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TATTVASAÑGRAHA
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
Vol. II
THE TATTVASANGRAHA
OF ŚĀNTARAKṢITA
with the Commentary of
Kamalaśīla

Translated into English by
GANGANATHA JHA

IN TWO VOLUMES
Vol. II

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INTRODUCTION

Much need not be said here in regard to the personal history of the two authors—regarding their (a) date, (b) residence, (c) contact and relation with other writers; as all this has been dealt with in great detail in the excellent Foreword attached to Vol. I of the Sanskrit Text. From this we learn that our Authors—who were Master and Pupil; (a) lived between 705 and 764 A.D., (b) they were residents of Magadha in North India, from where they went over to Thibet.

There are some points in connection with the third point (c). Among the other writers referred to in the work, we have the name ‘Sahantabhadra’ occurring twice in the Text (pages 506 and 508); while the name given in the Foreword is ‘Sahgabhadra’, and the pages referred to therein are also the same—506 and 508. Which of the two is the correct form of the name? ‘Sahgabhadra’ would appear to be so,—because we know what ‘Sangha’ is; while we do not know what ‘Sahanta’ is. In the body of the Translation, however, we have retained the form ‘Sahantabhadra’, because it was felt that the same misprint, if it is a misprint, could not appear twice, and in such close proximity too. It is interesting to note that ‘Samantabhadra’ is one of the names of the Buddha Himself mentioned in the Amarakośa.

Another interesting point regarding this third point (c) is that while the authors deal with, name and make large quotations from, the works of Shabara and Kumārila, they do not seem even to know Prabhākara; and yet Prabhākara flourished about the same time as Kumārila, if not earlier; and his views are really deserving of notice. The reason for this perhaps lay in the fact that Prabhākara does not materially deviate from Shabara, while Kumārila does deviate from him, and in his attempt to revive the ‘Āstika-patha’, he renders himself open to direct attack from the other quarter.

The list of authors provided in the Foreword does not contain the name of ‘Vātsiputra’, and yet the Author devotes Texts 336–349 to the demolishing of the Pudgala-philosophy of this writer, who is described as ढोंगलवायु. Apparently he represents a distinct sect among Buddhists known as ‘Vātsiputriya’. ‘Pudgala’ appears to figure very largely in the presentation of this philosophy.

The Foreword to the Text also provides us with an account of the ‘philosophy’ of our Authors (vide pp. XXXVIII–LIII); wherein we have a connected account of most of the important topics.

For all this the reader is referred to the said volume.
INTRODUCTION.

Here we are going to put together what details we have gleaned from the Text, in course of the translating.

Though the above-mentioned Foreword has supplied us with an exhaustive list of Authors referred to and named in the *Tattva-sangraha* and its commentary, one fails to find there the name of Tāyin who is named, and quoted from, in the Commentary on p. 12 of the Text,—and again in Shāntarakṣita’s text itself in Verse 1788. One wonders if Tāyin is a title of one of the writers already mentioned in the Foreword. From Text 3320, it would seem as if Tāyin were only another name for Buddha Himself; as Tāyin is here spoken of as Sarvavit, ‘omniscient’, which epithet can apply to the Buddha only;—this same identification is indicated also in Texts 3368, 3498, 3501 (which again speaks of Tāyin as ‘omniscient’) where the commentary definitely says—Tāyino buddhasya, of Tāyin the Buddha.

Under Text 1565, we have a simple explanation of the generally accepted principle that a ज्ञानित्याविद्याम् ज्ञान, the Cognition apprehending what has been already apprehended by another Cognition, is not Pramāṇa,—not a valid Cognition. The reason provided is that such Cognition cannot be the साधकतम—a most efficient instrument of the Apprehension, which has already been brought about by another Instrument, in the shape of the previous Cognition; hence the later Cognition cannot be regarded as प्रामाण्य, प्रमाण, which name can be applied only to what is the कर्म—the साधकतम—of the Pramāṇa, Apprehension.

I have often felt,—as Vijñānahākṣu also felt—that there was deep kinship between ‘Vedānta’ and ‘Buddhist Idealism’,—the only difference of importance being that while the Buddhist Idealist regarded Jñāna, like everything else, to be momentary, though real—more real, at any rate, than the External World,—the Vedānta regarded Jñāna,—at least, the Highest Jñāna, ‘Consciousness’, which is the same as ‘Soul’, the highest Self, to be the only Reality—and permanent. We have been inclined to regard this as an achievement of the Great Shankarāchārya, who succeeded thus in reconciling Hinduism and Buddhism and thus helping the fusion of the two.—It seems however that this feature of the ‘Vedānta’, this stressing of the eternity of Jñāna, at any rate, was older than Shaṅkarāchārya,—if we admit the date usually assigned to this great writer. For Shāntarakṣita in Text No. 328 et seq., in dealing with the philosophers whom he calls चतुर्विद्याक्षरवस्मिन् ज्ञानित्याविद्याम्, declares (in Texts 330-331) that the defect in the philosophy of these is slight, consisting only in their regarding all Jñāna as ‘one and eternal’. वेशानित्याविद्याम् तु दश्यम ज्ञानित्याविद्यात: | So, if Shaṅkarāchārya came after the seventh century, he can be credited only with having emphasised this idea and thereby led to the fusion of the two Philosophies or Religions,
This belief is further strengthened by a reference to the *Brahmasiddhi* of Manḍana Mishra,—which is believed to be anterior to Śaṅkarāchārya.

Under Text 348 we note another parallelism between the Buddhist and Vedānta ways of dealing with the ‘Soul’. We know that, in the last resort, the Vedāntin has recourse to the idea of *भनित्वबनीयता*, the ‘Soul’ being one of the *भनित्वबनीय*, Inexplicable, things. We find the same idea expressed by *Śāntaraksita* and his commentator under Text 348. The question having been put—"If no such thing as the *Pudgala* exists, then how was it that when asked if the *Jīva* was different from, or the same as, the *Body*, the Blessed Lord only vouchsafed the answer that ‘this matter has not been explained’; why did not He say straight away that ‘there was no such thing as the *Jīva*, Soul, apart from the *Body’?"—The only answer given by *Śāntaraksita* is that the intention of the Compassionate One was the denial of *Nāṣikya* (i.e. the view that denies the other world and other Regions); and to this end he adopted various methods’.—So that according to this also the Soul is something that has ‘not been explained’, is ‘inexplicable’, *भनित्वबनीय*.

On p. 16, line 7, we find mentioned a *Kārya* of the name of *Śitāharana*; the poet’s name is not given.

Under Texts 2671–2673 we have a comparison drawn between the Mīmāṃsāka’s and the Buddhist’s idea of *Pralaya*, Dissolution. According to the former, Dissolution consists in the destruction of particular countries and of particular families or peoples; and there is no such thing as *Universal* Dissolution; there is no evidence for any such Dissolution: while according to the Buddhist, there is an ‘undeniable Destruction affecting even Brahmā and others, which affects the Veda also; so that *Dissolution* consists in ‘the withdrawal of the energy of Fire, Water and Air, extending horizontally over the *Trisāhasra-Mahāsāhasra* (?) , downwards to the lowest limits of the atmospheric air, and upwards to the highest stages of *Dhyāna*; which affects Brahmā and other beings also’.

Text 2447 speaks of the *Pārasīkas* as perceiving nothing wrong in the marriage of their mother. Does this mean ‘Widow-marriage’?—or something worse?—Text 2807 speaks of these *Pārasīkas* as blindly adhering to their custom.

In Text 2520 the view is expressed that ‘attraction by the Magnet is due to the contact of the invisible rays of light emanating from the Magnet and penetrating the piece of Iron’. Does this indicate the knowledge of the fact that all phenomena relating to Light, Electricity and Magnetism are due to the action of the same ‘Force’ or ‘Fluid’?

The commentary on Texts 2653–2655, distinguishes between the verbal usage of the ‘Ārya’ from that of the ‘Dravīḍa’.
The two important technical terms of Buddhist philosophy 'Pratisaṅkhya-nirodha' and 'Apratisaṅkhya-nirodha' have been variously understood. The commonly-accepted view is that these terms stand for 'Conscious' and 'Unconscious Destruction'. Texts 2748-2749 bring out the other explanation. They say—"The two Nirodhas are not regarded as being of the nature of Destruction; because 'Pratisaṅkhya-nirodha is regarded as 'Dissociation, one after the other, from Impurities—brought about by Wisdom'; while Apratisaṅkhya-nirodha is that which serves as an absolute bar to the appearance of Impurities"; and this latter, adds the commentary, is due not to Wisdom, but to the inefficiency of the causes productive of the Impurities.

Text 2945 speaks of Mīmāṃsakas as 'Prāchya' (or Prochyā); does this stand for 'Easterner'? And does that indicate that Mīmāṃsā had its origin in the country to the East of Nālandā, where Śāntarakṣita is believed to have taught? This would fit in with common belief that a thousand years ago, the small land of Mithilā was able to bring together nine-hundred Mīmāṃsakas at any ordinary gathering of Pandits.

The commentary on Text 3018 tells us of the juice of the Drona flower as curing jaundice, when dropped into the eyes.

Text 3486 has accepted the definition of Dharma as यन्त्रजयिण्-वेयस-चिहितः.

Texts 3511-3512 tell us of a Shākhā (Rescensional Text) of the Veda,—known as 'Nimitta' which speaks of 'Bhagavān-Munisattamah',—the 'Blessed Lord, the Best of Sages'—explained by the commentary as Shākya Muni,—as being 'sarvajña', 'omniscient'.

When I was asked to undertake the translation of the Tattvasaṅgraha and its commentary, I agreed to do it, with some trepidation; because I have had no direct knowledge of the tenets of Buddhist philosophy, and I am fully conscious of the need of गुरुमुद्रितया, 'direct teaching from the Teacher's mouth', in all important matters.—A careful study of the Sanskrit Introduction attached to the Text, however, gave me valuable information and as I proceeded with the work, the way became gradually smoothened, and I was enabled to complete the work.

The work is rather disappointing; it is purely and almost entirely polemical; its avowed aim being the demolition of all views contrary to the tenets of orthodox Buddhism,—the doctrinaire part of which is neatly—though not at all clearly—set forth in the six opening verses of the Text.

I cannot conclude this without thanking Dr. Benoytosh Bhattachāryya, the talented Director of the Oriental Institute, for help rendered of
various kinds,—and also the Baptist Mission Press who have carried through the printing with their usual efficiency.

'MITHILA',
ALLAHABAD,
July 16, 1938.

GANGANATHA JHA.


**TATTVASAŅGRAHA.**

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CHAPTER XIX.

Other Forms and Means of Knowledge.

(A)

Verbal Cognition.

COMMENTARY.

The Author now proceeds to show that there are only two Means or Forms of Knowledge, by refuting the various theories regarding their number.—

The Opponent (of the Buddhist) urges the following objection:—

TEXT (1487).

"INASMUCH AS THERE ARE OTHER MEANS OR FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE, IN THE SHAPE OF VERBAL COGNITION AND OTHERS,—WHY HAS THE DEFINITION OF ONLY TWO SUCH MEANS BEEN PROVIDED?"

COMMENTARY.

What the Opponent means to do by this is (1) to point out that the definition provided is 'too narrow', and (2) to indicate that what has been asserted (under Text 3) regarding Truth 'being ascertained by the two Means or Forms of Knowledge' is futile.

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (1488).

THE REPLY TO THIS IS AS FOLLOWS:—IN FACT, THERE CANNOT BE ANY FORM OF COGNITION EXCEPT THE TWO (ALREADY DESCRIBED); BECAUSE ALL THE OTHERS THAT HAVE BEEN POSTULATED EITHER DO NOT POSSESS THE CHARACTER OF THE 'FORM OF RIGHT COGNITION', OR ARE INCLUDED IN THESE TWO.—(1488)

COMMENTARY.

'Included in these',—i.e. in the two Forms of Cognition already described.
What is meant is as follows:—The characteristic of Valid Knowledge is that it should be in conformity with the real state of things; and this is not present at all in any of the others that have been postulated; every case where this characteristic is present, is included in the said two, and hence the others have not been described separately.—(1488)

The Author now proceeds to show how the other so-called ‘Means or Forms of Knowledge’ are not real Means or Forms of Knowledge—or how, if they are real Means or Forms of Cognition, they are included under the two postulated by the Buddhist.

The additional Means or Forms of Knowledge posited by others are the following:—(1) Verbal Cognition, (2) Analogical Cognition, (3) Presumption, (4) Negation, (5) Ratiocinative Cognition, (6) Non-apprehension, (7) Probability, (8) Tradition and (9) Intuition.

As regards Verbal Cognition, the Author says as follows:—

TEXTS (1489–1491).

OTHER PEOPLE HAVE DECLARED ‘VERBAL COGNITION’ TO BE ‘THAT KNOWLEDGE OF IMPERCEPTIBLE THINGS WHICH IS DERIVED FROM WORDS’;—AND [THEY PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF IT], —‘THAT COGNITION IS DERIVED FROM (a) THE ETERNAL SENTENCE AND FROM (b) THE SENTENCE UTTERED BY A TRUSTWORTHY PERSON.—THIS CANNOT BE ‘SENSE-PERCEPTION’, BECAUSE THE OBJECT APPREHENDED BY IT IS BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES;—NOR CAN IT BE ‘INERENCE’, BECAUSE IT IS DEVOID OF THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF INERENCE;—UNTIL THE SUBJECT (MINOR TERM) IS DEFINITELY KNOWN TO BE POSSESSING OF THE PROBANDUM AND ALSO OF THE PROBANS, IT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A CASE OF ‘INERENCE’ OF THAT SUBJECT.—(1489–1491)

COMMENTARY.

Shaabar-svāmin (in his Mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya on 1. 1. 5) has provided the following definition of Verbal Cognition:—‘That cognition of things not within reach of the senses which proceeds from the cognition of words is called Verbal’; which means that the Specific Individuality of the word having been apprehended, the cognition that follows after that, in regard to things beyond the reach of the Senses, is called Verbal Cognition, because it is derived from words.

“This Verbal Cognition is of two kinds—(1) Proceeding from words not emanating from human beings, and (2) Proceeding from the words of trustworthy persons.—This cognition is different from Sense-perception, because the object apprehended by it is beyond the reach of the senses.—Nor is it Inference; as it is devoid of the ‘three features’. For instance, the object of Inferential Cognition is the Subject (Minor Term) which is qualified by the character that is sought to be proved (i.e. the Probandum),—not merely
the Subject by itself, nor the character by itself; and until the Probans is
deﬁnitely known as having the same character and as appertaining to the
same Subject,—the Inference cannot proceed. That is to say, until the
presence of the Probans in the Subject is deﬁnitely cognised with certainty,
there can be no Inference."—(1489–1491)

Question—Why cannot this condition of the deﬁnite cognition of the
Probans in the Subject be fulﬁlled in the case in question?
Answer:—

TEXT (1492).
"IN THE CASE IN QUESTION (I.E. IN VERBAL COGNITION) THAT WHICH
WOULD BE REGARDED AS THE SUBJECT FORMS THE OBJECT COGNISED
ITSELF; AND UNLESS THIS IS COGNISED, THERE CAN BE
NO IDEA OF ANY CHARACTER (PROBANS) BE-
LONGING TO IT."—(1492)

COMMENTARY.
"In the case of Verbal Cognition, anything, in the shape of the Tree and
such things,—that may be assumed to be the Subject,—forms the object cognised
itself; as that is what is expressed by the word. That is to say, in this
case, the Subject itself—and not the Subject as qualiﬁed by the Probandum,—
is the object cognised; and so long as the said Subject has not been deﬁnitely
cognised, how can there be any deﬁnite cognition of any character as belong-
ing to it?"—(1492)

TEXT (1493).
"AND IF THE SUBJECT HAS ALREADY BEEN COGNISED, PRIOR TO THE
RECOGNITION OF THE PROBANS IN THE SUBJECT (I.E. THE MINOR
PREMISS)—THEN WHAT IS THE USE OF KNOWING THAT
THE PROBANS SUBISTS IN IT AND SO FORTH, BY
VIRTUE OF WHICH THE COGNITION COULD BE
REGARDED AS INference?"—(1493)

COMMENTARY.
"Then again, if the Subject has been cognised before the recognition of
the Minor Premiss, then all attempt to obtain the recognition of this latter
would be futile; because the purpose of the whole attempt is to secure the
cognition of the Subject; hence, if that has been cognised, what would be the
use in trying to know of the presence of the Probans in the Subject?"
What has been stated is on the basis of taking it for granted that what the opponent has asserted is true. As a matter of fact, the Word is not a property of any such Subject as the Tree; as it is always found in the place where the Speaker is.—(1493)

It has been shown that (in the case of Verbal Cognition), there can be no subsistence in the Subject (i.e. the Minor Premiss); the following Text shows that there is no possibility of concomitance (between the Probans and the Probandum, as expressed in the Major Premiss):—

TEXT (1494).

“Nor can the concomitance of the Word with the object inferred (probandum) be ascertained; the concomitance of all things is recognised only by their functioning.”—(1494)

COMMENTARY.

‘Ascertained’—recognised with certainty.
‘By their functioning’,—i.e. by existence, by being present.
What is meant is that it is only what exists that can be concomitant, not what does not exist.—(1494)

The same idea is further elucidated:—

TEXT (1495).

“It is only when the fire exists whenever there is smoke that its concomitance is clearly perceived. In the case in question however, there is no such certain idea as that ‘the thing spoken of exists wherever the Word exists’.”—(1495)

COMMENTARY.

“It is because of the well-recognised fact that ‘wherever there is smoke there must be Fire’ that Fire is said to be concomitant with smoke; there is however no such concomitance between the Word and the Thing (spoken of).”—(1495)

Question:—Why is there no such concomitance?
Answer:—
"It does not exist at the place (where the Word is); nor at the time.—If it be urged that the required concomitance would be there in view of the eternity and the all-pervasive character (of the Word)"—then [the answer is that] that would be so with all words; and for that same reason the concomitance being perceived in all cases, there would be no idea of the negative concomitance at all; and it would thus be possible for all words to provide the cognition of all things."—(1496-1497)

COMMENTARY.

"The Thing (spoken of) does not exist at the place that is occupied by the Word; for instance, the word 'Dates' is heard in one place—the city of Pātaliputra for instance,—and yet the thing,—the dates themselves—do not exist there. Nor again is the Thing necessarily present at the time that the word is present; for instance, the word 'Dūipa' is present (uttered) now, while the person of that name lived long ago; and while the word 'Mahā-sammata' is present now, what it denotes is to come in future.—Under the circumstances, how can there be concomitance between words and the things denoted by them?

"The following might be urged—Words are eternal and as such exist at all times; so that things denoted by them cannot exist at a time other than that of the Word; nor can they exist at a place other than that occupied by the words, as being all-pervading in character, words are present at all places. Thus, by reason of their eternity and all-pervasive character, there would be concomitance between the Words and the Things denoted by them.'

"If that be so, then, such eternity and all-pervasiveness belong to all words equally; and hence it should not be the case that particular words should denote particular things only; in fact, any single word should denote all things, as all things would be present at the place and at the time at which the Word is present.

'The negative concomitance'—i.e. the absence of the Probans wherever there is absence of the Probandum.

'There would be no idea'—no apprehension; for the same reason that words are eternal and all-pervading.—(1496-1497)

Recapitulating the arguments, the Opponent formulates his case as follows:
TEXT (1498).

"Thus the Verbal Cognition is not Inference—because it is devoid of the three Features;—like Sense-perception;—as is shown by the absence of an object like that."

—(1498)

COMMENTARY.

"The Proposition of his Reasoning is—'The Verbal Cognition is not Inference';—'because it is devoid of the three features' is the statement of the Probanis (Minor Premiss);—'like Sense-perception' is the Corroborative Instance.—And 'as is shown by the absence of an object like that' is said in support of the Minor Premiss; what is meant by this is that the object of the Inference brought about by the Inferential Indicative like Smoke is the Subject as endowed with the particular property (Probandum),—and any such object is absent in the case of Verbal Cognition."—(1498)

Says the Opponent—'Not having the Three-features, Verbal Cognition may not be Inference; but how can it be regarded as Valid or Right Cognition'?

The answer is as follows:—

TEXT (1499).

"Inasmuch as the words speaking of the Agnihotra and other things bring about unshakeable cognitions,—the character of being Right Cognition cannot be denied to them."—(1499)

COMMENTARY.

The cognition is 'unshakeable' by reason of its being free from doubt and error; that is, it is Right Cognition because there is no Right Cognition sublating it; just in the same way as Sense-perception is Right Cognition.

Says Shabara-svāmin (in his Bhāṣya on Sū. 1. 1. 5)—"The cognition derived from the statement 'Desiring Heaven one should offer the Agnihotra' is not a doubtful one,—it leaves us in no doubt as to whether Heaven is to be attained or not;—and when this is cognised with certainty, it cannot be wrong; it is only when the cognition, after having come about, becomes sublated by the subsequent idea that 'it is not so', that it can be called wrong cognition;—the cognition in question however is never, at any time or at any place, found to be otherwise;—hence it must be true. As regards the assertion of the common people,—if it comes from a trusted person, or if it pertains to what is actually perceived by the Senses, then it is certainly true; if, on the other hand, it emanates from an untrustworthy person, or it relates to something beyond the reach of the Senses,—then having its source
in a human being, it cannot be regarded as right; because such a thing cannot be rightly known by human beings by themselves."—(1499)

In the following Text, the author proceeds to show that the definition of Verbal Cognition propounded in Text 1489, as "that Cognition which is derived from the eternal sentence", is open to the charge of being "impossible":

**TEXT (1500).**

**AS REGARDS THE 'ETERNAL SENTENCE', ITS POSSIBILITY AND EXPRESSIVENESS (USEFULNESS) ARE BOTH IMPROBABLE; HENCE THE FIRST DEFINITION OF 'VERBAL COGNITION' IS AN 'IMPOSSIBLE' ONE.—(1500)**

**COMMENTARY.**

There is no possibility of there being an 'eternal sentence', because it has been established that all things are in perpetual flux; also because of the reasons that are going to be adduced.

Even if such 'eternal Sentence' were possible, it could not convey a meaning (and serve any useful purpose).

Hence the statement that—"Through the eternal Sentence imperceptible things become known"—is impossible; hence the proposed definition is an 'impossible' one.—(1500)

*Question:—"Why can there be no eternal Sentence?"
*Answer:—

**TEXT (1501).**

**THE SENTENCE MAY BE 'CAPABLE' OR 'INCAPABLE'; IN EITHER CASE, AS THE CHARACTER WOULD BE ALWAYS THERE, THE COGNITION RESULTING THEREFROM WOULD COME ABOUT (ALWAYS); OR IT WOULD NOT COME ABOUT AT ALL.—(1501)**

**COMMENTARY.**

The 'eternal Sentence' may be 'capable'—of bringing about the cognition,—or 'incapable' at times; these two alternatives are possible. In the former case, as the said 'capability' would be always there, the Cognition resulting from it would be always there. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a thing has its capacity to produce something unobstructed, it must always produce that thing,—as for example, the final causal conditions,—the eternal Sentence has its capacity to produce verbal cognition unobstructed at all times,—hence this is a Reason based upon the very nature of the thing. Or it may be formulated as follows:—That effect whose cause is present in its perfect condition must come about,—e.g. the sprout, whose cause (in the shape of the seed, the soil and the requisite
moisture) is present in its perfect condition;—the Cognition resulting from
the eternal Sentence has its cause always present in its perfect condition;—

dence this is a Reason based upon the very nature of the thing.

Under the other alternative—that the eternal Sentence is incapable
(of bringing about cognition),—as the said 'incapability' would be there
always, any cognition resulting from it would never come about at all,—

just like the sprout whose cause is imperfect.—(1501)

Question:—"Why cannot the eternal Sentence convey a meaning (and
serve a useful purpose) ?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1502-1503).

Just as Hatred, Delusion, etc. are known to be sources of error,
so are Compassion, Wisdom, etc. known to be sources
of Truthfulness. Where, then, there is no Person
as the source, these two also cannot be there.

Consequently the Sentence that does not
emanate from a Person must be inex-
pressive (useless).—(1502-1503)

COMMENTARY.

A verbal cognition can serve a useful purpose in two ways: either by
representing things as they are, or by representing things as they are not;—

no third way is possible;—the use of both these kinds of Cognition have
their source in good and bad qualities, as ascertained by positive and negative
concomitance. For instance, the man who is beset with Love, Hatred and
other bad qualities is found to say things that are not true, while one who is
endowed with Compassion and other good qualities is found to say what is
true;—the receptacle of both these qualities—good and bad—which are the
sources of truth and falsehood,—is always a Person;—hence where there is
no Person, there can be no good or bad qualities;—and when the good and
bad qualities are not there, there can be no Truth or Falsehood;—and as
there is no third alternative possible, the statement that does not emanate
from a Person can serve no purpose at all; as the cause is not there; and
when the cause is not there, there can be no effect; if it were, it would be
causeless; and in that case there could be no restriction of Place, Time, etc.
in regard to such effects".

This argument is to be taken as a Reductio ad absurdum; otherwise, if
it were meant to be really true, then it would be contrary to perceptible
facts; because such sentences as 'One desiring Heaven should offer the
Agnihotra' are actually found to convey a definite meaning; and what is
actually perceived cannot be denied.

Further, the fact that the sentence is eternal is not admitted by both
parties; hence the Reason is 'Inadmissible'.
Stated in the form of a *Reductio ad Absurdum*, both the arguments are flawless. For instance, if the Veda is held to be 'without a Personal Author', then it must be meaningless (and useless); as the basis of *expressiveness*, in the shape of the Reason, is not there; and yet, it is not meaningless; hence it must have a Personal Author;—this is the contingency that is shown by the *Reductio ad Absurdum*.—(1502-1503)

In order to further support this *Reductio ad Absurdum*, and to refute the charge of being contrary to a perceived fact,—the author anticipates and answers an objection:—

**TEXTS (1504–1507).**

If it be urged that——"A certain meaning is actually comprehended from Words, hence they cannot be inexpressive or useless",—then (the answer is that) such comprehension can only be derived from explanations provided; and in the matter of explanations, it is found that the expounder is free to explain things as he likes.—It might be argued that——"The Word, by its very nature, has the potency to denote well-established things".—In that case, its meaning would be comprehended also by one who has no knowledge of the convention (bearing upon the Word and its denotation). Further, the Lamp, which is illuminative by its very nature, does not need a Convention (in illumining things). Lastly, as there is another Convention also (bearing upon the same Word), there could be no comprehension of that other thing from that same word. Even though there be a Convention, the Lamp cannot manifest Odour, Taste, etc.—Nor can any such Potency (of words) be recognised.—(1504–1507)

**COMMENTARY.**

'No chēt'—i.e. If it be urged that——"words cannot be inexpressive; and hence the conclusion of the Buddhist is contrary to a perceived fact".

The answer to this is that our conclusion would really be contrary to perceived facts if things were comprehended from the Veda itself, without the help of any instructions; as a matter of fact however, the comprehension of the meaning comes only through the help of the expounder relying upon Conventions (the conventional denotation of words); and it never comes from the Veda itself independently of Convention. For instance, the *Mīmāṃsaka* and others have been found to expound the meaning of the Veda in accordance with their own whim; and it cannot be right for the natural denotation of words to be dependent upon the whim of man.
The following might be urged—“The man does not expound a new meaning through his whim; he explains that same natural meaning of words which has been there all along. So that your conclusion is clearly contrary to this perceived fact.”

If that is so, and if the potency to express well-established things is already there in the Veda by its very nature,—then it should be possible for that meaning of the Veda to be comprehended by that man also who is ignorant of the Conventions.

Says the Opponent—“The Veda becomes a means of expressing things only through the help of the Conventions,—not independently by itself.”

That cannot be right. The Lamp and such things which are by their nature endowed with the potency to illumine things, do not need any Conventions. If this were not so, then, through positive and negative concomitance, the potency to express things would have to be attributed to those Conventions, not to any natural relationship (between the word and its meaning).

Then again, the comprehension of the meaning may follow from the Veda as helped by Conventions; even so, the view of the opponent would be defective. This is what is shown by the words—‘As there is another Convention, etc. etc.’—The Conventions set up by the author of the Nirukta are different from those set up by the Mimamsaka; and as there is this other Convention,—this latter could not bring about the comprehension of any meaning other than that indicated by itself; for the Lamp never illuminates what cannot be illuminated by it—such, for instance, as Odour, Taste and so forth,—with the help of Conventions.

Even granting that, on the ground of the other Convention, the Word may be applicable to (and lead to the comprehension of) another thing,—no validity could attach to the cognition thus brought about. This is what is meant by the words—‘Nor can any such potency be recognised.’—If, through the speaker’s whim, a word be actually applied to another thing (in another sense),—then, there would be confusion, and it would not be possible to ascertain the exact expressive Potency of the word; how then could it be possible to derive from it the cognition of the intended meaning?

Or, the words of the text may be explained in another way:—The natural expressiveness of the word may be either restricted to one thing, or applied to several things;—only these two alternative views are possible. If it is restricted to one thing, then the objection (to the Opponent’s view) is that—‘As there is another Convention, etc. etc.’—If the second alternative is accepted then—‘no such potency can be recognised’,—i.e. on account of confusion.

This has been thus declared—‘If words are restricted to one thing, then there could be no comprehension of any other thing (from it); if they are related to several things, then there is possibility of the contradictory things being expressed’.—(1504–1507)

Having thus proved that the first definition (provided under 1489) of Verbal Cognition is impossible,—the Author proceeds to sum up his argument
and show the 'inadmissibility' of the Probans put up by the Opponent (under 1499) to the effect that 'it brings about unshakeable cognitions':—

**TEXTS (1508-1509).**

**Thus, inasmuch as there can be no cognition of the meaning (of the Veda),—how can there be any 'unshakeability' in that cognition? It could be possible only on the basis of Conventions; and in this, it would not be different from the words of human beings. In fact, persons well-versed in the science of Reasoning do not recognise any difference between these two.—It can be 'unshakeable' only for the Shrotriyas who are ignorant of the ways of Reasoning.—(1508-1509)**

**COMMENTARY.**

If the Veda is not the work of a human author, then, as shown above, there can be no comprehension of its meaning; how then could the cognition brought about by it be 'unshakeable'? The meaning that is actually found to be comprehended from the words of the Veda must be one based upon Conventions, as has been shown above, under *Text* 1504. Hence it can only be through Conventions. Specially because the words of the Veda do not differ from the words of human beings; that is, they do not differ from human assertions.

Why this is so is explained in the words—'In fact, persons well-versed, etc. etc.'

'Between these two',—i.e. between words in the Veda and words emanating from men.—In every way the words can be brought about by men, and hence the Vedic words cannot differ from the words of men.

'It can be, etc. etc.'—In this the Author ridicules the Shrotriyas (Mimāmsakas).—(1508-1509)

The second form of Verbal Cognition put forward by the other party in *Text* 1489, is that brought about 'by words uttered by a Trustworthy Person'. In this definition, the Author detects the defect of 'Impossibility':—
TEXT (1510).

Because the 'Trustworthy Person' is not admitted, therefore the second definition also of Verbal Cognition is not proper. — Even if such a person were regarded as possible, that a certain person is such a one cannot be ascertained.

— (1510)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the Mīmāṃsakas do not admit of a Person 'free from defects'; hence no 'Trustworthy Person' can be admitted by them; how then could the word of such a person be valid (Right, Reliable)?

'Na kṣamam' — is not proper; i.e. it is 'Impossible'.

Even if the 'Trustworthy Person' be admitted, it could never be exactly pointed out that 'this person' is trustworthy; hence he would be as good as non-existent. Then again, because there is no valid means of ascertaining whether or not there are certain bad or good qualities in a certain person, — because such qualities are beyond the reach of the senses, — specially because as for the bodily and verbal behaviour of men, they are sometimes purposely misrepresented, — therefore how could any reliance be placed upon the word of such men? Because people with limited vision cannot properly discriminate among men.

TEXTS (1511-1512).

If it be urged that — 'that person is regarded as Trustworthy in regard to imperceptible things, whose assertions are found to be true in most cases'; — then (the answer is that) the mere fact of one's assertion being not true in some individual case, cannot prove that his assertions are never true; nor can the fact of its being true in one case prove that all his assertions are true. — (1511-1512)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged — 'Even though a man may not be entirely free from defects, yet if it has been found that in most cases his assertions are true, then such a person is regarded by us as 'trustworthy', — and not any person 'free from defects'; — and it is the assertion of such a 'trustworthy' person that is meant in the definition of Verbal Cognition (provided by us). Hence the definition is not open to the charge of being 'Impossible'.'

This cannot be right; because one assertion of the man has been found to be not incompatible with the real state of things, it does not necessarily
follow that all his assertions are true; because it is always possible that some assertion may be untrue. If it were not so, then the definition would be false.—(1511-1512)

Having thus proved that both definitions of Verbal Cognition are defective, the Author points out objections to Verbal Cognition in general:

TEXTS (1513-1514).

WHAT IS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN WORDS AND EXTERNAL OBJECTS, BY EXPRESSING WHICH LATTER THE WORDS WOULD BE 'TRUE' (VALID)?—THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM CANNOT BE OF THE NATURE OF BEING THE SAME IN ESSENCE,—BECAUSE THEY ARE APPREHENDED BY DIFFERENT SENSE-ORGANS, AND FOR OTHER REASONS. NOR CAN THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM BE THAT OF ONE BEING PRODUCED FROM THE OTHER; BECAUSE THIS IS NOT TRUE.

NOR IS THERE ANY OTHER CONNECTION POSSIBLE WHICH COULD BE TRUE.—

(1513-1514)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, between Words and External Things, there is no such relation as that of sameness or of being produced,—by virtue of which relation, the words expressing such things would be regarded as true. For instance, the relation of sameness is not possible between them,—because of such reasons as their being apprehended by different sense-organs; i.e. words are apprehended by a sense-organ which is different from that by which the things are apprehended; for instance, word is apprehended by the Auditory organ, while things are apprehended by the Visual and other organs.—By 'other reasons' are included differences of Time, Place, Appearance, Causes.

Kumārila has argued as follows:—"The argument that, 'one thing is different from another because they are apprehended by different sense-organs', is not Conclusive; because in a case where the same colour is seen by several persons, the Colour will have to be regarded as different, because it is apprehended by different sense-organs. It might be argued that 'all the sense-organs apprehending the Colour belong to the same universal 'Eye', so that the Colour is really perceived by a single sense-organ'. But, in that case, though 'Being' is perceived by several sense-organs, yet the Universal 'Sense-organ' being one, it would be perceived by the same sense-organ, and hence have to be regarded as one. For these reasons things have to be regarded as same or different, according as their cognitions are same or
different,—and not according to the sameness or diversity of the sense-organs concerned”.  

The actual words of Kumārila are as follows:—“That which is cognised by more sense-organs than one does not (on that account) become diverse; for, if it were so, then any and every object would have to be regarded as diverse on the ground of its being cognised by the sense-organs located in the bodies of different persons.—If it be urged that ‘in this case the sense-organs of all persons would be of the same category or class, and as such, in a way, identical’,—then we could have the same in the other case also, the class ‘sense-organ’ being one and the same. The class ‘Being’ also is not regarded as diverse, even though it is perceived by diverse sense-organs,—because it is always recognised as the same”. (Śhlokavārtika—Sense-perception, 156-157.)

This however is not right. Even when the difference is based upon the difference of cognitions, what has been urged remains equally applicable to what is meant to be proved (by the Opponent). For instance, in regard to the case in question also, the following might be said:—That the difference among things is due to the difference in cognitions is not true (conclusive); for instance, when several persons perceive Colour, there is diversity of cognitions,—and yet the Colour is not diverse; if one-ness (sameness of the Sense-organs) is assumed on the basis of the eyes of all persons belonging to the same class ‘Eye’, then the same sameness may be attributed to Colour, Taste and other things also, because even though these Cognitions are diverse, yet they all belong to the one class ‘Cognition’; and this would be a direct contradiction of the assertion that ‘Colour, etc. cannot be regarded as one,—because their cognitions are different’ (found in Śhlokavārtika—Sense-perception, 158).

Thus the answer provided (by Kumārila) is of the nature of a ‘Futile Rejoinder’.

If it be urged that—“Just as, even when there is difference in the Specific Individualities, there are certain characteristics upon the difference or non-difference of which people regard things as different or non-different, and treat them as the basis of conceiving of things as one or diverse; this is what we mean by the difference and non-difference of cognitions”,—all this would be equally applicable to the case of Sense-organs also. So enough of this.

‘Nor can the connection, etc. etc.’;—that is, the relation between Words and Things expressed by them cannot be that of being produced by them; as this would be not true; because even when the Thing is not there, the Word may be there, through the mere wish of the speaker.

Nor is there any other kind of inseparability between the two, except that of Cause and Effect; if any such were postulated, it would lead to absurdity.

From all this we conclude that the Word cannot serve as a valid means of cognition of the thing spoken of by it.—(1513-1514)

Says the Opponent—“If that is so, then how is it that it has been declared (by a Buddhist writer) that—‘Verbal Cognition is not a distinct form of Cognition, because it proceeds from Inference; just as the Inference,
based upon the character of being a product, is drawn by one for his own benefit, so the word also denotes things only through the negation of others.""

Anticipating this objection, the Author proceeds to show in what way \textit{Verbal Cognition} is meant to be included under \textit{Inference}:

\textbf{TEXT (1515).}

\textbf{FROM ALL VERBAL STATEMENTS THEREFOLLOWS INFERENCE OF THE}
\textbf{\textquoteleft DESIRE TO SPEAK\textquoteright{} (I.E. INTENTION, ON THE PART OF THE}
\textbf{SPEAKER); THIS (INTENTION) IS DEFINITELY KNOWN}
\textbf{TO BE THE CAUSE (SOURCE) OF THE WORDS,}
\textbf{THROUGH DIRECT PERCEPTION AND}
\textbf{NON-APPREHENSION.—(1515)}

\textbf{COMMENTARY.}

\textquoteleft All words?"—i.e. all those that are regarded as emanating from human beings.

This \textquoteleft Desire to Speak" or \textquoteleft Intention" is inferred from the Verbal statements, because they are the \textit{effects} of that Desire,—and not because it is \textit{expressed} (or denoted) by it. That the said Desire is the cause of the Verbal Statement is ascertained from the fact that there is positive and negative concomitance (between them).

When it was said (by the Buddhist writer) that \textquoteleft the word also denotes things only as the \textit{negation of others},"—what was meant by \textquoteleft denoting" was only \textit{indicating, making known}; that is, the explanation provided of that passage is as follows:—Just like theProbans \textquoteleft Because it is a product," it \textit{manifests} (indicates) a thing by means of the negation or exclusion of other things. This has to be so understood; otherwise, the instance \textquoteleft like the Probans \textit{Because it is a product}" would be one devoid of the Probandum; because there can be \textit{no denoting of \textquoteleft being a product}; as the \textit{denoting} is a property or function of words; so that, if actual \textit{denoting} were meant, then the statement of the Reason in the form \textquoteleft because it denotes things through the negation of others" would be \textquoteleft Too Specific" (hence Inconclusive).—(1515)

Says the Opponent:—"Even in regard to the \textit{Intention (Desire to Speak)}, the word should not be regarded as the \textit{Means of Cognition}; because it could not be the means of bringing about the cognition of any \textit{particular \textquoteleft Desire to Speak\textquoteright (Intention)}; for, if it were so regarded, it would be not true; as in the case of a man labouring under a mistake, a statement is not always understood in the sense in which it was intended by the speaker. Nor could it be the means of bringing about the cognition of the \textquoteleft Desire to Speak\textquoteright (or \textquoteleft Intention\textquoteright) \textit{in general}; because such a cognition would be useless. The cognition of mere \textit{Intention (Desire to Speak)} does not serve any useful purpose in actual practice; because no definite cognition of its meaning can be obtained."
Anticipating this objection in the following Text (1516), the Author asserts (in Text 1517) the fact of the Verbal Expression being an efficient Means of bringing about the cognition of the particular 'Desire to Speak'—

**TEXTS (1516-1517).**

"In the case of the Man under an Illusion, a Verbal statement is found which is quite different from what the man 'desired to say'; so also in the case of the 'Desire to speak' in general; hence the Verbal statement cannot function (towards bringing about the cognition of any Desire to speak)";

—if this is urged,—(then the answer is that) there is clear distinction between words used by the man under an illusion and those used by one who is not under an illusion. Clever men are quite able to discern this difference through the Context and such other circumstances.—(1516-1517)

**COMMENTARY.**

It must be admitted that there is difference between words used by the deluded person and those used by the person not so deluded; otherwise, a difference in the causes would make no difference in their effects. This difference clever men are quite able to discern, through the Context and other circumstances.

'Prakṛta' stands for the Context in which the words are used.

'And other circumstances';—this includes the freedom from confusion, happy facial expression and so forth.—(1516-1517)

**Question:**—"Why should there be a distinction among the words at all?"

**Answer:**—

**TEXTS (1518-1519).**

**Difference among Words is due to difference among their causes.**

—if there are people who do not notice this difference, the fault is theirs, not of the Indicative.—Otherwise, the fact of mere suspected smoke not having for once brought about the true notion of Fire,—might lead to the conclusion that even when cognised with certainty, Smoke cannot be a true Indicative of Fire.—(1518-1519)

**COMMENTARY.**

That is to say, the difference is due to the difference in the Causes. Consequently, when the effect has been duly pondered over, it is never found to be non-concomitant with its Cause; so that the Word does become the means of knowing the particular 'Intention of the Speaker'.
If some people however are unable to perceive any difference in the words that appear as indicatives (of the meaning),—the fault lies with these people themselves,—not with the Indicative (word). Because the Indication does not indicate the meaning by its mere presence,—it does so only when it is duly ascertained. Hence the fault lies with the person addressed.

