HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
EASTERN AND WESTERN
VOL. II
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
EASTERN AND WESTERN
VOLUME TWO
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## VOLUME TWO

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CHAPTER XXVI

PERSIAN THOUGHT

A. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

Zarathushtra, the prophet of Ancient Persia.—The form that has been in general use for some 2,500 years is "Zoroaster." The Greeks pronounced the name as Zoroastres. It became Zoroastres in Latin and later took the familiar form Zoroaster. In Platonic Alcibiades is found the earliest authentic classical allusion to him by this name.

The date of his birth is placed anywhere between 600 B.C. and 6000 B.C. Iranian tradition based on Pahlavi works, Bundahishn, Arda Viraf and Zatasparam, written after the downfall of the Zoroastrian Empire, that is, some 2,000 years after the time in which the prophet flourished, place him in the third century before Alexander the Great. This fanciful tradition was perpetuated by Albiruni, Masudi and other Arab writers. It prevailed up to the last century.

Aristotle, Eudoxus and Hermippus write that Zoroaster lived 5,000 years before the Trojan War. Diogenes of Laerte quotes Hermodorus and Xanthus to the same effect. Diodorus of Eretria and Aristothenes, on the other hand, say that Pythagoras was a disciple of Zoroaster. Pliny thereupon doubts where there was only one Zoroaster or there were others also bearing the same name. And Pliny was right.

After the passing away of the prophet, his successors who held the highest pontifical seat at Raghga in Media, were called Zarathushtratema, or most resembling Zarathushtra or Zoroaster.

The study of Oriental languages, religions and literature during the last 150 years, first in Europe and then in America, has thrown a flood of light upon this question.

Avesta is the sister language of Sanskrit. The Gāthās or holy hymns composed by Zoroaster have a flavour of antiquity familiar to the hymns of the Rg-Veda. There is a marked closeness between the grammar, metre and style of the Rg-Veda and the Gāthās. In fact, Gāthic inflexions, are more primitive than the Vedic. It is now thought that the composition of the Gāthās cannot be separated from the Vedas by any distance of time. The consensus of scholarly opinion now rightly places the period when Zoroaster flourished to at least 1000 B.C.¹

Philosophy of Ancient Persia.—It is said that Buddhism is not a religion but a philosophy. It can be said of Zoroastrianism, on the other hand, that it is not a philosophy but a religion.

Modern Hamadān, Old Persian, Ekbatana which the Babylonian
inscriptions called Agamatanu and the Greeks Ecbatana, means "A Concourse of Many Ways." As Ancient Persia was thus the Highway of Nations, so it was a meeting-place of the philosophies of the East and West and their transmitter all around at various periods of its history.

The early Zoroastrian Iranians had no love for metaphysical speculation. "The religious system of Zarathushtra is theological rather than philosophical. The utilitarian genius of the Persians led them to disparage metaphysical speculation as a vain attempt at the impracticable." 3

There are, however, speculations on eternal verities that have influenced early Greek philosophy. Similarly, Mithraism and Manichaeism, that arose in Persia under Zoroastrian influence, later went to Europe and greatly influenced philosophical thought in the West.

_East and West meet for the first time in history._—Cyrus conquered Ionia in 600 B.C. The Greek philosophers, from the days of Thales, the head of the School of Miletus, came in contact with the Orient. Numenius of Apamea says that Pythagoras and Plato reproduce the ancient wisdom of the Magi of Persia as also the brähmanas of India, who came to Persia.

_Ahura Mazda is the supreme godhead._ Ahura Mazda, later Ohrmazd, means "The Lord Wisdom" or "The Wise Lord." He is almighty, omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient. He is the creator and protector and nourisher. He is invisible and intangible. He is true and just and merciful. He is the friend and father of those that seek his friendship and long for his love. Many are his attributes. They are not accidents of his being, but are his very essence. He is light in the physical aspect, as he is truth in the moral.

_Spenta Mainyu or the Holy Spirit._—The manifestation of the creative will and thought of Ahura Mazda is Spenta Mainyu or Holy Spirit. He symbolizes the ideal or perfect existence as conceived in thought by Ahura Mazda. The materialization of the divine thought in creation spells imperfection and Spenta Mainyu is, therefore, shadowed by his inseparable opposite, Angra Mainyu, later Ahriman, the Evil Spirit. These two primeval spirits are the twins that emerged from the divine bosom. By their innate choice, the Holy Spirit chose righteousness and the Evil Spirit chose Wickedness. As the inveterate foe of mankind, the Evil Spirit lures man by his mischievous machinations to the path of wickedness.

Zoroastrianism speaks of Vohu Mahnah, "Good Mind," the first in Ahura Mazda’s creation, as the son of Ahura Mazda.

The Old Testament speaks of the Spirit of Yahweh.

Philo Judaeus says that Logos is the first-born Son of God. He acts as the vicegerent of God between God and the world. Logos is more than Plato's Idea of the Good. Like Spenta Mainyu, the Holy Spirit, he is creatively active. Spenta Mainyu and his adversary Angra Mainyu, are spoken of as _huworeehstar_ or the fashioners or cutters. Philo, likewise, speaks of Logos as Tomeus, "the cutter," and employs the word in the
same meaning. Again as Spenta Mainyu, who is the Spirit of Light, is shadowed by his opponent "the Spirit of Darkness"; so, says Philo, that Logos who is the Shekinah or Glory or Light of God is also the darkness or shadow of God. This is so, he says, because the creature reveals only half the creator and hides the other half.

Wisdom, in the Book of Wisdom of Solomon, is said to be identical with Logos. She is the divine essence and lives a quasi-independent existence in God and by the side of God. She works in the world as God's active agent.

The New Testament speaks of the intermediary spirit of God. Just as Spenta Mainyu, the Holy Spirit, works for Ahura Mazda, so says Numenius of Apamea, that God has bestowed divine qualities upon a second god who acts in the world as the Good Spirit. The Supreme God works in the spiritual world and the second god works both in the spiritual and material world.

God created Logos or the Son, says Origen, whose relation to the Father is the same that exists between Ahura Mazda and Spenta Mainyu. Though the Son or Logos, adds Origen, is co-eternal and co-equal with the Father, yet the Son is lesser than the Father.

*Asha or areta, Vedic rta is Righteousness.—Its visible symbol is fire. Asha Vahishta, or Best Righteousness, is one of the seven Amesha Spentas, "Holy Immortals" or Archangels. He presides over righteousness in the moral sphere. The good man is *asavan, "righteous," as the bad is *dregvant, "wicked." There is eternal struggle between the forces of Righteousness and Wickedness, until with the help and guidance of Ahura Mazda, mankind will rout and annihilate the forces of Wickedness. Then will dawn upon the earth the Kingdom of Righteousness.

Heraclitus of Ephesus adopts Fire as the first principle of nature. Everything that exists, he says, comes from it. It is the essence of all things. It works as Reason or Logos, the Divine Law that rules supreme in the universe. It represents the Universal Order that prevails in the world. It is the Reason or the Logos of the World. It is the law of perfection towards which man advances.

The Stoics adopted the ideas of Heraclitus. Man has to strive for the observance of the Law of Nature, so that he may rise to perfection. The cosmic law, identified with Fire or Logos is God. Man is either good and wise or evil and foolish, as he is righteous or wicked in Zoroastrianism. Like the Zoroastrian view, fire will consume the world in the end.3

*Man is made of material and spiritual elements.—He is made of the body which is perishable and the soul that is immortal. The most important spiritual faculties of man, besides intellect or reason, are daëna, "conscience," *urvan, "soul," and *fravashi, "guardian spirit."

Man is endowed with the Freedom of the Will. He is a free agent and is responsible for his good or evil deeds. He is advised that: "One alone is
the Path of Righteousness." Ahura Mazda's two primeval spirits, the Holy Spirit and the Evil Spirit, chose their ways of life. Even so it is left to man to choose between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, righteousness and wickedness. He has the power to choose between the opposites. Everything depends upon his own choice. He is the master of his destiny.

Daēna or Conscience.—It helps man to determine his future destiny of weal or woe. Man reaps as he sows. When a righteous Person dies his or her daēna greets the soul in the other world and welcomes it in the shape of a damsel of unsurpassed beauty. Dazzled by her matchless beauty the soul enquires who she is, the like of whom it never saw during its earthly life. The apparition replies that she is not a stranger. She is the personification of the good thoughts and good words and good deeds that the soul, during its terrestrial life, thought and spoke and did. She is nothing more than the reflex of its own character.

On the other hand, the soul of a wicked person is confronted at the Bridge of Judgment by its conscience in the shape of an ugly old woman, the personification of its own wickedness in life.

Fravashi (later Farohar).—The multifarious objects of the material world are the terrestrial copies of their celestial originals. All that exist in the world are copies of those eternal types. The sky, the earth, waters, trees, animals, human beings and all that belong to the kingdom of goodness have their Fravashis. Only Ahriman, the Evil Spirit, and the demons have them not.

Ahura Mazda had lived in his sublime singleness. He had the ideas and concepts of the spiritual and material creation in his mind.

Fravashis of men and women are their divine doubles. They are the prototypes after which mankind is created. They lived in supreme felicity in heaven. When Ohrmazd thought of creating mankind, he asked these spiritual intelligences whether they would like to stay in heaven or they would migrate to the material world that he was going to create. That world would be one of the opposites, good and evil. He desired to put every single Fravashi in one human body as the companion, friend and guardian spirit of the individual soul. In that world of imperfection there was to be the perpetual fight in the inner world of every individual and in the outside world with the Father of Evil and his demons.

The higher doubles of humanity volunteered to come down to earth, live in human hearts to face the onslaught of Ahriman and his evil hosts and to help mankind to fight them. Thus they chose the voluntary exile for a time in the world of joy and sorrow, good and evil, to tenant human bodies and through these material vehicles to fight evil and work for the redemption of the world of imperfection.

When a child is born, its Fravashi accompanies its soul as the higher double. The soul is the ego proper, the real I-ness. The Fravashi is the
divine agent that acts as its guardian spirit, its infallible monitor. It advises and applauds the good deeds of the soul and admonishes and warns it, when it thinks of doing evil. Thus the Fravashi lives as the friend and guide of the soul as long as the individual lives. When the individual dies, his or her soul advances to the other world to meet its fate and its Fravashi lives in heaven its individual life.

The last ten days of every year are consecrated to the Fravashis. They come down upon earth on these days of their festival. They visit the families of the departed ones and are eager that the kindred of the dead may welcome them and invoke them, so that they may bless them.

The Fravashis resemble the Vedic pits, the Platonic Ideas and the Roman Manes. Aristotle speaks of the spirit in addition to the soul of man. The spirit constitutes the real essence of the individual and carries on rational activity. The Platonists, Aristotelians and Stoics speak of the Nōns as the Image of God, constituting the true nature of man. Philo calls it Pneuma as distinguished from the soul.

The Fravashis are not classed as Yazatas or Angels. Philo, likewise, says that they are not Angels, but are personified abstract ideas that manifest the energy of God. As the Fravashis work for the maintenance of the world, so do the Ideas work for God. They preserve order in the universe. The Fravashi of an individual represents Ahura Mazda in man, so does the rational part of the soul typify the Logos. Plutarch speaks of two principles in man, the soul and the spirit.

The early Romans had believed that the dead gathered to a group of spirits, Di Manes. In the period of the Republic, it came to be believed that the Genius or the Divine Double accompanied every individual at birth and lived as long as he lived. At death, it gathered to the Di Manes. Under Greek influence, it was believed that the Genius lived after death. Di Manes became individualized protecting spirits. The Manes came down to earth and visited the families among whom they had lived and, like the Fravashis, longed for propitiation. Numenius of Apamea speaks of two souls in man, the one rational and the other irrational. Origen speaks of the twofold psychic division of man, soul and spirit. The relation between them resembles that existing between the soul and its Fravashi.

The problem of evil.—The existence of evil is a stubborn fact in life. Zoroaster stigmatizes evil as evil. It is not the passive negation of good. It is the active enemy of the good. It is not complementary to good. It is not good in the making. It is not illusion that causes it. It exists in the realm of reality. Evil is just evil.

Life is co-operation with good and conflict with evil. Good and evil are co-existing polarities.

 Evil is the enemy of Ohrmazd as of man. Man’s birthright is to fight evil. He is a soldier in the eternal struggle. The world is his battlefield. It is his duty to resist and rout evil in his own nature and around him Man
practises only passive virtues, if he himself eschews evil and becomes good. His active virtues lie in furthering good and fighting evil in society. He cannot rest content with securing his personal salvation by being good. It is his paramount, active duty to work for and fight for and secure salvation of all mankind.

The world is imperfect. Everyone is to fight the forces of imperfection in all phases of human life. By the constant effort of ages and the accumulated work of mankind, good will ultimately triumph over evil and the world will be made perfect. The Prince of Evil will be impotent. He will bend his knees and acknowledge his defeat in the warfare of countless ages between the forces of Light and Darkness, Truth and Falsehood, Righteousness and Wickedness.

Spenta Mainyu, the Holy Spirit, later identified with Ahura Mazda.—In the Gāthās of Zarathushtra, Spenta Mainyu, the Holy Spirit, is separate from Ahura Mazda. In the post-Gāthic period, the two are identified and Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu or Ohrmazd and Ahriman become the antagonistic powers. Hence from an early period of history, Zoroastrianism has come to be spoken of as the religion of dualism, based on the belief in two rival spirits.

Hippolytus relates on the authority of Aristoxenus (about 320 B.C.), that the Persians believed in two primeval causes of existence, the first being Light or the Father, and the second, Darkness, the Mother. Eudoxus and Aristotle wrote of these powers as Zeus, or Oromazdes, and Hades, or Areimanius. Plutarch says that Oromazdes came from Light and Areimanios from Darkness.

The Pahlavi controversial work, Shikand Gumanik Vijār or Doubt Dispelling Treatise, written in the ninth century, is the nearest approach to philosophical production. The writer who is a dualist, replying to the Jewish, Christian and Mohammadan critics, says that tracing both good and evil to God deprives Him of His divinity. The goodness of God demands that He could not be the author of evil. The All-wise God would not create His own adversary. God, the embodiment of mercy, could not inflict evil upon His own creatures. It is futile to attempt to resolve the Evil Spirit into a symbolic personification of man's evil nature. Evil is primeval in its origin. It is not relative, nor did man bring it into existence. It is enhanced when the flesh triumphs over the spirit, but it does not originate with the flesh. The father of evil is as real a personality as the father of goodness.

We may conclude this survey by stating that although Ahriman was co-eval and co-equal with Ohrmazd, he is not co-eternal, for he will enter into nothingness. Ohrmazd was, is and shall be, whereas Ahriman was, is, but shall not be. Hence, it may be said that Ohrmazd and Ahriman are not actually balanced equally against each other.

Mithraism goes to Europe.—Vedic Mitra, Avestan Mithra, attained to
the greatest prominence among all Indo-Iranian divinities. Mithraism is Zoroastrianism modified by Semitic accretions.

Plutarch says that the cult of Mithra was taken to Rome by the Cilician pirates taken captive in 67 B.C. Mithra's cult rapidly spread in Europe. His fame reached the borders of the Aegean Sea. Mithra came to be worshipped between India and Pontus Euxinus. It spread in different parts of Asia Minor and reached India in the third century A.D., when it had its root in the North-Western provinces and Gujarat.

Antiochus I, king of Commagene, is shown in relief clasping the right hand of Mithra. Nero desired the Magi to initiate him in the mysteries of Mithra. Diocletian, Galerius and Licinius dedicated temples to Mithra, who was officially recognized as the protector of his empire by Diocletian in A.D. 307.

Mithra acts as the mediator between the unknowable and unapproachable God and mankind. He fashioned the world as Demiurge.

The *hwarenà* or Kingly Glory had descended upon the kings of Persia. Mithraism took it to Europe. The ruling king declared that this Kingly Majesty, the shining halo, descended upon him. He was therefore the descendant of divinity or divinity in the flesh. It now came to be known as Destiny. The Semites called it gâda. The Greeks called it *tyse* or *tyssê*. Alexander's successors adopted it to strengthen their position and established the worship of the Glory or *tyse* of the King. This function of Mithra of dispensing the Kingly Glory made him popular among the Roman emperors. They declared themselves possessed of the Divine Glory.

The Achaemenian kings lived during winter in Babylonia. The Chaldean theology assimilated Mithra to Shamas, the god of the Sun. In Zoroastrian theology Mithra was distinct from the sun. United now with the Sun, he was called Sol Invictus, or the Invincible Sun in the Roman mysteries.

Zarvan Akarana or Boundless Time is Ohrmazd's attribute. Mithraism assigns it the first place. Kronos, "Time," is the supreme God. He is represented in sculptures as a lion-headed human monster. A serpent encircles his body. He has the sceptre and the bolts of sovereignty in his hands and holds in each hand a key to the gates of heaven. He is the creator and destroyer. The Persian angels who migrated to Rome with Mithra dwell on the sunlit summits of Mount Olympus.

*The Mithraic Mysteries.*—When the cult of Mithra entered Rome, the Mithraic rites were performed in the caves and grottos. The fire was kept burning perpetually in the deep recesses of the subterranean crypts.

The Mithraic Mysteries were rites performed in secret and concealed from the view of the public. Only those who were solemnly initiated could perform these rites. *Bṛhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad* (6. 3. 12) and the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* (3. 11. 5) say that such knowledge was not to be given to one who is not a son or to one who is not a pupil. Even if one offered him this earth with its treasure, one should reply: "This knowledge truly is more
than earthly treasure." The *Mundaka* (3. 2. 10. 11), the *Svētāsvatara* (6. 22), and the *Maitri-Upanishad* (6. 29) speak in the same manner.

In Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, the Mystery Religions observed such secrecy. St. Paul speaks of the hidden wisdom intended only for the initiated.

The neophyte, everywhere, was subjected to rigorous tests. He had to purify himself by several lustrations and ablutions to cleanse his soul of sin. He had to practise austerities and undergo flagellations and bodily tortures. He had to perform magical rites and pass through degrees of initiation before he was finally admitted as a participant in the Mysteries.

The hymn to Mithra (Yasht 10. 122) in Persia, speaks of flagellation.

*Christianity triumphs over Mithraism.*—The conversion of Constantine to Christianity became a turning-point in the destiny of Mithraism. Julian the Apostate (A.D. 361–363) was initiated in the mysteries of Mithra. He introduced the worship of Mithra at Constantinople. Afterwards Mithraism lost the protection of the State and Christianity triumphed over it. It lingered in the Alps and Vosges and other places for a considerable time. It left its mark behind. The votaries of Mithra used to celebrate the birthday of the Sun on December 25, when at the winter solstice light triumphed over darkness and the lengthening of the day began. The Christians adopted this day as the feast of the Nativity of Christ.

*Manichaeism goes to Europe in the third century A.D.*—Mani, a Zoroastrian priest, claimed to have received revelation. He appeared as a prophet and taught his new synthetic religion based on materials drawn from Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Christianity and Syrian Gnosticism. He explains the existence of evil by the dualistic theory. Light is synonymous with God. Satan arose from darkness. It is man's duty in life to fight the forces of Darkness and bring about the final triumph of Light over Darkness. Manichaeism teaches self-mortification and asceticism, which are foreign to the spirit of Zoroastrianism. Mani holds matter to be the root of evil. Mortification of the body, therefore, becomes a virtue in his system. All bodily desires are evil. They should be stifled and killed. Mani advocates quietistic, ascetic, passive virtues. Celibacy is a virtue with Mani. He recommended fasting.

Manichaeism spread in the Far East, reaching as far as China. It penetrated into the West in the fourth century. It contested supremacy with Christianity, as Mithraism had done before. St. Augustine was a Manichaean before he was converted to Christianity. Even after he had joined the Christian Church he was unable to free himself from Manichaean teachings. He imparted its dualistic philosophy to Christian doctrine.

*The aphorism: Ex Oriente Lux,* "The Light from the East," becomes familiar.—Porphyry, Eubulus, Clemen of Alexandria, Strabo, Diogenes, Laertius, Photius write about the Magi and their teachings. Neoplatonism had penetrated into Persia. Tansar, the premier of Ardeshir
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Babegan, was a Neoplatonist. When King Noshirvan the Just came to the throne in the sixth century, it was said that a disciple of Plato had occupied the throne of Persia. The great king had founded his famous academy at Jund-i-Shahpur. Eminent thinkers and writers from India, Rome and other places came there. King Justinian had closed the philosophical School at Athens and exiled the philosophers. King Noshirvan welcomed them at his academy. Several Greek philosophical works were translated into Pahlavi by royal behest. Similarly important Sanskrit works, including Pañca-tantra, the well-known Sanskrit work of fables, and other works were rendered into Pahlavi, the court language of Persia. These works were translated from Pahlavi into Syriac and Hebrew. The Arabs later translated them into Arabic. When they went to Europe, they became the torch-bearers of light and learning in the Dark Ages.

NOTES

CHAPTER XXVI—continued

PERSIAN THOUGHT

B. PHILOSOPHY IN ZOROASTRIANISM

ZOROASTRIANISM is a religion, it claims even to be a revealed religion like Christianity and Islam, and therefore primarily it is not a philosophy. But no revealed religion can hope to gain the allegiance of the learned and the intellectual unless its teachings can stand the test of reason. It is only in this sense that one can venture to write on the philosophy of Zoroastrianism, for every religion has its metaphysical implications and Zoroastrianism is no exception.

Dualism.—Among the great monotheistic religions Zoroastrianism can certainly claim to be one of the oldest, if not perhaps the oldest. And yet in popular parlance it has been generally described as Dualism, involving a belief in the eternal existence of two spirits, one good and the other evil. This is true of later Zoroastrianism, when the original purity and vigour of Zoroaster's teaching had been lost and a metaphysical dualism had developed involving Spenta Mainyu creating all good things and Angra Mainyu creating all evil things. We have an excellent example of this in the Vendidad, a corruption of vi-daeva-data, which means the Law against the demons. In the first Fargard we read:

"As the first best of regions and countries, I, who am Ahura Mazda produced Airyana-vaeco of good capability. Thereupon as, an opposition to it, Angra Mainyu, the deadly, formed a mighty serpent and frost caused by the Daevas.

"As the second best of regions and countries, I, who am Ahura Mazda, produced Gau, in which Sughada is situated. Thereupon as an opposition to it, Angra Mainyu, the deadly, formed a pestilence, which is fatal to cattle, great and small."

And so it goes on. This trend of thought developed even more vigorously in the Pahlavi period when a book like Shikand Gumanik Vijär undertakes a really philosophical defence of dualism to uphold the essential goodness of Ahura Mazda as God, and it anticipates the arguments of most recent thinkers like James and the Personal Idealists. But the author of the work is equally anxious to prove the ultimate supremacy of Ahura Mazda as He will ultimately overcome all evil and thus vanquish Angra Mainyu. But all this need be mentioned only as a later phase of Zoroastrianism, which as Manichaeism did not fail to affect the monotheism even of Christianity, as the history of the Manichaen heresy goes to show.

It would be better to deal with the teachings of Zoroaster himself
and see in what sense, if any at all, his teaching can be spoken of as dualistic. So far as his theory of creation is concerned it is through and through monotheistic. Ahura Mazda is the one and only creator of the whole universe. Day and night are not crudely opposed to each other as in later Zoroastrianism. There are no animals which can be described purely as evil, there is nothing in the physical world which is purely evil. It is only when Zoroaster begins to sing in the Gāthās of his own sufferings and disappointments that he comes to emphasize the evil that is in man and he develops a dualism, which is just Ethical Dualism. He comes to feel that while his Creator is really good in himself there is something in the universe which obstructs the work of the good. There are several pertinent passages in the Gāthās bearing on this point. In Yasaṇa 45. 1 he says: "Yea, I shall speak forth; hear ye, who come from near and far. Ponder well over all things. Weigh my words with care and clear thought."

This implies the moral responsibility of all human beings and he makes this clearer in Yasaṇa 30. 2 when he says: "Let each man choose his own creed for himself." What is he expected to choose between? The answer is given in the famous passage, Yasaṇa 45. 2: "I shall tell you now of those twin spirits, that took their birth at the beginning of life. The benevolent Spirit of Goodness thus spake to the Spirit of Evil: Neither our thoughts, nor our commands, nor our understandings, nor our beliefs, nor our deeds, nor our consciences, nor our souls, are at one." Here the opposition between the good and the evil is quite clear cut, but the opposition is not between two substances, but between two principles. It is a matter of interpretation whether these spirits are to be looked upon as persons or as mere figurative personifications. The psychology of religious consciousness in recent years has brought out the need of concretizing for purposes of worship. If Ahura Mazda is in Himself the Spirit of Goodness and is a Person, the spirit that opposes Him naturally also takes shape as a Person, though ultimately doomed to be vanquished. Zoroastrianism thus comes into being as a new force that fights the battle against Angra Mainyu, and Zoroaster as the Prophet fighting Angra Mainyu comes to be looked upon as an inveterate enemy of all that is evil. He has to face his tribulations and he does so unflinchingly and calls all mankind to this fight as well. The language of the Gāthās leaves no doubt that Zoroaster himself was an inveterate fighter and would not find any rest till he had laid low the powers of evil. His language also leaves no doubt that for him Ahura Mazda could have nothing evil in Himself and so all evil must lie outside Him. In philosophical language all evil is the negation of the good, and it is personified as the spirit of Angra Mainyu. The opposition between the good and the evil takes on other allied forms, as for example light and darkness, knowledge and ignorance, truth and lie, but the fundamental idea remains the same.

Emphasizing the idea of monotheism, Parsee scholars have been apt
to repudiate dualism altogether as an integral part of Zoroastrianism. They argue that Ahura Mazda is one and He is supreme, and that Spenta Mainyu as the Spirit of Goodness and Angra Mainyu as the Spirit of Evil are subordinate to Him. They overlook the fact that this makes Ahura Mazda Himself responsible for the existence of evil and all its consequences. And that is entirely against the whole spirit of the Gāthās. The passage already quoted from Yasna 45. 2 leaves no room for doubt. There can be no truck between the good and the evil. They are poles apart and they can never meet. The end of the conflict will and must end in the defeat of evil. One thing is certain, that Zoroaster was acutely conscious of the existence of evil; he could not associate it with Ahura Mazda, the embodiment of all goodness, and therefore the only solution that he could come to was to figure evil as an external force working in human beings against the will of God. Philosophically we may say that evil is just the negation of good, and when this negation is personified it becomes Angra Mainyu.

Whether this solution is sound or not remains a matter of opinion. But it has to be mentioned that this solution has been accepted by all the great monotheisms of the succeeding ages. In the Old Testament we have Satan thwarting the will of God, even though He is portrayed as almighty. In Christ we find the same conflict and His greatness lies in overcoming all temptations held out by Satan. In Islam, too, we have the figure of Iblis. The logic of this line of argument is inexorable and we find a great Christian like Dr. Albert Schweitzer frankly claiming that Christianity is dualistic and most rightly too. In his Christianity and Religions of the World he writes: "Every rational faith has to choose between two things: either to be an ethical religion or to be a religion that explains the world. We Christians choose the former, as that which is of higher value." In another passage he writes: "We hold to the absolutely and profoundly ethical religion as to the one thing needful, though philosophy may go to rack and ruin." But a little later in a more philosophical mood he writes: "The God who is known through philosophy and the God whom I experience as Ethical Will do not coincide. They are one, but how they are one I do not understand." This is honest and Dr. Schweitzer is by no means the only one who has been forced to this conclusion. The same difficulty crops up in the writings of William James and the Personal Idealists who find it logically impossible to endow God with omnipotence and all-goodness as most religious people glibly and inconsistently do. They are forced to choose between these two attributes of God and they would rather sacrifice His omnipotence than His all-goodness. Other systems of philosophy, like that of the Vedānta in India or of Spinoza and the Absolute Idealists, are in the opposite camp and are forced to deny God as a person and to merge it into the Brahman or the Absolute as the case may be.
So the Zoroastrianism of Zoroaster is dualism, but it is ethical dualism. Later Zoroastrianism in the age of the Vendidad developed it into a metaphysical dualism, for which there is no warrant in the Gāthās. But a still later School of the Magi Zoroastrians, the Zervanites, developed the view that Zervana Akūna or the Boundless Time was the primordial reality out of which evolved Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu. This is an ingenious attempt to have a metaphysical monism coupled with ethical dualism. The whole of Zoroastrianism as a religion is imbued through and through with this spirit of fight against Angra Mainyu. The hasti, or sacred thread, which every professing Zoroastrian has to wear round his waist, is nothing if not symbolical of this fight, exhorting him to be ever prepared to fight the Evil One at every step. The very epithets which are used to describe him bring this out. "Angra Mainyu is the Demon of Demons, who has crept into the creation of the Good Spirit. His standing epithet is 'full of death.' He is the worst liar. He is a tyrant, of evil creation, of evil religion, and of evil knowledge, and of malignity, as well as inveterately wicked."

Worship.—In the pre-Zoroastrian epoch the Iranian religion was nature worship. With the advent of Zoroaster fire and sun and water lost their religious importance, but survived even in the Gāthās as symbols of the power of Ahura Mazda. After his time the priests so accustomed to the old forms of worship revived this nature worship, though as subordinate to Ahura Mazda, and inevitably fire came to be looked upon as very sacred and its consecration in sacred fire-temples has given rise to the familiar idea that Zoroastrians are fire-worshippers. There is as much truth in this description as to say that Christians are Cross-worshippers. Firdusi’s lines penned a thousand years ago remain true to-day as then: "Say not that they [the Iranians] were worshippers of fire; they were worshippers of one God." Markham in his History of Persia says: "Persia is the only one [nation] that has never at any period of her history worshipped graven images of any kind."

Ethics.—Consistently with Ethical Dualism Zoroastrian ethics moves at a very high level. It focuses all its strength on emphasizing humā, kuhktā, huvāvaresahtā: pure thoughts, pure words, pure deeds. It is not possible to have a more succinct summary of ethical life and that is the best that can be said about Zoroastrian ethics. Whatever aberrations Zoroastrianism might have gone through on the metaphysical and religious side after the time of Zoroaster, it must be said to the credit of the Zoroastrian priests that they maintained the high level of Zoroastrian ethics. One feature of this ethics is worth noting: that it in no way favours asceticism. The Vendidad says: "There is no strength in those who do not eat, neither for vigorous righteousness nor for vigorous husbandry, nor for vigorous begetting of sons." And in Sad Dar we read: "With us fasting means fasting from sin with our eyes and tongues and
ears and hands and feet," Darius the Great in his rock edicts had it carved: "O man! This is Ahura Mazda's command to thee: think no evil, abandon not the right path, sin not."

Eschatology.—With the Greeks as with the Hebrews there was no clear conception of the life after death. The conception of immortality was very shadowy. It took a clear shape in Zoroaster. He promised paradise to the good and hell to the wicked. His doctrine of soul was simple. But in later Zoroastrianism it became somewhat complex. Every human being came to be looked upon as comprising a body with intelligence, daēna (ego or conscience), urvan (soul), and Fravashi (a sort of guardian spirit). The body is the vehicle for the soul and so has to be kept trim and healthy. The daēna determines a man's personality, becoming fairer or fouler with every good or evil action as the case may be, urvan is the soul which enjoys immortality. On the fourth day after death there is judgment when the urvan of the dead, if righteous, is accosted by a beautiful maid, and if evil by an ugly maid, and these maids are nothing but the manifestations of his own daēna, good or bad as the case may be. The conception of Fravashi is very peculiar. It stands for the guardian spirit and is associated with the good ones, so that their Fravashis are remembered in prayers.

If the greatness of a religion is to be measured in terms of the numbers of its followers, Zoroastrianism has no right to be called great to-day, for it cannot boast of more than a hundred thousand or so in the whole world. If the greatness of a religion, however, depends on its historic importance and its influence on the religions of the world, the greatness of Zoroastrianism cannot be challenged. In this connection I cannot do better than quote from my little book Zoroaster: His Life and Teachings as the concluding words of this brief essay.

"During its triumphant career of over two millennia, it came into contact with millions of people both to the east and west of Iran, and in this period it transferred a good deal of its moral and spiritual vigour to other people. The Hebrews and the Christians and the Muslims have all drunk deep, consciously or unconsciously, at the founts of Zoroastrianism, and the best of Zoroastrianism lives in the best of other religions. It is perhaps this consciousness that made the conversion from Zoroastrianism to Islam so easy after the Muslim conquest of Persia, and more definitely took away the zeal to spread their faith among others. A flame that has passed on its light to countless other flames must disdain so sordid a feeling as jealousy. Good thoughts, good words and good deeds are not the monopoly of Zoroastrians. In the dim antiquity Zoroaster preached it and his reward is that it has become the common inheritance of all humanity."
NOTES

2. p. 134.

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CHAPTER XXVII

PRE-SOCRATICS

1. INTRODUCTORY: THE EARLY BEGINNINGS OF GREEK THOUGHT

Philosophy in the West is generally said to begin with the Greeks. The Greeks were pre-eminently fitted, on account of certain national characteristics, to produce an independent and lasting system of philosophy. It was their impartiality, combined with a strong sense of reality, and an equally strong power of abstraction that enabled the Greeks to set up a world of Ideas, built up by the strength of independent human thought, the Logos, which could claim to explain reality in a natural way, in place of the mythological creations of artistic imagination. The Greeks not merely formulated all fundamental questions and problems of philosophy, by themselves no mean achievement, but also answered them with the transparent clearness which is peculiar to the Hellenist mind. They fashioned for philosophic thought the basic ideas in which the whole of later European Philosophy, Science and Theology moved and with which they still work.

But the Greek philosophical systems have not merely a secondary and preparatory value. They have a value in themselves, as an achievement in the development of man’s intellectual life. The Greeks proclaimed the Autonomy of Reason, and gave it a two-fold application. Wisdom, to the Greeks, is not a mere theoretical explanation of the world but also a definite practical attitude towards life. *In this respect Greek thought shows striking similarity with the main trend of Indian philosophical systems.*

The leading Greek thinkers always “lived” as philosophers. That is what Nietzsche called “the bold openness of a philosophic life” and what he missed in the lives of modern philosophers. The Greek idea of culture is something more than a “decoration of life”—a concealment and disfiguring of it: for all adornment hides what is adorned; it is the idea of culture as a new and finer nature, without distinction of inner and outer, without convention or disguise, as a unity of thought and will, life and appearance. Everything which makes for sincerity and honesty is a further step towards this true culture, however destructive of merely conventional and decorative culture it may seem to be.

Then, the absence of religious dogmatism in Greek philosophy produces both an impartial, scientific explanation of the world as well as a morality which is unfettered by authority or revelation.

Finally, Greek philosophy like Greek art and poetry grew out of the
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minds of the people and formed an organic component of Hellenic culture. It has a perfect artistic form in presentation and stands before us in eternal, unfading freshness like the poems of Homer or the masterpieces of Periclean art.

Homer.—Ionia in Asia Minor, where Homer sang, was the cradle of Greek Philosophy. Homer and Philosophy are the two poles between which the world of Greek thought rotates. Even Homer's language betrays the intellectual structure of the Greek mind. The Greeks regarded what we call "character" as knowledge: e.g. a king "knows" justice; a woman "knows" chastity, and so on. Secondly, there is an element of sadness, pessimism, "Moira," immutable fate, shortness of life, suffering of earthly existence; even the question of origin of evil is raised; but nowhere is there any trace of a systematic working out of these ideas in Homer.

Homer thus lays the foundation of later Greek Ethics (cf. Stoic "Fate" and Socratic "Virtue is knowledge.")

In the two centuries that followed Homer, the Greeks extended their territorial possessions to a great extent, and the colonization and emigration brought them into contact with numerous foreign peoples and revealed to them unknown morals and customs. In politics, the power of nobility began to totter and a constitution of an oligarchic or democratic nature was established. In poetry, the lyric was created and the individuality of the poet was emphasized. Individual priests and prophets began to make their appearance and gain influence. Religion entered upon a critical stage. The old cults no longer satisfied the new strong emotions.

Orpheus.—The new god, Dionysus, won for himself a place among the native gods. He is the god of creative nature, and was celebrated in nocturnal rites by torchlight on mountain tops with the accompaniment of wild music. This cult was connected with the name of the Thracian bard, Orpheus. The body is not the instrument of the soul, but rather its bonds, its prison, its tomb. The Orphic theology believes in transmigration, the grievous cycle of births. It borders on Pantheism, without, however, taking the final step, the difficulty of the duality of soul and body, god and the world, not being successfully surmounted.

Thus the first precursors of Greek Philosophy, whom Aristotle calls "theologians," are revealed to us in a curious twilight of Religion and Philosophy. The second preliminary phase of Greek Philosophy is the proverbial wisdom, which appears in connected form in the maxims and sayings of the seven sages. Plato's list included Thales, Solon, Pittacus, Bias, Cleobulus, Myson, Chilon, the first four being included in every list. The first-named, Thales of Miletos, was assigned a special place among his contemporaries and has been now generally accredited by historians as the father of all European philosophy.
GREEK PHILOSOPHY: EASTERN AND WESTERN

Greek Philosophy thus begins properly with Pre-Socratic Philosophy (from the beginning of the sixth to the middle of the fifth century B.C.). It consists mainly of Cosmology or Philosophy of Nature. Its main interest is in the world that surrounds man, the Cosmos. It came to an end with the scepticism of the Sophists, who turned the attention of Philosophy to man, his mental and moral nature, and to the practical problems of life.

Materialism or Hyllozoism.—The philosophical tendency, represented by the pre-Socratics, has been sometimes called "Materialism," the exception being "Anaxagoras." But we must remember that the separation of nature and spirit, or matter and mind, was wholly foreign to original, pure Greek thought. The Greek always imagined nature as animate. It would be more correct to speak of Hyllozoism. The problem of life and mind does not exist for these thinkers, since everything is living and infused, although in varying degrees, with mind. In Democritus and the Sophists we get the questions of Ethics and social Theory, as well as a Theory of education. It would be more accurate to describe the pre-Socratic Philosophy as Cosmological inquiry or Philosophy of Nature. Instead of remaining satisfied with the crude fashion of explanation by temporal sequence, these earliest philosophers raised the question, What is the permanent element in real existence, and of what are actual things composed? This question, so clearly put, marks the difference, once for all, between Philosophy and Mythology.

2. THALES AND ANAXIMENES

Thales.—Miletos was the home of the earliest School of scientific cosmology. There can be no doubt that the founder of the Milesian School, and therefore the first of the cosmologists, was Thales, a contemporary of Solon. The most remarkable thing we know about him is that he foretold the eclipse of the sun which put an end to the war between the Lydians and the Medes (May 28, 585 B.C.). He was forty years old at this time, so his birth is calculated to be 625-624 B.C. He died at 78 in 546 B.C. Thales visited Egypt and is said to have introduced Egyptian Geometry to Greece.

His Cosmology.—If Thales ever wrote anything, it was soon lost. All that we know of him is derived mainly from Aristotle. The following statements are attributed to Thales:

1. The earth floats on water.
2. Water is the material cause of all things.
3. All things are full of gods. The magnet is alive, for it has the power of moving iron.
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The first of these statements must be understood in the light of the second, which means that water is the fundamental or primary thing of which all other things are mere transient forms. The greatness of Thales consists in this, that he was the first to ask, not what was the original thing, but what is the primary thing now? or more simply, "What is the world made of?" The answer he gave to this question was: Water. Of all things we know, water seems to take the most various shapes. It is familiar to us in a solid, a liquid, and a vaporous form.

The third statement implies that Thales believed in a "soul of the world"—but this is Aristotle's inference. Burnet does not take such statements of Thales seriously, for according to him, to say that the magnet is alive is to imply that other things are not so. But this duality of matter and spirit had not yet been formulated. Thales had some notion of the efficient cause, however dim it was, and it is unfortunate that the later cosmologists could not "appreciate the very great step that Thales had taken, and so allowed themselves to rest content with the non-recognition of the efficient cause, until Anaxagoras came on the scene and rediscovered the conception of a psychical and efficient cause for which Aristotle gives him the credit that he fully deserves."

The Pan-psychism of Thales.—We should go beyond Zeller and characterize Thales' philosophy not only as "Hylozoism," but a "veritable Pan-Psychism." When Thales says, "All things are full of Gods," he is choosing magnet and amber as two examples—as pre-eminent specimens to prove the general contention that all things are full of gods. Burnet's interpretation entirely misrepresents the situation.

Anaximenes.—The doctrines of Anaximenes are the development of those of Thales, whereas Anaximander follows a totally different line of speculation. The style of Anaximenes is simple and unpretentious and is distinguished from the poetical prose of Anaximander. The speculations of Anaximander were distinguished for their boldness; those of Anaximenes are more careful and more fruitful in ideas that were destined to hold their ground.

Theory of the Primary Substance.—He was the first to proclaim as the ultimate reason of all material transformation a "true cause," a vera causa, and thereon rests his title to immortality. He ascribed the separation of material substances to condensation and rarefaction, or differences of proximity and distance in the particles. When most evenly diffused, in its normal state, so to speak, air is invisible; when most finely diffused, it becomes fire and in its progress towards condensation it becomes liquid and finally solid. Thus the underlying substance is one and Infinite, but not Indeterminate (as Anaximander held) but Determinate: it is air. From it all things that are and have been, and shall be, took their rise. "Just as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world." It differs in different substances by virtue
of its rarefaction and condensation. The importance of this philosophic
discovery will be obvious to everyone. It makes the Milesian Cosmology
thoroughly consistent for the first time, explaining everything by the
transformation of a single substance: thus all differences are regarded as
purely quantitative. The unity of the primary substance is saved by
saying that all diversities are due to the presence of more or less of it in a
given space. The analogy from human breath suggests that the primary
substance bears the same relation to the life of the world as to that of
man. It is an early instance of the argument from the microcosm to the
macrocosm.

3. ANAXIMANDER AND HERAKLEITOS

Anaximander.—The second generation of the Milesian School is repre-
sented by Anaximander who was born in 610-609 B.C. He is distinguished
by certain practical inventions: he was the first cartographer, the first to
construct a map. He was the first Greek philosopher to leave his doctrines
in a book written in prose.

His theory of the Primary Substance.—Anaximander seems to have
thought it unnecessary to fix upon water, air, or fire as the original and
primary form of body. According to him the material cause and first
element of things was the Infinite, a boundless something from which
all things arise and to which they all return again. And into that from which
things take their rise they pass away once more, "as is ordained; for they
make reparation and satisfaction to one another for their injustice
according to their appointed time." He was struck by the fact that the
world presents us with a series of opposites, of which the most primary
are hot and cold, wet and dry. If we look at things from this point of view,
it is more natural to speak of the opposites as being "separated out"
from a mass which is as yet undifferentiated than to make any one of the
opposites the primary substance. Thales made the wet too important
at the expense of the dry. Anaximander asks, how one of the particular
forms could be the Primary Substance? The "elements" (if we could use
the word by Anachronism) are in opposition one to another—air is cold,
water is moist, fire is hot, and therefore if one of them were infinite, the
rest would have ceased to be by this time. Thus there must be one eternal,
indestructible Substance, a boundless stock from which the waste of
existence is made good. If Thales had been right in saying that water is
the fundamental reality, it would be inconceivable how anything else
could ever have existed. Aristotle regarded it as an anticipation or pre-
sentiment of his own doctrine of "indeterminate matter." The reason why
Anaximander conceives the primary substance as "boundless" is that
indicated by Aristotle, viz. "that becoming might not fail."

His General Outlook.—Anaximander was quite clear that every created

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thing is doomed to destruction. Primary Matter alone, the source and destination of all life, he regarded as without beginning and without end. This gave him a kind of moral satisfaction. "Each separate existence he regarded as an iniquity, a usurpation, for which the clashing and mutually exterminating forms of life would suffer atonement and penalty in the ordinance of time." The natural order transformed itself in his mind to a comprehensive order of Justice. "All that hath existence is worthy to decay." Nothing seemed to him "divine" but Matter, the repository of force, dateless, eternal and un-aging. Everything at the end of long cosmic periods would be brought back to Primary Substance, the unity of the original, Universal Being.

_Herakleitos_ (535-475 B.C.).—Herakleitos of Ephesos, son of Blyson, flourished about 504-500 B.C. In boldness, originality and their great logical stature, Herakleitos and Anaximander stand out among the early Greeks as two lonely giants. He was not a disciple of anyone; but he was acquainted both with the Milesian Cosmology and with the poems of Xenophanes. He also knew something of the theories taught by Pythagoras. "The best in himself he believed that he owed to himself, for of all whose opinions he was acquainted with none had attained true insight." He belonged to the ancient royal house of Ephesos, but he renounced his claims to his brother. "Solitude and the beauty of Nature were his Muses. He was a man of abounding pride and self-confidence and he sat at no master's feet." The title of his work is unknown, but it has been divided into three parts by his Stoic commentators: (1) cosmological, (2) political, and (3) theological. His style is proverbially obscure and later got him the title of "the Dark." He wrote in an oracular style and was conscious of doing so. It was the manner of his time, an age of great individualities. They all felt that they are in some measure inspired. "He felt a contempt for the mass of the people." "His enigmatic philosophy is addressed to the fit and the few, without regard to the multitude, 'baying like curs at a stranger,' or to 'the ass that preferred the bundle of hay to the nugget of gold.' His headstrong temperament sometimes led him into inconsistencies of statement."

His Teachings.—He looks down not only on the mass of men but on all previous inquirers into Nature. He believed himself to have attained insight into some truth which had not hitherto been recognized. The truth hitherto ignored is—that the _many_, apparently independent and conflicting things we know are really _one_, and that, on the other hand, this _one_ is also _many_. The "Strife of Opposites" is really an "attunement." Wisdom is not a knowledge of many things, but the perception of the underlying unity of the warring opposites. This was the fundamental thought, which must be analysed into its various elements, one by one.

The Doctrine of Flux or Becoming.—It is here that we can connect his system with that of Anaximander who had treated the Strife of Opposites
as an "Injustice," while to Herakleitos it was the highest Justice. What, then, is the new Primary Substance? Herakleitos wanted something which of its own nature would pass into everything else, and everything else would pass in turn into it. This he found in fire; the quantity of fire in a flame burning steadily appears to remain the same and yet the substance is continually changing. It is always passing away in smoke, and its place is being taken by fresh matter from the fuel that feeds it. This is just what we want. If we regard the world as an "ever-living" fire, we can understand how it is always becoming all things, while all things are always returning to it. This brings with it a certain way of looking at the change and movement of the world. Fire burns continuously and without interruption, always consuming fuel and liberating smoke. It follows that the whole of Reality is like an ever-flowing stream, and that nothing is ever at rest for a moment. All things pass and naught abides. "You cannot step twice into the same stream."

The Upward and The Downward Path.—He works out the details of the perpetual Flux in terms of "exchange." This seems a good name for what happens when fire gives out smoke and takes in fuel instead. The pure fire is to be found chiefly in the sun. He called change "the upward and the downward path." The details of his Cosmology, if taken literally, as is done by Burnet and Zeller, make a most meaningless puzzle. So it is best to interpret him symbolically, and the clue to it may be found in mystic terminology. Herakleitos has clearly an idea of something more than a physical substance or energy in his concept of the ever-living fire. Fire is to him the physical aspect, as it were, of a great burning, creative, formative and destructive force, the sum of all whose processes are a constant and unceasing change. The idea of the one which is eternally becoming many and the many which is eternally becoming one, and of that one therefore not so much as stable substance or essence as active force, a sort of substantial will-to-become, is the foundation of Herakleitos' Philosophy. Nietzsche, the most vivid, concrete and suggestive of modern thinkers, as is Herakleitos among the early Greeks, founded his whole philosophical thought on this conception of existence as a vast will-to-become, and of the world as a play of Force.

4. RELIGIOUS REVIVAL. PYTHAGORAS AND XENOPHANES

The Pythagorean School represents a more developed stage in abstract reflection and stands out in the history of Greek thought as constituting an independent source which determined one line of thought in all the later Greek work. We now come to a period of religious revival which had an important influence on philosophy.
PRE-SOCRATICS

Orpheus and Pythagoras.—The Orphic communities looked upon revelation as the source of religious authority. Their doctrines had a startling resemblance to the beliefs which were prevalent in India. The main purpose was to purify the believer's soul so as to enable it to escape from the "wheel of birth" and it was for the better attainment of this end that the Orphics were organized in communities. This religious revival emphasized the view that philosophy was above all a way of life. The initiated, says Aristotle, were not expected to learn anything, but merely to be affected in a certain way and put into a certain frame of mind. Science too, was a "purification," a means of escape from the "wheel." The wise man became more and more detached from the world.

Pythagoras (c. 582–506 B.C.).—Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to recover the earliest forms of Pythagorean speculation. Our authorities are almost all of relatively late date. The School of Pythagoreanism had a continuous though somewhat disturbed existence; it incorporated elements from quite different philosophical views. Broadly speaking, two main points emerge out of the works of the early Pythagoreans: their views on transmigration, and their interest in, and promotion of, mathematical studies. The founder of the School was by universal consent Pythagoras, a native of Samos, an island in Asia Minor. It is no easy task to give an account of Pythagoras that can claim to be regarded as history. Heracleitos writes of him, "Pythagoras practised enquiry beyond all other men, and made himself a wisdom of his own, which was but a knowledge of many things and an art of mischief." Of his teaching we know still less than of his life. Hegel says that he had a remarkable personality and some miraculous powers of healing.

The Pythagorean Order.—The Order was simply, in its origin, a religious fraternity and not a political league. Nor is there the slightest evidence that the Pythagoreans favoured the aristocratic rather than the democratic party. The main purpose of the order was to secure for its own members a more adequate satisfaction of the religious instinct than that supplied by the State Religion. It was, in fact, an institution for the cultivation of holiness. Pythagoras taught the doctrine of transmigration: it was a development of the primitive belief in the kinship of men and beasts, as all alike children of the Earth. On this was based the system of taboos on certain kinds of food, viz. abstinence from animal flesh such as beef. This was not based on humanitarian grounds, as modern Western vegetarianism is, or on ascetic grounds, as in India, but on taboo. The Pythagoreans ate flesh when they sacrificed it to gods.

Pythagoras as a Man of Science.—Aristotle says that he was the first to discuss the subject of goodness, and that he made the mistake of identifying its various forms with numbers. Heracleitos admits that he had pursued scientific investigation farther than other men. What, then, was the connection between his Religion and Science, those two sides of his
activity? The answer is in the Orphic system of "purification"; the
greatest purification of all is disinterested Science, and it is the man who
devotes himself to that, the true philosopher who has most effectively
released himself from the "wheel of birth." Pythagoras was the first to
carry arithmetic beyond the needs of commerce, and made it a study
for its own sake. When Aristotle talks of "those who bring numbers into
figures like the triangle and the square," he meant the Pythagoreans who
knew the use of the triangle, 3, 4, 5, in constructing a right angle. In
later writers, it is actually called the "Pythagorean triangle." The
traditional Pythagorean proposition that the square on the hypotenuse
is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides was the real foun-
dation of scientific mathematics.

Proportion and Harmony: Music and Medicine.—Pythagoras was the
author of a momentous discovery by means of which the numerical ratios
which determine the concordant intervals of the musical scale, or the
"harmonic," stand in close relation to the "octave" in music. In Medicine
as in Music, the Pythagoreans held the law of proportion and harmony
applicable. They held the body to be strung like an instrument to a certain
pitch, hot and cold, wet and dry, taking the place of high and low in
music. Health is just being in tune, and disease arises from undue tension
or relaxation of the strings. We still speak of "tonics" in medicine as well
as in music. Health, in fact, was an "attunement" depending on a due
blend of opposites, and the same account was given of many other things
with which the physician is concerned, notably of diet and climate. When
we speak of "temperance" in eating and drinking, bodily temperature
and temperament, or of the temperature which distinguishes one climate
from another, we are equally on Pythagorean ground (cf. "Atonic"
Dyspepsia).

Numbers.—These discoveries led Pythagoras to say that all things are
Numbers. If musical sounds can be reduced to numbers, why should not
everything else? The Pythagoreans indulged their fancy in tracing out
analogies between things and numbers in endless variety.

The Philosophical Importance of Pythagoreanism.—The Pythagoreans
applied their principle also to the soul, and thus determined what is
spiritual as number. Aristotle finds a further application of the number-
conception as follows:

"Thought is the One, knowledge or science is the two, for it comes alone
out of the One. . . . Everything is judged of either by thought, or science,
or opinion, or feeling." In these ideas, vague as they are, even a modern
philosopher like Hegel finds "some adequacy." "While thought is pure
universality, knowledge deals with something 'other'." Form and content
are thus distinguished.

Xenophanes, Transition to the Eleatics.—Pythagoras had identified
himself with the religious movement of his time: Xenophanes denied the
anthropomorphic gods altogether. He ridiculed Pythagoras and the doctrine of transmigration. His chief importance lies in the fact that he was the author of the quarrel between philosophy and poetry which culminated in Plato's *Republic*. To attribute to gods "things which might be considered disreputable among men ... stealings and adulteries and deceptions of one another" is to set a very bad lesson for moral instruction. As a great satirist of his age, as the moral instructor of his nation, as an apostle of shrewd common sense, Xenophanes stands unequalled. He bewails that people do not prize wisdom as much as they prize physical strength. It is strange, he says, that a gymnast or a wrestler should come to be honoured more than even a philosopher. Would a city, he asks, be better governed for having more wrestlers than philosophers?

*God and the World.*—In metaphysics, Aristotle refers to Xenophanes as "the first partisan of the One," and seems to suggest that he was the first of the Eleatics. Plato says in the *Sophist*: "The Eleatics ... say that all things are many in name, but in nature one; this is their mythus which goes back to Xenophanes and is even older." Burnet finds it very unlikely that he settled at Elea and founded a School there. He does not take the remark of Plato seriously. The question of importance, however, for a history of philosophy is not whether he founded a School at Elea, but whether he founded the Eleatic doctrine. Xenophanes' way of thought must have led to that of Parmenides. Xenophanes speaks about his God as "abiding in the same place and as not moving at all," a way of speaking about the Primary Reality which is so characteristic of the whole Eleatic School. Xenophanes said that those who assert that the gods are born are as impious as those who say that they die, for in both cases the assertion amounts to saying that the gods do not exist at all. He believed that there were no gods but *God*, "the whole of whom sees, the whole perceives, the whole hears, who without effort sets in motion all things by mind and thought." Burnet tries to interpret these verses as satires on the Homeric gods, and not as a cosmological poem. We should give all credit to Xenophanes for stressing the monotheistic aspect of his teaching. There was, indeed, just one step left for Parmenides to traverse, to go over from this complete and philosophical monotheism to his pantheism.

5. THE ELEATICS: PARMENIDES AND ZENO

*Parmenides.*—Parmenides, son of Pyres, was a citizen of Elea. He was born in about 515 B.C. as, according to Plato, he came to Athens in his sixty-fifth year, and conversed with Socrates who was about eighteen or twenty. He founded the Eleatic School. His doctrines are composed in a poem which begins with a chariot ride of the poet to the "goddess" who reveals to him the plain truth and the deceptive beliefs of men.
The poem accordingly is divided into two parts: (1) The way of Truth, (2) The way of Opinion.

The Method of Parmenides.—The great novelty is his method of argument. “Only that can be which can be thought: for thought exists for the sake of what is.” Thus, “Non-Being” must be entirely rejected, but this is the common presupposition of all the former views. But then we come into direct conflict with the evidence of our senses, which present us with a world of change and decay. So much the worse for the senses, says Parmenides. His thoroughgoing dialectic made progress possible.

The Doctrine of Being.—In the light of his great principle (viz, that which cannot be thought cannot exist), Parmenides goes on to consider the consequences of saying that anything is. In the first place, it cannot have come into being. If it had, it must have arisen from nothing or from something. It cannot have arisen from nothing; for there is no nothing. It cannot have arisen from something; for there is nothing else than what is. Nor can anything else besides itself come into being; for there can be no empty space in which it could do so. Is it or is it not? If it is, then it is now, all at once. In this way Parmenides refutes all accounts of the origin of the world. Ex nihilo nihil fit. Further, if it is, it simply is, and it cannot be more or less. There is, therefore, as much of it in one place as in another. (That makes rarefaction and condensation impossible.) It is continuous and indivisible; for there is nothing but itself which could prevent its parts being in contact with one another. It is therefore full, a continuous indivisible plenum. (That is, directed against the Pythagorean theory of a discontinuous reality or empty space.) Further, it is immovable. If it moved, it must move into empty space, which does not exist. Also, it is “finite and spherical,” according to Burnet. On this point there is an acute difference of opinion between Burnet and Zeller, on the one side, as against Adamson and Gomperz, on the other. We must go into this question deeper, as on this depends the important conclusion, whether Parmenides is the “father of Idealism,” or still a materialist like the other early Greek philosophers. Burnet here closely follows Zeller, who identifies the contrast of Being and Non-Being with the difference between the space-filling and the void. “What is is, therefore a finite, spherical, motionless, continuous plenum, and there is nothing beyond it. The “matter” of our physical text-books is just the real of Parmenides.”

Materialism versus Idealism in Parmenides.—All the epithets which Burnet interprets in a materialistic fashion can, however, be interpreted in an idealistic sense, and we may quote the following from Parmenides in support of our interpretation: “Being is without beginning, and is indestructible. It is universal, existing alone, immovable, and without end. Nor was it, nor will it be, since it now is. ... Powerful necessity holds it in confining bonds. ... Therefore, Divine Right does not permit Being
to have any end. It is lacking in nothing; for, if it lacked anything, it would lack everything" (his Poem, lines, 59-89). Adamson and Gomperz are also sympathetic to the idealistic interpretation of Parmenides. Adamson understands Parmenides to have at least risen to the conception of the non-corporeal, if not to that of the incorporeal, i.e. mental or psychical. Gomperz interprets Parmenides' philosophy in a Spinozistic sense: "Was the universal Being of Parmenides merely matter, merely corporeal and extended? . . . This seems well nigh incredible. The supposition is rather forced on us that for Parmenides, as Spinoza might have said, thought and extension were the two attributes of one substance, and the real was at once the thinking and the extended. . . . The Material Being of Parmenides was incontestably a Spiritual Being as well. It is universal matter and universal spirit at once." This Spinozistic interpretation of Parmenides is not unfair on the whole.

*Plato and Aristotle on Parmenides.*—The testimony of Plato and Aristotle is, however, more valuable than that of others, because they were so much nearer Parmenides, and were less likely to misunderstand his doctrines. Aristotle's evidence is all the more important, because he had a naturalistic bias. He gives a fair objective presentation of Parmenides, even though he himself would not subscribe to the unity of thought and being. Plato was, however, in sympathy with the position of Parmenides, even though his own idealism was of a different kind. Plato speaks of Parmenides as a person to be at once reverenced and feared. It follows that he must have taken the trouble to at least understand the man whom he so much reverenced, and therefore his testimony is of real value. He tells us in the *Sophist* that Parmenides regarded Not-Being as unspeakable, inconceivable, irrational, meaning thereby that in order to exist, anything must be thought, conceived, and reasoned about.

*Parmenides and Saṁkara-cārya.*—Greek thought has many parallels in Ancient Indian thought. Saṁkara, who represents an ancient tradition of long duration, comes to the very position of Parmenides. His philosophy of the one Absolute Existence which is Being and Thought, sat and cit, at the same time, his recognition of Not-Being (māyā) as conceptually antithetical to the idea of Being, and as essentially non-existent, his explanation of the plurality of the world which is only apparent, his distinction of the phenomenal and the noumenal, the vyavahārika and pāramārthika (parallel to the Parmenidian distinction of opinion and truth), should enable us to call Saṁkara the Indian Parmenides. Finally, there is the very curiously identical way in which both Parmenides and Saṁkara argue against the Logical Universal. Is the Universal wholly present in the particular, or only partly? If it is wholly present, it is distributed in so many things, and so it is many; if it is partly present in the particulars which are many, it is divisible (cf. Plato: *Parmenides*, 131a ff. and Saṁkara-cārya, *Bṛhma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, II. r. 18). The extreme
similarity of the arguments can also be used to strengthen Gomperz's assertion that "if an idealistic interpretation of Parmenides be incredible on other grounds, the last traces of hesitation would be removed by the parallelism to Parmenides which we find in the Vedânta-philosophers of India" (Gomperz: Greek Thinkers, I, 179).

Zeno (b.c. 489 B.C.).—Zeno criticized the prevailing pluralistic systems from the point of view of the absolute monism of Parmenides. By his clever dialectic he sets the whole world of his opponents at naught in order to defend his master's monism. A modern critical philosopher, like Bertrand Russell, after the lapse of more than 2,000 years of advance and criticism, still calls his arguments "immeasurably subtle and profound." Opinions differ as to whether Zeno should be regarded as having a positive object for his philosophy or only a negative one. Gomperz thinks that though Zeno started as a believer in the Eleatic doctrine of unity, he ended as a sceptic and as a nihilist. Zeller, however, credits him with having a positive end for his negative method of argumentation. He starts by provisionally assuming the truth of an opponent's conclusion and then deducing from it, either an absurd conclusion or two contradictory results: in fact, his method was a reductio ad absurdum of the pluralistic position. His works are mainly written against Empedokles and the Pythagoreans, though by implication he attacks all Pluralists, including Anaxagoras and the Atomists and even the Herakleitean doctrine of incessant motion and change. As the first of the dialecticians or logicians, we may call Zeno the precursor not only of the Sophists and Socrates, but of the Platonic Dialectic itself.

Arguments against Motion.—Aristotle has summarized for us Zeno's arguments under two heads: (1) Those against Motion, and (2) Those against Multiplicity.

It is impossible for a moving body to reach any destination whatsoever.

It is impossible for the swift Achilles to overtake a creeping tortoise who is ahead of him.

The flying arrow must be regarded as at rest. Regarding these arguments, Aristotle says that one of the most significant fallacies underlying them is the confusion of the infinite and the infinitesimal. "With infinites in point of quantity, it is not possible for anything to come in contact in a finite time, but it is possible in the case of the infinites reached by division." (Aris. Phys., VI. 2, 233). Thus an infinitesimal space could be traversed in a finite time. In the Infinitesimal Calculus, which was later discovered, the position of Aristotle is further clarified. Aristotle did not see that the infinitesimals have to do with the finites no more and no less than the very infinites themselves; the two stand absolutely on a par so far as their relation with the finites is concerned.

Arguments against Multiplicity.—These arguments have been preserved for us by Simplicius. Being could not be a plurality, because it would
at once be finite and infinite. It is finite because it consists only of as many units as there are: it is infinite because we could always interpose an intermediate unit between any existing pair of units. Again, Being could not have any magnitude, for the same line could be shown to be both infinitely small and infinitely large at the same time, which is absurd. Finally, it is inconceivable how a bushel of corn could make a noise, when each grain and each smallest part of a grain is not perceived to make a noise, even though it must be regarded as making one.

Zeno's arguments against motion are based on a defiance of the application of the concepts of the Infinite and the Continuous to time; the arguments against multiplicity are based on a like defiance as extended to space. Zeno thus inspired Euclid in regard to the first principles of his science.

Zeno's argument of the bushel of corn has an additional interest to the student of Leibniz and modern psychology. It was intended to invalidate the authority of sense-perception: the example of the roaring of the sea, which Leibniz cited, points to the same difficulty. Leibniz solved the difficulty by his theory of "Petites Perceptions," but modern psychology tackles the problem more efficiently in the theory of the subconscious and unconscious mental states and the commingling of subconscious units to form a total state of consciousness.

Importance of Zeno.—Zeno's acute insight led him to discover the nature of the Continuous and the nature of the geometrical point. These, among others, are real contributions to the development of science. So far as his doctrine of absolutely motionless being is concerned, Aristotle urged that the whole to Zeno is a mere static reality, a mere "block-universe" which allows of no motion and no change. Trying to fly to the opposite pole from the eternal flux of Heraclitus, the Eleatics, Parmenides and Zeno, landed on the "desolate Whole, breezeless and motionless." Such a conception of Reality was to Aristotle unimaginable. The mistake of Zeno has been rectified in modern times by Bergson, who takes motion to be a spatio-temporal relation. Motion is neither a purely spatial nor a purely temporal function. It consists of a correlation between places and times: movement is indivisible. If we take the arrow to be motionless in each point of its course, then it cannot move at all. "To suppose," as Bergson says, "that the moving body is at a point of its course is to cut the course in two by a snip of the scissors at this point, and to substitute two trajectories for the single trajectory which we were first considering." (Creative Evolution, pp. 325-28.)

6. EMPEDOKLES AND ANAXAGORAS

Empedokles (c. 495-435 B.C.)—The personality and character of Empedokles can be understood as a combination of a passion for scientific
enquiry with a none the less passionate striving to raise himself above nature. With him it was not merely a question of knowledge of nature but of mastery of nature. His purpose was to discover what forces govern the natural world and to subject them to the service of his fellow-men. He believed himself to be a higher being, for in the circle of birth, as physician, poet, and leader of the people, he had reached the highest state; "he wandered like an immortal God among the mortals," and he had followers in thousands when he passed through a city.

His Teaching: Pluralism.—He sides with the Eleatics in his denial of becoming, but assumes the reality of motion. Matter is immutable in its essence, but bodies are in a state of constant change; their constituent elements (the "four roots") are combined and separated in different proportions. Hence we must abandon the notion of elementary unity; we must cease deriving air from water, or earth from fire, or water from air, and consider these four elements as equally original. He regards the "roots" as eternal, indestructible. This means that Empedokles took the opposites of Anaximander and the Pythagoreans, the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, and declared that they were "things," each of which was real in the Parmenidean sense. This is the reason why his system is regarded as an attempt to mediate between the monism of Parmenides and the extreme pluralism of Democritus and the Atomists.

Strife and Love.—The Eleatic criticism had made it necessary for subsequent thinkers to explain motion. Empedokles starts from the original state of a mixture of "four roots"; this fact makes change and motion possible. But what combines and separates the mixture? Empedokles postulates the existence of Strife, which separates all the elements in the sphere, and Love which is needed to bring them together again. It is important to notice that strife and love in Empedokles are not incorporeal forces, but corporeal elements like the other four. Love and strife are to the world what blood and air are to the body. A world of perishable things, such as we know, can only exist when both love and strife are in the world. The elements alone are ever-lasting; the particular things we know are unstable compounds, which come into being as the elements "run through one another" in one direction or another. They are mortal or perishable, just because they have no "substance" of their own. There is no end to their death or destruction. Nothing is imperishable but fire, air, earth and water, along with the two forces of love and strife. The clear duality of the corporeal and the incorporeal comes out only in the philosophy of Anaxagoras for the first time in Ancient Greek thought.

Anaxagoras (c. 500-428 B.C.).—He was born of rich parents, but he neglected his possessions to follow science. He was the first philosopher to take up his abode at Athens, where he was called by Perikles, whom Nietzsche calls the greatest of all Anaxagorans, the mightiest and worthiest man of the world; and Plato bears witness that the philosophy
of Anaxagoras alone had given that sublime flight to the genius of Perikles. But later, Anaxagoras was persecuted and put on trial for teaching that "the sun was red-hot stone and the moon earth." Like a true Ionian, he wrote in prose, and the fragments of his work which remain show that it was written in a "lofty and agreeable style."

The Doctrine of "Seeds."—His system, like that of Empedokles, aimed at reconciling the Eleatic doctrine, that primary substance is unchangeable, with the existence of a world which everywhere presents the appearance of coming into being and passing away. The conclusions of Parmenides are frankly accepted and restated. Nothing can be added to all things; for there cannot be more than all, and all is always equal (Fr. 5). Nor can anything pass away. What man commonly calls coming into being and passing away is really mixture and separation. Thus, he postulated a plurality of independent elements which he called "seeds." They were not, however, the four simple "roots," fire, air, earth and water of Empedokles: on the contrary, they were compounds. "There is a portion of everything in everything" (Fr. 11). "How can hair be made of what is not hair, and flesh of what is not flesh?" (Fr. 10). The smallest portion of bone is still bone—you can never come to a part so small that it does not contain portions of all the opposites. These words directly attack the Empedoklean doctrine of the four simple "roots." Though everything has a portion of everything in it, things appear to be that of which there is most in them (Fr. 12). "The things in one world are not cut off from one another with a hatchet" (Fr. 8). Thus the differences which exist in the world as we know it are to be explained by the varying proportions in which the portions are mingled. But, how are we to explain the transition from the state of the world when all things were together to the manifold reality we know? This is the other problem—the source of motion—which Anaxagoras deals with in his second great contribution to Greek thought, viz. his doctrine of Nous.

Nous.—Like Empedokles, he was in search of some external cause to produce motion in the mixture. He called it Mind or Nous. On account of this important innovation, he has been credited with the introduction of the psychical or spiritual element into philosophy. But he did not succeed in clearly formulating the concept of an incorporeal force any more than Empedokles. Both Plato and Aristotle expressed great disappointment over the failure of Anaxagoras to use his newly discovered principle for a teleological explanation of nature. "Nous" is absolutely simple, as opposed to matter which is completely composite and mixed. Nous is "mixed with nothing," "exists for itself alone," "the finest and purest of all things"; it possesses complete "knowledge" of all things and the greatest strength. Its essential function consists in the separating of the mixed mass. Matter, before Nous has worked upon it, exists as a mass in which nothing is separated from anything else. But the later stages of
this process of separation and world creation are all explained by Anaxagoras mechanically. He, like Descartes, is a dualist and not a teleological spiritualist like Leibniz. In Indian thought, his views have a parallel in the dualism of puruṣa and prakṛti in Śāmkhya philosophy.

7. THE SOPHISTS: PROTAGORAS AND DEMOKRITOS

_The Sophists._—The Eleatics had given a view of reality in flat contradiction to the evidence of the senses. Is the world of science any truer than the world of the senses? How can we say that thought is not as misleading as sense is said to be? Human thinking varies from age to age, people to people and even from city to city. The scientific Schools only agree on one thing, viz. that all other Schools are wrong. Such were the sceptical thoughts of the educated men in the middle of the fifth century B.C.

The word "Sophist" is apt to be misleading, on account of the modern sense in which it is used. But even in Plato and Aristotle the Sophist is defined as "a paid huntsman of rich and distinguished young men," and "one who makes money out of apparent wisdom." The "age of the Sophists" is, above all, an age of reaction against science.

_Protagoras_ (c. 500-430 B.C.).—The earliest Sophist was Protagoras of Abdera. Though Plato has given us a caricature of his teaching in the _Theaetetus_, he confesses that it is a caricature and goes on to give a much more sympathetic account of it. We are made to feel that Socrates had a genuine respect for Protagoras himself. His work, referred to by Plato as "The Truth," is the same as "The Throwers," a metaphor from wrestling, meaning an attack on Sensation as a source of knowledge.

His famous doctrine that "Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not," has been much discussed. Who is the "man" who is the measure? Is it the individual man or "man as such"? Plato explains it as meaning that "things are to me as they appear to me and to you as they appear to you." Demokritos also follows Plato. But it is not an immoral doctrine. Plato distinctly tells us that though, according to Protagoras, all beliefs are equally true, one belief may nevertheless be better than another. Thus Plato represents Protagoras as a convinced champion of law against all attempts to return to nature for guidance. He was a strong believer in organized society and he held that institutions and conventions were what raised men above brutes. So far from being a revolutionary, he was the champion of traditional morality, not from old-fashioned prejudice, but from a strong belief in the value of social conventions. Burnet rejects the story of his accusation for impiety as being "highly improbable." It is true that we do not know whether the gods exist or not, but if we
cannot attain sure knowledge, we would do well to accept the recognized worship. That is what we should expect the champion of law against nature to say. There is nothing impious in this view.

"The Homo Mensusa."—Zeller says that Protagoras was not a representative of Individualism in an ethical or political sense. Burnet represents the dictum to mean simply that "theories that set themselves in opposition to the common sense of mankind may safely be ignored." Gomperz gives a "generic" interpretation of the word "man." Human nature or Man-as-such is the "measure" of all things and not the individual man. The dictum, according to him, cannot possess an ethical meaning and cannot be the shibboleth of moral subjectivism. Schiller's Humanistic interpretation of the dictum shows that Protagoras gave a death-blow to the intellectualism and aestheticism which was corrupting Greek thought. This may be called the "individualistico-collectivistic" interpretation. According to this view, the "humanism" of Protagoras covers both "man" and "humanity." Burnet himself does not think it to be "an immoral doctrine." Zeller admits that there is no absolute religion, no absolute morality and no absolute justice, according to Protagoras. He regarded all morals and laws as only relatively valid, that is binding only on the human community which formulates them and only so long as that community holds them to be good.

Demokritos (c. 460-370 B.C.).—Demokritos was a universal mind who embraced the whole of the philosophical knowledge of his time. He was the first among the Cosmologists to include the realm of mental life in philosophy, doubtless under the influence of his great countryman, Protagoras. He was convinced, like Parmenides, of the impossibility of an absolute creation or destruction. But he did not wish to deny the manifold of being, the motion, the coming-into-being and the ceasing-to-be of composite things.

Atomism.—Being and Not-Being, the full and the empty, are declared by Demokritos to be the basic constituents of all things. The full is divided into innumerable particles, which are too small to be perceived. They are separated from one another by the empty, and are themselves indivisible. Hence they are called "atoms" or dense bodies, having no empty space in them. The "atoms" of Demokritos are real in the Parmenidean sense: they have neither come into being nor can they cease to be; they are completely homogeneous in substance, are distinguished only by their shape and size, and are capable of no qualitative change—but only a change of quantity. All qualities of things rest on the shape, size, position and arrangement of the atoms. Nevertheless, there is an essential difference between them, which is recalled in Locke's later distinction between Primary and Secondary qualities. Some qualities (weight, density, hardness), belong to things themselves; others (colour, taste), merely express the way in which the perceiving subject is affected. These atoms, according
to Demokritos, thanks to their different size and weight, are from the very beginning in a state of rotary motion. Thus Motion is transferred to the Primary Substance itself and we need not postulate (as in Empedokles and Anaxagoras) an alien force necessary to bring about motion. By this motion, similar atoms are, on the one hand, brought together, and on the other hand, separate and isolated atom-complexes or worlds are formed by the conjunction of atoms of different shapes. The world to which we belong is only one of such infinite worlds.

Theory of Knowledge.—As the soul is composed of atoms like everything else, sensation must consist in the impact of atoms from without on the atoms of the soul, the organs of sense being “passages” through which these atoms are introduced. The objects of vision are not strictly the things we see, but the “images” which bodies are constantly shedding. The image is not, however, an exact likeness of the body from which it comes: it is subject to distortion by the intervention of air. That explains the relativity of all perception by the medium of the senses. “By the senses we in truth know nothing sure.” Demokritos, however, does not agree with Protagoras in making all knowledge relative. He distinguishes between “true-born” and “bastard” knowledge, the former as distinguished from sense-perception is knowledge through the soul. But as he gives a purely mechanical explanation of this also, there is really no absolute separation of sense and thought in his theory of knowledge. Thought consists in a similar impact on the soul-atoms of the outside atoms.

Ethics.—Just as thought is superior to sense-perception, so reasonable knowledge of the good is superior to the impulses of the senses; peace of soul, the harmonious tranquility of the spirit is superior to pleasure and pain. “The best thing for a man is to pass his life so as to have as much joy and as little trouble as possible.” But Demokritos interprets happiness quite differently from vulgar hedonism. What we have to strive for is “well-being” or “cheerfulness”—a state of the soul. Here we can see the germs of an idealistic theory of conduct in a philosopher who had a mechanical and materialistic theory of nature and reality.

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CHAPTER XXVIII
SOCRATES, PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

1. SOC RATES: c. 470-399 B.C.

In the history of European philosophy there is no name more honoured than that of Socrates, even though there is no book which has come down to us as having been written by him. Personalities are greater than books and the figure of Socrates has come down to us with a vividness that makes him stand out as a colossus among men, as a great prophet and an inspirer, as the greatest Greek, as the greatest European.

Socrates and the Sophists.—Greek philosophy in its earliest years was crude in its metaphysics, but it was fundamentally metaphysical. It was only under the Sophists that it took a new turn and became predominantly humanistic. The Protagorean dictum: \textit{Man is the measure of all things}, became a philosophical dogma and the Delphic \textit{Know Thyself} became the chief inspiration in the Greek philosophical world. Socrates in his generation was looked upon as a Sophist, and in the genealogical tree of Greek philosophy he cannot but figure as the greatest of the Sophists, for he really completed the revolution started by Protagoras and Gorgias, though the Sophists as such represented more loosely strung tendencies of thought than a close-knit system of thought. In Socrates the humanism of the Sophists reached its zenith. He took it as a matter of pride when he said to his accusers: "But the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do with physical speculations." He emphasized again and again that the first duty of man is to know himself. Hence his zest for a searching enquiry into the definitions of virtues. He was true also to the Sophistic tradition when he affirmed man’s right to independence of thought irrespective of laws and social conventions.

But at this point the resemblance between Socrates and the Sophists ends. For if the word \textit{Sophist} has come to have an evil odour about it and has come to mean something despicable in the realms of thought rather than something honourable and praiseworthy, Socrates himself must be held mainly responsible for this change of meaning. He refused to be identified with the vulgar herd of the Sophists of his day. For were they not out to sell knowledge, and how can such a pure seeker after truth as Socrates bring himself down to their level? Moreover the Sophists were subjectivists. To them man was essentially relative to his environment.
and the changing modes of his society. Nothing is right or wrong except as we men make it so. In such a creed are embedded the seeds of anarchy. Socrates was too deep a thinker to be a party to such a creed. He believed in the gods as existing and did not take them to be mere figments of the ignorant human mind. He believed in the objectivity of the distinction between the good and evil which alone can guarantee a stable social existence. He believed in the objective truth of universal laws and was prepared to spend all his life searching for it, and having secured it to die for it. Such a burning sense of the mission of his life could hardly touch the souls of the Sophists and that is why Socrates transcended all Sophists.

*Socrates in Plato and Xenophon.*—Socrates wrote nothing, for with his famous irony he was just intent upon making people believe that he was only a seeker after truth and he sought for it through the medium of conversations with all and sundry. Even in face of the pronouncement of the Delphic Oracle that he was the wisest man of his age, he was content to reduce his wisdom to a full consciousness of his ignorance, while other people pretended to know what they did not really know. There is nothing in the whole range of literature to compare with the conversational zest of Socrates, and that is what has made the *Dialogues* of Plato such a masterpiece of philosophical literature. It has become a problem for Greek scholars to distinguish between the Socrates of history and the Socrates as pictured by the genius of Plato. *Prima facie* there cannot but be a difference between the two. But we have other evidence to show that in essence the Socrates of history was not materially different from the Socrates of Plato’s *Dialogues*. In the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon we find a picture of Socrates without all the glamour of Plato’s poetic art. But we find in Xenophon the same Socrates as in Plato: a strong powerful man with no beauty of face to boast of, moving about from street to street cornering people into talks of great philosophical import. He was a welcome guest to every house where thinking Athenians could meet and discuss the great problems of life, and the audience was not restricted to professional philosophers. It comprised soldiers and generals, administrators and statesmen, Sophists bursting with a sense of their own importance, youths conscious of their own physical beauty and not disdainful of drink and meat in abundance, and others who felt a charm irresistible in the sarcastic but thought-laden questions and counter-questions which made the wisdom of Socrates glitter like gold and left the haughty Sophists humbled in their pride. No one has taken the *Dialogues* of Plato to be exact replicas of Socratic conversations, or Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* to be anything but a matter-of-fact record of a masterly personality by a man of the world, a soldier, without any literary embellishments so as to make facts speak for themselves. But out of the *Dialogues* and the *Memorabilia* there emerges the same Socrates, unique and unmistakable in his greatness.
Logic and Ethics.—It is impossible to look upon the system of thought we find in Plato’s Dialogues as Socrates’ own, even though the ideas are put forth as coming from Socrates himself. So far as the actual philosophical teaching of Socrates is concerned we can say that only two main ideas emerged from him: concepts and definitions of virtues, while his method was peculiarly his own. The first was his doctrine of logic and the second his doctrine of virtue, both meeting in teleology as furnishing the ground-plan for all subsequent idealism.

While the Sophists were content to tinker with the changing shapes of things, Socrates sought to go behind the changes and see the unchanging behind the changing. However individual a man may be, there must be something which makes a man a man, when we have rid a man of all his individual characteristics. That which remains over and is to be found in every man gives us the concept of man, the universal in the individuals. However trite a philosophical doctrine this may sound after it has soaked into the very fibre of mankind for twenty-three centuries, it was a veritable landmark in the evolution of philosophy and made the future development of philosophy possible. The Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine that all knowledge is of the universals goes back to Socrates. Thus the discovery of the concept was the fundamental achievement of Socrates, while its practical application to the definition of virtues gave full rein to his dialectical genius. The concept could have been explored by him in the realms of physics and biology, but this was left to Aristotle in the succeeding generation, while Plato brought out the mathematical implications of the concept. Socrates with his urge to know man focused all his attention on the discovery of the ethical concepts in the different virtues. This was by no means an easy task and yet it was not difficult for Socrates to take up definition after definition of a virtue and show them all up in their unsatisfactoriness till he could so whet the spirit of enquiry among his audience that they would not rest content till they had succeeded in their quest. Temperance was a typical Greek virtue, so balanced and so harmonious. He discussed it in Charmides and sought to analyse it. He made his audience agree that temperance could not be quietness nor modesty nor doing our own business, nor even the doing of good actions, nor self-knowledge. He succeeded in persuading his audience to agree that the basic thing in life is the knowledge of good and evil. Temperance by itself cannot be understood. It is closely related to virtue in general. However negative the conclusion of Charmides may appear, it has led to a better perspective. Socrates is driven to deal with another characteristic virtue, friendliness, with a similar negative result in Lysis. An analysis of courage in Laches leads to the paradoxical conclusion that it is comprehensive of all virtue. These three have generally been accepted as embodying Socrates’ own teaching without much admixture of Plato’s own genius. Socrates’ dealing with wisdom, courage and temperance has brought
out the incompleteness of each of them and the need for a wider virtue which would include all of them, and he found it in justice. Virtues may be many, virtue is one; the unity of moral life is brought out in an exquisitely logical manner, where negations are understood in the light of their positive implications.

The idea that virtue is knowledge has been traditionally ascribed to Socrates. It is easy to criticize it, for Ovid was shrewd enough to say: "I see the better, I follow the worse." We are all aware, too, that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. But it was a part of the greatness of Socrates to believe that if only a man knows what is right he could not possibly fail to act accordingly. The ordinary mortal may know that Socrates was not right in his assumption, but he should be proud to accept the compliment that Socrates paid him by taking man's rationality at its face value and taking for granted his capacity to do what is right. Socrates was right for men as they should be. If men fail to act as they should, it is their misfortune even more than an error of Socrates.

**Personality of Socrates.**—If Socrates had done nothing more than this he would have assuredly found a place in the history of philosophy. But to understand the full significance of his place in philosophy we have to go beyond his teaching to something greater behind it and that is to his personality, for the triumph of Socrates was a triumph of his personality over all the evil influences that corrupted his age. He showed in his life what he taught in *Mono*, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an "instinct given by God to the virtuous," that it "comes to the virtuous by the gift of God."² The task of Socrates as a philosopher was to make explicit what was implicit in himself as a gift from God. No wonder if his life proved to be a more lasting influence than any writing of his could have been.

Socrates was a genuine Greek in his love of beauty. He was not blind to the exquisite beauty of the human body, in the development of which his countrymen so excelled. He could grow rapturous over the symmetry of Alcibiades or the naked form of Charmides. And yet there was nothing vulgar in his attitude, as is so explicitly brought out by Alcibiades when he speaks of "the haughty virtue of Socrates," which treated his advances with disdain.³ He was too much of a thinker not to know the exact limitations of mere physical beauty. Even while admiring the physical beauty of Charmides, Socrates hastens to add: "By Heracles, there never was such a paragon, if he has only one other slight addition."

"What is that?" said Critias.

"If he has a noble soul; and being of your house, Critias, he may be expected to have this."

"He is as fair and good within as he is fair without," replied Critias.⁴

It is in the *Symposium*, however, that the philosophy of beauty and love is dealt with, and the spirit of Socratic teaching is brought out when
Plato writes: "Evil is the vulgar lover who loves the body rather than the soul, inasmuch as he is not even stable, because he loves a thing which is in itself unstable, and therefore when the bloom of youth which he was desiring is over, he takes wings and flies away, in spite of all his words and promises; whereas the love of the noble disposition is life-long, for it becomes one with the everlasting." 5

It follows from his teaching that he would not bother overmuch about his own appearance. Nature had not endowed him with beauty, but he had sufficient sense of humour to justify his uncouth nose, for with his broad open nostrils he could smell better, and if his nose was comparatively flat it enabled him to see better, and if his eyes were protruding he was enabled to see not merely straight but better all round. Happy is the man who can thus laugh at himself and make others laugh with him. Successive generations have enjoyed his delicate sense of humour when a bucket of water was poured over him by his wife after a shower of abuse, and he coolly said that after so much thundering there must needs be rain.

Europe has produced only one figure which has a very marked resemblance to the Indian sage; utterly simple in his life, oblivious of material prospects, disdainful of dress and appearance, whole-heartedly devoted to the pursuit of truth and a perfect example of a jivan-mukta, the Indian ideal of a man who even while living has transcended the limitations of his earthly life. Such was Socrates. He was an ascetic in his own way. He did not make a fetish of fasting or any studied austerity of life. His asceticism took the form of taking life as it came. He did not bother about eating and drinking, but he could enjoy a good meal and enjoy a good drink; for he drank only when he was thirsty and could therefore never get drunk. 6 Bareheaded and barefooted he was content to move about in all seasons. His powerful frame was hardened by the rigours of climate. Verily did he make his body a perfect instrument of his great soul. Neither snow nor sun made any difference to his life, and he marched better than any soldier. In an age when men vied with one another to distinguish themselves in the forum as politicians, Socrates kept aloof from this wild craze, for he was "really too honest a man to be a politician and live." 7

His Historic Greatness.—The real greatness of Socrates shone forth most when he found himself foully accused of impiety and corrupting the youth. He could have saved his life by leaving Athens, but he would not give up his birthright to live in the city to which he owed everything. He was essentially a city man and he felt that his love of knowledge could only be satisfied in a city, for "the men who dwell in the city are my teachers." 8 He could have saved his life by consenting to live in Athens without preaching and carrying on his polemical conversations. But he would not give up his right to seek truth and to preach truth. A few years more of life gained ignominiously would not have given the
world the Socrates we have grown to love and admire. His greatness came out in the last days of his life when he braved the accusers and drank the cup of hemlock with the same serenity as if it had been a cup of delicious wine. Plato's Apology is a masterly dialogue, the finest introduction to philosophy that a student can find and the finest inspiration too, for in it we find Socrates becoming the protagonist of the spirit of truth and the accuser of his accusers, and the world has accepted his verdict, and the "ignorant" and "impious" Socrates has come to be looked upon as one of those rare spirits that exalt humanity, that come to birth periodically, in the language of the Bhagavad-Gītā, to redeem mankind when the world is drowned in sinfulness.

Philosophic Europe has been content to look upon Socrates just as a great teacher. If he had been born in India he would certainly have been looked upon as an Avatāra, an incarnation of Godhead. If he had been born in Palestine or Arabia or Iran he would have figured as a Prophet of God, for he had that in him which distinguished him from all ordinary mortals. He claimed to be guided by an oracle or sign, a kind of voice, which always forbids but does not command. The Daemon within him was an inspiration, an illumination of his soul, which others may accept or reject as they like. He was known to be subject to trances. Symposium records how one morning he could not find a solution of what he was thinking and he stood fixed in thought from early dawn till noon and as wondering crowds gathered round him he continued standing, lost in thought till the next morning.

The greatest glory of Socrates was the pertinacity with which he fought the battle of liberty of thought and the supremacy of righteousness in life, with a courage that could defy death and with a steadiness of vision which could take in the whole of life. It may be that the poetical vigour and picturesqueness of Apology is the work of Plato's genius, but there is no reason to doubt its essential truth as embodying the fundamental principles that governed the life of Socrates. The message of Socrates has come down to us through the centuries, undimmed by time:

"... I believe that no greater good has ever happened in the State than my service to the God. For I do nothing but persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons, or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue comes money and every other good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person. But if anyone says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not; but whichever you do, understand that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times."
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He was fond of describing himself in quaint terms, sometimes as a midwife bringing truth to birth, sometimes as a gadfly “which God has attached to the state, and all day long and in all places . . . always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you,” and sometimes as suffering from that species of madness which is “a divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention.” With his firm faith in God he could give to the merely intellectual teleology of Anaxagoras a warmth and a significance which has been the soul of all European Idealism of succeeding ages. The fine religiousness of Socrates is beautifully brought out by Plato in his Phaedrus when he makes Socrates utter this prayer:

“Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry.—Anything more? The prayer, I think, is enough for me.”

Socrates died a martyr, but his death has enriched the world. He anticipated the great idea of Christ: “But seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.” He knew the right path and pointed it out to his contemporaries and the succeeding generations. We can understand the depth of the meaning of his last words in Apology: “The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die and you to live—which is better God only knows.” Yes, indeed God knows and so too does mankind.

2. PLATO: C. 427-347 B.C.

Plato has always had the reputation of being one of the greatest philosophers, if not the greatest, in the history of European philosophy. Perhaps the greatest individual production of Socrates was his devoted pupil, Plato, for without Plato the world could not have come to appreciate the greatness of Socrates. But Plato’s devotion to Socrates has created problems which are not quite easy to solve, and have not been solved so far. In Plato’s Dialogues from first to last the hero is Socrates. He is the central figure and all ideas seem to emerge from him. Plato like a dramatist is only in the background. Is the teaching in the Platonic Dialogues of Socrates or of Plato himself? Since the main source of our knowledge of Socrates is Plato himself, prima facie it would not be impossible if Plato is merely a mouthpiece of Socrates. On the other hand, all post-Socratic Schools trace themselves to Socrates and they differ so much from one another, as e.g. the Cynics and the Cyrenaics, that it
would be justifiable to conclude that Socrates' own teaching was of such a fluid character that his successors found it possible to take up from him whatever suited their own thoughts or purposes, and that correspondingly Plato's own genius gave a particular twist to the teaching of Socrates. The question left to us now as a legacy by the Dialogues is: Is it Socrates or Plato, or, alternatively, how much of it is Socrates and how much Plato? The difficulty of interpreting the Dialogues is enhanced by the fact that the teaching of Socrates or of Plato is not presented in a cut-and-dried fashion as in an essay or in a treatise. A dialogue is essentially dramatic in character: very interesting, very suggestive, very thought-provoking, but in the end incomplete. The conclusions of the Dialogues are often negative and incomplete, and even while each one of them has a unity of its own, it is difficult to find a complete unity in a large number of dialogues composed across a span of years. On the whole it is safest to conclude that Plato's Dialogues really present the philosophy of Plato himself, though it may have found its inspiration in the personality and teaching of Socrates.

Plato came of an aristocratic family and when he came under the influence of Socrates he was so charmed that he was content to keep his own personality in the background and chose to speak only through the lips of Socrates. When Athens killed Socrates, Plato took to a period of voluntary exile, essayed his hand at constitution-making for Syracuse, and finally returned to Athens and founded the Academy. He has often been looked upon as a dreamer without a firm grip on the facts of life. This is a judgment far from being true, for if he found real values only in ideas and ideals, he also had the zeal of a missionary to see his ideas realized in practice. Though his own contemporaries did not take him seriously and his own pupil, Aristotle, figured as his bitterest critic, time has shown the remarkable vitality of Platonism. When Christian Europe tended to relegate him to dead archives as a mere pagan, the Arabs discovered him, and Al Platon came to be a great vivifying force in Saracenic culture; and the Arabs must be given the credit of giving back Plato to Europe through the Moorish universities of Cadiz and Cordova. Since then Plato and Aristotle have shared the honour of being the two intellectuals that have dominated European culture right down till to-day. Schiller's epigram that everyone is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian has become a part of history, but like all epigrams it expresses only a half-truth. I shall try to show the substantial identity of thought in Plato and Aristotle in spite of the misleading criticisms of his great teacher by Aristotle. The contrast between the two lies more in their method and their approach to problems. Plato is more imaginative, daring, original and poetic in his philosophy. Aristotle is more precise, more scientific, therefore more matter-of-fact, more learned. So the contrast between the Platonist and the Aristotelian reduces itself to a
fundamental difference in temperament, idealistic versus scientific. But even here man is far too complex to be bound within the framework of an epigram. For if Darwin with his growing scientific studies lost his ear for music, Einstein still finds in music his greatest joy. The fact is that a man can be both a scientist and an idealist, an Aristotelian and a Platonist in varying proportions. If one prefers Plato to Aristotle or vice versa, it may itself be due to a difference in temperament, and to exalt one at the expense of the other would not be philosophic.

Apart from the historic importance of both, it cannot be denied that the worth of their teaching has not lost its importance for the modern world. In fact in the writings of Plato we find a note, not so much Greek as modern, and he was a modernist before modernism. In spirit he belongs to modern Europe, and though twenty-three centuries divide him from our age we can hail him as a leader in the timeless democracy of truth. In his attitude to women, politics, labour and racial regeneration we find him to be a feminist, a State absolutist, a socialist and a eugenicist respectively. But to understand any portion of Platonic teaching it is necessary to understand his great Idealism which is the be-all and end-all of his philosophy.

*Metaphysics.*—Platonic Idealism definitely has its birth in the Socratic teaching of the Concept: that which expresses the essence of a thing, that which makes a thing what it is, and yet something that is free from all particular qualities. From this it is not difficult to draw the further conclusion that the Concept or the Idea as Plato prefers to call it, is a sort of an ideal in a supersensible world. Socrates does not seem to have drawn this conclusion. Whether Plato really drew this conclusion is a question on which scholars are acutely divided. This confusion goes back to Aristotle who was too matter-of-fact to believe that the essence of a thing can be anywhere else than in the thing itself. But he took the personifications of poetic Plato very literally and criticized him for the dualism he created by speaking of things in this world and their Ideas as having a supersensible existence. This criticism, coming as it did with the authority of Aristotle, tended to perpetuate the idea that the Ideas of Plato constituted a world apart. That Plato did often use language that implied this separation cannot be denied, as e.g. in *Timaeus*: "Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving any thing into itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted only to intelligence. . . . And there is another nature of the same name with it, and like to it, perceived by sense, created, always in motion, becoming in place, and again vanishing out of place, which is apprehended by opinion and sense." Passages like these give a plausibility to Aristotle's interpretation of Plato's Ideas, and scholars of succeeding centuries down to
Zeller have been content to accept this interpretation. But more recently new interpretations have been forthcoming which do not accept that Plato's teaching was really different from what Aristotle himself taught. We may briefly summarize these new interpretations as follows:

1. The doctrine of Ideas in Plato as found in the different Dialogues is really not a consistent homogeneous doctrine, and there is an earlier view and a later view. Such is the view developed by scholars like Jackson, Windleband and Professor Burnet, though not in exactly the same way. The gravamen of the distinction is that the earlier dialogues were the dialogues of Plato's immaturity, in which he just tried to follow Socrates by accentuating the distinction between the sensibilia and the concepts. Hence Professor Burnet speaks of the Socratic Dialogues and the Platonic Dialogues in which Plato outgrows the cramping influence of his Master and begins to utter his own thoughts in later and markedly more metaphysical dialogues like Theaetetus, Parmenides, Sophistes, The Statesman and Philebus. This development could not have been impossible, for pupils at one stage or another can grow into rebels, as Aristotle himself did in his generation, and Jung and Adler have done in ours. But then the question is complicated by the fact that even in these Dialogues Socrates continues to be the dominating figure, though the Ideas as interpreted in these later Dialogues are a negation of the Ideas existing by themselves in a supersensible world. The Ideas are in the things themselves and become the principles of explanation, the universals that are embedded in the particulars, giving a unity to the multiplicity of things. Does it mean that Socrates is criticizing himself of his younger days or that Plato has turned a rebel, but is unwilling to admit it and prefers to give the criticism of the earlier views as coming from Socrates himself? For either of these views there is no natural explanation. Plato would be a bad pupil of Socrates if he was afraid to proclaim the truth as he conceived it, even if he differed from his Master. If Plato was guilty of this, he wrote his great Apology in vain. Socrates contradicting himself or consciously criticizing himself without making an open admission of his earlier mistaken views also appears to be unreal.

2. Hence we are driven to the second alternative championed by Jowett that there was no earlier or later draft of the Theory of Ideas, that there was no real contradiction in Plato's exposition of his doctrine, that at bottom the teaching of Plato constituted a consistent piece of theory. Though in the various Dialogues it underwent a certain development which gave rise to an apparent inconsistency, the inconsistency was only of language, which in trying to bring out the full complexity of Ideas emphasized different facets like the well-known Indian story of four blind men interpreting an elephant in different ways, apparently contradictory and yet perfectly reconcilable in the intrinsic harmony of the object itself.

Stewart is much more definite in his Plato's Doctrine of Ideas in assert-
ing the fundamental consistency of Platonic teaching, and if there is a variation in language which gives an appearance of inconsistency he finds the explanation in the fact that Plato was not only a philosopher but also a poet and a man of religion. To a poet personification comes as easy as it possibly can, and Plato often lapsed into the language of poetry, for it was as natural to him to speak like a poet as like a philosopher. Take, for example, the interesting passage at the end of Book IX of The Republic. Socrates has been waxing eloquent over the perfection of his ideal Republic and Glaucot slyly asks where this city will be, "for I do not believe that there is such a one anywhere on earth." And Socrates replied: "In heaven there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he who desires may behold, and beholding may set his own house in order. But whether such a one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter; for he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other." The passage is interesting and instructive. The first part may easily be taken to imply that in heaven there is really an actually existing city of Socrates' dreams, but then he talks like a philosopher and drives home the point that whether such an ideal state exists or not does not matter so long as it serves as an incentive to a higher life. And this in brief is the real worth of ideals. Their real worth consists not in actual existence but in their teleological value. The teleology of Socrates develops in Plato into a full-fledged idealism. If in the earlier Dialogues there was a tendency towards the personification of Ideas as ideals, in the later philosophical Dialogues there is little of rhetoric and a good deal of hard thinking which seeks to establish the unity of an Idea and its various manifestations in things. A bare multiplicity of things is unintelligible without the unifying force of their Idea, while an Idea by itself without its actual manifestation in things would be a mere abstraction. Thus does Plato solve the problem of the relation of many and one, of thought and things. There is no mere thing, everything is rooted in thought. Thus does all philosophy become Idealism.

The existence of Ideas as embodied in things still leaves a plurality behind, but the urge of all Idealism is towards unity and we find this fully brought out in Plato. If the multiplicity of things is resolved in the unity of Idea, the multiplicity of Ideas also inevitably tends to be resolved in the broader and broader Ideas till in the end they all meet in the Idea of the Good. This is the most vital part of Platonic metaphysics as developed in The Republic. In The Republic it is urged: "You have often been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this." Our intelligence becomes blurred and confused when we are faced by the multiplicity of things which can give rise only to opinions differing from man to man like the four blind men and the elephant. But when our intellect rises to the level of Ideas we grasp the universal and attain knowledge.
"Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either; and as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honour yet higher." In short, what the sun is in the visible world, the Idea of the Good is in the world of ideas. The sun makes things visible, the idea of the good makes all things intelligible.

Republic.—Plato's Republic has overshadowed all his other Dialogues in fame, for it undoubtedly brings out the many-sidedness of his genius as no other Dialogue of his can aspire to do. It is for that very reason that it has been looked upon as a masterpiece in world's literature, while to a student of philosophy it offers the best introduction to every branch of philosophy. The Republic, as its name implies, is a book on politics, but only because it was found difficult to define justice in an individual without studying it in the broader perspective of the State. So it is in its origin ethical. The art of government leads on to the topic of education, and The Republic becomes a book on Pedagogics as well. Pedagogics involves gymnastics and art and literature and then we find a refreshing discussion of poetics and aesthetics. The State as involving the best life of man comes face to face with the problem of racial regeneration and The Republic becomes an embryonic text-book on what we have come to know as Eugenics as well. But all these details of man's life become illuminated only in the light of Ideas and the Idea of the Good and so The Republic becomes a great book on metaphysics too.

While this great book as a whole presents us with a Utopia and the world has generally a vague idea that Plato is essentially a dreamer, a close study of his works shows how alive he was to the facts of life. All his fundamental ideas are to be found in The Republic and other Dialogues throw light on his views as developing during his long life. A summary of it will serve to bring out the whole of Platonism. The first book raises the question of defining justice and affords a brilliant example of Socratic irony especially in dealing with the verbose pomposity of Thrasimachus, a Sophist. After this preliminary skirmishing real serious discussion begins with the second book, but justice in the individual or justice in the moral sense of the term presents difficulties so that the discussion of justice in the larger sense, i.e. in the State, becomes expedient. The genesis of the State brings out its co-operative character, involving the division of the citizens into three broad classes: the rulers or the guardians, the soldiers and the masses with slaves to carry on the routine
work, leaving the citizens free for political and other intellectual pursuits. This division is also based on the psychological distinctions between reason, the spirited part and the appetitive part. The guardians represent reason, the soldiers represent the spirited or active part, while the rest represent merely the appetitive part. It follows that the State can function satisfactorily only if the three divisions function satisfactorily, i.e. the wisdom of the guardians, the courage of the soldiers and the temperance of the masses meet in the highest virtue of the State: Justice. This explains also justice in the individual. When reason in an individual rules and his spirited part carries out the behests of reason and his appetites are controlled by his temperance, there automatically emerges justice in the individual as the harmony of his soul.

Who are to be the guardians? Naturally those in whom reason or wisdom predominates. One might have expected that with the smug self-satisfaction of man, Plato would have reserved the guardianship only for the males. But Plato would not allow himself to be carried away by the male prejudices of contemporary Greece. If the Greek wife was a drudge kept under strict control through her ignorance, there was the inspiration of the Hetaire. No great Greek but had his Hetaire: the great Aspasia of Pericles and Diotima of Socrates. They were educated and accomplished, full of wisdom and a source of inspiration to men. If women can be so wise, why should they be deprived of the opportunities of service, and why should the State be deprived of their services? On the quaint analogy of a bitch being as good a watch-dog as a dog he argues magnificently for the equality of the sexes. If the world did not accept his idea and had to wait till the twentieth century for its realization it was not the fault of Plato—on the contrary it brings out his greatness all the more, and establishes his right to be called a modernist.

Since the prosperity of the State depended upon the wisdom of the guardians, he was most careful about their selection and their selection depended upon their ability to pass a most rigorous course of education. That is how The Republic becomes the earliest book on Pedagogics in Europe. In Protagoras he slashed the shortsightedness of parents in entrusting the education of their children to the Sophists, of whose capacity they knew nothing and he stoutly maintained that "there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and drink,"19 for "knowledge is the good of the soul" and can be truly had only from them who have true knowledge. In the Laws he deprecated the education which "aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and justice" as "mean and illiberal, not worthy to be called education at all."21 In spite of the traditional Greek antipathy for barbarians, Plato in his Alcibiades dwells with gusto on the whole Persian system of training which produced a Cyrus, with its emphasis on riding, archery and speaking the truth.
Education.—In *The Republic* he dwells mostly on the education of the guardians, for on them turns the realization of his Utopia. Centuries before Froebel and Montessori he emphasized the importance of training in the nursery and the principle of freedom. "... a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind." 22

Golden children are specially sorted out to be trained as future guardians. With the example of Sparta before him he was quite conscious of the importance of building up the body, which is to be completed by the age of twenty. For ten years the correlation of sciences is to be studied, and for five years thereafter the study of philosophy or dialectic will fit the guardian to shoulder his responsibilities for fifteen years. After that the philosopher-kings will be at liberty to devote themselves completely to philosophy with but occasional intrusion into the whirlpool of politics. 23

It is as a part of the education of the guardians that Plato develops the Idea of the Good with which we have already dealt. It is closely connected with the great idea of Philosopher-kings which the so-called practical people tend to brush aside as a sample of Plato's Utopianism. "Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils—no, nor the human race, as I believe—and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day." 24 Mere politicians may sneer at this, and the man in the street jaded by the usual chicanery of politicians may hold up his hands in despair, but Plato was fundamentally right because the art of government is the most difficult and only they who are physically strong and mentally endowed with knowledge can lead to the redemption of the world. Plato was an aristocrat and the experience of Periclean democracy was not such as to win him over to democracy. He was wedded to State absolutism, in which the authority of the guardians is unchallengeable, but this authority rests purely on their disinterested character and devotion to the State, not on their wealth or mere power to do what they liked. The State exists not for mere life, but for the "continuance of the best life while we live." 25 It implied not mere superiority or inferiority but a spirit of friendship. In *The Laws* he says "there is no greater good in a State than that the citizens should be known to one another." For only on this basis can true friendship be developed. Such a State can only be a city State so beloved of the Greeks.

Communism.—Within such a small State there is the recurrent idea in Platonic *Dialogues* that friends should have everything in common, and that leads to the communism of wives and property which Plato allowed
himself to advocate for the guardians, but which has shocked the conscience of many. Communism of property was a feature of primitive societies and has come to be the ideal of modern communists and has even been exalted as a high moral ideal in which man is content to be satisfied with his bare needs and does not cast covetous eyes on others' goods to have more and more for himself. Communism of wives, too, was a feature of primitive societies, but no civilized society has ever sought to countenance it. How could Plato the philosopher, the great moral teacher, come to advocate such a feature in his Republic? This paradox could be understood not in the light of ordinary human psychology of sex, but only in the light of Plato's exalted motives. Plato was rigorously puritanical in his demand that the guardians should devote themselves wholly and solely to the service of the State. Having a family would come in the way of this disinterested service as it has done in endless cases, one of which may be cited as an arresting illustration. In the time of Lord Nelson Prince Carracioli of the Neapolitan fleet was charged with the offence of deserting his king and leaguing with his enemies. His defence was purely human, though the strict letter of the law would hardly condescend to look at it. After speaking of the "cowardly desertion of his subjects by the sovereign himself," the Prince proceeded to say: "It is known to you, gentlemen, that my patrimonial possessions lay in the city and that my family is large. If I had not succumbed to the ruling power, my children (here his emotion was shown by the altered tone, the quiver of the lip, and the suffusion of the eyes; he quickly conquered his emotion and continued in the same stern tone) would have been vagabonds in the land of their fathers. Gentlemen, some of you are parents, and I appeal to your feelings; let each of you place yourself in my situation and say how you would have acted." Family love is merely the love of an expanded self. To strike at this family love is to strike at selfishness. Religious monasteries whether in Roman Catholicism or in Buddhism and Hinduism are all an attempt to keep away from the lure of the family. Plato's injunction against individual marriage for guardians had the same motive. But unlike religious monasticism he was deeply interested in the preservation of the racial stock as well. He was conscious of the racial value of these guardians specially selected even as little children and nurtured through long years. He felt it would be a waste of precious sperm if they were not to leave progeny behind, as fine as themselves. The result was hymeneal festivals where male and female guardians would mate, but the children as soon as born would be separated from their mothers so that parents would not know their children and children would not know their parents. They would be brought up in special nurseries under the best auspices. It is a quaint teaching. His has been the solitary voice in its favour, but there is no vulgarity in it, on the contrary there is a sublimation of the sexual act in the interests of the State. It is
of some pathetic interest to realize that Plato himself saw the futility of his own ideas and when years later he came to write his *Laws* he gave up his communism of wives, even if limited to guardians, and spoke of marriage in eugenic terms. "Every man shall follow not after the marriage, which is most pleasing to himself, but after that which is most beneficial to the State." 27 For Plato marriage was first and last a social affair, an affair for the State. So much so is this the case that he would not countenance the idea of a healthy person living unmarried. "But if a man will not listen, and remains unsocial and alien among his fellow-citizens, and is still unmarried at thirty-five years of age, let him pay a yearly fine," 28 an interesting anticipation of the tax on bachelors.

**Eugenics.**—Plato was not conscious of the science of Eugenics, a term which was coined by Sir Francis Galton as late as in 1882. But the Spartans in their fanatical devotion to bodily development would not let a deformed child or a weak child grow up. They would rather let it die by exposure. Parental feelings were not allowed to come into conflict with the duty of rearing healthy children in the best interests of the State. Plato did not hesitate to take up this negative eugenics. In *The Republic* itself he says: "those who are diseased in their bodies they will leave to die." 29 Cruel though it all sounds to generations that have been accustomed to a different climate as fostered by Christianity, it cannot be denied that there is a good deal to be said in favour of Plato's views, provided, of course, our knowledge of eugenics and medicine were so perfect as to enable us to judge which cases of infants and invalids admit of a healthy growth, and which are beyond all cure. The proviso is a difficult one, but assuming its feasibility it would be difficult to deny that euthanasia has a case, for putting an end to the agony of an incurable disease is a ruthlessness which can claim kinship with the highest kindness. In such a society as in mediaeval Europe dominated by the extreme individualism of Christianity, in which every pious soul regarded this life as a mere transition stage and as a preparatory ground for the joys of heaven, the great ideas of Plato could have had no soil to flourish in. Where each individual in a sickly way nourishes his own salvation, and holds out a helping hand to others as a payment to get a footing in heaven, the eugenics of Plato cannot but appear weird and cruel. But the essential morality of Platonic teaching comes out when we compare its elevated motives with the indiscriminate slaughter of embryos so common in Christian Europe to-day, or with the savage indiscriminate infanticide of girls in uncivilized races.

Plato even indulges in a somewhat dogmatic fashion as to the need of a man marrying a girl with a contrary disposition to his, so as to secure balanced children. But it would be unfair to take his remarks very seriously, when even in the twentieth century we are still groping in the dark about the mystery of sex and birth. Perhaps a day may come when the
future will vindicate his eugenic speculations, as the past has already proved his foresight in the matter of feminism and politics. The invigorating touch of his philosophy does not begin and end in futile speculations, "the idle sign of an empty day." It essentially lies in its titanic power to make man think and face problems instead of passing them by with a vague shrug of the shoulders.

Aesthetics.—There is one aspect of Plato's Aesthetics which deserves more than a passing notice. In his educational theory he stresses the love of music in its broad sense of humanities. He would foster all virile music: songs that enthuse us, poetry that makes us heroic, philosophy that makes us virtuous. Contrariwise songs that are soft and enervating and poetry that revels in the vices of the gods and goddesses are to be totally banished from the State. Not merely such poetry but even the poets who write such poetry are to be banished from the State. A poet banishing poets is the funniest paradox in the pages of Plato, and the one portion in Plato's scheme of education which is most open to attack. His critique of poetry and poets is not at all worthy of a man of his temperament and his breadth of outlook. Although in the Lysis he admits that poets "are to us in a manner the fathers and authors of wisdom," in The Republic itself he plays a mere rhetorician and argues that poets are useless. They have been neither legislators nor generals nor inventors. They have contributed nothing to the improvement of mankind, an idea which goes counter to the close kinship between poetry and philosophy which can be found in all countries and all ages. The confusion in Plato's mind is by no means clarified when he takes up the indefensible attitude of branding all artists and poets as mere imitators, who are thrice removed from truth. The explanation for Plato's antipathy to poets is to be found in his puritanism. Unfortunately every age has its fanatical puritans who think that the only way to make life moral is to make it dull, joyless, spiritless. From age to age the conflict between the dullness and the fullness of life continues, and the pendulum swings backwards and forwards. Men have yet to realize that the highest morality is attained through the fullness of life, and not by starving our aesthetic cravings.

