcapādikā, recognises two kinds of Nescience. These are the kāraṇa-vidyā and the kārya-vidyās. The former is beginningless; the latter too are beginningless, but in the same sense as a continuous stream. Kāraṇa-vidyā is one, on the view of some, but not according to Vācaspati. Another name for it is mūlā-vidyā. As contrasted with it, the others are called tūla-vidyās or avasthā-jñānas, modal ignorances. See further, Introduction, section V.

2. The world, movable and immovable, has to be created through Hiraṇyagarbha, and thus requires greater effort than the elements; hence their comparison to the smile, which requires greater effort than a mere glance: so says the Kalpataru.

3. This is a joint salutation to the Vedas and to Paramāśiva, whom Vācaspati would appear to identify with the Saguna-Brahman, possibly following the lead of Saṅkara; see the Sivādvaitanirṇaya, para 3. 233, and the paras immediately preceding. The six añgas of the Veda are phonetics, prosody, etymology, grammar, astrology and ritual; the avyayas (indeclinables) like the particle ca (meaning 'and') are innumerable. The six añgas of Paramāśiva (Bhava) are omniscience,
contentment, eternal wisdom, independence, eternal illimitable resources, and unimaginable power; the avyayas (imperishable properties) are ten: knowledge, non-attachment, lordly power, austerity, truth, mercy, firmness, creatorship, self-knowledge and controllership: thus the Kalpataru.

4. Amalananda takes this expression to refer to a deity fond of sesamum. From a verse quoted in the Kalpataru the word “Mārtana” would seem to refer to the Sun. Das Gupta says Tilakasvāmin is another name for Kārttikeya or Skanda (see HIP, II, 107); in this identification, he has also the support of the Ṛjuprakāśikā.

5. Secondary Creator (apara-vedhas). Vyāsa is said to be so, because of a boon granted to him, in common with Dakṣa and others, in virtue of which they are known as Prajāpatis (creators). The Ṛjuprakāśikā justifies the attribution of creatorship to Vyāsa on the ground of his being an incarnation of Viṣṇu’s cognitive energy, as stated in the Purāṇas; the second line of the verse would thus be a justification of the second half of the first line.

6. The bhāṣya of Saṅkara is clear to outward appearance; but the depth of thought revealed on analysis shows its might and majesty.

PAGE 3

7. I.e., condition or cause; fire is the pervader and smoke the pervaded (vyāpya). That which is more extensive (adhika-desa-vṛtti) is the pervader, and that which is less extensive (nyūna-desa-vṛtti) is the pervaded. They are, of course, co-extensive, where the relation is reciprocal. The pervader in the present case is the
condition of the inquiry, i.e., lack of knowledge plus the existence of profit from the knowledge.

8. That is to say, the body whereon the attributes of the self have been superimposed.

PAGE 4

9. The intellect is the determinative faculty; certitude belongs to it, while doubt belongs to the mind (manas). It is essential to remember that all these psychical factors are in their own nature unconscious.

PAGE 5

10. The usage "You are myself" does exist, but it is very rare; hence the word "extensive" is used advisedly.

PAGE 6

11. That is to say, present it (avabhāsayanti) as of the same nature as themselves: Rjuprakāśika.

12. What is here meant is the cognition of the one being of the nature of the other (itaretarātva-pratītiḥ), not the actual identity of the one with the other. The latter is never doubted and its non-existence needs no proof.

PAGE 7

13. For the superimposition of attributes there must be either superimposition of their substrates or such a relationship between the latter that one may reflect the other. Neither of these being possible as between subject and object, whence the superimposition of attributes? The quotation is from the Sloka-vārttika, V, 39 (p. 280).

PAGE 8

14. Knowledge through perception necessarily comes before knowledge through any other means, such as
inference etc., and certainly long before knowledge through verbal testimony. Herein consists the priority (jyeṣṭatva) of perception. Further, words can convey knowledge only when they are perceived. For his arguments in meeting this contention, Vācaspati is indebted to Maṇḍana Misra; see the Brahmasiddhi, pp. 39-41, esp. p. 41. The example given for the origination of valid knowledge from what is empirically, but not absolutely, real may be paralleled by the difference of significance brought about by emphasis. Emphasis does not belong to the nature of the words; but when imposed on different words in a sentence, the sense of the sentence differs; the difference in sense is validly apprehended, though resulting from what is superimposed.

PAGE 9

15. This is a statement of Sābarasvāmin. The "other" is the implied sense (lakṣyārtha).

16. PM, VI, v, 54. The archetypal rite is that all of whose subsidiaries have been explicitly laid down by Scripture. There are other rites modelled on these; they are called vikṛṭis; their subsidiaries are as a rule taken over from the injunctions as to the prakṛti rite. Where, however, a particular subsidiary has been laid down for the vikṛti, the corresponding subsidiary from the prakṛti will not be taken over; the subsequent prescription in the vikṛti sublates the earlier injunction in the prakṛti. Thus, the prescription of kuśa grass as an auxiliary in the prakṛti is sublated when there is an express prescription of sara in the vikṛti.

17. Tantravārttika, p. 819.

PAGE 10

18. The word "agnihotra" is the name of a particular rite, an obligatory rite. There is another rite called the
"kuṇḍapāyināṁ ayana" which is not obligatory, though the injunction in that regard uses the word "agnihotra". The object of using this word is to indicate not the identity of the rites, but the need for transferring from the obligatory rite all such subsidiaries as are not expressly laid down for the other. On the whole topic see PM, I, iv, 4; II, iii, 24; and VII, iii, 1-4.

PAGE 11

19. That is, in the cognition "I am in this very abode, but cognising".

PAGE 13

20. There is no cognition of the form "I am the body"; but the cognition "I" is none the less due to the erroneous identification of the self with the non-self; that is why it is said that the identification is a fact, though not present in cognition.

21. The Sanskrit "adhyasya vyavahāraḥ" involves the use of the participial suffix (-ktvā) in "adhyasya" (superimposing). This is justifiable only where there is a common agent for both activities. See Pāṇini: 3.4.21. Vācaspati says there is this justification.

22. While Vācaspati identifies mithyājñāna with adhyāsa, treating prior superimpositions as the causes of subsequent ones, Padmapāda sees here a reference to the primal cosmic ignorance. He splits up the compound into mithyā and ajñāna. There are undoubtedly difficulties in treating Primal Nescience as a cause; see the Introduction. The author of the Vivaraṇa, a commentary on the Pañcapādikā, justifies Padmapāda's explanation on the ground that to allege superimposition as the cause
of superimposition would be to commit the fallacy of self-dependence (ätmāsraya). But as Maṇḍana and Vācaspati are never tired of pointing out, full intelligibility is just what one may not expect in the case of Nescience; non-intelligibility is constitutive of its very nature.

Page 15

23. The bhāṣya says that the empirical usage (vyavahāraḥ) is natural and beginningless. But if that were so, it could not have a cause. Hence, the beginninglessness should be taken really to qualify the cause, viz. superimposition. But this is itself an effect of prior superimpositions. How, then, can that be said to have no beginning? The reply is that what is here intended is not the absence of any beginning, but the absence of any beginning that may be said to be the first; in other words, we have a continuous process like that of a perennial stream. Such beginninglessness is called kārya-ṇāditva or pravāha-ṇāditva, as contrasted with svarūpa-ṇāditva, such as belongs to the jīva, Īsvara, Pure Intelligence, the difference between the jīva and Īsvara, Nescience, and its relation to Intelligence.

24. According to Vācaspati, sattā (reality) consists in unsublated self-luminosity. The other views, e.g. the inherence of reality as a genus, and practical efficiency, are maintained by the Naiyāyikas and cannot appeal to the advaitin for the reasons mentioned, viz. the introduction of duality and the infinite regress involved.

Page 18

25. This view (or something very much like it) comes in for criticism at the hands of Kavitārkika
Cakravarti Nṛsimha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya, of whom we know nothing beyond the summary given of his views in the first chapter of the Siddhāntalesasaṅgraha. The point of the criticism is this: does the yellow, which goes forth with the rays of light, pervade the object? If it does not, there is no possibility of its superimposition; if it does, then, even others who are near by should perceive the shell to be yellow, as if it were gilded. What the Cakravarti is criticising is the notion of two psychoses in an illusion, one cognising the "this" and the other the "yellow" or the "silver"; neither the existence nor the functioning of two such psychoses is intelligible, according to him. It is not clear from the Bhāmatt whether Vācaspati recognises two psychoses, though his language suggests such recognition; but Appayya Dīkṣita who briefly refers in the Parimala to the Cakravartin's criticism, makes out that it applies only to the Tārkikas.

26. An interesting question in relation to this experience is "whence the previous experience of bitterness for an infant, who has not yet tasted anything bitter, but turns away from the mother's milk, because of the delusion caused by biliousness that it is bitter?" One explanation is that the bitterness is imported from the experiences of a prior life. Cf. SLS., pp. 204-205 (Kumbakonam edition).

27. There has been more than one theory of reflection in advaita philosophy. Vācaspati seems to hold in common with Padmapāda and the Vivaraṇācārya that the image which appears to be apprehended is but the original face. There is a difference of opinion as to whether the original itself is apprehended but in a
different place or the original that is present in its own proper place. Padmapāda holds the former view and says that those who maintain the latter are patently contradicted by experience (see the Pañcapādikā, p. 23). The latter view is that maintained by Vācaspati, and must be part of his inheritance from another, possibly Maṇḍana, as otherwise it could not have come in for criticism even in Padmapāda’s days. The Bhāmatī view is that the reflected rays go back to the original image where it is and apprehend it, but not as where it is. In support of the view that what is apprehended is the original image itself, the Vivaraṇācārya points to the form of the sublating cognition “The face is not there” not “The face is not”. As regards Vācaspati’s own exposition, Appayya Dīkṣīta rightly remarks in the Parimala that the element of “non-apprehension of the location of the original” is not essential to all reflection, since it is absent from the cognition of the reflection of a tree, for instance, which may co-exist with the cognition of the tree where it is really located. The doctrine that the rays from the sense of sight are turned back by the stronger rays of the sun does not seem to be shared by the Vivaraṇācārya, who says they are turned back by the reflecting medium, the mirror etc. Neither version of the theory, of course, corresponds to the modern physicist’s notion of reflection, according to which the rays of the sun or other illuminant are reflected, not rays from the sense of sight. The most powerful criticism of the theory that the reflected image is identical with the original comes from the Advaitavidyācārya (probably Raṅgarāja Dīkṣīta, Appayya’s father) who holds that the reflected image is a fictitious
creation of Nescience, like the water of the mirage. These are some of the points urged by him. (i) It is not true that there is no notion of an independent face in the mirror. Children and other unsophisticated persons take the reflection to be an independent entity. (ii) The reflection does not have the properties of the original. The reflection of the sun does not burn, nor does the reflection of the moon cool. (iii) When we look at a calm sheet of water, we see not merely the reflections of our faces, but also the sandy bed. The only possible explanation is that some rays from the sense of sight pass through the reflecting medium while others are turned back. Whence this difference in the strength of the rays? Again, the rays which are admittedly weaker than water and are consequently turned back therefrom, are yet said to be stronger than the much stronger rays of the sun, so that they go up to the solar orb and enable us to see its reflection in the water! See further SLS., pp. 268-280 (Kumbakonam edition).

PAGE 19

28. "gandharva-nagara" is a delusion of cities, buildings etc., seen in the clouds.

29. It is said that the eye treated with the vasa (a bilious substance) from a frog, sees a bamboo as a snake and the colour of a snake in the colour of the bamboo. See the relevant portion of the Kalpataru and the Parimalā thereon.

30. "maruṣu maricīkā-nicayam" is literally a body of son's rays (shining) over a desert (and giving the appearance of water); it is therefore rendered here as "mirage". The R̄juprakāśikā takes "uccāvacam"
(understood in our translation to mean "high and low" as qualifying "waves") along with "maricika-nicayam," the whole compound meaning "the unspeakably intense rays of the sun shining over a desert"; according to this commentary "uccāvacam" means "vācām agocaram" or "atyadhikam".