If it were not so, then, if in a case where the presence of Smoke has been merely suspected in what was really only vapour,—and hence later on it is found that the Fire indicated by it is not there, and it has failed to indicate the true Fire,—it may lead one to the conclusion that even in cases where the Smoke has been duly cognised with certainty; it would not be indicative of the True Fire.

Further, when the entire fabric of verbal usage is regarded as illusory, being dependent solely upon mere semblances,—like the idea of 'Two Moons' that the man of defective vision has,—how could the charge of being invalid be brought, on the basis of falsity only, against the notion of the particular 'Intention of the Speaker'? Specially when real validity is not attributed to the idea of that particular 'Intention'. This has been thus declared—'When Verbal Cognition was declared to be Inferential, it was with a view to its indicativeness being dependent upon Convention, and not with a view to the real truth'.—(1518-1519)

The following Text shows that words can be the Means of Cognising 'the Speaker's Intention' in general also:

TEXT (1520).

IN THE CASE OF THOSE WORDS ALSO, THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN THE INFERENCE OF THE SIMPLE 'DESIRE TO SPEAK'; BECAUSE IT IS ALWAYS THERE;—FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING THE FACT OF ITS BEING PRODUCED BY THE SPEAKER'S BREATH AND SO FORTH.

—1520

COMMENTARY.

In the case of all words, uttered by deluded as well as undeluded persons, there is no incongruity in the Inference of a general 'Intention to Speak';—because it is always there,—i.e. there is no failure in the general premiss.

It might be argued that—'The assertion that—'through the mere presence of such a Person,—as through that of the Chintāmanī gem,—instructions issue forth at will, even out of the walls',—would appear to indicate that (as there is no speaker, there can be no 'desire to speak'), there may be falsity (in such assertions).'

But that is not so; because in this case also the initial cause lies in the 'desire to speak'; as even here the word issues forth only under the influence of the faculty produced by previous meditations. For instance, when a person has thoroughly got up a certain Text, it so happens that even when
his thoughts are turned towards other things, he can go on repeating (automatically) words and portions of verses of that text. And it cannot be said that the initial cause of such utterances does not lie in some previous efforts put forth by the man,—because, if it were not so, then, even on perceiving (misconceiving) smoke, in the vapour issuing from the cowherd's pot (and finding it as not truly indicating the Fire), one might regard the real Smoke also to be fallible as an indicative of real Fire.

From all this it follows that in all cases, there is no fallibility in the Indicative at all,—when due consideration is given to the Effect, the Indicative, the Time, the Place and other details,—and hence it is always present.

Nor can the Inference (of the 'desire to speak') be regarded as useless; as it serves to prove the fact of the utterance being due to the breath of the Speaker and so forth.

The phrase 'and so forth' includes such conditions as the presence of defects (which can exist only in the Speaker, whose desire is inferred from the verbal statement).—(1520)

Says the Opponent—"We grant that words can serve as the means of cognising the 'Desire to Speak'; but what is the Minor Term, what the Probandum,—what too the well-known relation between them,—by virtue of which the Verbal Statement can be regarded as a full-fledged Three-featured Inference,—and not a distinct Means of Cognition by itself?"

Answer:

TEXTS (1521-1522).

When the 'Desire to Speak' is the thing to be inferred, the presence of the Three Features is quite clear;—the Man is the Minor Term, wherein the presence of the Desire is the Probandum, which is proved by its effect in the shape of the verbal statement (Probans).

For example (the form of the Inference would be)—this Man is cognised as having had the Desire to Speak of the Tree,

—because he has uttered the word 'tree',—just as I had done under previous circumstances.—

(1521-1522)

COMMENTARY.

The Man is the Minor Term,—where he is actually seen;—the desire to speak is the Probandum;—the relation consists of occurring in the same 'chain', as shown before.—Where, however, the speaker is not visible, the Place would be the Minor Term,—and the man with the said desire would be the Probandum; because the place also is one of the causes of the Word;
as is clear from the fact that the Word that is heard in places like the mountain-cave is different from that heard elsewhere.—(1521-1522)

TEXTS (1523–1525).

Thus then, in cases where the other party have denied the presence of the Three Features,—we do not regard the Verbal Statement to be a Means of Cognition.—In cases, however, where the presence of the Three Features is admitted by them, the fact of its being 'Three-featured' is quite clear.—Where the 'desire to speak' is to be proved, it has been shown that the Three Features are present.—Such being the case, the Word is as good a Means of Inference as the Smoke,—because it is equipped with the Three Features, and because its objective is of that same kind.—(1523–1525)

COMMENTARY.

'Thus then, in cases, etc. etc.'—This means that, when the other party puts forward the reason 'because it is devoid of the Three Features' as against the idea of Verbal Cognition being inferential, in the sense of being something external,—his argument is superfluous; (as we also do not admit that).

'In cases however, etc. etc.'—This shows that the reason put forward by the other party is inadmissible, if it is urged against the inference of the Desire to Speak; because in regard to that, it has been shown that all the three features are clearly present.—(1523–1525)

End of Chapter XIX (A).
CHAPTER XIX.

Section (B).

Analogueical Cognition.

COMMENTARY.

With regard to Analogueical Cognition, the Author declares as follows:—

TEXTS (1526-1527).

'What sort of an animal is the Gavaya?'—on being thus questioned by people living in the city, the Forester makes the statement 'as the Cow so is the Gavaya'; it is this that is known as Upamāna (Analogy).—According to Shabara's view however, this is not outside the scope of 'Word' (Verbal Statement), hence it has been described in another way.

[Shlo.-Vā.—Upamāna, 1-2.]

(1526-1527)

COMMENTARY.

On being asked—'What sort of an animal is the Gavaya?'—The man makes the statement—'the Gavaya is like the Cow'; it is this Verbal Statement that is known as 'Upamāna', 'Analogy', among the older Naiyāyikas [e.g. Vātsyāyana, in his Nyāyabhāṣya on Śū. 1. 1. 6].

According to Shabara's view, as stated in his Bhāṣya (on Mi. Śū. 1. 1. 5), the cognition brought about by the said statement would be included under 'Verbal Cognition', and hence the Means of such a Cognition could not be regarded as a distinct Means of Cognition (apart from the Word); with this in view Analogy has been described by him in a different manner; he says—'Upamāna—that is, Similitude,—also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses; for instance, the sight of the Gavaya brings about the remembrance of the Cow'.—(1526-1527)

This (Shabara's) view the author proceeds to expound in the following—

* On the exact meaning of this passage in the Shabarabhāṣya, there is a difference of opinion among the Mīmāṃsakas themselves. According to the Rjuvimalā, the meaning of the words of the Bhāṣya is that 'the sight of the Gavaya brings about the Analogueical Cognition, that the animal seen is called 'Gavaya', to the man who, on seeing the Gavaya, has remembered the Cow.—This is the same as the view of Vātsyāyana, which has been controverted in the Shlokavārtika, the meaning according to which has been adopted in the translation above.
"Having seen the Cow, when the man goes to the forest and sees the Gavaya, bearing a manifold commonality (similitude, to the Cow) in several parts of the body, but with rounded neck (not with the dewlap);—the first cognition that he has of the Gavaya is one that apprehends only its shape; and this cognition is purely perceptual. The cognition that follows is in the more determinate form—'the shape of this animal is similar to the Cow's'; and this also comes about only when the operation of the senses is there; so that this also is regarded to be perceptual.'"—(1528–1530)

COMMENTARY.

Having seen the Cow previously, the man, later on, goes to the forest and sees the Gavaya,—of what sort?—bearing a manifold commonality in several parts of the body,—i.e. he thinks that many parts of its body are similar,—but with a rounded neck,—i.e. without the dewlap (which is the distinctive feature of the Cow),—then the first cognition that appears is of the non-conceptual (non-determinate) kind, which apprehends only the general shape of the Gavaya; and this Cognition is pure Perception.—That cognition also which appears later on,—in the form 'this animal is similar to the Cow'—which is more specifically conceptual,—is also pure Perception; as it is brought about by the operation of the senses.—(1528–1530)

The following might be urged against the above—'The cognition that appears is through Remembrance, as envisaging the similarity,—and not through the operation of the senses'.—

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1531).

"Though the said Cognition appears on the remembrance of the Cow,—yet, on account of subsisting in the Gavaya, there is proximity (of the similarity, to the Senses), and hence it would be within reach of the senses.'"—(1531)

COMMENTARY.

Though it is true that the said cognition apprehending the similarity follows after the Remembrance (of the Cow), yet, because as residing in the
Gavaya, it would be in proximity (to the senses), the similarity would be within reach of the senses.

'Sannidhi' stands for the character of being in proximity.

'Gavayaasthavat'—is the reason for its being regarded as in proximity; the sense being that—because the similarity resides in the Gavaya, therefore it is in proximity to the senses.—(1531)

Objection:—'Similarity resides in two things; how then can it be perceived in the Gavaya alone (the other thing, the Cow, not being before the eyes)?'

Answer:—

TEXT (1532).

"Like the Universal, similarity resides in its entirety in each member; because even when the co-relative is not perceived, the similarity is actually perceived."—(1532)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'sāmānyavat', means that it is like the Universal.

Even though similarity lies between two members, yet, like the Universal, it resides in its entirety in each member; it is for this reason that even when the co-relative, in the shape of the Cow (in the case in question) is not perceived, the similarity is actually perceived in the other member (Gavaya) which is before the eyes.—(1532)

The following might be urged—'If similarity were an entity by itself, then it could be perceived; as a matter of fact, however, it is not admitted that it is an entity by itself'.

Answer:—

TEXT (1533).

"The fact of Similarity being an entity cannot be denied; because it actually exists in the form of the presence in a thing of one kind of several parts similar to those in that of another kind." [Shlokavārtika—Upamāna, 18.]—(1533)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Similarity is a relationship in the shape of the Inherence, in a particular individual, of many parts—in the shape of the Horns and others—in existing in the Cow,—in the particular Individual, the Gavaya;—and a Relationship is not something entirely different from the Relatives; for, if it were, then there might be the possibility of there being no cognition of the Relationship at all.
The qualifying term is ‘in a thing of another kind’, because the presence of all common features in things of the same kind is not regarded as similarity.—(1533)

The following Text shows the real form of Analogical Cognition (according to Shabara)—

TEXT (1534).

“Under the said circumstances, the Cognition that appears in the form, ‘The Cow is similar to this animal’, is what is called Analogical Cognition.”—(1534)

COMMENTARY.

‘The Cow is similar to this animal that is now seen by me’,—this cognition appears in regard to the Cow which is not before the observer (not within reach of his senses);—and this cognition is what is called ‘Analogical Cognition’, which thus is a Means or Form of Cognition.

The following Text shows the object that is apprehended by the said Analogical Cognition:

TEXT (1535).

“Thus that which is remembered, and which is qualified by the (perceived) similarity, is the object that is apprehended by Analogical Cognition. Or, the object of the said Cognition may consist of the Similarity itself as subsisting in that (remembered) thing.”—[Shlo. Vā.—Upamāna, 37.]—(1535)

COMMENTARY.

Because Analogical Cognition is as described above, therefore the Cow that is remembered and which is qualified by the similarity of the Ganyaya (seen) is the object apprehended by that Cognition.—Or it may be the Similarity itself as subsisting in the Cow.—(1535)

Objection:—‘Similarity is cognised by Sense-perception,—the Cow also becomes the object of Remembrance;—what then is left to be known,—apprehending which, Analogy would become the Means of Cognition’?

Answer:—
TEXT (1536).

"Similarity having been apprehended by Sense-perception,—
and the Cow having been remembered,—the two together
(i.e. the Cow qualified by similarity) are not cognisable by any other Means of Cognition;
hence herein lies the functioning
of Analogy as a Means of
Cognition."—(1536)

COMMENTARY.

Though the similarity has become cognised by Sense-perception, and the Cow also has been remembered, yet, the cognition of the Cow as qualified by the Similarity has not been cognised by any other Sense-perception or Remembrance. Hence in the bringing about of this Cognition lies the operation of Analogy as a Means of Cognition.—(1536)

An example is cited, to illustrate this:

TEXT (1537).

"[For instance, in the case of the well-known Inference of
Fire from Smoke] though the Place is perceived by Sense-
perception, and the Fire (in the kitchen) is
remembered,—yet the cognition of the two
together (i.e. the Fire and the
Place in the Hill), does not
cease to be Inferential."

—(1537)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, when the Place,—the Minor Term—is directly perceived,—
and the Fire is cognised by Remembrance,—yet, when the resultant Inference of the place as qualified by Fire appears,—it does not lose its character of the Means of Cognition; in fact it remains a Means of Right Cognition. The same should be the case with Analogical Cognition also.—(1537)
OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.

It might be asked—Even if Analogy be a Means of Cognition,—in what way is it distinct from Sense-perception and the rest?
The Answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1538–1540).

"(a) Analogical Cognition cannot be regarded as Sense-perception, —because it is entirely devoid of the functioning of the senses. (b) Nor can it be regarded as Inference, because the 'Three-features' are not there; for instance, there is no Probans here (which subsists in the Subject); and the similarity of the Cow (to the Gavaya) has not been previously cognised as subsisting in the Subject; and the similarity that is perceived in the Gavaya cannot bring about the inference of the Cow."—(1538–1540)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be right to regard the cognition in question as Perception, because it is not brought about by the contact of the senses.

Nor can it be regarded as Inference; as the 'Three Features' are absent. For instance, what would be the 'property of the Subject', i.e. the Probans?—the similarity?—or the Gavaya that is seen? If the similarity were taken to be the Probans, would it be the similarity in the Cow?—or that in the Gavaya? These are the only two alternatives possible.—Now the similarity residing in such cognisable things as the Cow and the like cannot serve as the Probans, because, prior to the perception of the Gavaya, that similarity has not been apprehended; and what has not been apprehended cannot serve as the Probans; if it did, it would lead to absurdities.—Then it is the Similarity residing in the Gavaya that could serve as the Probans, because this similarity is apprehended when the Gavaya is seen'.—The answer to that is that what is perceived in the Gavaya cannot bring about the Inference of the Cow; as there is no co-ordination between them; just as there is none between the Cow and the blackness (perceived elsewhere).—(1539-1540)

Says the Opponent:—After the Gavaya has been perceived, the similarity residing in the Cow becomes apprehended, and then that similarity will serve as the required Probans.
The Answer to that is as follows:—
TEXT (1541).

"The similarity residing in the Cow cannot serve as the Probans, as it forms a part of the Proposition itself. The Gavaya also cannot serve as the Probans indicative of the Cow, as it has no connection with the Cow."—(1541)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as Similarity is the object Inferred, it cannot serve as the Probans.

"In that case, the Gavaya would be the Probans".

Here also, the Gavaya cannot serve as the Probans, for want of co-ordination.—(1541)

Says the Opponent—Then Analogical Cognition may not be a valid form of cognition at all.

Answer:—

TEXT (1542).

"The cognition in question cannot be regarded as not a form of Right Cognition; because it makes known what is not already known; for instance, before the perception of the Gavaya, its similarity, (in the Cow) has not been apprehended at all."—(1542)

COMMENTARY.

That is, before the perception of the Gavaya, there has been no apprehension of the Cow as qualified by similarity to the Gavaya; consequently, as Analogical Cognition brings about the cognition of the Cow as qualified by similarity to the Gavaya,—which has not been known previously,—it is only right that it should be regarded as a valid Means of Cognition.—(1542)

The above (Mīmāṁsaka) view of Analogical Cognition is refuted in the following Texts:—
OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.

TEXTS (1543–1545).

AS THERE IS NO OBJECT THAT COULD BE COGNISED BY THIS MEANS, IT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A MEANS OF COGNITION.—IT MIGHT BE URGED THAT—"THERE IS THE CONNECTION OF THE MANIFOLD COMMONALTY OF COMPONENT PARTS, WHICH IS WHAT IS COGNISED".—BUT COMMONALTY ITSELF HAVING BEEN REJECTED, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY MANIFOLDNESS IN REGARD TO IT? HOW TOO COULD THERE BE ANY 'CONNECTION' WITH SUCH MANIFOLD 'COMMONALTY'? [SAYS THE OPPONENT]—"THERE IS A MEANS OF COGNITION WHICH BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION OF SUCH COMMONALTY, IN THE FORM OF THE INFEERENCE THAT—COMMONALTY IS AN ENTITY AND IS APPREHENDED BY SENSE-PERCEPTION, BECAUSE IT IS COGNISABLE AS SOMETHING OTHER THAN NEGATION,—LIKE THE UNIQUE ENTITY".—[THE ANSWER TO THIS FOLLOWS IN THE FOLLOWING TEXT 1545.]—(1543–1545)

COMMENTARY.

Analogy cannot be a Means of Cognition, because there is nothing that is cognised by means of it,—and hence it is like any Means other than the six (that are accepted by the Mīmāṃsakā).

"But there is similarity, consisting in the presence of the manifold commonality of component parts, which is cognised by its means; hence the Reason adduced (by the Buddhist) is 'inadmissible'."

It is not so; in course of our examination of Commonality (Universal), all commonalties have been rejected; how then can there be any 'manifoldness of Commonalties'? Nor is connection of Commonalties possible. Hence our Reason cannot be said to be 'Inadmissible'.

The following might be urged:—"There is a Means of Cognition which establishes the existence of the Commonality. Hence your Reason remains inadmissible. The said Means of Cognition is as follows—'The Commonality is an entity',—and 'it is apprehensible by Sense-perception',—these are the two Propositions; the Reason (Premiss) is, 'because it is something cognisable, other than Negation'; that is to say, it is cognisable as something which has a character other than 'non-existence';—'the unique entity' is the Corroborative Instance; the specific Individuality of things is the 'unique entity'."—(1543–1545)

The answer to the above argument is provided in the following—
TEXT (1546).

The Reason (Premiss) here put forward is 'not admissible' for those who declare that anything cognisable in the form of 'Commonalty' (or Universal) falls under the category of the 'non-existent'. And in the case of the former of the two Probanda (put forth), the Premiss becomes part of the Proposition itself.—(1546)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'artha' in the compound 'Sāmānyārtha', stands for 'what is cognisable'.

As regards both the Propositions put forward,—the Buddhists hold that any such thing as 'Commonalty' (Universal) can have no character (existence); hence they cannot admit the statement that Commonalty is anything other than purely non-existent; so that to that extent, the Probans cited is 'inadmissible'.

As regards the first Proposition,—that 'Commonalty is an entity', — in that connection, the Reason cited forms part of the Proposition itself; for instance, it is only an entity that can be 'other than non-existent'; because the entity is only the negation of the non-existent; and it is this same that has been put forward, in other words, in the Premiss (Reason); and that same is the Probandum also; thus the Premiss forms part of the Proposition.—(1516)

Further, because it is of the nature of Remembrance, therefore, being like any other Remembrance, Analogical Cognition cannot be a valid form of Cognition. The following Texts explain how Analogical Cognition is of the nature of Remembrance:—

TEXTS (1547–1549).

What happens in this case is that there are some parts in the Gavaya's body which bring about cognitions similar to those brought about by the parts of the Cow's body;—hence when the Gavaya is seen, there follows the Remembrance of the parts of the Cow's body that have been seen before repeatedly. It is for this reason that, there does not arise any idea of the Horse and other animals, through that similarity,—but it does arise when the Gavaya is seen. Otherwise, if there were no such Remembrance, what would be the difference (between the case of the Cow and that of the Horse)?—(1547–1549)

COMMENTARY.

In its essence, there is no such thing as Similarity; all that is there is that there are some parts in the Gavaya's body which bring about the same
conceptual notions as certain parts of the cow's body; and similarity is not any distinct entity, apart from the said parts which give rise to the same conceptions; that this is so is clear from the fact that nothing apart from these figures in the conception at all. Hence what happens is that on the perception of the Gavaya, there arises a cognition in regard to the parts of the Cow's body, on account of the repeated perception of these latter in the past; and this cognition that arises is of the nature of Remembrance,—and it is not a distinct cognition apprehending a distinct entity in the shape of Similarity.—If it were not so, then, in regard to the Horse and other animals also,—as the presence of the manifold commonalty of component parts is there,—why should not the idea of these other animals appear on the seeing of the Gavaya, in the way as it does in regard to the Cow? There is no difference between the two cases, some degree of similarity being present in both cases.

'Otherwise',—i.e. if the parts of the cow's body had not been seen repeatedly.

In the case of the resultant cognition being of the nature of Remembrance, this difficulty does not arise; as the Remembrance appears in regard to that same thing which has been repeatedly seen before; as the causes that bring about Remembrance are restricted in their scope.—(1547–1549)

The following might be urged—"Analogical Cognition may be of the nature of Remembrance; but why should Remembrance itself not be regarded as a valid form of Cognition?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1550).

Remembrance cannot be a form of valid Cognition, because it envisages what is already known. How then could it be regarded as a distinct form of Valid Cognition?—(1550)

COMMENTARY.

'Iyam'—stands for Remembráé.—(1550)

Taking for granted that Similarity is an entity, the Author proceeds to show that, even according to the view of the Mīmāṁsaka, Analogical Cognition cannot be valid:—
TEXTS (1551-1553).

Or, Similarity may be an entity, residing in the Cow, like the Commonality (or Universal); even so, it will have been perceived in the Cow standing before the person before he sees the co-relative (Gavaya); and as such the cognition of the said similarity following upon the seeing of the Gavaya cannot escape from being of the nature of Remembrance.—[Says the other party]—"What has been previously seen in the Cow is similarity merely existing there, and it has not been definitely ascertained that it is similarity to the Gavaya; while this latter is what is apprehended by Analogical Cognition, which, thus, is different from Remembrance."—(1551-1553)

COMMENTARY.

There may be a real entity in the shape of Similarity; and it may be residing in everything in its entirety.—But even so, when, before seeing the Gavaya, the man sees the Cow standing before him, he naturally sees the Similarity which is inseparable from the Cow; otherwise the inseparability of the two could not be there.—And thus, as the subsequent Analogical Cognition would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended, it would not be a form of valid Cognition.

The following argument might be urged:—"The Similarity seen previously was merely as existing, it was not seen in the form that 'this is the similarity between this Gavaya and the Cow'; while this is the form in which the Similarity is apprehended by Analogical Cognition; so that it cannot be regarded as being of the nature of Remembrance".—(1551-1553)

The answer to this last argument is provided in the following:—

TEXT (1554).

Even if the Similarity had not been previously apprehended under that name, it was apprehended all the same, in its own form, which is called its very self.—(1554)

COMMENTARY.

Even though the Similarity has not been previously apprehended under that name,—i.e. as 'Similarity to the Gavaya',—i.e. the animal Cow as similar to the Gavaya may not have been apprehended prior to the seeing of the Gavaya;—yet in its own form, it has been already apprehended; that is, that which forms its very self—its essence, nature,—has been previously apprehended.
Question: "What is that own form in which it has been apprehended?"
Answer: "Which is called its very self";—i.e. that which is called the very self of the Cow,—in that form, which constitutes its nature,—it has been already apprehended.—(1554)

Question: "What if it has been already apprehended?"
Answer: —

TEXT (1555).

Mere Name does not constitute the 'essence' of things; by virtue of which, when it (the Name) has not been apprehended, the things could be regarded as 'not known', by people who know the true nature of the Self.—(1555)

COMMENTARY.

The Name does not form the 'essence' of things; so that, even if the Name has not been previously known,—if the thing happens to become known,—it cannot be said to be 'not known'. Specially for the philosopher who holds the view that Sense-perception is of the nature of definitely certain Cognition,—it cannot be right to say that the thing, thus known, is not known.—(1555)

TEXT (1556).

If on the strength of the slight element of Valid Cognition (found in Analogical Cognition),—it were to be regarded as an independent form of Cognition,—then there could be no limit to the number of such independent forms of Cognition; specially as there are other ways in which such slight elements of Cognition could be found.—(1556)

COMMENTARY.

Further, if the mere idea of 'being similar to this',—this slight element, found in Analogical Cognition,—were to be accepted as the basis for regarding it as a distinct Form of Cognition,—then there would be absurdities; and there could be no limit to the number of forms of Valid Cognition, such as is found in the declaration—'Sense-perception, Inference, Verbal Cognition, Analogical Cognition, Presumption and Negation are the six means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished.'—(1556)

The Author proceeds to show the Incongruitities that the above would lead to—
TEXTS (1557-1558).

When a line of Trees and such things are seen, what is actually perceived is only one tree, and yet some idea of the second tree being there, there follows the definite cognition (in regard to the former tree) that 'This is the first';—and this will have to be regarded as a distinct form of Cognition; as it does not depend upon any element of 'similarity' or other conditions (attendant upon the well-known forms of Cognition).—If it is denied in this case, on the ground that it apprehends only what has been already apprehended,—then the same might be said in regard to Analogical Cognitions also.—(1557-1558)

COMMENTARY.

'And such things'—is meant to include the line of Ants and so on.

As a matter of fact, when one sees a line of trees,—so long as one sees one of the trees only, there is no such definite cognition as that 'this is the first tree'; when however, he notices the second tree, there does come about, in reference to the former tree, the idea that 'this is the first tree';—and this would have to be regarded as a distinct form of Cognition (even if the contention of the Mīmāṃsaka in regard to Analogical cognition were accepted).

—Why?—Because it is a form of cognition not dependent upon any element of Similarity or such other conditions. So that, because it does not depend upon Similarity, therefore it cannot be analogical cognition;—because it does not depend upon the operation of the Senses, therefore it cannot be Sense-perception;—because it does not depend upon an Inferential Indicative, therefore it cannot be Inference;—because it does not depend upon Words, it cannot be Verbal Cognition;—because it does not depend upon any seen or heard of fact which would be otherwise inexplicable, therefore it cannot be Presumption;—and because it does not depend upon the cessation of Means and Objects of Cognition, therefore it cannot be Negation.—Thus there is room for the absurdity urged in the following declaration—'This is prior to that,—This is posterior to that—This is larger than that—This is shorter than that—all these cognitions would have to be regarded as so many distinct Forms of Cognition,—which is highly undesirable'.

It might be urged that—"as the cognition in question apprehends what has been already apprehended, it cannot be regarded as Valid Cognition";—this condition, of apprehending what has been already apprehended, is present in Analogical Cognitions also.

The plural number in 'Analogical Cognitions' is in view of the fact that there are many such Cognitions.—(1557-1558)
TEXTS (1559-1560).

When one sees the Gavaya, there appears the notion of its 'dissimilarity' to the Horse and other animals; why cannot this be a distinct form of Cognition?—If it be urged that "it cannot be so regarded because it is included under Negation",—then, the same might be said in regard to the notions of 'similarity', which also are included under 'Mutual Negation'.—(1559-1560)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, on seeing the Gavaya, there appears the idea of its similarity in the Cow,—and this is regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition; in the same way, when on seeing the Gavaya, there follows the notion of its dissimilarity in the Horse,—why cannot this also be regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition?

"It cannot be regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition, as it is included under Negation."

That cannot be right.

"Why?"

Because it envisages a positive entity; while Negation envisages a non-entity.

"Dissimilarity is only negation of similarity; and hence the notion of dissimilarity is really included under Negation."

'The same might be said, etc. etc.'—That is to say, if the negative character of a certain object is sought to be based upon its being subject to Mutual Negation,—then the same sort of object is found in the case of the notions of Similarity also,—which are regarded as 'Analogical Cognition'.—(1559-1560)

Question:—"How so?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1561).

Just as distinction from 'Similarity' is cognised in that case, so also is distinction from 'All Common Parts' cognised in the other case also.—(1561)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the idea of 'dissimilarity', there is perception of difference from (i.e. negation of) 'Similarity'; in the same way, in the case of the idea of 'Similarity' also, there is perception of difference from (i.e. negation of) the presence of all Common Parts; so that this also can be included under Negation, just like the notion of Dissimilarity.—(1561)

In support of the same, an argument is put forward:—
TEXT (1562).

Because that Cognition which apprehends 'the presence of several similar parts' would also fall under 'Mutual Negation'; (otherwise) if it were the 'presence of all similar parts' that is cognised, then there would be identity.—(1562)

COMMENTARY.

'Yēna'—indicates the reason for what has been asserted above. What is meant is that—because, in the case of the Cognition of Similarity, what is cognised is the 'presence of several similar parts',—and not the 'presence of all similar parts';—therefore this is a case of 'Mutual Negation'.—Otherwise, if all parts were similar, then there would be identity,—i.e. the Gavaya would be the same as the Cow.—(1562)

TEXT (1563).

Some people have held the view that—"After having heard the analogical statement, when one sees the similar object, he has the cognition of connection with the name,—and it is this that is called Analogical Cognition."—(1563)

COMMENTARY.

'Some people'—i.e. the Naiyāyikas.

They have provided the following definition of Analogy—"Analogy is that which accomplishes its purpose through similarity to a known object.—(Nyāyaśūtra 1. 1. 6)—The term 'prasiddhasadharmya' may mean either 'through similarity to a known object', or 'through well-known similarity';—the 'object' of which this 'similarity' is known is the Gavaya;—'through this'_—i.e. on the basis of this,—there is 'accomplishment'—fulfilment—of the 'purpose'—i.e. of the relation of Name and Named; and this is Analogical Cognition."

Other people have expressed the same idea in other words, as follows:—"Certain impressions having been left on the mind by a previous Verbal Cognition,—those impressions bring about a Remembrance,—this Remembrance leads to the Cognition of Similarity,—from which there follows the cognition of the relation to a Name,—this last cognition is Analogical Cognition.—The 'Verbal Cognition' meant here is that derived from the analogical statement—e.g. 'the Gavaya is like the Cow',—this produces an Impression, a faculty in the Mind,—this Impression brings about the remembrance of the said analogical statement, on the occasion of seeing the Gavaya in the present;—on the basis of this Remembrance, there follows a notion of Similarity.—'Samākhya' is Name, i.e. the word;—this Name is related to the object;—and the cognition of this Relation is what constitutes Analogical Cognition."
This is exactly the same idea (that has been set forth in the Nyāya-sūtra quoted above).—(1563)

The above view of Analogical Cognition is refuted in the following—

TEXTS (1564-1565).

If the perfect idea of the relation to the Name is there at the time of the hearing of the analogical statement,—then the resultant Analogical Cognition apprehends what has been already apprehended; and as such, it cannot have the character of a Means of Valid Cognition; because, like Remembrance, this Analogy also is devoid of the true character of the 'Instrument' (and Pramāṇa is an Instrument, a Means, of Cognition).—(1564-1565)

COMMENTARY.

At the time that the statement of analogy is heard, the idea of the relation of Name and Named is already there;—if the same idea appears again subsequently, it apprehends what has been already apprehended before, and hence—like Remembrance—cannot be a valid cognition.

It might be urged that—"It may apprehend what is already apprehended, and yet it may be a Means of valid cognition; what would be the incongruity in that?"

The answer to this is—"It is devoid of, etc. etc."—That is, the 'true character of Instrument' consists in being the most effective cause,—and a cause is most effective only when it tends to bring about what has not been already brought about.—(1564-1565)

The following might be urged—"There has been no previous idea of the relation of the Name at all; hence the Reason 'because it apprehends what is already apprehended' is not admissible".

Answer:

TEXT (1566).

If the idea has not been there, then, how is it that the man has the notion that 'This is the object whose Name I had heard before'?—(1566)

COMMENTARY.

If the cognition of the relation of the Name had not been there, then there could have been no such cognition, later on, as that 'this is the Gavaya whose name I had heard before'.—(1566)

A further argument to the same effect is stated:
TEXT (1567).

If a man has never heard of the name concerned, then, on seeing the Gavaya, he would never be able to have the idea that 'I had heard the name of this animal'.—(1567)

COMMENTARY.

Aviddhakarpa has asserted as follows:—"Of the name, the man has a general (vague) notion through Verbal Cognition,—and it is the definite idea of it that is brought about by Analogy".

This view is set forth in the following—

TEXT (1568).

"When one has heard the analogical statement, and perceives the similarity, he cognises the relation (of the Name) in connection with the particular object."—(1568)

COMMENTARY.

The word 'upayuktopa, etc. etc.'—is one who has heard the statement of analogy.—(1568)

The same idea is further expounded:—

TEXT (1569).

"Through verbal assertion, the man cognises the relation in a general way; and through analogy he cognises it as pertaining to a particular object."—(1569)

COMMENTARY.

'Particular object'—i.e. the Gavaya.

The answer to the above is provided by the following—
OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.

TEXT (1570).

WHEN THE RELATION OF THE NAME HAS BEEN COGNISED IN CONNECTION WITH ONE THING, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO RECOGNISE IT IN CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER THING; AS IT WOULD LEAD TO INCONGRUITIES.—(1570)

COMMENTARY.

'Na' has to be construed with 'Yujyatē'.

When the relation of the name has been cognised in regard to one thing, it cannot be right to cognise the same name as applied to another thing; for, if it did, then there would be incongruities.—(1570)

The possible incongruity is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1571–1573).

WHEN A MAN HAS RECOGNISED A CERTAIN NAME AS APPLYING TO THE MAN WITH THE WONDERFUL ARMLET, HE DOES NOT, AT ANOTHER TIME, RECOGNISE IT AS APPLYING TO THE MAN WITH THE BEAUTIFUL DIADEM.

—FOR THESE REASONS, WHEN A MAN HAS COME TO KNOW OF A NAME AS APPLYING TO A CERTAIN CONCEPTUAL IMAGE RECOGNISED AS SOMETHING EXTERNAL, AND CALLED THE 'UNIVERSAL',—THEN, EVEN IF HE COMES TO PERCEIVE THE Gavaya, HE MUST RECOGNISE IT AS APPLYING TO THE Gavaya ITSELF; AND IT IS ONLY ONE WHO IS IGNORANT OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE 'PERCEPTIBLE' AND THE 'CONCEPTUAL' THAT REGARDS IT AS 'EXTERNAL'.—(1571–1573)

COMMENTARY:

'Anāgada' is an ornament called 'Kāṭaka', Armlet.

'Chitrānāgada'—is the man who is wearing a 'chitra'—wonderful—'anāgada'—armlet.

When the man with the wonderful armlet has been once spoken of as 'Devadatta' (by name)—in the statement 'The man with the wonderful armlet is Devadatta',—and one, on hearing this, has cognised the name as belonging to that person,—he does not, at any future time, recognise that expression 'man with the wonderful bracelet' as applying to Yajñadatta, who is a 'man with the beautiful diadem'.

'Kīrīṭa' is diadem;—'Chārukīrīṭa' is the man with the beautiful diadem.

For the above reasons, in order to avoid the likelihood of the incongruity, when a Name has been recognised by a determinate cognition envisaging an external object, as applicable to a conceptually imposed object,—then, if he comes to perceive the Gavaya, he recognises that name as applied to that same conceptually imposed object,—and not to the external Specific Individuality of the name of 'Gavaya'; and the same conceptual Image is
what is spoken of as the ‘Universal’.—And this is purely imaginary, as it has been discarded above.

Question:—“How then is there the idea of the external Specific Individuality ?”

Answer:—‘It is only one, etc. etc.’—(1571-1573)

Question:—“What would be the incongruity if the Word (Name) were applied to the Specific Individuality ?”

Answer:—

TEXT (1574).

IT HAS TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE IDEA OF CONCEPTUAL CONTENTS AND WORDS ENVISAGING SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITIES HAS BEEN REJECTED IN DETAIL.—(1574)

COMMENTARY.

In course of our examination of the Denotation of Words, the idea that Words and Conceptual Contents envisage Specific Individualities, has been rejected in detail. Hence what is expressed by the name must be the conceptually imposed thing.—(1574)

TEXTS (1575-1576).

Even if they were envisaged by Words and Conceptual Contents, the resultant cognition would only be ‘Inference. That it proceeds from the ‘three-featured Indicative’ is thus deduced—‘This animal, which is similar to the Cow, is one to which the name Gavaya is applicable,—just like the Gavaya which was present in the mind at the time when the relevant Convention became known’.—

(1575-1576)

COMMENTARY.

We grant—for the sake of argument—that Words and Conceptual Contents envisage Specific Individualities. Even so, the Cognition in question becomes included under ‘Inference’; and Analogical Cognition cannot be a distinct form of Cognition.

Question:—“How can it be included under Inference when it is not brought about by the three-featured Indicative ?”

Answer—‘That it proceeds, etc. etc.’:—‘Similarity to the Cow’ is the Probans; ‘being one to which the name Gavaya is applicable’ is the Pro-
bandum; and 'the Gavaya present in the Mind, in the shape of the Reflected Conceptual Content, at the time that the Convention became known' is the Corroborative Instance;—and the Gavaya perceived at the time is the Subject, the Minor Term.—(1575-1576)

The following might be urged:—"At the time that the relevant Convention,—in the form 'The Gavaya is like the Cow',—was made, the Gavaya was not present in the Mind at all; hence the Instance cited is inadmissible".

The Answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1577).

IF AT THE TIME OF THE CONVENTION, THE GAVAYA WAS NOT PRESENT EVEN IN THE MIND,—THEN WITH REFERENCE TO WHAT IS THE CONVENTION MADE THAT 'IT IS SIMILAR TO THE COW'?—(1577)

COMMENTARY.

'Even in the mind'—the term 'even' means—'it is not only not seen, (but also not present in the mind)'.

If there is nothing that appears in the Mind as qualified by similarity to the Cow,—then, at the time that the Convention is made in the form 'it is similar to the Cow',—on what thing is this Convention based? And yet, such a Convention is actually made;—hence it has to be admitted that at the time of the making of the Convention, there is something present in the Mind which is qualified by similarity to the Cow.—(1577)

So far, it has been taken for granted (for the sake of argument) that the 'relation between the Name and the thing Named' forms the object of Analogical Cognition,—and then it has been shown that this Analogical Cognition cannot be regarded as a distinct form of valid Cognition,—(1) because it apprehends what is already apprehended (which fact makes it invalid), and (2) because it is included under 'Inference'.—Now what the Author proceeds to show is as follows:—the Relation can have no existence apart from the Relatives;—and the two Relatives in question (the Name and the Named) have both been apprehended by other Means of Cognition; for instance, at the time of the communication of the Convention, the Name was apprehended by Auditory Perception, and later on the Gavaya standing before the man is apprehended by Visual Perception; under the circumstances, what else is there to be known, for knowing which Analogy would serve as the Means of Cognition?—
It has been proved that the relation has no existence apart from the relatives;—on the previous occasion, at the time of the Convention, the name was perceived by auditory perception;—and later on the animal standing before the man is seen with the eye;—apart from these two already thus cognised, any mingling up of the two could not be valid cognition. Because any other cognition could only recapitulate what has been already cognised; as in the case of the notions of 'fragrant' and 'sweet'.—Thus the notion of the connection of the name cannot escape from being of the nature of remembrance.—(1578–1580)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is that the Cognition in question cannot be valid, as it apprehends what has been already apprehended.

'It has been proved'—in course of our examination of the Category of Quality.

The following might be urged:—"The two Relatives may have been cognised by auditory and other perceptions; it is the commingling of the two that is done by Analogical Cognition; and it is in this commingling that lies the validity of Analogical Cognition'.

The answer to this is—'Apart from these two, etc. etc.'

'As in the case of the notions, etc. etc.'—The affix 'vati' has the force of the Locative. The sense is that there are such notions as—'This thing that I have perceived is fragrant and sweet', where there is a commingling of things already apprehended,—which are not regarded as valid;' so would the Cognition in Question also be.

'Tat'—Thus, therefore.

'Nama瑜伽, etc.'—the cognition of the connection of the Name.

'Can escape, etc. etc.'—as already explained.—(1578–1580)

The following might be urged:—"The connection of the Name is nowhere created through similarity; what happens is that when the thing named is perceived, it is pointed out that 'this is the Cow', which is the form given to the Convention; nothing like this happens when the thing concerned is not perceived at all'.

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (1581).

Notions of connection with Names are produced by endless means, even apart from similarity; as is found in the case of such names as 'Narapa' (King) and the like.—(1581)

COMMENTARY.

'Notions, etc. etc.'—i.e. notions of the relation of Names.
'As in the case, etc. etc.'—i.e. of 'King' and such names.—(1581)

An example is cited of the manner in which notions of Names are brought about by endless means:

TEXTS (1582-1583).

'That person is the King who is protected from the rays of the Sun by the white umbrella';—having been told thus, the man, later on, sees such a person,—and through the said advice, comes to have the notion that 'this is the person bearing the name King'.—Now this would have to be regarded as a distinct form of Valid Cognition, as it has not been brought about by similarity or any such conditions (as bring about other forms of Cognition).—

(1582-1583)

COMMENTARY.

Someone says to another man—'Brother, please go for this business, and see the King passing along with many persons riding elephants and horses'.—The other man says—'Which one among them is the King?' The first man replies—'Among them, that person is the King who is protected from the Sun's rays by the white Umbrella'.—Bearing this instruction in his mind, the man goes forward, and when he sees such a person as described to him, there appears in his mind the idea that 'this is the person named King'.—Now, according to you (Naïyāyika)—this also would have to be regarded as a distinct form of valid Cognition—why?—Because it has not been brought about by similarity or any such conditions. This shows that the said notion is not included under the six well-known forms of Valid Cognition.—(1582-1583)

Aviddhakarpa notices the view that "there are only two Means (or Forms) of Cognition; and there is no object of Cognition apart from Specific Individuality and Commonality (or the Universal)";—and in refutation of this view, he puts forward the following arguments:—" (a) Perception has its companion
in the shape of a form of Cognition in addition to Inference,—because it is a form of Cognition,—like Inference.—Or (b) Inference has its companion in the shape of a form of Cognition in addition to Perception,—because it is a form of Cognition,—like Perception. Similarly (c) Specific Individuality has for its companion a cognisable object in addition to the Universal,—because it is cognisable,—like the Universal.—Or (d) The Universal has for its companion, a cognisable object in addition to the Specific Individuality,—because it is cognisable,—like the Specific Individuality."