Plato's idea that man's whole life is a course of education made him think that at every stage of his life a man's reading should be rigidly controlled. It has to be admitted that all art is not equally healthy any more than it is equally beautiful. There are books and pictures that may not be fit for the young, for as Plato says in The Laws the boy is the most unmanageable and most insubordinate of animals; therefore he has to be controlled by mothers and nurses and teachers. But from this, even if true, it does not follow that a man's whole life at every stage should be controlled by the ideas of nurseries and girls' schools. It would be a poor compliment to Plato's Pedagogics if even after years of strenuous discipline a man is not free to read what he likes or cannot be trusted to
browse at his ease among books of all sorts. Ovid's *Poems* and Rousseau's *Confessions* may not be ideal text-books for young souls to feed on, but a man's morality must have its foundations in sand, if it cannot withstand such a dose of reading. The attempt to wrap up a man's intellect in the woollen garments of censorship has always had a deleterious influence on social growth.

The trouble about Plato's Republic was that though based on very revolutionary ideas it tended to become rigid, for Plato was most nervous that the perfection he sought to achieve should be marred by any tinkering with his basic ideas. He had a deep faith in the idea that "when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the State always change with them," a saying profoundly truthful as a statement of fact, but Plato gave it a conservative twist by insisting that "any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State, and ought to be prohibited." No wonder when the whole delineation of the ideal republic is completed, Glauc with naive simplicity said: "You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors faultless in beauty"—indeed, faultless in every way except that they lack the movement of life.

It has to be admitted that Plato's diatribes against poets were directed primarily against Homer and Hesiod, who had transformed gods into vicious men with immortality added. It was this tendency that Plato was grappling against and on the whole under the limitations of Greek mythology there was some truth on Plato's side. Where he failed was in universalizing as a precept what was perhaps desirable in the case of Greece. Lesser men can afford to be provincial in their outlook. Poets and philosophers of the highest rank have to be universal in their appeal. However inviting the poets of Greece may have been for a rigorous onslaught, and whatever justification Plato's critique of Greek poetry may have had, it must be put down to the debit side of his genius that he failed to appreciate the true significance of art. We may deny the theory of art for art's sake and insist that all art must be ultimately moral; but it need not be moral by putting on the garb of ascetic severity. He would betray a disappointing lack of intellect who would censure *Macbeth* as fomenting disloyalty, *Othello* as encouraging conjugal jealousy, *Anna Karenina* as making for marital unhappiness, or *Vanity Fair* as delighting in the sharpness of Becky. The morality that Plato aimed at was the ghost that would flaunt its robes in a world from which all evil had been banned. But even while noting this shortcoming we cannot but bend our knee in honour of that moral earnestness which was the inspiration of his metaphysics and politics alike. With a touching vehemence the Athenian stranger is made to say in *The Laws*: "I have spoken with vehemence because I am zealous against evil men; and I will tell you, dear Cleinias, why I am so. I would not have the wicked think that having the superiority in argument, they may do as they please and act
according to the various imaginations about the gods; and this zeal has led me to speak too vehemently."

Myths.—It is refreshing to turn to Plato himself as a poet from his onslaught on poets. The poet in Plato expresses himself in his famous Myths. All philosophers have at one stage or another had to face the inadequacy of language to express their highest thoughts. Plato was no exception to the rule, but where his intellect failed to express itself his imagination stepped into the breach, The Myth of the Den in The Republic is beautifully explanatory. Plato tries to bring out the inferiority of the sensible world in comparison with the world of Ideas as the world of reality. When to the man in the street nothing can be more real than the things of sense, how to convince him that he is wrong? Plato does it by means of an analogy. Suppose there is a cave with an opening and a man is inside the cave with his back to the opening so that he is able to see only the shadows of the real people moving about outside the cave. So long as he sees only the shadows, the shadows must be taken by him to represent the real, for he has never seen what causes the shadows. If he is taken out of the cave and is brought face to face with the real objects he doubts their reality, for his reality is comprised within the shadows only. So too is the man in the street like the man in a cave. He sees only what appeals to his senses and he takes them to be the reality, whereas the reality of the Ideas eludes his understanding. The sensibilia are to him what the shadows are to the man in the cave. An abstruse metaphysical argument becomes pictorialized and intelligible.

Eschatology.—It is admitted that the Greeks had no clear conception of the immortality of the human soul. The Hades was merely a place for the ghosts of the dead to flit about in and it had no moral significance as heaven or hell. It is doubtful whether even Socrates was fully alive to the moral implications of immortality. But Plato was most alive to it. No European philosopher has essayed so many interesting, if not wholly convincing, arguments to prove the immortality of the soul. It is a recurrent topic in his Dialogues: Meno, Phaedo, Republic, Symposium, Laws. Plato knew the impossibility of proving it in logical terms but the conviction of his soul can be presented in a pictorial myth. The Vision of Er in The Republic seeks to describe the journey of Er after death and his sojourn before his rebirth on earth again after he had enjoyed the fruits of his deeds in his earlier birth. There is a continuity in this series of lives, but the consciousness of it is lost through quaffing the waters of the river of Unmindfulness.

If Plato denied the utility of poetic imagination as a moralist, he yet proved its utility in his own case, for a poet can see as far as a philosopher and being free from the trammels of logic can express himself in the universal language of poetic imagery.

There are many things in Plato’s Dialogues which cannot but appeal to
the Indian mind. Did he borrow them from the Brahmin seers who are reputed to have visited Greece or through Pythagoras, whose insistence on the theory of transmigration links him with the thinkers of India? The question is difficult to answer, though to an Indian it would be a matter of pride to say that the greatest Greek philosopher borrowed his best feathers from India. A generation ago Dr. Urwick made a brilliant effort in his Message of Plato to show that Plato’s Republic owes many of its most vital thoughts to the influence of India. Platonic psychology of reason, the spirited part and the appetitive part *prima facie* bears a striking resemblance to *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* of Indian philosophy. The Indian triad, however, is definitely more ethical in its connotation than Plato’s terminology, though subsequently he bases his doctrine of virtues on his psychology. It is possible to make much of such resemblances as Professor Urwick does, but on the whole it remains a very doubtful question whether Plato had come directly or indirectly under the influence of Indian Philosophy. Similar ideas often arise in different minds in different countries. This happens with scientific ideas even to-day though the world is so much smaller than it ever was before the days of the wireless and the aeroplane. Much more was this possible in the olden days of the bullock carts when ideas moved slowly from one part of the world to another. Even assuming that Plato was influenced by India or Iran, it is impossible to overlook the peculiarly Greek stamp of all Plato’s Dialogues. He is metaphysical, but his metaphysics is rooted in this life. He emphasizes it because it gives a completeness to the education of the guardians so that they can be all the better guardians. The role of the philosopher is not merely to think, but to act. The greatest aim of Plato was to bring into being an ideal State, and when he found how difficult it was, his last and longest endeavour was to produce his Laws, and develop a State not so ideal as The Republic, but one practicable and most conducive to human happiness. Like the Greeks generally Plato was intent on making the best of this life.

This was not the aim of the *Upaniṣad*ic sages of India. Their aim was to obtain *mokṣa* or deliverance from the cycle of births and death. Earthly existence is not the end-all of life, still less the be-all of life. It is only a stepping-stone to something higher. The *Upaniṣad*ic seers were not interested in developing an ideal society or State and this justifies the conclusion that Plato remains Greek and the Indian sages remain Indian. In Neo-Platonism we are far nearer the soul of India but Neo-Platonism was not Platonism, and European philosophers have not hesitated to say that the glory of Greek philosophy passed with the death of Aristotle and Neo-Platonism marked only the culmination of the decay of philosophy in Greece.
3. ARISTOTLE: 384–322 B.C.

If the embryonic ideas of Socrates were broadened into a system by the genius of Plato, it would be equally true to say that the embryonic system of Plato was developed by Aristotle into a full-fledged system with a book devoted to every conceivable subject known to him or even perhaps to posterity. If Plato overpowers us with the force of his imagination, Aristotle's industry and analytical genius leave us lost in wonder. No one has deserved more the appellation which Dante conferred on him as "the father of them that know," for the world has not produced another genius with so encyclopaedic a range of interests.

Plato's Dialogues, ostensibly devoted to some particular topic, were often chaotic in their contents, and if we had to deal with his views on a particular subject we would have to ransack all his Dialogues and collect the material scattered over some five volumes. Aristotle preferred to write a treatise on each subject so that his views are all cut and dried. His method, too, is of great interest, for in every case he would summarize the teachings of his predecessors on the topic he happened to handle, subject them to a shrewd critical analysis and then propound his own views in as pithy a fashion as possible. We miss in him the glitter and glow of Plato, but we gain in knowledge and a correct grasp of problems. If Plato was more original in all the humanistic subjects, Aristotle was more original in his study of the sciences, and all science goes back to him. A mere mention of his works gives one an idea of his industry and his wide interests. Apart from his Organon, the basis of all subsequent books on Logic in Europe, his Metaphysics, Ethics, Economics, Politics, Rhetoric and Poetics, are still of living interest and read by millions. There is also a long list of his works of more or less only historical interest: Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, On the Soul, Short Physical Treatises on Memory, On Dreams, and On Propheysing by Dreams; History of Animals, On the Parts of Animals, and On the Generation of Animals.

Aristotle started as a pupil of Plato and must have been the greatest among his fellow-students. But it is not difficult to realize that the imaginative fervour of the master must have left the acutely analytical pupil rather cold. It is clear, too, that the pictorialness of Plato was taken far too literally by Aristotle and hence his mistaken interpretations and criticism, which have added to the difficulties of Platonism, none too simple by itself. A breach was inevitable and Aristotle started the Lyceum against the Academy, and his peripatetic habit gave a new name to his School. Belonging to Macedonia, he was appointed tutor to Alexander the Great and gave an intellectual bias to a mind so restless and to a spirit so ambitious as Alexander's. Belonging to a family of physicians he had
a chance to develop his scientific genius. The rest he owed to Plato, from whom he really did not differ in fundamentals as will be explained later.

Science has always been a rapidly developing subject and the scientists of one generation are apt to be forgotten by the succeeding generations. If Aristotle is not forgotten, it is a tribute to his work and worth, but it is doubtful whether his scientific works are read to-day by anyone except a few who are interested in the history of science. As an example of his method of approach we might note how he begins to deal with a subject like dreams which remained obscure till the genius of Freud succeeded in extracting sense out of the nonsense of dreams. He begins his De Divinatione Per Somnum (On Prophesying by Dreams) thus: "As to the divination which takes place in sleep, and is said to be based on dreams, we cannot lightly either dismiss it with contempt or give it implicit confidence. The fact, that all persons, or many, suppose dreams to possess a special significance, tends to inspire us with belief in it (such divination), as founded on the testimony of experience; and indeed that divination in dreams should, as regards some subjects, be genuine is not incredible, for it has a show of reason; from which one might form a like opinion also respecting all other dreams." 38 The cautious tone of this beginning is typically Aristotelian, enhanced all the more by the more or less negative conclusion to which he is driven, when he classes prophetic dreams with mere coincidences. What is of importance in this short treatise is not that he had anything pertinent to say, but that his enquiring mind did not hesitate to grapple with a difficult and perplexing problem. Prophetic dreams are apt to be traced to God, but Aristotle would not countenance it, for he attributes the capacity to dream to lower animals as well, though he does not explain how he came to discover this. He notes particularly that such prophetic dreams are sent to persons of inferior type, and he concludes therefrom that they could not have been sent by God, though he does affirm that "they have a divine aspect, for Nature (their cause) is divinely planned, though not itself divine." 39

In the short space available it would be best to devote some attention to the three topics which show Aristotle’s genius and influence at their best: Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics and Politics.

Logic.—Formal Logic or Deductive Logic is practically identical with Aristotle’s Logic. This by itself is a great testimony to his genius that succeeding centuries have seen but a few modifications here and there in his main superstructure. What surprises us is that such a genius did not seriously tackle the problem of Inductive Logic which had to wait till the days of Bacon, or even perhaps of John Stuart Mill. Mere syllogistic argument gave a certain dogmatic character to Aristotelianism, which became the ideal of scholastic philosophy in the Middle Ages, while it came in for a good deal of harsh criticism, e.g. at the hands of Bacon, which should have been aimed rather at the Aristotelians than at Aris-
totle himself. But Aristotle has survived Bacon's onslaughts. His treat-
ment of the Categories, though arrived at empirically, is the work of
genius. Substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation,
condition, action and passion are the fundamental forms of the actual.
These categories do not purport to describe things by their actual quali-
ties. They merely point out the different aspects which may be kept in
view in any description. The doctrine of the predicables and of the syllo-
gism has become the part and parcel of a graduate's training in all the
universities, whatever his subject may be. Aristotle did not look upon
Logic as a specialized subject. He rather looked upon it as a sort of intro-
duction to all subjects, for Logic is nothing but methodology and no
subject can be studied without method. It was a porch which led to all
subjects.

\textit{Metaphysics}.—The most fundamental subject in Aristotle is what he
called First Philosophy or Theology, but which later generations have
come to know as metaphysics. This term was used by one of the first of
Aristotle's editors, Andronicus of Rhodes, who placed First Philosophy
after Physics and called it metaphysics—after Physics—a name which
has been retained by subsequent generations.

The function of science is to investigate the grounds of things, and the
function of the highest science is to deal with the most universal grounds
of things. In this sense it becomes First Philosophy. It comes before the
particular sciences, though it may follow physics in arrangement, and
since Aristotle came to identify Substance as the ultimate category with
God, the subject came to be spoken of as Theology also. But in the Chris-
tian era theology came to have a close connection with Christianity as a
revealed religion and so has now come to be quite distinct from meta-
physics.

With his scientific proclivities Aristotle started with individual things,
but as a philosopher and an apt pupil of Plato he saw something over and
above mere individuals. "If there is nothing apart from individuals, there
will be no object of thought, but all things will be objects of sense, and
there will not be knowledge of anything, unless we say that sensation is
knowledge. Further, nothing will be eternal or unmovable; for all per-
ceptible things perish and are in movement. But if there is nothing
eternal, neither can there be a process of coming to be; for that which
comes to be, and that from which it comes to be, must be something, and
the ultimate term in this series cannot have come to be, since the series
has a limit and nothing can come to be out of that which is not." 46 In
Book IV, Chap. I, he carries this argument to the logical conclusion that
"there is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes
which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the
same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others deals
generally with being as being." 47 This being is identified with substance,
though even in Aristotle the usual ambiguity which attaches to the term is not completely absent, for the term *substance* is used with reference to individual substances as well. But in metaphysics he uses the term as applicable to the ultimate being. *Prima facie* this being should correspond to Plato's Ideas, but Aristotle takes particular care to have his own doctrine distinguished from Plato's. He takes Plato's Ideas as existing by themselves in a supersensible world and criticizes them as a figment of Plato's imagination. He insists that the individual objects are real but that each of them has a universal aspect. This universal does not exist by itself but only in the individual objects. It is from this standpoint that he develops his doctrine of the Individual and the Universal. In our discussion of Plato we have already seen that Plato's teaching as developed in his later *Dialogues* like *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus* and *Sophistes* was exactly the same as Aristotle's and that in his criticisms of Plato's Ideas Aristotle allowed himself to be misled by the rhetorical and poetical language of the earlier *Dialogues*.

What Aristotle disowned as Ideas, he admits as Forms. If Ideas were really self-existent, it would be justifiable to use a new term *forms* to distinguish it from Ideas. Since a form represents the universal in the individual, all knowledge being of the universals can only be of forms. The form is the essence of a thing, but for its actuality it requires matter. So all becoming requires matter as well as form. Matter is a variable entity, changing its significance, e.g. in man rationality is form and animality is matter, in an animal life is form and its body would be matter. Matter by itself is only the possible, which is made actual by Form. Thus *prima facie* we get a dualism of form and matter, but nothing exists which is not a union of the two. Matter is a bare possibility and does not exist by itself, Aristotle makes an exception in the case of pure Form, unmixed with matter, and identifies it with God or Divine Spirit.

Since the physical world is always becoming, the problem of causation becomes of great importance. Aristotle looks upon all causation as fourfold. Everything must have a material basis, for without a material cause nothing can be. What gives actuality to matter is form, and so the formal cause becomes most important. But to make form act on matter there must be some agency and that is efficient cause. Lastly there is the final cause which brings out the purpose why an individual thing has come into existence. Though his followers in later ages over-emphasized the final causes and stood in the way of scientific development, from the philosophic standpoint final causes as bringing out the teleological aspect of things have their own legitimate place in the scheme of things, and bring out the true relationship between the Idealism of Plato and of Aristotle.

Causation implies motion and motion shares in the eternity of form and matter. But if the idea of motion is to escape infinite regress it must end in something which is unmoved and unmovable, and that is Pure
Form or God. In fact the necessity to have something unmoved to explain motion is one of Aristotle’s arguments for the existence of God. He couples with this the idea of teleology and we get the conception of God as "a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration, continuous and eternal, belong to God; for this is God." In so far as Aristotle’s God is not a person, he can be described as a deist rather than as a theist.

Fundamentally in metaphysics there is no difference between Plato and Aristotle. Both are idealists, though neither of them can be said to be pure theists, with a bent towards pantheism. Whatever ambiguity there may be in Plato, Aristotle’s teaching is more clear and definite and his *Metaphysics* has served as a model for all books on the subject during the succeeding centuries.

*Ethics.*—The Idealism of Aristotle takes a more definite shape in his humanistic works: *Ethics* and *Politics*. As in his *Organon* or Logic Aristotle has succeeded in producing in his *Ethics* a book which has served as a model for succeeding centuries and countless generations have learned the significance of a scientific discussion of ethical problems from this book. In the East generally ethics is so intermixed with metaphysics or religion that it has no book which goes to the bottom of ethics as a secular subject capable of a purely scientific treatment.

Though systematized, Aristotle’s *Ethics* follows in the wake of Platonic teaching. Accepting the old psychology of reason, spirited part and appetitive part, Aristotle takes up a discussion of the virtues based on this psychology, but instead of looking upon justice as a synthesis of wisdom, courage and temperance, he distinguished between the intellectual and the moral virtues. In order to act morally we must know wherein morality consists and this is the task that can be performed only by the intellectual virtues like wisdom, prudence and science. While wisdom is broader and is “the union of scientific (or demonstrative) knowledge and (intuitive) reason about objects of the noblest nature,” science is a ‘habit or formed faculty of demonstration” and prudence is more definitely concerned with practice so that it needs knowledge both of general truths and of particular facts, but more especially the latter.”

He defines it as a “formed faculty that apprehends truth by reasoning or calculation, and issues in action, in the domain of human good and ill.” Up to a point he accepts the Socratic dictum that virtue is knowledge, for without knowledge virtue is not possible, but he does not go so far as to identify the two, for while wisdom and reason may tell us what we should do, we may fail to implement our knowledge in action which is definitely moral in character. There is a more detailed treatment of moral virtues, very analytical too, in Aristotle than in Plato. With an exquisite sense of balance he defines moral virtue as “a habit or trained faculty of choice, the characteristic of which lies in moderation or observance of the mean relatively to the persons concerned, as determined by
reason, i.e. by the reason by which the prudent man would determine it." So a moral virtue is a mean between two extremes and he attempts to apply this criterion to all the virtues he deals with. He comes to difficulties in dealing with the basic virtue of temperance, for it should be a mean between profligacy on the one hand as denoting excess and something on the other as denoting deficiency. But like a true Greek, alive to the beauties of life, he fails to find this other extreme which can only be asceticism. He cannot conceive of a man "who found no difference between one thing and another" and naively concludes "We have no name for such a being, because he does not exist." Similarly he finds difficulty in dealing with truth as a mean, for truth is truth and departure from it cannot be gauged in terms of excess or defect. But he ingeniously finds the two extremes to be boastfulness and irony, which Socrates had so familiarized his contemporaries with. Justice again presents a great difficulty. The Romans gave it a stern rigidity: *iustitia ruat coelum*. Justice by its very nature can know no excess or defect. But Aristotle has to bring it within the four corners of his definition of virtue as a mean, and he tries to place justice between doing injustice and suffering injustice, which cannot be regarded as real extremes. In fact suffering injustice is a misfortune rather than a vice of which one need feel ashamed. The distinction he draws between legal and moral justice is quite pertinent. But we miss in Aristotle's treatment that magnificent sweep with which Plato deals with justice in the State and in the individual.

His *Ethics* finds its culmination in his picture of the high-minded man. He looks upon high-mindedness as "the crowning grace, as it were, of the virtues; it makes them greater and cannot exist without them." Poised between vanity and little-mindedness, he finds it easier to give a graphic picture of the high-minded man as a sage than an abstract analysis of the virtue of high-mindedness. This picture brings out the Greek ideal of a man and its limitations. It is quite intelligible that he should be perfectly good and have all the moral virtues and wisdom and prudence too, and that he should not think too much of wealth and power and that he should be open in his dealings. But he is also pictured as looking down upon his inferiors, as conferring, but not receiving, benefits. He does not like to be reminded of obligations received, i.e. gratitude is not a virtue. He is dignified to the great and polite to the middle classes, always trying to assert his superiority, though he does not care for men's praise, he is not expected to be fond of gossip and scandal. Even such non-moral attributes as a slow gait, deep voice and measured speech are noted with Aristotelian punctiliousness.

It is an interesting picture of all the virtues meeting in one man and bringing out the importance of a harmonious development of all our faculties. On the other hand it brings out too the inherent weaknesses of the Greek ethical ideal. There is in the picture an emphasis on haughtiness
and a palpable lack of humility. There is no recognition of benevolence and love as the most important virtues, though the sense of justice and the spirit of friendliness inculcated by Aristotle would go far to mitigate the evil effects of a lack of desire to serve others. Aristotle’s high-minded man stands out in vivid contrast to the Christian saint or the Hindu rsi. There is a consciousness of self-importance in him which is almost a burlesque of high-mindedness, giving him the air of a tragic hero.

The general aim of Aristotelian Ethics may be described as happiness. “But if happiness be the exercise of virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it will be the exercise of the highest virtue; and that will be the virtue or excellence of the best part of us.” Thus it is clear that it is not to be identified with mere pleasure as has been done by the English hedonists of the nineteenth century. The word happiness has come to be so debased by the Utilitarians that it would be but fair to distinguish Aristotle’s theory as Eudaemonism.

It speaks much for Aristotle’s cautious precision that in the very beginning he makes it clear that in Ethics we “can attain only to so much precision” as the subject admits of, “for the same degree of accuracy is no more to be expected in all kinds of reasoning than in all kinds of handicraft.” He also makes it clear that the good he seeks is the same for the individual as for the State, and so looks upon Ethics as a “sort of political enquiry,” thus reiterating the doctrine of Plato’s Republic. But unlike Plato he rigidly pursues his enquiry into the individual good without bringing in the State, till at the end of the book we come across the words “Let us begin then” as an expression of his conviction, so typically Greek, that the individual good is realizable only in the State and so Ethics can only be a part of, or an introduction to Politics.

Politics.—In his study of politics Aristotle brings to bear on it the same industry and the same depth of vision that mark his other works. Tradition has it that his Constitutions comprised a study of some 150 constitutions, but it survives only in the fragment on the Constitution of Athens. It bears witness to the extreme importance of politics in the life of Greece. His Politics agrees with Plato’s in substance, though he can hardly be expected to endorse the extreme idealism of The Republic. Aristotle’s book divides itself into three parts: the first part, comprising Books I to III, is sociological in character; the second part, Books IV to VI, deals with actual states in a realistic fashion; and the last part, Books VII and VIII, deals with the State as it ought to be. Apart from the method, historical and analytical, Aristotle agrees so much with Plato that in the short space available we may as well omit the details, for in Aristotle too we find the same distrust of democracy, the same distinction of the six types of state, the same bias in favour of aristocracy or even a great good king, the same justification for slavery and the same enthusiasm for the city-state. Neither the teacher nor the pupil could read the signs of the
times and appreciate the fact that the ideal of the city state was doomed, for it could not escape the inherent dilemma, as Sabine has so aptly pointed out: "It could not attain self-sufficiency either in its economics or its politics without adopting a policy of isolation, and it could not isolate itself without suffering stagnation in that very culture and civilization which Aristotle regarded as its crown of glory." The general importance of Aristotle's Politics may be briefly summarized as vindicating the authority of the State as the realization, and not as negation, of individual liberty and in his recognition of economic forces as affecting the life of the State. The growth and decay of constitutions as well as the theory of sovereignty have become so embedded in the whole texture of European political thought that we are hardly conscious of the deep originality of Plato and Aristotle in this sphere. Aristotle in his classification of the states closely followed Plato. Royalty and tyranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, polity and democracy were the pairs of good and evil in governments. Recognizing the value of Royalty, he yet admitted that in practice a polity could be the best type of government, where the will of the people expressed itself in reasonableness, whereas pure democracy would be just a next-door neighbour to anarchy.

The State represented the supreme authority in Greek life and thought. Christianity in the person of the Roman Catholic Church waged a losing war against the Greek tradition in European life, and in Europe to-day the State, inevitably expanded into large Nation States, reigns supreme. If the East has aspired to political freedom and recognized in the State the supreme means of solving all the problems of life, Greece may well claim to have conquered the world much more effectually than Alexander's armies ever did.

Poetics.—Prima facie Aristotle's writings do not affect us with that literary glow we always associate with a masterpiece of literature. But if Europe has learned to be critical, in order to be appreciative, of great literature, paradoxically the credit for it must go to Aristotle. In his two works Rhetoric and Poetics we find the main principles of the science of criticism laid down. The standards have varied during the ages, and romanticism and realism may have gathered force in ways which could not be justified on the basis of Aristotle's canons, but the canons of the critics themselves have been moulded by him, and the figure of Aristotle still seems to dominate the modern world of literary scholarship. It is not possible to share with the Middle Ages their deifying attitude towards Aristotle, but it is equally not possible to fail to recognize that modern Europe could not have been what it is without Aristotle.

Conclusion.—Socrates, Plato and Aristotle constitute a triad of philosophical teachers and pupils unmatched in the whole world. Who was the greatest of them all? In which order is their greatness to be evaluated? These are questions which defy clear-cut answers, except as based on mere
personal prejudices or prepossessions. The massiveness of Socrates' personality, the wide range of Plato's thought and imagery, the thoroughness and the ant-like industry of Aristotle—how can they be compared and evaluated? They were so alike and yet so different. If Socrates was the inspirer, Plato kept the Socratic tradition alive and made philosophy a live force, and Aristotle built up a library of learning by himself. They may have learned from the East, as the East has learned from them. If the West has yet to learn and acquire that peace which passeth understanding, the East has to learn that zest for life which made the Greeks such lovers of beauty and such champions of liberty and such masters of learning. The State has always existed whether in the East or the West, and has always exercised force and bent the wills of the subjects to the imperious will of the rulers. The future has yet to realize the dreams of Plato and Aristotle that the State is not for mere life but for the best life, that true liberty is found in willing obedience to the State, that the State has to aim at the culture of all its citizens and to realize it, before it can lay claim to have justified its existence. It is a task in which the East and the West have to work both together, for in the kingdom of knowledge and human happiness there is neither East nor West.

NOTES

18. ibid., p. 205.
23. ibid., pp. 241-4.
24. ibid., pp. 170-1.
28. ibid., p. 155
33. ibid., p. 112.
34. ibid., p. 214.
37. ibid., p. 330 f.
39. ibid., p. 628.
41. ibid., Book IV (1), p. 1003a.
42. ibid., Book XII, p. 1072b.
44. ibid., p. 185.
45. ibid., p. 192.
46. ibid., p. 187.
47. ibid., pp. 45–7.
48. ibid., p. 95.
49. ibid., p. 115.
50. ibid., p. 337.
51. ibid., p. 3.
52. ibid., p. 3.

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CHAPTER XXIX

JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

The history of Jewish Philosophy does not commence until after the Biblical period had run its full course, and the essential outline of the Jewish Faith had been clearly fixed. Unlike Indian or Greek Philosophy, it arises not from a free and spontaneous movement of the pure Reason, breaking away from the traditional forms of religion, but as an effort towards harmonizing the tenets of the Jewish Faith with philosophic teachings that held sway at successive periods of Jewish history. It is, therefore, fraught with all the tension inherent in an ambivalent attitude. Its fundamental problem, like that of Islamic and Christian Philosophy, is summed up in the formula "Faith and Reason."

Jewish Philosophy makes its appearance, and is developed, not as a product indigenous to the soil of Palestine, but in communities of the Diaspora. First the Jews living in the cultural sphere of Alexandria came under the spell of the Hellenistic civilization, and felt the need of reconciling their Jewish heritage with the Stoic-Platonic philosophy dominant in that age and environment. From the second century B.C. until the middle of the first century A.D., a literature sprang up in which Biblical concepts became increasingly overlaid with Stoic and Platonic elements of thought. It reached full maturity in Philo of Alexandria (c. 30 B.C.-A.D. 40), whose mystical bent drew him irresistibly to the Neoplatonism which had been inaugurated by the great Stoic teacher Posidonius in the first century B.C., and seemed to reflect the deepest tendencies of the age. Philo pursued this trend much more resolutely and with infinitely greater success than Posidonius. One may justifiably assert that the decisive factor in his accomplishment was the Jewish component which compelled him to seek the unity of the world in a wholly transcendent principle which was, at the same time, immanent in all being. The Biblical concept of God stresses both the transcendence and the immanence of the Divine Power. Philo could, therefore, accept neither the Platonic notion of God as the Idea of the Good which was the "measure of all things," nor the Stoic concept of Logos as an all-pervading divine principle. Plato's God was wholly transcendent, the Stoic deity wholly immanent. Posidonius had built up an impressive monistic system by identifying Plato's Ideas with the Stoic Logos. He saw the universe as a graded totality rising in a hierarchy of beings from stone to plant, animal, man, demons and gods. But his system was essentially pagan and pantheistic. Philo anchored the Posidonian cosmos in the supreme Reality of God who was transcendent and yet "filled the universe." The Platonic Ideas in whose image
the world is framed have their reality not outside the Creator's Mind (as in Plato's *Timaeus*), nor are they transformed into immanent principles of a dynamic world process, but become the Ideas of God, the Divine Mind in process of Creation. The Philonic Logos, it must be emphasized, is not a divine principle but merely the first creation of God. It reflects the order of the visible universe, the pattern thereof as created in God's Mind. The essence of God remains unknown. Philo is anxious to guard the concept of God against all forms of pantheism, and therefore adopts a strictly negative theology. He may have derived it from a passage in Plato's *Parmenides* where the One is described as having no name nor being spoken of and defined as inaccessible to knowledge, perception or opinion. But he sought to give it a legitimately Jewish character by reading into it the Biblical statement in which God declares His Name to be "I AM THAT I AM" and which Philo takes to mean "My Nature is to be, not to be spoken." Through Philo, this verse has become a *locus classicus* for scholastic ontology.

With Plato and Aristotle, but in striking contrast to the Biblical view, Philo sees the essence of religion in the contemplative life. Echoing Plato's famous image of the Cave, he compares those unable to rise to the contemplation of the Ideas to "dwellers in perpetual night" who "disbelieve those who live in the daylight." In terms which are borrowed from the descriptions of the philosophic Eros in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, he describes the genuine philosopher's yearning for the "Forms of good" when, "smitten by its ideal beauty," the mind follows the archetypal pattern of all virtue and "beholds with ecstasy its most divine loveliness." But whereas in Plato's view the Eros finds fulfilment in the ultimate vision of the One, Philo's love of God is an end in itself since the soul of man belonging as it does to the order of created beings, can only "love God but not behold Him." The mystical trend in Philo's thought may also be noted in his interpretation of the Socratic maxim, "Know thyself" which, in the Stoic view, bore the meaning: "He who knows himself knows the Divine." We have to learn "to live in the soul alone," to migrate from body, sense and even speech in order to find God in the peace of our mind. Religion, therefore, is identical with true philosophy. Prophetic inspiration is but the consummation of the philosophic quest for Truth, and described as something akin to the mystical experience of "illumination from above." In its most elaborate form, this view is expressed in Philo's mystical theory of the "Light Stream" which emanates from God and is perceived by the "Eye of the Soul," a theory which is deeply steeped in Graeco-Egyptian mythology. But the concept of an illumination from above has its root also in Philo's personal experience of "inspiration" which he occasionally describes with remarkable psychological insight.

The fusion of the Jewish and Stoic-Platonic philosophy which Philo
was able to achieve meant a complete transformation of the essence of
the Biblical religion. Revelation, in the Biblical sense, is not concerned
with timeless Being or metaphysical truths. It is rather bound up with
Time, historical situation, action and purpose. The prophets of Israel,
the spokesmen of Biblical revelation, are not philosophers but interpreters
of history. "For the Lord God will do nothing without revealing His
counsel unto His servants the prophets." History, in the prophetic
view, is not the "eternal recurrence of the same," the cyclic repetition
of the Great Year, but the field of Divine Revelation and human
response. God makes Himself known, not in the changeless essence
of His eternal Being, which is forever closed to man, but through time-
situations and the meaning they carry as revelations of God's Love and
Judgement. It is precisely the historical event, the fleeting moment, which
is fraught with a significance pointing to the Divine. It is here that the
prophetic consciousness differs most profoundly from that of Greece and
India where Time is swallowed up in Eternity, and the quest of the
religious mind is for the changeless, abiding Reality beyond the flux of
Time. There is this further difference. Biblical religion puts the emphasis
on right action rather than on philosophic speculation. Man cannot attain
to the knowledge of God's essence, but he can become His co-worker in
the spiritual sphere by imitating His attributes of goodness, love, mercy
and justice. The prophets of Israel insisted that a man should "know
the Lord," but they interpreted the "knowledge of God" as the outflow
of action rather than the result of mere contemplation. In Philo's
philosophy, the distinctive features of the Biblical religion are submerged
in the ideal of the Contemplative Life.

The influence of the new pattern which Philo's thought created can
be felt right down the Middle Ages and is shared by Judaism, Christianity
and Islam alike. Philo's writings owe their preservation to the care with
which they were studied by the Christian Church Fathers from the
Alexandrian School (Clement and Origen) down to John of Damascus
(d. c. 749), the spokesman of Eastern Christianity in the Islamic sphere
of culture. Philo's historical significance lies also in the fact—stressed by
H. Guyot and F. Heinemann—that his triad of God-Logos-World paved
the way for the mature Neoplatonic system of Plotinus which was to
dominate Islamic and Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages.

For nine centuries—from Philo to Saadya—Jewish philosophic activity
ceased. Alexandrian Jewry had lost its creative impulse, and the rabbinic
academies of Palestine and Babylonia, absorbed as they were in the study
and expansion of Jewish sacred literature, felt little or no inclination
towards philosophy. What there existed of speculative endeavour in the
religious field was attracted to Gnostic thought, the influence of which
is noticeable in the apocalyptic writings, scattered Talmudic and
Midrashic references, the ecstatic hymnology of Hekhalot mysticism and
kindred tracts describing the ascent of the soul into the celestial realms. The only systematic treatise of a quasi-philosophical character is the Sefer Yetzirah ("Book of Creation"), written probably between the third and sixth centuries AD, which approaches the problem of cosmology from a background of late-Hellenistic, possibly Neoplatonic mysticism, and may represent, as Leo Baeck surmised, a Jewish version of Proclus' The Elements of Theology.

The rise of mediaeval Jewish philosophy—the most vigorous and sustained form Jewish speculative thinking has assumed—is again due to the impact of environment. The brilliant revival of classical Learning and Philosophy, which was initiated under the aegis of the Abassid caliphs in the ninth century AD, and which lead to the "Hellenization of Islam," made a powerful impression upon the Jewish communities under Muhammadan rule. The Jews took a prominent part in all branches of culture, and soon began to engage in philosophic activity which followed, in large measure, the lead given by the Islamic Schools but did not lack in originality and in an influence of its own.

The initial phase of mediaeval Jewish philosophy may be designated as that of Kalam, seeing that the Islamic movement of that name provided the pattern on which Jewish discussion formed itself. As A. J. Wensinck has shown, the rise of Arabian Kalam was stimulated by the influence of John of Damascus, and thus a great deal of Philonic thought reached the Islamic and Jewish mediaeval world in this roundabout way. The outstanding representative of Jewish Kalam philosophy is Saadya (A.D. 882–942) who was born and educated in Egypt and acted as Rector (Gaon) of the famous rabbinic Academy of Sura (Babylonia). His Book of Doctrines and Beliefs reflects, in the arrangement and treatment of its topics, the influence of the Mu'tazila, the liberal wing of Kalam, which was predominantly concerned with the rational vindication of God's Unity and Justice. Saadya was able to blend Kalam rationalism with the ripe wisdom of the Jewish tradition. His philosophy is, therefore, not merely a Jewish variant of the Mu'tazilite Schools. It has a wider and more comprehensive vision. He freely employs Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic and Neoplatonic elements of thought as they suit his trend of argument. He shows himself closely acquainted not only with Greek thought but also with Gnostic speculation, Indian philosophy and Christian theology. Philosophic truth was, to him, the result of a persistent and methodical effort of human Reason. Revelation, on the other hand, presented the same truths dogmatically. Why, then, is Revelation at all necessary? The answer to this question given by him is that men are prone to be negligent in the pursuit of truth, and may, if unaided by Revelation, never arrive at the goal. The Scriptures, therefore, provide him with those truths which are essential for his intellectual and spiritual guidance. Saadya believes in the pre-stabilized harmony of Reason and
Revelation. God, who is the author of both, cannot contradict Himself. But while defending the need for Divine Revelation, Saadya is emphatic in his demand that one should try to understand rationally what religion taught authoritatively.

Saadya's arguments for Creation are deduced from the principles of Aristotelian physics, but he used them in the service of the Biblical concept of *Creatio ex nihilo*. Hellenistic Jewish philosophy had adopted Plato's dualism of the material and ideal realms, and conceived the creative act of God as a mere fashioning of primordial matter. Saadya introduces into Jewish philosophy a clear awareness of the incompatibility of the Jewish doctrine with either the Platonic notion or the Aristotelian concept of the eternity and uncreatedness of the world. In a chapter remarkable for its breadth of knowledge, he both reviews and refutes the great variety of cosmologies current in his age, and stresses the philosophic significance of the Biblical viewpoint. Equally important is his doctrine of the Divine attributes. Here he follows the tradition of negative theology which Philo had established and which had assumed a certain dogmatic urgency in view of the rise of the Christian doctrine of Trinity. Both Islamic and Jewish *Kalam* took up the position of negative theology with the avowed object of cutting the ground away for any possible suggestion that the different attributes of God constituted so many distinct aspects or persons in the Divine essence. Saadya maintains that the three attributes of Life, Power and Wisdom are implied in the very notion of a Creator God. It is due to the deficiency of human language that they cannot be expressed in one single term.

In stating the Jewish position *vis-à-vis* the various philosophic Schools and religious faiths, Saadya became the founder of mediaeval Jewish philosophy. His influence made itself felt in the very citadel of orthodox Judaism, the rabbinic academies of Babylonia. Samuel ben Ḥofni (d. A.D. 1013) and Hai Gaon (d. A.D. 1038), both rectors of the schools of Sura and Pumbedita respectively, adopted Saadya's rational theology. Jewish *Kalam* remained the guiding star of Oriental Jewry, particularly in the sectarian community of the Karaites who rejected the rabbinic tradition and recognized the authority of the Scriptures only. Joseph Albasir and his disciple Joshua ben Jehudah (eleventh century A.D.) follow the Mu'tazilite pattern much more closely than Saadya had done. As late as in the fourteenth century, Karaita *Kalam* still flourishes in the East as is evidenced by Aaron ben Elijah's *Eẓ Hayyim* ("Tree of Life")—written in 1346—which upholds the full-blooded rationalism of *Kalam* against the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian trends in later Jewish philosophy.

With the extinction of the great Babylonian academies in the middle of the eleventh century, Oriental Jewry loses its dominant position in Jewish life, and the centre of gravity shifts to the West, notably to Spain.
where for a period of over four centuries Judaism experiences its most illustrious phase of Diaspora existence. It is here that mediaeval Jewish philosophy reaches both its zenith and gradual decline. The sober period of *Kalam* rationalism now gives way, in the first place, to one of profound spirituality and mystical fervour. Its keynote is provided by the influence of Neoplatonism which completely overshadowed, for the time being, that of Aristotle. It has been the Neoplatonic professors, as Renan has shown, who, after the closing of the Academy, had not only brought Aristotle into prominence but also falsified him by presenting his philosophy in a Neoplatonic garb. Their commentaries which were widely studied by Islamic and Jewish thinkers, helped to establish the Neoplatonic brand of Aristotelianism so much in vogue in the mediaeval period. In addition, a more genuine Neoplatonism was mediated to the West by such spurious writings as the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, a compendium of Books IV–VI of Plotinus’s *Enneads*, and the *Liber de causis*, containing excerpts from a work by Proclus. The *Liber de causis* was particularly well known in Jewish circles and translated into Hebrew not less than four times. Alkindi, Alfarabi and Avicenna had welded the elements of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism into impressive systems the influence of which began to make itself felt amongst Jewish philosophers from the middle of the twelfth century onwards. The eleventh century and the first half of the twelfth are dominated by the mystical outlook of Neoplatonism rather than by Aristotelian principles. There is also a great deal of Gnostic and Hermetic influence alive in that period.

The great fascination which Neoplatonism held was due to the fact that it presented the totality of being as one all-comprising system, descending from the highest to the lowest. Matter was no longer a principle utterly foreign to the Divine but represented merely the lowest rung of the cosmic ladder. In this hierarchy of being, the place held in the gradations of existence also determined the order of value, and the destiny of all being. Everything had emanated from the One, and everything was meant to return to its source. It was the destiny of man to rise from his entanglement in Matter, and to partake in the bliss of the spiritual realm. This concept of the contemplative ideal was much more akin to the Jewish attitude than had been the earlier Philonic notion which was nurtured on the Platonic heritage. It involved not merely an intellectual but, to use a modern term, an “existential” approach to the mystery of Being, and called upon man to transform the very essence of his life in order to reach the goal of his destiny. The Jewish Neoplatonists could therefore combine the ideal of the mystic with the practical piety which formed the substance of Jewish teaching. In their philosophy, contemplation and action form an almost indivisible whole. It is through action that the soul is purged of its baser elements and enabled to reach the goal of eternal bliss in the contemplation of God. Religiously prescribed
action assumes the character of a spiritual discipline essential for the attainment of man's ultimate destiny.

In Solomon Ibn Gabirol (c. 1020-1050, possibly A.D. 1070), poet and philosopher, this Neoplatonic philosophy found a deep echo. His *magnum opus*, *Mekor Hayyim* ("Fountain of Life") became known to the Latin world through the translation made of it under the title, *Fons Vitae* by Dominicus Gundissalinus in collaboration with Abendeath, a baptized Jew of Toledo. Owing to the corruption of Gabirol's name into Avicelbron or Avicembrol, he was held by the mediaeval schoolmen to be a Christian. His work exercised a notable influence on the scholasticism of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Gabirol's system is interesting from two aspects. Firstly, it introduces Aristotle's distinction of Matter and Form into the very heart of theology by deriving the dual structure of all being from a duality inherent in God Himself. Gabirol, though uneasy about his daring step, was driven to it by the consideration that both Matter and Form must have their ultimate source in the supreme Reality of God. Secondly, he describes the formative principle in God as the Divine Will. For Plotinus, Will is but a name for God's freedom and necessity. That God is free does not mean that He could have acted otherwise than He did. As Dean Inge put it, "The Absolute is all necessity, as being subject to no necessity." Absolute freedom is equal to absolute necessity. This concept could hardly be regarded as compatible with the Biblical notion of a Creator-God who was all Will and Power, and who had called the universe into being by His Word and Command. Gabirol therefore introduces into the Neoplatonic system of necessity the Biblical concept of Divine Will. He identifies this Divine Will with the formative principle in God, and opposes it, as it were, to the essence of God which is the source of Matter. The freedom and spontaneity of the Divine Creative act is thus limited by the dark nature of God's essence. The dialectic involved in the human artist's creation—resistance of matter to form and the triumph of form over matter—is thus foreshadowed in the nature of Divine creation. Gabirol's differentiation between the essence and Will of God is not strictly maintained. At times, he describes the Will as mediator between Matter and Form; sometimes he obliterates the duality of the two aspects in God by identifying the Will of God with the Divine Wisdom. The latter term denotes obviously the element of essence rather than of Will, seeing that in God's Wisdom or Intellect the essences of beings are foreshadowed. Yet in spite of the obscurity which surrounds Gabirol's notion of the Will of God, it has brought to light the fundamental cleavage between the Neoplatonic and the Biblical view of Creation.

The most popular among mediaeval Jewish thinkers is Gabirol's contemporary Bahya Ibn Pakudah whose *The Duties of the Heart* (written between A.D. 1080 and 1090) has become the standard work on Jewish moral philosophy and a manual of the spiritual life. The "duties of the
Heart” such as sincerity of faith, humility, and love of God should inspire the “duties of the Limbs,” i.e. the ceremonial observances. There is a sprinkling of asceticism in Bahya’s ideal of the devotional life, which is due, in some part, to the influence of Islamic mysticism, and has its immediate source, as I. Heinemann has shown, in an Arabic treatise of Hermetic origin. The much-debated question as to whether Bahya was also influenced by Gaazzali, the great Islamic mystic, has been settled in the negative. Gnostic influence is pronounced in the treatise *On the Nature of the Soul* which has been wrongly attributed to Bahya, and which probably belongs to about the same period. In describing the descent of the soul through the celestial spheres and zones of elements until it reaches earth and enters the body, the book shows itself under the spell of Gnostic sources, especially in their Hermetic form.

Abraham bar Hiyya of Barcelona (in the early part of the twelfth century) is the first mediaeval Jewish thinker to employ Hebrew as a medium for philosophic discussion. Before him Arabic had been exclusively used for this purpose. He adopts the usual Neoplatonic triad of World, Soul and Intellect, but adds two more stages, which he calls the Worlds of Light and Dominion (Speech). The latter term is possibly a variant of the Logos, as Julius Guttmann has suggested. Of great interest is his attempt to establish a philosophy of history, modelled on Talmudic, Gnostic, Christian, and Islamic concepts. The periods of world history are said to correspond to the Seven Days of Creation described in the *Book of Genesis*; man’s corruption through the Fall of Adam has been remedied only in one particular line of his descendants, i.e. the people of Israel, in whom the rational soul is preserved in its original purity. Abraham Hiyya’s naturalistic interpretation of the peculiar character of Israel as the “Chosen People” is influenced by the Islamic version of the Gnostic Anthropos myth, and merely gives it a Jewish colouring. Strangely enough, a similar concept prevails in the otherwise deeply spiritual philosophy of Jehudah Hallevi, the celebrated poet-philosopher (c. 1085—c. 1141), whose dialogue *Kuzari* ranks as the most popular philosophic presentation of Judaism. It bears, in the Arabic original, the title *Book of Arguments and Proofs in Defence of the Despised Religion*, and is almost contemporary with the Abelard’s *Dialogue between a Jew, a Philosopher and a Christian*. Jehudah Hallevi, like Gaazzali, places the intuitive knowledge of the prophet above the speculative knowledge of the philosopher. The “God of Aristotle” is the Deity of rational theology, a mere “First Cause,” the “God of Abraham” is the personal, living God of religious experience, the God of revelation. The prophet is endowed with a suprarational disposition which enables him to reach the “angelic” stage, and to commune with God.

From about the middle of the twelfth century the influence of Alfarabi and Avicenna became more pronounced, and Jewish philosophy took a
turn towards a stricter form of Aristotelianism. The first work in which the new trend found expression is Abraham ibn Daud’s *The Exalted Faith* (1161) which contains a spirited attack upon Gabriol. It was soon eclipsed by Moses Maimonides’ (1135–1204) famous *Mishneh Torah* (“Guide of the Perplexed”), the most important work of mediaeval Jewish philosophy, which exercised a profound influence on all subsequent Jewish thought and, through Latin translations, on Christian scholasticism as well as on European philosophers in the periods of the Renaissance and of modern Aufklärung. It shares neither the naïve rationalism of *Kalam* whose principles it closely analyses and refutes, nor the mystical faith of the earlier Neo-Platonists, but clearly delineates the respective provinces of demonstrable and revelational truths. It breaks new ground in Theology by its incisive treatment of the doctrine of Divine attributes; in cosmology by joining issue with Aristotle’s theory of the eternity of the world; and in the interpretation of Jewish Law and ritual by evolving the novel viewpoint of comparative religion. Maimonides, like his predecessor, Abraham ibn Daud, recognizes in Aristotle the principal philosophic authority. His arguments for the existence of God follow the Aristotelian pattern. In addition, he develops an argument, first suggested by Avicenna, which postulates, on logical grounds, a necessary Being whose existence follows from its essence, and is transcendent to all contingent being. This Necessary Being is an absolute Unity. Following the Neo-Platonic tradition of negative theology, Maimonides explains in his elaborate doctrine of attributes that no positive statement, except that of existence, can be made of God. Two kinds of attributes only are admitted, those of “negation,” which exclude imperfections from God, and those of “action,” which describe His relation to the world without impinging on the mystery of His essence. The latter, which includes God’s moral attributes, are the ones that matter most from the aspect of religion.

Maimonides’ conflict with Aristotle concerns the problem of Creation. The alternative between the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world and the Jewish concept of *Creatio ex nihilo* is tantamount to the choice between an impersonal God, from whom the world emanates by necessity, and a personal God, endowed with will, who creates the world freely. Neither of these doctrines can be rationally demonstrated, and the decision is therefore to be left to the authority of prophecy. Maimonides argues against Aristotle that the law of causal necessity which operates within the created world does not apply prior to creation. God remains in control of the physical laws of nature. The possibility of miracles is thus safeguarded, but Maimonides tends to allegorize the miracles narrated in the Bible.

The core of Maimonides’ philosophy is his theory of prophecy. The prophet is superior to the philosopher, but not as Jehudah Hallevi had
it, on account of a suprarational disposition. There exists no faculty higher than the rational, but as a result of supreme intellectual training and moral conduct a person whose mind is concentrated on “God and the angels” may receive flashes of intuition, which illumine both the rational and imaginative faculties of his soul and give it insight into metaphysical truths denied to the discursive thinking of the ordinary philosopher. The overpowering vision of the prophet requires for its absorption and expression the use of symbolic images. Hence the pictorial character of prophetic speech and the necessity to interpret it allegorically. In addition to being a perfect philosopher, the prophet is also the lawgiver of the ideal state, and thus represents Maimonides’ version of Plato’s “philosopher-king,” following the precedent of Alfarabi and, ultimately, of Philo.

Although Maimonides was a younger contemporary of Averroës, there is no evidence that he was acquainted with the works of this most radical of the Islamic Aristotelians at the time when he wrote the Guide. If he knew them, he certainly took little notice of them. For in all points at issue between Avicenna and Averroës, he adopts the views of the former. During the last phase of mediaeval Jewish philosophy, however, Averroës comes increasingly to the fore. His popularity among Jews is best illustrated by the fact that of his numerous writings almost all were translated into Hebrew, some of them more than once, and that a host of commentaries were written on them by Jews. The outstanding Jewish Averrist of the late mediaeval period is Levi ben Gershom, known as Gersonides (1288–1344) whose The Wars of the Lord—by its opponents mocking called “The Wars Against the Lord”—attempts a fresh reconciliation of Judaism and Philosophy on a strictly Aristotelian basis. Creation means that the plurality of Forms contained in God is released and imparted to the prima materia, the substratum of being. Gersonides thus upholds the concept of Creation in Time, but sacrifices the Biblical notion of a Creatio ex nihilo which Jewish Philosophy from Saadya to Maimonides had been so eager to defend. The activity of God is spent in the act of Creation; the governance of the world is regulated by natural causality. Prophecy is knowledge of causal necessity applied to a concrete situation. Like Aristotle, Gersonides sees in God the Prime Mover who is absorbed in the thinking of His own thinking. The problem as to how such a notion can be reconciled with the Biblical concept of Divine Providence did not escape Him. If God is entirely Self-Thinking Intellect, how can He have knowledge of particular and individual things? The answer given by Gersonides is that God does not know the individual qua individual, but only in so far as it is embraced and conditioned by the universal order of things.

Gersonides also reverts to the Aristotelian position when he comes to the problem of Divine attributes. That problem had played a major part in Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, and held a place similar to the one
occupied by the problem of the Universals in Latin thought. Maimonides' negative theology had followed the Neoplatonic tradition. It was built primarily on Alfarabi's and Avicenna's distinction between essence and existence, which implied that in the case of all created beings existence was accidental to essence whereas in God essence and existence were one. Hence, God's nature was essentially different from ours, and terms such as existence, unity, and intellect applied to Him were mere homonyms without a positive content. It is true, distinction between essence and existence had already been suggested by Aristotle. As W. Jaeger suggested, one may see in it a residue of Aristotle's former Platonism. But the Islamic Neoplatonists went much beyond what was implied in Aristotle's logical distinction by assigning to the essence a reality of its own outside the visible world. Averroës rejects this distinction. Existence, he holds, is not an accident of Being. Each individual thing is one and the same with its essence. There is therefore, no such absolute cleavage between God and the created beings, as negative theology would suggest. The difference between the essence of God and the essences of created beings is one of infinite degree rather than of quality. God and man share alike in the common properties of Being and Intellect precisely because man derives his being and intellect from God. In God, they form His very essence and are primary; in men they are imparted and derivative. Hence positive and, at the same time, essential attributes are permissible. In following Averroës' view, Gersonides breaks the monopoly of Neoplatonism in Jewish philosophy, and paves the way for a positive theology more akin to the Biblical outlook without, however, giving his positive theology a content acceptable to Judaism. For the God he conceives is essentially the God of Aristotle whose nature is absorbed in the act of Self-Thinking rather than in his active relationship with the world.

The extreme Aristotelianism of Gersonides is made the target of attack by Hisdai Crescas (c. 1340–1410) in his The Light of the Lord, one of the profoundest works of mediaeval Jewish Philosophy. Crescas continues the line of discussion followed by Gersonides, but relentlessly endeavours to show that far from settling the problems it had set out to solve, it had only increased them. He argues that Gersonides' attempt to limit the knowledge of God to the universal order of things had excluded from the range of Divine cognition not only individual and particular things, but also the variety of species and of the stellar motions. Crescas ascribes to God both the knowledge and fore-knowledge of individual things and happenings, and thus re-establishes, in philosophic terms, the Biblical notion of Divine Providence. But he can do so only at the price of abandoning the concept of human freedom. God has accurate and definite knowledge of events by knowing the possible not only as possible, but as the inevitable result of human choice which is itself determined.
Crescas' theology also joins issue with Gersonides on the problem of Divine attributes. He goes much farther than his predecessor in upholding the possibility of positive attributes. Jewish Philosophy from Saadaya to Gersonides had insisted that God’s essence was one, simple and undefinable. There had been universal agreement that God does not possess any attributes as distinct from His essence. Crescas affirms the compatibility of Divine unity with Divine attributes unidentical, and yet one, with the Divine essence. A plurality of attributes does not imply plurality and composition of essence if these attributes form an essential unity among themselves and are one with the essence by inner necessity. God is not composed of qualities separable from one another but contains qualities forming an essential unity. Crescas was thus on his way to establishing the concept of God as an integrated personality rather than a “principle” in the sense of rational theology. The Divine attributes are but mental modifications of one single attribute, that of Goodness. They are, as it were, variations of one single theme, and express, in so many words, the sum-total of all perfections. But Crescas also assumes an unknowable Divine essence beyond the sphere of the attributes, and thus the strange concept arises of an absolutely hidden and unaccessible essence of God behind the knowable essential attributes.

Crescas' attack is not confined to Gersonides but makes a valiant and successful attempt to demolish, on logical grounds, the whole edifice of Aristotelian metaphysics. His critique of Aristotle is destructive of such basic Aristotelian notions as Matter, Space and Time, and foreshadows the approaching Renaissance. Pico della Mirandola quotes him extensively, and Spinoza, possibly also Giordano Bruno, are indebted to him. Crescas' demonstration of the infinity of Space and Time renders Aristotle's proof for the existence of God (that of the "Prime Mover") invalid. But even an infinite world requires as its ground a necessary Being. Creation need not be interpreted as an act in Time, but must be understood as Creatio ex nihilo.

In Crescas, mediaeval Jewish Philosophy reaches its climax and turning-point. It had inherited from the Hellenistic period—through the mediation of Islam—the legacy of Neoplatonic Aristotelianism. In a gradual process, it had shed first Neoplatonism and eventually radical Aristotelianism as well. It was hard to see which philosophy, if any, was to replace the old and well-worn system of thought. For some time to come, one simply pretended that the crisis did not exist. Crescas' successors in the field continued more or less the Aristotelian tradition. Simon ben Zemah Duran (1367-1444) reverts essentially to the position of Maimonides. Joseph Albo (d. 1444) seeks to harmonize Maimonides and Crescas. Don Isaac Abarbanel (1437-1509), the last Jewish thinker on Spanish soil, who shared with his people the tragic fate of the expulsion from Spain in 1492, is a lucid commentator of Maimonides. But mediaeval Jewish philosophy
was on its last legs. This is nowhere more patent than in the strained
discussions which were carried on in an effort to mark off against each
other the respective spheres of Reason and Revelation. That problem had
become increasingly difficult during the last stages of mediaeval Jewish
philosophy. The bold claim of Kalam that Reason could demonstrate the
whole content of Revelation had already been discarded by Maimonides.
But the tendency was to limit the claims of Reason to a narrow sector of
fundamental religious truths. In other words, Reason would confirm no
more than a basic minimum of natural Religion. Jewish thinkers such as
Simon ben Zemah Duran and Joseph Albo declared that the notions
of the existence of God, Revelation and Divine Retribution were the
central dogmatic tenets of Judaism, and thus tended to identify Judaism
with natural Religion. Other philosophers such as Isaac Albalag (end of
the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth century) and Elijah
Delmedigo (1460–1493) adopted the theory of double truth which was
prevailing in late Averroism, and thus completely abandoned the notion
of the fundamental identity of revealed and rational truths. In the case
of a conflict between Reason and Revelation, they held, the latter must
not be accommodated to the former if essential tenets of Faith are
involved. Only religious truths of secondary importance may be interpreted
in the light of Reason. Religion and Philosophy must not try to adapt
themselves to each other. They are said to be incompatibles.

In Isaac Abarbanel’s son Judah, called Leone Ebreo (c. 1460–1521),
contact with the Florentine Academy produces the brilliant episode of
a Jewish Renaissance philosophy. His Dialoghi d’Amore was the most
successful philosophic work of the period. Its grandiose concept of the
universe as an organism animated by Love and exhibiting both Truth
and Beauty, showed a bold spirit of approach but could not create the
basis of a new philosophy. Jewish Philosophy was resurrected in Spinoza’s
pantheism. For as H. A. Wolfson has shown, Spinoza’s system is steeped
in mediaeval Jewish thought, and draws final conclusions from its discus-
sions. But it is no longer compatible with Judaism nor does it put
forward such a claim.

The cruel fate suffered by Jewry from the expulsion of 1492 down to
the threshold of the Modern Age caused a complete eclipse of philosophic
study and furthered, instead, the development of mystical movements
in which the irrational forces of the soul could find more adequate
expression. This is not the place to trace the intricate and fascinating
story of this development which draws in many ways on the heritage of
mediaeval Jewish philosophy but pursues paths of its own leading to the
bizarre creations of Kabbalah. The roots of this movement lie, no doubt,
in the period of late antiquity, and are closely related to Gnosis. In
thirteenth-century Southern France and Spain, Gnostic speculation sud-
denly emerged through channels unknown, and eventually combined
with Neoplatonic elements of thought in creating the theosophy of the Book Zohar ("Splendour"). G. Scholem, following earlier scholars, asserts that Moses de Leon wrote the Zohar in order to stem the growth of rationalism among his educated contemporaries. No doubt the fierce opposition which leading orthodox Rabbis offered to the rationalism of Maimonides and his School drew much of its strength from the spiritual fervour of incipient Kabbalah. After the expulsion from Spain, the town of Safed in Palestine became the centre of mystical speculation, and a "new Kabbalah" arose, replacing the system of Emanations (Seferot) outlined in the Zohar, by a complicated and highly speculative mythology which owed its origin to Moses Cordovero and Isaac Luria. It was propagated by a circle of devout disciples led by Hayyim Vital, and exercised a tremendous influence on Jewish life, resulting in a practice of severe asceticism as a road to salvation. In the popular movement of Hasidism which Israel Baal Shemtob inaugurated in the second half of the eighteenth century, the ascetic life is abandoned in favour of the joyful service of God, and the Kabbalistic doctrine is simplified and cast into a popular creed. It is this spiritual background against which one has to see the sudden transformation of the cultural position of the Jew in the Wake of the French Revolution when Emancipation from civil and political restrictions opened up fresh and increased possibilities for Jewish participation in the general pursuit of science and philosophy.

Modern Jewish Philosophy reflects the fundamental change in outlook characteristic of the modern period from Descartes onward. It no longer seeks to harmonize Revelation and Reason as two distinct bodies of Truth, but is endeavouring to delineate the significance of Religion within the general framework of human Reason. In Moses Mendelsohn (1729-1786), this effort is inspired by the intellectual climate of German Aufklärung of which he was a distinguished representative. Mendelssohn bases his Jewish philosophy on Leibniz's distinction between Truths of Fact and Truths of Reason. Not historical Revelation, but the lumen naturale of human Reason is the source of religious truth. The basic affirmations of religion—the existence of a personal God and the immortality of the human soul—are universal truths on account of their "reasonableness." They do not depend on historical Revelation but are manifest at all times. Following a suggestion made by Spinoza, he restricts the significance of historical Revelation to the realms of practical morality and religious Law. In his famous phrase, Judaism is not a revealed religion but a revealed Law. Judaism thus shrinks to a body of Divinely ordained legislation but, at the same time, expands into a universal Religion of Reason.

The rise of Kantianism accentuated the division between the theoretical and practical spheres which Mendelssohn had accepted. The destruction of rational theology, cosmology and psychology which Kant accomplished,
made religion wholly dependent on moral philosophy, and into an expression of practical Reason. Kant’s moral and religious philosophy proved exceedingly attractive to Jewish thinkers of the period. Moritz Lazarus (1824–1903), the founder of Ethnic Psychology, interpreted Judaism as a system of autonomous ethics in the light of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), the originator of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, evolved a Jewish religious philosophy from the premises of his own system. Against Hegel, who had made ethics a part of his panlogistic metaphysics, Cohen emphasizes the essential difference between the moral and the ontological. He hailed Kant’s division of the two spheres of Nature and Morality, and upheld it with particular emphasis against Spinoza who had considered the actions of man like geometrical figures, asserting that \( \text{voluntas et intellectus idem sunt} \). Cohen’s spirited rejection of the monistic principle stems from a Jewish outlook. It reflects the Biblical consciousness of a holy God who is transcendent to Nature. God and Nature must not be identified. The Jewish concept of the Unity of God expresses the uniqueness and incomparability of God. But the idea of God is related to Nature as well. It not only invests the moral sphere with the aspect of eternal value, but also guarantees the maintenance of the physical world as a realm for moral realization. Cohen thus gives the Messianic ideal of Judaism a philosophic expression. The idea of God creates the concept of human history as a field for the working out of God’s purpose which is the unification of all mankind under the Law of Morality. In his *The Religion of Reason from the Sources of Judaism* (published posthumously in 1925), Cohen realizes that the concepts of humanity and universal history are insufficient to give meaning to the individual existence of man. He therefore breaks the magic circle of his idealistic philosophy in founding the meaning of religion not on the universal idea of morality but on the personal “Correlation” between God and the individual soul.

The idealist movements of the early part of the nineteenth century had inspired Solomon Formstecher—(1808–1889) and Samuel Hirsch (1815–1889) to recast the systems of Schelling and Hegel respectively in order to assess the true significance of Judaism within the dialectic process of history. Schelling had claimed that Spirit and Nature were expressive of each other and represented two equal aspects of the Absolute. This led him to a philosophy of pantheism. Similarly, Hegel had recognized in Nature a lower form of the self-realization of Mind. All that is real is therefore essentially reasonable and good. Formstecher and Hirsch reject this total or partial identification, and subordinate Nature to Mind. The Spirit, they maintain, is, first and foremost, the self-consciousness of Nature. It is therefore capable of understanding Nature and of aesthetic creation. But Mind is also consciousness of itself, of free will and the ethical ideal. Freedom is the essence of the Spirit. Pagan religion embraces
the aesthetic ideal, deifies Nature, and sees the destiny of man in his apotheosis. Christianity has not freed itself from this pagan outlook. Judaism is the Religion of the Spirit, places God above Nature, and considers it the duty of man to become free like God, but does not deify man. Judaism is superior to paganism inasmuch as the Spirit is superior to Nature. Revelation becomes, in terms of Hegelian dialectic, the awakening of the consciousness of the ideal. At the first stage—that of historical Revelation—the ideal appears to be given from without, as something external; it is prophetic Revelation, and as such an illusion. At the next stage prophetic teaching is embodied in Scripture, and becomes part of a religious tradition. At the third and final stage, the Mind recognizes itself as the source of the ideal and embraces it as its own child. The old conflict between Reason and Revelation is thus dissolved not by logical harmonization but by the concept of historical development. In radical opposition to this view, Solomon Steinheim (1789–1886) affirms that religious truth belongs to Revelation only. Reason must sacrifice itself to give way to Revelation. The teachings of Revelation are incompatible with, and irreducible to Reason. His position recalls the impassioned stand made by Kierkegaard against the shallow optimism of Hegel.

Modern Jewish Philosophy from Mendelssohn to Hermann Cohen is, on the whole, a sustained effort to interpret Judaism as the Religion of Reason par excellence. The latest phase of Jewish philosophy abandons this position and turns towards an "existentialist" interpretation of religion. It is a protest as much against the idealistic identification of Revelation and Reason as against the mediaeval harmonization of religious and philosophic truths. Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) in his The Star of Redemption, and Martin Buber (b. 1878) in his I and Thou evolve a philosophy which seems to revert to the fundamental attitude implied in the prophetic consciousness. Not the formal truths of logic in their timeless, abstract essence, but the truths brought out in the relationships of human beings with God and one another are the really vital and relevant ones. They are truths which spring from the presentness of time. Traditional philosophy with its stress on contemplation had made God into an object, an "It" to be known. The "new thinking" which Rosenzweig and Buber advocated is centred in the I—Thou relationship with its emphasis on response and action rather than contemplation. This "Existentialism" does not mean that man's existence is made the measure of all things. It is not a renewal of idealism in disguise. On the contrary philosophy is given the task of interpreting the relations which exist between God, man and the world. They are brought out in full by the terms Creation, Revelation and Redemption. God is as much alive as the gods of mythology; the world is complete in itself as are the works of plastic art; and man, thrown back upon himself, is as stubbornly and
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wilfully closed against God as the hero of the Greek tragedy. The importance of classical antiquity lies in the fact that it faithfully portrays the elementary situation of God, world and man. Here Rosenzweig sees the relative truth of paganism. It is truth in an elementary, unrevealing form, but it must not pretend to be the whole and complete Truth. Only when God, the world and man enter into relationship with one another do they fully reveal themselves. This Revelation happens in Time, and is therefore inaccessible to the pure Reason. Truth itself depends on Time; and only the Future will show whether it is verified by the three partners in the drama which we call History.

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CHAPTER XXX

NEOPLATONISM

I. THE FIRST PERIOD: PLOTINUS

Neoplatonism was the last phase of Hellenic thought, and it passed through three stages. In its first stage, represented by Plotinus and his School in Rome, it was essentially Hellenistic. Later in the Syrian School headed by Jamblichus and the Athenian School of Proclus it changed into a full-fledged scholasticism of Polytheism. In its third and final stage it passed into a theurgical mystery cult in the hands of those who regarded the practice of magic rather than rational speculation and contemplation as the means to gaining knowledge, and, devoid of all originality, wrote vapid, pedantic and almost ridiculous commentaries on their predecessors' works. Therefore to the historians of philosophical thought what is of interest is only Neoplatonism of the first stage, and, to a lesser degree, that of the second, the third stage hardly deserving any notice.

The founder of Neoplatonism, Plotinus (A.D. 204 or 5–270), was the greatest philosopher of the third century and undoubtedly one of the great thinkers of antiquity. Almost all our knowledge of his life and character is based on the short biography of his disciple, Porphyry, who attended his lectures during the last six years of his life and knew him intimately. He was born in Egypt, according to some, at a place called Lyco or Lycopolis. After attending the elementary school at his birthplace, he was sent for the usual course of education to Alexandria. There, as a young scholar, he studied under various philosophers, but their teaching failed to satisfy him. At last at the age of twenty-eight he found the man he was looking for in Ammonius Saccus (A.D. 175–242) who is regarded by some as the first thinker on Neoplatonic lines. Ammonius Saccus lectured in Alexandria after abandoning Christianity and had Plotinus, Origen, Longinus and others as his pupils. Plotinus attended his lectures for ten years. At the close of this period his love for the wisdom of the East made him take the opportunity of visiting the East by accompanying the military expedition of the Emperor Gordian against the King of Persia. When the army reached Mesopotamia, the Emperor was assassinated and Plotinus with great difficulty found his way to Antioch. From there he went to Rome in A.D. 224 and lived and lectured there for the rest of his life. He was a mystic philosopher of saintly habits, who was ashamed of being in his body, endeavoured always to raise himself above the storm and stress of earthly life, and lived in a spiritual world in constant pursuit of the beatific vision, without leaving society and its obligations.
Plotinus's writings, the *Enneads*, collected, arranged and edited after his death by his disciple, Porphyry, though simple, are here obscure and difficult, there crude and unpolished, and at places the very models of literary beauty. In these writings he clarifies and elaborates several aspects of Plato's teachings, synthesizes the "Good" of Plato, the "Spirit" of Aristotle and the "Universal Soul" of the Stoics, and gives a systematic reply to all post-Aristotelian tendencies in philosophy. He opposes the materialism of the Stoics and the Epicureans by his spiritualism, the scepticism of the New Academy by his optimism in the possibility of knowledge, the ethical dualism of the Gnostics by his monism, the pragmatism of the Eclectics by his doctrine of absolute values and ultimate truths, and the determinism of the astrologers by the conception of free-will as the source of evil.

His metaphysics put an end to the dualism of subjectivity and objectivity. Reality is spiritual, but it is neither a product of the mind nor something external and independent of the mind. It is the unity of self-consciousness that constitutes the duality of the spiritual world known and the faculty that knows—of thought content and thought activity. The Spirit that beholds and the Spiritual world are correlatives, neither of which has any meaning without the other.

Plotinus makes a tripartite division of man into body, soul and spirit. The body, according to him, does not consist of mere matter. Matter is an indeterminate something. It is created but not in time. By itself it is not corporeal, i.e. is not body, for body is a compound of matter and form. It is a mere receptacle of form, a pure potentiality of all things without any potency. Being indeterminate, it cannot be apprehended as being and is therefore as good as non-being. It is lowest in the scale of existence, and worst in the scale of value, the absence of illumination, "darkness," the "absence of Good," "the first evil." It is created by the soul, even as darkness is created by light by its absence. But in another sense it is a relative term. It denotes the substratum of that which is higher and gives it form. Thus soul is matter for the spirit, and spirit is "divine matter" for the Absolute.

Some identify soul with the body and regard it as corporeal. But the soul is not compound, while the body is so. It can neither lose nor acquire parts, while the body can. The quantitative categories do not apply to it, whereas they do apply to the body. Moreover, passage from the soul to the body is impossible. Qualities of the soul, e.g. justice, virtue, knowledge, cannot be stated in terms of extension, and changes in the soul (e.g. wisdom) have no corresponding changes in the body. Nor can body think and feel as the soul does.

Some hold that the soul is generated by the body, but the lower cannot create the higher. Far from being the product of the body, it is itself non-material and non-corporeal. It is unique and individual. The categories
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of quantity and extension do not apply to it. It is neither divisible into parts nor a part of any aggregate. On the lower plane individual souls resemble one another, and yet they are separate. But this appearance of separateness is due to their relation with the body. Actually there is unity behind their separateness. When apart from the body they are continuous entities. There is a lower soul and a higher soul. The lower soul is the principle of the physiological life. The higher soul is the principle of the life above it, but it also penetrates down to the lowest limit of life.

The soul is creative. Below its animating power there is only indeterminate matter. Above indeterminate matter, there is an ascending series of soul life. The whole chain of life is such that the principle of each lower grade is in the next above.

When the soul penetrates the body created by its own activity, it is characterized by sensation. Sensation is not a passive impression of external objects on the mind, but an active force that impresses form on matter. The object perceived through the sensation is not real but only an image of spiritual reality. Sensations are dim spiritual perceptions; spiritual perceptions are clear sensations.

Pleasure and pain are transient affections of the embodied soul. Being transitory and only slightly connected with the real world, they can be and should be conquered for the sake of more abiding things.

Memory, another faculty of the soul, is distinct from recollection. It is related to time, and is always something experienced. Recollection is always of Ideas. The higher soul and the lower have a memory of their own. After death the two souls get separated, each retaining a dim consciousness of what belonged to the other, but the higher soul chiefly remembers the higher experiences and recollects noble Ideas. Memory of friends, country, wife, children, etc., is common to both the higher and the lower souls, but as the higher souls grow, this memory of theirs becomes less and less till it completely fades away.

The soul’s faculty of imagination is of two types: (1) the sensible and (2) the intellectual. The former is the impact from outside on the lower or irrational soul and the latter on the higher or rational soul. It is midway between sensation and reasoning. In its higher stage it passes into opinion.

In discursive reasoning lies the proper function of the soul. Self-consciousness is the self-knowledge of the soul. In it the soul is reflected as in a mirror in which “we see ourselves as another.” The individual’s claims, like social justice, fellow-feeling, etc., belong to the world of the soul; beyond that there are no such claims. Personality belongs to the soul in so far as it stands in relation to others outside itself. The soul is teleological by nature and it turns towards Ideas which it lives to realize. It has its own proper activities, but when it wills, its activity is inspired from above. It governs what is below it by direct productive activity.
The individual soul passes from higher to lower life and back again. It comes down by choice to communicate its gifts down to the lowest degree. In this process it manifests its own powers and receives the knowledge of good and evil, but it also suffers hurt and in so far as it does that, its coming down is a fault. The shorter the process of descent, the less the hurt. The core of the soul, however, remains pure in spite of this descent.

The souls are immortal and eternal. They neither come into existence nor die. After the death of the body, the soul lives in the eternal world. The life after death is the awakening of the soul, but this awakening is from the body, not with the body. There is no bodily resurrection. The distinction of individuals is not lost in the eternal world. There the spirits are transparent to each other, and in spite of being distinct are not separate from each other. The lower souls of the sinful are reincarnated into bodies for the sake of punishment, but the higher souls always remain pure and sinless.

The third term of Plotinus' tripartite division is spirit. It is the same life principle as soul, but on the higher plane. Though soul is below spirit, it has a magnetic attraction for it, looks up to it, receives its imprints, and becomes more beautiful, for spirit and the gifts that flow from spirit are its proper beauty. When our reasoning faculty gets the imprints of spirit, not only does our beauty enhance, but also do we become spirit ourselves.

While the products of the sense perception are below us, and the products of discursive reasoning are with us, those of spirit are above us; and we behold these last, when spirit shines upon us. Spiritual beholding or spiritual perception is different both from sensation and discursive reasoning. It is an activity that beholds Ideas; and in beholding these it beholds itself. Thus while as discursive reasoning, the activity of soul thinks of other things, spirit thinks of itself. Its activity is self-knowledge. The essence of spirit being knowing, its knowing is identical with its being.

Spirit possesses all objects of spiritual perception (Ideas) in their changeless identity at all times simultaneously, i.e. in an eternal now, but these objects are not exterior to spirit. It embraces them all as the whole embraces its parts. Each idea is spirit and the whole of spirit is all the ideas. The truth is in spirit, and reality abides by it. Absolute truth agrees not with any other, but with itself. It is, and what it is, it says. Being, spiritual knowledge and spirit are, thus, one and the same thing. Consequently spirit, the knowledge of the real world and the real world are one. They are distinguishable, but not separate.

Corresponding to the tripartite division of man, Plotinus gives the tripartite division of Divine principles, on the lines of Plato's *Timaeus*, into the world soul, spirit and the One or the Absolute.
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Just as the individual soul is related to the body, so is the world soul related to the world of sensible objects. The world of sense is apprehended by a feeble contemplation, and a feeble contemplation makes a feeble object of contemplation. It is characterized by differentiation, opposition, time, place and change; while real things (Ideas in the spiritual world) are mutually inclusive, in harmony with one another, eternal, and unchanging. It consists of matter as well as form. But, like matter, form in the sensible world is without activity, and is, hence, partly unreal. Sensible reality is at best only a sharer in true reality—only a copy of it; and as a copy of it, it has that beauty which is possible for a copy. Following Plato, Plotinus calls our knowledge of the world of sense only opinion. The sensible world is created by the world soul, even as the individual's body is created by the individual soul.

Nature is the formative power of the world soul. The expansion of its energy irradiates matter by giving it form. It is not mechanical but teleological. The only true causes are final causes. The efficient causes are parts of the machinery which soul uses. Footprints of the world soul are traceable in the sensible world. The uniformities that soul finds in it are the forms implanted in the world of sense by the world soul.

Space and its divisions are limits imposed on matter by soul—limits which make the world of space and time fragmentary for us. Time is the copy by which the world soul translates eternity when it wills to reproduce the eternal Ideas into vital laws. It is thus a teleological category, and as such a measure of finite activity directed to some end beyond itself. It is the form in which the life of the world soul moves forward from one manifestation to another in its process of creation and generation. Movement is a copy of the movement of spirit—an eternal activity without change that belongs to the eternal world of Ideas. The world order evolves in astronomical cycles till all the individuals have been produced by the world soul, and then a new order begins. Thus the universe is eternal in the sense that it is an infinite series of finite orders, each of which has a beginning, middle and end. The Aristotelian influence is marked in Plotinus' tabulation of the categories of the world of appearance as (1) form, matter and their composite, (2) relation, (3) quality, (4) quantity, (5) space, (6) time, and (7) movement.

The question why the world soul created the Cosmos and a similar question why the Creator creates at all cannot be asked, since they imply the falsehood that there is a beginning in the eternal, and that creating is the act of a changeful being. "The sensible world is a life organized, effective, complex, all-comprehensive, displaying an unfathomable wisdom. It is a clear image, beautifully formed, of the spiritual world. No doubt it is a copy, not original; but that is its very nature; it cannot be at once symbol and reality. But to say that it is an inadequate copy is false; nothing has been left out which a beautiful representation within
the physical order could include. Therefore, it is not to be despised. There is nothing beyond which is not represented here. This sensible world is beautiful and good, but less beautiful and good than its original, for it has imperfections by virtue of its being a copy; and also has some positive evil, due to the play of the freewill of individual souls.

The world soul is then the author of the world of sense. In its downward flow it creates Cosmos as a copy of the world of spirit which it beholds in its upward movement.

The spiritual world is above the world soul; and is an image of the highest principle, God, The One, The Good or The Absolute. It is, indeed, self-reflection of the Absolute. It is the light that emanates from the Absolute and by which the Absolute sees itself. It is the world of Ideas, the archetypes of the world of sense, and after The Absolute Himself, possesses the greatest perfection and beauty, has no dividedness of space, and is eternal in the sense that in it there is no past, no future, but only an eternal present.

In the spiritual world there are three pairs of categories, spirit and being (thought and thing), identity and difference, stability and movement (permanence and change). Inconsistently with this general position, however, Plotinus omits sometimes spirit, sometimes both spirit and being, from this table of categories.

Spirit knows being, stability and movement, each of them separately. In knowing them, it posits them; for their existence lies in being thus seen. In spirit's self-knowledge resides movement, for knowing is an activity, and activity is movement. In the fact that this activity is directed on itself resides being, for being is not the act of knowing, but that which is known as existing. Being is both the source and the goal of spiritual knowing, for knowing is movement (an operation of the will that is not in time), and movement cannot start from movement, nor end in movement. But being is not potentiality but activity. Therefore the activity of spiritual knowing is also being. The three categories are thus both identical and different. Therefore identity and difference must be added to the other categories to complete the list.

Spirit is not simple. There are differences in spirits; otherwise there would be no communion and no interaction in the spiritual world. But spirits are not only different, they are also identical, for they exist in each other. They are many in one and one in many and all together.

All particular spirits are contained in the universal spirit. The universal spirit exists in itself and the particular spirits also exist in themselves; and yet it implies them and is implied in them. Thus each particular spirit exists in itself and in the universal spirit, and the universal spirit exists both in each particular spirit and in itself. The universal spirit is the totality of spirits in actuality and each of them in potentiality. The
individual spirits result from the inward activity of the universal spirit and individual souls, from its outward activity.

Particular spirits have their existence in constant unimpeded activity, not of discursive reasoning, but of calm contemplation—the beatific vision. Their life yonder is blissful. They have Truth as mother, nurse, existence and sustenance. All things, not those that are born and die, but those that have a real being, they see, and they see themselves in all; for all is transparent, nothing dark, nothing impenetrable; every being is manifest to every other; light runs through light; and everyone has all things in himself and sees all in every other, so that everywhere there is all and all is all and each is all, and infinite the glory. Each of them is great; the small is great; the sun, there, is all the stars, and every star is all the stars and the sun. While some aspect is prominent in each, all are mirrored in every other. The word yonder is used to mean not any future existence, but eternal Reality with all its categories—Reality as being (the substratum of spiritual objects), as their movement (the activity of their lives), as their stability (permanence), as their plurality (difference), and as their Unity (Identity)—all things seen in each and each in all in an ever-flowing now.

The science which deals with the spiritual world is Dialectic. The source of the first principles of this science is spirit. It is a science that is pursued by the soul, to which spirit furnishes whatever principles it can receive. When in possession of these principles, the soul analyses and synthesizes the material supplied by science, till it comes to spiritual knowledge. In proportion to its capacity of receiving these principles the soul itself becomes spirit. The Dialectical process is logical, but it rises above logic to intuitive wisdom.

Spirit and the spiritual world are a unity in duality, and the one cannot be without the other. This unity in duality points to a higher unity, which is pure unity without duality. Plotinus calls this unity without duality the One, the Absolute or God, and, like Plato, identifies it with the Good. This term "the One," is not used in the numerical sense, not as one of the units which make up the number two, for numerical unity is a correlative of plurality; and God has no such correlative. It is the source from which unity and plurality proceed. He is beyond activity, beyond spirit and the spiritual world of Ideas. We can say what He is not, but not what He is, for He is above all determination and all description. Even if we ascribe the highest attributes to Him, not as absolute but relative determinations, we must add "yet not these, but something better still." He is infinite. He has no knowledge as distinguished from the world known, for in Him the subject-object relation is transcended. He is not conscious, but super-conscious, for He possesses immediate apprehension—a consciousness higher than that of discursive reasoning, even higher than the intuitive perception of spirit. We cannot ascribe will to Him,
if it implies the desire for something not yet present. But He is all will in the sense that He is what He wills to be, and there is nothing in Him that is prior to His will. He is all necessity, being subject to no necessity. He is all free, for all freedom of the world of spirit proceeds from Him. He is not subject to teleology that marks the world of becoming. He is the First Cause, and, as the Good, the final Cause of all that is, but as the First and Final Cause He is co-eternal with all that He causes, for having nothing above Him, He cannot be in another, but contains all others, embracing them without dividing Himself into them and without losing anything from Himself, like the sun that radiates light and heat without any loss to itself. We may call Him the First Activity or the First Potency, for He is above the distinction of activity and potency. The One or the Good is not good, but the source of all goodness. He is not beautiful, but Beauty above all beauty, the First Beauty, the source of all that is beautiful. Of these two attributes of the One, Good is primary.

There is a continuous chain of dependence in all grades from the One down to matter and back, such that in every grade all the higher grades are present. All lower grades depend upon the One, but the One depends upon nothing.

The Good is the source and goal of all beings. It is what every being desires and to which it aspires. Things are desired only when the Good bestows, on the one side, grace upon them, and on the other side, love upon the subject. As soon as grace plays upon the beauty of things beheld by the soul, and the soul is coloured by the light of the Good, it (the soul) is filled with holy ecstasy and becomes love. It is not moved even by spirit for all its beauty, if no grace plays upon that beauty. Even in heaven the soul is not content with itself; it still aspires and loves; and its love is purest and keenest when it is in full view of the Absolute, which made life and made spirit, and which gave spirit to all spiritual things and life to all living things. When graced with spirit, spiritual things become more beautiful than they are without spirit, and when graced with life, living things become more beautiful than they are without life.

The One, the ground of all being, is unknowable. Even spirit, when it is occupied with its own intuitive power and with the spiritual world, cannot know it. But when spirit is carried out of itself by aspiring love then it becomes, for the moment, that which it can never know. In such moments identification of the seer and the seen, the seeker and the sought is so complete that it transcends the distinction between the knower and the known, and the question of knowledge or knowability becomes irrelevant to it. These moments come when we strip ourselves of everything, even of things belonging to the world of spirit, in our burning love for the One, for it is impossible to experience the One, when one is occupied with another. The soul would not change this condition
of union with the One for anything—not even for the heaven of heavens. It is so exalted that it thinks lightly even of the spiritual intuition which it formerly treasured, even as a traveller entering into a palace admires at first the beautiful objects that adorn it, but when the master appears, he alone is the object of attention. Spirit in thinking knows the spiritual world. Spirit in love with the One, at moments, becomes the One. The soul and the One are, like two concentric circles, one when they coincide, and two only when they separate.

The vision of the soul when it becomes one with the Absolute is too immediate to be described, for one can hardly describe as other than oneself that which, when seen, seems to be one with oneself. You cannot show it to one who has not had the happiness to have seen it. The faculty for having this vision, however, all have, but few use.

Being mainly interested in the contemplative life at spiritual heights, Plotinus paid very little attention to the problems of social morality, and wrote no treatise on Ethics. He dealt very meagrely even with the political virtues which, according to him, have to be mastered before the stage of purification in which the ascent of the soul begins. These virtues are to be practised because they take away false opinion, and teach us the value of order, measure and discipline. Purification of the soul means detachment from the body and elevation to the spiritual world. When the soul retires into itself, is stripped of all its lower nature, and cleansed of all external stains, it becomes the image of spirit. If in this retirement into thyself "thou dost not yet find beauty there, do like the sculptor who chisels, planes, and polishes till he has adorned his statue with all the attributes of beauty. So thou chisel away from thy soul what is superfluous, straighten that which is crooked, purify and enlighten what is dark, and do not cease working at thy statue until virtue shines before thine eyes with its divine splendour, and thou seest temperance seated in thy bosom with its holy purity."

The highest ideal is contemplation of and gradual union with the Good, the Absolute; and the satisfaction one gets in its pursuit is not to be confused with egoistic or even altruistic pleasure, for pleasure is a mark not of the Good but of our good, or relative good. In this relative sense the good of matter is form; of form, body; of body, soul; of soul, virtue and, above virtue, spirit; and of spirit, the Good.

Thus, according to Plotinus, the good of everything lies in its ascent, stage by stage, to the world yonder, the other world, the world of spirit, and even beyond, to the absolute unity of the One—its original source. His otherworldliness, however, is not the same as that of the ascetics and the early Christians who favoured celibacy and despised everything that belonged to the flesh. For him married love is the image of the spiritual union with the One, and may be the beginning of the ascent to the spiritual world. Though detachment from the body is commended, the
body is not to be altogether ignored. A man should give his body "all that is useful and possible, though he himself remains a member of another order." He should use it as a musician uses his lyre, so that when it is worn out he may still be able to sing without it.

According to Plotinus, matter is evil, but the Stoic ideal of freedom from matter by suicide does not meet his approval. This freedom is to be attained by the subordination of matter to form, by the subjection of the material man—his passions and desires—to the higher man, his reason.

Contrary to the Gnostic doctrine of total depravity, Plotinus holds that vice is always mixed with some good and no human being is completely bad. Wickedness arises from character and character is founded on our own free will. The universal soul is above the contradiction of freedom and necessity.

Plotinus expounds his theory of beauty in a chapter of the Enneads. To him belongs the credit of making aesthetic an integral part of philosophy and of the distinction between corporeal and spiritual beauty and between the beauty of nature and art. Beauty, according to him, does not consist in proportion or harmony; for then it can reside only in wholes and not in parts, say, simple colours; and can equally be a quality of ugly wholes, which may show inner proportion but conflict with their wholes. Beauty is really a quality of things which the soul recognizes as akin to its essence, and ugliness is a quality of things which it regards as alien to its real essence, which is, of course, spirit. As beautiful things participate in forms which belong to the spiritual world, in recognizing beauty, we recognize these forms. Ugly things are ugly in proportion to the absence of form, and beautiful things are beautiful in proportion to the forms present in them. The absolutely ugly is devoid of all form, "all divine meaning." The forms combine and unify the parts into a unity, and the unity so created is beautiful, and so are its parts.

The beauty of incorporeal things consists in their being free from impurities. An ugly character is soiled by base passions. A purified soul becomes a form, that is to say, wholly spiritual.

The good and the beautiful are the same. True beauty of the soul is to be like the One, the Good. He who has not seen the One desires it as the Good; he who has seen it admires it as the Beautiful. The Good or the Supreme Beauty beautifies those who love it. He who desires to see the Vision must shut his eyes to corporeal beauty, though he may train himself by contemplating noble things here on earth, especially noble deeds, and becoming beautiful himself; for the soul can see beauty only by becoming beautiful itself.

The individual artist does not create beautiful works by imitation, as Aristotle holds, but by imagination, a wiser creator than imitation; for imitation copies what it has seen and imagination produces what it has
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not seen. The artist is inspired by the forms of the spiritual world. His activity, therefore, identifies itself with the formative Activity which is the source and fountain of all beauty. Hence art shows that spontaneity which is impossible in mechanical skill or even in overt action. Nature is beautiful because it participates in the forms of the spiritual world.

Although Plotinus' philosophy is highly religious, he is, nevertheless, indifferent to public worship. He holds that one should prepare oneself for receiving Divine grace by developing aspiring love; yet "it is for the gods to come to us, not for us to go to them." Prayer is the silent yearning of the soul for affinity with the Supreme One.

Like Aristotle, Plotinus believes in the existence of beings more divine than men. These are, according to him, gods, which are demons of a higher order, demons and the heavenly beings, the sun, the moon, the stars and the earth—all created by the world soul. The gods belong to a sphere below the spiritual world, and are all one, or rather one in all. The moon is on the border-line between the spiritual world and the world below. Every being above the moon is a god. Demons and the heavenly beings belong to a sphere below the spiritual world. Demons proceed from the universal soul, dwell on the earth, are everlasting, and have bodies of spiritual matter. They behold the spiritual world above; can feel, remember, and hear petitions; and can clothe themselves in fiery or airy coverings. The sun, the stars and the earth hear our prayers, and indicate coming events, but, being determined by natural necessity, can cause nothing.

2. THE SECOND PERIOD

Plotinus was the last great philosopher of antiquity. His influence in the Middle Ages was even greater than that of Aristotle, who before the Muslims studied Greek literature and wrote commentaries, had been known as a mere disciple of Plato. His doctrines supplied a philosophical basis first to Paganism, then to Christianity, and last of all to Islamic Mysticism and Neoplatonism. After Plotinus no Neoplatonist rose to his stature. Chief among those who commanded the respect of the School are Malchus, Jamblichus and Proclus.

Malchus.—Malchus, born in Phoenicia in A.D. 232, first studied under Longinus. At this time he changed his name into the Greek form Porphyry. When he was thirty, he became a disciple of Plotinus, remained with him till the latter's death, and lectured after him in Rome till A.D. 304. He collected, arranged, and edited Plotinus' works entitled the *Enneads*, and wrote a valuable Biographical introduction to them. He also wrote a Life of Pythagoras. While on the whole remaining faithful to his master's teachings, he differed from him in the latter's attack on Aristotelian categories and wrote in defence of them in his *Introduction to the*
Categories of Aristotle. In this work he also deals with the five conceptions later called the predicables. These distinctions of predicables brought into relief in the following age the view that substance or being is the highest conception, and led to division by Dichotomy, known as Porphyry's Tree, i.e. the division of the most general conception, substance, down to the individual man through succession of the intermediate conceptions, body, living being, animal and men. He also formulated the problem whether the universals, species and genera, are merely subjective ideas or exist outside the mind; and if they are external realities, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal; and if, incorporeal, whether they exist in themselves or only in things—a problem which became one of the main topics of philosophical interest in the Middle Ages. Plotinus had as little superstition in him as it was possible to have in those days, but this cannot be said of Porphyry, much less of other Neoplatonists. In his biography of his master his reference to magical influences and evil spells tends to vitiate an account which has been otherwise regarded as reliable.

_Jamblichus._—Jamblichus of Chalxis in Coele-Syria (d. c. 330) enjoyed a high reputation for his learning and his genius. Most of his works, including commentaries on the _Dialogues_ of Plato and the _Analytica_ of Aristotle, are lost. Some portions of a large work on Pythagoras are, however, extant. He attended Prophyry's lectures in Rome, then went to Syria, and became the head of the Syrian School of Neoplatonism. This School was known for its orientalizing Pythagoreanism and theurgical tendencies, whereas the Roman School, headed by Plotinus, was still profoundly Greek in spirit, for, in spite of its theory of emanation and its ascetic individualistic ethics, it regarded contemplation as the highest activity and owed allegiance to universal reason.

Jamblichus's philosophy is marked with the influence of Pythagoras, Plato, and the religions and theurgy of Egypt and the Orient. It lends support not so much to scientific thought as to belief in the Pagan pantheon, magical influences, and the powers of supernatural agencies. He developed a logical process by triads by which he gave a philosophical basis to the orders of Homeric and other gods. He is opposed to Plotinus' theory of the participation of soul in spirit and of spirit in the One, on the ground that this would interfere with the absolute unity of the unspeakable One. This helps him in combating the Christian idea of man-God. From God's absolute unity he derives a triad of secondary unities from which proceed three orders of gods: intellectual, supramundane, and those immanent in the world. The gods of the first two orders are transcendent; those of the third, which are identical with Pythagoras' Numbers, Plato's Ideas, and Aristotle's Forms, alone rule our destinies. Beings like souls and spirits participate in and communicate with only the third.

_Proclus._—The third of these prominent Neoplatonists, Proclus
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(A.D. 412–485), born in Byzantium, was educated first at Lycia, then at Alexandria and for a short time at Athens in the private school of Plutarch, the son of Nestorius, where, after completing his education, he assisted and then succeeded Syrianus, the successor of Plutarch. In him was combined great ability for dialectical reasoning with a strong belief in mythology, and he used, even more than Jamblichus, the former in defence of the latter. Indeed he was a true scholastic of Hellenic Paganism. Like Syrianus, he assigned a very high place to the Orphica and other neo-Pythagorean works. He had initiated himself into all the mysteries, and regarded himself as the hierophant of the whole world. Like Jamblichus, he hated and fought Christianity which had by now become strong enough to be progressive and persecuting. Besides his philosophical works, he wrote on mathematics as well as grammar. He respected Aristotle, whose Organon he knew by heart, more deeply than did Plotinus or Jamblichus. His commentaries on Plato’s works though misinterpretative, are ingenious and acute. His Institutio Theologica is an outline of Plotinus’ doctrines and Theologia Platonica contains Jamblichus’ modifications of those doctrines. His own philosophy is a synthesis of both. Hence, though much less original, it is said to be the culmination of Neoplatonism. Like Plotinus, he accepts the Aristotelian view that physical objects are syntheses of form and matter and the Platonic Aristotelian distinction of body, soul and spirit.

For deriving the world from the unspeakable One, Proclus follows the same line of argument as Jamblichus. The process of change from the permanent One to the world of the many is dialectical. This dialectical process arises from the principle that the effect, though separate from the cause, is essentially the same; and therefore strives to return to it from its state of separation. Hence there are three moments in every event: permanence of the cause, going forth of the event, and its return to and unity with the permanent cause. The whole process is thus a chain of triadic links. Proclus divides his metaphysical theology into three parts and follows this triadic scheme through each part. A likeness of this schematism to Hegel’s dialectic is too obvious to need mention. From the One who can be only figuratively represented as the One, the Good, the Absolute and the First Cause, proceed, as emanations of the Divine content, three principles, being, life, and their unity, spirit. Again, from being proceed the infinite, the end and their unity, the finite; from life, potentiality, existence, and their unity, intelligible life; from spirit static thought, thought in motion (perception), and their unity, reflective thought. The first is the sphere of Deity as the content of gods, second, of demons, and the third, of the spiritual world. By this triple triad, Proclus gives a logical basis to Polytheism. He carries out this dialectical scheme of the Divine content to the minutest details. The whole scheme is, nevertheless, supposed to reveal to us only the intelligible world. The
unspeakable is supra-natural and can be reached only by supra-natural ways. Religious truths can be discovered only by theurgy.

Agreeing with Plotinus, Proclus holds that the whole content emanating from the unspeakable Unity is a gradual deterioration or diminution of the Divine content, so that the lower elements are always subordinate to the higher; but when he says the three elements of the spirit repeat themselves in the other triads as well, he seems to discard, at least by implication, this relation of subordination.

The ethics of Proclus is not different from that of Plotinus. The vision of the unspeakable One is our ethical ideal. It can be achieved by the soul only if it enters into its own innermost essence, where the One resides. When this happens, we are in a state of ecstasy or frenzy. It is only in this state that we can be in union with the One, and in this union reach our final goal. In one respect he deviated from Plotinus and that is in making theurgical practices and religious exercises the means for invoking divine and demonic grace.

3. THE THIRD PERIOD

The Neoplatonists of the third period that deserve mention are Amelius and Eustachius of the School of Rome; Theodorus, Aedisius, Chrysanthius, Eusebius, Maximus and Hypatia of the Syrian School; and Marinus, Isidorus, Zenodotus and Damascius of the School in Athens. Damascius was the head of this last School when in the year A.D. 529 the Emperor Justinian closed the School and prohibited lectures on Greek philosophy in Athens. Damascius with Simplicius and some other Neoplatonists emigrated to Persia; but while some of the party remained there in the School started by Nawsherwan at Jundi Shapur, the rest came back after going through considerable hardships. Greek philosophy was being consumed by its own unhealthy and wasting tendencies and perhaps would have gradually perished by itself, but the Emperor's intolerance drove it to the East, where it regained its health and flourished under Muslim patronage only to return to the West later with greater vigour and enhanced glory.

NOTE

1. cf. Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad.

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PART II

MEDIAEVAL THOUGHT

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ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY
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ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE MEDIEVAL SCHOLASTICS
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SUFISM
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CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM
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CHAPTER XXXI
ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS PRECURSORS

I. INTRODUCTION

In a History of Philosophy showing the inter-relations of Eastern and Western thought St. Augustine occupies a unique place. He was born in Tagaste in Roman Africa in A.D. 354 and died at Hippo in A.D. 430, after being Bishop of that city from A.D. 395 to 430. He was thus an African belonging to the far-flung Roman Empire and was brought up on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, facing Europe. The cultures and traditions of various races from different parts of the world moulded his character and shaped his thinking. Semitic influences were at work in his life, passed on to him through the society, perhaps through the blood, of the Phoenicians with whose language and ideas he was well acquainted. Persia influenced him deeply through the doctrine of Manichaeism which he followed for a period of nine years. Latin and Greek classics played an important part in his intellectual growth. He was taught Latin from his childhood and his entire education was imparted almost exclusively in that language. As a boy he studied selected passages from the Latin poets, such as Terence, Horace, Catullus, Ovid, Juvenal, Persius and Martial. He also read widely in Virgil and derived much pleasure from his poetry. His writings bear many traces of his familiarity with the Latin poets, which began from his school days. He went on to study the Hortensius of Cicero, which stimulated in him an ardent love of philosophy. He also learnt Greek as a boy but did not make much progress in it, as he was not inclined to master the subtleties of that language. This was a cause of regret with him afterwards and he made the best use of whatever he knew of Greek for an understanding of the New Testament. He was particularly indebted to the Greek philosophy of Neoplatonism, which formed an integral part of his thinking to the end of his life, though considerably modified by later study and experience. Christianity, urged upon him constantly by his mother from his infancy but resisted and neglected for several years, entered his life with great vigour during an emotional crisis of conversion when he was thirty-two years old and became the dominant factor in his life and thought to the end of his days. Thus in a peculiarly intimate way St. Augustine illustrated in his life and philosophy the contact of East and West. He has been universally acknowledged by Christian theologians as the greatest teacher in the Christian Church after
St. Paul; his influence upon Christian life through the ages has been continuous and profound down to the present day. It is a significant fact that an early Christian thinker, held in such great respect through the ages, has been moulded by influences emanating from such widely scattered regions of the world as Africa, Persia, Greece, Rome and Palestine. He is, therefore, assured of a very important place in a History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western.

2. ST. AUGUSTINE AND MANICHAEISM

As a young man Augustine was greatly attracted to the philosophy of Manichaeism. The founder of this system of thought was a Persian, Manes or Mani by name, who lived from the years A.D. 240 to 277. Manichaeism seems to have spread widely over the Roman Empire. The main doctrines of this religion are found described in a letter called *Foundation*, which was believed to have been written by Manes himself, and also in the books of Faustus who lived about the same time as Augustine and who was considered to be the chief exponent of the Manichaean religion. In the writings of Augustine criticisms and comments on the Manichaean doctrines are found in abundance. From these sources it is possible to reconstruct the essential tenets of the Manichaean religion. According to its teaching there were two eternally opposing substances—the Kingdom of Light presided over by God the Father and the Kingdom of Darkness presided over by a dreadful Prince, who was not a Deity but who was as eternal as the Chief who ruled over the Kingdom of Light. The Kingdom of Darkness was a material entity and the Kingdom of Light a spiritual entity and there was constant antagonism and conflict between them. Manichaeism sought thus to explain the presence of evil and sin in the world. This dualism has been the distinctive feature of religion in Persia. It would be an interesting subject of speculation to enquire how Persia in particular happened to make this characteristic contribution towards the problem of evil, which has baffled the minds of philosophers all through the ages and in all parts of the world.

With regard to the ultimate destiny of man, the Manichees held that the elect would be redeemed from the body, but that inferior souls unable to reach such deliverance would by a process of transmigration be degraded into brute cattle and become chained to the earth. An elaborate mythology formed a vital part of the Manichaean doctrine.

The Manichees held a highly critical view of the Christian Scriptures. They expressed great respect for them, but rejected quite freely texts which did not harmonize with their views, holding that the authority of such texts was doubtful and that the New Testament was deplorably corrupt at various points. They taught that the essence of Christianity
was moral conduct and not dogmatic beliefs. Manes claimed that his teaching was identical with Christian doctrine and that he had direct communion with Jesus Christ and derived his authority from Him. He called himself "Manichaeus, an apostle of Jesus Christ by the appointment of God the Father." This curious claim that Manichaeism was the original and pure form of the Christian religion was an important characteristic of the Manichaeism of St. Augustine's day.

There were several reasons why St. Augustine, though born in a Christian family, was attracted to this strange medley of Manichaen beliefs. The Christian teaching which had been given to him in his youth was utterly inadequate to meet the problems and needs of a brilliant, restless and enquiring mind. He was not well-grounded in the essential doctrines of the Christian religion. He did not understand that Christianity did not make God the source of evil. The existence of evil in the world perplexed him greatly and he thought that Manichaeism offered an effective solution while Christianity failed to do so. Moreover, in his youth his ideas were strangely materialistic. He had, therefore, no difficulty in accepting the doctrine that evil was a material substance which existed from eternity and which was in continual conflict with God. But the main attraction of the religion of Manichaeism to his mind was its appeal to reason without any demand for faith. The Manichaean teachers constantly emphasized the term "Truth" and claimed that their followers need not accept anything on the basis of faith but were expected to believe only those doctrines which could be demonstrated satisfactorily to the intellect. To a brilliant young man like St. Augustine, with a keen desire to explain intelligibly whatever he believed, this important doctrine of the Manichees proved to be of the most potent influence.

He found certain difficulties in the religion of the Manichees. He could not accept readily their mythology. They worshipped the Sun but he held it was only a symbol of some hidden truth which would become clear to him as he advanced in spiritual knowledge. He realized that the Manichees observed the festival of Manes with great rejoicing while they seemed quite indifferent to the value of Easter Day. He did not realize that on Manichaean principles Christ was only a phantasmal being who could not die and who could not, therefore, rise again. St. Augustine never became a whole-hearted believer in Manichaean doctrines. He was only a "hearer" and was permitted to eat flesh, to cultivate land and to marry if he pleased. The really devoted and advanced followers of the Manichaean religion were allowed none of these concessions. With characteristic fervour and enthusiasm St. Augustine persuaded five of his personal friends to accept the Manichaean doctrine.

St. Augustine's own account of his relation to the Manichean sect is worth quoting here. "Thou knowest, Honoratus, that the circumstance which led me among those men, was their profession, that, setting aside
the terrors of authority, they would lead such as would listen to them, to
God by the plain and simple way of reason, and would rescue them from
all errors. . . . But what again recalled me from being altogether fixed
among them, and held me in the class of 'Hearers,' as they term it, so that
I let not go the hopes and cares of this world, but that I observed that
they were rather fluent and copious in refuting others, than solid and
settled in establishing their own views?""

A public discussion took place in Carthage between a Christian teacher
named Hellepides and the Manichees. Certain arguments from Scripture
were set forth by Hellepides. The Manichees could not refute them effect-
ively, but claimed that the passages referred to were spurious. They were
unable to produce any satisfactory evidence to maintain their claims.
Augustine's faith in the Manichees received a rude shock from this meet-
ing. He also began to doubt whether evil was a material substance as the
Manichees maintained. Other doubts arose in his mind, but the Manichees
persuaded Augustine to wait for the arrival of Faustus, their ablest
exponent. When he met Augustine, he however confessed his ignorance
with the utmost candour and stated frankly that he really did not know
the answer to the many questions raised by Augustine.

3. ST. AUGUSTINE AND NEOPLATONISM

After passing through a period of scepticism Augustine came under the
spell of Neoplatonism.

According to the teaching of Plotinus, the Absolute cannot be de-
scribed, but can only be called Being or Unity. "The Absolute is none of the
things of which it is the source. Its nature is that nothing can be affirmed
of it—not existence, not essence, not life—since it is that which trans-
cends all these." Ultimate Reality is beyond good and evil. Moral quali-
ties imply limitations and cannot exist in the Absolute. This indescribable
Absolute was the goal of spiritual attainment for which Plotinus strove.
The student of Indian philosophic thought will recognize how closely
akin the teaching of Plotinus is to the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta.3

4. THE CONVERSION OF ST. AUGUSTINE

In the year A.D. 384 Augustine became the Professor of Rhetoric in the
city of Milan. His mind was in a state of intellectual ferment. He had ac-
cepted the teaching of the Manichees and then had given it up. He had
been a sceptic but the negative attitude of scepticism had not satisfied the
deepest instincts of his soul. The philosophy of Neoplatonism had appealed
to him considerably but it did not obtain his final and whole-hearted
allegiance. His profoundly religious nature was not content to adore and worship the Absolute, of which nothing but existence could be predicated, though Neoplatonism left, as we shall see later, a lasting impression on his mind. His moral life was in a state of chaos.

St. Ambrose was the Bishop of Milan at that time. Augustine attended regularly his sermons and was deeply impressed by them. At first he was attracted by his eloquence and his delivery but slowly he began to take careful note of the content of Ambrose's preaching. He was drawn by the emphasis which the preacher laid on the doctrine of the spiritual nature of God. Augustine had become convinced that the materialistic conceptions which the Manichees held were quite unsatisfactory. His contact with Neoplatonism had enabled him to understand the nature of God as Spirit.

The emotional and intellectual struggles in Augustine's life reached a crisis. The story of his conversion is set forth by Augustine in imitable words in the pages of his spiritual autobiography entitled Confessions, which has remained a spiritual classic in the Christian Church down to the present day. We have only space here to quote a paragraph or two from this story. "I cast myself down, I know not how, under a certain fig-tree, giving full vent to my tears; and the floods of mine eyes gushed out, an acceptable sacrifice to Thee. And, not indeed in these words, yet to this purpose, spake I much unto Thee: And Thou, O Lord, how long? how long, Lord, wilt Thou be angry, for ever? Remember not our former iniquities, for I felt that I was held by them. I sent up these sorrowful words; How long? how long, 'to-morrow, and to-morrow'? Why not now? Why not is there this hour an end to my uncleanness?

"So was I speaking, and weeping in the most bitter contrition of my heart, when lo! I heard from a neighbouring house a voice, as of boy or girl, I know not, chanting, and oft repeating, 'Take up and read; Take up and read.' Instantly, my countenance altered, I began to think most intently, whether children were wont in any kind of play to sing such words: nor could I remember ever to have heard the like. So checking the torrent of my tears, I arose; interpreting it to be no other than a command from God, to open the book, and read the first chapter I should find. For I had heard of Antony, that coming in during the reading of the Gospel, he received the admonition, as if what was being read, was spoken to him; Go, sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come and follow me. And by such oracle he was forthwith converted unto Thee. Eagerly then I returned to the place where Alypius was sitting; for there had I laid the volume of the Apostle, when I arose thence. I seized, opened, and in silence read that section, on which my eyes first fell: Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying: but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, in concupiscence.
No further would I read; nor needed I: for instantly at the end of this sentence, by a light as it were of serenity infused into my heart, all the darkness of doubt vanished away."

5. THE TEACHING OF ST. AUGUSTINE

St. Augustine's mother died when he was thirty-three years old, a year after his conversion. They were standing together in a house at Ostia and talking about the things of eternity. She died soon after this conversation. The beautiful passage, giving the gist of their conversation on that memorable occasion, is of great importance for an understanding of the main elements of St. Augustine's teaching. "We were saying then: If to any the tumult of the flesh were hushed, hushed the image of earth and waters and air, hushed also the poles of heaven, yea the very soul be hushed to herself, and by not thinking on self surmount self, hushed all dreams and imaginary revolutions, every tongue and every sign, and whatsoever exists only in transition, since if any could hear all these say, 'We made not ourselves, but He made us that abideth for ever'—If then having uttered this, they too should be hushed, having roused only ears to Him who made them, and He alone speak, not by them, but by Himself, that we may hear His Word, not through any tongue of flesh, nor Angel's voice, nor sound of thunder, nor in the dark riddle of a similitude, but, might hear whom in these things we love, might hear His Very Self without these (as we two now strained ourselves and in swift thought touched on that Eternal Wisdom, which abideth over all); could this be continued on, and other visions of kind far unlike be withdrawn, and this one ravish, and absorb, and wrap up its beholder amidst these inward joys, so that life might be for ever like that one moment of understanding which we sighed after: were not this, 'Enter into thy Master's joy?' And when shall that be? When we shall rise again, though we shall not all be changed?"