PAGE 20

31. "bhāvā-ntaram abhāvo hi." This part of the line occurs in the Slokavārttika, p. 566, where, however, it is followed by "purastāt pratipāditaḥ" not by "kayacit tu vyapekṣayā". The whole line as here quoted occurs in the Vibhramaviveka of Maṇḍana Misra (see v. 129, p. 14, Madras edition). It is not unlikely that Vācaspati's own quotation is from Maṇḍana.

PAGE 21


33. The verse is from the Slokavārttika, p. 476. This view of Kumārila, which treats existence and non-existence as co-existent aspects of everything, is to be distinguished from the view of Prabhākara, which denies any kind of reality to non-existence, since the non-existence of anything, say a pot, is nothing more than the bare locus, i.e., the ground itself. The line "bhāvā-ntaram abhāvo 'nyo na kascid anirūpaṇāt" seems to some extent to be reminiscent of this view; and it is not infrequently mistaken for an expression of the Prabhākara view; see, for instance, D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, p. 160 and the foot-note. The ascription,
however, is erroneous, since that line is Kumārila’s description of his own position. See the *Slokavārttika*, p. 245; also the *Vibhramaviveka*, v. 127, p. 14, where this line is cited in the exposition of the Vārttika-kāra’s own position.

PAGE 22

34. See Note 33.

PAGE 25

35. Expressions like “long-lived one” and “beloved of the Gods” are applied to the opponent, more particularly to the Buddhist, sarcastically, to indicate his folly.

PAGE 27

36. “True,” that is, literally, “correspond to their objects.” Correspondence for the Naiyāyikas and for the Prābhākaras (whose view is set forth in the present passage) seems to have meant nothing more than “practical efficiency”. It is difficult to determine whether the Naiyāyikas ever understood it to mean “resemblance” and could be characterised as representationists.

PAGE 30

37. For the criticism of akhyāti-vāda *Cp.* the *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 136-147, esp. p. 137.

PAGE 31

38. *Bhasmaka*, morbid appetite due to over-digestion; seems to have been known as *Yañaittt* in Tamil; *Cp.* *Maṇi-mēkalai*, patikam, line 66.

PAGE 32

39. The *Nyāyakanikā* is Vācaspati’s Commentary on Maṇḍana’s *Vidhiviveka*. Amalānanda in the relevant part
of the Kalpataru gives a summary of Vācaspati's arguments in the Nyāyakārikā. The main argument is this. Truth is self-evident, not made known by constancy of the cognition to its object. If cognition does require constancy, for what purpose does it need it—for the presentation of the object cognised or for successful practical activity? Not the first, since cognition does not arise first and then present the object; rather does it arise as the presentation of an object. Nor the second; for, in order to apprehend constancy, practical efficiency etc. should be first apprehended. Is this effected by another cognition? Then the constancy of that cognition comes in question and we have an infinite regress. If another cognition be not needed for the second cognition, validity would be ascertained neither for that cognition nor for the first cognition, dependent thereon for its validity. And if the validity of the second cognition be self-evident, why not that of the first as well?

The Brahmatattvasamikṣa referred to three lines later is Vācaspati's commentary on the Brahmāsiddhi of Maṇḍana.

PAGE 34

40. The Rjuprakāṣikā reads "ātma 'jado"' taking the two words "self" and "non-inert" in apposition, so that the sentence means: "If it is manifest, it stands to reason that the self, which is non-inert, is not, like pot etc., manifested in dependence on another."

PAGE 36

41. That is to say, we are left only with the fact of the relatedness of consciousness to objects and the self;
and with this we got no further forward, as the analogy of the ignorant father and the scholarly son still applies.

PAGE 38

42. For, then, the plurality of reflections of the sun would introduce difference into the sun. It is to be noted that this demonstration of self-luminosity is offered by the objector, with a view to show the impossibility of superimposition.

PAGE 41

43. Chûnd., VI, iii, 2.

44. There is a continuous stream of superimposition, wherein jîva-hood and object-ness (viṣayatva) alternate, without the defect of reciprocal dependence. The content of an earlier superimposition may be jîva-hood; and this jîva may become the object of the next superimposition.

PAGE 42

45. Svēt., VI, 14.

46. "Praudhi-vāda" is sometimes rendered as "an extravagant argument". It is in the nature of a supplementary argument, which proceeds by conceding the opponent's assumptions though really untenable as suggested by its synonym. It has no strict relevance to the main thesis as its establishment. Thus the denial of God in the Sāṅkhya Sûtras is said by Vijñâna Bhikṣu to be a "prauḍhi-vāda".

PAGE 45

47. That the inner self, which is pure intelligence, is different from intellect etc., this is what is to be
apprehended; this apprehension constitutes the final cognition, which is of the same class of reality as what is removed thereby, though it is of a higher degree in that it requires nothing else for its own removal. The rise of this cognition is of itself the removal of Nescience, since nothing else remains to be acquired or done for this removal. But even the final cognition is other than the knowledge which is the self; it only helps to reveal the latter, through removing the obscuration caused by Nescience; hence that cognition may be spoken of as "knowledge" only derivatively or secondarily.

PAGE 49

48. The reading in all printed texts is "pravartate," though "pravartante" seems obviously to be called for. As the text stands, the meaning would seem to be "why should he (the knower) not function of himself?" But it is evident both from what follows and from the commentaries that it is the functioning of the senses and of the pramāṇas generally which is here in question. The reading "pravartante" has been adopted in the present text on the strength of two MSS. in the Adyar Library: 30 L 22 (Grantha script) and 40 B 19 (Malayalam script). It is interesting to note that the Kalpataru takes the second question to relate to a different objector and not to be merely explanatory of the first question. The first question is "why should the knower utilise the pramāṇas?" The atmanepada in "upādatte" implies that the utilisation is for his own benefit. The obvious complement of that question is "why should not the pramāṇas function for his benefit without being utilised by him?" This would be the question of a follower of the Saṅkhya, according to which, primal
nature functions of itself in the presence of Spirit, for the benefit of Spirit. But there is another possibility—that prakṛti and its evolutes may function, not for any one's benefit, but just because it is their nature. The second question is based on this possibility. This interpretation, says the author of the Ābhoga, is justified, nay demanded, by the force of "eva" in "svayam eva kasmāt" etc. One may also note in this connection that, while for Vācaspati adhiṣṭhānam (in the Bhāṣya) means "controller" Padmapāda, Ānandagiri and Govindānanda take it to mean "locus". The sentence in the Bhāṣya would thus mean: "and without the locus of the senses (that is to say, the body) there is no functioning."

PAGE 50

49. The words of the Bhāṣya "And without a knower" etc. imply also "and without valid knowledge". The need for a knower who can control the pramāṇas has been already explained, and there is no need to repeat it. What is shown here is the need for superimposition, because of the nature of valid knowledge, viz., the combination of intelligence and non-intelligence (cidd-ādi-rūpa-garbhaṁ).

PAGE 53

50. PM, III, vii, 18. The question is whether the sacrificer (yajamāna) should personally engage in each act of sacrificial ritual, including all subsidiaries or whether it will suffice if he makes the dedication of the sacrificial material. The prima facie view is that the sacrificer should himself engage in all the rites, since the fruit is declared to go to him; and the
fruit necessarily goes to that agent who is implied by the activity of engaging in the rites. The final view is that the services of the officiating priests (ṛtviks) have been formally purchased by the yajamāna and that this purchase would be futile if the yajamāna had to perform all the rites himself. The aphorism cited here is the statement of the *prima facie* view; but in both views, the fruit is understood to go to him who engages in activity for its sake; and this is all that is intended to be illustrated here.

PAGE 56

51. Cp. *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 43. There are three expectancies for every operation prompted by an injunction: what is to be accomplished? wherewith? and how? In the case of the *syena* or hawk sacrifice (so called because it injures the enemy even as quickly as a hawk would pluck out the enemy’s eyes) injury to the enemy is what is to be accomplished. But this cannot be in the last resort a Scripture-ordained end, since it conflicts with the prohibition of injury to all beings. It is at best a Scripture-permitted end. One of the expectancies, therefore, is not fulfilled from an absolute point of view. Despite this, the injunction of the hawk sacrifice is observed by those who are eligible for it, *i.e.* those who have not conquered anger.

PAGE 61

52. *PM*, I, ii, 40.

PAGE 62

53. “The inner self alone is their principal sense.” The word *mukhyā-ṛṭhaḥ* would ordinarily mean “primary”
or “expressed” as opposed to “secondary” or “implied sense”. The inner self, however, is not the primary or expressed sense of the words “That” and “thou” in “That thou art”. Hence, the word mukhya here means nothing more than “non-figurative”; see the Rjuprakāśikā.

Page 65

54. “daṇḍī preśān anvāha.” Scripture says “maitrā-varuṇaḥ preśati ca ‘nvāha ca.” While the adhvaryu actually offers the oblations, the maitrā-varuṇa has the task of preparing them and the hotṛ priests have the function of calling on the deities to come up as soon as the offerings are ready. On the adhvaryu satisfying himself from the maitrā-varuṇa that the offerings are ready, the latter, with the former’s consent, gives permission to the hotṛ priests, in the formula “āśrāvaya,” to call the deities. When the invitation has been made, that fact is communicated to the adhvaryu by the maitrā-varuṇa in the formula “astu śrauṣṭaḥ”. The first of these formulāe is called the praiṣa and the second the anuvacana. That the uttering of both of these belongs to the maitrā-varuṇa results from the text already mentioned. When, therefore, it is said later “daṇḍī preśān anvāha (the priest with the baton chants the permission and the reply),” this should be taken to be a restatement in respect of the chanter and the chanting, being injunctive only in respect of the qualification of having a baton. If the emphasis were not on the baton, the statement would be wholly futile. Hence the importance of what is not primary in the sentence. But this is not so in the case of “brahma-jījñāsa”.
55. "mān-badha" etc.; see Panini, III, i, 6. This aphorism says that the stems mentioned, *viz.*, mān, badha etc., undergo a duplication and a lengthening of the initial consonant. Thus, from mān we get māmān; this, in accordance with another rule, becomes mīmān; and this with *san*-suffix, which, however, does not mean "desire" in the present case, becomes mīmāṃsā.

56. *PM*, I, i, 1.


59. *Manusmrți*, VI, 35. The three obligations are (1) to the Gods, (discharged by sacrifices), (2) to the fathers, (discharged by the creation of progeny), and (3) to the sages, (discharged by study of the Veda and observance of brahmacharya). The two smṛtis cited a few lines earlier are respectively *Manu*, II, 28 and *Gautama*, VIII, 22. On the whole subject of the relation of karma to jñāna Cp. *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 27-37.

60. "samyoga-prthaktva" is literally a two-foldness (*i.e.*, a difference) of relation. The subsidiary happens to be in two relations, one with the rite of which it is a necessary part, and the other with the fruit specifically enjoined. E.g., there are two texts "khādīre pasum badhnāti (he is to tie the beast to the ebony stake)" and "khādiram vīryakāmasya yūpam karoti (he who
desires virility is to make the stake of ebony)". As subserving the sacrifice, ebony would be a constant factor thereof; but, as subserving the desire for virility, it would be a variable factor. There is no inconsistency in the same subsidiary having this twofold relation (sāmyoga-prthaktva).

61. *Ved. Sū.*, III, iv, 32. It is worth noting that Maṇḍana's interpretation of the horse-analogy is both distinctive and interesting. He who wants to go quickly gets hold of a horse, though he can otherwise foot the distance. The use of ritual is analogous to the service rendered by a horse; see *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 36-37.