This (view of Aviddhakarna) is what is set forth in the following—

**TEXTS (1584–1586).**

"ANOTHER PARTY SEEKS TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF ANOTHER FORM OF COGNITION, ON THE STRENGTH OF INFERENCE, THUS :—PERCEPTION IS CONNECTED WITH A FORM OF COGNITION DIFFERENT FROM INFERENCE, BECAUSE IT IS A FORM OF COGNITION, LIKE INFERENCE. SIMILARLY INFERENCE ALSO."

THIS IS NOT RIGHT; AS THE PROBANS CITED IS NOT INVARIABLY CONCOMITANT (WITH THE PROBANDUM); AND SPECIALY BECAUSE NOTHING IS PUT FORWARD WHICH WOULD NEGATIVE THE CONTRARY OF THE DESIRED CONCLUSION.—FURTHER, IN THIS WAY, YOU WOULD BE RUNNING COUNTER TO THE DOCTRINE OF 'FOUR FORMS OF COGNITION'. THE ANSWER THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO THAT WOULD ALSO SERVE HERE.—(1584–1586)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Saṅgatam'—connected, related.

This is only by way of illustration; it should be understood to apply to the proving of the existence of other cognisable things also.

Nothing has been mentioned by way of negativing the Probans in the contrary of the Probandum; hence there can be no Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum. Consequently all that has been cited as the Probans is Inconclusive; because their presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion.

Then again, what is asserted goes against the doctrine that restricts the number of the Forms of Cognition to four; as in the way shown, the existence of other forms of cognition also might be proved. For instance, it can be said that—'Perception has for its companion a Form of Cognition other than Inference, Analogical Cognition and Verbal Cognition,—because it is a Form of Cognition,—like Inference'.

Further Cognisable Things have been held to fall under three classes—viz.: Universal, Particular and Particular-Universal. This also would be contravened; as in the same way the existence of other Cognisable Things also may be proved.

Whatever answer you may have to these criticisms will serve my purpose also; so enough of this.—(1584–1586)
CHAPTER XIX.

Section (C)

On Presumption.

COMMENTARY.

The following has been urged in regard to 'Presumption' (which has been regarded as an independent Means or Form of Cognition, by Mimāmsakas):

TEXT (1587).

"IF A CERTAIN FACT, COGNISED THROUGH THE SIX MEANS OF COGNITION, IS FOUND TO BE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE, AND THENCE LEADS TO THE ASSUMPTION OF SOME OTHER FACT,—THIS IS CALLED 'Arthāpatti' 'PREJUMPION' ".—(1587)

[KUMĀRILA : Shlokavārtika—Arthāpatti, 1.]

COMMENTARY.

In regard to Time, Place, etc., when a certain fact has been duly cognised through the six Means of Cognition,—in the shape of Perception, Inference, Analogy, Word, Presumption and Negation,—and it is found to be otherwise inexplicable,—if a certain other fact were not there,—then the assumption of this other fact is made pertaining to what is not perceptible;—this assumption is the Means of Cognition called 'Presumption'.

'Called'—i.e. by Shabaravāmin; who says (under Śū. 1. 1. 5)—'Presumption consists in the presuming of something not seen, on the ground that a fact already perceived or heard of would not be possible without that presumption; for instance, it is found that Devadatta, who is alive, is not in the house,—and this non-existence in the house (which is seen) leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house'.

In this passage, the term 'seen' stands for 'cognised through the five means of Cognitions other than Word'; and 'heard of' stands for 'cognised by means of the Word'.—(1587)

In the following Texts, examples are set forth, in order, of Presumption based upon the six Means of Cognition:
"For example—(1) the assumption of the burning power of Fire, based upon the perceived fact of its having burnt a certain thing;—(2) the assumption of the mobility of the Sun based upon the inferred fact of its going from place to place.—[Shlokavārtika—Presumption, 3];—(3) the Potencies of all things are presumed on the basis of the inexplicability of the effects produced by them; [Shlokavārtika—Shūnya, 254]; and all such Potencies that become cognised are such as have not been known already,—and these are cognised without any idea of the relation (of Concomitance)."—(1588-1589)

**COMMENTARY.**

(1) An example of Presumption based upon Perception is the following—Having perceived the fact of burning by Fire, there is Presumption of the presence of Burning Power of Fire.

(2) An example of Presumption based upon Inference is the following—When the fact of the Sun's moving from place to place has been inferred, this leads to the Presumption of the presence of mobility in the Sun.

(3) The potencies of all things are always presumed on the basis of the inexplicability otherwise of the effects produced by them. This Presumption (of Potencies) itself is based sometimes on Perception; e.g. when one perceives the effect and thence resembles the potency in the Cause;—when however the effect is known through Inference or some other means of Cognition, and thence the Potency of the Cause is presumed, then the Presumption is based upon Inference or some other Means of Cognition.

The compound 'Kāryārthāpatti, etc.' is to be expounded as 'those whose cognition is brought about by the otherwise inexplicability of the effect;—(i.e. the fact that the effect cannot be explained except on the basis of the Potencies)'.

It cannot be said that the Potency of the Cause is already known; because the said Potencies that are cognised are always such as are not already known; so that the cognition does not apprehend what has been already apprehended; and hence this must be regarded as a Form of Valid Cognition.

It might be argued that—'Potencies are always inferred from the effects,—they are not presumed'.

The answer to this is that the cognitions in question are brought about without any idea of the relation (of Concomitance, necessary in all Inference); hence they cannot be regarded as Inference.—(1588-1589)

The following text proceeds to show the said absence of any idea of the Relation:
TEXT (1590).

"THE RELATION OF THESE POTENCIES HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY COGNISED;—NOR IS IT COGNISED NOW; AND IT IS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF SUCH COGNITIONS THAT THERE COULD BE THE TWO PREMISSES."—(1590)

COMMENTARY.

Prior to the time of Inference, the relation of the Potencies to the effects has not been cognised,—in the way in which the relation of Fire and Smoke is previously recognised in the kitchen; because the Potencies are not perceptible. This shows that there can be no Major Premiss (asserting the Invariable Concomitance).

'Nor is it cognised now'—at the time of Inference; for the same reason that they are not perceptible. This shows that there can be no Minor Premiss.

The effect cannot be regarded as a property of the Potencies residing in the Cause, as there can be no ground for this idea.—(1590)

TEXT (1591).

"IN THE CASE OF PROVING THE POTENCY OF THE EAR, ETC., WHATEVER PROBANS MIGHT BE PUT FORWARD, WOULD ALL BE FOUND TO BE 'OF UNKNOWN SUBSTRATUM'; AS THE SUBSTRATUM WOULD CONSIST OF THE POTENCIES THEMSELVES, AND THESE ARE STILL UNKNOWN."—(1591)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, in a case where the Potencies of the Ear, etc. are made the Subject of the Inference, whatever Probans (Reason) might be put forward, for the proving of the said Potencies, would all be 'of unknown substratum'; because the Potencies would be their substratum, and these are not known (as yet).

From all this it follows that all Potencies are cognisable through Presumption, not through Inference.—(1591)

TEXT (1592).

"(4) 'HE IS CORPULENT AND DOES NOT EAT DURING THE DAY'—ON HEARING SUCH WORDS, ONE CONCLUDES THAT THE MAN EATS AT NIGHT; AND THIS IS PRESUMPTION BASED UPON WHAT IS HEARD."—[SHLO. VĂ.—PRESUMPTION, 51]—(1592)

COMMENTARY.

(4) Presumption based upon Verbal Cognition is there when, on hearing the words that 'Devadatta is corpulent without medication, and does not
eat during the day', one concludes that the man eats beforehand at night. Such an assumption is Presumption.—(1592)

The following might be urged:—'The idea that the Man eats at night is derived from the said words—He is corpulent and eats not during the day—they themselves [so that it is only a case of Verbal Cognition].'

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1593–1598).

"As a matter of fact, the idea of the Night (and the Man eating at night) cannot be derived from the sentence speaking of the Day (and the man not eating); because what is expressed by the words of the latter has no connection with eating at night. Nor is there any contradistinction whereby the latter could indicate the eating at night.—Nor can a second (and totally different) meaning be attributed to the words (speaking of the Day); because these are already taken up in expressing another idea.—From all this it follows that the idea in question (of eating at night) is derived from a totally different sentence present only in the mind of the person. —Thus then, this sentence (in the mind), though it is not actually verbally expressed, is yet duly cognised,—and it has to be pointed out which one among the Means of Cognition, Perception and the rest, it is which brings about the cognition of the said (unspoken) sentence.—As the Sentence is not actually spoken, it could not be Perception; nor could it be Inference, because the Sentence has never been found to be concomitant with the other factor; and if, even when this relation (of concomitance) has never been perceived, the factor concerned were regarded as an Inferential Indicative,—then the utterance of any one sentence might bring about the cognition of all Sentences; because on the point of being unrelated, there would be no distinction between one sentence and another."—(1593–1598)—[Shloka-vārtika—Arthāpatti, 56–61.]

COMMENTARY.

There are two kinds of meaning possible in a sentence—in the form of (a) Connection and (b) Contradistinction; of these 'Connection' consists in the
unification or commingling of things expressed by the words like Milk and Water, and 'Contradistinction' consists in these things expressed standing in the relation of excluder and excluded;—or 'Connection' consists in the well-known relation of cause and effect,—and 'Contradistinction' in the exclusion of the unlike.—In neither of these two forms could the (unspoken) sentence 'He eats at night' be the meaning of the (spoken) sentence 'He eats not in the day'. For instance, the words of the sentence 'He eats not in the day' denote the Day and so forth; and these have no 'Connection' with eating at night; as the two are entirely different. Nor is there 'Contradistinction' between them; because the word 'day' is never used in the sense of the negation of non-night.

It might be argued that—"That he eats at night is another meaning of the same sentence 'He eats not in the day'."

The answer to this is—'Nor can a second meaning, etc. etc.'—There can be no assumption of another meaning for the same sentence,—as it is entirely taken up in expressing the idea of the man not eating in the day, and hence cannot express the other idea that he eats at night. Consequently the idea of the man eating at night must be expressed by another sentence. 'Present in the mind'—This shows that the cognition is not Verbal.

'Though it is not verbally expressed',—i.e. even though it is not Verbal, due to words; as in the manner shown above, it cannot be verbal cognition.

For the cognition, then, of the sentence—'He eats at night'—which is understood (in the Mind), some 'Means' will have to be pointed out; which could only be one out of Perception and the rest.—And yet it cannot be any of these. Hence it must be an entirely distinct Means of Cognition.—This is what is meant.

The idea of the required Means being one from among Perception and the rest is next refuted—'As the sentence, etc. etc.'—The sentence expressing the idea of the man eating at night, not being actually spoken, cannot be of the nature of Perception, because it is not heard. Nor can it be of the nature of Inference, because there is no relation (of concomitance). For instance, the sentence expressing the fact of eating at night has never been perceived in association with the sentence speaking of not-eating in the day,—which fact alone could constitute the relation of concomitance between the two. Nor is there any other Inferential Indicative available.

It might be argued that, "even without the perception of any relation, it could be regarded as an Inferential Indicative",".

The answer to that is—'And if, even when. etc. etc.'—That is to say, if it could be an Inferential Indicative even when it is not known to be related, then from the utterance of the sentence speaking of the man not-eating in the day, there should follow the cognition of all sentences,—not only of the sentence speaking of eating at night.—Why?—Because, as regards being devoid of relation, the sentence speaking of eating at night does not differ from any other sentence; that is, in the point of being not-related, all sentences stand on the same footing.—(1593–1598)

The following Text describes the Presumption based upon Analogical Cognition:—
TEXT (1599).

"(5) The Cow is likened to the Gavaya,—a cognition is produced by this likeness,—the potency in the object whereby it becomes apprehended by that cognition,—is derived on the strength of the said Analogical Cognition."—(1599)

COMMENTARY.

(5) When the object, Cow, is likened to the Gavaya, there is in the Cow the capacity to be apprehended by the Analogical Cognition; and this capacity is derived from the strength—Presumption—based upon that Analogical Cognition.—(1599)

The following Texts describe the Presumption based upon Presumption—

TEXTS (1600-1601).

"(6) Inasmuch as the denotation of a word cannot be otherwise defined, we assume the expressive potency of words; and as this potency would not be otherwise possible, we deduce, through another Presumption, the eternity of words; [Shlokavartika—Arthāpatti, 6-7];—because what is non-eternal cannot be related to any Convention."—(1600-1601)

COMMENTARY.

'Abhīdhā'—Denotation; i.e. expressing of meaning.—This could not be done by words, could not be defined,—except through Expressive Potency;—having thus 'presumed' the expressive potency of Word, it is found that this potency would not be otherwise possible,—i.e. there is no other way of explaining such a Potency,—without recognising the eternity of words; so that this cognition of the eternality of words is also obtained by means of another Presumption.

Question:—"Why cannot there be Expressive Potency without eternity?"

Answer:—'Because what is non-eternal, etc. etc.'—That is to say, if what was perceived at the time of the making of the Convention does not continue to exist till the time of being used, then, the making of the Convention would be entirely futile; as Convention is set up only for purposes of usage; and the Word that is present at the time of usage is not one with which the connection of the meaning had been set up at the time of the Convention.
OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.

Or, the text may be explained in another way:—'Tadananyagatāḥ'—since, of the word existing at the time of usage, there is no difference from the word perceived at the time of the making of the Convention.—How is it known that there is no difference?—Answer—Because what is non-eternal, etc. etc.'—(1600-1601)

The following Texts describe the Presumption based upon Negation:—

TEXTS (1602-1606).

“(7) The absence of Chaitra from the House having been cognised through Negation, the cognition of the presence of Chaitra outside the House which is marked by his absence, has been cited; this is to be regarded as another kind of Presumption, based upon Negation. [Shlokavártika—Arthāpatti, 8-9].—This (Presumption) is different from Inference, because the Minor Premiss (Probans as residing in the Minor Term) and the other factors do not form part of it. When the object cognised, is either the Man connected with the exterior (of the House), or the exterior connected with the Man,—in either case, how could ‘absence in the House’ serve as the Probans (residing in that subject)?—[Ibid., 10-12].—What is regarded as the Probans in this case is the ‘absence of the living man in the House’; and there can be no cognition of this absence without knowing his presence outside the House. [Ibid., 19].—As for pure ‘absence in the House’;—apart from the idea of his being alive—such absence is found in the case of dead persons also, and hence cannot be a proof of his presence outside.”—[Ibid., 21].—(1602-1606)

COMMENTARY.

The absence of Chaitra has been cognised by the Negation—absence,—of Perception and other Means of Cognition;—the House is qualified by this ascertained absence;—i.e. the idea that ‘Chaitra is not in the House’;—and the presence of Chaitra,—if he is alive—is cognised as being outside of the said House;—this cognition, in the form ‘Chaitra is outside the house’,—has been cited—in the Bhāṣya, by Shabarasvāmin;—that is, only as an indication of the other kinds of Presumption; e.g. when Dévadatta is alive, if he is not in the house, there is Presumption of him as being out of the house.

This is an example of Presumption based upon Negation.

Almost all Naiyáyikás have included Presumption under ‘Inference’. In refutation of this view, Kumarila adds—‘This is different from Inference, etc. etc.’—Inasmuch as the Probans, etc. do not enter into it as factors—as its causes—this must be different from Inference; just like Perception. Because the object of cognition in this case is either Chaitra qualified by the
place outside the house, or the place outside the house qualified by Chaitra; in either case, how could the absence of Chaitra, which resides elsewhere (inside the House) serve as the Probans? That is to say, it could never serve as the Probans.

Then again, if absence in the House were assumed as the Probans,—it could be so assumed only in one or the other of two ways—i.e. either as the absence of the living Devadatta, in the House, or absence in the House in general. In the former case, there would be this objection—that 'the absence of the living man, etc. etc.'—‘there can be no cognition of this absence, etc. etc.’—That is, the cognition of the living Devadatta—the certainty regarding it—would not be possible until his presence outside is definitely known.

What is meant by this is that the Probans in this case would be one that is 'inadmissible', and that if it is admissible, it is futile.

If the second alternative is accepted [i.e. absence in the House in general is the Probans], the Probans would be Inconclusive; as even when Devadatta is dead, people recognise his absence in the House. This is what is shown in the words 'as for pure absence in the House, etc., etc.'—'Vidyamānate' is being alive.—(1602–1606)

With the following Texts begin the refutation of the above view (regarding Presumption as a distinct Means of Cognition).

In the first place, the definition that has been provided is not a proper one. For instance, the definition provided is that 'Presumption consists in the presuming of an imperceptible fact without which a perceived or heard of fact would not be possible'. In connection with this, the following points have to be considered:—Has the relation of that imperceptible fact with the perceived and heard of facts been perceived anywhere, or not? If it has been perceived, then the cognition in question becomes an Inference, as brought about by the perception of the said Relation.—If the Relation has not been perceived, then, in that case, the non-burning power of Fire might also be presumed, in the same way as its burning power is; because so far as being not related is concerned, both stand upon the same footing.—It might be argued that—'inasmuch as Fire has never been actually found to be associated with non-burning power, there can be no presumption of this latter'.—But in that case, there should be no presumption of the burning power also; because Fire has never been seen to be associated with that power. Thus it is only when the relation between two things is well known that, on seeing one of the two invariably concomitant members of that relation, there can be a presumption of the other relative;—and when this has been presumed,—it is only through the said Relation; and hence this presumption becomes included under 'Inference'.

The examples also that have been cited are not right. These examples have been cited to show that through four Presumptions one cognises the Potency of something known through Perception and the other Means of Cognition.

The author points out the defect that is common to all these:—
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TEXT (1607).

APART FROM THE Potent OBJECT, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS 'Potency',
which could be cognised by means of Presumption; and as
for the Potent object, it is cognised through
Perception itself.—(1607)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as Potency is nothing apart from the Potent object,—and
the Potent object is cognisable by Perception,—Presumption would be
apprehending what is already apprehended; and on that ground alone, it
could not be regarded as a Means of Valid Cognition.

The mention of 'Perception' in this connection is only by way of
illustration.—(1607)

The following Texts point out the objections that are applicable specially
to that example of Presumption which has been cited as based upon
Perception:

TEXTS (1608–1610).

IN THE CASE OF SUCH PHENOMENA AS Burning AND THE REST, THEIR
CAUSE IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED IN THE FORM OF THE Fire AND THE
REST, AND THERE IS NOTHING WRONG OR UNCERTAIN IN THIS PER-
CEPTION; WHAT THEN COULD 'Potency' BE, APART FROM THOSE
CAUSES?—IF THE 'Potency' IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT (FROM THE
SAID CAUSES), THEN AS THAT 'Potency' WOULD BE WHAT BRINGS
ABOUT THE EFFECT, THE OBJECT (CAUSE) ITSELF WOULD NOT BE AN
ACTIVE AGENT AT ALL (IN THE BRINGING ABOUT OF THAT EFFECT);
IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE OBJECT DOES BRING ABOUT THE EFFECT,
THEN THE Potency WOULD NOT BE ANYTHING DIFFERENT;—
BECAUSE THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF THE 'Object' IS THAT
IT SHOULD BE capable of effective action; AND THAT THE OBJECT IS
SO CAPABLE IS LEARNT FROM Perception ITSELF.—(1608–1610)

COMMENTARY.

'There is nothing wrong, etc.'—This compound is to be taken as an
adverb (modifying the verb 'perceived').

If the Potency is regarded to be something different from the object,
then,—in the bringing about of the effect (in the shape of the phenomenon
cited), the Potency being the effective agent, the object itself would cease
to be an active agent; which would mean that the object is a non-entity;
as the characteristic of the Entity is that it should be capable of effective
action.

If, in order to guard against the object becoming a non-entity, it be
admitted that the object does have some action in the bringing about of the
effect concerned,—then the 'Potency' could not be anything different—from the object.—Why?—Because 'Potency' can be only that form—or nature,—which is capable of effective action;—it cannot be anything else.

As regards the verbal expression 'the Potency of the object'—which implies some sort of a difference between the two,—that is meant to discard the notion of any other kind of difference, and is used in this form only with a view to the enquiry as to what 'Potency' is,—and the answer is that it is the object itself.—(1608–1610)

The following might be urged—"Capacity for effective action is not the characteristic of Potency; it is something else".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (1611).

There is no means of knowing any other characteristic of Potency.

Even if such another characteristic were known, there would be no use for it; as the effect would be accomplished by the mere presence of the object.—(1611)

COMMENTARY.

There is no means of knowing any other characteristic of 'Potency',—which Means could distinguish Potency from 'Negation'—in the form of the absence of all capacity.—Even if such a characteristic were known, it would serve no useful purpose for men who would be seeking for effective action; because the needed effective action will have been accomplished by the presence—i.e. by the very nature—of the Object itself;—as has been declared in the following words: 'To persons seeking for effective action, what would be the use of cogitating over what is not fit for effective action? Certainly, the young woman has no need to consider whether the impotent man is ugly or handsome'.—(1611)

TEXT (1612).

If the other characteristic of 'Potency' were held to be cognisable through presumption based upon the fact of the effect being otherwise impossible,—this cannot be right, as the effect is actually produced otherwise,—as it proceeds from the Object itself.—(1612)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"There is another characteristic of Potency—that is, Potency which is always cognisable through the fact of
the effect not being otherwise possible; so that—'being inferred from the effect' would be the characteristic of Potency'.

This definition of Potency cannot be right.—"Why?"—Because the effect is actually produced otherwise,—that is, the effect is produced even without such a distinct thing as 'Potency'.—"How so?"—It proceeds from the Object itself.—Because this effect proceeds from the Object—the Thing—therefore the existence of the effect is possible even without the Potency; so that what is the use of assuming the Potency as something apart from the Thing itself?—(1612)

TEXT (1613).

Fire, as apart from Water and other things, is clearly perceived as capable of burning; what then is the use of the said 'Potency'?—(1613)

COMMENTARY.

The same idea is further clarified—

TEXT (1614).

If it be urged that—"The Potency is not something absolutely different (from the Thing),—it is of a dual character, being both (different and non-different)'—then (the answer is that) it cannot be so, because of self-contradiction. And further, its non-difference (from the Thing) would be cognised by Perception.—(1614)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged:—"The objection urged would apply if we held that the Potency is something absolutely different from the Thing; as a matter of fact, however, we regard it to be of a dual character, being both different and non-different'.

This cannot be right.—"Why?"—Because of self-contradiction;—if it is different, how could it be non-different at the same time? If it is non-different, how could it be different? There is clear self-contradiction if two mutually exclusive properties—the presence of one of which must mean the absence of the other and vice versa,—are attributed to the same thing. In fact, being another consists in not being the same, as is found in the case of 'another self'.

Granting that the Potency has the dual character,—even so, that Potency of the dual character is cognisable by Perception itself; because the non-difference of the Potency from the Thing is also cognised by Perception,—and not absolute difference only; whereby it would not be perceptible. Under the circumstances, the statement that 'Potency is always cognisable from the effect' would become set aside.—(1614)
TEXT (1615).

The perceptibility (of Potency) being thus established,—all that has been said (by the other party) regarding its not being cognisable by Inference, does not affect us. Because in this case we do not regard the cognition to be of the nature of Inference.—(1615)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, it has been declared (by Kumārila, see above under Text 1589) that "Potencies of all Things become cognised through Presumption" and so forth; where it has been shown that Potencies cannot be inferred. That does not affect our position at all.—"Why?"—Because in this case—of Potency being perceptible,—we do not regard the cognition to be of the nature of Inference; for the simple reason that Inference consists of the cognition of only such things as are not cognisable by Perception.

This shows that the arguments adduced are superfluous.—(1615)

It has been argued above under Text 1591, that "whatever Reasons are adduced in regard to the Potency of the Ear, etc. would all be such as have their substratum unknown".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1616).

As regards such things as the Auditory Organ and the like which are not amenable to Perception,—their very existence, in the shape of Potency, is cognised by Inference.—(1616)

COMMENTARY.

Objection:—"It has been said previously that their existence is proved; why then is it said now that their existence is indicated?"

Reply:—

TEXT (1617).

What was asserted on the previous occasion was only the fact of the apprehension of sound being dependent on other causes,—on the ground that even when its cause was there, it did not come about, because something else was absent;—as in the case of the Sprout and such things.—(1617)

COMMENTARY.

Existence is not proved directly; what is proved is the fact of Auditory and other Perceptions, as the Subject, being dependent upon other causes,—
on the ground that when the other cause, of its Auditory Perception,—in the
shape of attention of the mind—is not there the Perception does not come
about. This argument is formulated as follows:—When even on the presence
of something, another thing appears only occasionally (not always), then this
latter must be dependent upon other causes; e.g. even when the soil is there,
the Sprout appears only occasionally;—even when the attention of the
Mind is there, the Auditory Perception comes about only occasionally; this
thus is a Reason based upon the nature of things. When this fact of
being dependent upon other causes has been established, then it is deduced
that that other cause must be the well-known Auditory Organ; that is why
it is said that existence is cognised, in this way—and not directly.—Hence
there is nothing wrong in this.—(1617)

It has been argued (under Text 1588) that—"From the inferred mobility
of the Sun, the Potency is cognised by Presumption".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1618-1619).

WHEN THE SUN REACHES ANOTHER PLACE, WHAT HAPPENS ALWAYS IS THAT
IT IS BORN (AGAIN) IN A PLACE DIFFERENT FROM ITS ORIGINAL
PLACE; THIS IS AS IT IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE FIRE-
FLAME; A THING THAT REMAINS PERMANENT IS OF A
TOTALLY DIFFERENT KIND; OTHERWISE SUCH
REACHING OF ANOTHER PLACE WOULD NOT BE
POSSIBLE.—AS REGARDS POTENCY, IT HAS
ALREADY BEEN SHOWN THAT IT IS
NOTHING APART FROM THE THING.

—(1618-1619)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that Presumption is included under Inference.

For instance, whenever anything is found to reach another place, it is a
case of the thing being born in a place other than its original one;—as is
found to be the case when the fire-flame moves from one place to the other;
—the Sun is found to be reaching another place; hence this is an Inferential
Reason based upon the nature of things.

This Reason cannot be regarded as 'Inconclusive'; because a thing
that remains permanent—i.e. an object that always remains in one and the
same form—cannot reach another place; as it can never renounce its original
position; if it does renounce it, it must be in a new form born again. This
is the Reasoning sublating any conclusions to the contrary.

It might be argued that—"This Presumption has been cited as proving
the existence of the Potency, not the birth of the thing; how then is it that
the Presumption is said to be included under this Inference?"

The answer to this is—'As regards Potency, etc. etc.'—(1618-1619)
The Author next points out the objections against the example of the 'Fat Devadatta not eating in the day', as illustrating Presumption from what has been heard:

**TEXT (1620).**

No certain cognition can result from the assertion that 'the fat man eats not during the day',—as the speaker might be asserting this through enmity or delusion and such other causes.—(1620)

**COMMENTARY.**

What this shows is that there can be no Presumption based upon Verbal Cognition.—(1620)

The following might be urged:—"It is not that the other assertion is indicated by the first sentence, on the basis of what is expressed by it;—it is indicated by the assertion itself; and the assertion itself is directly perceived (heard)."

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (1621).**

If another expressive statement is indicated (in Presumption) by the first statement, independently of what is expressed by itself,—then that other statement also would indicate another statement.—(1621)

**COMMENTARY.**

The sentence is said to be 'independent of what is expressed by it' when it functions by itself, not through its meaning; when the mere sentence by itself indicates (through Presumption) the other sentence which is expressive of a definite meaning,—then that other statement also would indicate another statement; that is, it would be possible for the sentence asserting eating at night to indicate another sentence; as the condition of being devoid of relation would be equally present in the case of all.—If then it be said that the indication is through what is expressed by the first sentence, then the objection urged before remains in force.—(1621)

In the following Text, the Author anticipates and answers the intention of the Opponent:
TEXT (1622).

If, the idea of what is expressed by the sentence is admitted as emanating from the other person, or as brought about by another Means of Cognition,—then the cognition of what is expressed by the later sentence may be regarded as following from that.—(1622)

COMMENTARY.

In order to avoid the incongruity urged above, it might be said that the dependence of what is expressed by the first sentence is also admitted,—as emanating from the other person (who has asserted that 'the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day') who is known to be reliable;—or as brought about by another Means of Cognition—Perception, etc. whereby it is known that the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day.

The answer to this is—'Then the cognition, etc etc.'—That is, the cognition of the fact itself (expressed by the second sentence) might follow from that fact (expressed by the first sentence)—i.e. from fatness along with not eating in the day; and there need be no indication of the sentence in the mind. And in that case, the cognition would become included under Inference, and hence Presumption need not be a separate means of Cognition.—(1622)

The following Text shows how the said cognition becomes included under 'Inference':—

TEXT (1623).

What is cognised is the Man spoken of as related to eating at night;—on the ground of his being fat while going without food during the day,—like another person.

—(1623)

COMMENTARY.

'Iśṭāh'—spoken of,—i.e. the Man as related to eating at night. The Probans is—'because while going without food during the day, he is fat' 'like another person' is the Corroborative Instance.

This is a Probans in the form of 'effect'.—(1623)

Question:—"How is the relation of Cause and Effect known in this case?"

Answer:—
TEXT (1624).

That there is fatness when there is eating is known with certainty through positive and negative concomitance; and hence the cognition of one thing follows from the other which is thus related to it.—(1624)

COMMENTARY.

The relation of Cause and Effect between Fatness and Eating—as between Fire and Smoke,—is known with certainty; whereby it is right that there should be cognition of one thing—i.e. the Eating—(which is the Cause) from another thing—i.e. the Fatness, which is related to the former as its effect. But it cannot be right that the cognition of one sentence should proceed from another sentence which is not so related to it; as if there were such cognition, then there would be incongruities.—(1624)

The following Text shows what the incongruity would be:—

TEXT (1625).

How can a sentence be cognised, which is devoid of all relationship? Otherwise all things would be cognised through a single thing.—(1625)

COMMENTARY.

How can a sentence be cognised, which is devoid of relationship—such as that of sameness and origination? It can never be cognised. Otherwise—if a sentence devoid of all relationship were cognised,—from any single thing—in the shape of the Jar for instance,—all jars would become cognised. This however does not happen. Hence the cognition must be held to follow from a definite relationship (of concomitance).—(1625)

The following text further elucidates the incongruities involved:—

TEXT (1626).

When there is no relationship—or when, even though existent, the relationship is not definitely known,—if the other sentence were indicated, it would be unreliable (invalid).—(1626)

COMMENTARY.

The idea really is that there is a relationship between the two sentences.—But if, at any time, there is no relationship between one sentence and another,—or if existent, it is not definitely known, and hence is as good as non-
existential,—if, when the relationship is not definitely known, if the second sentence were indicated,—such indication would be invalid; that is, it would be a baseless cognition; and if baseless cognitions were admitted, then the incongruity of everything being indicated by everything would be inevitable. —(1626)

The following Text anticipates an argument from the Opponent's standpoint:

TEXT (1627).

"There is no such royal edict as that 'that alone is valid which is related'. How does validity attach to Perception, in which there is no relationship?" —(1627)

COMMENTARY.

The Opponent says:—"That validity can attach to only what is related can, at best, be only a Royal Edict; there can be no reason for such an idea. For instance, if it were not a Royal Edict that 'validity can attach to only what is related',—how could there be any validity in Perception, in which there is no Relationship? This has to be explained." —(1627)

The answer to the above is provided in the following:

TEXTS (1628-1629).

If something unrelated could be cognised,—then why should not there be cognition of other things also? Because in the matter of being unrelated, no distinction among things can be perceived. In the case of Perception also, validity rests upon Relationship only. The validity of a cognition consists in its being in conformity (with the real state of things), and this conformity depends upon the Perception owing its existence to the Thing perceived.—(1628-1629)

COMMENTARY.

If an unrelated thing could be cognised, then there would be an incongruity,—because there could, in that case, be no distinction between one thing and another,—the absence of relationship being equally present in all things. You have not given any answer to this contention of ours.

As for the question—How is there validity in Perception, in which there is no Relationship?—it is irrelevant; because no one regards Perception to be valid, in the absence of a Relationship. In fact, even in Perception, validity rests upon Relationship only.
The reason for this is pointed out—'The validity of a cognition, etc. etc.'—
'Validity' consists in conformity, which is the capacity to get at the real
thing; and how could this conformity be unreservedly admitted in the case of
Perception, if it did not derive its own existence from the thing perceived?
(1628-1629)

The following Text explains what would be wrong if it were otherwise:

TEXT (1630).

No such 'conformity' with the real state of things concerned
can be certain, in a cognition of which the particular
object is not the basis, or in one which has no
(objective) basis at all. Or else, there
would be conformity with all
(things).—(1630)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'ataddhētuḥ' is to be expounded as 'na-taddhētuḥ';
taddhētuḥ' being expounded as that of which the particular object is the
(objective) basis; that is, that which is based upon something else;—in such a
cognition,—and also in a cognition which has no objective basis,—i.e. which
is devoid of all objective background,—there can be no 'conformity with
the real state of the thing concerned', in all cases. "What then?"—There
would be conformity with all things. So that the incongruity is present in
this case also.—(1630)

Or, what the affirmative sentence 'Devadatta is fat and he eats not during
the day' does is to bring about the inference of its own cause, in the shape
of the speaker's particular 'desire to speak',—this inference being based
upon the Indicative in the shape of the effect of the said desire; and then
it brings about the idea of the contrary sentence 'He eats at night',—
but by implication, not directly,—through the inference of the character of
the Cause,—just as in the case of smoke, there is implication of its being
due to defect in the fuel.

This view is what is expounded in the following—

TEXT (1631).

Or, it may be that what is inferred is the Speaker's 'desire to
speak' relating to the second statement; by this there
is cognition of negation following from the
affirmative assertion.—(1631)

COMMENTARY.

'By this'—i.e. by the Inference of the character of the cause,—not
directly; because it is from the affirmative sentence that the said 'desire
to speak' is apprehended,—in which 'desire', the negative sentence also figures. Otherwise, if the eating at night did not figure in the said 'desire to speak', and mere denial of eating were meant, then the statement would have been in the form 'Devadatta does not eat' and the terms 'fat' and 'during the day' would not be there.

'Vyatirekagatiḥ'—the cognition of the contrary sentence.—(1631)

It has been asserted (under Text 1599) that—"the presence, in the cow, which is likened to the Gavaya', of the capacity to be apprehended by that cognition is cognised by Analogical Cognition"

This is refuted in the following—

TEXT (1632).

THE VALIDITY OF ANALOGICAL COGNITION HAVING BEEN REFUTED IN DETAIL, THE VALIDITY OF PRESUMPTION ARISING OUT OF IT BECOMES REFUTED AS A MATTER OF COURSE.—(1632)

COMMENTARY.

Even granting the validity of Analogical Cognition, the Presumption based upon that cognition cannot be regarded as being a distinct Means or Form of Cognition, as it apprehends what is already apprehended; and also because there is no separate cognisable thing, in the shape of Potency, which could be cognised through it.

This is what is explained in the following—

TEXTS (1633-1634).

THE COW HAS BEEN HELD TO BE THE OBJECTIVE BASIS OF ANALOGICAL COGNITION; AND IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT THE OBJECTIVE BASIS BRINGS ABOUT ITS OWN COGNITION, BY ITS MERE PRESENCE.

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF THE 'POTENCY', FOR THE APPREHENSION WHEREOF PRESUMPTION BASED UPON ANALOGICAL COGNITION IS REQUIRED AS A DISTINCT MEANS OF COGNITION?—(1633-1634)

COMMENTARY.

'For the apprehension whereof'—i.e. for the cognition of Potency. The rest is easily understood.—(1633-1634)

It has been argued (under Text 1600) that—"Inasmuch as the Denotation of a word cannot be otherwise defined, we assume the expressive Potency of Words, etc. etc.";—where an example has been cited of a Presumption based upon another Presumption.

The following Text points out that the argument is 'Inconclusive'—
TEXT (1635).

As a matter of fact, even in the absence of sameness, there is nothing incompatible in the expression of things by words; just as there is expression by such means as the shaking of the hand and so forth.—(1635)

COMMENTARY.

There is no incompatibility in the expression of things by such non-eternal means as the shaking of the hand, winking of the eye and so forth; similarly, even in the absence of the sameness of the Word (at the time of Convention and at the time of Usage), there should be no incompatibility in the expression of things by the Word. So that the Instance that has been cited is Inconclusive.

'Sameness' here stands for eternity; 'being different' constitutes evanescence; hence 'being non-different or same' constitutes eternity.—(1635)

Says the Opponent:—"It has been pointed out that if the Word were not eternal, then it could not continue during all the time between the Convention and the Usage."

The answer to that is as follows:

TEXT (1636).

What serves as the cause of the expressiveness of words is the sameness of the conception, like shaking; and there is no incompatibility in this.—(1636)

COMMENTARY.

Though the Specific Individualities being all momentary, there can be concomitance or continuity of them, yet there are some Specific Individualities which are so constituted that, either directly or indirectly, they become the cause of an illusory conception of sameness; and hence becoming conceived as the same, they become expressive, through Convention;—'Like Shaking'—i.e. just as Shaking 'is expressive'.—(1636)

The Opponent urges the objection that "the instance of 'shaking' that has been cited is devoid of the Probandum":—
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TEXT (1637).

"Those actions that are seen subsisting in perceptible things are all held to be eternal, like the letters in the Word,—on the ground of recognition."—(1637)

COMMENTARY.

"We hold the letters to be eternal, on the ground of Recognition; in the same way, the gestures made by the Hand also are eternal; hence the 'Shaking' (of the Hand) that has been cited is 'devoid of the Probandum',—[i.e. it is not non-eternal]; hence that does not falsify our Premiss".—(1637)

Questions:—If this is so, and the Gestures of the Hand, etc. are eternal, how is it that these are not cognised always?

Answer (from the Opponent):—

TEXT (1638).

"That these are not apprehended always is due to the absence of the Indicator. What would be the 'producer' under your theory is regarded by us as the 'Indicator'."—(1638)

COMMENTARY.

'These'—i.e. the Gestures,—'are not apprehended always';—just as, under your theory, the Gestures are not perceived always, because of the absence of the producer,—so, under our view also, it is because of the absence of the indicator; so that the same explanation is available for both of us.'—This is what the Opponent means.—(1638)

The above argument is answered as follows:—

TEXTS (1639-1640).

It cannot be so; so long as the capacity is not obstructed, its cognition should be there always; in the absence of the said capacity, it should never be there at all.

Thus no 'indicators' are possible for the gestures. As regards 'Recognition' indicating eternality, that has been already rejected.

—(1639-1640)

COMMENTARY.

There are only two alternatives possible regarding the capacity of the Gestures which are held to be 'indicated' by certain indicators:—By their
nature (a) they have the capacity of bringing about cognitions—or (b) they do not have this capacity.

If they have the said capacity, then the Cognition producible by these should be there always—at all times; because their nature, being eternal, could not be obstructed by anything; because a thing to which (on account of its Eternality) no peculiarities can be added, can never, for that reason, be obstructed.

If, on the other hand, they do not have the capacity, then, in the absence of the capacity, the cognition producible by them could never be there. So where would be the use of the Indicator?

For these reasons, it is not possible for the Gestures, which are held to be eternal, to have any 'indicators'. If they are non-eternal, however, it is possible for a new character to be produced by the Indicators, and hence in this case, the presence of Indicatives would be logical.

It has been asserted that—"They are held to be eternal, like Letters, on the ground of Recognition".—The answer to that is—'As regards Recognition, etc. etc.';—for the proving of eternality (the Probandum), Recognition has been put forward as the Probans; and this Recognition has been already rejected under the examination of the Permanence of Things (Chapter VIII).—(1639-1640)

It has been argued (under Text 1602 et seq.) that—"The absence of Chaitra having been cognised through Negation, etc. etc."

The answer to that is as follows:

**TEXTS (1341–1343).**

It cannot be right to deduce the fact of Chaitra being outside the house from the fact of his absence in the house, because, there being a chance of his having died, the latter fact is capable of another explanation also.—If it is the absence of the living man in the house that is meant to be the basis of the presumption bringing about the idea of his being outside, —this also cannot be right; as the element of certainty would be lacking. When a man with ordinary powers of vision does not see Chaitra in the house, he can have no certain Cognition regarding his being alive.—(1641-1643)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Another explanation':—it is possible for Chaitra to be absent in the House, without being outside.
This shows the 'Inconclusive' character of the Reason put forward.
It might be argued that—'what is put forward as the basis of this particular instance of Presumption is the absence of the living Devadatta in the House,—not mere absence.'
This cannot be right.—'Why? '—Because the fact of Devadatta being alive would still be doubtful. So that the Probsans would be open to the defect of being 'Doubtful—hence—Inadmissible'.
The ground of uncertainty is stated—'When a man, etc. etc.';—as there are no Means of Ascertaining the fact of Chaitra being alive, the ordinary man with ordinary powers of vision would always be uncertain about it.—(1641-1643)

The following might be urged—"Even though the man with ordinary powers of vision could not have any means of perceiving the fact of Chaitra being alive, yet Inference and the other means of cognition would be always available for him".—This is what is urged in the following—

TEXT (1644).