The tumult of the flesh is hushed. When we engage in prayer or meditation, numerous distractions come to us through the avenues of the senses. We hear sweet music and are pleased; harsh sounds reach us and we are annoyed. If attractive sights stretch before us, we are apt to gaze on them and the smooth flow of our thoughts is disturbed. The comfort of our posture has much to do with the continuous stream of our meditation. Thus in all these ways the appetites of the body and its senses determine the nature of our meditation. If there is to be effective prayer, the clamour of the senses must cease and the urges of the body must stop. It is only then that we can commune in peace with God. The method of meditation explained here has much in common with the Neoplatonist and Indian spiritual technique. "Neoplatonism believes in the Hindu
technique of entering into spiritual consciousness. By meditation we can free the soul from its subjection to the body and attain union with the Supreme. Plotinus asks us to strip off everything extraneous till the vision is attained. We must abstract from the body, which does not belong to the true nature of the self, from the soul that shapes the body, from sense, perceptions, appetites, and emotions, and even the intellect with its duality. Then the soul touches and gazes on the supreme light."

The things of the transitory world speak to us and say: "We made not ourselves: He made us who abides for ever." Earth and sea and sky are full of lovely objects which speak to us of God. St. Augustine's characteristic method of investigation is to start with the nature of the outer world, and pass therefrom to the inner world of self and thence finally to God. These three steps of his dialectic can be noticed in the following passage.

St. Augustine says: "What shall I do to find my God? I will consider the earth; the earth is made. Great is the beauty of the regions of earth, but it has a Maker. . . . I look up to the sky and to the beauty of the stars; I admire the brightness of the sun, bringing to birth the day; the moon, soothing the darkness of night; these are wonderful sights, amazing even, for they are not earthly, but heavenly; but even there my thirst is not yet appeased: I wonder, I praise, but I seek Him who made these things. . . . My God, who made these things that I see with my eyes, is not to be sought out by these eyes. But perhaps God is some such being as the soul herself? No, the object in quest is some unchangeable truth, some being that subsists without defect. Not such is the soul herself, open to defect and improvement, to knowledge and ignorance, remembering, forgetting, now willing, now unwilling. Such changeableness is not incident to God. Seeking, therefore, my God in visible and corporeal things, and not finding Him; seeking His substance in myself, as though He were some such being as I myself am, and not finding Him there either; I feel that my God must be something above my soul. Yes, I seek my God in every body, earthly and heavenly, and find Him not; I seek his substance in my soul, and find it not there; still longing to understand and discern the invisible things of God by the things that are made (Rom. i, 20), I have poured out my soul above myself, and now there remains nothing for me to touch but my God."

The direct communion of God with the soul passes beyond the region of words and even of images of words. Words are often utterly inadequate to convey profound experiences. When we see a beautiful sunset and try to express in human language the wonderful sight which we see and the deep feelings or thoughts which it raises in our minds, we find how inadequate words are. The joy that we experience in seeing a real sunset is far greater than any joy we may have in reading about a sunset, however great a command of words the writer may have. We use words constantly
in the intercourse with our fellow-men. If we do not use words with our lips, we imagine ourselves as holding converse through the images of words. In prayer we always use words when we pray aloud; if we pray in silence we use the images of words; but both words and their images have only a limited scope. They cannot fully express all our deepest feelings and thoughts. If after a long separation we meet a friend, we are unable to speak because the joy is so great. The human spirit and the Divine Spirit meet on a lofty level where words are woefully insufficient.

St. Augustine writes: "Being thence admonished to return to myself, I entered even into my inward self, Thou being my Guide; and able I was, for Thou wert become my Helper. And I entered and beheld with the eye of my soul (such as it was), above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, the Light Unchangeable. Not this ordinary light, which all flesh may look upon, nor as it were a greater of the same kind, as though the brightness of this should be manifold brighter, and with its greatness take up all space. Not such was this light, but other, yea, far other from all these. Nor was it above my soul, as oil is above water, nor yet as heaven above earth; but above to my soul, because It made me; and I below It, because I was made by It. He that knows the Truth, knows what that Light is; and he that knows It, knows eternity."8

The communion between God and man is a blissful experience; itroused in us the highest joy. The joy that is derived from the immediate and direct communion of the human soul with the Divine Soul is not a momentary experience but lasts all through eternity. It is difficult to understand what the nature of eternal life will be. But St. Augustine suggests that the life eternal will be a continuation of the moments of bliss which we experience here and now in our fellowship with God. In this life our fellowship with the Divine is fragmentary and incomplete. In the hereafter the joy of communion with God will be a continuous and permanent experience.

From this brief account of the teaching of St. Augustine, it is evident that he owed a heavy debt to Neoplatonism. But he was emphatic and clear in recognizing its final inadequacy. "Thou procuredst for me, by means of one puffed up with most unnatural pride, certain books of the Platonists, translated from Greek into Latin. And therein I read, not indeed in the very words, but to the very same purpose, enforced by many and diverse reasons, that in the Beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God: the Same was in the beginning with God: all things were made by Him, and without Him was nothing made: that which was made by Him is life, and the life was the light of men, and the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not. And that the soul of man, though it bears witness to the light, yet itself is not that light; but the Word of God, being God, is that true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world.
ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS PRECURSORS

And that He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. But, that He came unto His own, and His own received Him not; but as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, as many as believed His name; this I read not there. Again I read there, that God the Word was born not of flesh nor of blood, nor of the will of man, nor of the will of the flesh, but of God. But that the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, I read not there."9

NOTES

2. Plotinus, Enneads, III. 8–10 (translated by McKenna, II, 134).
8. The Confessions of St. Augustine, pp. 132, 133.

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CHAPTER XXXII

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

I

THE GENERAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

1. THE PROBLEM

In the present state of our knowledge it would be premature to attempt a definitive history of Islamic philosophy. Too many facts are still unknown, too many works have been neglected for centuries and remained unread and are only gradually being rediscovered in Eastern and Western libraries and edited and studied. There is no agreement among scholars on the best approach to the subject: some try to understand Islamic philosophy as an exclusive achievement of the Arabs and accordingly minimize the importance of that Greek element whose presence throughout they cannot deny; others tend to fix their attention on the Greek sources and do not realize that the Islamic philosophers, although continuing the Greek tradition, can rightly claim to be understood and appreciated in their own setting and according to their own intentions which may be different from those of their Greek predecessors.

Very little has been said about the philosophical significance of Islamic philosophy for our own time. Only a few good interpretations of Arabic philosophical texts are available and accessible to the general reader. It is a promising field of research, but only a small portion of it has been cultivated. Hence nothing more than a very provisional sketch of the main development of Arabic philosophy can be given at the present juncture.

Islamic philosophy presupposes not only a thousand years of Greek thought about God and self-dependent entities, about nature and man and human conduct and action: its background in time is the amalgamation of this way of life with the Christian religion which had conquered the lands round the Mediterranean during the three centuries which preceded the establishment of Islam as a new religion from the Caspian Sea to the Pyrenees. The unbroken continuity of the Western tradition is based on the fact that the Christians in the Roman Empire did not reject the pagan legacy but made it an essential part of their own syllabus of learning. The understanding of Arabic philosophy is thus intimately linked with the study of Greek philosophy and theology in the early stages of Christianity, the last centuries of the Roman Empire
and the contemporary civilization of Byzantium. The student of Arabic philosophy should therefore be familiar not only with Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and various minor Greek philosophers, but also with thinkers like St. Augustine or John Philoponus who was the first to combine the Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology.

2. THE GREEK ELEMENT

Philosophy is a way of life discovered by the Greeks in the sixth century B.C. and developed by them in successive stages to a wonderfully balanced and harmonious interpretation of man and the universe. It exhausts, if we look at it from a distance, all the approaches to an understanding of the world and of man's position in it, which are possible from the starting-point of an unshakable belief in the power of human reason. The civilization of the Greeks owes much to the earlier civilizations of the Ancient East, of Egypt and Assyria, for example; but their confidence in human reason is something essentially new. Plato, the greatest of all Greek philosophers and the founder of a natural theology whose appeal is still as fresh and impressive as ever, did not overlook the irrational element in man and gave it its proper place as a servant of reason, without setting himself to do violence to human nature and throw it out altogether. Later centuries were less cautious, and conceived rationalism in terms which were too narrow, leading it to destroy itself in scepticism, dogmatism and mysticism. But the tradition of Greek philosophy was never completely interrupted, and while it declined in the West it had a new lease of life in Muslim civilization. Greek poetry was neglected in its homeland and in Byzantium, and almost forgotten in the Latin world, and had to be rediscovered and revalued in the centuries following the Italian Renaissance. Greek philosophy, however, survived and was continuously studied, and the considerable Arabic contribution to this survival is by no means adequately realized in the world of scholarship. Had the Arabic philosophers done nothing apart from saving Greek philosophy from being completely disregarded in the Middle Ages—and they did more—they would deserve the interest of twentieth-century scholars for this reason alone.

When in the seventh century the Arabs conquered Egypt and Syria which were largely hellenized, and the somewhat less completely hellenized Mesopotamia, Greek philosophy had been in existence for a thousand years and more as a continuous tradition of study handed down in well-established schools throughout the Greek-speaking world. The great creative period of Greek philosophy was long since over and its light had become dim, when it was handed on to the Arabs. It is important for those who aim at understanding the Arabic philosophers in their proper setting to realize what Greek philosophy was like in the fifth and
sixth centuries A.D. and not rashly to compare Plato and Aristotle with the Muslim philosophers without taking all the later developments into due account and without knowing how Plato and Aristotle were read and explained in the Greek schools with whose late exponents the Muslims became acquainted. The task is, in some respects, difficult, because certain features of the late Greek schools are known to us only from Arabic sources and were considered uninteresting in the later centuries of Byzantine Greek civilization.

3. THE HEBRAIC ELEMENT

Jewish thought, out of which Christianity and Islam ultimately developed, is also based on the civilizations of Egypt and Assyria, but it took a quite different turn. According to Jewish thought the authority of the supreme God and revealed knowledge are superior to human reason, and faith in God is considered the only true and certain good—instead of the Greek appreciation of wisdom as the perfection of man. Christianity conquered the Roman Empire in its entirety during the fourth century A.D., whereas Judaism continued as the special religion of the Jewish people. The Koranic conception of faith is, in all its essential features, in harmony with contemporary Jewish and Christian ideas; the exaltation of prophecy and the intuitive attainment of truth through supernatural powers of this kind are of primary importance in Islam, though by no means foreign to Judaism and Christianity. We shall have to specify the stage which Islam, as a religion of this type, had reached at the time when we first hear of Muslims who call themselves "philosophers," using the Greek word for the new knowledge which, in full consciousness of what they were doing, they imported from a foreign and basically different world.

4. JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN ATTEMPTS AT ASSIMILATING GREEK PHILOSOPHY

The rise of Arabic philosophy in the first half of the ninth century A.D. did not represent the first invasion of a Hebraic religion by Greek thought, although one has to be fully aware that it is different from previous developments of a similar kind, in view both of the stage reached by Greek philosophy in the century after Justinian and of the special situation of the Muslim religion, which had to find its bearings in defending itself against Christian and Manichean criticism and attack. But the comparison of the Jewish and the Christian attitudes to Greek philosophy helps towards a better understanding of the somewhat different history of Greek philosophy in the Muslim world. Philo of Alexandria had in the first century A.D. tried to explain the essence of
Judaism in terms of contemporary Greek philosophy, which meant for him a not too radical Platonism; but his attempt had been abortive so far as the future development of Judaism was concerned. Nevertheless it helped Clement of Alexandria and Origen, who both used him widely, to build up the foundations of the first Christian philosophy in the third century. Philo, Clement and Origen were still free from the impact of Neoplatonism, which became the dominant pagan philosophy from the fourth century onwards and hence increasingly influenced Christian thought as is shown by such writings as those of the man who called himself Dionysius the Areopagite. The syllabus of philosophical learning which became more or less common after A.D. 500 was based on Aristotle's lecture courses, selections from Plato, and Neoplatonic Metaphysics; but the great authorities of the past were studied according to the interpretation of the late Neoplatonic commentators who, basing themselves on earlier commentaries like those of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, tried to make Aristotle a consistent, systematic and dogmatic philosopher. It was not until this date that the actual teaching of pagan philosophy of the Neoplatonic-Aristotelian type was taken over by Christian teachers. This created a new problem or, at any rate, gave increased importance to a problem already understood before, that of the relations between this philosophy and Christian religion and theology. This discussion is, in our tradition, represented by John Philoponus, a monophysite commentator on Aristotle, a philosophical defender of the *formatio mundi* against the Aristotelians, and also a theological writer like a Muslim dialectical theologian (*mutakallim*). It is, at the same time, the historical background of Arabic philosophy which faced the perennial problem of faith and reason, of revealed and natural theology, in a form conditioned by this late development of Greek philosophy as part of a syllabus of Christian learning. This late Greek philosophy was not the same everywhere but varied, however slightly, in different places and at different times; accordingly the development of early Islamic philosophy is by no means uniform either: there was more than one route from Syriac and Egyptian seats of Greek learning within the Muslim Empire to Baghdad, to Persia and all over the steadily extending Islamic world.

II

THE GREEK LEGACY

1. AUTHORS TRANSMITTED

The authors studied by the Arabic-speaking Muslim philosophers and, accordingly, translated from Greek or Syriac into Arabic, are those
studied in the late Greek schools. This means that the philosophical texts by Greek authors preserved in Arabic translations include a certain number of Greek texts which are otherwise lost through the narrowing interest of the later centuries of Byzantium; on the other hand it is clear that those Greek texts of earlier times which did not appeal to the late Neoplatonic Schools and are for this reason lost in their Greek original cannot be recovered from Arabic translations either. Hence we find, for example, in Arabic versions lost philosophical treatises by Galen or sections of a paraphrase of Plotinus or unknown treatises on Platonic philosophy or Greek commentaries on Aristotle, but are disappointed whenever we look for writings of the pre-Socratics, dialogues of Aristotle, works of early and middle Stoic writers, etc. The value of the Arabic translations for the Greek text of the authors translated is not as negligible as is often assumed, and much can be learned from the Arabic versions about the actual transmission of the various works. The authors best known to the Arabs were Aristotle and his commentators; we know their translations of them relatively well and are able to appreciate their fine understanding of the original arguments, which on the whole comes up to the level of the late Greek schools. Aristotle’s *Dialogues*, which had been very popular in the Hellenistic age and had, because of their Platonic colour, appealed to some of the Neoplatonists, were not translated. But almost all the treatises of Aristotle eventually became known, with the exception of the *Politics*, which to all appearance was not studied much in the Greek Schools of the Imperial Age. Hence a thorough knowledge of Aristotle’s thought, as the late Neoplatonists understood it, is common to all Arabic philosophers from Al-Kindi in the ninth to Ibn Rushd in the twelfth century, although its application varies in the different philosophical systems established on this base. Aristotle’s formal logic was latterly used also by the theological adversaries of the philosophers. In addition, most of the commentaries known to the Greeks were eagerly studied and discussed, and some of them are known to us only through the Arabs. Plato’s *Timaeus*, *Republic* and *Laws* were available and were studied. The *Republic* and *Laws* became textbooks of political theory in the school of Al-Fârâbî; the *Timaeus* was widely known, but the detailed history of its study in the Islamic world is still to be written. Philosophers like Al-Râzî styled themselves Platonists, but their Plato had a definitely Neoplatonic character. Porphyry and Proclus were more than mere names; the Arabs were acquainted with many minor Neoplatonic treatises unknown to us, and the Hermetic writings were read and studied in Arabic versions. The philosophical writings of Galen were better known than anywhere in the later Christian world. Only a small fraction of the works actually translated has been traced, but very full lists are preserved in Arabic works, and their influence can often be inferred from Arabic philosophical books. For example, John Philoponus’
arguments against Proclus were taken up by Al-Ghāzali in his thorough-going attack on the philosophers, and Alexander of Aphrodisias' treatise on Fate may well have helped the Muhammadan discussions on determination and free will. Whatever Arabic philosophers tried on their own can only be understood and appreciated if one acquires a thorough knowledge of the terminology and the types of argument used by the Neoplatonic professors of Aristotelian philosophy.

2. TRANSLATORS AND TRANSLATIONS

The Arabic translations of Greek philosophy begin in early Abbāsid times (about A.D. 800) and can be followed up until about A.D. 1000. The translators were with very few exceptions Christians, some of them followers of the Orthodox Church, the majority Nestorians or Jacobites. They translated from Syriac versions or, less frequently, from the Greek original. A history of their very interesting literary activity cannot yet be given, but its general outline is clear. The philosopher Al-Kindi (died A.D. 873), for example, had already a large number of translations at his disposal, and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, written by an unknown Neoplatonist, were expressly translated for his use, as were probably many other works. The translators were patronized and encouraged by the Caliph's court, particularly during the reigns of Al-Ma'mūn (A.D. 813–33) and Al-Mu'tāsīm (A.D. 833–42), and came to work in organized teams. The reasons for the attitude of these Caliphs—which came to an end during the reign of Al-Mutawakkil (A.D. 847–61)—are not clear, and one hesitates to believe that either their personal thirst for knowledge or the predominance of the Mu'tazilite movement was responsible for such an outburst of publicly assisted editions of philosophical (and scientific) texts. The earlier translations—among which are those used by Al-Kindi—are less well known. A new standard was established by Al-Kindi's contemporary, the Nestorian Ḥunain Ibn Ishāq (died after A.D. 870) and his school, who translated from the Greek into Syriac and Arabic after having, in each case, established a critical text of the work to be translated. Ḥunain's philological methods, which he himself explains in detail, come fully up to the level of contemporary Byzantine scholarship. He found Greek scholarship still alive in Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, and even in the capital, Bagdad itself. Ḥunain's son, Ishāq was particularly concerned with translations of Aristotle, and his versions are very reliable indeed and reveal a very high degree of real understanding. Later philosophers and translators could thus use much better texts than Al-Kindi, who, like all other Muslim philosophers, did not understand Greek or Syriac. A third School of translators, who, however, did not know any Greek, used the Syriac translations of the School of Ḥunain very freely for their Arabic versions and followed the
same standards of philological accuracy, discussing variants of earlier Syriac and Arabic versions. They built up a definite syllabus for the study of Aristotle, consisting of translations selected from versions prior to Hunain and also versions emanating from his School. They established a regular tradition of instruction in the Aristotelian philosophy, using the best Greek commentaries available to them. The best known representatives of this school are the Nestorian Abū Bishr Mattā, who was a friend of the philosopher Al-Fārābī (A.D. 870–950) and Al-Fārābī’s pupil, the Jacobite Christian Yahyā Ibn’Adi (A.D. 893–974). Their wide and subtle knowledge of Greek Philosophy was the basis on which Al-Fārābī built. It was also presupposed by the later Spanish philosophers Avempace and Averroës, and the high quality of their comprehension of Greek thought is less astonishing if one keeps this fact in mind. Avicenna knows them but follows—at least partly—a different path.

Thus the Christian translators, assisting the general trend of thought in the first two centuries of the Abbasid Empire, prepare the ground for the rise of Islamic philosophy. What had happened before in Rome, in the time of Cicero and Seneca and again in the century after St. Augustine, and had been attempted, from the fifth century A.D. onwards, in the Christian Syriac civilization, repeated itself, though on a much larger scale, within the orbit of the vigorous and enterprising Islamic culture. Translations of a similar type smoothed the passage of Greek and Islamic thought to mediaeval Jewry, and eventually created in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, for the first time, a Jewish philosophy superior to Philo’s unsuccessful attempt. Both Arabic and Hebrew philosophical texts found their way through translations to the schoolmen of the West. Translators are not very conspicuous figures in the history of philosophy, but without their painstaking work the essential links in the continuity of Western thought would never have been joined together, nor would Arabic philosophy in particular ever have come into existence. The function of these translators was not simply to transmit texts. They were partly under the influence of the Arabic theologians, partly or rather for the most on their own initiative, instrumental in building up a complex and lucid Arabic philosophical terminology and laying the foundations for an abstract Arabic style. This terminology reproduces the terminology of the late Greek commentators and of the Neoplatonic philosophers which had gone far beyond Aristotle and Plato themselves. This alone is a very great contribution of the Arabs to the history of philosophy; it will only be sufficiently appreciated when a full Arabic-Greek dictionary of philosophical terms has been compiled.
3. SOME ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF LATE GREEK PHILOSOPHY

All the Arabic philosophers shared a common background which was neither Platonic nor Aristotelian exclusively, but a mixture of both these elements in varying degrees according to differences of temperament and individual inclinations. To ignore or deny this background called for an originality of which none of them was capable. To grasp the nature of the main features of this framework is essential to an understanding of the individual solutions offered by the Arabic philosophers.

Greek philosophy was accepted by the Arabs, as it had been previously accepted by Greek and Latin Christians, as providing a "natural theology," i.e. a theory of the divine as revealed in the nature of reality and as accessible to human reason. That God's existence can not only be explained by reason and argument, but that it can also be scientifically demonstrated, is a conviction found throughout Greek philosophy, with the exception of the radical Sceptics; it was only slightly affected by the Neoplatonic followers of Iamblichus who asserted that there was supernatural truth in obscure books like the Chaldean Oracles "whom it is unlawful to disbelieve." Otherwise the intuitive knowledge of particularly gifted individuals was either rejected as superstition or considered as subsidiary to philosophical insight, not superior to it. The Muslims had to adjust themselves to these conflicting possibilities in one way or another.

This Greek philosophical religion and the metaphysical theory on which it is based are intimately connected with astronomy, i.e. the eternal order of the stars. This applies to Aristotle as well as to the Neoplatonists who transmitted to the Arabs the world-picture assumed by them all. The First Cause whose existence is proved in this way is identified with God. Aristotle's distinction between the highest God and the star-gods became more influential in the Neoplatonic age, when the balance of interest definitely shifted from nature and science to the transcendent, and philosophers built up a great hierarchy of supernatural beings on the basis of Aristotle's Metaphysics. The form in which this metaphysical tradition reached the Arabs was definitely Neoplatonic, i.e. reality was represented as a chain of spiritual forces emanating from the One in timeless cosmic reproduction like the rays from the sun. All mere products were held to be inferior to the First Cause. The First Cause, the One, remained, however, unaltered and undiminished, although it continued in eternal creation. This Neoplatonic theology was accepted by the Christian Neoplatonists, and accordingly we find it, for example, in St. Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. One work, but by no means the only one, through which this Neoplatonic theology reached
the Arabs was the pseudo-Aristotelian De causis, an epitome of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, somehow transformed by a Christian; its Latin translation is of great historical importance for the history of scholastic philosophy before Aquinas. This type of metaphysics, though varying in detail and developed in different ways, is common to all the Islamic philosophers from Al-Kindi to Ibn-Rushd.

Another feature shared by almost all the Islamic philosophers, but not yet traced in any Greek work, is the description of the active intellect, the nous poietikos of Aristotle, as a separate metaphysical entity, a kind of intermediary between the spiritual world above the moon and the human mind, through which both the human mind and the human imagination are linked with the divine. It had, apparently against Aristotle’s original but not very clearly expressed idea, been identified by Alexander of Aphrodisias with the First Cause. Some later philosophers mentioned in Pseudo-John Philoponus’ commentary on the De anima, assumed it to be a semi-divine being in its own right. The Greek original of the theory of the intellect in Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sina, for example, has not yet been found, but there can be no doubt that it is a late and very natural offshoot of Neoplatonic speculation, possibly originating in Alexandria. It is obvious that such a theory presents particular difficulties to adherents of a rigid monotheism. Hence Arabic philosophers identified this active intellect with the Qur’anic Spirit of Holiness, i.e., Gabriel, the angel of revelation, or with the Kingdom of Heaven, the ultimate abode of immortal souls.

The way in which the problem of immortality confronts philosophers depends upon the general psychological theory to which they adhere. Now Islamic psychology is for the most part based on that of Aristotle as understood in the commentaries of Alexander (third century) and Themistius (fourth century) and among the Neoplatonists Simplicius and John Philoponus (sixth century). But Aristotle had been very reticent about the soul’s ultimate fate after death, and recourse was therefore had to Neoplatonism tempered with Stoicism, as in Al-Fârâbî, or arguments from Plotinus, as in the philosophy of Ibn Sinâ. The resurrection of the body, one of the incontestable tenets of Islam (and of Christianity as well) created a new difficulty for the Muslim philosophers, in addition to the problem of the immortality of the soul with which the Neoplatonic Aristotelians had been confronted. These and other similar difficulties were partly already felt in the late Greek Schools, partly either became more pressing or were completely new for the Muslims; the different way in which they met these difficulties allows us, in my view, to come to a more satisfactory grouping of the various philosophical Schools in Islam.

The problem of supernatural knowledge, ascribed to individuals with prophetic powers, as well as that of the irrational elements in the life of the soul, had from the time of Plato never been neglected by Greek
philosophers. In the later part of the Hellenistic period and in the centuries dominated by Neoplatonism it had been most ardently discussed, and new solutions had been proposed. The reaction of Islamic philosophers differs in each case and again shows a very definite grouping. Al-Kindī accepts the religious interpretation of the contemporary Kālām, Ar-Rāzī rejects all the prophets as impostors, Al-Fārābī subordinates prophecy to philosophy, Avicenna considers prophecy the highest perfection attainable by human beings.

We are still not sufficiently well informed about either the different Greek Schools of Neoplatonism in the sixth century and after, or about the adaptation of their teaching to Christianity in Syriac surroundings, and the general decline of learning all over the Eastern Mediterranean world in this period. The differences between the two great Schools of Alexandria and Athens, the latter of which was closed by Justinian in 529, are evident and repeat themselves in the history of Arabic philosophy. What we might call the classical Greek tradition, which we know from Plutarch and Marcus Aurelius, from Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias, survived in the Neoplatonic philosophical School of Alexandria; there are direct links, guaranteed by Arabic biographical tradition and independent analysis of Arabic philosophical works, between it and the tenth century philosophical School of Baghdad, and thence with Al-Fārābī and through him with Avicenna on the one hand and, above all, with the Spanish Arabic philosophers on the other. This School upheld the primacy of reason and viewed the different religions as conveying the one philosophical truth in symbolic form. The School of Athens was more inclined to rely on faith and “revealed” pagan books, and philosophers like Proclus claimed a direct knowledge provided by supernatural insight beyond philosophical proof. This kind of Greek philosophy could appeal to Christian and Muslim philosophers who were bent on balancing the claims of human reason against the supremacy of Scripture and revelation, and there are, indeed, quite remarkable features which Al-Kindī and these Neoplatonists have in common. We know also independently that the Syriac Nestorian Aristotelians derived their acquaintance with philosophy from centres close to the Athenian School. It is also clear that the Platonic element was stronger in the Athenian School than in the Alexandrian, and this difference is again to be noticed in the corresponding Schools of Islamic philosophy. The Greek background of Ar-Rāzī’s thought, who is probably the most original of the early Islamic philosophers, is less easy to discover.

Islamic philosophy is thus a “productive assimilation” of Greek thought by open-minded and far-sighted representatives of a very different tradition and thus a serious attempt to make this foreign element an integral part of the Islamic tradition. It is an interesting and by no means uniform history. The more we learn about the history of mankind,
the more we realize that there is no spontaneous generation in history but only a continuous shaping of new "Forms" out of existing "matter." Islamic philosophy is an interesting example of this process which constitutes the continuity of human civilization.

III

SOME ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHERS

Before embarking upon the discussion of some aspects of Islamic philosophical thought, another difficulty has to be faced. The student of Greek philosophy finds reliable critical editions, modern translations of all the authors preserved and often valuable commentaries in addition. He can without hesitation approach the main questions and discuss the real meaning of the texts with which he is concerned. Most of this preliminary work has still to be done for Arabic philosophical texts, and hence students of Islamic philosophy have to give a great part of their time to this indispensable and by no means secondary work. Fifteen philosophical essays by Al-Kindī have only recently been edited for the first time, most of them from a unique MS. in Istanbul which seems to have come from the library of Ibn Sinā. Two of them have been translated into Italian. Eleven philosophical treatises of Ar-Rāzī were edited about twelve years ago; two of these also are available in translation. A certain number of Al-Fārābī's philosophical writings have been edited in Germany, Syria, India, England and Spain; most of these editions are, however, by no means satisfactory and are in urgent need of revision, as are the translations based on them. A critical edition of Ibn Sinā's main philosophical encyclopaedia Ash-Shīfā is at last in preparation; most of the existing editions of other philosophical works of his are unsatisfactory, and much is still unedited. Averroës' Tahāfut at-Tahāfut, his defence of philosophy against Al-Ghazālī's attack, has been excellently edited, and so have other works of his. Most of Avempace's writings exist only in a unique MS. in Oxford (the Berlin MS. is lost) and only a very small part of it has been edited and studied.

I. YA'QUB IBN ISHAQ AL-KINDI (died after A.D. 870)

It is instructive to compare how different Islamic philosophers characterized their indebtedness to the Greeks and their personal contribution. All of them agree that truth as obtained by philosophy transcends the borders of nations and religions, and that it in no way matters who was the first to discover it—their attitude may after all be com-
pared to that of the founder of Islam, who considered the new religion as the final revelation of religious truth but by no means the first. There would be no philosophy without the Greeks, and whoever ventures to cut himself off from the collective experience of past centuries will never achieve anything as a philosopher or a scientist, since the period of one individual life is much too short. "It is fitting to acknowledge the utmost gratitude to those who have contributed even a little to truth, not to speak of those who have contributed much.... We should not be ashamed to acknowledge truth and to assimilate it from whatever source it comes to us, even if it is brought to us by former generations and foreign peoples. For him who seeks the truth there is nothing of higher value than truth itself; it never cheapens or abases him who searches for it, but ennobles and honours him." These proud words are to be found in the preface of the earliest metaphysical work in Arabic, which Al-Kindi dedicated to the reigning Caliph Al-Mu'tasim. Three hundred years later, when the history of Islamic philosophy was approaching its end, Ibn Rushd reaffirmed this cosmopolitan attitude as something obvious: to do as Al-Kindi did had become an established practice, and the enthusiasm of the first philosopher had turned into an established routine of teaching.

Al-Kindi was the first to establish this tradition. "My principle," he says, "is first to record in complete quotations all that the Ancients have said on the subject; secondly, to complete what the Ancients have not fully expressed, and this according to the usage of our Arabic language, the customs of our age and our own ability." That implies that he is not only expressing Greek thoughts in Arabic but claims some originality of his own, in connecting this new branch of knowledge with the interpretation of Islam favoured by the Caliphs Al-Ma'mun and Al-Mu'tasim, with whom he appears to have been intimately connected. He evidently accepted the Mu'tazilite creed without reserve, but gave it a philosophical substructure. We may understand the Mu'tazilites as champions on the one hand of a reasonable creed against anthropomorphism and literalism, and on the other of an essentially religious standpoint against scepticism and unbelief. Al-Kindi had evidently to defend the line he took against the fideist attitude of theological orthodoxy, which was to raise its head again in his later years.

This attitude of Al-Kindi implied some modification in the traditional Neoplatonic-Aristotelian system, once he acquiesced in some of the main tenets of revealed religion such as the creation of the world out of nothing and the resurrection of the body on the Day of Judgment. Accordingly we find the Neoplatonic world-view introduced into Islam for the first time, but with a very significant proviso. There can be no question of "eternal creation," and one of the basic axioms of Greek philosophy, that nothing can come from nothing, must be abandoned, at least in one place: the highest sphere of the heaven, through which the divine substance is trans-
mitted to the lower strata of the universe and to the seat of human life, which is the earth. The highest sphere had been created from nothing in a single moment of time by the omnipotent will of God, and would not last a moment longer once God had decided on its end. The working of the world according to the Neoplatonic law of emanation was thus made dependent on the religious certainty of the creation of the world from nothing, and so on an act of God, who was beyond and above the laws of nature. The obvious philosophical difficulties which this view implies were overlooked, the desire to reconcile theology and philosophy being too strong: Al-Ghazālī’s re-elaboration of theology, which eventually won the day, shows that this trend of thought was probably more in keeping with the very nature of Islam than the attempts of the later philosophical schools. Otherwise Al-Kindi’s *Metaphysics* shows no signs of deviation from the general trend of Neoplatonic Aristotelianism as described above. The divine First Cause is in accordance with Plotinus and his successors defined as the One; above and beyond all the qualities to be found in man, and therefore only to be described in negative terms—as Christian theologians and the Mu’tazilites had also held. Like Ibn Sinā, Al-Kindi stresses, on the whole, the Platonic element in the late Greek synthesis of Plato and Aristotle. He neglects the Aristotelian forms of demonstration in favour of the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms preferred by the Stoics and by Neoplatonists like Proclus, and is for this reason criticized by Al-Fārābī and his followers. His psychology needs still further study, but its main features are clear. Like Plato he defines the soul as a separable substance, and even transmits an otherwise lost fragment from the *Eudemus*, a dialogue which Aristotle composed in his youth, when he still believed in the immortality of the whole soul as his master had done. At the same time he is acquainted with Aristotle’s *De anima*, either the whole work or some summary of it, and refers to his definition of the soul as the entelechy of the body. The same inconsistency is repeated in the psychology of Ibn Sinā, in whose philosophy the Platonic element, and particularly the influence of Plotinus, are stronger than in Al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd. There are more parallels of this type between Al-Kindi and Ibn Sinā—who epitomized a consolatory treatise by Al-Kindi—but it appears premature to state a definite historical connection between Al-Kindi and the most influential of later Islamic philosophers.

Al-Kindi’s theory of prophecy was famous, but no trace of his rational explanation of this phenomenon has hitherto been found. That it meant for him the highest perfection attainable to man is, however, beyond doubt. The prophet has divine knowledge through intuition which is decidedly superior to anything human knowledge can ever hope to reach. Hence the Qur’ān, as understood by the Mu’tazilites, conveys a higher truth than philosophy. In the case of the resurrection of the
body, for example, Al-Kindi is satisfied with referring to the statement of the prophet, which he explains with dialectical arguments; he appears not to be in the least disturbed that he is unable to give a philosophical demonstration. We may be reminded of Plato, who expressed in mythical form those personal religious convictions of his for which he could not find or had not yet found a demonstration. Revealed truth takes the place of Plato's myth in Al-Kindi's attempt to build up, for the first time, not an Arabic replica of Greek philosophy but Greek philosophy for Muslims. A very striking feature in Al-Kindi's thought, which he shares neither with Al-Farabi nor with Ibn Sinâ, is his acceptance of astrology as a science. That the influence of the planets is real was not doubted by the Neoplatonic School of Athens, and we may see in this parallel a new reason for linking Al-Kindi with this particular School. But in his attempt to foretell the probable duration of the Arabic Empire he relies both on the approved method of astrology and on the Qur'ân: science only confirms the odd arithmetical calculation based on the well-known enigmatic letters with which some suras of the Qur'ân begin.

2. ABÛ BAKR MUHAMMAD IBN ZAKARIYYÂ AR-RÂZÏ  
(died A.D. 923 or 932)

Whenever we read a line written by Ar-Râzî, we feel ourselves in the presence of a superior mind, of a man who is sure of his own value without being conceited, and who does not consider himself to be inferior in philosophy and medicine to his great Greek predecessors whom he admires as his masters. Although Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, Hippocrates and Galen can, in his view, not be surpassed, he does not hesitate either to modify their philosophical conclusions if he believes that he knows better, or to add to the store of accumulated medical knowledge what he has found out by his own research and observation. Whenever, for instance, he treats a particular disease he first summarizes everything he can find in Greek and Indian sources, now available in Arabic translations, and in the works of earlier Arabic doctors. He never fails to add his own opinion and his own judgment; he never adheres to authority as such. This applies to his philosophy as well. He claims to fulfill the function of a Socrates and an Hippocrates in his own time, within the orbit of the Arabic-speaking world. He is not impressed by the supernatural powers ascribed to, or claimed by, the Jewish, Christian and Islamic prophets. He points out that they disagree with each other, and that their utterances are self-contradictory. The religions which they have founded had provoked only hostility, war and unhappiness. We feel reminded of the fiercest Greek and Roman adversaries of traditional religion, Epicurus and Lucretius. "Tantum religio potuit suadere
malorum." The Platonists and Stoics had accepted traditional religion, though on their own terms, and were for this reason more welcome to Christians and Muslims, whereas Ar-Rāzī's attitude amounts to heresy and comes near to the later Western slogan of "the three great impostors, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad." Like Epicurus, he does not believe that philosophy is only accessible to the select few, as Plato's aristocratic conception of philosophy and its dignity had proclaimed and as most Islamic philosophers, following in Plato's footsteps, unanimously asserted. Philosophy was open to every human being, it was indeed the only way of salvation. "Whoever makes an effort and busies himself with study and research has set out on the way of truth. Indeed, the souls of men can be purified from the mud and darkness of this world and saved for the world to come only by the study of philosophy. When a man studies it and grasps a part of it, even the smallest part we can think of, he purifies the soul from mud and darkness and assures its salvation. Were all those who have hitherto tended to destroy their souls and neglected philosophical study to give the slightest attention to it, it would be their salvation from this mud and darkness, even if they grasp only a small part of it." He believed in the cathartic power of philosophy, as had Plotinus and Porphyry. A famous Platonic saying comes to mind: "If one mixes a small quantity of pure white with average white, this average becomes more white, more beautiful and more true." Ar-Rāzī may have been deaf and insensitive to the voices of Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. He certainly understood the religious depth by which Platonism, the spiritual religion of the Greeks, is most distinctly and unmistakably characterized. Ar-Rāzī does not believe in the eternity of the world but following some interpreters of the Timaeus such as Plutarch and Galen, teaches that the world came into being in time, whereas matter alone is eternal. Although he denies the creation from nothing this comes nearer to the Islamic view and reminds us of the attack made on Proclus by the Christian John Philoponus which was afterwards used by Al-Ghazālī against the Muslim defenders of the eternity of the world. God the creator is described as Omniscient and All-Just, as absolute Knowledge and Justice, but also as absolute Mercy. Man should, according to Plato, make himself like God, in the greatest degree possible to man. Hence the creature nearest to God's favour is the wisest, the justest, the most merciful and compassionate. Philosophy is not mere learning but a way of life, knowing and acting accordingly. All this is not so far from the spirit of Islam.

Ar-Rāzī claims to be a Platonist, and it cannot be denied that Platonic, or rather Neoplatonic, elements dominate his thought, and that his views differ widely from those late Greek systems which the majority of Islamic philosophers followed. Al-Fārābī attacked him in two treatises, notably for this reason. It is, however, if the phrase may be permitted, a very
Neoplatonic Platonism, full of elements which remind us of Gnostic speculations; it comprises, on the other hand, certain definite features of the Greek atomic theory of matter which may have well been combined with the Platonic tradition in the later centuries of the Roman Empire. We are still rather in the dark about the immediate sources of Ar-Rāzi's philosophical thought. He knew Proclus, for example, well and had translations of him at his disposal. Probably his philosophical knowledge was as all-embracing as his medical knowledge, of which we have better information. Tradition connects him with the pagan Greek school of Harrān which survived there during the first centuries of Islam, and there is no reason to doubt this, although we are unable to verify the report in the present state of our knowledge. There were five eternal principles, not one, as in the other systems: the Creator, the soul of the world, matter, absolute time and absolute space. He was aware that he differed fundamentally from Aristotle, but very deliberately and decidedly he claimed to follow his own way: "But I say,..." It would lead us too far to discuss his cosmogony in detail and to follow up its repercussions in later Islamic thought—especially since he has only recently been rediscovered by modern scholarship, and much detailed research has still to be devoted to the remains of his philosophical work. But the greatness of the man cannot be doubted.

Both he and Al-Kindi wrote treatises on popular ethics, based exclusively on Greek material. They are both available in modern translations; and it is obvious which of the two succeeded better in bringing the commonplaces of the Platonic tradition to life. Ar-Rāzi could fill them with his own experience of life, whereas in Al-Kindi we are aware of the arguments but we are not really touched. Both Ar-Rāzi and Ibn Sinā wrote autobiographies, Ar-Rāzi in self-defence, Ibn Sinā at the request of a pupil. Ibn Sinā tells us that he knew everything at the age of eighteen and did not add anything to his knowledge in the course of his later life: it became more mature but it did not grow in bulk. Ar-Rāzi was far from such self-righteousness. "If ever I have come upon a book I have not read," he affirms, in his old age, "or heard tell of a man I have not met, I have not turned aside to any engagement whatever—even though it has been to my great loss—before mastering that book or learning all that that man knew." This is again in keeping with the attitude of the greatest among Greek philosophers, who never tired of learning as long as they lived, as Solon had said in an oft-quoted line: "I grow old constantly learning many things." The greatest Islamic scholar, Abū'raftān al-Birūnī (died A.D. 1048), famous for his deep and sympathetic understanding of Indian religion and Indian life, seems to have been unique in appreciating Ar-Rāzi's greatness both as a philosopher and as a scientist, Vesalius, the founder of modern anatomy in the sixteenth century, who knew only his medical work, praised him as
the last vigorous representative of the Greek tradition in the Middle Ages, whether Eastern or Western. His verdict is not very far from the truth.

3. Ḡ nợ 造船 AL-FARABI (died A.D. 950)

Al-Kindī was an Arab of noble descent, born in Başra. His father had held a high position as governor of Kūfa, and he had spent most of his life at the Caliph’s court in Baghdād. Ar-Rāzī was of Persian origin and passed the greater part of his life in his native town of Raïy, near the site of Teheran but spent some time in Baghdād as well. Al-Fārābī was a Turk from Transoxania, who studied first in Khurasān, then came to live for many years in Baghdād, becoming eventually a pensioner of the famous Hamdānid Shiʿite ruler of Aleppo, Saifad-daula.

Al-Fārābī was bent on assigning to philosophy a dominant position in the Islamic world and was not satisfied to give it the second place as the handmaiden of theology. Nor, on the other hand, was he convinced that Ar-Rāzī’s attempt could be successful in the long run and that the Law of Islam and the theology which had developed from it could be excluded from the higher life. His own works show a different approach. Philosophy was not to replace traditional religion altogether but was to assign it its proper position as had been done in the Greek world by Plato. He tried, indeed, to re-interpret the whole of Islam from his own philosophical standpoint, using Greek philosophy as a torch which gave new light to every aspect of Islamic life: dialectical theology, creed and Qurān, law, jurisprudence, grammar, aesthetic appreciation of artistic prose and poetry, and above all the organization of the perfect society and the essential qualities of its ruler. If the times were propitious, one universal world-state might come into existence; if not, several religions might exist side by side, and, if this also were impracticable, Islam at least might be reshaped according to the demands of the royal power of philosophy, which was the highest perfection of which man was capable. Yet Al-Fārābī was not a man of action himself, as Plato had been, but rather a thinker who put forward a new scheme to show how things ought to be, living himself in retirement as an ascetic and watching the world with a serenity of mind of his own.

Al-Fārābī did not, like Al-Kindī, claim simply to follow the Greek philosophers. He believed that Greek philosophy was in full decay in Greece, that the “Hellenes,” the pagan Greeks, existed no more, but that the works of Plato and Aristotle themselves could guide those who were about to revive it and show the way to restoring its glory in the land of Irāq from which, according to late Greek opinion as shared by Al-Fārābī, it had originally come. It has been pointed out how intimately he is connected with the Baghdād school of Christian translators and
philosophers, and it is certainly to his credit that he fully understood the interpretations of Aristotle and Plato which were at his disposal and passed them on to his pupils. But this alone would scarcely have made him a Muslim philosopher. Fortunately he makes his procedure sufficiently clear himself, and in addition he gives four comprehensive surveys of his whole philosophical system which are all available for study and comment.

A more orthodox Aristotelianism than that adopted by Al-Kindı was conjoined in Al-Fārābī with an appreciation of Plato's political theory which enables him to contribute forcefully to the discussion of the qualities by which the successor of the Prophet, the head of the Muslim community, was to be distinguished. If philosophy was the highest achievement of man, he must be a philosopher king. In the use of Plato's Republic as a textbook of political theory Al-Fārābī was followed by Ibn Rushd (as also in other important aspects of his thought), but we look in Ibn Rushd's highly polished and admirably worked-out productions in vain for his predecessor's reformatory zeal and original freshness. Ibn Rushd treated the Republic in his lecture courses, because Aristotle's Politics was not available in Arabic translation and because Al-Fārābī had done so before. Al-Fārābī's interest in Plato arose from genuine Islamic problems of his day, and enabled him to find an original and impressive solution.

An otherwise unknown account of Plato's philosophy which did full justice to the political side of his work, an equally unknown commentary on Plato's Republic, and a paraphrase of Plato's Laws were used by Al-Fārābī to convey his views on the ideal caliph to Muslim readers. He eliminated almost every element of Plato's logic, physics and metaphysics which he considered superseded by later developments of Greek philosophy, and picked out the arguments which he could use for his purpose. In the same way he included in his first comprehensive work on philosophy a general summary of Aristotle, stopping short at the Metaphysics, using here a scheme of ordinary Neoplatonic type, as described above. He made it clear in his programme that he was only selecting those parts of the Platonic and Aristotelian legacy which fitted his own ends. What these were is not always absolutely clear, and he leaves it to the intelligent reader to guess their application for himself. He could only express himself this way and is very sparing with direct hints.

Aristotle's logic of demonstration, according to Al-Fārābī, provides the key to the philosophical understanding of the universe which springs from the study of physics and metaphysics. Revealed theology (Kalām) is definitely subordinate to this natural theology, and its method corresponds to Aristotle's dialectic as found in the Topics, starting from views generally admitted but not capable of serving as the premises of strictly
scientific demonstration. This dialectical theology is already Greek in its structure and in many of its tenets; it is not to be rejected but is definitely of secondary importance. What corresponds to beliefs and views of the crowd in Aristotle are the beliefs and rules, etc., which the orthodox teachers of religion instil into the Muslim's mind, and which are guaranteed by the religious law. Al-Farābī by no means intends to ban this "legal theology" as such, although he tries to open it to Greek influence as well. But it is certainly very remote from the truth which the philosopher can obtain. "Mythical theology" is represented by the Qur'ān, which appeals to people's imagination as poetry does, and convinces them of truth through arguments in rhetorical form. It is obvious that this scheme could be applied to other religions as well, and Al-Farābī appears indeed to have had such a wide and universal conception in mind, which is not the less daring because Greek thinkers had expressed similar views before. There is one universal religion, but many forms of symbolic representation of ultimate truth, which may differ from land to land and from nation to nation; they vary in language, in law and custom, in the use of symbols and similitudes. There exists only one true God for the philosophical mind, but He has different names in different religions. Some forms of symbolic representation are near to the truth obtained by philosophical demonstration, others are more remote from it. There are things of which you may try even to convince non-philosophers by straightforward fiction. Several "ideal states" of this kind may exist at the same time, all providing the same happiness and the same good life. The ruler of such a state would be able to give due attention to all the different aspects of the life of such a community: he would be king and imām, prophet and legislator in one. Before, however, he could begin to philosophize, he would be educated in the customs of his particular religion and instructed in the traditions of the community to which he belonged, just like Plato's philosopher king.

As in Plato's thought, metaphysics, psychology and political theory were intimately connected in Al-Farābī's scheme of an ideal state. The same order prevailed in the universe, in man and in organized society—in the universe of necessity; in man if he deliberately decided to imitate the hierarchy of the universe in his own soul and to let his mind govern himself; in society if the perfect man, the philosopher, did not withdraw into solitude but moulded the community according to his supreme understanding of the working of the divine mind. The world was ruled by the First Being, the First Cause, which was eternal and perfect, without matter and without form, the absolute One without any other specification or qualification. This had been, in all essentials, the upshot of Al-Kindī's metaphysics as well. Centuries of unquestioned philosophical tradition had given to a highly controversial and hypothetical postulate like this the appearance of self-evidence, and it had been eagerly
accepted by Christian theologians and, to a large extent, by their Muslim counterpart, the Mu'tazila. Al-Fārābī's philosophy is connected with the last Alexandrian philosophers, whose thought shows a growth in the influence of Aristotle, and hence to the definition of the Godhead as one indivisible substance he adds, probably like his Christian Greek predecessors, that God is thought, thinking and object of thought in one, nous, noûn, noumenon, 'aql 'aql na'$āl. He then proceeds to explain that this general definition of the First Cause agrees with the special expressions and the attributes of God used in Islamic theology. Similarly his pupil Yahyā ibn 'Adi showed that the Christian Trinity was only a symbolic expression of the Aristotelian definition of God. The "secondary substances," the star-gods, corresponded to the angels of revealed theology, and the "active intellect" to the spirit of holiness—as has been explained before. There would be other symbols in other religions, and we know, from Al-Bīrūnī, that Muslim philosophers could even understand and appreciate image worship in other religions as a symbolic form by which man was reminded of the existence of God.

Al-Fārābī's theory of human nature was fully and almost exclusively based on Aristotelian psychology—more than the corresponding section in Ibn Sīnā's great philosophical encyclopaedias, which contain Stoic and Platonic elements not used by Al-Fārābī. The faculties of nutrition (and everything connected with it), of sense perception, of imagination and intellect are described and their hierarchical order within the one and undivided soul is particularly stressed, as a parallel to the order in the universe, and the order to be established in society. The active intellect is understood as a separate metaphysical entity. In the activity of his mind in contemplation, man experiences the most perfect felicity. But this intellectual vision of the divine reality of things does not lead to a mystical union of the soul with the active intellect, whereas Plotinus, Porphyry and Proclus had themselves experienced unity with God and considered it the highest state of existence which human beings could reach. Ibn Sīnā was more of a mystic than Al-Fārābī and those who followed him. Al-Fārābī accepted reward and punishment in a future world on the level of traditional religion and believed that the conduct of the common man could be improved in that way; he thought that this must have been in Muḥammad's mind when he taught this in the Qur'an. But as a philosopher he shared the deep and serious conviction of the Stoics that only the souls of the good survive, i.e. the souls of those who have lived a life resembling that of God as far as human beings can, who have lived a spiritual life without doing violence to the human frame. Their souls lose their individuality after death, and then become part of the "active intellect" of the Kingdom of Heaven. The other souls perish with the body, "Wer keinen Namen sich erwarb noch Edles will, gehört den Elementen an." Avicenna, again, is nearer to
Plotinus. He does not restrict immortality to special souls; every soul survives and preserves its individuality.

If a man's imagination is directly connected with the "active intellect," he has prophetic powers, and this is the perfection of this faculty of his soul. As imagination is subordinate to reason, so prophetic powers are associated with philosophy but are by no means superior to it. "Man becomes wise and a philosopher through that which reaches his passive intellect and then his mind works to perfection, and he becomes a prophet through that which reaches his imagination. This man has reached the most perfect rank of human nature and the highest degree of felicity." This is the first condition by which a man becomes fit to rule. (Al-Fārābī avoids the words Caliph and imām, since his scheme is meant to apply to every community, but he has the Muslims in the forefront of his mind). Then he must be a good orator and be able to convey to people what he knows and to impress their imagination, and he must be well fitted to guide them to felicity and to those activities by which felicity and happiness are reached. He must also be strong in his body and capable of practising the art of war.

It is impossible in a short survey to give the details of Al-Fārābī's political theory, to point out its relation to the contemporary discussions of the Caliphate in other quarters and to describe his proposals for a second or third or fourth solution. If a single ideal ruler could not be found and the necessary qualities were only available in separate individuals, they were in that case supposed to rule as a team basing themselves on the law as established by the first ruler. In Islamic terms, the first philosopher-prophet-king-lawgiver can only have been Muhammad himself, although Al-Fārābī nowhere says so. There is a sense of urgency in his sober detached and unrhetorical style which leads us to believe that, for once, the Platonic philosophy in its entirety, though not in the details of its tenets, had raised its head in Islamic lands: "If at a given time it happens that philosophy has no share in the government, though every other qualification for rule may be present, the ideal state will remain rulerless, the actual head of the state will be no true king, and the state will head for destruction; and if no wise man is to be found and associated with the acting head of the state, then after a certain interval the state will undoubtedly perish" (Al-Fārābī). "At last... I was driven to affirm, in praise of true philosophy, that only from the standpoint of such philosophy was it possible to take a correct view of public and private right and that, accordingly, the human race would never see the end of trouble until true lovers of wisdom should come to hold political power, or the holders of political power should, by some divine appointment, become true lovers of wisdom" (Plato, 7th Letter).
4. ABŪ 'ALĪ AL-ḤUSAIN IBN 'ABDALLĀH IBN SINĀ [AVICENNA] (A.D. 980–1037)

With Ibn Sinā we enter a new and different period of Islamic philosophy. The philosophers hitherto discussed had all been pioneers. They had been the first, as far as we know, to draw on the translations of Greek authors which had gradually become available; they had each more or less direct contact with certain definite attitudes of late Greek, pagan or Christian philosophy and had, each in his own way, attempted to give Greek philosophy a high place within the civilization of Islam which was then still developing and abundant in scope and possibilities. But the contact with ancient philosophy outside the Islamic world is now over, and a definite tradition of Islamic philosophy is established instead. The philosophers can and actually do develop their arguments in depth and intensity, but they can neither fall back upon the Greek originals—as philosophers did later in the West—nor have recourse to the Syriac, as the bilingual Christian teachers of philosophy in tenth-century Baghdād constantly and successfully do. Ibn Sinā, who passed all his life in Persia, often in a high political position as minister at different small courts, has become the most influential and most revered of all the early Muslim philosophers. He disliked the Christian philosophers of Baghdād but appreciated a great deal of Al-Fārābī's thought. He was aware of all the past history of Islamic philosophy, as well as of arguments and theories of Greek origin which we find in his works for the first time; he appears to be often in agreement particularly with Al-Kindī, not only in his appreciation of Plotinus but also in not a few other affinities of outlook which may become more apparent in future research; in his theory of prophecy, for example, or his frequent use of the hypothetical syllogism, which is less liked though also used by the more consistent Aristotelian, Al-Fārābī. His very decided Platonism which crowns the Aristotelian substructure also connects him with Al-Kindī and his Greek predecessors and has assisted Western Platonists before Aquinas to express their Augustinian Platonism in philosophical terms. The mystical component in the thought of the "Chief Master" is very noticeable and important, and his long Arabic poem on the descent of the human soul into the body is deservedly famous for its beauty and the deep feeling expressed in it. There appears to be no attempt to reform Islam according to the postulates of philosophy. Influenced partly by Al-Fārābī, partly by Al-Kindī, he tries to reconcile philosophy and religion through allegorical interpretation, whereas Ibn Rushd, following Al-Fārābī more closely, unconditionally upholds the primacy of reason and criticized Avicenna severely for his "inconsistency." Ibn Sinā is a systematic thinker of the first order. His great and
justly famous medical encyclopaedia, the Qānūn, is lacking in originality, if compared with Ar-Rāzī, but is deservedly celebrated for its clear and exhaustive and well-classified arrangement of the subject-matter. It was for centuries very popular with Arabic, Persian and Latin doctors alike. The same systematic genius manifests itself in his great philosophical encyclopaedia asb-shifā (sanatio) in which he deals at length with all the philosophical, mathematical and natural sciences. It is only partly published in the original text; some sections are known in Latin. An abbreviation of the great work, the Najāt (salvatio) is completely known, and was printed together with the Qānūn, the second Arabic work ever printed, in Rome in 1593.

It is impossible to deal here with all the aspects of His Excellency the Minister’s immensely rich philosophical work, and a short survey of his psychology must be accepted instead of a more comprehensive treatment. He based it, like Al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd, on Aristotle’s De anima, but with modifications partly reminding us of Al-Kindī, partly drawn from other ancient sources, and elaborated it in his own way. The differences from Al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd are evident. Aristotle’s definition of the soul is accepted in full, but at the same time the soul is defined as an incorporeal substance. It has been shown in a fine recent study by an Indian scholar, how this inconsistency in Ibn Sīnā’s theory—which also leads him to affirm the immortality of the individual soul—grew out of difficulties inherent in Aristotle’s psychology which were elaborated by Alexander of Aphrodisias and particularly by Neoplatonic commentators like Simplicius of Athens. This trend of Platonizing Aristotelianism reached the Arabs and is first noticeable in Al-Kindī’s scanty remains; Avicenna discussed it most vigorously and with great subtlety. His is also a very elaborate and unique discussion of the inner senses, of internal perception, which developed the Aristotelian concept of common sense by differentiating the Aristotelian concept of imagination and splitting it up into five different faculties. It is, however, evident that by doing so he reproduced some later Greek theory which is lost in the original. The inner senses seem to have been first discussed in the Porch. Since Avicenna, in accordance with Muslim faith, considered prophecy as the highest and most divine human faculty, he could not be satisfied like Al-Fārābī to consider it as the highest kind of imagination, but had to try to connect it with the intellect. He did so by identifying it with sagacity or quick wit, the “power of hitting the middle term of a syllogism in an imperceptible time,” a power of infallibly guessing the truth without the help of imagination. He fitted this power, which we know from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and which had subsequently been given greater importance in Stoic thought, into the framework of Neoplatonic metaphysics, making it a recipient of the inspiration coming from the “active intelligence.” We cannot say
whether he was the first to do that or whether he had a predecessor in late Greek philosophy.

There are other deviations from the scheme adopted by Al-Fārābī, especially in metaphysical theory, which all point to the same shifting of the balance in favour of Plato. Let us realize, without discussing particulars, what this Platonism amounts to. Whenever the modern reader turns from Aristotle to Plato, he does more than feel a mere difference in style, he is aware of a greater, richer personality, of a great artist and a sublime poet. Plato was above all a religious genius of the first order, and Plotinus and those Neoplatonists who were able to understand him felt this religious element in Plato and praised him for this reason as the prince of philosophy. Because they understood this, Ar-Rāzī and Ibn Sinā are nearer to the inner spirit of Plato’s thought than Al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd. Aristotle belongs to Plato, and has rightly been associated with him by those Greek philosophers who appealed to the Muslim thinkers. He tried to make the religious experience of his master, which dominated his mind from the beginning and throughout his life, accessible to the critical understanding. This is the real meaning of his metaphysics as we have come to realize after a period of misunderstanding. His analytical genius, however, was stronger than his constructive power and he did not succeed in building up an edifice of his own which was comparable to the achievement of Plato. Later centuries needed Aristotle as a kind of philosopher of religion, as a help to an adequate understanding of Plato, and were rightly, I believe, convinced that philosophers need both and cannot dispense with either of them. Avicenna’s style is abstract, he is deeply steeped in Aristotelianism and cannot do without Aristotle. He cannot compare with Plato or Plotinus in his philosophical style. But he understood something which is the very essence of Plato’s thought, and it may be that for this reason he appealed to religious Muslims—as Plato himself has conveyed religious truth, to people open to religion, at all times. This comes out very well in the poem to which I referred before, about the fate of the human soul:

"Until, when the hour of its homeward flight draws near,
And 'tis time for it to return to its ampler sphere,
It carols with joy, for the veil is raised, and it spies
Such things as cannot be witnessed by waking eyes.
On a lofty height doth it warble its songs of praise
(for even the lowliest being doth knowledge raise).
And so it returneth, aware of all hidden things
In the universe, while no stain to its garment clings.

(Transl. E. G. Browne)"
5. IBN RUSHD [AVERROES] (A.D. 1126–1198)

Ibn Sīnā never wrote a commentary on the lines of the Greek commentaries on Aristotle, many of which were known to the Arabic philosophers and imitated by the Christian teachers of philosophy in tenth-century Baghdad and, to all appearance, by Al-Fārābī. He most probably knew them all but evidently did not feel like adding to them. He tells us in an autobiographical passage, referred to earlier in this chapter, that he had acquired all his enormous knowledge at a very early age, and was, in his later life, concerned mainly with erecting his own philosophical system on these foundations. He was not interested in explaining the original texts in detail but was bent on maturing his own thought, despite the exacting demands of his public career. Recent research has shown that there is a certain development in his thought but no departure from his original position, only an increasingly refined elaboration of his attitude. One can, incidentally, make similar observations in comparing the various works of Al-Fārābī.

Ibn Rushd, who lived in the most remote western corner of the Muslim world, was very different from Ibn Sīnā with whose works he was familiar. The greater part of his literary output consists in commentaries on Aristotle, which he wrote for two of the Almohad rulers. He wrote partly commentaries in the style of Alexander of Aphrodisias, partly very elaborate summaries in the style of Themistius, partly still shorter summaries of a type also favoured by the Greeks. He drew on the similar work of Al-Fārābī, which reached him through intermediaries, the Spanish philosophers Ibn Bājjā (Avempace) and Ibn Tufail, the author of a rightly famous philosophical novel The History of Hāvy ibn Yaqzan. Ibn Rushd deserves a place of honour in the long series of commentators on Aristotle and upholds an important tradition. His commentaries, like those of Al-Fārābī, are almost lost in the Arabic original. They evidently found very few readers; the centuries after Ibn Rushd were indifferent or hostile to philosophy. But a great number of his commentaries were translated into Hebrew and Latin and became of great importance for mediaeval Jewish and especially Western Latin Aristotelian studies. For more than three hundred years Western scholars read Aristotle mainly with the help of the commentaries of Averroës, and his judgment is still taken into consideration at the present day. Critical editions of the few Arabic texts preserved have recently begun to appear.

Ibn Rushd’s view of philosophy and religion is almost the same as Al-Fārābī’s belief in the primacy of reason. The symbols of faith, different in each religion, point to the same truth as does philosophical knowledge, common to philosophers of every creed and every nation, which is based on demonstration and argument. There is no “double truth.” Hence Ibn
Rushd the philosopher can as a high judge administer religious law according to the Mālikite rite and compose a manual of this law without acting against his general views on philosophy and religion. Al-Fārābī’s plan to reform the law with the help of Greek philosophy had long since been abandoned.

It is not surprising that Ibn Rushd, who consistently followed the Alexandrian exegesis of Aristotle, like Al-Fārābī before him, had to disagree with many of Ibn Sinā’s tenets. It is worth mentioning that he blames him also for having made concessions to the theological school of the Ash’arites, which had become the most influential theological school after Al-Fārābī’s time. But his debate with Ibn Sinā and his reaffirmation of a more Aristotelian Neoplatonism, revealing as it may be for the history of Muslim philosophy, is overshadowed by his greatest and most original work entitled The Incoherence of the Incoherence, in which he subtly and vigorously defends philosophy against Al-Ghazālī’s determined and able attack entitled The Incoherence of the Philosophers. This is certainly a Muslim philosophical work, in so far as it uses the whole arsenal of Aristotelian philosophy for the intense discussion of an issue which could only arise between Muslim parties at variance. Ibn Rushd shows himself a perfect master of Aristotelian philosophy and handles his arguments with admirable skill and accomplished understanding. He discusses all the main problems of Muslim theology and makes a supreme effort to show that only philosophy can give a satisfactory answer to them. The eternity of the world, the Creator and First Cause, the attributes of God, God’s knowledge and providence are discussed in this lengthy and exhaustive work. Al-Ghazālī’s arguments are quoted in full and discussed and refuted with a fairness and subtlety which compel our admiration. The search for truth which had made Al-Kindī the first Muslim philosopher is passionately alive in the last great representative of Greek philosophy in mediaeval Islam. We may take it as symbolic that the famous saying “amicus Plato magis amica veritas” is, by an odd chance, preserved only in Arabic tradition.

Al-Ghazālī moved on the same level as Ibn Rushd. He was a great theologian who was able to understand his philosophical adversaries and to use all the methods of thought with which men like Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sinā had provided those Muslims who cared to reason about God and man. Scholars who are competent to judge say, rightly I believe, that his arguments are often better than Ibn Rushd’s refutation. Al-Ghazālī had a more intimate feeling for the very essence of Islam and of religion in general, and hence his influence on the future of Islam was more lasting than his adversary’s belief in the primacy of reason.

Averroës had been fighting a losing battle, as far as mediaeval Islam is concerned. We read in the work of a younger contemporary, the Persian
Suhrwardi al-maqtūl, the description of a dream in which Aristotle appears to him. The Aristotle of the dream praises Plato. Suhrwardi asks him whether there is any Muslim philosopher who has come near to Plato and may be compared to him. He hints at Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sinā. Aristotle is not impressed. But when Suhrwardi mentions the first of the “intoxicated” Sufis, the early Persian mystic Abū Yazid of Bistām (died 875) and a follower of the Gnostic Dhūl Nūn the Egyptian (died 861), Aristotle at last gives an affirmative answer: these are true philosophers and true wise men. Plato the mystic is still appreciated, Plato the philosopher and political reformer is forgotten and has no message for Muslims who live in accordance with the religious instincts of the common people and express their attitude to God in an orthodox theology, which used the arguments of ancient stoicism and scepticism, and in Sufic mysticism. Islamic philosophy, based on too narrow a concept of reason, had failed where Greek philosophy had failed before it. But its failure may help modern man to find his own way and to reach ultimately the true balance between faith and reason, as Plato, the prince of philosophers, had done in the fourth century B.C., in the Academy at Athens.

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CHAPTER XXXIII

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE MEDIAEVAL SCHOLASTICS

I. INTRODUCTION

The Philosophy for which St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1226–74) stands is no more particularly his than it can be ours. When the principles of a philosophy are really universal, we are not faced with a closed system. Such a philosophy grows in consistency the more its first principles are understood, while gradually ceasing to be systematic in the narrow sense. The first principles upheld by St. Thomas and the mediaeval scholastics are such that in their light it would be perfectly in conformity with the scholastic method that St. Thomas Aquinas’ own applications and conclusions should be corrected where necessary and extended as required.

The mediaeval scholastics lived in a world which nobody dreamt of denying was a universe in which the same principles prevailed. Dante, the seer of the European Middle Ages, calls Aristotle "the Master of those who know" (Inferno, IV, 131); Averroës, the Muslim commentator of Aristotle, is named with honour among the virtuous souls as the one "who wrought the great commentary" (Inferno, IV, 144); and St. Thomas Aquinas is called a "flame of heavenly wisdom" (Paradiso, XII, 2), wiser even than Aristotle, and chosen to discourse on the glory of Him Who moveth all. Dante will not exclude all "pagans" from Heaven. He would place them nearer Christ in the final judgment than those who cry, "Lord! Lord!", but serve Christ only in name (Paradiso, XIX, 106).

The scholastic counterpart of the Divina Commedia of Dante Alighieri (A.D. 1265–1321) is found in the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas. "Truth," says St. Thomas, announcing a fundamental principle of Catholic doctrine, "whatever be its formulation or by whomsoever it be spoken, is spoken by the Holy Spirit of God." The Church does not require anyone to accept any doctrine of purely human origin nor is there any particular system, peculiar to any individual, which a person must adopt in order to be a Christian. All the same, the Church regards with special favour the principles announced by St. Thomas Aquinas, precisely because no one can desire a more satisfactory attitude than his towards Truth.

The Theological Motive.—St. Thomas, like all his mediaeval contemporaries, is first and foremost a theologian. Here again, his theological principles are outstanding. On the difficult problem of "revelation" outside the official Christian Scriptures, one hardly knows how to better his
doctrine in order to satisfy orthodox standards and simultaneously retain a perfectly open mind. Writing in the thirteenth century, he teaches:

If anyone born in barbarous nations do what lieth in him, God will reveal to him that which is necessary to salvation, either by inspiration or by sending him a teacher.4

The words, by inspiration, are significant, because they justify, from the orthodox Christian point of view, the possibility as well as the necessity of teaching revealed by God, outside the official Scriptures, sufficient unto salvation and in perfect accord with the Christian doctrine. The very teachers, who would ordinarily be considered unofficial, are acknowledged to be sent by God.

The Thomistic synthesis is chiefly built on the theological elucidations of St. Augustine and on the philosophical principles of Aristotle, the latter being corrected and emended in the light of the Christian revelation, with which, it is shown, the impartial intellect must agree. Sometimes indeed St. Thomas shows himself so anxious to uphold even the shortcomings of Aristotle that his general synthesis suffers as a consequence. When, however, Aristotle contradicts himself, he is summarily rejected.5 Generally St. Thomas has no hesitation to admit entire groups of proofs and observations from Aristotle, inasmuch as he can find none better. Of all the theologians that preceded him, he undoubtedly is the first to accept Non-Christian testimony, like that of Aristotle, when true, side by side with texts from Scripture and corroborations from the Fathers of the Church.

Philosophical Problems.—To the controversies of the thirteenth century and the misuse made of Aristotle therein is probably due the pronounced orientation of St. Thomas Aquinas towards the prime reality of the world. Strange doctrines had begun to be taught in the thirteenth century in the name of Aristotle and reason in the University of Paris. Siger of Brabant and other professors of the faculty of arts claimed to expound the real mind of Aristotle with the help of the latest commentaries and translations from Arabic into Latin. It was being shown that, according to Aristotle, the most authentic doctrine of antiquity was that the world of itself was eternal. There was no need of God Himself, because there was no need for an absurd doctrine like creation-from-nothing-existing. The world itself had no need of God to keep it in motion, because, according to the greatest “Philosopher” acknowledged by all, the world was not only eternally in existence but eternally in motion. Another parallel thesis in the faculty of arts was that there was only one intellect for all men and therefore there could be no question of personal immortality after death!

The turmoil raised by these doctrines can scarcely be imagined by modern readers. There has come about during the last five hundred years
such a change and confusion of terminology that we now reconcile ourselves to any value given to terms and insist at most that a modern philosopher should be consistent within his own system. As a consequence, for most modern readers the reality of the world is not distinguishable from absolute reality, eternity is only the perpetuation of time, the infinite is synonymous with the indefinite or the incalculable, physical motion is the same as metaphysical motion, a general notion is identical with a universal or transcendental notion, intellect is the same faculty as reason, personality is not different from individuality. With such a confusion of terms, there is no hope of understanding the traditional doctrines of Christianity or of appreciating the contribution of St. Thomas Aquinas and the mediaeval scholastics towards that one-world way of thinking which prevailed in the Middle Ages and previous ages, and which it is imperative to restore in our own days.

In the thirteenth-century Europe, some incorrect notions, acquired through the misunderstanding by the Latins of Arabic and Hebrew equivalents of Greek terms and doctrines, made the general tension worse than ever. An incongruous doctrine arose in the University of Paris that the only way out of the unintelligible medley of so-called philosophical and so-called theological ideas was by admitting two truths instead of one. It was contended that the truth of philosophy known to us by reason was essentially opposed to the truth of theology known to us by faith. The human mind in Europe was evidently at a cross road. Among the Latins, at any rate, there was consternation, because the older School of thought, nurtured mostly on the philosophical principles and outlook of Plato and St. Augustine, could advance no arguments to satisfy the keen minds of the faculty of arts, which claimed to have discovered in Aristotle a realistic liberation from the thraldom of theological obscurantism. The conflict between the philosophers and the theologians threatened to grow into a permanent stalemate of two truths, one of reason and the other of faith. In this impasse, it is incorrect to think that St. Thomas threw in his lot blindly with the Aristotelians or that his great contemporary, St. Bonaventure, continued with blindfolded eyes to maintain the Augustinian and Platonic position. St. Augustine was, in fact, the common ground for both the Angelic Doctor of the Schools and the Seraphic Doctor of Christian mysticism.

It was practically impossible to get at the original Aristotle through the hedge of Arabic and Hebrew commentators, who mainly at that time held the secret of the Greek. If there was a gulf between Latin and Greek, which only a few rare spirits could cross, there was to the Latins a further widening of the gulf because of the commentators and interpreters, who had themselves to be correctly understood. Bald and uncritical translations into Latin from the Arabic not only misrepresented the Arabic philosophers but produced a queer caricature of Aristotle called "Aver-
roism." The name "Averroës," which is the Latin corruption of "Ibn Rushd," covers in mediaeval scholasticism a doctrine no less corrupted from the original one propounded by Abûl-Walid ibn Rushd of Córdoba, one of the greatest Muslim philosophers of the twelfth century.

This fact was unknown to St. Thomas Aquinas, but it was clear that there was something wrong about the Aristotelian doctrine which passed under the name of "Averroës." The fatal errors of Latin Averroism were still more evident to St. Bonaventure. St. Thomas decided to recover the original Aristotle as directly as possible and persuaded his brother in religion, William of Moerbeke, to make new translations from the Greek original. It was only by A.D. 1259 that St. Thomas had sufficient data about the original Aristotle to resolve the polemic between reason and faith and meet the Latin Averroists of the faculty of arts on their own ground.

The Catholic Attitude.—St. Thomas does not approach his task sentimentally. He had the clarity of mind and the firmness of will to refuse to espouse Averroism with Siger of Brabant or to condemn it outright with St. Bonaventure. He does not collect the material for his synthesis like a mere compiler of eclectic. Eclecticism in religious philosophy or religious tradition, without critical synthesis, results in caricature and syncretism, which satisfies nobody intellectually. St. Thomas found it necessary to learn from everybody. He improved his technique by adopting Aristotle's view about the need for everybody to have clear definitions and a clear statement of the problem under investigation. Poetical and emotional language have no place in metaphysical discussion. He then proceeded to lay down the ground plan, like a titan laying the foundations, that the very first principle in metaphysics is non-contradiction. Faith and reason cannot contradict each other, because such a contradiction would reflect on God, Who is the First Principle of all and from Whom the true doctrines of faith and the first principles of reason are equally derived. There is a fundamental hierarchy and subordination of knowledge and of disciplines recognized by St. Thomas.

It is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz., metaphysics, can dispute with one who happens to deny its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he will concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his arguments. ... If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by argument, but only of answering his objections, if he has any, against faith. Since faith (in the true sense) rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the proofs brought against faith are not demonstrations but (mere) arguments that can be answered.
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In contrast to the great majority of his fellow theologians, who admitted only theological criteria, St. Thomas, following the lead of his illustrious teacher, St. Albert the Great, protested against merging the fields of philosophical and theological investigation. St. Thomas defended the autonomous rights of the human reason, provided it recognized its own natural limitations, and secured for philosophy its rightful place in the hierarchy of the profane sciences. At the same time, he vindicated for theology a place in the sacred disciplines corresponding to the pre-eminence of metaphysics in philosophical studies. The just liberation of philosophy from absolute dependence on theology in the first instance and, as a consequence, the natural deference which both philosophy and theology have to pay to metaphysics and revelation, respectively, mark a new era in the history of human thought. Thus St. Thomas Aquinas may rightly be considered one of the founders of the modern concept of philosophy.

The Masters.—Having demarcated the provinces of philosophy and theology, St. Thomas could regard the heterogeneous materials that came under his survey with the eye of a master builder. St. Albert the Great, his teacher, had an accurate knowledge of Hebrew and Arabic authors. The erudite teacher drew the attention of his promising pupil to the work of Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, known as Maimonides to the mediaeval Latins. Rabbi Moses had written a remarkable book in Hebrew, entitled Moreh Nebuhim, which has been translated with distinction into English as Guide for the Perplexed. Relying on Fārābī and Ibn Sinā, great Oriental philosophers of Islamic fame, Moses ben Maimon had tried with conspicuous success to solve the problem of the reconciliation of faith and reason. Rabbi Moses had assimilated the philosophy of Aristotle equally with that of Plato and was well entrenched in the Hebrew tradition. His guidance therefore was invaluable. In fact, Maimonides was the only capable Guide that St. Albert and St. Thomas could find among the older philosophers. An essential part of St. Thomas’s teaching concerning the knowledge that God has of Himself and His creatures is based on the doctrine of the Guide for the Perplexed. Rabbi Moses compares God’s knowledge of His universe to the knowledge which an artist conceives of his work. The details of a piece of art contemplated by an artist are implicit in the artist’s thought, but have no separate existence in the artist’s conception. This analogous idea of God as Artist (cf. Vişvakarman) occurs frequently in St. Thomas and later made a special appeal to the men of the Renaissance.

Concerning the divine attributes, Rabbi Moses had said that these attributes can neither be identical with the Divine Essence nor are they capable of defining it. For that reason the only suitable name for God is the unutterable Tetragrammaton (J H W H = Jahowâh), corresponding to OM in Indian tradition, which is associated with no attribute. The attributes generally applied to God should be regarded either as expres-
sions of divine activity or as simple negations of their opposites. St. Thomas adopted without reservation the repudiation by the Jewish philosopher of the attribution of human passions or failings to God, but he gives an original turn to the argument of Maimonides by regarding the divine attributes as identical with the Divine Essence. In this respect, St. Thomas's theology approximates to that of Śāṅkara, though generally he is with Rāmānuja. Nevertheless, the original position of Rabbi Moses is never completely abandoned; it crops up again and again in his writings, till we find the Angelic Doctor taking refuge in the deep silence of the mystical theology of pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. This side of his doctrine affords a perfect parallel to the doctrine of Śāṅkara.

One of the greatest services rendered by Rabbi Moses to the cause of a perennial philosophy was to strengthen the fibre of metaphysical speculation by pointing out that absurdities, implying absolute contradiction, are ipso facto absolute unrealities and therefore can in no way limit the omnipotence of God, when they are excluded from the universe of possibilities to which extends the divine omnipotence. St. Thomas at once welcomed this light on the exact meaning of omnipotence and made it the luminous basis of his own architectonic synthesis. In this connection the help afforded by Rabbi Moses in clarifying the doctrine of creation was indispensable.

2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Divine Omnipotence.—Aristotle, while accepting the eternity of the world, had himself adduced no proof for or against his acceptance. In the absence of any proof, the Hebrew metaphysician makes it clear that we are left with the contemplation of the Universe of Possibilities open to the Omnipotence of God, Whom he identifies with the Absolute Infinite. If God so wills it, there is no contradiction, absolutely speaking, in the creation of an eternal world, willed by God that it should be so from all eternity. On the other hand, there is, again absolutely speaking, no contradiction that the world should exist with time (not in time, for time is created with the world). Since both possibilities are feasible to Divine Omnipotence, we cannot tell which of the two happened, unless God in His goodness reveals it to us. The question of space, like the question of time, does not affect the pure metaphysical speculation. Space equally like time is created with the world.

Aristotle does not deal with the strict doctrine of creation, which we must later minutely consider. He was involved, in his days, with quite another controversy, namely, a controversy which took for granted, an eternal chaos out of which a cosmos or ordered world had to be generated. Aristotle had maintained that an eternal chaos could not generate a
proper cosmos, unless a further hypothesis was likewise taken for granted that the chaos was eternally in motion. Aristotle was in no way concerned with the doctrine of producing a cosmos out of nothing-previously-existing. The Latin Averroists had not understood Aristotle’s problem and were using his conditional hypothesis against the doctrine of creation and also against the necessity of admitting any Supreme Reality like God to sustain the eternal and, therefore to their minds, self-subsisting reality of the world.

The Intellectual Revolutionary.—In the name of reason and philosophy, the age-old Platonism of St. Augustine and Boethius which had served the Church for a thousand years was being ridiculed at the new seats of learning at Paris, Oxford and Padua. Seen from this angle, the inflexible and unrelenting Aristotelianism of St. Thomas appears as the most effective answer to the spirit of the times. St. Thomas admired the firm structure of Aristotle’s cosmos, entirely composed of reality, the fact of which was reported by the senses (pratyakṣa). Thereby he could have his feet firmly planted on a reality, which he could validly use as the point of departure for his arguments for the greater Reality of God. St. Thomas resolved at the risk of perpetrating a revolution in the customary mode of approach to liberate Philosophy from the philosophers and to make Aristotle himself, who was being used against the very concept of Religion, a worthy vehicle of the true notion of Religion. In this true notion of Religion, the Absolute Infinite had to be recovered; it lay submerged under an Aristotelian notion of the infinite which was not the true Infinite. The relation of the finite to the Infinite had to be clarified and the exact meaning of creation and Creator to be metaphysically explored. Aristotle himself would be made the advocate of true knowledge and brought in to confirm the Christian revelation. For himself, he was prepared to undergo the odium of his fellow theologians; and, indeed, very soon after his death, the Platonic party swiftly brought about his condemnation at the hands of the Bishop of Paris. In England his doctrine, which recognized truth wherever it was to be found, caused “almost infinite scandal” and was likewise condemned by the Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate of England. The pseudo-Augustinians who had climbed into the seats of power increased the gravity of the censure. The Middle Ages in their decline refused to listen to one whom the Catholic Church of Rome later canonized as a Saint and declared the Common Doctor of the Universal Church.

Metaphysical Catholicism.—The genuine Catholic mind is willing to learn from anybody and everybody, even from those who consider themselves its irreconcilable enemies. St. Thomas believed that there is a kernel of truth to be discovered in every point of view. Just as he did not hesitate to recognize the truth in the Guide of Rabbi Moses, he accepted and made his own many elements coming from the Muslim culture which
was at that time deeply rooted in Spain. The Jews and the Muslims, in fact, held the torch of learning high and bright during the Middle Ages in Europe. Dante’s *Divina Commedia* has been recently shown to have been modelled very closely on the conception of the great Muslim mystic, Muhyyi’ddin Ibnu’l-‘Arabī (A.D. 1165–1240), who was born at Murcia in Spain.16

There was no important non-Christian author of his acquaintance that St. Thomas did not investigate and draw upon for his synthesis of Catholic Truth. Of Muslim philosophers, Avicenna (Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Sīnā, A.D. 980–1037) of Bukhārā was known to the Latins almost a century before they were introduced to Averroës. The translations from the Arabic of Ibn Sīnā were very crude. For example, the scholastic term *intentio* hardly conveys the meaning of the Arabic *ma’qūlat*, i.e. what is intelligible or understandable by the intellect (*’aql*). In the mind, the conception of a particular thing, e.g. a man, is primary or previous to the conception of the general notion, *man*, which alone can be made the subject-matter of logic. St. Albert the Great saw the truth of Ibn Sīnā’s contention and incorporated it into the pattern of his own thinking. Thence it passed on to St. Thomas Aquinas and the other scholastics.17

The author known as Algazel to St. Thomas is another of the great figures of Muslim culture, from whom he learnt much about how to understand and defend the Truth of Religion. Abū Ḥāmid ibn Muhammad al-Tūsī al-Ghazâlī (A.D. 1058–1119) held the balance evenly in his time between faith and reason in the Islamic tradition, just as St. Thomas succeeded in doing subsequently in the Christian tradition. Al-Ghazâlī’s works on logic, physics and metaphysics were already in the possession of the Latins in the twelfth century.18 Adequate translations were available only in the middle of the thirteenth century, when a School of Oriental Studies was set up at Toledo. Al-Ghazâlī had written in his own way and for his own time a confutation of those philosophers in Islam who under cover of the name of Aristotle were maintaining an essential divorce between faith and reason. The arguments marshalled by Al-Ghazâlī against the rationalists appeared under the title, *Tahāfût al-falāsīfa*, which means “Incoherence of the Philosophers” and was translated into Latin as *Destructio Philosopherum*. Raymund Martin, a contemporary of St. Thomas, had a knowledge of Arabic authors probably unequalled in Europe until modern times. He perceived at once the value of Al-Ghazâlī’s quotations and method of dealing with the enemies of Religion. His *Pugio Fidei adversus Mauros et Judeos* is as great in its own line as the *S起码 contra Gentiles* composed by St. Thomas Aquinas against the false philosophers and sophists among the Jews and the Muslims no less than against the Latin Averroists.

Abūl-Walid ibn Rushd of Córdoba (A.D. 1126–1198) wrote a firmly-
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worded reply to the indiscriminate onslaughts of Al Ghazâli under the title, Tahâfutu-l-Tahâfut, "The Incoherence of Incoherence." This appeared in Latin as Destructio destructionis, wherein the original Ibn Rushd is himself transformed into "Averroës." The Arabic text makes it evident that Ibn Rushd is not "Averroës" but the determined adversary of that very rationalism which was caricatured as "Averroism." The distortion was complete and caused endless trouble and misunderstanding among the mediaeval Latin scholastics. It is conceivable that the "Platonic" party, both among the Christians and the non-Christians, made the most of their opportunity to disfigure Aristotle. Now that the authentic writings of Ibn Rushd are available and the great Muslim commentator is allowed to speak for himself, it is strange to find that he as well as St. Thomas Aquinas are on the same side and make titanic efforts to defend the harmony between faith and reason. The very title of one of Ibn Rushd's greatest compositions is proof against the absurdity of the two truths taught in the University of Paris, not to mention Oxford and Padua, as a doctrine coming from Ibn Rushd (Averroës). The title reads: Fašlu-l-maqqâlî fî muwâfaqati-l-hikmati wal-sharî'â and means "A true and critical discussion of the Agreement between Philosophy and Revealed Religion." There is even a close similarity between the very methods and arguments advanced by Ibn Rushd and St. Thomas Aquinas. Both hold with masterly skill a middle course between sceptical mysticism and unbridled rationalism. Both declare that reason cannot penetrate into the mysteries of the faith, which in themselves do not militate against reason but are above reason. The extreme position reached by the via remotionis (cf. neti, neti) is tempered for religious purposes by considerations drawn from the via analogiae (cf. upamâna). Both employ the demonstrations from Aristotelian Physics about the nature of motion and order as analogical proofs for the changeless and directing Reality of God. Some research students tend to think that Ibn Rushd and St. Thomas Aquinas drew so heavily and convincingly on analogical proofs because of their familiarity with Hermetic mysticism which prevailed in intellectual circles in the Middle Ages. All St. Thomas's proofs, for instance, for the existence, or, more correctly, for the metaphysical Reality, of God, receive their full significance, when they are understood in terms of analogy.

Physical motion has to be understood not as it is originally in the Physics of Aristotle but in a higher metaphysical sense than that contemplated by Aristotle in his own metaphysics. The "infinite" of Aristotle is shown by St. Thomas to be not the absolute Infinite but a "relative infinite" (infinitum secundum quid), which is, strictly, the mathematical infinite, either as the incalculable (a-sankhyam) or the quantitatively indefinite (a-parimitam). The Absolute Infinite of Ibn Rushd and St. Thomas Aquinas is absolutely unlimited (anantam) and excludes only absolute nothing (atyantabhāva). The analogical formula, "That which is
below is as that which is above, and that which is above is as that which is below;” has to be steadily kept in mind when reading what St. Thomas Aquinas has to say about God. Otherwise, there is every likelihood of being dissatisfied with his demonstrations and conclusions. Ultimately, therefore, it is not only the senses that are called into play but the speculative intellect working on conclusions supplied by the discursive reason.

The Supreme Reality of God.—St. Thomas advances five proofs to establish the satisfaction of Aristotelian readers that the Reality of God is a greater truth than the very reality of the world and the mind. As a specimen of the scholastic method, we reproduce only the substance of the first proof:

It is certain and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are moving (being shifted, changed, transformed). Now whatever is moved is moved by another, because nothing can be moved except it be in potentiality to that towards which it is moved; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. The reason is because motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something which is itself in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby “moves” it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself.

Therefore what is moved must be moved by another. If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on indefinitely, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequentially, no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover; as a staff moves only because it is moved by the hand.

Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this everybody understands to be God.24

Four other demonstrations, equally rigorous and analogical, are added. Aristotle only reached the “indefinite,” because he did not avail himself of analogy, whereby the intellect visualizes in the analogical data furnished by the discursive reason the Absolute Infinite. The mediaeval scholastics reached the Absolute Infinite, beyond the “relatively infinite” of Aristotle, because they knew the value of analogy, which they had learnt from Plato and found confirmed in the Christian revelation.
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It is a mistake to think that St. Thomas Aquinas has no place for the older method of the Augustinian, Benedictine, Cistercian, or Franciscan Schools for demonstrating the Absolute Reality of God. St. Thomas insists that there is nothing that the intellect can work on, unless suitable data are previously presented by the senses. *Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu*. We must remember that the psychology, which the mediaeval scholastics inherited from the Greeks, recognized only the five external senses and knew nothing of the sixth sense which is wholly internal and not very obvious, the *manas* of Indian speculation. This *manas* (cf. Latin *mens*) is an internal sense as well as a mental faculty. The European mediaeval schoolmen had to find some place for its indispensable functioning and spoke of a "*sensrium commune*," a common clearing-house, where the mind examines the individual percepts reported by the senses and transforms them by the power of the intellect, passive and active, into general as well as universal or transcendental ideas.

St. Thomas’s contention was that the reality of the world is appreciated and estimated for what it is worth by the intellect working on data ultimately derived from the senses. St. Thomas is right in insisting on data ultimately derived from the senses. But we cannot do justice if we are going to be satisfied with his five ways of demonstrating to the Aristotelians the Absolute Reality of God; we must take into account his attitude towards the speculative intellect which had been cultivated in the monasteries since the time of St. Augustine. The speculative argument for the Absolute Reality of God had first been formally stated by St. Anselm (A.D. 1033–1109). He spoke of demonstrating the *existence* of God and thereby gave sceptics the right to question how an Infinite Being conceived by the mind to exclude only absolute nothing could, as a matter of "reality," be demonstrated to be existing outside the mind. The hidden equivocation in the word *existence* is responsible for the prolonged discussion that arose out of what was called the "ontological argument." A further cause for misunderstanding was that, after the fourteenth century, "reality" came to be recognized more and more as a term to be applied exclusively to the external world.

*Being and Existence.*—Benefiting from the fruits of the general scholastic discussion, we can now see that "being" has to be carefully distinguished from "existence." It is more accurate to understand "being" as the principle of existence (*ex-sistensia*) and to appreciate the etymological meaning of *existence* to be whatever "stands out" or is manifest, i.e. perceived, directly or indirectly, by the senses. The more careful scholastics preferred to say that God *is* rather than God *exists*. Indeed, according to the contention of the older line of thought and expression, if Being be identified with God, the correct statement concerning God and the world should be that God *is* and that the world *exists* because of God. Similar to certain styles of speech in the *Upanisads*, we might adopt the expressions
that, if God is Being (sat) conceived as independent Reality, then the
world has no being of its own and is to that extent Unreal (a-sat); if, on
the other hand, we concede prime reality to the world (sat), then God is
the Supreme Reality of the world’s reality (satyasya satyam). 32

For the older School, the real meaning of the metaphysical fact that the
world depends in principle for its existence on the independent Being of
God was religiously expressed by saying that the world has been created
by God. St. Thomas clarified the issue for general acceptance by showing
that existing realities have “actual” being, possible realities have “poten-
tial” being, but God does not have being in any way; He is His Own
Being (Svayam-bhū). 33 It would be false to conceive God as the mere
summation of actual and possible reality. He is the transcendent Principle
not only of what is actually in existence or of what may possibly be given
existence but equally of the non-manifestable as well as of the not-to-be-
manifested realities (futuribilitia), which are beyond the reach of the
present order of manifestation or creation. St. Thomas had to cope with
the topical arguments advanced by the university men, who ridiculed
whatever was beyond their own comprehension. The arguments of the
Augustinians, like St. Anselm, that the reality of their idea of God was
based on non-contradiction and therefore furnished a self-evident proof of
the Infinite Reality of God left the savants of the universities untouched.
They maintained that the mind could equally entertain the proposition
that there is no God as the proposition that there is God. St. Thomas
ironically accepts the challenge and affirms that it is true that the very
opposite of the proposition, God is, can be mentally entertained, because
in Scripture it is written: The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God
(Psalm liii, 1).

It happens, as Boëthius says, that there are some notions of the
mind which are common and self-evident only to the wise, for example
that incorporeal substances are not in space. Therefore I say that the
proposition, God is, is self-evident of itself, for the predicate is the
same as the subject, because God is His Own Being. . . . But because
we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident
to us, but needs to be demonstrated by things more known to us,
though less known in their nature—namely, by His effects. 34

Evidently he means that his arguments are not meant for the wise,
who know the essences of things, like the mystics and seers of old to
whom the proposition God is was self-evident, and rightly so. He is writing
for those who (like himself and the Aristotelians) do not know the essence
of God or, at least, to whom God is less known in Himself than in His
effects.

Creation.—Let us now treat of the doctrine of creation, which is the
most self-evident of the effects of God. Creation requires that the existing

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world be produced out of nothing previously existing. The mediaeval scholastics carefully noted that "nothing-previous-existing" has a
pregnant meaning of its own. "Absolute nothing" is, as we have seen
above, what lies at the basis of whatever implies contradiction. Possible
realities do not imply contradictions and therefore cannot be identified
with absolute nothing. To the scholastic mind, which is scrupulously
careful about terminology, "nothing-previous-existing" means strictly
"nothing-actually-existing," and it is evident that "nothing-actually-
existing" can very well be some possible-reality, in so far as it does not
imply contradiction. In other words, "nothing-previous-existing" may
very well be some possible-reality-not-actually-existing. Creation, therefore,
becomes clear in its implications, when its terms are understood in their
strict connotation. The world, in creation, has to be produced not out of
"absolute-nothing" but out of a "possible-reality-not-actually-existing."
Before creation, the world is essentially a possible reality which has to be
given a further reality in the strict line of existence only. The scholastics,
therefore, were perfectly intelligible when they said that the world, before
creation, was nothing only existentially, i.e., only in the strict line of
existence.

In contemplating the Omnipotence or Infinite Power of God with
respect to creation, we have to exclude only whatever intrinsically implies
contradiction. The Infinite Universe of Possibilities, called the Divine
Omnipotence, is ordinarily visualized as in a mirror darkly, though in
ecstasy it is ineffably bright. The question is, can Omnipotent Infinitude
sustain in existence by its Own Power a possible reality, which needs
further reality or actuality to make its real possibility manifest in actual
existence? The answer will be decided by the concept we intellectually
are capable of forming of the full meaning of the Absolute Infinite. Where
the true Infinite is apprehended correctly, the answer will be in the
positive, as it actually is in all the religious traditions of mankind. Where
we contemplate only a pseudo-infinite, as is done in some modern systems
of philosophy, the answer must necessarily be in the negative.

We can now add that the actual existence of a world, existing solely
and wholly because of the Omnipotent Power of God's Infinitude, demands
necessarily that its actual existence be sustained every instant by direct
description on the part of the Creator. No intermediate agents can, according
to St. Thomas, be employed because creation is within the purview only
of Omnipotence and, by its connotation, Omnipotence (being Infinite) is
necessarily unique.

Some Comparisons.—The technical terminology of mediaeval scholasticism, which we have tried to expand and interpret in a popular manner,
inevitably loses in precision and accuracy by such popularization. We find
that it is safer to substitute equivalent terminology from Oriental sources
rather than attempt wholesale modernization. The traditional termin-
ology, both East and West, is relatively fixed. In creation, for instance, the creative act is correlated to the potency of the individual entity, which receives the actuality of existence and thus comes into actual reality from possible reality. In Indian tradition, for example, the mediaeval European terms act (actus) and potency (potentia) correspond more exactly to purusa and prakriti than the modern meanings of act and potency would lead one to suspect. Furthermore, just as purusa and prakriti are correlated to each other in every existing-individual (vyakty), whose existence is wholly sustained by the Supreme Principle, Ullama Purusa, or God (Isvara), even so the act and potency in every existing individual is sustained wholly by God, Who is called Actus Purus or Pure Act by St. Thomas. It is essential to note that the mediaeval European doctrine equally with the traditional Indian doctrine has no relation at all to any "dualistic" conception like the "spirit-matter" dualism of modern European philosophy. This is patent from the fact that prakriti like potency in the traditional concept has no actual existence apart from purusa or act, while "matter" as conceived by Cartesius and the moderns can very well exist on its own, apart from "spirit." Here, again, a still more insidious pretext for confusion and caricature has to be guarded against. Finite individuals are distinguished from one another and are distinguishable from God, because of their limitations under some respect or the other. In scholastic metaphysics, they are conceived of as composed not "physically" but metaphysically of "Form" (forma, corresponding to Gr. idea) and "Matter" (materia, corresponding to Gr. hyle), which have respectively nothing to do with what we understand in modern language as physical shape or chemical matter. The mediaeval European forma corresponds closely to the Indian metaphysical notion of naman, which is the noumenal or intelligible cause of the integration constituting each individual in its finite limitations. These limitations themselves are traced in St. Thomas's system to prakriti or potency, conceived of here as individual capacity for receiving purusa or forma, and spoken of in this connection as "materia" or, better, "materia prima" to distinguish it from "materia secunda," which, unlike the former, is already endowed with existence and marked with quantitative characteristics (signa quantitae).

The Infinite.—The true Infinite, which alone is the competent principle (tattva) of "creation" is the Anantam of the Upanisads (e.g. Taittiriya Up. 2. 1) and must be rigorously saved from confusion with the merely indefinite (a-parimitam) or the incalculable (a-samkhyaam). The Infinite (Anantam) has no common measure (pramana) with the finite (santam) or vice versa; but St. Thomas admits, for philosophical purposes, a kind of analogical predication between the finite and the Infinite. The analogy, we repeat, is not one of direct proportion but a kind of proportionality (upamana). Otherwise, we should be reduced to silence. The true Infinite (Anantam) is not polar to the finite (santam) but to absolute nothing
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(atyantābhāva). Consequently creation is not polar to absolute nothing but to nothing-previousy-existing (prāgabhāva). Understood with this rigorous precision, the scholastic elucidation that creation is polar to nothing previously existing finds its perfect formulation also in the Tarka-samgraha of Annam-Bhaṭṭa: kāryam prāgabhāva-pratiyogī.35

Mysticism.—We cannot do more than touch the deeper implications of the speculative and mystical doctrine of the scholastics. In speculative doctrine, the part played by the intellect is predominant. St. Thomas cut through the controversies of his time by defining the nature of the intellect.

Since the intellectual power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness of Him Who is the First Intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some superadded perfection of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there is needed some likeness of God on the part of the visual power, whereby the intellect becomes, capable of seeing God.36

Just as Arjuna had to be given "divine sight" (Bhagavad-Gītā XI, 8), so man’s natural powers have to be supernaturally raised by divine grace. This increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect by St. Thomas. The intellectual illumination comes from God.

By this light, the blessed are made deiform, that is, like God, according to the scriptural saying: When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and we shall see Him as He is. (1 John iii, 2).37

The parallel doctrine in Indian tradition of becoming like (sādharmya) God, recorded in Bhagavad-Gītā XIV, 2, makes it clear that the blessed are raised to a super-human state, in which personal immortality takes on a divine significance. The Latin Averroists, who taught the strange doctrine of the intellect being the same, identically and numerically, in all and of the consequent annihilation of personality after death, had misunderstood the proper implications of the Aristotelian doctrine about the nous. The Aristotelian nous is a supra-individual faculty, like the buddhi of Indian speculation or the ‘aqil of Islamic doctrine. This faculty in the Oriental traditions is supra-individual but essentially personal, not in the phenomenal but noumenal and hypostatical sense further clarified below. The entire trend of the discussion in the West has been vitiated by the incompleteness of Greek metaphysics, which restricted itself to the individual “ego” and never reached the deeper suppositum or personal hypostasis (ātman). The psyche is no substitute for the pneuma, just as the Buddhist ātman is no substitute for the Hindu ātman.

There is obviously a deeper and ineffable position to be considered. It
was common doctrine among the mediaeval scholastics that the soul in some wonderful manner becomes what it really knows: cognoisces fit cognitum. The Aristotelian formula that "the soul is in some way all things" (De Anima III, 8) is quoted with approval by St. Thomas Aquinas. The mediaeval doctrine in its fullest implications would correspond to the doctrine of the Upanisads: brahma-vid brahmaiva bhavati. There is also good reason to think that Eastern mysticism had reached Europe through the Neoplatonics and particularly under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite. The European mediaevals found great satisfaction in these writings. Among the Augustinians and Franciscans, the Platonic work of Avicébrón (Solomon ben Gabirol, c. A.D. 1021-1058) found enthusiastic students. St Thomas directed the sharpest criticism against Avicébrón's "Fountain of Life," wherein knowledge about God Himself and things divine was regarded as innate in the mind. On the contrary, St. Thomas was very partial to the works attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite. Durante has counted 1,702 citations of the pseudo-Dionysius in Thomistic writings. We may judge the measure of reverence accorded to Dionysius in the Middle Ages from the fact that Dante places him in paradise next to Boéthius, St. Albert and St. Thomas himself.

In St. Thomas's own mystical experience, we find that when he was deeply occupied in the composition of the Pars Tertia, which is the most important section of the Summa Theologica and deals with the sacramental relation of man to God through the mystery of the Incarnation of the Christ, he received in ecstasy such a revelation of things divine that he was convinced everything he had written was useless and referred to his compositions as rubbish. He left his Summa incomplete. Henceforth his silence had to be angelic. What mystical union is he never attempted to set down in words like St. Bonaventure or Meister Eckhart. If this be the depth of yoga or tawhīd, we shall never know from St. Thomas Aquinas. His secret has remained between him and God.

Ethics.—The greatness of an achievement, however intellectual, has to be judged no less from the practical side. The practical intellect in Christian thought is never radically divided from the speculative intellect. There is no absolute distinction between Christian nyavahāra and paramārtha. In this respect, the Christian ideal might be said to be also the burden of the Bhagavad-Gītā. In Christian doctrine, the government of the universe depends not on arbitrary conventions but on an eternal law (lex aeterna), which is identified with the Divine Essence. The eternal law corresponds to the Vedic conception of the eternal rta, which is identified in ancient Hindu speculation with the Divine satya. When the eternal law is reflected or participated in creation, we have the eternal law in so far as it is embedded in nature and, under this aspect, it is called the natural law (lex naturalis). The lex naturalis is the European mediaeval counterpart of what is dharma in Indian tradition. It follows that what-
ever is perpetrated against the natural law, as above defined, is necessarily an offence against the eternal law, just as a-dharma is necessarily an-ṛtam.

The mystical foundation of religious unity.—The treatment of ethics in St. Thomas is governed by the Aristotelian doctrine of purpose and its fulfilment. But the end or purpose of man in Christianity is not a mere egocentric development of the individual as in Aristotle but has to be the supernatural (gūnāśīta) attainment by man of an end beyond his ego-centred self in the supernatural enjoyment of God (gūnāśītānanda). This supernatural end corresponds with the purpose of Indian spiritual endeavour (puruṣārtha-sādhanā). St. Thomas had no difficulty in adapting the Nichomachean Ethics to the requirements of the Christian ideal. It was again really the East (through Christianity) completing the partial tradition previously recorded in the West by Aristotle. The emphasis which Christianity laid on man as being created by God and for God, and as seeking his deepest life in his mystical relationship to God, brought about the emancipation of man in Europe from the old Greek totalitarianism. For the first time, we find in Western philosophical terms the explicit formulation of the Christian doctrine of the free man in the limited state. The more interesting mystical implications of man's metaphysical relationship to God should be pursued in the Mystical Theology of St. Bonaventure and continued by subsequently examining what the austere contemporary of St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Bonaventure, the Dominican Meister Eckhart, has to say about a subject which by its essence is beyond words and definitions. If we ask St. Thomas himself in what the possession and enjoyment of God consists, he teaches that it must primarily be an intellectual activity. In the contemplation of God, the Divine Essence is, as it were, seen in the mirror (speculum) of the speculative intellect. The Divine Essence, it is well known, is Triune in the Christian tradition and is described by Dante as "the Triune Light which shines in a Single Star" (Paradiso, XXXI, 28).

On this point, it is relevant to study convergent traditions in order to find a basis of understanding between the East and the West. In Hindu tradition, there is the doctrine of Brahman as tri-vidha, i.e. bhokty, bhoga, āpravādy or, more metaphysically, akhanda sac-cid-ānanda. In ancient Persian tradition, the doctrine of the Absolute Infinite as Zarvan akarana admits the highest equations in the following manner: Ahura Mazda (sat), Vohu Manah (cit), Asha Vahista (ānanda as rta). In the Islamic tradition, the Absolute Infinity and Uniqueness (Aḥādiyyah) of Allāh is recognized as Al-Āqīl (sat), Al-‘Aqlu (cit), Al-Maqūl (ānanda). All these traditions are concerned with various expressions about the same Absolute Infinite, Who is necessarily One and peerless (ekam evādvitiyam). It is misleading to speak of various religions; the accurate terminology speaks of various traditions, which can be mutually corrected and enriched,
concerning what is (in God’s mind) One Religion for all. Moreover, the Absolute Godhead is for all these traditions in customary modern terms incorrectly described as im-personal. The correct term is supra-personal. There is a good deal of confusion regarding the exact meaning of “person,” which has acquired a fixed significance in the accepted usage of Christian writers. St. Thomas explains the term thus:

Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, inasmuch as His Essence contains every perfection, this name person is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way. The same is true also of other names, which we attribute to God although we have imposed them on creatures. 35

The objection taken to the original meaning of the name person (Latin: per-sona means a mask through which one spoke on the stage) is answered thus by St. Thomas:

Although this name person may not belong to God as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it most excellently belongs to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name person was given to signify those who held high dignity. ... Therefore some define person as a hypostasis distinguished by reason of dignity. And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of a rational nature is a person. Now the high dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; thus the name person pre-eminently belongs to God.36

It is unfortunate that the European languages had no more suitable term to indicate high dignity. When substituted by equivalent Eastern terms more amenable to metaphysical treatment, the objection to the term person as applied to God disappears. The Indian term puruṣa, when applied to individuals endowed with buddhi, is the exact equivalent of “person” in mediaeval scholastic usage. “Puruṣa,” when applied to God, is seen to be still Person, but immensely more acceptable as Puruṣottama. Perhaps modern philosophers, who insist on considering “person” as purely phenomenal on account of the etymology of the word, would have been more satisfied if Tertullian, who first used the word to indicate dignity of a metaphysical kind, had used the term personant instead of person. Then the idea of the hypostasis (ātman) behind the mask (persona) would have been more precisely indicated.

The evidence that the mediaeval scholastics could see as clearly in practical matters as in speculative ones is chiefly to be found in the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologica. St. Thomas defines law by
insisting on its rational essence as a dictate of reason. Law cannot be
enforced as rightful or genuine unless it is reasonable. For St. Thomas,
law is "an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by one
who has charge of the community." His very definition brings him at
once to the Ruler of the whole universe. Every possible legal ordinance
has to be derived from the eternal law, which we have seen above is no
other than the mind of God. In the European Middle Ages, the claims of
spiritual authority over the temporal power were based on an hierarchical
conception that the intellectually superior should guide the inferior in the
administrative applications of eternal principles. What brought about the
passing of the mediaeval hierarchy of functions was the attempt on the
part of the State to usurp totalitarian control by setting up Churches sub-
ordinate to itself in opposition to the supremacy of the Catholic Church.
Thus were the scales in the late Middle Ages heavily weighted in favour
of a conception of the State as having unlimited power in every sphere.

Positive laws enacted in contravention of the eternal law would be
condemned by St. Thomas as unjust enactments, making for the unsettle-
ment of all order. The political ruler is represented as drawing his authority
from the people over whom he rules. A political legislator can remain in
charge of the people's welfare as long as he is devoted to the good of the
community as a whole. While there are many forms of legitimate govern-
ment possible, the best form recommended by St. Thomas is the one that
combines the advantages of all.

Such a constitution is one in which there is an apt mixture of monarchy
in so far as there is one supreme ruler; of aristocracy, in so far as many
share in power according to their deserts; and of democracy or popular
rule, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people and are chosen
by the people.

The stately monument which St. Thomas Aquinas raised to what has
come to be called the Philosophia Perennis still stands in its essential
strength. St. Thomas's criticism of the Augustinian theologians stirred up
in the following century an implacable adversary in Duns Scotus, the
Subtle Doctor of the Schools. Several joints in the Thomistic construc-
tion were shaken; and it was shown that the Philosophia Perennis for
which St. Thomas had laboured so conspicuously was greater than St.
Thomas himself. Today there is again in the Catholic Church a renaissance
of the Thomistic vision. When the traditions of India and China are
better known, it will be possible to build with Thomistic guidance a better
and wider Catholic synthesis than what the Angelic Doctor was able to
achieve in the Middle Ages with the materials at his disposal.
NOTES

1. Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, q. 109, a. 1 ad hum. St. Ambrose: Gloss on I Cor. xii, 3; Migne, Patrologia Latina, XVII, col. 245.


4. II Sent. dist. 28, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4.

5. Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, q. 1, a. 4, c.

6. In III Met., 8; Contra Gentiles III, 73.


8. Summa Theologica I, q. 1, a. 8, c.


11. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 1:2: "For this is understood of the Being, by which God subsists in Himself, that it is unknown to us what kind it is and what it is." In Boëtium, De Trinitate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4: "We are united to God, Who is, as it were, unknown."

12. A. D. Sertillanges has the following explanation to offer about the mystical Thomistic silence in Revue de Philosophie, August 1906, p. 167: "The word cause, like the word being, applied to God, does not claim to place a definable notion in Him, but implies only the postulate of all-round deficiency... inasmuch as we feel ourselves and our universe to be dependent. Therefore our affirmations concerning Him ultimately recoil on our own selves. They do not qualify Him at all; they qualify Him in relation to us. That is why we find ourselves face to face with absolute nihilism with respect to the notion of God... We have of Him, strictly speaking, neither notion, nor definition, nor concept."


15. De Malo, II, 2.


20. Summa Theologica I, q. 7, a. 2, c.

21. ibid., I, q. 2, a. 3, c.

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23. Summa Theologica, I, q. 104, a. 1, c.
24. ibid., I, q. 2, a. 1, c.
25. Turka-samgraha, XXIX, 3.
26. Summa Theologica I, q. 12, a. 2, c.
27. ibid., I, q. 12, a. 5, c.
28. ibid., I, q. 14, a. 1, c.
33. Etienne Gilson: The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, London, 1938. On the technical difference between ecstasy and rapture, see Bonaventure: In Hexaëmeron, II, 29, t. V, p. 341 et seq. We are informed that a person who attains ecstasy can indeed tell us how he attained that spiritual experience and he can even lay down the exterior conditions necessary for such an experience; but, if he would speak of the content of his experience, he can say or explain practically nothing of it. In II Sententiarum 23, 2, 3, concl., t. II, p. 544. St. Bonaventure teaches that the state of rapture is exceptional and produced only in those "who, by the special nature of the privilege, have passed beyond the state of men who are still journeying in the world (status viatorum, cf. yati)." Etienne Gilson adds the comment: "He, whom God raises to rapture is no longer a man; he is one of the Blessed; and this precisely because the motion of a human vision of God is a contradiction."
36. Summa Theologica, I, 1, 29, a. 3, c.
37. ibid., I, q. 29, a. 3 ad 2.
38. ibid., Ia, Iae, q. 90, a. 4, c.
39. ibid., Ia, Iae, q. 105, a. 1, c.

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CHAPTER XXXIV

ŚŪFISM

Scholars wrangle about the derivation of the word Śūfī, though about its exact connotation I do not think that there is any reason to quarrel. Let us cast a hurried glance on the various attempts of the lexicographers:

1) Some say: “The Śūfīs were only named Śūfīs because of the purity (Ṣafā) of their hearts and the cleanliness of their acts (āthār).” Bishr Ibn al-Hārith said: “The Śūfī is he whose heart is sincere (ṣafā) towards God.”

But if the term Śūfī were derived from “Ṣafā” the correct form would be “Ṣafawi” and not Śūfī!

2) Others think that the Śūfīs were called Śūfīs only “because they are in the first rank (ṣaff) before God, through the elevation of their desires towards Him, the turning of their hearts unto Him and the staying of their secret parts before Him.”

But if the term Śūfī were referred to Ṣaff (rank) it would be Ṣaffī and not Śūfī.

3) Others have said: “They were called Śūfīs because their qualities resembled those of the people of the Bench who lived in the time of God’s Prophet. They had left this world, departed from their homes and fled from their companions. They took of this world’s good only so much as is indispensable for covering the nakedness and allaying hunger.” One of them was asked: “Who is a Śūfī?” He replied: “He who neither possesses nor is possessed.” By this he meant that he is not the slave of desire.