62. Proximate and remote contributors" are the results of two varieties of auxiliaries, which are distinguished as they subserve the rite and indirectly the fruit, or the fruit alone directly, not the rite; the fruit being distant in time, what subserves that alone is said to be a remote auxiliary (āradupakāraka); what subserves the rite directly, e.g., the material used or to be used, is a proximate contributory (sannipatya- or sāmaṇvāyika-upakāraka). Where the subsidiaries of a rite are expressly mentioned by Scripture, they are said to be obtained by direct teaching (upadesa); where, however, they have to be derived from another rite which is its model, they are said to be obtained by transfer (atidesa). For a full list of subsidiaries (aṅgāni) see *Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāśa*, (Edgerton): sections 182-191. See list of corrections.

PAGE 75

63. The āgneya and two other rites constitute the darseṣṭi; similarly the āgneya with still two other rites constitutes the paurṇamāseṣṭi. The two groups of three
bring about heaven as the ultimate fruit. But since this fruit comes after much delay, while the rites perish as soon as they are performed, an unseen potency (apūrva) has to be assumed; this is produced by the rites and it in turn produces heaven. But each rite does not produce heaven; it is only the six rites together with their subsidiaries that produce that result; each of these perishable rites, however, should produce an apūrva, while the ultimate result, heaven, is the result of an apūrva which is final (paramā-'pūrva) and to which all the other apūrvas (known as utpatty-apūrvas) contribute. Now, the samit is the name of one of the rites subsidiary to the three main rites of the darsa or paurnamāseṣṭi; it produces its own apūrva which is contributory to the paramā-'pūrva generated by the āgneya etc. It is only in order that the āgneya etc. may produce their fruit, that the due performance of the samit etc. and the generation of their appropriate apūrvas are necessary. But it is possible to perform the āgneya etc. even without performing the samit etc. In the case of the purodāsa, the sacrificial cake made of rice flour, we have a different relationship; in the absence of purodāsa, the āgneya etc. could not be performed; these depend on the purodāsa for their very existence, not merely for their fruitfulness.

64. The mortar in which the rice-grains for the sacrificial cake are pounded is purified by sprinkling.

PAGE 78

65. For the school of Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, verbal testimony is not of itself a means of immediate knowledge. The internal organ (which, according to them, is a
sense-organ) intuities the real, as aided by knowledge gained through testimony, reasoning thereon and so on. As against this, the Vivarana school holds that knowledge through verbal testimony may of itself be immediate. An example given of this is the statement "Thou art the tenth" addressed to the proverbial party of ten fools who, on crossing a river, reckoned up their total number as nine, each enumerator leaving himself out of the counting. When the enumerator is pointed to by an outsider with the words "Thou art the tenth" there arises the full and immediate certitude of his being the tenth man and of the whole party being safe. Verbal testimony would thus seem to be a cause of immediate knowledge. The following free rendering of a passage from the Kalpataru will be of interest in this connection: "This is the idea. Of Brahman, though of itself immediate, mediacy is apprehended because of delusion. Hence, the intuition thereof can be only through a means of valid immediate cognition. And since the internal organ generates in the conditioned self the immediate psychosis of 'I,' that (organ) is established to be the cause of immediate cognition in the self. That (organ), however, as aided by the succession of cognitions of the unity of Brahman and the self, intuities in the case of the jiva its being of the nature of Brahman, which is secondarily implied by the word 'That,' in the same way as the sense of sight aided by the retentia of prior experience is the cause of the recognition of the oneness implied by 'that-ness' and 'this-ness' (in the recognition 'This is that Devadatta'). But verbal testimony is not settled to be the cause of valid immediate cognition. If cognition were intuitive because of the object cognised being capable of immediacy (as is maintained by some
advaitins, e.g., the author of the \textit{Iṣṭasiddhi}, that (immediacy) would result even for the inference whose content is the difference between the body and the self. Even in the case of 'Thou art the tenth,' the intuition results only from the sense-organ as aided by that (statement). Further, the immediate cognition generated by contemplation of the knowledge resulting from the Vedāntas cannot be delusive, because of the strength of the basic means of knowledge (\textit{i.e.}, Scripture). Nor does it follow that validity is extrinsic; for, confirmation by the basic means of knowledge is sought (only) to remove the suspicion of invalidity. This has to be admitted because of such texts supported by reasoning as 'But it is seen by the concentrated intellect.' Cognition from verbal testimony arises only in the form 'that which is directly immediate,' not in the form 'Brahman is mediate'; yet, the cognition remains mediate, because of the nature of the instrument (verbal testimony), and is not delusive; thus, everything is clear.' Cp. \textit{Brahmasiddhi}, p. 134. One is tempted to think that between the two rival views, there is but a distinction without a difference. Even where verbal testimony is held to cause immediate cognition, the object, it is said, should be proximate or immediate. May not this proximity mean proximity to a sense-organ, \textit{i.e.}, the mind?

66. According to Vācaspati, what is veiled by Nescience is the conditioned Brahman; for, the unconditioned is flawless; it can be neither veiled nor revealed. What is revealed by the final intuition must, therefore, also be the conditioned Brahman. In veiling and in manifestation there is the relation of content and container, and what enters into any relation cannot be the unconditioned. But at the stage of the final cognition
the conditioning is such that the condition does not appear; the pure Brahman itself seems to appear; the condition is the psychosis, which, as has been said, is itself on the brink of destruction. This condition operates by its very existence, constituting an exception to the general rule that a condition operates as such only when known to be such. See further the Kalpotaru on this topic. Here, again, the difference between the Bhāmati and Vivaraṇa schools tends to be verbal rather than material; for, the distinction is difficult to make out between what is said to be the intuition of pure Brahman and what is said to be the intuition of the conditioned Brahman, but without any awareness of the condition or the conditioning.

PAGE 82

67. The expression "bhinna-karmatā" means the performance of action suited to those who are different, i.e., who have not the conceit of being human beings; actions, in other words, which are suitable to beasts etc. It has been translated rather freely as "transgression of the law".

68. Vācaspati's account of release while embodied (jīvan-mukti) is not very satisfactory. In the present exposition he seems to hold to the view of Maṇḍana (Cp. the Brahmasiddhi, p. 130), that the so-called perfected saint is not wholly perfect; he is only a sādhaka, not a siddha. But later on, in commenting on IV, 1, 15, Vācaspati echoes Saṅkara and maintains expressly that the jīvan-mukta is a siddha, not a sādhaka. He also stands there for the continuance of a part of Nescience, in the form of prārabdha-karma, while in the present context, he postulates, like Maṇḍana, the continuance of
impressions alone. As noted in the Introduction, to postulate the continuance of a body is not the same as to postulate continuance of the conceit of identity with the body. If the latter be a necessary element of jīvan-mukti, it would indeed be difficult to avoid Rāmānuja's criticism that the assertion of jīvan-mukti is like the son's assertion of his mother's barrenness. Vācaspati's ingenious explanation of how prohibitions, though not prescriptions, hold good in the case of the jīvan-mukta has obvious leanings towards Maṇḍana's doctrine that jīvan-mukti is at best figurative, a predication based on the close proximity of final release. The more usual explanation is that the psycho-physical mechanism of the released self is so attuned that it cannot possibly go wrong. This is simpler and perhaps more satisfactory. That Vācaspati is far from consistent will be apparent from what he says under II, iii, 48 (p. 626): "For him, however, who knows the difference from everything beginning with the intellect, for him who is devoid of the conceit of the enjoyership of karma, there is no eligibility in respect of karma. And thus, there is not (for him) acting as he likes, since, for him who is devoid of conceit, there is not even that." This is very different from the position that prohibitions are binding, because they do not call for an act of faith in the same manner as prescriptions.


70. Kaivalya Upaniṣad, I, 3; Mahānārāyana, XII, 28.

71. Satapatha Brāhmaṇa XI, ii, 6, 13.
271

72. *Muni*, III, i, 8.

PAGE 85

73. *Bhagavad-Gita*, VI, 3.

PAGE 86


75. Jāra-marya-vāda etc. When one is about to die of old age (or illness for the matter of that), an expiatory ceremony (prāyascitta) is prescribed; this is what is meant by the prescription about jāra-maraṇa. The cremation of dead bodies is also a prescribed rite; this is what is referred to in the words "being reduced to ashes". In the case of those who have performed sacrifices during their life-time, the son is enjoined to perform a final sacrifice (antyeṣṭi). Jāra (old age) is synecdochic for illness and the like as well. There seems to have been a reading "jāra-marya-'rthavāda," which is explained by the *Rjuprakāśīka* to mean that which is enjoined (vadhīyate=vidhīyate) in the case of (=arthe) death due to old age etc.

PAGE 88

76. Sequence may be settled by direct *statement* (śruti), *sense* (artha), the order of *mention* in the texts (pāṭha), the *position* of that whose sequence is to be settled (sthāna), the sequence adopted in the *principal* (mukhya), or the sequence adopted in the first *procedure* (pravṛtti). The first of these is, of course, the clearest indication. Direct statement may be by the participial -ktvā suffix, as in "Having become a householder (gṛhī bhūtvā), he is to become a forest-dweller" etc. It has been said in the text (of the *Bhāmatt*) that such sequence
is sublated by the disregard of sequence in "Or, if otherwise, let him renounce from the student's order of life" and so on.

The next determinant of sequence is artha. The text about the preparation of barley gruel occurs after that about the performance of agnihotra. Since the latter requires some material, and barley gruel appears to be the material, it would be natural to prepare this before performing the oblation. Those who stick to the order of mention would, however, maintain that the oblation should come first, some other material being assumed therefor and that the preparation of the gruel should be assumed to have some other unseen result. This involves the abandonment of the visible material and the visible result and the assumption of something invisible in both cases. Rather than incur this defect of prolixity (gaurava), it is preferable to recognise the sequence warranted by the sense (artha) and prepare the gruel first so that it may be offered in the agnihotra.

The next determinant is the order of mention (pātha). The darsa-pūrṇamāsa consists of six rites, three to be performed at the fullmoon and three at the new moon. They are (1) the āgneya, the agniśomīya, and the anubandhya, and (2) the āgneya, the aindram dadhi and the aindram payaḥ. For either set of three, there is a set of subsidies called fore-sacrifices (prayāja). These are mentioned in the following order: "samido yajati, tanunapatam yajati, ido yajati, barhir yajati, svāhākāram yajati." Should they be performed in this order alone or in any other? The answer is that since the names of these rites occur to the mind in the order of mention, they should be performed in that order.
They are learnt in that order, in accordance with the injunction to study one's Veda; and the texts serve the purpose not only of making known the rites, but also of recalling them to mind for the sake of their observance.

Of the Jyotiṣṭoma as archetypal rite, there is a modification called the śadhyaskra, in which all the three animals,—the āgniśoṃiya, the savaniya and the ānu-bandhya,—have to be offered up on the same day, not on three different days, as in the archetype. On which day, then, are they all to be offered? On the second day—the day to which the savaniya animal belongs in the archetype—after collecting the soma in the cup dedicated to the Āsvins. For, in this way, each of the other animals is moved out of its place by one day alone; whereas in any other way, there would be a disturbance of two days for one or other of the animals. And on the second day, the savaniya animal is to be approached first, because the offering of that animal belongs eminently to that day; and from the originative injunction in the archetype, it is understood to follow immediately on the filling of the cup dedicated to the Āsvins. The other two animals may be approached either in the order belonging to them in the archetype, or without regard for any special sequence. Thus is sequence settled by position (sthāna).

Sequence among the subsidiaries may be settled in conformity with that in the principal rite (mukhya). When such an order is adopted, the intervals between the subsidiaries and their respective principals would be equal; otherwise, there would be a larger interval in some cases, and in others none at all. The offerings in the āgneya etc. have to be sprinkled with
the ghee left over from the fore-sacrifices. The āgneya comes first and the aindram dadhi comes next; the sprinkling of the respective materials should follow the same order. If the latter were sprinkled first and then the former, since the āgneya has to be offered up first, between the sprinkling of it and its offering there would be no interval at all, while there would be too long an interval in the case of the aindram dadhi.