"THE CERTAINTY REGARDING HIS BEING ALIVE BEING OBTAINED THROUGH THE Word OR OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION,—CERTAINTY REGARDING HIS ABSENCE IN THE HOUSE BEING OBTAINED THROUGH Negation,—DUE VALIDITY WOULD BELONG TO THE PRESUMPTION BASED UPON THE Negation."—(1644)

COMMENTARY.

'Through the Word'—i.e. when a word uttered by him is heard, or when an ascetic engaged in austerities behind the wall says that 'Chaitra is alive'.
‘Through Negation'—as a Means of Cognition,—in the shape of the absence of Perception and the other Means of Cognition,—the certainty of Chaitra's absence in the house being obtained,—it becomes known that the absence in the house is of the living Chaitra;—then due validity would belong to this Presumption as based upon Negation.—(1644)

The answer to all this is as follows:—
TEXTS (1645–1647).

Even then, the absence in the house is cognised from the fact of his not being seen through the eyes;—which shows that the said absence in the house is cognised through an Inferential Indicative.—One who is not in the house is always outside of it,—as is found in the case of the man standing in the courtyard seen by men at the gate; the Man inside the house provides the term where the Probandum is known to be absent.—

From all this it follows that this Presumption does not differ from Inference.

—(1645–1647)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that Presumption is included under Inference.

For instance, Chaitra is the Subject, the Minor Term;—his being outside is the Probandum;—‘Being alive and yet not being in the house’ is the Probans, of the nature of an ‘effect’;—‘the man standing in the courtyard’ is the Corroborative Instance per similarity;—‘the man in the house’ is the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity.—

‘Sadana’ is House.

The Invariable Concomitance (the Major Premiss) is indicated by the two Instances.

The Probans cannot be said to be ‘inadmissible’. Because absence in the House has been cognised by ‘the non-perception of what should have been perceived, if there’; as for the man being alive, this is said to be ascertained in accordance with the doctrines of the other party. In reality, the Probans is doubtful, as there is no Means for obtaining a certain cognition of his being alive.

“But it has been said that there are such means as the Word, etc.”

In that case, if his being alive has been duly ascertained by means of Word, etc., then that is enough to prove his existence outside;—what then is there left to be done by Presumption?

Thus, it is on the basis of the doctrines of the Opponent that we regard the Probans put forward by us as ‘admissible’, and through the Probans it has been proved that Presumption is included under Inference.—(1645–1647)

End of Presumption.
CHAPTER XIX.

Section (D).

On ‘Negation’.

COMMENTARY.

In regard to ‘Negation’—Abhāva—the Author sets forth the following views:

TEXT (1648).

“IN THE CASE OF AN OBJECT WHERE THE FIVE MEANS OF COGNITION DO NOT FUNCTION FOR THE COMPREHENSION OF THE EXISTENCE OF THAT OBJECT,—NEGATION IS THE ONLY MEANS OF COGNITION.”

KUMĀRILA: Shlokavārtika—Negation, 1].—(1648)

COMMENTARY.

According to Mīmāṃsakas, entities are of two kinds—Positive and Negative,—the former being characterised by existence and the latter by non-existence;—and they hold that every object has two aspects—the existent and the non-existent; thus it being acknowledged that the Object has these two aspects,—the existent and the non-existent,—in the case of an object,—i.e. the non-existent aspect of the object,—the five Means of Cognition, ending with 'Presumption', do not function,—for what?—for the comprehension of the existence of that object,—i.e. for apprehending the existent aspect of the object,—in the case of such cognisable object, in the shape of its non-existent aspect,—'Negation' is the only Means of Cognition.

This shows only the object cognisable by this Means of Cognition, not the form of the Cognition itself.—(1648)

Question:—What then is the form of this Cognition?

Answer:—

TEXT (1649).

“What is regarded to be ‘Negation, a Means of Cognition’, is the non-functioning of Perception and the other Means of Cognition; this may consist either in ‘the non-modification of the Soul’, or in the cognition of another object.”—[Shlokavārtika—Negation, 11].—(1649)

COMMENTARY.

What is regarded to be ‘Negation, a Means of Cognition’ is the non-functioning of Perception and the other Means of Cognition.
The term ‘pramāṇābhaṅga’ may be taken either as the Genitive—Taittirīya Compound, or as the Kārmadārāya.

In some places the reading is ‘pramāṇa-ābhavaḥ’, in which the meaning of the Locative ending would be ‘among Pramāṇas’,—the singular number in ‘pramāṇa’ being due to all Pramāṇas being referred to as a class.

Thus has Shabara-svāmin declared (under Śū. 1. 1. 5)—'Negation consists in the absence of the Means of Cognition and it gives rise to the notion of a certain unseen object not existing'.

Question—'What is this non-functioning (of the Means of Cognition) ?'

Answer—'This may consist, etc. etc.'—This—i.e. the non-functioning of Perception and the rest,—may be said to consist in the Soul in a state of rest, not becoming modified into the form of the cognition of the Jar or any such thing which may be meant to be denied;—or it may consist in the cognition of the spot on the ground as devoid of the said Jar, etc.

—(1649)

Objection—It is the absence of things that is called ‘Abhāva’, 'Negation'; how then can it be an entity? Certainly the absence cannot be an entity.

Anticipating this objection, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to prove that Negation is an entity:

TEXT (1650).

"THE NEGATION (ABSENCE) OF THINGS IS APPREHENDED WHEN THERE IS NO APPREHENSION OF THE THINGS THEMSELVES; AND IT IS DIVIDED UNDER FOUR HEADS—'THE PREVIOUS NEGATION' AND THE REST."—(1650)

COMMENTARY.

If the 'Negation of the Means of Cognition' were not an entity, then, as a non-entity, it would have no capacity at all; so that there could be no cognition or idea of it;—nor would there be any division of Negation into the four kinds of 'Previous Negation' and so forth. And yet this is not so. Hence inasmuch as the Idea of Negation cannot be otherwise explained,—and as the well-known fourfold division also of it cannot be otherwise accounted for,—Negation must be regarded as an entity.

Some people hold that these two ‘Presumptions’ afford the proof for Negation being an entity.

Others however explain that the sentence (in the Text) to the effect 'It is divided under four heads' embodies an Inference; and they formulate it as follows:—Negation is an entity,—because it is divided,—like the Jar and other things.—(1650)

The following Texts proceed to show how 'it is divided under four heads':—
TEXTS (1651–1654).

(1) 'That the Curd is not in the Milk' is a case of 'Previous Negation';—(2) 'That the Milk is not in the Curd' is a case of 'Destruction';—(3) 'The non-existence of the Horse in the Cow is a case of 'Mutual Negation'.'—[Shlokavārtika—Negation, 2-3].—In this last case, the Cow does not have the form of the other, and hence this negative character belongs to it by itself.*—(4) The flat portion of the Hare's head, being devoid of hardness and height, and hence there being no horns in the Hare,—this is a case of Absolute Negation [Shlokavārtika—Negation, 4].—If there were no such entity as 'Negation' classed under these several heads of 'Previous Negation' and the rest,—then there could be no usage based upon the differentiation of causes and effects'.—[Shlokavārtika—Negation, 7].—(1651–1654)

COMMENTARY.

When in reference to the cause—such as Clay or Milk,—people have the idea of the effect—the Jar or the Curd—not being there,—this is called 'Previous Negation'. If this 'Previous Negation' were not an entity, the product, Curd, would always be there in the Milk.

In the same way, when in reference to the Curd, there is the idea of the Milk being no longer there,—it is called 'Destruction'. If this Negation were not an entity then the Milk would still be there in the Curd.

In reference to the Cow, there is the idea of its not being the Horse; this is called 'Mutual Negation'. Because the Cow does not have the form of the other,—the Horse—therefore this is called 'Mutual Negation'. If this Mutual Negation were not an entity, then the Horse would be there in the Cow.

When the flat parts of the Hare's head are found to be devoid of growth and hardness,—and entirely non-existent in the form of Horns,—it is called 'Absolute Negation'.—Even though here also, in so far as the nature of the things is concerned, we have a case of 'Mutual Negation'. [The flat Head not being the Horn], yet, it has been cited as an example of 'Absolute Negation', in accordance with the popular notion of it. In common parlance whenever 'Mutual Negation' is spoken of, the two things are mentioned in the co-ordinated form—'This is a Cow, not a horse'; in the case of the negation of the Hare's Horn, however, they do not say—'This is the Hare, not the Horn'. If 'absolute Negation' were not an entity, then the Hare's Horn would be there. As says Kumārila [in Shlokavārtika—Negation, 2-4]—'If Negation were not a Means of valid Cognition, then there would be Curd in the Milk,—Milk in the Curd,—the Cloth in the Jar,—the Horn

* This sentence is not a quotation from the Shlokavārtika.
in the Hare,—sentience in the Earth and other substances,—Corporeality in the Soul,—Odour in Water,—Taste in Fire,—and both Odour and Taste along with Colour, in Air,—Touch and the other qualities’ in Ākāśha.—Here ‘sentience’ stands for the soul; ‘Corporeality’ for solidity;—‘those two’—Odour and Taste—along with Colour, would be there in Air;—and Colour, Taste and Odour, along with Touch would be there in Ākāśha.

Further, there could be no differentiation into Causes and Effects in the transactions of the ordinary world,—if Negation did not exist in its various forms of ‘Previous Negation’ and the rest. For instance, one who wants Curd, obtains Milk,—but one who wants Milk does not seek to obtain Curd; similarly one who wants the Cow does not secure the Horse; nor does the man who wants the Horse secure the Cow. It is in this way that business is carried on in the world.—(1651-1654)

The following might be urged—‘Even if there is this fourfold division, how does that make Negation an entity?’

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (1655).

"These several kinds (of Negation) could not appertain to a non-entity; hence Negation must be regarded as an entity; for instance, the ‘Negation’ of the Effect consists in the ‘presence’ of the Cause."—[Ślokavārtika—Negation, 8].—(1655)

COMMENTARY.

There can be no division of a non-entity; as division always rests in entities.—Hence Negation must be an entity.

"What sort of an entity can it be?"

Answer:—‘The Negation of the Effect, etc. etc.’—The Presence of the Cause—Milk, for instance—is what constitutes the Negation of the Effect—Curd; and the Presence of the Effect—Curd—is what constitutes the Negation of the Cause—Milk. It is in this way that Negation is an entity.—(1655)

The following Text seeks to prove, by means of Inference, that Negation is an entity:

TEXT (1656).

"Or again, Negation may be regarded as an entity,—like the Cow, etc.,—because it is apprehended by exclusive and inclusive notions,—and also because it is cognisable.”—[Ślokavārtika—Negation, 9].—(1656)

COMMENTARY.

‘Negation is an entity’,—this the statement of the Proposition; in support of this there are two Reasons: (1) ‘because it is apprehended by
exclusive and inclusive notions', and (2) 'because it is cognisable' ;—'like the Cow, etc.' is the Corroborative Instance.

Of these, the 'inclusive Notion' is the idea, in regard to all the four kinds of Negation, that 'it is Negation' ;—the 'exclusive notion' is in the form of the differentiating idea as 'Previous Negation is not Destruction'.

(1656)

Kumārila has described three kinds of Negation:—(1) the 'Non-modification of the Soul' ;—(2) 'the Cognition of some other particular object' ,—as declared under Text 1649 (which is a quotation from the Shlokavārtika—Negation, 11),—and (3) 'mere cessation (non-functioning) of all Means of Cognition,' as described by him in this passage—'That Cognition is regarded (by the Buddhist) as Inference which is brought about by the three-featured Probas; but that Means of Cognition which consists in not being brought about (i.e. Negation) cannot stand in need of a Cause'—(Shlokavārtika—Negation, 44).

In regard to this third kind of Negation, the following Text anticipates and answers an objection:—

TEXT (1657).

"If it be asked—'How can Negation be a Means (or Form) of Cognition?'—our answer is—what sort of Object is it that is cognised by it? Just as the cognisable object is negative, so should the Means (or Form) of Cognition also be understood to be.'—[Shlokavārtika—Negation, 45].—(1657)

COMMENTARY.

The following point may be raised—How can 'Negation', which consists in non-appearance of Perception, be a Means of Cognition?

The answer to this is—'What sort of Object is it that is cognised by it? The rejoinder may be—'What is cognised is negative in character.'

In that case (our answer would be that), the Means of Cognition also should be understood to be of the same nature as the Object cognised; why then should it be asked—how Negation can be a Means of Cognition?—Certainly it cannot be denied that the Means can be of the same nature as the Object.—(1657)

Question:—Negation may be a Means of Cognition; but why should it be different from Perception and the rest?

Answer:—
TEXTS (1658-1659).

"The negation of the Means of Cognition must be different from Perception and the rest,—because it is spoken of by the name 'Negation',—like the negation of cognisable things.—

Or the negation (of things) must be cognised through a means which is of the same nature as itself,—because it is something cognisable,—just like the positive entity. For these reasons, this Means of Cognition must be of a nature different from the positive."

[Shlokavārtika—Negation, 54-55].—(1658-1659)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Negation of Perception and the other Means of Cognition' must be regarded as a Means of Cognition different from Perception and the rest,—because it is spoken of by the name 'Negation',—just like the negation of cognisable things.

Or, the cognisable object named 'Negation' may be the subject (Minor Term),—the Probandum regarding it being that 'it is cognisable through a Means of Cognition of the same nature as itself' ;—'because it is a cognisable object' is the Probans;—the cognisable object called 'positive' is the Corroborative Instance. From this it follows that the Means of Cognition which is of the same nature as the cognisable 'negation' must be distinct from Perception and the rest which are positive in character.—(1658-1659)

The above arguments (of Kumārila, in support of 'Negation' as a distinct Means of Cognition) are answered in the following—

TEXT (1660).

As regards these arguments—the 'modification' of the eternal entity (Soul) has been rejected already; the existence of the contrary of such a 'modification' cannot be occasional.—(1660)

COMMENTARY.

This shows the 'impossibility' of the first definition of Negation as 'the non-modification of the Soul' (see Text 1649). What is meant is as
follows:—By the process of Preclusion, ‘non-modification’ is something ‘contrary to modification’; it is this, as appearing at certain times, that is meant to be the characteristic feature of ‘Negation’. If it were not this occasional ‘non-modification’ that is meant by the process of Preclusion, then the thing defined would be there at all times.—Such ‘non-modification’ is not possible in the case of the Soul; as the possibility of any modification of an eternal entity has been already rejected. Under the circumstances, how could there be any basis for what is only the contrary of that Modification by the process of Preclusion?

The ‘sattva’, ‘entity’, meant here is the Soul, which is qualified by the adjective ‘nīya’, ‘eternal’.—Or, the compound ‘nīyasattva’ may be expounded as ‘that of which, the sattva, existence, is nīya eternal’; that is, eternal.

‘The existence of the contrary of such modification’;—‘the contrary of modification is non-modification’;—this cannot be occasional; it must be eternal; as being always of one and the same form, the Soul is one only.—(1660)

The following might be urged—“Non-modification is not of the nature of something contrary to modification’, it is only of the nature of the ‘absence of modification’; so that the definition cannot be impossible”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1661).

If what is meant by ‘non-modification’ is only the absence of modification,—then, as the entity concerned is eternal, this should be understood to be there at all times, as it never ceases.—(1661)

COMMENTARY.

‘Tatpratikṣeṣopamātrātmā’—‘Tat’ is modification;—‘Pratikṣeṣa’ is denial, absence;—‘mātra’ is only;—that which has this absence of modification for its essence.

‘This’—i.e. the ‘non-modification’ in the form of ‘absence of modifications’—should be always of one and the same form; as there can be no modification of the Soul.—(1661)

In the following Texts, the possibility of ‘non-modification’ is taken for granted, and then it is shown that the definition is too wide:—
TEXTS (1662–1664).

Or, there may be 'non-modification' of the Soul. Even so, the definition is wrong. Because in the state of sleep, swoon and the like, even though this (non-modification of soul) is there, the objects (of cognition) are there.—If then, the 'non-modification of the Soul' be held to be in reference to the Jar and other things, on the ground that when there are other cognitions, the place concerned is seen to be devoid of those things,—then, even by this explanation, what more has been said in addition to what is said in the second definition (of Negation) that has been suggested,—in view whereof the two definitions have been put forward as alternatives?—(1662–1664)

COMMENTARY.

'Wrong'—Too wide.
'Swoon and the like'—'And the like' is meant to include those conditions where there is interception, or the thing is behind one's back.
'Even though this is there'—i.e. even though the Soul is there, not modified into the form of the Cognition of the Jar and other things.

[Says the Opponent]—"Even though cognition other than those based on real objects are there, this is cognition of the place as devoid of the Jar and such real substances,—and it is this that is meant by 'non-modification'; as the Soul (under the states) is not modified into the form of the cognition of the Jar, etc. [and thus this precludes the cases of sleep, swoon and the like].—'Tasya' stands for the Soul.—'Asau' stands for non-modification".

If this is what is meant (by the first definition), then there would be nothing said (in the first definition) which differentiated this definition from the second definition (put forward in Text 1649) to the effect that 'Negation is the cognition of some other object'; so that the putting forward of two alternative views would be useless.—(1662–1664)

The following Text points out the defect in the second definition of Negation (put forward under Text 1649):

TEXT (1665).

If the second kind of 'Negation' were admitted, then, when the 'cognition of some other thing' would come about, there would be 'negation' of everything else,—even that which is not perceptible.—(1665)

COMMENTARY.

'Even that, etc. etc.'—i.e. things removed in time, place and nature.
'Second kind of Negation'—i.e. that in the form of 'the cognition of something else'.—(1665)
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TEXT (1666).

"What is cognised through the said cognition of some other thing, in the shape of the place devoid of the thing in question, is the non-existence of only that which is as capable of being cognised as the other thing cognised,—when other causes are present",—if this is what is meant [then the answer is as in the following Text].—(1666)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"What we mean to prove is not the non-existence of all that is not perceived; it is the non-existence of only that which is as capable of being cognised as the place devoid of the Jar and other things,—i.e. that only which would be perceptible if it were there.

'Through the cognition of some other thing',—i.e. on the cognition of the place devoid of the Jar and other things."—(1666)

The answer to the above is as follows:

TEXTS (1667–1670).

[Under the circumstances] the 'non-existence' should be said to be of only that Perception which envisages the perceptible object,—not of others; as that would be false.—How too is it known that the cognition of the other thing has come about, when cognitions themselves are not perceptible? If it is known through Presumption, that too is of the nature of Cognition,—how then is it itself cognised? If another Presumption is suggested, then there is an infinite regress.—If the 'negation of cognition' is an entity, the 'negation of the cognised object' also should be the same. Under the circumstances why do you not include 'Negation' under 'Perception' itself?—(1667–1670)

COMMENTARY.

'Sakyadarshana' is that thing the Perception of which is possible, i.e. what is perceptible. 'Ābhā' is form, figure;—hence what is meant is that Perception which envisages the perceptible thing.

'Not of others'—i.e. of Inference and the rest; because what is cognised through these is imperceptible; and the absence of these is not followed by the absence or negation of things removed in time, place and nature; so that the absence or negation of these would be false (if brought forward as bringing about the Negation of these things). Hence there would be no sense in
adding the term ‘and the rest’ in the phrase ‘negation of Perception and the rest’.

Further, if ‘the cognition of a thing other than that’ were definite and certain,—then it must be admitted that it proves the absence of the counter-entity. Otherwise, if the Negation were proved as merely existing, then it would mean that the negation in question has become cognised by all men, through the said ‘cognition of the other thing’ appearing in any one person only. In that case, how could the Mīmāṁsāka, who regards Cognition as imperceptible, become cognisant of that ‘Cognition of another thing’?—He would never be able to cognise it.

‘If through Presumption’;—‘if it is cognised’—this has to be construed here, from the Context;—as has been asserted in the statement—‘As there can be no idea of the object that is not cognised, the cognition of the thing is inferred from the inferential indicative in the shape of the Idea of the thing’;—here the term ‘inferential indicative’ stands for Presumption;—and ‘cognition of the thing’ means that cognition which can be explained otherwise than on the basis of the said Presumption;—‘inferred’ stands for definitely cognised.

In that case, as this Presumption also would be a Cognition,—it has to be explained how it is itself cognised.

If the answer be that ‘it is cognised through another Presumption’,—then, there would be an infinite regress.

Then again, if the idea of Negation being an entity is admitted, then, just as the ‘negation of the Means of Cognition’ is an entity, the ‘negation of the object cognised’ also should be an entity; and in that case, being an entity, why cannot Negation be regarded as cognised through Perception itself? In that case there would be no need for postulating a distinct Means of Cognition for the Cognition of Negation.—(1667–1670)

The following Text supports the same idea of Negation being included under Perception:

TEXT (1671).

The ‘Negation of the effect’ consists in the presence of the cause; and this latter is of a nature distinct from the other, and is apprehended by Perception itself.—(1671)

COMMENTARY.

It has been declared (by Kumārila himself, see Text 1655 above) that ‘The Negation of the effect consists in the presence of the Cause’; and this ‘presence of the Cause’ is of a nature—character—distinct from the Effect; and it is apprehended by Perception itself; so that what other aspect of ‘Negation’ is left to be cognised, for the sake of which Negation would be a distinct Means of Cognition?
OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one Means of Cognition has no cognisable object other than that of another Means of Cognition, then it cannot be a distinct Means of Cognition; —e.g. a seventh Means of Cognition,—'Negation' has no cognisable object apart from what is cognised by Perception; hence the assumption of such a distinct Means of Cognition would be failing in the fulfilment of the wider condition.—(1671)

The Opponent urges the 'inadmissibility' of the Reason adduced in this argument—

TEXTS (1672-1673).

"As a matter of fact, in the case of everything which is always existent in its own form, and non-existent in the form of other things,—it is only a certain aspect that is cognised through certain Means at certain times; and it is only when the existent (positive) aspect is to be cognised that Perception and the rest come in; and when the non-existent (negative) aspect is to be apprehended, the operation of the 'non-appearance of Perception and the rest' (i.e. 'Negation') comes in."—

(1672-1673)

COMMENTARY.

"There would have been no object left to be cognised by Negation if objects had only one aspect; as a matter of fact, however, objects have two aspects—they are existent (positive) in their own form, and non-existent (negative) in the form of other things; there thus being two aspects of every object, there is only a certain aspect of it that is cognised through a certain Means,—all aspects are not cognised by all Means of Cognition.

"This same idea is further explained—'It is only when the Positive aspect, etc. etc.'—When the Positive aspect of the Object is apprehended, then there is the operation of the five Means of Cognition, Perception and the rest,—and not of Negation; when however it is the Negative aspect that is meant to be apprehended, then there is operation of the 'non-appearance of Perception, etc.'—i.e. of 'Negation'".—(1672-1673)

Our Reason would have been 'inadmissible' if one and the same thing had both (positive and negative) characters; as a matter of fact however the presence of two characters in the same object is incongruous.—This is what is shown in the following—
TEXT (1674).

It is the form (aspect) of the Thing itself that is held to be 'differentiated'; it is in that same form that it exists, and it is in this form that it is perceived.—(1674)

COMMENTARY.

When the thing is 'differentiated' from another thing, it is not in any other form; in fact it is differentiated in its own form; hence it is the form of the thing itself which is apprehended as differentiated from the other thing; as it remains in its own form. That form in which it is differentiated,—in that form, the Thing is always existent, never non-existent. This thing is perceived in the form in which it is differentiated from other things; so that there is no apprehension of any second form or aspect of that thing.—(1674)

It has thus been shown that the postulating of the two forms (aspects) of things is incompatible with Perception; the following Texts show that it is incompatible with Inference:—

TEXTS (1675–1677).

What is capable of effective action is said to be 'existent',—other than that is said to be 'non-existent'; the two cannot exist together in the same substratum, as they are contradictory.—"But the same thing may be capable of that effective action which it can itself accomplish, but incapable of another (effective action)".—It is for this reason that the dual character can never subsist in any single thing. If it is something else that is regarded as 'incapable' of the other action,—then there are two things; and the dual character does not belong to one and the same thing.—(1675–1677)

COMMENTARY.

(A) That which is capable of effective action is 'existent',—for example that aspect of the thing which is regarded as 'existent';—and what is held to be 'non-existent' is not capable of effective action;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

(B) Things that are mutually contradictory can never coexist in the same thing,—e.g. Light and Shade, or Heat and Cold,—the existent and non-existent aspects are mutually contradictory;—so the idea that they coexist is contrary to a universal proposition.

The Opponent urges the objection that the Reason adduced is 'inadmissible'—"The same thing, etc. etc.—That is to say, one and the same thing is capable of the effective action which can be accomplished by itself,
and also *incapable* of that effective action which can be accomplished by others; hence the Proban based upon the *capability for effective action* cannot be admissible; because the thing is not admitted as *capable of efficient action*, in regard to such action as can be accomplished by others. Nor is there any contradiction between 'existence' and 'non-existence', as the two are in reference to distinct aspects of the thing; for instance, the thing is called 'existent' in reference to such effective action as can be accomplished by itself, and that same thing—not another—is called 'non-existent', in reference to such action as can be accomplished by others; there would have been 'contradiction' if it had been called 'non-existent' also in reference to the action accomplished by itself."

The answer to this is as follows—'As a matter of fact, etc. etc.';—That same thing which is 'capable' of the action that can be accomplished by itself, is 'incapable' of that which can be accomplished by others;—and it is not any other thing. Things do not differ through difference in their relatives or through difference in words;—because the thing is impartite.

'Tat' stands for 'tasmāt', 'for these reasons'.—*For these reasons, the dual character can never belong to the same thing.*

If it be held that—"the aspect that is incapable of such action as can be accomplished by others is different from that which is capable of effective action". This is what is introduced by the words 'If it is something else, etc. etc.'.

The answer to this is that *there are two things*;—that which is *capable* of effective action is one thing, and that which is *incapable* is the second thing; so that in saying what you have said, you have asserted the existence of *two things*, and not the dual aspect of one and the same thing.—(1675–1677)

The following text points out defects in the third definition of 'Negation' put forward—that it consists merely in the absence of *Means of Cognition.*

**TEXT (1678).**

**The idea of 'Negation' being an entity having been previously accepted, why is it described to be featureless?**—(1678)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Previously accepted'—in the assertion that 'Negation consists in the non-modification of the Soul or in the cognition of something else' *(Text 1649).*

'Featureless'.—It has been asserted (by Kumārila, see under Text 1657) that—"Just as the cognizable Object is negative, so should the Means of cognition also be understood to be"; from which it is clear that the Means or Form of Cognition consists in the apprehension of the Object; hence it cannot be right to attribute the character of 'Means or Form of Cognition'
to what is entirely featureless; this is what is meant; and this same idea is
going to be put forward again (in the following Text).—(1678)

This same idea is further explained—

TEXT (1679).

THE OBJECT THAT IS FEATURELESS BEING DEVOID OF THE FORM OF
Cognition, CANNOT BE A Means or Form of Cognition; AS THIS
IS ALWAYS OF THE NATURE OF Cognition.—(1679)

COMMENTARY.

'this'—i.e. Means or Form of Cognition.
That which is not of the nature of the cognition of things cannot be a
'Means or Form of Cognition';—e.g. the Jar and such things;—and Negation
is devoid of the nature of the cognition of things;—hence there is non-
apprehension of the wider character (which must mean the absence of the
less wide character).—(1679)

The following might be urged:—"The Eye and the other organs are not
of the nature of the cognition of things,—and yet, as they serve as causes
bringing about the cognition of things, they are called 'Means of Cognition';
the same would be the case with 'Negation' also; so that the Reason adduced
is not true (Inconclusive')."

This is the argument anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXT (1680).

If it is urged that—"Negation is a Means of Cognition because—
like the Eye, etc.—IT SERVES AS THE CAUSE OF Cognition",
—then (Our answer is that) what is entirely
featureless can never serve as the
cause of anything.—(1680)

COMMENTARY.

It is not right to make assumptions on the basis of the figurative idea
of being the 'cause of cognition'; because what is entirely featureless and
hence devoid of all capacity, cannot be rightly regarded as a Cause. If it
were so regarded, it would cease to be featureless; and further, as what is
featureless cannot be specially related to any particular time or place, if a
cognition were brought about by it, it would never cease at all.—(1680)
TEXTS (1681–1683).


(1681–1683)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, what is itself not known cannot bring about the Cognition of anything else;—if it did, it would lead to absurdities; this has been already explained; so it has to be explained in what way 'Negation' itself is known. It cannot be cognised by itself; as if it were so, then the negation, or absence, of the object also would be cognised by itself, and there would be no need for postulating a Means of Cognition in the shape of 'Negation'; as this is meant only for the purpose of bringing about the cognition of the negation of the object,—and this negation of the object will have been cognised by itself, like the negation of the Means of Cognition.—Nor can it be regarded as cognised by its own Cognition, because, ex hypothesi, it is 'devoid of the form of Cognition';—how then could it be cognised by its own Cognition? It is only what is of the nature of Cognition that can be so cognised.

It might be argued that it could be known from another negation of the Means of Cognition bearing upon itself.—But then there arises the question—how is this latter Negation known?—If it were held to be due to yet another Negation,—then there would be an infinite regress. This has been thus declared:—'Otherwise the non-existence of the Object is known through Non-apprehension, and the non-existence of the Apprehension is known by another Non-apprehension; so there is an infinite regress'.

In order to avoid this Infinite Regress, it may be held that the Cognition of Negation is due to the absence (Negation) of the Object.—But in that case there is mutual interdependence. For instance, the Negation of the Means of Cognition is cognised through the cognition of the Negation of the Object, and the negation of the Object is cognised through the Cognition of the negation of the Means of Cognition; thus the defect of mutual interdependence is quite clear.—Thus you are reduced to that condition where the thrust of the Javelin throws out the Eye-ball!

From all this it follows that the Non-apprehension of one thing consists only in the apprehension of another thing,—and 'Negation' need not be a Means of Cognition different from Perception.
The following might be urged:—"How is that apprehension of one thing known? What has been urged against the Cognition of Negation would apply to that also".

The answer to this is that—'the said Perception, etc. etc.'—That is, the Perception of the one thing becomes cognised by itself,—not through anything else; hence in this case there is no Infinite Regress.—"Why?"—Because, by its very nature,—in its own form,—it is not-dark,—i.e. it is of the nature of Light (which is self-luminous).—Nor would cognition through mere presence lead to incongruities, as nothing else (except Cognition) is of the nature of Light (i.e. self-luminous).—(1681–1683)

Question:—"Why should there be this hostility towards the apprehension of Cognition through something else?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1684–1686).

As a matter of fact, the apprehension of Cognition through something else is not possible in any way,—either (a) through the inferential indicative,—or (b) through another cognition (Perception),—or (c) through presumption.—There being a possibility of objections being raised against all these three, there would be several infinite regresses creeping in for you.—[It must be admitted therefore that] as among things equally capable of being apprehended, the apprehension of one leads to the definite cognition that the others are non-existent.—(1684–1686)

COMMENTARY.

(1) Some people hold that Cognition is cognisable through the inferential indicative;—this inferential indicative being either in the form of the idea of a thing, or in that of an action, or in that of a thing perceptible by the senses, or some manifest object, and so forth.

(2) Others hold that Cognition is perceived through another cognition,—and not self-cognised,—because the operation of anything upon itself involves an incongruity.

(3) Others again hold that it is cognised through presumption based upon the inexplicability (otherwise) of what is duly known; i.e. the idea of a thing being known would be inexplicable if the cognition of the thing were not there, the Cognition itself being by its nature dull (non-intelligent, dark).

Thus these three theories have been put forward.

Now there being a possibility of objections being brought up against each of these three theories—relating to the inferential indicative and the rest,—such as—'How is the inferential indicative itself known?', and so forth,—there will be several infinite regresses creeping in.—For instance, the inferential indicative and the rest could not be cognised until Cognition
is cognised; hence its cognition should be sought for from somewhere else; and for that also, it would be necessary to have recourse to another Inferential Indicative and so forth. This same process being urged against each of the three theories,—there would be an endless Infinite Regress.

From all this, the right conclusion would be that the apprehension of one thing brings about the Cognition of the non-existence of other things.—When one has to deny the time and place of things, the negation (denial) is made of the perceptible things themselves, as it is these latter that stand on the same footing as the thing that has been apprehended; it being impossible to deny anything else. If sameness were denied, then all would be denied,—as has been seen before; because all things become included under 'what is not—that thing—which is apprehended',—according to the principle that 'what is not the same as one thing is another thing'.—(1684–1686)

Question:—

TEXT (1687).

"What is that one thing on the cognition whereof the sky is cognised as moon-less? How too is the absence of all sound cognised anywhere?"—(1687).

COMMENTARY.

[Says the Opponent]—"When a man notices the absence of the Moon in the Ākāsha, there is no apprehension of any one thing, by virtue of which it could be said that from the apprehension of that one thing follows the apprehension of the non-existence of other things; specially as there is no such real thing as Ākāsha which could be apprehended as devoid of the Moon. Even that Ākāsha which others have postulated as something real is beyond the reach of the senses.—Then again, when at a certain place the absence of sound is noticed,—from the apprehension of what one thing does that follow?—It cannot be urged that it follows from the apprehension of the spot on the ground concerned; because the ground is not equal to the Sound as regards its perceptibility,—because the ground is visible, while the Sound is audible; and what are meant to be mutually related in the present context are things that stand on the same footing regarding their perceptibility.—This is clear from the assertion that 'one thing is other than the other when both are related to the same cognition and yet are not dependent upon one another'.—Nor can the cognition in question be said to proceed from the apprehension of Time; because there is no such category as 'Time' apart from the other categories, whose apprehension could be there. The Time that is accepted by the other party is also something beyond the senses'.—(1687)

The answer to the above is as follows:—
TEXTS (1688-1689).

As a matter of fact (all that is perceived is) the Mass of Light and Shade, which the observer regards as 'Akāśa'; anything apart from that has no existence; nor is it perceived.—In the case of the absence of all Sounds also, its cognition is due to the non-perception of its effect; and this non-perception is cognised ultimately through the self-cognition of other cognitions.—(1688-1689)

COMMENTARY.

'Of the mass of Light and Shade';—add—'on the perception of';—this same—mass of Light and Shade—is regarded by the observer as 'Akāśa', nothing apart from that. For instance, during the day or night, the man perceives the 'Akāśa' to be 'like sapphire' or 'like the Cloud'; and for the other party, the Akāśa has neither colour nor shape.

'Anything apart from that';—that is, anything like the Akāśa postulated by the other party has no existence apart from the said Mass of Light and Shade; and if it does exist, it is not perceptible by the senses.

As regards the absence of all sounds also, it is cognised through the non-apprehension of its effect in the shape of Auditory Cognition; and this non-apprehension is cognised through the apprehension of the Visual and other Cognitions; so that here also there is the apprehension of one thing, in the shape of the apprehension of these other Cognitions.

Says the Opponent:—"All cases of the existence of the Causes are not covered by the existence of the Effect, by virtue of which the existence of the Effect, on its cessation, would preclude the existence of the Cause also. That this cannot be the case is due to the fact that Causes are not always effective (even though present)."

[Answer]—We do not say that all cases of the existence of the Cause are covered by the existence of the Effect; what we say is that particular cases of the existence of the Cause,—whose effectiveness is never obstructed,—are those that are meant to be excluded by the non-existence of the effect (auditory Perception),—not the existence of all causes. For instance, even in a case where the apprehension of the bare place brings about the cognition of the absence of the Jar, what brings about this latter cognition is the non-apprehension of the effect in the shape of the apprehension of the Jar; because the absence that is cognised is only that of the Jar which would have been perceptible (if it were there),—and not of all Jars. And what would be that which is perceptible? That alone whose capacity has not been obstructed. Because Perceptibility has been described as a particular character,—and what is the character of a thing must be perceptible. Otherwise, here also, all cases of the Existence of the Jar would not be covered by the Apprehension of the Jar; and hence the absence of the non-pervading factor could not lead to the absence of the un-pervaded factor; and there would be no cognition
of the *absence of the Jar*. It is for this reason that in all cases, the non-apprehension of the character of the thing leads to the thing being regarded as *non-existent*. In reality however what has to be perceived is the *non-apprehension of the effect* (which leads to the cognition of the non-existence of the *Cause*).—(1688-1689)

The following Text proceeds to show the 'Inconclusive' character of the Reason—' because it is spoken of by the name *Negation* [therefore Negation should be regarded as different from Perception and the rest'; see *Text 1658*]:—

**TEXT (1690).**

**THUS, IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT N**EGATION **IS ESSENTIALLY A POSITIVE ENTITY, THE FACT OF ITS being spoken of by the name *Negation* **IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH ITS BEING INCLUDED (UNDER OTHER MEANS OR FORMS OF COGNITION).**—(1690)

**COMMENTARY.**

' *Thus* ',—i.e. under the principle that 'the perception of one thing is what is called the non-perception of other things' and so forth.

' *The fact, etc. etc.* '—Even when 'Negation' is included under 'Perception', the fact of its being spoken of by the name 'Negation' does not become incompatible.

This shows that the Probans put forward by the Opponent is not absent where the contrary of the Probandum is present.—(1690)

**TEXT (1691).**

**AS REGARDS THE CONTENTION (UNDER TEXT 1659) THAT "NEGATION MUST BE COGNISED BY A MEANS WHICH IS OF THE SAME NATURE AS ITSELF",—THIS IS ENTIRELY SUPERFLUOUS; AS EVEN IN WHAT WE ASSERT THERE IS THAT sameness of nature.—(1691)**

**COMMENTARY.**

' *There is that sameness of nature* ',—the 'non-apprehension', in the shape of the apprehension of something else, being negative in character.

In this connection, some people urge the following objection:—"The cognition that envisages merely the absence of things cannot be included under Perception and the rest,—because it envisages only the absence (negation) of things, while Perception and the rest envisage positive things;—nor can it be regarded as invalid,—as it is in conformity with the real state of things. When you (Buddhists) postulate the absolute destruction of things, you cannot deny the absence of things."
What has been explained above disposes of this objection also. In the case in question, what the particular Conceptual Thought envisages is not pure negation devoid of all specifications of time, place, etc.,—it envisages the qualified Negation in the form that at a certain place 'the Jar is not'; and that it is so is due to the fact that the Place, etc. have the capacity of being perceived. Thus it is that Negation is not regarded as a distinct Means or Form of Cognition; because what is conceived is only such empty place as has been apprehended by Perception.—Even if there were apprehension of pure, unqualified, Negation, the cognition apprehending it could not be regarded as valid, because it would be envisaging a non-entity; and all consideration of the validity of cognitions, by men seeking for effective action, relates to entities only.—What has been urged therefore is beneath notice.—

(1691)

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End of Negation.
CHAPTER XIX.

Section (E).

_On 'Yukti' (Ratiocination)_

_and_

_'Anupalabdhi' (Non-Apprehension)._  

The author argues as follows, in connection with 'Ratiocination' and 'Non-apprehension' (as distinct Means of Cognition):

TEXTS (1692–1695).

(A) "That thing comes about when this thing is there, and it does not come about, when it is not there,—therefore it proceeds from that'—this is called 'Ratiocination'. The sage Charaka has declared that it is a distinct Means of Cognition; because it cannot be Inference, as no Corroborative Instance is available'.—

(B) "When a certain thing is cognisable by an apprehension,—then, from the absence of that apprehension, one deduces the non-existence of that thing;—this is regarded as 'Non-apprehension'.—This also is a distinct Means of Cognition, as it does not need a Corroborative Instance and other factors. In fact, in the Instance also, non-existence would be cognised by means of this same 'Non-apprehension'.'—

(1692–1695)

COMMENTARY.

When a thing is cognised as being the effect of a certain thing, on the ground of its being produced only when the latter is present,—it is regarded as a case of 'Ratiocination'.—As it is _conceptual_, it cannot be _Perception_; nor can it be _Inference_, as there is no Corroborative Instance; and if there were an Instance, then also the notion of _being an effect_ would be due to _being produced only when the other is present_; and in support of that, another instance would have to be sought for; and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress.—Hence this is a distinct Means of Cognition; so says the sage Charaka, the medical doctor.

Similarly, when there is cognition of the non-existence of a thing derived from the _absence of its apprehension_, it is a case of 'Non-apprehension'; and the reasons for regarding this also as a distinct Means of Cognition are to be found as in the case of 'Ratiocination'.—(1692–1695)

The above is refuted in the following—
TEXT (1696).

There is no restriction regarding the cognition of Cause and Effect, and the cognition of Non-existence; and in the cases cited there is no difference between the Probans and the Probandum.—(1696)

COMMENTARY.

The compound ‘Kāryakāraṇatā, etc.’ is to be expounded as the ‘pratipatti’, cognition, of ‘Kāryakāraṇatā’, the relation of Cause and Effect, and of ‘abhāva’, ‘non-existence’; the cognition of the relation of Cause and Effect is said to be by means of ‘Ratiocination’, and the cognition of ‘non-existence by means of Non-apprehension’.

‘Asyām’—in the two cases cited—of ‘Ratiocination’ and ‘Non-apprehension’,—there is no difference between the Probans and the Probandum.—(1696)

How there is no difference is shown in the following—

TEXT (1697).

