TATTVASAÑGRAHA
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
Vol. I
THE TATTVASAÑGRAHA
OF ŚĀNTARAKŚĪTA
with the Commentary of
Kamalaśīla

Translated into English by
GANGANATHA JHA

IN TWO VOLUMES
Vol. I

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PREFACE.

Vol. I of the English Translation of *Tattvasaṅgraha* is being sent out. The talented editor of the Gaekwad Series has supplied all the information available regarding the Authors of the Original and the Commentary,—in the extensive and lucid Introduction to the original Sanskrit Text.

The texts translated are difficult—linguistically as well as philosophically. In the latter aspect, my past work on Kumārila’s *Śhlokavārtika* and Uddyotakara’s *Nyāyavārtika* has enabled me to follow the trend of the arguments; as these two writers form the principal targets for attack in the work; and the work is entirely polemical.—In the linguistic aspect of the work, I have not always felt quite sure, especially in regard to the technical terms in which Buddhistic literature abounds and my knowledge of these had all been derived from ‘Brahmanical’ Sources. But as the work progressed, I felt surer of my ground, and I hope that in the final result, I have not gone far wrong in my interpretations. For the slips that there are bound to be there, I apologise to Buddhist Scholars and hope that they will correct me wherever I may be found to have gone astray.

In that hope, I send forth this work of mine with thankfulness for having been given the strength of mind and body to do it.

My thanks are due to the Editors of the Sanskrit Text, whose introduction has been helpful in the understanding of the text.

ALLAHABAD,

*July 23, 1937*

GANGANATHA JHA
TATTVASĀNGRAHA.

Volume I.

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The subsequent volumes will contain the following Chapters.

Examination of other forms of Cognition—

Chapter XIX (A)—Verbal Cognition.

" XIX (B)—Analogical Cognition.

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manent? Mere Being is said to be their sole function as well as Cause'.—
This points to the section on the Permanence of Things (Chapter 8, below).

Objection —“If this is so, then the Intervolved Wheel of Causation cannot
be regarded as the basis of any adjustments regarding Act, its Fruit and the
Connection between them, and such other things; as ex hypothesi, the said
Wheel is mobile (momentary).’’

The answer is supplied by the second line of the first verse of the Text—
‘Karma, etc.’, ‘It is the basis of such notions as Actions, etc.’—What the
Text means is that this shall be explained later on. In this connection
‘Actions’ are good and bad, their ‘fruits’ are desirable and undesirable, and the
‘connection’ between them is that of the product and the produced (cause and
effect); the ‘notion’ of this is its adjustment, usage, arrangement.—The
term ‘ādi’ (‘and the rest’) in the Text includes all such notions as those
of Remembrance, Recognition, Uncertainty, Certainty, the Following up of a
self-appointed Task, Eagerness for perceptible things, Cessation of such
eagerness, the Relation of Cause and Effect, the Cogniser of these, the Means
of Cognition, Bondage, Emancipation and so forth. The said ‘Wheel’
is the ‘basis’ of all these;—such is the analysis of the compound.—To this
effect there is the following declaration of the Blessed Lord—‘O Bhikṣus
the Action is there, the Fruit is there, but the Actor is not found,—apart
from the ‘indication’ (Saṅkēta) of the ‘Principles and Practices’ (Dharmas),
—who renounces these ‘Sensorial Phases’ (Skandhas) and takes up
others. So that it is due to the indication of the ‘Principles and Practices’
that a certain thing comes about when another thing is there (as its cause).’’
—This points to the Chapter on Actions, their Fruits and the Connec-
tion between these (Chapter 9, below).—This Intervolved Wheel of Causation
should be understood as appertaining to the Sensorial Phases (Skandhas),
‘Phenomena’ (Dhātus) and the ‘Receptacles’ (Āyatanas); as it is these that
are produced by the Intervolved Wheel of Causation.—(1)

[Text 2.] Question—‘‘There are many such things as Substance,
Quality, Movement and the rest; why does not the Wheel of Causation apply
to these?’’

The answer is given by lines 1 and 2 of Text 2, beginning with the
term ‘guṇa, etc.’, ‘It is devoid of all such concepts as Quality, etc.’—The
term ‘guṇa—. . . samavāya’ is a Copulative Compound;—the term ‘jāti’,
‘universal’, includes both kinds of Universal, the Higher (Wider) as well
as the Lower (Narrower);—the term ‘ādi’, ‘and so on’, includes the
(1) ‘Specific Individuality’ subsisting in ultimate substances (as postulated
by the Vaishēṣika), (2) also those characteristics which some people describe
as distinct from the things possessing those characteristics,—e.g. the character
of ‘Being’ as subsisting in all the Six Categories (of the Vaishēṣika),
the character of being apprehended by all such Means of Cognition as bring about
the apprehension of existing things, and so forth. The compound between
the term ‘guṇa . . . samavāya’ and ‘upādhi’ is Karmadhāraya, one between
the qualification and the qualified [the ‘upādhi’ being the qualified, and the
preceding term the qualification];—of these upādhis, concepts, (in the
shape of Substance, etc.] the wheel is devoid; i.e. it is free from all this. In
regard to this, the Blessed Lord has declared as follows:—" O Brahma! All is All; i.e. the five 'Skandhas' (Five Sensory Phases), the twelve
'Ayatanas' [Twelve Sensory Receptacles—consisting of Mind, five Sense-
organs and the external objects apprehended by these six], and the eighteen
'Dhātus' [Elements or Ingredients, consisting of the aforesaid twelve, along with
the six elements of Visual Sensation, Auditory Sensation, Olfactory Sensation,
Gestatory Sensation, Tactile Sensation, Mental Sensation]."—This points
to the Section on the Examination of the Six Categories (Chapters 10 to 15).

Question—" In the absence of the said concepts, how does the Intervolved
Wheel of Causation become the object of Verbal Expression and Conception?
And when it does not become the object of these two, it cannot
be spoken of; as a matter of fact Verbal Expression and Conception cannot
operate apart from the concepts in question. How then is it that the
Blessed Lord has propounded it? "

[Page 12.] The answer to this is contained in the second line of Text 2,
beginning with the word 'āropita', 'It is amenable, etc.'—The compound
'āropita, etc.' is to be explained as follows—'āropita ākāra' is the imposed
or assumed form; and this 'assumed form' is the character of the Wheel of
Causation, as forming the object of Verbal Expression and Conception; i.e. that
which forms the subject of the Wheel of Causation is that which is amenable
to Verbal Expression and Conception in an assumed (superimposed) form.—
The term 'pratyaya' (Cognition) here should be understood in the sense of the
particular form of Cognition which appears in the form of a verbal concept,—
as is indicated by the proximity of the term 'verbal expression'; specially as
these two are invariably associated in regard to any single object. Thus the
sense of the Text comes to this—Though the said concepts are not there (in
the Wheel), yet through the fact that things are always perceived as distin-
guished from each other, the Conception is understood to appertain to
something external; so that the amenability to Verbal Expression, in the
form of invariable association, is present (in the said Wheel). In reality,
however, it is not amenable to Verbal Expression, because all sorts of
Conceptual Content have disappeared from it. But, just as the denotation
of words is admitted in common parlance as something nice, though not
justified by reason,—in the same manner, with a view to introducing the
True Teaching, the Blessed Teacher, closing his eyes, in the manner of
the elephant, to the true character of things, sought to express the
true idea, through a sort of illusion; and this simply because there is
no other way of doing it.—Even though the form of the denotation of
words is really superimposed upon it (as an illusion), yet, by reason of
invariable association, it becomes indirectly related to the thing to be
spoken of, and thus becomes the means of expressing it; and the thing,
thus expressed, does become manifested, by virtue of the powers of the
Teachers; hence there is no chance of being deceived (regarding the true
nature of the thing spoken of).—This is what has been thus declared by
Tāyin—" By whichever name is a Phenomenon (or Entity or Manifestation)
spoken of,—this Phenomenon does not really exist there; such is the
phenomenal character of all phenomena."—(2)
[Text 3.] Question—"Is this (Wheel of Causation) a mere verbal jugglery indulged in on account of the paucity of valid reasons in support, —just as has been done by other philosophers assuming (without sufficient proof) their Categories? Or is there any valid reason for accepting it?"

The answer that there is such valid reason is given in Text 3.—'Spaṣṭa, etc., 'It is definitely cognised, etc.'—The compound 'Spaṣṭalakṣaṇa' is Karmadhārāya, meaning 'whose definition, character, is clear, i.e. well-defined'; the 'clearness' of the 'definition' is due to the fact that it is free from the three defects of being impossible (inapplicable), or too narrow or too wide; the definition of the Means of Right Cognition provided by other philosophers, on the other hand, is not 'clear'; the Text therefore has characterised its own Means of Cognition as 'clear'. Endowed with this character of being 'clearly defined' are the 'two Means of Cognition',—Sense-perception and Inference;—by these is the Wheel of Causation 'definitely cognised'; this will be explained under all the sections (as occasion presents itself). This also is approved by the Blessed Lord, who has declared thus—'O Bhikṣus, my word should be accepted after due investigation, not merely through regard for me; just as gold is accepted as real only after heating, cutting and rubbing on the touch-stone'.—As regards Sense-perceptions, its definition is that it should be free from 'mistake' and 'conceptual content' or 'determination'; this is exactly as declared by the Blessed Lord—who has said that 'one who has the visual cognition cognises the Blue all right, but not as blue'; the phrase 'cognises the Blue' implies that the cognition does not apprehend an object other than its own, which indicates the fact of its being not mistaken (or wrong); and the other phrase 'not as blue' denies the presence in the Cognition of any connection with the definite name 'blue'; which indicates the fact of its being non-conceptual or not-determinate (free from all association with words). As regards Inference, the definition of that also has been set forth by pointing out the nature of the Līṅga (Inferential Indicative, 'Middle Term', Probans); which has been thus set forth—'The Līṅga, Probans, is that which is (a) never non-concomitant with the Probandum, and (b) which is definitely known,—only then does it become the means of inferential cognition; this Probans, O Bhikṣus, is sometimes Constructive, in all cases it is Destructive'. Here the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum is clearly asserted. This same condition has been stated in the dictum that 'The Probans is the basis of Inference, when it is characterised by invariable concomitance'; in this statement the Probandum has not been mentioned, because it is clearly indicated by the mention of the 'invariable concomitance of the Probans' (which can only be with the Probandum).—This Probans is divided into three kinds, distinguished according to such peculiarities as those of (1) nature, (2) effect and (3) non-apprehension; the Probans called 'nature' has been indicated by the term 'Constructive' in the phrase 'O Bhikṣus, that which is Constructive';—as for the Probans styled 'Effect' it has been illustrated in the following statement—'The presence of Fire is known through Smoke, the presence of Water is known through the line of White Cranes flying above; and the Race (Gotra) of the Wise Bodhisattva is known through certain signs'.—Lastly, the Probans styled as 'a particular form of non-apprehension' has also
been explained in course of the denial of mere Non-apprehension by itself being a Means of Cognition; this has been declared in the following words —‘O Bhikṣu, a Living Being cannot validly cognise a Living Being, or find a means of knowing it; if a Living Being validly cognises a Living Being, he becomes destroyed; I alone would cognise a Living Being, or someone else if he were like me’. Herein we have the denial of the validity of mere Non-apprehension in general in regard to things beyond the ken (of ordinary men); the sentence ‘I alone, etc.’ clearly shows the validity of particular cases of Non-apprehension.—All this points to those sections of the Text that deal with Sense-perception (Chap. 17), Inference (Chap. 18) and other Means of Cognition (Chap. 20).

Question—“This Intervolved Wheel of Causation,—is it concomitant with any such generic character as ‘being an entity’, as declared by the Syādvādins (Jaina)? Or is it entirely unmixed (pure) in its essence?—‘What if it is the one or the other?—If it is concomitant with anything, then there would be a cross-division between the definition of the Wheel and that of Sense-perception and the rest;—there would also be the incongruity that the cause would cease to bring about the effect, as there would be no difference between the Cause and Effect; and in that case the Wheel would not be ‘definitely cognised by means of the two Means of Cognition’ (as stated in Text 3). Nor again, is it right to posit any such entity as the Intervolved Wheel of Causation; because even if it is entirely unmixed in its essence,—inasmuch as there would be no particular diversity among the auxiliary causes, there would be no possibility of its having any efficient activity (which is the characteristic of every entity); exactly as there is none in things admittedly non-productive.’”

In answer to this objection, we have the second line of Text 3—‘Aṇīyasūpi, etc.’—‘It is not mixed up with the nature of anything else even in the slightest degree’. What is meant is as follows—It is the latter of the two alternatives that we accept; and yet there is no room for the objections that have been urged against it; this we shall explain later on. The compound ‘mishrībhaṭāparatmakah’ (in the Text) is to be analysed as—‘wherein the nature of anything else is not mixed up’; that is, wherein there is not the slightest trace of the character of anything else,—for instance, that of the Cause in the Effect and so forth.—‘In the slightest degree’,—even in the most subtle form,—and not only in the form of many such extensive entities as ‘Being’, ‘Knowable’ and so forth,—this is what is implied by the particle ‘api’, ‘even’. What is meant is that, if the form of a single entity were present in it, the entire world would enter into its essence. This the Author will explain later on. This is what has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord—‘How can the Sprout be eternal?—Since the Sprout is one thing and the Seed an entirely different thing. Verily the Sprout is not exactly the same thing as the Seed. So also is the Sprout unlike the Seed. Hence one thing (Seed) does not pass on into the essence of another thing’.—This points to the Chapter dealing with the Examination of Syādvāda (Chap. 20).—(3)

Question—“The Skandha (Sensory Phase) and the rest, are pure and unmixed in nature; even so, do they always remain unchanged in their
character?—as has been declared by some persons who hold all things to be real entities, passing from one phase into another?"

The answer that it is not so is provided by the word 'āsāṃkrāntim', 'it admits of no translocation' (Text 4). What is meant is that, if there were translocation (passing from one phase into another), then, inasmuch as everything (every cause) would always exist in its entirety, there would be no Effect or Product, and hence no possibility of any 'Intervalved Wheel of Causation'.—The word 'āsāṃkrānti' (in the Text) signifies 'that wherein there is no translocation'—i.e. passing from phase to phase,—'of the Skandha and other factors'.—[Page 14].—This has been declared by the Blessed Lord in the following words—'When the Eye is produced, it does not come out from anything else;—when it is destroyed, it does not return to anything else; what happens, O Bhikṣus, is that the Eye, not having been in existence, comes into existence,—and having been in existence, it ceases to exist.'—This points to the Chapter dealing with the Examination of the Three Points of Time (Chapter 21 of the Text).

Question—"Then does it exist only at the time that it is actually seen? As declared by the Chārvāka (Materialist)—'Whence can there be any coming again for that which has been burnt and ceased to exist?'"

The answer is supplied by the Text in the word 'anādyantam', 'it is without beginning, without 'end'; the compound being analysed as 'that whose beginning and end are not'. This also has been pointed out by the Blessed Lord—'O Bhikṣus, the cycle of Births has no end and no beginning, etc. etc.';—in this quotation the term 'avara' stands for 'end, and 'agra' for 'beginning'; hence the negation of these two is what is spoken of as 'anavarāgra'. This has been so asserted with reference to people who have not taken to the Noble Path; for those who have taken to the Noble Path, the Cycle of Birth has actually ceased. It is in view of this that it has been declared that—'For the childish person who knows not the true Dharma, the path of Birth and Rebirth is a long one.'—This points to the Section dealing with the Examination of the Philosophy of the Lokāyatas (Chapter 22 of the Text).

Question—"Is this Intervalled Wheel of Causation of the nature of an external object? Or has it a purely subjective existence?"

Answer—'It is like the reflected image and other things' (Text). This shows that it has a purely subjective existence. The sense therefore is that this has a purely subjective existence,—just like the Reflected Image, Whirling Fire-Circle, the Fanciful City in the Sky and such other fanciful things. This has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord—'The external thing, as fancied by childish people, does not exist, it is only the Mind which, tossed about by Impressions, bears the semblance of the object and thus becomes operative'.—This points to the Chapter on the Examination of the External World (Chap. 23, Text).

Having thus shown that the Intervalved Wheel of Causation is entirely free from the webs of the fanciful assumption of things that have no existence, the Author sums up the whole idea in the words 'Sarvaprapaṇcha, etc.', 'It is absolutely free from the whole lot of fantasies'; that is, it is free from the whole
lot of fantastic notions, like the idea of Primordial Matter being the cause of things and so forth.

Question—"Has this doctrine been realised by other teachers also, like Viṣṇu, Śiva, Hiranya garbha and the rest?"

Answer—Not so; it has not been apprehended by others; as a matter of fact, all other philosophical systems lay stress upon wrong notions of the Soul, and it is the Blessed Lord alone on whom this enlightenment has dawned. This is what the Text means. This the Author will explain in the course of all the sections of his work.—(4)

Question—"Was this doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation apprehended by the Blessed Lord by Himself and then promulgated? Or did he promulgate it on the basis of the Veda which is regarded by others as revealed (not the work of any Person)?"—As declared by the followers of Jaimini—'Thus as regards things that are beyond the reach of the Senses, there is no Person who has seen them directly; hence that man alone knows them rightly who knows them through the Eternal Word.'

The answer to this is—Not so; 'Svatantrashrutiniḥsāṅgaḥ'—'independently of any self-sufficient revelation' (Text 5). The term 'Self-sufficient revelation' stands for the Veda whose authority is said to be self-sufficient,—that is the Eternal Word;—'niḥsāṅga' is one who is not dependent upon, not depending upon it, i.e. seeing things directly by himself;—the Lord Himself promulgated the Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation. As a matter of fact, there is no sentence or assertion that has not emanated from a Person; as has been declared by the Blessed Lord—'These Great Sages, the Ānanda-paurāṇas (Denizens of the Blissful Regions?) are the authors of the Vedas and the promulgators of the Mantras'. What the Author means is that he is going to explain this later on.—This points to the Section dealing with the Examination of the Self-sufficient Authority of the Revelations (contained under Chapter 19 of the Text).

Question—"For the Blessed Lord who had attained all his own ends, what was the need for promulgating this Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation?"

Answer—'With a view to bringing about the Welfare of the World (Text 5). 'Welfare of the World' is what is good for the world; this 'Good' consists in the destruction of all Afflictions and Illusion, brought about by the due comprehension of the Right Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation;—the desire to bring this about is what is meant by the 'view to bring about';—this is the cause that led to the promulgation of the said Doctrine.

Question—"How is it known that the Lord had the desire to bring about the welfare of the world?"

Answer—'Supreme mercy having entered into His very soul through long innumerable cycles' (Text 5). The compound is to be analysed thus:—'He whose supreme mercy'—'Mahādayā'—entered into His very essence,—(ātmābhūtā)—through long (anālpaīh) innumerable cycles (kalpaśaṅkhyayaih). This 'supreme mercy' of the Blessed Lord is inferred from the
fact that He did not renounce the work of doing good to other people, even though He had attained all His own ends.—(5)

[Page 15.] Question—"What did this Person do—who had this supreme mercy entered into His very soul?"

Answer—"Who propounded, etc."—The term 'who', though a common pronoun, stands here for the Blessed Lord Buddha; as no one else possesses the qualities described.—The Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation;—this term 'pratīyāsamutpāda' stands for the doctrine that the 'utpāda', 'causation' or 'origination' of the Sīkādhās (Sensory Aggregates or Phases) and other things takes place—'pratīya', i.e. on the basis of, Causal Ideations; that is to say, who declared the Sensory Aggregates and other things to have been produced on the strength of Causal Ideations. Though the term 'Samutpāda' (Origination or Causation) seems to have a negative (or exclusive) connotation, yet what is really meant to be expressed by the term is the positive entity produced (by the Ideation), but viewed as excluding other aspects of it.

—Or, the term 'Samutpāda' may be construed as 'Samutpadāyatī', that which is produced, the Product,—the term being formed with the 'Ghaṇī' affix in the active sense, according to Pāṇini's Śûtra 'Kṛtyalayato bahulam (3.3.113)'; and this term 'Samutpāda' thus explained is compounded with the term 'pratīya', according to Pāṇini's Śûtra 'Śup-supā (2.1.4)', or according to the rule governing such compounds as 'Mayuravaiśaksu (2.1.72)'.

—Or the term 'Samutpāda' may be taken by itself, not compounded with any other term.—What is expressed by all this is the fact that the Blessed Lord has the fully equipped power of bringing about the welfare of others. So that what the phrase 'who propounded the said Doctrine of the Wheel of Causation' means is that the Lord has acted towards the bringing about of the welfare of others. And what constitutes his action towards bringing about the welfare of others is this same teaching to others regarding the right path towards Heaven and Final Emancipation.—This has been thus declared—'The act has to be done by yourselves, the Blessed Ones are only expounders'.

The equipment of this capacity to bring about the welfare of others consists of the capacity for the direct vision of Dharma and Supreme Mercy. Even a merciful Person, if he is devoid of the knowledge of Truth, would be unable to teach the Truth; and, on the other hand, even though one may possess the true knowledge of things, if he happen to be devoid of mercy, he would either give no teaching at all, or, even when teaching, might give such teaching as is harmful. Hence in the Blessed Lord, are present both these—Knowledge and Mercy—as equipment of His capacity to bring about the welfare of others. That He is possessed of the capacity for direct vision of Dharma has been indicated by the term (in the Text) 'indeed of any self-sufficient revelation'; and the presence of Supreme Mercy has been indicated by the term 'Supreme mercy having entered into His very Soul'.

Question—"As a matter of fact, this Right Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation has been taught also by other Persons—such as Bodhi-sattvas and Saints; what peculiar excellence then does this constitute in the Blessed Lord Himself?"
Answer—He is the Greatest of Expounders. Though it is true that the said Saints and others also have expounded the Doctrine of Intervolved Wheel of Causation, yet the Supreme Lord is the ‘Greatest’ among them. The other persons could have no capacity to expound the said doctrine, except by reason of the fact that the essence of Dharma had been taught by the Supreme Lord.—Or the Supreme Lord—and none others—can be the ‘Greatest’, because He represents the highest stage in the ascending scale of the presence of Excellences and the absence of Defects; the others not being so.—By thus pointing out the fact of the Blessed Lord being superior to the Saints and others, it is made clear that the Lord was equipped with a specially efficient intellect,—this efficiency consisting in the destruction of all Dispositions, Afflictions and Ignorance regarding all cognisable things. If it were not for this, in what way would He be superior to other Saints? It is with a view to this that the Author has added the epithet ‘That Omniscient Person’ (Text 6). This points to the Chapter dealing with the proof for the existence of the Omniscient Being (under Chapter 2 on ‘God’ and Chap. 24).

Question—“What is it that is going to be done after bowing to the Omniscient Person?”

Answer—The ‘Compendium of True Doctrines’ is going to be composed. The ‘True Doctrine’ meant are all those that have been mentioned as the accompaniments of the Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation; as these alone are not wrong;—the bringing together of these doctrines, which lie scattered, within a small compass is what is spoken of as ‘Sangraha’, ‘Compendium’; and as this brief résumé is dealt with in a book, the book itself is spoken of as the Compendium; just as the poem dealing with the Abduction of Sita is called the Sitā-haraṇa (Sita’s Abduction).—Or, the term ‘Tattvsangraha’ may be explained as the book itself, in the sense that ‘it deals, rightly and completely, with the True Doctrines’.—Is being composed;—the Present Tense has been used in reference to the time taken by the act of composing, from beginning to its completion.—(6)

End of Introductory Section.
CHAPTER I.

Dealing with the Examination of the Doctrine of Primordial Matter.

(A)

The Statement of the Sāṅkhya Doctrine of ‘Prakṛti’ (Primordial Matter).

TEXT (7).

“IT IS OUT OF Prakṛti (Primordial Matter) ITSELF ALONE, AS EQUIPPED WITH ALL POTENCIES, THAT THE VARIOUS PRODUCTS EVOLVE, REALLY HAVING THEIR ESSENCE IN THAT SAME MATTER.”—(7)

COMMENTARY.

In order to show that there is no functioning of Primordial Matter, the Author proceeds to set forth the Sāṅkhya theory regarding it, in Text (7).—That which is equipped—endowed with all such potencies—productive of the host of products such as the Mahat (Cosmic Intelligence) and the rest, —such is Pradhāna, Primordial Matter, which consists of the Attributes of ‘Harmony’, ‘Energy’ and ‘Inertia’, in the state of equilibrium; and it is from out of this that the Cosmic Intelligence and other Evolutes evolve;—such is the view of the Followers of Kapila.—The emphasising of ‘Primordial Matter alone’ is for the purpose of excluding such agencies as those of Time, A Personality and the like;—the addition of the term ‘Kēvalāt’, ‘itself’, is meant to exclude the ‘God’ postulated by the Theistic Sāṅkhya (Yoga).—Evolve,—are produced, directly or indirectly. The process of this Evolution is as follows:—Out of Pradhāna (Primordial Matter) first of all evolves Buddhi (Cosmic Intelligence);—out of Cosmic Intelligence, evolves Ahāṅkāra (the I-principle);—out of the I-principle evolve the five Tanmātras (Rudimentary Substances), consisting of Sound, Touch, Taste, Colour, and Odour—and also the eleven Sense-organs;—the five Organs of Sensation, in the shape of the Organ of Hearing, of Touch, of Vision, of Taste and of Smell,—the five Organs of Action, in the shape of Organs of Speech, Hands, Feet, Excretory Organ and the Generative Organ;—and Mind is the eleventh.—Out of the five Rudimentary Substances evolve the five Gross Substances,—Ākāśa out of Sound-rudiment, Air out of Touch-rudiment, Fire out of Colour-rudiment, Water out of Taste-rudiment and Earth out of Odour-rudiment.

This is as declared by Ishvaračyena (in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 22)—‘From Primordial Matter issues the Great Principle (Cosmic Intelligence); thence the I-principle; thence the Group of Sixteen; from among this Group of
Sixteen, out of five, issue the five Gross Substances'. Here the term 'Mahān', 'Great Principle', stands for Buddhī, the Cosmic Intelligence; this Cosmic Intelligence functions in the form of such conception or determination of things as 'this is a jar', 'this a piece of cloth'.—The I-principle functions in the form of such notions as 'I am handsome', 'I am presentable'.—The Mind functions in the form of Reflection; for instance, a boy happens to hear that food is to be had in another village, and this gives rise to his reflection in the form 'I shall go there, I wonder if there would be curds and molasses or curds only'; that which functions thus as Reflection is the Mind.—Such is to be understood the distinction among Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle and Mind. The rest (of Ishvarakṛṣṇa's Kārikā) is easily intelligible.

These entities, Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, along with Primordial Matter and the Spirit make up the twenty-five Principles (or Realities, Real Entities) of these philosophers. To this end, it has been declared that—"One who knows the twenty-five Principles,—be he addicted to any life-stage, being either a Hermit (wearing knotted locks), or a Wandering Mendicant (with shaven head), or a Householder (wearing the top-knot),—becomes liberated; there is no doubt on this point'.

All these various Products evolving out of Primordial Matter are not entirely distinct from their Cause,—as are the Products postulated by the Buddhās;—they are, in fact, of the same essence; i.e. they have their essence in that same.—Primordial Matter; such is the analysis of the compound 'tadrūpāh' (in the Text). The products are of the same essence as Primordial Matter, in the sense that they are all made up of the Three Attributes. For instance, in the ordinary world, it is found that the Product is of the same essence as the Cause; e.g. the cloth woven out of black yarns is black, and that woven out of white yarns is white. And Primordial Matter is made up of the Three Attributes;—and all that is manifested, in the form of Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle, Rudimentary Substances, Sense-organs and Gross Substance, is also found to be made up of the Three Attributes, hence it is that all this latter is of the same essence as Primordial Matter.—Similarly, Primordial Matter is not-distinguishable; that is to say, it cannot be distinguished that 'these are the Three Attributes, Harmony and the rest (constituting the Unmanifest Primordial Matter), and these are the Cosmic Intelligence and the rest constituting the Manifest'; in fact, the notion always is that 'the Attributes are the Manifest, and the Manifest is the Attributes'.—Further, both these,—the Manifest and the Unmanifest—are Objective, because they have the character of objects of enjoyment (experience, for the Spirit).—Both again are common,—to all Spirits; just as the Malla-dāsi (the Slave-girl who is the common property of several men).—It is also insentient, as it cannot feel pleasure or pain or delusion. —It is productive; that is, Primordial Matter is productive of Cosmic Intelligence, Cosmic Intelligence produces the I-principle, the I-principle produces the Rudimentary Substances and the Eleven Sense-organs; and the Rudimentary Substances produce the Gross Substances.—Thus all these various Products evolve, all having the same essence as Primordial Matter,—inasmuch as they also are constituted by the Three Attributes (are non-distinguishable, objective, common, insentient and productive). This has
been thus declared (by Ishvarakṛṣṇa, in Kārikā 11)—‘The Manifest is with the Three Attributes, undistinguishable, objective, common, insentient and productive; so also is Primordial Matter; the Spirit is the reverse and yet also similar’.

The following question has been raised—”If the Products are of the same essence as Primordial Matter, then how is it that in this Philosophy a distinction has been made between the Manifest (Product) and the Unmanifest (Cause)? For instance, it has been declared by Ishvarakṛṣṇa (in his Kārikā 10)—‘The Manifest is with cause, not eternal, not-pervasive, mobile, multiform, dependent, soluble, composite, subordinate; the Unmanifest is the reverse of this’. The meaning of this is as follows:—It is the Manifest alone that has a cause; e.g. Cosmic Intelligence is ‘with cause’—i.e. has its cause in Primordial Matter; the I-principle has its cause in Cosmic Intelligence; the Five Rudimentary Substances and the Eleven Sense-organs have their cause in the I-principle; and the Gross Substances have their cause in the Rudimentary Substances. The Unmanifest, however, is not so (having no cause), because it is never produced, having no beginning.—Primordial Matter and Spirit subsist everywhere, in heaven, in sky and on Earth, pervading all things;—not so the Manifest, which, in fact, is non-pervasive in character.—Then again, in the course of Birth and Rebirth, the Manifest, equipped, in the form of the Subtle Body, with the thirteen-fold body consisting of Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle, the Sense-organs, actively moves along (from birth to birth); not so the Unmanifest; because, being all-pervading, it cannot be mobile.—Further, the Manifest is actually found to be multiform, through such diversity as is involved in the notions of the Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle and the rest;—not so the Unmanifest, which in one and the same form, is the cause productive of all the three Regions.—Then the Manifest is ‘dependent’,—that which is produced out of another thing is dependent upon this latter;—not so the Unmanifest; as it is not a product.—The Manifest again is ‘soluble’, in the sense that it goes into dissolution; for instance, at the time of the Universal Dissolution, the Gross Substances become dissolved into Rudimentary Substances, the Rudimentary Substances and Sense-organs into the I-principle, the I-principle into Cosmic Intelligence, and the Cosmic Intelligence into Primordial Matter; the Unmanifest however never goes into Dissolution; as it has no cause into which it could become merged.—Further, the Manifest is ‘composite’, being made up of such components as Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste and Odour; not so the Unmanifest, as Sound and the rest are not found to be present in the constitution of Primordial Matter. —Lastly, just as, while the father is alive, the son is not his own master, so also the Manifest is always ‘subordinate’, resting always on its Cause; not so the Unmanifest, because it is eternal and hence not subservient to any Cause”.

The answer to this is supplied in the Text, by the word ‘ Bhāvataḥ ’;—‘bhāvataḥ’ means that ‘in reality’ there is sameness of essence, and yet there is nothing incongruous in the idea that there is distinction into ‘Cause and Effect’, based upon the diversity of modifications.—Or, the term ‘bhāvataḥ’ may mean ‘by their nature’,—the sense being that by their very nature,
consisting of the Three Attributes, the things operate only in that form, which is the same as that of Primordial Matter. What is meant is that, the diversity found in the World in the shape of the 'Great Principle' (Cosmic Intelligence) and other products is due to the predominance or otherwise of one or the other of the Three Attributes of Harmony, Energy and Inertia. Thus it becomes finally established that the Product always exists in the form of the Cause.—(7)

*Question*—“How is it known that the Effect (Product) exists even before it is produced?”

*Answer*

TEXT (8).

"If the *Effect* were non-existent, potentially, in the form of the *Cause*,—then it could not be produced; because it would have no form at all, being like the *Sky-Lotus*."—(8)

COMMENTARY.

For proving the existence of the Effect (even prior to its production), the other Philosophers (*Sāṅkhya*) have put forward the following five reasons (as stated in *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 9)—“(1) Because what is non-existent cannot be produced,—(2) because there is always recourse to the Cause,—(3) because all things are not possible,—(4) because the efficient can produce only that for which it is efficient,—and (5) because the Effect is of the essence of the Cause,—therefore the Effect must be existent (even before it is produced).”

(1) In support of the first reason, the following explanation has been provided (by the Text) in the words—"If the Effect were non-existent, etc.—That is to say, if the Effect did not already exist in the form of the Cause, even prior to its production, then it could not be produced; as it would be like the *Sky-lotus* (a non-entity). This reasoning is formulated as follows:—What is non-existent cannot be produced,—as for instance, the *Sky-lotus*, —prior to its production, the Effect is non-existent, according to the other party,—hence the acceptance of the other party’s view would lead to a contingency contrary to the universal proposition (set forth above as the Major Premise);—as a matter of fact, no such contingency does arise;—hence it becomes established that whatever effect is produced in the shape of such Effects as *Oil* and the like, by such causes as *Sesamum* and the like, did exist even before the said production.”

Potentially—i.e. in the form of the latent potency; as regards actual appearance (manifestation), even the followers of Kapila do not regard the Effect to have existed prior (to the actual production).

Because it would have no form at all,—which means that, if the Effect had no existence, then it could not have any form at all.—(8)
In support of the second reason set forth [as above, in Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 9, "Because there is always recourse to the Cause"], the following argument has been put forward (by the Sāṅkhya):

TEXT (9).

"How is it that people have recourse to only specific causes, in the shape of such diverse things as the Paddy-seed and the like, and not any other,—even though the non-existence (of the desired Effect or Product) is equal (everywhere) ?"

COMMENTARY.

"If the Effect were non-existent, then people would not have had recourse to only specific causes (productive of particular Products). For instance, when a man wants paddy-grains, he takes up paddy-seeds, not Kodrava-seeds; when a man, thinking of feeding Brāhmaṇas the next day, wishes to have curds ready for the purpose, he secures a supply of milk, not water. As regards the 'non-existence' of the Paddy-grain or the Curd, this 'non-existence' (according to the Opponent) is there as much in the Paddy-seed as in the Kodrava-seed (and as much in milk as in water); then how is it that though the 'non-existence' of the Paddy-grain and other products is equal everywhere (in the Paddy-seed as well as in other seeds), yet it is only the specific seeds that are secured; the persons wanting the paddy-grain could secure the Kodrava and other seeds also,—inasmuch as the Paddy-grain would be as 'non-existent' in these latter as in the Paddy-seeds.—If it be urged that those other seeds are not secured by people because the desired grain is not there in them,—then, in that case, the person wanting paddy-grain also should not secure the Paddy-seed, as the desired grain is not there also (according to the Opponent),—exactly as in the Kodrava-seed. But this is what never happens. Hence it follows that the particular Effect (Paddy-grain) is actually present in the particular Cause (Paddy-seed)."—(9)

In support of the third reason (set forth in Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 9, 'because all things are not possible'), the following explanation is provided:

TEXT (10).

"Everything likely to be produced would be produced from everything; because the negation of co-essentiality is equally present in everything."—(10)

COMMENTARY.

"If it is your view that the Effect that is produced has been non-existent (before production), then, under that view, every product, in the shape
of gold, silver and the rest, would be produced from all things, such as grass, dust, clods and the rest;—why?—because the negation of co-essentiality is equally present in everything; that is, the negation or absence of the character of being co-essential with,—of the same essence as—the Grass and the rest is equally present in everything that is likely to be produced.—In the preceding text, the incongruity was indicated through the Cause, and in the present text, it is indicated through the Effect; such is the difference between the two.—And yet, as a matter of fact, everything is not produced from everything. Hence it follows that the natural law is that one effect is produced from one cause because it is only in that cause that that effect already exists (in a latent form).”—(10)

The following might be urged (against the Sāṅkhya view):—'The potency of Causes is such as is restricted to specific Effects; hence, even though the Effect has been non-existent, yet it is only some one effect, an actual Product, that is produced,—and not an absolute non-entity, like the Skhy-lotus; this is the reason why only a specific cause is secured (for the production of a particular effect), that one which is efficient for the purpose, not anything at random; so that particular effects are produced from particular causes, and not every effect from every cause”.

Having this objection in view, the Sāṅkhya, under the pretext of answering it, puts forward the following arguments in support of the fourth reason set forth [in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 9: 'Because the efficient can do that only for which it is efficient'].

TEXT (11).

"Because the potencies of these things are restricted in their scope, therefore it is not as has been urged; hence it does not answer our argument. Because potent causes produce only such effect as is amenable to their potency.”—(11)

COMMENTARY.

Of these things,—i.e. of things that are held to be causes.—It is not as has been urged;—i.e. the objection urged does not affect the Sāṅkhya position; hence it is not a suitable answer to our argument made by the Baudhā and others.—Why?—Because even potent Causes, when producing their effects, produce only such effects as are amenable to their action, and not what is not so amenable.—(11)

[Says the Opponent to the Sāṅkhya]—"Who has said that causes produce effects which they are not efficient to produce,—that you are denying it here? All that is said is that they also produce such effects as have been non-
existent; and that such previously non-existent effect is quite amenable to the potency of the cause”.

To this the Śāṅkhya makes the following reply:—

TEXT (12).

“THAT TO WHICH NO PECULIARITY CAN BE ATTRIBUTED, WHICH IS FORMLESS AND UNMODIFIABLE,—HOW COULD SUCH A THING BE PRODUCED BY CAUSES,—WHEN ANY MODIFICATION WOULD INVOLVE THE LOSS OF ITS VERY ESSENCE?”—(12)

COMMENTARY.

The Śāṅkhya reasons as follows:—“The acceptance of the view that the Effect produced has been non-existent implies that causes produce an effect which is incapable of being produced by them. For instance, that which is non-existent is formless—i.e. characterless;—that which is formless is, like the Hare’s Horn, something to which no peculiarity can be attributed, —i.e. which cannot be regarded as having any characteristics;—and that to which no peculiarity can be attributed must be unmodifiable, immutable,—like Ākāśa;—how can such a thing, which has not acquired a specific form, be produced by any cause?—It might be argued that ‘from the fact of its being perceived in its existing state (after being produced) it follows that it does become modified’.—The answer to that is that any modification would involve the loss of its very essence. If modification is admitted, then its very essence,—essential character, which is described as consisting of formlessness,—would become lost. As a matter of fact, unless the non-existent thing has relinquished its essential character (of formlessness), it cannot become existent; and if it does relinquish the essential character, then it would not be true that the non-existent (formless) thing has become existent (with form); the form of the Existent is entirely different from the form of the non-existent,—the two being mutual contradictories. Hence what is non-existent cannot be produced. If it be admitted that a Cause can produce such a thing—then it would be admitted that Causes actually produce only such things as are incapable of being produced! Certainly what is incapable of being produced can never be produced; as we find in the case of the Sky-lotus. From all this it follows that the Śāṅkhya argument (the fourth in the Kārikā) is un-answerable.”—(12)

In support of the fifth reason [stated in the Śāṅkhya-kārikā, 9—Because the effect is of the essence of the Cause]—we have the following—
TEXT (13).

"Thus the Effect being impossible, what would that be by producing which anything would be a Cause? As a consequence, it cannot be possible to admit the causal character of even such things as the Seed and the like."—(13)

COMMENTARY.

Thus,—i.e. in accordance with the reason explained in the preceding text; or on account of the four Reasons stated above (by the Sāṅkhya),—the Effect being absolutely impossible, under the theory that 'the Effect is non-existent (prior to its production)',—what would that be by producing which, the Seed and other things would be a Cause? Hence it would be possible to assert that the Seed and other such things cannot be 'Causes', because their effect is non-existent, like the Sky-lotus. And yet such an assertion is impossible. Hence it becomes established that the contrary view is the right one, that the Effect exists even prior to its actual production.—(13)

The following argument might be urged (against the Sāṅkhya)—"It may be taken as established that the Effect is existent; but how is it proved that all the diverse Products emanate from Primordial Matter itself?"

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (14).

"All that is Manifest is clearly known to be homogeneous with Pleasure and the rest, from the fact of the Effect being found to be the product of Satisfaction, Irritation and Dejection, etc."—(14)

COMMENTARY.

As proofs of the existence of Primordial Matter, the following five affirmative arguments have been set forth by the other philosophers (Sāṅkhya), detailed as below (in Sāṅkhyaḥkārikā, 15-16)—‘(1) Because the various Products are finite,—(2) because they are homogeneous,—(3) because activity is due to efficiency (potency),—(4) because there is distinction between Cause and Effect,—and (5) because there is merging of the entire world (of effects),—therefore the Unmanifest (Primordial Matter) exists'.—The meaning of this is as follows:—

(1) Primordial Matter exists,—because the various Products are finite. In this world it has been seen that a thing that has a producer is always finite; for instance, the Potter takes up earth-clods which are finite and produces the Jar, which again is finite containing a seer or two seers and a half (of water); the 'Manifest' consisting of Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, is found to be finite,—Cosmic Intelligence being only one, the I-principle being
only one, the Rudimentary Substances being only five, the Sense-organs being only eleven, the Gross Substances being only five. Hence, through Inference, we prove it that Primordial Matter does exist, and it produces the Manifest which is finite. If Primordial Matter were not there, then all this Manifest would not be finite (would be without any definite size).

(2) For the following reason also, Primordial Matter must be there—Because the various Products are found to be homogeneous. As a matter of fact, whenever something is found to belong to a certain genus, it is bound to have emanated from a Cause consisting of that Genus; for instance, when things like the Jar and the Saucer are found to belong to the Genus ‘Clay’, they are the products of the Cause consisting of Clay. The Manifest in question is found to be homogeneous with—permeated by—such Genuses (Generic entities) as ‘Pleasure’, ‘Pain’ and ‘Delusion’—how?—because of its being found to be the product of Composure, Distress and Dejection. Thus Composure, Brounacy, Attachment, Delight and Afection are the products of the Sattva-Attribute (Harmony); as a matter of fact, Composure (Happiness) is actually spoken of as Sattva (Harmony); similarly Irritation, Emaciation, Piercing Pain, Numbness, Anxiety, Calamity, and Impotuosity are products of the Rajas-Attribute (Energy); and Pain is spoken of as ‘Energy’;—Depression, Concealment, Despondency, Disgust and Lethargy are the products of the Tamas-Attribute (Inertia); and Inertia is spoken as ‘Delusion’. All this—Composure, Irritation and Dejection—is found to be the Product of Cosmic Intelligence and the rest (constituting the ‘Manifest’); and from this it is inferred that these are only particular phases of ‘Pleasure’, ‘Pain’ and ‘Delusion’ (as representing the three Attributes of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, respectively). And from the fact of their being products of ‘Pleasure’, etc. it follows that they are ‘homogeneous’ with ‘Pleasure’, etc.; and from this ‘homogeneity’, it also follows that they have emanated from a Source (Cause) which is constituted of these (Pleasure, etc.); this having been established, it also follows by implication that this Source or Cause must be Primordial Matter. Thus it is established that Primordial Matter exists—by the fact that the diverse products are found to be homogeneous.

(3) For the following reason also, Primordial Matter must exist:—Because activity is due to efficiency;—in the ordinary world, when a man takes up an activity, it is only when he has the efficiency (or capacity) for it; for instance, the Weaver taking up the work of cloth-weaving. By this we infer that Primordial Matter has the efficiency (or Capacity) by virtue of which it produces the ‘Manifest’;—this efficiency (or Capacity) cannot be there without a substratum; hence we conclude that there is Primordial Matter wherein the said efficiency subsists.

(4) For the following reason also Primordial Matter must exist:—Because there is distinction between Cause and Effect. In this world, it is found that there is distinction between Cause and Effect; e.g. the Clay is the Cause, the Jar is the Effect; and this Effect has a character entirely different from that of the Cause; e.g. the Jar has the capacity to contain Honey, Water and Milk, while Clay has no such capacity. Similarly seeing the Effect, in the shape of the ‘Manifest’ in question, we infer that there is
Primordial Matter out of which is produced the Product in the shape of Cosmic Intelligence and the rest.

(5) For the following reason also, Primordial Matter must exist:—Because there is merging of the entire world; the term 'Vaishvartapya', 'Entire World', stands for the three Regions (Heaven, Earth and Nether World); all these, at the time of Dissolution, merge into something; for instance, the five Gross Substances merge into the Rudimentary Substances,—the five Rudimentary Substances and the Sense-organs merge into the I-principle,—the I-principle merges into Cosmic Intelligence; thus the whole of the Three Worlds become merged; 'merging' means non-differentiation, as for instance, in the state of Milk, the differentiation is not possible, that Milk is different from Curd; similarly at the time of Universal Dissolution, no such discrimination is possible as that 'this is Manifest (Product) and that is Unmanifest (Cause)'. From this we conclude that there is such an entity as Primordial Matter wherein Cosmic Intelligence and the rest (making up the Manifest) become merged, incapable of being distinguished.

Our Teacher (Śaṅkarācārya), however, has mentioned (in the Text) only one reason—that of Homogeneity, which is meant to imply the others also.

In the Text, in the phrase 'Pleasure and the rest', the term 'the rest' includes Pain and Delusion;—the term 'Manifest' stands for all the entities, from Cosmic Intelligence down to the Gross Substances.—The phrase 'is clearly known' means is distinctly perceived;—how?—'from the fact of the Effect, etc. etc.'; the term 'et cetera' is connected with each member of the compound (Composure, etc., Irritation, etc. and Dejection, etc.). This is as we have already explained above.—(14)

Having established the validity of the reason 'On account of homogeneity', the Text sets forth (on behalf of the Śaṅkhya) the full argument in support of their doctrine.—

TEXT (15).

"Thus, the whole (Manifest) must be taken as having emanated from something made up of the said (Pleasure, etc.),—because the said generic character is found present in it,—just as in the case of the Jar and other things; and this something is Primordial Matter",—so say the followers of Kapila.—(15)

COMMENTARY.

'The whole must, etc.';—i.e. emanated from a Cause which is made up of Pleasure and the rest;—this sentence states the Conclusion to be proved. —The Proban (Reason) in support of the conclusion is stated in the words—'Because the said generic character is found present in it;—that is, it is all
permeated by the generic character of being made up of the Three Attributes;—just as in the case of the Jar and other things;—i.e. such diverse products as the Jar and the rest.—And this Cause made up of the Three Attributes is Primordial Matter;—so say the followers of Kapila,—i.e. the Sāṅkhyaṣ offer the said explanation.—(15)
(B)

Rebuttal of the Sāṇkhya Doctrine.

COMMENTS.

With the words 'Tadatra', the Author begins the Rebuttal (of the Sāṇkhya Philosophy).—

TEXT (16).

IN ANSWER TO THIS, THE WISE ONES DECLARE THAT THE ARGUMENT THAT HAS BEEN URGED (BY THE SĀNKHYA AGAINST THE DOCTRINE THAT THE EFFECT IS NON-EXISTENT PRIOR TO ITS PRODUCTION) IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE EFFECT. AND THE ANSWER THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO THAT ARGUMENT WOULD EQUALLY APPL Y BE THE ANSWER OF THE WISE ONES ALSO.—(16)

COMMENTS.

It has been asserted (by the Sāṇkhya) that "The various products emanating from Primordial Matter and other Causes, are of the same essence as those Causes".—In regard to this, we proceed to consider the following points:—If these diverse Effects are of the same essence as Primordial Matter, then how is it that they emanate from it as its effects? When one thing is non-different from (of the same essence as) another, it cannot be its cause or effect; because the Cause and its Effect must be totally different in character from one another. If it were not so, how could there be any clear conception as to one thing being the 'Cause' and another the 'Effect'? In that case, how could there be any such deduction as that made by you—(a) that Primordial Matter must always be the Cause, (b) that the group of sixteen, consisting of the five Gross Substances and eleven Sense-organs must always be the Effect, and (c) that among Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle and Rudimentary Substances, one is the Effect of what precedes, and the Cause of what follows it? This deduction has been thus formulated (in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 3)—"Primordial Matter is never a Product—the group of seven consisting of the Cosmic Intelligence and the rest are both Product and Productive—the group of sixteen is always Product;—the Spirit is neither Product nor Productive".—In fact (under the Sāṅkhya Doctrine) everything would be equally liable to be the Cause or Effect of everything else. Or, the character of Cause and Effect being always relative,—and (under the Sāṅkhya doctrine of all things being of the same essence) there being no entirely different thing to be conceived of as in relation to another,—all things would, like the Spirit, be 'neither Product nor Productive'; otherwise the Spirit also might be spoken of as 'Product' and
'Productive'. It has been said that—'When Rudrila asserted that what is Curd is Milk and what is Milk is Curd, he gave evidence of his being Vindhyavāsin, an inhabitant of the wilds of the Vindhya Hills'.

[Under Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 10] it has been declared that the Manifest has the character of being 'caused' and the rest, and the Unmanifest is the reverse of all this;—this also is mere childish prattle. As a matter of fact, when one thing is not different in nature from another thing, it cannot be contrary to this latter; because 'contrariness' consists in difference of nature; otherwise, there would be an end to all notions of 'difference'; and as a consequence, there would be no grounds for accepting any difference among the Attributes of Harmony, Energy and Inertia (which are insentient) on the one hand and the sentient Spirits on the other; and the whole universe would be uniform; this would involve the contingency of the whole being produced and also destroyed at one and the same time. That all these contingencies would follow would be due to the fact that the notion of all kinds of 'Non-difference' must share the same fate (of being accepted or rejected). From this it follows that the 'Unmanifest' also, like the 'Manifest', should possess the qualities of being 'with cause' and the rest (which have been attributed to the 'Manifest' only), for the simple reason that the form (essence) of the Unmanifest is not different from that of the 'Manifest';—or (conversely) the 'Manifest' should, like the 'Unmanifest', possess the qualities of being 'without cause' and the rest, on the ground of its form being not different from the Unmanifest; both these universal affirmative propositions would have to be accepted; otherwise undesirable contingencies would arise.—Then again, in ordinary worldly experience, the relation of Cause and Effect is always apprehended on the basis of well-ascertained positive and negative concomitance; while as regards the subject under discussion, Cosmic Intelligence and other things are not ordinarily known to be produced from such causes as Primordial Matter and the rest. Nor again is any eternal thing found to have the nature of a Cause, on the basis of which the fact of the diverse Products being produced out of Primordial Matter (which is eternal) could be admitted. And the reason for this lies in the fact that, if an eternal thing is capable of any effective action, any idea of its operations being gradual or non-gradual (simultaneous), would involve self-contradictions.

The following argument might be urged—'The relation of Cause and Effect that we postulate is not based upon the idea that the Cause produces something that did not exist before at all; and it is only such causal relation that would be incompatible with the non-difference in essence (form);—what we do assert is that Primordial Matter undergoes modification into the form of Cosmic Intelligence and other Products,—just as the Coiled Serpent uncoils itself and becomes modified into the Elongated Serpent,—and it is in this sense that it is called the 'Cause' of Cosmic Intelligence and other

* There appears to be a pun here upon the name 'Vindhyavāsin'; Vindhya is the name given to the Vindhya Hills, so the direct meaning of the term 'Vindhyavāsinī' would be the character of being a denizen of the wilds of the Vindhya Range; the indirect inuendo is to the Sāṅkhya author who gave expression to the opinion referred to here; his name was Vindhyavāsin. See Foreword, page LXI.
Products; and these, Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, being of the nature of modifications, are called its 'Effect' (or Product);—and there is nothing self-contradictory (or incongruous) in such modification, even though there be non-difference (between the original and its modification)."

This cannot be right; as under such circumstances, there can be no 'modification'. Because if there were Modification, it could come about either on the abandoning of the original form, or on the non-abandonment of it. If it were to come without the abandoning of the original form, then there would be a commixture of the two forms (original and modified); and it would be possible to perceive youth at the time of old age. If, on the other hand, Modification were to come after the abandoning of the original form, then this would involve the loss of form (of the original); so that it would mean that the previous form has been destroyed and a new and different form has come about; so that it could not be proved that any one thing is the 'modification' of another.—Then again, you explain 'modification' to consist in a change in the original itself into something else;—now would this change be in part or in whole? It could not be in part, because there are no parts (in Primordial Matter); nor could it be in whole, because that would mean the production of an entirely new thing and the consequent destruction of the original. Hence it cannot be right that there is change of the same thing; as it involves the notion of the coming into existence of an entirely different character (and thing).

It might be argued that—"What is meant is that while the thing itself remains constant, one property of it disappears and another property appears, and this (variation of the Property) is what is called Modification; and it does not mean that the very essence of the thing itself becomes different ".

This also cannot be right. Because when the Property appears and disappears, would that Property be something different, or non-different, from the thing itself (in which it appears and disappears)?—If it were something different, then the thing itself remaining exactly the same, how can it be said to be modified? When two such things as Cloth and Horse, which are entirely different from the Jar and other things, are produced or destroyed, it is not regarded as a modification of the Jar and other things. If it were so regarded, it would lead to an absurdity. It might be argued that—"if this line of argument were adopted, then the Spirit also would be 'modifiable'; inasmuch as the properties related to the Spirit actually appear and disappear, which would mean 'modification' of the Spirit itself, not of anything else ".—Not so, we reply. As no relationship can subsist either in an entity or a non-entity, there can be nothing that could have any relationship at all. For instance, if a Relationship existed, it could subsist either in an entity or in a non-entity;—as a matter of fact however, it cannot subsist in an entity; because the full majesty of its entire nature being already known as independent, it would not be possible for it to be dependent upon anything else (in the shape of a Relationship). Nor could the Relationship subsist in a non-entity, because by its very nature, it is devoid of all characterisation and as such cannot be dependent upon anything; e.g. the 'Hare's Horn' and such non-entities cannot be rightly held to be dependent upon anything.—Further, you do not advocate that there is modification on
the appearance and disappearance of entirely different properties;—what then?—what you advocate is that, in the case of an entity, its own essential character remaining constant, there is variation in its conditions (states), and this is what is meant by 'Modification'. When, however, the Properties are distinct from the Entity having the properties, there is no possibility of any essential character remaining constant; as the entity itself is the one 'essence' of the Properties; and that, ex hypothesi, is entirely different from them; so that there is no possibility of any essential character remaining constant. Nor again does any person ever become cognisant of any such Property coming within his range of cognisance as is different from the appearing and disappearing Properties; hence all wise men regard such a property as non-existent.—If, however, it be held that it is not a different entity at all, as both the properties, the appearing as well as the disappearing, would be non-different from the Entity to which they belong,—they should, like the Entity itself, be one only; and under the circumstances, on what basis would either the Entity or the Property be 'modified'? The two varying Properties being non-different from the Entity which remains constant,—there can be no appearance (production) or disappearance (destruction) of these,—just as there is none of the constant Entity. As regards the Entity also, inasmuch as it is non-different from the Properties, all that might be possible would be the production (appearance) of something new that did not exist before and the destruction (disappearance) of that which has been in existence; so that in no case would there be 'Modification' of any single thing. From all this it follows that, even on the basis of 'Modification', your theory of 'Cause and Effect' is not tenable.

All this defect in the Sāṅkhya theory is too manifest to need assertion;—with this idea, the Author has omitted to set it forth, and with the idea that 'we shall answer later on the objection that the Sāṅkhya has urged against the theory of the Effect being non-existent (before the causal operation)',—he proceeds, at this stage, to criticise the theory of the Effect being existent, by showing that it is open to the same objections (that have been urged against the theory of the Effect being non-existent). This is what is done in the text—'In answer to this, etc.'

The term 'suddhiyāḥ', 'wise ones', stands for the Bauddhas; they declare that the fivefold argument that the Sāṅkhya has set forth in the words 'Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc.' (Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 9),—is equally applicable against the theory of the Effect being existent. For instance, it can be asserted (with equal reason) that 'Because what is existent cannot be produced,—because there is recourse to the Cause,—because all things are not possible,—because the efficient thing can produce only that for which it is efficient, and—because the Effect is of the same essence as the Cause,—therefore the Effect is not-existent!';—[the reading 'Asadakaranāt' of the Sāṅkhya-kārikā being altered into 'Na sadakaranāt'] the negative 'not' (in the beginning) being construed with the phrase 'the Effect is existent' (at the end of the sentence). 'Why should the Effect be regarded as not-existent?';—Because of all the very same reasons that have been set forth in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā—Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. etc.—And when an objection is equally applicable to
both parties (to a discussion), then it should not be urged by one against the other; such is the sense of the Text.

Objection—"In what way is there this equality (between the two theories),—when the objection as urged by one party is that 'the Non-existent cannot be produced', while as urged by the other, it is that 'the Existent cannot be produced'?

There is no force in this objection; as it arises from non-comprehension of the sense of what is asserted. All that is meant by the assertion of 'equality' in the Text is only with reference to the five statements (in the Kārikā) regarding 'non-production', 'presence of connection between Effects and Specific Causes' and so forth [and not with reference to the conclusion deduced from these statements by the two parties, which are certainly contradictory]; because the reasons of the 'non-producibility' and the rest are equally applicable as against the theory of the Effect being existent. The answer that you, upholders of the doctrine of the Effect being existent, would make against these arguments (as against your doctrine) would also be the answer of the wise Baudhās who uphold the Doctrine of the Effect being non-existent.—(16)

Question—"In what way are the two 'equal'?"
The answer is provided in the following—

TEXT (17).

IF THE CURD AND OTHER EFFECTS ARE ALREADY WHOLLY EXISTENT IN THE ESSENCE OF (THEIR CAUSES) MILK AND THE REST,—THEN,
INASMUCH AS THEY WOULD BE EXACTLY LIKE THE CAUSE,
ETC. IN THEIR ESSENCE, WHAT OF THEIRS WOULD BE THERE THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE PRODUCED?—(17)

COMMENTARY.
The argument here set forth is for the purpose of supporting the view that 'what is already existent cannot be produced' (an argument aimed against the Sāṅkhya). If the Effects (Products) in the shape of Curd and the rest exist wholly—in their entirety,—i.e. in their mature and properly differentiated character, regarding their specific taste, potency and consequences,—in the essence of their Causes, Milk and the rest,—then, as they would be already existent, what of their form would be there that would have to be produced,—i.e. for the purpose whereof they would have to be produced by such causes as Milk and the rest?—The compound 'hētvādīsādṛśhātmānām' is to be analysed as 'those whose essence is exactly like the Cause, etc.'; the 'Cause' here stands for the Primordial Matter; the 'etc.' stands for the Sentence;—and certainly the fully matured Effects being thus circumstanced, what is meant is the fully developed form of the Effects, which, thus, cannot be produced again.—This indicates the two Reasonings that go to demolish any such permanent relation as that between Cause and Effect.—(17)
DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.

The Author now formulates the argument in the clear and proper form—

TEXT (18).

(A) The said Effect cannot be produced by the Cause,—because it already exists,—like the Cause and the Spirit.—(B) Thus also what is postulated cannot be the Cause,—because there is nothing that can be brought about by it,—just like the other thing.—(18)

COMMENTARY.

'Hētu', 'Cause', stands for Primordial Matter, and also the common things, Milk and the like;—'Tat kāryam', 'the said effect', stands for the Cosmic Intelligence, etc. (products, according to the Śāṅkhya, of Primordial Matter), as also the common things, Curd and the like;—'Sattātāh', means 'because it already exists';—'hētu-vitti-vat', 'like the Cause and the Spirit',—'Cause' stands for Primordial Matter and also for the common things, Milk and the like; 'vitti', 'Spirit', stands for the Sentient Faculty; and what is like these two is 'like the Cause and the Spirit'.—The argument may be thus formulated—That which is existent in its entirety cannot be produced by anything,—as, for instance, Primordial Matter and Spirit;—and the Effect in its mature state is already existent (ex hypothesi),—according to the opinion of our Opponent the Curd and the Products are already existent;—hence (if these were held as to be produced) it would involve the contingency of going against a universal law.—Nor can the reason (probans) here put forward be regarded as not true, inadmissible; because, if what cannot be produced in any form were regarded as producible, then all things would have to be regarded as producible, and this would lead to a regressus ad infinitum, which would nullify the Opponent’s proposition; and it would also involve the further absurdity of the producibility of what has already been produced.

So far the Author has shown that what are regarded (by the Śāṅkhya) as ‘Effects’ cannot really be ‘Effects’ or ‘Products’; now he proceeds to show that what are regarded as ‘Causes’ cannot really be ‘Causes’—Thus also what is postulated, etc.'—'Postulated',—i.e. the Entity posited. What is meant is as follows:—Primordial Matter, and also the Seed, Milk and other common things,—which have been postulated as the ‘Cause’ of such intended effects as Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, as also Curd and other common products,—cannot be the cause of these latter,—that is, it is not capable of being treated as the producer;—why?—because there is nothing that can be brought about by such a cause; as a matter of fact, there is nothing that can be brought about by the said entity; and as the said entity has this character, it cannot be regarded as the ‘Cause’. That this is so follows from what has been said (in the first half of the Text), regarding the effects in question being not effects at all; it is for this reason that the Text has used the term ‘ataḥ', 'thus'.

'Parātmavat', 'Just like the other things', i.e. like the thing with a different character,—i.e. like the entity which has not been posited as a Cause; the
entity that has not been posited as the Cause is the Spirit,—as declared (in
the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 3)—‘The Spirit is neither productive nor product’.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—That for which there
is nothing to be brought about cannot be a Cause,—e.g. the Spirit;—the
entity postulated (as Cause) is one for which there is nothing to be brought
about;—hence the entity concerned is not found to fulfil the conditions which
are invariably concomitant (with the nature of the Cause).

Both these arguments put forward in the Text are only meant to expose
the anomalies (involved in the Sāṅkhya doctrine); hence there is no need
for putting forward only such corroborative examples as are accepted
by both parties.

There is a party among Sāṅkhya who hold the view that—‘The Spirit
also is also a doer (a Cause) in regard to his own experiences,—on the analogy
of the Reflection [which, though not of the Reflecting Substance, is yet attribut-
ed to it; similarly though Experience does not subsist in the Spirit, yet it
is attributed to him]’.

As against this party, the explanation of the Text would be as follows:—
The term ‘parātma’ stands for the ‘Para-ātmā’, the Liberated Spirit; as
such a Spirit would be liberated, he could not be the doer (Cause) in regard
to Experience. Hence (even so) there is nothing wrong with the corroborative
instance cited in the Text.—(18)

The Author, in the following text, indicates (on behalf of the Sāṅkhya)
the fallacy of ‘Inadmissibility’ in the argument just put up by himself—

TEXT (19).

IT MIGHT BE URGED THAT “THERE IS SOME PECULIAR FEATURE, SOMETHING
IN THE SHAPE OF MANIFESTATION AND THE LIKE,—BY
PRODUCING WHICH, CAUSES MIGHT CEASE TO BE
DEFAMED (AS FUTILE)”.—(19)

COMMENTARY.

[The Sāṅkhya may argue as follows:—]—“If, in your first argument,
you mean your premiss to be in the fully qualified form ‘because it already
exists in its entirety, even along with such features as being manifest and the
rest’,—then the premiss is ‘Untrue’, ‘Inadmissible’; because we do not
regard the Effect as existing along with all such features as being manifested
and the like; we regard it as existing only in the form of a potency (in the Cause).
—If, on the other hand, you mean your premiss to be in general form, with-
out the said qualification,—then it is ‘Inconclusive’; because such peculiar
features as manifestation and the like are actually produced (even under our
theory).—Nor does our theory involve the absurdity of all things being Effects
produced.)—For the same reason, the second reason put forward by you is also
‘not true’, ‘Inadmissible’, as there is something to be brought about,
produced.

This is what is meant by the phrase ‘Something in the shape of Manifesta-
tion and the like’; the expression ‘and the like’ is meant to include such
peculiar conditions as Growth, etc.—'Which' (in the Text) stands for the 'peculiar feature'.—'To be defamed',—blamed. What is meant is that our theory is not open to the fallacies that have been urged against our Reason as being 'Inadmissible', 'Untrue' and the like.—(19)

The Author answers the above arguments in the following—

TEXT (20).

If this (peculiar feature) existed previously, then the objection is not answered; if, however, it did not exist previously, then, being non-existent, how could it be produced out of the Causes?—(20)

COMMENTARY.

There can be only two alternatives: (1) This 'peculiar feature' that has been spoken of, existed already, in its pristine state of Primordial Matter, prior to the condition of 'manifestation' and the rest,—or (2) it did not so exist. If it did exist, then you have not succeeded in showing the invalidity (inadmissibility) of the two Reasons put forward by us, and thus answering them. If, on the other hand, it did not exist previously,—then, even so, how could that 'peculiar feature' secure its production from the said 'Causes'? As your argument is that what is non-existent cannot be produced,—such production cannot be right;—such is the sense of the Text.—(20)

The argument 'because what is already existent cannot be produced' as stated by the Author himself (against the Sāṅkhya theory on p. 24, l. 20, parodying Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 9) has been duly supported; now he proceeds to argue in support of the other four arguments,—'because there is recourse to the Cause' and the rest,—in the following—

TEXT (21).

For the same reason, if there is nothing to be produced, there would be no 'recourse to the Cause',—nor would there be any production out of even a specific Cause,—nor would there be any 'efficiency', nor any 'operation' (of the Cause).—(21)

COMMENTARY.

As in accordance with the said reasoning, the Effect to be brought about would (according to the Sāṅkhya) be already in existence [read 'Sādhyasya bhāvāt'], 'recourse to Cause' would not be possible; as intelligent persons have recourse to a cause only for the purpose of something that could be brought about by that Cause. Nor would it be necessary that particular
Effects, like Curd and the rest, must proceed only from particular causes; simply because there would be nothing to be produced out of any cause. This supports the (parodied) argument 'Because all things are not possible'. What is meant is that when the Sānkhya asserts that 'an Effect cannot be produced from all causes', what he means is that 'a particular Effect can be produced only from a particular Cause'. This is not possible under the Sānkhya theory of the Effect being already existent; as, under this theory, there would be nothing to be produced. — Similarly as regards the argument that 'an efficient Cause can produce only that for which it is efficient', neither 'efficiency' nor 'the production of that for which it is efficient' is possible under the Sānkhya theory; for the very same reason that there is nothing to be produced (under the theory). If anything were produced by another thing, then alone could one admit the 'efficiency' of the latter thing, which could then be accepted as the 'Cause' of that which would be produced; — not otherwise. — This is what is meant by the words—Nor would there be 'efficiency', nor any 'operation of the Cause'.—(21)

The following Text proceeds to show that it is not right that things should be regarded as 'Cause', for the simple reason that what is regarded as to be produced already exists (according to the Sānkhya)—

TEXT (22).

INASMUCH AS EVERY EFFECT IS ALREADY THERE IN ITS ENTIRETY, THERE CAN BE NOTHING 'TO BE PRODUCED' (AN Effect); CONSEQUENTLY, THE VERY NAME 'CAUSE' CANNOT BE LOGICAL.—(22)

COMMENTARY.

This is said in support of the argument (the last one in the parodied Sānkhyakārikā)—'Because the Effect is of the same essence as the Cause'. — But it is not (i.e. the name 'Cause' is not illogical). Hence the Effect cannot be regarded as existent; — this conclusion has to be construed with all the (five) arguments set forth above.—(22)

With the following text the Author proceeds to criticise the theory of the Effect being existent, from another point of view—

TEXT (23).

ALL MEANS (OF CONFORMATION), WHEN OPERATIVE, SERVE TO SET ASIDE WRONG CONFORMATION AND TO PRODUCE DEFINITELY CERTAIN CONFORMATION; THIS WOULD NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH REASON (UNDER THE SĀNKHYA THEORY).—(23)

COMMENTARY.

'Operative'—active. — 'Wrong Cognition' includes also Doubtful Cognition, as it partakes of both the contraries (affirmation and denial), and hence
is as much an 'imposition' (as Wrong Cognition).—As a matter of fact, every Means (of Cognition), when operating on its objective, does two things: it sets aside Misconception and Doubt relating to the object of Cognition, and produces a definitely Certain Cognition relating to it. This fact cannot be compatible with reason, under the Sāṅkhya theory of the 'Existent Effect'.—(23)

In the following text, the Author proceeds to explain why the said fact is not compatible with reason, under the Sāṅkhya theory:

TEXT (24).

THE DOUBT AND THE MISCONCEPTION CANNOT BE SET ASIDE, AS THEY WOULD BE ALWAYS THERE. NOR IS THE PRODUCING OF DEFINITELY CERTAIN COGNITION POSSIBLE, FOR THE VERY SAME REASON. HENCE ALL THAT HAS BEEN SAID IS FUTILE.—(24)

COMMENTARY.

[It is not compatible] because, as regards Misconception and Doubt, both of these, under your theory, would be of the nature of either Sentience (Consciousness, Spirit) or Cosmic Intelligence and Mind; in either case any setting aside of these would be impossible, because Spirit, Cosmic Intelligence and Mind,—all these being eternal (constant),—Misconception and Doubt also would be constant. Nor would the production of Definitely Certain Cognition be possible through any Means; for the same reason,—i.e. because it is always there (ex hypothesi).—From all this it follows that all that you have said in support of your doctrine is entirely futile.—What this hints at is that the Sāṅkhya-doctrine involves self-contradiction; for instance, when the Sāṅkhya speaks of the means of producing a definitely Certain Cognition, it implies the producing of the Definite Cognition which has not been there; and this is contrary to the assertion that 'the Effect is existent': so there is clear self-contradiction.—(24)

TEXT (25).

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, (IT BE HELD THAT) THE DEFINITE COGNITION THAT WOULD BE PRODUCED WOULD BE ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN THERE,—THEN, THIS ONE INSTANCE (OF THE EFFECT BEING NON-EXISTENT) WOULD INVALIDATE ALL THOSE REASONS (THAT HAVE BEEN SET FORTH BY THE SĀṆKHYA).—(25)

COMMENTARY.

If, in order to avoid the futility of the reasons, it be admitted that the Definite Cognition that is produced from the Means is one that did not exist before,—then, in that case, the entire set of reasonings—' Because
what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. etc.' (Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 9)—becomes invalidated; because as there is nothing incongruous in the production of the Definite Cognition (which has not been existent), so there would be no incongruity in the production of any other non-existent thing;—similarly, just as there is production of the non-existent Definite Cognition,—and the securing of the particular Means for the said production,—and as there is no possibility of the said Definite Cognition being produced from all sorts of Means (Wrong, Doubtful and the like),—and as even though non-existent, the Definite Cognition is brought about by only such means as are efficient for that purpose,—and just as these Means have the nature of the 'Cause',—so exactly could it be also in every other case [and the Premiss of the Sāṅkhya would thus become annulled].—(25)

TEXT (26).

If it be held that—"the Effect, which has been unmanifested (latent, in the Cause), acquires manifestation through the Causes",—then (the question is) what is this manifestation of the Effect?—it cannot consist in the appearance (production) of a peculiarity in its nature; because of non-differentiation and non-connection.—(26)

COMMENTARY.

The Sāṅkhya may argue thus—"Though, even prior to the operation of its Means, the Definite Cognition is already in existence, yet the Means (Cause) is not futile; because prior to the operation of the Cause, the Cognition was unmanifested (lying latent in the Cause), and subsequently (to the operation), it acquires manifestation through that cause; hence what the Cause operates for is the manifestation (of the latent Effect); and so there is no futility."

This however cannot be right; because there can be no such 'manifestation'. This 'manifestation' consists either (a) in the appearance of some peculiarity in the nature of the Effect, or (b) in the apprehension of the peculiarity, or (c) in the disappearance of what has been obstructing the apprehension of the peculiarity.

It cannot consist in the appearance of some peculiarity in its nature; because would this 'peculiarity in its nature' be non-distinct from the Effect [Definite Cognition in the case in question], or distinct from it? If it were non-distinct, then, inasmuch as there would be non-differentiation from the Definite Cognition (Effect), it would be as constant as the form of the Definite Cognition itself; and hence there could be no 'production' of it. If, on the other hand, the 'peculiarity' is something distinct from the Effect (Definite Cognition) itself,—even so, there could be no such connection (or relationship) as 'this is a peculiarity of that'. Because any such connection (between the Effect and its Peculiarity) could only be either one of 'container and contained'
or of 'Cause and Effect' (Producer and Product).—The former is not possible in the case in question; because the two factors concerned not rendering any help to one another, the said relation of 'Container and Contained' is not possible; even if there were any help rendered, if that Help were something distinct from the two factors, then the Connection itself could not be there; so that there would be an infinite regress. If, on the other hand, the Help were not so distinct, then the operation of the Cause would be futile; as the Definite Cognition (Effect) itself would have brought about the 'Peculiarity', which, ex hypothesi, is not-distinct from the said Help.—Then again, the 'Peculiarity' being something incorporeal, it would not be possible for it to fall downwards, and as such, it would not need a 'container' (or receptacle, support), because a 'receptacle' can only serve the purpose of preventing this downward fall (due to gravity).—Nor is the relation of 'Cause and Effect' possible (between the Effect and its 'Peculiarity'); because the Cause in the shape of the Definite Cognition being always there, it would be possible for the peculiarity to be produced always,—which is absurd. Nor would it be right to hold that the production of the Peculiarity by the Definite Cognition would be dependent upon the actual operation of the Cause. Because there can be no dependence upon what renders no help; and if there is help rendered, then the theory becomes open to the objection and infinite regress urged above.—Further, this Peculiarity that is held to be produced as something distinct,—is it existent or non-existent (prior to the operation of the Cause)? These two horns of the dilemma present themselves here also.—If the Peculiarity is something non-existent, then, as urged above, all the reasons (put forward by the Sāṅkhya) become invalidated. If, on the other hand, it has been existent, then there is no use for the Cause. —If in regard to the Manifestation also, a further 'manifestation' were postulated,—there would be nothing to prevent the infinite regress as to what this further 'manifestation' is and so forth.—Thus, even on the alternative of the two being distinct, there would be 'non-connection';—and as there would be no connection (relationship), any production of 'peculiarity' in the nature of the Effect would not be possible.—(26)

TEXT (27).

THE 'MANIFESTATION' OF THE EFFECT CANNOT CONSIST IN ITS APPREHENSION; NOR IN THE REMOVAL OF WHAT WAS OBLITERATING ITS APPREHENSION;
BECAUSE THE APPREHENSION IS A CONSTANT FACTOR, AND
ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF A SECOND
(APPREHENSION).—(27)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be right to regard the 'manifestation' (of the Effect) as consisting in the appearance of the cognition of the Effect; because the Cognition of the Effect is a constant factor. For instance, this cognition of the Effect must, under the theory of the upholder of the theory of the Effect being
existent, be something eternal; under the circumstance what of it would be there which would be produced? Also because no second apprehension is possible, the Manifestation of the Effect cannot consist in the appearance of the Cognition of that Effect. The particle 'also' has the cumulative force; and it has to be construed apart from its place in the text; it should be taken as after the word 'asambhavat',—(i.e. at the end of the sentence). So that the sense comes to be as follows:—According to your view, Cognition (Consciousness) is one only,—your doctrine being that from Creation down to Dissolution, there is only one Consciousness; and it is this same Consciousness that constitutes Definite Cognition; apart from this then, what other 'apprehension' is there which would be styled 'manifestation', and which would be produced by Causes?

The following might be urged here (by the Sāṅkhya)—"The Apprehension of an object is not of the nature of 'Buddhi' (Consciousness), it is of the nature of 'Manas', 'Mind'".

But that cannot be right; because all these terms—'Buddhi' (Intelligence), 'Upalabdhi' (Apprehension), 'Adhyavasāya' (Determinate Cognition), 'Manas' (Mind), 'Samvedī' (Knowledge) and so forth,—are synonymous. This is going to be explained later on.

Nor can 'Manifestation' of the Effect consist in the 'removal of what has been obstructing its apprehension'; for the same two reasons. For instance, that which has been obstructing its apprehension being something eternal (ex hypothesi), no 'removal' of it is possible. It is not possible for this 'removal' to be in the nature of 'disappearance'; because until the thing has renounced its previous form, it cannot 'disappear'.

Further, 'because there is no possibility of a second apprehension', there can be no obstacle to apprehension; as there can be no obstruction (concealment) of what is non-existent, because what is 'obstructed' is always something that is existent. From all this it follows that there can be no 'removal' of the Obstruction (of Apprehension).

Or the term 'nityatvāt', 'because of its being constant' (in the Text), may be taken to mean that, because the Cognition of the Effect is constant (eternal), there can be no 'obstruction' of it; and because such obstruction is impossible, there can be no 'obstruction' of it.—Nor again can the 'removal of the obstruction' be brought about by anything, because it is characterless (being a negative entity, it has no positive character).

Under the doctrine of the 'Existing Effect', the futility of the causal operation is not the only incongruity; the impossibility of Bondage and Liberation is another incongruity; in fact, the most undesirable contingency of the cessation of all worldly activity cannot be avoided. For instance, you hold the doctrine that 'Liberation' follows on the appearance of True Knowledge, in the shape of real discrimination between Matter and Spirit; now as this True Knowledge is always constantly present, all embodied beings would be always 'liberated'; hence there could be no 'Bondage'. Conversely, 'Bondage' also has been held to be due to Wrong Notion (Mis-conception, Illusion); and as this Illusion also would be a constant factor, all beings would be always 'under bondage'; and under the circumstances, how could there be any 'Liberation'?
Then again, whenever people have recourse to any activity, it is either for securing what is beneficial or for getting rid of what is harmful. Under the theory of the 'Existent Effect' however, there can be nothing that cannot be secured, nor anything that cannot be got rid of; hence the whole world would be without desire for anything; so that ultimately there would be total cessation of all worldly activities.—(27)

Having thus refuted the doctrine of the 'Effect being existent (even prior to the operation of its Cause),' the Author proceeds to refute the objections likely to be urged against the doctrine that 'the Effect is non-existent (prior to the operation of its Cause)'.

TEXT (28).

JUST AS (UNDER THE Sāṅkhya THEORY).—EVEN THOUGH, ON THE GROUND OF ALL THINGS BEING CONSTITUTED BY THE THREE ATTRIBUTES, THERE IS NO DIFFERENTIATION AMONG THEM, AND YET EVERYTHING (CAUSE) DOES NOT PRODUCE EVERYTHING (EFFECT),—IN THE SAME MANNER, EVEN THOUGH THE EFFECT IS NON-EXISTENT (BEFORE THE CAUSAL OPERATION), EVERYTHING CANNOT PRODUCE EVERYTHING.—(28)

COMMENTARY.

The very denial of the theory of the 'Existent Effect' has, by implication, proved that the Effect is 'non-existent'; as 'existent' and 'non-existent' are contradictory terms; and hence no third alternative is possible. Even so, the Author now proceeds to show the futility of the objections that the Opponent has urged (against the Buddhist theory of the 'non-existent Effect').

The objection has been urged (by the Sāṅkhya, under Text 8, above) that "if the Effect were non-existent, it could not be produced, because it would have no form at all".

Now this Reason is fallacious, beset with the fallacy of being 'Unknown' (not admitted); because the theory is that it is the nature or character itself (of the Effect) that is produced (by the Cause), and this nature or character of the thing is not 'known' (admitted) to be 'formless'.—It might be urged that "before its production, it is certainly characterless".—Not so, we reply; as it is not possible for it to be 'characterless'; it cannot be right to regard the character itself as characterless; because when something is said to be 'characterless' what is meant is that it has no character; and this certainly is not there, even before the production of the thing; in fact, (under the argument of the Opponent) that itself would come to be characterless by which the Effect is produced.—If the Reason 'because it would have no form' be held to have been put forward with reference to the 'formless entity' in the shape of the 'negation of the thing',—then the reasoning would be futile (proving what is already proved or admitted); as the 'negation of the thing' has not been regarded by any one as 'something produced'.—Further,
the Reason is invalid also as being 'Inconclusive': as no reason has been put forward for sublating the contrary; inasmuch as the potency of the Cause is always restricted, it is only some non-existent thing that is produced,—only that for the production of which the Cause is there; that thing, for producing which there is no Cause—such for instance as the 'Sky-lotus',—is never, produced. Hence the Reason put forward (by the Sāṅkhya) is 'too wide, Inconclusive'. Everything cannot be regarded as the Cause of everything; nor is any such universal proposition accepted as that 'whatever is non-existent must be produced'; what is accepted is the proposition that 'whatever is produced was non-existent before its production'.

The following might be urged (by the Sāṅkhya)—"All Causes being equally productive of what has been non-existent, why is it that all Causes are not productive of all non-existent effects?"

This criticism can be urged with equal force against you also: All Causes being equally productive of what has been existent, how is it that all Causes are not productive of all effects? According to your view, there is nothing that is non-existent, which, on account of its non-existence, could not be produced.

"It is because the potency of Causes is restricted that, though things like the Hare's Horn are existent, they are not produced."

The same is equally true for the other theory also.

Then again, just as for you, even though all things are equally constituted by the Three Attributes, yet everything is not productive of everything, because the potency (of things) is restricted;—the compound 'Sarvakāraka' may be explained as 'productive of everything' or as 'that which has everything for its producer';—in the same manner (under our view also), even though all things (Effects) are equally non-existent, yet everything will not be productive of everything.

In fact, what has been asserted in the Text—'As in your case, so in mine also'—has been said after having admitted the Opponent's contention, for the sake of argument; in reality, there is no 'equality' between the two theories. Because (under our view) even though there is diversity among things, yet, some one effect is produced by some one Cause only; there being no incongruity in the idea that the efficiency of the Cause is always restricted by the diversity of character involved in the 'series of causes' (Wheel of Causation) bearing upon a certain Effect. If, on the other hand, there is 'non-differentiation' (between Cause and Effect),—how could it be possible to conceive of such an incongruity as that involved in one and the same thing being both 'cause' and 'non-cause' at the same time? Specially as distinction (differentiation) among things is always based upon contrary properties being attributed to them. This has been thus declared—'For all differentiation there must be some ground or basis in the nature of the things concerned; if there were non-differentiation, then, all being one and the same, its activity as well as inactivity would both be rendered impossible'.—(28)

In the following Text, the Opponent raises an objection on the basis of the Restriction of Potencies (of Causes):—
DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.

TEXT (29).

"INASMUCH AS THE PRESENCE OF LIMITS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR YOU, THE POTENCIES CANNOT BE RESTRICTED. ON THE VIEW OF THEIR BEING EXISTENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEIR RESTRICTION WOULD BE RIGHT AND PROPER AS PERTAINING TO THE LIMITS."—(29)

COMMENTARY.

For you—i.e. for the Buddhist who holds the Effect to be non-existent—it is not possible for the (causal) Potencies to be restricted.—Why?—Because the presence of limits,—in the shape of Effects—would be impossible; [as the Effects would be non-existent, there would be nothing with reference to which there could be restriction];—for the simple reason, that when the limit is non-existent, that which is limited cannot be there. This argument may be formulated as follows:—Things devoid of limits in the shape of existent Effects cannot have their potencies restricted,—e.g. such things as Hare's Horns,—and (according to you) things like the Paddy-seed are devoid of limits in the shape of existent Effects; hence they do not fall within range of the Major term [i.e. they cannot have their Potencies restricted].—With a view to show the soundness of his own view, the Sāṅkhya adds—On the view of their being existent, etc.—i.e. if Effects are held to be existent;—‘their’—i.e. of the Potencies.—(29)

In the following Text, the Author points out the invalidity of the reason (set forth by the Sāṅkhya, in the preceding Text):—

TEXT (30).

IT IS NOT SO; IT MAY BE THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF 'LIMITS', THERE CAN BE NO SUCH SUBSEQUENT ASSERTION AS HELD BY US.

BUT THERE IS NO HARM DONE TO THE NATURE OF THE THING ITSELF WHICH IS ENTIRELY FREE FROM ALL RESTRICTIVE ADJUNCTS.—(30)

COMMENTARY.

[It cannot be as urged by the Opponent]—because, on account of the absence of 'Limits', it may be that there can be no such subsequent assertion as that 'the potency to produce Curd is present in the Milk'; that may be so; but there is that Entity which is entirely free from all restrictive adjuncts—which is not a mere imposition (or assumption), subsequent to which there appears another Entity, which has not been previously perceived; and there can be no denial of such an Entity (as of the former one).—(30)
The Śāṅkha may urge the following—"Where, with regard to anything, there is absolute cessation of all verbal and conceptual content—the very nature of the thing must cease ".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (31).

The Name of Things is not their 'Essence' (Nature, Form); because all kinds of 'Conception' and 'Verbal Expression' proceed through habit, with reference to the undifferentiated (Immaculate) Entity.—(31)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Nature' of a thing is what has the widest extension (range); it is only when that is excluded that it sets aside its less extensive concomitants,—be it Cause or Effect,—because there is invariable concomitance between the two (the more extensive 'Nature' and the less extensive Cause or Effect); nothing else sets aside this; for if it did, it would lead to absurdity. Such 'verbal expression' as that 'Milk has the potency to produce Curd',—does not constitute the 'Essence'—Nature—of things; if it were so, then alone could 'the verbal expression', on being excluded, exclude the relevant thing also.

'Verbal Expression' is mentioned only by way of illustration; 'Conception' (Fanciful Assumption) also as related to the Thing in question is meant to be included.

'Essence' also is mentioned only by way of illustration; it includes the 'Cause' also; so that the 'Name' of a thing is not its 'Cause'; because the thing can be produced without the Name.

The Author states the reason for the assertion just made—Because all kinds of 'Conception', etc. etc. Because,—inasmuch as,—all 'Conceptions', which are connected with Names,—as also all 'Verbal Expressions'—expressive words,—both of which are of all kinds—of various kinds,—proceed, become applicable,—through habit,—with reference to the undifferentiated (Immaculate) Entity,—i.e. the Entity which has no component parts and which is of one constant uniform nature. That is to say, there is a single Entity, in the shape of 'Word-Sound' for instance, which, being constant, is 'conceived' and 'spoken of' by speakers existing at varying times. It is only when these 'Word-conceptions' become identified with, and have for their objective, the said constant Entity, that this latter becomes diversified; or (conversely), like the Essence of the Entity itself, the Conceptions themselves become unified in essence; in no case can it be right that any single thing should be diverse in its essence; any such idea would lead to absurdity.—Hence what happens is that the potency of the Cause being restricted, it is only some non-existent thing that is produced, not all.

Thus the Reason (put forward by the Śāṅkha, under Text 8, above)—'because it would have no form at all' is Inconclusive.

For the same reasons, the other reasons also (propounded by the Śāṅkha in support of the 'Existence of the Effect' under Śāṅkhyaakārikā, 9)—such
as 'because the particular Cause is secured', and the rest,—become invalid. Because, what is said regarding the 'Securing of the particular Cause' would be true if the said 'Securing of the particular Cause' were found anywhere to have been due to the presence (therein) of the Effect; specially as it is quite possible for the said securing of the particular Cause to be due to the restricted character of the Potency of the Cause itself.

That 'everything cannot be produced from everything' is also due to the restricted character of the Causal Potency itself; as it is impossible for everything to be, by its very nature, capable of producing all things.

As for the argument set forth (by the Sānkhya) above, under Text 12— "that to which no peculiarity can be attributed, which is formless and unmodifiable,—how could such a thing be produced by Causes?",—that also has been urged without understanding the real sense of our theory. We do not say that a Non-entity is produced; if we had said that then alone could it be urged against us that any modification of it would involve loss of its very essence. We have however already explained that what is produced is a Thing itself (not a mere non-entity); all that we say is that the thing was non-existent before its production,—a conclusion deduced from the fact that (prior to production) it is not found to fulfil the conditions of Cognisability and that which is already a full-fledged entity cannot be an Effect, something to be produced; and that it is spoken of as 'produced' by that Cause on whose mere proximity it springs into existence. Nothing is produced by the entering into it of any operations (of the Cause), because all things are, by their very nature, devoid of operative activity. Then again, there is nothing that can be called a 'non-entity', which could be modified (as urged by the Sānkhya); nor can 'non-existence' constitute the 'Essence' of anything; because 'non-existence' is a mere negation.—Then again, if it be asserted that "What is non-existent cannot be produced, because no peculiarities of the product could be attributed to it'—then how could the Existent also be produced, since its essential features are already accomplished, and no further peculiarities could be attributed to it?—For these reasons, the reasoning that "Because what is efficient can produce only that which can be produced by it" is invalid.

Further, inasmuch as under the theory of the 'Non-existent Effect', it is possible for things to be 'Causes', the final (Sānkhya) argument also— "Because the Effect is of the essence of the Cause"—is invalid, 'too wide and Inconclusive'.—Or, inasmuch as the fact of the Existent thing being an 'Effect' has been already shown to be impossible,—and as all the facts that have been urged, in the shape of the arguments (in Sānkhyakārikā, 9)— "because the particular Cause is secured" and so forth,—are explicable only under the theory of the Effect being non-existent,—all these four arguments are 'contradictory' (as urged in support of the Sānkhya doctrine of the 'Existent Effect'), because they actually prove what is contrary to the conclusion desired (by the Sānkhya)—(31)

[Says the Sānkhya]—"If it is your view that what is produced has been non-existent, then how is it that in the Sūtra (of the Buddhists), the production of both, the Existent as well as the Non-existent, has been denied?
This is the declaration—'O high-minded one, all Things are un-produced, as neither the Existing nor the Non-existent is ever produced.'

The answer to this is provided by the following:

TEXT (32).

IN REALITY, THE 'PRODUCTION' (OF A THING) CONSISTS IN ITS BECOMING A THING; THIS 'PRODUCTION' CANNOT BE RELATED TO WHAT IS EXISTENT, OR WITH WHAT IS NON-EXISTENT; IT IS RELATED ONLY TO A CONCEPTUAL IDEA WHICH IS PURELY NON-EXISTENT—(32)

COMMENTARY.

The particle 'tū' (in reality) serves to emphasise what is going to be said.—When we come to examine in what manner a particular thing may be distinguished from other things, we find that what is called the 'production' (appearance, coming into existence, of a Thing) is only its own Essence, becoming itself, which exists merely for a moment, free from all connection with all elements of the Past and the Future. It is not a 'Universal' with particular features, as assumed by the Vaibhāṣika; such a 'Universal' is going to be refuted (under Chapter 13). Nor does it consist in 'inherence in Being' or 'inherence in its own Cause', as postulated by the Vaishēṣika; as both these also are going to be refuted (under Chapter 13); and because, under the theory of the other party (the Vaishēṣika), both these (Inherences) are constant, and what is already constant cannot be produced. To this effect there is the following declaration:—'Being (Existence) consists in being in contact with the Cause; the Cause is a cause by virtue of producing the Effect; the Being and the Contact both being constant, what is there that could be produced?'

This—the said Production—cannot be related to what is non-existent,—by the relation of 'co-essentiality' (being of the same essence); as 'existent' and 'non-existent' are mutually contradictory, what is non-existent cannot come about. Nor can the 'production' be related to what is existent already from before; because before Production, the existent cannot be there.

Question—"Then how is it that you (Buddhists) are upholders of the doctrine that 'the Effect is non-existent'?"

Answer—Only to a conceptual idea, etc.;—it is only to a conceptual idea,—which is of the nature of either the Active Agent or the Instrument,—(Cause)—it is led into relationship. As a matter of fact, there is nothing called 'non-existent' which could enter into 'production'; the idea therefore that 'the non-existent is produced' is purely conceptual.—(32)

Question—"What is the basis of this 'conception' on which the said Idea is supposed to rest?"

The answer is supplied by the following:—
TEXT (33).

THE BASIS (OF THE SAID CONCEPTION) LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE FORM OF A THING PERCEIVED IN IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE TO ANOTHER THING DID NOT EXIST BEFORE. IF THE SAID THING HAD EXISTED PREVIOUSLY, THEN THIS BASIS WOULD NOT BE THERE (FOR THE SAID ASSUMPTION).—(33)

COMMENTARY.

When the previously unperceived form of a particular thing is perceived in immediate sequence to another thing,—the said form is one that did not exist before—i.e. prior to its own 'middlemost state' *—for the simple reason that it is not apprehended as fulfilling the conditions of being perceived. Hence this forms the basis for the conception that the thing that is produced is one that did not exist before.—"How so?"—If the said thing, etc.;—i.e. prior to its 'middlemost state', if the form of the thing, this middlemost state, had existed, there could be no room for the said 'basis' of the Conception that 'what was non-existent has become produced'. Because the term 'becomes produced' connotes that particular state of the thing which appears in its 'middlemost state'; and if this were present even previously (to that state), then this would set aside the notion that the 'form' of the thing consists in that particular form of it which appears during the 'middlemost state' only. As (ex hypothesi), it would be as all-pervading as Akāśa, and as such it could not have any 'previous' or 'middlemost' or 'subsequent' states at all. Under the circumstances, it would be possible to assert that 'all things are produced at all times', as there would be no grounds for differentiation.—(33)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out further defects in the doctrine of the 'Existential Effect':—

TEXT (34).

IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT THE CURD AND OTHER EFFECTS SUBSIST IN THE MILK AND OTHER CAUSES, IN THE FORM OF LATENT POTENCY; NOW WHAT IS THIS 'POTENCY'? IF IT IS THE SAME AS THE CURD AND OTHER EFFECTS,—THEN THIS ALSO WOULD BE PERCEIVED LIKE THE MILK ITSELF.—(34)

COMMENTARY.

It is asserted (by the Śudkhya) that the Effect subsists in the Cause; what do you really mean by this? Do you mean that the Effect exists

* Each object has three momentary 'States': (1) moment of non-existence, prior to coming into existence, (2) moment of existence, and (3) moment of non-existence, cessation, destruction.
there in the actually manifested form? If so, then that cannot be; for if it were so, then while the Milk is still in the form of Milk, the Curd would be perceived, just as it is after the production of the Curd.—Or, is it meant that it subsists there in the form of Latent Potency?—Is this ‘Potency’ something different from the Curd and other Effects as manifested in the perceptible form? Or is it the same as these?—If it is the same, then, as before, it should be perceptible (which it is not).—(34)

[The other alternative that it is something different is taken up in the following Text]:—

TEXT (35).


COMMENTARY.

If the other alternative is accepted—viz. that the ‘Potency’ is something different from the ‘Effect’,—then the view that ‘the Effect subsists in the form of the Cause’ becomes abandoned; because you admit the existence of an entity different from the Effect, in the shape of ‘Potency’. For instance, when something becomes manifested in a form endowed with particular qualities resulting from the development of the particular taste and potency,—then it is called an ‘Effect’, like the Curd for instance; and this Curd-effect is spoken of as ‘non-existent’ in the state of Milk, because it is not capable of being perceived. As regards ‘Potency’, which (you say) is something different from this ‘Effect’,—it cannot thus be an ‘Effect’; for the simple reason that the existence of one thing (Potency) cannot mean the existence of another (Effect); for if it did, then it would be all confusion.

“But we have such expressions as Butter is longevity, where Butter is found to be spoken of as longevity, which is a totally different thing, and Damp Reed is foot-disease, where Damp Reed is spoken of as foot-disease, a totally different thing.”

In answer to this, the Text has added the phrase ‘except figuratively’;—i.e. there can be no such expressions except in figurative language. Longevity is spoken of as Butter only figuratively, through attributing the character of the Effect (Longevity) to its Cause (Butter); and such expressions are not possible in their literal sense. If, when you say that ‘the Effect is existent in the Cause’, you are using only figurative language, then there is no difference between our views; there is difference however if you intend the assertion to be taken in its literal sense.—This is what the Text shows by means of an example—The existence of Harmony, etc.—Even you (Śāṅkhya) do not hold that the form of ‘Pain’ (Rajas-Attribute) and ‘Delusion’ (Tamas-Attribute) is the same as that of ‘Harmony’ (Sattva-Attribute);
as each one of these has been held to have a distinct character of its own.—(35)

The Text now proceeds to show the Inadmissibility of the Premiss put forward (by the Sāṅkhya under Kārikā 16) in the form "Because of homogeneity":—

**TEXT (36).**

The 'Manifest' is not admitted by us in any way whatsoever as homogeneous with (made up of) Pleasure and the rest; because Pleasure and the rest are 'internal', 'subjective'; and that these are so is manifest from their own clear cognition.—(36)

**COMMENTARY.**

That the 'Manifest', in the shape of Sound and other things, is 'homogeneous' with—of the same form as,—Pleasure (Pain and Delusion), is not admitted by us in any way;—why?—because Pleasure and the rest are 'internal',—i.e. subjective, of the nature of consciousness (feeling); and Sound and other things being insentient,—how could they be homogeneous with Pleasure, etc.?—The argument may be formulated as follows:—Things that are not of the nature of Consciousness cannot consist of Pleasure and the rest;—e.g. the Spirit postulated by the other party;—and Sound and other things are devoid of the nature of Consciousness; hence the more extensive character is found absent in them (which excludes the presence of the less extensive character, that of consisting of Pleasure, etc.).

The following argument might be urged:—"It is only after the invariable concomitance of the character of being of the nature of Consciousness with the character of consisting of Pleasure, etc. has been established that the absence of the former might exclude the character of causing Pleasure from Sound and the rest; as a matter of fact however, the said invariable concomitance itself has not been established,—inasmuch as we do admit the Spirit to be of the nature of Consciousness (and yet not consisting of Pleasure, etc.)."

In answer to this, the Text adds—That these are so is manifest from their own cognition. That is, the fact of Pleasure, etc. being of the nature of Consciousness is well established,—how?—from the cognition of Pleasure, etc. themselves; i.e. the cognition of Pleasure, etc. is itself quite clear on this point.—As a matter of fact, it is too clear (to need emphasis) that the Cognition itself of Pleasure, etc.—in the form of the Feelings of Satisfaction and the rest, following upon the presence or absence of Sound and other things, is self-luminous by its very nature and does not depend upon anything else to illumine (manifest) it;—and whatever is independent of other things to manifest it, and is self-illumined in the form of Satisfaction, etc.,—is spoken of by such terms as 'Consciousness', 'Pleasure', 'Feeling', 'Cogni-
tion,—all which are synonymous. If the experiencing of Pleasure, etc. were due to some other feeling,—then the feeling of Pleasure, etc. would be of the nature of something other than Satisfaction and the rest; because it itself would not be of the nature of that; as is the case with the Ydg, or the Person making inferences, cognising the Pleasure, etc. as felt by other persons. If this were not so, then these persons—Ydg, etc.—also would be themselves actually feeling the Pleasure, etc. as present in others, and (hence) being distressed and so forth (on account of those feelings). Or (conversely), as in the case of the Ydg, so in all cases, the feelings of being kindly or unkindly treated would be absent, as the circumstances would be the same in both cases,—If then, the Feeling is admitted to be of the nature of Satisfaction and the rest, it becomes established that Pleasure, etc. are of the nature of Consciousness. Because our Pleasure is nothing more than the feeling of Satisfaction, and Pain is nothing more than the feeling of Dissatisfaction.—From all this it follows that the Reason put forward in the Text is not Inconclusive nor Inadmissible. Specially among people who (like the Sdhy) believe in the Reality of the External World, it is an admitted fact that Sound and other things (which are external, objective) are devoid of the nature of Consciousness. If it were not so, then they would have accepted the doctrine of the Idealist; and this would be what we most desire.—Nor can our Reason be regarded as 'Contradictory', as it is found present in every case where the Probandum is known to be present.—(36)

The following argument might be urged (by the Sdhy):—"As a matter of fact, though Consciousness (or Cognition) by itself is devoid of the Blue or any other colour, yet it appears to be of that colour, by reason of the proximity of the Blue Object outside; and in the same manner, the Consciousness, which by itself is devoid of the form of Happiness and the rest, appears in these forms by reason of the imposition of the external Happiness, etc. upon it; so that, even though the Feeling is of the nature of Happiness, etc., these latter cannot be regarded as constituting Consciousness; and thus our principal Reason is not 'too wide' or Inconclusive."

The answer to this is provided by the following:—

TEXT (37).

ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIVERSITY OF HABIT AND NATURE, ALL POSSIBLE ATTACHMENT AND THE REST ARE CLEARLY FOUND TO BE RESTRICTED TO EACH SINGLE OBJECT, LIKE SOUND AND THE REST.—(37)

COMMENTARY.

'Bhvanajatibhdatah';—'Bhvan' stands for Habit;—'jati', 'nature', for one's own character;—on account of the diversity—peculiarity—of these two;—attachment and the rest;—attachment' stands for Longing; the phrase 'and the rest' includes such feelings as Love and the like, due to
DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.

the Harmony-Attribute, Hate, Agitation, etc. due to the Energy-Attribute, and Dejection, Illusion, etc. due to the Inertia-Attribute; thus the effects of all the Three Attributes become included;—all these are found to be restricted,—i.e. of one form;—for instance, on account of their peculiar habits, the Lover and other persons have one or the other of the said feelings in regard to Wine, Woman and other things, according as they have been found to be conducive to good or evil;—similarly on account of the peculiar nature, one or the other of the said feelings appear in some of the animals, like the Deer (who are attracted by Sound), the Elephant (who are attracted by Odour) and the like.—All these feelings (of Love, Hate and the rest) are always restricted (to the Lover, or the Deer, etc.),—and do not appear in all persons or animals. This would not be right if Sound and other objects were of the nature of (consisted of) Pleasure and the rest.—(37)

Question—"Why?"
The answer is given in the following:—

TEXT (38).

BEING IN KEEPING WITH ONE AND THE SAME OBJECT, THE CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD BE VARIEGATED IN CHARACTER.—IF IT BE URGED THAT "IT IS NOT SO BECAUSE OF DESTINY AND SUCH OTHER FORCES";—THEN THE CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD NOT BE IN KEEPING WITH THE OBJECT AT ALL.—(38)

COMMENTARY.

All the said Feelings being in keeping with one and the same object, the Consciousness of each person would be variegated in character,—just like the cognition of such objects as the Blue and the like.

It might be urged that—"Even though every Object is tripartite in character (as made up of the Three Attributes), yet under the influence of such auxiliary unseen forces as those of Destiny and the like, in the form of Merit and Demerit, it is only some aspect of it that figures in the consciousness of any one person,—and not all its aspects to all persons.—The term 'ādi', 'such other forces', includes Habit, Nature, Desire to hold and the like."

If that were so, then the Consciousness would not be in keeping with the object; i.e. such Consciousness would not rest upon the object; as it would be devoid of the form of the Object itself.—(38)

The following text proceeds to show how the Consciousness would be 'devoid of the form of the Object':—
TEXT (39).

**The form of the Object itself is three-formed, and the Cognitions (of men) are one-formed;—how can these latter be really possible with reference to the Object,—being entirely different from it in character?—(39)**

**COMMENTARY.**

The form of the Object consists of the Three Attributes of **Sattra** (Harmony), **Rajas** (Energy) and **Tamas** (Inertia).—*The Cognitions of men are one-formed;*—the term *‘tat’* stands for Men, Spirits; what is meant is that the Cognitions that men have are all found to be of one form, having their form determined solely by each one of the numerous circumstances of *‘Attachment’* and the like. *How can these latter,—i.e. the Cognitions—in reference to the Object—Sound and the rest,—really—truly,—be possible?*—"Why cannot these be possible?"—*Because they are different from it in character;* i.e. quite different in character from the object on which they are based.—The argument is to be formulated in the following form:—When a Cognition does not apprehend the form of a particular object, it cannot have this object for its objective basis;—e.g. Visual Cognition cannot have Sound for its objective basis;—the Cognitions in question are devoid of the form of the three-formed object;—hence the conclusion of the Opponent would be opposed to the wider Premiss, and there is reason for denying it also, in the shape of likely incongruities.

The following might be urged (by the **Sāṅkhya**):—"Even though what is actually apprehended by Perception is the Object, Sound and the rest, in its *entire* aspect,—yet, on account of predisposition and other circumstances, the definite cognition that actually appears (according to the Buddhist) is only in reference to certain aspects of it,—such as its momentary character—and not in reference to all its aspects;—in the same manner (according to us) the Cognition would appear in a *single* form under the unseen influence of Destiny and such other circumstances."

This cannot be right. According to us, such conceptions as those of ‘momentary character’ and the like do not in reality have any Entity for their objective; because (according to us) the ‘Entity’ is beyond all conception. It is only indirectly that conceptions (and Cognitions) are connected with the Entity, and thereby becoming the means of apprehending that Entity, they come to be recognised as the **Pramāṇa** (Proof, Evidence, Means of Cognition) for that Entity. As for Love and the rest on the other hand, they are actually admitted by the other party to have objects as their real objective; if that were not so, then the said Love, etc. would have no basis (or substratum), and it would (thus) be not true to say that ‘the Cognition of the feelings of Pleasure, etc. follows from the Cognition of Sound and other objects which are of the nature of Pleasure, etc.’—Further, inasmuch as the feelings of Love, etc. are definitely determinate in their character, there is no uncertainty or indefiniteness attaching to their character, and as a result of this, the Cognition of the feeling of these would be always
in their entire form. In fact it is this cognition of the object of all definite Cognitions that constitutes their definiteness.—(39)

It has been asserted above (by the Sāṅkhyā, under Text 14) that—"From the apprehension of such effects as Satisfaction, Irritation and Dejection, it follows that Sound and other objects are made up of Pleasure (Pain and Delusion)").—The following text proceeds to show that the premiss herein set forth is Inconclusive:—

TEXT (40).

FOR THE FOLLOWERS OF YOGA, 'SATISFACTION', 'DISSATISFACTION' AND 'DELUSION' ARE PRODUCED IN THE SAME SPIRIT; AND YET THE OTHER PARTY DO NOT HOLD THE SPIRIT TO BE OF THE ESSENCE OF THOSE.—(40)

COMMENTARY.

Those followers of Yoga who accept the teachings of Kapila, when meditating upon the Spirit as distinguished from Primordial Matter, derive Satisfaction and Happiness, after having practised meditation of the Spirit in the right manner; but those who do not succeed in the practice of Meditation, and hence do not perceive the Spirit quickly enough, become beset with Dissatisfaction; while those who are, by their very nature, of dull intelligence, become beset with Delusion;—and yet the other Party do not regard the Spirit to be of the essence of these—i.e. to consist of the Three Attributes. From this it follows that the premiss stated in the form "Because of the apprehension of such Effects as Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction and Dejection"—is Inconclusive, 'too wide'.

"As a matter of fact, however, Pleasure, etc. proceed from Volition (Determination, the function of Cosmic Intelligence), not from the Spirit."

The same might be said of Sound and the rest also; and in that case, as all these objects (Sound, etc.) would be products of mere Volition, there could be no such things as External Pleasure, etc.; because 'Volition' is of the nature of Consciousness, purely subjective. For the same reason the proposition that "Cognition or Experience is of the nature of Satisfaction (Dissatisfaction and Dejection), through the influence of such impositions as those of external Pleasure, etc."—also becomes rejected. Specially because, even without the imposition of such external things, Happiness, etc. are actually found to appear entirely on the substratum of the Spirit itself. How too could the imposition of something else bring about the well-known feeling of Pleasure, etc. which appears independently of the proximity of external things, from the mere contemplation of what is agreeable and disagreeable?

It might be said that "the Mind also (wherein this Contemplation takes place) would be made up of the Three Attributes through the imposition of the same".

But that cannot be; because by the assertion that "That which is independent of all other illumining agencies and is self-sufficient, etc." it has been established that it is of the nature of Consciousness.
From all this it follows that the reason put forward (by the Sāṅkhya) —"Because of homogeneity"—is 'Inadmissible', 'unproven'.—(40)

Now the Author admits (for the sake of argument) that the Reason (Homogeneity) is 'admissible', 'proved',—and proceeds to show its invalidity, 'Inconclusiveness'—in the following:—

TEXT (41).

Even though the 'Manifest' be accepted as 'consisting of three Attributes';—Primordial Matter does not become established as the one eternal Cause of that (Manifest); because that 'Manifest' is not imbued with any single generic character.—(41)

COMMENTARY.

Even if it be taken as proved that the 'Manifest' consists of the 'Three Attributes', yet that does not prove what the Sāṅkhya wishes—viz. that the Cause of that 'Manifest' is that which is called 'Primordial Matter'; that is to say, because the reason that has been put forward has not been found to be concomitant with a Cause of that kind. For instance, what the Sāṅkhya desires to prove is that the Cause of the 'Manifest' is one, consisting of the Three Attributes, eternal and all-pervading; as a matter of fact, with such a Cause, the invariable concomitance of the Reason has nowhere been perceived; nor is it necessary that the Cause must be of the same nature as the Effect is found to be; because there is a clear difference between the Cause and its Effect. You hold that the Effect in the shape of the 'Manifest' is that which has such characteristics as 'having a Cause', 'being non-eternal', 'non-pervasive' and so forth; and yet you do not hold the Cause (of this Manifest) to have these characteristics. Hence your Reason (Premiss) is 'too wide', 'inconclusive'.

The Text next proceeds to show that the Reason put forward (by the Sāṅkhya) is 'contradictory' also, inasmuch it entails the conception contrary to the nature of the particular Entity:—As the one eternal Cause, etc.;—that is to say, what is meant to be proved is the existence of an Entity, which is one, eternal and made up of the Three Attributes, as the Cause (of the 'Manifest'); and no such entity is established by the Reason put forward;—in fact, what is established is something quite contrary to it.—"How so?"—Because that is not endowed, etc.—The particle 'hi' stands for 'because'; hence the meaning is that the Effect in the shape of the 'Manifest' is not recognised to be imbued with any such single generic character as consists of the Three Attributes and which forms the very essence of the 'Manifest'.—"What is it then that is recognised?"—The 'Manifest' is actually cognised as endowed with such qualities as multiplicity, non-eternity and so forth. If the 'Manifest' were really imbued with any such generic character as that postulated by the other party, then the Cause also of that 'Manifest' would have to be recognised as possessed of that character. Inasmuch as, however, the Effect (in the shape of the 'Manifest') is actually
found to be imbued with such qualities as ‘non-eternality’, ‘multiplicity’ and the like—it is its Cause also has to be inferred as possessed of these same qualities. Specially because in the case of a Cause that is eternal, the idea of its fruitful operations being both sequential and simultaneous would involve self-contradiction;—and because diversity in the Effect can be only due to diversity in the Cause; otherwise the diversity in the Effect would be without any Cause (baseless).—From all this it follows that any such single eternal Entity as Primordial Matter cannot be recognised.—If the name ‘Primordial Matter’ is given to a Cause that is non-eternal and many, then there we have no quarrel with you.—(41)

Question—“How is it known that the Manifest is not imbued with any single generic character ?”
The answer is supplied in the following:—

TEXT (42).

ALL ‘MANIFESTED THINGS’ ARE FOUND TO BE LIKE IRON-BARS; AS HAVING THEIR FORMS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ORDER OF SEQUENCE AND THEIR ESSENCE MIXED UP WITH FANCIES.—(42)

COMMENTARY.

Just as bars made of Iron stand apart from each other,—so these ‘Manifested Entities’, as they appear in their own forms, are found to be diverse and separate, due to diversities of place, time, potencies, appearances and so forth; and they do not enter into each other’s essence (or constitution). This proves the multiplicity (of Manifested Entities).

In order to prove their non-eternality, it is added—Having their forms, etc. etc.;—the compound is to be analysed as—‘have their forms associated with’—embraced, affected by—an order of sequence’.

Question—“If this is so, then how is it that Entities are conceived of as units,—in the form of ‘Earth’ and the like,—and also as lasting,—in such notions as ‘this is that same thing’ ?”

Answer—Their essence mixed up with fancies; that is to say, the conception of ‘unity’ in regard to things is a ‘fancy’, a wrong assumption. This is going to be established later on, under the sections dealing with the doctrine of the ‘Perpetual Flux’.—(42)

It has thus been shown that the Reason ‘Because of Homogeneity’ (as propounded by the Sāṅkhya in support of his doctrine of all things being the product of one ‘Primordial Matter’) is open to the three fallacies of being ‘Unproven, Inadmissible’, ‘Contradictory’ and ‘Too Wide, Inconclusive’.—The Author now proceeds to show that the corroborative instance cited (by the Sāṅkhya in Text 15, above) in the words ‘Just as in the case of the Jar and other things’ does not fulfil the conditions of,—and is not possessed of the properties of—the Probans and the Probandum [and as such cannot serve as a ‘corroborative instance’]:—
TEXT (43).

So also the various products of clay and other things are not recognised as imbued with any single generic character,—nor as the effects of any single cause; as all such things as the 'lump of clay' are diverse.—(43)

COMMENTARY.

The phrase 'and other things' is meant to include the products of such things as gold and the like.—The term 'so also' may be taken as cumulative,—adding one further defect in the opponent's reasoning,—or as indicating similarity (to other defects already pointed out).—The phrase 'not imbued with any single generic character' serves to show that the instance cited (jar, etc.) is devoid of the property of what has been cited (by the Sāṅkhya) as the probans of his reasoning.—The phrase 'Nor as the effects of any single cause',—has to be construed with 'recognised'; and it serves to show that the property of the (Sāṅkhya's) probandum also is not present in the instance cited.

Objection—'As a matter of fact, single causes—of all such things,—are actually found in the form of the lump of clay or of gold and other things; and every one of these is also found to be imbued with the generic character of 'clay', 'gold' and the like. In what way then is our instance devoid of both the properties of the probans and the probandum?'

Answer—'As all such things as the 'lump of clay' are diverse;—there can be no such single composite entity as 'lump of clay';—if there were, then (since generic characters are all-pervading ex hypothesi), if it covered one point in space, the entire space would become covered. Nor is any generic character found to appear in each individual thing,—every one of which is perceived as distinct by itself.—(43)

The text again proceeds to show the 'inconclusiveness' of the Sāṅkhya's reason—'Because of homogeneity'—by itself:

TEXT (44).

In the case of 'spirits', even though they are endowed with 'sentience' and other qualities, they are not regarded (by the Sāṅkhya) as preceded (produced) by a single entity (as their cause).—It might be said that 'the said qualities are attributed to the spirits only secondarily (indirectly, figuratively)';—then why cannot the same be the case in regard to the matter under discussion also?—(44)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, the spirits are regarded (by the Sāṅkhya) to be endowed with endless such properties as being 'sentient', 'enjoyer' and the like;
and yet they are not regarded by you as having a single Cause endowed with the same properties.—It might be urged that—"The property of being endowed with Sentience and the like that has been attributed to Spirits, is not in the direct literal sense, but in the indirect, secondary, figurative sense; and the reason for this lies in the fact that, all Spirits are found to be excluded from ‘insentience’ and other such qualities, and hence they are placed under the genus ‘Sentient’, which stands for the ‘negation or exclusion of Insentience’, which is assumed to meet their case; though in reality there is no such genus’.—If then, it is only indirect and figurative, then, in regard to the ‘Manifest’ also,—as in the case of Spirits,—why is the presence of Pleasure, etc. not taken as ‘assumed’ in the same way,—without their being preceded and produced by any single Cause endowed with the same qualities?—Thus the Probans (Reason) is found to be Inconclusive.

The mention of ‘Spirits’ is only by way of illustration. In the same manner, Pleasure, etc., being so many modifications of Primordial Matter, are endowed with such qualities as being ‘attributes’, ‘insentient’, ‘non-enjoyer’ and so forth,—and Primordial Matter and the Spirits are endowed with such qualities as ‘Eternality’ and the like,—and yet none of these are preceded and produced by any single such Cause. So the Probans is clearly Inconclusive.—(44)

Thus the Reason (put forward by the Sāṅkhya)—"Because of homogeneity",—has been refuted. Now under the pretext of Re-affirming his conclusion, the Author proceeds briefly to point out defects in the other reasons (put forward by the Sāṅkhya):—

**TEXT (45).**

**THUS, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A CAUSE IN THE SHAPE OF ‘PRIMORDIAL MATTER’, ALL DIVERSITY RELATING TO EFFECTS AND CAUSES AND OTHER THINGS BECOMES EXPLICABLE, ON THE BASIS OF THE DIVERSITY OF POTENCIES.—(45)**

**COMMENTARY.**

It has been asserted (in Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 15) that “Primordial Matter exists as the Cause, (a) because of the finite character of specific objects, (b) because Activity is due to Potency, and (c) because there is differentiation between ‘Cause’ and ‘Effect’.”—As a matter of fact, all these three Reasons are inconclusive, as no reason is provided to preclude a conclusion contrary to the one set forth.

For instance, **even in the absence of a Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter**, the three facts set forth—that of objects having a finite character, etc.—are not inexplicable. For instance, if what is sought to be proved is only the existence of a Cause,—then the argument is superfluous,—‘proving what is already proved’; we also do not admit of any Effect being produced without a Cause; so that if the name ‘Primordial Matter’ were given in general to all Causes, then there would be nothing to quarrel about. On the
other hand, if what is sought to be proved is that 'there is an intelligent Cause, which produces an effect of certain finite dimensions, and acts according to its potencies',—then the Reason adduced becomes invalidated by 'inconclusiveness'; as even in the absence of an intelligent actor, there is nothing incongruous in the production of a particular effect with well-defined dimensions determined by the potencies of its own Cause. Further, it is not right to regard Primordial Matter as intelligent, as it is, *ex hypothesi*, 'insentient', and 'intelligence' is synonymous with 'sentience'.

Further, if by means of the Reason 'Because Activity is due to Potency', it is meant to prove the existence of a mere Cause possessed of potencies not different (from those just needed for the particular effect),—then it is superfluous, proving what is already admitted by both parties. If, on the other hand, the Cause meant to be proved is some *one* Eternal Cause possessed of distinct and diverse potencies,—then the Reason becomes invalidated by 'inconclusiveness'.—Further, as concomitance with any such Reason is not cognised anywhere, the Reason becomes invalidated as being 'Unknown' and 'Inadmissible' also; because as a matter, nowhere has any activity of the Cause towards the producing of an Effect been found to have been due to extraneous and additional potencies; as all potencies subsist in the essence of the thing itself.

Another reason put forward by the *Sāṅkhya* (in *Kārikā* 15) is—“Because of the merging of the whole world”.—This Reason is absolutely 'unknown, Inadmissible'. No such 'merging' of things is known of, all things being liable to such absolute destruction as leave behind no traces at all. If there were such 'merging', it would come about either on the disappearance of the previous condition of the thing concerned, or without such disappearance. If it comes on the disappearance of the previous condition, then it involves the absolute destruction (without leaving any traces) [which the *Sāṅkhya* does not admit]. If, on the other hand, it comes without the said disappearance, then there can be no 'merging' at all; because no 'merging' is possible for any entity so long as it retains its own untramelled essence. Otherwise there would be endless incongruities. Hence the statement 'because of the merging of the whole world' involves a self-contradiction.

Thus, *even in the absence of a Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter*, the diversity relating to the Effect,—in the shape of its being 'finite' and the rest,—and the differentiation also into Cause and Effect—become explicable, *on the basis of the diversity of potencies*. And this means that the reasons set forth by the *Sāṅkhya* are all 'inconclusive'.

The phrase 'and other things' is meant to include the argument (of the *Sāṅkhya*)—“Because all activity is due to Potency”.

Or, the particle 'api', 'even',—in the phrase 'even in the absence, etc. etc.'—may be meant to be restrictive; hence the meaning comes to be this:—It is *only* when there is no Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter that there can be diversity in the Effect due to the diverse potencies of the Cause; and also because it is only thus that the relation of Cause and Effect would be possible;—hence the Reasons put forward (by the *Sāṅkhya*) are 'contradictory'. For instance, if Primordial Matter were the Cause of the 'Manifest', then the whole universe, as being (*ex hypothesi*) of the same
essence as that Matter, would be a single substance having the same character and form as that Matter; so that there could be no such distinction among Products as 'Cosmic Intelligence', 'I-principle', 'Five Rudimentary Substances' and so forth; and this would mean that the World is entirely devoid of 'modification'.—Similarly, it is only in the absence of any such 'Cause as Primordial Matter that the activity of the Potter and other Agents towards the making of the Jar and other things, in accordance with their potencies (powers), would be possible,—which would not be possible if there were such a single Cause as Primordial Matter. This is what has been already explained under Text 21, by the statement—'Nor would there be any efficiency, nor any operation'.

The distinction into 'Cause' and 'Effect' also is possible only 'in the absence of any such single Cause as Primordial Matter'. It has been already pointed out above that no diversity in the world would be possible if there were any entity as Primordial Matter (as the one Cause);—it has also been pointed out that if Primordial Matter were the Cause, then the whole world would be of the same essence as that Matter, which would lead to the absurdity that the entire world is a single substance (without any diversities); and under the circumstances, as there would be no 'diversity of forms' at the very outset, how could there be any 'merging' of it (as declared in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 15)?—(45)

Thus ends the Section on the Examination of the Doctrine of 'Primordial Matter'.

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CHAPTER II.

Examination of the Doctrine of 'God'.

(A)

Statement of the Doctrine of 'God' (Theism).

COMMENTARY.

The next Chapter, beginning with the Text (46), proceeds to prove that there can be no operation of any such Being as the 'Supreme Lord', 'God'.

TEXT (46).

Other philosophers declare the 'Lord' to be the Cause of all things produced; on the ground that no insentient thing, by itself, can produce its effects.—(46)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as things that are not produced,—such as the Atom, Ākāsha and so forth,—are eternal, they have no Cause, hence the Text has added the qualification 'things produced'.—The term 'Lord' stands for God.—'Others'—i.e. the Naiyāyika and other (Theists).—Some of these Theists hold that "the creator of the whole world is a distinct Soul or Spirit with special qualities, the omniscient God";—others hold that "the creator is a Substance (Being) distinct from the 'Soul' or 'Spirit', because He is eternal, one and equipped with the knowledge of all things, and as such having qualities different from those of the 'Spirit' or 'Soul'".

Question—"Where there are already such Causes of the world as Merit and Demerit, Atoms and so forth, why do these philosophers postulate another Cause in the shape of God?"

Answer—'No insentient thing, etc.'—Though Merit and the rest may be the Cause,—yet all these, being devoid of sentience or intelligence, cannot, by themselves, without an Operator or Supervisor, produce their effects; hence there must be a Creator (who is intelligent), as nothing that is devoid of intelligence is ever found to be the Operator. This argument is formulated as follows:—What is devoid of Intelligence cannot produce its Effect, without an Operator;—e.g. such things as Clay-lump, Stick, Water, String and the rest (all which are required for the making of the Jar) cannot produce the Jar, without the Potter;—Merit and the rest (which are regarded as the Cause of the World) are all devoid of Intelligence;—hence the idea that (these are enough to produce the World) would be contrary to the universal Proposition stated. Thus it becomes established that there is an Operator
and that is God.—Even so, Merit and the rest do not become useless (in the producing of the World); because God is only the ‘Efficient Cause’ (Guide, Supervisor) [and Atoms and Merit, etc. would still be needed as the ‘Constituent’ and ‘Contributory’ Causes].

The following objection might be urged:—“Those Merit and Demerit that are held to subsist in the Soul or Spirit (of Man) may be the required Operator; why should one assume a God?”

Answer.—That cannot be right; the particular Spirit at that time (of Creation) would be wholly unconscious;—so long as his Body, Sense-organs and other aggregates of Causes and Effects are not produced, the Spirit remains unconscious, not perceiving even such Colour, etc. as are quite perceptible; under the circumstances, how could it perceive Merit and Demerit, which are entirely imperceptible? To this end, there is the following declaration—‘The ignorant Creature, not master of his own pleasure and pain, may go to Heaven or to the Nethermost Hole,—only as he is urged by God’ [quoted in Nyāyavārttika 4. 1. 21, where the Tātparya speaks of it as ‘Smṛti’].—(46)

The Text proceeds to set forth two Reasons propounded by Aviddhakarṇa (an ancient Naiyāyika) in proof of the existence of God:

**TEXTS (47–48).**

“(A) That which is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its own component parts is subject to a Cause that is endowed with Intelligence,—for instance, the Jar and other objects.—The thing in dispute,—which is perceptible by means of two sense-organs and also imperceptible,—must be preceded (and produced) by a Cause endowed with Intelligence,—Atoms supplying the corroborative instance ‘per Dissimilarity’.”—(48)

**COMMENTARY.**

The argument has been thus formally stated:—“The thing under dispute, which is perceptible by means of two sense-organs or not perceptible at all, must be regarded as produced by an Intelligent Cause,—because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its component parts,—like the Jar, and unlike the Atoms [the Jar being the Corroborative Instance per Similarity, and the Atoms being so per Dissimilarity].”—Now in this formulated argument—‘What is perceptible by means of two Sense-organs’ stands for the three kinds of Substance, Earth, Water and Fire—which are perceptible by means of the two organs of Vision and of Touch, because they fulfil such conditions of perceptibility as being large, being composed of several substances, being coloured and so forth;—the ‘imperceptible’ are Air and the rest, simply because the conditions of perceptibility are ‘being large’, ‘being composed
of several substances', 'being coloured' and so forth,—and all these conditions are absent in Āir and other things; as has been declared in the following passage—“Perception follows from Largeness, Presence of several Substances and Presence of Colour; the Atom is imperceptible because it contains no other substances; Air is imperceptible because it is devoid of the presence of Colour;—the term 'Saṅskāra' stands for subsistence, presence in composition; —and the Diad (Two-Atom-Compound) and other things are imperceptible because of the absence of largeness.”

Now, in this argument, if the Probandum to be proved were stated in the general (unqualified) form that ‘Things perceptible by two sense-organs and those imperceptible are produced by intelligent causes’,—then it would be superfluous, proving what is already admitted by both parties, in regard to such things as the Jar and the like, over which there is no dispute at all. It would involve the fallacy of ‘contradicting one’s own doctrine’, because the Naiyāyika does not admit such imperceptible things as the Atom, Ākāśa, and the like to be ‘produced by an Intelligent Cause’; and also because these latter are eternal (hence not produced at all), the said assertion would involve that contradiction of a perceived (well-recognised) fact.—It is for the purpose of avoiding all these difficulties that the qualifying term ‘under dispute’ has been added; the term ‘Vipratipatti’ standing for different opinions, and that which forms the subject of diverse opinions is said to be the matter under dispute.—With this qualification, what become the ‘subject’ of the argument are only the Body, Sense-organs, the various Regions and so forth; and what is asserted does not apply to the Atom and such other things.

Similarly, if the Probandum (to be proved) were stated in the form that ‘the things under dispute are produced by a Cause’,—then the argument would be futile—proving what is already accepted by both parties. In order to avoid this, the qualification has been added—in the form ‘produced by an intelligent Cause’. This argument, thus stated, cannot be futile as addressed to the Saṅkhya, as there is no Intelligence (Buddhi) for the Saṅkhya apart from Primordial Matter; and certainly a thing cannot be produced by itself.

‘Arrangement of component parts’;—the ‘arrangement’,—i.e. conjunction in the form of ‘aggregation’,—of the parts that go to make up the Things; by this the Things in question are characterised—differentiated; consequently they must be as asserted. More ‘characterisation by components’ would include the universals ‘Cow’ and the like (which also are held to be consisted of components in the shape of the individual animals) and thus render the Reason ‘too wide’; hence the qualification ‘its own components’; what the universal ‘Cow’ and the rest are differentiated by is the arrangement of the parts that go to make up the Substance,—not by the arrangement of the parts that go to make up the Cow itself.

The ‘Intelligent Cause’ thus proved is ‘God’.

It is this proof that has been stated in these two Texts.—The compound ‘Svārambhaka, etc.’ is to be analysed as meaning ‘that which has for its Vishēṣana—differentia—the peculiar, characteristic,—arrangement, disposition—of its own component parts’. This indicates the invariable con-
DOCTRINE OF 'GOD'.

comitance of the Reason (Middle Term) [with the Probandum]. The presence of the Reason in the Subject is indicated by the words 'which is perceptible by means of two organs, etc. etc.'—The expression 'vivādapadam' stands for 'what forms the matter under dispute'.—(47-48)

The second argument propounded (by Aviddhakarṇa) is next explained:

TEXT (49).

"(B) The material cause of the body and other things is controlled by an intelligent being,—because they are endowed with colour and other qualities,—like the yarn and such things which have been seen to bring about their effects (only when controlled by the intelligent weaver)."—(49)

COMMENTARY.

Of the body and other things,—the material cause,—in the shape of atoms and such things—can bring about their effects only when controlled by an intelligent cause;—such is the construction of the text.—The reason (probans) stated is 'because they are endowed with colour, etc.'—The 'yarn, etc.' are cited as the corroborative instance. This has been thus declared—'The material causes of the body, the world and other things produce their effects only when controlled by an intelligent being,—this is what we assert, on the ground that they are endowed with colour, etc.,—like such things as the yarn and the like'.—(49)

Uddyotakara however has formulated the argument as follows:—"The causes of the world,—in the shape of 'primordial matter', 'atoms' and 'destiny' (unseen force)—need a controller with superior intelligence, in the producing of their effects,—because their activity is intermittent,—like the yarn, the shuttle and such other causes (of the cloth)":*—This is the argument set forth in the following text.—

TEXT (50).

"In the producing of their effects, all such causes as merit, demerit and atoms are controlled by an intelligent being,—because they operate intermittently,—like the shuttle and the yarn."—(50)

COMMENTARY.

The meaning of this is quite clear.—(50)

* These words are not found in Uddyotakara's Nyāyaśāstra. This idea is there (under Sūtra 4. 1. 21, p. 463, lines 11 et seq.—Bib. Ind. Edn.); but the exact words are not there. Apparently the Commentator has reproduced the sense of Uddyotakara's argument.
Prashastamati argues as follows:—"All the usages of men, at the beginning of creation must have been preceded by (dependent upon) the teaching of other persons,—because later on, the usage of enlightened men is found to be restricted to particular things,—as for instance, in the case of little boys who have not yet learnt the use of words, it is found that their usage of words as restricted to particular things is always preceded (and brought about) by the teaching of their mother or other persons;—the phrase 'the usages of enlightened men are restricted to particular things' means that the usage of men after enlightenment is found to be so restricted;—that Person to whose teaching usages at the beginning of Creation are due is God, whose superior knowledge does not disappear even at the time of Universal Dissolution".

It is this view that is shown as fully established,—by the Author in the following Text:—

TEXT (51).

"AT THE BEGINNING OF CREATION, USAGE AMONG MEN MUST HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE TEACHING OF OTHER PERSONS;—WHEN THEY BECOME SUBSEQUENTLY AWAKENED TO CONSCIOUSNESS, IT IS FOUND TO BE RESTRICTED TO PARTICULAR THINGS,—LIKE THE USAGE OF LITTLE BOYS."—(51)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'Sarga', 'Creation', stands for 'generation'; the 'beginning' of this is its first moment.—The rest is easily intelligible.—(51)

There are other arguments also put forward by Uddyotakara; these are the following:—"The Manifested World, consisting of the Primary Elemental Substances and the rest, are productive of Pleasure and Pain, only when controlled by an intelligent Cause,—(a) because it is, by itself, insentient, (b) because it is a Product, (c) because it is perishable, and (d) because it is endowed with Colour (or Form) and other qualities,—like the Axe and other things".*

These are the arguments that are set forth in the following two Texts:—

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* This is clearly a brief paraphrase of the arguments stated by Uddyotakara in his Nyāyavārttika, on Śūtra 4. 1. 21, page 463, lines 11 et seq., Biblio. Ind. Edn., where the words are very nearly the same.
TEXTS (52-53).

"The Manifested World, consisting of the Primary Elemental
Substances and the rest, becomes the source of pleasure
and pain to all people, only when controlled by an In-
telligent Cause,—because it is insentient, itself
a product, evanescent and so forth,—like
the axe and other things; thus every-
thing is clearly believed to be
His."—(52-53)

COMMENTARY.

Controlled by an Intelligent Cause,—i.e. controlled by a Cause which is
endowed with sentience.—Thus,—i.e. for the said series of reasons;—'His',
—i.e. of God, the Cause of the entire world.—(52-53)

Question—In what way is God's omniscience proved, by virtue of which
He should become an object of devotion for people seeking for Prosperity
and the Highest Good?

The answer to this is supplied by the following Text—

TEXT (54).

"The fact of His being the Creator of all things having been
established, His omniscience is proved without effort;
because the Creator must be one who knows the
form and all other details regarding what
He has created."—(54)

COMMENTARY.

This has been thus explained by Prashastamati and others:—"The
omniscience of God is proved by the fact of His being the Cause (Creator)
of the entire World; because the Creator must possess full knowledge of all
such details regarding what he creates as its material and contributory
causes, its use, its receiver and so forth. In the world, when a man makes
anything, he knows its material cause, etc.; e.g. it is well known that the
Potter who makes the Jar and such things, knows its material cause, in the
shape of Clay-lump,—its contributory causes, in the shape of the Wheel, etc.,
—its purpose, in the shape of Fetching Water and the like,—and its receiver,
in the shape of the Householder (who uses it); similarly God, who creates
all the worlds, knows their material causes, in the shape of the Atom, etc.,—
their contributory causes, in the shape of Merit, Demerit, Space, Time and so
forth,—also the auxiliaries to their operation, in the shape of the Universal
the Particular and Inherence,—their purpose, in the shape of the Experience
(of Men),—and receivers in the shape of Men. This shows that He is
omniscient.—One who knows the form and other details regarding what he has
created;—'Form and other details',—'Form' stands for character; 'other
'Details' stands for the Material Cause and the rest; the 'Vidaka' of these is one who knows. Such is the sense of the compound. The word 'vidaka' is to be grammatically explained either as included under the group of words beginning with 'yajaka', or as formed with the affix 'aga' in the passive sense—with the reflexive 'ka' added to it.—The rest is easily intelligible.—(54)

There is yet another series of arguments set forth by these persons:—

(A) "That which is the substratum of the variegated and the mobile, and that which is not the substratum of these—which is the thing under dispute,—is cognised through a means of cognition other than the five beginning with the second,—just as Colour, etc. are cognised as distinguished from the character of 'being an entity' and so forth,—the 'Hair of the Tortoise' (a non-entity) being the corroborative instance per dissimilarity".

In the argument as thus worded, the term, 'vichitrodaya' stands for the category of Quality, in the sense that its 'udaya', appearance, is 'vichitra' variegated; the term 'prasyanda' stands for the category of Mobility;—the 'aspada', substratum, of these two is the category of Substance;—that which is not the substratum of these two (Quality and Mobility) stands for the five categories of Quality, Action, Universal, Particular and Inherence;—such a thing is cognised through a Means of Cognition other than the five beginning with the second,—i.e. other than Inference, Analogy, Word, Presumption and Non-apprehension; i.e. through Sense-perception. The rest is easily intelligible.

(B) The other argument propounded by them is in the following form:—"The Thing under dispute,—which is (1) what is embraced by the Particulars of such Universals as 'Being' and the like, and also (2) what is not so embraced,—is perceptible to some one,—because they exist,—like Colour and the rest".—In this statement, the term 'Being and the like' stands for the six non-specific (general) entities,—'Being', 'Evanescent', 'Material Product', 'Cause', 'Universal', 'Particular';—the 'particulars' of these go to specify Substance, Quality and Action;—hence what is 'embraced' by these particulars are these three categories of Substance, Quality and Action;—'what is not so embraced' consists of the Universal and the rest. The rest is easily intelligible.—[And the Person who has the perception of all these things is God.]

This series of arguments is set forth in the following Text:—

TEXT (55).

"The Thing under dispute must clearly be perceptible to some one,—because of such reasons as being a thing, being existent and so forth;—just like the diversities of Pleasure, Pain, etc.—[And this some one is God]."—(55)
(B)

Refutation of the Doctrine of ‘God’ (Theism).

COMMENTARY.

The text now proceeds to supply the answer to the above arguments—

TEXT (56).

The first argument (propounded by the Naiyāyika) is open to the fallacy of being ‘unproven, Inadmissible’; because the existence of any such ‘arrangement’ as ‘Conjunction’ is not proven, nor that of the ‘Composite’.—(56)

COMMENTARY.

In the arguments set forth (under Text 47) in the form ‘What is insentient cannot produce its effect without a controller’,—the Probans (‘because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of component parts’) is one which, without any valid objection, could be cited as proving the contrary of the Probandum (for proving which it has been put forward); and thus its presence in the contrary of the Probandum being suspected, it becomes ‘inconclusive’;—this is what the Text means.

Then again, the Probans that has been put forward in the first argument—‘Because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its component parts’,—is ‘unproven’ and Inadmissible also. How this is so is explained in the next sentence—Because, etc. ;—what is meant by the expression ‘arrangement of component parts’ is a particular kind of Conjunction; and the character of being characterised by this Conjunction is attributed to the substance called ‘Composite’; now both these,—the said Conjunction and also the Composite that it characterises,—are yet ‘unproven’, ‘unknown’ (to at least one of party to the Discussion, the Buddhist, who denies both); hence the Probans cited is doubly ‘unproven Inadmissible’.—(56)

Question—‘In what way are the two unproven?’

The Answer is supplied by the following Text :—
TEXT (57).

Because both the facts that have been assumed (and put forward) are such as are not actually apprehended; and for the same reason the Corroborative Instance also that has been cited has no connection with the Probans cited.—(57)

COMMENTARY.

In brief, the Author for the present states his reason only in the form of 'Non-apprehension', which annuls the Naiyāyika's argument,—a detailed objection to these two arguments will be provided under the Chapters (10–15) dealing with the Six Categories.

Both the facts,—i.e. that have been put forward as the 'Arrangement' and the 'Composite'.—[Both of these are not apprehended] because the 'Arrangement' has been regarded as something visible, in such statements (by the Naiyāyika) as 'Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Higher Universal, the Lower Universal and Action are visible, as inhering in coloured substances'.—The 'Composite' also has been regarded as visible, in the statement—' There is perception of it because it is large, is made up of several component substances and is coloured'.—As a matter of fact however, apart from Colour, etc., no other 'Conjunction' or 'Composite'—such as is accepted by the Naiyāyika,—ever appears in Consciousness. Thus, while fulfilling the conditions of 'perceptibility', if it is not perceived, it must be regarded as non-existent, like the 'Hare's Horns'.—It will not be right to argue that—'inasmuch as Atoms are beyond the reach of the Senses, [if there were no such thing as the Composite composed of the Atoms], the perception of Colour and other qualities would be impossible';—because it is admitted that qualified Atoms are apprehensible by the Senses, and hence they are not 'beyond the reach of the Senses'.—Thus then, both 'Conjunction' and 'Composite' being non-existent, the Jar that has been cited as the Corroborative Instance per similarity is found to be devoid of that character which has been set up as the Probans; this is what is meant by the Text in the words 'has no connection with the Probans, etc.'—(57)

It has thus been shown that the Probans is essentially 'unproven and Inadmissible', on the ground of the qualification and the qualified being 'unknown'; the following Text proceeds to show that it is 'unproven' also on the ground of the unproven (unknown) character of part of its substratum:—
TEXT (58).

VISUAL COGNITION AND TACTILE COGNITION ALWAYS APPEAR DIFFERENTLY; THEY CANNOT THEREFORE HAVE ONE AND THE SAME SUBSTRATUM,—JUST LIKE THE COGNITION OF ODOUR AND OTHER THINGS.—(58)

COMMENTARY.

In the argument (put forward by the Naiyāyika, under verse 48, above) two kinds of things have been mentioned as the ‘Subject’—‘what is perceptible by two Sense-organs’ and ‘what is imperceptible’.—Now as a matter of fact, there is no object that is known (accepted by all parties) to be ‘perceptible by two Sense-organs’; for instance, both Visual Cognition and Tactile Cognition, are known to appear in different forms, respectively as manifesting the Blue and other Colours and as manifesting Hardness, Softness, etc. of the things touched; thus both these cognitions cannot have the same objective,—because they appear as different,—like the Cognitions of Odour, Taste and other things. The argument may be formulated thus:—Any two cognitions appearing in different forms cannot have the same objective,—like the Cognitions of Odour and Taste,—the Visual and Tactile Cognitions do appear in different forms;—hence the attributing of both to a single object would be a direct contravention of the said universal proposition.—If, even when appearing in different forms, Cognitions were to have the same objective, then the Cognitions of Colour, Sound and such diverse things also might be regarded as having the same objective; this is the reason that annuls the argument of the Naiyāyika.—(58)

[Says the Naiyāyika]—"If the two Cognitions (Visual and Tactile) cannot have the same objective, then how is it that there is the recognition in the form that 'I am touching in the dark the same jar that I had seen in the light'?—Hence the proposition set forth (by the Buddhist) is annulled by Inference. The Inference has been formulated by Uddiyotakara in the following form—'The two Cognitions under dispute,—the Visual Cognition and the Tactile Cognition,—have the same object,—because it is recalled (recognised),—like the Cognition of the Blue Lotus'.'

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—

* This discussion is a clear reference to Nyāya-Sūtra 3. 1. 1—'Darshana-sparśanābhāyāmēkārthagrahanāt'.
† This is a reference to Nyāya Vārtika, 3. 1. 1, page 350, Bib. Ind.
As a matter of fact, what brings about the joint cognition (involved in Recognition) is the fact that Recognition consists in an assumption arising out of the potencies of the two cognitions concerned.—Thus, such things as water, fire and the like are not perceptible by two sense-organs; and hence the probans (of the Naiyāyika) is found to have its substratum 'unproven, inadmissible', as is indicated by the 'unproven' character of the object itself.—(60)

COMMENTARY.

'Tayoḥ'—i.e. of the Visual and Tactile Cognitions as apprehending (respectively) Colour only and Touch only;—'Potency' is capacity;—out of that capacity arises the assumption, which constitutes—forms the essence of—the 'Recognition' (in question).—This shows that Recognition is not perceptible; firstly, because it is an essentially wrong cognition, apprehending as one what is really not one,—and secondly, because its very essence lies in an assumption.—Nor is there any other Means of Cognition (available for bringing about a valid notion of Recognition); firstly, because it apprehends what has been already covered by previous Cognitions, and as such it apprehends what has been already apprehended (and as such, is not of the nature of a Direct Valid Cognition); and secondly, because it is essentially wrong. From all this it follows that the Reason put forward (by the Naiyāyika)—"Because there is Recognition"—is 'inconclusive'. If the validity of Recognition had been established and admitted, then the Reason would not be open to the charge of being 'inconclusive'; because in cases where notions of such things as the Jar and the like have appeared,—taking in, in accordance with the capacity of things, a common idea of its Colour and other details,—if the Colour and the Touch have been duly apprehended, each by itself, by the organs of Vision and of Touch, then, at some future time, if the impressions of the things perceived present themselves accompanied by signs indicative of those things, there appears the notion of 'unity', 'sameness', which is essentially wrong, and is of the nature of 'Remembrance' (not Direct Cognition). It is for this reason that in this joint notion, the Colour—Blue,—also presents itself; though it is not
right that the notion of Colour should appear in the notion of Touch; as Colour is perceptible by the Organ of Vision (not of Touch).—For these reasons, the only reasonable view is what the Teachers have stated in the following words:—'After one has perceived by the Visual and Tactile Organs, each in its own way, there appears, subsequently, a notion, joining the two perceptions and apprehending the two objects conjointly as one unit; and this notion is of the nature of Remembrance'.

Objection—'In case the conjoint entity (Colour and Touch combined) has been previously actually perceived, then it would be right to regard this as Remembrance; but, you (Buddhists) do not admit of any joint entity, apart from the individual things, Colour and the rest,—which could have been thus previously perceived; and if Colour and the rest were only individually perceived, then the Remembrance could only be one of 'Colour' only, or of 'Touch' only and so forth,—and not of the 'Jar'; and in regard to things that have not been previously cognised, there can be no Remembrance;—then how could any Remembrance arise in regard to the joint entity (as asserted by your Teachers)?'

This is not right, we reply. It is not asserted that the joint entity that is previously perceived is something distinct from Colour and the rest;—your objection would hold only if the assertion of our Teachers meant this; what is meant however is that those same Colour and the rest, when serving the fruitful purpose of holding water and the like, come to be collectively called the 'Jar'; and what happens is that after each of those Colour and the rest, has been perceived by means of each of their pertinent sense-organs,—there appears, at some future time, the Remembrance of these under the appellation of 'Jar', which bears the impressions of the said perceptions.—Or the 'Joint Entity' may be regarded as 'conceptual', and being of the nature of a 'conceptual entity', as apprehended by its own cognition; under the circumstances, why cannot Remembrance of such a Joint Entity be possible?

From all this it is clear that the Reason (put forward by the Naiyāyika),—'Because of the peculiar arrangements of its component parts',—has its substratum 'unproven'.—'Why so? '—The Answer is—By the 'unproven' character of the object itself; that is, the object as stated by the Naiyāyika in the form 'perceptible by two sense-organs' is not proven, unknown; and thus the Reason having its substratum 'unproven', becomes itself open to the fallacy of being 'unproven', 'unknown, Inadmissible'.—(59-60)

Thus it has been shown that the Reason (put forward by the Naiyāyika) is 'unproven' in three ways—'unproven' regarding its qualified (subject), 'unproven' regarding the qualification of that subject, and 'unproven' regarding its substratum; the following Text proceeds to show a fourth kind of 'unproven-ness' as pointed out by the Teacher:—
TEXTS (61-62).

In the case of Temples and such things, the presence of a peculiar arrangement (of component parts) is distinctly perceived,—from which perception follows the cognition (inferential) of an intelligent builder,—even when no such builder is actually seen; if, in the case of such objects as the Body, the Mountain and the like, a similar peculiar arrangement of parts were distinctly perceived, then it would be correct to deduce from this perception as the reason, the conclusion that is desired (by the Naiyāyika).

(61-62)

COMMENTARY.

That 'peculiar arrangement of parts' which is known,—through affirmative and negative concomitance,—as produced by the operations of an intelligent builder, in the case of such things as the Temple and the like;—on the perception of such a peculiar arrangement of parts, the notion is deduced that the Temple has had an intelligent builder, even though no such Builder is actually seen at the time;—if a similar 'arrangement of parts' were put forward in connection with such 'subjects' as the Body, the Mountain and so forth,—then your desired conclusion might have been proved. Because when the affirmative and negative concomitance between a Cause and an Effect has been duly discussed, that Effect can never fail to be produced by that Cause; for if it did, it would cease to be the Cause.—As a matter of fact however, no such 'peculiar arrangement of parts' is so well known as regards the Tree, the Mountain and such things; all that is known is only the bare babbling that 'there is an arrangement'. A certain character which, by its very nature, stands as something distinct, does not cease to be so distinct by mere assertion; and if brought forward as a Reason or 'Probans', such a character cannot be sufficient to prove the desired conclusion; as the presence of such a character would not be incompatible even with the contrary of that conclusion. As for example, when the character of 'being a product of Clay' is brought forward as a Reason for proving that the Anthill has been 'built by the Potter'.—Such is the meaning of the Text taken as a whole.

The meaning of the words of the Text is now explained:—From which perception follows the cognition of an intelligent builder,—i.e. from the perception of which 'peculiar arrangement' there would follow the inference of an intelligent cause.—In the case of such objects as the Body, etc. etc.;—'Tanu'
DOCTRINE OF 'GOD'.

is Body; 'Agā' is mountain, or Tree; the phrase 'and the like' includes such things as the Ocean and so forth.—The conclusion that is desired,—
i.e. the fact of being the work of an intelligent maker.—'Sādhana' is proof.—(61-62)

Question—"In what way would it be correct" (to draw the desired conclusion)?

The Answer is provided by the following Text:

TEXTS (63-65).

WHEN A CERTAIN THING IS DEFINITELY RECOGNISED, THROUGH AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE, AS THE EFFECT OF A CERTAIN CAUSE, THEN, THE PERCEPTION OF THAT EFFECT MUST PROVE THAT CAUSE;—SUCH IS THE STANDING LAW.—THE 'PECULIAR ARRANGEMENT OF PARTS' IN SUCH DIVERSE THINGS AS THE BODY, THE MOUNTAIN AND THE LIKE HOWEVER IS NOT AN EFFECT OF THIS KIND; THERE IS A MERE ASSERTION TO THAT EFFECT.—SUCH A REASON, WHEN PUT FORWARD, Renders the conclusion open to Doubt and Denial, as it does when put forward for proving that 'the Anthill is the work of the Potter'.—(65)

COMMENTARY.

The Effect,—e.g. smoke;—of a certain cause,—e.g. Fire;—definitely recognised,—in regard to Fire, etc.;—the perception of that effect—when the effect in the shape of Smoke is seen.

"If that is so, then the same may be the case with the matter under dispute also."

The answer is—The peculiar arrangement however, etc.

"If the peculiar arrangement is proved by the general assertion, then, it can very well be put forward as the Reason."

Answer—Such a reason, etc.—Such—i.e. based on mere assertion.—Work of the Potter, etc.;—the reason being 'the fact of its being a product of Clay'.

Thus then, the conclusion arrived at is that the 'peculiar arrangement' in question is 'unproven', and as for mere 'arrangement', that is 'inconclusive'.—(63-65)

In the following Text the Opponent urges that what the Buddhist has put forward is only a 'Futile Rejoinder':—
TEXT (66).

"What has been put forward (by you) is only a 'Futile Rejoinder', as it is based upon the assumption of a particular character; while what has been put forward (by us, the Naïyāyīka) is only the general character of 'Effects'."—(66)

COMMENTARY.

"What you have urged is only a 'Futile Rejoinder', that particular form of it which is put forward 'per parity of the character of effect'. For instance, when it is argued that 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced', the man putting forward the Futile Rejoinder says—'The character of being produced that you put forward as the Reason,—do you mean this character as: (1) subsisting in such things as the Jar? (2) Or as subsisting in Sound? Or (3) as subsisting in both (Jar and Sound)? The first alternative is not possible, as the subsistence of this Reason in the subject (of your syllogism, Sound) would be 'unproved'; in fact the character of one thing (the Jar) cannot subsist in another thing (Sound). The second alternative also cannot be accepted, as there would be no Corroborative Instance fulfilling the conditions of the Reason. The third alternative also would be open to both these objections. This has been explained to be an example of that Futile Rejoinder which is named 'Per Parity of the character of the effect'; as stated in the following words:—'When the Conclusion is shown to be not-proved on the basis of even the slightest deviation from the character of the Effect, it is Futile Rejoinder'.

"In the case under consideration the inference of non-eternity is sought to be proved on the basis of the generic character of the 'Effect', not on any particular aspect of it. Hence if a Rejoinder is put forward on the basis of the assumption of a particular character (or aspect),—when the Reason or Probans has been put forward by the other party on the basis of its general character,—this is a Futile Rejoinder, named 'per Parity of the character of Effect'. In short, this is based upon the assumption of a different character and hence is a Futile Rejoinder."—(66)

The above is answered by the following Text:—

TEXT (67).

[In the example of Futile Rejoinder cited] the mere thing (Effect in General), as excluded from all that is not that Thing (not-Effect), does really prove non-eternity, on account of its being of the same essence as that. But as regards the Probans under discussion, there is no reason for it at all.—(67)

COMMENTARY.

The argument put forward above (against which the example of Futile Rejoinder has been cited) is quite right and proper; because the mere fact
of being an effect (Product) in General does prove non-eternity (Evanescence); because between these two there is that invariable concomitance which consists in being of the same essence.—In the case of the reasoning put forward (by the Naiyāyika) however, there is no such reason behind the Probans as put forward by the Naiyāyika—viz. "Because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its component parts"; specially as 'arrangement of parts' in general is a factor the contrary of which is not precluded by any incongruity; hence the requisite 'invariable concomitance' is not available. In fact any such concomitance in the form of 'being produced from it'—on the cognition of which the consequent conclusion could become accepted even when one does not actually perceive the actual operation of the Cause,—is absolutely unknown, inadmissible. This is what is meant by the Text.—(67)

The following text proceeds to show that the Naiyāyika's reasoning would be open to the fallacy of 'Indecision' (Inconclusiveness), even if he gave up the idea of 'concomitance' being of a particular kind (i.e. invariable) and intended it to be in the general form (of mere concomitance in general).

TEXT (68).

As a matter of fact, the Smoke that has been seen to be invariably concomitant with Fire is white; and yet the mention of mere 'whiteness' could not prove the existence of Fire; if it did, then that existence could be inferred even from the 'Snow'.—(68)

COMMENTARY.

"How is it then that the Futile Rejoinder is cited?"
The answer is given in the following Text:—

TEXT (69).

When the invariable concomitance (premiss) is stated in the general form, and the objection urged against it is on the basis of a particular aspect of it,—then this is said to be a Futile Rejoinder.—(69)

COMMENTARY.

In a case where the invariable concomitance of the Probandum with the Probans is definitely known to be in a general way,—specially by means of the right cognition of its absence in the contrary of the 'Subject',—and yet the objection that is urged against it is on the basis of a particular aspect or character (of the Probans),—then such an objection constitutes a 'Futile
Rejoinder'.—In the case of the reasoning (put forward by the Naiyāyika) however, the invariable concomitance cited is not known to be in the general form; the Probans that has been objected to as being ‘unproven’ is one that has been put forward as being concomitant with a particular ‘arrangement of component parts’; hence this objection is not of the nature of a ‘Futile Rejoinder’.—(69)

If a general character could bring about the cognition of a thing even without being invariably concomitant with it, then absurdity could result;—this is what is shown in the following Text:—

TEXT (70).

THE MERE CHARACTER OF ‘BEING DENOTED BY THE TERM Go’ (AS A GENERAL CHARACTER) MIGHT PROVE THE ‘PRESENCE OF HORNS’ IN THE QUARTERS AND OTHER THINGS (WHICH ARE ALL denoted by the term ‘Go’).—IF THE REASONING WERE NOT ADOPTED IN A DIFFERENT FORM.—(70)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Heaven, Quarters, Speech, Eyes, Rays, Thunderbolt, Earth and Water,—all these things are ‘denoted by the term Go’; if, on the basis of this general character of ‘being denoted by the term Go’, it were sought to be proved that a particular Cow of variegated colour has horns,—then on the basis of the same character, it would be possible to infer the presence of Horns in Heaven, etc. also.—(70)

The following might be urged (by the Naiyāyika):—“As a matter of fact, there is invariable concomitance between the character of ‘having a peculiar arrangement of component parts’ and that of ‘being produced by an intelligent Cause’,—just as there is between this latter and the character of ‘being a Product (Effect)’.”

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (71).

IF IT WERE PROVED BY SOME VALID MEANS OF COGNITION THAT THERE IS AN INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE BETWEEN THE PROBANS AND THE PROBANDUM (CITED BY THE NAIYĀYIKA), THEN, THE CONCLUSION WOULD BE FULLY ESTABLISHED BY REASONING, AND NO ONE COULD HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY AGAINST IT.—(71)

COMMENTARY.

But, as a matter of fact, no such Invariable Concomitance is proved; this is what the Author proceeds to show by the following Text:—
But the existence of a Being who is eternal, one, and the substratum of eternal all-embracing consciousness,—can never be proved; as the invariable concomitance (premiss) that may be cited would be devoid of the probandum.—(72)

Commentary.

What you (Naiyāyika) desire to prove is, not only that the World has been created by an Intelligent Maker, but that it is preceded (produced) by the intelligent Entity known as God, who is the Cause of the whole World, being himself one, eternal and the substratum of an eternal all-embracing consciousness. In fact, it is this entity that forms the subject of dispute. The existence of such a Being cannot be proved;—why?—because the invariable concomitance (that might be put forward to prove Its existence) will be devoid of the probandum (the character to be proved); for the simple reason that any positive corroborative instance that might be cited in the form of the Jar and such things would be lacking in the element of similarity that is essential [the maker of the Jar not having all the character that is predicated of God], and this would make it impossible to prove the necessary invariable concomitance between the Probans and the probandum; as in no particular instance (of any product) is there any invariable concomitance between the Probans and the character of the probandum as postulated (by the Naiyāyika).—(72)

With a view to showing the same, the following text proceeds to add the following:—

Text (73).

For instance, all such products as houses, steps, gateways, towers and the like are definitely known to have been made by makers who have been many, and with fleeting ideas.—(73)

Commentary.

Further, the probans is not only 'unproven' and 'inconclusive'; it is also 'contradictory';—this is what is shown by the Author in the following text:—

Text (74).

For the same reason, the probans is also detrimental to what is desired; inasmuch as what it establishes is [a cause] that is many, and the substratum of fleeting ideas.—(74)

Commentary.

For the same reason,—i.e. because the invariable concomitance (premiss) is contrary to the probandum (which is desired to be proved).—What the
term 'also' indicates is that the Probans is not only 'unproven' and 'inconclusive', as shown above [but it is also 'Contradictory'].—(74)

[Says the Naist—"The Probans would be 'Contradictory' only if it were invariably concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum; in the case in question however, there is (as you say) no invariable concomitance even with the mere character of 'having an intelligent Cause'; how then could there be any such concomitance with any particular form of that character (which alone could be contrary to the desired conclusion) ?"

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (75).

The invariable concomitance that has been asserted by you is only with reference to the Probandum in the form of 'the character of having an Intelligent Cause'; and we are going to assert it clearly with reference to a second (different, contrary) Probandum.—(75)

COMMENTARY.

You, Theist, in asserting the existence of God, have set forth an Invariable Concomitance in reference to the Probandum in the shape of 'the character of having an Intelligent Cause'; if that were not so, and if this general proposition (premiss) also were not admitted, then how could it have been possible to prove that all things have God for their Creator?—Thus then, we admit (for the sake of Argument) the premiss from your view-point—that 'Things have an Intelligent Cause',—and then proceed to show clearly that your Probans is invariably concomitant with a particular Probandum which is 'Second'—contrary—to that particular Probandum which you desire to prove;—this 'Second' Probandum being 'the character of being preceded (produced) by a person of evanescent and many Cognitions (Ideas)'.—(75)

Question—"How are you going to show this clearly ?"
The answer is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (76).

For us, eternal things cannot produce any effects, because 'consecutive' and 'concurrent' action are mutually contradictory; and if objects are consecutive, there must be the same consecutiveness in their cognitions also.—(76)

COMMENTARY.

Any such eternal things as God and the like cannot produce any effects; because in any productive activity of an Eternal Thing, there is incompatibility
between 'Consecutiveness' and 'Concurrence'; hence only non-eternal things can be productive causes; as it is these alone which go on unceasingly changing their sequential character—of being present now and past at the next moment. Thus it is proved that an Intelligent Maker must be evanescent and many.

As regards the assertion (of the Naiyāyika) that "God is endowed with eternal and one Consciousness"—this is contrary to all reason; this is what is indicated by the words 'If objects are consecutive, etc.' [Objects being fleeting, evanescent, according to the Naiyāyika also, their cognitions also must be evanescent; hence there can be no eternal cognition or consciousness].—(76)

What has been just asserted (in the second line of the preceding Text) is further supported by the following Text:—

TEXT (77).

GOD'S COGNITION MUST BE CONSECUTIVE, BECAUSE IT IS RELATED TO CONSECUTIVE COGNISABLE THINGS;—JUST LIKE THE COGNITION OF DEVADATTA AND OTHER PERSONS, RELATING TO FLAME AND OTHER THINGS.—(77)

COMMENTARY.

That Cognition of which the object is consecutive must itself be consecutive; just as we find in the case of the cognition of Dēvadatta and other men pertaining to such things as Flame and the like;—and God's Cognition has for its object only such things as are consecutive. This is a Reason based upon the nature of things. And as this reasoning is put forward only by way of exposing the incongruity involved (in the Theist's position), [and not as a formal Inferential Argument],—it will not be right to urge against it the fact of the Probans being 'unproven' (not admitted by both parties). Inasmuch as the Cognition of Dēvadatta and others relating to such things as 'Universal' and the rest (which are held to be eternal) would be devoid of the main characteristic of the Probans (evanescence of the Object),—the instance cited is that of things like the Flame (which all parties admit to be evanescent).

Question—"What is the actual proof (argument) which annuls (the Theist's reasonings) ?"

Answer—If God's Cognition manifesting itself is produced by an object which is consecutive, then it becomes proved that it must be consecutive;—if it is not so produced, then, as there would be no proximate contact (with the Object and the Cognition), God could not cognise the Object at all. And the result of this would be either that Cognitions would have to be held as valid even in the absence of their object, or you would have to renounce your doctrine (regarding the omniscience of God). There would be a further absurdity that, in regard to such objects as have been destroyed, or have not yet been produced, the Cognition (of God) would be objectless. —This is the argument that annuls the Theist's reasonings.—(77)
It has been asserted (by the Naiyāyika, under Text 48 above) that—
“Atoms supply the corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity [in support of the reasoning that ‘the World must have an Intelligent Cause, because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of component parts’]”.

The Author proceeds to show in the following Text that the said Instance per Dissimilarity is one from which the character of the Probandum is not excluded:—

TEXTS (78-79).

The Jar and other things are regarded by us as mere aggregates of Atoms; and the Potter and other men who make those things are only makers of the Atoms; hence the character that you mean to prove (i.e. your Probandum) is not excluded (absent) from the Atom which has been cited (by you) as a Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity.—(78-79)

COMMENTARY.

The ‘Composite’ is going to be denied by us in detail (under Chapter 10); and it has already in a way been denied; hence (there being no such composite whole as the Jar) the Potter must be regarded as the ‘maker’ of Atoms only; and thus the ‘character to be proved’,—that of being made by an Intelligent Maker,—is one that is not excluded from the Atoms, which have been cited as an Instance per dissimilarity; and thus the Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity that has been cited (by the Theist, in support of his reasoning) is found to be open to the defect that the character of the Probandum is not absent from it [and hence it cannot serve as an instance per dissimilarity].—(78-79)

The following might be urged:—“If what we had desired to prove were the particular phase of any character, then the Corroborative Instance per Similarity cited by us (in the form of the Jar) might have been open to the defect of being devoid of the character sought to be proved (Probandum); as it is however, what we are seeking to prove is only the general character of ‘being produced by an Intelligent Cause’; and when that General thesis has been proved, then, by implication, God becomes proved as the Cause (Maker) of the Tree and other things. Potter, etc. cannot be the maker of these things, as they are of the Jar and such other things; because the General character is further specified by a particular characteristic. For instance, in the case of such things as the Tree and the like, it is not possible that there should be any other Maker; and the implication of this recognised fact is that, even without the specific mention of a particular character (of the Maker), it is God alone that comes to be recognised as the Maker of these things.”

The answer to this is supplied in the following Text:—
DOCTRINE OF ‘GOD’.

TEXT (80).

IF THE CHARACTER OF ‘BEING PRODUCED BY AN INTELLIGENT CAUSE’
IS MEANT TO BE PROVED ONLY IN A GENERAL FORM, THEN WE
HAVE NO DISPUTE WITH YOU; AS ALL DIVERSITY IS
DUE TO ACTIONS.—(80)

COMMENTARY.

If it is as you now explain, then your argument is open to the objection
of being futile—seeking to prove what is already admitted by all parties.—
“How so?”—Because all diversity,—i.e. the diverse character of the world
that exists,—is due to Actions,—i.e. brought about by common and uncommon,
good and bad, deeds. Hence men performing the good and bad actions, who
are all intelligent beings, become the cause of all this. And (in this form
we also accept the general proposition that ‘Things are produced by Intelligent
Causes’); so your argument becomes ‘futile’.—(80)

If (in order to avoid this) it be held that “the proposition sought to
be proved is in a particular (not the General) form”,—then the answer is as
given in the following Text:

TEXT (81).

IF WHAT YOU SEEK TO PROVE IS THE FACT THAT THE WORLD IS CREATED
BY A CAUSE WHO IS ONE AND WHOSE CONSCIOUSNESS IS ETERNAL,
—THEN THERE IS ABSENCE OF THE PROBANDUM (IN THE
INSTANCE); AND IT IS ‘INCONCLUSIVE’ ALSO, SINCE
SUCH THINGS AS THE HOUSE AND THE LIKE ARE
FOUND TO BE MADE BY SEVERAL MAKERS.—(81)

COMMENTARY.

Though this has been already explained under Text 73 above, yet it is
asserted again with a view to clinching the argument.—The compound
‘Nityaikabuddhipûrvatvam’ may be taken to mean either ‘produced by
one who is eternal and has a single Consciousness’, or ‘produced by one
whose Consciousness is eternal and one’.—Absence of the Probandum;—i.e.
in what has been cited as the Corroborative Instance per similarity;—also
‘inconclusiveness’;—i.e. of the Probands—(this has to be supplied).—“How?”
—The answer is—Since such things as the House, etc. etc.—(81)

It has been asserted (by the Theist, above, under Text 49) that “The
material Cause of the Tree and other things is controlled by an Intelligent
Being, etc. etc.”

The answer to these arguments is given in the following Text :—
TEXT (82).

AGAINST THE OTHER REASONINGS (OF THE THEIST) ALSO, THIS SAME CRITICISM MAY BE URGED mutatis mutandis; SOME OTHER CRITICISM ALSO IS NOW BEING BRIEFLY SET FORTH.—(82)

COMMENTARY.

As against the reason 'Because they have colour, etc.', this same criticism may be urged: This same,—as follows:—(a) It is Unproven; (b) as there is no Invariable Concomitance, it is Inconclusive; (c) if there is Invariable Concomitance, it is Contradictory; (d) the Instance is devoid of the Probandum; (e) if the Conclusion is meant to be general, it is futile, and so forth.—For instance, that presence of Colour, etc. which is controlled by an Intelligent Controller is not admitted as being present in the Tree, etc.;—mere 'presence of Colour' by itself is not invariably concomitant (with the Probandum); hence the Probans is Inconclusive; if there is invariable concomitance, then, it becomes contradictory, as proving a conclusion contrary to the one desired;—the Corroborative Instance per similarity is devoid of the Probandum, as no concomitance is admitted with the character of 'being controlled by an eternal and one Intelligent Being';—if the conclusion is meant to be in the general form, then the argument is futile; if it is meant to be specific, then it is inconclusive (Doubtful), the contrary being found to be the case with such things as the Jar and the like.—In this same manner, the criticism may be applied to the other reasons also.—(82)

Another reason has been put forward (by the Theist, under Text 50)—'because they operate intermittently [all such Causes as Merit, Demerit and Atoms must be controlled by an Intelligent Being]'...

Against this an additional objection is put forward in the following Text:—

TEXT (83).

'INTERMITTENT ACTION' OF ATOMS AND OTHER CAUSES IS NOT PROVEN (ADMITTED); AS THERE IS 'PERPETUAL FLUX', ALL THINGS ARE UNDERGOING DESTRUCTION EVERY MOMENT; IT IS ALSO 'INCONCLUSIVE' IN REFERENCE TO THAT SAME (GOD), AS HIS ACTIVITY ALSO IS CONSECUTIVE (HENCE INTERMITTENT).—(83)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, all things (according to us) disappear immediately on appearance, and they do not remain in existence even for a single moment; how then can the action of these be 'intermittent'? This Reason therefore is one that is 'unproven, inadmissible', for your Opponent. It is also 'incon-
clusive', in reference to the same—God; as God also operates only intermittently over things which appear consecutively; and yet He is not controlled by an Intelligent Being; for if He were, then there would be no need to posit such Intelligent Controllers.—If the Reason be meant to be qualified by the qualifying phrase 'being insentient',—as has been actually done by Prashastamati,—even so the 'inconclusiveness' remains unavoidable; as the exclusion of the contrary of the Probandum remains doubtful. That Reason alone can be regarded as logical which serves to exclude the Probans from the contrary of the Probandum; that however which does not entirely set aside all doubt of the presence of the Probans in the contrary of the Probandum,—even if put forward,—is as good as not there (i.e. ineffective). Further, even with the said qualification, the Reason remains open to the aforesaid defects of being 'unproven' and the rest.—(83)

As regards the argument (put forward by the Theist under Text 51, above) that—"At the beginning of Creation usage among men must have been due to the teaching of other persons, etc. etc.'—it is answered by the following Text:

TEXT (84).

ACCORDING TO US, AT DISSOLUTION, PERSONS DO NOT CONTINUE TO REMAIN WITH ALL CONSCIOUSNESS AND MEMORY COMPLETELY LOST; BECAUSE THEY ARE BORN IN EFFULGENT REGIONS, AND FROM THESE LATTER THEY ARE BORN AGAIN IN THIS WORLD.—(84)

COMMENTARY.

In Text (51) the Theist has used the qualifying phrase, 'when they become awakened to consciousness'; but such a qualification is absurd. Because under our theory, it is not true that at Dissolution, there remain Persons with all consciousness and memory lost and with all organs enfeebled; what happens is that they are born in Luminous Regions, in celestial bodies, endowed with superior forms of clear consciousness; those however who have still got to expiate their Karmic residue through the fruition of particularly sinful and other deeds become born in other material regions; so that even at the time of the future evolution of the world (following after Dissolution), those same persons fall down from the Luminous and other regions and become born in this world, without losing all consciousness and memory. Hence any such qualification as 'when they become subsequently awakened to consciousness' is absurd.

Further, the Reason put forward is also 'inconclusive', because its absence from the contrary of the Probandum is doubtful. And if all that is meant to be proved is the fact of 'being preceded by the teaching of other persons',—then the argument is 'Futile', as all parties are agreed that in the matter of usage, which is beginningless, dependence on mutual teaching is inevitable.—If then what is meant to be proved is the fact of its being
preceded by the teaching of the particular person called God’, then the Reason put forward is ‘Inconclusive’,—because as a matter of fact, it is actually possible in other ways also (without such teaching). The Corroborative Instance also, in this case, would be devoid of the Probandum. This has already been urged before as a general defect (in the Theist’s argument).—(84).

The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason put forward is also ‘Contradictory’ and the Conclusion is contrary to the Theist’s own doctrines:—

TEXT (85).

THEN AGAIN, THE ‘TEACHERSHIP’ OF A MOUTHLESS PERSON CAN ONLY BE A MATTER OF BLIND FAITH; GOD’S ‘MOUTHLESSNESS’ IS PROVED BY HIS HAVING NO BODY, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE IN HIM OF MERIT AND DEMERIT.—(85)

COMMENTARY.