In the Vājapeya, seventeen animals are to be offered up on the same day. These have to be approached, sprinkled, tied up and so on. It is a matter of indifference which animal is approached first. But the whole series of operations should not be finished in the case of one animal before the next one is approached; for, then, it would not constitute the offering of the seventeen together. What interval there is should be only such as is unavoidable. Hence, each stage of each operation should be gone through with all the animals. Now, when the first stage (sprinkling) is over, is there any order to be observed for the next stage? The prima facie view is that it is an unnecessary tax on the mind to remember the original order and that the second stage may begin with any animal ready to hand. The final view is that the sequence adopted in the first operation should be preserved throughout the series of operations. When simultaneity is enjoined and succession is adopted only because it is inevitable, delay in each operation should be reduced to a minimum; for each animal there may be only sixteen intervals between one operation and the next; and this can be secured only by adhering to the original order. This is sequence settled by pravṛtti.

It is, of course, understood that these determinants have been mentioned in the order of superiority and that
each subsequent one is less conclusive than the preceding one.

77. The single result is the final supreme unseen result, the paramā'-pūrva, to which the fruit of subsidiary rites, the utpatty-apūrvas as they are called, are contributory.

78. E.g., "He who desires heaven should sacrifice with the darsa and pūrṇamāsa," wherefrom it is understood that all the six sacrifices comprised under darsa and pūrṇa-māsa are contributory to heaven.

PAGE 89

79. I.e., a specific human object, say, the securing of cattle in plenty; this is distinguished from what is kratv-artha, subsidiary to the rite itself as serving its due accomplishment. When the same subsidiary fulfils both ends, we have two-in-one-ness (samyoga-prthaktva). As part of the darsa-pūrṇamāsa there is a water-sprinkling ceremony called ap-praṇayana; this ceremony is by itself merely kratv-artha. But he who desires cattle is to sprinkle from a godohana (milking) vessel; in this case, the sprinkling becomes puruṣa'-rtha. See PM, IV, i, 2.

PAGE 90

80. It has been shown that even where is explicit use of the participial (-ktvā) suffix, indicative of sequence, no sequence is intended, as shown for instance in the case of the Jabula Upaniṣad. In the case of the desire to know Brahman there is not even such a suffix to be explained away. Therefore, the existence of sequence as between the soma sacrifice and the darsapūrṇamāsa-iṣṭi has no application here, that being a case of the explicit use of the
participial suffix: "Having performed the darsapūrṇamāsā-īṣṭī" etc.

PAGE 91

81. Kartari krtyaḥ. The -ya suffix generally signifies the object of an act. But "become" is an intransitive verb and no object thereof can be signified. To this objection it is said that the suffix in bhavyaḥ is really a krtya suffix, which signifies the agent (kartṛ) of an act, not its object.

PAGE 92

82. PM. I, i, 5.

PAGE 93


PAGE 96

84. "Jāyasva mriyasva" is apparently in the imperative mood meaning "be born and die". Here, however, the sva-suffix is used to signify mere repetition. They are repeatedly born and they repeatedly die: this is the sense. This is illustrated by Appayya Diksita through the Sanskrit equivalent of the common Tamil expression veṭṭu vettenru veṭṭinān which apparently means "He cut saying 'cut, cut,'" but really means "He cut in the 'cut, cut' manner (i.e., repeatedly)".

PAGE 97

85. Brh., IV, iv, 23.

PAGE 100

86. Chānd., VIII, i, 6.

87. This paragraph is commenced, says the Kalpataru, as a reply to Bhāskara, who holds that though the
reason given for the desire to know Brahman may be good enough in itself, there is yet no indication in the aphorism that this is what was present to the aphorist’s mind. The reply makes out that the word brahma itself brings to mind the Veda, and not the whole of it, but those parts of it (i.e., the Upaniṣads) which may suitably come after the preliminaries understood by the word “then (atha)”.

PAGE 102

88. This is in answer to the objection that “horse-fodder” is a dative compound, meaning “fodder for the horse,” though the compounded elements are not related as basic object (prakṛti) and its modification. The answer is that Kātyāyana himself declares “horse-fodder” and the like to be possessive compounds, in spite of their dative sense.

PAGE 120

89. This is the idea: a thing may be defined if it is known in experience or if its attributes at least are known; or verbal testimony may apply to it; but in none of these ways is Brahman susceptible of being defined.

90. The terms “samāhāra-dvandva” and “itaretara-dvandva” are difficult to render adequately into English. “Collective compound” and “distributive compound” may serve as a near approximation: that is to say, in the case of the “samāhāra-dvandva,” any predication made would apply to the collection as a whole, the collection being the principal (viseṣya) in that compound; in the “itaretara-dvandva,” however, the predication would apply to each member of the whole, the collection here being but an attribute (viseṣaṇa) of each member of the aggregate. The latter compound is well exemplified in the text, where the
predicate, "niyata," applies to each member of the compound—time, place, fruit etc. A "samāhāra-dvandva" is always in the neuter.

PAGE 123

91. The son performs the annual ceremonies (sraddha) for his departed ancestors. Here, the son is agent alone, not enjoyer, while the fathers are enjoyers alone, not agents. Similarly, the vaisvānara-īṣṭi, offered on twelve potsherds, by the father on the birth of a son, is for the welfare of the son; here, the son is not agent, but enjoyer alone; the father is agent, but enjoyer only remotely, through the welfare of his son; see PM, IV, iii, 38-39.

92. Planetary and guardian deities. The reason urged for their non-creatorship is the fact that the world contains many agents, enjoyers etc. It is not the plurality that is important here, but the diversity. If the world were at least of a uniform nature, its creation by those of limited knowledge and power might be intelligible; what precludes their creatorship is the diversity of the world and the finitude of the capacity of these deities. Being themselves jivas, says the Kalpataru, they cannot create a world full of jivas like themselves; here too the essential defect is finitude. One may also expect the cause to differ in some way from the effect; there would be no such difference, if these deities were the cause.

PAGE 125

93. On the three varieties of pariṇāma, see Yoga Sūtras, III, 13. Dharma-pariṇāma is exemplified by clay ceasing to be a lump and becoming a pot. Lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma belongs to the dharmas: e.g., the lump of clay ceases to be present and comes to belong to the past; the
pot ceases to be of the future and comes to belong to the present. Avasthā-parināma belongs to the lakṣaṇas: e.g., even the pot that is present attains each moment different states as new or old. By lakṣaṇa is understood temporal characteristic or, as Woods renders it, time-variation; avasthā is a mode. Prof. Keith following Prof. Jacobi suggests that the treatment of these three varieties in the Yogabhāṣya gives clear indications of indebtedness to Vasubandhu. See Some Problems of Indian Philosophy, IHQ, VIII, pp. 431-432. The word lakṣaṇa in dharma-lakṣaṇa is used in the sense of rūpa, "consisting in".

94. Taitt., III, 1.

Page 131

96. The soma juice is collected and kept in cups called "grahas". In a particular sacrifice called the "atirātra," the use of sixteen cups is prescribed; but elsewhere in Scripture, there is also the prohibition of the use of the sixteenth cup in the atirātra sacrifice. In the face of such contradiction, it is understood that there is option for the sacrificer to use or not to use the sixteenth cup.

Page 132

97. The Śrīraṅgam edition reads "svātāntreyaṁ iva bhavati," meaning that human activity and non-activity, though dependent on prescriptions and prohibitions, seem to be free. This discrediting of freedom is not required or supported by the text. The Kalpataru too seeks not to deny freedom, but to show and justify the dependence on prescriptions etc.: "Though capable of acting of his own free will, yet, because of his not knowing the
instrumentality (of particular acts) to what is beneficial or harmful, there is need of the prescriptions and prohibitions that give that knowledge."

99. In the tarkapāda (II, ii).
100. Inference sāmānyato dṛṣṭa is the third of the traditionally recognised three classes of inference. It is essentially inference by analogy. Thus, the sun is inferred to move, on the analogy of Caitra, for the sun changes its position and similar change of position for Caitra is accounted for by motion. Its special value lies in dealing with a *probandum* which is beyond the reach of the senses (atīndriya). That Brahman is not in the sphere of the senses has been already stated. Now, Vācaspati goes on to say that it is not even in the sphere of inference, even that variety of it which is applicable to what is super-sensuous. The argument of the *Nyāya-kaṇikā* is explained at some length by the *Kalpataru*. The inference of a creator may establish at best a human creator; for, in the case of some human beings extraordinary powers of creation have been observed, as in Viśvāmitra who created a whole universe. It is possible for one or more human beings, therefore, to create a world, acting simultaneously or in succession. If you say that you argue to a creator with knowledge of the means employed, do you mean *some* knowledge of them? If so, omniscience is not established and your inference of the Lord fails. If, however, you claim omniscience to be your *probandum*, again the inference fails, since the *probandum* is not present in any co-subject (sapakṣa).
You may say that the potter knows everything in connection with the pot he makes and that, similarly, God knows everything in connection with the world he makes. But the potter knows not who will buy his pot nor what uses it will be put to; and if God's knowledge were similar, it would fall far short of omniscience. Further, God, who has no mind, can have no knowledge. If you say that, because of his lordship, he has knowledge even without a mind, you may as well say that, because of his lordship, he creates the universe, though he has no knowledge; and thus, like the moneylender who in his greed for interest loses the principal, you cut at the very root of the argument for an intelligent creator.

PAGE 136

101. Under I, i. 4.
102. Taitt., III, 6.

PAGE 140


PAGE 142

104. Recitation of the Veda, if defective in respect of the hymns, words or due inflection of the voice (svara) is said to be productive of evil, even as if the words were a thunder-bolt. The legendary instance of this is that of Tvaṣṭhā who performed a sacrifice to obtain a son who would vanquish Indra. But since he misplaced the stress in the compound "Indra-satruḥ," what he actually said amounted to a prayer for a son of whom Indra would be the vanquisher; thus was born Vṛtra, who was slain in due course by Indra.

106. In respect of the upāṃsu sacrifice, scripture says "He is to perform the upāṃsu sacrifice at intervals," and goes on to say "Viṣṇu is to be sacrificed to with the upāṃsu, for the avoidance of jāmita (monotony)" etc. Two other deities are also mentioned as to be sacrificed to with the upāṃsu. The deity and the material constitute the form of the rite. The latter set of texts "Viṣṇu is to be sacrificed to" etc. mentions the deities; another text says that where the material is not specifically mentioned, the ghee in the darvī is the material. Thus, the latter set of texts would seem to be really injunctive, the first being merely a collective restatement; further, the imperative suffix is to be found only in the second set. Nevertheless, the final view is that the first text alone is injunctive. If the second set were injunctive, then, for the same purpose and with the same material, there would be the prescription of three rites to three deities, though the unity of purpose would suggest a single rite. If the first text is injunctive, the second set may be taken to contain restatements thereof combined with eulogistic passages mentioning the fruit. There can be no syntactical unity, if several rites be taken to be enjoined. Further, in "Viṣṇu is to be sacrificed to" etc., Viṣṇu etc. appear to be the principals, while the rite is secondary, whereas the rite is primary in the first text, its mention there being novel (apūrva). In the second set of texts, we have to construe Viṣṇu etc. as secondary and relate them as deities to the rite which is really primary. Rather
than do this, it is simpler to take the first text as injunctive. Though the verb there is in the present indicative mood, it may be interpreted as an imperative. As for the form of the rite, even the second set is not self-contained; and the co-operation of the general text declaring the material is available for the first text too, which text has the further advantages of parsimony and novelty. For such reasons, the second set is treated as containing restatements, having the force "so great is the upāṃsu that Viṣṇu etc. are the deities thereof". The governing principle is that of syntactical unity for the whole passage beginning with "jāmi vā etad yajñasya kriyate" up to "agniṣomāv upāṃsu yaṣṭavyā 'jāmitvāya". The same principle is applied to the Vedānta texts beginning with "Existence alone, dear one, this was in the beginning" etc.