The relation of ‘cause and effect’ is nothing other than that one thing is produced only when the other is there; nor is non-existence known to be any thing other than the ‘non-perception’ of what is perceptible.—(1697)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of ‘Ratiocination’, there is no difference between the Probans and the Probandum; because the reason (Probans) is the fact of one thing being produced only when the other is there,—the relation of Cause and Effect is the Probandum; and we find no difference between these two; the two are synonymous, like the terms ‘taru’ and ‘pādapa’ (both meaning Tree).

In the case of ‘Non-apprehension’ also, there is no difference between the Cause and the Effect. For instance, if mere absence of apprehension is meant (by ‘Non-apprehension’), then as nothing like it is known, it would be open to the Infinite Regress and other objections urged above. If, on the other hand, the ‘Non-apprehension’ of a thing is only the ‘apprehension of something else’, then it becomes included under ‘the Non-apprehension of what should have been apprehended’; and this does not prove the non-existence, which is cognised by Perception itself. It is for this reason that the text has declared—‘Nor is non-existence, etc. etc.’—(1697)
It might be argued that—"what are meant to be proved are not the Relation of Cause and Effect and Non-existence themselves, but the ordinary usage regarding these."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1698).


COMMENTARY.

'Tadbhāvavyavahāra'—is the 'vyavahāra', usage,—of the 'bhāva', character, of 'cause and effect' and 'non-existence'.—That is, what is meant to be proved is the capacity of being spoken of as expressed by a certain name.—[And in this way, the two Means of Cognition become included under Inference]—The arguments being formulated as follows:—

(A) Things that, by their nature, are perceived after the operation of a certain thing, are capable of being spoken of as the 'effect' of that thing,—e.g. the things perceived at the time of Convention; the Jar is found to be perceived only after the Operation of the Potter; so also Words are found to be perceived only after the Operation of the Palate and other portions of the Mouth;—this being a Probans based upon the nature of things.

(B) Similarly in the case of 'Non-apprehension', if usage is what is meant to be proved, then the Inferential Reasoning may be formulated as follows:—When certain things capable of being apprehended are not apprehended in certain places, they are to be spoken of as non-existent in those places;—e.g. the Head of the Hare is one that can be spoken of as a place where the Horn is non-existent;—and as regards the doctrine of 'Universals', it is found that the 'Universal' and other categories postulated by others, which are held to be perceptible, are not perceived at all in individuals—like the spotted Cow for instance,—which are supposed to be the substratum of the said 'Universal'; so that here 'Non-apprehension' is in the very nature of these things. As regards the Individuals,—the spotted and other cows—these are duly perceived, hence these are not rejected as non-existent.

Nor can the Probans be said to be 'Inconclusive'; because the idea that there is only manifestation (by the Cause, of what already exists) is going to be rejected.

It is only on the basis of these facts that things are spoken of as 'non-existent'.

Nor can the Probans be said to be 'Contradictory', as it is actually present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.—(1698)
CHAPTER XIX.

Section (F).

On 'Sambhava', 'Probability'.

COMMENTARY.

"'Sambhava', (Probability) serves to bring about the cognition of the components of the Aggregate after the Aggregate itself has become cognised. For instance, the idea of 'a hundred' follows after the existence of 'a thousand' has been cognised. This cannot be Inference, as there is no Corroborative Instance available."

The objection against this is set forth in the following—

TEXT (1699).

As a matter of fact, the members of the Aggregate are the causes of the idea of the Aggregate; hence the cognition of the probability of 'a hundred' proceeding from that of 'a thousand' is only produced by the Inferential Indicative.—(1699)

COMMENTARY.

Because the Aggregate is not something apart from the components of the Aggregate,—and these components are the cause (basis) of the very notion of the 'Aggregate',—therefore the cognition of 'a hundred' that proceeds from 'a thousand' is only a case of cognition produced by the Inferential Indicative, in the shape of Effect.—(1699)

________________________________________

End of Section (F).

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CHAPTER XIX.

Section (G).

On 'Aitihya', 'Tradition' and 'Pratibhā', 'Intuition'.

COMMENTARY.

There are others who regard 'Tradition', etc. also as distinct Means of Cognition.—Of these 'Tradition' is that Means or Form of Cognition whose original promulgator cannot be discerned, but has come down through a long-continued assertion;—e.g. 'A yakṣa resides in this Banyan-tree'.

'Intuition' is that cognition indicative of the existence or non-existence of things, which appears suddenly without any restrictions of Time or Place; e.g. when the virgin has the notion 'my brother will come to-day'; and this does come about; hence it is valid cognition.

The objection to the above is set forth in the following—

TEXT (1700).

'Tradition', 'Intuition' and the rest are found to be false in many cases; hence these cannot be regarded as 'Means of Right Cognition'; as such assumption would lead to incongruities.—(1700)

COMMENTARY.

The phrase 'and the rest' includes 'Recognition' and others; these also are regarded by some others as 'Means of Right Cognition'.

'Would lead to incongruities';—e.g. Dream-Cognition might be found to be true in a certain case and thereby come to be regarded as a valid Means or form of Cognition.—(1700)

End of Section (G).
CHAPTER XIX.

Section (H).

Summing up.

COMMENTARY.

Having thus rejected all other Means or Forms of Cognition, in detail, the author briefly proceeds to discard them (and thus sums up the question):—

TEXT (1701).

Or, all this effort is out of place; since things exist in two forms only—viz.: Perceptible and Imperceptible.—(1701)

COMMENTARY.

Things are of only two kinds—Perceptible and Imperceptible.—(1701)

Objection:—"There is also another kind—which is both Perceptible and Imperceptible, and which is neither Perceptible nor Imperceptible."

Answer:—

TEXTS (1702–1708).

Any other kind is not possible,—in the shape of both Perceptible—and Imperceptible, or neither Perceptible—or—Imperceptible. Because in any single thing, both action and inaction would be self-contradictory. That thing is called 'Perceptible' which produces its cognition directly (immediately); the contrary of this is regarded by the wise, as 'Imperceptible'.—Now Verbal Cognition, Analogical Cognition and the rest cannot envisage the former (Perceptible) thing; as in that case they would become included under 'Perception', or be futile, like Remembrance.—Even if they envisage Imperceptible Things, in what way could anything be envisaged by all? If directly (immediately), then the thing would not be 'Imperceptible', being exactly like the Perceptible Thing. If the cognitions are dependent upon something else (i.e. indirect, mediate), would the cognition be related to it or not related? Would it envisage distinction or not?—If it arose out of what is not related, then there could be no restriction; and if it
ENVISAGES *distinction*, THEN THERE COULD BE NO INVARIABLE CON-
COMITANCE. IF, LASTLY, THE COGNITION ENVISAGES AN *imperceptible*
THING,—IS BASED UPON A RELATED OBJECT—AND DOES NOT ENVISAGE
DISTINCTION FROM IT,—THEN IT IS CLEARLY 'INFERENCE'.—(1702—
1708)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be right for any one thing to contain within itself a mixture
of mutually contradictory properties;—if it did contain such, it would cease
to be one thing. For instance, that thing is called 'Perceptible' which
brings about the cognition of the thing as it exists, *directly*,—i.e. without
the intervention of the Inferential Indicative or such other means of cogni-
tion. On this principle, such cognitions as *Sound is momentary* would
be one envisaging an *imperceptible* Thing. One and the same thing cannot
be regarded as both active and inactive as regards anything; by virtue of
which anything could be both—Perceptible—and—Imperceptible—as producing
and not-producing a certain cognition.

Nor can a thing be neither—Perceptible—nor—Imperceptible; because in
regard to anything, the negation of one character always implies the affirma-
tion of the contrary character. If there are more things than one, then there
is no incongruity in there being both *action* and *inaction* in any given case;
e.g. the action and inaction of *Colour and Taste* (both) in regard to Visual
Perception. Nor is there any incongruity in both *action* and *inaction* of
even one thing, if it is in reference to more things than one; e.g. that of Colour
with reference to both Visual and Auditory Perceptions.—It is in view of
this that the Text says—'In any single thing, both action and inaction would
be self-contradictory'.

For all these reasons, things are of only two kinds—(Perceptible and
Imperceptible).

Now, if the Word and other Means of cognition were distinct *Means of
Cognition*,—there could be only two alternatives regarding them—they
envisage either (a) the Perceptible Thing, or (b) the Imperceptible Thing.

They cannot envisage the Perceptible Thing.—"Why?"—Because in
that case they would be liable to become included under 'Perception';
as the Verbal and other Cognitions, in that case, would envisage those same
things that are envisaged by Perception.—It might be urged that—"the
other Means of Cognition bring about the Cognition of the thing concerned
after it has been envisaged by Perception";—the answer to that is that
't it would be futile'; that is, apprehending what is already apprehended, the
Cognitions would be *invalid*,—like Remembrance.

Under the second alternative also (that Verbal and other cognitions
envisage Imperceptible Things)—when the Imperceptible thing is cognised—
would it be cognised *directly*, or *indirectly*, through the intervention of some-
thing else?—It cannot be cognised *directly*; as, in that case it would be
like any *perceptible* thing and would cease to be *imperceptible*. Because it
is called 'Imperceptible' only because it does not produce cognitions *directly*;
if then, it were to produce cognitions *directly*, how could it be called 'Im-
perceptible'?
If the cognition of the Imperceptible thing were produced through the intervention of something else,—(1) would it be produced through the intervention of something related to it? (2) of something not related to it? (3) would it envisage distinction? or (4) envisage non-distinction?—These four alternatives are possible.—As an example of cognition envisaging distinction, there is the cognition of a particular Fire—produced by Leaves or Grass, produced through smoke in general. An example of cognition envisaging non-distinction, there is the cognition of mere Fire as excluded from other unlike things, produced by Smoke.—Now if this latter cognition were brought about by the intervention of a thing (Smoke) not related to the thing concerned (Fire),—there would be no restriction at all; anything might bring about the cognition of anything.—If the cognition envisage distinction, then there would be no Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum; as there would be no concomitance regarding the qualifying factor; and to that extent, the Probans would be Inconclusive. —If then the cognition envisaged non-distinction, then it would be included under 'Inference'.

All this is what is urged in the Text—'If, lastly, the Cognition, etc. etc.; and does not envisage distinction, etc. etc.'—That is, devoid of all tinge of distinction, envisaging the mere object as excluded from all unlike things; e.g. the cognition of mere Fire, from Smoke.—If the cognition in question is of this kind, then it is clearly Inference, as brought about by the perception of Relation,—as the cognition of Fire, from Smoke.—(1702–1708)

End of Chapter XIX.
CHAPTER XX.

Examination of 'Syādvāda' (Jaina Doctrine)

COMMENTARY.

It has been declared in the Introductory bases (Text, 3) that the 'True Doctrine' is 'not mixed up with any foreign element, to the smallest detail'.

—In support of this idea, the Author proceeds with the next chapter; and starts off with an objection (from the standpoint of the other Party):—

TEXT (1709).

"As a matter of fact, every entity has more than one aspect,—like the gem sapphire; why then should there be any incompatibility among 'existence', 'non-existence' and the rest?"—(1709)

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted (under Text 1675, above) that 'What is capable of effective action is said to be existent,—other than that is said to be non-existent,—the two cannot exist together in the same substratum, as they are contradictory'.

Against this, Āhrika (a Jaina writer) and others urge the following objections:—

"Every entity has more than one aspect,—the General and the Particular; just like the lustrous gem which appears to be of variegated colour; why then should there be any contradiction (incompatibility) between existence and non-existence,—in view of which it is said that 'the two cannot co-exist in the same substratum'?—The term 'ādi' in 'sadādi' is meant to include 'activity and inactivity', 'unity' and so forth'.

Though this objection has been already refuted under Text 1676, by the sentence 'Namu tadātādhi, etc.', yet it has been introduced here for the purpose of expounding the matter in detail, or for setting forth a fresh theory. —(1709)

For proving the General and Particular character of things, Āhrika has formulated the following arguments in due order:—
TEXT (1710).

"If an entity were not-equal to (entirely different from) other entities, then it would not differ from the 'sky-flower.'

On the other hand, if it were entirely devoid of non-equality (difference), then it could not be regarded as anything different from those things".

—(1710)

COMMENTARY.

"If a certain thing spoken of—the Jar, for instance,—were not-equal to (i.e. different from) all other things,—such as the Cloth and the like,—i.e. if it were always excluded (differentiated) from these,—then there would be no difference between the Jar and the 'sky-flower'; as it would be always differentiated from all other things; and a thing that is always differentiated from all other things can have no other state save that of the 'sky-flower'. Consequently, one who is not willing to admit the equality of that thing to the 'sky-flower', must admit that it is equal (similar) to other entities, in being an entity; hence this general character (commonality), in the shape of the universal 'entity', has to be admitted.

It may be asked—"In what way then is there the Particular?"
The answer is—'If it were entirely devoid of non-equality, then it could not be regarded as different from those things.—If that same entity, Jar, were devoid of non-equality to other things like the Cloth,—i.e. if it were not non-equal to them,—then the Jar could not be regarded as anything different from the Cloth, etc., in the form—'This is Jar, that is Cloth'; just like the specific individuality of things;—and yet, as a matter of fact, it does differ from other things; hence it becomes established that it has the Particular character also.—(1710)

TEXTS (1711–1713).

"If the intended entity is entirely not-equal to other things, then it ceases to be an entity; for that which is excluded from 'Entity', where could there be any other position, except non-existence,—as in the case of the 'sky-flower'? Thus then, one who wishes the Entity to be not-equal to the 'sky-flower', must accept the universal 'Entity' as the character common to all entities."

(1711–1713)

COMMENTARY.
The following Texts set forth another argument in favour of the view that every entity has a commonality, a general character:—
"If it were not as asserted, then, to what would this fact be due—that the common notion of 'entity' does not appear in connection with the 'Crow's Teeth', while it always appears as restricted to Entities alone?—If it be urged that—'the said restriction is due to similarity',—then our answer is that, that same (similarity) is what we call 'Commonalty'—This same remark applies also to the view that 'the said restriction is due to a certain capacity in the nature of things'.—Absolute difference (from other Entities) therefore is not possible for any Entity; because Entities do not differ from each other, on the point of being 'Entities'".—(1714–1716)

COMMENTARY.

'If it were not, etc. etc.'—If an entity were 'not-equal' to—different from—every other entity,—then how is it that the common idea of 'being an entity' is found to appear only in connection with the Jar and such things, and not in connection with the 'crow's teeth' (and other non-entities)? The basis for this has to be explained.

It might be urged that—'the basis for this lies in the similarity (among entities)'.

Then it becomes established that that same Similarity is the 'Commonalty', the Common character; 'similarity' being synonymous with 'Commonalty' (Common character).

It might be explained that—'the said comprehensive potency subsists in the Jar and other entities only, and not in the Crow's Teeth and such non-entities; hence 'the capacity of the nature of things' is what forms the basis of the notion in question'.

This view also is dispensed with by what has been just explained; i.e. the answer to this is the same as that to the view regarding 'Similarity'; because the said capacity may be regarded as the required 'Commonalty'.

From all this it follows that, in the form of 'entities', all things—the Jar and the rest—are not-different from one another.—(1714–1716)

The following Texts provide reasons for accepting the 'difference' (particular character) of things from one another:

TEXTS (1717–1719).

"If the said entity were entirely devoid of dissimilarity from the other standard entities,—then that entity would not be different from these; there would be complete non-difference,—as from their own selves. What is called 'dissimilarity' is only a form different from those; hence
THE IDEA THAT 'THERE IS NO DISSIMILARITY, AND YET THE THING IS DIFFERENT' WOULD INVOLVE A SELF-CONTRADICTION. CONSEQUENTLY, WHEN ONE HAS TO ACCEPT SOME SORT OF DIFFERENCE AMONG THINGS, HE HAS TO ACCEPT 'DISSIMILARITY' ALSO, AND THENCE ALSO THE 'PARTICULAR' CHARACTER OF THINGS.'—(1717–1719)

COMMENTARY.

'Standard entities'—the Cloth and the rest (to which the Jar is being compared).—If the Jar were entirely devoid of dissimilarity to these other things—Cloth, etc.—then, there being no difference between them, the Jar could not be any thing different from those things; as it would be non-different from it, like the form of its own self. For instance, what is called 'dissimilarity' is only that form of the Jar which is different from the Cloth, —nothing apart from that form; hence to say that 'there is dissimilarity in the Cloth, etc., and yet there is no difference from the Jar,' would involve self-contradiction;—as 'difference' and 'dissimilarity' are synonymous terms.—(1717–1719)

Having thus established the fact that every entity has the two-fold character—the General and the Particular, the Jaina proceeds to show that these two aspects serve as the basis of usage free from all confusion:—

TEXTS (1720-1721).

"THE ENTITY ITSELF IS ONLY ONE IN ESSENCE, BUT IS REGARDED AS HAVING SEVERAL ASPECTS; AND THESE ASPECTS ARE THERE IN THE FORM OF BEING APPREHENDED BY INCLUSIVE AND EXCLUSIVE COGNITIONS; THE FORMER ONES, BEING INCLUSIVE, ARE SPOKEN OF AS 'COMMON' (UNIVERSAL, GENERAL), WHILE THE LATTER, BEING EXCLUSIVE, ARE CALLED 'PARTICULAR.'—(1720-1721)

COMMENTARY.

"The real truth of the matter is as follows:—Like the gleaming Sapphire, every entity, while being one, has several aspects; of these aspects, some are apprehended by inclusive notions, and others by exclusive notions. Those that are apprehended by inclusive notions are inclusive and hence spoken of as 'Common,' while others, which are apprehended by inclusive notions, are exclusive and hence said to be 'Particular.' The inclusive notion appears in the one non-distinctive form of 'Entity'; while the exclusive notion appears in the distinctive form 'this is jar, not Cloth.'"—(1720-1721)

The following Texts proceed to refute the above Jaina view:—
EXAMINATION OF ‘SYĀDVĀDA’ (JAINA DOCTRINE).

TEXTS (1722-1723).

If the ‘General’ and the ‘Particular’ were of the nature of each other, commingling and confusion would be inevitable; hence it cannot be possible that every entity has two aspects.—If they are not of the nature of each other, then they are diverse (two distinct things), and hence it does not follow that there are ‘two aspects’ (of a single entity).

—(1722-1723)

COMMENTARY.

There are two alternatives possible: (1) The ‘General’ is the same as the ‘Particular’ and (2) The ‘General’ is something different from the ‘Particular’.

In the former case, the Particular and the General being of the nature of one another, there would be commingling and confusion; the result of which would be that it could not be discerned that ‘this is General and that is Particular’; which means that there cannot be two aspects of the same entity.

If, in order to avoid the confusion, the latter alternative is accepted, even so, the two being regarded as not of the nature of each other,—there would be ‘diversity’—difference of nature between the General and the Particular; thus there would be no confusion between the two, only if the two were entirely different; but even so,—even when the two are different,—there are two things, and not two aspects of one thing.

The following might be urged—‘Even when there has come about a difference in the nature of the General and the Particular, the entity that exists in the form of the General and the Particular is one and the same’.

This however will be a contradiction in terms. For instance, if the General and the Particular are regarded as non-different from one and the same thing, how could there be any difference in the nature of those two themselves? Being non-different from one and the same thing, they must be non-different from one another,—like the nature of any single entity. When however the difference between the nature of the General and that of the Particular is accepted, there could not be any single thing that would be non-different from those two; because being non-different from the two, what is meant to be one would have to be regarded as two,—like the form of the General and the form of the Particular.

From all this it follows that the assertion that “every entity has two aspects” involves self-contradiction.—(1722-1723)

The following Texts put forward the view of Sumati (a Jaina writer of the Digambara School):—
TEXTS (1724-1725).

"THOUGH THE ENTITY MAY BE OF ONE NATURE ONLY, YET IT CAN HAVE
DIFFERENT PROPERTIES; THERE COULD BE NO INCONGRUITY IN THE
PRESENCE OF DIFFERENT STATES (OF THE SAME THING); WHICH
IS FOUND, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF THE POTENCIES
OF THE ACTIVE AGENCIES;—NOR CAN THERE BE ANY
INCONGRUITY IN WHAT IS ACTUALLY SEEN; AND
IT IS ACTUALLY SEEN THAT EVEN THOUGH
THE GENERAL AND THE PARTICULAR ARE
ASPECTS OF ONE AND THE SAME
THING, YET IN ACTUAL PRACTICAL
LIFE THERE IS DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THEM."—
(1724-1725)

COMMENTARY.

_Sumatī_ has offered the following explanation in connection with the
objection urged against the Jaina doctrine:—"It has been urged that if the
General and the Particular were not regarded as different, there would be
confusion.—But this does not affect the case at all. Though, by reason of
their being of the same nature there may be confusion,—there can be difference
in their properties,—as is found to be the case with the potencies of Active
Agencies. For instance, there are such expressions as ‘Balāhako vidyotaḥ’,
‘The Cloud flashes’ (where the _Cloud_ appears as the active Agent), and
‘Balāhakādvidyotate’, ‘flashes from the Clouds’ (where the Cloud appears
as the _Source_, the Ablative); in such cases we find the potencies of the
active agencies varying through the diversity of their effects; even though
they being all of the nature of ‘substance’ there is a certain amount of con-
fusion. If this is not admitted, that would be quite contrary to common
experience as well as scientific (Grammatical) principles.

Then again, there can be no incongruity urged against what is actually
seen. For instance, in the case of the General and the Particular, though
they are aspects of one and the same thing, and are quite distinct and never
confounded, yet, all practical business is actually found to be carried on on
the basis of their difference.—The compound ‘bhedalokayātrā’ is to be ex-
pounded as ‘Practical business on the basis of difference’; and this is carried
on, though the entity is one only embracing both the aspects.—The argument
may be formulated as follows:—When any one thing is treated as diverse,
it is on the basis of the diversity of its properties,—as in the case of the
Potencies of active agencies;—the idea of the General and Particular being
aspects of one and the same thing involves treatment of the thing as diverse;
—this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(1724-1725)

The above argument is answered in the following—
EXAMINATION OF 'SYĀDVĀDA' (JAINA DOCTRINE).

TEXT (1726).

IN FACT, IF THE THING HAS ONLY ONE FORM, IT CANNOT HAVE DIVERSE PROPERTIES; A DIVERSITY THAT IS NOT A CREATION OF FANCY IS WHAT IS CALLED 'PLURALITY'.—(1726)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that the Reason adduced by the Jaina is 'contradictory'; inasmuch as it proves the contrary of what is intended to be proved. For instance, what the other party intends to prove is real diversity of properties; but no such 'diversity of properties',—which is not a creation of fancy—is proved by the Reason adduced; as 'one-ness' of the thing itself is admitted; and what is one entity cannot be compatible with Diversity; as Diversity is what is called 'Plurality'; and how can a thing that is Plural be one?—(1726)

The Corroborative Instance that has been cited (by the Jaina writer) is 'devoid of the Probandum', and the Probans also is one that is concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1727).

AS REGARDS THE POTENCIES, THEIR DIVERSITY IS MERELY A CREATION OF THE SPEAKER'S 'DESIRE TO SPEAK'; HERE ALSO NO DIVERSITY CAN BE REASONABLE IN WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY ONE.—(1727)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged (by the other party):—"Even though Diversity is what is called 'Plurality',—why should such real Plurality of a single entity be incompatible,—by virtue of which the Reason is said to be 'contradictory', as proving the contrary of the desired conclusion?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1728-1729).

THINGS ARE SAID TO BE 'ONE' WHEN IT IS SAID 'THIS IS THAT'; WHEREAS THEY ARE SAID TO BE 'DIVERSE' WHEN IT IS SAID 'THIS IS NOT THAT'. Being that and Not being that thus being mutually contradictory, cannot, in any way, be attributed to any one entity.—(1728-1729)

COMMENTARY.

When it is stated categorically that 'this is that', then the things are said to be 'one'; as in the case of Consciousness and Spirit. On the
other hand, when the identity between things is denied, they are said to be 'diverse, different'; as in the case of Matter and Consciousness. As it is impossible for both affirmation and denial to pertain to any one thing, there is clear contradiction between 'Unity' and 'Plurality', which are based respectively upon the said identity and difference. Hence any diversity of properties of a single entity can be only a creation of fancy.—(1728-1729)

Question:—"Why should there be contradiction between Identity and Difference (Affirmation and Denial) ?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1730).

AFFIRMATION AND DENIAL ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY; AND THEY CANNOT BE MADE BY ANY SANE-MINDED PERSON, IN REGARD TO ONE AND THE SAME THING.—(1730)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"What is the basis of the assumption of the diversity of properties? There must be a distinct basis for it; otherwise there would be confusion among things. Hence it follows that that which would be that distinct basis would be the real 'diversity of properties' for us."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1731-1732).

WHEN AN ENTITY, EXCLUDED FROM SEVERAL LIKE AND UNLIKE THINGS, IS DIFFERENTIATED FROM THIS AND THAT,—THAT IS CALLED 'THE DIVERSITY OF PROPERTIES'. IN THIS WAY EVEN A SINGLE THING MAY BE ASSUMED TO HAVE NUMBERLESS DIVERSE FORMS; BUT IN REALITY, NO SINGLE THING CAN REASONABLY HAVE TWO FORMS.—(1731-1732)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'sajātiya, etc. etc.' is to be expounded as—there is first a karmadāravya compound between 'like and unlike' and 'several';—and from these the entity is 'excluded'.—When such a single entity is differentiated from this and that,—like and unlike thing—this is what forms the basis of the idea of the 'diversity of properties'. Thus, inasmuch as there can be an assumed 'Plurality',—there can be no reason for postulating a real duality of form for any single thing.

The particle 'api' implies that there would be 'superfluity' in the Jaina writer's argument if what were meant to be proved were the mere fact of the thing having in a general way, a diversity of properties.—(1731-1732)

The following might be urged:—"The argument urged (by the Buddhist) is Inconclusive, in view of entities like Narasimha and others; though these
beings are of a single nature, yet the real presence of the dual character (Half Man, Half Lion) is not found to be incompatible”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS (1733-1735).**

Such entities as Narasimha and others which have been described as having dual characters,—in their case also the dual character is not real. As a matter of fact, Narasimha is of the nature of an aggregate of many atoms, and is not endowed with any one uniform form; what is variegated (various) cannot be one,—as is found in the case of the collection of several kinds of gems.—If there were one form, there could not be a dual character and the consequent appearance of several shapes; and even if the smallest part of the body that could be covered by the leg of a fly were hidden, the body could not be said to be not-hidden.—(1733-1735)

**COMMENTARY.**

The term ‘ādi’ includes the gleaming Sapphire.

‘Sa’ stands for Narasimha.

‘Sandoha’—is aggregate.

‘Naikarūpavān’—not having a single form. This shows that the Instance cited by the Jaina writer is not one ‘admitted’ by the opposite party; as for the Baudhā, Narasimha is not one composite whole, he being only an aggregate of many atoms.

The author cites the reason for denying the said oneness—What is variegated cannot be one; e.g. a collection of several kinds of gems;—and Narasimha has a variegated form.—So that the Jaina reasoning involves an idea contrary to the nature of things.

The fact that ‘if it were one, it could not have a dual character and consequently there would not be appearance of several forms’, provides an argument against the said ‘unity’;—this argument being based on the fact the idea of ‘diversity’ is based entirely upon the appearance of diverse forms.

‘If any one part of the body were hidden, the whole might become hidden’ (under the Jaina’s idea);—this provides another argument against the conclusion of the Jaina writer; because it cannot be right that one and the same thing should have the contradictory characters of being hidden and being not hidden at the same time.—(1733-1735)

**Question:** “If Narasimha is only an aggregate of many atoms,—then how is it that there is an idea regarding him as being a single entity with a dual character?”

**Answer:**—
TEXTS (1736-1737).

By their very nature, the said atoms are the basis of the recognition that envisages the salient features of the Man and the Lion;—as is clear from the fact of its arising from a particular idea. In this same way are the variegated gems and other cases disposed of.—The variegated character, based upon the presence of several forms, is certainly incompatible with unity.—(1736-1737)

COMMENTARY.

The Recognition that envisages the features of the body of the Man and the Lion (in the body of Narasimha),—of that the only cause or basis consists of the atoms (composing those features); what then, would be the use of assuming the composite whole (Body)?

If it be asked—Whence this 'nature' of the Atoms?—The answer is—'As is clear from the fact of its arising out of a particular Idea'; i.e. because it proceeds from a particular cause; the 'particular idea' in this case is in the shape of the past deed leading up to the particular state of existence, and also the factors and other parts of the body peculiar to the particular animal-species.

What has been said regarding the case of Narasimha also serves to dispose of the case of the glittering gems, etc.;—and it is not necessary to criticise them separately.—(1736-1737)

It has been argued (by the Jaina writer, under Text 1716) that—'in the form of entities all things are not-different from one another.'—This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (1738-1744).

'Becoming an Entity' is said to consist in 'capacity for effective action'; if this were all-pervasive, then every thing would be capable of doing every thing. Generally, one thing is held to be productive of another, only by reason of the presence, in it, of the capacity for that action; if then, that capacity is equally present in another thing, why should not this be productive of the same?—If the 'Blue' and other objects themselves are held to constitute the all-embracing character of 'Entity', then the white and yellow things also would do what is done by the Blue one; and in that case, the whole universe would become a single 'Entity', devoid of a second; and thus it would
EXAMINATION OF 'SYĀDVAŚA' (JAINA DOCTRINE).

NOT BE TRUE THAT A SINGLE THING HAS SEVERAL ASPECTS.—IF THE Blue, etc. THEMSELVES DO NOT CONSTITUTE 'ENTITY',—AND THIS IS LIKE THE 'BEING' (Sattva) POSITED BY 'Kaṇāda',—THEN IT CANNOT BE AS YOU HOLD, THAT ONE THING CANNOT HAVE SEVERAL ASPECTS; AS THERE WOULD BE CLEAR DIFFERENCE.—FURTHER, WHAT CONSTITUTES 'DIFFERENCE' AMONG THINGS IS THE PRESENCE OF CONTRARY PROPERTIES, AND NO OTHER KIND OF 'DIFFERENCE' IS HELD TO LIE BETWEEN 'BLUE' AND 'YELLOW'. THIS SAME CONDITION IS PRESENT BETWEEN THE 'GENERAL' AND THE 'PARTICULAR'; BECAUSE WHILE THE FORMER IS 'INCLUSIVE', THE LATTER IS OTHERWISE. WHY THEN SHOULD NOT 'DIFFERENCE' BE ADMITTED AS CLEARLY LYING BETWEEN THEM?—(1738–1744)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Entity' is said to be that which is capable of effective action,—nothing else.—If this capacity is present in all things, then every thing would be capable of doing every thing. It is only in this sense that things are held to be productive. This capacity then being equally present in all cases, anything might be produced out of anything.

Further, is the 'Entity' the same as the Blue, the Yellow and other things? Or is it something different?—If it is the same, then, as it would be all-pervasive, even the white and yellow could bring about the colouring in the cloth that is brought about by the Blue.—Then again, there being no other character or nature possible, the entire Universe would become a single conglomeration of things; and this would upset the proposition that a single entity has several aspects.—If on the other hand, the 'entity' is something different from the Blue, etc.,—like the 'Being' posited by Kaṇāda, —i.e. just as Kaṇāda has postulated the 'Entity', called 'Being',—as something different (from the particular things),—then it becomes all the more unreasonable to attribute 'Plurality' to any single thing; as in this case there would be clear absolute difference.

Then again, any two things are 'different' only when they have contrary properties,—e.g. Hot and Cold;—the General and the Particular are found to have contrary properties; because while the former is 'inclusive', the latter is otherwise; 'otherwise'—i.e. not-inclusive, 'exclusive'.—If, even on the presence of contrary properties, difference were not admitted, then there would be no difference even between the Blue and the Yellow, which is admitted in some way, by the other party;—Kumārila himself having declared (in Shlokavārtika—Sense Perception, 158) that—'as their cognitions are different, Colour, etc. cannot be one and the same';—where it has been declared that there is difference among the Blue and other things.—(1738–1744)

The author puts forward—from Kumārila's point of view—the objection against the Buddhist argument, the objection that the Reason put forward is 'Inconclusive':—
"As in the case of the Variegated Colour, one may emphasise any one colour as he chooses,—because the colour is variegated,—
in the same way 'difference' or 'non-difference' of an entity might be emphasised.—(Shlokavārtika—Ākṣṭi, 57-58).—When a thing of a mixed character is
cognised simultaneously, then all distinctions like 'difference', 'sameness' and
so forth, disappear.—(Ibid., 62-63)."

(1745-1746)

COMMENTARY.

'Kalmāśa-varaṇa'—is the variegated colour.—In this case one can fix
upon, as he wishes, upon any of the several colours present—regarding the
thing either as Blue, or Yellow or Red;—in the same manner, in the case of
the Entity which has a variegated or mixed character,—being existent in
its own form, and also non-existent in the form of other things,—and also
having the two-fold character of the General and the Particular,—one can
fix upon Unity or Diversity, as he likes. When a man wishes to emphasise
the diversity-aspect, then he fixes upon diversity; and when he all at once
cognises a thing as being both General and Particular,—then all that has
been urged regarding its difference or non-difference, etc. disappears; i.e. it
does not apply at all; because what is clearly cognised through Perception
is the thing of the mixed character. The objection that has been urged
regarding the thing being different or non-different, etc. etc. is as follows:—
(a) The General thing being non-different from the Particular things in the
shape of the Horse, etc. should also have a diversity of forms like these
particular things;—(b) the Particular things, being non-different from the
General, all Particular things should become the same, like the General
group;—(c) how could difference and non-difference, which are mutually
contradictory, reside in the General and the Particular? The other objections
are such as—Unity and Plurality being mutually contradictory, how can
one and the same thing be General as well as Particular?—(1745-1746)

It might be argued against the above (argument of Kumārila's) that—
'If so, then in all cases, there would be cognition of the Mixed Character,
and it would not be successive and simultaneous'.

The answer to this (from Kumārila's point of view) may be as follows:—
EXAMINATION OF 'SYĀDVĀDA' (JAINA DOCTRINE).

TEXT (1747).

WHEN A THING HAS SEVERAL FORMS, ONE MAY EMPHASISE ANY ONE ACCORDING TO HIS OWN WHIM, EITHER SUCCESSIVELY OR SIMULTANEOUSLY; THERE CAN BE NO OTHER WAY WITH VERBAL EXPRESSIONS.—(1747)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, in the case of everything whether its 'General' and 'Particular' aspects are emphasised, one after the other or simultaneously, depends upon the wish of the Speaker; so that when one wishes to speak of the 'existence' and the 'non-existence' aspects of a thing,—or the 'General' and 'Particular' aspects of it,—simultaneously, he emphasises its form in that way. If he wishes to speak successively, one after the other, of the 'existence' and 'non-existence' aspects, or the 'General' and 'Particular' aspects—then he emphasises that form. In fact, all its forms are emphasised successively and simultaneously (as one wishes),—just like the Emerald and other gems in a Mass of jewels.

It may be asked—'Why cannot it be indicated in a way other than successively or simultaneously?'

The answer to that is—'There can be no other way, etc. etc.'—i.e. no way other than 'successively or simultaneously'.

'Vidhi'—is way, method.—(1747)

The following Text answers the above arguments (of Kumārila):

TEXTS (1748-1749).

IT CANNOT BE AS EXPLAINED ABOVE. THAT WHAT IS 'VARIEGATED' CANNOT BE 'ONE' HAS JUST BEEN POINTED OUT. 'VARIEGATION' CONSISTS IN 'SEVERAL FORMS', AND IT CAN NEVER BE CON- COMITANT WITH 'UNITY'.—ALL THE REAL FORMS THAT THERE MAY BE OF A CERTAIN THING WOULD BE SO MANY (DIFFERENT) THINGS; AND THE THING IN QUESTION ITSELF REMAINS ONLY ONE.—(1748-1749)

COMMENTARY.

The idea that 'a single entity is variegated' involves a contradiction in terms, as already explained under Text 1734 above; and the reason for this is that the term 'variegated' itself connotes Plurality; and between 'Unity' and 'Plurality' there is 'contradiction' consisting in the fact of the presence of one implying the absence of the other. Consequently one thing cannot have several real forms. Even if it had,—this fact would not prove the plurality of the single thing; as all that it would mean would be that there are so many things come about; but that also only if these forms could be proved
to be real. But in no case can Plurality belong to what is one, as the two are mutually contradictory.—(1748-1749)

It has been argued (under Text 1712, above)—"For that which has been excluded from 'Entity', where could there be any other position?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1750).

If a certain thing were excluded from one 'Entity', it would be devoid of sameness only with that entity; it would not become like the 'Sky-flower';—as it would still be capable of efficient action.

—(1750)

COMMENTARY.

If what is cited as the Reason is 'exclusion of all entities';—and similarity to the 'sky-flower' is meant to be proved by it,—then the Reason is 'inadmissible'; because the exclusion of the Jar from all entities, cannot be admitted; all that can be admitted is that it is excluded or differentiated from things other than itself.

If, on the other hand, the Reason meant to beadduced is exclusion from some things, then it is 'Inconclusive'.

For instance, the Jar, excluded or differentiated from the Cloth and other things, could be recognised only as devoid of sameness with the Cloth, and it could not be recognised as absolutely devoid of essence (existence), as even as thus excluded, it would be capable of efficient action.—(1750)

The following Texts show the 'Inconclusive' character of the Opponent's Reason:—

TEXTS (1751-1752).

As a matter of fact, the capable (potent) form of one entity does not reside in other entities,—because the effect produced and the form of the apprehension are found to be different and so forth; this has been explained before.—'That a certain entity is not the same as the other,'—this alone can follow from the exclusion (or differentiation) there-from;—and not the fact of its being a non-entity devoid of all properties.—(1751-1752)

COMMENTARY.

If the character of 'Entity', consisting of capacity for effective action, were something embracing all 'entities' collectively, then alone could the
thing differentiated from others be said to be featureless (non-existent),—
the 'entity' being something that is characterised by capacity for effective
action. As a matter of fact however, the 'capable (or potent) form of one
entity—the Blue for instance—cannot subsist in other things,—like the
white and the rest; as has been explained under Text 1740.

Question:—"Why cannot it subsist in other things?"

Answer:—Because the effect produced is different, and the form of
Apprehension (Idea) is different. The term 'Upalambha' here stands for
Apprehension, i.e. Cognition; and 'nirbhāsa' for the form of that Cognition
(i.e. the Idea).

The phrase 'and so forth' stands for diversities of birth, of existence, of
destruction, etc.

For these reasons all that 'non-contact'—differentiation—from another
entity can prove is only that 'the entity in question is not the same as this
latter'; it cannot prove it to be devoid of properties, a mere non-entity.

"Why?"

Because the capacity for effective action, which constitutes the essence of
'Entity', is present in it.—(1751-1752)

Objection:—"If there is absolute difference among entities,—how can
there be such all-embracing notions as 'this is entity', 'this is entity' (in
regard to all things)?—how too can there be any difference between the
Entity and the 'sky-flower', etc.—if there were no similarity?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1753-1754).

'The conception being there that 'that also is capable of effective
action',—there would be this idea that 'it is an entity';—
thus there would be subjective similarity consisting
in 'differentiation from what is incapable'.

Thus, even though there is absolute dif-
ference, there is a subjective similarity;
and thus an 'entity' being 'equal'
to other entities, becomes dis-
tinguished from the 'sky-
flower'.—(1753-1754)

COMMENTARY.

'Differentiation from the Incapable' ;—'the incapables' meant are such
non-entities as 'the son of the Barren Woman',—there is 'differentiation'
from these,—i.e. the entity is not the same as these.

Because the subjective Similarity is there, therefore it cannot be admitted
that "If an entity were not equal to other entities, it would not differ from
the sky-flower".—(as asserted by the Opponent under Text (1710).

In the following Texts, the Author sets forth the objections urged by
Sumati (against the Buddhist point of view):—
"If the form in which a certain thing is differentiated from other things,—homogeneous and heterogeneous—were the same in which it is similar to the homogeneous things,—then it should be recognised as similar to the heterogeneous things also; as the form would be the same in both cases.—And yet it is not so recognised.—Hence it follows that the form in which the thing is not similar to the homogeneous things, and the form in which it is similar to these,—must be different from one another."—(1755-1757)

COMMENTARY.

_Sumati_ argues as follows:—

"That form in which a certain thing is differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous things,—if, in that same form, it were similar to the homogeneous things,—then it should be recognised as similar to the heterogeneous things also; as the form would be the same in both cases.—And yet as a matter of fact, it is not so recognised.—Hence it follows that that form in which it is dissimilar to the homogeneous things,—and that form in which it is similar to these things,—between these two forms, there must be difference.—It might be asked—'when it is homogeneous to them, how can it be dissimilar? And if it is dissimilar to them, how can it be homogeneous to them? The two are contradictory'.—This however does not affect our position. Because the other party regards everything as having two aspects, the General and the Particular; hence in the 'General' aspect, all things are said to be 'homogeneous' to that thing, while in its 'Particular' aspect, it is held to be 'heterogeneous'; and in this latter sense, it is said to be dissimilar; so that the objection urged does not affect the position.

The compounds 'Samānāparavastu' stands for the 'Samāna', the Homogeneous, and the 'apara', Contrary,—i.e. the Heterogeneous.—The rest is easily intelligible, hence it is not explained in detail.—(1755-1757)

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (1758).

It is in that same form that it is understood to be similar, because the cause of such understanding is present, in the shape of being the cause of one and the same conception, as differentiating these from other things.—(1758)

COMMENTARY.