But if the term “Śūfī” were derived from “Ṣuffah” (or Bench) the correct form would be “Śūfī” and not “Ṣuffī”

4) Lastly it has been claimed that they were only called Śūfīs because of their habit of wearing Śūf, i.e. wool.

If the derivation from Śūf (wool) be accepted the word is correct and the expression sound from the etymological point of view. Abū Bakr al Kalābādhi thinks that it at the same time “has all the (necessary) meanings such as withdrawal from the world, inclining the souls away from it, leaving all settled abodes, keeping constantly to travel, denying the soul its carnal pleasures, purifying the conduct, cleansing the conscience, dilution of the breast and the quality of leadership.”

Ibn Khaldūn was also of the opinion that the word Śūfī is derived from Śūf. But it is necessary to remember that it is not merely by putting on rough hair-cloth and coarse wool that one is called a Śūfī. As Huj′wiri has said: “Purity (ṣafā) is a blessing from God and the ‘wool’ (Śūf) is the proper dress of the cattle.”
According to the researches of Imām Qushayrī, the word “Ṣūfī” came into vogue a little before the expiry of the second century Hijri (or A.D. 822). After the death of the Holy Prophet, “Companions” was the title adopted by the people of that age. They needed no better title, for “Companionship” was unanimously regarded to be the highest and the best. Those who associated themselves with the “Companions” were called in their own times Tābeyyūn (Followers). And “The followers of the Followers” was the title conferred upon those who sat at the feet of the Followers. After the expiry of this period there was a slackening of religious spirit. Hearts were turning more towards the pleasures of the world than towards God. A number of systems and orders cropped up. Each order was divided into a number of branches! Seeing this state of affairs those who adored God above all things and were wholly consumed by the fire of His love, separated themselves from the rest of the world and devoted themselves to the recollection and remembrance of God—the only object of their love.

These men were later called the “Ṣūfis.” They were cut off from the mundane world for God’s sake—clean of impurities, full of meditations; in their eyes gold and mud were of equal value. And that is why Abu ‘Ali al-Rudhbārī has defined a Ṣūfī thus:

“One who wears wool over (his) purity, gives his lust the taste of tyranny, and having overthrown the world, journeys in the pathway of the chosen one” (i.e. the Prophet).

In the light of these historical facts it is now easy to determine the exact meaning of Ṣūfism. If one casts a glance over the various definitions of Ṣūfism given by the Ṣūfis themselves one will find not a few necessary attributes ascribed to them. It is not necessary to try to state them all here. But the gist of them all is beautifully expressed in a definition formulated by Sheik-ul-Islām Zakariya Anṣārī, which is as follows:

“Ṣūfism teaches how to purify one’s self, improve one’s morals, and build up one’s inner and outer life in order to attain perpetual bliss. Its subject-matter is the purification of the soul and its end or aim is the attainment of eternal felicity and blessedness.” The following few sayings of the more prominent Ṣūfis amplify and extend with fresh details the definition above formulated.

Imām Qushayrī, the author of the great Ṣūfī compendium, Rasā‘ul, takes Ṣūfism in the sense of purity, i.e. the purity of inner and outer life and says that “purity” is something praiseworthy in whichever language it may be expressed and its opposite, impurity, is to be eschewed.” Abū‘l-Husayn al-Nūrī being asked what Ṣūfism is, replied: “Abandonment of all the portion of the carnal soul.” To Abū Ali Qazwīnī Ṣūfism is nothing but “pleasing manners.” Abū Sahl Ṣa‘lūkī defines it as “abstaining from objections,” Abū Muḥammad al-Ja‘rīrī thinks that
Ṣūfism is the building up of good habits and the freeing of the heart from all evil desires and passions.

It is clear, then, that according to these great Ṣūfis, Ṣūfism is nothing but the purification of the senses and the will. It is the effacement of one's desires in the will of God. It is the building up of a solid wall between the pure self and the Gog and Magog of passions and desires. It is, in a word, self-discipline—the avoidance of what is forbidden and the performance of what is ordained.

In this sense Ṣūfism is a purely Islamic discipline which builds up the character and inner life of the Muslims by imposing certain ordinances and duties, obligations and impositions which may not be abandoned in any way by any man. The Prophet Muḥammad was sent to “instruct” mankind “in Scripture and Wisdom and to sanctify them.” The Ṣūfis keep these “instructions” before their eyes, strive their utmost to perform what has been prescribed for them to do and to discharge what they have been called upon to do, subsequent to that prescription. God says: “And those who fight strenuously for us. We will surely guide them into Our way” and again: “Oh ye who believe! Do your duty to God, seek the means of approach unto Him and strive with might and main in His cause: that ye may prosper.”

But this is not the whole meaning of Ṣūfism in Islam. It certainly has an esoteric sense. To understand this esoteric meaning it is necessary to follow the three main categories or classifications of men given by the Qur'ān in Sura LVI (Wāqiah). Here men are sorted out into three classes: (i) The companions of the Right Hand (Aṣḥāb-ul-Ma'īmanā), (ii) The Companions of the Left Hand (Aṣḥāb-ul-Maṣḥ-amā), and (iii) Those nearest to God (Muqarrabūn).

The companions of the Right Hand are “those who believe in the Unseen,” are “steadfast in prayer” and “have the assurance of the Hereafter” in their hearts. They are “on the right path guided by their Lord.” The companions of the Left Hand are “those who reject Faith” and go after false gods. The Qur'ān describes them as those “who have bartered guidance for error” and “have lost their true direction.” This classification is thus according to the awareness out of which spring their actions, knowledge of the right path and illusion of the wrong path. But who are the “Muqarrabūn”? They are not just the companions of the Right Hand only. Otherwise they would not have been placed in a different category. The Ṣūfis believe that it is just another name for those who are not only on the right path guided by their Lord, but also know the right relation between “Haqq” and “Khalq,” or between the Creator and the Created, between God and man. To be more explicit, those who regard their Creator as their “Ilāh” or Deity and worship Him alone and ask for His aid alone and believe that there is none other than He worthy of our devotion and able to help us, are called in the
ŞūFISIM

Qur'ān the Companions of the Right Hand. And those who regard some Created beings as their deities and worship them and seek their aid thus rejecting the faith which lays down that God alone is our Cherisher and Sustainer, are termed the Companions of the Left. The “Muqarrabūn” are those who not only believe their Creator as their only Deity and worship Him alone and seek for His help alone, but also know the true relation that exists between them and their Creator. Thus the great Şūfi Saint Shaykh Shahābuddin Suhrwardi in his famous Şūfi Compendium 'Awarif al Ma‘ārif (Chapter One) holds that though the term Şūfi is not used in the Holy Qur’ān, the word “Muqarrrib” connotes the same meaning which is expressed by the term Şūfi.

Now let us determine in some detail the nature of the exact relation which the Qur’ān posits between Haqq and Khalq.

At the outset it is clear that the Qur’ān teaches the doctrine of Pluralism. As opposed to the claims of Singularism it posits the “otherness” of Khalq or Created things, their discreteness, their manyness and plurality. This otherness is “real” and not merely “suppositional.” Haqq or God, the One exists and possesses infinite attributes. Things, the Many, also exist and have attributes. Externally, things are the creatures of God and God is the creator of things. Says the Qur’ān: “God is the Creator of every thing.” Internally things are the “ideas” (i.e. “objects known”) of God. God knows the things—is their Knower. And God knew them before He Created them. They existed as “ideas” in His mind before they were Created:

“And He knows everything.”

Now the relation between the Creator and the Created, the Knower and the Known is not one of “identity” but is definitely that of “otherness.” Things known or created are the “other” of their Knower and Creator. A painter conceives, say, the idea of a dog, and then paints it on the canvas. The idea exists in his mind, depends for its (mental) existence totally on his mind. The painter’s mind is the “substratum” of the idea. But the Knower and the Known, the mind and the idea are in no sense identical. The painter is not the dog and the dog is not the painter. The relation between the two is clearly one of “otherness.”

Now, as it was shown above, things are internally the ideas of God. God being a Knower from eternity Knows His own thoughts—those being the objects of His knowledge. Now the Şūfis call the ideas of God the “Essences of things” which when manifested or created are called “external objects” or “Created things” or merely the many “things” of the world (Khalq).

Let us now analyse more fully the internal aspect of things—things considered as the ideas of God or “Essences,” i.e. before they are created.
externally. Even as ideas, things are not identical with the essence or Dhat of God. Now what constitutes the difference between God, the Knower and the ideas of God or essences which must now be termed as "the Known"? This may be briefly expressed thus:

**The Known**
(1) Is a form possessing limitation or determination or individualization.
(2) Subsists in the mind of the Knower, does not possess its own independent existence. The Sufis call it "a relative non-existent."
(3) Possesses no attributes, e.g. life, knowledge, will, etc., though possesses the capacity of acquiring those attributes, if given.
(4) Is passive. Having no existence and existential attributes of its own, it possesses no activity of its own.

**The Knower**
(1) Is free from any limitation or determination—is not a form.
(2) Exists in Himself, depending on nothing else but Himself.
(3) Possesses positive attributes, e.g. life, knowledge, will, power, hearing, sight and speech. (These are called the primary attributes of God.)
(4) Is active.

From the above statement it is clear that the relation between the Known and the Knower is one of "otherness," never of "identity." The essences of things are the ideas of God, co-eternal with God. God is "one," His ideas are "many." God exists independently, ideas depend on the mind of God for their existence. The essence of God is free from any limitation or determination, the ideas, though unlimited in number, are limited or determined in form possessing their own peculiarities or characteristics or essential nature, termed Shakkilah in the Qur'an.

If the ideas or essences are "the other" of God, things which are just the external manifestation of ideas must, for the same reason, be the other of God. God manifested externally what was contained in the essence—or the essential nature of things. God transcends the limitations and determinations of things. Says the Qur'an:

"He is not in the likeness of any thing:
He is the hearer and the seer."

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Again:

"Praise and glory be to Him: For He is above what they attribute to Him." The essence or Dhāt of God being absolute, is free from all limitations, and, as all things are necessarily determined, "God is not in the likeness of any thing" and is "above what they attribute to Him." How can God be identified with things? How can the Creator be the same as the Created? Essentially things are different from God and this difference is not merely suppositional but is a real difference—difference of essences, the essence of God being the other of the essence of things. God is comparable to no created beings. He is transcendent in the sense of being a necessary being, self-begotten, self-caused, self-existent, independent and absolute in contradistinction to the contingent, created and determined beings of the phenomenal world. He is transcendent also in the sense that He is unknowable and incommunicable and beyond all proof, as the Qur'ān says:

"God keeps the knowledge of His Self hidden from you."

The relation between God, the One, the transcendent Being ("not in the likeness of any thing") to the many things of the Universe may be expressed in theological language thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The One</th>
<th>The Many</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khālid (Creator)</td>
<td>Makhliq (Created beings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabb (Lord)</td>
<td>Marbūb (Slaves)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilāh (The worshipped)</td>
<td>Malih (Worshippers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mālih (The Master)</td>
<td>Mumlūk (Servants)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the gist of the whole doctrine so far stated is that man cannot become God, as some people taking Islamic Mysticism for a phase of Pantheism are led to suppose.

Thus according to the doctrine of Pluralism the essence of God is different from the essence of the Created beings and the relation of "otherness" exists between the two. But it is equally true that according to the Qur'ān as shown by the Şūfis, Pluralism does not negative Singularism. Apparently this seems to be a strange thesis, combining two irreconcilables, Pluralism and Singularism. Let me formulate the thesis of Singularism or Monism as stated in the Qur'ān.

The Qur'ān asserts that God is immanent in all beings. This immanence is clearly indicated in various ways. The proximity of God to man is shown in the following verses:

"We are nearer to man than his jugular vein" (S. L., 16).
"We are nearer to him than ye, and ye see not" (LVI, 85).
The Omnipresence of God is shown by the following verses:

"To God belong the East and the West: Whithersoever ye turn, there is the presence of God. For God is all-pervading, all-knowing" (II, 1115).

"And God it is that encompasseth all things" (IV, 126).

"And He is with you wheresoever ye may be" (LVII, 4).

"He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the Inward and He knows everything" (LVII, 2).

How is this proximity, nearness, omnipresence, outwardness, inwardness or immanence of God to be understood? How is the transcendence of God to be reconciled with His immanence? How is God in spite of being the "other" of things, the first and the last, the inward and the outward of things? Here a clear knowledge of the metaphysical background of the problem is necessary. At the risk of repetition let me state the whole thing succinctly.

The Sufis believe that according to the Qur'an God exists and is the absolute knower. Knower implies "knowledge" and the "object known." God knows His own thoughts, these being the objects of His knowledge. Now if God's knowledge is perfect (which, ex-hypothesi, it is), His ideas (objects of knowledge) are also perfect in every way. But God has knowledge, is a knower from eternity. Therefore His ideas are also eternal. They are uncreated. Knowledge is an attribute of God and cannot therefore be separated from Him. It constitutes the very essence of God. As God is uncreated His knowledge (or ideas) is also uncreated. The difference, of course, does not impair the essential unity of knowledge, Knower and Known, but is none the less inherent in the nature of things, i.e. in Reality as manifested to us. "Triplicity," as Ibn-al 'Arabi says, "is the foundation of becoming."

Now the ideas of God are technically called "Essences." The essences are firstly uncreated and secondly perfect and unchangeable. They are the essences of things. Every essence has its own characteristics or essential nature. In the Qur'an these characteristics are called "Shākilāt."

As the essences are uncreated and unchangeable their characteristics or aptitudes are also uncreated and immutable.

Now as we have seen above, creation is nothing but the external manifestation or actualization of the ideas of God or the "essences." The secret of Creation, the Sufis believe, is that God manifests or reveals Himself in His own Ideas. In thus manifesting Himself God remains unchanged as He ever was, is, and shall be. God gives and yet preserves Himself, is multiplied and yet remains one. He manifests Himself according to the "aptitudes" of the things in which He is manifesting Himself. He bestows His attributes on His Ideas or forms or essences and they become things. The essences of things are in themselves non-existent, that is to
say, they subsist only in the knowledge of God as “ideas.” They derive what existence they possess from God who is the real substance of all that exists. There is really nothing in existence except God. He is the First, the Last, the Outward, the Inward, He is the substance of what is manifested and is the substance of what remains latent at the time of manifestation. In explaining the Qur’anic Verse:

“He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the Inward, and He knows everything” (LVII, 2), the Prophet says:

“You are the Outward and there is nothing above You; You are the Inward and there is nothing below You; You are the First and there is nothing before You; and You are the Last and there is nothing after You.”

Thus by reason of His manifesting Himself in the forms of things God becomes the First and the Last, the Outward and the Inward of things. That is how His proximity, nearness, omnipresence, in a word, immanence in every thing becomes comprehensible. An eminent Indian Sufi has expressed the whole thing in the following couplet beautifully:

“The same incomparable Being in spite of its incomparability has manifested itself in the form of everything.” Ibn-al’Arabi says: “Glory be to God who created things being Himself their essence, i.e. external being.”

When things derive their existence from God who is the real substance of all that exists, it follows necessarily that all attributes, i.e. life, knowledge, will, power, hearing, sight and speech, belong to God alone. As ‘Abdal Karim Jili has said: “When the Sufi knows the true meaning of God and there was naught beside Him,” at that moment it is revealed to him that his hearing is God’s hearing, his sight God’s sight, his speech God’s speech, his life God’s life, his knowledge God’s knowledge, his will God’s will and his power God’s power and that God possesses all these attributes fundamentally; and then he knows that all the aforesaid qualities are borrowed and metaphysically applied to himself whereas they really belong to God.” (This is what is called the doctrine of Tauhid-i-Şifātī, a necessary consequence of the doctrine of Tauhid-i-Dhātī.)

Attributes go forth into actions. When attributes really belong to God it necessarily follows that God alone is the doer, the agent. We negate actions according to the Qurʾān, from the essences of things as we negate existence and attributes from them (Tauhid-i-Feʿli). God alone exists, has attributes and is the real agent. And to God alone “belong all things in the heaven and on earth.” He is the only Lord and Master (Tauhid-i-fe-al-Āthār).

Such is then the nature of the relation between “Haqq” and “Khalaq.” The Knower (or Haqq or Reality) manifests Himself in the Known (or
Khāliq) revealing all the aptitudes of the Known. Khāliq by itself is non-existent. Existence belongs to the knower alone which is the only Reality. There is no duality of Being or existence. Ontologically there is but one Reality. (Singularism—Unity of Existence.)

The existence is one but the Essences are multiple. Essences, as we have seen above, are the Ideas of the Knower. They are co-eternal with the knower. They are un-created. If the Ideas were created by the Knower, the Knower did not possess them before they were created by Him. But this means the Knower was ignorant of them before they were created. Nobody thinks of God as ignorant at any moment. Therefore the Ideas are co-eternal with God. Ideas constitute the knowledge of God and are not separable from Him. Further, the Ideas are not the same as God. For reasons given above, a relation of "otherness"—not of identity—exists between the knower and the known. But this constitutes no "shirk" (believing in another external existence) for ideas possess no external existence. They merely subsist in the mind of God. God manifests Himself in the forms of His Ideas expressing their aptitudes in full and thus the world appears.

If the Ideas or Essences are the "other" of God, being limited in form, things which are just the external manifestation of ideas must for the same reason be the "other" of God. So in the Qur'ān they are called "the others of God." (Pluralism—Multiplicity of Essences.)

Thus in Existence there is unity, but in Essences there is multiplicity. And one who knows the true relation that exists between himself and God is a Sūfi, in the esoteric sense of the word. The Sūfi knows that internally he is an idea in the mind of God. Being an idea he is co-eternal with God. Externally he is a created being in whose form God has manifested Himself according to the aptitudes or "Shākilāt" of the Sūfi. He possesses neither independent existence of his own nor any existential attributes (life, knowledge, power, etc.). He exists with the existence of God, sees through God, hears through God, etc. As one of the Sūfis has said:

When Truth its light doth show,
I lose myself in reverence,
And am as one who never travelled thence
To life below,
When I am absented
From self in Him, and Him attain;
Attainment's self thereafter proveth vain,
And self is dead.
In Union divine
With Him, Him only I do see:
I dwell alone, and that felicity
No more is mine.
Having thus defined the nature of Ṣūfism, both in its exoteric and esoteric senses, let us now trace briefly the historical development of the esoteric teachings of Ṣūfism in Islam. No one has yet attempted to write a history of Islamic Mysticism.

Jāmī, one of the greatest Persian authorities on Ṣūfism, tells us that the first exponent of the esoteric Ṣūfī doctrines was the Egyptian or Nubian, Dhu’l-nūn (d. A.H. 245–246), a pupil of the famous jurist Mālik b. Anas. Dhu’l-nūn’s teachings were recorded and systematized by Junayd of Baghdād (d. 297). The doctrines of Junayd were boldly preached by his pupil Abū Bakr Shibli of Khurāsān (d. 335). It was he who brought out the esoteric teaching of Ṣūfism from the innermost recesses of the heart and "displayed it above the heads of the people," like Socrates who had brought down Philosophy from the heaven to the earth. These teachings were committed to writing by Abu Nasr Sarraj (d. 378) in his book Lūna’ (Ed. R. A. Nicholson) and later by Abu-al-Qāsim al Qushayrī (d. 437) in his Rasā’il. But the first person who introduced system into the Islamic esotericism and codified it was the great mystic Shaykh Muḥyiddin Ibn-al-Arabi (born at Murcia in south-east Spain in A.D. 1164, A.H. 560).

From the beginning it was, and still is, most usual for the beginner in the path of holiness to put himself under the direction of some spiritual guide, who acts as his teacher, and is known as Shaykh, Murshid or Pir. In many cases this pupilage involves absolute obedience to the teacher, for he knows the way, and also because the renunciation of personal wishes and inclinations (termed Ḥawā) and all that can be described as self-will (termed Nafs) is one of the forms of abnegation required of those who seek God and His proximity or Qiṣr. From the grouping of devotees around some prominent teacher has arisen the foundation of darwīsh confraternities or Orders, sometimes as sodalities of laymen, who pursue their secular occupations and meet from time to time for religious exercises and instruction, and sometimes as permanent communities living in strict obedience under a Shaykh. To follow the development of Ṣūfism in Islam it is necessary to take special notice of these various confraternities or Orders of Ṣūfis which arose during the past centuries. There are fourteen such Orders (or Khānwādāhs) which are entitled to the special attention of the historian of Ṣūfism.¹⁴

(1) Zaydiyyah: Founded by ‘Abdul Wahid b. Zayd (d. A.H. 177). He was the Chief disciple of Ḥasan Baṣrī (d. 110). The doctrine of this sect consisted of "Detachment" and "Separation." The meaning of "Detachment" is "that one should be detached outwardly from accidents, and
inwardly from compensations: that is, that one should not take anything of the accidents of this world, nor seek any compensation for what one has thus foresworn, whether it be of temporal or eternal, but rather that one should do this because it is a duty to God, and not for any other reason or motive." 15 "The meaning of 'Separation' is that one should separate oneself from all forms and be separated in the states and one in the acts; that is, that one's action should be wholly unto God, and that there should be in them no thought of self, no respect of persons and no regard for compensation." 15

Alone with a lone God he is alone;  
One he remains, for his Desire is one. 16

'Abd-al-Wahid b. Zayd was a great mystic who had broken the "clinging bonds of selfhood" and had attained to the state of "detachment" or "separation"—one highest state attainable in the mystic path of upward flight towards God.

(2) 'Iyādiyyah: Founded by Fuḍayl b. 'Iyād of Kūfah (d. 187). He was the chief disciple of 'Abd-al-Wahid b. Zayd. His special doctrine was the doctrine of Love. He said that he worshipped God out of love, not out of fear or hope. He who worships God out of fear or hope worships himself, the object for which he worships God being either the salvation of his soul or the bliss which he will enjoy in Heaven. 17 Love, as it has been said, "is a pleasure if it be for a creature, and an annihilation if it be for the Creator." By "annihilation" is meant, that no personal interest remains, that such love has no cause. 18

(3) Adhamīyyah: Founded by Ibrāhīm b. Adham (d. 161). He was the chief disciple of Fuḍayl b. 'Iyād. He was associated with Imām Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150), for a long time. Junayd called him the "Key of knowledge." It is said that Ibrāhīm b. Adham (who was a son of the king of Balkh), once went out to hunt for pleasure. A voice called him, saying: "Not for this wast thou created and not to this wast thou commanded." Twice the voice called him and on the third occasion the call came from the pommel of his saddle. Then he said: "By God I will not disobey God henceforth, so long as my Lord protects me from Sin." 19 He was thus forcibly drawn by God, he being the "sought" and God the "seeker." Those who are thus drawn forcibly out by God are granted revelation of spiritual states and are thereby expelled from their carnal appetites and their possessions. Abū Bakr al-Kalabadhi quotes the following verses composed by al Baraqi, which beautifully explain the doctrine of the "Seeker and the Sought," the main teaching of Ibn Adham:

The Seeker's heart is based in purity,  
And passion leads his steps in every glen;
Along whatever vale his course may be,
His only refuge is the Lord of men.

He paid with purity, and purely paid,
And pureness to his heart a lantern brought.
His seeking was upon the Seeker stayed:
Thrice-blessed is the seeker who is Sought.\(^{159}\)

(4) *Ajamiyyah*: Founded by Ḥabib 'Ajamī (d. 156). He was the chief disciple of Ḥasan Baṣrī. His doctrines consisted of "abstinence" and "patience." Abstinence is "when the hands are void of possessions, and the heart of acquisitiveness" (*Junayd*). If the heart is void of acquisitiveness possessions do no harm. The Prophet has said: "This world does not weigh with God so much as a gnat's wing."\(^{21}\) The Śūfi, therefore, quits what may be dispensed with. God alone is the sole object of his love.

(5) *Ṭayfūriyyah*: Founded by Abū Yazīd Ṭayfūr Ibn 'Isā al-Bisṭāmī (A.H. 160–260). He was styled Imām-ul-'Ulamā'. He was the chief disciple of Imām Ja'fer Śādiq. The main teachings of this sect consisted of *Sukr* (Intoxication) and *Ṣahw* (Sobriety).

Abū Yazīd's grandfather was a Zoroastrian who had embraced Islam. According to Junayd, Abū Yazīd was a born saint (*Wali*). "The Śūfis," says Abū Yazīd, "are children in the lap of God."\(^{22}\)

(6) *Karkhiyya*: Founded by Ma'rūf Karkhī (d. 200). Ma'rūf's father was a Zoroastrian. Ma'rūf ran away from his parents, came to 'Ali b. Musā Riza and embraced Islam. He was a great scholar and an eminent Śūfi. He was the chief disciple of Imām Musā Riza who loved him and took great pains in his training. It was from Ma'rūf alone that Six famous Śūfis ordered draw their inspiration. "The foundation of piety," says Ma'rūf Karkhī is the "avoidance of what is forbidden and dissociation from the soul: the more they have done without the pleasures of their souls, the more they have attained certainty."\(^{23}\)

(7) *Saqatiyyah*: Founded by Ṣaʿdī b. Mughḥūlī Saqātī (d. 253). He was the chief disciple of Ma'rūf Karkhī and the Shaykh of the famous mystic Junayd of Baghdād.

The chief doctrine of this School is the doctrine of Recollection. Real recollection consists in forgetting all but the One recollected. Says the Qur'ān, "And remember thy Lord when thou forgettest."\(^{24}\) That is to say, when thou hast forgotten what is not God, then thou hast remembered God. The Prophet said: "The solitary ones have the precedence." When he was asked: "Who are the solitary ones?", he answered: "Men and women who recollect much."\(^{25}\) The solitary is one who has none other with him.

(8) *Junaydiyyah*: Founded by Al-Junayd of Baghdād (d. 297). He was given the title of Ṭawūs-ul-'Ulamā' (The Peacock of the Learned).
He was the first great Sūfi who recorded and systematized the esoteric teachings of Sūfism. He was the chief disciple of Sari-al-Saqātī.

Junayd defines Sūfism thus: "It is the purification of the heart from associating with created beings, separation from natural characteristic, suppression of human qualities, avoiding the temptations of the carnal soul, taking up the qualities of the spirit, attachment to the sciences of reality, using what is more proper to the eternal, counselling all the community, being truly faithful to God and following the Prophet according to the Law."

Junayd, being asked concerning the gnostic, said: "The colour of the water is the colour of the vessel." It means that in every state the gnostic follows what is more proper: now his states are diverse, and that is the reason why he is called "The son of his time."

Junayd's esoteric teaching was based on Ṣahw (Sobriety) and love and his practice was contemplation. He discarded Ṣuhr (Intoxication), for he said, "We have no need of the company of those who are unsound." He believes that ecstacies are preserved before God during their ecstasies. "Ecstasy is akin to passing-away (zawāl), while gnosis is stable and does not pass away."

Space at our disposal does not allow us to give even a short account of the teachings of the rest of the above-mentioned fourteen famous Sūfi Orders. We have to content ourselves by giving their names only:

(9) Ḥubairiyyah: Founded by Ḥubairat ul-Baṣri (d. 287).
(10) Chishtiyyah: Founded by Khaja 'Ulu Dinawari (d. 299).
(11) Garzawaniyyah: Founded by Abu Ishaq Garzaroni (d. 426).
(12) Tusiyyah: Founded by 'Alaud Din Ṭusi (d. 560).
(13) Suhrawardiyah: Founded by Dhiaud Din Abu Najib Suhrwardi (d. 563).
(14) Firdausiyyah: Founded by Najmud Din Kubra (d. 618).

Mention must be made here of the Great Saint and Sūfi Shaykh 'Abdul Qādir Jilānī (d. 561) who founded the Order known as Qādiriyyah. The Ṣulūk (pilgrimage or dharma) of Qādiriyyah is divided into three stages. In the first stage the Sālik (one who enters on Sulūk) recites silently or aloud the name of God (Dhikr). By this "those who have faith are taken out of darkness into light." The Sālik considers that everything is the manifestation of God. He never sees anything without seeing God in it. In the second stage the Sālik takes no cognisance of things. Objects have no reality for him. "He passes away from his own attributes and persists in the attributes of God."

"So form from form must be withdrawn
At revelation's dazzling dawn."

In the third and last stage evacuation of thought, both of reality and
non-reality, takes place. A colourless impression dawns on the mind: the impression of Sameness, God being above thought. "There remains the vision of what was of God for God, the One and Eternal is alone in His Oneness."

It was due to Ghazzālī's influence that Ṣūfism attained a firm and assured position in Islam. Ghazzālī was born in Ṭus in 450. Having lost his father when young he was educated and brought up by a trusted Šūfi friend. The latter part of his life as a student was spent at Nayshapūr as pupil of the Imām al-Haramayn. In 484 he was appointed to teach in the Nizamīyah Academy at Baghdād by the great Wāzīr, Niẓām al-Mulk. There Ghazzālī achieved a great success as a professor and consulting lawyer. Then he suddenly left Baghdād in 488 and spent ten years in retirement and in the practices of devotion. When he returned to Baghdād as a professor his teaching was strongly leavened with Ṣūfism. "He had learned that the Šūfis were on the true and only path to the knowledge of God, a complete purifying of the heart from all but God was their Path, a seeking to plunge the heart completely in the thought of God was its beginning and its end was complete passing away in God. Ghazzālī says that the state of the Šūfis passes from the beholding of forms of angels and prophets to stages where language fails and any attempt to express what is experienced must involve some error. They reach a proximity to God which some have fancied to be a ḥulūl (fusion of being), others an ittihād (identification), and others a Wusūl (union), but those are all erroneous ways of indicating the real fact which passes all understanding."30

Ghazzālī reduced Ṣūfism to a scientific form. By his dominant influence orthodox Ṣūfism was introduced into Sunni theology and has since held its own. This admission of modified Ṣūfism into the orthodox church of Islam took place in the sixth century A.H.

In the seventh century Ṣūfism appeared in Spain. The first Spanish Ṣūfī seems to have been Shaykh Muḥyīd-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn 'Ali (A.D. 1165–1240), commonly known as Ibn-al 'Arabi (or Ibn 'Arabi, particularly in the East) and Ash-Shaykh-ul Akbar (Doctor Maximus), who travelled widely in Asia and died at Damascus.31 "No mystic of Islam," says Professor E. G. Browne, "with the possible exception of Jalālud-Dīn Rūmī, has surpassed Shaykh Muḥyīd-Dīn in influence, fecundity or abstruseness."32 His teaching and example have been a great source of inspiration to practically every pantheistic Ṣūfī that came after him whether in Arabic-speaking countries or in Persia. Even Rūmī is supposed to have had his share of influence through attending the lectures of Ṣadruddin of Qumiyah on Ibn-al 'Arabi's Fuṣūṣ al Hikam. 'Irāqi (d. 686), Jāmī (d. 898), Jīlī (d. 811), Shabistāri (d. 720), Qāshānī (d. 730), and many others are among the Ṣūfis whose doctrines, terminology and mode of thought bear evident marks of the influence they received from his
books or books of his disciples. Outside the Islamic world Ibn-al ‘Arabi’s influence reached Christian philosophers and mystics of the Middle Ages. The works of Lully and Dante show traces of such influence, as Monsieur Palacios maintains.33

Ibn-al ‘Arabi is the founder of the School known as Wajudiyyah, a School that taught the Doctrine of Divine Emanation. He taught that Reality is manifested in the lower stages without diminution in the higher stage, and all the manifestations (inward and outward) are the essence itself and in the essence, and that essence itself is existence. He further taught that Asmā (names of God) and Sifāt (attributes) are essence themselves differentiated in the lower stages of knowledge.

The views of Ibn-al ‘Arabi were not to be left unchallenged. Shaykh Ruknud-Din ‘Alāud-Dawlah was the person who disputed his position. He was a native of Samnān who settled at Baghdād in 687 and became a disciple of Shaykh Nūruddin. He read the works of Ibn-al ‘Arabi and wrote commentaries on his Futuḥāt. He was the founder of the Shuhūdiyyah School. He taught that the world was a reflection and not an emanation of the Divine Being and that existence is separate from and external to essence.

With the Wajudiyyah School, the external existence is the existence of God Himself. With the Shuhūdiyyah, the ādīn (non-being) is conjoined with the reflex or illumination of the Asmā (name) and Sifāt (attributes) of God. With the former, God is present in His Creatures in reality, with the latter, He is present by His knowledge.

In the seventh century also we have the great Šūfī Jalāl-ud-Din Rūmī (d. 672). He was a native of Bālk, but his father, Bahāū-Din, was compelled to leave that city and migrate westward and finally settled at Qonyâ (Iconium), where he died (628). Jalālud-Din had been educated by his father, who was a scholar of great fame and reputation and after his death he went to Aleppo and Damascus and came under the influence of Burhānud-Din, who had been one of his father’s renowned pupils and continued his training in Šūfī doctrines. After the death of his teacher he came in touch with the great Saint Shams-i-Tabriz who stirred his soul to ecstasy and set him free from self and selfhood’s strangling chain. It was after the death of Shams-i-Tabriz that Rūmī began to compose his great mystical poem Mathnawi, a work which has attained an extraordinary eminence and reverence throughout the whole world of Islam.34

Jalālud-Din Rūmī founded an Order of Darwishes known as Mawlawī Order, or “dancing darwishes” as they are called by Europeans. The special doctrine of Rūmī is the “Nearness of God.” “The nearness of God” he maintains is not attained by rising higher in space. Nearness of God is attained by shaking off one’s existence. The treasures of Truth are found in non-existence. “O thou proud of thy existence, thou knowest not what non-existence means.”35
Again: "When the disc of the Sun makes its appearance in the East no trace of the night or the stars is left. Similar is the case with the seeker of the Presence of God. When God appears the seeker passes into nothingness. In the Divine Presence he perishes and then exists and does not exist. This existence in non-existence is a strange phenomenon." 36

But this phenomenon, strange as it is, is to a certain extent made intelligible when we bear in mind that in the nearness of God or what is technically known as 'Fana' (or Passing-away) the essence of the Seeker's being survives. For essentially, as we know, he is an idea in the mind of God and Ideas are different from the mind that knows them. That is to say, the seeker (the idea) does not become God (the knower), and God (the knower) does not become the seeker (idea). No transformation of essence takes place. Reversion to original form is all that happens. Before Creation the seeker was an idea in the mind of God, and in the state of 'Fana' he becomes as he was when he subsisted in God's mind—an idea. God alone remains. 37

In India nowadays, we find the complete dominance of four Sufi Orders. Our present historical sketch may be brought to a close by a short description of these Orders. The first is the Chishtiyya Order which took its rise in the seventh century A.H. It was founded by Khwajah Muinuddin Chishti Sijjizi, who was a native of Sijistan (d. 633). The devotees of this Order generally practise Chilla, i.e. they shut themselves up in a room for forty days, put themselves "on short commons" and abjure sleep. They are fond of audition (sama'). With them Sama causes the ascension of the heart (galli) towards God. It is, however, the training-ground of the beginner, as it works on thought. The adept has outstripped thought, he is impressed by the unlimited effect of music—the music of the spheres. The voice of the musician and of the jackdaw have an equal effect on him; or as the famous Sufi poet Sadi has put it.

"Those who indulge in God-worship
Get into ecstasy from the creaking of a water-wheel."

But Sama' is governed by three necessary conditions: time (Zamân), place (makân) and brotherhood (ikhwân). By time is meant the time in which the audience is concentrated on the thought of God and all other ideas are excluded from their mind. By place is meant, a secluded place from which strangers are excluded; and by "brotherhood" is meant the followers of one and the same pir.

The second Order is called Naqshbandiyya. It was founded in the eighth century by Khwajah Bahâ'uddin (a.h. 728–791). The devotional practices (ashghâl) of this order were as many as eight, or as some say, eleven. The first eight were devised by Khwajah 'Abdal Khâliq Ghajdwani (the pir of Khwajah Bahâ'uddin), and the last three by Khwajah Naqshband himself.
The order was introduced into India by Khwājā Bāqī-Billāh (d. 1012) and Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi (d. 1035).

The Qādiriyyah Order also has a large following in India.

The Suhrawardiyyah Order founded by Dīāuddin Abu Najib Suhrawardi (d. 563) and strengthened by his nephew and chief disciple, Shahābud-Dīn Suhrawardi (d. 632), the author of the famous Sufi compendium, 'Awārif- ul-Ma'ārif, has also a large following in India.

In recent times there was a revival of Sufism in India under Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi, a pious man belonging to Shuhūdiyyah School (d. 1035). He is known as Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī (The Renewer of Islam on the Head of the Second Millennium of the Islamic Era). He introduced the Naqshbandiyyah Order into India. He was the chief disciple of Khwājā Bāqī-Billāh (d. 1012). We have noted above the chief points of differences between the Wajidiyyah and the Shuhudiyyah Schools of Sufism. The Mujaddid widened the bounds of religious experience by realizing and describing a large number of higher stages and states yet untraversed and unknown to his predecessors. His chief work is Maktūbāt.38

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Unless otherwise mentioned all dates in this chapter are A.H. (Anno Hijra).

1. The Doctrine of the Sūfis or Kitāb al-Ta'arruf limadhdhab ahl al-tasawwuf, translated from the Arabic of Abū Bakr al-Kalābadhī by Arthur John Arberry, Cambridge University Press, 1930, p. 5; referred to in future as D.S.

2. ibid., p. 9.

3. ibid., p. 10.


7. cf. The Tradition known as "Hadīth-a-qrbe-Nawafī": "I am for him hearing, sight and hand so that through Me he hears and through Me he sees," etc.


9. S. II, 255.


12. ibid.

13. Junayd is reported to have said to Shībīlī: "We studied this Science deeply and then concealed it in the vaults, but thou hast come and displayed it above the heads of the people (D.S., p. 147).

14. For a detailed account of these Orders, cf. Jawaher Ghaybī by Muẓaffar Ali Shah, Nawal Kishwar Press, Lucknow, 1887; cf. also Shah Wali-ullah's Ha'māt and 'Intibāh fi Salāsīl Aūliyā'.


16. ibid., p. 105.


19. See Nafahāt al-Ums, p. 28. This well-known story is also related by Qush-ayrī, Risālah (Cairo, 1284), p. 10. The fullest biography of Ibrāhīm b. Adīm is that given by Ibn 'Aṣākir, Tā'rikh Dimashq (Damascus, 1330), p. 167 H.


30. cf. Ghazâlî's great book Al-Mun-jidh mir-al-Ḍalal (Rescuer from Error), which MacDonald describes as "Unique in Islam and which in the form of an apology for the faith is really an Apologia pro vita sua" (see D. B. MacDonald's Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory, p. 216).

31. Was also known in Spain as Ibn Surâqah.


33. See Palacio's Islam and Divine Comedy and Abenmasarra.

34. cf. O'Leary's Arabic Thought and Its Place in History.

35. qurb ne bala zâ Pastî rastan âsî,
qurb-e Haq az jins-e Hasti rastan ast,
Kargah Ganjé Haq dar Nisti-st,
Garr'e Hasti che diam Nist chist.

(Rumi.)


38. Edited by M. Nur Ahmed under the title Maktûbât-i-Imâm-i-Râbbâni (Persian), printed at Lahore, 1334. See Dr. B. A. Fârûqi's monograph on the Mujâddid's Conception of Tawhid, M. Ashraf, Lahore, India.
CHAPTER XXXV

CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM

MYSTICISM has no history, for it is concerned with that experience of man which is beyond the measurements of time and space. This is well illustrated by that event in the life of Christ which is described as his Transfiguration. When he determined to go up to Jerusalem to certain death, he took his three closest disciples up into a mountain, and was transfigured before them. They described the experience in terms of brilliant light. With him they saw two persons from the history of their Hebrew race. These two, though divided from each other by several centuries, and though the second of them was previous to the Christ by eight centuries, had one experience in common. They had both climbed the holy mount of Sinai, and there had mystical communion with God. In the case of Moses this was described in negative terms of sight. Man cannot see the face of God. He was said to have seen the hinder parts of God. In other words he experienced a darkness more pregnant than any light. In the case of Elijah the description is in terms of sound. He heard a sound "as of gentle stillness." In other words he experienced a silence more profoundly pregnant than any sound. Christ was the "Word" or "Thought" of God incarnate in a human being. These two, who preceded Christ in time, communed on the holy mount with the not yet incarnate Word of God.

Negative terms recur to the lips of Christian mystics. St. Paul speaks of having heard words which are not able to be spoken, and sights which cannot be described. A century after the New Testament we find Clement of Alexandrina referring directly to Moses, when he speaks of the necessity of seeking God in darkness, "recognizing not what he is, but what he is not." Origen, of the same School, moves towards a reason for this need of negatives. He says: "If you close up the senses and look up with the mind, and if you turn from the flesh and awaken the soul, thus, and thus only, shall you see God." He discerns a particular calling to the path of mysticism, and refers to another incident in the life of Christ, which has become a frequent analogy for two callings in the spiritual life. It is the occasion when Christ visited the home of two sisters. Martha busied herself in the service of hospitality, but Mary simply sat at his feet. He commended Mary as having chosen "the better part."

As the Roman civilization declined into increasing anarchy many chose this better part and sought the refuge of the desert. In solitude men attempted to be detached from the distraction of the business of life;
in some places only relieving their solitude for common weekly worship; later, in others seeking a greater degree of common life, but still a solitude in common. One of the earliest and greatest of these monks, of the fourth century, is Antony. For him mystic prayer is beyond the categories of reason: "That prayer is not perfect in which the monk understands himself or his own prayer." Macarius sees it as a tremendous climb up twelve steps, and this symbol of the ladder also returns again and again in mystic description, till "he who is rich in grace stands ever night and day on the summit, and is free and pure, for he is high and captive." Macarius also uses the analogy of the bride and the bridegroom to describe the relation of the soul with Christ, an analogy which derives from both Old and New Testaments, and is used by many mystic writers, notably Bernard of Clairvaux.

It is instructive to consider the methods of these Fathers of the Desert. Apart from the common offering of the Liturgy on Sundays, their daily spiritual exercises in their solitary cells was the recitation of the Scriptures, especially Psalms. Their bodies were subjected to ascetic practices; and manual labour, such as the making of palm leaf mats, formed part of their routine. The great monastic founders took over the elements of their life into their more fully regularized communities. While St. Basil has set a pattern for the East, which has not greatly altered down the centuries, St. Benedict has been succeeded by other founders in the West, and a great variety of his original pattern, though his own Order continues a vigorous existence.

St. Augustine, whose *Confessions* show him to be indeed a mystic, has something to say on the "active" and "contemplative" vocations, already touched on by Origen. His other important contribution is the definition of the several kinds of vision and audition experienced by mystics. He discerns three kinds. The corporeal is the most open to criticism as being over concerned with the senses, and therefore most liable to be the fruit of other causes than divine. In these the object of vision seems actually to be outside and over against the visionary. The imaginary is as actual as the corporeal, but is perceived by the senses of the imagination, and is more interior. The intellectual is the highest kind of vision. In this nothing is perceived, but there is a vivid awareness of the presence of the object of the vision. In this category we note that once again that which is farthest removed from the normal means of measurement is considered the most reliable and useful to the mystic. It may be noted that none of the Masters encourage dependence on or desire for phenomena of the visionary kinds. They are not to be taken as tokens of advance.

St. Gregory takes up the question of vocations, and decides that the contemplative is superior to the active. Yet he says that it is the duty of any man who is called to responsibility to leave the contemplative and return to the active. He postulates a third vocation, the "mixed,"
which transcends and combines the other two. He maintains that this is illustrated by the Christ Himself who came from his long hours of solitude to periods of tremendous activity. The importance of this postulate cannot be overestimated; it gives room for an affirmative approach to God for the mystic as an alternative to the negative, which has so largely held the field.

We cannot leave this early period without some reference to one who perhaps had more influence than any other on subsequent centuries. The mistaken identification of this writer, probably of the late fifth century, with Dionysius, the Areopagite and disciple of St. Paul, gave his teaching especial weight. In its own right it is weighty enough, defining as it does the "divine dark," in which, as we have seen, the mystics tended to seek God. The Unknown cause of all is beyond knowledge either by the perceptions of the senses or the intellect. He dwells in the super-essential light, obscured by all lights of which we can be cognisant. Only as we rise beyond all known means of knowledge can we know him. "Ignorance about God is truly knowledge."

Having traced the main course of mystical discovery in the early centuries of the Christian era, it seems best now to survey briefly the tradition of the several countries or regions of Europe, and to follow with some consideration of the tradition of Eastern Christianity which will relate more closely with the mystical tradition of the rest of the East.

With Italy the mind at once associates St. Francis of Assisi. He left few writings, but it is clear from the records that he was a mystic of a high order, in whom the two vocations of the active and contemplative presented a continual stress which resolved in the third "mixed" vocation of St. Gregory’s category. He is distinguished for his discernment of the Divine displayed through nature, and his conversion seems to have been linked with his first contemplation of the countryside after a long confinement through illness. With his joy in nature, of which the Canticle of Brother Sun is the expression, went a keen appreciation of the sorrows of the world, and the Passion of Christ was the subject of his meditation. These two lines of approach to communion reached their culmination in his supreme mystical experience on Mt. Alverna. The symbol of the vision which accompanied his receiving of the stigmata is of great importance. The symbol was a crucified seraph. The seraph is the highest in the hierarchy of angelic beings. It symbolizes the pure flame of the Divine Love. This symbol combined with the symbol of the Passion of Christ suggests an experience in which the joy and the pain were sublimed in a third inexpressible something which contains and yet goes beyond both.

This affirmative way seems to be a mark of the Franciscan tradition. Bonaventura, later in the same thirteenth century of St. Francis' experience, maintains that the Dionysian "learned dark" can be sought by every man, but there is something beyond it which is the privilege
of the few. In Dante, a Franciscan Tertiary, we have a clear indication of an affirmative approach. In the *Vita Nuova* his initial experience is linked with his meeting with Beatrice, and she is his guide in the *Divine Comedy*, once he has passed beyond the gloom of Hell, and particularly in the lofty flights of the *Paradiso*.

Catherine of Genoa, in spite of the influence upon her of Dionysius, developed a distinctive and affirmative doctrine of "Pure Love," of which, if one drop fell into Hell, Hell would be transformed into heaven. The ardent soul is ready to plunge into this fire of Love, whatever the pain of the purification which would thereby ensue. In this principle she has discovered a single element to account for the pains and joys of the mystic path. So absorbing of attention became this pure love, that she could not suffer distraction from it, even to intercede for her nearest disciples and relatives. In it every act and thought was caught up into the single direction of the soul towards its creator.

Catherine of Genoa was tremendously active in the limited sphere of her own hospital. The other Italian, Catherine of Siena, was tremendously active in the affairs of Europe, especially of the rival popes. Yet in her is to be found a mystic led beyond power of resistance along the path. Not that there was not battle, but she seemed to possess an inviolable purity of soul, to which Christ in a vision bore witness after a bout of evil imaginings which had beset her, but to which in truth her will never consented. With her we have a distinct example of the "Spiritual Marriage"; that experience which sometimes marks the entrance into the last of the four stages of the Mystical experience, that of Transforming Union.

On the Iberian Peninsula the tradition of the Franciscan way is not without its witnesses. St. Anthony of Portugal, though better known as of Padua, is so obscured by legend as to make it difficult to assess his contribution. Ramon Lull, on the other hand, has left writings, and the colloquies of his hero, Blanquerna, upon the powers of the soul, display the Spanish gift for philosophizing and analysing in their mysticism. St. Peter Alcantara, a Franciscan of a later date, may seem to give pause to this judgment, were it not that of all the methods of prayer, which began to appear at the turn of the Middle Ages towards the Renaissance, his is the most comprehensive. In himself he illustrates certain mystic phenomena, concerned with the third stage of mystic prayer, Ecstasy. It is said that the suspense in the recital of forms of prayer, known as the *ligature*, was so marked in his case that it took him five hours to say his mass, which normally takes half an hour. His tendency to *levitation* added to the anxieties of those who assisted him. With all that he displayed the characteristically Franciscan note of simplicity.

Thomas Aquinas was a Spaniard and a member of the Order of St. Dominic, also a Spaniard. In his mystical doctrine he takes up a dis-
tinction made by Bernard of Clairvaux, in the previous century, between "pure contemplation" and "revelation" in comprehensible imagery, which he calls "phantasmata." St. Thomas distinguishes three phases. In the first, phantasmata answer the needs of man. In the second there is no need of them, as there is not to disembodied spirits. The third is the Beatific Vision, the unveiled sight of God, which is not granted to souls in probation. The human mind, by natural operation, knows spiritual things only indirectly. Mystical Knowledge gives direct apprehension of spiritual things. The laying down of the pen of the great scholastic is too famous to need quotation as evidence that this direct apprehension finally removed desire to use the natural operation of his powerful mind.

Ignatius Loyola cannot be overlooked in a survey of mystics. His experience at Manresa would alone entitle him to it. His Spiritual Exercises have had more influence on ascetic than upon mystical theology. This seems to be because the earlier exercises, which aim at that detachment which is necessary to vital decisions, have received more attention than the later.

The great period of Spanish contribution is that of the Discalced Carmelites in the sixteenth century. Few, if any, of the Masters have given so comprehensive an account of their experience as Teresa of Avila. With her, and the writings of John of the Cross, we come somewhere near to a system of approach to the mystic heights. St. John gives us a doctrine of the "dark nights," the first of which weans the senses from their delight in spiritual sweets, and prepares the soul for that austere but profound love by the will, which leads on through the second night of the soul towards the secret meeting with the Beloved. In the writings of St. Teresa we are shown the progress of the mystic soul through those stages which Père Poulain has described as: 1. Prayer of Quiet; 2. Prayer of Full Union; 3. Ecstasy; 4. Transforming Union. St. Teresa's vivid autobiography shows the evidence in her own life for such treatises of hers as The Interior Castle. She has a full share of "phantasmata," but sets little store by them. The one evidence of progress is the growth of the fruits of virtue in the garden of the soul.

Meister Eckhart, the Teuton Master, was a Dominican who lived at the turn of the end of the thirteenth century, a few decades after the Franciscan Bonaventura and Thomas Aquinas. He is sometimes called the scholastic mystic, and is much influenced by the Neoplatonic ideas of Dionysius the Areopagite. He sees God as the absolute and infinite being. God is best described as "nothing." God "is," rather than possesses "being." There is a pantheistic tendency in this doctrine. Yet he considers that the Divine existence is especially present in human beings, and union with God is attained by knowledge, knowledge that the creature in itself is nothing, and by that knowledge the acquirement of a sense of continuity with the Divine. Eckhart's disciples, Henry Suso and Tauler,
formed a group known as the Friends of God. Tauler especially influenced the Flemish mystic, Ruysbroeck, who is known for his treatise on the steps of love. Ruysbroeck saw progress in the symbol of the ladder, by which the soul moves up from the active life through the interior life to the contemplative life. Yet at the summit the soul preserves her own identity. Ruysbroeck influenced Groot, who founded the Brethren of the Common Lot, a society which numbered amongst its members the author of the Imitation of Christ, a work which can hardly be described as mystical in itself, but has assisted many to that attitude of mind and soul in which mysticism may grow.

It is significant that the first considerable English mystic tends to describe his experience in terms of music. Even when writing in prose the English mystics tend to be poets. The author of the Cloud of Unknowing makes use of the divine dark of Dionysius in terms of evocative words, preferably monosyllables, such as "God," "Sin," "Lump," with which he seeks to induce the condition he describes in those who are ready for it. Julian of Norwich has the same gift, and her magic phrases have been seized on by the poets, not least her conviction that "All will be well." Of this early period the difficult lady, Margery Kempe, alone seems uninfluenced by numbers. In the seventeenth century the Cambridge Platonists influenced mysticism, and the results are chiefly expressed in the Metaphysical poets, of whom Henry Vaughan and Thomas Traherne are undoubted mystics. The latter shows a mystic relation with the Divine in the world of nature, which gives a freshness and grace to his positive approach reminiscent of St. Francis. In the next century William Blake continues a mystic poetic tradition, though it is doubtful whether he penetrated beyond the need of phantasmata, and in the nineteenth there is Christina Rossetti.

Of the ascetic writers Augustine Baker in the seventeenth century has had great influence, especially with his comments on the stage of affective prayer, the period of the first dark night of St. John of the Cross, in his Holy Wisdom. William Law in the next century goes near to relating mysticism to ordinary life, as a counterpart to similar work in France. Of our own day T. S. Elliot, especially in his later poetry, gathers up and reinterprets the mysticism not only of Europe but of the East as well.

The practical French, led by St. Francis de Sales, have led the way in opening up the path to mysticism for those outside the cloister. In Paris there was a period in the seventeenth century when the mystic life seemed almost to centre in society, with Madame Acarie as an uncrowned queen. This woman could hardly read spiritual writings without being carried into abstraction. All through even the writers from amongst the Communities bear the influence of the direction of souls in the world. Brother Lawrence, who like the author of the Imitation, prepares souls for the coming of mysticism rather than is a mystic, teaches the importance
of the Practice of the Presence of God. This doctrine is taken much deeper in the teaching of the Jesuit Father, De Caussade, who teaches the necessity of Abandonment to the Will of God in the circumstances which each moment brings, a doctrine which has been given importance in our own day by the Benedictine, Dom John Chapman.

Looking back over the tradition of Christian Mysticism in the West we can discern the outline of a way to Mysticism, and a way of Mysticism in the ascetic and mystic writers. We have deliberately left aside those who seemed outside the main tradition, for the sake of clarity, however instructive they may be in themselves. Among them are such names as those of Jacob Boehme, Molinos, Madame Guyon, and even George Fox, the first Friend or Quaker.

In the early days of monasticism, both in the desert and in the foundations of the first Orders which still persist, we see how great a part recital of Scripture and traditional prayers, especially in the liturgical worship of the Church, took in the forming of dispositions for the onset of mystical experience. With it went discipline, either by actual ascetic practices or simply by a regular routine of occupation. Beyond these, in the so-called ages of faith, the soul seemed to require little else to set the environment in which it could exercise itself in contemplation.

The elaborate systems of meditation and other forms of what is called Mental Prayer, in distinction from the Vocal Prayer which focussed in the liturgy, appear to have been the product of the Renaissance. The new learning shook the earlier simplicity of faith, and it needed a considerable amount of "conditioning" to create the environment suited to contemplation. The mind was conditioned by crowding out mental attitudes inimical to prayer by consideration in meditation of subjects suitable to prayer. The emotions were conditioned by the acts of prayer arising from these considerations. The emotions were disciplined by the experience of "The Night of the Senses," in which spontaneous aspirations ceased to rise, and the soul was driven back on "forced acts" which expressed the dispositions known to be proper, the most fruitful being of resignation to God's will. The will was conditioned, first by resolutions being formed as a result of meditation and affective prayer, and later by a simple sustained attention to God in the Prayer of Simplicity.

The Stage of the Disciplining of the Mind is sometimes called the Purgative Way. The Stage of the Disciplining of the Emotions is sometimes called the Illuminative Way. The Stage of the Disciplined Direction of the Will is sometimes called the Unitive Way. Souls are led by the Holy Spirit of God, and pass through these Stages more or less rapidly, and more or less in order. It may be noted that some at least of the Masters expect this third Stage of Mental Prayer to be within the reach of all devout and sincere souls.

Beyond them lie the realm of Mystic Prayer, in which the first Stage
of The Prayer of Quiet can follow quite gradually from the Prayer of Simplicity. The difference being that the attention is drawn by God to Himself, rather than directed by the soul. Beyond this is the Full Union, wherein the soul is drawn irresistibly. Beyond this Ecstasy, where the abstraction may be accompanied by the phenomena of several kinds which have already been noticed in some Masters. The final Stage of Transforming Union, sometimes introduced by the Spiritual Marriage, is one in which the soul seems possessed of God, and free from "phantasmata." This is often accompanied by heroic activity. The goal is a Union of the will with the Will of God, and not an absorption in which the soul loses identity. The Dark Night of the Soul covers these stages of yearning after the Beatific Vision, which most Masters hold to lie beyond life in the body.

As we turn to the Eastern tradition of Christian Mysticism, we seem to enter a different world. It has behind it the common tradition of the early centuries which it shares with the West, but just as Western Monasticism developed many varieties of pattern, while the Eastern preserved one form, so in the Eastern we do not find the same analysis and distinction of progressive stages as we have found in the Western. One explanation offered for this is that, while Western Mysticism is Christocentric, and seeks to repeat in the soul the experience of Christ, the Eastern centres on the acceptance of the Holy Spirit of God for the deification of the whole personality from within.

There is a tradition of asceticism in the East, and extracts from the writings of the Fathers of eleven centuries are gathered up into the "Philokalia," The Love of Spiritual Beauty. This asceticism aims at humility, at overcoming the passions of man's unregenerate nature, and leaving him free to be worked upon by the Holy Spirit of God. The Holy Spirit is immanent in the created world, as well as implanted by grace in man; there is not the same tendency to find a dualism between the natural and the supernatural as there is in the West. The goal of Mysticism is the transfiguration of the whole of nature. The Way therefore is affirmative to a degree rarely found in the West, though discernible in such a saint as Francis of Assisi.

In this deification the personality is changed but not absorbed. Simon the New Theologian describes his experience: "Suddenly He came and united Himself to me in a manner quite ineffable; without any 'confusion of persons' He entered into every part of my being, as fire penetrates iron, or light streams through glass." Light is a word which comes again and again to express mystic experience. In the tradition there seems little place for the Dark Nights of St. John of the Cross. A visitor to St. Seraphim of Sarov saw the whole body of the saint filled with light which shone all around him, when at the touch of the Saint he also was "in the spirit."

The story of this monk of Sarov, who lived in the last century, is a
classical example of a mystic of this tradition. We see him returning after long years of great asceticism, during which grew a great intimacy with creatures of the forest, and silence, to a remarkable ministry to souls in his monastery, to which visitors from all classes of life came to see him. We see a resolution of the pull of the One and the Many in the streaming forth of the Love which unites to the One to meet the needs of the many.

Mysticism is a gift, a charisma, but there are ascetic methods of preparing for it. In them can be seen the continuity with the early Fathers of the Desert. The Liturgy plays a great part, for the Eastern Church has a profound sense of sat-sanga, of sobornost. With it is an individual soaking in Scripture. One practice is to read through the New Testament each week. A gospel for each of four days, and the other books in the rest of the week. There is a use of icons, sacred pictures which bring near the sacred being portrayed. There is the Prayer of Jesus.

"The practice of reciting the 'Jesus Prayer' lies at the very heart of Orthodox mysticism. By means of this prayer Our Lord Jesus Christ enters our hearts and enlightens our whole being. The Jesus Prayer ('O Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, Have mercy upon me a sinner') is the point at which mystical concentration begins," writes Nicholas Berdyaev. Methods of its use are described in a little book translated from the Russian under the title of The Way of a Pilgrim. Under the guidance of an "Elder," staret, the pilgrim first learnt to repeat the prayer a great number of times each day aloud, next he learnt to repeat it silently so often that at last it began of itself when he woke in the morning. Then he learnt to repeat with inhaling and exhaling of breath to the beats of the heart. Thus by practice the Holy Name became the undercurrent of all the outward activities of his daily life. Exercises based on use of this prayer are practised in the cloister, and by the devout in the worldly avocations of life.

In the Western tradition the place of a "director" of the soul is well understood. In the Eastern tradition the personal relation with the elder seems to be closer, much more akin to the guru. In the Western monastery the novices are generally placed under one Novice Master. In the East one or two novices are attached to an experienced monk, who becomes in truth their spiritual father. St. Seraphim illustrates the relation of the elder to those in the world.

One Indian mystic has attracted the interest of scholars of mysticism. Sundar Singh was a Sikh, who became a Christian after a profound mystical experience of the Christ. He disappeared into the Himalayas in 1929. Apart from visions and several extraordinary events on his journeys he seems to have had a continuous sense of the presence of God. Von Hügel, a well-known writer on mysticism, was puzzled by the apparent absence of a "dark night" in his experience. It would seem that with little knowledge of the Eastern traditions of Christian mysticism his
own fell into natural harmony with it. In his travels Sundar Singh came across members of a secret samnyāsin mission, whom he tried to persuade to make themselves publicly known but without success. There may therefore be even now in India a tradition of Christian Mysticism, which cannot as yet be examined. We may expect it to have affinities rather with the Eastern tradition than the Western.

There is considerable expectation that we are on the verge of a considerable spread of mysticism among men in ordinary walks of life. The rationalism of the last two centuries, which has affected even Eastern countries, is leaving men with a sense of frustration. Life is more than such of it as can be weighed and measured. On the other hand men cannot easily return to that relation of religion to life that expressed itself in frequent symbolic ceremonies. The mystic life is the true interior life of man. For him who lives it the very acts of every day become symbols of the unbounded eternal realm. The ancient traditions of India, China, and Japan are being studied in the West in a new way. As Neoplatonism fertilized early Christian mysticism, so may they fertilize that of tomorrow.

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PART III

MODERN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY

RATIONALISM
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CHAPTER XXXVI

RATIONALISM

I. INTRODUCTION

After the breakdown of scholasticism Western philosophy gradually assumed what is called the "modern" outlook. Negatively, this outlook which was a legacy of the Renaissance consisted in the rejection of ecclesiastical authority. Positively it was the acceptance of the scientific attitude which was the dominant characteristic of the mental atmosphere of the seventeenth century. Of Rationalism and Empiricism, the two concurrent movements of thought with which modern Western philosophy began, the former, founded by Descartes, retained an element of scholasticism, viz. respect for authority. This authority was not, however, the Church—though Descartes was a sincere Catholic—but Plato, who came to occupy in the philosophical world during the Renaissance the same place as Aristotle had done in the Middle Ages. In fact, it is to Plato that the rationalists from Descartes to Leibniz owed their fundamental categories of philosophical thinking as well as their theory of knowledge which held reason instead of experience to be the source of knowledge in its true sense. With this theory of knowledge at their disposal they could account for the persistent problems of philosophy concerning God, soul and immortality which Empiricism ultimately rejected as spurious. Rationalism thus remained linked up with the ancient and the mediaeval world, while Empiricism stood in the end in complete isolation from both.

But then the question remained: How to deal with the new scientific outlook which was alien to the ages of Greece and, particularly, to mediaeval theology? So far as Descartes was concerned, it was impossible for him to sacrifice the scientific outlook, he being one of the creators of the science of the seventeenth century. Nor would he as a philosopher be willing to surrender the cause of philosophy. Hence the dilemma which Descartes, the scientist-philosopher had to face. A philosopher of a lesser genius than Descartes would have been overwhelmed by it. But Descartes found in it an occasion for setting before himself the problem of the reconciliation of the claims of philosophy and science. For him, philosophy was concerned with God, soul and immortality, i.e. the foundation of religion and morality. So his fundamental problem was the vindication of religion and morality alongside of science. The solution obviously demanded an attempt to form a conception of the universe such as would be consistent with the truths of science and make room for religion and morality at the same time. Descartes who was the first to have made this
attempt, inaugurated thereby a new era in the history of Western philosophy. And the development of modern philosophy and, particularly, Rationalism was mainly determined by the mental outlook which was reflected by the fundamental problem as formulated by Descartes.

2. RENÉ DESCARTES (A.D. 1596–1650)

Religion and morality did not strike Descartes as presenting any new problem. Science was, of course, new as compared with religion and morality, and it was created by the scientists of the seventeenth century including himself. In such a background Descartes’ fundamental problem would be solved merely by stating that the validity of religion and morality and science presupposes respectively the reality of God and soul as conceived by religious and moral tradition, and the physical universe as conceived by the science of his age. But Descartes’ actual procedure in his most important philosophical works, A Discourse on Method and the Meditations, was not so simple and straightforward as this. This was due to the fact that he wanted to create the impression that he was proving, and not merely affirming, the reality of God, soul and the physical universe; and that he was thereby establishing, and not merely assuming, the validity of religion and morality and science. To this end Descartes formulated a theory of knowledge which was his outstanding contribution to philosophy and which owed its importance specially to the fact that his solution of the problem of reality had at least the appearance of having been deduced from it.

Proof, according to Descartes and other rationalists, consisted in deduction. This view was the necessary corollary of the rationalist theory of knowledge which held that mathematics is the pattern for all knowledge. But by advocating it these philosophers overlooked the fact that the use of deduction as the sole method in the field of our knowledge of reality is arbitrary and unwarrantable. Deduction presupposes some self-evident principle or principles from which universally and necessarily valid conclusions could be drawn. In order to prove the reality of God, soul and the physical universe Descartes, therefore, needed a self-evident basis from which he could deduce the existence of these things step by step in the manner of a geometrician.

A principle is self-evident if doubt about its truth is self-contradictory. In search of such a principle Descartes resorted to a method of elimination as a first step by means of which he could discard whatever proposition failed to stand the test of self-evidence. This method was the well-known “Cartesian doubt” which evidently aimed at the attainment of truth but which was not the theory known as scepticism which adopts the doubting attitude as an end in itself. The scope of Cartesian doubt was,
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however, fairly wide. The whole field of our sense-perception, as Descartes held, could be doubted. For it might be that what are presented to us by the senses are after all as unsubstantial as dreams, illusions and hallucinations. And it might also be, he continued, that the cause of the unsubstantial presentations is an evil demon and not a good God. So our belief in God would in its turn come in for doubt. But once our doubt reaches this stage it would be, Descartes feared, impossible for us even to maintain the validity of mathematical truths. For it might easily be guessed that the so-called mathematical truths are, really, errors imposed upon our mind by the evil demon, and that our power of judgment is so overwhelmed by the deceitfulness of the evil demon that we are unable to detect their erroneous character.

I may thus pursue my doubt farther and farther. But I cannot, as Descartes said, doubt that "I doubt." In other words, there is no getting away from the act of doubting itself by means of doubt. But to doubt is to think. So "I think" is an indubitable fact. But I cannot think if I do not exist. Hence, as Descartes concluded, "I think, therefore I am" (cogito ergo sum). The existence of the I, he warned, is not inferred syllogistically as seems to be implied by the word "therefore." It is an intuitive certainty by which Descartes meant that the very act of thought implies the existence of the I that thinks. But this was an unwarrantable position. For his ultimate datum could properly be described in the form: "there are thoughts." The use of the word "I" might still be justified, but only for the sake of grammatical convenience and not in the sense of a thing. In fact, the ultimate datum is not "I think" but "I think something"; and thought in so far as it necessarily implies the thinker implies equally necessarily the object at the same time. But even then the thinker is not a thing that thinks but I-consciousness as related to object-consciousness. Descartes' position, on the contrary, was this: He first abstracted thought from its object and treated this abstraction arbitrarily as a concrete datum and then interpreted it in terms of the category of substance handed down by scholasticism. In this Descartes demonstrated too clearly that his real purpose was somehow to affirm the reality of the soul in its traditional sense. Besides, in regarding thought as the essence of the soul he obviously had already in his mind the idea of the separateness of the soul from the physical universe. This shows that his "cogito ergo sum" was, really, not an ultimate principle but a deduction from the hypothesis of dualism granted to be true.

For Augustine the cogito was the surest of all knowledge; for Descartes it was the first principle of philosophy besides. So on the view of the latter, everything else than my mind, viz. other minds and external objects, if knowable at all, should be known to me indirectly from my knowledge of myself. Descartes thus secured the priority of self-knowledge to outer perception and thereby introduced the subjectivist tendency into the
history of modern philosophy. In consequence, he was, however, faced with the problem of the explanation of our ordinary supposition that there are things outside our mind.

The *cogito*, Descartes soon discovered, besides being the first principle of philosophy, provides a criterion of truth. It is self-evident because it is *clear* and *distinct*. The mind is really a thinking substance because, as Descartes held, we clearly and distinctly conceive it as such. Outer perception, on the contrary, is vague and indistinct and therefore cannot guarantee the reality of its objects. That being so, for proving the reality of anything other than our own mind we could not directly employ Descartes' general principle of truth; all things that we clearly and distinctly conceive are true. This was the problem. It was impossible for Descartes to solve it so long as he stuck to his conception of mind as a substance, i.e. a self-sufficient reality.

But the dependence of mind upon external object was for Descartes out of the question. He therefore found it necessary to examine the contents of the mind with a view to ascertaining whether indication could be had from them of anything on which the mind could be said to be dependent. The contents of the mind are "ideas" which Descartes brought under three heads: those that are created by us; those that are produced by outside objects; those that are innate. Under the last head he recognized an idea, viz. the idea of God which struck him as specially significant in this connection. But about ideas in general Descartes held that they are mere mental presentations and not things outside and thus admitted a distinction between thought and reality. So he needed *proofs* for inferring the existence of God from our idea of Him. These proofs he derived mainly from scholastic philosophy.

I am conscious of myself as *finite* and therefore *imperfect*. But, as Descartes argued, I could not have had this consciousness, if I did not have in my mind the conception of the most *perfect* being. There should then be a cause of this conception of mine. But no imperfect being can be the cause; therefore, the most perfect being must exist to have produced the conception of perfection in my mind. Moreover, in being conscious of myself as finite I am conscious of myself as dependent upon the most perfect being for whatever I possess. Therefore, the most perfect being must exist, on whom I am so dependent. Finally, by reviving Anselm's ontological argument in a modified form Descartes stated that while our ideas of other things may be ideas of mere "essence" without there being anything to which the essence could belong, our idea of God, being innate and therefore clear and distinct, is peculiar in that in its case *existence* follows from the idea of essence as necessarily as the properties of a triangle follow from the definition of a triangle.

These arguments are in fact deduced from a number of assumptions which it is impossible to examine in a short space. Suffice it to observe that
they are based on a confusion of theoretic self-sufficiency with moral perfection; for thus they could show that the not-self on whom the individual mind is dependent is God as conceived by traditional religion. But the existence of God, as Kant insisted later, cannot be proved by any purely theoretical argument; and no argument can prove the existence of God which has no moral considerations as its basis. From a different standpoint, Hegel also objected that the so-called ontological argument is vitiated by its initial assumption of the separation of thought from reality. In any case, Descartes cannot be said to have proved by these arguments anything more than the existence of a being independent and external to the finite mind.

After the existence of God has been proved, it becomes easy to prove the existence of the external world. I can no more be said to be deceived in my belief in external reality because it would be inconsistent with the goodness of God to suppose that He could so deceive me. Therefore, the external world exists. In arguing thus Descartes was obviously assuming that our clear and distinct conception of external objects by itself is no guarantee of their reality. But if what we clearly and distinctly conceive is not true, it would be impossible for Descartes to infer the existence of God from our innate idea, or clear and distinct conception, of Him. It is then clear that Descartes' inference of the existence of the external world from the existence of God is a glaring instance of circular reasoning. Moreover, the recognition of divine veracity as a new criterion of truth is on the part of Descartes an unfortunate departure from his strictly logical position that ultimate truths are clear and distinct, that is, their own evidence.

Despite divine veracity, our sense-perception, as Descartes held, remains vague and indistinct: the senses cannot give us knowledge, but only serve our practical purposes. What divine veracity then does is only to validate our belief in what we clearly and distinctly conceive. But what we so conceive are mathematical truths with regard to which the question of reality is irrelevant. So in referring to the existence of what we clearly and distinctly conceive what Descartes had really in mind were not mathematical truths but mathematical objects, i.e. objects characterized by mathematical properties. In fact, it is the existence of such objects that Descartes inferred from the existence of God. This shows that his real purpose in his so-called proof of the existence of the external world was somehow to affirm the reality of that world as conceived by the science of his age.

Descartes' account of the external world is based on the consideration that external reality is ultimately of a mathematical nature. Hence he distinguishes between the primary and secondary qualities of external objects. The latter, e.g. colour, smell, etc., as he held, are the effects produced in our mind by external objects by means of the senses and are
vague and indistinct and therefore cannot be characteristics of external reality. In other words, the qualitative differences of things presented to us by the senses are unreal. What really exists in the external world, then, is the primary quality, extension. But extension, as Descartes held, is not identical with any of the quantitative determinations of corporeal things, e.g. shape, size and figure, but pure three-dimensional space. So the difference between corporeal things or objects in space and space itself, Descartes continued, is not a difference in reality but only in the mode in which they are conceived by us. Thus he came to hold that external reality is devoid of quantitative differences also. In upholding this position Descartes admitted a distinction between the whole, viz. matter and the part, viz. the individual corporeal object, and regarded the former as prior to, and of a higher degree of reality than, the latter. A similar distinction he did not, however, bring to bear upon his understanding of mind inasmuch as individual minds were, in his view, ultimately real. But Spinoza came later to understand both the world of matter and mind in the light of the distinction which Descartes employed in understanding the former world alone.

Descartes did not, however, regard the quantitative differences of physical things as unreal. They as modes of matter are, according to him, derivative, being due to the action of motion on matter. He thus came to admit the reality of motion and thereby upheld the scientific doctrine that the physical universe is ultimately matter and motion. But as one who had already identified external reality with extension Descartes thought that the reality of motion is a mystery which could be solved only by the hypothesis that God originally imparted motion to matter. But motion implies time and change which it was equally impossible for Descartes to explain consistently with his view of external reality as identical with extension. In fact, as a result of his view of mind and matter as substances Descartes had already ruled out the temporal aspect of reality as a whole. In consequence, he was, on the one hand, committed to the view of the soul as eternal as against the view of it as immortal which he needed for his ethico-religious purpose. On the other hand, he was debarred from speaking of the undeniably changing character of the physical universe. It is with a view to removing this twofold difficulty that Descartes was led to admit time in the sense of an infinite atomistic series of moments. But since time, like motion, was out of place in his conceptual view of the universe, he had no option but to regard it also as a continuous miracle, pointing to the agency of God. By thus suggesting the supreme importance of God with respect to the explanation of the several aspects of the universe Descartes was only preparing the ground for the modification of his conception of the universe in the manner in which Spinoza actually modified it later.

The Cartesian universe was divided into two sections: on one side there
were minds regarded as pure thought, unextended and separate from body and whatever is bodily; on the other there was matter held to be pure extension, devoid of all qualities except those which pertain to the nature of extension. This position is known as Cartesian dualism. We, however, know, said Descartes, that both mind and matter were created by God. But creation, as he held, implies the separateness of the created world from its creator. Therefore, as Descartes argued, there is nothing to prevent us from holding that the physical world grows naturally as demanded by science, and that the human mind acts from freedom as demanded by morality. As regards the latter point, Descartes further stated that the freedom with which the human mind as a creation of the free will of God is originally endowed is not absolute freedom that God alone possesses, viz. power of choice; but limited freedom, viz. choice in giving or withholding assent. The former point simply expressed Descartes’ deterministic theory of the material world, according to which all movements of matter are determined by physical laws. Even living organisms, bodies of human beings and animals were regarded by him as machines. But while animals, according to Descartes, were mere automata, determined entirely by the laws of physics and devoid of consciousness, men were different, as having souls.

Of the problems which Cartesian dualism set on foot those relating to mind’s action on body in volition and its knowledge of the physical world in perception (implying in either case the relation between mind and body) proved particularly difficult. It is specially with reference to the difficulty of these two problems that Descartes’ followers came to appreciate the difficulty of the Cartesian system. And it is in connection with their attempt to solve these problems that the Cartesian system came to undergo modification in one respect or another. As regards volitional action, Descartes himself attempted to explain it thus. He fell back upon the crude hypothesis that the mind resides in the pineal gland where it is in contact with body, and then stated that the mind, though it cannot affect the total quantity of motion in the universe which is constant, can directly alter the direction of the motion of the living organism and indirectly of the material world. But this explanation was obviously inconsistent with Cartesian dualism which precluded the possibility of mind’s connection with, and influence on, body in every possible sense. Hence it was abandoned by Descartes’ disciples, Gueulincx and Malebranche.

As regards our knowledge of the external world, Descartes’ own explanation took the shape of the theory known as representationism which states that the mind knows external objects indirectly from ideas produced by the action of the latter on the former. But this position was obviously inconsistent with Cartesian dualism. Moreover, granted that ideas somehow arise in the mind, they, being mental and therefore unextended, cannot be said to represent extended physical things. Descartes’ explana-
tion of sense-perception thus put a step farther back the difficulty to which this form of knowledge was initially exposed by his dualism.

Arnauld, one of the Cartesians, disputed the existence of such things as ideas and suggested that the mind knows material objects directly and immediately. But he could not maintain this position consistently with dualism which he advocated in common with Descartes. Guelinckx took up the problems of volitional action and perception together and sought to solve both by means of his theory known as Occasionalism. According to this theory, on the occasion of my volition the bodily action that follows is caused not by my will but by God. Similarly, the ideas which arise in my mind on the occasion of my brain processes (due to the stimulation of my sense-organs by external objects) are not the outcome of my brain processes but are creations of God. But this explanation, apart from its fanciful and unscientific character, obviously exposed both mind and body to the constant interference of God and thereby tended to undermine the very foundation of Cartesianism which insisted on the separation of mind and matter not only from each other but also from God.

Cartesianism fared worse at the hands of Malebranche who went a step farther than Guelinckx in holding, like Berkeley after him, that there is no such thing as a non-mental external world that could produce ideas in our mind. All our ideas, he continued, are really the ideas in the mind of God which constitute the so-called external world. Besides dismissing in this manner the independent reality of the external world, Malebranche went still farther to state that the mind as a knower is a mere participant in the ideas of God and as such is a part of divine existence, having no independent reality of its own. In fact, Malebranche found it impossible to admit the independent reality of the individual mind except in one of its aspects, viz. as will or the moral agent. Thus the process of the breakdown of the Cartesian system went on gathering increasing momentum from one Cartesian to another until it reached its culmination in the philosophy of Spinoza where the fundamental problem of Descartes came to receive a solution radically different from his own.

BENEDICT SPINOZA (A.D. 1632–1677)

Spinoza's philosophical position foreshadowed in some of his earlier works including the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, was fully formed in his chief work, the Ethica. His aim was to work out with all the rigour of logic a standpoint from which religion and morality and science could be viewed in their proper perspective. Some have admired the ethical excellence of Spinoza's life and teachings. Some have been deeply impressed by his religious earnestness, although in the eyes of the orthodox he was nothing but an atheist and a materialist. And it is a fact that he was not
a scientist of the order of Descartes. Yet there is no doubt that Spinoza was eminent as a metaphysician with a scientific outlook and as such came to view religion and morality in an altogether new and unorthodox perspective.

With Descartes, on the one hand, mind was first in the order of ideas and its existence was the first principle of philosophy; on the other, God was the first in the real order of things, i.e. ultimate reality or substance in the true sense of the term. This conflict between the two orders Spinoza sought to resolve by developing the Cartesian method into a geometrical line of proof whereby he could deduce the ideas of all things from the idea of an all-inclusive being. In this his aim was to build up a philosophical position not merely on so simple and easily available a foundation as the logical criticism of the Cartesian method and principles but on a theory of knowledge which was peculiarly his own.

No one can, nor could Spinoza, fail to be impressed by the temporal character of the immediate data of experience. But our immediate experience being the first, unenlightened or, in Spinozistic language, "imaginative" view of things, time, as Spinoza thought, cannot be regarded as a characteristic of reality unless it is found to survive in a rationalized order of being. Things as perceived do indeed endure, i.e. indefinitely continue to exist. But their duration, according to Spinoza, is nothing concrete but an abstract quantity which is divisible and only fit to be measured by a standard suited to our practical purposes. Moreover, there can be no duration without change, nor is there any duration than which we cannot conceive a greater or a smaller one. The characteristics of duration then are, as Spinoza observed, such that they are absolutely incompatible with the true nature of reality. Hence he held that reality is above the limitations of duration; it cannot be an entity occupying one or many or infinite moments or enduring without beginning and without end. Nor did he regard reality as the negation of duration or timelessness. For him, it was absolutely positive which it could be only as the identity of essence and existence or essential existence meaning eternity (aeternitas). Spinoza thus arrived at the scholastic conception of the most real being as the essence which involves existence. Thus he also accepted as the first principle of his philosophy what Descartes wanted to establish by his ontological argument.

The basis of Spinoza's procedure described above was his theory of knowledge which placed scientia intuitiva above perception and reason. Unaided perception, as Spinoza held, consists of "confused" and "inadequate" ideas and, therefore, cannot present to us anything but fragments of reality. Reason, however, grasps things with their relations and connections and so views them in a sense under the form of eternity (sub specie aeternitatis). But being essentially analytic, it emphasizes the abstract relations of things, losing sight of the wholeness of reality. In
this view of reason Spinoza was only expressing his idea of the limitations of the scientific view of the world. The defect of reason, he continued, is, however, remedied at the third and the highest stage of our knowledge in \textit{scientia intuitiva} which views things truly under the form of eternity by realizing that they are within, and flow from, eternal existence. In fact, Spinoza insisted that not only the things that are known but also the knowing mind have, from the point of view of this highest stage of knowledge, a share in the eternity of essential existence. Thus, from the super-rational standpoint which Spinoza regarded as the standpoint of philosophy proper, the eternity of the human mind was, for him, what the existence of the individual self was for Descartes. In consequence, modern philosophy in the hands of Spinoza came to shed the subjectivist and anthropocentric tendency which Descartes had introduced into it.

Essential existence which was, for Spinoza, the one and only Substance is, of course, "infinite." But he did not, as his Hegelian interpreters say that he did, mean Substance to be "indeterminate." Spinoza's assertion: "all determination is negation" (\textit{omnis determinatio est negatio}) had nothing to do with Substance but only pointed to the fact that finite things as parts within a whole are characterized by limitations. Substance which Spinoza conceived as the all-inclusive being could not but have an unquestionable positive significance and be really characterized by Attributes expressing content. But Spinoza warned that nothing could be an Attribute of Substance which did not express the infinitude, undividedness and unchangeability of essential existence. For the reason explained above Spinoza, of course, found it necessary to deny Time to Substance from this point of view. But most surprisingly did he declare that illimitable and indivisible Extension is not only not an absurdity but is perfectly intelligible and survives logical criticism. It is on the ground that extension is divisible that Leibniz came later to exclude it from his conception of substance. But then it was, as we shall see while studying Leibniz, as a result of this that he was led to admit an infinite number of substances. Spinoza was anxious to maintain the \textit{wholeness} of ultimate reality. He, therefore, found it necessary for the fulfilment of this purpose to recognize in Extension an eternal aspect and to attribute Extension in this aspect to Substance.

But Extension could not be attributed to Substance unless Thought was attributed to it at the same time. Otherwise no explanation, as Spinoza thought, could be had of the relation found to subsist between subject and object, thought and reality, viz. that they involve each other in a peculiarly intimate manner without loss of their distinctness. In fact, Spinoza held that Thought is the "objective essence" (\textit{essentia objectiva}) of Extension and Extension is the "object" (\textit{objectum or ideatum}) of Thought. This, of course, meant that Extension and Thought are inseparable from each other, so that both should be Attributes of the same Substance.
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Extension and Thought are not, however, the only Attributes which Substance could possess. On the contrary, "an absolutely infinite being," as Spinoza said, "must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite Attributes each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence." This statement of Spinoza clearly brings out the two important points in his doctrine of Attributes. First, each Attribute of Substance is in itself infinite, and Substance has infinite Attributes. Secondly, the Attributes are not our ways of knowing Substance, but constituents of Substance itself. The very fact that while mentioning only two Attributes, Spinoza spoke of "infinite Attributes" implies that those two which he mentioned could, in his view, no more be our ways of knowing Substance than the rest which he could not mention or which we could not know. The question which naturally arises in connection with Spinoza's doctrine of Attributes is, however, this: How is it that of the infinite Attributes he could mention only two, viz. Extension and Thought or that we can know only these two Attributes? To this question Spinoza could obviously reply by assuming that we as embodied souls are the modes of Extension and Thought exclusively; and that we can only know what we are. But even granting the validity of these assumptions, one might justifiably object, as some of Spinoza's critics actually did, that he was thus bringing the human point of view to bear upon the characterization of the Absolute or Substance.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Spinoza was anxious to exclude from his conception of Substance any characteristic which he considered as signifying finitude. Thus he called his Substance unique rather than one even in the sense of a unity in multiplicity. For he regarded numerability as a limitation, incompatible with the infinitude of Substance.

God and Nature were, for Spinoza, only two different words meaning the same Substance, i.e. the essence which involves its existence. So he, unlike Descartes, had no need of any proof of the existence of either. Religion and science then appeared to him not as opposed to, but perfectly compatible with, each other. From this point of view he proceeded to correct the errors which sprang from the anthropomorphism of theology.

The divergence of theology and science were, in the view of Spinoza, due to the divergence of their respective interpretations of the concept of causality. While science aims at interpreting the world absolutely deterministically, theology understood divine causality on the analogy of human actions regarded as "free" in the sense of proceeding from an indeterminate will and being motivated by "final causes." Theology thus conceived God as the transient cause of the world and as a "person," of course, differing from human personality in being "omnipotent" and "omniscient." But Spinoza retorted that God so conceived is not what He really is, viz. essential existence. As a being whose essence necessarily involves existence, God, as Spinoza held, is indeed a cause, the cause of
Himself (causa Sui). He could also be called the cause of the world. But since "all things that are," he argued, "are in God, and through God must be conceived," and since "beyond God no substance can be granted," He is the immanent and not the transient cause of the world. In other words, things were not created by God once upon a time, but flow from His nature from eternity to eternity with the same necessity as it follows from the nature of the triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles.

By thus conceiving divine causality on the analogy of geometrical ground and consequent, Spinoza ruled out the theological view that God is a person who acts from "final causes" and from a will, free in the sense of being arbitrary or undetermined by His own nature. The latter part of this view, as Spinoza held, amounts to taking refuge in the "asylum of ignorance," while both the parts assume imperfection of God. By proceeding on these lines Spinoza not only freed religion from theological prejudice but admitted a new religious standpoint which outstripped science by including within the ambit of the deterministic theory human minds besides the physical world.

Spinoza's new conception of creation obviously implied the unity of God as Creator (Natura Naturans) and God as the created world (Natura Naturata). So the problem which he had to deal with in connection with creation was that of individuation, which in his case obviously concerned the formal deduction of particular physical things and individual human minds from the Infinite Attributes of Extension and Thought. His solution of this problem given in his doctrine of Modes may be stated as follows.

Particular physical things as extended are, as Spinoza held, divisions in, but not of, Extension. Therefore, substantially or really, they do not differ from one another. Their differences or rather their distinctive features, their "thinghood," their "sensible qualities," etc., are due to the diversity of their states as determined by the world-process, "motion and rest" which Spinoza called the "immediate infinite and eternal Mode" of Extension. He thus set aside Descartes' crude idea that "motion" was imparted to matter by God and emphasized the all-importance of "motion" in the understanding of the physical world, promoting thereby the cause of traditional physics.

The physical world for Spinoza was not, however, a mere collection of corporeal things but a whole reflected by every one of them. Accordingly, he held that finite bodies derive their distinctive features not directly from the Mode of "motion and rest" but mediate through the physical world as a whole or, in his terminology, "the face of the corporeal universe" which he called the "mediate infinite and eternal Mode" of the Attribute of Extension. Spinoza thus conceived finite bodies as parts within a whole or a complete system of finite bodies ultimately grounded in "motion and rest."
Spinoza then insisted that there is within Thought a complete Modal System, strictly parallel to the Modal System within Extension. "Infinite Intellect" is the "immediate infinite and eternal Mode" of Thought corresponding to "motion and rest" in Extension. He did not, however, tell us what was the "mediate infinite and eternal Mode" in Thought corresponding to the "face of the corporeal universe" in Extension. But there is no doubt about his real meaning which is that there is a whole or a complete system of individual minds within which they are parts, and which is ultimately grounded in the "infinite intellect" of God.

Finite corporeal objects and individual minds for Spinoza, then, were not substances. They were the "finite modes" of God as res extensa and as res cogitans, that is, the Attributes of Extension and Thought respectively. This was taken by Spinoza to mean that individual minds are the soul-side or "objective essences" of finite corporeal objects, and the latter are the bodily side or "ideata" of the former. Thus Spinoza conceived minds and bodies as constituting two parallel systems held in a peculiarly intimate relation in one and the same Substance. This was, in fact, his well-known solution of the difficulty of Cartesian dualism.

It would, however, be unfair to attribute to Spinoza the view that particular things, whether individual minds or finite corporeal objects, are absolutely unreal or unqualified negations. Indeed, he held that particular things in so far as they are taken out of the system to which they belong and thus regarded as self-subsistent things, are unreal abstractions and appear to us as incomplete and transitory as coming into existence and passing away at definite times and at definite places. But this view of particular things, as Spinoza insisted, is, to say the least, partial and inadequate, if not illusory. Its defect is so deep-rooted that it cannot, as he believed, be corrected from within even by viewing particular physical things as events in an infinite series of finite causes and finite effects and by viewing individual minds, as Descartes had done, as enduring through an infinite series of moments, i.e. immortal. The correction, as Spinoza held, is made when finite things are viewed in their true perspective, viz. as "essences" eternally realized in and through the infinite Substance. This, in clearer terms, means that the existence of finite things is not a mere occurrence in the spatio-temporal series but the eternal and infinite being which they possess as aspects or adjectives of God. Hence Spinoza’s pantheism: all that is, is God.

In a world as conceived by Spinoza where everything is determined by absolute logical necessity there is no "possibility" or "contingency" or "chance" nor any such thing as the free "will" of individual souls. Reality, for him, being eternally "complete" and "perfect," virtue and vice, as we know, should be terms which do not express the nature of things as they are in and for themselves but only as they are for us under our changing circumstances and requirements, i.e. from a relative and, therefore,
partial and inadequate standpoint. Thus the real order of the world, according to Spinoza, is without those very things which are said to be the presuppositions of morality. How then can he speak of man's striving to become better or of the ideal for him? The reply was deduced by Spinoza from his theory of Reality which it was that led him to deny the so-called presuppositions of morality.

The human mind being on Spinoza's metaphysical theory an inevitable consequent of the nature of God, the emotions and conduct of man should be treated not as an independent subject for moral considerations but, even from the moral point of view, as flowing from the same source as he himself does. Of course, man viewed as he is in himself has a relative independence, a tendency to persist in his own being which Spinoza called conatus or rather "desire" (cupiditas) comprising the whole gamut of the forces of self-assertion—strivings, instincts, impulses, etc. And it is when an action is referred to a man's cupiditas alone that he is conscious of it as an act of "free will" on his part or as originating in himself. But such reference, as Spinoza warned, proceeds from the ignorance of man's essential nature, i.e. of the dependence of his essence and therefore, of his conatus on the entire universe of Thought and Extension.

But even within the necessary determination of all human conduct there was, for Spinoza, a distinction between man's "freedom" and his "bondage" or "slavery." Man is free with respect to those of his actions which can be clearly conceived as following (of course, proximately) from his own nature alone. On the other hand, he is passive or a slave with respect to those of his actions, the clear understanding of which requires the conception of outside causes besides his own nature. Accordingly, Spinoza divided the emotions or the springs of action under two heads, passions and actions. The former, as he held, depend on "confused" ideas and derive their quality of pleasure or pain from the varying outside influences over the mind besides the nature of the mind itself. In consequence, they produce in the human mind various kinds of sensuous reactions such as love and hatred, fear and anger and revenge and thus divide man from man. The latter, on the contrary, depend on "adequate ideas," because they follow from the nature of the mind alone, and so are manifestations of the mind's power to think, which is the real strength of character. A strong character, Spinoza continues, acts freely: in relation to himself he is above the urges of sensuous desires and promotes his true welfare by practising the virtues of "Temperance," "Sobriety," etc.; in relation to his fellow-men he is under the inspiration of "Magnanimity" and "Nobility" and is, consequently, devoted to a constant and intelligent endeavour to help and befriend them.

Thus Spinoza believed that a free man alone can do good to others, and that a free man is he whose actions follow from his "adequate" ideas or from his reason. The life of virtue, then, is the life of reason, i.e. a life
in which all desires are under the control of reason. Therefore, the "ultimate" end of man, as he insisted, is to conceive everything including himself adequately. But since nothing can be adequately conceived without God, man's ultimate "end," so Spinoza concluded, is to know God. The knowledge of God is the only tie that can unite all men; because, as he believed, the essential characteristic of the human mind is to have adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Indeed the realization of the ultimate end, as Spinoza observed, is free from the feelings of excitement and depression which are respectively attendant upon the fulfilment and frustration of the passing desires. But he was satisfied that it is possessed of the superb intellectual consciousness of Beatitude which, for Spinoza, was the highest form of love, being at once the culmination of our knowledge and emotion in our "intellectual love of God" (amor intellectualis Dei). But our knowledge of God, as Spinoza held, is our realization of our eternity, and so in the last analysis is God's knowledge of us as in Him. Therefore, our intellectual love of God is God's "constant and eternal" love of us as in Him which, Spinoza believed, is the Ideal for us, being our Salvation or "freedom from bondage."

Thus Spinoza brought to completion a system of philosophy comprising scientific, religious and moral considerations, based on his metaphysical theory which held that particular things, including human minds, while being in themselves mere potentialities, are actualized in the essential existence or eternity of God.

4. GOTTFRID WILHELM LEIBNIZ (A.D. 1646-1716)

Leibniz, like Spinoza, was anxious to exclude extra-logical considerations in his treatment of philosophical problems, and was no less a believer than the latter in the importance of logic as a basis of metaphysics. But he lacked the courage of conviction and honesty of purpose needed for fighting popular beliefs, which admirably characterized both the private life and the philosophical thought of Spinoza. In consequence, he produced one philosophy for public consumption and another for his private satisfaction. The former was characterized by his opposition to Spinoza and the latter was Spinozistic in outlook.

Leibniz' analysis of the world of experience led him to agree with Descartes and Spinoza that time is no characteristic of ultimate reality. This was due to his acceptance in common with these philosophers of the notion of substance as fundamental—a notion which is incompatible with the reality of change. Both Descartes and Spinoza regarded extension and thought as characteristics of reality. Extension was held by Leibniz to be divisible and therefore not ascribable to substance, because substance
is not divisible. In consequence, Leibniz denied the reality of matter and affirmed substance to be unextended. But extension or space is at least an appearance which needs to be explained. Therefore, he held that there must be many substances to the arrangement of which the appearance of space is due. Thus, in place of the one Substance of Spinoza Leibniz came to admit an infinite number of substances which he called "monads."

The monads, as Leibniz held, are not material atoms, because the latter have magnitude, nor even mathematical points, because these have position. In fact, Leibniz conceived the monads as souls. This was the logical consequence of his denial of extension to substance and his allowing the attribute of thought to remain. Modern philosophy thus came to resume in the hands of Leibniz the subjectivistic tendency which Spinoza had left behind.

Naturally then Leibniz regarded activity as the essence of monads. But he went further to make the astounding statement that the activity of a monad takes the shape of mirroring the universe which in its developed aspect is perception, and in its potential aspect apposition. As all monads are thus souls endowed with perception and apposition, there could on the view of Leibniz be no differences of kind in the ultimate structure of the universe. All differences should, therefore, be ultimately of degree only due to the variations of the proportions of actuality (i.e. perception) and potentiality (i.e. apposition).

Leibniz further believed that Nature never takes a leap (Natura non facit saltum), but is subject to the law of continuity or continuous development. Hence he held that the monads form an unbroken graded series ranging between the "simple" monads and minds. The former are the lowest in the series and are, therefore, characterized by the most undeveloped or confused perception, i.e. unconscious mental states (petite perceptions) and, in fact, as Leibniz held, form matter. Minds, are, however, superior to other monads in the distinctness and clearness with which they mirror the universe; and they possess self-consciousness as their distinctive feature besides consciousness and unconsciousness.

The hierarchy of monads being infinite and continuous or unbroken, there cannot be in the world, as Leibniz held, any such thing as a vacuum. Every possible grade of variation in it is filled by some one monad or another. And since in a continuous graded series every grade of variation is dissimilar to every other, no two monads are exactly alike. This Leibniz called the principle of "Identity of Indiscernibles."

It is on the ground of the qualitative distinction between mind and matter admitted by Descartes that his followers held that the two substances cannot interact. But Leibniz, in spite of regarding the monads as of the same kind, held similarly that each monad is independent of the rest, and no two monads can have causal connection with each other. This view was expressed in his famous statement that the monads are
“windowless.” One of the difficulties which consequently arose related to perception which Leibniz conceived as the monad’s mirroring the universe, but which seems to be due to the action of the perceived object on the percipient. For solving this difficulty Leibniz held that a monad mirrors the universe not because the universe acts on it but because God made the monads in such a manner that there is always perfect harmony between the changes in one monad and those in any other. This “pre-established harmony,” as Leibniz held, appears deceptively as interaction.

Leibniz’ doctrine of pre-established harmony obviously retained the fanciful character of Occasionalism: it only substituted one miracle for the many miracles envisaged by the latter. In Leibniz’ own estimation this defect was, however, more than compensated for by the fact that pre-established harmony pointed to the existence of God. But this meant no substantial advantage for his doctrine over Occasionalism. For Occasionalism also presupposed the existence of God; and the God the existence of whom pre-established harmony might prove would no less be a deus ex machina than that of Occasionalism.

But Leibniz did not depend on pre-established harmony alone in arguing for the existence of God. The argument from pre-established harmony, as he himself believed, was valid only on his own assumption that the monads have no causal relation to one another and yet act in harmony with one another, which is obviously such that it would amaze anyone who is not acquainted with the history of Cartesianism. But the ontological argument, as Leibniz thought, stood on a different footing. This argument in its traditional form was based on the assumption that God is the most perfect being and therefrom it stated that if He does not exist, He is not the most perfect being. But in coming to deal with it Leibniz felt that it needed in addition a proof of the compatibility of all perfections in God defined as the most perfect being and thus of the possibility of God so defined. To this end he argued that a perfection is a “simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limit whatever it does express”; so that all perfections as thus defined can together belong to God. But this addition to the ontological proof was only an expression of Leibniz’ general belief that nothing can be said to exist or to be actual which is not logically possible. It provided no safeguard against the objection which Kant later raised against the ontological argument by maintaining that “existence” is not a predicate.

The philosophy of Leibniz as propounded in his published works, the Monadology, the Principles of Nature and of Grace and the Théodicée, was based on two logical principles, the law of contradiction and the law of sufficient reason regarded as distinct from each other. All propositions based on the former are, of course, necessary. But all propositions asserting existence, i.e. concerning matters of fact, as Leibniz held, are based on
the latter, and are *contingent*. It would be logically possible for every particular thing in the universe as well as the universe as a whole, as he believed, not to exist. Indeed the universe has always existed; but it contains within itself no reason why it should have done. Therefore, there must be outside the universe a sufficient reason for its existence, which can be no other than God. Thus Leibniz revived the cosmological argument but replaced its conception of God as First (transient) Cause by his more satisfactory conception of Him as Sufficient Reason. But even then his argument depends (as did, on Kant's showing, the cosmological argument in its traditional form) on the ontological argument. For it would be absolutely meaningless to call God the sufficient reason for the existence of the universe except on the assumption that God Himself is a being whose essence involves existence.

Leibniz resorted to the cosmological argument in another form, viz., as an argument not directly from contingent propositions but mediatelly through *eternal* or *necessary* truths. Contingent propositions, as he held, do not contain the reason for their assertion of existence. And the reason cannot itself be contingent but must be some eternal truth or another. But nothing can be a reason for existence which does not itself exist. Therefore, an eternal truth, as Leibniz concluded, must exist; and it can exist only in an eternal mind, viz., God. This argument as a form of the cosmological argument is open to the objection mentioned above. Moreover, it involves the unwarrantable position that a truth *exists* and, further, depends for its existence on the mind that apprehends it.

Strict adherence to the law of sufficient reason would demand the view that all *actions* take place with logical necessity, excluding "chance" and "freedom" of choice. But in coming to deal with the actions of human beings and God, Leibniz, at least in his published works, contrasted himself with Spinoza by allowing free will in the case of both. Human beings indeed act from motives, but they do so, as Leibniz held, under no *logical necessity* but out of *choice* from amongst a number of possible alternative lines of action. He advocated a similar view about God's act of creation with reference to his doctrine of many possible worlds. The actual world which God has created was only one of an infinite number of "possible" worlds which He contemplated before creation. So His act of creation was under no logical compulsion. Nor, as Leibniz argued, could it be arbitrary; for a possible world is a world which does not contradict the laws of logic. Therefore, it could spring from no other source than the great latitude of *choice* that many possible worlds afforded to God.

By associating divine creation with his doctrines of many possible worlds and the free will of God Leibniz had, however, to face a question from which Spinoza was free, viz., why did God choose the world which he has actually created. His reply was: because it is the *best* of all possible
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worlds. The best world, in his view, is not, however, a world which contains no evil, but one in which there is the greatest excess of good over evil. Some evils, as Leibniz stated with sufficient justification, are, of course, inseparable from any possible world, viz. the imperfection and finitude of things which he called metaphysical evils. Moral evil or sin, as he admitted, is indeed such that God might have decreed that the world should be without it. But in that case He could not endow man with free will which is a great good; nor could He, therefore, allow the possibility of virtue. If God was thus justified, Leibniz continued, in willing moral evil to exist, He could not at the same time will that there should be no physical evil, e.g. pain, misery, etc.; for in the absence of physical evil sin would remain unpunished. The merit of the solution which Leibniz thus gave of the problem of evil was that it was based on the recognition of the obvious fact that the world contains both good and evil. But his assumption that good preponderates over evil in the existent world, although it made for optimism, was open to debate.

By holding as against Spinoza that extension is phenomenal and not an attribute of Nature and accepting thereby an infinite number of windowless monads as ultimately real Leibniz missed the organic unity of the world. But by taking thought seriously and thus holding that the whole universe is reflected by each single monad he tried to restore that unity. In consequence, Leibniz stood in contrast with Spinoza in this, that while the latter applied the macrocosm-microcosm relation to God endowed with the Attributes of Extension and Thought, Leibniz applied the same relation to each single monad. Leibniz indeed maintained this contrast of his position with that of Spinoza so long as he could not appreciate the difficulty of his own view of the relation between microcosm and macrocosm. But he reached the turning-point of his philosophical career when he became alive to the necessity of explaining how monads could be existentially independent and the universe could be an organic whole at the same time. Hence he was led to go beyond the position, an account of which I have so far given.

The new position taken up by Leibniz was marked by his reconsideration of the distinction which he had made between the universe and God (Monads of monads). The actual world including all the monads being only one (though the best one) of the infinite possible worlds contained in the thought of God, God was conceived by Leibniz as something more than the actual world, i.e. as a Being whose potentiality transcended the actuality of the world. But this is a position which was untenable even on Leibniz' own principles. For God Himself being on his view constituted by thought just as the monads are, no possible arrangement of monads, i.e. no possible world could be conceived by God without thereby becoming actual. He therefore had no option but to declare that the conception of potentiality is incompatible with the conception of an
absolutely perfect being, viz. God. Hence the Spinozistic standpoint re-emerges in the philosophy of Leibniz.

It is in agreement with Spinoza that Leibniz gave up the distinction that he had originally drawn between necessary and contingent propositions by advocating the new view that their respective basic principles, the law of contradiction and the law of sufficient reason, mean one and the same thing, viz. that every true proposition is analytic. So he came forward to state that even the so-called empirical propositions concerning matters of fact should be of the subject-predicate form, i.e. such that their predicates are deducible from their subjects. The notion of what happens to anything, whether God or a human being or a physical thing or of what any such thing does, then, must from all eternity be included in the very notion of that thing. Leibniz thus entertained without mentioning in his published works a theory of the world as deterministic as that of Spinoza.

In another way Leibniz tried to adhere to strict logical principles, excluding all extra-logical considerations. This relates to his suggestion of a new way of deducing the existence of things in place of the one he had made public. The latter consisted in stating that those things alone exist which are compatible with the absolute goodness of the divine creator. The former, on the contrary, made no reference to God, but was expressed by Leibniz' view that two or more things can exist only in so far as they are "composable," i.e. are such that their being together does not involve a contradiction.

This strict logical way of viewing things seemed to him to admit of further development so as to provide a body of mathematically formulated and, therefore, incontrovertible principles which could impart to logical thinking the precision of mathematical calculation. But this idea of Leibniz which, in fact, proved to be the basis of a new branch of knowledge, viz. mathematical logic, bore almost no fruit in his own philosophy. And this was so because it demanded a logical theory other than the one which Leibniz was unwilling to give up, viz. the Aristotelian doctrine of the importance of the law of contradiction, i.e. the subject-predicate theory of proposition. Nevertheless, he overcame to some extent the limitation of his own logical position in so far as he adhered till the last to his doctrine of an infinite number of monads which was evidently incompatible with his subject-predicate theory of propositions. Thus, inconsistency saved Leibniz from the monism of Spinoza which was the inevitable consequence of the logical theory admitted by him in common with the latter.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The philosophical movement inaugurated by Descartes owed its origin to the idea of the attainment of necessary truths. In consequence, all the philosophers who successively joined this movement based their
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philosophy on the logical principle of contradiction. But Spinoza excelled them all in his unflinching adherence to this principle in working out his philosophical outlook as a whole. For him, therefore, there were no truths concerning matters of fact which were not deducible from a necessary truth; and no individual things could there actually be which were not the potentialities or modes of essential existence, i.e. Substance or that which alone is actual. None amongst the rationalists could, however, realize the logical difficulty of this position before Leibniz brought it to light that truths concerning matters of fact are contingent and, therefore, are based on a logical principle other than the law of contradiction, viz. the law of sufficient reason, and that the so-called modes are not potentialities but actualities or substances called monads. But, as seen before, Leibniz proved too weak to overcome the influence of Spinoza and failed to bring out the full significance of his new logical discovery.

The rationalist movement almost came to an end after Leibniz. His disciple Wolff failed to appreciate the importance of most of Leibniz' outstanding contributions to philosophy. But he emphasized Leibniz' distinction between necessary and contingent truths not, however, by regarding them as belonging to two separate spheres but by holding that for every sphere of reality there is a body of knowledge deducible from bare conceptions and another derivable from pure experience. The importance which Wolff thus conceded to empiricism in agreement with Leibniz, however, went on increasing with the spread of Locke's principle: all human ideas arise from experience. But the full weight of the empiricist standpoint was not felt in the philosophical world in the West until Hume came to work out the logical consequence of the Lockian principle. He showed that there can be no such thing as essential existence or substance, nor any knowledge properly so-called, which is universal and necessary. He then held that whatever is, is temporal (i.e. of the nature of a succession) and that our knowledge of things happens synthetically, providing no guarantee of apodeictic certainty. Thus empiricism came into the philosophical world in the West as an antithesis of rationalism. At such a crisis what was, however, needed in the true interest of philosophy was to deal afresh with what could be called the fundamental problems of philosophy and, thereby, to find out what importance the rival philosophies had. It is this task which Kant undertook in his Critical Philosophy and as a result inaugurated a new epoch in the history of Western philosophy.

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CHAPTER XXXVII

EMPIRICISM

1. INTRODUCTION

Broadly speaking empiricism is an attitude of mind rather than a specific School of philosophy. As such it reappears in the history of philosophy in all ages and in all climes. As a definite epistemological doctrine it has probably had less vogue in India than in any other country where the philosophical tradition has been at all prominent. In this broad sense *empiricism* means the conviction that philosophy which is an attempt to systematize, explain and understand human experience must take its start from the facts of that experience, and must eventually return to that experience for its final seal of approval. That philosophy starts from human experience is perhaps true of all philosophical Schools, for philosophy is nothing but a questioning of our experience—although it may lead us into fields so far remote from anything which we find in immediate experience as the Brahman of the Vedantists, the Archetypes of Plato, or the Thing-as-such of Kant.

While all philosophy, whether in East or West, starts from experience, it is not always the case that it returns to experience, and actually attempts to answer the questions from which it had its beginning or source. Curiously enough, in the course of their search, philosophers often forget the original question for which they had started to look for an answer, and become so enamoured of the answer they have found that they do not trouble to enquire whether it actually supplies an answer to that question, or fits in with the facts of experience from which they had started. It is this tendency to speculate which has brought philosophers a bad name as dreamers and unpractical men. Empiricism is a revolt against this tendency, and it turns its face resolutely against the acceptance of any philosophical hypothesis which is not supported by the facts of experience.

Possibly, amongst the ancients the greatest achievements in the realm of philosophy may be ascribed to India and to Greece. But the approach and outlook of these two ancient cultures to philosophical problems were quite different. This contrast between ancient Indian and Greek philosophy is best brought out by the wide generalization that whereas Indian philosophy is primarily interested in the world of subjective experience, the ancient Greeks were mainly interested in the world of external things, which stands over against the world of subjective experience, and of which we become aware through the flux of our impressions. Except for the Vedânta all the other Schools of Indian philosophy have their origin
in the conflict which arises in man's experience as a result of pain, or from a sense of the conflict of duties. Greek philosophy on the other hand, at least in its early phase, is dominated by a sense of curiosity about the world of nature and seeks to penetrate the secrets which lie behind its ever-changing face. One is tempted to say that while Indian philosophy takes its birth in man's feeling of resentment at his fate, Greek philosophy is the child of wonder which the world of objects and occurrences in the external world evoke in his breast. In this sense we may well say that the ancient Greeks were the true originators not only of Natural Science, but also of that philosophical tradition which keeps closest to scientific thought and of which empiricism is a typical example.

During the Middle Ages Europe was dominated by dogmatic and theological conceptions and the empirical outlook remained in eclipse till the period of the "Renaissance." Although the renaissance was essentially a revolt against the shackles which the Church had imposed on the free activity of the human intellect, and was initiated by a rediscovery of the original works of the classical age of Greece, out of the ferment of the ideas germinated by it were born not only the independent conception of Natural Science, but also that movement of philosophical thought which we call specially modern, and which henceforth was to be considerably influenced by scientific discoveries and was to move forward in close association with them. Kepler (1571–1630), a German, Galileo, an Italian born at Pisa (1564–1642) and Isaac Newton, an Englishman (1642–1727) are great names in the struggle which science carried on to establish its claim to an independent investigation of natural phenomena by observational and experimental methods unhampered by fear of theological interference. It was as a result of the discoveries which they made in the field of Natural Science that philosophical interest centred itself on the problem of method, and empiricism which alone attempts to take serious notice of the progress of scientific thought, once again came into its own.

2. BACON

On the philosophical side Francis Bacon (1561–1626), who had studied at Cambridge, and had a brilliant though short-lived career in the courts of Elizabeth and James I, must be regarded as the precursor of the empirical movement with which we are concerned. The importance of Bacon lies in his advocacy of the inductive method of reasoning as opposed to the deductive to which philosophers since the time of Aristotle had been addicted. Deduction, according to Bacon, could not yield any new knowledge, the conclusion being already contained in the premises. New knowledge could only be obtained through the method of induction which rested upon observation of experience, analysis of the data observed, and
inferences based upon these resulting in hypotheses, which were to be constantly tested in the light of observation and experiment. The obstacles which stood in the way of the adoption of this empirical and scientific method of enquiry, Bacon called "idols," i.e. false notions which acted as shackles on the free activity of man's intellectual and critical powers.

Bacon's own ideas of the scientific method of discovery were, however, limited. He made no attempt to analyse or find any philosophical justification for the principle of the uniformity of nature and its offshoot, the principle of causality on which the whole system of inductive enquiry is based. Bacon thought that by the simple process of comparison, concomitant variation and exclusion of negative instances, one could arrive at the underlying form or structure of the phenomena which were being investigated. He emphasized particularly the importance of crucial instances, that is, instances in which the presence of a certain factor $p$ in the causal condition is invariably followed by the presence of $q$ in the effect, and the absence of $p$ in the causal condition is invariably followed by the absence of $q$ in the effect.