If it were possible for usage to be preceded by (due to) God’s teaching, then the Reason not be ‘Contradictory’; as it is however, God having no mouth, it is not possible for Him to be a teacher; and the fact of His having no mouth is proved by His having no body,—i.e. because He is devoid of a body.—Question—“But how do you know that He has no body?”—Answer—On account of the absence in Him of Merit and Demerit; that is, in God there is no Merit and Demerit, which are the causes of Souls having bodies. This has been thus declared by Uddyotakara:—’Proof is available for the presence of Intelligence in God, but there is no proof for the presence of such qualities as Merit and the rest’.—Thus the ‘teacherness’ of God being impossible, usage cannot be attributed to His teaching; what is indicated is only the fact of its being due to the teaching of some persons other than God; and thus by discarding what is desired to be proved, the Reason becomes ‘Contradictory’.

Even if God’s ‘teacherness’ is admitted, the doctrine that He is ‘mouthless’ becomes abandoned; and in this way the conclusion becomes contrary to the Theist’s own doctrine.

As regards the argument—‘The manifest consisting of the Primary Elements and the rest being controlled by an Intelligent Controller, etc. etc.’ (put forward by Uddyotakara, in Nyāyavārtika, p. 463, and quoted in the Text 52),—it can be shown that the Reasons cited there also, as before, are (a) ‘inconclusive’, as there is no proof against a contrary conclusion,—(b) ‘futile’, if the reason is meant to be stated generally,—and (c) if it is

* This is an exact quotation from the Nyāyavārtika, p. 468, ll. 12 et. seq., Bib. Ind. Ed., with this slight difference that for ‘Sutte’ in the present context, Nyāyavārtika has ‘Sambhavē’.
meant to be particular, then the Corroborative Instance cited is devoid of
the Probandum.—(85)

Having refuted in detail the arguments put forward for proving the
existence of God, the following Text proceeds to urge the defects in the
Invariable Concomitance (Premiss, on which the Theist bases his arguments),
and thereby to establish his own view:—

TEXT (86).

IN ALL THE ARGUMENTS, THE INvariable CONCOMITANCE (PREMISS) IS
CONTRARY TO INference; AND THERE CAN BE NO INvariable
CONCOMITANCE OF THE PROBANS ON THE BASIS OF A
CONTRARY (FALSE) CHARACTER.—(86)

COMMENTARY.

In every one of the arguments put forward (by the Theist), the Invariable
Concomitance that has been cited as between the Probans and the Probandum,
is contrary to Inference,—as is going to be explained later on.

Question—"Why is not this contrariness to Inference urged against the
conclusion (of the Theist) ?"

Answer—It would be so urged if the conclusion formed part of the Proof
(Reasoning). As a matter of fact however, the Conclusion does not, either
directly or indirectly, form part of the proving of the Probandum; hence
when what is going to be done is the urging of objections against the proof
of the Probandum, if the party urged the defects in the Conclusion, he would
become subject to the Clincher of 'Urging what is not a defect'. It is for
this reason that in connection with the statement of proofs, the defects of the
Conclusion should not be urged. If in some cases, a defect in the Conclusion
is actually urged, there also it should be taken as having been urged only
for the purpose of demolishing the Invariable Concomitance.—Or such
instances may be regarded as possible only in cases where the Conclusion
alone has been asserted (without any reasoning in support of it).

Question—"Even at the time that the Invariable Concomitance is put
forward, how can there be contrariness to Inference ?"

Answer—There can be no invariable concomitance, etc.—'Contrary character'
—is that which is opposed to all Means of Valid Cognition, false; as such a
character would be impossible (non est), an invariable concomitance with it
would be impossible; certainly there can be no invariable concomitance with
what does not exist.—(86)

Question—"What is that Inference by which the Invariable Concomitance
is annulled ?"

The answer is provided by the following Text:—
TEXT (87).

God cannot be the cause of born things,—because he is himself devoid of birth,—like the ‘sky-lotus’. Otherwise, all things would come into existence simultaneously.—(87)

COMMENTARY.

That which is itself devoid of birth cannot be the cause of anything;—as the ‘sky-lotus’,—God is devoid of birth;—hence the proposition that He is the cause would be contrary to the Universal Premiss.—This argument is meant only to indicate an absurdity in the doctrine of the Opponent; hence it is not open to the objection that the substratum of its reason (probans) is ‘unproven’.

Otherwise, all things would come into existence simultaneously;—what is meant is that, if the Cause were one whose efficiency is never obstructed, then all things would come into existence simultaneously,—exactly like things which are admitted to be produced at one and the same time.

This argument is the proof that annuls the invariable concomitance of the theist. Or this may be taken merely as stating the sense of what has been said before.

The absurdity (involved in the theist’s position) is to be shown in this manner:—When the Cause is present, in its complete form, then the Effect must appear as a matter of course; just as it is found in the case of the sprout which appears as soon as the final stage has been reached by the causal conditions conducive to it;—now under the doctrine of the theist, as God, the cause of all things, would always be there and free from defects, all things, the whole world, should come into existence at once.

The following argument might be urged:—‘God is not the only Cause (of all things); in fact what He does He does through the help of such auxiliary causes as merit and the rest,—God Himself being only the efficient (controlling) Cause. So that so long as merit and the rest are not there, the ‘cause’ of things cannot be said to be present there in its efficient form.’

This is not right; if there is help that has got to be rendered to God by the auxiliary causes, then alone could He be regarded as dependent upon their aid; as a matter of fact however, God is eternal and as nothing can introduce into Him any efficiency that is not there already, there can be no help that He should receive from the auxiliary causes; why then, should He need such auxiliaries as are of no use to Him?—Further, even these auxiliary causes,—all of them should have their birth subject to God and as such, they should be always near Him. Thus, how can our reason be regarded as ‘unproven’?—Nor is our reason ‘inconclusive’; for if that were so (doubtful), then there would be no ‘perfect (defectless) cause’ at all (of things). If then, the perfect cause itself never came into existence, then there would be no birth (production) of anything, as the ‘absence of perfect cause’ would always be there.
Uddyotakara has argued as follows*:— "Though the Cause of Things named 'God' is eternal and perfect and always present, yet the producing of things is not simultaneous, because God always acts intelligently and purposely; if God had produced things by His mere presence, without intelligence (or purpose), then the objection urged would have applied to our doctrine. As a matter of fact however, God acts intelligently; hence the objection is not applicable; specially as God operates towards Products solely by His own wish. Thus our Reason is not Inconclusive."

This is not right. The activity and inactivity of things are not dependent upon the wish of the Cause; only if it were so that the appearance of all Effects would not be possible, even in the constant presence of the untrammelled Cause in the shape of God, simply on account of His wish being absent. The fact of the matter is that the appearance and non-appearance of things are dependent upon the presence and absence of due efficiency in the Cause. For instance, even though a man may have the wish, things do not appear, if he has not the efficiency or power to produce them; and when the Cause in the form of Seeds has the efficiency or faculty to produce the Sprout, the Sprout does appear,—even though the Seed has no wish at all. If then the Cause called 'God' is always there fully endowed with the due untrammelled efficiency,—as He is at the time of the producing of a particular thing,—then why should Things stand in need of His wish, which can serve no purpose at all? And the result of this should be that all things should appear simultaneously, at the same time as the appearance of any one thing.—Thus alone could the untrammelled causal efficiency of God be shown, if things were produced simultaneously. Nor can God, who cannot be helped by other things, stand in need of anything, for which He would need His wish.

Further, in the absence of Intelligence, there can be no desire for anything else,—and the Intelligence of God you hold to be eternally uniform; so that, even if God acted intelligently, why should not there be a simultaneous production of things? Because like God Himself, His Intelligence also is always there.—If then, His Intelligence be regarded as evanescent, even so, it must co-exist with God, and its presence must be as constant as God Himself; so that the objection on that score remains in force.

Thus the addition of the qualification, in the form 'because of God's Intelligence',—turns out to be futile; and our Reason is not 'Inconclusive'. Nor is the Reason 'Contradictory', because the Probans is present in all cases of the Probandum.

And yet the production of things is not found to be simultaneous; hence the conclusion must be contrary to that desired by the Theist.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—'When a certain thing is not found to be produced at a certain time, it must be taken to be one whose Cause at that time is not untrammelled in its efficiency,—as is found in the case of the Sprout not appearing while the Seed is still in the granary;—

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* These are not the exact words of the Nyāyaśāstra; it is a paraphrase of what has been there said under Sūtra 4. 1. 21, p. 466, 1. 8, and p. 467, ll. 10 et. seq., Bib. Ind. Ed.
it is found that at the time of the appearance of one thing, the whole World is not produced,—hence what has been stated (by the Opponent) as a universal proposition is not found to be true.

This argument cannot be regarded as ‘futile’, because it has been shown that if God were the Cause of things, then it would be impossible to regard the Cause of things to be *trammelled* in any way.—(87)

The following Text sets forth another argument (against Theism):—

**TEXTS** (88-89).

**Things that are born consecutively cannot have God for their Cause,—just like the notions of foolish persons arising from the said reasonings (of the Theist).—If those (notions) also are produced by God, then the adducing of proofs (in support of them) should be useless; because of (His) eternity; and as He would be beyond remedy, the said statement could render no help.—(89)**

**COMMENTARY.**

The ‘notions’—i.e. the definite conclusions—derived from such reasonings as ‘because characterised by a peculiar arrangement of component parts’ and the rest,—relating to the object sought to be proved,—appearing in the minds of those foolish persons who are keen on proving God as the Cause of the World.

*Objection*—“As a matter of fact, the said reasons have all been shown to be invalid and beset with fallacies that have been pointed out; and hence no conclusive notions could be derived from them, regarding what is desired to be proved; and under the circumstances, there could be no Corroborative Instance in support of the reasoning here set forth (by you).”

That is true; that is why the Text has used the term ‘foolish persons’; foolish people are not capable of discriminating the validity of Proofs, and hence they derive their notions from invalid premises also.

“Even so, the Corroborative Instance would remain devoid of the Probandum; because ‘the notions of foolish persons’ also are accepted by us as having God for their efficient Cause.”

*Answer*—If these notions also, etc.—These notions,—i.e. the notions of foolish persons; if these also are held to be produced by God,—then the adducing of proofs should be useless; the putting forward of reasons would be entirely useless; i.e. because they would all be produced from God Himself.

“God would be the producer of the said notions, through the help of the statement of proofs,—and not by Himself alone; so that the said statement would not be useless.”
Answer—Because of His eternality;—if the statement of proofs served to remove God's inefficient character and render it efficient,—then it could be helpful to Him; but inasmuch as God is eternal and hence His character cannot be liable to removal or production, He could not be helped by anything; so that the statement of the proof cannot be of any use to Him.—(88-89)

Further, even in the absence of Causes with perceptible efficiency, you postulate the causal character of God, whose efficiency is never perceived;—and this lands you in absurdities; because even after having assumed such a God, you might as well assume even such (absurd) things as the Dhēṣṭkaśaka and the like (?), as there would be no difference between such things and God.—This is what is shown in the following Text:—

TEXT (90).

WHEN YOU HAVE SEEN THAT A CERTAIN THING EXISTS ONLY WHEN CERTAIN OTHER THINGS EXIST, AND NEVER WHEN THESE DO NOT EXIST,—THEN, IF YOU ASSUME A CAUSE FOR THE FORMER, OTHER THAN THESE LATTER,—HOW CAN YOU AVOID FALLING INTO AN INFINITE REGRESS?—(90)

COMMENTARY.

A 'yat' has to be added after 'bhavaddṛṣṭam', 'seen by you'. If you assume a Cause other than these;—i.e. a Cause other than those whose efficiency has been perceived (by the positive and negative concomitance spoken of).—(90)

It has been argued (in Text 54) that "the fact of His being the creator of all things having been established, His omniscience is proved without effort".—The answer to this is provided by the following Text:—

TEXT (91).

BY THE REFUTATION OF GOD'S CREATORSHIP, HIS OMNISCIENCE ALSO IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE SET ASIDE BY THE SAME; AS IT IS ON THE STRENGTH OF 'CREATORSHIP' THAT THE ARGUMENT FOR 'OMNISCIENCE' HAS BEEN BASED.—(91)

COMMENTARY.

You regard God to be omniscient only on the strength of His being the Creator of all things; hence by the refutation of His Creatorship, His omniscience also becomes set aside 'without effort'.—(91)
Admitting (for argument's sake) the validity of the Theist's arguments, the following Texts proceed to point out another objection:—

TEXTS (92-93).

YOUR REASONINGS MAY NOT BE BESET WITH THE DEFECTS URGED ABOVE; AND YET THE CREATOR CANNOT BE ONE, BECAUSE THE FALSY OF SUCH A PROPOSITION HAS BEEN SHOWN ABOVE; AND WHEN THE ONENESS OF THE CREATOR IS NOT PROVED, WHEREIN COULD 'OMNISCIENCE' SUBsist?—(92-93)

COMMENTARY.

The defects urged above—ending with 'being contrary to Inference' (Text 86).

The upshot of the whole is as follows:—Though it may be true that the reasonings put forward succeed in establishing an Intelligent Creator of such things as the Body, Mountains and so forth,—yet it is by no means certain that the Creator of one particular thing is the same as that of another thing; because it is quite possible that each effect may have its own separate Cause (Creator); in fact, in the case of such things as the House and the like, it is found that they are made by many persons; hence it is not possible to establish that there is only one Creator for all things. And under the circumstances, how can 'omniscience' be regarded as proved?

Prashastamati has put forward the following argument for proving a single Creator:—"All beings, from Brahmā down to the Piśācha must have over them a single All-Superior Being,—because among themselves there are found to be of varying grades of superiority;—in the ordinary world it is found that where there are several persons of varying grades of superiority, they are always under the sway of one Superior Being; e.g. the controllers of the House, the village, the city and the province are all under one Sovereign Emperor of the entire world; and all such beings as serpents, Rākṣasas, Yakṣas and such other beings are possessed of varying grades of superiority among themselves;—from these facts we are led to think that all these also are under one Controller in the shape of God".

If what is meant to be proved is that all these Beings are 'controlled' by God,—then the Reason put forward is 'Inconclusive'; as there is no valid reason for precluding the contrary conclusion; specially as no Invariable Concomitance is admitted. The Corroborative Instance also is found to be devoid of the Probandum.—If from the mere fact of there being a Controller, it is meant to prove that the Control is actually there,—then the argument is futile; as we also accept the fact that the 'Enlightened One' (Buddha), who was the crest-jewel of the entire universe, did actually control the entire world, through His mercy; by virtue of which all good men of the present day also attain prosperity and Ultimate Good.
DOCTRINE OF 'GOD'.

The same writer (Prashastamati) has adduced the following further argument:—"All the Seven Worlds must have been created by the intelligence of a single Being,—because they are all included under one 'Entity',—just like the several rooms of a House; we find that all the rooms of a House are built by the intelligence of a single architect; in the same way all the seven worlds are included under the one universe; hence it is concluded that these must be the creation of the Intelligence of a single Creator; and the one Being by whose intelligence all these have been created is the Blessed Lord, the one Architect of the whole universe".

The Probans of this reasoning is 'unproven' (not admitted); there is no such thing as a 'single universe' or a 'single house'; such names have been given to certain things only for the purpose of simplifying business-transactions.—For this same reason the Corroborative Instance that has been cited is devoid of the Probans. Further, as a matter of fact, the several rooms in a house are actually found to be built by several architects (and masons);—hence the Probans is 'inconclusive' (Doubtful) also.

Objections to other Theistic arguments also may be set forth in the aforesaid manner.—(92)

It has been argued (under Text 55) that "The theory under dispute must be perceptible to someone, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is provided by the following Text:—

TEXT (93).

IN FACT, THE REASON ADDUCED FOR PROVING THE 'OMNISCIENT PERSON' IS EFFECTIVE ONLY AGAINST THE FOLLOWERS OF JAIMINI.—(93)

COMMENTARY.

If what you seek to prove is only an 'Omniscient Being' in general, then your proofs have no force against us; as it proves what is already admitted by us. In fact, it is effective only against the followers of Jaimini who deny the 'Omniscient Being' entirely.

If however what you seek to prove is the 'omniscient' God, then as there can be no Invariable Concomitance, the Reason is 'inconclusive', and the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum. For all these reasons, your arguments are not effective against us. Such is the meaning of the Text.

The Theist, in his arguments, has made use of such qualifications for the Subject of his argument as 'appearing in various forms'. But there is no use for such an epithet; it is only a loud enunciation of your views for the purpose of deluding other people. For instance, if, in the absence of such epithets for the Subject, the Probans is free from the defects of being 'unproven' and the like, then that alone suffices for proving the desired conclusion;—on the other hand, if the Reason is defective by reason of being
‘unproven’ and the like, then, even on the introducing of the said epithet, the desired conclusion is not established. Hence in every way the qualification added is absolutely useless.—Further, the Probans is one whose very substratum is ‘unknown’, ‘unproven’; as the other party knows of no such subject or entity as is possessed of the qualification in question. Hence the Subject should not be one that is known to your Philosophy only.—(93)

Here ends the Examination of the Doctrine of God.
CHAPTER III.

Dealing with the Doctrine of Both—God and Primordial Matter—being the Cause of the world.

Statement of the Doctrine.

COMMENTARY.

The following Text proceeds to show that there can be no functioning of Both (God and Primordial Matter):—

TEXT (94).

The doctrines of 'God' or 'Primordial Matter' severally being the Cause (of the World) having been refuted,—it follows that these two together cannot be the 'maker' of things produced.—(94)

COMMENTARY.

In this connection, some Sāṅkhya (the Theistic Sāṅkhyaśas, followers of the 'Yoga' system) have asserted as follows:—

"It is not from Primordial Matter alone that the various products are produced (as held by the Sāṅkhyaśas in general); that is not possible, as that Matter is insentient; no insentient entity has been found to proceed to any activity, in the absence of a Controller;—the 'Spirit' (as postulated by the Sāṅkhya) cannot be that Controller, because at the time (of the beginning of the world) he is entirely unconscious (the 'consciousness' of the Spirit being dependent upon contact with the products of Primordial Matter, after these latter have come into existence). For instance, what the Spirit cognises, and is conscious of, is only a thing that has been already 'determined' by Intelligence; so that prior to contact with Intelligence, he is absolutely unconscious,—and cognises nothing at all; and until he cognises things, he cannot make or produce anything; hence he cannot be the 'maker' (of the World).—From this it follows that God is the maker, not by Himself alone, but through the help of Primordial Matter. For example, Devadatta alone by himself is not able to give birth to a son, nor is the Potter alone by himself able to make the Jar."

The doctrines of God or Primordial Matter severally being the Cause (of the World) having been refuted, it follows that the doctrine of these two jointly being the Cause—maker—of things born,—i.e. of products—also becomes refuted.—(94)
Objection—"If the separate makership of these two has been refuted above,—their joint makership remains unrefuted; certainly, even though it is a fact that each of the Eye and other Sense-organs by itself alone has not the capacity to bring about the Visual and other perceptions,—yet it does not necessarily follow that they cannot do so jointly."

The answer to this objection is provided in the following Text:

TEXTS (95-96).

As for their 'association' assumed on the basis of their acting jointly,—this could be due either (a) to the creation of some peculiarity, or (b) to their serving a common purpose. (a) The former of these assumptions cannot be right, as both are 'unmodifiable'; (b) nor is the latter acceptable; as that would lead to the absurdity of all products coming into existence simultaneously.—(95-96)

COMMENTARY.

'Association' implies joint action; this can be of two kinds—either (a) by the creation of some peculiarity in one another, or (b) by serving a common purpose. The assumption of the 'association' of the former kind,—that consisting in the creating of some peculiarities—cannot be right;—why?—because both God and Primordial Matter are eternal and hence unmodifiable (unchangeable).—Nor is the assumption of the second kind of association right;—such is the construction of the words of the Text;—why?—because that would lead to the absurdity of all products coming into existence simultaneously. The potency of the Joint Cause—in the shape of God-Primordial-Matter—being absolute and untrammelled, and they being constantly associated,—its causal activity (towards the making of all things) would always be there.

In this connection, the arguments already urged before (in Commentary on Text 87)—in the words 'That Cause is present in its complete form, etc.'—may also be brought forward.—(95-96)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out, from the standpoint of the Opponent, the inadmissibility (unproven character) of the Reason put forward above (under 87), to the effect that 'when the Cause is present in its complete form, the Effect must appear as a matter of course, just as it is found in the case of the Sprout, etc. etc.':
TEXTS (97-100).

The Theistic Sāṅkhya may argue as follows:—"It is a well-established fact that Primordial Matter is triple in its essence;—when the Supreme Lord comes into contact with the manifested Rajas-aspect (Energy), He becomes the Cause of Creation;—when again, He has recourse to the manifested Sattva-aspect (Harmony), then He becomes the Cause of the subsistence of the world;—when He comes into contact with the manifestly operative Tamas-aspect (Inertia), then He brings about the dissolution of the entire world. Thus the Attributes of Harmony, Energy and the rest are His auxiliaries, and these become operative only consecutively; that is why there is no absence of consequitiveness (i.e. simultaneity) of Products."—

(97-100)

COMMENTARY.

"Even though these two Causes (Primordial Matter and God) are constantly present together, yet the various products will come into existence only consecutively, one after the other; because the three Attributes of Primordial Matter,—Sattva and the rest,—are the auxiliaries of God; and as these Attributes function only consecutively, there is bound to be consequitiveness in the Products also. For instance, when God becomes affected by the operative Rajas-attribute, He becomes the Creator of creatures, as the Rajas-attribute is conducive to production;—when however, He has recourse to the operative Sattva-attribute, then He becomes the Cause of the continued existence of the worlds, because the Sattva-attribute is conducive to subsistence;—when He comes into contact with the operative Tamas-attribute, then He brings about the dissolution—destruction—of the entire World; as the Tamas-attribute is conducive to mergence (dissolution).—This process has been thus described (by Bāṇa-Bhaṭṭa in the opening verse of his Kādambari):—'He who has recourse to Rajas at the birth of creatures, to Sattva during their existence, and to Tamas at their dissolution,—who is unborn, and controls the birth, existence and destruction, who consists of the Three Vedas, the very essence of the Three Attributes,—to Him obeisance!'

"The particle 'Kila' (in Text 99) is meant to indicate improbability (of any complete Dissolution)."—(97-100)

The answer to the above is provided in the following Text:—
TEXTS (101-102).

The answer to this is as follows:—At the time that the two are performing one act (of creating or maintaining or dissolving),—is their capacity to perform the other acts present? Or is it not present?—If it is present, then at the time of creation, the other two acts also should come about;—thus whenever any one of the acts would be there, the other two would have to be there!—(101-102)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'tayoh', 'the two', stands for Primordial Matter and God;—at the time of performing one act;—i.e. from among the three acts of creating, maintaining and dissolving,—at the time that any one is being done, is their capacity to do the other two acts present in them or not?—These are the two alternatives. If the capacity is there, then, inasmuch as at the time of creating, their Cause would be present in its untrammelled form, the other two acts—of maintaining and dissolving—should also come about, just like the act of creating; so that at the time that a thing would be maintained in existence—its creation and dissolution also should be there! And at the time of dissolution, there should be its maintained existence and creation! This certainly cannot be right. Because when the three conditions are mutually nugatory (and incompatible) it is not possible that they should co-exist in the same object.—(101-102)

The following might be urged—"At the time that Primordial Matter and God are bringing about one effect in the shape of the Creation (Birth) of one thing, there is not present in them that particular form of theirs which would be productive of the other two effects (Maintenance and Dissolution); that is why there is no possibility of the absurdity that has been urged."

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (103).

As a matter of fact, the two (Primordial Matter and God) are the cause of the other two acts also, not in any other form than the one that brings about the one act; the form of the cause remains the same; why then should there be any cessation of the functioning of any act at all?—(103)

COMMENTARY.

The Pronoun ‘Tat’ stands for the Cause, that is, Primordial Matter and God,—of the other,—i.e. of the two subsequent acts.—Not in any other form,—
—what then?—it is always in its own form that the Two operate as Cause.

—(103)

The following might be urged:—"Though it does not serve as the Cause in any other form, yet at the time that it is producing one effect, the capacity necessary for the producing of other effects is not present in it for the time being; that is why the other two effects do not appear at that time."

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:

TEXT (104).

If there were disappearance of any particular potency, then the Cause could never be productive of its particular effect;—because it is devoid of that potency at some other time; just like the 'Sky-lotus' and such other things.—(104)

COMMENTARY.

At some other time,—i.e. at the time of the producing of the particular effect meant by the Sānkhyā.—(104)

The following might be urged:—"Even though all the Potencies are present in Primordial Matter, yet a particular effect is produced only by that particular Potency which becomes manifestly operative and thereby becomes the Cause of that effect; thus it is that there is no simultaneity in the appearance of effects."

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:

TEXT (105).

If the manifested form of the Potency had that same (Primordial Matter and God) for its Cause, then, that would continue to be there at all times, because of the proximity of the Cause, which is eternal.—(105)

COMMENTARY.

The 'manifested form' of Sattva and other Attributes that you speak of,—cannot be said to be eternal; because these are found to appear at only certain times; then, in regard to the coming into existence of this 'manifested form', there are only three alternatives: they could be either (a) produced by the same Cause,—Primordial Matter and God,— or (b) produced by some other Cause,—or (c) they would be self-sufficient.—(a) Under the first of these alternatives, the said 'manifested form' would always be there, because its
Cause, in the shape of Primordial Matter and God, is eternal and hence always present close at hand.—(105)

As regards to second alternative, the objection is stated in the following Text:—

TEXT (106).

(b) As regards the second alternative, that cannot be accepted by the other party; and for that very reason, it could not be the effect of some other cause.—(c) Nor can it be self-sufficient; as it appears only at certain times.—(106)

COMMENTARY.

Apart from Primordial Matter and God, no other Cause is admitted by the Sāṅkhya, from which the said ‘manifested form’ could be produced.—Nor is the third alternative right; this is what is asserted by the words ‘nor can it be self-sufficient’.—(106)

Says the Opponent—"If the said manifested Potency be self-sufficient (self-produced)—why should that be incompatible with the fact of its appearing at only certain times?"

The answer is supplied by the following Text:—

TEXT (107).

If it were self-produced, then it would be causeless; as any operation of a thing upon itself is a contradiction in terms.—If there were dependence (upon something else) then the effects would be such as would appear at only certain times.—(107)

COMMENTARY.

If the ‘production’ (of the Manifested Potency) were due to itself—its own nature,—then it would most certainly be causeless.

Question—"Why should an effect produced from itself be causeless,—when its own nature (or essence) would be its Cause?"

Answer—Any operation of a thing upon itself is a contradiction in terms; any causal action of a thing upon itself—its own essence,—is incompatible.

The following might be urged:—"Let it be causeless; even so the Effect would not appear at only certain times."

Answer—If there were dependence, etc. etc.—Things that are dependent for their existence upon other things can appear only at certain times; as their existence and non-existence would be dependent upon the presence and
absence of those other things. Those that are not dependent for their existence upon other things,—as they do not need the aid of anything else,—why should they appear at certain times only?—(107)

Question—"How do you prove that there is 'self-contradiction' (incongruity) in a thing operating upon itself?"

The answer is given in the following Text:

TEXT (108).

FOR INSTANCE, MERE NEGATION (ABSENCE) IS NOT REGARDED AS HAVING ANY ACTION UPON ITSELF;—AS FOR THE WELL-ESTABLISHED POSITIVE ENTITY, IT IS WELL KNOWN AND RECOGNISED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.—(108)

COMMENTARY.

When the 'nature' or 'essence' of the Effect produces itself,—is it itself an established entity or not? It cannot be an established entity; because under the circumstances, the said 'essence' is nothing apart from the established form; so that the recognition is as established as the 'essence' itself. Hence, as there would be nothing to be produced, whereupon could the Entity operate?—(108)

The following Text proceeds to show that the 'Essence' cannot be something not-established:

TEXT (109).

IF ITS OWN 'ESSENCE' IS STILL UNESTABLISHED, IT CANNOT BE OPERATED UPON BY ANYTHING;—BECAUSE IT IS BEREFT OF ALL POTENCY, LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS' AND SUCH THINGS.—(109)

COMMENTARY.

'Upon anything';—this is a general statement; the meaning is that it cannot operate either upon itself or upon any other thing. If it did operate, then it would itself be an established entity; as such operation is the only characteristic of an established entity.—(109)

End of Chapter (3)—dealing with the Doctrine of Primordial Matter and God, both being the Joint Cause of the World.
CHAPTER IV.

The Doctrine of the 'Thing by Itself'.

COMMENTARY.

The opening verses of the Text have spoken of 'other entities', which includes the doctrine of those philosophers who hold that the origination of the world is due to its 'own nature' (or constitution); this is the doctrine that is taken up now for refutation, even out of its proper sequence, because there is little to be said regarding it,—by the following Text:—

TEXT (110).

The Propounders of the Doctrine of the 'Thing by Itself' describe the origination of things as being independent of all causes. They do not declare even the thing itself to be its own 'Cause'.—(110)

COMMENTARY.

Though the Doctrine of the 'Thing by Itself' has nowhere been directly promulgated in so many words, yet it is implied by the doctrine that the Things are produced by themselves (as detailed in Texts 106 et seq.).—Those who assert that things are born out of themselves have been silenced by the words (in Text 107)—'The operation of a thing upon itself is a contradiction in terms';—now the upholders of the doctrine of 'the Thing by Itself' are going to be silenced.

These philosophers assert as follows:—"The origination of things does not proceed either from themselves or from any other thing; in fact, it is independent of all Causes;—i.e. it does not depend on the action of any 'Cause' at all."

Question—"What is the difference between these people and those who ascribe the origination of things to themselves?"

Answer—They do not, etc.—'They'—i.e. the upholders of the 'Thing by Itself';—the thing itself,—i.e. its own form (prior to origination);—'even'—this implies that they do not accept the form of any other thing to be the 'Cause'; the difference thus is that while the previous people hold the nature of the thing itself to be its 'Cause', these other people do not accept even that as the 'Cause'.—(110)

These people put forward the following reason in support of their view:—"When a thing which fulfils the conditions of perceptibility has its existence not perceived, it should be regarded by intelligent persons as non-existent,—as the 'Hare's Horns';—any 'Cause' of things is something whose existence
is not perceived;—hence it follows that there can be no cognition of the
‘nature of the thing’ (the Cause)
.

In the following Text,—it is shown that the Reason put forward is not
‘unproven’ (hence inadmissible):

TEXT (111).

“Who makes the diversity in the Lotus and its filaments, etc.? By whom too have the variegated wings of the
Peacock and such things been created?”—(111)

COMMENTARY.

‘Rājiva’ is Lotus;—the ‘filaments, etc.’ of the Lotus.—Such is the
analysis of the compound;—‘Et cetera’ is meant to include the Stalk, the
Petals, the Pericarp and other parts, also the sharpness of thorns and the
like.—‘Diversity’;—such diversities as those of shape, colour, hardness and
the like—‘Who makes?’—The sense is that no one makes it, since we do not
find any such ‘cause’ as God and the like.—(111)

The following might be urged—“Even if it be regarded as proved that
external things are without ‘cause’, because no such cause is perceived,—
how can it be taken as proved in regard to internal things?”

The answer to this is provided by the following Text:

TEXT (112).

“Just as the Sharpness and other properties of the Thorn and
other things must be regarded as without cause, on the
ground of their appearing at certain times
only,—so also must Pain and other
(internal) things be regarded as
without Cause.”—(112)

COMMENTARY.

“Even though the fact of Pain and other internal things being without
cause is not proved by Perception, yet it is clearly proved by Inference.
For instance,—what appears only at certain times is definitely known to be
without cause,—e.g. the Sharpness of the Thorn and such things;—Pain and
such internal things appear only at certain times;—hence this is a Reason
based upon the nature of things. Nor is it right to hold that when a certain
thing is present or absent when another thing is present or absent, then the
latter should be regarded as the ‘Cause’ of the former;—as this is not found
to be always true; for instance, Visual perception is present when there is
Touch (in the object perceived), and is absent when there is no Touch; and
yet Touch is not the ‘Cause’ of Visual perception. Hence the said definition
of the causal relation cannot be true. From all this it follows that 'the origination of all things is independent of all causes'."—(112)

The Author answers the above arguments of the upholder of the 'Thing by Itself'—with the following Texts:

**TEXTS (113-114).**

**AS REGARDS THE LOTUS AND ITS FILAMENTS, ETC., IT IS DEFINITELY ASCERTAINED THROUGH PERCEPTION AND NON-APPREHENSION THAT THEY HAVE THEIR 'CAUSE' IN THE SEED, CLAY, WATER AND THE REST UNDER CERTAIN PECULIAR CONDITIONS,—WITH WHICH LATTER THEY ARE POSITIVELY AND NEGATIVELY CONCOMITANT;—
SUCH BEING THE CASE, WHAT OTHER 'CAUSE' CAN THERE BE OF THOSE,
WHICH YOU ARE ASKING ABOUT ?—(113-114)

**COMMENTARY.**

By this Text, the Author shows that the Reason adduced by the other party is 'unproven' and 'inadmissible', and the conclusion put forward is contrary to perceived facts.

It has been asserted (under Text 111) that "of such things as the Lotus, its Filaments and the like, no Cause is perceived".—This is 'not admitted'; as through Perception and Non-apprehension, such 'Cause' is definitely cognised to consist in the Seed, Clay, Water and such things, with which the said things are positively and negatively concomitant. To explain; when it is found that a certain thing is produced only when another thing is present, and it becomes modified by the modifications of this latter, —then this latter thing is said to be the 'Cause' of the former thing. Such a 'Cause of the Lotus and its Filaments, etc.' is found in the shape of the Seed, etc.,—which under certain peculiar conditions,—such as becoming swollen under moisture and so forth,—serves as their 'Cause', with which they are positively and negatively concomitant;—i.e. the Lotus, etc. come into existence only when the Seed, etc. are present, and they do not come into existence when these latter are absent;—that these are the 'Cause' of the Lotus, etc. is definitely ascertained through Perception and Non-apprehension.—

Thus the Reason (Premise) put forward by the other party is 'inadmissible', not true.

Then again, it has been urged that "the definition of 'Causal Relation' is not true (fallible)".—This Reason also is 'unproven', not admissible; as, in the instance cited, as Touch also is a cause of Colour, it is admitted to be the cause of Visual Cognition also. To explain,—the term 'touch' (in this connection) stands for the material substance; and it is only by associating with these substances that Colour subsists; hence in regard to Visual
Cognition, Touch does serve as a 'Cause'; the only difference is that while one (Colour) is a direct cause, the other (Touch) is only an indirect one.

Further, mere negation (Absence) is not regarded by us as determining the causal relation;—"what then?"—It is a particular kind of absence that is so regarded; for instance, when it is found that, even though other efficient agents are present, yet in the absence of some one agent, the thing in question is not produced,—then this latter agent is regarded as the 'Cause' of that thing; and not when there is simple negation in the form that it is not produced while the other is absent'. Otherwise (if such mere negation were to determine the causal relation) the Date growing in the country where one's mother may have been married would not be produced if the mother's marriage had not been there [as ex hypothesi, by mere negation the 'Mother's Marriage' would be the 'Cause' of the growth of the Date].

The negative Premiss in the qualified form that we have shown is not 'fallible' (untrue) in regard to Touch. For, if it could be shown that, even in the presence of Colour and other conditions (of visibility), there is no Visual Cognition on account of the absence of Touch alone,—then there might be 'fallibility' in our premiss. Nothing like this however can be shown. Hence there can be no 'fallibility' in the definition of the 'Causal Relation' (as stated by us).—(113-114)

It is not only such things as the Seed of the rest that are definitely known as the 'Cause' of things; even particular points of Place and Time are definitely known as such 'Causes';—this is what the Author shows in the following Text:

TEXTS (115-116).

PARTICULAR POINTS OF Place AND Time ALSO ARE RELATED (AS CAUSE)
TO THINGS.—"How so?"—IF THE SAID POINTS WERE NOT
THE CAUSE OF THINGS, THESE WOULD BE PRODUCED
EVERYWHERE AND AT ALL TIMES.—(115)

AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER THINGS ARE FOUND TO BE PRODUCED
SPECIFICALLY AT A CERTAIN PLACE, AT A CERTAIN TIME AND IN
CERTAIN RECEPTACLES,—BEING DEPENDENT UPON THESE
AND INDEPENDENT OF ALL OTHERS.—(116)

COMMENTARY.

If the Lotus, etc. did not have them—i.e. the particular points of place and time,—for their 'Cause',—then such phenomena as their production only in a particular Place, like Water and things like it, and not in other places like Stone,—and only at the particular point of time like the Summer, and not at other points of time like the Winter,—would not be possible; in fact, the Lotus and other things would come into existence at all places and at all times, as they would be independent of the peculiarities of place
and time. It is clearly recognised therefore that they are dependent upon these latter, from the fact that they avoid certain places and times and appear only at special places and at special times.—(115-116)

Question—"The things in question (by their insentience) cannot have any wish; how then can they have any need for (dependence upon) the causal conditions?"

The Answer is given in the following Text:—

TEXT (117).

What is meant by their being 'dependent' is that they come into existence in that manner; so that it is the character of 'Effect' that is spoken of as 'dependence'.

That things come into existence in that manner is a perceptible fact; hence the said causes become duly established.—(117)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by the Things being so 'dependent' is that they come into existence at particular places and times and not at others; it does not mean that they have any 'wish' or 'desire'.

Objection:—"If such is their dependence on the particular points of time and place,—even so, how does it follow that they are effects of these?"

Answer:—"It is the character of 'Effect' that is spoken of as 'dependence'.—The character of the Effect is not anything else except the dependence involved in the fact that they come into existence in that particular manner.

Question:—"How is it known that they come into existence in that particular manner?"

Answer:—"It is a perceptible fact.—(117)

TEXT (118).

Thus the doctrine of the 'Thing by itself' is discarded by Perception; specially as the exact nature of the 'Cause' of things is duly ascertained through Perception and non-apprehension.—(118)

COMMENTARY.

'Tat'—Therefore, thus;—or the whole expression 'Tatsvābhāvikavādāḥ' may be taken as a compound, meaning 'The doctrine of the Thing by Itself in regard to the Lotus and other things';—is discarded by Perception; Perception alone is mentioned here, as the 'non-apprehension' also of a
certain thing consists only in the 'apprehension' of something else, and as such, is of the nature of 'Perception'.

It has been sought (under Text 112, above) to prove that "Pleasure and such internal things can have no Cause because they appear only occasionally".—This reasoning however is 'contradictory', inasmuch as it proves only the contrary of what is desired to prove; because what has no cause and what is not dependent upon anything else cannot be 'occasional', appearing only at certain times and places. What is meant is that the Corroborative Instance cited is devoid of the character desired to be proved.—(118)

Thus it has been shown that the conclusion (of the other party) is contrary to facts of Perception and that their Reason is 'unproven, Inadmissible'; now the Author takes for granted (for the sake of argument) the 'admissibility' of the Reason, and then proceeds to show its 'Inconclusiveness'—in the following Text:—

TEXT (119).

IT MAY BE THAT THERE ARE NO PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE 'CAUSE' OF THINGS; BUT THE MERE ABSENCE OF PROOF (MEANS OF CON-SIDERING) CANNOT PROVE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ANY THING.—(119)

COMMENTARY.

If mere 'Non-apprehension' is put forward as the reason for the non-existence of the Cause, then it is 'Inconclusive'; because mere absence of proof—i.e. mere absence of a valid means of knowing,—cannot serve as a reason for establishing the non-existence of the thing concerned.—(119)

Question:—"Why cannot it be a proof?"
The answer is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (120).

INASMUCH AS 'PROOF' (MEANS OF COGNITION) IS NOT PERVERSIVE OF THE 'EXISTENCE OF THE THING'; NOR IS IT ITS 'CAUSE',—

(a) BECAUSE THERE IS DIFFERENCE, (b) BECAUSE THERE IS NON-COMONITANCE, AND (c) BECAUSE IT PROCEEDS FROM THAT,—[MERE ABSENCE OF PROOF CANNOT PROVE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A THING].—(120)

COMMENTARY.

When one character is pervasive of (more extensive than) another, then alone does the absence of the former imply the absence of the latter; similarly the absence of the Cause implies the absence of the effect; and the
reason for this lies in the fact that the less extensive is invariably concomitant with the more extensive one, because of the two being of the same essence,—and the effect is invariably concomitant with the Cause, being produced by this latter. In the case of ‘Proof’ and ‘non-existence of a Thing’ there can be no co-essentiality, as the two actually appear to be distinct;—nor can Proof be the ‘cause’ of the Thing, as there is no concomitance between them; the Thing existing even when the Proof is not there. For instance, there is nothing incongruous in admitting the existence of Things which are far removed in space and time and character and hence are not within reach of any Proof (Means of Cognition);—and when a thing can be there even during the absence of another thing, the latter cannot be regarded as the Cause of the former; for if it were, then it would lead to an absurdity. In fact, if the other party were to regard this as a ‘Cause’, he would renounce his own position.

Also because it proceeds from that,—Proof cannot be the ‘Cause’ of the Existence of Things. That is, the Proof arises out of the Thing itself—which forms its objective; and the cognisable Thing does not arise out of the Proof.—(120)

It might be argued that—“Even though not invariably concomitant, the Proof (being absent) may yet preclude the existence of the Thing”.—The answer to this is provided by the following Text:

**TEXT (121).**

*When a thing is neither the one nor the other, its absence does not conclusively preclude the other thing; because there is no connection.—(121)*

**COMMENTARY.**

*Neither the one nor the other,—i.e. neither the Cause, nor pervasive;—the absence of what is not invariably concomitant cannot rightly be taken as necessarily precluding the other thing; for if it did, it would lead to an absurdity: the absence of the Horse might, in that case, imply the absence of the Cow also.—(121)*

**TEXT (122).**

‘Non-perception’ by all persons is doubtful; ‘Non-perception’ by any one person himself is inconclusive; as it is found that the grass and other things growing in the caves of the Vindhya Mountain do exist, even though they are not perceived.—(122)

**COMMENTARY.**

Further, when ‘non-apprehension’ is put forward as the Reason (for *non-existence*), is it put forward in the form of the absence of perception by
all men? Or of the absence of perception of any one person himself?—It cannot be the former; because ordinary men with limited powers of perception can never be sure of any thing being not perceived by all men; hence it must be always doubtful. People of limited vision have no means of knowing that no man has the perception of an unseen cause for such things as the marks on the wings of the Peacock. As for any single man's own non-perception, that can never be conclusive:—why?—because even though such things as the grass, the coral, the pebbles and the like growing in mountain-caves are not perceived, yet they do exist; that is, there is nothing incongruous in regarding them as existent.—Thus the reasons adduced being doubtful, the non-existence cannot be regarded as proved beyond doubt.—(122)

TEXTS (123-124).

 IF NO REASON IS ADDUCED TO PROVE THE FACT OF THINGS HAVING NO CAUSE, THEN, INASMUCH NOTHING CAN BE PROVED WITHOUT REASON, YOUR THEORY IS NOT PROVED.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU DO ADDUCE A REASON PROVING IT,— THEN ALSO YOUR THEORY IS NOT PROVED,— AS THE PROVING ITSELF WOULD BE PRODUCED BY THE PROOF ADDUCED [WHICH WOULD THEREFORE BE THE CAUSE OF THE PROVING].—(124)

COMMENTARY.

Further, you have to be asked the following question:—In support of your conclusion that 'Things have no Cause',—do you adopt any Reason, or not?—If you do not adopt it, then your view does not become proved; as there can be no proving of anything without adequate proof (means of cognition).—If, on the other hand, you do adopt a Reason,—even then, your view cannot be proved; [such is the construction of the words of the Text].— "Why so?"—Because the 'proving' itself would be produced by the Proof adduced.—This is what has been thus declared by the revered Āchārya Śāri—'One who declares that there is no Cause would demolish his own conclusion if he adduced any reasons in support of his assertion; on the other hand, if he were slow to adduce reasons, what could be gained by mere assertion?'—(123-124)

The following might be urged:—"The Reason that I adduce is indicative, not productive; why then should my conclusion not be proved?"

The answer to this is provided by the following text:—
TEXT (125).

As regards the indicative,—be it in the form of the Probans, or in the form of words expressive of that (Probans),—it is said to be 'indicative' of the probandum (desired conclusion), only when it becomes the 'cause' of the proving (making known) [of the said conclusion].—(125)

 COMMENTARY.

The indicative Probans—i.e. the Probans fulfilling the three conditions, as conceived by the Reasoner for his own benefit;—or in the form of words,—when the same Probans is asserted for the benefit of some one else,—expressive of that—i.e. of the Probans.—Cause of the proving,—i.e. of the bringing about of the definite cognition of the object to be cognised.—If it were otherwise, and the Probans or Reason did not serve as the 'cause' of the said proving,—then, how could it be regarded as an 'indicative'? In fact, in this way, everything would be 'indicative' of every thing else.—(125)

Question—"If this is so, then how do the Teachers make the distinction between the Indicative and the Productive?

The answer given in the following text is that the 'Indicative' is so called because it makes the thing known, and what is called 'productive' is that which actually brings into existence the thing concerned:

TEXT (126).

Thus it is really the 'Productive' Cause which is spoken of as 'Indicative'; it is because it does not actually produce (bring into existence) what is desired to be accomplished that it is not called 'Productive'.—(126)

 COMMENTARY.

It is called 'Indicative',—and not 'Productive'—because it does not actually produce what is desired to be accomplished; while that which actually produces what is desired to be accomplished,—such as the Sprout and the like,—is called 'Productive'. Hence there is nothing wrong in the distinction that has been made.

This answers all the objections that may be urged against the declaration of Āchārya Sāri. For instance, the following is an objection that may be raised—"Even when asserting with Reason that there is no Cause, why should one demolish his own conclusion? As what he asserts is an Indicative Reason, while what he denies is the Productive Cause".—The answer to this is as follows:—The Indicative Reason also is a Productive Cause, because it produces the cognition of the thing.—This urges against the other party the
fact of his assertions being self-contradictory. In fact, there can be no Reason that could prove the absence of all Cause,—because such a proposition would be clearly one that is contrary to, and set aside by, sense-perception and the rest.—(126)

With the following Text, the Author sums up his position and thereby also shows that the conclusion of the other party is contrary to, and set aside by, Inference also :

TEXT (127).  

FROM all this it follows that other things also have their 'causes',—as their production is restricted,—just like your cognition of the Probandum appearing when the PROBANS is there.—(127)

COMMENTARY.

Things like the Lotus and its filaments,—which are 'other' than the things spoken of by the other party in his reasoning.—As their production is restricted;—i.e. they are produced only when certain particular things are there.—The argument may be formulated as follows :—Those things whose production is restricted to occasions when certain other things are there must be regarded as with Cause,—as for instance, your own cognition of the Probandum (desired to be proved) which appears only when the Probans (Reason) is there ;—the same is the case with the Lotus and other things ;—[hence these must be regarded as 'with Cause']—this being a Reason based on the nature of things.—(127)

__________

End of Chapter (4)—dealing with the Doctrine of the 'Thing by Itself'.

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CHAPTER V.

The Doctrine of SOUND ('Word-Sound') being the Origin of the World.

COMMENTARY.

The upholders of 'Word-Sound' as 'Brahman' assert their view in the following words:—

"Free from such distinctions as 'prior' and 'posterior',—unborn,—imperishable,—such is the Brahman consisting of 'Word-Sound'; and from this Brahman there evolve the whole lot of Things,—such as Colour and the like;—this fact is clearly recognised. This has been thus declared—'Without beginning and end, Brahman, of the essence of SOUND,—in the form of Letter-Sounds, evolves in the form of Things; whence proceeds the entire world-process'.—The term 'ādi', 'beginning', here stands for production;—'nidhana', 'end', stands for destruction; that which is free from these two is 'without beginning and end';—'in the form of the Letter-Sounds';—as it is the Letters 'a' and the rest which are the means (of the expressing of Word-Sound);—this indicates the evolution in the form of the 'word', the 'name';—the evolution in the form of the 'thing denoted' is indicated by the phrase 'in the form of things';—the term 'process' stands for the diverse things;—the term 'Brahman' mentions the name."

What has been asserted in the verse just quoted is reiterated in the following Text:—

TEXT (128).

"THE WHOLE LOT OF THINGS IS RECOGNISED AS EVOLVED OUT OF THAT Brahman WHICH IS OF THE ESSENCE OF Word-Sound, THE HIGHEST,—UNAFFECTED BY DESTRUCTION AND ORIGINATION."—(128)

COMMENTARY.

'Destruction' and 'Origination' have been mentioned only by way of illustration; what should be understood to be meant is that it is entirely free from all such distinctions as priority and posteriority of Place; this includes freedom from distinctions of 'priority' and 'posteriority' of Time also.

'Of the essence of Word-Sound';—of the nature of Word-Sound; it is this fact of Word-Sound forming its essence that makes it spoken of as 'of the essence of Word-Sound'; what is meant is that Word-Sound is its inseparable form.

'Highest',—in the form of the syllable 'om'; this syllable 'om' is the essence of all words and names and also of all things; and it constitutes
the Veda. This Word-Sound existing in the form of Letters and Words constitutes the Veda; which is the means of comprehending the syllable, of which it stands as the replica.—This Highest Brahmān is perceived only by such persons as have their minds thoroughly imbued with Merit conducive to the fulfilment of Prosperity and the Highest Good.

In support of this view, they set forth the following reason:—"When a set of things is always associated with the form of a certain thing, the former are modifications (evolutes) of that thing; e.g. the Jar, the Saucer and the Cup are evolutes of Clay, being always associated with the form of Clay; and are hence known to be of the essence of Clay;—all Things are found to be associated with some form of Sound in the shape of Names; this reason being based upon the very nature of things; as it is a clearly perceptible fact that all things are associated with some form of sound (in the shape of Name); for instance, when a cognition of the Name-Sound is produced in regard to things, the cognition of these things appears always associated with that Name-Sound. This is what has been thus declared (in Vākyapadīya)—There is no cognition in the World which is not associated with word-sounds; in fact, all cognition is always interfused with words'.

—The knowledge of the nature of things also is always dependent upon the form of their cognition (which is associated with words). From this it follows that all things are always associated with Name-Sounds; and this being established, it follows as a matter of course that they have their essence in these Sounds; as having their essence in Sound means nothing more than being always associated with Name-Sound.—(128)

The Author proceeds to refute the above doctrine (of Sound being the origin of the World) in the following Texts:—

TEXTS (129–131).


COMMENTARY.

Is the World regarded as 'of the Essence of Sound',—'Shabdāmaya'— in the sense that sometimes it takes the form of the modification of Sound?
Or in the sense that sometimes it is produced from Sound,—as in the case of the expression ‘annamayāḥ prāṇāḥ’ (‘Life is of the essence of food’), the affix ‘mayaḥ’ denotes cause (the meaning being that Food is the cause of Life)?

The first alternative cannot be right; as the said ‘modification’ itself is not possible. Because when Brahman who is ‘of the essence of Sound’ takes the form of the Blue and other things, does It—or does it not—abandon its own pristine Sound-form? If the former alternative be accepted—that It does abandon its pristine Sound-form,—then there would be an end to the view that it is ‘without beginning and end’, that is, imperishable, indestructible; as there would be a destruction of the pristine form.—If the second alternative be accepted,—that It does not abandon its pristine form,—then, at the time that Blue is cognised by the deaf person, he should have the perception of Sound also; as the cognition of Sound would be non-different from the cognition of Blue. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is non-different from another,—if one is cognised, the other becomes also cognised,—as when the Blue is cognised, the essence of that same Blue becomes also cognised;—Sound is non-different from Blue; hence this is a reason based on the nature of things.—If it were not so, inasmuch as the conditions for better or worse would differ in the two (Sound and Blue), they could not be recognised as of the essence of the other. This would be an argument against the conclusion (of the other party).—(129–131)

This same argument is set forth in greater detail, in the following Text:—

TEXT (132).

[IT WOULD BE AS ASSERTED ABOVE] BECAUSE ALL THINGS (ACCORDING TO YOU) EXIST PRIMARILY IN THE FORM OF SOUND; AND IF THE SOUND-FORM IS NOT ABANDONED, THERE CAN BE NO MODIFICATION (EVOLUTION).—(132)

COMMENTARY.

‘Yēna’ here stands for ‘yasmat’, because,—you hold that primarily the World is of the nature of Sound.

The second line explains why it would be as asserted.—(132)

Question—“What if the World remains primarily of the essence of Sound?”

The Answer is provided by the following Text:—
TEXT (133).

The identity (of Sound) with Blue and other things being not figurative (but real),—why should not there be cognition of Sound at the time that the Blue and other things are cognised?—(133)

COMMENTARY.

Identity of Blue, etc.—i.e. with Sound.

At the time that the Blue and other things are cognised;—that is, under the circumstances when Blue, etc. are cognised;—why should not there be cognition of Sound?—that is to say, Sound also fulfilling all the conditions of perceptibility, it is only right that there should be perception of it, just as there is of Blue and other things.—(133)

TEXT (134).

If there were no cognition of it (Sound), then there should be none of the Blue and other things also; because both are of the same essence. In case they had different properties, there would be absolute difference between them.—(134)

COMMENTARY.

If you do not admit of the Cognition of Sound (at the time of the cognition of the Blue, etc.) then there would be the absurdity of there being no cognition of the Blue, etc. also, just as there is none of Sound;—because both are of the same essence;—that is, Blue and the rest are of the same nature as Sound. Otherwise, if the Blue, etc. be held to have properties different from those of Sound, it would have to be admitted that the two are absolutely and entirely different.—(134)

The following Text explains why it would be so:

TEXT (135).

What indicates difference among a number of things is the presence of incompatible properties; otherwise, no difference could even be assumed among diverse individuals.—(135)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be right for any one object to be perceived and not perceived at the same time and by the same person; if it were, then, the object would cease to be one. Otherwise, if, even in the presence of incompatible properties,
there were one-ness, then even that difference which is assumed and accepted as subsisting among the Jar and other things would not be possible. —The term ‘even’ is meant to imply that it is not in the form of Brahmān only that there would be no diversity; because the established view is that while Brahmān rests within Itself, there is no diversity in It; as diversity is appertinent to modification. —For instance, when Brahmān is held to be ‘without beginning and end’, It is not in the form of such things as the Jar and the like,—but in the form of the Supreme Self. The Jar and other things are actually seen to be undergoing origination and destruction and to be occupying limited place and time.

The absurdity has been urged above (in Text 131) against the other party—that the deaf would clearly perceive Sound (when he perceives the Blue and other things). This should be understood to be applicable to the other party only if the form of Brahmān is regarded as fulfilling the conditions of perceptibility. —The absurdity is not applicable if Brahmān is held to be extremely subtle and beyond the reach of the Senses. —But in that case the objection to be urged should be that (if Sound be not perceived, then) the Blue, etc. also would not be perceived, as these are of the same nature as Sound; and in that case there could be no such generalisation as that ‘ordinary men perceive only that much of things as is liable to origination and destruction’.

The following argument might be urged here: —“Just as according to you (Baudhā) the momentariness, though not different from Blue, etc., is not cognised when these latter are cognised, —so, in the same manner, there would be no cognition of Sound”.

This is not right; it is not true that momentariness is not cognised when Blue, etc. are cognised; what does happen is that even though momentariness is actually apprehended by the non-conceptual Cognition, yet it is said to be not definitely cognised, because of the imposition upon it of other qualities, through Illusion. So that, so far as the man’s general indefinite apprehension is concerned, it is duly apprehended; but it is not apprehended in so far as its well-defined cognition is concerned; and as referring to distinct forms of the cognition (definite and indefinite), both characters—of being apprehended and not-apprehended—are quite compatible.

In the case of your theory, however, such apprehension and non-apprehension of Sound (at the time of perceiving Blue, etc.) cannot be right; because you regard all cognitions as equally determinate and well-defined; so that Sound would be definitely apprehended in its complete form by a single cognition; and there would be no aspect of it which would remain not-apprehended. This has been thus asserted—“How can that aspect of it which is not definitely apprehended by well-defined cognitions—form the object of these latter?” —If some cognition is admitted by you to be undefined and non-conceptual, then you should not make such an assertion as the following—“There is no cognition in the world which is not associated with words”—In this case too, the reason adduced (by you) that “Things are associated with the form of Word-Sound”—would not be true, and as a result of this, there being no proof, any attempt to prove the fact of all things being of the essence of Sound would be entirely baseless.
Further, as regards the momentariness of things, it is actually established by means of proofs; and even though thus duly apprehended, it is spoken of as not definitely cognised. As regards the fact of Things being of the essence of Sound however,—by what proof is it established that it could be admitted in the same manner as momentariness is admitted?—(135)

The following Text proceeds to set forth another method of criticising the 'Sound' theory:

TEXT (136).

If the one 'Sound-essence' be held to be different with each individual thing, then all things would occupy the same point in space and would be cognised in one and the same form.—(136)

COMMENTARY.

When (according to you) the 'Sound-essence' undergoes modification, does it become different with each object, or not?—If the view is that it does not become different, then all things, Blue and the rest, should occupy the same point in space. That they should occupy the same point in space is said only by way of illustration. Time, modifications, functions and conditions also are meant to be included. The Cognition,—appearance (in Consciousness)—also would be in one and the same form; as all things, Blue and the rest, would be non-different from the one essence of Sound.—(136)

TEXT (137).

If (on the other hand) it differs with each individual (thing), then Brahman becomes many,—as having a form which is diverse and of the nature of several things,—just like the diversity of individuals.—(137)

COMMENTARY.

If the 'Sound-essence' is admitted to differ with each individual, then Brahman becomes many;—as having a form which is diverse and of the nature of several things; i.e. one whose nature—character—is diverse and of the nature of several things;—and yet Brahman is held to be one. Thus your theory goes directly against your own tenet.—(137)

The Author states another objection (to the Sound-theory)—in the following Text:
TEXT (138).

If Things consisted of eternal ‘Sound’, they also would be eternal; and hence as Things would be accomplished simultaneously with the Sound, no ‘modification’ would be compatible.—(138)

COMMENTARY.

If Things consisted of eternal Sound,—i.e. if they were of the same nature as eternal Sound,—i.e. if Sound constitutes the very essence of the World,—then Things also should be held to be eternal; and hence as at all times the Things would be accomplished simultaneously with Sound,—on account of their being so accomplished,—it is not possible for them to be of the nature of ‘modifications’.—‘Tat’ stands for ‘tasmāt’, Hence.

Or the ‘simultaneity’ meant may be that of all such things as the Blue and the like.—(138)

Question—“Even if things are accomplished simultaneously, why should not they be modifications?”

The Answer is supplied by the following Text:

TEXT (139).

There could be ‘modification’ only if there were disappearance of one form followed by the appearance of another form,—as is found to be the case with Clay and other things;—it could not be possible however if all appeared without sequence (simultaneously).—(139)

COMMENTARY.

In a thing in regard to which there was no ‘Sequence’, however, ‘modification’ would not be possible; the term ‘tu’, ‘however’, is to be construed with ‘akramā’.—From this it follows that it cannot be right to regard Things as ‘consisting of Sound’, through ‘modification’.—(139)

The following Text proceeds to show that the other alternative cannot be maintained:

TEXT (140).

If the World be regarded as ‘consisting of Sound’ in the form of ‘Product’ (not eternal),—even so, as Sound would be unmodifiable, there could be no sequential appearance.—(140)

COMMENTARY.

Even so, as Sound is eternal (ex hypothesi), and hence unmodifiable,—it is not possible for the Products to appear sequentially; in fact, all things
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should appear simultaneously, as being the effects of equally perfect cause of unobstructed potency. In fact, the appearance of effects is delayed only when there is some imperfection in the Cause; if the Cause is perfect, therefore, for what would the effect wait, and hence not appear simultaneously?—(140)

TEXT (141).

IF, FROM SOUND WHICH IS OF ONE FORM ALWAYS, DIVERSE FORMS ARE PRODUCED, THEN HOW IS IT THAT THE WORLD IS SPOKEN OF AS 'EVOLVED' IN THE FORM OF THE OBJECT?—(141)

COMMENTARY.

Further, if it is admitted that out of Sound, which is of one form only, various diverse forms are produced,—then it will not be true to say that 'Brahman evolves into the form of the Object'; because it is not right that when a different thing is produced, one thing should evolve out of another in that form, without actually entering into that form itself.—Thus the Proposition set up by the other Party cannot be maintained in any way at all.—(141)

Another reason put forward (in support of the view that the World is produced out of Sound) is—"because all things are permeated with Sound-forms"; the following Text proceeds to show that this Reason is 'unproven', 'Inadmissible':—

TEXTS (142-143).

IN THE CASE OF SUCH DIVERSE THINGS AS THE JAR, THE PAIL AND THE LIKE, IT IS FOUND THAT ALL OF THEM ARE OF THE NATURE OF CLAY, WHICH DIFFERENTIATES THEM FROM ALL THAT IS NOT-CLAY; AND ON THE BASIS OF THIS IT IS ASSUMED THAT IN ALL THESE THERE SUBISTS THE ONE 'CLAY-NATURE';—NO SUCH NATURE HOWEVER IS PERCEIVED IN THE CASE OF SUCH THINGS AS THE BLUE, THE YELLOW AND SO FORTH; HENCE THE ASSUMPTION OF ANY SUCH ONE NATURE AS IS PRECLUSIVE OF ALL THAT IS NOT-SOUND WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY BASELESS.—

(142-143)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, there can be no one comprehensive notion of all things; everything has its own specific character, and thereby differentiated from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous things; whenever they are
regarded as permeated by a common character, it is only an assumption based upon the fact of that character serving to differentiate them from such other things as are heterogeneous; for instance, in the case of such things as the Jar, the Cup and the Pail, etc.—even though these are really distinct from each other,—the common character of 'Clay' is assumed, on the basis of the exclusion of all that is not-Clay. Even this assumed 'uniformness', consisting of being permeated by the nature of Sound, is not possible in the case of the things in question,—such as, the Blue, the Yellow and the like; because we do not perceive the Sound-character in the Blue, the Yellow and such things; and when you do not perceive such a uniform character in them, how can it be assumed that, being permeated by Sound-character is due to the preclusion of what is not of the nature of Sound? Thus the assumption is entirely baseless and hence the reason is 'unproven', 'Inadmissible'.—(142-143)

It has been urged (under Text 136) that "all things would occupy the same point in space and would be cognised in one and the same form";
—the following Text raises an objection from the point of view of the other party:

TEXT (144).

IF IT BE HELD THAT—"BRAHMAN IN ITS ESSENCE REMAINS EVER UN-
DIFFERENTIATED; IT IS ONLY UNDER DISTURBANCE DUE TO
IGNORANCE THAT PEOPLE REGARD IT AS DIVERSE".—(144)

COMMENTARY.

The following view might be urged by the Opponent:—"The one Principle of Brahman remains always undifferentiated,—essentially unmodified; in reality, there is no modification of It; what happens is that people having their minds and eyes clouded by the darkness of Ignorance, regard It as diverse, in such forms as the Blue and the like. This has been thus declared:—
' Even though Ākāśa (Space) is pure, yet obsessed by darkness, people come to regard it as limited and made up of diversified parts; in the same manner, though Brahman is immortal and unmodifiable, yet It appears to be nullified by Nescience and hence diversely modified'.—Under the circumstances, there would be no such absurdity as all things occupying the same point in Space; because in reality all things are non-entities, therefore there would be diversity in their cognitions also,—the diversity being due to the oscillations of Nescience".—(144)

The above argument is answered by the following Texts:
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TEXTS (145-146).

Even so, what is actually perceived in the form of Blue and the rest by persons trammelled by Nescience which form serves as the basis of rejecting and acquiring certain things,—apart from that form, what is there in the form of 'Brahman', unperceived, which could be cognised as 'existing', by persons whose mind has risen above (the shackles of Nescience)?—(145-146)

COMMENTARY.

The existence of the cognisable thing can be established only by means of Proofs (Means of Cognition); there is however no proof for (means of cognising) the existence of Brahman as postulated. For instance, It cannot be proved by Perception, as Brahman does not appear in any form other than the Blue and the rest as the basis of such activity as rejecting and acquiring;—and when It does not appear at all (in any pure form of Its own), how could It be cognised as existing, by persons whose minds have risen (above the shackles of Nescience) and are centred on the path of Reason?—(145-146)

TEXTS (147-148).

The undifferentiated Brahman cannot be proved by Perception, because It never appears in that form;—and as nothing can be produced from what is eternal, there can be no Probans in the form of an effect (which could lead to the Inference of Brahman); and as the very existence of the Thing itself (Brahman) is still unproved, no character of Its own could serve as the Probans leading to the Inference (of the said Brahman); and apart from these two, there can be no Probans which could prove the existence (of Brahman).—(147-148)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged (by the other party):—"The said Brahman is proved by Its own cognition, since it is of the nature of
Consciousness itself. For instance, Brahman Itself is Light, because It is of the essence of Sound, and because it is of the nature of Intelligence."

This however is contrary to our own experience; for instance, even when one has his mind wandering elsewhere, when looking with his eyes upon Colour, one has such non-determinate perception of the Blue and such things as is free from verbal expression; this is going to be explained in detail later on.

This also sets aside what has been asserted as to "there being no cognition in the world which is not associated with words".

From all this it follows that the undifferentiated Brahman of the essence of Sound cannot be proved by Perception.

Nor can It be proved by Inference. If there were an Inference (of Brahman) it could be based on a Probans in the form of an Effect (of that Brahman), or in that of the nature of Brahman Itself.—As for mere Non-apprehension, it can have only negation for its object, and can have no influence upon an affirmation (such as that of the Existence of Brahman).—Now, there can be no Probans in the form of an Effect, because no effect can proceed from what is eternal; because any fruitful action—either consecutive or concurrent—would be repugnant to the very nature of the eternal Thing.—Nor can there be a Probans in the shape of the nature of Brahman Itself; because the Thing itself, in the form of Brahman, is still not established; and so long as the Thing itself has not been established, no nature or character of it can be established independently by Itself.

It might be urged that there may be some other Probans (apart from the two just mentioned).—In answer to this, it is added—Apart from these, etc.;—i.e. apart from Nature and Effect, there is nothing that can prove your Probandum; as no other Probans would be invariably concomitant with it; and what is not invariably concomitant cannot serve as a Probans; for, if it did, it would lead to absurdities.

It has been asserted that Things are associated with Sound-forms;—such association has not been proved, and is absolutely false; and as such cannot prove the fact of Brahman being really of the essence of Sound.

Nor can such a Brahman be proved by Scripture; as the character of 'Scripture' itself is uncertain.

'Non-apprehension' also is a sort of Indication (Probans); but that is included under what has been mentioned already as 'Nature'.—Nor can this 'Non-apprehension' serve to prove Existence; and it is Existence that is desired to be proved; this is what is meant by the phrase—which could prove the existence of Brahman.—(147-148)

Further, you must understand that Brahman is not capable of bringing about even mere Cognition; and being so incapable, Its form turns out to be that of mere non-entity. A further elucidation of this is supplied in the following Text:—
THE DOCTRINE OF 'WORD-SOUND'.

TEXT (149-150).

All consciousness must be consecutive, as it must follow the order of sequence of the objects cognised; if it were not so, its effect in the form of cognition would come about simultaneously.—Hence even in the effect in the form of 'Cognition', there is nothing, apart from the rejecting and acquiring, which could be within the powers of Brahman; so that it becomes reduced to the position of the 'Son of the Barren Woman'.—(149-150)

COMMENTARY.

All this has been proved under the section dealing with 'God' (in Text 89).

'Tatah param', 'apart from that';—i.e. other than the Blue and other things which form the basis of the acts of rejecting and acquiring.—Or the term 'tatah' may be taken as the re-assertion of the Conclusion; the meaning being that it is something apart from the Blue and other things which form the basis of the acts of Rejecting and Acquiring'.—Or the term 'tatah' may be taken as the re-assertion of the Conclusion, in the form 'therefore it is true, real'.

The position of the 'Son of the Barren Woman';—for regarding the 'Son of the Barren Woman' as a non-entity, there is no reason apart from the fact of his being incapable of effective action.—(149-150)

The following might be urged:—"The said essence of Supreme Brahman is perceived only by such Yogins (Mystics) as have their mind aided by Merit leading to Prosperity and Highest Good".

This also is not possible;—this is what is shown by the following Text:

TEXT (151).

For the same reason even Mystics with their 'chain of pure consciousness' do not know that form of Brahman; as the necessary connection could be possible only after an action of the cognition itself.—(151)

COMMENTARY.

If the Mystic had operated upon the cognition born of mystic communion, then it might be admitted that Mystics perceive that form of Brahman. As it is, however, in the manner shown above, no such operation is possible; hence this view cannot be right.

The following might be urged:—"When Mystics perceive that form of Brahman, it is not through the appearance of cognition relating to it; as apart from that, neither the Mystic nor the mystic cognition has any existence; what happens is that during the mystic state, Mystics perceive It as their own self, in the form of Light effulgent".
The answer to this is as follows:—If it is so, then it has to be explained what the Brahman's form is prior to the mystic state. If it is always of the form of Light effulgent, then there can be no state which is not-mystic; as ex hypothesi, Brahman is ever of the nature of the effulgent light of Self; so that the Liberation of all beings would be accomplished without effort.

It is possible that the following might be urged:—"Just as for you, Buddhists, during the state of Dream and the like, the Cognition, though one, appears in a variegated form,—so the Brahman also, even though one, appears diverse to persons whose chain of cognitions is not pure, through Ignorance."

That cannot be right; because as a matter of fact, apart from Brahman, there are none whose 'Chain' is not pure, to whom the said form could appear as stated.

"Brahman appears, by Itself, in that form."

In that case, no Liberation would be possible; because Brahman is always of the nature of one single Cognition. As for us (Buddhists), Liberation is quite possible, as at that stage, there appears a distinct pure Cognition.

Further, for you, apart from Brahman, there can be no Ignorance or Illusion under whose influence the Brahman would appear in the said form. And on account of Illusion being non-separate from It, it would be well-said that 'under the influence of that Illusion, Brahman appears as Itself in that form'!

It might be said that—"When it is said that 'It becomes cognised under the influence of Ignorance', what is meant is that It is,of the nature of Ignorance (or Illusion)."

If so, then the implication is all the clearer that there can be no Liberation: when the Eternal One Brahman has the nature of Ignorance, there can be no cessation of that Ignorance, which forms the essence of Brahman,—by virtue of which cessation there could be Liberation.

If then, Ignorance is admitted to be something apart from Brahman,—even so, it could not produce any effect upon Brahman, which is eternal and hence not susceptible to any addition to Its qualities. So that it cannot be right to assert that Its appearance (in Cognition) is due to the influence of Ignorance; and thus there being no connection between Ignorance and Brahman, there can be no Birth and Rebirth.—Nor can it be right to assert that "It could be described as being neither real nor unreal"; because all things must fall within one or the other of these two; otherwise it would not be a Thing (Entity) at all. Nor will it be right to say that "it is because of its being a Non-entity that it is cognised in that form";—as such an explanation would lead to absurdities.—If, even in that state, it is called a 'State' or 'Condition', in the sense that its nature is capable of fruitful action,—we have nothing to say against that.

As for us (Buddhists), Ignorance (or Illusion) is only the Disposition of wrongful Attachment (or Yearning); and this Disposition is called a 'Faculty'; and this Faculty is only of the Essence of Cognition in the form of a 'Cause'. Hence what happens is that each preceding Cognition,—which is of the nature of Ignorance and serves as a Cause,—
is followed by a succeeding Cognition, which is of the nature of its Effect and has within itself the traces of wrongful attachment; and under such circumstances, it is only right that there should appear a Cognition in the form under discussion, due to the Influence of Ignorance.—This Ignorance is duly removed by Mystic Practices,—through the process of succeeding moments endowed with gradually increasing degrees of inefficiency (in the Ignorance),—and there appears a series of pure Cognitions and consequent Liberation; so that the process of 'Bondage and Liberation' becomes duly established on a reasonable basis.

This is not possible under your theory; as Brahman, being Eternal and One, cannot have two 'states' (of Ignorance and Liberation),—and because the said Brahman is one, the Liberation of one man would mean the Liberation of all men; and the non-liberation (Bondage) of one would mean the Bondage of all.

Nor is there any proof for the fact of Brahman being of the nature of the Light of Self', during the non-mystic state. The Cognition that proves anything is of the nature of Light' and hence recognised as self-cognised'. The 'Sound-self' however is never found to be cognised in all cognitions,—as has been already mentioned before.—Thus then, if it is admitted that during the non-mystic state, Brahman is not of the nature of the 'Light of Self',—even so, it will have to be explained how the 'Light of Self' which, thus, would not be previously existent, comes about subsequently during the mystic state', in the Brahman, without this latter having abandoned Its previous form and character.

From all this it follows that your doctrine of 'Sound-Brahman' is absolutely wrong. We desist from further expatiation on this point.—(151)

With the following Text, the Author applies the previously-detailed objections to this doctrine also:

TEXT (152).

THIS DOCTRINE OF 'Brahman' ALSO IS SIMILAR TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE 'EVOLUTION FROM PRIMORDIAL MATTER'; AND THE OBJECTIONS URGED AGAINST THIS LATTER SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE APPLICABLE TO THE FORMER ALSO.—(152)

COMMENTARY.

The objection may be stated thus:—'The World cannot be the effect of Sound,—because it exists,—like the cognition of the Cause; hence what is meant to be the Cause cannot be the Cause,—because it cannot be so proved,—like the other Self',—and so on.—(152)

End of the Chapter on the Doctrine of 'Sound-Brahman'.

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CHAPTER VI.


With the following Text, the Author introduces the doctrine of the ‘Vedavādin’ (Follower of the Veda):

TEXTS (153-154).

Others, however, postulate the ‘Puruṣa’ (Spirit),—similar in character to ‘God’—as the cause of the world,—their mind being swayed by an ill-conceived doctrine. Thus ‘Spirit’ has his powers such as do not cease even in regard to the dissolution of all things; he is the cause of all born things, just as the spider is of the cobwebs.——(154)

COMMENTARY.

These people state their doctrine as follows:—“The Puruṣa, Spirit, alone is the Cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the whole world; his powers do not cease even in regard to Dissolution. This has been thus declared—‘As the Spider is the cause of the cobwebs, the Lunar Gem of water, and the Banyan Tree of its offshoots,—so is the Spirit the Cause of all born things’;—and again ‘The Spirit alone is all this, the past, and also the future’.”

Similar in character to God;—i.e. He has qualities equal to those of God; inasmuch as both are the ‘efficient cause’ of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe; the only difference between these two (Spirit and God) is that those who regard God as the Cause of the World postulate other things also like the Soul and such things, as the ‘constituent’ and other kinds of Cause (God being only the ‘efficient’ cause),—while those who regard ‘Spirit’ as the Cause of the world, posit the Spirit alone as the sole cause (efficient as well as constituent); but the character of being the efficient cause of creation, sustenance and dissolution is common to both doctrines. They have their mind swayed by an ill-conceived doctrine; i.e. their mind is under the influence of a doctrine which is wrongly conceived.

The term ‘Urṇanābha’ stands for the Spider.——(153-154)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to set forth the objections against this doctrine:—
DOCTRINE OF THE 'PURUṢA'.

TEXT (155).

The refutation of this also is to be set forth, in the same manner as that of 'God': For what purpose does this 'Spirit' perform such an act (as the creating, etc. of the world)?—(155)

COMMENTARY.

'Ishvaravat'—is to be construed as 'ishvarasya iva', 'as in the case of God'.

This refutation is to be stated thus:—'The Spirit cannot be the Cause of born things,—because He is Himself devoid of birth,—like the sky-lotus; otherwise all things would come into existence simultaneously'.—[This is exactly the same argument that has been put forward against 'God', under Text 87, above].

If the upholders of the Spirit put forward the same arguments that have been put forward by others in proof of 'God',—then the same fallacies —of being 'unproven' and the rest—that have been shown in the latter should be applied to the former also.

The Text mentions another line of objection also—For what purpose, etc.—The activity of all intelligent beings is found to be prompted by some purpose; hence it has to be explained for what purpose the Spirit performs such an act as that of creating the world.—(155)

TEXTS (156-157).

If he does it because he is prompted by another being, then he can not be self-sufficient (independent).—If he does it through compassion, then he should make the world absolutely happy. When he is found to have created people beset with misery, poverty, sorrow and other troubles,—where can his compassion be perceived?—(156-157)

COMMENTARY.

If the Spirit does all this, even though himself unwilling to do so, because he is prompted by another Being in the shape of God and the like,—then the 'self-sufficiency' that has been postulated for him disappears.—If it were through compassion that he did it, for the purpose of helping others, then he would not make it full of such dire miseries as those of Hell, etc.,—he would make it entirely happy.—(156-157)
TEXT (158).

Further, inasmuch as, prior to creation, the objects of compassion would not be there,—there could not be even that compassion through the presence of which the Ordainer is assumed.—(158)

COMMENTARY.

Further, prior to creation,—there is no entity towards whom he would be compassionate;—and through the presence of this ‘compassion’, the Ordainer—Creator—is assumed.—(158)

TEXT (159).

Nor should he ever bring about the dissolution of those beings who would be always prosperous. If in so doing, he be regarded as dependent upon the ‘Unseen Force’ (of Destiny), then his ‘self-sufficiency’ ceases.—(159)

COMMENTARY.

If he created people through compassion, and they were always happy,—then why should he bring about their dissolution? The sense is that if he has to bring about Dissolution, he should bring about the Dissolution of only such Beings as are miserable and imbecile.—It might be urged that—“He makes people happy or unhappy in accordance with their Destiny, in the shape of Merit and Demerit.”—That cannot be right; as in that case his ‘self-sufficiency’—which has been postulated,—would cease. One who is himself endowed with power does not depend upon anything else; if one is wanting in power, then the creation of the world itself might be attributed to That on which he is dependent; and in that case He would cease to be the ‘Cause’.—(159)

TEXT (160).

Then again, why should he make himself dependent upon that Destiny, which is conducive to suffering and pain? In fact, full of mercy as he is, the right course for him would be to ignore that Destiny.—(160)

COMMENTARY.

It may be granted that he is dependent upon the ‘Unseen Force’ (of Destiny). Even so, it is not right for the merciful Being to make himself dependent upon such Destiny—in the form of Merit and Demerit,—as leads
to pain and suffering; on the contrary, he should totally disregard such Destiny, if he is influenced (in his activity) by Mercy and Compassion; merciful persons do not seek for such causes as bring about suffering; because the sole motive behind their actions consists in the desire to remove the sufferings of others.—(160)

TEXT (161).

If the functioning of the Spirit be said to be for purposes of 'Amusement', then he would not be his own master regarding that Amusement, as he would be dependent upon the various implements of that Amusement,—just like a child.—(161)

COMMENTARY.

If it be held that "He creates the world, not through Compassion,—but for purposes of 'Amusement'",—that also cannot be right. As, in that case, in the matter of bringing about this 'Amusement', he would not be 'self-sufficient',—being dependent upon such diverse implements of Amusement as creation, sustenance and dissolution (of the world).—(161)

TEXTS (162-163).

If he had the power to create them, he would have created, at one and the same time, all the implements conducive to the pleasure to be accomplished by the 'Amusement'.—If he did not have that power in the beginning, then he could not have it for creating them consecutively either. Because for an indivisible thing, it is not possible to have Power and also to be without Power.—(162-163)

COMMENTARY.

Further, those various implements of Amusement that are there,—if he has the power to create them, then he should create them all at the same time; if he does not have that power in the beginning, then he could not create them subsequently, one by one either; as the 'powerless condition' would be there still; it is not possible for one and the same thing to have the power and not to have the power—to do a certain act—at one and the same time,—the two, power and absence of power, being mutually exclusive.

The arguments that have been urged before against the doctrine of God,—e.g. why does He undertake such an operation as creation and so forth,—are applicable to this doctrine also.

This also disposes of the following arguments set forth by Prashastamati:—"God undertakes activity for the purpose of helping others. Just
as a certain sage, who has had all his own purposes accomplished and hence for whom there is nothing to be done for either acquiring what is desirable or avoiding what is not desirable, undertakes the work of teaching for the benefit of others,—similarly God also, having made known the majesty of His own power, proceeds to act for the purpose of helping living beings.

—Or, just as, on account of the natural potency of Time, the Spring and other seasons come about by turns, upon which animate and inanimate products come about by their own inherent nature,—similarly in the case of God also, the faculties of creating, maintaining and dissolving become manifested by turns, and through these, He becomes the Cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of all living beings."

This argument becomes set aside by what has been said above. For instance, the assertion that "Spirit acts for the purpose of helping others" is to be met by this reasoning:—If it were kindness towards others, then He should have created the world absolutely happy, etc. etc.

As regards the statement that "it is due to the nature of his powers";—the objection against this is as follows:—If he had his powers fully manifested, he would bring about creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world simultaneously; if he has not his powers manifested, then the creation and the rest could not be brought about even consecutively; if then, the Being with manifested power were someone else, then how could there be a single Being in the shape of Spirit?

The assertion regarding Time being the cause operating towards the consecutive appearance of Spring and other seasons is also open to the same objection. Time, in fact, is nothing more than Things of the world themselves as beset with such diversities as those of heat and cold; as we are going to explain later on.—(162-163)

The Author now proceeds to examine Uddyotakara’s view that the functioning of God is due to His own nature:—

TEXTS (164-165).

If it be held that "the functioning at the beginning of Creation is due to his nature,—just like the functioning of Fire and such things towards burning and such effects, which is due to their very nature";—then, under the circumstances, all things should come into existence simultaneously; because of the presence of the Cause fully competent to produce them.—(164-165)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara argues as follows:—"The action of God cannot be for purposes of amusement; on the other hand, just as in the case of Earth and other Rudimentary Elements, their very nature is such that they operate towards the bringing about of their products, so also in the case of God".—(This is a
clear reference to what is said in the Nyāyavārttika, pages 466-467; though the words are slightly different).

This is not right; as the appearance of all things being entirely dependent upon the action of that Being,—when the Cause in its fully efficient and perfect form would be present, all things would be produced simultaneously. It will not be right to introduce the qualification of “intelligence” (in the Cause),—as we have already explained (under the section on God).—(164-165)

Question—‘If this is so, then how is it that the effects of Fire and other things do not come about simultaneously?’

The answer is provided in the following Text:

**TEXTS (166-167).**

In the case of such things as Fire and the like, their powers are dependent upon the efficiency of their own causes, and hence restricted in their operations, and consequently not effective at all times. If it were not so, all effects would come into existence simultaneously,—if in their case also there were no such restriction.—(166-167)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘Tēṣām’—of Fire and such things.—The particle ‘āpi’, ‘also’, implies that what is urged is applicable not to the case of ‘God’ only.—‘If there were no such restriction’,—that is, the restriction due to the efficiency of their own causes.—(166-167)

The following might be urged:—“The Spider acts through its own nature, —why then does it not produce its effects, in the shape of cobwebs and the like, simultaneously ?”

The answer to this is given in the following Text:

**TEXT (168).**

In the case of the Spider also, the causal capacity to produce the cobwebs is not admitted (by us) to be due to its very nature; what produces them is the saliva emitted by the Spider’s eager desire to devour insects.—(168)

**COMMENTARY.**

The Spider also does not act by its very nature; what happens is that it acts from its eager desire to devour insects,—which appears only occasionally,
through special causes.—The Spider thus is not always of one and the same character; its efficiency also is only occasional and due to the force of its own causes.—(168)

The following might be urged:—"The Spirit may not act through Compassion, or through Amusement; but somehow it acts unintentionally (automatically)."

The answer to this is given in the following Text:—

**TEXT (169).**

*If the functioning (of the Spirit) be 'somehow' (unintentional),—then what sort of 'intelligence' is his?—Since even the fisherman does not act without thinking over the effect of his action.—*(169)*

**COMMENTARY.**

How could such a Person be listened to by intelligent men,—being more ignorant and stupid than even such common people as the fisherman and the like.—'Buddhimattā' stands for intelligence.—'Shanaka' is the fisherman.—(169)

This objection against the 'Spirit' should be taken as rejecting all those 'creators'—Shauri and the rest,—who have been postulated by other people.—This is what is shown in the following Text:—

**TEXT (170).**

'Shauri' (Viṣṇu), 'The Self-born' (Brahmā), and others who have been assumed to be the creators (of the world)—all become actually rejected by the above reasonings.—*(170)*

**COMMENTARY.**

'Shauri' is Viṣṇu; 'Self-born' is Brahmā;—'and others' is meant to include 'Intelligent Time', which also is postulated by some people.

[There is a lacuna in the Text here.]

End of the Chapter on 'Spirit' as the Creator.
CHAPTER VII.

Doctrine of the 'Self' (Soul).

SECTION (A).

According to the Nyāya-Vaishēśika School.

TEXTS (171–176).

Others again postulate the 'Self' (Soul) as the substratum of Desire and the rest,—which, by itself, is not of the nature of Consciousness, but is eternal and all-pervasive;—it is the doer of good and bad acts and the enjoyer of the fruit of these; it is 'conscious', not by itself, but through the presence of Consciousness;—the presence of Cognition, Effort, etc. as also the character of being the 'doer' is attributed to it. Its being the 'Enjoier' (Experiencer) consists in the subsistence in it of the feelings of pleasure, pain and the like;—contact with physical body and with special unprecedented cognitions and feelings is called its 'birth'; and dissociation from these same as taken up before is called its 'death'; its 'rebirth' consists in becoming equipped with a body and mind, under the influence of Merit and Demerit. It is assumed to be 'hurt' by the hurting of its body, Eyes and the rest; so that though it is eternal, the said process (of birth and rebirth) has been held to be unobjectionable.—(171–176).

[There is a large lacuna here in Shāntarakṣita's Text itself; as is clear from the following portions of Kamalashīla's Commentary, of which latter also, the earlier portions are wanting.]

COMMENTARY.

[The existence of the Soul as the cogniser has been asserted in the following words:—'All particular cognitions of such cognisables as Substance, Quality and Action, which are comprised under 'Being', etc.,—and also of Generality, Specific Individuality and Inherence, which are not comprised under 'Being, etc.'—all which cognitions are perceptional or inferential or analogical or verbal or occult (astrological, etc.) or intuitional (e.g. 'my brother will come to-morrow') or doubtful or wrong or dreamy or dream-cognition,—are apprehended by a cogniser distinct from my body, etc.,—(a) because their origination is dependent upon their own causes,—(b) because they are 'general' and 'particular',—(c) because they are of
the nature of Consciousness,—(d) because they are very quickly destructible,—
(e) because they leave impressions,—(f) because they are cognitions,—just
like the cognition of other persons;—the Jar and other things serving as
the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity."

The import of this comprehensive argument the Author sets forth
(from the Nyāya-standpoint) in the following Text:—

TEXT (177).

"My Cognitions are apprehended by a Cogniser distinct from my
body, etc.—because they are cognitions,—like cognitions
other than mine.—(177)

COMMENTARY.

In the phrase ‘body, etc.’, the ‘etc.’ includes the Intellect, Sense-organs
and Feelings.—‘Because they are cognitions’,—this also is only illustrative;
the other reasons also are meant,—such as ‘having their origin dependent
upon their own causes’ and the rest (mentioned in the aforesaid compre-
hensive statement).—(177)

Shāṅkarasvāmin (an old Nyāya-writer) proves the existence of the
Soul in another manner:—“Desire and the rest must subsist in something,—
because, while being entities, they are effects,—like Colour, etc.”.—This
argument is set forth in the following Text:—

TEXTS (178-179).

"All such things as Desire and the rest must subsist in some-
thing; because while being entities, they are effects,—
like Colour.—This something is the Spirit (Soul).
The presence of the qualifying phrase ‘while
being entities’ saves the argument from being
‘untrue’ (fallible), in regard to Destruc-
tion; because though Destruction is an
effect (has a cause), yet it is not an
‘entity’.”—(178-179)

COMMENTARY.

The words ‘the presence of the qualifying phrase, etc.’ serves to show
the use of the phrase ‘while being an entity’.—(178-179)

Uddyotakara, on the other hand, seeks to prove the existence of the
Soul in the following manner:—[The words here are almost an exact
reproduction of the words of the Nyāyavārttika on 1. 1. 10, page 70, also on 3. 1. 1, page 340, Bib. Ind. Edn.]—"Dēvadatta's cognitions of Colour, Taste, Smell and Touch must be due to one and to several causes,—because they are recalled as 'mine',—just like the simultaneous cognitions of several men who have come to an understanding among themselves, relating to the glances of the dancing girl.'—The meaning of this is as follows:—

"When several men have come to an understanding to the effect that 'when the dancing girl casts her glances, we should throw clothes to her', there are several cognitions, by several cognisers, of the single object in the shape of the 'glances',—and yet as the object cognised (the glances) is one only, each man recalls the cognition as 'I have seen', 'I have seen';—in the same manner, in the case in question also, the cognitions of several things would be recalled, on account of their cause (cogniser) being one only; and that one Cause is the Soul.—The 'recalling' of the cognitions also consists in their being grouped together in such expressions as 'It has been seen by me,—heard by me' and so forth, as due to their belonging to a single Cogniser. In the case of the glances of the dancing girl however, what is meant to be stressed is only the fact of the cognised object (not the Cogniser) being one. In all cases however the fact of the 'recalling' remains, whereby several cognitions become associated with a single entity.'"

This argument of Uddyotakara's is set forth in the following Text:—

TEXTS (180-181).

"ALL COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, ETC. SHOULD BE REGARDED AS HAVING ONE AND ALSO SEVERAL CAUSES,—BECAUSE THEY ARE RECALLED BY THE NOTION OF 'BEING COGNISED BY ME';—JUST LIKE THE COGNITIONS OF SEVERAL MEN REGARDING THE GLANCES OF THE DANCING GIRL. IF IT WERE OTHERWISE, THERE COULD BE NO 'RE-CALLING', AS THERE WOULD BE NO BASIS FOR IT."—(180-181)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(180-181)

The following is another argument put forward by the same writer (Uddyotakara):—[This argument is found set forth, in different words, in the Nyāyavārttika, under 3. 1. 19, page 368, Bib. Ind. Edition; see also page 340]—

"The term 'Soul' must be expressive of something different from the aggregate of Body, Sense-organs, Mind, Intellect and Feelings,—because it is a single term, while being distinct from the well-known synonyms of these latter,—like such terms as 'Jar' and the like.'"

This argument is set forth in the following Text:—
TEXTS (182-183).

"The term 'ātman' (Soul) must be expressive of something distinct from the aggregate of Intellect, Sense-organs and the rest, —because it is held to be a single term, while being different from the well-known synonyms of those terms; —whatever is definitely known as fulfilling these conditions is always qualified by the said property; as is found in the case of the term 'cloth'."—(182-183)

COMMENTARY.

Being different from the well-known synonyms; —i.e. such terms as 'dhi' (which is a synonym of 'buddhi') and the rest, which are well-known synonyms of the term 'Buddhi'; the term 'Soul' is distinct from all these synonyms. —Whatever is definitely known, etc. —i.e. which is different from well-known synonyms and is yet a single word, —is always qualified by the said property, —i.e. is always characterised by the quality of being expressive of something distinct from Intellect and the rest.—(182-183)

The same writer has also adduced a negative Reasoning in proof of the Soul—“This living body is not Soul-less, because if it were so, it would have to be regarded as devoid of the functions of Breathing, etc., —like the Jar and such things”.

TEXT (184).

"This living body would be devoid of breathing and other functions, —because it would be soul-less, —like the Jar. Hence it cannot be soul-less."—(184)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be soul-less, —i.e. the Living Body cannot be without a Soul. Or the meaning of the Text may be that 'the Soul cannot be non-existent', —devoid of existence; that is, its existence is established.—(184)

As regards the question as to how the eternity and omnipresence of the Soul are to be proved,—Aviddhākāraṇa has propounded the following argument:—“The cognitions that I have had since my birth must have had the same cogniser who had the first cognition immediately after my coming out of my mother's womb, —because they are my cognitions, —like my first cognition. —The same reasoning may be stated in regard to Pain and other experiences also. —This is the inferential reasoning that proves the eternity of the Soul.”

This argument is set forth in the following Text:—
TEXT (185).

"ALL SUBSEQUENT COGNITIONS ARE APPREHENDED BY THAT SAME COGNISER WHO APPREHENDED THE FIRST COGNITION IMMEDIATELY ON BIRTH,—BECAUSE THEY ARE MY COGNITIONS,—LIKE THAT FIRST FORERUNNER OF THOSE COGNITIONS."—(185)

COMMENTARY.

Like the first forerunner, etc.—i.e. the first forerunner of all subsequent cognitions.—(185)

In proof of the omnipresence of the Soul, the same writer sets forth the following argument:—"The Earth, Water, Air and Mind which are things under dispute, are at a distance from my Soul, and yet they are in contact with that Soul,—(a) because they have material form,—(b) because they have velocity,—(c) because they have priority and posteriority,—(d) because they are associated with, and dissociated from, each other,—just like my own body ".

This argument is set forth in the following Text:—

TEXT (186).

"EARTH AND THE REST, EVEN THOUGH EXISTING AT A PLACE REMOTE FROM ME, ARE YET CONNECTED WITH MY SOUL,—BECAUSE THEY HAVE A MATERIAL FORM, ETC.,—JUST LIKE MY OWN BODY."—(186)

COMMENTARY.

The next Text sums up the arguments of the protagonists of the Soul:—

TEXT (187).

"THUS THE EXISTENCE, ETERNALITY AND OMNIPRESENCE OF THE SOUL BEING DEFINITELY PROVED,—IT BECOMES ESTABLISHED THAT NOTHING IS SOUL-LESS."—(187)

COMMENTARY.

The following Text proceeds to answer the above arguments (of the upholders of the Soul):—
TEXT (188).

As regards the first argument that has been put forward, it is open to the charge of 'proving what is already admitted' (futile); as the apprehensibility of your cognition by the omniscient person and others is already admitted (by us).—(188)

COMMENTARY.

The first argument,—i.e. the one set forth in Text 177—"My cognitions are apprehended by a Cogniser, etc."—This is futile; inasmuch as we already admit the fact that your cognitions are apprehended by a Cogniser other than your body, etc.,—in the person of the Omniscient Being, as also by the Shravakas and Pratyekabuddhas and other thought-readers.—(188)

As regards the instance per similarity cited in the same argument—"like the cognitions of other persons",—it is one that is 'devoid of the Probandum' (i.e. the character meant to be proved is not present in it).—This is shown in the following Text:—

TEXT (189).

Whenever consciousness appears, it appears in its own form, independently of any other 'illuminator'; so also the 'cognition of other persons';—hence your instance is devoid of the Probandum.—(189)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as the 'cognition of other persons' also appears in its own form, independently of any other 'illuminator',—this instance that you have cited is devoid of the Probandum,—i.e. devoid of the character that is sought to be proved,—viz. that of 'being apprehended by a Cogniser distinct from the Body and the rest'.—(189)

It might be argued that—"it is not mere Cognition of another person that is meant to be the Corroborative Instance, but that particular cognition which appears in the form of the thing concerned".

The answer to this is supplied in the following Text:—

TEXT (190).

Even if the instance meant be that cognition which is cognised as tinged by the form of the thing concerned,—it would be doubtful in regard to another cognition.—(190)

COMMENTARY.

Even so, with reference to that cognition which does appear in its own form, without any 'cognition of another person',—there would be doubts regarding the Probans cited, which, therefore, would remain 'inconclusive'.
It might be urged that "the said Cognition also must be apprehended by a Cogniser different from itself,—(a) because it is prone to appearance and disappearance,—(b) because it is cognisable,—(c) because it is capable of being remembered as a means of cognition,—like the objects (of cognition)".

But here also: (1) as there would be nothing to preclude the contrary of the Probandum, the negative concomitance would remain doubtful; (2) as it would involve cognition after cognition, there would be an infinite regress;—(3) there would be no 'object' whose appearance had not become manifested; hence, for the establishing of one 'object', it would be necessary to carry on a series of Cognitions, which would take up the entire life of a man.

If for fear of the 'infinite regress', some one cognition were accepted as appearing by itself,—then that one case would render doubtful and inconclusive the whole set of Reasons cited,—in the form 'being liable to appearance and disappearance' and the rest. Further, in that case, why should there be any aversion to the acceptance of the 'self-cognisability' of other cognitions also,—on the basis of that said one cognition?—If (in order to avoid this difficulty) it be held that the said one cognition is one whose form is not cognised at all;—even so, that cognition not being 'un-proven', the entire set of cognitions preceding it would be 'not proven',—having their appearance not manifested; and as a consequence of this, the object (of cognition) also would be 'not proven'.—Further, as regards the opinion of the Idealists,—under which all Cognitions are self-manifested, on account of their being no 'Cogniser' of Cognisable things, and are not manifested by any other Cognition,—the defect in the Opponent's reasoning, of 'being devoid of the Probandum' would remain absolutely unshaken.

In the same manner it may be pointed out that the other reasons—'having its birth dependent upon Causes' and the rest,—are open to the objection of being 'Futile' and so forth.

[In the opening lines of the Commentary on 171–176, above, it has been asserted by the Naiyāyika that "all particular cognitions of such cognisables as are the objects of Being, etc. etc."];—herein the qualification that has been added to the subject of the Reasoning, is, as before, absolutely useless; as in the matter of proving the Probandum in question, they do not render any help at all. Because what is there that does not become included under the subject thus qualified?—since all my perceptual and other cognitions are declared to be apprehended by a cogniser other than the Body, sense-organs and the rest. Even if a distinction were made on the basis of some cognitions being 'perceptual' and some 'inferential' and so on,—any distinction in regard to the Subject itself would be useless; as all cognitions would have become included under the term 'my cognitions'.—Nor even for the opposite party is any such qualified Subject known; hence the Reasons put forward are devoid of a substratum.—If it is the case that by setting up a useless qualification, another reason is put forward for the proving of the said substratum,—then the reasoner becomes subject to the 'Clincher' of 'Arthāntara', 'Irrelevancy'—by reason of setting up something entirely unconnected with the thing under consideration.—(190)
If (by the argument set forth under Text 178), it is sought to be proved that desire and the rest must subsist somewhere, —and that the 'cause' only can be such a substratum, —you seek to prove what is already accepted by us. If however it is the receptacle (or container) that is meant by you to be the 'substratum' (of desire, etc.), —then also the assuming of a 'receptacle' for what is immobile is absolutely useless.—(191-192)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued (under Text 178, above) that "desire, etc. must subsist somewhere"; if, by this, all that is meant to be proved is that only the Cause is the substratum of desire, etc., then the effort is futile; because we also do not regard desire, etc. to be without cause; as is clear from our declaration that 'the mind and the mental phenomena are brought about by four etc.'.

'Parikalpyātē'—asserted, meant.

If the 'substratum' you seek to prove is in the form of a 'container' (receptacle),—then what is asserted being annulled by inference, there can be no invariable concomitance between that and the Proban put forthward.—This is what is shown by the words—'If however it is the Receptacle, etc.,'—i.e. the receptacle of the desire, etc. It might be possible to postulate such a 'receptacle' for things with material forms, which are capable of moving about,—for whom the 'receptacle' would save them from falling down; those things however which, like pleasure and the rest, are immobile (and immaterial) can never fall down, and under the circumstances, what would any such thing as the 'soul' do for them, whereby it would be their 'receptacle'? (191-192)

Objection—"when the jujube-fruit and other things are placed in such receptacles as the jar and the like,—even though these latter do not do anything for the fruits, yet they serve as their 'receptacle' (container); in the same manner the soul would be the 'receptacle' of pleasure, etc."

The answer to this is provided in the following text:

TEXT (193).

The pit and other things can be the 'receptacle' of the jujube fruit and other things, because they serve to obstruct their movement, or because they bring about specific changes.—(193)

COMMENTARY.

'Because they serve to obstruct their movement';—this is in accordance with the view that things are not momentary;—'because they bring about
specific changes,—this is in accordance with the view that things are momentary; as the 'changes' meant here are those that are brought about on the same spot where the constituent cause existed.—Both these kinds of 'receptacle' are impossible in the case of Desire and the rest; hence there can be no 'receptacle' for these.—(193)

Under the argument urged above (in Text 178) the phrase 'while being entities' has been introduced as a qualification;—this qualification is absolutely useless; as there is nothing that it can serve to exclude. This is what is pointed out in the following Text:

TEXT (194).

IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO REGARD 'DESTRUCTION', WHICH IS FORMLESS, AS A 'PRODUCT'; HENCE THE QUALIFICATION MENTIONED IN THE REASONING OF THE OTHER PARTY IS ENTIRELY USELESS.—(194)

COMMENTARY.

If Destruction could be of the nature of a 'Product', then the qualification 'being an entity' would serve the purpose of excluding that; as a matter of fact however, as it is a non-entity, causes cannot do anything to it; how then could it have a Cause? This reasoning may be formulated as follows:—That which is a non-entity cannot be the product of anything,—e.g. the 'Hare's Horns',—Destruction is a non-entity;—hence to speak of it as having a cause would be contrary to the said universal proposition.—If it were a 'product', it would be an 'entity', like Pleasure, etc.—This would be an argument against the reasoning of the other party.

Further, what has been asserted also runs counter to your own doctrine. For instance, the name and the idea of 'Product' is due—(a) to its acquiring its character, or (b) to its subsistence (manifestation) in its Material Cause, or (c) to the subsistence therein of 'Being' (existence);—Destruction is not possessed of the character of Substance, etc., hence it cannot subsist in its Material Cause; nor, for the same reason, can 'Being' (Existence) subsist in it (Destruction), for the simple reason that it has no form (wherein the Existence could subsist). If it were otherwise, then, like Substance, etc., it would also be 'contained' in a receptacle, and be an 'Entity' also; and as such, it could not be excluded by the qualification in question; hence this qualification—'being entities'—is absolutely useless.—(194)

As against the argument put forward by the Opponent under Text 180 above, to the effect that 'the cognitions of Colour, etc. have one and several causes, etc. etc.',—the Author urges as follows:
TEXTS (195-196).

The 'recalling' of such notions as 'by me (seen, heard)', etc. must be due to perturbations of ignorance; as such notions of the one-ness of the Agent (Perceiver) are found to appear also in connection with all momentary things. From this false assumption, it cannot be right to deduce any conclusion regarding the true state of things; specially as even things that are diverse by reason of the diversity of their powers become the basis of an effect conceived of as one.—(195-196)

COMMENTARY.

'Seen by me and heard by me, etc. etc.'—the 'recalling', in the 'associating' of several such cognitions, has been put forward as the reason for their having a single Cause (in the shape of the 'Soul').—But this reason is 'inconclusive';—as even in regard to momentary things, such 'recalling' is possible through the false assumption of their being due to a single Cogniser. Hence it cannot be right to deduce any conclusion regarding the true nature of things from the fact of such 'recalling'.

Question—"In what way do your Moments (Momentary entities) come to be the cause of the said Recalling (of Cognitions) ?"

Answer—By reason of the diversity of their powers, etc.;—i.e. by reason of the peculiarity of its powers,—the thing which is many (diverse) becomes the 'basis'—cause—of such single effects being recalled in one form; as is found in the case of such medicines of fever as Gudāchī and the rest; all which is going to be explained in detail later on.—(195-196)

Question —"How is it ascertained that the notion in question is wrong ?"
The answer is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (197).

If many things—such as the cognitions of Colour, Sound and the rest,—were the effects of a single continuous (Permanent) Cause,—then any order of sequence among such Effects would be incongruous; as their efficient Cause would be always there.—(197)

COMMENTARY.

If the cognitions of the Blue and the rest were the effect of a single such Cause as the 'Soul', which is eternal, continues for all time, past and future,
—then any order of sequence among such cognitions would be incongruous; as the efficient Cause being present, all the effects should appear simultaneously; specially as the eternal Cause cannot need the help of anything else; for the simple reason that it cannot be helped by anything else.—(197)

Further, if what is meant to prove is merely the fact of the cognitions being ‘preceded by a Cause’, then the effort is futile;—this is what is shown in the following Text:

TEXT (198).

INASMUCH AS THE APPEARANCE OF SIX COGNITIONS OUT OF A SINGLE PRECEDING COGNITION IS CLEARLY RECOGNISED SIMULTANEously,
—WHAT YOUR ARGUMENT PROVES IS ADMITTED (BY US).—(198)

COMMENTARY.

From a single preceding Cognition,—out of a single Cognition immediately preceding them,—there is an appearance of Six Cognitions, through the Eye and other organs,—which ‘appearance’ is clearly recognised. For instance, at the time that a man sees the complexion of the dancing girl, he also hears the Sound of the drum and other musical accompaniments, smells the odour of the Lotus and other fragrant things, tastes the Camphor and other things, feels also the wind emanating from the fans, and thinks of taking up his clothes.—It cannot be right to say that his vision appears to be such because it moves quickly, like the whirling fire-brand. For if it were so, then the appearances would be vague and dim. To explain;—it is on the basis of the ‘recalling’ of all these perceptions (through the several Sense-organs) that you explain the feeling that the whole lot of the perceptions appears in a single Cognition; the Recalling too is done through Remembrance;—and Remembrance, appertaining, as it does, to the past, is always indistinct;—while the single Cognition of Colour and the rest is found to be quite distinct.—Further, in the case of such expressions as ‘saro-rasa’, there is an appearance of the cognitions quickly apprehending the ‘sa’ and other letter-sounds; so that in this case also there might be the notion of a single Cognition; and there would, therefore, be no idea of any order of sequence among them.—All this is going to be explained later on; in the present context the Text has merely indicated the lines of the refutation (of the Opponent’s doctrine).—(198)

If what you seek to prove is the fact of the Cognitions having a single Cause, by the fact of their having for their Cause a Single Eternal and Uniform Entity,—then your premiss is one that is annulled by Inference.—This is what is shown in the following Text:
TEXT (199).

That things appearing consecutively, one after the other, cannot have one and the same cause, has just been pointed out. For this reason, herein the (Opponent's) premiss asserting the invariable concomitance is found to be clearly annulled by inference.—(199)

COMMENTARY.

'Just been pointed out,'—in Text 197.

The 'annulment' is in the following manner:—Things whose causes—efficient and untrammelled,—are present, must be produced simultaneously;—e.g. Sprouts and such other effects, whose causal paraphernalia is complete, appear at one and the same time;—Devadatta's cognitions of Colour and such objects have their Causes—efficient and untrammelled,—present; this is a reason based upon the nature of things.—As a matter of fact however they never appear simultaneously; hence the conclusion is wrong.—(199)

The following Text proceeds to show that the Corroborative Instance also is 'devoid of the Probandum':—

TEXT (200).

As for the 'glance of the Dancing girl', it is not really a single entity; in fact it is made up of several minute particles; and its 'one-ness' is only assumed.—(200)

COMMENTARY.

Such things as the 'glance of the Dancing Girl' are not single entities; they are, in reality, an aggregate of several minute particles.

Question—"If that is so, then how do they come to be spoken of as one?"

Answer—Its one-ness is only assumed.—(200)

Question—"What is the basis of this assumption?"
The answer comes in the following Text:—

TEXT (201).

It is because it is used for a single purpose that it is spoken of as 'one'. If something like this is what you desire to prove, then your effort is futile (proving what is already admitted).—(201)

COMMENTARY.

Because the 'glance of the Dancing Girl' is used for the purpose of bringing about the single effect in the form of Visual Cognition,—therefore, even though diverse, it is spoken of as 'one'.
It might be urged by the Opponent—"It is just such a Probandum, of which the one-ness is assumed, that we mean; so that the Corroborative Instance cannot be said to be 'devoid of the Probandum'."

The answer to this is that—if something like this is what you desire to prove, then it involves the fallacy of 'futility', 'proving what is already proved'; as (according to us) several Impressions appearing consecutively do form the objects of the apprehension of several things, which go to make up a single Cognition.—(201)

Under Text 182, it has been argued that "the term 'soul' is expressive of something distinct from the aggregate of Intellect, Sense-organs and the rest".—This is answered in the following Text:

TEXTS (202–204).

IN THE CASE OF SYNONYMS,—SUCH AS 'buddhi', 'chitta' AND THE REST,—WE FIND THAT THOUGH EACH OF THEM IS A SINGLE TERM, YET IT DOES NOT EXPRESS A THING DIFFERENT (FROM THAT EXPRESSED BY OTHERS);—HENCE YOUR REASON IS 'INCONCLUSIVE'.—"BUT A QUALIFICATION (IN THE FORM 'AS APART FROM RECOGNISED SYNONYMS') HAS BEEN ADDED."—OUR ANSWER TO THAT IS THAT THE QUALIFICATION IS NOT 'ADMITTED', AS THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE 'SOUL' IS SYNONYMOUS WITH 'CONSCIOUSNESS'; AS IT IS CONSCIOUSNESS ITSELF, AS THE SUBSTRATUM OF 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS', THAT IS SPOKEN OF AS THE 'SOUL'. ALL THIS HAS BEEN SAID BY US ON THE BASIS OF 'ILLUSORY CONCEPTION'; IN REALITY, THERE IS NOTHING THAT IS DENOTED BY THE TERM IN QUESTION ('SOUL').—(202–204)

COMMENTARY.

The reason—'because it is a single term'—is 'inconclusive'.—Because in the case of such synonyms as (a) 'buddhi', 'chitta', 'jñāna',—as (b) 'indriya', 'akṣa',—as (c) 'vēdanā' and 'chitta',—as (d) 'kāya' and 'sharīra',—which are denotative of (a) Intellect, (b) Sense-organs, (c) Cognition, and (d) Body,—according to our view, the character of denoting distinct things is not present, though each term is 'one'; hence no preclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being possible, the Reason must be 'inconclusive'.

Says the Opponent:—"It is because we suspected this that in our argument we added the qualification, 'apart from well-recognised synonyms', to our Reason; how then can it be Inconclusive?"

The answer to this is as follows:—This qualification of the Reason is one that is 'not admitted'.—"How?"—Because the fact remains that the
Soul' is the synonym of 'Consciousness'. As it has been declared (by the other party) that—"It is Consciousness itself which, as the substratum of I-consciousness, is spoken of as 'Soul'"; in this quotation 'upacharyate' stands for the phrase is spoken of in common parlance. It is for this reason that what Uddyahotakara has said, regarding the 'figurative use' not being right where the 'direct use' is possible,—should be taken as being due to his ignorance of what is meant. This is what is made clear by the term 'griyatē' (is spoken of). Hence the Reason has a qualification that is 'unproven', inadmissible.

Whatever we have said regarding the 'inconclusiveness' of the Reason so far is on the basis of 'Illusory Conception'—admitting, for the sake of argument, the fact of there being something denoted (by the term 'Soul');—if what is sought to be proved is the fact of the term 'Soul' being really denotative of something distinct from Intelligence and the rest,—then the Reason put forward is a highly improper one, the premiss (invariable concomitance) on which it is based being annulled by Inference.—This is what is shown by the Text in the words—'all this has been said, etc.';—that is, as a matter of fact, all verbal usage is based upon a conceptual imposition of its connection with things;—this is going to be explained later on. Thus then, in reality, there is nothing that is denoted by the term 'Soul'; and under the circumstances, how could there be any invariable concomitance between the said Reason and the Probandum (the character sought to be proved)?—(202–204)

The following Text proceeds to show that even with the said qualification, the Reason remains 'inconclusive':—

TEXT (205).

THE REASON IS FOUND TO BE FALSE ALSO; WHEN, FOR INSTANCE, NAMES, SUCH AS 'Kāraka' (ACTIVE AGENT), AND THE LIKE, ARE APPLIED TO THINGS LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS'.—(205)

COMMENTARY.

When a name, such as 'Kāraka', is applied to such non-entities as the 'Sky-lotus' (in such expressions as 'the Sklyotus is a non-entity', where the 'Sky-lotus' may be spoken of as the 'Nominative'),—then, according to both parties, the term is one only and also distinct from terms denoting the Body, etc.;—and yet the denotation of the term does not consist of a thing distinct from the Body, etc. Hence the Reason, as urged, is 'Inconclusive'.—(205)

Question—"How can the declensional names we applied to non-entities, which are absolutely characterless?"

The answer is supplied in the following Text:—
TEXT (206).

[The use of] Terms being based entirely on Convention,—what is there to which they cannot be applied?—In the case of terms like ‘Soul’ also, there is nothing in their very nature which is expressive of anything.—(206)

COMMENTARY.

‘Convention’ proceeds from the independent desire of men (to give a certain name to a certain thing); and Terms also are expressive of that alone; wherefore then could there be any restriction of their use?

If the meaning of the Opponent’s Reason be that “because it is an unconventional single term”,—and by that means its Inclusiveness be sought to be avoided,—then the answer is—In the case of terms like ‘Soul’, etc.—that is, apart from Convention, terms, by their nature, are not expressive of anything; for, if it were so, then even unlearned persons (not conversant with Convention) could understand the meaning of words; there would also be no independent instruction as to the meaning of words; also because all Convention would, in that case, be useless. From all this it follows that such terms as ‘Soul’ and the like, by their nature, are not expressive of anything; so that the Reason put forward is ‘unproven’, ‘Inadmissible’.

If (in order to avoid these difficulties) it be sought to add a further qualification—to the effect that ‘it has for its objective a cognisable thing which is included under a category which cannot be specified’;—as has been asserted by Bhāviveka,—even so, inasmuch as such a qualification would be ‘unproven’, the Reason itself would be ‘Inadmissible’,—as also ‘Inconclusive’, on account of the absence of the necessary invariable concomitance.—(206)

It has been argued above (under Text 184) that “The living body would be devoid of Breathing, etc., if there were no Soul”.—The answer to that is provided in the following Text:—

TEXTS (207-208).

The contingency that has been urged would be right if the connection between the functions of Breathing, etc. and the Soul were well-established; otherwise, it would be absurd. For instance, the absence of the ‘Son of the Barren Woman’ cannot make the Living Body devoid of Breathing, etc. And your urging of the contingency in question is of the same kind.—(207-208)

COMMENTARY.

If between Breathing, etc. and the Soul, there were some connection,—as that of being produced from it, or being of the same nature,—known as
established, then there would be some reason for urging the contingency that the absence of the Soul would involve the absence of Breathing, etc. Otherwise, the urging of the absence of one thing on the absence of another thing not connected with it at all, would be absurd. Certainly the absence of 'the Son of the Barren Woman' does not entail the absence of Breathing etc. Hence, if someone were to put forward the contingency of absence of Breathing, etc. as due to the absence of the 'Son of the Barren Woman', —like that of the Jar,—this would be entirely 'inconclusive'; in the same way your argument putting forward the contingency of Breathing, etc. being absent on account of the absence of the Soul is purely 'inconclusive', for the simple reason that no connection is known (to subsist between Breathing, etc. and the Soul).—(207-208)

Question—"How do you know that the connection is not known?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (209-210).

The Breathing, etc. cannot be of the same nature as the Soul, as a difference between them has been admitted; nor is the relation of Cause and Effect possible between the two, as in that case, there would be simultaneity; thus then, on the absence of the Soul,—with which they have no connection,—why should the Breathe—Upward, Downward and the rest,—depart from the body?—(209-210)

COMMENTARY.

'Between the two,'—i.e. between the Soul and Breathing, etc., there cannot subsist the relation of being of the same nature; because the Nāgāyikā himself admits the nature of the two to be different.—Nor can the relation between the two be one of being produced from it; because (if the Soul were the Cause), then, inasmuch this Cause would always be present in its perfect form, the Breathing, etc. would all be simultaneous.—Apart from these two, there is no connection possible. Thus then, being devoid of any connection with the Soul, why should they disappear from the Body which is still endowed with Life?—They can never so disappear. The sense is that for this reason, the Reason put forward by the other party is 'Inconclusive'.

By this same argument all those indications of the Soul which have been put forward by the other party,—in the shape of Desire, Hatred, Effort, Pleasure, Pain, Cognition and so forth,—should be understood to be rejected; on the sole ground of there being no connection between these and the Soul. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When certain things are not related (by concomitance) with any particular thing, they cannot be regarded as indicators of this latter thing,—e.g. the line of cranes cannot be regarded as indicators of Sesamum and other things;—and Breathing, etc. are not related with the Soul; hence the conditions of the general proposition are
not fulfilled by these.—The Probans here put forward cannot be said to be 'unproved'; as it has been already proved that neither of the two forms of relation is present in the case.—Nor can the Probans be said to be 'Inconclusive'; for, if the Probans were so, then all things would be indicators of all things.—Nor can the Probans be said to be 'Contradictory'; as it is actually found to be present wherever the Probandum is present.

The other party has also asserted that "from the knowledge of the Instrument follows the knowledge of the Operator (of the Instrument)".—This however is 'not-proved'. Because it has not been proved that the Eye and other organs are 'specific instruments' (of specific cognitions), in reality; as in the producing of cognitions the 'causal efficiency' of all the organs is equal; and because any such distinction as that between the 'Instrument' and the 'Operator' is purely arbitrary.—If what is sought to be proved is only the fact of the Soul being the operator, then the argument is superfluous; because we have never denied the presence of the conceptual (assumed) 'Operator'. If the Reason be intended to prove the real Operator, then it is 'Inconclusive'; as the Eye and other organs have never been found to be invariably concomitant with any such real Operator.—(209-210)

It has been argued (in Text 185) that "all subsequent cognitions are apprehended by that same Cogniser who apprehended the first Cognition immediately on birth, etc. etc.".—This is answered in the following:—

**TEXT (211).**

**THUS THE EXISTENCE OF THE 'SOUL' NOT BEING PROVED BY ANY OF THE PROOFS (PUT FORWARD), THE INSTANCES THAT HAVE BEEN CITED OF 'ETERNALITY' AND 'OMNIPRESENCE' BECOME 'DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM'.—(211)**

**COMMENTARY.**

The Opponent has cited the instances of 'the first cognition' and 'my body'; all these instances are 'devoid of the Probandum';—as the existence of the 'Soul' has not been proved.—Consequently the Probans is clearly 'inconclusive'.—(211)

With the following Text, the Author again introduces the view of Uddyotakara, Bhāvavikta and others:—

**TEXT (212).**

**OTHERS HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE 'SOUL' IS PROVED BY PERCEPTION; BECAUSE 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS' IS SELF-COGNISABLE, AND THE SOUL FORMS THE OBJECT OF THAT CONSCIOUSNESS.—(212)**

**COMMENTARY.**

These people argue as follows:—"Soul is proved by Perception itself; for instance, the notion of 'I', which is independent of any remembrance
of the connection between an Inferential Indicative and that which has that
Indicative, is of the nature of 'Perception',—like the cognition of Colour
and other things. Of this notion of 'I', Colour, etc. do not form the object;
as what appears in that notion is different from the cognition of Colour, etc.;
hence the object of that notion must be totally different [and that is the
Soul]".—[Uddyotakara has stated this view under 3.1.1; see Nyāyāvārttika,
p. 345.]

This view is answered in the following texts:—

TEXTS (213-214).

THIS IS NOT RIGHT; BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE FORM OF THE
'SOUL' DOES NOT BECOME MANIFEST IN 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS';
THEREIN IS NOT PERCEIVED ANY MANIFESTATION OF ETERNAL-
ITY, OMNIPRESENCE AND SUCH PROPERTIES (POSTULATED OF
THE SOUL); WHAT IS CLEARLY PRESENT THEREIN, ON
THE OTHER HAND, IS THE 'FAIR COMPLEXION', ETC.;
AND THE 'SOUL' IS NOT HELD TO BE OF THE NATURE
OF THESE LATTER;—HENCE THE 'SOUL' CANNOT
BE AN OBJECT OF 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS'.—(213-214)

COMMENTARY.

The fact of 'I-consciousness' having the 'Soul' for its object cannot be
regarded as proved; as the form of the 'Soul' is not present in it. This
argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is devoid of the
form of another, it cannot have this latter for its object; e.g. Sound is not
an object of visual perception;—the notion of 'I' is devoid of the form
of the Soul; hence if it were regarded as its object, it would be contrary to
the universal proposition stated above.—That the Probans of this argument
is not 'unproven' is shown by the Text in the words—'There is not perceived
any manifestation of Eternity and Omnipresence, etc. etc.';—that is to say,
the Soul is held to be eternal, omnipresent, intelligent and so forth; not the
slightest manifestation of these characters is perceived in 'I-consciousness';
the manifestation that is perceived in 'I-consciousness' is all in connection
with 'fair-complexion' and other conditions of the body,—as is apparent in
such expressions as 'I am fair,—with weak powers of vision,—lean,—beset
with acute pain' and so forth. From this it is deduced that I-consciousness,
which is thus found to appear as connected with the conditions of the Body,
envisages the Body.—'Clearly present';—it is said to be clear, because
it is never found to fail.

This argument serves to reject the following statement made by
Uddyotakara and others:—"The character of 'Soul' is figuratively (in-
directly) attributed to the Body which is only the locus of experience,—just
as when speaking of a satisfactory servant, the King says—'He is what I
am'".—This assertion becomes rejected; because if such an attribution
(notion) were figurative and indirect, then it would be liable to be false;
because in the case of the Lion and the Boy, when the Boy is figuratively
spoken of as the 'Lion', —the notion of 'Lion' can never be true in reference to both the Boy and the Lion. —It might be urged that "the Body and the Soul are actually spoken of as distinct, in such expressions as 'My body, etc.'; and to that extent, the said figurative attribution does become false". —But it is not so; as it might be possible to regard the notion of 'Soul' with regard to the Soul also as false; as in this connection also, we find such expressions as 'My Soul', where there is a distinction made between the two. —If it be urged that "in this case the distinction is assumed", —then the same may be said in regard to the other case also.

"Even if the expression 'I am fair' is used in its direct sense, why should not the Soul be the object of this notion?"

The answer is —The Soul is not held to be of the nature, etc. —i.e. of the nature of 'fair-complexioned', etc.; for the simple reason that it is not possible for the Soul to have any such qualities as Colour and the like. —(213-214)

It has been explained that it is not right to regard the 'Soul' as forming the object of 'I-consciousness', because this latter is devoid of the form of the 'Soul'. The following Text proceeds to show that the same cannot be right also because in that case there would be no dispute (between us and the Naiyāyika):—

TEXT (215).

IF THE SOUL WERE REALLY AMENABLE TO PERCEPTION, THEN WHEREFORE SHOULD THIS DISPUTE ARISE REGARDING ITS EXISTENCE AND OTHER THINGS? —(215)

COMMENTARY.

'Existence and other things' —i.e. regarding its Existence, Eternality, Omnipresence and so forth. —(215)

The following might be urged —"Just as, for you, even though the Blue and other things are actually perceived, yet disputes arise in regard to their momentariness and other characters, which are held to be non-different from the nature of those things; —in the same manner, there might be dispute regarding the Existence, etc. of the Soul also".

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (216).

THE 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS' ALWAYS FUNCTIONS IN THE FORM OF A DEFINITE COGNITION; AND BETWEEN A DEFINITE COGNITION AND A MERE INDEFINITE CONCEPTION, THERE IS ALWAYS THE RELATION OF 'THE ANNULER AND THE ANNULLED'. —(216)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of Blue and the rest, it is only right that even though they are apprehended by Perception, there should be a dispute regarding their
momentariness and other properties; because the Perception of these things is always indeterminate (vague, undefined) in character, and as such not conducive to any definitely certain cognition; and hence there can be no definitely certain cognition of their momentariness and such other properties.—In your case however, it would not be right; because the notion of 'I' is well-defined and definite (according to you) and hence of the nature of a definitely certain cognition,—so that the notion of the Soul also would be definitely certain;—and where a thing has been the object of a definitely certain cognition, there can be no room for any assumed conception to the contrary; by virtue of which any dispute could arise; specially as when there are two contrary notions, one must annul the other. In fact, it is in the very nature of definitely certain cognitions regarding their objects, that they bring about well-ascertained notions of their objects; so that, if they do not bring about these well-ascertained notions, it follows that they do not apprehend the objects at all.—(216)

Having thus demolished the Opponent's doctrine, the Author proceeds to set forth his own view:—

**TEXTS (217-218).**

Thus it follows that Desire and all the rest cannot subsist in the 'Soul';—because they appear successively,—like the 'Seed—Sprout—Creeper'.—Or, all psychical (subjective) concepts must be regarded as having their forms obsessed by 'absence of Soul',—because of such reasons as 'being things', 'being existent' and so forth,—just like the Jar and other external objects.—(217-218)

**COMMENTARY.**

The argument is to be formulated as follows:—Things that are produced successively can not subsist in the Soul,—e.g. Seed—Sprout—Creeper;—Pleasure and the rest are produced successively; hence they are found to be beset by a concomitance to what is denied (by the Opponent); because 'successive origination' is invariably concomitant with 'subsistence in what is not-Soul', which is contrary to 'subsistence in the Soul' (which is what is desired by the other party). A reason annulling the desired conclusion is also available in the fact that the appearance of effects must be simultaneous when the cause is present in its perfect form.

Or,—there is also a more direct reason:—Things that are endowed with the character of being things, being products, having origin, and so forth,—all these are devoid of the 'Soul',—as is found in the case of such things as the Jar and the like;—and all such subjective (psychical) concepts as the Mind, Intellect, Pleasure, Pain and the rest appearing in the Living Body, are endowed with the said character of being things and the rest;
[hence they cannot have any connection with any such thing as the Soul].—(217-218)

Question—"In what way is this invariable concomitance (Premiss) established?"

The answer is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (219).

If the things in question were connected with the Soul, then the things caused by that (Soul) would have to be regarded as eternal; and being eternal, they would yet be powerless for effective action. Consequently it would not be possible for them to have the properties of 'existence' and the rest.—(219)

COMMENTARY.

If the things in question are connected with the Soul—if the Body and the rest were controlled by the Soul,—then this Soul would be their 'Cause'; as what is not a Cause cannot be a controller; as otherwise there would be an absurdity.—And the Body and other things caused (produced) by that Soul, having their Cause always present in its perfect form, would have to be regarded as eternal,—i.e. not successive.

The following might be urged:—"If they are held to be eternal,—even so they retain their character of being things and so forth".

The answer is given in the words—'And being eternal, etc. etc.';—i.e. being eternal, the Body and the rest would have to be regarded as powerless in bringing about any effective action. The word 'prasajyate' (singular) of the first line being transformed, in this construction, to the plural form ['Prasajyate' as applied to the second line being construed as 'Prasajyante'].—The sense is that in the case of an eternal thing, any effective action,—either successive or simultaneous—is incompatible. And on the cessation of the power for effective action, they cease to be 'things' (entities); because 'capacity for effective action' is the characteristic of all Entities (Things). And when the character of being Entities has ceased, there is cessation of the other characteristics of Entities also,—such as having existence and the like; and thus the invariable concomitance becomes duly established.—(219)

Uddyotakara argues as follows:—"What is it that is meant by [the Living Body] being not connected with the Soul?—(a) If it means that the Body does not serve any useful purpose for the Soul,—then, there can be no Corroborative Instance (such as would be accepted by both parties); as (according to us) there is nothing that does not serve a useful purpose for a Soul.—(b) If again, what is meant is simply the denial of the Soul, the meaning of the proposition being that 'the Soul is not the Body', then our answer is—
who is there that regards the Body as the Soul? Then again, the negative preposition 'nis', 'not' (in the term 'nirātmakam' 'no-Soul') signifies the negation of what is expressed by the following term 'ātman' (i.e. of something with Soul). So that it behoves you to explain what is that which is with Soul; for in no case do we find the negative Preposition 'nis' prefixed to a term denoting a non-entity; for instance, in the expression 'nirmāṣikām', 'without flies', the preposition is added to 'makṣikā' (denoting the Fly, a positive entity).—(c) Again, if the statement 'the Body is not with Soul' is meant to deny the Soul in the body, then the reasoning proves only what is already admitted by all; for who is there who holds that the Soul subsists in the Body?—(d) If then the statement means that the Body has no connection with the Soul, then there can be no Corroborative Instance.—Lastly, all the aforesaid four cases would mean the denial of a distinctive character in regard to the Soul; and this would imply the tacit admission of the Existence of the Soul itself, in a general way; so that what was sought to be denied becomes admitted.—If what is meant is that the term Soul, being a verbal entity, is transient, it must denote something that is transient; then, in the first place, in view of the term 'eternal', the premiss of the above reasoning is found to be inconclusive', doubtful; and secondly, [the term 'soul' in your argument can stand either for the Body or for something other than the Body]; if it stands for the Body and such things, then the argument becomes superfluous; and if the term stands for something other than the Body, etc. and your proposition declares it as denoting something transient, then the existence of something other than the Body, etc. becomes admitted; and this goes against your doctrine."—[This is an exact quotation from Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika on 3. 1. 1, Bib. Ind. Edn., p. 346, line 18 to p. 347, line 10.]

The above is answered by the Author in the following Text:

TEXT (220).

THAT 'NEGATION OF THE SOUL' WHICH OTHER PEOPLE SEEK TO PROVE IN REGARD TO THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS,—THAT SAME WE ARE GOING TO PROVE IN REGARD TO THE LIVING BODY.—(220)

COMMENTARY.

The objection that has been urged above is equally applicable to your case also. For instance, it is admitted by you that the Jar and other external things are 'without Soul', either on the ground of their being not occupied by a Soul, or on the ground of their being the receptacle of the Soul’s experiences. If it were not so, then you could not have mentioned these as the Corroborative Instance in your argument which is stated in the form—'This Living Body is not without Soul, because, if it were, then it would be devoid of Breathing and such other functions,—like the Jar and other things'.—Now in reference to these Jar and other things, the
question may be put—‘In what sense are these without Soul? Does it mean that they serve no useful purpose for the Soul’ and so on (as has been urged by Uddyotakara, in the passage quoted above). If so, then (a) you affirm the fact of all external things, like the Jar, being equally without Soul,—on the ground of their being not occupied by the Soul, or on account of their being the receptacle of the Soul’s experiences;—and you deny the absence of Soul in regard to the Living Body, in the assertion ‘The Living Body is not without Soul’; and from this denial you deduce the conclusion that it is the Living Body alone that is with Soul, and not the dead body, or the Jar and other things. In the same manner, we also prove the fact that ‘the Living Body is without Soul, because it is a thing and so forth’ (as explained above).

—Thus the various alternatives put forward—‘Is it meant that the Body serves no useful purpose for the Soul’ and so forth,—are entirely out of place; as ‘absence of Soul’ has been admitted by you also (in regard to certain things).

Further, it has been alleged that ‘there is no Corroborative Instance in support of the assertion that the Body serves no useful purpose for the Soul’.—This is not right. Because it is possible to set up the following argument—When one thing does not add any peculiar property to another thing, it cannot be regarded as serving any useful purpose for this latter,—e.g. the Vindhya of the Himalaya;—the Body and the rest do not add any peculiarity to the character of the Soul, which remains eternally of one uniform character;—hence the wider factor not being present (the less extensive factor cannot be admitted).—The Probans put forward in this argument cannot be said to be ‘unproven’, ‘inadmissible’; because the ‘additional property’ not being anything distinct from the Soul itself, any ‘adding’ to it would amount to the ‘adding’ to the Soul itself; and this would imply the ‘transience’ of the Soul. If, on the other hand, the ‘additional property’ be held to be distinct from the Soul itself,—as there would be no basis for any connection between that property and the Soul, there would be no such idea as that ‘this property belongs to the Soul’.—From all this it follows that for an Eternal Entity, there is nothing that can serve a useful purpose; as, in regard to such an Entity, it could not do anything at all.

It has been further alleged—‘Who is there who regards the Soul as the Body?’—This again is not right; there are actually some people who describe the Body, etc. as being transsubstantiation of the ‘Soul’ (Spirit);—e.g. the Followers of the Upaniṣads (Vedantins). So that the denial in question may well be regarded as urged against these people.

Then again, it has been argued that—‘the preposition ‘niṣ’ (in the term ‘nirātmakam’) must pertain to the term that follows after it; hence it behoves the other party to say what is it that is with Soul (which is denied by the negative Preposition)’?—This also is entirely irrelevant. What is denied by the negative Preposition cannot be a real positive entity,—in fact it is only a conceptual entity that may be denied; a real positive entity can never be denied. Thus then, what is denoted by the negative compound (‘nirātmaka’; without Soul) is that particular entity which the other party has conceived through illusion; as it is only with reference to such an entity that the said denial is made, in order to proclaim that the other party entertains
a wrong notion.—If it were otherwise, then, when you proceed to put forward denials of the Buddhist's assumption of 'momentariness' expressed in such words as 'The Lamp and the rest are momentary',—you would be open to the same objection; because we never find any case where the negative is used without a term following it.

Then again, it has been asserted—"Who is there who holds that the Soul subsists in the Body?"—This also is not right; as there are some people who regard the Soul to be of the size of the 'half of the Thumb' or of 'a Shyāmāka grain'; and under their view, the Soul, being a corporeal material substance, must be subsisting in the Body; and it is only right that the denial in question should be made against these people.

It has been alleged that "there is no Corroborative Instance in support of the denial of the Body being related to the Soul".—This is not true; as it is easy to prove, as shown above, that there can be no relationship between the Body and the Soul,—because one does not render any help to the other,—as between the Vindhya and the Himālaya mountains.

It has also been alleged that—"The denial of the particular implies the acceptance of the general".—This generalisation is not true; e.g. even though you deny the momentariness of the Lamp and other particular things, you do not accept the momentariness of anything in general.—It might be argued that—"We do admit the applicability of the term 'momentary' to the Lamp and such things, on the basis of their not continuing to exist for a long time; so that in this way, momentariness in general may be regarded as admitted".—If it is so, the applicability of the term 'Soul' also to the Mind associated with 'I-consciousness' is admitted by us; and this may be regarded as the Soul in general being admitted.

The assertion of the two alternative views regarding the term 'Soul' denoting something transient, etc. etc.—is not relevant; for the simple reason that no such view has been held; nothing, in fact, has been held (by us) as to be really denoted by the term 'Soul'. Nor has any such object been admitted by us as is distinct from Colour, etc.' Nor again is the denotation of the term 'Soul' admitted in regard to any eternal thing, which would falsify the said premiss.—Nor lastly can the use of the term 'Soul' in reference to the Body, etc. be regarded as 'figurative' (indirect);—because such use is never found to fail, as explained above. Hence there is no 'Superfluity' in our reasoning.—(220)

TEXT (221).

THUS THE 'Soul' BEING SOMETHING 'NOT-PROVED', THE ENTIRE FABRIC (OF CONCEPTIONS) THAT HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN REGARD TO IT, BECOMES BASELESS LIKE 'THE SON OF THE BARREN WOMAN'.—(221)

COMMENTARY.

Thus, any such thing as the 'Soul' being found to be precluded by all means of Right Cognition, and hence 'not proved', 'not admissible'—
the 'entire fabric (of Conceptions)',—such as its being the doer, the experiencer and the like,—that has been set up by you, turns out to be like 'the Son of the Barren Woman',—entirely baseless. Hence no criticism is made of all this fabric; as it becomes demolished by the demolition of its very basis (in the shape of the Soul).—In what manner our view is not open to the criticism that it involves 'the destruction of what has been done and the appearance of what has not been done' [i.e. the contingency of the Person not experiencing the effects of his own deeds, Karma, and experiencing those of the deeds not done by him]—is going to be explained under the Chapter dealing with the 'connection between Action and its Effects' (i.e. Chapter 9).

End of the Examination of the 'Nyāya' Doctrine of the 'Self'.

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CHAPTER VII.

SECTION (B)

Examination of the Mimāmsaka’s Conception of the ‘Self’.

COMMENTARY.

The Author next proceeds to refute the Mimāmsaka’s Conception of the ‘Soul’:

TEXT (222).

Others again have declared the ‘Soul’ to be of the nature of Chaitanya, Sentience, exclusive and inclusive in character;—this Chaitanya (Sentience) being the same as Buddhi (Intelligence).—(222)

COMMENTARY.

‘Exclusive’ in character;—the states of Pleasure, Pain, etc. (wherein the Soul is perceived) are mutually exclusive;—‘inclusive’ in character,—such character as ‘Intelligence’, ‘Substance’, and ‘Being’ are ‘inclusive’ or ‘comprehensive’ (inasmuch as they serve the purpose of ‘comprehending’ or including, not excluding);—these two, ‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’ form the ‘character’,—characteristic feature—of the Soul.—What is meant is that the followers of Jaimini declare the ‘Soul’ to be of the nature of ‘Sentience’ (Consciousness), and to be ‘exclusive’ in the form of the states of Pleasure, Pain, etc., and ‘inclusive’ or ‘comprehensive’ in the form of ‘Being’ and the rest.—This Chaitanya, ‘Sentience’, is not anything different from Buddhi, ‘Intelligence’,—as held by the Sāṅkhyaśas (according to whom Buddhi is Cosmic Intellect, a product of Primordial Matter, while Chaitanya belongs to the Spirit);—it is in fact Buddhi, ‘Intelligence’, itself. This is what is shown in the text—‘Sentience’ being the same as ‘Intelligence’; that is, it is only a form of Intelligence; the sense is that apart from Intelligence, no other form of ‘Sentience’ is recognised.—(222)

Question—“How is it possible for one and the same Soul to have the two mutually contradictory characters of being ‘exclusive’ and ‘inclusive’?”

The answer to this from the Sankhya point of view is as follows:—
TEXTS (223–225).

"Just as, in the case of the Serpent, the 'coiled' form disappears, and after that, appears the 'straightened' form; but the character of being 'Serpent' continues through both states;—in the same manner, in the case of the Soul, there is no complete disappearance of the character of 'eternal Sentence'; nor is there continuance of its whole character; there is disappearance of such of its states as 'Pleasure', 'Pain' and the like,—and these appear again; but through all these 'Sentence' continues."

(223–225)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the Serpent,—snake,—though it remains one and the same, the coiled form disappears and the straightened form appears,—and yet the character of the 'Serpent' continues in both forms;—in the same manner, in the case of the Soul,—though it is of the nature of eternal Intelligence, and one only,—yet, there never is disappearance of its whole character,—nor is there a continuance of its whole character,—as postulated by the Naiyāyīka in regard to their 'Soul'; what happens is that its states of Pleasure, etc. go on disappearing and appearing again, but the form of 'Intelligence' continues to permeate through all these states; hence there is no incompatibility between the 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' character.—Such is the sense of the Text as a whole.

The meaning of the words is as follows:—The compound word 'nitya-chaitanyaśvabhāvasya' is to be explained as 'that which has eternal Intelligence for its form';—'whole character',—i.e. of the entire form;—'continuity'—'there is not'; such is the construction;—'and these appear again',—i.e. the states of 'Pleasure' and the like.(223–225)

Question—Why is the theory of Absolute Exclusion not accepted, as it is by the Bauddhas, who postulate 'absolute (traceless) Destruction' of things,—or even the theory of Absolute Inclusion (all-comprehensiveness), as it is by the Naiyāyīka and others?

The answer is as follows:—
TEXT (226).

"If there were absolute destruction of the Soul, there would be 'destruction of what is done and the befalling of what is not done'; and if the Soul always remained of the same form, then there could be no experiencing of pleasure, pain and the rest."—(226)

COMMENTARY.

If there were absolute destruction (of the Soul), then there would be destruction (ineffectiveness) of the act done; as the doer would not be there to come into contact with the effect of the act; and there would be 'belfalling of what is not done'; as the Soul experiencing the effect of the act done would be experienced by a Soul who did not do the act. —Further, if the Soul remained of one and the same form, there could be no experiencing of Pleasure, Pain, etc. for it, —just as there is none for Ākāśa; specially as there would be no difference between the 'state of experiencing' and the 'state of not-experiencing'. This has been thus asserted by Kumārila:—'Thus both the absolute conditions being impossible, the Spirit (Soul) should be held to be of the nature of both Exclusion and Inclusion,—just like the Serpent in the coiled and other forms'. (Śloka-vārtika, Ātmavāda, 28)."—(226)

Objection.—If the Spirit (Soul) is of the nature of both states, the state that does the act would not be the same that experiences its effects; so that this doctrine also would involve the anomaly of the 'destruction of what is done and the befalling of what is not done'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (227).

"The Soul's characters of 'doer' and 'experencer' are not dependent upon the state; hence, as it is the Soul itself that remains the same through the various states, it is the Doer of the act that always obtains (experiences) the fruit of that Act."—(227)

COMMENTARY.

The character of being the Doer—and that of being the Experencer—are not dependent upon the state of the Soul; they are dependent upon the Soul itself; as it is the Soul itself,—not its condition or state—which does the Act and experiences its effects. Hence, for this reason, inasmuch as the Soul to whom the states belong remains the same and does not abandon its previous form, it is the Doer himself who secures the fruit of that Act:—So that this doctrine is not open to the said objection.—(227)
Question—What is the Proof (Means of Cognition) that establishes the existence of the Soul?

The answer is supplied by the following Text:

**TEXT (228).**

"The Spirit (or Soul) as described is proved by the presence of Recognition; and the doctrine of 'No-Soul' is disproved by this same (Recognition)."—(228)

**COMMENTARY.**

*By the presence of Recognition,*—involved in such notions as 'I cognised it', 'I am cognising it' and so forth, where there is 'recognition' of the same 'doer' (cogniser)—is proved—the existence of the Soul.*—*By this same*—Recognition—also is disproved the doctrine of 'No Soul', as profounded by the Buddhist and others; as has been thus declared—*Thus from this fact Recognition which is admitted by all men, follows the refutation of the doctrine of No-Soul*—(Shlokavārtika, Ātmavāda, 136).—(228)

**Question**—How do these two conclusions follow from the fact of Recognition?

The answer is as follows:

**TEXTS (229–237).**

*The notion of 'I' involved in the conception 'I know' envisages the Cogniser; this Cogniser may be either the 'Soul' or the absolutely evanescent 'Cognition' (Idea). If it is the 'Soul' that is the objective of that notion, then all is square; on the other hand, if the momentary 'Cognition' (Idea) is held to be so, then all becomes inexplicably confounded. For instance, the notion that appears in the form 'it was I who cognised this thing on a previous occasion, and it is I who am cognising it now',*—*of this notion, what 'Cognitive Moment' is assumed to be the objective? Would such a 'moment' be (a) past, or (b) present, or (c) in the form of a continued series? If it be the first (a), the moment could well be the objective of the notion 'I cognised it (in the past)'; but it could not be the objective of the notion 'I am cognising it (now)', because the cogniser is not cognising the thing at the moment of speaking; it is only when the object is present at the time (of cognition) that it can be spoken of as 'I am cognising it'. But (in regard to such a present object) it would not be true to say 'I cognised it', because the object did not exist in the past.*—*From this it follows that both of these (past and present)
cannot form the objective of the said notion. Nor did both 'Cognitive Moments' cognize the thing in the past; nor do they both cognize it in the present.—(c) Nor can the 'Series' be regarded as the 'cognised object', as both are impossible; the 'Series' could not cognize it in the past; and as it is not an entity, it cannot cognize in the present.—For all these reasons, it is established that that wherein 'I-consciousness' subsists,—which must be something distinct from the said cognition,—is the 'Soul' of the eternal form.”—(229–237)

COMMENTARY.

That the conception 'I know' envisages the Cogniser,—is beyond all dispute; as the verb 'I know' connotes the notion of the person who does the cognising. Now in regard to this Cogniser, there are two theories possible: (1) that it is the 'Soul', or (2) the absolutely evanescent Cognition (Idea) as postulated by you (Buddhists).—If the theory that 'it is the Soul' be accepted then all becomes square, as it accomplishes what is desired. If, on the other hand, the other view is accepted—that it is the Idea, then all becomes extremely inexplicable. Because, the conception appears in the form 'I cognised this in the past and I am cognising it in the present', and herein there is a clear conception, the notion of 'I' being the Cogniser in both cases;—of this conception of 'I', if the 'Cognitive Moment' be assumed to be the object, would this 'moment' be (a) past, or (b) present, or (c) both present and past, or (d) in the form of a continued series? There are these four possible alternatives.—Now as regards (a), the past 'moment' being assumed as the object of the notion of 'I', the idea that 'I cognised' might be all right, as the thing had been cognised in the past; but the idea that 'I am cognising it now' could not be true, because the past 'Cognitive Moment' does not cognise the thing at the present time,—as ex-hypothesi it has already disappeared.—(b) If the second alternative is accepted that the present 'Cognitive Moment' is the object of the notion of 'I', then the idea that 'I am cognising' would be all right, as it is really the Cogniser at the present moment; but the idea that 'I knew it in the past' would not be true,—why?—because it did not exist at the previous time. The word 'idam' (in the Text) stands for the present Cognition. Thus then, inasmuch as the conception operates both ways, it becomes established that the present and the past, both, Cognitive Moments cannot form the object of the notion of 'I'; as both these 'Cognitive Moments' did not cognise the thing in the past, nor do they cognise it in the present; as a matter of fact, one 'Moment' cognised it in the past, and another 'Moment' is cognising it in the present.

For the same reason the 'Series' also cannot form the object of the notion of 'I'; as both—the past and the present acts of cognition—are impossible. Because this 'Series' did not cognise the thing in the past, nor does it cognise it in the present; because being only 'conceptual', it is not a thing, an entity; and what is not an entity cannot be the Cogniser, as being a Cogniser is a property that can belong only to an entity.
From all this it follows that, that thing wherein the notion of 'I' (I-consciousness) subsists,—and as shown above, it must be something distinct from the said Cognition,—is the Soul.—(229-237)

*Question*—How is it proved that the Soul is eternal?"

The answer is as follows:—

**TEXTS (238-239).**

"The 'Cogniser' who formed the object of 'I-consciousness' in the past must be regarded as continuing to exist to-day,—because he is the object of 'I-consciousness',—like the Cogniser in the present.—Or, he (the present Cogniser) must be regarded as having been the Cogniser of yesterday,—because he is the Cogniser;—or because of the same reason (of being the object of 'I-consciousness'),—like the Cogniser of yesterday; and all these fulfill the conditions of the Probandum."

—(238-239)

**COMMENTARY.**

*He who formed the object of 'I-consciousness' in the past continues to exist to-day; just like the Cogniser in the present;—and the Cogniser in the present is the object of 'I-consciousness';—this is the Reason based up the real state of things.*

'Or, he'—i.e. the present Cogniser.—'Because of the same reason'—i.e. because of being the object of 'I-consciousness'.

This argument has been formulated in reference to the Cogniser as the Subject. The Author next proceeds to set forth another argument on the basis of the present I-notions as appertaining to the Probandum—*All these, etc.*—'*all these'—I-notions, of the past and of the present—fulfill the conditions of the Probandum,—i.e. come to appertain to the Probandum.—(238-239)

The following Text proceeds to show how this is so:—

**TEXT (240).**

"All (I-notions) of yesterday and of to-day must have the same object,—because they are I-notions belonging to the Cogniser connected with one and the same 'Chain',—like any single Cognition."—(240)

**COMMENTARY.**

'*All I-notions of yesterday and of to-day',—this states the Subject in regard to which the Probandum is to be predicated;—'must have the same object'.—
this states the Probandum;—the meaning is that they should have one and the same object. —The Probans is stated thus:—Being such I-notions as belong to a Cogniser who is connected with one and the same Chain,—such as that of a single person like Dëvadatta. The mere character of being I-notion is present in the I-notions of other persons also; hence if the Probans had been stated in that form, it would be 'Inconclusive'; hence in order to avoid that contingency, the Probans has been stated as qualified by the qualification of pertaining to a Cogniser connected with one and the same Chain'. 'Like any single Cognition',—this is the Corroborative Instance; it means 'like any single intended Cognition among these same I-notions'.—(240)

With the next Text, the Author proceeds with the Answer to the above-stated doctrine of the Mimãnsaka:

TEXT (241).

IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE TO BE CONSIDERED:—

If Intelligence is held to be eternal and one, then, Cognition also should have to be regarded as of the same character.—(241)

COMMENTARY.

If Intelligence is held to be eternal and one, then Cognition also—which has no form other than that of Intelligence,—should have to be regarded as eternal and one. This however cannot be desirable for you; as it would be contrary to your doctrine. For instance, the author of your Bhâsya (Shabara) has declared [under Sûtra 1. 1. 5, page 9, line 17, Bib. Indica Edition] that 'Cognition, being momentary, cannot be present at the time of another Cognition'. Jaimini also has asserted (under Sû. 1. 1. 5) that 'Perception is that Cognition of man which is produced on the contact of an existing thing'; and if Cognition were eternal, there could be no 'production' of it.

It would also involve self-contradiction on the part of Kumârila himself: He has declared for instance that—'It does not remain for a single moment, nor does it even appear in the form of wrong cognition whereby it could operate later on towards the apprehending of its object, like the Sense-organs and the like'—(Shlokavârtika, Pratyaksa-Sûtra, 55).

Further, if Cognition were held to be only one, this would be contrary to the doctrine of 'Six Means and Forms of Cognition'.—It would also be contrary to Perception also; as Cognitions are clearly perceived to be liable to appearance and disappearance in the course of the thinking of things with constant imposition of variations.—(241)

Not perceiving all these incongruities and self-contradiction, Kumârila declares as follows:—
TEXT (242).

"Cognitions, and the Soul also, are held to be eternal and one, on the ground of their being of the nature of 'Intelligence'; if there is diversity, it is due to the object."—(242)

[This is a quotation from Shlokavārtika, Chapter on Eternality of Sound, 404].

COMMENTARY.

Cognitions and the Soul also are regarded as eternal and one;—why?—because they are of the nature of Intelligence; that is, because, under our view Spirit is of the nature of Intelligence in the form of Cognitions.

Question—How then is it that such diversity (in Cognitions) is recognised as 'Colour-Cognition', 'Taste-Cognition' and so forth?

Answer—"If there is diversity, it is due to the object; the term 'if', has been used as admitting (for the sake of argument) the opinion of the other party; the sense being—'If—in case—diversity be assumed".—(242)

Objection (to Kumārila's position)—If Cognition is eternal and one, then, how is it that it apprehends Colour and other things consecutively? It should apprehend all at once, there being no distinction (to which the successiveness would be due).

The answer to this (from Kumārila's point of view) is given in the following Text:

TEXT (243).

"Though, by its very nature, Fire is always of the nature of a burner, it burns only what is presented to it,—and that also only a thing that is capable of being burnt, not any other thing, nor at any other time."—(243)

COMMENTARY.

Fire is eternally of the nature of a Burner, and yet it does not burn all things at all times. It burns only what is brought to it;—and then also, it burns only a thing that is capable of being burnt,—and not the Sky or any such thing.—(243)

In the following Text, he cites another example:
TEXTS (244-245).

"Or, the clean mirror, or the Rock-crystal, reflects the image of only what is placed before it;—in the same manner, Souls, though possessed of eternal Sentience, apprehend Colour and other things only when they are themselves in the Body and the things are presented to them by the organs. And it is this Sentience that we call 'Intelligence'."—(244-245)

COMMENTARY.

The epithet 'clean' has been added because the dirty mirror is not capable of reflecting images.—'Placed before it',—carried to it.—In the same manner;—this introduces what has to be illustrated. Though, in reality, the Souls are all-pervading, yet, it is only when, under the influence of the Unseen Force (of destiny), they subsist in the Body, that they apprehend things that are presented to them by the Eye and other organs,—not while they are away from the Body.—This eternal Sentience is what we call 'Buddhi' (Intelligence), and it is not different from it,—like the 'Buddhi' (Cosmic Intellect) of the Sāṅkhya.—(244-245)

Question—If that is so, how is it that this Cognition is known as evanescent?

In answer to this, the next Text proceeds to show the reason, already indicated before, why Cognition is regarded as evanescent, and thereby explains that evanescence:—

TEXT (246).

"It is on account of the evanescent character of the functioning of the presenting organs that the Cognition is evanescent; just as, even though Fire is always a burner, it burns only when the combustible thing is close to it."—(246)

COMMENTARY.

'Presenting organs',—the Eye and other organs which present to the Soul the Colour and other things;—the 'functioning'—operation—of these organs is 'evanescent'—fleeting;—and on this account, the resultant Cognition is recognised as evanescent; by itself, it is not evanescent, fleeting.—"If, by itself the Cognition is not evanescent, then the objection remains that
it should apprehend all things".—The answer to this is that even though Fire is always a burner, etc. Similarly, the Cognition does not always apprehend all things; for the simple reason that all things are not always in close proximity (to the organs, etc.)—(246)

Question—How do you know that Cognition is eternal?

Answer:—

TEXT (247).

"Cognition is always recognised as being of the nature of 'Intelligence'; as regards the Cognitions of the Jar, the Elephant and so forth, their diversity is held by people to be due to the diversity among those things."—(247)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'tatra' is a meaningless term used as introducing the sentence—'Being of the nature of Intelligence';—because it is always recognised as 'Cognition', it is eternal, like the Word-Sound.

"If that be so, then how is it that in common parlance, we find such distinction among Cognitions accepted by observers as 'this is the Cognition of the Jar', 'that is the Cognition of the Cloth' and so forth?"

Answer—As regards the Cognitions of the Jar, etc. etc. ;—'due to the diversity among those things',—i.e. the diversity among the Jar, the Elephant and the rest.—(247)

The same idea is further clarified by the following Text:—

TEXT (248).

"People who follow up the diversity among the objects cognised do not speak of the cognition as 'that same cognition'; nor is there non-recognition of it as 'Cognition', so long as notice is not taken of the diversity among the objects."—(248)

COMMENTARY.

People who follow up, etc.;—i.e. the Cognisers.—What this Text shows, by means of affirmative and negative premisses, is that the diversity in Cognitions is due only to diversity among the objects cognised.—Nor is there non-recognition, etc.; that is, there is recognition.—(248)

The following Text proceeds to answer the above arguments:—
TEXT (249).

IF SUCH IS THE CASE, THEN, ON THE OCCASION WHEN THERE APPEAR COGNITIONS IMPOSING THE CONCEPTS OF 'ELEPHANT' AND THE REST IN REFERENCE TO SPOTS WHERE THESE ANIMALS DO NOT EXIST,—TO WHAT IS THE DIVERSITY IN SUCH COGNITIONS DUE?

COMMENTARY.

If the diversity of the Cognition is due to the diversity in the objects cognised,—then, what is the basis for the diversity that appears in the case of those Cognitions which successively impose the concepts of the 'elephant', 'horse' and the rest upon a place where the elephants do not really exist? The meaning is that in such cases there is no basis at all for the notion of such diversity. Because, there is no difference in the Cognitions per se; as all Cognition is held to be one (by the Mīmāṃsāka). Nor can the diversity be due to the multiplicity of the objects imposed; as there is no object that does the imposing.—(249)

The following might be urged:—"The idea that a Cognition may be devoid of a real object is not true; as has been declared by Kumārila—'It is not admitted that even in the case of Dreams and other such Cognitions, a real external object is entirely absent; in every case there is an external background, only conceived of in connection with a wrong place and time'. [Shlokavārtika, Nirālambanavāda, 107-108]."

This is the view presented in the following Text:—

TEXT (250).

IF THE INDIVIDUAL OBJECTS EXISTING AT OTHER TIMES AND PLACES BE HELD TO SUPPLY THE BASIS FOR SUCH IMPOSED COGNITIONS,—ON THE GROUND THAT IN ALL COGNITIONS THE BASIS OF REALITY IS SUPPLIED BY OBJECTS EXISTING AT TIMES AND PLACES OTHER THAN THOSE OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE COGNITIONS THEMSELVES,—[then the answer would be as stated in the following Text].—(250)

COMMENTARY.

'Basis',—i.e. the cause of the notion of diversity among Cognitions.—The compound 'dēśakālānyathātmakam' is to be analysed as—'that of which the time and place are otherwise',—or as 'that of which the differentiation is done by time and place'.—(250)

The answer to this is given in the following Text:—
TEXT (251).

But as a matter of fact, the Cognitions in question have no such connection with that particular place; why then should they appear in that form at that place?—(251)

COMMENTARY.

When at a certain place, a number of individual objects actually appear as 'imposed' upon Cognitions in a certain order of sequence,—there is no connection between the Cognition and those individual objects existing at other times and places,—in the same order of sequence. Under the circumstances, how is it that they appear in the form that is imposed upon them arbitrarily? Certainly it cannot be right for one thing to appear in the form of another thing; if it were, then this would lead to incongruities; and in this way all Cognitions would come to have all things for their objects; and there would be an end to all ordered usage regarding things.—(251)

TEXT (252).

Then again, under your view, the external form is not declared to belong to the Cognition; nor are the Elephant, Pole and other things actually existent at the place desired.—(252)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, under your—Mīmāṃsaka's—view, the form that appears (in Cognition) does not belong to the Cognition; as you assert that the Cognition is formless.—"What if it is so?"—At the place desired etc.;—i.e. at the place where the 'imposition' is made—, the Cognitions should appear as connected with that same time and place wherewith the said objects—Elephant and the rest—are connected;—how is it then that they appear at a time and place which are not connected with themselves and which are yet different from those with which the objects are connected?—From this it follows that these Cognitions have no real basis, and they are, in reality, unmixed in character and mobile; that they are so is due to the fact of their appearing only occasionally;—and it also becomes established that the Soul, which is of the nature of the said Cognition, must also be evanescent and many.

The following might be urged:—"Cognition is a property of the Soul; hence the diversity of the Cognition need not imply diversity of the Soul, the latter being only an object having that property."

This cannot be right; 'Pratyaya' (Cognition), 'Chaitanya' (Sentience), 'Buddhi' (Intelligence), 'Jñāna' (Knowledge) are all synonymous terms; nor does a mere difference in names make any difference in the nature of things. Further, even with a difference in their names, all these are actually
accepted (by you) as being of the nature of Sentience (Chaitanya); and as this Sentience is one and the same, there can be no distinction among the Cognitions that are of the same nature. If it were not so, then, on account of the attribution of contrary properties to them, the two (Sentience and Cognition) would become entirely different from one another.

This same argument in proof of Cognitions having no real basis serves also to prove the imperceptibility of Cognitions. For instance, it has been proved that the form appearing in the Cognition cannot be the external Elephant, etc.; so that it becomes established that the Cognitions apprehending that form as their own are of themselves, because they are self-luminous in their character.—(252)

It has been argued (under Text 243 above) that—"Though by its very nature, the Fire is always of the nature of a burner, etc. etc."—This argument is refuted in the following Text:

TEXT (253).

IF COGNITION REMAINS FOR EVER IN THE FORM OF THE APPREHENSION OF ALL THINGS,—THEN HOW IS IT THAT THE COGNITION OF ALL THINGS IS NOT PRESENT AT ALL TIMES?—(253)

COMMENTARY.

If Cognition, which is of the nature of Apprehension, exists for ever, then all things should be cognised at all times.—(253)

The following Text proceeds to show how this is so:

TEXT (254).

THAT COGNITION ON WHICH SOUND HAS BEEN IMPOSED MUST BE THE SAME THAT APPREHENDS TASTE, COLOUR AND OTHER THINGS.

IF THIS IS NOT ADMITTED BY YOU, THEN YOU HAVE, BY YOUR OWN WORDS, ADMITTED THAT THERE IS DIFFERENCE AMONG COGNITIONS.—(254)

COMMENTARY.

That Cognition on which Sound has been imposed,—i.e. the Cognition of Sound,—is the same that apprehends Taste, Colour and other things,—and it cannot be different; so that at the time of the apprehension of one thing, there should be apprehension of all things,—as the Cognition apprehending all these would be there always. This has been thus declared:—"Many things being apprehended by a single Cognition, all these would be apprehended once for all, without any distinction; nor could it appear in any order of sequence, as no distinction is possible'.
If this is not admitted; if you do not admit that the Cognition of Sound is the same that apprehends Taste and other things, then you would be admitting that there is diversity among Cognitions.—(254)

The following Text is going to show that the instance of Fire that has been cited (in Text 243) is itself 'unproven' (not admitted by all parties):—

TEXT (255).

Even Fire is not always a 'burner' of all combustible things; otherwise the whole (world) would be instantly reduced to ashes.—(255)

COMMENTARY.

The Fire, in the form of the burner of all combustible things, is not always existent; if it were, then all combustible things would be reduced to ashes,—because they would always have their burner in contact with them,—like that combustible thing which is in actual contact with the fire-flame.

'Even', 'api', is meant to indicate that it is not only Cognition that cannot be of the nature of the apprehension of all things.—(255)

Objection—"If that is so, then Fire is not always of the nature of the Burner (possessed of the power to burn); how then could it burn even the thing that is presented to it?"

The answer is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (256).

In fact, it is only when it is in close proximity to the combustible thing that Fire can be rightly regarded as the burner; thus it is why there does not happen the contingency of all things being burnt all at once.—(256)

COMMENTARY.

Thus it is;—it is because of our acceptance of the view just expressed—that there is no simultaneous burning of all things;—i.e. there is no likelihood of any such absurd contingency.—(256)

It has been argued (under Text 244, above) that—"Just as the clean Mirror or Rook-crystal, etc. etc."—It is shown in the following Text that what has been alleged there would not be possible if the Mirror, etc. were eternal and always of the same form:—
All such things as the Mirror, the Rock-crystal and the like are themselves in perpetual flux; and when they become connected with the Blue Lotus and such objects,—they become causes of bringing about the illusion regarding their reflections,—if that were not so, everyone of those things would be always one and the same,—when in contact with the said objects, as well as when not in contact with them; and as such it should be seen either as always with its reflection or always without its reflection.——

(257-258)

**COMMENTARY.**

The Rock-crystal, the Mirror and the like are things that are in a state of perpetual flux,—undergoing destruction every moment; and when they come into contact with the Blue Lotus and such things, they become masters in the producing of illusions (regarding the reflections of these things, which have no real existence, and whose Cognition, therefore, must be illusory, wrong).

If that were not so,—i.e. if it could reflect the image without being momentary,—then it would have to be admitted that the Mirror in contact with the object is the same as that not in contact with it; so that, even in the absence of the Blue and other reflected things, the reflection of these would be perceptible, as the reflector will not have abandoned its previous character (when in contact with the object);—or, conversely, even when in contact with the object, it would be seen without the said reflections; as its form would not be different from its previous state (when not in contact with the object).

This argument serves to set aside the possibility of all reflections in general in any such reflecting substances as the Mirror and the like,—under the view that things are not-momentary.——(257-258)

The Author now proceeds to refute the possibility of the perception of all Reflections,—under both theories—that things are momentary and that things are not-momentary:
AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE MIRROR-SURFACE CAN NEVER CONTAIN THE REFLECTION (OF ANYTHING),—BECAUSE IT IS LASTING, BECAUSE IT IS INDIVISIBLE, AND BECAUSE SEVERAL THINGS WITH MATERIAL SHAPE CANNOT SUBSIST TOGETHER.—(259)

COMMENTARY.

Because it is lasting,—i.e. not momentary,—therefore the Mirror-surface cannot contain the reflection.

Even if it is momentary, it cannot contain the reflection because it is indivisible; when the reflection is perceived it is perceived as if it were inside the mirror, just as the Water is perceived inside the well; and yet the Mirror-surface has no parts,—i.e. vacant space;—because its component particles are closely packed. Hence the perception of the Reflection must be an illusion.

Or the term ‘निरविभागत्व’, ‘indivisibility’, may stand for absence of difference between the previous and succeeding states; and the reason for this absence is ‘because it is lasting’; so that the meaning comes to be—‘because on account of its lasting character it is devoid of difference between its previous and succeeding states’; that is, because it has no previous or succeeding states.

Further, because several things with material shape cannot subsist together,—the Mirror-surface cannot contain the reflection,—this has to be construed here. Because what are perceived in the Mirror-surface are only reflections occupying the same space; material things with forms can never occupy the same points in space; as if they did, they would become one and the same.

This objection is applicable under both views—of things being momentary or non-momentary.—(259)

The Rock-crystal also does not become transformed into the reflected image of the object placed by it; this is what is shown in the following Text:—

TEXT (260).

PERSONS STANDING ON THE TWO SIDES OF IT PERCEIVE ONLY THE PURELY WHITE ROCK-CRYSTAL; HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT THIS ALSO DOES NOT BECOME TRANSFORMED INTO THE REFLECTION.—(260)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, the man standing in front of the Rock-crystal placed in contact with the Hibiscus Flower, perceives it as red; while persons who may be standing on two sides of it would perceive it as purely white,—not even as partly red and partly white.—Now if the Rock-crystal had become transformed into the reflection (of the Flower), then, just like the man standing
in front, the persons standing on the two sides of it also would perceive it as red.

This objection is applicable under both views—of things being momentary and not-momentary.—(260)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out the objection that would be applicable only under the view that things are not-momentary:

**TEXT (261).**

**The Opponent's theory would also entail the incongruity of the Rock-crystal becoming different with each object placed before it,—if there were a real transformation of it into the reflection.—(261)**

**COMMENTARY.**

If the Rock-crystal and such things were really transformed into the reflection of the object placed before them, then,—just as the reflections of the various things placed before the reflector appearing one after the other, are different in character, and hence there is no identity among them,—in the same manner, in the Soul, and in the Rock-crystal and such things also, there would be differences due to the character of each thing presented to it (and reflected therein).—If the perception of the Reflection, however, be admitted to be an illusion, then there can be no objection to it,—this is what is meant by the epithet 'real'.—(261)

**TEXT (262)—(First line).**

**From this it follows that the said perception of the Reflection is an illusion,—appearing in connection with things possessed of diverse unthinkable potencies.—(262)**

**COMMENTARY.**

Inasmuch as, under both theories, it is not possible for the Reflecter to become transformed into the Reflection,—it becomes established that it is an Illusion.

**Question**—"If that is so, then such Illusion appears only in connection with things like the Rock-crystal, and not with things like the Wall."

The answer is supplied by the words—'In, connection with things possessed of diverse unthinkable potencies.'—Diverse,—of various kinds;—and 'unthinkable',—are the potencies of things; no objection can be raised against the particular potentialities of things,—as these potentialities are the effects of the series of causes that have brought about each thing. In fact, you also can have no dispute against this much; as you have yourself said—'Who can take objection to the fact that it is Fire, not Ākāsha, that burns?'.—(262)
“If that is so, then in the case of Cognition also, the idea of its being transformed into the reflection of its object may be mere Illusion; so that there is no transformation into the reflected form.”

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (262)—(Second line).

IN THE CASE OF COGNITION, THERE CANNOT BE EVEN ILLUSION; AS THERE IS ABSENCE OF DIFFERENCE.—(262)

COMMENTARY.

It is not right that there should be Illusion in the case of Cognition. What is implied by the term ‘even’ is that it is not only ‘transformation into Reflection’ that is not right;—why?—as there is absence of difference; i.e. because there is no difference. In the case of the Rock-Crystal and other things, it is right that there should be Illusion, as it is possible for the illusory cognition to be different from those things; in the case of Cognition, however, there cannot be another Cognition in the form of an Illusion; as all Cognition is held (by the Mīmāṃsaka) to be one. Nor can it be said that the Cognition itself appears in the form of an Illusion; as Cognition has been held to be eternal (which Illusion can never be).—(262)

It has been argued above (under Text 247), for the purpose of proving the one-ness and eternality of Cognition that—‘Cognition is always recognised as being of the nature of Intelligence, etc. etc.’

This is answered in the following Text:—

TEXT (263).

THE CHARACTER OF BEING DIFFERENT FROM NON-COGNITION IS ONE THAT IS COMMON TO ALL COGNITIONS; AND THE SAID RECOGNITION COULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE IMPOSITION OF THAT COMMON CHARACTER,—EVEN UNDER THE VIEW OF COGNITIONS BEING MANY AND DIVERSE.—(263)

COMMENTARY.

The ‘Recognition’ that has been put forward is Inconclusive; because the said fact of ‘Recognition’ can be explained, in regard to all Cognitions, as being due to the imposition of the character of being different from what is not-cognition;—i.e. such things as the Jar and the like;—and this would not be incompatible even with the view of Cognitions being many and diverse.—The following has to be definitely understood: It is only when Cognitions are many,—and not when they are not many,—that the said Recognition can be explained as being brought about by the ‘exclusion of all that is not homogeneous to it’. For instance, in the case of such superimposed (assumed) Cognitions as have no real background, even when a diversity among the
objects is not admitted, there is no Recognition; e.g. there is no such recognition as that ‘this Cognition of the Horse and the Chariot is the same as what was the Cognition of the Elephant’;—and it has been already proved that all these Cognitions are without any real background; hence we are not asserting that here again. Thus the assertion—that ‘there is no non-recognition of it as Cognition so long as notice is not taken of the diversity among the objects’ (Text 248, above)—should be regarded as ‘unproven’ (untrue).—(263)

Then again, if the Soul is held by you to be eternally of one and the same form, then such diverse states as ‘Happiness’ and the like are not possible. If you do admit these diverse states, then the Soul cannot be eternally of one and the same form. As one and the same thing cannot have such contradictory characters as diversity and non-diversity.

This Objection has been sought to be answered by Kumārila; and what has been said by him is now introduced in the following Text,—for the purpose of refuting it (below, under Text 268 et. seq.)—:

TEXTS (264-265).

"THE PERMANENT SOUL HAVING BEEN ABSOLUTELY ESTABLISHED AS DEVOID OF DIVERSITY DUE TO THE DIVERSITY OF STATES,—WHAT PEOPLE ASSUME TO BE THE STATES OF HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS AND THE REST,—EVEN WHEN UNDERGOING ALL THESE STATES, MY PERSON (SOUL) DOES NOT RENOUNCE HIS CHARACTER OF BEING SENTIENT, BEING A SUBSTANCE, BEING AN ENTITY AND SO FORTH." [Shlokavārtika, page 695]—(265)

COMMENTARY.

‘Undergoing’—passing through;—‘Person’—Soul. The term ‘and so forth’ includes such generic characters as being knowable, being rightly cognizable, being the active agent, and the like.—(265)

The following Text proceeds to show that there is no disappearance of the specific properties:

TEXT (266).

"EVEN ON THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW STATE, THE PRECEDING STATE IS NOT ENTIRELY DESTROYED; IT BECOMES MERGED INTO THE COMMON CHARACTER, IN ORDER TO HELP THE APPEARANCE OF THE NEXT STATE.” [Shlokavārtika, page 596]—(266)

COMMENTARY.