It is in the same form that it is said to be 'similar',—because they form the basis of the same conception. What is meant is that those that do not
form the basis of the same conception are treated as 'dissimilar', while those that do serve as that basis are regarded as 'similar'.—(1758)

Question:—"Why do not all things become the basis of the same conception,—the difference being equally present in all ?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1759).


COMMENTARY.

No question can be raised regarding the nature of things—such as—why should Fire, and not Water, burn or be hot? All that can be reasonably asked is—to what is this nature due? For, if the nature of things were not due to any cause, there could be no restriction, which would lead to incongruities. Hence it should be said that it is due to its own cause; but then the question would be—to what is that due? And so on and on it would go on to a beginningless series (of causes).

'Ākṣa' is sense-organ.—'Amṛtā' is the herb Gṛṣṭhā,—'and the like' goes with each of the two.

What is meant is that it is only the Gṛṣṭhā and other herbs that have the capacity to allay fever and other diseases,—not other things. And it is the Sense-Organ, the object, the Light and Attention that have the capacity to produce particular cognitions.

In the same way, it is only certain things to which belongs the capacity to bring about a single conception.

Or, the term 'ākṣa' may stand for the Vibhūtaka fruit; and the term 'and the like' goes with the whole compound.—(1759)

In the following Texts, the objection is raised that "the Corroborating Instance cited cannot be admitted":—
"How can the Eye be productive of the Cognition of the Blue and other things,—if it is held to have that form alone which is differentiated from the Blue and others? In fact, just as the Ear is not regarded as productive of the Cognition of Blue, etc., on account of its being different from the Blue, etc., which are productive of the Cognition of Blue, etc.,—so also the Eye should not be regarded as the cause of that Cognition.—How could any other thing, which is different from the productive cause, be productive of it?—From all this follows the conclusion that there must be inclusiveness also among things."—(1760–1762)

COMMENTARY.

"If the Eye be held to be that which has a form exclusive of the Blue, etc.,—and not any that is inclusive; this is what is meant by the particle 'eva', 'alone';—in that case the Eye cannot be the cause of the perception of the Blue, etc.; because it has been differentiated (excluded) from what is productive of that perception;—when a thing has been excluded from the Cause of a certain thing, it cannot be the Cause of that thing; e.g. the Ear which, being differentiated from the Blue, etc., which are the cause of the perception of the Blue, etc., is not the cause of the perception of the Blue, etc.;—the Eye also is (ex hypothesi) differentiated from the Blue, etc., which are the cause of the perception of Blue, etc.;—hence there is the possibility of an apprehension contrary to a universal truth.

As a matter of fact however, it is not so [i.e. the Eye is not non-productive of the perception of Blue, etc.].—Hence the truth should be otherwise than this; that is, when one thing is productive of another, it cannot be excluded from the nature of being so productive,—e.g. the Blue, which is productive of the perception of Blue, cannot be excluded from its own nature;—and the Eye is actually productive of the perception of the Blue, etc. So this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

In the same way Blue, etc. may be made the Minor Term in the Reasoning.

From all this it follows that there is inclusiveness among things.

Thus through the contrary of the Reductio ad absurdum, it has been shown that the example cited is not admissible.—(1760–1762)

The following might be urged—"The thing could be excluded from the other things and yet be productive of the Cognition; so that the Reductio ad Absurdum is Inconclusive".

This is what is answered in the following—
TEXT (1763).

"If it were not as above, then, 'differentiation' being the same in both cases, why is not the ear also regarded as productive of the cognition of blue, etc.,—just like the eye, which also is different from the colours?"—(1763)

COMMENTARY.

"The possibility of the ear also being regarded as the cause of the cognition of blue, etc. is a proof of the contrary of the conclusion (arrived at by the Buddhist); but the difference is the same in both cases. The difference that there is between the eye and the blue is the same as the difference between the ear and the blue; i.e. the ear is as different from the blue, etc. as the eye is."—(1763)

The answer to the above arguments of the Opponent is as follows:

TEXTS (1764–1775).

The 'exclusion' (differentiation) of the eye, etc. from the cause (of the cognition of blue) is not admitted, without qualification. Because the nature of the eye, etc. is also regarded as the cause; and it is not possible for anything to be 'excluded' from its own nature; if there were 'exclusion' of a thing from its own nature, the thing would become devoid of all character. When 'exclusion' is spoken of, it is exclusion from another cause that is meant; what is meant being that the eye is not of the form of that other cause;—and this is quite acceptable to us.—It is not that what is productive of the cognition is described precisely as it exists. In fact, all cognitions proceed from their own specific causes. If, on the ground of their being of the same nature, they were regarded as a single productive cause,—then, as the said nature itself is there (as the cause), what would be the use of other auxiliaries?—If it be held that—'on account of defects in other particulars, the one (nature) is not productive (of the cognition)',—then (the answer is that) those causes are incapable (of bringing about the cognition in question), by reason of difference. If there were no difference, how could they be defective?—Just as, even when there is difference—as among particular things,—everything is not the cause of every other thing,—in the same
WAY, EVEN THOUGH THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFERENCE IN 'PLURALITY', YET THERE WOULD BE RESTRICTION (OF ONLY SOME CAUSES BRINGING ABOUT SOME EFFECTS). EVEN WHEN THERE IS DIFFERENCE, IT IS ONLY A CERTAIN THING THAT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE OF THE PARTICULAR EFFECT BY REASON OF ITS NATURE. IN THE CASE OF 'INCLUSIVENESS', HOW COULD THE ONE THING BE PRODUCTIVE AND NON-PRODUCTIVE OF THE SAME ONE THING?—IF THERE IS DIFFERENCE IN THIS CASE ALSO,—THE DIFFERENCE MAY BE THERE; BUT IS THAT DIFFERENCE FROM THAT THING ONLY? THERE CAN BE NO DIFFERENCE APART FROM THE 'INCLUSIVE' (PRODUCTIVE CAUSE); AND THIS IS NON-PRODUCTIVE. IN FACT, THAT ALONE IS A REAL ENTITY WHICH IS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE ACTION; AND THIS ENTITY IS non-inclusive; AND FROM WHAT IS inclusive, THE EFFECT IS NOT PRODUCED. IN FACT DIFFERENCE AND NON-DIFFERENCE CAN BE NOT-IMAGINARY (REAL) ONLY IN RELATION TO THAT FORM OR NATURE IN REFERENCE TO WHICH THE MAN HAS RE-COURSE TO ACTIVITY. OTHERWISE THE DIFFERENCE IS THERE BY ITS VERY 'NATURE', AND THE 'GENERAL' CHARACTER ALSO IS THERE BEING DUE TO 'EXCLUSION'. THE THING ITSELF IS NOT 'INCLUSIVE' (COMPREHENSIVE); AS IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD BE MOST INCONGRUOUS ACTIVITIES.—(1764–1775)

COMMENTARY.

If mere 'differentiation from the character of the productive' is put forward without any qualification, as the Probans, then it cannot be 'admitted'. Because as a matter of fact it is not admitted that there is unqualified 'differentiation' of the Eye, etc. from the character of being productive; for the nature of the Eye, etc. also is regarded as productive; why should then there be any such restriction as that the effect must always be produced by this Cause, not by another? This Cause may produce it, and the other may also produce it; we see no incongruity in this. Under the circumstances, if the 'differentiation of the Eye, etc.' meant were without reservation of any kind, then there would be their differentiation from their own nature, which would mean that they are 'devoid of nature or character' (featureless). It is for this reason that there can be no differentiation of things from their own nature.

If then, 'the differentiation of the Eye, etc.' meant to be the Probans be that from other productive causes (of Cognition)—than their own nature,—then the Probans is 'inconclusive'; as in that case what is differentiated from the other nature may not be of that nature, but it need not cease to be productive (of the cognition); because everything is productive, in its own form, not in the form of something else; and from that nature of itself in which it is held to be productive, it has not been differentiated;—why then should it cease to be productive? So that the Probans put up is found to be 'Inconclusive'. 
If then, what is meant by 'not having the nature or character of a certain thing' is exclusion by way of 'contradistinction',—then the argument is superfluous; because 'differentiation of character' among things mutually is what is admitted by both parties.

The compound 'atayjanakarūpatvam' is to be thus explained:—'That other cause' is the Colour,—there is the nature or form of this,—which is 'atayjanakarūpa',—and that which does not possess this form or character of the other Cause (Colour, etc.) ;—that is, it has not the same character or form as Colour, etc.—Or, it may be taken as a Karmadhāraya first and then compounded with the negative term as Bahurūhi.—Or again, it may be taken as a three-membered Bahurūhi.—[The sense remains the same under all these explanations].

There arises the following question:—"In the bringing about of a certain effect,—why should the independent (unmixed) productive character be attributed to the Eye, etc. themselves, by virtue of which these alone could be restricted to that effect?"

The answer to this is that 'In fact, all cognitions proceed, etc. etc.'—This serves also to answer the objection urged to the effect that—"the difference of the Ear from the cognition being the same as that of the Eye, why should not the Ear be regarded as productive of it?"—Thus then the 'nature' of things being restricted, even when there is difference, it is only one thing that is productive, not the other. There is nothing incongruous in this.

If then the Eye, etc. were regarded as productive, on the ground of their having a common character, though different,—then that one nature of them would be productive and hence the only Cause; which would mean that the effect proceeds from that alone; and in that case, the other contributory causes would have to be regarded as useless.

If it be urged that 'the one Cause cannot produce the effect, on account of defects in other particulars',—then those particulars that are regarded as 'defective' would be incapable, impotent,—why?—by reason of difference; i.e.—because they are different from that comprehensive 'nature' which has been regarded as capable (of producing the effect in question); and if what is incapable happen to be defective, then that cannot hamper the production of the effect; as in that case anything might cease to be produced at all.

It might be urged that—"we do not regard the General and Particular aspects of things to be absolutely distinct, and hence the Reason put forward 'by reason of difference' becomes inadmissible".

The answer to this is as follows:—If there were no difference, how could they be defective? That is, if the Particulars are non-different from the General, then it should not be said that 'The one thing is not productive by reason of the defective character of particulars'. Hence, when the General is there in its perfect form, those Particulars that are non-different from that General cannot be defective. When between two things, one does not always share the fate of the other, they cannot be of the same 'nature'. 
Further, the incongruity urged is there in your case also: 'Presence' or 'Inclusion' being the same in all things, why does not everything produce everything? Just as, in your case, though the Presence or Inclusion is there in all cases, everything does not produce everything, so it would be in our case also. So there is no force in this.

Then again, even when the difference is equally present in several things, it is only one thing, not others, that produces a certain effect; and this might be due to the restriction on the productiveness of things,—on the principle that the 'nature' of one thing is not the 'nature' of the other; and there can be no incongruity in this.

When however, the productiveness belongs to one comprehensive entity,—then one and the same entity would be productive as well as non-productive,—how could these two mutually contradictory affirmation and denial subsist in the same entity? There could be no incongruity if they subsisted in different entities. This is what is meant by the words of the text—'Ekasya, etc.'; 'How could the one thing be both productive and non-productive, etc. etc.'.

The following might be urged—'We do not regard anything to be absolutely comprehensive (inclusive), on account of which there would be the incongruity of the same thing being both productive and non-productive of an effect;—what we hold is that there is difference also; so that non-productiveness would not be incongruous'.

There may be difference; but it has to be explained whether this difference from the 'productive' nature is meant to belong to the same comprehensive 'productive nature', or to another. It cannot belong to that same; because there can be no exclusion (difference) of a thing from its own nature; as in that case it would become nature-less (devoid of its character). Nor can it belong to another; if it is different, then, as it would be of the productive nature, and not imperfect, it could not be regarded as non-productive; if it were, that would lead to an absurdity.

We grant that that same thing may be different from its own nature; even so, the incongruity of one and the same thing being both productive and non-productive remains unanswered. For instance, even when the difference is there, it could not be effective in bringing about the one effect in question.

'There can be no difference apart from its inclusion (or comprehensiveness); in fact, it would be that same inclusion; so that the incongruity of the same thing being both productive and non-productive would still be there.

—The term 'anasya' (Inclusion) here stands for that which is comprehensive or inclusive,—i.e. the productive nature.—The particle 'nanu' is meant only to emphasise what is said.

Then again, it is found from positive and negative concomitance that the Effect is produced from Particulars only,—hence these Particulars themselves should be regarded as associated with Specific Individualities, which latter therefore do not necessarily indicate the 'Universal' or General aspect of things; because the character of the 'Entity' consists in capacity for effective action. Under the circumstances, whether the General is different from the Specific Individuality—or non-different from it—does not con-
cern the man who seeks only for effective action and who is not concerned with the said difference or non-difference; as a matter of fact, when the Man seeks for effective action, he has recourse to that which he considers fit for that action; and he ponders over the difference or non-difference of only that thing; and he does not ponder over them simply because he likes to do it.

'Otherwise;—i.e. if Difference (Exclusiveness) and Non-difference (Inconclusiveness) are not regarded as real,—then, of the thing capable of effective action, there would be real difference or exclusiveness, in its own form,—and the General or inclusive character would be there, through the 'exclusion' (of all other things), which would be determined by the Conceptual Content. So that there would be no dispute on this point.

It is only to this extent that the man seeking for activity has recourse to the consideration of Difference in general; and where would there be any need for his considering any such General entity as is not capable of effective action?

It might be argued that—'The thing itself may be the General,—(the comprehensive factor),—why assume exclusion at all?'

The answer to that is—'The Thing itself, etc. etc.'—That is, if the form of the Cloth were present in the Jar, then the man seeking to carry Honey or Water might take up the Cloth; and there would be other such incongruous activities. The other likely incongruities meant are all things being produced and destroyed at the same time and so forth.—(1764–1775)

It may be that other people also, like the Buddhists, accept the view that 'the various Generalities (Universals, Commonalties) are assumed on the basis of things from which a certain thing is not not-excluded, and these Generalities embrace the Particulars (Individuals)'.

In view of this, the following remark is made:

TEXT (1776).

IN CASE THE 'VARIEGATED CHARACTER' OF THINGS SPOKEN OF REFERS ONLY TO CONCEPTUAL CREATION (FANCY),—THEN WHAT WOULD BE THE DIFFERENCE IN THE ASSERTIONS MADE BY 'Vipras', 'Nirgranthas' AND 'Kāpilas'?

COMMENTARY.

'Variegated character'—Difference, Diversity.—(1776)

The following Texts set forth Kumārila's view on the subject:
TEXTS (1777-1778).

"When the Pot is broken up and a Dish is made (of the same gold), the man wanting the former becomes sorry, while the man wanting the latter becomes glad, while one wanting only the gold remains neutral. Thus the thing has three aspects; and the said three ideas would not be possible if there were no production, continuance and destruction of things." [Shlokavārtika—Vana-vāda, 21-22].—(1777-1778)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila argues as follows:—"Inasmuch as all things are capable of being born, continuing to exist and being destroyed,—they have three aspects. That this is so is shown by the fact that a single thing can bring about three effects: For instance, when the Pot is broken up and made into a Dish, sorrow is produced in the man who wanted the former, while pleasure is produced in one who wanted the latter, while there is indifference in the man who wanted only gold. If the thing had only one aspect, then the idea produced by it would be of only one kind, not of three kinds.

‘Varāhamānaka’ and ‘Ruchaka’ are particular kinds of utensils.—(1778)

The following might be urged (against Kumārila)—If it is admitted that the Entity has three aspects,—even so, how does it follow that the three aspects consist of Destruction (Continuance and Production)?

Answer (from Kumārila):—

TEXT (1779).

"As a matter of fact, there can be no Sorrow without destruction, and there can be no Happiness without production; and there can be no Neutrality without continuance. It is in this way that the Universal (commonality) is eternal."—[Shlokavārtika—Vana-vāda, 23].—(1779)

COMMENTARY.

‘It is in this way, etc. etc.’;—Because there can be no indifference without Continuance, therefore,—i.e. on account of the invariable concomitance between Neutrality and Continuance,—the Universal—‘Gold’ is understood to be eternal.—(1779)

The answer to the above arguments of Kumārila is as follows:—
EXAMINATION OF 'SYÄDVÄDA' (JAINA DOCTRINE).

TEXTS (1780–1783).


COMMENTARY.

The principal sentence is 'because of the absence of a common substratum'; this is explained in what follows—'Production, Continuance, etc. etc.—If a single entity had the three aspects of Production and the rest,—then it would mean that all these three—Production, Continuance and Destruction—are there in the thing at one and the same time; and yet it cannot be possible for these mutually contradictory properties to be present in anything at one and the same time; as otherwise, they would not be contradistinct at all.

Question—"How then can there be the three notions described?"
In answer to this the Text shows how this is possible—'All this, etc. etc.'
When the Gold in the shape of the Pot is destroyed by itself—why should any man so wanting it be sorry for it? Why too, on the production of a new thing in the shape of the Dish out of the Gold, should one be happy? As for continuance, there can be no such thing for anything of the nature of Gold; as both Production and Destruction are absolute without any connection with anything (past or future).—(1780–1783)

Question:—"If that be so, then how is there the feeling of Indifference?"
Answer:—

TEXTS (1784-1785).

WHEN THE DULL-WITTED MAN PERCEIVES THE TWO THINGS MADE OF GOLD, HE LOOKS UPON IT AS A CASE OF THE APPEARANCE OF SIMILAR PRODUCTS AND THEREBY COMES TO THINK OF IT AS SOMETHING LASTING.—IF THE GOLD ITSELF HAD A LASTING FORM, THEN THAT FORM, IN THE SHAPE OF THE Dish, COULD BE PERCEIVED IN ITS PRECEDING AND SUCCEEDING STATES ALSO; OR ELSE, THERE WOULD BE DIVERSITY.—(1784-1785)

COMMENTARY.

When the dull-witted man perceives the two things—the Pot and the Dish—made of gold,—though perceiving it, he is not able to distinguish
between the characters of the two things, being deceived by the appearance of another similar thing,—and then he has the idea of being similar products, which is the cause of his illusion, he concludes that the Gold has continued to remain all the time.

'Samānāparabhāvēna' ;—though the common character of being negation of not-gold, the two articles are regarded as the same or similar; and the man regards it as a case of the birth of two things with a common character.

Question :—"How do you know that the man regards the gold as something lasting, on account of being deceived by the appearance of common products;—and not on account of the gold being really lasting?"

Answer :—'If the gold, etc. etc.'—If eternity did belong to the gold, then the Dish also would be perceived in the Pot, which is perceptible. 'Otherwise'—if the Dish is not perceived when the gold is in the state of the Pot, which should be perceptible,—or if the Pot is not perceived when the gold is in the state of the Dish, which should be perceptible,—then there is clear difference between the two (Dish and Pot); and as the gold is not-different from them, like its own nature—the gold also becomes diverse. It is in view of all this that the Text says—'Or else, there would be diversity'.

Under Text 1717—"If the said entity, etc. etc."—a Reason has been put forward in proof of the Diverse character of things.

The only objection we have to urge against that is that it is superfluous [proving what is already admitted].—(1784-1785)

End of Chapter XX.
CHAPTER XXI.

Examination of the doctrine of 'Traikālya'—'Things continuing to exist during three points of Time.'

COMMENTARY.

Under Text 4, the True Doctrine has been called 'Immobile'; the Author proceeds to support that idea.

TEXT (1786).

ON THE GROUND OF THE GOLD CONTINUING TO BE THE SAME, WHEN IT COMES TO BE REGARDED AS SOMETHING PERMANENT,—SOME BUDDHISTS ALSO HOLD (ON THE BASIS OF THIS) THAT THE THING (BY ITSELF PERMANENT) PASSES THROUGH DIVERSE STATES.—(1786)

COMMENTARY.

The Buddhist Doctrine is that 'there is nothing that has continued existence'; against this, the following objection is urged:—"How can it be said that 'there is nothing that has continued existence'—when as a matter of fact, some Buddhists (of the Vaibhāṣika-Realistic-School) also,—like Dharmatāt and others—have accepted the view that an object continues to exist at three points of time, through its diverse states;—this view is held on the analogy of the Gold (discussed above) continuing to exist (in the state of the Pot and that of the Dish)?"

This same idea is further expounded in the following texts:—

TEXTS (1787–1790).

"JUST AS GOLD DOES NOT ABANDON ITS COLOUR, EVEN WHEN THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN ITS STATE,—SIMILARLY UNDER ALL ITS STATES, THE ENTITY DOES NOT ABANDON ITS CHARACTER OF 'SUBSTANCE'.—IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN THE COGNITION OF PAST AND FUTURE THINGS WOULD BE OBJECT-LESS.—HOW AGAIN, IS IT THAT IT HAS BEEN ASSERTED BY Tāyin that Cognition rests upon these two?—How again is Action, which is past and has no further existence, held to be productive of results? How too could Mystics have the distinct cognition of past and future
From all this it follows that Past and Future things are not the objects of mere "negation of Substance", because they are included under the character of the "states", etc., just like the present thing."—(1787-1790)

COMMENTARY.

Among the Buddhist writers (referred to under Text 1786) are the following:

1. **Bhadanta-Dharmatrīta**—the upholder of the view that while the thing undergoes changes, it remains substantially the same. He argues as follows:—When a certain thing has entered into its course of existence, there is change only in its mode of existence, not in the substance; for instance, the substance Gold undergoes several changes through which it comes to be called the 'armlet', 'necklet', 'ear-ring' and so forth, but there is no change in the Gold itself. In the same way, the object is something different from the Future, and other 'modes'. For instance, when a certain object abandons its 'future' Mode and reaches the 'present' Mode;—and when it renounces its 'present' Mode, it reaches the 'past' Mode, and yet the Object itself does not change; as throughout the three Modes, the same character of the 'substance' continues. If it were not so, the 'future', 'present' and 'past' objects would be entirely different from one another.—What is it that is meant by the term 'bhāva', 'Mode', here?—It is a particular quality on which the notions of 'Past,' etc. are based."

2. **Bhadanta-Ghoṣaka**—holds that the changes undergone by the Object are in its character. He argues as follows:—"When the Object has entered into its course of existence, it is said to be 'past', when it has the character of the 'past', but is not entirely deprived of the character of the 'future' and the 'present': for example, a man may be attached to one woman, but he need not be disgusted with other women. Similarly when the Object is 'future' or 'present' [it has these characters, but is not entirely devoid of the other two characters]."—The difference between this view and the previous one is that under this view things are spoken of as 'past' on account of the actual presence of a particular character.

3. **Bhadanta-Vasumitra**—holds the view that the changes undergone by things is in their aspects or states. He argues as follows:—"When a thing has entered the course of existence, it is spoken of variously, according to its varying aspects (or conditions); and these variations relate to the aspect, not to the substance; as the Substance remains the same at all three points of time. For example, when the clay counting-piece is placed in the place of Units, it is denominated 'one', when placed in the place of Hundreds, it is denominated 'hundred', and in place of Thousands, it is denominated a 'thousand'. Similarly when the thing is in the state of activity, it is called 'present'; and when it has ceased from activity, it is 'past', and while it has not become active at all, it is 'future'. So that things are spoken of in accordance with their states, as in the case of the clay counting-piece, where there is no change in the nature of the Substance;
only different denominations are assigned to it in accordance with its varying position, which makes it indicative of varying numbers”.

(4) Buddha-deva (a writer of the second century A.D.)—holds the view that the changes are due to changes in ‘Relativity’.—He argues as follows:—“When an object has entered its course of existence, it is called one or the other in relation to what has gone before and what is to come. For instance, the same woman is called ‘mother’ as well as ‘daughter’; and the usage in question is also dependent upon the past and the future; when a thing has something before it, but nothing after it, it is called ‘future’; when it has something before it and also something after it, it is called ‘present’; and when it has something after it, but nothing before it, it is called ‘past’.”

All these four Buddhists are Asti-vādins, Realists (upholding the view that things have real and permanent existence),—called respectively: (1) ‘Mode-changers’, Bhāva-vādin, (2) Laksāṇavādin, ‘Character-changers’, (3) Avesthāvādin, ‘Aspect-changers’ and (4) Anyathānyathika, ‘Relative changers’.

(1) Of these, the first (Dharmatrāta—the Mode-changer) does not differ from the Sāṁkhya, who holds the ‘Modification’ theory. So that the refutation that has been put forward against the Sāṁkhya is applicable to this Buddhist Realist. For instance, would the ‘modification’ come about without the abandoning of the previous mode or after its abandonment? If the former, then there would be comingling and confusion of the Modes. If the latter, then that would be incompatible with the permanent existence of things.

(2) As regards the second view (that of Ghoṣaka),—here also there would be the same comingling and confusion; as all things may have all characters. As regards the man (falling in love with one woman, which has been cited as an example), he is spoken of as ‘attached’ (or ‘in love’) on account of the appearance of Attachment, which is a totally different thing; and he is said to be ‘not disgusted’, when there is mere association (meeting together); in the case of the ordinary thing however, there is no appearance of the ‘character’, nor the mere association of ‘character’—which would constitute the ‘attainment’ of it by the thing; as, if it were, then like ‘attainment’, the ‘character’ also would become something different from the thing. Thus there is no analogy between the two cases—the case in question and that of the example cited.

(3) As regards the third view (of Vasumitra),—that the changes in things are due to variations in their aspects or states of activity,—its refutation is going to be set forth in detail below.

(4) As regards the fourth view (that of Buddhādēva), it involves the incongruity of three states occurring under the same state. For instance, under the ‘Past’ state, the preceding and the succeeding moments would be ‘past’ and ‘future’ and the ‘middle’ moment would be the ‘present’. This criticism against this is quite clear.

The Examination of the ‘Idea of things continuing to exist during the Three Points of Time’ proceeds in the Text, only with reference to the
third among the above views—[i.e. the view of Vasumitra, that the changes in things are due to the variations in their states of activity].—What has been stated in connection with the example of Gold (under Texts 1786-1787) is only an indication of the thesis of all these writers,—and it is not in strict reference to the view of Dharmatrāta only (the first of the views described). This is clear from what is going to be said (under Text 1791)—‘As regards the distinction among things due to their states of activity, etc. etc.’; —and under the view of Dharmatrāta the distinction is not based upon states of activity; it is only under Vasumitra’s view that it is so.

This view (Vasumitra’s) is as follows:—

“If the ‘Past’ and the ‘Future’ were not there, then such notions as ‘There lived Mahāsammata’, ‘Śaṅkha is going to be an all-world sovereign’ and so forth,—which involve the idea of what is past and what is going to be—would be entirely baseless; in fact, the Object not being there, the Idea also could not be there; because in regard to the case of everything, the Idea is in the form in which the Object is cognised; so that if the cognised Object is not there, there is nothing that could be apprehended by the Cognition; hence there would be no Cognition (or Idea) at all.

“Further, the Blessed One has declared that ‘Every cognition is produced on the basis of two things.—Which two things?—The Eye and the Colours and the Mental Function’. If then the Past and the Future are not there, the cognition based upon these would not be on the basis of two things; so that there would be incompatibility with the scriptures.

“Further, a past act could not bring about its fruit, if it were devoid of essence and devoid of existence, at the time of the appearance of the fruit, as the cause of that fruit would not be there; what is non-existent cannot have the capacity to produce an effect; as ‘non-existence’ consists in the absence of all capacity.

“Then again, such ideas as ‘Mahānā Devadatta lived’, ‘the world-sovereign Shankha shall be Maitreya Tathāgata’,—which appear distinctly and severally in the minds of Mystics, in regard to the Past and the Future, could not be possible; as there can be no distinction among things that are non-existent.

“From all this it follows that past and future entities, like Śrīharṣa and others, cannot be regarded as mere ‘negations of substance’,—because they have been declared as ‘to be included under the states’.—The Blessed Lord has declared as follows:—‘O Bhiksus, if the Past form had not existed, then the noble Śravaka would not have heard and been entirely indifferent regarding past forms; hence, because there is a Past form of things, therefore the noble Śravaka has heard and has thus become indifferent to the Past. All this severally would be much too detailed; hence thus whatever form has been past or is in future,—all this is spoken of briefly as Colour-phase’.”

In the compound (in the text)—‘Adhvasaṅgaha, etc. etc.’,—the term ‘adhvasaṅgaha’ stands for Colour, etc., in the sense that they are ‘included under the states’.

The ‘Etc.’ includes ‘Sensation’ and other Phases.
The second ‘ādi’ implies the further reason that all these have been taught as consisting of suffering, transitory as a whole, devoid of the Soul, and so forth.—(1787–1790)

The following might be urged:—‘Like Ākāśa, all things are always existent; hence there can be no idea of the Past, etc.’

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS (1791–1793).**

"In this connection, there should be no such cogitation as to how this diversity in the states comes about. Because this distinction among the states is conceived on the basis of activity. That which is engaged in activity is called ‘Present’; that which has ceased from activity is called ‘Past’; and that which has not yet attained activity is called ‘Future’.—The ‘activity’ of things serves only to ‘project’ the Result, not to produce it. As there can be no such ‘projecting’ in the case of past things, there is no possibility of activity in them."—(1791–1793)

**COMMENTARY.**

The various states are determined through activity; that which is engaged in activity is ‘Present’; that of which the activity has ceased is ‘Past’ and that which has not yet attained Activity is ‘future’.

**Objection:**—“What is it that is meant by ‘Kāritra’, ‘Activity’, in this connection?—If it is operation, in the shape of seeing and the rest,—e.g. seeing and the rest are the ‘activity’ of the Eye and other organs,—since the Eye sees, the Ear hears, the Nose smells, the Tongue tastes,—and Cognition also is the Cogniser, as it is that which cognises things; and thus Colour, etc. become perceptible by the Senses;—if this is what is meant by ‘activity’, then, even when the Man has been born, if the Eye, which shares the fate of the body, has no activity, the man (or the Eye)—could not be regarded as ‘present’.—Secondly, activity may be held to consist in the giving (producing) and receiving of the fruit,—for instance, the caste and other properties of man, which are born along with the Eye, are the result (fruit) of human effort; the Visual organ (Eye) or the supervising Deity, or Vibration brings about human effort; and it is by reason of bringing about this result that the Eye becomes a cause, and hence comes to be spoken of as ‘present’.—Under this definition of ‘activity’, even Past things, being held to be productive of all-embracing results sharing the same fate, would have to be regarded as ‘Present’.—Thirdly, it may be held that the ‘Activity’ meant here is that which gives and takes all sorts of results.—In that case, the Past, being the cause of some part of such results, would have to be regarded as ‘Half-present’.”
In view of this objection, Ācārya Sahantabhadra has offered the following explanation:—What is called the ‘activity’ of things is the potency of projecting the Result,—not of producing it; the Past and other things, which are only partial causes, do not project the result; it is only in the ‘present’ state that the Result is projected (thrown out) by its cause. Nor can there be ‘projection’ of what has been already projected, as that would lead to an infinite regress. Thus there being no ‘activity’ possible in what is ‘past’, there can be no confusion in the character of these (Past, Future and Present).

—(1791–1793)

The following Texts answer the above arguments (of the Realist Buddhist):

TEXTS (1794–1796).

These people will have to admit that this ‘activity’ is either different from, or the same as, the object concerned; as there can be no other way in which it can really exist.—If it is something different from the object, then the past and future states of ‘present’ things would have to be regarded as formless,—because they are ‘causes’ and are ‘embellished’, and so forth,—like the activity. Otherwise, the things would be everlasting; as the ‘form’ would be there all the time; and apart from this, there is no other characteristic of the ‘everlasting’.—(1794–1796)

COMMENTARY.

The said Activity will have to be regarded by these people either as different from, or the same as, the Entity; as there can be nothing apart from both ‘difference’ and ‘non-difference’, as these are mutually exclusive; the affirmation of one being invariably concomitant with the denial of the other; and there is no other way in which the thing can exist.

If then the Activity is something different from the Entity, then the Past and Future states of Present things would have to be regarded as ‘formless’,—because of their being causes and being embellished,—like the Activity.—The term ‘and so forth’ is meant to include ‘being an entity’ and so forth.—Otherwise—that is, if, they were not formless in the Past and in the Future,—then, all ‘embellished’ things would have to be regarded as eternal; as the ‘form’ (or Nature) would be always there; and the ‘eternity’ of a thing is nothing more than being always there; as declared in the following words—‘The learned men regard that Form as eternal which is never destroyed’.—(1794–1796)

The following might be urged:—“If eternity is a potency,—then how can the two Reasons—‘being cause’ and ‘being embellished’—escape from being not incompatible with the contrary of the Probandum?”

This is answered in the following—
TEXTS (1797-1798).

THE IDEA OF THE ETERNAL THING being a cause has already been rejected before—on the ground of the impossibility of its effects appearing either successively or simultaneously.

As for being embellished, this is clearly impossible in an eternal thing.—When Activity is described as something different from the Phases and other things (postulated by Buddhists), there is the irresistible contradiction of your own doctrines.—

(1797-1798)

COMMENTARY.

‘Before’—i.e. under the chapter on the Permanence of Things.

All that is embellished has been held to be non-eternal, hence the character of being embellished cannot belong to an eternal entity;—this is clearly understood.

Further, when the Activity is described as something different from the Phases (Skandhas) and the Inner Receptacles (Ayatanas),—there is clear contradiction of your own (Buddhist) doctrine; as the Blessed Lord has declared as follows—“All things, O Brähmana, are included in the Five Phases and the Twelve Receptacles and the Eighteen Substances.”—

(1797-1798)

· TEXTS (1799-1800).

If, on the other hand, the Activity is not different from the Entity, then, being inseparable from the Entity, it would be there at all times, just like the nature of the Entity; and in that case, the division among the states could not be made on the basis of this activity; as there could be no such distinction as that between cessation, and non-attainment, of the said Activity.—(1799-1800)

COMMENTARY.

If the Activity is held to be non-different from the Entity, then like the nature of things, it would be inseparable from the Entity; the Activity also would be something existing at all times; and in that case there could be no such distinction among states as that—that which has ceased from activity is ‘Past’, that which is still active is ‘Present’, and that which has not yet attained Activity is ‘Future’. Because if the Activity were distinguishable into ‘attained’ and ‘not attained’,—then alone could the said distinction be
possible; the said distinguishing however is not possible; because there can
be no such distinction in the case of what is always present in the same form
—(1799-1800)

TEXT (1801).

Or (conversely), because it would be non-different from the
activity—the Entity, like the Activity, would be devoid
of the ‘previous’ and ‘later’ conditions, and
would have its sole existence in the
middle (present).—(1801)

COMMENTARY.

Further, being non-different from Activity, the Entity also would have
only such existence as is devoid of the previous and later ends,—like Activity
itself.

The compound ‘Pārvāpara, etc.’ is to be explained as ‘that which has
its all—sole existence—in the middle,—being devoid of the two ends of the
‘previous’ and the ‘later’.—(1801)

In the following Texts the Author laughs at the other party for expounding
mutually contradictory doctrines:—

TEXTS (1802-1803).

Activity is not there always,—and the Entity is described as
being there at all times,—and yet the Activity is said
to be non-different from the Entity;—certainly this
is conduct worthy of a divine being!—Even if it be
held that the existence of the states (in the
Activity itself) is dependent upon other
activities,—the same question would be
equally well raised against that
view also.—(1802-1803)

COMMENTARY.

Under the circumstances, it comes to this that the Entities, Colour and
the rest, do not exist at all times, as they are non-different from Activity.
This is shown in the Text—‘The Entity, etc. etc.’

For the following reason also the Activity must be something different
from the Entity—‘And the Activity is non-different, etc. etc.’.

‘Divine Beings’—God and the like; who act and live independently,
not minding what is proper and what is improper; and just as their behaviour
is unreasonable, so also is the conduct of the philosopher under review.
EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'TRAIKALYA'.

Then again, if the Activity itself is regarded as 'future', without another Activity, then it should not be said that the states are determined by Activity; as that would not be true; inasmuch as in the case of Activity itself its 'future' and other states are determined on the basis of its own existence; and in the same manner the 'future' and other states of Entities also could be determined on the basis of their own existence.

In order to avoid this objection it might be held that, in the case of Activity also, there would be another Activity, which would be the determining factor.—But in that case also the same question—as to its being different or non-different from the former Activity,—would arise. And this would be open to the further defect that it would involve an infinite regress.—(1802-1803)

It has been pointed out that if the Activity is non-different from the Entity, it must be there at all times,—like the form or nature of the Entity itself.—Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra has offered an answer to that, which is anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXTS (1804-1805).

"Properties distinct from the Entity have also been found to qualify it; for instance, the quality of 'Resistance',—If this is urged, this cannot help the matter under discussion; such characters as that of Resistance and the like are not present in the Entity at all times; they have been regarded as occasional; because the Entity itself is produced in that way.

—(1804-1805)

COMMENTARY.

"As a matter of fact, Properties distinct from the Entity and yet qualifying it have been found; for example, the character of Resistance and the like found in Earth and other things. These things—Earth, etc.—as Categories,—are all the same; and yet these are found to be 'resistant' and 'non-resistant', 'similar' and 'dissimilar';—thus being qualified by properties which are distinct from the form of the things themselves. In the same manner, the Entity could be qualified by Activity, which may be different from the Entity itself."

This explanation will not help the present topic. The topic under consideration is this—If the Activity is regarded as non-different from the Thing,—then there can be no distinction in the Activity which, being of the same nature as the Entity, could not serve to determine the distinction among the states (as 'Past', etc.).—As regards Earth and the other things (that have been cited by Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra),—they are distinct from
one another by reason of their being associated with mutually divergent characters,—and hence it is that while some are 'resistant', others are 'non-resistant'; as is found in the case of 'Sensation', etc.; but it is not that those same are 'non-resistant' which are 'resistant'; and this for the same reason that there is no comprehensive entity in the form of 'Category', by virtue of which the qualities of 'Resistance', etc. could be occasional. In fact, what happens is that the Entity itself, which is impartite, and is 'excluded from like and unlike things',—is produced in that way. For these reasons it is not right that any property, other than the form of the Entity itself, should distinguish any single Entity.—(1804-1805)

Question:—"How then is it that there is such an expression as 'Ṛṇasya saprātiṣṭhāvatvam', 'Resistance of the Form', where the two appear as different from one another,—if a property non-different from a thing cannot serve to distinguish it?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1806).

IT IS THE ENTITY ITSELF, WHEN IT DOES NOT INDICATE 'DIFFERENCE FROM OTHER THINGS', THAT IS SPOKEN OF BY THE WORDS 'IT IS OF THE FORM'; JUST AS 'DISPOSITION' IS SPOKEN OF AS 'OF THE MIND'.—(1806)

COMMENTARY.

'When it does not, etc. etc.';—that is, when it ignores the difference from other things.

'Spoken of as, etc.'—i.e. as if it were something different.

'It is of the form, etc.'—'It' stands for 'Resistance'.

'By the words',—i.e. by the expression 'Resistance of the Form'.

An example is cited—'As Disposition, etc. etc.'.

The term 'api cha' should be understood in the cumulative sense.—(1806)

The same writer (Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra) has argued as follows:—

"Activity is not something different from the Entity,—as it is not found to have any nature apart from that.—Nor is it the Entity only; because even though it forms its very nature, yet it is non-existent at times.—Nor is it a particular (form of it), as the Activity has had no previous existence. In fact, the 'Activity' is like the 'Chain' (Series): the consecutive birth of the Entity is called the 'Chain' (or Series), and yet it is not something different from the Entity, as it is always apprehended as not-separate from it; nor is it the Entity only, as in that case even a single 'Moment' would have to be regarded as the 'Chain'; and yet with all this, it cannot be said that the Chain does not exist; because its effects are found to exist.—[Similar is the case with 'Activity'].—All this has been thus asserted—'It is admitted
that there are effects of the Chain,—and yet the Chain, as such, is nowhere existent (by itself, apart from the Entity); similar should be understood to be the case with ‘Activity as bringing about the states’.

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXTS (1807-1809).**

*If the ‘Activity’ is described as ‘neither same nor different’, like the ‘Chain’, etc.,—then it becomes purely ‘illusory’; and thus being purely imaginary, like the ‘Chain’, it could serve no useful purpose in regard to any effect; as it is only a real Entity that is capable of effective action. Thus then, as the presence of the ‘Activity’ would not be real, any determining of the States based upon that ‘Activity’ could not be real.—*

*(1807-1809)*

**COMMENTARY.**

‘*Like the Chain, etc.*’—the ‘etc.’ is meant to include the ‘Aggregate’ and such things.—

The ‘Chain’ is incapable of being spoken of as either different or non-different from the links of the chain; hence, like the ‘Pudgala’ (Body) it is featureless, devoid of form;—in the same way the ‘Activity’ in question also would be featureless;—when there is some feature (or form), it is necessary that it should be either different or non-different. Thus then, the Activity in question being purely imaginary, it could not serve any useful purpose in the bringing about of any effect; just like the ‘Chain’. The ‘Chain’, which is purely a creature of fancy, does not serve any useful purpose towards any effect, because it is featureless; and the appearance of an effect is inseparably connected with some feature (or character). Hence it is only an entity, which has the form of a ‘link in the chain’ that is capable of effective action, —not the imaginary ‘Chain’. From this it follows that the ‘Activity’ in question having a purely imaginary existence,—there can be no real presence of it, either before or after anything, and consequently any notions of the distinct ‘states’ determined upon the basis of such Activity must also be imaginary, not real.—(1807-1809)

Says the other party—“It may be that the Activity has a purely imaginary existence; and hence the distinction of the states based thereupon may also be only imaginary;—what is the harm in that?”—This is the view taken up in the following—
Firstly, the activity in question consists in ‘the capacity to throw out results’ and is capable of being spoken of; how can it be said to have an imaginary existence, when the capacity of things is an entity?—Secondly, the form that is admitted to be bringing about such effects as burning, cooking and the like—is this same form held to be in the ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’ states?—If it is the same, how can activity, inactivity and cessation of activity belong to the entity that has a single form?—How can these mutually contradictory modes be present in what is only one and undifferentiated?—If it is argued that—“because it abandons one ‘State’ and then takes up another, that entity cannot be undifferentiated, which passes through the States”,—then the question arises—are these ‘States’ different from the entity?—[The other party answers]—‘No; as in that case, the entity would not be an active agent. Because it is only through the existence of the ‘States’ that the existence of the effects is apprehended.’—(1810–1815)

COMMENTARY.