PAGE 154

107. The following is the Kalpataru summary of the arguments of the Nyāyaśāstra: (1) Religious duty, which is what is to be done, cannot be the sphere of perception, which is born of the contact of sense with what is. (2) Even the perception of Yogins can claim excellence only in respect of sense-objects; hence perception is inapplicable to dharma, the content of the Veda. (3) And since it has no probans etc., it cannot be the sphere of inference etc. (4) And no person can utter intelligible statements when he is ignorant of what he is to speak about. Hence the Vedas are not of human origin. It should be remembered that the word "human" in this context applies to all beings short of the omniscient one, and not to men alone.
108. The reference is to *Bṛh-Upaniṣad*, I, iv, 15; the immediately preceding text is from the same Upaniṣad I, iv, 7. The word "lokaṁ" is translated by some as "state" or "true state". But the word "enjoyment" seems to accord better with Śaṅkara's understanding of the passage in his bhaṣya on that Upaniṣad.

109. The reference is to *TS*, I, v, 1. The story goes that the devas handed over their wealth for safe-keeping to Agni, who in a fit of greed ran away with it and hid himself in the waters. When he was caught by the other devas, he howled and his tears became silver. The statement is good as a fairy tale but is of no practical value. It is therefore explained to be subsidiary to the prohibition of the offering of silver as daksīṇa, a prohibition which occurs later in the same Śruti.

110. Darviḥoma (*PM*, VIII, iv, 1-9) is the name of a rite; it is not the injunction of an accessory, in which case it would mean an injunction of a sacrifice with the darvi. It is not a sacrifice (yajña) but an oblation (homa). No special accessories are prescribed, the same accessories—spoon etc.—being used as are prescribed for other enjoined rites. It has no archetype. Besides the text enjoining its performance, there are no other texts laying down the fruit or praising it and so on. Hence that one text is to be taken to perform all the functions, particularly those of praising and prescribing the homa.

111. The text is "well established (long-lived) are they who meditate on the ratri". The fruit of long life,
being mentioned only in an eulogistic passage, is not really its fruit; that fruit is understood to be heaven, on the analogy of the Visvajit sacrifice. But the final view is that the fruit is whatever is mentioned nearest, in the order of express statement, eulogistic passage, what is carried over from another and so on. In the case of the Rātrisattra, no fruit is expressly stated; but the eulogistic passage mentioning long life as the fruit is only next in authority; hence, this is the fruit, not heaven, which, even in the case of the Visvajit, is not expressed, but is assumed; see *PM*, IV, iii, 17-19.

112. Piṇḍa-pitr-yajña is an offering to the manes, to be made on the afternoon of the new moon day. This is an independent, not a subsidiary, rite, since a particular time is prescribed and that time is also seen to be prohibited for other rites; further, it is enumerated along with other principal rites. This being the case, it ought to have a fruit of its own; no fruit, however, is mentioned; hence, on the analogy of the Visvajit, its fruit is taken to be heaven. That the fruit is heaven, in such cases, is ascertained in *PM*, IV, iii, 15-16, in connection with the Visvajit sacrifice; yet the analogy of the Piṇḍa-pitr-yajña is mentioned here, since in fact the Visvajit has another fruit; for, it is prescribed as an expiatory rite for him who undertakes a sattra sacrifice, performs the saṅkalpa, but fails to go through with the sacrifice.

Page 167

113. *PM*, IV, i, 22-24. It is enjoined that curds should be poured into hot milk. The object of the pouring is the production of cream (āmikṣā). Whey too results, however, as a by-product.
114. The removal of Nescience is not something over and above knowledge; Cp. *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 32: vidyo-'daya eva 'vidyā-nivṛttih.

115. If a sacrifice is enjoined, it does not follow that it should bear fruit either here alone or only in a hereafter. Thus, the Kārīri is performed to secure rain, so that the crops may be luxuriant; if that is fruitful at all (and not obstructed by some unknown cause), it should bring its fruit in this life, almost immediately after the sacrifice. The Citrā is performed for obtaining cattle; there is no restriction as to when this should bear fruit; a man may become prosperous as the result of that sacrifice, whether in this life or the next.

116. See note 112 on Pinda-pitr-yajña.


118. Vardhamāna would appear to have been a gold ornament in the form of a svastikā.

119. "Difference is dependent" etc. This one sentence seeks to summarise a good part of the interesting and rather stiff dialectic of the second chapter of the *Brahmasiddhi*. Interested readers should turn to that for fuller information. A slight expansion of the argument of the *Bhāmatt* is, however, attempted here. Our knowledge of difference is necessarily bound up with that of the correlates.
which are different. The cognition is of the form "A is different from B"; and this would not be possible, if there were no prior knowledge of A and B; and this cognition of A and B cannot be of them as non-different, as otherwise the subsequent cognition of their difference could not arise; therefore, the cognition of difference, which we seek to explain, is based on a cognition of differentes, which would not be cognised as such but for a cognition of their difference; thus we have reciprocal dependence. Further, the cognition relates to several units, each of which is different from the others. Now, if there were no units, there would be no difference either. But your contention that difference is real tends to abolish the unit. For, difference is either an attribute of the units or it is of their very constitution (svabhāva). If it be an attribute, is it identical with the differentes or not identical? Obviously, an attribute cannot be identical with that which is said to possess it; else, it would be of the very constitution of that which possesses it. If the attribute is not identical, is, in other words, different, what is the nature of this second difference? Is that too an attribute, as it obviously should be? Is it, then, different from the elements it differentiates? The answer must be in the affirmative; and thus, we get an infinite regress of differences, each resting on the next without any finality. Let us say, then, that difference is of the very constitution of things. Two difficulties present themselves: (1) A and B are the alleged differentes. They agree in this, that what is called "difference" is of the very constitution of both. Now, if two things agree in some particular aspect, so far forth they are identical. Because "difference" is of the constitution of both A and B, the two are so far identical. But this
was just the reason alleged for their non-identity. Thus, if difference be of the nature of things, it abolishes itself. (2) We must have A and B before we can say that they are different. But we cannot have these or any other units; for, of each alleged unit, difference is the very nature. Hence, whatever may be set up as a unit, down to the primal atom, tends to break down indefinitely. There is nothing which can be called one. A single thing is not single either in itself or as a combination of simpler elements, since there can be no units to combine. These objections apply not merely to the cognition of difference, but to its very existence. Unity, on the other hand, cannot be shown to be thus dependent on difference for its existence. True, in respect of cognition, there does seem to be such dependence. But this may be explained on the basis of a posited difference. A phenomenon need not be explained by external causes in every case, since internal defects like those of a sense-organ (jaundice, joy, fear etc.) may be the causes in many cases. Since difference and non-difference cannot both be real, one of them must be treated as posited. For the reasons here stated and on grounds of parsimony (Occam’s razor), it is proper to assume difference to be posited on non-difference.

PAGE 181

120. Pr., VI, 8.

PAGE 182

121. Nyāya Sūtras, I, i, 2.

PAGE 184

122. In the imagined identification (sampat), primacy belongs to what is imagined, not to that on which
it is imposed; it is āropyaprādhāna, not ālambanā or adhīṣṭhānaprādhāna, like superimposition (adyāsā); the distinction is stated almost in the same terms in the Pañcapūdikā. For the identification of the Dravidācārya mentioned on page 185, see Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri in Proceedings of the Oriental Conference, Madras, pp. 468-473, where a plausible case is made out for the equation with Tirumalaisai Ālvār.

123. Stūta-sastra-vat. The mention of the deities in a musical chant is a stuti; where the mention is not in a musical chant, it is called a sāstra. Since both of these serve to make clear the relation of subsidiaries (the deities) to the principal (the sacrifice), and since they have the visible result of mentioning the nature of the deities, they are but subsidiary rites; this is the prima facie view. The final view holds that they are principal rites with an unseen potentiality as their fruit, as otherwise the expressly stated injunction "stauti," "saṁsati" etc. would be futile. Further, a stuti, e.g., "this kṣatriya youth has large eyes" is intended to be a praise, not a description; hence, description, denotation etc. of the deities may not be said to be the visible result of stuti etc. Similarly, here too, the contemplation of the self may be the principal; this is the sense. On stuti and sāstra as principals, see PM, II, i, 13-29. For the punctuation of this sentence, we have relied on the Kalpaturu and the Nīrnayasagar edition of the Bhāmatī with the Ratnaprabhā. The punctuation in other editions is clearly erroneous. See also additional notes.

124. PM, II, i, 8.
125. "Bright gold is to be worn." This is one of the stray sayings which occur without being related to any particular sacrificial rite. It is contended as a prima facie view that since the material and the deity for an independent rite are not mentioned, since it is mentioned in the Ādhvaryava Veda presumably as something to be done by the adhvaryu, since the wearing must be intended as a purification of the wearer or the gold or both, and since the purification must be intended for the sake of some other rite, the injunction to wear gold should be subsidiary to the agnihotra and other such rites. The final view is that since an independent result is declared—disfiguring the enemy, and since there is no application (niyoga) of the wearing in the context of any other rite, it is an independent duty. The second of these reasons is more important, since the declaration of fruit may be discounted on the ground of the absence of the usual formula "He who desires this is to do such and such". Hence it is that the Bhūmattī has the words "viniyoga-bhangena, because of failure of the application". Nor may subsidiariness be established on the analogy of the ladle made of pārna wood, for, unlike the ladle, this wearing is not invariably related to a sacrifice, gold being worn even for purposes other than sacrificial. See PM, III, iv, 20—24.

126. The Srīraṅgam edition reads vaktṛ, vākya, vācaka and vacanāni, instead of paktṛ, pākya, pāka and pacanāni. What is intended in either case is the denial of agency, whether as a speaker or as a cook, though the latter is, perhaps, the more forceful illustration. The
Rjuprakāśikā would appear to support the Śrīraṅgam reading.

PAGE 200


PAGE 202

128. The compound might mean "those which are the contents of injunctions"; in the present context, however, the meaning is "those whose content is an injunction, i.e. something to be done"; see the *Kalpataru*.

PAGE 207

129. The process of learning assumed by the Prābhākaras is rather elaborate. They say that when A asks B to bring the cow, and B brings it, C, who hears A's words and sees B's action, infers B's understanding of the sense of the words, and thus comes to know that those words mean that action. But how does C know that the understanding of the sense of the words should have preceded B's actions? The relation of words to sense in this case he comes to know only later. If it be said that he knows from prior conditioning of action by knowledge of the word-sense, since the process of learning is the same there too, the question is but pushed one stage back, and we have an infinite regress. The only way to get out of the difficulty is to hold that the meaning of words is original and natural, and that the meaning is conveyed even independently of relation to what is to be done.

PAGE 209

130. "He is to offer flour (as an oblation)." Flour, here, has not been used in the rite up to this stage; therefore, it has not been purified; nor after the oblation does it
survive, since it is reduced to ashes; hence, then too, it cannot be treated as purified by the rite; it must therefore be understood that what is primary in this injunction is the oblation, not the flour, and that the latter, though in the accusative case, should be interpreted in the instrumental case (ṣaktunā juhoti); there is viniyogabhanga in the case of flour, in the same way as in the gold that is to be worn.