‘Preceding state’,—of happiness.

"If that is so, then why is not Unhappiness also not felt during the state of Happiness?"
The answer is—*It becomes merged, etc. etc.*—While the state of ‘Happiness’ remains in its own form, the other state, of ‘Unhappiness’, does not appear; it remains merged in the common character, which permeates through all states,—such as being sentient, being substance and so on; and thereby renders possible the appearance of the succeeding state of ‘Unhappiness’; it is for this purpose that it becomes merged in the common character.—(266)

*Objection*—If that be so, then the mergence of the states into the common character also should be as unreasonable as in the other states; as that also involves an incongruity.

In regard to this objection, the explanation is as follows:—

**TEXT (267).**

"The States, in their own forms, are mutually incompatible; as for the common character, however, it is not incompatible with any State, and it is actually recognised, in its common form, in all States." *Shlokavārtika*, page 696—(267)

**COMMENTARY.**

The States of ‘Happiness’ and the rest are incompatible among themselves; hence it is not reasonable that they should become merged into each other;—on the other hand, if any one State became merged into the common character, where would there be any incongruity, which would go against the acceptance of its mergence therein? As a matter of fact, the said common character is actually seen to be compatibly permeating through all the States; as is clear from the fact that ‘Sentience’ and the other common characters are found to be present in all the States.—(267)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to answer the above arguments of the *Mimāmsaka* :—

**TEXT (268).**

*If the States are not entirely different from the Soul, then there should be destruction and origination of the Soul also, following upon the destruction and origination of the States.*—(268)

**COMMENTARY.**

If the States are not held to be entirely different from the Soul, then, on the destruction and origination of the States, there should be destruction and origination of the Soul also. The term ‘entirely’ is meant to show that, if there were even the slightest degree of *non-difference*, the said ‘des-
struction and origination' would be irrepresible. The argument is to be formulated as follows:—When one thing is non-different from another, its destruction and origination must follow on the destruction and origination of the latter, just like the specific forms of those same States of Happiness and the rest,—and the Soul has been held to be non-different in nature from the States of Happiness and the rest; hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.—(268)

The following Text shows that the Reason just put forward is not 'Inconclusive':—

TEXT (269).

IF THERE BE PRESENCE OF CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES, THEN THERE SHOULD BE ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE; JUST AS IN THE CASE OF YOUR SOULS WHICH ARE ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT FROM EACH OTHER, THROUGH THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER BELONGING TO EACH OF THEM.—(269)

COMMENTARY.

If it be held that destruction and origination pertain to the States only, not to the Soul,—so that the two (the States and the Soul) have two contradictory properties—of 'origination' and 'non-origination',—then there must be difference between them; just as in the case of Souls, which are many,—each has its own character restricted to himself,—and hence they are regarded as distinct from each other; that is, this much alone serves as the basis of difference.

The qualification 'distinctive character belonging to each' has been added for the purpose of avoiding the fallacy of the 'absence of the Probandum' in the Probanas, due to the fact that in the case of the Souls also, there is no difference in their own pristine forms. As a matter of fact, the form belonging to each of the individual Souls is entirely different from each other; if that were not so, as there would be no restriction regarding the apprehensions and remembrances of different persons, there would be confusion in all matters.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is not subject to the same vicissitudes as another, there cannot be non-difference between them;—e.g. among Souls, each having its own distinctive form restricted to itself, they are not subject to the same vicissitudes,—the States of Happiness and the rest also are not all subject to the same vicissitudes;—hence, inasmuch as the wider condition is not found in them (they cannot be non-different).—(269)

It has been asserted that "on the appearance of another State, the preceding State is not entirely destroyed";—the following Text supplies the answer to this:—
TEXT (270).

IF YOUR 'STATES' BECOME MERGED INTO THE SOUL IN THEIR OWN FORM, THEN, ON THE APPEARANCE OF HAPPINESS, UNHAPPINESS ALSO SHOULD BE FELT.—(270)

COMMENTARY.

When the States become merged in the Common Soul, they could be so merged either in their own form or in some other form; if it is the former that is meant, then on the appearance of Happiness,—i.e. when there is feeling of the State of Happiness,—Unhappiness also should be felt; as this latter also is possessed of the common character of 'feeling'.—(270)

If they become merged in some other form, then there would be the following difficulty:—

TEXT (271)

AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHEN THERE IS TRANSFERENCE OF ONE FORM TO SOMETHING, THERE CAN BE NO TRANSFERENCE OF ANOTHER FORM. SO THAT IF THE STATES BECAME TRANSFERRED (MERGED INTO THE SOUL) IN THEIR OWN FORM, THEN THE SOUL ALSO WOULD BE SOMETHING LIABLE TO ORIGINATION.—(271)

COMMENTARY.

Further, the transference (mergence) of Happiness and other States into the Soul could be possible only in their own forms; and in that case, like Unhappiness and the other States, the Soul also, being non-different from them, would be something liable to origination,—capable of being produced.—(271)

It has been asserted (under Text 227) that "the Soul's characters of Doer and Experiencer are not dependent upon the State." The answer to this is provided in the following:—

TEXT (272).

IF THE CHARACTERS OF DOER AND EXPERIENCER ARE NOT DEPENDENT UPON THE STATE,—THEN THE SAID CHARACTERS CANNOT BELONG TO THE SOUL,—AS THEY CAN BELONG TO ONLY ONE WHO HAS THAT STATE.—(272)

COMMENTARY.

If the character of 'Doer', etc. rested in the Souls themselves,—then these could never belong to the Soul, which never abandons its previous char-
acter. This argument may be formulated thus:—One who has not abandoned his previous States of non-doer and non-experiencer can never do or experience,—e.g. the Akāśa,—and the Soul never abandons its State of non-doer and non-experiencer; hence we find (in the assertion concerned) conditions contrary to the more extensive character.—(272)

The revered Dīnāgā having declared that—'if the fact of the Soul being modified on the appearance of Cognition meant the non-eternity of that Soul, then, there can be no Cogniser in the shape of the Soul not modified';—in answer to this declaration, Kumārila has argued as follows:—"We are not denying the fact of the Soul being expressed (spoken of) by the term 'non-eternal'; but if the term meant mere modification, then that alone would not imply the destruction of the Soul."—(Shlokavārtika, Ātmavāda, 22).

Against this the Author states the following objection, which also serves to sum up his own conclusion:—

TEXT (273).

For these reasons, we are not denying the fact of the Soul being spoken of by the term 'eternal'; but on account of its form being subject to modification, there must be destruction of it.—(273)

COMMENTARY.

For these reasons, we are not denying the fact of the Soul being spoken of as 'eternal',—on the ground that Sentience, which is in a State of perpetual flux, continues undestroyed, along with its Cause, as long as the world lasts. But its form—nature—being subject to modification, as there is always the abandoning of the preceding and the appearance of the succeeding form,—its liability to destruction is clearly indicated.—(273)

As regards the instance of the Serpent, etc. that has been cited above (under Text 223),—the following Text proceeds to show that all these things are not found to be eternal and of one and the same form:—

TEXT (274).

The Serpent also is liable to become crooked and so forth, because it is subject to perpetual flux; if it had a permanent form, then, like the Soul, it could never come by another State.—(274)

COMMENTARY.

Just as in the case of the Soul,—because of its being always of one lasting character,—there is no possibility of another State,—so in the case of the
Serpent also. If it were subject to destruction (modification) every moment, then alone could it have another State; as the 'appearance of another State' is always in the form of the 'appearance of another character'.—(274)

It has been argued (under Text 229) that "The conception of I in the notion I know apprehends the Cogniser";—the following Text proceeds to show that this is 'unproven' (not admitted by all parties):

**TEXT (275).**

**AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE 'NOTION OF I' COMES ABOUT WITHOUT A REAL BASIS, THROUGH THE FORCE OF THE BEGINNINGLESS SEED OF THE VISION OF BEING; AND THAT ALSO ONLY IN SOME PLACES.**—(275)

**COMMENTARY.**

The said 'I-notion' has no real background, by virtue of which the 'Cogniser' could form its object.

"If that is so, then what is the cause of its origin?"

The answer is that—*It proceeds from the beginningless, etc. etc. 'Vision of Being' is the vision of the existing body;—the 'seed' of this vision is the Potency of Dispositions; and this 'seed' is beginningless;—and it is through the force of this that 'I-consciousness' is brought about;—and that also only in some places,—i.e. only in the internal economy of the Sextuple Body.—(275)

**Question.**—"Why does not the 'I-notion' come about everywhere?"

The Answer is supplied in the following:

**TEXT (276).**

**IT IS ONLY SOME (NOT ALL) IMPRESSIONS THAT SECURE THE REQUISITE POTENCY FOR BRINGING ABOUT THE SAID NOTION APPREHENDING THAT PARTICULAR FORM; HENCE IT DOES NOT APPEAR EVERYWHERE.**—(276)

**COMMENTARY.**

'The said notion, etc.'—i.e. the 'I-notion, apprehending the form of the Cogniser, as existing through the preceding and succeeding points of time'.—'Not everywhere',—i.e. in other 'chains', like those of the Jar and other things.—(276)
TEXT (277).

If this were not so,—the objection in question could be urged with equal force against your 'Soul' also; but all difficulties are removed by the fact that there is diversity in its potencies.—(277)

COMMENTARY.

Further, even when the 'I-notion' is held to have the Soul for its basis,—the objection in question would apply with equal force:—Why does the said notion not appear in connection with another Soul also?—It might be answered that "it is not so because of the restrictions imposed by the potency of things",—then, for us also the same answer would be available,—that the notion appears only in regard to some internal objects, and not in regard to all. So that all difficulties would be removed.—(277)

It might be urged that—"There may be such restriction; but how is the fact of its having no real basis proved?"

The answer is supplied by the following:—

TEXTS (278-279).

If the said notion (of 'I') had an eternal thing for its basis, then all 'I-notions' would come about all at once, as their efficient cause would be always present.

—If it had a non-eternal basis, then all these notions would be equally clearly manifest.

Hence (it follows that) the other parties needlessly raise questions regarding the existence of the basis of the said I-notion.—(278-279)

COMMENTARY.

The basis (background) of this 'I-notion' could be either eternal or non-eternal;—if it is eternal, then all 'I-notions'—'I-consciousness'—would come about (appear) simultaneously, as their cause would be present in its perfect condition; nor can the said basis be without cause; as such an idea would lead to absurdities;—nor can an efficient cause stand in need of auxiliary causes;—all this has been discussed more than once.—Nor can it be urged that "there is only one I-consciousness", because its multiplicity is clearly proved by its appearing only occasionally. For instance, during the states of deep sleep, or of intoxication, or of swoon, there is no 'I-consciousness' felt, and yet at other times, it is actually felt; and this non-apprehension of it at certain times shows that it appears only occasionally; and because it
appears only occasionally, therefore it must be regarded as many also. Thus it is clear that all these 'I-notions' would come about simultaneously, as their coming about is dependent upon the presence of the said cause only.

If then the other view be accepted that the basis of the 'I-notion' is non-eternal, then all I-notions should be all as clearly manifest as the Visual and other Cognitions; as they would be directly apprehending the specific individuality of the thing concerned.

For these reasons, we conclude that 'other people'—other philosophers, like Kumārila and others—needlessly raise questions regarding the basis of the I-notion in question,—in such words as (those under Text 232)—"Of that notion, what cognitive-moment is assumed to be the object?" and so forth.

—(278-279)

In this connection, it has been asserted by the Buddhist that the 'I-notion' is entirely baseless, and it appears only as an Illusion due to the beginningless Dispositions of the "Vision of the Body of Being".—As against this, Kumārila has raised an objection, which is set forth below:—

TEXTS (280-281).

"What the Disposition can do is to bring about the Recognition of the Cogniser; it cannot bring about the Cognition of a thing as what it is not; because it cannot be the cause of Illusion (Wrong Cognition).—Thus the 'I-notion' cannot be regarded as an Illusion; as there is nothing to annul it (and hence prove it to be wrong)";—

[Śhlokavārttika, page 720]—if this is urged [then the answer is as given in the following Text].—(280-281)

COMMENTARY.

What the Disposition can do is to bring about the Recognition of the Cogniser, and not the Cognition of a thing—Cogniser—as what it is not, —i.e. as not-Cogniser; the construction is that Disposition cannot bring about this latter Cognition.—"why?"—because it cannot be the cause of Illusion; in fact it always brings about the Cognition of a thing exactly as it had been cognised on the previous occasion, and not a wrong Cognition.—Thus then, because this I-notion is produced from Dispositions, and because there is no valid reason for annulling it, it cannot be regarded as an Illusion.

The term 'chē', 'if this be urged', should be construed away from its place,—after the end of the sentence.—(280-281)

The following Text answers this argument:—
TEXT (281).

WHAT HAS BEEN URGED IS NOT RIGHT; AS THE REASONING ADDUCED ABOVE IS CLEARLY FOUND TO BE SUBVERSIVE OF THE SAID IDEA.—(281)

COMMENTARY.

‘Adduced above’—under Text 278.—(281)

It has been argued that ‘Disposition cannot be the cause of Illusion’; this reason is ‘Inconclusive’;—this is shown in the following Text:—

TEXT (282).

HOW IS IT THAT, ENTIRELY FROM DISPOSITIONS,—SUCH DIVERSE ILLUSIONS COME ABOUT AS THOSE THAT DEVOTEES HAVE IN REGARD TO GOD AND OTHER BEINGS AS BEING THE CAUSE OF THINGS AND SO FORTH?

COMMENTARY.

If Disposition were not the cause of Illusion, then how could such Illusions appear, purely out of Dispositions, as ‘God is the cause of all products, omniscient, the receptacle of eternal cognition’ and so forth? In fact, Kumārila himself has denied a creator of the world, like God and other Beings.

In the phrase ‘proceeding entirely from Disposition’, the term ‘entirely’ is for the purpose of excluding a real background.—(282)

TEXTS (283-284).

THUS THEN, THE BASELESSNESS OF ‘I-CONSCIOUSNESS’ HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED, THERE CAN BE NO Cogniser WHO COULD BE APPREHENDED BY THE SAID ‘NOTION OF I’. HENCE AMONG ALL VALID FORMS OF COGNITION, THERE IS NOT ONE WHICH IS FOUND ABLE TO SUPPLY A FIT EXAMPLE;

AND THE REASONS ALSO THAT HAVE BEEN ADDUCED IN DUE COURSE ARE FOUND TO BE ‘UNPROVEN’ REGARDING THEIR SUBSTRATUM.—(283-284)

COMMENTARY.

Thus ‘I-consciousness’ being baseless, there can be no Cogniser who could be admitted to be the object of that consciousness. Hence the existence of the ‘soul’ is not proved.
The other party has adduced (under Text 238, et seq.) such reasons as 'because he has been apprehended by past I-notions' and so forth,—for proving the eternity of the Soul; against this it is urged that there can be no Cogniser, etc.—i.e. neither an eternal nor a non-eternal Cogniser is there who could serve as the corroborative instance; hence the corroborative instance (of the opponent's inference) is 'unproven' (non-existent). For instance, the first and second reasonings (set forth by the opponent) are open to the objection that the corroborative Instance is beset with the defect of having its subject unknown; as there is no such Cogniser known as is the object of the 'I-notion' of to-day and also of yesterday.—As regards the third reasoning, the Instance cited—'like the single Cognition'—is devoid of the Probandum and the Probans; because the 'one Cognition' intended to be the 'I-notion' of the cogniser connected with the same chain,—and also to appertain to a single object,—is 'not proven' (not admitted by all parties). Thus, on account of the two characters being 'unproven', the Instance itself has been declared to be 'unproven'.

Adduced in due course,—i.e. those Reasons that have been adduced above;—'in due course'—according to the nature of the defect found in each.—'Unproven regarding their substratum',—for instance, in the first and second arguments, the Reasons adduced are 'unproven regarding their substratum', as it is not admitted that there is any such object as 'the Cogniser apprehended by I-notion';—in the third argument, though the substratum is not 'unproven', inasmuch as the 'Cognitions' which form the subject are well-recognised entities,—yet, what is 'not proven' in regard to them is the fact of their being qualified by a 'Cogniser connected with a single chain',—because it is well known that Cognitions are baseless (devoid of any basis in reality). This is the reason why the Text has used the qualifying term, 'in due course'.—(283-284)

End of section 7 (b) dealing with the Mimāmsaka's Doctrine of the 'Soul'.

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CHAPTER VII.

SECTION (C).

The Sāṅkhya doctrine of the 'Soul' (Spirit).

COMMENTARY.

The Text proceeds now to refute the 'Soul' as postulated by the Sāṅkhya:

TEXTS (285-286).

Others hold Chaitanya 'Sentience' to be distinct from the form of Buddhi, Intellect (Cognition). They postulate 'Sentience' as the 'Spirit's' own form; he only enjoys the fruits presented to him by Primordial Matter; he is not the 'doer'; the character of 'doer' is held to belong to Primordial Matter alone.—(285-286)

COMMENTARY.

'Others'—the Sāṅkhyaśas. They postulate the Spirit's own form as consisting of Chaitanya, 'sentience',—which is something different from Buddhi (of the Sāṅkhyaśas, which is Cosmic Intellect); as their doctrine is that Buddhi is of the nature of Primordial Matter, while Chaitanya is the form of the Spirit alone.—This 'Spirit' is the enjoyer of the fruit of good and bad deeds, presented by Primordial Matter,—but he is not the doer of the deeds; as the character of the doer is held to belong to Primordial Matter alone, which contains within itself the evolution of the whole world. In support of this doctrine they adduce the following proof:—Whatever is of the nature of an aggregate is found to be for another's purpose,—e.g. Beds and such things;—the eye and the rest are of the nature of aggregates; hence this is a reason based on the nature of things;—and this 'another' is, by implication, the Spirit (or Soul). This is what the other party means.—(285-286)

With the following Text proceeds the refutation of the said doctrine (of the Sāṅkhyaśas):—
TEXT (287).

AS REGARDS THIS DOCTRINE, IF 'SENTIENCE' IS HELD TO BE ONE ONLY,
THEN HOW IS IT THAT, IN THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND
AND OTHER OBJECTS, WHAT IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED
IS A FORM BESET WITH DIVERSITY? —
(287).

COMMENTARY.

To explain—When the Sāṅkhya says that ‘Sentience is the Soul’s own
form’, what becomes postulated is that sentience is eternal and of one form,—
inasmuch as it is non-different from the Soul who is eternal and of one form.—
This however is contrary to facts of perception; inasmuch as in the Cogni-
tions of Colour, Sound and other things, what is clearly—distinctly—per-
ceived, through their own Cognition itself—is a form beset with diversity,—i.e.
a diverse character is perceived;—and this could not be possible if Sentience
were only one.—(287)

The following Text shows that the said doctrine is open to the charge of
being contrary to doctrines of the Sāṅkhya himself:

TEXT (288).

IF 'SENTIENCE' IS OF ONE FORM AND CONTINUES TO EXIST FOR ALL TIME,
THEN, HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SENTIENT SOUL TO BE
THE ENJOYER OF THINGS OF MANY KINDS? —(288)

COMMENTARY.

The Soul is of one form, and yet the enjoyer of many kinds of things,—
this involves self-contradiction; specially as it cannot be distinguished
from the state in which one is not the enjoyer.—(288)

It might be argued that “there is no self-contradiction, because of the
presence of the desire to see and other characters”.

The following Text supplies the answer to this:

TEXT (289).

THE 'DESIRE TO SEE' AND THE LIKE, WHICH ARE DIVERSE, DO NOT
COME INTO EXISTENCE AS FORMING THE BASIS OF THE SPIRIT'S
EXPERIENCE; FOR, IF THEY DID SO, THEN THE SOUL
ITSELF WOULD BE SOMETHING PRODUCED.—(289)

COMMENTARY.

If, in regard to colour, etc. the 'desire to see', 'desire to hear' and so
forth,—which are different from one another,—be assumed to be the basis of
the Spirit's experience,—then no such can come into existence. If they did come into existence, then,—i.e. if they came into existence as distinct from each other,—the Spirit also would be something produced, just like the 'desire to see', etc. as it is non-different from these.—(289)

This same point is made clearer in the following:

TEXT (290).

THE 'DESIRE TO SEE' AND THE REST ARE NOT ANYTHING DISTINCT FROM 'SENTIENCE'; AND IF THIS LATTER WERE LIABLE TO 'APPEARANCE AND DISAPPEARANCE', THEN THE SAME COULD NOT BE DENIED OF THE SOUL.—(290)

COMMENTARY.

If they were something entirely distinct, then there could be no such connection between them as that 'these are his'; as there is no benefit conferred which could be the basis of such connection.

'The same',—i.e. the attributing of 'appearance and disappearance'.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—When there is no basis for any restriction regarding the existence of a thing, that thing should not be so restricted by any intelligent person,—e.g. Ākāsha as having a material shape;—in the case of the Spirit there is no basis, in the shape of 'Desire to see' and the rest for restricting the character of 'being the experiencer' to it; so that no reason is perceived for such restriction.—This Reason cannot be said to be 'unproven'; as has been explained already.—(290)

For the following reason also the character of 'experiencer' cannot belong to the Soul, on the ground that it cannot be the 'doer':—

TEXT (291).

IF GOOD AND BAD DEEDS ARE NOT DONE BY THE SOUL, THEN WHEREFROM DOES THIS DIVERSITY IN HIS EXPERIENCES PROCEED?—(291)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, no one enjoys the fruit of the act that he has not done; for if he did, then this would involve the incongruity of the 'accruing of what has not been done', etc. etc.—(291)

The following Text states a likely answer from the other party:
TEXT (292).

If it be held that—"It is Primordial Matter that bestows the fruits, in accordance with the desires of the Soul; and this relationship between the two stands like that between the Lame and the Blind persons,"—
[then the answer is as given in the following Text].—(292)

COMMENTARY.

Though the Soul is not the doer of deeds, yet it is Primordial Matter that presents to him things, in accordance with his desires, and then he enjoys these things.—So that there is none of the incongruity that has been urged.

Question:—"Primordial Matter being insentient, how can it be the Doer of good and bad deeds, by virtue of which it brings about the fruits of deeds for the Soul according to his desires?"

Answer:—This relationship, etc.; just as the Blind man acts towards things, through his connection with the man with eyes,—so do the Cosmic Intellect and other divergent things perform the functions of determining and the rest towards such effects as Merit, etc., through their contact with the Soul, which is sentient.—This has been thus asserted—"The Soul serves the purpose of bringing about Perception (of Matter), and Primordial Matter serves to bring about Liberation (of the Soul); the connection between these two thus is like that between the Lame and the Blind; and creation (evolution) proceeds from this connection" (Sāṅkhyakārīkā, 21).—(292)

The above argument is answered in the following—

TEXT (293).

If that is so, then how is it that even when the desire for the desired thing is there, it is not fulfilled? Primordial Matter cannot stand in need of anything else.—(293)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant is that Primordial Matter brings to the Soul the desired fruit of even such acts as he has not done, then how is it that, at all times, on the desire appearing for anything, the desires of all men do not become fulfilled?

It might be argued that—"It does not become fulfilled because its cause, in the form of Merit, is not present".
The answer to that is that Primordial Matter cannot stand in need of anything else.—Merit is a product of Primordial Matter, and as such non-different from it; consequently it must be always present; and the desired fruit must therefore always appear. For instance, all things (for the Sāṅkhya) are included under the two categories of 'Primordial Matter' and 'Soul', and these are always close to one another; so that the fruit should be always there.

Then again, if it is the desired fruit that Primordial Matter brings to the Soul, why then does it present to him what is undesirable? For certainly no one desires what is undesirable.—(293)

Further, if Primordial Matter presents the thing to the Soul,—even so, it cannot be right to regard him as the 'enjoyer', as he is unmodifiable.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (294-295).

If, at the time of his enjoying a thing, there is no modification in the Soul,—then he cannot be the enjoyer; nor can Primordial Matter be of any service to him.—If (on the other hand) there is modification in him, then his eternity disappears; as 'modification' consists in becoming changed into something else; and how could any such change be possible if the Soul remained in the same condition always?—(294-295)

COMMENTARY

If the Soul is not made to undergo 'modification' into Joy and Sorrow due to Pleasure and Pain and so forth,—then he would be just like Ākāśa, and hence he cannot be the Enjoyer; and Primordial Matter also cannot be of any service to him,—[such is the construction of the Sentence];—because no service can be rendered to that which is unmodifiable.—If then, it be admitted that the Soul is modifiable,—then there is the undesirable contingency of his losing his eternity; because what we mean by the 'Non-eternity' of a thing is that it does not remain in the same form always; and as this would be there, if the Soul were modifiable, how could he be eternal? As what is meant by 'eternity' is that the thing should retain the same form always.—(294-295)

The following text provides another explanation of the Soul being the 'enjoyer'—from the standpoint of the other party:—
The following might be urged—"First of all the Cosmic Intellect becomes evolved in the form of the object; and when this object has been 'determined upon' (defined) by Cosmic Intellect, the Spirit attains it. Thus his character of being the 'enjoyer' is through the appearance of the reflection; and the Spirit never renounces his own nature."—(296-297)

COMMENTARY

'The Spirit is not held to the 'enjoyer' in the sense that he becomes modified; what is meant is that he becomes so by way of the appearance therein of the object 'determined' by Cosmic Intellect. That is to say, the object, first of all, enters as a reflected image in the mirror of Cosmic Intellect,—this reflected image of the object then becomes transferred into Spirit, which is the second reflecting mirror; and this is what constitutes the Spirit being the 'enjoyer' (of the object); and not his undergoing modification. By the mere transference of the reflected image, the Spirit does not renounce his own nature, because, like the Mirror he remains just as he was.—Thus, in the argument that was urged above (by the Buddhist against the Sāṅkhya) to the effect that 'what is non-differentiated from the non-enjoyer cannot be the enjoyer etc. etc.' (under Text, 288)—the Reason is found to be 'inconclusive'.—(296–297)

The answer to this is supplied in the following—

TEXT (298).

Our answer to this is as follows:—If the reflection appears in the same form (as the reflecting substance), then the same liability to 'appearance and disappearance' remains.—If, on the other hand, it is different, then the Spirit cannot be the enjoyer.—(298)

COMMENTARY

You hold that the reflection of the object in Cosmic Intellect becomes transferred to the Spirit, who is like a second mirror;—now if this reflection in Spirit is non-different from the Spirit itself, then the Spirit remains liable to 'appearance and disappearance' as urged above; for the simple reason that he is non-different from (identified with) the Reflection, which is liable to appearance and disappearance.—If, on the other hand, the view held is that the Reflection is something different from the Spirit, then he cannot be the 'enjoyer'; as his condition would not be different in any way from what it was when he was not the 'enjoyer'.—Nor can it be right to regard the Spirit's
character of being the ‘Enjoyer’ as being due to his contact with the reflection of the object; as there can be no ‘contact’ between two such entities as do not benefit each other in any way.—(298)

TEXT (299).

If Primordial Matter operates towards bringing about the diversified creation, in accordance with the (Spirit’s) ‘desire to see’ and the rest,—then how can it be insentient?—(299)

COMMENTARY

Then again, if Primordial Matter knew of the Spirit’s ‘desire to see’ etc.—then it might be reasonable to regard its activity to be for the sake of the Spirit, and to be in accordance with his ‘desire to see’ etc.;—as a matter of fact, however, the said Matter is itself insentient,—even when in contact with the Sentient Spirit;—it cannot then be right to regard its activity as brought about as by the contact of the Lame and the Blind. Because even though the Blind man does not see the road, yet he knows of the Lame man’s desire, because he is himself sentient. Primordial Matter however cannot know the Spirit’s ‘desire to see’ etc., because being insentient by its very nature, it is unconscious.—Nor is it possible for these two—Spirit and Primordial Matter—to be related like the Lame and the Blind,—as there can be no mutual benefit in their case.—(299)

TEXT (300).

Primordial Matter knows how to produce the Soup and other things, and yet does not know how to eat (enjoy) them,

—What can be more incongruous than this?—(300)

COMMENTARY

If it be held that Primordial Matter actually knows of the Spirit’s ‘desire to see’ and the rest of it.—then it must have to be regarded as being the ‘Enjoyer’ also. How can one who knows how to produce a thing not know how to enjoy it? Hence what can be more incongruous than that Primordial Matter knows how to produce things, but does not know how to enjoy them? The meaning is that nothing can be more incongruous. The Cook who prepares the soup and other things cannot be regarded as not knowing how to eat (enjoy) them. The particle ‘iti’ should be taken as understood after ‘viśā ṛti’.—(300)

In the following text the Author sets forth the answer likely to be given by the other party:—
TEXTS (301-302).

If it be argued that—"inasmuch as Primordial Matter is equipped with Cosmic Intellect, all this cannot be incompatible with its nature"—then, on the ground of its being equipped with Intellect, it would have to be possessed of Sentience also,—like the Sentience in Spirits. Because 'Intelect', 'Volition', 'Consciousness', 'Feeling', 'Knowing',—
all this is expressive of Sentience.—
(301-302)

COMMENTARY

'All this'—i.e. acting in accordance with the Spirit's 'desire to see' and the rest;—'its nature'—its character of Primordial Matter.—What is meant is this—"Even though Primordial Matter is not of the nature of Sentience, yet it is equipped with Cosmic Intellect which is of the nature of 'determination',—and thus it can know of the Spirit's 'desire to know' etc., and act accordingly; so that there is no incongruity at all".

The answer to this is that on the ground of its being equipped with Intellect, etc. etc. That is to say, if it is admitted that Primordial Matter is equipped with Intellect, then it should have to be regarded as endowed with Sentience also, like the Spirit; as 'Buddhi' (Intellect) etc. are only so many synonyms of 'Sentience'. For instance, that which is of the nature of light and has its form known by itself and shines independently of all else, is 'Sentience'; and this character is present in Buddhi (Intellect) also; why then should this latter not be the same as Sentience? specially as apart from Intellect, we do not perceive any other form of Sentience, by virtue of which this distinct nature could be attributed to Spirit.—(301–302)

In the following Text, the other party proceeds to show that Buddhi (Intellect) is something different from 'Sentience':—

TEXT (303).

"Cosmic Intellect must be insentient by its nature,—like Sound Odour, Taste and other things,—on account of the two reasons of being produced and being perishable",—

If this be your view—[then the answer is as stated in the following Text].—(303)

COMMENTARY

The opponent's argument is formulated thus:—"Whatever is characterised by the character of being produced, being perishable, and the like,—must
be *insentient*,—e.g. Taste etc. ;—Cosmic Intellect is so characterised; hence this must be a reason based upon the nature of things (for regarding it as *insentient*).”—(303)

The following Text answers this argument:—

**TEXT (304).**

**IF THE REASONS ADDUCED ARE MEANT TO BE SELF-SUFFICIENT, THEN THEY ARE NOT ADMITTED BY BOTH (PARTIES); IF THE REASONS ARE MEANT TO BE INDIRECT, THEN THERE IS NOTHING TO ANNUL THE CONTRARY CONCLUSION.**—(304)

**COMMENTARY**

The reason that has been put forward,—is it meant to prove the conclusion *directly* or *indirectly* (*per Reductio ad absurdum*)?—If *directly*, then the Reason adduced is ‘not admitted’ by either one or the other of the two parties; for instance, the ‘ producibility’ of things that the Buddhist admits is in the form of the production of something that did not exist before,—similarly, the ‘ perishability’ of things that the Buddhist admits is of the nature of complete destruction,—while such is not the ‘ producibility’ or ‘ perishability’ that is admitted by you, the *Sāṅkhya*; as you regard them as being of the nature of ‘ appearance’ and ‘ disappearance’ respectively; and the form in which you admit these is not the one that is admitted by the Buddhist; hence the reason comes to be ‘ not admitted ’ by either one or the other party. The mere admission of the verbal expression does not prove the admission of the Reason; the admission of a fact is proved by a fact, as it is only a fact that can be the *cause*. This has been thus declared—‘In the case of such fallacies as Falsity and the like, even though the verbal expression may be quite correct, the Reason may be regarded as fallacious, as it is only a fact that can prove a fact.’

If it be held that the Reason adduced is meant to prove the conclusion *indirectly*; even so, inasmuch as no reason has been adduced which would annul (and make impossible) a conclusion contrary to the one intended, the two reasons adduced must be regarded as ‘ inconclusive’. What is there, for instance, to obstruct the notion that ‘ producibility’ and ‘ perishability’ belong to *Sentience*?

As for the assumption of the *Sāṅkhya* in the following *Kārika*—“As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the Calf, so does Primordial Matter act towards the liberation of the Spirit” (*Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, 57*),—this is not a sound assumption at all; because it is not independently by itself that the Milk flows for the Calf’s growth; what happens is that the milk is produced by particular causes functioning occasionally; and when produced, the milk becomes the means of the calf’s growth; and it is in this sense that it is said that ‘ even the insentient thing acts’. No such activity however is possible for Primordial Matter; because, inasmuch as Primordial
Matter is eternal, and there can be no other cause except itself,—it cannot be right to regard its Potency as only occasionally active, on account of being dependent upon certain causes operating only occasionally. Nor can it be right to regard the said Potency of Primordial Matter to be inherent in it; for, if that were so, then as the Cause in its perfect form would be always present, the entire purpose of all men, in the form 'prosperity' and 'highest good', would be brought about all at once.—(304)

It might be argued that—"There may be non-difference between Cosmic Intellect and Sentience; even so the fact of its being Spirit remains undenied"—The answer to this is given in the following—

TEXTS (305-306).

There is no harm done to us by the mere application of the term 'Spirit' to Sentience; what we assert is that its eternity is difficult to prove; because the Eye and other things serve a fruitful purpose. If Sentience were everlasting, then all such things as the Eye and the rest would be useless; e.g. there would be no use for the fuel if Fire were everlasting.—(305-306)

COMMENTARY

What we deny is not merely the applying of the same 'Spirit' to Sentience; what we do deny is the property of 'eternity' that is imposed upon it.—'Why?'—Because such things as the Eye, the Light, the Mind and the like serve a fruitful purpose. Otherwise, if Sentience were everlasting—eternal—then the Eye and the rest would be entirely useless; as the only purpose served by these is the bringing about of Sentience (Cognition); and there can be no bringing about of what is eternal.—An example is cited.—There would be etc.;—i.e. if fire were everlasting, then people would not fetch fuel for the lighting of fire.

From all this it follows that Sentience cannot be Eternal. (305–306)

Another argument put forward by the Sāṅkhya (in Kārikā 17) is that "all composite things are found to be for another's use".—The author proceeds to examine who this 'another' is:
TEXTS (307–310).

The fact of the Eye etc. being for 'another's use' is asserted (by the Saṅkhya), on the ground of their being 'composite things', like the Bed, Seat and such things.—If it is meant by this to prove that they serve the purpose of something else which is capable of having additional properties produced in it,—then what is sought to be proved is already admitted; inasmuch as the said Eye etc. are admitted by us to be helpful to Cognition. On the other hand, if it is meant to prove that they are helpful to something that is unmodifiable,—then the reasoning is open to the fallacy of the corroborative instance being devoid of the probandum; as the things cited as the instance are also helpful only to what is mobile (perishable).—Lastly, if what is meant to be proved is merely the vague general fact of their being helpful to 'another',—even so, the reason would be superfluous; as they are already admitted to be helpful to the Mind.—(307–310)

COMMENTARY

The 'another' that is meant,—(a) is it one capable of having additional properties produced in it?—or (b) one incapable of having such additional properties produced, and hence unmodifiable?—or (c) what is meant to be proved is the mere vague fact of 'being for another's purpose', which is pleasing enough so long as it is not examined?—These are the three alternatives possible.

Under the first alternative (a), the reasoning proves what is already admitted; as we also admit that the Eye etc. are helpful to Cognition; as is clear from the statement that 'That Cognition which originates from the Eye and the Colours is Visual Perception, and that Cognition which originates from the whole body and the touchable things is Bodily (Tactile) perception.'

Under the second alternative (b), the Reason is 'contradictory'; this is what is shown in the text 309. If the Eye, etc. are meant to be proved as helpful to something that is unmodifiable (eternal), then as the Reason is found, in the instance cited, to be concomitant with the contrary of the probandum, it becomes 'Contradictory'; because the Bed and other things (cited as instances) are actually found to be helpful to what is mobile, i.e., non-eternal; in as much as it is impossible to add to the properties of what is unmodifiable.

(c) Lastly if these alternatives are excluded, and what is meant to be proved is merely the vague general fact of 'being for another's purpose', even so it would be proving what is already admitted; as the Eye and the rest are actually admitted (by us) to be helpful to the Mind. If the Mind
also is included in the Probandum (along with the Eye etc.), as held by the Naiyāyikas, even so, what you desire is not proved; as you do not hold the Spirit to be other than the Mind. Nor does the argument prove what is wanted by the Naiyāyikas; because it is already admitted that the Eye and the rest are 'for another's purpose', in the sense that they are helpful to one another; specially as the notion of 'another' is purely relative, like the notion of 'near and far'.

Then again, the 'composite character' that is assumed in the Mind is actually there, inasmuch as it takes in the help rendered by several causes; and to this extent your reason would be 'unproven' also (if the Mind also is included among 'the Eye and the rest').—(307–310)

End of the Examination of the Sāṅkhya Doctrine of 'Soul'.
CHAPTER VII.

SECTION (D).

The Doctrine of 'Soul' according to the Digambara Jains.

COMMENTARY

The Author now proceeds to refute the 'soul' postulated by the Digambara (Jaina):

TEXT (311).

The Jains, like the Mimamsakas, assert that the Person (Soul) is characterised by 'Sentience'; that, in the form of 'Substance', it is inclusive, and in the form of 'Successive Factors', it is exclusive.—(311)

COMMENTARY

'S Jainas', i.e., the Digambaras.—They assert as follows:—"The Soul is characterised by Sentience only; and in the form of Substance, it remains the same under all states, and as such is 'inclusive' (comprehensive) in its nature; while in the form of successive factors, being distinct with each state, it is 'exclusive' in its nature. This two-fold character of the Soul is cognised by direct Perception, and hence does not stand in need of being proved by other proofs. Thus that 'Sentience' which is found to continue to exist through all the states, even though these states are diverse, in the forms of Pleasure and the rest, —is 'substance'; while the 'successive factors' consist of the diverse states which appear one after the other; and all these are distinctly perceived".

Such is the view of the other party (the Digambara Jainas).—(311)

The refutation of this view proceeds with the following—

TEXT (312).

Under this view also, if the unmodified Substance is connected with the Successive Factors, then there is no difference (change) in it, and, in that case, it could not be liable to modification.—(312)

COMMENTARY

There are two opinions possible:—(a) The Substance that exists in the form of Sentience may be connected with the 'successive factors in its un-
modified form, i.e., without renouncing its previous character of 'Sentience', or (b) it is connected with the 'successive factors', in its modified form, i.e., in a form in which the previous character has been abandoned. If this latter view be accepted, then there is disappearance of the 'eternity' (of the Soul); as under this view, there would be no single entity existing throughout the series of successive factors. If the former view be accepted—that it is connected in its unmodified form,—then there is no difference, i.e., change, as between the preceding and succeeding states; so that the sentence would not be liable to modification; i.e., it has to be regarded as unmodifiable; as 'modification is of the nature of 'change', becoming something else. And yet it is held to be modifiable. The argument may be formulated as follows:—When a thing cannot be differentiated between its preceding and succeeding states, it cannot be regarded as modifiable; e.g. the Ākāsha; Sentience is not differentiated at all in any state; so that the wider character being absent (the narrower one must be denied).—(312)

In the following texts, it is urged from the standpoint of the Jaina that the reason just put forward is 'unproven', 'not admitted':—

TEXTS (313–315).

"When Sentience is spoken of as 'one', it is with reference to Space, Time and Nature; when it is spoken of as 'different', it is with reference to Number, Characteristic, Name and Function.—When we speak of the 'Jar' (Singular) and its 'Colour and the rest' (Plural), there is difference of 'Number' and 'Name'; there is also difference of 'nature', inasmuch as 'inclusiveness' (comprehensiveness) is the nature of the substance Jar, while 'exclusiveness' (distributiveness) is the nature of the Successive Factors in the form of Colour and the rest; and there is difference also of 'function'; inasmuch as the purposes served by the two are different.—Similarly between the 'Substance' and the 'Successive Factors'.—Thus Substance is not absolutely undifferentiated, as it does become differentiated in the form of the Successive Factors."—(313–315)

COMMENTARY

If the Substance were absolutely different from the successive factors, then no differentiation in it would be possible; because, on the ground of their non-difference regarding place, time and nature, the two are held to be one and the same; as a matter of fact, however, the two are different as regards number and other factors; for instance, the difference regarding
number is that while the substance is one, the successive factors are many; that is, the Substance is characterized by the number ‘one’, while the Successive Factors—Pleasure and the rest—are characterized by the number ‘many’; the nature of the two also is different: inasmuch as the Substance is ‘comprehensive’ in nature, while the Successive Factors are ‘distributive’ (exclusive). The term ‘sanjñā’ stands for Name; and ‘artha’ for action, function. This has been thus stated:—Between the qualified and the qualification, there is non-difference, due to non-difference in their place, time and nature, but there is difference due to difference in their number, name, nature and function, as is found between the Jar and its Colour and other properties’; that is, between the Jar and its Colour, etc., there is non-difference regarding place, etc., while the Jar is different from Colour etc., regarding number, etc.; e.g. the Jar is one while its properties, Colour and the rest, are many. There is difference in their name also: while the one is named ‘Jar’, the other is named ‘Colour and the rest’. There is difference regarding their nature also: while the Substance, in the shape of the Jar, etc., is comprehensive in its nature, the Successive Factors, Colour etc., are distributive. There is difference in their function also: the Jar serves the purpose of containing water, while Colour and the rest serve the purpose of lending colour to the cloth and so forth.

What has been said above (regarding the Jar and Colour etc.) should be understood to hold respecting the substance ‘Soul’ which is of the nature of ‘Sentience’ and the Successive Factors, ‘Pleasure, Pain and the rest’. In this case, the difference of ‘function’ should be understood as follows: The function performed by Sentience is the ‘apprehension of things’, while that performed by Pleasure, Pain, etc. is happiness, unhappiness, and the like. This is what is shown by the Text, in the words ‘Rūpādayah... saṅkhyāsaṅjñāvibhādātā’; the latter term is to be construed with the term ‘dṛavyaparyāyayoh’ appearing later on (under text 315); the various terms in the second line of Text 314 are to be construed along with their respective correlates: the construction being ‘Kāryabhāda’ ‘difference of purpose’ constitutes the ‘difference of functions’, and ‘anuvṛtti’, ‘vyāprī’; ‘Comprehensiveness and Distributiveness’ constitute the ‘difference of nature’. One sentence ends with the word ‘dṛavyaparyāyayoh’ ‘similarly between the substance and the successive factors’ (in line 1 of text 315); and another sentence begins with the terms ‘Evam naikāntāna.’

‘Thus the Substance, etc.’, this sums up the fallacy of being ‘unproven’ in the Reason (put forward by the Buddhist as against the Jaina). What is meant is that, as shown above, the Substance is not absolutely undifferentiated; as a matter of fact, it becomes differentiated through the diversity in the forms of the Successive Factors; and thus Substance not being absolutely different from the Successive Factors, the reason put forward (by the Buddhist, in Text 312) ‘because there is no difference’ is ‘unproven’, ‘not true’.—(313–315)

The answer to the above argument of the Jaina is provided in the following—
'One-ness' (Sameness, Identity) consists in non-difference of nature were there if this 'one-ness' (between two things), then 'difference' (between them) would be hard to prove in any way; as in the case of the forms of the Successive Factors themselves.—(316)

COMMENTARY.

Even admitting that there is non-difference between the 'Substance' and the 'Successive Factors'—such being the case, the 'non-difference' should be absolute; how then could there be 'difference' between them, which is the contradictory of 'non-difference'? It cannot be right to affirm and deny a thing,—affirmation and denial being mutually contradictory. For instance, when two things are spoken of as 'one', what is meant is that there is 'non-difference in their nature (character)';—this 'non-difference' being inseparable from 'negation of difference'; and when there is such 'non-difference of character' (between the 'substance' and the 'successive factors'), how could there be, at the same time, 'difference', which is the negation of 'non-difference'? This argument may be formulated as follows:—In a case where there is non-difference between two things, there can be no room for difference, which is the contradictory of 'non-difference'; e.g. as is found in the case of the same 'successive factors' and the 'substance', in regard to the specific individuality of each, where there is non-difference of character; and between 'substance' and 'successive factors', non-difference is clearly present (hence there is perception of what is contrary to the Probandum, i.e. difference).—(316)

Thus in reality, there being non-difference between 'Substance' and the 'Successive Factors', there cannot be any difference between them as regards their 'characteristics' also; this is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (317-318).

The 'One-ness' thus between 'Substance' and the 'Successive Factors' being not-figurative (i.e. Real), the 'Substance' also should be distributive (exclusive), like the forms of the 'Successive Factors'; or those 'Successive Factors' themselves should be comprehensive in their character, like the 'Substance'; because the one-ness of these with 'Substance' is duly established.

—(317-318)

COMMENTARY.

When a thing is non-different from another thing which is 'exclusive' in its nature, the former also must be exclusive; as for example, the forms.
of the Successive Factors themselves;—and Substance is non-different from
the Successive Factors, which are exclusive; so that there is a natural reason
(for the Substance also being exclusive).—Or (the argument may be stated in
another form)—When a thing is non-different from another which is inclusive in
character, the former also must be inclusive; e.g. the form of the ‘Substance’;
and the ‘Successive Factors’ in the form of Pleasure, etc. are non-different
from the ‘Substance’ which is inclusive; hence this is a natural reason (for
regarding these as inclusive). If this were not so, then as the fate befalling
them would be different, the two would have to be regarded as different.

There is also an argument which annuls the contrary of the conclusion,
in the form that—“if things possessed of contradictory properties would
be regarded as one, there would be an end to all business.”—(317–318)

TEXT (319).

FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE IS NO SUCH LASTING ‘SUBSTANCE’
AS THE ‘SOUL’ AND THE LIKE; BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT DIFFERENT
FROM THE ‘SUCCESSIVE FACTORS’, LIKE THE FORM
OF THE ‘SUCCESSIVE FACTORS’ THEMSELVES.—(319)

COMMENTARY.

The phrase ‘and the like’ is meant to include the Jar, Grains and other
things.—(319)

The following text sets forth the upshot of the second, ‘indirect’,
proof:

TEXT (320).

NONE OF THE ‘SUCCESSIVE FACTORS’ ALSO CAN BE BESET WITH ‘APPEAR-
ANCE AND DISAPPEARANCE’,—BECAUSE THEY ARE NON-
DIFFERENT FROM ‘SUBSTANCE’,—LIKE THE PERMANENT
FORM OF THE ‘SUBSTANCE’. —(320)

COMMENTARY.

The text has added the clause ‘like the permanent form of the Sub-
stance’ in view of the argument that “Inasmuch as Substance also is held
to be beset with appearance and disappearance, there can be no absence
of the Probandum in the Reason”. The compound ‘niyatātma’ is to be
taken as a Karmadhāraya, the meaning being ‘the eternal form—nature—
in the shape of Substance and so forth’.—(320)

The following Text clinches the argument:
TEXT (321).

For this reason it should be admitted, either that there is absolute destruction of all, or that all is permanent (eternal); exclusiveness and inclusiveness could not exist in any single thing.—(321)

COMMENTARY.

Any such comprehensive entity as ‘substance’, cannot be accepted, not only because it is non-different in nature from the ‘successive factors’, but also for the following reason (shown in the next text), it is not perceived apart from the ‘successive factors’ even when the conditions of its perception are present, and hence it should be treated as ‘non-existent’. This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (322).

As a matter of fact, there is no perception of ‘substance’, which should be perceptible, as something permeating through (and comprehensive of) the ‘successive factors’, —hence it cannot be regarded as existing, —like the ‘sky-lotus’. —(322)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that the statement that “The Soul, in the form of Substance, is permeating through the ‘Successive Factors’, is apprehended by perception itself” is not true; because as a matter of fact, no such substance as ‘Soul’ is perceived to appear, in that comprehensive (all-embracing) form, in any such Cognition as is admitted (by all parties) to be ‘Sense-perception’. —(322)

Question.—“If it is so,—i.e., if there is no such substance as ‘Soul’, apart from the ‘Successive Factors’, —how do the distinctions of Number etc. come about?”

The Answer is provided in the following—

TEXT (323).

In fact, things are capable of diverse fruitful actions; —they are causes of the notions of ‘similarity’ and the rest; —and they are amenable to conventional verbal expressions connoting such things.—(323)

COMMENTARY.

The ‘fruitful actions’, —of the ‘successive factors’, Colour etc., —are ‘diverse’ —of various kinds—distinguished as similar and dissimilar; —the
"similar" actions are the *holding of water* and the like, and the "dissimilar" actions are the colouring of cloth, the bringing about of visual perception and the like;—of these actions, the "Successive Factors" are capable. Thus is the compound to be analysed. As regards the "similar action," all the "Successive Factors" are used simultaneously; hence in order to indicate their common causal efficiency,—even though there is no common identical Substance permeating through them, and even though they are different from each other, yet—they are spoken of by means of the single term "Jar," as being *one* in number; and when it is intended to indicate the dissimilar specific actions of each of the "Successive Factors," they are spoken of by means of words expressive of the plural number;—it is in this way that the diversity in *number*, as also diversity in *action* (purpose) is explained.

"How then is there diversity of characteristics?"

*They are causes of the notions, etc. etc.—*The things, Jar e.g., become "causes of notions of similarity," when under all conditions, of baked, unbaked, etc., they are conceived of as 'Jar' and 'Jar' only,—being apprehended as objects of indeterminate cognitions;—as even though they are destroyed every moment, they are produced at each succeeding moment as particular things, but of similar shape. But when they become produced in the different colours of *dark, red,* and the like, they become "causes of notions of dissimilarity." Thus even in the absence of any simple comprehensive entity permeating through them, the things become the causes (basis) of notions of similarity and dissimilarity, and thereby come to be regarded as "comprehensive" and "exclusive" in character; and thus the *diversity of character* becomes established.

The term 'ādi' in the compound 'tulyādi' is meant to include the 'atulya,' 'notions of dissimilarity'.

"To what then is the *diversity in Name* due?"

' *They are amenable etc.'—*Such things',—i.e. things like Colour, which are capable of diverse fruitful actions and are causes of notions of similarity and dissimilarity; such things form the 'object'—connotation—of such conventional verbal expressions as 'Jar' and 'Colour' etc.; and the said things are amenable to such verbal expressions (names).—(323)

Thus what is proved by Perception is the fact that things are without 'Soul',—this is what, by way of recapitulation, is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (324).

In fact, it is only the 'Successive Factors' that are cognised as characterised by 'appearance and disappearance'; hence pure 'soullessness' becomes clearly established.

COMMENTARY.

'Successive Factors'—i.e. Colour etc., as also Pain etc. as felt in their own nature;—'only'—i.e. without any one 'substance' non-different from
them:—because for an eternal entity, any fruitful action, either simultaneous or consecutive, is incompatible. In fact, fruitful action in the case of things is possible only when they are liable to 'appearance and disappearance'. Thus, through Inference also, it becomes established that those things which are capable of fruitful action are 'without Soul', this being indicated by their mere existence.—(324)

Against what the Buddhist has said under Text 322 above, the author anticipates the following objection from the opponent's (Jaina's) standpoint:—

TEXT (325).

IT MIGHT BE URGED THAT—"WHAT EXISTS IS THE MIXED FORM OF THE 'SUBSTANCE' AND THE 'SUCCESSIVE FACTORS',—BECAUSE IT IS HELD TO BE DUAL IN FORM, BUT IMPARTITE,—LIKE Narasimha."—(325)

COMMENTARY.

'Mixed' —joined together; that is why the form of the 'Substance', though existent, is not perceived:—The next sentence explains the reason for its being thus 'mixed' in character: Because it is held to be etc.,—i.e. because the Soul and other things, though dual in form, are held to be impartite,—like Narasimha; and because the Soul is impartite, therefore it exists in the joint dual form, and hence is not perceived separately.—(325)

That this assertion (of the Jaina) involves self-contradiction is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (326).

THE ASSERTION THAT 'A CERTAIN THING IS OF DUAL FORM' CAN BE BASED ON THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL THINGS,—BECAUSE THE TERM 'FORM' CONNOTES NATURE.—(326)

COMMENTARY.

If the thing is 'impartite', then, to speak of it as 'of dual form' is a contradiction in terms; because such an assertion can be based only upon the existence of several things; because when a thing is spoken of as 'dvi-rupa', 'of dual form', what is meant is that 'it has two forms—two natures'; and one and the same thing cannot have 'two natures'; as that would deprive it of its one-ness. What you have proved is only that there are two forms or characters, and not that there is a single entity with two forms; and that for the simple reason that the characters of being one and being many are mutually contradictory and preclusive.—(326)

As regards Narasimha, he is one only and is not regarded as of 'dual form',—this is pointed out in the following—
TEXT (327).

Narasimha also cannot be one and also of 'dual nature'; as he is perceived as such because he is an aggregate of many atoms.—(327)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by 'also' is that it is not only the thing under dispute that cannot be 'of dual form'. 'He'—i.e. Narasimha—'as such', through the diverse character of the parts of his body, and also through His occupying larger space; otherwise He would not appear as He does. If even a small part—of the size of the fly's leg—of His body were concealed, He would be hidden to that extent.

This same argument also sets aside the fact of His being of the Colour of the Emerald.

All this we are going to explain in detail under the chapter on 'The Refutation of the Composite Whole'.

End of Chapter on the Jaina 'Doctrine of the Soul'.

_____

End of Chapter on the Jaina 'Doctrine of the Soul'.
CHAPTER VII.

SECTION (E).

The 'Advaita' Doctrine of the Soul.

COMMENTARY.

Others, upholding the Advaita (Monistic) system of Philosophy, who are followers of the Upaniṣads, postulate the 'Soul' to be Eternal, One and of the nature of Consciousness, which appears in the form of the illusory modifications of Earth etc.—This is the view set forth in the following Texts.—

TEXT (328).

Others assert that—"The Earth, Fire, Water etc. are the illusory modifications of eternal Consciousness, and this is what constitutes the 'Soul'".—(328)

COMMENTARY.

This is what constitutes the Soul—That is, the Soul is of the nature of one Eternal Consciousness of which Earth etc. are illusory modifications. —'Others'—i.e. the followers of the Upaniṣads.—(328)

Question.—'What is the proof of this? '—The answer is given in the following—

TEXT (329).

'There is nothing in this world which is endowed with the character of apprehensibility; and all this is held to be the illusory modification of Consciousness.’—(329)

COMMENTARY.

Apart from Consciousness (Cognition), Earth etc. are not found to fulfil the conditions of 'apprehensibility';—whereby they could appear (be perceived) as composites;—and Atoms do not exist (for the Vedāntin); hence, by implication, it is concluded that Earth etc. are merely so many reflections in Consciousness.

'This'—i.e. Earth and the rest.—(329)

The above view of the Vedāntin is controverted in the following—
The error in the view of these philosophers is a slight one,—due only to the assertion of eternality (of Cognition); as diversity is clearly perceived in the cognitions of Colour, Sound and other things.—If all these cognitions were one, then, Colour, Sound, Taste and other things would be cognisable all at once; as in an Eternal Entity there can be no different states.—(330-331)

COMMENTARY.

'The error is a slight one';—as they postulate only Cognition (Consciousness, as the only entity), which is quite reasonable.

"If that is so, then what is even the 'slight error' in their view?"

It is due to the assertion of 'eternality'.

"But why should not the acceptance of 'eternality' be reasonable?"

Answer—Diversity is clearly perceived etc. etc.;—'Eternality' connotes remaining in the same state always, and 'non-eternality' connotes not remaining in the same state always; and as a matter of fact, the Cognition that manifests (apprehends) Colour, Sound and other things is not found to be in one and the same state always;—actually it appears at one time as manifesting Colour and at another time, as manifesting Sound and other things, in a certain order of sequence. Under the circumstances, if all these things, Sound and the rest, were manifested by a single Eternal Cognition, then all of them would appear (be Cognised) simultaneously, like the bedspread of variegated colours; as the Cognition manifesting them would (ex hypothesi) be always there.

It may be held that "the Cognition of Sound and other things are different 'states' of it appearing one after the other,—so that the apprehension of Sound etc. could not be simultaneous".

The answer to this is—'In an Eternal Entity there can be no different states';—because the 'states' are not different from the Entity to which they belong; so that the Entity to which the states belong would be liable to 'production and destruction',—appearance and disappearance,—in the same way as the States are liable; or, conversely, the states also would be eternal, like the Entity to which they belong.—If, on the other hand, the states are different from the entity to which they belong, then there can be no idea of the states belonging to this entity; as there is no benefit conferred by the one on the other; and this alternative (of the states being different from the Cognitions) would also be contrary to the doctrine that the eternal Cognition is the only one Entity.—(330–331)

Further, if the Eternal Cognition existed, it could be known either through Perception or through Inference; that it cannot be known through Perception is shown in the following—
TEXT (332).

Cognition or Consciousness is never apprehended as anything distinct from the cognitions of colour and other things; and inasmuch as these latter undergo variations every moment, what remains there that could be lasting (permanent, eternal)? — (332)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, apart from the Cognitions of Colour etc., which appear one after the other, we do not apprehend any lasting Consciousness, eternal and one,—whereby it could be held to be known through Perception.—Then, inasmuch as it is well known that the Cognitions of Colour and other things are apprehended one after the other, and are destroyed every moment—it has to be explained what remains there that is non-different from those Cognitions? Thus, inasmuch as there is no apprehension of any such Cognition, which would be apprehended if it were there,—it cannot but be regarded as ‘non-existent’. This is what the Text means.

Nor can it be held that the said Eternal Cognition is known through Inference. Because such an Inference would be based either upon the nature of the Cognition itself, or upon that of its effects. It cannot be the former, as there is nothing which can prove that such is the nature of the said Eternal Cognition; on the contrary, there is Perception itself which precludes any such notion.

Thus the doctrine that ‘the world is the illusory modification of the Eternal Consciousness’ is not right. — (332)

Then again, under this doctrine, the notions of ‘Bondage’ and ‘Liberation’ are not possible.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (333).

There can be no distinction in Cognition as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’—if the ‘Soul’ consists of a single (eternal) Cognition; how then can there be any ‘Bondage’ and ‘Liberation’? — (333)

COMMENTARY.

For one who holds the view that—Cognition is in perpetual flux, different with different persons, undergoing variations in a series,—the notion of ‘Bondage and Liberation’ is quite reasonable, as being due to the coming about of a series of cognitions, wrong and right; and through the practice of yoga, gradually purer and purer Cognitions coming about, the series of impure cognitions cease and the final Aim (of Liberation) is attained; and thus the attempt at Liberation becomes fruitful.—For you, on the other hand,
the 'Soul' is of the nature of one Eternal Cognition; how then can there be any 'Bondage' and 'Liberation' for such a Soul? Because if the one Cognition is eternally wrong, then, as there could be no other state for it, there could be no possibility of 'Liberation'; on the other hand, if the one Cognition were eternally right, then as it would be always pure, there could be no 'Bondage'.—As regards our doctrine, the Cognition is held to be defective (wrong) or pure (right), in accordance with the varying character of the Series (in which it appears), and hence the notion of 'Bondage and Liberation' is entirely reasonable. This has been thus declared—'Cognition is defective and free from defects, beset with impurities and free from impurities; if it were never impure, then all embodied beings would be always liberated; if it were never pure, then the attempt to secure Liberation would be fruitless'.

—(333)

If it be held that 'Bondage and Liberation are only assumed, not real';—then it becomes necessary to explain the basis of this assumption. What this basis is under the doctrine of 'Cognitions being non-eternal' has been shown above. Thus the Effort—in the form of the contemplation of Truth,—that you put forth for the attaining of the 'Ultimate Aim' and for passing beyond the cycle of Birth and Death, can only lead to futile fatigue.—This is shown in the following—

TEXTS (334-335).

WHAT COULD THE MYSTIC SET ASIDE OR ACCOMPLISH BY THE PRACTICE OF YOGA? WHAT TOO IS THERE THAT COULD BE REJECTED?

As Wrong Cognition also is of the nature of the same (eternal Cognition).—The Knowledge of Truth also cannot be something to be brought about; as, being of the nature of Cognition, it is always there.—So that the entire Practice of Yoga also is entirely fruitless.—(334-335)

COMMENTARY

If, by the contemplation of Truth, the Mystic could set aside, or bring about, anything, then his Effort would be fruitful. As it is however, he can never set aside Wrong Cognition, because it is of the nature of the same,—i.e. of the nature of Eternal Cognition.—For the same reason it cannot be rejected; because what is eternal cannot be destructible and hence its rejection is impossible.—How can the Yogin accomplish—bring about—the Knowledge of Truth? Being of the nature of Eternal Cognition, the Knowledge of Truth would be always there.—Thus the doctrine in question cannot be right.—(334-335)
CHAPTER VII.

SECTION (F).

The Doctrine of ‘Soul’ according to Vātsiputriyas.

COMMENTARY.

The Author proceeds to refute the doctrine of ‘Pudgala’ (Soul) set up by the Vātsiputriyas.

TEXT (336).

Some people who regard themselves as ‘Buddhas’ describe the Soul by the name of ‘Pudgala’, and declare it to be neither the same as, nor different from—(the Skandhas, Thought-phases).—(336)

COMMENTARY.

‘Some people’,—the Vātsiputriyas.—Though these people regard themselves as ‘Saugatas’,—sons of Sugata, Buddha,—yet, under the pretended name of ‘Pudgala’, they postulate the ‘Soul’, which cannot be said to be either the ‘same as’, or ‘different from’, the ‘thought-phases’. The question arising as to how persons, who admit their being ‘Sons’ of the Blessed Buddha who has taught the doctrine of ‘No-Soul’, have wedded themselves to a false view of ‘Soul’,—the Author answers it in a joking spirit, by the term ‘who regard themselves as Buddhas’.

The character of the ‘Soul’ is held to be as follows:—(a) He who is the doer of the diverse good and bad deeds, (b) the enjoyer of the agreeable and disagreeable fruits of his deeds, and (c) who moves from the point of the abandonment of the preceding Thought-phase to the point of the assuming of another Thought-phase, and is also the Experiencer,—is the Soul.—All this is held to be true (by the Vātsiputriyas) of their ‘Pudgala’ also; the only difference is in regard to the name.—(336)

Question:—What is the reason for regarding the Pudgala as ‘incapable of being spoken of’ (either as the same as, or as different from, the Thought-phases)?

The answer is given in the following—
TEXT (337).

THE 'Pudgala' CANNOT BE SPOKEN OF AS 'DIFFERENT' FROM THE Thought-phases,—AS IN THAT CASE THIS DOCTRINE WOULD BE THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE 'Taitrithika Philosophers';—NOR CAN IT BE SPOKEN OF AS THE 'SAME' (NON-DIFFERENT); AS, IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS 'MORE THAN ONE' (MANY) AND SO FORTH;—HENCE IT IS BEST TO REGARD IT AS 'INCAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF' (AS EITHER THE ONE OR THE OTHER).—(337)

COMMENTARY

If the Pudgala were held to be different from the Thought-phases,—then it would come to be the view of the 'Soul' propounded by the Taitrithika Philosophers,—which would mean the acceptance of the doctrine of the Eternal 'Soul'; and it is not possible (as shown above) for the Eternal Soul to be the doer and the enjoyer, because it is always undifferentiated, like Akāśa; and the Blessed Lord also has denied the Eternal Soul; whose words—'all entities are devoid of the Soul'—would thus become contradicted.

"In that case, the Pudgala may be regarded as non-different from the Thought-phases".

Nor can it be spoken of as 'non-different' from the Thought-phases.—If the Thought-phases, Colour and the rest, were the Pudgala, then, as it would be non-different from many Thought-phases, the Pudgala itself would have to be regarded as many,—like the various forms of the Thought-phases; and the Pudgala is held to be one; as has been asserted in the sentence—'The Pudgala is one, and is born in the world as one; and so also the Tathāgata'.—The phrase 'and so forth' is meant to include 'non-externality' and such other characters.—Under the circumstances, the Pudgala would be something liable to destruction, like the Thought-phases; which would mean that there is 'destruction of what has been done' [i.e. there would be no accruing of the fruit of one's deeds to the man, who would be disappearing every moment]; and the Blessed Lord has rejected the doctrine of the absolute destruction of things.—From all this it follows that the Pudgala is 'incapable of being spoken of' (either as the same as, or as different from, the Thought-phases).—(337)

The following Text proceeds to show that like other things, the Pudgala also cannot be regarded as existing, because it is incapable of being spoken of;—this conclusion being deducible from your own words:
TEXT (338).

These people should be told that (according to what they have said), the Pudgala cannot be regarded as existing in reality;—because it is incapable of being spoken of either as the same or as different (from Thought-phases);—just like the 'Sky-lotus' and such non-entities.—(338)

COMMENTARY

The argument may be formulated as follows:—That which is incapable of being spoken of either as the same as, or as different from, a thing cannot be an entity,—as the sky-lotus;—and the Pudgala is (ex hypothesi) incapable of being so spoken of;—hence the wider character being absent (the narrower character must be absent); the corroborative instance per dissimilarity is supplied by Feelings etc.—(338)

Question—'How is the invariable concomitance (Premiss) urged here arrived at ?'

The answer is provided by the following—

TEXT (339).

A thing cannot escape being either 'same as' or 'different from', another thing; in fact, it is only what is entirely formless that can be regarded as 'incapable of being so spoken of'.—(339)

COMMENTARY

A thing cannot escape from being either the same as, or different from another thing,—as there is no other third alternative possible. If that were not so, then Colour and the rest also would be 'incapable of being spoken of' (either as the same as or different from one another).—It is for this reason that it is only what, by its very nature, is formless that is regarded as 'incapable of being spoken of',—not so any Entity.—(339)

"How is that"?

The answer is given in the following—
TEXTS (340-342).

It is only an entity that can be liable to the alternatives of being 'different' or 'non-different'; hence it is only in regard to things that are formless (i.e. non-entities) that it can be correct not to speak of them either as 'different' or 'non-different' (from one another);—not so in regard to an entity;—because in the case of the denial 'this is not what that is',—like a different thing',—it is difference that is clearly spoken of;—similarly when there is denial 'this is not what that is not', what is clearly spoken of is non-difference (between the two); thus it is that an entity can never escape from being either different or non-different from another entity.—(340–342)

COMMENTARY

As a matter of fact, an Entity alone can be the substratum of difference and non-difference;—never a non-entity; hence the non-mention of both difference and non-difference is possible only in regard to things that are formless,—i.e. have no character of their own; such non-mention is not right in regard to an Entity;—such is the construction of the sentence; and the reason for this lies in the fact that no third alternative is possible.

"Why is no third alternative possible?"

Answer:—Because in the case of the denial etc. etc.;—that is, when there is the denial, 'The Pudgala is not of the nature of Colour and other things', what is mentioned is the difference of the Pudgala from Colour and other things; because the denial of the fact of one thing being the same as another is invariably concomitant with the affirmation of a different character for the former. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is devoid of the character of another thing, it is different from it,—e.g. Colour is different from Feeling;—the entity named 'Pudgala' is devoid of the character of Colour and the rest; hence this is a reason (for its being regarded as different from them) based upon the nature of things.—Similarly where there is denial 'this is not what that is',—i.e. the denial of its not being of the same character as the other thing,—what is meant is its non-difference from that thing; because the denial of a real Entity being different from another thing is invariably concomitant with the affirmation of its being the same as that thing; if it were not so,—and no character is affirmed regarding that thing,—then all character being denied of it, it would become a non-entity; because a non-entity is characterised by the denial of all character in regard to it. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is denied the character of being something other than another thing, it must be the same as this latter,—just as Colour is denied the character of being something different from itself;—the Pudgala (according to the opposite party) is denied the character of being something other than Colour and the rest; hence this is a reason (for its being regarded as non-different from the latter) based upon the nature of things.—Thus we conclude that an Entity cannot escape from the alternatives of being different or non-different from another thing;
so that the Premiss of our main reason (against the doctrine of the Vātsīputrīyas) is fully established.—(340–342)

It has thus been proved that, under the theory of its being ‘incapable of being spoken of’, the Pudgala can have an existence only in imagination. The author now proceeds to clinch the argument by showing that if the Pudgala is regarded as an entity, it cannot be right to regard it as ‘incapable of being spoken of’; otherwise the conclusion would be contrary to your own assertion—

TEXT (343).

YOUR WORDS THAT "THE PUDGALĀ IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE THOUGHT-PHASES" ARE A CLEAR ASSERTION OF ITS NON-DIFFERENCE; WHILE THE WORDS ‘THE THOUGHT-PHASE IS NOT THE PUDGALĀ’ CLEARLY ASSERTS ITS DIFFERENCE.—(343)

COMMENTARY

Further, when you assert that ‘the Pudgala is incapable of being spoken of’; you loudly proclaim quite clearly that the Pudgala is different from the Thought-phases. This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (344).

THE PRESENCE OF CONTRARY PROPERTIES IS SPOKEN OF AS CONSTITUTING ‘DIFFERENCE’ AMONG ENTITIES; IS THERE NO SUCH ‘DIFFERENCE’ BETWEEN THE PUDGALĀ AND THE THOUGHT-PHASES?—(344)

COMMENTARY

This argument may be formulated as follows:—Where two things are possessed of properties that are mutually exclusive, they must be different from one another,—e.g. between Colour and Feeling, the former being endowed with material shape and the latter being devoid of material shape;—Pudgala and Thought-phase are (according to you) possessed by such mutually exclusive properties as ‘capable of being spoken of’ and ‘incapable of being spoken of’; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding the two as different).—(344)

The following Text proceeds to show that the reason here put forward is not ‘unproven’:

TEXT (345).

FOR INSTANCE, THE PUDGALĀ IS SAID TO BE ‘INCAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF’ AS DIFFERENT OR NON-DIFFERENT FROM FEELING AND THE REST, WHILE COLOUR, NAME AND OTHER THINGS ARE SAID TO BE ‘CAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF’ AS DIFFERENT FROM THEM.—(345)

COMMENTARY

That is to say, the Pudgala is said to be ‘incapable of being spoken of’ as different or non-different from Feeling, Name and the rest; while Colour,
Name, and the rest are spoken of as quite 'capable of being spoken of' as different from each other; so that our Reason is not 'unproven'.—(346)

The following Text shows another reason why the presence of contradictory properties in the two (Pudgala and Colour, etc.) must be admitted:

TEXT (346).

THE 'COLOUR-PHASE' AND THE REST ARE HELD TO BE 'CAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF' AS 'NON-ETERNAL'; WHILE THE PUDGALA IS NOT SO; SO THAT THERE IS A CLEAR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO.—(346)

COMMENTARY

The assertion that 'all impressions are non-eternal' shows that Colour and the rest are quite 'capable of being spoken of' as 'non-eternal'; while the Pudgala is not held to be so 'capable of being spoken of' as 'non-eternal'; on the ground that it is entirely 'incapable of being spoken of' (as anything at all).

Nor is our Reason 'inconclusive'; because all idea of 'difference' is based upon the said fact (of the presence of contradictory properties); if it were not so, then the whole Universe would be a single Entity; which would mean the possibility of all things being produced and destroyed simultaneously.—(346)

The Pudgala is a non-entity, not only on account of its being 'incapable of being spoken of as different or non-different from Colour etc.', as explained above,—but it is a non-entity for the following reason also, on account of its being 'incapable of being spoken of as non-eternal';—this is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (347).

Capacity for effective action is the differentia of the existence (of a thing); and such capacity is restricted to momentary entities only; hence if anything is 'incapable of being spoken of (as momentary)', it cannot be an existent entity.—(347)

COMMENTARY

What characterises 'Existence', the nature of an 'Entity,' is Capacity for effective action;—as a matter of fact, a non-entity is characterised by the absence of all Capacity; which implies that Capacity for effective action
is the only characteristic of an Entity. This Capacity is restricted to momentary Entities only;—that is, it is invariably concomitant with momentariness; specially as any effective action would be impossible for an Eternal Entity, whose activities could not be either successive or simultaneous. So that, if the Pudgala is 'incapable of being spoken of as momentary';—then it cannot have the nature of an 'Entity'; as the more extensive character of 'momentariness' is absent in it;—just as the absence of the character of 'Tree' means the absence of the character of the 'Shimshapā' (a particular tree). This is what has been thus declared:—'That which is incapable of being spoken of as non-eternal cannot be the cause of anything.'

The following might be urged:—"If the Pudgala were eternal, then Effective Activity would be incompatible as, being neither successive nor simultaneous;—but as a matter of fact, it is as 'incapable of being spoken of' as non-eternal as it is of being spoken of as eternal; so that effective action cannot be incompatible with it."

This is not right; there can be no entity with a specific individuality which is devoid of both these characters (of eternality and non-eternality); as 'eternal' and 'non-eternal' are mutually exclusive (and contradictory) terms; so that in any entity, the presence or absence of one of these must mean the presence or absence (respectively) of the other.

We are not objecting to the application of the term 'incapable of being spoken of', to the Pudgala; because the applying of names to things depends entirely upon the wish of the speaker, and as such, cannot be objected to by anyone. What we are doing however is to examine the nature of the 'Entity',—is this nature always present in the thing called 'Pudgala', or not? If it is present, then the thing must be eternal, because 'eternality' consists in nothing else except that character which is always present and is never destroyed;—and it is only a thing having this character that is called 'Eternal'; as has been declared in the words—'The learned call that thing Eternal which, in its own form, is never destroyed.'—If, on the other hand, the other view be held, that the said nature is not always present in the Pudgala,—then the Pudgala must be non-eternal; as the only characteristic of the non-eternal thing is that it should not be lasting (permanent).—Thus then there being no other alternative apart from being 'momentary' (non-eternal) or 'non-momentary' (eternal),—and effective activity—either successive or simultaneous—being incompatible for the non-momentary (Eternal) Entity, the Existence of a thing must be invariably concomitant with 'momentariness'; so that if 'momentariness' is absent in the Pudgala, 'Existence' also must be absent,—and it becomes established that it is non-existent.—(347)

Says the Jaina:—"If it is so, and if the Pudgala does not exist at all,—then how is it that the Blessed Lord (Buddha) when asked—as to whether the Living Entity is this and the Body is that,—the Living Entity being different from the Body,—said 'this has not been explained'?—Why did he not say straight away that there is no such thing as the Living Entity (Soul)?"—

This is answered in the following—
TEXT (348)

Great men have successfully explained all those cases where there is conflict between 'Scripture' and the real state of things. In fact the diverse teachings of the Merciful One are for the purpose of rebuking 'Unbelief' (Nāstikya).—(348)

COMMENTARY

If there were such an object as the 'Pudgala', then alone could it have deserved an explanation as to whether it is different or non-different (like other things); as a matter of fact, however, the object itself has not been proved; how then could its character be explained? An absolute non-entity, as the 'Hare's horn' can have no sharpness or other properties, which could be explained. Hence while propounding the notion that the Pudgala has only an ideal (imaginary) existence, the Blessed Lord said 'it has not been explained'.

He did not declare straight away that 'it does not exist', because the question had not been asked about the nature of the object itself [the question having been only about its difference or non-difference from the Body].

Or it may be that, even though the thing had a merely 'ideal' existence, He wished to avoid the extreme view that 'it does not exist';—in consideration of the welfare of such disciples as were not yet fit for receiving the extreme Doctrine of the 'Void' (Nihilism), He did not say that 'the Soul or Pudgala does not exist.'—It has been thus declared;—'Noting the difference between the Tusker and the Tusk, and the destruction of Actions, the Jinas propound the Dharma,—on the analogy of the Tigress' Cub (?)'.—In this way have Vasubandhu and other teachers succeeded in disclosing the real import of the teachings in such works as the Kosahparamārthasaptati and the rest; hence it should be learnt from those works. In the present context the details are not written down for fear of becoming too prolix.

"If that is so"—says the opponent—"how do you construe the assertion that 'there is existence' which proves it?"

The answer is—'For the purpose of rebuking unbelief etc. etc.'—There are divine teachings of the Merciful One which speak of 'sattva' and 'astitva' (Existence),—which are not incompatible (with the Buddhist doctrine);—this has to be taken as understood. The 'mental series' in which the idea of existence appears,—it is with reference to the non-cessation (continuity) of that series, that the Blessed Lord has said 'there is existence'. If he had not done so, then there would be an idea that even those 'Impressions' do not exist in the cause-effect-chain of whose 'moments' there has been no break,—which would mean that things of the 'other world' do not exist,—and this would demolish the whole idea of the 'other world', and the disciples would become inclined to 'unbelief'. [The form 'Nāstikya' here is used in the old sense of the idea that there is no such thing as the 'Soul' or the 'other world.']—(348)
The following argument has been urged by the opponent:—"It has been declared by the Blessed Lord as follows—'O Bhikkhus, I am describing to you the Burden, the Taking up of the Burden, the Throwing up of the Burden and the Bearer of the Burden; the term 'burden' stands for the five constituent thought-phases, the 'taking up of the Burden' for satisfaction (pleasure), the 'throwing up of the Burden' for Liberation, and the 'Bearer of the Burden' for the Pudgalas.'—Now, how do you explain this? Certainly the 'Bearer of the Burden' cannot be the same as the 'Burden' itself."

The answer to this is supplied by the following—

TEXT (349)

THE MENTION OF THE 'BEARER OF THE BURDEN' AND SO FORTH
IS MADE WITH THE Aggregates, ETC. IN MIND;
AS REGARDS THE PARTICULAR DENIAL,—THAT
IS OF USE AGAINST THOSE WHO HOLD
THOSE VIEWS.—(349)

COMMENTARY.

The Thought-phases that appear at the same time, when meant to be spoken of collectively, come to be called 'aggregates'; when these appear at the same time, in the form of Cause and Effect, they come to be called a 'series' or 'Chain'; and when they are used as the basis of conception as a single concept, they come to be called by such names as 'members of the Series' and 'Components of the aggregate';—and it was with these 'aggregates' in mind that the Teacher spoke of the 'Bearer of the Burden'; and there is thus no incongruity in this.

The term 'etc.' in the expression 'aggregates, etc.' includes the Series and the term 'and so forth' in the phrase 'Bearer of the Burden and so forth' stands for the Burden and the rest.

Thus then, those same Thought-phases which are spoken of as 'aggregate,' 'series' and the like, are spoken of as the Pudgala, the Bearer of the Burden', as in common parlance it is this to which the name 'Pudgala' is applied. It is for this reason that the Blessed Lord has described the Pudgala in the following words:—'What is Pudgala, the Bearer of the Burden'?—having asked thus, He goes on—'It is that which, O Long-lived one, bears such and such a name, belongs to such and such a caste, to such and such a clan, takes such and such food, feels such and such pleasures and pains, and lives so long'. Thus being of the nature of the 'aggregate of thought-phases', the Pudgala should be understood to be only ideally existent, and not as an Eternal Substance, as postulated by others;—it was with a view to show this that the Lord used the above words. It has to be accepted as true; otherwise, as the 'Burden', etc. also have been spoken of as something different from the Thought-phases, (in the passage under reference), these also, like the Pudgala, would have to be regarded as not included among the Thought-phases. Thus it is clear that those preceding Thought-phases themselves which operate
towards the bringing about of another succeeding *Thought-phase* have been spoken of as 'Burden',—those that are going to appear as the result have been spoken of as the 'Bearer of the Burden'. So that the passage quoted does not warrant the conclusion desired by the Opponent.

Udyotakara has argued as follows:—[This is a clear reference to *Nyāya-vārtika* 3-1. 1, page 341, but the passage found extends only up to the words 'naiva tvamasi', in line 26, of the present text]—"One who does not admit the 'Soul' cannot make sense out of the words of the *Buddha* who has declared —'O Bhadanta, I am not Colour, I am not Feeling, Name, Impression or Cognition, O Bhadanta; similarly O Bhikṣu, you are not Colour, or Feeling, Name, Impression, or Cognition, you are not, O Bhadanta'—here Colour and the other *Thought-phases* have been denied to be the object of 'I-consciousness', this denial is particular, not *Universal*; while one who denies the 'Soul' should assert the denial in the Universal form 'I am not—you are not'. A particular denial always implies a corresponding particular *affirmation*; e.g. when it is said 'I do not see with my left eye', it is clearly implied that 'I do see with my right Eye'; if the man did not see with the right Eye also, then the mention of the qualification 'left' in the former assertion would be useless; the assertion should have been in the general form 'I do not see'. Similarly in the case in question when it is said 'Colour is not the Soul, Cognition is not the Soul', it becomes implied that the Soul is and it is something different from these (Colour, Cognition, and the rest). It may be 'incapable of being spoken of' or anything else, but in any case the *Soul* is there."

It is in answer to this that the Text adds—'As regards the particular denial, etc.'—That is to say, the mountain of the doctrine of the extant Soul propounded by evil-minded persons has risen up with twenty peaks,—such as 'Colour is Soul, Cognition is Soul, the Soul has Colour, the Soul has Cognition, Colour subsists in the Soul, Cognition subsists in the Soul' and so forth. —It is as against the first five of these views that the denial has *its use as against persons who hold those views*. The term 'Taddṛṣṭin' means those who hold the view that 'Colour is Soul' and so forth. What is denied in the assertion (made by our Teacher) is exactly those points where the foolish-minded persons might have their doubts; and it is not intended to *affirm* anything. Otherwise, by saying what could not benefit His hearers, the Expounder would prove himself to be lacking in intelligence.—(349)

**End of the section on the Vāśiputriyas' doctrine of 'Soul'.**
CHAPTER VIII

Examination of the Doctrine of the Permanence of Things.

COMMENTARY.

The Author has spoken of his doctrine (in the opening lines of his Introduction) as 'mobile', 'impermanent'. The following Texts proceed with the proof in support of this:

TEXT (350-351)

Or, all this Effort (to refute the various doctrines regarding the origin of the World) is made needlessly; as all such doctrines are really set aside by the well-established doctrine of the ‘Perpetual Flux’ of things.—Hence it is this ‘Perpetual Flux’ that is going to be clearly established for the refutation of all that has been referred to above and all such things as the ‘Universal’ and the like which are going to be mentioned later on,—a refutation that is applied equally to all those doctrines.—

(350-351)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, by establishing the Perpetual Flux of things, all the various entities postulated by others,—such as those of ‘Primordial Matter’ ‘God’ and the like—become discarded at a single stroke; under the circumstances, all the effort that we have put forth in the above extensive portions of our work, towards the setting forth in detail of the several doctrines and refuting them, is practically useless; that is to say, all these are refuted by the much simpler method (of establishing the Perpetual Flux). That is to say, ‘Primordial Matter’ and the rest are not held by others to be undergoing destruction immediately on appearance, or to be liable to absolute destruction; hence by the establishing of the doctrine of ‘Perpetual Flux’ which includes all things, all those postulated entities become set aside; holding this opinion as we do, we proceed to establish this ‘Perpetual Flux’ with special care,—for the purpose of discarding (a) all those doctrines that have been discussed so far,—beginning with ‘Primordial Matter’ and ending with ‘Pudgala’,—and (b) all those that are going to be discussed later on,—such as the ‘Universal’, ‘Quality’, ‘Substance’, etc., Words and their denotation, the Means
and the Objects of Right Cognition, the Thing of Variegated Character coloured with the various tints of the Emerald, etc., an Entity continuing during all these points of time, the four Elemental Substances postulated by the Chārvāka and the Materialists, and the Mass of Words (Veda) posited by the followers of Jaimini.

'Clearly',—because for the proof set forth, there is a Reason that satisfies all the three conditions of the valid Probans.

What is meant by this is that in reality, the whole purpose of our philosophy reaches its culminating point in this examination of the 'Permanent Character' of things.—(350-351)

The Author proceeds to show how this Perpetual Flux is established:

TEXT (352)

SOME PEOPLE HOLD THAT THERE ARE TWO CLASSES OF THINGS—
Created AND Uncreated; OTHERS HAVE HELD THAT
THE TWO CLASSES OF THINGS ARE
Momentary AND Non-momentary.—(352)

COMMENTARY.

In this connection, the followers of Nyāya and others do not regard anything as 'momentary', and they hold that there are two classes of things in the shape of 'Created' and 'Uncreated'; among things some are 'created',—as the jar and the rest, while some are 'uncreated'—as the Atom, Ākāsha, etc.

Others however,—like Vāsiputriyas—hold that there is a further classification of things under the two heads of 'momentary' and 'non-momentary'; that is, according to these people, such things as Cognition, Sound, Light-rays, are 'momentary', while such things as Earth and Ākāsha are 'non-momentary'.—(352)

Such being the diversity among the various views, the Author first of all proceeds to set forth reasonings in support of the 'Perpetual Flux' of those things that are held to be 'Created',—which thus form the 'Subject' of the Reasoning set forth:

TEXT (353)

AMONG THESE, ALL THOSE THINGS THAT ARE 'CREATED' ARE IN
'PERPETUAL FLUX';—BECAUSE, AS REGARDS THEIR
DESTRUCTION, ALL OF THEM ARE ENTIRELY
INDEPENDENT.—(353)

COMMENTARY.

As regards their destruction, things are independent of other Causes.—This briefly indicates the Reason which fulfills all the three conditions of the Valid Probans.—(353)

This reason is more clearly stated in the following—
TEXTS (354-355)

WHEN A CERTAIN THING DOES NOT NEED ANY OTHER CAUSE FOR THE
BRINGING ABOUT OF A CERTAIN CONDITION, THAT CONDITION SHOULD
BE REGARDED AS ATTACHING TO IT PERMANENTLY,—BECAUSE, OUT
OF ITS OWN CAUSES, THAT THING APPEARS IN THAT CONDITION ;—
JUST AS THE CAUSAL CONDITIONS ARE INDEPENDENTLY, BY THEM-
SELVES, CAPABLE OF PRODUCING THEIR EFFECT ;—AND ALL
THE THINGS THAT ARE PRODUCED ARE INDEPENDENT OF ALL
ELSE IN THE MATTER OF THEIR DESTRUCTION.—(354-355)

COMMENTARY.

The argument is to be formulated as follows:—When certain things are
independent in regard to a certain condition, they should be regarded as per-
manently attached to that condition ;—as for example, the causal conditions
that produce their effect immediately, are permanently restricted to those
effects;—all things that are produced,—i.e. all created things—are independent
in regard to their destruction; hence this is a natural reason (for concluding
that they are permanently attached to this destruction).—'Any other Cause',
—i.e. any cause other than that which has produced the thing itself.—The
reason for this statement is added—because out of its own causes, it appears
in that form ;—i.e. because it is produced in a form so permanently
attached to the said condition.—When certain things are not permanently
attached to a certain condition, they are not independent in regard to that
condition; as for instance, the unbaked jar in reference to the Baking. This
forms the corroborative instance per dissimilarity.—(354-355)

Says the Opponent:—"The Reason put forward is Inconclusive: Even
though things are independent regarding their destruction, yet it is quite
possible that the destruction of a thing may come about at some other time
and at some other place; so that it cannot prove the immediate destruction
of the thing, which is what is desired by the upholder of the 'Perpetual
Flux', the doctrine of all things being 'momentary'.''
The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (356)

EVEN THOUGH INDEPENDENT, IF THE DESTRUCTION WERE TO
COME AT ANOTHER PLACE AND TIME,—THEN, ON ACCOUNT
OF ITS BEING DEPENDENT UPON THOSE,
THE THING COULD NOT BE
REGARDED AS 'INDEPEND-
ENT'.—(356)

COMMENTARY.

'Ἐξα'—i.e. the Destruction.

'On account of its being dependent upon those'—i.e. dependent upon the
other time and place.
If a certain thing being independent in regard to a certain condition, were to be in this condition only at a certain time and place,—then, as dependent upon that time and place, it would not be ‘independent’ at all. How then is there any ‘inconclusiveness’ in our Reason? For instance, if a certain condition were to be present only at a certain time and place,—and never apart from these,—then, how could it be regarded as ‘independent’? As such existence itself would constitute its ‘dependence’; which term cannot stand for ‘desire’, for the simple reason that the thing is devoid of all ‘intention’.—(356)

"If then what is meant to be the reason is the fact of its being entirely independent,—then such a Reason is ‘not proven’, ‘not admitted’; for instance, some things are dependent, for their destruction, upon such causes as the stroke of a Bludgeon—as in the case of things like the Jar. Even those things which,—like Cognition, Words, and the like,—are known to be ‘independent’,—though they do not depend, for their destruction, on any such cause as the stroke of a Bludgeon, yet they do depend upon the peculiarities of time and place. Thus the Reason, as put forward by the Buddhist, is entirely ‘unproven’.

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (357)

ALL PRODUCED THINGS ARE ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE INDEPENDENT IN REGARD TO THEIR DESTRUCTION;
AS IN THIS MATTER, ALL CAUSES OF DESTRUCTION ARE ENTIRELY INEFFECTUOUS.—(357)

COMMENTARY.

‘Always and everywhere’,—i.e. at all times and places,—the produced things are independent of the cause of their destruction; because those that are not accepted as the cause of the destruction are ineffectuuous,—i.e. of no use; and there can be no ‘dependence’ upon what is of no use,—it renders no help;—as if there were, then it would lead to an absurdity.—(357)

The following Text shows why they are ineffectuuous:

TEXT (358)

FOR INSTANCE, THE ‘DESTRUCTIVE CAUSE’ CANNOT BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS THE BRINGER ABOUT OF A ‘DESTRUCTION’ WHICH IS NOT-DIFFERENT FROM THE THING ITSELF; AS THE POSITIVE THING IS PRODUCED FROM ITS OWN CAUSE.—(358)

COMMENTARY.

When the destruction is brought about,—is it an entity or a non-entity?—if it is an entity, then it must be brought about by the ‘Cause of Destruction’:—
now, would the destruction, as an entity, be brought about as something \textit{not-different} from the thing that was the ‘cause of the destruction’? or as something \textit{different} from that thing? In regard to any existing entity, there can be only these two alternatives; and only one of these two can be right; both cannot be right; nor can both be wrong; as the denial of one character of a thing must always imply the affirmation of the contrary of that character, and the affirmation of the former must imply the denial of the latter; and one and the same character cannot be both denied and affirmed, as has been explained above.

Of the two alternatives shown above, it cannot be right to hold that ‘the Destruction, as an entity, is brought about as something \textit{not-different} from the cause of that destruction’; because that which is of the nature of a positive thing is always produced—born—from its own cause; as that also, like the thing itself, is produced out of what is not-different from it; and what has been already brought about cannot have another Cause; as if it did have one, then there would be no end to the series of such causes.—(358)

The following might be urged:—“When the thing is born out of its cause, it is not in its complete form; hence what it obtains from another cause is another character in the shape of ‘Destruction’.”

This is answered in the following—

\textbf{TEXT (359)}

\textit{When a certain thing that comes out of its cause is without parts,—the ‘Destruction’ that would be imposed upon it by other causes must be of the same nature.—(359)}

\textbf{COMMENTARY.}

A single thing cannot have two \textit{natures}, by virtue of which it could be produced in parts; on the contrary, the thing is \textit{without parts}; and when a thing is produced from its Cause, it must be produced in its entire form; how then can another nature be imposed upon it, later on, by other Causes? In fact, what is not produced at the time that a thing is produced, cannot form the \textit{nature} of that thing; because ‘non-difference’, ‘sameness’, implies complete identity of condition. Hence that which comes about at a later time, in the form of ‘Destruction’, must be a different ‘nature’ (character); and how can this, which is thus \textit{different}, belong to the thing itself? Hence there is nothing in this theory.—(359)

If the other alternative be accepted that ‘the Destruction produced is something \textit{different} from the thing’, even so, the cause of the destruction of the thing would be useless. This is what is shown in the following—
TEXTS (360-361)

IF THE DESTRUCTION THAT IS BROUGHT ABOUT IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE THING, THEN THERE IS NOTHING PRODUCED IN THE THING ITSELF BY THOSE OTHER CAUSES (OF THE SAID DESTRUCTION); SO THAT THE EFFECTS, LIKE THE APPREHENSION OF THE THING AND OTHER PHENOMENA, SHOULD CONTINUE AS BEFORE. AND AS THE THING CONTINUES TO REMAIN IN THE SAME CONDITION, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANY ‘CONCEALMENT’ ETC. OF IT.

—(360-361)

COMMENTARY.

The bringing about of one thing cannot confer any benefit on another thing; if it did, then this would lead to an absurdity. Nor can it be right to assert that ‘the bringing about of the Destruction related to a thing helps the thing itself’; because no relation is known to subsist between them. For instance, inasmuch as the two are, ex hypothesi, different, the relation between the two cannot be one of ‘identity’; nor can the relation be that of ‘being produced from it’, as the destruction is produced only from the ‘Cause of destruction’; and there can be no other real relation between the two. Even if there were some relation between the two, as the Thing is (ex hypothesi) an established positive entity, the apprehension and other effects produced by it must also be positive entities (and Destruction is not positive):—In the compound ‘Upalambhakāryādi’, the ‘Upalambha’, ‘Apprehension’, itself is meant to be the ‘Kārya’, ‘effect’; and the term ‘ādi’, ‘and the other phenomena’, is meant to include the containing of water (of the Jar), the breaking of the thighs, and so forth.

It might be argued that—‘when the thing becomes concealed—or obstructed—by the destruction, which is something different from it, it ceases to produce such effects as its own apprehension and the like.’

In answer to this it is added—‘As the thing continues to remain in the same condition, etc. etc.’—Nothing is possible as a ‘concealer’ or ‘obstructor’ of a thing unless it removes its properties or does not produce them; if it were, it would lead to absurdities. Hence it follows that, on account of its previous nature being unabandoned, unconcealed, and unobstructed, there can be no ‘concealment’ or ‘obstruction’ of the thing.—(360-361)

The following argument might be urged:—‘It is not possible for the thing (whose destruction has been brought about) to bring about its apprehension and other phenomena; because the destruction of the thing—being different from it,—has destroyed it.’

This is answered in the following—
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TEXT (362)

It is not true to assert that "the thing is destroyed by another thing named 'destruction'",—because the arguments based upon the alternatives of its being 'different' or 'non-different' and so forth are applicable, by implication, to such an assertion also.—(362)

COMMENTARY.

When the destruction destroys the thing,—is the thing destroyed different or not-different (from the destruction)? Or again, if it be asserted that 'it brings about that destruction of the thing which consists of its annihilation, like the Bludgeon and other things', the same alternatives may be put forward. And the objections urged above would all become applicable; as is going to be explained later on. This is what is meant by the sentence 'the arguments based, etc. etc.'; i.e. even against the assertion that what is called 'destruction' brings about another destruction. 'Are applicable by implication', i.e. the alternatives of being different or non-different and so forth are applicable to this also.

Thus it is established that the destruction of a thing cannot be an entity, [the first alternative put forward above, under Text 358].—(362)

The following Text proceeds to show that the 'destruction' of a thing cannot be of the nature of a non-entity:—

TEXTS (363-364)

If it be held that—"the 'destruction' ('Nāsha') brought about is of the nature of the 'negation of entity', otherwise called 'disruption', (Pradhvamsa'),—there can be no reasonable cause for that also.— If negation were an effect, then it would be an entity, like the sprout and other effects; because while there is possibility of its being regarded as something 'not-produced', it is found to come about through the potency of a cause.—(363-364)

COMMENTARY.

What is brought about, produced, is always an entity, not a non-entity, because of the latter, which is of the nature of the absence of positive character that could be predicated of it, there is no form that could be produced.
Hence *what is of the nature of the negation of entity*, i.e. what consists of the denial of existence,—cannot be brought about by anything,—simply because it is a non-entity,—like the ‘Hare’s Horns’. Otherwise (if it were something produced) then it would be an ‘effect’, and as such an entity,—like the sprout and other effects. This argument may be formulated as follows:—What is an *effect* must be an *entity*, as the sprout and other things,—and Destruction is an effect (*ex hypothesi*), hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as an *effect*).

The author states the ‘invariable concomitance’ (*Premiss*) of this reasoning—*Because it is found to come about through the potency of a Cause*. As a matter of fact, that alone is said to be an ‘effect’ which acquires an accretion to its nature through the potency of a Cause; and it is only an *entity* that can acquire such accretion to its nature.

This point is not disputed even by the *Naiyāyika* and others: As these people also declare the character of the ‘effect’ to be either ‘inherence in Being’ or ‘inherence in a Cause’; and *Destruction* cannot inhere either in Being or in its Cause; for, if it did, then, like Substance and other things, it would have to be regarded as a *substratum of existence* (i.e. an *entity*).—(363-364)

Says the opponent—“If that is so, let the *Destruction* be an entity, what is the harm in that?”

*Answer* :—

**TEXT (365)**

**THE VIEW THAT ‘NEGATION’ IS BROUGHT BY AN ‘AFFIRMATION’ HAS BEEN SOUGHT TO BE SUPPORTED BY HAVING RECURSE TO ‘PRECLUSION’ (AS THE FORM OF THE NEGATION SO BROUGHT ABOUT);—BUT THE ARGUMENT BASED UPON THE ALTERNATIVES POSSIBLE REGARDING DIFFERENCE OR NON-DIFFERENCE, ALL BECOME APPLICABLE TO THIS VIEW.—(365)**

**COMMENTARY.**

‘How is Negation brought about by Affirmation?’ In answer to this question the other party has recourse to ‘Preclusion’, i.e. the assertion that it is Negation in the form of ‘Preclusion’ that is so brought about; that is to say, through the speaker’s choice sometimes even an *entity* is spoken of as a different form (negation) of some other entity. With this explanation also the view is open to all those arguments that have been urged above as based upon the alternatives of ‘difference’ or ‘non-difference’ etc.—(365)

If, for fear of this criticism, it be held that—“what is brought about by the Causes of ‘Destruction’ is Negation,—not in the form of ‘Preclusion’,—but in the form of the *absolute negation*.”—But here also, the inefficacy of the cause of ‘Destruction’ would be still clearer.

This is what is shown in the following—
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TEXT (366)

If it be held that "what is meant by 'Destruction' is the negation of effective action, and this does not bring about a positive entity";—even so, it becomes established that what brings about the destruction cannot be its 'Cause';—because it is devoid of the character of 'Cause'.—(366)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, if 'Destruction' means the 'negation absolute'—as in the expression 'brings about Destruction, i.e. Negation'—the negative term would be related to the term denoting action, and the meaning would be that it does not bring about an entity (in the form of Action); and as this would be the denial or negation of Action, what it would imply is the fact of the 'Cause of Destruction' not being a 'Cause'; for how can a thing devoid of action be a 'cause'? So that nothing can be the Cause of Destruction.—(366)

In this connection, the Author proceeds to set forth those arguments in proof of Destruction having a Cause which have been propounded by Aviddhakarpa :—

TEXTS (367-368)

"This Destruction of the Thing is not present at the time that the Thing is in existence; nor is it present before (the Thing has come into existence); nor very long after (the Thing has come into existence). In fact, it comes immediately after (the Thing has come into existence); thus, inasmuch as it comes into existence only at a particular time, it must have a Cause. If it were independent (of all Causes), then this occasional character would be impossible, as shown before".—(367-368)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the Destruction of a thing cannot be present at the time that the thing is in existence, as if it did, then the momentarily existent
thing could never exist. Nor can it be present before the thing has been produced, as what has not been born cannot be destroyed; e.g. the 'son of the Barren Woman' and such non-entities are not destroyed while unborn. 

—Even when coming after the thing has come into existence, it cannot come very long after it; because all things (ex hypothesi) being destroyed at the third moment (of existence), there cannot be another destruction very long afterwards, as is found in the case of Fire that has become reduced to ashes. The destruction of the thing, therefore, must come immediately after it has come into existence, i.e. at the second moment. Thus it is established that, as it has the time of its coming definitely fixed, the Destruction must have a Cause, just as the sprout has—'as it has the time, etc. etc.; i.e. because it appears only occasionally. The invariable concomitance of this reason is next shown—'If it were independent etc. etc.'—if it were independent of all Cause, then its occasional character could not be possible; as in that case its existence would be there at all times. Hence, from its occasional character, it is deduced that it must have a Cause.—(367-368)

Another reason for the same conclusion is set forth in the following—

TEXT (369)

"As it comes immediately after the Thing, the Destruction must have a Cause; also because, not having been in existence, it comes into existence,—just like the following Moment."—(369)

COMMENTARY.

Thus three reasons have been stated: Destruction must have a Cause, (a) because it is occasional, (b) because it comes immediately after the thing, as admitted by the Baudhāyas, and (c) because not having been in existence, it comes into existence, like the following Moment. The 'Hare's Horn' and such other non-entities serve as Corroborative Instances per dissimilarity. —(369)

The author next states the reasons adduced by Uddyotakara [in Nya-
yavārtika on 3.2.14, page 415, Bib. Indica, from where large portions of the Commentary on this Text are bodily quoted]—
"Then again, if Destruction had no Cause, it would be either a non-entity, like 'the Son of the Barren Women' and other non-entities, or an eternal entity, like Ākāsha; as no other alternative is possible.—If Destruction were a non-entity, then all things would be eternal, as there would be no Destruction (of anything); and the idea of the Destructibility (fleeting character) of all properties would be baseless.—If Destruction were eternal (existing at all times), then it would be possible for the Thing to exist along with its own destruction; as there could be no incompatibility in this case; and the assertion of the 'Destruction' of what has not been produced would not be in keeping with Reason."—(370–372)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows:—

"One who declares that 'there is no Cause for Destruction' should be questioned as follows: Does this mean that there being no Cause for Destruction, Destruction does not exist (come into existence) at all, like the 'sky-lotus'? or that having no Cause, it is eternal (ever-lasting), like Ākāsha and other things? According to your view what is causeless is found to be of two kinds—eternal and non-existent, there is no other alternative to these two—existence and non-existence.—Now, if being without a Cause, Destruction is non-existent, then all things must be eternal; as there is no Destruction at all. And the idea that 'all properties become destroyed' becomes, in this case, baseless; because when there is no movement, the idea of anything 'moving' is impossible. If, on the other hand, having no Cause, Destruction is eternal,—then it becomes possible for it to co-exist with the Thing (destroyed), as the Destruction would be always there. And this would be highly improper, as the Presence and Absence of a Thing are mutually negatory. If then the said co-existence is not admitted, then there can be no producing of any effect, as its contrary, the Destruction of the effect would be there always:—and when a thing is not produced at all, there can be no Destruction of it; for instance, such unproduced things as the 'Hare's Horns' are not known among people to be destroyed; hence any such assertion as that 'there is destruction of what has not been produced' cannot be in keeping with Reason."—(370–372)

The Author answers all these criticisms in the following Texts:
TEXTS (373-374)

What sort of 'Destruction' is it (the causelessness of) which the other people object to? (a) Is it the 'momentary existence' of Things, as explained by us? Or the 'cessation of the form of the entity', called 'Disruption' (Dhvamsa, Annihilation)?
—If it is the former, then there is no quarrel.—

(373-374)

COMMENTARY.

Destruction is of two sorts—positive and negative. For instance when, on account of the thing being mobile and having only a momentary existence, it becomes 'destroyed', this is called 'Destruction' (of the positive kind); and there is the other kind of Destruction which consists in the thing losing its positive character and becoming what is called 'disruption', 'annihilation'. If it is in reference to the former kind of 'Destruction' to whose 'causelessness' objection has been taken (by other people) on the ground of the reasons adduced above,—then it is entirely futile (as what is objected to is denied by us also).—(373-374)

The futility of the arguments is further explained:

TEXT (375)

That thing which, having a momentary existence, is called 'Destruction'.—This Destruction we also admit as having a cause; it is only the other kind of Destruction which we regard as without cause, on the ground of there being nothing else (which could be its cause).—(375)

COMMENTARY.

Question.—'If that is so (and you admit what we have argued), then why have you held Destruction to be 'without cause'?'

The Answer is—'It is only the other kind etc. etc.'; i.e. there being nothing else,—apart from the Cause that brought the thing into existence,—coming later on, in the shape of the Bludgeon and such things,—that we regard the Destruction to be without cause.—(375)

The Subject (of the inference) in the form of 'Destruction' being as explained, the two Reasons,—'because it is occasional' and 'because not having been in existence, it comes into existence',—are duly admitted (by us also). As regards the character of 'coming immediately after the thing', if that is intended to be true only in a general way, then that too is
duly admitted (by us), because its existence immediately after that thing which is the Cause is admitted by us.—If, however, what the other party means by 'the Destruction coming immediately after the thing' is that it comes immediately after that thing which forms its own self (essence),—then such a Reason is not admitted.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (376)

THE CHARACTER OF 'COMING IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE THING' DOES NOT SUBSIST IN THE DESTRUCTION AS DESCRIBED; BECAUSE THE DESTRUCTION IN THE FORM OF THE MOBILE (MOMENTARY) THING APPEARS ALONG WITH THE THING ITSELF.—(376)

COMMENTARY.

'In the Destruction as described', i.e. in the form not different from the nature of the mobile thing itself. There can be no 'parts' of a thing which is devoid of parts, by virtue of which such Destruction could come immediately after such a thing: because, like the nature of the Thing itself, its Destruction also comes about on the coming about of the thing itself; otherwise its forming the very nature of the thing would not be true; as already explained.—(376)

It has been argued above that 'There is no basis for the notion that all Properties are destructible' (under Text 371);—this also becomes rejected by what has been just said.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (377)

THUS THEN, THE DESTRUCTION BEING THERE, THINGS CANNOT BE ETERNAL; AND THE NOTION THAT 'THINGS ARE DESTRUCTIBLE' CANNOT BE BASELESS.—(377)

COMMENTARY.

Simply because all things have the character of existing for a moment, and those very things that are regarded as so destructible form the basis of the notion of 'destructibility of things',—this notion therefore, cannot be baseless.—(377)

If then the 'Destruction' intended to be the Subject of the arguments adduced by the other party is that in the form of 'Disruption' (Annihilation),—then all the three Reasons adduced are 'unproven', 'not admitted' (by us).—This is what is shown in the following—
TEXT (378)

As regards 'Annihilation', as it can have no essence (character), it cannot 'come into existence immediately after the thing';—and as regards the presence of the character of 'coming into existence after having not existed before', this is precisely like the 'Sky-lotus' and other things.—(378)

COMMENTARY.

Such characters as 'coming into existence immediately after the thing,' and the like can exist in things only, never in a non-entity, like the 'Hare's Horns'; and 'Annihilation' has no 'essence', no character;—how then can it have any such character as 'coming immediately after the thing' and the like?

As regards the presence of the character of 'coming into existence, having been not in existence before'; the particle 'cha' includes the character of being occasional.—(378)

"If that is so, if Annihilation has not the character of coming into existence immediately after the thing, then what can be the meaning of the assertion that 'there is Annihilation of the thing'? When something does not belong to a thing, it can never be attributed to it."

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (379)

When it is said that 'there is Annihilation of the thing', what is meant is that 'the thing is not there'. And it is not meant to convey the affirmation (predication) of any thing.—(379)

COMMENTARY.

Even though the assertion 'there is Annihilation of the thing' appears to be affirmative of Annihilation, yet what is really meant is only the negation of the Thing itself, and not the affirmation of any positive entity.—(379)

"In such expressions as 'It is Chaitra's Son', it is the existence of the son that is affirmed; so in the expression 'There is Annihilation of the thing', it must be the presence of the Annihilation that is affirmed."

This is answered in the following—
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TEXT (380).

The mere naming of a person as 'Donkey' does not lead to the attribution of the whole character of the Ass to that person.—(380)

COMMENTARY.

The existence and non-existence of things are not dependent upon the use of mere words, as the using of words depends upon the whim of the speaker; if it were not so, then if, through a whim, the name 'Donkey' were given to a man, the entire character of the Ass would have to be attributed to that man.

The term 'bālēya' (in the Text) is a synonym for 'rāsabha' (Ass).—(380)

The following Text asserts that it must be understood that when 'annihilation' is spoken of in regard to a thing, it is only the negation of the nature of the thing itself, and there is no affirmation of anything—

TEXT (381).

If the category named 'Annihilation' were affirmed in reference to a thing, there being nothing actually produced in the Thing,—how is it that the Thing ceases (to exist)?—(381)

COMMENTARY.

If it were not as declared by us, and if the category of 'annihilation' were regarded as affirmed in reference to the thing,—then, as there is nothing actually produced in the thing concerned,—why should that thing cease to exist?—(381)

As regards the argument put forward above (under Text 371)—'If Destruction were non-existent, all things would be eternal',—it is answered in the following—

TEXT (382).

Thus it is that the Existence of any 'Destruction of Things' of the nature of 'Annihilation' is not admitted; because the 'Destruction of a Thing' consists in the Dissociation of a particular form, and not in the negation of its existence.—(382)

COMMENTARY.

Thus:—because it is really of the nature of the dissociation of a particular form of the Thing,—and it is not of the nature of the negation of the Thing due to the cessation of the existence of the nature of the Thing itself,
Why then should our doctrine involve the absurdity of all things being eternal? If the ‘Destruction of things’, in the form of the negation of their character, were non-existent, then alone the things would be eternal; as a matter of fact, however, the Destruction in the shape of the negation of character, though itself negative in character, is actually there;—how then could the things be eternal?

As for the notion of all properties being destructible,—the basis for this has been already explained.—(382)

It has been argued by the Opponent (under Text 372, above) that ‘If the Destruction of the thing be eternal, then it would be co-existent with the Thing itself’. This is answered in the following—

**TEXTS (383-384).**

**WHEN IT IS ASSERTED THAT ‘DESTRUCTION IS OF THE NATURE OF CESSATION’, IT DOES NOT MEAN THE AFFIRMATION OF ITS POSITIVE CHARACTER; IT ONLY DENIES THE CONTINUITY OF THE PARTICULAR FORM OF THE THING BEYOND ONE MOMENT. THUS NO LASTING FORM IS AFFIRMED IN REGARD TO THE ‘ANNIHILATION’, AND THERE IS NO ROOM FOR THE ALTERNATIVE THAT IT IS ETERNAL.—(383-384)**

**COMMENTARY.**

When it is said that ‘there is cessation’, it does not mean the affirmation of the positive form of ‘cessation’ in regard to ‘Annihilation’,—for the simple reason that it has no positive form; it means only the denial of the continuity of the particular form of the Thing beyond one moment. Thus there is no room for the alternative that it is something absolutely eternal; because, on account of its having no character at all, it is impossible for it to have a permanent form. Specially because the properties of eternity or non-eternity are invariably concomitant with the nature of things.

It has been argued by Uddyotakara (under Text 371, above) to the effect that—‘Under your view, what is without Cause may be either eternal or non-existent, etc.’—But this assertion is based upon his ignorance of the doctrine of his opponent. As a matter of fact, for Baudhhas who are fully conversant with Logic, what is without cause must be non-existent; this has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord—‘The Wise One seeking for the common property among similar things does not perceive any such property in the slightest form’.—As for the Vaibhāsikas (a particular sect among Buddhists), who posit such existent things as Ākāśa and the rest, they are converts to your view, and they cannot be regarded as Followers of the Buddha; hence the putting forward of their view cannot be relevant.

Thus all causes of Destruction being inefficacious, our Reason (put forward under Texts 353–366) cannot be said to be ‘Unproven’. 
For the following reason also the Causes of Destruction should be declared to be inefficacious:—When a Thing is produced from its Cause, is it produced sometimes as *evanescent* by its very nature,—and sometimes as *not-evanescent* (eternal)? If it is produced as *evanescent*, then it cannot be the cause of Destruction, because it is destroyed through its own nature. When a certain nature (or character) belongs to a Thing, this thing, when produced, is produced with that same nature; and it does not depend upon any other cause (for producing that nature). For instance, the things that are bright or fluid or solid and the like—when produced—are produced along with these properties,—and they do not depend upon another cause for the bringing about of these properties. It might be argued that—"In the case of the seed and such things, it is found that though the seed has the nature of producing the sprout, yet by itself it cannot produce it, it needs the help of other causes in the shape of water and such things,—and in the same way, though the Thing may have the evanescent nature, yet for its destruction it would require other Causes." This cannot be right; because what is regarded as the 'cause' of a thing is what brings it about in its final complete form; nothing else is regarded as its 'Cause'. So when a thing has a certain nature, it must produce it by itself, and it does not need another Cause. If the seed in the granary does not produce the sprout, it is because such productivity does not constitute its 'nature'; it may be called 'the cause of the Cause' (of the Sprout), not the *direct* Cause; so that this does not vitiate our position.

If the alternative view be accepted,—that when the Thing is produced it is produced in the *non-evanescent* (permanent) form, then, for that also, any Cause of its destruction would be entirely inefficacious; because any change in the nature of such a thing would be impossible. Because if the nature of a thing were not destroyed immediately after its production, then, later on also, as the same character of *permanent standing* would be there, what is there that would be done by the 'cause of destruction', by virtue of which the thing could be destroyed?—The following might be urged—"In the case of Copper and other things it is found that, though they are solid, yet, on the contact of fire, their condition becomes changed; similarly even though the thing may be naturally *indestructible*, the Cause of its destruction may change its condition; and by reason of this, it may become *destroyed* on its coming into contact with that Cause of Destruction".—This cannot be right; as a matter of fact, it is not the same thing that becomes *changed*; because 'Change' consists in the production of another nature or character; now this 'change' that you speak of—is it something different from the Thing itself? or is it the Thing itself? It cannot be the Thing itself; as that has been already produced by its own Cause [and hence could not be produced again by the Cause of the change]. If it is something different from the Thing, then the Thing itself remains as before, retaining its permanence; so that it has not *changed*. As regards the example of *Copper* and other things, that is not admissible. Because what happens in their case (according to us) is that the preceding 'solid-moment' of the Copper being inherently perishable (destructible) becomes destroyed by itself,—then under the influence of such auxiliary causes as Fire and the like, there is produced, out of its own constituents and under other circumstances, a different character in the
shape of fluidity; again this character of fluidity, being inherently perishable, becomes destroyed, and there is produced, out of the auxiliary causes and out of the same constituents, another character in the shape of solidity. So that there is no change of one and the same thing.

Thus the 'Cause of Destruction' is in every way infructuous; and our Reason is not 'unproven'.

Nor is our Reason 'Contradictory'; as what is put forward does actually happen according to our view.

Nor is the reason 'inconclusive'; as it has been already established before.

The following might be urged—"The Ākāśa does not need a cause for becoming corporeal (with a shape), and yet it is not permanently liable to corporeality; in the same manner, though the Things may be products, yet there may be some thing which is not permanently liable to destruction."

This is not right. There is no Product which is not regarded as non-eternal (evanescent); as all caused things are held to be evanescent; and these same Products are made the 'subject' of the inferential argument; how then can the Reason be 'inconclusive'? Those things which, though Products, are yet expected to be eternal, on account of their indestructibility,—these are really included under the category of 'uncreated things', and as such should be regarded as discarded by the discarding of that category itself. So that there is no defect in our Reason. Nor is it admitted that Ākāśa and such other things are independent in the matter of their corporeality; because as a matter of fact, when a Property does not belong to a thing, that thing is certainly 'dependent upon something else' in regard to that property; things are never regarded as 'dependent on something else' for the purpose of those properties that are already present in them; in fact, they are so dependent, only in regard to Properties that are not there already. So the Corroborative Instance cited by the other party is one that cannot be admitted.—(384)

The Author proceeds to say something regarding the category of 'uncreated things':—

TEXTS (385-386).

The Ākāśa and other things which have been held to be 'uncreated' are really non-existent, in the form of 'entities'; as they are devoid of all potentiality; hence there can be no room for attributing to them any such alternative characters as that of 'momentariness' or 'non-momentariness'; whereby they could be regarded even as an 'entity'—be it either momentary or otherwise.—(385-386)

COMMENTARY.

If things like Ākāśa were such as have their existence established, then alone could there arise any discussion as to their being momentary, etc.;
because Properties have no existence by themselves;—if they did, then they would cease to be Properties. Nor are Ākāśa, etc. uncreated things,—because, being devoid of all potentiality, they are to be spoken of as ‘non-existent’,—like the ‘son of the Barren Woman’. This argument may be formulated as follows:—A thing that is devoid of all potentiality must be non-existent,—like the ‘son of the Barren Woman’;—Ākāśa, etc. are devoid of all potentiality; so that this is a natural reason (for regarding them as non-existent); or in reality, there is absence of the more extensive character (which implies the absence of the less extensive character).—Nor can the Reason adduced be said to be ‘inconclusive’, as this alone is enough to justify the notion of ‘non-existence’. Nor can the Reason be said to be ‘unproven’; as we shall explain later on. Nor, lastly, can it be said to be ‘contradictory’; as it is found to be present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.—(385-386)

Question:—“Why cannot the question of momentariness or non-momentariness arise in regard to a non-entity?”

The answer is provided in the following—

**TEXT (387).**

**THAT THING IS SAID TO BE ‘MOMENTARY’ WHOSE FORM PERSISTS FOR A MOMENT; WHILE THAT THING IS SAID TO BE ‘NON-MOMENTARY’ WHICH IS ENDOWED WITH A LASTING (PERMANENT) FORM.**—(387)

**COMMENTARY.**

The meaning of this is clear.—(387)

_Uddyotakara_ has put forward the following argument:—“The term ‘Kṣanika’ (‘momentary’) contains the Possessive Affix (‘ṭhaḥ’, by Pāṇini 5.2.115); how does this affix come in? If, in accordance with the Nir-ukta, ‘kṣaṇa’ stands for kṣaṇa, Destruction, and the term ‘kṣaṇika’ means that which has destruction,—this cannot be right; because of the difference in time; that is, at the time that there is Destruction, the thing to which it belongs is not there (having ceased to exist); and the Possessive affix is never found to be used in connection with things that exist at different times. If (with a view to escaping from that difficulty) it be held that the positive entity itself, as qualified by its impending destruction, is what is spoken of as ‘kṣaṇika’, (‘momentary’),—even so, it is not possible for the thing qualified by the destruction to be spoken of as possessing that Destruction; and thus also the use of the Possessive affix would be unjustifiable. If what is meant by things being ‘kṣaṇika’ ‘momentary’, is that the time of their existence is only one moment; and that having posited the ‘kṣaṇa’, ‘Moment’, as the lowest conceivable measure of time, we call those things ‘momentary’ which continue to exist only during that point of time;—then
this also cannot be right; because the Bauddha admits of Time only as a mere name (a hypothetical entity, without reality); and it is not right for what is a mere name to be regarded as the qualification of an entity." (Nyāyavārttika on 3.2.14, page 418, lines 8–16, Bib. Indica Edition.)

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (388).

THAT FORM OF THE THING WHICH DOES NOT PERSIST AFTER ITS PRODUCTION IS WHAT IS CALLED 'Kṣaṇa', 'MOMENT'; AND THAT WHICH HAS THIS FORM IS HELD TO BE 'Kṣaṇika', 'MOMENTARY'.—(388)

COMMENTARY.

What is called 'moment' is the character of the thing which is destroyed immediately after it has been produced; and that which has this character is called 'momentary'. This has been thus declared—'Moment is that which is destroyed immediately after the thing has come into existence, and that which has this is called momentary.'—(388)

"Even so, as the 'nature' of a thing is not-different from the Thing itself, there can be no such idea as that 'this belongs to that',—which idea is based upon the difference of the two factors concerned."

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (389).

EVEN WHEN THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO THINGS, THERE IS NOTHING TO PREVENT THE NOTION OF 'THIS BELONGING TO THAT'; AS EVERY EXPRESSIVE WORD IS APPLIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ARBITRARY WHIM.—(389)

COMMENTARY.

In such expressions as 'one's own nature', 'the body of the stone-image', and so forth,—even though there is no actual difference between the two things spoken of, the Possessive ending implying difference is used on the basis of an assumed difference; so would it be in the case in question also. Verbal expressions are used, not always in accordance with the real state of things, but in accordance with the whim of the speaker.—(389)

Further, when a man utters a verbal sound, that sound denotes, in that form alone, only that much of a thing as to which it is applied,—such
denotation being due to convention; and in reality there is no 'basic term' or an 'affix'; the term (verbal sound) 'kṣaṇika' is applied by the learned to only such a thing as does not continue to exist after its coming into existence; and such a thing being meant to be denoted by the term 'momentary'—it may be used along with an affix or without an affix,—we have no regard for any such use, which is used on the basis of conventions that are purely arbitrary.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (390).

What is meant to be spoken of (by the term 'Kṣaṇika', 'momentary') is the thing that does not continue to exist after its coming into existence; and that term may be used either with the affix or without the affix (to which Uddyotakara has taken objection).

COMMENTARY.

'Evam'—i.e. by the term 'kṣaṇika', 'momentary.'
'With the affix'—i.e., with the Possessive affix (Thañ).—(390)

Thus it has been shown that if Ākāśa and the rest are regarded as uncreated, they must be regarded as being non-existent; and it is now going to be shown that if they are regarded as existent, they must be momentary :

TEXT (391).

If Ākāśa, Time and such things are existent, then, being so, they cannot escape from being momentary,—just like the created things.—(391)

COMMENTARY.

'Kṛtāḥ'—stands for 'kṛtakāh', 'created things'.
This indicates 'being', 'existence', as the Reason (for regarding things as momentary).—(391)

This Reason is stated more explicitly:
TEXTS (392–394).

For instance, whatever things are existent are all in a state of perpetual flux,—just as all created things have just been shown to be;—these things, Ākāśa, Time, God, and the rest are held by you to be existent;—these could never have an existence if they were devoid of momentariness;
—because permanent things cannot have any fruitful activity, either successively or simultaneously,—therefore they are held to be non-existent.

—(392–394)

COMMENTARY.

The reasoning may be thus formulated:—What is existent must be momentary,—like the things just shown to be momentary;—Ākāśa and other (uncreated) things are held by you to be existent; this is therefore a natural reason (for regarding them as momentary).

'As have been shown to be',—i.e. as momentary.

This shows that the Corroborative Instance is not devoid of the Probandum, as its presence has been already established.

'Held by you' ;—this is meant to indicate that the reasoning here put forward is an indirect one, in the form of a Reductio ad absurdum. Otherwise the Reason cited would be one that is not admitted by one or the other of the two parties.

Question—'In what way is the invariable concomitance of the Reason (with the Probandum) established ?'

Answer:—'If they were devoid of momentariness, etc.' ; the 'existence' that is meant to be the Reason here is that which consists in 'capacity for fruitful action'; and this 'existence' must be absent, if 'momentariness' is absent; because when things perform a fruitful act, they do it either successively and simultaneously,—there is no other way of acting except successively and simultaneously; as these two are mutually exclusive, as is clearly perceived; for instance, the Jar is not perceived, at one and the same time, to perform the successive functions of containing wine, water and other liquids as apart from one another,—and also the simultaneous functions of bringing about its own cognition and also containing water, at one and the same time;—now those various acts that the Jar is seen to perform successively,—or the Potter is seen to make the Jar, the plates and other objects,—all those it or he is not able to do or make simultaneously. When too the Jar is found to produce its own cognition and other things at one and the same time, it is not, at that same time, found to produce those same
successively also. All this is clearly established by direct Perception. Thus *succession* being excluded by *simultaneity*, and *vice versa*, the cognition that precludes both these functions (the successive as well as the simultaneous) naturally precludes the object also to which those functions belong,—and it also indicates that there can be no third kind of functioning; thus then there is mutual exclusion—‘contradiction’—between these two—*succession* and *simultaneity*—of that particular kind in which the presence of one implies the absence of the other. Thus no third kind of activity being possible, all fruitful activity of things must be either *successive* or *simultaneous*; and when such activity is precluded in Permanent things by the absence of the more extensive character, it precludes its characteristic in the shape of ‘existence’ also. In this way the necessary invariable concomitance becomes secured.

It cannot be argued, in answer to this that—"The *succession* and *simultaneity* of the things themselves have not yet been proved, insomuch as *Time* is not postulated by us as a distinct entity."—It will not be right to argue thus, because we do not say that the ‘succession’ and ‘simultaneity’ of things are due to a distinct category in the shape of *Time*; what we mean is that it is due to their coming into existence in those ways. For instance, when it so happens that when one comes into existence, the others also come into existence similarly, then they form the basis of the notion of ‘non-succession’ or ‘simultaneity’; as is found in the case of several sprouts coming out from similar causal conditions;—when, on the other hand, things appear in a different manner, they are spoken of as ‘successive’; e.g., such things as the sprout, the stem, the leaves, and so forth.—All these are clearly recognised by direct perception, and are spoken of as such by people. The functioning of Causes also towards the bringing about of such things is similarly spoken of as ‘successive’ or ‘simultaneous’. Thus the objection that has been urged cannot be rightly urged against us.

Says the opponent:—"In case the Thing were proved to be *permanent*, the preclusion of *succession* and *simultaneity* might not imply the preclusion of *fruitful activity*; e.g. when the existence of the ‘Tree’ becomes precluded in regard to a certain place, it precludes the particular tree ‘*shimshapā*’; otherwise, if the place itself were unknown where could the *absence* of the *shimshapā* be cognised? As a matter of fact, the *permanent thing* itself does not exist (for you, the Buddhist), as this is what you wish to deny. If, however, you do admit that such a *permanent thing* does exist, then it cannot be right to deny it; since you admit its existence as the substratum (of the two kinds of activity). Thus your reason—‘because it has existence’,—becomes ‘inconclusive’, as it is found to be present also in the contrary of your Probandum (‘Momentary’)."

It is not so, we reply. When we urge the non-perception of the more extensive character as proving our negative conclusion, we do not urge it as an independent valid cognition; we put it forward only in the form of a *Reductio ad absurdum* against the opponent; the sense being—if you accept the *permanence of the thing*, then, you cannot admit its fruitful activity,—as ‘succession’ and ‘simultaneity’,—which are of larger extension, and with which the said ‘succession’ and ‘simultaneity’ are invariably concomitant,
—cannot be present in it; because when the wider thing is not there, the narrower thing cannot be there; otherwise the two could not be related as being of 'larger' and 'narrower' extension. Hence on the preclusion of the capacity for fruitful activity, the presence of existence also cannot be accepted; as the said capacity constitutes the characteristic of 'existence.'

By this method, the non-existence of things becomes established.

Nor is it necessary that the Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity must always be a real entity; as all that is meant to be shown by such instance is that the absence of the Probandum means the absence of the Probans. And this is proved by the mere assertion,—without admitting the real existence of any object,—that when the wider thing is absent the narrower thing also must be absent,—after it has been recognised in a general way that between the two things there lies the relation that one has a wider extension than the other and as such there is invariable concomitance between them; e.g., the assertion 'when the Tree is absent, the Shimshapā cannot be there.'—This has been thus declared:—'In the case of the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity, it is not necessary that the existence of the objective substratum should be admitted; as what is intended follows from the mere assertion that on the absence of one, the other also cannot be there'.—(393-394)

The following Text shows that the Permanent Thing cannot have any successive fruitful activity:

TEXT (395).

** EFFECTS ARE DELAYED ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-PROXIMITY OF THE CAUSE. IF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE WERE THERE, TO WHAT WOULD THAT DELAY BE DUE? —(395)**

COMMENTARY.

It is not by their own wish that the effects come into existence or not come into existence; in fact, their being and not being depend upon the presence or absence of the Cause. Under the circumstances, if the Thing in its permanent form were always there, as the cause of all things,—then how is it that all effects are not produced at once,—being dependent as they are upon the mere presence of the said Cause? and why should they appear successively—one after the other?—'Kṣēpa' is Delay.—So that even the subsequent effect should come into existence beforehand,—because its Cause would be there in its untrammelled form,—just like the effect that the Opponent has in view.—(395)

In the following Text, the Opponent offers an explanation:—
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TEXT (396).

"Even of the eternal thing, there are certain auxiliaries,—on account of whose help, the former brings about the large number of its effects, in succession".—(396)

COMMENTARY.

"Even though the Permanent Entity is always there, yet its auxiliaries come up to it only in succession; hence on account of these latter, the Permanent Entity will naturally produce its effects only in succession".—(396)

The following Text answers this argument:—

TEXTS (397–399).

This is all very well; but when those other things become its 'auxiliaries', is it because they are the cause of the causal efficiency (of the Permanent Thing)? Or because they also serve the same purpose?—If they are the cause of the causal efficiency (of the Permanent Thing),—then this Thing itself would be produced by them; and yet this is incapable of being produced, as it is always there (being permanent). Or, if the very form of the Permanent Thing were held to be produced (by the auxiliaries), then its eternity (permanence) disappears. If the 'peculiarity' (produced in the Permanent Thing) be regarded as something distinct from the Thing itself, then,—how can this (Thing) be regarded as the 'Cause'?—(397–399)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, it is not possible for the Permanent Thing to have any auxiliary. Because (a) would that be an 'auxiliary' by virtue of creating peculiar conditions in the thing—as the Earth, Water and other things become auxiliaries of the seed through producing in it such conditions as swelling and the like? Or (b) would it by virtue of their serving the same purpose as the thing—as Colour etc. become auxiliaries to the Eye in producing the visual perception of Colour, by mere appearance?—The former view cannot be maintained; because the 'peculiar condition' that is produced in the Thing, by the auxiliary—would that condition be non-different or different from the form of the thing itself?—or would it be neither different nor non-different? Or would it be both different and non-different?—as
held by the Ājīvakas. These are the four alternatives. The first of these
alternatives is not tenable; as in this case, the condition, being non-different
from the thing, would be, like it, always there, and what is always there
cannot be produced,—or if it be produced, the thing itself also might be
produced in the same way; and that would deprive it of its permanence.
—If the second alternative be accepted, in that case, the effect being
produced by the condition in question, the Thing itself would cease to be the
Cause.

The term ‘asau’ (in the fourth line of the Text) stands for the
Permanent Thing.—(397-399)

The same argument is further clarified in the following—

TEXT (400).

THE EFFECTS WOULD IN THAT CASE BE PRODUCED ONLY WHEN THE
SAID ‘CONDITION’ IS THERE,—AND THEY WOULD NOT BE
PRODUCED WHEN THE ‘CONDITION’ IS NOT THERE;—
AND THUS IT WOULD BE THIS ‘CONDITION’ THAT
WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS THEIR
Cause.—(400)

COMMENTARY.

When ‘it’—i.e., the said condition—is there.—‘Thus’, i.e., from the
positive and negative concomitance just pointed out.—(400)

The following Text states an answer from the standpoint of the Opponent
[and then refutes it]—

TEXTS (401-402).

IT MIGHT BE ARGUED THAT—“ON ACCOUNT OF ITS (THE CONDITION’S)
RELATION TO THE THING, THE CAUSAL CHARACTER DOES BELONG TO
THAT (THING) ALSO”.—WHAT ‘RELATION’ CAN BE HELD TO SUBIST
BETWEEN THESE TWO?—IT CANNOT BE identity; AS THE TWO
ARE RECOGNISED AS DISTINCT. NOR CAN THE RELATION
BE HELD TO CONSIST IN THE FACT THAT IT IS PRODUCED
FROM IT; AS IN THAT CASE, THERE SHOULD BE SIMUL-
TANEITY; AND THEN THE APPEARANCE OF THE EFFECTS
ALSO WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS.—(401-402)

COMMENTARY.

‘Its’—i.e., of the condition.—‘That’—the permanent thing.

With the words ‘what relation, etc.’ the Author replies to the answer
of the Opponent. The meaning is that no relation is possible between the
two. There are only two kinds of relation possible: Identity and Being
Produced out of it:—the relation between the thing and the condition cannot
be that of Identity; as the two have been admitted to be different. Nor can the relation be that of being produced out of it; because, in fact, the effects are produced out of the auxiliaries themselves. If then, it be accepted that the conditions are produced out of the thing, then, as the appearance of the conditions would be contingent upon the thing itself, all the conditions would be produced simultaneously, and this would imply the simultaneous appearance of all the effects also; as the Cause (in the shape of the Permanent Thing) along with the conditions would be always present.—(401-402)

**TEXT (403).**

**IF IT BE HELD THAT THERE IS NEED FOR A FURTHER AUXILIARY,**

—THEN THERE WOULD BE AN INFINITE REGRESS. FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF RELATION, THE EFFECT CANNOT BE PRODUCED EVEN ONCE.—(403)

**COMMENTARY.**

If it be held that "for the producing of the said 'conditions' also there is need for other auxiliaries; so that the conditions appear successively and hence there can be no simultaneous appearance of the effects".—this cannot be right; as in this way, there would be an Infinite Regress. For instance, for these auxiliaries also, there would have to be postulated further auxiliaries for the bringing about of other conditions; of that condition again, which would be different, there would be no relationship,—and if it were to be produced out of the same, then all effects would be produced simultaneously; and if a further auxiliary were needed for that,—the same difficulties would again present themselves.—Thus there being this infinite regress, no relationship between the Thing and the Condition could be established; and when this cannot be established, then the effect would be produced not from the Permanent Thing, but from the Condition itself.—(403)

**TEXTS (404-405).**

**IF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWO (THE PERMANENT THING AND THE CONDITIONS) WERE HELD TO BE THAT OF 'INHERENCE' (SUBSISTENCE), THEN ALSO THE FOLLOWING HAS GOT TO BE CONSIDERED:—**

**IS THE 'INHERENT' THING SO REGARDED BECAUSE IT IS HELPFUL? OR NOT SO? IF THE FORMER ALTERNATIVE IS ACCEPTED, THEN IT COMES TO BE THE SAME AS THE RELATION OF 'BEING PRODUCED FROM IT', AND THIS HAS JUST BEEN REJECTED.—(404-405)

**COMMENTARY.**

It might be argued that—"the relation between the condition and the Permanent Entity is not that of being produced from it, but that of inhering
in it, the condition being inherent (subsisting) in the Permanent Thing".—This cannot be right; this is shown in the Text with the words —'Then also, etc.'—'Or not so';—the construction being—'it is held to be inherent without being helpful'.—Under the first alternative, the help rendered being non-different from the Thing helped, it would come to be the same relation which has been spoken of above as that of being produced from it; and this has been just rejected.—(404-405)

If the second alternative is accepted, then there being no distinction, everything would be 'inherent' in everything. This is what is explained in the following—

**TEXT (406).**

In case the 'inherent' be not something helpful to that wherein it inheres, then all things would be equally inherent, as there could be nothing to differentiate one from the other.—(406)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Equally',—because, in the matter of being not helpful, it could not be differentiated from the thing that is meant by the opponent (to be inherent).—(406)

The Author next takes up the views that both (the Permanent Thing and the Conditions) are both different and non-different:—

**TEXT (407).**

Each of the two alternatives—that the two are Different and non-different—having thus been severally rejected, the idea that the Condition is both (different and non-different) also becomes discarded.—(407)

**COMMENTARY.**

The rejection of each of the two alternatives naturally implies the rejection of both alternatives; as the two alternatives together do not differ from the two alternatives treated severally.—Further (between two contradictories), the acceptance or rejection of one must imply the rejection or acceptance, respectively, of the other; hence it cannot be right to regard the existing thing as being both different and non-different (from the Conditions); as the same thing cannot be both affirmed and denied at the same time; otherwise it would cease to be one.—(407)

The following Text shows that this has already been explained before, in course of the examination of the doctrine of the 'Pudgala' (section F, chapter VII) and the rest.
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TEXT (408).

IN COURSE OF THE EXAMINATION OF THE 'PUDGALA', ETC.
IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT BOTH ALTERNATIVES
CANNOT BE ACCEPTED. HENCE THE 'CONDITION'
CANNOT BE BOTH 'DIFFERENT' AND 'NON-DIFFER-
ENT'; NOR CAN IT BE NEITHER 'DIFFERENT'
NOR 'NON-DIFFERENT'.—(408)

COMMENTARY.

The other party now puts forward the view that the 'Auxiliaries' of
the Permanent Thing become so by reason of their serving the same purpose
as the latter [the second alternative suggested under Text 397]. To this
effect, some people argue as follows: "The Permanent Thing does not
require the Auxiliaries,—and yet apart from the Auxiliaries, it cannot bring
about its effect; the fact of the matter is that its very nature is such that it
produces its effect only when all its auxiliaries are close to it,—and never
by itself, like the Final Cause. Hence even though the thing be always
present, there is no possibility of all its effects being produced simultane-
ously."

This is the view set forth in the following—

TEXTS (409-410).

"EVEN THOUGH THE PERMANENT THING MAY NOT ACTUALLY NEED THE
AUXILIARY AGENCIES, YET, APART FROM THESE LATTER, IT CANNOT
PRODUCE ITS EFFECT, LIKE THE FINAL CAUSE; ITS OWN NATURE
IS SUCH THAT IT BECOMES AN EFFICIENT CAUSE ONLY
WHEN IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE AUXILIA-
RIES; HENCE IT IS THAT EVEN THOUGH THE
PERMANENT THING IS ALWAYS PRESENT,
ITS EFFECT DOES NOT COME ABOUT
ALWAYS."—(409-410)

COMMENTARY.

The 'na' (at the end of the second line) goes with 'kārakaḥ'.
'Like the Final Cause';—this is meant to be the Corroborative Instance
per dissimilarity; or it may be taken as the Corroborative Instance per simi-
arity in support of the proposition stated in the last line 'it becomes an
efficient cause, etc.'

The term 'hētuvat' is to be analysed as 'hētōk' (with the genitive
ending) 'iva'.
'Even though the Permanent thing, etc.'—i.e., even though the Permanent
Thing is always there.—(409-410)

The above view is answered in the following—
TEXT (411).

This may be so; but if the character of the Permanent Thing in its complete form (along with its auxiliaries) be held to be the same as that of it in its incomplete form (without the auxiliaries), then the auxiliaries also should be permanent (Eternal).—(411)

COMMENTARY.

The above theory may be all right; but what has to be examined here is this—The character that belongs to the Permanent Thing in its complete form as fully equipped with its auxiliaries,—is this character the same as that of the same thing in its incomplete form (without the Auxiliaries)? Or is it different from this latter?—If it is the same, then the auxiliaries should be regarded as permanent.—(411)

The following Text shows how that is so—

TEXTS (412-413).

Because they must exist while that thing exists whose character is connected with them.—If, on the other hand, the incomplete form be held to be different (from the complete form), then the unity of the thing becomes lost.—Thus the successive appearance of effects is not possible, even when the cause is dependent (upon auxiliaries).—(412-413)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'tatsambaddha, etc.' is to be expounded as 'that whose character is connected with them,'—i.e. the Auxiliaries.

'They must exist'—i.e. the Auxiliaries must exist.—Just as when a man tied to a chain is dragged, the chain also becomes dragged,—the auxiliaries must follow the Permanent thing with which they are connected. Thus alone does the Thing become saved from renouncing its previous character. If it does not renounce its character which is connected with the auxiliaries, then on account of the non-relinquishment of the character connected with the auxiliaries, the implication is that it does not relinquish the auxiliaries also; because the 'connection' is always dependent upon the connected factor. Otherwise the character of the thing would not be the same as the previous one.
If it be held that the incomplete form of the thing (i.e. without the auxiliaries) is different from that of the complete form (along with the auxiliaries), then the answer is as follows: If the form of the thing as without the auxiliaries be held to be different from its form as with the auxiliaries, then it loses its permanence; as the form is nothing different from the thing itself.

Thus, even if the action of the cause be dependent upon auxiliaries, it is not possible for the Permanent Thing to have any successive fruitful activity.—(412-413)

The following Text shows that even simultaneous action is not possible:—

TEXT (413).

AS FOR simultaneity, THAT IS NOT FAVOURED (BY THE OTHER PARTY AT ALL); AS THE EFFECTS ARE ACTUALLY FOUND TO APPEAR IN SUCCESSION.—(413)

COMMENTARY.

Even the other party do not favour the idea of the effects of the Permanent Thing being simultaneous. For instance, the following are described as the effects of Permanent Things: (a) Pleasure, Pain and the Rest,—of the Soul; (b) Sound,—of Ākāśa; (c) the successive cognitions—of the Mind; (d) the gross substances, from the Diad onwards,—of the Atoms; (e) all products,—of Time, Space, God and so forth. And in the case of all these effects it is clearly perceived that they appear in succession.—(413)

What is meant is that the theory of simultaneity is contrary to perceived facts, and also contrary to the opponent’s own doctrines.

The author now proceeds to show that it is contrary to Inference also:—

TEXT (414).

IF THE THING POSSESSED OF THE CAUSAL POTENCY DISAPPEARS, AFTER HAVING BROUGHT ABOUT ALL ITS EFFECTS SIMULTANEOUSLY,—THEN ITS momentariness BECOMES ESTABLISHED.—(414)

COMMENTARY.

That is, does the nature of the thing consisting in its capacity for effective action disappear, after having brought about all the effects simultaneously?
Or does it continue to exist?—These are the only two alternatives possible.—If it is held that it disappears, then that establishes its momentary character; as at each moment fresh natures would be appearing, one after the other, each preceding nature becoming destroyed by itself.—(414)

TEXTS (415-416).

If, on the other hand, the form of the efficient Cause continues (after having brought about the effects), then it should produce the effect over again; because, how could any efficiency be attributed to what is not effective in bringing about due effects? Thus all things would be non-existent and momentary,—like the 'sky-lotus',—on account of their being devoid of all efficiency; because—it is efficiency (for effective action) that constitutes the characteristic of (existing) 'things'.—(415-416)

COMMENTARY.

If the second alternative is accepted, then, as the form of the thing, in the shape of its causal efficiency, would continue,—it should produce its effect over again; because it will not have abandoned its previous form, just like its previous condition; and thus there would come about the same succession of effects. This shows that the doctrine of simultaneity is contrary to Inferential Reasoning.

It might be argued that—"It may be that the effective action of the Permanent Thing is neither successive or simultaneous; and yet its efficiency may be there all the same."

In answer to this, it is said—'How could any efficiency, etc. etc.'—When the efficiency of things is determined, it is only on the basis of their bringing about their effects; so that when a thing does not bring about any effect, how could it be efficient? Otherwise, why could not efficiency be attributed to the 'sky-lotus' and other such things also?

Says the Opponent—"Even though the efficiency of the Thing has disappeared, the existence of the Thing is still there (it still exists); and as it would be in existence, your Reason becomes Inconclusive."

Answer:—'Thus all things could be non-existent, etc. etc.'—The only characteristic of an existing thing is that it should have the capacity for effective action; if this capacity has disappeared, how could existence, the characteristic feature of the entity, remain there?
Thus it is established that Ākāśa and other things which are held to be non-momentary (permanent) can only be regarded as 'non-existent',—like 'the son of the Barren Woman',—because they are devoid of the capacity for effective action, functioning either successively or simultaneously. 

—(415-416)

TEXT (417).

IF, THEN, CAPACITY (FOR FRUITFUL ACTION) BE NOT ADMITTED TO BE THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF THE 'ENTITY',—THEN, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT REHOVES THE OTHER PARTY TO POINT OUT SOME OTHER CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF 'ENTITIES'.—(417)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—"If capacity for effective action were the characteristic feature of entities, then alone all this would be very well".—In that case it should be explained what their characteristic feature is. As a matter of fact, when it is said that the 'Hare's Horn' and such thing are 'non-entities', this idea is based entirely upon the absence in them of the capacity for effective action. Then, inasmuch as 'entity' and 'non-entity' are mutually exclusive, it follows, by implication, that the characteristic feature of 'entity', as distinguished from 'non-entity', consists in its capacity for effective action.—(417)

The following Text anticipates the opponent's answer to the above:—

TEXT (418).

IF THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF 'ENTITIES' BE HELD TO CONSIST IN BEING RELATED TO EXISTENCE (BEING),—THAT CANNOT BE RIGHT; BECAUSE NO SUCH RELATION AS THAT OF 'INHERENCE' AND THE LIKE IS KNOWN TO SUBSIST BETWEEN THEM. HOW TOO COULD THEY BE THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF ONE ANOTHER?—(418)

COMMENTARY.

[Says the Opponent]—"Capacity for effective action is not the characteristic feature of entities; it is 'being related to existence', i.e., the 'Inherence of existence (Being)', that is their characteristic feature."

The answer to this is—That cannot be right; i.e. that cannot be the right characteristic feature of entities;—because no such relation as that of 'Inher-
ence' and the like is known to subsist between them; the phase 'and the like' is meant to include 'existence'. If any such relation as Inherence and the like were known to subsist between them, then 'Inherence' might be the characteristic feature of 'entities'; as a matter of fact however, it is exactly those relations whose existence the opponent has set out to prove; and also because there are valid proofs to the contrary. Or even the proofs already adduced before may be regarded as setting aside 'existence' (Being) as well as 'Inherence'. The reason for this lies in the fact that 'Existence' or 'Being' can have no relation with anything, as it cannot be helped by anything; and there can be no relation between things that are not helpful to one another; if there were such relation, it would lead to an absurdity.

Further, it behoves you to explain what is the characteristic feature of 'Being' (Existence), 'Inherence' and of the 'ultimate specific Individualities',—which feature marks them out as 'entities'. As a matter of fact 'Existence' (or 'Being') does not inhere (subsist) in either 'Inherence' or in 'the ultimate specific Individualities'; nor does it subsist in 'Being' or 'Existence' itself. In fact, the theory (of the opponent) is that what the presence of existence (or Being) marks out as 'entities' are only the three categories of Substance, Quality and Action.—Thus the characteristic feature proposed is found to be too narrow (not applicable to all the things in question).

Even granting that such entities as 'Existence' and the rest do exist;—the 'inherence of existence' cannot be the characteristic feature of 'entities'; because it is an entirely different thing; when one thing is entirely different from another, it cannot constitute the form of the latter; and thereby serve as its characteristic feature. Thus, when a person is found whose mind is bewildered by his ignorance of the real character of 'entities', if a definition of their characteristic feature is provided, what should be pointed out as the required feature is some character in the thing in question itself which serves to differentiate it from something else; so that through that character, the nature of the thing could be determined; e.g. the Earth is distinguished as characterised by roughness of surface. One thing cannot constitute the form of another thing; for if it did, then it would not be another thing at all; how then could it form its characteristic feature? Specially because the term 'characteristic feature' in the present context stands for the nature or character of things.—(418)

Some people argue as follows:—'That entity which in its ultimate form does not bring about any cognition even for the Omniscient Person,—what would be the proof that would establish the non-existence of such an entity,—by virtue of which such a universal proposition could be asserted that 'whatever exists is momentary'? Nor would the non-cognition of such an entity vitiate the omniscient character of that Person, as His omniscience applies to only such things as are cognisable; it is only when a man does not know what is knowable, that he is regarded as not omniscient; while the said entity is not knowable; because, even though its cognition could be produced, it would remain incapable of being cognised.'

Against these people, the author directs the following remarks:
TEXTS (419–421).

ALL OPERATIONS BEARING UPON THE CONSIDERATION OF THINGS ARE TO BE CARRIED ON BY ONE WHO HAS AN UNDISTURBED INTELLECT AND SEEKS TO ACCOMPLISH A USEFUL PURPOSE,—NOT BY ONE WHO IS DEMENTED. HENCE IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF ONLY SUCH A THING AS WOULD BE OF USE TO SOME PEOPLE, AT SOME PLACE, AT SOME TIME AND IN SOME WAY. IT IS IN REFERENCE TO SUCH A THING THAT WE ARE PROVING THE momentariness ; AND IT IS ONLY WITH REFERENCE TO SUCH THINGS THAT THE Universal Premiss has BEEN Asserted.—(419–421)

COMMENTARY.

Whenever there is any consideration as to anything being existent or non-existent, it is done by one who seeks to accomplish some useful purpose,—and not because he is addicted to the habit of considering things; as otherwise he would be regarded as a demented person. Hence an intelligent person can seek to determine the existence of only such things as could be of use to persons seeking to accomplish a useful purpose, in some way, directly or indirectly, at some place, and at some time; and not anything else; as there would be no basis for such consideration, and no useful purpose would be served by it.

The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include the consideration of such particular things as Fire, Water and the like.

Thus what we are trying to prove is the momentary character of only those things which are capable of accomplishing some useful purpose of intelligent men, and which alone are known as ‘entity’, ‘thing’, and which have the said character of being capable of accomplishing a useful purpose. And as what we have cited as the Reason is the ‘capacity for fruitful action’, there is no fallibility in such a Reason, and it is only such a Reason which is found to be actually invariably concomitant, in the universal form, with the Probandum (Momentariness). That Premiss is said to be ‘universal’ which asserts the universal concomitance of the Reason, without any distinction between what *is actually known to contain the Probandum and what is not so known.—(419–421)

The following texts answer the question why the character of ‘entity’, ‘thing,’ cannot be attributed to what is devoid of the capacity for effective action:—
TEXTS (422–424).

That which is devoid of all capacity, and is like 'the son of the barren woman', never becomes a cause (basis) even for the mind of the Omniscient Person. And as in such a thing, intelligent men do not perceive an effect or character and so forth, they do not seek to establish its existence; as any such attempt would be absolutely baseless. There can be no useful purpose served by proving the momentariness of such a thing. So that any objection taken to this is also absolutely futile.—(422–424)

COMMENTARY.

'Even for the mind, etc.';—the term 'even' is meant to indicate that it is so, not only in regard to the 'moments' of the same 'series' as the said kind, but also in regard to such other purposes as the holding of water and the rest (in the case of the Jar).

'Do not perceive the effect or character and so forth';—the term 'kārya', 'effect', stands for the fruit, result;—the term 'rūpa' for nature, character, —and 'so forth' includes the particular time, place and condition;—what is meant is that such a thing does not differ in any way from absolute non-entities like the 'Hare's Horns'.

Nor is there any useful purpose to be served for the person seeking to accomplish a purpose, by proving the 'momentariness' of such a thing; because the perception or non-perception of such a character in it would not help in accomplishing any good, nor in avoiding an evil. This has been thus declared—'For one seeking to accomplish a useful purpose, what would be the use in discussing a thing which is incapable of accomplishing a useful purpose? What need has the young woman of discussing whether the man wanting in virility is handsome or ugly?'

For these reasons, when the disputant raises such questions as—'How is it known that it is momentary?';—it is entirely futile; because his opponent does not wish to prove the momentariness of such things.—(422–424)

The opponent now proceeds to show that 'capacity for fruitful activity' also cannot be the right differentia of 'entity',—as it would be too wide:—

TEXT (425).

"Such things as the sky-lotus are found to be capable of fruitful activity, in so far as they serve as the cause of their own cognition; and yet these are not existent."—(425)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, things like the 'sky-lotus' are found to be capable of such fruitful action as the bringing about of such cognitions as 'the sky-
lotus', 'the sky-lotus';—and yet they do not really exist; hence the definition that 'Efficiency is the characteristic feature of the entity' (as put forward by the Buddhist under Text 416) is found to be 'too wide'.—(425)

The following Text supplies the answer to this:—

TEXT (426).

THE CHARACTER IN QUESTION AS ATTRIBUTED TO THE 'SKY-LOTUS' IS ENTIRELY BASELESS; ITS IDEA IS THERE ONLY AS THE RESULT OF ONE'S EAGERNESS FOR WRANGLING.—(426)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the capacity for fruitful activity is not admitted in the 'sky-lotus' and such things. The idea of it is merely an outcome of the opponent's imagination and is utterly baseless.—(426)

Question:—"What is the Proof that annuls the idea of the said notion actually arising out of the 'sky-lotus' and such things?"

Answer:—

TEXT (427).

IF THE SAID IDEA HAD A NON-ENTITY FOR ITS CAUSE, THEN IT WOULD BE PRODUCED CONSTANTLY; AS THE NON-ENTITY CANNOT NEED ANYTHING ELSE, BEING ALWAYS DEVOID OF DISTINCTIONS.—(427)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'abhāvakāraṇatā' is to be expounded as 'the character of having a non-entity,—like the sky-lotus,—for its cause'. If the idea had such a non-entity for its cause then the idea of the sky-lotus and such things would be produced constantly; because its cause would be always present in its perfect form. Nor can it be said to be dependent upon the help of other things, as by its very nature it is incapable of being helped by anything else; hence its activity towards producing its effect could not
be hold to be occasional on account of the occasional absence of such aids.—(427)

In the following Texts, the author sets forth the view of Bhadanta-Yogasena (a Buddhist writer):

TEXTS (428–434).

"Even if things are momentary,—how can there be any effective action? The initial auxiliaries could not be productive of peculiarities in one another; because if they have come into existence, they must be there already in their complete form; if they have not come into existence, as the entities would not be there, as this absence would be without differentiation, wherefore could not the effect itself be produced therefrom (for the bringing about of which the auxiliaries are posited)? Specially as they could not be differentiated from anything else, being equally open to question. Thus too there would be an infinite regress of auxiliaries for you.—Then again, as they could not have an effective action either successively or simultaneously, it is useless to regard them as 'momentary'; specially when no peculiarity can be brought about by any auxiliaries, the entire series is rightly held to be wholly undifferentiated (uniform). If then the destruction were without cause, it should come about at the very beginning; and if there be no possibility of it at the beginning, how could it come at the end also?—If again, no cause is admitted except the cause of the entities themselves,—then why should there be any incongruity in their destruction coming about in certain cases only (not always)?"—(428–434)

COMMENTARY.

Yogasena has argued as follows:—"Even if things were momentary, any activity of theirs, either successive or simultaneous, would be incompatible. Because, by themselves, they could be either capable, or incapable, of such action. If they are capable, then they cannot need auxiliaries; as what is itself capable does not need anything else. If the things are themselves incapable, then any need for auxiliaries is all the more baseless. For instance, the things that fall within the scope of the first series cannot acquire any peculiarities from one another; because things that are produced and not produced being existent and non-existent, cannot stand in the relation of Helper and the Helped. Hence at the initial stage, they being all undifferentiated, they could not produce any particular 'moment'; for, if
such a 'moment' could be produced from the undifferentiated things, wherefore could the effect in question also not be produced? Nor can it be right to say that they are produced out of what is different from the initial 'series'; as it is entirely on this ground that there is no differentiation among the components of the 'series' themselves. If these also were ultimately to bring about particular entities, then there would be an infinite regress.—Thus, there being no differentiation, how could any effect be produced from an undifferentiated 'series' of Causes? If there were to be production out of the undifferentiated Cause, then all things would be produced from all things.

"Thus then, even when there is an incongruity in effective action, coming either successively or simultaneously,—things do have effective activity,—and in the same manner, even though they are permanent, they could have the necessary effective activity. Hence it is needless to have recourse to the theory that things are momentary.

"Thus the Reason put forward (by the Buddhist)—'because things exist (therefore they must be momentary)—is found to be Inconclusive.

"Nor can it be said that—'the production of the effect is due to the "series" in a particular condition, and not always';—because in accordance with the reasoning explained above, there being no peculiar condition brought about by Auxiliaries, the series would remain always undifferentiated.—Nor can it be right to assent that—'the series itself is only a peculiar feature connected with its own constituent cause';—as this would be contrary to a perceived fact. For instance, the effect is actually found to appear and disappear at the appearance and disappearance (respectively) of the Auxiliaries. If then, the peculiar condition were connected only with its own constituent cause, then the productivity would belong to the thing independently of auxiliaries.

"Further, in accordance with the reasonings adduced above, the series remaining always undifferentiated, such particular products as the Potsherd and the rest could not be produced out of the Jar.

"Then again, if the Destruction of a thing, consisting of the cessation of the series of its homogeneous moments, were without Cause,—then, as independent of all else, it should come about at the very outset; and if it does not come about at the initial stage, it could not come at a later stage either; because it would, even then be as undifferentiated as before.—If then, for the destruction of things, no such Cause is admitted as another 'series' distinct from the Cause of the things themselves,—then why should Fire be the destroyer of Cold? because what is ineffective cannot be a destroyer,—simply because it is incapable of doing anything; and even so if it were regarded as an effective destroyer, it would be an absurdity; and everything would be the destroyer of everything. Thus it would be impossible to explain such phenomena as the use of the term 'non-apprehension' and the 'destroying of life'—as being due to opposition (or destruction)."—(428–434)

The above arguments are answered in the following—
Our answer to the above is as follows:—There can be no mutual help in the case of things appearing at the 'initial stage'; they become auxiliaries only by virtue of having the same effective action. Even when there is no help rendered to one another, these are not entirely undifferentiated; because when they are themselves produced out of their own constituent cause, they become productive of their own several distinct 'series'.—(435-436)

Commentary.

The effect is produced only from a cause that is efficient; and yet auxiliaries are not entirely useless. Because the Auxiliary is of two kinds—(1) that which serves the same purpose, and (2) that which renders mutual help;—in the case of the effect appearing immediately, the auxiliary can be of the former kind only, not of the latter kind; because at one and the same moment one could not produce any peculiarity in the other, as it remains impartite (undifferentiated);—in the case of the remoter effect, however, the auxiliary is of that kind where there is mutual help; as the qualified succeeding moment is produced mutually out of both, and the remote effect is produced by mutual help in reference to its own 'series'. Thus then, as regards those that appeared at the initial stage, there can be no differentiation from one another; and yet there can be nothing incongruous in their rendering mutual help; inasmuch as they serve the same purpose. But they are not undifferentiated in regard to the producing of the immediately following particular 'moment'; as the entire series of the succeeding effects is produced out of its own preceding 'causal ideas', and each member of this series is equally efficient in producing the said effects. These 'Causal Ideas' are produced from their own 'Causal Ideas',—these again from other 'Causal Ideas' of their own; and thus there is an endless series of causes. —Even if there is an Infinite Regress, that is nothing undesirable. Even though each member of the series is efficient, yet the others are not useless; as they also have been produced as so efficient, through the potency of their own causes. Nor is it possible for them to have a separate existence, as there is no cause for it. Nor can it come later on, as all things are momentary.

'They become productive of their own several distinct series';—that is, they are capable of producing the set appearing at the second moment. The term 'their own constituent cause' should be understood to have been added for the purpose of precluding the usefulness of an auxiliary that appears at the initial stage. And it is not possible for any effect to be produced entirely from its own constituent cause, as everything becomes possible with the help of attending circumstances. This has been thus declared—
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'Nothing can come out of any single thing, all is possible out of the attendant circumstances.'—(435-436)

TEXT (437).

THENCEFORWARD THE PARTICULAR ENTITIES THAT COME INTO EXISTENCE ARE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THAT; ON ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT THOSE THAT HELP TOWARDS THEM ARE OF THAT NATURE.—(437)

COMMENTARY.

'Thenceforward';—i.e. since the moment following the second 'moment'.

'Are brought about by that';—that is, produced by the particular causes brought about by the auxiliaries.

'How so?'

'On account of, etc. etc.';—i.e. because their nature is of that character, —i.e. produced by particular causes brought about by particular auxiliaries. 'Those that help towards them';—this should be construed with the preceding phrase 'because their nature is of that form'; and the particle 'ча' has to be understood as before the phrase 'Those that help towards them'. The meaning thus is as follows:—Towards the effect that comes into existence at the third moment, the particulars that have appeared during the second moment are helpful, as its cause; and those that are so helpful have the character of having a nature which is capable of producing the effects producible by the particulars brought about by the auxiliaries; so that the particulars appearing at the third moment are all brought about by these.—(437)

Question—'How does this restriction become applicable to these?'

Answer.—

TEXT (438).

EVERY MOMENT, ENTITIES GO ON COMING INTO EXISTENCE, WITH DEFINITE UNDEFINABLE POTENTIALITIES, AND NO OBJECTION CAN BE TAKEN TO THEM,—JUST AS TO THE FIRE'S CAPACITY TO BURN.—(438)

COMMENTARY.

The nature of things cannot be criticised (or objected to); because all diversity of the nature of things comes out of a series of 'ideas' bringing the things into existence; like the 'burning capacity' of fire; as a matter of fact, they come into existence every moment, as endowed with diverse potentialities, through the functioning of the series of ideas coming one after the other. Hence, even though, for some reason, they are cognised as being similar in form, through the presence of some similarity,—yet, in
reality, their nature is entirely different. That is the reason why only one entity becomes the cause of only one other entity, and not everything of everything. Hence there is no force in the objection urged.

'Bhavanti', 'go on coming into existence',—i.e. are produced.—(438)

It has been argued by the opponent (under Text 433, above) that "if the Destruction were without cause, it should come about at the very beginning";—this is answered in the following:

TEXTS (439-440).

IT IS 'DESTRUCTION' IN THE SHAPE OF THE 'BREAKING UP OF THE SERIES' WHICH IS WITHOUT CAUSE; AND THIS DOES NOT COME ABOUT EVEN AT THE END;—WHAT IS DENIED IS ITS COMING INTO EXISTENCE IN THAT FORM. AS FOR THE COMING INTO EXISTENCE OF SUCH DISSIMILAR THINGS (SERIES) AS THE POTSHerd AND THE LIKE,—THIS CERTAINLY HAS A CAUSE; BUT THIS ALSO IS NOT PRODUCED AT THE BEGINNING, BECAUSE AT THAT TIME ITS CAUSE IS NOT THERE.—(439-440)

COMMENTARY.

'Destruction' is of two kinds—(1) in the form of the 'Breaking up of the series', and (2) in the form of the coming into existence of a 'dissimilar series'.—If then what has been urged refers to 'Destruction' in the form of the 'Breaking up of the series',—then that cannot be right; as such 'Destruction' does not come about even at the end; for the simple reason that it has no form; then what do you mean when you ask 'How does it come about at the end?' Thus then, inasmuch as we do not admit of its coming into existence at any time, the argument based upon its presence or absence at the beginning or at the end is entirely irrelevant. All that is done by us is that its coming into existence in that form is denied;—'in that form',—i.e. by the appearance of another similar series. When it is said that 'there is destruction of the Jar', what is meant is that 'another similar series does not come into existence'; and there is no affirmation of anything.

If the 'Destruction' meant by the opponent is that in the form of 'the coming into existence of a dissimilar series',—then the fact of its being without cause is one that is not admitted (by anyone); because it is not admitted by any one that the stroke of the Bludgeon produces anything of the nature of a positive entity. That is the reason why it cannot come into existence even at the beginning; as at that time its cause, in the shape of the Bludgeon, is not there.—(439-440)

The following Text proceeds to explain the idea of 'antagonism' (relation of Destroyer and Destroyed) among things:
TEXTS (441-443).

There are two kinds of 'momentary things'—some are causes of decadence,—e.g. Fire is the cause of the decadence (diminution) of Cold; and others are not so.—People, not perceiving the truth, think that there is antagonism of various kinds among things, even when the relation of cause and effect is there. As a matter of fact however there is no real 'antagonism' among things, in the shape of the relation of the destroyer and destroyed. It is in this sense that the expression 'notion of antagonism' has been used.

—(441-443)

COMMENTARY.

There are certain things which become causes of the 'decadence' of certain other things,—the 'decadence' consisting in the production of 'moments' of gradually decreasing degrees of intensity; for instance fire is the cause of such a 'decadence' of Cold;—while there are other things which are not so,—i.e. not causes of the decadence of things; e.g. Fire is not the cause of the 'decadence' of smoke.—Among the former—i.e. among the causes of decadence,—even though there is the relation of cause and effect,—yet people, having their powers of vision bedimmed by ignorance, think that there is 'antagonism' (between the said cause and the thing whose decadence has been brought about).—of various kinds,—e.g. Fire is antagonistic to Cold, Air is antagonistic to the Lamp, Light is antagonistic to Darkness and so forth.—In reality, however, there is no such antagonism among things as that between the destroyer and the destroyed; because when an entity comes into existence, it does so in its complete form,—and it is impossible to bring about any change in the nature of a thing; there can be no cause for any such change,—whether it be different or non-different from the thing. As regards the non-entity, nothing can be done to it, simply because it is non-existent.—So that in both ways, the 'antagonist' can do nothing. It is for this reason that the Teacher has declared that 'When your cause is there in its perfect form, and yet there is non-existence (of its effect) while something else is existent, it is spoken of as antagonism';—it is only a notion of antagonism; i.e. there is no real antagonism.

The particle 'api' stands for 'cha', and should be construed after 'eva'.—(441-443)

In the following Texts, the author sets forth arguments against the doctrine of the 'Perpetual Flux', from the standpoint of the followers of Jaimini and others:
TEXTS (444-445).

"As a matter of fact, there is always the Recognition of a thing in the form ‘this is that same’, when the sense-organ concerned is rightly functioning; and this Recognition is quite firm and undeniable.—This therefore is an irrepressible fact of perception, which annuls all the reasons that have been adduced for proving the ‘Perpetual Flux’ of things.”—(444-445)

COMMENTARY.

"For instance, in regard to Mountains, the Body, the Diamond and such things,—after the proper functioning of the sense-organ concerned, there appears the valid sense-perception called ‘Recognition’,—in the form of ‘this is that same’,—which rejects the idea of things being ‘momentary’. Even though it is true that such Recognition is found to appear also in regard to newly grown nails, hairs, grasses, and such things,—yet the Recognition regarding the Diamond and such things cannot be invalid,—as it is never annulled. This is what is meant by the epithets ‘firm and undeniable’. What is meant is that the mere fact that the Recognition in the case of Hair—brought about by the Eyes affected by darkness,—is invalid cannot lead men with unclouded minds to regard as invalid the direct visual perception of the real Hair, brought about by undimmed Eyes.—The epithet ‘firm’ implies the fact of its not being of doubtful character,—there being no such doubt as to whether this is really the same or something else. The epithet ‘undeniable’ implies the fact of its not being wrong.”—(444-445)

The Author answers these arguments in the following—

TEXTS (446-447).

In fact, Recognition can never be of the nature of Direct Sense-perception; because the form of the thing itself is inexpressible, and the Recognition is expressed in words.—Recognition must be wrong, and Sense-perception is entirely different from it. That Recognition is wrong is clear from the fact that it appears in the form of the notion of ‘non-difference’ where, in reality, there is difference.”—(446-447)

COMMENTARY.

The very fact of the said Recognition being of the nature of Perception is not admitted. Because the real character of a ‘Thing’ is inexpressible in
words, because of the absence of contiguity; hence its real cognition can only be in the form of a mental apprehension; specially because when the Thing has not been apprehended as related to any words, it cannot be possible to apprehend it along with a verbal expression. Hence a Real Perception, pertaining as it does to the specific individuality of things, must be beyond all imposition, indeterminate. And as such Perception would be entirely valid, it cannot be wrong. This is the reason why wise men have declared the definition of Perception to be that 'it is free from all determination, and not mistaken,' which is perfectly logical.—Recognition, on the other hand, is not 'free from determination,' as it is always conceived in the verbal form 'this is that same'; nor is it unmistakable, because it apprehends, as non-different, things that are really different.—(446-447)

Question:—"How is it so?"

Answer—

TEXT (448).

IF THE RECOGNITION DID APPREHEND THE FORM OF THE THING AS PREVIOUSLY COGNISED, THEN IT WOULD HAVE APPEARED AT THAT SAME TIME, AS ITS OBJECT WOULD BE THE SAME,—LIKE THE PREVIOUS COGNITION.—(448)

COMMENTARY.

If the Recognition had the same object that has been cognised before, then it would have appeared at that same time,—because as having the same object, its cause would be there in its perfect form; like the previous cognition;—'as its object would be the same';—i.e. the object of the Recognition would be that same object which has been cognised before.—(448)

The following Text puts forward reasonings in the indirect form of a reductio ad absurdum:—

TEXTS (449-450).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, HOWEVER IT IS NOT SO; THEN THE RECOGNITION HAS NOT BEEN REGARDED AS APPREHENDING THE SAME OBJECT;—BECAUSE IT IS PRODUCED AT ITS OWN TIME,—LIKE THE COGNITION OF ANOTHER THING; AND INASMUCH AS IT APPREHENDS AS non-different WHAT IS REALLY different, IT MUST BE MISTAKEN,—LIKE THE NOTION OF THE ILLUSORY BALL.—(449-450)

COMMENTARY.

The arguments may be thus formulated:—(a) When a cognition does not appear even when the thing is there in its perfect form, that Cognition cannot have that thing for its object;—e.g. even when Colour is there in
its perfectly perceptible form, the auditory perception is not there;—even when the Diamond and other things were there in the perfectly perceptible form at the time of their previous perception, their Recognition does not appear at that time; hence the wider condition not being present (the less wide condition cannot be there).—(b) Thus if the Diamond and other things were permanent, the Recognition of those things should appear on the previous occasion, when its causes would be present in its perfect form;—and yet as a matter of fact, it does not appear at that time;—hence it becomes established that those things cannot be permanent. Thus then, it remains undisputed that since it apprehends as non-different what is different, the Recognition must be mistaken, like the cognition of the illusory Ball. Thus it has been shown that Recognition is not one that has its object not denied;—[hence it is invalid]; because its object is actually annulled by the aforesaid reasoning which has proved it to be wrong.—(449-450)

For the following reason also,—that it apprehends what is already apprehended,—Recognition cannot be valid,—being just like Remembrance.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (451).

IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO REGARD RECOGNITION AS VALID,—BECAUSE IT OPERATES TOWARDS AN OBJECT WHOSE PURPOSE HAS BEEN ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED,—LIKE REMEMBRANCE AND SUCH OTHER COGNITIONS;—AND HENCE IT IS DEVOID OF THE CHARACTER OF THE VALID MEANS (OF COGNITION).—(451)

COMMENTARY.

That active agent alone is called the 'Means of Right Cognition' which is the best implement and the most effective instrument in the bringing about of the action of valid Cognition. If then, Recognition has for its object something that has been already apprehended by a previous Cognition, then, inasmuch as it would be operating towards a Cognition that has been already brought about, it could not be 'the most effective instrument',—and under the circumstances, how could it have the character of the 'Means of Right Cognition'? If it did, then Remembrance also would be a means of Right Cognition (which no one admits). And when it has not acquired the character of a 'valid means of Right Cognition', it cannot be effective in annulling any notion. If it did so, it would lead to an absurdity.

"Recognition may not be a separate Means of Right Cognition; and yet the mere fact of its having for its object something that existed at the previous time does annul the notion of the 'Perpetual Flux' of things.'"