You (Sahantabhadra) have explained that the capacity of entities to throw up their effects is what is meant by ‘activity’;—now, how can this capacity to throw up effects have a merely imaginary existence? That is, it can never be so. Consequently the distinction of the ‘states’ based thereupon should also be accepted as real.

Further, the Form of Fire is found to be one that is capable of such efficient actions as those of Burning, Cooking, etc.;—is this the same that continues in the ‘Past’ and other states? Or is it different? If it remains the same,—then how can such contradictory properties as ‘activity’, ‘inactivity’ and ‘cessation from activity’ belong to the said form which is one and the same, totally undifferentiated?—And it is only through the presence of these properties that the Entity could have such states as the ‘Future’, ‘Present’ and ‘Past’ respectively. If, even in the presence of contradictory properties, the entity remained the same, then all ideas of Difference would become uprooted, and the entire universe would have to be regarded as one only. And such one-ness would mean that all things should be produced together at one and the same time.

It might be argued that—“By virtue of the variations undergone in the process of abandoning one state and taking up another,—the Entity in the three states is not entirely undifferentiated.”.

But even so, are these states different or non-different (from the Entity)? This has got to be explained.

Says the other Party—“They are not different;—i.e. they do not differ from the Entities.—‘Why?’—Because, in that case the Entity could not be
an active agent; i.e. it would be inactive; as through positive and negative concomitance, it has been ascertained that efficient activity (causal efficiency) to produce effects belongs to the states only. [Hence by being different from the States, the Entity could not be an active agent].—(1810–1815)

The objections against this last view [that "the States are not different from the Entity"] are pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (1816–1820).

How do these people accept the view that there is non-difference between the Entity and the States?—They (the States), not having been in existence, come into existence and then become destroyed;—how then could they be the same as the Entity?—In the middle 'state', the Entity is 'active' in its own form,—then, as the same form persists in other two states also, how could 'activity' and 'cessation of activity' be there in these two states?—If it is 'active', in the form of something else, then it ceases to be active again.—If, lastly, it be held that the Fire and other things, in the Past and Future states, are different from the same in the present state,—then it is true that there would be no room for the objection that comingling and confusion would be involved; but even so, as the Entity in the middle (Present) state becomes capable of fruitful action only when it comes into existence after the time during which it was not in existence, and after having come into existence, it does not continue to exist,—there would be no continuity of existence for the Entity.—(1816–1820)

COMMENTARY.

How can any one accept the view that the states are non-different from the Entity?—No one can accept it.—Because the States come into existence after having been non-existent, and after having come into existence, they become destroyed;—while nothing like this happens to the Entity; because it has been held to be existent at all times. Under the circumstances, having been non-existent, then coming into existence and then ceasing to exist,—how could the States be the same in essence as the Entity?—They can never be so; because, they stand upon entirely different footings.—Otherwise, being the same as the Entity, the States also would have to be regarded as existing at all times,—just like the nature of the Entity; because they are non-different from the Entity; or (conversely) the Entity itself would have to be regarded as subject to non-existence before existence and so forth,—like the form of the States.
Even granting the assumption that the States are non-different from the Entity,—the objection based upon the attributing to them of mutually contradictory properties still remains unanswered. For instance, when the Entity is in the ‘middle’ (Present) state,—is it active in its own form? Or in the form of something else?

If it is active in its own form, then, as that same form would be there in the Past and Future states also,—how could this form of the active entity become active and inactive?

If it is active in the form of something else, then it ceases to be active; and hence becomes a non-entity.

Thus it is clear that it is not right to say that the same form is there in the Past and Future states also.

If then there is some other form (of the Entity) in these States,—then, under this view, there would be no room for the objection that it involves the confusion and comingling in the same thing of mutually contradictory properties of Activity and Inactivity,—because the Entity would not be the same. But (the other difficulty will remain, that) if the Entity, Fire, which is capable of such action as Burning and Cooking, comes into existence after having been non-existent, and having come into existence, it disappears,—this is incompatible with the doctrine of the permanent existence of the Entity; because there is no continuity of existence.—(1816–1820)

The following might be urged—"It is true that the Entity, not being capable of action before it becomes capable of action, and having become capable of action, it ceases to be so; but even so, in these Past and Future states also the Entity is there all the same, though not capable of action; so that our theory is not incompatible with the idea of the Entity being there at all times."

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (1821).**

**AS A MATTER OF FACT, THAT ENTITY ALONE IS REAL WHICH IS** *capable of action*; **HENCE FROM THAT WHICH IS NOT SO IN THE TWO STATES,**

—**NO EFFECT CAN PROCEED.—(1821)**

**COMMENTARY.**

' *That alone* '—which is capable of action.

' *In the two states* '—in the Past and Future states.

' *That which is not so* '—i.e. not capable of action.—(1821)

The following might be urged—"In the case of such 'Past' entities as the 'Partial (or divided) cause', *capacity for action* is actually held to be there; hence the conclusion that 'no effect can be produced' cannot be admitted."

The answer to this is as follows:
EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'TRAİKĀLYA'.

TEXTS (1822–1828).

Such a Past Entity would be one that has come into existence, not having been there before, and as such it would clearly be 'Present', —just like any other 'Present' entity; also because it would be occasional. —If an entity has no cause, it can be either eternally existent or non-existent, because it would not be dependent upon anything else. That however, which has its existence dependent upon a Cause must be called 'Present'. —Then again, other people have postulated that 'modification' of Form, etc. is different in character from 'Pratīsaṅkhyaṇirodha' (Dissociation from Impurities brought about by transcendental knowledge), and other 'eternal verities'; and this 'modification' or embellishment of form and other things, comes about through Birth, Existence, etc.; now what is that peculiarity by producing which, Birth is said to be 'productive' of the thing? Is it something non-different from the 'unborn' form? Or different from it? If the peculiarity is non-different from the Form, then there can be no 'production' of it; as it would, in that case, be there even before the 'Birth', just as after it. As for a different peculiarity, there can be no such,—because by reason of this difference, there can be no relation between them. Further, as it would not be existent before, it would involve the notion that the Effect was not existent (which is incompatible with the opponent's doctrines). —Similarly if there were 'Reversal of Character', 'Continuance' and 'Destruction' (brought about respectively by the embellishments of 'Decay', 'Stability' and 'Non-eternity'), —the objections based upon their being 'different or non-different', 'Decay' and the rest, would be applicable to these also. —(1822–1828)

COMMENTARY.

'Just like any other present Entity' —i.e. any other Entity whose 'present' character is not disputed.

'Also because it would be occasional'; —this also goes with 'it would be Present'.

The Reason here put forward cannot be regarded as Irrelevant. Because as a matter of fact that thing is called 'Present' which has been produced by the Causal Link (or Factor); and what is occasional must owe its birth to a Causal Factor; because for that which has no cause, there are only two conditions possible—perpetual existence or non-existence; for the simple reason that its existence is not dependent upon anything else; hence what is occasional must have an existence that is brought about by a Causal Factor,—
and thus it becomes established that, that which has its existence brought about by a Causal Factor must be 'Present'; that is to say, 'Being Present' is invariably concomitant with 'being occasional'.

Further, if the Entity is really objectively 'Past' and 'Future', then all 'Embellishments' (or Modifications) would be everlasting; and in that case, there would be no difference between Form, etc. and the 'Dissociation from Impurities by transcendental knowledge' and other 'eternal verities'.

It might be argued that it is only the Form and such things as are actually found to be embellished (or modified) that can be regarded as 'modified'—not Ākāśa and the other Eternal Verities; so that there would be clear difference between Form, etc. and the said 'Eternal Verities'.

This is the view that has been held by other people.

This however cannot be right. Because there are four marks of modification—(1) Birth, (2) Decay, (3) Existence, and (4) Non-eternity. Among these, Birth produces things, Existence leads to their continuance, Decay leads to their decadence, and Non-eternity destroys them; hence among these, the functions of Producing and the rest have been held to be present.

Now the question arises—What is that Peculiarity which Birth produces by virtue of which it comes to be spoken of as 'productive' of the Form, etc.?—Is this Peculiarity something different from the Form, etc.? Or non-different from them? These are the only two possible alternatives.

It cannot be non-different from Form, etc.; because the Peculiarity in question would, in that case, be an accomplished thing even before the functioning of 'Birth', and as such it would be incapable of being brought about,—just as after its accomplishment; what is already an accomplished entity cannot be brought about again; if it were, then there would be an infinite regress.

Nor can a Peculiarity be brought about which is different from the Form, etc.; because as it would be different from them, there would be nothing to determine that 'this Peculiarity belongs to that Form'. For instance, the relation between them cannot be that of Identity,—as they are held to be different; if they are not held to be different, then the above objections come in. Nor can the relation between them be that of one being produced by the other; as the production of the thing is due to Birth itself. No other kind of relation is possible;—those of container and contained being included under that of being produced. If then the relation of being produced from it is held to subsist between the said Peculiarity and Form, etc.—then, as the Peculiarity would be capable of being produced by the Form itself alone, it would be produced at all times from that alone; and under the circumstances, what would 'Birth' do to it?—It might be argued that 'the Form produces the Peculiarity, through Birth'.—The answer to that is that it cannot be right that there should be any dependence upon the Birth which can render no help at all. Otherwise it would lead to an absurdity. If the Birth be held to actually render some help, then in regard to this Help, the question would arise as to its being different or non-different and so forth,—just as it arises in the case of the Peculiarity; and this would lead to an infinite regress.
From all this it follows that if there is difference, then there can be no relationship.

Further, if it be held that the said 'Peculiarity' did not exist before,—then it would mean the acceptance of the view that the effect has been non-existent (which is inconsistent with the opponent's doctrines).

Similarly, if Decay brings about a reversal of character,—and if Existence brings about stability,—and if Non-eternality brings about destruction,—then the question regarding these—'Reversal', etc.—being different or non-different, will arise, as it arose in connection with Birth; and all the objections then urged would be applicable in the case of these also.—(1822-1828)

TEXTS (1829-1830)

These, 'Birth' and the rest, are productive of their effects, in accordance with the limitations of their nature; and this capacity of theirs is there before as well as after; this potent form thus being there at all times, why should they not proceed with the activity in keeping with their nature? At the starting of such activity there can be no limitation on the 'States'.—(1829-1830)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, the capacity of 'Birth' and the rest to produce their effects is limited to their respective capacity; and this capacity of theirs is there at all times; hence they should produce their effects at all times. It cannot be urged that there is absence of the 'Causal Factor' (which prevents the production). Because the Causal Factor also is there at all times. Thus then, as Birth and the rest would be producing their effects in the 'past' and 'future' states also,—one and the same 'state' should include all the States, of which thus there need be no division.—(1829-1830)

TEXTS (1831-1832).

Further, would the 'Past' and other entities be momentary, or not?—If the former, then there is the same absence of restriction.—The 'Moment' that is born becomes the 'Present',—that which, on being born, becomes destroyed, becomes the 'Past',—and that which is yet to be born becomes the 'Future'.—(1831-1832)

COMMENTARY.

Again, are the Past, Present and Future things momentary or not? These are the two alternatives.—If the former,—if they are momentary.—
then there is the same absence of restriction.—The next sentence—'The Moment, etc. etc.' shows this same absence of restriction.—(1831-1832)

TEXT (1833).

If, on the other hand, the said things are not momentary,—then that goes against your doctrine; under your doctrine it has been shown that all modifications are momentary.—(1833)

COMMENTARY.

If the other alternative is accepted—that the Past and the rest are not momentary—then it goes against your doctrine.—The term ‘Kṛtānta’ stands for Siddhānta, accepted doctrine.—The doctrine referred to is that ‘all modifications are momentary’.—(1833)

TEXT (1834).

The view in question is opposed to reason also: If the things are existent, they must be momentary, like present things. The invariable concomitance between these two terms has been already established before.—(1834)

COMMENTARY.

Further, the view in question does not go against your own doctrine only, it is opposed to reason also. For instance, whatever is existent must be momentary,—like the present thing,—the Past and the Future are existent—hence they must be momentary. Previously—under the treatment of the Momentary Character of things (under Chapter VIII) the Invariable Concomitance of this Probans (Being existent, with the Probandum, Being momentary) has been established. Hence it cannot be said to be ‘Inconclusive’ (Doubtful). Further, ‘existence’ is characterised by capacity for effective action;—what is not-momentary is not compatible with effective action, either successive or simultaneous;—and when there is no effective action, there must be cessation of existence also, which is characterised by effective action. Thus Existence becomes excluded from where the Probandum (momentariness) is absent.—(1834)

COMMENTARY.

Further, there are the two alternatives—these Past and Future things are capable of effective action—or not capable.—If they are capable, then, the capacity being there, the things must be regarded as ‘Present’,—like those things whose ‘present’ character is not disputed. The argument may be thus formulated—Things that are capable of effective action must be regarded as Present,—as those things whose ‘present’ character is not disputed,—and the Past and Future things are capable of effective action; hence there is this Reason based upon the nature of things, which provides the Reductio ad absurdum.—The Probans cannot be said to be ‘Inconclusive’; because the absence of the ‘Present’ character in the Past and Future things would imply the absence of all capacities,—just as in the ‘sky-lotus’. —The argument may be thus formulated:—Things that are not—‘Present’ are also not-efficient for any action,—e.g. the ‘sky-lotus’,—and the Past and Future things are not ‘Present’; hence there is perceived in them the absence of the wider character.

Nor can this argument be said to be ‘Inconclusive’, in view of the three eternal verities’—Ākāśa, Pratisāṅkhya-niruddha and Apratisāṅkhya-niruddha,—which do not undergo modifications;—because these also are included under the Minor Term (Subject of the Syllogism).

Thus there is no ground for the Reason being regarded as ‘Inconclusive’ (or Doubtful).

Then again, the restricted capacity for effective action that there is in entities, must be admitted to be due to some cause; otherwise, if it were
without cause, then there could be nothing to restrict it; and the capacity of things would, in that case, not be restricted (or limited); with the result that each and every thing would be utilised in bringing about each and every effect. Thus it cannot be right to restrict the efficiency of the eternal verities, Akāśha and the rest. Consequently they do not supply the ground for regarding the Reason as 'Inconclusive'.

Nor can it be urged that the former Reason is one whose presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion; because the efficiency that pertains to a particular efficient activity,—the birth of which is due to causal factors,—is what characterises the 'Present'; and this characteristic of the 'Present' is present intact in the Past and Future things also; hence, there being no other basis for this, why should these be not regarded as 'Present'?—(1835–1840)

TEXT (1841).

AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS, ALL ATTEMPT TO ATTAIN HEAVEN AND FINAL BEATITUDE WOULD BE FUTILE; AS NO FRUIT IS FOUND THAT COULD BE ATTAINED BY EFFORT.—(1841)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, for the man for whom the Past and Future are actually present,—the fruit of acts also would be there at all times; hence any effort to attain Heaven or Final Beatitude would be futile; as there would be no fruit that could be attained by effort,—what would be the efficiency of the Austerities and Penances that constitute 'effort'?—It might be said that "they would have the efficiency to produce the desired results".—That would mean that the said 'Production' of Results is something that was not there before and has come about now.—But even so, what is it that would be efficient? And wherein would it be efficient?—"The efficiency would lie in making the results 'present'."—What do you mean by 'making them present'?—If it means 'bringing them to another place', then the thing becomes eternal, as it would remain for all time.—How too could there be any such 'bringing' in the case of Sensations, etc., which are immobile? Even so, this 'bringing' would be something that did not exist before, but has now come into existence.

'Heaven' stands for the place on the summits of mount Mēru.—'Apavarga', 'Final Beatitude', stands for Deliverance;—the 'Samsarga' of these is their attainment.—The 'effort' for this consists in Observances and Austerities.—(1841)
EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'TRAIKALYA'.

TEXT (1842).

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PAST AND FUTURE THINGS ARE HELD TO BE WITHOUT THE CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION,—THEN, ON THAT GROUND ALONE, THEY WOULD BE NON-EXISTENT,—LIKE THE 'SKY-FLOWER'.—(1842)

COMMENTARY.

If then the second alternative view (proposed under Text 1835) is accepted—that the Past and Future things are devoid of capacity for effective action,—then, in that case, for that very reason,—of being devoid of capacity for effective activity,—they would have to be regarded as 'non-existent', like 'sky-flowers'; as the only characteristic of 'non-existence' consists in the absence of all capacity.—(1842)

Having thus adduced arguments in favour of the view that the 'Past' and the 'Future' do not exist, the author proceeds to refute the arguments that have been put forward in support of the view that they do exist:—

TEXT (1843).

AS REGARDS THE REASONS THAT HAVE BEEN ADDUCED, THEY MUST RESIDE IN THINGS; AND UNTIL THESE THINGS ARE ESTABLISHED, THE REASONS CANNOT BE ADMITTED.—OR ELSE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE 'PRESENT' CHARACTER BEING ESTABLISHED, THE SAID REASONS ARE 'CONTRADICTORY',—AS GOING AGAINST THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT.—(1843)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Reasons' meant here are those adduced by the other party, under the Text 1790; these are 'Inadmissible in regard to their substratum'; because the things in which they are said to reside are the Past and Future things, and it has been shown that these do not exist; as has been said—'if the thing is not there, its property cannot be there'.

Even if the said things existed, as they have been proved to have the 'Present' character, the Reasons in question would be proving something contrary to the very nature of the Subject; and as such, 'they would be 'Contradictory'.—(1843)

Question:—"If that is so, then how is it that Buddhist writers have declared the Past and Future Forms, etc. to be included among the 'states'? The Past and Future character of non-entities like the Hare's Horns is never tried to be determined'.

Answer:—
TEXTS (1844-1845).

That form which, having come into existence, has ceased to exist, has been described as 'Past'; and that which is to come when the causal factors are complete has been described as 'Future'.—If the 'existence' of this were insisted upon, then they must be regarded as 'Present'; this is what has been just proved; as the only characteristic of the 'Present' is that it should be existent.

—(1844-1845)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(1844-1845)

*Question* :—"How is it that the presence of Form, Sensation and the rest has been attributed to these?"

*Answer* :

TEXT (1846).

When form, etc. are attributed to the Past and Future things, it is through imposing upon them their past and future conditions; and not in reality.—(1846)

COMMENTARY.

'Tām dashām'—that condition.—(1846)

*Question* :—"How is it then that Cognition has been declared to rest in two substrates?"

*Answer* :

TEXT (1847).

When the Seer of Truth declared that Cognition proceeds from two causes,—this teaching was in view of the Cognition with an object.—(1847)

COMMENTARY.

Cognition is of two kinds—with object (objective) and without object (purely subjective). It is in reference to the Cognition with Object that Cognition has been taught by the Blessed Lord, as being based upon two substrates.—(1847)

*Question* :—"How is it known that there is Cognition without Object also?"

*Answer* :—
EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'TRAIKĀLYA'.

TEXT (1848).

IN THE CASE OF THE COGNITIONS OF 'ETERNAL THINGS', 'GOD' AND SO FORTH,—THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE BACKGROUND; AS WORDS AND NAMES ARE DEVOID OF THE FORMS OF THOSE.—(1848)

COMMENTARY.

'And so forth', includes such other assumed things as Primordial Matter, Time, etc.

No such idea should be entertained as that these cognitions have their objective background in the words; this is what is meant by the words—'As Words and Names, etc. etc.'—What is meant is that the 'form' of God—such as Eternality, Being the Cause of all things and so forth,—that is envisaged in the said cognitions,—of that form, the Word or the Name is entirely devoid,—which Word or Name does not undergo any modification.

The term 'ādi' in 'shabdānāmādi', is meant to include the contingent cause (of Cognition), postulated by other people, in the shape of the Reflected Image of things.—(1848)

Question :—"If then there is Cognition without object also, then how is it called 'Cognition'? Because 'Cognition' stands for that which apprehends things; and when there is nothing to be apprehended, how could the cognition be there?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1849).

IT IS CALLED 'COGNITION' ONLY BY VIRTUE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE NATURE OF 'CONSCIOUSNESS'; AND THIS 'CONSCIOUSNESS' ALSO CONSISTS IN THE COGNITION BEING not-dark WHICH IS DEDUCED FROM ITS being luminous.—(1849)

COMMENTARY.

"The presence of the nature of Consciousness also is not possible without cognition' ;—in answer to this it is added—'And this Consciousness, etc. etc.'—'Sā' stands for the presence of the nature of Consciousness;—'asya'—i.e. of the Cognition.—"What is it?"—It consists in the Cognition being not-dark; only, on account of there being nothing else to be illumined by it, and also of the absence of any other source of illumination, the Cognition is of the nature of Light itself,—like the Light diffused in the atmosphere; and it is by virtue of this luminosity that it is called 'Cognition'.—(1849)

Question :—"How does the past act bring about its fruit"?

Answer :—
TEXT (1850).

What brings about the Fruit is the cause of fruition,—not anything 'Past'. In fact, the Fruit is held to proceed from the 'chain' of Cognitions impressed by the entity (when present).—(1850)

COMMENTARY.

'Impressed'—i.e. rendered capable of producing the fruit, through the long series of 'causal factors'.—(1850)

Question:—"If that is so, then how is it that the Blessed Lord has declared that—'There is Karma, which decays, is obstructed and becomes modified'?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1851)

In view of the said Impression being attributed to the 'Series of Cognitions', the Lord has said that 'there is Karma', which assertion is figurative; as the Principal (of the Debt) is said to be 'not destroyed (lost)'.—(1851)

COMMENTARY.

'Bhaktya'—Figuratively.

When in the case of a Debt, when the accrued interest has become equal to the Principal, the Principal actually disappears; yet it is said to be 'not lost'. In the same way the Karma, Act, also, though past and gone, is spoken of as 'not gone and destroyed'.—(1851)

Question:—"What was the purpose for which the Teaching was given in figurative language?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1852).

The matter has been explained in this way by the Teacher, for the purpose of removing the notion of the utter annihilation (of past acts). Otherwise, how could he explain the Teaching imparted in the Aphorism declaring the 'Void'?—(1852)

COMMENTARY.

If it were declared that 'the Past act does not exist', it might be understood that there is non-existence of that potency to produce the fruit which had been set going by the past act; and the disciples would come to take
up the view of the utter annihilation of the Past and its Effects; it is in view of this possibility that the Lord has said that 'the Act persists'.

'Otherwise'—if the Past really persisted,—then how could we explain the teaching in the aphorism where we are taught that 'in reality all is void'?

As a matter of fact, when the Eye is produced, it does not come from anywhere; similarly when it is destroyed, it does not go away to any other place; what happens is that after having been not in existence, it comes into existence, and having come into existence, it again becomes non-existent. It might be urged that—'in the Present state, it comes into existence, after having not been in existence'.—That is not so; because the 'State' is not anything different from the entity (Eye); as is clear from the assertion that these same (things) are the 'States' and they exist as such.—If it be meant that—'not having been itself, it becomes itself'—then it would be established that there can be no 'future' Eye.—Further, if the Modifications are always there, the Cause and Effect would not be there; which would mean that there is no fixed Truth; and this would imply the absence of the two paths of 'Repression' (Purification) also; and thus the four Truths being non-existent, there would be no possibility of True Knowledge, Renunciation, Direct Intuition and Meditation. These being not there, there would be non-existence also of the Pudgalas (Bodies) which are near about the regions where the Fruit of Acts come about. This would put an end to all Teaching. From all this it follows that the assumption of 'Past' and 'Future' things is not wholesome.—(1852)

It has been asked by the Opponent (under Text 1789)—'How have Mystics distinct cognitions of the Past and Future?'

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (1853–1856).

The Mystics cognise that form of the 'Present' thing which, directly or indirectly, has become either an effect, or a cause; subsequently, they follow it up with conceptual cognitions, which are purely common (secular) in character, and which are really without objects (without a real objective background).—Thus it is that, on the basis of the said past and future series of causes and effects, proceed all teachings regarding the Past and the Future.—As for the Tathāgata Himself, His teachings proceed without circumlocution; because the Series of His cognitions are entirely devoid of the webs of Conceptual Content.—(1853–1856)

COMMENTARY.

It has become the 'Effect' in relation to the 'Past',—and 'Cause' in relation to the 'Future'.

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'Vikalpānugatātmabhiḥ'—i.e. with Conceptual (Determinate) Cognitions.
'Really without objects'—because the Specific Individuality of things
cannot be envisaged by Cognitions associated with verbal expressions.
'Tat'—Thus, Therefore.

On the basis of the Past and Future series of Causes and Effects,—
proceed all teachings regarding the Past and the Future,—from such Mystics
as have not yet reached the Purest (Highest) stage.

As regards the Blessed Lord Himself, He does not even have the purely
secular cognition,—because He is always calm and collected on account of
the destruction of all Illusion and Ignorance; and all that is Conceptual is
the product of Ignorance and Illusion. This has been thus declared—
'Conceptual Content itself having assumed the form of Ignorance proceeds to
impose its own form in the shape of the External world'.—So that, under
the influence of the whole mass of His previous Meditations, Piety and
Knowledge, His nature has become like that of the Chintāmaṇi-gem; hence
His teachings proceed without circumlocution of any kind.—(1853–1856)

End of Chapter XXI.
CHAPTER XXII.

Lokāyata—Materialism

COMMENTARY.

[In the Introductory Text, 4] the Truth has been spoken of as 'without beginning, without end'.—The Author proceeds to set forth arguments in support of this view, starting with the criticism that has been urged against it:

TEXT (1857).

"If there is no entity that has continuity of existence, then there can be no 'other world', because there is nothing that could belong to the 'other world'."—(1857)

COMMENTARY.

'No entity'—like the Soul, etc.—The 'Soul' has been already rejected; hence it cannot be 'continuous', simply because it does not exist at all; as for the Cognition and other entities, they are all momentary, and it has been proved in the Chapter on 'The Three Points of Time' that there can be no continuity of these.—(1857)

'The Body, etc. might appertain to the other world.' The answer to that is as follows:

TEXTS (1858-1859).

"The Body, the Cognition, the Sense-organs and the rest being destroyed every moment,—they could not pertain to the other world; and there is nothing else that is admitted (by you, Buddhists). Hence consciousness must be regarded as produced from, or manifested by, certain material substances,—just like fermented acids, liquors and such things."—(1858-1859)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'and the rest' includes Feeling (Vedanā) Name-conception (Sanjñā) and Mental Faculties (Samskāra).
‘There is nothing else that is admitted’—in the shape of the ‘Soul’.

Thus this turns out to be the assertion of the view of the Lokāyata (Materialist). His aphorisms read as follows:—"There being nothing that could belong to the other world, there can be no other world;—there are four material substances, Earth, Water, Fire and Air; and from these proceeds Consciousness".

Some commentators upon these aphorisms offer the explanation that Consciousness is produced out of the material substances; others explain that it becomes manifested by them. Hence the author has mentioned both these views—'produced or manifested'.

‘Shukta’—is fermented acid.

‘Surā’—is intoxicating liquor.

‘And such things’—is meant to include things having the effect of making people unconscious and so forth.—(1858-1859)

An objection is raised—'As a matter of fact, Consciousness (or Cognition) is always produced on the basis of such causes as the Eye and other Sense-organs, and Objects, in the shape of Colour (Forms);—this fact is too well known. How then is it said that Cognition proceeds from those material substances?'

The (Materialist's) answer to that is as follows:

TEXT (1860).

"'THE NAMES 'BODY', 'SENSE-ORGAN' AND SO ON ARE APPLIED TO PARTICULAR COMBINATIONS OF EARTH AND OTHER MATERIAL SUBSTANCES; THERE IS NO OTHER REALITY THAN THESE.'"—(1860)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Lokāyata-Sūtra—'It is to the combination of these that the names 'Object' and 'Sense-organ' are applied;—the Sense-organ, etc. have no existence apart from the Great Material Substances;—the idea of those appear only in regard to the combinations of these;—and 'combination' has no existence apart from the combining elements;—these four Material Substances are well known by direct Perception.—Apart from these, there is no other Reality, equally well known by direct Perception;—and apart from Perception, there is no other Means of Cognition, which could prove the existence of the 'other world' and such things."—(1860)
“There can be no relation of cause and effect between the two minds (Consciousnesses) under dispute,—because they subsist in different bodies,—just like the consciousness of the cow and the consciousness of the horse.—Cognitions (Consciousness) cannot be the effects of the Cognition (Consciousness) in question,—because they are Consciousness,—like Consciousness connected with another ‘series’.”—(1861-1862)

COMMENTARY.

“Further, if the mind that existed in the past body were the cause of the mind (Consciousness) in the body now born,—and the mind in the dying body were the cause of the mind in the future body,—then, inasmuch as there would be no cessation in the continuity of the mind, the existence of the ‘other world’ might be postulated. As a matter of fact, however, there can be no relation of cause and effect between the said two minds in dispute,—because they reside in different bodies,—just like the Cognition of the cow and the Cognition of the horse.

“Or, the produced cognitions maybe made the ‘subject’,—in regard to which there is denial of the idea of their being produced by the last cognition in the past (dead) body;—the ‘probans’ being the same as before, ‘because they are cognitions’;—the ‘cognitions appearing in other series’ supply the corroborative instance.

“The argument may be formulated as follows:—The (present) Cognition cannot be produced by the last Cognition in the past body,—because it is Cognition,—like the Cognition appearing in another Series;—the Cognitions appearing in the Body in question are all Cognitions;—hence there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the contrary; inasmuch as ‘being cognition’ is concomitant with the contrary of ‘being produced by the Cognition in the last Body in question’.”—(1861-1862)

The idea of the ‘previous birth’ has thus been denied by the Materialist; he proceeds to deny the ‘future birth’;—
TEXT (1863).

"The Dying Consciousness of the man beset with Affections cannot bring about the contiguity of another Mind (or Consciousness),—because it is Dying Consciousness,—just like the Dying Consciousness of the Person free from the 'Afflictions' (Passions and Impurities)".—(1863)

COMMENTARY.

"The Dying Consciousness cannot bring about another Consciousness,—because it is Dying Consciousness—like the dying Consciousness of the 'Arhat', (the Person free from the Afflictions (of Passions, etc.).".—(1863)

Question:—How then does the Consciousness (Mind) come about?
Answer:—

TEXT (1864).

"From this it follows that the right view is that Consciousness proceeds from the Body itself which is equipped with the Five Life-breathe—Prāṇa, Apāna and the rest;—as has been declared by Kambalāśvatara.".—(1864)

COMMENTARY.

The Sūtra is—"It is from the Body itself, etc."—which has been pronounced by Kambalāśvatara.—(1864)

An objection is raised—Even before the Body has been completely formed, and while it still exists only in the form of the fetus, etc.,—Consciousness is already there, though in latent condition; and this Consciousness is known as being produced by the Consciousness in the past body; then how can it be asserted that it proceeds from the Body itself only?

The answer to this is as follows:—
"To assert that Consciousness resides in the Foetus, etc. is sheer audacity; nothing can be cognised at that stage, as the sense-organs are not there; and Consciousness can have no form other than the cognition of things; it is for this same reason that there is no Consciousness in the state of swoon. Nor can Consciousness exist there in the form of a latent potency; because no Potencies can exist without a substratum; and as there is no Soul that could be that substratum of Consciousness, the Body is the only substratum possible for it. So that at the end, when the Body has ceased to exist, wherein could the Consciousness subsist?"—(1865–1868)

COMMENTARY.

"The Sense-organ and the Object are the cause of the birth of Consciousness;—because Consciousness consists only in the apprehension of things; at the foetus-stage of the Body, neither the Sense-organs nor the Objects are there; how then could there appear the effect of these, in the form of Consciousness? Thus it is proved that on account of the absence of the Cause, there can be no Consciousness, even in a swoon.—Such is the upshot of the whole.

"It cannot be right to assert that at that stage the Consciousness is there in the state of latent Potency. Because at that stage, there is no substratum for such a Potency, either in the shape of the 'Soul' postulated by the Nāṣiyāyikā, or in that of the 'Chain of Cognitions' (postulated by the Buddhist); and Potency cannot be there without a substratum. Hence it follows that on the ground of sheer capacity, the Body alone can be the substratum of Consciousness. For the simple reason that there is nothing else that could be the required substratum,—either in the shape of the 'Chain of Cognitions' or the 'Soul'. Consequently, at the end, when the Body dies, the substratum in the shape of the Body having ceased to exist, how could the Consciousness exist without a substratum?

"Thus it is proved that there can be no Future Birth."—(1865–1868)
TEXTS (1869-1871).

"When the other body has not been seen, how can it be understood that the required substratum is the body that is born subsequently? How too could the consciousness, residing in different bodies, be related to the same 'chain of cognitions',—being like the consciousness of the elephant, the horse and other animals?—For these reasons, as the substratum of consciousness, you have either to seek for a beginningless and endless transmigrating personality,—or accept pure materialism."

(1869-1871)

COMMENTARY.

"It might be argued that—the consciousness would be subsisting in that intermediate body which would be produced immediately after death".—But that cannot be right; because no such intermediate body has ever been seen appearing immediately after death; and there can be no certainty regarding the existence of what has never been seen; as such a thing is always regarded as non-existent.

Nor can it be right for the consciousness of one 'chain' to subsist in another body;—as in that case the character of being related to the same 'chain' would be lost;—just as in the case of the consciousness of the different animals, elephant, horse and so forth.

"The argument may be formulated thus:—Consciousness appearing in different bodies cannot belong to the same 'chain',—like the cognition of the elephant and that of the horse,—the consciousness subsisting in the dead body and that subsisting in the succeeding intermediate body subsist in different bodies; hence there would be the possibility of the apprehension of what is contrary to the wider conception;—but as a matter of fact, there is no such apprehension;—hence the contrary must be true. That is, what are related to the same 'chain' cannot subsist in different bodies,—e.g. the consciousness of the elephant does not subsist in the body of the horse;—the consciousness of every person is related to the same 'chain';—hence there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the contrary; because 'being related to the same chain' is invariably concomitant with 'subsisting in the same body', which is contrary to 'subsisting in different bodies'.

The words—'For these reasons, etc. etc.'—recapitulates the materialist's view.

'Adi'—is birth, beginning;—'nirhana' is destruction, end;—that which has neither beginning nor end is 'beginningless and endless'.

Or, accept pure Materialism*;—this indicates the Lokāyata-Sūtra—

'There is no one related to the other world; hence there can be no other world.'—(1869–1871)

The following Texts answer the above arguments (of the Materialist):

**Texts (1872–1877).**

As regards the 'other world', there is no such 'other world', apart from the 'chain of Causes and Effects, in the form of Cognition and the rest'. What is spoken of as 'the other world' or 'this world', that is only by way of a certain limit placed upon the said 'chain' which is beginningless and endless. We regard it to be thus, in the same way as people addicted to the pleasures of the perceptible only assume the 'other world' to consist in some other part of the country. If what you are denying is the 'other world' different from those just mentioned,—then the attempt to prove that denial is futile; as there is no dispute (between us) regarding the non-existence of such 'other world'.—Objection—'The chain being a non-entity, it cannot have different states; how then can the 'other world' consisting of these, be anything real? '—Answer—There is nothing in this; what are denoted by the term 'chain' are the members of the chain, spoken of collectively by that term for the sake of brevity;—just like such terms as 'forest' and the like.—(1872–1877)

**Commentary.**

What is the 'other world' which you are denying? Is it something different from the Chain of causes and effects, consisting of Cognition and the other four 'phases' (Skandhas)? Or is it this same Chain?

The former cannot be right; as no such 'other world' has been admitted. In fact, there is nothing apart from the Chain of Causes and Effects, in the shape of Cognition and the rest,—which could be accepted. What is actually regarded as the 'other world', or 'this world', or the 'previous world',—is only by way of a certain limit,—in the form of a hundred years or so—placed upon the said Chain of Cognition, etc., which is without beginning and without end. This is exactly as you (Materialists), who are addicted to merely perceptible pleasures, apply the name 'other world.'

*[This use of 'nāstikatā' is to be noted; as it affords another indication of the truth that 'nāstika' is not the same as 'Atheist'; 'nāstikatā', as we find here, is the view that denies the other world. This is in agreement with the View of Vātsyāyana, who also sums up the 'Nāstika' view in the words 'Nāsti ātmā nāsti paralokaḥ', 'There is no Soul, there is no other world.']
to some other part of this same visible world; as is declared in such assertions as 'The Man is only so much as is perceptible of the senses'; and again, 'The other world consists in another place, or another time or another state'.

If, on the other hand, the 'other world' that is denied is something different from the said Chain of causes and effects in the shape of Cognition, etc,—then, as such a conclusion is already admitted (by both parties), any proving of it would be futile; as no such 'other world' is postulated by us.

An objection is raised—"The Chain being a non-entity, any State that is attributed to it must also be a non-entity; under the circumstances, the 'other world' based upon such limitation could not be real".

Answer—This does not affect our position. What the term 'Chain' denotes are the members of the chain, which are entities;—these being spoken of, for the sake of brevity, and expressed collectively and simultaneously, by the one name 'Chain'; just in the same way as the Dhava and other trees (which are real) are spoken of collectively as 'Forest' (though the Forest as such is not a real entity).—(1872–1877)

Question:—"If it is so, then how was it that the Chain was spoken of as a non-entity under Text 1807, where the Chain or Series has been declared to be 'illusory' (unreal) ?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1878–1885).

It is because it is conceived as 'one' (composite), and is featureless and incapable of being indicated either as the same, or as different (from the component members of the Chain),—that the Chain has been regarded as a 'non-entity':—just like the 'line of sky-lotuses'.—As it is, why cannot the Chain be accepted as being without beginning and without end?—If [it had a beginning and] the first member of the 'Chain' consisted of the first cognition,—this could be held to be either (1) 'without cause',—or (2) as produced by an eternal cause,—or (3) as eternal by itself,—or (4) as produced from any substance,—or (5) as produced by any other Cognition.—(1) The first cognition would appear at the very inception of the foetus, and it could not come about without cause; because otherwise, its existence, which is only occasional, would be quite the reverse (everlasting).—(2) Nor could it be brought about by such eternal causes as Mind, Time, Space, God, Soul and so forth; because on that very account it should be eternal.—(3) On account of the absence of the said 'eternal existence' it would be sheer audacity to assert that the Cognition is one and eternal; as difference is clearly perceived among the cognitions of Colour, Sound and other things.—(4-5) Nor could it be produced from, or
manifested by, the material substances—Earth, Fire, Water and Air; as, in that case, all Cognitions would be simultaneous; as the other party regard these substances as of permanent form; and the idea of a permanent thing requiring the help of auxiliaries has been already rejected. —(1878–1885)

COMMENTARY.

That 'Chain' which has been postulated as one has been found to be incapable of being indicated as the same as, or different from, the members of the Chain, and on that ground, it has been regarded as a 'non-entity';—just like the 'Series of sky-lotuses'; and we do not base our notion of the 'other world' upon the states of any such one 'Chain'.—If it is this 'Chain of Cognitions, etc.', called the 'other world', which you are denying,—then, it cannot be right to deny this 'other world' on the basis of the denial of the very form or existence of the said 'Chain'; because what is actually perceived cannot be denied. All the denial that could be made of it would be with regard to its qualities of beginninglessness and endlessness.—But why cannot these—endlessness and beginninglessness,—be accepted?

If beginninglessness is denied, and the first cognition at birth is held to be the first cognition (the beginning),—then this initial cognition would be either (1) without cause,—or (2) produced by an eternal cause, like an eternal Cognition or God and so forth,—or (3) it would itself be eternal,—or (4) it would be produced from any Substance,—or (5) produced by a Cognition appearing in another 'chain'.—These are the five alternatives possible.

If each cognition in the chain were the effect of another previous cognition in the same Chain,—then alone could the Chain be beginningless, not otherwise. That is why the Author has set forth these alternatives that are possible (under the idea of the Chain being not beginningless,—and then to show the untenability of every one of these alternatives).

(1) The first alternative cannot be accepted; as under that view the Cognition would have permanent existence. Things are occasional only when they are dependent upon other things, and what is without cause is not dependent upon anything,—why then should it cease to exist?

(2) Nor is the second alternative tenable; as for that same reason it would be eternal. Effects become non-existent only by reason of the absence of their cause; when the cause is present in its perfect form, you have to explain why the effect should not come about.

(3) Nor can the third alternative be accepted.—"Why?"—Because of the absence—of permanent existence.—The same absence is further emphasised by the words—'It would be sheer audacity, etc. etc.'.—This points out the fact of the Opponent's Proposition being contrary to perceived facts.

(4) The sentence 'Nor could, etc. etc.' rejects the fourth alternative.—'Kṣoṇi' is Earth.—This alternative is open to the same objections as the second one—that it proceeds from the Eternal God, etc.; because the four Major Elemental Substances are held by the other party to be eternal.—It will not be right to urge that—"the production of the Cognition from an
Eternal Cause would be possible as it would be dependent upon auxiliary causes";—because it has been thoroughly established that an eternal cause cannot depend upon an auxiliary, as it can render no help to it.—(1878–1885)

[The refutation of the fifth alternatives follows under Text 1893.]