PAGE 217

131. This is from Śabaravāmin’s bhasya on PM, I, i, 2.

132. Vacaspati follows Kumārila in his view of the relation of language to meaning. He rejects the sphaṭa doctrine of the grammarians and Maṇḍana Misra, holding to the possibility of an ordered recollection of the audible sounds which manifest the different letters; from such a recollection may arise word-sense. The word-senses which rise thus are, however, not independent. They are fundamentally parts of a sentence-sense; this latter is their purport. Hence each word, while expressing its own sense, reaches forward to the sentence-sense, which is secondarily implied (lakṣita) by all the words together. While thus the integrity of the sentence is recognised, it is not exalted at the expense of the independence of the words. It would appear that while some form of associationism is held to in the explanation of how different audible sounds come to constitute a word, this view-point is transcended in considering the relation of word-senses to the sentence-sense. One wonders why advaitins like Śaṅkara and Vacaspati did not favour the doctrine of pada-sphaṭa and vākya-sphaṭa, based as
it is on a psychology which is truer and has more in common with advaita principles. See further the Bhāmatt, I, iii, 28, Vācaspati's Tattvabindu and an article on "Vācaspati's criticism of the Sphoṭa-vāda," Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, VI, 311.

PAGE 218

133. Slokavārttika, VII, vv. 342, 343; p. 943.

PAGE 219


PAGE 220

135. PM, II, i, 1.

PAGE 223

136. Ordinarily, the negative particle should be construed with the verb-ending, to signify a prohibition. There are, however, two exceptions: (1) when the sentence is introduced with words relating to something positive, such as "His vows are" etc.; and (2) when otherwise an option would result. (1) An example of the former is the Prajāpati-vrata, where it is said to be part of a vow not to look on the rising nor on the setting sun. The premising of a vow raises the expectation of something to be done; not looking at the sun must be understood to mean something to be done, not merely something to be avoided. Hence, the negative statement is taken to enjoin the formation of a resolve not to see the rising or the setting sun. The negative particle is detached from the optative verb-ending and attached to the root of the verb, so that it may signify not-seeing, i.e., the resolve not to see. When combined thus with verbal roots or with nouns, the negative indicates not prohibition, but exclusion,
e.g. non-brahmin. (2) It is said in Scripture "Not in the after sacrifice (anúyāja) shall he say ye-yajāmahe". If this be taken to be a prohibition, it would imply the prior establishment of the saying of ye-yajāmahe in all sacrifices; for, only of the contingent can there be any denial, as otherwise negation would be futile. No such rule is established as to saying ye-yajāmahe; and if it be assumed, option would result, just as there is, for instance, between "He is to offer oblation before sun-rise" and "He is to offer oblation after sun-rise". Nor can the negation wholly annul the assumed rule so that option may not result; for, such wholesale annulment is possible only between independent statements, but not between statements one of which is presupposed by the other; here, the rule is presupposed by the negation. Because of this contingency of option, the negation is related not to the word "say," but to "after-sacrifice," so that the meaning is "He shall say ye-yajāmahe not at the after-sacrifice". See the Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāsa, (Edgerton), pp. 168—174. Students of Western Logic will note the insistence on relevance to the context in both prohibition and exclusion. Denial can be only of that which is possible; exclusion is only of that which is similar and falls into the universe of discourse (nañ iiva yuktam anya-sadṛṣa-dhikaraṇe).

PAGE 229

137. "Upalakṣaṇa" may be rendered as a "qualification per accidens". It is difficult to render into English so as to bring out its difference from vīseṣaṇa (proprium) on the one hand and upādhi (conditioning adjunct) on the other. The distinction is well explained in the
Kalpataru, p. 420 (under I, iv, 22). That which inheres in the product and serves to distinguish it, like the blueness of the nilotpala, is a *vīsesāṇa*. What is not inherent may be either an *upādhi* or an *upalākṣaṇa*. Of these, that which lasts as long as the product and serves to distinguish it is an *upādhi*; that which is occasional and causes the cognition of difference is an *upalākṣaṇa*. The distinction between these two corresponds to that between inseparable *accidens* and separable *accidens*. Redness is not inherent in the crystal nor the crow in the house. But when one is asked to fetch the red crystal, the redness is present in the crystal till it is brought; but when a house is pointed to Caitra as that which has a crow perched on it, the crow does not necessarily remain there till Caitra reaches the house; redness is an *upādhi*, the crow is an *upalākṣaṇa*.

PAGE 242

138. This Brahman-knower has been identified as one Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya, on the strength of references in Ātmasvarūpa's *Prabodhaparivodhīnti*, (R. No. 3225 of the Govt. MSS. Library, Egmore), an unpublished Commentary on the *Pañcapādikā*, and in Mādhavamantrin's *Tatparya-dīpikā*, a Commentary on the *Sūtasamhītā*; see Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri in the *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, I, p. 5 ff. The learned author of this paper suggests the identification of Sundara Pāṇḍya with (1) Kun Pāṇḍya, reputed to have been a learned king, who was cured of his illness and reconverted to Śaivism by the famous Saiva Saint, Tirujñānasambandha, or (ii) Tirujñānasambandha himself, or (iii) some other pre-Kumārila scholar of the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsās. The first two of these
suggestions suffer from the difficulty of having to reconcile the advaita taught in these verses with the Saivism of the reputed author; the characterisation of the latter as Sivaadvaita is of little help, for, between Sivaadvaita and what we may for convenience call Sankaradvaita, there is a wide enough gap to bridge. And while there is a tradition that Kun Pandyay was a Jaina before his reconversion, there is no tradition that he was an advaitin, either earlier or later; and the difference between the positions ascribed to him is not so slight as to be glossed over. The same difficulty applies to the second identification. The third is too vague to need acceptance or rejection. Whether the ascription of the verses to an Acarya Sundara Pandya is itself correct is a question that merits further consideration, since the ascription seems to appear only in comparatively late works. It is within the bounds of possibility that a quotation is mistaken for one’s own composition; thus, verses quoted by a comparatively obscure and late Sundara Pandya may have been wrongly ascribed to him by Atmasvarupa and Madhavamantrin; but in the absence of any knowledge of a later Sundara Pandya or about the trustworthiness of Atmasvarupa, this is nothing more than a bare possibility. An attempt has been made in the Jignyasa, I, ii, 1-6 to traverse the arguments of Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar; but most of the contentions are rather puerile and unconvincing.

PAGE 244

139. The advaitin cannot insist too strongly that the cognition which destroys Nescience is also a psychosis and that it possesses only the same class of reality as what it destroys; it is not absolutely real. Though in a
sense the product of Nescience, (for it is based on distinctions of pramāṭr, pramāṇa and prameyeya, which distinctions are products of Nescience) it has yet the capacity to destroy its generatrix and itself at the same time. The fire born of the friction of bamboos in a forest does not spare the bamboos which generated it; and, when the whole forest is consumed, it dies out of itself. Nor is it true that what is not absolutely real has no practical efficiency. Even a dream, though unreal, causes effects physical and psychical, besides serving as an indicator of future events, auspicious or otherwise. Indeed, the advaitin maintains that practical efficiency belongs only to the empirically valid, neither to the wholly real nor to the wholly unreal. The latter cannot be efficient, since it itself is not; the former, being eternally accomplished, has no activity and hence cannot be efficient. That is why Vācaspati says “As for that intuition which is real, that is not something to be done, since it is of the nature of Brahman.”

PAGE 245

140. Is’a., 11.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

[The following additional notes relate to pages: 10, 20, 27, 46, 49, 71, 95, 122, 147, 153, 162-165 and 220-223, 227-228, 237, 239.]

PAGE 10

“prakaraṇā-ntara” is difference of context (see the list of corrections). This is the last of the six pramāṇas given by Jaimini (PM II, iii, 24) for differentiating rituals.
It is defined thus: anupādeya-guṇa-sahakṛtā-'nupasthitīḥ prakaraṇā-'ntaram. In essence it consists in non-proximity to the intellect. The term occurs again on page 148, and the same idea is expressed by Vācaspati as “asannidhāna” on page 146.

PAGE 20

“tadguṇa-saṃvijñāno bahuvrihiḥ.” Adjectival compounds are of two kinds—the inclusive and the non-inclusive. In the present case the denotant of the compound “janmādi” is “origination, sustentation and destruction”; this denotation includes that of the component parts “janma and ādi”; thus this compound is of the inclusive type. In a compound, however, like “citraguṇ” in sentences like “citragum ṣānaya (bring the man with spotted cows)” the spotted cows which are signified by the component parts are not included in the signification of the compound; for what is intended is the arrival of the owner of the cows, not his arrival with the cows; hence this compound is of the non-inclusive type.

PAGE 27

“abheda-vyavahāraḥ sāmānādhikaranya-vyapadesas ca” has been rendered as “empirical usage as non-different and appositional designation”. Vyavahāra (usage) ordinarily includes vyapadesa (verbal designation) too; here, however, they are distinguished, “vyavahāra” signifying practical activity alone. Hence the denotation of “empirical usage” is narrower in the present context, excluding what is mentioned in “appositional designation;” it is, in other words, equivalent to “pravṛtti (activity),” which is the word used by Vācaspati in the middle of p. 28.
"nirupadrava-bhūtārtha-svarūpasya" etc. The outsiders here cited are the Baudhās, who teach the doctrine of nairātmya. The apprehension of this truth costs some effort. But once there is the apprehension and contemplation thereof, there is increasing clarity, which, however, does not call for increased effort, in the same way as each increased success in jumping calls for a bigger effort than before. Nor is there subsequent sublation by error, the impressions of which too persist; for knowledge has a bias for truth, and disturbances due to error exist only till truth is attained, not thereafter. This is a favourite verse with Vācaspati; see, for instance, the Śāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on verse 64. The word "intellect" in the translation has to be understood as synonymous with knowledge; see also list of corrections.

PAGE 49

The reading "pravartante" adopted by us seems to have the support of the Bhūmatitilaka and the Rjuprakāśikā. The Parimala, which uses the analogy "yathā pradhānām pravartate" etc., may possibly prefer the reading "pravartate". On either reading, the subject of the sentence "atha svayam eva kasmāt" etc. has to be supplied from without; but on the reading "pravartate" it is possible to understand that the subject is neither the self (which does not fit in) nor pramāṇas (which requires the plural), but "yathā pravartate tat (that which is active)". Such usage may be taken to be idiomatic, and it agrees with what comes before and after. But we prefer the reading "pravartante" since it has the support of two commentaries besides that of the MSS. mentioned in Note 48.
"adhikṛtā-dhikāra" is rendered as "eligibility of the person already eligible". Two components enter into adhikāra—the possession of certain qualities, connate, acquired or both (this alone is what is understood by fitness or eligibility ordinarily), and the possession of interest in the fruit to be attained. The former is more in the foreground when, for instance, a Brahmin is said to be the adhikārin for a particular rite. In adhikṛtā-dhikāra, interestedness is more to fore; it is a person, interested in a particular result, that is further interested in another result accruing from a further subsidiary.

"nityā-nityā-vastu-vivekaḥ." Vācaspati's position is this. What is eternal is not already known as distinct from what is non-eternal, as then there can be no further inquiry; nor can indefinite knowledge, of the nature of doubt, avail to generate non-attachment. What does exist is the distinction of eternity from non-eternity, the discrimination of the attributes (which are called vastu, since they dwell therein, vasatt 'ti). This knowledge of eternity and non-eternity is linked up with the knowledge of desirability and non-desirability. And thus he knows that among the denotations of the "Thou" and the "I," that which will be established as eternal will be that which turns out to be desirable and the non-eternal that which turns out not to be desirable. This much of knowledge can account for both non-attachment and the desire to know Brahman.