Bacon not only did not try to find any philosophical basis for the principles on which induction rests, but also underestimated the role of the creative imagination in the formation of hypotheses. Hypotheses cannot be framed by a mere patient collection of data, and in fact the initial process of selection of relevant data for any scientific enquiry cannot even be initiated without a preconceived hypothesis. It is in the formation of hypothesis that great scientific genius is required and not in the patient and slow accumulation of data, which without a guiding principle of selection would only lead us into a bewildering mass of chaos. Apart from this, scientific enquiry cannot altogether dispense with deductive reasoning, for not only is every particular scientific law a deduction from the fundamental principle of the uniformity of nature, but even in the testing of a hypothesis a long chain of deductive reasoning is involved in connecting some observed data with the hypothesis which it is supposed to validate.

3. HOBSES

Of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), another British philosopher whose outlook was essentially empirical, only the briefest mention can be made. He was more of a thoroughgoing materialist than Bacon ever confessed to being. Knowledge, according to Hobbes, consisted solely of perception which made us aware of material bodies and of their motions. All that philosophy was concerned with was inferences from causes to effects and from effects to causes. He recognized four branches of philosophy—geometry which dealt with the movements of material particles in space, physics which dealt with the changes brought about in material bodies
through their impact upon one another, ethics which dealt with movements within the nervous system and politics which dealt with the effects of one nervous system on another or group of other nervous systems. Every body has a tendency to preserve itself, hence all bodies whether inorganic or organic came in conflict and collision with each other, and were at war with each other. Hobbes proceeded to apply this theory in detail to the problem of politics, and his great *Leviathan* is considered a classical piece of writing in the sphere of political philosophy, where curiously enough he became an advocate of Absolute Monarchy.

4. **LOCKE, BERKELEY AND HUME**

We must turn now to the most typical School of empirical philosophy which is represented by Locke (1632–1704), Berkeley (1685–1753) and Hume (1711–1776). Locke was an Englishman, Berkeley an Irishman and Hume a Scotsman. The importance of this School lies in this, that beginning with Locke who formulated the fundamental problem, namely, the source and extent of human knowledge, and defined the empirical approach to it, his successors carried forward the same line of thought to its logical conclusions. Our treatment must of necessity be brief, and we shall have to leave out of account many interesting features of these British philosophers whose writings are in some ways models of precise and accurate thinking untrammelled with that load of pedantry which often mars the work of philosophers.

**Locke.**—John Locke’s most important philosophical work is his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. He also wrote on political and educational subjects. In politics he was a staunch defender of individual liberty, thus opposing the doctrine of his contemporary, Thomas Hobbes. His political views exercised considerable influence on the movements of the day, but his educational views, which were also very advanced, were not taken serious notice of till much later times.

The main problem with which Locke’s *Essay* is concerned is that of the extent and limit of human knowledge. The criterion of knowledge which he lays down is not very different from that of Descartes. Knowledge is that of which man is certain. But by certainty Locke does not mean merely a subjective state of conviction. He means by it some kind of objective or logical necessity which cannot be questioned. But before attempting to tell us what kind of knowledge can claim such certainty, Locke thinks that we ought first to study the source and origin of our ideas which constitute the content of our knowledge. If there are *innate ideas* as Descartes had believed, that is, ideas not derived from experience but known intuitively, then the bounds of human knowledge would be very extensive and we would know many things which lie beyond the
range of experience. The starting-point of Locke's empiricism is therefore a denial of innate ideas. Locke employs many arguments to disprove the existence of innate ideas. His main argument which had force against the position of Descartes is that since mind is defined as consciousness there can be nothing in the mind of which it is not conscious. If there were innate ideas, such as those of God or substance, whether material or spiritual, or of cause, these ideas would be consciously present to the human understanding from its very origin, and human infants, as well as savages and untutored men, would have clear and distinct awareness of them and not only learned philosophers. But since neither babies nor savages nor common people have such ideas, and even philosophers were constantly quarrelling about them, it was obvious that no such ideas existed independently of experience, and it was therefore only in the light of experience that the truth or falsity of such ideas could be established. Locke therefore holds that prior to experience the mind is a tabula rasa or empty slate, and the source and origin of all our ideas lies in experience.

As stated before, Locke's position is perfectly sound as against Descartes and against all rationalistic theories of knowledge. It is, however, misconceived in the light of modern psychological theories which not only do not regard the human mind as a mere passive recipient of impressions from without, but also hold that there may be much in the human understanding of which it is not consciously aware.

To return, however, to Locke's chain of reasoning. If all our ideas are furnished by experience, then there are only two sources from which they can be derived, that is, sensation, and reflection. Through sensation the understanding becomes aware of all that it knows of the external world, and through reflection it becomes aware of all the operations that it performs itself. Ideas, therefore, are of two kinds, those derived from sensation and those derived from reflection, or what we in modern phraseology should call introspection.

Unfortunately at this stage Locke commits one of his major blunders, that is, he introduces a dual usage of the term idea which is the source of much confusion and inconsistency in his own system and also accounts for the far-reaching, and what to Locke would have been very shocking, conclusions which his successors Berkeley and Hume drew from his premises.

Up to this point Locke had meant by idea whatever was the content of the human understanding, that is, whatever is in the mind when the mind is aware of or knows something. But now Locke introduces a new definition of idea by saying that an idea is whatsoever the mind perceives, whether by sensation or by reflection, that is, he confuses the object of knowing with the content of knowledge, or in simpler terms, the object of awareness with the state of being aware. Actually Locke meant to keep distinct these two usages of the term idea, but his ambiguous terminology
led him into a fog from which he could not escape without sacrificing his logic.

The ideas which the understanding receives either by sensation or by reflection are simple, but the understanding has certain faculties by virtue of which it can reproduce, compare, and combine simple ideas to form complex ideas. Mind has the power of composition but not that of invention or creation of simple ideas which are not actually presented to it. Simple ideas of sensation are those of colour, sound, smell, number, extension, figure, rest and motion. Simple ideas of reflection are those of mental operations such as remembering, comparing, compounding and abstracting.

In sensation we do not directly perceive the actual qualities of objects. A sensation is an image or reflection thrown upon the mind which is a kind of mirror. But sometimes the sensation is a true copy of the real qualities of things, and sometimes it is a sort of sign or symbol of some real quality which itself is not truly reflected in the sensation. This leads Locke to make a distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter, which was the source of much trouble later. Locke believes that our ideas of number, extension, figure and motion represent the real qualities of things, whereas colour, taste, smell and sound are only secondary qualities to which there is no corresponding counterpart in objective things.

Locke's reasons for making this distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of objects perceived through the senses are feeble and halting. The only thing he has to urge in favour of the distinction is that the former are perceived through more than one sense, whereas the latter are perceived through only a single sense.

Locke thinks that we have certain and reliable knowledge about the primary properties of external things, but as to whether we also have knowledge of material substance, that is of something in which these qualities inhere and to which they pertain, he is somewhat hesitant. In fact the idea of matter or substance is a complex idea, which the understanding frames by combining together the ideas of primary qualities, and then looking for a support or base in which these qualities inhere.

Locke has not the courage either to assert or to deny firmly the existence of material substance. His view seems to be that such a substance must be assumed, though we do not know what it really is. But shaky as Locke's position was on the subject of material substance, it was still more shaky on the question of spiritual substance, whether finite in the sense of the individual consciousness or infinite in the sense of God. But before dealing with these conceptions let us return to Locke's initial problem, that is the question of the extent and reliability of human knowledge.

The simplest element of knowledge is a judgment, that is an act of affirmation or denial. But judgments are of two kinds. There are judg-
ments in which our affirmation or denial is actually perceived to hold good, and judgments which are matters of opinion and which do not yield that complete certainty which is characteristic of true knowledge. The difference between these two kinds of knowledge is one of kind and not merely of degree. It does not depend on the degree of subjective conviction or strength of our belief, but upon the logical characteristic that in one case we cannot even conceive of an alternative, while in the other the possibility of such an alternative is not ruled out. The former kind of knowledge is absolute and neither any fresh evidence nor any different method of reasoning can prove it to be false. Completely certain knowledge is of two kinds, either intuitive or demonstrative, and its limits are extremely narrow. In intuitive knowledge we perceive the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately without the intervention of any other. For example, that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three is more than two and equal to one and two. This kind of knowledge has the highest degree of certainty. Demonstrative knowledge eventually rests upon such intuitive judgments, for it consists only in a chain of intuitions in which each idea at every step is intuitively connected with the next, but the first step is only mediate connected with the last. Since such a chain of intuitions is not simultaneously perceived an element of memory enters into it, and to that extent such demonstrative knowledge does not possess the same degree of certainty as simple intuition.

Locke assumes that we have such intuitive knowledge of our own self. The knowledge of God, he believes, can be demonstrated from our knowledge of our own self, and from our knowledge of the external world of which we are aware from our sensations. But Locke did not work out the validity of such beliefs either from an appeal to the verdict of direct experience or to any strict chain of logical reasoning which led to these conclusions.

The fact is that Locke having started from premises which were far too simple, and having conceived of the human understanding as a purely passive or at most a reproductive machine, found the whole structure of our common-sense beliefs crumbling around him. He was, however, temperamentally so wedded to the common-sense attitude towards the external world as well as the world of spirit that he compromised at every step and eventually came to a philosophy which departed in very small measure from the beliefs which orthodoxy prescribed. It was for his followers to pursue the chain of his reasoning to its logical conclusions, and to expose the seeds of scepticism which were hidden in it.

Berkeley.—Berkeley, who represents the second stage of this movement of empiricism, takes his start from Locke’s assumption that whether in perception or in reflection whatsoever is the object of the understanding is an idea. If this be so, then whether we perceive primary qualities, or secondary qualities, what we are perceiving are only ideas, and therefore
the mind can have no knowledge of any substance which is an "unthinking" or material substance. Hence he comes to the conclusion that nothing exists but spiritual substances and their subjective states. In other words he is a thoroughgoing and extreme mentalist.

There are many lines of approach which lead Berkeley to this conclusion. It will be well to begin with that aspect of his approach, which though derived from Locke we have not had the opportunity of discussing before. This is the controversy between Conceptualism and Nominalism which modern philosophy inherited from mediaeval philosophy. Properly speaking Plato was the most thoroughgoing conceptualist that the history of philosophy has produced. But it will take us too far afield to delve into the intricacies of Platonic philosophy. Suffice it to say that in the mediaeval period two Schools of philosophy prevailed—one called the Conceptualist and the other the Nominalist. The conceptualists held that universal and abstract ideas, such as those of God, substance, matter, causality and so on, had an absolute existence independent of all particular or individual existing things. The nominalists believed that all existence consisted of particular or individual things, and abstract ideas and universals were merely terms which the human mind invented to describe or typify these individual existences.

Since Locke believed that the total content of the human mind consisted of simple ideas whether of sensation or of reflection, but which the mind in virtue of certain faculties could compose into complex ideas, it followed that Locke leant on the side of the nominalists rather than towards the conceptualists. In fact Locke had gone so far as to say that general or abstract ideas were merely convenient linguistic symbols which helped us to summarize the relations of similarity or difference which we observed in our actual perceptions.

In his most important philosophical work, a Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge and later in his Dialogues, Berkeley carries this nominalistic doctrine to its extreme. He maintains not only that abstract ideas do not correspond to any reality external to themselves, but that in fact the human mind does not even possess any such ideas. When I say that I have an idea of a horse, as distinct from this horse or that, but which is an idea of the class of animals called "horses" or of some quality such as "horsiness," in virtue of which they are all classified as horses, I am really talking nonsense. When I look inside my mind I always find the idea of this horse or that horse but never the idea of "horsiness." These so-called class concepts or abstract ideas are pure fictions of the imagination.

Berkeley's denial of matter is largely based upon his denial of abstract ideas, for he holds that where I talk of matter what I actually perceive or have an idea of is this or that particular sense content, and never any abstract or universal substance called matter.
There are, however, many other lines of approach from which he reaches the same conclusion. It was easy for him to show that if secondary qualities do not have any existence independently of the perceiving mind, then no such claim can be made on behalf of primary qualities, for primary qualities are known in the same manner as secondary qualities, namely, through sensation, and are subject to the same type of variation due to subjective conditions as secondary qualities. A stick immersed in water looks bent at the point of immersion, and an object varies in size and shape according to its distance from the focal point of vision. The material substance of Locke, the substance in which the sensory qualities inhere, turns out therefore to be a fiction. If it has any reality at all, it must be in terms of the sensory qualities we perceive and not in something else.

But Berkeley's most convincing argument against the existence of unthinking matter is derived from Locke's double usage of the term "idea." If an idea is whatsoever is the object of the understanding in perception, then what we perceive at any time can only be ideas and nothing else. Therefore when we say that we are perceiving an object which is coloured, or hard, or round, what we are perceiving is just the colour, the resistance, the shape which we actually experience and not some unknown sub-stratum in which these sensory qualities are supposed to inhere. Colours, shapes, hardness, roundness, etc., are sensations or mental entities and we have no right to infer that they belong to some substance which is altogether different in character. As Berkeley puts it "esse is percipi," or to be is to be perceived.

And so Berkeley comes to the conclusion that nothing exists but thinking minds and their thoughts. Unfortunately Berkeley had a one-track mind. While he could see the inconsistencies in Locke's belief in the existence of a material substance, he failed to see that the same logic would have led him to the denial of spiritual substances and so to the denial not only of finite selves but also of God, who was for Berkeley the corner-stone of his entire philosophy.

The fact is that Berkeley was only a partial empiricist. He turned the empirical outlook on our knowledge of the external world, but when it came to the spiritual world, he was both an intuitionist as well as a rationalist. So far as finite selves were concerned, he believed that we know our own self by intuition and other finite selves by reasoning from analogy. As for God, His existence was a necessary condition of the order and sequence of our sensations belonging to what we call the external world, since in the absence of any material substance there was no other way in which the orderly working of natural phenomena could be explained. The world of sense experience is not a mirage or dream or fantasy which we create for ourselves. It is, so to speak, a fantasy or invention of the Divine mind who presents it to us in an orderly sequence of events.
The ideas of our external senses are imprinted on our minds by God; whereas the ideas of our imagination are the creation of our own self. But in the last resort the difference between the ideas of sense perception and of the imagination is not of kind but only of degree. The ideas of sense perception are more vivid, constant and regular; whereas the ideas of the imagination are dim, flitting and irregular. If external things consist only of sensory qualities which we directly perceive, what happens to them when we ourselves cease to perceive them? Berkeley’s answer is that they continue to exist because other minds continue to perceive them, and in any case God’s ever-watchful eye is constantly upon them.

The objects known to the human mind are therefore of three kinds, namely, ideas whether of sensation or reflection, finite minds, and the infinite mind of God. God is the cause of our ideas in so far as they are ideas of sense perception. He is equally the cause of our own existence as well as of the existence of other finite selves. The chain of causality in nature is, however, not mechanical but final, that is, it is dictated by the will of God who has ordained all things to work in perfection towards the salvation of mankind. Berkeley at this stage modifies his extreme nominalism, for if the mind has no abstract or universal ideas, it can have no knowledge either of finite selves or of God, or of morality, or of the scheme of final causes which governs the world. He claims that we know finite selves as well as God through notions which are not ideas. We similarly have notions of relations between ideas as well as substances. How notions are formed and in what manner they differ from abstract ideas Berkeley is unable to explain. His only justification appears to be the claim that we know spirits, both finite and infinite, and spirits are not ideas, for ideas exist in spirits and are not possible without the existence of such spiritual substances.

Hume.—We turn now to Hume, who is by common consent recognized to be the greatest of this School of British Empiricists. His greatness lies in the rigour and consistency of the logic which he applies to Locke’s assumptions. His most important philosophical work is the Treatise on Human Nature, but because of its extremely sceptical conclusions it brought his name into disrepute. Later he produced a more diluted version of his philosophy in his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, which work was alone known to Kant and greatly influenced the development of Kantian Philosophy. Hume also wrote on morality, politics and religion in a somewhat sceptical way, but these are popular works in which he does not expound his views in so blunt and outspoken a manner as he had done in the Treatise.

In what follows we shall confine ourselves to the line of reasoning adopted by him in the Treatise. In the opening sentences of the Treatise he declares, “All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds which I shall call impressions or ideas. The differ-
ence betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions, and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning." In these few sentences is contained in a nutshell not only Hume's entire theory of the origin of our ideas, but also the far-reaching sceptical conclusions which he drew from it. He goes on to make the distinction already made by his predecessors between impressions and ideas which are simple and those which are complex, but while a simple idea is always a copy of a simple impression, a complex idea is not in the same way a mere reproduction of corresponding impressions. Complex ideas may differ from our original impressions in two ways. Firstly, they may combine together impressions which had been received separately as, for example, when I have an idea of a winged horse, or they may leave out some feature or features which were present in our impression but which are left out in recollection or imagination. The mind thus has the power of combining and of substracting or abstracting from our impressions but it has no power of creating new simple ideas which do not correspond to some actual impression. Thus I can have no idea of a sound which I have never heard, a colour or shape I have never seen, an emotion or passion I have never felt.

In addition to impressions and ideas, Hume admits the validity of certain relations. These are relations of similarity, identity, space and time, quality, number, degree and difference. The relationship of identity is examined in further detail at a later stage and is eventually reduced to similarity or to contiguity or close succession. He then enquires whether we have any idea of substance and maintains that we have no such idea, because if we have any such idea it must be derived from some impression either of sensation or of reflection. If it is derived from sensation, then he asks, from which sense? "If by the eyes, it must be a colour, if by the ears, it must be a sound, if by the palate, it must be a taste, and so of the other senses. But I believe that none will assert that substance is either colour, or sound or a taste." Similarly, reflection cannot give us an impression of substance. The impressions of which we are aware through reflection are either those of passions or of emotions and neither of these can represent a substance. We therefore have no idea of substance except that of a collection of particular qualities, to which we give a particular name which helps us to recall the collection of particular impressions for which it stands. In the same way all other abstract ideas have no impressions which correspond to them, and are only convenient ways of describing collections of separate individual impressions.

So far Hume's thought follows closely that of Locke and Berkeley
except that he is more precise and logical in his statements. We now turn to the most characteristic part of Hume's philosophy, namely, his treatment of the idea of causality. He starts off by saying, "Tis a general maxim of philosophy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence." He first enquires if this belief rests on intuition and rejects this possibility. All that can be intuitively certain is that of which we have a direct impression, but we have no direct impression of any necessary connection between our impressions such as that implied by causality. That a is followed by b we can know through the relationship of succession in our impressions, but that a must of necessity be followed by b we can never know through direct impressions. Nor can such a belief be established demonstratively, for in order to show that a is the cause of b, we have first to assume the general proposition that every event must have a cause. How then do we come to have such a belief, or what is that common experience which leads us to the assumption that certain causes must produce certain effects? What we actually experience is the constant conjunction of two objects in a regular order of succession and contiguity, and when this has happened a number of times, we proceed to call one cause and the other effect. When such a connection has been formed in our minds, whenever one of these is present in impression we infer the existence of the other. The idea of the other which is produced by a belief has so much force and liveliness that it seems to have the same degree of vivacity as a real impression. The belief in causality is thus a propensity of the mind, a habit which results from constant association of two events in such a way that when one of them is present in impression we are led to think of the other as an idea, but that idea has the same force or liveliness as if it was a real impression. Such constant conjunction though it gives rise to a subjective belief in ourselves of a necessary connection, does not itself amount to an actual impression of a necessary connection. The jump from the impression of a to the idea of b or vice versa is the result of our belief that there is a causal connection between them. This belief, however, has no objective guarantee and is the result merely of constant association.

Such a belief cannot be justified in the light of any such principle as that of the Uniformity of Nature. In fact the belief in the uniformity of nature is itself an unwarranted generalization from particular instances of observed constancy of sequence. No amount of experience that impressions have occurred with a certain sequence and regularity in the past can be a guarantee that they will continue to occur in the same manner in the future.

Hume's treatment of personal identity or of the reality of the self is as destructive as his treatment of causality. We never have an impression of our self as a permanent or identical being. What we perceive are particular impressions of our passions or our emotions but never of the self.
which is supposed to experience them. The self is nothing "but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux or movement." The identity we ascribe to ourselves is similar to that which we ascribe to material things and is derived from close succession and resemblance between the chain of our impressions or ideas. Memory which can recall past impressions as ideas further strengthens this illusion of identity between our past self and the present. There are gaps in the succession of our impressions and in their recollection in idea. We tend, however, to ignore these gaps as a result of custom or habit. The self as a permanent unchanging and abiding substance cannot therefore be known through any impression. Nor can its existence be established by any other line of reasoning. Hume, in other words, was led to a complete solipsism. There is neither any material substance which exists independently of the chain of our impressions and ideas, nor is there any permanent self which is conscious of and to which these impressions and ideas belong. There are no doubt defects in his reasoning, for he could not really explain what he means by "a bundle or collection of different perceptions." What constitutes one bundle and how it is differentiated from other bundles could in part be explained on the basis of memory, but since memory has gaps, as admitted by Hume, it cannot really explain what is understood by the continuity of an individual consciousness.

Although Hume's logic leads him to a complete scepticism, the ultimate philosophical attitude which he defends is that of mild tolerance rather than that of militant disbelief. It is true that a critical examination of our faculties reduces the bounds of certain knowledge to the narrow orbit of our fleeting impressions, but beyond this lies the range of probable knowledge, which as a normal human being it is not necessary for the philosopher rudely to disdain. Our scepticism should enable us to view with disfavour the dogmatism of others but not to foster a counter dogmatism of our own. Philosophy, in fact, is not a practical guide to life, and is to be pursued for the theoretical pleasure which it yields rather than for any practical benefits which it confers. "A true sceptic," he declares, "will be diffident of his philosophical doubts as well as of his philosophical convictions, and will never refuse any innocent satisfaction which offers itself on account of either of them." A truly wise and judicious saying which it would be well for all philosophers to take to heart.

5. CONCLUSION

This concludes our account of the phase of Empiricism to which this chapter is confined. Any detailed criticism or appraisal of the work of the philosophers we have mentioned would clearly be a task which cannot be
attempted in the present connection. The contribution of British empiricism to the movement of philosophical thought is indeed substantial, and that in spite of the fact, that perhaps none of the views propounded by them can be said to hold good in the light of later developments. Nonetheless they helped to expose many a fallacy in the reasoning of their rival Schools, and opened out new pathways of enquiry which keep alive man's unending quest after truth.

In retrospect when we survey the work of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, we can only say that their range of enquiry was too narrow and that they confused the problem of the source and origin of knowledge with that of its validity. Though knowledge must take its start from experience, there is no reason to believe that it must contain no elements which go beyond experience, and in the absence of which experience itself becomes a chaos of impressions about which no intelligible discourse can be held. Knowledge implies universals just as much as it implies particulars and even the most extreme empiricists cannot get along without their aid. Whereas Locke and Berkeley compromised on this question of universals, Hume alone consistently refused to give them any place in his system. But actually his philosophy, though it theoretically denied the validity of universals, constantly made use of them for purposes of exposition. In fact the phase of empiricism which we have studied, especially as it culminated in the complete solipsism of Hume, fails to satisfy that second canon of empiricism which we laid down at the opening of this chapter. We then held that a philosophy must not only make its start from experience but it must also justify itself in the light of experience. That the Humian scepticism fails to satisfy this test he himself admits when he advocates that we must live as natural men and not as philosophers.

The presence of a universal element in knowledge was later demonstrated by Kant though he introduced a dualism between the sensory aspect of knowledge and the universal aspect which he was never able to overcome. Universals or categories as Kant calls them cannot be known by the pure understanding independently of experience, nor can they be imposed on the material of sense impression unless they somehow are germane to that material. How these universals come to be known and in what manner they can be justified in the light of experience is indeed the task of a New Empiricism the beginnings of which have been laid by thinkers of our own generation such as G. E. Moore, William James, Bertrand Russell and others, but the completion of such a philosophy, if it can be said to be capable of completion at all, is the task of future generations.

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CHAPTER XXXVIII

IMMANUEL KANT

1. INTRODUCTION

In Philosophy, as in Nature, there is no absolute break. In both, the process of change goes on without interruption and generally we do not even notice that it is so. A stage is, however, reached when the difference between what has been and what is strikes even a casual observer and we hail it as a new beginning. It is of advantage to fix our attention on such stages or landmarks, for by doing so we are better able to understand the progression of change. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is the founder of modern philosophy, but only in the sense described above. He was deeply aware of the work of his predecessors, took stock of their philosophical achievements and sought to build up his own system on his assessment of their contribution.

The apparent conflict between scientific laws and man’s sense of freedom and values impressed on Kant the inadequacy of all prevailing philosophies. The scientific outlook presupposes that every event is conditioned by preceding events. The law of causality is thus extended to cover the whole realm of experience and leaves no room for human freedom. Man’s self-consciousness, on the other hand, seeks to transcend the mechanical laws of Science. His creation of beauty, his search for the truth and the urge of his sense of duty make him seek for laws which transcend the mere “is” and establish the rule of the “ought.”

Kant’s awareness of the need of a new philosophy was, however, a process of slow growth. He had been brought up on the rationalistic philosophy which was then dominant on the Continent. Its tradition overlooked Spinoza and was unaware of the deeper implications of Leibniz’ thought. It had failed to satisfy the British Empiricists who could find in it no explanation of the progress of Science. Kant admired Locke but did not accept his theories, while his knowledge of Berkeley and Hume seems to be confined only to such translations as had appeared. He did not, therefore, realize the full implications of Hume’s scepticism till he became aware independently of the inner contradictions in the prevailing theories of knowledge.

The Problem.—A brief statement of the problem may help us to understand both (a) why Kant was so long content with the account of knowledge given by Wolff and Baumgarten and (b) why Hume roused him from his dogmatic slumber. Philosophical speculation started with the realization that all objects of experience have two aspects. We have, on
the one hand, a continual change in the objects of experience; on the other, there are certain permanent and stable elements which alone make experience possible. Some philosophers emphasized the permanence and others the transience of the Real. Plato sought to account for both permanence and change by his distinction between knowledge and opinion. Reason gives us Ideas which are eternal and universal. The senses reveal to us objects which are changing and particular. We have knowledge of Ideas but of objects we have only opinion. Plato was, however, not clear in his mind as to the relation between Ideas and objects. Objects are, to him, sometimes the copy of Ideas, sometimes their effect and sometimes their partial manifestation. The Rationalists developed Plato's theory of Ideas and said that the world of experience revealed by sense is phenomenal and without ultimate reality. The Empiricists, on the contrary, emphasized the importance of Sense and held that Knowledge can increase only by a reference to the particular which is revealed in immediate experience.

Descartes first formulated in modern terms the problem of the relation between knowledge and its objects. He, however, accepted without question that all knowledge was a development of certain a priori truths. Such a theory can explain the certainty of knowledge but not its application to the world of experience. His analysis, therefore, ended in a position where knowledge was a system of Ideas whose internal consistency was guaranteed by clarity and distinctness, while its validity depended upon the goodness of God.

Like Descartes, Locke also sensed the problem and sought to resolve it by an enquiry into the nature of the human understanding. In his anxiety to avoid the a priori, he however identified experience with what is immediately given. The result was that experience was dissolved into a conglomeration of sensations and impressions. Such a theory can explain the immediacy of knowledge but only at the cost of its universality. Neither the followers of Descartes nor those of Locke fared any better. The Cartesian demand for unity ended in Leibniz's postulation of an infinity of units. Lock's insistence on certainty led to Hume's denial of all knowledge beyond the consciousness of momentary experience.

Two factors helped Kant to grasp the problem which led to the formulation of the critical philosophy, viz. his knowledge of Physics and his discovery of the teaching of British empiricism. As a student of Physics, Kant could not accept without question the identification of knowledge with rational construction. His doubts on the point were further enhanced by his appreciation of Hume's position that connections of thought are distinct from connections of fact. Unlike the mathematician, Kant therefore asked why intellectual constructions should have objective validity: why the true must be not only internally consistent but also conform to external reality.

Modern philosophy thus arose from the necessity to account for the
advance in scientific knowledge. The fact of advance was common ground between Rationalists and Empiricists. They differed only in their explanation of its cause and nature. For the Rationalists, the advance was due to the conceptual character of science which made it possible to infer new truths from a few *a priori* laws. The necessity and universality of science followed from its analytic character, for new knowledge was only an elaboration of what was already implicitly known. The vehicle of scientific knowledge was, therefore, the analytic *a priori* judgment.

Empiricists would not, however, accept such an explanation of the advance of science. They pointed out that if the analysis of the concept meant a development of its meaning, then we must account for this increase in our knowledge. The concept could not, therefore, guarantee the validity of the judgment. If, on the other hand, there was no development of meaning, but only a re-statement of what we meant by a term, then it was not a judgment at all but a definition of a word. Nor could such analysis give us an account of the origin of the concept. Empiricists, therefore, attributed the success of science to its use of the experimental method. They held that the empirical judgment guaranteed its own validity as in such judgment we were in immediate contact with reality. The vehicle of knowledge must, therefore, be the synthetic judgment of sense.

Rationalists could thus explain the certainty of knowledge but could not account for its novelty. Without novelty, science is reduced to tautology. Empiricists could account for its novelty by a reference to immediate experience, but emphasis on immediacy threatened to destroy the universality of science. Besides, difficulties arise as soon as we enquire what immediacy means. A particular perception of a particular finite mind at a particular point of time may be unquestioned, but how should we determine the contents of such experience? How again are we to define the mind which is the subject? In fact, Hume's analysis of the consciousness into a stream of perceptions proved that there was no empirical way of knowing the unity of consciousness. For empiricism, there could be no connection of ideas and still less a transition from a connection of ideas to a connection of facts.

The realization that neither Rationalism nor Empiricism can give a satisfactory account of the scientific judgment was thus the starting-point of Kant's critical investigations. Judgments of Science claimed universal validity like the analytical judgments. Yet, like judgments of perception, they apply to objects of experience which are given to us as particular and finite. Thus, judgments of Science are both synthetic and *a priori*. The central problem of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is: How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?

Kant started his metaphysical investigations to justify metaphysics and discover its method. He also sought to reconcile the demands of
mechanistic science with the requirements of man's moral obligations. At first sight, the transition from these large issues to the formulation of a narrow logical problem may strike one as surprising. In fact, however, the formulation of this question marks a revolution in philosophical method.

2. THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The Critique of Pure Reason.—Till Kant's time, philosophers had concerned themselves more with the nature of being than of knowing. Rationalists thought that truth was a property of either the knowing subject or of the object known. Empiricists sought truth in the relation of ideas to a reality of which ideas are sometimes the effect, sometimes the reflection. In other words, all philosophical enquiry till Kant's time was primarily ontological. Even Locke who started with an enquiry into the nature of human understanding had soon to abandon it for an examination of the objects of our knowledge in order to determine their ontological nature and status. Kant's discovery that the synthetic a priori judgment is the vehicle of scientific knowledge changed the character of philosophical enquiry by asking not what things ultimately are but what are the conditions implied in the fact of knowledge.

Knowledge is, for Kant, unquestionable. Denial of knowledge is self-contradictory, for the denial can be based only on knowledge and is itself knowledge. Given the fact, philosophy must find out its conditions. He, therefore, turns to fields where knowledge is unquestionable, namely, in Logic, Mathematics and Science by which he means Physics. Kant shows that in all these fields, advance in knowledge became possible only with a revolution in method. The essence of this revolution is the experimental verification of theoretical formulations. A posteriori justification of a priori thesis is knowledge. This, however, means a combination of synthesis and analysis, as opposed to former theories of knowledge which regarded all a priori knowledge as analytic and all a posteriori knowledge as synthetic.

Progress in Mathematics and Physics, therefore, began, according to Kant, only when this divorce between analysis and synthesis, between a priori and a posteriori was overcome. Similar progress, he argued, would be possible in Metaphysics with a similar revolution in method. Philosophy must find out the conditions in which an object becomes an object of knowledge for us.

In the first Critique, Kant's answer is that our knowledge is knowledge of objects and depends upon two factors, viz. sensibility and understanding. Through sensibility, data are given to us, and through understanding, we interpret and cognize them. Kant thus takes over from the empiricists the account of sensibility as passive and, from the rationalists,
that of understanding, as active. Unlike them, he insists that only the co-operation of the two can give us knowledge. The functions of sensibility are analysed in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and of the understanding in the Transcendental Analytic.

Transcendental Aesthetic.—We receive sensations but we perceive objects. This is possible only because the sensations have a certain structure or pattern. When we enquire what this pattern is we find that all sensations are given in space and time, and must therefore conform to the nature of space and time. If we analyse the nature of space and time, we can thus find out some of the essential conditions of the validity of experience. This is what Kant sets to do in Transcendental Aesthetic. As against Newton, he shows that space and time are not objective realities independent of the mind. As against Leibniz, he shows that they are not confused ideas abstracted from our experience of things known independently of space and time. According to Kant, space is the form of externality in which alone the mind can be aware of sense-data as being outside us. Space is thus presupposed in all sense experience and cannot, therefore, be derived from sense experience. As a condition precedent of all sense experience, Kant calls space an a priori form of perception.

Similarly, time is the a priori form of succession in which alone the mind can receive sensations and inner experiences one after another. It is presupposed in all perception of succession and cannot, therefore, be derived from such perception. Since all experience involves perception, space and time are thus a priori conditions of the possibility of experience.

The reference to space and time had been anticipated by the Empiricists but they did not realize its implications. They assumed that only particulars are given in experience, but since what we perceive are objects, not sense-data, they were unable to explain how the transition took place. This conflict led Hume to doubt the possibility of knowledge itself.

By his insistence on unity of the a priori and the a posteriori, Kant sensed that the particular is not bare content without form. The logical corollary to this would be that the given is never the bare particular. In fact, for Kant, sensation could not be atomic, for the perception of space and time is itself the perception of a manifold. Even in the Aesthetic, he speaks of space and time as manifolds of intuition, while in the Analytic he points out that space and time themselves must involve the synthetic activity of the Understanding. "In the Aesthetic, I have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility. This I have done simply in order to note that it precedes any concept though, as a matter of fact, it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the sense but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible" (B. 160–1).

An element of structure or synthesis is thus involved even in the perception of the particular. Kant, however, goes further and says that perception also involves the activity of the Reason, for it presupposes
an idea of the system of reality. Knowledge thus depends on the cooperation of Sense, Understanding and Reason, but while Sense and Understanding enter into the constitution of our knowledge, Reason only prescribes the limits within which Sense and Understanding operate. "The hypothetical employment of Reason has, therefore, as its aim the systematic unity of the knowledge of the understanding and this unity is the criterion of the truths of its rules" (A. 647 = B. 675). Coherence is thus our test of truth. Objects can be objects of knowledge only so far as they conform to the unity of the system of Reality. If we regard Reality as a thoroughly interconnected system, it would follow that every part of such a system must be organically related to the other parts as well as to the whole.

It is, however, necessary to distinguish Kant's position from the atomism of Hume and the absolutism of Hegel. For Hume, experience is dissolved into a series of discrete sense-data. For Hegel, reality is a vast organic system in which the parts are microscopic reproductions of the macroscopic whole. Against Hume, Kant insisted that universal and necessary elements are involved even in the concept of the bare particular. Against Hegel, he forewarned that the given may be concrete, as including in itself various aspects of combination, but it is not and cannot be concrete in the sense of the self-contained universe. "The systematic unity, as a mere idea, is, on the other hand, only a projected unity and must be regarded not as given in itself, but only as a problem for the understanding. It helps us, however, in the discovery of a principle in the manifold and special modes of employment of the understanding, directs its attention to cases which are not given and thus renders it more coherent" (A. 647 = B. 675).

Transcendental Analytic.—We need not, however, anticipate Kant's final findings. He was roused, as he has himself said, from his dogmatic slumber by Hume's insistence that the law of causality claims universality, though it is synthetic and not analytic. Empiricism could not account for this claim, and since for Hume all knowledge is empirical, he concluded that the claim was based not on knowledge but on feeling. Feelings are, however, private to the individual, and hence there is no question of one man's feelings coming into conflict with another's. Hence, to regard knowledge as depending on feeling would lead to a denial of the distinction between truth and falsehood.

Kant saw the force of Hume's objections but he could not accept his conclusions. Hume had applied his analysis to the law of causality but Kant showed that the law of causality is not the only instance of the synthetic judgment which claims universality. In fact, such judgments are to be found throughout the field of experience. Hence, to deny the validity of such judgments would be to deny the possibility of experience. Kant, therefore, concluded that there must be something wrong in the
account of knowledge given by both Empiricists and Rationalists. According to both, knowledge is mere analysis. For the Rationalists, it is the analysis of universal a priori laws; for the Empiricists, it is the analysis of the manifold of experience revealed in sense. For both, the mind is passive in knowledge. In the one case, it reflects the relation of concepts; in the other, of sense-data. Neither saw that analysis is itself a form of activity, and passive receptivity cannot explain knowledge of any type.

This emphasis on activity explains why his analysis of the nature of the synthetic a priori judgment led Kant to formulate a new theory of truth. He saw that a prima facie examination of the contents of knowledge cannot determine the question of their truth or falsity. If what is true were always self-evidently true, it would be impossible to account for the fact of error. For Kant, therefore, the relation between present and possible experience became the test of truth. Where a perception is consistent with previous knowledge and is a condition for further knowledge, we regard it as true. If a perception is contradicted by past or prejudices the possibility of future experience, we regard it as illusory in spite of its immediacy. The distinction between truth and error, therefore, becomes for Kant relational rather than immediate. The different experiences of our waking moments are consistent with one another and hence real. The experiences in our dreams are unreal precisely because they lack such consistency.

We can give no account of the synthetic a priori judgment if sense and understanding are isolated from one another. Their co-operation is self-evident in all our experience. While we may distinguish between understanding and sense, their objects, Kant insisted, are not separate. In fact, what is given in sense never becomes an object for us till we apply a conceptual category to it. On the other hand, the categories have no objects of application unless they are given in sense. “Intuitions without concepts are blind, concepts without intuitions are empty” (B. 75).

It may be argued that the concept which expresses the nature of an object or event is general and as such can have no reference to space and time, while intuition as a particular can exist only with reference to space and time. If, therefore, both sense and understanding refer to the same object, would it not follow that the concept is somehow restricted to the intuition and hence loses its universality? Kant’s reply is that the essence of the concept is to ignore the existential difference of particular intuitions and express the unity of their nature. The understanding proceeds by establishing relations between objects of sense. What is not given in sense is equally inaccessible to reason. In Kant’s words: “All judgments are functions of unity among our representations,” and “by function, I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation” (B. 93 = A. 68).

We may express Kant’s thought in the following way. The function of
the concept is to classify intuitions and hence, while both intuition and concept refer to the same object, they are distinct. We may, therefore, regard the concept as the way in which the diversity of experience is brought under general rules. What is true of a particular concept would be equally true of the general modes of human thought. Since "we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgment" (B. 94), we can infer about the nature of experience itself by an analysis of the nature of judgment. What we would describe in such an account would not be a description of the particular objects of experience but of the conditions which make experience possible. If, therefore, we could find out the principles which govern different types of judgment, we would simultaneously discover the different forms in which alone objects can be given to us in experience. These underlying principles of different types of judgments are the Kantian categories. They are at the basis of all our perception and thought. They guarantee the validity of experience, but for precisely that reason their application is confined to the limits of experience.

Metaphysical Deduction.—Kant thought that formal logic had completed the analysis of judgment as pure form in abstraction from all content of knowledge. He therefore derived his list of the categories from the list of judgments in formal logic. We need not here point out that this professed respect for formal logic did not prevent Kant from questioning its analysis of the nature of judgment or altering its scheme of classification to suit his own purposes. His formulation of the categories as a priori basis of all judgment may be briefly indicated in a tabular form as follows:—

Judgments

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>According to Quantity</th>
<th>According to Quality</th>
<th>According to Relation</th>
<th>According to Modality</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>Problematic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Hypothetical</td>
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<td>Singular</td>
<td>Infinite</td>
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Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>According to Quantity</th>
<th>According to Quality</th>
<th>According to Relation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>Reality</td>
<td>Substance and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Accident</td>
<td>Impossibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Negation</td>
<td>Cause and</td>
<td>Being and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totality</td>
<td>Limitation</td>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Non-being</td>
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<td>Reciprocity</td>
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The categories explain how Science is possible. The object of Science is to examine the particular and discover the general laws of its nature. The essence of this discovery is to predict about its future behaviour.
Prediction depends on anticipation or fore-knowledge, which Kant justifies by linking it with the nature of the mind itself.

In pre-Kantian philosophy, understanding and sense were regarded as separate faculties aware of different types of objects. For Plato, Reality was revealed only through the Ideas of Reason, while sense gave the objects of experience. The distinction between Reality and appearance was thus equated to the distinction between understanding and sense. Kant denied this sharp separation between sense and the understanding and held that they are the passive and the active aspects of the mind whose co-operation makes knowledge possible. As sensibility, the mind receives the data of knowledge from outside and may be regarded as receptive or passive. As understanding, the mind acts on the data and synthesizes them into judgments of knowledge proper. For Kant, therefore, the distinction between sense and understanding is neither in respect of their nature nor in respect of their objects but only in the functions they perform.

We may, therefore, express Kant's theory of knowledge by saying that the appearance which is revealed to us in experience is not different in nature from the real or the absolute. The real is the totality of which we have only partial knowledge. Our knowledge of even what we think we know is never exhaustive and there is always room for further increase of knowledge. The unity of reality is, therefore, a presupposition of knowledge but it can never be an object of our knowledge.

The first form of the unity is supplied by space and time. If intuitions were atomic, experience would be impossible. Intuitions of the present must be related to other possible intuitions. This relation cannot be regarded as accidental or casual, for it is the basis of our sense of objectivity. The way in which the manifold of sense is organized differs in different cases, but since they are all given to us in our experience they must be subject to the modes of our experience. The unity of space and time is therefore, according to Kant, a condition of the possibility of experience. If we do not assume such unity, we can give no account of experience. The denial of the possibility of experience is, however, self-contradictory. This unity of space and time extends not only to the experience of the individual but of all men. This is so because the experience of one man is not independent of the experience of another. Not only are men aware of the same objects but they also are aware of one another and of one another's experience. Consequently, all individual experiences of space and time must be fitted into the framework of one universal space-time.

The Transcendental Deduction.—The unity of space and time is a necessary condition but cannot by itself account for our experience. For this we require also the unity implied in the activity of the understanding. The understanding selects, supplements and interprets what is given in
sense. At any moment there are thousands of shades of colour, nuances of sound, degrees of smell, grades of touch which are present in the field of our experience. If we did not group them on some principle, the very abundance of sense-data would make rational experience impossible. How selective our perception is is seen when we can talk to an associate in the midst of a crowd; or when a mother, who sleeps through all the din and bustle of the city wakes up at the slightest cry of her child. Organization of sense-data is, therefore, an essential function of the understanding. According to Kant, experience is possible only through the organization of sense-data by the activity of the understanding. Such organization is expressed in judgment.

In the *Aesthetic*, Kant sought to show how space and time are conditions of the possibility of experience. In the *Transcendental Analytic*, he attempts the deduction or justification of the categories by proving that they also are necessary conditions of experience. A comparison of the two versions of the Transcendental Deduction of the categories shows how Kant’s thought developed even during the brief interval between the First and the Second Editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In both Deductions, Kant assumed without question that “of all representations, combination (or synthesis) is the only one which cannot be given through objects. Being an act of the self-activity of the subject, it cannot be executed save by the subject” (B. 130).

*Deduction A* starts with an analysis of the experience of time. Our apprehension of time is also a process in time. Hence apprehension of time is possible only if present and past apprehensions are united in one consciousness and recognized as such. Recognition, however, implies self-consciousness and hence no consciousness is possible without self-consciousness. Self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of objects as we can never catch the self in its consciousness of itself. Consciousness of self and consciousness of objects thus arise simultaneously through an act of the understanding. Self-consciousness must, at the same time, be consciousness of something that is not self. From this, Kant deduces that the categories which make judgment possible must lie at the basis of all our experience.

It will be seen that *Deduction A* does not indicate how consciousness—whether of the self or of objects—is tied up with the act of judgment. Their unity is assumed rather than proved. *Deduction B* marks an improvement on *Deduction A*, because it states more clearly the relation between the consciousness of object and judgment. An object has not only distinct constituent elements, but also a unity which converts it from a multiplicity of sense-data into an object: A manifold, though given, is not for that reason alone an object to us. It becomes an object for us only if it can be combined in one consciousness as *its* object. The identity of the self is thus the precondition of consciousness of objects, but if it were pure
identity without content, we could not be aware of the identity. It is only in contrast to the variety and change of its specific experiences that we can apprehend the unity and identity of the self. In Kant's words: "The analytic unity of self-consciousness presupposes a synthetic unity of the manifold" (B. 138).

Kant then goes on to show that to be aware of an object is to judge. He rejects former theories that a judgment is the representation of a relation between two concepts, and asserts that "a judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception" (B. 141). Hume had pointed out that if we confined ourselves to the mere relation of ideas, there was no way of distinguishing between a mere subjective association and an objective judgment. The failure to discover any principle on which the distinction could be based led Hume to deny the possibility of knowledge itself. By linking judgment to the unity of the self and thus to the possibility of experience, Kant establishes the validity of such distinction.

The distinction between a judgment and an association of ideas may therefore be described as follows. In an association, the relation between the ideas is casual and contingent and is therefore liable to change without in any way affecting the subject's unity of experience. In a judgment, this relation is no longer arbitrary and is governed by a law that is linked with the unity of the self. The relation of ideas in a judgment is therefore necessary even when it is not concerned to assert the relation as necessary. In B. 143, Kant elaborates this and distinguishes the objective unity of given representations (i.e. a logical judgment) from the subjective (i.e. a psychological association of ideas). It is a judgment when their relation is based on original apperception and its necessary unity. It holds good even if the judgment is itself empirical and therefore contingent, as, for example, in the judgment "bodies are heavy." What is asserted here is not that our empirical intuition reveals any necessary relation between "body" and "heavy" but that our unity of experience demands this relation between the two ideas. In a case of subjective association, all that we could say would be that if we support a body, we feel an impression of weight. This impression may be different for different persons at different times. When, however, we say that "the body is heavy," we do not merely state that the two representations are joined in our perception. What we are asserting is that they are combined in the object itself and the combination would hold whoever may be the experiencing subject.

The function of the understanding is thus to establish relations between sense-data. Since, however, all sense-data are given in space and time, these relations must conform to the nature of space and time. Similarly, the nature of understanding must also govern our knowledge of objects of experience. By analysing the types of judgment, we can therefore
determine the types of objects accessible to our experience. Analysis of knowledge is therefore simultaneously an analysis of experience. Epistemology is the only approach to ontology.

The Analytic of Principles.—The concept is a function of unity among representations. The category is the principle underlying the formation of the concept. Hence categories must underly our perception of even objects of sense. Since all experience begins with sense, categories are operative as the basis of experience itself. For that very reason, however, categories can neither be the result of sense experience nor given in sense experience. It is not difficult to see why this is so. In ordinary experience we do not generally notice the non-sensuous aspects of experience, but analysis shows that without such non-sensuous elements experience would itself be impossible. We regard gold or silver as an object, but if we ask in what its objectivity lies, there is no answer in terms of sense alone. Gold is hard but hardness is not gold; similarly, its colour, brightness or weight do not singly or in haphazard combination give us gold. It is a particular organization of these elements which alone can be described as gold. What applies to the individual object, applies still more to objectivity or substantiality. Gold, silver, etc., are regarded as substances, but when we ask what constitutes their substantiality, there is no answer in terms of sense. Categories are thus underlying principles which constitute experience and make synthetic a priori judgments possible. They are forms of unity among sense-data.

Space and time are as such homogeneous. A moment of time or a point of space is indistinguishable from any other. Without qualitative differences among them, we would not, therefore, perceive them as distinct moments. Sense-data, so far as they are merely spatio-temporal, would also be indistinguishable. Without synthesis of differences we could not perceive even space and time. This would, however, destroy the possibility of knowledge itself. Variety of experience which is essential to knowledge cannot, therefore, be explained in terms of space and time. Variety presupposes difference and the perception of difference is based on judgment and the judgment is based on the category. Hence, even our perception of space and time involves the categories.

Hume had shown that we cannot justify our knowledge of causal connection either by analysis of the concept or from perception of the event. However much we may analyse the concept of fire, it cannot give us the concept of ashes. Nor can we infer the relation from perceiving fire followed by ashes. What we perceive is a succession of events in time and not any necessary order in them. Since we cannot infer perception of succession from succession of perceptions, for Hume there is no distinction between mere sequence and consequence.

Kant did not question Hume's reasoning but tried to show that acceptance of Hume's position would make it impossible to give an
intelligible account of experience. Kant argued that unless we can distinguish between the succession of our perceptions and the succession of that which is revealed in perception, we cannot have the idea of sequence at all. One experience follows another, both when we first look at the floor and then at the roof and when we first see the fire and then the ashes. When, however, we compare the two cases, we find that in one the order of perception is irrelevant to the nature of the object perceived, whereas in the other the order of perception is necessary if we are to make sense of the experience. Kant, therefore, first suggested that when the order of perception is irreversible, we have a case of causality. He soon realized that irreversibility alone cannot distinguish sequence from consequence. Strictly speaking, no order of perception can be reversed, for each perception is unique. Kant, therefore, substituted irreversibility by intelligibility as the test of an objective order. Where a certain order of perception is intrinsic to the nature of the object, we say that the order is objective; where the order does not determine the character of the object, we have cases of subjective succession.

Causality, like other categories, is thus a general principle underlying experience. Its very generality, however, imposes two conditions on it. The first is that the principle does not by itself enable us to know the relation of particular causes and effects. For this, we must go to particular experiences. The second is that since categories are principles underlying the organization of sense-data, they can never transcend sense-data completely. The relation of events to one another and the idea of sequence are all governed by the law of causality, but the moment we seek to go beyond the world of experience, causality has no further application.

Sense and understanding are thus both involved in all experience and it is their unity which constitutes experience. For that very reason, however, neither have any application outside experience. Noumenal reality must thus remain beyond the reach of human knowledge, but act as a limiting condition. We have, therefore, within experience itself an inner contradiction. On the one hand, objects of experience are revealed to us only through the co-operation of sense and understanding; on the other hand, the recognition of this suggests to us the existence of some reality beyond. In other words, what is revealed in experience is never completely revealed. Our knowledge of objects is an ever-growing process. Neither sense nor understanding can exhaust the infinite mysteries of the Real.

The Transcendental Dialectic.—The human mind cannot, however, rest in a position like this and seeks to apply the categories beyond the realm of experience. The success of Science invites us to apply the categories to noumenal reality. The law of causality holds throughout the world of experience. We seek to extend the law still further and derive experience itself as an effect of some unknown cause. From the point of view of Science,
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dthis is unavoidable, for Science cannot recognize the distinction between appearance and reality. The application of the scientific method beyond the world of experience leads, however, to what Kant called antinomies or self-contradictions.

The Ideas of Reason.—The human mind aims at totality and unity of all knowledge. Such knowledge presupposes the soul as the subject of experience (the psychological Idea), the world as its object (the cosmological Idea), and God as the totality of the self and the universe (the theological Idea). We must, from the nature of the case, think of the self as a perfect unity. We must similarly regard the universe as a self-contained system. God as the totality of the self and the universe must be free of all inner contradictions. None of them can be revealed in experience for they are beyond the reach of both sense and understanding. Kant, therefore, regards them not as categories, but as Ideas of Reason which underly all activities of both sense and understanding. Totality and unity are thus the goal towards which knowledge strives but which must from the very nature of the case remain unattainable.

We have seen that all knowledge is based on analysis and synthesis. Neither has any meaning apart from the subject of experience. We therefore naturally seek to explain the nature of the self. The self which is given to us is, however, empirical. It continues in time and is the subject of particular experiences. These experiences are successive perceptions, but unless they belonged to one unified self, experience as a continuous process would be impossible. To belong to one self, past and present experiences must be held together and, according to Kant, it is through imagination that past experiences are revived and combined with experiences of the moment. Imagination is therefore essential to knowledge. We may, in fact, say that knowledge is imagination controlled by laws governing the nature of space and time. The emphasis on imagination shows even more clearly the importance of the object in the knowledge situation. Subject and object are thus equally indispensable for experience. We cannot even think of an object without the subject, Nor can we think of the subject without reference to objects of experience. We know of the subject only as far as experience reveals to us a manifold of perceptions. Like the knowledge of the external world, our knowledge of the self is also a never-ending process.

After showing that knowledge of the self as a substance is impossible, Kant turns to our speculations about the nature of the universe as a totality. Science is restricted to the analysis of experience but experiences must always be particular experiences. Man has therefore no experience of the totality of experience, and yet when we talk of the universe it is this totality of actual and possible experiences that we mean. This, explains Kant, is the reason why any statement about the universe as a whole leads to self-contradictions. He cites in the Antinomies several
examples of this. Is the universe finite or infinite? If we call it finite, the question arises: what is there outside its limits? If, on the other hand, we call it infinite, our understanding is unable to grasp it as a concept. Similar difficulties arise if we try to apply the category of causality to the universe. To assert that the universe has a beginning is, according to Kant, just as unintelligible as to say that it is eternal. As in the case of our knowledge of the self, our knowledge of the universe is a never-ending process. Our judgments are valid only of what we know, and since we can never attain a complete knowledge of the universe, any statement about the universe as a whole is bound to lead to paradoxes.

Similar problems arise in respect of our idea of God. According to Kant, it is futile to infer the existence of God from that of the universe. If God can be self-originating, so can the universe. Nor can we characterize the universe as good or evil. We describe God as the true, the good and the beautiful, but experience reveals to us also elements which are their opposite. If, therefore, God is the totality of all experiences, we are forced to say that the untrue, the evil and the ugly are also contained in His nature.

From all these discussions, Kant infers that the categories cannot apply to problems of the self, the universe or God. Nor is this surprising. For the categories are the laws of understanding and hence apply only to experience. Science which deals with experience, therefore, conforms to the categories and derives its validity from them. The categories which are the laws of understanding are therefore universal within the realm of experience, but the moment we seek to extend their application beyond experience they can lead only to paradoxes. In other words, Science cannot explain the why of anything and should not attempt to do so. Its business is to describe the how of things by seeking to establish uniformities of behaviour among experienced phenomena. Science, therefore, succeeds when it seeks to establish relations between particular experiences, but fails when it aims at explaining experience in its totality.

3. ETHICS: THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

Neither the scientist nor the man of religion has, however, been satisfied with Kant's solution. The object of his metaphysical enquiries was to justify science and explain its necessity and universality. The result of his enquiries was that scientific knowledge is valid only of the empirical, and ultimate truth must always remain beyond science. Neither does the man of religion fare any better. Since knowledge is restricted to the world of experience, religious consciousness cannot give knowledge. It would follow that human faith is blind and we must accept on trust what cannot be proved. Nor is this Kant's only difficulty. Since the self of
which we are aware is empirical, it is subject to the categories of the understanding. Hence its acts must conform to the laws of causality. What is governed by the law of causality is a fact. A fact is, and the ought has no place in the realm of the is. Hence, freedom of the will is a mere illusion; and judgments of value become inexplicable.

In order to save man's freedom, Kant therefore makes a further distinction between the empirical and the real self. Subject and object are governed by the law of causality, but since they are empirical, they cannot affect the transcendental nature of the self. The categories of the understanding do not apply to this real self which is revealed immediately in our consciousness of obligation. This consciousness, as an immediate experience, carries the evidence of its own validity. It inspires man to transcend the laws of nature to establish his ideals. This transcendence is proof of its nonenominal character, for how can an empirical perception justify the denial of empirical laws? Science extends the range of our observation but cannot account for this urge to go beyond science. This urge is the categorical imperative and is due neither to instincts nor to imagination, but is the expression of reason in its purity.

The empirical self has a history governed by the categories. This is the self which psychology seeks to explain by recounting heredity, environment and personal history. Since it is subject to psychological laws, it cannot, according to Kant, account for our consciousness of moral obligation. Such consciousness is a unique fact and remains the same in the midst of all differences of heredity or environment. Duty as such has nothing to do either with our likes or dislikes or with our emissions or commissions. Even when we fail in the performance of our duties, we are aware of the fact. This itself is evidence that moral obligation is independent of what we may or may not do. When we introspect, we may be able to explain why we succumbed to temptation, but it does not absolve us from what was our duty. The sense of moral obligation is therefore based on the awareness that we could have done something other than what we actually did. This choice between alternatives is what constitutes moral freedom.

Awareness of duty is therefore independent of individual likes or dislikes. As an immediate experience it has as much claim to validity as any of the findings of science. Kant concludes that man transcends the world of appearance in his consciousness of duty. As an empirical self, man is subject to laws of nature. As the agent of moral duty, he goes beyond nature and shares in the character of ultimate Reality. It is because of his consciousness of freedom that man can regard himself as the master of circumstances and not their victim. He accepts obligation for his own acts and demands it from other individuals.

As free, man performs his duty without regard to consequences. Whatever we do for the sake of results is, according to Kant, utilitarian. So far
as prospect of pleasure or pain affects us, it infringes our freedom of choice. Duty is the expression of freedom and must, therefore, have no motive beyond itself. Derived from pure reason itself, duty is universal and unconditional. The moral law is a categorical imperative. It is not hypothetical like the law of prudence, "If you want pleasure, do this." Reason commands categorically, "Thou shalt do thy duty."

Kant, therefore, sharply differentiates duty from worldly wisdom or prudence. Wherever any extraneous considerations come in, it is no longer a case of duty. Much that passes as morality is therefore nothing but expediency. To be honest, because honesty is the best policy, is, according to Kant, not right but expedient. We act dutifully only when we act for duty's sake.

Kant's conception of duty, however, leaves us only with a bare formal law. Its characteristic is its universality and unity. Nothing according to him can be a duty whose principle cannot be generalized into a law of universal application. Whatever satisfies this test of universalization is duty. Since, however, this is a formal law, it is difficult to see how it can discover to us what our duty is in a concrete situation.

Even if it be conceded that the self as noumenal is free, this freedom must, on Kant's own showing, remain beyond our knowledge. It is no explanation to refer the necessity to the phenomenal and the freedom to the noumenal character of things. The phenomenal is just as unintelligible without freedom as the noumenal is without necessity. The only way out is to recognize the difference between them as one of degree. That is phenomenal in which the aspect of freedom is negligible while the noumenal is that in which causality is not the most important element. This is the logical conclusion of Kant's account of the categories, for the categories determine only the general form of our experience while the details are filled up empirically. Thus the category of causality tells us that events must be connected according to the causal law, but it does not and cannot reveal to us the cause or the effect of a particular event. Specific causal laws cannot be deduced from the general principle of causality. This universal principle of knowledge would, however, be violated in the world of morality. Kant's sharp distinction between the phenomenal and the moral world requires that the principle of moral actions must, even in details, be deduced from the pure form of the moral law.

Besides, Kant's theory cannot give us a satisfactory account of the problem of conflict of duties. A conflict of duty arises when we are aware of different claims upon us and cannot decide which claim is obligatory. Any one of the claims, given the necessary conditions, might become a duty; the difficulty is that we are not able to decide which claim is predominant. A conflict between freedom and necessity is, on the other hand, a conflict between two laws one of which is ex hypothesi duty and
the other not-duty. There is little difference of opinion so long as we talk of duty in the abstract; the difficulties begin when we come to apply the principle to a concrete situation. If particular duties were deduced from the concept of duty, there could *ex hypothesi* be no conflict among them.

It is interesting to trace Kant’s analysis of the concept of freedom in the successive stages of his thought. The doctrine of degrees of freedom is implicit in the Analytic in the distinction between the mathematical and the dynamical categories. In the Antinomies, freedom means merely the spontaneity of things-in-themselves. When we attempt to find out the positive content in the definition, we find that it only brings out the contrast between things in their phenomenal and their noumenal character. Freedom gets a more specific meaning when it is regarded as the peculiar attribute of moral beings—the differentia which distinguishes man from physical objects. Freedom here refers to the fact of man’s dual allegiance. He is simultaneously a denizen of the realm of moral ends and the world of mechanical law. A stricter interpretation attributes freedom to man only when he acts in a very peculiar and exceptional way, viz. out of reverence for the law which is the product of Reason as such. Freedom thus gets its specific meaning only in the context of moral action.

Thus, both his theory of knowledge and his ethical theory require for their proper understanding a recognition of the dual character of all experience. Even phenomenal objects must exhibit spontaneity, since otherwise the concept of causality becomes unintelligible. Man is subject to the law of necessity in the phenomenal world but free as an individual in the realm of things-in-themselves. Kant, however, did not always recognize this, as his sharp separation of the theoretical from the practical resulted in the reference of freedom and necessity to mutually exclusive spheres.

The relation of freedom to necessity is analogous to that of the particular to the general. We may regard it as essentially the problem of the nature of the individual. Both the *First* and the *Second Critique* failed to solve this problem. In knowledge, the understanding guarantees the validity of the *a priori* constitutive principles of knowledge but cannot explain their application to the details of experience. In morality, though we are concerned with an expression of the nature of reason, we cannot know it, for it is an act of the individual, and the individual as such cannot be known.

Kant sought for a reconciliation of the conflict between human freedom and the law of causality in the following way. The particular is contingent and, as contingent, free. Yet it is governed by the universal of which it is an instance. From one point of view, the particular is a mere reflection of the universal; from another, it is independent. The particular is always a particular of a universal, but we cannot know it as such by considering only its universality. Governed by the universal, it is, therefore, still in
a sense free. At the same time its freedom does not violate the universality of the universal. Nor can the particularity be explained merely in terms of space and time. Space and time are, in their own nature, homogeneous and therefore spatio-temporal character cannot constitute particularity. Besides, the particular retains its identity in spite of the differences in its spatio-temporal location.

4. THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT: THE AESTHETIC AND THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT

In the third Critique, Kant sought a solution of this conflict through an analysis of our aesthetic experience. Such experience is a function of imagination and hence the third Critique brings out, even more clearly than in the first Critique, the importance of the role of imagination in knowledge. A concept is a function of unity among representations and is, therefore, valid only when it is an element in a judgment. This, however, leaves unanswered the question as to how we come to have any concepts at all. Even an empirical concept is the result of generalization and, since generalization means unifying the diverse, it must be based on an a priori principle. This principle can only be that of the mind's demand for intelligibility, or harmony, among its different experiences. In other words, knowledge requires not only the subsumption of many particulars under one concept, but also their organization into a whole of which they are elements.

Kant says that works of art are the best examples of such harmonious wholes, for a work of art is characterized by harmony between its form and its content. It is thus intelligible without being an instance of an abstract concept. An analysis of the aesthetic judgment would, therefore, help us to apprehend the roles of understanding and imagination in knowledge. Kant divides the aesthetic judgment into the judgment of the beautiful and the judgment of the sublime. Our awareness of the beautiful rests on the harmony of the cognitive powers or, in Kant's words, "the mutually quickening activity of the imagination in its freedom and of the understanding with its conformity to law." A judgment of the sublime, in which a disharmony is overcome, depends more on the perception of freedom and infinity than of harmony. The imagination refers directly to Reason and its Ideas and is, therefore, free from the limits which reference to understanding imposes on the judgment of beauty.

Works of art are not, however, the only objects in our experience where we find suggestions of such inner harmony. Biology brings to us the knowledge of organisms whose behaviour cannot be fully explained by the laws of mechanical causality. The concept of purpose fits their case, but we must not, warns Kant, conclude that the world is governed by
some divine purpose. Kant insists that both mechanism and teleology are regulative principles governing all our knowledge, but they cannot, and should not, be regarded as determining principles which enter into the very constitution of reality.

The essence of the aesthetic experience is the enjoyment of the beautiful. If we analyse the beautiful, we find that it is characterized by intelligibility and spontaneity, order and freedom. The type of the beautiful is the work of art which is both unique and universal. An artistic representation of an object answers no questions as to whether the object is this or that and yet draws attention to resemblances and characteristics which are recognized by all as significant of its true character. In giving up the claim to objective truth the aesthetic judgment is also liberated from the compulsion of the objective.

The two problems with which the third Critique deals are those of the relation of causality to freedom and of the categories to the details of experience. Both problems are concerned with the application of law to individual cases and rest on the difficulty of understanding how an individual can at the same time exhibit law or universal character. This character cannot be determined by merely looking at the particular. Out of the infinite number of resemblances to and differences from other particulars only some are significant for our knowledge. To distinguish between the essential and the non-essential aspects, we must, therefore, have a principle to guide us in our selection, and yet we start with the individual and the principle is not given to us. We can, therefore, do only one of two things. We may select out of our stock of concepts the one which seems to fit the experience in question. We may, alternatively, invent a new concept to describe a novel experience. The two operations are not of course entirely distinct. In selecting an old concept we add to its meaning. Invention is impossible unless previous experience affords us with a clue.

We have to remember that knowledge is itself a type of activity which originates in our search after intelligibility. On the other hand, knowledge can never be complete. Our experience is never completely intelligible but Reason sets before us the ideal of complete intelligibility. In the effort to fulfil that demand, the understanding is continually extending the boundary of our knowledge. This demand for complete knowledge is as much a moral as an intellectual urge.

If knowledge is an activity, moral action at the same time has an aspect of knowledge. We cannot perform our duty unless we know it, but duty is not an object externally presented to the cognitive consciousness. As expression of the nature of Reason, it is self-revealing. To perform duty is to know it. Moral action leads at the same time to the awareness of the external world, for freedom can be realized only in the world of experience.
Both knowledge and conduct thus seek to express the innermost nature of Reason. Both succeed only partially because they are incomplete. Both refer to the same world of experience and hence it follows that both are regulative of, but do not constitute, experience. Hence the distinction between freedom and necessity is one of degree rather than quality. The intelligibility of the beautiful is thus a foretaste of the intelligibility of reason. That is why Kant has called the beautiful the immanence of the transcendent in appearance.

The beautiful, according to Kant, is the meeting-point of unity and multiplicity, of the universal and the particular. It is also the meeting-point of mechanism and purposiveness. The order and uniformity of the beautiful suggest the order and uniformity revealed in the laws of understanding. Its uniqueness is analogous to the uniqueness of our moral consciousness.

According to Science, the universe is governed by laws that know no exception. Each part is determined by its relation to the other parts and to the whole. We must, therefore, know the universe through our knowledge of the parts. Morality and religion, on the contrary, seek to explain elements in the universe in terms of the whole. Unless we can appreciate the purpose and the end, we cannot understand the working of any particular part. Kant pointed out the dangers of both the scientific and the teleological approach. Science fails to account for the uniqueness and the dignity of the individual. Teleology tends to identify the purpose of a particular individual or society with the purpose of the universe as a whole.

The attempt to discover the purpose in what is experienced is legitimate but not the attempt to derive the objects of experience from a purpose which we assume through some other source. We try to understand the relations of different elements in the universe by the application of the laws of understanding. Since knowledge can never be completed, our endeavours for a mechanistic interpretation of the universe will not attain final success. We must apply the teleological interpretation with the same limitations in our mind. We must try to find out what is the inner purpose of the world by comparing and combining the different elements revealed to us in experience. This ultimate purpose cannot, however, be known till the universe is known in its totality. Since such total knowledge is unattained, our aim to define the purposes of the universe must always remain an endeavour rather than an achieved task. Both purposiveness and mechanism are, therefore, for Kant, regulative. Neither can by itself give us complete knowledge of reality.

The third Critique is, therefore, an attempt to soften the distinctions which the first two Critiques had made too rigid, by showing that both understanding and reason require, though in different ways, a living individual element in thought. To say, as Kant often did in the first
Critique, that the understanding gives knowledge but not of the individual is really to deny the possibility of knowledge. To say, as Kant so often did in the second Critique, that reason is concerned with the individual but gives no knowledge is equally to deny the intelligibility of the moral conduct. Hence, the intelligibility of knowledge as well as conduct rests upon that of the aesthetic judgment, for such judgments are concerned with the individual and yet give knowledge.

The universality of the laws of thought may depend on their necessary character, for we must use these laws if we are to think at all. This is, however, not the case with empirical judgments. Empirical judgments, or for the matter of that, even judgments of science are not necessary ingredients in all thinking. They claim acceptance by every one though they are based on individual acts of perception. Hence, their validity cannot be derived from a consideration of the general laws of thought. Their validity derives only from the fact that they seek to express knowledge of one real world, even though the whole world as one object of experience is never given to us. Perceptual as well as scientific judgments seek to determine the unity of the world, but the unity is known only so far as the claims of such judgments are verified. We cannot know the world as a finished product of which the different aspects are revealed to us in succession. We can think of a unified world only so far as we have succeeded in organizing the successive revelations into a unity. Knowledge is not a passive process in which a unified world gradually imprints itself on our mind. On the contrary, knowledge is essentially selective and assumes that out of the infinite details of experience, some are relevant and important, some are not. The distinction between relevance and irrelevance can, however, be made only on the basis of a principle and this principle can be no other than the assumption that the world is a unity. This, however, is an assumption, and as such immediately related to the imaginative construction that is the essence of the aesthetic judgment. There is, therefore, no difference in principle between the universality claimed by empirical judgments and that claimed by the judgment of art.

The result is that the rigid distinction between understanding, judgment and Reason breaks down. Each faculty must in its own way deal with the relation of the universal to the particular, and at the same time maintain the unity of knowledge. Kant thought that this is peculiarly the function of judgment, which must somehow account for the operations of both Reason and understanding. Understanding is, therefore, assimilated to the determining judgment, while it is almost impossible to distinguish some of the activities of Reason from those of the regulative judgment. In the third Critique, Kant thus recognizes that the spontaneous creative activity of the mind is necessary, not only for thinking of the unconditioned totality which Reason seeks to know, but also for
the awareness of the barest particular which understanding grasps by
the application of the categories. The principles of judgment are involved
in all knowledge and come into play as soon as we begin to consider the
particular, not after we have already determined and described it.

5. CONCLUSION

The main contribution of Kant, therefore, is that he has, on the one
hand, attempted to define the limits of the scientific method and, on the
other hand, to establish the necessity and universality of science within
these limits. In spite of the phenomenal progress of science, he refused
to equate science with the whole of experience. At the same time, he
insisted that there is no alternative to science for the explanation of
phenomena, whether physical or mental. He thus sought to maintain the
validity of every type of human experience in its own sphere. While
fully conscious of the interdependence of the true, the good and the beauti-
ful, he insists on their distinctiveness and autonomy. There is action in
knowing, knowledge in acting and aesthetic feeling in both knowledge
and action. Nevertheless, we must distinguish Science from Art and
both from Morals if we are to understand their function in experience.
One of the greatest merits of Kant is that he resisted the temptation to
reduce the multitudinous complexities of life to the unity of some simple
pattern.

This comprehensiveness accounts for the deep and lasting influence of
Kant on all subsequent philosophy. The pragmatic Schools of thought
which have developed in recent times owe as much to Kant’s analysis
as the different forms of Idealism and Realism. With Kant, the Prag-
matists refuse to accept the ultimate truth of scientific laws, but unlike
Kant, they cannot account for their validity even within the field of
experience. Like Kant, the Idealists recognize the contribution of the
mind to processes of knowledge and admit that knowing is an activity.
Unlike Kant, they seek to construct reality out of the activities of the
mind itself and elevate metaphysics to a science of transcendental reality.
Like Kant, the Realists recognize the importance of the given in the
knowledge situation. Unlike Kant, they seek to construct reality by
permutation and combination of these elements without reference to mind.
Pragmatists have not drawn the lesson of Kant’s teaching that even
scepticism requires some scaffoldings of universal truth. Idealists ignore
Kant’s warning that necessity and universality which derive from the
structure of experience can be limited only to the field of experience.
Realists overlook Kant’s insistence that the given becomes an object for
human consciousness only so far as it is cognized.

This comprehensiveness and the endeavour to do justice to every aspect
of experience is perhaps the outstanding characteristic of Kantian philosophy. To say this is not to say that Kant's account was in all respects fully satisfactory. This it could not be in the nature of the case. That his successors emphasized one aspect or other of his many-sided philosophy is only external evidence of this fact. Such development in the hands of his successors was, however, inherent in his own formulation. He held that we can think of the world only so far as we have actually unified it in knowledge. Since knowledge is an ever-growing process, this unity is never fully realized in experience, but serves as an ideal to challenge our best endeavours. With growing experience, there must, therefore, be a changing philosophy, but its attitude and method must conform to the nature of experience. His analysis of knowledge sought to give its proper value to every element of experience. His view of experience itself sought to recognize the contribution of all the faculties of the human mind. In his attempt to maintain the autonomy of science, morality and art in their respective fields, Kant displays a broad humanism which is also evident in his conception of world peace guaranteed by a world government organized in the interests of the whole of humanity.

NOTES

Of the many works of Kant, the following may be specially mentioned:

1. Critique of Pure Reason. It is generally recognized to be the most important of Kant's works. The First Edition was published in 1781, and a Second Edition with considerable revisions in 1787. References to the First Edition, according to accepted practice, are marked "A," and to the Second Edition, "B." There are several good translations of which the present writer has found the one by Professor W. Kemp Smith (Macmillan) the most useful.


6. On Philosophy in General. Translated by Humayun Kabir (Calcutta University).

7. Perpetual Peace. Translated by M. Campbell Smith (George Allen and Unwin).

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Of books on Kant there is no end, but the following may be recommended:

(i) Kant's Metaphysics of Experience, by H. J. Paton (George Allen and Unwin).

(ii) A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, by N. K. Smith (Macmillan).

(iii) The Categorical Imperative, by H. J. Paton (Hutchinson's University Library).

(iv) Study of Kant, by J. Ward (Cambridge).

(v) Kant, by A. D. Lindsay (Benn).
(vi) The Critical Philosophy of Kant, by Edward Caird (Maclehose).
(viii) Philosophy of Kant, by Watson (Maclehose).
(ix) On the Philosophy of Kant, by R. Adamson (David Douglas).
(x) The World as Will and Idea, by Schopenhauer.
(xi) Kant's Leben und Lehre, by E. Cassirer.
(xii) Commentary, by Kuno Fischer.
(xiii) Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung, by Cohen.
(xiv) La Critique de Kant et la Metaphysique de Leibniz, by Nolen.
(xv) Kommentar zu Kant's Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, by Vaihinger.
CHAPTER XXXIX

FICHTE, SCHELLING AND HEGEL

The line of thought which Kant started and which culminated in Hegel, may be shortly described as German Idealism. It is of peculiar interest to Indians, who are familiar with the philosophical tradition of their country. In India philosophy was largely concerned to determine the nature of the self or spirit, and it formed part of a serious spiritual discipline for the realization of the highest end of human existence. German idealism, too, makes it its principal business to determine the nature of the self or spirit, and philosophy is raised, as in Hegel, to the rank of the highest spiritual activity.

I. JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (A.D. 1762-1814)

Since Kant repudiated idealism and held to his belief in things-in-themselves, it may be well to regard Fichte as the founder of German idealism. Fichte began as a Kantian and in his subsequent thought he said he only tried to make Kant's philosophy self-consistent. He recognized, with Reinhold, the necessity of deducing the categories from a highest principle. Kant no doubt deduced the categories in his own way. But he really proved the unity of apperception as the supreme condition of experience and implied that the different categories were the different forms of this unity. He did not make it at all clear how the different categories flowed from the unity of apperception. Fichte also agreed with Maimon who showed how the commonly accepted view of the thing-in-itself was inconsistent with the Kantian position. He tried to remove these defects of Kant's thought; but he did not merely propose certain amendments, but gave us a new system in his Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of Science), in which he believed the truth of Kant's philosophy shone in its purity without the inconsequent excrescences which Kant allowed to remain on it.

Fichte fully accepted Reinhold's demand for the unity of principle and himself emphasized that "every thing must hang firmly in a single ring." He was therefore in search of a first principle which shone by its own light and did not depend on anything else but on which everything else depended. He found this principle in the Kantian unity of apperception or self-consciousness which he called the ego. But he went beyond Kant. For Kant self-consciousness supplied the point of unity to which all knowledge must be referred. The ego for Fichte is the unity under which
every thing, whether in existence or knowledge, has to be subsumed. What was merely logical or epistemological for Kant became for Fichte metaphysical as well. In fact, in self-consciousness, as Fichte understands it, both knowledge and existence are identified. For the ego to know and to exist are not two different things but one and the same. We can abstract from anything else, but it is not possible to abstract from the ego. Existence in its case is not problematical. We cannot raise a real question about its existence, as we can about anything else, because it will be already presupposed in the supposed questioner.

It need hardly be said that by the ego Fichte does not understand the individual self. Individuality is a particular limited mode of consciousness and, as such, it cannot be equated with what is universally present in all modes.

The principle of self-consciousness shines by its own light. That is, it cannot and need not be proved, but all proof presupposes it. But how does the philosopher get at it? Fichte says we know it by intellectual intuition. By intellectual intuition he does not seem to mean anything more mysterious than the immediate consciousness of ourselves which we possess in every act of our experience. Intuition, however, does not mean the reception of a datum in consciousness. "It is invariably the product of a constructive act" (Adamson), as is illustrated by the intuition of a triangle which is really the consciousness of a definite procedure of construction. Wissenschaftslehre claims to give a systematic exposition of what is contained in the fundamental intellectual intuition. It really seeks to deduce the whole world of thought and existence from self-consciousness.

Deduction, however, does not mean production. Fichte will not narrate to us how the world is produced from self-consciousness. He will merely show how the various notions by which we understand the world are already involved in the notion of self-consciousness. These notions are the categories, but they are not empty forms or mere thoughts. Just as in the case of self-consciousness we have both knowledge and existence, so these categories make up thought and being at the same time; they are thoughts as well as objects. Let us see very briefly how Fichte proceeds in his work of deduction.

We have seen that it is impossible to go behind the ego. So we begin with the fundamental thesis, (i) the ego posits itself. But merely with the ego there is no scope for consciousness, which always requires an object, and we cannot separate consciousness from the ego. So along with the thesis we have the antithesis, (ii) the ego posits the non-ego. But the unlimited ego and the unlimited non-ego conflict with each other and give rise to a contradiction. The contradiction is resolved by the synthesis, (iii) the ego posits itself as limited by the limited non-ego. We have the ego and the non-ego here as limited or determined by each other. The
limited ego and the limited non-ego do not conflict with each other (as the unlimited ones do), and so the contradiction is removed. What Fichte seems to bring out by his thesis, antithesis and synthesis, is that self-consciousness involves both subject and object as mutually determined and inseparable from each other.

The above synthesis really contains two propositions, first, the ego posits itself as determined by the non-ego, and, secondly, the ego posits the non-ego as determined by the ego. The first provides the foundation for theoretical, the second for practical, philosophy. In the sphere of knowledge (theoretical), the non-ego or the object is the determining factor. We cannot know just as we please, but must know as the object is. In the practical or volitional sphere, the object is as we will it and is thus determined by the subject.

In the theoretical sphere we are no doubt determined by the object, but the object (non-ego) is not an alien other, an external thing-in-itself, but something posited by the ego itself. Fichte is trying to explain experience, and necessity is an essential aspect of our experience. This is ordinarily explained by reference to an external self-existent object. But a self-existent object has no meaning for Fichte who always understands an object as being for a subject. He explains the sense of necessity as being due to the self-limitation of the subject itself.

We have no space here to describe how Fichte deduces the different categories like causality, substantiality, etc., or how according to him we get, by further and further reflection, to the different cognitive activities like sensation, conception, etc., from the original act of self-limitation of the ego.

We may note that the primary activity by which the infinitude of the ego becomes limited, and it becomes subject having object before it, is described by Fichte as productive imagination. If we take the description literally, we may say that the whole world is imaginary or kalpita, as some Indian systems would have it.

The question arises, how does the ego come to oppose the non-ego to itself and thus to limit itself? The question cannot be answered in the theoretical Wissenschaf tsllehre, because it starts with the mutual opposition and limitation of the ego and the non-ego. We are referred for an answer to the practical part of Fichte's philosophy. Theoretical consciousness is not foundational for him, practical or moral consciousness is. The Kantian assertion of the primacy of the practical reason was taken seriously and literally by Fichte. Free activity rather than knowledge defines for him the original nature of the ego. The pure activity of the ego is mere self-position—an activity that returns upon itself. So far as the ego reflects, the direction of its activity is centripetal; so far as the ego is reflected upon, the direction of its activity is centrifugal. If it were mere free infinite activity, nothing would result from it. The outgoing activity
receives, as it were, a shock \((anstoss)\) and it returns upon itself, and the pure activity of the ego or the ego as pure act is, then, no longer actual but only potential. It is then a task, an ideal which we ever strive to fulfil. We have as it were, two egos here, one ideal and the other real. The ideal or the pure ego or the ego as idea, as Fichte sometimes calls it, can hardly be said to exist in any ordinary sense, and is not certainly conscious. It becomes conscious when, through the shock \((anstoss)\), reflection starts and there occurs a division in the ego and it appears as the subject with the object standing against it.

The shock is only a figurative description. The fact seems to be that we have the consciousness of obstructed activity which is inherent in moral experience, and this implies absolutely free activity as ideal as well as the presence of obstacles in our way which we seek to overcome.

By intellectual intuition we know the self-conscious ego, but it is a striving ego, and it inevitably implies the ego as ideal which every one of us carries within him and which lays down an infinite task for us that cannot be fulfilled in time. This is really the basis for our belief in immortality. (The distinction between the ideal ego and the self-conscious ego seems to correspond to the distinction between \(Paramātmā\) and \(jīvātmā\) in Indian philosophy.)

According to Fichte, we know ourselves as real solely because we have a sense of duty. Through mere representation \((Vorstellung)\), no reality is ever revealed directly. We believe in our self-existence, because our self-consciousness is bound with a moral demand. As Fichte himself says, “I know myself only through this medium of the moral law.” I know and exist as a moral subject, and the world exists for me only as the field of my moral activity.

2. SCHELLING (A.D. 1775–1854)

Just as Fichte started as a Kantian, Schelling started as a Fichtean; but he soon discovered that Fichte’s philosophy was unduly subjective. Both Schelling and Hegel accuse Fichte of subjectivism. But Fichte’s philosophy was not certainly subjective in the sense of being based on the individual subject. Fichte built on the foundation of the ego, but the ego was not individual and in its purity was not even a subject. Still, his philosophy may be said to be subjective in the sense that the pure ego is to be realized in the individual subjects (and not in nature as well), and the whole realm of nature is equated with the non-ego which is absolutely dependent upon, or relative to, the ego. It was one of Schelling’s aims to give nature its due. Schelling’s philosophy passed through several phases. We may notice only two of them here, which have some bearing on the philosophy of Hegel.
The dominating idea of *Natur-philosophie*—one of those phases—is that nature is a process instinct with intelligence and moving towards self-consciousness. It is wrong to conceive nature as a mere dead mechanism, as the opposite of conscious thought. It cannot be defined merely as non-ego. It is also ego, in the sense that all things in nature exhibit intelligence in their structure. Conscious intelligent beings form part of nature and they are in a sense produced by nature. This would not be possible if intelligence were foreign to the being of nature. Schelling does not admit any dualism between nature and spirit. In his view nature is visible spirit and spirit is invisible nature.

Schelling was influenced by Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*, from which he seems to have derived his idea of organism which he applied to nature as a whole. An organism, we know, is a self-shaping whole. It is productivity and product at the same time. Its growth and structure are all intelligible and it is wrong to suppose that intelligible forms are imposed *ab extra* on dead matter by a foreign intelligence. We have rather to suppose that intelligence works from within in all organic beings. What is true of an organism is true of nature as a whole. Schelling connects inorganic and organic nature in a serial line. What is chemical process (e.g. combustion) in inorganic nature appears as power of reproduction in organic nature. Electricity and magnetism have their counterparts in irritability and sensibility in organic nature. He easily shows that the functions of organisms are not possible without the environment of inorganic nature and this, he says, would not be the case unless both organic and inorganic nature had a common ground. He thus conceives the whole universe as an organism dominated, as it were, by a common soul.

Schelling identifies nature with spirit or intelligence, because the laws and the forms of natural beings are all intelligible. Reason cannot impose rational forms on what is foreign to it and exists independently of it. These rational forms are forms of intelligence and what bears these forms must itself be intelligent. If one points out that nature to its last core cannot be wholly liquidated in intelligible forms, Schelling replies that the irrational element that remains is merely an abstraction due to our imperfect understanding. He presents a monistic and dynamic view of nature and makes a wide use of the principle of development, trying to show how nature, through its various forms and grades, moves towards self-consciousness, its highest form. There is no duality between mind and matter, personality and nature, both are embraced in a single intelligent scheme. He admits that self-consciousness is the highest form of intelligence, but contends that in itself self-consciousness is a mere form and that it is the rational content which gives value to self-consciousness. Spirit realizes itself not merely in consciousness but in the intelligible contents as well.

Schelling regards the philosophy of nature as co-ordinate with trans-
cendental idealism. One treats spirit as a function of nature and the other treats nature as a function of spirit. But they are both one-sided. The true view goes beyond them both. With this we are introduced to another phase of Schelling’s philosophy, the philosophy of identity, which seeks to disclose to us the true nature of reason as it is in itself.

By reason here Schelling understands absolute reason which is conceived as the total indifference of the subjective and the objective. To think of reason as it is in itself, the thinking subject must be abstracted from, and if we can do this, we shall find that reason can no longer be conceived as subjective, as it is generally done. It cannot also be conceived as something objective, because the object is only for a subject and so the objective view of a thing does not give us a true view of it as it is in itself. The standpoint of philosophy is the standpoint of reason and the philosophic cognition is the cognition of things as they are in themselves, i.e. as they are in reason. Such cognition leaves us with nothing but reason in its self-identity. The nature of reason is identity with itself. Everything is one with reason and besides reason there is nothing. There is no distinction or division in it. The law of reason is the law of identity. The absolute identity, however, cannot know itself except by setting itself up as subject and object. But there is no real opposition or qualitative difference between the subject and the object, but only quantitative difference. In the subject we have the same identity as in the object but with a preponderance of subjectivity, and, similarly in the object, we have the same identity with a preponderance of objectivity. But when we come to difference, we seem to have already departed from the absolute identity and are in the realm of finitude. This apparent separation from the absolute identity, which is the ground of individuality and finitude, is the work of reflection or imagination. Nothing individual exists in its own right but as a mode of the absolute identity. If we could view things from the point of view of totality, we should see in the whole a perfect equilibrium of subjectivity and objectivity, that is nothing but pure identity, in which nothing would be distinguishable. This distinctionless self-identical Absolute of Schelling easily reminds one of the non-dual Brahman of the Advaita Vedānta.

3. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL (A.D. 1770–1831)

Hegel in his early career was much under the influence of Schelling, but he soon found that he could not be satisfied with Schelling’s view of Reality or the Absolute. The Absolute, in which no distinction could be made and to which even the distinction of subject and object was entirely extraneous, could afford no satisfaction to the rational mind of Hegel. He maintained that the Real as rational realized itself through the
opposition of subject and object, so that the distinction between subject and object was not extraneous but essential to it. Again, he could not suppose that the subject and the object were parallel developments of equal importance, as Schelling thought. For him, although the object was necessary, the subject always predominated over it. He had, however, learnt the lessons of Schelling’s philosophy of nature and so his Absolute, although spiritual, was not subjective like Fichte’s, but combined in itself both subjective and objective aspects.

Hegel characterized and condemned the Absolute of Schelling as a shot out of a pistol and, again, he called it a night in which all cows were black. He meant thereby that the Absolute to which our understanding could not rise through intelligible rational steps, could not be considered satisfactory in philosophy. The point in the second criticism was that differences should not be flatly denied or abolished in the absolute, but should be explained and accommodated within it. This gives us a clear indication of the nature of the absolute which Hegel would consider satisfactory. It should be one as well as many, subject as well as object.

If we ask how these opposed characteristics can be combined in a single conception, he would refer to his famous dialectical method for a satisfactory explanation.

The Dialectical Method.—Hegel conceives philosophy as science (Wissenschaft) by which he means systematic knowledge. Truth exists for him only as a system and the science of philosophy exhibits this system, the system of pure reason. This science is made possible only by its characteristic method which it cannot borrow from elsewhere, from positive science or mathematics.

The dialectical method, which is the proper method for philosophy, according to Hegel, is determined by the subject-matter of philosophy itself; in fact, it is the inner self-movement of the philosophical content, and so the progress of the method defines at the same time the progress of the subject-matter itself. The method here is not something to be externally applied; but it really constitutes “the moving soul” of scientific procedure, and is the principle whereby the inner connection and necessity in the content of the science (i.e. philosophy) is made possible and evident.

The method, however, depends on a certain logical position, with which ordinary understanding is rather unfamiliar. It asserts that by a negative judgment we reach a higher concept which because of the negation is richer than the original one. All negation is further determination. When an affirmation is met by a negation, we are confronted with a contradiction. But we cannot rest in a contradiction which is abhorrent to thought. We are therefore led on to a negation of the first negation which resolves the contradiction. This second negation does not merely restore the original position, but gives us the original position as enriched by the double negation.
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Every finite concept, according to this view, bears within itself its own opposite, so that if we assert the first, we are required to assert the second, its opposite, also; and we cannot rest in sheer opposition, but are led on to a third position, which overcomes the opposition and reconciles the opposed concepts as elements in a higher concept. Any finite concept, thus, when taken as a predicate of reality, will lead us to its other and both are then seen to be but partial truths forming part of a third concept, which gives a better description of reality. The thesis and the antithesis do not cancel each other, but are preserved as amended in the synthesis.

Whatever concept we begin with is, so far, given as immediate and taken in an isolated fashion. But the inherent dialectic soon makes the distinction evident which is latent in the concept, and we are led to its other, which is required to define the distinction. The other or the second concept is thus mediately given. We see, then, the immediate becomes mediate, but the immediate is not lost in the mediate. We have to return to the immediate which now takes the form of mediated immediacy, which is the characteristic of genuine thought at every stage. Neither the immediate nor the mediate gives us the truth and nowhere is either available by itself. Abstract thought is apt to take immediacy and mediacy as opposed and irreconcilable characters, just as it would take both thesis and antithesis as rigidly fixed. Concrete thought, with which alone, in Hegel's opinion, philosophy is concerned, presents a fluid aspect and is characterized by both mediacy and immediacy at the same time. We thus find thesis running into antithesis and both appearing as inseparable moments in synthesis which presents their truth in a more adequate form.

The dialectic method thus effects a synthesis of opposites. This does not mean that opposition is not recognized as opposition, but only that the opposed elements are shown to be parts of a higher unity which realizes itself through them.

The negative self-relation of the concept is the most important point in the dialectic. The concept goes out of itself and becomes its own other (first negation), but it also overcomes the opposition and returns to itself (second negation). The result of the dialectic movement is the truth which is the self-identical whole, while the earlier moments are all abstract.

The first synthesis, though positive, is not fully concrete and the contradiction of the opposites is not wholly removed. And so the synthesis in its turn becomes a new thesis which is opposed by its proper antithesis and these are again reconciled in a new synthesis which transcends them both and retains the truth which was in them. This triadic dialectical process continues until a fully concrete synthesis is reached in which contradiction is finally dissolved and which therefore does not lead to any further opposition. This final synthesis is the fully adequate definition of the Absolute.
Nothing is lost or left behind through dialectical progress, but whatever is gained is preserved and enriched. The dialectic moves, as it were, both forward and backward; at every new stage, we no doubt get a new concept, but it is related back to the old or what we started with. It thus both widens and deepens our knowledge.

Philosophy for Hegel is the science of pure reason. Reason is defined by its pure concepts (just as understanding for Kant is defined by its categories). These concepts or categories together form a systematic unity which is the unity of reason. The dialectic method which is the method of philosophy really defines reason's own way. The pure concepts are not connected by us according to our subjective convenience, but they are of themselves connected with one another dialectically and form a system. These concepts in their systematic development from, and in connection with, one another, are studied by Hegel in the *Science of Logic*. By considering below certain typical stages, we shall see how the dialectic method is actually worked by Hegel.

*The Science of Logic.*—The categories in Hegel are not mere forms of thought, merely valid of experience. They are characters of the real as well. They define the Real or the Absolute. Since the definitions are not due merely to our subjective acts, but to the nature of the Absolute itself, they may be regarded as the self-definitions of the Absolute. The logic which treats of them is said by Hegel to represent God in His eternal essence. It means that the concepts treated of in Logic underlie all thought and being.

*Being, Nothing and Becoming.*—The first category, the most abstract definition of the Absolute, is Being. The least that can be said of the Absolute is that it just positively is. But in so far as it merely is and no more, and has no determinate character, it is nothing. Being and Nothing are the first pair of opposites which meets us in Hegel's logic. If we assert mere being without any definite content or character, we really assert nothing. When we are thinking of anything as mere being, we are not thinking of anything in particular, i.e. we are thinking of nothing. Being and Nothing as pure thoughts are equivalent.

By Nothing we do not mean pure nullity, in which all being is cancelled and which would make all predication impossible. But what is first called Being is now called nothing, and so there is a contradiction, not a cancellation of one by the other.

The contradiction is resolved by the category of Becoming, in which the ideas of Being and Nothing are combined. When a thing becomes, it passes from being into nothing and from nothing into being. Being and nothing are inseparable moments or abstract aspects of Becoming which is more concrete than they. It is really the first concrete phase of the absolute.

Becoming is a category of pure thought and is not to be understood
as change. Change involves time, and time is a phase of nature, not a category of thought. "If we conceive the Absolute as that which preserves its self-sameness in and as an endless coming-to-be and perishing of finite things and next divest that still partly sensuous conception of temporality and of all particular content, then what remains as a residue of pure thought will be roughly what Hegel means by Becoming as a self-definition of the Absolute" (Mure).

Becoming is restless coming into being and passing out of it. It leads to Determinate Being which is Being with an element of definiteness. We get here the idea of quality which implies limit and finitude. We know a thing is what it is and is different from others by virtue of its quality. Quality next makes the thing limited and therefore finite.

Finite, False Infinite and Infinite.—When we conceive of anything as finite, we think of it as limited by something else or by an other. But the other is also something, to which this something is an other. Something becomes an other and this other is itself something and it likewise becomes an other and so on ad infinitum. Here we get the idea of what Hegel calls the False Infinite, the infinite of common understanding which stands for mere endlessness.

We get a contradiction here. Something finite was to be determined by its other, but the other runs into an endless series and the determination cannot take place. The finite is determined and cannot be determined by its other. The contradiction is resolved by the idea of the true Infinite. Something is determined by an other, but the other is also something. So something is determined by itself. The idea of self-determination or freedom is the true idea of the Infinite, for whose meaning we have not to refer to anything outside itself.

It is not possible to pass in review all the categories (which number some scores) of Hegel's Logic here, and to show how they are derived from one another. We have already seen how the dialectic proceeds and what kind of end it has for its object. Let us try here to explain the last category, which, in a way, sums up the whole Logic and defines the Absolute completely. Hegel calls it the Absolute Idea.

The Absolute Idea.—From the nature of the dialectic, we know that the earlier categories enter into the meaning of the later ones, and so for a full comprehension of the meaning of the Absolute Idea we should have to refer to all the preceding categories. This is not possible here. But even without such reference it is possible to arrive at a general understanding of the concept of Absolute Idea.

Logic is divided into three sections. In the first (The Theory of Being), categories of a simpler kind are considered. They are understood by themselves without explicit reference to others. They may be called unities and described as immediate. Such are Being, Quality, Quantity, etc. They refer no doubt beyond themselves, but the reference is not
explicit. In the second section (The Theory of Essence), categories come in pairs so that they are not intelligible by themselves without reference to their opposites. They may be regarded as differences and described as mediate. Such are Inner and Outer, Form and Content, Substance and Accident, etc. In the last section (The Theory of Concept), categories are as much differences as unities. They embody identity in difference and may be regarded as both mediate and immediate. To begin with the concept of concept itself. It means universality and it has its opposite in particularity. But in concrete thinking we cannot have the universal standing apart, opposed by the particulars. The universal mediated through, or specified by, the particular is the individual which is the concrete universal. It is the unity of the opposites, universal and particular. The Absolute Idea being the last category in the Theory of Concept shows this characteristic also: it is distinction as much as identity, a balanced harmony of the subjective and the objective.

It would be best to explicate this concept by reference to the two preceding concepts. These fall under the broad head Knowledge (Erkennen), which is specified as Knowledge proper and Will, otherwise called the theoretical Idea and the practical Idea, or the Idea of the True and the Idea of the Good. In Knowledge, the subject and the object are not merely opposed but are also united and harmonized; there is unity between them which does not abolish their difference. Knowledge in this general sense should be distinguished from Knowledge proper which is one of its subdivisions.

In Knowledge proper, the subject is determined by the object. In case of imperfect or erroneous knowledge, it is the subject which is condemned and not the object. The subject has to accommodate itself to the object. This one-sidedness is a defect in this category. There is a further defect also. In Knowledge proper, the object is taken as given, as merely found. It is not in any sense necessary. Philosophical thought requires that its object should be necessary. Now Hegel recognizes with Kant that necessity cannot be found in the object but must be given by the subject. So if there is to be any necessity in the object, it must be produced by the subject. That is, the object must be determined by the subject. Here we pass on to Will or the practical Idea, in which the subject produces the harmony between itself and the object, not by accommodating itself to the object, as in the case of Knowledge proper, but by moulding the object according to its own demands. This gives us the Idea of the Good, which means the harmony of the object with the subjective notion.

We have secured necessity here (because the object is not merely contingently found, but demanded of necessity by the subject), but still there is one-sidedness, because the object is here determined by the subject. There is a further defect. The ideal sought to be realized through action is taken as unreal in some sense. This defect is remedied when the ideal
or the subjective is found to be also real, when Will is identified with Knowledge, the Good with the True. This is done by the Absolute Idea.

The Idea for Hegel is not merely a regulative concept which is no proper object of knowledge as in Kant, nor is it a mere ideal, somewhat unreal, as in Fichte. But it is fully real, and in fact the real is fully known only when it is conceived through the Idea. When we conceive the universe in its totality, we cannot but think that the ideal which realizes itself in it is real in an eminent sense. In any case, the Idea of the True and the Idea of the Good are made one in the Absolute Idea, in which the subject and the object are not only balanced and harmonized but completely identified. There is no distinction here between the subject and the object, between the real and the ideal. It is thought thinking, not an alien other, but itself. Following Aristotle Hegel describes it as *noesis noesew* or thought. In Platonic language it may perhaps be described as the Idea of Ideas. It is the synthesis of all concepts having itself for its object.

The content of the Absolute Idea is the system of Logic, i.e. the system of concepts dialectically connected with one another. The form is the dialectical method itself which is also the indwelling principle of those concepts.

The Absolute Idea is truly infinite, as it is completely self-determined. It is thus also perfect freedom.

Logic ends with the Absolute Idea. As there is no inconsistency or disharmony in it, it has no tendency to move beyond itself to any higher idea, in the way the earlier categories have led up to it. There is nothing higher to be achieved in the realm of pure thought. The Idea in its absolute freedom goes into self-estrangement and becomes its other, Nature, to return to itself in the form of Spirit. From Logic, therefore, we pass on to the Philosophy of Nature.

*The Philosophy of Nature.*—The transition from the Absolute Idea to Nature is rather obscure. We know the dialectic of pure reason is already completed with the Absolute Idea. At every stage it describes, as it were, a circle. It starts with a position and goes out into opposition and then returns to the original position which is deepened through the outward and inward movement. The nature of the movement and the circle described vary from stage to stage. It seems that when the dialectic of pure reason is completed, a dialectic movement of another kind starts with pure reason in its totality as position—going out to Nature as opposition and returning back to itself as Spirit which is the deeper and final position.

In any case it is clear that Hegel regards Nature as the other or opposite of pure reason. Nature is the Idea in the form of otherness. It is marked by characteristics which are the opposite to those which characterize the realm of pure reason. If there we have pure universals, in Nature we have only particulars. In Logic we have pure thoughts which are in a
sense abstract, not given; in Nature we come upon givenness or immediacy. In Logic all contradictions are resolved; Nature is the realm of unresolved contradiction, because the Idea in the form of externality is incongruous with itself. In the realm of Nature, then, we have to deal with the accidental and the irrational. No particular thing in Nature can be wholly determined conceptually or deduced. It was therefore an improper question on the part of Krug to ask of Hegel whether he could deduce the pen with which Krug was writing. Particularity may be deduced, but not the particulars. Hegel attributes this to the impotence of Nature, in which reason seems to have gone to sleep to awake later in the form of Spirit. Nature is, as it were, reason gone mad. But mad or sleeping, reason is not totally absent in Nature. In fact in his philosophy of Nature Hegel shows how through various stages Nature approaches self-consciousness or achieves spirituality, i.e. reason comes back to itself. He does not, however, describe the genesis of the different phases of Nature. He is merely concerned with showing the interconnection of the different concepts by which we understand Nature. In this he was dependent on the particular sciences which had already worked up these concepts.

It was no doubt an immense task to give philosophic interpretation of the basic concepts, of so many different sciences, and it is no wonder that Hegel did not achieve great success in this field. In any case his work has little present-day interest, not only because many of those concepts have now changed but also because, even in his own day, many of his so-called deductions appeared superficial, arbitrary, and, even, fanciful (e.g. The point is the negation of space, but it is a negation essentially spatial; and so becomes a line; and the negation of the negation is the surface.—Croce, *What is living*, etc., p. 186).

It is, however, well to realize what exactly Hegel is trying to do in his philosophy of Nature and what place it occupies in his entire system. It occupies an intermediate position, and is a connecting link between Logic and the Philosophy of Spirit. We reach the Philosophy of Spirit through the Philosophy of Nature. In the latter Hegel studies Nature in three groups of sciences, (i) mechanical (including Geometry and Mechanics), (ii) Physical, and (iii) Organic (including Geology, Botany and Zoology). He shows how starting from a state of utter dispersion, isolation and indifference, Nature gradually achieves unity and individuality and lastly self-consciousness in man.

He starts with the most abstract general concept of Nature which he calls the form of externality. The logical concept is characterized by internality. One concept is involved in another and is thus internal to it. In Nature particular things are just side by side with, or outside, one another.

Space is the very form of externality. In it points are conceived as
being outside one another. Space for Hegel is not, as in Kant, an intuitional form. It is a concept and abstraction, but abstraction of immediate being and externality or outsidedness. Time, likewise, is abstract and ideal. It is described as the negative unity of outside-oneness (Ausser-sich-sein). It is being which is not, while it is; and which is, while it is not, the intuited becoming. Time is not, any more than space, to be conceived as a receptacle. It is merely the abstract form of passing away (Verzeihren).

The concept of motion arises out of a unification of space and time. In motion, in fact, space and time get their actuality. The sub-strate or subject of motion is matter. In gravitation matter shows a tendency towards unity and internality which is further accentuated in individual bodies studied by physics. In vegetable and animal organisms we reach greater and greater co-ordination and individuality and lastly in man, the highest type in nature, we find the transition from Nature to Spirit.

The influence of Schelling is quite evident in this part of Hegel’s philosophy.

The Philosophy of Spirit.—If Logic constitutes the foundation of Hegel’s system, the Philosophy of Spirit is its crown. In his Philosophy of Spirit Hegel provided not only a metaphysic of spirit, a comprehensive philosophy of culture, but also laid the foundations of many social and cultural sciences (Geistes-wissenschaften).

Both Logic and the Philosophy of Nature find their completion in the Philosophy of Spirit. The logical idea and the external Nature are presuppositions for the life of spirit, in which the Idea is realized and Nature finds its truth. The Absolute Idea is no doubt the most adequate definition of the Absolute, but it is still abstract. In reality the Absolute is spirit. The Absolute Spirit, not the Absolute Idea, is the last word of Hegel’s philosophy.

The philosophy of Spirit studies the different stages and phases through which spirit realizes itself by recovering itself from its self-alienated otherness and becomes the Absolute. We are concerned here only with conceptions and their inter-connection. Any development we may speak of is only logical or ideal, not historical.

It is not possible to convey an adequate idea of the rich and varied contents of the philosophy of Spirit in an abstract summary. We shall attempt here to give only a general idea of the kind of topics discussed by Hegel.

Spirit is studied in three forms, Subjective, Objective and Absolute.

The Subjective Spirit.—The Subjective Spirit is studied in Anthropology, Phenomenology and Psychology. These terms, specially the first and the last, are not used by Hegel in their current senses. Anthropology studies Spirit in its most elementary stages and it is then called Soul. We are to see here how Spirit recovers itself from its sleep in Nature and in the first stage it has hardly risen above Nature. It is practically one with

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it. It is then called the Natural Soul, which is a kind of nascent mind devoid yet of consciousness and individuality. The natural soul rises to a higher stage in sensation and a still higher stage is reached in feeling. Neither sensation nor feeling is properly conscious, although a steady progress is marked in them towards subjectivity and individuality. When Spirit reaches consciousness it becomes the object of study for Phenomenology.

Spirit, which was simple unity or immediacy in anthropology, becomes differentiated as consciousness and object in phenomenology. Consciousness is studied in three principal grades.

First, there is mere objective consciousness which rises from mere sense-certainty to perception and to (scientific) understanding. In every case we have the object standing over against the subject of the conscious ego. Secondly, there is self-consciousness. In self-consciousness, whether in the form of desire or recognitive self-consciousness (finding other ego like oneself), the object is appropriated and assimilated to the subject. Thirdly, there is reason, which combines both consciousness and self-consciousness. The object for reason is both distinct from and identical with the subject. When the object is recognized as no other to the subject, when its externality is abolished, we reach the stage of Spirit proper, which is studied in Psychology.

Spirit in psychology is not without an object, but the object is recognized as its own, not anything outside the subject. We are no longer concerned with an external world but with what forms part of the life of the spirit itself, with representation, thinking and willing. Spirit is first theoretical, when it merely finds the object or content (although within itself), and secondly it is practical when the object is made by it. The subject as making or moulding the object is will. Lastly we have the free spirit which is at once both theoretical and practical. Free spirit is not only free but knows itself as free. It wills nothing but itself or the realization of its freedom. To realize freedom is to make it objective and spirit thus comes to constitute itself into a world independent of individual caprice. The world as embodying the idea of freedom or free spirit is the Objective Spirit.

The Objective Spirit.—Hegel's theory of the Objective Spirit comprehends his philosophy of Right, Ethics, Political Philosophy and Philosophy of History. We shall attempt to explain, as far as we can within a short compass, Hegel's conception of the Objective Spirit itself and briefly indicate the scope and sphere of its manifestations.

To understand the Objective Spirit, we must first understand clearly what spirit is. The idea of spirit is no doubt a very difficult idea and the whole philosophy of Hegel may be regarded as an exposition of this idea. We have already given some idea of it as self-conscious intelligence and will, as reason. It is described as infinite, universal and free. It is what
lies at the basis of Nature and History and is realized in and through them. It is self-developing and self-realizing Idea or reason in all being and experience.

Kant tried to bring out the element of reason in Nature. It is generally conceded that some forms of reason or rational laws constitute the essence of Nature. Our social and political institutions, on the other hand, are supposed to be subject to no such rational principles. They are often thought to be due to arbitrary accidents of human nature. Hegel tries to show that our social and political activities and institutions to which they give rise are no less subject to reason or rational laws.

It is the function of philosophy to trace reason in all things. But reason is not imported into things by the philosopher. He only discovers the reason which is already present there. Reason as embodied in our social and political institutions is the Objective Spirit.

We studied the Subjective Spirit in the previous section and came to the conception of it as freedom or free will. True willing is always free. Unfree will is not will. In the sphere of spirit, we have already attained the unity of subject and object. So what the free spirit wills is not a foreign object but only itself as free and universal.

The first form in which my freedom and universality are objectively realized is that of right. There is some difficulty in explaining this idea, as there is no single English equivalent for Recht in German which means both law and right. In any case it is clear that I am quite free so long as I am within my right and act according to law. In the institution of law we have the first realization of our freedom. Law in the true sense must be universal in essence, and as spirit, I am also universal, and so in obeying law I am only obeying myself and realizing my freedom. Law, however, has reference to external things and has no relevance to my inner subjective life. Right in relation to my subjective will assumes the form of duty. Rights and duties are co-relative notions. So we easily pass from the sphere of legal right to that of morality.

Hegel takes morality in a subjective sense, as concerned with our willing only. To be moral I must will freely, i.e. will myself as universal. But my self as universal appears here as ideal only. In the moral sphere we cannot overstep the division between ideal and actual, and we are consequently doomed to an endless process in trying to make actual what is only ideal. Moreover, my self as universal describes only the formal character of what is to be willed; it gives no positive content. Because of this defect and inconsistency, we are led beyond the sphere of subjective morality to that of social ethics or the objective ethical order (Sittlichkeit), in which we achieve a unity between the ideal and the actual and my universality gets some positive content. The ethical order is embodied in the institutions of the family, civil society and the state.

As a member of a family, I am under the universal represented in the
family, and whether as a son or as the father, I have my duties prescribed to me by my position in the family. The idea of the family represents some moral ideal which is also actual. The family as an institution is not an abstraction but an actuality. The family, however, does not keep all its members in a coherent unity for all time. The subordinate members in course of time become independent and this leads to the disruption of the family. As members of a family, the persons had no private ends; their ends were the same as those of the family. As independent persons, they have their private ends, each following his own, using others as his means. But in this way they come to be mutually dependent on one another. This state of mutual dependence of independent persons characterizes civil society, which is the sphere of individualistic ethics, where our personal ends claim precedence over all others. If the moment of universality is emphasized in the family, it is the moment of particularity which gets prominence in civil society. The members of a family have no ends of their own except the ends of the family; civil society has no ends of its own except the ends of the individual members. When these two sides are completely synthesized, we get the idea of the State which has an end that is one with the end of its citizens.

The State combines the universality of the family with the particularity of civil society and is thus an individual. It is supreme over all its citizens, but it does not suppress their individual liberty but provides scope for its realization. It is wrong to go against the State, because it would be going against our higher universal self. But this is so only when the State is a genuine one, which exists for the common good of all its citizens. If it serves the interests of a particular class or individual, it has no moral claim to our obedience (see Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, pp. 160-1, 280, Knox's translation, Oxford).

The State is the highest manifestation of the Objective Spirit. It is even spoken of as "the divine Idea as it exists on earth." This is so, because it is only in the life of the State that we realize objectively our freedom or spirituality.

These ethical institutions appear in Hegel as super-individual entities in which higher and higher forms of the Objective Spirit are realized. They are even spoken of as ethical substance, because some ethical ideal is actually present as realized in them.

Hegel considers the objective ethical order as higher than the sphere of subjective morality. His idea of it seems analogous to the Indian notion of spiritual right (dharma) as embodied in a social order (varnaśrama).

We cannot stop with the State. The ethical idea has reality only as the spirit of a people. This spirit is embodied in the State which they constitute. But the spirits of different peoples have their truth only in the absolute universality of the concrete Idea which may be called the world-spirit (Weltgeist). This world-spirit presents itself in the movement
of history. The process of history for Hegel is a process of liberation through which spirit comes to itself and realizes its truth. This liberation is the highest and absolute right.