This is not right; because in reality, its object is not the same as the previous thing; in fact it is a figment of the imagination, and even though purely imaginary, it apprehends, through illusion, the previously perceived thing; and by reason of this illusory apprehension, it is said to have the previously perceived thing for its object. Under the circumstances, how can
the doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux' be discarded on the strength of the said 'Recognition' which is illusory in its very source?—(451)

The following Texts urge—from Kumārila’s standpoint [vide Shlokavarttika—Perception, Shlo. 234]—the argument that "Recognition does not apprehend what has been already apprehended":—

TEXTS (452-453).

"As a matter of fact, the existence of the thing at the present time (of Recognition) has not been included under the previous Cognition; this is a peculiar feature in Recognition, which is not present in Remembrance. Remembrance is in the form of 'that' and appertains only to that which has been already cognised before; Recognition however is in the form 'This is that same', which is something totally different (from the previous Cognition)."—(452-453)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila has argued as follows:—"The previous Cognition has not apprehended the existence of the Thing at the present time (of Recognition); as it could not appear in the form 'this is the same as that'; hence there is a difference between Recognition and Remembrance.—"How?"—Remembrance always appears in the form of 'That' which takes in only that much of the Thing as has been cognised before; while Recognition takes in the idea of 'This' also (being in the form 'This is the same as that'), which is an additional feature of the thing concerned. To this extent, Recognition is something different from Remembrance. Thus Recognition acquires the character of a real 'Means of Right Cognition', after having shaken off the Doubt and Mistake in regard to it."—(452-453)

He proceeds to show in what way it shakes off the Doubt and Mistake:—

TEXT (454).

"Inasmuch as there is no Doubt or Mistake in regard to what is cognised (by Recognition),—Recognition acquires the character of the 'Means of Right Cognition' after having set aside both."—(454)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as Doubt and Mistake do not exist at all in regard to the thing recognised,—having been dispelled, like cold in a place surrounded by a large mass of flaming fire.—(454)
The following argument has been urged against Kumārila's position:—
In the case of an object cognised through Inference,—such as the inference of the dark complexion of the child (from the fact of its being born of a dark woman),—it is sometimes found that it is subsequently set aside by direct Perception (when the child is actually seen to be fair-complexioned);
in the same manner, in the case in question, even though the permanence of Things might be cognised through Recognition, yet it may be that at some later time, the successive (fluctuating) character of things may be proved through Inference based upon the fact of the effects of the thing being successive; and the said permanence vouchèd for by Recognition may thus be set aside by this subsequent Inference. Under the circumstances, how can the doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux' be held to be discarded (by Recognition)?

This is answered (from Kumārila's point of view) in the following—

TEXT (455).

"A thing, though cognised by other means of Cognition, could be accepted as otherwise, if so apprehended by Sense-perception; when however a thing is already taken up by Sense-perception, there can be no appearance of any other Means of Cognition (to the contrary)."—(455)

COMMENTARY.

'Other means of Cognition'—i.e. Inference and the rest; such as 'The child must be dark-complexioned because he is the son of so and so' and so forth.

'Could be accepted as otherwise',—through the instrumentality of Sense-perception;—'otherwise',—i.e. of a form other than that apprehended through Inference, etc.

'Already taken up',—i.e. apprehended.

'There can be no appearance, etc.';—Means of Cognition other than Sense-perception,—i.e. Inference and the rest—cannot set aside Sense-perception.—(455)

Why so?

Answer:—

TEXT (456).

"When a thing has been duly apprehended through the firmly established highest Means of Cognition,—how could one ever have a Cognition to the contrary, on the strength of the other weaker Means of Cognition?"—(456)

COMMENTARY.

It is only right that what has been ascertained through Inference should be concluded to be otherwise, on the strength of Sense-perception; because
this latter is the highest among the Means of Cognition; but Inference and
the rest can never alter the nature of a thing as cognised through Sense-
perception; as they are weaker.

'Firmly established',—i.e. free from Doubt and Mistake.
'To the contrary',—i.e. otherwise than that cognised through Sense-
perception.—(456)

With the following Text, the Author answers the above arguments of
Kumārila:

**TEXT (457).**

*If existence at the present time is held by you to be distinct from
the previous existence, then difference between them
becomes proved by yourself.—(457)*

**COMMENTARY.**

It has been asserted that the object of Recognition is existence at the
present time;—is this present existence different from the existence apprehended
by the previous Perception? Or, is it the same? If it is different, then
difference being proved by your own assertion, there is contradiction of
your own doctrine; while for us, it is what is desired by us.—(457)

**TEXT (458).**

*If the present existence is not-different (from the previous existence),—
then how is it that it is 'not included in the previous
Cognition'? In fact, if it were not included therein;
then it would come to this that the thing
itself was not apprehended at all.—(458)*

**COMMENTARY.**

If the 'present existence' is something different from the 'previous
existence', then, how could it have been not-included in the previous Cogni-
tion,—on account of which you have asserted (under Text 452) that 'it is
not included in the previous Cognition'?

The following might be urged—"The momentary character of Sound and
other things, though not anything different from these things, is said to
be not-apprehended when the things are apprehended; the same may be true
in the case in question also."

This is not right. It is not true that while the object, Sound, is appre-
hended, its momentary character, though not-different from it, is held to
be not apprehended; what is held is that, though the momentary character is apprehended, yet its apprehension is not definitely certain, on account of the ground for certainty not being there; because mere apprehension does not bring about certain Cognition; the certainty is dependent upon the needs of the apprehender and the soundness of the repetition of the apprehension.—This explanation is not available for you; because for you, even the previous perception is determinate (certain) in character; and when the form of the thing has been definitely cognised with certainty, through that previous Perception, then its present existence also, which is non-different from the previous form, must also have been definitely ascertained with certainty by that same Perception; if this latter were not definitely certain, the form of the thing also,—as non-different from this present existence,—would have to be regarded as not definitely ascertained.

Some people have held that—"The validity of the Recognition is based upon the definite ascertaining of the Thing that has been in doubt."—This also becomes rejected by our above reasoning. Nor, in the present case, is there any ascertaining of a Thing in doubt;—because in the case of Hairs, even though different hairs come out one after the other, there is Recognition; so that the doubt would remain (even after Recognition, which has been found to be fallible in the case of Hairs).—(468)

It has been argued (under Text 455) that—"what has been cognised by other Means of Cognition could be accepted as otherwise, if so apprehended by Sense-perception".—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (459).

If what has been cognised through Inference and the other Means of Cognition were annulled by Sense-perception, then Inference and the rest could not be regarded as Means of Right Cognition,—because they are annulled,—like Cognitions through defective vision.—(459)

COMMENTARY.

If the subject-matter of an Inference,—such as 'because it is your child [it must be dark-complexioned]',—could be annulled by Sense-perception,—then that Inference cannot be a Means of Right Cognition at all; because on account of its subject-matter being annulled, there can be no agreement with the real state of things, and hence it would be like the perception obtained through defective vision.—Hence the assertion that—"What has been cognised through other Means of Cognition could be accepted as otherwise, on the strength of Sense-perception"—is irrelevant, being entirely impossible.—(459)
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It has been argued (under Text 456) that—"Sense-perception is the highest among the Means of Right Cognition";—that also is not true.—This is shown in the following—

TEXT (460).

THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REAL STATE OF
THINGS' BEING EQUALLY PRESENT IN ALL FORMS OF VALID CONSCIOUSNESS,
—WHY SHOULD THERE BE A PREJUDICE AT ALL?—IN CASE THE
SAID CHARACTER BE NOT PRESENT IN INFERENCE AND THE
REST, THEN THESE LATTER WOULD NOT BE VALID MEANS
OF RIGHT CONSCIOUSNESS AT ALL.—(460)

COMMENTARY.

The 'validity' of the Means of Right Cognition consists only in their having the capacity to bring about the right notion of things; and if this is admitted as belonging to all the Means of Right Cognition,—then, why should Perception be regarded as the 'highest' among them?—It might be said that "it is Perception alone that is in strict accordance with the real state of things";—then, this character of being in strict accordance with the real state of things being absent in Inference and the rest, these latter would not be 'Means of Right Cognition' at all; because the very idea of being a 'Means of Right Cognition' is based upon accordance with the real state of things; and this (ex hypothesi) would be absent in Inference and the rest.—(460)

The following Text introduces the arguments advanced by Bhāvavikṣa (against the doctrine of Perpetual Flux):—

TEXT (461).

"THE ALL-COMPREHENSIVE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE (PREMISS)
THAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED IN ALL THE REASONINGS (PROPOUNDED
BY THE BUDDHIST) BECOMES ANNULLED BY THE FOLLOWING
INFERENCE; OR ELSE, THE PROPOSITION (ASSERTING THE
DOCTRINE IN QUESTION) ITSELF BECOMES
REJECTED.'"—(461)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—"What is that Inference ?"
Answer :—
TEXTS (462-463).

"The subsequent cognition of the Sun and other things must appertain to the same Sun and other things that exist at the time of the cognition that appears in connection with the Sun and Moon, etc.,—because while it is not a cognition of anything related to the Earth and other things, it is spoken of as the Cognition of those things (Sun, etc.),—just like the previous cognition of the Sun at that time."—(462-463)

COMMENTARY.

"The Cognitions—in dispute—of the Sun, the Moon, the Planets, the Stars and such objects must appertain to the Sun, the Moon, the Planets, the Stars and the rest as associated with the time at which appeared the cognition of these Sun and the rest in Dēvadatta and other persons,—because while not apprehended as related to the Earth, they are spoken of by means of the term 'the Cognition of the Sun, the Moon, the Planets, the Stars and the rest',—like Dēvadatta's Cognition of these things on the first occasion.'

'Must appertain to, etc.'—i.e. to luminous substances.

'While not apprehended as related to the Earth'—this qualification has been added in order to avoid the invalidity that might apply to it on the basis of the Cognition of the Sun, etc. as painted in pictures.

'Subsequent',—i.e. a Cognition other than Dēvadatta's; i.e. appearing at a different time.—(462-463)

The following is an argument put forward by Bhāvavikta:—"The substrata of Universals like 'Colour', the substrata of those substrata, and the particular Cognitions of all these,—in the form of Perception, Inference, Analogical Cognition, Verbal Cognition, Remembrance, Recognition, Mystic Vision, Doubt, Wrong Cognition, Representative Cognition, Dream, and Dream-end,—all these cannot be liable to destruction immediately on coming into existence,—because they are spoken of by such verbal expressions as—'knowable', 'rightly cognisable', 'expressible', 'either existing or non-existing', 'not characterised by cognitions whose object is something different from Being and Non-being', 'not apprehensible by cognitions whose objects are non-apprehensible', 'not expressible by words which are inexpressive', 'expressible by such words as are the products of sounds produced by the conjunction and disjunction of homogeneous and heterogeneous substances',—like 'Previous Negation' and such things.'

'Substrata of Universals like Colour', etc. are the Colour, etc. themselves.—'The substrata of these substrata'.—What are these?—Such things as the Jar, (which are the substrata of Colour, etc.).—'Mystic vision',—perception by mystics.—The others have been explained before.—'Either existence or non-existence'—i.e. Being or Non-being.—Inasmuch as there
is nothing that is 'neither Being nor Non-being', there can be no cognition of which that could be the object; and its 'non-characterisation' follows from its very non-existence. — Similarly, the apprehension of an inapprehensible object being impossible, inapprehensibility by such apprehension follows as a matter of course. — Similarly inexpressibility by words which are inexpressible also follows from the fact that such words are meaningless.

'Homogeneous things' are substances, like the lips, teeth and so forth, all these having the common character of being products; 'heterogeneous things' are Ākāśa and the rest; the mutual conjunction and disjunction of these homogeneous and heterogeneous substances produce the first Sound, and this first Sound brings about, in due succession, its product in the shape of the Sound that reaches the Ear; and it is by this Sound that things are expressed. — The process of sound-production, according to these people, is as follows: — The initial sound arises from Conjunction and Disjunction; thence proceed other sound waves, in the manner of the filaments of the Kadamba flower; that Sound which reaches the Ākāśa in the Ear, that alone is heard, not any other.'

This entire set of reasonings is set forth in the following :

**TEXTS (464-465).**

"ALL THOSE THINGS THAT ARE THE SUBSTRATA OF COLOUR, ETC., — AND THE SUBSTRATA OF THESE THINGS, — AS ALSO THE COGNITIONS THAT APPEAR IN REGARD TO THESE, — ALL THESE ARE NOT, LIKE THE SKY-LOTUS, LIABLE TO DESTRUCTION IMMEDIATELY ON COMING INTO EXISTENCE, — BECAUSE THEY ARE COGNISABLE AND EXPRESSIBLE."—(464-465)

**COMMENTARY.**

The two reasons 'cognisability' and 'expressibility' have been mentioned by way of illustration; the other reasons also are meant to be applicable.

'Khārabinda' — is the 'arabinda', Lotus, in 'kha', the Sky, — i.e. the 'Sky-lotus'. —(464-465)

Uddyotakara [in Nyāyavārtika on 3. 2. 14, page 421, Bib. Ind. Edn.] has stated the argument (against Perpetual Flux) as follows: — "The Cognitions under dispute, appearing at diverse times, must appertain to the same thing, — because while being rightly co-extensive with the cognition of that thing, it is expressible by the same terms, — like the present cognition of a thing as appearing in various persons". — Here the term 'avyuthāyi' stands for what is not 'vyuthāyi', wrong, — i.e. what is right; — the 'co-extensiveness' is that of the cognitions of the Jar and such things; — and the epithet 'right' is meant to qualify this 'co-extensiveness'; what is meant is that the said co-extensiveness is never sublated or annulled. This qualification has been added in order to avoid the falsity that might attach to it on
the basis of the example of the Lamp-light and such things.—'Expressible by the same terms'—such as 'Chaitra's Cognition', 'Chaitra's Cognition' and so forth.

This argument of Uddyotakara's is set forth in the following—

TEXTS (466-467).

"Our proclamation is that the Cognitions under dispute which appear in succession,—all appertain to one and the same thing,—because the fact of their being based upon one thing is never annulled, and they are all spoken of by the same terms;—just like the cognitions of several men appearing at the present single moment.'"—(466-467)

COMMENTARY.

'Proclamation'—our conclusion, declaration.

'Co-extensiveness',—the character of subsisting in the same thing;—this is not annulled.—Such is the analysis of the compound.—(466-467)

The above argument is answered in the following—

TEXT (468).

IN THE FIRST REASONING, THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE IS DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM, AS IT IS ALL INCLUDED UNDER THE PROBANS; AND ALL OBJECTS OF COGNITION ARE NOT ALWAYS SYNCHRONOUS WITH THEIR COGNITION.—(468)

COMMENTARY.

'In the first reasoning',—where the Reason (Probans) is stated in the form 'because it is spoken of as the Cognition of that' (under Texts 462-463).—As a matter of fact, the first Cognition of the Moon, etc. also does not appertain to the Moon, etc. as existing at the time of the Cognition;—because what forms the object of the cognition is what is included under the Probans itself. Further, it is not possible for any causal relation to subsist between synchronous things. It has been thus asserted:—'What does not exist could have no previous potentiality, and it could have no use later on; all causes must exist before (these effects); hence the object cannot exist along with its own cognition'.—(468)

The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason is 'inconclusive', even with the qualification 'though not apprehended as related to the Earth' (under Text 463):—
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TEXT (469).

WHEN TERMS LIKE 'SUN' AND THE REST, WHOSE USE DEPENDS UPON THE SPEAKER'S WHIM, ARE APPLIED TO THE LAMP AND SUCH THINGS, —THE COGNITION OF THE SUN THAT APPEARS PROVES THE FALSY OF THE REASON IN QUESTION.—(469)

COMMENTARY.

In the second set of arguments also (set forth in the Introduction to Texts 464-465),—for the simple reason that things like the 'Universal' do not exist at all,—no one holds them to be 'momentary';—if the Opponent proceeds to prove the absence of such momentariness in those things (like the 'Universal', etc.),—then his effort is entirely futile.—This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (470).

THINGS LIKE THE 'UNIVERSAL' HAVE NO CHARACTER AT ALL (BEING NON-EXISTENT).—HENCE THE 'MOMENTARINESS' OF SUCH THINGS CANNOT BE POSTULATED BY ANYONE; SO THAT ANY REASONS ADDUCED FOR THE PROVING OF THE ABSENCE OF 'MOMENTARINESS' IN THE SAID THINGS IS ENTIRELY FUTILE.—(470)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'like', in the Expression 'Things like the Universal' is meant to include the substrata of the Universal, in the shape of Colour, Jar and the like, and also the Cognitions of these.—These also, even as qualified by the said qualification, do not exist at all; hence the reason that has been adduced for the purpose of proving the 'momentariness' of such things is entirely futile; that is to say, there can be no dispute on that point at all.

The Author has not gone into the minute details of the reasoning in question. If we go into the minute details, we come across a large number of defects. For instance, the reason that has been adduced in the form that 'it is either existent or non-existent', is found to be absent in the Probandum and also in the Corroborative Instance; as the term 'either—or' signifies option, and option is possible only when there are more things than one, and not when there is only one thing; and it is not possible for both existence and non-existence to be present in the object that forms the Probandum; because it being of the nature of 'entity', it is only existence that can belong to it. Nor are both possible in the Corroborative Instance; because, as it is a 'non-entity', it is non-existence alone that can belong to it. —The Reason also as stated has been loaded with a useless qualification: For instance, the expression 'because it is expressible by words', even by itself, is highly improper, as the term 'expressible' itself implies the
qualification ' by words '.—Similarly, the qualification put forward by the words ' homogeneous, etc.' is too childish. Similarly the other qualifications of the Reason should be regarded useless.

Further, all the Reasons put forward are ' inconclusive ',—because no evidence has been adduced in denial of a conclusion contrary to the desired conclusion.—This is going to be explained later on.—(470)

As regards the argument set forth under Texts 466-467,—the answer is provided in the following—

TEXT (471).

AS REGARDS THE CHARACTER OF ' BEING EXPRESSED BY THE SAME TERM ' 
—THIS IS PRESENT IN THE COGNITIONS OF THINGS LIKE THE 
LAMP ALSO. HENCE THIS REASON BECOMES 
' INCONCLUSIVE '.—(471)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the Cognitions of the Lamp, we find that the same expression ' Cognition of Lamp ' is applied to the cognitions which have different things (in the shape of the flickering flames) for their object; hence the character of ' being expressed by the same term ', which has been adduced as the Reason for sameness, is found to be ' fallible ' in the case of the ' Cognitions of the Lamp '.

Or the Text may be read with a taunting intonation, the sense being—
—' the said character subsisting in the Cognitions of the Lamp is, on that very account, a very Sound reason, and for you, indeed, it is infallible; but in reality, it is not so '.—(471)

In the following Text the Author anticipates the view of the other party:—

TEXT (472).

IF IT BE HELD THAT " IN THE CASE OF THE COGNITIONS OF THE LAMP, 
THE ' CO-EXTENSIVENESS ' IS SUBSEQUENTLY ANNULED ",—THEN 
HOW IS IT THAT YOU DO NOT PERCEIVE THE CLEAR 
ANNULMENT OF THE SAME IN YOUR PROPOSED 
CONCLUSION ALSO ?—(472)

COMMENTARY.

" In fact, the qualification—' while being rightly co-extensive with the Cognition of that thing '—has been added (by Uddyotakara), solely for the purpose of excluding such cases as that of the ' Cognitions of the Lamp ', as the one-ness of the object of these latter Cognitions is annulled; because the Lamp is at one moment with a high flame, and the next moment with a
low flame, it is at one moment very bright and at the next moment, less bright. How then can our Reason be false?"

Such is the sense of what the Opponent says.

In answer to this, the Author adds—'How is it, etc.'—That is, the qualification also is one that is not admitted. As a matter of fact, even in regard to the character of the Opponent’s intended Probandum, there is annulment;—why is that also not perceived? For instance, in regard to Chaitra and other persons, the Cognition of them that is produced is in such diverse forms as ‘infant’, ‘boy’, ‘youth’ and so forth,—in regard to the mountain and such things, the notions are diverse in the shape of ‘cold’, ‘hot’, etc. So that, as in the case of the Lamp, so in the case of these things also, the diversity of the cognised thing is clearly perceived. If it were not so, then, if the same mountain that was cold subsequently became hot,—then under both conditions both cold and heat would be perceptible there; because the said qualified conditions being related to the thing, the qualities would have to be regarded as present there; for instance, when a man tied to a chain is pulled, the chain also becomes pulled. This has been nearly all explained before.—Thus even with the said qualification, the Reason is ‘unproven’, ‘not admitted’.—(472)

The annulment of the Opponent’s argument by Inference also is next shown:—

TEXTS (473-474).

The Cognitions under dispute cannot pertain to one and the same thing, because they appear in succession,—like the Cognitions pertaining to Lightning, Lamp and such things.—In all Cognitions pertaining to one and the same thing, the presence of succession is incompatible. And when the effect is the same, even the dependence of other things would be incongruous.

—(473-474)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated thus:—What appears in succession can never have its complete cause always in close proximity to it,—as the cognitions of Lightning, Lamp and such things;—the Cognitions under dispute all appear in succession;—hence there is found something which is contrary to that with which the desired character is invariably concomitant.—This Reason cannot be said to be ‘inconclusive’; because succession is not possible in the Cognition of any single object, the complete cause of which Cognition is present.—Nor can the cause be said to be dependent on other causes (which could account for the succession); because what is permanent cannot be helped by such aids; and no dependence can rightly be held to lie on what is not helpful; as this would lead to absurdities. If there were
help actually rendered, then the thing would lose its permanence. This has been explained hundreds of times.—(473-474)

The following Text shows that all our arguments are free from the defect of 'Inconclusiveness', as there is no proof in support of a conclusion contrary to ours:—

TEXT (475).

All these Reasons are free from doubt and denial;—as no proofs have been adduced in annulment of these.—(475)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily intelligible.—(475)

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End of the Chapter on the Permanence of Things.

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CHAPTER IX.

Examination of the Relation between Actions and their Results: Action and Reaction.

COMMENTARY.

The Author now proceeds to examine the doctrine of Relation between Actions and their Results, the Law of Action and Reaction, mentioned in the Introductory verses; and starts off with an objection from the standpoint of that doctrine, against the Doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux':—

TEXT (476).

"IF ALL THINGS ARE OBSESSED BY non-permanence, IN THE FORM OF 'MOMENTARINESS', THEN HOW CAN THERE BE ANY RELATION BETWEEN ACTION AND ITS RESULT (REACTION), OR BETWEEN THE CAUSE AND ITS EFFECT AND SO FORTH?"—(476)

COMMENTARY.

The Text speaks of 'non-permanence in the form of momentariness', with a view to exclude that 'non-permanence' which does not consist in momentariness; the meaning being—'if things are held by you to be obsessed by that non-permanence which belongs to momentary things'—then, how could there be any such relations as the one subsisting between Actions and their Results and so forth, which are recognised among men and in the scriptures?—The expression 'and so forth' is meant to include the means of cognising the cause and its effect, the Recognition following after Apprehension, the longing for one thing aroused by the seeing of another thing, the notion of Bondage and Liberation, Remembrance, Decision following after Doubt, seeking for something kept by oneself, the cessation of curiosity for things already seen and such other hosts of grounds for objection raised by the evil-minded.—What is meant is that if a doctrine is contrary to notions current among people and recognised by the scriptures, it can never secure acceptance; hence the Doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux' is open to the objection that it is annulled by universally accepted notions.—For instance,
it is well known among people that the result of the good or bad action is experienced by that same man who did the act; when a good or bad act has been done by Dēradatta, the result of that act—agreeable or disagreeable,—is not experienced by Yaññadatta. Nor is such an idea countenanced in the scriptures, where we read—‘When the action has been done by this person, who else will experience its results?’—Such a notion is contrary to the doctrine of the ‘Perpetual Flux’ of things; as under that doctrine there cannot be any one entity who would do the act and experience its result; so that the said doctrine is clearly open to the criticism that it involves the anomaly of ‘the disappearance of the action done by the Person himself and the befalling upon him of the effect of what was not done by him’.—(476)

The following Text explains how the doctrine is open to this criticism:—

TEXTS (477–479).

"In the case of active people, that ‘moment’ (MOMENTARY THING) which is believed to be the doer of the act, does not continue to exist at the time of the appearance of the result of that act;—and the act was not done by that ‘moment’ which is spoken of as the experiencer of the result at the time of its appearance; as it did not exist at that time.—Thus, inasmuch as no single entity is admitted as being the doer of the act and the experiencer of its results,—the position thus clearly is that the act is lost for the man who did it and its results befall one who did not do it,—which is extremely anomalous."—(477–479)

COMMENTARY.

‘Does not continue to exist’;—as it is destroyed immediately on its coming into existence.

‘Inasmuch as no single entity, etc.’;—i.e. since the Act and its Result have not been taken up by one and the same entity. There is ‘loss of the Act’ for the doer of the act, as he does not come by the result; and there is ‘befalling of what he did not do’ on the man who did not do the act.

‘Extremely anomalous’;—i.e. no such situation is found either among people or mentioned in the scriptures.—(477–479)

The anomaly of ‘the loss of what is done and the befalling of what is not done’ has been pointed out, on the acceptance of the view that ‘activity’ is possible; the Opponent next proceeds to show—from Kumārila’s standpoint,—that activity itself is not possible (under the Doctrine of ‘Perpetual Flux’):—
RELATION BETWEEN ACTIONS AND THEIR RESULTS.

TEXTS (480-481).

"As a matter of fact, under the Doctrine of 'No-Soul', the doer of an act would know, beforehand, that, 'as I am going to perish immediately, there would be no result from this act, or it would come to some one other than myself'; and knowing this, the intelligent man would not undertake the performance of any act, good or bad, for the purpose of securing its result; as for the result, it would be still further removed."—(480-481)

COMMENTARY.

Under the Doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux', it would be held that all things are devoid of 'Soul'; as all things being dependent upon their cause (in the 'Causal Chain'), nothing can be independent (self-sufficient). Under the circumstances, the intelligent agent must know,—be conscious of the fact,—"what?"—that 'after my destruction, the result could not accrue to me, as I would not be there at the time that the Result comes about; even if the Result comes about, it would come to a Moment other than myself'. Knowing this, the intelligent person would not undertake the act at all; how then could there be any result which can follow only from an act preceded by the activity (of an active agent)? Such Result would be 'still further removed', as absolutely impossible.—(480-481)

It has thus been proved that there can be no relation between Action and its Result; the Author next proceeds to show,—again from Kumārila's standpoint,—that the Relation of Cause and Effect is not possible under the doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux':—

TEXT (482).

"Neither the Future nor the Past Entity can be capable of producing the effect; as for the Present one, that also does not continue to exist till that time."—(482)

COMMENTARY.

'Till that time';—i.e. during the time that it would come into existence and produce the effect, it does not continue to exist,—being momentary—(482)

The following Text adduces arguments in support of each of the assertions made in the preceding Text regarding the Future, etc.:—
TEXTS (483-484).

"AN ENTITY THAT HAS ITSELF NOT SECURED ITS EXISTENCE CAN NEVER BE THE CAUSE OF SOMETHING ELSE; NOR CAN THE DESTROYED ENTITY (BE A CAUSE); NOR CAN THE PRESENCE (OF THE PRESENT ENTITY) BE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING THE EFFECT.—FURTHER, IF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PREVIOUS 'MOMENT' BE HELD TO BE absolute, THEN THERE COULD BE NO PRODUCTION OF ANY SUBSEQUENT 'MOMENT', AS ITS CAUSE WOULD NOT BE THERE."—(483-484)

COMMENTARY.

That thing is called 'future' which has not yet secured its existence;—what has not secured its existence must be 'non-existent'; what is non-existent must be devoid of all potentiality;—what is devoid of all potentiality cannot serve as the cause of anything else,—i.e. cannot serve as the cause of bringing about any other thing; because it is agreed on all sides that it is only a potential thing that can serve as a cause.

Similarly what has perished cannot serve as the cause of anything else, as it is devoid of all potentiality.

As for the Present thing, that has no continued existence, by virtue of which it could be capable of producing any effect.

Then again, if it is held that the preceding 'Moment' perishes absolutely, then there could be no producing of the subsequent 'Moment', as there would be no cause for such production.—(483-484)

The following argument might be urged (by the Buddhist):—Just as the rising and falling of the weighing scales come about simultaneously, so also would be the destruction of the Present Moment and the appearance of its effect; so that what is meant is that the subsequent Moment is brought about by the preceding Moment before the latter has been destroyed; and that the appearance of the later moment would not fail to have its cause.

The following Text supplies the answer to this argument:—

TEXT (485).

"EVEN IF THE DESTRUCTION AND PRODUCTION WERE SIMULTANEOUS, THERE WOULD NOT BE MUTUAL DEPENDENCE; SO THAT THERE COULD NOT BE THE RELATION OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT', AS THERE WOULD BE NO HELP RENDERED BY IT."—(485)

COMMENTARY.

Even if the Destruction (of the first Moment) and the Production (of the second Moment) be assumed to be simultaneous, there would not be the
relation of 'Cause and Effect' between the said *Destruction and Production*, or between the Moments undergoing the said Destruction and Production;—because the two would be independent of one another.—“How would they be independent of one another?”—Because *there would be no help rendered by it*; that is, the Destruction, being featureless, would have no action; and as for the entity that is regarded as the Cause, it is not present at the time that the Effect comes into existence; so that it could not have any action bearing upon the latter.—(485)

The following might be urged (by the Buddhist)—Even without any operation, the relation of 'Cause and effect' would be there on the basis of mere *proximity*.

The answer to this is supplied by the following—

**TEXT** (486).

"**The Odour and other qualities that appear after the destruction of the Colour of the jar are not held to be the effect of this latter; in the same way the subsequent Colours also (could not be regarded as the effect of the previous colour).**"—(486)

**COMMENTARY.**

If the idea is that when one thing comes into existence after another, it must be the effect of this latter, then just as, after the 'Colour-Moment' subsisting in the Jar has ceased, the homogeneous Colour-moments that appear in it are regarded as the effects of the preceding Colour-moment,—so also the *Odour* and other properties that are produced in the same Jar would have to be regarded as the Effects of that same preceding Colour-moment. And, yet, even though this immediate sequence is there, the *Odour-moment* is not held to be the effect of the preceding Colour-moment; because between material properties, there cannot be the same causal relation that there is between material substances themselves, because they appear in different 'chains' (or series). This is the opinion that our opponent himself holds.

'**In the same way the subsequent Colours also**';—that is to say, the homogeneous Colour-moments cannot be regarded as the effects of the previous Colour-moment, entirely on the ground of immediate sequence; as otherwise there would be an absurdity.—(486)

Having thus shown that mere immediate sequence cannot be the basis of the causal relation, the Opponent sums up his own view by way of recapitulation:—

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TEXT (487).

"Thus that alone can be regarded as the cause of an effect whose action is found to be there before the production of that effect; and not mere immediate sequence."—(487)

COMMENTARY.

'Not mere immediate sequence', — 'can be the basis of the notion of Cause-effect' — this has to be regarded as understood.—(487)

What has been already explained above is now briefly summed up:

TEXTS (488-489).

"The upshot briefly is this:—If the Effect were produced from a Cause that has perished, then such an Effect would be without cause,—as what has perished can have no character (or potentiality).—If the Effect be held to be produced from a Cause that has not perished,—then, as the Cause in that case would continue to exist during several moments,—wherefore could the 'momentary character' of things not become discarded (on that account)?"—(488-489)

COMMENTARY.

Only two views are possible in this connection:—(1) The Effect is produced out of the Cause which is itself destroyed, and (2) that it is produced out of the Cause which is not destroyed; things cannot be other than either destroyed or not destroyed. The first view cannot be right; because what has been destroyed is non-existent, and if production from that were admitted, the effect would have to be regarded as without Cause; which would mean that it is eternally existent.—Nor can the second view be right; as, in that case, things would continue to exist during several moments, which would deprive them of the character of momentariness.—'Wherefore could it not be discarded?'.—i.e. it would certainly become discarded. For instance, it would mean that—(a) the Thing comes into existence, then (b) it acts, then (c) it produces the Effect, then (d) it perishes; so that it is there during all these several moments; which rejects the idea of its being 'momentary'.—(488-489)

Having thus shown the impossibility of the relation of 'Cause and Effect', the Opponent proceeds to show the impossibility of any Means of Cognising such relation:
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TEXTS (490-491).

"If the Jar and such things existed only for one moment, then they could not be perceived by the Eye; as things that have been destroyed are never cognised,—as is found in the case of things long past.—The relation of 'Cause and Effect' cannot be apprehended by means of 'Perception and Non-apprehension', because the nature of things is not apprehended at all."—(490-491)

COMMENTARY.

The Relation of Cause and Effect is sought to be proved through Perception (of Effect only when the Cause is present) and Non-apprehension (of the Effect when the Cause is absent). Under the circumstances, if Things were momentary, as they could not be in existence at the moment of their cognition, they could not be perceptible; as the relation of Cause and Effect is not possible between things existing at the same moment. Thus there is no possibility of Perception or Non-apprehension (in support of the momentariness of things); specially because 'Non-apprehension' also is only a form of 'Perception', being, as it is, of the nature of the apprehension of a Thing as not related to anything else; and hence there being no use for it when there is no apprehension of any thing. Such being the case, how could the relation of Cause and Effect be proved through Perception and Non-apprehension?—(490-491)

Even though there be an apprehension of the Thing,—as there can be no one entity who would comprehend the preceding and succeeding Moments,—there can be no relation between these two.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (492).

"What permanent Doer (Agent) is there who would correlate the cognitions appearing in succession? If any such were seen, then alone what is desired could be admitted; and if any such is not seen, then this latter cannot be understood."—(492)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'gati' stands for apprehension.—'Kramavadgatim',—the 'gati', apprehension, which is 'kramavati', successive.—'Who would correlate'—have a comprehensive notion of.—That is, no one.—If there were any one who would conceive of such a comprehensive notion as—'The smoke has become cognised through the cognition of the Fire, and without the cognition of the latter the former is not cognised'—which appears in succession,—as apprehended by a single Perceiver, then it might be possible to establish the relation of 'Cause and Effect'.—There can however be no such correlator,
under your view,—hence the relation of Cause and Effect cannot be established.—(492)

The following Text proceeds to show the impossibility of ‘Recognition’—

TEXT (493).

"If things are in ‘perpetual flux’, then Recognition also is impossible; because what has been seen by one person cannot be ‘recognised’ by others.”—(493)

COMMENTARY.

‘Recognition’ consists of the notion that—‘that same object which was seen by me previously is seen by me now’—which includes within itself the two perceptions as pertaining to the same object and the same perceiver;—and such ‘Recognition’ cannot be possible if all things were in a ‘perpetual flux’; as under that view, neither one ‘perceiver’ nor one ‘object’ would be there (to be related to both perceptions); for instance, Vīśvamitṛa does not ‘recognise’ what has been seen by Dēvadatta.

The mention of ‘one person’ is only by way of illustration; it is also to be understood that the object also which has been seen by one person cannot be ‘recognised’ by another person.—(493)

The Buddhist may argue that—As in the case of the hair and nails that have been cut and have grown again, though there is difference (between what has been cut and what has grown again), yet there is ‘recognition’ on account of similarity,—so would it be in all cases of Recognition.—This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (494-495).

"In the case of the hairs and other things, where there is difference, Recognition may be due to similarity, because the perceiver is one and the same. When however there is difference of both, there would be no basis for Recognition. If there is no single entity who could have the comprehensive notion, then how is it that, on seeing Colour, there appears a longing for the taste and other qualities (of the thing seen)?”—(494-495)

COMMENTARY.

If there were a single cogniser, then there could be Recognition based upon similarity, even when there is difference between the two things con-
cerned,—such Recognition being due to the common Cogniser. When however there is difference of both,—i.e. when the cognisers as well as the cognised things in the two cases are different, there would be no basis for the Recognition.—Then again, if there were no single cogniser correlating the two cognitions,—then how could there be such phenomenon as that when one sees the colour of the citron-fruit, he remembers the taste concomitant with that colour and evinces a desire for experiencing that taste and undertakes activity towards securing it? Certainly no one could have a longing, etc. for what has been seen by another person.—(494-495)

The following Text proceeds to show that 'Bondage' and 'Liberation' also would not be possible (under the doctrine of Perpetual Flux):

TEXT (496).

"What is bound up with chains of Attachment, etc. in the Prison-house of the World is one 'Moment', while the 'Moment' that is liberated is another, who has not been in Bondage;—this is incomprehensible."—(496)

COMMENTARY.

One 'Moment' is bound up with Attachment while another is liberated,—this is incomprehensible; i.e. impossible.

'Bhava' is world, Cycle of Birth and Rebirth,—which is the 'prison-house', the place where persons are kept in bondage.—(496)

The following Text proceeds to show that any attempt at Liberation would be useless,—as no Liberation can be possible:

TEXT (497).

"For the bound (imprisoned) person, Liberation can never be possible; because (ex hypothesi), he is absolutely destroyed.

Hence all the effort put forth by persons seeking for Liberation is futile."—(497)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—there would be Liberation for one who has not been in bondage;—where is the incongruity in that?

The answer to this is provided in the following—
TEXT (498).

"The person securing Liberation has always been found to be one who has been bound up in chains, etc.; any such assertion therefore as that 'The unbound person becomes liberated' is contrary to a well-perceived fact."—(498)

COMMENTARY.

That the person who is liberated is the same that had been in bondage is a fact well recognised and seen in the world. The assertion therefore of the Liberation of the Person who has not been in Bondage is one that is annulled by popular notion and also by a perceptible fact.—(498)

The following Text points out that the said idea is annulled by Inference also—

TEXT (499).

"'Bondage' and 'Liberation' must belong to the same person,—because they are of that nature,—like Bondage and Liberation in the ordinary world.—Thus everything becomes thoroughly well-established.'”—(499)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be thus formulated:—Bondage and Liberation must subsist in one and the same person,—like the Bondage and Liberation in the world,—the 'Bondage' and 'Liberation' under dispute are Bondage and Liberation in the form of Attachment and Dissociation therefrom;—this is a reason based upon the nature of things.

'Because they are of that nature'—i.e. because they are in the form of Bondage and Liberation, i.e. because they have the character of Bondage and Liberation.

'Tau', 'these two'—i.e. Bondage and Liberation.

Thus the single substratum in the shape of the 'Soul' being established, all the doctrines relating to the Relation between Actions and their Results and so forth become thoroughly established;—i.e. are beautifully proved; there being no room for the criticisms directed against them.—(499)
"IN THIS SAME MANNER IT MAY BE SHOWN THAT, IF ALL THINGS ARE
IN 'PERPETUAL FLUX', REMEMBERANCE AND SUCH OTHER
PHENOMENA WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE,—AS THERE WOULD
BE NO SINGLE SUBSTRATUM (UNDER THAT
THEORY)."—(500)

COMMENTARY.

As any single Agent would be impossible, it should be understood that
there would be no possibility of any such phenomena as the following:—
Remembrance, well-ascertained cognition, seeking for a thing hidden by one-
self and so forth. Because in all these, the substratum being different,
there would be incongruities; e.g. when Chaitra is the original apprehender,
doubter, hider and seeker,—Maitra could not be the rememberer, the ascer-
tainer, seeker, and so forth.—(500)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to answer the above
criticisms (levelled against the Doctrine of Perpetual Flux):—

TEXT (501).

WE PROCEED TO ANSWER THE ABOVE CRITICISMS AS FOLLOWS:—THINGS
BEING WITHOUT 'SOUL', IN REFERENCE TO THESE ALSO, THE
RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT BEING THERE, ALL
THE SAID NOTIONS BECOME ESTABLISHED
WITHOUT ANY DIFFICULTY.—(501)

COMMENTARY.

Even when things are regarded as being 'without Soul', all such notions
as those relating to 'the Relation between Acts and their Results' and so
forth, are based upon the relation of 'Cause and Effect'; so that when
the relation of Cause and Effect is there, all those notions become established
and there is no incongruity at any point.—(501)

Says the Opponent—"This definite Law of Cause and Effect itself is
not possible without a 'Soul'.'"
The answer is provided in the following—
TEXT (502).

Just as the potency of the seed is restricted to the Sprout even in the absence of a permanent 'Soul',—so would it also be in the case of psychical concepts.—(502)

COMMENTARY.

Just as the potency of the Seed and such things is restricted to the Sprout and such things,—even without a controller in the form of the 'Soul',—so would it also be in the case of every psychical concept. Such things as the Seed and the rest are not controlled by the 'Soul', in the way that the Body, as the receptacle of experience, is held to be controlled. Otherwise, there would be no sense in the (Naiyāyika's) argument that "the living body cannot be without soul, as, if it were, then there could be no breathing and other functions"; in the case of the Jar and such things, if the absence of 'Breathing, etc.' were found to follow from the absence of the 'Soul', then alone could the negative concomitance involved in the argument be admissible;—if the Jar, etc. also were with Soul, then how could the Reason adduced have the requisite negative concomitance?

'Even in the absence of a permanent Soul',—i.e. even when there is no character which is common to them all.—(502)

Question—"How does the Causal relation become established?"

Answer :—

TEXT (503).

Either indirectly or directly, it is only a certain thing,—and in only certain cases—that has the potentiality in regard to another thing; thus alone are such relations as that between actions and their results possible.—(503)

COMMENTARY.

Just as, in regard to external things, the law of Action and Reaction is restricted, so is it in regard to the group of Psychical Concepts also; as the causal potency is everywhere restricted; it is only from certain good and bad acts that particular results, agreeable or disagreeable, follow, through a chain of 'moments'; e.g. from the apprehension of Colour follows its Remembrance,—from cognition follows definite conclusion,—from the act of depositing follows the subsequent seeking for it,—from the longing for a thing follows the actual sight of it,—thence the cessation of the eagerness for it. In no case do the Buddhists admit of all these Reactions of Remembrance and the rest as connected with any one single entity; for them, it is mere Conception, a mere Idea. This has been thus declared—'The Action is there, the Result is there, but the Maker (Agent) is not
perceived,—one who abandons these thought-phases and takes up others; nothing apart from the Law of Things; this Law of Things being
that where such and such a thing appears when such and such another thing is present—the former is said to be produced from the production of the latter.'

'Such relations as between Actions and their Reactions';—this is meant to include Remembrance and the rest;—the 'relation' meant is that of 'Cause and Effect' ('Producer and Product').—(503)

Objection—"If that is so, then how is it that among people and in the scriptures it is said in reference to the Soul—'When the action has been done by him, who else will experience its Reaction?''

Answer:—

TEXT (504).

The Notion of the ' Doer ' and the rest is in reference to the unity of the ' Chain '; and that too is held to be only a figment of the imagination; it is not a part of the real state of things.—(504)

COMMENTARY.

People have the light of their wisdom bedimmed by a mass of deep ignorance; hence they ignore all considerations regarding their being this or that, being existent or non-existent, and so forth,—and come to regard the chain of impressions in the shape of particular causes and effects as 'one', and thus come to make use of such expressions as 'The same I am doing this act', and proceed to make attempts to bring about their Liberation.—It is in view of this (popular) egotism that the Blessed Enlightened Ones, desirous of saving their disciples from the pitfalls of Nihilism, propound the theory of the ' Unity of the Chain ' and thereby explain the notions of the ' Doer ' and the like.

Says the Opponent—"The said Explanation is enough to establish the reality of the matter under dispute '.

Answer:—"It is not a part of the real state of things';—as a matter of fact, the real state of things cannot be determined on the basis of the notions entertained by childish persons enmeshed in illusion and averse to the investigation of truth; specially as the said notion is negatived by the evidences of ' Soullessness ' and ' Perpetual Flux ' of Things.—(504)

The Author anticipates the Opponent's objection to the effect that "the absence of the continuous Soul in the case of Seed and such things not being admitted (by all parties), the Corroborative Instance (cited by the Buddhist, under Text 502) is one that is not admitted (and hence inadmissible as Corroborative Instance)" :—
In the absence of continuity, the relation of 'Cause and Effect' would be of the particular kind just pointed out,—this alone is possible among things appearing under different 'chains'.—In the case of the Seed, Sprout and such things, the relation of Cause and Effect is found to be definitely certain, and yet there is not the slightest trace of continuity.—(505-506)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'anwaya' stands for anugama, continuity,—i.e. of any particular character.—(505-506)

The following might be urged by the Opponent:—"Continuity is certainly present in the case of the Seed and such things; as has been declared by Uddyotakara:—What happens in the case of the Seed and Sprout is that the components of the Seed relinquish their previous formation and become arranged in a different formation,—when they have taken this formation, the Earth-element in it becoming mingled with the water-element, and heated by the Fire-element, produces a substance in the shape of the Sap; and this Sap, along with the previous components assumes the form of the Sprout. Such being the case, how can it be true that there is not the slightest trace of continuity?"

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXTS (507-508).

If the elements of Earth and the rest in the Seed—Sprout—Creeper and so forth are not different,—then there can be no difference among them; as, in that case, all of them would be of the same nature. Hence it must be admitted that there is no continuity in this case.
For these reasons, for the purpose of establishing the existence of 'Action and Re-action', the superior philosophers should put forth an effort to prove the relation of 'Cause and Effect';—and for the purpose of establishing the non-existence of 'Action and Reaction', the other philosophers should put forth an effort to disprove the relation of 'Cause and Effect'.—(507-508)

COMMENTARY.

The sense of this is as follows:—If the Earth and other elements present in the later formation continue without surrendering their previous forms,—then there can be no surrendering of the previous formation and the assuming of the later formation; because both the formations would be exactly of the same nature as before; so that there would be no difference among the Seed, the Sprout, and the Creeper,—all being of the same nature.—In case you admit of difference among the Seed, etc., then, as there would always be the abandoning of the preceding form, it must be admitted that the Earth and other elements also abandon their own respective formations and assume other formations. Otherwise, there would be no difference at all; as already explained. Thus there being an appearance of several forms, one after the other, where would there be any 'continuity'?

Inasmuch as on the proving of the true character of the causal relation, all such notions as the relation between Action and its Result become explicable,—and on the disproving of it, the said notions become dispelled,—for the purpose of determining the existence of Actions and their Results, etc.,—efforts should be put forth for the proving of the Causal Relation,—by the superior philosophers,—i.e. by the Buddhists, who are 'Superior philosophers' on account of their being followers of the best doctrines. And for the purpose of disproving the same notions, effort should be put forth by other philosophers,—i.e. the followers of other philosophical doctrines.

The term 'Kāryakāraṇatāsiddhau' has been construed twice over,—the last term in one case being 'asiddhau'.

[The latter assertion would appear to be in the nature of a taunt].—(507-508)

As for the two alternatives—'destroyed or not destroyed'—set forth by the Opponent (under Texts 488-489),—the author proceeds to dispel them,—thereby establishing the Causal Relation as the very root of all laws:
TEXTS (509-510).

Our explanation is as follows:—The Effect comes into existence at the second moment;—the Cause had come into existence at the first moment; and during that moment it is not destroyed. But being momentary, it does not exist at the moment at which the Effect is there; even if it were there, it would be useless, as the Effect will have already come into existence.—(509-510)

COMMENTARY.

Our view is that the effect comes out of the Cause while this latter is still undestroyed; and there is no possibility of the two being simultaneous; because what happens is that the Effect comes into existence at the second moment, through its dependence upon the Cause which has come into existence at the first moment and has not yet become destroyed; so that when the Effect comes into existence it does so from the Cause while it is still undestroyed; as it has not been destroyed at the first moment. And yet the Cause does not continue to exist at the moment that the Effect is in existence, as, being momentary, it cannot so continue to exist. Even if it were to continue, it would not have the nature of the Cause; because when the Effect has already come about, it would be absolutely useless.—(509-510)

The following Text shows this same uselessness:—

TEXT (511).

What has already come into existence cannot be produced by it over again; because what is meant by a thing 'coming into existence' is that there should come about something that did not exist before. If it were not so, then there would be no resting at all.—(511)

COMMENTARY.

'If it were not so, then there would be no resting' ;—i.e. if it were not as stated, then there would be no resting,—i.e. there would be no limit; i.e. there would be an infinite regress. If what has come into existence were to be produced again, then there would be an equal possibility of its being produced over again; and in this way there would be an infinite regress of productions,—there would be no cessation in the activity of the Cause,—and the Causes themselves would be liable to be produced; as there would be nothing to
distinguish them:—and the result would be that there could be no such distinction as ‘this is the Cause and that the Effect’.—(511)

In the following Text the author sums up his position and shows that there is no flaw in the view that the Effect is produced from the Cause while the latter is still in existence:—

TEXTS (512–514).

Thus we conclude that it is at the second moment that the Effect comes into existence out of an efficient Cause which came into existence at the first moment and has not yet been destroyed.—If it had been held that the Effect comes into existence at the third moment, then it would come out of the destroyed Cause; as the cause of the development will have been destroyed, like the Effect itself,—as is going to be explained later on.—There would be simultaneity only if the Effect had come at the first moment. But this cannot be right,—being just like the doctrine of the Effects coming into existence along with the Cause.—(512–514)

COMMENTARY.

As regards the alternative of the Effect coming out of the destroyed Cause, that is improper, as it is not held by us. As that alternative would mean that the Effect comes at the third and subsequent moments,—as has been held by the Vaibhāṣikas, in such assertions as—‘the one presents (the effect) when it is past’; if this view were held, then it would mean the admission of the view that the Effect comes from the destroyed Cause;—but such is not the view held by us; because it is devoid of reason.—

There might have been some chance of the anomaly of the Cause and Effect being simultaneous if the view were that the Effect comes at the first moment; as these same Vaibhāṣikas regard the Cause as ‘born along with the Effect’. This is entirely unreasonable.—(512–514)

Why this is unreasonable is shown in the following—

TEXT (515).

What did not exist could have no potency;—if the Potency were there, the Effect would surely be produced; hence simultaneity between Cause and Effect is clearly incongruous.—(515)

COMMENTARY.

When the co-born Cause (i.e. the Cause that comes into existence along with its Effect) produces its Effect, it can do so either while it is itself unborn,
or when it is itself born;—the former alternative cannot be right; as the Cause does not exist prior to the production of the Effect,—and as such, is devoid of all potentiality.—If it be said that—"It produces the effect when it is born, and then, being endowed with potentialities, it produces the Effect,"—the answer is—'if the Potency were there, etc.'; i.e. if the Cause has its potency while it is in the state of having been born, then, like the character of the Cause, the Effect also would be already born; and under the circumstances, on what would the potency of the Cause operate?—Thus the doctrine that Cause and Effect are simultaneous is clearly contrary to the authority of Inference.—(515)

Says the Opponent:—"The relation of Cause and Effect is the same as the relation of 'Agent and Object'; and as such it would be highly incongruous if the two factors appeared at different times. For instance, between the Potter and the Jar, the relation of 'Agent and Object' is perceived only when the two are there at the same time".

The answer to this is provided in the following—

**TEXTS (516-517).**


(516-517)

**COMMENTARY.**

If, in the producing of the Effect, the Cause operated in the manner of the Pair of Tongs,—or if the Effect, in the process of coming into existence were to do so by embracing its Cause in the manner in which a woman is embraced,—then there might be simultaneity and co-existence of the two always. As a matter of fact, however, the whole of this universe is entirely devoid of activity, there is, in reality, no 'active agent' or 'objective' at all,—apart from 'Convention'.—Such is the sense of the whole answer.

'Prakṛti'—is cause.—(516-517)

Opponent—"If that is so, and everything, the Cause as well as the Effect, is inactive, how is it that people are found to make use of such verbal
expressions as 'the Fire produces Smoke', 'the smoke comes into existence on the basis of Fire,' and so forth?'

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXTS (518-519).

THOUGH THE THING IS REALLY INACTIVE, YET ON ACCOUNT OF THE RESTRICTION IMPOSED BY THE NATURE OF ITS CAUSE WHICH CAME INTO EXISTENCE AT THE FIRST MOMENT, THERE APPEARS, IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS, SOMETHING COMING INTO CONTACT WITH THE SECOND MOMENT; IT IS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE FORMER IS SAID TO PRODUCE THE LATTER;—SUCH ASSERTION BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH A CONVENTION WHICH IS PURELY ARBITRARY, BASED UPON THE WHIM OF THE SPEAKER.

—(518-519)

COMMENTARY.

On account of the restriction imposed upon the potency of the Cause, arising from the Idea that gave rise to that Cause,—a particular Effect is produced from the Cause which has appeared at the first moment,—this Effect being in contact with,—i.e. appearing at—the second moment; it is then that the said 'Cause' is said to produce the said 'Effect'. The mention of 'producing' is only by way of illustration; it should be understood to mean also that the Effect comes into existence on the basis of the Cause.

"Who are the people who speak of it as such?"

'Such assertion, etc. etc.'—that is, thus say those persons who act in accordance with conventions based entirely upon the speaker's wish, irrespectively of external realities.—(518-519)

Question—"If a thing, on coming into existence, did not become operative, how could it become the Cause in the bringing about of a particular effect?"

Answer :—

TEXT (520).

WHAT WOULD BE THE GOOD OF ANY ACTIVITY AT ANY TIME OTHER THAN THAT OF ITS OWN BIRTH? MERE EXISTENCE IS THE ONLY OPERATION, AS IT IS WHEN THIS IS THERE THAT THE EFFECT APPEARS.—(520)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as the Effect is produced immediately after the Cause has come into existence, any operation of that Cause on this Effect, after the latter
has come about, would be absolutely useless. Because, what is it that is called the 'operation' of the Cause? It is that immediately after which the Effect secures its appearance; and as a matter of fact, the Effect appears immediately after the existence of the Cause; hence it is this existence itself which may be called the 'operation'. What is the need of assuming any 'operation' other than this 'birth' (coming into existence) of the Cause?

"If this is so, then, how is it that people speak of 'the Effect has need of the Cause', 'the Cause operates on the Effect'?"

Answer:—

TEXT (521).

It is the necessary condition of 'immediate sequence' that is called 'need'; and in the appearance of the Effect, the only operation of the Cause in all cases is its 'existence'.—(521)

COMMENTARY.

The 'need' that the Effect has of the Cause consists only in the fact of its coming into existence immediately after the latter; and of the 'Cause also, the only 'operation' towards the bringing about of the Effect is that it is always in existence at the time of the appearance of the Effect.—(521)

Further, you have to admit that the 'causal character' of an 'operation'—or of a Thing with that operation,—towards a particular Effect consists entirely in the fact of the latter coming into existence only when the former is in existence; in fact, for the determining of the causal relation between a Cause and its Effect there is no ground except positive and negative concomitance. Such being the case, why is not the causal character attributed to the Thing itself (and not to its action or operation)?—specially as it cannot be said that the positive and negative concomitance of the Effect with the Thing itself is not well known. Hence it is far better to regard the Thing itself as the Cause, with which the positive and negative concomitance of the Effect is well recognised.—This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (522).

As a matter of fact, the Operation also is assumed to be the Cause only on the basis of the fact that the Effect appears when the Operation is there; it is far better, then, that the Thing itself to which that operation belongs should be regarded as the Cause.—(522)

COMMENTARY.

'Assumed',—i.e. the 'operation', which has been assumed by you to be of the nature of neither the Cause nor the Effect, nor both.
'That to which the operation belongs',—'becomes the Cause, by reason of the fact of the Effect appearing only when it is there'—such is the construction of the sentence.

'The Thing itself',—i.e. the Thing by itself, without any peculiar form of activity or operation, may be regarded as the 'Cause'.—(522)

Question—"What is the peculiarity in this latter view that it is said to be 'far better'?'"

Answer:—

TEXT (523).

As a matter of fact, it is on the existence of the Seed itself that the Sprout is seen to appear; on the other hand, nothing is seen as coming into existence on the existence of an 'Operation'.—(523)

COMMENTARY.

'On the existence',—i.e. on mere existence; i.e. on the existence of the Thing—the seed—itself, devoid of any other operation (or activity).—This establishes the fact of the Effect being positively and negatively concomitant with the Thing itself,—and not with the Operation.—(523)

Says the Opponent:—"Even though the concomitance of the Effect with an Operation is not admitted,—yet the Operation can have the causal character".

Answer:—

TEXT (524).

If you assume the 'causal character' of the Operation when its potency (towards the Effect) has not been perceived,—then why do you not assume the same of something else also? Or, what distinguishing feature do you find in the 'Operation' which is not found in that other thing?—(524)

COMMENTARY.

Having assumed the Operation to be the Cause, you will have to assume some other thing also as the Cause; because this latter would not be different from the 'Operation', as both would be equally such as having their potency not perceived;—and so on there would be an infinite regress (of assumed Causes).—If no other Cause (than the Operation) is assumed, on the ground of there being no basis for it, then, the assumption of the 'Operation' also may not be there; as the 'baselessness' would be equal in both cases.
Then again, this ‘Operation’ that is said to produce the Effect,—does it produce it through the medium of another Operation? Or by its mere existence? It could not be the former, as, in that case, the causal character should belong to that other Operation, not to the previous Operation; and for this later Operation also, there would be the need for another Operation, etc.—all which would be open to the same objection. And if that other Operation also would need a further Operation, then there would be an infinite regress.—(524)

If then, it be held that the *Operation* produces the Effect by its mere existence,—then, like this Operation, the Thing itself might produce the Effect by its mere existence; and the assuming of the ‘Operation’ would be entirely futile.—This is what is explained in the following—

**TEXT (525).**

*Just as the ‘Operation’, without any other (Operation), is held to be the Cause of the Effect,—in the same way, why cannot others, like it, be Causes?*—(525)

**COMMENTARY.**

Just as the Operation, without further Operation, is regarded as the Cause of the Effect, in the shape of the Sprout,—in the same manner, why cannot other things also, without any particular Operations, be regarded as ‘Causes’?—(525)

It might be argued that—"the Operation does not directly help the Effect,—it helps only the Thing to which it belongs".

The answer to this is provided in

**TEXT (526),**

[which is missing in the printed Text; the commentary upon it however is available, as follows]:—

The phrase ‘held to be the Cause’ (of Text 525) is to be construed here also.—What is meant is that for you also, when the causal character would belong to the Thing as equipped with the Operation, it would be so without the intervention of a further Operation; so that there would be no Corroborative Instance available for you.—(526)

Then again, apart from its existence, there can be no other ‘Operation’ of the Thing, for the simple reason that if it were there, it would be perceived, and yet it: s not perceived.—This is explained in the following—
RELATION BETWEEN ACTIONS AND THEIR RESULTS.

TEXT (527).

THOUGH IT HAS BEEN REGARDED AS PERCEPTIBLE, YET WE DO NOT PERCEIVE IT; HOW THEN CAN WE ACCEPT THE CONNECTION OF THAT AS THE BASIS (OF THE CAUSAL CHARACTER)?—(527)

COMMENTARY.

'Operation' has been held by you to be something perceptible; as asserted by Kumārila (Shlokavārtīka: Shabdaniyatā—433)—'When the Operation of a Thing is perceived before the Effect, that thing is regarded as the Cause of that Effect, etc. etc.'—And further, that particular entity which is of the nature of the 'Operation'—is it something different from the Thing to which it belongs? Or is it non-different from it?—In the case of all entities, no third alternative is possible; and no such alternatives are possible as 'it is both different and non-different', or that 'it is neither different nor non-different'.

If then, it is something different, then the Thing itself cannot be the 'Cause', as the 'causal character' belongs to the Operation which is something different from the Thing.—It might be argued that 'by virtue of its connection with the Operation, the Thing also would have the causal character'.—That however is not possible; because there can be no connection between things which do not help one another.—It might be answered that 'the Operation is helped by the Thing'.—That also is not right; as a matter of fact, the Thing has no other Operation by which it could help the previous Operation; if it were otherwise, then there would be an infinite regress (of Operations), whereby the successive Operations themselves would accomplish each other, and there would be no connection between the Operation and the Thing.—If it be assumed that the Thing helps the Operation, without any further Operation,—then, why should not the Thing by its mere existence, without any Operation, help the Effect (to come into existence),—for which purpose a different thing in the shape of the Operation is assumed? In fact, there is nothing to prevent its usefulness towards the Effect, by its mere existence. From all this it follows that it is not right to assume a distinct thing in the shape of the 'Operation'.

If then the other alternative be accepted—that the 'Operation' is non-different from the 'Thing' (to which it belongs),—then it becomes admitted that 'existence' is the only Operation; because the term 'existence' connotes only the nature of the thing concerned.

Thus the view that the 'Operation' (of the Cause) is something different from its own coming into existence—cannot be accepted.—(527)

Further, in the case of Cognition, it is found that as soon as it appears in the form of the apprehension of its object,—it operates by its mere existence; and hence in the case of all Things, the causal character must belong to themselves, without any subsequent operation.—This is what is explained in the following—
TEXT (528).

IN THE CASE OF COGNITION, ITS COMING INTO EXISTENCE ITSELF HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS CONSTITUTING ITS CHARACTER OF ‘MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION’; WHY THEN SHOULD NOT THE CAUSAL CHARACTER IN THE CASE OF ALL THINGS BE HELD TO BE THE SAME?—(528)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of Cognition there is no other operation apart from its being born, coming into existence; for instance under Mīmāṃsā-sūtra 1. 1. 4, defining ‘Sense-perception’,—while explaining the purpose served by the term ‘janma’, ‘birth’, in the Sūtra, Kumārila has declared as follows,—“What the term ‘birth’ of Cognition connotes is the fact of the Cognition being a Means of Right Cognition as soon as it is born; in the case of other agencies, a certain Operation is found, which is something distinct from their birth; in order to preclude the same in the case of the Means of Right Cognition, it is necessary to use the term ‘birth’.”—(Śloka-vārtika: Sūtra 1. 1. 4, 53-54).

‘The causal character, etc.’;—i.e. why cannot all things be regarded as produced by the ‘birth’, ‘coming into existence’, of the Cause?—(528)

“In the case of Cognition, it is quite right that mere existence is the Operation, as the Cognition does not continue to exist at any later time, being momentary; [but the same cannot be true in the case of other things, which are not momentary].”

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (529).

JUST AS COGNITION IS MOMENTARY, SO ARE ALL THINGS THAT ARE BORN, AS THEY HAVE BEEN PROVED TO BE. HENCE THE WHOLE UNIVERSE MUST BE DEVOID OF 'OPERATION'.—(529)

COMMENTARY.

Under the chapter on the ‘Permanence of Things’ it has been proved that all things are in ‘perpetual flux’.

‘So are, etc.’;—i.e. like Cognition.

‘Hence’;—i.e. because of their momentary character.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—Things that are momentary can have no action (or operation),—like the Cognition,—Seed and other things have already been proved to be momentary;—this therefore is a reason based on the nature of things (for regarding them as devoid of action). As a matter of fact, things have no subsequent existence, and there could be no action without a substratum;—this supplies the argument annulling the possibility of action or operation in things.
From all this it follows that the only basis for the relation of Cause and Effect consists in *immediate sequence*, and not in any *action* (or operation, on the part of the Cause).—(529)

It has been argued above by the Opponent (under Text 486) that—"the Odour and other qualities that appear when the colour of the Jar has been destroyed, etc. etc.";—but this is not incompatible with the Buddhist's argument;—this is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (530).

AS REGARDS ODOUR AND OTHER QUALITIES (APPEARING IN THE JAR), THE FACT OF THEIR BEING CAUSES OF EACH OTHER, AS FORMING FACTORS OF THE SAME 'CHAIN', IS ACTUALLY ADMITTED (BY US); AND THIS IDEA IS NOT ANNULLED BY THE ALLEGED ANOMALY OF THEIR BEING SUCH CAUSES.—(530)

COMMENTARY.

As regards Colour, Taste and other qualities, it is already admitted by us that as forming part of the same 'chain' they are auxiliary causes of each other; as has been thus declared—'Without the action of Potency, there is no Cause of Taste; this is the only explanation of all past qualities that have existed at the same time, which is derived from the indications of their Effects'.—(530)

Says the Opponent:—"Just as Smoke appears in immediate sequence to Fire, so sometimes it may appear in immediate sequence to such things also as the Cow, the Horse and the like; then why cannot mere *immediate sequence* be regarded as 'inconclusive' (in the proving of the Causal Relation)?"

Answer:—

TEXT (531).

EVEN WHEN ONE THING APPEARS IN IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE TO ANOTHER,— IT IS ONLY IN SOME CASES (NOT ALWAYS) THAT THE LATTER IS THE CAUSE OF THE FORMER, WHERE THE SEQUENCE IS INVAR- IABLE; THIS IS WHAT IS ACCEPTED, IN VIEW OF SUCH BEING THE REAL STATE OF THINGS;—THE SAME IS THE CASE UNDER THE VIEW THAT THINGS ARE PERMANENT.—(531)

COMMENTARY.

We do not say that mere *immediate sequence* is the basis of 'Causal Relation'); what we do assert is that one thing is to be regarded as the Cause
of another when the latter is always found to appear in immediate sequence to the former; that is, one thing is regarded as the Cause of another when the latter is found to appear only in immediate sequence to the former. Smoke is not found always to appear in sequence to the Cow, the Horse and so forth; because it actually appears even in the absence of these animals.—Then again, to you also, who hold Things to be permanent, the said criticism would be applicable—why the smoke, appearing after the Cow, etc. is not regarded as the Effect of these?—(531)

The Opponent urges an objection (in the first half, which is answered in the second half)—

**TEXT (532).**

"If a thing that is active towards the producing of an Effect is not to be regarded as the Cause of this latter, [what then?]"—Then let that be accepted as the 'Cause' of a thing whose presence is always essential for the appearance of this latter.—(532)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Then let, etc.'—This sentence supplies the Buddhist's answer to the other's objection.—(532)

Thus it has been shown that even under the doctrine of things being momentary, the Relation of Cause and Effect is quite possible. The Author next proceeds to show the possibility of the 'Means of the Cognition' of the said Relation:

**TEXTS (533–535).**

As a matter of fact, the existence and non-existence (of things) are always known through perception and non-apprehension (respectively),—if the view held is that the Things are apprehended by cognitions with forms.—If, on the other hand, you hold that the Thing is apprehended by a cognition which is formless,—then the same is found to be the case under the doctrine of things being momentary. Because whenever cognition is produced by its antecedent causes, it is always in the form of an apprehension having the same colour, etc. that happen to appear at the time.—(533–535)

**COMMENTARY.**

Just as the apprehension of the Permanent Thing would come about for you, so also would that of the Momentary also come about.
For instance, when the apprehension of a Thing appears, it comes about either through a Cognition with a form, or through a formless Cognition. If it comes through the Cognition with a form, then the apprehension of the form of the Cognition would be the same as the apprehension of the Thing concerned; and this would be equally possible under both views—of things being permanent or momentary. If on the other hand, it is through formless Cognition, that also makes no difference in the two views. Because, as a matter of fact, the Cognition is produced in such a form by antecedent Causes that what it apprehends is the same Colour, etc. that happen to be present at the same time,—and no other Colour, etc. ; because it is produced in the form of the apprehension of these same. Thus then, it being admitted that Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of the Colour, etc. appearing at the same time,—there is no difference in the character of the Thing itself as concerned under the two views of Permanence and Momentariness. You will have to admit the presence of the character of 'Cognition' in the apprehension of each particular Colour, etc. appearing at the same time; by virtue of which, even though the character of appearing at the same time is equally present in all, yet what distinguishes the Cognition is the Colour, etc., and not the Sense-organ concerned. And this explanation holds good under the doctrine of the Momentariness of things also. So it is of no significance at all.—(533–535)

The Opponent raises an objection against both (Cognition having a form—as also being formless):

TEXT (536).

"If Cognition has a form, then Consciousness would be of variegated form. If, on the other hand, it is not marked by any form, there can be no basis in the form of proximity (for specifying the Cognition)."—(536)

COMMENTARY.

If the Cognition has a form, then in the Cognition of such things as the sheet of variegated Colour, this variegated Colour would be present in the Consciousness (Cognition) also; while it is not possible for a single Cognition to have various Colours.

If on the other hand, the Cognition is formless, there could be no such differentiation as that 'this is the Cognition of the Blue Colour, not of the Yellow Colour'; as in all cases, the mere Cognition itself would be of the nature of Consciousness, and hence there being no distinction, there would be no basis for the said differentiation (in the Cognition).—(536)

The following Text supplies the answer to this criticism:
TEXT (537).

YOU ALSO HAVE TO SUPPLY SOME EXPLANATION IN ANSWER TO THE
ABOVE; AND WHATEVER ANSWER YOU PUT FORWARD WOULD
ALSO BE OUR ANSWER TO IT.—(537)

COMMENTARY.

The criticism that has been urged applies equally to both parties; as you
also will have to accept one or the other of the two views—of Cognition having
form or being formless otherwise there would be no possibility of the
Cognition apprehending an object.—Nor is there any other alternative besides
these two ways in which the Cognition could apprehend the object. When a
criticism is applicable to both parties, it should not be urged by one against
the other. Thus then the answer that you may be able to make to the
criticism shall be our answer also. For instance, under the view that Cogni-
tion has some form, the answer that you might make would be either that
the forms are unreal, or that they are nothing different from the Cognition
itself with which it is found to be invariably concomitant, even though the
two appear to be different;—and this same answer shall be ours also.—
Under the view that Cognition is formless, the explanation that could be
given would be that that character of the Cognition whereby it apprehends
only a particular thing is due to previous Causes;—and this same answer
shall be available for us Bauddhas also, who hold Cognitions to be formless.
Hence our answer to the Opponent’s criticism is that it cannot be urged
against us.—(537)

Having thus established the existence of the ‘Means of Right Cognition’
apprehending the Relation of Cause and Effect, the Author now proceeds
to meet the objection that his theory involves the anomaly of ‘the waste of
what is done and the befalling of what is not done’;—

TEXTS (538-539).

THERE WOULD BE ‘WASTE OF WHAT IS DONE’, ONLY IF THE CAUSE DID
NOT PRODUCE AN EFFECT;—NO SUCH VIEW HOWEVER IS HELD BY US,
WHEREBY THERE COULD BE NO ‘CAUSAL CHARACTER’.—THE
‘BEFALLING OF WHAT IS NOT DONE’ ALSO WOULD BE THERE
IF AN EFFECT WERE PRODUCED WITHOUT A CAUSE;
THIS ALSO IS NOT HELD BY US; AS THE PRODUCTION
OF THE EFFECT IS ALWAYS DEPENDENT
UPON THE POTENCY OF A PARTICULAR
CAUSE.—(538-539)

COMMENTARY.

If it had been held by us that there is really a Doer and Experimenter, then
the doctrine of the ‘Perpetual Flux’ might have involved the anomaly of ‘the
waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done’;—as a matter of fact however, the view held by us is that the Universe is a mere Idea, and there is nothing that is done or experienced by anyone. How then could the said anomaly of ‘the waste of what is done, etc.’ be urged against us?

It is possible that the anomaly of (a) the Waste of what is done and (b) the befalling of what is not done’ is urged against us on the ground that our view involves the production of Results from a Cause (a) which has lost that capacity to bring about desirable and undesirable results which is concurrent with a pre-existing Intelligence,—and (b) which has acquired that capacity which is not concurrent with the preceding act.—But this cannot be right; because there is no incompatibility between the doctrine of ‘No-Soul’ and the presence of the capacity due to previous acts. For instance, just like the Seeds soaked in red dye, the particular potentialities due to previous acts do actually continue in the ‘chain’, and it is through these as subsequently developed that the desirable or undesirable result appears. Nor do we hold that the Result proceeds from a ‘chain’ not set up by previous acts; thus how could our view involve the anomaly of ‘the befalling of what has not been done’?

Uddyotakara has argued that “the Mind being a fleeting entity, there is no possibility of its being affected (impressed) by Actions”.—This is not right; as a matter of fact, there can be no affecting of the permanent thing which has not denounced its previous form; as for the ‘impermanent (fleeting) thing, its being ‘affected’ consists in the very fact of the coming about of a new character. When the Scriptures speak of ‘the Permanent Entity as affected’, it is with reference to the permanence of the ‘Chain’; that ‘Chain’ which is liable to be snapped cannot serve as the ‘Cause’, as it cannot be present at the time of the birth of the Result at a long interval; hence it would be clearly wrong to regard such a ‘Chain’ as the substratum of the ‘impression’ leading to such a result. This is what is meant.—Thus what has been urged by Uddyotakara is based upon his ignorance of the doctrines of the other party and deserves to be ignored.—(538-539)

Kumārila has argued as follows:—“When we speak of ‘the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done’, we do not mean that the said anomaly is due to the act done by a certain Doer being destroyed,—for the simple reason that under your view, there is no Doer; what we mean is that, inasmuch as you hold the destruction of the Act and the production of its Result to be absolute,—this is what involves the said anomaly of ‘the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done’.” [See Shlokavārtika, Ātmapāda 12 et seq.]

In answer to this the Author proceeds to show that the said anomaly in this last form is what is actually admitted by the Buddhist and hence it is not right to put that forward to him as an undesirable contingency:—
TEXT (540).

WHAT IS URGED AGAINST US, BY SETTING FORTH THE ALTERNATIVE OF THINGS BEING DIFFERENT EVERY MOMENT, IS THE FACT OF EVERYTHING UNDERGOING DESTRUCTION AT EVERY MOMENT AND SO FORTH. BUT BY URGING ALL THIS THE OTHER PARTY HAVE NOT PUT FORWARD ANYTHING THAT IS DISAGREEABLE TO US.—(540)

COMMENTARY.

"The preceding Action-Moment being absolutely destroyed, there is 'waste of what is done'; and then an absolutely new Result-Moment being produced, there is 'befalling of what is not done'",—if such is the anomaly that is urged against us, through the setting forth of alternatives relating to the momentary change in things,—then what is urged against us is what is quite agreeable to us. In fact, we are going to show that there is no continuity of the slightest trace of any part of anything at all.—(540)

As regards the argument (put forward by the Opponent, under Texts 496-499) that "the intelligent man would not undertake any activity",—this is answered in the following—

TEXTS (541-542).


COMMENTARY.

Those persons whose powers of seeing things other than the ordinary ones have not deteriorated,—for them the assumptions made relating to the difference among Moments do not arise at all. Because they are fully satisfied by their conviction that by realising the 'Chain' to be one they would be quite happy, and hence betake themselves to the performance of actions.—Those persons also who are devoted to the welfare of other people, having realised, through reasoning and scriptures, the 'momentariness' and 'soul-less-ness' of all things, and thus fully realised the Truth,—they also accept the 'Intervolved Chain of Causation'; they come to understand that when acts of charity and the like are done, being prompted by sympathy and good will, there come about Impressions tending to the welfare of oneself and also of others,—these impressions appearing in a mutually
intervolved 'Chain' or 'Series';—and that no such impressions arise from
the performance of such evil acts as Harming others and the like. Having
thus realised the exact limitations of Causes and their Effects, they under-
take the performance of good deeds. This has been thus declared—' Until
the loss of love for one's own self comes about, the man continues to suffer
pain and does not feel comfortable; there should therefore be efforts put
forth for the removing of these false impositions,—even though there be no
such entity as the Experiencer (of the fruits of actions)'.

How the Relation of Cause and Effect and the Means of Right Cognition
thereof are established has already been explained above.—(541-542)

It has been argued above (under Text 493) that "if things are momentary,
Recognition cannot be explained".—The answer to this is provided in the
following—

TEXT (543).

THE PECULIAR CHARACTER OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT' IS RESTRICTED
to some MINDS only; that is HOW REMEMBRANCE, etc.
come about WITHOUT OBSTRUCTION.—(543)

COMMENTARY.

In the term 'kāryakāryitā', 'kāryā' is that which has an effect, i.e. a
Cause; and thus the compound stands for the character of Cause and Effect.—
In reality, there is no one who is the Rememberer or the Apprehender of things;
for, if there were, then it would mean that the thing is remembered by the
same entity that had apprehended it. What happens is that Remembrance
and the rest come about only in that 'Chain' (or Series) in which their seed
has been laid by the successive production of more and more specialised
'moments' by a specially vivid apprehension;—and not anywhere else;
as the scope of the relation of Cause and Effect is restricted. Such in brief
is the sense of the Text.—This has been thus declared:—' Our theory cannot
be vitiated by the possibility of Remembrance and Experience of Results
coming to other persons; because there can be no such remembrance at all:
Who is the man whose mind has ever remembered what had been apprehended
by another?'

As for Recognition and the rest, they are always brought about by
previous Remembrance; hence there is no incongruity at all.—Nor has it
anywhere been proved that Recognition and the rest are all based upon
a single Cogniser, by virtue of which it has been asserted (under Text 494)
that "if there were difference between the two, the Recognition would be
baseless". Because merely on the basis of the relation of Cause and Effect,
difference has to be admitted in all cases.—(543)

It has been argued (under Text 496) that "what is bound up with the
chains of Attachment, etc. is one Moment, etc. etc.; and hence there can be
no idea of Bondage and Liberation under the theory of 'Perpetual Flux'".—
The answer to this is provided in the following—
TEXT (544).

IGNORANCE AND THE REST, IN THE FORM OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT', ARE HELD TO CONSTITUTE 'BONDAGE', AND THE CESSION OF THESE, AS CONSISTING IN THE PURITY OF THE MIND, IS HELD TO CONSTITUTE 'LIBERATION'.—(544)

COMMENTARY.

For us no 'Bondage' and 'Liberation' have been admitted as belonging to any one entity; as no one is held to be either 'bound' or 'liberated'; all that is admitted by us is that 'Impressions' in the form of Ignorance and the rest ending with decay and death are spoken of as 'Bondage' on the ground of their being the cause of pain. This has been thus declared:—'All this is merely an aggregate of the Thought-phase that causes pain'.—When the said Ignorance and the rest cease, by virtue of True Knowledge, there comes about purity of the Mind; and it is this purity that is spoken of as 'Liberation'; as thus declared—'When the Mind is beset with the troubles of Attachment and the rest, it constitutes the Cycle of Birth and Death, and when the same is freed from them, it is called the End of Birth'.—(544)

It has been argued (under Text 499) that "Bondage and Liberation appear in the same substratum".—The next Text proceeds to show that in this argument the Corroborative Instance cited is 'devoid of the Probandum':—

TEXT (545).

EVEN IN THE ORDINARY WORLD, THESE TWO—'BONDAGE' AND 'LIBERATION'—ARE NOT ADMITTED AS APPEARING IN THE SAME SUBSTRATUM; AS EVERYTHING IS HELD TO BE MOMENTARY.—(545)

COMMENTARY.

When it has been proved that everything perishes immediately after it is born, then nowhere can Bondage and Liberation be accepted as appearing in the same substratum; hence what has been cited by the Opponent as the Corroborative Instance is what is not admitted.—(545)

Having thus established his own doctrine, the Author proceeds to discard the doctrine of the Opponent:—
As the coming in of any peculiarity is entirely impossible, all notions of the 'Doer and the Experiencer', 'being in bondage' and so forth,—in regard to the Soul,—must be incompatible; or else the Soul is something evanescent.—(546)

COMMENTARY.

If the Troubles in the shape of Attachment and the rest had really brought about the Bondage of the Soul,—or if Contemplation and the rest had really produced certain peculiarities in the Soul,—then the idea of the Soul's 'Bondage and Liberation' might have been admitted; as a matter of fact, however, as the Soul is eternal (ex hypothesi), no peculiarities can be produced in it; for the same reason no ideas of 'Bondage and Liberation',—which presuppose limitations of the relation of Cause and Effect,—are possible in regard to the Soul;—just as in regard to Ākāsha.

'Or else',—i.e. if peculiarities were actually produced in the Soul,—then as the 'Peculiarity' would be of the nature of the Soul, the Soul itself also, being non-different from the Peculiarity, would, like the Peculiarity, be something evanescent.—If the 'Peculiarity' were something different from the Soul, then, the idea of its being produced in the Soul would be wrong,—as no connection would be possible (between the Soul and the Peculiarity). This matter has been discussed times without number.—(546)

End of Chapter IX.
CHAPTER X.

The Examination of the First Category—'Substance'.

COMMENTARY.

The Introductory verses have spoken of the Doctrine of 'Intervolved Chain of Causation' as 'free from such limiting conditions as those of Quality, Substance, Action, Universal, Inherence and so forth'. In support of this the Author proceeds to examine the 'six categories' (of the Vaishēśikas); this examination is what is introduced in the following—

TEXTS (547-548).

The Followers of Aksapāda (Gautama, Naïyāyikas) and of Kaṇāda (Vaishēśikas) have asserted, solely on the strength of Verbal Authority, that—"the theory of the Universal and such things being formless, set forth previously—cannot be right; because the six categories of 'Substance' and the rest do really exist".—Hence the refutation of these, Substance and the rest, is briefly set forth here.—

(547-548)

COMMENTARY.

"In one of the earlier chapters, that on the 'Permanence of Things' (Chapter VIII), it has been asserted (by the Buddhist) that 'the Universal and such concepts being formless, the momentary character is not attributed to them' (Text 740).—This cannot be right; because the six categories of Substance, Quality, Action, Universal, Ultimate Individuality and Inherence do really exist";—so say the followers of Aksapāda and others. Naïyāyikas have been called 'Aksapāda' because they are the disciples, followers, of Aksapāda; and similarly the followers of Kaṇāda, the Vaishēśikas, have been called 'Kaṇāda'.

'Solely on the strength of verbal authority' ;—i.e. they are dependent upon Verbal Authority only, totally devoid of reason.—(547-548)

With a view to refuting the category of 'Substance', the Author sets forth the subdivisions of 'Substance' (as postulated by its exponents):—
TEXT (549).

SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN HELD TO BE OF NINE Kinds—DIVided UNDER THE
different HEADS OF 'Earth' AND THE REST; OF THESE, THE
four BEGINNING WITH THE 'Earth' ARE OF TWO
KINDS—eternal AND non-eternal.—(549)

COMMENTARY.

The idea underlying this setting forth of the subdivisions is that when
the subject has been thus stated, it is easier to find fault with it.

'Nine kinds',—as stated in the Sūtra (Vaishēṣika)—'Earth, Water,
Fire, Air, Ākāsha, Time, Space, Soul and Mind'. From among these,
Substance in the form of the first four—i.e. Earth, Water, Fire and Air—
is of two kinds, being eternal and non-eternal.—(549)

These two kinds are shown in the following—

TEXT (550).

THE 'ATOMS' THAT HAVE BEEN HELD TO BE OF THE NATURE OF 'Earth'
AND THE REST ARE eternal; WHILE THOSE MADE UP OF THE
ATOM AND THE REST ARE evanescent.—(550)

COMMENTARY.

Earth, etc. in the form of the Atom are eternal,—the Atoms being eternal.
Those that are made up of the Atom and the rest are non-eternal, according
to the Law that what has a Cause must be non-eternal.

'Atom and the rest',—i.e. those among which Atoms are the first.
Ākāsha and the rest are eternal ;—such is the sense of the Text.—(550)

The Author proceeds to discard 'Substance' of the said four kinds:

TEXT (551).

AMONG THESE, THE non-existence OF THE eternal (PERmanent)
ATOMS HAS already BEEN proved, BY ESTablishing THE FACT
OF ALL THINGS BEING IN A STATE OF 'Perpetual
FLux'.—(551)

COMMENTARY.

Among these, what have been described as Earth and the rest in the form
of Permanent Atoms,—the non-existence of these in the form of anything
permanent has been proved by the establishing of the 'Perpetual Flux'
of things which pervades over all things ; the Universal proposition having
been established in the form—"Whatever exists must be momentary,—because what is not-momentary cannot have any fruitful action either successive or simultaneous; hence what is not-momentary cannot exist."—(551)

The following Text states a counter-argument in annulment of the permanence of Atoms:

TEXT (552).

IF ATOMS WERE PERMANENT, THEN ALL GROSS SUBSTANCES WOULD BE PRODUCED AT ONCE; AS THEY ARE EQUALLY INDEPENDENT OF CONJUNCTION AND OTHER CONDITIONS.—(552)

COMMENTARY.

If Atoms, which are the cause of all gross things, like the Mountain and so forth, are held to be permanent,—then their Products, in the shape of all gross things, should be produced simultaneously, as their cause would be always there in its perfect condition. This argument may be formulated thus:—All those things whose causes are present in their perfect and unobstructed form must be produced at once,—like many Seeds, when their causes are present in their perfect and unobstructed forms;—all gross things are held to have permanent Atoms for their cause;—so this must be a natural reason (for regarding them as liable to be produced all at once). If things were not to be produced even in the presence of their causes in the complete form,—then they might never be produced at all, there being nothing to distinguish one case from the other; this would be a counter-argument in annulment of the Nyāya doctrine.

The following argument might be put forward by the other party:—"The Cause is held to be of three kinds—(1) the Inherent (Constituent)Cause, (2) the Non-inherent Cause, and (3) the Efficient Cause;—when one thing inheres (subsists) in another, it is its Inherent Cause; that which acts as the Cause without inhering in a thing is its Non-inherent Cause; e.g. the conjunction of the component parts is such a Cause of the composite object;—all the other kinds of Cause are included under the third kind, the Efficient Cause. Such are the various kinds of Cause that go to produce a thing. All these necessary causal conditions in the form of Conjunction and the rest cannot always be present; and the presence of the complete Cause cannot be admitted at all times. So that the Reason put forward in the above argument of the Buddhist cannot be admitted."

In answer to this, the Author has added—"They are equally independent of Conjunction and other conditions";—if Conjunction and the other conditions produced a certain peculiarity in the Atoms, then these latter would be dependent upon those conditions; as it is however, the Atoms, being permanent, cannot have any peculiarity produced in them by anything else; under the circumstances, how could they be dependent upon Conjunction and other conditions?
As a matter of fact however all such gross things as the Body, the House and the like do not appear at one and the same time;—in fact, they are found to be produced one after the other. Hence the conclusion must be contrary to the one propounded by the Naiyāyika. This argument may be formulated as follows:—The causes that produce things successively must be impermanent,—e.g. the Seeds which produce the Sprouts successively;—the Atoms also are productive of Effects in succession; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding Atoms as impermanent).—(552)

Aviddhakarṇa has put forward the following proof of the Permanence of Atoms.—"What is held to be the producer of Atoms cannot be endowed with the property of existence,—because it is not cognised by any Means of Right Cognition indicating existence;—like the 'Hare's Horns'. The 'property of existence' means the property that should be present in the existing thing; and the denial of this in the said Cause is what is meant. It means simply that 'there is no Cause productive of the Atom.'"

This is the argument which is anticipated in the following—

TEXT (553).

If the Producer of Atoms is not held to be endowed with the property of existence, on the ground that it does not form the objective of any Means of Cognising Existent Things,—[then the answer is as explained in the following Text].—(553)

COMMENTARY.

The construction of the sentence is—'If the Producer of Atoms is not held to be endowed with the property of existence'.

The term 'vidyamānopālamāṇa, etc.' means that 'it is not the objective of any such Means of Right Cognition as serves to apprehend the existent thing'. The rest is easily intelligible.

What is indicated by this is the argument that the assertion of the impermanence of Atoms is contrary to, and annulled by, Inference; because of the declaration that 'the existing thing which has no Cause must be permanent', which proves the permanence of Atoms on the ground of there being no cause productive of them.—(553)

The following Text explains that the Reason put forward here is not admissible:—
TEXT (554).

The reason adduced cannot be right; because it is inadmissible; as the cause of atoms is actually perceived in the shape of the weaver and the like; inasmuch as the cloth and other things are all constituted of atoms.—(554)

COMMENTARY.

The question being—"The weaver, etc. are known to be the cause of such things as the cloth and the like, then how can it be said that they are found to be the cause of atoms?"—the answer is—'They are constituted of atoms'; what is meant is that this is going to be shown later on.—(554)

Then again, in the case of things that are far removed in space, time and character,—even though no means of right cognition is found to be operative, yet their being existent is not regarded as incompatible; so that the reason cited ['Because it is not the objective of any means of right cognition'] is 'not-conclusive' (in proving the non-existence, of the cause of atoms).—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (555).

It may be that the existence of a thing cannot be known in the absence of a means of the right cognition of the existing thing. But the mere absence of the means of right cognition cannot bring about certainty regarding its being actually non-existent.—(555)

COMMENTARY.

'Cannot bring about certainty, etc.';—as is found in the case of such things as the ghost (which is not seen, and yet one cannot be sure that it does not exist).—(555)

Having thus denied the substance in the form of cause (atoms), the author next proceeds to deny it in the form of products (things composed of atoms):—

TEXT (556).

The composite substance made up of atoms,—as distinct from qualities and components,—is never apprehended; hence, there being no evidence for it, it cannot be admitted.—(556)

COMMENTARY.

'Qualities'—colour, etc.;—'components'—yarn, etc.;—that which is something different from these;—such a composite, distinct from qualities
and Components, is never apprehended. As a matter of fact, any such composite substance as the ‘Cloth’, complete in itself, and entirely different from qualities like Whiteness, and from components, in the shape of the Yarns (composing it)—never appears in any visual or other kinds of Cognition. From this non-perception of the Substance as distinct from Qualities, it also follows that there is no basis for the idea that Substance and Quality are distinct categories;—and from the non-perception of the Composite as distinct from the Components, it follows that the idea of Component and Composite (Part and Whole) is groundless.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a perceptible thing is not perceived, it does not exist,—just as the Jar, not being perceived at a certain place, is regarded as non-existent;—and no ‘Qualified Substance’, apart from the Qualities and Components,—which is held to be perceptible,—is ever perceived as occupying the same place;—nor is any ‘Composite’ ever perceived apart from the Components;—hence this is a natural reason (for regarding such Composite Substance as non-existent).—The Reason adduced here cannot be said to be ‘not admitted’; because there is the distinct declaration of Kaṇṭāda to the effect that ‘In a gross substance, there is perception due to its containing several substances and to qualities’ (Vaishēśika-sūtra), which clearly shows that the Quality and the Components are regarded as perceptible.—(556)

In the following Texts, the Author sets forth the arguments put forward by Uddyotakara, Bhāvavikta and others,—to show that the Reason that ‘the Composite Substance is never perceived as distinct from its Qualities and Components’, adduced in the above argument, is ‘not admitted’, ‘unproven’;—

**TEXTS (557-558).**

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE ROCK-CRYSTAL IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED WHEN IN CONTACT WITH ANOTHER THING, EVEN THOUGH ITS QUALITY IS NOT PERCEIVED;—SIMILARLY THE LINE OF CRANES AND SUCH THINGS ARE ALSO SEEN;—WHEN THE MAN IS COVERED BY A LONG CLOAK, EVEN THOUGH HIS COMPLEXION, ETC. ARE NOT PERCEIVED, THERE IS PERCEPTION OF HIM AS A ‘MAN’;—IN THE CASE OF THE RED CLOTH, THERE IS PERCEPTION OF IT AS ‘CLOTH’."—(557-558)

**COMMENTARY.**

The said writers argue as follows:—"The Substance is really apprehended as apart from its Qualities; in fact, even when its Colour and other Qualities are not perceived, the Substance itself is perceived. For instance, (a) when the Rock-crystal is placed near another thing, even though the colour of the white Rock-crystal itself is not perceived, the Crystal itself is perceived.—(b) Similarly things like the Line of Cranes flying in the sky at night when the light is dim, are actually perceived, even though their white
colour is not perceived.—(c) Similarly when a man is covered by a long cloak reaching to his feet, even though his dark complexion and other details are not seen, the perception that it is a ‘man’ is there all right.—(d) In the case of pieces of cloth coloured with saffron, etc., even though the natural colour of the cloth itself is suppressed, yet the Cognition of the ‘Cloth’ itself is there.”—(557-558)

It has been explained above that the distinction between the Substance and its Quality is vouched for by Perception itself; in the following Texts, they proceed to show that it is proved by Inference also:

**TEXTS (559-560).**

“(A) Colour and other Qualities are entirely different from the Lotus and other things,—because they are distinguished by these (latter)—just as the Horse is distinguished by Chaitra (the Rider).—(B) Or, the Earth and other Substances are entirely different from Colour, Odour and other Qualities because they are differently spoken of by means of words in the Singular and Plural numbers (respectively),—just as the ‘Moon’ (Singular) and the ‘Stars’ (Plural) are different.”—(559-560)

**COMMENTARY.**

The Quality is different from the Lotus, because they are spoken of as ‘the Qualities of the Lotus’, where the Qualities are distinguished by the Lotus; just as in the expression ‘Chaitra’s horse’, the Horse is distinguished—i.e. differentiated—from other riders, by Chaitra, and is therefore different from him.

Each of the Substances,—Earth, Water, Fire and Air,—are different from (the Qualities) Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch,—because they are spoken of by means of words in the Singular and Plural numbers (respectively),—just as the Moon and the Stars; just as ‘Moon’ being in the Singular number and the ‘Stars’ in the Plural number form the basis of difference between them, so also ‘Earth’ is in the Singular number, and the compound ‘Colour-Taste-Odour-Touch’ is in the Plural number; similarly ‘Water’, ‘Air’ and ‘Fire’ also.

The several ‘Stars’ meant are Pushya and the rest.—(559-560)

Having thus proved the difference between the Quality and the Substance possessing the Quality, the Opponents proceed to prove the difference between the Composite and its Components:
EXAMINATION OF THE FIRST CATEGORY—'SUBSTANCE'.

TEXT (561).


COMMENTARY.

This argument is formulated as follows:—Things having different makers, different effects, different times, different sizes must be regarded as different,—just like the Pillar, the Jar and such things;—the things under discussion do have different makers, different effects, different times and different sizes.—This Reason cannot be said to be 'unproven' ('not admitted'), or 'inconclusive'. In fact, the difference among things is always based upon the presence of contradictory properties,—as is found in the case of the Pillar, the Jar and so forth;—such contradictory properties are found in the Composite and the Component; for instance, of the Yarn, the maker is the (spinning) woman, while of the Cloth, the maker is the Weaver; the Cloth—and not the Yarn,—has the capacity to remove cold; the Yarns are found there before the Cloth; hence it is prior in time, while the Cloth appears later, after the operation of the Weaver; the length and breadth of the Cloth are different from those of each of the Yarns; thus the sizes of the two are different. Thus the Reasons adduced are not 'inconclusive'. Such is the sense of the argument.—(561)

Having thus established the difference between the Composite and the Components, the Opponent proceeds to prove the same on the strength of Perception also:—

TEXTS (562-563).

"IF THERE WERE NO GROSS SUBSTANCES, THEN THE PERCEPTION OF THE TREE AND SUCH THINGS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE; BECAUSE THE ATOMS ARE BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES; NOR WOULD THE TERM 'ATOM' (SMALL) BE POSSIBLE; BECAUSE IT IS THE EXTREMELY SUBTLE THING, THAT IS SO SPOKEN OF IN RELATION TO A GROSS SUBSTANCE; HENCE IN THE ABSENCE OF THE GROSS SUBSTANCE, IN RELATION TO WHAT WOULD ITS 'SUBLTLETY' BE?"—(562-563)

COMMENTARY.

If there were no Composite Substance, there would be the anomaly that there would be no Perception at all; as the Atoms themselves are beyond the reach of the Senses.—In the absence of the 'gross' thing again, the
name 'Atom' (Small) itself would not be possible.—Why?—'Because it is the extremely, etc.'—This is easy to understand.—(562-563)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to answer the above arguments (of the Realists):

**TEXT (564).**

**IN THE CASE OF THE Rock-crystal (cited above), the Rock-crystal is perceived as red in Colour; and yet, in reality, it cannot be red;—as that would demolish your own theory.—(564)**

**COMMENTARY.**

It has been asserted that "the Rock-crystal and such things are perceived even when their Qualities are not perceived"; but this cannot be admitted; because the said perception, being not in accordance with the reality, must be wrong, and hence baseless. For instance, when the red Hibiscus flower is placed adjacent to the Rock-crystal, the latter is perceived as Red, which it is not;—similarly when the Line of Cranes are perceived as Dark (in the dark) when they are really White. Neither of these two things—Rock-crystal and the Cranes—are really of the Colour as perceived;—i.e. of the Red or the Dark colour.—"Why?"—*Because that would demolish your own theory;—i.e. if they were really of the Colour that is perceived, then your theory, just mentioned,—that things are perceived even when their Colour is not perceived,—would become demolished.—(564)

The Opponent might argue that—"the Rock-crystal itself is perceived, apart from the Colour".—This is answered in the following—

**TEXT (565).**

**APART FROM THE COLOUR, NOTHING ELSE IS PERCEIVED OF THE NATURE OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT; AND IT CANNOT BE RIGHT,—EVEN FOR YOU—that things should be apprehended by the Cognition of something different; as that would lead to an absurdity.—(565)**

**COMMENTARY.**

As a matter of fact, apart from the Red Colour, nothing else of the nature of something different,—i.e. in the shape of the 'Rock-crystal'—is perceived; as all that is actually perceived is the Red Colour.—If it be urged that "what is perceived as Red-coloured is the Rock-crystal itself which is not really red",—then our answer is that 'it cannot be right, etc. etc.';—i.e. when a Cognition is regarded as appertaining to a particular thing, it is on the basis
of the form cognised; if then, the object of the Cognition had a form other than that of the Cognition,—then *Sound* and other things might be the object of the Cognition of *Colour*,—there being no difference between the two cases.—(565)

Even granting that a Cognition may have for its object something which has a form different from that of the Cognition itself,—even so, what the other party desire cannot be accomplished.—This is what is shown in the following—

**TEXT (566).**

It might be possible too in that case, that it is the *White Colour* (of the Rock-crystal) itself that is actually cognised; but such a Cognition would be clearly wrong,—like the Cognition of the Conch being *Yellow*.—(566)

**COMMENTARY.**

That is, (under the view of the other party) it might be possible that in the case cited, what actually exists apart from the White Substance (Rock-crystal) is the *White Colour*, which is cognised as 'red'.—But even so, that does not prove the existence of the *Substance with the Quality*.—The 'cha' should be construed as after 'shuklādayāḥ'.

'*The Cognition would be wrong*';—i.e. not in strict accordance with the real state of things.—(566)

Another instance cited by the Opponent was that of 'the man covered by a cloak'.—That also cannot be regarded as 'Perception'; because it is accompanied by a verbal expression ('this is a man'), and also because it is *indistinct*. It can at best be regarded only as an 'Inferential Cognition', as pertaining to the 'man' in the shape of the aggregate of *Colour* and other Qualities. So that this also does not serve to prove the existence of the *Composite Substance*.—This is what is shown in the following—

**TEXT (567).**

The Cognition that appears in the case of the man covered by the cloak is Inferential, and does not appertain to the Man at all; because what is really cognised in this case is the Cloak having the shape due to the Man.—(567)

**COMMENTARY.**

The compound 'taḍḍētusannivēśhasya' is to be expounded as 'the cloak which has the shape of which the Man,—who is only an aggregate of
Colour, etc.—is the Cause'.—This shows that the inferential Cognition is brought about by the particular indicative mark called the 'Effect'.—(567)

Another example cited (by the Opponent) is the notion of the 'cloth' in reference to the Red Cloth.—The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (568).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, SUCH THINGS AS THE RED DYE AND THE SAFFRON PRODUCE A NEW COLOUR IN THE CLOTH, ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PREVIOUS COLOUR; BECAUSE THE CLOTH ITSELF IS MOMENTARY (AND ITS PREVIOUS COLOUR HAS PERISHED ALONG WITH IT).—(568)

COMMENTARY.

What happens in the case cited is that the Cloth itself being momentary, its previous White Colour is destroyed, and a new Colour comes into existence through other causal conditions; and when this new Colour is perceived, there appears, on the wake of that Perception, the reflective notion pertaining to the aggregate—as 'the Cloth, the Cloth'—with appropriate distinction; and this notion (of the 'Cloth') is purely illusory, without a real object. Thus the Cognition cited is not of the nature of Perception at all.

Nor is it Inference; as its object is one that has been already apprehended by a previous Perception, and also because it is not a Cognition brought about by means of an Inferential Indicative.

Thus in the case cited there is no Colour that has been suppressed.

—(568)

The following might be urged:—"If the original White Colour does not lie hidden in the Cloth, then how is it that when the Cloth is washed, the White Colour reappears?"

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (569).

WHAT HAPPENS IS THAT OUT OF ONE COLOUR (RED) ANOTHER WHITE COLOUR IS PRODUCED THROUGH THE INTERVENTION OF WATER AND SUCH OTHER THINGS;—JUST LIKE THE BLACK COLOUR OF METALS.—(569)

COMMENTARY.

Just as, in the case of Metals which have become bright white by the contact of Fire, the Dark Colour is again subsequently produced,—so in the case in question also, another White Colour is produced in the Cloth. Hence there is no incongruity at all.—(569)
The following might be urged:—"How do you know that a fresh White Colour is produced,—and not that the previous White Colour itself, which could not be perceived by reason of being suppressed, becomes perceptible later on, by the removal of the suppression?"

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (570).

If the Colour had remained in the same condition, then there could be no suppression of it; as the previous unsuppressed Colour would continue to exist.—(570)

COMMENTARY.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—That which has not abandoned its unsuppressed character cannot be suppressed by anything else,—just as the same in its previous condition;—and under the suppressed condition also, the original Colour has not abandoned its unsuppressed character; hence this would be a proposition which is contrary to a larger proposition.

On the other hand, if it be held that, the Colour has abandoned its unsuppressed character,—then it becomes established that the Colour subsequently produced is different from the original Colour.—(570)

It has been argued (under Text 559) that "The Colour differs entirely from the Lotus, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (571).

The diverse ways of verbal expression wherein the genitive and different numbers are used proceed entirely from the speaker’s whim; hence it is not right to determine the real state of things on the basis of such expressions.—(571)

COMMENTARY.

If it were admitted that the use of the Genitive and other forms of verbal expression proceed precisely on the basis of the real state of things, then the existence of such things could be admitted on the basis of those expressions; as a matter of fact, however, verbal expressions proceed entirely from the whim of the speakers,—and they do not depend upon the real state of things; how then can they prove the real existence of anything?

The use of the ‘Genitive’ referred to is in such expressions as ‘Pañasya rūpah’, ‘Colour of the Cloth’ [which, according to the other party proves the difference of the Cloth from the Colour];—and the use of diverse ‘numbers’
referred to is in such expressions as 'Pataḥ', 'Cloth' (in the Singular), and 'rūpādayaḥ' 'Colour and other qualities' (in the Plural).—The phrase 'diverse ways' is meant to include the use of the Locative,—as in the expression 'Puṭī rūpādayaḥ', 'Colour, etc. in the Cloth',—and such use of Nominal Affixes as in the expression 'Pataya bhāvaḥ pataṭvam', [where the Universal character of 'Cloth' is spoken of as different from the particular Cloth].—(571)

In the following Text, the Author further reiterates the 'inconclusive' character of the Reason adduced by the other party:

TEXT (572).

FURTHER, THE OTHER PARTY DO NOT REGARD THE 'EXISTENCE' OF THE SIX CATEGORIES AS ANYTHING DIFFERENT; NOR IS ANY SINGLE 'GROUP' OF THEM ADMITTED.—(572)

COMMENTARY.

There are such expressions used as 'sanyām pādārthānām aṣṭivām', 'the existence of the Six Categories', 'sanyām varṣaḥ', 'the group of six',—where the Genitive forms are used, even though there is no real difference between the two factors (the Categories and their existence, or the Categories and their group). You do not admit any such thing as 'existence', apart from the Six 'Categories' themselves.

This is only by way of illustration. In fact, in such words as 'dārāḥ', 'sikataḥ' and the like, even though the Plural number is used, we do not perceive a multiplicity of the things (wife or sand).

As a matter of fact, the 'svatva', 'self-hood', of a thing is not regarded as a distinct category.—(572)

In the following text, the Author anticipates the answer of the Opponent:

TEXT (573).

IF IT BE SAID THAT—"THE EXISTENCE OF THE SIX CATEGORIES IS HELD TO BE THE PROPERTY SUBSISTING IN WHAT IS AN OBJECT MADE KNOWN BY A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION",—THEN, IN THAT CASE, THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DISTINCT FROM THE SIX THAT YOU POSTULATE.—(573)

COMMENTARY.

"What is meant is that the 'existence' of the Six Categories is a distinct property consisting in their being cognisable of such Means of Right Cognition as apprehend existing things;—so that there is no discrepancy in our Premiss";—this is the sense of the Opponent's answer.
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The answer to this is—"In that case, etc., etc.";—"Distinct"—i.e. a distinct Category; i.e. it becomes a seventh 'Category'; and this would militate against the doctrine of the 'Six Categories'.—(573)

Says the other party—"This is what we readily admit; hence it does not vitiate our argument."

How is it then that you have declared the Categories to be six only?
The answer to this question is anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXTS (574-575).

"The Six that have been postulated are Things with Properties, and the Properties are certainly admitted by us to be distinct from them."—If this is said (by the other party), then (we ask)—What is the relation that is held to subsist between the Categories and the Properties?

This relation cannot be that of 'Conjunction', as this is restricted to Substances alone (under the Nyāya-view); nor is the other relation, that of 'Inherence', possible; and no other relation is accepted by the other party.—(574-575)

COMMENTARY.

"The 'Six Categories' that have been postulated are only those that have Properties; while the 'Six Categories' in the shape of the Properties are held to be quite distinct; as is found in the following words of the Padārthapravāśhaka—'This mention has been made of only the things with properties, without any mention of the Properties.'"

The answer to this explanation of the other party is provided by the words—'Then what is the relation, etc., etc.';—Relation—of the Property in the shape of Existence, etc.—with 'those'—i.e. the Categories;—what is that relation by virtue of which Existence becomes the 'property' of the Categories? Without some sort of relation the character of 'Property and With Property' would not be possible; otherwise it would lead to the absurdity of everything being the Property of everything. As a matter of fact, there is no relation between the Property of Existence and the Categories. Because there are only two kinds of Relation—Conjunction and Inherence. The relation of Conjunction is not possible in the case in question, because being of the nature of Quality, Conjunction is restricted to Substances only [and Substance is only one of the Six Categories; all these latter, therefore, cannot have Conjunction with the Property of Existence].—Nor can the relation be one of the nature of Inherence, because it is held to be one only, like 'Existence' itself; while if the relation of 'Inherence' subsisted between Inherence and
the Categories, then the former 'Inherence' should have to be regarded as different from the latter [and this would involve self-contradiction].—(574-575)

It might be argued that "the Property of Existence could belong to the Categories without any relation". The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (576).

IF NO RELATION IS POSSIBLE, THEN HOW COULD THE PROPERTY BELONG TO THE CATEGORIES?—IF IT WERE HELD TO BELONG TO THEM MERELY ON THE GROUND OF ITS BEING PRODUCED BY THEM, THEN THERE WOULD BE OTHERS ALSO LIKE IT.—(576)

COMMENTARY.

So that it would lead to an absurdity.

If it be held that the Property is said to be related to the Six Categories, on account of its being produced by them,—then, there are other things also,—such as Water and the like—which would be 'like it'—i.e. related to things like the Tank and such things, merely on that ground 'of being produced by them'; and under the circumstances, the postulating of Relations in the shape of 'Conjunction' and 'Inherence' would be futile.—(576)

TEXT (577).

FURTHER, AS THERE WOULD BE 'EXISTENCE' OF THE EXISTENCE ALSO, THE INCOMPATIBLE (GENITIVE) ENDING WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH IT; AND IF THERE WERE EXISTENCE OF THAT EXISTENCE ALSO, AND SO FORTH, THERE WOULD BE NO END TO IT.—(577)

COMMENTARY.

Further, even granting that the Property of 'Existence' belongs to the Six Categories,—your Reason remains defective (false, inconclusive). For instance, that Existence itself would have existence, as it is an Entity; how then could there be the Genitive ending in the expression 'existence of Existence', which (as you say) is based on difference?—If it be held that there is yet another existence of the Existence, then there is an Infinite Regress.—(577)

Says the Opponent:—"When it is found necessary and desirable, 'Infinite Regress' cannot be a defect that can justify the rejection of the Premiss ".

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (578).

Thus in all these 'Existences', the character of 'being with property' would be due to the presence therein of another property; and in the case of Substance and the rest also, the character of 'being with property' has been accepted on the same basis.—(578)

COMMENTARY.

In each one of these Existences (ad infinitum), the character of 'being with property' would be due to the presence therein of the properties coming one after the other; and under the circumstances, the assertion that 'these Six Categories alone are with property' would not be correct; as there would be many other things also (in the shape of the Existences), apart from the Six Categories, which would be with property. Such is the sense of the argument.

It might be argued that—"what are said to be six only are those things that are always with property only [while others are with property and also are themselves property]."

But there is nothing in this explanation. As, under this explanation, Quality, Action, Universal, Individuality and Inherence could not be mentioned therein, as these are not always with property only, they are of the nature of property also,—as all these subsist in the Substance.

'On the same basis'; i.e. because of the presence of other properties.

The Opponent says:—"The existence of the Six Categories consists in their Cognisability by the Means of Cognising existing things; and this Cognisability is in the form of the Cognition which has the Six Categories for its object; as it is only when this Cognition is present that they are regarded as 'existent'. Thus 'cognisability' is produced by Cognition and 'predicability' is produced by Predication; so that the use of the Genitive Ending—based upon difference,—becomes quite possible. Nor is there an Infinite Regress; nor the contingency of Categories other than the six (postulated by us)."

This also is a mere figment of the Opponent's imagination. If the things in question are in their essence of the nature of a Category (Thing) capable of effective action, then, as being capable of effective action, they must be Categories (Things); this being conceded, if they are spoken of by words with case-endings connoting difference,—in such expressions as 'the existence of these',—only to meet the enquiry as to their being other forms of Categories,—then what is the dispute between us? Because though its character is really not-different, yet having withdrawn that character from it, if the speaker were to speak of it as if it were different,—then there would be no dispute; because the use of words depends entirely upon the speaker's whim,—as is found in the case of characters created in concocted stories, where extreme degrees of beauty and other qualities are assumed and described.—(578)
It has been argued by the other party (under Text 561, above) that "the Yarns and the Cloth are distinct things, because their makers and potencies are different, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (579-580).

If it is the difference of the Cloth from the very first yarns that is sought to be proved,—then there is the irresistible defect of 'futility'. Those other yarns also that appear later on, in another state (form), capable of a particular kind of useful action,—are not entirely different in character from those first yarns.—(579-580)

COMMENTARY.

If what you are seeking to establish is the difference of the Cloth from those first yarns which have not yet acquired the name of 'Cloth',—then you are proving what is already admitted. In fact, all things being momentary, it is admitted by us that the later yarns which subsequently come to be called 'Cloth' are actually produced from those first yarns,—though (as a matter of fact) it is not possible for one thing to be produced out of another totally different from it.—(579-580)

If, on the other hand, what is sought to be proved is the difference of the Cloth from those yarns that have come into existence at the same time as the Cloth,—then, the Reasons adduced are such as are not admitted, 'Unproven'.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (581-583).

The intention being to indicate their use in the accomplishment of a single purpose,—if each yarn were spoken of separately, then there would be the defects of (a) prolixity, (b) incapacity, and (c) futility;—with a view to avoid these, thinking that there would be simplicity of usage if all the yarns were mentioned by a single name, people making use of words have brought forth the single term and applied it to the yarns.—But these (yarns) do not serve to prove the Cloth, which is synchronous with those yarns, as having a different maker and different potencies and different size.—(581-583)

COMMENTARY.

If the Cloth existing at the same time as the yarns were at the time actually known as something different from the yarns, then, in comparison
with the yarns, it might be recognised as having the characters of having a different maker and the rest (which have been put forward by the other party); as it is, however, that Cloth itself is not known as something different from the yarns; as it is this very difference that the other party has proceeded to establish. The mere presence of the two different names—'Cloth' and 'Yarns'—does not necessarily prove the two things to be different, as different names may be applied to the same thing for various other purposes. For instance, some particular yarns, having reached a certain condition, become capable of accomplishing the useful purpose of keeping off cold; and there may be other yarns—which, for instance, have just left the hands of the spinning women—which are not so capable. And with a view to indicate that the former yarns are capable of accomplishing a single purpose, the single term 'Cloth' is applied to them by people speaking of them, specially for the purpose of avoiding confusion; even though, in reality the Cloth is not anything different from the yarns.

Question:—"Why, then, is a single term applied at all?"

Answer:—If each of the yarns were spoken of separately,—i.e. if each yarn were spoken of one by one,—then, there would be the following defects:—
(a) Prolixity; i.e. as many words will have to be used as there are things capable of accomplishing the same purpose; and this would be too prolix;
(b) Incapacity; it will not be possible to ascertain the specific forms of each individual; this is what is meant by incapacity;—(c) Futility: speaking of them as having some imaginary common form, it is better to speak of them by a single word; and hence there is no use in speaking of each of them separately.—On the other hand, if they are all spoken of as a whole, there is the distinct advantage that usage becomes simplified. Just as single comprehensive words are used in speaking of all things by such all-comprehensive names as 'World', 'Three-Worlds', 'Universe' and so forth. Exactly of the same kind is the name 'Cloth' (as comprehending all the yarns).

The compound 'vibhinna, etc.' is to be expounded by making a copulative compound between 'Kartr' and 'Samarthya, etc.', and then taking this copulative compound as qualified by the term 'vibhinna'.—(581–583)

It has been argued (under Text 462, above) that—"if there were no gross Substance, the perception of the Tree and such things would not be possible; etc., etc."—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (584).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THOSE ATOMS THAT HAVE COME INTO EXISTENCE AS MUTUALLY HELPFUL,—ARE NOT BEYOND THE SENSES; AS THEY ARE WITHIN REACH OF THE SENSES.—(584)

COMMENTARY.

The fact of Atoms being beyond the reach of the senses is not admitted; because such Atoms as have attained a certain condition are actually percepti-
ble by the senses.—In fact, it is for people who regard Atoms as eternal, that the appearance of peculiar features in the Atoms being impossible, they would be always beyond the reach of the senses;—not so for us.

'Anyonyābhīsarāḥ'—'as mutually helpful',—i.e. as helping each other.

—(584)

The following text also shows that Atoms are perceptible by the senses:

TEXT (585).

THE 'BLUE' AND OTHER SHAPES HAVE BEEN POSTULATED IN REGARD TO THE Atoms THEMSELVES; AND THE VISUAL AND OTHER COGNITIONS ALSO SERVE TO MANIFEST ONLY THOSE BLUE AND OTHER SHAPES.—(585)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—‘Atoms are held to exist in a sequential form—one after the other;—and certainly they are not ‘perceived’ in that form; then how can they be said to be perceptible?’

Answer:—

TEXT (586).

THOUGH THEY ARE NOT PERCEIVED IN THE SEQUENTIAL FORM,—YET THEIR PERCEPTIBILITY CANNOT BE DENIED,—IT BEING SIMILAR TO THAT OF DRINKS AND OTHER THINGS.—(586)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'adhyakṣatābādhā' may be taken as a genitive Tatpurusa compound, meaning—'non-denial of Perceptibility';—or it may not be treated as a compound but two separate words—'adhyakṣatā' and 'abādhā',—the meaning being ‘Perceptibility is undeniable’; i.e. there being no annulment of it, it cannot be denied.

'It being similar, etc.';—i.e. its perceptibility remains as undeniable as the perceptibility of Drinks and other things. For instance, in the case of a 'Drink', the 'Taptopala' (=? Heated or Burnt, Stone, a medicinal preparation), the 'Śūrākāma' [=? Quick-silver and gold, another medicinal preparation, the Makarādhvaja ?], and such things,—where the constituent atoms are of mixed characters (tastes), they are actually perceived as such. In the case of these things, there is no 'composite substance' (apart from the constituent Atoms), the things consisting of heterogeneous elements. In fact, if the Composite were something different from the Atoms, no conjunction among them could be visible; because the substratum of such conjunction—i.e. the Atoms—are unseen (ex hypothesi); and if even one of the factors of the Conjunction is not visible, the Conjunction cannot be perceived; e.g.
the conjunction between the Jar and the Ghost; and the conjunction between the Solar Disc and parts of space and of Akāsha. Such being the case, where all the conjuncts—in the shape of Atoms,—are imperceptible, how can the Conjunction subsisting in them be perceptible?—(586)

Question:—“Thus then, the whole matter being uncertain, how can the perceptibility of Atoms be accepted as reasonable?”

Answer:—

TEXT (587).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, IN THE MATTER OF THE PERCEPTION OF ALL THINGS,—WHICH EXIST ONLY IN THE FORM OF mutual exclusion (negation),—THERE IS THE SAME UNCERTAINTY IN REGARD TO all THEIR CHARACTERS AND FORMS.—(587)

COMMENTARY.

Under the view of the other Philosophers also, whenever anything is apprehended by Perception, there is no certainty in regard to all the forms and characters of that thing; what happens is that it is regarded as perceived to that extent which serves to differentiate it from other things,—and not all its forms and characters. Because even if other factors were perceived, there would be no certainty regarding them, and these would be of no practical use, and as such, would be as good as not-perceived.

‘The same uncertainty’;—i.e. as in the case of the apprehended thing. —(587)

Says the Opponent:—“Inasmuch as things are impartite,—and everything is actually perceived in its complete form,—why should there be no certainty regarding the whole Thing?”

Answer:—

TEXT (588).

EVEN THOUGH, THE THING BEING IMPARTITE, ITS CHARACTER IS APPREHENSIBLE ONLY BY Indeterminate Perception, YET THERE IS DEFINITE (CERTAIN) COGNITION OF ITS DIFFERENTIATION (FROM OTHER THINGS); AND IT IS THIS DEFINITE COGNITION THAT IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE CAUSE (OF CERTAINTY).—(588)

COMMENTARY

‘Ākṣa’ is that which pertains to the senses; i.e. perceptual cognition;—and this is qualified by the term ‘akalpana’, ‘indeterminate’;—though it is apprehensible by indeterminate Sense-perception, yet etc., etc.
‘There is definite (certain) cognition of its differentiation’;—i.e. certainty as regards its being different;—the cause of this consists in Repetition, Close Proximity, vividness of conviction of difference, and so forth. As a matter of fact, mere Apprehension by itself does not bring about certainty, which is brought about with the help of repetition, etc. also. Hence the meaning is that there is certainty where all these conditions are present.

All this we have said on the supposition (for the sake of argument) that Atoms exist and also the external object is actually cognised by Perception; as a matter of fact however, for the Idealist, there is no external object, in the shape of Blue and the like, cognised by Perception; because in dreams and other such conditions, there is perception of such things as the Blue, even though such things have no existence at the time; and this fact makes the ordinary perception of such things also at least doubtful; specially as the form of the ‘Blue’ being devoid of the nature of one or many, its cognition must be of the nature of an illusory appearance.—Nor are the Atoms admitted as existent; because they exist in sequential succession,—and as they vary in regard to the point of space occupied by them, they cannot be regarded as one. Under the circumstances, in view of such an Atom, how can it be asserted that Atoms are perceptible as having the Blue Colour, and that the sequence has no significance, being imposed upon it from outside—through illusion?—(588)

The Opponent might argue that—"if there were no Composite substance, how could a man with open eyes have the notion of 'one mountain' in reference to what are only so many Atoms?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (589).

Just as in the case of the Lamp it is only a series of similar flames which brings about the illusion (of its being one); so [in the case of the Mountain also], there is an illusion of unity, even though what are really cognised are several subtle entities appearing in close juxtaposition.—(589)

COMMENTARY.

In such things as the Lamp, it is the series of successively appearing similar flames that give rise to the illusion of there being 'one lamp',—though in reality there are several flames,—in the same manner, in the case of the mountain, what are really cognised are many small and smaller entities appearing in close juxtaposition, and this gives rise to the illusion of 'oneness'. So that there is no incongruity at all.—(589)

Question:—"If then, the Atoms are not perceived as distinct from one another, how do they become perceptible?"

Answer:—
TEXT (590).

IF THE PERCEPTIBILITY OF ATOMS IS NOT ADMITTED BECAUSE OF THEIR BEING NOT-DIFFERENTIATED, THEN HOW IS IT SEEN IN THE CASE OF THE LAMP AND SUCH THINGS? OR, IS THE COMPOSITE HELD TO BE OF THAT KIND?—(590)

COMMENTARY.

If it is held that what cannot be cognised in differentiated form cannot be perceptible, then, how is it that perceptibility is found in the Lamp, wherein also the individual flames appearing in quick succession cannot be differentiated?—Or is it that the Composite only is a thing that is perceptible, even though its components are not differentiated? The reason thus put forward by the Opponent is inconclusive.—(590)

The following Text advises the other Party as to the way in which he should level his criticism:—

TEXTS (591-592).

ALL THAT CAN BE URGED IS—"ON THE DEFINITE COGNITION OF THESE (ATOMS), HOW IS IT THAT IT IS NOT REALISED THAT WHAT IS PERCEIVED AS BLUE IS THE FORM OF THE ATOMS?"

—BUT THAT ALSO CANNOT BE THE CAUSE; BECAUSE THE COGNITION IN QUESTION CANNOT BE WITHOUT AN OBJECT; AND YET IT CANNOT HAVE FOR ITS OBJECT A SINGLE GROSS OBJECT, AS THERE IS INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN GROSSNESS AND ONE-NESS.—(591-592)

COMMENTARY.

'These'—i.e. of the Atoms.

'That also cannot be the Cause etc., etc.'—i.e. the fact of the Atoms being perceived as differentiated from one another cannot be the cause—of the fact that the Blue colour is not perceived as belonging to the Atoms; because the certainty regarding this can be got at from other sources. For instance, the upholder of the 'External Thing' cannot hold a Cognition to be devoid of an object; if he did admit it, then his view would come to be the view of pure 'Idealism'.

Under the circumstances, the Colour, etc. which form the objects of the Cognition, and appear therein in the gross form,—is it one or many? If one, is it composed of the components, or not so composed? In either
of these two forms, it cannot be one, as that would be incompatible with Perception.—(591-592)

Question:—"What is that 'incompatibility (with Perception) ?"
Answer —

TEXTS (593-594).

IF THE GROSS OBJECT WERE OF THE NATURE OF one ONLY, THEN ON EVEN PART OF IT BEING COVERED BY THE LITTLE LEG OF A FLEA, ALL OF IT WOULD BECOME COVERED, WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION;
—AND ON ONE PART OF IT BEING REDDENED, ALL OF IT WOULD BECOME COLOURED RED.—OR, ON THE CONTRARY, THE PRESENCE OF INCOMPATIBLE PROPERTIES WOULD INDICATE multiplicity.—(593-594)

COMMENTARY.

If the gross object were one, then the covering of one part of it would mean the covering of all of it, and the colouring of one part would mean the colouring of all; as, according to your view, there would be no difference between the covered and uncovered parts, or between the coloured and uncoloured parts. And yet it is not possible for any single object to be possessed of contradictory properties,—as that would lead to absurdities. Thus the whole universe would become a single substance; and this would involve all the anomalies of simultaneous production of things and the rest. As a matter of fact too, the covering of one part is not seen to lead to the covering of all. Thus the said view is clearly incompatible with perceived facts.

It is incompatible with Inference also: For instance, that which is obsessed by contradictory properties cannot be one,—e.g. the Cow and the Buffalo;—the gross object is found to be obsessed by the contradictory properties of being perceived and not perceived, as being 'covered' and 'not covered';—hence there is found in it the contrary of the wider condition, [which makes one-ness impossible].—The contingency of the whole universe becoming one would be an Inference that would annul the notion [of the said one-ness of the gross object].—(593-594)

Uddyotakara has argued as follows—"As there can be no diversity in any one thing, the term 'all' cannot be rightly applied to it; then how can there be the use of the term 'all', on the basis whereof all (sava) of it could be said to be covered ?"

This objection is expounded in the following—
TEXT (595).

"INASMUCH AS THE OBJECT IS OF ONE UNIFORM CHARACTER, TO WHAT WOULD THE USE OF THE TERM ‘sarva’ (‘all’) BE DUE? BECAUSE THAT TERM DENOTES MORE THAN ONE INDIVIDUAL THING, WHILE THE Composite IS NOT OF THE NATURE OF MANY INDIVIDUALS."—(595)

COMMENTARY.

"As a matter of fact, the term ‘all’ denotes many—more than one—things; while the Composite is not many; how then can the term ‘all’ be used in reference to it—in such an assertion as ‘all of it would become covered’?"—(595)

This argument is answered in the following—

TEXTS (596–598).


COMMENTARY.

It is just the well-known things,—like the Cloth, the Body and so forth,—that have been put forward by you as ‘composites’; and in regard to all these things the use of such terms as ‘one’ and ‘all’ is also well known; e.g. people are found saying ‘all of this cloth has been coloured’ and so forth.—Such being the whim of speakers,—when there is a desire to speak of the colouring of things like the cloth-piece which occupy a larger space, we also, on the basis of the ordinary notion, make use of the said expression, for the purpose of bringing out the incongruity involved in your view.

Further, this criticism is applicable to yourself, who regard the gross object as one,—not to us; because we do not regard the gross object to be one.—(596–598)

The following might be urged—‘The said criticism cannot apply to us either, because (according to us) the application of the name ‘Cloth’ to its
component yarns is only indirect, figurative, based upon their being its cause; so that the use of terms like 'all' would be all right'.

The answer to this is provided in the following—

**TEXT (599).**

*If the name be said to be figurative (indirect), then there should be difference in number. There is also no difference in the cognition, which is admitted by both (though directly and indirectly).*—(599)

**COMMENTARY.**

If it is as you say, then there should be 'difference in number'; i.e. in all cases, the Plural number should be used—'all Cloths are coloured'; you do not consider it right to use the Singular number in regard to things that are many.

It might be argued that—'when the term 'Cloth' is used in regard to the component yarns, it is in accordance with the number of the composite object, which term 'Cloth' therefore does not abandon the gender and number of what is denoted by it'.

But this also cannot be right; this is what is shown in the second line—'There is also no difference, etc. etc.'; if the applying of the name 'Cloth' is figurative (indirect), then the distinction between the cognition of what is direct and what is indirect would be only a halting one; because as a matter of fact, there is no difference. For instance, when the expression is used as 'all of the cloth is coloured', the idea that it produces is not that 'what is coloured is not the Cloth, but the yarns that are its constituent cause'.

The particle 'cha' in the Text implies, the following argument:—You do not admit that the Cloth, being only one, is denoted by the term 'all'; how then can the term 'all', without the term 'Cloth', be applied to the components, on the basis of the Number of the Cloth?

Or, the second line may be explained as follows:—The 'bhēda', *diversity*, of the Cognition, is not present in what are regarded as 'direct' and 'indirect'; i.e. different colours are not found in the yarns and the Cloth, in the way in which they are found among Colour, Taste, and other things; and when the forms of the two are not found to be different, they cannot be regarded as *direct* and *indirect*.—(599)

The following Text introduces the answer given by Shankarāsvāmin:—

**TEXT (600).**

"*Inasmuch as Conjunction is not all-embracing in its character, the colouring cannot belong to all the Cloth; nor is the whole found to be covered.*"—(600)

**COMMENTARY.**

He argues as follows:—"The colour spoken of as belonging to the Cloth is of the nature *Conjunction* (contact) with such colouring substances
as the red dye, saffron and so forth; and Conjunction is a quality that is not all-embracing; hence when one (part) is coloured, the whole does not become coloured.—Similarly when one part of the body is covered by the Cloth, the whole body does not become covered.—(600)

The following Text shows that this explanation is not right:—

TEXTS (601-602).

WHEN THE SUBSTANCE HAS NO PARTS, WHAT FORM WOULD BE THERE THAT WOULD NOT BE EMBRACED (BY THE CONJUNCTION)? IF SUCH AN (UNEMBRACED) FORM OF THE SUBSTANCE REMAINED THERE, THEN DIVERSITY BECOMES ESTABLISHED.—EXISTENCE IN SEVERAL PLACES IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ANY SINGLE OBJECT. HENCE IT BECOMES ESTABLISHED THAT THINGS LIKE THE CLOTH ARE DIFFERENT IN FORM FROM THE ATOMS (COMPOSING THEM).—(601-602)

COMMENTARY.

If the Cloth is a single substance, then in such an impartite substance, what is it that would not be embraced by the Red Colour, by virtue of which the contact of the colour would be not-pervasive? If it is admitted that there is something left unpervaded by the colour, then that alone suffices to establish difference between the two parts,—as it would be impossible for the mutually contradictory pervaded and unpervaded parts to belong to one and the same thing. Nor would it be possible to explain that one part—the one covered by the Colour,—is larger than the other; because the thing has no parts. Otherwise, as all such diverse things as Water, Animal, Elephant and the like would be equally one only, there would be no difference among them and hence there could be no such differentiation as that between ‘large’ and ‘small’.

“The difference would be due to the one being made up of a larger number of component parts than the other.”

In that case, those parts themselves, appearing in larger or smaller numbers, may be the basis of the notions of ‘gross’ and ‘subtle’,—what is the use of postulating a ‘composite’ made up of those components, specially when these latter have not been found to be effective at all?

As a matter of fact, even when there are large and small number of component parts in things, that cannot constitute a difference among the composites themselves, as these latter are impartite; so that there can be no basis for differentiation into ‘gross’ and ‘subtle’. If the difference were held to be based upon the larger and smaller number of components, that would only imply the admission of the components, as the notion of ‘gross’ and ‘subtle’ would be applicable to these alone; and that would mean that the Atom is the only entity; nothing apart from the Atom, either gross or subtle, being perceived at all.
Then again, what is the meaning of the assertion that "Conjunction is not all-pervasive"?—If it means that it does not pervade over all (whole) of the substance,—then it cannot be right; because it has been held that the term 'all' cannot apply to the substance.—If it means that "Conjunction subsists only in a part of its substratum",—that also cannot be right; as there can be no 'part' of it.—It may be said that what is meant is that "it subsists in a component making up the substance";—if that be so, then, inasmuch as what has been coloured are only the components (where alone the contact of the Dye subsists), the colour of the composite would not be red at all; so that what should be perceived should be coloured and not-coloured, at one and the same time.—Further, what is called 'the component making up the substance',—if that is of the same form as the composite itself,—then the Conjunction that would subsist there would also subsist only in a part of that component (as Conjunction is non-pervasive, ex hypothesi); so that the objection would be equally applicable to this also.—If, on the other hand, the component be held to be of the form of the Atom, then, inasmuch as Atoms are beyond the reach of the senses, the Conjunction subsisting therein would also be beyond the reach of the senses; so that there could be no perception of the Red colour at all.

The Opponent might argue thus:—"Pervasion is the name given to that character whereby the shape of the finger is perceived only on the perception of the whole finger; hence when Conjunction is said to be not-pervasive, what is meant is that in its case it is not that it is perceived only on the perception of its substratum".

This is not right. As a matter of fact, Conjunction is never perceived while its substratum is not perceived; e.g. the Conjunction between the Jar and the Ghost (which is not perceived because the Ghost is not seen). Thus then, under this explanation, the colour also would not be perceived; it should be regarded to be perceptible only when its substratum is perceived; and hence that also would be pervasive in character.

Says the Opponent:—"Even when the substance inhering (subsisting) in the other un-coloured components is perceived, there is no perception of the colour, which consists in Conjunction; hence even when its substratum (in the form of the substance) is perceived, the Conjunction is not perceived [and this is what makes it non-pervasive in character]".

This is not right. In this way, there being only one substance inhering in components some of which are coloured and some un-coloured,—even though a component might be coloured, the Colour would be not-perceived (in the Thing) through that perception of colour; because even though the substratum would be perceptible, the colour would be imperceptible. Nor is there any other way of perceiving the Conjunction, except the perception of its substratum.

From all this it follows that there is no 'object' which is of one form. Even when of various forms,—on the strength of being itself,—the difference can lie only in the form of the aggregation of Atoms; specially as the number of possible components can never be one.

Thus it is proved that the Jar and such things exist only in the form of
Atoms; and hence the *Blue* and the rest form the shape of the Atoms; there being no other 'single object' possible.—(601-602)

It has been argued above (under *Text 562*) that "there could be no such word as *Atom* ".

The following *Text* supplies the answer to this:

**TEXT (603).**

*It is only people who have not understood the real nature of things that conceive of 'one mass'; and it is on the basis of this assumption that the term 'atom' is used.*—(603)

**COMMENTARY.**

'It is on the basis, etc., etc.'—i.e. these people are dependent upon the slight thread of the said assumption.—(603)

Another answer is supplied in the following:

**TEXT (604).**

*Or, the name 'Atom', as applied to what has been described, may be taken as baseless, dependent upon mere convention; just as the name 'lord' is applied to one who has no property at all.*—(604)

**COMMENTARY.**

'As applied, etc. etc.'—i.e. to what is imparted, and has no resistance. Just as even the poor man is praised as 'the Lord', where the name 'lord' is applied without any basis, on the strength of mere convention or custom,—so also is the use of the name 'Atom'. So that there is no incongruity at all.—(604)

It has thus been established in a general way that there can be no single *gross substance*, either made up, or not made up, of component parts. The Author now proceeds to point out the weak points in the notion of that of which the *composite* is held to be made up:

**TEXTS (605-606).**

*(A) Such things as the yarns and the hand and other limbs cannot be permeated by any single 'composite',—because they are more than one,—like such well-known things as straw, hut and jar.—*
Or (B)—The substance in question cannot subsist in several components,—because it is one,—like the Atom.—And (C) Impossibility of subsistence would be the proof annulling the other party's proposition.

—(605-606)

COMMENTARY.

The arguments are to be formulated as follows:—

(A) That which is diverse cannot be permeated by a single substance,—e.g. the Jar, the Hut and many other things which are many are not permeated by any single substance;—the components in question, such as the yarns, the Hand and other Limbs of the body and so forth, are diverse;—hence there is found in these a character which is contrary to the larger term of the Opponent's proposition (i.e. to the components being permeated by the single composite).

Or, (B) What is one must subsist in a single substance,—like the single Atom;—and the substance called 'composite' is one;—hence there is found a character incompatible with the larger predicate of the Opponent's proposition.—This is an argument in the form of a reductio ad absurdum.

(C) In support of both the above arguments, the author adduces a proof annulling the contrary of the Buddhist's conclusion—'Impossibility of subsistence, etc. etc.';—i.e. the fact that the subsistence of the composite in the components cannot be explained on the basis of any means of Right Cognition serves to annul the conclusion (of the other party).—(605-606)

Question:—"Why should there be this impossibility?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (607-608).

[If the Composite subsisted in the Components] it could subsist in one Component, either exactly in the form in which it subsists in another Component, or in some other form.

No third way is possible.—It is not possible for it to subsist in one exactly in the form in which it subsists in another; because it is already embraced within its fold by the latter. If it were not so, then it would not be subsisting in that either.—(607-608)

COMMENTARY.

When the one Composite which is embraced—subsists—in one of its components—in one form,—is it in the same form that it subsists in another of its components? Or in some other form?—There are only these two alternatives possible; in fact in any case, there can be no other alternative than the thing being one or the other.—The former alternative cannot be
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accepted; as it is entirely embraced within the folds of the first component,—how can it have any opportunity of subsisting in the other component at the same time? Otherwise, if it subsisted at the same time in the other component also, then it could not have subsisted in the first component in its entirety. It can have no other form in which it could subsist in the other component also; because in that case, it could not be regarded as 'one'.—(607-608)

The following Text formulates the argument:—

TEXT (609).

JUST AS THE BABY DOES NOT OCCUPY THE LAP OF A SECOND NURSE,—SO A SUBSTANCE EMBRACED IN ONE COULD NOT SSBSIST IN ANOTHER (COMPONENT).—(609)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When a thing is embraced by one thing, it cannot subsist in another thing at the same time;—e.g. when a baby is occupying the lap of one nurse, it cannot occupy the lap of another nurse;—the substance (composite) is embraced by one component;—and thus there is perceived a character which is contrary to your conclusion.

'The substance could not subsist in another';—this states the first conclusion of the argument.—(609)

The Author next states the argument in support of the contrary of the Opponent's conclusion, which is thus annulled by it:—

TEXTS (610-611).

IF THE COMPOSITE ESSENTIALLY RELATED TO ONE COMPONENT SSBSISTED IN SOME OTHER COMPONENT OCCUPYING A PLACE OTHER THAN THAT OF THE SAID COMPONENT,—THEN IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE TWO COMPONENTS OCCUPY THE SAME PLACE AND ARE ESSENTIALLY ONE AND THE SAME, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT DIFFERENTIATED.—

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE COMPOSITE SSBSISTED IN THE OTHER COMPONENT IN ANOTHER FORM,—THEN AS OCCUPYING TWO PLACES, THE COMPOSITE COULD NOT BE ONE;
SPECIALLLY AS DIFFERENCE IN FORM (AND CHARACTER)
MUST CONSTITUTE DIFFERENCE IN THE THING ITSELF.—(610-611)

COMMENTARY.

If the composite substance, which has its form and character connected with one Component, subsisted in another Component which occupies another
point in space,—then the components in question would have to be regarded as occupying the same point in space; which would mean that they are essentially one and the same, being of the same nature.

"Why so?"

Because they are not differentiated;—because they exist without being differentiated from one another.—Otherwise,—if they existed in their differentiated forms,—they could not occupy the same point in space.

If the second alternative is accepted,—i.e. the Composite subsists in the second component in a different form,—then it means that one thing subsists in several components,—which would be inadmissible; because, as a matter of fact, when one thing differs from another in its nature, it must be different from this latter; as difference in things is always of the nature of difference in their character (and form).—(610-611)

Uddyotakara has argued as follows:—"All that the assertion 'The Composite subsists in the components' does is to mention two objects, one of which is the substratum (container) and another the subsistent (the contained), which means that the latter becomes the subsistent,—this 'subsistence' being of the nature of the contact called 'Inherence'."—(Nyāyavārttika, 2. 1. 32, page 217, Line 4, etc.).

The answer to this is provided in the following:—

TEXT (612).

IF IT BE HELD THAT THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE COMPOSITE IN THE COMPONENTS IS OF THE NATURE OF 'INHERENCE',—THEN THE SAME CONSIDERATIONS AS ABOVE FOLLOW THAT IDEA ALSO WITH EQUAL FORCE.—(612)

COMMENTARY.

Even in regard to this form of subsistence, the considerations just urged are applicable,—such as 'does it subsist in another component in the same form and character as in one component, or in some other form?'; they follow this idea also as if in ferocity, in anger—not tolerating the criticisms emanating from the poor intelligence of the other party.—(612)

Hitherto the subsistence of the Composite has been discarded without recourse to the alternatives of its subsisting in whole or in part.—Now the author proceeds to show the way of discarding the same by recourse to the said alternatives,—in the manner indicated by actual experience:—
TEXT (613).

Or again, if it (the Composite) subsists (in the Component) in its entirety,—then it becomes liable to being regarded as many; as for its subsistence in part, that is not what is held (by the other party); and the Composite would (in that case) not be one; and it would not subsist anywhere at all.—(613)

COMMENTARY.

When the substance (Composite) subsists in its components,—does it subsist in each one of them in its entirety? or in part?

If in its entirety, then the entire form of the Composite should be as many as there are components. Unless it had the same form in each component, it could not be present in each component in its entirety; as there can be no subsistence except in a form that is fully recognised. Such being the case, if the Composite subsisted in each component simultaneously in its entire form, then it would have to be regarded as many, several; just like the Lotuses blooming in several ponds.

If the other view be held, that it is in part that the Composite subsists in each component, then there would be an infinity of such 'parts' of the Composite. For instance, those of its parts in which this Composite subsists in each of its components would themselves be its 'parts', in which also the Composite would subsist in part; and so on and on ad infinitum.

It might be argued that—' Those of its parts through which the Composite subsists in the Components are all its own forms, and not different things; as apart from the Composite itself, there can be no parts of its own. Hence there can be no such infinite regress.'

The answer to this is as follows:—' The Composite would not be one (in that case)';—i.e. if such were the case, then, the Composite would not be one only; as it is only a conglomeration of the components—and these latter are many); and under the circumstances, the thing (man) may be regarded as consisting only of such of his limbs, Hand and the rest, as are actually seen; what use then would there be of assuming any others?

The Author points out another defect in the Opponent's theory:—

'And it would not subsist anywhere at all'; the term 'vṛtāḥ syāt', 'would subsist', has to be supplied. What is meant is as follows:—If each of the Composites present in each of the components had occupied the same point in space, then alone could the Composite be subsistent in the Component; as a matter of fact, however, each of the Composites does not occupy the same point in space; because if they did subsist in each of the Components, then they could not occupy the same point in space; specially as there is no other 'Composite' of the same form. How then could it be said to be subsistent in the Components?—(613)

In the following Texts, the author sets forth the answer made by Shankarāsvāmin:—
"Whenever a reason is adduced,—either directly or in the form of a Reductio ad Absurdum,—it becomes truly applicable only when it is itself apprehended;—not otherwise.—As a matter of fact, subsistence either in whole or in part has never been perceived (by you, Buddhists),—on the basis of the impossibility of which in the substance, the substance could be held to be non-existent, or something else.—If, on the other hand, such subsistence has been perceived by you anywhere, then it cannot be denied in the case of the substance and such things,—if the said subsistence has not been perceived, then the question does not arise regarding the distinction; all that could be asserted would be that 'the subsistence is not there'. And this would not be right; as it is something directly perceived; as is clear in such notions as 'this subsists here'.—If it be held that 'the fact of this being direct perception is not admitted', then some annulling reasoning should be put forward. Otherwise, even such cognitions as those of colour and such things might cease to be of the nature of 'Perception'."—(614–618)

COMMENTARY.

Shankarasvāmin argues as follows:—"Whenever a Reason is adduced,—either directly or in the form of a Reductio ad absurdum,—it becomes applicable only when it is itself perceived; otherwise it would be open to the charge of being 'unproven'.—As a matter of fact, you have not anywhere perceived the subsistence of anything either in its entirety or in part;—hence on the basis of the absence of such subsistence, it does not behave you to regard the (composite) substance as non-existent. Or—if it were possible—then there would be something else—Component and Composite.

If such subsistence has been perceived by you anywhere, then it could be the same in the case of the Substance, etc. also, which, therefore, cannot be denied.—If, however, the said subsistence has not been perceived, then there does not arise any question regarding the distinction—as to whether the subsistence is in entirety or in part; because it is only when the object itself has been admitted that anything can be denied in regard to it. When however the object itself is not admitted, then it is better to deny the object itself,—so that the assertion should be in the form that 'there is no subsistence',—and not the denial of any particular character in regard to it. But such an assertion—as that 'there is no subsistence at all'—would not be proper; because the subsistence of the Composite in the components is vouched for by direct Perception.

Question:—What is that Perception?

"Answer:—It is in the form 'This subsists here' ;—i.e. the Perception is in the form—'This—Cloth—subsists in the yarns'.

"It might be argued that this notion cannot be regarded as Perception.
"In that case, it behoves you to put forward some reasoning in annulment of the said notion; whereby its perceptual character could be rejected. If, even in the absence of such annulling Reason, the notion be not accepted as 'Perception', then, your cognition of even such things as colour and the like would not be Perception; as there can be no difference between the two cases."—(614–618)

The Author answers the above in the following—

TEXT (619).

That 'the subsistence is not there' has already been established above, in a general way. As for the notion that 'it subsists herein', there is no such cognition at all; as this exact form does not appear in any cognition.—(619)

COMMENTARY.

Under Text 607—the subsistence of one thing in several things has already been rejected above in a general way.

As regards the assertion that "the notion that this subsists herein is vouched for by Perception",—this also is something out of the common; because, as a matter of fact, among people, no such notion as 'the Cow subsists in this Horn', or that 'the Cloth subsists in the yarns',—ever appears even in men's imagination; the notion that appears is that 'the Horn is in the Cow', 'the yarns are in the Cloth'.—Nor in any Perception does the Cloth ever appear as something different from the yarns; and unless the two were distinguished, there could be no such notion as that 'this subsists in that'. For instance, until discriminating persons have actually perceived the water as something distinct from the Pond, they do not have any such notion as 'there is Water in the Pond'.—(619)

It has been argued (under Text 615 above) that "subsistence either in entirety or in part has not been perceived by you, etc. etc."—This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (620-621).

What is meant by (the question containing) the terms 'in entirety' and 'in part' is—does the substance subsist as an impartite whole,—in the way in which the Bilva-fruit lies in a dish? or does it subsist in some other way—as a certain person, Chaitra, does when lying down on several seats?

—(620-621)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by the term 'in entirety' is—whether the substance subsists in all its Components in its impartite form,—as is found in the case
of the Bilva-fruit lying in a dish? or in some other way?—in the way, for instance, in which a person like Chaitya lies down upon more than one couch. This is what is meant by subsistence 'in part'.

This is only by the way.

Uddiyotakara has argued as follows [in Nyāyaśāstra on 2. 1. 32, page 216, Bib. Ind.]:—"Inasmuch as the terms entire and a part cannot be applied to one and the same Composite, the question raised—as to whether it subsists in its entirety or in part—is an improper one; as a matter of fact, the term 'entire' stands for all, excepting nothing, while the term 'a part' stands for one among several; as such, these two terms cannot be rightly applied to any one Composite."

This argument becomes rejected by what has been said in the Text. As a matter of fact, in common parlance, the terms whole and in part are found to be applied to such things as the Foot and the like, in such expressions as 'Does the whole foot lie in the pond, or only in part?'—Nor can it be right to say that such use is figurative; because it is never found to fail or falter; as has been pointed out before.—(620-621)

So far the four kinds of Substance, ending with Air [i.e. Earth, Water, Fire and Air] have been discarded;—the Substance called 'Soul' has already been discarded in the chapter on 'Soul';—the Author next proceeds to deny the remaining four kinds of Substance—viz.:—Ākāśa, Time, Space and Mind; [and to that end, sets forth the arguments whereby the other party seeks to establish their existence]:—

TEXT (622).

"SOUNDS MUST SUBSIST IN SOMETHING,—BECAUSE OF THEIR perishability AND SUCH OTHER CHARACTERS; LIKE THE JAR, THE LAMP-FLAME AND SUCH THINGS;—AND THIS SOMETHING MUST BE Ākāśa".—(622)

COMMENTARY.

The existence of the substance called 'Ākāśa' is sought to be proved by the other party in the following manner:—

"There must be a Substance named Ākāśa, permanent, one and all-pervasive, having sound for its indicative; sound is its indicative in the sense that it is its quality.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—Those things that are equipped with qualities like perishability and producibility, must subsist in something else;—and the 'substratum' of sound can only be Ākāśa, as that alone has the requisite capacity. Because, the said sound cannot be the quality of the four substances,—Earth, Water, Fire and Air,—(a) because, while being perceptible, it is not preceded by any quality in its Cause,—(b) because it does not last as long as the Substance lasts,—and (c) because it is perceived in a place other than its substratum;—and the qualities of all tangible things have been found to be otherwise
than all this.—The qualification ‘while being perceptible’ has been added with a view to those qualities in the Atom which are produced by Fire-contact.—Nor can Sound be a quality of the Soul;—(a) because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ,—(b) because it is perceptible by other Souls,—(c) because it is perceived as distinct from the ‘I-notion’; while all qualities of the Soul, such as pleasure and the rest are otherwise than all this.—Sound cannot be a quality of Space, Time and Mind,—because it is apprehended by the Auditory Organ.—Thus, by elimination, Sound can be the quality of Ākāsha, of which, therefore, it becomes the indicative.—This Ākāsha, having Sound as its only common Indicative, and having no other specific indicatives, must be one;—and as having its qualities perceptible everywhere, it must be all-pervading;—and having a quality, and itself not subsisting in anything else, it must be a substance;—and as it is not created (by any one), it must be permanent.”

Such is the process of reasoning put forward by the other party (in proof of Ākāsha as a Substance).

The following Texts sets forth his reasonings in support of Time being a Substance:

**TEXTS (623-624).**

"The notion of Priority, Posteriority and so forth must have for its basis something other than mobile substances like the Sun,—like the notion of the Jar and such things,—because it is entirely different in character from the notion of wrinkles, grey hairs, emaciation and so forth;—and it is this basis, cause, which is held to be 'Time'."—(623-624)

**COMMENTARY.**

"The term 'mobile substances' should be taken as standing for 'wrinkles', etc.

"Such notion as—'Prior', applied to the Father;—'Posterior', to the Son;—'simultaneous', 'for a long time', 'soon', 'is being done', 'was done', 'will be done', and so forth—all this notion of Priority and Posteriority, etc. must be based upon (due to) some substance other than the Sun and other mobile substances;—because they are different in character from the notion of 'wrinkles', 'grey hairs' and so forth,—like the notion of the Jar and such things:—and that which is the basis of the said notions must be Time, as that alone has the requisite capacity. For instance, the said notion of 'Priority' and 'Posteriority' cannot be due to Space,—because when the old man is standing in space at the back of the younger man, he is said to be 'posterior'; and similarly when the Son is standing in space in front of the Father, he is said to be 'prior'.—Nor can the said notion be due to wrinkles, grey hairs and such causes; because it is entirely different from the notion of these.—Nor can it be due to any Action (Movement),—because it is different
in character from that also.—To this end is the Sūtra (of the Vaiśeṣikas)—
‘Such notions as Prior, Posterior, Simultaneous, for Long Time, and Soon
are the indicatives of Time’.

"The character of being permanent, one and so forth has to be under-
stood in regard to Time in the same way as in regard to Ākāśa."—(623–624)

The following Texts set forth the arguments (of the Opponent) in support
of ‘Space’ as a Substance:

TEXT (625).

"Similarly Space is inferred from such notions as ‘fore’ and
‘aft’."—(625)

COMMENTARY.

Taking one corporeal substance as the starting point, there are, in regard
to other corporeal substances, the ten notions as—‘this is to the East—to
the South—to the West—to the North—to the South-East—to the South-
West—to the North-West—to the North-East,—above—below—of that’;
and that upon which these are based is Space. Says the Sūtra:—‘That to
which the notion that this is from that is due is the indicative of Space’;
—because these are peculiar notions,—and peculiar notions cannot appear in a
haphazard manner;—nor are they dependent upon the corporeal substances
themselves; as such mutual interdependence would nullify both; hence,
there being no other cause for them, these are regarded as indicatives of
Space.—Of this Space, the qualities of one-ness, all-pervasiveness and other
qualities are to be understood to be like those of Time.—Though Space is
one only, it comes to be regarded as diverse by reason of the diversity of its
effects.—The argument may be formulated as follows:—The notions of
‘fore’ and ‘aft’ and the like must be based upon a Substance other than
the corporeal substances,—because they are different from the notions
arising from these,—like the notions of pleasure, etc.—(625)

The indicative of Mind is next stated:

TEXTS (625-626).

"The Mind has been held to be inferred from the successive
appearance of cognitions; which requires a cause different
from the Eye and other sense-organs. As a matter of
fact, the cognitions of colour and such things
appear successively,—like the Chariot and such
things."—(625-626)

COMMENTARY.

Even when the contact between the object and several sense-organs is
present at the same time, the cognitions are found to appear one after the
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other; which shows that there is some other cause,—distinct from the object and the sense-organ,—the presence and absence of which leads to the appearance and non-appearance (respectively) of the cognition. Thus from this appearance of cognitions, in succession, the inference of Mind is got at. To this effect we have the Sūtra—'The fact that cognitions do not appear simultaneously indicates the Mind'. The argument may be formulated thus:—The Cognition of colour and such things is dependent upon a cause other than the Eye and the other organs,—because it appears in succession,—like the Chariot and such things.—(625-626)

With the following Text proceeds the refutation of the arguments (urged above, in favour of the existence of Ākāśa, Time, Space, and Mind as distinct Substances):—

TEXT (627).

INASMUCH AS SOUND IS ALREADY ACCEPTED AS HAVING ITS CAUSE IN THE 'GREAT ELEMENTS' THAT HAVE BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED (OR NOT-ACKNOWLEDGED),—IT IS ALREADY ADMITTED THAT SOUNDS SUBsist IN THOSE ELEMENTS. SO THAT THE FIRST REASON PUT FORWARD (FOR THE EXISTENCE OF Ākāśa) CANNOT PROVE (WHAT IT IS MEANT TO PROVE).—(627)

COMMENTARY.

If it is only the fact of Sounds being subsistent in a general way in something that is sought to be proved,—then the Reason is superfluous (proving what is already admitted). Because, as a matter of fact, Sounds are already admitted as having their cause in the Great Elements that have been acknowledged (by all parties) and those that have not been so acknowledged;—and Sounds are certainly subsistent in those elements which are their cause (source); because effects are always subsistent in their cause, having their appearance (production) inseparably connected with the Cause. The 'acknowledged' elements are the Chitta (Idea) and the Chaitya (the Ideal), which are accepted (by Buddhists also).—The term 'ādi' includes the causality of such elements as are not acknowledged (i.e. Earth etc., which though not-acknowledged by the Buddhist, are accepted by the other party).

'Tēgu'—i.e. in those elements.

'Ii'—i.e. therefore.

'The first Reason',—i.e. the one put forward under Text 622;—it cannot prove what it is desired to prove; that is, because it is open to the objection of being 'superfluous'.—(627)

If, on the other hand, what is meant to be proved is that Sounds are subsistent in a particular manner,—that is, subsistent in a substance which is one, incorporeal, external and all-pervading,—then there can be no corroborative Instance possessing the character meant to be proved; and to that
extent, the Reason becomes 'inconclusive'.—This is what is shown in the following—

**TEXT (628).**

The subsistence of Sounds in Ākāśa,—which is one, all-pervading and eternal,—cannot be proved (by the Reason adduced),—because it is devoid of 'positive concomitance';—and also because there would be absence of succession and so forth; as also universal contact.—(628)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Na-ēśām'—goes with the preceding line.

That the Opponent's conclusion is contrary to Inference is shown in the Text by the words 'and also because, etc.'; i.e. what has been said in the foregoing sentence to the effect that 'the subsistence of sounds is not proved', is so also because of the following reason:—If the Sounds were subsistent in the eternal, one substance, Ākāśa,—then like the several Sounds produced at the same time, even Sounds produced at other times would be there at the same time in question,—as their cause would be present there always in its perfect condition, and also because they would all be subsisting in the same substratum;—and it has already been explained that what is eternal cannot be dependent upon anything else; nor would it be right to regard that as 'subsistent' which is of no use. So that the appearance of all Sounds would cease to be successive.

The phrase 'and so forth' includes the anomaly of all Sounds being heard by all persons. Because the Auditory Organ consists of Ākāśa, and Ākāśa is one only,—all Sounds would reach the organ of all men and hence become heard; and on account of the impartite nature of Ākāśa, any such restriction would be impossible as that 'this is my own Auditory Organ and that is of another person'.

The following argument might be urged:—"When the tympanum of one has been affected by his Destiny, then that portion of the Ākāśa alone which is circumscribed by that tympanum forms the Auditory Organ of that person; that is why Sound is not perceived through other openings,—such as the mouth, the nostrils and the like. And when that same Tympanum is hurt, there is deafness".

This cannot be right; because Ākāśa being impartite, any such partition of it would be impossible. Nor can imaginary component parts bring about, through mere imagination, any effective action which can be done only by real positive entities; merely imagining Water to be Fire does not make the former to burn or flare up.

It might be said that—"what is meant by Ākāśa having a part is that contact with it is not pervasive".

This also has been already answered.

Then again, under the theory in question, the Jar, the Tympanum and all such things, as being in contact with one and the same Ākāśa, would come
to occupy the same point in space; because when one thing comes into contact with Ākāsha in one form, the other thing also comes into contact with it in the same form; so that other Jars and other things also would appear at the same place; because these would be in contact with Ākāsha which is in contact with the former thing;—just like the Jar already existing there. In this way, all Sounds also would appear at one and the same place; and this would be contrary to the generally accepted notion regarding Sounds appearing far off or close by.

These are the difficulties that appear against the Opponent's theory.

(628)

As regards the arguments put forward for proving the existence of Time and Space,—these also are generally open to the charge of being 'superfluous'; and particularly, the Reason is devoid of the necessary concomitance,—and the conclusion is annulled by Inference.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (629-630)

The notions of 'Priority and Posteriority' (and of 'fore and aft') are based upon a conception arising out of particular conventions; they are not due to 'Time', nor to 'Space'. Inasmuch as these are impartite, one, 'priority', 'posteriority' and the like are not possible in them. If the notions be said to be based upon the things related to them, then they themselves become useless.—(629-630)

COMMENTARY.

'Particular Conventions',—i.e. the understanding that the epithets 'prior' and 'posterior' are to be applied to things produced before and after, and so forth;—the conception that arises out of such conventions,—is the basis of the notions in question. Thus it is that there is no mutual interdependence; as the notion is based entirely upon a particular convention. Thus then, if the other party has set out to prove only that the said notions have a cause, then it is superfluous (as it is admitted by all parties).

If however he intends to prove that a particular Substance is that cause, then (1) there is annulment by Inference, (2) absence of concomitance, as before; and (3) the Reason is 'contradictory', as it proves what is contrary to the desired conclusion;—this is what is meant by the words of the Text—'Inasmuch as these are impartite'.

'Related to them',—i.e. to Space and Time.

As a matter of fact, what is desired to be proved is that the notion of 'Priority and Posteriority' and so forth is based upon the impartite and single substances, Time and Space;—this is not proved (by the Reason
adduced). Because a thing becomes the 'object' (of cognition) when it produces a cognition exactly of the same form as itself; in the case of an impartite substance, there cannot be any differentiation between 'fore' and 'aft', to which the notion of 'fore' and 'aft' could be due; thus by proving the contrary of what is desired to be proved, the Reason becomes 'Contradictory'.

'If the notions be said to be based, etc. etc.';—This anticipates the answer of the Opponent. It might be argued (by the Opponent) that—"Such external and internal things as the Lamp and the Body and the like are related to Space and Time,—there is 'priority and posteriority' among these,—and it is this 'priority and posteriority' of their relatives that is attributed to Space and Time,—hence the Reason is not Contradictory".

The answer to this is as follows:—'Then they themselves become useless'.—Under the said assumption, Space and Time themselves would be useless; as what is meant to be brought about by them will have been brought about by the things related to them. For instance, Time is held to be the cause of such notions as those of the various divisions of priority and posteriority as are denoted by the terms 'Kṣaṇa', 'Lava', 'Kāṣṭha', 'Kālā', 'Muhārta', 'Ahorātra', 'Arddhamāsa' and so forth (the various divisions of Time);—and Space is held to be the cause of the notions of 'East', 'North' and so forth;—and as a matter of fact, all this diversity does not belong to Space and Time; it is present in the divisions themselves; so that the assuming of Time and Space is entirely useless.—(629-630)

As regards the argument adduced for proving the existence of Mind,—if the mere fact of certain notions having a cause in general is meant to be proved, then it is superfluous.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (631-632).

Mind as distinct from the Eye, etc. is admitted by us also; that idea being regarded as 'Mind' which appears immediately after the six (cognitions).—If however the Mind is regarded as permanent, then there comes the anomaly of cognitions being simultaneous; thus the reason put forward by you becomes destructive of what is desired.—(631-632)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant to be proved is the eternal and one Mind, then the conclusion is one that is annulled by Inference, and the Reason is 'Contradictory'. This is what is shown by the words 'If however, etc. etc.' 'Destructive of what is desired'—because what it proves is only the dependence (of the notions cited) upon an impermanent (fleeting) cause which is distinct from the Eye and other organs. Otherwise, if they had
an eternal Cause, as the Cause would always be present in its perfect form, the successive appearance of Cognitions would be incongruous.—(631-632)

The following Text jokingly confirms the same ‘contradictory’ character of the opponent’s Reason—

TEXT (633).

I THINK THAT THE Sūtra (Nyāya-sūtra 1. 1. 36) HAS BEEN COMPOSED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVING AND DISPROVING THE MIND AS POSTULATED BY THE Buddha AND THE OTHER PHILOSOPHER (RESPECTIVELY),—AND HENCE IT HAS BEEN REPEATED WITH AN ADDITIONAL ‘a’ (‘not’).—(633)

COMMENTARY.

I think as follows:—The Sūtra ‘Yugapajñānāvapapativrmanasoliṅgam’ (‘The fact that cognitions do not appear simultaneously is—and is not—indicative of the Mind’,—Nyāya-sūtra 1. 1. 16) is meant to prove the ‘Mind’ as conceived by the Buddha,—and to disprove the same as conceived by the other philosopher; for the latter purpose an additional ‘a’ (‘not’) being read (before ‘liṅgam’, ‘indicative’). Such is the sense of the Text as a whole.

The meaning of the words is now described:—The compound ‘Saugata—siddhāya’ is to be expounded as ‘for the purpose of the proving and disproving, respectively, of the Mind, as postulated by the Baudhāya and the other Philosopher’.

Question:—“How can one and the same Sūtra express two mutually contradictory meanings?”

Answer:—‘With an additional a (not)’;—that is to say, as applied to the view of the other philosopher, the words of the Sūtra are to be construed as ‘for the disproving—asiddhi—of the Mind postulated by the other philosopher’,—with an ‘a’ (before ‘liṅgam’);—and it is different when applied to the view of the Buddhist, in which case it is without the said ‘a’ (‘not’).

Question:—“How can one and the same expression be with, and also without, the syllable ‘a’ (‘not’)?”

Answer:—It is ‘repeated’;—i.e. in such a case, the repetition of the expression is justified.—(633)

End of the Chapter on ‘Substance’.
CHAPTER XI.

On 'Quality' as a Category.

COMMENTARY.

The Author now proceeds to discard the categories of 'Quality' and the rest:—

TEXT (634).

BY THE REJECTION OF 'SUBSTANCE', 'QUALITY', 'ACTION' AND THE REST, WHICH ARE HELD TO BE SUBSISTENT IN SUBSTANCE, ALL BECOME DISCARDED.—(634)

COMMENTARY.

'Quality', 'Action', ending with 'Specific Individuality', become rejected by the rejection of 'Substance'; because they subsist in this latter; and when the substratum is not there, the 'subsistents', which are dependent upon it, cannot be there.

'Hold to be, etc.'—i.e. held to be subsistent, either directly or indirectly, in Substance. For instance, Quality and Action are held to be directly subsistent in Substance; as declared in the Sūtra (Vaishāsika)—"'Quality is subsistent in Substance, devoid of qualities, not the cause of Conjunction or Disjunction, independent'";—which is the definition provided of Quality; similarly the definition of Action provided is—"'It subsists in one Substance, is devoid of Qualities, the independent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions'". The term 'ākādravyam' in this last Sūtra means 'subsisting in one Substance'.—Qualities, on the other hand subsist, some of them, in several Substances; e.g. Conjunction, Disjunction and the rest. The Genus and the Specific Individuality subsist, some of them, in Substances only; e.g. such genera, as 'Earth' and the like; while such genera as 'Quality', 'Action' and so forth subsist in Qualities and Actions related to Substances.—The Summum genus—which is 'Being'—subsists in the three categories beginning with 'Substance' [i.e. in Substance, Quality and Action].

Thus, when Substance has been rejected, Quality and the rest become rejected without any effort. What is meant by this is that the final upshot of the examination of the other Categories has been achieved under the examination of Substance itself.—(634)

Opponent:—"If that is so, then the Denial of Subsistence should be proceeded with separately."

Answer:—
TEXT (635).

The ‘Relative’ (wherein the Relation could subsist) having
been discarded, whose ‘Subsistence’ would it be?
and where? Still a detailed denial of each
(category) is going to be set forth.—(635)

COMMENTARY.

‘Subsistence’ is described as ‘inherence of the five categories’; so
that when the Substance and other (four) categories—wherein alone the
said Relation could subsist,—have been rejected, whose ‘subsistence’ would
it be? and where? That is, of nothing and nowhere; for the simple reason that
all that could be the substratum and the subsistent have been rejected.—(635)
The detailed denial of Qualities is now set forth.

In this connection, the Sūtra (Vaishēśika) is as follows:—“The following
are the Qualities:—Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Dimension,
Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Cognitions,
Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Hatred and Exertion”; the particle ‘chā’, ‘and’,
including Gravity, Fluidity, Viscidity, Momentum, Merit and Demerit and
Sound.—Colour is what is apprehended by the Eye, and subsists in Earth,
Water, and Fire;—Taste is apprehended by the Gustatory Organ, and subsists
in Earth and Water;—Odour is apprehended by the Olfactory Organ
and subsists in Earth;—Touch is apprehended by the Tactile Organ, and
subsists in Earth, Water, Fire and Air”.

From among these Qualities, the Text sets forth the denial of the first
four—Colour and the rest:—

TEXT (636).

If in a large substance, the Blue colour is held to be one only,—
then how is it that there is no manifestation and per-
ception of it when it is seen in light coming
through an aperture?—(636)

COMMENTARY.

Qualities are perceptible only when they subsist in a large substance;
that is why the Text has added the epithet ‘large’.

If it is held that the Blue Colour,—in all its four forms,—that subsists
in a Large Substance is one only and without parts,—then, at the time that
there is manifestation of the Blue Colour as subsisting in a large substance
like the Jar placed in a small room, through lamp-light coming through an
aperture in the split bamboo or some such thing,—the whole of the Blue
Colour subsisting in the whole Jar should be manifested and perceived;
because it has no parts; as a single entity cannot have parts, by virtue of
which there would be manifestation of one part only.
'Light coming through an aperture' has been mentioned only by way of illustration.

Similarly when odour in a part of the Earth is manifested by Water, the odour in other parts of it also should become manifested and perceived.

Similarly in the case of Flames and the Mango and other fruits,—the Touching and Tasting of one part should lead to the perception of the Touch and Taste subsisting in the whole of those substances.—(636)

It might be urged (by the Opponent) that "there do come about the manifestation and perception of the entire Blue Colour?"

The Answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (637).

THE BLUE COLOUR IS NOT HELD TO EXIST IN WELL-DEFINED PARTS; HENCE WHAT IS MANIFESTED THEN BY THAT (LIGHT) MUST, ON THAT ACCOUNT, VARY WITH EACH ATOM.—(637)

COMMENTARY.

' Then '—at that time.

' By that '—by the light coming through the aperture.

' What '—i.e. the Blue Colour.

In case it is admitted that the Blue Colour in its entirety varies with each atom,—then that would imply the presence of the Atomic Dimension in the Blue Colour,—just as in a Substance; which would mean that the Blue Colour has a quality (Dimension); so that it would have the character of ' Substance ' (which alone can have a quality), and not that of ' Quality '. If things varying like this with each atom, were called ' Quality ', then the dispute (between us) would be only in regard to names.—When the thing is possessed of the Atomic Dimension, it cannot be right to regard it as a ' Quality ', simply on the ground of its subsisting (in a Substance); because there can be no ' subsistence ' between two things, one of which exists and the other does not; if there were, it would lead to absurdities. That is to say, in that way, on the ground that it subsists in the Component substance, the Composite Substance would also have to be regarded as a ' Quality '.—(637)

"As regards the Quality of 'Number', it has been defined as 'the basis of the notions of one and so forth'. Number subsists in one substance and also in several substances; the Number 'one' subsists in one substance; and the numbers beginning with 'Two' subsist in several substances.—Of the Number subsisting in one substance, the eternality and the appearances should be understood to be like those of the Colour and other qualities subsisting in the atoms of Water, etc.; while of Number subsisting in several substances, the appearance is due to the unities associated with the cognition of several things; and its destruction (disappearance) follows from the disappearance of the unitary conception; and in some cases, the disappearance is also due to the destruction of the substratum.—Number of both these
kinds is vouched for by Perception. Others have held it to be established by Inference also, on the ground that all specific cognitions are dependent upon diverse causes."

The denial of this *Number* is set forth in the following—

**TEXT (638).**

'*NUMBER', WHICH IS HELD TO BE PERCEPTIBLE, DOES NOT APPEAR IN COGNITION AS ANYTHING DISTINCT FROM SUCH NAMES AS 'THE ELEPHANT', ETC. WHICH CONNOTE 'NEGATION OF THE CONTRARY'; HENCE IT MUST BE NON-EXISTENT.—(638)**

**COMMENTARY.**

Such names as 'elephant' are applied to the animals as being the negation of what is not—elephant,—such things as the Aggregate and the like;—apart from such names, there is no such thing as 'Number' which is perceptible; hence it must be non-existent, like the 'Hare's Horns'. And yet it has been held (by the other party) to be perceptible; as declared in the following *Sūtra*—"Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority,—as subsisting in coloured things,—are perceptible by the Eye".—(638)

The following *Texts* show that the existence of 'Number' is not proved by the Cognition of specific individualities:—

**TEXTS (639-640).**

*AS IN COGNITION, SO IN THINGS LIKE THE JAR ALSO, THE NOTION OF 'ONE' AND THE REST IS ONE THAT FollowS ONLY FROM AN IMAGINARY CONVENTION SET UP BY A MERE WHIM.— THERE CAN BE NO DIFFERENTIATING NUMBER IN THESE (COGNITIONS), BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT 'SUBSTANCE'—NOR CAN THE NOTION BE SAID TO BE 'FIGURATIVE', AS IT IS NOT FOUND TO BE FALLIBLE.—(639-640)*

**COMMENTARY.**

There are such notions as 'one cognition', 'two cognitions' and so forth,—in which the notions of *one, two*, etc., appear even though there are no such Numbers actually present (in the Cognitions);—in the same manner, in the case of a Jar also when it is not accompanied by anything else, there is the notion of its being 'one'; and this must have its source in the imaginary convention that has been set up by people. Consequently the argument based upon such notions cannot be conclusive.
That in Cognitions, no Number exists follows from the fact that Cognitions are not Substance, while Number is a Quality and as such must subsist in a Substance.

It might be argued that "in the case of Cognition, the said notion may be regarded as figurative,—the sense being that 'Cognition is as if it were one',—and the absence of companion may be taken as the similarity on which the figurative expression is based ".

The answer to this is as follows:—'Nor can the notion, etc., etc.';—that is, the notion in question cannot be rightly held to be figurative; as it is not found to be fallible. Such figurative expressions as 'the Ploughman is an ox' mean that 'the man is as if it were an ox', and not that he is 'an ox itself'—as he does not have the dewlap and other distinguishing features of the ox;—there is no such failure (negation) in the case in question,—the notion being that 'the cognition is one', not that 'it is as if it were one'; as a matter of fact, the notion in regard to the Cognitions is just as infallible as that in regard to the Jar and such things.—(639-640)

The Opponent may urge the following—"The notion is described as 'figurative', not on the basis of similarity',—but what is meant is that the notion of 'one', etc. in regard to Quality, Action, Subsistence and so forth is based on the ground that these subsist in the same substratum as the 'one-ness', etc. subsisting in the Substance that forms their own substratum".