"yathā 'huḥ: buddhi-siddham tu na tad asat." This quotation has been traced by Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar to the Nyāya Sūtras (IV, i, 50), where, however, the
reading is "buddhi-siddham tu tad asat". Vācaspati himself interprets this aphorism thus in the Tātparyatīkā: tad asad bhāvi kāryam anenai 'va kāraṇena janyate na 'nyene 'ty anumānād buddhi-siddham eve 'ty arthaḥ. The aphorism thus interpreted fits in naturally with the rest of the Bhāmati context. And the comment of the Kalpataru is almost a paraphrase of the words of the Tātparyatīkā: yad asad iti prasiddham tad buddhy-ārūḍhena rūpeṇa sad eva, anyathā turaṅga-śṛṅgavat karmatva-nirdesa'-yogāt. In the light of this, therefore, it seems necessary to amend the text by leaving out the "na" and correct the translation thus: "That, however, which is non-existent (i.e., to be produced), is (certainly) existent in the intellect." In regard to this suggestion of the learned Professor, certain difficulties have to be pointed out. The Kalpataru, at the end of the sentence quoted above, goes on to say: iti sat-kārya-vādina āhuḥ. The aphorism, as it occurs in the Nyāya Sūtras, is the statement of the final view of asat-kārya-vāda held by the Naiyāyika. The words of the Kalpataru would, therefore, suggest that the citation here is not of a Nyāya aphorism, but of the aphorism of some school professing sat-kārya-vāda. The suggestion is reinforced by the Bhāmatītilaka, which says: atra sat-kārya-vādi-sammatim āha. Once this possibility is conceded, there is the further possibility that the aphorism here cited by Vācaspati has a "na" in it. That this is more than a bare possibility seems made out by the Rūjuprakāṣikā, which implies the presence of a "na" in the aphorism: na hy asan nara-śṛṅgādi buddhāv alikhya vyākriyate; buddhi-sattve 'sattvā'-yogāc ca; tatra vṛddha-sammatim āha—yathā 'hur iti. The words of the Kalpataru too do
not rule out the reading with a "na". The least that is necessary to support the suggested correction is the further correction of the *Kalpataru* and the *Bhūmattilaka* so as to make them read "asat-kārya-vādina āhuḥ" and "asat-kārya-vādi-sammatim āha". Such procedure involving a double correction may seem condemned by the law of parsimony. But there are at least two countervailing considerations of some weight. The first is that no other source has been traced, while the Nyāya aphorism as interpreted by Vācaspati fits into the present context. The other is that there is comparatively little point in the advaitin appealing for support to the sat-kārya-vādin, as he himself is of that persuasion; on the contrary, his reliance even on the asat-kārya-vādin would be just and purportful. As against this it must be noted that the point at issue in the *Bhūmatis* is the possibility of creation by a non-intelligent being. The pūrvapakṣin in this case is not the follower of the Nyāya (which admits an intelligent creator), but the follower of the Sāṅkhya (well known as sat-kārya-vāda), according to whom the world is not before creation buddhi-siddha for an Īsvara. Thus, though the suggested source and corrections are extremely plausible, it is difficult to accept them outright at the present stage; further, neither the printed editions of either book nor the MSS. that we have been able to consult warrant the correction. The MSS. consulted for the *Kalpataru* are 20 H 14 and 20 H 19 of the Adyar Library; for the *Bhūmatis*, MSS. mentioned in Note 48 were consulted, and for the *Bhūmattilaka*, MS. No. 39 C 14 of the same Library. Of course, scribal errors leading to the perpetuation of wrong readings are not uncommon.
The expressions "heya" and "upādeya," which occur very frequently in the Bhāṣya and the Bhāmati, have been rendered uniformly as "to be rejected" and "to be accepted." It should be noted, however, that, except in a few cases (as in the present one), what is meant is avoidance and seeking, not mere intellectual rejection or acceptance. When, for instance, it is said that Brahman, being one's own self, is neither "heya" nor "upādeya," it means that it is neither to be avoided nor sought.

"caitya-vandanādi-vākya." It would appear from the Rjuprakāśikā that the "statement" is "caityam vandeta," not "caitye vandeta," so that the obeisance is to the caitya, not in the caitya. Conformably to this, caitya would mean not a shrine, but the consecrated fig-tree to which Buddhists offer worship.

These pages contain statements of the Prabhakara position based on the doctrine of anvitabhidhāna. Certain terms, though common to the Bhāṭṭa school, are used in special senses. The equivalents used in the translation are such as would apply throughout the book; the peculiarities of Prabhakara usage will, therefore, not be clear therefrom. In the following translation, terms distinctively suitable to Prabhakara’s system are employed; it may be used along with or in the place of the translation on the above-mentioned pages. For this school, kārya, niyoga and apūrva are synonyms. What is to be done (kārya) is that which prompts (niyoga), and this is
the trans-experiential potency (apūrva) which secures heaven. The determinant of kārya is volition (krśti), and of this the determinant is the particular act (kriyā). The fruit (bhāvyā or phala, e.g., heaven) is emphatically not what prompts nor the determinant. The person prompted is called the niyojya; he is not the person enjoined, since niyoga means apūrva, not an injunction, as in the Bhaṭṭa school.

**TRANSLATION**

[P. 162] Further, if for him who has heard (studied) about Brahmaṇ there occurs the cessation of the attributes of transmigration, why is it, then, that, on top of hearing, reflection etc. are found declared? Therefore, even because of the contingency of the futility of these, the Vedāntas do not have for purport the nature of Brahmaṇ, but have for purport what is to be done, whose determinant is the contemplation of the self. And this, which is to be done, as prompting him who is to be prompted in respect of itself is called niyoga (the prompter), and as not previously experienced through other means of knowledge, it is called the trans-experiential. And since there is not the establishment of this without the observance of its determinant (contemplation), that itself, which is to be done, implies for its own establishment the observance of the contemplation of the self, (this being) the determinant and instrument of that. And what is to be done, since its definitive knowledge depends on (that which defines) its own determinant [its own determinant is volition, and the determinant of that is the particular act, contemplation in the present instance], is defined by
the determinant, contemplation; similarly, since of contemplation too there cannot be definitive knowledge in the absence of its determinant, the self, [P. 163] that itself, which is to be done, implies, for the sake of the determination of that (contemplation), the self as that (determinant). As they say: "That, however, which is introduced, i.e., implied, for the establishment of that (which is to be done), that too falls within the scope of the injunction; this is the usage of the *Tantra* (the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsa)." And, in the case of contemplation, the determinant of the prompter (niyoga), its falling within the scope of the injunction consists in the observance of it as an act; for the self, however, which is the determinant of that (contemplation), (falling within the scope of the injunction consists in) the certitude of its own existence.

[P. 165] And, since what is to be done is not independent of him who is prompted, the eligible (interested) person who is to practise, he states the particular class of person prompted: "And there being purport in respect of an injunction" etc. Becoming Brahman is present as already established in the eulogistic passage "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself"; yet (because of this statement of the existent being changed into a statement of what is to be accomplished), there being the expectancy of the particular class of person prompted, on the analogy of the rātrisatras, he who desires to become Brahman comes to be understood as the particular person prompted. For, if on the analogy of the pīṇḍa-pitr-yajña, the person prompted be assumed to be he who desires heaven, that would be the signification of the absolutely remote by the
eulogistic passage, which would then have a sense wholly unrelated to itself. And, since to become Brahman is to be immortal, it is said (in the commentary) "For him who desires immortality."

[P. 220] Further, even by those who recognise the purport of all words to be what is to be done, it is not possible in the case of (texts like) "A brahmin is not to be killed," "Liquor is not to be drunk," to recognise what is to be done as purport. For, what is to be done, having its limits defined by volition, is pervaded by volition, and ceases with the cessation of that, like Śiṃsapā-ness on the cessation of tree-ness [śiṃsapā being the name of a particular kind of tree]. Volition, indeed, is human effort; and its definitive knowledge depends on its determinant. And its determinant, being of the nature of what is to be accomplished, can be only a doing, which has a before and an after, and helps to bring about something else; (it can be) neither a substance nor a quality. It is, indeed, what is directly pervaded by volition that is the determinant of volition; and, in the case of substance and quality, which are already existent, there is no pervasion by volition. Therefore it is there is the statement of the author of the sacred teaching: "Verbs signify doing; through their instrumentality can be known what is to be done (kriyā)." [P. 221] Though for words signifying substance and quality there is relation to what is to be done, in their effect-stage [i.e., in the stage when complete sentence-sense arises, with what is to be done as the main element], yet, since relation to what is to be done is direct in the case of (words signifying) doing, while for words signifying substance and quality it is
through their conjunction with doing, the understanding of the trans-experiential (apūrva) is only from those which signify doing, not from words signifying substance or quality. Nor is it that in statements like “He is to offer oblation with curds,” “He is to pour diagonally and continuously,” curds etc. are the determinants of what is to be done; for, even there, what is to be done has as its determinant the doing alone—the offering of oblation or the diagonal pouring. Nor on this score, because of the injunction (being) of the oblation and the diagonal pouring as qualified by curds and continuity, as in (the injunction of the qualified in) “He is to sacrifice with the soma (-juice),” do (the texts) “He is to offer the agnihotra oblation,” “He is to pour ghee diagonally” become restatements of that (injunction of the qualified). Though here too what is to be done has for determinant doing alone, yet, substance and quality, as complements of the doing, though not determinants, fall within the scope of the injunction. The doing, indeed, being undefined, as the bare functioning of a kāraka (causal correlate of doing), is defined by the particular causal correlate—substance etc.; hence, substance etc. are complements thereto. And thus, when doing falls within the scope of the injunction, that falls within the scope of the injunction certainly together with its complements; hence, substance and quality, though not determinants, yet as complements thereto, come to be within the scope of the injunction. And thus, the injunction which goes over to substance and quality through the channel of doing, because of the fear of prolixity and because its own content is otherwise established, comes, through a restatement thereof, to have for purport substance etc., which are complements thereto;
hence, in all cases, what is enjoined (i.e., what is to be done) has doing alone for its determinant. Hereby is refuted the view that in "There is that āgneya (cake) which is prepared on eight (earthen) plates" what is enjoined has for determinant the connection of the material and the deity. Now, (it may be said), the meaning of the root "bhū (to become)," (in "bhavati" of the text) cannot fall within the scope of an injunction; for, if what becomes be already existent, then that which has its existence (already) accomplished cannot be that which becomes; ether, indeed, does not become; nor, if non-existent, since what is non-existent cannot be what is prompted, like a sky-flower; therefore, what falls within the scope of the injunction is the operation which belongs to him who brings about, the producer, and which is implied by the becoming, the operation to be brought about; and, since this operation is activation, volition, effort, it cannot be cognised without a determinant; therefore, there being the need for a determinant, its determinant is only the connection of material and deity brought to mind by the word "āgneya". (To this the Prābhākaras say) now, how can human effort, which has an operation for its determinant, refer to a connection, which is not of the nature of an operation? Truly, even in "Make a pot," human effort does not directly refer to the meaning of the noun, pot; rather does it cause the hand etc. to manipulate the staff etc. Therefrom one understands that volition alone, which is for the sake of the pot and has a manipulation for determinant, but not that (volition) whose determinant is directly the pot. The pot comes within the scope of that (volition) as what is desired, not as a determinant. [P. 223] As determinant, however, there is only the manipulation
by the hand etc. For the same reason, even in "There is that āneya" etc., what falls within the scope of the injunction is only the sacrificial act, which is implied by the connection of material and deity, and which is the determinant of what is to be done. What is it that is said in "There is that āneya (cake)" etc.? (It is said) "One should bring about (what is to be done) through the sacrifice with agni as deity." Hence it is that the texts "He who, knowing thus, performs the full moon sacrifice," "He who, knowing thus, performs the new moon sacrifice" become restatements of the six sacrifices prescribed in "There is that āneya" etc. Hence too for that (group of sacrifices) itself, which falls within the scope of the injunction and is restated, there is the relation to fruit, in "He who desires heaven is to sacrifice with the new and full moon sacrifices".