The Objective Spirit completes itself in the world-history and becomes the world-spirit. But it is clear that spirit in the form of the State (as representing a particular people) suffers from a finitude. Even the world-history is burdened with the limitations of the spirits of particular peoples which it represents. So the spirit of thought inherent in the world-history must rise above it, rid itself of "worldliness" and realize its concrete universality in the knowledge of the Absolute Spirit as the eternal truth, for which Nature and History serve as manifesting media.

The Absolute Spirit.—Hegel’s theory of Absolute Spirit comprises his Philosophy of Art (Aesthetics), Philosophy of Religion and Theory of Philosophy. These cover vast fields. We can merely indicate here his general point of view and state his main conclusions.

Spirit in its truth and highest realization is the Absolute. The subjective and the objective spirit suffered from the defect of one-sidedness. The subjective spirit was merely inward, and although it had the spiritual spark of consciousness, it had no objective embodiment. The Objective Spirit, on the other hand, was merely outward and could hardly be said to have any unitary consciousness. These defects are remedied in the Absolute spirit which is both subjective and objective. Through forms of Nature and through social ethical and political institutions, spirit was coming to itself, and it now realizes its true nature and ultimate freedom in the form of the absolute spirit. It is reason knowing itself as the ultimate and total reality. This knowledge takes place in three different stages, through Art, Religion and Philosophy. These represent three kinds of spiritual activities in which spirit knows itself or the Absolute, respectively, through sensuous image, representation and pure thought. The Absolute which we know as truth in philosophy and worship as God in religion appears as beauty in aesthetic experience.

Art.—When we remember that Hegel’s philosophy of art is part of his theory of Absolute spirit, we can understand how he makes the Absolute itself the true object of art. The idea of the beautiful which is of fundamental importance here is not something abstract. It is the absolute idea so far as it has taken the form of an individual reality and is in immediate identity with it.

The idea is the content of art and presents itself in sensuous form. The sensuous appears in art as spiritual and the spiritual as sensuous. The inner comes to be known through the outer; the outer points a way to the inner. Spirit comes to be sensibly present in the work of art, but free from mere materiality.

The sensible becomes ideal and yet remains externally present. In art thus we are concerned with show or appearance. But this appearance
is not a deception or anything worse than any appearance in the empirical world. In the empirical world, the essence appears in the form of chaos and contingency whereas art brings to light the genuine content of appearances and gives them a higher spiritual reality.

Art is not meant to imitate nature nor is it art's business to impart moral instruction. Its end lies in itself in presenting and revealing truth in sensible artistic form.

Two factors are involved in a work of art, (i) the idea or thought and (ii) the material. Various forms of art arise according as one or the other factor predominates or both are perfectly balanced. There is an urge on the part of spirit to manifest itself. Sometimes it finds the material too heavy or dense for its expression; we have then the symbolic form of art (as architecture). In the classical form both thought and material are balanced and perfectly united (as sculpture). In the romantic form (painting, music, poetry), the material occupies a very subordinate position, and the element of thought predominates. In these ascending forms, we have better and better revelation of the idea. But from the nature of the case, no kind of sensible object, whether stone or sound, can ever be a fit medium for the revelation of spirit. Spirit can manifest itself truly only in a spiritual medium or thought. But we cannot leap at once from sense to thought, but pass through the intermediate stage of representation which is the sphere of religion.

Religion.—The Absolute, which is apprehended through sense in art, is grasped in religion through representation. Representation is not thought proper. It is a kind of pictorial thought, in which images are used in a generalized form. It does not give literal truth, as pure thought does, but truth, as it were, in a garbled version. The Absolute is the object of religion as well as of art and philosophy. But it is conceived here as God. We think God has created the world and even think of Him as king or father. This is pictorial thinking, because God as spirit can sustain only a spiritual relation with the world, and cannot be an actual creator, king or father in the literal sense.

The idea of God is fundamental to the concept of religion. It stands essentially for the unity of a spiritual principle. The second element in religion is the distinction between God and the subjective consciousness for which He exists. Religious consciousness posits a distinction between itself and God, and it is on the basis of such distinction that religion can exist at all. Spirit appears divided here between God and men. The third moment in religion is the unification of the individual subject with God in worship (cultus). Through worship we seek to heal up the spiritual division and restitute the original unity.

In religion, as we saw, we are in the sphere of representation, which, like common understanding, conceives things in their abstract distinction and cannot recognize their concrete unity. Thus we suppose that the
infinite (God) creates the finite world and men, who are distinct from God and remain separate till they are subsequently unified with Him. Really, however, as we saw earlier, the infinite has no being apart from the finite and the finite has its being and truth only in the infinite. The so-called creation of the world and the separation of men from God and their subsequent reconciliation with Him do not stand for actual historical acts, but only symbolize the eternal fact that the infinite freely distinguishes itself into the finites and remains in their unity identified with itself. When we view things in this light we are already in the field of philosophy.

Philosophy.—We have been in this field from the beginning, for we have been concerned so long only with philosophy which is the explication of the concept of reality. But this explication passes through different stages, pointing to the various phases of the Real. Philosophy now, as the last part of the theory of absolute spirit, means the ultimate or most adequate exposition of the nature of the Real or the Absolute. When philosophy is regarded as the unity of art and religion, their correction and synthesis, we have to understand that the forms of intuition and representation are raised to the form of self-conscious thought. In the sphere of the absolute spirit, whether in art or religion, we have been knowing the Absolute in one form or another. But the forms so far proved inadequate. The most adequate form is provided by Philosophy. The last vestige of inadequacy disappears, because the form here determines itself into, becomes, or is, the content. The distinction between form and content is transcended. The concept has itself for its object. We reach here again the noesis noeseos of Aristotle, which we found at the end of Logic. What was there an abstract category is here the concrete reality.

Art and religion are different modes of the consciousness of the Absolute. Philosophy is the absolute mode. It is the idea thinking itself (die sich denkende Idee), truth which knows (die wissende Wahrheit).

Logic describes the dialectical evolution of pure concepts or the real nature of reason according to Hegel and is really foundational in Hegel’s system. The philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit may both be regarded as applied logic, because they merely show how reason is operative in the realms of nature and spirit. We come at the end to the idea of reason as an ideal process of dialectical evolution, manifesting and working itself out in and through nature and history, knowing and realizing itself in art, religion and philosophy. It is the eternal idea, existing in and for itself, which as absolute spirit, eternally works, produces and enjoys itself (die ewige an—und für sich seyende Idee sich ewig als absoluter Geist behältigt, erzeugt und geniesst.—Hegel, Vol. 10, p. 475).
4. CONCLUSION

We have tried to give above in meagre outline what is perhaps the most imposing system of thought the West has produced. It covers in its wide sweep almost every department of human thought and activity, and seeks to give some rational explanation for every sphere of our experience.

Hegel speaks of the ultimate reality as absolute and infinite, as truth which knows. One may almost be tempted to use the Upaniṣadic expression “satyam, jñānam, anantam brahma” to describe his view. His Absolute, however, is not pure Brahman, but Brahman, which is already involved in māyā, it is puruṣa already united with prakṛti. Apart from the difficulties of his dialectic logic, one schooled in Indian thought would find something mysterious in his view of reason, which, without the aid or interference of any other principle, goes out of itself and assumes the garb of materiality. The main difficulty, however, will be to understand the nature of reason itself, which not only lets itself go in a movement but makes the result of the movement identical with the movement itself.

However, comment or criticism is beyond our present scope. A modern philosopher, with his predominantly empirical outlook and working piece-meal mostly on special problems, is apt to be out of sympathy with the great system-builder, the philosopher of pure reason. But we cannot fail to recognize that Hegel correctly conceived the ideal of a rationalist philosopher and followed it in practice systematically. That ideal is to make oneself conscious about the nature of reason and its principles, and to illuminate or interpret every department of experience in their light. Considering the subtlety, complexity and the vastness of the subject, we may easily expect that complete success in this field will not be achieved by any limited intellect. But if we are to make any substantial contribution to philosophy, we must be doing in our own way the kind of work that Hegel did in a grand manner.

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CHAPTER XL

SCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE

I. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER (A.D. 1788-1860)

RATIONALISM which culminated in Hegel's philosophy, with its exclusive stress upon reason or thought, produced a great reaction against this mode of thinking. The leader of this reaction, known as the romantic revolt against rationalism, was Schopenhauer.

On attaining maturity and inheriting a decent fortune from his father, he entered the University of Gottingen, where he applied himself to the study of philosophy and the natural sciences, while continuing his study of Greek and Latin classics. G. E. Schulze was his teacher here, but his real teachers were Plato and Kant. From Gottingen he moved to Berlin in 1811 and attended the classes of Fichte and Schleiermacher. At that time there was going on in Germany a tremendous effort to free the country from the yoke of Napoleon, and Fichte took an active part in this movement for German freedom, and by his discourses stirred the German people to great patriotic fervour. Schopenhauer, however, took no part in this struggle and moved from Berlin to the little town of Rudolstadt, where he gave himself up to contemplation, the fruit of which we see in his first work On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which was composed here.

This little book, which was published in 1813, Schopenhauer looked upon as an introduction to his philosophy. Thus, in the Preface to the First Edition of his chief work, The World as Will and Idea, he says, referring to this book, "Without an acquaintance with this introduction and propaedeutic it is absolutely impossible to understand the present work properly, and the content of that essay will always be presupposed in this work just as if it were given with it." The main thing which he tries to establish in this book is that reason, in the sense of cause, exists in four different forms: as reason of knowing, as reason of being, as reason of becoming, and finally as reason of action or motive. The most novel feature of the book is its distinguishing, evidently under the influence of Kant, mathematical reasoning from logical reasoning, the former being based upon intuition and the latter upon deduction from premises to conclusion.

The World as Will and Idea was published in 1818. After an interval of a quarter of a century, he published a second edition of this work
with many additions, but without changing its general structure. This book shows the great influence which Kant's philosophy had upon him—an influence which he freely acknowledged. Thus, in the preface to the first edition of this book, he says that one of the essential conditions for a proper understanding of his book is an acquaintance with the works of Kant which he calls "the most important phenomenon that has appeared in philosophy for two thousand years." He likewise describes the effect which the writings of Kant produce upon the mind of man as being "very like that of the operation for cataract on a blind man." The book also shows the influence of Plato upon him. Another influence upon him which he acknowledges in this book is that of Indian thought, especially the thought of the Upanisads. He has acknowledged this in those ever-memorable words which we cannot help quoting here: "And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker of the benefit conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to us through the Upanisads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which this still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe that the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate no less deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth century: if, I say, the reader has also received and assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him." Again, "In the whole world there is no study ... so elevating as that of the Ouapanikhat (i.e. Upanisad). It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death."

In 1836 appeared his book The Will of Nature, where he gave a very clear exposition of his cosmology, and in 1841 his Two Main Problems in Ethics. It was now that the tide of popular opinion turned in his favour. Several authors began to show great interest in his writings. Encouraged by this, he brought out a second edition of his chief work. It contained fifty new chapters of supplementary material, which represented the most mature product of his thinking and threw considerable light on many an obscure point of his philosophy. Finally, in 1851 appeared two volumes of essays on subjects of general interest under the title Parerga und Paralipomena. These essays were much appreciated by the reading public, and brought him the recognition for which he had so eagerly longed. There were other reasons also for his growing popularity. The popularity of his great rivals, Schleiermacher, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel began at this time to wane, and now people began to look to him for a new orientation in philosophy. He began to get some disciples, of whom the chief was Julius Frauenstadt, who acted as his publicity agent. His popularity at first grew among non-academic men—merchants, soldiers, lawyers, etc. But gradually even academic men—university professors—began to show interest in his writings. J. E. Erdmann devoted considerable space in his book German Speculation since Kant to an exposition of his philosophy.
Recognition came from all quarters, so that the last ten years of his life were the happiest period of his career.

As we have already pointed out, Schopenhauer's philosophy is a reaction against rationalism. It is in a way its antithesis. If reason believes in continuity, the will knows only discontinuity; if reason loves peace and harmony, the will delights in restlessness and struggle; if reason is static, the will is essentially dynamic, and so on. There can be no doubt that the will acts as a corrective to reason. A Weltanschauung based entirely upon reason is undoubtedly one-sided, and requires to be supplemented by another, which points out those aspects of reality which are ignored by reason. This is the historical justification of Gefühlswelt and Willenswelt, which both emerged as a reaction against rationalism. Schopenhauer's philosophy is an extreme form of Willenswelt. It shows the characteristic strength, as well as the weakness of this Weltanschauung in a most aggravated form.

Judged negatively, that is, as a corrective of constructions based upon reason, this philosophy is undoubtedly of great value. It draws our attention to the fact that there are many aspects of reality which are ignored by rationalism. But it is doubtful whether it has any great value, when judged by its positive contribution to our knowledge of reality. And this we propose to show.

But first, let us try to understand what Schopenhauer means by will and what exactly is its difference from reason. In The World as Will and Idea, he describes the nature of will and its relation to idea as follows: "The will, which, considered purely in itself, is without knowledge, and is merely a blind incessant impulse, as we see it appear in unorganized and vegetable nature and their laws, and also in the vegetative part of our own life, receives through the addition of the world as idea, which is developed in subjection to it, the knowledge of its own willing and of what it is that it wills. And this is nothing else than the world as idea, life, precisely as it exists. Therefore, we called the phenomenal world the mirror of the will, its objectivity. And since what the will wills is always life, just because life is nothing but the representation of that willing for the idea, it is all one and a mere pleonasm if, instead of simply saying 'the will,' we say 'the will to live.'" He further states: "Will is the thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world. Life, the visible world, the phenomenon, is only the mirror of the will. Therefore, life accompanies the will as inseparably as the shadow accompanies the body; and if will exists, so will life, the world, exist. Life is, therefore, assured to the will to live; and so long as we are filled with the will to live we need have no fear for our existence, even in the presence of death."

Now what are we to understand from these long passages? In the first place, we gather that the will is the noumenon or the thing-in-itself, and
the idea its phenomenon. Secondly, we learn that this noumenon or thing-in-itself is without knowledge, and is merely a "blind incessant impulse." It appears, therefore, that, according to him, a blind incessant impulse without consciousness is the primordial reality and that it objectifies itself in life and consciousness. Such a reality is hardly distinguishable from physical force, and this view, therefore, which looks upon life and consciousness as evolving out of such a reality, can hardly be distinguished from materialism. The stumbling-block in the path of materialism in all ages has been the difficulty of explaining the origin of consciousness out of matter or force. Has Schopenhauer been able to overcome it?

It seems he believes he has been able to get over the difficulty with the help of what he calls "immanent dogmatism," which consists in the view that a force is working immanently in all phenomena, whether conscious or unconscious, though at different levels. But this does not in any way remove the fundamental difficulty of his position. That difficulty has nothing to do with the question of transcendence or immanence. Even an immanent principle cannot perform the miracle of passing out of the unconscious into the conscious, if in the unconscious there is no trace whatsoever of consciousness. His self-complacency, therefore, in thinking that he has scored a triumph over the transcendentists who set up a Divine Will separate from the world which arises out of it, is somewhat premature.

His "immanent dogmatism" reaches its climax in the second of the two passages we have quoted from The World as Will and Idea, where he speaks of life as "the mirror of the will." How can the sun be said to be the mirror of darkness or light the mirror of the shadow? A mirror reflects the character of the original. It cannot reflect that which is the direct opposite of the original. Yet in Schopenhauer's world this miracle is a daily occurrence.

The thing is, Schopenhauer reverses the relation between noumenon and phenomenon, when he speaks of the blind will as the noumenon and the conscious idea as the phenomenon. In his heart of hearts the idea is really the noumenon and the will the phenomenon. All our hopes, all our aspirations are centred in the idea, as he has so beautifully shown in the fourth book of the first volume of The World as Will and Idea. He has given man salvation through the aesthetic idea. Yet just when he has done so, he says, "No, no, there cannot be any salvation for man, for the blind will will swallow up the idea."

Schopenhauer seems to be here a prisoner of his vicious logic. Because he has started with the absurdly wrong principle that the noumenon is the restless, the eternally unsatisfied, the perpetually warring, therefore he pictures it as a monster which swallows up all our precious things, and from which escape is the only way in which we can save ourselves.
That is why he says, "Flee, flee from the noumenon." In the history of philosophical thought no other philosopher, either ancient or modern, either Western or Eastern, has said such a thing. "Flee from the phenomena to the noumena"—that can have meaning. That is a possible attitude of mind, although in an exaggerated form it may lead to pessimism. That is all that the most confirmed pessimists, whether ancient or modern, whether Eastern or Western, have said. But they have not said, "Flee from the noumena."

And why have they not said so? Because it has no meaning. You may be, nay, you should be asked to flee from evil. But is there any sense in asking you to flee from the good? Yet that is what "flee from the noumena" can mean. For the noumena must be regarded as good. If somehow, by our standards, the noumena appear to be evil, then the fault lies, not with the noumena, but with ourselves. We have to change those standards, for they are false, or, to describe it in the very expressive terminology of Nietzsche, what we require in such a case is an Umwertung aller Werte, a transvaluation of all values. "Evil, be thou my good"—that is what Milton's Satan said. But as ethical writers have pointed out, that is not a possible attitude for any human being.5

Perhaps Schopenhauer himself perceived the absurdity of his position and was moving towards some noumenon which was not the blind will, but of which the blind will itself is a phenomenon. That is why he sometimes speaks of the will as an Urphänomen, a primordial phenomenon.6 Hoffding takes him to task for this, for this is tantamount to giving up his original position that the will is the thing-in-itself. But we think it is better to be inconsistent than to persist in a fundamentally wrong position. We see this in the case of Spinoza, whose final position, as John Caird says in his Spinoza (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics), is a direct contradiction of his original one. But Spinoza's status as a philosopher has improved enormously by reason of this repudiation of his earlier untenable position even at the cost of consistency.

Schopenhauer's pessimism is due to his regarding reality itself as evil. But, as we have already pointed out, it is a contradiction in terms to speak of reality as evil. If it is impossible for man to flee from reality, as Schopenhauer points out, then that is a "consummation devoutly to be wished." Can anything be conceived better than to be always in the presence of reality? Yet Schopenhauer treats it as a misfortune, and that is the root cause of his pessimism. Rather the view that we always live in the presence of reality, and try as we may, we cannot get out of reality, is to be treated as the most optimistic view imaginable.

In Selections from Schopenhauer (publishers: Charles Scribner's Sons), the editor, Dewitt H. Parker, in his introduction says, "Another instance of the effect of Hindu thought upon the philosopher [Schopenhauer] was his pessimism." Now this is a gross misconception of Hindu thought.
Hindu thought, if by that is meant the thought of the Upaniṣads, is certainly not pessimistic. The Upaniṣadīc sages who could say, “atra brahma samuṣṭate” (“here, in this body, Brahmān is attained”), and who conceive Brahmān as Joy (śānta), cannot by any stretch of imagination be called pessimists. The general standpoint of the Upaniṣads is indicated by the verse of the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad which says, “The seer does not see death nor disease nor sorrow. He sees all, and seeing all, he attains all in all ways.” Now this is as far removed from pessimism as anything possibly can be. It is true this buoyant optimism of the earlier sages was to some extent toned down later, and there emerged a more realistic attitude which admitted the presence of evil, but refused to look upon it as inescapable. Evil is there, it admits, but man has the power to escape it. Evil, in the sense in which Schopenhauer understood it, that is, inescapable evil, does not find any place in Indian thought. Even in the systems of Buddhism, which are considered to be the most pessimistic of all systems of Indian thought, evil is not regarded as ineradicable, for it is distinctly stated that with the uprooting of desire (tyāgaccheda), it is possible to enter into nirvāṇa which is beyond all misery. There is no system of Indian thought which denies man the chance of salvation.

Schopenhauer’s pessimism, therefore, was not derived from his study of Indian thought. What he owed to Indian thought was his love of the idea, of the peace and tranquillity that come from contemplation. His passionate love for the contemplative life was undoubtedly a thing which he acquired through his contact with Indian philosophy. The best portions of his works are undoubtedly those which deal with the idea in its different forms. It is a pity that Schopenhauer failed to give that which was nearest to his heart a leading position in the ontological world. On the contrary, he had to give it a back seat. This voluntary self-abnegation on his part was due to his lack of faith, to the absence of that buoyant optimism which characterized the ancient sages of India.

Nevertheless the idea was the pivot round which his thoughts moved. Its position in his writings, in fact, is very similar to that of Satan in Milton’s Paradise Lost. Just as, due to the exigencies of the Biblical tradition, Milton had to paint Satan in dark colours, yet, as his critics have pointed out, he made him the real hero of his great epic, so Schopenhauer poured his whole soul into his doctrine of the idea, yet, due to his original sin in giving the blind will the supreme place in the real world, he was forced to give it a low ontological status. This tragedy later became a very common one in the history of Western philosophy, so much so that the philosophy of values in modern times is a continuous story of the martyrdom of values, their sacrifice at the altar of reality. Reality, in fact, has become a veritable Moloch that has to be appeased by the sacrifice of values.
It has become almost a commonplace of philosophical criticism to pit Schopenhauer against Hegel and declare that the real point where Schopenhauer has scored over Hegel is his dynamism. The truth, however, is that Hegel's philosophy is even more dynamic than that of Schopenhauer. His thought is a revolutionary thought which has none of the quietistic features usually associated with this term. Its nature is not to remain within itself, but to go out of itself to join itself to that which is its direct contradictory. It is because of this that it is identical with reality or that logic is identical with metaphysics. His logic is a revolutionary logic which has for its object the understanding of the nature of reality. For this reason it may be called the logic of the real, as distinguished from the logic of forms (Aristotle) and the logic of objects (Kant).

Schopenhauer, however, has scored over Hegel on two points. Firstly, with regard to the nature of the ultimate principle, it is necessary to indicate the different strands that constitute it, as is, for example, done by Śrī Aurobindo with the help of his conception of Consciousness-Force, which goes into the make-up of Saccidananda, which is his Absolute. Schopenhauer has also done it by separating the will element in the Absolute from the cognitive element. Hegel has given no explicit recognition to the will element, but has merged it in his omnibus principle, Thought, which does duty in his philosophy, not only for cognition and volition, but also for intuition. Secondly, Schopenhauer has drawn attention to the presence of discontinuity in evolution, which by no amount of logical jugglery can be resolved into continuity. He has, therefore, given us an emergent theory of evolution, which, as this writer has shown elsewhere, is the theory of evolution which is applicable to the conception of reality as value. This is a great advance upon the Hegelian conception of evolution from the standpoint of continuity which works well when reality is viewed from the conceptual standpoint, but is absolutely helpless when reality is conceived as value.

To sum up.—Schopenhauer has done great service to philosophy by drawing attention to the importance of the recognition of the will factor in world evolution, but he has made the fatal mistake of supposing that the will can only act blindly—a mistake to which is directly traceable his pessimism. We will now deal with a philosopher who, while recognizing the importance of the will factor, does not conceive the will as blind, and has, therefore, escaped the pessimism of Schopenhauer.

2. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (A.D. 1844-1900)

In his earlier years Nietzsche came very much under the influence of Schopenhauer and Wagner, especially of the latter. His first book, Die Geburt der Tragödie (The Birth of Tragedy) is full of enthusiastic
admiration for Wagner. Its chief object was to expound the ideal of a union of nature and culture, of the Apollonian and Dionysian spirits. His next book, Die Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen (Unseasonable Considerations), containing a number of elaborate essays, was published in 1873-6. One of these essays was on David Strauss who, in the eyes of Nietzsche, represented the worst form of the new German spirit that had arisen after the victory of Germany in the Franco-Prussian War. Another essay was on the use and abuse of history, where Nietzsche criticized the tendency in his country, at that time, of giving excessive importance to the rôle of history in culture. A third essay in this collection dealt with Schopenhauer as educator, where he depicted the liberating influence which Schopenhauer's writings had on their readers, while a fourth dealt with Wagner in Bayreuth. This last essay brought to light the presence of some reservations in his mind about the greatness of Wagner's creations, as well as of his personality. These reservations culminated in the breaking off of his friendship with Wagner during the Bayreuth festival in 1876.

In his next book, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (Human, All Too Human), published in 1878, Nietzsche emancipated himself completely from the influence of Wagner and Schopenhauer because he felt they both showed an inclination towards Buddhistic and Christian negation of life. This book ushered in what might be called his negative critical period. To this critical period belonged most of his important works, such as Morgenröthe (The Dawn of Day), published in 1881, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science), published in 1882, and Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil), published in 1886. In these books he attacked very severely the ideas of art, religion and morality as they were current in the romanticism of his day, although his own philosophy was also romanticism, as we shall presently show.

Also sprach Zarathustra (Thus Spake Zarathustra) (1883-91) stands in a class by itself. It is the most revealing of all his writings, the most intensely personal of all his books. Here he pours out the whole of his soul. Its style is also very different from that of his other works, being didactic, nay, almost Biblical. Its teachings are put into the mouth of Zarathustra, the founder of the Iranian religion, whom Nietzsche admired very much on account of certain qualities in him which he valued very highly, and whom, therefore, he chose as the mouthpiece for his doctrines. Its central doctrine, the gospel of the Superman, is the chief legacy which he has left to the world. He was, therefore, not very wrong in regarding it as his most important work. It is true, Brandes has pointed out many defects of this book, but in spite of these, it is undoubtedly a most remarkable work.

Zur Genealogie der Moral (The Genealogy of Morals), 1887, forms the transition to the last group of Nietzsche's works. To this last group belong Die Götzendämmerung (The Twilight of the Idols), 1886, and Der Fall
Wagner's (The Case of Wagner), 1888. Nietzsche contra Wagner (Nietzsche against Wagner) and Antichrist were first published in the collected edition of his works. Ecce Homo and Der Will zur Macht (The Will to Power) were published posthumously. The last work was evidently intended as a résumé of his whole philosophical position, but was left in an unfinished state.

Nietzsche's mind gave way in January 1889, although he continued to live for more than eleven years after this, his death taking place on August 25, 1900. The causes of his mental breakdown were overwork and extreme loneliness. The latter cause he himself mentioned in a letter to his sister written on July 8, 1886: "My health is really quite normal—only my soul is so sensitive and so full of longing for good friends of my own kind. Get me a small circle of men who will listen to me and understand me—and I shall be cured." The precise nature of his insanity is a subject of much controversy. As the writer of the article on Nietzsche in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, edited by James Hastings, says, "Nietzsche's case is perhaps fresh evidence that even in insanity genius fails to follow the ordinary rules."

As we have already said, Nietzsche's philosophy is a development of Schopenhauer's voluntarism without its pessimism. Unlike Schopenhauer, Nietzsche did not regard the will as an evil, but, on the contrary, he looked upon everything which caused a suppression of the will as an evil. His whole criticism of current morality and religion is that they do not give proper scope for the exercise of the will. There was another difference between his standpoint and that of Schopenhauer. Unlike the latter, he did not view the will as cosmic, but always as individual. There was, in fact, no place for any cosmic principle in his philosophy. He was totally innocent of the "immanent dogmatism" of Schopenhauer, according to which there is a universal manifestation of the will in the whole universe, the difference between one manifestation and another being only a difference of level.

There is no universal in Nietzsche's philosophy; there is only the individual, conceived as struggling, asserting, in other words, as willing. The individual, to maintain himself, must always assert himself. He must wage war against all error and illusion. He must follow the Dionysian spirit and abandon the Apollonian one of being at peace with the world. Nietzsche, therefore, is violently opposed to all theories which advocate a calm submission to the inevitable. What he values in man is his revolt against all tradition, his battle against blind and foolish chance.

This is the destructive aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy, but his destructive philosophy is only a prelude to his constructive philosophy. Unlike Schopenhauer, he had never any intention to rest in negation. His revolt against tradition, his opposition to all established order is simply to show the necessity for the production of the "heroic
man," the man of genius. He therefore accepts the Protagorean doctrine with a change: Not man, but the man, is the measure of all things. For him history is not the history of the common people but of the men of genius. Thus, in *Use and Abuse of History* he says, "The time will come when we shall keep away from all constructions of the world-process, or even of the history of man, a time when we shall no more look at masses but at individuals who form a bridge over the wan stream of becoming." As Lichtenberger points out in his *Gospel of Superman*, Nietzsche admits that a mass of people is a roundabout path taken by nature to produce a dozen great men, and he lays down the principle that "humanity must always act so as to bring men of genius into the world—this is its task, it has no other." For this reason he calls man only a temporary halting-ground; the destination of evolution is the Superman. In *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, he speaks of man only as a bridge. "What is great in man," he says in a passage of this book, 12 "is that he is a bridge and not the goal. What is lovable in man is that he is a transition and a decline." In another passage of this book he says, "Man is something that must be overcome." He therefore compares the Superman to the lightning whose advent means the complete overhauling of the present order, the destruction of whatever is ordinary and commonplace.

It is out of the ashes of the old, therefore, that the new order can arise. Not by any change or transformation, but only by a total destruction of the old can the new make its appearance. Nietzsche does not believe in any attempt at converting or improving the weak and the decrepit. The only way, according to him, to deal with them is to annihilate them. This means, in the sphere of morality, that the only way in which a better order can be established is by what he calls a "transvaluation of values"—a complete overhaul of the current scale of values. The current morality, which looks upon it as a virtue to refrain from injury, violence or exploitation, is, according to him, based upon the principle of the will to the denial of life, and, therefore, stands self-condemned, for life, in his view, "is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildly, exploitation. . . . 'Exploitation' does not belong to a depraved or imperfect and primitive society; it belongs to the nature of the living being as a primary organic function; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Life." 13

Nietzsche holds that there are two types of morality—master-morality and slave-morality—and what goes by the name of morality at present is what he stigmatizes as slave-morality. Sympathy or fellow-feeling, for instance, which is highly valued in present-day morality, is in his view a virtue of slave-morality only. Master-morality or "noble" morality has no need of it. To quote his words: "The noble type of man regards himself as a determiner of values; he does not require to be approved of; he passes
the judgment: 'What is injurious to me is injurious in itself'; he knows that it is he himself only who confers honour on things; he is a creator of values. He honours whatever he recognizes in himself: such morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of plenitude, of power which seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of a wealth which would fain give and bestow: the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not—or scarcely—out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the superabundance of power. Proceeding further in the same strain, he says, "Such a type of man is even proud of not being made for sympathy; the hero of the Saga, therefore, adds warmly: 'He who has not a hard heart when young, will never have one.' The noble and brave who think thus are the farthest removed from the morality which sees precisely in sympathy, or in acting for the good of others, or in désintéressement, the characteristic of the moral."

Such is Nietzsche's characterization of the noble man and of his morality, called by him "master-morality." Here we see the philosophy of the heroic life run mad. But Nietzsche is not content with destroying the fabric of morality. His mad philosophy of the will to power saps the foundations of logic and metaphysics also. For his principle of the transvaluation of all values he applies not only to the region of morals but also to that of logic and metaphysics. Thus he asks: "What is it that forces us in general to the supposition that there is an essential opposition of 'true' and 'false'? Is it not enough to suppose degrees of seemingness, as it were lighter and darker shades and tones of semblance—different valeurs, as the painters say?" Nietzsche thus wants to do away with the distinction between the true and the false, as he wants to do away with the distinction between good and evil. But has this any meaning? As this writer has said elsewhere, no intelligible talk is possible unless we believe that there is such a thing as truth and that there is such a thing as good. Nor has Nietzsche himself been able to do away with these distinctions. What he has in fact done is to show that the will to Power is the only truth and the Superman the only good.

**NOTES**

1. vide Preface to the first edition of *The World as Will and Idea*, translated by Haldane and Kemp.
4. ibid.
9. See this writer's article "Logic of the Real" (Proceedings of the Second Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1926).
10. vide Mure, An Introduction to Hegel.
12. vide Also sprach Zarathustra, Neumann's edition, p. 16.
14. ibid., Aphorism 34.
PART IV

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ITALIAN AND AMERICAN IDEALISM
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PRAGMATISM
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EVOLUTIONISM
A. Spencer, Bergson, Morgan and Alexander
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REALISM
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MARXISM
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LOGICAL POSITIVISM
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EXISTENTIALISM
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CONCLUSION: SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
by His Excellency Professor S. Radhakrishnan
CHAPTER XLI

BRITISH IDEALISM

1. INTRODUCTION

The revival of the empirico-realistic approach to reality, particularly in contemporary British philosophy with its predominantly sceptical tendencies, is a rich tribute to the genius of Hume. It shows that the Scottish sceptic had really exhausted the resources of what may be called the psychological approach to knowledge and reality, while the general disfavour into which idealism has fallen is symptomatic of the enormous difficulty of breaking through the empirical bias of human mind and of rising to the strictly epistemological level in our analysis of experience. When we try to appreciate a speculative truth, as we have observed on another occasion, "it is not simply a question of thinking with the learned and speaking with the vulgar, as Berkeley supposed; the difficulty is not merely one of language, but of counteracting our habitual modes of thought."

It would be obviously absurd to pretend to attempt an exposition of the permanent contributions British idealism has made, within the limited scope of this essay. The best way of expounding correctly a philosophical position is to start with the reactions it has provoked and examine the grounds of such reactions. But this indirect method of exposition being out of the question here, all that is attempted is to throw into prominence one particular aspect of the great idealistic movement beginning with T. H. Green and developed by F. H. Bradley, B. Bosanquet and McTaggart. And even within this narrow field we shall have to exclude the consideration of some of the valuable trends of analysis of which British idealism may justly be proud. While fully conscious of the fact that in philosophy summaries propagate ignorance, we have yet to be content with a brief outline of a great movement, only emphasizing one of its aspects which in spite of all that has so far been written on it has remained unrecognized or neglected.

2. THOMAS HILL GREEN (A.D. 1836–82)

It has been rightly remarked that "it was with Green, and not before him, that German idealism really began its mission on Anglo-Saxon soil." It is further true that Green for the first time "opened the carefully guarded philosophical frontier" of Britain to "the free entry of new ideas."
The mission of the new ideas on the new soil may be best appreciated by characterizing Green's works as a mighty attempt at a synthetic philosophy by avoiding the two extremes of naturalism and agnosticism. The revulsion he felt against the naturalistic world-view on the one hand, represented by Mill, Lewes, H. Spencer, and against the agnosticism of Mansel and Hamilton on the other, determined the course of his thought; and while he found in the teachings of Kant and Hegel a most effective exposure of naturalism, he sought to avoid agnosticism by reading Kant "with Hegelian spectacles."

Green's crusade against naturalism is reflected in his doctrine of relations, which, for its proper appreciation, may be divided into inter-objective relations and the subject-object relation. In regard to the inter-objective relations, his contribution lies in reaffirming, with a slight reorientation, Kant's view that an object, when shorn of all relations, such as spatial, temporal or causal, would reduce itself to a non-entity for us. An object does not exist first in isolation and then in relation to another object; on the contrary, its very existence implies spatio-temporal and causal relations. This was in essence Kant's reply to Hume. While Hume had insisted that all existences were "distinct existences" without any necessary relations between them, and that the causal relation was but a conjunction generated by repeated observations, Kant contended that the so-called distinct existences are mere abstractions; every object of knowledge must have, at the least, a determinate place in space and time, and this spatio-temporal location presupposes the universality and necessity of causal connection. That was why Kant stressed the peculiarity of the analogies of experience as lying in the fact that they are concerned with the existence of the objects and "the relations to one another by which their existence is determined."

Green was evidently convinced of the essential truth of Kant's analysis, and so he started with a defence of the dogma that understanding makes nature. But he accepted Kant's position with a reorientation to which it would be perhaps difficult even for Kant to agree. The term "understanding," as used by Kant, had a strong flavour of a faculty in the midst of other faculties, whereas Green uses it in the sense of the universal pre-condition of all determinate facts. "If by thought is necessarily understood a faculty," it is emphasized by Green, "then to say that the agency which makes sensible facts what they are can only be that of a thinking subject, is an absurd impropriety." He therefore recommends that, in order to appreciate the Kantian analysis of experience, we must "modify some of our habitual notions of thought as exercised by ourselves" in knowing a world of "determinate facts." The reason why Kant's epistemology has been amenable to subjectivistic interpretations is that, while the final result of his analysis of knowledge is to expose the hollowness of the empiricists' attempt to solve epistemological questions through
the psychological method, he could not always free himself successfully from the individualistic and dualistic modes of expression peculiar to the psychological approach to knowledge and reality. The long-drawn-out empiricism-rationalism controversy had already built up the philosophical tradition with its sharp dualism between sense and thought as being the only two possible sources of knowledge, and it was, therefore, assumed that knowledge must originate either from sense-experience or from thought. Under the influence of this dualistic tradition, Kant's first impulse was to hold that knowledge originates, neither from sense alone nor from thought alone, but from their combination. Thus he continued to use the term "thought" as a faculty by the side of another faculty or "capacity of receiving impressions." It was only in the transcendental deduction that the truth forced itself upon him that the problem of *quid juris* could not be solved by the method of solving that of *quid facti*, and that to derive the categories "from experience would be a sort of *generatio aequivoca*." Little did he realize that by this he sounded the death-knell of the dualistic implications of the Faculty Psychology from which the problem of origin derives its intelligibility.

Those who identify what is generally called objective or transcendental idealism with subjective idealism or mentalism do but scanty justice to the profound conception of objective thought which, since Hegel's masterly analysis of knowledge, has remained as one of the valuable achievements of idealism. In several well-known, but much misunderstood, passages Hegel warns that the term "thought" may be either used in the sense of "a faculty of thought, one among a crowd of other faculties, such as perception, conception and will, with which it stands on the same level," or it may be used in its objective meaning as *nous*. It is in this latter sense that man is said to be a being that thinks, and, as a thinker, he is universal. Green is equally emphatic that the idealist's contention about the foundational character of the thinking subject would be "an absurd impropriety" if thought is taken to be a faculty; and this accounts for the contemptuous tone in which he condemns the undergraduate's conception of idealism.

The disastrous consequences of the dualistic implications of the psychological analysis of knowledge are best represented by the development of philosophy from Descartes to Hume. The Cartesian dualism of the thinking substance and the extended, substance made impossible the problem how, on this supposition, the mind could ever break through the circle of its own ideas. This gave rise to the theories of representationism and occasionalism, often dressed in theological trappings. But the artificiality and inherent contradictions of these theories led to a gradual change in the connotation of the term "idea," till Berkeley realized that idea can be like nothing but an idea. This was a momentous insight the full implication of which was not fully seen by Berkeley. The term "idea,"
as used by the philosophers from Descartes to Hume, had its meaning heavily laden with some type of causal theory, and, consequently, it was supposed to be the effect on the mind produced by a cause external to it; it became some sort of a subjective or mental image intervening between the knowing mind and the cause lying beyond the image. But along with the psychological meaning, the term "idea" conveyed a subtler and more pregnant meaning which did not receive a clear formulation before Locke who came to see that an idea is whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. It is no more a psychological image, because even the cause of the image which was supposed to lie beyond the image is an idea in the latter sense. This emancipation of the term "idea" from the causal theory was carried out more systematically though not fully by Kant who sought to analyse the conditions under which the objects must stand in order that they be appropriated by the self that knows them. The post-Kantian idealists, while agreeing in a general way that Kant was right in showing, against empiricism, that the world must reveal itself through the constructive or unifying function of thought, rejected the thing-in-itself as being inconsistent with Kant's own analysis of knowledge as involving the categories of thought. Thus came about the full emancipation of the term "idea" from the causal theory and no idealist has since used it in the sense of a psychical image or a state of consciousness. Green, in conformity with this new connotation of the term "idea," which he also called phenomenon, accused Spencer of identifying true idealism with the raw undergraduate's conception of idealism.

Along with the change in the content of idea, the terms "mind" and "thought" underwent profound alterations, and here again it is Kant to whom goes the credit of detecting the ambiguity with which they had been used in philosophical literature. By his distinction between empirical apperception and transcendental apperception and his insistence on the "I think" as the transcendental condition of all experience, Kant brought into prominence the double aspect of mind, namely mind as one object among other objects, and mind as the subject presupposed by all objects. Following the same tradition, Green has remarked that the subject-object relation is the most generic element in our definition of the knowable universe because "matter," in being known, becomes a relation between subject and object; mind, in being known, becomes so equally. It is incorrect, therefore, he continues, to speak of the relation between "matter" and "mind" as if it were the same with that between subject and object. "A mode of the latter relation constitutes each member alike of the former relation." Once the confusion between the subject-object relation with the inter-objective relation is cleared, the term "thought," as used in the idealistic analysis of knowledge, can no more stand for the subjective process of mind.

The defect of subjective idealism, as it may now be clear, lies in looking
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upon the mind as only one object in the midst of other objects, and not as a subject presupposed by all objects. As thus conceived, mind has the same logical presuppositions as matter, such as the categories of substance, causality, etc. In that case, it would be as absurd to trace these presuppositions to the mind as to ascribe the laws of the triangle to the square; the categories being the conditions of mind as well as of matter, it would be absurd to contend that the mind is the source of those very conditions without which it could not itself be conceived as existing.

"The greatest writer," Green accordingly urges, "must fall into confusions when he brings under the conceptions of cause and substance the self-conscious thought which is their source, and nothing else than this is involved in Locke's avowed enterprise of knowing that which renders knowledge possible as he might know any other object." 5 No criticism of transcendental idealism is, therefore, likely to be effective so long as it is identified with subjective idealism with its psychological interpretation of "idea," "mind" and "thought"—an interpretation which has no place in true idealism since Kant's transcendental analysis of experience. Green's complaint against the realist is not that the latter insists on the independent existence of matter, and in fact he has repeatedly emphasized that the world which we know cannot begin and end with the birth and death of individual man. His real complaint is that the realist, on account of his confusion of the psychological with the epistemological interpretation of such terms as idea, mind or thought, has identified otherness with externality. So far mentalism and realism meet on the common error of placing the logical presuppositions of the objects on the same level with the objects. This mistake, which may be called the fallacy of transcendental dislocation or that of illegitimate particularization of the universal, is analogous to placing the geometrical figures on the same level with, or alongside of, the space which conditions them. To put the analogy in terms of Indian philosophy, the mistake is that of placing the ghatakāśa or māthākāśa alongside of the mahākāśa.

It is only when we succeed in avoiding this fallacy of transcendental dislocation implicit in the confusion of the psychological with the epistemological approach to knowledge that we are in a position to appreciate the value of a further and deeper level of Green's analysis of knowledge. So far he has contended that the subject-object relation is the precondition of all inter-objective relations and that the categories are absolutely valid within the world of this inter-objective relations. He now proceeds to show that even the subject-object relation is not ultimate, but it points, as its support, to an unconditioned Conscious Principle. To think, Green remarks, is to condition and to condition is to think. Every object that we can think of must, therefore, be related to some other object by which it is conditioned; that is, every object of thought is ideal or self-transcendent, and the categories are but the
different ways of determining or conditioning the objects of knowledge which constitute nature. But, at the same time "the existence of a knowable nature implies that of a principle of union which is not itself part of the knowable nature, not one or any number of the relations which constitute it, an unconditioned, in relation to which alone the mutual conditioning of phenomena is possible" . . . "a principle of consciousness . . . which is not itself subject to the laws of nature."  

Green struggles hard to secure acceptance of this unconditioned principle of consciousness as the foundational principle of all knowledge and experience, and admits that though it cannot be known as a determinate "something," yet, as the foundational principle of the determinate objects, it cannot be denied either. It is one "which, on however limited a scale, we ourselves exercise in the acquisition of experience" and we are "entitled to say of it; negatively, that the relations by which, through its action, phenomena are determined are not relations of it—not relations by which it is itself determined." 

As we have contended above, the value of Green's analysis must be ultimately judged, if it is judged correctly at all, neither from the psychological standpoint of common sense which interprets everything atomistically, nor from the epistemological standpoint of intellectual knowledge which inevitably moves at the relational level. But the question we should ask ourselves is whether there can be any knowledge of relation if knowledge itself be a term of the relation; or, to put it in another form, whether I could ever be conscious of a relation, if I had been myself one of the terms between which the relation obtains. Two events, for example, may be related temporally, but, as Green rightly urges, a consciousness of related events, as related, cannot consist in those events. Within the consciousness that they are related in the way of before and after, there is no before and after. The profound truth which these remarks are intended to convey would be totally missed if, in pursuance of the dualistic and discursive nature of language-ridden thought, we were to interpret consciousness or knowledge, as used in this context, as some sort of a relation between two entities.

When the atomistic view of the world has been corrected and replaced by the relational view, it is no more just to criticize the conclusions of the latter from the atomistic standpoint than to disfavour or give up the findings of the ultra-relational view on the ground of their non-conformity to the relational way of thinking. The logical process from atomism to the Eternal Foundational Consciousness is apparently as smooth in Green's as in Śaṅkara's analysis of experience; and the result is that the rejection of the latter would necessarily involve the acceptance of the atomistic view of the world.

It is, of course, another question whether Green, whose analysis has remarkable similarity with that of Śaṅkara, has always been sufficiently
careful in expressing his view on the unconditioned consciousness. That he was not uniformly successful here has been one of our contentions in *The Nature of Self*. But, as a further elaboration of Green's metaphysics is impossible within the limited scope of this essay, we must now turn to another remarkable attempt to reach the ultra-relational Absolute.

As E. Caird's contribution to that aspect of British idealism to which we have restricted ourselves here was not sufficiently important to justify a detailed analysis of his position, we may pass on to F. H. Bradley with the remark that E. Caird scented a drift to agnosticism in Green's analysis (vide *Mind*, Vol. VIII, 1883, p. 360) and sought to bring back the idealistic thought of England to its Hegelian moorings, by banishing the ultra-relational Absolute from the field of idealism.

3. FRANCIS HERBERT BRADLEY (A.D. 1846–1924)

F. H. Bradley's metaphysics is partly a reaction against and partly a further development of Green's analysis of experience. While Green proved the impossibility of a natural history of self-consciousness, and of the conceptions by which it makes the world its own, Bradley tried to show the unreality of all conceptions involved in our knowledge of the world by exhibiting their inner discrepancies. While Green contended that nothing external to thought can have intelligible existence, Bradley sought to prove that thought, moving as it does by the machinery of terms and relations, must give appearance, and not reality. The unalterable system of relations which formed the central and most important part of Green's conception of Reality degenerates, under the scholastic hair-splitting of Bradley's analysis, into a makeshift, and a mere practical compromise. Thus the pillars of Hercules upon which Green placed the entire burden of his metaphysics tumbled down under the weight of Bradley's scholastic analysis.

A similar analysis of the basic concepts and the exhibition of their inner discrepancies were undertaken by the Buddhists of the Madhyamika School, headed by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti whose objective was to prove that Reality for thought was a mere Naught (or, Śūnya); and this negative dialectic method was later pressed into the service of the Advaita system, particularly by Śrī-śaṅkara and Ācārya who were interested in showing the inscrutability (a-nirvacaniyātā) of the phenomenal world. Thus this peculiar method of negative dialectic has been a favourite method with thinkers of widely divergent philosophical persuasions.

But, has Bradley, to restrict ourselves to Western philosophy, succeeded in his campaign against thought and its categories? Has he not, on the contrary, committed the same mistake, as Hume had done before
him, of unconsciously accepting the validity of those very principles which he consciously repudiates? He condemns philosophy as a contradictory appearance while himself philosophizing. Similarly, while asserting that no possible truth is quite true, he claims absolute truth for his own position. While exposing the contradictory nature of judgment he has to make countless judgments about the nature of Reality. The only conclusion that follows from this hysteren proteron in Bradley's procedure, as we have put it elsewhere, is that it is neither philosophy nor truth, nor judgment, which is to blame; but it is his conception of philosophy, his theory of truth, and his analysis of judgment, that are in need of revision.

Bradley, however, was too acute a thinker to be totally blind to the paradox of unqualified scepticism, and he is anxious to defend the claims of thought against the attacks of the complacent sceptic. We cannot, he perceives clearly, "indulge with consistency in an ultimate doubt," because in order to think at all you must subject yourselves to "a standard which implies an absolute knowledge of reality; and while you doubt this, you accept it, and obey while you rebel." Following this line of analysis, Bradley concludes that "Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion. And it is proved absolute by the fact that, either in endeavouring to deny it, or even in attempting to doubt it we tacitly assume its validity."

In view of these remarks, one would naturally expect Bradley to agree with the other idealists that Absolute reality cannot be external to thought. But such an expectation receives a smashing blow when he is reminded that Reality must satisfy "our whole being," and that in the Absolute our "main wants—for truth and life, and for beauty and goodness—must all find satisfaction." As intellect alone makes theory, and metaphysics is "mere theory," it is here the intellect alone which has to be satisfied. But reality "must satisfy our whole nature" which includes such non-intellectual elements as feeling and will. The Absolute, therefore, is more than an intellectual whole, it is a supra-intellectual whole which is an "absolute experience in which phenomenal distinctions are merged, a whole become immediate at a higher stage without losing any richness." Thus, according to Bradley, the Absolute contains "an 'other' than mere thought." At the same time it is admitted that the "other" does not lie outside intelligence because "if thought asserted the existence of any content which was not an actual or possible object of thought certainly that assertion would contradict itself." So far, then, he admits that even the "other" is not external to thought.

Thus, on the one hand, Bradley urges that the Absolute contains more than mere thought and, on the other hand, he admits that there is nothing in the Absolute which is not an object of thought. Here we come upon the central crux as also the strength of Bradley's position, and, as such, it needs a little further elucidation, even in a short analysis like this,
What he is anxious to maintain is that, though every fact is an object of thought, yet thought and fact are not the same. The first assertion distinguishes his position from agnosticism and the latter from panlogism. It is most unfortunate that his critics have generally failed to note this peculiarity of Bradley's position and have accused him of having committed those very mistakes which he has persistently pointed out in the rival systems. He is as much against reducing the fact into mere thought as against positing a reality lying altogether beyond thought. It would, therefore, be as rash to say that in his analysis panlogism ends in an act of apostasy as to characterize it as mystical intuitionism. Bradley's condemnation of the bloodless categories and his criticism of agnosticism would show the hollowness of such comments.

It is, of course, a different question whether such a position as Bradley has developed is ultimately tenable or not. That he is not himself happy over it appears evident from his scenting a dilemma in it. Reality, he says, is an "other" different from truth and yet not able to be truly taken as different. Without resolving the dilemma he simply remarks that "we indeed do something to solve it by the identification of reality with experience or with sentence in its widest meaning." This is certainly no solution but only the adoption of the ostrich policy in face of a grave situation. In fact, the dilemma cannot be solved while philosophy fails to purge itself of the ruinous tendency to objectify what is the presupposition of all objects. And Bradley is constantly using the term "thought" in the psychological sense of one item by the side of the other items, though he is sometimes compelled by his training in the idealistic tradition to acknowledge that even the thatness of "that" is a distinction made by thought. It is obvious that if thought is taken to be the universal background of all distinctions, it cannot in the same breath be said to be an element alongside of the other sides of our nature, such as feeling and will. This would be to commit the fallacy of an illegitimate particularization of the universal. His painstaking dialectic to expose the ideality of thought and to condemn it to the sentence of suicide involve this fallacy of particularizing a universal. For, to borrow his own language, "what can be more irrational than to try to prove that a principle is doubtful, when the proof through every step rests on its unconditional truth?"

No idealist who knows his business will agree to this irrational procedure of taking thought to be a faculty by the side of the other faculties and thus committing the naturalistic mistake of making thought itself an object of thought co-ordinate with other objects. Being the inalienable accompaniment of all objects, thought can no more be objectified, far less condemned, than the Law of Contradiction which accompanies all judgments. In this respect, the Italian idealists' protest against the tendency of the British idealists to reduce thought to the position of its own object is partially justified. The question of reducing fact to thought does not
arise at all except on the false assumption that thought is one object in
the midst of the other objects in the democracy of the universe.
In fact, this mistake has remained as a persistent tendency in British
idealism, and Bradley's dilemma signifies nothing more than the reductio
ad absurdum of the practice of objectifying the presupposition of all
objects. Yet it must be said in fairness to British idealism that Green
and Bradley are the two British idealists who have done most to shatter the
belief that the ultimate Reality is to be found in the sphere of relational
experience. Their difference reduces itself to this, that while Green
calls it unconditioned consciousness or noumenal ego which, as the source of
the categories, cannot be brought under the categories, Bradley dismisses
these terms as infected with relations and characterizes the Absolute as
a total experience transcending the differences between mere volition and
mere thought and possessed of a higher immediacy than feeling at a level
below distinction and relation. Bradley's dissatisfaction with Green's
view here arises out of his opinion that consciousness is not original
and that the self's character is gone when it ceases to be relative. But, then,
even immediate experience which is taken by him to be the ultimate
foundation of all relational knowledge, cannot extricate itself from a
similar difficulty. The immediate experience, he says, opens the one road
to the solution of ultimate problems; it is a knowing and being in one, a
direct awareness which is non-relational, and which is neither explicable
nor describable. Are we not faced here with the difficulty of describing what
is yet said to be indescribable, and of using relational terms to indicate
what is non-relational? If, then, the ultimate presupposition of relational
experience must be what Bradley rightly, and not wrongly as discovered
by his critics, takes it to be, then it is better to call it Self or Consciousness
or Knowledge, the reality of which is re-asserted in the very process of
refuting or doubting it, rather than experience which has a stronger
relational association that the other terms. Here Green certainly has
been more careful than Bradley in his choice of the terms in which to
describe the Absolute.

4. BERNARD BOSANQUET (A.D. 1848-1923)

While Bradley, by his uncompromising criticism of relational thought,
has given a distinct turn to British idealism which in Green had, on the
whole, kept faithful to its Hegelian moorings, a further change in its
complexion was brought about by Bosanquet whose departure from Green
is in some respects more radical than Bradley's. Similarly, though it
is true that Bradley and Bosanquet developed their world views in close
collaboration and that Bosanquet everywhere sought to change Bradley's
abrupt "either-or" into the gentler "both-and," yet this compromising
attitude of Bosanquet, as rightly observed by Metz, led him to make concessions incompatible with his own position. This may be illustrated from his reformulation of the issue between naturalism and idealism, in a way which marks an important departure from the position of Green. It had been contended by Green that the existence of a knowable nature implies that of a principle of union which is not itself part of the knowable nature. Bosanquet, on the contrary, remarks: "Plainly, if you hold that to be a part of the Universe disqualifies knowledge from being true, you must, to make knowledge capable of truth, make it external and additional to the universe."\(^{17}\)

Knowledge, according to Bosanquet, therefore, should be considered to be an essential form of the self-revelation of the universe, and the mind, in so far as it helps this revelation through its interpreting activity, an organ of the universe itself. It is obvious that Bosanquet's attempt to reconcile the competing claims of naturalism and idealism respectively is but an extension of the same principle by which Lotze had sought to bridge over the dualism between spirit and nature. The beauty of colours and tones, it was maintained by Lotze, are what Nature in itself strives to produce and express, but cannot do so by itself; for this it needs as its last and noblest instrument the sentient mind which alone can put into words its mute striving. Though these remarks were made by Lotze in the context of the secondary qualities, Bosanquet finds in them a convenient metaphysical method for smoothing away the opposition between naturalism and idealism.

The ultimate explanation of his departure from the earlier tradition lies in the bold determination with which Bosanquet seeks to develop and carry to its legitimate consequences the idealistic dictum that "Truth is the whole." Apparently he is not satisfied with the rich harvest it yielded at the hands of his predecessors whose analysis, though inspired by the belief that Reality is an organic unity, failed to work out its full implications in the different spheres of life and experience. Bradley's analysis, for example, sharpened the dualism between the intellectual and the non-intellectual sides of our nature leading to the belief that although in metaphysics the intellect is not to be dictated to, yet it is a one-sided appearance only. Bosanquet, on the other hand, seeks to smooth away the dualism by insisting that the criterion throughout is the same, so that "bad taste is bad logic, and bad logic is bad taste." He therefore discourages the method of exclusively \textit{a priori} arguments in metaphysics and replaces it by that of analysing experiences according to what is called their centrality. We cannot in the present context evaluate the net result of this methodological change, and shall therefore restrict ourselves to the consideration of a few consequences following from the dictum that truth is the whole.

One of such consequences is the denial of the claim of any "special
class of principles" to be superior to the so-called contingent truth. "It is really because we cannot conceive ourselves denying the complete world of our experience that we are obliged to hold the simplest a priori truths to be affirmed in their negation." This embodies Bosanquet's partial criticism of Bradley's view on the absolute criterion, namely, that either in endeavouring to deny it or even in attempting to doubt it, we tacitly assume its validity. All necessity being ex hypothesi conditional, even those principles, such as the law of non-contradiction, must not be "considered as formal propositions, given and self-evident each within its own four corners, and irresponsible to alterations in the general body of knowledge." In other words, "the proof of every judgment is ultimately in the system as a whole"; and it is from the system that "every proposition and every judgment takes its meaning as well as its certainty." It is in the context of this that one is to understand Bosanquet's opinion that the religious and moral experiences or the world of beauty and science "are a higher and deeper evidence of the being and nature of the real than are the formally undeniable judgments."

In commenting upon these observations, the first point we would like to stress is that Bosanquet's arguments do not always move in the same direction. He has admitted unequivocally that "Reality, the law of contradiction asserts, is a consistent unity which is merely to say over again that it is unity." This, however, does not prevent him from holding that the Law does not possess any unmediated necessity, and that its necessity is derived from the system as a whole. He was perhaps conscious of this apparent anomaly and has, therefore, remarked that his arguments amount to nothing more than "denying the distinction between necessary and contingent truth." Here, there is clearly a shifting of the ground. In criticizing the distinction between necessary and contingent truth, Bosanquet follows Green's arguments against Leibniz. But he does not apparently see that Green's contention against the distinction between mathematical truths and truths of experience cannot establish the mediated necessity of the Law of Contradiction. What Green sought to establish was that given any proposition conceived as wholly or unconditionally true, you cannot conceive its contradictory to be true consistently with that idea of the unity of the world without which no proposition could be conceived to be really either true or untrue. In other words, every judgment, according to Green, must be consistent with the unity of the world, and, consequently, the unconditional truth of a given proposition may be ultimately traced to the unity of the world. The validity of the law of contradiction is thus presupposed by Green which itself does not stand in need of proof. Bosanquet, on the contrary, seeks to prove the presupposition in the light of the same considerations which were advanced by Green for proving the truth of a proposition. Every "true proposition," he remarked, almost borrowing Green's language,
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"is so in the last resort because its contradictory is not conceivable in harmony with the whole of experience." But he does not apparently see that this criterion presupposes, and so cannot prove, the law of contradiction, which is not, strictly speaking, a proposition like the other propositions.

We have devoted some space to Bosanquet's discussion of the law of contradiction in order to emphasize the importance of recognizing the distinction between proof and presupposition. And if our contentions be so far correct, it will not be difficult to detect the mistakes likely to be committed by every philosopher who fails to appreciate the peculiarity of those principles of knowledge which, being at the foundation of proof and disproof, cannot themselves be proved or disproved. As foundational, they cannot be denied without in the same breath re-asserting their validity; here Bradley was right, and Bosanquet's criticism, to say the least, is highly misleading.

Bosanquet's treatment of the self suffers from the same confusion of a presupposition with what stands in need of proof or disproof. Here, again, in conformity with the empirical bias of British thought, he brings the self to the bar of experience, and discovers that the self, itself, "draws its material from Nature, and even as subject, as confronted with its objective surroundings, is making use of that material to give itself the feeling of self-hood." "A true self is something to be made and won, to be held together with pains and labour, not something given to be enjoyed." "It is like a fragment yearning towards the whole." There is a sense, no doubt, in which Nature exists "only through finite mind. But finite minds again exist only through nature." These remarks, which may be multiplied indefinitely, represent the serious nature of Bosanquet's departure from the position of Green for whom the subject-object relation was the most generic relation presupposed by all inter-objective relations. And here his analysis and discussion align Bosanquet with Locke as also with an influential section of Indian philosophers of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika Schools. The self, according to this tradition, is only one object in the midst of other objects—and as such, must be proved in the same way in which anything else is to be proved—and not the presupposition of all objects and, consequently, underlying proof and disproof. The mistake arises, to put it in the language of the "Advaita" School of philosophy, out of confusing a pre-established (svayam-siddha) principle with an adventitious (ajantuka) object amenable to proof or disproof.35

It was against this ruinous confusion that Kant insisted on the double nature of the mind. This was also why Green brought to prominence the peculiarity of the subject-object relation. The crucial question is, not whether the minds should be regarded as "substances, crystal nuclei, fallen or celestial angels, or whether they should be compared to a "rising and falling tide," and possessed of a higher type of individuality

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than nature and life. The really important issue for a sound philosophy of self is whether we can put any meaning to anything except in terms of self-conscious thought and whether this self-conscious thought is capable of being proved as we prove the things of which it is the presupposition.

Mind, conceived as an organ of the universe, can as little explain how the universe can be an object of knowledge as when it is conceived as a substance. The biological categories can as little do justice to the self-conscious thought as the mechanical categories of substance and cause. It is true that the concept of organ, when applied to the mind, turns, by virtue of its emphasis on continuity, the edge of uncompromising dualism between spirit and nature when these are conceived as substances. But, on the other hand, it introduces a subtler type of dualism between the whole and the part, as well as between the organism and the environment. The part, no doubt, is continuous with the whole, but, in so far as it belongs to, or is of the whole, it is clearly inapplicable to the subject which is presupposed by all objects and all inter-objective relations. To put it more strictly, all relations, including the relation of difference, exist for the subject; and consequently the subject is not one of the terms that is related to, or different from, the other. All distinctions, as it is often said, are within consciousness or within knowledge; and this implies that consciousness or knowledge cannot be distinguished from something other than itself. Yet, on the other hand, this circumstance does not reduce consciousness to a mere zero, or an abstraction empty of all contents; all that it means is that consciousness, though undeniable, is indefinable.

Thus when the concepts of subject and consciousness are subjected to a strict analysis they are found to stand for a non-relational principle, though such a principle has proved to be a great strain upon most of its critics, of the realistic as well as of the idealistic Schools. The strain rises to the greatest pitch when faced with its inevitable implication that all relations, including the relation of difference, must be inter-objective. Thus, for example, when Cook Wilson realizes that in expressing and explaining the various aspects of the subject-object relation we use the ordinary categories which are all of the relation of object and object,26 or when Bradley urges that we cannot strictly speak of a relation between immediate experience and that which transcends it, except by a licence, there is, no doubt, a violent wrench in the discursive intellect; but that is certainly no excuse for denying the validity of the conclusion of a rigorously conducted analysis, far less for the reluctance to pursue the analysis to the bitter end. Bradley’s critics have, almost always, made this mistake of deprecating his theory of immediate experience on no better ground than its indescribability in terms of the relational intellect, and this in spite of his clear admission that it is indescribable. In this respect,
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Bradley has been as unfortunate as Śaṅkara in the development of Indian thought.

As these considerations cannot be further pursued here, all we can do is to pass on after expressing our conviction that the value of the contributions made by Green and Bradley to a sound metaphysics lies in a large measure in their recognition of the non-relational basis of relational experience, without which the greatest thinker will fall into confusions. Bosanquet, on the other hand, is too infatuated with the conception of the whole to appreciate fully the role of this non-relational foundation of experience except as a means of escape from inconvenient criticisms. It is, then, no wonder that Bosanquet’s critics have been often puzzled over the inconsistencies of his analysis, of which at least one is pointedly brought forth by Professor G. Watts Cunningham who has rightly seen that Bosanquet must either renounce the immediacy of the Absolute or “admit that the conception of negativity has no ontological significance.” A more serious, and perhaps the most fundamental, error is that of placing knowledge alongside of the other forms of self-revelation of the universe, and thus missing its foundationality. It is a clear case of what we have called the fallacy of transcendental dislocation.

5. J. M. E. McTAGGART (A.D. 1866-1925)

In McTaggart we come across a remarkable attempt at a synthesis of Hegelianism with the native tradition of British thought thrown into prominence by Bradley and Bosanquet. While Green and Caird, convinced of the reality of the unity of self-consciousness, condemned the empirico-psychological approaches to epistemological and metaphysical problems, Bradley and Bosanquet revived the tendency to distinguish the theoretical from the other sides of human nature, and insisted that the Absolute must satisfy, not simply the theoretical demand for consistency, but all the main wants of human nature of which intellect is an element. This led Bradley to consider thought to be a one-sided appearance needing, like feeling and will, transmutation and transformation in a whole beyond thought and the other elements. So Reality, according to Bradley, must not only be theoretically harmonious, but “it must be harmonious altogether.” In the same spirit, McTaggart questions the adequacy of knowledge as an expression of the Universe. But, it may be asked, is it not absurd to talk of knowledge as inadequate? His answer is that “there is a great difference between indicating an ideal and realizing it.” Knowledge shows us its own ideal, but it cannot realize it. Similarly, volition too cannot completely express the harmony of spirit. The defect of knowledge and volition is supposed to be identical, and it consists in the presence of the not-self as an external or alien
element. It is only in the emotion of love that "we are able to regard the object as it regards itself" and the not-myself loses all appearance of contingency and alienation. The dialectic looks upon the self and the not-self as equally real, yet each is only a moment of the true reality which consists of immediate centres which are mediated by relations. Thus McTaggart rejects Green's view which reduces one side of an opposition to the other, and thinks that the view of the dialectic does not favour this reduction. The Absolute, it is therefore concluded, can only be perfectly manifested in the emotion of love between finite selves that are its only fundamental differentiations.49

We need not pursue further McTaggart's analysis and arguments for establishing the superiority of love to knowledge and volition, nor need we examine the correctness of his interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic. What, however, needs comment in the present context is his co-ordination of knowledge with volition and emotion—an assumption which has come to be a permanent feature of psychological analysis. That psychology has epistemological presuppositions which therefore defy psychological treatment was the outcome of Kant's analysis of knowledge. And this belief has inspired the idealistic movement in England, as represented by Green and Caird, till the confusion between psychology and epistemology was again brought into vogue by Bradley, leading to an unbridgeable gulf between logic and metaphysics. That this dualism was not universally approved by the British idealists was evident from Harold H. Joachim's emphatic protest against the irreconcilable antagonism created by Bradley between logic and metaphysics.49

The whole matter may perhaps be made clear in another form. The distinction between knowledge, volition and emotion, in so far as it is claimed to be a true distinction, must reject as false an analysis which is inconsistent with it. When challenged the distinction must be shown to be the conclusion of certain considerations that claim to be true; it is on their presupposed truth that the conclusion rests. In this sense true knowledge and whatever is implied by it are the very ground upon which the distinction stands. Similarly, knowledge which is absolutely true is presupposed by our preferences for any of the three factors, knowledge, volition and emotion. In other words, the term "knowledge" is ambiguous, as it may either mean the foundational knowledge which is presupposed by the psychological distinction, or it may mean one of the elements distinguished by psychology. As foundational, knowledge cannot be identified with one of the distinguished elements, and placed alongside of them.

In the light of these considerations, it will be easy to see why McTaggart breaks off from the tradition of strict idealism which "rests on the essential dependence of the object of knowledge upon the knowing subject, or upon the fact of knowledge," and replaces it by a spiritualism of the type
of Berkeley, Leibniz or Ward. The root of his dissatisfaction, as that of the realists, lies in the unwarranted assumption that idealism is necessarily wedded to the psychological meaning of mind and of knowledge, as one item by the side of the other items. Green, as we have stressed above, fought hard against this assumption, and was consequently led to affirm an unconditioned conscious principle at the foundation of experience which, therefore, could be only negatively defined. McTaggart, following the psychological tradition revived by Bradley and Bosanquet, has naturally found it impossible to continue his allegiance to idealism in spite of his profound respect for Hegel's philosophy. The only thread that binds McTaggart to British idealism is his belief that the ultimate interpretation of the universe must be spiritual; but the thread is too tender to bear the strain put upon it by his "ontological idealism" with its avowedly pluralistic bias. The term "spirit" as used by McTaggart has a connotation too overlaid with objectivistic implications to fit into the deeper aspects of Green's Spiritual Principle. The reason why this escapes our notice is the influence a word exercises upon our minds even when its original meaning has completely evaporated. Thus, for example, one man's conception of God may be another man's idea of devil; and yet both of them may enjoy the reputation of being theists simply on the ground of the identical word used by them. Similar is the case with the word "spirit" as used by Green and McTaggart respectively. Though their thoughts move in the identical atmosphere of Hegelian philosophy, one reads into it what is as opposed to the findings of the other as the absolutism of Śāṅkara is opposed to that of Madhva though both of them claimed allegiance to the philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa.

McTaggart's attempt to prove that the only substance free from inner discrepancy must be a spiritual substance which alone, therefore, exists, though admirable for its analytic subtlety and uncommon hair-splitting distinctions, is all along based upon the assumption that the categories of the world of finite object are not inapplicable to the principle that is the logical pre-condition of all finite existences. So long as this assumption is allowed to stand a coherent interpretation of the universe will remain a mere dream. To show this in detail would be to undertake a comprehensive, critical discussion of McTaggart's arguments particularly of his principle of determining correspondence. This however falls beyond the scope of the present essay that is deliberately restricted to one particular aspect of British idealism.

NOTES

3. *Prolegomena*, Section 47.
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY; EASTERN AND WESTERN

7. Prolegomena, Section 52.
10. Appearance and Reality, p. 492.
11. Ibid., p. 155.
12. Cf., e.g. Green, Prolegomena, Section 47.
20. Ibid., p. 46.
23. The Principle, p. 50.
25. Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya on Br. Sūt. II, 3. 7.
27. The Idealistic Arguments, p. 427.
30. The Nature of Truth.

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CHAPTER XLII

ITALIAN AND AMERICAN IDEALISM

I. INTRODUCTORY

The term ‘idealism’ conveys a variety of meanings and the meaning varies according to context. We are concerned in this paper with idealism as a philosophical doctrine. As such it has a long and chequered history both in the East and the West and it has assumed many different, even widely divergent, forms. It is not the purpose of this paper to trace the history and study the various forms of the doctrine, but only to give a short review of the Italian and American versions of it with reference to their chief representatives, Croce and Gentile, Royce and Howison, respectively. If we classify idealism into its two distinctive types, absolutism and spiritual pluralism, as is usually done, Croce and Gentile may be assigned to the first, Howison to the second and Royce may be regarded as a mediator between the two types.

German idealism dominating all its rivals exercised a profound influence on the thinking minds in Europe and America during the major part of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth century. It found a congenial soil in England where it flourished in the philosophical systems, e.g. of Bradley and Bosanquet. From England the idealistic movement spread to America where the works of Kant, Fichte and Hegel came to be studied very closely and carefully. Royce was deeply influenced by Fichte in particular, under whose influence he developed a distinctive form of idealism in the light of American experience. In Italy, however, "it is Hegel who has become the spiritual father of the recent neo-idealist movement there, of which Croce and Gentile are the outstanding figures."

Contrasted with the idealism of Bradley, the idealisms of Croce, Gentile, Royce and Howison are all opposed to the conception of a "block universe," share a dynamic voluntaristic outlook and emphasize the value and importance of the empirical world. They are, therefore, treated together here.

A. ITALIAN IDEALISM

An important feature of the neo-idealistic philosophy of Croce and Gentile may be best understood as suggesting a way out of naturalism and orthodox Christianity. It is essentially anti-metaphysical and humanistic in character. Further, as throwing light on their philosophy,
we might mention the names of Vico, Spaventa and Francesco de Sanctis, who were there immediate predecessors and inspirers. As to Hegel, though Croce and Gentile held him in high esteem for his speculative genius, they criticized his philosophy and developed their own along new lines in the light of their own thought and experience. Finding a substantial element of truth in his dialectic, they yet criticized him for confusing the nexus of distincts and the nexus of opposites within the concrete universal. This confusion, according to Croce and Gentile, landed Hegel into panlogism. In a word, Hegel was in their eyes "the weaver of dialectical triads" and "the builder of a closed system."

CROCE (1866–1952)

Philosophy of the Spirit.—Benedetto Croce was born in 1866 in a small conservative well-to-do Catholic family of loyalists and attended an old-fashioned school. At Rome he attended some lectures on Moral Philosophy. The interest which he had in antiquarian studies and historical researches did not satisfy him as to their fundamental principles; so he gradually turned to the study of Philosophy. He became a philosopher without "paying the usual penalty of poverty or a professorship." It was much against his will that he was drawn into politics and made Minister of Public Education, "perhaps to lend an air of philosophic dignity to a Cabinet of politicians." But he did not take politics seriously. He spent his time chiefly in conducting in collaboration with Gentile his famous periodical, La Critica. He denounced the war of 1914 as a suicidal mania. He remained aloof from war and so became as unpopular in Italy as Bertrand Russell in England or Romain Rolland in France. But soon after, his countrymen began to regard him as their friend, philosopher and guide.

In his first book on Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx, he rejected the economic interpretation of History and refused to admit materialism as a philosophy for thinking people or even as a method for science. Mind or Spirit was to him the primary and ultimate reality. And he developed his philosophic thought under the title of The Philosophy of the Spirit in four volumes and Philosophical Essays containing his famous essay on What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel.

Croce describes his philosophy as the Philosophy of the Spirit. According to him, the Mind or Spirit alone is real and there is no reality which is not Mind or Spirit, i.e. every form which Reality assumes or can assume is grounded in Mind. Mind is creative and its creativity consists in the interpretation of Reality. Reality is dynamic, and the concrete alone is real. Hence philosophy is the study of this dynamic, concrete Reality. To say that Reality is Mind or Spirit is to say that Reality is Experience—an activity, the forms of which are distinguishable but inseparable.
Hence it is a system, a whole and a unity, mental through and through. How then to account for the concrete world of objects, the distinction between the subject and the object? "The concrete world on its theoretical side," says Croce, "is wholly an aesthetic-logical reality." Such a distinction as subject and object is itself a product of Mind. Thus Mind creates its own objects and this leads to the conclusion that Experience is a self-determining and self-creating activity.

Croce distinguishes between two types of the activity of the Mind, viz. (1) Theoretical, and (2) Practical, i.e. knowing and doing, or understanding and will respectively. These two activities stand in a definite relation. "Will depends on understanding in a manner in which understanding does not depend upon will. All knowing has action in view, but it is not necessary to will in order to know." 2

Knowing is an active process with two forms, Intuition and Conceptual thinking, or aesthetic and logical respectively. These two are related to each other "as a first to a second degree," because the logical is dependent upon aesthetic activity or activity of intuition, while the aesthetic depends upon no other activity. Doing is also divided into Economic activity and Ethical activity, the useful and the good respectively. The beautiful and the true, the useful and the good are thus the four distinct pure, universal concrete concepts, each giving us the whole of reality under one of its aspects.

Theoretic Activity: Intuition and Concept.—"Knowledge has two forms. It is either intuitive knowledge or logical; knowledge we acquire by imagination or knowledge we acquire by intellect; knowledge of the individual or knowledge of the universal; Knowledge is, in short, either productive of images or productive of concepts." 3

What does Croce mean by intuition, the first sub-grade of the theoretic activity? The following instances bring out clearly what he means. The impression of moonlight portrayed by a painter, a musical theme, the outline of a landscape sketched by a map-maker; all these can be intuitions and can exist without the shadow of an intellectual reference. In what respect, it may be asked, does this intuition differ from perception—that "bugbear of the realists"? The reply is that perception is the apprehension of some thing as real. Knowledge of reality is what we mean usually by perception. Perception is indeed intuition, but intuition is much wider than perception; for, no question of reality arises in the case of pure intuition. As regards sensation, Croce says, it forms the lower limit of intuition.

Intuition has a character of its own and it is the characteristic of every intuition to be expressive. It is just this expression of intuition in image which is the function of an artist. And the keynote of Croce's aesthetic theory is "Beauty is expression." Art is lyrical. It is giving expression to the intuition in the poet's or musician's soul. Further, when we enjoy
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a beautiful work of art, it is our own intuition that we are expressing. "Even that aesthetic sense which is contemplation rather than creation is also inward expression: the degree in which we understand or appreciate a work of art depends upon our ability to see by direct intuition the reality portrayed; our power to form for ourselves an expressive image." 4

The second sub-grade of theoretic activity is conceptual thinking which universalizes what is given in bare intuition. Without intuitions concepts are not possible, just as without sensations intuitions themselves are not possible. For Croce, the concept is mental and stands for no class of qualities in the external world; it is merely a moment or phase in thinking. As such it has three characteristics which are found nowhere else together. The concept is thus all three in one or one in three. The three characteristics are Expressiveness, Universality and Concreteness.

By expressiveness is meant that the concept, being based on an intuition which it completes, contains some expression as well. The mind cannot think a concept without thereby expressing it in some form. "To think logically is to speak, it may not be aloud or to others, but some expression the thought must have. If we cannot express our concept it is a sure sign that we do not yet possess it." 5

The characteristic of universality differentiates a concept from an intuition. Instances of concepts of such an entirely general character are quality, evolution, shape and beauty. The concept is immanent in every intuition or image which forms the material of thought. It is also transcendent.

Finally, to say that the concept is concrete is to say that it is real, present in every moment of our experience, immanent in every intuition. It is this quality of concreteness which enables us to distinguish the pure concept from a pseudo-concept. A pseudo-concept, according to Croce, is a mere class-name. We arrive at it by a kind of mental shorthand; abstracting from all existing "trees," for example, certain common qualities, we class them under the term "Tree." It is with these pseudo-concepts that the natural and mathematical sciences deal, while logic is the study of Pure Concepts. The concepts "of natural sciences are concrete, but not universal; and those of mathematics are universal but not concrete; while the true or pure concept is not universal and concrete, but universally concrete and concretely universal." 6

Practical Activity: Economic and Ethical.—Willing is the function of the practical activity, as knowing is the function of the theoretical. For Croce, there is no distinction between a volition and the action which issues therefrom. Hence the appropriateness of the phrase "Volition-action." Just as there is no intuition which is not expression, there is no volition which is not also action. Whatever is not action is mere mechanical movement and this is a pseudo-concept, an abstraction from
the concrete whole which is action. The practical activity is divided into
two sub-grades, the Economic and the Ethical. The economic activity
is based upon the concept of the useful and the ethical on that of the
good. The economic and the ethical are so related that while the former is
independent of the latter, the latter is dependent upon the former. It is,
however, important to note that every action embodies the forms both
of utility and of goodness. There is no purely economic, self-regarding,
individual act, just as there is no purely ethical, other-regarding universal
act. Egoism and altruism, therefore, are logically connected and indis-
soluble moments of experience. As such every action is both egoistic and
altruistic in character.

Identity of Philosophy and History.—Philosophy as Croce holds is
metodologia and not metaphisica. Philosophy is merely the universalizing
in a concrete form of the materials supplied by intuitions. A philosophic
idea dawns in the mind of the thinker at a particular point of time and
space and under certain definite circumstances and conditions without
which it could not have been what it is. The philosophy of Bergson, for
example, could not have been what it is at the time of Heracleitus,
for it presupposes a knowledge of modern developments in natural
sciences and philosophy which was impossible in the days of Heracleitus.
Philosophy changes with the change of history and since history changes
at every moment, philosophy at every moment is new. Hence it follows
that a final philosophy in the sense of a definitive pronouncement of
total truth is impossible. Never can any philosopher, however great, not
even Hegel, claim a title to a complete and final philosophical system.
The book of philosophic wisdom is not closed. The new philosophical
proposition is made possible only by the old; the old lives eternally in
the new that follows it and the new becomes old. Again, we cannot think
of history as a whole without distinguishing it at the same time into
the history of human activities useful and good, beautiful and true. These
are the respective subject-matters of economics and ethics, aesthetics and
logic; departments of philosophy which together and without further
addition constitute the whole of it.

To interpret history is to find out the causes, the consequences and
the correlations of events and not to attempt to discover any cosmic
purpose. Croce criticizes Hegel, Marx and Buckle for having interpreted
history to suit their own preconceived notions. All history is contemporary,
because it has a contemporary significance and illumination.

Ordinarily, a distinction may be made between history and philosophy,
the former as laying emphasis on narration of facts and the latter
on conceptual understanding. But if we probe into the meaning of his-
torical and philosophical propositions, we find that at bottom they
are one. Their functions being the same, viz. the synthesis of materials
of intuitions, they are regarded by Croce as being identical. "History
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does not precede Philosophy nor philosophy history; both are born at one birth."

GENTILE (1875-1944)

Giovanni Gentile was a junior contemporary of Croce and rendered valuable assistance to him as the joint-editor of La Critica, which served as an excellent forum for discussion of literary, historical and philosophical problems. Croce and Gentile together contributed in no small measure to the development of philosophical thought in Italy. Gentile was both a philosopher and a politician. He was a professor of Philosophy in the University of Rome; and under Mussolini's regime, he became Minister of Education. He started his political career as a liberal, but later joined the fascist movement.

Gentile was unto Croce a student, but he criticized his master and developed the neo-idealist doctrine to its logical conclusion in his own way by emphasizing the unitary character of Reality, and developing his philosophy of self-consciousness.

_Philosophy of Self-consciousness._—Croce started with a dynamic reality whose cyclic activity is a synthesis of four distinguishable but inseparable phases, viz. the useful, the good, the beautiful and the true. These phases, he holds, are in no way detrimental to the systematic unity of Reality. But Gentile asks, how can mind be a unity and yet the basis of four-fold multiplicity? If it is a unity, multiplicity cannot be as real as unity. If it is a multiplicity, there was no unity at all and there can be none. Gentile, therefore, starts with a criticism of the four phases of Reality and reduces all multiplicity to abstraction. But this fails to account for the apparent multiplicity of experience which is a characteristic feature of our routine day-to-day life. Experience to us is essentially a subject-object relation. The knowing subject and the known object together constitute our knowledge. Agreeing with Croce, Gentile holds the view that the world of objects is not external to minds. The distinction which is made between subject and object is itself the product of Mind. Mind makes its own objects. Knowledge does not mean the relation between mind and non-mind which is independent of it. The object of experience is inseparable from experience. It is indissolubly one with experience. The subject and the object, the knower and the known, all dissolve into Mind in the act of Self-consciousness. It is the self-same mind which is both subject and object in Self-consciousness. The subject is as much and just as complete mind as the object. In the words of Gentile, "The multiplicity is not indeed added to unity; it is absorbed in it. It is not \( N + 1 \) but \( N = 1 \)." Therefore, Self-consciousness is the only reality which is unity with two apparently distinguishable phases, in which the same mind throws itself completely, appearing as subject and object.

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Again, Gentile points out that if the object of knowing is the subject himself looking into his own inwardness, creating his own object, then knowing and doing cease to be different phases; knowing is willing and willing knowing. Thus Spirit, Mind or Self-consciousness is not a unity of two activities, knowing and doing, but it is a single knowing-doing activity.

*Actual Idealism.*—Gentile distinguishes between two kinds of thoughts, concrete thought or concrete act of thinking (in which there is yet no differentiation between the act of thinking from the content thought of) and abstract thought, which is past thought or thought made object. In this way he tries to show that multiplicity of experience and the duality of mind and reality are due to the movement from concrete to abstract thought. It follows that thought as a process can never be its own object. When we reflect, it is thought as a product, the past thought, which becomes the object of thought. This past thought, abstract thought, either mine own or of others, is real to me when it becomes a part of my concrete thinking. Thus one moment of thought is succeeded by another and that by a third, and so on. Actual moment of thought gives all these past thoughts a concrete objectivity and in itself is succeeded by a further act which is actual. Thus all past thought becomes passive, which is nature; the actual thought alone is active, which is the Spirit. "Nature is fossilized thought, the debris of the life of thinking, its shadow and echo; it does not face us, it follows."9

Gentile also makes a distinction between the empirical ego and the Transcendental ego. The empirical ego or the individual is an object or a part of nature. In knowing what I am, either as being different from other individuals or as being the same, I am already not what I am. I am something deeper than the self, I know to be myself. I am not what I know, but the knowing activity itself, which is the Spirit. Thus all experience is of the type of Self-consciousness. The *empirical ego* is *real* as rooted in the Transcendental ego which is immanent in it.

Such in brief outline are the philosophical views of Croce and Gentile, the distinguished leaders of the neo-idealistic movement in Italy. In conclusion, it may be worth our while to note a few points of difference between them, though they agree in regard to their basic idealistic position, and also to compare, however briefly, their views with those of Indian Philosophers. The differences between Croce and Gentile are well brought out in their polemical discussions as summarized by P. Romanell, in his charming little book, *Croce versus Gentile*, written in the dialogue form after the manner of Plato. Croce differentiates his philosophical views and outlook from Gentile's by finding fault with Gentile's theologizing philosophy; for his enthusiasm for the unity of the spirit ignoring distinctions, as leading to mysticism; for his Trans-
cendental ego which is only the ineffable God in the modern garb. As a staunch liberal humanist, Croce protests against Gentile’s totalitarian and fascist philosophy of life. To impose authority at any cost, as Croce says, is to dispose of common consent.

Neo-Idealism (of Croce in particular) and early Buddhism (generally speaking) agree in their anti-metaphysical and humanistic outlook. They have ruled out dogmatic religion and abstruse metaphysics from their philosophy. They are not interested in subtle and abstract metaphysical discussions which do not illumine, but only mystify and prove unprofitable, especially when judged from the human and moral point of view. This attitude gains in significance if we compare it with the Buddha’s silence on metaphysical problems. Croce is well known as a humanist substituting the worship of beauty and the life of culture for religion, and a liberal democrat emphasizing the ideal of individual liberty. Again, Buddhism and Neo-Idealism agree on the dynamic view of Reality and the essential identity of philosophy and history. In this connection Dr. Dasgupta refers to the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda). "According to Buddhism, the being of an event or an appearance has no further concept to define it than that it has been determined by something else or it is determining something else. This concept of truth or philosophy is, therefore, identical with the concept of history, viz. that of determining and that of being determined." He also points out that the "view of Yogācāra Buddhism is largely akin to the general position of Croce." Finally, it is suggested that Gentile’s philosophy of Self-consciousness reminds us of a similar philosophical theory of Yājñavalkya and Śaṅkara. But this similarity will be obvious only after the implications of Gentile’s philosophy are properly worked out.

B. AMERICAN IDEALISM

From Italy we now turn to America. A young nation, America has no antiquity comparable with Italy. Its philosophical tradition dates back only to its colonial period when it lived on imported ideas and its thought was saturated with foreign inspiration. July 4, 1766, gave America political independence but intellectually it remained colonial for some more decades. A process of intellectual emancipation, however, began as new ideas were imported from without, especially from Germany and Britain and thoughtful Americans began to review them in their historical perspective and interpret them in their own way.

The middle of the nineteenth century saw a great academic awakening expressing itself in critical and constructive work of a high order. Philosophy was freed from clerical domination and became an independent department in the Universities. That philosophy was recognized as a
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professionalized discipline was due largely to the influence of Germany. This also explains why German idealism exercised such deep attraction for the minds of American thinkers and won so many adherents among professors of philosophy in American Universities. Societies like “The Philosophical Society of St. Louis,” “The Kant Club” headed by W. T. Harris and “The Concord Summer Club” fostered the study of German thought and led to the rise of the different schools of idealism in America. In the present study, we are concerned with only two of them, viz. Absolute Idealism and Personal Idealism as represented by Royce and Howison respectively.13

JOSIAH ROYCE (1855–1916)

A man of great learning, speculative grasp and attractive literary style, Josiah Royce was during his college education greatly impressed by the writings of Mill and Spencer. He studied first at the University of California and later in Germany under Lotze, Wundt and Windelband. During this period he came under the influence of Kant, the Romanticists, Schopenhauer and later Hegel. Returning to America, he took his Doctorate at Johns Hopkins University by writing a thesis on “The Possibility of Error.” William James was impressed by his scholarship and helped him to secure in 1882 a position in the Harvard University where he taught philosophy for the rest of his life.

Royce had his share of sorrows and afflictions but he bore them in a spirit of cheerful resignation, which is a characteristic feature of his idealistic view of life. German idealism appealed to him most and he loved to live in its serene atmosphere and build up his own theory. He regarded order, peace and security as the objectives of social life. In philosophy he formulated his theory of the Absolute in which all differences are reconciled and all values eternally conserved.

Royce’s philosophical theory is usually described as Absolute Idealism; but it differs from that of Hegel, Bradley or Śāṅkara. He derived inspiration and learnt much from German and British idealists but gave a new and fresh turn to the idealistic doctrine. He incorporated into his system elements of truth which he discovered in the rival schools of thought. It is evident from his monumental work, The World and the Individual, that he arrived at his Conception of Being, which he named as Synthetic Idealism, through a searching but sympathetic criticism of Realism, Mysticism, and Critical Rationalism.

In weaving the complex fabric of his system, Royce utilized the threads supplied by Pragmatists like Peirce and James and Personal Idealists like Howison. He had imbibed the spirit of transcendentalism from literary idealists like Emerson. His works also reveal some acquaintance
with Upaniṣadic thought, traces of which may be seen in the exposition of his idealistic theory and in his sympathetic understanding of mysticism. During more than thirty years of his philosophical career he wrote a series of books in which we find different formulations of his theory. A shift in interest and emphasis is revealed in his later writings which are marked by a deeper concern with ethico-social problems, a greater emphasis on will and purpose and a better appreciation of personality in relation to the Absolute. Limitation of space does not allow us to discuss in detail the different phases and stages of his philosophy. All that we can attempt here is to consider briefly a few of the distinctive features of his thought.

**Error and the Absolute.**—Like Kant, Royce emphasized the need of a criticism of knowledge as supplying the foundations of metaphysics. In his first philosophical work, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, he tried to answer the question: *What do I know?* "Doubt for a truth-seeker," he wrote, "is not only a privilege but a duty." To doubt our beliefs is to imply that (a) there may be error in our judgments and (b) there is a difference between true and false judgments. To admit the possibility of error implies the absoluteness of truth. In and of itself, no single judgment can be an error; it is simply an assertion. It is an error only by comparison with a more adequate judgment or a "higher thought" which includes it. If error is thus relative to a higher or more comprehensive thought, we are inevitably led, in the last analysis, to an all-inclusive, Infinite Thought. Royce reaches the same conclusion by a parallel argument that our partial and fragmentary experiences require an all-inclusive, Absolute Experience for their interpretation. This he describes as Omniscent Being or God. The very existence of error, of partial and fragmentary experiences is thus found to imply the Absolute. To doubt or deny the Absolute is to affirm it: "this Absolute Experience is related to our (partial) experiences as an organic whole to its own fragments."

**Internal and External Meaning of Ideas.**—As we reflect on experience with which we start, we find that it has not only a factual but also an ideal side. The bare facts are mere abstractions. Experience is always an idealized or meaningful experience. It is ideas that give meaning to facts. We have therefore to inquire into the nature of an idea. An idea has an inner character and it may be viewed as an embodiment or expression of a conscious interest or purpose. It has also an external reference, a reference to an object beyond itself. An idea has thus not only an inner meaning as fulfilling a conscious purpose but also an external meaning in its reference to an object beyond it, with which it is in cognitive relation. The distinction between these meanings corresponds to that between the *what* and the *that*, between essence and existence. These are inseparably joined and together constitute the unity of experience. The realists and the mystics, says Royce, indulge in false abstraction. The
whole emphasis of the former is on the external and of the latter on the internal meaning. Royce himself lays special stress on the internal meaning or purpose which ultimately determines the truth of an idea and finds in will the key to knowledge. This indicates the voluntaristic phase of his philosophy.

Synthetic Idealism.—Royce formulated his own theory of Synthetic Idealism through a critical estimate of the three conceptions of Being as developed in Realism, Mysticism and Critical Rationalism. For Realism, "to be real means to be independent of an idea or experience through which the real being is, from without, felt, or thought, or known." 16 What is is not only external to our ideas of it but absolutely and independently determines the validity of our ideas. What we "merely think" makes "no difference" whatever to the fact. Realism implies a dualism between ideas and objects. It separates too rigidly the external from the internal meaning of ideas, laying special stress on the former. In his criticism of Realism, Royce points out that it is based on a false abstraction in so far as it sunder and holds quite apart ideas and objects, the internal and the external meaning of ideas. In reality, these are inseparably joined and mutually dependent as parts of one Reality. If any fact or object is wholly "other" or beyond experience, it renders any linkage between them and in consequence, any true knowledge of it impossible. By merely examining an idea, taken by itself, we cannot tell whether its object is or is not real. Nor can we tell by merely considering an object, whether any particular idea external to that object does or does not rightly represent it. A consistent realist has to admit that his own theory, being an idea and at the same time an independent entity, has no relation to any real world; a world in which he lives but which, on his theory, is reduced to a realm of nothingness or void.

Royce has greater sympathy for Mysticism, Christian as well as Hindu. He observes that Mysticism first appeared in India and that the Upanishads contain the entire story of the mystic faith. Mysticism, according to him, is the polar opposite of realism. For it "... to be means, simply and wholly, to be immediate." 17 Mysticism says: "Know the truth is not outside. It is nigh thee, even in thy heart. Purify thyself. In thee is all truth. How shall it be except as known and as one with the Knower?" As opposed to Realism, Mysticism lays the whole emphasis on the internal meaning. Being is identified with fulfillment of purpose. All ordinary, finite ideas are condemned since they have no absolute internal meaning and so cannot be taken as real. Royce regards the mystics as the most thoroughgoing empiricists, because they take their stand on pure, absolute experience. This is Reality. This is self in completeness. "That art thou." Royce refers to Yâjñavalkya's Neiti, Neiti and to Bernard's Nescio, Nescio. A mystic says, "Believe not those prattlers, who boast that they know God. Who knows Him is silent."
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It is well to remember that Royce has, for purposes of his discussion, taken extreme forms of Realism and Mysticism. He finds that Mysticism, like Realism, is based on a false abstraction. He does not agree with mystics in their excessive emphasis on internal meaning and immediacy. Nor does he share in their disparagement of the world of fact in their anxiety to exalt the Absolute. When Royce says, *That art thou*, he urges that this is true not of the imperfect self of the merely finite idea but of the fulfilled and final or Absolute Self. He accepts the *Neti, Neti* doctrine, not as expressing the essential nature of true Being but the present inadequacy of our passing and finite ideas. The finite, however, is lighted by the Infinite; the glimpses of the Eternal are truly seen in the temporal. To sum up: "If mysticism is to escape from its own finitude and really is to mean by its absolute Being anything but a Mere Nothing, its account of Being must be so amended as to involve the assertion that our finite life is not mere illusion, that our ideas are not merely false, and that we are already, even as finite, in touch with Reality." So to amend it is the mission of Royce's idealism.

Royce then proceeds to consider the third conception of Being which he describes as Critical Rationalism. He finds it in a developed form in the philosophy of Kant and regards it as marking an advance over the first two conceptions, viz. Realism and Mysticism. Unlike Realism, it holds that Being is not absolutely independent. It is objective but not isolated from the realm of ideas. Unlike Mysticism, it keeps away from any tendency towards subjectivism and recognizes the meaning and value of finite ideas. Its watchword is neither Independence nor Immediacy but Validity. For it, "to be real now means, primarily, *to be valid*, *to be true, to be in essence* the standard for ideas." Our ideas have a standard external to themselves to which they must correspond. To be real is to be related to possible experience, under known and specified conditions.

But what do we mean by validity and possible experience? asks Royce. These terms are not used unambiguously by the critical rationalists. As applied to ideas that we actually verify, validity means that they are concretely expressed in our individual experience. But as applied to the whole realm of valid truth in general (to the world of nature as not yet observed by us, or to mathematical truth not now present to us), it means that this realm has an extra-empirical character. Validity appears as universal, formal and abstract. The truth seems at first to be an individual fact, but it transforms itself into a universal principle. According to Royce there is no such thing as mere possibility; possibility logically involves actuality. Reality is concrete and individual; what validates ideas must be conceived in terms of Individual Experience.

It is to resolve the difficulties in these three doctrines that Royce formulated his theory of Synthetic Idealism. Being is something "other"
than and authoritative over finite ideas, as Realism asserts; for ideas seek Being as that which, when completely known, will fulfill them and end their doubts. Being is not, however, something independent of them. Being is fulfilment of purpose which ideas seek, as Mysticism insists, but it is not a merely immediate fact that quenches them. Being involves truth or validity of ideas, as Critical Rationalism demands; but validity is not to be conceived as an abstract universal but as having a determinate form, a concrete content. An idea is true, "if, in its own measure, and on its own plane, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own final and completely individual expression." Being is "what gives true ideas their truth; or in other words, to be real is to be the object of a true idea." Therefore, "what is, or what is real, is as such the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas."

Reality is thus in the last analysis identical with complete internal meaning or ultimate purpose, the otherness of external meaning being in the end an appearance. Royce holds that the meaning or the purpose of the idea is not its extinction but its extension so as to embrace what at first appears as its other. The purpose of the idea is its own completion. "This alone is. All else is either shadow or else is partial embodiment. This alone is real, this complete life of divine fulfilment of whatever finite ideas seek." Royce calls it God, the Absolute Self, Infinite Thought and Will. It is all-inclusive, all-knowing and in it all purposes are eternally accomplished. The Absolute or God is also named by him in his various writings as Logos, Problem-Solver, World-Interpreter, Beloved Community. These different names imply either a change in emphasis or a shift in the point of view.

*The Absolute, Self and Nature.—* This general outline of Royce's theory of Being requires to be filled in by a few important details. In this connection his views on the relations of the finite selves and the physical world to the Absolute deserve special consideration. It was no easy task for Royce to adduce arguments, both logical and ethical, in support of his version of the philosophy of the Absolute. He had to take particular care to avoid the two extremes of rigid monism and absolute pluralism in terms of which his philosophy was likely to be interpreted.

Royce repudiated the empirical, intuitive and transcendental conceptions of the human self. According to him, it is neither an actual experience, nor a thing nor a substance but "a Meaning embodied in a conscious life." The meaning, purpose or life-plan of every finite self is fragmentary and is only a partial expression of Divine will or plan. Every self is different from every other. All these selves combine in the unity of the Absolute Self, without losing their individuality, freedom and moral responsibility. The individuality of a self does not mean its independence of other selves; on the contrary, it is closely linked with the
inter-communication and interdependence of all selves. Royce is thus opposed to Leibniz’s theory of mutually independent, windowless monads. To say that a self is an individual, uniquely embodying the Will of God or the Absolute, is to say that it is free. To be free is to be self-determined. It is true that finite selves are what they are in and through the Absolute, that the Absolute Will or the Will of God is inclusive of all finite wills. But it is not correct to argue on that ground, says Royce, that finite selves are swallowed up in God or that their wills are not free at all. “We are in God, but we are not lost in God.” Royce argues in the same manner in favour of the immortality of individual selves in the Absolute. He is anxious to conserve their personal immortality and yet he makes them ultimate sharers in the all-embracing vision of the Absolute.

It follows from the central idealistic theory of Royce that the world of nature is throughout of such stuff as ideas are made of. These ideas which constitute the world, though outside finite minds, yet exist in and for the Universal Mind. The world out there must in order to be known by us be a mental world. If it were not mental or spiritual in its inner character, it would be totally inaccessible to us. God is its final, not its mechanical cause; it is the expression of His will or purpose. The inner significance of the world as the vesture of God can be understood only through “appreciation,” not through scientific “description.” What is appreciated, i.e. inwardly felt and immediately apprehended, is inner meaning, purpose or value. What is described is the external aspect of facts. Scientific description is abstract, superficial and mechanical, as it is concerned only with what can be measured, verified and communicated. It thus leaves out the deeper aspects of life and its ultimate value. However great the achievement of science and its practical utility, Royce says, science does not give us a full view of life and cannot disclose the ultimate nature of reality.22

It is interesting to note in this connection Royce’s ingenious use of the idea of Time-span. Abandoning the ideal contrast of mind and matter, of self and nature, and stressing their continuity and analogy, he suggests that there are various types and degrees of conscious processes. We may understand this statement when applied to animate beings, but if it be asked how inanimate objects can have consciousness, Royce’s reply is that what we regard as inanimate objects are in fact living, though we do not realize this because they have time-spans different from ours.23 We thus have no right whatever to speak of really unconscious nature but only of uncommunicative nature. We can communicate only with those beings that share our time-span, and not, for example, with mountains and stars with their vastly longer rhythms or time-spans. This does not, however, mean that they are totally devoid of any type or degree of consciousness. They only appear to us to be so devoid, because our range is limited, but they are not so to God, to whom with His
unlimited range, everything is all at once, *totum simul*, and with Whom it is all Everlasting Now.

_Loyalty and Beloved Community._—The last phase of the philosophy of Royce is dominated by ethico-religious interests. It centres round two important conceptions of Loyalty and Beloved Community, which are developed by him in his _Philosophy of Loyalty_ and _The Problem of Christianity._ Partly under the influence of Peirce and Howison, he formulates in these later writings a theory of the world as a community of minds rather than a realm of ideas. Knowledge is described as a social process, a community of interpretation, rather than in the traditional idealistic fashion. God is conceived not in the conventional theistic manner but as the Spirit of Community, without, however, detracting from His supreme religious status.

In his earlier work, _The Religious Aspect of Philosophy_, Royce had formulated his theory of morality of harmony based on moral insight. It is moral insight that promotes human solidarity by the service of art, science, truth and the State, and harmonizes the conflicting individual wills into the unity of the Universal Will. In his later work, _The Philosophy of Loyalty_, we have an eloquent presentation of the conception of loyalty as constituting the keystone of his ethical doctrine. He defines loyalty as "the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause." As instances of loyalty he mentions the devotion of a patriot to his country, of a martyr to his religion, of a captain to his sinking ship. A man is moral when he is loyal to a cause. But there are many different causes and our loyalties may conflict. The question therefore arises: How are we to decide what causes are good and worthy of our loyalty? How are we to reconcile conflicting loyalties? That cause is good, answers Royce, which satisfies not only my interest but the interest of all the fellow-beings who are equally loyal to the same cause. In other words, that cause is good by being loyal to which similar loyalty of others is in no way disturbed. That cause which fosters loyalty to loyalty is good. "In choosing and in serving the cause to which you are to be loyal, be, in any case, loyal to loyalty." This, according to Royce, is the highest moral command. Loyalty to loyalty is the supreme virtue, all virtues like justice, charity, fidelity being only its special forms. Such loyalty unifies and ennobles life, giving it centre and stability, and filling it with hope and courage. "All the loyal are, and in all times have been, one genuine and religious brotherhood." To act as if one were a member of such brotherhood is to attain the goal of moral life, to win what religion calls salvation.

It may be seen from the above account how Royce finds in his developing philosophy an easy passage from "Loyalty to Loyalty" to the "Beloved Community." Royce accepts St. Paul's interpretation of Christianity and holds that the conception of the Beloved Community is the very
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essence of Christianity. For him Christian love takes on the form of loyalty. What can truly and justly claim our loyalty is not any community or union but a community of memory and hope, a unity of faith and redeeming grace. No man can be saved in his isolation, but only through his loyalty to the Beloved Community. Such loyalty according to the generally accepted interpretation of Royce's religious attitude, means love of God and implies surrender to His Will.

GEORGE HOLMES HOWISON (1834-1916)

The names of Royce, James and Dewey are usually mentioned as the three most eminent thinkers that America has produced. Howison does not occupy that high position as a thinker or writer, but deserves recognition as a very successful teacher who inspired many generations of pupils, some of whom came to be known as great thinkers. Howison, whose life was a veritable Odyssey, travelled extensively in Europe and moved from place to place in America, holding different teaching posts in various Universities and institutions, lecturing on subjects as diverse as Mathematics and Political Science, Logic and Philosophy of Science. His wanderings came to an end when at the age of fifty he settled in the University of California as a professor of philosophy.

Howison was for a short time under Hegel's influence till Leibniz's theory of Monads came as an important corrective to Hegel's philosophy of the Absolute. The Absolute of Hegel, Howison said, is "the night in which all cows are black." In "The Great Philosophical Debate" (reproduced in Royce's The Conception of God), Howison criticized the Absolutism of Royce on the ground that it led to the obliteration of individuality. This criticism led Royce to modify his theory and formulate a conception of The Beloved Community which resembles that of Howison's Republic of Spirits. Howison had a warm and worthy friend in Euchen, a well-known German philosopher with whom he had a rare intellectual agreement. Both of them stood firmly and fully on the platform of Personal Idealism. They combated every form of pantheism as they held that it annulled every distinction in the realm of value and left no place for ethics.

Howison did not work out a logically comprehensive system of philosophy but expressed his views on a number of philosophical problems in a style which is both lucid and forceful in articles in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, the Hibbert Journal and in his Limits of Evolution and Other Essays. The two problems which drew his special attention were Evolution and Individuality and he sought to solve them by formulating a theory known as Personal Idealism or Spiritual Pluralism.

Nature and Limits of Evolution.—Howison did not doubt the reality of evolution as a fact of biology and valued it as a method of science
within that field. He, however, held that its extension to the whole world as a cosmic theory was an unwarranted speculation. Evolution, he held, cannot satisfactorily explain the origin of life or mind. The idea of evolution is grounded in the idea of progress, the meaning of which can be understood only in the light of a goal, an ideal that is "beyond" the actual and not yet realized. Evolution thus means progress in the direction of the goal to be achieved. The explanation of evolutionary progress is therefore teleological, not mechanistic. Let science study "man the physical, the physiological, or the experimentally psychological," but let it not venture to encroach on "man the spirit." The spiritual man cannot evolve from mechanical nature. On the contrary, it is nature that requires man the spirit for its explanation. The world, according to Howison, consists of a plurality of spirits, selves or persons who constitute the Eternal Republic of which God is the President. Howison therefore held that the theory of evolution destroys the reality of personality, whether human or divine, if it is mechanistically interpreted or extended beyond its legitimate sphere or propounded as a cosmic theory.

Personal Idealism.—The dominating motive of Howison's philosophy was ethical. He was primarily concerned with maintaining and defending the integrity, moral freedom and responsibility of man. He was opposed to both materialism and "historic idealism" for both according to him were monistic. The former reduced mind to matter. The latter allowed no room for real, independent minds in the all-inclusive, Universal Mind. Both therefore involved the denial of personal freedom and moral agency. Howison fought against pantheism as it was either atheistic or acosmic and as such overwhelmingly impersonal, contradicting personal freedom and immortality. Howison did not think that science supports the claims of pantheism, but if it did, "this would be an indictment of science rather than an endorsement of pantheism." Though a pluralist, he is opposed to anarchic individualism. Though a believer in God, he rejects the doctrine of God as "an all-predetermining Single Mind that alone has real free agency."

God, Man and Nature.—Howison reduces all existence to minds, or to the items and orders of their experiences. "These phenomenal experiences, as recognized by the active forms of consciousness, are what we call the physical world of nature." The Universe is thus an innumerable number of uncreated, free, self-subsistent selves who have no origin in time nor existence in space, yet on account of whose correlation and co-existence "Time and Space and all that both contain owe their existence." It is mind which is "nature-begetting" and the finite minds alone are "directively and productively causal of it." If there is a multiplicity of free, finite, individual minds, as Howison holds, how can the objectivity of nature be accounted for? He answers by referring to the "benign consensus of the whole society of minds" who have an identical
CHAPTER XLIII

PRAGMATISM

1. INTRODUCTION

The pragmatic movement in philosophy, associated with the names of William James and John Dewey in America, and F. C. S. Schiller in England, originated primarily as a polemic against absolute idealism of the Hegelian School which, for some time, dominated Anglo-American thought through the teachings of its able exponents like T. H. Green, Edward and John Caird, F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet and Josiah Royce. The absolutist’s belief in the efficacy of the dialectic method for establishing knowledge and truth, his monistic outlook and conception of a world of static perfection, a “block universe,” logically complete and determined through and through, his transcendentalism and other-worldliness, came in for severe criticism at the hands of the pragmatists. The absolutist approach to the problem of reality being purely logical and intellectual, had no appeal for the pragmatist whose approach was essentially human. The absolutist’s conception of the world, says W. James, is no doubt “simple, clean and noble,” since “principles of reason trace its outlines” and “logical necessities cement its parts.” But it is far too abstract and remote from the world of concrete personal experiences which is “multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed.” The “contradictions of real life being absent from it,” it is a “monument of artificiality,” a “way of escape” from the real world and not its explanation. It is an unreal substitute for the concrete world of ours with its change and plurality, chance and indeterminism.

The pragmatist emphasis on the reality of the temporal as opposed to the eternal, on change and plurality as opposed to permanence and abstract unity, on indeterminism as opposed to necessity typifies the characteristic outlook of the twentieth-century philosophy. In its anti-absolutism, pragmatism agrees with all the contemporary philosophical tendencies, including Italian neo-idealism, Anglo-American neo-realism and logical positivism; in its anti-intellectualism and emphasis upon the biological categories, it is akin to Bergsonism and voluntarism.

It is difficult to give a clear-cut definition of pragmatism; partly because it is not a systematic doctrine which can be understood in terms of some single cardinal principle, and partly because it is prompted by different motives in its different exponents. Pragmatism expresses a philosophic attitude, a particular outlook on life, and professes to be a criticism and a method rather than a systematic philosophy.
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For the pragmatist, philosophy is not a barren intellectual pursuit, but is vitally related to human life and existence. Philosophical conceptions are not merely of a dialectical nature, but have serious implications for human life. Our theories are otiose if they have no bearing on the problems of life, and our ideas and beliefs have no meaning if they fail to modify our conduct and make any possible difference in our experience. Our concepts do not merely describe and characterize an independently real world, but are, as in experimental science, working hypotheses, ways of getting results, whose truth value depends upon the extent to which they admit of empirical verification. The life which we live as human beings is primarily a life of instincts and desires, of a continuous process of adjustment and readjustment to an environment, of enterprise and adventure, risks and uncertainties, failures and achievements, decadence and progress. Every moment of our lives we stand on our trial, faced with some vital issues which call for decisive action on our part. Under the circumstances, we cannot, except at our own peril, indulge in barren intellectual pursuits or fiddle with logical trivialities. Our intellect must be harnessed to the service of action, and knowledge must subserve the ends of life. Philosophy must exist for the sake of life, and not life for the sake of philosophy.

2. ORIGIN OF PRAGMATISM: CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE (1839–1914)

Both James and Dewey attribute the origin of pragmatism to Charles Sanders Peirce, the American scientist and logician. The term pragmatism was suggested to Peirce by his study of Kant. In his Metaphysics of Morals Kant made the distinction between the laws of morality which are a priori, and the rules of skill and the technique of art, based on experience and having definite relation to human purpose. The former he named "practical" and the latter "pragmatic." Having an experimental cast of mind, Peirce was not interested in the a priori practical laws which, for him, belonged to an airy region of thought, but he readily seized upon the word "pragmatic," which has definite bearing on human purpose, to name his own doctrine. As a logician, he was interested in the art and technique of real thinking and used his pragmatic method for the purpose of making our ideas clear and forming effective definitions in conformity with the spirit of scientific method.

In his pragmatism, Peirce develops the meaning of ideas rather than of truth. As an experimentalist, he was not inclined to accept the meaning of ideas on authority or from an analysis of their conceptual definition, but would rather put them to work to see what they amount to in terms of their sensible effects, and what perceptual characteristics they are
likely to develop. The whole meaning of an idea is determined by its conceivable practical bearings and possible sensible effects. A concept cannot be defined in the abstract; its sole meaning lies in what it amounts to in the concrete. Whatever assertion you may make to an experimentalist, "he will either understand as meaning that, if a given prescription for an experiment ever can be and ever is carried out in act, an experience of a given description will result, else he will see no sense at all in what you say." Propositions, from the point of view of an experimental scientist, have no meaning unless they can be translated into prescriptions for attaining new experimental truths. According to the pragmatic principle, then, the meaning of a concept is to be found "in all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of the concept could imply."6

Peirce is not interested in defining the sensuous details of phenomena, but tries to define their rational purport which lies in the purposive bearing of the word or proposition in question. The meaning of a proposition, according to him, "is a general description of all the experimental phenomena which the assertion of the proposition virtually predicts." It is, further, that form of the proposition in which it "becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those special circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design," but "under every situation and to every purpose."8 Hence Peirce not only identifies meaning with the future, but also with the general. He emphasizes the universality of concepts in the realm of experience as well as their purposive bearing.