This is the explanation anticipated and set forth in the following:—

TEXT (641).

"The notion of one in regard to Cognitions is assumed on the basis of the one-ness subsisting in that same substance, on account of their subsisting in the same thing",—if this is asserted [then the answer is as in the following Text].—(641)

COMMENTARY.

The answer to the above is provided in the following—

TEXTS (642-643).

The number 'one' may subsist in the one Cognition; but on what basis does the notion of 'two' proceed, in reference to Cognitions? Or even in regard to the 'Six Categories' and the rest?—The notion too of its 'subsisting in the same thing' can only be figurative, and hence fallible,—like the notion of 'fire' in regard to the boy.—(642-643)

COMMENTARY.

If the notion of 'one-ness' is due to subsistence in the same substance, —then it may be so in regard to one Cognition, as also to Pleasure and the
rest,—in which case the notion of 'one' is due to their subsisting in the same substance 'Soul' (which is one);—but what would the basis of such notions as 'two cognitions', 'three Cognitions' and the like? Certainly duality, etc. do not subsist in the Soul (in which the Cognition subsists).

The assertion too that is made,—such as 'Six Categories', 'the two, Pleasure and Pain', 'the two, Desire and Hatred', 'Five kinds of Action', 'Two kinds of Genus, the Higher and the Lower', 'One Being', 'One Subsistence' and so forth,—what would be the basis for such notions? In these cases, there is no Number subsisting in the same thing.—So that this assumption also is not comprehensive enough; hence it cannot be right.

Further, 'Subsistence in the same thing' and such other basis, are asserted; and yet the notion of such subsistence, even if it appeared, could be only figurative,—because there are no other things; and hence the notions would be fallible; just like the notion of 'Fire' in regard to the Boy, where there is no real ground for applying the word to him. And, yet the notion is not fallible. So that the objection urged above still remains in force.—(642-643)

The following Text anticipates the arguments set forth by Aviddha-karpya for the proving of the existence of Number:—

TEXT (644).

"THE NOTION OF NUMBER IS ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF ITS BEING DIFFERENT FROM THE NOTION OF THE 'ELEPHANT' AND OTHER THINGS; THE SAID NOTION (OF NUMBER) MUST ARISE FROM THINGS OTHER THAN THOSE,—JUST LIKE THE NOTION OF THE 'BLUE CLOTH' AND THE LIKE."—(644)

COMMENTARY.

He argues as follows:—"The notion of Number must have a basis other than such things like the Elephant, Horse, Chariot and the like,—because it is different from the notions of the Elephant, etc.,—like the notion of the 'Blue Cloth'.—'Must arise from things, etc., etc.',—i.e. it should arise from a thing other than the said elephant, etc."—(644)

The Author answers this argument in the following—

TEXT (645).

WHAT IS DESIRED TO BE PROVED COULD BE PROVED AS BEING DUE TO SUCH CAUSES AS AN IMAGINARY CONVENTION ARISING FROM MERE WHIM AND SO FORTH. THE EXISTENCE OF 'NUMBER' IN COGNITION AND OTHER THINGS ALSO MAY BE DUE TO THE SAME CAUSE.—(645)

COMMENTARY.

Causes apart from the 'Elephant, etc.' are already admitted (by us also) in the shape of imaginary Convention and the like; so that the argument adduced is entirely futile (the conclusion being admitted by us).
The term 'and so forth' is meant to include the Remembrance of Convention and such other things. If however what you intend to prove is the fact of the notions in question having causes other than the said Imaginary Convention and the like, then the reason adduced is inconclusive. This is shown by means of a Reductio ad Absurdum—'The existence of Number in Cognition, etc., etc.';—'The same cause',—i.e. the fact of being different from the notions (of Elephant, etc.).—What is meant is that the 'Number' involved in such notions as 'One Cognition', 'Two Cognitions', 'Five Actions', would be due to the same Cause; as here too 'the difference from the said notions' is present:—As a matter of fact the said Number is not due to this circumstance; hence the Reason is Inconclusive.—(645)

Further, you have explained that the number 'Two' which subsists in more than one substance is brought about by several 'unities' associated with the several Cognitions. But as a matter of fact, there can be no basis for such an assertion.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (646).

IF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE NUMBER BE EXPLAINED AS DEPENDENT UPON COGNITIONS,—THEN, WHY CANNOT THE NOTION BE ACCEPTED AS DUE TO MERE CONVENTION?—(646)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'mere' is meant to exclude such notions as 'one', 'two' and the rest, the genus constituted by these, and the relationship of these.

'Why cannot the notion, etc., etc.';—i.e. the notion of 'two', 'three', 'four' and so forth, that appear in connection with the numbered things,—why cannot this be accepted as brought about by mere Convention?—The advantage in this would be that it would not involve the assuming of the causality of anything whose potency is not perceived; for if such causality were assumed, then there would be an infinite number of such 'Causes'. It is far more reasonable therefore to postulate the 'unitary conception' itself as the requisite cause,—on the strength of positive and negative concomitance. Otherwise, it might be assumed that 'deities, getting at the Haritaki, bring about the movement of the bowels' [not the Haritaki itself].—As a matter of fact too, 'duality' and the rest, which have been held to be perceptible apart from things excluded from the 'aggregate' and such entities, are never perceived; nor are they compatible; because the existence of 'one' in 'many' has been denied, and 'genus' and 'subsistence' are going to be denied.—(646)

The following Text proceeds to deny 'Dimension':—
ON 'QUALITY' AS A CATEGORY.

TEXT (647).

'DIMENSION' HAS BEEN CLASSED AS 'LARGE', 'LONG' AND THE LIKE;
—WHY CANNOT IT BE REGARDED AS DUE TO DIVERSITY OF FORMS
IN THE THING ITSELF?—(647)

COMMENTARY.

The theory of the other Party is as follows:

"Dimension is the basis of all notions of size; it is of four kinds—(1) Large, (2) Small, (3) Long, (4) Short.—The 'Large' Dimension again is of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal;—the eternal, as also the Largest, Dimension subsists in Ākāśa, Time, Space and Soul; the 'non-eternal' Dimension subsists in the Triad and other substances.—Similarly the 'Small' Dimension also is of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal;—the eternal and also the smallest, Dimension, subsists in the Atom and the Mind,—in the shape of the 'atomic globule'; and the non-eternal Dimension subsists in the Diad only; it is also used in connection with such things as the Pearl, the Āmalaka-Fruit, the Bilva-fruit and the like, which are really 'large',—but only figuratively, on account of the absence of much 'largeness' in their 'large dimension'; e.g. the 'Large Dimension' of the Pearl is not of the same degree as that of the Āmalaka; and so on in regard to all things.—Question:—What is the difference between the Largeness and Length as subsisting in the Triad and the Smallness and Shortness subsisting in the Diad?—Answer:—As regards Largeness and Length, there is mutual distinction; for instance, we come across such varied expressions as 'from among the Large things, bring the Longer one', 'from among the Long things, bring the larger one'. As regards the distinction between 'smallness' and 'shortness', it is perceptible only to Mystics who alone see them."

In this scheme the 'Large' and the rest are held to be something different from Colour and the rest,—on the ground that they are apprehended by Cognitions other than cognitions of these latter, like Pleasure, etc.—In this Reasoning, if the Reason adduced is meant to consist in the fact that "Largeness, etc. are the objects of Sense-perception different from the Sense-perception of Colour and such things",—then, such a Reason is one that is 'unproven', not admitted; because as a matter of fact any such thing as the 'Large and other Dimension' is never found to appear in any Sense-perception, apart from the Colour and other things as they exist.—If then, it be held that the notion of 'small', 'large' and the like is a cognition that is entirely different from the cognition of Colour, etc.,—then the Reason becomes 'fallible', 'Inconclusive'; as there is nothing to invalidate a contrary conclusion. As a matter of fact there is nothing that really forms the object of the notion in question; as what is held to be such is a mere verbal figment. All that happens is that when the same Colour is seen turning towards the same direction,—and it is desired to bring out the difference between that Colour and other Colours,—there appears the notion, based upon preconceived convention, that it is 'large'. And this does not
justify the conviction that it is something altogether different. Consequently there is nothing apart from Colour, etc., that could be regarded as the object of that notion; and hence the Reason is one that is unproven.

The Proposition (or Conclusion) also is contrary to Perception; inasmuch as the 'large' and other dimensions, which are meant to be perceptible, are never perceived apart from Colour and other things.

Thus then, why cannot the 'Dimension' of things be regarded as of the same nature as Colour and the rest, but based on this difference, turning towards a direction different from that towards which other things turn? In so doing, the assumption of unseen and unreasonable things is avoided.—This is what is implied by the particle 'eva' in the Text.—Thus when several Colour, etc. are seen or touched, as turning towards the same direction, people come to speak of it as 'long'; and when the Colour, etc. seen or touched are fewer as compared to the former, they speak of it as 'short'. The same explanation may be applied to the notion of 'Large', etc. also.

As in the case of the denial of Colour and other qualities, so here also, the denial of the 'Large' and other dimensions may be set forth, on the basis of the alternatives—is it one or many?—(647)

Further, inasmuch as the Reason adduced is found even where the Probandum (character to be proved) is absent, its 'inconclusiveness' becomes all the more pronounced. This is shown in the following—

**TEXTS (648-649).**

A Line of Mansions is conceived of as 'large'; and yet no 'Dimension' commensurate with the form of the Line is assumed.

If it be said that it is spoken of as such on the basis of the quality subsisting in the same object (Mansion),—then the answer is that neither 'Largeness' nor 'Length' is ever meant to belong to Mansions.—(648-649)

**COMMENTARY.**

Even where the 'Largeness' as conceived by you is not present,—in such things, for instance, as the Line of Mansions—the notion of 'largeness' is found to appear.

It will not be right to assert that—"The largness subsists in the same Houses wherein the quality of 'line' (being in a line) is present, and on the strength of this inference in the same thing, the Line comes to be spoken of as Large";—because this would be contrary to the Opponent's own doctrine. This is what is meant by the words of the Text—'Neither Length, etc., etc.'.

'Dhāmasu'—in the Mansions, Palaces;—the Dimension—extending to a mile and so forth,—is not meant (by the Opponent) to be present in the Palaces.—(648-649)

**Question:**—"Why cannot such Dimension subsist in the Houses?"

**Answer:**—
TEXT (650).

The 'Palace' is held by you to be a 'conglomeration', which is a Quality; which, as such, cannot have Dimension (which is another Quality); nor can there be another 'line' of it. Nor can recourse be had to figurative expression.—(650)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, you regard the 'Palace' to be of the nature of Conjunction, Conglomeration, and hence a Quality; and not a composite substance, as it is not productive of heterogeneous substances. The said Quality cannot have Dimension; because your doctrine is that Qualities cannot reside in Qualities. For the same reason the Palace, which is one quality, cannot have a 'line' (or series), which is another quality; the expression 'line of Palaces' itself would be an absurdity; whence then could it be 'large' or 'small'? To explain further—'Line' (series) is held to be of the nature of 'Number'; and Number, as a Quality, can subsist only in a Substance, never in a Quality.—Even if 'line' or 'series' be regarded as of the nature of a 'Composite',—even so, the substratum of a Substance must be a Substance, not a Quality; so that the Line (a Substance) cannot subsist in the Palace (a Quality).—If 'Line' be held to be of the nature of Genus,—even so, as the Genus subsists in its complete form in every one of its component Individuals, even a single Palace could be called a 'Line',—like the Tree. This has been thus asserted—'Though the House is a Conglomeration (Conjunction), how can there be a line of it? If it were a genus, then even a single Palace might be called a Line'.—With regard to the Line (series) also, the notion of 'Long', 'Large' and so forth is equally impossible; as in the Palace, of which it is a substratum, the quality of 'one-ness' and the like is not present; and as regards the Wood and other materials (that go to make up the Palace), the intended Length, etc. are absent in them.

Then again, when there are several 'Lines of Palaces', it would not be possible to have the notion of 'Line' and 'Line' extending over all; as one genus cannot have another genus. This has been thus asserted—'Where there are several Lines, how can that term be applied? The genus cannot have another genus'.

Nor can it be right to seek shelter under 'figurative expression'; as the notion of 'largeness' is not found to be fallible in reference to things like the Line; and hence it cannot be regarded as figurative. What is not different from the direct connotation cannot be regarded as 'figurative'; otherwise it would lead to absurdities. This has been thus declared—'The notion of Largeness in regard to the Line, which has been held to be figurative, cannot be figurative, as it is the object of a Cognition which is in no way different from the direct connotation of the term'.—(650)

"There is the notion that 'this is separate from that'; and on the strength of this notion even a thing that is in contact with another thing is differentiated from it;—and that which is the cause or basis of this differentia-
tion is called ‘Separateness’ (a distinct Quality—according to the Naiyāyikas). This ‘Separateness’ is something different from the Jar and other things,—because it forms the object of a cognition different from the cognition of these latter, as in the case dealt with before.’

Such is the view of the other party (the Naiyāyika). Here also, as in the case of ‘Dimension’, the Reason is open to the charge of being ‘Un-proven’ and ‘Inconclusive’.—With this idea in his mind, the Author adds the following—

TEXT (651).

THE NOTION OF ‘BEING APART’, WHICH IS ASSUMED AS BEING DUE TO THE QUALITY OF ‘SEPARATENESS’,—WHY HAS IT NOT BEEN HELD TO REST IN THE VARIOUS THINGS OF DIVERGENT CHARACTERS?—(651)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, as a matter of fact, no such thing as ‘Separateness’ as distinct from Colour, etc. ever appears in Perception; so that the fact of its being cognised by a cognition different from the cognition of Colour, etc. cannot be admitted. Hence inasmuch as, while being perceptible, the intended quality is not perceived, it must be taken to be non-existent.—Nor can it be regarded as proved by the definite cognition ‘this is separate’. Because those same things, Colour and the rest,—existing in their own character—when conceived of in relation to other things, from which they are found to be differentiated,—become the basis of the notion of the things being ‘separate’; and hence the said notion cannot prove the existence of any other thing (apart from those things themselves).—Hence the notion of ‘being apart’, which is described as proceeding from the quality of ‘separateness’,—why cannot that notion be held to rest in heterogeneous and homogeneous characters? That is, it is best to regard it as resting upon that. This shows the ‘inconclusiveness’ of the Reason adduced by the other party. The compound ‘vibhīnna, etc.’ is to be expounded accordingly. —(651)

The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason cited is present in the contrary of the Probandum also:—

TEXT (652).

JUST AS COGNITION, PLEASURE AND THE REST, BEING DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER, ARE SPOKEN OF AS ‘SEPARATE’, AND HENCE BECOME THE BASIS OF THAT NOTION (OF SEPARATENESS), INDEPENDENTLY OF ANYTHING ELSE,—SO WOULD OTHER THINGS ALSO.—(652)

COMMENTARY.

In Pleasure and other Qualities, the Quality of ‘separateness’ cannot subsist; because Qualities are devoid of Qualities (under the Opponent’s
ON 'QUALITY' AS A CATEGORY.

Doctrine); and yet they are spoken of as 'separate', in the sense that they are mutually exclusive; and as such they become the 'basis'—cause—of that notion of 'being separate'. In the same manner, the Jar and other things also, which have been regarded as 'substance', should be devoid of any such quality as 'Separateness', distinct from themselves.—Nor can the said notion be said to be 'figurative'; as it does not differ in any way from the 'direct' notion.—Such is the sense of the Text.

Or, the Text may be taken as showing the notion of 'being separate' to be not based upon anything apart from the things concerned, and thereby points out the annulment of the Opponent's Conclusion by Inference.—This Inference may be formulated as follows:—Things that are mutually exclusive are not the substrata of any such quality as 'separateness', apart from themselves,—like Pleasure, etc.,—Jar and other things are mutually exclusive;—hence this is a natural Reason (for believing that the Jar, etc. cannot be the substratum of any such quality as 'Separateness').

It is impossible for any one thing to subsist in many things. As for Subsistence (which the Naiyāyika postulates as subsisting in many things), it is going to be rejected later on; and hence there can be no such relation as 'Subsistence'. An argument annulling the said notion is also available in the shape of the possibility of such relation being not present in Pleasure and the rest.—(652)

The Author next proceeds to criticise the qualities of Conjunction and Disjunction:—

TEXT (653).

Conjunction and Disjunction as restricted to substances have been postulated by others as causes of the notions of 'being joined' and the like; these are entirely useless.—(653)

COMMENTARY.

The Opponent's scheme is that—"Conjunction and Disjunction are the bases, respectively, of the notions of 'being joined' and 'being disjoined'; they consist in the contact of what has not been in contact, and the ceasing of contact of what has been in contact;—and that they are brought about by the action of either one or of both, as also by Conjunction and Disjunction".

All this is a mere scheme; and there is no proof for the idea that these are real entities; hence they have been needlessly postulated by the other philosophers.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—That in support of which there is no proof (no means of Cognition) can never be regarded by intelligent persons as 'existing',—e.g. 'the Son of the Barren Woman';—the other party have no proof in support of 'Conjunction', and 'Disjunc-
tion'; hence there is non-perception of the wider condition (which makes the less extensive conclusion impossible).—(653)

The following Texts (654–663) set forth the arguments adduced by Uddyotakara, which are calculated to show that the Author's own Reasons are 'Unproven' (Not admitted):

TEXTS (654–657).

"If there were no Conjunction, then the Soil, the Seed, the Water and the Earth and such things should be always producing their effects; as there would be no ground for differentiation. —As a matter of fact however, the Soil, the Seed, the Water and such things are always found to require something else in the producing of their effects;—like the stick, the wheel and water, etc. (in the making of Jar). That thing which they require is Conjunction; and as it has a particular characteristic, it is regarded as distinct (from other things). When one is told to 'bring two conjoined things', he brings only those two things in which he perceives the Conjunction, avoiding everything else."—(654–657)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows [in Nyāyavārtika on 2. 1. 33, Page 221, Bib. Ind.]:—"If Conjunction were not a distinct thing, then, of such things as the soil, the seed, etc.—each itself being always there,—they would always produce their effects in the form of the sprout, etc. As a matter of fact however, they do not do so. Hence from the fact of the non-production of the effects always, it is understood that the soil, etc. require the help of some other thing, in the producing of the effect in the shape of the sprout; just as in the producing of the Jar, the Clay, the Stick, the Water, the Thread, etc. require the help of the Potter. Hence it is established that this something else that they need is Conjunction.

"Then again, the Conjunction between two substances is perceived as a qualification of those substances, and hence it is directly perceived as something different from those substances. For instance, when someone is told by another person to 'bring two conjoined things', he brings only those two things in which he perceives the Conjunction, and not any Substance at random. If the Conjunction were not something real and different, he might bring anything.

"All these arguments put inversely are to be used in proving the existence of Disjunction."—(654–657)
TEXT (658).

"If Conjunction and Disjunction were not there, then to what would such distinct notions be due as—'This thing is attached to it'—'This is detached from it'?"—(658)

COMMENTARY.

"Further, even when there is no other difference between two things, one is said to be 'attached to it', and another to be 'detached from it';—how could there be such diverse notions, if Conjunction and Disjunction did not exist, as something distinct, in the two things? A particular notion in regard to a thing cannot be possible without the presence of something peculiar; otherwise everything would be possible always and everywhere."

—(658)

TEXTS (659-660).

"It sometimes happens that even when one thing is really detached from another, it is perceived as attached to it,—and when the thing is really close to another, it is perceived as detached from it;—there are these two misconceptions. And a misconception has always some primary factor as its counterpart. This primary factor has to be pointed out in the two misconceptions cited. If such a primary factor is asserted, Conjunction and Disjunction become established."

—(659-660)

COMMENTARY.

"Further, it so happens sometimes that, even the Dhava and Khadira trees are really detached from one another, and to a man standing at a distance, they appear to be close (attached) together; and in the case of the line of Cranes seated on the thin top of a tree, even though they are close together, yet they appear as if detached; both these cognitions—apprehending things as they are not,—are false, misconceptions. And as a matter of fact, no misconception is ever produced without the apprehension of a primary factor; for instance, unless a man has had the perception of the Cow, he cannot have the misconception, as 'Cow', of the Gavaya; so that there must be some primary factor pointed out as the basis of the said two misconceptions. When such a primary factor is pointed out, the existence of Conjunction and Disjunction would become established. Apart from these two, there can be no basis for the said notion."

—(659-660)
"Then again, on what basis is the notion of 'the man with earrings' produced? It could not proceed from the mere presence of the Man and the Ear-ring; for in that case, the said notion would be there always.—Further, it is only something that has been perceived to be present in one place that is denied in another place. If Conjunction has not been perceived, then how does it come to be denied in such expressions as 'Chaitra is without Ear-rings'? Hence it follows that there is some such real thing in the shape of Conjunction, whose affirmation and denial proceed with due distinction."—(661-663)

COMMENTARY.

"Then again, when there appears the notion that 'Devadatta is wearing Earrings',—on what basis does it appear? This needs to be explained. The said notion cannot be due to the mere presence of the Man and the Ear-ring; as Devadatta and the Ear-ring being lasting entities, the notion should appear constantly (even when Devadatta would not be wearing the Ear-ring).

"Further, it is only when a certain thing has been perceived to be present in a certain place that the notion of the negation of its presence is found to appear in reference to another place; under the circumstances, if you have never perceived Conjunction to be present, then how could you have the distinct notions of Chaitra being 'with Ear-rings' and 'without Ear-rings'? What is denied by the expression 'Chaitra is without Ear-rings' is not the Ear-ring, because it having been assumed to be existent in another place and at another time, it could not be denied entirely. Nor can it be the denial of Chaitra, the man; as he stands on the same footing as the Ear-ring. Hence what is denied must be Chaitra's contact (Conjunction) with the Ear-ring.—Similarly by the affirmative expression 'Chaitra with the Ear-ring', what is affirmed is neither the Ear-ring, nor Chaitra,—as both these are well-established entities;—hence, by elimination, all that can be affirmed is the Conjunction between these two, which has not been cognised by any other means.—From all this it follows that, there is such a real thing as Conjunction (and Disjunction), by virtue of which there appear such distinct affirmative and negative notions as 'Chaitra with Ear-rings' and 'Chaitra without Ear-rings'.

"The term 'ādi' is meant to include the notion of 'qualification', as pointed out before."—(661-663)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to answer the above arguments of Uddyotakara:
ON 'QUALITY AS A CATEGORY.

TEXT (664).

THE ANSWER TO THE ABOVE IS AS FOLLOWS:—THE WATER AND THE REST DO NOT REMAIN THE SAME, AS ALL THINGS ARE MOMENTARY.—

EVEN WHEN EXISTENT, THEY STAND IN NEED OF THAT CONDITION IN WHICH THERE IS NOTHING INTERVENING BETWEEN THEM.—(664)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued under Text 654 above that—"Seed, etc. would always be producing their effects"; but the reason that has been urged—that they are not differentiated—i.e. they remain the same,—is not true, not admitted by us; because all things being in 'perpetual flux', it is only in a particularly differentiated condition that they are productive of their effects.

It has been argued under Text 655 above, that—"The soil, etc. are dependent upon something else, etc.".—If this is meant to prove merely the general fact that they are 'dependent',—then the argument is superfluous (proving what is already admitted by us); this is what is shown by the words 'Even when existent, etc. etc.'; that is, it is held by us also that the seed, etc.—even when existent,—become capable of producing their effects in the shape of the sprout only when they are in that condition in which there is nothing intervening between them and so forth; so that on this point the argument of the Opponent is superfluous.—The term 'avyava-dhana' means that condition in which there is nothing intervening and so forth.—The phrase 'so forth' includes such factors as the absence of obstruction, etc.; that is to say, that particular condition in which (a) there is nothing intervening, (b) there is no remoteness among them, (c) there is no obstruction by a contrary force;—all these being obstacles to the appearance of the effect. And as the 'condition' of a thing is nothing different from the thing itself, the argument put forward does not prove the existence of Conjunction as something distinct.

If then what is intended by you to prove is the fact of the Seed, etc. being dependent upon a different thing in the shape of what you call 'Conjunction',—then, as your Reason, not being found to be concomitant with any such character, becomes 'Inconclusive'; and the Corroborative instance also is devoid of the Probandum. This is what is meant by the Text.—(664)

The following might be urged:—"How do you know that the soil and the rest are dependent upon a particular condition of their own, in becoming the cause of producing the effect in the shape of the sprout,—and they are not dependent upon the Conjunction of something different from themselves? and it is on the strength of this that you urge against us the fact of our argument being superfluous if mere dependence is meant to be proved".

The answer to this is provided in the following—
TEXT (665).

If the water, etc. needed the Conjunction only, then they would appear immediately on their coming together (Conjunction),—or not appear at all.—(665)

COMMENTARY.

If the Soil, Water and the rest needed only their Conjunction to bring about their effect in the shape of the sprout, then it should come about as soon as they come into contact with one another; because the Cause would be there in its perfect form,—exactly as it does later on. If the effect does not appear immediately on their first contact, then it should not appear at all, even later on; as the Cause would even then be as defective as on the previous occasion. Nor would it be reasonable to suppose that the soil, etc. are dependent upon Conjunction which does not help them at all; as such a theory would lead to absurdities.—Nor again is it right to regard the Conjunction as appearing only occasionally; as the cause (basis) in the shape of the soil, etc. is always there.—It might be held that—"in the bringing about of the Conjunction also, there is need for such forces as those of 'Destiny' and the like".—But this cannot be right; because the same objection would be applicable against that view also. For instance, what would be the answer to the question—'Why does not the said Destiny bring about the effect at once?'.—The answer might be that—"it does not do so, because the requisite urge is absent in the Cause".—Then comes the Question—why should there be this absence of the requisite urge?—Such Questions would be everywhere inevitable under the theory of Causes being permanent entities.—For one, on the other hand, who holds all things to be impermanent (momentary),—as the chain of all (momentary) causes is beginningless, there can be no possibility of the anomaly of all things being produced at one and the same time; because the succeeding causes would all be restricted by the preceding ones (in the same Chain), and hence the Causes of these could not be present at the same time by reason of their own causes not being present in their perfect condition. Thus it is only under your doctrine that there is possibility of the anomaly of the Soil, etc. producing the sprout at all times; hence it becomes established that the Soil, etc. do not require any such distinct thing as 'Conjunction'.—(665)

It has been asserted (under Text 656 above) that—"as Conjunction has a particular characteristic it is regarded as distinct".—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (666).

When a man sees two things having come close together by themselves, he brings those things in that condition (when told to do so).—(666)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, what falls within the range of the perceiver's vision is not any distinct thing in the shape of Conjunction, by noticing which he
brings up the 'Conjoined things'; what happens is that he notices that the
two things, which were previously in the condition in which there was an
interval of space between them, have subsequently come into the condition
in which they have come into juxtaposition,—these things come to be
spoken of as 'conjoined things'; as it has been already proved that the
term 'Conjunction' connotes only a particular condition of things. So
that whenever one finds two things in this particular condition in which they
become expressible by the term 'conjoined things', one brings these, and
none others. No intelligent person ever acts on the strength of words, in
regard to what is not expressed by those words.—(666)

It has been argued (under Text 658, above) that—'To what would such
distinct notions be due as 'this thing is attached to it—this is detached
from it' ?'

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (667).

WHEN A THING IS PRODUCED IN THE detached FORM, IT BECOMES THE
BASIS FOR THE NOTION OF BEING 'DETACHED'; ON THE OTHER
HAND, WHEN IT IS PRODUCED IN THE attached FORM, IT
BECOMES THE BASIS OF THE NOTION OF BEING 'AT-
ACHED' ;—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE House,
THE VindhyA mountain AND THE Himālaya
mountain.—(667)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, it is a distinct object that is produced in a particular
form that becomes the basis of a distinct notion; hence the Reason urged by
the Opponent is Inconclusive. This is the upshot of the Text as a whole.

The construction is—'the thing that is produced in the detached form
becomes the basis for the notion of being detached'.—On the other hand,—
i.e. when it is produced as not-detached.

'Just as in the case of the House, etc. etc.' ;—these form examples of the
said two notions.—Even under the doctrine of the opposite party, when
two Houses have been produced as attached to one another, and are therefore
of the nature of Conjunction itself,—there is no other Conjunction which
serves as the basis of their being 'attached';—similarly when two Houses
have been produced as detached, there is no other Disjunction which forms the
basis of the notion of their being 'detached'.—In the case of the Himālaya
and VindhyA Mountains also, the notion of their being 'detached' is not due
to any other thing in the shape of 'Disjunction',—because your own idea
is that 'Disjunction consists in separation following after Contact' [and
certainly there never has been any contact between the two mountains].
—(667)
It has been argued (under Text 659, above) that—"the notion of being attached that appears with regard to what is detached, etc. etc."—The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXTS (668-669).

A MISCONCEPTION DOES NOT APPEAR ALWAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PRIMARY CONCEPTION; FOR INSTANCE, THE NOTION OF 'TWO MOONS' APPEARS INDEPENDENTLY OF ITS SIMILARITY TO ANY OTHER (PRIMARY) NOTION, THROUGH SOME INTERNAL DERANGEMENT, WHILE THE MIND IS TURNED ELSEWHERE.—OR, THE REQUISITE 'PRIMARY' IN THE CASE IN QUESTION MAY BE THAT SAME THING WHICH HAS BEEN PRODUCED IN THE ATTACHED FORM AND THE LIKE (BUT IS MISCONCEIVED AS BEING DETACHED OR OTHERWISE).—(668-669)

COMMENTARY.

That all Misconceptions appear only through the perception of similarity (to a primary) cannot be admitted; because there are some misconceptions which are produced, independently of all similarity, merely through some disorder in the sense-organs. For instance, when a man has the fancies of his Mind turned elsewhere, though what is actually before the eyes is a single Moon, yet, on account of the sense-organ concerned (the Eyes) being deranged by disease and darkness, there appears the cognition furnished by the form of two Moons; and this is quite clear and free from all taint of being entirely fanciful.

The phrase 'while the Mind is turned elsewhere' shows that the notion of 'two moons' is entirely indeterminate in character; the idea being that in an indeterminate notion, there can be no perception of similarity; as this latter is always in the form of the cognition of some sort of unity between the thing seen now and that seen previously; and as such, it must be of the nature of some verbal expression relative to the previously perceived thing.

Or, granting that the previous Misconception is in the wake of a Primary Cognition,—even so, what the other party desires cannot be proved.—This is what is shown by the words—'Or, the requisite Primary, etc. etc.'—The phrase 'and the like' is meant to include the thing born in the detached form. What is meant is that the same thing,—produced as attached or detached,—when conceived of as precluding things of the other kind, comes to be spoken by a name applied to it in accordance with that (attached or detached) form which has been perceived first; and this may be regarded as the Primary (of the later misconception of the same attached thing as detached, or vice versa). So that the argument adduced by you does not prove what is desired by you.—(668-669)
ON 'QUALITY' AS A CATEGORY.

It has been argued (under Text 661, above) that—"The notion of the man with the Ear-ring, etc. etc."—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (670).

The notion of 'the Man with the Ear-ring' arises only with reference to Chaitra (the Man) and the Ear-ring, in whom a particular condition has come about; and it only appears as if the cognition were of 'Conjunction' (between the two).—(670)

COMMENTARY.

Just as what is called 'Conjunction' comes into existence only when Chaitra and the Ear-ring appear in a certain state,—and not always;—in the same manner, the notion also of 'the man with the Ear-ring' is due to a particular state of things, and as such, why should it appear always?

The compound 'Jātāvasadhāvishēsayoh' is to be explained as 'the two, Chaitra and the Ear-ring, in whom a particular state has been produced'.—(670)

It has been argued (under Text 662, above) that—"It is only something that has been perceived to be present in one place that is denied in another place, etc. etc."—The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (671).

It is the one peculiar condition seen in one place which is denied in another place.—As regards the notion 'Chaitra is without the Ear-ring', it is not Conjunction that is denied; for the simple reason that this Conjunction has never been seen.—(671)

COMMENTARY.

The notion in question has been explained as being based upon a certain state of things; and when this state of things, which should be perceptible, is not perceived under another state of things,—then there is its denial (in regard to this latter state of things); —and what is denied is not the Conjunction that is assumed by you. For the simple reason that the 'Conjunction' has never appeared in any Cognition, apart from the things to which it is held to belong.
Thus our Reason is not open to the charge of being ‘Unproven’.—(671)

The following might be urged (by the Opponent)—"If we have not been able to produce proofs in support of Conjunction,—what is your proof in annulment of it?"

The answer is provided by the following—

**TEXTS (672–674).**

The notion of things being ‘Conjunct’ cannot be due to the Conjunction postulated by the other party,—(A) because it is the notion of ‘being conjunct’;—like the notion of ‘being conjunct’ in connection with the mansion and such things;—or (B) because it appears only when there is more than one thing,—like the cognitions of several differentiated yarns.—The same two arguments may be urged mutatis mutandis, against Disjunction also.—And the reason annulling (both these Conceptions of Conjunction and Disjunction) consists in the fact that it cannot be right for one thing to subsist in more things than one.—(672–674)

**COMMENTARY.**

The arguments may be formulated as follows:—The notion of ‘being conjunct’ is based upon the mere Object, which has nothing to do with the Conjunction postulated by you,—just like the same notion in such expressions as ‘the conjunct houses’,—and the notion of ‘Chaitra with the Earring’ is the notion of ‘being conjunct’; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as due to the nature of the thing itself).—Or, that which appears on the coming together of several things follows from the things themselves entirely devoid of the Conjunction postulated by you,—as the notion of several yarns lying apart from one another;—the notion of ‘being conjunct’ is a notion of this kind;—hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as due to the nature of the things themselves).

‘Yuktadhīḥ’,—i.e. the notion of two things being conjunct.

These same two arguments may be put forward also for denying ‘Disjunction’:—(a) Because it is the notion of ‘being disjunct’,—or (b) because
its appearance is dependent upon the absence of several things,—the notion of 'being disjunct', in the case of two rams and such things, must be due to the particular things themselves, irrespectively of the 'Disjunction' postulated by the other party,—just like the notion of 'being disjunct' that appears in relation to two Rams living far apart, or that which appears in relation to the Himālaya and the Vindhya Mountains.

*Question*: "What is the reason that annuls the conclusion contrary to the Probandum in the above reasonings,—which would preclude the presence of the Reason in something where the Probandum is known to be absent?"

*Answer*: "The reason annulling, etc. etc."—That is, the fact that the subsistence of one thing in several things cannot be right, has been shown in detail in the Chapter on the 'Composite Whole', under Text 607 (above); hence it is not set forth here.—(672–674)

The author proceeds to set forth objections against the Qualities of 'Priority' and 'Posteriority':

**TEXTS (675-676).**

**The name (and idea) of 'Priority' and 'Posteriority' have been assumed as the basis of the notions of 'fore' and 'aft',—as these notions cannot be determined in reference to Space and Time.—But just as the Blue and other colours, which come into existence in succession (one after the other), come to be spoken of 'fore' and 'aft', without reference to distinctions due to any other conditions,—so would the said notions be in regard to other things also.— *(675-676)*

**COMMENTARY.**

[The position of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika is as follows]—"That from which arise the notions 'this is before' and 'this is after' are the Qualities named 'Priority' and 'Posteriority', which are the basis of the said notions of 'fore' and 'aft' respectively.—The term 'ādi' is meant to include the idea also of 'fore' and 'aft'. The argument may be formulated as follows:—The idea of 'fore' and 'aft' must be based upon something other than the Jar and other things, because it is different in character from the idea of these latter,—like the idea of Pleasure, etc.—For instance, when two objects are standing towards the same direction, there appears the notion 'this is
fore and that is aft'; this notion cannot be due to Space (Direction);—nor can it be due to Time; because even when two persons, one old and the other young, are present at the same time, but in uncertain directions, there appears the distinct notion of 'fore' and 'aft' (Senior and Junior); so that this distinction is there even though there is no difference in Time. Apart from these two—Space and Time,—there is nothing else which could be regarded as the basis of the notions in question. Hence it becomes established that what form the basis of these notions are the Qualities of 'Priority' and 'Posteriority'.—'These notions cannot be determined in reference to Space and Time';—that is to say, it cannot be held to be in reference to near and far objects in contact with points in Space and Time.

—The terms 'Space' and 'Time' are used here figuratively, in the sense of objects in contact with points of Space and Time. So that what is meant is that Priority and Posteriority,—both kinds—have been explained by other people as being due to Space and Time. The manner in which these are said to be produced by Space is as follows:—When two objects are standing in the same direction,—then, in reference to the point near any one observer, taken as the standard-point, there appears, in regard to the object wherein Posteriority subsists, the notion of its being 'far off';—and on the basis of this idea, from the contact of the further point in Space, the Quality of Posteriority becomes produced;—and taking a point further removed from the observer as the standard-point, there arises the idea of the object being 'near', in reference to the object wherein Priority subsists; and from the contact of this with another point in Space, the Quality of Priority becomes produced.—The manner in which these Qualities are produced in reference to Time is as follows:—Between an old and a young man standing at the present time, in varying directions,—with regard to that person whose contacts with sunrise and sunset are deduced to have been larger in number,—from his wrinkles, grey hairs, growing beard and so forth,—there arises the idea of his being 'old' (Prior) in reference to the standard-point provided by the other man; and on the basis of this idea, from the contact of another point of Time, the Quality of 'Priority' becomes produced;—and from the standard-point provided by the older man, the idea of the other man having had lesser contacts with sunrise and sunset is deduced from the fact of his being 'beardless' and so forth,—from which arises the idea of 'nearness' (proximity) in regard to the younger man; and through this idea, out of the contact of another point of Time, the quality of 'Posteriority' becomes produced.'

The Text proceeds to show that the above Reasoning in support of Priority and Posteriority is 'Inconclusive', on account of the Reason being present in the contrary of the Probandum also—'Just as the Blue, etc. etc.'—'Bhāva' is existence, and the 'vyavasthīti' qualified by this is coming into existence; when this is 'kramēṇa', in succession, [it serves as the reason for what is going to be said]. That is to say, in the case of Blue, etc., on account of their coming into existence in succession (one after the other), the whole phenomenon is regulated by the conditions of Time, not by the conditions of any Quality,—and hence we have such notions of Priority and Posteriority as 'this is the prior or earlier Blue' and 'that the posterior
or later Blue',—even in the absence of any such Qualities as Priority and Posteriority; because no Quality can subsist in a Quality;—why cannot the same be accepted in the case of the Jar and other things also?

What is meant by this is as follows:—If what is meant by the Opponent is to prove the mere fact of being dependent on something else, then the Reason adduced is 'Inconclusive', as it is present in the contrary of the Probandum also.—If what is meant to be proved is the fact that the notion in question is based upon the particular Quality brought about by the eternal substances of Time and Space,—then there can be no Corroborative Instance.

—The conclusion is also annulled by Inference; for instance, it is possible to set up the following inference—The notion of 'Fore' and 'Aft.' is based upon a certain regularity in the successive appearance of things without any such quality as has been postulated by the other party,—because it is the notion of 'Fore' and 'Aft.'—like the notion of 'Fore' and 'Aft.' in regard to Colour and such things;—the notion in question in regard to Jar, etc. also is such a notion of 'Fore' and 'Aft.';—hence it is a natural reason (for regarding it as being based upon the said regularity, etc.).

It might be argued by the Opponent that—"In the case of the Blue, etc., the notion of Priority of Posteriority is figurative, based upon the notion subsisting in the same object as the Blue, etc.; and hence the Reason is not open to the fallacy of 'Inconclusiveness'; and inasmuch as, in the case of the Blue, etc. also, the qualities of Priority, etc. are admitted to form the basis of the said notion, the Corroborative Instance cited is not devoid of the Probandum."

But this cannot be so; it has been already answered by the statement that as the notion is not found to be fallible, it cannot be regarded as 'figurative'; and further, as the two qualities are not perceived even in their own substratum, it is not right to accept any notion as based upon it; how then could it ever be based upon it in the case of Blue and the rest?—What too could be assumed to be the basis in the case of such things as Pleasure and the like? As there is no co-subistence in the same substratum.

Further, as Time and Space have already been rejected above, they cannot be regarded as existent; the 'Priority' and 'Posteriority' based upon these should also be regarded as non-existent; how then could the notion be believed to be based upon those? Consequently any such idea cannot save the Reason from being 'Inconclusive'.—According to you again, Time and Space have no parts, from contact with which, as associated with 'unitary conception', the notion of 'Priority' and 'Posteriority' could be produced; the reason for this lying in their being essentially one and without parts. Nor can it be right to seek explanation for a state of things in a merely imaginary 'part' conceived figuratively; as all such assumptions are restricted within well-defined limits by the real state of things; and what is merely 'figurative' is essentially unreal and false. Hence our Reason is not Inconclusive.

As for the Reason adduced by the Opponent, it may be pointed out that it is 'Unproven', 'not admissible'.—(675-676)

With the following Texts, the Author anticipates and answers the arguments adduced in favour of such qualities as 'Number' and the rest:
If it be held that—"*Number, Conjunction and the rest cannot be non-different from Substance, because they serve to characterise and differentiate this latter,—like the Stick*.—Then [our answer is that] there is proving of what is admitted by us, if what is meant is that they have an *illusory existence*; because what is *imaginary* cannot be defined either as *this* or *not this*.—

(677-678)

**COMMENTARY.**

Says the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*—"*All the above-mentioned qualities, Number and the rest, cannot be non-different from Substance,—because they serve to characterise and differentiate Substances;—when one thing differentiates another, it cannot be non-different from the latter,—just as the stick, which differentiates Devadatta, cannot be the same as Devadatta.*"

If what is meant to prove by this argument is simply the denial of these being the same as Substance, then it is open to the charge of being futile. Because all things that have an *illusory or imaginary existence* are *non-entities*, and as such it cannot be asserted in regard to them as to whether they are the same as, or different from, anything. And this is what is admitted by us also.—(677-678)

The following *Text* anticipates the Answer given to the above by *Aviddhakarna* :

**TEXT (679).**

*If the fact of the *Group* and such things being *undesirable* is denied (by the opponent) on the ground that they have distinctive features,—just like Colour, Sound, Taste and other things,—[then our answer is as given in the next Text].*—(679)

**COMMENTARY.**

He has argued as follows:—"*The particular states of the Group and the Chain are not incapable of being defined as this or not-this,—because they are endowed with distinctive features,—just like Colour, Taste and such things.*"—(679)
The following Text supplies the answer to this argument (of Aviddha-karṇa):—

TEXTS (680-681).


COMMENTARY.

If what is meant to be the Reason is the presence of real specific properties, then it cannot be regarded as ‘admitted’ (by both parties); because for the Baudhāyaṇa, it cannot be admitted that the ‘Chain’ and other things which have merely ‘illusory existence’ are endowed with any real specific properties.—If however the Reason is meant to be put forward only in a vague general sort of way, then such imaginary properties as ‘non-existence’, ‘incorporeality’ etc. are present also in the ‘sky-lotus’ and such things;—hence the Reason adduced becomes ‘fallible’, ‘inconclusive’.

‘Even when stated in this form’,—i.e. if the assertion is made in a vague general sort of way, without reference to any well-determined specific properties.

For the following reason also the Reason is ‘fallible—inconclusive’:—Because ‘non-difference’—sameness—and ‘difference’—being something else,—rest always in an object,—not anywhere else. The ‘Chain’ and other things have a mere ‘ideal’ existence, and as such are not objects; how then could there be any difference or non-difference from these?

Thus then, it has been shown that, in the first argument (propounded by Aviddhakarṇa), if what is meant to be proved is merely the denial of the non-difference of Number, etc. from Substance,—then there is ‘futility’.—(680-681)

It might be argued that—‘it is not more denial of non-difference that we seek to establish, but, in view of the fact that two negatives make one affirmative, by means of the two negatives we are seeking to prove the difference of Number, etc. from Substance’.

This is the reasoning that is refuted in the following text:—
TEXT (682).

Thus then, if what is meant to be asserted is that Number and the rest are other than (different from) Substance,—then the reason becomes open to the fallacy of 'Having no substratum',—because Number and the rest are not admitted at all.

—(682)

COMMENTARY.

That is, what the other party seeks to prove is not that they are not non-different, but that they are different.—(682)

The following Text shows how Number and the rest are devoid of substratum:—

TEXT (683).

If it is Substance itself, as diversified through 'Group', etc., that is spoken of as such,—then what the argument would prove would be the difference of Substance from itself—thus involving self-contradiction.—

(683)

COMMENTARY.

'Is spoken of as such' ;—i.e. as 'one', 'two' and so forth.

It might be argued that—"what is to be proved is the difference of Number, etc. which are only forms of Substance."

The answer to this is—'What the argument would prove, etc.' ;—i.e. no entity can be different from its own form; as it would become devoid of its own character.—'Self-contradiction',—i.e. contradiction of one another; because 'Difference' and 'Non-difference', being of the nature of exclusion and inclusion, cannot co-exist in any single object.

Thus have all qualities ending with 'Posteriority' been rejected. The rest of the qualities (postulated by the Nyāya-Vaishēṣika)—beginning with Cognition and ending with effort—have been held to subsist in the Soul. They should therefore be taken as discarded by the rejection of the Soul itself.

As a matter of fact however, the Soul cannot be the substratum of these qualities. Because the Soul could be the substratum of these, either as being the cause of their production, or as being the cause of their subsistence. It cannot be the cause of their production, because,
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the Cause (Soul) being always there in its perfect form, Pleasure and other effects would be produced always; nor can there be any dependence upon auxiliaries for a Cause in which no peculiar properties can be produced by anything else; as has been reiterated hundreds of times.—Nor again can an eternal Substance have the capacity of producing effects; as such production could only be either successive or simultaneous, and it has been explained that in the case of an eternal substance there is incongruity both in successive and simultaneous activity.—Nor again can the Soul be the cause of the subsistence (of the Qualities in question); because 'subsistence' has no other form than that of the 'Subsistent' itself; so that if the Soul were said to be the cause of subsistence, it would mean that it is the cause of the subsistent thing itself; and this idea has just been rejected. Then again, the subsistent thing being a well-established entity, it can have no cause at all; as there would be nothing therein that could be done by the Cause.—Even if the subsistence were something different from the subsistent thing, there could be nothing done by the cause in the latter, as it will have brought about only the subsistence, which ex-hypothesi is something different. And thus not producing anything in the subsistent thing, how could the Soul be its substratum?—Nor will it be right to urge that—"inasmuch as the Soul will have produced the subsistence related to the subsistent thing, it would be a helper of the latter; because the said relationship is not yet proved.—As a matter of fact, the Soul cannot be regarded as the cause of the subsistence; because an eternal thing can have no such causal potency,—as has been explained before.

Further, the entity (in the shape of subsistence) that is established (by the Soul)—would it be of permanent nature? or evanescent? If the latter, then how can it be established by something else? It would lose its character. If, on the other hand, it is permanent, then also its establishment (Cause) would be futile; as by its very nature, the subsistence would be there always.

Further, as regards corporeal things, it is possible to assume for them, a substratum which prevents their falling downwards; for the things in question however, which are incorporeal,—such as Pleasure and the rest,—there can be no falling downward; then what would the 'substratum' do for them?

Lastly, for what cannot be spoken of either as existent or as non-existent, there can be no subsisting at all.

In this manner Pleasure and other Qualities may be shown mutatis mutandis to be incapable of being regarded as subsistent; from which it follows that there can be no such thing as 'Quality'.

Then again, Buddha has been accepted by the other party as being of the nature of Jñāna, Cognition,—as declared in the following Sūtra—"Buddhi, Upalabdhi, Jñāna, are synonyms" (Nyāyasūtra 1. 1. 15). Even though Buddha is of this nature, yet the other party have not admitted any such form of it as is apprehended by itself; in fact they regard it as apprehended by another Buddha. Thus, not having a self-sufficient existence, like Colour and other things,—it cannot rightly be regarded even as Buddhi. This is going to be explained later on.—(683)
Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Hatred and Effort,—are Qualities that have been held to be distinct from Cognition (Buddhi). These we are going to reject in course of the examination of the Means of Right Cognition (Chapters 17, 18 and 19).

As regards the Qualities of Gravity, Fluidity and Viscidity,—these are to be rejected in the same way as Colour and the rest.

In view of this, the Author proceeds next to reject the Quality of Momentum (Sañaṣkāra):—

**TEXTS (684-685).**

**MOMENTUM HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS BEING OF THREE KINDS—NAMED 'Vēga', VELOCITY,—'Bhāvanā', IMPRESSION,—AND 'Sthitasthāpaka', ELASTICITY'.—ALL THIS HOWEVER IS NOT COMPATIBLE;—BECAUSE THINGS BEING MOMENTARY, THERE CAN BE NO ACTION IN THEM, OF THE CONTINUITY OF WHICH THE MOMENTUM NAMED 'VELOCITY' COULD BE THE CAUSE.—**

(684-685)

**COMMENTARY.**

There are three kinds of Momentum: Velocity, Impression and Elasticity.

Of these the Momentum named 'Velocity' subsists in the five corporeal substances, Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Mind,—and is produced by an action due to Effort and Propulsion. It is the cause of action proceeding in a particular direction; and prevents contact with tangible substances. For instance, in the Arrow, it is due to action produced by a particular effort; by virtue of which it falls on the head of a remote object. That is why it is accepted as having its existence indicated by particular effects. In such things as the branch of a tree, the same quality is due to the movement produced by the stroke of the stone hurled at it.

The Momentum called 'Impression' is a quality of the Soul; it has been said to be produced by Cognition, and also to be the Cause of Cognition. It is accepted as having its existence indicated by such particular effects as Remembrance and Recognition.

As regards the quality of Elasticity, it belongs to corporeal substances; it is the quality that brings its solid and lasting substratum back to its previous position from which it had been torn away by some one's effort; for instance, when the Palm-leaf which has been rolled up for a long time is spread out, and then let off,—it reverts to its former (rolled) position. The effect of this quality is seen in such things as the Bow, the Tree-branch, the Horn, the Teeth and also in Cloth and so forth, when they are bent and straightened.

'All this',—i.e. all the three kinds of Momentum.

Of the Momentum called 'Velocity', any such effect as connection with an action is not admitted; because it has been proved that all things are in perpetual flux (momentary); hence immediately upon things coming into
existence, they cease to exist; so that no action is possible in them, of the
continuity of which action, Velocity could be the cause.—If by ‘continuity
of action’ is meant the production of things that is perceived to be separate
from its constituent cause,—then even so, the Reason remains ‘Inconclusive’
(Fallible). Because what are inferred from the said ‘continuity of action’
are the previous Causal-Ideas of things produced in that way,—and not
any such thing as the said ‘Momentum’; because concomitance with this
latter has nowhere been perceived.—Further, if the not-falling of the arrow
were due to the quality of Velocity, then it should never fall at all; as
the Velocity preventive of such falling would be always there. Under the
circumstances, what could be the explanation of the fact of the arrow falling
while moving in a particular region of Ākāśa ?—It cannot be said that—
‘the falling is due to the cessation of Velocity on account of its force having
been destroyed by contact with such solid substances as Air and the like’;—
as, in that case, the falling should come about before it does; as the Air
obstructing it is there all along.—It might be argued that—“Before the
Arrow actually falls, the force of the Velocity is very strong, it pierces
through the obstacle due to the Air, and carries the Arrow further to another
place”.—If that be so, to what is its subsequent weakness due whereby it
does not carry the Arrow still further? As a matter of fact, in all cases,
it is found that the Arrow falls in the way, while moving through Ākāśa,
over the whole of which the contact of Air is equally present. It cannot
be said that the Velocity becomes altered later on; as there is no cause which
could produce this alteration in the Velocity; as its inherent cause in the
shape of the Arrow is the same all through.—It cannot be right to say
that what qualifies it subsequently is the cause called ‘Karma’ (‘Action’).
Because that also would be open to the same objection. Even if the sub-
sequent Velocity be different (from the initial one), as there would be no
cause for the destruction of the former Velocity, it should continue as before
and there should be no falling down of the Arrow.—The Contact of Air
cannot be destructive of the previous Velocity; as if that were so, then the
Arrow should fall down before it does,—as pointed out above; the Air
being the same all through, its contact also would be there all through.
So there is nothing in this explanation.—(684-685)

The following Text states the objections against the Momentum named
‘Impression’.

TEXT (686).

THE MOMENTUM CALLED ‘IMPRESSION’ IS OF THE NATURE OF AN IMPRESS
ON THE MIND. IT CANNOT BE A QUALITY OF THE SOUL; BECAUSE
THIS HAS BEEN REJECTED.—(686)

COMMENTARY.

If Impression is postulated only in a general way as the cause of
Remembrance, then the argument proves what is already admitted and is
therefore futile. Because it is already admitted (by us) that the cause of
Remembrance consists in Impression which is a form of the Mind itself,
being a potency produced in it by a previous apprehension; this is known by the name of 'Vāsanā', 'Conception'.—If what is meant to be proved is Impression as a Quality of the Soul, then, as such an impression will never have been found to be concomitant with Remembrance, the Reason would be Inconclusive; and the Conclusion also would be one that is annulled by Inference. And inasmuch as its intended substratum, the Soul, has already been discarded before, and hence cannot exist, its quality also would be non-existent.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a number of things subsist in another thing, they can have no subsistence if the latter thing is non-existent,—e.g. the picture cannot exist if the wall is not there;—and under the Opposite party's view, the Momentum in question is subsistent in the Soul;—hence there is found in it a character that is contrary to what is concomitant with the Probandum. Hence what is desired is not proved. Specially as the Soul itself has been previously discarded. Thus the net result of the means of Right Cognition bearing upon the matter is that Impression should be regarded as being of the nature of an impress upon the Mind, and not a quality of the Soul. The sense is that while the former view is supported by proofs, the latter is not so supported.—(686)

The following Text points out objections against the third kind of Momentum (i.e. Elasticity):—

TEXT (687).

There can be no such quality as 'Elasticity', because things are in a 'perpetual flux', and hence nothing can be lasting (sthita); if there were any such thing, it should continue to exist in that same form.—(687)

[The name of this Quality appears throughout in this work in the form 'Sthitasthāpaka', though the form in which it is known from the Nyāya-Vaishēṣika books is 'Sthitasthāpaka'. That the former form is not an error of the copyist or the printer is clear from this Text, where the first term in the compound is clearly stated to be 'sthita'.]

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the 'Sthīta', 'lasting', thing, of which this Quality is said to be the 'Sthāpaka', 're-establisher',—is that thing by itself not-lasting? Or is it by itself lasting? Only these two alternatives are possible.—If it is not-lasting, then as in a moment it will have ceased to exist, what would be there which the Quality in question would re-establish? On the other hand, if it is, by itself, lasting,—then, if the thing in question would be existent,—then, as all existing things continue to exist in their own form,—i.e. without deviating from it,—the thing would continue in the same form; and in that case, what would be the need for assuming a 're-establisher' of it, which would have nothing to do?—(687)

It might be argued that—"Even though all things are momentary, as each of them would exist for a moment, and would continue in the con-
tinuous 'Chain',—it is in regard to this that the Quality in question is said to function',—then, the answer is as follows:—

TEXT (688).

THE MOMENTARY EXISTENCE OF A THING CONSISTS MERELY IN ITS BEING PRODUCED FROM ITS CAUSE; AND THE 'CONTINUITY IN THE CHAIN' ALSO (OF EVERY SUCCEEDING THING) IS DUE TO BEING PRODUCED FROM EACH PRECEDING THING.—(688)

COMMENTARY.

Momentary things are admitted to exist only as being produced from their causes; and what is called their 'sthit', 'status', consists only in their acquiring their own selves,—and not in their taking up their form subsequently to their having acquired their status; as by themselves all things are momentary, and hence incapable of staying at any time subsequent to their coming into existence.—Or, if the thing did so exist, it would never cease to exist, it should be there as before; and even subsequently, it would remain the same; or else, it would have to renounce its own nature. —In the 'Chain', the production of each succeeding Product is due to the immediately preceding cause. So that even here, there is nothing that could be done by the Momentum in question.—(688)

Says the Opponent—"Well then, the Momentum in question would establish what is not-momentary ".

Answer :—

TEXTS (689-690).

[WHAT IS NOT-MOMENTARY] DOES NOT APPEAR IN ANY OTHER FORM;—OF WHAT THEN COULD THE MOMENTUM BE THE 'ESTABLISHER'?—

NOR HAS THIS MOMENTUM BEEN FOUND TO HAVE-CAUSAL CHARACTER; THE CAUSE THEN MAY CONSIST OF THIS MOMENTUM OR SOMETHING ELSE. FURTHER, THE MOMENTUM IN QUESTION HAS BEEN HELD TO BE A QUALITY THAT RE-ESTABLISHES WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY PRODUCED,—SUCH FOR EXAMPLE, AS THE Cloth.—WHAT THEREFORE HAS BEEN CALLED A 'QUALITY' AND 'MOMENTUM' IS NOT POSSIBLE.—(689-690)

COMMENTARY.

It has been already pointed out that the thing that is not-momentary can never become otherwise than it is, and hence its status is there always,—
so that there would be nothing to be established by the quality in question, establisher of status, Elasticity.

It might be argued that—"The Quality may not be the establisher; it may be the producer of the Moment itself".

The answer to this is that this Momentum has not been found to have causal character; the conviction regarding the reality of the truth about things is always dependent upon the Means of Right Cognition; and as a matter of fact the causal character of Momentum,—as something different from well-known causes—is not definitely recognised in things like the Cloth by Perception and Non-apprehension,—or as something different from the ordinary effects, as in the organs like the eyes; hence the notion in question cannot be based upon any such character.

If it be argued that—"even though its causal potency has not been perceived, yet the fact of its being the Cause might be presumed".

If that be so, then Momentum, or anything else, like the Parrot, the Crane, etc., might be the Cause,—i.e. presumed to be as such. The fact of its not being perceived does not constitute a positive peculiar feature, by virtue of which it could be only by presuming the Momentum,—and nothing else,—even though its potency has not been perceived,—that you should be satisfied.

As a matter of fact, the Momentum in question has not been held by you to be the cause of production; in fact it is held to be a quality in a thing—e.g. the Cloth is already produced, which re-establishes its former status; and in this it is of no use, as already explained above.—And it is on admitting (for argument's sake) the possibility of its being the cause of production, that the above objection has been urged; the idea being that there may be some one who may cross beyond the limits of even his own doctrine.

The last sentence—"What therefore, etc. etc."—sums up all that has been said above.—(689-690)

The Author next points out objections against the Qualities of 'Merit and Demerit':—

TEXT (691).

Mind, Mind's Contact and the Soul having been previously discarded,—there can be no 'Unseen Force' of the kinds postulated by the other party.—(691)

COMMENTARY.

"The Unseen Force (Destiny) is what brings the fruits of an act to its Doer,—it is a Quality of the Soul,—is produced by the contact of the Soul and Mind,—and is destroyed by its own effect; it is of two kinds—the two kinds being Merit and Demerit; of these Merit becomes the cause of the Doer's happiness, welfare and liberation; and Demerit becomes the cause of his unhappiness, calamities and sin."
Such is the account of the Unseen Force provided by the other party. Inasmuch as the Soul, the Mind, and the contact of these—which have been regarded as the cause of the said Force,—have been already rejected before,—there can be no Cause for the said Force; and hence it is concluded that it cannot be existent.

As regards Sound, that has been held to be the Quality of Ākāsha,—it has been already rejected above, when it came under review, apart from its proper place. Hence objections against it are not repeated here.—(691)

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End of Chapter XI.
CHAPTER XII.

Examination of the Category of 'Action'.

COMMENTARY.

The Author next proceeds to set forth the objections against the Vaishāsika category of 'Karma', Action:—

TEXT (692).

IN THINGS THAT ARE IN A 'PERPETUAL FLUX', ANY ACTION, IN THE SHAPE OF 'THROWING UP' AND THE LIKE, IS IMPOSSIBLE; BECAUSE IT CEASES AT THE VERY PLACE WHERE IT IS BORN, AND HENCE IT CANNOT GET AT ANY OTHER PLACE.—(692)

COMMENTARY.

"The Sūtra on this point is—'Going up, going down, contracting, expanding and moving—are the five Actions'.—Of these, going up is that act which is the cause of the Conjunction and Disjunction with upper and lower space (respectively). That is to say, when, by virtue of effort and such other agencies, there arises,—in some part of the body, or in some such solid substance as the clod of Earth which is connected with the body,—an action which becomes the cause of the conjunction of that thing (Limb or Clod) with the upper layers of Ākāsha, and also of its Disjunction with the lower layers of it,—that Action is called 'going up'.—The Action which is the cause of effects contrary to these is 'going down'.—When a straight object becomes curved, this Action is called 'contracting'; as has been thus described:—When of a straight object like the arm, the foreparts in the shape of the Finger and the rest, become disjoined (separated) from the points of Ākāsha with which they have been in contact,—while the hind part still remains in contact with those points,—then the whole object in the shape of the Arm becomes curved; and this action is called 'Contracting'.—When the Conjunction and Disjunction appear in a manner contrary to the one thus described, the whole object becomes straightened again; this Action is called 'Expanding'.—That which becomes the cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions with several stray objects in diverse places, is the Action called 'Going'.—The first four forms of Action are the cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions with well-defined parts of Space and Ākāsha, while Going brings about Conjunctions and Disjunctions with sundry points in space in various directions.—Thus there are only five kinds of Action. Such other actions as Going Round, Flowing, Evacuating and the like are all included under
'Going'.—All these five kinds of Action are established as having their existence indicated by such effects as Conjunction and Disjunction subsisting in solid objects. Conjunction and Disjunction are the effects common to all Actions; this is what establishes the existence of the effects of Action. It is proved by direct Perception also; as has been thus described—'Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority and Action subsist in coloured (solid) objects, and hence are perceptible to the Eye' (Vaishēṣika-sūtra).

Such in brief is the scheme of the other Party.

As regards this, Conjunction and Disjunction having been already rejected, what has been put forward as the 'Effect' of Action cannot be admitted. If what is put forward as the Reason for postulating Action is its effect in the shape of such Conjunction and Disjunction as consist of being produced in juxtaposition and so forth—even so, the Reason would be 'fallible' (and Inconclusive); because the concomitance of such Conjunction and Disjunction with Action is in nowise admitted (or proved).—On the other hand, the Reason is concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum; so that it is also 'Contradictory'.—If merely the existence of a Cause is meant to be proved, then the Reasoning is superfluous; because the fact of Air and such other things being the cause of the said Conjunction and Disjunction is accepted by us also.—If a particular character (of the Cause) be meant to be proved, then the Conclusion is annulled by Inference. For instance, when the Action appears in a Substance, does it appear in a momentary substance? Or in a non-momentary (permanent) substance? It cannot appear in the momentary substance, because it ceases to exist—becomes destroyed—at the very spot where it comes into existence, and hence it cannot get at any other spot. This Inference may be formulated as follows:—When a thing ceases to exist at a certain spot, it cannot subsequently get at any other spot,—e.g. the Lamp and such things;—all the things in question do cease at the very spot where they come into existence;—hence there is an apprehension which is contrary to a character wider than the one desired to be proved (by the opposite party).—(692)

The following Text shows that the Reason set forth (by the Buddhist, in the Inference just cited) is not 'Fallible' (or Inconclusive):—

TEXT (693).

The other party also have asserted that the time of Action is subsequent to the time of the birth of the object,—even in such things as the Lamp-flame, which are admitted (by him also) to be fleeting in their character.—(693)

COMMENTARY.

Some things are admitted to be fleeting in their character;—e.g. the Lamp-flame is admitted to be something which ceases very quickly; and
even in these, Action appears only after they are born,—i.e. come into existence; and have been held to last only for 'six moments', and only to that extent, not-momentary (lasting).—(693)

The following Text shows how this is so—

TEXTS (694-695).

(1) (At the first moment) there is contact with the Cause,—
(2) then the appearance of the generic character,—
then (3) some commotion in the parts of the object,
—then (4) the disruption of the parts,—then
(5) the destruction of the contact,—then
(6) the destruction of the object ;—in
this way, even in the case of the
Lamp-flame and such things, what
has been held is that they last
for six moments only.—
(694-695)

COMMENTARY.

For instance: (1) what comes first is the moment of contact with the Cause,—(2) then the moment of the appearance of the generic character of the Thing produced,—(3) then action among the component parts,—then (4) the moment of disjunction of the Composite,—then (5) the destruction of the Conjunction that produced the object,—then (6) the destruction of the object itself ;—in this way, in the case of things like the Lamp-flame, what has been held is that they last for six moments only. Thus, there being no momentary object (for the Opponent) which could have any action, the Action of all active objects must be such as appears after the birth of the objects.—So that our Reason is not 'unproven', as there can be nothing else that could be momentary (for the other party).—(694-695)

It might be asked—'Even if we admit the momentary character of Things, why cannot their action appear at the time of their birth ?'

The answer to this is provided in the following—
TEXTS (696-697).

It is only when there is separation from the posterior spot, and contact with the frontal spot, that the object may be assumed to be 'going' ('in motion'), or to be the substratum of any other action. When the mobile person does not last even for a moment,—even though such a person be extremely small, there is no possibility of passing over to another spot removed by the minutest point.—(696-697)

COMMENTARY.

When it is possible for an object to become separated from the place behind it,—and to come into contact with the place before it, then it can be said to be 'going'; or for another thing, to be the substratum of such actions as Expanding and the rest; all this cannot be said in regard to any other things—such as Ākāsha.—The object that lasts only for one moment however cannot be so long as to admit of its abandoning the place behind it and then passing over to that before it; because at the moment of its existence itself it is within the clutches of disappearance (destruction); and as such it is unable to pass over to the other place.—Hence no Action is possible even at the time of the birth (of the object). Nor is it possible at either of the two ends; because at the time in question, this cannot be determined. Thus then, as regards the object which does not last even for a single moment,—the possibility of its passing over to a remote place may rest awhile; it is not possible for it to pass over even the minutest space. Under the circumstances, how can there be any Action in what is momentary?—(696-697)

Nor can there be Action in a non-momentary object;—this is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (698).

In case the object is something lasting, 'going' and the rest are all impossible; because such an object should remain the same under all conditions.—(698)

COMMENTARY.

That object is said to be 'non-momentary' which remains in the same form always; it is all the more impossible for any Action to appear in such an object; as, like Ākāsha, it remains always in the same condition.—This argument may be thus formulated:—If an object remains always the same, it can have no Action,—as in the case of Ākāsha;—the object regarded as 'non-momentary' is always of the same condition;—hence there is appre-
hension of something contrary to what is wider (than the Conclusion of the Opponent).—(698)

The following might be urged:—"Even if the non-momentary object is always the same,—inasmuch as, by its very nature, it has the form of the 'moving entity',—it could have Action; hence our Reason is not Inconclusive".

The answer to this is provided in the following—

**TEXTS (699-700).**

If the action of Going and the rest constituted the very essence of the 'Moving Entity',—then, this latter could not stay immobile for even a single moment; because even when the Going, etc. are not there, they should certainly be there,—inasmuch as the object has not renounced its previous form, and is exactly as it was at the time of the appearance of the Going, etc.—(699-700)

**COMMENTARY.**

If such objects as Devadatta and the like, which are held to be non-momentary, were, by their very nature, connected with the Actions of Going, Throwing up and the rest,—then, they should never stand unmoving: as the Going nature would always be there. Hence in the case of these, Devadatta, etc., who are endowed with the action of Going,—even when there is no Going—i.e. even when they are standing immobile,—the said actions of Going, etc. should be there,—just as at the time of the appearance of those acts; because the objects will not have abandoned their previous form or nature.—(699-700)

**TEXTS (701-702).**

If, on the other hand, the objects were, by their nature, of the nature of the 'immobile entity',—then absence of going should be there always, and there would be no movement of any kind even for a moment. Because, even when going might be there, the object would still be of the nature of the 'immobile entity',—because it will not have renounced its previous nature,—just as at the time when it was not moving.—(701-702)

**COMMENTARY.**

If, from fear of the above criticism, it be held that the object, by its nature, is immobile,—then the absence of going, etc. should be there always; because the object is of the same form always,—like Akāsha.
The particle ‘ādi’, ‘etc.’; is meant to include the actions of *Throwing up* and the rest.

Under such circumstances, even when there would be actual *going*, etc., the object would be *immobile*; because it has not renounced its *immobile nature*—exactly as in the unmoving condition.

‘Pras panda’ is Action.

In the term ‘nishchalātmakakūlavat’, the ‘Vatī’—affix has been added to the compound with the Locative ending—[the meaning being ‘as at the time, etc. etc.’]—(701-702)

It might be argued that—“it is not of the same form; it is of both forms, *going* (mobile) and *not-going* (immobile); hence the criticism urged is not applicable; and the Reason too is ‘unproven’.”

The answer to this is provided in the following—

**TEXT (703).**

—if the object were *mobile* at one time and *immobile* at another then, inasmuch as two mutually different characters would be there, it would be two different objects.—(703)

**COMMENTARY.**

The ‘cha’ after ‘ēkādā’ should be construed after ‘punah’.

What is meant is that, in the manner suggested, as the mutually contradictory characters of *mobility* and *immobility* would be imposed upon it, the object would cease to be one.—(703)

The following Text shows that for the above reason, it becomes established that the object is *momentary* :

**TEXT (704).**

—it is clearly seen that the two are entirely different; because of the presence of contradictory properties;—like two things of which one is moving and another not moving.—(704)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘The two’—i.e. things in the *mobile* and *immobile* states.

‘Like two things, etc. etc.’—i.e. such things as the Creeper (moving) and the Mountain (not moving).—(704)

Having thus established the annulment of the Opponent’s conclusion by *Inference*, the Author proceeds to show that it is annulled by *Perception* also :—
TEXT (705).

THE ACTION THAT IS REGARDED AS VISIBLE IS NOTHING DIFFERENT FROM
THE OBJECT. EVEN SUCH EXISTENCE OF IT AS WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH REASON, IS NEVER ACTUALLY
PERCEIVED.—(705)

COMMENTARY.

If a perceptible thing is not perceived, it comes to be regarded by intelligent men as ‘non-existent’;—as Cloth not perceived at a certain place;—and Action is never perceived as apart from the Colour, etc. (of the object);—hence this is a reason for regarding it as naturally not-perceived (and hence non-existent). As a matter of fact, Action never becomes manifest in any Sense-perception, as anything apart from the Colour, etc. of the object as produced in a different position. As regards such notions associated with verbal expressions, as ‘Throwing up’, ‘Throwing down’ and the like,—they cannot be Perception, for the very reason that they are associated with verbal expression. Nor are they compatible with reason, if taken as associated with a distinct category in the shape of ‘Action’; because what are really seen are only the Colour, etc. as produced under certain conditions; and the verbal expressions (names) also are applied only to these latter, in accordance with Convention.—This has just been explained, when it was pointed out that no movement is possible in things either permanent or impermanent.

Thus it is not proved, as asserted, that the existence of Action is proved by Perception itself.—(705)

The above arguments are summed up in the following—

TEXT (706).

THUS ‘GOING’ AND THE REST ARE IMPOSSIBLE EITHER IN PERMANENT
OR IMPERMANENT THINGS; BECAUSE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THEM EITHER TO BE SEPARATED FROM THEIR FORMER PLACE,
OR TO GET AT ANOTHER PLACE.—(706)

COMMENTARY.

‘Thus’,—i.e. because it has been discarded by Inference and Perception, as just shown above.

‘Because it is not possible, etc. etc.’;—i.e. because separation from the former place is not possible; and because junction with another place is not possible. The words are to be construed in the respective order.—(706)

Question—“If this is so, then how is it that people speak of Going?”
Answer :—
TEXT (707).

The notion of 'Going' is an illusion,—as in the Lamp-flame,—due to the appearance of different but similar things being found consecutively in diverse places.—(707)

COMMENTARY.

'Different but similar things';—'different' and 'similar' are compounded first,—then that compound is compounded with 'things'.—Of these different and similar things,—there is appearance (birth)—which is consecutive,—i.e. in a place other than that of its own Cause,—when such appearance is seen, there arises, from it, the notion that it is 'going';—just as in the case of the Lamp-flame, when it is being carried by someone, there appears the notion that 'the Lamp-flame is moving'; while certainly the same Lamp-flame does not move from one place to another; because it has been held (even by the Vaisheshika) to last for six moments only. Further, what is called the 'birth' (appearance) of a thing consists in mere Being, entirely devoid of any preceding or succeeding end; and the apprehension of such 'birth' or 'appearance' is only natural.

Or 'janmanaḥ' may be construed as Ablative;—the sense being—'because things are born consecutively, therefore different and similar things are perceived in different places'.—(707)

End of Chapter on 'Action'.
CHAPTER XIII.

Examination of 'Sāmānya', the 'Universal'.

With the following Text the Author begins the criticism of the Category of 'The Universal':—

TEXT (708).

'Substance' and other Categories having been rejected, the 'Universals' also have become rejected; as they have all been assumed to subsist in the three Categories.—(708)

COMMENTARY.

'The Universals',—i.e. the Genuses. These are held to be subsistent in the three Categories,—Substance, Quality and Action; and hence become discarded by the rejection of these Categories themselves; as without the Substratum, the Subsistent cannot exist anywhere; for if it did, it would not be subsistent at all.

The mention of the 'Universal' is only by way of an illustration; the Ultimate Individualities also are held to be subsistent, as subsisting in Ultimate Substances; hence these also become discarded by the rejection of their substratum.—(708)

Even though the 'Universal' has been discarded, yet the Author is desirous of putting forward special objections against it; and as until the character of the thing is known, a criticism of it is not possible, he proceeds to describe the character of the 'Universal' and the 'Particular':—

TEXTS (709–711).

The 'Universal' is postulated by the other party in the following manner: "It is of two kinds—'Being' is a 'Universal' which is 'Universal' only, as it pervades over all things; 'Substance' and the rest, while being 'Universals', are also spoken of as 'Particulars'; because in regard to their own substrata, they become the cause of their comprehensive notion, and also serve to differentiate their substrata from all things belonging to other 'Universals';—and in this way they also become the cause of the exclusive notion of those substrata.'—(709–711)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Universal' is of two kinds—the Higher and the Lower; 'Being' is the highest 'Universal'; it is called 'Universal', 'common', because it
forms the basis of only a comprehensive notion in regard to all its three substrata—Substance, Quality and Action; for this same reason it is not a 'Particular' at all.

The Lower kind of 'Universal' is in the form of 'Substance', 'Action' and so forth; this kind is called 'Universal' (Genus, Class) in so far as it is the basis of the comprehensive notion of its substrate, in the shape of Substances, etc.; and though being 'Universal', it is also called 'Particular', in so far as it serves as the basis of the exclusive notion of its substratum as distinguished from things belonging to other 'Universals'. For instance, in regard to 'Quality', there arise such exclusive notions as 'it is not-Substance', 'it has no qualities' and so forth; and the cause (basis) of these must consist in such 'Universals' as 'Substance' and 'Quality',—not in anything else; because there are no such things as 'not-Substance' and so forth. There is no incongruity in the same thing being both 'universal' and 'particular', when it is taken relatively to other things. This is what the Text means.—(709–711)

The Author states the definition of 'Ultimate Individuality', as provided by the other party:—

**TEXT (712).**

"THERE ARE SOME 'PARTICULARS' WHICH SERVE AS THE BASIS OF EXCLUSION ONLY; THESE HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS 'ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES SUBSISTING IN ETERNAL SUBSTANCES'."—(712)

**COMMENTARY.**

There are some 'Particulars' which are held to be 'Particulars' only, not 'Universals'; because they serve as the basis of exclusion—i.e. of 'exclusive notion'—only.

"Which are these?"

*Answer—'These have been defined, etc. etc.'*;—it has been declared (in the *Vaisheshika-Sutra*) that—"'Ultimate Individualities subsisting in eternal Substances are the ultimate (differentias)'".—'Subsisting in eternal Substances',—i.e. subsisting in Atoms, Ākāsha, Time, Space, Soul and Mind. As Atoms are the two ends—beginning and end—of the Universe,—and liberated Souls and liberated Minds continue to exist till the end of the Birth-rebirth-Cycle, and hence forming one end,—the Specific Individualities subsisting in them have been called 'ultimate'; specially as it is only in these that the said Individualities are more clearly perceived. Their Subsistence too is always in the eternal Substance, like the Atom. This is the reason why they have been described both as 'ultimate' and as 'subsisting in eternal Substances'.—These are called 'Viśheśa', 'Specific Individualities', because they serve as the basis of the absolute exclusion of the eternal Substances from one another, and hence serve to 'specify', 'distinguish', their substratum from everything else.—(712)
The question arising—"How is the existence of these Specific Individualities proved?"—the following answer is given:—

TEXT (713).

"INASMUCH AS IT IS ON THE STRENGTH OF THESE THAT MYSTICS HAVE THE NOTIONS,—IN CONNECTION WITH THE ATOM AND OTHER ETERNAL SUBSTANCES,—THAT 'THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT',—THESE ARE REGARDED AS SUBSISTING IN EACH OF THESE SUBSTANCES."—(713)

COMMENTARY.

It is found that people like ourselves have, in regard to the Ox,—the notion of the 'Ox' as distinguished from the 'Horse', through the presence of a particular shape, qualities, action and constituents,—these notions appearing in the form respectively of 'the Ox, white, fast moving, fat-humped, with a large bell';—in the same manner, in people different from us, such as Mystics, there appears,—in regard to each of the eternal objects, Atoms, Liberated Souls and Liberated Minds,—the exclusive notion that 'this is different from that'; and also when the same object is seen at another time and place, there is recognition of it as 'this is the same'; of such notions there being no other basis,—that to which they are due is held to consist in the 'ultimate Specific Individualities', whose existence is inferred from the peculiar experience of the Mystics.—Each of these Individualities subsists in its own substratum, and their existence is proved by the direct perception of the Mystics.—(713)

Question—How is the existence of 'Universals' (Genuses, Communities) proved?

Answer:—

TEXT (714).

"SUCH 'UNIVERSALS' (COMMUNITIES, GENUSES) AS 'BEING', 'COW' AND THE LIKE ARE VOUCHED FOR BY DIRECT PERCEPTION; AS THE NOTION OF 'BEING' AND THE REST ARE FOUND TO APPEAR ONLY WHEN THE SENSE-ORGANS ARE FUNCTIONING."—(714)

COMMENTARY.

It is a well-established principle that when one thing follows the presence and absence of another thing, the former proceeds from the latter;—in regard to Substance and the rest, the appearance of the notion of 'Being' (Existence), etc. follows the presence and absence of the functioning of the Sense-organs;
wherefore then could the said notion not be regarded as produced by the Sense-organs,—just like any other Cognition through the Sense-organs? If it were not so regarded, then it would lead to an absurdity.—(714)

The following Text seeks to prove the existence of 'Specific Individualities' by means of Inference also:

TEXT (715).

"The existence of these is cognised by means of Inference also: A distinctive notion must be due to a different cause."—(715)

COMMENTARY.

'A distinctive notion'—a notion of a kind different from that of things like Substance, etc.

'Due to a different cause'—whose birth is due to other causes.

The inference may be thus formulated:—When one notion is different in form from another, it must be due to a cause other than the latter,—like the notion of 'Colour' in regard to the Cloth, the Leather and the Blanket;—of this same kind is the notion of 'being' in regard to Substance, etc.;—hence this is a natural reason [for assuming a different cause for it, in the form of the 'Universal'].—Such is the view of the other Party (the Nyāya-Vaishēṣika).—(715)

The sense of the same argument is shown by setting forth the arguments propounded by Bhāvivikta:

TEXTS (716–720).

(A) "In regard to the Cow and the Elephant, the peculiarities of Name—'Cow' and 'Elephant',—and Ideas—must be due to causes other than Convention, Shape, Body, etc.,—because while appertaining to the Cow and the Elephant, they are different from the Names and Ideas of these latter;—just like the Names and Ideas 'with calf' and 'with the goad' (respectively) as applied to the same Cow and Elephant. The qualifying clause has been added for the purpose of excluding the 'Hare's Horns' and such other non-entities. The Name and Idea of the other things are the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity.
(B) "The idea pervading over all cows proceeds from something different from the body of the cow,—because it appears as a differentiator,—like the idea of the 'blue' and the like.

(C) "The 'universal' cow is something different from the 'individual' cow,—because it forms the object of a different idea;—like the idea of the colour and other qualities of the same cow,—also because it (the universal) is spoken of as belonging to that (the individual),—just as the horse is spoken of as belonging to Chaitra."—(716-720)

COMMENTARY.

Bhāvavikṣa has argued as follows:—"In regard to such things as the cow, horse, buffalo, boar, elephant, etc., the peculiarities of name—'cow', etc.—and idea must be due to a cause related to the form of each animal, but different from such causes as convention, shape, body and the like;—this is the pronouncement (of the conclusion).—[The reason is this]—because while appertaining to the cow, etc., they are names and ideas different from the names and ideas of the body, etc.;—just like such peculiar names and ideas relating to the same animals as—'the cow with the calf', 'the bullock with the load', 'the boar with the dart', 'the elephant with the goad' and so forth.—The corroborative instances per dissimilarity are the names and ideas of the forms of the body and other things.—It follows from this that this 'other cause' must be the 'universals', 'cow', 'elephant' and so forth."

The term 'abhidhāna' stands for name;—'prajñāna' for idea, cognition;—the peculiarities in the shape of these two are meant by the compound 'abhidhānaprajñānavishēgāth'.

'Samaya' is convention;—'ākṛti'—shape;—'piṅga'—body;—the term 'etc.' includes colour and such details. Different from these are the causes related to and in keeping with the form of each of the animals in regard to its name and idea.

Or the compound may mean that the causes of the names and notions of 'being' and the rest are different from convention and the rest. The rest being understood as before.

'Proclamation'—Proposition, conclusion.

In order to avoid the 'fallibility' due to the reason otherwise applying to non-entities like the hare's horn (which also has a distinct name and idea relating to it),—the qualification has been added in the form 'while appertaining to the cow, etc.'

The compound setting forth the reason is to be expounded as—'because they have names and ideas different from the names and ideas relating to the body, etc.' The 'names and ideas of the body' serve as the corroborative instance per dissimilarity; as in this instance, the presence of a cause
other than the Names and Ideas of the Body is absent; and hence the Reason adduced is also absent in them.

Uddyotakara [under Nyāyavārtika on 2. 2. 61, page 319 et seq.] has stated the argument as follows:—"The Idea pervading over all Cows proceeds from a Cause other than the Body, etc.,—because it appears as a differentiator,—like the Idea of the Blue, etc.—Or again, the 'Universal' Cow is something different from the individual Cow,—because it is the object of a different Idea,—like Colour and Touch, etc.,—also because it is spoken of as belonging to this latter,—just as the Horse is spoken of as belonging to Chaitra, and as something different from Chaitra."

All these arguments have been set forth in these Texts. They are easily intelligible.—(716-720)

The Author answers all these arguments in the following—

TEXTS (721-722).

All this has no essence in it; it is an elaboration of a mere theory; there is no evidence at all in support of it. As a matter of fact, the notions of 'Being', etc. are not found to proceed from the functioning of the sense-organs; they arise from a body of conventions.—(721-722)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued (under Text 714, above) that the fact of the notions of 'Being', etc. being of the nature of Sense-perception is deduced from the presence of the operation of Sense-organs.—If, by the Reason here adduced, it is meant that the said notions follow immediately after the operation of the Senses,—then it cannot be 'admitted'; because as they are of the nature of 'determinate Cognitions', the body of Conventions (bearing upon the verbal expression) must interpose (between the Sense-operation and the resultant Determinate Cognition).—(721-722)

It might be urged—"without a comprehensive something, how can mutually distinct entities become the basis, directly or indirectly, of the notion of identity or unity?"

In anticipation of this question, the Author supplies the following explanation:—
TEXTS (723–726).

IN THE CASE OF THE Dhārī, Harītakī, ETC., IT IS FOUND THAT THERE IS PRESENT IN THEM, EITHER SINGLY OR COLLECTIVELY, THE POTENCY TO REMOVE VARIOUS DISEASES; AND YET THERE IS NO 'UNIVERSAL' (COMMUNITY) IN THEM WHICH HAS THAT POTENCY; BECAUSE THE CURE OF THE DISEASES IS FOUND TO BE QUICK AND DELAYED.—Nor can any diverse peculiar properties be produced in the 'universal', through the diversities of the Soil, ETC. BECAUSE IT REMAINS ALWAYS IN ONE AND THE SAME FORM; THE SAID DIVERSE PROPERTIES, HOWEVER, ARE PRESENT IN THE Dhārī, ETC.—Thus though, as a rule, things are entirely different, yet some of them having well-defined potencies are conceived of as similar, and hence these things become the basis of the conception of similarity, ETC.,—NOT OTHER THINGS.—(723–726)

COMMENTARY.

Dhārī and some other fruits, though of entirely different forms, are yet, severally or jointly, endowed with the capacity to remove various diseases,—even without any comprehensive entity embracing them all.—It cannot be right to urge that—"even in this case it is only a comprehensive 'universal' that does the effective act"; for the simple reason that there is no such common 'universal' over them capable of performing the various fruitful acts. If there were such a common 'universal', there could be no possibility of the notion that people have, of the capacity of removing diseases quickly or slowly that is found in only some Dhārī, etc. and that at only certain times; as the 'universal' would be of only one uniform character.—Nor can it be right to assert that—"the said Universal itself performs the diverse fruitful acts, when it acquires certain peculiar properties due to the soil as watered by milk and such things";—because the 'universal' is, ex hypothesi, eternal, and hence incapable of having any peculiar properties produced by anything else; and hence no such properties could be produced in it by the diversities of Soil and such things; because the 'universal' is always of one and the same form. As for the Dhārī, etc.; on the other hand, they are evanescent things and hence diverse properties are produced in them by the diversities of Soil, etc.; and hence they become endowed with the diverse potencies of curing diseases.—In the same manner, other things also, like the Jar, are produced out of their Causal Ideas in such forms that by their very nature they come to be conceived of as of one and the same form. Hence there is no difficulty in this case.

The term 'etc.' in the expression 'the basis of the conception of similarity, etc.', is meant to include the capacity to perform such fruitful acts as the holding of water and the like.—(723–726)

The question being—"How is it proved that 'the Body of Conventions' comes between (the functioning of the Senses and the appearance of the notions of Names, etc.)?"—the Answer is provided in the following—
All that the expression 'Being' (Existence) is meant to convey is only the idea of capacity for action; it is in this sense that the Convention is established, in regard to the things in question, or to any other thing, according to the whim (of people).—Persons using the term 'go' ('Ox' or 'Cow') establish the Convention in regard to the term as applicable to things serving such diverse purposes as carrying, yielding milk and so forth.—Thus it is that all these notions of 'Being' and the rest are found to proceed from the conception of these Conventions, and not immediately after the functioning of the Sense-organs.—(727–729)

COMMENTARY.

The notions of 'Being' and the rest can never appear in persons who are not cognisant of the Conventions bearing upon those terms; if they did, then there would be no use in establishing the Conventions at all. Thus it is that the makers of Convention apply the term 'existent' (Being), on noticing a certain identity (among things) indicated by the fact of their performing similar functions; and it is in regard to such things that the notion of 'Being' appears.

'Or to any other thing' ;—i.e. of the expression 'Entity'.

Similarly in the case of the terms 'go' ('Ox' or 'Cow') and the rest, the Convention bearing upon them is made upon their capacity for such actions as carrying and the like. Hence, after the Convention has been made, when people come to use the term,—even when the Ox is seen, the previous Convention steps in and the name 'Ox' comes to the mind; and the idea that it 'exists' comes only later in a clear form. In some cases, through repeated use, the whole process passes through the mind so quickly that every step in it is not fully realised; but it is quite clearly distinguished by persons who have used the term for only a short time.

The whole matter is thus summed up:—From all this, it follows that on account of the intervention of the body of Conventions, the notions in question cannot be said to be directly perceptible; because it is not reasonable to regard as 'perceived' things that are cognised only indirectly; as such a process would lead to absurdities.—(727–729)

The following Text proceeds to show that for the following reason also, the notions of 'Being', etc. are 'effects of memory, and have to be treated as so many Remembrances, and cannot be regarded as 'Perception':—
TEXT (730).

AT FIRST, EVERY COGNITION APPEARS IN A FORM FREE FROM VERBAL
EXPRESSION; THEN COMES IN THE BODY OF CONVENTIONS;
HENCE THE NOTIONS IN QUESTION PARTAKE OF THE
NATURE OF Remembrance,—FOR THAT REASON
ALSO.—(730)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, there is no Convention bearing upon the 'Specific
Peculiarity' (of Things); and it is only after one has seen the entity,
prior to its determination, only as a point of 'Specific Peculiarity', free
from all contact with verbal expression,—that there follows its Cognition
based upon the functioning of the Sense-organ;—then there comes to the
mind, the body of Conventions bearing upon that same entity;—then there
appear the notions of 'Being' and the rest,—in accordance with the said
Conventions,—in regard to the thing that has been seen; and these notions
embody all the 'determination' with reference to the thing, and give verbal
expression to them. How can these notions escape from being regarded
as 'Remembrance'?

'For that reason also',—i.e. because they are 'determined' as seen.
'The notions in question',—i.e. those of 'Being' and the rest.—(730)

Question—"Whence has this sequence in the appearance of Cognitions
been deduced?"

Answer:—

TEXT (731).

IT IS BECAUSE THE PROCESS IS AS DESCRIBED THAT WHEN A MAN HAS
HIS MIND TURNED SOMEWHERE ELSE, THERE APPEARS ONLY THE
VAGUE APPREHENSION OF THE MERE thing APART FROM
ALL SPECIFIC PECULIARITIES.—(731)

COMMENTARY.

It is because the notions of 'Being', etc. appear in the above-mentioned
sequence, that when a man has his mind fixed elsewhere,—i.e. he is absent-
minded,—if he sees a thing lying before himself,—until there come to his
mind the conventions and conceptions bearing upon that thing, the first
perception that appears is that of the mere thing, entirely devoid of all specific
peculiarities. If it were not so,—if this first Cognition were in the full-fledged
form equipped with the verbal expression and all the rest of it,—then, why
should the absent-minded man apprehend the mere thing devoid of all quali-
fications? It is not possible for two determinate Cognitions with verbal
expressions to appear at the same time.

Thus it is proved that the assertion that "the notions of 'Being', etc.
are positively and negatively concomitant with direct Sense-functioning"
is not true.—(731)
It has been argued above (under Text 716) that—"In regard to the Cow and the Elephant, the peculiarities of Name and Idea must be due to causes other than Convention, etc. etc."—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (732).

AS REGARDS THE FIRST REASON ADDUCED,—IT IS SUPERFLUOUS; AS THE FACT OF THE NOTIONS BEING BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE BODY OF CONVENTIONS IS ALREADY ADMITTED (BY US); AND THAT SAME RELATIVE (BODY OF CONVENTIONS) IS WHAT IS POSITIVELY AND NEGATIVELY CONCOMITANT.—

(732)

COMMENTARY.

If all that is sought to be proved is the general fact that the notions in question are due to other causes related to the character of the things concerned,—then it is superfluous—proving what is already admitted. Because the Body of Conventions bearing upon the Cow, etc. is that other cause related to and in keeping with the character of the things; as the said notions appear only when this Body of Conventions is there, and they do not appear when what is there is some heterogeneous Body of Conventions; which shows that it is this Body of Conventions, which is positively and negatively concomitant with them, that is the Cause of the notions in question; as these are found to follow on the wake of the positive and negative concomitance of these Conventions. Thus the attempt to adduce Reasons for this is entirely futile.—(732)

TEXTS (733-734).


COMMENTARY.

If the ‘Conventional Conception’ is included in the ‘Subject’ (of the Opponent’s Reasoning), and then it is sought to be proved that all these
notions are due to their connection with an eternal and all-embracing Entity named 'Universal', which is apart from all those,—then what has been cited as the Corroborative Instance would be 'devoid of the Probandum'; because the concomitance of the things with such a Probandum has nowhere been perceived. As a matter of fact, the Calf, the Goad and such things that have been cited as the cause (basis) of the notion of the Cow being 'with Calf', or the Elephant being 'with the Goad', have not been proved to be so. Specially because when these things—the Calf and the Goad,—revert to the position of their 'Specific Peculiarity', they are not found to be the direct cause of any Names and Ideas,—for the simple reason that all 'Specific Peculiarity' is, by its very nature, beyond the reach of verbal expression. Thus the Corroborative Instance cited is 'devoid of the Probandum'.—If they be regarded as the indirect cause of the notions, then that would lead to an absurdity, because indirectly, everything is of use in the producing of everything.—(733-734)

Question—"How is it then that people regard such external things (as the Calf and the Goad) as the cause of the notions (of the Cow being with the Calf; and the Elephant being with the Goad)?"

TEXT (735).

In fact, all these notions proceed on the basis of things like the Goad, which consist in mere 'Idea' and are illusory, on which 'externality' is imposed.—(735)

COMMENTARY.

It has been already pointed out that the 'Specific Peculiarity' of Things which forms the root-cause of the Idea of the 'Goad' and such things, is not touched by an 'imposition' (or qualification). As regards the 'Illusory' form of things, it is a mere product of the art of Imagination; it consists in mere 'Idea', and is not an external object. People regard it as an 'external thing', because they are unable to distinguish between what they see and what they imagine, and hence they regard the form cognised as 'external'; so that the external existence of the Goad and such things cannot be admitted.

'Avalambhya' is to be construed with 'anikshādikam'.

What is meant is that the notions proceed to apply to the Goad, etc. which are purely illusory, which consist in mere 'Idea' and on which the external character is superimposed.

'Antarmātrā' is Buddhī, Idea, Cognition.—(735)

In the same argument (under 716), the Opponent has introduced the qualification "while pertaining to the Cow". This again is not right; as it cannot exclude anything (and hence is useless as a qualification).—This is what is shown in the following—
TEXTS (736-737).

' The negation of Action, quality and name' is also described (by you) as the cause of the notion of 'Non-existence'; hence the qualification serves no useful purpose.—

The said description (of the cause of the notion of Non-existence) also is not right; because if it is a cause, then it must be a positive entity, as possessing a definite potency. Lastly, the notion of 'Non-existence' would be applicable to 'Being' and such 'Universals' also.

—(736-737)

COMMENTARY.

Of the notion of 'non-existence' also, the 'Negation of action, quality and name' has been described as the Cause.—This cannot be right; because what has been said to constitute the character of the 'Cause' is the potency to produce the effect;—this Potency can reside only in a Positive Entity; as the Positive Entity alone is characterised by the said Potency. If then, Negation also had the said Potency imposed upon it, how could it not attain the character of the Positive Entity? As the presence of that Potency alone constitutes the nature of the Positive Entity. In this way the Negation would lose its negative character itself. As 'negation' consists only in the cessation of the character of the 'Positive Entity'.

Then again, if 'the negation of Action, Quality and Name' were the Cause of the notion of Non-existence, then the notion of being 'non-existent' would apply to 'Being' and other Universals also; as therein also is present 'the negation of Action, Quality and Name'—just as much as in such non-entities as the 'Hare's Horns'.—(736-737)

The following Text shows that the Reason cited (by the Opponent under Text 716) is 'unproven' (not admitted):—

TEXT (738).

The fact of the notions in question being different from the notions of the Body, Shape, etc. is not admitted (or proved); hence the reason put forward is also open to the charge of being 'unproven'.—(738)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the notions of the Cow and such things do not have for their objective anything other than the Body, etc. (of the animals); by virtue of which they could be held to be distinct from these latter.—(738)
The Conclusion also (of the Opponent’s Argument) is annulled by Inference:—

TEXT (739).

THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION (OF ALL COWS, FOR INSTANCE) MANIFESTS WITHIN ITSELF THE VERBAL EXPRESSION AND THE CONSTITUENT INDIVIDUALS; WHILE THE ‘UNIVERSAL’ IS DESCRIBED AS DEVOID OF ALL TINGE OF COLOUR, SHAPE AND VERBAL EXPRESSION.—(739)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—What is meant by you to be proved is the fact that the basis of comprehensive notions consists of something different from the Body, etc.;—this however is not right; as no such thing enters into the notions at all; and also because what does appear in these notions is something quite different, in the shape of Colour, Shape, etc. That is to say, you describe the ‘Universal’ Cow to be devoid of all tinge of Colour, Shape and Verbal Expression; and yet the actual Cognition that appears is always apprehended as accompanied by the manifestation of Colour, etc.; how then could the basis of such Cognition consist of what is devoid of Colour, etc.? Certainly a Cognition of one form cannot have its basis in something of an entirely different form; if it did, it would lead to absurdities.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When a Cognition manifests an object distinct from some other object, it cannot be regarded as apprehending this latter object;—e.g. the Cognition of Sound cannot be regarded as apprehending Colour;—and as a matter of fact, the comprehensive notion manifests within itself Colour and the rest which are something different from the pure ‘Universal’;—so that what is actually perceived is contrary to the premiss (cited by the Opponent).

‘Manifists within itself the Verbal Expression, etc. etc.’;—‘verbal expression’, i.e. the name ‘Cow’;—‘constituent individuals’, in the form of colour, shape and the rest; ‘avabhāsavān’, containing the manifestation of these.

‘Aksara’, ‘Letters’, stands for the verbal expression ‘gauḥ’, which is made up of the letters ‘ga’, ‘au’ and the Visarga.—(739)

Shankarasvāmin has argued as follows:—“The ‘Universal’ Blue also is of the form of Blue; if it were not so, then there would be no such comprehensive idea as ‘Blue’; thus the Reason adduced by the Buddhist being not admitted, there is no annulment of the Naiyāyika’s Conclusion by Inference (as urged in the preceding Text, by the Author).”

This is answered in the following—
EXAMINATION OF 'SĀMĀNYA', THE 'UNIVERSAL'.

TEXTS (740–742).

If the 'Universal' also were in the form of 'Blue', then, what would be its difference from 'Quality'?—As a matter of fact, however, no all-comprehensive 'Blue' is ever perceived. Even though it may be manifesting itself, it is never perceived in a differentiated form. Under the circumstances, how could the Idea and Name apply to the Individual, on the basis of the said comprehensive notion?—Further, the other party holds the notion of the 'Universal' to be definite and certain; consequently, its non-perception cannot be right, as that would imply that it is incognisable.—(740–742)

COMMENTARY.

Such being the case, there can be no difference between the Quality 'Blue' and the 'Universal' 'Blue'; as, ex hypothesi, both have the same form. It might be urged that—"the Quality 'Blue' is not something comprehensive, while the 'Universal' 'Blue' embraces all that is blue at all times and at all places; and in this sense there is a difference between the forms of the two".

The answer to this is that 'no all-comprehensive Blue is ever perceived'. That is, as a matter of fact, any such comprehensive 'Blue' as distinct from the Quality Blue,—embracing all that is of the form of Blue,—is never perceived to manifest itself; as all that appears in Perception is a specific 'Blue' alone by itself. Even in the 'determinate' Cognition, there does not appear any second Blue; as that Cognition only 'determines' what has been perceived (by the previous indeterminate Perception).

It might be argued that—"Just as for the Bauddha, the Momentary Character of Things, though apparent, is not actually apprehended in its differentiated form by people with dull intelligence,—so the 'Universal' also".

This cannot be right; as even so, the theory propounded by you—that "on the strength of the perception of the Universal there appear the single identical Name and Idea in regard to Individuals that are diverse",—would become untenable; because if the qualifying factor is unperceived, there can be no perception of the qualified thing; e.g. until the Stick is seen, there can be no such notion as 'the man with the stick'. Similarly in the case in question. Because the idea put forward by you is that Diversities (Individuals) by themselves are beyond the reach of Verbal Expression and Cognition;—and these diversities, which are by themselves beyond the reach of Cognition and Verbal Expression, would (under your theory) be cognised only on the strength of the perception of the 'Universal';—how, then, can the Cogniser not 'perceive' the Universal itself?
Further, for the man for whom Perception is always 'indeterminate', it may be right to say that 'even though apparent, it is not apprehended'; as 'Apprehension' involves the functioning of the idea of Certitude; but for you, who hold all Perception to be determinate, it is not right that there should be no apprehension; as that would mean that there is no Cognition of it at all. In fact, the apprehension of objects by all certain Cognitions consists in their bringing about certitude; if then, they do not bring about this certitude, it comes to this that they do not cognise or apprehend the object at all.—(740–742)

Even granting that the existence of something other than the 'Blue' is proved, there can be no proof for what you desire to prove; as your Conclusion itself is barred by Inference, and to that extent, the Premiss also cannot be admitted.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (743).

Even though it may be taken as established that the notions in question have a different cause, the existence of the 'Universal' as comprehensive, and free from impermanence, does not become established; because the notions in question appear in succession.—(743)

COMMENTARY.

'Free from impermanence',—i.e. free from non-eternity,—eternal.

"Why is it not established?"

'Because the notions in question appear in succession'; i.e. the notions of the 'Cow' and the rest. If these were due to any such commonality as the 'Universal', then they would not appear in succession,—as their cause being always present in its perfect form, they should all appear simultaneously; just like several things produced simultaneously. Specially because a cause that cannot be helped does not need anything else.—(743)

Now, even admitting the Reason, the Author shows that it is 'fallible' ('not true', 'Inconclusive'):

TEXT (744).

On what basis does the term 'Category' ('Padārtha') rest when applied to the six (Vaishēśika Categories)? As also the notion 'It exists' which is found to be present in 'Being', etc.?—(744)

COMMENTARY.

There is not (even for the Vaishēśika) any such 'Universal' as 'Padārtha' (the genus 'Category') subsisting in all the six Categories,—on the
basis of which there should be such a comprehensive notion as 'this is a Category—this is a Category and so forth' ;—similarly in the 'Universal', the 'Specific Individuality' and 'Inherence', the 'Universal' Being does not subsist; by virtue of which each of these could be conceived of as 'existing'; because (according to the Vaishēṣīka) 'Being' subsists only in the three Categories of 'Substance', 'Quality' and 'Action'.—As regards the three Categories of Substance and the rest, the Opponents hold the name to be based upon the presence of the 'Universal'; hence the fallibility of the Reason has not been urged in regard to these.—(744)

The following argument may be put forward:—"Even in the Categories named, the property of 'existence' is present in the form of being the object of the right Cognition that 'it exists'; so that here also the name is due to something other than the object itself; and hence the Reason is not untrue".

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXTS (745-746).

If in regard to the Categories mentioned, the notion that 'it exists' is due to something else,—then, in regard to this 'something' also the notion that 'it exists' is present;

and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress,—

and the character of 'having the property'

would cease. In view of these, the Reason would become 'fallible' (untrue).—

Then again the all-embracing con-comitance of the Reason has not yet been established.—

(745-746)

COMMENTARY.

Even if it be admitted that the notions in question are due to something else, the defect of 'Fallibility' remains; because even in regard to the property mentioned by the Opponent, there is the notion that 'it exists', which is expressed by the words 'this property of existence is there' ;—so this notion of is-ness will have to be attributed to something other than 'Existence' (or Being); and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress; as also the anomaly that other things also would be receptacles of the Property, and hence 'things possessing that property'; and the result thus would be that there would be no such restriction of number as that 'there are only six Categories' which can have properties.—If, in order to avoid the Infinite
Regress, a further property (of is-ness) is not postulated, then, in view of these notions,—as appearing in connection with the Categories, or with the property of Existence,—the Reason would have to be regarded as 'fallible' (untrue).

It may be that the 'inconclusiveness' of the Reason is not due to its being Too Wide; even so, how could the defect of its negation being open to 'doubt' be avoided?—This is what is pointed out in the words—'Then again, etc. etc.';—what is meant by 'all-embracing concomitance' is the cognition of the fact of the Reason being invariably concomitant with the whole of the thing in which the Probandum is sought to be proved.

The following argument might be urged:—"The required concomitance is there all right; because, if there were no other Cause, how could the notion in question (of the Universal 'Cow', etc.) be different from the notion of the thing itself? There can be no difference among notions of the same object, even when they are many. If there were such difference, then, there could be no diversity even among the notions of different things, like Colour, Taste and so forth; because diversity among things is always due to the diversity among Cognitions."

This is not right; as a matter of fact, there can be no idea of 'Universal' in regard to the 'Specific Peculiarity' of things. Because the 'Specific Peculiarity' never forms the object of any notion associated with verbal expression.—But,—even in the absence of any 'Universal',—if the view be held that each thing by itself is one only and is excluded, from other things, on some basis,—and it is through this basis that there come about various assumptions and verbal expressions of an all-embracing character, in accordance with conventions and the experience of people;—if such were the view, then there would be no opposition to it. This is the reason why the Text speaks of the 'absence of concomitance'.—(745-746)

It has been argued (above, under Text 719) that—"The comprehensive idea that appears in regard to the Cow and other things, etc. etc.'.—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (747).

THE ARGUMENT IN PROOF OF THE 'UNIVERSAL' THAT HAS BEEN URGED AFTER THE ONE JUST DISPOSED OF, ALSO BECOMES REJECTED BY THIS; BECAUSE THE FALLACY OF 'FUTILITY' AND THE REST ARE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO THAT ALSO.—(747)

COMMENTARY.

'By this',—i.e. by the refutation just explained.—As the same objections are equally applicable to that also; for instance, the defect of being 'futile',
'superfluous' (proving what is already admitted) and the rest are applicable to this argument also.

The phrase 'and the rest' includes the fallacies of the Corroborative Instance 'being devoid of the Probandum', the Reason being 'unproven', and 'fallible' (Inconclusive) and so forth.—(747)

The following Text points out the 'Fallibility' of the Opponent's Reason in another manner:—

TEXTS (748-749).

WITHOUT ANY ALL-EMBRACING BASIS, THERE IS—(a) A PARTICULAR COGNITION IN REGARD TO THE 'COOK'; (b) SIMILARLY THERE IS THE NOTION OF 'NEGATION' IN REGARD TO NEGATION ITSELF; AS ALSO (c) IN REGARD TO PERSONS AND THINGS CREATED BY IMAGINATION, AND (d) IN REGARD TO DEAD AND UNBORN PERSONS.—IN VIEW OF ALL THESE COGNITIONS, THE REASON BECOMES OPEN TO THE FALLOACY OF 'FALLIBILITY'.—

(748-749)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the notion of the 'Cook', the 'Teacher' and the like, there are no such all-embracing bases as the character of being Cook, the character of being the Teacher and so forth, on which comprehensive notions of the 'Cook' and the 'Teacher' could be based. Similarly in regard to the four kinds of Negation,—Prior Negation and the like,—how could there be any such comprehensive notion as 'Negation'? Certainly there could be no 'Universal' in this case,—as this must rest in positive entities.—Similarly in regard to persons and things created by imagination,—such as the poetical character of Chandrāpiṣa (in Kādambarī) and White Palaces in the sky and so forth,—and also in regard to persons dead and unborn—such as Mahāsammata, Śaṅkha and the rest,—how could there be any notion without there being any comprehensive character? Surely there is no 'Universal' in these cases; which are all based upon individuals.—(748-749)

The following Texts explain the notions of the 'Cook', etc.:—
TEXTS (750–754)

In fact, there is no single basis for the notions of ‘Cook’ and the rest.—If it be said that “the act (of cooking) is the basis”,—then, the answer is that the Act varies with each individual person; and you have postulated the ‘Universal’ as embracing all individuals only, on the ground that unless there is an all-embracing entity, there can be no comprehensive notion of things which are different.—If, even without such all-embracing character, the Act be regarded as the basis (of the comprehensive notion) then why should not the individuals themselves be regarded as causes of it?—Further (if the Act were the basis, then) the notion of ‘Cook’ could not appear in regard to the man after he has desisted from the act (of cooking); surely even the other party do not regard the Act as present there at all times,—like the ‘Universal’.

If it be held that “the Notion and Name of the Cook, etc. is based on past and future action”—then such an Act cannot be the cause at all, for the simple reason that it is not present at the time.—(750–754)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be right to say that the notion in regard to the Cook is due to the act of cooking; because this Action also is held to be different with each person,—just like the individuality.

You postulate the ‘Universal’ as embracing all individuals, on the ground that, in regard to diverse things, there could not appear any comprehensive notion, in the absence of an all-embracing entity. Under the circumstances, if even without this all-embracing character, the Action were the basis of regarding diverse things as one,—then why should there be an aversion to the individuals, whereby ignoring these, the ‘Universal’ has been postulated as the basis of that notion?

Then again, if the notion in regard to the Cook were due to the Action, then after the man has desisted from the Action, and is not doing any cooking, the notion of Cook could not appear in regard to him. You do not regard the Action to be ever present, like the ‘Universal’, by virtue of which the notion could appear even when the Action had ceased. When one thing is due to another, it cannot appear in the absence of this latter.

Nor can past and future Action be rightly regarded as the basis of the said notion; because what is past or yet to come cannot be there, and what is not there cannot serve as the cause of anything.—(750–754)

Śaṅkara-svāmin argues as follows:—“The comprehensive idea of the Cook is based upon the presence of that particular Action which is related to the ‘Universal’ (or Genus) ‘Action’; hence, even after the actual act of
cooking has ceased, the permanent basis of it (in the shape of the Universal) is always there, and from that there arises the idea of the Cook".—This view is anticipated in the following—

TEXT (755).

IF THE IDEA BE SAID TO BE DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE ACT RELATED TO THE 'Universal' Action,—AND THIS PERMANENT BASIS IS ALWAYS INDICATED BY IT EVEN WHEN THE PARTICULAR ACT HAS CEASED,—[then, the answer is as given in the following Text].—(755)

COMMENTARY.

'By it',—i.e. by the action.
'Permanent basis',—in the shape of the 'Universal' Action.—(755)

The answer to this is given in the following—

TEXT (756).

WHEN THE PARTICULAR ACT HAS CEASED, THE PERMANENT 'Universal', EVEN THOUGH INDICATED, CANNOT REALLY EXIST; FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT ITS RECEPACLE HAS CEASED TO EXIST.—(756)

COMMENTARY.

'Its receptacle',—i.e. the receptacle of the Universal; i.e. the particular act.

As a matter of fact, the 'Universal' cannot be perceived,—or even exist,—by itself, apart from its receptacle; otherwise it would have to be regarded as baseless.—(756)

The following argument might be urged:—"When once the Universal has been indicated and perceived,—even if its receptacle, in the shape of the particular act, ceases, the Idea based upon it still continues".

The answer to this argument is as follows:—
TEXTS (757–760).

In the case of such 'Universals' as the 'Stick', the 'Armlet', and the like,—even though they have been indicated and perceived once (in one person),—the idea of the 'man with the Stick' (or 'the man with the Armlet') does not continue on the removal of the Stick or Armlet.—If the 'Universal' Cook were something entirely different (from the individual persons), then (as a permanent entity) it should be present in the new-born child also, who also could be conceived of as a 'Cook'.—If it be held that, like the idea of 'Being' (Existence), it does not subsist in a certain substratum (the child just born F.I.),—then, later on, also it could not subsist in it; as the conditions would be the same.—It may be that at the initial stage (when the child is just born) there is no Inherence between the two (the Universal and the Particular) because of the defective character of their relation-ship. But if so, then, how could there be that Inherence, even afterwards, when the defect would still be there?—

(757–760)

COMMENTARY.

There would be many absurdities. For instance, such 'Universals' as 'Stick' and the like having been perceived once,—when Devadatta had given up the Stick, the idea of his being 'with Stick', or 'with the Ear-ring', would be there.

Nor is it right to say that even in the man who has given up cooking, the 'Universal' Cook is present; because, the 'Universal' being eternal, it would be present in the new-born child also.

The Opponent might argue thus:—'The idea of 'being existent', though due to the 'Universal Being' (Existence), does not come about always; in the same way, the 'Universal' Cook also, being inherent in a certain particular substratum, would not appear at all times; so that it would not inhere in the new-born child.—'Inhering' is mentioned only by way of illustration; the 'Universal' would not be manifested;—this also has to be understood'.

But in that way, it comes to this that it may not inhere in it at all. Because the non-inherence of the 'Universal' in the new-born child, at the earlier stage, could be due only to some defect in the character of the relation between the 'Universal' and the Particular Object; and this defect would be present there at the later stages also;—how then could the 'Universal' inhere in it at all? According to your view, the Object is not momentary,—by which at the subsequent stages the Object (Child) would be a different entity.

'That'—i.e. Inherence.
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'Their relationship'—i.e. the relation between the 'Universal' and the Particular Object.
'Tādāmyā',—i.e. the previous defective form not having been abandoned.—(757–760)

Even when the Object is admitted to be evanescent, the objection stated remains in force;—this is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (761).

IF THE PARTICULAR OBJECT BE NOT PERMANENT, IT MIGHT ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL CHARACTERS; BUT EVEN SO, THE DEFECTIVE NATURE OF THE 'UNIVERSAL' WOULD NEVER CEASE.—(761)

COMMENTARY.

It may be that the Particular Object, being impermanent, will acquire additional qualities later on; but the 'Universal', being permanent, will always retain its character of being averse to Inherence; hence how could it be 'inherent' even at a later stage?—Nor can it be right to assert that—"the 'Universal' remains for ever in a state which is not averse to subsequent Inherence";—because in that case, the Particular Object also would have to be regarded as eternal; as the 'Universal' related to it would be eternal; because in the absence of one relative, the other relative cannot be said to be devoid of the defect preventing its related nature.—(761)

The following Text puts forward the answer given by Uddyotakara:—

TEXT (762).

"THE NAME 'Cook' IS MEANT TO BE APPLIED TO THAT WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THE ACT OF cooking; AND THIS 'PRINCIPALITY' IS PRESENT IN ANOTHER COOK ALSO."—(762)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows (in Nyāyavārtika, Sū. 2. 2. 8, page 320) —'It is through ignorance of our Reason that our Opponent has urged that—just as the term Cook is comprehensive in its connotation, and yet there is no such Universal as Cook,—so also is the comprehensive character of the connotation of the term Cow'.—Because what is meant by our Reason is that 'Particular Cognition cannot be accidental (without cause)'; and what this means is that the Idea which is different from the idea of the individual object must be due to a different cause;—and not that all comprehensive ideas are based upon 'Universals'. Such being the case, that which is the principal cause of the action of cooking is what is spoken of by the name 'Cook'; and this principal character is present in other persons also; hence the objection urged against us has no force."
This argument is answered in the following—

TEXT (763).

WHAT IS IT THAT IS CALLED ‘PRINCIPAL CHARACTER’?—IT CANNOT BE A
POTENCY; BECAUSE THIS DOES NOT SUSTAIN (IN OTHER INDIVIDUALS).
—FOR THE SAME REASON IT CANNOT BE SAID TO CONSIST IN
THE NATURE OF THE SUBSTANCE, QUALITY OR ACTION,
ETC.—(763)

COMMENTARY.

What is this ‘Principal Character’?

If it is a Potency, that cannot be right; as potency is restricted to each
individual substratum, and must therefore vary with each individual object,
and cannot subsist in another object.

For the same reason, it cannot consist in the ‘nature’—essence, self-
sufficiency,—of Substance, etc.; as this also cannot belong in common to
several objects.

The term ‘etc.’ is meant to include any entity that may be held to be
distinct from Substance, Quality and Action.

As regards the explanation offered (by Uddyotakara) of the assertion
that “the appearance of the notions in question is due to other causes”,—
this has already been answered by pointing out that if some sort of a Cause
is meant, then the argument is futile, as we also admit it as being due to
Conventional Conception;—if on the other hand any particular Cause is
meant, then there is ‘absence of concomitance’ and also ‘Falsity’, in view
of such notions as those of the Cook and the like.—(763)

The following Texts sum up the Author’s position—

TEXTS (764-765).

THUS THE NOTION THAT APPEARS IN REGARD TO THE ‘COOK’ IS DEPENDENT
ONLY UPON THE DIVERSITY OF CONVENTION, AND APPREHENDS
ONLY THE FORM THAT PRECLUDES ALL UNLIKE THINGS.—
FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT ALL NAMES AND
NOTIONS PROCEED DIVERSELY IN ACCORDANCE
WITH CONVENTION, WITHOUT THERE BEING
ANY ALL-EMBRACING ENTITY.—(764-765)

COMMENTARY.

‘Thus’,—because no other cause is found, on examination, for the
notions of the Cook and the rest, therefore,—even in connection with diverse
objects like the Cook, etc., the comprehensive notion—idea—which ultimately
apprehends only something distinguished from all things unlike itself—pro-
ceeds in accordance with Convention; as this exclusion of the unlike is always
present.

Because this is so, therefore it follows that in the case of the ‘Cow’,
etc. also, notions partaking of a uniform character, as also Names, should
proceed on the basis of Convention—even without any entity like the
‘Universal’.—So that the Reason put forward by the other party remains
‘Inconclusive’, (Fallible, Untrue).—(764-765)

The following Text further supports the argument (urged under Text 748,
above) based upon the notion of ‘Negation’ with regard to Negation—

TEXT (766)

THUS THE NOTION OF NEGATION WITH REGARD TO Negation IS NOT INCOM-
PATIBLE; NOR IS THE COMPREHENSIVE NAME (INCOMPATIBLE);
BECAUSE THEY PROCEED FROM CONVENTION, WHICH DOES NOT
INVOLVE THE ASSUMPTION OF ANY OTHER ENTITY.—

(766)

COMMENTARY.

The only basis for a comprehensive notion, that will apply to all cases,
consists in the Body of Convention; otherwise, the incongruity of the com-
prehensive notion that we have in regard to all Negations,—as also of the
very term ‘Negation’—cannot be denied. Because in the case of Negations,
there can be no ‘Universal’, which subsists only in entities (not in non-entities).

Why it is not incompatible is shown by the words—‘Because they proceed
etc., etc.’; the Convention is called ‘anartha’ in the sense that it does not
involve the assumption of any other entity in the shape of the ‘Universal’
and so forth; from such convention, they proceed;—i.e. the Name and the
Idea follow the presence or absence of the said Convention.—(766)

The following Texts anticipate and answer Shāṅkarasvāmin’s answer to
the Baudhā’s criticisms—
TEXTS (767–770).

"Such notions (of Negation) as 'the previous negation of the Jar', 'the Destruction of the Jar' and the like, apprehend Negations with positive entities as their adjuncts; and the comprehensive character of the said notion of 'Negation' is due to the comprehensive character of those adjuncts'.—If this is urged, then (our answer is that) this cannot be so; (a) because there is disparity and (b) because it cannot rest upon that.—(a) The comprehensive notion of the 'Jar' may be rightly regarded as being due to that; not so the comprehensive notion of 'Negation'; the notion of 'presence' (Affirmation) is entirely different from the notion of 'absence' (Negation). (b) The notion of the 'Cow' or the 'Horse' is not held to be due to the 'Universal' Being. If it did, then only one 'Universal' would have to be postulated as accomplishing everything (as being the basis of all notions).—(767–770)

COMMENTARY.

Shankarasvāmin has argued thus:—"The notions of Negations are never found to be free from adjuncts [the Negation is always of something]; for instance, in all such notions of Negation as 'the previous negation of the Jar', 'the Destruction of the Jar' and so forth,—they are found to rest upon Negations associated with certain positive entities as adjuncts; which shows that in all cases the notion of Negation has its comprehensive character dependent upon the 'Universal' permeating the said adjuncts; so that there is no 'fallibility' in our Premiss'.

'Tasyāḥ'—of the said notion (of Negation).

The above argument is answered in the words—'It cannot be so, etc., etc.'.—The compound 'Vailakṣanyātaddāshrayāt' may be construed to mean either (a) 'because there is the fact that it cannot rest upon that, along with the fact that there is disparity', or as (b) 'because there is disparity, and also because it cannot rest upon that'.

The first of these two reasons—'because there is disparity'—is explained in detail, in the words—'The comprehensive notion of the Jar, etc., etc.';—it is not right that notions of diverse forms should be based upon one and the same adjunct; as in that case a single 'Universal' would serve all purposes, and it would be useless to postulate several 'Universals'. Thus then notions of positive entities like the 'Jar' etc. may be due to the 'Universal' 'Jar',—how could the notions of 'Negations' be based upon those 'Universals', being, as they are, entirely different from these latter in character? For example the notion of the universal 'Cow' does not proceed on the basis of the 'Universal' Being.—(767–770)

Bhāvavikta has argued as follows:—"It is not held that in every case, the Notion is exactly in keeping with its Cause (or basis). For instance,
the number 'Plurality' subsisting (a) in Elephants and Horses, or (b) in the Dhava and Khadira trees, forms the basis of the notions of (a) the 'Army' and (b) the 'Forest' ;—similarly the mixture of several heterogeneous substances forms the basis of the notions of 'drinks', 'fermented gruel' and the like. Otherwise (i.e. if the resultant notion must be exactly in keeping with its basis) the notions in question should have been of (a) 'Many' and (b) 'Mixture' '.

This is the argument that is anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXTS (771-772).

"In all cases the notion is not in exact accordance with its basis,—inasmuch as the notions of 'Army', 'Forest' and the like have number, etc. for their basis" ;—if such be the view, then, why should not the said notion in regard to these diverse things also be held to be based upon the diversity of the body of conventions set up by one's own whim?" (771-772)

COMMENTARY.

'The said notion',—i.e. the Comprehensive notion.
The 'diversity'—i.e. Peculiarity of the Conventions. (771-772)

Question:—'What is the peculiarity on the basis whereof this statement is made?'

Answer:—

TEXTS (773-774).

When there is cognition of diversity, then there arises the desire to set up a convention ;—then the convention is set up ;—then comes the hearing of the name in accordance with that convention ;—then the 'body' or 'form' of the convention ;—then the notion (in accordance with that convention).

That this is the cause (basis) of the said notions is thus known definitely through affirmative and negative premisses. In regard to other causes, there would be an infinite regress. (773-774)

COMMENTARY.

The relation of Cause and Effect is ascertainable only by means of affirmative and negative premisses: and in regard to the comprehensive notion in
question, the only cause that is so ascertained is the Body of Conventions set up by the desire of man. For instance, first of all, there appears the cognition of difference among things;—after this cognition has come, there comes the desire to set up a Convention;—from that desire proceeds the setting up of the Convention;—then the hearing of the same at the time of actual usage of the name;—from that hearing of the usage, there follows the 'body' or 'form' of the Convention; from this Body of the Convention, comes the using of the name in regard to the diverse things in question;—and then finally the notions of 'Jar' and the like come into appearance.

Among all people, down to the veriest cowherd, the idea of such being the cause of the notions in question is definitely recognised with certainty.

As for the 'Universal' on the other hand, its capacity has nowhere been seen; if then it were regarded as the Cause of the notions, it would lead to absurdities; for, after having assumed that as the Cause, why could you not assume another cause, of which also the capacity may not be known and so on?—(773-774)

The following Texts continue the same line of reasoning—

TEXTS (775-776).

The assumption of something else (as the cause of the comprehensive notion) is based upon the idea that the correlative of a thing should be of the same nature as that thing.

But, even so, when the notions are diverse, it is far better to accept what has been just suggested (by us); as in this case, the restriction is due to the capacity of things; and it is far better to assume that which has been found to be true in regard to things whose capacity is well known,—through affirmative and negative premises.

(775-776)

COMMENTARY.

When you were expounding the reason for your conclusions to consist in the fact that they should have a basis similar to themselves, you had to postulate millions of 'Universals'. If the 'Universal' also produces notions of diverse forms, then it is far better to assume this,—that is, that which has been actually found to have the capacity (of producing the said notions). As in so doing, there would not have to be an assumption of anything not actually seen.
Further, when you are asked the question—How is it that one and the same ‘Universal’ produces diverse notions?—You will have to say that “such is the restricted capacity of things that even though itself one, it is capable of producing notions of diverse forms”.—If such be the case, then why should not the assumption be that the determining factors consist in the diverse things themselves whose capacities are well known and fully ascertained? In doing this, nothing would be done which is not in strict accordance with experience.—(775-776)

The following might be urged—“Of the ‘Universal’ also, the capacity is well known and fully ascertained”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (777).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO AFFIRMATIVE CONCOMITANCE (OF THE NOTIONS) WITH THE UNIVERSALS; AS THEIR NOTION IS NOT ALWAYS PRESENT; AS FOR NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE, THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF WHAT ARE ETERNAL.—(777)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact the notions of ‘Being’ and such other Universals do not appear at all times; and hence it can never be right to assert the affirmative concomitance of these with the Universals. If the notions were really concomitant with the presence of the Universals, then, as the Universals would be there at all times, why could not the notions appear at all times? Specially as the Universal does not need anything else; because other things cannot create any peculiar capacities in it. Hence there can be no affirmative concomitance with these Universals.

Nor is negative concomitance possible. Because at the time that the notions of Being, etc. do not appear,—it cannot be said that the cause of this non-appearance lies in the non-existence of the Universal; because eternal things must be always present, and hence their non-existence (absence) is impossible. Consequently there can be no negative concomitance with the Universals.—(777)

Thus then, there being objections against the view that Comprehensive notions should have their cause in something different (from the individual things),—the following assertion of the other party also becomes discarded:—

“When in regard to Quality, there arises the notion that it is not-substance, it is not-Action and so forth, the basis for this lies in the particular-Universal ‘Quality’; while Inference in the same object is the basis for the compre-
hensive notion of the 'Universal' that appears in regard to the pure Universals 'Being' and the like'.

This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (778).

The view that "the Universal 'Quality' is the basis of the notion of 'not-substance' and the like" is not reason-
able; for the same reason there can be no

'inherence in the same object' in the
case of the notion of the 'Univer-
sal'.—(778)

The following Text shows that the Theory in question involves an absurdity also—

TEXT (779).

As for 'inherence in several things', this is present in Number, etc. also, just as in the 'Universals'; hence the notion

of 'Universal' must be there in regard to

Number, etc. also.—(779)

COMMENTARY.

If 'Inherence in several things' were the basis of the Comprehensive notion in regard to 'Universals', then,—as such 'subsistence in several substances' is found in such things also as Number, Conjunction, Disjunction, Composite Substances and so forth,—the notion of 'Universal' should appear in regard to these also; because the basis of such notion would be equally present in this case also.

As for the character of 'forming the object of one and the same cognition', this also is restricted to the universals 'Being', etc. as appearing in the forms of the 'existing,' etc.; and it does not touch any other 'Universal'; so that, on the strength of that also, the comprehensive notion of 'Universal—Universal' cannot appear in regard to the several Universals. Consequently the following assertion of Kumārila is entirely irrelevant:—"The subsistence of one in several different things is the basis of the name 'Universal' as applied to Being, etc.; or it may be due to their being the basis of one and the same cognition'". (Śhlokavārtika-Ākṛtivāda, 24).—(779)
So far the author has explained the Reason 'Because there is disparity' [put forward by himself under Text 768, against the opponent's explanation of the comprehensive notion of 'Negation' in regard to the several kinds of Negation]. He next proceeds to explain the other Reason 'Because it cannot rest upon that':

**TEXTS (780-782).**

*Universals called 'Jar' and the rest subsist only in the Jar; they cannot subsist in Negations; how then does the comprehensive notion (of Negation) arise in regard to these latter?—The (comprehensive) notion and Name cannot be applied to one thing on the basis of what subsists in something else; for instance, the notion and Name 'Cancer' cannot be based upon the Universal 'Elephant'. As a matter of fact, even 'subsistence in one and the same thing' is not present here. Notions of Taste, Colour, and Heaviness might arise from their 'subsistence in one and the same thing'; in the case in question (of Negation) however, even this subsistence is not there; for the simple reason that Negation does not subsist in anything at all.—(780-782)*

**COMMENTARY.**

As a matter of fact, the 'Universal' subsists only in the Jar and such entities, never in Negations, because these latter are non-entities. How then could there appear, in regard to these Negations, any comprehensive notion associated with the form of a Universal, on the basis of the 'Universal' Jar which subsists in something other (than the Negations)? For instance, the 'Elephant' does not become the basis of a comprehensive notion regarding the Cancer.

"But a notion is actually found to appear in connection with one thing on the basis of something that subsists elsewhere; e.g. such notions as 'the sweet Taste is viscid, cool and heavy'.

This is answered in the words—'Even subsistence in one and the same thing, etc., etc.'—In the example cited, the qualities of 'Coolness' and the rest subsist in that same substance wherein the sweetness subsists; so that on the strength of this 'subsistence in the same substratum', there is co-existence; while Negation never subsists in any substance along with Universals like the 'Jar'; for the simple reason that that which has no colour and form cannot subsist in anything.—(780-782)

The following Text anticipates the answer given by Uddyotakara—
TEXTS (783-784).

If it be argued that—"in this case there is the relation of Qualification—and—Qualified"—then the answer is that such a relation is assumed only when some other relation is already there; for instance, the relation of Qualification and Qualified is assumed on the basis of the close proximity (contact) between the two factors concerned; in the absence of such contact, the relation in question cannot be possible, as there would be no basis for it.—(783-784)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows:—"The relation between the Universal 'Jar' with the particular Jar is of the nature of Inherence, while the relation of Negations is of the nature of Qualification and Qualified; so in both cases the 'relation of the same thing' is the basis for the common name".

The answer to this is that 'Such a relation, etc., etc.'; that is, the relation of Qualification and Qualified among Entities is always brought about by some other relation; e.g. the relation of Qualification and Qualified between Devadatta and his stick is due to conjunction (contact) between them, and the same between the King and his officer is due to the relation of Master and Servant. In the case of Negations however, there is no such other Relation which could form the basis of the relation of Qualification and Qualified; how then could any such relation be possible? If it were possible, then there would be an absurdity; everything could be the qualification of everything'.—(783-784)

The question then arising as to—"how, in the absence of any other relation, such notions are current among people as 'the Prior Negation of the Jar'?"—the following Texts supply the answer—

TEXTS (785-786).

As regards such expressions as 'the Prior Negation of the Jar', it is a creation of mere fancy; just like the description of 'bravery' in regard to an imaginary person. In cases where the relation of Qualification and Qualified is based upon a real entity, there is bound to be some other relation (regarded as its basis).—(785-786)

COMMENTARY.

When it is found that a thing which was not there has come into existence,—and there is a desire to speak of it,—there appears an imaginary
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notion which indicates ‘Prior Negation’ as something different from the thing concerned, and related to it by the relation of Qualification and Qualified; it is on this imaginary basis that the relation of Qualification and Qualified is mentioned, and there is no such relation in reality;—just as in the case of the picture drawn by an artist, the qualities of ‘bravery’ and the like are assumed. In cases where you postulate the said relation of Qualification and Qualified,—some other relation (as its basis) has surely to be looked for; otherwise there would be no regularity or restriction.—(785-786)

The following Text proceeds to show that the answer given by Shankara-śrīvāmin is not relevant to the objection urged by us—

TEXT (787).

THE OBJECTION URGED BY US WAS IN REGARD TO SUCH NOTIONS AS ‘THIS NEGATION’, ‘THAT NEGATION’. AS REGARDS THE ‘UNIVERSAL’ SUBSISTING IN THE ADJUNCT, THAT SUBSISTS ONLY IN ITS OWN SUBSTRATUM.—(787)

COMMENTARY.

What we had urged was as follows:—In the case of the Negation of the Jar, the Negation of the Cloth, the Negation of the Hare’s Horn and so forth,—we find the comprehensive notion of ‘Negation’ appearing, even when there is no such ‘Universal’ as ‘Negation’,—hence in other cases also the assumption of the ‘Universal’ is useless; and we did not raise the objection against the ‘Prior Negation’ and other Negations that are conceived of in connection with a large number of things of the same kind.

“ If that is so, what then?”

As regards the ‘Universal’ subsisting in the adjunct, etc., etc.—That is, the Universal ‘Jar’ subsisting in the adjunct, the particular Jar, subsists only in its own substratum,—i.e. only in the Jar, not in the Cloth and other things. How then could there arise, from that, the notion regarding the ‘Prior’ and other Negations of such heterogeneous things as the Cloth and the rest? This is what is meant.—(787)

It might be argued that—“ there is one all-embracing Universal everywhere”;—the answer to that is as follows—
TEXT (788).

Nor is it held that the single all-embracing universal 'Being' subsists in them all. Because notions of 'Negation' do not appear apart from the six categories.—(788)

COMMENTARY.

There is no one Universal embracing several such heterogeneous things as the Cloth and the like,—upon which the notion in question could be based.—It might be argued that—'there is the Great Universal (the Summum Genus) called 'Being', and the notion of Negation would arise on the basis of that'.—That however cannot be right; as it is not true; that is to say, you have such notions of Negation as are involved—(a) in the denial of such things as 'Dissociation from Impurities' ['Pratisankhyāniruddha'], a technicality postulated by the Bādha, but denied by his opponents] as apart from the six Categories,—and (b) in the true denial of such imaginary characters in stories like Kapināja;—to which adjunct would such notions of 'Negation' be due, which could be regarded as their basis? Surely according to your view there is no real 'Being' (existence) in the case of such things as the said 'Dissociation from Impurities' and the like.

This same argument answers also the following assertion of Kārila's:—

"If it be urged that 'in the case of Prior Negation, etc. there is no Universal posited',—the answer is that Being itself is the Universal in these, as qualified by non-appearance" [Shlokavārtika-Apohavāda, 11]; where the last qualification means that the 'Being' that subsists in the Negations is qualified by the character of being not-produced.

The objection that we have urged above applies to this view also. Because there can be no 'Being' (Existence, Reality) in the things postulated under other systems, or in character and things created in imaginary tales, etc,—on which basis the notion of 'Negation' could arise in regard to them.

"What is conceived in the case of these things is the imaginary 'Being', which has no counter-part reality in the external world."

If that is so, then why is not the denotation of all terms admitted to consist in mere fancy, entirely devoid of any single permanent Universal in the shape of 'Being'? Otherwise, if a Universal in the shape of the one eternal 'Being' be postulated,—inasmuch as all such terms as 'Being', 'Man' and the like would equally connote only the 'exclusion of other things', why should there be divergent notions regarding these?—There can be no answer to this objection.—(788)

It has been urged by the author above (under Text 749) that—'in regard to persons created by imagination, and in regard to dead and unborn persons, the notions of Negation appear without any all-embracing basis'. This argument is further elaborated in the following—
In the case of things created by imagination, there can be no Universal subsisting in them; because there is no possibility of the existence of the Individuals (that would make up the universals). Hence the 'fallibility' of the opponent's reasons remains as before.—Similarly with regard to past and future things,—if there is a cognition of an eternal universal, then no such pure 'universal' (without the constituent Individuals) can ever be apprehended. Or, if such a pure Universal by itself were apprehended, then it could not be the 'universal' of any Particulars. Such a Universal could not be manifestable by Particulars; just as the Himalaya is not manifestable by the Vindhya.—Nor can the Universal be tied down to the Particulars through its birth being dependent upon these.—Nor lastly can the Universal be dependent upon the Particulars for its cognition, because it is eternal and because it is apprehended purely by itself.—There is also no possibility of its being dependent upon any such thing as the contact of its own substratum with the sense-organ concerned. Consequently this Universal could either be apprehended at all times, or not apprehended at any time at all.—As regards its capacity to bring about its own cognition by itself, it may or may not have this capacity; whichever way it is, it would always remain so. Its natural form,—with or without the said capacity,—would be unshakeable, because it is itself permanent. Who then, could ever shake what is unshakeable?—(789–795)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'ichchhārachita, etc.' is to be expounded as 'that of which the form is created by imagination': The term 'ādi' includes dead and unborn things.—There is no Universal subsisting in such imaginary things, on which the said notion could be based.

"There may be no Universal in regard to imaginary things; in regard to the past and future things, the notion could be due to the Universal".

This is not true; the nature of things subsisting in other things is not such that they exist by themselves, without their substratum; if they did not exist, then they would cease to be subsistent.
Even if the subsistent things existed by themselves,—even so, the difficulty remains; because the other party also does not admit the apprehension of the Universal by itself. This has been thus declared by them—"The Universal depends for its cognition upon the contact of its substratum with the sense-organ".

Further, if the Universal could be apprehended by itself, the cognition of the Particular Individuals could not be held to follow from the cognition of the Universal; because the Particular does not exist at the time that the Universal is apprehended by itself.

Nor would there be any connection between the Particulars and the Universal,—such as is involved in the notion that 'this is the Universal of these Particulars'; as there would be no basis for such a connection.

For instance, if there were a basis for such connection, it could consist either, (a) in the fact of its being manifested by them, or (b) in its being produced by them, or (c) in its cognition being dependent upon their cognition.—(a) The Universal cannot be regarded as connected with these Particulars on account of its being manifested by them; because being permanent, it can have no peculiarity produced in it by anything else, hence it could not be manifested by anything else; when one thing does not confer any benefit upon another thing, it cannot serve as its manifestor; for instance, the Himalaya is not the manifestor of the Vindhya. The Particulars in the same way cannot be the manifestor of the Universal. Hence the notion involved in the proposition is contrary to a wider proposition. If a thing that confers no benefit were to be regarded as the manifestor, then there would be the absurdity that everything would be the manifestor of everything else.—(b) For the same reason, because the Universal is held to be eternal, therefore it cannot be right to regard it as dependent upon the Particulars for its production.—(c) Inasmuch as there is apprehension of the pure Universal by itself, it could not be held to be dependent upon the Particulars for its cognition.—Thus all the three alternatives are impossible.

Hence the assertion that—"the Universal has its apprehension dependent upon the contact of its substratum with the sense-organ"—is not right; because there can be no 'substratum' for the Universal; how then could the Universal be dependent for its cognition upon the contact of the sense-organ with any such 'substratum'? ?

The particle 'ādi' includes such conditions as the contact of the Mind and Soul, and the like (postulated by the Vaishēṣika).

Then again, as the Universal is eternal, and hence can have no peculiar features introduced into it by other things,—it cannot be dependent upon anything else. Consequently, if it is capable of bringing about its own cognition, then it should bring it about at all times; if it is incapable of bringing it about, then it could not bring it about at any time at all. Whatever its nature be—capable or incapable,—it could not alter it; or else it would lose its permanence; this has been thus declared—'Its capacity or incapacity, which rests in its very nature,—who can destroy? As it is eternal and hence not amenable to treatment'.—(789–795)
It has been argued (by Bhāvivikta, under Text 720) that—"the Universal Cow is something different from the Cow, etc., etc."—The following Text shows that the Reason adduced there is found to be false, in view of the case of such notions as those of the 'Cook' and the like—

TEXTS (796-797).

"The Universal 'Cow' is something distinct from the individual Cow, because it forms the object of a different Idea,—like Colour, Touch and the like;—also because it is spoken of as belonging to that, just as the Horse is spoken of as belonging to Chaitra".—This argument may be shown to be 'fallible' (untrue) in view of the notion of the 'Cook' and so forth.—In this same manner, other wrong arguments also are to be discredited.—

(796-797)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, even though the Universal 'Cook' is not held to be anything different from the individual Cook, yet it does become the object of diverse cognitions,—such as 'this is a cook—that is a cook' and so forth; there are also such verbal expressions as 'Devadatta's Cook-ship', where the two things are expressed by words with different case-terminations. Thus the Reason adduced by the other party is found to be 'Inconclusive' because 'too wide'.

'Other wrong arguments';—such as those put forward by Kumārila and others.

The following are the 'wrong arguments' set forth by Kumārila:—"(1) In regard to the diverse particular cows there appears the notion of 'cow',—this must be due to a single entity in the shape of the Universal 'Cow',—because it manifests the cow and is of one form;—just like the notion in regard to a single individual cow.—Or again (2) The notion of 'Cow' cannot be due to a particular Cow, the Black one for instance, or it must be due to something different from this particular Cow;—because it appears even when this particular Cow is not present;—just like the notion of 'being made of Clay' in regard to the Jar.—If it is asked how this Universal is said
to subsist in all particular individuals,—our explanation is as follows:—This notion of 'Cow' (the Universal) has for its object something that subsists in everyone of the individuals;—because each individual is found to contain the whole form of the thing,—like the notion in regard to each individual.—The one-ness also of the Universal is fully established. Because even though the Universal subsists in its entire form in every individual, yet it is _one only_,—because it is apprehended by a cognition of one and the same form; just as the _exclusion of the Brāhmaṇa_ by such negative terms as 'non-brāhmaṇa'.—It cannot be urged against this that,—'this notion of identical form in regard to things that are different must be wrong, and hence it is not right to determine the nature of things on the strength of that notion'.—Because there is no defect in the source of this notion; nor is there any subsequent cognition that annuls this notion. Hence there being none of the causes of mistake, the assertion that it is wrong cannot be right'.

All these arguments have been thus formulated (by Kumārila, in _Ślokavārtika—Vanavāda_ 44–49):—"The Idea of Cow in regard to the different individual cows is based upon the one Universal 'Cow',—because it manifests the cow and because it is of one form,—just like the notion of the individual Cow.—The Idea of the 'Cow' cannot be based upon the individual Black Cow,—or it must be based upon something other than this individual,—because it is present even when the individual is not present,—just as the notion of 'being made of clay' in regard to the Jar.—The Idea of the 'Cow' has for its object everyone of the individuals in which it subsists, because it subsists in everyone of them in its complete form,—just like the notion in regard to each individual.—Even though the Universal subsists in each individual, yet it is only one,—because it is cognized as one—just like the _exclusion of the Brāhmaṇa_ in the case of the negative term (like 'non-brāhmaṇa').—The notion of 'one-ness' in regard to the Universal Cow cannot be regarded as wrong;—because there is no defect in its source, nor any subsequent cognition annulling it'.

In the _first_ of these arguments, the Corroborative Instance is 'devoid of the Probandum'; because a single Universal 'Cow' is not admitted; hence the fact of the notion of the one individual cow being based upon that cannot also be admitted.—If what is proved is the general fact of its having a single basis, then it is superfluous; because it is admitted by us also that the notion is due to the _exclusion of the non-cow_, which is one only, which serves to distinguish the Cow from all heterogeneous things.

In the argument that the notion of 'Cow' cannot be based upon any particular Black Cow,—if what is denied is the fact of its being produced directly from it, then it is superfluous; because the producing is interposed by the apprehension of the 'specific peculiarity' and the 'conception of the Convention'. If what is denied is the fact of even _indirect_ production, of the notion from the individual, then the Proposition is annulled by direct experience and the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum.

Even when what is meant to be proved is that the notion is based upon something other than the individual,—if the fact of the notion being due to something else be sought to be proved even when the Black Cow is close by,—then this also is contrary to direct experience. Because as a matter of fact,
it proceeds from the cognition of the Cow close by. The Corroboration
Instance also is devoid of the Probandum.—If, on the other hand, what is
sought to be proved is that when the Black Cow is not there, the notion of
Cow that appears in the presence of the Cow of variegated colour is due to
something different from the Black Cow,—then the argument is superfluous.—
If then what is meant to be proved is the fact of its being due directly to the
entity itself,—then the Reason is ‘inconclusive’; as it has been explained
that there is no real entity (like the Universal ‘Cow’) which could form
the basis of the said notion.

As for the argument that has been adduced to prove that the Universal
subsists in its entire form in every individual,—there also if the fact is meant
to be proved in a vague general way, then it is superfluous. Because in
regard to every individual thing, its notion is based upon the notion of the
thing as excluded from every other thing.

If what is meant to be proved is the fact that the notion has for its
object a real entity called ‘Universal’ which subsists in its entire form in
every individual,—then the Corroboration Instance is devoid of the
Probandum and the Reason is ‘inconclusive’. As the concomitance of such
a character is not known of anywhere. If a single thing subsisted in its
entire form in several things, then all the diverse individuals would be of
one and the same form; because every one of them would be associated
with the same entity, ‘Universal’, subsisting in every single individual.
Or the Universal itself would have to be regarded as being of diverse forms,—
because at one and the same time, it subsists in its entire form in several
things; just like the Bilva and other fruits placed in several vessels kept
at varying distances. So that the argument is annulled by this Inference
also.

For this same reason, the assertion that “there is no annulling cognition
to the contrary” is not true. As the annulling cognition has been pointed
out above and is also going to be pointed out later on.

As regards the argument in proof of the one-ness of the Universal,—there
also, as it is not admitted that the Universal subsists in each individual,
the fact of its being apprehended by a single cognition cannot be admitted;
hence the Reason is one whose very basis is not admitted.—As regards the
Exclusion of the Brāhmaṇa, it is not really one,—because it is a non-entity;
hence the Corroboration Instance is devoid of the Probandum.—If the
‘one-ness’ be meant to be imaginary, then the reasoning is superfluous;
because if it is imaginary, then it is already admitted by us in the form of
‘Apotha’ (Exclusion of the Contrary).

As regards the statement that “there is no defect in the source of the
notion”,—that also cannot be admitted,—because the defect of the source
is always there, in the shape of the beginningless influence of Ignorance.

In this same way all wrong arguments are to be disposed of.—(796-797)

Having thus pointed out the defects in the arguments adduced by the
other party, for the proving of the Universal, the Author proceeds to advance
arguments against the very Conception of the Universal:
TEXTS (798–801).

It is averred that the ‘Universal subsists in several things’. What is this ‘subsistence’ meant to be?—Is it staying? or being manifested? As for ‘staying’, which stands for not deviating from its own form,—this belongs to the Universal by its very nature;—any receptacle of it could not produce this in it, by virtue of which that substratum could be regarded as ‘that which makes it stay’. As for preventing its movement (which is another form of ‘subsistence’), it cannot belong to the Universal, as it does to the jujube fruit (contained in the cup); because the Universal is, by its nature, immobile; hence it cannot have a receptacle.—If it be held that ‘staying’ is inheritance,—that cannot be accepted; as it is the exact nature of this ‘Inheritance’ that is being examined. In the form of the relation of the sustainer and sustained which subsists among things never found apart from each other, such ‘Inheritance’ is admitted by us also.—(798–801)

COMMENTARY.

It is essential that the subsistence of the Universal in the diverse individuals should be admitted; if it were not, then how could there be, on the basis of that Universal, any comprehensive notion of one and the same form specifically in connection with those things?—Now this ‘subsistence’ of the Universal, when it is there, could be either in the form of staying or in that of being manifested. Staying also is of two kinds—not deviating from its own form and having its downward movement checked.—The former is not possible in the case in question; because, being eternal, the Universal would, by its own nature, never deviate from its own form. Nor can it be the latter; because the Universal is incorporeal and all-pervading, and hence it can have no movement; so that downward movement would not be possible; hence it cannot be right to assume the checking of any movement.

The answer that what is meant by the ‘subsistence’ of the Universal in the diverse things is its inheritance in these,—would be no answer at all; as it is just this ‘Inheritance’ the exact nature of which is being considered.—For instance, ‘Inheritance’ has been defined as the relation of sustainer and sustained that subsists in things never found apart from each other. Now what is being considered is whether this character of being sustained is of the nature of its staying being restricted, or of being manifested. In the case of entirely distinct things, it cannot be right to postulate any such distinct thing as ‘Inheritance’ which can serve no useful purpose; as such postulating would lead to absurdities,—as in that case everything would ‘inhere’ in every other thing. Because ‘Inheritance’ has been postulated as that which combines things which are distinguished from one another; but even when there is such a distinct thing as ‘Inheritance’, things which
are essentially different do not assume one another's form; for, if they did, they would lose their own form.—In giving the name of 'Inheritance' to that other thing, there can be no dispute.—From all this it follows that the 'staying' (of the Universal in the diverse things) cannot be anything different.—(798–801)

The following Texts proceed to show that it is absolutely incongruous to assume a 'receptacle' for the 'Universal'—

**TEXTS (802–804).**

In the case of Water and such things, there may be a 'Receptacle' which prevents their downward movement; in the case of Universals however, which are immobile, what would be the use of Receptacles?—In the case of what is capable of bringing about its own cognition, what would be the use of any causes of manifestation?—And also in the case of what is incapable of bringing about its own cognition, what would be the use of any causes of manifestation? If what was incapable yesterday were made capable (to-day), then the thing would be impermanent,—just like the jar manifested by the lamp.—(802–804)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Agatīnām', 'Immobile'—which are devoid of movement. The absence of movement in the Universal is implied by its incorporeality and all-pervading character.

Nor can the 'subsistence' of the Universal in the Individuals be of the nature of being manifested. Because the 'manifestation' of the Universal could only consist in bringing about its Cognition, not in any strengthening of its character, because the character of an eternal thing cannot be changed. Under the circumstances, if the Universal has the capacity of bringing about its own Cognition, then why should it need any other cause for its 'manifestation'?—If, on the other hand, it does not possess the capacity of bringing about its own Cognition, then it would not be reasonable to assert its dependence on something else, as by its very nature, the Universal is such that nothing can be introduced into it by other things.—If it be held that other things do introduce peculiar features into the Universal, then, like the Individual, it would become specific, and cease to be Universal.

The thing, etc. etc.—The entire category 'Universal' is held to be based upon the name and notion of 'existence', [hence 'bhāva' here stands for the thing Universal, in that sense].

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When there is no basis for one thing subsisting in another, then it cannot subsist in this latter,—e.g. the Himālaya in the Vindhya;—there is no basis for the subsistence of the Universal in the Individuals;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider 'term' (which implies the negation of the narrower term).—(802–804)

The following Text sets forth another objection—
TEXT (805).

The various Universals, 'Jar' and the rest, could subsist either in their own respective receptacles or in all places,—like the 'Highest Universal' (Summum Genus).—(805)

COMMENTARY.

'Ghastadi, etc.'—i.e. such diverse 'Universals' as the 'Jar' and the rest.

The Universals 'Jar', 'Clayey' and the like have been described as all-pervasive, and yet would they be described as pervading only over their own substratum—or as pervading over all space, even where there are no individuals at all?—There are only these two views possible.

'Like the Highest Universal';—'Being' is called the 'highest' Universal because it comprises the largest number of things. It is this widest Universal as comprising the largest number of things that has been cited as the instance, and not any such Universal as pervades over only such space as happens to lie between two individuals; as the said character is not perceived in this latter.—(805)

Out of the two alternatives set forth above, the Author sets forth the objection against the first alternative:—

TEXT (806).

When the thing comes into existence in another place, it is not understood how the Universal is perceived there, or how it gains subsistence therein.—(806)

COMMENTARY.

When in a place entirely devoid of the Jar, a Jar comes into existence (on being made),—how the particular Universal 'Jar' comes to be perceived in that Jar,—or how it subsists in it,—it is not understood.—(806)

The following Text explains why it is not understood—

TEXT (807).

The Universals cannot be said to have come into existence along with the new Jar,—because they are eternal; nor can they be said to have been there already, because (ex hypothesi) they are not all-pervading; nor can they be said to have come from elsewhere, because they are immobile.—(807)

COMMENTARY.

In the said case the Universal 'Jar' could either come into existence along with the different individual Jars,—or it would be there already,—or
it would come in from another place;—only under these three conditions could the Universal be perceived, or subsist, in the Jar newly come into existence. As a matter of fact however, the Universal could not be produced along with the new Jar,—as it is eternal (and hence cannot be produced). Nor could it have been there already, because it is not all-pervading in character. Nor lastly could it come in from elsewhere, because it is immobile. How then could the Universal subsist, or be perceived, in this case?

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When in any place a thing is not produced, nor has it been already there, nor has it come from elsewhere, then it cannot be perceived, nor can it subsist,—just like the Horn on the Hare's head;—where the Jar is produced in a place which had been devoid of it, the Universal is neither produced, nor has it been there already, nor has it come from elsewhere;—hence the wider character is not perceived (which implies the absence of the narrower character).—This Reason is not Inconclusive, because there is no other way (apart from the three mentioned) in which the Universal could subsist or be perceived.

—(807)

The following Text sets forth the objection against the second alternative view (mentioned in Text 805, that the Universals 'Jar' and the like are all-pervading, subsisting in all things):

TEXT (808).

WHEN THE CONTACT OF ITS SUBSTRATUM WITH THE SENSE-ORGAN AND SUCH OTHER CONDITIONS WOULD BE PRESENT AND BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE UNIVERSAL,—THAT UNIVERSAL WOULD BECOME PERCEIVED EVERYWHERE;
BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO DIVISION IN ITS FORM.—(808)

COMMENTARY.

'The contact, etc. etc.'—i.e. the causes of Perception.
'Such other conditions';—this is meant to include the contact of the Mind and Soul and so forth.

What is meant is that the Universal being perceived in one particular individual, it should be perceived in other and heterogeneous individuals also, as also in the interval between two individuals; because it is of one uniform character which cannot differ from the one that is actually perceived.—(808)

This same argument is further elucidated in the following Text—
TEXT (809).

(a) If the Universal (in the new Individual) be not-different from that which has been already perceived,—then there should be perception of that Universal also;
—(b) or (b) like it, the other also should not be perceived;—or (c) there should be difference.—(809)

COMMENTARY.

(a) That is to say, if the form of the Universal subsisting in other heterogeneous individuals and in the intervals were not-different from the form of the Universal subsisting in the Individual that is seen,—then, the former also should be seen, as it would be not-different from what is seen, like the form of this latter.—(b) If however there is no perception of the said Universal, then there should be no perception of that Universal as subsisting in the perceived individual which is non-different from what is not perceived.—(c) Lastly, if the Universal in question be held to be of both kinds,—then that would involve a diversity of nature; two mutually contradictory characters being present; and for any clear-minded person, it cannot be right to regard as one what is found to be obsessed by the two mutually contradictory characters of perceptibility and imperceptibility; as such an idea would lead to absurdities; as in that case the whole Universe would be a single substance, which would imply the anomaly of the whole being produced and destroyed at one and the same time. If it were not so, then they would be 'one' only in name; and there can be no difference of opinion regarding mere names.—(809)

Thus having discredited the whole conception of the 'Universal', the Author proceeds to formulate the arguments against it:—

TEXTS (810-811).

The notions of 'Tree' and such things cannot be based upon the 'Universals' postulated by the other Party;—because things appear in succession, and because they are comprehensive,—like the notions of the 'Cook' and such things.—The fact that what is eternal cannot be productive (of effects) also serves to annul the Opponent's Proposition.—All the objections that were urged against 'Conjunction' also serve to annul the Opponent's conclusion.—(810-811)

COMMENTARY.

Notions that are endowed with the properties—of appearing in succession, being comprehensive, being entities, being produced, and so forth—cannot
proceed from the eternal, one all-pervading 'Universal', as conceived by 
the other party;—like the notions of the 'Cook';—the notions of the 
'Tree', etc. are of the said character; hence there is perception of a character 
concomitant with the contrary of the Opponent's conclusion. As being in 
succession and the rest are all concomitant with non-eternity, which is con-
trary to eternity (postulated by the Opponent). What is eternal cannot 
have any effective action, either successive or simultaneous,—as both are 
incompatible; hence the Reason adduced by us cannot be regarded as 
'Inconclusive'. As regards the fallacy of our Corroborative Instance being 
'devoid of the Probandum', that has been already disposed of by us in detail; 
hence the Instance also cannot be said to be 'unproven'.

The Author states another argument in annulment of the Opponent's 
conclusion—*All the objections, etc. etc.*;—these objections were set forth 
under Text 674, above, where it has been shown that one thing cannot subsist 
in several things; similarly in the section dealing with the *Composite*, under 
*Text 607*.—(810-811)

The following *Text* sums up the section—

**TEXT** (812).

*Thus has been rejected the 'Universal' as an entirely distinct 
entity. As regards the 'Universal' postulated by the 
followers of Jainini, that is going to be rejected 
under the chapter on 'Syādvāda'*

(Chapter XX).—(812)

**COMMENTARY.**

The 'Universal' has been postulated by the Vaiśeṣika and his followers 
as something entirely distinct from the Individuals; and we have stated 
the objections against this doctrine. The Jainas and the followers of 
Jainini have postulated the 'Universal' as non-different from the Individual, 
and also of both kinds; and this will be examined, in due course, under 
the Chapter on 'Syādvāda'; on the present occasion, we had set out to 
criticise the doctrine of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika; hence we do not take up the 
other doctrine, which would be somewhat irrelevant to the Context.—(812)

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*End of the Examination of the 'Universal'.*
CHAPTER XIV.

Examination of the Vishēṣa: 'Ultimate Individuality'.

COMMENTARY.

The Author sets forth the objection against the Category of 'Ultimate Individuality':—

TEXT (813).

Then again, the 'Ultimate Individualities' that have been postulated as existing in Ultimate Entities, have been already proved to be impossible, by the rejection of the 'Eternal Substance'; they are mere 'moments'.—(813)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Ultimate Individualities' have been defined as 'subsisting in eternal substances and as existing in ultimate substances'. This cannot be a definition at all; as it is open to the charge of being impossible; there is no substance that is eternal; it has been already rejected under the Chapter on the Examination of Substance; under the circumstances, how could these Individualities be admitted as subsisting in eternal substances?—(813)

The existence of these 'Ultimate Individualities' has been sought to be proved on the basis of the peculiar experience of Mystics; but the Reason in that case is 'inconclusive'. This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (814–816).

Among Atoms, Ākāsha, Space and such things (in which the Ultimate Individualities are held to subsist),—If their forms are distinct from each other,—then the apprehension of distinction among them need not be due to anything else in the shape of this Ultimate Individuality.—If, on the other hand, they have their forms mixed up with each other, then, even though there may be difference, the apprehension of absolute distinction could not but be wrong.—How too is the distinction among 'Ultimate Individualities' apprehended? If by themselves,—then why is not the same held to be the case with Atoms and other things also?—(814–816)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the form of Atoms, etc. may be either distinct from each other, each having its own specific character, or, mixed up.—If it is the former,
then, as the things would themselves be always apprehended in their unmixed—distinct—forms, the assumption of any further 'Individualities' for the purpose of the Mystics' apprehending their distinct forms would be useless.—If the second alternative is accepted, then, even in the presence of the distinct Category of the 'Ultimate Individualities', how could the Mystics' cognition of the Atoms, etc. as distinct,—when their forms are (ex hypothesi) not entirely distinct—be free from error? It would be clearly wrong, being the cognition of things as what they are not; and the Mystics, in that case, would not be true Mystics, on account of entertaining a wrong notion of things.

Then again, if the distinct cognition of things were not possible without a distinct category in the shape of 'Ultimate Individualities',—then, how could there be distinct cognitions regarding these Individualities themselves? As there are no further 'Ultimate Individualities' in them; if they were there, then there would be an infinite regress; it would also be contrary to the Opponent's doctrine that these Individualities are ultimate and subsist in eternal substances; as these other Individualities would be subsisting in the Ultimate Individualities also (which are not Substances). If, for these reasons, it be admitted that the Ultimate Individualities themselves become the basis of the distinct cognitions of themselves,—then, in the case of Atoms, etc. also, they themselves may be regarded as the basis of their distinct cognitions; why should there be this aversion against them that, even though they have their individual forms mutually exclusive, their capacity to bring about distinct cognitions of themselves is not admitted,—while such capacity is admitted in the 'Ultimate Individualities'? We find no reason for this aversion, except stupidity.—(814–816)

The following Texts anticipate the answer to the above given by Prashastamati—

TEXTS (817–818).

"Just as the unclean character belongs to the Dog's flesh by itself, and to other things by contact with it,—so in the case in question also;—and just as between the Jar and the Lamp, the Lamp, by itself, is always the illuminator of the Jar, because it is of the nature of Light,—so also in the case in question."—(817–818)

COMMENTARY.

Prashastamati has argued as follows:—"The Dog's flesh is unclean by its very nature, and other things become unclean by coming into contact with it; in the same manner, the 'Ultimate Individualities' by themselves are the basis of exclusive notion—on account of their being of the nature of exclusion,—while Atoms and other things become such basis only through the presence in these of the said Individuality.—Then again, even if a thing
may not be of a certain nature, yet its notion may come about through the presence of something else; e.g. the cognition of the Jar is brought about by the Lamp; while the cognition of the Lamp is not brought about by the Jar.—' Ayam' stands for the Jar.—'So also in the case in question';—that is, the apprehension of distinction among Atoms, etc. is due to the presence of the Ultimate Individualities; while that of the Individualities themselves is due to their very nature."

This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (819–822).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THIS 'UNCLEAN CHARACTER' IS SOMETHING PURELY ILLUSORY, NOT REAL; HOW THEN COULD IT BE THERE EITHER 'BY ITSELF' OR 'THROUGH SOMETHING ELSE'?—OR, EVEN IF THE UNEARN CHARACTER BE SOMETHING REAL, IT MAY BE THAT OTHER THINGS BECOME 'UNEARN' THROUGH CONTACT WITH THE DOG'S FLESH; NOTHING LIKE THIS IS POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF ETERNAL SUBSTANCES, BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO 'BECOMING' (BEING BORN) FOR THEM.—THROUGH THE INFLUENCE OF THE LAMP, MOMENTARY OBJECTS,—LIKE THE JAR, THE ORNAMENT AND SO FORTH,—BECOME THE CAUSE OF THE PRODUCTION OF COGNITIONS; BUT THE APPREHENSION OF DISTINCTION CANNOT COME ABOUT THROUGH THE INFLUENCE OF THE 'ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES' IN QUESTION,—BECAUSE IT COMES ABOUT IN SUCCESSION,—LIKE PLEASURE AND THE REST.—(819–822)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the 'Unclean Character' of things is purely illusory, hypothetical, and not real; because it does not remain fixed; for instance, one and the same substance may appear to be 'unclean' for a Vedic scholar, but quite clean to the Hunter; and it cannot be possible for one and the same thing to combine within itself two mutually contradictory characters; as it would, in that case, cease to be one and the same.

Or, the 'Unclean Character' of things may be something real. Even so, it cannot serve as a Corroborative Instance; because what happens in the case of such things as food-grains and the like is that when they come into contact with an unclean thing, like the Dog's flesh, they abandon their previous clean character and become born again as endowed with the unclean character; hence it is right that in their case the unclean character is adventitious, due to something else. There is however no such basis in the case of Atoms and other eternal substances; by virtue of which any such adventitious distinctive feature could come into them; because they are eternal and hence they cannot be born with the new character.

Similarly, in the case of the Lamp also, the character of being the cause of cognitions, as found in the Jar, may be held to be adventitious, due to something else (in the shape of the Lamp).
The last text sets forth the argument against any such explanation in the case of *Ultimate Individualities*. The exact form of this inference and the premiss upon which it is based may be stated in the manner indicated above.—(819–822)

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*End of Chapter XIV.*
CHAPTER XV.

Examination of ‘Samavāya’ (Inherence, Subsistence).

COMMENTARY.

The following Texts proceed to set forth objections to the Category of ‘Inherence’:

TEXT (823).

"Inherence (Subsistence) is apprehended on the basis of the notion of ‘this subsists in that’;—such as is found in the expressions ‘the cloth consists of (subsists in) these yarns’, ‘the mat consists of (subsists in) the reeds’."—(823)

COMMENTARY.

"In regard to things that are inseparable, and among things where one is the container and the other the contained,—there is the notion of ‘this subsisting in that’; and the relation upon which this notion is based is ‘Inherence (Subsistence)’. This is apprehended as something different from Substance and the other categories, on the basis of the particular notions of ‘subsistence’ present in such conceptions as ‘the Cloth subsists in these yarns’—In the case of such Universals as ‘Being’, ‘Substance’ and the rest, it is found that they bring about cognitions like their own, of their substratum,—and on this basis they are regarded as different from one another and also from their substratum;—the same is found to be the case with ‘Inherence’ also; in regard to all the other five categories, there are such notions as—‘The Universal Substance subsists in this substance’, ‘the Universal Quality subsists in this quality’, ‘the Universal Action subsists in this action’, ‘the Ultimate Individualities subsist in these substances’ and so forth; and on the basis of these notions, it is concluded that Inherence is something distinct from these five (Substance and the rest).—This argument may be formulated thus:—When a notion is found to appear in regard to a thing in a form different from that of that thing, that notion must be based upon something different from that thing,—for example, the notion of ‘the man with the stick’ in regard to Dēvatattva;—of this same kind is the notion of ‘this subsists in that’ that appears in regard to the five Categories;—and this is regarded as justifying the conclusion (that the notion is due to a distinct category in the shape of Inherence)."—(823)

The Author proceeds to explain the character of this Inherence:
"If there were no such thing (as Inherence), what would be the basis of the said notion? No particular notion is found to appear without a particular cause.—Inasmuch as the same notion of 'subsisting herein' is equally present in all cases, Inherence does not vary, like Conjunction. In fact it is perceived in all things as one and the same, just like 'Existence'.—Inasmuch as its cause is never apprehended, it is eternal,—like 'Existence'. By no means of valid cognition is its cause apprehended."—(824–826)

COMMENTARY.

"Unless there is some basis for the notion, the notion of 'existence', etc. would always be there;—this is the Inferential argument subversive of your doctrine.

"Thus under the theory of the Vaishēṣika, 'Inherence' is inferred from the presence of the notion of 'subsisting in this'; while according to the Naiyāyika, it is directly perceived in the notion of 'subsisting in this'. That is to say, when the sense-organ is functioning, there appears the perception that 'the Cloth subsists in these yarns', and on the basis of this, they declare this notion to be 'Perception'.

"This Inherence (which is a form of Relation) does not vary with the various correlatives,—as Conjunction does; in fact, like 'Existence', 'Being'—it is one and the same everywhere; for the simple reason that its indicative feature,—the notion of 'subsisting in this',—is everywhere the same.

"'Like Conjunction'—is an Instance per dissimilarity.

"Having no cause,—Inherence is eternal,—again like 'existence'. The fact of its having no cause is proved by the fact of no Cause of it being cognised by any means of Cognition."—(824–826)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to set forth the objections against 'Inherence':—

TEXT (827).

As a matter of fact, the idea of 'subsisting in this' exists for our opponents only; and it is due entirely to their infatuation with their own doctrine; it is never met with in common experience.

—(827)

COMMENTARY.

This points out that the Opponent's Reason is open to the fallacy of its substratum being 'unknown'. Such ideas as 'the cloth subsists in these
yarns' are only assumed through one's infatuation with his doctrines; in ordinary experience, no such ideas are ever found to appear; hence the very basis of the Probandum turns out to be one that does not exist at all. —(827)

The following texts lend further support to the same objection:—

TEXTS (828-829).

If the 'container' and the 'contained' were perceived as distinct from one another, then alone would there be any such notion as 'this subsists in that';—as is found in the case of the Fruits and the Pit (where the fruits lie);—the Cloth and the Yarns however are never perceived as distinct from one another,—by virtue of which there could appear any such notions as 'this subsists in those'.—(828-829)

COMMENTARY.

It is only when two things have been found to be distinct from one another, when one is found to be contained in the other, that there appears the notion that 'this subsists in that'; such is our ordinary experience; as is found in the case of the notion 'these Bāl fruits are contained in this pit'. In the case of the Cloth and the Yarns however no such difference has been perceived; in fact, no such difference exists; how then could there be any such notion as 'the Cloth subsists in the Yarns'.—(828-829)

The following might be urged:—"It may be that the said notion has been assumed by us on the strength of our own doctrine; but even so, it behoves you to explain the basis of such a notion."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (830).

In the case of this notion imagined by mere whim,—as in the case of merely assumed things,—it cannot be right to question the other party regarding its basis.—(830)

COMMENTARY.

When one does not wish to find a cause, how could he be questioned regarding such cause for an effect which you have yourself assumed? In
fact, you have to question yourself, who have assumed the effect, under your own whim; whims do not always follow the real state of things; they are essentially free from all restraint; hence nothing can be proved on their basis; as it would lead to an infinite regress. For instance, for what is assumed by you, another person might assume something entirely different.

—(830)

Then again, it is not that notions like 'this subsists in that' do not appear at all; in fact, the notions that do appear are to the contrary. This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (831–834).

The notion that does appear in ordinary experience is in the form 'the Branches in the Tree', 'the stones in the Hill'; and this notion proceeds from the fact that the two (the Branch and the Stones) are perceived to be in close contact with the other portions of the two 'immovables' (Tree and Hill). The notion that 'those two (Tree and Mountain) subsist in these (Branches and the Stones)' however that is put forward (by the Opponent) is one that is beyond all ordinary experience.—What such notions as 'This Colour or that Action in this Jar' apprehend is identity; the general terms 'Colour' ('Action'), 'Jar' connote these things generally, in all states and conditions; hence for the purpose of mentioning their particular forms, they are spoken of in the manner expressed in the said notions; and it is on the basis of those particular forms that the notion appears in that form,—not on the basis of 'Inheritance'; because the distinction among all these is not perceived.

—(831–834)

COMMENTARY.

In ordinary life such notions are met with as 'The Branches in the Tree', 'The Stones in the Hill',—and not such as 'The Tree in the Branches', 'the Hill in the Stones'. That notion also of 'the Branches in the Tree' is not due to 'Inheritance'; it is due to the fact that the two (Branches and Stones) are perceived in close contact with portions of 'the two immovables', other than the Tree and Stones spoken of,—those other portions being the Trunk of the Tree, and the Base of the Hill.—The term 'immovables' is meant to stand for both, the Tree and the Hill, in view of the fact that both are equally immovable.
Those two;—the Hill and the Tree.
In these;—in the Stones and in the Branches.

Question—"There are many such well-known notions among people as 'The Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, and Action in the Jar'; what could be the basis of such a notion, except Inference?"

Answer:—' What such notions, etc. etc.'—' Identity', i.e. Being of the nature of the Jar; this is what is apprehended by the said notion,—or by men. When 'Colour' is spoken of as 'in the Jar', what is meant is that the Colour is of the nature of the Jar, not that it is the same as the Jar. When there is a desire to speak of certain common potencies like those of Colour and the rest, and yet to distinguish those present in things other than the Jar, one introduces the term 'Jar' (and uses the expression 'the Colour in the Jar'). Each of the terms 'Colour' and the rest, by itself, is used for the purpose of connoting the specific capacity of each of these factors to bring about the visual and other cognitions specifically; thus it is that the term 'Jar' just indicates those diverse factors; thus there being no co-ordination between the two, the sameness of form is explained on the basis of different substratum.