Hence it is an invariable rule that in every case what is enjoined has for determinant doing alone, through the channel of volition. And thus, in "Kill not," "Drink not" etc., if there be admitted something to be done, then, its pervader, volition, would have to be admitted, as also the doing which pervades that (volition) as determinant. And thus, on the analogy of the Prajāpati-vrata, what is enjoined would, as signifying exclusion through the implication of the resolve not to kill or not drink, have that (resolve) as determinant. And thus it would follow that (that function of negation which consists in) the denial of what there is occasion for is wholly abandoned. Nor when there is a possibility (of direct significance) is implication proper. In the case, however, of "See not the rising sun" etc., since they commence with "His vow," there is not the possibility of the denial of that for which
there is an occasion; [P. 224] hence it is proper through the signification of exclusion, to imply the resolve not to see. Therefore, in “Kill not,” “Drink not” etc., which are denials of what there is an occasion for, since doing is non-existent, volition pervaded thereby is non-existent; and that being non-existent, there is non-existence of what is pervaded thereby, viz., what is to be done; hence there is no rule that all statements have for purport what is to be done; thus he says . . . .

Page 165

“‘brahma veda brahmaī ‘va bhavati ’iti” etc. The sentence as it stands may imply that the fruit “brahma-bhavana (becoming Brahman)” has a need for the particular person prompted (niyojya-vīśeṣa). This, however, does not fit in with the Prābhākara doctrine, which acknowledges efficiency for the apūrva alone, not for the fruit. Becoming Brahman, though stated as siddha, has to be understood as sādhyā (what is to be accomplished); and for this change (viparīṇāma) there is an expectancy (ākaṅkṣā), which is satisfied by the statement of the particular class of person prompted. The genitive in “brahma-bhavanasya” would be thus a case of anādare śaṣṭhi, this being indicated in the translation by “yet”; this construction is mentioned in the Bhāmatīṭtilaka too. See also list of corrections.

Pages 227 and 228

The word “kartavyātā” has been translated as “obligation” or as “obligatoriness”. There is, of course, no question of moral obligation here; what is present is, at best, a mechanical urge or impulsion consequent on a person’s natural desires and passions. Because of these a
person is tempted to drink or kill; it is this temptation or impulse which is restated by the prohibition and negatived. The object of the negation is to make it known that what is restated, the tempting act, is instrumental to evil. Throughout this context the reader is requested to remember that no ethical significance attaches to the words "obligation" and "obligatoriness".

PAGE 237

The punctuation of lines 8-12 of the text is unsatisfactory in all the printed editions; the present punctuation is based on the explanation given in the Kalpataru. "dvedhā" in "samsayo vā dvedhā yuktah" means "as between two possibilities"; this qualification is purportful, as, in other cases, the doubt may be among more than two possibilities. The translation has therefore to be corrected; see the list of corrections.

PAGE 239

"That contemplation and reflection are not principal rites" etc. The word "principal" here is not to be contrasted with "subsidiary"; it means rather that which has an apūrva result; even subsidiaries, like stutis and sastras (mentioned on p. 185), have apūrva results, and should, therefore, be classed as "principal" in this sense; in this context, therefore, a guṇa-karma is not what is subsidiary in general, but what is proximately subsidiary, subserving the rite itself, not the apūrva generated; it is, in other words, a sannipatyo'-pakāraka.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ait., Aitareya Upaniṣad.
Ait. Brāh., Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.
Brh., Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
Chānd., Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
Gītā, Bhagavad Gītā.
HIP., History of Indian Philosophy by S. N. Das Gupta (Cambridge University Press).
IHQ., Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.
Īsā., Īsavāsa Upaniṣad.
Jābala., Jābalopanisad.
Kaṭha., Kaṭhopanisad.
Kena., Kenopanisad.
Munḍ., Munḍakopanisad.
P.M., Pūrva-mīmāṃsa-sūtras.
Pr., Prasnopanisad.
Rv., Rgveda.
Sū-Bh., Śābara-bhāṣya.
Svet., Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad.
SLS., Siddhāntaesaṅgraha by Appayya Dikṣita.
Taitt., Taittiriya Upaniṣad.
TS., Taittiriya Samhita.
Upa., Upaniṣad.
Ved. Śū., Vedānta Sūtras.
YS., Yoga Sūtras.
## CORRECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Read</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>12, 13</td>
<td>भवति</td>
<td>प्रतिपत्त्वत्वात्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>अन्त-</td>
<td>अन्त-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>मन्यन्ते</td>
<td>मन्यन्ते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>दुःखरूप</td>
<td>दुःखरूप</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>ब्रह्मदिक्षित्स्वरूपस्यत्वाय</td>
<td>ब्रह्मदिक्षित्स्वरूपस्यत्वाय</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>विदिकिय</td>
<td>विदिकिया</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>परस्पर</td>
<td>परस्पर</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>नियतवात्</td>
<td>नियतवात्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>लक्षणयम्</td>
<td>लक्षणयम्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>इति; निर्विषयः</td>
<td>इति निर्विषयः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>पौर्णमास्त्याम्</td>
<td>पौर्णमास्त्यम्</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7  2, 3 | take on the reflection of | be reflected in

7  14 | concealment | condemnation

8  23, 24 | its origination (perception so far as) (by perception) it is) what originates

10 13, 14 | in another context ascertained through difference of context
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAGE</th>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>FOR</th>
<th>READ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>7, 8</td>
<td>of the attributes</td>
<td>of attributes absolutely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>. . . distinct</td>
<td>distinct (among themselves) as also of substrates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(similarly distinct)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>23, 24</td>
<td>non-proximate</td>
<td>non-proximate to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>. . . the cogniser</td>
<td>the cogniser; whence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>then the extreme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>proximity (to the)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>9-11</td>
<td>And . . . apprehension</td>
<td>And, for memory and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>apprehension, delusiveness consists in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the appositional designation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>sublation</td>
<td>sublation by error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>no effort</td>
<td>no (further) effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>it</td>
<td>the truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>as something</td>
<td>as that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>This is how</td>
<td>This is how: when</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>when</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>as something</td>
<td>as that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>That</td>
<td>How</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>skilled</td>
<td>prudent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>explained; by us</td>
<td>explained by us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>skilled</td>
<td>prudent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>khādira</td>
<td>being made of khadira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>24-28</td>
<td>in respect of</td>
<td>together with the host</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>. . . krama</td>
<td>of subsidiaries ending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>with sequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGE</td>
<td>LINE</td>
<td>FOR</td>
<td>READ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>in the conceit</td>
<td>under the conceit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>is established</td>
<td>will be established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>comes</td>
<td>will be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>becomes</td>
<td>turns out to be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>indicating its own attribute</td>
<td>of the type which signifies (the inclusion of the sense of the parts) as components of that (i.e., the sense of the compound).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>That subject</td>
<td>That</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>many</td>
<td>may</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Sacred Teaching-Source</td>
<td>Being-Sacred-Teaching-Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>apathy</td>
<td>monotony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>though</td>
<td>through</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>khādira</td>
<td>what is made of kha-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>nature</td>
<td>existent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>enjoined for this</td>
<td>enjoined,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(becoming)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Line</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Read</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>as ... passage</td>
<td>by the eulogistic passage, since it has a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sense wholly unrelated to it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>193</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>they</td>
<td>that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>their own</td>
<td>their own sense as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>20-22</td>
<td>And therefore</td>
<td>And for this reason too,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>... anything</td>
<td>that it is not subsidiary to anything</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>else</td>
<td>else, it is distinct from the four kinds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of substances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>225</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>process of becoming</td>
<td>doing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237</td>
<td>10, 11</td>
<td>Or there may be</td>
<td>Or, doubt may be appropriate, as between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>... two ways</td>
<td>the two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>viz., the fruit</td>
<td>and with the (ultimate) fruit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE T.P.H. ORIENTAL SERIES

Sri Bhagavad-Gita: Sanskrit Text and English Translation by Dr. Annie Besant. Indian Popular Edition As. 4; Special Edition As. 8; Foreign Edition As. 12; Presentation Edition—Leather Re. 1-8.

Sri Bhagavad-Gita: Sanskrit Text and English Translation by Dr. Annie Besant and Sri Bhagavân Dās, M.A. This Edition contains a word for word translation and an introduction to Sanskrit Grammar. Indian Edition Rs. 2-8; Foreign Edition Rs. 3-8; Presentation Edition—Superior Leather Gilt Rs. 8.

The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali: Sanskrit Text and English Translation by Prof. M. N. Dvivedî. It contains also notes drawn from various authoritative sources, viz., the Bhāṣyas of Vyāsa, Vācaspatimisra, Bhoja and Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, and the Yogavārttika of Vijñāna Bhikṣu; besides there is an introduction to its study by George C. Williams. Indian Edition Re. 1-4; Foreign Edition Re. 1-12.

The Twelve Principal Upanishads: Sanskrit Text, English Translation and notes from the commentaries of Śrī Saṅkaracārya and the gloss of Ānandagiri in THREE Volumes.

Vol. I: Contains nine Upaniṣads, viz., Īsā, Kena, Kaṭha, Prasna, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍukya, Taittirīya, Aitareya, and
Svetāsvatara Upaniṣads, translated by that eminent Orientalist Dr. E. Roer. Prof. M. N. Dvivedi has contributed a scholarly preface to these volumes. Indian Edition Rs. 4; Foreign Edition Rs. 5.

Vol. II: Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad, translated by Dr. E. Roer. Indian Edition Rs. 6; Foreign Edition Rs. 7.


Sapta-Padarthi or a Manual of the Seven Categories. Sivaditya’s Treatise on Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika Systems of Indian Philosophy. Text, transliteration and translation with Notes by Prof. D. Gurumūrti, M.A., Theosophical College, Madanapalle. With a Foreword by Prof. Rādhakṛṣṇan, M.A., Vice-Chancellor, Āndhra University. Indian Edition Rs. 2-8; Foreign Edition Rs. 3-8.

Viveka-Chudamani or Crest-Jewel of Wisdom. By Śri Saṅkarācārya with Text in Devanāgarī and Translation complete by Mohini M. Chatterji, F.T.S. Indian Edition Rs. 2; Foreign Edition Rs. 2-8.

Uttara Gītā or the Initiation of Arjuna in Yoga and Jñāna. Text and Translation with notes by B. K. Laheri. Indian Edition As. 8; Foreign Edition As. 12.

Manameyodaya: A Primer on Mīmāṁsā by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa; Text in Devanāgarī, English translation, with Introduction and Notes by Prof. C. Kunhan Rāja, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon.), Head of the Department of Sanskrit and Prof. S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Sāstrī, M.A., B.Sc. (Oxon.), Bar-at-Law, Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Madras. Indian Edition Rs. 5; Ex. Edition Rs. 6.


Haṭha-Yoga Pradipika of Svātmārāma Svāmin with the commentary of Brahmānanda. Text and translation with Notes by Yogi Srinivāsa Iyengār, B.A. Indian Edition Rs. 3; Ex. Edition Rs. 4.

The Vishnu Sahasranāma. Text in Devanagari and translation by R. Ananthakrishna Sastri. Rs. 2-8.

Lalitasahasranāma, with Bhaskararaya’s Commentary, translated into English by R. Ananthakrishna Sastri. Lalitasaahasranamastotra is printed in Devanagari as an appendix. Rs. 4.

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

The Nine Upanishads, translated into English with Preamble and Arguments by G. R. S. Mead and Jagadish Chandra Chattopadhyaya, containing Isa, Kena, Kaṭha, Prasna, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍukya, Taittiriya, Aitareya and Sveta-svatara Upanishads. Board Re. 1-8; Cloth Rs. 2.
Taittiriya Upanishad, with Sankara's Commentary by A. Mahadeva Sastri. Board Rs. 4-8; Cloth Rs. 5.

Thirty Minor Upanishads, translated by K. Narayanaswami Aiyar. Rs. 3-8.

Introduction to the Study of the Upanishads, by Vidyaranya translated by A. Mahadeva Sastri. As. 6.

DISCOURSES


Introduction to the Bhagavad-Gita. By V. K. Ramanujachariar. Rs. 3.


THEOSOPHICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE
Adyar, Madras, India
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borrower No.</th>
<th>Date of Issue</th>
<th>Date of Return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X Krishna</td>
<td>9-6-82</td>
<td>13-7-82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P.T.O.