Although in Peirce's theory action or conduct plays an important part, yet the "stoical maxim that the end of man is action did not appeal to him," and he did not make thought or rational activity subordinate to particular ends or interests: "To say that we live for the sake of action would be to say that there is no such thing as a rational purport."9 For the pragmatist the sumnum bonum does not consist in action, but in that process of evolution whereby the existent with the aid of action becomes gradually a body of rational tendencies or of habits generalized as much as possible.10 In Peirce's pragmatism, according to John Dewey, the role of action is that of an intermediary. It is by means of action that concepts are applied to existence, and the modification of existence resulting therefrom constitutes the true meaning of concepts.11

From his pragmatic point of view, Peirce also discusses the meaning of the terms "reality" and "truth." The meaning of these terms must be determined on the basis of their effects having practical bearings. The effect which the real things produce is to cause beliefs, and beliefs are the consequences which give the term "reality" its rational purport. The sole purpose of scientific inquiry is to pass from a state of doubt to a state of settled belief, and the scientific method of fixation of belief is to push the inquiry far enough to secure consensus of opinion among
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qualified investigators. To fix our belief about Reality, whose characters are independent of what this or that man thinks about them, we should secure agreement of all the investigators. "Reality" will then mean the object of those fixed beliefs about which, after prolonged inquiry, consensus of opinion has been secured, and "truth" happens to be merely a quality of these beliefs.14

3. PRAGMATISM OF WILLIAM JAMES (1842–1910)

Whereas Peirce’s pragmatism had a decidedly intellectual cast, in so far as he was interested in the rational purport and not in the sensuous quality of experience, and it emphasized the reality of "generals," James being more of a nominalist, emphasized the reality of particular sensible experience. Peirce himself disagreed with the interpretation which James had put upon his pragmatism.15 James no doubt accepted the fundamental principle of Peirce that "our beliefs are really rules for action," and that our thought distinctions being never "so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice," our whole conception of the object is really a conception of its possible sensible effects.16 But he developed this principle in a way which, according to Dewey, in one sense extended and, in another sense, narrowed its range of application. James extended the meaning of the principle in so far as he held that "the effective meaning of any philosophical proposition can be brought down to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether active or passive, the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular, than in the fact that it must be active."17 And he takes the word "practical" to mean "the distinctively concrete, the individual, particular and effective as opposed to the abstract, general and inert."18 Thus in one sense he extended the sweep of Peirce’s principle by "the substitution of particular consequences for the general rule or method applicable to future experience." But in another sense it meant a narrowing down of the application of the principle, since it "destroyed the importance attached by Peirce to the greatest possible application of the rule, or habit of conduct—its extension to universality."19

Scientific method is interested in fixing the belief of the community, in securing consensus of opinion about our object of belief. Before a particular belief is fixed and adopted by the community, the function of our will, according to Peirce, is to "control thought, exercise cautious doubt, and to weigh reason; and this is the exact reverse of James’s will to believe which is the will not to exercise this sceptical will."20

James seized upon Peirce’s principle that "at the root of every distinction of thought" there is something "tangible and practical," and that there is "no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice," to develop his own pragmatic
criterion of meaning and truth and also a method for solving philosophical disputes. As a humanist, James realized the vital implications of philosophical problems for mankind, and at the same time saw the futility of a purely intellectual and logical approach to these problems, which often with its unintelligent hair-splitting and unmeaning verbal subtleties, leads us into a blind alley. He therefore suggested that in order to determine whether a given philosophical question has vital meaning or is merely verbal, we should consider what interests were at stake if one or other of the theses in dispute were accepted and affirmed. There is "no difference in the abstract truth that does not express itself in a difference in concrete fact, and in conduct consequent upon that fact," and "the whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world formula or that world formula be the true one." The dispute between theism and materialism, for example, is merely verbal if we look only to the past of the world, and consider its course to be completed. But if we take the future into account, the two theories would present to us wholly different outlooks of experience. It would then no longer be a matter of indifference whether matter or God was the cause of the world.

Viewed prospectively, materialism would mean the denial, and theism the guarantee of our ideal and spiritual values, and our life would take a different turn, according as we adopt one or other of these alternatives. In this way, pragmatic method affords a means of discovering the meaning of philosophical conceptions, and ways of solving metaphysical disputes.

In his theory of the will to believe, James pleaded for the right of man to choose his beliefs even in the absence of definitive evidence. By this, however, he did not mean that we should believe according to our whims. He limited the sphere of such beliefs to religion and morals, where formal reasonings cannot settle the matter, and the issues being momentous and forced on us, our decision can be withheld only at the risk of losing the advantages that would follow if the belief were true. Where the issues of life are at stake, we should not be over-scrupulous about errors; it is often better to incur the risk of being mistaken than give up the chance of guessing the truth. Thus James seeks a justification for our moral and religious beliefs and the actions based thereon, although the truth of such beliefs may not be logically certified in advance.

According to James, the pragmatist does not conceive knowledge as a finished product or a completed system, and the function of epistemology is not merely to analyse it and lay bare its underlying ground and universal principles. For the pragmatist, on the other hand, knowledge is a concrete, dynamic process, something which is not given, but made—a complex event within experience, involving a particular kind of relation between
its terms. Knowing is a sort of enterprise, attended with hopes and fears, and ending in success or failure. The process of knowing happens within experience, which, according to James, is a self-contained and self-sustaining reality, leaning on nothing more ultimate for its support. In holding the view that "the knower and the object known must both be portions of experience," James seeks to overcome the traditional dualism of subject and object. In direct acquaintance, as in sense-perception, where there is no inner duality of the knower and the known, and no implication of self-transcendence, "object and subject fuse in the fact of presentation," and "any one of the same that," in experience, figures "in two divergent kinds of context," "alternately as a thing known and as a knowledge of the thing." But human knowledge is not circumscribed within the field of presentation, and most of the things we know are represented to us by what we know about them. Where direct knowledge of things is practically impossible, we know them indirectly in terms of their substitutes. The substitute in such cases is an "idea of" the thing and the thing for which the substitution is made is the "object." As a fact of experience, the idea is simply what it is, and as such does not transcend itself. But as one term of the knowing situation, it somehow transcends itself and connects with the object lying beyond its own boundaries. This self-transcendence of idea in knowledge cannot be explained if its relation to object is statically conceived. It can be explained if only knowledge is conceived as essentially dynamic—an affair wholly of transitions and leadings within experience.\textsuperscript{33}

In the pragmatic theory of knowledge, the idea performs the function of meaning and is not a mere image. An idea is practically what it does. But what is the function of meaning in terms of which an idea is defined? Knowledge being wholly a matter of transition from the idea to the object, the meaning of an idea is essentially a plan of action terminating in the object meant. To say that the idea means or intends its object, is to start a series of incipient actions which, if completed, would terminate in that object. Knowing is a concrete natural process, and the idea, functionally considered, is an instrument which through a series of intervening experiences, brings us into the object's neighbourhood, gets us into commerce with it and enables us to deal with it and act about it.\textsuperscript{34}

Where from the nature of the case, immediate access to the object is practically impossible, the ideas function as substitutes for real experiences, and by "experimenting on our ideas of reality, we may save ourselves the trouble of experimenting upon the real experiences which they severally mean." In such a case, "the ideas form related systems," "corresponding point for point" to the system of reality; "and by letting an ideal term call up its associates systematically, we may be led to a terminus which the corresponding real term would have led to in case we had operated on the real world." From the pragmatic point of view,
the idea as a practical substitute for immediate experience, which it means, gives us a virtual access to it. 35

The problem of the meaning of ideas and their function in knowledge leads us naturally to the problem of truth. If knowledge is conceived, not as a static, but as a dynamic relation between the idea and its object, and if knowledge is not a finished product, but is in the process of being made, then truth, which according to James is a property of ideas, is not a property which belongs to them eternally, but is something which happens to them and they become true or are made true by events. The truth of ideas is in fact an event or a process. 36 Ideas are made true by the mediating events which lead them on to their goal. Ideas themselves are events, and what the intellectualist calls singular truth, or Truth with a capital "T," is for the pragmatist only a "collective name for the truths in the plural, these consisting always of a series of definite events." 37

The common view held about truth is that it lies in the agreement of our ideas with their objects, and falsity means their disagreement. The pragmatist interprets the word "agreement" in a wide sense to mean not "copying" or "resembling" reality, but "to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed." The truth of an idea, thus, lies in its practical sequel, in the capacity of the idea to "lead us into useful verbal and conceptual quarters as well as directly up to useful sensible termini," "to consistency, stability and flowing human intercourse." 38

An idea becomes true in the process of leading up to its object, that is, in the process of verifying itself. A mere coherence among ideas cannot get beyond the stage of hypothesis, until the ideas have been experimentally verified. It is then that the ideas become true. So also, as we have already seen, the mere pretence of ideas agreeing or corresponding to reality cannot make the ideas true until and unless the ideas have been acted upon and confirmed in terms of actual facts. In order to substantiate the truth of an idea, it is not necessary always that it should be actually verified, it is enough for all practical purposes that it should be verifiable. An idea need not be actually verified, if we are sure, that certain conditions being fulfilled, it is capable of being verified. "Only potentially verifying processes may thus be true as well as full verification processes." "Truth lives for the most part on a credit system," and "our ideas may pass so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank notes pass, so long as nobody refuses them." Verifiability in most cases is as good as verification. The intellectualist view of truth as an inherent quality of ideas obtaining ante rem, is interpreted pragmatically as the "verifiability" of ideas as distinguished from their actual verification. In our world there are innumerable ideas which sometimes "work better
by their indirect or possible than by their direct and actual verification." Truth, then, is ultimately made in the process of verification. 29

We cannot reach finality in the matter of truth, and what is called the absolute truth—the ideal limit towards which all our temporary truths are expected some day to converge, and which no further experience will alter—can be attained when verification has attained its last limit, and when all the facts have been registered or what James calls, "bagged." But this ideal is impossible to realize in practice, and for all practical purposes we have to be satisfied with the partial, tentative truths, which are likely to be modified, and superseded in the light of future experience. So expediency demands that we should live by whatever truth we can get for the time being, in the hope that in the course of our growing experience, and in the light of fresh facts, new truths, superseding the older ones, will reveal themselves to us. Truths thus admit of degrees, and our partial truths contribute their quota to the making of the absolute truth. 30

Following Dewey and Schiller, James introduces the idea of "satisfaction" in determining the meaning of truth. James regards satisfactions as the marks of truths and their indispensable, though not sufficient condition. Just as there are degrees of truths, so there are degrees of satisfaction. A less true idea would therefore be less satisfactory than an idea which is more true. But the satisfaction of which James speaks here is a specific sort of satisfaction which on its subjective side is determined by the interest which evoked the idea, and on its objective side, controlled by the conditions imposed upon us by the nature of reality. Satisfactions do not indicate that the ideas are merely true for us, and that they have no relevance to independent realities. Though subjective feelings, satisfactions are yet intimations of objective realities. 31

Our account of James's conception of knowledge and truth must have revealed that the pragmatist attitude is definitely anti-intellectual, and more allied to the empiricist attitude, in so far as it opposes abstractionism, verbalism, and a priorism, and emphasizes concreteness, action and value of looking to the facts. In its attitude of "looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities, and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences and facts," pragmatism allies itself with empiricism.

But in holding the view that all knowledge is prospective in its results, and the truth of an idea is to be determined in terms of verification by future experience, Pragmatism implies a definite extension of ordinary empiricism, which in its outlook is more retrospective. Pragmatism looks more to the future experiences than to the past, and the main function of ideas, according to it, lies in their capacity for organizing future experiences. 34

In so far as pragmatism looks to the future, and emphasizes the value
of future consequences, it cannot subscribe to a conception of the universe which is ready-made and completely determined. For pragmatism, the universe is in the process of becoming, not a finished product, but something malleable and plastic, which can be shaped and moulded by our creative activity. The value of general ideas does not lie merely in registering facts, but in serving as plans for future action, with a view to making the world better and other than what it actually is. "In our cognitive as well as in our active life," James holds, "we are creative," and "add to the subject and to the predicate part of reality." These considerations have led James to develop his theory of "Meliorism," which is a new type of moral idealism to be clearly distinguished from Optimism. Meliorism holds that the universe is neither intrinsically good nor inherently evil. Evil is as real and as much a part of the world as good. But since there is nothing in this universe "eternally fixed," and everything is in a process of becoming, it is possible for man with his free and creative will to play a decisive part in bringing into being the salvation of the world, so far as it lies in his power. By his act man can "create the world's salvation." 33

4. INSTRUMENTALISM OF JOHN DEWEY (1859–1952)

James regarded concepts and theories not as solutions or answers to the philosophical enigmas, but as instruments which are "mental modes of adaptation to reality," carrying us prosperously from any one part of experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, and enabling us "to move forward" and "make nature ever again by their aid." 34 He, however, never formulated a complete theory based on this functional or instrumental view of concepts and ideas, of which an attempt was made in Dewey's theory of Instrumentalism. Dewey tried to formulate a precise theory of concepts, judgments and inference, from considering the ways in which thought functions in the experimental determination of future consequences.

Apart from this instrumental view of concepts which Dewey accepted from James, he was influenced by the biological account of mind which James offered in his Principles of Psychology. Dewey was not interested in the account of mind as a stream of consciousness, which resulted from James's reinterpretation of introspective psychology and criticism of the psychological atomism of Locke and Hume. But he was deeply interested in James's emphasis upon the fundamentally biological nature of mind, and the criterion which James sought to establish for discovering the existence of mind. James laid down that the pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon. Analysing the different
mental acts, James laid bare their essentially teleological nature, and maintained that their intellectual analysis is controlled by the notion of ends to be attained and the means for attaining them. Dewey was also influenced by the suggestion of James that the categories such as number, space, time, etc., might have originated as a result of "original biological sports," or "spontaneous variations," and are being maintained because of their applicability to concrete experiences, after once having been created.33 These suggestions regarding the origin of mind and the biological origin of categories together with the notion of instrumental function of thought in the determination of future experiences, provided Dewey with the necessary materials for developing a theory of mind and knowledge akin to behaviourism.

In common with James, Dewey urges against absolutism that reality is not a completed system, but is in a process of constant change, and that nature is fundamentally a process, a correlated series of events. In the passage of nature the events are ordered into definite well-marked stages. At one stage in the history of our universe there were no living or conscious beings. Living beings appeared at a certain stage as a result of certain groupings of inanimate objects, and mind appeared on the scene when the living beings acquired a certain degree of organization. Each of these stages is marked by the emergence of some genuine novelty, a real addition to the world, and cannot be conceived to have been implicit in the earlier stage from which it evolved. Living beings are "characterized by needs, by efforts which are active demands to satisfy needs, and by satisfactions," the terms need, effort, demand and satisfaction being interpreted in a purely biological sense. This type of activity does not characterize the physical events at the inorganic level, and life therefore introduces a new mode of interaction of events into the natural order. The organic activity is characterized by selective and discriminative responses which form the essence of sensitivity. This is the characteristic of behaviour in plants and lower animals.36

When the animals become complex and develop distance-receptors and power of locomotion, sensitivity is realized as feeling, more or less vague, and their "activities are differentiated into the preparatory or anticipatory, and the fulfilling or consummatory." They have the feelings, but do not know that they have them. Their activity is psycho-physical, but not mental, that is, they are not aware of meanings.37

The "feeling creature" assumes the added property, "mind," "when it reaches that organized interaction with other living creatures which is language, communication." Mental phenomena appear on the scene when the merely "feeling" animal has reached that organization by virtue of which it has developed the power of using tools, that is, things used as means to consequences, and specially, language, being the "tool of tools." To use things as tools or as means to consequences, is to endow
them with fixed meanings which enable us to signify and deal with
distant or absent objects without having the necessity of dealing with
them directly and physically. Language is the tool *par excellence*, and
is the most effective device invented for the purpose of communication
and consolidation of meanings.\(^{38}\)

Where there is mind, "feelings are no longer just felt," but "they have
and they make sense; record and prophesy." The invention of language
which synchronizes with the emergence of mind, not only enables us to
economize our energy in dealing with other human beings, but introduces
into the scene the new quality of meaning which endows the natural
events with character by virtue of which they are demarcated and
noted. Events thus "become more than mere occurrences; they have
implications," and hence "inference and reasoning are possible."\(^{39}\)

The distinction between physical, organic and mental is one of levels
of increasing complexity and intimacy of interaction among natural
events. Each of these levels has its appropriate categories which are not
"explanatory" but descriptive of the fact in question. Since there is a
perfect adaptation of nature, life and mind to one another, and that
mind has developed in the world of nature, there is, in the ultimate
analysis, no mystery in the conception of an embodied mind. There is
thus no question of mind existing except in connection with some
organized body.\(^{40}\)

It is because mind is an "organization of vital affairs," and all its
functions developed out of the pattern of organic behaviour, that nature
is the appropriate scene of its invention and plans, and forms the subject-
matter of its knowledge. Just as the organic functions are sustained by
utilizing the materials drawn from the natural environment, so thinking
which is naturally serial with biological function will have as materials
of thought the events and connections of this environment, and the
human organism will use its thinking as a means of sustaining its functions,
and its thoughts will have the character that defines knowledge.\(^{41}\)

Dewey thus urges against the Intellectualists, from his biological stand-
point, that thinking or reflection is never, as thinking in everyday life
or science shows, purely contemplative, and carried on for its own sake,
but always "comes after something, and out of something or for the sake
of something." It is always "some final objective for the sake of which
thought intervenes." Occasion for thinking is provided when there is some
maladjustment between organism and environment, when the smooth
flow of life is interrupted, and "opposed responses are provoked which
cannot be simultaneously taken in overt action," giving rise to "active
discordance, dissentienty" and conflict. In a world in which there is no
trouble, no doubt, and no "problem of evil," thinking would not exist
and hence no knowledge.\(^{42}\)

The material for thinking is anything in the world, relevant to this
need, anything which presents the problem and suggests modes of dealing with it effectively. "Thinking is adaptation to an end through the adjustment of particular objective contents," which form its data. At every stage of his procedure the thinker is stimulated or checked by the particular situation that confronts him.43

Dewey holds that thinking or knowledge-getting is not a speculative affair, and "all knowledge issuing from reflection is experimental in the literal physical sense of experimental." He regards the thinking activity as an integrated unity of mental and overt bodily and physical activity. Thinking, according to him, "involves the explorations by which the relevant data are procured and the physical analyses by which they are refined and made precise; it comprises the readings by which the information is got hold of, the words which are experimented with, and the calculations by which the significance of entertained conceptions or hypotheses is elaborated." "Hands and feet, apparatus and appliances of all kinds are as much a part of it as changes in the brain." Thus physical operations and equipments are as much a part of thinking as the mental activity itself, and thinking is "mental, not because of a peculiar stuff which enters into it or of peculiar non-natural activities which constitute it, but because of what physical acts and appliances do; the distinctive purpose for which they are employed." Instrumental theory of thinking and knowing is in essence a mode of behaviourism. Thinking is not a "transcendent act" "suddenly introduced into a previously natural scene, but that the operations of knowing are natural responses of the organism."44

Dewey, however, differs from the extreme behaviourists of the Watsonian type. He does not accept the view which reduces speech to vocalization and thinking to a silent exercise of the organs of vocalization and other internal structures, and the theory which denies conscious quality to behaviour and reduces it exclusively to mere routine or impulsive type. He considers the behaviourist account of thinking one-sided, since in defining thinking in terms of language habit, it confines thinking within the "closed door of lips"—something taking place "inside the organism"—and thus involving the "elimination of relations with other human beings."45

The emergence of thinking is marked by a diremption of experience into object or datum, on the one hand, and idea or concept on the other. The object, which is in need of reconstruction, consists of those elements in the situation which are the outcome of past experience crystallized into habit, and the concept or the idea forms the hypothesis or the plan of action, which on the basis of the given object, effects the reconstruction. What we call knowledge is the final phase of thinking culminating in the necessary transformation of the object so as to ensure once again the smooth flow of life. So what we term knowledge implies a difference made in things by knowing.46
Since thinking is provoked by some practical difficulty arising in our experience, we act upon the idea designed as a plan of operation to meet the needs of the situation, and if the idea through action successfully meets the difficulty or fulfils the purpose for which it was intended, we call the idea "true," and the knowledge valid. What we term "agreement" is between purpose or plan and its own execution and fulfilment. The idea is formed as a sort of "working hypothesis," and is made true in the process of experimental verification which initiates a series of activities which succeed in harmonizing the discrepancies of a given practical situation. Verification is the process which makes an idea true, and what we call truth is the outcome of the process.\(^{47}\)

The constructive function of intelligence and thinking, Dewey holds, is not limited exclusively to making adjustments or adaptations within a particular environmental situation; it is creative and not a mere "routine mechanic." Its service is not limited to meeting only the existing needs of the situation, but also lies in bringing new ends of its own. "As a matter of fact the pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of the mind is to project new and more complex ends—to free experience from routine and from caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes already given either in the mechanism of the body or in that of the existent state of society, but the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action, is the pragmatic lesson. Action restricted to given and fixed ends may attain great technical efficiency; but... such action is mechanical... no matter what the scope of the performed end... Intelligence as intelligence is forward-looking; only by ignoring its primary function does it become a mere means for an end already given."\(^{48}\)

This emphasis upon the creative and forward-looking character of intelligence brings into clear relief the dominant motive of Dewey's whole philosophy, which is an attempt to furnish a logical basis for progress in the individual as well as well as in society. Progress, Dewey holds, is not automatic, and there is no such thing as "wholesale progress" in human affairs. It is a "retail job, to be contracted for and executed in sections," and "depends upon human intent and aim and upon acceptance of responsibility for its production." The future of progress lies entirely in our hands. "If we want it, we can have it—if we are willing to pay the price in effort—especially in effort of intelligence." It depends upon deliberate human foresight and socially constructive work. Dewey is throughout actuated by a melioristic motive, and exhibits a passionate interest in the problems of progress and social reform. His philosophy is a constant protest against the divorce of knowledge from action, theory from practice, and the evils of life, he thinks, have mostly arisen from this unnatural separation. If knowledge is treated as divorced from the practical context in which it has arisen, and if its proper role, which lies
in working out the necessary conditions under which the individual is
to create freely the values of civilized life, is forgotten, then it becomes
"a luxury, and hence a social nuisance and disturber."\textsuperscript{49}

5. HUMANISM OF F. C. S. SCHILLER (1864–1937)

Humanism, which is essentially a variant of pragmatism, was developed
as an explicit philosophy by Schiller at Oxford. Schiller's earlier philosophic
view described as personal idealism, was formulated as a reaction against
Hegelianism. It emphasized that philosophy as the theory of life is a
practical, and not a speculative affair, and the philosophical method
should be scientific and based on experience. As against the Hegelian
Absolute, he stressed the reality of the personal ego and the plurality
and independence of individuals. He conceived God as one among other
finite individuals and limited by them. From the standpoint of evolution
God was regarded as the idea and consummation of the process, though
the divine will is restricted and the process of evolution is hampered by
the recalcitrant element of evil whose reality cannot be explained away.\textsuperscript{59}

In the later stage of the development of his philosophic thought, Schiller
was less interested in metaphysics and turned more to the logical,
epistemological and psychological problems. During this period he also
came under the influence of American pragmatism and particularly under
the influence of James with whom he formed a close friendship and
frequently exchanged notes on questions of common philosophical interest.
In his views on psychology, he was influenced by the teleological and
voluntarist conception of mental life which had Ward and Stout as its
chief exponents. His critical attitude towards formal logic he derived
largely from the writings of Alfred Sidgwick whose contribution in this
connection Schiller describes as "epoch-making."\textsuperscript{31}

Humanism of Schiller is a standing protest against the views which
seek to "depersonalize" and "dehumanize" science and knowledge, and
base them on abstract principles. Schiller particularly directs his attack
against the intellectualist versions of psychology and logic.\textsuperscript{57}

He holds that there is a close connection between logic and the human
sciences, and particularly psychology. Logical thinking cannot be treated
in abstraction from the psychological aim in which it originates, and it
ceases to convey any meaning if divorced completely from its psycho-
logical context of interest, purpose, emotion and satisfaction, on which
its "very existence depends."\textsuperscript{53} Logical thinking as it actually occurs is
"a human and personal act through and through, and essentially part
of a personal train of thought which arises in an individual mind at some
particular time and place." Logic is not a formal, but a normative science,
which may be defined as "the systematic evaluation of actual knowing."
It is a science which appreciates or evaluates, and in distinguishing between good thinking and bad, between right and sound reasoning and that which is wrong and perverse it conceives truth and error as prototypes of good and bad and resembles normative sciences like ethics and aesthetics. It therefore cannot neglect the processes of thinking which it evaluates as logically irrelevant.54

For humanism, then, truth is essentially a valuation. Every judgment, whether true or false, is put forward as a truth-claim by its maker, and it is the business of logic as a normative science to evaluate this truth-claim. Its value is tested by its working, and is validated only when it is verified. The verification is effected in terms of consequences entailed by the judgment in question and its capacity in fulfilling the purposes and satisfying the interests by which it was prompted in the mind of its maker. It is thus that the value of judgment is tested and its truth-claim established.55

Although humanism regards truth as valuation, and all values are practical, yet it would be a misrepresentation of the humanist version of truth to hold that it reduces truth to mere utility. For the humanist truth is no doubt useful, but whatever is useful is not on that account true. It admits that all truth may be useful, serviceable and efficacious, but its converse is by no means true.56

Humanism does not recognize any truth which is timeless or eternally valid, and the only truth we know, and with which we are concerned in our real life, is human truth, conditioned by psychological interests, and coming into being by human effort and agency—a truth not given as an independent fact, but made by us. The process of truth-making is a continuous, progressive and cumulative process. The satisfaction of one cognitive process leads on to the formulation of another, and a new truth, when established, naturally becomes the presupposition of further explorations. Thus the new truth is continually grown out of the old as a more satisfactory mode of handling the old problems.57 The emphasis upon the growing and dynamic nature of truth almost obliterates the distinction between truth and error, and there are only "grades and stages of both which proceed the one from the other and pass over the one into the other."58

Humanism, like pragmatism, "is more a method of solving the problems of knowing than metaphysical doctrine about the problems of reality as such. But nevertheless it has also metaphysical implications of considerable interest. Our whole activity of knowing would be futile if it met with no response from nature. If the reality were hard and rigid and did not accommodate itself to our knowing and will, all our activities would be paralysed. The necessary postulate of a dynamic theory of knowing and truth is a certain plasticity of the real, whereby we are enabled to adapt it to our ends."59
In holding that man is the creator of truth and to some extent the shaper and moulder of reality, Schiller accords to man a central position in the scheme of things. This definitely anthropocentric conception makes man a real centre of activities, and implies a sort of pluralism in which the individuals are regarded as real, self-subsistent, and independent entities, as against the absolutist conception which treats all individuals as essentially one and slurs over their differences. 

Metaphysics is a highly individualized product, and it is the personality of the metaphysician which supplies “the principle which evaluates the data of the sciences (as known to him), and arranges them in a system that brings the world nearer to his heart’s desire.” Metaphysical synthesis thus brought about is “imaginative and conjectural,” consisting in merely “personal guesses at ultimate reality.” Humanism which claims to be only a method, looks upon the efforts of metaphysicians with tolerance, and is prepared to accord to their systems only aesthetic value and artistic merit, and repudiates their claims to objective truth.

6. CONCLUSION

Our study of Anglo-American pragmatism in its different forms must have revealed that it is not so much a systematic doctrine as a criticism and a method, or perhaps the expression of a definite attitude, a way of looking at life and dealing with the problems of experience. As a philosophical attitude, it is a typical expression of that growing dissatisfaction of the contemporary mind with any world-view which implies a denial of the reality of change and plurality, human freedom and individuality, evolution and progress, as real factors in human experience. It allies itself with vitalism, in its biocentric attitude; with voluntarism in its emphasis upon the primacy of activity over pure contemplation, and the purposive character of the whole of mental life; with evolutionism, in its forward-looking attitude and in its conception of a growing and a developing universe; with empiricism in its concern for facts, and finally with indeterminism and pluralism in its emphasis upon the reality of human freedom, and recognition of individuals as real centres of activity in human life.

Pragmatism is not interested in the construction of metaphysical systems, and seeks to demonstrate the futility of logical solution of ultimate questions. It repudiates intellectual constructions of reality as abstract and devoid of relevance to concrete experience. It conceives reality as growing and amenable to change by human activity, and thinking and knowing as dynamic and constructive. Truth is not an eternal character of things revealed in direct insight, but is created by human operations on the data of experience. There is no finality about
truth, since the process of truth-making is a growing and a continuous process.

Whatever may be the logical merits of the pragmatic theory of truth and knowledge, and its repudiation of speculative metaphysics, there is no denying the fact that pragmatism did a valuable service in exposing the speculative aberrations of absolutism, and bringing philosophy from the heights of transcendentalism down to the familiar empirical level of the ordinary man—nearer to human life and existence, from heaven down to the solid earth. In recognizing the central importance of man in the scheme of things—and emphasizing his freedom and individuality and creative power—his role in shaping and moulding his environment with a view to making a better and a happier world, pragmatism preached a gospel of activism, full of hope and promise for the future of mankind—a philosophy likely to rescue man from the slough of despondency, and vivify him with self-confidence and faith in his own power as the shaper, not only of his own destiny, but as one who is also destined to play an effective part in the larger field of human welfare and progress.

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CHAPTER XLIV

EVOLUTIONISM

A. SPENCER, BERGSON, MORGAN and ALEXANDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Philosophies of Evolution are, no doubt, the result of the influence of biology on philosophers of the nineteenth century. In ancient philosophy as well as in modern philosophy prior to Spencer, thinkers generally failed to take note of the special nature of growth as it functions in the realm of living organisms. The problem of change discussed by them is really very different from the problem of growth in the world of living creatures. Some philosophers denied change flatly, calling it an illusion, while others made it absolutely real, denying any changeless core of permanent reality behind it. The reconciliation of change with continuity, which can be made only through the concept of organic growth or development as it operates in the realm of living beings, was all but absent in pre-evolutionistic thinkers. Alone among the great system-builders of ancient Europe Aristotle was able to think in terms of an orderly, progressive development of gross matter into pure form through graded intervening stages. And Aristotle was a biologist!

Next to biology, psychology is the science which can serve as the ground for the development of evolutionary concepts. An ever-growing personality maintaining its psychological self-identity in the midst of continuous growth is the bed-rock on which a theory of evolution can be easily grounded. Psychology and biology provide between them the soil for the ripening of concepts which philosophers of evolution can press into service. And the first thinker to build up a systematic philosophy of evolution on the basis of these two sciences was Spencer.

2. HERBERT SPENCER (1820–1903)

In Spencer we find a rare combination of the empirical attitude to experience fostered by science with a passion for synthetic system-building characteristic of the speculative thinker on the plane of pure thought. British Philosophy of the time lacked system, and Spencer supplied what was lacking in it by his conception of three levels of knowledge, namely, common sense, scientific and philosophic—each more
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general and unified than the level below. A persistent attempt was made to reach a formula of the highest degree of generality which could embrace the entire universe, and this attempt was inspired throughout by the idea of evolution.

Spencer's formula may be considered in two stages. The first stage, wherein all life process is interpreted as a progressive differentiation of the relatively simple into the relatively complex, or as a movement towards increasing differentiation and individuation, was anticipated by Schelling. Spencer saw at once that this characterization of evolution was one-sided and incomplete, and so, accepting it only as the first part of his formula, he supplemented it by an account of the process which runs counter to differentiation. In the total process of evolution—“differentiation is balanced by integration, difference by unity and development by regression or dissolution.” The formula for evolution as it emerged finally from the pen of Spencer runs thus: “Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion during which matter passes from a relatively indefinite, incoherent, homogeneity to relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.” This formula, particularly that part of it which is the basis for the Spencerian concept of organization, is a striking generalization of philosophic value. It does attempt to give some indication of the direction in which evolution is taking place. But why evolution has taken just this direction and no other is not explained. Direction is determined by the urge to evolution, and this fundamental urge is not taken into account by Spencer, whose thought is mostly governed by a rigid mechanical principle.

3. HENRI BERGSON (1859–1941)

The most striking criticism of Spencerian evolution which is at once an unveiling of the fallacies lurking at the heart of all mechanistic philosophies of evolution erected on positivistic bases, was offered by Henri Bergson in his Creative Evolution (1907). According to Bergson, Spencer has neglected the core of evolution for the crust. “He [Spencer] takes reality in its present form; he breaks it to pieces, he scatters it in fragments which he throws to the winds; then he ‘integrates’ these fragments and ‘dissipates their movement.’ Having imitated the whole by a work of mosaic, he imagines he has retraced the design of it, and made genesis.”

This may be a science of evolution; it certainly is not a philosophy of evolution. The philosopher who would explain life movement which is evolution should get to the inwardness of life, discarding its outer crust. He should install himself at the very heart of life-movement; he should be one with it; he should live it.
Evolutionist thought was given a sudden and unexpected turn by Bergson who, while maintaining the form of the concept of evolution, completely transformed its content. If one abandons the usual scientific standpoint of external observation and places oneself at the very heart of life movement, identifying oneself with it, then the conclusion is inescapable that change is the only reality. Bergson, like every other outstanding evolutionist philosopher, draws facts in support of his position from modern biology and psychology, but his standpoint is unique and without precedent in the history of European thought. Evolution has been conceived as a mechanical process wherein fitness of the organism for the environment is the criterion for survival. Variations which place certain organisms in a favourable position and adaptations brought about by change in the environment are sufficient to explain the development that has taken place in successive generations of species. Of mind and its role in evolution, and of purpose as a guiding factor in determining the nature of species, we need take no account. Mechanistic causation which has proved its worth in the realm of physical science is adequate for explaining phenomena in the biological sciences too. Such is the attitude of mechanistic biology which Bergson challenged on purely scientific grounds. In his Creative Evolution he cites instances drawn from all levels of organic life to prove that mechanistic explanations put forward by evolutionists are utter failures. One of his most clinching arguments is that had the criterion of mechanistic evolutionism been really valid and adequate, evolution should have ceased long ago. There are many lower organisms perfectly adapted to the environment. "Why did not life stop wherever it was possible?" asks Bergson, "why has it gone on? Why indeed, unless it be that there is an impulse, driving it to take ever greater and greater risks towards its goal of an ever higher and higher efficiency?" This impulse, this elan vital, this life urge is postulated by Bergson as the only possible explanation of all the baffling facts of evolution. This is Bergson's most outstanding contribution to the philosophy of evolution. Breaking through the outer crust of change in the body of the living organisms which has been the only concern of evolutionist thinkers so far, Bergson penetrates to the core of the evolutionary process and discovers therein the vital impulse, supra-physical in character, determining the tortuous and sinuous course of evolution. With this vital impulse guiding life movement, chance becomes a meaningless shibboleth, and variations and mutations acquire a hitherto unsuspected teleological significance. These are but examples of the "greater and greater risks" which life takes towards its goal. Such is the revolution heralded by the Bergsonian concept of elan vital as the motive force in evolution.

Bergson's account of the manner in which the elan vital operates as an impulsive force in evolution has puzzled many thinkers. He does not seem to admit any goal for evolution, but seems to think of an "open" evolu-
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tion. And as a corollary to this indeterministic attitude, Bergson is forced
to postulate not one direction of the evolutionary process, but several,
somewhat on the analogy of a “shell” which suddenly bursts into frag-
ments, which being themselves shells, burst into fragments again, and so
on for a time incommensurably long. Despite this extreme indeterminism
in evolution, the Bergsonian theory is perhaps the only philosophical
theory which takes us nearest the heart of the mystery of evolution. Let
us, therefore, try and understand the Bergsonian concept by a supreme
effort of synthetic intuition, as Bergson would say.

Bergson’s view is diametrically opposed to mechanism, while with
finalism it has certain elements in common, but the differences are so
revealing that our author has done well to draw pointed attention to
them. Finalism is wedded to the view that the world process is determined
strictly according to a pre-ordained plan of evolution. Were it so, argues
Bergson, there should be complete harmony in nature. Instead we find
lack of harmony, disorder and disorganization in the world, and in the
realm of living organisms we find freaks, regressions and maladaptations.
Such harmony as there is, is only harmony which we discover after the
event. “There is harmony or identity of impulsion, and not of aspira-
tion.” And the only legitimate conclusion that we can draw from these
considerations is not that evolution is guided by a preconceived end, but
it is the result of the explosive force of the *élan vital* which creates divergent
paths for the development of living organisms.

There are certain facts in the divergent lines of evolution of life that go
to substantiate Bergson’s view. Along entirely different lines, nature has
produced certain identical functions and identical organs. Sexual repro-
duction in plants and animals and the eye in the pecten and vertebrates
are cases in point. Plants can multiply without the intricate mechanism
of sexual reproduction, and the elaborate structure of the human eye is
entirely unnecessary for the pecten. On no one of the biological theories
can these facts and others similar to them be explained. Adaptation,
accumulation of small chance variations, mutation and the whole host of
biological concepts are helpless in the face of these baffling facts which
point to evolution as a great creative adventure undertaken by the *élan
vital*. Nothing is fore-ordained in this adventure; nothing is determined
beforehand. Blunders by the way, repetitions along different lines, regres-
sions and sudden creations are bound to occur in creative evolution. Such
is the stand that Bergson takes in the course of his novel approach to the
problem of evolution.

Evolution is truly creative like the work of a great artist. An impulse
to action, an urge, an undefined want is there beforehand, but until the
want is satisfied we cannot know the nature of what will satisfy it. Until
*élan vital* has actually brought an organ into existence or a new species
into life, even omniscience could not have predicted the shape of things to
come, just as one cannot predict what exactly will come out of the brush of an inspired painter before he has completed his picture.

The explosive life urge or \textit{elan vital} which works in a spirit of creative adventure, unhindered by any plan in the mind of anyone, not excluding the mind of God, has thrown up plants and animals in the first instance. Plants in general stored up energy and remained immobile while animals used up energy for sudden and rapid movement. Along the line of animals, nature has again thrown up two divergent directions of development, one of insects which are creatures of instinct and the other of vertebrates in whom intelligence has taken root and developed by stages. The antithesis between instinct and intellect is essential to Bergson’s philosophy and so is his contention that instinct is nearer to nature than intelligence: But not instinct as such, but instinct “that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely,” in other words, instinct which has become transformed into intuition, is alone competent to grasp the inwardsness of evolution.

We may perhaps get some light on this concept of intuition if we consider another aspect of Bergson’s philosophy, namely, the role of matter in creative evolution. We have already likened the course of evolution to the trajectories traced by the contents of an explosive shell. The two chief forces in this explosive process are the chemicals inside the shell and the resistance offered by the shell itself. Similarly in creative evolution, we have to take account of the explosive force of the \textit{elan vital} and also of the resistance offered to it by matter. Under the tremendous urge of \textit{elan vital} life grows enormously, but it has to meet and overcome the opposition of matter. While the explosive force is under the control of life itself, the resisting matter is not. This latter is alien to life. And life overcomes the resistance of matter by insinuating itself into and permeating matter. It enters into matter and draws it towards itself little by little. Matter is immobility, nature has evolved intellect. Intellect, let it be noted is made for action on dead, immobile matter, and as such, is not capable of dealing with life and the course of its evolution. As against the intellect, we have another faculty which is peculiarly gifted to deal with life, its origins and its development. In its lower manifestations it is called instinct. “Instinct... is moulded on the very forms of life; while intelligence treats everything mechanically. Instinct proceeds, so to speak, organically. If the consciousness that slumbers in it should awake, if it were wound up into knowledge, instead of being wound off into action, if we could ask and it could reply, it would give up to us the most intimate secrets of life. For it only carries out further the work by which life organizes matter...” And Bergson does ask and does get a reply. In the opening sections of his \textit{Creative Evolution} Bergson probes into consciousness with the object of getting at the secret of all life, for the psychic continuum which is consciousness, is but a replica of the great design by which \textit{elan vital} operates.
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to throw up ever-increasing and divergent forms of life. And in the psychic continuum which is self-existence Bergson finds change without ceasing. The ego endures, that is, is in constant flux, and time is the stuff of which it is made. What, then, is the connotation of the term "endures"? What does "Duration" mean in Bergsonian Metaphysics? "Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances." "For a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly."

By a remarkable process of analysis Bergson has shown that life in general and life in individual consciousness are both marked by the same characteristics: continuous flux without ceasing which is enduring or maturation, and whose essence is Time; indeterminateness in regard to the goal of this flux; and creativity throughout the course of this flux. Behind both the manifestations of life there operates the tremendous urge of plan vital as the motive force of evolution. Such is creative evolution which is ultimately responsible for the origin and development of species, and for the maturation of individual life. And the secret of this great creative adventure can be probed into only by intuition which ordinarily lies dormant in us and requires to be awakened. An unbiased student of evolution placing himself at the heart of the evolutionary process must see for himself that Bergson's characterization of life-movement is nearest the truth. It may be very disconcerting to have to think of evolution as an "open" process without a plan and without a goal. But life process is a great creative adventure without a preconceived plan and pre-ordained goal, and Bergson's creative evolution is the nearest approximation that we have to the process as it works itself out in individual consciousness as well as in nature as a whole.

4. C. LLOYD MORGAN (1852-1936)

The concept of creative evolution had a decisive influence over all evolutionist thinkers, and among them we may mention Lloyd Morgan, who moulded the philosophy of Emergent Evolution.

Lloyd Morgan's thought was profoundly influenced by his deep interest in biology and animal psychology. It is worth noting here that Morgan's work in the field of animal behaviour was the source of inspiration for Behaviouristic psychology. The Gifford Lectures on "Emergent Evolution" which Morgan delivered in 1922-23 contains a philosophy of evolution which was nurtured on a scientific soil.

In Morgan's Emergent Evolution we can note unmistakable evidence of an attempt to reconcile mechanism with teleology, the older streams of naturalistic evolutionism with the powerful current of creative evolution released by Bergson. Two forces are operative in evolution according to
Lloyd Morgan: one generating development by simple continuation of the old, and the other bringing into existence something absolutely new and unpredictable at certain critical stages in the course of evolution. The former yields a resultant, and the latter an emergent. The former, it is plain enough, is a concession to Spencerianism and Darwinism, while the latter, meant to be a protest against the mechanistic conceptions of the life process, is the outcome of the impact of Bergsonianism on the mind of Morgan. But curiously enough Morgan makes an emphatic protest against vitalism and says that such concepts as the *clan vital* and entelechy should be rejected by us as they are not consistent with the demands of "Science." Emergence should, according to Morgan, be established on strictly scientific grounds. This is no easy task, and Morgan had ultimately to make use of principles other than the strictly scientific or natural in order to support his "emergent" theory of evolution.

Evolution advances, then, according to Morgan, under the guidance of two principles; the resultant principle and the emergent principle. The former unfolds what is already there, but is hidden, latent and not yet patent; the latter brings something absolutely new into existence at certain critical stages in the advance of nature. These cannot be predicted before their advent. The emergent cannot be "predicted from the data afforded at the level below that at which in due course it emerges." In this way, life emerges out of matter, and mind out of life. Along the line of evolution, therefore, Morgan marks out two critical stages. At the first stage life emerges, and at the second mind. The advent of neither could have been predicted before the event, even by one who possessed complete knowledge of the conditions just before their emergence. Neither of them was latent at the stage just preceding their emergence. They are absolutely new, and appear suddenly without any cause for their presence. Morgan would have us look upon "emergence" as the principle which makes for advance in continuity in evolution, continuity itself being assured by the "resultant" principle.

Though Morgan advocated the view that evolution throws up absolutely new existences at certain stages, still he could not shake off completely the influence of the evolutionary naturalism of Spencer and Darwin. Emergence thus becomes an untenable half-way house between naturalism and creative evolution. The result may be summed up in the words of Dean Mathews: "Without doubt 'emergence' is a valuable descriptive formula for certain aspects of the evolutionary process... But, I would ask, does the concept of emergence take us beyond description? Is it any more than a convenient summary of observed phenomena? We may all gladly admit that there is continuity and that there is emergence of new qualities within that continuity; but we feel some curiosity about the reason why there should be this emergence. It is the task of philosophy not simply to describe, but to explain."
Nothing but confusion can result from the Morganian extension of the concept of emergence from the chemical to the vital and psychic realms. We are familiar with what are called the emergent properties of chemical compounds. These properties are novel, but they belong to the same category as those which are old. A molecule of water will freeze at 0°C, and will nourish plants. These properties are not possessed by oxygen and hydrogen. And certainly they could not have been predicted before the actual advent of water. Yet the properties are only physical. Molecules organized in a particular way are said to generate life. But how this happens is not understood on the theory of emergence. There is a most challenging question relating to the theory of emergence to which Morgan gives widely differing answers. Why does emergence take place? Morgan is inclined to say at first that we must accept emergence as a fact. It just occurs and there is an end to it. But in the latter stages of the development of his philosophy of evolution Morgan makes certain assumptions, and one of them relates to "an operative power or activity which is behind all happenings and is the cause and impulse of all things. . . . This activity manifests itself in all the manifold phenomenal forms of the course of development. The cause of all this is the creative activity of God." Morgan therefore is compelled to posit the working of an active principle behind evolution as the only way of explaining the emergence of life and mind. In fact, the élan vital of Bergson which Morgan claims to have thrown out of his front door has entered Emergent Evolution through the back door in the shape of the activity principle. It is plain that the half-way house of emergence is bound to lead us on to creative evolution as the inescapable destination of all speculative evolutionist thinking.

There is confusion of a most serious type lurking in the emergent view of values. Values, it must be noted, emerge not from organization in an individual, but from organization of individuals in social groups. Life emerges (if we are to believe in Emergent Evolution) from the organization of matter in a living cell, and mind emerges from the organization of living cells in animal organisms. Values, on the other hand, depend on the organization of individual human beings. These two concepts are so entirely different from each other, denoting as they do two different kinds of organization, that we should have two different terms for expressing them. In the lower stages of evolution there is now a tendency to regard even matter as psychotropic. But the more significant aspect of the problem is missed in these gratuitous concessions to the efficiency of the psychic forces in evolution. The fact is that spirit or mind is not only antecedent to matter, is not only the organizer of matter, but matter is merely an organ of spirit. In the present state of our knowledge of evolution we have to conceive of matter as somewhat analogous to the limbs of certain organisms which are thrown off and are replaced by fresh limbs when the need arises. Such a view is open to us in the scheme of creative evolution.
presented by Bergson, and such a view is the inevitable outcome of the emergence hypothesis of Morgan. Creative evolution is the crown and culmination of emergent evolution.

5. SAMUEL ALEXANDER (1859–1938)

In Alexander’s system we find it boldly asserted for the first time in the history of philosophy that “space-time” is the stuff of which the world is made, the matrix out of which the universe has evolved. This “space-time” is pure, undifferentiated or absolute motion. It corresponds to the “Absolute” of idealism with this difference, that it is at the bottom of the scale of evolution. Alexander was, of course, influenced by the recent developments in science, but his metaphysical concept of “space-time” is his own creation. Bergson, as we are aware, despatialized time, and evolved a concept of duration, pure and simple. Alexander, on the other hand, spatialized time in order to confer true continuity on it. Time by itself and without space yields only a succession of momentary existences. True continuity is the result of space penetrating into time. Similarly, time penetrating into space produces multiplicity and diversity in it. Alexander’s contention is that “there is no moment of time without a position in space and no point of space without a moment of time.” The ultimate basis of reality is a continuum of point-instants. This is “space-time” and out of it the universe has evolved. Alexander tries to present to us a picture of the continuous evolution of the universe with no gaps and no surprising jumps in between. Continuity is his watchword. By small imperceptibly graded and progressively ascending states, particular motions evolved out of “space-time” or pure motion. Next to come out in the course of evolution is life. And Alexander is emphatic in holding that “life” is only a continuation of the processes of matter. Life is an emergent out of matter, and yet it is continuous with matter.

Let us pause here to consider the elusive connotation of “emergence” as used by Alexander. Our author is no doubt indebted to Lloyd Morgan for this concept, but in his hands it gets shorn of all biological implications and is transformed into a purely metaphysical concept. The “space-time” matrix, according to Alexander, gets articulated and differentiated into qualities and categories. “Qualities are empirical characters; categories are the essential and universal constituents of everything which is given in experience,” “The categories are the general scaffolding of the world; only through qualities do things obtain colour and shape, tone and timbre.” “In the course of development there arise on the basis of elementary processes by new arrangements and grouping of elements new qualities and ever new stages of being of higher order. . . . The higher quality emerges from the lower plane of existence and has its roots in it.
Yet it raises itself above it and no longer belongs to it; it arranges its possessor in a new order of being.” Alexander calls this newly arising quality the “emergent.” Here is a desperate attempt to fit into Spencerian naturalism the concept of novelty, and such an attempt is bound to raise more problems that it can solve.

Let us now get back to the story of evolution. Life having arisen out of materiality, gives rise to mind in its turn. Alexander does not accord to mind any very exceptional position in the scale of evolution. This, of course, is in keeping with his general insistence on continuity even where novelty is indicated. Alexander materializes mind by endowing it with spatio-temporal qualities. The mental is as much extended as the material. Consciousness is only one thing among other common things in the material world. Thus does Alexander claim to have established the affinity and continuity of the psychical with the physical.

Up to this point Alexander has managed to maintain the rigidity of his system by endowing every emergent with spatio-temporal qualities. And now when he has to deal with values he feels constrained to relax the rigorous demands of continuity. Values emerge next in the scale of evolution, but cannot be objectified completely. The primary qualities of matter and even its secondary qualities are, according to Alexander, objective. They exist whether they are perceived by a mind or not. But values exist only in relation to the subject cognizing them. Alexander tries to tone down this subjectivism to a certain extent by saying that values arise out of the relation of mind to its objects, and that they depend not so much on the individual as on collective consciousness.

The last and highest being to emerge out of the “space-time” matrix is God. Alexander has gone back to the rigidity of his system in his conception of Godhead. God is, like matter and mind, a creature of the “space-time” matrix, and not a creator of the world. God is not a finished being but an eternal Becoming. “He can never realize the idea of Himself but finds himself continually on the way towards this idea.” An incomplete God who is constantly evolving may not be welcome to religious consciousness, but there He is as the crown and culmination of the scheme of emergent evolution.

The order of evolution according to Alexander can be briefly stated thus: first determinate motion emerges out of the space-time matrix, then matter comes out of motion and then emerge qualities of matter; life emerges out of matter and mind out of life; finally comes Deity as the last and the highest emergent in the scale of evolution. Values do not fit into this well-knit system, and so they are treated apart by Alexander as emerging out of mind through socialization of individual consciousness. Here is a magnificent effort at system-building which is bound to inspire awe in the mind of any critic. We must look carefully, however, for fallacies lying hidden in the very foundations of Alexander’s system.
When we do so we discover in the first place an irreconcilable conflict between continuity and emergence in Alexander’s system. Lloyd Morgan got over the difficulty by frankly admitting the novelty and unpredictability of the emergent. Alexander is unwilling to make this admission, and struggles hard to make the emergent continuous with its antecedents. He says that by special groupings of old processes, new stages of being come into existence. But finally he has to admit the creativity of the process and declare that we have to accept this creativity as a fact to be revered with “natural piety.”

In Alexander’s conception of the role of divinity in evolution we find the second fallacy in emergent evolution. Deity is thrown up as the last stage in evolution, yet God is the eternal driving force of the whole world-process. Alexander is forced to postulate an urge for evolution. “The continual change and movement of things through the divine nius moves ever upwards, towards ever higher, richer, and more perfect forms.” Space-time and motion by themselves can never account for the why and wherefore of evolution. It is Deity who is the ultimate cause and goal of evolution. We see in this account of God, how the Alexandrian version of emergent evolution has to move up to creative evolution in order to reveal the best that is within it.

A third consideration also leads us to the conclusion that in developing his philosophy Alexander is drawing closer to Bergson than he would care to admit. In his detailed characterization of Space-time, Alexander gives greater prominence to time than to space which he relegates to the background. Space is static; time is dynamic. Without time there is no movement. And Alexander attaches great importance to movement which he calls “pure movement.” This “pure movement” is the ultimate stuff of the universe. In a language which is almost Heraclitian, Alexander exalts pure movement to the status of the essence of the world, and speaks of change as the universal characteristic of all things that have evolved out of the primal matrix. No greater tribute to the validity of the Bergsonian concept of “duration” could be paid than the admission that universal flux is the essence of existence. And this single consideration is enough to reveal to us the fact that the concept of emergence is incomplete in itself and that it must move on to be completed by “creative evolution.”

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CHAPTER XLIV—continued

EVOLUTIONISM

B. WHITEHEAD (1861–1947)

I

PHILOSOPHY, according to Whitehead, is the critique of abstractions. "A civilization which cannot burst through its current abstractions is doomed to sterility after a very limited period of progress. An active School of philosophy is quite as important for the locomotion of ideas as is an active School of railway engineers for the locomotion of fuel." The biggest and most basic of all the abstractions which it is imperative for modern thought to break through is the entire scientific (mechanistic) outlook of the seventeenth century whose hold continues to be surprisingly strong not only on the educated layman but also on the minds of many scientific experts, in spite of Einstein and Minkowsky, Schrödinger and Heisenberg. No doubt its success, theoretical as well as practical, during the last three centuries has been astounding, and its narrow abstractions were themselves the main grounds of its success. It was necessary to concentrate on a few salient and simple features of a particular type of experience (sense-experience), and to turn back not only on the other and no less valuable forms of experience, but also on the "dim recesses" around perceptual consciousness itself, in order to make any headway in the organization of thought. This mechanistic outlook, however, has now outgrown its usefulness even within the precincts of physics, and its persistence in the background of modern thought is proving a drag on the progress of the biological and social sciences.

What is most vicious about the current abstractions of science is that they surround us with a world in which there is no scope or support for our sense of values. Not only are the deepest insights of the mystics of all ages denied; even our appreciation of beauty and art do not seem to fit into the ways or moods of thought generated by the scientific tradition. There is, in consequence, a split between our intellectual and our emotional lives. Instead of each enriching the other, each can be enjoyed only when the other is forgotten. This "divorce of science from the affirmations of our aesthetic and ethical experiences" has been the main provocation which has forced Whitehead out of his mathematical and mathematico-logical closet into the open spaces of metaphysics, and has set him on his great adventure of ideas. He invokes philosophy "to perform its final
service. It should seek the insight, dim though it be, to escape the wide
wreckage of a race of beings sensitive to values beyond those of mere
animal enjoyment."

Whitehead is not censuring the abstractions of science as a destructive
critic with hostile intentions—like Bradley, Bergson and, to some extent,
Eddington in recent times. To be sure, these thinkers had stood for a
more integral outlook incorporating the ethical, aesthetic and religious
values of life. But they were all convinced that the analytical intellect was
tainted with some sort of an original sin which made it unworthy and
incapable of reaching the precincts of the Real. Whichever way it pro-
ceeded in its quest, it was bound to get lost in a maze of contradictions
(conventions in Eddington’s case), and these contradictions were irre-
solvable and ultimate. They were a sign to indicate that our intellect was
dealing only with appearances. To get at reality we have to free ourselves
from the curse of this discursive understanding, and turn to a different
type of experience—intuitive and immediate.

It is otherwise with Whitehead. He is not dismayed by conflicts and
contradictions; for him "a clash of doctrines is not a disaster—it is an
opportunity." For him reason remains the supreme arbiter between truth
and falsity, appearance and reality. "The appeal to reason is the appeal
to that ultimate judge, universal and yet individual to each, to which all
authority must bow."

He has no intention of trying to take us away from
science to mysticism. An uncharitable critic might say that he is trying
to bring mysticism inside science itself. It would be more correct to say
that his philosophy is an attempt to give us a broader and more concrete
formulation of the concepts of science so that they, while remaining fully
competent within their own sphere, might at the same time take cogni-
zance of the deeper, though dimmer, experiences of the human spirit.

Such a course was possible for Whitehead because, unlike Bradley or
Bergson, he believed that the abstractions and contradictions of scientific
thought were corrigeble, even if not completely curable. "It is important
to ask what Wordsworth found in nature that failed to receive expression
in science. I ask this question in the interest of science itself; for one main
position in these lectures is a protest against the idea that the abstractions
of science are irreformable and unalterable. Is it not possible that the
standardized concepts of science are only valid within narrow limitations,
perhaps too narrow for science itself?"

Many people, experts as well as the dilettanti, have raised an outcry against the limitations of science.
Perhaps it is Whitehead alone who has shown us in detail that they are
"too narrow for science itself," and who has made serious attempts at
reformulating the abstract concepts of science, instead of merely rejecting
them in favour of some esoteric supra-rational mode of experience.

Pure idealism (as for instance, Fichte’s or Hegel’s) has always treated
the facts of perceptual experience as a bit of a nuisance, just as purely
materialistic theories (e.g. those of eighteenth-century France, or Watson's in our own time) have been frankly hostile to the deliverance of our non-perceptual experiences. Apart from philosophies of the mystical and quasi-mystical brand (Existentialism and Logical Positivism may be taken as illustrations—I include the latter too in this category because, in spite of its declared opposition to mysticism, a consistent logical positivist, according to its founder, has to be speechless), the most considerable trend in contemporary philosophy is one or other of the varieties of emergent materialism. The difficulty with emergent materialism (including its most popular form, dialectical materialism) is that "emergence" is not the solution, it is the name of a problem. The problem is how to define matter so that we can conceive it as behaving physico-chemically at one level, biologically at another and morally, aesthetically and rationally at a third. The emergent materialists seem to be as chary of telling us what they mean by matter as the theologians are of telling us what they mean by God. The general trend of their writings shows that they mean by matter what the physicists mean by it, or rather, what they used to mean by it in the nineteenth century. Such matter, as Whitehead has pointed out, is incapable of evolution. To insist that this very matter can, by just taking a leap, behave teleologically in a living organism and rationally in a human body, is either to believe in miracles or to change the definition of matter surreptitiously—at each leap. A new conception of matter (or whatever name we give this basic entity) is a great desideratum of modern thought. Whitehead's philosophy is probably the most competent attempt at evolving such a conception.

II

Whitehead mentions four great novel ideas introduced into theoretical science in the nineteenth century which led to the transition from the Newtonian cosmology to the new philosophy of organism. It is interesting to compare them with "the three major scientific discoveries" which, according to Engels, formed the background of Marxist philosophy. The first three are identical for both. Whitehead's list is:

1. Conservation and transformation of energy.
2. Atomicity and its application to biology.
4. Fields of force and activity pervading all space.

The first of these diverted scientific thought from mass to energy as the fundamental concept in physics—thus leading to the dissolution of the billiard ball theory of matter. The consequence of the second was that not only the living cells but inorganic atoms too, as they were conceived later by the Rutherford-Bohr theory, turned out to be highly organized centres
of ceaseless activity—organisms at different levels. Thirdly, the theory of evolution suggested the philosophical generalization that even between such extremes of natural phenomena as a block of stone and a man of genius, a continuous gradation of organization was conceivable so that their diversity, immense as it appeared, might not be ultimate or irreducible. The fourth great discovery, which Marx and Engels missed, became the keystone of Whitehead’s conception of the world as a unity of internally related events. This idea of an infinite field of activity first made its way into physics through Fresnel’s wave theory of light, but it did not really come to its own until the formulation of Maxwell’s electromagnetic vector equations—about the eighties of the last century.

These were the principal landmarks in the advancement of scientific thought which undermined the foundations of Newtonian cosmology. According to Whitehead the most important pillar of that cosmology was the doctrine of Simple Location. This was the doctrine of the independent individuality of each bit of matter whose properties could be correctly described without referring to what was going on in the rest of the universe. Its reality was supposed to be fully manifest at any instant of time without bringing in its past or its future. This narrow and highly abstract conception of matter and its relation to space and time has played a great role in the march of science during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but it has played itself out. “Modern physics has abandoned the doctrine of Simple Location. The physical things which we term stars, planets, lumps of matter, molecules, electrons, protons, quanta of energy, are each to be conceived as modifications of conditions within spacetime, extending throughout its whole range. There is a focal region, which in common speech is where the thing is. But its influence streams away from it with finite velocity throughout the utmost recesses of space and time. Of course, it is natural, and for certain purposes entirely proper, to speak of the focal region, thus modified, as the thing itself situated there. But difficulties arise if we press this way of thought too far. For physics, the thing itself is what it does, and what it does is this divergent stream of influence. Again the focal region cannot be separated from the external stream. It obstinately refuses to be conceived as an instantaneous fact. It is in a state of agitation, only differing from the so-called external stream by its superior dominance within the focal region. Also we are puzzled how to express exactly the existence of these physical things at any definite moment of time. For at every instantaneous point-event, within or without the focal region, the modification to be ascribed to this thing is antecedent to, or successive to the corresponding modification introduced by that thing at another point-event.”

The philosophy of Organism takes process, or the passage of events all round us and within us as the primary reality and all else as derivative from that. This is undoubtedly the more concrete, the more empirical
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approach, for our experience, taken in its entirety, is always of events, not of stationary states. From these events (or "actual occasions" in his later terminology) Whitehead proposes to derive the familiar things of common sense as well as the remote objects of science. The most fundamental relation between events is that of extension, extension of one event over another both as regards its temporal as well as its spatial expanse. Whitehead has devised a special method for the study of various types of relations of extension between events—the method of Extensive Abstraction. According to Broad, "this method is the prolegomena to every future philosophy of nature." With the help of this method Whitehead has shown how to construct space, time, point, particle and other basic concepts of science out of events. Beyond these atomic events or actual entities of experience there is nothing. "Everything that can be said about the universe must be said about an actual entity or a group or a nexus of actual entities."

Prehension is another basic relation between events. Whitehead has brought into use this word in preference to "apprehension," as, except in the higher organisms, this is not a conscious relation. Neither is it to be understood in the inert passive way in which material bodies are supposed to be affected by each other in Newtonian physics. "Prehension" means an active grasping by one entity of other entities, a grasping which effects its own being as well as of those grasped by it. Each event grasps within its own unity a pattern of aspects of other events; and it is itself an aspect in the patterns prehended by other events. Whitehead conceives every actual entity as dipolar. Its "physical pole" is its prehension of other actual entities; its "mental pole" is its grasp of new possibilities. Though in most entities the mental pole is dormant, what Whitehead is insisting upon is that even inorganic bodies are not merely passively acted upon, they actively respond to the influences reaching them, select from them and react along a particular line of possibility in accordance with their "subjective aim"—which in more orthodox language could be described as their nature, embracing their past as well as their future. A magnet responds to an electric field, a photographic plate to light rays—but not vice versa.

With things simply located and externally related, Whitehead believes that Hume's question regarding the validity of induction cannot be answered. "If in the location of configurations of matter throughout a stretch of time there is no inherent reference to any other times past or future, it immediately follows that nature within any period does not refer to nature at any other period. Accordingly induction is not based on anything that can be observed as inherent in nature." Whitehead's treatment of the problem of induction suggests that in course of validating the principle of induction, he is practically obliterating the sharp line that is supposed to divide perception of a given fact from inductive
and indirect knowledge of something absent. Whitehead would have it that we know an absent entity directly because it is involved in the being of a present entity through causal action and in other intimate ways. He speaks of our "experiencing causes" in their effects. This can be compared with the Nyāyāyika's theory of inductive knowledge, who also in the last analysis resolves it into a species of perception (alaukika pratyakṣa—transcendental perception). "The ancient Nyāya asserts that we can discern universals by means of perception . . . Through perception of the universal smokiness we apprehend all cases of smoke. The apprehension of the universal renders possible universal connections presupposed by inferential processes." 9

Whitehead's emphasis on the internality of relations between events should not give rise to any misapprehension that his philosophy of organism is but another version of Hegel's philosophy of the Absolute. No doubt there is a great deal in common between these two philosophers—though "Whitehead does not appear to have read Hegel," as Collingwood remarks in his posthumous book. Both of them are very conscious of, and responsive to, values other than those of the discursive understanding, and are convinced that these values can be incorporated in a rational system of thought. The philosophies of both are philosophies of organism, of internal relations, of concrete entities, of dialectical units, but their differences are no less profound. Whitehead's philosophy is above all a philosophy of process and growth in time, whereas for Hegel all development is only logical. This, however, was more a limitation of Hegel's time than of his thought, for matter as defined by the physicists of early nineteenth century was much too static to be really capable of any development. Hegel was naturally unable to conceive how this Newtonian matter could have produced life or mind.

Secondly, Whitehead's philosophy, in spite of its speculative flights, is empirical; Hegel's philosophy in spite of its emphasis on the concrete was a transcendental philosophy. "What is the status of the enduring stability of the order of nature? There is the summary answer, which refers to some greater reality standing behind it. This reality occurs in the history of thought under many names, The Absolute, Brahman, the Order of Heaven, God. My point is that any summary conclusion jumping from our conviction of the existence of such an order of nature to the easy assumption that there is an ultimate reality which, in some unexplained way, is to be appealed to for the removal of perplexity, constitutes the great refusal of rationality to assert its rights. We have to search whether nature does not in its very being show itself as self-explanatory." 10

Thirdly, for Hegel internality of relations was unqualified and unredeemed. As a result, no finite entity could be understood without going all the way to the Absolute; if we stopped short, we ended in error. That in a way undermined all science, for science is not possible unless some
relations can be ignored as being irrelevant. Whitehead’s system provides for such relative isolation. “Neither science, nor art, nor creative action can tear itself away from obstinate, irreducible, limited facts.” All relations are internal but not all are equally relevant to an actual occasion. Moreover, they serve not for its dissolution in a higher Reality (there is nothing more real than the actual entities), but for its enrichment and grandishment: “In a certain sense everything is everywhere at all times.” That is why Whitehead himself traces his philosophy to Leibniz rather than to Hegel (cf. Science and the Modern World, p. 181). But his monads (“occasions of experience”) instead of being windowless, are all windows. It is to be noticed that Whitehead’s deep-rooted empiricism is responsible for his pluralist trend of thought, and his pluralism is responsible for his reversal to the Aristotelian notion of final causes. He is definitely of the opinion that no genuine pluralism can maintain itself without admitting teleology in some form, for individuality and finite purpose are interdependent conceptions.

Just as in the philosophy of organism Leibniz’s monadology and Hegelian monism reach a dialectical unity, so also it synthesizes the Heraclitean or Bergsonian emphasis on change with the Platonic conception of the fundamental status of universals in reality. Process is an undoubted fact of experience, but so is recognition. An event, however, cannot be recognized, for it is a continuous passing away. To provide for recognition we have to admit a feature in the event which can remain relatively unaltered or is capable of repetition in spite of the flux of events. To this non-transient feature Whitehead has given the name “eternal objects.” He of course rejects the Lockian notion of an underlying and enduring substance behind qualitative changes. What endures is the quality itself, or a pattern of qualities. Whitehead speaks sometimes of three kinds of objects: sense objects, perceptual objects and scientific objects. A particular sense-given quality such as navy-blue or velvet-soft is a sense object. A chair or a tree—entities which common sense usually refers to as a “thing”—is a perceptual object. It is a habitual pattern of sense objects such that on the occurrence (or “ingression”) of one or more in a given event, the ingestion of other sense-objects in the nexus of that event may be expected, even though they are not being experienced at the moment. A physical object is defined as a non-delusive perceptual object. When we recognize a particular chair as the same that we saw five minutes ago, what we are recognizing is the “physical object,” not the event-series or the Minkowsky world-line in which the physical object “that chair” is situated. A scientific object such as a particular electron or quantum of energy is of course not presented in sense-experience like a chair. “They embody those aspects of the character of the situation of the physical objects which are most permanent and are expressible without reference to a multiple relation including a perciplient event.”

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Bowman has raised the objection that “in place of an initial duality of perception and scientific thought, Whitehead has given us a duality which is admittedly more fundamental and irresolvable, viz. that between event and object.” Whether Whitehead has succeeded in overcoming the former duality or not, we shall examine subsequently; but we cannot charge him with having “given us” the latter. Firstly, he does not bifurcate change from permanence, particular from universal in the fashion of idealists like Plato. His line of thought on this point is Aristotelian; he admits “eternal objects” in so far as they are ingressed or situated in the events; they have no superior or transcendent being. Secondly, Whitehead has not burdened philosophy with this duality-in-unity of change and permanence; philosophical thought has carried this burden ever since its dawn amongst the Ionian and the Upanisadic thinkers. Refusal to recognize this essential dialectic of experience results only in unbalanced speculations like those of Parmenides and Heraclitus, Plato and the later Buddhists, Hegel and Bergson.

III

Negatively, Whitehead’s philosophy arises out of the denial of two basic abstractions in the heritage of modern thought—the Newtonian doctrine of the simple location of material bodies, and the Cartesian separation of mind from nature. So far, we have confined our discussion to those aspects of Whitehead’s philosophy which are connected more or less with the first denial. Whitehead, however, is better known for his second denial, the denial of “the bifurcation of nature.” What he is essentially protesting against is the bifurcation of nature into two systems: one, the nature of electrons and light quanta, studied by the physicists and believed to be independently real; the other, the nature of the poets and painters, endowed with sunset hues and the song of the nightingale, with champak odours and the soft touch of the spring breeze. This nature is believed to be dependent upon the mind and body of the observer. Scientists and scientific philosophers have conspired to exclude it from the domain of objective reality; it has no more than a ghostly existence in the mind of the percipient subject. Whitehead finds all this not only unacceptable but totally unbelievable. According to him “causal nature is a metaphysical chimera,” and “for natural philosophy everything perceived is in nature. We may not pick and choose. For us the red glow of the sunset should be as much part of nature as are the molecules and electric waves by which men of science would explain the phenomena.” Otherwise, Whitehead feels, the poets would have to “address their lyrics to themselves, to turn them into odes of self-congratulation on the excellency of the human mind.”

What science asserts, and what Whitehead does not deny, is that a
physical disturbance emanating from the throat of the nightingale causes modifications in the surrounding medium; this modification travelling with a finite velocity reaches the listener’s eardrums and produces a specific change in his afferent nerves and brain. According to Whitehead, the experience which we describe as hearing a nightingale’s song is the mental pole of the event whose physical pole is the neural change mentioned above. Even so, we can no more attribute the nightingale’s song as heard to the region of space-time where the physical occurrence connected with the origin of the disturbance took place than we can attribute the concomitant neural changes to that region. The relation between spatio-temporally separated conditions and their effect may be as intimate and internal as you like. Nevertheless it does not enable us to characterize the cause with the properties of the effect. If a piece of wax has melted due to the heat from a distant furnace, the furnace cannot be described as a molten piece of wax, nor can it be said to contain that as one of its aspects. At best, what we can say is that the furnace has the “power” to melt a piece of wax.

This is one of the main arguments that Lovejoy has brought against Whitehead’s strictures on the bifurcation theory (vide his Revolt Against Dualism, Ch. V). It seems to ignore, however, that Whitehead’s denial of bifurcation is intimately connected with his denial of simple location. We have seen before that in denying simple location he had reached the paradoxical position from which he could state that “in a sense everything is everywhere and at all times.” This evidently implies that the effects of a thing are to be included in the total conception of the thing. It is only from such a standpoint that Whitehead has been able to claim that the contents of perception are occurrences within the body of the percipient as well as features of the external world.

His epistemological position is very different from that of the American neo-realists for whom all contents of perceptual consciousness are wholly external, the mind, or rather the brain, acting only as an organ of selection from elements of the physical world. Whitehead, on the other hand, thinks that perceptual experience is in the first instance confined to the neural regions of the observer. “It is an evident fact of experience that our apprehension of the external world depends absolutely on the occurrences within the human body.” But our body is in intimate connection with the happenings in nature; therefore “in being aware of the bodily experience we must thereby be aware of the whole spatio-temporal world as mirrored within the bodily life.”

The difficulty is that the body does not, strictly speaking, mirror the external world. It distorts and transmutes it. The bodily event has of course an external reference. It may be taken as symbolizing external events—Whitehead has himself developed a symbolic theory of perception (vide Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect). But the relation between
the symbol and the symbolized need only be that of structural resemblance; there is no warrant for taking the symbol as a copy or mirror-image. Whitehead does not seem to have succeeded in displacing the usual scientific position that perception gives us only a structural knowledge of the external world, not qualitative. He is not averse to recognizing some distinction between what we perceive immediately and its external conditions. At all events there is a small time lag which may become fairly large when, for instance, we are perceiving a star.

As a matter of fact the distinction between causal nature and apprehended nature re-enters Whitehead’s philosophy through the back door as the distinction between appearance and reality. “The objective content of an occasion of experience sorts itself out under two contrasted characters—Appearance and Reality.” 18 Appearance is defined thus: “Appearance is the effect of the activity of the mental pole, whereby the qualities and co-ordinations of the given physical world undergo transformation.” 19 This is enough to please the heart of any bifurcationist. But there is more to come: “No one type of external event is associated with one type of sense-percept. Hardly any percept is strictly normal. Gross illusions are plentiful, and some element of illusion almost universal.” 20 What justification is then left for endowing our perceptual contents with physical reality? If we insist on thrusting them upon the delicately ordered pattern of events studied by the natural scientists, shall we not thereby disrupt the order of nature? Moreover, if whatever we perceive were to be included in the objective world, physical nature itself would be bifurcated into two very dissimilar classes of entities—one consisting of those which strictly obey the laws of physics, and the other consisting of the recal-citrant sense-given elements—which the scientists safely stow away in the lumber-room of the so-called subjective or mental entities.

Of course we are free to maintain that, “it is a real fact of nature that the world has appeared thus from the standpoint of these antecedent occasions of the personal life. . . . Given these conditions of normality the resulting appearance will be that proper to the species of animal under circumstances of that type.” 21 But no working scientist, nor any Lockian supporter of the bifurcation theory of nature ever thought of denying this kind of objectivity to our normal percepts. And this same objectivity, i.e. universality of apprehension (not physical reality of apprehended contents), would have satisfied the most romantic of poets of the nineteenth century. I believe Wordsworth’s artistic conscience would have been quite at ease if he were assured that all sensitive souls may be expected to feel the same thrill of joy which he felt whenever he saw a rainbow in the sky. He would not have insisted that the thrilling colours of the rainbow should be somehow included in the electromagnetic field equations of the physicists or in their interpretation by the philosophers.

Whitehead recognizes that the harmonious integration of appearances
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is enough for the creation and appreciation of beauty. But in his view artistic perfection is reached only when a work of art has obtained Truthful Beauty, that is to say, when art has achieved not only a harmony of appearances amongst themselves, but has attained to a further harmony, viz. harmony of the aesthetic construct with reality. This additional harmony of art is not, and cannot be, of that detailed and exacting variety which science tries to obtain; it can only be very general. It is not necessary for art or our aesthetic life that the nature of physics should be one with the nature of the poets and painters, or that it should find a place for "the light that never was on sea or land." What we can demand from both Science and Art on behalf of our integral personality is that the broad character of reality which Science discovers and which Art only vaguely hints at should not conflict. This is the kind of integration of experience that Whitehead is out to achieve by a reorientation of the scientific picture of nature based on the revolutionary changes in science found necessary for the advancement of science itself. His crusade against any frontiers between physical and perceptual entities was from excess of zeal; it is not, as such, strictly demanded by the tenor of his philosophy of organism. What is demanded is that matter and mind should not be wholly disparate in their essential natures, not the identity of apprehended nature with causal nature.

NOTES

2. Adventure of Ideas, p. 204.
3. ibid., p. 208.
5. Adventure of Ideas, p. 201.
7. Emmet, Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism, p. 79.
11. ibid., p. 114.
12. ibid., p. 111.
17. ibid., p. 111.
19. ibid., p. 270.
20. ibid., p. 275.

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CHAPTER XLV

REALISM

1. MAIN ASSUMPTIONS

 Laird describes Realism as "an attitude and a tendency" and says that "the main assumption of Realism is that things can be known as they really are." As a "tendency" it is fluid and varies from one realist philosopher to another. As an "attitude" Realism stands for that special kind of attitude expressed by Hume: "all distinct ideas are separable"; i.e. what is distinct in thought is distinct in existence. Realism considers Relation to be a distinct category; and recognizes all the three categories, Thing, Quality, and Relation, as distinct and valid of Reality; whereas Idealism reduces Relation to Quality on the ground that there is ultimately only one kind of propositional form, the subject-predicate form; while F. H. Bradley rejects the categories of Thing, Quality, and Relation, as "appearance," as ultimately inconsistent and self-contradictory.

Realists say that mind is distinct from the object of its knowledge; that there is no priority of mind over the objects of its knowledge: that Spirit and Matter both exist, if anything exists at all; otherwise the alternative is agnosticism and total scepticism, as Professor G. E. Moore says. Matter exists in the same sense as Spirit; to say that spirit alone exists is "the grossest superstition" as Moore puts it.

What exists has to other existents a relation; the most general form of this relation is "togetherness" or "compresence" as Alexander states it. The purest form of this general relation is space-time; and the relation between a mind and its object is of the same kind as the relation between a chair and a table. There is nothing unique about the relation between a mind and its object except that, in knowledge, one of the terms happens to be a mind. If this is true, then every space-time relation is potentially a cognitive relation. The relation of "togetherness" or "compresence" does not, however, imply "dependence." Realism means by "togetherness" that one entity exists along with others, but no entity is "dependent upon" another entity. All Realists say that "being" is independent of "knowing"; but Professor C. D. Broad distinguishes between existential and qualitative mind-dependence. Broad says that something may be "a state of mind" without being mind-dependent. The object of knowledge is existentially independent of a mind, but it may be qualitatively mind-dependent. He means by this that, "an object can exist and have qualities when it is not a constituent of any state of mind (but) it might acquire
some new qualities or alter some of its old qualities on becoming a constituent of a state of mind. 28

Realists define Knowledge as a "discovery" and "direct revelation." 29 Knowledge is not "making" or "combining." There are two things which we know: (a) Objects, and (b) our own mental processes (and other minds). Alexander distinguishes between the different ways in which we know them; he says, we "contemplate" objects but "enjoy" mental processes. This distinction is entailed by the fact that "the mind which is thus a set of acts towards objects, is not an object which can be looked at itself." 30 Of the existence of "other minds" we have "assurance." This Knowledge is not inferential.

Realists distinguish between an "act" of experiencing and what is experienced. This distinction was first made by Brentano (1838–1907) in 1874. 31 The object, or what is experienced, is not mental; what is mental is the act. This distinction is applicable to every kind of experience: to sensing, perceiving, judging, feeling, and willing.

Our knowledge of the external world according to Realism is direct and immediate; and the external world is not an inference from our sense-data. As Broad puts it: "It is false logically to suppose that the existence of a physical world in general could be inferred from the existence of our sensa. ... I suppose that the existence of sensa is a necessary condition, but it is certainly not a sufficient condition of my belief in the existence of the physical world." 32 Therefore the subjective idealist cannot be refuted; nor can the Realist prove the independent reality of the external world unless he has already a belief in its existence. As Santayana puts it: "Without assuming realism it is impossible to prove realism." 33

The external world is not an inference: "It is not reached by inference, and could not be logically justified by inference." 34

What is the external world? It is a "logical construction" out of the facts of our sense-data.

It is a "construction" in the sense that, between the purely general concept of a physical order which the independent reality of the external world implies and the facts of our sensa, a variety of alternative theories as to the nature of the physical world is possible; as to the kind of whole it is and the kind of geometry and the number of its dimensions, etc. "With traditional views about the nature of Space, Time, and Matter, it is extremely difficult to fit the world of sensa and the world of physical objects together into a coherent whole." 35 The merit of Modern Realism consists in having introduced two original principles in its "construction" of the external world. The first principle is The Principle of Extensive Abstraction introduced by A. N. Whitehead in his "epoch-making" books (as Broad describes them) The Concept of Nature and The Principles of Natural Knowledge. This Principle has enabled the Philosophy of Science to dispense with abstractions such as points, moments, etc., and to define.
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them in terms of their classes. The second principle is known as Ockham's Razor: "Wherever possible substitute constructions out of known entities for inference to unknown entities." This is introduced by Russell.¹⁶

An essential part of the theory of the external world involved in modern realism is its "theory of objects." This may be stated by a reference to Berkeley.

Berkeley defined a physical object as "a collection of ideas."²⁷ By "idea" he meant "sensation," "sense-data" or "sense-object." Sight gives the "idea" of light and colour; and, "ideas" exist "in the mind." So Berkeley argued: There is no unheard sound; i.e. there are no unsensed sensa. Therefore, there are no unperceived physical objects, said Berkeley. Berkeley's view implies a distinction between two kinds of "perceptible" objects (sense-objects and physical objects), and his theory involves a relation between them. Berkeley held the wrong view that there is a "reciprocity in the relations between sense-objects and physical objects."²⁸

Realists say that unperceived physical objects exist; or, they say that though belief in their existence may be false, yet there is no contradiction (a distinction which is due to Professor G. E. Moore) in asserting propositions about them; some say that the independent existence of physical objects is quite consistent with their qualitative mind-dependence. These statements pre-suppose a theory of "objects" which may be stated from two points of view. There is a systematic ambiguity in the term "object."

"Public" and "Private" Objects.—Russell²⁹ says that sense-data are "private" while physical objects are "public" and "neutral." Broad adds that a physical object "persists," has shape and size (for whatever has shape, has size), and is capable of motion. Besides, a physical object involves, according to Broad: (a) a complete optical object and, (b) something which is not optical at all; since it is the centre for sound and radiant-heat sensa, it being very exceptional for (a) to occur without (b).³⁰

Is a "public" object a perceptible object? Professor G. E. Moore said in a class lecture: "imperceptible objects are also 'public' objects, e.g. the electron."

Now, "imperceptible" and "public" objects are what Whitehead calls "scientific" objects.³¹ Broad distinguishes between various orders of scientific objects: (molecules, atoms, electrons, etc.), and he says that this hierarchy is a real fact in Nature. Physical objects "live in" physical space and time; scientific objects in scientific space and time. Scientific objects are of different orders and they "need different minimal spaces and durations to live in"; and this fact is recognized as regards space, but is stated in a misleading way, says Broad: "molecules are divisible and electrons are not."³²

The connection between scientific objects which represent what "is ultimately permanent in nature" and physical objects which are relatively
impermanent is the basis for the statement: "the unperceived parts of perceptible events" exist.  

"Subsistent" and "existent" objects.—Realists, however, differ about the meaning of "is." This is one of the points of difference between the Anglo-American and the continental Realists, notably Brentano (1838–1907), Meinong (1853–1921), and Husserl (1859–1938). Meinong says that the difference between Red and Green does not "exist" in the same sense in which tables and chairs exist, but subsists. He distinguishes between three classes of objects: (a) subsistent or ideal objects: e.g. Universals, Relations, etc.; (b) existent objects, tables and chairs and sense-data; and (c) non-subsistent or "impossible" objects which neither exist nor subsist: e.g. round-square. Meinong distinguishes between the "being" of an object and its "being an apprehended object." "An object can be when the presentation by which it would be apprehended is not and it can likewise not be when this presentation is."  

The "apprehended" object is a "veritable" or presented object. The purpose of Philosophy is the classification of ideal objects irrespective of their existence. In this sense Philosophy is a Science: it is an a priori Science; it is a Gegenstandstheorie; it is a "theory of objects."

There is a change in the terminology of the continental philosophers which must be noticed. Instead of the word "object" there occurs, in Husserl the term "idea." Philosophy is an "eidetic science." It is an enquiry into "ideas" or Eidos, those "logical forms" or "essences," the universal categorical forms contained in possible truths and in possible facts; "objects" which are not empirical "matters of fact" (in Hume's sense), but which are pure and which are "phenomena," because they are objects of a possible consciousness and are in essential relation to it, and which, as Brentano says, are "intended" (intentionalität) whether they exist or not.

This movement of thought which calls itself Pure Phenomenology tends to diminish the opposition between the Real and the Ideal. It moves towards a realism or idealism, as the case may be, of the Platonic type.

Method: Logical Construction²⁶ or Analysis.—The Method of Modern Realism is Analysis; it is also called "ostentation." The aim of analysis is to discover the ultimate structure of facts. What is a fact? Whatever Language expresses is a fact; and, to talk about facts is to talk about the Universe. Every fact has a structure; i.e. every fact has elements, an arrangement of the elements, and a form. The elements are either the "constituents" of a fact or its "components." A "constituent" is that of which a "component" is predicated; and "components" are either qualities or relations. Sometimes "components" may serve as "constituents."

Every fact has an ultimate structure: this is not revealed by the ordinary use of language. Hence the need for analysis and the need to analyse language and its expressive function. What the ordinary language ex-
presses, or "shows," is a "sketch"; what analysis reveals is "ostentation." Thus "sketch" reveals structure; analysis reveals *ultimate* structure. There are different levels of analysis: (a) Material or same-level analysis; the analysis of "admiration" into "awe and fear" is a material analysis, and this is "same-level" analysis, because we are talking about the same thing. (b) Formal Analysis: This is necessary when a sentence offends against the rule: "separate points separately stated." (c) The third level of analysis is ostentation. This is *philosophical* analysis; its aim is logical construction. "When A and B are so related that to say something about A, is to say something about, but not the same thing, about B and B is more ultimate than A, in the sense defined, then A is said to be a logical construction out of B." Thus the external world is a logical construction out of sense-data.

2. G. E. MOORE (b. 1873)

According to Moore, Philosophy is an activity which consists "largely in giving reasons." Giving "a reason" means giving a *good* reason, for people *have* bad reasons for their beliefs. And giving a good reason in Philosophy is different from giving a good reason in Logic. In Logic, giving a good reason means giving a *formal* reason; Logic is a demonstration of what follows from what. The Logician uses "follows from" in a narrow sense; the philosopher *alone* uses it in a wide and popular sense which all understand. What is *understood* need not be defined. Philosophy is understood by all even when they *misunderstand* philosophical problems. There is, as Moore once said in his Metaphysics class, a sense of the word "understand" such that when something is misunderstood it is understood. Philosophy is what we all understand; therefore Philosophy is Common Sense.

(a) Moore's Refutation of Idealism.—When idealist philosophers say, *esse* *percipti*, Moore’s question is: what *reason* have they for saying so? They mean that *esse* is *necessarily* *percipti*. What is the sort of necessary connection they assert between *esse* and *percipti*? The sort of necessary connection they assert is that which exists between a thing and its qualities. "The relation of blue to the consciousness is conceived to be exactly the same as that of the "colour" blue to the blue "bead." If the relation between *esse* and *percipti* is the same relation as between a thing and its qualities, then it follows that, to say "a thing is" means that "it is perceived"; for if a thing exists its qualities must exist. This, however, is an error. The idealist is led into this error by his analysis of experience into two, and only two, constituents: content and existence. There are, according to Moore, three constituents in experience: a unique element called consciousness, a unique relation of this consciousness to the object which is the third constituent. The relation of knowing is unique. It is
present in the sensation of blue, or "the most exalted and independent thing of which I am aware." Three consequences follow from this: (i) when I have a sensation of blue, my awareness is related to something outside; so the idealist's problem how are we to get out of our circle of ideas does not arise; because to have a sensation is already to be outside it. (ii) Blue exists in the same sense as my experience of it exists. (iii) The object has exactly the same nature both when we are aware of it and when we are not aware of it. Knowing makes no difference to the object known.

If Moore's analysis is right, it would follow that, the relation of knowing is "external" to the object known and the subject that knows. If so, there may be a self or an awareness, which need not be aware of anything. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School of Indian Realism which is Logical Atomism, asserts a possibility of this sort. According to it, in mokṣa or Liberation, the Self is not only without pain or pleasure but is without knowledge. This conclusion must leave us "dumb" as it left Protarchus in Philebus (21 A): "But if you had neither mind nor memory, nor knowledge nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of sense." Thus the question is not whether spirit and matter exist, but what "reason" have we, as Moore would say, to think that spirit and matter are distinct.

(b) External and Internal Relations.—Realism is based on the reality of relations; and all relations are external. Idealism denies the reality of relations, or asserts that all relations are internal; or it reduces relations which are between terms to adjectives which are in the terms they qualify. This view entails Monism as in Spinoza and Bradley; or the denial of interaction in pluralistic systems, as in Leibniz. W. E. Johnson speaks of Relations as "transitive adjectives," though he by no means denies the reality of relations. Bradley's objection is that, if a relation is "between" the terms it relates, then there must be another relation between the relation and the term, for there is a "between" between them. To this McTaggart replies: that the notion of "between" is unanalysable and is simple as the notion of "in." W. E. Johnson explains that the "pretence of paradox" in Bradley's objection is due to Bradley's confusion between a "tie" and "relation." And Broad asks: why should a relation which is a universal need another relation, unless you confuse it with a particular?

Moore's essay on "External and Internal Relations" in his Philosophical Studies is as well known as his Rebuttal of Idealism. The main point of Moore's criticism of the "dogma" of internal relations, as he calls it, is his distinction between two senses of "follows from." Idealism asserts: "Relations make a difference to terms." "To make a difference" means that the term would necessarily have been different without the relation. From the fact that a term had not a relation, it would "follow" that the term would be different. Moore distinguishes between: (a) a strict and (b) a general sense of "follows." The "strict" sense of "follows" is Entailment;
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e.g. "being red" entails "being coloured." The general sense of follows is Material Implication; e.g. "being a person in this room" materially implies "being more than five years old." But "being more than five years old" is not deducible from "being a person in this room." It is only as a matter of fact true. Whereas "being red" entails "being coloured"; the latter is deducible from the former. A relation, according to Moore, is "internal" only in the sense of "being deducible from"; in this sense relations are not internal, according to Moore, but some relational properties.

But Moore's argument is inconclusive and many questions arise out of his distinction. Supposing it is true that relations are not internal in Moore's sense, this would mean that the Universe may not be a deductive system. Moore's second sense of "follows from" raises the doubt whether the Universe, or anything at all, is a system. On Moore's theory, we could not say of anything that it is necessarily so-and-so but only as a matter of fact so-and-so. If the Universe, or anything in it, is a system, it is not a "logical" system of inter-related things in which one thing necessarily follows from another, but a "factual" inter-relatedness in which things are as a matter of fact so-and-so. (But Moore thinks that, "to search for 'Unity' and 'System' at the expense of truth, is not the proper business of philosophy, however universally it may have been the practice of philosophers."

It is to be noted that an "external" relation, as Moore defines it, is a necessary relation. Its necessity is factual and not logical. Moore's doctrine of External Relations involves the following notions: (a) that something as a matter of fact is so-and-so; (b) that, though no exception to the contrary has been found, yet it is logically possible that a given term might have existed without a given relation; and (c) that it would not be a different term without the relation.

The relation of Samavāya in the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika School of Indian Realism which is said to hold between ayuta-siddha, i.e. objects which are invariably found associated," is an external relation in Moore's sense. Samavāya is a "necessary" relation and it involves the logical possibility that at least one of the objects related by samavāya might have existed without the other.

3. BERTRAND RUSSELL (b. 1872)

Russell's original contributions to Philosophy are in Logic; and Russell has given Realism a logical foundation and structure which is as great as the structure which Idealism received from Kant. Every problem, says Russell, is on analysis discovered to be either not philosophical at all or else to be logical.34 By "logic" Russell means Mathematical Logic, which arrives at its fundamental ideas by an analysis of Mathematics; and Mathematics is the best example of formal reasoning. "In all the many
possible worlds philosophy and mathematics will be the same. Mathematical logic has freed Philosophy from two erroneous concepts: the *infinitesimal* and the *antinomies*. Mathematical Logic does "not welcome contradictions as proofs that such and such features in the apparent world are unreal."  

**Problem of Infinity.**—One of the main contributions of Russell to Realism is his analysis of the concepts of infinity and continuity. Realism asserts the reality of the external world. To assert the reality of the external world is to assert the objective reality of space and time. Space and time are not, as Kant said, "forms of perception." To assert the objective reality of space and time is to predicate of them the characteristics of infinity and continuity. To do so Realism must refute the Kantian antinomies, because, the Kantian antinomies deny the infinity of space and time. But the problem about the infinity of space and time is a problem, Russell says, about *Order*, about *Series*, about *Collections*, and about *infinite Wholes*. What Kant's argument proved was that, an infinite series cannot be completed by "successive synthesis"; i.e. by "enumeration."  

Thus Kant's treatment of infinite series made the problem inductive; at the same time the antinomies showed that there could be no solution which is inductive. Therefore the problem needed another "Copernican revolution" in Method. Russell finds this in the method of "deductive synthesis." We cannot enumerate an infinite series; nor have we, as McTaggart said, an *intuition* such as an omniscient mind might have. Nor can we reject the notion of an "infinite whole" on the ground that it is non-existent; if we did reject it, then the term *Universe* would be destitute of meaning.  

The problem as thus presented itself to Russell makes him recognize a third mode of knowledge which deals with the peculiar difficulties of infinite series and wholes. The third mode of knowledge may be called "Knowledge by Formal Implication" as distinguished from "Knowledge by Acquaintance" and "Knowledge by Description."  

The logical problem which thus arises by a refutation of the Kantian antinomies is a problem about (infinite) aggregates. But why aggregates? Russell recognizes two kinds of wholes: Unities and Aggregates; "the difference between the (two) kinds of wholes is important and illustrates a fundamental point in Logic." Aggregates, he says, are of "special relevance" to Mathematics. Now, the doctrine of aggregates is a part of the problem of whole and part. There are three points to be noted in Russell's discussion of this topic in *The Principles of Mathematics*: (a) that unities and aggregates are "very different classes of wholes"; (b) that, "each class of wholes consists of terms which are not simply equivalent to all their parts"; (c) that the analysis of a "whole" (for, "whatever can be analysed is a whole") is "in some measure falsification."  

"Analysis gives
us the truth, and nothing but the truth, yet it can never give us the whole truth." Russell asks us to note "the very narrow limits of this doctrine," lest it should become a cloak for intellectual laziness." Even so the problem is: how can we get, not only "the truth," but "the whole truth" about an infinite aggregate without "analysis," without "enumeration," and without having "knowledge by acquaintance" or "knowledge by description" of every member of the infinite whole? The problem for Russell's Mathematical Logic is not unlike the problem posed by the pupil in the Mundaka-Upanisad (kasmin nu bhagavo vijnate sarvam idam vijnatam bhavatitii, tr. 3) "By knowing what, Sir, does all this become known?"; i.e. "all this" of an infinite whole or aggregate. Russell's answer is: Propositional Functions.

Propositional Functions. 45 — The most original contribution of Russell to logic is his theory of Propositional Functions. In Logic we mean by a "proposition" primarily a form of words which express what is either true or false. A "propositional function" is "an expression containing one or more undetermined constituents, such that when values are assigned to these constituents, the expression becomes a proposition." A propositional function, therefore, contains a variable. "X is human" is a propositional function. On Russell's theory, expressions in traditional logic such as, "all A is B" is a propositional function. A and B must be determined as definite classes before such expressions can become true or false.

Logic uses the words "all," "every," "a," "the," "some," etc.; these terms require the use of propositional functions. In Logic we do not "enumerate" particulars or instances; we pass from instances to the general law behind them. Thus we know an "infinite whole" without knowing every member, because we know that a whole exemplifies a certain propositional function. We know "all men are mortal" because we know that the propositional function "X is a man and X is mortal" is always true. Thus there are "only two things that can be done with a propositional function; one is to assert that it is true in all cases, the other is to assert that it is true in at least one case, or in some cases."

Russell says that the clear need in logic is to keep "propositional functions" distinct from "propositions." Even so, a propositional function without a proposition is "empty," and a proposition without a propositional function is "blind."

Russell's theory of propositional functions is a theory about Universals. It is a more correct interpretation of his theory of universals to say that we recognize a propositional function or a Universal in an instance or particular than to say that we "pass from" from a particular to a Universal. (This may partly explain Russell's distrust of induction, which he regards as "disguised deduction.") Russell's theory presupposes that we have prior knowledge of Universals. Russell's theory of knowledge appears to have emancipated itself from the "empiricism" of the older English Schools, and his philosophy may be described as "transcendental" Realism.
4. THE AMERICAN SCHOOLS OF REALISM

The New Realism.—Realism from being a tendency has become a “School” with the American New Realists and the Critical Realists. The motive of their co-operative studies is that, philosophers must make their “implicit agreements or disagreements explicit.” We may speak of the New Realists first and the Critical Realists later. New Realism distinguishes itself from “traditional realism” or “substantialism,” which thinks that substances are independent of qualities; this is the sort of view held by Locke: substance is a “I know not what.” New Realism rejects this view as it leads to the wrong theory that, “the soul may exist without thinking”; that its nature, in other words, is independent of the forms of consciousness by which it is known. In spite of its distinction from “traditional realism” or “Substantialism,” there is a tendency in New Realism to banish consciousness from its description of the Universe. It is better to confine ourselves to this point in expounding its doctrines. To the New Realist the existent world is a four-dimensional manifold of quality groups and his eleven categories are as follows:—

1. One quality-group, one space, one time = event.
2. Same qualities, different spaces, or different times = Qualitative identity; similarity; species; class.
3. Different qualities, same space, same time = numerical identity: co-inherence of attributes in one thing: ‘is-ness.’
4. Same qualities, in space at continuously different times = duration; rest.
5. Same qualities, in same space at discontinuously different times = succession, time interval.
6. Qualities partly same, partly different, same space, different times = one thing undergoing changes of state.
7. Same or different qualities, same time continuously, different spaces = one extended thing.
8. Same or different qualities, same time, discontinuously different spaces = plurality of extended things, distances.
9. Same qualities, continuously different spaces, continuously different times = moving thing.
10. Qualities that change with change of space and time relations = mere states; accidents.
11. Qualities (if such there be) that remain unchanged through all change of space and time relations = ultimate elements of quality: permanent substances.” (The New Realism, pp. 263–264.)

The above scheme makes no room for consciousness or causality; and yet New Realism talks of both consciousness and causality under “causal-implication.” Consciousness is an instance of the relation of implication, and New Realism defines implication as a relation of one-sided dependence. If A implies B it is not the case that B implies A. New Realism talks of “independence”; it means by this not the absence of relation between terms but of reciprocity between them. “Independence” means “non-reciprocal dependence.” Thus, e.g., “being experienced” is not essential to
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"existing"; hence "existing" is independent of "being experienced"; and every simple thing is logically independent of every other simple thing. But there is the fact of change; and New Realism recognizes change. It defines change as a transition from a state in which entities are independent to a state in which they become dependent; but the dependence is one-sided and is not reciprocal.

The question is: is causality an instance of implication? Professor G. E. Moore used to say that the proposition if P then Q, is ambiguous because it may mean either the relation of Entailment or the relation of Causality. According to Moore, they are distinct relations, while Professor C. D. Broad was not certain, he said, what the relation of causality is, since it is, clearly, less than Entailment and more than Probability. New Realism says, Matter "implies" consciousness; and implication has been defined in New Realism as one-sided relation of dependence. There is no error if New Realism defines implication as a relation of one-sided dependence and considers causality a relation of this sort. But the question is: what is the sense or direction of this relation? Does matter "imply" consciousness, or does consciousness "imply" matter? The one-sided relation of implication says: if A then B. It says that there is the "implied" and the "impler." It does not say what "implies" what. New Realism assumes that Matter is the "implied" and consciousness the "impler." This view would be correct if, and only if, it were true that we are aware of the external world first and aware of ourselves only afterwards as the effect of causal action of objects upon our consciousness. But there is very good reason to hold the opposite view which is more plausible, as Descartes's Cogito ergo Sum, at least, shows. I can think away the external World but cannot think away the thinker. No one says: I am not, as Śāṅkara puts it.

Alexander, in his British Academy Lecture on The Basis of Realism, says that, Realism does not deny the status of mind in the Universe, but denies its "pretensions." New Realism, similarly, may be said to be based, not on the status of matter, but upon its "pretensions."

Critical realism.—"Everything is as if Realism is true," but if a proof is wanted, Critical Realism will use the pragmatic test (like the test of samvādi-pravytti, "coherent or harmonious activity" of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika).

The main point about Critical Realism is that it is a sort of synthesis or "meeting of extremes" in Philosophy. It is a "third thing" between Realism and Subjectivism, between Noumenalism and Phenomenalism. As against the direct Realism of the New Realists, Critical Realism says that we have no direct knowledge of the external world. Our knowledge of the external world is through the "appearances" which are given to us in sense perception; but these are not "copies" of what is outside. As against subjectivism or phenomenalism, Critical Realism says that, our knowledge is not of phenomena only; phenomena refer to objects. It is the

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reference that explains the fact of "objectivity." Kant said that, "appearances" are given in sensation under the "forms of perception" and are synthesized by the activity of the Understanding. The "object" is a product of the mind's synthesizing activity. It is this that explains, according to Kant, the fact of "objective reference." To the Critical Realist, what explains the fact of objective reference is the activity of "relating" the "given" to an object. We have direct intuition, not of objects, but of the qualities given in sense-experience; and, according to the Critical Realist, there are three factors in experience: (a) the mind which knows; (b) the existing object which is the centre of reference; (c) the qualities given in sense-experience. Critical Realism describes the last by various terms: "character-complexes," "content," "datum," "the given," "quality," etc., but the term most widely used is essence. What is given in immediate experience is "essence"; and knowledge is an activity which consists in relating or predicating the "essence" of the "object." The "essence" is real; and the relation between "essence" and "object" is unique. Now, the "essence" is, in a sense, "the given"; in another sense it is the "taken"; it is "taken by the mind as constituting the character of the object." Says Durant Drake: "Our data, the character-complexes given in conscious experience, are simply character complexes, essences, logical entities, which are irresistibly taken to be characters of the existents perceived, or otherwise known."47 If so, the Critical Realist's definition of "essence" is similar to Spinoza's definition of an Attribute: "An attribute (attributum) I understand to be that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance" (Ethics, Def. IV).

The Critical Realist's definition of the activity of "relating" the given "essence" to the "object" leads him to his conception of truth and error. Error is "false attribution": the Critical Realist's theory of error resembles the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of error known as anyathā-khyāti.48 The doctrine of "false attribution" would imply that the object of the predication and the predicate are both real. The penny, to quote Broad's example, looks elliptical to me; there is something given in my sense-experience which is elliptical, but which does not "belong to" the round physical object, the penny. But the roundness of the physical object and the elliptical character of the sense-object are both real; the error is due to "false predication."

Two points emerge from this theory of error: that there is a knowledge (in the Indian sense of the nirvikalpaka), in which there is neither error nor contradiction. It is the kind of knowledge in which there is "knowing" but no "relating"; there is another kind (savikalpaka), in which the given essence is related to the object, which is the centre of reference. What, then, is the relation between the "essence" and the "object" in a true judgment? The relation according to the Critical Realist is not "one-one correspondence" but should be identity, though this is not very clearly admitted by all Critical Realists.49
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The assumptions behind Critical Realism are two: they are stated by Santayana as: (a) Transitiveness, and (b) Relevance. The first means that self-existing and independent objects become objects of knowledge to a knowing mind which indicates and identifies them; the second means that the thing so indicated may have some of the qualities that the mind attributes to it. The position of New Realism and Critical Realism may be briefly compared. Both are opposed to epistemological idealism. New Realism holds that objects as known are identical with objects as they are outside the mind; Critical Realism denies this and holds that objects as existing are not directly known; what is directly known is the "essence." Critical Realism is dualistic, while New Realism may be described as "epistemological monism."

5. CONCLUSION

The essay may conclude with a note on the words "real" and "reality," F. H. Bradley said: "Existence is not reality, and reality must exist." The contradiction between existence and reality is overcome for finite existence by the doctrine of degrees of truth and reality; each entity is true or is real in its degree. The contradiction between existence and reality is finally overcome only in the Absolute which alone is truly real and which alone truly exists. This, in general, is the position of Idealism.

Realism generally says: whatever is, is real. There are different senses in which this proposition is true. (a) This proposition is not a definition of Reality. Reality is indefinable; it cannot be defined in terms of "experiencing," or in terms of "non-contradiction." The "is" denotes Being, and the proposition means: Being is the same as Reality. This does not imply that assertions of unreality are self-contradictory. The proposition "whatever is, is real" though a tautology, indicates the very wide denotation of the term Real. (b) The term "is real" is used in an absolute sense; it does not, for instance, mean "is more or less real" involving the doctrine of degrees of truth and reality. As Laird puts it: to the Absolutist each entity is not "quite true" because it is subject to qualification in a wider context; to the Realist, however, each entity is true or is real "in its own right." (c) There is empirical knowledge that "whatever is," is a diversity; therefore "whatever is, is real" means that the diversity is real; and the main assumption of Realism is, as Laird said, "things can be known as they really are," and things "as they really are" are a diversity. Realism therefore involves a pluralistic metaphysics: No two entities are alike. (d) Whatever is, is in space-time; or, it is pure space-time to begin with. Space-time is real and Reality is a process. Modern Realism says, as against the older Philosophies of Change, that: (i) Process is not a mere "coming into being and a passing away" without a future. On the con-
trary: “The world as it passes perishes, and in perishing it yet remains an element in the future beyond itself”; therefore, as we perish we are immortal. (ii) Process is “a ceaseless upbringing of something new”; and what is “new” is the quality of “deity.” This is not merely spatio-temporal.

In this “ceaseless upbringing of something new” the “last and the best” is yet to be; and so, a new compassion may yet arise in the hearts of men. Such is the “temper” and the “idealism” of Modern Realism, which is a Logical Atomism based on Mathematical Logic. It is a Philosophy of Change and Evolution, and a Theory of Values.

NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. A Study in Realism, pp. 2, 8.
3. Realism is, therefore, known as “Logical Atomism.” Russell, Contemporary British Philosophy: First Series. Compare Wittgenstein, “Atomic facts are independent of one another.” “From the existence or non-existence of an atomic fact we cannot infer the existence or non-existence of another.”
4. 2, 661-2. Tractatus.
5. Appearance and Reality, F. H. Bradley, Chs. II and III.
7. The “dependence” that is denied by New Realism is reciprocal dependence, not onedependence.
15. Broad, ibid., p. 271.
17. Fraser, Selections from Berkeley, p. 35 ff.
19. Problems of Philosophy, Ch. II.
23. Broad, ibid., p. 390.
24. Quoted in Dawes Hicks: Critical Realism, p. 296.
26. The Method of Analysis called “Logical Construction” was expounded by Mr. John Wisdom in a series of five articles in Mind, 1931-33. Refer also: Mind, October, 1936: “Mr. Wisdom on Philosophical Analysis,” by Mr. A. H. S. Coombe-Tennant.
29. M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 264-6. Moore’s position entails a similar conclusion.
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30. Logic, Part I, Ch. XIII.
32. Logic, Part I, p. 211.
33. Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 84.
34. Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 42.
35. ibid., p. 190.
37. ibid., Lecture VI, Russell.
43. Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Ch. XV.
46. M. Hariyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 253.
47. Critical Realism, p. 5.
48. Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 253.
49. Essays in Critical Realism, p. 117. J. E. Turner thinks that the relation is "identity-in-difference." A Theory of Direct Realism, p. 23. "One-One correspondence" seems to be a notion distinct from "identity"; it is very difficult, however, to illustrate the distinction between the two notions. Identity is logically simpler.
51. Appearance and Reality, p. 400.
52. McTaggart thinks that "whatever is, is real" is a tautology, Sec. 2, The Nature of Existence, Vol. I. Some would consider it an identical proposition. Moore said that a tautology, an identical proposition and an analytic proposition are all distinct.
53. A Study in Realism, p. 12.
54. A. N. Whitehead, Essays in Science and Philosophy, p. 89.
CHAPTER XLVI

MARXISM

1. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION

"We cannot manipulate reality into accord with any ideal of our mind, but have only to recognize it. Philosophy with Śaṅkara is not the production of what ought to be, but is the apprehension of what is. A spiritual perception of the infinite as the real leads to peace and joy."

(Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 614.)

"Philosophers have so far interpreted the world; the point is to change it." (Marx, Thesis on Feuerbach.)

These two quotations represent two basic attitudes towards the world—the religious and the moral. The essential contrast is between those who want to fight for ideals which are yet in their imagination against evil and suffering which are realities, and those for whom ideals are already fully realized in a higher and more real order, and evil only a product of their distorted vision. Moral life is from first to last a struggle, whereas the religious temper is at peace with the world. Religion has in fact been defined as "the belief that there is an unseen order and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto" (James). Religion has also been defined as "what the individual does with his solitariness" (Whitehead). In contrast, morality could be described as what the individual does with his society. The opposition between these two attitudes centres round the problem of evil. To the moralist, evil and suffering are not the kinds of things that can be explained away. For Marx, they were the most over-bearing aspects of reality. His whole life, in thought, and in deed, was a battle against them—a battle that knew no respite and gave no quarter. "For religion," on the other hand, "all is the perfect expression of a supreme will, and all things therefore are good. Every thing imperfect and evil, the conscious bad will itself, is taken up and subserves this absolute end." Why then disturb the working out of this absolute end through what appears to us as evil and imperfection? As a result religion tends to become self-centred. Its austere discipline is directed primarily to the attainment of one’s private salvation. Even the pious idealist Bradley had to raise his voice in protest: "Because for it (religion) all reality is, in one sense, good alike, every action may become completely indifferent. It idly dreams itself away in the quiet world of divine inanity, or forced into action by chance desire, it may hallow any
practice, however corrupt, by its empty spirit of devotion" (Appearance and Reality, p. 393). No wonder that Marx, preoccupied with the horrors of the slum life and working conditions in the industrial towns of early nineteenth-century England, was revolted by the spectacle of such "divine inanity" and said, "Religion represents the spiritual force of oppression just as the state represents the physical."

More than two thousand years before Marx there was another great moralist who had dedicated his life to the cause of human suffering and its removal. He was Gautama the Buddha. Like Marx he too had to renounce the gods and the Scriptures and become a social rebel. It is interesting to compare their answers to the problem of suffering. Their answers differed because their approach to the problem was from almost opposite angles. While Marx’s attention was focused on the social origin of suffering, the division of society into classes and the exploitation of man by man, the Buddha’s thought went to the source of suffering in the individual—avidyā or ignorance of the ephemeral nature of things and its consequence; trṣṇā or an endless chain of desires. For Marx, therefore, salvation lay in understanding the nature of class-struggle and applying that knowledge to the establishment of a classless society in which "the free development of each will be the condition for the free development of all." For the Buddha, nirvāṇa was through prajñā or understanding the four noble truths and reaching through their application a state of complete detachment and peace (the state of the arhat).

Are not these two teachings complementary? The Buddha’s mind was so preoccupied with the problem of the individual that he forgot that so long as society continued to be a jungle where men prey upon each other, as individuals, as classes and as nations, any quiet detachment that a few individuals favoured by fortune or gifted by nature could attain, would only be at the cost of morality. It is to be remembered also that economic freedom from the bondage of inhuman physical privation for the vast majority of men (who are not capable of realizing true vairāgya or detachment) was not possible with the technological resources of those days. In fact, it did not become possible to visualize such a freedom until the industrial revolution was well on its way—that is to say, until about the time of Karl Marx. Marx’s mind, on the other hand, was so much concentrated on social chaos and injustice that he took it for granted that once the social problem was solved, everything else would take care of itself.