"Why then are both the terms used?"

Answer:—' The general terms, etc. etc.'—The term 'Colour' connotes Colour in general, in all sorts of conditions; for instance, just as the Colour in the Jar is spoken of as 'Colour', so also is the colour in the Cloth; hence the word 'Colour' by itself does not connote anything in particular,—as to which particular Colour is meant. When, however, the expression used is 'the Colour in the Jar', the Colour connoted is that particular one which is in the form of the Jar, as distinguished from that in the Cloth and other things. Similarly, the term 'Jar' also connotes the Jar under all conditions,—white, yellow, moving, not moving and so forth; hence the word by itself does not connote anything particular; but when the expression 'the white colour in the Jar' is used, the notion that appears is that of the white Jar as distinguished from other jars. Thus it is that when one wishes to speak of this particular Jar, the words are used in the form 'Colour in the Jar'.

It is on the basis of such expressions that there appears the notion of the Colour in the Jar, in reference to the Jar. It is not on the basis of any such thing as 'Inference'. The reason for this is next stated—'Because the Distinction, etc. etc.'—there is no difference apprehended among 'Inference', 'Jar' and 'Colour',—on the basis of which the said notion could be said to be based upon 'Inference'.

What is meant by this is that the Reason adduced by the Opponent is 'inconclusive' and his Conclusion is annulled by Inference and other means of cognition.—(831–834)

It has been argued by the Opponent (under Text 825, above) that—"Inasmuch as one and the same notion of 'this subsisting in that' is equally present in all cases, Inference does not vary like Conjunction".—This is answered in the following—
EXAMINATION OF 'SAMAVĀYA' (INHERENCE, SUBSISTENCE). 455

TEXTS (835–839).

If there were one and the same Inherence in all things, then the notion of 'Cloth' should appear in the Potsherds also; it would also follow that the Universal 'Cow' subsists in the Elephant also; so that the Elephant also should have the form of the Cow, just like the Variegated Cow.—The notion that 'the Cloth subsists in the Yarns' is based upon Inherence; this same Inherence being present in the Potsherds also, why is it that there is no such notion as that 'the Cloth subsists in the Potsherds'?—If it be urged that this is so for the simple reason that the Cloth does not subsist in the Potsherds,—then the answer is that in the Yarns also, it subsists only by Inherence; is this Inherence then not present in the Potsherds? In fact the Inherence of the Cloth in the Yarns must be the same as the Inherence of the Cloth [read 'patasya' acc. to comm.] in the Potsherds; and hence there could be no restriction in the notion at all.—(835–839)

COMMENTARY.

If there were only one 'Inherence' in all the Three Worlds, then, such notions also should appear as 'the Cloth in the Potsherds', and also that the Universal 'Cow' subsists in the House; and hence just as the notion of 'Cow' appears in regard to the variegated Cow, so should it appear also in regard to the Elephant.

Then again, the notion that 'the Cloth subsists in the Yarns' has been explained as being due to the influence of Inherence; this Inherence of the Cloth is present in the Potsherds also; why then should there not be a similar notion—'The Cloth in the Potsherds'—in regard to the Potsherds also?

It might be argued that—'inasmuch as the Cloth does not subsist in the Potsherds, the said notion does not appear.'

This cannot be true. Because the notion that the Cloth subsists in the yarns is also said to be so only on the strength of Inherence; is not this same Inherence present in the Potsherds also—on account of which there could be no such notion as 'the Cloth subsists in the Potsherds' also, just as in the Yarns?—As a matter of fact, that Inherence of the Cloth which is said to be present in the yarns should be the same as that of the Cloth in the Potsherds. Under the circumstances, wherefore should not there be an admixture of the notions of things (and the consequent confusion)? For these reasons, there could be no restriction in the notion at all; and as a result of this, the relation of Substance, Quality and Action with their respective qualifications—in the shape of the Universals 'Substance', 'Quality' and
‘Action’,—being one and the same, any division among the said Categories would be impossible.—(835–839)

The following Text propounds the possibility of the notion of ‘Cow’ in regard to the Elephant:

**TEXT (840).**

_Similarly, the Inherence of the Universal ‘Elephant’ in the Elephant should be one and the same as the Inherence of the various Universals ‘Cow’ and the rest in their respective substrata._—(840)

**COMMENTARY.**

In the following Texts (841–845), the author sets forth the answer given by Prashastamati:

**TEXT (841).**

“Even though Inherence is one, the restriction of container and contained is always there; by virtue of which the Universal ‘Substance’ is present in Substances only, and the Universal ‘Action’ is present in Actions only.”—(841)

**COMMENTARY.**

Prashastamati has argued as follows:—“Though Inherence is one, yet there is no likelihood of an admixture among the five Categories; because there is always a restriction as to what is contained in what; that is to say, the Universal ‘Substance’ is contained in Substances only, the Universal ‘Quality’ is contained in Qualities only, the Universal ‘Action’ is contained in Actions only; and so on, the notion of the Universals ‘Substance’ and the rest appear as restricted to a particular substratum only.”—(841)

In anticipation of the objection that—‘in that case, Inherence would vary with each object’,—Prashastapati offers the following explanation:
EXAMINATION OF ‘SAMAVĀYA’ (INHERENCE, SUBSISTENCE).

TEXTS (842-843).

"From the perception of the fact that the notion of 'subsisting in this', which arises out of 'Inherence', is present in all cases, it is concluded that 'Inherence' is one only; at the same time, from the perception of the fact that such bases as the Universals 'Substance' and the rest are absent in certain cases, it is concluded that the notions of these Universals 'Substance' and the rest are restricted in their scope."—(842-843)

COMMENTARY.

"The notion of 'subsistence in this', which is based upon Inherence, is found to appear in all cases in one and the same form, from which it follows that Inherence is one only. However, even though Inherence is one, the notions based upon the Universals 'Substance', etc. are found to appear in distinct forms as resting in distinct substrata; and thus they are found to be absent—not present—in all cases; from this it is concluded that these Universals are distinct and diverse; so that there can be no admixture of the five Categories."—(842-843)

In answer to the question—How is it that there is this restriction of the Container and Contained, when the relation (of Inherence) is one and the same?—the following answer is provided (by Prashastamati):

TEXTS (844-845).

"Even though 'Conjunction' is one only, yet the relation of Container and Contained is restricted to the Pit and the Curd (placed therein); similarly there would be restriction in the case in question also. So that, even though Inherence is one only, yet as there would be diversity in the character of being the manifest and manifested, there would be no incongruity in it at all."—(844-845)

COMMENTARY.

"Even though Conjunction is one only, yet in the case of the Curd and the Pit, the relation of Container and Contained is restricted;—similarly, in the case of the Universals 'Substance', etc., even though Inherence is one only, yet, by reason of the diversity in the capacity of manifest and
manifested, there would be restriction regarding the relation of *Container and Contained*.

"In it"—i.e. in the restriction of the relation of *Container and Contained."—(844-845)

The answer to the above arguments (of *Prashastamati*) is given in the following—

**TEXTS (846-847).**

If inheritance is one only, then any restriction regarding the *Container and Contained* is impossible. The universal 'Substance' is held to subsist in substance only;—how could that be due to inheritance? This same inheritance of the substance is present in quality, etc. also; as these latter are related to the universals 'Quality', etc.;—and inheritance is the same in both.—(846-847)

**COMMENTARY.**

According to us, there is no such relation of *Container and Contained* as is held to subsist between the universal 'Colour' and the particular Colour; it is admitted by you only; and this is impossible for you who regard inheritance to be one only. These and other incongruities in the opponent's standpoint are now pointed out.

For instance, the opponent accepts the restriction that the universal 'Substance' subsists in substances alone; and he does so on the basis of 'Inheritance';—now the 'Inheritance' of the universal as 'Substance' is present in qualities also; because those are related to the universal 'Quality'.

*Question*:—"Even though the relation is there, how is it concluded that that relation is that of inheritance?"

*Answer*:—"Inheritance is the same in both."—'Both'—i.e. the two universals 'Substance' and 'Quality'. Thus the notions having the same basis in both cases, admixture and confusion are inevitable.—(846-847)

**TEXT (848).**

If it were not so, then this (inheritance) would be different in the various universals like 'Quality', etc.,—just as conjunction varies with each conjunct factor.

—(848)

**COMMENTARY.**

'If it were not so',—i.e. if the inheritance of the universal 'Quality' in particular qualities were not the same as the inheritance of the universal
'Substance' in particular Substances,—then Inherence should vary with each substratum; just as Conjunction does.—(848)

It has been argued (by Prashastamati, under Text 843, above) that—"From seeing the absence of such basis as the Universal of 'Substance', etc. it is concluded that the scope of these Universals is restricted."—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (849).

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE ABSENCE OF NOTIONS BASED UPON THE UNIVERSAL 'SUBSTANCE',—WHEN THE BASIS IS THERE. FOR THE SAME REASON THERE CANNOT BE RESTRICTION OF IT.—(849)

COMMENTARY.

So long as the cause is there in its perfect condition, there cannot be absence of the effect; if it were there, then, it would not be the effect of that cause. Thus then the absence of the said notion being impossible, the restriction regarding the relation of container and contained also cannot be right.—(849)

"The restriction could be based upon such common expressions as 'The Universal Substance is contained—subsists—in Substances only'."

Answer :—

TEXT (850).

THE EXPRESSIONS OF 'BEING CONTAINED' AND 'SUSBISTING' AND THE LIKE ALSO ARE BASED UPON THE SAME 'INHERENCE'; HENCE THESE ALSO CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF RESTRICTION.—(850)

COMMENTARY.

The use of expressions like 'being contained', 'subsisting' and so forth also are explained by you as based upon the same 'Inherence'; and as this is the same everywhere, how could it serve to restrict anything? Hence these notions of 'contained in', etc. cannot serve as the basis of restricting the relation of Container and Contained. Because the notions in question stand upon the same footing as this latter relation.—(850)

"In that case the Restriction may be due to the limitations relating to the capacity to manifest and be manifested."

Answer :—
TEXT (851).

The difference in the capacity to manifest and to be manifested also is based upon Inherence itself; it cannot be due to anything else; because there can be no ‘producing’ of things that are eternal.—(851)

COMMENTARY.

Substances have been held to be the manifesters of the Universal ‘Substance’, —and this on the strength of Inherence itself; because it is on account of the fact that the Universal ‘Substance’ inheres in a particular substance that it is said to be manifested by it.

‘It cannot be due to anything else’;—i.e. to any such circumstance as the production of the character capable of bringing about an idea, which has been postulated by the Buddhist. Because Inherence has been held to exist even in eternal things like ‘Being’ and the like,—and it is not right that there should be any ‘production’ of what are eternal.—(851)

The same line of argument is further supported in the following:—

TEXT (852).

By the mere presence of the lamp, the lamp does not become capable of producing any notions; so also the universals like ‘Jar’ (cannot become capable of producing notions).—(852)

COMMENTARY.

The case of the ‘Pit and the Curd’ has been put forward as an example (under Text 844, by Prastastamati). The following Text shows that this is not admitted by us:—

TEXT (853).

That the conjunction in the case of the Curd and the Pit is one only has been already rejected by us before; any restriction on that basis is not possible; as that would lead to absurdities.—(853)

COMMENTARY.

‘Before’—i.e. in the Chapter on the Refutation of the Quality of Conjunction.

Conjunction may be one only, yet the objection remains—this is what is shown in the text—‘Any restriction, etc.’

‘On that basis’,—i.e. on the basis of Conjunction.
The 'absurdity' referred to lies in the possibility of such notions as 'the Pit in the Curd'; as the only ground for it—in the shape of Conjunction,—would be equally available in this also.—(853)

It has been argued above (under Text 826) that "Inherence must be eternal, because no Cause of it is perceived".—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (854).

BY THE ETERNALITY OF INHERENCE ALL THINGS BECOME ETERNAL; BECAUSE ALL THESE ARE EVER PRESENT, BY INHERENCE IN THEIR OWN SUBSTRATUM.—(854)

COMMENTARY.

If Inherence is eternal, then the Jar and other things also will have to be regarded as eternal; as they exist for ever in their own substratum. In fact, it is on the ground of Inherence that these things are held to subsist in their substratum,—and this Inherence is eternal;—why then should not the things persist for ever?—(854)

In the following Texts, the Author anticipates and answers the Opponent's reply :—

TEXTS (855-856).

"THINGS BECOME DESTROYED EITHER THROUGH THE DISRUPTION OF THEIR COMPONENTS, OR THROUGH THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE,—JUST LIKE ACTION,—ON ACCOUNT OF CONJUNCTION AND SUCH OTHER CAUSES";—IF THIS IS URGED, THEN, THAT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE THE INHERENCE OF THESE COMPONENTS ALSO IN THEIR SUBSTRATUM IS HELD TO BE ETERNAL. IF THESE CAME TO DESTRUCTION, THEN INHERENCE ALSO WOULD BECOME DESTRUCTIBLE."—(855-856)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged by the Opponent :—"The Jar and other things become destroyed either through the disruption of their component parts or through the destruction of the parts; just as, while the Jar is in the state of being whirled or baked, its action (motion) becomes destroyed by the contact of a solid substance. This has been thus declared—'By the contact of solid substances, the action becomes destroyed, as also the action unfavourable to the production of the effect'. Similarly one Cognition becomes destroyed through another Cognition; one Sound becomes destroyed through another Sound."

Such is the Opponent's scheme. What he means is that, even though the Inherence may be there as the basis of the object's continued existence,
if other auxiliary causes are absent, and contrary circumstances become operative, the Jar cannot remain for ever.

This is answered in the words—'That cannot be so'.—What has been urged cannot be right; because of the said components also there are components wherein their Inherence lies for ever; how then could there be any destruction or disruption?

This is so not only in regard to the substances composed of those components; it is so in regard to Action, etc. also; this is what is indicated by the particle 'api'.

If it be admitted that there is destruction of the components of the object, then the Inherence also would have to be regarded as liable to destruction.—(855-856)

"Why so?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (857-858).

WHEN THE Relative has ceased to exist, it is impossible for the Relation to exist. WHEN THE conjunct OBJECT HAS BEEN DESTROYED, THE Conjunction can no longer be there.

AND JUST AS THE conjuncts ARE THERE WHILE THE Conjunction IS THERE,—SO ALSO THE Inherents SHOULD exist WHILE THE Inherence IS THERE.—(857-858)

COMMENTARY.

He supports the same idea, in the words—'When the Conjunct object, etc. etc.'

What is meant is that, on account of the Relative having ceased to exist, the Inherence comes to be non-eternal, just like the Conjunction which ceases on the destruction of the Conjunct. Or the other alternative is that the relatives continue to exist, because of the Relation not having ceased; these relatives being like the two substances, the Conjunction between whom has not ceased.—If it were not so, then, in both cases, the Relation in question would lose its character.—(857-858)

The Opponent urges the following argument:—

TEXT (859).

"EVEN ON THE DESTRUCTION OF ONE Relative, THE Inherence continues to exist, because the other Relative is still there.—Nor would the same be the case with Conjunction; because there is difference."

—(859)

COMMENTARY.

What the Opponent means is as follows:—"In the first Reason (adduced by the Buddhist), if what is meant is the destruction of all Relatives,—then
it is partly 'unproven', 'not admitted'; because the destruction of all Relatives is not possible; as even at Universal Dissolution, the Atoms remain.

If then the Reason is put forward with a view to some sort of Relatives having ceased to exist, then it is Inconclusive; because even when a certain Relative may have ceased to exist, other Relatives would still be there.—It might be urged against the Opponent that, 'by the same reasoning process, Conjunction also should have to be regarded as eternal'.—Anticipating this, the Opponent says—*It cannot be so, because there is difference*; that is to say, Conjunction varies with each conjunct object; hence it is only right to regard it as evanescent; Inheritance, on the other hand, is only one in the whole world, because its basis, in the shape of the notion of 'subsistence herein', remains always the same; hence it cannot be right to regard Inheritance as evanescent; as it is always perceptible in another Relative (even on the cessation of one Relative)."—(859)

The above argument is answered in the following—

**TEXTS (860–864).**

If it is as explained, then when certain inherent objects like the Jar have ceased to exist,—what is it that continues to exist? (A) Is it that Inheritance which has been assumed to constitute the existence of those objects, which Inheritance continues to exist in the other Relatives? Or (B) is it something else, as in the case of Conjunction, Plurality and so forth?—(A) It cannot be the former; if the Inheritance of that kind continues to exist, then the said objects—Jar, etc.—also should be there. If they were not there, then the Inheritance that constitutes their existence could not remain there; or it might be there in mere name.—From all this it follows that even before, as after, the objects could not be subsisting in their substratum, through any such thing as 'Inheritance'. Thus this 'subsistence' of theirs cannot be real.—(860–964)

**COMMENTARY.**

When the Jar, and other things that are held to 'inhere' in their cause, cease to exist—what is it that continues to exist?—(A) Is it the 'Inherence' that has been assumed as constituting their existence in their cause,—this Inherence continuing to exist in Relatives other than the Jar, etc.?—(B) Or is it something else,—like Conjunction and Plurality, which vary with each Conjunct?—The term 'ādi' is meant to include Disjunction.

If the former alternative is accepted, then the Jar, etc. should still continue to exist, because there would be no falling off of the nature of their existence, which (in the shape of Inherence) would be just as it was before
their destruction. Or, if the Jar, etc. did not continue to exist, as their existence would not be there, the Inherence also could not be there; or otherwise the Inherence could not constitute the existence of those things. If the mere existence of Inherence were postulated as something independent of all things and not benefiting anything,—then it would be something only in name; and there would be no corresponding reality; and under the circumstances to assert that ‘Inherence constitutes the existence of things’ would be mere verbiage.

This is what is made clear in the words—‘From all this it follows, etc. etc.’—‘They’—the Jar, etc.—could not be subsisting in their substratum, on the strength of any such thing as ‘Inherence’.—‘As after’,—i.e. after the destruction of their constituent cause, when they have really no existence at all.

‘Thus this, etc.’—explains the real sense of the Reason adduced.—(860-864)

TEXTS (865-866).

(B) If, on the other hand, the ‘Inherence’ that continues to exist, while the other Relative is there, is something different,—as in the case of Conjunction, Disjunction, Plurality and so forth,—then, in that case, there would be plurality of Inherence also, just as there is of Conjunction, etc.—Thus, if ‘Inherence’ is postulated to exist, then there would be this and many other incongruities.—(865-866)

COMMENTARY.

(B) If the second alternative,—that what continues to exist is something else,—is accepted, then, there should be plurality of ‘Inherence’, just as there is of Conjunction, etc.; and this would involve the surrendering of the doctrine that there is no diversity in Inherence.

‘This and many other incongruities’;—this is meant to include such incongruities as—(a) the Futility of the Cause’, (b) the contradiction of several aphorisms’, (c) incompatibility with facts of Perception, etc., (d) ‘the simultaneous birth of all things’.

(a) For instance, the ‘birth’ of a thing is described as ‘inherence in the cause’ or ‘inherence in Being’; and Inherence is eternal; hence causes could not have any capacity to bring about the birth of the effect; hence causes would be futile.

(b) There would be contradiction of such (Vaisheshika) aphorisms as—“Conjunction is brought about by the action of either of the two factors, by the action of both, and by Conjunction”; “Cognition is produced by the contact of the Sense-organ and the object, etc. etc.”
(c) The doctrine in question goes against the idea of the Eye, etc. being the cause of Perceptional and other cognitions.

(d) Birth, in the shape of 'Inheritance', being eternal, there can be no sequence in the birth of things,—which will have to be regarded as simultaneous; this would be an incongruity; and it would also go against the Opponent’s own doctrine that “the non-simultaneity of Cognitions is indicative of the Mind.”

Lastly, the Birth of things being eternal,—the entire world would consist of things which could not benefit, or be benefited by, others; and hence the propounding of the Philosophy would be futile; and so on and so forth, there would be many incongruities, which would cut off and smash the entire fabric of the Opponent’s Philosophy.—(865-866)

End of Chapter XV.

30
CHAPTER XVI.

*Examination of the Import of Words.*

**COMMENTARY.**

The Author proceeds to set forth the Introduction to the arguments in support of the view (set forth in Text 2) that the Truth is 'amenable to Words and Cognitions only in an assumed (superimposed) form':

**TEXTS (867-868).**

"If adjuncts do not exist in reality, then on what basis would there be such cognitions and verbal expressions as 'the man with the stick', 'the while', 'move', 'exists', 'cow', 'here' and so forth?—They cannot be held to be baseless. Nor can they apply promiscuously to all things."

—(867-868)

**COMMENTARY.**

"What is apprehended by Word and Cognition is a Real Entity; hence what words express by means of affirmation and denial is only the real state of things";—such is the view of the Realists.—The view of the Negationists (Apohists), on the other hand, is as follows:—"There is nothing real that is expressed by words; all verbal cognition is wrong, because it proceeds by imposing non-difference upon things that are really different; in a case where there is indirect connection with an entity, there is some sort of agreement with the object, even though the Cognition is really wrong". Such is the view of these people. The one uniform, non-different, form that is imposed upon things proceeds on the strength of the apprehension of things in the form of the 'exclusion of other things'; and it being itself of the nature of the 'exclusion or negation of other things', it is mistaken by people under the spell of illusion to be one with that which is excluded by it,—and it ultimately brings about the apprehension of the thing 'excluded' from others;—for these reasons it comes to be known as 'excluded from other things'. On this ground it has been held that what is expressed by words is *Apoha*, the 'negation of others'.

The Realists urge the following objections (against the Apohist, Negationist, *Buddha*):—"If,—according to you,—for Verbal Cognition, there is no real basis as the adjuncts—qualifying factors—in the shape of *Substance, Quality, Action, Universal, Ultimate Individuality* and *Inherence*,—then how is it that among people, there are such verbal expressions and
cognitions as 'the man with the stick', which are all based upon adjuncts in the shape of substance, etc.? For instance, such expressions and notions as 'the man with the stick', 'the animal with horns' are known to be based upon adjuncts in the shape of _substances_; such expressions and notions as 'white', 'black' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of qualities; such expressions and notions as 'moves', 'wanders' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of _Action_; such expressions and notions as 'is', 'exists' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of 'Being'; such expressions and notions as 'Cow', 'Horse', 'Elephant' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of _Universals and Particulars_; and the expression and notion 'The Cloth in these yarns' are based upon _Inherence_.—If then, there did not exist any of these Substance and the rest, the expressions and notions of the 'Man with the stick' and other things would become baseless.—The term 'ätä' goes with every member of the compound. So that every one of such similar expressions and notions become included, as 'the umbrella-holder', 'the horned animal' and so forth.—As for the _Ultimate Individualities_, they are cognizable by mystics only; hence these are not meant to be included here.

"And yet it is not right that these expressions and notions should be regarded as entirely baseless. If they were so, they would be equally liable to appear everywhere.

"Nor are they found to apply promiscuously to all things, without distinction.

"From all this it follows that _Substance_ and the rest do really exist.

"The argument may be formulated as follows:—Expressions and notions that appear in mutually distinct forms must have a real basis,—like the Auditory and other notions;—the expressions and notions of the 'stick-holder', etc. do appear in distinct forms;—hence this is a natural reason (for regarding them as having a real basis).—If they had no such basis, things would appear in all places without distinction;—this is the argument setting aside a contrary conclusion."—(867-868)

The Author proceeds to refute the above Reasoning (of the Realist) in the following—

TEXT (869).

THE ANSWER TO THE ABOVE IS AS FOLLOWS:—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO REAL BASIS FOR THESE EXPRESSIONS AND NOTIONS;
THE ONLY BASIS FOR THEM CONSISTS IN THE SEED LOCATED IN THE PURELY SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS.—(869)

COMMENTARY.

If what the Realist desires to prove is the fact that the notions and expressions in question have a real basis in the external world, then the Reason adduced is Inconclusive; as there is nothing to annul the contrary conclusion. If what is meant to be proved is only that they have some sort
of basis, then the argument is futile; because we also hold that they have their basis in the awakening of the Tendencies and Impressions embedded in the inner consciousness; though not in the external object; because the first cognition being always verbal, is wrong, and it cannot have any real basis.

Located, etc.;—i.e. embedded in consciousness; i.e. in the form of Tendencies and Impressions.—(869)

This same line of thought is further supported by reference to the scriptures:

TEXT (870).

Whatever is said to be the object of a verbal expression is never really cognised; such is the very essence of entities.—(870).

COMMENTARY.

Whatever;—i.e. 'Specific Individuality', 'Universal' and the like.

Such is the very essence of things;—this character, of being beyond the reach of words, forms the very essence of things. This has been thus declared—'By whatever name a thing is spoken of, that thing is not really cognised there; such is the very essence of things'.

Question:—'What is the proof for Verbal Cognition being wrong and baseless?'

Answer:—The proof has already been asserted by us to the effect that, inasmuch as Verbal Cognitions impose non-difference upon things that are different, they are all wrong. For instance, when one thing is cognised as what it is not, that cognition is wrong; e.g. the cognition of Water in the Mirage;—Verbal Cognition consists in the imposing of non-difference on what is different;—hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as wrong). There is no real entity in the shape of the 'Universal' which could be the object of Verbal Cognition—by virtue of which the Reason might be regarded as 'Unproven'. Because the 'Universal' has been already discarded in great detail.—Even granting that there is such a thing as the 'Universal';—even so, if that Universal is held to be something different from the particular things, the cognition would still be one of non-difference where there is difference; and hence wrong. Because a set of things cannot be the same as others when they are held to contain these. If, on the other hand, the Universal be held to be non-different from the particular things,—the entire Universe would really form the single object of the 'Universal'; and hence the cognition of it as 'Universal' must be wrong, because the notion of the 'Universal' does not appertain to a single thing; as the cognition of the 'Universal' is always preceded by the perception of diversity.

When Verbal Cognition is thus proved to be wrong, it must also be objectless, baseless; because the object productive of the cognition having surrendered its form, there can be nothing left which could be the basis of the cognition.

Or, we may prove the objectlessness of Verbal Cognitions in another manner: That alone can form the import of words whereeto they have been
applied by Convention; nothing else can form their import; as if it did then that would lead to absurdities. And there is no object wherein the application of any words has been fixed by Convention. Hence all Verbal Cognitions and Expressions must be entirely baseless.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When words have not been fixed by Convention at their very inception, upon certain things, they do not really denote these things;—e.g. the word 'Horse' which has not been applied by convention to animals with the Develap (i.e. the Cow) does not denote the cow;—all words have not been applied by Convention, at the very inception to any things; hence the wider conception is never apprehended; that is, *Denotativeness* is invariably concomitant with *being fixed by Convention*, and this latter is absent in the case of words.—(870)

The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason adduced is not 'unproven'—

**TEXT (871).**

'Specific Individuality', 'Universal', 'Relation to Universal', 'Something endowed with the Universal', 'Form of the Cognition of the object',—none of these really find a place in the 'Import of Words'.

—(871)

**COMMENTARY.**

That is to say, when the 'Import of words' is held to consist in an object in regard to which a Convention has been duly apprehended,—such import would consist, either (1) in 'Specific Individuality', or (2) in 'Universal', or (3) in 'Relation to the Universal',—the pronoun 'tat' in the compound 'tadyogah' standing for the Universal,—or (4) in 'something endowed with the Universal',—or (5) in 'the form of the Cognition of the object'. These are the only alternatives possible.—In the case of everyone of these, no Convention is possible; and hence it cannot form the 'Import of Words'.

'Really';—this has been added in order to indicate that the author does not deny the illusory 'import of words'; and hence there is no self-contradiction in terms; otherwise there would be a self-contradiction involved in his Proposition; inasmuch as it could not be possible to *assert* that 'Specific Individuality and the rest do not constitute the Import of words', without speaking of them by means of these words; so that by speaking of these by their names, for the purpose of proving his proposition, he would be admitting the fact that these are capable of being *expressed by words*;—and yet this fact is denied in the Proposition; so that there would be self-contradiction.

This explanation answers *Uddyotakara's* assertion to the effect that "if words are inexpressive, then there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Premiss".—Because we do not entirely deny the fact of words having their 'import'; for the simple reason that this is well-known even
to the meanest cowherd. What we do deny, however, is the character of
Reality which the other party impose upon the Import,—not the Import
itself.—(871)

The following Text proceeds to show that 'Specific Individuality'
cannot form the 'Import (or Denotation) of Words' because there can be
no Convention in regard to it:—

TEXT (872).

OF THESE, 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' CANNOT BE DENOTED BY
WORDS; BECAUSE IT CAN HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH
THE TIME OF CONVENTION AND USAGE.—(872)

COMMENTARY.

'Cannot be denoted by words';—that is, because there can be no Conven-
tion in regard to it.

Question:—"Why can there be no Convention in regard to it?"

Answer:—Because there is 'viyoga', absence,—of connection with the
time related to Convention and Usage,—'there can be no Convention in
regard to the Specific Individuality' [this has to be supplied].

What is meant is that Convention is made for the purposes of usage;
and not through mere love for it; hence people can rightly make Conven-
tions only with regard to things present at the time related to that Convention
and Usage;—not with regard to anything else. As regards 'Specific Indi-
viduality', it cannot be present at the time of the Convention and Usage;
hence there can be no Convention in regard to it.—(872)

Question:—"Why is it not possible for the Specific Individuality to be
present at the time of Convention and Usage?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (873-874).

THINGS OF THE NATURE OF INDIVIDUALS CANNOT BECOME INTER-RELATED
AMONG THEMSELVES,—BECAUSE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES (AMONG
THEM) OF PLACE, TIME, ACTION, POTENCY, MANIFESTATION
AND THE REST.—FOR THIS REASON, THE THING CON-
CEIVED BY CONVENTION IS NEVER MET WITH IN
ACTUAL USAGE; AND THAT IN REGARD TO WHICH
NO CONVENTION HAS BEEN APPREHENDED
CAN NEVER BE COMPREHENDED
THROUGH WORDS,—LIKE ANY
OTHER THING.—(873-874)

COMMENTARY.

The variegated Cow, etc. are so many distinct Individuals,—and as such
have their individual forms excluded from each other, through differences of
place, etc.; and as such, they never become inter-related among themselves. Consequently, when a man has set up a Convention in regard to one of these individuals, he could not carry on usage, on that basis, in regard to other individuals.—In the phrase ‘manifestation and the rest’, the term ‘the rest’ is meant to include Colour, Shape, Condition and other peculiarities.

‘Is never met with in actual usage’;—what is meant is that, in this way, there being no Convention in regard to it, the Reason adduced by the Author cannot be said to be ‘unproven’.

That the Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’ is shown by the words—‘That in regard to which no Convention has been comprehended, etc. etc.’

‘Like any other thing’;—i.e. like things of other kinds.

‘Dhanate’;—Through Words.

What is meant is as follows:—If the Word denoted a thing in regard to which no Convention has been apprehended, then the term ‘Cow’ also should denote the Horse; and in that case, the making of Conventions would be useless. Hence the possibility of this anomaly annuls the contrary conclusion; and thereby the Author’s Premiss becomes established.

This same Reason, ‘Because no Convention can be made’, has been indicated by the Teacher Dīnāgā in the declaration—‘The Word denoting a Universal cannot be denotive of Individuals, because of endlessness’; what is meant by ‘endlessness’ is the impossibility of Convention.

This also sets aside the following argument of Uddiyotakara (Nyāyavārtika 2. 2. 63, p. 327):—‘If you make ‘Words’ the subject of your argument, then, as endlessness is a property of things (denoted by words), it would be a Reason that subsists elsewhere than the Subject. If, on the other hand, the diverse things themselves are the Subject, then neither affirmative nor negative corroborative Instances would be available. So that ‘endlessness’ cannot serve as a valid Reason’.

The same writer has also urged as follows (in Nyāyavārtika 2. 2. 63, page 326):—‘The objection urged is applicable to those (Buddhists) who hold that what are denoted by words are things without any qualifications; as for ourselves, what are denoted by words are Substances, Qualities and Actions as qualified by Being, etc.; so that wherever one perceives the Universal ‘Being’, etc., one uses the word ‘existent’ and so forth. The Universal ‘Being’ is one only; hence in regard to things characterised by that Universal, it is quite possible to set up Conventions. So that endlessness cannot serve as a valid reason for you’.

This is not right. It has been already proved that there are no such real entities as Universals like ‘Being’ and the rest which are either different or non-different from individual things.—But even granting that there is such a thing as the Universal;—even so, as it is possible for several Universals to subsist in one Individual, there could be no use of such words as ‘Being’ and the like, free from confusion. Further, until it has been explained by means of words that ‘Being’ is so and so’, the person making the Convention could not indicate the things denoted by those words by means of ‘Being’ and other Universals;—and until the Convention has been made, words like ‘Being’, etc. cannot be used. So that there would be the incongruity of mutual interdependence.
The following argument might be urged:—"The person concerned himself comes by the usage and then, through affirmative and negative concomitance, comes to establish the connection between the word and its denotation and therefrom becomes cognisant of the relevant Convention."

This cannot be right. No one person can ever come by the entire usage bearing upon any subsequent thing.

"What happens is that having once found that the term ‘existing’ is frequently applied to things endowed with existence, he concludes that the same word is applicable to even unseen things of the same kind."

That cannot be true; as such is not found to be the case. In fact no Convention can apply to unseen things which are endless and which differ widely regarding their being past and future. If Convention were applicable to such things, it would lead to an absurdity.

"One really does comprehend such Convention in regard to the things when he speaks of them as conceived of by Determinate (conceptual) Cognition (which involves verbal expression also)."

If that is so, then it comes to this that the application of words appertains to only such things as are merely fanciful—and not to real things. So that the past and future not being before the man at the time, if there did appear a ‘determinate cognition’ of those, it could only be objectless, and hence what is made known by it must be a non-entity.—How then could the Convention relating to such things be anything real? We desist from further augmentation on this point.

Lastly, as our Reason is present in all cases where the Probandum is present, it cannot be said to be Contradictory.

Thus it becomes established that words cannot have ‘Specific Individualities’ for their ‘import’ (denotation).—(873-874)

The following might be urged:—"There are certain things, like the Himālaya Mountain, which remain permanently in one and the same form,—so that there can be no diversity in them due to Place, Time and Distinction;—consequently, as they would be present at the time of Convention and Usage,—your Reason becomes partially ‘inadmissible’.

The answer to this argument is as follows:

TEXT (875).

EVEN IN THE Himālaya AND SUCH THINGS WHICH DO NOT DIFFER WITH TIME AND PLACE,—THERE ARE Atoms WHICH ARE DIVERSE AND MOMENTARY, AS PROVED ABOVE.—(875)

COMMENTARY.

‘And such things’—is meant to include other mountains like the Malaya.

All these are aggregates of many Atoms; hence there can be no Convention relating to all their component parts; also because it has been proved that all these things are destroyed immediately after their appearance. Thus,
in the case of these things also, there can be no presence, at the time of usage, of the character that was present at the time of the making of the Convention. Hence our Reason is not 'unproven'.—(875)

It has thus been established that there can be no Convention bearing upon 'Specific Individuality,—because Usage being impossible in connection with it, the Convention would be useless. It is now going to be shown that no Convention is possible in regard to it because no Action is possible:—

TEXTS (876-877).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO ASSUMPTION OF CONVENTION IN REGARD EITHER TO THE born OR TO THE unborn THING.

THERE CAN BE NO REAL CONVENTION RELATING TO THE unborn,—AS THERE CAN BE NONE RELATING TO THE Horse's Horn;—NOR ONE IN REGARD TO THE Born THING; BECAUSE CONVENTION IS MADE ONLY ON THE RECALLING TO MIND OF THINGS APPREHENDED BEFOREHAND;—HOW COULD THIS BE DONE IN REGARD TO WHAT HAS PASSED AWAY LONG AGO?

—(876-877)

COMMENTARY.

It has been already proved that all things become destroyed immediately after appearance (birth); if then Convention were made regarding them, it could be made either before they were born, or after they were born;—it is not possible for any real Convention to be made relating to what is still unborn; because what does not exist can have no character at all and hence cannot be the substratum of anything.—The Text has used the term 'real' in order to exclude the illusory. Hence the assertion does not become vitiated by the well-known case of the Convention whereby the name of an unborn son is fixed upon beforehand; because such convention is purely illusory, bearing, as it does, upon an object which is the creation of fancy.

'As in the Horse's Horn';—the affix 'vati' is added to the word ending with the Locative.

Nor can the Convention be made relating to the thing after it is born; because a Convention regarding anything can be made only when the thing has been apprehended, and this apprehension has been followed by the remembrance of its name and distinguishing features; it could not be made otherwise than this; as it would lead to incongruities. Thus then, at the time of the remembrance of the name and the distinguishing features, the 'Specific Individuality' of the thing—being momentary—will have long disappeared; so that, as in regard to the unborn, so in regard to the born thing also, there can be no real Convention; as at the time of the making of the Convention, both would be equally absent. In fact, even at the time at which thing is actually apprehended, the 'Specific Individuality' that forms
the basis of that apprehension, being momentary, is not in existence; how much less possible is it at a later time, when there is remembrance of the uniformity of things appearing long after that apprehension?—(876-877)

It might be argued that—"the Convention could be made in regard to that momentary entity in the series of momentary entities born through the potency of the entity apprehended which appears at the moment that the Convention is made".—The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (878).

As for the other thing of the same kind which appears through the potency of the thing apprehended at first, the Body of Convention is not possible in regard to that also. As for similarity, that also is only imaginary.—(878)

COMMENTARY.

Though at the time of the making of the Convention, another 'momentary entity' is present, yet, as the Convention could not bear upon it, no Convention is possible; when a maker of Conventions apprehends a Horse, and then remembers its name and makes up the Convention, he does not make the Convention bear upon the Cow that may be present at the time, but which has not formed the subject of that Convention.

It might be argued that—"There is a similarity among all Specific Individualities, and on this basis they might be regarded as one and the Convention made regarding them".—The answer to this is—'As for similarity, etc. etc.'; that is, similarity is imposed upon things by 'determinate' (conceptual) cognitions; so that if these are what are denoted by words, then it would mean that the Specific Individuality is not denoted at all.

Thus there can be no Convention in regard to the Specific Individuality (of Things). Nor can it be in regard to the Specific Individuality of the Word. Because all that the maker of Convention does is to apply to a particular thing a particular Name which has been recalled to Memory; while Memory cannot recall the name that has been really apprehended previously, because that ceased to exist long ago; and the name that he actually pronounces is not the one that he has known previously; so that there could be no real Remembrance of it; and what has not been apprehended by the Memory cannot be recalled by it. Hence it follows that what is recalled by Memory and remembered is only a creation of fancy, and not the Specific Individuality (of the word). Thus there can be no Convention relating to any Specific Individuality. Hence it becomes established that Specific Individuality is something that cannot be named at all.—(878)

The Author next states another proof in support of the view that Specific Individuality cannot be denoted by words:—
TEXT (879).

The idea of 'Heat' that follows on the utterance of the name ('Hot') is not so clear and distinct as the perception of the (hot) thing brought about by the sense-organ.—(879)

COMMENTARY.

The cognition of the Hot thing brought about by the Senses is clear and distinct,—not so the cognition that is brought about by the word 'hot'; people whose Visual, Gestaactory and Olfactory organs have been impaired do not cognise the Colour and Taste, etc. of things on the hearing of the mere name—'mātuliṅga' (Citron), for instance; while people whose eyes are intact have a clear perception of those through that sense-organ. This has been thus declared—'The man who has been burnt by fire has the idea of having been burnt, on the contact of fire,—which idea is entirely different from the idea of burning arising on the utterance of the word burn'.

The perception of the thing, etc. etc.—is an Instance per dissimilarity.—(879)

"Even if the idea is not so clear and distinct, why cannot Specific Individuality form the denotation of the word?"

TEXT (880).

It is not right that there should be any connection between the Specific Individuality and the Word; nor does the thing appear in the cognition brought about by the word; just as Taste does not appear in the cognition of Colour.—(880)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be thus formulated.—When a thing does not appear in the cognition brought about by a certain other thing, it cannot form the denotation of that;—for instance, Taste in the cognition brought about by Colour;—Specific Individuality does not appear in the cognition brought about by Words;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider term (which implies the absence of the narrower term).—The Proof annulling the conclusion of the other party consists in the anomaly pointed out here. For instance, when a Word is said to be denotative of a certain thing, all that is meant is that it brings about the cognition of that thing,—nothing else; and a cognition cannot be said to be of that thing whose form does not appear in it at all; if it did, it would lead to an absurdity. Nor can one and the same thing have two forms—one distinct and the other indistinct,—by virtue of which the indistinct form could be the one denoted by Words;
because one is incompatible with two; and it has been shown that things existing at different times are mutually incompatible.—(880)

The Naiyāyikas declare as follows:—"The Individual, the Configuration and the Universal,—all these constitute the Denotation of the Word—(Nyāyaśūtra, 2. 2. 63).—The term 'padārtha' here stands for the 'artha', denotative, 'padasya', of the Word.—The term 'Individual' stands for Substances, Qualities, Actions and Ultimate Differentia; this has been defined in the Śūtra.—The Individual consists of particular Qualities, Actions and Substances (Nyāyaśūtra, 2. 2. 64). The meaning of the Śūtra, according to the author of the Vārtika (Uddyotakara), is as follows:—'Differentia' is that which is differentiated; 'guṇavishēṣa' is that which is differentiated from Qualities, i.e. Action. This same term 'guṇavishēṣa' taken a second time is meant to be an Ākāśa Compound,—standing for Quality; the term 'vishēṣa' 'particular', in this case is meant to exclude the Configuration, which is essentially a form of Conjunction, and Conjunction is included under the category of 'Quality'; hence if the qualifying epithet 'particular' were not there, Configuration also would become included; and yet this is not meant to be included under the 'Individual', as it has been mentioned by a separate word.—The term 'āśraya', 'Receptacle', in the Śūtra stands for Substance; Substance being the receptacle or substratum of the said particular Qualities and Actions. This Substance has been indicated by the Śūtra wherefrom the term 'tat' has been eliminated. The compound 'Guṇavishēṣaśārayaḥ' therefore has to be expounded as—'Guṇavishēṣaḥ (Particular Qualities)—Guṇavishēṣaḥ (Actions)—Tadāśrayaḥ (Substances)'. This is a collective copulative Compound, and yet the Neuter ending has not been used as the use of the particular gender depends upon the whim of people. Thus the sense of the Śūtra comes to be this: 'That which is guṇavishēṣaśāraya is the Individual, also called Mārti, Composite'. When the name 'mārti' 'composite' is applied to substance, it is to be taken locatively—as 'that wherein component parts adhere'; when it is applied to Colour, etc., it is to be taken nominatively, in the sense of 'those that adhere—inhere—in substances'; as for the term 'vyakti', it is applied to Substances accusatively and to Colour, etc. instrumentally.—According to the author of the Bhāṣya (Vātsyāyana) however, the Śūtra is to be taken exactly as it stands—'That which is the receptacle of distinctive qualities is the Individual, and that also is the material Body'. Thus it has been said that—That Substance which is the receptacle of the particular qualities,—Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch,—and also of Gravity, Fluidity, Solidity, Faculty, and also of the non-pervasive Dimension,—is called 'mārti', 'composite body', on account of its being made up of component parts.—The term 'ākṛti', 'Configuration', denotes the contact of the limbs of living beings, in the shape of Hands, etc. along with their components, Fingers, etc. Says the Śūtra (Nyāya, 2. 2. 65)—'Configuration is that which indicates the universal and its characteristics'; on this the Bhāṣya says—'That should be known as Configuration which serves to indicate the Universal and the characteristic features of the Universal. This Configuration is nothing apart from the definite arrangement of the parts of an object and the components of those
parts'.—The term 'arrangement' stands for a particular form of contact; and the term 'definite' serves to exclude artificial contacts.—The 'characteristic features of the Universal' consist of the limbs of living beings,—the Head, the Hand and so forth,—as it is by these that the Universal (or genus) 'Cow' and the like is indicated. In some cases, the genus is manifested directly by the Configuration; e.g. when the genus 'Cow' becomes manifested on the perception of the exact shape of the Head, Legs, etc.; in some cases it is manifested by the characteristics of the genus; e.g. when the genus 'Cow' is manifested by the Horns and other such limbs which are perceived severally. Thus it is that the Configuration becomes the indicative of the genus and of the characteristics of the genus.—The term 'Jāti' 'Genus', denotes that entity which is called 'Sāmānyya', Universal, which is the basis of the comprehensive names and notions of things. Hence the next Sūtra (Nyāya, 2. 2. 66)—'Jāti, Universal, is the basis of comprehensive cognitions'; that is to say, the Universal is the source from which comprehensive notions arise.'

Of these three—Individual, Configuration and Universal,—the idea of the Individual and the Configuration, being denoted by words, should be taken as rejected by the foregoing rejection of the idea of the Specific Individuality forming the denotation of words.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (881).

IN THIS SAME MANNER THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONFIGURATION ALSO MAY BE REJECTED; INASMUCH AS OTHERS REGARD BOTH THESE ALSO AS BEING OF THE NATURE OF 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY'.—(881)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the rejection of the Universal will come later.
'Rejection'—as forming the 'import' of words.
"Why?"

Inasmuch as 'both these'—Individual and Configuration,—are held by others to be of the nature of 'Specific Individuality'; so that just as 'Specific Individuality' cannot be denoted by Words, because there can be no Convention bearing upon it,—so also, in regard to these two also, there can be no Convention; hence the Reason cannot be said to be either 'Unproven', or 'Inconclusive'.—(881)

Further, the 'Individual', in the shape of Substance, Quality and Particular Qualities,—'Configuration', in the shape of Contact,—and all these, Substance and the rest,—have been already rejected. For this reason also it cannot be right to regard these as being denoted by Words.—This is shown in the following—
TEXT (882).
INASMUCH AS THE REPUTATION OF SUBSTANCE, ETC. AND OF CONTACT, HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY SET FORTH,—IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO REGARD THESE AS FORMING THE REAL 'IMPORT' OF WORDS.—(882)

COMMENTARY.

Having thus explained the impossibility of Convention regarding Specific Individualities, the Author proceeds to explain its impossibility regarding the other three—Universal, Connection of the Universal and That Which is Endowed with the Universal (as mentioned under 871):

TEXT (883).
THE UNIVERSAL AND THE CONNECTION HAVING BEEN ALREADY REJECTED IN DETAIL,—THE OTHER THREE KINDS OF 'IMPORT OF WORDS' NO LONGER REMAIN POSSIBLE.—(883)

COMMENTARY.

'The other',—i.e. barring 'Specific Individuality', the three—(1) the Universal, (2) the Contact of the Universal, and (3) the One Endowed with the Universal.—As regards the Universal and its Connection, these simply do not exist; and hence in regard to what is endowed with the Universal, also no Convention can be possible; as all naming is done only in reference to Universals; and that which is so endowed can only exist in the form of Specific Individuality; so that the objections urged against this last are equally applicable to the other also.

The Universal forms the denotation of words—says Kātyāyana. Substance forms the denotation of words,—says Vyādi.—Both (Universal and Substance) form the denotation of words,—says Pāṇini.—All these views become discarded by what has been said above; because the 'Universal' can have no connection,—'Substance' is of the nature of 'Specific Individuality'; and hence the objections urged against this latter remain applicable to it.—(883)

The Author sums up his position in the following—

TEXT (884).
FOR THESE REASONS THE ASSERTION THAT 'THE INDIVIDUAL, THE CONFIGURATION AND THE UNIVERSAL ARE DENOTED BY WORDS' IS IMPOSSIBLE; BECAUSE ALL THESE ARE FORMLESS.—(884)

COMMENTARY.

'Tat'—For these reasons.
'Formless'—Featureless; devoid of character.—(884)
TEXT (885).

AS REGARDS THE 'FORM OF COGNITION', IT RESTS IN THE COGNITION ITSELF, AND DOES NOT FOLLOW EITHER THE OBJECT OR ANOTHER COGNITION; HENCE THAT ALSO CANNOT SERVE THE PURPOSE (OF THE OTHER PARTY); AS THAT ALSO CANNOT REALLY BE DENOTED (BY WORDS).—(885)

COMMENTARY.

As regards the 'Form of Cognition', it is of the same essence as the Cognition itself, and as such rests therein; as such, like the Cognition itself, it does not follow either the Object cognised or another Cognition; consequently, as it cannot be present at the time of the Convention and Usage, no Convention can be made relating to it, just as there can be none relating to Specific Individuality. Even if it were present at the time of the Usage, it is not possible that users should make any Convention in regard to it. As a matter of fact, when a man desires to do something on the basis of certain words, he has got to know the words likely to be useful for that purpose, and then make use of them; and it is under this impression that people make use of expressive words; and not through a mere whim. The form of the Cognition, which is rooted in Fancy, cannot be able to accomplish any such desired purpose as the alleviation of cold and the like; because, in actual experience, it is found that mere apprehension does not accomplish any such purpose. Thus then, as there can be no Convention bearing upon this also, our Reason—'because no Convention can be made regarding it'—cannot be stigmatised as 'Unproven'.—(885)

The following might be urged—"There are other 'imports of words', in the shape of what is denoted by the verb 'to be' and the like; and as the Convention could be made regarding these, the said Reason remains 'Unproven' to that extent."

The answer to this is supplied by the following—

TEXT (886).

THESE SAME ARGUMENTS SERVE TO SET ASIDE SUCH 'IMPORT OF WORDS' AS HAS BEEN HELD TO CONSIST IN THE DENOTATION OF THE VERB 'TO BE' AND THE LIKE. STILL WE ARE GOING TO SAY SOMETHING REGARDING THESE.—(886)

COMMENTARY.

'The same arguments',—i.e. those urged against Specific Individuality, etc. forming the Import of Words.—[These serve to set aside those]—because this also is included under the said 'Specific Individuality, etc.'—(886)
The following Text proceeds to show what are the denotations of the
verb 'to be' and so forth:—

TEXT (887).

They say that what is denoted by the verb 'to be' constitutes
the 'Import' of all words,—in connection with the Cow
and such things; it is just as in the case of words like
Apūrva (Unseen Force), Devātā (Deity) and
Svarga (Heaven).—(887)

COMMENTARY.

The particle 'iti' is misplaced; it should be construed with 'asyaṁrathā'.
What is meant is as follows:—What is cognised as denoted by the verb
'to be' forms the 'Import' of all words; i.e. it represents the denotation of all
words; i.e. it forms the 'Import of words'. Hence, in the case of the Cow
and such objects, what forms the import of the words 'Cow' etc. is similar
to the Import of such words as 'Unseen Force', 'Deity' and 'Heaven'.—
This is what these people say. That is to say, the word 'Unseen Force'
does not introduce into the Cognition the form of any object,—and all that
is understood from it is that such a thing does exist to which the term
'Unseen Force' is applied;—so also is the case with words the things
expressed by which are visible,—such as the word 'Cow' for instance.
Because from these words also what is understood is that there is a thing
which is spoken of by the word 'Cow', or which is related to the 'Universal'
Cow. As regards the particular form of this Cognition, which enters into the
consciousness of some people,—that is due to the influence of their own
doctrines.—(887)

Text 886 has spoken of 'denotation of the verb to be and the like';
the term 'and the like' is a reference to certain other theories that have
been propounded regarding the 'Import of Words'. These theories are now
set forth (under Texts 888 to 892):—

TEXT (888).

Some people assert that what is denoted by words is (a) an
aggregate free from distributive and collective deter-
mination; or (b) an unreal relationship.—(888)

COMMENTARY.

(a) Some people assert that what the word—'brāhmaṇa' for instance—
denotes is the aggregate of austerity, caste, learning, etc. without any
conceptual determination either collective or distributive; just as the word
'forest' denotes the Dhava and other trees. That is to say, when the word
'forest' is uttered, the notion that appears is not a determinate or well-defined, one,—either of the Dhava or the Khadira or the Palāsha or any particular tree (distributively),—or of the Dhava and the Khadira and the Palāsha and other trees (collectively);—it is only a vague indefinite conception of the Dhava and other trees in general;—similarly when the word 'brāhmaṇa' is uttered, the notion that appears is not a well-defined one—either of Austerity or Caste or Learning, (distributively), or Austerity and Caste and Learning (collectively); what are cognised are Austerity and the rest conceived of as one aggregated whole as differentiated from other correlative.—The term 'vikalpa' (in the Text) stands for the distinct conception of any one individual from among a group consisting of an indefinite number of individuals; and 'Samuchchaya' stands for the distinct conception of a definite number of individuals related together;—and the notion brought about by words is free from both these conceptions.

(b) Others however have held that what is denoted by the word is the relation of a thing—substance, f.i.—to an undefined 'Universal'—'Substance', f.i.;—and this is said to be 'unreal' because the individual correlative not really denoted by the word.—Or, it may be that, like the dark complexion and other properties, Austerity, Caste, etc. also appear in the notion as a single unity,—and hence it is the relationship of these that is called 'unreal'. Because these are not really apprehended together in their own forms; what is apprehended is only the aggregate of these perceived like the whirling fire-brand, without reference to the individuals making up the aggregate.—(888)

TEXT (889).

(c) Or the Real with Unreal Adjuncts is the 'Import of Words'.—(d) Or 'Import of Words' may consist in the word itself in the state of 'abhijalpa' (Coalescence).—(889)

COMMENTARY.

Others have declared that the Real with Unreal adjuncts is what is denoted by words. For instance, the adjuncts, in the shape of such details as bracelets, rings and such things, are 'unreal' so far as the denotation of the word is concerned; and yet these adjuncts belong to something that is 'real'—in the shape of the Gold which has a generic form and permeates through a number of particular things. This 'Real with Unreal adjuncts' forms the Import of Words,—i.e. is what forms the denotation of the word.

Others again declare that it is the word itself in the state of 'Coalescence' that constitutes the Import of Words.—(889)

The following Text explains what is meant by this 'Coalescence':—
TEXT (890).

WHEN THE FORM OF THE WORD BECOMES IDENTIFIED WITH THE OBJECT THROUGH THE CONCEPTION THAT 'THIS IS THAT',—THAT WORD THEY REGARD AS IN THE 'STATE OF COALESCENCE'.—(890)

COMMENTARY.

When the character of the object is imposed upon the Word—by such expressions as 'Word is the Object'; on the basis of this imposition, when the form of the Word becomes identified with the Object,—the Word in the state of this unification with the object is said to be 'in the state of coalescence'.—(890)

(e) Others have held the following view:—"When the form of an external object is impinged upon the Idea, and is apprehended as an external object, it becomes manifested in the form of the Idea; and it is this Idea that is denoted by Words". This is the view set forth in the following—

TEXT (891).

WHEN AN OBJECT FORMS THE CONTENT OF THE IDEA, ON THE BASIS OF AN EXTERNAL OBJECT,—AND IT COMES TO BE COGNISED AS 'AN EXTERNAL OBJECT'; THIS (MIXTURE OF IDEA—OBJECT) HAS BEEN REGARDED BY SOME PEOPLE AS FORMING THE 'IMPORT OF WORDS'.—(891)

COMMENTARY.

'Content of the Idea',—i.e. revolving in the Idea, subsisting in the Idea. 'On the basis of an external object';—i.e. that for the manifesting of whose form recourse is had to the real-unreal external thing,—in the shape of the letter-symbols. 'It comes to be cognised as an external object';—i.e. manifested in the form of the Idea, but apprehended as something external. That is to say, so long as the form of the Idea is not impinged upon the objects and is cognised, on due consideration, as Idea itself,—it is not recognised as forming the import of words; because what is purely subjective can have no connection with any form of activity; for instance, actions spoken of in such words as
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Bring the Cow', 'Eat the Curd', are not possible for the mere Idea; and what words denote is a thing capable of action; hence what is apprehended as an Idea cannot be denoted by words. When, however, the form of the Idea becomes impinging upon the external object, the observer becomes influenced by its external character and comes to regard it as capable of action, and thus it becomes denoted by words.

Question:—"What is the difference between this theory and the theory of 'Apoha'? The upholder of 'Apoha' also asserts that what is denoted by the word is the form of the Idea apprehended as something external; as has been declared in the following passage:—'There is nothing incongruous in the statement that that object forms the Import of words which follows from the impinging of the form of the Idea and the cognisance of the exclusion of other things'."

This is not right. The upholder of the Theory of the Idea-form being impinged upon things holds that what is denoted by the word is what has a real existence in the form of the Idea, and is impinged upon Substance and other things, which also are real,—and which therefore along with its object is not false or wrong; and he does not admit that the said idea is without real basis, and rests entirely on the imposition of non-difference upon things that are different, and is, on that account, false (wrong), and dependent entirely upon mutual exclusion among things [as held by the upholders of Apoha].—If the upholder of the Theory under review really held the view held by us and expressed in the following declaration—'all this apprehension of things as one is a false notion,—its basis lies in mutual exclusion, which is what is expressed by the name',—then his argument would be entirely superfluous [as what he would be seeking to prove would be what is already admitted by us]. This is what is going to be asserted later on in the passage—'If the basis of this lies in mutual exclusion, then that is exactly our view'.

—As for the Apohist, on the other hand, he does not hold anything denoted by words, or the form of the Idea, to be real. Because what he holds is that that alone forms the Import of the word which appears to be apprehended by the verbal cognition; and (under the Theory under review) what is apprehended by the verbal cognition is not the form of the Idea, but the external object which is capable of effective action.—And yet the external object is not really apprehended by it,—because the apprehension is not in strict accordance with the real state of things; on the contrary the thing is accepted in accordance with the apprehension; so that the Import of words is something that is superimposed; and what is superimposed is nothing; so in reality, nothing is denoted by words.—As for what has been said by the Apohist (in the passage quoted by the other party in line 21 on the preceding page of the Text) regarding 'that being the denotation of words',—that has been said with a view to the superimposed object. The upholder of the Theory however, regards the form of the Idea to be really denoted by words. Thus there is a great difference between the two theories.—(891)

(f) Others have held that—"By repeated usage Word comes to produce an intuition, and it does not actually denote any external object".—This view is set forth in the following—
TEXT (892).

In short, all words are productive of Intuition, through repeated usage; as is found in the case of making things known to children and animals.—(892).

COMMENTARY.

'Repeated usage',—finding the word applied to a certain object again and again.

'Intuition',—is a mental capacity which tends to bring about the notion of a certain activity as due to a certain cause; this capacity is produced by the word as associated with frequent usage; it varies with each sentence and with each person; as its diversity is illimitable, on account of the usage of words being endless, it cannot be described; hence all that is said is that it is like making things known to children and animals;—the stroke of the driving hook, used for making things known to the elephant, comes to produce an Intuition in the animal; in the same manner all expressive words,—such as 'tree', etc. etc.—through repeated usage, come ultimately to produce only an Intuition and they do not actually denote anything directly. Otherwise, how could there be mutually contradictory interpretations of Texts? How too could there be any imaginary stories and other compositions which speak of things created by the imagination of the writer?

—(892)

The Author now proceeds to refute the various theories (regarding the Import of Words, that have been set forth in Texts 887–892):—

TEXTS (893-894).

What is expressed by the Verb 'to be' is said to be denoted by words;—is it meant to be the 'Specific Individuality' of Things? Or the 'Universal'? Or the Contact? Or something else which reflects the Cognition?

—The objections to everyone of these alternatives have been already set forth above. Further, as for what is expressed by the Verb 'to be', which has been held to form the Import of words,—there can be no diverse usage based upon that.—(893-894)

COMMENTARY.

If 'what is expressed by the Verb to be.' is held to be of the nature of what has been expounded before,—then it is open to the same objections that
have been previously set forth.—Further, as no definite form can be conceived of in regard to 'what is expressed by the verb to be',—if that alone were denoted by Words, there could be no such divergent usage of words as 'Cow', 'gacaya', 'Elephant' and so forth; as these animals would not be denoted by the words at all.—(893-894)

The following text anticipates the answer of the other party—

TEXT (895).


COMMENTARY.

The following may be the answer of the other party:—"The diverse usage would proceed on the basis of the cognition of the mere 'Being' of the Thing concerned (which is what is expressed by the verb 'to be'), as qualified by the Universal Cow and the word ('Cow'), but devoid of such distinctions as being of variegated colour and so forth.—If that is so, then why is the denotation of the word said to consist in only what is expressed by the Verb 'to be',—when such particulars as the 'Cow', etc. are also said to be denoted?—The answer to this given by the other party is—'The opinion, etc. etc.';—that is, as a matter of fact, the idea of the Horn and other particulars does not proceed from the word; it is for this reason that the opinion has been held that 'what is denoted is what is expressed by the verb to be,—and not the Universal Cow, etc.'; the reason for which opinion lies in the fact that the qualifying factors—the Universal Cow and the word (name) 'Cow'—are not cognised through the word.—Hence there is no incongruity in our opinion."—(895)

The above is refuted in the following—

TEXT (896).

IF THIS BE SO, THEN THERE SHOULD BE DENOTATION OF THE THING AS EQUIPPED WITH THOSE, AS ALSO OF THE DIVERSE PARTICULARS. AND IN THAT CASE, THE SAME OBJECTIONS WOULD BE APPLICABLE. APART FROM THESE, THERE IS FOUND NOTHING 'EXPRESSED BY THE VERB to be'.—(896)

COMMENTARY.

If the view is that the object alone as qualified by the Universal 'Cow', etc. is denoted by the word,—then it becomes admitted that there is denota-
tion of the object as possessing that ‘Universal’. In that case, as the ‘Universal’ and also its ‘Inherence’ have been already rejected, there would be no possibility of there being any object equipped with these; so that the same objections would be applicable.

Further, as the object equipped by these particulars would be of the nature of the ‘Specific Individuality’, there could be no Convention bearing upon it, and there could be no usage of words; the notions obtained too would be hazy,—as already pointed out before.

If it be said that What is expressed by the verb ‘to be’ is something different from ‘Specific Individuality’ and other things,—then the answer to that is that, apart from these, etc.—i.e. apart from ‘Specific Individuality’ and other things, there is nothing ‘expressed by the verb to be’ which is within the range of our cognition.—(896)

The following text sets forth the objections against the theory of the ‘Aggregate’ being denoted by Words (as expounded under Text 888):—

TEXT (897).


**COMMENTARY.**

Even under the view that what is denoted is the ‘Aggregata’, a much clearer conception of ‘Universals’ and ‘Particulars’,—in the shape of Austerity and the rest,—is admitted; hence all the objections that have been urged against the denotation of each of these singly, are all applicable to the view in question.—(897)

The author next states the objections against the two views set forth (under Texts 888 and 889) regarding ‘the Unreal Contact, etc.’:—

TEXT (898).

**ANY SORT OF RELATION AMONG SUBSTANCE AND THE REST, WHOSE NATURE HAS BEEN DULY ASCERTAINED, AS ALSO ANY REAL ‘UNIVERSAL’,—HAS BEEN ALREADY DISCARDED.—(898)**

**COMMENTARY.**

In course of the examination of the Six Categories, any such relation as Conjunction and Inherence has been rejected;—under the examination of the Sāṅkhya doctrines, we have rejected the idea that the ‘Universal’ is real and consists of the three Attributes, and is not-different (from the Particular
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Products);—and the ‘Universal’ as something different from the Particulars has been rejected in course of the examination of the Six Categories;—hence the Import of Words cannot consist either of ‘the conjunction of the Unreal’, or of ‘the Real Universal with Unreal Adjuncts’.—(898)

The following Text points out objections against the view that what is denoted is ‘Coalescence’;—

TEXTS (899–901).

INASMUCH AS THE IMPORT OF WORDS CANNOT CONSIST OF PARTICULARS OR UNIVERSALS, THERE CAN BE NO FORM OF THE WORD AS COALESCED (IDENTIFIED) WITH ITS DENOTATION. THEN AGAIN, THIS ‘COALESCENCE’ ALSO MUST RESIDE IN THE COGNITION ITSELF, INASMUCH AS IT IS DIFFERENT FROM EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIP. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT WOULD BE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS VIEW AND THE VIEW THAT THE COGNITION OR IDEA ITSELF CONSTITUTES THE IMPORT OF WORDS?—

AS REGARDS THE VIEW THAT THE FORM OF THE IDEA (OR COGNITION) IS WHAT IS DENOTED BY WORDS,—THAT HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED, ON THE GROUND THAT IT WOULD BE NOTHING DIFFERENT FROM THE IDEA AND AS SUCH COULD NOT BE PERSUADIVE.—(899–901)

COMMENTARY.

If there were such a thing as the ‘denotation’ of the word, then it might become coalesced with it; but in so far as it has been proved that no ‘denotation’ of the Word is possible, in the form of ‘Specific Individuality’ and the rest,—how could there be any ‘coalescing’ with it?

Then again, the said ‘Coalescence’ also must reside in the Cognition only. Because the external Word and the external Object (denoted) must be distinct by reason of their being perceived by different sense-organs and so forth; hence any coalescence or identification of these cannot be right. The ‘Coalescence’, therefore, that is proper is only of such Word and Object as reside in the Cognition. So that when the Word, having taken up the form of the denoted Object, has its verbal character obscured, and appears in the Cognition,—it introduces the objective element into its subjective form; and it is then that it comes to be described as ‘abhiṣālpa’, ‘Coalescence’. This must be a form within the Cognition itself, and nothing exterior to it; because what is exterior must be of an entirely distinct character.

Under the circumstances, what would be the difference between this view and the other one by which the Cognition or Idea itself is regarded as the Import of Words?—None at all. In both cases the denotation would be purely subjective; the only difference being that the word and the denotation had coalesced and become one.
Both these views would be open to the same objection. How could that which is non-different from Cognition be something different? This is what is shown in the words—'As regards the view that the form of the Cognition, etc. etc.'—(899-901)

The Author points out the objections against the view that it is 'Intuition' that is brought about by words (set forth in Text 892):

**TEXTS (902-905).**

As regards 'Intuition', which has been regarded as the 'Import of Words',—if it appertains to the external object, then, inasmuch as the external object has one particular character, how could there be various 'Intuitions'?—If the 'Intuitions' be held to be objectless, and existing only in the form of Faculties,—then how could there be either comprehension or activity regarding external things?

—If it be held that these two (Cognition and Activity) abandon the external form and rest within themselves,—then the Import of Words becomes unreal, false—as proceeding through illusion.—Nor can Intuition be held to be baseless; as in that case, it should appear everywhere.—If the basis of it be held to consist in the 'mutual exclusion' among things,—then that is exactly our view.—(902-905)

**COMMENTARY.**

If 'Intuition' is really based upon the external object, then it cannot be possible for various Intuitions to appear in persons living at mutually incompatible times, relating to any single thing like Sound; because what is one cannot have several natures.

If Intuitions are devoid of objects, then Activity and Comprehension in connection with objects should not be possible; as the word would have no connection with objects.

If it be held that—"the Comprehension and Activity come about under illusion, the object being imposed upon what is objectless",—then the Import of Words becomes illusory, mistaken; and of this Illusion, some cause has to be found; otherwise, if there were no cause of the Illusion, it should appear everywhere and at all times.—If the mutual exclusion among things be held to be the cause of the illusion, then you support our own view, and as such your argument becomes superfluous.—(902-905)
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The following Text sets forth the objection that applies to all the various theories on the subject:—

TEXT (906).

AGAIN, IS ALL THIS MOMENTARY OR NOT? IF IT IS MOMENTARY, THEN THERE CAN BE NO CO-ORDINATION. IF OTHERWISE, THERE SHOULD BE NO SUCCESSIVE COGNITION.—(906)

COMMENTARY.

All this—‘Specific Individuality’, ‘Universal’ and so forth (which has been held to be denoted by words)—is it momentary or not-momentary?—In the former case, as there could be no co-ordination between what existed at the time of the Convention and what exists at the time of Usage,—no Convention could apply to the case at all.—If, on the other hand, it be held that it is all not-momentary, then,—inasmuch as what is successive cannot proceed from what is not-successive, there would be no cognition relating to Words and their Import,—as such cognition can only be successive.

‘Otherwise’—i.e. if it is not-momentary.—(906)

Other people have asserted as follows:—"The Word brings about the Inference of the desire to speak (of a certain thing), as declared in the statement that ‘There is no other means save the Word of inferring the desire to speak’.”—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (907).

THIS SAME ARGUMENT SERVES TO SET ASIDE THE ‘DESIRE TO SPEAK’ AS (HELD TO BE) COGNISED THROUGH WORDS. WHEN, AS SHOWN ABOVE, THERE CAN BE NO ‘DENOTATION OF WORDS’, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY ‘DESIRE TO SPEAK’? OR EVEN THE WORD ITSELF?—(907)

COMMENTARY.

If the ‘desire to speak’ is really held to be appurtenant to the real ‘Import of Words’,—then it is ‘unproven’; because there can be no ‘Import of Words’ in the shape of any such thing as ‘Specific Individuality’ and the rest. Hence there can be no real ‘desire to speak’ of any object; as there is nothing to which the word may be related.

Nor can there be a word denotative of the object; this is what is stated in the words—‘or even the word itself’.—‘Shruti’ stands for the Word. If the ‘desire to speak’, is what is expressed by the Word, then the Word cannot be applied to any external object; as it would not be expressed, like any other thing.—(907)

The idea may be that—‘there is some sort of similarity between what appears in the ‘desire to speak’ and the external object,—and on the basis
of this similarity, the word may be applied to the external object, even though it may not be directly expressed; as happens in the case of twins".—

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (908).

HOW CAN THE WORD BE APPLIED,—MERELY THROUGH SIMILARITY,—TO WHAT IS NOT EXPRESSED BY IT? AND THE VIEW THAT IT IS THROUGH SIMILARITY, AS IN THE CASE OF THE NAMES OF TWINS, IS ALSO DISCARDED BY THIS SAME ARGUMENT.—(908)

COMMENTARY.

Such being the case, the application of words to external objects can never be possible; in fact it might be possible to apply the word to an object not figuring in the 'desire to speak' at all; as in the case of twins.

The *Vaibhāṣika* postulates, as mark of the object called 'Name' and 'Basis', a distinct faculty.—This theory also becomes discarded by this same argument. Because if the said 'Name' is momentary, then there can be no co-ordination; if it is not-momentary, then there can be no *succession*; and there is the anomaly of the word being applied to an external object; and it could not always be on the basis of similarity.—All these objections descend upon this theory in a body.

Or the phrase 'by this same argument' may be taken to refer to the objections urged against 'Specific Individuality' and the rest. That is to say, in the present connection also, it may be said that—'The nature of the Name, etc., which contains nothing else, is such that there can be no Convention in regard to them; similarly what does not exist cannot be denoted by words'.—(908)

It has been asserted above by the Author that if words denote things that figure in the 'desire to speak', then they cannot apply to external objects. The following Text anticipates the Opponent's answer to this:—

TEXT (909).

"WHEN TWO PERSONS THINK OF THE FORM FIGURING IN THE 'DESIRE TO SPEAK' AND IN THE 'INFERENCE' AS SOMETHING EXTERNAL, THEN THE WORD BECOMES APPLIED TO IT";—IF THIS VIEW BE HELD, THEN THAT AGAIN IS EXACTLY OUR OPINION.—(909)

COMMENTARY.

"The 'Desire to speak' is present in the 'Chain' of the Speaker, and the 'Inference' based upon that Desire is present in the 'chain' of the Hearer;
the form that is connected with these two,—i.e. which figures in these;—when the two persons—the Speaker and the Hearer—think of the object as so figuring,—then the Word comes to be applied to that external object. That is to say, though in reality what the speaker is cognisant of is what is figuring in his own consciousness, yet he thinks that he is speaking to the other man of an external object; and the Hearer also has the impression that 'this man is speaking to me of an external object'; hence, just as two men suffering from defective vision see two moons, so also is all this use of words."

If this is so, then, you have fallen on our side; and all your argumentation is futile.

'Again',—i.e. once you had come to our side when you postulated the 'Intuition' as the 'Import of words'.

It is thus established that the Reason (put forward by the Author)—'because no Convention can be made',—cannot be regarded as 'unproven'. The idea that it may be 'Inconclusive' or 'Contradictory' has been already rejected before.—From all this it follows that all that is brought about by words is the 'Apoha', 'Exclusion of others'.—(909)

On hearing the term 'Apoha', the other party, having his mind perturbed, and not knowing the exact nature of this Apoha, proceeds to urge against that doctrine the fact of its being contrary to experience:—

**TEXTS (910-911).**

"Why do you say that the Word brings about the 'exclusion of others'? As a matter of fact mere negation is not apprehended in the idea brought about by the Word; on the contrary, in the case of all such words as 'Cow', 'Gavaya', 'Elephant', 'Tree' and so forth,—the verbal cognition that results is always in the positive form."

**COMMENTARY.**

The particle 'iti' is to be taken as understood after 'anyāpohakṛt'. The meaning is—"'Why do you say that what is brought about by the word is the exclusion of others?'"

Why should not this be asserted?

"Because, as a matter of fact, mere negation, etc. etc.; that is, 'the exclusion of others' is intended to be a mere negation; and mere negation does not figure in Verbal Cognition; on the contrary, Verbal Cognition is always found to apprehend the positive form of things; and what does not figure in Verbal Cognition cannot be rightly regarded as the 'import of words'; as such an idea would lead to absurdities. Thus the Proposition (of the Apohist) is contrary to experience."—(910-911)
The next three Texts state the fact of the Buddhist's Proposition being contrary to experience,—in accordance with the opinion of Bhāmaha:

TEXT (912).

"If the whole purpose of the word 'Cow' is served by the exclusion of others',—then, please find some other word which brings about the notion of 'Cow' in regard to the Cow itself."—(912)

COMMENTARY.

"If the word 'Cow' only serves the purpose of denoting the 'exclusion of others', then,—as it would be taken up in that,—that term 'Cow' could not bring about the idea of the animal with the dewlap; hence it would be necessary to seek for some other word which could bring about the notion of 'Cow' in regard to the said animal with the dewlap."—(912)

It might be said (by the other party) that—"one and the same word 'Cow' would bring about both the notions, and hence the second word need not be sought after"—To this, Bhāmaha makes the following reply:

TEXT (913).

"In fact, cognition is the fruit of Words; and no single Word can have two fruits. How could both Affirmation and Negation be the fruit of any one word?"—(913)

COMMENTARY.

"Words have for their fruit the cognition of affirmation and of negation.—'What then?—No single word can have two fruits; of any one word,—be it affirmative or negative,—there cannot be two fruits appearing at one and the same time; that is, no such is ever found.—Nor again is it possible for mutually contradictory cognitions of affirmation and negation to be the fruit of a single word."—(913)

In the following Text, Bhāmaha puts forward his comprehensive argument (against Apoha):

TEXT (914).

"When one hears the word 'Cow' uttered, he should, first of all have the idea of the non-cow,—as the word 'Cow' would have been uttered for the purpose of negativing the 'non-cow'."—(914)

COMMENTARY.

"If it is the negation of the non-cow that is mainly expressed by the word 'Cow', then, on hearing the word 'Cow', the first idea in the mind of
the hearer would be that of the ‘non-cow’; because that is held to be the ‘import’ of the word the notion regarding which appears *directly and immediately* after the word; the notion of the ‘negation of the non-cow’ does not appear *directly and immediately* after the word ‘Cow’.—Thus, on account of the incongruity of there being no notion of the *Cow*, and on account of the incongruity of the first appearance of the notion of the *non-cow*, ‘*Apoha*’ (Negation of others) cannot form the Import of Words.”
—(914)

The Author next proceeds to set forth objections against *Apoha*, from the point of view of *Kumārila*:

**TEXT (915).**

“*Those who have admitted the Universal ‘negation of the non-cow’ as the Import of the Word have, by the expression, admitted the Universal ‘Cow’ as an entity.’*—[Shlokavārtika—*Apoha 1*]—(915)

**COMMENTARY.**

*Kumārila* has argued as follows:—“When the Universal ‘Negation of the Contrary’ is asserted to be the Import of words, it could be either in the form of ‘Preclusion’ or ‘the negation of what is possible’;—If it be the former, then the Proposition is open to the charge of being ‘futile’,—inasmuch as we also hold that what is denoted by the word ‘Cow’ is the *Universal* named ‘Cow’; and this is exactly what you also assert in other words when you declare that ‘what is denoted by the word *Cow* is the *Universal* in the shape of the negation of the non-cow’; so that the dispute is only in regard to the name (of the Universal).”—(915)

**Question:**—How is it the same thing asserted in different words?

**Answer—**

**TEXT (916).**

“*Inasmuch as all ‘Inexistence’ has been held to be of the nature of some other ‘existence’,—please say what that ‘Inexistence’ is which is of the nature of the ‘Negation of the Horse (and other non-cows)’?*”—[Ibid. 2]—(916)

**COMMENTARY.**

“Since all ‘Inexistence’, in the four forms of ‘Previous Inexistence’ and the rest, has been found to be of the nature of existence”—as declared in the following words—while the Curd is not present in the Milk, it is called previous *Inexistence*; when the Milk is not present in the Curd, it is called
Inexistence per Destruction; the absence of the House, etc. in the Cow is called mutual Inexistence; when portions of the head of the Hare are flat and devoid of a hard protuberance, it is said to be absolute Inexistence, in the shape of the Hare's Horn... These thus are not so many kinds of non-entity. Hence Inexistence must be an entity' (Shlokavārtika: Abhāva, 2-4 and 8).—What is meant is that it is Milk itself which, while not present in the form of the Curd, comes to be known as the 'Previous Inexistence' (of the Curd); and similarly with other forms of Inexistence.—Thus Inexistence being only a form of Existence, what is that Inexistence which is meant by you to be the 'Negation of the Horse, etc.'; please tell us this."—(916)

The Buddha might say—What is to be said? What we mean is none other than the 'Specific Individuality' of the Cow.

"The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (917-918).

"You do not admit of any individuality in the nature of something uncommon (unique), because it is devoid of conceptual content; so also (you do not admit) the 'variegated animal' and the like; as in that case the import would not be universal (common).—Hence the idea of the 'Cow' must be based upon that form which subsists in common in every single individual (Cow); [and in this there can be no dispute between us]."—[Ibid. 3 & 10]—(917-918)

COMMENTARY.

That which is the unique (uncommon) Individuality is not held by you to constitute the 'negation of Horse and other non-cows';—why?—because it is devoid of conceptual content (or determination); that is, all determination ceases in it; it is only the Common Universal that is held to form the object of determination (conceptual thought); while that entity which is uncommon, unique is beyond all determination; as declared in the following words—'What is perceptible by the senses is the self-cognisable, inexplicable form.' The ground for regarding anything as an Individual consists in its uncommon (unique) character; hence what is meant by the words of the Text is 'that which is an Individuality by reason of its uncommon character'.

Hitherto the Text has made only a general statement. It reasserts same thing in reference to a particular instance—'So also, etc. etc.':—that is, just as you do not admit of the Import of the word 'Cow' to consist in any unique individual in the shape of the 'negation of the Horse and other non-cows', so also you do not admit of any positive entity in the form of the
‘negation of the Horse, etc.’ as forming the Import of such words as the ‘variegated cow’ and the like.—Why not?—*Because in that case the Import would not be universal*;—that is, if it were so admitted, then, the Universal could never form the Import of the word; as it would have no connection with the word. Because it is so, therefore there can be no common entity in the shape of the ‘negation of the Horse, etc.’; consequently the conclusion must be that the idea of ‘Cow’ is based upon that character which resides completely in each one of the members of the same class—the *variegated* and other cows; and this can be only the *Universal ‘Cow’*.—If you speak of this same as the ‘negation of the non-cow’, then the difference is only in name and your proposition thus is open to the charge of being ‘superfluous’.—(917-918)

The following Text takes up the second alternative (mentioned under Text 915)—that the ‘*Apoha*’ is of the nature of the ‘negation of what is possible’;—

**TEXT (919).**

"*If the Import of words be assumed to be of the nature of mere Negation, then it would only be another kind of ‘Void’, spoken of by means of the negative word.*"

—(919)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘*Spoken of by means of the negative word*’;—the ‘Negative Word’ is the word expressive of the negation in the form of the ‘negation of the non-cow’; and what would be denoted by this word would only be the ‘*Void*, the absence of the external world; since the form of the ‘entity’ would be denied.

‘Another kind’; this ‘Void’ you (Buddhist) had postulated, and we had rejected under the chapter on *Idealism* (Vijñānavāda of the Shlokavartika); and on the present occasion of examining the nature of the Import of Words, the same ‘Void’ is again put forward under the garb of ‘*Apoha*’; which denies the object whose existence is vouched for by experience.—(919)

"Where is the harm if that is so?"

_Answer:—_

**TEXT (920).**

"*In that ‘Void’ there would be an apprehension of the character of the cognitions themselves of the Horse and other things; and in that case it would be useless to posit the ‘*Apoha* (Negation) of others’ as the Import of words.*"—[Ibid. 37]—(920)

**COMMENTARY.**

If the ‘*Void*’ is what is denoted, then it comes to this that in all Verbal Cognitions what is comprehended is only the factor of ‘Cognition’ itself;
as *ex hypothesi*, there can be no apprehension of the form of any thing external.
—"Even so, what is the harm?"—In that case, it would be futile to assert that the *Apotha* is denoted by words; as what would become the Import of Words would be the form of the Cognition which would be a positive entity independent of all tinge of anything external. What is meant is that in this way there would be a contradiction of your own doctrine—by this Proposition of yours.—(920)

The same idea is further explained:—

**TEXT (921).**

"In that case, the ‘form of the Cognition’, which is posited as the ‘Import of Words’, would be the Universal."— [Ibid. 38]—(921)

**COMMENTARY.**

That is to say, the ‘form of the Cognition’ itself, in the form of the positive entity, ‘Universal’,—would be the Import of Words.—(921)

The following might be urged—‘Even without a substratum (in the external world), the cognition in question would appear in the form of the ‘exclusion of the heterogeneous Cow, etc.’; hence the postulation of the ‘Apoha’ is quite right.’

This is answered in the following—

**TEXT (922).**

"As a matter of fact, whenever the said Cognition appears in connection with the Import of Words, it is always in the form of a positive entity; hence in such cases, the Import could be assumed to consist of the positive entity only,—a Cognition not of the nature of ‘Apoha’."—[Ibid. 39]—(922)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘*Vasturūpā*’;—in the form of a positive entity.

The said cognition’,—i.e. the cognition the Horse, without a real substratum in the external world.

‘In connection with the Import of Words’,—as relating to the Horse and other things conceived of.

‘To consist of a positive entity ’;—in the shape of the Idea embracing the notion of the Horse and other non-cows.
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

The effect of the emphasis is explained—a cognition not of the nature of Apoha; i.e. that Import of Words, in the shape of Idea, wherein the Apoha does not enter at all; the compound 'buddhyanapohakam' being expounded as 'the non-exclusion of the Idea',—i.e. without any exclusion of other Ideas.—Or the compound 'buddhyanapohakam' may be explained as follows—'apohaka' is that which excludes,—'anapohaka' is that which does not exclude;—the compound thus standing for 'that which does not exclude the Idea'.—What is meant is as follows:—Though one Cognition is always different from another Cognition, yet when it appears, it does not tend to the exclusion of the other cognition; it always tends to the positive cognition of such entities as the Horse and the like. Consequently the most reasonable thing is to accept the view that what is denoted is a positive entity, not Apoha; because one Cognition cannot exclude (be of the nature of the Apoha, negation, of) another.—(922)

Then again, this Apoha that you have postulated as the Import of Words,—has been held to be denoted by the word as taken out of a Sentence; but what is expressed by the Sentence must be of the nature of Intuition; as has been declared in the following—"Hitherto has been discussed the denotation of the Word as taken out of a Sentence; but what is brought about first of all is what is expressed by the Sentence, which has been called Intuition".—In this connection we have the following Text:

TEXT (923).

"Even in the absence of the corresponding external object there is Intuition expressed by the Sentence; similar may be the case with what is expressed by the word also; why should the Apoha be postulated at all?"—[Ibid. 43]—(923)

COMMENTARY.

Just as, even in the absence of an external object denoted by the Word,—you describe the meaning of the Sentence to be of the nature of Intuition, not of the nature of 'Apoha',—even so, the meaning of the word,—like the meaning of the Sentence,—also may be of the nature of Intuition. Under the circumstances, why is any such thing as 'Apoha' postulated at all? That is to say, the Import of both Sentence and Word may be of the positive character.—(923)

The following might be urged:—In the case of Intuitions also, there is always exclusion of one Intuition by another; hence Apoha is postulated.

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (924).

"In the case of a Cognition, no 'exclusion of another Cognition' is apprehended; in fact, apart from the coming about of its own form, the Cognition carries with it no other factor."—[Ibid. 41]—(924)

COMMENTARY.

It might be said that—"even though it is not apprehended, it may be there all the same"; hence it is added—'In fact, etc. etc.';—even though there may be exclusion of one Cognition from another, yet the Word has got nothing to do with it. Because as a matter of fact, when the Cognition is brought about by the Word, it does not bear within itself any factor expressed by the word, apart from its own appearance, in the shape of the exclusion of other Cognitions; on the contrary, it is always found to appear in the positive form. And the factor of an entity which is not expressed by the word cannot form the Import of that word; otherwise we would be landed in an absurdity.

The sense of all this is that the Proposition (of the Buddhist regarding *Apoha*) is annulled by actual experience.—(924)

*Kumārila* again shows, by means of an Incongruity, that the doctrine of *Apoha* is contrary to experience:—

TEXT (925).

"If *Apoha* formed the Import of Words, then all words would be synonymous,—those that denote diverse Universals, as well as those that denote Particulars."—[Ibid. 42]—(925)

COMMENTARY.

The words denotative of diverse Universals,—like 'Cow', 'Horse', etc.—as well as those denotative of Particulars,—the 'Variegated Cow', etc.—would all become synonymous for you; as there would be no difference in their meanings,—just like the words 'vrkṣa' and 'pāḍapa' (both of which denote the *tree* and are hence synonyms).—(925)

*Question* :—Why is there no difference in the meaning?

*Answer* :—

TEXT (926)

"There can be no difference among *Apohas*, because they are non-entities, and devoid of all such conceptions as 'related', 'one' and 'many'."—[Ibid. 45]—(926)

COMMENTARY.

Such conceptions as 'related', 'one' and 'many' are possible only in regard to an entity, not to a non-entity; and as *Apohas* are non-entities,
there can be no such conceptions in regard to them as being 'mutually related' and so forth; how then can there be any difference among them?—(926)

"If difference is admitted among Apohas, then surely they become entities".—This is shown in the following:

TEXT (927).

"If the Apohas are different, then they must be entities, because of that difference,—just like the Specific Individuality of things. If they are non-entities, then they cannot be many, and hence they cannot escape from being synonymous."—[Ibid. 46]—(927)

COMMENTARY.

'Vastu'—states the Probandum.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—Those that differ among themselves must be entities,—like the Specific Individualities;—Apohas differ among themselves;—hence this is a natural Reason (for regarding them as entities); and if they are entities, then it becomes established that the Import of Words is positive.

This means that the Proposition of the Apohist is annulled by Inferential Reasoning.

On the other hand, if Apohas be held to be non-entities, then, there can be no plurality among them; and under the circumstances, it is certain that they are synonymous.—(927)

The following text anticipates the Bauddha's answer to the above:

TEXT (928).

There would certainly be difference among Apohas, based upon the difference among the Horse and other things.—[Ibid. 47]—(928)

COMMENTARY.

This argument has been thus stated:—'They are diverse, through the diversity of the things excluded; but they are absolutely inert in the matter of difference among themselves'. So that, even though there is no difference among the Apohas themselves, yet, as there is difference in the Horse and other things excluded (by the Apoha denoted by the word 'Cow'),—there would be difference among the Apohas also, which are of the form of the
exclusion of non-cows (and non-cows are many and diverse); thus they could not all be synonymous.—(928)

This answer is rejected in the following—

TEXT (928).

"In fact, there can be no distinction among Apoñas—either by themselves, or through others."—[Ibid. 47]—(928)

COMMENTARY.

There can be no diversity or plurality in the Apoña itself,—because it is of the essence of mere negation. If it were diverse through others,—then this could be only imaginary, not real. Because it is not right that a nature that does not belong to a thing by itself should come to it through others. —(928)

Why should not this be right?

Answer:—

TEXT (929).

"When even the substrata to which they are related do not make any difference in the form of the Apoñas,—that they would be differentiated by the excluded things, which are exterior to them, would be an assumption that is too far-fetched."—[Ibid. 52]—(929)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, when the things to which they are related, the variegated and other Cows—which are their substrata—enter into their very constitution,—are unable to produce any difference in the essence of the Apoñas,—inasmuch as even among the several cows, variegated and the rest, the Apoña, in the shape of the 'Exclusion of the non-cow', is held to be one only,—then how could this Apoña be rendered diverse by the objects excluded—such as the Horse, etc.—which are exterior to it? A thing that cannot be diversified by that which enters into its very constitution cannot certainly be diversified by what is exterior to it; as in that case the latter would cease to be exterior.

For this reason, what has been suggested is too much of an assumption.—This has been said in a joking spirit.—(929)

It might be argued that—in that case the inner correlates in the shape of the substrate themselves may be taken as serving the purposes of the differentiation.

The answer to this is provided in the following—
TEXTS (930-931).

"In the same manner, its diversity cannot be due to the diversity of its substratum;—diversity in the relative of a thing does not justify the assumption of diversity in the thing also. How much less there is exclusion possible for that which is a non-entity, unrelated, undifferentiated, unspecified, vague and undetermined?"—
[Ibid. 48-49]—(930-931)

COMMENTARY.

'Its'—of Apoha.

Why is it not possible?

Answer—'Diversity in the relative, etc. etc.';—the idea that the non-entity cannot be diversified by the diversity of its relative—because it has no character at all,—may rest for a while; as regards entities also, no diversity is ever found to be due to the diversity in relatives; for instance, when Devadatta, who is a single entity, occupies, either simultaneously or successively, different seats, he continues to be perceived as the same without having become diverse. How much more so is this then in the case of the 'exclusion of others', which is a pure non-entity? Because it is a non-entity, therefore it is 'unrelated'—not connected with anything,—'undifferentiated'—not distinguished from anything heterogeneous,—simply because it is a non-entity; for the same reason, it is also 'unspecified';—how can such a non-entity acquire diversity merely through diversity in its relatives?—
(930-931)

"Further, it may be granted that diversity is due to diversity in relatives; even so, as you do not admit of the 'Universal' as an entity, it is not possible for your Apoha to have the relative, in the shape of its substratum; the diversity of which could account for the diversity in the Apoha".—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (932).

"As a matter of fact, no one can conceive of the Cow and other things—any similarity of form among whom is not admitted,—to be the substratum of Apoha."—(932)

COMMENTARY.

If a real similarity among Cows were admitted, then they could be accepted as the substratum of the Apoha, of Horse and other things, on the basis of that common similarity;—not otherwise; hence one who desires
to have these Cows as the substratum of *Apoха*, must admit of the similarity; and in that case, that similarity as the 'Universal' would form the Import of the Word, and there would be no use for the assuming of *Apoха*.

The term 'Viṣaya' in this Text, stands for *substratum or receptacle*; just as in such expressions as 'Jalaviṣayā matsyāḥ'.—(932)

For those people also who assume the diversity of *Apoха* to be based upon *what is excluded* (by it),—even that diversity is not possible without an entity in the shape of the 'Universal'.—This is shown in the following—

**TEXT** (933).

"In the absence of a common property, it is not possible to determine the things excluded (by *Apoха*). For this reason also there can be no *Apoха*."—[Ibid. 72]—(933)

**COMMENTARY.**

If there were some property common to the Horse and all other non-Cows, then they could all be 'excluded' by the word 'Cow'; not otherwise; as no other ground for distinction is perceptible. If such a common property is admitted, then the postulating of the *Apoха* becomes useless. Thus, for this reason, there can be no *Apoха*.—(933)

"Further, it is held by you that the *Apoха* is indicated by the Word and by the Inferential Indicative; now both these, Word and Indicative, cannot be operative in the absence of a positive 'Universal'; hence (for you) how is the *Apoха* indicated ?"

This argument is set forth in the following—

**TEXT** (934).

"Of the Word and the Indicative, no operation is possible without concomitance;—and without these (Word and the Indicative), there can be no *Apoха*;—and there can be no concomitance for what is 'uncommon' (unique, specific)."—[Ibid. 73]—(934)

**COMMENTARY.**

'A ṇavayavinirmukta'—i.e. without co-ordination.

'These'—i.e. the Word and the Indicative.—Without these, the *Apoха* 'cannot be apprehended',—this has to be taken as understood.

It might be said that—"the Word and the Indicative may operate on the basis of concomitance with the Specific Individuality".

The answer to this is that 'there can be, etc. etc.'. That is, the Specific Individuality is something uncommon, not partaking of anything else; how
can there be any concomitance with it?—Thus Word and Indicative can have no bearing on the assumption of 'Apooha'.—(934)

"Even if there be operation of Word and Indicative,—the authority or validity attached to these (by the Apohist) becomes shaken."

This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (935).

"While the Apoha itself has not become accomplished,—where could the concomitance be asserted (which is necessary for the proper functioning of all Indicatives)? And if the concomitance is not perceived,—there would be no validity in these (Word and Indicative)."—[Ibid. 74]—(935)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Word and Indicative can be valid only when there is no absence of concomitance of what is to be affirmed;—in the case in question, Apoha is what is meant to be affirmed;—now, as it is of the form of mere Negation, and hence devoid of any (positive) character, it cannot be an accomplished entity; under the circumstances, wherein could the 'concomitance', or 'absence of non-concomitance' of the Word and Indicative be asserted?

What would be the use of asserting the concomitance?

Answer:—If the concomitance is not perceived, etc. etc.

'In these'—in Word and Indicative. Because validity consists in absence of non-concomitance.—(935)

It might be argued that—even without their concomitance being apprehended, the Word and the Indicative would indicate their object merely through the 'non-perception of the heterogeneous'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (936).

"They could not signify anything by mere non-perception; because non-perception being common in all cases, there could be no distinction.—[Ibid. 75]—(936)

COMMENTARY.

'Mere' ;—this serves to exclude the perception of concomitance.

Question :—Why could not they signify it?

Answer :—'Because non-perception, etc. etc.'—'In all cases'—i.e. in regard to heterogeneous things, to homogeneous things, and also to the particular thing concerned.—Hence there could be no such distinctive cogni-
tions as—'this is the thing itself', and 'that is something else'; in fact, the word could not indicate its own objective; as the concomitance would be not-apprehended there also, just as in any other thing.

In some places the reading is 'pratyāyyo' (in place of 'pratyayo'); in which case the meaning is that there could be no distinction in the thing indicated; —i.e. it could not differ.

In this way, there being a possibility of the loss of validity of the operation of Words and Indicatives, it cannot be right to regard the Apoha as the Import of Words.—(936)

It has been argued (under 932, above) that—"no one can conceive of any similarity of Cow, etc. etc.".—The following Text anticipates the Buddhist's answer to that argument:

TEXT (937).

"It might be argued that—even in the absence of similarity of form, there could be assumption of Apoha;—then why is the Apoha of the 'non-cow' not assumed in the case of the Cow and the Horse?"—[Ibid. 76]—(937)

COMMENTARY.

If, even in the absence of similarity, the apoha of the non-Cow be assumed in the case of the Variegated and other Cows,—then why can it not be assumed in the case of the Cow and the Horse also? The absence of similarity would be common to both cases.

The Author has used the form 'gavāśwayoh', evidently forgetting the rule embodied in the Sūtra 'Gavāśwaprabṛttīnī cha sanjñāyām'.—(937)

The said presence of common conditions in the two cases is further explained:

TEXT (938).

"Difference from the Spotted Cow is the same in the Black Cow and in the Horse. So that if no other 'commonality' is admitted, whereto would the Apoha of the non-Cow apply?"—[Ibid. 77]—(938)

COMMENTARY.

'Whereto, etc. etc.'—Just as the 'Apoha of the non-Cow' is not applied to the Horse, on the basis of its difference from the Spotted Cow,—so, inasmuch as the Black Cow also is different from the Spotted Cow, the said 'Apoha of the non-Cow' should not apply to the Black Cow also. So also to the spotted and other Cows; 'difference' being equally present in all cases. [And the Buddhist does not accept any such commonality as that subsisting among all Cows, but not in any other animal.]—(938)
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

"Further, just as it is not right to regard the Specific Individuality and other things as denoted by words,—on the ground of the absence of Convention,—so also it cannot be right in the case of Apoha also".—This is shown in the following—

TEXT (939).

"As a matter of fact, the Apoha of the non-Cow has never been previously perceived by the Sense-organs;—and the operation of words does not lie anywhere else.
On the perception of what then would the Word be used?"—[Ibid. 78]—(939)

COMMENTARY.

The Convention-maker sets up the Convention on the basis of his firm conviction regarding the denotation of the word;—the Apoha however is never perceived by the Sense-organs;—'previously'—i.e. prior to the using of the word, at the time of fixing up the relation between the name and the named.—It cannot be perceived, because it is a non-entity, and Sense-organs operate only upon entities.

It might be argued that the Word could be used on the apprehension of the Specific Individuality as differentiated from other things.

The answer to that is that 'the operation of words, etc. etc.';—'anywhere else',—i.e. in anything other than 'the Apoha of others',—in the shape of the Specific Individuality.—(939)

It might be argued that—"the Apoha may not be apprehended by the Sense-organs; it could be apprehended by means of Inference".—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (940).

"By what has gone before, there can be no inference either, in this case; and for the same reason there can be no conception of any connection of this."—[Ibid. 79]—(940)

COMMENTARY.

'What has gone before',—under Text 934, above.
'There can be no, etc. etc.';—'connection of this'—i.e. with the Word.
The particle 'api' is meant to imply that the said absence of diversity is not the only reason.
'Tēna'—for the same reason.

Thus it has been shown that the Reason adduced by the Bauddha (against the denotation of Words)—'because no Convention can be made'—is 'incon-
clusive'; inasmuch as the application of words to the *Apoha* is admitted, even though no Convention can be made in regard to it.—(940)

The following text again proceeds to show that there can be no Convention in regard to the *Apoha*:

**TEXT (941).**

"How could one apprehend the fact of something not being denoted by the word 'Cow'?—'It could be learnt from the fact that the word *Cow* was not found to be applied to it at the moment of the apprehension of the connection of that word'. [This is what the Baudhāya may say.]"—[Ibid. 81]—(941)

**COMMENTARY.**

It behoves you to explain this:—How do you know that the *Horse and other non-Cows* are denoted by the word 'non-Cow'—i.e. they are not denoted by the word 'Cow'? The Baudhāya answers—'It could be learnt, etc. etc.'—'at the moment, etc. etc.'—i.e. at the time of the comprehension of the Convention.—(941)

The Opponent (*Kumārila*) rejects this explanation (provided by the Baudhāya):—

**TEXT (942).**

"In that case, all things, with the sole exception of the single individual *cow*, would become excluded by the *Apoha*; and in that case it would not be proved that any *commonality* constitutes the import of Words."—[Ibid. 82]—(942)

**COMMENTARY.**

If it is your opinion that the word 'Cow' cannot apply to anything except the one that was perceived at the time of the apprehension of the *Convention*,—then, with the exception of the one *Spotted Cow* which has been the object of the Convention, every thing else,—even the *Black* and other Cows,—would have to be excluded by the word 'Cow'; and in that case, it could not be established that any *Commonality* is denoted by the Word.—(942)

The following text shows that no Convention could be made regarding the *Apoha*, as it would involve mutual interdependence:—
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

TEXTS (943-944).

"It is only a well-established entity in the shape of the non-Cow that could be excluded by the Apoha (denoted by the word 'Cow');—and the non-Cow is of the nature of the negation of the Cow;—hence it has to be explained what this Cow is which is negatived (in the non-Cow).—If this Cow is of the nature of the negation of the non-Cow, then there is mutual interdependence.—If the Cow is admitted as an entity for the sake of the Apoha, then the postulating of the Apoha becomes futile."—[Ibid. 83-84]—(943-944)

COMMENTARY.

The Cow is apprehended through the 'exclusion of the non-Cow';—the 'non-Cow' is of the nature of the negation of the Cow;—hence the second term in the word 'non-Cow' has got to be explained, which is negatived by the negative particle in the word 'non-Cow'; there can be no negation of anything, the exact nature of which is not known.

It might be argued that—'what is it that has to be explained? It is already known that the Cow is of the nature of the negation of the non-Cow.'

The answer to that is—'If this Cow, etc. etc.';—'this' stands for the Cow. Thus then, the Cow being of the nature of the negation of the non-Cow, it could be apprehended only through the apprehension of the non-Cow;—and the non-Cow being of the nature of the negation of the Cow, it could be apprehended only through the apprehension of the Cow;—thus this would be a clear case of mutual interdependence.

It might be argued that—'The Cow that is negatived by the word non-cow is a well-established positive entity, for the sake of Apoha,—i.e. for the fulfilment of the Apoha in the shape of the exclusion of the non-cow,—so that there would be no interdependence.'

The answer to this is—'If the cow is an established entity, etc. etc.';—That is, if that be so, then it is useless to assume that Apoha forms the denotation of all words; inasmuch as you admit the Import of words to consist of a positive entity. Consequently (to be consistent) you should not admit of any positive entity to be denoted by a word; and if you do not admit it, then the objectionable 'interdependence' becomes inevitable.—(943-944)

The following Text sums up the same mutual Interdependence:
TEXT (945).

"Unless the Cow is established, there can be no non-Cow; and if there is no non-Cow, how can the Cow be there? Between two negations, there can be no such relation as that of the Container and the Contained and the like."—[Ibid. Apoha 85]—(945)

COMMENTARY.

For the purpose of proving the relation of qualification and qualified (between the two), the Teacher Dhinnāga has declared as follows:—'Such terms as Blue Lotus and the like signify things qualified by the negation of other things'.

The Opponent shows the impropriety of this view, in the words—'Between two negations, etc. etc.'—When between two things, a real relationship is known to exist, then it may be correct to say that one is qualified by the other; in the case of the Blue-Lotus however, inasmuch as the two are of the nature of the negation of Blue and negation of Lotus, which are mere negations, and hence devoid of any form,—there cannot be any such relation between them as that of Container and Contained and the like.

The term 'and the rest', includes such relations as those of Conjunction, Inference, Inference in a common substratum and so forth.

In the absence of any real relation, it is not right that there should be a notion of one being qualified by the other. If it were so, then there would be an incongruity.—(945)

The following might be urged (by the Baudhā):—'It is not meant by us that in the case of the expression Blue Lotus, the negation of the non-lotus is qualified by the negation of the non-blue; hence the said objection cannot apply to us. What we mean is that there is an entity which is excluded from the non-blue and the non-lotus; and what is denoted by the word is that entity as qualified by the exclusion of other things.'

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (946).

"As a matter of fact, any thing uncommon (unique, specific) is never cognised as qualified by the Apoha. How too could any relationship be assumed between an entity and a non-entity?"—[Ibid. Apoha 86]—(946)

COMMENTARY.

That is, because the Specific Individuality cannot be expressed by words, and also because all the objections urged against that view are applicable in the present case also.
Even if the uncommon entity be apprehended—even so, it cannot be qualified by the exclusion of other things; this is what is shown by the words—'How too, etc. etc.';—the 'non-entity' is the Apoha, the 'Entity' is the uncommon thing; and there can be no connection between the entity and the non-entity; because connection always rests upon two entities.—(946)

"Further, the connection may be there; even so, the Apoha cannot be regarded as the qualifying factor";—this is shown in the following—

TEXT (947).

"IN FACT, NOTHING CAN SERVE AS A qualification, BY ITS MERE EXISTENCE; IT IS ONLY WHEN IT COLOURS THE qualified WITH ITS OWN COGNITION THAT IT BECOMES ITS qualification."—[Ibid. Apoha 87]—(947).

COMMENTARY.

The Blue does not become a qualification of the Lotus by its mere existence;—what then?—When one thing, on being cognised, colours the qualified thing with the cognition tinged with its own form, then alone it is said to be the qualification of that thing.—(947)

This process of qualification is not possible in the case of Apoha; this is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (948).

"THE TERMS 'Horse' AND THE REST DO NOT BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE Apoha; AND THE IDEA OF THE qualified THAT IS HELD IN THIS CONNECTION CANNOT BE ONE IN WHICH THE qualification IS NOT COGNISED."—[Ibid. Apoha 88]—(948)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the cognition of the Horse and other non-cows does not apprehend the Apoha; it apprehends a positive entity; and thus there being no possibility of the Apoha being cognised, it cannot colour the Horse, etc. with its own cognition.

It might be urged that—"Even without being itself cognised, the Apoha could be the qualification".

The answer to this is that 'the Idea of the qualified, etc. etc.';—there can never be a cognition of the qualified thing of which the qualification is not apprehended.—(948)
"Granting that there is cognition of the Apoha,—even so, inasmuch as there can be no cognition of that form in regard to any thing, it could not rightly serve as its qualification".—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (949).

"The qualification cannot bring about a cognition which is like something totally different; for how can that be said to be the qualification in a cognition which is like something different?"—[Ibid. Apoha 89]—(949)

COMMENTARY.

Every qualification is found to bring about in regard to the qualified thing a cognition in keeping with its own form; and one kind of qualification does not bring about a cognition like something else; e.g. the Blue does not produce in regard to the Lotus the cognition of Red; nor does the stick bring about in regard to the Stick-holder, the idea of his wearing ear-rings.—In the case in question also, the verbal cognition that appears in connection with the Horse, etc. is not coloured by negative character; on the other hand, it partakes of the positive character.

It might be argued that—"Even when bringing about a cognition unlike itself, a qualification can be so called."

The answer to that is—'How can, etc. etc.'—'Like something different', i.e. unlike the qualification itself.—(948)

Question:—"What would be the harm if it did?"
Answer:—

TEXT (950).

"If a qualification be regarded as such even in regard to the qualified thing which is totally different, then, everything can serve as the qualification (of everything)."—[Ibid. Apoha 90]—(950)

COMMENTARY.

If, for you, there were an assumption of something being a qualification, even in regard to a Qualified thing, which is unlike, and not like,—in accordance with the form of,—that Qualification,—then everything,—Blue and the rest,—could be the Qualification of everything; and there would be no restriction at all.—(950)

It might be argued that—'the Apoha does colour the Qualified Entity with its own Cognition (Idea)'.

The answer to that is as follows:
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

TEXT (951).

"If the Qualified thing is cognisable in the form of negation, then it cannot be an Entity; consequently for you, there can be no Entity that could be denoted by words as qualified by Apoha."—[Ibid. Apoha 91]—(951)

COMMENTARY.

'Negation'—i.e. the Apoha;—'cognisable in the form'—i.e. cognised as being of the same form as;—if the Qualified thing has its character such that it is cognisable in the form of negation;—i.e. if the thing is cognised in the form of Negation,—then it ceases to be a positive Entity; as the 'negative' and 'positive' are contradictory terms.

The argument is summed up in the words—'Consequently, for you, etc. etc.'—(951)

The following might be urged—'As a matter of fact, Words and Inferential Indicatives are found to operate only in regard to things as excluded from others, and not as devoid of such exclusion (Apoha); and it is on that ground that it is asserted that the Apoha is established by Words and Indications; and it is not on the basis of the pointing out of what is excluded; so that all that has been urged regarding the theory being contrary to experience is not relevant at all'.

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (952).

"Even though the Word and the Indicative may not operate upon anything devoid of Apoha,—yet the Cognition rests upon the Entity which is what it apprehends."—[Ibid. Apoha 92]—(952)

COMMENTARY.

Even though the thing may be 'excluded from others',—yet when Cognition arises in regard to it, through Words and Indicatives, it does not rest upon that 'Exclusion of others' which may be there, but upon the element of 'Entity'; as it is to this latter that it is attached. That factor of the thing which is apprehended by the Verbal or Inferential Cognition is really the object of that Cognition, and not anything else which, even though present, is not apprehended. For instance, even though the smell and other properties of the flower are there, yet these are not held to be denoted by the word 'Mālatī'.—(952)
Nor is it right to assert that—‘the Word and the Indicative operate upon the thing as ‘excluded from others’.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (953).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE Uncommon Thing NEVER FIGURES IN THE COGNITION; NOR AGAIN CAN IT BE RIGHrTy REGARDED AS Cognisable, BECAUSE IT IS ‘INDETERMINATE’."

[Ibid. Apoha 93]—(953)

COMMENTARY.

When a thing is ‘excluded from others’, it can, under your doctrine, be only the Uncommon Specific Individuality,—and yet it is your view that this latter does not figure in Cognition brought about by Words and Indicatives—on the ground that it is apprehensible only by ‘indeterminate, non-conceptual cognition’, while Cognition born of Words and Indicatives appertains to commonality.

If it be held that this latter Cognition does apprehend the Specific Individuality,—then this cannot be in accordance with Reason; this is what is shown in the words—‘Nor again can it be rightly, etc. etc.’—that is to say, the Uncommon (Specific) Entity cannot be apprehended by Cognition born of Words and Indicatives; because all conceptual ideas are absent in that Entity; as Conceptual Thought operates only through the contact of the ‘Universal’ and such other qualifications and never through the pure Thing; in-itself.—(953)

It might be argued that—‘Even though the Uncommon Entity may not be apprehended by Words, it can be said to be qualified by Exclusion’.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (954).

"THE STATEMENT THAT ‘WHAT IS NOT APPREHENDED BY THE WORD IS YET QUALIFIED’ IS TOO BOLD. FOR ALL THESE REASONS THE Commonality SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE OBJECT OF Words AND Indicatives.’”—[Ibid. Apoha 94]—(954)

COMMENTARY.

The author proceeds to prove, in another way, the fact of Commonality (Universal) being a real entity:—
TEXT (955).

"When individualities could not be what is 'excluded by Apoha' because they are not denoted by words,—then the commonalty (universal) alone is what could be 'excluded'; and because of its 'exclusion', it must be an entity.'"—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 95]—(955)

COMMENTARY.

'Individualities'.—That is, the uncommon (specific) entities—cannot be expressed by words; hence they cannot be regarded as 'excluded'; because what is not spoken of cannot be denied (or excluded).

The commonalty alone is what could be excluded,—that is, because that alone is what is expressed by words.—(955)

It might be asked—'if the commonalty (or universal) were excluded,—even so, how could that establish it as an entity?'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (956).

"Mere negations cannot be objects of 'exclusion',—for, if they were, they would lose their negative character.

Consequently, it is clear that when there is an 'exclusion' (Apoha) of another 'exclusion' (Apoha), it can be only of a positive entity in the shape of the commonalty (or universal)."—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 96]—(956)

COMMENTARY.

'Negations'—i.e. Apohas, exclusions.

If there were exclusions of these exclusions, they would be positive entities.

The reason for this is set forth—'For if they were, etc. etc.'—That is, the negative character would be abandoned by those exclusions. What is meant is as follows:—If exclusions were excluded, then their negative character would be denied; and when there is this denial, the Negations would abandon their negative character; and thence the Negations in the shape of the exclusions having abandoned their negative character, they would become positive entities.—This is the explanation given by some people.

Others explain the words of the text 'abhāvabhāvavarjanāt' to mean 'because there can be no negation of negations'—i.e. it is not right that 'Exclusions' (Apohas) which are negative should be 'excluded'; because all 'exclusion' (denial) is of the positive entity.
From all this it is clear that when there is (exclusion) of one *Apoha*, the Cow, in another *Apoha*, the Horse,—it could be an exclusion of the 'Universal' only. It is established therefore that the Universal, being the object of 'Exclusion', must be a positive entity.—(956)

Then again, the *Apohas* could be either different or non-different among themselves. If they are held to be different, then there are objections to that view.—This is shown in the following—

**TEXT (957).**

"If the Negation of a Negation is different from it,—then it must be a Positive Entity. If not, then the Cow will be the same as the Non-Cow for you."—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 97]—(957)

**COMMENTARY.**

If, 'Of the negation'—i.e. of that negation which is denoted by the word 'non-cow',—'the negation'—i.e. that which is denoted by the word 'cow',—were different from the former Negation,—i.e. something other than it,—then it would be a Positive Entity; because the positive character consists only in the absence of negation.

If it is not different from it, then, for you, the Cow also should be Non-Cow; because what is not-different must be understood to be the same.—(957)

The following might be urged—'What are excluded by the words Cow and Horse are only the Specific Individualities as excluded from one another; and it is not Negations that are excluded; hence the contingency of their becoming positive entities cannot be unacceptable to us'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (958).**

"Though in the case of other words, a positive entity may be what is 'excluded',—yet in the case of the word 'sat' ('Being'), nothing apart from 'Negation' is regarded as 'excluded'.—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 98]—(958)

**COMMENTARY.**

In the case of words other than 'Being'—e.g. such words as 'Cow' and the rest,—it may be that what is excluded is an entity, in the form of the Hill and other things; but in the case of the word 'Being' itself, there is nothing that could be held to be excluded except that which is called 'Negation'; that is, Negation alone can be excluded; because the word
‘Being’ is used only in the sense of excluding what is non-being, (Non-existent).—(958)

Question:—‘What is the harm if that is so?’
Answer:—

TEXT (959).

"In that case, even the Non-existent (Non-being) would have a positive character; which would be a great calamity.—And when there is no Negation, there would be no Existence (Positive) at all; and (as a consequence) Non-existence also would be impossible."—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 99]—(959)

COMMENTARY.

As shown before (under 956, above) ‘Negations would abandon their negative character’;—hence if there were exclusion of the non-existent, it would be a positive entity; and as this would involve the idea of the non-existent also being a positive entity, which would be contrary to the Apohist’s doctrine,—this would be a great calamity for him.

It might be said—‘The Negation may be an entity, what then?’

The answer is—‘When there is no Negation, etc. etc.’—When there would be no Negation, there would be no ‘existence’ of anything at all; because, according to your view, existence is only the exclusion or negation of non-existence; so that, when Negation is ‘excluded’, it becomes an Entity, and loses its character; hence there can be no non-existence either; as that also is only the exclusion or negation of existence, and existence does not exist, as shown above.—(959)

It has been asserted before—(a) that ‘they would be differentiated by the excluded things’ (Text, 929), and (b) that ‘there can be no difference among Apohas because they are non-entities’ (Text, 926).—These arguments have been thus answered by certain Bauddhas:—‘The difference among Apohas is due, not to the difference of substrata, nor to the difference among the excluded things; what happens is that on diverse external objects there are superimposed Apohas which are themselves featureless, and consist only in the form of those objects, and hence appearing as diverse; they are so superimposed by cognitions, which, though rather objectless, rest upon diverse unreal objects, and are related to variegated conceptual Impressions extending over all time without beginning;—and being thus superimposed, these Apohas appear as diverse and as existing; so that the diversity and positive character of Apohas would be due to the diversity of the said Impressions’.

This is answered in the following—
"Either diversity or the positive character of Apohas cannot be assumed to be due to the diversity of Impressions; because impression cannot be held to exist when there is no entity."—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 100]—(960)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, no one holds the view that Impressions or Tendencies belong to the non-entity.—That there is no objectless Cognition has also been thoroughly discussed and proved in course of our examination of Idealism. Hence there can be no conceptions based upon unreal objects; how then can there be any Impression resting upon such conception?

'Avastunt',—i.e. when there is no Entity which could be its substratum; and when there can be no Cognition without objects,—as there could be no cognition that could produce the Impression—how could there be any Impression? And when there is no Impression, how could the diversity among Apohas or their positive character, be due to Impressions?—(960)

Having thus discarded 'Apoha' as the 'denoted', the Opponent of the Buddhist proceeds to discard it also as held to be the 'denotative':—

TEXTS (961–963).

"You cannot base the diversity among Words also upon the said conditions. There can be no 'uncommon' denotative Word, as no such could have been perceived before. Under the circumstances, if a 'commonality' were assumed in the shape of the 'Apoha (Exclusion) of other Words',—as it could only be a non-entity, as shown above, there could be no diversity among words.—Just as among denotative Words, so between the 'denoted' and 'denotative' also there could be no difference. That there can be no 'difference' based upon the difference in the 'excluded things' has already been explained."—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 102, 104, 105]—(961–963)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'Shaśabdabheda' stands for the mutual difference among words denotative of diverse Universals and those denotative of Particulars.

'Upon the said conditions',—i.e. based upon the diversity of Impressions or on the diversity of the 'Excluded Apohas'.

Objection:—'Among words, diversity is clearly perceived, as based upon their source and upon the imposition on them of mutually contradictory characters'.

Answer:—'There can be no uncommon word, etc. etc.'—What is said here is with reference to the denotative word; and what is meant is that
the uncommon word, which is apprehended in auditory Perception, as of the nature of a 'Specific Individuality', cannot be denotative.—Why?—Because no such could have been perceived before; that is, the Word that is there at the time of usage will not have been perceived before that usage,—i.e. at the time of the making of the Convention relating to it; and the word that was perceived at that time will have long ceased to exist, so that there could be no usage of that word; nor is it right that there should be any usage based upon the word that was not perceived at the time of the Convention; as that would lead to incongruities.—From all this it follows that the Specific Individuality cannot be denotative.

In fact, among you yourselves, there is a difference on this point; as it has been stated (by one of yourselves) that—'no particular thing can be denoted, and no particular word can be denotative, because it has not been perceived before; it is the Commonalty (Universal) that will be so, as is going to be explained.'—Hence no objection can be taken to what we have said regarding the denotative word.

Such being the case, if it be held that what is denotative is the 'Exclusion of other words,' in the form of the 'Word—Universal',—in the same way as the 'Exclusion of other things' is of the form of the 'Thing—Universal',—then, as shown above, under Text 926,—as there can be no diversity among the denoted Apohas, so there can be no diversity among the denotative Apohas also; because these latter are featureless.

And just as there can be no difference among the denotative Apohas, so also there can be no difference between the denotative and the denoted Apohas; because these also are featureless.

It might be argued that there may be difference among these, due to the differences among the Excluded things.—The answer to that is—'That there can be no difference, etc. etc.'—that is, how there can be no difference due to difference among the excluded things has been already explained above, under Text 928.—(961–963)

So far it has been shown that the Proposition (of the Bauddha) is contrary to experience and to his own doctrines. Kumārila now proceeds to prove that it is open to the charge of involving the incongruity of the relation of 'denoted and denotative' being impossible, and also to that of being contrary to the Opponent's own doctrines:—

TEXT (964).

"There could be no relation of denoted and denotative between the two Apohas, because they are non-entities, under your view; just as the 'Sky-flower' and the 'Hare's Horn' are, according to ordinary people."—

[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 108]—(964)

COMMENTARY.

The relation of denoted and denotative cannot lie between what are non-entities; e.g. there can be no such relation between the 'Sky-flower'
and the ‘Hare’s Horn’;—and the denoted and denotative *Apohas* are both non-entities;—hence there is perception of a character contrary to the character of wider extension.—(964)

*Objection* against the above:—‘There is cognition of the absence of Rain from the absence of clouds (where both are non-entities); hence the reason put forward is not conclusive’.

*Answer*:—

**TEXT (965).**

"If some one, perceiving the said relation between the non-existent Rain and the non-existent Cloud, were to urge ‘inconclusiveness’ against our reason,—then, according to our view, there is an entity in the case cited also; but how could it be under your view?"—[Shlo.-

Vā. *Apoha* 109]—(965)

**COMMENTARY.**

On seeing that between the Rain and the Cloud both of which are non-existent, i.e. mere negations—[‘*asat*’ in the compound standing for the abstract noun ‘*asattva*, non-existence’],—the relation of *denotative and denoted* (indicator and indicated) is present,—if the *Bauddha* were to argue that our reason,—‘because they are non-entities’—is ‘inconclusive’,—then that cannot be right; because according to our view, in this case of the Cloud and Rain also there is an entity present, in the shape of the clean sky; because according to us Negation is an entity. For you, *Baudda*, on the other hand, how could it be? That is, how could there be the relation of *Indicator and Indicated* in the case cited? It could not be possible at all.

The particle ‘*api*’, ‘also’, is misplaced; it should have come after ‘*adak*’; so that the meaning is as follows:—It is not only in the case of the two *Apohas* that it is not possible for you to have the relation of *Denoted and Denotative* (Indicator and Indicated), it is not possible also in the case of the Rain and the Cloud.—(965)

"Then again, you hold the opinion that the Word and the Inferential Indicative,—in both of which *affirmation* forms the subordinate, and *negation* the predominant factor,—are expressive of their objects; and you have also made the following statement—‘When the denotation of another word has not been perceived, the relationship of the Word is easily deduced from the perception of even a part of what is denoted by it; and there can be no fallibility in this’.—All this is not right, under the theory of *Apoha*. "—This is what is shown in the following—
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TEXT (966).

"When one does not admit the denotation of the word to be positive (affirmative) in character, there can be no negation also for him; as this is always preceded by that."—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 110]—(966)

COMMENTARY.

'Preceded by that',—i.e. preceded by affirmation; that is Negation is only the denial of what has been affirmed.

Further, under the Apoha-theory, there is no possibility of the relation of qualification and qualified between Blue and Lotus, and the co-ordination between them,—which is perceived in actual experience.—(966)

"With a view to explaining these,—the relation of qualification and qualified and the co-ordination,—the Bauddha has made the following statement:—'Words denote diverse things on account of the diversity of the things 'excluded'; they are ineffective in the matter of their own diversity. They become the qualification and the qualified when bringing about the same effect; and the difference being based upon that fact alone, it is not abandoned by their own Commonality; and yet the said difference has not been asserted, as there is doubt regarding it; and when the two are equal and similar, then they serve the same purpose'.

The following Text proceeds to show that all this cannot be right:—

TEXTS (967–969).

"It is held that what is denoted is Apoha only; under this theory, there can be no possibility of the relation of qualification and qualified or of co-ordination, in the case of such verbal expressions as 'Blue-lotus', which have a mixed connotation; because the 'exclusion of the non-blue' does not involve the 'exclusion of the non-lotus',—nor does the latter involve the former. Hence the relation of qualification and qualified is not possible (between the Blue colour and the Lotus).—Nor would the said relation be possible between the words apart from what they denote."—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 115–117]—(967–969)

COMMENTARY.

What was rejected before was the possibility of the relation of qualification and qualified between the things denoted; what is rejected now is the same relation between words; hence there is no repetition.

The relation of qualification and qualified consists in each of the two serving to differentiate the other; and this is held to be present only in
a number of words connected together,—such as 'Blue lotus'. It appears also in the case of expressions where the terms are not co-ordinated; e.g. in the expression 'King's officer'. It is said to be a case of 'co-ordination' when two words, having different connotations, are applied to the same object; such 'co-ordination' is held to be present only in compounds like 'Blue-lotus'.

Now in regard to such verbal expression as 'Blue-lotus,' and the like,—whose connotation is mixed,—there is 'co-ordination',—and this would not be possible under the Apoha-theory.

'Mixed connotation'—i.e. a connotation of mixed character. As declared in the statement—'The Blue-lotus is neither Blue only nor the Lotus only, because what is denoted is the combination of both'.

Question:—Why is this not possible under the Apoha-theory?

Answer:—'Because, etc. etc.' Because on the 'exclusion of the non-blue', there is no 'exclusion of the non-lotus'. Nor does the latter—i.e. 'Exclusion of the non-lotus'—involve the former—i.e. the 'exclusion of the non-blue'.—[In some texts, the reading is 'itarā' for 'itarah'; where the Feminine form may be taken as with reference to the term 'Chyuti'; 'itarā' thus standing for the 'Chyuti', exclusion, of the Non-Blue].—What is meant is that these two do not stand in the relation of container and contained, because both are featureless. And when there is no relation, there can be no relation of qualification and qualified; if there were, we would be landed in absurdities.

What is meant by this is that under your theory there can be no mixed connotation, as all words denote mere negation; and hence the relation of qualification and qualified is not possible.

It might be argued that,—'there may be no relation of qualification and qualified between what are denoted by the words,—why should it not subsist between the words themselves?'

The answer to this is—'Nor would, etc. etc.', that is, it is only through their denotations that the relation of qualification and qualified becomes attributed to the words; hence when the said relation is not possible between what are denoted, how can there be any attributing of it to the denotative words?—(967–969)

Kumārila now proceeds to deny 'co-ordination'—

TEXT (970).

"CO-ORDINATION IS NOT POSSIBLE, AS THE APOHAS ARE DIFFERENT.—
IF IT BE HELD TO SUBSIST ON THE BASIS OF WHAT IS DENOTED,
THEN WHAT SORT OF 'SUBSISTENCE' WOULD THERE
BE BETWEEN THE TWO?"—[Shlo.-Vā.
Apoha 118]—(970)

COMMENTARY.

It is only when two words are applied to the same object that there is 'co-ordination' between them; and (under the Apoha-theory) it is not possible
for the words 'blue' and 'lotus' to apply to the same object; because what are denoted by them are, respectively, 'the exclusion of the non-blue' and 'the exclusion of the non-lotus'; and these two are distinct. For instance, it has been asserted by yourself that 'words have diverse denotations because the things excluded by them are diverse'. The argument may be formulated as follows:—Words like 'Blue Lotus' cannot form the object of co-ordination, because they pertain to different things, like the words 'jar', 'cloth' and so forth.

It might be argued that 'the exclusion of non-blue also stands where there is exclusion of non-lotus'; and thus the Apohas denoted by the two words may be applied to the same thing; and hence, through these denotations, co-ordination may be said to lie between the words also. 'Tat' stands for co-ordination.

The answer to this is—'What sort of subsistence, etc. etc.'—'Tayoḥ'—'between the two',—i.e. between the 'Exclusion of the non-blue' and the 'Exclusion of the non-lotus'. That is to say, there can be no real subsistence in these; as what is formless cannot subsist anywhere, like the 'son of the Barren Woman'.—(970)

Then again, there may be some sort of subsistence in the case of things like the Blue and the Lotus; but even though present, it could not be expressed by words.—This is shown in the following—

**TEXT (971).**

"As a matter of fact, nothing 'uncommon' is ever apprehended; and anything else does not exist for you. Where then would be the use of the co-ordination of words, which is not apprehended at all?"—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 119]—(971)

**COMMENTARY.**

No 'uncommon' thing in the shape of the Blue Lotus and the like is ever apprehended through words, because all conceptions are absent therein,—as has been declared (by the Apohist).—Under the circumstances when the thing which is the substratum is not known, how can the subsistence of the Apohas subsisting therein be cognised? That is, the cognition of the property is concomitant with that wherein the property subsists.

It might be argued that—'as there is a substratum of these Apohas which is entirely different from the Uncommon Entity, the said objection is not relevant'.

The answer to this is—' Anything else does not exist—for you'.

It might be urged that—'even if the co-ordination is not actually cognised, yet it is there all the same, in the actual state of things'.

The answer to this is—'Where would be, etc. etc.'—'Aikārthyaṃ' is co-ordination.
'Where would be the use'—i.e. nowhere at all.—Because even if a thing exists, if it is not cognised (known), it cannot form part of the usage of people.—(971)

The following might be urged:—'If it were mere exclusion that is denoted by the word, then there would be room for the said objection; as a matter of fact, however, what is denoted is the entity along with the exclusion; consequently the two words having the two exclusions as their adjuncts could very well apply to a single entity alone with the Apoha; so that the co-ordination would be there all right'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (972).

'If it be said that what is denoted is the Entity along with the Apoha,—there also, concomitance with the word would be unattainable, as it would be dependent upon something else.'—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 120]—(972)

COMMENTARY.

'There also',—i.e. in the Entity along with the Apoha being regarded as denoted by the word,—the 'concomitance'—i.e. indication—of the various variations of the non-blue Lotus with the word 'Blue'—would be unattainable;—why?—because the word—'Blue'—would be dependent upon something else; inasmuch as it denotes the object only as subordinate to the Exclusion,—and not directly; and as there is no direct denotation, there could be no indication of its variations; just as the word 'sweet' does not indicate the white colour; though as things stand, the white colour is a variety of the non-sweet, yet, the potency of the word lies in the indication of the varieties of only that which it denotes directly, and not in that of the variety of what is denoted through the intervention of something else. Consequently, as there would be no indication, by the word 'blue', of the varieties of the Lotus, this latter could not be its variety; and when it could not be its variety, no co-ordination would be possible.

Thus, then, the objection that you have yourself urged against the denotation of the Individual as endowed with the Universal,—by the statement that 'the word cannot denote that which possesses the Universal, because it is not independent',—is applicable also to the view that what is denoted is the entity along with the exclusion. This is what has been made clear by the Text. That is to say, if the denotation of the word consisted of the Entity along with the 'Universal', then the word 'Sat', 'Being', 'Existence', would express the substance with the form of the 'Universal' as its subordinate factor, and not directly; because it does not indicate the varieties in the shape of the Jar and other things; and in the event of the varieties not being indicated, there can be no co-ordination, as already pointed out. This same incongruity is equally applicable to the view that what is denoted is the entity along with the Exclusion; as in this case also the word 'sat' would
express the substance with the Exclusion as its subordinate factor, and not
directly; and the non-indication of varieties would be present here also. What
then would be the difference between the 'Universal' and the 'Exclusion'—
or between 'that having the Universal' and 'that having the Exclusion'?—(972)

The following Text points out another objection:—

TEXT (973).

"There can be no connection between the Apoha and Gender,
Number, etc. As the Individual is inexpressible,
there can be no connection through that
either."—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 135]—(973)

COMMENTARY.

'Gender'—Masculine, Feminine and Neuter.
'Number'—Singular, Dual, Plural.
'Etcetera'—Stands for the connection of Action (Verb), Time (Tense)
and so forth.

There can be no connection between those and Apoha, as this latter is a
non-entity; while the factors mentioned are all properties of Entities. Nor
can the word ever denote anything devoid of the said Gender, etc. What is
meant is that in this way the Proposition (of the Apohist) is contrary to
experience.

It might be argued that—'The Particular (Individual) which forms the
substratum of Exclusion is an entity, and it can therefore have the necessary
connection with Gender, etc. and through that, these can be attributed to the
Apoha also'.

The answer to this is—'As the Individual, etc. etc.';—that is to say,
said Individual, being 'indeterminate' (hence inexpressible), cannot be
spoken of as connected with Gender, Number, etc.; how then could these be
attributed to the Apoha, through the Individual?—(973)

The following Text proceeds to show that what has been held regarding
Apoha being the denoted and denotative is not all-embracing (not applicable to
all words).

TEXT (974).

"In the case of Verbs, the 'exclusion of others' is never
cognised; because in their case there is nothing to be
denied which could form the object of ex-
clusion.'—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 139]—(974)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of Verbs—words with conjugational endings, like 'pachati'
('cooks'), 'gachchhati' ('goes') and the like, wherein action forms the
predominant factor, no ‘exclusion of others’ is apprehended;—why?—
because ‘in their case, etc. etc.’; in the case of nouns—terms like ‘ghāta’
(Jar), etc.—with declensional endings—there are certain well-established
entities in the shape of the non-jar, etc. which are negatived and can figure
in the ‘exclusion’ (expressed by the word ‘Jar’); not so in the case of
verbs, like ‘pachati’, etc. where no well-established counter-entities are ever
apprehended.—(974)

The following might be urged—‘There may be nothing to be negatived
actually figuring in the exclusion, even so, there may be a probable counter-
entity (na-pachati) of which there could be negation in the form na-na-pachati.’
[So that the denotation of the verb pachati would be na-na-pachati]:

This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (975-976).

“Even when na-na would be uttered, there would be negation
of negation only; so that the pachati (action of cooking)
would remain there in its own (positive) form.—
Similarly in the case of verbs there is the idea
of being in course of accomplishment, as also that
of the past, etc.; and as Apoha is something
well-established, these ideas would
be baseless (if Apoha were all
that is denoted by words).”—
[Shlo.-Va. Apoha 140-141]—
(975-976)

COMMENTARY.

Even when the expression ‘na-na-pachati’ is uttered, what is expressed
is only the negation of a probable negation.
‘What is the harm in that?’

Answer:—So that the ‘pachati’, etc. etc.; that is to say, two negatives
always denote an affirmation; so that on the use of the said expression, the
action of ‘pachati’ remains there in its positive form; hence the denotation
of the word would be positive (not negative, in the shape of Apoha).

Then again, the verb ‘pachati’ signifies an act in the course of being
accomplished; and that action is regarded as in the course of being accomplished
of which some portions have been accomplished while some are still unaccom-
plished, and of which therefore the portions happen to be in a certain order of
sequence.—Similarly in the case of such verbs as ‘abhūt’ (Past Tense) and
‘bhavisyati’ (Future Tense), there are ideas of past and future points of time.
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

In regard to the *Apoха* however, no such ideas of *being in course of accomplishment*, etc. is possible; because it is a fully accomplished thing consisting entirely of Negation. Consequently, under the view that *Apoха* is denoted by words, the idea of *being in course of accomplishment* and also the idea of 'past', 'future' and the like can have no basis at all; hence it is contrary to experience.

'Bhūtādirūpaṇam',—the conception, idea, of the Past, etc.—(975-976)

The following *texts* proceed to show that the theory cannot cover all cases and as such it is contrary to experience:

TEXTS (977-979).

"In the case of the whole mass of denotations like *Injunction* and the like,—there is no idea of the 'Exclusion of others'. How could there be any *Apoха* even when the negative is coupled with Negation?—Particles like 'Cha' and the rest can have no connection with the negative; hence here also no *Apoха* is possible.—In the case of what is expressed by a sentence, the 'Exclusion of others' cannot even be indicated.—In the case of such expressions as 'ananyāpoха' ('Non-exclusion of others'), no denotation is apprehended at all (apart from the Positive).—Wherefore too could there be anything 'excluded' in the case of such words as 'Praṃēya' and 'Jnēya' (which embrace all conceivable things)?"—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoха* 142-144]—(977-979)

COMMENTARY.

'And the like'—is meant to include *Invitation*, *Addressing* and the like. There is 'no idea'—apprehension—of the 'exclusion'—denial—of other things; and the reason for this lies in the fact that 'there is nothing to be denied that could figure in the denial', as pointed out above (under Text 974).

In such expressions as 'na na-pachati devadattaḥ' ('Devadatta is not non-cooking'), where one negative is coupled with another negative,—what sort of *Apoха* could be possible? None at all; since two negatives always imply the *affirmative*.

Further, in the case of particles like 'cha',—i.e. of all *nipāta* adverbs, prefixes, prepositions, and so forth,—all which have been regarded as *words* ;
and yet these can have no connection with the negative, as such a combination would not be expressive of anything at all. That is to say, in the case of the word 'Jar', when it is connected with the negative in the expression 'non-jar', one has the notion of something else, in the shape of the Cloth; and hence the denotation of the word 'Jar' without the negative is held to consist in the 'negation (exclusion) of that other thing (Cloth)'; in the case of the particles 'cha' and the like, there is no connection with the negative, in such expressions as 'na cha'; and what is not connected with the negative cannot be negated (or excluded). Hence in this case no Apoha is possible; i.e. there must be absence of Apoha.

Further, in the case of sentences, what is expressed by them is held to be of one mixed form, like the variegated colour; consequently the 'exclusion of others' cannot be indicated in their case; because there is no counter-entity known to exist in any accomplished form. It has been asserted that 'in the case of such sentences as Chaïtra, bring the cow, the 'exclusion of others' is assumed to be in parts—such as that of 'non-chaitra' and the rest. But this would be a case of denotation of words, not of the Sentence. As it is one impartite whole, and does not admit of such dissection. Thus then your theory of the denotation of words does not cover all cases.

Then again, in the case of such expressions as 'Na anyâpohaḥ Ananyāpohaḥ', there is nothing apprehended as denoted, except something positive,—Because what is understood to be denoted is not merely the form of the Apoha; as the double negative always expresses the positive.

The particle 'ādi' (in the compound 'ananyāpohasabaddādu') stands for such synonyms as 'ananyavyāvṛtti', 'ananyavyavachchhēda' and so forth.

Objection:—'What is said here has already been said (under 977) in the words 'Nañashchāpi nañḥ, etc.; so that there is needless repetition'.

True. But the reiteration is made with a view to showing that the words of the Apohist himself—that the denotation of words consists in the Exclusion of Others—show that he regards the denotation to be positive. Because what the term 'anyāpoha', 'Exclusion of Others', excludes (or denies) is what is denoted by the term 'ananyāpoha', 'Non-exclusion of Others'; and this latter is clearly understood to be positive.

Then there are such words as 'cognisable', 'knowable', 'predicable', and so forth; and there is nothing that is excluded by these; as all things are 'cognisable', etc. by their very nature. If anything were assumed to be excluded by these words, it would be entirely cognised in the form of 'exclusion'; and as such would remain 'cognisable'; because what is not cognised cannot be excluded. Then, as there is nothing that could be excluded in this case, the theory of the Apohist cannot be universally true.—(977–979)

Objection:—'In the Hitumukha (a work of that name) it has been declared that there is Inference of the Cognisable as consisting of the Exclusion of the Non-cognisable which is assumed for the purpose. So that how can our Apoha-theory fail to apply to the case of these words?'

Answer:—
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

TEXTS (980-981).

"RATHER THAN ASSUME THE THING TO BE EXCLUDED, IT IS FAR BETTER TO ASSUME THE ENTITY ITSELF.—AS THE IDEA OF THINGS BEING OF THE FORM OF COGNITIONS HAS BEEN REJECTED, WHAT IS DENOTED CANNOT BE ANYTHING INTERNAL (SUBJECTIVE); NOR IS IT POSSIBLE FOR ANY SUBJECTIVE THING TO BE 'EXCLUDED'. THUS THERE CAN BE NO APoha IN THE CASE OF THE WORDS IN QUESTION.—LASTLY, IN THE CASE OF SUCH WORDS AS 'ēva', NOTHING IS FOUND TO BE 'EXCLUDED'.—

[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 145-146]

—(980-981)

COMMENTARY.

If all that is cognisable is assumed to be excluded as 'cognisable',—then it is far better to admit the positive entity itself to be denoted by the word; which is what is accepted by all men. That is to say, in so doing there would be no assumption of the Unseen, nor the denial of the Seen. That is why it is spoken of as 'far better'.

Some (Buddhists) have held the view that—'what is denoted by all words is only the reflection of conceptual thought, and it is this that is excluded, differentiated and expressed'.

The answer to this is—As the idea of things, etc. etc. That is, we have already rejected the idea that things are of the nature of cognitions; and we have done so on the ground that Cognition is formless, while the thing has a form and is clearly perceived as existing in the external world; consequently there being no internal (subjective) form resting in Cognition, it cannot be right to regard any such thing as denoted by words.

Nor is it possible for any such subjective thing to be rejected,—for the same reason that no such thing exists.

In the case of the words in question—i.e. words like 'Cognisable'. Then again, there are such words as 'ēvam' ('thus'), 'ītham' ('in this way') and so forth; in the case of these, nothing is found that can be 'excluded'; as there is no counter-entity in this case, in the form of what could be excluded.

It might be argued that—'in such expressions as 'na ēvam' ('not thus') there is something probable that could be regarded as 'excluded'.

This also is not possible in this case, as already pointed out. Because here also, in the expression 'na nāivam', there is negation of negation; and the 'ēvam' remains in its own unnegated—positive—form. So the same reason that we had urged before becomes applicable here also.—(980-981)

All the above has been set forth as put forward by Kumārila. With the following Texts, the Author proceeds to set forth objections put forward by Uddyotakara against Apoha [In Nyāyavārttika on 2. 2. 63, pp. 332-333]:—
"In the case of the word 'all' ('sarva') what is it that is assumed to be the 'excluded'? There is no such thing as the non-all, which could be excluded.—If it be urged that 'one and the rest' are the non-all, then it comes to be the exclusion of the denotation itself; as the parts would be excluded, and no whole is admitted.—Similarly, in regard to the denotation of the word 'group' ('Samūha'), the constituents would be excluded; and nothing apart from this is admitted; hence all such words become deprived of their meaning.—As regards the words 'two' and the rest, which also are applied to groups, as the 'one' and other constituents would be excluded, they could no longer be so applicable.—Then again, the denotation of the word 'Cow' is said to be the 'Non-non-cow';—now is this positive or negative? If it is positive, is it the Cow or the Non-cow?—If it is the Cow, then there is no dispute; as the denotation turns out to be of the positive character. On the other hand, if it is the non-Cow that is denoted by the word 'Cow',—that would exhibit a wonderful insight into the meanings of words indeed!—Nor can it be negative; as, in that case injunction and the rest would not be possible.—Nor does any one ever comprehend a negation from the word 'Cow'."—(982–988)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows:—"It cannot be right to say that words denote the Apoha of other things; because this explanation cannot apply to all words; that is to say, in the case of words where there are two mutually exclusive contradictions, it may be that when one is affirmed the other is denied; as for instance, it may be true that when the word 'Cow' is heard, the Cow is affirmed and the non-Cow is denied. But this is not possible in the case of the word 'Sarva' ('all'), as there is no such thing as non-all, which could be denied by the word 'all'.—But in this case also, there is denial or preclusion of one and the rest; so that our explanation takes in this case also'.—You mean that one and the rest are the contradictories of all, the non-all which are excluded by the word 'all'.—But this is not right; as it involves the incongruity of words abandoning their own meaning. If the word 'all' excludes one and the rest,—inasmuch as these latter are what go to make up the All, and (for the Buddhist) the whole has no existence apart from its constituents, the exclusion of one and the rest would mean the exclusion of everything that goes to make up the All, and there would be
nothing left for the word ‘all’ to denote: and this word would thus become meaningless.—[The word ‘anga’ stands for part].—Similarly all collective words, like ‘group’ and the rest, would become meaningless, if they were used for the exclusion of their own constituents; as it is held that the group has no existence apart from the members that make up that group. —As for the words ‘two’ and the rest, they also pertain to groups (of Two, Three, etc.); so that, if they denoted the exclusion of one and the rest,—as these, being precluded, would not be there to make up the said groups, the words would become meaningless.”

This is the argument that is indicated by the words—‘They would not be so applicable’ (Text 985). What is meant is that the words in question are accepted as applicable to groups; but they would cease to be so applicable.

“Further, when it is asserted that what the word ‘Cow’ denotes is the ‘Apoha of other things’,—i.e. something that is ‘not non-Cow’,—is this something (A) Positive or (B) Negative?—(A) If it is Positive, is it the Cow or the non-Cow?—If it is the Cow, then there is no quarrel between us.—If it is the non-Cow that is held to be denoted by the word ‘Cow’,—this shows a wonderful insight into the meanings of words!—(B) Nor can it be something Negative; as nothing negative can form the subject of any injunction or comprehension thereof; as a matter of fact, when one hears the word ‘Cow’, neither the Injunction nor its comprehension pertains to anything merely negative.”

This is the argument that is indicated in the words ‘Nor can it be negative, etc., etc.’—‘Praśa’ stands for Praśaṇa, Injunction; that is, the urging of the hearer by the Speaker to something; this belongs to the Speaker; while ‘Comprehension’ belongs to the hearer.—The term ‘and the rest’ is meant to include such nouns as ‘carrier’, ‘milker’ and the like.

Lastly, it is by actual experience that the meaning of words is comprehended; and as a matter of fact, no one ever comprehends negation from the word ‘Cow’.—(982–988)

“Further, Apoha, Exclusion, being an Action, it behoves you to point out its object (i.e. the object excluded). That is to say, you explain ‘Apoha’ as ‘not being the non-Cow’; now is this object of the Apoha, the Cow or the non-Cow?—If it pertains to the Cow, how can there be negation of the Cow in the Cow itself?—If, on the other hand, it pertains to the non-Cow, how can the Apoha or Exclusion of one thing (non-Cow) lead to the comprehension of another thing (the Cow)? Certainly, when the Khadira tree is cut, the cutting does not fall upon the Pālēsha tree.—Further, if the phrase ‘the Cow is not the non-Cow’ is explained as the negation, in the Cow, of the non-Cow,—then you should explain who has ever conceived of the Cow as the non-Cow,—which conception would be negativized by the said Apoha?”

The Arguer regards the first two alternatives as irrelevant, hence he sets forth the third alternative [that there is preclusion, in the Cow, of the non-Cow]:—
"Why is the denotation of the word ('Cow') held to be the Apoha—in the form 'the Cow is not non-Cow'? Who has ever attributed the character of the non-Cow to the Cow—that it is denied here?—It is held that it is the 'exclusion of the non-Cow' in the Cow, which forms the denotation of the word;—is this held to be something different from the Cow? Or non-different?—If it is different, does it abide—or not abide—anywhere? If it does abide, then it becomes a Quality, and the word cannot be denotative of the Substance;—and thus as the word 'Cow' would denote only a Quality, there would be no co-ordination in such expressions as 'the Cow moves', 'the Cow stands'.—If it does not abide in any thing, then what would be the sense in which it could be mentioned, for the purpose of exclusion, by the term 'Agoh', 'of the non-Cow'?—If, lastly, the 'Apoha', 'exclusion of others' is held by you to be non-different (from the Cow),—then it comes to be the same as Cow; what more would, in that case, be expressed (by the term 'Apoha')?"—(989–994)

COMMENTARY.

The particle 'cha' (in Text, 989) has the collective sense; what is meant by the sentence is—why do you assert the denotation of the word 'Cow' to be the Apoha in the form of 'Not non-Cow'? 'Why should it not be so asserted'? (asks the Buddhist). The answer is—'Who has, etc. etc.'

"For the following reason also Apoha cannot be accepted:—Because none of the alternatives possible under that theory is admissible: The Apoha, or Exclusion, of the non-Cow in the Cow,—is this (A) Different, or (B) Non-different—(from the Cow)?—(A) If it is different; (a) does it abide (in the Cow)? Or (b) does it not abide in it?—(a) If it does abide in it, then, inasmuch as it abides in it, it becomes a Quality; that is, the word 'Cow' denotes a Quality, and not the Substance, the animal, Cow; and under the circumstances, there can be no such Co-ordination as that expressed in the words 'the Cow is standing', 'the Cow is moving'.—(b) If, on the other hand, it does not abide in it, then what is the significance of the Genitive ending in the phrase 'agoh apohah' ('the Apoha of the non-Cow')?—(B) If, lastly, the Apoha is non-different from the Cow, then it is the same as the Cow, and the postulating of it is entirely futile."—(989–994)
TEXTS (995-996).

"Is this Apoha one and the same in connection with all things? Or is it several?—If one, then, being related to several cows, it would be the same as the Universal—'Cow'.—If it is several, then it would be endless,—like so many individual objects. Consequently, just like the diverse individuals, this also could not be 'denoted'.—(995-996)

COMMENTARY.

[Uddyoṭakara continues]—"You should explain whether this Apoha is one and the same in regard to all things? Or is it different with each individual thing? If it is one and the same, and is related to several cows, then it is the same as the Universal 'Cow'. If on the other hand, it is many (differing with each individual cow), then it is as endless as the individual objects themselves; so that no conception of it would be possible; which means that it cannot be denoted."—(995-996)

TEXTS (997-1000).

"This Apoha, 'Exclusion of other things'—is it itself denoted or not-denoted? Even if it is denoted, is it denoted as something positive? Or only as the 'negation of other things'?—If it is denoted as something positive, then you should abandon your extremist view, whereby it has been asserted that 'in every case it is the exclusion of other things that is denoted by words.'—If, on the other hand, the said 'Exclusion' (Apoha) is denoted in the form of the 'Exclusion of other things',—then such a view would involve an infinite regress. —If then it be held by you that the said Apoha (Exclusion of other things) is not denoted, then your assertion, that 'the word always brings about the exclusion of other things', would become annulled."—(997-1000)

COMMENTARY.

"You have to be questioned—is this Apoha denoted or not denoted? If it is denoted, is it denoted as something positive? Or as the 'exclusion of other things'?—If it is denoted as something positive, then the assertion that 'The denotation of words consists in the exclusion of other things'
is not universally true.—If it is denoted as the ‘exclusion of other things’, then that ‘exclusion of others’ would itself have to be denoted as another ‘exclusion of other things’; and so on and on, there would be no end to it.
—If then the *Apoha* is held to be *not-denoted*, then that would contradict the statement that ‘the word brings about the exclusion of what is denoted by other words’.”—(997–1000)

All this has been set forth by *Uddyotakara*. In answer to this, the revered *Diṇṇāga* has declared as follows:—‘In all cases, the substratum being the same, there is no disruption, and all that is desired is duly accomplished; hence in due course, all characteristics of the ‘Universal’,—such as *one-ness, eternity, complete subsistence in every component*—subsist in the *Apoha* itself. Consequently, on account of the superiority of its excellence, the only theory that is right is that ‘the denotation of words consists in the exclusion of other things’.

In reference to this, *Kumārila* argues as follows, thereby summing up the arguments against the doctrine of *Apoha* :

**TEXTS (1001-1002).**

“**FURTHER, one-ness, eternity and subsistence in every individual,—one who would attribute these to *Apohas* which are featureless, would be making cloth without yarns.—**

**FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE ELEMENT OF**

‘exclusion of others’ **COULD BE PRESENT ONLY IN THE DENOTATION OF THOSE WORDS WHEREIN THE NEGATIVE TERM IS PRESENT; IN ALL OTHER CASES THE THING ITSELF IS WHAT IS DENOTED.’” [Shloka-Vartika-Apoha—163-164.]

—(1001-1002)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘In those words alone where the negative term is present’,—e.g. in such expressions as ‘abhakṣeyo grāmasūkaraḥ’, ‘the tame hog is not-to-be-eaten’.

‘The thing itself’—in the positive form.

‘In all other cases’—where the negative term is not present.—(1001-1002)

Having thus set forth the opinions of others, in order of importance, the Author sets forth the answer to these :—
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

TEXTS (1003-1004).

All these are wrong views based upon ignorance of what is meant by the 'Apoha, Negation, of other things'.—People who are themselves damned damn others also.—As a matter of fact, Apoha is of two kinds due to difference between—(1) Paryudāsa (Relative Negation, Contradistinction, Exclusion) and (2) Niśēdha (Absolute Negation, Denial, Prohibition). Paryudāsa again is of two kinds

(a) Due to difference of Conception (Idea), and (b) Due to difference of Concept (Object).—

(1003-1004)

COMMENTARY.

'Due to difference, etc. etc.';—i.e. because there is Relative Negation and Absolute Negation, there are two kinds of Apoha, Negation.

'Due to difference in Conception, etc. etc.'—i.e. due to difference of the nature of the Conception, and due to difference of the nature of the Concept. Of these 'the nature of Conception' consists in the appearance of cognition of several things in one comprehensive form;—and 'the nature of Concept'—consists in the nature of the object, as contradistinguished from unlike objects,—i.e. in the form of 'Specific Individuality'; and the two kinds of Paryudāsa are based upon difference of these two;—such is the sense of the compound.—(1003-1004)

The following Text points out the form of Negation (Paryudāsa, Exclusion) in the form of Conception—

TEXTS (1005-1006).

It has been explained on a previous occasion (Text 723) that things like the Haritaki and other things, though distinct from one another, become the basis of unitary conception. On the basis of such things, there appears a reflection in the determinate Cognition,—which reflection is definitely apprehended (conceived of) as 'objects', even though the objective character is absent in it. [And it is this conception of the reflected image that is called 'Apoha'].—(1005-1006)

COMMENTARY.

'On a previous occasion'—i.e. in the chapter on the examination of the 'Universal', under Text 723 et seq. It has been explained there that,—
many such things as the Harițaki and the rest, without any commonality among them, perform the same function of allaying fever and other diseases,—and exactly in the same manner the Black and other Cows, even though different among themselves, become, by their very nature, the basis of the unitary conception, even without any such entity as the Commonalty or the Universal.

'Abhayādisamāḥ', i.e. like the Harițaki, etc.—the similarity consisting in fulfilling the same purpose.

'On the basis of such things, etc. etc.';—on the basis of consisting in objects like the Harițaki and the rest,—brought about by the apprehension of the action of such causes,—is the determinate Cognition;—in this cognition there is the reflection,—reflected image—of the objects,—i.e. there appears a reflection which is apprehended as the same as the objects;—and it is to this apprehension that the name 'Apoha' has been applied.

'Determinate',—this is an adjective qualifying 'cognition'.

'Arthāmatābhāvā';—even though the character of the 'external object' is wanting.

'Nīshchitam'—definitely apprehended.—(1005-1006)

Question:—"Why has the name 'Apoha' been given to it?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1007–1009 ½).

(1) BECAUSE IT APPEARS AS 'EXCLUDED' (DISTINGUISHED) FROM OTHER 'APPEARANCES',—(2) BECAUSE IT IS THE BASIS (CAUSE) OF THE COGNITION OF A THING AS 'EXCLUDED' FROM OTHERS,—(3) BECAUSE IT IS COGNISED THROUGH AN ENTITY 'EXCLUDED' (FROM OTHERS),—AND (4) BECAUSE IT IS APPREHEND-ED IN THE FORM OF THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' CONSISTING IN THE 'EXCLUSION' OF UNLIKE THINGS, BY PERSONS CONFOUNDED BY ITS SAMENESS—THE NAME 'Apoha, Ex-CLUSION, OF OTHERS' HAS BEEN GIVEN TO IT, ON THE SAID BASIS.—(1007–1009 ½)

COMMENTARY.

The name 'Apoha' has been applied to it on four grounds:—(1) Firstly and chiefly, because it itself appears as 'excluded' (distinguished) from the appearances imposed by other conceptions,—the name 'Apoha of others' has been applied, in the sense of what is excluded—'apokhyatē'— from others—'anyasmāt'.—On the other three grounds the name rests only indirectly (figuratively). (2) For instance, through imposing the character of the Effect upon the Cause; as when the name is applied because it is the cause of the cognition of a thing as 'excluded' from others;—(3) it is applied
through imposing the character of the *Cause* upon the *Effect*; as when the name is applied ‘*ṇaḥśṭavastu-dvārā*’; i.e. ‘through’—by means of—an ‘entity’ which is ‘*ṇaḥśṭa*’—i.e. ‘excluded from others’; i.e. it proceeds from the apprehension of the said conception;—(4) the fourth ground lies in the fact that it is apprehended by persons confounded by its sameness with the ‘exclusion of unlike things’.

‘*Its sameness*’;—i.e. the sameness of the reflection of the object in the conceptual thought.

‘*On the said basis*’;—i.e. on the basis of the four facts, in the shape of its *appearing as excluded from other appearances* and so forth.—(1007-1008)

The following text shows the form of the *Apoha* in the form of the *object*:

**TEXT** (1009).

*So also, in regard to the ‘*Specific Individuality*’ which is the basis of the said ‘*exclusion*’;—on the ground that there is in it the ‘*exclusion*’ of others.—*(1009)*

**COMMENTARY.**

The words of the preceding text—‘the name *Exclusion of others* has been given to it on the said basis’;—have to be construed along with this text also.

The basis (for this *Apoha*) is pointed out—‘*On the ground, etc. etc.*’;—that is, on the ground of the presence therein of the differentiation—exclusion—from other—i.e. unlike, heterogeneous,—things; i.e. because the *exclusion of unlike things* is there. What is meant by this is that to the ‘Specific Individuality’, the name ‘*Apoha, Exclusion, of others*’ is applicable in its primary sense.—(1009)

The following Text points out the form of *Apoha* in the form of ‘*Negation Absolute*’:

**TEXT** (1010).

‘*Negation Absolute*’ we have in such instances as ‘*the Cow is not non-Cow*’; in this the ‘*negation of the other*’ is very clearly apprehended.—*(1010)*

**COMMENTARY.**

Having thus set forth the nature of the three kinds of ‘*Apoha*’, the Author proceeds to connect it with the subject-matter under discussion, the *Denotation of Words*:
TEXT (1011).

It is the first of these Apohas that is expressed by words; because the cognition brought about by words apprehends the external object.—(1011)

COMMENTARY.

'First'—i.e. that which consists in the Reflection of the object, as described above (in Text, 1006).

The reason for this is explained—'Because the cognition, etc. etc.';—that alone should be regarded as the 'denotation of words' which actually appears in the Verbal Cognition;—and as a matter of fact, in Verbal Cognition, there is no apprehension of Negation Absolute, nor that of the 'Specific Individuality', as there is in Sense-cognition; what actually appears in it is that Verbal Cognition only which apprehends the external object. Hence it is only the reflection of the External Object, which appears directly in Verbal Cognition as identical with it, that can be rightly held to be the denotation of the word.—(1011)

As regards the well-known relation of the denotative and denoted which subsists between the word and its denotation,—it is none other than the relation of Cause and Effect; in fact it is of the nature of the relation of Cause and Effect itself.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1012).

When the cognition in that form has resulted from the word, there has come about the relation of Denoted and Denotative, in the shape of Cause and Effect.—(1012)

COMMENTARY.

'The Reflection in that form'—is that reflection which is of the nature of the apprehended external object;—when the birth—appearance—of the cognition of that—has been brought about—produced,—the relation that has resulted is, on reflection, found to be that of Cause and Effect. For instance, the Word, as bringing about the Reflection, is called 'denotative'; and the Reflection, brought about by the Word, is the 'denoted'.

Thus the assertion made by the Opponent—that 'mere negation does not figure in Verbal Cognition' (Text, 910)—is irrelevant; because mere negation is not regarded as the denotation of words.—(1012)

It has been shown that Apoha, in the form of 'Reflection', being brought about directly by words, forms the primary denotation of words. The Author now proceeds to show that there would be nothing incongruous in
describing the other two kinds of *Aphoha* (described under 1007-1008) as forming the *secondary* (indirect) 'denotation of words':—

**TEXTS (1013–1015).**

_The direct form (of *Aphoha*) having been explained as above, Absolute Negation also is apprehended by implication,—in the form that the nature of this thing is not the nature of the other thing.—When there is connection (of the word) with certain things, there comes about, by implication, the apprehension of 'excluded' things also.—Hence this also is figuratively spoken of as the 'denotation' of the Word._

_These two kinds of Verbal *Aphoha* are not directly spoken of as such._

—(1013–1015)

**COMMENTARY.**

'As above',—as something brought about.

*Question*:—"How isAbsolute Negation apprehended by implication?"

*Answer*:—That the nature, etc. etc.—That is, on the basis of the fact that the nature of *this thing*—the reflection of the Cow—is not the nature of *the other thing*—the reflection of the Horse and other things.

Having thus shown that the notion of the *Aphoha* in the shape of Absolute Negation forms, on the ground of invariable concomitance, the secondary denotation of words, the Author proceeds to assert the same in regard to 'Specific Individuality' also:—'When there is connection, etc. etc.';—the 'connection' of the Word with the object meant here is the indirect one of invariable concomitance in the shape of that of *Cause and Effect*; in the following way:—First of all there is the apprehension of the object as it stands; then the speaker's desire to speak of it; then the movement of his palate and other organs of speech; then the utterance of the word; in this way when there is this indirect connection between the word and the objects spoken of—such as Fire and the like,—then there follows the cognition, through Presumption, of the object as 'excluded from unlike things'.

Thus both these kinds of *Aphoha*,—Absolute Negation and that in the form *excluded from others*,—are figuratively spoken of as denoted, by the word.

'This also';—i.e. the Specific Individuality; 'also' refers to the Absolute Negation.—(1013–1015)

As against the Revered *Diśnāga, Uddyotakara* has urged the following (in *Nyāyavārtika*, 2. 2. 63, pages 333-334):—"If the *Aphoha* is not denoted by the word ('*Aphoha*'), then you have to explain what the word can signify apart from what is denotable by it? If that same (*Aphoha* itself) forms
the denotation of the word, then, this would be incompatible with
your declaration that 'a word is said to denote something when it is found
that it brings about, in its denotation, the exclusion of what is denoted by
other words'; as the only meaning that this declaration could have (under
the theory that Apoha is not denoted) would be that the non-denotative word
denotes something—(which is absurd) ".

The following Text proceeds to explain that this assertion has been made
through ignorance of the meaning of the words (of the Teacher), and to show
that there is no incongruity in those words:

TEXT (1016).

WHEN THE WORD BRINGS ABOUT THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS, IT
IS SAID TO 'DENOTE ITS OWN MEANING'; AND THERE IS NO
INCONGRUITY IN THIS.—(1016)

COMMENTARY.

The Specific Individuality also is the word's 'own meaning', by implication,—as explained before;—and when in its 'own meaning' in the shape
of the Specific Individuality, the Word brings about—produces—the 'ex-
clusion of other things'—i.e. the Apoha in the form of Reflection, as excluded
(distinguished) from other Reflections,—then it is said to 'denote' it. And
there is nothing incongruous in the words of our Teacher.—(1016)

The following Texts explain this same declaration of Diṇṇāga's:

TEXTS (1017–1018).

THE WORD IS SAID TO 'DENOTE', BECAUSE IT PRODUCES A REFLECTION
OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE EXTERNAL THING; IT DOES NOT
TOUCH THE EXCLUSIVE FACTOR IN THE SHAPE OF THE SPECIFIC
INDIVIDUALITY; APART FROM THE SAID PRODUCTION OF
THE REFLECTION, THERE IS NO OTHER DENOTATIVE
FUNCTION OF THE WORD.—(1017–1018)

COMMENTARY.

What the revered Teacher means is as follows:—Of the word, there is
no function of denoting external things, other than the producing of the
Reflection of the Conception apprehending those things; because all
entities are devoid of activity. Hence when the word produces the Reflec-
tion of the conception tending to the apprehension of the external thing,
it is said that 'it denotes its meaning'. It does not touch the exclusive
factor, in the shape of Specific Individuality as excluded (distinguished) from
like and unlike things; as this would serve no useful purpose.
'Apart from, etc. etc.';—i.e. apart from the producing of the said Reflection, there is no other denotative function of the word.—(1017-1018)

Having thus explained the nature of Anapaha, the Author now proceeds to meet and set aside the objections urged by others.

It has been urged (by Bhāmaha, under Text 912) that—"if the word 'Cow' serves the only purpose of excluding other things, then please point out some other word which would produce the notion of Cow in the Cow."

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (1019).

IT IS ONLY WHEN THE REFLECTION HAS BEEN COGNISED THAT THERE FOLLOWS THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS', BY IMPLICATION; BECAUSE THE IDEA OF 'OTHERS' DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE REFLECTION AT ALL.—(1019)

COMMENTARY.

It is the idea of the Cow itself which is produced by the word; as regards the 'exclusion of others', that is understood only by implication,—and from the word itself; because the Reflection of the Cow is free from the touch of any other appearance (or reflection). If it were not so, then, it would never be apprehended in its specific form. That is why, for the bringing about of the idea of the Cow, another word is not sought after; because the said idea of the Cow is produced by the word 'Cow' itself.—(1019)

It has been urged (under 913 above) that—"words have their fruits in Cognitions, and any one word cannot have two fruits, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1020).

AS IN THE CASE OF THE SENTENCE SPEAKING OF 'NOT EATING AT NIGHT', THE WORD IN QUESTION HAS TWO FRUITS (RESULTANTS),—ONE DIRECT AND THE OTHER BY IMPLICATION; AND IT IS SO BECAUSE THERE IS NO AFFIRMATION ENTIRELY WITHOUT NEGATION.—(1020)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the sentence 'Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day', the direct meaning consists of the denial of 'eating during the day', and the implied meaning consists of the affirmation of 'eating during the night'; in the same manner, in the case of the word 'Cow', which is affirma-
tive (positive) in character, the idea of affirmation is the direct resultant, and the idea of negation is the indirect resultant due to implication.

The reason for this is stated—"And it is because, etc. etc."—because there is no affirmation without negation; in fact, affirmation is always concomitant with the negation of the unlike; as there can be nothing which is not excluded (differentiated) from things unlike itself.

Thus there is nothing incongruous in a single word having two resultants.—(1020)

Question:—"Why is it so?"
Answer:—

TEXT (1021).

Because the word does not directly bring about both these,—
(1) the idea of its own denotation, and (2) the exclusion of another thing.—(1021)

COMMENTARY.

There would be incongruity if it were held that both the resultants—affirmation as well as negation—are brought about by the word at the same time; when however, the view is that,—as in the case of 'not eating during the day',—only one is brought about directly, while the other is got at only by implication,—then there is no incongruity.

As for the argument (urged in 914) that—"on hearing the word cow uttered, the first idea that one should obtain would be that of the non-Cow",—this also is rejected by what has been just said; because no such view as indicated has been held by us; that is to say, we have never held the view that the negation (exclusion) of the non-cow is done by the word directly; in fact, it has been already explained that this is obtained only by implication.—(1021)

It has been argued (by Kumárika, under Text 915, above) that—"Those who have accepted the commonality in the shape of the negation of the non-cow as denoted by the word, have admitted the positive entity, the Universal 'Cow' to be so denoted".

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (1022).

The Universal 'Cow' also is held to be an appearance of the same kind; inasmuch it is apprehended as common to all cows—the Variegated and the rest.—(1022)

COMMENTARY.

"Of the same kind",—that is, superimposed upon, reflected in, the Cognition, as something external.
The reason for this view is next stated—*Inasmuch as, etc. etc.*; all cows, variegated and the rest, are apprehended as 'Cow', 'Cow', as of common form; and it is on this account that this is called 'Commonality' or 'Universal'.—(1022)

As regards its *externality*, that also is spoken of as such only by persons under illusion; it is not real.—This is what is shown in the following—

**TEXT (1023).**

*Because it is cognised as a positive 'entity', therefore it is called a 'positive entity';—this mistaken cognition is produced quickly from its seed.*—(1023)

**COMMENTARY.**

*Objection* :—"If in any case, there were a positive entity in the shape of the Commonality based upon an external object actually apprehended, then it might be possible to have an illusion of the Commonality based upon similarity; when however, there is no real primary 'Commonality' (according to the Buddhist), the said illusion of commonality is not possible for you."

*Answer* :—'This mistaken cognition, etc. etc.'—'Quality' ;—i.e. the cognition in question appears, independently of the perception of any real Commonality,—through some internal aberration,—like the conception of 'two moons'; all illusions do not really proceed from the perception of similarity; they appear through mental aberration also. Hence there is no incongruity in our view.—(1023)

The following Text proceeds to show that our view is not open to the charge of 'futility'—of having a Probandum that is already proved :—

**TEXT (1024).**

*That same 'form of the cognition' called the 'Apoha', is the 'denotation of the word',—also (regarded as) a 'positive entity', in the form of the 'Commonality'; on account of its being apprehended as such, through mistake.*—(1024)

**COMMENTARY.**

The 'form of the Cognition' described above, as imposed upon it as something external, is called 'Apoha' ,—which is the 'denotation of the word'; and it is spoken of as an external thing, in the shape of the Commonality (or Universal).

The reason for this is stated—'On account, etc. etc.' ;—i.e. because it is apprehended in the form of the Commonality, and in the form of a positive entity.
The reason for its being called 'the denotation of the word' and the
'Apotha' has already been explained above, under Texts 1017 and 1007.—
(1024)

Question—"Wherefore is not that a real Commonalty (Universal) ?"
Answer:—

TEXT (1025).

IT IS NOT RIGHT TO REGARD ITS CHARACTER OF Universal entity, AS REAL;
BEING NON-DIFFERENT FROM THE Cognition, HOW COULD IT
APPERTAIN TO ANOTHER THING ?—(1025)

COMMENTARY.

In reality, the Apoha is not anything entirely different from the
Cognition; how then could it appertain to another thing,—by virtue of which
appertenance, it could be the 'commonalty' of several things? It has been
declared above—'How can what is non-different from the Cognition appertain
to another thing?'

For this same reason, our reasoning is not open to the charge of being
'redundant' (seeking to prove what is already admitted); because you do
not admit the Universal named 'Cow' to be of the form of Cognition and
not of the form of an entity; on the other hand, you postulate the Universal
'Cow' as a real entity embracing all cows—variegated and the rest. Hence
our reasoning is not 'redundant'.

It has been urged (under 919) that—"If mere negation be assumed to
be the denotation of words, this would be only the void expressed
differently". As no such assumption is made by us, it does not affect our
position.—(1025)

It has been urged (under 920, by Kumārila) that—"There would be
apprehension therein of part of the cognition of the Horse itself, etc. etc"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1026).

THOUGH THIS FORM OF 'Apotha' IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE FORM OF
THE COGNITION, YET ITS external character IS APPREHENDED
ONLY BY DELUDED PERSONS.—(1026)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(1026)

It has been argued (under 921, by Kumārila) that—'if the denotation
of words is independent of things, then the assumption of Apoha is useless'.

The answer to this is as follows:—
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TEXT (1027).

IT IS NOT ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT OF THE OBJECT, INASMUCH AS THE
NOTION OF THAT COMES IN INDIRECTLY; AND YET IN THAT
FORM, THE CHARACTER OF POSITIVE ENTITY
DOES NOT BELONG TO IT, AS EXPLAINED
BEFORE.—(1027)

COMMENTARY.

There is an indirect concomitance with the object; hence, even though
the conception is primarily mistaken and illusory,—yet it is not entirely in-
dependent of the external object; just as the idea of 'jewel' in the bright-
ness of the jewel (though wrong, is not independent of the jewel). Hence
'Independence of the external object' is something not admitted by us.

As regards the argument (urged in Text 922, by Kumārila) that—"the
cognition that is produced in regard to the denotation of words is in the
form of the positive entity",—the answer is given in the words—'and yet
in that form, etc. etc.'—that is, even though the cognition is in the form of
the positive entity, yet, the positive character that belongs to it is not in
the form of something external, nor in the form of another cognition; as has
been explained under Text 1014.—This also sets aside the view that 'the
Apotha of other Cognitions' is not apprehended by a Cognition; because it
is actually apprehended indirectly, by implication.—(1027)

It has been urged (under 923, by Kumārila) that—"Even in the absence
of the external thing, just as there is Intuition denoted by the Sentence so
would it be in the case of the word also".

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (1028).

THAT Apoха WHICH IS IN THE FORM OF REFLECTION, AND WHICH ALSO
IS CALLED 'INTUITION', IS PRODUCED BY THE WORD ALSO;
AND WE READILY REGARD THIS AS THE
DENOTATION OF WORDS.—(1028)

COMMENTARY.

We have described the meaning of the Sentence as of the form of
Reflection, named 'Intuition'; so also is the meaning of the word described.
Because by the Word also, what is produced is the Apoха in the form of
Reflection; so that for us the Apoха in the form of the Reflection is held to
be the denotation of the Word also, not only of the Sentence. This is what is
meant by the term 'also'. Thus there being no difference of opinion between
us, the complaint against us is not right.—(1028)
It has been argued (under 924, by Kumārila) that—"the exclusion of one Cognition from another is not apprehended ".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1029).

OWING TO THE FACT OF ITS NOT BEARING ANY FACTOR APART FROM THE APPEARANCE OF ITS OWN FORM, ITS 'EXCLUSION FROM ANOTHER COGNITION' BECOMES DULY APPREHENDED.—(1029)

COMMENTARY:

It is because the Cognition does not bear within itself any factor apart from the manifestation of its own form, that—on account of its being restricted within its own form,—the exclusion of one cognition from another becomes apprehended; otherwise, if the Cognition bore the form of another, how could it be apprehended as excluded from that another?

'For that reason'—i.e. because it does not apprehend any form other than its own.—(1029)

It has been argued (under 925, by Kumārila) that—"Words that are denotative of diverse Universals and those that are denotative of Particulars would all be synonyms ".

This is answered as follows:—

TEXT (1030).

IN THE CASE OF WHAT DOES NOT EXIST, ANY DIFFERENCE THAT MAY BE THERE CANNOT BE REAL; SO ALSO WOULD BE ITS NON-DIFFERENCE; AND HENCE THE WORDS WOULD CERTAINLY BE SYNONYMOUS.—(1030)

COMMENTARY.

Apoṭha, being featureless, has no form; and hence it is said that there is no difference among Apoṭhas; similarly it is said that there is no non-difference among them. Thus there being no really non-different thing, how can the contingency of all words being synonymous be urged against us ?—(1030)

This same idea is explained more clearly in the following—
'Non-difference' consists in being of the same form; how can this be there in what are formless? Words become synonyms only when what is denoted by them is one and the same.—(1031)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"If there is no one form in formless things, why should words not be synonymous?"

Answer:—'Words become synonyms, etc. etc.'—(1031)

The following might be urged—"If among formless things, there cannot be presence of the same form, in reality,—even so it would be there in imaginary form; and on the basis of that the incongruity of all words being synonymous can be rightly urged".

Answer:—

TEXT (1032).

Just as, even in the absence of form, there is imaginary unity (uniformity),—in the same manner, difference also could be imaginary; whence then could the words be synonymous?—(1032)

COMMENTARY.

"In the absence of form"—i.e. in the absence of any characteristic features. —(1032)

Question:—"If that is so, then how is there any such notion among people that these words are synonymous, and those others are not synonymous?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1033).

In reality, words are neither synonymous nor not-synonymous; as it has been explained that what is denoted by them is neither one and the same nor diverse.—(1033)

COMMENTARY.

If what is denoted by words were really different or non-different, then they could be either synonymous or not-synonymous. As a matter of fact, however, it has been explained above (under Text, 871) that neither Specific Individuality, nor the Universal, nor what is possessed of the Universal, can be really denoted by words.—(1033)
"How then is there the restriction regarding words being synonymous and not-synonymous?"

*Answer:*

**TEXT (1034).**

**But whenever more than one thing is seen to be performing one and the same function, the property of 'oneness' is imposed on them and the same word is applied to them.--(1034)**

**COMMENTARY.**

Even without there being any Commonalty (or Universal), there is restriction regarding the application of a common word to a number of things,—and the basis of such application lies in the fact of several things performing the same fruitful function. By their very nature, some things, even though many, perform the same fruitful function; and for the purpose of expressing the fact of their performing the same fruitful function, people speaking of them,—for the sake of brevity—impose upon them a common form, and apply to them a common name. For instance, when the various things—Colour, etc.—are found to perform the same function of containing Honey, Water and other things,—the name 'Jar' is applied to them.—(1034)

*Question:—"Without a single comprehensive (all-embracing) factor, how can a single word be rightly applied to several things?"*

*Answer:*

**TEXT (1035).**

**In the case of the Eye and other things, all tending to bring about the single effect in the shape of the cognition of Colour,—if someone were to apply a common name, even without a comprehensive (common) element [in the same manner would it be in other cases also].—(1035)**

**COMMENTARY.**

As a matter of fact, the application of words to things depends entirely upon the whim (of people). For instance, the Eye, Colour, Light and Mind, all tend to bring about the single effect of Colour-cognition; if some one, through sheer whim,—even without there being a common element,—were to apply a single word (name) to them,—would there be any one to prevent him from doing so? Among all these things, the Eye and the rest, there is no Common Element, in the form of 'being productive of visual perception'; specially because you regard the Universal, the Ultimate Differentia and Inherence also to be productive of visual perception'; and in the things in question, there is no Universal or Inherence either;
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because the Universal cannot belong to a Universal, and in Inherence also there cannot be a second Inherence.—(1035)

Says the Opponent:—"How can the Jar and such things be spoken of as performing the same function—when, their actions, in the shape of holding water and the rest,—as also the C cognitions apprehending them,—differ from one another, on the ground of the difference among their ‘Specific Individualities’?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1036–1037).

THOUGH THE ACTION OF THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS, IN THE SHAPE OF HOLDING WATER, ETC.,—AND ALSO THE COGNITION OF THOSE THINGS,—ARE DIFFERENT (DIVERSE),—YET, AS IT FORMS THE BASIS OF A SINGLE (COMPREHENSIVE) CONCEPTION, THE COGNITION IS SAID TO BE ONE ONLY; AND AS THIS COGNITION FORMS THE BASIS, THE THINGS ALSO ARE SPOKEN OF AS NOT-DIVERSE (ONE).—(1036–1037)

COMMENTARY.

Even though the effects differ on account of the difference in their ‘Specific Individualities’, yet, the effect in the form of Cognition,—inasmuch as it serves as the basis of the single comprehensive conception,—is spoken of as one; and on account of this one Cognition being the basis, the things,—in the shape of the Holding of Honey, Water, etc., and in the shape of the individual Jar, etc.,—also are spoken of as one.—This is what is meant by the text—‘And as this cognition, etc. etc.’.

The previous singular form ‘uchyatě’ has, in construing, to be changed into the plural form ‘uchyantě’.

The particle ‘api’ is to be construed after ‘arthāḥ’.

In the way shown, it is quite reasonable to regard these as ‘performing the same fruitful function’.

Objection:—"But in this way there would be infinite regress. The said Conception also would be diverse on account of the diversity of the Specific Individualities; so that that also could not be accepted as one; hence for establishing the oneness of that, it would be necessary to postulate a further comprehensive conception, and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress. So that there being no single effect or action, it would not be possible to apply a single name to several things."

Answer:—It is not so; the oneness of the comprehensive conception is not attributed to the performance of a single function; it is based upon the fact of its apprehending the same thing. So that there will be no infinite regress. Because all comprehensive conceptions by their very nature apprehend one and the same thing. The meaning of this therefore comes to be this:—Inasmuch as it is the basis of one uniform comprehensive
conception, the effect in the shape of Cognition is spoken of as one; and because of its being the basis again, the things—Jar, etc.—also come to be spoken of as ‘one’.—(1036-1037)

Thus then, even without a positive entity in the shape of the ‘Universal’, the words ‘Jar’, etc. come to be the common denotative of several things. This is the conclusion asserted in the following—

TEXT (1038).

OF THESE, WORDS LIKE ‘JAR’ HAVE BEEN SAID TO BE COMMON DENOTATIVES, ON THE SINGLE BASIS OF THE REFLECTION DISTINGUISHED (EXCLUDED) FROM UNLIKE THINGS’.—(1038)

COMMENTARY.

The following text shows that even with regard to one and the same thing,—even without a positive ‘Universal’ or ‘Particular’,—there is application of several words independently of one another:—

TEXT (1039).

SIMILARLY, WHEN PERFORMING SEVERAL FRUITFUL FUNCTIONS, EVEN A SINGLE THING IS SPOKEN OF AS IF IT WERE MANY,—BY VIRTUE OF THE MULTIPlicity OF THE EXCLUSIONS OF THINGS NOT PERFORMING THOSE FUNCTIONS.—(1039)

COMMENTARY.

Sometimes, even while only one, by its nature, a thing comes to perform several functions, through the intervention of other accessories; and in such cases, even without any diverse elements in the shape of positive commonalities and the like, several characters are imposed upon it on account of the multiplicity of ‘exclusions’ of things not performing those functions; and as a consequence of this, several words come to be applied to that thing.—(1039)

An example of this is cited in the following—

TEXT (1040).


COMMENTARY.

Colour is spoken of as an ‘obstacle’ when it prevents the appearance of another colour in its own place; and it is also spoken of as ‘visible’,— because it serves to bring about visual perception.
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A second example is cited:—"And Sound, etc. etc."—even though sound is a single entity, yet, on being the resultant of the cognition following upon effort (of the speaker), it is spoken of as ‘Cognised’; and as the resultant of auditory perception, it is spoken of as ‘auditory’; ‘śrāvāṇa’ stands for ‘śrūṣṭi’, audition, i.e. Auditory Perception; and what appears therein is ‘auditory’. Or the term ‘śrāvāṇa’ may be explained as ‘perceived by the auditory organ’.—(1040)

It has thus been shown that several words are applied to a thing which, as performing a single function, is one only. It is now shown that in some cases, words are applied even on the basis of the diversity of other causes:—

TEXT (1041).

IN SOME CASES, THE WORD IS APPLIED, ALSO ON THE BASIS OF THE DIVERSITY OF OTHER CAUSES; E.G. SOUND ARISING FROM EFFORT, AND THE HONEY PRODUCED BY THE LARGE BEES.—(1041)

COMMENTARY.

‘Produced by the large bees’, as distinguished from that produced by the smaller bees.—(1041)

Thus it has been shown that diverse words are applied to the same thing, on the basis of the multiplicity of effects (function) and causes. The following Text is going to show that diverse words are applied to the same thing, even without a commonality, where there is desire to express only the exclusion of its effect and cause:—

TEXT (1042).

IN SOME CASES, THE WORD IS APPLIED ON THE BASIS OF THE EXCLUSION OF THE EFFECT AND CAUSE OF THE THING; AS FOR EXAMPLE, Colour is spoken of as ‘inaudible’, or Lightning is spoken of as ‘not produced by effort’.—(1042)

COMMENTARY.

The term ‘Kāryahētu’ stands for the things of which the previously-mentioned factors are the Effect and Cause;—the ‘Vishēṣa’ of these is their exclusion (denial).

“What are the words like this?”

‘Inaudible, etc. etc.’;—Colour is spoken of as ‘inaudible’, when what is meant is the exclusion of Sound which is the effect of Auditory Perception;—similarly, for the purpose of excluding things produced by effort, the term ‘not produced by effort’ is applied to Lightning.—(1042)

Having thus explained that, even in the absence of any positive entity in the shape of a Commonality, Words are applied with distinction merely on the basis of exclusion, the Author proceeds to show that there is no possibility of the incongruity of all words becoming synonymous:—
TEXTS (1043-1044).

Due to the said and other distinctions, ‘exclusions’ are postulated on the basis of differentiated things; and so also are the words as applied to those things. Thus words, as denoting distinct things in accordance with Convention, are applied with due differentiation; and as such they are not synonymous under our view.

—(1043-1044)

COMMENTARY.

The term ‘other’—includes words expressive of different ages—such as ‘child’ and the like,—and also such words as ‘nairūtmya’, (‘absence of soul’, or ‘featurelessness’).

‘On the basis of differentiated things’;—i.e. exclusions, of which the basis consists in things differentiated from one another.

‘So’—associated with ‘exclusion’.

‘Applied to those things’;—i.e. applied to the ‘excluded’ (i.e. differentiated) things.—Because, indirectly, they are the cause of the apprehension of the said denotation of the word.

‘Shrutayah’—Words.—(1043-1044)

The following might be urged:—‘The words may not be synonymous,—because a distinction is assumed in the things; but how can there be the difference between words denoting Universals and those denoting Particulars, unless there are Universals and Particulars?’

Answer:—

TEXT (1045).

Nor is there any incongruity in Universals and Particulars being denoted by words, as appertaining to larger and smaller number of things,—on the basis of the inference of the relevant Convention.—(1045)

COMMENTARY.

For example, the word ‘Tree’ brings about the ‘Reflection’ inferred in the shape of the ‘Exclusion of non-trees’,—in regard to all trees—the Dhava, Khadira, Palāśa and so forth; hence, as appertaining to a larger number of things, what is denoted by the word is spoken of as the ‘Universal’ (Commonalty).—On the other hand, in the case of the word ‘Dhava’, there is ‘exclusion of the Khadira and other trees’, which brings about the conception of only a few of the trees (the Dhava ones only); hence what is denoted by it is said to be a ‘Particular’.—(1045)

In regard to what has been asserted (under Text 928, as coming from the Baudhā), the Author says:—
TEXT (1046).

The said 'exclusions' of things, created by mere assumption, cannot really differ, through difference in the 'excluded things', or through that in the substratum.—(1046)

COMMENTARY.

If the diversity in the Apoha were held (by us) to be real and based upon the diversity of 'excluded things', or upon the diversity of the 'substratum', —then the objection urged would have been applicable. As a matter of fact, however, the 'exclusions' are not real, but assumed on the basis of the diversity among like and unlike things.—(1046)

The following Text shows that the said exclusions appear as distinct things, only on account of the said assumption,—not in reality:—

TEXT (1047).

The externality that is attributed to these exclusions is only assumed (imaginary), not real. In reality, difference and non-difference subsist only in real things.—(1047)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"Why is it not real?"
Answer:—'In reality, etc. etc.'.—(1047)

The following Texts proceed to show that in reality it is the assumptions (assumed conceptions) only that differ among themselves:—

TEXTS (1048-1049).

What differ among themselves are the conceptual contents apprehending the said exclusions;—and those differences are due to the influence of their root, the thing as differentiated from several things, and Convention. Things, consisting of 'specific individualities' do not become either unified or diversified in parts; it is only the conceptual content that varies.—(1048-1049)

COMMENTARY.

'Their Root',—in the shape of Wind and other Humours, and the Tendency to conceptual thought;—the thing as differentiated from several things,—and the Convention;—it is due to the 'influence'—force—of these that the Conceptual Contents, apprehending the thing as excluded from several
unlike things, become diversified; it is not the things that are diversified. For instance, the Dhāva and other trees do not become unified in the form of the Universal 'Tree'; nor do they become diversified, in parts, in the form of the momentary individual trees; all that varies is the conceptual content. This has been thus declared—'Things by themselves do not become either aggregated or diversified, in reality; that their form is one or many is due to the fluctuations of the Cognition'.—(1048-1049)

It has been argued above (under Text 932) that—"No one can be able to conceive, in regard to the Cow, the unknown similarity in the object of Apoha, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1050).

EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO COMMON PROPERTY, YET WHAT ARE EXCLUDED AND WHAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE EXCLUSION ARE APPREHENDED AS DIFFERENT, BY REASON OF THEIR APPEARING AS DIVERSE IN THE SUBSEQUENT DETERMINATE JUDGMENT.—(1050)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'apohyāpohagochārāḥ' is made up of the 'apohya' 'what are excluded'—i.e. (in the case of the word 'Cow') the Horse and other animals,—and the 'apohagochara', 'what are contained in the exclusion',—i.e. the Variegated and other Cows; these are so spoken of as the 'exclusion of the non-Cow' pertains to them.

Thus, though there is no concomitance of any commonality, yet, those that bring about the determinate judgment of non-different things are regarded as having their similarity well known,—while those that bring about the determinate judgment of diverse things,—are regarded as otherwise (i.e. as having their similarity unknown).—(1050)

The following might be urged—"In the absence of some one Commonality, how can the things that bring about a single determinate judgment become diverse?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1051).

IT WOULD BE ONLY A FEW THINGS WHICH, WHILE BEING DIVERSE BY THEMSELVES, WOULD BRING ABOUT A SINGLE DETERMINATE JUDGMENT; AS ALREADY EXPLAINED BY US.—(1051)

COMMENTARY.

It has been explained in course of our examination of the 'Universal' that the Dhātri (Āmalakī and other fruits), without commonality, come to
perform a single fruitful action; in the same way, it would be only a few things that would bring about the single determinate judgment and yet be many and diverse.—(1051)

It has been argued (under Text 934, by Kumārila) that—"Words and Inferential Indicatives do not apply to what is devoid of concomitance, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1052).

THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' CONSISTS OF THE THING-BY-ITSELF, AS 'EXCLUDED FROM WHAT IS NOT ITSELF';—AN ASSERTION OF CONCOMITANCE CAREFULLY MADE IN THIS FORM WOULD NOT BE INCONGRUOUS.—(1052)

COMMENTARY.

Even though there is no entity in the shape of the Commonality (Universal), yet, if an assertion of concomitance is made in regard to mere 'Specific Individuality' as excluded (differentiated) from unlike things,—that would not be incompatible (with our view).—(1052)

Question:—"Why so?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1053-1054).

THAT WHEREIN SUBSISTS THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY (Smoke) DIFFERENTIATED FROM Non-smoke,—IN THAT SAME SUBSISTS ALSO THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY (Fire) DIFFERENTIATED FROM Non-fire; AS IN THE Kitchen; AND HEREAFTER (IN THE HILL) THERE IS THE Specific Individuality differentiated from Non-smoke;—HENCE the Specific Individuality differentiated from Non-fire ALSO MUST BE THERE.—(1053-1054)

COMMENTARY.

'That'—i.e. that place.

'Herein'—subsists the Specific Individuality distinguished from non-smoke; this proposition asserts the presence of the Inferential Indicative (Probas) in the subject of the Inference (Hill).

'Hence, etc. etc.'—asserts the resultant cognition (Conclusion) brought about by the Premises.

Or, the meaning may be that all the five factors of the Inferential Process may be shown by indicating the concomitance in connection with Specific Individualities.—(1053-1054)
The above is an example of the Inference where the Probans is the effect of the Probandum. The following texts cite an example of the Probans in the form of the nature of things:

**TEXTS (1055-1056).**

THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY THAT IS DIFFERENTIATED FROM 'MAN'S HORNS' AND OTHER NON-EXISTENT THINGS IS ALSO DIFFERENTIATED FROM PERMANENT THINGS,—JUST AS THE COGNITION, THE LAMP-FLAME, ETC. ARE;—THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY OF SOUND, ETC. IS NOT A non-existent thing.—In this way there can be the assertion of concomitance through differences as indicated.—(1055-1056)

**COMMENTARY.**

That Specific Individuality which is differentiated from the non-existent, because it is not non-existent,—is also differentiated from Permanent Things,—as we find in the case of Cognition, Lamp-flame and such things.

The necessary concomitance can be asserted in this way,—without touching upon any particulars; and there would be nothing incongruous in this.

The concomitance shown here is in regard to the Probans 'because it exists'; [the inference being in the form—'The Specific Individuality of Sounds, etc. is differentiated from Permanent Things, because it exists,—like Cognition, Lamp-flame, etc.'].—(1055-1056)

**Question:** "If there is concomitance with the Specific Individuality only, then how is there Inference in regard to things partaking of the nature of the 'Universal'?"

**Answer:**

**TEXT (1057).**

THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY ITSELF, WHEN ITS DISTINCTION IS NOT MEANT TO BE EMPHASISED, HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS CONSTITUTING THE 'UNIVERSAL' (OR COMMONALTY);—NOTHING ELSE; AS NOTHING ELSE IS ACCEPTABLE.—(1057).

**COMMENTARY.**

That same Specific Individuality,—when its distinctive features are not meant to be emphasised,—constitutes the 'Commonalty'; as has been already explained.
The term ‘Sāmanyalaksana’ means that which is indicated by the common character,—not taking into account the distinctive characters.

‘Nothing else’,—in the shape of the ‘Universal’ as postulated by the other philosophers. As such ‘Universal’ cannot be acceptable to the Buddhist.

This has been thus declared:—‘As it is apprehended through its own form as well as through another, its object has been held to be two-fold’;—and again—‘Inasmuch as it is based upon the Thing—by—itself as differentiated from things not of that form, the Indicative of the absence of diversity has been declared to appertain to the Commonalty’.

For this reason, the concomitance also, of the Inferential Indicative and the Word, is declared to pertain to the Specific Individuality itself.

Thus we conclude that there is no Inferential Indicative in support of the conclusion contrary to ours,—not merely from the fact that no such Indicative is actually perceived,—but because there is non-apprehension of a particular kind.—(1057)

It has been argued above (under Text, 938, by Kumārila) that—‘The difference from the Variegated Cow is equally present in the Black Cow and in the Horse, etc. etc’.

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (1058).

THE DIFFERENCE FROM THE VARIEGATED COW BEING EQUALLY PRESENT IN THE BLACK COW AND THE HORSE, WHY IS IT THAT THE UNIVERSAL ‘COW’, AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM THE HORSE, SUBSISTS IN THAT?—(1058)

COMMENTARY.

It behoves you to say—when the Horse is equally different from the Variegated Cow and the Black Cow,—how it is that the Universal ‘Cow’, as differentiated from the Horse, subsists in the Variegated and other Cows, and not in the Horse?—(1058)

The reply to this may be as follows:—‘What is there to be said here? It is clear that it is only the Variegated and other Cows—and not the Horse—that are capable of manifesting the Universal ‘Cow’; hence the said Universal subsists in the Cows, not in other things. Nor will it be right to urge the question—‘why the Variegated and other Cows alone have the capacity to manifest the said Universal’. Because such restriction is due to the very nature of things; and there can be no complaint against the nature of things; as all such restrictions are due to the series of causes that have brought about the things.’

The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1059).

IF IT BE HELD THAT ‘ THAT ALONE HAS THE CAPACITY TO MANIFEST IT ’
—THEN, EVEN THOUGH THE SUBSEQUENT DETERMINATE JUDGMENT IS THE SAME, THAT ALONE HAS THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE IT, AND NOT THE Horse.—(1059)

COMMENTARY.

‘ Manifest it ’—i.e. the particular Universal ‘ Cow ’.
‘ That alone ’,—i.e. the Variegated and other Cows, not the Horse.

If that be so, then, even when there is diversity, and there is no Commonalty, the variegated and other Cows alone,—not the Horse—would have the capacity to bring about the determinate judgment; even though this judgment would be the same. This view of ours also would not be incompatible.—(1059)

Question:—“What is the upshot of all this?”
Answer:—

TEXT (1060).

THUS THEN, IN WHATEVER THING THE SAID DETERMINATE JUDGMENT IS PRESENT,—TO THAT THE ‘ EXCLUSION OF THE NON-COW ’ BECOMES APPLICABLE,—EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE UNIVERSAL ’ COW ’.—(1060)

COMMENTARY.

In whatever thing—Variegated Cow, etc.—the said determinate judgment is present—in the form ‘ this is a Cow ’, ‘ that is a Cow ’,—to that,—even in the absence of the Universal ‘ Cow ’, as a positive entity,—the ‘ exclusion of the non-Cow ’,—in the form of the Reflection—becomes applied.—(1060)

It has been argued above (under Text, 939, by Kumārila) that—“The Exclusion of the non-Cow is not apprehended, at first, by the Sense-organs, etc etc”.

The following Texts show that this statement is not admissible:—

TEXTS (1061-1062).

THAT THING WHICH IS ‘ DIFFERENT FROM THE non-cow ’ IS CERTAINLY APPREHENDED BY THE SENSE-ORGANS; THE REFLECTION ALSO WHICH IS SUPERIMPOSED UPON IT IS APPREHENDED BY ITS OWN COGNITION. IT IS ON NOTICING THIS THAT PEOPLE USE THE WORD; THE RECOGNITION OF ITS RELATION ALSO BECOMES CLEARLY EXPLAINED ON THE SAME BASIS.—(1061-1062)

COMMENTARY.

The Apoha in the shape of the ‘ Specific Individuality ’ is apprehended through the sense-organs themselves.
As for the *Apooha* in the form of the Reflection of what is denoted by the Word, it is really of the nature of Cognition itself, and as such vouched for directly by its own cognition (it being self-cognised).

The particle 'cha' is meant to include the *Apoohas* not directly mentioned. So that the *Apooha* in the form of Absolute Negation also is apprehended by implication; as has been shown under the *Text* 1014, by the words 'the nature of one is not the nature of the other'.

Thus it is on noticing the *Apooha* in the form of 'Specific Individuality' and the rest, that people come to use words,—not on noticing a positive entity in the shape of the Universal; because no such Universal exists and because no such Universal figures in any cognition. And that through perceiving which people use the words must also be the basis upon which rests the relations of those words,—not on any other basis; if it did, it would lead to absurdity.—(1061-1062)

It has been argued above (under *Text* 941, by *Kumārila*)—"How could the fact of anything being denoted by the word 'non-cow' be cognised?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT** (1063).

*When, in regard to anything, there is no such determinate judgment, the fact of its being denoted by the word 'non-cow' becomes clearly perceived.*—(1063)

It has been argued above (under *Texts*, 943-944, by *Kumārila*) that—"It is only the well-established non-Cow that could be excluded, and it is of the nature of the negation of the Cow, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS** (1063-1065).

The *Cow* and the *Non-cow* are both well-established,—as there are distinct determinate judgments in regard to both; it is only the word that is not well-established; and hence it is applied according to the speaker's whim.—As a matter of fact, a distinct thing does not need for its apprehension, the apprehension of another thing; hence there is no room here for the charge of 'mutual interdependence'.—(1063-1065)

**COMMENTARY.**

As a matter of fact, things like the Cow, by themselves, bring about distinct determinate judgments regarding themselves, and as such, are well
known in their distinct forms. For the purpose of speaking of them, people make use of words, which are not well known, through their whims. Under the circumstances, if the form of a distinct thing required, for its own apprehension, the apprehension of another different thing,—then there might have been mutual interdependence. As a matter of fact, however, the distinct thing is apprehended without the apprehension of another thing; and when it is definitely known as something distinct bringing about a distinct determinate judgment,—and then the Convention is made in the form 'this is a Cow', 'that is a Cow' and so forth,—according to the man's wish,—how then, can there be any mutual interdependence?

'Vittau'—stands for 'vittarthaṃ', for the apprehension.—(1064-1065)

It has been argued (under Text 945, by Kumārila), that—"There can be no relationship of Container and Contained, etc. between two negations".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1066-1067).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, VERBAL COGNITION, NOT TAKING COGNIZANCE OF ANY EXTERNAL OBJECT, APPREHENDS ITS OWN MARK AS SOMETHING EXTERNAL, ON ACCOUNT OF STRONG ILLUSION.

—THIS IS ALL THAT IS DONE BY WORDS; AND WORDS DO NOT EVEN TOUCH THE OBJECT; NOR IS ANY OBJECT DENOTED AS QUALIFIED BY Apoha.—(1066-1067).

COMMENTARY.

In reality, no object qualified by Apoha is denoted by words. Because it has already been explained that no object is touched by Words anywhere, for the simple reason that the necessary conditions are absent. For example, Verbal Cognition, even though not pertaining to any external object, actually appears as apprehending its own mark—i.e. form—as something external; and it does not really touch the form of the object; because its apprehension is not in accordance with the real state of things.—(1066-1067)

Question:—"If that is so, then, why has the Teacher declared that 'words like Blue-Lotus express things qualified by the exclusion of other things'?"

Answer:——

TEXT (1068).

AS FOR THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE AUTHOR OF THE Lakṣaṇa—that 'Words express things qualified by the exclusion of other things', what it means is as follows.—(1068)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"What does it mean?"

Answer:——
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TEXTS (1069-1070).

Those things that are qualified by the Exclusion of other things,—
either as their cause or their instruments—are definitely
cognised as not mixed up with things of other kinds.
The Word expresses these things. And, because
it brings about the Cognition apprehending
those things, there is denial of the
'Universal' and such other com-
monalities.—(1069-1070)

COMMENTARY.

Things are of two kinds—external and imposed upon the Cognition; in regard to the external thing, there is no denotation by words; and it is only on account of words bringing about the conceptual content pertaining to them that it is said, figuratively, that 'the word denotes things'; and the purpose served by such figurative expression is the denial of the denotation of the Universal. Such is the meaning of the Texts as a whole.

The meaning of the words is explained:—'By the exclusion of other things';—i.e. by differentiation from other things;—this differentiation being either the Cause or the Instrument,—the Tree and other things are definitely Cognised as qualified; that is they are definitely differentiated from other things. This shows that in the compound 'arthāntaranivṛṭti-viśiṣṭān', the term 'nivṛtti' is to be construed as with the Instrumental Ending.

'Dhvāna' is Word.—(1069-1070)

As regards the thing imposed upon the Cognition, that is denoted by words primarily and directly.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1071).

Those things however which appear in the Cognition—these internal (subjective) things the Word denotes directly; and the fact of these things being qualified by 'Exclusion' has just been explained.—(1071)

COMMENTARY.

'Ayam'—stands for the word.

Question :—"How can the character of being qualified by the exclusion of other things be attached to them ?''

Answer :—'The fact, etc. etc.'

'Just'—that is, under Text 1069, it has been explained that things imposed upon the Cognition are excluded (or differentiated) from other things.—(1071)
Objecition:—"If no objective factor is expressed by the word, then how is it that the Teacher has declared that it is only a certain part of the Thing that is apprehended by the 'exclusion of other things'?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1072).

When it is said that 'a certain portion of the thing is apprehended by the Exclusion of other Things',—it is the said Reflection that is meant.—(1072)

COMMENTARY.

Objecition:—"Reflection being a property of the Cognition, how can it be a 'portion of the object'?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1073).

It is spoken of as a portion of the object, because it proceeds on the basis of the perception of the object as 'excluded from other things', and because it is superimposed upon the object.—(1073)

COMMENTARY.

Because it comes about through the perception of the object 'excluded from other things',—and because it is superimposed upon it—i.e. upon the Object excluded from other things—by deluded persons,—therefore that same Reflection is figuratively spoken of as 'part of the object'.—(1073)

In the following Text the author applies the Instrumental ending in the compound 'arthāntararāpaśṛtyā' in the case in question:—

TEXT (1074).

As before, the Instrumental Ending may signify either the Cause or the Instrument. Or it may signify that it is 'in that form'.—If the Thing were not differentiated from unlike things, then it could not be so.—(1074)

COMMENTARY.

'As before';—i.e. just as under Texts 1068–1070,—where it is said that 'the Word expresses things as qualified by the exclusion of other things',—so the same may be applied here also.—Or in all cases, the Instrumental Ending may be taken as signifying the idea of being 'in that form';—this is what is mentioned by the words 'tāna vātmanā'.
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Question:—"The exclusion of other things is a property belonging to the Object; as such, how can it be either the Cause or the Instrument of the apprehension of the Reflection?"

Answer:—'If the thing, etc. etc.'—That is, if the Thing were not excluded (and differentiated) from unlike things, then, in the form of its Reflection, it could not be apprehended as something excluded from unlike things. That is why the exclusion from other things is to be regarded as the Cause and the Instrument.—(1074)

It has been argued above (under Text, 949, by Kumārila) that—"one kind of qualification cannot bring about the cognition of a different kind, etc. etc."—This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (1075–1077).

What is meant by (the Cow) being 'different' is only the 'exclusion of the non-Cow'; and this exclusion is of the nature of that same difference.—Even when the difference has been asserted, the Thing itself does not entirely disappear. Thus even when it has the nature of the qualification, the cognition of the thing does not cease. Even when there is non-difference, the qualification is there as a creation of fancy. That character, having been withdrawn therefrom, has been placed there as if different; whereby it becomes its qualification, like the stick and other things.—(1075–1077)

COMMENTARY.

If the 'exclusion of other things' were meant to be something positive qualifying the Thing, then all the objections urged would be applicable. As a matter of fact, however, the 'exclusion of other things' which is held to be the qualification is in the form of the thing itself; so that the notion of the qualified is naturally in accord with that of the qualification. For instance, when one speaks of the 'exclusion' of the Cow 'from the non-Cow', this 'exclusion' is only of the nature of the 'difference of the Cow from the Horse and other things',—not anything else.—Hence, even though the exclusion, of the Cow, from the non-Cow, is mentioned in the negative form, when all that is meant is the negation of other things,—yet in reality, it forms the very essence of the Cow itself,—just like the 'difference'; that is, 'difference' is not anything different from the different thing,—it is that same; otherwise that thing could not figure in the 'difference' at all.

'Tat'—i.e. thus—even when the 'exclusion of others' is of the nature of the qualification, the idea of the 'Thing' itself does appear in regard to what is qualified by that qualification.

It might be argued as follows:—"In ordinary life the qualification is known to be something different from the qualified, as the stick of the Man
(stick-holder); and 'Exclusion' is (as you say) not different from the Thing; how then can this Exclusion be the qualification of the Thing?"  
The answer is—'Even when there is non-difference, etc. etc.'—In reality, nothing can be qualified by anything; because what does not accord any help cannot be a qualification;—if the according of help be admitted, then, in cases where the Cause may not exist at the time of the coming about of the effect, there could be no relation of qualification and qualified between the two things not existing at the same time;—while in the case of both existing at the same time, as the things would be already there in their accomplished forms, there would be no mutual help; and hence there could be no relation of qualification and qualified. Consequently, in the case of all things, what happens is that, though each of them stands separately, on its own footing, like so many iron-bars,—yet there is a jumbling up of them as a creation of fancy.

Thus then, though, in reality, there is no difference between the 'Exclusion' and that wherein the Exclusion subsists, yet, on the basis of an imaginary difference, there would be the relation of qualification and qualified between them.—(1075-1077)

It has been argued above (under Text 955, by Kumārila) that—"when Individuals, not being denoted, cannot be 'excluded', then what would be 'excluded' would be the Universal".

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (1078-1079).

Discriminators of Truth declare that what is denoted by the Word is mere 'Reflection'. People, not knowing the distinction between what is 'perceived' and what is 'fancied' regard it to be something 'external'.

—As that is what is apprehended (by words), Individuals are denoted by Words.—In reality however there is nothing that is denoted by words,—as has been proved already.—(1078-1079)

COMMENTARY.

The reason 'because Individuals are not denoted' is not-admitted. Because the 'non-denotability' of words that we have asserted is only in view of the real aspect of things, not in regard to the illusory aspect. Under the illusory aspect, it is only Individuals that are denoted,—as is happily accepted by people wanting in true insight, and is well known; so that the Reason adduced is not-admitted.

What is 'perceived' is the external thing, in the shape of Specific Individuality;—what is 'fancied',—imaginary—is the 'Reflection' that figures in Determinate Conception.
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS. 563

If the Reason adduced by you is the real ‘non-denotability of Individuals’,—then we also do not admit of any real ‘exclusion’ of Individuals; so that in that case your argument proves only what is already admitted by us, and is, as such, superfluous, futile.—This is what is shown by the sentence—‘In reality, etc. etc.’.—(1078-1079)

The following Text reasserts the fact of the Opponent’s Reason being ‘not-admitted’:

TEXT (1080).

Thus, Individuals being denoted by words, they are also capable of being ‘excluded’. As regards the Universal, there can be no ‘exclusion’. Even if there were ‘Exclusion’ of it, it could not have the character of the ‘entity’.—(1080)

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted (under 955) that—‘in that case what would be excluded would be the Universal; and as subject to Exclusion, this Universal would be an entity’;—and the author now shows that the Reason—‘Because Individualities cannot be excluded’ is ‘not admitted’ and it is also ‘Inconclusive’—by the words ‘As regards the Universal, etc. etc.’—there can be no exclusion of it; because it has been shown that there can be exclusion of Individuals only.

‘Even if there were, etc.’—that is to say, if the said Reason is put forward in support of the conclusion contrary to the Opponent’s, there would be nothing to set aside such a conclusion. —(1080)

It has been argued (under Text 956, by Kumārila) that—‘Negation cannot be subject to exclusion, etc. etc’.

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (1081).

Negation is not ‘excluded’ (denied) in the words ‘Negation is not Negation’; it is however clearly ‘excluded’ (denied) in such expressions as ‘The Entity is not of the nature of Negation’.—(1081)

COMMENTARY.

Negation is not ‘excluded’ in the words ‘Negation is not Negation’,—by virtue of which it would abandon its negative character (as urged by Kumārila). But, what is an Entity has the positive character, and as such remains distinct from the Negative; hence by implication, the Negation becomes subject to ‘Exclusion’; this is what is meant by us.—(1081)

This same idea is further clarified in the following—
TEXT (1082).

When one thing is not of the nature of another, it is called its 'Apotha' (Exclusion, Negation), and the entity is not of the nature of Negation. But even though there is 'Apotha' of Negation, it does not acquire the character of the positive entity.—(1082)

COMMENTARY.

Though in this way, there is Apoaha of Negation, yet it does not become a positive entity.—(1082)

The author is going to cite an example which is accepted by both parties, and through that, is going to make it clear how the Reason of the Opponent is 'Inconclusive':—

TEXT (1083).

Even though it is urged that 'things are not produced by Primordial Matter or God and so forth',—the character of being produced by Primordial Matter, God and so forth does not become a positive entity.—(1083)

COMMENTARY.

You, Māmānsakas, also do not admit the fact of Things having been created by Primordial Matter, or God, or Time and other Causes; but the negation (denial) of this fact does not make it a positive entity;—in the same manner, even though there is Apoaha (negation, denial) of Negation, yet that does not make the Negation a positive entity. Consequently, the Reason adduced by you is Inconclusive.—(1083)

It has been argued (under Text 950, by Kumārila) that—"there would be a great calamity in that the Non-existent would become a positive entity". The following Text shows that this also becomes answered by the above pointing out of the Inconclusive character of the Opponent's Reason:—

TEXT (1084).

Thus then there is no such calamity as that of the Non-existent becoming a positive entity. In fact, even on the establishment of the Negation, the existence remains there (in the Entity),—and the non-existence (of the Negation) becomes established thereby.—(1084)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued (under the same Text 959) that—"if Non-existence is not established, there can be no Existence; nor can Non-existence
be established ".—The answer to this is that—even on the establishment of the Negation, in the above manner, the existence of the Positive Entity does become established; as that rests upon its own nature. And the above-mentioned establishment of Negation also constitutes its non-existence.

The answer to this argument has been made out of its turn (along with that to Kumārila's argument put forward under 955 et seq.), because the same answer is applicable to both.—(1084)

The Author now reverts to the order of sequence of the Opponent's arguments, and takes up that put forward in Text 957, to the effect that—"If the Negation of the Negation is different in character from the Negation itself, then it becomes a positive entity".

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (1085).**

The Cow, which is 'the negation of the Non-Cow' is held to be a positive entity, and of a character different from that of the Non-Cow; but by this the Non-cow does not become the Cow, for me.—(1085)

**COMMENTARY.**

That it would become a positive entity does not indicate an undesirable contingency for us; as it is quite agreeable to us. Because the Cow is actually held by us to be a positive entity quite different in character from the 'Non-cow' in the shape of the Horse and other animals,—it is not held to be of the nature of Negation. So that it would be a positive entity. And as the difference of the Cow from the Non-cow is what is admitted by us, there is no such contingency as that of the Non-cow becoming the Cow.—(1085)

It has been argued (under Text 960, by Kumārila) that—"Impressions cannot pertain to the Non-entity".—The following Texts show that this is both 'Not-admitted' and 'Inconclusive':—

**TEXTS (1086-1087).**

Even in regard to Non-entities, there can be Impressions, created only by the Mind (Cognitions),—just as in the case of things of various kinds created by imagination. This diversity among Apohas, as also their positive character, would be assumed on the basis of the diversity among Impressions; just as in the case of creations of imagination.—(1086-1087)

**COMMENTARY.**

That the Mind (Cognition) does not operate upon non-entities cannot be admitted. Because, the Mind (Cognition) does operate through the
imposing of the form of things created by mere imagination; and the Mind (Cognition) thus does create Impressions in the subsequent mind, which tends to bring about future homogeneous conceptual contents. Because, again, through the development of the 'Chain', it may get at an awakening cognition, which brings about a similar Mind (Cognition). In the same manner, in the case of *Apohas*, there would be difference among themselves and also the positive character, due to the influence of assumptions and imagination.

Thus the Reason adduced by *Kumārila* is 'inconclusive'.

The meaning of the words of the Text is clear; hence we have not explained them in detail.—(1086-1087)

It has been argued (under 961, by *Kumārila*) that—"you cannot secure diversity among words also, on the basis of Impressions".

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (1088).**

*Just as we have explained the fact of 'the exclusion of other things' being denoted by words,—exactly in the same manner should be understood the 'exclusion of other words' also.—*(1088)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Just as, etc. etc.' :—i.e. as being in the form of Reflection; of which the difference from other Reflections is clearly perceived.

Hence what has been discussed in detail (by the Opponent) is entirely irrelevant.—Such is the sense of the Text.—(1088)

It has been argued (under Text 964, by *Kumārila*) that—"There could be no relation of *Denoter and Denoted* between two *Apohas*".—The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (1089).**

*Inasmuch as the *Apohas* are apprehended as 'things', they cannot be regarded as non-entities; this is well known and admitted as pertaining to the *Illusory* aspect of things. As regards the *Real* aspect, what the opponent seeks to prove is accepted by us already.—*(1089)

**COMMENTARY.**

If by the reason adduced—"Because they are non-entities"—it is meant to be a general statement of fact, then that is not admitted; because the two *Apohas* in question—which are in the form of Reflections—one of which is the *denoter* and the other is the *denoted*.—are actually recognised by deluded
persons as *external things*; and hence they are endowed with *illusory reality*.—(1089)

If, on the other hand, the Reason adduced pertains to the Real Character of 'Entity',—then the argument is superfluous. Because in fact, we do not accept anything as being the *denoter* or *denoted*, *in reality*.—This is what is shown in the following—

**TEXT (1090).**

*In reality, there can be nothing that can be either denoter or denoted,—as all things being in perpetual flux, no concomitance is possible.—*(1090)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Because no concomitance is possible',—that is to say, the Specific Individuality cannot be concomitant with—present at the time of—the making of the Convention and that of the using of the word.—(1090)

The following might be urged by the other party:—'We are not denying the *real* relation of *Denoted* and *Denoter*; what we are denying is the *illusory* relation of *Denoted* and *Denoter* which is based upon the *real* fact of the two *Aphoras* being non-entities; so that our Reason is not *not-admitted*; nor is our conclusion open to the defect of being superfluous'.

The following *Texts* proceed to show that, if both are regarded to be illusory and real, then the two objections do become applicable:—

**TEXTS (1091-1092).**

*If it is the illusory Relation of Denoter and Denoted that is denied, on the basis of the real fact of the two Exclusions being non-entities,—even so, 'falsity' becomes unavoidable; in view of such words and things denoted by them as are the creation of imagination.—*(1091-1092)

**COMMENTARY.**

Under the circumstances, the Reason would be Inconclusive; as in the case of such creatures of imagination as *Mahāśvētā* and the like, and also words denoting these,—even though they are non-entities *in reality*, yet the *illusory* Relation of Denoter and Denoted is actually present.—(1091-1092)

The following might be urged by the other party:—'In the case of things like *Mahāśvētā*, the denoted thing, in the shape of the Universal, is
real,—and also the word denoting them; and hence their case does not falsify our Premiss."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1093).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO 'UNIVERSAL' (COMMONALITY) IN THE CASE OF THE THINGS IN QUESTION, WHICH COULD BE DENOTED; NOR IS THERE ANY UNIVERSAL WORD DENOTATIVE OF THAT UNIVERSAL; NOR DOES THE DENOTATIVE CHARACTER BELONG TO THE WORD, AS SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITIES ARE ALL IN PERPETUAL FLUX.—(1093)

COMMENTARY.

In course of our examination of the 'Universal', we have rejected, in great detail, the whole conception of the 'Universal'; hence the assertion that the 'Universal' is the denoted and denoter in the case in question makes the Reason 'false' (Inconclusive).

'Tasya'—of the Universal.

The term 'Universal' has to be taken as understood after 'denotative' which connects it with the context.

It might be argued that—"Even though there is no real entity denoted in the case, yet the denotative certainly is there in the shape of the Specific Individuality of the word 'Mahāśvētā', etc. ".

The answer to this is—'Nor does the denotative, etc. etc.' ;—that is, it has been shown that the 'Perpetual Flux' embraces all things; hence the Specific Individuality of words cannot be denotative, because as it is momentary, it could not form the subject of any Convention; also because it could not be concomitant with the time of usage; as explained before.—(1093)

The following Text sums up the argument:—

TEXT (1094).

HENCE BOTH OF THESE SHOULD BE HELD TO CONSIST IN THE ILLUSORY 'REFLECTION' ETC.—THUS IN VIEW OF THESE, THE 'FALSY' REMAINS UNSHAKEN.—(1094)

COMMENTARY.

'Both'—i.e. the denoted thing as well as the denotative Word.

'Reflection, etc.'—The 'et cetera' is meant to show that even under the view that Ideas (Cognitions) are formless, it would be necessary to admit the existence, within the Idea itself, of another specific Idea in the form of the conception of 'object' where there is no real object.
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"In view of these"—i.e. things created by imagination.
'Tat' stands for 'tasmat', 'therefore', 'thus'. Or it may mean 'of that'—i.e. of the Reason,—the 'falsity' remains unshaken.—(1094)

It has been argued (under Text 966, by Kumārila) that—"one for whom there is nothing positive denoted by words,—for him there can be no negation either".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1095-1096).

For the man by whom the denotation of words is not admitted to be anything positive, the Mind (Cognition) reflecting the Thing is what is brought about by the Word, and this Cognition ultimately brings about the idea of the thing. When words express their meanings, there is, by implication, the exclusion of other things; and through the presence of this there is negation also, as preceded by the apprehension of the positive thing.—(1095-1096).

COMMENTARY.

It is not that we absolutely do not admit the fact of words denoting positive things;—by virtue of which you have urged the undesirable contingency against us. As a matter of fact, it is admitted by us that the word produces the 'mental condition' (Cognition) which ultimately provides the idea of the Thing; so that in our opinion also what is denoted by the word is a positive entity which is illusory in character. In reality however, there is nothing that is denoted by words; hence it is only the real positive character of things that is denied by us;—so that the illusory positive character of the thing denoted by words being accepted by us,—whenever there is anything positive denoted by the word,—the negation of other things becomes apprehended by implication; and hence it is quite possible to have this negation as preceded by the apprehension of the positive thing.—(1095-1096)

The following might be urged by the other party:—"If it is admitted that the Word does denote positive entities, then, how is it that in the
Hūtumukha, the Lakṣaṇakāra has spoken of the 'impossibility of the positive'?"

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (1097).**

The 'impossibility of the Positive' has been averred on the ground that such things as the 'Universal' and the like cannot form the subject of Words and Determinate Conceptions.—(1097)

**COMMENTARY.**

Inasmuch as there are no real 'denoted things' or 'denotative words' in the shape of the 'Universal' and the like,—there can be no real subject for Words and Determinate Conceptions,—it has been asserted by the great Teacher,—in view of the real state of things,—that 'there is impossibility of the Positive'; hence there is no contradiction at all.—(1097)

It has been argued (under Texts 967, etc., by Kumārila) that—"If it is held that it is mere Apoha that is denoted, etc. etc.".—The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (1098).**

From the term 'Blue-Lotus', only one thing is cognised,—and that is the Reflection excluded (differentiated) from the 'non-blue' and the 'non-lotus'.—(1098)

**COMMENTARY.**

What the term 'Blue-lotus' expresses is, not mere negation, but—the single Reflection of the object—as excluded from the 'non-blue' and the 'non-lotus',—partaking of the nature of both. Consequently, in the case of words like 'Blue-lotus', there certainly is the denotation of things of mixed character,—which has to be admitted on the strength of actual cognitions appearing in that form; and on the basis of this the necessary co-ordination becomes quite possible.—(1098)

It has been argued (under Text 972, by Kumārila) that—"If it be asserted that what is denoted is the thing endowed with the Apoha, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:
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TEXTS (1099–1101).

We do not hold that what the word denotes is the thing endowed with the 'exclusion' (Apoha) of other things; because for us, there is no 'exclusion' other than the thing excluded from something else. Hence the objection that 'it is dependent upon something else' is not applicable to the 'denotation of words' as honestly explained,—in the way that it is to the theory of the 'Universal' (being denoted by words). Because there is no difference between the Relation of qualification and qualified and 'co-ordination.' Consequently there is no incongruity in the theory that it is Apoha that is denoted by words.—(1099–1101)

COMMENTARY.

If exclusion were something entirely different from the Thing excluded, then there would be the possibility of the incongruity that has been urged against the view that 'what is denoted is the Thing as endowed with the Apoha'. As a matter of fact however, for us, exclusion is not something different from the Thing excluded from others;—in fact, it is the excluded thing itself that is spoken of as 'exclusion', when what is meant to be stressed is the mere negation of other things.—Consequently, the incongruity that has been urged against the Denotation of Universals,—in the form that, if the Universal is what is primarily denoted by words, the denotation of the Thing endowed with that Universal would be dependent upon that (Universal), and consequently there being no indication of the varieties of the said Thing, there is no possibility of co-ordination or any other relationship with it,—does not apply to the theory of Apoha, as there is no denotation (under this theory) of anything equipped with the 'Exclusion of other things', as something different.

This is what is meant by the words 'Hence the objection, etc. etc.'.

'Tat'—'tasmāt'—Hence.

'Avadātam, etc. etc.'—i.e. to the 'denotation of words' as expounded by the Teacher Dīnāgā, with the purest conviction.

The grounds for this inapplicability are next stated—'Because there is no difference, etc. etc.'—That is, there the Denotation of words—in the shape of the 'Exclusion of other things'—is not different from,—not anything other than—that which is excluded from others.

'Qualification and qualified, etc. etc.'—This is easily understood.—(1099–1101)

The following Texts show how co-ordination, etc. is not incompatible:
TEXTS (1102–1104).

When the word ‘blue’ is uttered alone, the particular ‘Reflection’ that appears is one that scintillates through all blue things such as the Cuckoo, the Lotus, the Blue Bee and the like.—When the word ‘Lotus’ is added to it, then the Cuckoo, the Collyrium and other blue things become ‘excluded’, and the resultant Reflection is one that is further particularised and becomes definitely applied to one blue thing only.—Thus the necessary co-ordination is not rendered impossible.

All this explanation is absolutely impossible under the theory of the other party.

(1102–1104)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, when the word ‘blue’ is pronounced, there appears the Conceptual Reflection (the Image) of a doubtful form, inasmuch as it serves to exclude the ‘yellow’ and other colours and things having these colours, and envisages all blue things, such as the Blue Bee, the Cuckoo, the Collyrium and so forth.—When the word ‘lotus’ is added (to the word ‘blue’), the same Reflection becomes apprehended as differentiated from the Cuckoo and the rest, and particularly restricted to the thing excluded from the Non-lotus. Thus in relation to the said Conceptual Reflection, there is a mutual relation of differentiation and differentiated between the two words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’; and hence there is nothing incongruous in their being related to each other as qualification and qualified.

Or (another explanation possible is that) both the words together express the thing in the form of a single Reflected Image excluded from the ‘non-blue’ and the ‘non-lotus’; so that both pertaining to the same thing, there is co-ordination between them.

Such is the meaning of the Texts as a whole. The meaning of the words is as follows:—‘Scintillating’,—i.e. not restricted to any particular thing, doubtful.—The word ‘pika’ here stands for the Cuckoo.—The rest is easy.

It might be argued (by the Opponent) that—‘under our theory also, the co-ordination would be all right’.

The answer to this is—'All this explanation is, etc. etc.';—that is, the above-described explanation of ‘co-ordination’, etc.—(1102–1104)

Question:—"Why should it be impossible under our theory?"

Answer:—
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

TEXTS (1105-1106).

BY THE SINGLE WORD, THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY BECOMES EXPRESSED IN ITS ENTIRETY; AND WHEN THAT HAS BEEN DENOTED, WHY SHOULD THERE BE NON-COGNITION OF OTHER THINGS,—FOR THE SAKE OF WHICH ANOTHER WORD WOULD BE PRONOUNCED,—WHEN, IN REALITY, THE THING HAS BEEN DENOTED IN ITS ENTIRETY?—IF NOT, THEN IT BECOMES more than one.

—(1105-1106)

COMMENTARY.

Under the theory of those who hold that words denote positive entities when the single word 'blue' expresses the Specific Individuality of the Lotus and other (blue) things,—why should there be any absence of cognition of such other particular things as the Lotus and the Collyrium,—since the Blue Thing has been denoted in its entirety? Because the idea that one and the same thing should be both known and unknown to the same person involves self-contradiction. This is what is pointed out in the text by the words 'Why should there, etc. etc.'—'Non-Cognition' stands for bad cognition, i.e. doubtful and wrong cognition.

Thus there being no doubtful or wrong cognition, there can be no desire on the part of the speaker to pronounce any other word, such as 'Lotus' and the like. This is shown by the words 'for the sake of which, etc. etc.'—'For the sake of which',—i.e. for the purpose of removing which non-cognition.

It might be argued that—"when the Blue thing has been denoted by the single word 'blue', it has been denoted only in part, not in its entirety; hence for the purpose of speaking of other characteristics of the Blue Thing, another word is sought after".

The answer to this is—"When in reality, etc. etc.' There are no parts in any single object, by virtue of which there could be denotation in part; because the one (whole) and the many (parts) are mutual contradictories, one being the negation of the other; so that what your explanation does is to establish as many distinct things as there may be parts; and hence there would be no such concepts as 'one' and 'many'.—(1105-1106)'

The following might be urged by the other party:—"The word 'blue' does not denote a particular substance; it denotes either the quality called 'Blue' or the Universal 'Blue' inhering in that quality; the word 'lotus' also denotes the Universal 'Lotus', not any particular substance; hence, as the two words denote two different things, it is only right that there should be a need for the word 'lotus' (after the utterance of the word 'blue').".

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXTS (1107-1108).

If the Universal 'Blue', or the Quality Blue, is denoted by the word 'blue', then the word 'Lotus' (pronounced with that word) should denote another Universal 'Lotus';

—Such being the case, there would be difference between the two words, just as there is between the words 'Bakula' (a kind of flower) and 'Utpala' (Lotus); so that any co-ordination, etc. between them will be all the more impossible.—(1107-1108)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'anyāṇindivarajāti' is to be taken as a Karmādhāraya,—

'anyā' qualifying 'indivarajātih'.

'Vyavasayā'—i.e. should be denoted.

'Utpalashrutā'—has the Ablative ending.

Thus under this theory co-ordination would be all the more impossible; since, like the words 'bakula' and 'upala', the words 'blue' and 'lotus' would not be applicable to the same thing. There can be no such expression as 'bakulam upalam'.—(1107-1108)

The following might be urged by the other party:—"Though the word 'blue' denotes a particular Universal and a particular Quality, yet, through those, it also denotes the substance related to the Blue Quality and the 'Blue' Universal;—similarly the word 'lotus', through the Universal 'Lotus', denotes the substance;—in this way their application to the same thing being possible, there would be co-ordination between them; which would not be possible in the case of the words 'bakula' and 'upala'."

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (1109-1110).

If it is the Substance related to the Quality and the Universal that is denoted by the word 'Blue', then the word 'Lotus' would be useless. As what is related to the said two factors (Quality and Universal) is exactly what is equipped with the Universal 'Lotus'; and as this will have been already expressed by the word 'Blue', the word 'Lotus' would be useless.—(1109-1110)

COMMENTARY.

'The Quality'—called 'blue'; the 'Universal'—as the Universal 'blue'; that which is related to these is 'Gunātaṇḍāṇisambāddham'.
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

'The word Lotus would be useless',—as the substance will have been already expressed by the word 'blue'. This is explained by the words—
'As what is related, etc. etc.';—'the two factors' are the Quality and the Universal.

The following might be urged (by the other party)—"Even though the word 'blue' denotes the substance possessing that quality and belonging to that Universal,—yet, inasmuch as the word 'blue' has been found to be applicable to several substances, the man who hears the word pronounced does not obtain any definite idea of the Lotus, specifically;—as the Cuckoo and other things are also 'blue'; hence, the use of the word 'lotus' becomes useful, in that it serves to dispel the suspicion that other substances might be meant".

This is not right; as this assertion is made because the person making it does not know the subject under consideration. The subject under discussion is that under the theory that words denote positive things, there can be no co-ordination, etc. If then, the word 'lotus' is used only for the dispelling of the said suspicion,—and not for the denoting of a substance,—then, in that case, a positive entity would not form the denotation of the word; as all that the word 'lotus' will have done would be the dispelling of the form wrongly imposed upon it. Then again, it is a self-contradictory statement that is made, when it is asserted that "the word 'blue' denotes the substance Lotus'" and yet "there is no certainty produced in the mind of the hearer". That cannot form the denotation of a word, in regard to which no certainty is produced. If it did, that would lead to absurdities. Nor again is there any room for suspicion in what has been cognised with certainty; as 'Certain Cognition' and 'Uncertain Cognition' are mutually destructive.

It might be said that—"Even though the words Blue and Lotus are not applicable to the same thing, yet what are denoted by them—viz. the Quality and the Universal—do subsist in the same substance,—and hence through their denotations, there would be co-ordination between them."

This cannot be right; as it would lead to absurd contingencies. In the manner stated, there would be co-ordination between the words 'Colour' and 'Taste' also; as what are denoted by them—i.e. Colour and Taste—subsist in the same substance, Earth. Further (under the explanation offered) there would be no possibility of the expression 'blue lotus' bringing about the cognition of a single thing; as the two words would be separately denoting the Quality and the Universal subsisting in the single substance; and unless the words bring about the cognition of the same thing, there can be no co-ordination between them.—Enough of this!—(1109-1110)

The following might be urged:—"The word 'lotus' does not denote exactly the same thing that is related to the quality Blue and the Universal 'Blue'; it denotes something different. Hence the word 'lotus' cannot be useless."

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (1111).

If what belongs to the Universal 'Lotus' is different from what is related to the Quality and Universal (Blue),—then the words 'Blue' and 'Lotus' cannot be co-substrate (co-ordinated).—(1111)

COMMENTARY.

There is a hiatus after the particle 'yadi' ('if').
'They cannot be co-substrate';—i.e. they cannot be co-ordinated.—(1111)

The following might be urged:—'Though the same Substance is denoted by the word 'blue', and also by the word 'Lotus',—yet the word 'blue' denotes the Substance, not as something related to the Universal 'Lotus', but as related to the Quality Blue and the Universal 'Blue'; consequently, the word 'Lotus' is used for the purpose of expressing the fact of the substance being related to the Universal 'Lotus'; and as such it cannot be useless.'

This argument is raised and answered in the following:—

TEXTS (1112–1114).

If the word 'Blue' does not denote the substance related to the Quality and the Universal (Blue) as related to the Universal 'Lotus',—then the substance as related to the Universal 'Lotus' should be something totally different; as a matter of fact, what is related to the Universal 'Lotus' is that same substance that is related to the other two (Quality and Universal 'Blue'); and that substance has already been expressed, in its entirety—not in part,—by the word 'Blue',—and has also been apprehended by the verbal cognition brought about by that word;—so that the word 'Lotus' would be entirely useless.—(1112–1114)

COMMENTARY.

If the word 'blue' does not denote the Substance related to the Quality and the Universal 'Blue', as related to the Universal 'Lotus',—then (there is the following incongruity).

The substance as related to the Universal 'Lotus' is not something entirely different from the substance as related to the Quality and Universal 'Blue',—on the basis whereof on the denotation of the Substance related to the Quality and Universal 'Blue', there might be no denotation of the Substance as related to the Universal 'Lotus'. As a matter of fact, however, there is
no difference between the correlatives in the two cases; and hence the two substances must also be the same; and hence it cannot be right that on the denotation of one there should be no denotation of the other.

Further, even admitting what has been said,—the substance related to the Universal 'Lotus' may be different from that related to the Quality and the Universal 'Blue'; even so the word 'Lotus' would be useless. Because that impartite thing which is related to the Universal 'Lotus' is exactly what is related to the two factors of the Quality and the Universal 'Blue',—it is not anything different from it; and as that thing is impartite, it must have been denoted in its entirety, by the word 'blue'; and it would also have figured in the Verbal Cognition—brought about by that word;—hence what would be left there undenoted in the denoting of which the word 'Lotus' would have its use?—(1112–1114)

Uddyotakara has argued as follows:—"The assumption (made by the Buddhist) that 'the object being impartite, whenever it is cognised, it is in its entirety, not in part' is not possible; because the word 'sarva', ('entire', 'whole'), is applied to things not-one (several), while the word 'ek①' is applicable to the part.'

Anticipating this argument, the Author provides the following answer to it:

TEXTS (1115–1116).

If (it be said that), in regard to a thing devoid of plurality, the assumption of the alternatives of 'entirety' and 'severality' ('plurality') is not possible,—such an assertion could only proceed from ignorance of the meaning of the sentence (used by us).

What we made clear was that the first word 'blue' itself expressed all that had to be expressed, and no part of itself was left (unexpressed).—1115–1116

COMMENTARY.

'Devoid of plurality'—i.e. the thing without parts.

'The assumption, etc. etc.'—the assumption of the alternatives—viz.: whether what figures as the object of the cognition is the thing in its entirety, or in parts.

This assertion proceeds from ignorance of what our statement means. For instance, what is meant by our statement that 'by the very first word 'blue' the thing has been expressed in its entirety' is as follows:—What has been expressed is the thing exactly as it stands, and no aspect of it has been left out, for the denoting of which the word 'lotus' would be required; because the thing has no parts.—Such being our meaning, the argument urged
by Uddyotakara is in the nature of *Verbal Casuistry* (attributing a meaning to our statement never intended by us).—(1115-1116)

Thus, just as the word ‘lotus’ would be useless, so also the use of such words as ‘non-eternal’ would be useless; or if they were used, they would be only synonyms,—like the words ‘taru’ and ‘pādapa’ (both of which stand for *tree*).—This is the application of the said reasoning to other cases indicated in the following—

**TEXT (1117).**

**IN THIS SAME WAY, THE UTTERING OF OTHER WORDS ALSO WOULD BE FRUITLESS. IN FACT, THE UTTERANCE OF SUCH WORDS WOULD ONLY MEAN SO MANY SYNONYMS.—(1117)**

**COMMENTARY.**

‘Udāraṇam’—i.e. use, utterance.

‘Uktau’—i.e. in the uttering.

This idea has been expressed in the following statement:—‘A certain thing having been entirely taken up by a word—or by an idea,—there remains nothing else that could be expressed by another word or Idea; hence these would be synonyms’.—(1117)

The following might be urged:—‘Under the theory of the Buddhist also, when a certain thing has been expressed by a word, there could be no doubtful or wrong cognition in regard to other aspects, and hence why should there not be the incongruity of no other words being used?”

*Answer* :

**TEXTS (1118-1119).**

**FOR US, NO EXTERNAL THING IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORD; NOR IS ANY IDEA OF EXTERNAL THINGS HELD TO PROCEED FROM WORDS,—BY VIRTUE OF WHICH, THE THING IN ITS ENTIRETY HAVING BEEN TAKEN UP BY THESE TWO, ANY SUBSEQUENT WORD WOULD BE A MERE SYNONYM OF THAT WORD.—(1118-1119)**

**COMMENTARY.**

‘These two’—i.e. the said word and the said *Idea*.

‘Subsequent’,—coming later on.—(1118-1119)

*Question*:—“Why is not the objection regarding the *absence of co-ordination* applicable to the view under which the denotation of words is ‘illusory’?”

*Answer* :—
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

TEXTS (1120-1121).

WHAT IS PRODUCED BY THE WORD, IN DUE COURSE, IS ONLY THE Reflection; AND IT IS THROUGH DELUSION THAT THIS APPEARS AS one AND AS external. THE Co-ORDINATION AND OTHER RELATIONS ARE DUE TO THE Reflection. IN REALITY, ALL THESE WORDS ARE HELD TO BE OBJECT-LESS.—(1120-1121)

COMMENTARY.

When the word 'blue' is uttered, what it brings about first of all is the conceptual Reflection, excluded (differentiated) from all non-blue things, and scintillating over the Lotus and other (blue) things and hence not excluding these latter, and conceived (objectively) in the external form; then when subsequently, the word 'Lotus' is uttered, what it brings about is the conceptual Reflection, excluded from all that is non-lotus, and with the form of only one external thing superimposed upon it;—in this way, in due course, there is brought about an illusory (conjunct) conceptual Reflection, excluded from the 'non-blue' and the 'non-lotus', with the one external form imposed upon it;—and it is in consequence of this that an illusory co-ordination becomes possible.

"Why is it not so, in reality?"

Answer :—In reality, all these words are held to be objectless.—(1120-1121)

It has been argued (under Text 973, by Kumārīla) that—"there can be no connection between the Apoḥa and Gender, Number, etc".

The answer to this is as follows :

TEXT (1122).

AS FOR THE CONNECTION OF GENDER AND NUMBER, IT IS NOT PRESENT IN INDIVIDUALS ALSO; IN FACT, SUCH CONNECTION IS BASED ENTIRELY UPON CONVENTIONS SET UP BY THE WHIMS OF PEOPLE; IT IS NOTHING REAL.—(1122)

COMMENTARY.

The fact of Gender, Number, etc. belonging to things is not admitted. In fact it is due entirely to Conventions set up at whim.

'In Individuals also'—the term 'also' is meant to include the Apoḥa.

The argument may be formulated thus :—When one thing does not follow the presence and absence of another thing, then it cannot belong to it;—e.g. Coolness and Fire;—Gender and Number do not follow the presence and absence of individual things,—hence there is non-perception of the wider term (which implies the non-existence of the narrower).—(1122)
The following text shows that the Reason just adduced cannot be said to be 'not admitted':—

TEXT (1123).

There are three words (denoting the same thing)—'Taṭah' (Masculine) 'Taṭam' (Neuter) and 'Taṭi' (Feminine); and yet any one thing cannot have three forms; for if it did, then, all cognitions would have to be variegated in character.—(1123)

COMMENTARY.

If Gender really belonged to things, then, on account of the three words—'tataḥ', 'tataṃ' and 'taṭi'—in three genders, being applicable to the same thing (Bank of rivers);—the thing would have three forms; and it is not possible for one and the same thing to have the three forms—Masculine, Neuter and Feminine; if it did, it would cease to be one thing. If, even in the presence of mutually incompatible properties, things were to be one, then the entire universe would become a single thing; and in that case it would all be produced and destroyed at one and the same time.

Then again, on account of all things being expressed, by either one word or by another, as having the three genders, all cognitions relating to them would have to be variegated in character.—(1123)

The following might be urged:—'Even though all things may have three genders, yet the cognitions of things would appear exactly as envisaging that form alone which the speaker may desire to speak of; hence they could not be of variegated character.'

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1124).

If they were dependent upon the speaker’s whim, then the cognitions would not envisage the things at all. Under that whim, the cognitions should be of one form, and yet the thing is not of one form.—(1124)

COMMENTARY.

'If they, etc.'—i.e. if the cognitions were dependent upon the whim.

If, through the Speaker’s whim, the Cognitions be of one form, then the Cognitions in question could not envisage things of three kinds (as having three Genders); because no single thing has that (mixed) form; and it would thus be as objectless as the visual cognition of sound!

'Tadvashat',—i.e. through the speaker’s whim.—(1124)
Some people think that "the three genders in the case of the words cited may be explained as pertaining to the three states of the thing concerned (River-bank),—the three states being those of destruction, appearance and continuance".

That this also cannot be right is shown in the following—

**TEXT (1125).**

**IF THE APPLICATION OF THE GENDERS WERE BASED UPON THE STATES OF continuance, appearance and destruction,—THEN, ALL THE THREE GENDERS WOULD BECOME APPLICABLE TO ALL THINGS.—(1125)**

**COMMENTARY.**

There is a hiatus after 'syāt' (the conditional clause ending there).

If the 'application'—regulation—of genders were based upon the states of continuance and the rest, then all the three genders would be applicable to all things,—like the River-bank, the Chain and so forth. Because, as in the case of the River-bank, so elsewhere also, all the three states of continuance and the rest would be there. Otherwise, there should not be three genders in the case of the three words 'tataḥ', 'taś' and 'taśam' also; as there is no difference between the two cases. Thus the definition proposed becomes too wide.—(1125)

The definition is 'too narrow' also, because it is not true in all cases;—this is what is shown in the following—

**TEXT (1126).**

**THERE ARE THREE WORDS USED (IN CONNECTION WITH NON-ENTITIES)—'Abhāvāḥ' (MASCULINE), 'Nirupākhyam' (NEUTER) AND 'Tuchchhataḥ' (FEMININE); WHAT SORT OF CONNECTION WITH THE STATES OF continuance, ETC. COULD BE ASSUMED IN REGARD TO THE NON-ENTITIES (spoken of by these words)?—(1126)**

**COMMENTARY.**

Even in the case of non-entities,—such as the Hare's Horn and the lake,—the states of continuance, etc. are not there; and yet in regard to them words of all three genders are applied—in the shape of 'abhāvāḥ' (Masculine; Non-existent), 'Nirupākhyam' (Neuter, Featureless) and 'Tuchchhataḥ' (Feminine, Insignificant). So that the proposed regulation of genders cannot include such cases; hence it is too narrow.—(1126)
TEXTS (1127–1130).

Of things,—'Appearance' is Birth; 'Destruction' is perishing; and 'Continuance' is the Thing in its own form. Now in Birth there is no perishing; why then is it spoken of as 'Utpattiḥ' (Feminine)? Nor is there existence in its own form; why then is it spoken of as 'janma' (Neuter)? In Destruction also, the other two states are not there; why then is it spoken of as 'tirobhāvah' (Masculine), 'nāshah' (Masculine) and 'tirobhavanam' (Neuter)? As regards Continuance also, on what ground is it spoken of as 'sthitiḥ' (Feminine) and 'svabhāvak' (Masculine)?—If the form of these is not differentiated, then they should always be in one and the same gender.—(1127–1130)

COMMENTARY.

For the following reason, the explanation provided is too narrow.—Because in connection with the same said states of Continuance and the rest, it is found that to each of these, words of all the three genders are applied. For instance, Appearance is spoken of as 'upādaḥ' (Birth, Masculine); Destruction is spoken of as 'nāshah' (Perishing, Masculine); Continuance is spoken of as 'ātmasvarūpam' (its own form, Neuter).—Now as regards Appearance, there can be no 'continuance' or 'destruction' in it; how then could such words as 'upattih' (Feminine) and 'janma' (Neuter) be applied to it? Similarly as regards Destruction, there can be no 'continuance' or 'appearance' in it; how then could it be spoken of by such terms as 'tirobhāvah' (Masculine), 'vināshah' (Masculine) and 'tirobhavanam' (Neuter)?—The particle 'api' in the Text serves to show that Destruction itself could not be spoken of by that same word.—Similarly, as regards Continuance, Destruction and Appearance being impossible therein,—it has to be explained on what grounds it is spoken of as 'sthitiḥ' (Feminine) and 'svabhāvak' (Masculine).

It might be said that—"inasmuch as these, Continuance and the rest, are not differentiated among themselves, each of them may be capable of taking all the three Genders".

The answer to this is stated in the words—'If the form of these, etc. etc.';—that is, if the form of these is not differentiated from each other, then there should, in reality, be only one, not three, Genders.—(1127–1130)

The other party says:—"The Feminine, Masculine and Neuter are so many different Universals, like the Universal 'Cow' and the like."

The answer to this is as follows:—
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

TEXT (1131).

IF THE FEMININE AND THE REST BE HELD TO BE SO MANY DIFFERENT UNIVERSALS,—THEN ALL SUCH SHOULD BE REGARDED AS DISCARDED BY THE REJECTION OF THE 'UNIVERSAL' ITSELF.—(1131)

COMMENTARY.

On a previous occasion, in course of the Examination of the 'Universal', all particular Universals also have been discarded; hence there can be no such particular Universals as 'Feminine' and the rest. Hence the definition provided is an 'impossible' one.—(1131)

Then again, in connection with the particular Universals, we find,—even without any other Universal, the application of such words as 'jatiḥ' (Feminine), 'bhāvaḥ' (Masculine), 'sāmānyam' (Neuter);—hence the definition provided turns out to be 'too narrow'.—This is what is shown in the following :

TEXT (1132).

SUCH WORDS ARE APPLIED TO PARTICULAR UNIVERSALS, AS 'jātih' (FEMININE), 'bhāvaḥ' (MASCULINE) AND 'sāmānyam' (NEUTER).

NOR IS IT POSSIBLE FOR UNIVERSALS TO SUBSIST IN OTHER UNIVERSALS THEMSELVES.—(1132)

COMMENTARY.

'Nor is it possible, etc. etc.'.—Because the doctrine (of the other party) is that Universals are devoid of Universals. This has been said on the basis of the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas.

The Vaiṣyākaraṇas, Grammarians, however regard Universals as subsisting in Universals also; as declared in the following passage—'Even when the object and the Universal are denoted, all words are denotative of the Universal, inasmuch as all things exist in the form of their functions (Vākyapadīya, 3. 16).—What these people mean is as follows:—The theories laid down in regard to Universals by other philosophers need not necessarily be accepted by Grammarians; as a matter of fact, Universals are inferred from the effects of the functions of the connection between the word and the resultant cognition; and there can be no limit placed upon such Universals. Hence the basis of the term 'Universals' consists in that Universal which has a common substratum as inferred from the perception of the effects of the said functions. What is meant by the Universal 'existing in the form of their functions' is that their special character is restricted by the functions of the word and the resultant Idea.

This theory should be taken as rejected by what has been said (under Text 1131, second line) that 'all such Universals should be taken as dis-
carded by the rejection of the Universal itself (in the chapter on *Universals*).—
(1132)

The following Text states the objection that is equally applicable to all:

TEXT (1133).

**How too can there be such words as 'Abhāvali' (Masculine), 'Nirupākhyam' (Neuter) and 'Tuchchhatā' (Feminine)?—**

From all this it follows that the entire scheme of three genders is purely conventional.—(1133)

COMMENTARY.

There is no Universal in non-entities like the Here's Horns; because it is a property of entities; consequently the application of the words 'abhāva' and the rest to non-entities should be impossible. Consequently the said rule regarding Genders is 'too narrow'.

Thus it follows that the entire scheme of the three Genders is based solely upon Conventions made according to the whim of speakers.—(1133)

The following Text shows that *Number* also (like Gender) cannot follow the presence and absence of the real state of things:

TEXT (1134).

*Number* also is purely conventional, and is assumed through the whim of the Speaker, even when there is discrimination between difference and non-difference; as is found in the case of words like 'Dārā' (Wife), etc. and 'Vipina' (Forest), etc.—(1134)

COMMENTARY.

*Number* also is purely conventional, not real. In the case of words like 'dārā' (which stands for wife, and is yet treated as Masculine, and always Plural), though there is no difference (in what is denoted by this word and that denoted by other words like 'patnī', etc.), yet its peculiar gender (and number) has been determined by mere whim.

Thus the Reason put forward by us cannot be said to be 'Unproven'. For instance, the Plural or the Singular Number of words is not always based upon the real multiplicity and singularity of things; e.g. in the case of
such words as 'dārāḥ', 'sikatā', 'varṣā', etc.—even though there is no real multiplicity, yet they are used in the Plural Number. Similarly in the case of such words as 'Vana', 'Triśhuvana', 'Jagat', 'Śaṇṇagari',—even though there is no singularity, yet they are used in the Singular Number. Hence our Reason cannot be said to be 'Unproven'.

Nor is our Reason 'Inconclusive'; for, if it were so, then everything would belong to everything.

Lastly, because our Reason subsists in things where the Probandum is known to be present, therefore it cannot be said to be 'Contradictory'.—(1134)

In the following Texts the Author urges the fallacy of 'being unproven' against the Buddhist's Reason—from Kumārila's point of view:—

TEXTS (1135-1136).

"If words like 'Dārāḥ' are used in reference to the Individual as well as the Universal, it is so applicable on the basis of the number of either Individuals or the Components.—The word 'Vana' denotes either Individuals as qualified by the number of the Universal, or the Universal as subsisting in a plurality of Individuals." [Ślokavārtika·Vanavāda 92–94.]—(1135-1136)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila argues as follows:—"The word 'dārāḥ' is applied sometimes to the Universal and sometimes to the Individual; when it is applied to the Universal, then it is used according to the Number of the Individuals,—and these Individuals consist in the many women; when however it is applied to the Individual, then it is used in accordance with the Plurality of the Components of the Individual, in the form of her hands, feet and other limbs. —In the case of the word 'Vana', what are denoted are the Individuals, in the shape of the Mango, Khadiira, Palāsha and other particular trees, as qualified by the Number (Singular) of the Universal 'Tree' subsisting in all those individual trees; and that is why the word is used in the Singular Number 'vanam'; as what it denotes is the Substance qualified by the Number of the Universal. Or what is denoted by the word 'vana' is the Universal itself as subsisting in the Individual trees, Dhava and the rest; hence it is used in the Singular Number, the said Universal being one only."—(1135-1136)

The answer to the above is as follows:—
TEXT (1137).

In this way all words in the Singular Number become doomed.—If it be argued that "in the case of other words (in the Singular Number) the Speaker's wish does not lie that way",—then that wish itself might be the basis in the cases in question also.—(1137)

COMMENTARY.

In the way described above,—all words in the Singular Number,—like 'vrksah'—become doomed,—discarded; as the said reasoning would apply everywhere. As in regard to every word in the Singular Number, it might be said that "if the word is used in reference to the Individual, etc." (Kumārila's words in the preceding Text.)

It might be argued that—"in the case of other words,—like 'vrksah'—the Speaker's wish does not lie towards speaking of the Individuals and the Universals".

In that case, Number (in words) would not be in accordance with the number of things,—on the contrary, the presence and absence that would determine the Number (in words) would be the Speaker's wish itself. In that case, in the case of words like 'dārāh' also, that same wish may very well form the determining factor; the idea being that, even when there is no diversity (multiplicity) in the thing, the Plural Number is used because there is the Speaker's wish to speak of it as many.

Thus our Reason is not 'unproven'.—(1137)

It has been asserted (by Kumārila, quoted under Text 1136) that—"the word 'vāna' denotes the Individuals as qualified by the Number of the Universal".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1138).

There can be no Number in the Universal at all.—Even if the Number were there in the Universal, how could the Individuals be qualified by that Number?—"[They could be so qualified] through the connection of what is connected (indirectly), or through direct connection itself".—[If this be held then the answer would be as in the following Text.]—(1138)

COMMENTARY.

There can be no Number in the Universal; as it subsists in substance only.
This has been said in accordance with the doctrine of the *Vaishēšikas*. In case that doctrine is not accepted, and it is held that Number does belong to the Universal,—then, in what way could it be established that the Individuals, *Dhava* and other trees, are qualified by that Number (of the Universal)?

The following explanation might be offered:—"It could be so established either (indirectly) through the connection of the connected, or through direct Connection itself; that is, if the Number is something different from the Universal, then the Universal would be connected with the Singular Number,—and without Universal there would be connection of the Individuals, trees, *Dhava* and the rest; thus the qualifying of the *Dhava* and other Individual Trees would be done indirectly;—if, on the other hand, the Number is not something different from the Universal, then that would be directly connected with the Individual Trees, which would thus become qualified by that Number. In this way it would be established that the Individuals are 'qualified by the Number of the Universal'.—(1138)

The following *Text* supplies the answer to the explanation given (in the latter part of the preceding *Text*):—

**TEXT (1139).**

*If it be so, then even a single Tree could be spoken of as 'Vana' (Forest); several trees also are spoken of as such only through Connection, and that is present in the Single Tree also.—(1139)*

**COMMENTARY.**

If the application of the word 'vana' to Individual Trees, *Dhava* and the rest, be due only to the presence of the connection of the Connected, or of Connection itself, then even a single tree could be spoken of as 'Vana'; as the basis of the application would be present there. For instance, even the several trees—*Dhava* and the rest—are spoken of as 'Vana', only through the connection of the Number of the Universal,—and not through anything else; and this connection is present in the single Tree also;—why then should this also not be spoken of as 'vana'?—(1139)

It has been asserted (in *Text* 1136, by Kumārila) that "the word 'vana' may be taken as denoting the Universal subsisting in the many individual trees")

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (1140).

That (Universal) which subsists in the many individual trees is the same that subsists in the single individual (tree),—
the basis thereof being the same in both cases;
consequently, the idea of ‘Vana’ (Forest) should be there in connection with the single tree also.—(1140)

COMMENTARY.

Under the said view also, a single Tree could be spoken of as ‘Vana’.
Because what the word ‘vāna’ denotes is the Universal as subsisting in the many Individuals; and that same Universal subsists in the single Individual tree, Dhava also; thus the basis of the notion of ‘vāna’ being the same in all cases, why should the notion of ‘vāna’ not appear in connection with the single tree also?—(1140)

In the following Text, the Author sums up his Reasoning:—

TEXT (1141).

Thus the use of words in the singular and other numbers should be regarded through concomitance and non-concomitance, as depending entirely upon the Speaker’s whim,—
not upon the real state of things; as it is not always in accordance with this latter.—(1141)

COMMENTARY.

‘As it is, etc. etc.’; because the real state of things is not exactly as expressed by the words.—(1141)

It has been argued (under Text 973, by Kumārila) that—“the Apoha can have no connection with Gender and Number, etc.”; where the ‘etcetera’ is meant to include the connection of Action, Time and so forth.

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (1142).

The connection of Action, Time, etc. has been already rejected before. Hence all these also are purely conventional, and do not really subsist in individuals also.—(1142)

COMMENTARY.

‘Before’—i.e. in course of the rejection of such concepts as Action, Time and so forth, the connection also of Action, etc. has been discarded; hence these also cannot belong to things.

‘Conventional’—created by Convention.—(1142)
Even granting that these (Gender, Number, Action, etc.) belong to things,—inasmuch as the Apoха in the form of the 'Reflected Image' is apprehended by deluded persons as something external,—through this apprehension, connection with Gender, Number and the rest would be there through the Individual.—Hence what has been asserted (by Kumārila, under 973) to the effect that—"the Individual being something that cannot be spoken of by words, the connection cannot be through that either",—is 'Inconclusive'.

It is also 'unproven', 'unadmitted', under the theory that all this is purely 'illusory'; this latter fact is shown in the following—

TEXT (1143).

IN FACT, THE Apoха IS DENOTED AS APPREHENDED IN THE FORM OF THE INDIVIDUAL; AND THE Apoха THEREFORE IS CONNECTED WITH GENDER, ETC. THROUGH THAT INDIVIDUAL.—(1143)

COMMENTARY.

'Apoха is denoted'—by the Word.
'Tat'—Therefore.
'Asya'—of the Apoха.—(1143)

It has been argued (under 974, by Kumārila) that—"in the case of Verbs, 'the exclusion of other things' is not apprehended".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1144).

THE WORD IS USED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE THING INTENDED; HENCE THE 'EXCLUSION OF WHAT IS NOT-INTENDED' BECOMES APPREHENDED BY IMPLICATION.—(1144)

COMMENTARY.

That "in the case of Verbs the exclusion of other things is not apprehended" cannot be admitted. Because when a person uses a word, it is not because he is addicted to such use, but for the purpose of bringing about the cognition,—in the person hearing the word,—in regard to a certain thing that is intended, desired, to be known. Consequently, when the desired thing is apprehended, the exclusion of the undesired thing also becomes apprehended by implication; as the 'desired' and the 'undesired' are mutually exclusive.—(1144)

It might be argued that "all things are desired". —The answer to that is as follows:—
TEXT (1145).

All things cannot be desired; as, in that case, there would be no restriction regarding any denotations. Hence in the case of words like 'Cooks' and the like, there is clearly 'something excluded'.—(1145)

COMMENTARY.

If all things were 'desired' (to be expressed), then there could be no restriction regarding the denotation of words; in that case, it would not be possible for the hearer to undertake any activity that might be called for on the hearing of the word; consequently it cannot be right that all things are desired (to be expressed).

From all this it follows that in the case of words like 'cooks' (Verbs) there is 'exclusion of the undesired', by implication; and it is quite clearly apprehended.—(1145)

The following Texts also proceed to show how the said 'exclusion of the unintended' is expressed by implication:—

TEXTS (1146-1147).

When the verb 'pachati' ('Cooks') is uttered, what is understood is that 'he is not doing nothing,—nor is he eating or gambling'—where the 'exclusion of other acts' is clearly apprehended. Thus, whatever is intended (to be spoken), there is always something 'excluded' by the 'Relative Negation',—this something being 'doing nothing' and also other acts (than the one meant to be spoken of by the verb used).—(1146-1147)

COMMENTARY.

From the above it is clear that the verb 'pachati' (cooks) excludes 'doing nothing', and also other acts like Eating, Gambling and the like,—which thus are the 'excluded', through 'Relative Negation'. Hence the assertion that 'there is nothing that is denied in the form of Relative Negation' (Text 974) is not true.

In the compound 'Paryudāsātmakāpohym',—'paryadāsātmakam' is to be taken as qualifying 'apohyam'.

'Whatever is intended to be spoken of',—by that, there is something to be 'excluded' through Relative Negation, in the shape of 'doing nothing' and the rest.—(1146-1147)
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

It has been asserted (in Text 975, by Kumārila) that—"the 'cooking' remains un-negativised in its own form". The following Text shows that this assertion involves self-contradiction on the part of Kumārila:

TEXTS (1148-1149).

Your assertion that "the Cooking remains un-negativised in its own form" involves self-contradiction; because the words 'in its own form' can only mean that 'there is negativising of the form of other acts'; otherwise the emphasising would be meaningless.—(1148-1149)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"In what way is there self-contradiction?"

Answer:—'Because what the words, etc. etc.'—That is, when it is asserted that 'the Cooking remains un-negativised in its own form', the emphasis laid upon the last phrase indicates that the Cooking remains itself by negativising the forms of other acts. If that were not the meaning, then the emphasis that you have laid upon the phrase 'in its own form' would be meaningless, as there would be nothing that would be precluded by that emphasis.—(1148-1149)

It has been argued (under Text 976, by Kumārila) that—"the idea of something to be accomplished, as also the idea of the Past, etc. would be baseless".

This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (1150-1151).

Apotha being featureless, what sort of 'accomplishment' could there be of it? Certainly there is no 'accomplishment' of the 'Sky-lotus', etc.—If it be urged that "inasmuch as it is apprehended as a thing, it appears as with features",—then (we ask) what if it is so?—[It may be said that] "from this it would follow that it has the same properties as entities."—(1150-1151)

COMMENTARY.

If the Apoха has been apprehended by you as featureless, then how can you say "because it is accomplished"? Certainly there is no accom-
plishment of such things as the 'sky-flower'; and that because all such are featureless.

The following might be urged—"Even though Apoha is featureless in reality, yet by deluded persons it is conceived as something external, and hence, it comes to appear as with features".

The answer to this is—What if it is so? That is, even if the Apoha appears to be with features, how does that help you in the present context?

The other party replies—"In that case, etc. etc.;—that is, what follows from it is that, just as the positive entity is apprehended in accomplished form, so Apoha also, being cognised as having the same properties as positive entities, is apprehended as something accomplished; hence the assertion that 'it is accomplished' is quite right".—(1150-1151)

The answer to the above argument of the opponent is that, if it is as just explained, then you yourself have shown the basis of the notion of 'being accomplished' and of that of 'past' and so forth, and consequently you should not say that all this becomes baseless.

This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1152).


POSITIVE ENTITIES,—COMES TO BE BASED UPON

THAT SAME.—(1152)

COMMENTARY.

'Based upon that same',—i.e. based upon the apprehension of the fact that they are of the same character as Positive entities.—(1152)

It has been argued (under Text 977, by Kumārila) that—"In the case of all such denotations as Injunction and the rest, there is no idea of the exclusion of other things".

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (1153).

IN THE CASE OF ALL SUCH DENOTATIONS AS THE INJUNCTION AND THE LIKE,—WHAT IS 'EXCLUDED' (NEGATIVED) IS 'NON-EXISTENCE', ETC.,—EXACTLY THAT WHICH IS NOT MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF; BUT THIS IS DONE BY IMPLICATION,—NOT DIRECTLY BY THE WORD.—(1153)

COMMENTARY.

All such Denotations as the Injunction and the like are always differentiated from 'Negation' and the rest, and are apprehended as such;
so that what is 'excluded' and negatived in their case is 'non-existence', which is what is not meant to be spoken of by the word concerned. Thus there is here also the apprehension of the 'exclusion of other things'.—(1153)

It has been argued (under Text, 977, by Kumārila) that—"In the case of a negative appearing with another negative, what sort of Apoha could be there?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1154–1156).

Of similar kind would be the Apoha, when a negative is joined with another negative; just as it is apprehended when there are four negatives. In some cases, when a negative is associated with another negative, what is apprehended from it is something positive; the third negative expresses the negation (absence) of that positive thing; and when for the negativine of that again a fourth negative is used, if that is meant to be spoken of, what is denoted by it is the 'exclusion of another'.—(1154–1156)

COMMENTARY.

'Tachchatustaya, etc.'—where there are four negatives.

Question:—"In what form is it apprehended?"

Answer:—"When a negative, etc. etc.'—The word 'arthaḥ' is to be taken as co-ordinated with the word 'vidhiḥ'.

'Negation of that',—i.e. the negation of the said positive thing.

'For the negativine of that',—i.e. for the negativine of what has been expressed by the third negative (by itself), as apart from the positive factor.

'Turiyaḥ'—is fourth;—the form being due to the rule which lays down the addition of the affix 'yat' in the sense of making up, to the term 'chatur', and the elision of the first letter.

'If that is meant to be spoken of',—i.e. on the use of the fourth negative.

'By it'—i.e. by the fourth negative.

'The exclusion of another is denoted';—i.e. it expresses the Reflection, in the positive form, as differentiated from the negation expressed by the third negative.—(1154–1156)

The Author makes this same idea clear by means of an Example:—
TEXTS (1157-1158).

When it is said 'nāsavu na pachati' ('It is not that he does not cook') what is understood is that 'he cooks'; if a third negative is added, what is understood is either that 'he is doing nothing' or that 'he is doing something other than cooking';—and when a fourth negative is added, what is understood is something differentiated from this last, that is, 'he is cooking'. So that here the 'exclusion of another' is similar to that in the case of the affirmative sentence.—(1157-1158)

COMMENTARY.

'Differentiated, etc.'—i.e. from the idea of his doing nothing, or of his doing something other than cooking.

'Exclusion of another is similar to that in the case, etc. etc.';—Just as in the case of the affirmative sentence 'He is cooking', what is expressed by implication is the negation of his doing nothing or doing something else,—so also in the case of the second negative, it is seen that it expresses the negation of the same doing nothing, etc. It is only for the purpose of making things clearer that the use of four negatives has been cited.—(1157-1158)

It has been argued (under Text 978, by Kumārila) that—'in the case of the particles cha and the rest, there can be no connection with the negative'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1159).

Of particles like 'cha', the meaning intended is something like 'combination'; and thus there would be 'exclusion', by that, of things other than that, in the shape of 'option' and the like.—(1159)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'ādi' is meant to include such terms as 'vā', which denote option,—the term 'api', which denotes probability, connection, etc.,—the term 'tu' which denotes qualification,—and the term 'śva' which denotes emphasis.

'Other than that'—i.e. other than Combination, etc.

'By that'—i.e. by the term 'cha'.—(1159)
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

It has been argued (under Text 978, by Kumārila) that—"In the case of the meaning of the Sentence, 'exclusion of other things' cannot be indicated."

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (1160-1161).

'The exclusion of others' is clearly understood in the case of the meaning of a Sentence. It is only the denotations of certain words construed together that is spoken of as 'the meaning of the Sentence'; what would be 'excluded' by these words would clearly be the things different from those denoted by these words; so that the same would be 'excluded' by the meaning of the Sentence also. Because the meaning of the Sentence is nothing apart from the meanings of the words (composing it)."—(1160-1161)

COMMENTARY.

'Construed together'—Related, as cause and effect.
'Things excluded'—by the words.

Objection:—"The denotation of words is one thing, and totally different from that is the meaning of the Sentence; why then is it said that what are 'excluded' by the denotation of the words would also be 'excluded' by the meaning of the sentence?"

Answer:—'It is nothing apart from that';—the meaning of the sentence is not anything different from the denotations of the words,—in the shape of something of a mixed character, like the colour of the Kālmāśa; because such a thing, if it existed, would be perceived, and yet it is not perceived.—(1160-1161)

This same idea is made clearer by means of an Example:

TEXT (1162).

When the meaning of the Sentence—'Chaitra, bring the cow',—has been comprehended, what is understood, by implication, is the Āpoha (exclusion) of other agents, other objects and so forth (than those expressed by the words of the Sentence)."—(1162)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the said sentence, nothing else comes into the mind except what is expressed by the words—'Chaitra' etc.—composing it; and
when Chaitra has been comprehended, the exclusion of non-chaitra also becomes comprehended through implication. Otherwise,—if the exclusion of other Agents, etc. were not meant, then the mention of Chaitra, etc. would be meaningless; and hence no such sentence could be addressed by any person to any one; and there would be an end to all usage in the world.—(1162)

It has been argued (under Text 979, by Kumārila) that—"nothing is comprehended in the case of such words as 'Non-exclusion of others' ('ananyāpoha')."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1163).

In the case of such words as 'ananyāpoha' ('non-exclusion of others'), what is comprehended cannot be something positive, as desired by the other party; because the Universal and such other likely positive denotations have been already discarded.—(1163)

COMMENTARY.

It is true that, in reality, nothing positive,—in the shape of the Universal, etc. is comprehended; because all these have been rejected in detail in the Chapters dealing with the Universal, etc.—(1163)

Question:—"What, then, is it that is comprehended?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1164).

In fact, the conception that follows from this word envisages something positive; and it is only later on that there appears the idea of the negation (exclusion) of what is denoted by the word 'Apoha'.—(1164)

COMMENTARY.

Objection:—"If it is held that there appears the idea of the negation of what is denoted by the word 'Apoha',—then Apoha only should not be regarded as the denotation of the word; as that is negatived by it."

Answer:—
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS. 597

TEXT (1165).

Words like this, however, are unconformable, as there is absence of connection. All verbal cognitions do not always envisage things as they actually exist.—(1165)

COMMENTARY.

'Words like this'—i.e. Like 'ananyāpoha'.
'Unconformable',—i.e. not in conformity with any real state of things.
Question:—"Why so?"
Answer:—'As there is absence of connection';—i.e. there is no connection with any such thing as is expressed by the word; because any positive entity in the shape of the Universal, etc. as denoted by words has already been rejected.

Question:—"If that is so, then how is it that the word 'Ananyāpoha' brings about the idea of the negation of what is denoted by the word 'Apoha' (as just declared by you) ?"

Answer:—'All verbal cognitions, etc. etc.'—That is, there are some verbal cognitions, as arising out of impressions due to repeated false conceptions, which envisage things that do not exist; and either the existence or non-existence of things cannot be proved on the basis of such cognitions.—(1165)

It has been argued (under Text 979, by Kumārila) that—"in the case of such words as cognisable, knowable and the like, there can be nothing that is 'excluded'".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1166).

In the case of such words as 'cognisable' and 'knowable',—which is it in whose case there is nothing 'excluded'?

Certainly, such a word is never used by intelligent men, alone by itself and suddenly.—(1166)

COMMENTARY.

Among the words 'cognisable' and the like, which is it in whose case it is said that there is nothing 'excluded' ?—If it is said in regard to the word 'knowable' alone by itself, apart from any sentence, and independently of all connection with other words,—then the argument is superfluous; because a word alone by itself is never used, and hence has no meaning at all.

This is what is shown in the text by the words—'Certainly such a word, etc. etc.';—'alone',—without any other words.—'Suddenly'—without any context.

As a matter of fact, it is for the benefit of the listeners that words are uttered,—not because the speaker has the habit of using them;—and a single word could not confer any benefit on the listener, in the shape of remov-
ing his doubt or ignorance. For instance, if the word did bring about in the
listener a cognition free from all doubt, after setting aside his doubts and
misconceived notions,—then it would have conferred a benefit on him;
no such benefit can be said to be conferred by any word used singly by itself.
—(1166)

In fact, the use of the word has its use only in helping to remove the
doubt and ignorance of the listener and bring about his well-ascertained
cognition; and hence it can be usefully used only in a sentence;—this is
what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1167-1168).

IN FACT, THE WORD IS USED BY INTELLIGENT PERSONS ONLY FOR THE
PURPOSE OF REMOVING THE DOUBTFUL AND WRONG IDEAS THAT
SOME ONE MAY HAVE IN REGARD TO A CERTAIN THING.
CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS ONLY WHEN USED BY SUCH MEN
AND WHEN BRINGING ABOUT COGNITIONS FREE
FROM DOUBT AND MISTAKE THAT THE WORD
BECOMES USEFUL.—(1167-1168)

COMMENTARY.

' Ārēka' is Doubt.
'Some one'—i.e. the listener.
'In regard to a certain thing'—some object.
'For removing it, etc.'—i.e. for removing doubt and wrong notions.
'Tīna'—by such words as 'knowable' and the like.
'Taih'—by the intelligent persons.—(1167-1168)

If what the opponent has said is with reference to the words in question
as occurring in a sentence,—then what is said cannot be admitted.—This is
shown in the following—

TEXTS (1169-1170).

WHAT IS REGARDED BY DULL-WITTED PERSONS AS OPEN TO DOUBT IS
WHAT IS 'EXCLUDED' BY THE WORD IN QUESTION; OTHERWISE,
THE UTTERANCE OF THE WORD WOULD BE USELESS.—IF HE
DOES NOT REGARD ANYTHING AS OPEN TO DOUBT, THEN
WHY DOES HE ASK (ANOTHER PERSON) ABOUT IT?—
IF ONE UTTERS A WORD THAT DOES NOT
BRING ABOUT EMBELLISHMENT (ENLIGHTEN-
MENT),—HOW CAN HE BE REGARDED AS A
SANE-MINDED PERSON?—(1169-1170)

COMMENTARY.

What is 'excluded' by the word 'knowable' occurring in a sentence
is just that which is regarded by dull-witted persons—persons with dull in-
telligence,—as open to doubt. Hence it cannot be admitted that in the case of words like ‘knowable’, there is nothing that can be ‘excluded’.

‘Otherwise’;—if it does not ‘exclude’ what is doubted by dull-witted persons.

It might be argued that—“The listener may have not doubted anything”.

The answer to that is—‘If he does not regard, etc. etc.’.—If the listener has no doubts regarding anything, then why does he seek for advice from another person? It is only for ascertaining things that one questions another person; otherwise he would be mad.

It might be argued that—“Even if the listener has any doubts regarding anything, that doubt cannot be removed by the word in question.”

The answer to this is—‘If one utters a word, etc. etc.’;—‘Saṁskāra’ is embellishment, in the form of the removal of the listener’s doubt; the word that has this embellishment is one that brings about the said removal; the affix ‘kap’ is added according to Pāṇini’s Sūtra ‘Shēṣād vibhāṣā’.

‘Brūvan’,—the explainer using the word.

‘How can he, etc. etc.’—That is, he would be insane. Because it is only for the embellishment (enlightenment) of listeners that words are used.—(1169-1170)

Question:—“What, and in what sentence, is that which is open to doubt in the mind of the dull-witted person,—which is ‘excluded’ by the word in question?”

Answer:—

TEXT (1171).

WHEN IT IS ASSERTED THAT ‘COLOUR IS COGNISABLE BY VISUAL PERCEPTION’—THIS CERTAINLY SERVES TO ‘EXCLUDE’ (DENY) SOMETHING SUPPOSED BY SOME PERSON.—(1171)

COMMENTARY.

‘This’—i.e. the sentence ‘Colour is cognisable by Visual Perception’.

—(1171)

Question:—“What is it that is supposed?”

Answer:—

TEXT (1172).

[THE SUPPOSITION IS]—“IT IS NOT BY THE COGNITION THROUGH THE EYE ALONE THAT THE BLUE AND OTHER COLOURS ARE COGNISABLE,—BUT ALSO BY THE ONE ETHERAL COGNITION, THROUGH THE EAR ALSO.”—(1172)

COMMENTARY.

The dull-witted man might suppose that Colour is cognisable also by the Eternal Cognition through the Ear;—and it is this supposition that is ‘excluded’ (negativd) by the sentence ‘Colour is cognisable by the
Cognition through the Eye'; the meaning being that—'Colour is cognisable by Cognition through the Eye only, not by Cognition through the Ear and other organs'.—(1172)

TEXTS (1173-1174).

The word 'cognisable' is used when there are such doubts as—
(a) 'Are all things cognisable as momentary, or not?'
(b) Are all things cognisable by the Cognition of an all-knowing person?
(c) Are negations, which do not bring about any cognition, cognisable?

(1173-1174)

COMMENTARY.

(a) 'Are all things cognisable as momentary, or not?'—(b) 'Are all things cognisable by the Cognition of an Omniscient Person?'
(c) 'Are negations—'which are of the nature of the absence of all determining features, and which do not even bring about a cognition—cognisable?'—When such doubts appear, then, it is said—'all things are cognisable as momentary;—

and they are cognisable by an Omniscient Person;—and negations also are cognisable.'—And in all these what is 'excluded' (negated) is the supposition that 'things are cognisable as non-momentary' and so forth.—(1173-1174)

Question:—'Is all this supposition negated by the mere assertion (of cognisability in a certain form)'

Answer:—

TEXT (1175).

That they are cognisable in the forms asserted follows from the fact that it has been proved that all things are momentary and so forth. Negation also is cognisable as illusory, as it has been proved that it is in that form.—(1175)

COMMENTARY.

In the forms asserted'—i.e. as 'momentary' and the rest; as all this has been established by proofs.

Question:—'How is Negation cognisable?'

Answer:—'Negation also is cognisable, etc. etc.';—'in that form',—i.e. in the form of Negation.

As a matter of fact, even non-entities are also somehow proved to exist, hence they are regarded as cognisable; if they were not so, then there could be no usage regarding them.—(1175)

Says the Opponent:—'Are Words cognisable as evanescent (non-eternal), or not?—When this doubt is raised, and the answer is—'cognisable';—
if the man who is ignorant of the context in which the word 'cognisable' has been uttered, hears only the word 'cognisable', there does appear in him some sort of a cognition of a nebulous character.—If then the word 'cognisable' by itself (apart from a sentence) had no denotation, then how is there the said cognition that is expressed by it?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1176–1178).

That words like 'knowable', 'cognisable' serve as the means of producing cognitions (ideas) having been perceived only when they appear in a sentence,—if, at some other time, they are found to be used alone by themselves, the idea that is produced by them, in regard to things that are nebulous, is in accordance with what has been found in the case of their use in a sentence.—In fact, in the case of words like 'Jar' also, it is the same; so that the words 'knowable' and the like are just like the words 'Jar' and the rest.—(1176–1178)

COMMENTARY.

What the whole of this means is as follows:—As a matter of fact, there is no Cognition following from the hearing of the word ('cognisable') by itself; what happens in such cases is that the man has previously heard the word used in a sentence as conveying a definite meaning,—so that when he subsequently hears it pronounced alone by itself, he has his mind influenced by the similarity of the word in the two cases, and he comes to presume that he has understood its meaning. That this is so is shown by the fact that under this latter presumption, the nebulous and wavering idea that the listener has is of those same things which he cognised on previous occasions, when the word was used in sentences. This is exactly the same as in the case of the ordinary words like 'Jar'.—For instance, the question having been put—'Shall I bring water in a Jar or in the Hands?—The answer is 'In the Jar'; if the man who hears this last word alone is ignorant of the context in which it has been uttered,—the idea that he has is in accordance with the meaning of the word 'Jar' that he had understood in those previous sentences that he had heard with that word in them.

Thus then it follows that words like 'cognisable' are just as denotive of particular things as other denotive words. This is what is pointed out in the Text by the words—'So that, etc. etc.'.—(1176–1178)

It has been argued (under Text 980, by Kumārila) that—"Rather than assume the Thing 'excluded', it is far better to assume the thing itself".

This is answered in the following—
TEXTS (1179-1180).

The statement that, "Rather than assume the 'excluded' thing it is far better to assume the thing itself", is self-contradictory; as in every case there is 'exclusion of some other thing'. That thing alone is assumed which is meant to be spoken of; hence there is implication of that which is meant to be spoken of; but all things are not meant to be spoken of.—(1179-1180)

COMMENTARY.

'Thing itself, etc. etc.'—It is an Entity,—not not a non-entity—meant to be spoken of, which is assumed by us, on the basis of actual cognition, to be 'denoted' by the word; hence when that is apprehended, there is, through Implication, the 'Exclusion' of what is not meant to be spoken of; so that our explanation of the word and its denotation does not fail to apply in any case.

In fact, it is in reference exactly to those cases where doubts are likely to arise in the mind of the dull-witted person that our Teacher has made the following statement:—'Having assumed the non-cognisable, through the exclusion of that, we have the inference of the cognisable'.—(1179-1180)

It has been argued (under Text 980, by Kumārila) that—"Inasmuch as the idealistic form of things has been denied, nothing internal (purely subjective) can be denoted by words".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXTS (1181–1183).

As for the denial of the Idealistic form of things,—such denial is impossible because the fact is self-evident; as actually there are several impositions without any basic reality.—It has to be admitted that there must be something in the Idea (or Cognition) itself which appertains specifically to each object envisaged by it; and that is precisely its 'nature';—and this same 'nature' of the idea has been spoken of by us as 'Form', 'Reflected Image', 'Appearance', 'Figuring', 'Manifestation'. So that there is only a difference in the name, without any real difference.—(1181-1183)

COMMENTARY.

'Impossible'—to make.

Question:—"In what way is the fact of the Thing being of the form of the Idea (cognition) self-evident?"
Answer:—'As actually there are, etc. etc.'—In Dreams and other forms of cognition, it is found that, even in the absence of a real substratum, there are imposed cognitions, clearly known to the meanest cowherd—and this fact is self-evident to every man in his own experience. It cannot be right to say that 'in these cases what is cognised is the real thing as existing at other places and at other times';—because the thing cognised is not cognised in that form; and one thing cannot be cognised in the form of any other thing; for if it did, then it would lead to an absurdity.

Further, you will have to admit that there is some peculiarity in the Cognition itself due to the cognised object,—by virtue of which, even though as Cognition, every Cognition is the same, yet every individual cognition differs from the other, so that in one there is apprehension of the Blue, not of the Yellow colour; and on this basis there is a differentiation in Cognition.—And when you admit this, then, by implication, it would also become admitted that the Cognition has form. Because without such form it would be impossible to definitely ascertain the particular nature of the Cognition. Hence what you speak of as the 'nature' of the Cognition is nothing other than what we speak of as 'Form', 'Figuring' and so forth; so that the only dispute between us is one regarding names.—(1181-1183)

It has been argued (under Text 981, by Kumārila) that—'Nothing excluded is noticed in the case of such words as 'ēvam' and the like'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1184).

IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'ēvam' (THUS), THERE IS 'naivam' (NOT THUS) WHICH IS CLEARLY 'EXCLUDED'; IN THE SENSE OF 'IN ANOTHER MANNER'.—(1184)

COMMENTARY.

'It is thus—and not thus', in this way there is the idea of 'another manner' which is what is 'excluded'—differentiated—by the word 'ēvam', 'Thus'; and this is clearly apprehended.—So that our theory of Verbal Denotation does not fail to apply to this case also.—(1184)

In this way the criticisms urged by Kumārila have been answered. The Author now proceeds to answer those urged by Uddyotakara.

It has been argued (under Text 982, by Uddyotakara)—'What is it that is assumed to be excluded in the case of the word 'sarva', 'all'?'

The answer to that is as follows:—
TEXT (1185).

In the case of the word ‘all’ also, as presented in actual usage, there is something ‘excluded’; and what is regarded as meant to be spoken of here also is the ‘exclusion of others’.—(1185)

COMMENTARY.

Here also, as in the case of words like ‘knowable’, the word ‘all’ is never used alone by itself; it is always used in a sentence; hence what is ‘excluded’ by it would be just that in regard to which there may be doubt in the mind of dull-witted persons.

‘Abhidhītisītab’—meant to be spoken of.—(1185)

Question:—“What is it that is meant to be spoken of?”
Answer:—

TEXT (1186).

‘All things are soulless’, ‘all men are gone’,—in such sentences, what is apprehended is entirety, and what is ‘excluded’ is a certain factor.—(1186)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—“What is the factor that is excluded?”
Answer:—

TEXT (1187).

There are such misconceptions as—‘only external things like the jar are soulless’, ‘only some men can go’; and it is these that are ‘excluded’.—(1187)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued (under Text 983, by Udhyotakara) that—“If it be held that one and the rest are excluded by the word ‘all’, etc. etc.”.
The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (1188).

In the case of the word ‘all’, the negation of all parts is not what is meant to be spoken of; hence the incongruity of the ‘exclusion of its own meaning’ that has been urged has been so under ignorance.—(1188)

COMMENTARY.

If it were meant that when the word ‘all’ is used in a sentence in the course of usage, there is negation of all parts,—then there might be ‘exclusion
of its own meaning'.—As a matter of fact however, what is held to be
negativised is only that which is open to doubt by the dull-witted person;
how then can there be any 'exclusion of its own meaning'?
The same reasoning applies to the case of such words as 'ādi' and the
like.—(1188)

It has been asked (under Text 986)—"Is it positive or negative?"
The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1189).

It is neither Positive nor Negative; it is neither diverse nor same;
it is neither subsistent, nor non-substantial; it is neither
one nor many.—(1189)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"Why is it not positive?"
Answer:—

TEXT (1190).

In reality, it does not exist in the form in which it is apprehended;
hence it cannot be Positive. Nor is it Negative, as it
is apprehended as an entity.—(1190)

COMMENTARY.

By deluded people it is apprehended as something external, and yet
it does not exist in that form; and as having no external form, it is not
Positive.
Question:—"Why cannot it be negative?"
Answer:—'Nor is it negative, because it is apprehended as an entity';
and yet, as it presents itself as something external, it cannot be said to be
entirely negative.—(1190)

Question:—"Why cannot Apoha be of the nature of 'diversity' or of
'sameness'?"
Answer:—

TEXT (1191).

'Diversity' (Difference) and 'Sameness' (Non-difference), etc.
are resident in entities; while the 'Denotation of
words' is entirely featureless; hence the said
characters have no place here.—(1191)

COMMENTARY.

'Diversity and sameness, etc.'—i.e. Difference and Non-difference, etc.—
the 'etc.' including 'being subsistent' and 'non-substantial' and so forth.
All these are properties residing in Entities only; how could they reside in the Apoha which has its body created only by the artist of Conceptual Thought?

It has been argued that—"Apoha being of the nature of Action, its objective has to be pointed out ".

The reason put forward is not admitted; because the Apoha denoted by the Word is of the nature of a 'Reflected Image'; and this Reflected Image, being in the form of the apprehended external object, cannot be a mere negation.

For the same reason there is no room for the optional alternatives set forth (by Uddyotakara)—as to whether it has, for its objective, the Cow, or the Non-Cow; as it is always apprehended as something positive, appertaining to the Cow [hence the question of its pertaining to the Non-Cow does not arise].—(1191)

It has been asked (under Text 989)—"Who has attributed the character of the Non-Cow to the Cow, that it has to be 'negatived' (by the Apoha)?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1192–1194).

For us the Word does the 'negativing of other things' directly; and after the negativing has been done by the Word, it becomes apprehended through its own force,—in the form 'its nature is not the nature of anything else',—as has been explained in detail (under Text 1013); hence what is urged on the present occasion—'who has attributed the character of the Non-Cow to the Cow, that it has to be negatived?';—is through ignorance of the view of the other party. As a matter of fact, this is not what is held to be 'negatived' by the Word directly.—(1192–1194)

COMMENTARY.

What has been urged would have been true only if the Word had expressed 'the negation of others' primarily; as a matter of fact, however, what the Word produces, first of all, is only the Reflected Image of the Thing (spoken of); and it is only after that has been comprehended that, through the force of its implication, the said 'negation' (exclusion) becomes comprehended. Apparently this doctrine of ours is not known to the other party, and what he has urged is something insignificant, beneath notice. Such is the upshot of the Text. The rest is easy.—(1192–1194)

As regards the optional alternatives put forward—regarding Apoha being different or non-different and so forth,—all that has been already discarded.

It has been asked (under Text 997, et seq., by Uddyotakara)—whether the Apoha is denoted or not denoted, etc. etc.—

The answer to that is as follows:—
TEXTS (1195–1199).

The 'denotability' that you ask about—is 'denotability' by which word? Is it 'denotability' by the word 'Apoha'? Or by the word 'Jar' and the rest?—As regards the question—whether the Apoha that is denoted is itself of the nature of Apoha (negation, exclusion) or it is something positive,—when we come to think of it, what is cognised is the Apoha that figures in the Cognition.—Our view is that what is denoted by the word directly is the Reflected Image,—and as regards 'the negation of other things', like the Universal etc.,—that is comprehended only indirectly, through implication.—What all such words as 'Jar', 'Tree' and the like denote is the said Reflected Image, as it is the cognition of this that they produce directly; and anything else, they imply only indirectly.—Thus then, there is no incongruity regarding the positive character; nor is there anything undesirable for us.—As regards the alternative of Apoha not being 'denotable',—that we do not accept; and hence that is not our view.—(1195–1199)

COMMENTARY.

As regards the alternatives set forth regarding the denotability of 'the exclusion of others',—if it is urged in regard to the term 'exclusion of others'—then, inasmuch as it is held by us that what is denoted by this term is something positive,—that should not have been urged against us as an undesirable contingency.

That is to say, when the question is raised,—as to whether what is denoted by the word is something positive, or the 'exclusion or negation of others'—and it is said that 'it is the negation of others that is denoted by the word',—there appears in the listener the idea envisaging the 'negation of others', in the form of a Reflected Image; and if there is an idea of the negation of positive entities as forming the denotation of the word, that comes only by implication.

If what is urged is with reference to the words 'Jar' and the like, then, what these words bring about directly is the Apoha in the shape of the Reflected Image, which is denoted by those words in the positive form, and the idea of the 'negation of others' is obtained by implication; so that there is no undesirable contingency for us.

Nor is our view open to the objection that there would be no resting ground or finality (in the assumption of Apoha after Apoha); because the 'negation of others' is held to be comprehended only by implication,—and hence to be only an appendage to actual Denotation;—the view that it is not expressed is not accepted by us; and hence there can be no room for those incongruities that have been urged against that view.—This is what is indicated by the words—'As regards the alternative, etc. etc.'—(1195–1199)
It has been urged (under Text 1001) that—"Singularity, eternality, etc. cannot be attributed to Apoha".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1200).

The ideas of 'one-ness', 'eternality' and the like are purely imaginary, not real. Hence your laughter at us on this point is indicative of a very high grade of learning (on your part)!—(1200)

COMMENTARY.

If 'one-ness' and the rest had been mentioned by us as real, then there might have been some cause for your laughing at us. As a matter of fact, however, it has been mentioned by our Teacher only as something purely imaginary (subjective, conceptual),—and he has mentioned it only in view of common misconceived notions. Under the circumstances, how can a learned person find any cause for laughter in this? On the contrary, you yourself, by criticising what you have not understood, have become an object of derisive laughter.—(1200)

It has been asserted (under Text 1002, by Kumārila) that—"for these reasons, the element of the negation of others could be there only in the case of words that are associated with the negative particle, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1201).

Even in cases where the thing itself is apprehended, the 'exclusion of other things' is also apprehended,—as is indicated by the force of the emphasising term (used by you); if it were not, then, the emphasising would be useless.—(1201)

COMMENTARY.

The factor of the 'exclusion of other things' is cognised, not only in cases where the negative term is present; also where the negative term is not present, the same is cognised. This has been made clear by yourself when you said that 'the Thing itself is apprehended', where you have emphasised the 'itself'. If this is not what you mean, then that emphasising word is useless. Thus when it is said that 'the thing itself is cognised', it is all the more clearly implied that the 'exclusion of others' is also cognised.—(1201)

In the following Text, the other Party proceeds to show that the Buddhist theory of Apoha cannot apply to all cases.—
TEXT (1202).

"In the case of such terms as 'son of the Barren Woman',—where there is no external object which would be the 'contrary' (excluded),—wherein would the {Apoha} subsist which is said to be denoted by it?"—(1202)

COMMENTARY.

"In the case of the term 'son of the Barren Woman',—there is no such thing as the external son, which would be the contrary, and hence the object of the exclusion; then wherein would that Apoha rest which is said to be denoted by that term? It is essential that there should be an entity which is the substratum or object of the Apoha; as such substratum would be non-different from 'what is excluded by another'."—(1202)

The above is answered in the following—

TEXT (1203).

As non-entities have no form, words appertaining to those cannot be even suspected of being denotative of the Universal and such things. In fact, it has been fully established that they are only indicators of the Reflection.—(1203)

COMMENTARY.

Such non-entities as the 'son of the Barren Woman' have no form,—no character;—hence words relating to those cannot even be suspected of being denotative of the Universal, etc. It is only in the case of words relating to entities that there could be any question as to whether what is denoted by them is some form or only a Reflection. As regards non-entities (or Negations) they are entirely different from Entities, hence how could words applied to them be even suspected of pertaining to entities? From this it is clear that the words in question have no object (denotation at all); all that they produce is the mere Reflection of things; and this Reflection is what is actually apprehended. Thus there is no room for the objection that has been urged.

The same is further explained:—
TEXT (1204).

WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY WORDS IS ONLY THE REFLECTION THAT APPEARS,
as created solely by Impressions made by objectless (empty) conceptions.—(1204)

COMMENTARY.

'Words'—like 'Son of the Barren Woman'.—(1204)

Those words however that relate to entities, denote only the Reflection;
—the formal proof for this is stated in the following—

TEXT (1205).

THE WORDS IN QUESTION ARE DIRECTLY EXPRESSIVE OF THAT (REFLECTION) ALONE,—BECAUSE THEY ARE DEPENDENT UPON CONVENTION,—LIKE WORDS EXPRESSING IMAGINARY THINGS.—(1205)

COMMENTARY.

[The argument may be formulated thus]—Words that are dependent upon Convention are expressive of only the Reflection of the Conceptual Content produced by the impressions made by objectless (empty) conceptions,—as for instance, words like 'the son of the Barren Woman';—the words in question—i.e. words like 'Jar' and the like, which form the subject of the present discussion, are dependent upon Convention; and this is a natural reason (for holding that they are expressive only of the Reflection, etc. etc.).—(1205)

Having established his own position, the Author next proceeds to adduce arguments for rejecting the views of the other party:—

TEXT (1206).

THES WORDS ARE NOT DENOTATIVE OF THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' AND THE REST, THAT HAVE BEEN ASSUMED BY OTHERS. HENCE THESE SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE LIKE THOSE JUST MENTIONED.—(1206)

COMMENTARY.

'Bhēda' stands for 'Specific Individuality'.
'And the rest'—includes the Universal, etc.
'Hence',—i.e. on account of their being dependent on Convention.
'Like those',—like words speaking of imaginary things.—(1206)
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.

The Author shows that the two Reasons adduced are not 'Inconclusive':—

TEXT (1207).

THAT THERE CAN BE NO CONVENTION IN REGARD TO 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' AND THE REST HAS BEEN ALREADY PROVED BEFORE. HENCE THE REASONS ADDUCED ARE NEITHER 'DOUBTFUL' NOR 'CONCOMITANT WITH THE CONTRARY OF THE PROBANDUM'.—(1207)

COMMENTARY.

It has been already proved before—on the ground of the 'Impossibility of Conventions' (under TEXT 876 et seq.) and on that of its 'not bearing upon anything else',—that Convention is impossible and also useless.

'Tat'—Hence, therefore.

The two Reasons are not Doubtful or Concomitant with the Contrary of the Probandum.—(1207)

In the following Texts, the Opponent argues that the first of the two Reasons adduced is 'Inconclusive':—

TEXTS (1208-1209).

"UNDER THE THEORY OF Apoha also, how is convention possible? How too is it fruitful?—When it cannot be known to both, the Speaker and the Listener; as the idea of one cannot be known to the other. What too was seen at the time of the making of the Convention is not seen at the time of the use of the word.'"—(1208-1209)

COMMENTARY.

"Just as, in the case of Specific Individuality and the rest, there is impossibility of Convention and Futility, so it would be also in the case of Apoha; so that, inasmuch as there would be no Convention made, the denotation by words of the Apoha alone cannot be right; hence the Reason adduced is Inconclusive.

'How too is it fruitful?'—That is, how is fruitfulness possible—'Tasya'—stands for the Convention.

Question:—Why is Convention not possible in this case?

"Answer:—Because it cannot be known to both.—The term 'hi' denotes reason; the meaning being—Because the Apoha in the shape of Reflection cannot be one and the same, as the object of Convention, for both, the Speaker and the Listener.

Why?

"Because the Idea of one, etc. etc.;—people of limited vision are cognisant of only their own ideas; no one with limited vision can be cognisant of the
idea in another's mind; and in reality the *Apoha* in the form of Reflection
is nothing different from Idea (Cognition); so that as between the Speaker
and the Listener, what would be known as the subject of a Convention could
not be known to the other; hence wherein could the Convention be made or
comprehended? Unless the Speaker knows the thing, he cannot make any
Convention relating to it; nor can the Listener comprehend it. If he did,
it would lead to absurdities. For instance, the *Reflection of the object,*
which is what the Speaker cognises as figuring in his cognition, is not cognised
by the Listener; and what is cognised by the Listener is not cognised by the
Speaker; as every man is cognisant only of what appears to himself.

"The futility of Convention is next shown—'What too, etc. etc.'—
The Reflection that was apprehended at the time of the making of the
Convention, by the Listener or by the Speaker, is not apprehended at the time
of the use of the word; as the former, being in a perpetual flux, has long
ceased to existence; and that which is apprehended at the time of the use
of the word was not seen at the time of the making of the Convention; as
what was apprehended at that time was something entirely different. And it
is not right that usage should be based upon a Convention that rests upon some-
thing different; as such usage would lead to absurdities."—(1208-1209)

This argument is answered in the following—

**TEXT (1210).**

**EVEN THOUGH EACH PERSON IS COGNISANT OF WHAT APPEARS TO HIM-
SELF, YET THERE IS SOMETHING IN THE COGNITION OF EXTERNAL
THINGS WHICH IS COMMON TO BOTH PERSONS.—(1210)**

**COMMENTARY.**

As a matter of fact, the *form of the cognition* also is not accepted by us
to be denoted by words,—in view of which the impossibility of Conventions
relating to that could be reasonably urged against us. Because, for us,
all verbal usage is purely illusory, being assumed in accordance with the
notions of individual persons,—it is as illusory and false as the idea of two
moons that appears in the man of disordered vision; all that is produced by
words is a Conceptual Content relating to the Thing, through the arousing of
the Impressions of objectless conceptions; and it is the Reflection of this
that is called the 'Denotation' of words, because it is produced by words,—
not because they are denoted (expressed) by them.—So that though, in
reality, the Speaker and the Listener are cognisant of what appears in their
own consciousness,—yet inasmuch as the root of illusion is equally present
in both men,—just as in the case of the man with the disordered vision,—
the apprehension that the two men have of the external object is similar;
and yet the idea in the mind of the Speaker is that 'the thing that I
cognise is also cognised by this man'; the Listener also has the same idea.—
It might be asked—How is the fact of both of them apprehending the same
thing known to each of them?—The answer to that is that in reality, it
is known to them; and yet the source of the Illusion being there, equally in both, there is—as already explained by us—a mistaken usage in accordance with each man’s own apprehension,—just as in the case of the perception of two moons by the man of disordered vision.—Thus then, both men having the apprehension of the same thing, the making of Convention is quite possible.—(1210)

An example is cited to illustrate the above:—

**TEXT (1211).**

**JUST AS THE MAN WHOSE EYE HAS BEEN ATTACKED BY A DISORDER SAYS TO ANOTHER LIKE HIMSELF THAT ‘THERE ARE TWO MOONS’,** —SO ALSO IS ALL VERBAL USAGE.—(1211)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘*Who is like himself*’,—i.e. to the other man, with disordered vision.—(1211)

Nor is the Convention futile in this case;—this is shown in the following—

**TEXT (1212).**

**THE CONCOMITANCE OF THE CONVENTION HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE NOTIONS OF MEN; IN FACT, ALL COGNITIONS BROUGHT ABOUT BY WORDS ARE ULTIMATELY FALSE.—(1212)**

**COMMENTARY.**

The idea that the Convention is concomitant with the two points of time,—that of its making and the consequent usage,—is admitted only on the basis of the apprehension of Reflection of the Thing apprehended by the Speaker and the Listener; it is not really true; the idea, in fact, is based upon the fact that at the time of usage both the Speaker and the Listener have the (false) notion that the thing seen now and that seen at the time of the making of the Convention are one and the same.

*Question* :—“Why is this not accepted as being so in reality?”

*Answer* :—‘In fact, all cognitions, etc. etc.’.—(1212)

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*End of Chapter XVI.*
CHAPTER XVII

Examination of the Definition of "Sense-perception".

COMMENTARY.

On the subject of the Means of Right Cognition, there are four kinds of
difference of opinion bearing upon (1) their Nature, (2) their Resultant,
(3) their Object, and (4) their Number. And by setting aside these diverse
opinions, the clear idea of the Means of Right Cognition can be obtained.
In order to show this and to support the idea that 'the Truth is ascertained
by means of Two Means of Right Cognition which are endowed with the
true characteristics of the Means of Right Cognition' (as asserted under
Text 3, of the Introduction),—the Author proceeds with the following—

TEXT (1213).

The Sense-perception and the Inference, which others have put
forward, in proof of their concepts,—are not acceptable.
They are of the nature described below.—(1213)

COMMENTARY.

'In proof of their concepts'—i.e. such concepts as—Quality, Substance,
Action, Universal, Inherence and so forth.
'Others'—The Vaish śīka and others.
'E vam'—as going to be described.—(1213)

'Sense-perception' as a Means of Cognition consists of the Eye and
the rest and is (a) conceptual (determinate), or (b) of the nature of
'Non-cognition'. Such is the diversity of opinion regarding the nature of
Sense-perception.—By rejecting this, the Author propounds his own
definition of it:

TEXT (1214).

Sense-perception is free from conceptual content and not er-
roneous.—'Conceptual Content' is idea associated with
verbal expression; it is not [regarded as] the
basis of verbal expression, etc.—(1214)

COMMENTARY.

The character of being 'Sense-perception' is what is predicated of
that Cognition which has been described as 'free from conceptual content and
not erroneous'; as in every case, it is the defined thing (distinguishing
feature) that is predicated. [The meaning therefore is—'That Cognition which is free from conceptual content and is not erroneous is Sense-perception'] as is found in the case of such expressions as 'That which shakes is the Ashvattha'.—The thing defined here is Sense-perception; as it is the definition of this that forms the subject-matter of the present Context. It is not the definition of 'freedom from conceptual content and non-erroneousness' that is the subject-matter of the Context; by virtue of which this latter could be taken as predicated in the sentence.

The 'Cognition' has not been mentioned, because it is already implied in the negation of 'Conceptual Content'; just as in the case of the sentence 'Bring the milk one without the calf', where the cow is not mentioned, as it is already implied by the negation of the calf.

Question:—'What is it that is meant by the term 'Conceptual Content' ('Kalpanā'), freedom from which serves as the differentia of Sense-perception?'

Answer:—'Conceptual Content is idea associated with verbal expression'.

Question:—'Is that Kalpanā also to be admitted, against which, in the character of being the basis of verbal expression, Shankarāsvāmin and others have urged objections in great detail?'

Answer:—No; it is not the basis of verbal expression; 'regarded as'—this has to be taken as understood. Hence the objections that have been urged on that score are not applicable to our view; because we do not accept that view.

'Kārpa' is verbal expression ('being spoken of', 'being named'); and the basis for such expression consists of the Universal, the Name and so forth; since there can be no speaking of things without such distinguishing features as consist of the Universal, etc.

The term 'ādi' (et cetera)—in the text is meant to include such characteristics as Doubt and Deliberation, as leading to association with words etc., and also the assumption of the apprehender and the apprehended and so forth.

'Abhīlāpa'—is expressive word; and it is in a generic form; that Idea which appears as associated with that word is called 'abhīlāpinī'.—(1214)

Question:—'How is it known that there is such an Idea (or Cognition) ?'

Answer:—

TEXT (1215).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE COGNITION THAT IS CAPABLE OF CONNECTING THE THING AND THE WORD ALWAYS APPEARS AS ASSOCIATED WITH VERBAL EXPRESSION (WORDS),—EVEN WHEN THE WORDS—LIKE 'TREE' AND THE LIKE—are not ACTUALLY USED.—(1215)

COMMENTARY.

The construction may be as—'even when the words like tree, etc. are not used',—or as 'which is capable of connecting the thing and the word, in the shape of tree, etc.'
This indicates the Conceptual Content as something directly perceived; the said Idea being recognised by the experience of all living beings.—(1215)

The following Text shows that the said Conceptual Content is well known as the source of all activities of persons from infancy onwards:—

TEXT (1216).

THROUGH THE CONTINUANCE OF THE IMPRESSION LEFT BY THE CONSTANT ASSOCIATING OF THE THING AND ITS NAME DURING PAST LIVES,—EVEN THE NEW-BORN INFANT BECOMES CAPABLE OF ACTIVITY, BY REASON OF THE SAID CONCEPTUAL CONTENT.—(1216)

COMMENTARY.

'Atita-bhava' is past lives;—during these there has been 'nāmārtha-bhāvanā', constant associating of things with their names;—this constant associating leaves its 'Vāsanā', Impressions, or capacity in the mind;—through the 'anvaya', continuance of this capacity, even the infant has ideas associated with words; and it is through the presence of this Conceptual Content (Idea associated with words), that the infant becomes capable of activity,—such as smiling, crying, sucking the breast, becoming pleased and so forth.—From this effect its cause in the shape of the said Conceptual Content is assumed in the infant. This has been thus declared—'All activity in the world is based upon words, which even the infant has recourse to, through the impressions left by past lives'.

This Conceptual Content, presenting the object, as associated with vague verbal expressions and existing only in the subjective form,—as if it were something external,—appears in the mind of Infants also, by virtue of which in their later life, they become capable of comprehending the relevant Conventions.—(1216)

The Author shows again how the existence of the Conceptual Content is vouched for by Perception:—

TEXT (1217).

THAT WHICH IS CLEARLY COGNISED AT THE TIME OF REFLECTION AND IMAGINATION AS IF INTERPENETRATING THEM,—CANNOT BE SET ASIDE BY MERE WORDS.—(1217)

COMMENTARY.

The following Text shows that the existence of Conceptual Content is proved by Inference from its effect in the shape of Verbal Usage:—
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TEXT (1218).

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN WORDS AND THINGS, DUE TO CONCEPTUAL CONTENT, IS ILLUSORY; HENCE AS IT CANNOT BE BASED UPON ANYTHING ELSE,—IF THERE WERE NO CONCEPTUAL CONTENT, THE SAID CONNECTION, EVEN AS IT IS, WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE.—(1218)

COMMENTARY.

Any real connection between Words and Things has been negatived by our predecessors, and it has also been proved that it is all illusory. Under the circumstances, if this Conceptual Content were not there, then the said connection,—even as it is,—i.e. even in the illusory form,—would not be possible; as that connection is based upon the Conceptual Content; and as it has been proved that anything external,—in the form of Specific Individuality, Universal and the like,—cannot form the denotation of words. —(1218)

Question:—"Other people describe the Conceptual Content not only as the idea associated with words", but also as that which is capable of being connected with the Universal, Quality, Action and so forth. Why do not you accept these?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1219).

SOME PEOPLE HAVE REGARDED THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT TO BE THAT WHICH IS CAPABLE OF BEING CONNECTED WITH THE UNIVERSAL AND THE REST;—THAT VIEW CANNOT BE RIGHT, AS THE UNIVERSAL, ETC. HAVE ALL BEEN REJECTED, AND THEY ARE NEVER PERCEIVED.—(1219)

COMMENTARY.

'They are never perceived'—i.e. the Universal, etc. are never actually perceived.

This answer has been given on the assumption (for the sake of argument) that the Universal, etc. do exist.—(1219)

The said 'non-perception' of the Universal, etc. is further emphasised in the following—
TEXT (1220).

THE UNIVERSAL AND THE REST BEING NEVER PERCEIVED,—AND THEIR CONNECTION BEING NEVER MANIFESTED,—HOW CAN THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THINGS BE POSSIBLE,—AS BETWEEN MILK AND WATER, ETC.?—(1220)

COMMENTARY.

'Like Milk and Water, etc.'—When Milk and Water are mixed up, they do not appear separately,—and hence it is no longer possible to connect the two; in the same manner, even if the Universal and the rest do exist, they never appear as distinguished from their substratum; and hence it is not possible to connect them with their substratum.—(1220)

"If then the Conceptual Content in the form of association with the Universal is not possible, then, how is it that the propounder of the definition (Dirṇāga in his Nyāyamukha) has asserted that 'Conceptual Content' consists in connection with Name, Universal and so forth'?"

The Answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1221).

TWO KINDS OF CONCEPTUAL CONTENT HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN THE TWO ASSERTIONS, IN ORDER TO SET FORTH THE TWO VIEWS THAT HAVE BEEN HELD BY PERSONS BELONGING TO OUR OWN PARTY AND BY THOSE BELONGING TO OTHER PARTIES,—IN ORDER TO SHOW WHICH IS TO BE ACCEPTED AND WHICH TO BE REJECTED.—(1221)

COMMENTARY.

What is to be rejected is the Conceptual Content in the form of connection with the Universal, etc. which is the view accepted by the other party; and what is to be accepted is the view of our own party that it consists in association with name. In order to set forth this distinction, both views relating to Conceptual Content have been asserted.

Question:—"How do you know that it is so?"

Answer:—'By the two assertions';—that is the words used by the Teacher are 'nāmajātyādiyojana';—'connection or association with Name and Universal, etc.', where both the Name and the Universal, etc. have been mentioned, as representing the two views. If this were not intended, then the expression used would have been either 'association with Name, etc.' or 'association with the Universal, etc.' Nor is the enumeration meant to
be exhaustive; as in that case the addition of 'et cetera' would be meaningless.
—(1221)

Says the Opponent:—“Conceptual Content is a property of the Cogni-
tion; what forms the subject-matter of the present context is the view that
the said Content is absent (in Sense-perception); as it is Sense-perception that
is being considered; and it is not intended to expound the absence of the
Object; as regards the ‘association of Name, Universal, etc.’, on the other hand,
it is a property of the Object, not of the Cognition. So that what the pro-
ponent of the Lakṣāṇa has asserted appears to be entirely irrelevant.”

Anticipating this criticism, the Author supplies the following answer:—

TEXT (1222).

This 'Connection with Name, etc.' remains there after having
indicated its own immediate cause; hence the assertion is
not irrelevant.—(1222)

COMMENTARY.

'Anantaram'—immediate—'nimittam'—cause; and that cause is in
the form of the verbally-associated Idea;—and this is called 'connection'
because it appears in a form envisaging two things;—and there is no con-
necting of one thing by another; as properties of things have no functions to
perform.

The indication of this immediate cause is done in two ways; and why
this 'connection' comes in has been explained.

The compound 'nāmādiyojanā' is to be explained as 'that whereby the
connection of the two things is brought about'; there being Bahuvala compound even when there is no co-ordination between the factors concerned.—
Or the compound may be explained on the basis of the assumption that the
Cause is spoken of as the Effect. The purpose served by this indirect expres-
sion is that it serves to bring out the efficiency of the cause as bringing about
an effect different from other causes.

[So that the expression 'nāmādiyojanā' stands, indirectly, for the Con-
ceptual Content itself.]—(1222)

Or, the expression 'nāmajātyādiyojanā' may be explained in another
way (as standing for kalpanā, Conceptual Content, itself):—'Yojana' is
that wherewith one is connected;—and this 'yojanā' of 'Name, Universal,
etc.' would be the same Conceptual Content, explained as 'Idea associated
with verbal expression'; so that there is nothing defective in the definition
propounded by Diṇṇāga.

This is what is explained in the following—
TEXT (1223).

Name, Universal and all the rest are connected by the said Conceptual Content; hence what is spoken of (by Diśnāga's definition) is the same Conceptual Content which has been described as 'the Idea associated with verbal expression'.—(1223)

COMMENTARY.

The following Text supplies another answer to the criticism (urged against Diśnāga's definition):

TEXT (1224).

Or, what has been spoken of (in the definition in question) is the same Conceptual Content that we have ourselves asserted;

—(This interpretation) being based upon the fact that in all cases things are spoken of by their name (this being the meaning of the compound 'nāmādiyojanā').—(1224)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"If it be as asserted above, then how do you explain the explanatory words of the Teacher? For instance, he has declared as follows:—In the case of Proper names, like Dīthā, what is denoted is an object qualified by a Name; in the case of common nouns like 'Cow' what is denoted is the object qualified by the Universal 'Cow'; in the case of adjectives, like 'white', what is expressed is the object qualified by the Quality of 'whiteness'; in the case of verbal nouns what is denoted is the object qualified by the Action; and in the case of words speaking of substances,—like 'stick-holder', 'horned' and the like—what is denoted is the object qualified by the substance. —By this text the Teacher has made it quite clear that things qualified by the qualifications of the 'Universal', etc. are also separately denoted by words."

The answer to this is that 'In all cases, etc. etc.'—'In all cases'—i.e. even in the case of words denoting the Universal, etc.—What is meant is as follows:—Just as when Proper names are pronounced, what is denoted is the object qualified by the Name,—so also in the case of words expressive of the Universal, etc.,—like 'Cow'—what is denoted is the object qualified by that Name;—similarly in all cases [what is denoted is an object qualified by, connected with, a name].—(1224)

Question:—"In that case, how are we to construe the Instrumental in the-words 'jātyā', 'gunēna' etc. (by the Universal, by the Quality)?"

Answer:—
TEXT (1225).

IT IS THROUGH THESE THAT THE INSTRUMENTAL ENDING BECOMES USEFUL; SO THAT THE MEANING COMES TO BE THAT THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT BECOMES CONNECTED WITH THE NAME, THROUGH THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE UNIVERSAL, ETC.—(1225)

COMMENTARY.

The particular thing spoken as 'Cow' is that which is connected with that Name through the Instrumentality of the Universal; similarly, through the instrumentality of the Quality, etc. It is in this sense that the Universal, etc. become the Instrument (of Connection), and thus the Instrumental Ending becomes useful.

Question:—"If that is so, then how are the words (of Diṅnāga)—'nāma-jātyādīyojanā'—to be construed?"

Answer:—'It is through these, etc. etc.' That is the words are to be construed as 'nāmnaḥ jātyādibhiḥ yojanā', ['connection with the Universal, etc., of the Name'].

'Sēyam'—This stands for the Conceptual Content itself, which is implied by the force of the compound, which is to be explained as follows:—'Jātyādīyojanā' means 'jātyādibhiḥ yojanā', 'connection with the Universal, etc.'; 'nāma-jātyādīyojanā' means 'nāmnaḥ jātyādīyojanā', 'connection with the Universal, etc., of the Name'.—(1225)

Objection:—"If that is so, then in the case of Proper Names, there would be nothing to denote the Universal, etc., and hence the said explanation cannot apply to their case."

In anticipation of this objection, the Author provides the following answer:—

TEXT (1226).

INASMUCH AS THERE IS THE UNIVERSAL EXPRESSED BY THE PROPER NAME, THE EXPLANATION SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS NOT APPLICABLE TO IT. IT HAS BEEN MENTIONED SEPARATELY ONLY IN VIEW OF POPULAR USAGE.—(1226)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—Such words as 'Dīthta' which are known as Proper Names, also take up a 'Universal' as their denotation, which
Universal subsists in an entity restricted within a limited period of time; they denote such a Universal because they are incapable of denoting any object marked by a momentarily fluctuating character, while each of these (Proper Names) continues to remain attached to one entity from birth to death. If the Proper Name did not denote such a Universal, then,—having been applied to the individual in his childhood, how could it denote that same individual in his old age, who would have become a different individuality?—Even for those persons who hold the view that the body is not momentary, but lasts for some time,—it is admitted that in course of time, the component parts of the body go on deteriorating, by reason of which deterioration,—or by reason of its connection with such deterioration of the components,—the body in a later age is different from that in the earlier age.—Even under the view that it remains the same body undergoing developments and changes,—the Name that has been associated with a certain thing at one stage of its development, could not denote the same thing when it has reached a further stage of development; e.g. the name 'milk' which has been associated with the Milk in the first stage, is not applicable to the Curd, which is only a later stage in the development of milk. In the same way in the case of the Body also, the name applied to it in childhood could not be applied to it in youth or old age. For these reasons, the Universal must be admitted (even in the case of the Denotation of Proper Names).

Or, even if there be no such entity as the Universal (in this case),—even so, our explanation does not cease to apply to the case of Proper Names. Because it is only the diverse Individuals that are conceived of as common—when their distinct individualities are not meant to be emphasised,—when they become included under Common names denotative of the 'Universal'. Consequently the Teacher propounding the definition under question has mentioned the Proper Names separately from Common names. This is what is explained by the words—'*It has been mentioned separately, etc. etc.'* In common parlance, the word 'Cow' is known as a Common name (denoting a Universal) while the word 'Chitrāṅgada' is known as a Proper Name (applied to a single Individual); that is why the two have been mentioned separately.

—(1226)

The Opponent raises the following objection:—

**TEXT (1227).**

"INASMUCH AS THE 'EXCLUSION (Apoha) OF OTHERS' IS THE ONLY DENOTATION OF WORDS, ALL WORDS SHOULD BE 'COMMON' ONLY. OR, INASMUCH AS THEY ARE DEPENDENT UPON THE SPEAKER'S WHIM, THEY SHOULD ALL BE 'PROPER' ONLY."—(1227)

The answer to this is given in the following—
EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION". 623

TEXT (1228).

IT IS TRUE THAT WHAT THE PROFESSOR OF THE SCIENCE OF REASONING HAS SAID IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POPULAR IDEA OF THINGS; AS IT IS ONLY ON THESE LINES THAT VERBAL USAGE ACTUALLY PROCEEDS.—(1228)

COMMENTARY.

'On these lines';—i.e. under the fivefold division of Proper Name, Universal, Quality, Action and Substantive.—(1228)

Says the Opponent—"If what is meant by Diṅnāga, is the 'Kalpanā', Conceptual Content, as understood by the Buddhists themselves, then how is it that, having asserted that 'others have held that things are denoted by words which have no corresponding objects', he has, later on, stated his own view of 'Kalpanā'?

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1229).

The said 'Universal' and the rest are nothing different from what is known by these words among people;—IT WAS WITH A VIEW TO EMPHASISE THIS FACT, THAT THE STATEMENT 'OTHERS ETC.' HAS BEEN MADE.—(1229)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—As a matter of fact, anything in the shape of the Universal, as apart from the 'Individuals—'spotted cow' and the like—has no real existence,—it is all purely illusory;—it is with a view to emphasise this fact that the Teacher has made the assertion in question,—and not with a view to indicate a separate kind of 'Kalpanā'.

'Others'—other Buddhists.

'Words which have no corresponding objects',—i.e. words which denote only Apoha, independently of any such things as 'Universal' and the rest.

Such is the meaning of the passage quoted from the Teacher's work.—(1229)

It is not only we who regard the Conceptual Content as 'Idea associated with words'; in fact, others also have got to accept it as such; otherwise there would be no usage in the world.—This is what is shown in the following—
TEXTS (1230–1233).

Even those who are wedded to the notion that Conceptual Content consists in 'connection with the Universal and the rest', have to admit that it is 'idea associated with words'.—Otherwise, just as the two connected things are non-existent, so their connection also would be non-existent, —all things being conceived severally each by itself; and there would be no need for postulating the 'Conceptual Content'. And the result of this would be that there would be no usage in the world; because usage has been regarded as associated with the Universal and the rest,—and association with the Universal and the rest is inseparable from association with words. Thus alone could the expression 'spoken of' used by the Teacher be fruitful.

—(1230–1233)

COMMENTARY.

Even when Conceptual Content is regarded by others as 'association with Universal, Quality, Action and Substance',—in reality 'association' with Name alone constitutes the Conceptual Content. Because as a matter of fact, whenever a thing is apprehended as distinguished by the Universal, etc. it is so only through the Name; if it were not so, then—like the apprehension of several distinct things, there being connection independently by itself,—how could there be any 'Conceptual Content'? And the result of this would be that the world would become dumb.—It is for this reason that even on seeing the man with the stick, one does not connect the various factors implied in the notion of the 'stick-holder', until he recalls the particular Name.

Just because all such connection is invariably concomitant with the association of words, the words of the Teacher—to the effect that 'what is spoken of in the case of words like 'Cow' is the thing qualified by the Universal'—become fruitful (have some sense). Otherwise, without the Name, how could the (passive) term 'is spoken of' be used?—As the action of speaking (expressing) belongs to the word.—(1230–1233)

The following Text sums up the arguments in favour of the notion of the Conceptual Content:

TEXT (1234).

Thus 'Conceptual Content' is something that can be easily proved without effort, as there is no dispute regarding it among Teachers who take their stand upon all true doctrines.—(1234)

COMMENTARY.

The following Text explains what Divināga really means by asserting the Conceptual Content in two forms.—
EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION". 625

TEXTS (1235-1236).

It was in view of all this that the assertion of ‘NAME, UNIVERSAL AND THE REST’ was made; and herein the Teacher made mention of his own view as also the view of others; without indicating the difference by actually saying that ‘my own view is so and so’. It was for this reason that he subsequently added the statement that ‘OTHERS HAVE HELD, ETC.’—(1235-1236)

COMMENTARY.

As to which of the two views is to be accepted and which rejected has been already indicated by us when we showed that even ‘association with Universal, etc.’ is invariably concomitant with ‘association with Name’.

‘The assertion of Name, etc.’—this is to be construed with ‘akarot’, ‘made’ (in the second line).

The assertion of his own view as also the view of others has been made for the purpose of showing which is to be accepted and which to be rejected.—(1235-1236)

Question:—“How then are the words of Divñaga in his Nyåyamukha to be construed ?”

Answer:—

TEXT (1237).

THUS IN THIS WAY IS THE PASSAGE FROM THE NYÅYAMUKHA TO BE EXPLAINED. BY MENTIONING THE ‘COGNITION’, IT IS THE ‘IDEA ASSOCIATED WITH WORDS’ THAT HAS BEEN INDICATED.—(1237)

COMMENTARY.

The relevant passage from the Nyåyamukha is as follows:—‘That Cognition of the form of things which, through the imposed identity of the qualifying and denotative adjuncts, appears as non-determinate, in connection with each of the sense-organs,—is Sense-perception’.—Here the ‘qualifying adjunct’ stands for the Universal, etc.—and the ‘denotative adjunct’ for the Name; the ‘imposition of the identity of these two’—with the things possessing the Universal, etc. and also with the thing bearing the Name.—The ‘imposition of identity’ is mentioned only by way of illustration; in some cases where the adjuncts are apprehended as distinct—e.g. when it is said ‘the Universal Cow subsists in this’, ‘the name of this is so and so’,—there also the presence of the Conceptual Content is admitted.

Objection:—“It has nowhere been said that the subsequent resultant Idea constitutes the Conceptual Content; how then do you get at the idea of the said Conceptual Content (from the words of the passage cited) ?”
Answer:—'By mentioning the Cognition, etc. etc.'—That is to say, when the passage, in contradistinction to the Conceptual Content, mentions the Cognition as 'Sense-perception', it clearly indicates that the Conceptual Content is a property of the Cognition. Thus the meaning of the passage comes to be this:—That Cognition, which, through the imposition of the identity of Name, etc. appears as non-determinate, is Sense-perception; that Cognition, on the other hand, which is determinate is of the nature of the Conceptual Content, and hence it is not Sense-perception; and the implication of this is that Conceptual Content consists in the Idea associated with words as contradistinguished from Sense-perception.—In this way the passage has presented the Teacher's own as also other people's views.—(1237)

Or, it may be that in the passage under reference, the Teacher has stated only his own view.—This is explained in the following—

TEXT (1238).

Or, the term 'vishēṣaṇa' ['Qualifying Adjunct', as occurring in the passage quoted from the Nyāyamukha, on p. 372, Bottom] may be taken as standing for 'Differentiation', 'Exclusion',—by virtue of which words bring about the 'Apoha, Exclusion, of others'; [it is called 'Differentiation'] because it does the differentiating (or excluding) of the Universal, etc.—(1238)

COMMENTARY.

In the compound 'vishēṣaṇābhidhāyakābhedopachāra' (in the passage quoted from the Nyāyamukha, in the commentary of Text 1237), the term 'vishēṣaṇa' stands for differentiation, i.e. exclusion;—and the Word is the 'abhidhāyaka', denoter, of this Exclusion, not of Universal, etc.; and there is 'imposition of the identity' of this; in this way is the compound to be explained.—(1238)

Objection:—"If Conceptual Content is 'Idea associated with words', then it is something having properties, an object; it is not likely for one object to belong to another object, in view of which its negation or denial could be brought about as a property of it; hence what is asserted is most incoherent. Thus if Sense-perception is 'free from conceptual content', then how is it spoken of by the word 'Sense-perception'?"

This is the objection that is urged by Bharga, Bhāradvāja and others, who think that the term 'free from Conceptual Content' is synonymous with 'inexpressible by words'.

The Author says that this objection has been answered already:—
EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION". 627

TEXTS (1239–1242).

Conceptual Content being held to be as actually understood and described above, it is the denial of the sameness of this with Sense-perception that has been asserted; and this is not inconsistent with the fact of its being spoken of by such words as 'Adhyakṣa' ('Pratyakṣa') and the like. In Sense-perception there is absence of Conceptual Content, but 'Conceptual Content' is not the same as 'expressed by words'. Otherwise, Colour, Odour and the rest would become determinate (as they are 'expressed by words').—Thus there is no room for what the dull-witted persons have urged.—If the word 'Sense-perception' actually denotes Sense-perception, then how can its being said to be 'free from Conceptual Content' be held to be improper?—(1239–1242)

COMMENTARY.

'Denial of the sameness':—when Diṇāga says that 'where there is no Conceptual Content, that is Sense-perception' what he does is to deny the sameness of the two; the meaning being [that Sense-perception is] that Cognition which is not of the nature of the said Conceptual Content;—it does not deny what is contained in the 'content'.

This disposes of the first objection.

The second objection also is not proper; because 'freedom from Conceptual Content' is not 'inexpressibility by words', it is only 'freedom determining concepts'. Even though the Cognition is non-determinate, yet it is regarded as expressed by words, by reason of its being actually found to be so expressed; and yet it does not become 'determinate', being, in this respect, like Colour and other things (which, though expressed by words, do not become determinate on that account). This is only by the way.—(1239–1242)

The following might be urged:—"Conceptual Content may be as described. But how does Sense-perception become proved to be 'free from Conceptual Content' ?"

Answer:——

TEXT (1243).

That Sense-perception is 'free from Conceptual Content' is recognised very clearly; since it is found that even when one has his mind attracted by something else, he has the perception of the blue Colour and other things through his senses.—(1243)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that the absence of Conceptual Content is clearly perceived in one's own experience.—(1243)
It might be urged that—“It is the Conceptual Content itself attracted by other things, which perceives the Blue Colour and other things”.

Answer :—

TEXT (1244).

This same Conceptual Content does not apprehend the said object; because if it did, it would abandon the expressing of the ‘past’, etc. and there would be the incongruity of its being connected with the name of that object.—(1244)

COMMENTARY.

If that same Conceptual Content apprehended the said object (Blue Colour, etc.), then it would abandon the signifying of past and other things, and would contain within itself the name of the ‘Blue’ itself.

The ‘abandoning of the signifying of the past and other things’ has been asserted, because the Conceptual Content cannot be associated with two sets of words.

The Compound ‘tannāma, etc.’ is to be explained as—‘There would be the incongruity of the connection of the name of the object before the perceiver’.—(1244)

It might be argued that—“In that case, there may be some other Conceptual Content that would apprehend the object;—why is not this view accepted?”

Answer :—

TEXT (1245).

At the particular time, there is no other Conceptual Content which is associated with the name of that object; because there is no recognition of any such perceptible Conceptual Content, and the simultaneous presence of both cannot be desirable.—(1245)

COMMENTARY.

There are two answers pointed out in due sequence—(1) the opponent’s idea being contrary to perceived facts, and (2) its being contrary to his own doctrines; inasmuch as it involves the presence of two Conceptual Contents at the same time.

‘Both’—i.e. the two Conceptual Contents.—(1245)

The following Text sums up the subject :—
EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION". 629

TEXT (1246).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHAT MAKES THE COGNITION DETERMINATE APPEARS ALONG WITH THE COGNITION ITSELF; HENCE THE COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE SENSES IS CLEARLY non-determinate (FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT).—(1246)

The Opponent might urge that the fact of the ‘determining factor’ appearing along with the Cognition cannot be accepted. This is the argument put forward in the following—

TEXT (1247).

IF IT BE HELD THAT "COGNITIONS APPEAR IN SUCCESSION (NEVER SIMULTANEOUSLY), AND THE IDEA OF SIMULTANEOUS APPEARANCE IS DUE TO THE QUICKNESS OF THE SUCCESSION; AS IN THE CASE OF THE WHIRLING FIRE-BRAND"—

[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS STATED IN THE FOLLOWING TEXT].—(1247)

COMMENTARY.

The question being raised as to why the Cognitions are perceived as appearing simultaneously, if, in reality, they appear in succession,—the answer given is that ‘the idea of simultaneous, etc. etc.’; as in the case of the whirling fire-brand. That is, in the case of the whirling fire-brand, it is found that when the whirling is done very quickly, the idea produced is that of a single flaming circle; all the several perceptions being mixed up as one; in the same manner, cognitions appearing very quickly one after the other, there is the idea of their appearing together as one.

Or, the term 'ālāta' may be taken as standing for the perceptions of the fire-brand,—the cognition being spoken of figuratively as the object; the sense of the affix 'vati' remains the same as before, in this interpretation also. —(1247)

The above argument of the Opponent is answered in the following—

TEXT (1248).

WHAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED IS THAT THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NAME OF THE OBJECT BEFORE THE MAN'S EYES.—(?)(1248)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—What is being dealt with is not the fact of the two appearing together, but the absence of Conceptual Content in the
Perception; and this absence is proved by the fact that even when a man has his mind elsewhere at the time of the apprehension of the object before his eyes, he does not apprehend the otherwise apprehensible Conceptual Content associated with the name of that object. And the Opponent has urged no criticism against this. Because, even if the two cognitions are actually apprehended in succession,—the Conceptual Content is not apprehended; so that the attack does not affect our main position.—(1248)

The following Text shows that the idea of the simultaneous appearance of the two cognitions is entirely mistaken:—

TEXT (1249).

That the said idea (of the simultaneity of the other Conceptual Content and the Cognition) [cannot] be wrong has just been made clear. And this same simultaneity between the object and the Cognition is also quite clear for that same reason.—(1249)

COMMENTARY.

'It cannot be wrong'—such is to be the construction along with what has gone before.

Its idea—i.e. the idea of the two appearing at one and the same time.

As a matter of fact, an idea is regarded as wrong when it is annulled by a valid cognition to the contrary; in the present case there is no such cognition to the contrary, by virtue of which the idea in question could be regarded as wrong.

"How do you know that there is no such cognition to the contrary?"

Answer:—This has just been made clear;—that the cognition of the object before the man's eyes appears at the same time as the mind is attracted by something else—is clearly perceived; and it is this cognition that is called 'Sense-perception';—wherefore then is there anything wrong in this?—(1249)

It is not only that there is nothing to prove that the idea of the said simultaneity is wrong,—in fact, there is proof to the contrary (to show that it is not wrong). This is what is shown in the following—
EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION". 631

TEXTS (1250-1253).

In the state of things attending upon the watching of the dancing girl, the whole lot of sensations is apprehended at one and the same time, even though there are many intervening factors. If this also were regarded as a mistake due to the quick succession in which the sensations appear,—then (the answer is that) there is still quicker succession in the case of cognitions produced by the two words 'latā' and 'tāla' when pronounced together; why then is there no idea of simultaneity in this case?—Then in a case where the operations of the mind alone are concerned, no succession should be perceived, because all cognitions (mental operations) occur in quick succession and do not stay for any length of time. So that in all these cases (of quick succession), no succession could be perceived. The notion of simultaneous cognition however would be there, just as in the case of perception of sound, etc. (in the case of the dancing girl).—(1250-1253)

COMMENTARY.

Under such conditions as the witnessing of the dancing girl, we find that each single sensation, even though intervened by five other sensations, appears to be close to, and unseparated from, the other; for instance, at the same time that one sees the girl dancing, he also hears the song and its accompaniments, goes on tasting the camphor and other spices, smells the sweet fragrance of flowers placed before the nostrils, touches the air proceeding from the fans and thinks of making presents of clothes and ornaments. [All this goes on simultaneously.] Thus even when there are so many intervening factors, among the several cognitions, there appears the illusion that all these appear at one and the same time,—this illusion being due to the quick succession in which the cognitions appear;—such being the case even when there are several intervening factors, it becomes all the more possible that there should be the notion of the letters being pronounced at one and the same time, in cases where two words like 'latā' and 'tāla',—or 'saraḥ' and 'rasaḥ' are pronounced, where the utterance of the syllables is so much quicker; so that in the case of such utterances as 'saraḥ-rasaḥ', when the words are heard, there should be no recognition of the two different words or the two different things denoted by them.—Further, in a case where there is Conceptual Content in the form of pondering over several philosophical and literary problems,—which ponderings are not interrupted by heterogeneous sensations through the Eye, etc.,—the appearance of the ideas is extremely quick; and hence it would not be possible to form any idea of succession in them. And as all Cognitions are momentary, and cannot continue for any length of time they always appear quickly; so that the cognition of nothing could be successive at all;—'just as in the case of the perception of sound, etc.';—i.e. just as in the
case of the perception of sound, taste, etc. while seeing the girl dancing.—
(1250–1253)

As regards the instance of the 'Whirling Fire-brand', it is 'devoid of the Probandum';—this is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1254–1256).

IN THE CASE OF THE WHIRLING FIRE-BRAND, THE ILLUSION OF SIMUL-
TANEITY APPEARS IN THE FORM OF THE CIRCLE; THIS NOTION OF
THE CIRCLE IS NOT DUE TO THE CONNECTING OF THE VARIOUS PER-
CEPTIONS OF THE FIRE-BRAND AS IT IS WHIRLED ROUND; BECAUSE
THE (CONTINUOUS) CIRCULAR FORM IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED. IN
FACT, THE SAID CONNECTING OF THE VARIOUS PERCEPTIONS COULD
BE DONE ONLY BY REMEMBRANCE, NOT BY DIRECT PERCEPTION;
AS NO PERCEPTION CAN APPREHEND WHAT IS PAST AND GONE.—
THE OBJECT ALSO OF THE REMEMBRANCE COULD NOT BE VERY
CLEAR, AS IT HAS ALREADY DISAPPEARED; FOR THIS SAME REASON,
THE APPEARANCE OF THE CIRCLE ALSO COULD NOT BE VERY CLEAR
(IF IT WERE DUE TO THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE MANY COGNITIONS).
—(1254–1256)

COMMENTARY.

When this mental illusion appears, it does not appear as combining the
several visual perceptions (of the Fire-brand); it appears only as the Sense-born
single perception of the Circular form, through the force of certain accessory
circumstances; that this is so is clear from the fact that the perception is
quite clear; and it would not be so clear if it were accompanied by the
Conceptual Content. Because such combination of perceptions could be
done only by Remembrance, not by Sense-born Perception; as the latter
functions only when the object perceived is close by, and hence it could not
apprehend what is past and gone. The object too of such a Remembrance
could not be clear;—why?—because it will have already disappeared.—
Hence, as the perception of the Whirling Fire-brand, if it were an illusion,
would be indistinct,—it cannot be an illusion; in fact, it is a sense-born
regular Perception. Thus the Instance cited by the Opponent is devoid of
the character sought to be proved.—(1254–1256)

Having thus established—by means of Perception itself—the fact of
Sense-perception being 'free from Conceptual Content',—the Author proceeds
to prove it by means of Inference:—
EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION". 633

TEXTS (1257–1260).

Or again, when there is no basis for the existence of a thing in a certain form,—that thing in that form is not admitted as real, by the wise. For instance, the White Horse is not admitted to be the Cow because the Dewlap and the other features of the Cow are not present in the Horse. In the case of Sense-perception there is no reason for the presence of the determinate character (the character of being associated with Conceptual Content), which could bring about the apprehension of the thing along with its properties. —Spotted and other Cows are instances to the contrary. If it were not so, it would lead to absurd contingencies.—The reason adduced cannot be said to be 'unproven' (or not-admitted); as the universal and other qualifying factors have all been rejected. Nor are the properties cognised as apart from those factors. Nor are there any such properties.—(1257–1260)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be thus formulated:—When the basis of the idea of a thing in a certain form is absent, that thing is not accepted by intelligent persons to be of that form;—for instance, the White Horse is not accepted as of the form of the Cow, because the basis of the 'cow-idea', in the shape of the dewlap and other characteristics of the Cow, is absent in the Horse;—in the case of Sense-perception, which is produced on the basis of the specific object Blue,—the basis for its being regarded as associated with Conceptual Content (i.e. Determinate), in the form of the apprehension of the object along with its properties, is absent; and thus there being no apprehension of the Cause [the effect, in the shape of its being associated with Conceptual Content cannot be there]. The Spotted and Black Cows supply the Corroborative Instance per contra. Lastly, there is the possibility of the incongruity that all things might become accepted to be of all forms and that the person accepting things would come to be regarded as stupid.—Such is the upshot of the Inference put forward.

'Karka' is white Horse.

'Universal, etc.'—i.e. the qualifying factors (postulated by the Realists).

Even if the Universal and the rest are real entities, our Reason is not 'unproven';—this is what is meant by the words—'Nor is the thing, etc.'; i.e. as apart from Colour and the rest which have been held to be qualified by the Properties (Universal, etc.).

Question: "If there is no cognition of Properties as distinct from what is qualified, then, why should it not be a qualifying factor?"

Answer:—'Nor are there any such Properties'—i.e. as differentiated from the thing.
From all this it follows that there is no apprehension of anything along with its properties. Hence the Reason adduced by us cannot be said to be 'Unproven'.—(1257–1260)

It might be argued that—"There may be no qualifying Properties in the shape of the Universal and the rest; the form of the word itself will be the distinguishing property."

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXTS (1261–1263).**

**THE NAME also, which would be the 'Specific Individuality' of the Word, can never be denotative; as the idea of the 'Specific Individuality' being the Denoter or the Denoted has been already rejected.—It is for this reason that the idea of the Denoter and Denoted has been regarded as something superimposed (upon things);—while what one apprehends by Sense-perception is something which is not superimposed; because this perception is there only when the 'Specific Individuality' is there,—and it is not there when the Specific Individuality is not there—through the intervention of something else or some such reason.—(1261–1263)**

**COMMENTARY.**

There can be no Convention in regard to the 'Specific Individuality',—not even to the 'Specific Individuality' of the Word; for the simple reason that there can be no connection with Convention at the time of usage; and apart from its 'Specific Individuality', there is no other form of the Word; nor again can the Word be connected with anything with regard to which there has been no Convention; if it did, it would lead to absurdities;—nor can there be any Conceptual Content without connection with words;—from all this it follows that the whole idea of the Denoter and Denoted is something 'superimposed'—imaginary—not real.

It might be argued that—"even so, the Perception shall become associated with Conceptual Content (Determinate) through apprehending the 'superimposed' thing."

The answer is that 'what one apprehends, etc. etc.'

'When it is not there',—i.e. through its absence,—the word 'vyatirēkatah' being construed here; the sense being that 'it is through the absence of the Specific Individuality (that the Perception also is absent)'.

**Question:**—"When is there absence of the Specific Individuality?"
Answer:—'Through the intervention, etc. etc.'—The term 'some such reason' stands for the distance of time, place and so forth.—(1261-1263)

The following Text adduces another proof for the same:

TEXT (1264).

The nature of the Blue and other things, being individually specific, is incapable of having any Convention in regard to it; the perception of these things, therefore, cannot be associated with words.—(1264)

COMMENTARY.

The nature—essence—of the Blue and other things is such that no Convention can be made in regard to them.

The question being—"why is it so?"—the answer is 'being individually specific'; that is, it is incapable of being present at the time of usage; and Convention is for the purpose of usage alone; hence there can be no Convention in regard to it.

Further, there is Convention only when the thing concerned has already become cognised,—not while it remains uncognised, unknown; and until the Perception has come about, it cannot apprehend the Blue, etc.; and as soon as it has come about, it would (according to the Opponent) at once associate it with words; but at the time that the Perception actually appears,—and also at the time of the apprehension of the related verbal expression,—the perceived thing, being momentary, cannot be present, and hence the Perception cannot apprehend it; by what then, and with what, would the Word be associated? From all this it is clear that the nature of the Blue and other things is incapable of having any convention in regard to it.

'Of these'—i.e. of the Blue and other things.

'Cannot be associated, etc. etc.'—i.e. the verbal expression cannot enter into it.

The argument may be formulated thus:—When a thing is such that no Convention is known in regard to it,—there can be no 'determinate' Perception of it,—e.g. the Visual Perception of Odour;—and the Perception of the Blue, etc. is such that no Convention is known in regard to it,—hence the idea of the Perception being 'determinate' would involve a notion contrary to a wider proposition.—(1264)

In the following texts, the Author sets forth the 'inadmissible character' of the Reason put forward by himself (under Texts 1257-1260),—this criticism being urged from the standpoint of the Digambara (Jaina) philosopher, Sumati:
TEXTS (1265–1267).

"NAME (UNIVERSAL) AND THE REST MAY NOT BE THE DISTINGUISHING PROPERTIES PERCEIVED, IN THE OBJECT (OF SENSE-PERCEPTION)—EVEN SO, THE REASON PUT FORWARD DOES NOT CEASE TO BE INADMISSIBLE; BECAUSE IF THERE IS NO APPREHENSION OF THE THING AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER THINGS, THEN, THERE WOULD EITHER BE AN APPREHENSION OF THE THING BY ITSELF ONLY, OR NO APPREHENSION AT ALL; AS IN THE CASE OF THE JAR—IF THERE IS NO APPREHENSION OF THE JAR AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER JARS, THEN THERE IS EITHER APPREHENSION OF THE JAR BY ITSELF ALONE, OR NO APPREHENSION OF THE JAR AT ALL."—(1265–1267)

COMMENTARY.

Śrīmad describes all things as existing in two forms—the Universal and the Particular; the Universal again is of two kinds—one determined by the Particular, e.g. the 'Cow', and that not so determined (conceptual), e.g. 'Being', 'Entity'. That Universal which exists only in the undetermined (non-conceptual) form is of only one form and is amenable to non-conceptual Perception (Perception free from Conceptual Content), in the form of mere observation, purely subjective Ideation; while the other—i.e. the Universal determined by particulars—is amenable to Conceptual Perception.—Such is Śrīmad's scheme of Perception.

Kumārila however describes the Non-Conceptual Perception, purely subjective Ideation, as apprehending the 'Specific Individuality' of the particular (or Individual); and the Conceptual Perception as apprehending the 'Universal'.

Śrīmad, in examining the nature of Perception in the form of purely subjective Ideation as posited by Kumārila and others, has argued thus—"One who holds this view should be asked the following question.—In this Perception, is the Thing before the eyes of the observer apprehended purely by itself, as characterised by its own form which is impossible anywhere else? Or is it not so apprehended?—If he says it is not so perceived, then our answer to him is as follows:—If there is non-apprehension of the Thing in a form distinguished from other things;—that is, in a form distinguished from a thing other than the intended thing,—i.e. the form or character of the intended thing which is not present in the other thing;—if there is non-apprehension of the Thing as qualified by such a form,—then, either there would be apprehension of the Thing itself only,—i.e. the said Thing even without the character impossible in other things;—or, if even this is not apprehended, then there would be no perception of the Thing at all.—'As in the case of the Jar'—this cites an example.

This example is explained in the next text (1267):—"In the case of the perception of the Jar, if there is no apprehension of the Jar in the form that is impossible in another Jar, to which it may be compared,—then either there would be apprehension of the Jar by itself alone,—without any quali-
fication as that of being of silver or of copper and so forth;—or, if there is no apprehension of the Jar by itself, then there would be no apprehension of any Jar at all,—not even of the one intended; so that there would be no apprehension of the Jar at all.—In the same manner, in the case in question if the distinguishing character is not apprehended, there would either be apprehension of the thing alone by itself,—or there would be no apprehension at all; there could be no escape from these alternatives".—(1265–1267)

[Sumati's] Pārvapakṣa (Criticism) against us thus would be as follows:—

TEXT (1268).

"If Perception is regarded as apprehending the Thing as distinguished from other apprehensible things,—then this cognition would be Conceptual (Determinate), just like the cognition of the Tree and other things."—(1268)

COMMENTARY.

"If Sense-perception is intended to be apprehensive of the Thing as characterised (distinguished) by a character not found anywhere else,—then it becomes Conceptual; because it apprehends the thing as characterised or qualified by some character; just like the Perception in the form 'This is a tree'".—(1268)

The following argument might be urged against Sumati:—'There is no such thing as the Thing itself which could be apprehended as qualified by a character; what there is is only that qualified thing which is held by you, and also by me, to be the Particular (or Individual); it is this only that exists and is apprehended'.

To this Sumati makes the following answer:—

TEXT (1269).

"There is no Particular (or Individual) without a touch of the Universal. If this is not touched in the apprehension, then the Particular, becoming devoid of Being, cannot be apprehended."—(1269)

COMMENTARY.