But when capitalist exploitation and waste are ended, and society has been planned to our heart’s desire, shall we reach the end of our quest? Are the abundance of economic goods and the absence of social injustice all that are needed to make men complete and contented? “It may indeed be said that religion is ‘the protest of the oppressed creature,’ and that therefore when social oppression in the form of the class-stratified society
is done away with, the private need for religion will vanish as well as the class which profited by it. This, however, is to forget what we could call 'cosmic oppression' or creatureliness, the unescapable inclusion of man in space-time, subject to pain, sorrow, sadness and death.4 We shall still need the courage to bear this "cosmic oppression," strength to conquer the greed for power and fame, the cruelty and intolerance and aggressiveness of man, which even our socialist civilization shows no signs of being able to liquidate. Even when man is at peace with society, he will not be, without further struggle, at peace within himself. Where else could we find that courage and strength and peace except in the inner recesses of our mind, in the deeper and unexplored layers of the self? "Religion is not so much a revelation to be attained by us in faith, as an effort to unveil the deepest layers of man's being and get into enduring contact with them. The religions of the world can be distinguished into those which emphasize the object and those which insist on experience. For the first class, religion is an attitude of faith and conduct directed to a higher power without. For the second, it is an experience to which the individual attaches supreme value. For them religion is more a transforming experience than a notion of God."5 Belief in God, as we have seen, is detrimental to the full expression of the moral consciousness. As one of the most deeply earnest of all moralists, Marx was of course sharply critical of religion in its usual theistic form, and of all philosophical idealism that served directly or indirectly as a handmaid to theology. Would he have opposed the conception of religion, or rather, of spiritual experience, given above in the extract from Radhakrishnan? At least there is no warrant for saying so in his writings. His materialism has been much misunderstood, by both followers and detractors.

2. HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

As a monistic system of philosophy there is an overall attempt in Marxism to make the sciences of nature historical and the study of history scientific. But despite its name, the Marxist theory of history is not materialistic in any recognized sense of the term, except negatively, as a denial of Hegel's teleological idealism, or Mill's recourse to extreme psychologism in the interpretation of historical phenomena. The Marxist conception of history is at the same time a rejection of an out-and-out materialistic theory, as for instance, Montesquieu and Buckle's geographical theory. Engels says, "The naturalistic conception of history is one-sided. It forgets that man can react upon nature, change it and create new conditions of existence."6

Marx drew attention to the fact that before there can be any civilization or culture, man must live. Unlike the lilies of the field he can live only by
toiling and spinning and producing the wherewithals of life. The tools used in production, together with the labour power, technique and traditions of work possessed by the people, constitute the forces of production. That is one aspect of what Marx calls the mode of production. The other aspect, which is dependent upon the first, is the relation of production, relations of men to the objects and forces of nature, and to each other, into which they enter in the organization of their productive life—property relations being the most important of these. It is this mode of production—also called the economic structure of society—which according to Marx is the basic factor in history. "The economic structure of society always forms the real basis from which, on the last analysis, is to be explained the whole superstructure of legal and political institutions, as well as of the religious, philosophical and other conceptions of each historical period."

As the forces of production change, the existing relations of production become incompatible with the new technical developments, i.e. they become incapable of utilizing to the full the developed forces of production. A change in the relation of production takes place accordingly, but not smoothly, nor without a struggle. As the change implies the transference of ownership from one class to another, the possessing class resists the change with all its might, whereas the new rising class struggles to gain the ownership. Every such change, therefore, takes the shape of a revolution. That is why Marx conceives all history hitherto as a history of class-struggles. However, when the new relations of production do get established, the entire superstructure of society—political, legal, moral, religious and intellectual—undergoes a more or less rapid transformation to become compatible with the interest of the new ruling class for, as Marx says, "The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production."

This is the barest outline of Marx's theory of history. No details can be given here, but we must briefly consider one or two controversial points of philosophical importance that it gave rise to.

How far is this theory of history really deterministic? Does it deny human freedom altogether, and assert that man is nothing but a creature of his physical and economic environment? To start with, the question can be answered in the negative on two counts. First of all, it is not even intended by Marx or Engels to apply to individual cases. "When, therefore, it is a question of investigating the driving forces which lie behind the motives of men in their historical actions and which constitute the real ultimate driving forces of history, then it is not a question so much of the motives of single individuals, however eminent, as of those motives which set in motion great masses, whole peoples, and whole classes of the people in each people; and here, too, not the transient flaring up of a straw fire which quickly dies down, but a lasting action resulting in a
great historical transformation." To attempt to "explain" the ideas of an individual artist or thinker in terms of general sociological laws—a rather common tendency in present-day Marxist literature—is as futile as to try to understand the behaviour of individual molecules of a gas with the help of the statistical laws of thermodynamics. All that Marxism entitles them to do is to link up the prevalent tendencies in the art and culture of a period with their social background.

Secondly, although the determining influence of economic factors on ideas and institutions is emphasized by Marx, it is not maintained as a necessary or immutable character of social life. Far from that, economic determinism is repeatedly described by Marx as the law of what he calls "pre-history," and by Engels as applying to the phase of "the animal existence" of man. As Haldane says, "Marxists believe that the principle of economic determinism of other human activities is largely true, but they are out to make it untrue by founding a society in which economic classes have been abolished, and in which this particular kind of determinism no longer holds." But this point has been so forcefully brought out by Marx and Engels themselves that it had better be given in their own language. "As long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long therefore as activity is not voluntarily but naturally divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him." "At this point (with the socialization of the means of productions), in a certain sense, man finally cuts himself off from the animal world, leaves the conditions of animal existence behind him and enters conditions which are really human. . . . The objective external forces which have hitherto dominated history will then pass under the control of men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only from this point that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom."12

But even during the period of "pre-history," i.e. history up to the advent of the classless society, does the formula of economic base and political and cultural super-structure apply in any significant way? The base-superstructure metaphor is a static metaphor, derived from the most static of all the products of human activity, viz. architecture. It is surprising that Marx, whose awareness of the dynamics of history was unparalleled, nevertheless chose such a static metaphor with which to illustrate it. Unlike the foundation of a skyscraper, the economic base of the social superstructure is perpetually changing. A base that is liable to change as the structure is being raised on it, is hardly a base at all. And the question inevitably arises: what causes it to change? Sometimes Marx seems to be playing with the idea of a chance mutation of the forces of
production. Sometimes, when he is more realistic, Marx recognizes the fact that it is the advance of science which is mainly responsible for the change in the technique of production—which in its turn sets all the complex of social changes into action. But science occupies a place high up in the superstructure. If the base depends upon the superstructure quite as much as the superstructure depends upon the base, we might as well drop this metaphorical originality, and talk in the more old-fashioned language of organic interdependence. It is to be noted that Hegel had already visualized the close inter-connection between the various factors of human culture. He had gone so far as to say that, "only in the presence of a given form of religion can a given form of state-structure exist, only in the presence of a given state-structure can a given philosophy and a given art exist." What Marx added to it was the recognition of the importance of economic forces. He not only recognized them but made them basic. Economic factors are no doubt very important, and a proper appreciation of them very helpful in the understanding of history—unquestionably far more helpful than was Hegel’s Absolute Idea. But they are not "basic" in any exact sense of the term, at any rate, not within the limits of human history.

In justification of their historical materialism, Marx and Engels raise the ultimate metaphysical question as to which came first in point of time, mind or matter? If anyone is interested in the theological question of a First Cause, he may score a point against the theologians by positing Matter there instead of God. Marx is very hard on the idealists for placing the causes of historical changes inside men’s heads, in their ideas and motives, and for not having enquired into the moving forces of the ideas themselves. He himself traced them to the relations of production and finally to the forces of production. In his turn, he forgot to enquire as to how the forces of production arose and changed, for that brings us back to the creative role of ideas. The discovery, and particularly the application, of new technical ideas may no doubt be possible only under definite economic needs and conditions. But that merely throws us back on an endless regress, for these economic conditions were themselves the product of earlier and cruder technology. Ideas and relations of production have acted and reacted upon each other throughout history, and beyond human history there is neither idea nor "Produktionverhältniss."

To point out an inaccuracy in the formulation of the Marxist theory of history is not, however, to gainsay its great practical importance. In spite of what has been said above, it may yet be maintained that we cannot transform a social system without changing its economic structure. That the present society is rotten to the core cannot be denied. Marx was ahead of his time in having seen that a society in whose economic life the acquisitive instinct was allowed to have free play, and whose legal system assumed the unfettered exploitation of man by man, was
bound to be so. The gist of Marx's materialistic interpretation of history is the very idealistic contention that our politics and our culture will be dominated by our economic system, so long as we do not fully grasp its power and learn to control it. Marx's quest for freedom was the old humanist and liberal quest for freedom. His advance on the earlier humanists was that he understood how to relate it to the necessity of economic laws.

The doctrine of ideologies, viz. the doctrine that the prevalent system of thought and belief—in Marx's language "the ruling ideas" of any society—is a function of its economic structure, is of paramount importance in Marx's theory of history. An ideology can be defined as a set of ideas whose pattern is predominantly determined by the existing economic forces and class interests. They are held "with a false consciousness; the real motives remaining hidden from the thinker." Science is a very important domain of "the ruling ideas" of the bourgeois society. Is it also tinged with ideological falsity, or is it an exception to the general theory of ideology? Max Eastman has pointed out the absurdity of regarding science as ideology—for which he holds Engels more responsible than Marx. Eastman apparently failed to notice that Engels himself had drawn a sharp distinction between science and ideology in Anti-Dühring, in the chapter on Morality, Law and Eternal Truths, and had gone so far as to assert that "certain results obtained by these sciences (the physical sciences) are eternal truths, final and ultimate truths." What is socially determined is, of course, the general direction of scientific studies, the shifting of attention and emphasis from one topic to another in different periods, not the actual contents of these sciences. Crystallography, for instance, reflects the structure of crystals, not the structure of its economic surrounding.

Historical materialism recognizes, in fact, a dual determination of ideas: by their epistemological objects, and by their economic environment. Marx frequently speaks of ideas as reflections or mirror-images of things; he also speaks of ideas being reflections of class interests or the economic structure of society. These two uses of the word "reflection" are very different, and have been a source of confusion. Ideas reflect in the first sense in so far as they are true and in the second sense to the extent that they are false or distorted. Any actual system of thought, e.g. the Hegelian Cosmology, or for the matter of that Dialectical Materialism itself, "reflects" reality, or is "determined" by it, in both the above-mentioned ways, which is the same thing as saying that they are partly true and partly false—one may of course be truer than the other. To say that the one is true from the bourgeois point of view and the other from the proletariat, makes no sense. As Sydney Hook, an accredited Marxist himself, remarks, "It would be completely misleading to speak, as some Marxists do, of class truths." Perhaps all that is meant is that the Hegelian philosophy served the interest of the
bourgeois class and state, whereas Marx’s ideas are useful to the proletariat. But no ideas that are totally false to reality can serve the interest of any class; and the proletariat may find a little self-delusion as useful to its interest as any other class did.

3. DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Materialism.—The sharp line that Descartes drew between mental and material phenomena proved immensely fruitful in developing the physical sciences, for it liberated them finally from all vestigial remains of the animistic faith of mediaeval investigators. But it created formidable difficulties in the way of philosophy by confronting it with the insoluble problem of the relation of two such alien substances as mind and matter. Spinoza escaped out of it by denying their duality and conceiving them as aspects or "attributes" of one ultimate substance (God or Nature). The more influential Schools of philosophy, however, tried to solve the problem by reducing one of the two Cartesian substances to the other. The eighteenth century, therefore, saw the birth of Berkeleyan idealism on the one side, and French materialism on the other.

The growing tension between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie manifested itself in the first instance as a clash of ideas. Amongst the staunchest supporters of the collapsing feudal order was the Church. On the other hand, the new science and the new trends of philosophical thought based on that science rallied round the rising bourgeoisie. Accordingly, the eighteenth-century philosophy in France took a strongly anti-religious turn. Marx enthusiastically welcomed this negative side of French materialism: its fight against superstition and super-naturalism, its denial of God and the Scriptures, its onslaught on idealistic philosophy—which was characterized as a handmaid to theology. Its positive side, its attempt to explain all that is in nature and man as a consequence of material particles moving according to the laws of mechanics, was rejected by Marx. The inadequacy of the mechanistic treatment of life and mind had been amply shown by the new idealism of Kant and his successors, not to speak of Hume who had almost succeeded in demonstrating that the laws of mechanics were themselves nothing but mental habits. The key to Marx’s new materialism was supplied by Hegel with his law of the change of quantity into quality. This made it possible for Marx to hold that development in material organization resulted not only in greater complexity, but at certain stages the increase of complexity led to the emergence of new qualities of matter, not reducible to, or explicable by, the qualities of the earlier stage. Such qualities were life and mind.
Dialectical Materialism thus results from a *mariage de convenance* of French Materialism with the Hegelian Dialectic.

Engels defines materialism and idealism as opposite answers to "the question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature—the paramount question of the whole of philosophy." Marx and Engels regarded the idealist answer to be that thought or idea is "the demiurges (creator) of the real world, and the real world is only the external phenomenal form of the idea." Materialism, according to them, is nothing more than the belief that matter is primary and mind a late-comer in the world of matter. Haldane wants us to "notice the emphasis which is laid on temporal priority rather than on logical priority." No idealist, apart from the subjectivists, denies the temporal priority of the material universe to the human mind. The question of the logical priority of the Absolute Spirit of Hegel, or the Transcendental Subject of Kant has not received adequate discussion at the hands of the Marxists. We find only an impatient dismissal.

It is the first duty of a materialist to tell us what his philosophy means by matter. One can be mystical and speechless about God, but not about matter. Unfortunately, the founders of dialectical materialism, Marx and Engels, never bothered to tell us what precisely the term "matter," the "demiurge" of their universe, conveyed to them. Their impatience at the Berkeleyan question as to the existence of matter can be understood, but as scientific philosophers they should have paid more attention to the problem of its meaning. Perhaps we are being a little unfair to them. We should remember that the epistemological problem about matter reached its present magnitude only after their time; first, as a result of the thorough logical analysis to which Moore and his realistic School subjected it; and, secondly, as a result of the revolutionary changes in the physical theories of matter, starting with the experiments of Rutherford in 1908, and still continuing in the hands of Schroedinger, Heisenberg, Dirac and a host of front-rank mathematical physicists. It is a pity that dialectical materialism became a dead system of philosophy with the death of Marx and Engels. Its first and last philosophical development—if that can be called a development—took place when Lenin had to face some Russian deviationists who had come under the influence of Mach. That was just about the time when the new atomic physics set about revolutionizing our conception of matter.

In his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* Lenin gives us three definitions of matter, which, if not plainly contradictory, are certainly incompatible with each other:

1. "Matter is the objective reality given to us in sensation." (P. 96.)
2. "Matter is a philosophical category designating the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photo-
graphed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them." (P. 84.)

3. "Matter is that which acting on our sense-organs produces sensations." (P. 96.)

The first definition suggests naïve realism or a presentational theory viz. that in sensation mind is directly aware of material objects without the intervention of sensory ideas or any other intermediaries. The word "given" presumably is meant to assert a direct knowledge of matter as against inferential theories. But the second definition contradicts this, for here sensations are characterized as "copies" or "photographs," and matter is given not "in sensation" as in the first definition, but "by sensation." Apparently it is being claimed that in sensuous experience we are presented at once with two entities of entirely different natures, one a "sensation," which is mental, and the other a material object; and further, that without any inference we are directly aware of the relation between these two entities as the relation of a photograph to its original. This is against all experience. In whatever way we analyse our perceptual experience, we never find two distinct entities simultaneously presented there. Perception, as direct awareness, is awareness of one entity only. Whether that entity is to be characterized as a sensory idea or a physical object or a neutral something, may be debatable; its duplication is palpably false. The third definition suggests that Lenin himself was aware of this, for matter has now become the cause of our sensations, what "produces sensations," the latter (sensation) alone being, presumably, what is directly given to us. From the given sensation we may legitimately infer that under certain circumstances it is caused by some thing which is not another sensation, and call that cause matter. What reason have we for asserting that the external cause is an exact prototype, a photographic original of our sensation? To say with Berkeley that the cause of our sensation is God's volition may be bad reasoning. But to say with Engels and Lenin that the cause of our sensation is its photographic original is to say something for which no reason at all can be found. An attempt to describe a table in the language of the Bohr-Sommerfeld theory would immediately show how very different a physical object is from our percept of it, and how utterly lacking in the qualitative richness of our experience. The more recent quantum mechanical theories have eliminated even the few remaining qualitative elements that were to be found in Bohr's theory, and reduced physics to a study of pure structure—which however is not a mere idea. Russell has succeeded in putting in one sentence the conception of matter that is taking shape out of the still rather nebulous state of recent physical theory: "The inferences from experiences to the physical world can, I think, all be justified by the assumption that there are causal chains, each member of which is a complex structure ordered
by the spatio-temporal relation of compresence (or of contiguity); that all the members of such a chain are similar in structure; that each member is connected with each other by a series of contiguous structures; and that, when a number of such similar structures are found to be grouped about a centre earlier in time than any of them, it is probable that they all have their causal origin in a complex event which is at that centre and has a structure similar to the structure of the observed events." This very abstract development of contemporary physics is no more destructive of materialism than were the electro-magnetic theories of the nineteenth century whose philosophical repercussions in the shape of Mach's sensationalism and its derivatives Lenin had to combat. We must give him credit for having foreseen that as physics develops, the credulities of the common-sense conception of matter will be gradually but inevitably discarded. He had therefore to make clear that philosophical materialism must not be tied up either with naïve common sense or with antiquated science: "The sole philosophical 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." Perhaps Lenin did not realize that this was also an implicit coup de grâce to Engel's photographic theory of matter, a theory which he himself had been championing enthusiastically.

The only sensible way to define matter is to define it as physics does, viz. as whatever obeys the fundamental equations of physics. The highly abstract nature of these equations might have caused for a time an elation in the idealist camp by giving them the false impression that physics was lending its powerful support to their standpoint. We have seen that such is not the case. Modern physics does not weaken the materialist position vis-à-vis the epistemological idealists. But if we adhere strictly to the definition of matter as supplied by physics—and no other definition is acceptable, or even available—materialism is imperilled in another way. Dialectical Materialism regards life and mind as qualities of matter at higher stages of its development. It is a distinctive feature of dialectical materialism to insist that these higher stages of matter are irreducible to the laws of behaviour of its lower stages, by which, evidently, are meant the laws of physics and chemistry. If matter as we find it in a living organism or in man exhibits features which fall outside the limits of physico-chemical laws, then by what right can we still call it matter, since matter is by definition what obeys the laws of physics and chemistry? We must either go back to mechanistic materialism and regard life and mind as ultimately reducible to physics, even if we cannot carry out the reduction at the moment, or supply a new definition of matter (Marx and Engels hardly attempted it, and Lenin, as we saw, failed in his attempt), such that physico-chemical matter, organic matter and conscious matter might be consistently treated as its different
phases. Dialectical Materialism must either step back or move forward; its present conception of matter and of the relation of matter to mind is illogical. And substitution of Logic by Dialectics is of no avail, as we shall presently see.

**Dialectics.**—One of the chief features of Dialectical Materialism is the great emphasis it lays on change and movement as the basic character of Reality. This is nothing new. There have been flux philosophies ever since the days of Heraclitus in Greece and Buddhist Schools in India. What is new about it is its enquiry into the causes of change. Change in the condition of a material body is not primarily due to the action of external forces, not, at any rate, when matter has reached a certain stage of organization. Dialectical Materialism conceives change—at least the more significant manifestations of change—as self-change, brought about by a conflict of forces within the changing substance. Dialectical laws are the laws of their self-movement. These laws were first formulated by Hegel in his attempt to show that if we start with the simplest concept, viz. Being, we are impelled beyond by an innate logical necessity through a series of transitions which takes us higher and higher up, until we reach the highest of all concepts—the Absolute Idea. Hegel believed that the same principles of transition could be traced in Nature and History, for these were nothing but processes in the self-realization of the Absolute Idea in time. Marx, having "turned Hegel right side up," naturally conceived the dialectical laws as primarily the most universal laws of the development of the material world, and only secondarily as the laws of conceptual movement. Three such laws are specified:

1. Interpenetration, or identity and conflict, of opposites.
2. Passage of quantity into quality.
3. Negation of negation, which actually contains the two previous laws.

Before we discuss these laws, attention should be drawn to another aspect of Dialectic, namely, its subjective aspect, its importance as a method of study. This aspect of the Marxian Dialectic, which is a very Hegelian aspect, is an onslaught on the classical or Aristotelian Logic for its shortcomings as methodology, and, at the same time, an attempt to install in its place a new Logic, the Logic of Contradiction. The two chief points about this new Logic—besides the fundamental importance that it attaches to change—are its rejection of the laws of contradiction on the ground that objective contradictions are a prevalent feature of reality; and secondly, its refusal to apply the lower categories (e.g. mechanism) to phenomena at higher stages of development (e.g. life or mind). This second feature of the dialectical method arose out of Marx's awareness of the failure of earlier materialists like La Mettrie and Holbach to give any satisfactory account of mind. The rejection of the lower categories at
higher levels of existence is again derived from the Hegelian Philosophy, except that Hegel would have insisted not only that the lower categories are inadequate at higher stages, but also that they are inadequate for a full understanding of phenomena, even at their lower level, the highest and most inclusive category (Spirit) being the only adequate category at all levels. Marxian Dialectic, on the other hand, regards different categories of thought (which are also the laws of being) as adequate at their respective levels of reality. As Sydney Hook points out, "When it deals with the structure of the atom, it does not introduce, as idealists do, will or purpose or feeling (Whitehead); when it deals with the rise and fall of civilizations, it does not interpret the historical process in terms of biological stimulus and response, as is the fashion with 'vulgar' behaviouristic materialists (Watson)." If all relations are internal, Hegel's dialectical method is the sounder; if not, we have to decide in favour of Marx. Marx's dialectical method seems more acceptable on this point, but the question of the internality of relations is too large a question to be raised here.

The first feature of the dialectical method emphasizes objective contradictions as a pervasive character of reality. Perhaps there is some confusion in the use of the word "contradiction." Lenin, for instance, mentions action and reaction, electron and proton or the class-struggle as illustrations of what he calls "identical opposites." In what way are they "identical"? The presence of opposed elements or tendencies in certain facts is indisputable, but what is there contradictory about them? What is there in such facts that is incompatible with classical Logic? The Aristotelian law of contradiction precludes the existence of the same particle which is at the same moment both positively and negatively charged, but is completely consistent with the co-existence of two different particles which are differently charged, however close they may come to each other. Similarly for the other instances. Engels, following Zeno, says that according to classical Logic, motion, or any kind of change for the matter of that, should be impossible. All change is a case of objective contradiction par excellence, and since change is the most fundamental aspect of all reality, classical logic, based upon the law of contradiction, is completely useless. The contradiction in motion is supposed to consist in the fact that a moving body must be "at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in another place." But motion never implies such a contradiction. A moving body is not at different points at the same instant, it is at different points at different instants. Classical Logic has many shortcomings, but its inability to admit change or motion is not one of them. To believe so is a result of faulty analysis and misconceptions about continuity and infinity, as has been amply shown by Russell in Our Knowledge of the External World.

What we have been criticizing is the notion of the identity of opposites as a fact of common experience which is supposed to necessitate a new
Logic. It is not intended, of course, to deny that under certain conditions development may take place by a conflict of opposing forces or tendencies. If that is all that the Marxists mean by insisting upon the identity of opposites as a cause of change, they may well be right. The only criticism against that would be that though in certain spheres, particularly in the sphere of social evolution—where ideas and beliefs are important—changes do take place in that way, all change cannot be subsumed under the dialectical formula.

One great difficulty about appreciating the scientific character of the three laws of dialectic is that Engels as well as the contemporary exponents of Marxist thought mention a few instances where they can be fitted in, and immediately proceed to generalize them over the whole of nature. Some of these instances are admissible, others are open to question. Engels mentions the seed-plant-seed transformation as a case in point. The second negation gives us many seeds but not seeds at a higher level. Increase in the number of seeds is surely not the emergence of a new quality. Conscious of this, Engels says that by careful gardening we can improve the quality of an orchid. But doubt we can; but is Dialectic then supposed to work only with such exceptional cases of germination, and to be inapplicable to the vast majority of normal germination, where there is no improvement in quality? In illustrating the principle of negation of negation, Engels mentions the butterfly which dies on laying its eggs. What about the millions of other species of animals which do not "negate" themselves on procreation? Strangely enough, Engels finds a simple algebraic convention like the writing of $\sqrt{a} = a^2$ to be "teeming with contradictions." Any number of instances of motion and change could be cited where the dialectical law seems clearly inapplicable: the swinging of a pendulum, the motion of planets and stars, the propagation of light and heat in space, and so on. There is no change of quantity into quality here, or any evidence of the triadic pattern of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. It is clear that some changes take place according to the dialectical principle, others do not. Surely it was imperative to specify the conditions under which the dialectical law is supposed to apply, as it is necessary in the case of all scientific laws. Dr. Bernal thinks that the dialectical principle is "concerned primarily with the origin of the new"—presumably referring to the emergence of the irreducibly new quality. Engels and, in our own time, Professor Broad held that chemical properties have such irreducible novelty, but more recent developments in atomic physics have practically reduced chemistry to physics. Irreducible novelty is still claimed in the domain of biology, though even here the most competent authorities are now rejecting such a claim (vide Sherrington—Man on his Nature). Besides, the phenomena of life obtain in an infinitesimal part of the universe and, in all probability, for a period of time that is negligible in comparison with the duration of the universe. Even if biological changes
did take place in accordance with the dialectical formula, that would be very inadequate ground for claiming these laws to be "laws of the widest possible generality."

Dr. Bernal has another suggestion for preserving the generality of dialectics. He says that the generality of these laws "does not mean that if any small portion of the field of nature or humanity is considered in isolation, it would be possible to demonstrate in it the dialectical process. Such a portion might be only a part of a larger process, and changes in it only become understandable dialectically when the larger process is considered as a whole. From the most general standpoint the only field for operation of the dialectic is the universe as a whole" (my italics). To this Professor Carritt has made the apposite answer: "Dr. Bernal also seems to admit that nothing short of the universe exemplifies the triadic dialectic. And as he does not know the whole universe, that can only be a pious act of faith." The only laws applicable to the universe as a whole which physics has so far ventured to suggest are of the type of the conservation laws and the second law of thermo-dynamics—which are as far removed from the dialectics as anything could possibly be. Finally, Dr. Bernal makes a bold retreat from the sweeping claims that are made on behalf of the dialectical principle and confesses that "to apply the dialectic to material, whether inorganic or biological, in the hands of a scientist, is to make nonsense of it. The dialectic must be applied to the scientist and his material at one time." Another eminent contemporary Marxist, Professor Herman Levy, has come to precisely the same conclusion: "I doubt very much whether there are any useful illustrations in the field of science. The scientific movement, however, regarded as a social isolate, does provide one. . . . I think, therefore, I have said enough to indicate that the so-called laws of the dialectic, couched as they must be in very general terms, must have their principal application in the field of social and economic development."

Here, undoubtedly, they have their great use, provided they are used as a tentative hypothesis, and not in any spirit of dogmatic certitude. We must remember that Marx himself applied the dialectical principle almost exclusively to social phenomena. Engels and the present-day Marxists are responsible for the wide and unwarranted claims that are made for it.

**Theory of Knowledge and Truth.**—If we analyse the implications of the few passages that Marx has left on the subject, it is clear that he was definitely toying with an out-and-out instrumentalist theory of truth and knowledge. The *Theses on Feuerbach*, for instance, has for its opening sentence: "The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the thing, reality, what we apprehend through our senses, is understood only in the form of the object of direct apprehension, and not as sensuous human activity, as practice, not subjectively. Hence in opposition to materialism the active
side was developed abstractly by idealism." It is surprising to find that
the Histories of Philosophy, as a rule, scrupulously avoid mentioning the
name of Marx as the real originator of the instrumentalist theory. Russell
goes to the other extreme, and identifies not only the theories of knowledge
in Marx and Dewey, but also their ideas about matter. "Whether Mr.
Dewey is aware of having been anticipated by Marx, I do not know,
but undoubtedly their opinions about the metaphysical status of matter
are virtually identical." Further, Russell goes on to blame Engels and
Lenin for having missed the point in Marx's instrumentalist approach,
and for having tacked on to him a copy theory of knowledge which is
out of joint with the activist trend of his philosophy.

Probably Marx's own view, as Russell admits, oscillated between a
"mirror-image" theory of ideas and an instrumentalist conception of
knowledge. The point to be remembered is that Marx was above all a
materialist; and in spite of his materialism being dialectical, it, no less
than the earlier materialisms, demands the independent existence of a
material world, having a character and structure of its own. No doubt
we can alter Nature, at least in our immediate neighbourhood; and
knowledge helps us to alter it. But Marx could never hold that the act
of knowing as such changes reality. If he did, that would be the end of
his materialism. And that is precisely what we have in the instrumentalism
of Schiller and Dewey, for whom the character of reality is not independent
of the knowing process. An example from antiquity would be some of
the later Schools of the Buddhists, who also regarded knowledge instrumentally and held practical success to be both the meaning and the test
of truth. This was possible for them because their metaphysical position
was subjectivist, or a near approach to subjectivism. For a full-blooded
materialist some sort of correspondence theory is inevitable, for however
much we may test the truth of our ideas by their ability to lead us to
successful practice, the meaning of their truth can only be correspondence
to the independent world of matter. The exact sense of this correspondence
may be difficult to define. It is not, as we have seen, a straightforward
reflection or photographic copy—at any rate, science does not give any
support to such views.

Engels and Lenin had therefore no choice. If they had not ignored
Marx's instrumentalist view of knowledge, they would have been com-
pelled to put aside his materialism. Russell, whose own preferences, till
lately, have been towards a realism that easily shaded off into subjectivism,
naturally attaches much the greater weight to Marx's instrumentalist
trend and considers this to be the strongest argument against his
materialism. "I agree with Lenin that no substantially new argument
(against materialism) has emerged since the time of Berkeley, with one
exception. This one exception, oddly enough, is the argument set forth
by Marx in his Theses on Feuerbach and completely ignored by Lenin.
If matter as something which we passively apprehend is a delusion, and if 'truth' is a practical rather than a theoretical conception, then old-fashioned materialism, such as Lenin's, becomes untenable. But Engels and Lenin, who were a little more anxious than Russell to preserve the unity of Marxist theory and practice as a whole, rightly decided to disregard the extreme instrumentalist predilection of the Theses on Feuerbach, and therefore emphasized that the truth of our ideas lay in their correspondence with objective reality. They retained, however, workability or verification in practice (including scientific practice) as the only reliable test of truth. This is one of the many varieties of pragmatic thought to be found in William James, though his expression of it is half-hearted and not free from ambiguity. Curiously enough an exact prototype of the Marxist doctrine of truth, with correspondence to independent fact as its meaning and practice as its test, is to be found in the Nyāya School of Indian philosophy. "The Nyāya holds that the validity of knowledge is not self-established, but is proved by something else (paratathā-pramāṇa). . . . We cannot straight away know whether our cognitions correspond to reality or not. We have to infer this correspondence from its capacity to lead to successful action."

How do we infer it? What are the principles involved in such an inference? Evidently these principles cannot themselves be validated by practice, for they are presupposed in the very process of practical verification. And is the verifying experience self-validating, intrinsically assured of being free from error or illusion? Such questions, however, lead us to the inter-relation and interdependence of the correspondence, coherence, pragmatic and intrinsic theories of truths—a fascinating subject but rather outside the scope of our present topic, and certainly beyond the limits of the space allotted for it.

NOTES

2. "The pivot round which religious life, as we have traced it, revolves is the interest of the individual in his private personal destiny. Religion, in short, is a monumental chapter in the history of human egotism." William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 480.
5. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 21.
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23. *ibid.*, p. 139.

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CHAPTER XLVII

LOGICAL POSITIVISM

1. ORIGIN AND PROGRAMME

Logical Positivism is the philosophy of a group of thinkers called the Vienna Circle (Der Wiener Kreis), formally organized by Moritz Schlick in 1928. Prominent among its members were Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, H. Feigl, P. Frank, K. Gödel and a few others. It attracted the sympathy and stimulated the interest of similar minds working on the borderlands of Science, Mathematics and Philosophy. Different centres were started in Poland and Germany. In Great Britain it found a strong supporter in A. J. Ayer and in America in C. W. Morris. But with the death of Schlick, the advent of the war and increasing internal differences the members of the group drifted apart. Most of the surviving members and sympathizers, such as Carnap, Neurath, Reichenbach went over to America and organized with the co-operation of Dewey, Russell, Bohr, Morris, Tarski and others the Unity of Science movement, and they have been publishing, in several volumes, the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Through repeated criticism, the original views of the school have undergone many changes. The terms Logical Empiricism, Scientific Empiricism, even Rational Empiricism are now preferred by different adherents who belong to the wider movement of Unity of Science or Scientific Empiricism, which sometimes shades off into Scientific Philosophy or Philosophy of Science.

In the history of philosophy there are alternate periods of construction and destruction. Logical Positivism is the peak of the destructive moment that follows the constructive philosophy of Hegel and the neo-Hegelians. It combines the anti-transcendental and empirical teachings of previous thinkers like Hume, Mill, Mach and James, with the analytical methods of scientific thinkers like Helmholtz, Poincaré and Einstein, and of mathematical philosophers and symbolic logicians like Frege, Russell and Whitehead and of the contemporary realists like Moore and the American neo-realsists. Linguistic analysis by Wittgenstein and others also exerts a great influence on the movement.

The programme of Logical Positivism can be said to consist broadly of two chief topics, one negative and the other positive. The first consists in demonstrating the impossibility of metaphysics, and the second in the logical interpretation and consolidation of the results of all the different branches of Science by reducing them to a universal language. We shall deal with these two one by one.
2. IMPOSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS

By "metaphysics" the positivists mean any theory of reality beyond or behind what can be grasped by experience. As A. J. Ayer puts it in an article entitled, "Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics," in *Mind*, July 1934, "the fundamental postulate of metaphysics" is that there "is a super- (or hinter-) phenomenal reality." He further points out that "it is the aim of metaphysics to describe a reality lying beyond experience and therefore any proposition which would be verified by empirical observation is ipso facto not metaphysical."

The reason why the logical positivists consider metaphysics impossible is very different from the considerations which led Hume, Kant and others to a similar conclusion. For whereas most of these earlier thinkers regarded metaphysical questions about trans-phenomenal reality insoluble because of the limitations of human knowledge the positivists regard these very questions as meaningless combinations of words. But it is necessary for us now to consider why they regard metaphysical questions and answers as meaningless.

They come to this conclusion from (1) their general empirical conviction that all knowledge ultimately depends on sense-experience, and from (2) their logical analysis of language. If we analyse linguistic statements we find that compound ones can be ultimately resolved into simple ones conveying some reports of immediate sense-experience. Following the earlier theory of Wittgenstein propounded in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922), by which Schlick and other positivists were much influenced at the beginning, they hold that the structure of all meaningful language represents the structure of the facts of experience. Every simple sentence like "this is green" mirrors or pictorially represents the structure of a simple fact, that is, a state of affairs that makes the sentence true. To understand the meaning of such a sentence we have to refer to the experience of the state of affairs, which can be observed if it is true. As this is also the method by which we can verify the sentence, that is, understand whether it is true or false, it can be said that the method of ascertaining the significance of a sentence is the same as that of its verification.

Thus Logical Positivism comes to adopt what may be called the verificational theory of meaning, which is sometimes rather loosely expressed by the dictum: The meaning of a sentence is the method of its verification. By applying this theory of meaning to metaphysical doctrines regarding unexperienced entities it is pointed out that such doctrines are meaningless since *ex hypothesi* we cannot verify them by any experience. By way of illustration we may cite here the following cases given by A. J. Ayer in his *Language, Truth and Logic* (Chapter I). Some metaphysicians
hold that the sensible world is a mere unreal appearance. Such a statement cannot be verified by any sense-experience, the veracity of which is here questioned. It cannot, therefore, be said either to be true or to be false. It is nonsensical. Again, some metaphysicians hold that the ultimate substance or reality is one, others that it is many. But such a statement also does not possess any meaning because substance or reality is here conceived as something lying behind experienced facts, and we cannot think of any observation by which the statement can be verified. Similarly, the metaphysical controversy between realists and idealists is devoid of significance, for we cannot think of any observation by which it can be settled whether there is any object as the external cause of our sense-perception existing behind it.

Against such a conclusion the metaphysicians might of course protest that sense-experience is not the only source of knowledge, and that there may be pure intellectual or other kinds of intuition, or a priori ideas from which knowledge about non-sensible entities may be derived. The reply given by the positivists is similar to that of the earlier empiricists who deny a priori ideas. Against Kant’s so-called a priori propositions of pure mathematics, empiricists like Mill held that they are really the result of long and uncontradicted experience which produces such a strong degree of belief that the opposites of such propositions become inconceivable. But positivists like Ayer hold that the necessary truths of mathematics and formal logic are really analytic propositions which follow from the postulates, symbols and definitions adopted by them.¹

But even admitting the empirical position, one may find it difficult to accept the verificational theory of meaning on several other grounds. It may be asked: if the meaning of a sentence depends on actual verification by experience, what would become of statements about empirical facts not actually observed? By this criterion, even a sentence like, "There is still great heat in the womb of the earth," "There is no living being in the sun" will be meaningless, though they do not refer to any metaphysical or non-phenomenal entity. To remove this difficulty Schlick points out that even where the fact has not been actually observed owing to practical difficulties we may conceive the theoretical possibility of observing it and thereby anticipate the experience we can have of it by which it may be found out to be true or false. So he says that even a proposition like, "there are mountains on the farther side of the moon," can be accepted as significant. But metaphysical propositions about entities like God, Absolute, etc., which are regarded as super-phenomenal cannot be said to be significant because they are not only not actually verified, but cannot even be said to be verifiable, their subjects being imperceptible by their very natures.

But it may be asked: What about historical propositions relating to the distant past which, by its nature, is now unobservable? In reply positivists
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like Ayer hold that even if such propositions about empirical facts are not directly observable now, we can yet indirectly verify them by observing the consequences which may be expected to follow if they are true.

Again the question may also be asked as to whether verifiability on which the meaning of an empirical statement is said to depend implies the availability of conclusive proof regarding the truth or falsity of the statement. If that be the case then it may be pointed out that even the general propositions laying down the laws of science will have to be rejected as nonsensical. For, a general proposition like, "All materials attract one another," "All gases are fluid," "All living beings need oxygen" cannot be conclusively verified as their subjects are classes, the members of which are far too many to be exhausted by observation. Schlick admits that verification, on which meaning depends, should be conclusive and so he frankly admits that such propositions of science are technically meaningless, though they are important for practical life. They may be classed, therefore, as "important nonsense" and distinguished from the other kinds of nonsense.

But Ayer differs from this plain conclusion. Eager to save the prestige of science rather than the initial criterion of meaning, he holds that a general proposition of science can be said to be significant if it can at least be rendered probable by observation. In support of this contention he presses the point that nothing but a tautology (or analytic proposition) can be said to be wholly certain. All synthetic propositions, including even a particular one like "This is green," can at best be a probable hypothesis. Because, as soon as we assert a proposition even about a sense-content we have to describe it with a general name after bringing it under a class, and we are liable to commit errors in doing so. We cannot, therefore, be absolutely certain that our description is true. The degree of certainty may increase with repeated observation and successful verification; but logically there can be no end to this process, though some degree of certainty may be quite sufficient for practical purposes. Ayer holds, therefore, that "our claims to empirical knowledge are not susceptible of a logical, but only of a pragmatic, justification"; "the only propositions that are certain are those which cannot be denied without self-contradiction, inasmuch as they are tautologies."

The logical positivist tries thus to defend his verificational theory of meaning and thereby maintain his objection against metaphysics, namely that all metaphysical propositions which are synthetic in nature and involve reference to some unobservable entity, are devoid of sense; since they cannot be verified either in practice or in principle, nor can they even be rendered probable by direct or indirect observation.
3. THE TRUE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

Though the logical positivist tries to demonstrate thus the meaningless character of metaphysics engaged in enquiries about the non-empirical, he is not altogether critical of the utility of philosophy. He discusses, therefore, what philosophers should shun and what they can profitably investigate.

Philosophy should first of all shun all pretensions to building systems by positing some \textit{a priori} first principles and deducing conclusions from them. Except the probable laws of nature discovered by empirical observation and induction there can be no universal proposition containing knowledge about the universe. The so-called necessary propositions obtained by \textit{a priori} intuition are either not necessary or merely tautologous. An intuition can at most yield knowledge about a present mental fact, but never a general proposition. The really necessary and universal propositions are all analytical and verbal. A metaphysician who pretends to evolve a world-view out of such tautologies is really spinning a cobweb of theories from his own mind, and even if they constitute a consistent deductive system they really make no contribution to our knowledge of reality.

Philosophy should not also pretend to be a science of sciences. It is a mistake to think that it can supply the sciences with sound ultimate principles on which they can stand, because all genuine knowledge-giving principles or laws must be obtained from observation of empirical phenomena, and it is the business of sciences themselves to obtain them. Nor is it legitimate to think that philosophy can synthesize the general laws and theories discovered by the different branches of Science and thus form a view of the entire universe. Such a work can be done competently only by scientists, and if done it will constitute a general science, not a separate kind of discipline called philosophy.

Giving up such a false ambition of lording it over science, on the one hand, and giving up metaphysical pretensions, on the other, philosophy can engage itself in the fruitful work of the logical analysis of empirical statements containing the results of science. Its subject-matter should not be factual but linguistic. It should then be a grammar of science and thus distinguished from science. Such useful work has been already done, though not in a very systematic and exclusive manner, by many previous empirical philosophers and logicians. The logical positivists devote particular attention to this work. Carnap systematically develops this branch of knowledge, i.e. the Logical Analysis of Language, in his book, \textit{Logical Syntax of Language (Logische Syntax der Sprache)} and in his more recent contributions to \textit{The Encyclopedia of Unified Science}. We may briefly state here the outlines of his researches and those of his colleagues, like Neurath, in this direction.
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When a particular language, that of a branch of Science or that of the people of a country, is the object of study, it is called the object-language and the language in which the results of the study are formulated is called the meta-language. Similarly the theory about a theory can be called meta-theory and that about science in general meta-science. Philosophy as a branch of knowledge engaged in the formal analysis of the language of science is a metascience, propounding metatheories in a metalanguage. Now philosophy as a metatheory proceeds in three directions of analysis, called respectively pragmatics, semantics and logical syntax (sometimes called syntactics). C. W. Morris uses the name Semiotic as the general name for all these three branches. These three deal with the "three components" in a situation in which a language is used, namely, (1) "the action, state and environment of a man who speaks or hears," (2) the relation of the linguistic sign or word to some object of experience designated by it, and, (3) the signs or words as such and the formal relations among them. C. S. Peirce, Ogden and Richards helped, by their researches, the logical positivists in the separation and clarification of these three factors. We may briefly discuss these branches of the new philosophy of language.

(a) The Pragmatics of a language studies the behaviour of persons as the cause and as the effect of the use of linguistic signs and discovers "the role of the language in different social relations," and the "mode of use of all words and expressions, especially the sentences."

(b) Semantics is the science of meaning or more exactly the study of the relation of signs to the things they designate. It may be mentioned here that in India this branch of knowledge is almost as old as the systems of philosophy. The philosophers of the Mimāṃsā, Vedānta and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Schools, as well as the grammarians and the rhetoricians of India, devoted much attention to the different aspects of meaning. But in the West it has attracted the special attention of philosophers only during the last fifty years or so. Ogden and Richards, and particularly the Polish logicians Lesniewski, Ajdukiewicz and Tarski have discussed and thrown much light on the subject in recent times.

The pragmatics of a language helps the study of its semantical rules governing the relations of expressions to their designata, i.e. things designated, which are found by analysis to be either objects like the sun or properties of such objects, such as heat, or the relation among objects such as cause, or "a certain physical function" such as temperature. A language when analysed semantically is found to consist of some signs as its elements. Two kinds of such signs can be distinguished, words (e.g. man, cow, red, etc.) and special symbols (e.g. 0, +, −, etc.) Again, in another way signs are divisible into descriptive signs (designating objects, properties, etc.) and logical signs (designating assertion, denial, implication, quantity, condition, etc.). It is also found out by analysis that
several terms in a language or of different languages have the same designation, and so they are synonymous.

"We know the meaning (designation) of a term," says Carnap, "if we know under what conditions we are permitted to apply it in a concrete case and what conditions not." Ordinary people know how to use a word but cannot give the precise rule governing its application. Semantics tries to formulate such rules.

The problem of truth involving the correct use of words is also shown as a semantical problem and is sought to be solved by semantical laws. Carnap says: "The term 'true' as it is used in science and everyday life, can also be defined within semantics." To determine whether a sentence, "the moon is blue," is true we have to determine whether the thing designated by the term "moon" has the property designated by the term "blue."

(c) Logical Syntax (or Syntactics) is the third direction of analysis that Philosophy can undertake in respect of a language. Disregarding "the activities of the speaking and listening persons," as well as the relations of expressions to the objects meant, it considers only the expressions as such and tries to ascertain their formal properties and mutual logical relations. Carnap utilizes the methods and results of Mathematical Philosophy and Symbolic Logic in his work, *Logical Syntax of Language*, for constructing a calculus of logical relations among the different elements or signs constituting any given language. The rules of syntax chiefly consist of (1) the rules by which elementary signs or words can be combined to form the significant sentences of a particular language system, and (2) the rules by which new sentences can be logically derived or deduced from given sentences. The former are sometimes called formation rules and the latter transformation rules.

It has been pointed out previously that genuine language originates from experience. It should be possible, therefore, to analyse every such language into some simple or elementary statements recording some immediate experience. Such primitive statements are called by positivists protocol statements or simply protocols. The protocols like "This is green," "This is painful" are directly verifiable and, therefore, their meaning or sense can be directly ascertained. Other genuine or significant statements can be verified only indirectly, that is, by analysing them into their component protocols or deriving them from protocols by logical rules of inference.

Considering each genuine branch of Science as a system of statements, the positivists try to analyse them into its ultimate elements or protocols by the combination of which the system has been constructed and they also try to discover the logical relations or rules by which the different protocols are significantly combined into a true system. The protocols themselves are also analysed into their component words, and the rules
by which these words are combined into significant sentences are also discovered.

In this way it is found that the basic elements out of which a science-system is constructed are not many. By substituting suitable symbols for these root concepts or terms, and applying the logical rules (discovered to hold among the terms of that science) and the axioms and postulates underlying it and using also symbols for logical relations (like identity, negation, implication, etc.), the logical positivists attempt to reduce the entire science to a symbolic and mathematical form just as symbolic logicians reduce the traditional Formal Logic to Symbolic Logic. They try to show that by adopting such a method cumbersome and lengthy statements can be reduced to brief formulae; arguments can be carried on with the greatest ease and accuracy, and new and unexpected results can similarly be deduced by symbolic operations on known truths.

This process of the reduction of a science into a mathematical and symbolic form has been called by J. H. Woodger "formalization of the science" or "construction of the metatheory of the science" in his work, The Technique of Theory Construction (Vol. II, No. 5, of International Encyclopedia of Unified Science).

Neurath, Carnap and their colleagues think that it should be possible to reduce the language of all sciences, by analysis and formalization, into a common language which may be called physical language. This theory, that is "that the physical language is the universal language and can, therefore, serve as the basic language of Science" has been named by Neurath Physicalism. It should be remembered, however, that this theory does not hold that the language of science should be what the language of the traditional science of Physics is, or that every phenomenon found in any science can be explained by the present system of physical laws. It only means that "every scientific fact can be interpreted as a physical fact, i.e. as a quantitatively determinable property of spatio-temporal position (or as a complex of such properties)," and that "every scientific explanation of fact occurs by means of a law, i.e. by means of a formula which expresses the fact that, situations or events of specified kind in any spatio-temporal region are accompanied by specified events in associated regions related in specified fashion."

Physicalism naturally leads to the theory of the unity of all sciences for which the positivists have been trying hard through their different works, and now particularly through the several volumes of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. The object of this movement is not to abolish the different branches of science but rather to fashion the language of each science in such a way as to make each adopt the quantitative and spatio-temporal terms with the help of which physical laws are expressed.

The positivists anticipate here two great objections that can be raised against this method. The first objection is: Can we express all qualities
adequately, in terms of quantity? If not, how can there be exhaustive reduction of all language to quantitative language? The second objection is: How can it be possible to express the theories about the animate and the mental in terms of physical determinations? As to the first objection, the success of the attempt of Physics and other sciences in their reduction of qualities to quantities (e.g. colour, sounds, etc., to waves of specified length, frequency and other quantitative determinations), encourages the positivists to hope that qualitative language can gradually be eliminated altogether. To meet the second objection the positivists point out that the phenomena of life and mind can also be studied in the objective way by the observation of the behaviour of living and conscious beings in space and time and measuring the spatio-temporal antecedents and consequents as is being done, for example, by Behaviouristic and Experimental Psychology. Interested readers may refer to Neurath's *Foundations of the Social Sciences* and Woodger's *The Technique of Theory Construction* (in *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* series) for satisfying their curiosity as to how Sociology, Biology, etc., can be studied and re-oriented from the physicalist standpoint.

It was stated previously that Logical Positivism began with the empirical faith that our language is ultimately rooted in experience and consequently only those statements possess sense which are either the protocols (i.e. direct reports of some experience) or derivable from or reducible to such protocols. The empiricism of Mach, according to which experience is composed of atomic elements, supplied the basis of Positivism towards the beginning, and then each word corresponding to a bit of sense-object (like "green," "pleasant") was regarded as the ultimate unit. But Positivists were influenced thereafter by Wittgenstein, who regarded facts, i.e. relational configurations (like "this is green," "this is pleasant") as the ultimate elements of the world and regarded these as the objects of direct experience. And then Gestalt Psychology also influences Positivism and shakes its initial faith in atomic empiricism. As a result of such disturbing influences the positivists fail to be unanimous as to the nature of the protocols, i.e. whether they were about atomic sensations, situations or configurations. Under such circumstances some positivists prefer to ally themselves with the pragmatists and behaviourists. They cease to quarrel about the nature of primitive experience and confine their attention only to outward behaviour and try to study the relation between such behaviour and language, rather than between experience and language. This kind of study is called, as we said before, the behaviouristics or pragmatics of the language.

Physicalism is in favour of this method. By adopting it, Positivism also tries to avoid the solipsistic difficulty, arising from empiricism, namely, how can one's language (the meaning of which is based on one's own subjective experience) be understood by another individual who can have no

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access to the experience of his neighbour? If the meaning of the word "red" for the first individual is not a subjective sensation of his but is what he does (i.e. speaks, points to, selects, avoids) when the word is uttered to him or by him, then the second individual can interpret the word in terms of such observable behaviour. We can thus understand how inter-subjective knowledge is possible through language. Physicalism thus favours the methods of behaviourism and pragmatism, though it does not hold the metaphysical theory of materialism.

The aversion of the positivists to metaphysics generates a dislike for the material mode of speech and leads Carnap to advocate the formal mode of speech in discussing the language and statements of Science. The material mode of speech is the ordinary way of speaking by reference to objects, states of affairs, etc., whereas the formal mode of speech is confined to linguistic forms, using "words" for "objects," "statements" for "states of affairs." We may explain this with the help of some of Carnap's own examples. In describing Economics in the material mode one can say that "its propositions describe economic phenomena such as supply and demand, etc." Now changing this into the formal mode of speech one should say that "its sentences can be constructed from expressions: 'supply and demand,' 'wage,' 'price,' etc., put together in such and such way." The question, "What objects are the elements of given, direct experiences?", which is in the material mode, can be correctly formulated in the formal mode, according to Carnap, as "What kinds of words occur in protocol statements?" The answer to this question, in the ordinary material mode, would be: "The elements that are directly given are the simplest sensations and feelings." But the correct way of replying, in the formal mode, would be, "Protocol statements are of the same kind as: 'joy now,' 'here, now, blue, there, red.'"

By analysing scientific statements the positivist finds that most of them are in the material mode and some in the mixture of formal and material modes. His business is now to turn them all into the formal mode, so as to purge them of all references to facts and experiences and confine them purely to words. It is hoped that each science can thus be translated and transformed into a sentential calculus which can be further simplified by substituting symbols for the constants and variables of that science, as also for the words expressing the logical constants (like "all," "every," "some," "not," "if," "therefore") and ultimately all sciences can be linked up and unified.

But in course of their logical analysis the positivists also feel the necessity of understanding the exact senses of the basic scientific concepts of law, probability, induction, causation, etc. So many of them engage themselves in the interpretation of Science, just as old inductive logicians used to do. Space does not permit the discussions of the very interesting results of their investigation in this direction. The reader may be referred
to *An Examination of Logical Positivism* by J. R. Weinberg (published by Hartcourt, Brace & Co.) for an excellent account of the matter.

By the application of logical analysis Carnap and other positivists also try to show how pseudo-problems and nonsensical theories are generated in Metaphysics by the meaningless use of language. Briefly speaking, such linguistic errors may arise (1) either by the use of a meaningless word with other words which carry sense (e.g. “What is nothing?”, “Nothing exists as the object of enquiry”); (2) or by the combination of words none of which has any sense (e.g. Tun prin tam); (3) or by the combination of words each of which has meaning in other contexts, but the combination as a whole does not make any sense (e.g. This square is a circle; honesty is white). Metaphysical nonsense is mostly generated by linguistic constructions of the first and the third kind. The word “nothing” is wrongly supposed to denote some object. One says “A table exists here,” “A chair exists there,” “Nothing exists on the table.” By false analogy it is supposed that like chair and table, nothing also must be some existent. The existentialist philosopher Heidegger evolved the philosophy of nothing, for example, by thinking that nothing was the entity which was revealed by the human feeling of dread or care (*Angst*)—“the feeling of being on the verge of nothing.” By logical analysis it can be found out that a confusion between the formal and the material modes of speech is responsible for this error and pseudo-theory. When one feels or says that there is nothing, he wants really to say that the statement that there is anything would be false. The falsity of a probable statement is, therefore, meant briefly by nothing, which, therefore, should be regarded only as a form and property of speech not as an existing object denoted by speech. Taken in the material mode, “nothing” would be nonsense and would make any sentence in which it is so used also nonsensical.

By a similar logical analysis it can be shown that the problem of universal as an ontological problem is meaningless. But taken as a problem about a formal property of classes of words and sentences it is significant. The metaphysical problem about the thing-in-itself is another pseudo-problem which is found by logical analysis to be constructed out of the illegitimate combination of three words, each of which has sense in appropriate contexts, but which do not amount to any sense when they are combined thus and intended to stand for some entity beyond experience.

Thus logical analysis can purge philosophy of its pseudo-problems and its meaningless statements which pass in the name of theories.

4. CONCLUSION

We may wind up now the discussion with a few observations. The necessity of the logical analysis of language arises in the history of the Philosophy of a country when a large heritage of problems and theories is
presented to posterity in the form of an accumulated stock of sentences the meanings of which are sometimes ambiguous, sometimes mutually conflicting and sometimes misleading. Under the pressure of such a necessity Indian Philosophy developed, some centuries ago, its branches of linguistic analysis (e.g. the Vākyā-sāstra of Mīmāṃsā and the Saṅga-khanda of Nyāya). A similar necessity occurs in Western Philosophy much later, and Logical Positivism arises as a result during the present century and tries to perform the very necessary work of the clarification of ambiguities, the removal of pseudo-problems and demonstration of the limits of philosophical thinking.

But in their youthful enthusiasm for the reformation of Philosophy and a rather blind respect for Science the positivists propound doctrines which not only throw metaphysics into the sphere of the meaningless, but also turn some of the basic elements of science, e.g. the universal propositions expressing laws, causality, etc., into meaningless statements, as we have tried to show. But it is still more amusing to note that their criterion of meaning based on empirical verifiability renders, as Wittgenstein and others have to admit, the very sentences containing the criterion and other rules of syntax, meaningless. Because these sentences are about sentences, and not about empirical facts which only the latter sentences refer to.

If, again, we coolly analyse the positivists' criticism of metaphysics we find that it is nothing more than a tautology. For if we translate the sentence "Metaphysics is meaningless" by substituting for the subject and the predicate the meanings that they themselves give to these words, then it is equivalent to: "That which deals with the trans-empirical (non-empirical) possesses no reference to the empirical." But such a platitude cannot really stultify metaphysics. If all the discussions of the positivists, regarding language, are regarded by themselves worth the while in spite of their "meaninglessness," in the technical positivist sense of the word, metaphysical discussions, when purged of the ambiguities, confusions and contradictions may be at least as valuable. In fact even if we judge the value of metaphysics by the pragmatic test of empirical consequences—which some positivists adopt for determining meaning—the history of human culture and civilization will justify its existence.

The more recent tendency of some positivists, namely, not even to refer to facts of experience or matters of fact but to confine themselves wholly to the world of language, turns positivism into a kind of linguistic solipsism. As a consequence, positivists cannot claim to perceive even words and determine the sense of statements, nor justify and explain intersubjective intelligibility. Even Bertrand Russell—who is in general sympathy with this movement—notes this tendency with disapproval. We may end with the words with which he closes his book, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth: "... complete metaphysical agnosticism is not compatible with the maintenance of linguistic propositions. Some modern philosophers hold that
we know much about language, but nothing about anything else. This view forgets that language is an empirical phenomenon like another, and that a man who is metaphysically agnostic must deny that he knows when he uses a word. ́

NOTES

1. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Ch. IV.
2. op. cit., p. 184.
3. ibid., p. 186.
6. ibid., p. 6.
10. ibid., p. 44.
13. ibid., p. 47.
14. ibid., pp. 45-6.

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CHAPTER XLVIII

EXISTENTIALISM

I. INTRODUCTION

Existentialism is the latest movement of European thought which has achieved popular success in contemporary France. Since it has become fashionable there, all sorts of people have begun to be described as existentialists, so much so that Jean-Paul Sartre, a recognized leader of the School, has remarked that the word "no longer means anything at all." Even if we consider only the philosophical writers who are usually called existentialists, we find they differ widely from one another in their metaphysical views. Nevertheless it is not difficult to discover certain common points among them. They all emphasize the importance of the individual man as individual as well as his freedom and responsibility for being what he is.

Existentialism seems to have arisen as a reaction against both naturalism and idealism.

By naturalism we mean here the kind of philosophical view according to which the world of matter, governed by mechanical laws, is the fundamental reality and if anything is to be regarded as real, it must appear to the understanding, dominated by the category of causality, as a case or instance of a general law. The apparent distinction between matter, life and mind, is no doubt granted, but is really explained away as being a function of material differences. Man is viewed as part of a huge machine, completely determined in all respects. His actions, it is true, are not entirely determined by external physical forces, but they are determined by motives and impulses, which act as psychological forces. He has an illusory sense of freedom, but enjoys no real freedom. His personality counts for very little in the face of the immense physical reality, in whose ample lap he finds his insignificant cradle and grave.

Naturalism is the philosophy of the scientific man and is fast becoming, if it has not already become, part of the common sense of the educated mankind. It is usually joined with a faith in material progress and although the means of life and easy comfort are accumulated in abundance, there goes with it a steady deterioration in the quality of life lived, resulting in inner vacuity, boredom and restlessness of spirit. The points to be noted for us here are these: man is an item among innumerable other items in a vast objective structure; he has no real freedom and everything in reality is in principle knowable.

Idealism tries to make out that much of what is claimed by naturalism
as given fact is in truth mere hypothetical construction, that consciousness is presupposed by every fact that can be asserted, and enjoys a unique status not shared by any objective fact whatever. Consciousness is thus basic to the conception of reality. This consciousness clearly is not factual or individual in character. Still man as the bearer of this consciousness comes to occupy a central place in reality. But man is not merely a spectator of the universe. He realizes or seeks to realize certain ends and purposes which have objective validity. We thus get the notion of the objective spirit, idea or ideal, which is realized, through natural processes and human actions, in nature and history. This ideal is not the same thing as consciousness in general, but as opposed to mere nature, it is to be put on the side of consciousness or non-factual reality and is sometimes described as reason. In this idealistic picture the position of man is, no doubt, improved, because it is in man that both consciousness and the ideal are realized. But what becomes of the individual man and his freedom? He is a mere theatre or medium for the manifestation of reason and has no ultimate reality. He is a mere tool and has no real freedom. His so-called freedom consists in the acceptance of the necessity of the ideal. Further, in idealism, consciousness being basic, everything is knowable; there cannot be, in principle, any unknowable part of reality.

We thus see that the individual as such is disregarded in both idealism and naturalism, there is no real freedom and no room left for mystery. We have irrepresibly consciousness of freedom and responsibility but this is not really explained but explained away by these philosophies. Idealism, moreover, tends to falsify our sense of death. In fact, in making us one with the ideal, it puts us beyond death. We feel, on the contrary, death as a real inescapable destiny for us men. Existentialism is a revolt against this falsification of real human existence.

We have described Existentialism above as the latest movement of European thought. But its beginnings can be traced back to Kierkegaard whose first important work, Either/Or, was published in 1843. Many people trace the roots of existentialism in ancient philosophy. The kind of attitude that finds expression in existentialism may be described as the revolt of life against thought, of passion and feeling against reflective contemplation. It is thus not a new phenomenon. It is as old as the Cynics and the Cyrenaeics of the ancient world. In fact in every age we find some gifted people who dislike the rigour and discipline as well as the pretensions of abstract thought and would in the name of life give more importance to feeling and will than to reflective thinking. Romanticism, Nietzscheism and Bergsonism are in the same line and existentialism appears to be the latest expression of the same temper.

We have already referred to the fact that existentialists do not agree among themselves in their metaphysical views and that the term existentialism has begun to be used in a variety of senses. In these circum-
stances what we propose to do here is to explain the main philosophical ideas of some of the important thinkers among the recognized existentialists. We begin with the Danish thinker, Kierkegaard.

2. KIERKEGAARD (1813-55)

In his day the intellectual life of his country was dominated by Hegelian ideas. In opposition to Hegel, who laid great stress on the objective spirit and emphasized the objectivity of truth, Kierkegaard asserted "Subjectivity is truth" or "Truth lies in subjectivity." He did not mean by it what is commonly called Subjectivism or individualism or any variety of pragmatism. We should remember that Kierkegaard was primarily a theologian and his statement will perhaps be best understood if it is taken theologically. "God is truth" is a common assertion of Christian theology. Kierkegaard could never stand the notion that God was an object. To him God was infinite subjectivity, actus purus, and consistently with this position, if we are to arrive at the conclusion "God is truth," we must grant that subjectivity is truth. Man too has truth and becomes truth to the extent he becomes pure subjectivity or a spiritual person. Kierkegaard was thoroughly scandalized by the Hegelian idea that God realizes Himself in the world, which is a sum of objects. At least the prevailing view that Hegel's system not only gave us the highest knowledge of mankind but constituted the self-knowledge of God himself appeared ridiculous to him. Even the secrets of a finite personality, Kierkegaard found, could not be penetrated by any system of philosophy and it was nothing less than fantastic for a system to pretend that it could disclose the secrets of the infinite mind of God. He was against all closed systems and he particularly found Hegel's system suffocating as it reduced the individual man to an insignificant item in the universe and left no real freedom for him. To Kierkegaard the individual person is quite unique in nature and cannot properly be known or understood in general terms. Secondly, the individual is never a finished product, but is always becoming or making himself. It is a question of continuous effort and it proceeds from his inner passion for freedom.

The ideas of choice and decision are of primary importance in Kierkegaard's thought. This decision is always a risk. The individual finds himself amidst uncertainty but he takes risks and decides. "My choice and decision are quite personal. No God or Absolute decides in me but I do it on my own account."

I am no doubt a subject, by which Kierkegaard does not mean a mere intellectual knower, but a complete person with feelings and volitions. But the subjective exists only in relation to an object. There is no existence except in relation to a being. Kierkegaard could think only as a Christian
and for a Christian to exist is to exist in presence of God. But to feel oneself in presence of God is to feel oneself a sinner. To exist is to be a sinner. Existence is in a sense the highest value but it is a sin at the same time. Through the consciousness of sin we enter the sphere of religion and once there we have to complete the spiritual journey from religion which is philosophy to religion proper which is a scandal to our reason, inasmuch as it affirms that God who is eternal is born in the world at a particular moment in history. In any event, my existence means my being in contact with something beyond myself. I cannot help being essentially anxious about, and supremely interested in, this existence, because on my relation with this other or God depends an infinity of pain or joy. Kierkegaard calls God the absolute other, because although He is our protector and receives us in infinite love, He is absolutely heterogeneous in His nature from us individuals.

Kierkegaard shows his opposition to Hegel also by his insistence on real possibilities. According to Hegel, the world is the necessary unfoldment of the absolute idea and freedom is another name for rational necessity or necessity as seen or understood. According to Kierkegaard on the contrary there are real possibilities, and it is left to our choice and decision to make them actual.

Kierkegaard was, as we saw, more of a theologian than a philosopher and he wrote in a provincial language. His influence was not, therefore, effectively felt in the current European thought till his ideas were translated in intellectual terms by two German philosophers, Heidegger and Jaspers.

3. MARTIN HEIDEGGER (1889–)

Heidegger was a pupil of Husserl and was undoubtedly influenced by him. The phenomenological School, founded by Husserl, developed in several directions and the philosophy of existence is sometimes regarded as a branch or a further development of phenomenology. In one of its aspects phenomenology emphasizes the fact that essences of things are given to certain characteristic modes of intuition. Just as physical objects are given to perception, the numbers of arithmetic or the concepts of geometry are given to the intuition of the mathematician. In every case, whatever the object of our knowledge, whether a physical thing or a mathematical notion, we have after all to recognize it as such and such in a direct mode of apprehension. When we want to study the nature or essence of a thing we should study it as it is given to us. All objects are given (this is the realistic trend in phenomenology), but all are not given in the same way. To know the essential nature of an object, we must study it in the particular mode of consciousness in which it is given.

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Philosophy is not concerned so much with things which have being (Seiende)—that is the concern of the sciences—as with being as such (Sein). In philosophy thus we want to know the essence of being. Now, the essence of a thing is given, according to Husserl, by certain formal characters or empty forms (Leerformen), which on analysis are found to be constituted by some specific acts of consciousness. A reflective study of consciousness in such essential constitutive acts will disclose, at the same time, the essential nature of things given to consciousness. The theory of being is thus included in a theory of consciousness. This may be regarded as the idealistic or transcendental aspect of Husserl's philosophy.

Heidegger agrees with Husserl in regarding being, and not things which have being, as the principal object of philosophical study. But he deviates widely from Husserl's transcendental philosophy. Although he would accept the view that in order to know the real nature of a thing we should have an essential intuition of it, and so, if being is to be known, it must be intuited in a proper form, he would never regard being as constituted by any act of consciousness.

Heidegger makes a sharp distinction between essence and being or existence. When we ask about a thing as to what it is, we are asking about its essence. Having known what it is, we may still ask whether it exists. This shows that essence does not include existence.

Philosophers, especially those who would support the ontological argument for the existence of God or deduce the world from some idea or ideas, generally affirm some intimate connection or unity at some point between essence and existence. Heidegger would not grant any such unity. It is a cardinal doctrine with all existentialists that the existence precedes essence, and their main concern is with existence.

We have already seen that according to Heidegger the main philosophical problem is the problem of being and if being is to be known truly, it must be grasped in its givenness. Now, when a thing is given, it may no doubt be given in a clear or obscure form, in a more or less determinate or indeterminate fashion, Heidegger holds that it may also be given in an authentic or proper (eigentlich), or in an unauthentic or improper form. That is to say, it may be actually given or merely symbolically meant or believed. An illustration will make the point clear.

When I perceive a bird on a tree, I no doubt take the bird to be given along with its being. What is actually given, however, is an essence, the what of a bird, the birdy character. In fact there may be no bird on the tree but just a leaf or two in a peculiar position which presented the birdy character, so that it is meaningful to ask whether there is any real bird on the tree corresponding to the character presented. Thus in regard to any external thing what is primarily given is essence, and existence is secondary. It is quite otherwise with the self. We may quite significantly ask what I am, but it gives no sense to ask whether I am, because I cannot
ask the question without presupposing my own existence. Here existence is primarily given, essence is secondary.

Being in its proper form is experienced in the case of the self alone. It is then called existence. Birds and beasts, chairs and tables, even mathematical objects have no doubt being in some sense, but they do not enjoy existence or being in its proper form which I experience in my own case. I do not experience myself as a thing having being (Seiende), but in experiencing myself I experience existence itself.

I know two things to be different when they show different characters. Similarly their identity means the identity of their characters. In my own case, however, I do not assert my self-identity on the basis of any self-identical character. I know myself already as self-identical without knowing what self-identical essence or character I possess. My identity is the identity of existence. Similarly I know myself as different from you without knowing in what character we differ from each other.

A thing is nothing but the collection of its qualities. When the qualities, colour, form, etc., are abstracted we may suppose that there still remains the thing-in-itself. But the thing-in-itself is merely an empty conceptual form. But I am never reduced to an empty form of thought when abstraction is made of my qualities. “I” never means an abstract general concept. It stands for that absolute concreteness which the word “I” and only this word can signify, the concreteness of existence. Generally speaking, the qualities of the ego are the ways or modes of its existence, and are not mere characters as in the case of things.

My qualities then express the modes in which I exist. That is, they are certain realized possibilities beside which there are innumerable others which have not been realized. Any other man represents another possibility of my existence and I may well entertain the idea that I were he. It is quite possible to think of myself as possessing other qualities, another character or essence. But this is not so possible about the thing. I may well complain why I am not in the more fortunate position of my neighbour, but it is senseless to complain why a thing is not something else.

I am free metaphysically, because my existence includes innumerable possibilities which are not determined by any essence whether in me or in somebody else. A thing is “unfree,” because it is absolutely determined by its character. In fact its being is one with its essence or character. It can be only what it is or what follows from its essence. There is no determining essence in the case of man. The dissociation of his existence from any essence constitutes his metaphysical freedom.

Do not the things exist? Heidegger would hardly grant them any self-existence. He takes a pragmatic view of things. A stool means for him something to sit upon; a weapon is something to fight with. The meaning of any object is determined by the use we can make of it. The world in a sense presupposes man for whom it exists as the field of his activity.
Man lives in the world, and the contents of his thought, feeling and volition are derived from his position in the world, apart from which he would be a mere abstraction. Consciousness of myself as an existence is thus bound up with my consciousness of the world. But I live as one among others of my fellow-beings and so my consciousness of myself is at the same time consciousness of other fellow-beings with whom I live and share in a common world. Other men are experienced by me not as mere objects for my use, having only instrumental being, but as having as good an existence as myself. I experience them as possibilities of my own existence.

The fact that I can take up in my own being other historical existences, as possibilities of my own existence, raises me above the animal which is not capable of this feat and lives its appointed being in a rigid and fixed world. The consciousness of my freedom is based on this fact.

My metaphysical freedom is practically limited and is never absolute. I find myself already as Heidegger says, "thrown" in a particular situation (hinwirft in Welt) in the world, belonging to a particular race and burdened with certain inborn tendencies of character and intelligence. I did not choose my position and it all happened without my knowledge and assistance. This determining factor in my existence Heidegger calls "fate" (Schicksal). My freedom is limited by my fate. Freedom is true being; limited freedom or freedom conditioned by fate is the special form of being which man enjoys. In his freedom he accepts the fate in which he is thrown and makes use of it.

I realize my being only in relation to the world. The world of things arises or has meaning for me only in so far as I feel a care or concern (Sorge) for it. I realize my own existence as well as the being of other things only in my concern for them. This concern is doubly directed, to the world as well as to myself, rather across or over the things of the world to myself. All my acts are directed no doubt to certain things of the world but ultimately they are directed to an end in myself. The end-point is hardly ever a consciously realized objective but only a felt point. Through my acts of concern or care and anxiety I do not maintain in being some existence which is already there, but really I make myself and realize a possibility of my existence in the direction of the fate in which I am thrown.

There is another fundamental form of experience which runs through human life and is called by Heidegger "anguish" (Angst). Anguish is not the same thing as fear. Fear derives its power from anguish which is already there, latent. Fear is a mode of anguish related to a particular object. Fear threatens us with death and all anguish properly speaking is anguish of death. Death, however, is not anything determinate which we can represent to ourselves. It is the end, the nothing (das Nichts). Here we arrive at a difficult notion of Heidegger's philosophy, the notion of nothing.

We are, as it were, "thrown" in the state of existence and it is of the
essence of this our peculiar position that we do not know whence we come and whither we go. Our vision is blocked on both sides and we strike against the nothing. In our feeling of anguish we experience this nothing. Heidegger seems to credit the nothing with an active function (das Nichts nichtet), which influences our being. He even makes it one with absolute being. One is reminded here of the Buddhistic conception of the void (Śūnyā). How this nothing is to be conceived positively and absolutely may indeed be a real difficulty. But the way in which Heidegger makes anguish an inalienable aspect of our existence and speaks of anguish as primarily the anguish of death seems clearly to point to the fact that our hold on life and existence is uncertain and precarious and in our inner being we are utterly alone.

Care or concern is not a common element present in our thoughts and acts. But our thoughts and acts are interpreted by Heidegger as expressions of care and anguish. Care and anguish again express the nature of our human existence in relation to itself, to the world and to death. Human existence in its authetic form is to be realized through an interpretation of care and anguish.

What is meant by this authentic form has now to be understood.

There is a distinction in our meaning of the subject when we speak of it as “I” and when we speak of it as “we” or “one.” When I say “we do not know who made this world,” I do not mean by “we” merely “I and some others,” but “any one” in general. I might as well say “one does not know, etc.” But if I say “I do not know,” I confine ignorance to myself, with which primarily I alone am concerned. Now, often in our thought and action the “I” is lost in “we” or “one.” “One” is also a subjective being and is to be understood as a possible form of “I.” “One” is “I” or self, but not in its authentic form. When I decide merely as “one” the burden of responsibility is lightened for me. The decision is really mine when I take it in my individual capacity. To pass from “one” to “I” signifies a deep change in our position in the world. It gives us a sense of personal responsibility, of our unique individuality, which cannot be repeated or replaced, as well as of our utter solitariness. So long as we act merely as “man” and not as unique individuals, there is a sense of security. This sense is lost as soon as we begin to act and think in our individual personal capacity. Life becomes a hazard and death, which is certain and always possible, stares us in the face and casts its shadow over life. Life in reality is “life to death,” precariously lived in presence of the threatening nothing on all sides. It is no consolation to think that man is mortal, because man in general does not die, but individual men die and I have to die my own death. Death is not a distant possibility, but a possibility which is ever present and a part of my authentic existence.

The I or self is pure existence, but all existence is “thrown” in a determinate historical situation. To act as a self is to act from this situation,
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out of free will, instead of being driven along by it. We have, however, to put ourselves knowingly within the framework of the historical situation and obey its demands, rather than run after dreamy ideals which have no relation to our time and place. The two central concepts of Heidegger's philosophy, freedom and fate, supply the proper orientation for his ethics. We have to avoid passive fatalism on the one hand and dreamy idealism on the other. Neither for Hegel nor for Heidegger is there any ethical command which is valid for all times. The command is the command of the hour; it is to fulfil what the time demands. According to Hegel, what is to be done at the moment follows logically from the idea which is realized in the entire process of history. For Heidegger, the human individual stands free, with knowledge and will, in an historical situation to do what the situation as such reveals to him as its meaning and demand.

4. KARL JASPERS (1883–)

Jaspers was a psychiatrist to start with and in his practice he found that the patient could not be treated merely as a "case" that would entirely and unequivocally come under a general law. On the contrary some personal relationship with the patient was found necessary. In this personal relationship, the purely scientific and objective attitude is entirely dropped and we become conscious of a sphere of reality that is not to be conceived in purely objective terms.

"As being I am radically different from all being of things, because I can say 'I am,'" says Jaspers (quoted by von Aster). I no doubt know about my being, but I cannot make myself an object of my consciousness. The "I" which is treated as objective and is studied in ordinary psychology means no more than the totality of mental facts which make up the contents of my consciousness. The "I" which I mean when I say "I am" stands over against these contents as subject. When I try to regard this subject itself as object, I get merely a contentless ego-point, which is no more than an empty form of the ego. This ego-form is not certainly meant by "I" when I say "I am."

Agreeing with Husserl and others, Jaspers regards our consciousness as always intentional, that is, directed meaningfully to something which we seek to realize clearly as given. To know any object is to realize it as given. Not merely so, we connect with it other objects and ultimately with the totality of objects constituting the objective world. But neither the total world (or the absolute) which I seek, nor the self that I am, can ever be objectively given. Nevertheless I am aware of them both in some form, but in a form that transcends the world of the given.

We know the absolute, says Jaspers, in cyphers or symbols, i.e. only symbolically. Not only in fact, but in principle, there is no other way possible.
I am somehow aware of my own existence. Jaspers speaks of the exposition or revelation of existence (existenzerhellung), but the revelation never amounts to objective givenness. I realize my existence in will and desire, in my conscious acts. I experience my will and act as free and as originally arising in the self. This experience may be objectified and studied in psychology as an indifferent psychological fact and brought into connection with other facts of consciousness. But in that case will or act loses its proper meaning. The self and freedom become mere illusions. I am reduced to a mere part among other parts of an inter-connected objective world. So long as we are in the objective attitude, we cannot prove, despite our self-consciousness and consciousness of freedom, that the self and freedom are not illusions or that the objective world is not all that there is.

But Jaspers points out that we cannot remain content with this objective view of reality, not only because everything objective must refer ultimately (as Kant made out) to consciousness in general, but also because in our study of life and consciousness, we come across facts which do not admit of purely scientific explanation in objective, deterministic terms. This failure of science does not of course prove the reality of a transcendent sphere but gives us at least the right to follow the hint given in the revelation of existence, in our consciousness of self and freedom and not to reject them as discredited illusions.

Existence or self in its free being is equated by Jaspers with will. But the will which is self is not to be understood as a blind impulse in the heart of things, as Schopenhauer would perhaps understand it. Such an impulse would not be an I, but an it. I know and experience my own self in act and will as creative, free and original, and this experience is quite distinct from an experience in which I lose myself in a foreign element, in a force or impulse in me. It is the personal will, and not an impersonal impulse, that is supposed to reveal existence. The broad hint contained in this "revelation" is that the objective world is not the only reality, but behind it there stands "I am" as pure existence, not as an object having being.

The self does not exist as a transcendent reality constituting a separate world different from the world of our experience. There are no two worlds, but only one, but this need not be a world of objects only, as it appears to be when we are in the objective attitude. We may more properly conceive the world as appearance of the self, following the hint afforded by existential revelation. But this revelation itself should not again be treated as a psychological fact. Existential revelation is a transcendence of all objective facts, but this transcendence does not lead us to a transcendent being away from the world. Transcendence has a peculiar meaning here: it is also remaining in the world, in the consciousness of objects, in being intentionally directed to them.

We should note that the self is not something from which the will issues. It is itself the will. The will is creative. It creates itself the self which is
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conscious. If we abstract the will from consciousness, in which it "shines" or appears, the will ceases to be will. Existence constitutes the depth of consciousness, the depth which glimmers through consciousness, but it is not anything beyond or outside consciousness. Self, existence and will mean the same thing. It has being only in operation which is at the same time the illumination or evidencing of consciousness in relation to it.

The existential self is thus related to consciousness and to the world and therefore to an historical situation in which it finds itself. It finds itself in communication with other existences. The situation provides the occasion for its self-creation. The self has thus no timeless being, but exists in time.

We ascribe immortality to the self, but according to Jaspers our language is only mythical if by immortality we mean endless continuance in time. The self is immortal in the sense that being and immortality are the same. This introduces us to metaphysics proper, in which we are concerned with the absolute or the unconditioned.

I feel no doubt that I am, that I lay hold of myself in my forward-going voluntary acts; but I am also made to realize that I do not act and have being purely out of my own self, but stand in an inevitable relation with an absolute and unconditioned being. This relation with an absolute becomes clear in what Jaspers calls "limiting situations," in which we come to realize the limitations of the existential self, in the consciousness of inevitable struggle, suffering, guilt and death. We have already bored down to the level of the self in distinction from the outward objective being of the world. We are called up here to take a further step and reach down to the absolute which conditions my existence. That I am conditioned by something else seems clear from my consciousness of struggle and suffering, guilt and death. As I am the condition of the world, it is clear that I am not again conditioned by the world. Here again we have a transcendence, a transcendence not only of the world but even of the existential self, which points to an absolute being.

In myths, religious dogmas and metaphysical systems one speaks of the absolute. But it would be a mistake if we took the mythical, religious or metaphysical ideas literally and not symbolically. In the limiting situations we live or experience (erleben) these ideas as cyphers or symbols which we enliven by our existential relation with the absolute. We do not thereby get to an absolute in itself. We only attain a clarification or illumination of the world as experienced by the existential self.

The absolute can be known only symbolically. Properly speaking, the absolute cannot be known, but only symbolically experienced. This symbolical experience cannot be further analysed or explained, but it is something that imparts depth and significance to our life in the world. When religious ideas and metaphysical concepts are realized as symbols,
the world of our experience, viewed in their light becomes, so to speak transparent.

"What is meant or expressed by these symbols?" is a question which Jaspers rejects not merely as unanswerable but as devoid of significance. Jaspers' philosophy in certain points is strangely similar to the philosophy of K. C. Bhattacharya who too speaks of our metaphysical knowledge as merely symbolical and denies of the absolute all knowledge in the proper sense. For both philosophizing is not so much a matter of logical arguments as an attempt at deepening our consciousness. At a superficial level, Jaspers would say, we are aware of the world of objects, at a deeper level we get the existence of the self which is the condition of the world of objects; at a still deeper level we get the absolute which conditions even the existence of the self. Bhattacharya would perhaps, following the Advaitic tradition, resolve our consciousness of the world and of our individuality into the consciousness of the absolute. Jaspers would no doubt make the world transparent in the light of the absolute, but this would not probably make the world disappear altogether.

5. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE (1905- )

Heidegger and Jaspers represent two different types of existentialism which have been respectively developed into the atheistic and the theistic movements within the School in contemporary France. We shall study these briefly in their chief representatives, Sartre and Marcel.

In his philosophical thought Sartre seems to owe most to Heidegger, although Hegel and Husserl also appear to have influenced him considerably. While Heidegger's works were known only to philosophical specialists, Sartre through his novels and dramas has been largely responsible for the spread of existentialist ideas among the educated public. We cannot go over the wide common ground between Heidegger and Sartre. We shall only touch upon certain distinctive points in the latter's position.

Sartre is very much impressed by the contingency, irrationality and superfluity of all particular existences. A particular root, for instance, with its particular shape and colour is beneath all explanation. Its function as hydraulic pump would explain root in general but not this particular root with all its peculiarities which distinguish it from others. No particular thing or existence is exactly necessary: there is no rational connection between it and anything beyond it. It might as well not be, it is quite superfluous. What he sometimes describes as nausea is fundamentally the experience of the contingency and absurdity attaching to all existence.

Sartre makes a distinction between being-in-itself (en-soi) and being-
for-itself (*pour-soi*). By being-in-itself he understands being which is self-identical and opaque and has no reference beyond itself. It is the kind of being we generally associate with a material object. Being-for-itself means what would ordinarily be understood as consciousness. Being-in-itself is not conscious, Consciousness appears through "annihilation" or negation. This term (*neutralisation*) corresponds to the negative function ascribed to nothing in Heidegger, but is more akin in meaning to negation in Hegel and like the latter Sartre seems to use it in a loose and wide sense.

To be conscious is to be at a distance from, as well as present to, oneself. But this distance or gap is no being, it is negation of being. Being-in-itself is unconscious and there is no reason why it should negate itself and become conscious. Consciousness is a contingent fact. The *pour-soi* is not implicit in the *en-soi* (as in Hegel); it is an original but contingent appearance.

In becoming conscious, we take a leap beyond being, and thus cease to be anything. To escape from this nullity, without suffering loss of consciousness, we aspire to attain being in-and-for-itself (*pour-soi-en-soi*). But the whole idea is contradictory (what is in-itself cannot be beyond itself), and we are condemned to an endless pursuit and our consciousness suffers from a radical sickness.

Sartre gives an interesting analysis of our consciousness of other persons. To realize the presence of other persons as persons, we have to know them not merely as objects but also, and especially, as subjects. When I know another person, he is of course an object to me. To realize his being as subject, I must find myself in the position of an object to him. To be an object is to be in the state of immobile being-in-itself, to be deprived of free subjectivity and movement. I find myself in such a state when, e.g. I am caught eavesdropping by another person and his gaze glues me, as it were to my place and petrifies me into an object. Another person thus means for me someone who is staring at me. His subjectivity is a threat to my subjectivity. All my objects in a sense gravitate towards me as their subject. When another subject appears on the scene, the objects seem to be pulled away towards him and wrenched from my dominion. Another person thus always appears to me as a rival and an adversary. Real communion between one person and another does not seem to be possible in Sartre’s view.

Freedom occupies a central place in Sartre’s thought. He makes it one with our very being. As a conscious person I cannot exist shut up in being-in-itself, but in consciousness and in my acts I break away from this being, and exist as this break, as this transcendence or freedom. Freedom thus is not a doubtful achievement but a necessity of my being. “Man is condemned to be free,” as Sartre says paradoxically.

Sartre describes his existentialism as consistent atheism on the one hand and as humanism on the other. As man is absolutely free and makes
himself what he actually is, we need no God to account for his being. Many people who deny the existence of God would still believe in a realm of eternal ideas or objective values. But if there is no divine consciousness, there is nothing to support this realm. Consistent atheism thus requires the denial of objective values. Sartre therefore says there are no objective values which I have to accept. Just as I make or create myself, I create my values also by my free choice.

Existentialism is humanism not in the sense of regarding man as the ultimate end (because according to Sartre man has no determinate nature which can be so regarded), but in the sense of regarding man as the creator of all values. I exist as truly human only in going beyond my immediate being in pursuit of an aim which is not dictated to me but which I freely project.

My freedom is absolute, but I cannot escape responsibility and anguish. Since I am not determined by anything else, the responsibility for my being and deed rests squarely on my shoulders only. My responsibility is really very great, because in making any choice I am choosing or legislating for the whole world. For I can only choose what is better, better not only for me but for everybody in the world. This heavy responsibility cannot but make me sad.

6. Gabriel Marcel (1889– )

Marcel presents a different type of existentialism from what we find in Sartre and Heidegger. He could rather go with Kierkegaard and Jaspers. Sometimes his view is described as Christian existentialism, but he thinks his view would be acceptable to many who are not Christians.

The fundamental metaphysical question for him is, what am I? He makes a distinction between a mystery and a problem. A problem relates to things that can be considered objectively and is resolvable by means of the intellect. A mystery does not admit of such resolution, because it includes in its scope the subject also, so that the matter cannot be considered quite objectively. The question of existence, for instance, involves me also who am to answer the question. Existence in which I am involved cannot be detached from myself and made an object of my contemplation. The ontological reality is thus a mystery and not a problem. It cannot be resolved like a problem through the mediating work of the intellect but may be revealed or illumined directly through participation or immediate contact.

We find this kind of contact right at the root of psychical life. In sensation I become in a sense one with the thing sensed. There is immediate participation here without the distinction of subject and object. The experience of our bodies is another instance of such participation. My
body is not an instrument or object to me. I am identified with my body: but still it is not a subject. I cannot say I have the body (as object) nor can I say I am the body (as subject). My body is more than my subjective self and yet it is not anything away from me. I am incarnated in the body and thus there is an immediate participation of myself in the other. Existence means such incarnation and participation.

In my sense of "you" I am again in immediate contact with some reality which is more than myself but which is not intelligible apart from all relation to myself. There would be no I or you for selves enclosed in subjective isolation.

In love the barrier between one self and another gives way and one begins to participate in the life of another. Hope, in the metaphysical sense, betokens an assurance of identity between my will and the will at the heart of things. This assurance does not depend on any objective evidence and indeed it may spring even in face of all evidence to the contrary. It is easy to understand that both hope and love can exist only on the basis of faith.

Faith is implicit in every judgment of existence which assumes some reality going beyond the present immediate experience. The existence of external objects is affirmed by an act of faith. The certainty which accompanies my body-consciousness seems to be communicated to my awareness of other bodies with which my body comes in contact. The existence of other selves also is accepted on faith. In these several ways, we realize some presence going beyond the immediate here and now. Ultimately, in the highest kind of faith we realize the supreme transcendence which is called God. Neither the existence of external objects nor that of other selves or God is rationally demonstrable. Each is revealed by a direct contact or participation.

We have already said that existence means such participation. It seems we begin with a relatively superficial level but gradually we reach deeper and wider levels which are already involved in our existence. Philosophizing for Marcel is thus unravelling a mystery, realizing the deeper implications of our being, not a mere construction of a theory or elaboration of concepts. "It is not so much a question of building up as of digging down."

Marcel distinguishes between having and being, attaching greater importance to being than to having. Having implies possession which is a burden and impediment. Being means freedom from encumbrance. Existential progress is from the burden of having towards the freedom of being. Marcel conceives the ideal of releasing oneself from the encumbrance of all possessions at the time of death and preparing oneself for entrance into life eternal. Death does not mean for him sinking into a void but rather a step towards eternity.

It will be apparent from the above account that the strength of the
existentialist philosophers lies rather in their acute psychological or phenomenological analyses than in the logical coherence of their ideas. When they separate essence from human existence, I do not know how they can still make any significant assertion about human existence. If I am absolutely free, as Sartre makes out, and if there is no God and no objective value, I do not see how and to whom I am still responsible, especially when there is no standing I to bear the burden. In spite of these real or seeming inconsequences, the great emphasis laid by existentialists on the unique dignity of human personality is to be welcomed as a corrective to the dehumanizing tendencies of the present-day mechanical and materialistic civilization. When man is being regarded as a tool, as an item in the objective world and is often called upon to sacrifice himself for a class or the state, it is good to be reminded that in our real existence we enjoy an inner subjective being which in its depth cannot be reached or represented by any generality.

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CONCLUDING SURVEY

We have passed in review the results of over thirty centuries of uninterrupted philosophical endeavour, the anxieties and efforts, the ardours and ecstasies, the hopes and disappointments concentrated in the history of the pursuit of philosophy. We cannot help asking, especially in these tense and cruel days, what good was it all, what good will it ever be? Has philosophy played an important role in historical reality? Has it been the guiding power in human destiny in these thirty centuries or has it only been the luxury of the leisureed few, a parenthesis in people's lives? If political leaders and scientific inventors have decided the fate of nations, has philosophy been an echo dying away among the mountains? Is it a tempting but fruitless exercise of the mind, a flight from the objectives of immediate living?

The very history of philosophy gives an answer to these questions. Philosophy is an essential aid to life. We are planted in a world where we are required to think and reflect on the nature of the cosmos, the meaning of right and wrong, the destiny of the human individual. It is a law of man's intellectual consciousness to search for the truth of things and strive to live in the spirit of truth.

Our review indicates that the variety of ideas and methods in European, Chinese and Indian philosophy has nothing exclusive to any one tradition. The differences are only in the matter of emphasis. Philosophy as such knows no frontiers. We come across in every tradition the distinction of Reality and appearance, of the pure and the empirical ego, of intuition and intellect. We also find that there is a revival of philosophy in periods of scepticism. Philosophy has been a major force in all dynamic periods of civilization. When tradition loses its hold, when scepticism prevails, philosophy comes into its own, plays an active role and attempts to assist and enrich life.

Systems of Philosophy can be understood only in relation to their time and place. All thought is a dialogue with circumstance. It is not absolute and final. It is embedded in the stream of history like any other perishable product of the ages. In systems of philosophy we do not get the reality of the world but a vision of reality reflected in the living and therefore changing mirror of man's mind. Intellect does not work in abstraction. It works in the service and with the material of the entire human being.

History of Philosophy does not merely unroll the panorama of human folly. It is not a series of errors and discrepancies. We find in it not merely change and succession but progress. The new preserves the old at least to the extent of being conscious of it and avoiding its shortcomings. Philosophy changes with the changes of historical perspective. Today we must integrate the new discoveries with our philosophical conceptions.
The test of life is the capacity to respond to challenges. Dynamic civilizations are distinguished by their capacity for growth and their ability to communicate to posterity the results of their adventures.

The most important event in the history of India in recent years is the transfer of power in August 1947. Liberation from political bondage is not real freedom though an essential step towards it. It should mean a recasting of our thought, a remaking of our social, economic and political institutions, in other words a new birth of the people.

II

Each age has its faith and our age is committed to science. The masses of people are being permeated in however crude and superficial a way by the dominant zeitgeist. This is in contrast with the earlier centuries when only a thin layer of society participated in the movement of ideas. Led away by the magnificent achievements of science many of us are inclined to accept the all sufficiency of matter, the omnipotence of the world of sense, and account for psychology and history on the basis of material considerations. Psychology is founded on physiology and in history attention is limited to external data, laws and institutions, rites and customs. The deeper human element is neglected, and this has brought about a crisis in our spiritual position. Philosophy today, someone said, is half science and half sentiment.

Philosophy should base itself on positive knowledge of actuality and not speculative idealism, on facts of outward nature, facts of the individual mind and facts of spiritual life, of what is without us, of what is within us, of what is above us.

The traditional conception of the world as saṃsāra, process, change is confirmed by modern science. The world is a flux, dynamically single. Whitehead, for example, describes the nature of the world as process, change or becoming. It consists of events and their inter-relations. In a sense, all nature, the whole universe is one complete event of which particular events are parts or partial aspects.

Change, however, is not mere change; it is becoming or development. It is not a mere passage or transition from one stage of being to another. The very character of existence as process means that each successive step or moment of the process is modified by all that has gone before and in its turn modifies all that comes after it. This is true of all existence, physical, vital and psychological.

We may extend the kingdom of knowledge and push back the frontier which divides the known from the unknown but there will always be a frontier. There are certain final limits which scientific knowledge cannot overcome. There are gaps between the inorganic and the organic, between
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life and mind, and between mind and spirit that we cannot bridge. Progress of scientific knowledge discloses the existence of limits to it.

Even in the world of matter nothing happens suddenly. There is always a certain process of development. It takes time for sugar to melt in water. The higher we go the less is it true that changes are subject to a mechanical determination by which certain antecedent facts or conditions are necessarily followed by certain consequences without relation to the inner nature of the being. Mechanical sequence applies, if at all, to certain limited material systems that are in principle reversible, to which time makes no difference. This is not true of life or mind where reversibility is meaningless. Freedom admits of degrees and has a certain basis in necessity. It is not anywhere altogether absent.

While the universe is a developing process, it is not self-explanatory. Science can trace the facts and their interconnections but cannot offer any explanation of the world it attempts to describe. The Bhagavad-Gītā says: Beginnings and ends are all unknown; we only know the middle which is in constant flux. But the search for the beginnings and ends cannot be stifled. The demand for the interpretation of the facts disclosed by science is insistent. Philosophy, which is the fruit of contemplation, is not only a right and a duty but a supreme need. It is the sign of freedom in a world of necessity, freedom in the very awareness of bondage. In philosophy, we confront the universe and argue about its structure and meaning. In a sense, it is a venture of faith. We have to choose a direction though we cannot see the landscape as a whole. It is not irrational faith. It is the same kind of faith which the scientist employs in theoretical physics, for example. There is a wide difference between our actual experience which is nebulous, untidy and ill-adjusted and the world of perfectly defined objects, ideas and abstract concepts. Einstein in his paper on Principles of Research read to the Physical Society in Berlin says: "The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction. There is no logical path to these laws; only intuition resting on sympathetic understanding of experience can reach them." In his Herbert Spencer lecture, he observes, "Every attempt at a logical deduction of the basic concepts and postulates of mechanics from elementary experiences is doomed to failure." The concepts which arise in our thought and in our linguistic expressions are all—when viewed logically—the free creations of thoughts which cannot be inductively gained from sense-experience. The truth of general principles in physics is ultimately based on a check by direct physical experiment and observation. The two criteria for scientific truth are logical consistency and agreement with observed data. The tests are logical and empirical. The whole method and procedure of science are based on faith in the orderliness of nature. Einstein stresses that "this knowledge, this feeling is at the
centre of true religiousness. In this sense, and in this sense only, I belong to the ranks of devoutly religious men."

Philosophy is not a mere factual exposition of scientifically ascertained facts. It is not a list of propositions which are treated as meaningful because they can be sensibly verified. In metaphysical interpretation as in scientific interpretation we have to study facts and by intellectual imagination, by speculative insight reach principles which are not a priori but are inferences of reflection on experience.

There is, however, a theory which has become a modern form of superstition that excludes all metaphysical thinking. "We pursue logical analysis but not philosophy," says Rudolf Carnap. It is not a bad thing for philosophers to be compelled to show exactly what they mean and state it as clearly as possible. If we are taught to be more vigilant in the use of words it is all to the good, but this does not mean that metaphysical statements are meaningless and that there are no philosophical problems. According to the doctrine of Logical Positivism all significant statements are either tautologies or records of observed facts. The former are the concern of mathematicians and lexicographers and the latter of the empirical scientists. Therefore there are no problems which need worry philosophers.

Even Logical Positivism is not a mere analytic statement. The view that problems of philosophy are linguistic is itself a hypothesis. The verification principle is a metaphysical statement, neither a tautology nor an empirical fact. It is a synthetic a priori proposition of exactly the type that Logical Positivism intends to exclude. Logical Positivism is itself a kind of metaphysics, a sceptical metaphysics.

Philosophy is a sustained effort at interpretation by the hypothetical method. It is as empirical in its method as any other science though like history its data cannot be studied objectively from the outside. We can study any subject in a scientific manner though the central concepts in each case may vary with the nature of the subject. The orderliness and the growth in values, the transitions from matter to life, from life to animal instinct, from animal cunning to human self-consciousness, from human self-consciousness to spiritual wisdom illustrate the incorporation of fresh ideas and values in the cosmic process. Sankara affirms that the whole cosmic evolution is a gradual unfoldment of the varied possibilities of the Supreme Spirit. ekasyād kītasthasya citta-tāratamyaḥ jñānaisvāryānām abhivyaktih pareṇa pareṇa bhāyasya bhavati. It is a view which is supported by scientific metaphysicians like Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, Whitehead and Eddington among others. The world is not self-sufficient. It depends on something which lies beyond it and cannot be known in the way in which it is known. The seeker's scientific conscience brings him to the frontiers which he cannot pass but takes him to another order of experience. The real is not to be reduced to the material. The wonders of science are many but nothing is more wonderful than the mind of man.
which has unravelled the secrets of nature. If science tells us anything it is the power of mind over matter, the mind which exerts the whole energy of its varied being.

The subject is to the object as purusa is to prakrti, as spirit to matter, as freedom to necessity. If we are conscious of necessity, if we discriminate the self from the world of necessity we attain to our true status as free beings. The Supreme is not an intellectual idea but a living reality. We are made aware of the Beyond, the Transcendent. Why is the world what it is and not any other? This relates to Being as Freedom. A scientific study of the facts of nature takes us beyond the facts to the transcendent Being which is also Freedom.

If we emphasize only the Being aspect we tend to make it abstract when it remains a negative principle opposed to the world, to its multiplicity and plenitude. God as absolute transcendence is an idea in which everything vanishes. Transcendence itself will be reduced to nothingness. It will become empty freedom if it does not give itself out. The cosmic universality is that which gives meaning to transcendence.

III

Existentialism is a new name for an ancient method. The Upanisads and Buddhism insist on a knowledge of the self: atmanam viddhi. They tell us that man is a victim of ignorance, avidya, which breeds selfishness. So long as we live our unregenerate lives in the world of time governed by karma or necessity, we are at the mercy of time. This feeling of distress is universal. A sense of blankness overtakes the seeking spirit, which makes the world a waste and life a vain show. Man is not the final resting-place. He has to be transcended. Man can free himself from sorrow and suffering, by becoming aware of the eternal. This awareness, this enlightenment is what is called jnana or bodhi.

The symbolism of the second chapter of Genesis expresses the same truth. Innocent Adam tastes the fruit of the tree of knowledge and the fall is the result. This intellectual knowledge is a leap forward in man’s awareness. Adam and Eve become smitten with fear the moment they become aware of good and evil. They are anxious that they may not rise equal to the sense of obligation which that awareness imposes. The fall represents the need for getting out of the fallen condition. The different factors emphasized by the modern existentialists are indicated here: (a) knowledge; (b) sense of good and evil; (c) insecurity, fear, anxiety; and (d) search for a way out.

Existentialists affirm that the human self is to be treated existentially. The human being is not a thing, a product of natural forces, not an unreal appearance of the Absolute. We should not reduce the reality of the
individual to forms of thought or universal relations. Man has an incommunicable uniqueness about him. For the sake of preserving human freedom existentialists sometimes deny the reality of the transcendent. Marx says: "Man is free only if he owes his existence to himself." Nietzsche's Zarathustra exclaims: "If there are gods who could bear not to be a god? Therefore there are no gods." Nicolai Hartmann adopts the theory of postulatory atheism. For the sake of human freedom we must postulate the non-existence of god. Thus the two qualities of human beings, self-consciousness and moral freedom are brought out. The impermanence of things is what the Buddha stressed. Events of the world are essentially unstable and fleeting. There is nothing that we can grasp, nothing that we can keep. The day of life sinks inevitably into the night of death, maranāntam hi jīvitaṁ. Death is the token of the power of time over us.

For Heidegger all existence is infected with the character of time, of historicity. Man is aware of the intense actuality of life, at the moment life is passing away. Is it possible, asks Heidegger, that time, despite its ontological nature, and all the consequences that follow from it, offers us a ground for our existence and a certainty that will permit us to gain a fundamental tranquillity of soul? "Temporality discloses itself as the meaning of real dread (sorge)." In the exciting moments of fear, in the devastating experience of being thrown into the world of space and time, man finds that he stands on the obscure ground of a mysterious nothing which is not a mere mathematical zero but something more positive than that. When man experiences this nothingness in all its existential weight, he suffers from a feeling of profound unrest and care, a "radical insecurity of being." This sense of nothingness is not so much a metaphysical concept as a psychological state, an inner condition which provokes the sense of dread and starts the religious quest.

Self-consciousness means ethical freedom. Unless the individual is free to disobey the commands, he will not have the opportunity to conform to them freely and deliberately. The possibility of the misuse of freedom frightens him. The fact of moral freedom produces sin though sin is not a necessary consequence of freedom.

The fact of freedom, according to Kierkegaard, produces anxiety, the fear that we may abuse our freedom, "Anxiety," says Kierkegaard, "is the psychological condition which precedes sin. It is so near, so fearfully near to sin, and yet it is not the explanation for sin." Anxiety is the precondition of sin, the fear that we may sin. It is a basic constituent of human freedom. The fact of sin is an empirical discovery, not a theological dogma.

When man looks at himself, the disorders of his self and the unintelligible forces that control him, he feels unsure of himself, distressed in spirit, sick unto death.

There is no unhappiness worse than division. We cannot be at ease
in this divided state. We crave for fulfilment, for redemption from the fall. We must reach out beyond the frontiers of this dual, divided consciousness. The age-old cry is on our lips: *a:sato mā sad gamaya, tamaso mā jyotir gamaya, mṛtyor mā amṛtaṁ gamaya.* "Lead me from the unreal to the real; lead me from darkness to light. Lead me from death to immortality." Intellectual consciousness has inflicted the wounds; full creative consciousness must heal the wounds. If we remain at the level of intellectual consciousness, if we are satisfied with ourselves and the world, we are once-born. Our lives would be facile, unintentional, unpurposive. The twice-born are those whose complex and ardent personalities are broken on the wheel of doubt and spiritual crisis and then reassembled, reanimated and reintegrated.

Through the exercise of his intellectual consciousness man is able to discriminate between subject and object. Man, a product of nature, subject to its necessities, compelled by its laws, driven by its impulses is yet a non-nature, a spirit who stands outside of nature. Man has the capacity for self-transcendence, He has the ability to make himself an object. He has affinities with a world of nature and with a world outside of nature. The *Upaniṣads* distinguish between *samsāra* and *mokṣa*: the Buddhists distinguish between *karman* and *nirvāṇa*, between the principle which governs the world of objects and that which transcends the object.

Heidegger draws a distinction between being and existence. If man fails to transcend his existential limits, he would be condemned to death and nothingness. He must first experience the void, the nothingness, the *sūnya* of the Mādhyamika Buddhist, not for its own sake, but for transcending it, for getting beyond the world of *samsāra*. The experience of dread is the experience of the problem whether man shall attain to being or shall not, whether he shall annihilate nothingness and get beyond it or whether nothingness shall annihilate him. When the individual withdraws from the empirical, when he penetrates to the centre, when the objective world falls away, he affirms the reality of spirit which is not an object, which is not a temporal existent, which, though in time is not of it. He then realizes that time is not all, that death is not all, that it is possible to circumvent the time process and say with the Buddha or the Christ: "I have overcome the world." Man's awareness of his finiteness and temporality implies his consciousness of eternity. By facing the bitter meaning of nothingness, we attain illumination of the Being in which existence dwells.

While Heidegger speaks to us of being and existence, eternity and time, Kierkegaard approaches the problem from the moral side. The struggle between self and self is not possible unless we look upon the longing for the good and the rebellion against it as belonging to the same individual. The felt contradiction is possible only through the reality which is above
the discord. In moral life we strive to give spirit existence, and thus humanize our nature. The possibility of the misuse of freedom which is the source of anxiety, according to Kierkegaard, shows the disrelationship of the self to its own self. The anxiety can be allayed only by reintegration. The self must become grounded in its own real being. The creative act of freedom is possible only from one who has broken through the necessity of the natural world. There are two elements in man, one in which he is involved in the flux of time and history and another by which he transcends it, that by which he is lifted above the ordinary causal nexus. It is the pressure of reality that provokes the quest and the discontent. These are stages in man’s pilgrimage through life. The analysis of the human predicament reveals the fact of God as Being and God as Perfection.

Existentialism crystallizes the present sense of intellectual and moral need. It is a passionate return of the individual to his own freedom in order, in the unfolding of its processes, to extract the significance of his being. We cannot achieve harmony in living, if the outward conditions of existence are unknown and if the inward spirit is distracted. We must recognize that human nature is a part of nature and involved in it; the human soul fascinated and tortured asks to be saved. It wishes to establish an organic harmony with nature which seems to be blind and groping and thwarts life with disease and death and with its own inward discord.

IV

Human life enlightened is spirit, the voice of life, of truth and of beauty. When rational thought is applied to the empirical data of the world and of the human self, the consciousness of a Supreme who is Pure Being and Perfect Freedom is reached; but it may be argued that it is only a necessity of thought, a hypothesis however valid it may be. But there is an ancient and widespread tradition that we can apprehend the Eternal Being with directness and immediacy. When the Upaniṣads speak of jñāna or gnosis, when the Buddha speaks of bodhi or enlightenment, when Jesus speaks of the truth that will make us free, they refer to the mode of direct spiritual apprehension of the Supreme in which the gap between knowledge and being is closed.

The experience is not of a subjective psychic condition. The human individual strips himself one after the other of the outer sheaths of consciousness, penetrates to the nerve and quick of his life until all else fades away into illimitable darkness, until he is alone in the white radiance of a central and unique ecstasy. This is the fulfilment of man. This is to be with God. This is to be of God.

Attempts to rationalize the mystery, to translate into the language
of concepts that which is inexpressible in concepts have resulted in different versions. They all take their source in the aspiration of man towards an unseen world though the forms in which this aspiration is couched are determined by the environment and climate of thought. The historical statements of faith should not be confused with the inner meaning of religious life itself. This is the teaching not only of the Upaniṣads and of Buddhism but also of the Greek systems and Platonism, of Islam and of the Gospels and the Schools of Gnosticism. This is the perennial philosophy, the sanātana-dharma of which Plotinus said: "This doctrine is not new; it was professed from the most ancient times though without being developed explicitly; we wish only to be interpreters of the ancient sages, and to show by the evidence of Plato himself that they had the same opinions as ourselves." This is the truth expressed in the Quranic verse: "Mankind were one community, and Allah sent (unto them diverse) Prophets as bearers of good tidings and as warners. . . . And those unto whom (the Scripture) was given differed concerning it, (even) after clear proofs had come unto them, only through (prejudice and) hatred of one another." And again, "Lo (Muhammad)! We inspire thee as We inspired Noah and the prophets after him, as We inspired Abraham and Ismail and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and Jesus and Job and Jonah and Aaron and Solomon, and as We imparted unto David the Psalms; And (as We revealed the Truth unto) messengers We have mentioned unto thee before and messengers We have not mentioned unto thee"? This is the religion which Augustine mentions in his well-known statement: "That which is called the Christian Religion existed among the Ancients and ever did exist from the beginning of the human race until Christ came in the flesh at which time the true religion, which already existed, began to be called 'Christianity.'" We must now get back to this fundamental wisdom which has been obscured and distorted in the course of history by dogmatic and sectarian developments. We must get back to the primal sources which are not necessarily what was in the beginning but what is eternally present.

The basic principle of all democracy is implicit in the famous text: That art thou, tat tvam asi. All men are not equal in regard to their psychological aptitudes and talents. The essential equality of men lies in the depths of spirit where the road is open to each man for fulfilling his destiny. The text affirms the equality of value of each person as a free spirit. This equality forbids that any man should be treated only as a means and not at the same time as an end in himself. This equality entails a social order in which there are equal opportunities for all members, for education and work, for health and cultural development.

It is a commonplace to say that the changes brought about in the objective conditions of living by science and technology have subjected the human individual to a process of transformation more radical than
ever before in history. These have shattered all past ideals of order and produced men who have abandoned all inwardness, who stagger through a world of accident from moment to moment, who are driven by elemental, irrational overpowering fanatisms to mechanical action. This great betrayal of the human spirit will lead to the ultimate destruction of humanity. If we are to be saved from mounting chaos, we must find a new human order, where we do not reduce the human individual to a mere object of scientific investigation, where we recognize him as a subject of freedom. We must make the basic concepts of our civilization illumine, guide and mould the new life. If our civilization is to function, we must cease to be blind and thoughtless. We must not allow the values of spirit to recede beyond the horizon of man. We must strive to be human in this most inhuman of all ages.

It is the task of philosophy not merely to reflect the spirit of the age in which we live but to lead it forward. Its function is creative, to state the values, to set the goals, to point the direction and to lead to new paths. It must inspire us with the faith to sustain the new world, to produce the men who subordinate national, racial and religious divisions to the ideal of humanity. Philosophy is nothing if not universal in its scope and spirit.

NOTES

1. avyaktaditi bhutani vyakramadhyani bhurata avyaktanidhanany eva tatra hau paridevunau.
   Radhakrishnan: The Bhagavadgita, p. 111 (Allen and Unwin)


3. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p. 287.

4. Introduction to the Unity of Science, p. 29.


6. Al Quran, II. 213.

7. Ibid., IV. 163-164.
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