"The term 'mātra', 'itself', in the Opponent's statements stands for the Universal, that which is called 'Being'; and absolutely independent of this Universal, there is no Particular (or Individual) which could be apprehended.—It might be said—'Under your view there may be such a Universal, but this is not touched at all at the time of the apprehension'.—Our answer to that is—'If this is not quite clear in the apprehension, that is due to its having
become devoid of Being:—that is, if, at the time of apprehension, the said Universal ‘Being’ is not touched by Sense-perception,—and the Particular (or Individual) alone is apprehended,—then this Particular by itself, if apprehended at all, would be devoid of existence, as devoid of the character known as ‘Being’;—and thus it could become characterless; and as such could not be apprehended by Sense-perception, because it would be devoid of Being,—having lost its Being or Existence, and become like the ‘sky-flower’.”—(1269)

TEXT (1270).

"The assertion that the Cognition apprehends a qualified Thing, and yet it is not Conceptual implies great temerity indeed! Certainly, no 'qualification' is possible except through connection with qualifications."—(1270)

COMMENTARY.

"From all this it follows that your assertion—that the Cognition apprehends a qualified object, and yet there is in it no Conceptual Content implies great temerity on your part, in making an assertion opposed to all canons of Right Cognition."

This sums up the criticism against the Buddhist doctrine.

"The Reason for this is provided, in the words—'Certainly no qualification, etc. etc.'—that is to say, just as a man does not become a stick-holder, without the stick,—so a thing cannot be qualified without connection with qualifications.—Hence that cognition which apprehends the qualifications is 'Conceptual' (with Conceptual Content).

"The argument may be formulated as follows:—The Apprehension of the qualified thing, which is under dispute, is Conceptual,—because it apprehends a qualified thing,—like the cognition 'This is a piece of Cloth'."—(1270)

The following Text proceeds to answer the above criticisms of Sumati:—

TEXT (1271).

When the Cognition is held to apprehend the qualified Thing,—it is by reason of its apprehending the Thing as differentiated from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things,—and not of the connection of qualifications.—(1271)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant by Sumati's Reason—'because it apprehends the qualified thing' is the presence of a qualification which is something distinct
from itself,—then it is 'inadmissible'; because for the Buddhist, there is no such thing as the 'qualification', through connection with which the cognition would apprehend things along with qualifications; according to the Buddhist, what is apprehended is only the Thing itself as differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous things; and it is by reason of this latter apprehension that the Cognition is said to apprehend the 'qualified' thing.—(1271)

*Question:*—"Then are all such expressions as 'qualified', 'being distinguished', 'qualified character', and so forth purely negative?"

*Answer:*—

**TEXT (1272).**

**WHAT IS MEANT BY 'BEING QUALIFIED' (DISTINGUISHED) IS 'DIFFERENCE'**

—not the connection of qualifications. But the idea also that 'this is different' is not cognised as associated with words.—(1272)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Difference'—i.e. Differentiation (Preclusion) from homogeneous and heterogeneous things;—and this is not anything different from the thing differentiated; it is the thing itself which is spoken of in that form, through the exclusion of other things, when this exclusion is meant to be emphasised.

The following might be urged—"If there is always the apprehension of the Thing as distinguished from homogeneous and heterogeneous things, then the Apprehension becomes 'determinate' (Conceptual); because it appears in the Verbal form 'This is different'. Otherwise how could it apprehend the 'difference', if it appeared in any other form? When a certain apprehension appears in one form, it cannot be said to apprehend another; if it did so, it would lead to an absurdity."

The answer to this is—'But the idea also, etc. etc.'—(1272)

*Question:*—"How is it then that it is said to be 'different'?"

*Answer:*—

**TEXT (1273).**

**IT IS ONLY AFTER THE THING HAS BEEN APPREHENDED AS THE 'NEGATION OF ALL THINGS OTHER THAN ITSELF', THAT THERE APPEARS THE CONCEPTUAL COGNITION IN THE SAID FORM.**

—(1273)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Svabhāvā'—other than its own self.—When the Thing has been apprehended as the negation of—as differentiated from—all other things,—and when the (non-conceptual) perception in the specific form of the Blue has
appeared,—then there follows the Conceptual Content associated with the words ‘it is different’. If this were not so, then it would be something of the nature of purely verbal expression, or the essence of the thing as associated with the verbal expression, through which the thing could be associated with the name ‘different’ or ‘non-different’, and apprehended as such.

From all this it follows that our Reason is not ‘inadmissible’.—(1273)

In case the Reason adduced by the Opponent—‘ because it apprehends a qualified thing’—is based on the idea that through ‘negation’ (differentiation) itself the thing becomes qualified,—even though it be not qualified in the sense of being connected with a qualification in the shape of some other thing,—even so our Reason cannot become ‘Inconclusive’.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1274).

OTHER PEOPLE REGARD THE Universal AS NOT DISTINGUISHED BY QUALIFICATIONS,—WHICH UNIVERSAL THEY REGARD AS APPREHENDED BY NON-CONCEPTUAL PERCEPTION. WHAT HAS BEEN URGED IS APPLICABLE TO THAT ALSO.—(1274)

COMMENTARY.

The Universal has been held to be of two kinds—(1) distinguished by qualifications, and (2) not distinguished by qualifications. That which is not distinguished by qualifications has been held to be apprehended by Non-conceptual Perception.

‘To that’—i.e. to the Universal.—Hence the charge of being apprehended by Conceptual Perception would apply to these also.—(1274)

* Question :—“How so?”
* Answer :—

TEXT (1275).

THE Universal IS RECOGNISED AS ‘DISTINGUISHED’ FROM THE PARTICULAR; HENCE THE PERCEPTION OF IT WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED (UNDER THE OPPONENT’S CONTENTION) AS CONCEPTUAL.—(1275)

COMMENTARY.

That is understood to be the Universal which is ‘qualified’—i.e. distinguished—from the Particular; if it were not so, then there would be no Universal at all, if it were not excluded—distinguished—from the Particular.

—Such being the case, the Perception that apprehends this Universal, as distinguished from the Particular, becomes ‘Conceptual’, as it apprehends
something that is *qualified*. And yet, according to your view, this cognition is *not* conceptual; hence your Reason is itself Inconclusive.—(1275)

The said *Sumati* himself, anticipating the objection that his own Reason becomes 'Inconclusive' by the case of the Universal, has answered it. This answer is shown in the following—

TEXT (1276).

"A thing is called 'Universal' when it is apprehended without distinction; hence it is not right to regard the Universal as something distinguished from the Particular."

—(1276)

COMMENTARY.

There is no 'Universal' apart from the *Particulars*, by virtue of which on being apprehended it would be amenable to Conceptual Perception; in fact, it is only when the Particulars are apprehended without distinction that they are called 'Universal'; that is to say, when they are not cognised, each in its own distinctive form, they are called 'Universal'. Consequently, how could the Universal be 'distinguished' from the Particulars, by virtue of which its apprehension would become 'conceptual'.—(1276)

*Question* :—How then can there be a clear division between the Universal and the Particular?

*Answer* (provided by *Sumati*):—

TEXT (1277).

"When these (Particulars) are cognised as similar or dissimilar, they indicate the existence in themselves, of the character of the 'Universal' or the 'Particular'."—(1277)

COMMENTARY.

"These same Particulars, according as they are cognised as similar or dissimilar, become spoken of as 'Universal' or 'Particular', respectively
and in this way they bring about a division between the use of the two names, 'Universal' and 'Particular'."—(1277)

The above criticism of Sumati's is answered in the following—

TEXTS (1278-1279).

If the said 'similarity' and 'dissimilarity' are held to be differentiated, then the fact of the Universal being distinguished from the Particulars remains as before.—If, on the other hand, they are not held to be differentiated, then, how can the clearly marked division be possible, without crossing each other?

There is no other way in which they could be conceived.—

(1278-1279)

COMMENTARY.

'Differentiated' :—Not mixed up; i.e. the Universal being one thing and the Particular being another thing.

That the Universal is distinguished from the Particular is said only by way of illustration; in fact the Particular also is distinguished from the Universal; as both these having distinct characters are clearly distinguished from one another.

'The fact, etc.'—'Asanakīraṇā' is unmixed. This has been declared by the same Sumati in the following words—"The Particular is perceived only as infused with the character of such Universals as 'Being,' and the like, not otherwise; hence it is only right that what is qualified should form the object of a qualified (determinate, conceptual) Perception; as for the Universal, on the other hand, it is capable of being perceived independently of all Particulars; and hence there can be nothing incongruous in its forming the object of the non-conceptual Perception".—This clearly marked distinction would not be there.

It might be argued that—"It is not held to be either distinguished or undistinguished."

The answer to that is—'How can, etc. etc.'—As a matter of fact, among things so related that the presence or absence of one must imply the absence or presence of another,—the negation of one is inseparable from the affirmation of another; consequently, there can be no other alternative.—(1278-1279)

Then again, to speak of the Particulars as apprehended 'without distinction' involves a contradiction in terms.—This is what is shown in the following—
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TEXTS (1280-1281).

OF THE PARTICULAR THINGS THERE IS NO OTHER CHARACTERISTIC EXCEPT THAT OF BEING 'PARTICULAR' (OR 'DISTINCT'); HOW THEN CAN THERE BE ANY APPREHENSION OF THEM WHICH DOES NOT ENVISAGE THE 'DISTINCT' FORM? EVEN IF THEIR FORMS ARE ENVISAGED, THEY ARE APPREHENDED ONLY AS DISTINCT FROM OTHER PARTICULARS; SO THAT THEIR PERCEPTION WOULD BE 'CONCEPTUAL'.

—(1280–1283)

COMMENTARY.

There is no 'Particular' apart from the various Things. If then, the Particular were not envisaged in the apprehension of the Universal, how could the various Things be apprehended? That is to say, being non-different from the nature of what is not apprehended, the Particulars also would be not-apprehended.

If it be held that the various Things are apprehended,—then, if these forms are envisaged,—and are apprehended,—the Particular also would be apprehended, being, as it is, non-different from what has been apprehended. So that, in regard to these various things, the Cognition that is held to be apprehensive of the Universal turns out to be conceptual.—(1280-1281)

Further, it may be that the Universal being non-different from the Particulars, it may not be 'distinguished' from those; even so, the Universal would certainly be 'distinguished' from such featureless non-entities as the 'Hare's Horn'; and it would thus become apprehensible by Conceptual Perception; and yet it is not so; hence your reason remains 'Inconclusive'.

This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (1282–1283).

THE UNIVERSAL IS COGNISED AS 'DISTINGUISHED' (DISTINCT) FROM THE FEATURELESS THING; HENCE FOR YOU, IT SHOULD BE COGNISABLE BY CONCEPTUAL PERCEPTION.—IF IT BE URGED THAT "THE UNIVERSAL CANNOT BE REGARDED AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A NON-ENTITY",—THEN (WE ASK) IS IT OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE NON-ENTITY? IF NOT, THEN WHY IS IT NOT ADMITTED THAT IT IS 'DISTINGUISHED' FROM IT?—(1282-1283)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged:—"There can be no distinction made between the Universal and the Non-entity; nor can there be any similarity
between them. Because that is supposed to be a non-entity which is not anything; and such a thing cannot be either distinguished from, or similar to, the Universal. If it were, it would be an Entity.—Even if the Void—i.e. the Non-entity—were distinguished from the Universal, then also it would be an entity; because a non-entity cannot have the character of ‘being distinguished’; and without the character of ‘being distinguished’, a thing cannot be regarded as ‘distinguished’.—Nor can the Non-entity be ‘similar’ to the Universal; as even so it would have to be an entity. A non-entity cannot have a form similar to something else; and unless a thing has a form similar to another’s, it cannot be regarded as ‘similar’ to it; as otherwise it would lead to an absurdity.—Hence relatively to the Void (Non-entity), the Universal cannot be said to be either distinguished (distinct) or similar. Because when one thing is either distinct or similar in relation to another thing, then this latter also has to be regarded as distinct from, or similar to, the former. If it were not so, then the others also could not be perceived as distinct from, or similar to, it.—Further, there is no such thing as ‘non-entity’ apart from entity; when an entity is not found to be another entity, it is called ‘non-entity’ in relation to it; how then could it be ‘distinguished’?"

All this has been argued by Sumati; as against all this, the Author proceeds to urge as follows:—

TEXT (1284).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, IN THE CASE OF THE ENTITY ALSO, BEING ‘DISTINGUISHED’ CONSISTS IN NOT BEING THAT SAME; AND AS THE UNIVERSAL IS NOT THE SAME AS THE NON-ENTITY, WHY CAN YOU NOT REGARD IT AS BEING ‘DISTINGUISHED’ FROM THE NON-ENTITY?

—(1284)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the entity also, when it is ‘distinguished’ from Non-entity, this ‘being distinguished’ is not anything different; it is only the negation of sameness; the meaning being that it is not the same as the other; and this can be equally so in the case of the Universal also, in relation to the Non-entity, like the Hare’s Horn. Because the Hare’s Horn is a non-entity in the sense that it is not capable of any action whatever;—the Universal on the other hand is not regarded as so incapable;—so that its being distinguished from the Non-entity is quite clear. That there should be the distinction of the Universal from the Non-entity, and yet the Non-entity does not become an entity,—that is nothing very important.

As regards the Non-entity, the assertion (made by Sumati) that it is nothing different from Entity and so forth,—it is clear that the writer has not pondered over the meaning of his own assertion: Because when it is said that ‘an Entity is not found to be another entity’, the fact of its being ‘distinguished’ from it becomes asserted; because it speaks of its preclusion from it.—All
that has been urged, therefore, is only the effect of blindness. Hence we desist from further argumentation.—(1284)

The upshot of his whole argument is stated by the Author in the following—

TEXT (1285).

FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT WHATSOEVER COGNITION APPEARS IN REGARD TO THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' OF THINGS APPERTAINS TO WHAT IS BEYOND THE RANGE OF WORDS AND IS HENCE NON-CONCEPTUAL.—(1285)

COMMENTARY.

With the following Texts, the Author proceeds to present the view of Kumārila; and thereby indicates the charge against his own Reason (Premiss)—put forward (under Text 1257 above), to the effect that 'when there is no basis for the existence of a thing in a certain form, that thing, in that form, cannot be admitted as real',—that it is partly 'inadmissible' as not present in a part of the Subject of the Reasoning:—

TEXTS (1286–1288).


COMMENTARY.

All sense-perceptions are made here the Subject (of the Argument); and the sense is that the Premiss (of the Buddhist)—that 'the basis of conceptuality, in the shape of the apprehension of the thing qualified by qualifications, cannot be there'—is not admissible. Because, as a matter of fact, except in the initial Pre-cognition, in all other Sense-perceptions, 'the apprehension of the thing as qualified by qualifications' is present.—If the Buddhist puts forward his Premiss in reference to the Pre-cognition, then the argument is superfluous.

Such is the view of the Opponent (Kumārila).
'Like the cognition of the infant and the dumb' — i.e. like the infant's cognition, and like the dumb person's cognition. — 'And the rest' is meant to include the man in a swoon. The only point of similarity in all these cases is the absence of association with words'.

'Purely' — what is meant by this 'purity' is freedom from the two Universals.

This same idea is made clearer in the second text (1287) — 'Neither the Universal nor the Particular, etc. etc.' — The term 'Particular' stands for the intermediate Universal, 'Cow' and the like; and 'Universal' for the Summum Genus, 'Entity' and the like. — 'The substratum of both these' — this indicates the pure thing.

'Subsequently, etc.' — This makes clear the partial 'inadmissibility' of the same Premiss. 'Subsequently' — i.e. after the apprehension of the apprehension of the pure thing, — that cognition, by which the thing is apprehended along with the qualifications of the class-character and the rest, is also regarded as 'Sense-perception'.

'By the class-character, etc.' — This indicates the apprehension of the Thing as qualified by qualifications.

This shows that the said cognition apprehends what has not been already apprehended; — and also that the Premiss (of the Buddhist) is inadmissible. — (1286–1288)

TEXT (1289).

"Again and again, as more and more Conceptual Contents come in, there follow further apprehensions, in connection with the same; and all this is regarded as 'Sense-perception'" — (Shlokavārtika — Sense-perception, 125). — (1289)

COMMENTARY.

'Again and again' — i.e. at the third and subsequent moments.

'There follow further apprehensions' — i.e. such as apprehend what has not been already apprehended.

'In connection with the same' — i.e. in accordance with the connection of the sense-organ concerned. — (1289)

The following might be urged (against Kumārila) — If, at the first operation of the Sense-organ concerned, the Thing does not appear as equipped with all its properties in the shape of the Universal and the rest, — then, it should not so appear even subsequently; as the circumstances are the same in both cases.

The answer to this is provided in the following—
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TEXT (1290).

"WHEN A MAN RETURNS FROM BRIGHT LIGHT INTO AN INNER ROOM, THINGS DO NOT MANIFEST THEMSELVES TO HIM IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS ENTRANCE; BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT LATER ON HE DOES NOT PERCEIVE THOSE THINGS BY HIS SENSE-ORGANS."—(Shlokavārtika—Sense-perception, 126).

—(1290)

COMMENTARY.

'Uṣṇāt'—i.e. from bright light.
The construction is 'uṣṇāt praviṣṭamātrānām', 'who have just come in from bright light'.

'He does not perceive, etc. etc.'—The particular intonation implies that things are actually apprehended by the sense-organs.—(1290)

Having thus cited the Example, he applies the same idea to the case in question:—

TEXT (1291).

"JUST AS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCES, HE PERCEIVES A MERE SEMBLANCE OF THE THING AND SUBSEQUENTLY HE PERCEIVES THEM IN THEIR TRUE FORM,—SO ALSO WITH THE PROPERTIES OF 'CLASS-CHARACTER' AND THE REST."—(Shlokavārtika—Sense-perception, 127).—(1291)

COMMENTARY.

In the inner room, the Man apprehends the mere semblance of the thing; later on he apprehends the thing more specifically as 'blue' and so forth;—in the same manner in the case in question, having, at first apprehended the thing in its mere outline, one would subsequently come to have the Perception of the thing equipped with the Class-character and other properties. So that there is no incongruity at all.—(1291)

If such be the case,—and all the cognitions that appear after the initial Pre-cognition are valid,—then, in a case where the man has had the pre-cognition of the thing, and then closing his eyes, conceives of the thing as connected with the Class-character and other properties (as the Conceptual Content), then, inasmuch as this latter apprehends things not apprehended before, this also would have to be regarded as Sense-perception.

The answer to this (from Kumārila) is as follows:—
TEXT (1292).

"If after having pre-cognised the thing, the man closes his eyes and then imposes conceptual contents,—this latter would not be 'Sense-perception';—because it is not in accordance with the connection (of the sense-organs)."—(Shlokavārtika—Sense-perception, 128).

—(1292)

COMMENTARY.

'Having pre-cognised'—i.e. having apprehended by Pre-cognition.
'Eye's'—to be construed with 'closes'.
'It is not in accordance, etc. etc.'—i.e. it has not been brought about by the contact of the sense-organ concerned.—This has been thus asserted by Kumārila—'Thus then the process of conceptual content being similar in the two cases, that cognition which follows upon the contact of the sense-organ has the character of sense-perception;—this is well-known among people, even without any definition'. (Shlokavārtika—Sense-perception, 254).—(1292)

To all these arguments of Kumārila, the answer is as follows:—

TEXTS (1293-1294).

What has been urged is not right. If the Cognition in question appertains to the specific individuality of the thing,—
then, even on the apprehension of the universal and other properties, it should remain free from verbal expression. Because it has been proved before that the specific individuality of things cannot be denoted by words; hence the cognition that rests upon that must be free from conceptual content (and association with words).—(1293-1294)

COMMENTARY.

'Even on the apprehension, etc.'—The word 'even' means 'even granting that the Universal exists'. In reality, the Universal, etc. having been already rejected, how could there be any validity in the apprehension thereof? Well, granting that they do exist, even so, on their apprehension, the Cognitions that appear subsequently to the initial Pre-cognition, having only the specific individuality of Things as their object, must be free from conceptual content; just as the Pre-cognition is. Because the Universal and other properties have been held to be not-different from the specific individuality.
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The argument may be formulated as follows:—That Cognition which apprehends the Specific Individuality must be free from Conceptual Content,—like the Pre-cognition;—the Cognition that is held to be the subsequent Perception does apprehend the Specific Individuality;—so this is a natural reason (proving its non-conceptual character).

This argument is only in the nature of a Reductio ad absurdum.—The Reason cannot be said to be Inconclusive. Because, that the Specific Individuality cannot be denoted by words has already been proved in the Chapter dealing with the 'Exclusion of other Things' (as forming the denotation of words).

Nor is the Reason Contradictory; as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is known to exist.—(1293-1294)

It might be urged that—"The Reason is Inadmissible, as it pertains to the Universal only".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1295).

IF THE UNIVERSAL ALONE WERE APPREHENDED, THEN THE QUALIFICATION (PROPERTY) WOULD BE SOMETHING ABSOLUTELY DISTINCT; AND THIS IS NOT WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER PARTY, AS ASSERTED (BY HIMSELF).—(1295)

COMMENTARY.

'The qualification would be something absolutely distinct'—from the Thing qualified.

'This is not acceptable to the other party',—i.e. this absolute distinction between the qualification and the qualified.

"How do you know that it is not acceptable?"

Answer:—'As has been asserted'—i.e. by himself.—(1295)

Question:—"What is it that has been asserted by him?".

Answer:—[Kumārila says as below]—

TEXT (1296).

"IF THE QUALIFICATION WERE ABSOLUTELY DISTINCT FROM THE QUALIFIED, THEN HOW COULD IT BRING ABOUT IN THE QUALIFIED A COGNITION IN KEEPING WITH ITSELF?"—[Shloka-vārtika—SENSE-PERCEPTION, 142].—(1296)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'absolutely' has been added in view of the fact that some sort of indirect distinction is admitted; inasmuch as his view is that the
Universal and other qualifications are different as well as non-different (from the qualified), but not absolutely different, or absolutely non-different. He has assserted as follows:—"As their cognitions are distinct, Colour, etc. cannot be one and the same; what is held is that they are one as well as diverse, as conceived in the form of 'Being' (when they are one) and in the form of 'Colour', etc. (when they are diverse')."—(Shlokavārtika, Sense-perception, 158).—He has again asserted that—"For us, the Universal and the rest are not other than the Individual"—(Shlokavārtika, Sense-perception, 141).—'Parāvam', 'difference', here stands for 'other than'.

'In keeping with itself'—i.e. tinged with the form of the qualifying factors; as the qualification is so called only because it brings about the apprehension of the qualified thing which is tinged by the qualifying factor; otherwise, it would not be a qualification at all; as it has been declared that—'The Qualification is so called because it colours the qualified thing with its own cognition'.—(1296)

The following might be urged:—"As a matter of fact, the subsequent cognitions envisage both (the Universal as well as the Particular), inasmuch as what they apprehend is the Particular as characterised by the Universal; so that they cannot be said to apprehend the Specific Individuality only'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1297).

ONE AND THE SAME COGNITION CANNOT COMPREHEND BOTH THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY AND THE UNIVERSAL; BECAUSE, IF SUCH A COGNITION WERE 'CONCEPTUAL', THERE COULD BE NO COMPREHENSION OF THE FORMER,—ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT WERE OTHERWISE, THERE COULD BE NO COMPREHENSION OF THE LATTER.—(1297)

COMMENTARY.

It is not right that one and the same Cognition should apprehend the Specific Individuality as well as the Universal.—Because, would that Cognition be Conceptual or Non-conceptual? If it were Conceptual,—Determinate,—then there could be no apprehension of the 'former',—i.e. the Specific Individuality.—If 'otherwise',—i.e. if it is Non-conceptual,—then there could be no apprehension of the 'latter'—i.e. of the Universal.—(1297)

It has been proved that if the subsequent Cognitions apprehend the Specific Individuality, they must be 'Non-conceptual'.—The Author now proceeds to show that—even granting that the said cognitions are 'Conceptual', as they would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended (by the previous Non-conceptual Cognition), no validity could attach to those Cognitions;—
ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING NO ABSOLUTE DISTINCTION (BETWEEN THE UNIVERSAL AND THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY),—IF THE UNIVERSAL AND OTHER PROPERTIES HAVE BECOME ALREADY APPREHENDED BY THE INITIAL COGNITION,—THEN THE SUBSEQUENT COGNITION WOULD BE APPREHENDING ONLY WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY APPREHENDED,—AND IT WOULD THUS BE LIKE REMEMBRANCE.—(1298)

COMMENTARY.

The Universal and the rest are not regarded as absolutely distinct from the Individual; as has been declared by Kumārila (in Śhlokavārtikā, Sense-perception, 141) that—“The Universal and the rest are not anything other than the Individual”. Under the circumstances, as the Universal and the rest will have been already apprehended by the initial (non-conceptual) Pre-cognition, the subsequent definite (conceptual) cognition of the same Universal and the rest would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended,—and thus being like Remembrance,—it must have to be regarded as invalid.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—The Cognition apprehending what has been already apprehended cannot be valid,—e.g. Remembrance;—the Conceptual Cognition following on the wake of Perception apprehends what has been already apprehended;—hence there is perception of a character contrary to the wider notion (of validity).—(1298)

[Says the Opponent]—“If the Reason adduced here is that “the Universal, etc. are already apprehended as differentiated from all imposition (Doubts and Misconceptions),—then it is one that is ‘not-admitted’; if it means that they are apprehended somehow, then it is Inconclusive, in view of the character of Inference”.

This is the argument that is set forth in the following—

TEXTS (1299–1300).

“(AT THE INITIAL STAGE), THERE IS ONLY A VAGUE IDEA OF SEVERAL UNIVERSALS, AND THERE IS NO DEFINITE IDEA OF ANYTHING; THE DEFINITE IDEA COMES ONLY LATER; AS THIS APPREHENDS THE THING AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM ALL IMPOSITIONS (DOUBTS AND MISCONCEPTIONS). JUST AS INFERENCE APPREHENDS THE OBJECT AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM IMPOSITIONS, SO ALSO DOES THE (LATER) DEFINITE COGNITION.”—(1299-1300)

COMMENTARY.

“At the first stage, the Thing is apprehended by Pre-cognition only in a vague, not in the well-defined form; the well-defined cognition comes only
later, and this is valid, as it apprehends the Thing as differentiated from impositions,—like Inference. For instance, after the subject, Sound, has been apprehended by Perception, there appears, through the fact of its being a product, the well-defined (inferential) idea that it is non-eternal; and this subsequent Inferential Cognition of the non-eternity of sound is valid; in the same manner the subsequent Perceptional Cognition becomes well-defined when it apprehends the thing as differentiated from impositions. On this point of well-defined cognition apprehending things differentiated from imposition, you also do not hold a different opinion; as is clear from your assertion to the following effect—'Between well-defined cognition and imposed cognition subsists the relation of the annulled and the annulled; and it is understood that the well-defined cognition becomes operative on the thing being differentiated from impositions'."—(1299-1300)

The answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXTS (1301-1303).

**As a matter of fact, the validity of Inferential Cognition does not rest upon its apprehending a thing differentiated from impositions; if that were so, then Remembrance also would have to be regarded as valid. What really happens is that after the Sense-perception (of a certain thing) there appear certain impositions (Doubts and Misconceptions), and it is by reason of setting aside these impositions that Inferential Cognition has been regarded as valid. This is not possible for you; because in the case of such cognitions as 'The white—cow—walking'—after the sense-perception, no imposition is found to appear, which could be negated (by the subsequent valid Cognition)."—(1301-1303)**

COMMENTARY.

The validity of Inference lies in its precluding the imposition that has crept in, and not merely in precluding an imposition; in the latter case validity would attach to Remembrance also. In the case of the (initial non-conceptual) Perception being followed by the conceptual perception of the 'white—cow—walking', there is no preclusion of an imposition that has crept in, because no such imposition has actually come in.

"How do you know that it has not come in?"

*Answer:—* *In the case of such cognitions, etc. etc.*;—when a Concept does come in, it does not remain uncognised; hence, being capable of being cognised, if the Imposition is not cognised, it follows that it has not come in at all.—(1301-1303)

All this has been said after taking it for granted that the Universal and the rest do exist. Now the Author proceeds to show that in reality, the
Universal and the rest do not exist at all, and hence the Perception apprehending them cannot be conceptual:

TEXTS (1304-1305).

As a matter of fact, Universal and the rest do not exist, either as non-different, or as different, from (Individuals),—by virtue of which the conceptual cognition of those could have the character of 'Perception'.—(a) [They cannot be the same as the Individuals] because there is no comprehensiveness. (b) [Nor can they be different from the Individuals] because they do not appear as different from the Individual.—(c) [Nor can they be both different and non-different] because Difference and non-difference always remain mutually exclusive.—

(1304-1305)

COMMENTARY.

The Universal and the rest (if they existed) could be either (a) non-different from the Individuals,—or (b) different from them,—or (c) both, different and non-different.

(1) The first alternative cannot be right; because there is no comprehensiveness; i.e. there is absence or negation of pervasion; that form is called 'Universal' which pervades over several things; there is no such 'pervasion' among individuals, whereby they themselves could become the 'Universal'; if there were such pervasion, the entire universe would come to be of the same form; so that there could be no Universal at all; as the Universal must subsist in several things.

(2) Nor is the second alternative possible [i.e. the Universal, etc. cannot be different from the Individuals]; 'because they do not appear as different from the Individuals';—the term 'bheda' stands for Individuals;—and what does not appear cannot be perceived. This has been thus declared—'Individuals do not pervade over one another; there is no other pervasive entity; how then can anything be different from Cognition?'

(3) Nor is the third alternative possible; 'because the two views of difference and non-difference are mutually exclusive',—that is to say, when two things are mutually exclusive, the negation of one must mean the affirmation of the other; and difference and non-difference are so mutually exclusive, because the nature of one is such that it must preclude the nature of the other. Hence there can be no third alternative (in addition to difference and non-difference).—(1304-1305)
Says the Opponent:—"If Sense-perception is non-conceptual, how is activity carried on on its basis?—This is a means of bringing happiness', 'this is a source of unhappiness',—one always makes up his mind definitely on these lines and then betakes himself to activity for the securing of the former and the avoiding of the latter.—Further (under your view) there can be no idea of Inference or Inferred; because at the time of Inference, the character in question, as also the subject wherein it is sought to be proved, must be such as have been previously cognised in a definite form;—and they could not be regarded as definitely cognised by a Perception that is itself uncertain. Nor could it be regarded as cognised by Inference; as that would mean an infinite regress of Inferences. There is no third Means of Right Cognition (for the Buddhist, except Perception and Inference). So that under your view, there would be an end to all forms of activity.—From all this, and on the basis of the Reason that activities are actually carried on on the basis of Inference, etc., it becomes established that the idea of Perception being non-conceptual is ruled out by Inference".

To one who would argue thus, the Author offers the following answer:—

TEXT (1306).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN THE NON-CONCEPTUAL PERCEPTION HAS THE POTENCY TO BRING ABOUT THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT; HENCE THROUGH THAT, IT BECOMES A FACTOR IN ALL ACTIVITY.

—(1306)

COMMENTARY.

'Through that'.—That is, through the Conceptual Content, the Non-conceptual Perception also becomes the cause of definitive cognition and thereby becomes a factor in all activity. For instance, even though Sense-perception is 'free from Conceptual Content', yet, whenever it appears, it appears as qualifying, through the manifestation of its form in consciousness, the Thing perceived—like Fire, for instance—as differentiated from all other homogeneous and heterogeneous things;—and as this perception apprehends one definite thing with a well-defined form,—and is also accompanied by the idea of the thing as differentiated from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things,—it renders manifest, in that same thing, certain positive and negative concepts—such as 'this is Fire',—'this is not a bunch of flowers'; as these two concepts are only indirectly related to the Thing concerned, they are not regarded as valid, even though they are in perfect accord with the real state of things; and the reason for this lies in the fact that it involves the unification of what is seen and what is conceived, and as such cannot be regarded as the apprehension of what is not already apprehended, (and hence valid).

It is for the reason stated above that the non-conceptual Perception, being the cause of the said two concepts, becomes the cause of the indication of a third kind of negation also. For instance, whenever a cognition appears
in regard to anything, it envisages it because it bears its semblance; and as anything other than that thing is not perceived, it distinguishes the former thing from all else; in connection with all things, there are these two poles—what is perceived and what is other than the perceived; consequently it is indicated that there is no third alternative.

"If that is so, then, if the Subject,—Sound, for instance—has been apprehended by Perception itself, the inferential concept of non-eternity that appears in connection with it cannot be valid."

That does not affect our position. Even though the Perception be brought about, yet that aspect of the thing alone is said to be 'apprehended' (by the Perception) in regard to which the resultant definite cognition is produced and which alone lends itself to activity; while that aspect in regard to which it is not able to produce a definite cognition, because of the operation of an imposition based on misconception—even though such an aspect might be apprehended as fit for lending itself to activity—it is regarded to be as good as not-apprehended; and it is in regard to this that, for the purpose of setting aside the said imposition, Inference becomes operative and hence valid;—no such validity can belong to the Conception that follows in the wake of the Sense-perception; as in the latter case, there is no setting aside of any imposition that has come in.

Question:—"What is the reason that, though the apprehension appears in regard to the form of the thing which is different from that of all other things, yet the resultant Idea is not certain and definite?"

Answer:—The reason lies in the fact that it is dependent upon other causes. Merely because a thing has been apprehended it does not follow that the Idea in regard to it is certain and definite; because it depends upon other causes, in the shape of repetition, the man's interest, the vividness (of the original perception) and so forth. Just as, when one has the same person as his Father and Teacher, when he sees him coming, the definite idea in his mind is 'My Father is coming', not 'my Teacher is coming'.—(1306)

Bhāvavikṣa and others, who take exception to the idea that 'the non-conceptual Perception leads to activity through bringing about the Conceptual Content', bring forward certain arguments;—these are set forth in the following—

TEXT (1307).

"The non-conceptual cannot bring about the Conceptual Content,—

(a) because their objects are different,—as in the case of the cognition of Colour, etc.,—and also because it is non-conceptual—like the Eye, etc."

(1307)

COMMENTARY.

The cognition produced by the Senses (which is non-conceptual) cannot bring about the conceptual cognition, which is mental,—(a) because their objects are different, as in the case of the cognitions of Colour, Touch, etc.;—and also (b) because it is non-conceptual,—like the Eye and other organs.
In support of the Reason 'Because their objects are different', the instance cited is 'as in the case of the cognitions of colour, etc.'; and in support of the Reason 'Because it is non-conceptual', the instance cited is 'like the eye, etc.'—(1307)

The following Text points out the defects in the above reasoning:

TEXT (1308).

**There is no incompatibility between the Conceptual Content and the said Reasons; nor is there difference in their objects; as the object apprehended by the one is the same as that apprehended by the other.**—(1308)

**COMMENTARY.**

Both the Reasons adduced (in the preceding Text) are 'Inconclusive'; as no incompatibility has been indicated between the Reasons and the contrary of the conclusion sought to be proved by them.

'Anayaḥ'—of the two Reasons.

'Nor is there difference, etc. etc.';—that is to say, even though the Conceptual Content is objective (has an object), yet the assertion that 'their objects are different' is 'inadmissible'.—(1308)

In reality however the Conceptual Content is not *objective*, it is without an object; hence the Reason cited is all the more inadmissible. This is shown in the following—

TEXT (1309).

**In reality, the Conceptual Content proceeds without any objective basis; it has no object at all, which could differ from anything else.**—(1309)

**COMMENTARY.**

The following Text shows that the Corroborative Instance (cited by Bhāvivikṣa, in 1307 above) "as in the case of the cognition of Colour, etc.", is devoid of the Probandum (the character sought to be proved):—

TEXT (1310).

**Among the cognitions of Colour, Sound, etc., mutual causal relation is actually present; hence the Instance that has been cited is one in which the Probandum is not known to exist.**—(1310)

**COMMENTARY.**

—As among the Cognitions of Colour, Sound, etc., mental causal relation is actually present,—consisting in the fact of their following in the wake of one another.—(1310)
Again, the Text is going to show that the reason "Because their objects are different" (cited by Bhāvaviveka in Text 1307) is Inconclusive, by reason of its presence in a thing where the Probandum is definitely known to be absent:—

TEXT (1311).

INASMUCH AS BETWEEN THE Cognition of Fire AND THE Cognition of Smoke, THERE IS THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT,—THE SAME COULD BE POSSIBLE IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO; HENCE THE REASON CITED IS FOUND TO BE INCONCLUSIVE ALSO.—(1311)

COMMENTARY.

'Etasmin' stands for the Reason cited—"Because their objects are different".

The Cognition of the Middle Term 'Smoke' is the cause of the cognition of the Major Term 'Fire',—even though the objects of the two cognitions are different. The same may be the case here (with the non-conceptual and the conceptual). So that the Reason adduced is Inconclusive.—(1311)

Having thus proved the fact of Sense-perception being 'free from Conceptual Content', the Author next proceeds to explain the use of the other qualification, 'not erroneous' (in the definition of Sense-perception propounded by himself under Text 1214):—

TEXT (1312).

THE EPI ThET 'NOT-ERRONEOUS' HAS BEEN ADDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCLUDING SUCH ILLUSIONS AS THOSE OF THE *Keshonāraka' (Hair-Tuft) AND THE LIKE; AS THESE ARE NOT REGARDED AS 'VALID COGNITION' ON THE GROUND OF THEIR BEING 'ERRONEOUS'.—(1312)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'not-erroneous' should be understood as 'not incongruent' —and not as 'having for its basis a form as it really exists'.—If this latter were meant, then, as under the view of the Yogācāra (the extreme Idealist) there can be no real basis, the definition, thus interpreted, would not be applicable to Sense-perception as accepted by both theorists (the Realist Sautrāntika and the Idealist Yogācāra).—As regards 'being non-incongruent', what it means is 'the presence of the capacity to envisage a thing which is capable of the intended fruitful activity',—not actually envisaging it; as obstacles are likely to appear in the actual envisaging.

* 'Keshonāraka', 'Hair-Tuft'.—It is not clear what is meant by this. It is supposed to stand for the idea one has on closing the eyes of tufts of hair floating in the regions of the eye; which idea is 'erroneous', as there is no real Hair-Tuft there.
**TEXTS (1313-1314).**

**Some People have Held that Illusion is purely mental. But that is not so; as it is found to appear only when the Sense-organ is present (and operative) and to cease when this latter (becomes disordered, ceases). If it were purely mental, it should cease like the illusion regarding a serpent, even when the disorder of the Sense-organ has not ceased; and yet it continues to be perceived quite clearly.**

—(1313-1314)

**Commentary.**

The idea of these 'some people' is that it is not necessary to add, to the definition of Sense-perception, the qualifying term 'not erroneous' (for the purpose of excluding Illusion which, being purely mental, can never be 'Sense-perception').

Against this view the following might be urged:—Granting that Illusion is mental; even so, it is not necessary to add the qualifying term 'not erroneous'; because what the person propounding the definition under review wanted to do was not to provide a definition of only that 'Sense-perception' which is brought about by the Sense-organs, but also of that Sense-perception which appears in the Mystic and which is purely mental; as in this latter Dream-cognition also is non-conceptual, as it appears quite distinctly; and yet it is not 'non-erroneous'; hence for the exclusion of this, the addition of the qualifying term 'non-erroneous' is necessary.

This is true; but there are Illusions possible through the Senses also [and they are not always mental]; hence the said view of 'some people' is not right.

The author explains how Illusions may be sense-born—'But that is not so, etc. etc.'—The illusion appears only when the Sense-organ is there, and when the Sense-organ is in any way disordered, i.e. hurt—the Illusion ceases; which shows that like any other sense-born cognition, this Illusion of the 'Hair-tuft' and the like also is Sense-born.

Further, if the Illusion belonged entirely to the Mind, then the mental aberration would be the sole cause of the Illusion, and hence the Illusion would cease on the cessation of the mental aberration, though the disorder
of the Sense-organ may still be there.—The illusion regarding the serpent and such things is cited as an example.

That the Illusion should not be very clear is another incongruous possibility cited. What is mixed up with Conceptual Content cannot bring about a very clear apprehension of the Thing; as the said Content operates only through the presentation of the Universal (which is always vague).—(1313-1314)

The following texts sets forth the objection of the other party:

TEXTS (1315–1320).

"(a) As regards the reason that ‘the Illusion is there only when the Sense-organ is there’,—in its direct sense, it is inadmissible; and in its indirect sense, it is inconclusive; as it is present in remembrance also.—(b) As regards the reason ‘Illusion is an aberration brought about by the disorder of the sense-organ’,—that is clearly found also in the case of effects produced indirectly,—for example, in the case of the Mule and such things.—(c) As regards the idea that ‘all mental illusions cease after reflection’,—this also is not quite true (inconclusive), in view of such ideas as ‘Entity’ and ‘Universal’. If it be held that these notions do cease on the subsequent notion that ‘these are not found in the specific individuality of things’,—then the answer is that such cessation is possible also in the case of such illusions as that of ‘Two Moons’.—If it be urged that the existence of these does not cease’,—then, the same may be said in regard to the notions of the Universal, etc. also—As regards the illusions regarding God and such other beings, appearing in persons who are bent upon believing in them, there is no cessation at all, even on listening to millions of reasons; in fact, these dull-witted persons declare that these reasons are no reasons at all.”—(1315–1320)

COMMENTARY.

(a) If the fact of Illusion being there only when the Sense-organ is there is cited as a Reason in the direct sense, then it is inadmissible for one or the other of the two parties; for the other party, it is not proved that Illusion is produced directly from the Sense-organs; as that is exactly what is still to be proved. On the other hand, if it is meant in the indirect sense, that the Illusion being there only when the Sense-organ is there is cited as the Reason;—then it is inconclusive; because such indirect concomitance with the Sense-organ is present in Remembrance also (which is not regarded as Sense-born).
(b) As regards the Premiss that 'the Illusion is an aberration brought about by the disorder of the Sense-organ,'—that also is Inadmissible in the direct sense; and if taken in the indirect sense, this also is Inconclusive; as in the case of the Mule, which is born of the Mare from the Ass,—all the embryonic stages intervene between the contact of the animals and the birth of the Mule—and it is only when the final product is subsequently found to resemble the Ass that the idea comes about that it is born of the Ass; but that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is produced from the Ass directly.

(c) The assertion that "Mental Illusion ceases on reflection" is also Inconclusive,—in view of the ideas of Entity and Universal'. That is, for you the Buddhist,—who, relying on Reasoning, hold that there is no such thing as the Universal,—the generic idea that there is in regard to things like the Jar being 'entities' or 'universals' does not cease at all.—If you think that—"when one comes to reflect over them, the said ideas do disappear, through such notions as 'these ideas do not appertain to the Specific Individuality',—then we say that this is no answer at all. In the case of the Illusions regarding 'Too Moons' and the like,—when one comes to ponder over them, they also cease through the notion that 'these do not appertain to the Specific Individuality'; and yet these do not become 'mental'.

It might be urged that "the existence of these does not cease".

The same may be said in regard to the notions of the Universal, etc. also; as the existence of these also does not cease.—(1315–1320)

The following Texts supply the Author's answer to the above arguments:

TEXTS (1321–1323).

THE IDEA OF THE ILLUSION BEING THERE WHEN THE SENSE-ORGAN IS THERE CANNOT BE SAID TO BE 'INADMISSIBLE', IN ITS DIRECT SENSE. BECAUSE THERE IS NO INTERVENTION BY ANY UNMISTAKEN (RIGHT) NOTION; AS NO SUCH INTERVENING RIGHT NOTION IS EVER APPREHENDED.—EVEN WHEN THE MAN HAS HIS MIND NOT TURNED TO OTHER THINGS, HE HAS THE CONTINUOUS PERCEPTION OF 'TWO MOONS'; WHICH SHOWS THAT THE PRODUCTION (OF THE ILLUSION, BY THE SENSE-ORGAN) IS NOT INDIRECT.—AS REGARDS THE IDEAS OF 'ENTITY', 'UNIVERSAL' AND SO FORTH,—WHERE THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR BEING RETRACTED,—CESSATION IS QUITE POSSIBLE, IF THE PERSON SO WISHES. SO ALSO IN THE CASE OF THE IDEA RELATING TO GOD.—(1321–1323)

COMMENTARY.

'Cannot be Inadmissible',—i.e. it must be admissible.—Why?—Because there is no intervention by any unmistakable notion—of the One Moon;—
because while it would be cognisable if it were there, no such notion is cognised at all.

This same idea is made clear in the sentence—‘*Even when the man, etc. etc.*’—‘*Continuous*’—is to be construed with ‘*perception of the Two Moons*’.

For this same reason the Premiss, that ‘illusion is an aberration produced by the aberration of the Sense-organ’, also is not ‘Inconclusive’. As this also is not interrupted,—in view of which the case of the *Mule* would render it false, inconclusive.

As regards the notions of ‘*Entity*’, ‘Universal’ and so forth,—when the person retracts them by his own wish, there is cessation of these also.

But in the case of the Illusions like that of the ‘Hair-tuft’, there can be no retraction at will; hence our premiss is not Inconclusive.

It might be argued that—‘*even in the case of Perception through the Senses, there can be cessation at will, by closing one’s eyes for instance*’.

The Visual Perception does not cease immediately on the appearance of the wish; in fact what is brought about by the man’s wish is only the closing of the eyes; and it is only when the Eyes have ceased to function that the Visual Perception ceases. In the case of mental Illusion, on the other hand, it ceases directly after the wish of the man; hence the two cases are not analogous. It has to be borne in mind that, when the Eyes are fixed upon a thing, even though the man may not wish to look at the thing, the thing is actually seen; so that the *wish* has no direct influence upon the Visual or other Perceptions.—(1321–1323)

**TEXT (1324).**

**There are others who declare that—“Notions like ‘the yellow conch-shell’, even though illusory, are valid,—inasmuch as they are not incongruent with effective action.”—(1324)**

**COMMENTARY.**

There are some people belonging to our own party (Buddhists) who do not wish to have the qualification ‘not-erroneous’ (in the definition of Sense-perception); because (they argue that) even the illusory idea of the ‘Yellow conch-shell’ is Sense-perception. Because it cannot be Inference, as it is not brought about by an Inferential Indicative. And that it is valid is clear from the fact that it is not incongruent with reality. It was for this reason that the Teacher *Dīnavāga* did not introduce this qualification—‘not erroneous’—in his definition of Sense-perception. *Error, Illusion, Ignorance,*
Inference—these he has mentioned as having the ‘Semblance’ of Perception, which shows that the definition intended by him was that ‘it is free from Conceptual Content and is not incongruent with the real state of things’. He has also included the ‘tainiram’ (among the Semblances of Perception), where ‘timira (Darkness) stands for ignorance’—as found in such expressions as ‘Timiraghnañcha mandänäm’; and that which proceeds from Timira—Ignorance—is ‘Taimira’, i.e. incongruent.—(1324)

The answer to the above is provided in the following—

TEXTS (1325-1326)

This cannot be right. The effective action available is not in keeping with the form apprehended. Otherwise there would be incongruities; as in the cognition where there is appearance of the Hair and such things, there is compatibility, though only with the light (which is not apprehended) and other details; hence the validity of this would be irresistible (under the opponent’s view).

—(1325-1326)

COMMENTARY.

The validity of a cognition is of two kinds—(1) when there is compatibility with the appearance, and (2) when there is compatibility with the Apprehension.—In the case in question (of the idea of the ‘yellow conch-shell’), the ‘absence of incongruence’—(i.e. compatibility)—is not in accordance with the appearance, as what appears—what is apparent—is the yellow conch-shell; and yet what is found (on touching) is not the yellow thing; nor is its compatibility in accordance with the apprehension, because it is the yellow thing itself that is apprehended as capable of a particular fruitful activity; and yet no fruitful activity in that form is actually found.—Nor can there be validity even when there is compatibility with what is not apprehended at all; as that would lead to absurdity; as in the case of the cognition of the Hair-tuft also, what is actually got at is only the light (whose reflections create the impression of the Hair-tuft).—(1325-1326)

If you think that “though the apprehended Colour is not obtained, yet the shape is certainly obtained”,—then our answer is as follows:
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TEXT (1327).

There can be no shape apart from the Colour; and with the apparent Colour, there is no compatibility (in the case in question).—(1327)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(1327)

The Author now sums up his arguments:

TEXTS (1328-1329).

If, without regard to the form of things, validity were presumed on the ground of mere compatibility with fruitful action,

—then how would this not contradict such assertions (of yours) as that ‘the definite cognition of the thing is in the form of the thing’?—

As regards the possibility of ‘compatibility’ (in the case of the notion of the ‘yellow conch-shell’), that can only be the result of the impression (of a previous cognition).—1328-1329

COMMENTARY.

Validity cannot be presumed merely on the basis of the compatibility of effective action, without regard to the form; as in that case the cognition in the form of the thing itself might have to be regarded as invalid.

‘In the form of the thing’—i.e. in the form that appears in the cognition.

‘Such assertions as’;—this is meant to show that the presumption in question would go against such assertions of the Teacher as—‘As the form of the thing figures in the Cognition, in that form is the thing rightly cognised’.

As regards ‘compatibility with effective action’, (in the case) in question, it should be understood to be the result of the Impression left by previous apprehensions. That is to say, the idea of the ‘yellow conch-shell’ is the effect of the Impression left by a previous apprehension of the ‘white conch-shell’. And the ‘compatibility with effective action’ (that has been said to be present in the case) is due to this Impression.—(1328-1329)

The Author now proceeds to show how the character of ‘Sense-perception’ belongs to the Sensation of Pleasure, etc.:
TEXT (1330).

THE REASONING THAT IS USED IN PROVING THE NON-CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER OF THE COGNITIONS PRODUCED BY THE MENTAL SENSE-ORGAN, ALSO SERVES TO PROVE THE NON-CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER OF THE SENSATIONS OF PLEASURE, ETC.—(1330)

COMMENTARY.

"The Reasoning, etc."—that is, the argument based upon the impossibility of Conventions and so forth.

Even though this Reasoning has nowhere been urged specifically in regard to mental cognition, yet the Reasoning that has been urged in regard to Cognitions through other Sense-organs,—in the shape of the impossibility of Conventions,—is equally applicable to Mental Cognitions also.

Or, the 'mental' cognition meant here may be the cognition of the Mystic, which is going to be referred to later on. The Mental Perception has not been defined here, as its character is well-known to Buddhists.

What the Text means is that the fact of the Buddhist view of the sensations in question being not annulled by any means of right cognition, has been fully explained by the Teacher; hence we do not seek to prove it here.—(1330)

The following Text sets forth the Vaisheṣīka view (regarding the exact nature of the sensations of Pleasure, etc.) :

TEXT (1331).

"THEY (PLEASURE, ETC.) ARE NON-APPREHENSIVE OF ANOTHER THING; HOW THEN CAN THEY CARRY THEIR OWN COGNISANCE WITH THEM? IN FACT, THEY BECOME COGNISABLE ONLY BY THE COGNITION WHICH SUBSISTS IN THE SAME SUBSTRATUM AS THEMSELVES'.—IF THIS IS URGED—[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING Texts].—(1331)

COMMENTARY.

"It is not only that they are not self-cognised; they are not apprehensive of any external thing either; that is, they are of the nature of Cognition. In fact Pleasure, etc. become cognised only by that Cognition which subsists in the same substratum as themselves—i.e. the Soul".

Such is the doctrine of the Vaisheṣīkas.—(1331)

The above view is answered in the following—
As a matter of fact, Pleasure, etc. are felt immediately after the perception of the external object; why is it that they are always felt at that same time?—It is regarded as cognised by Mental Perception; but this perception is not there at the time; as cognitions have been described as appearing in succession (not at the same time).—If it be urged that "it is only simultaneous birth of cognitions that is not admitted, not their simultaneous existence",—then the answer is that there can be no (continued) existence of anything; as all things have been proved to be momentary.

—If it be urged that "there is an illusion of simultaneity, due to the quick succession of the cognitions",—this also has been rejected already.—If the Pleasure, etc., were amenable only to Remembrance, then the feeling could not be vivid (as it is).—If it be assumed that the said illusion is in the form of 'agreeable' and 'disagreeable',—then it comes to this that the existence of Pleasure and Pain rests in themselves (and they are thus self-cognised).—When the Mystics cognise, by Sense-perception, the Pleasure, etc. of other persons,—then, on account of the similarity of experience, they would themselves be unhappy (at the unhappiness of other people). For you, the feeling of Pain consists, not in the existence of the Pain itself, but in the cognition of which that Pain is the object; and that is another 'Chaim'.

—The same applies to the inference of another person's Pain also, as Inference has been described (by others) as objective (with object), and not purely subjective (not touching objects).

—(1332–1339)

COMMENTARY.

It is meant to show that the Proposition (of the Vaiṣeṣīka) is contrary to perceived facts.

When, as a matter of fact, Pleasure, etc., are apprehended at the same time as the Cognition of the external object upon which they rest,—then by which particular cognition subsisting in the same substratum as themselves would they be apprehended?—Certainly not by that Visual Cognition of the external object; as this rests upon the external object, while Pleasure, etc. are felt within and as such they are held to be cognisable by mental Cognition only. And yet at the time concerned there can be no mental Cognition; because the theory held is that Cognitions appear in succession, one after the other.

It might be held that—"it is only the birth of Cognitions that has been held to be in succession, not their existence".
That cannot be right; as it has been established that all that is born has only a momentary existence.

As regards the explanation that "there is only an illusion of simultaneity, due to the quickness of the succession,"—this has been already refuted.

Then again, under the view suggested, the clear perception of Pleasure and Pain, in the form of joy and grief, would not be possible; because the view held is that Pleasure and Pain, envisaging Conceptual Contents, are apprehended only by Mental Perception; and Mental Perception is Conceptual; and what is conceptual cannot make the appearance of things quite clear. Under our view on the other hand, what is regarded as Sense-perception is that which is brought about by the Cognition brought about by the Sense-organs, which is aided by the object coming into existence immediately after the object of the said Sense-perception.

Further, if Pleasure and Pain were actually apprehensible, their manifestation would be as something separate, as in the case of the Blue and other things; and yet if they were separated from the cognition, they could not be felt as agreeable and disagreeable.

It might be argued that—"as there is no difference from the Cognition, the idea of agreeableness and disagreeableness must be wrong".

In that case it becomes established that the existence of Pleasure and Pain rests in their own cognition; because Pleasure and Pain have no other form apart from what is agreeable and disagreeable; and if it is admitted that the Cognition has this form, then it also becomes admitted that Pleasure and Pain also are of the nature of Cognition itself. Any other form not being admitted, it cannot be admitted that they are mere illusions.

"Agreeable" is that which is favourable, and the opposite of this is 'disagreeable'.

The term 'and the rest' (after 'Pleasure') includes Indifference.

If then the existence of Pleasure, etc., consists only in the appearance of their own 'Chain',—and it is not accepted that the same constitutes their apprehension also,—but it is held that their apprehension must consist in the appearance of the cognition regarding themselves,—then, in that case when Mystics apprehend the Pleasure, etc., of other persons, they should be just as unhappy as the persons actually experiencing the Pain, etc., and it is not open to you to say that "it cannot be so, as they belong to separate chains"; because you do not admit that their continuance consists in the fact of their appearance in the same 'chain'; what you accept is only the appearance of the Cognition of the Pain; and the cognition is present in the 'chain' of other people also; so that the incongruity remains.

If, as the cause of Pleasure, etc. you accept both,—then, inasmuch as the Pleasure, etc. would be present in their own 'chains', it becomes proved that they are self-cognised. In this way, 'presence in one's own chain' serves to distinguish them from those 'present in other chains'.

Question:—"If Pleasure, etc. are of the nature of their own cognition, then, how can the said incongruity of mystic perception be urged against those—Mimamsakas for instance,—who do not admit of any mystics?"
Answer:—'The same applies, etc. etc.'—Except Buddhists, there are no philosophers for whom Inference is, in reality, devoid of objectivity; hence, for one who infers the Pain of other persons (just as the Mystic who perceives it), there would be the same experiencing of pain—[so that the said incongruity would be there all the same].—(1332–1339)

TEXT (1340).

[Says Šaṅkarasvāmīn]—"Pleasure, etc. are apprehended only as 'Pleasure, etc.'; they are not apprehended as 'Cognition'; consequently like the Jar, etc., they cannot be Cognition."—(1340)

COMMENTARY.

Šaṅkarasvāmīn says:—"Pleasure, etc. cannot be of the nature of Cognition, because they are never spoken of as 'Cognition';—just like the Jar, etc.".—(1340)

The objection to this view is as follows:—

TEXT (1341).

If difference is to be accepted on the basis of Convention, then Cognition itself may not be spoken of as 'Cognition',—and on the basis of that, Cognition would become Non-Cognition.—(1341)

COMMENTARY.

If difference of nature were based upon Convention (i.e. the use of words, which is purely a matter of Convention),—then, there may be some one who might set up the Convention that the Cognition should be spoken of as 'non-cognition', and in accordance with this Convention, Cognition would become Not-cognition, for you!—(1341)

TEXT (1342).

If it be urged that—"Being clearly of the nature of Light, it could never be as alleged",—then, you are faced with this contingency—is not all this the same in the case of Pleasure and Pain also?—(1342)

COMMENTARY.

If the view is that—"Cognition, being of the nature of Light, can never be non-cognition",—then the answer is that all this is equally there in the case of Pleasure and Pain also.

The Reason also is false, 'Inconclusive'; so this is nothing.—(1342)
TEXT (1343).

As regards the Mystic's Cognition, we are going to describe it, on the basis of spotless reasons, as arising out of the contemplation of things and being free from Conceptual Content and Error.—(1343)

COMMENTARY.

'We are going to describe',—under the chapter on The Omniscient Being.—(1343)

The Author next proceeds to set aside the diversity of opinion regarding the 'Fruit' (ultimate effect) of 'Sense-perception' as a means of Cognition:—

TEXT (1344).

The cognition of the object is held to be the 'fruit' of the Means of Cognition,—when the 'Means of Cognition' consists in the 'sameness of form' (between the Cognition and the Cognised);—or Apprehension of itself is the Fruit, and the Means, in this case, consists in 'capability'.—(1344)

COMMENTARY.

(a) When the external object is what is cognised,—then the cognition of that object is the Fruit, and Sameness of form the Means, of the Cognition; as even in the case of the self-cognition, the Cognition is of the same form as what is cognised.—(b) When what is cognised is of the nature of Cognition, then the 'apprehension of itself' is the fruit, and capability the Means, of the Cognition. Thé said capability belongs to the Cognition only which carries with it the cognisability of its own function; by virtue of which capability, it is Cognition alone—and not the Jar and such things,—that apprehends itself;—hence it is by the instrumentality of this capability that Cognition is found to be self-manifested; hence Capability is said to be the 'Means', the Instrument, of the Cognition of the Cognition itself. This has been thus declared—'The Cognitions of Cognitions themselves, being neither the one nor the other, are capable of such self-apprehension; hence their capability is the Instrument (Means) and they themselves are the cognised, and their own apprehension is the fruit'.—(1344)

In the following the Author sets forth the objection urged by Kumārila—
TEXT (1345).

'Just as, when the cutting weapon strikes at the khadira-tree, the resultant Cut does not appear in the Palāsha-tree,—in the same way nowhere in the World is the (cutting) Axe found to be the same as the Cut itself' [Shlokavārtika—Sense-perception, 75].—(1345)

COMMENTARY.

The Bauddha has addressed the following argument to the person who asserted that the Means of Cognition was different from its Fruit:—If there is difference between the Means of Cognition and its Fruit, then the objective of these two—the Means of Cognition and the Fruit of Cognition—also must be different; and yet this cannot be right; when, for instance, the cutting weapon, the Axe, is struck at the Khadira-tree, the Cut does not appear in the Palāsha-tree; hence it must be admitted that the objective of both is the same and hence there is no difference between them.

It is in answer to this that Kumārila says—'If one who desires the objective to be the same should declare the Means of Cognition to be the same as its Fruit, then he would be setting aside the well-known distinction between Cause and Effect; just as, when the cutting weapon strikes at the Khadira-tree, the Cut does not appear in the Palāsha-tree, so also nowhere in the world is the Axe found to be the same as the Cut itself' (Shlokavārtika—Sense-perception, 74-75).

The word 'Chhēdana', 'Cutting weapon', stands for that by which something is cut.—(1345)

The following Text supplies the answer to this argument of Kumārila's:

TEXT (1346).

The distinction of 'Cause and Effect' does not rest upon the substratum of that distinction; Cognition being formless, the said distinction cannot be possible.—(1346)

COMMENTARY.

The apprehension of Blue is not the apprehension of Yellow,—this distinction in the cognition of things is based upon the sameness of form, nothing else; so that the distinction of Cause and Effect is made through the relation of what is distinguished and what distinguishes, not through the relation of the Produced and Producer; because the relation of the Acting Agent, the Instrument and the rest is not real; because all things being momentary, they cannot have any action. When the Cognition is produced in the form
of the Object, it appears to be characterising the object and hence active. Herein lies the action of the Cognition in presenting the object,—not in mere invariable concomitance. For instance, the sprout does not cease to be invariably concomitant with the seed. Thus the Cognition itself cannot be the Means of Cognition.—It is for this reason that the nature of the Means of Cognition is stated through the distinction that it is the Cognition with a form,—not the formless Cognition—which is the Means of Cognition. This distinction too should be understood to be made through the Conception that follows in the wake of the Cognition.—(1346)

The following Text shows that the Buddhist view is not nullified by common experience:—

**TEXT (1347).**

Thus then, the (commonly known) distinction (between the Cognition as Means and Cognition as Fruit) is purely imaginary,—as in the case of the Bow. The distinction cannot be held to be based upon the relation of the Producer and Produced.—(1347)

**COMMENTARY.**

In connection with the Bow, there are such notions as—(a) 'The Bow pierces', (b) 'He pierces with the Bow', (c) 'the arrow proceeding from the Bow, pierces',—where the same Bow is spoken of as (a) 'Agent', (b) 'Instrument, and (c) 'Ablative';—and this distinction is only imaginary (not real); and yet it is not incongruous; so it is in the case in question also.—(1347)

**TEXT (1348).**

When the compact fibre of the wood is rent asunder by the Cut of the Axe, the Axe is (popularly) called the 'Cut' only when it enters into the fibre; and it is in this way that there is sameness (between the Axe and the Cut).—(1348)

**COMMENTARY.**

When the cutting of the Trees with the Axe comes to be examined, it is found that the cut consists in the entering of the Axe into the wood-fibre; and this entrance is a property belonging to the Axe itself; so that in this sense there is sameness between the Axe and the Cut; and there is no incongruity in this.—(1348)

The same idea is further elucidated:
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TEXT (1349).

WHEN ONCE THE DISTINCTION HAS BEEN MADE,—IT MAY BE ASSUMED TO BE OTHERWISE ALSO;—IT IS ONLY THE FORM OF THE DISTINCTION THAT IS SPOKEN OF IN THE FORM OF THE PRODUCER AND PRODUCED.—(1349)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila has in his Shlokavārtika (Sense-perception, 78), in the words "The Cognition can be the Means as bringing about the apprehension, etc. etc."—based the distinction between the Means and Fruit on the relation of Producer and Produced. And in this there is nothing incompatible with our view. As our Teacher has declared as follows:—'The attributing of the name Pratyakṣa to the Eye and other causes is not incompatible'.—All that we say is as follows:—It is essential that in the beginning the relation of Cause and Effect can be based only upon the distinction previously made; until the difference in the Cognitions has been distinctly recognised, nothing can proceed on the basis of the difference in objectives; and for the recognition of the difference among Cognitions there can be no basis other than the sameness of form; and from this it follows by implication that the sameness of form is the most efficient instrument; and it is on the basis of this sameness of form that the Cognition proceeds to prompt people to activity; and the fact of the prompter being the Means of Right Cognition can be determined only by one who is seeking to engage in the activity concerned; and not merely as a whim. It has been thus declared—'Every wise person seeks to determine what is the proper means of cognition and what is not so, only for the purpose of some fruitful activity'. It is for this reason that that factor alone in the Cognition has to be brought out by which it serves to prompt men to activity. But in drawing the distinction between the Means of Cognition and its fruit on the basis of the relation of Producer and Produced, there is no recognition of that sameness of form which is the only prompting factor; consequently the said distinction between the Means of Cognition and its fruit on the said basis would be absolutely useless. This is the reason why the Teacher had recourse to a figurative (indirect) interpretation, as he felt that the determining of the character of the Means of Cognition on the said basis cannot take any part in the prompting to activity.

Thus when the distinction has once been made, it may subsequently be explained on the basis of the relation of Producer and Produced;—and there would be nothing objectionable in that—[only the initial distinction has to be made first, and hence it cannot be due to that relation].—(1349)

The following Texts sets forth the character of the 'Fruit' as proposed by Kumārila:—
TEXTS (1350-1351).

"The 'Fruit' consisting in the apprehension of the object, the character of the 'Means of Cognition' must belong to what goes immediately before it. Hence if the Cognition be held to be the 'Means', then the 'Fruit' must be something else.—It cannot be right to attribute the character of the 'Fruit' to the self-recognition (by the Cognition), as this is going to be refuted later on. Nor can it be right to assert that the 'Means' consists in the form of the object (cognised); as in that case there would be a diversity of objectives" [Shlokavārtika—Sense-perception, 78-79].—(1350-1351)

COMMENTARY.

'What goes, etc. etc.'—i.e. the Eye and the other sense-organs.

'The Fruit must be something else'—in the form of rejecting or acquiring or ignoring the thing cognised;—this also has been declared by Kumārila himself.

As regards 'self-recognition' (by the Cognition), that has been refuted; hence that cannot be regarded as the 'Fruit' of Right Cognition.

If the form of the object be held to be the Means of Cognition, then the objectives of the Means and the Fruit would be different; for instance, the form of the object would be something external (objective), while the self-recognition of the Cognition would have the form of the Cognition itself (which is purely subjective).—(1350-1351)

The above argument is answered in the following—

TEXT (1352).

'Self-recognition' cannot be denied; as that would involve the incongruity of there being no Cognition at all.—Nor can the objectives be different; as 'self-recognition' aslo is held to be the cognition of the object.—(1352)

COMMENTARY.

In accordance with the maxim—'He who has no apprehension of Sense-perception can have no perception of anything'—there would be incongruity of there being no perception of anything, if the cognition of the cognition itself were denied; hence this 'self-recognition' cannot be denied.

Nor can it be right to hold that the two cognitions have two different objectives; because 'self-recognition' also is held to be the cognition of the object, because it is the effect of that, not because it consists entirely of that;
as it has been explained that the self-recognition has the same form. Hence there is no incongruity at all.—(1352)

\textit{Shankarāsvāmin} urges the following argument:—

\textbf{TEXT (1353).}

"\textit{As a matter of fact, the Means of Cognition must bring about an effect other than itself,—because it is an active agent,—like the Hatchet;'—if this is urged [then the answer is as follows]}:—(1353)

\textbf{COMMENTARY.}

"The Means of Cognition must be one that brings about an effect different from itself,—because it is an active agent,—like the Hatchet, etc.'"—(1353)

The answer to the above is as follows:—

\textbf{TEXTS (1353–1355).}

\textit{The argument is futile; as a different 'fruit' has been admitted; and in accordance with reasons already explained (under Text 1348), there is no 'different' fruit at all.—As regards the Means of Cognition being an 'active agent',—that is not admissible by us, if what is meant by it is that it is productive; if what is meant is that it is the Regulator, then there can be no objection to it; and in that case the reason becomes 'inconclusive', as it indicates no incongruity.}—(1353–1355)

\textbf{COMMENTARY.}

'\textit{Futile},'—because it seeks to prove what is already proved; inasmuch as \textit{different} 'fruit' or 'effect' has been already admitted in the form of 'characterisation' (specification).—The particle '\textit{hi}' connotes \textit{reason} (for what is said).

The corroborative instance cited—'\textit{like the Hatchet}',—is one that is 'devoid of the Probandum'; because it has been already shown that the \textit{Hatchet} is the same as the \textit{Cut} (vide Text, 1348).

The premiss—'\textit{because it is an active agent}'—is 'inadmissible' if what is meant is that it is \textit{productive} of its effect; if it is meant that it is the \textit{Regulator},—then that is accepted by us.
But even if it is meant that it is the Regulator, the Reason is Inconclusive, as there is no incongruity (indicated).

If 'activity' in general be what is meant, then also the Reason is Inconclusive, as there is no incongruity indicated.—(1353-1355)

**Objection:**—"If the Cognition were of the form of the Object, then the sameness of the object might constitute the character of the 'Means of Cognition'; as a matter of fact, however, the Cognition that is brought about is only of a form similar to that of the Object, and of the same character;—hence it cannot be as suggested; just as the Colour and Taste of a thing belong to a category quite different ".

This is what is anticipated and answered in the following—

**TEXTS (1356-1357).**

*If it be argued that—"the cognition cannot have the same form as the object apprehended,—because it belongs to a different category,—like the cognition of Colour, Taste, etc."—[then the answer is as follows]—

In due accordance with our doctrine we have clearly explained this and also other things in course of our rejection of the idea of a real object being apprehended.—(1356-1357)

**COMMENTARY.**

We who are followers of the doctrine of Idealism readily accept what has been urged; it does not affect our position at all. In fact, the objection that you have urged against the object apprehended has been only indistinctly (vaguely) stated; while this is exactly that we have stated quite clearly, while examining—i.e. rejecting—the idea—conviction—that there is something real that is apprehended.—(1356-1357)

**Question:**—"What is that clear statement in proof of your doctrine?'

**Answer:**—

**TEXT (1358).**

*If there were absolute sameness of form, then Cognition would become Non-cognition; as for partial sameness of form, that would make every Cognition apprehensive of everything.—(1358)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Absolute sameness of form' would consist in the fact of the Cognition being 'excluded' from exactly those homogeneous things from which the
cognised object is 'excluded',—while 'partial sameness' would consist in 'exclusion' from only a few of those.—(1358)

Question:—"If that is so, then, why has the validity of the Cognition been said to consist in its being of the same form as the Object?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1359–1361).

But under the doctrine of the reality of the external world, the possibility of the sameness of form has to be accepted; that is why it has been mentioned.—Under the doctrine, however, of cognition being a mere reflected image,—even if the cognition differs from the cognised object, the sameness of form belongs to the reflection; and the cognition can be only figurative.—Lastly, for one who does not admit the cognition to be the receptacle of the semblance of the object,—there is not even the said method possible for the cognising of the external object.—(1359–1361)

COMMENTARY.

'It has, etc.'—'It' stands for 'the possibility of the sameness of form', or the 'form' itself.

'Nirbhāśi', 'Reflected Image':—'Nirbhāsa', 'Reflection', is sameness of form with the object; and that which has this sameness of form, is the 'Reflected Image'.

'From the cognised object':—i.e. from the external object.

'Belongs to the Reflection':—i.e. to the Reflection in the form of the Cognition.

'Sameness of form':—with the object.

'Figurative':—Indirect, Secondary.

'Cognition':—i.e. of the object.

'Receptacle':—substratum.

As regards the divergence of opinion regarding the object of Cognition, the Universal as a real entity has been already rejected; hence for Perception which has been regarded as having an entity for its object, there can be no other object except the Specific Individuality, and this having been already pointed out as being got at by implication, no special effort has been made for setting aside the said divergence of opinion.

Some people have argued as follows (against the Buddhist's definition of Sense-perception):—"The definition suggested is not a proper one; the definition put forward is that of the Means of Cognition, with the view that other people may, through that definition, come to understand what the Means of Cognition is, and then regulate their action accordingly; and it is not
put forward only for satisfying a whim. And (in so far as the proposed definition is concerned) the knowledge that Sense-perception is 'free from Conceptual Content' and all that cannot, in ordinary life, either prompt a man to activity, or make him desist from it.'

This is not right. The nature of things cannot be made or determined according to one's wish; by virtue of which one could frame a definition accordingly; what has to be done, however, is to take the thing as it stands, and to put forward a definition embodying that particular aspect of the thing which one wishes to bring out. For example, one points out 'roughness' as a characteristic of the Earth. If it were not thus, then the definition put forward might be open to the charge of being an 'impossible' one.

As regards Sense-perception, there is nothing else to indicate its character, except 'freedom from Conceptual Content' and 'freedom from error'.—For instance, it must be 'free from error', because it is a valid means of Cognition; and it must be 'free from Conceptual Content', because it directly apprehends the Specific Individuality of things; and it has been proved that the Specific Individuality is something in regard to which no Convention can be made, and hence its cognition must be free from association with words.—It is for this reason that all intelligent persons regard this definition as entirely in accordance with reason.

Nor is it true that this definition cannot bring about either activity, or desisting from activity, on the part of intelligent persons. For instance, in connection with such cognitions as—(a) the Idea of the Jar, the action of Throwing up, the Universal, the Number and so forth, (b) the idea of Recognition, and (c) the idea of the 'yellow conch-shell',—some persons have been led to regard all these as 'Sense-perception', in accordance with the definition provided by other parties,—and then they find that all these are either Conceptual or Erroneous, and then,—in accordance with the definition provided by us,—they conclude that these cannot be 'Sense-perception'; thereupon they desist from (give up) the notion that Number and the rest are real entities;—and they also conclude that what is an entity is only that Specific Individuality—of the 'Blue' for instance,—which is inexpressible by words, and hence they betake themselves to activity towards that.—How even the non-conceptual Cognition can lead to activity has been already explained before.

Says the Opponent:—"If this is so, then let there be a single item in the definition—'free from Conceptual Content', and 'free from error' need not be added. Because that fact alone which is already known prior to the intended activity, should be put forward as a definition for the benefit of persons desirous of undertaking activity in accordance with that definition; and no unknown thing; as the latter is as good as non-existent. And as a matter of fact, any certainty regarding 'freedom from error' cannot be there until it has been found to be compatible with the fruitful activity undertaken; in fact people with limited powers of perception are not able to ascertain the truthful character of a cognition, except through the perception of its practical effect; because for such persons the capacity of things can only be inferred from its effects; it has been shown above that 'truthful-
ness—i.e. conformity with the real state of things—of the Cognition consists only in its capacity to make people actually get at the thing cognised. So that if this conformity were learnt only subsequently, it would serve no useful purpose; as after that, there is no further activity."

Answer:—There is no force in this objection. It has been already explained that it is necessary to add the qualification ‘free from error’, in order to save the definition from the defect of being ‘too wide’ by reason of the possibility, under the definition, of notions like those of the ‘Hair-tuft’, etc. being regarded as valid cognition.—As regards the argument that before the activity has actually taken place, people with limited powers of vision have no means of ascertaining the truth of the cognition,—this also is Inconclusive. Where is there any such hard and fast rule that people with limited vision cannot ascertain the capacity of anything? If that were so, then, they would be unable to be certain of anything; which would mean that they are unconscious beings; because even animals and infants, through repeated experience, come to have their impressions aroused, are able to feel certain that ‘this thing brings pleasure’, ‘that other brings pain’, and are found to act accordingly,—even before their present activity,—and then avoid the precipice and take to the mother’s breasts. Also in the case of people who are constantly thinking of something that has never existed before, and have their mind disturbed by excessive desire, grief, fear and so forth,—even without remembering any points of similarity, etc.—it is found that the mere repetition of the vivid idea has the capacity to bring about the cognition. In a case where there is no repetition, there alone,—not everywhere—is the potency to be only inferred from its practical effects.

This same explanation applies to the certainty attaching to the perception of Inferential Indicatives, like Smokes; as here also, the effect, in the shape of Smokes, is, by its very nature, something entirely different (from the Fire), and the certainty regarding its difference is due to repeated observation, whereby the idea of the Inferential Indicative also becomes possible, and consequently there is no rejection of Inference.

Says the Opponent:—“The repetition would be there only after the first activity has taken place; it has to be explained how that first activity comes about”.

Answer:—That activity proceeds from the doubtful cognition.

Question:—“How can the Perception which gives rise to Doubt have any validity?”

Answer:—How can there be validity in the Perception that brings about certainty?

“It is due to the fact that this Perception brings about a definite Cognition and the man seeking for it takes up his activity.”

This same may be said also with regard to Perception leading to Doubt.

Even though in this case, the cognition is contrary to the form of what is sought after, yet it is not in that form that the Perception leads to activity, because what is so cognised is not what is wanted; nor does it lead to desisting from activity; because it is only when there is cognition of the thing as desired that there can be any activity on the part of the man. Otherwise,
from Perception leading to Doubt, no one could act or desist from acting. But this does not so happen; on the contrary, it so happens that that activity is all the more powerful which proceeds on the part of persons who do not apprehend any evil consequences from the activity in question. So far as this aspect is concerned, there is no difference between the Perception leading to Doubt and that leading to Certainty. It is only where the Perception brings about a cognition entirely contrary to the thing cognised, —or where it brings about no cognition at all,—that there is no activity on the part of the man seeking for something; and hence it is only this Perception that is invalid,—not any other.—(1359–1361)

End of the Chapter on Sense-perception.
CHAPTER XVIII.

Inference.

COMMENTARY.

The Author proceeds to state the definition of Inference:—

TEXTS (1362-1363).

Inference is held to be of two kinds, as divided into—(1) For one's own benefit, and (2) for the benefit of others. (1) Inference 'For one's own benefit' consists in the cognition of the inferred object derived from the three-featured Probans; and (2) Inference 'For the benefit of others' consists in the statement of the three-featured Probans. That Probans which has only one or two features (out of the necessary three) is regarded as a 'semblance of the Probans.'—(1362-1363)

COMMENTARY.

Inference is of two kinds—as divided into 'for one's own benefit' and 'for the benefit of others'.—The former should be understood to be that Cognition of the inferred object which is derived from 'the three-featured Probans',—the Indicative that fulfils the three conditions of (1) 'being present in the Subject', (2) 'being present in that wherein the Probandum is known to be present', and (3) 'being entirely absent where the Probandum is known to be absent'.—The Inference 'for the sake of others' should be understood to consist in the verbal expression of the said three-featured Probans.

Question:—"Why has not the definition of the Wrong Inference been provided?"

Answer:—'That Probans which, etc. etc.'—'Sound is eternal, (a) because it is a product, and (b) because it is corporeal, and (c) because it is non-cognisable',—in this Inference only one of the 'three features' is present in each; e.g. in (a) the character of being a Product fulfils the single condition, of being present in the subject (Sound) [while it does not fulfil the condition of being present where the Probandum is known to be present, as the Probandum, Eternality, is known to be present in Ākāsha, Soul, etc., which are not Products; nor does it fulfil the condition of being absent where the Probandum
is absent, as the Probandum, Eternality, is absent in the Jar, where the character of being a Product is not absent]; — (b) the character of being corporeal, fulfils only the second condition, of being present where the Probandum is known to be present and does not fulfil the first condition of being present in the Subject (Sound), because Sound is not corporeal; nor does it fulfil the third condition of being absent where the Probandum is absent, as it is not absent in the Jar (which is corporeal) where the Probandum (Eternality) is known to be absent; — (c) the character of being non-cognisable fulfils only the third condition, of being absent where the Probandum (Eternality) is known to be absent (e.g. in the Soul, etc. which are cognisable) [and it does not fulfil the other two conditions, as it is not present in the Subject, Sound, which is cognisable; nor is it present where the Probandum is known to be present, e.g. the Soul, etc. which are cognisable]. — Those fulfilling only two of the three conditions are the Probands in the following argument—‘Sound is non-eternal,— (a) because it is visible, (b) because it is audible, and (c) because it is incorporeal’; —where respectively only the following conditions are not fulfilled—(a) ‘Because it is visible’ does not fulfil only the condition of being present in the subject; (b) ‘Because it is audible’ does not fulfil the only condition of being present where the Probandum is known to be present; and (c) ‘Because it is incorporeal’ does not fulfil the only condition of being absent where the Probandum is known to be absent.—This has been thus expressed.—‘Sound is eternal, because it is a product, because it is corporeal and because it is non-cognisable; — and Sound is non-eternal, because it is incorporeal, because it is audible and because it is visible’. —(1362-1363)

In the following Text, the Author sets forth the objection urged by Pātraśvāmin :=

TEXT (1364).

"THE CHARACTER OF THE VALID PROBANS IS FOUND IN WHAT IS 'IMPOSSIBLE OTHERWISE', — AND NOT WHEN THIS CONDITION IS NOT FULFILLED, EVEN WHEN THE 'THREE FEATURES' ARE PRESENT. HENCE THE 'THREE-FEATURED' PROBANS ARE IMPOTENT (INFRACTUOUS)."—(1364)

COMMENTARY.

Pātraśvāmin argues as follows: — "The Probans is valid only when it is found to be 'otherwise impossible'; and not when it has the 'three features'. Because it is found that even when the Probans has the said three features, it is not valid, when it does not fulfil the condition that it is 'otherwise impossible'; e.g. in the case where the Probans is cited in
the form 'Because he is the Son of so and so' [therefore he must be dark]. Consequently the 'three-featured' Probans are infructuous, inefficient'.

In the term 'otherwise impossible', the term 'otherwise' stands for 'without the Probandum'; that is to say, the valid Probans is that which exists in the Probandum only.—(1364)

In the following Texts, Pāṭrasvāmin justifies the view that the true Probans is that which has the one characteristic of being 'otherwise impossible',—by showing in detail that there is positive as well as negative concomitance (between the definition and the thing defined):—

TEXT (1365).

"That which is 'otherwise impossible' is held to be the Probans, while this is only 'one-featured'; it may or may not be regarded as 'four-featured'."—(1365)

COMMENTARY.

'One-featured'—That which has only one characteristic, that of being 'otherwise impossible'; that alone—none other,—is regarded as 'Probans', by ordinary men as well as by investigators. Through Presumption this same character implies the three features of 'Being present in the Subject' and so forth; and hence it may be regarded as 'four-featured';—or it may not be so regarded, because in several cases, the Probans is found to be valid even when it has only one or two or three features.

Inasmuch as 'being otherwise impossible' is its one characteristic feature,—it is called 'one-featured'.—Along with 'being otherwise impossible', if it is found to exist in like things and not to exist in unlike things, then, it becomes 'two-featured'; and when along with 'being otherwise impossible', it is also existent in like things and also to be absent where the Probandum is known to be absent, then it is 'three-featured'; and it is not called 'three-featured' on account of the presence of the three features of 'presence in the Subject' and the rest (mentioned in the Buddhist's definition); because a Probans of this latter kind cannot bring about a valid cognition.—(1365)

"Or, the Probans is spoken of as 'one-featured' in view of the one character of 'being otherwise impossible', because this is its principal characteristic; and it is not spoken of in terms of the other features of 'presence in the Subject' and the rest, because these latter are secondary, or because they do not serve any useful purpose."—This is what is shown in the following—
TEXT (1366).

"Just as among people, the man who has three sons is spoken of as 'having one son', on account of the one son being a good son,—so it should be understood in the present instance also."—(1366)

COMMENTARY.

Says the other party:—On account of the relation of Invariable Concomitance, the character of the Probans should be rightly attributed to the 'three-featured' Reason only.

The answer to this (from Pātravāmin) is as follows:—

TEXT (1367).

"As a matter of fact, the relation of Invariable Concomitance is not present in the 'three-featured' Reasons; it is really found only in those Reasons which have the one characteristic feature of 'being otherwise impossible'."—(1367)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'anyathāsambhava, etc.' is to be expounded as 'those Reasons in whom there is the single character of being otherwise impossible'.

—(1367)

The same idea is re-affirmed in the following—

TEXTS (1368-1369).

"That alone is the true Probans which has the character of 'being otherwise impossible'; as for corroborative instances, they may be there, or they may not; as they are not the Means. If the character of 'being otherwise impossible' is not there, what is the use of the 'three features'? And if the character of 'being otherwise impossible' is there, what is the use of the 'three features'?"—(1368-1369)

COMMENTARY.

'Corroborative Instances',—in the form similarity and dissimilarity. 'They are not the Means'—of proving the Probandum.
It would be better to read the second line of 1369 before the first line.—(1368-1369).

The following Text proceeds to show that there can be no Invariable Concomitance in the 'three-featured' Probans:

TEXT (1370).

"The reasoning in the form—'He must be dark, because he is the son of so and so,—like other sons of his who are found to be dark',—contains the 'three-featured' Probans, and yet it cannot lead to any valid definite conclusion."—(1370)

COMMENTARY.

In the following Texts, it is shown, by a number of examples, that it is only the 'one-featured' Probans that has the requisite capacity (of leading to a valid conclusion):

TEXT (1371).

"An example of the One-featured Probans without corroborative instances, we have in the Reasoning—'Positive and Negative entities are essentially existent—because they are capable of being apprehended somehow'.'"—(1371)

COMMENTARY.

The Reasoning is in the form 'Positive and Negative entities are somehow existent, because they are apprehensible somehow'.—In this case there are no external corroborative Instances, either of similarity or dissimilarity, either in the form of a statement or in the form of actual things; because all things have been included under the Subject (Minor Term) 'Positive and Negative entities'; and there is nothing apart from these. As regards the character of 'being present in the Minor Term', this is 'otherwise impossible', and is nothing apart from this latter; hence the Probans here is 'one-featured'.

'Somehow',—under some such term as 'Cognisable' or its synonyms.

'Are essentially existent',—'somehow' has to be construed with this also.—Hence the full Reasoning is—'Because they are somehow apprehensible, therefore they are somehow existent'.—(1371)

In the following Texts, examples of the 'two-featured' Probans are cited:
TEXTS (1372–1379).

"(1) 'The Shasha-lāńchhana (Hare-marked) is not Non-Moon,—because it is spoken of as the Moon';—here we have a 'two-featured' Probans.—(2) Another is thus stated:—'I think that this pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect,—because its appearance was felt on the touch of the falling insect'.—(3) 'In bringing about the effect in the shape of the perception of Colour, the Eye is endowed with a unique potency,—because it is used for that purpose,—or, because Colour is found to be actually perceived by its means'.—(4) 'The Soul, the Jar and other things are somehow essentially non-existent,—because they are somehow inapprehensible in any way, like the Horns of the Hare'.—(5) 'Even the Hare's Horn and such things are somehow existent,—because they are somehow apprehensible,—just like the Soul, the Jar and such things'.—(6) 'It is understood that your father is in this house,—because your father's voice is heard in the house'.—(7) In the case of Words, Lamps and such things,—it is found that they are actually indicative (of things) through the character of 'being otherwise impossible', even though they do not reside in the Subject (Minor Term).—Hence for us, it is the 'one-featured' Probans that should be regarded as the Indicative (Probans),—on the ground of its being the most important; what is the use of assuming such characters as 'residing in the Subject' and so forth?"—(1372–1379)

COMMENTARY.

The proposition may be stated either in the form 'The Hare-marked is not Non-Moon', or 'The Hare-marked is the Moon'; and the Probans is 'because it is spoken of by the well-known popular name Moon', or 'because it is spoken of as the Moon';—the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity being supplied by the clod of earth and such things.

(2) Another Probans is next mentioned, which is 'two-featured':—'This pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect,—because its appearance was felt on the touch of the falling insect';—i.e. the 'udaya', appearance, of which was 'pratilabdha', felt, on the 'sparsha', touch, of the falling insect.—The feminine affix 'īṇp' is not added at the end of the compound, because it is intended to be a common factor.

(3) [Another example]—'The Eye has the potency of the most effective instrument in bringing about the apprehension of the Colour existing at the present time,—because, while it is not damaged, it is that which is used as the Instrument, by a man who desires to see Colour and acts intelligently'—or—'because it is actually found to bring about the cognition of Colour';
the Ear, etc. being the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity.—‘Tasya’—of the Colour.

In all these three Reasons, there being no Corroborative Instances per Similarity, they have only two features.

(4) [Another example]—'The Soul, the Jar and other things are somehow essentially non-existent,—because they are somehow not-apprehended,—like the Hare's Horn.'—In this case, there is no Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity; as 'the Jar and other things' include the entire group of Positive Entities and they have been mentioned in the Proposition as essentially non-existent; and the negative entity has been put forward as the Instance; and apart from the 'Positive' and the 'Negative', there is no third category,—wherein it could be pointed out that the exclusion of the Probandum implies the exclusion of the Probans.

(5) [Another example]—'Things like the Hare's Horn are somehow essentially existent, as they are somehow apprehensible';—the absence of the Instance per dissimilarity here also may be explained as above.

(6) [Another example]—'This house is understood as having your father within,—because your Father's voice is heard.'—Here also there is no Instance per Similarity; hence the Probans is only 'two-featured'.

(7) In the case of Words, Lamps and such things, it is found that, even though they do not subsist in the Subject (Minor Term), yet they indicate (make known) things, in the same way as the Inferential Probans in the shape of Smoke, etc. Words and Lamps are not properties subsisting in the Jar and such things indicated by them; and yet the Thing is actually apprehended through them; hence in this case the two conditions are present—that of 'absence where the Probandum is known to be absent', and 'being otherwise impossible'; hence the Probans here is a 'two-featured' one.—(1372–1379)

The following Text supplies the answer to the above arguments of Pātravāmin:—

TEXT (1380).

IS THE PROPOSED DEFINITION MEANT TO BE GENERAL? OR, IN REFERENCE TO A PARTICULAR SUBJECT ON WHICH KNOWLEDGE IS SOUGHT?

Or in reference to the Instance?—(1380)

COMMENTARY.

The proposed definition of the Probans is that (it is 'otherwise impossible', which means that) it should not exist apart from the Probandum;—(1) now is this meant to be general (applicable to all Probans)? Or is it meant to be applicable to any particular object? and in the latter case, (2) is it meant to be in reference to a particular object in which the existence or otherwise of the Probandum is sought to be known? Or (3) in reference
to that object which forms the Corroborative Instance.—These are the alternatives possible.—(1380)

The following Text points out objections against the first alternative:—

TEXT (1381).

If it were understood to be general, then, what would be indicated would be the existence of the probans in the object where the probandum is present; and it would not accomplish what is sought to be accomplished.—(1381)

COMMENTARY.

The mere fact of its not existing apart from the probandum,—without the other fact of its existing wherever the probandum is known to exist,—does not make ‘visibility’—[which does not exist apart from the probandum, Non-eternality; but is not present in all cases where Non-eternality is present],—does not prove the Non-eternality of Sound.—Hence the first alternative cannot be right.

‘It would not accomplish, etc. etc.’—that is, it could not establish the desired conclusion regarding the presence of the probandum in the object.—(1381)

Question:—“Why so?”

Answer:—

TEXTS (1382-1383).

For instance, ‘Visibility’ is known to be inseparable (not existing apart) from ‘Destruction’, in a general way; and yet it (Visibility) cannot prove it (destruction) in Sound.—

If, then, it be said that its presence in the object is meant,—then, in that case, under your view also, the probans becomes ‘three-featured’ as before.—(1382-1383)

COMMENTARY.

‘Tat’—Visibility.

‘Tasya’—of Destruction.

‘Cannot prove it’—cannot indicate its presence.
It might be said that—"in order to guard against the said objection, recourse may be had to the qualification that the Probans should be actually present in the object".—In that case, under your view also, the Probans comes to have the same 'three-featured' character that it had under ours.—(1382-1383)

*Question:*—"How so?"

*Answer:*—

**TEXT (1384).**

'Being otherwise impossible' includes Positive and Negative Concomitance; and by its presence in the object its presence in the Minor Term becomes admitted.—(1384)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Positive Concomitance'—is presence wherever the Probandum is known to be present.

'Negative Concomitance'—is absence where the Probandum is known to be absent.

'Samshraya'—is admission, i.e. acceptance.—(1384)

The following Text shows that there is no incompatibility with the opinion of our Great Teacher:—

**TEXT (1385).**

A similar abbreviated definition has been indicated by our Teacher also: who says that 'the Probans exists in the Cognisable object and is pervaded by a part of it'.—(1385)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Grāhyadharmaḥ', i.e. existing in the cognisable object, i.e. the object in which the Probandum is sought to be proved; i.e. in the Minor Term.—(1385)

The following Texts point out the objections against the second alternative noted above (under Text 1380):—
TEXTS (1386–1388).


COMMENTARY.

The Probans may be defined as being inseparable from the Probandum in the Minor Term only,—as asserted in the following words—'The character of the Probans is held by others to exist in the Instance and to be not seen apart from the Probandum; in my opinion however, it is that which does not exist in the Minor Term apart from the Probandum; the followers of Shabara derive this knowledge from Presumption, and the followers of Bhikṣu, from Inference; for us, Inference is something totally different, like Narasimha (having a dual character).'

[In this passage]—Dharmīni.—In the Minor term;—i.e. that in which the existence of the Probandum is sought to be proved;—'Amunā'—i.e. what is sought to be proved. That which is incapable of existing in the Minor Term apart from the Probandum;—this is meant to be the definition (of Probans).

If such be the definition of the Probans, then that same Means of Cognition by which the Probans would be known as inseparable from the Probandum, as existent in the object where the Probandum is sought to be proved,—that same Means of Cognition would have made known the Probandum also (as present in the Minor Term);—so that the Probans would be entirely useless.

If the Probandum is not known, then the Probans also is not known; because the Probans has been defined as what is present in the Minor Term inseparably from the Probandum; and this inseparability from the Probandum cannot be known if the Probandum is not known; so that the Probandum would remain 'unknown', because the cognition of inseparability depends upon the Cognition of both.

It might be urged that—'The Probans may be known by other means of cognition'—then what is the use of the Probans, the Probandum having become known already?

Further, if the definite cognition of the Probandum were dependent upon the Probans, then there would be the incongruity of mutual interdependence.
Question:—"How?"

Answer:—'If the definite Cognition, etc. etc.';—the cognition of the Probandum would be dependent upon the cognition of the Probans,—as therein alone lies the use of the Probans,—and the cognition of the Probans, which is characterised by inseparability from the Probandum, would be dependent upon the cognition of the Probandum; thus there would be clear mutual inter-dependence'.—(1386–1388)

The following Text—takes note of the third alternative set forth above (under Text 1380):—

TEXT (1389).

Even if the Probans were known as existent in the Corroborative Instance, that would not bring about the cognition of the Probandum in the Minor Term. Because its invariable concomitance will not have been definitely cognised all over.—(1389)

COMMENTARY.

'In the Corroborative Instance',—i.e. in the object that serves as the Corroborative Instance,—which object is different from that in which the Probandum is sought to be proved.

'If it were known',—i.e. if the Probans were known.

What is meant is as follows:—If the inseparability (concomitance) of the Probans is held to be in the object which forms the Corroborative Instance,—and which is something different from the Minor Term, in which the Probandum is sought to be proved,—and not 'all over'—everywhere—along with the Minor Term,—then how could such a Probans bring about the cognition of the Probandum in the Minor Term?

Why it could not bring it about is explained—'Because its invariable concomitance, etc. etc.'.—(1389)

With the following Text, the author proceeds to point out defects in the examples cited (by Pārabhāśāmin, in Texts 1371 to 1378):—

TEXT (1390).

As regards the Probans that has been put forward (under 1371), in the form 'Because it is apprehended somehow',—the object of this is not open to uncertainty; hence it is useless.—(1390)

COMMENTARY.

As regards the Probans that has been put forward, in the form—'Because it is somehow apprehended',—this is absolutely futile; as its object is not open to doubt; that is, it asserts what is already known; and what is already
known cannot be the objective of the Probans; it is only a doubtful matter that is dealt with by the Probans; because 'a Reason is stated only in reference to what is doubtful'.—What too is known only in an isolated form cannot be the substratum of the Probans; as the Probandum would be already known (under the definition propounded by Pātrāsvāmin).—(1390)

It might be urged that—"here also what forms the object of the Probans is what is open to doubt".—The answer to that is as follows:

TEXT (1391).

**THAT THE POSITIVE ENTITY IS ESSENTIALLY EXISTENT IS KNOWN TO ALL PERSONS; THEN HOW IS IT SAID THAT IT IS KNOWN 'SOMEHOW'?—(1391)**

**COMMENTARY.**

When all persons somehow know it for certain that the Positive Entity is existent, why do you state your Proposition in the form 'The Positive Entity is somehow existent'?—

'Tadātmatvam'—being essentially existent.

The mention of the 'Positive Entity' is only by way of illustration; the Negative Entity is also meant.

'Somehow'—i.e. in the form of 'being cognisable',—it is known for certain that all this is existent; hence the Probans is absolutely futile.—(1391)

It might be argued that—"the said fact is not admitted by the Sāṅkhya and others; hence it is sought to be proved".

The answer to that is as follows:

TEXTS (1392-1393).

**EVEN UNDER THE DOCTRINE THAT 'ALL THINGS ARE ONE',—ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIVERSITY IN THE NATURE OF THE MODIFICATIONS, WHAT IS MANIFESTED IS ALWAYS IN SOME DEFINITELY CLEAR FORM. EVEN THOSE WHO REGARD ALL THINGS AS 'FEATURELESS' (DEVOID OF CHARACTER), ALWAYS HAVE RECOURSE TO SUCH QUALIFYING TERMS AS 'TRULY' AND THE LIKE.—(1392-1393)**

**COMMENTARY.**

'The doctrine of all things being one' is the one that is held by the Sāṅkhya; for those who take their stand upon this doctrine, what is manifested—apprehended—is always in some definite form.

**Question:**—"How so?"

**Answer:**—'On account of, etc. etc.';—'nature of the Modifications',—i.e. in the form of Modifications.
The term 'ādi' is meant to include the 'unmixed (Pure) Primordial Matter, consisting of Pleasure, Pain, etc.' and 'the Spirits as distinguished from one another, and from Primordial Matter'.

'Even those'—i.e. the Mādhyamikas, Idealists.—These also, in asserting the 'featurelessness' of all things, always add the qualifying term 'truly', and they do not assert them to be absolutely so; because they do admit of their being produced at least in the Ideation.

'Truly'—i.e. strictly logically.

The term 'ādi' includes such qualifying terms as 'in reality' and the like.

In fact it must be admitted by all men that the fact that a thing is somehow existent is quite certainly recognised.—(1392-1393)

TEXT (1394).

Otherwise, it cannot be admitted that 'it is somehow apprehended'.—If it is Usage that is sought to be proved,—

then something well known should form the Corroborative Instance.—(1394)

COMMENTARY.

'Otherwise',—i.e. if what has been just said is not admitted, then—the Probans—in the form 'because it is somehow apprehended'—cannot be admitted.

Previous to this the defect pointed out in the statement of the other party was that it was futile; it is now pointed out that it is inadmissible.

If it is Usage that is meant to be proved,—then the Corroborative Instance could be found in the case where the use had been made; and in this case, the Probans would become 'three-featured'. Otherwise, if there were no Corroborative Instance, the Usage also could not be known.—(1394)

The following Text points out the defect in the second Reasoning put forth (by Pātravāmin, in Text 1372, where the 'two-featured' Probans is exemplified):—

TEXT (1395).

As regards 'being spoken of as the Moon', this is present also in things where the probandum is known to be present;—

or it is also sometimes present in the Man (who is spoken of as the Moon), or in Camphor, Silver and such other things (which are also called 'Moon').—(1395)

COMMENTARY.

'Mānavakē'—i.e. in Man.—(1395)

Objection:—"If a three-featured Probans is possible, for the proving of the 'Moon', then how is it that your Teacher has asserted that, when a
man declares that the Moon is not the Moon,—for the proving of its being the Moon against such a person, there can be no Inference,—as he has asserted in the following passage—'In the case where there can be no Inference on account of the thing in question being unique, it is excluded by its contrary which is well known in its verbal form; when, for example, it is said that the Hare-holder is the Moon because it is an entity; in a case like this there is no Minor Term'?

In anticipation of this objection, the following answer has been provided:

**TEXT (1396).**

There would be 'uniqueness' only if the probans were meant to prove 'Moon-ness'; as, in the absence of any well-known fact regarding it, it would be based entirely upon the nature of the thing itself.—(1396)

**COMMENTARY.**

'It would be based entirely, etc.';—i.e. it is in regard to the probans in the shape of the existence or non-existence of things, that 'Uniqueness' has been asserted,—not in regard to a probans in the form of a well-known fact; because in the case of the latter, as it is dependent upon the wish of the speaker, the necessary concomitance would always be there. The inference, without a corroborative instance, has been spoken of only in the case where the other party holds a different opinion and denies all experience, and consequently cannot be convinced of the thing being the Moon on the basis of any well-known fact,—nor is there any inferential indicative (probans) based upon the capacity of things by which the Moon-ness could be proved in reference to the Hare-holder,—because the name 'Moon' is based upon the mere whim of the speaker and is not an inherent property of the thing concerned. That this is so is clear from the following statement—'One who does not wish to attribute Moon-ness to the Hare-holder,—what sort of well-known cognition could he want? It is for this reason that the inference addressed to him has to be without a corroborative instance, and hence unique,' too specific.'

In place of 'chandraivaśādhanē', 'To prove Moon-ness', some texts read 'achandrasādhanē', 'to prove that it is not-Moon'; and with this reading, the explanation would be as follows:—Where the other party has asserted that 'The Hare-holder is not the Moon, because it exists',—when the probans, 'because it exists', has been cited by that party for proving the 'Non-moon-character',—then, the person who proceeds to answer him by proving the 'Moon-character', has a reason why he cannot put forward an inference of 'uniqueness'; and it is this reason that the teacher has indicated by asserting that 'where, on account of uniqueness, there is no inference, etc. etc.', which refers to the absence of an inferential indicative in the shape of the character of the thing concerned, as apart from any well-known fact (which could be cited).—(1396)
The following Text points out the defect in the third argument (put forward by Pātrāsvāmin, in Text 1373, regarding the 'falling insect '):—

TEXT (1397).

There is no distinction perceived between 'being brought about by the falling insect' and 'having its appearance felt on the touch of the falling insect'.—(1397)

COMMENTARY.

'There is no distinction perceived',—between the Probans (Premiss) and the Proposition (Conclusion); that is, the Probans is a part of the Proposition itself. In the case in question, what is meant to be proved is the fact of the Pain being due to a particular insect,—and the same fact is asserted, in different words, in the Probans (Premiss). Hence there is no difference between the Premiss and the Conclusion.—(1397)

The following might be urged:—"If the epithet falling is not introduced, and the Probans (Premiss) is stated in the general form 'because its appearance is felt ',—then the Premiss cannot be a part of the Conclusion."

Answer :

TEXT (1398).

'Falling' must be made a qualification in the Probans; otherwise 'Inconclusiveness' (Falsity) would be inevitable.—(1398)

COMMENTARY.

The qualification must be there; otherwise the Premiss would be falsified by reference to the Pain caused by other insects.—(1398)

TEXT (1399).

If what is meant to be proved (asserted in the conclusion) is that between the two (the Pain and the Insect) there is the relation of Cause and Effect,—which has been forgotten,—then the Probans would be 'three-featured', as there would be a Corroborative Instance provided by previous experience.—(1399)

COMMENTARY.

It might be urged that "what is meant to be proved is the relation of Cause and Effect—for the benefit of one who has forgotten it,—then, in
that case, the Probans would become 'three-featured', as the Corroborative
Instance would be provided by such well-known cases as that of *Smoke and
Fire*.—(1399)

The following *Text* supplies the answer to the argument stated (by
*Pārāśārvāmin*, in Text 1374) regarding "the Eyes having the peculiar potency
for bringing about the effect in the shape of Colour-perception".

**TEXT (1400).**

**As a matter of fact, the very existence of the Eye,—which is the
subject—is still uncertain; and the proving of this
(existence) cannot be right,—as it would be
open to the defects of 'Inadmissibility'
and the rest.—(1400)**

**COMMENTARY.**

There is a stop after 'na' (in the second line).

*Inadmissibility and the rest*.—The term 'and the rest' includes
'falsity' and 'contradiction'.

What is meant is that if *Existence* is to be proved, then the Probans
put forward is open to all the three defects of the Probans. For instance,
if the character cited as the Probans is something *positive*, then it is 'inad-
missible' ;—if it is both (positive and negative), then it is 'Inconclusive' ;
—if it is *negative*, then it is 'contradictory'.—This has been thus declared—
'The positive property is not admitted; both positive and negative would
be Inconclusive; and the negative one would be contradictory; how then can
Existence be proved?'

If what is sought to be proved is the *potency in the Eye, the Subject, to
bring about visual perception*,—even so, inasmuch as 'potency', 'existence',
etc. are synonymous, the proving of *Potency* would involve the proving of
*Existence*.—On the negative aspect also, inasmuch as the Potency, being
beyond the reach of the senses, would not be well-known, the Probans would
become fallacious, as having no well-known substratum.

Similarly, the Probans, in the form 'because of the perception of Colour',
would be something not present in the Subject, and hence it should be
understood to be *Inadmissible*.—(1400)

*Question* :—"How then can you also prove the existence of the Eyes
and the other sense-organs ?"

*Answer* :—
TEXT (1401).

But sometimes, even though Colour and other things are there, Visual Perception does not take place; hence it is understood that that (Perception) alone cannot be a reason (for the existence of the Eye).—(1401)

COMMENTARY.

'Sometimes',—when, for instance, the Eyes are closed.

We never seek to prove the existence of the Eye—directly as 'this is the Eye'; what happens (according to us) is that it is found that the Perception appears only when certain things, in the form of Colour, etc. are there, —and it is so found that it is present when these things are there, and it is absent when they are absent;—and what we seek to prove is that the Perception could not have those things alone as its cause,—that it must have some other cause; so that the Subject (of our Inference) is the said Perception, which cannot be said to be 'unknown'.—What this other cause is comes to be spoken of as the 'Eye'.

The basis of our conclusion is the practical notion of diversity.—(1401)

The following might be urged:—"It may be that, in the manner shown, the Perception may be the Subject; even so, the Probans remains only 'two-featured'."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1402).

The Sprout is actually found to exist as having its birth inseparably connected with its Cause; and this is always available as the Corroborative Instance; the Instance per dissimilarity is too clear (to be stated).—(1402)

COMMENTARY.

'Inseparably connected with its Cause'—invariably concomitant with its Cause—is the birth—appearance, coming into existence—of the Sprout. Things like the Sprout, having their birth dependent upon their Cause and hence coming into existence only occasionally, are possible as the Corroborative Instance (in the proving of the Visual Perception as being due to the Eye);—the argument being formulated thus:—Those things that appear on the presence of something else, only occasionally, cannot be regarded as produced from that alone, they must be regarded as dependent upon other causes,—for instance, even when the soil and other things are there, the Sprout is found to appear or not to appear according as the seed is there or not there;
—even when Colour, etc. are there, the Visual Perception appears only at certain times, according as the Eyes are closed or not closed; hence in the case of the denial of the Eye, the argument would point out that the said denial would be contrary to a wider proposition; while in the case of the asserting of the existence of the Eye, it would contain a natural reason.—

(1402)

The Text now takes up the argument put forward (by Pātṛsvāmin) under Text 1375, to the effect that "the Soul and the Jar are somehow non-existent, etc. etc".

TEXT (1403).

IN PROVING THAT THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS ARE "SOMEHOW NON-EXISTENT",—THE PROBANS IS FOUND AS, IN A PREVIOUS CASE, TO BE 'FUTILE' AND ALSO 'INADMISSIBLE'.—(1403)

COMMENTARY.

Here also, there would be proving what is already admitted; as the fact of the Jar, etc. being 'somehow non-existent' is already admitted.

In case it is not admitted, then the Probans also, in the form 'because it is not apprehended ', cannot be admitted; so that the Probans becomes 'Inadmissible'.

In this way, the defect in the Probans may be pointed out,—just as it was in connection with the argument seeking to prove that the things in question are existent.—(1403)

It has been argued that—"there being nothing where the Probandum is known to be absent, there can be no Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity".

—The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXTS (1404-1405).

HERE ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE per dissimilarity; THAT SAME FORM OF THE THINGS BECOMES the thing where the Probandum is known to be absent.—IN THE PROVING OF THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING SOMEHOW EXISTENT ' IN REGARD TO NON-ENTITIES,—THERE WOULD BE 'PROVING OF WHAT IS ALREADY ADMITTED '; ALSO 'INADMISSIBILITY', AND THE CONCOMITANCE OF THE CONTRARY CHARACTER IN THAT WAY.—(1404-1405)

COMMENTARY.

That form in which the Jar, etc. are apprehended,—if their existence in that form is accepted by them, then, in that case, that same character would
also serve as the *Instance per dissimilarity*; because in that character, the Probans—‘being unapprehended’—will have ceased to exist.

Similarly in the case of the argument regarding things being ‘somehow existent’, the defect of ‘futility’ would be present.

‘Nirātmasu’—i.e. in non-entities.

‘Concomitance of the contrary character’;—i.e. the ‘contrary character’,—in the shape of the cessations of the Probandum—would be pervaded by (concomitant with) the absence of the Probans.

‘In that way’—i.e. by the possibility of the *Instance per dissimilarity*.—
(1404-1405)

The following *Texts* point out the defects in the argument propounded (by Pātrusvāmin), in Text 1377, regarding “Your father being present in the house, etc. etc.”:

**TEXTS (1406-1407).**

(1406-1407)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘Tasya’;—the voice as belonging to the Father must certainly have been heard before. If it had not, then the Probans would be inadmissible.—
(1406-1407)

The said *three-featured* character of the Probans is shown in the following:
In that house wherein the Father had been found before,—and also in that wherein he had not been found before,—there is the concomitance, positive and negative, clearly perceived.

—As regards the Word, it does not make known any external object at all; because in this case, the character of 'being otherwise impossible' is not present; the Word can only be the indicator of the 'speaker's wish' (to speak of a certain thing). If this (Speaker's wish) were meant to be what is expressed by the word, then its difference is quite clear. Because when the 'Speaker's wish' is not there, the word cannot be used.—As regards the Lamp, it does not make the Blue and other things known by becoming the Indicative (inferential); all that it does is to make things capable of being cognised; and it is only in this sense that it is called a 'means of cognition'. Only in case the Word were an Inferential Indicative, would it be necessary to consider if it fulfils the conditions of being present in the Subject (Minor Term) and so forth. Otherwise, why cannot the same be urged in connection with the Eye and other organs (as Means of Cognition)?—Even through the character of 'being otherwise impossible', Visibility cannot prove anything, unless it is present in the subject (Minor Term).—Thus 'one-featured' Probans are all impotent.—In those that have been cited as 'one-featured' Probans, the presence of two features becomes clearly indicated; and in those that have been cited as 'two-featured', the presence of three features becomes clearly indicated; because every Probans must reside in the Subject (which therefore is an additional condition that must be fulfilled).—If it be argued that 'this feature is implied by the character of being otherwise impossible',—that cannot be so; because in the case of Sound, though Visibility may be otherwise desired, it is not present in sound (which is the subject).—(1408–1415)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of Words, the character of being otherwise impossible cannot be admissible,—in reference to external things; because it cannot serve as an Inferential Indicative of these latter,—being, as it is, dependent entirely upon the Speaker's wish. —If the said character is asserted in the case of words, in reference to the object that figures in the cognition (brought about by the words),—then, there are all the three features present, as in the case of Smoke (indicating the Fire). Because, if the Speaker's wish is not there, words cannot be used, the use must be regarded as the effect of that wish;
and as such it is indicative of the thing spoken of, just as the Smoke is of Fire; and this is accepted by us; but not as being expressive of the thing.

As regards the Lamp, it is not admitted to be even the Indicator like Smoke; all that is admitted is that it has come to be popularly regarded as the Indicator (making things known) by reason of its making the Jar, etc. (objects cognised) capable of bringing about the cognition; but the words are not inferential Indicatives; hence any discussion as to the Indicative subsisting in the Subject cannot arise in this case. If it did arise in this case, then why could not the same discussion arise in the case of the Eye and the rest (which are the means of Sense-perception, not Inferential Indicatives)?

‘Otherwise, etc. etc.’; this sums up the subject-matter under consideration. The sense is that, even though Visibility is invariably concomitant with non-eternity, it does not prove this non-eternity in Sound.

Thus then, inasmuch as in all cases, the condition of subsisting in the Subject must be present,—by admitting this as a necessary condition, those Probans that have been cited as ‘one-featured’, must, necessarily, become ‘two-featured’,—and those cited as ‘two-featured’ must become ‘three-featured’. Thus, on account of the necessity of subsistence in the Subject, it is the one-featured Probans that are really impotent.

It cannot be right to argue that—‘such characters as subsisting in the Subject are all implied by that of ‘being otherwise impossible’, and hence they cannot form so many different independent characteristics of the Probans’—because the other party has himself asserted that there is the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’, even when subsistence in the Subject is not there, in the following passage—“Through the character of being otherwise impossible the Lamp and other things are actually indicative of things, even though they do not reside in the subject (Text 1378, above)”.

In the case of Visibility,—even though ‘non-eternity’ is ‘otherwise impossible’,—visibility does not subsist in the Subject. So that in every way what has been asserted is entirely doubtful.—(1408–1415)

It has been argued above,—under Text 1370—that “in the case of the Reasoning ‘He is dark because he is the son of so and so’, even though the Probans has all the three features, yet it is not conducive to certainty of cognition”.

The answer to that is as follows:

TEXT (1416).

In the case of such Probans as ‘because he is the Son of so and so’, the contrary being open to doubt, the three conditions are not present; because what is cited is not incompatible with the contrary.

—(1416)

COMMENTARY.

It may be possible that the child may be the son of the man and yet be not dark;—there being no incompatibility in this, the absence of the Probans
where the Probandum is known to be absent is open to doubt [and this is one
of the three features]; so that the Probans is not 'three featured'; hence
the example cited (by Pātrasvāmin) is not relevant.—(1416)

The following might be urged—'Certainly there is incompatibility;
even when there is no difference in the cause, if there were difference in the
effect,—then the effect would be causeless'.

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (1417-1418).

Even when the child is born of a certain person, there is always
a likelihood of diversity in its features, by reason of the
peculiarities of such causes as the 'Destiny' (of the
child) and food (of the Parents) and so forth.—

Further, (a) what is cited as the Probans does
not constitute the nature (of the Probandum);
(b) nor is that its Effect; (c) nor is it of
the nature of 'the non-perception
of the perceptible';—and apart
from these (three) there is
nothing that can make
the Probans 'infal-
liable' (true).—

(1417-1418)

COMMENTARY.

Through such causes as the peculiarity of past good deeds (Destiny) and
eating of hot food and other diverse circumstances, diversity in the features
of the child—such as fairness and the like—are possible; wherefore then
can there be any incompatibility where a diversity in the causes is well
known?

Then again, the Premiss—'Because he is the son of so and so'—is not
a 'natural' Reason,—as 'being a product' is (in the proving of non-
 eternality); in the latter case, 'being a product' can have no other character
save that of non- eternality; while in the case in question it is not that there
is no other character for 'being his son'; because the appellation of 'his
son' is applied,—not on the ground of the son being dark, but,—on the basis
of the aggregate of five ingredients (of which the body of the child consists).
—Nor is the Probans one based on 'effect'; as there is no causal relation
known to subsist (between Being his son and Darkness).—Nor (lastly), is it
of the nature of the 'non-perception of the perceptible', as what is cited is
in the positive form; also because there being no incongruity between the
two, the Probans cannot prove the negation of complexions other than the
Dark.
Apart from these three there can be no Inferential Indicative,—because of the absence of 'Invariable Concomitance' (in all other cases); without Invariable Concomitance, there can be no proper 'indicative' character; for, if there were, it would lead to absurdities.

Thus then, what has been cited is neither a 'Probans', nor is it 'three-featured'. How then could there be 'Infallibility' in it?

'Non-perception of the perceptible'—is the non-apprehension of something which fulfils all the conditions of apprehensibility.—(1417-1418)

In the following Texts, the author sets forth certain objections against the 'infallibility' put forward as constituting the character of the true Inferential Indicative:—

**TEXTS (1419–1421).**

"The said 'Infallibility' is seen in other cases also: For instance, (1) the blooming of the Lily and the rise in the sea have the Rise of the Moon for their 'indicative'.

(2) From the presence of sun-light, the presence of shade on the other side is inferred.—(3) When the half-burnt wood-piece is seen in the dark from a distance, it brings up the idea of smoke.—(4) From the rise of the Krtikā (asterism) is inferred the proximity of the Rohini (asterism)."

(1419–1421)

**COMMENTARY.**

(1) From the Rise of the Moon—follows the inference of the Blooming of the Lily and the Rise in the Sea.

The term 'ādi' is meant to include such cases as the Blooming of the Lotus inferred from the Rise of the Sun.

(2) From the presence of sun-light, there follows the inference of the shadow on the other side.

(3) When from a distance one sees in the darkness a half burnt piece of wood, he infers the presence of smoke.

(4) From the rise of the asterism Krtikā, one infers the proximity of the asterism Rohini; since it is well known that the asterisms rise in the same order in which they are enumerated in the list beginning with Ashvinī.

All these are not included among the three kinds of Probans (mentioned in Texts 1417-1418). Why then should it be asserted that there can be no 'Infallibility' in any Probans other than those of the said three kinds?—

(1419–1421)

The answer to the above is as follows:—
TEXTS (1422-1423).

THE BLOOMING AND THE REST, WHEN PRODUCED, ARE PRODUCED AT
SAID (MOON-RISE, ETC.). SO THAT HERE WE DO HAVE THE
INFERENCE OF THE CAUSE FROM THE EFFECT. IF THERE
WERE NO SUCH STRICT RELATIONSHIP, THEN EVERY-
THING COULD BE INFERRED FROM EVERYTHING.

—(1422-1423)

COMMENTARY.

When the said Blooming and the rest—Blooming of the Lily, Rise of the
Sea and the Blooming of the Lotus and the Shadow and Smoke—are pro-
duced,—in what way?—at the same time as the said Moon-rise, Sun-light and
the Half-burnt Wood-piece,—which are known to be the effects of the same
Causes;—that is to say, that which is the cause of the Moon-rise, etc., which
appear at the same time as the Blooming of the Lily and other phenomena,
becomes also the auxiliary cause in the bringing about of the Blooming of
the Lily, etc.;—the said Moon-rise, etc., while leading to the inference of
their own causes, lead to the inference also of the effects appearing at the
same time, in the form of the Blooming of the Lily, etc.; and they do not do
this directly. In this way, the Probans in the case in question is one based
upon the character of the 'Effect'.

That this is so has to be admitted; because if the Probans were to lead
to the inference of things without some such relationship, then they might
lead to the inference of anything and everything; because the absence of
relationship would be equally present in all things. Hence in the cases in
question also, some sort of relationship has to be pointed out; and this rela-
tionship can only be one of Cause and Effect as just explained.—(1422-1423)

Question:—"What sort of relationship is there between the Proximity
of the Rohini-asterism and the Rise of the Krittikā-asterism?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1424-1425).

A PECULIAR ATMOSPHERIC CURRENT IS THE CAUSE OF THE Rise of the
Krittikā-asterism; THAT SAME, IN CONTINUATION, ALSO BECOMES
THE CAUSE OF THE Proximity of the Rohini-Asterism. HENCE
ITS COGNITION IS HELD TO BE DUE TO THE COGNITION OF
THAT; AND THERE IS NO OTHER COGNITION OF IT
WHICH IS INDEPENDENT.—(1424-1425)

COMMENTARY.

'Prabhaṇjana'—is Air-current.

Here also there is Inference from a particular Probans which is dependent
upon the same auxiliary circumstances. This has been thus declared—
Being dependent upon one and the same set of auxiliary circumstances is what leads to the inference of a particular cause of a particular thing,—as is found in the case of Smoke which is a product of half-burnt fuel.'—(1424-1425)

Objection:—"In the case where the Reflection leads to the Inference of the object reflected,—the Probans cannot be included under any of the three kinds of Probans,—because the Reflected Image is a non-entity (and has no real existence); hence the definition provided by you is too narrow'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1426).

The Inference of the Reflected object proceeds on the basis of the Inferential Indicative in the shape of the Reflection; this is only right; and the Indicative from which it proceeds is not different from that which rests on the nature of the 'Effect'.—(1426)

COMMENTARY.

In the following Text the author sets forth the objection from the Opponent's standpoint:—

TEXT (1427).

"The Reflection cannot be an entity, because two things cannot exist together at the same place; then how can it be regarded as an Effect, which must be something real",—if this is urged [then the answer is as in the following Text].—(1427)

COMMENTARY.

For the idea that the Reflection cannot be an entity, the Reason is—two things cannot exist together; the Reflection is perceived as occupying the same place as the reflecting surface of the Mirror, and it is not possible for the forms of two things to be seen at the same place; as there would always be an obstacle; hence it cannot be possible for any two things to exist at the same place. Hence the idea must be regarded as illusory.

Or [there may be another explanation of the Text]—Two things cannot exist together at the same place;—which two things?—The surface of the reflecting mirror and the Reflection of the Moon; the surface of the Mirror occupies one point in space, and the Reflection of the Moon occupies a different point in space, inside the Mirror; like the water at the bottom of the well. When a thing is produced in one place, how can it be perceived in another place? Hence it follows that there is no such Entity as the Reflection; and
the perception is due to the force of the attendant circumstances:—unthinkable indeed are the diverse forces of things!—(1427)

The above objection is answered as follows:

TEXTS (1428-1429).

Even though the character of the 'Entity' does not belong to the Reflection as a corporeal object, yet how can the Cognition envisaging the Relection be regarded as Objectless? And it is this latter (Cognition), that is regarded here as the 'Effect' and the 'Inferential Indicative'; and though itself without a material basis, the Cognition appears under the influence of the reflected object which is therefore regarded as its Cause.

—(1428-1429)

COMMENTARY.

It is only the Cognition of the form of the Reflection that is regarded as the effect, and hence the Inferential Indicative, and not any external object in the shape of the 'Reflection'.—(1428-1429)

——

Objection:—"It has been asserted under Text 1363 that—'Inference for the sake of others consists in the statement of the three-featured Probans'.—Why has this been so asserted, when other people have described the Inference for the sake of others as consisting of the statement of the 'Proposition', 'Final Conclusion' and 'Re-affirmation' also?"

This is what is anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXT (1430).

The Inference for the sake of others has been described by others as 'the statement of the Proposition and the rest'.—But, not being an integral part of proof ('proving'), the Proposition is of no use.—(1430)

COMMENTARY.

The author rejects the said view of other people, in the words—'But, not, etc. etc.'—'Sādhana', 'Proof', (here) stands for the proving; i.e. the cognition of the object to be cognised;—the Proposition is not an 'integral part'—i.e. the cause—of the proving; this is what is meant by the compound 'asādhanāṅgabhūtam'.
Not being an integral part of the proving, the Proposition is of no use, and hence need not be stated.

'Of no use' may be explained as not a cause; in which case, the phrase would form part of the conclusion set forth here (which would be that the Proposition is not a cause of the proving).—(1430)

Question:—"How is the Proposition not an integral part of the Proving?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1431–1433).

For want of relationship, the Proposition cannot be rightly regarded as proving the thing directly; nor can it be rightly regarded as doing it indirectly, because it does not indicate what is possible.—If it be regarded as part of the proving, on account of its presenting the objective of the Probans and the Probandum,—like the statement of the Corroborative Instance,—then it would be like words conveying an order, and in view of this the reason given would be fallible. And as merely the objective will be indicated, the said statement of the Proposition would be useless also.—(1431–1433)

COMMENTARY.

'It does not indicate what is probable',—because it only states what is meant to be proved.

What is meant is as follows:—As words have no connection with things the statement of the Proposition cannot serve any directly useful purpose;—nor indirectly, like the statement of the Probans, because it does not indicate what is possible;—as declared in the following passage—'They made the assertion of the Minor Term, for the purpose of intimating their intention,—which shows where the doubt lay; hence it does not serve any directly useful purpose in the actual proving; and as it states only what is meant to be proved, it cannot help indirectly either'.

Some people hold the following opinion—"The Proposition has to be stated,—in the same way as the Corroborative Instance is stated,—because, even though it does not form a part of the Inference, yet it presents the objective of the Probans and the Probandum; as declared in the words—'Since the two forms that remain are shown in the Corroborative Instance'; that is, the statement of the Corroborative Instance, even though it does not form a separate factor of the Inference, is yet stated for the purpose of showing the two features of the Probans—other than the feature of subsisting in the Minor Term'.

The answer to these people is provided in the words 'Like the Corroborative Instance, etc. etc.'—'Words conveying an order',—such as 'Do this;—Prove the Sound to be non-eternal'.—The term 'ādi' includes words conveying a request and so forth. [Under the opinion put forward] it would be necessary
to put forth such expressions also; on the ground that in the absence of these also, it is not possible to propound an Inference all on a sudden.

‘Useless’;—because the Probandum would become cognised even without it. For instance, if the inference is stated simply as ‘whatever is produced is non-eternal,—and Sound is produced’, the cognition comes about that ‘Sound is non-eternal’, even without the statement of the Proposition.—(1431–1433)

**Question:**—“How then can there be any distinction made regarding the ‘Sapakṣa’ (‘That in which the Probandum is known to be present’) and so forth?”

[This is the question stated in the following]—

**TEXT (1434).**

“How then can there be any distinction made regarding the ‘Sapakṣa’ (‘That wherein the Probandum is known to exist’) and so forth, when the subject (Minor Term) is not actually stated? The ‘three-features’ also cannot be there; as that too is dependent upon that.”—If this is urged [then the answer is as given in the following Text].

**COMMENTARY.**

“That is to say, ‘Sapakṣa’ is the name given to that object which is similar to the Minor Term, in the sense that what is sought to be proved (the Probandum) is present in it; and that where there is no such similarity is called the ‘asapakṣa’ (or ‘Vipakṣa’). If the Proposition were not stated, then the ‘three features’ (of the Probands), which is dependent upon that,—i.e. upon that which is the substratum of the ‘Sapakṣa’,—would not be there, and the entire fabric (of Inference) would become shattered to pieces.”—(1434)

The answer to the above is as follows:—

**TEXT (1435).**

In the mere statement of the Proof (inferential), there is no distinction made regarding the ‘Sapakṣa’ and the rest. It is only in a scientific treatise, that they are distinguished and divided for the purpose of (explaining) the usage.

—(1435)

**COMMENTARY.**

That is to say, even a barbarian who knows nothing of the distinction of ‘Sapakṣa’ etc., when it is stated to him that ‘where there is smoke, there is
Fire,—and there is smoke at this place,'—he grasps the positive and negative concomitance between Smoke and Fire, and hence comes to recognise that 'Fire is there',—without knowing anything about the 'Sapakṣa' and other details.—Hence it follows that at the time of the actual proving, there need be no distinction as regards the 'Sapakṣa' and the rest.

Question:—"Where then is this distinction made?"
Answer—In a Scientific Treatise.—(1435)

Or, even at the time of the statement of the proof, if the said distinction were made,—there would be nothing in it that would be incompatible with our view. This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (1436).

EVEN WHEN IT IS BASED UPON THE SUBJECT-MATTER IN QUESTION, IT IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE; THE DISPUTANT DOES NOT STATE THE PROOF EVEN FOR THE OTHER PARTY, ALL OF A SUDDEN.—(1436)

COMMENTARY.

Though the statement of the Proposition is not made at the time that one actually propounds the Premiss, yet if the said distinction is made in regard to the matter under dispute,—i.e. the Subject—there is nothing incongruous in it.—Nor can it be urged that "at the time of the propounding of the Premiss (Reason, Probans), there is no matter under dispute";—because, even for the other party,—i.e. for one who makes the statement of the Proposition,—the disputant does not put forward his Premiss, all of a sudden,—without reference to some subject under consideration.—(1436)

The question arises still—"The object whose particular character one wishes to ascertain may be the subject under consideration; even so how can the said distinction be made in reference to that subject under consideration?"

The answer is provided in the following—

TEXT (1437).

THE CHARACTER OF RESIDING IN THE MINOR TERM (SUBJECT) FOLLOWS ITS PRESENCE IN THE SUBJECT WHOSE CHARACTER IS MEANT TO BE ASCERTAINED; AND THE 'SAPAKṢA' IS THAT WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THAT SUBJECT; AND THE 'VIPAkJA' IS THAT WHERE THE SAID CHARACTER IS ABSENT.—(1437)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(1437)

The 'Upanaya', 'Reaffirmation' (as one of the five Members of the Syllogism) has been defined as 'that which, on the strength of the Corrobora-
tive Instance, reasserts the Subject as being so, or as being not so"—(Nyāya-
sūtra 1. 1. 38).—'This Re-affirmation is not the means of proving the conclusion, as it only serves to make clear the sense of the Probans adduced, being, as it is, like a second affirmation of the Probans'—such is the authoritative statement of Dīnāgā in regard to this Re-affirmation.—But Bhāvavikṣa and others have argued as follows, in order to show that (without this Reaffirmation) the function of the Probans itself would remain unfulfilled:—"'The fact of the Probans subsisting in the thing where the Probandum is known to be present is not made clear by the statement of the Probans, which comes just after the statement of the Proposition; because the former only mentions the Reason—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product';—and whether this character of 'being a product' subsists, or does not subsist, in Sound, this is learnt only from the Reaffirmation.—Or the Reaffirmation may be regarded as serving the purpose of providing Re-presentation; when the Probans is stated at first, it points out the presence of the Probans—e.g. 'being a product'—in a general, unqualified, form;—then the Corroborative Instance is cited, where it is shown that the said Probans is invariably concomitant with the Probandum;—so that when, after these, the Reaffirmation is stated, it brings about the Representation of the Probans with the qualification that it is invariably concomitant with the Probandum,—'So is Sound a product'. Thus inasmuch as it indicates a particular feature, it is not a mere repetition'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1438-1439).

If there is no statement of the Proposition, there can be no statement of the Reason (Probans); and consequently, there need be no statement of the Reaffirmation, for the purpose of intimating the existence (of the Probans in the Minor Term, Subject).—Mere presence (of the Probans in the Subject) having been stated at first, and then, if its invariable concomitance (with the Probandum) is subsequently pointed out,—by this all that is intended becomes accomplished; so that the Representation would be entirely useless.—

(1438-1439)

COMMENTARY.

'For the purpose of intimating the existence'—of the Probans, in the Subject, Minor Term.

What is meant is as follows:—The necessity of the statement of the Proposition having been negatived in the manner shown above,—if the
statement of the Reason is to come after that, then it cannot come in at all; and as a consequence of this, there should be no statement of the Re-affirmation, as this has to be preceded by the statement of the Reason.—If the Reaffirmation is made for the purpose of showing that the Probans resides in the Subject, then some other purpose will have to be asserted as following from the Statement of the Reason.

It might be urged that—"The purpose served by it is the intimating of the fact of its being the Reason."

That however cannot be accepted; because what would be the use of this intimation of that fact, when the proving of the Probandum is actually accomplished in another way—as explained previously? Consequently, barring the intimation of the fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject, no other purpose can be pointed out, for the Statement of the Reason. Thus then this fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject having been already indicated by the Statement of the Reason,—if the Reaffirmation is again made for that same purpose, it is clearly proved that it is a needless repetition; how too could the Probans be 'inadmissible' without such Reaffirmation?

As for the Representment, that also is useless; because the mere fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject having been previously asserted by the Statement of the Reason,—and the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum also having been already asserted,—what is wanted would be already accomplished; so that the affirmation of the same thing over again would clearly bear the imprint of a needless repetition. Where then would there be 'inadmissibility' of our Reason in this case also?—

(1438-1439)

'Nigamana', 'Final Conclusion' (the fifth member of the five-membered syllogism) has been defined as 'the Re-statement of the Proposition on the basis of the Statement of the Probans' (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.39). What is meant is that when it is re-asserted that 'Therefore Sound is non-eternal',—the word 'therefore' implies the potency of the Probans as shown in the Corroborative Instance, and then on the basis thereof, there is reassertion of what had been stated in the Proposition;—this re-assertion is called the 'Final Conclusion', 'Nigamana',—the exact connotation of the term 'nigamana' being that whereby the Proposition, the Premiss (statement of the Probans), the Corroborative Instance and the Re-affirmation are connected, strung together, as serving the same purpose (Nyāya-bhāṣya).

As a matter of fact however, when (as shown before) the statement of the Proposition itself is not there, how can there be any statement of the Final Conclusion, which is only a reiteration of the Proposition? Hence the Final Conclusion cannot form part of the Reasoning to prove the conclusion.—On this subject, the Revered Dīnāga has made the declaration that 'Inasmuch as the Final Conclusion is a mere repetition, it cannot be the means of proving anything'.—Against this, Uddyotakara and others, under the above Sūtra, have argued thus:—"There is no repetition here, because the Proposition states the Probandum as to be proved, while the Final Conclu- sion states it as proved; and without the Final Conclusion there can be no proving; because until that is stated, the suspicion regarding the truth of
the other Factors of the Reasoning does not entirely cease as to whether or not Sound is really non-eternal (for instance); hence for the removal of this suspicion, the Final Conclusion has to be stated separately.”

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1440).


COMMENTARY.

When it has been definitely ascertained that in Sound there is present the character of ‘being a product’, which has been shown to be invariably concomitant with ‘non-eternality’,—how can there be any suspicion of its contrary, ‘Eternality’? When the fact of a certain substance being surrounded by flaming fire has been duly ascertained, no sane man can ever suspect the presence of coolness in that substance. [Even if there were any such suspicion] it could not be set aside merely by the statement of the Final Conclusion, without any reasons.—(1440)

Aviddhakarṇa has argued as follows:—“A single idea cannot be expressed by diverse isolated assertions; hence for bringing about the connection between these assertions it is necessary to state the Final Conclusion.”

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1441).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT IS ONLY BY CONNECTED ASSERTIONS THAT AN IDEA IS EXPRESSED; HENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING ABOUT THIS CONNECTION, IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO STATE THE FINAL CONCLUSION SEPARATELY.

—(1441)

COMMENTARY.

When the fact of the Probands being connected with the Probandum by the relation of sameness or by that of Cause and Effect has been established,—then the statement of its presence in the Subject and its invariable concomitance (with the Probandum) as connected together, bring about, by implication, the single Idea, in the shape of the desired Conclusion. Even though the statements are isolated, yet they are connected, and as such together lead to
the desired end. Consequently it is not necessary to state the Final Conclu-
sion for the purpose of bringing about the said connection.—(1441)

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TEXT (1442).

SOME PEOPLE HOLD THAT INFERENCE IS OF TWO KINDS AS FOLLOWS—
(A) That based upon perceived particulars and (B) that based
upon generalised relationship.—(1442)

COMMENTARY.

'Some people'—Kumārila and others.
They describe Inference as of two kinds—(1) that based upon perceived
particulars, and (2) that based upon generalised relationship.—(1442)

Question :—Which is the Inference based upon the Perceived Particulars?
Answer :—[Given by Kumārila]:—

TEXTS (1443–1445).

(A) "That based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars is as
follows :—It so happens that, in the case of two particular
things,—such as the Fire produced by burning dried cow-
dung, and the Smoke proceeding from that Fire,—the observer
has the cognition of the things,—and then subsequently,
on going to another place, the observer happens again and
again to recognise in other places the presence of the same
Fire through the indication of the same Smoke seen before;
and due validity attaches to such cognition (by reason of
its being based upon the previous perceptual cognition),
and it becomes recognised as a Means of Cognition distinct
from Perception; because it brings about the cognition of
a thing (Fire) the existence of which had been in doubt. It is
this that has been described by Vindhyavāsin as Inference
based upon the perceived relationship of Particulars".—[Shloka-
vārtika—Inference, 141–143].—(1443–1445)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows :—First of all, the man has noticed through
Sense-perception in a certain place a particular Fire and a particular Smoke,—
at a later time, he goes to another place and again and again sees the same
particular Smoke, and then infers the same particular Fire;—this is Inference
based upon the perception (of the relationship) of Particulars; it is so called
because it has for its objective the previously-perceived Particular. This
cannot be regarded as invalid on the ground of apprehending what has been already apprehended; because there is an additional factor present here, in the shape of the removal of the doubt as to whether or not the Fire is still there.—This is the sum total of what Kumarila means.

We now proceed to explain the words in detail—

'That based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars'.—Question—

'What relationship'?—The answer is as follows:—Shabarasaṃhin has stated the definition of Inference as follows:—'When the perception of one factor of a well-recognised relationship leads to the cognition of the other factor of that relationship,—which latter is not in contact with the man’s sense-organs—this second cognition is what is called Inference (Inferential Cognition). This Inferential Cognition is of two kinds: (1) that based upon directly perceived relationship, and (2) that based upon a generalised relationship. As an example of the former, we have the inferential cognition of Fire following from the cognition of Smoke [which is based upon the relation of invariable concomitance between a particular Smoke and a particular Fire perceived in the kitchen]; and as an example of the second kind of Inference, we have the case where, finding that the Sun changes its position, we infer that it moves,—on the ground of our experience that in the case of Devadatta it is only by moving that he changes his position (which experience has led to the generalised relationship between moving and change of position in general)._ (Shbara-Bhāṣya, on 1. 1. 5, Translation, page 15).

In connection with this, Kumārila, with a view to explaining the nature of the Inference based upon the perceived relationship of Particulars has used the words—'Pratyakṣadṛṣṭasambandham, etc.' (Text 1443.)—This is to be construed as 'The Inference based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars—they explain as follows';—The words 'they explain' having gone before in the preceding text (in the Shlokavārtika).

In connection with the two particular things—Fire and Smoke—the observer has formed the idea of the new factor in the shape of dry cowdung,—the idea being that 'these two things Fire and Smoke are the effect of the burning of dry cowdung';—and then he has also formed the idea of the particular spot in the shape of the Hill,—the idea being that 'these two things, Fire and Smoke, exist on the Hill'.—The compound 'gomayēndhana' means 'that of which dry cowdung is the fuel', and the compound 'taddēsha' means 'that of which that is the place';—and these two compounds qualify the 'vishēsya' the 'two particular things' (Fire and Smoke);—the 'ādi' stands for other particular fuels in the shape of the woods of the various trees, Sarja, Sarala, Sallaki and the rest,—and also other Fires;—there arises the cognition, in regard to these;—the Locative being construed by 'splitting up' the words;—such perceptual cognition becomes apprehended by the observer;—that same observer, through the indicative in the shape of the same Smoke as seen in another place and at another time, cognises the same Fire; and this happens again and again;—this cognition thus becomes one that is distinct from the previous Perceptual Cognition.—Or the construction may be 'he cognises Fire on the basis of the previous cognition'.—The compound 'Sandikhyamāna, etc.' is to be interpreted as 'the cogni-
tion of that thing whose presence was in doubt—as to whether it is there or not'.—This Inference based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars, as described above, has been spoken of by Vindhyavāsin as ‘Vishēṣatodṛṣṭa’, ‘Inference in relation to Particulars’.—(1443–1445)

The other kind of Inference, the Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, that based upon generalised Relationship, is next described—

TEXT (1446).

"Though the Inference based upon generalised Relationship could be exemplified on the basis of another Fire and another Smoke,—yet the Inference cited is that of the ‘Sun moving’, as this is based absolutely upon generalised Relationship" [Shloka-vā.—Inference, 145].—(1446)

COMMENTARY.

The author of the Bhāṣya (Shabara) has cited the Inference of the moving of the Sun from its change of position as an example of Inference based upon generalised Relationship. In regard to this, the following objection might be raised—‘In reference to another Fire and another Smoke (other than those actually perceived), there can be Inference on the basis of common character; and this Inference of Fire and Smoke would be based upon generalised Relationship; while these Smoke and Fire were present in his mind already, why did he give this up and cite the case of the Sun moving as an example of Inference based upon generalised Relationship?’

Anticipating this, Kumārila offers the explanation—‘Though the Inference, etc. etc.’. That is to say, when the Inference based upon Generalised Relationship could be cited, on the basis of other Smoke and Fire as corroborative Instances,—the author of the Bhāṣya has cited the case of the Sun, in consideration of the fact that the moving of the Sun is imperceptible at all times, and hence for cognising it, the only means available is the Inference based upon generalised Relationship, and not that based upon Perceived Particulars; hence he wished to cite a case like that of the Sun which was purely and unalloyed one of Inference based on Generalised Relationship; and he did not cite the case of Smoke and Fire, as in this case the Inference need not always be one based upon Generalised Relationship.—(1446)

The objection to the above-mentioned classification of Inference is as follows:—
TEXTS (1447-1448).

INASMUCH AS IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT 'PERPETUAL FLUX' IS ALL-EMBRACING, THERE CAN BE NO INFERENCE OF WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE,—BY ITSELF.—IF IT BE ARGUED THAT "THE SAMENESS IS ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF THE SAMENESS OF THE CHAIN"—THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) NO SUCH SAMENESS CAN HAVE ANY REAL EXISTENCE; AND WHAT IS MERELY ASSUMED CANNOT BE AN ENTITY.—

(1447-1448)

COMMENTARY.

'All-embracing',—i.e. embracing all such things as Fire, Smoke and the rest.

It might be argued that—"Even though the individual things are momentary, there would be sameness (unity) of the chain or series."

The answer to that is—'No such sameness, etc.'—That is, this sameness would be something assumed, not real; so that in reality, there would be no continuity of existence for anything; under the circumstances, it cannot be right to say 'by the observer remaining at that place', or 'by that same means' and so forth.—What too is merely assumed cannot be an entity or thing; hence there would be no sense in the words 'because it is a cognition of a thing whose existence was doubted' (as used in Text 1445, by Kumārīla).—

(1447-1448)

The following might be urged—"When the Inference was described as based upon Perceived Particulars, it was on the basis of the assumed, not real, sameness."

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (1449).

A COGNITION DEVOID OF OBJECTS IS NOT ADMITTED BY YOU; AND IF THE INFERENCE HAD AN ASSUMED OBJECT, IT WOULD CLEARLY BE DEVOID OF AN OBJECT.—(1449)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged:—"Though the Individual is fleeting (momentary), yet the Universal is something not fleeting; and on this basis, the sameness or unity would be real, and the Inference would not be devoid of an object".

The answer to this is as follows:—
If what is meant is that—"even on the destruction of the Individual, the Universal persists"—then, that cannot be; because even if the Universal existed, that also would certainly be covered by the 'Perpetual Flux'.—Further, on what grounds have you asserted the restriction that "these same two Particulars whose relationship has been cognised by Sense-perception, etc. etc." (Text 1443)?—Then again, having once cognised a thing by means of Inference, if the same thing is cognised again by means of Inference,—why is not this latter regarded as valid? What is the peculiarity in the previous one (whereby it is regarded as valid, and not the later one)?—If it be urged that—"the later one is not regarded as valid because like Remembrance, it apprehends what has been already apprehended",—then why is not the previous Inference also regarded as the same?—If it be argued that—"in the former Inference there is this additional peculiarity that it sets aside the doubt that has set in during the interval,"—why is not the same in the latter also? Hence it is this latter itself that sets aside the doubt as to something being present or not present; and hence the Generalised Perception is really what is independent.—(1450–1455)

COMMENTARY.

'Ākṛti'—The Universal.

'Even if'—i.e. granting that such a thing as the Universal exists.

The other party regards the Individual and the Universal as identical; how then can the Universal continue to exist when the Individual is destroyed? If it did, then, having different fates, they would have to be regarded as distinct from one another.

'If it exists'—This also is only by way of being granted; as in reality, the Universal having been once for all rejected, how could it exist?—'If it exists'—i.e. even if it existed;—it would be in 'perpetual flux'; as the 'perpetual flux' has been proved to be all-embracing.

Further, when a thing has been once cognised by means of an Inference,—and later on, the same thing (Fire) is cognised by another Inference drawn from the same Inferential Indicative Probans, (Smoke),—why has not this latter Inference also been cited as one based upon Perceived Particulars,—when the qualification of having been 'cognised by Perception' is considered desirable?
It might be argued that—"It has not been so regarded as it apprehends what has been already apprehended ".

That cannot be right; as the same applies also to what is based on Perceived Particulars.

"In the case of that based upon Perceived Particulars, there is this additional peculiarity that it has set at rest the doubt that has appeared during the interval."

That cannot be right; as this same peculiarity is also present in what is based upon the Inferred Particulars.

Thus from all this it follows that when all things are in a 'perpetual flux', the only Inference possible is that based upon generalised Relationship, not any based upon Perceived Particulars.—(1450–1455)

TEXT (1456).

SOME SHORT-SIGHTED PEOPLE HAVE ASSERTED THAT "INFERENCE IS NOT A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION", THOUGH, BY THESE VERY WORDS, THEY OFFER UP THEIR OWN 'DESIRE TO SPEAK' (INTENTION, IDEA IN THE MIND, AS SOMETHING TO BE INFERRED FROM THOSE WORDS).—(1456)

COMMENTARY.

'Some people'—the followers of Brhaspati and others.

'Through these same words',—i.e. by the words 'Inference is not a means of Right Cognition'.

This shows that the assertion of these people involves self-contradiction. For instance, when a man makes a statement to another person, it is on the basis of the understanding that 'the idea present in one's mind is understood from the words he uses, which are indicative of that idea'; so that when the people denying Inference make the statement,—by this statement itself—they admit the fact of Inference being a Means of Right Cognition;—and yet this same he denies by the statement that 'Inference is not a Means of Right Cognition';—and this is self-contradiction.

This objection is going to be further explained later on.—(1456)

The Chārvākas urge the following arguments (against Inference, as a Means of Right Cognition):—
"Inference for one's own sake cannot be right,—because it is brought about by the three-featured Indicative, which is subversive of what is desirable,—like Wrong Cognition.—Nor can the presence of the 'Three Features' in the Indicative be regarded as the means of Inference; as they are present also where there is no Inference,—just like the 'Two features'.—Further, the contradiction of Inference is possible in every Reasoning; so also there is possibility in every case of the inferring of mutually contradictory conclusions; and there is possibility of finding a Reason which is concomitant (not-separable) with the contrary of the desired conclusion (deduced from an Inference)."—(1457–1459)

COMMENTARY.

Inference for one's own sake cannot be right,—because it is brought about by the three-featured Indicative,—like the Wrong Cognition. [Here is a Wrong Cognition based upon a three-featured Indicative]—'The eye and other organs are for the purpose of other persons, because they are composite things; like the Couch, the Seat and such things'; this is a wrong cognition, being subversive of a desirable idea, but brought about by a three-featured Indicative; and like this the Inference in question also is brought about by a three-featured Indicative, and hence it must be wrong.

Nor can the presence of the Three Features in the Indicative be the means of Inference; because, like the Two Features, they are present also where there is no Inference.

Further, in every reasoning, contradiction of Inference would be possible; for example, it would always be possible to put forward the Inference that 'The intended Probandum cannot reside in the Subject (Minor Term), because it is a part of the aggregate of all these several factors, like the form of the Minor Term itself'; and this would put an end to all Inferences.

Then again, in all cases, when an Inference has been put forward, there is always a possibility of several undesirable contingencies being put forward; for instance, when the Inference has been put forward that 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like the Jar',—some one might set up the argument to the contrary, that 'just as the reason asserted proves the non-eternity of Sound, so does it also prove the fact of its not being the quality of Akāśa', and so forth.

Lastly, in every case, it is possible to find a Reason that is concomitant with the contrary of the desired Conclusion; for instance, the inference having been put forward, that 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like the Jar', some one may put forward the following reasoning which is concomitant with (and proves) the contrary of this conclusion—'Sound is
eternal, because it is perceptible by the Ear, like the universal Sound'. Several such examples may be found in the *Tattvarāja*.—(1457–1459)

_Bhartṛhari_ argues (against Inference) as follows:—

**TEXTS (1460–1462).**

"**CONDITION, PLACE AND TIME BEING DIFFERENT IN REGARD TO DIFFERENT POTENCIES, THE COGNITION OF THINGS BY MEANS OF INFERENCE IS NOT ATTAINABLE.**—**EVEN IN THE CASE OF A THING WHOSE POTENCY IS WELL-KNOWN, THAT POTENCY BECOMES RESTRICTED IN REGARD TO PARTICULAR EFFECTIVE ACTIONS, BY BECOMING RELATED TO PARTICULAR THINGS.**—**EVEN WHEN A CERTAIN CONCLUSION HAS BEEN DEDUCED WITH GREAT CARE, FROM AN INFERENCE, IT MAY BE PROVED TO BE OTHERWISE BY OTHER MORE INTELLIGENT AND CLEVER PERSONS WELL-VERSED IN THE ART OF REASONING."—(*Vākyapadiya*, p. 16).—(1460–1462)

**COMMENTARY.**

The potency of things varies with their Condition, Time and Place; hence no definite conclusion can be got at regarding them by means of Inference; for instance, it is not possible to be convinced that 'Devadatta is unable to bear the burden, because he is Devadatta, like Devadatta in the state of childhood'; here there is a possibility of the man's potency having changed, hence the reasoning becomes 'indecisive'.—Similarly, difference in the _place_ makes a difference in the taste, strength and ripening of the Āmalaki, the Kharjūra and other fruits; hence it cannot be argued that—'all Āmalaki fruits are astringent, like the Āmalaki I am tasting now.'—Similarly difference of _time_ leads to variations in the coolness and other properties of the water of the well, and hence it cannot be right to argue that 'all water is cool', and so on.

'Avaśṭhādēśāhākālānam'—the Genitive ending _goes_ with 'bhūdāt'; and the Genitive in 'Bhāvānām' _goes_ with 'prasiddhi'.

Then again, the Fire's capacity to burn, _which is manifested in the case of grass_, is set aside as against the mass of clouds; and there can be no such reasoning as—'The mass of Clouds is burnt by Fire, because it is earthy (?), like the grass'.

Further, when one man has proved a certain fact, another man, more clever, proves quite the contrary of it; this cannot be desirable.—(1460–1462)

Another writer argues as follows:—
"Inference for the benefit of another cannot be a means of right cognition, because it is only a reiteration so far as the speaker himself is concerned; as the man putting forward the Inference does not himself derive his knowledge of the thing from that Inference. — For the other person, to whom the Inference is addressed, the cognition so derived comes to be for his own sake; because what difference is there between the cognition derived through the Ear and that obtained through the Eyes? — So far as the other person is concerned, the statement (of the Inference) cannot be regarded as Inference for the sake of another; because it falls within the chain of cognitions produced by the Ear, and because it is a means of cognition, — like the Sense-organ. — nor is there any direct indication of the object inferred; hence, like the idea of the relation of invariable concomitance, it cannot be a means of Right Cognition. — If it be explained that — "it is called for the sake of another, because it leads to the activity of the other person "', — that also cannot be right; because (in this way), the Inference for one's own benefit also might be regarded as 'for the sake of another' [as that also might lead to the activity of other persons]."

(1463–1467)

COMMENTARY.

Inference for the sake of others cannot be a means of right cognition, because it is only a reiteration, so far as the speaker himself is concerned.

As regards the other person to whom the Inference is addressed, — for him, the cognition so derived turns out to be for his own benefit; what difference is there between the cognition of a thing derived through the Ear and that derived through the Eyes? Just as, when one's Visual Organ is operative, the resultant cognition is not spoken of as being 'for the benefit of others', — so also it cannot be spoken of as such if the cognition is derived through the operation of the Auditory Organ. — The term 'darshana' stands for the Visual Organ, — the term being derived as 'drṣhyatā anēṇa', 'that whereby a thing is seen'. — 'Samvit' — stands for cognition.

Similarly, so far as the other person is concerned, to whom the Inference is addressed, the statement of the Inference cannot be said to be for the sake of others; — because it falls within the chain of cognitions produced by the Ear, — or because it is a means of cognition, — like the Sense-organ. — The compound ' Shrōtrṣantāṇādi' contains the statement of two reasons; and 'yatha indriyasya' cites the corroborative Instance.

There is another argument also: — So far as the other person is concerned, the statement of the Inference in question cannot be said to be 'for the sake of another', — because it does not directly indicate the object
inferred,—like the cognition of the relation of Invariable concomitance.—
*Tasmāt*—i.e. because it does not directly indicate the object inferred.
What is meant is that because it is not directly indicative of the inferred
object, therefore the statement cannot be regarded as a means of Right
Cognition,—it being like the Cognition of the relation of Invariable Concomi-
tance,—i.e. the *Invariable Concomitance* between the Probans and the
Probandum; and the cognition of an Indicative which is so related to the
Probandum (is not by itself the Means of Right Cognition).

If it be explained that *"it is said to be for the benefit of another,—because
it leads to the activity of the other person"*;—even so it cannot be right;
because in that sense the Inference for one's own benefit may also be for the
benefit of others; because *'another*' is a relative term; just like the term
*"other side".*—(1463–1467)

The above arguments are answered in the following—

**TEXT (1468).**

*WHEN THE INFECTION IS SPOKEN OF AS 'BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE THREE-
FEATURED INDICATIVE', WHAT IS MEANT TO BE INDICATED IS THAT
IT IS COMPATIBLE (WITH THE REAL STATE OF THINGS);
AND THIS SAME (COMPATIBILITY) IS WHAT CHARAC-
TERISES THE VALID COGNITION; WHY
THEN IS IT DENIED?*—(1468)

**COMMENTARY.**

First of all, the author points out the *'contradictory'* character of the
Probans in the first argument propounded in Text 1457—viz.: *'Because it is
brought about by the three-featured Indicative'*.—*'What is meant is that
it is compatible, etc. etc.'*;—that is, what is meant to be indicated is that
it is compatible; the sense being that, because the cognition that proceeds from
the Three-featured Indicative is indirectly appurtenant to the thing con-
cerned, it is not incompatible, just like Sense-perception, as has been asserted in
the following statement—*'Inasmuch as the Probans and the Probandum
are indirectly appurtenant to the Thing, and are entirely free from any
wrong notions regarding it, there can be nothing deceitful about it.'*

*'This same'*;—*i.e. compatibility; as has been thus declared—'The cognition
that is not incompatible is right (or valid)'*. In the case of Sense-per-
ception also,—even for one who admits its validity—there is nothing that
can be pointed out as determining its validity,—except this absence of inco-
patibility; and this same condition is present in the case of the cognition
proceeding from the *three-featured Indicative*; why then is the validity of the
cognition brought about by the Three-featured Indicative sought to be denied,
on the ground of its being brought about by the Three-featured Indicative?

What is indicated by this is the incongruity between the Probandum
and the Probans (as put forward by the Opponent (in 1457). For instance,
where there is the character of *being brought about by the three-featured Indica-
tive, there is absence of incompatibility;—and where there is absence of incompatibility, there is validity; and validity and invalidity are mutually exclusive,—the incompatibility consisting in the fact that where the one is present the other cannot be present and where the one is absent, the other is present; so that by implication the Probans put forward by the Opponent is 'Contradictory'.—(1468)

The following Texts proceed to show that the Corroborative Instance (cited by the Opponent in 1457, that of 'Wrong Cognition') is 'devoid of the Probandum':—

TEXTS (1469-1471).

When the 'Wrong Cognition', as 'subversive of what is desirable', is spoken of as being 'similar', the 'similarity' meant must be only that of the view of the First Party,—and not real similarity; because as regards the real state of things, the Cognition in question has been definitely found to be not incompatible; in fact, it is in view of this fact that it is a valid argument against what is 'desired' by the Disputant.—Thus the Reason adduced is found to be 'Contradictory';—and the Corroborative Instance also is found to be devoid of the Probandum.—In the same way, in the second argument, the Probans is 'Inadmissible'.—(1469-1471)

COMMENTARY.

As proving the contrary of what is desired by the disputer, the cognition in question must be valid; otherwise, if it were meant that all cognitions are invalid and at all times,—in regard to another Probandum,—then, such invalidity might affect Sense-perception also. In fact, it has been spoken of as 'wrong Cognition', only in reference to the view of the First Party.—The term 'pūrnapaksa' here stands for the 'paksa', view—of the 'pūrva', the First Party. One who holds the view that the Eye and the rest appertain only to an object which is essentially incapable of any additional features imposed upon it,—it is only in reference to the view of such a party that the Cognition could be spoken of as 'wrong'; because (under that view) the Eye, etc. have been proved to be the Cause of many fleeting cognitions. 'Contradictory'; because the character of 'being brought about by the Three-featured Indicative' is never present in any invalid Cognition;—and when the cognition so brought about is valid, then the said character is present in that same Cognition which is 'subversive of what is desired' (by the Disputant).

Says the Opponent:—'When an argument to the contrary is urged against the Materialist, then the Corroborative Instance cannot be one that is admitted (by both parties). The opponent does not admit the validity of the Cognition of what is subversive of what is desired; and what is not admitted by either of the two parties cannot serve as a Corroborative Instance.'
In fact, the law is that what is equally admitted by both parties—that alone can be cited against the argument of either party."

The answer to this is as follows:—Though the other party has not actually admitted the validity of the cognition, in so many words,—yet, the absence of incompatibility has to be accepted, as that cannot be denied; and those who accept that, have tacitly accepted the validity also, in so far as the real state of things is concerned; consequently, the ‘contradiction’ that we have urged is in regard to the real state of things, not in regard to the theory of the other party.

Or, the Opponent’s Reason may be regarded as ‘contradictory’ on the ground of being indicative of a contradictory Reason. For instance, the ‘contradictory’ Reason would be in the form—‘What is not incompatible is valid,—e.g. Sense-perception,—the cognition brought about by the three-featured Indicative is compatible; [hence it must be valid]’;—this would be Reason based on the nature of the thing itself. The Reason here put forward cannot be ‘Inadmissible’, for, if it were not admitted, then the Subject would become featureless and there could be no Reason at all (indicative of validity). Nor can it be ‘Inconclusive’ (Doubtful),—as that would make Sense-perception also invalid.

‘Asādhyatā’;—i.e. the Instance would be devoid of the Probandum.

‘In the second argument’;—i.e. in the argument ‘nor can the presence of three features, etc. etc.’ (urged under Text 1458).

‘The Probans is inadmissible’;—because it is not present anywhere where the (valid) Inference is absent.

‘In the same way’;—i.e. by the reasoning based upon the presence of Three-features, etc. etc.—(1469–1471)

The following Text provides the answer to the argument urged (under 1459):

TEXTS (1472–1474).

Exponents of the True Reasoning have all declared that that Reason alone is capable of proving the conclusion whose relationship (with the Probandum) is known with certainty,—such relationship being either in the nature of sameness of essence or of being an effect;—and against such a Probans, there can be no such defect as that of ‘being contrary to Inference’ and so forth. Because no such Inference could be possible except through essential sameness or being the cause. Mutually contradictory properties cannot belong to the same thing. Consequently there can be no possibility of any Probans which might be concomitant with the contrary of the desired conclusion.—(1472–1474)

COMMENTARY.

‘Against such a Probans’;—i.e. in a Probans that is related through essential sameness and through being an effect.
'Except through essential sameness, or being the cause';—i.e. except through being the same, or being the Cause,—there can be no Probans (Inferential Indicative); if there were, it would be featureless and not a Probans at all.

It has been argued that—"What is meant to be the Probandum is not present in the Subject (Minor Term)".

The answer to that is that, if the Probandum is not present in the Minor Term, then the aggregate (of the 'Three features') as a whole is not present in the Probans; hence on account of the absence of a part of the aggregate, such a Probans would be clearly 'inadmissible'.

It has been argued that—"in the case of all Inferences, there is possibility of particular Inferences to the contrary".

This is not right. Because that alone is called 'Contradictory' which is found to prove the contrary of the desired Probandum; and no particular case is meant to be the Probandum (in the argument under dispute, which is in reference to the definition of Inference). As a matter of fact, in the case of an Inference based on the nature of things, there is no possibility of there being any (valid) Probans proving the contrary; because in the same thing, two mutually contradictory properties cannot coexist.—(1472–1474)

It has been argued (under 1470) that—"on account of the diversity of Condition, Place and Time, etc. etc."

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXTS (1475–1477).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, INFERENCE PROCEEDS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THINGS WHOSE 'INDICATIVE CHARACTER' HAS BEEN PROPERLY ASCERTAINED BY REPEATED EXPERIENCE; ALL ELSE IS REGARDED AS 'NOT IN- FERENCE'. SO THAT EVEN THOUGH THE POTENCIES OF THINGS VARY ACCORDING TO THE VARIATIONS OF CONDITION, TIME AND PLACE, YET THE COGNITION OF THINGS BY MEANS OF INFERENCE IS NOT UNATTAINABLE.—AND WHEN A CERTAIN CONCLUSION HAS BEEN DEDUCED, WITH GREAT CARE FROM AN INFERENCE,—IT CANNOT BE PROVED TO BE OTHERWISE, EVEN BY CLEVERER PERSONS.—(1475–1477)

COMMENTARY.

It is only the well-ascertained Probans that is held to be truly indicative,—not one that is doubtful; e.g. when the presence of Smoke is only suspected, in regard to Vapour, it does not lead to a certain Cognition of the presence of Fire.

Question :—"How does the certainty of the Probans come about?"

Answer—By repeated experience:—as is found in persons well-versed in the science of gems,—in regard to gems. That is to say, persons who are conversant with the nature of the things concerned, do discern the real Smoke from Vapour: and when they proceed to act after discernment, they
do actually find Fire.—Thus then, inasmuch as the well-discerned Probans is never found to fail,—the cognition of things is not unattainable through such Probans,—even though the things vary with variations of Condition, Place and Time.—And when a thing has been well-ascertained by means of well-discerned Probans,—it can never be made otherwise; e.g. when the presence of Fire has been well-ascertained by means of the presence of Smoke, the Fire cannot be proved to be otherwise (i.e. absent); as one and the same thing cannot have two contradictory characters.

It has been argued (in commentary on 1460, etc.) that—"Devadatta is not capable of bearing a burden in his childhood, etc. etc.,—and the Fire burning the Abhrapañjula, etc. etc.".

But in all these cases, there is no proper Probans at all; as the 'three features' are not present. The mere fact of not being perceived cannot lead to the idea of the Probans being excluded from that where the Probandum is known to be absent; as has been thus declared—'Exclusion from that where the Probandum is known to be absent cannot follow from mere non-perception.' In fact, the reality of Invariable Concomitance follows only from the presence of the relationship either of essential sameness or of being the effect; as has been thus declared—'Either from the relationship of Cause and Effect, or on the restrictive nature of the thing concerned, there is definite Invariable Concomitance,—and this follows from Perception, not from Non-perception'; and in the case of the arguments cited, neither of the two relationships—of essential sameness, or of being the effect—is present.—(1475–1477)

The following might be urged—"How is it known that the well-ascertained Probans never fails? There is no reason why this should be so."

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (1478).

(a) There can be no nature (or character) without a nature (or character); (b) nor can there be effect without a cause. Because (otherwise) there would be the incongruities of (a) 'deviation from nature', and (b) 'causelessness'. And without these two (relationships) there can be no inference.—(1478)

COMMENTARY.

There are only two kinds of Probans—(1) Nature of the thing and (2) being an Effect; 'non-apprehension' being included under 'Nature'. And these two kinds of Probans are not possible except where there is a Probandum, called 'Nature' and 'Cause',—by reason of which there could be 'fallibility' (falsity) in the Probans.

"Why is it not possible?"
Because otherwise, etc. etc.'—There is copulative compounding between 'bhēda' and 'animittatā'; the sense is that the Probans which forms the Nature of the thing would cease to be its 'nature'; and the Probans which is an effect would come to be without cause; and yet no Probans is admitted which forms neither the 'nature' nor the 'effect' (of the Probandum)—except when there is no connection and when there is no Invariable Concomitance.

Without these two',—i.e. as 'nature' and as 'effect'. The word has the Dual Ending.—(1478)

It has been argued (under Text 1463) that—"the Inference for another's benefit cannot be valid, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXTS (1479–1481).**

The statement of the three-featured Probans has been described as 'Inference for the benefit of another', on the ground of its being indicative of what is possible,—with reference to the other person addressed. But this 'inferential character' can only be 'secondary' (figurative) and conventional. Hence the fact of its being 'indictative of what is possible' cannot lead to any incongruity.—If Inference is not a Means of Right Cognition, then your assertion is useless. Indeed no disputant ever comprehends what you wish to speak of.—(1479–1481)

**COMMENTARY.**

The statement (of the Inference) has been spoken of as 'for another's benefit', in reference to the other person; hence it cannot be open to the objection urged against its being in reference to the speaker himself.

Even in reference to the listener, the other person, as there is the setting forth of the three-featured Probans,—and on that account, it leads to the Inference,—or on account of Convention,—it has been spoken of as 'Inference'; this name 'Inference' being applicable only to what is indicative of what is possible. Consequently, there can be no such incongruity as that of the Sense-organ, or the cognition of the relation of Invariable Concomitance, being regarded as 'Inference for another's benefit'; as in those cases, there is no 'indication of what is possible'. It is for this same reason that this Inference differs from the cognition based upon actual Perception. For instance, the cognition of the Indicative, Smoke, is directly brought about by Visual Perception, not by Auditory Perception; as what is directly apprehended by the latter is the Word (uttered by the Man) only; and the Word is not the indicative of the external thing (Fire), in the way that Smoke is; because the Word is related to the speaker's wish to speak (which is subjective), and hence it can have no relation (of invariable concomitance) with
anything external (objective); all that the word does is to indicate the presence of Smoke; and it is through Convention that it brings about the conceptual Cognition (associated with words), and hence, in reference to the external thing, it comes to be described as being 'for the benefit of others'. And when what is meant to be understood is only the Speaker's wish to speak, then it turns out to be 'for the Speaker's own benefit'. Because it is held to be indicative of the Speaker's wish to speak of what contains the Smoke, which is the effect of the statement in question; it is 'indicative', not expressive, of it; because no other cognition is comprehended from it.

'Your assertion is useless';—i.e. the assertion that "Inference is not the means of right cognition". —Because as a matter of fact, from the said statement, no person to whom it is addressed, comprehends what you wish to speak of.—This shows that your assertion involves 'self-contradiction'. —This has been explained previously.—(1479–1481)

Purandara has argued as follows:—"What is known as Inference, in the ordinary world, is admitted by the Chārvākās also; what they deny is that form of Inference which people have set up, beyond that known in common experience".

This is anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXTS (1482-1483).

IF IT BE URGED THAT—"WHAT IS ORDINARILY KNOWN AS THE INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE IS ACCEPTED BY US, BUT NOT WHAT HAS BEEN SET UP BY OTHERS";—THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) EVEN THE ORDINARY MAN UNDERSTANDS WHAT IS THE 'CAUSE', ETC. OF THE EFFECT, ETC.; AND IN REALITY, THIS IS ALL THAT THE MASTERS OF THE SCIENCE OF REASONING ALSO HAVE DECLARED. SO THAT WHEN THE ORDINARY (POPULAR) IDEA IS ACCEPTED, WHAT IS IT THAT BECOMES EXCLUDED?—(1482-1483)

COMMENTARY.

The construction is—'the ordinary man understands, etc. etc.'.

'Effect, etc.'—'Etc.' is meant to include the 'nature' of the thing. —Similarly in 'Cause, etc.', the 'nature' is meant to be included. In both cases the Plural number has been used in view of individual things.

Thus then, the Inferential Indicative which is understood by ordinary men to be related through the relationship of 'Nature' and 'Effect',—is just what has been spoken of by us as the 'Probans';—and when you accept this, what is it that you discard, for which you are denying the character of 'Inference'?—(1482-1483)
It might be argued that—"No Inference is admitted by us at all;—but the other party have accepted it as a Means of Right Cognition; and in view of this latter, our assertion is not useless".

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (1484).**

IF THIS (INERENCE) IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE, THEN WHAT DOES THE OTHER PARTY UNDERSTAND BY IT?—OF WHAT SORT TOO WOULD THAT COGNITION BE WHICH HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY WHAT IS NOT A MEANS OF COGNITION?

—(1484)

**COMMENTARY.**

How have you come to the conclusion that your opponent has accepted Inference as a Means of Knowledge? The idea of another man cannot be known by Sense-perception; and for you there is no other Means of Right Knowledge whereby you could derive a definite Cognition?

Even if there be such a definite Cognition; even so, if what the other party accepts is not a means of Cognition, then how does his opponent know what it means? The accepting of a Means of Knowledge cannot be a mere whim.

It might be argued that—"Just as a man wrests the sword from the hands of his enemy and by that same sword fells the enemy,—in the same way the Atheist takes up what the other regards as a Means of Right Cognition and then by that same attacks his opponent".

The answer to this is—'Of what sort, etc. etc.';—what is meant is as follows:—If, through delusion, the other party has accepted as Means of Right Knowledge, what is really not a Means of Knowledge, then, how can it be possible for one to bring about the right Cognition in the mind of that party, by means of what is not a Means of Right Cognition, as right Cognition is the only resultant of the Means of Knowledge? Certainly; if a man has taken up, as sword, what is not-sword,—another man cannot take up that and strike the other with it. The example cited therefore is not analogous.—

(1484)

_Aviddhakarna_ has argued thus in the _Tattvaśīkā_:—"It may be asked—'By means of this Means of Knowledge (Inference), what is the idea that is conveyed to the other person? It is only what is admitted by both parties (the Speaker and the person addressed) that can convey any idea'.—But this is not right. Because Inference is in the form of a verbal statement; and it is not a Means of Right Cognition for the person making the statement; and yet that person conveys the idea (expressed) to the other person; as his sole effort is towards the conveying of the idea to that other person; hence the Means need not be admitted by both parties".

This is the view put forward in the following—
TEXT (1485).

"Inference, consisting of a verbal statement, is not a Means of Knowledge for the Speaker; he only conveys the idea to the other party by means of the statement."

—(1485)

COMMENTARY.

'He'—i.e. the Speaker.
'Tena'—by means of the Inference consisting of the verbal statement.
The above view is controverted in the following—

TEXT (1486).

A certain Means of Knowledge is held to be not a Means of Knowledge only when it does not bring about the cognition of what is not already known; as for instance, the Inference that you have put forward, which conveys no idea to the Speaker.—(1486)

COMMENTARY.

When a statement is said to be 'not a Means of Knowledge', it is not because, it conveys the idea to the Speaker,—but because it does not convey any information that is not already known. As regards conveying the idea to the Speaker, it is of course there. In the case of your Inference (argument) on the other hand, it conveys no idea to the Speaker. Hence the two cases are not analogous.—Otherwise, what is urged would be something admitted by both parties.

From all this it follows that that Means of Knowledge which is not devoid of reason must be accepted by all parties as a Means of Right Cognition,—just like Sense-perception.—(1486)

End of Chapter (18) on Inference.

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