TEXT (1886).

IF THE OTHER PARTY ASSERT THAT "THESE ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCES ARE MOMENTARY (NOT ETERNAL)",—THEN, IN THAT CASE, WHY CANNOT THEIR OWN DOCTRINE BE REGARDED AS REJECTED BY THIS?—(1886)

COMMENTARY.

If the four Major Elemental Substances are described by the other party as momentary,—with a view to escape from the objections urged above,—then also, there are objections against him.—This is what is meant.

[These objections—against the view that Cognition proceeds from the elemental substances, Earth, etc.—are now set forth in detail.]

For instance, there is nothing to prove that between Cognition and the Body (made up of the material substances), there subsists the relation of Cause and Effect,—on the basis whereof the usage of the other party could be justified. This argument may be thus formulated:—When there is no evidence in support of a certain thing having a particular character, no sane man should treat that thing as being of that character;—for instance, one should not treat Fire as cold;—there is no evidence in support of the presence of a causal relation between the Body and Cognition,—hence the wider proposition is not available.—Nor can the Reason be held to be ‘inadmissible’. Because the causal relation is always based upon Perception and Non-apprehension; and as such, it can be ascertained through particular positive or negative concomitance (Premiss),—not by mere perception or non-perception. When the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a particular cause is going to be ascertained through positive concomitance, what is to be found out is if the thing in question is one which is perceptible and which, being not seen before, is seen when the other thing (the Cause) is seen;—otherwise, if it were not found out if the thing is perceptible and was not seen before,—then it might be thought that the thing (Effect) might have been there even before the Cause appeared, or it might have gone to some other place. So that there would be nothing in the idea of the Tree and such other things, which have been existing before the cause in question, being the cause of the effect concerned. This possibility becomes averted by noting that the effect is one that could be perceived and is yet not perceived; as this condition is not fulfilled in the case of false causality. In this way the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a certain cause becomes ascertained through positive concomitance.—In the ascertainment of the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a certain cause through negative concomitance, it has to be found
out what is that thing during the absence of which the effect in question
does not appear, even though other efficient causes are there; otherwise,
if all that were ascertained were that it does not appear when the other is
absent, it would be doubtful if that particular cause is really efficient enough to
bring about that effect; as other causes efficient for that purpose are also
absent; so that it might be conceivable that—"these latter are the real
causes of the effect; and it is the absence of these to which the absence
is due; and as for its absence also during the absence of this other thing
(which is intended to be the cause),—that may be a mere accident; just as in
the case of the absence of date-palm, which grows in a place where the
'Mātrivivāha' (?) generally grows, during the absence of this latter. Hence
the qualification, 'other efficient causes being present', has to be added.—
It is in this way that it is fully ascertained that the thing in question only
can be the cause of the effect concerned; its absence being duly followed (by
the absence of the effect). There is no such following of the absence of any-
thing which renders no help in the bringing about of the effect; if it did, it
would lead to absurdity.—Thus it is only through positive and negative con-
comitance that the relation of Cause and Effect can be ascertained, not in
any other way.

There is no such positive or negative concomitance between the Body
and the Cognition. For instance, there can be no certainty regarding the
positive concomitance between one's own Body and Cognition; because in
the Foetus, before the appearance of the Cognition, the Body alone is not
perceived; nor is it perceived apart from the Cognition. As regards the
Body of another person also, the Cognition is not one that could be per-
ceptible; and hence there is no perception of any order of sequence. Hence
there can be no certain idea of positive concomitance.—Nor can there be
any certainty regarding negative concomitance; it is possible to know that
when one's own body is absent, his own cognition also is absent,—because
the man himself is absent; but it can by no means be ascertained that in
the absence of another man's body, his cognition also is absent. Because
that man's cognition not being perceptible, even on the absence of his body,
there may be doubts regarding the absence of his cognition. It is for this
reason that, even in the case of Trees, though the Body is not there, it is
not certain that the Cognition is not there; as in this case also there will
be the suspicion that its presence is not amenable to perception. It cannot
be right to be certain of absence on the basis of the absence of vibration, etc.,
as it is not necessary that causes must necessarily produce their effects. It
would be always a matter of doubt whether the absence of Cognition in the
Tree is due to the absence of the Body or to the absence of its Cause in the
shape of the absence of Desire which would be the cause of its having a
particular body.

Thus the Reason adduced by us is not 'inadmissible'.

Nor is it 'contradictory'; as it is present in all cases where the Pro-
bandum is known to be present.

Nor again can it be 'Inconclusive'; as that would lead to incongruities;
and also it would mark the objector as being devoid of intelligence.
Question:—"What is there to prove that the contrary of the Proposition 'The Body cannot be the cause of the Cognition' is not true?"

Answer:—This has no force; as the proof is there; for instance, that 'the Body cannot be the cause of the purely subjective Cognition' is going to be proved under Text 1930—'Mental Consciousness is independent, self-sufficient, etc. etc.'; specially as it is this subjective Consciousness itself which serves as the dominant cause in bringing about the contact of other bodies; which shows that it is not dependent upon the present body; and thus it is that the existence of the 'other world' becomes established.

Then again, the Body may be the Cause of the subjective Consciousness. But would it be so in the form of the single composite whole,—or in diverse forms, in the form of an aggregate of atoms?—Would it be the cause along with the sense-organs? Or without the sense-organs? Would it be the material (constituent) cause? Or the contributory cause?—These are the alternatives possible.

Now, the Body, as a single composite whole, cannot be the Cause of Cognition;—as the very idea of the 'composite whole' has been already rejected. And also because such an idea would militate against the notion that the cause consists of the Four Major Elemental Substances; as a single thing could not have four forms; as, if it did, then there would be an end of all notions of 'plurality'.

Nor can the Body in the form of the aggregate of atoms be accepted (as the Cause of Cognition). Will the Cause consist of the Atoms severally or collectively? It cannot be severally; as in that case the Cognition would arise from each one of the atoms, just as the sprout arises from every one of the seeds. Nor could it be collectively; as in that case, the defect in anyone of the limbs—like the Nose for instance,—would lead to the contingency of no Cognition being produced at all; just as the defect in even one of the various ingredients of the Cause of the sprout,—in the shape of the soil, for instance,—makes it impossible for the sprout to appear. In fact, whenever an effect is dependent upon a concatenation of cause-conditions, it does not come about, when even one of those conditions is absent; if it did, it would not be dependent upon them.—It might be held that "all the atoms are the cause of Cognition, according as they happen to be in proximity".—But in that case, there should be some difference between the effect as produced by a perfect cause and that produced by a defective cause; as the two causes would be different; otherwise the distinction in the cause would be pointless. As a matter of fact, when a cause that has been perfect in all its parts happens subsequently to be defective in certain parts, there is not found any difference in the subjective Cognition at all; and this is due to the fact that the impressions of past auditory and other cognitions continue intact.—It is only in the case of Animals, like the Elephant for instance, that there are changes in the subjective Consciousness, not in the case of human beings; the animals in the infantile stage of the body are dull, while those that have acquired a larger body are cleverer; the improvement and deterioration of the Cause, in this case, are found to bring about improvement and deterioration in the Effect; hence when, between two things,
the changes in one do not lead to changes in the other, one cannot be the Effect of the other; otherwise there would be absurdity; and the changes in the Effect would be without cause.

Nor can the other alternative view be accepted, that the Body along with the Sense-organs is the cause of subjective Consciousness.—For, here also, would the subjective Consciousness proceed from each of the sense-organs severally? or from all of them collectively?—It could not proceed from each severally; because it is found that even after the disappearance of the Sense-organs one by one, the subjective Consciousness comes in all right. For instance, even when the motor-organs have become disabled by Paralysis and other diseases, the subjective Consciousness remains intact and enjoys a perfect state of existence. And when between two things, the changes in one do not bring about changes in the other, one cannot be the Effect of the other; otherwise there would be incongruities. Further, under the view under consideration, subjective Consciousness would have to be regarded as (a) apprehending only particular things, (b) as being free from conceptual content (indeterminate), (c) as being dependent upon the presence of the object,—just like the Visual and other sense-cognitions; because it would have the same cause as these latter; and also because there would be the possibility of several conceptions appearing at the same time.

Nor can the other alternative view be accepted,—that "Subjective Consciousness proceeds from all the sense-organs collectively"; as in that case, there could be no Subjective Consciousness, even when one of the Sense-organs would be absent (disabled); just like the absence of the Sprout on the absence of even one of its contributory causes.

Nor can the other alternative view be accepted—that "Subjective Consciousness proceeds from the Body without the Sense-organs". As under that view, it would be possible for the said Consciousness to proceed from the Hand and such other parts of the body even when severed from the Body. If it were held that a qualified Body is the cause,—then it would come to this that the cause consists of the Body as along with the Sense-organs; as no qualified Body can be shown other than the Body with the Sense-organs.

Nor again can the view be accepted—that "the Body is the material (constituent) cause of Subjective Consciousness".—Because that particular cause is accepted as the 'Material Cause' of a certain Effect which is found to fulfil the two conditions—viz. : (1) that it helps, by its presence, the entire nature of the Effect embracing all its peculiar features, and (2) that the Effect undergoes no change except upon changes in the said Cause; as is found in the case where the Clay is held to be the 'material cause' of the Jar as it passes successively through all the modifications proceeding from the clod of clay to the finished product called 'Jar'. It is for this reason that when one desires to modify a certain thing he modifies it by modifying its material cause,—not in any other way. When an antecedent Material Cause is there without having its potency impeded in any way,—no one can impede the appearance of the subsequent Effect going to be produced. For instance, in the case of the Jar, no modification can be made in the effect to be
produced, without having brought about a 'moment' in the Clay incapable of further efficiency. In fact, in the bringing about of all modifications, the process is the same—that of producing a 'moment' (entity) incapable of producing another 'moment'; if it were not so, nothing could be directly contrary to anything. If such direct modification were possible, then, as the Cause, so the effect also could be modified directly by itself,—not through the bringing about of a like modification in its material cause.—It is true that in the case of the Lamp,—there is a modification brought about in its outspreading light by putting up an intervening screen without modifying the Light at all; but in this case the Lamp is not the direct Material Cause of the Light; each Light-moment is the cause of the Light-moment that follows it; so that what happens is that the screen brings about a modification in the shape of a 'moment' devoid of further causal efficiency, and thereby practically destroys the Light at that point.—In a case where a thing is modified without modifying an entity, it is not a case of Material Cause; when, for instance, the Cow is modified without modifying the Gavaya.

In the case in question, however, it is found that, without modifying the Body, the Subjective Consciousness is subjected, by wrong-doing, to modifications, such as evil intentions and the like. So that here there would be apprehension of something contrary to the wider premiss (that there can be no modification in the effect without modifications in the Cause;—if the Body were regarded as the Material Cause of Subjective Consciousness).

Objection:—"When there is modification in the Body, in the shape of being well-nourished and strong,—which is brought about by good food,—there is actually perceived a modification in the Subjective Consciousness, in the shape of Love and Hatred, etc."

What does it matter if such modification is seen? This alone does not make our Reason inadmissible. For example, all that is meant by us is that, when between two things, the modification of one is possible without modification of the other, then the one cannot be the Material Cause of the other. It is quite possible that under certain circumstances, without any modification in the Body, there is modification in the Subjective Consciousness by wrong-doing. Consequently why should our Reason be 'inadmissible'? But on the basis of occasional stray instances of modification (of the Subjective Consciousness due to modification in the Body) it cannot be right to regard the one as the Material Cause of the other. As, in this way, the object also might become the Material Cause (of Cognition). For instance, when one sees such disgusting things as the blood of the tiger, etc., there appears a modification in the mind of a cowardly person, in the shape of swoon and so forth; and yet this does not make the said Subjective Consciousness a material effect of that blood. Again, when the Mind is beset with oscillations due to love or grief and such causes, there come about certain modifications in the Body; and on the basis of this the Body might come to be regarded as having the Mind for its Material Cause. What is a fact is that when the modification of one thing always follows the modification of another, then alone can the one be rightly regarded as the Material Cause of the other. Modifications of the Mind in the shape of Love, Hate, etc.
do not always follow from the strength and vigour of the Body; as it is not found to follow in the case of the vigorous man who has attained wisdom. Conversely, even a man or an animal with a weak body and poor development, who happens to have no opportunities for sexual and other indulgences, has his mind beset with much Love and Hate, etc. And when one thing comes about in the absence of another thing, one cannot be rightly regarded as the Cause of the other. If it were so regarded, there would be incongruities. Love and Hate, etc. do not proceed directly from the Body;—the absence of opportunities for sexual and other indulgences being the necessary intervening conditions. For instance, when the Body is quite vigorous, there is a pleasure felt in the contemplation of pleasurable sensations; in such cases, the man, who has a body and a soul and has his mind beset with the notion of impermanence attaching to Pleasures and their Means,—sometimes feels that what obstructs his pleasure does him good as well as harm; and thence follows the idea of the two alternatives of loving (the benefactor) and hating (the obstructor); thence follow (respectively) good-will and ill-will; from all this proceed the notions of Pleasure and other things.—All this is well-known through positive and negative concomitance. In fact, it is only when the Mind is happy and at peace that Love is found to appear; and it is often found not to appear when the Body is vigorous. From all this it follows that vigorousness, etc. of the Body cannot be the cause of Subjective Consciousness.

From all this it also follows that, on account of its affording no direct help, the Body cannot be the Contributory Cause of Subjective Consciousness; because in the case of the Sprout, it has been found that the Contributory causes are only those that have a direct bearing upon it,—e.g. the Soil, Moisture, etc. If it were not so, there would be incongruities. Love and other feelings therefore must be regarded as proceeding from the awakening of an antecedent homogeneous seed. As for vigorousness of the Body, youth and so forth, these are found to give rise to Love, etc. by enlivening the impressions of the past, in men who have had no practice at meditation and are hence without the requisite wisdom.

Even granting that sometimes the Body has a direct bearing upon Subjective Consciousness, when this latter proceeds from its own material cause;—even so, it does not follow that it ceases upon the cessation of the Body. For instance, even on the cessation of Fire, the Jar does not cease to exist, because it has proceeded from its own material causes; so this does not affect our view adversely.—Nor is the Reason 'Inconclusivo'; for, if it were, then there would be incongruities.—Nor again is the Reason 'Contradictory', as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.

Thus it is proved that the Body cannot be the Material Cause of Subjective Consciousness;—nor can it be the Contributory Cause;—from all which it follows that Subjective Consciousness proceeds from preceding cognitions one after the other occurring in the same 'Chain'.

The following argument might be urged:—"When any two things are found to be invariably concomitant with one another (always found to exist
together), they must be regarded as Material Cause and Effect; as in the case of the Lamp and the Light; there is such invariable concomitance between the Body and the Subjective Consciousness;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things”.

The Reason adduced here is ‘inadmissible’ for one or the other party. Because in certain cases, where the Mind-essence is devoid of material form, Subjective Consciousness is present even though there is no body.—Nor does the argument put forward quite prove what is meant to be proved; as on the same grounds Subjective Consciousness might be regarded as the Material Cause of the Body.

The Reason adduced is ‘Inconclusive’ also; as the said concomitance is possible even when the cause is different; as between Fire and fluidity of (melted) Copper. For instance, it is only with Fire as the contributory cause, that Copper produces Fluidity,—not otherwise; similarly, in the case in question, the Foetus, which is the material cause of the Body, produces the next body, which is the contributory cause of Subjective Consciousness; so that the concomitance between the Body and the Subjective Consciousness is not due to the one being the material cause of the other;—to this extent, the Reason adduced is ‘Inconclusive’, ‘Doubtful’.

The following might be urged:—“Even though the Subjective Consciousness appearing subsequently proceeds from each proceeding Consciousness (cognition),—yet that which appears for the first time must have proceeded from the Body; hence it cannot be regarded as beginningless”.

This is not right. There is no proof in support of such an assumption,—as has been explained already.—It cannot be said that “there is no proof to the contrary either”;—because there certainly is proof to the contrary. For instance, if the Mental Cognition (Subjective Consciousness) were once at the outset produced out of the Body and then subsequently came to be produced out of each preceding homogeneous Cognition,—then for ever afterwards it would be produced out of preceding homogeneous cognitions,—and never out of heterogeneous cognitions produced through the Eye and other organs; when once the Smoke has been produced by Fire, it is never, later on, produced from anything not homogeneous to itself. As a matter of fact, Mental Cognition is not always found to be produced by Mental Cognitions only; it is found to be produced by any Cognition that happens to go immediately before it;—when one thing has been found to appear immediately after another thing, the former cannot be held to proceed from anything other than the latter; as in that case, it would have to be regarded as being without cause. As regards Mental Cognition, it is found to appear immediately after the visual and other cognitions; hence it becomes established that it can follow from any Cognition without restriction.

Further, if it is only at the earlier stage that the Body is the material cause of the Mental Cognition,—and not at the later stages,—then why should it not proceed entirely independently of the Body? It is not right that it should depend upon the Body which does not help it in any way.—It might be urged—“In your case also, where one cognition is preceded and brought about by another cognition, why should not the Cognition proceed by itself
alone?"—There can be no force in this, as it does so proceed; as in the case where the Mind-element is without material embodiment; when a Cognition wants another Cognition, it is dependent upon that; this is only natural and should not be objected to.—If it is held that "at the later stages also the Body does help the mental Cognition,"—then there would be the incongruity of several chains of Cognition proceeding at once; as the Body which is the Material Cause of the other Cognition would be present there in its efficient form and would be productive of the same. Because whichever Cognition is produced from the Body sets going its own 'chain of cognitions' which is different from the other Chains; in this way therefore for a single person there would be issuing forth, at every moment, innumerable 'Chains of Cognition'. But such is never found to be the case.

It might be argued that—"when the Body helps the Cognition at the later stages, it does not help as its Material Cause; it is only as a Contributory Cause that it helps the Mental Cognition that has been produced out of itself as the Material Cause, in bringing about each of its succeeding effects; so that the Body helps as a contributory cause, and the Cognition does not function entirely independently of the Body at any stage."

This also cannot be true. When one thing is known to be productive of another thing in a certain way, it cannot produce it in any other way; as there is no difference in the conditions. For instance, the Light, having served as productive of visual Cognition as its basis, does not produce it in another way; as has been thus declared—'Apart from apprehensibility, there is no other characteristic of the apprehensible thing; Colour and other things cannot otherwise be helpful to the Cognition.'—If it were not so, there could be no certainty regarding the difference and non-difference of the Effect from the character brought about by its Cause; as it would not be following in the wake of the help rendered by it; and this would mean that the Effect is without a Cause.

Then again, at the first stage,—apart from the Body being directly productive of the Cognition,—you have not noticed in it any other character of the Material Cause. What you have apprehended is merely the fact of its being a directly contributory cause. And as this is present at the later stages also,—why should it not be the Material Cause at those stages also? Otherwise, as at the later stages, so at the first stage also, it may not be the Material Cause at all; as the conditions are the same.

It will not be right to argue that—"At the later stages also, it is the Body itself which, along with the preceding Cognition, would be the Material Cause of each succeeding Cognition."—Because the possibility of its being such a Material Cause has been already rejected in detail; and also because in that case, the first initial Cognition also would have to be regarded as preceded and produced by another Cognition.

It is for these reasons that even under the view that material substances are impermanent, the following objection urged by the Teacher, remains applicable—'If the Cognition, once produced from the Body, becomes restricted to its own kind, through something else, then why should there be cessation of the Efficient Body?'
From all this it follows that Mental Cognition (Subjective Consciousness) is *without beginning*. Or it may be understood that all Cognition, without exception, is without beginning. Because if the Cognition had a beginning,—then, when the Cognition would appear first of all, would it be *Sensuous* Cognition or *Mental* Cognition?—It could not be *Sensuous* Cognition; because in the case of men asleep, or in a swoon, or with mind elsewhere,—even though the Sense-organs are there, the *Sensuous* Cognition does not appear, on account of the absence of the mental functions. Hence it is understood that the Sense-organs alone cannot be the cause of Sensuous Cognition; they can be so only through the help of a particular functioning of the Mind; and it should be so understood because the causal relation between things is always determined by positive and negative concomitance. —When too one thing has been ascertained to be produced, at first, from a certain other thing,—it cannot obtain appearance before that from any third thing; as such appearance would be without a cause; as for example, if *Smoke* were held to proceed from non-fire. When the Sensuous Cognition has come about first of all, it does so only through a favourable mental operation; hence it becomes established that the Sense-organ alone can never be its cause; otherwise it would be without a cause; this is an argument that annuls the said view.

Nor can the first Cognition be a *Mental Cognition* (the second alternative put forth on bottom of p. 530 of the Sanskrit Text). As a matter of fact, it never appears independently by itself in reference to anything not apprehended by the senses; if it did, there would be no deaf or blind persons.—Even if it did appear so,—it should be explained if it would be *conceptual* (determinate) or *non-conceptual* (indeterminate)?—It could not be *conceptual*; whenever Conceptual Thought operates it operates always as associated with verbal expression, expressive of the concept; because it is always found to appear in the form of an internal (unexpressed) verbal presentation; and this expressive verbal form of the Conceptual Thought could proceed either (a) from the comprehension of Convention,—or (b) from the fact of Word in the expressive form being a property of the Cognition itself, like the form of consciousness,—or (c) from the comprehension of the meaning of the Word. These are the only alternatives possible.

(a) It cannot be true that it proceeds from the comprehension of Convention; because the Convention has not yet been comprehended.

(b) Nor can the second alternative be accepted; because the essence—form—of the Word is twofold—*Specific Individuality* and *Universal*. Of these the *Specific Individuality* of the Word is always apprehended in an inexpressive form; hence on that basis, the Cognition could (not) be conceptual (determinate). Nor is it a property of the Cognition itself, as it always appears as something external, like the Blue and other objects. If then, it were the property of the Cognition itself, then the Blue and other things also might be the property of the Cognition itself; as there would be nothing to distinguish between the two cases. In that case the entire universe would be mere *Cognition*, and not a modification of Material Substances.
Object ion :—" According to the view that Cognition has forms, the Blue and other things are of the very essence of the Cognition, and it is these that appear as external; what then is it that is meant by the assertion that 'because they appear in the external form they cannot be properties of the Cognition'?"

True; but the very fact of Cognition appearing in a form tainted by the external object leads us to conclude that it forms the essence,—not of the Cognition,—but of the external object; as therein lies its own essence. In the Cognition it appears only on account of certain circumstances and is purely adventitious.

From all this it follows that the Word in the form of 'Specific Individuality' cannot be expressive; nor can it be the property of the Cognition itself.

As regards Word in the form of the 'Universal',—though that is expressive, yet it cannot be a property of the Cognition itself; because it is tacked on, not to the Cognition itself but, to that which is comprehended on the hearing of the Specific Individuality of the Word appertaining to the external thing. The 'Universal' of one thing cannot be tacked on to another thing; if it were, then there would be incongruities in the Cognition; as in that case the Universal 'Cow' could be tacked on to the Horse. And until the thing, in the shape of the Specific Individuality has been apprehended, it is not possible to tack on to it that property which is expressive; for the simple reason that Properties are always dependent upon the Objects to which they belong, and as such cannot be apprehended by themselves. And the thing in the form of 'Specific Individuality' cannot be apprehended by conceptual thought; as this latter always envisages the 'Universal'. Hence it becomes established that all Conceptual Thoughts have their source in the awakening of the Tendencies created by the beginningless apprehension of 'Specific Individualities'.

(c) Nor, lastly, could the fact of the conceptual thought having the form of the expressive Word be due to the comprehension of what is expressed by the Word. Because words do not subsist in the object; nor are they of the nature of objects; for if they were so, they could be understood by the unlearned also; and it would, in that case, be impossible to apply words to things according to one's own choice.

Further, though all objects are similar in so far as they are impermanent, yet Conceptual Thought cannot envisage them all at one and the same time; as each Conceptual Thought appears only in respect of certain well-defined objects with special forms, as differentiated from other forms. Hence the Cause that is pointed out should be through a conceptual thought that appertains to a single form. Such a cause cannot be indicated to be any other except Repeated Practice; as is found in the case of the Conceptual Thoughts appertaining to dead bodies (?). Thus then as the Conceptual Thought proceeds through previous repeated practice, it becomes proved that the Conceptual Cognition is without beginning.

Nor can it be right to accept the alternative (set forth on p. 53, line 7 of the original) that 'the first Mental Cognition (or Subjective Consciousness)
is non-conceptual'.—Because under that view there would never be any Conceptual Cognition at all.—It might be argued that—"in the manner explained before, it could appear later on on the basis of Conception".—But that cannot be; so long as the man rests upon non-conceptual cognition, he cannot set up any Convention. Because no Convention can be set up until the Universal Word or the Universal Thing figures in the Cognition; what does figure in the Cognition however is the Specific Individuality, and no Convention can be made either in relation to it or upon its basis; because it is meant for the purposes of Usage, while the Specific Individuality that is seen at the time of the Convention can never be present at the time of usage; consequently it has to be admitted that there is Conceptual Thought before the Convention is made relating to the Specific Individuality. And this is not possible without repeated experience; so that there also it becomes established that the Cognition in question is without beginning.

Then again, if it is not admitted that 'the first Cognition at birth is due to the continuity of the impressions left by the repeated experiences of previous lives',—then, how would you account for the idea in the new-born babe,—even among animals—of a certain thing being a source of pleasure and another a source of pain? It is by virtue of such ideas that it seeks for the mother's breasts which it regards as a source of pleasure, and it cries out when it does not find it, or having found it suddenly stops crying and proceeds to feed itself. Certainly during its present life, the baby has never experienced the fact of the breasts being the means of allaying the pangs of hunger. Nor has it had any experience of falling from a precipice being a source of hurt and pain; and yet even the newborn young of the monkey becomes afraid of death and the suffering caused by falling from a height, and, on account of that fear, clings more strongly to the mother's arms; and also avoid the place where there is a precipice. Until people have had some actual experience of things bringing pleasure or pain, they never invariably seek to obtain the one and avoid the other. If they did, there would be an absurdity.—The example of the Iron being drawn to the Magnet cannot be properly cited in this connection; because that attraction is not without cause; if it were without cause, then it would always be there. If then it has a cause, it is the Magnet that is pointed out to be the cause on the basis of positive and negative concomitance; and some similar cause will have to be found for the action of the child in securing and avoiding certain things. No such cause can be indicated, apart from repeated experience. Hence it becomes established that the action of children in seeking to obtain and avoiding certain things is due to repeated past experience; and that, on this account, the Cognition must be without beginning.

It is for these reasons that the author is going to indicate other objections applicable in common (to all the views of the Materialists)—under Texts 1930 and 1940 below.—Hence we desist from further details.

Further, if the Chāṅkāyas admit the momentary character of things, then their own doctrine,—that Material substances are everlasting—becomes upset.—(1886)
TEXTS (1887-1888).

[The Materialist might say]—"Let the doctrine be upset; we accept the view that all things are decidedly momentary, because it is a reasonable view supported by all kinds of reason".—If your love for reason is so great that you have no regard for your own doctrine,—then you should accept also the more reasonable view that 'Primary Elemental Substances do not exist at all'.—(1887-1888)

COMMENTARY.

If you accept the momentary character of things, because it is in accordance with Reason, then you should accept the doctrine that 'Ideas alone exist', which is still more reasonable; because reasonableness, which is your criterion for acceptance, is present in this case also.—(1887-1888)

Question:—"How so?"
Answer:—

TEXT (1889).

The Primary Elemental Substances cannot exist in the form of composite wholes, nor in the form of Atoms; because there can be no conjunction of Atoms,—as is going to be explained.—(1889)

COMMENTARY.

'Tēśām'—of the Primary Elemental Substances.
'Going to be explained',—under the next chapter on the Examination of the 'External World'.—(1889)

Question:—"If the said elements do not exist, then how is it that they figure in Cognitions?"
Answer:—
TEXT (1890).

Not having any real external form, they figure in cognitions only through the fruition of dispositions; just as during dreams; they do not appear anywhere else.—(1890)

COMMENTARY.

‘Anywhere else’—i.e. apart from cognition.—(1890)

Question:—“How then is it that people and the scriptures speak of the Earth and other Elemental Substances?”

Answer:—

TEXT (1891).

All these four Primary Elemental Substances are assumed on the basis of what appears in cognition,—just like dreams and illusions. And they have no real existence.—(1891)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—“If the elemental substances do not exist, then what is the basis of the Cognition (of these)?”

Answer:—

TEXT (1892).

It is not possible that what is something different from the Cognition should figure in it; it is only a previous cognition envisaging the substances that could produce another such cognition.—(1892)

COMMENTARY.

‘Tadanyasya’—something different from the Cognition, in the shape of the four elemental substances.—(1892)

It has thus been proved that the first Cognition after birth cannot proceed from any material substance. The author now proceeds to demolish the view that it is produced only by another Cognition (occurring in a different chain);—the fifth alternative put forward under Text 1880:—
IF THE COGNITION IN SOME OTHER 'CHAIN' BE HELD TO BE THE CAUSE (OF THE FIRST COGNITION),—THEN (THE QUESTION IS)—IS THAT THE 'MATERIAL CAUSE' OF IT, OR THE 'CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE'?—IF IT IS MEANT TO BE THE MATERIAL CAUSE, THEN THE LEARNING AND CULTURE OF THE PARENTS SHOULD CONTINUE IN THE CHILD'S 'CHAIN OF COGNITIONS';—THAT SUCH IS THE NATURE OF THE MATERIAL CAUSE AND ITS EFFECT HAS BEEN ASCERTAINED, THROUGH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE, IN CONNECTION WITH ONE'S OWN 'CHAIN'.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE COGNITION OF THE OTHER 'CHAIN' BE ASSUMED TO BE THE 'CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE', OF THE FIRST COGNITION, ON THE BASIS OF ITS OWN MATERIAL CAUSE,—THEN THERE WOULD BE NOTHING WRONG IN IT.—(1893–1896)

COMMENTARY.

Would this 'Cognition' occurring in 'another Chain',—i.e. the 'Chain of Cognitions' of the Parents,—be the Material Cause or the Contributory Cause (of the First Cognition under consideration)?—It cannot be the Material Cause; as, in that case, it would be possible for the peculiar learning and culture of the Parents to continue in the Son; just as the Parents' Cognition continues in their own subsequent cognitions. It has been found in the case of all Material Causes and their Products that the embellishments of the preceding 'moment' continue in the succeeding 'Moments'; this having been found, by positive and negative concomitance, to be the case is one's own 'Chain'.

The following might be the opinion suggested—"When one lamp is lighted from another Lamp the second lamp is not produced as equipped with the size and other embellishments of the first one,—it is produced merely as a lamp without any embellishments; it acquires its own embellishments from other sources in the shape of its own wick and oil, etc.;—and the same may be the case with the Cognition in question also".

That cannot be so; because the embellishment of the Lamp sets up a 'chain' in its own substratum also; because it is itself evanescent; that is the reason why on the exhaustion of the 'fuel' (in the shape of the oil and wick), the Lamp ceases to exist. The embellishment of Learning and Culture however is not evanescent; as it continues for a long time. Hence it is not possible for mere Cognition without embellishments to be produced in the manner of the Lamp.

Further, in the case of the Lamp and other things, the presence or absence of peculiarities is determined on the basis of their being aggregates of larger and less number of atoms; of the single thing, as a mere entity, there cannot be either presence or absence of peculiarities. In the case in question however, the single entity, the Cognition in the mother, would have the peculiarities of the cultural and other embellishments, while when appearing in the son, it would be without these peculiarities;—who can impart such a teaching?
Then again, the *reductio ad absurdum* that has been urged is in regard to the view that one Cognition is the Material Cause of the other; but one Lamp is not the Material Cause of the other Lamp; because it belongs to an entirely different 'Chain'. Hence what has been urged is nothing at all.

Further, in the case of Beings who have no mother—e.g. the sweat-born insects,—how could the first Cognition be due to a Cognition in another series?—We resist from further argumentation on this subject.

If, on the other hand, it be held that the Cognition of the other Chain is a *contributory* Cause of the First Cognition,—then the argument proves what is already admitted (by all parties) and hence is superfluous.—(1893-1896)

The following Text formulates the argument in support of the beginninglessness (of Cognition):

**TEXT (1897).**

*Thus then the First Cognition must be regarded as arising out of its own Material Cause,—because it is Cognition and so forth,—like the Cognition of the present moment.*—(1897)

**COMMENTS.**

The argument may be formulated as follows:—That entity which partakes of the nature of the Four Phases of Cognition, Feeling, Name-Conception, and Mental Faculty, must be regarded as proceeding from its own Material Cause;—because it is Cognition, Feeling, etc. etc.—just like the same Four Phases during youth and old age;—the First Cognition is of the nature of Cognition:—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing.

In the term 'First Cognition', the mention of *Cognition* is only by way of illustration; what is asserted should be understood to be true of Feeling and the other Phases also.—(1897)

The following Text puts forward an argument against the contrary of the above conclusion:

**TEXT (1898).**

*As other causes have been rejected, if the Cognition were entirely without cause,—then, it could not have any particular character at all.*—(1898)

**COMMENTS.**

All other causes, in the shape of the eternal things—Mind, Time, Space, God and so forth,—have been rejected before; and the view that the Cognition arises out of itself is not accepted; the only alternative left is that it should be without cause; but in that case it could not have any such particular (distinguishing) character as *Being Cognition* and the like. Because a character
or property that is purely accidental cannot serve as a determinant, and hence there could be no determination on the basis of that.

Thus the *causelessness* of Cognition would be open to rejection by the incongruity of there being no possibility of the appearance of such distinguishing characters as that of *Being Cognition* and the like;—and there would be the further objection that if it were causeless, it would not be possible for the Cognition to appear only occasionally.—(1898)

Having thus established the fact of there being a 'previous' birth, the author proceeds to establish the 'future' birth also:

**TEXT** (1899).

*The Cognition at the moment of death is capable of bringing about its product,—because it is beset with affections, not having shaken off all attachment,—like the previous cognition.*—(1899)

**COMMENTARY.**

The Cognition or Consciousness that is beset with affections is capable of producing its effect in the shape of another Cognition,—because it is beset with affections,—like the Consciousness during the previous state;—and the Consciousness at the moment of death is beset with affections; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

This Reason cannot be said to be 'inadmissible'; because as a matter of fact, the Consciousness that is dissociated from the idea of 'Void', which is opposed to all experience, is always beset with affections; because it is dissociated from its opposite,—just like the Consciousness during intercourse.

Nor is the Reason 'Inconclusive' (Doubtful); because the appearance of another Cognition is always due to this much only. Hence the reason against the contrary of the conclusion would consist in the impossibility of there being a fully efficient cause.—(1899)

The same point is further elucidated:

**TEXT** (1900).

*In the form in which the Cognition produced a definite Cognition in the past,—why cannot it, in the same unalloyed form, be productive of it in future also?*—(1900)

**COMMENTARY.**

'In the same form'—i.e. bearing the same form or character.—(1900)

In the following Text, the Opponent urges the objection against both the above arguments,—that "the Corroborative Instances cited are devoid of the Probandum":—
TEXT (1901).

"According to the other view, the idea is that consciousness proceeds from the body itself; how then can the two corroborative instances be admitted to be equipped with the probandum?"—(1901)

COMMENTARY.

"The probandum, that is desired to be proved, is that the cognition proceeds from its own material cause and produces its own product; according to the other Party, however, cognition is always produced from the body itself; so that for him there can be no instance which fulfills the conditions of the probandum; why then has the Buddhist put forward the two instances of 'the present cognition' and 'the previous cognition'?"

[The answer to this is as follows]—

TEXTS (1902–1905).

The idea of the body being the cause (of cognition) has been already discarded, on the ground of its involving the possibility of all cognitions appearing simultaneously, on account of there being no other (contributory) causes.—As a matter of fact, it is found that cognition in the form of remembrance, affection and so forth (which are cognitions) actually proceeds from pleasurable experiences and pleasant reminiscences of the same [which also are cognitions] ;—and this cannot be denied.—Then again, it is also seen that deterioration and improvement in one's later cognitions are brought about by deterioration and improvement in the practice of the learning and arts.—It is also seen that when the functioning of the mind is defective, there is no apprehension of other things.—On account of all these facts, the idea of cognition proceeding from cognition cannot be objected to.—(1902–1905)

COMMENTARY.

There is no force in the above objection. It has been already shown that the body cannot be the cause of cognition, on the ground that that would involve the simultaneity of cognitions; because there is no other contributory cause which would be needed; and if the body is eternal, it cannot require anything else; if on the other hand, it is not eternal, then the previous and the present, both objections, would be applicable. As a matter of fact, what is proved by proper means of cognition cannot be set aside by mere assertion; as otherwise there would be incongruities; so that nothing could be the
cause of anything at all. This is what has been described in the words 'mere disagreeableness cannot render things objectionable'.

Further, it is found that after a pleasurable experience, when there is remembrance of it in a definite form, there proceeds, from this pleasurable Cognition, a feeling of love and attachment—'How beautiful she is! So youthful and slim-waisted, with a handsome face!' and so forth; when one goes on contemplating upon it there appears in the mind of the man inclined to be passionate, the passion of Love. Similarly when some one causes one an injury, one goes on thinking of it—'He has done me this injury,—he has done it in the past—he is going to do it again' and so forth; thereupon there appears Hatred.—How can all this be denied;—specially by one who takes his stand upon Sense-perception (as the only Right means of Cognition)?

Similarly, when there is deterioration and improvement in the previous practice of Learning and Arts, it is found that there are corresponding deterioration and improvement in the subsequent Cognitions. And it is found that, when the Mind is attracted elsewhere and the functioning of the Mind is defective, there is no perception of other things.

From all this it is clear that the idea that Cognition is the Cause of Cognition, is in accordance with reason and should not be objected to; also because it has been actually proved that Cognition is the Cause of Cognitions.—(1902–1905)

**TEXT (1906).**

**The Reason—'because they subsist in different bodies'—cannot be admissible. Because how can there be any subsistence of the Cognition, which is incorporeal and hence not liable to fall down, in the Bodies?—(1906)**

**COMMENTARY.**

Under Text 1861, it has been argued (by the Materialist) that—"there cannot be any relation of Cause and Effect between the two Cognitions under dispute, because they subsist in different bodies";—this Reason there put forward is not admissible. Because, if the 'subsistence' meant is that of the nature of 'container and contained', then such subsistence in the Bodies is entirely impossible for Cognition, which is not liable to fall; because even though the causal relation may be there, the Cognition, which is incorporeal, could never be liable to fall; and for what is not liable to fall, no container is needed, as it could serve no useful purpose.—(1906)

**Question:**—"What then would the Container (or Receptacle) do in the case of Water and such things?"

**Answer:**—
TEXT (1907).

In the case of water and other things, the Receptacle (Container) would be there as serving to prevent their falling down.

In the case of Cognitions however, which are devoid of movement (and hence of falling), what would be the use of Receptacles (or Containers)?—(1907)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of Earth, etc. which are corporeal, things are produced on the spot where the material cause exists, and never in a place where that cause does not exist; hence that which serves as preventive of their moving away from that place is regarded as the Receptacle (Substratum, Container). No such thing is possible in the case of what is incorporeal.—(1907)

TEXT (1908).

If then, the 'Subsistence' (of the Cognitions in the Bodies) be assumed to be of the nature of 'Identification' (sameness),
—that also cannot be right. Because for you,
Cognition cannot be of the nature of the Body.—(1908)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant by 'Subsistence' is 'being of the same nature',—that also cannot be admitted. For you, who insist upon the External Things only, it cannot be right to assert that 'Cognition is of the nature of the Body'; though it is all right for me who posit the Cognition only; and for whom the Body also is of the nature of the Ālayavijñāna (a series or chain of Cognitions).—(1908)

Question:—“Why cannot it be right (to assert that Cognition is of the nature of the Body)?”

Answer:—
LOKĀYATA—MATERIALISM.

TEXTS (1909-1910).

IF THE COGNITION IS OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE BODY,—THEN WHY IS
NOT THE CONSCIOUSNESS (COGNITION) OF LOVE, HATRED, ETC.
NOT PERCEIVED BY OTHERS AS CLEARLY AS THE BODY IS ?—

IN FACT, COGNITION IS COGNISED BY THE COGNISER
HIMSELF ALONE, WHILE THE BODY IS COGNISED BY
HIMSELF AS WELL AS BY OTHERS. THINGS
THAT ARE SO COGNISED ARE ALWAYS
DISTINCT, E.G. COLIC PAIN AND THE
DRAMATIC ACTOR.—(1909-1910)

COMMENTARY.

When the Body of a man is perceived by another man, it should be
possible for the latter to perceive the Love, Hatred, etc. also of the former; as
the two are not different.—Nor can the premiss be falsified on the basis of
occult powers (whereby the feelings of others are perceived); because at the
time concerned no such powers are noticeable.—Nor can Consciousness be
regarded as incognisable; as in that case, it could not be cognised by the
Cogniser himself.

Further, whenever between two things, one is cognised by one while
the other is cognised by both,—they are different from one another; for
instance, Colic Pain and the Dramatic Actor;—of the two Cognitions in the
two bodies in question, while one is cognised by one, the other is cognised by
both; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—‘Suññāvī ’—
By the Cogniser himself.—(1909-1910)

Says the Opponent—“If this is so, then nothing can prevent the doctrine
of Pure Idealism—(that there is Cognition or Consciousness alone)—also being
rejected on these same grounds ”.

The Answer to that is as follows :—

TEXTS (1911-1912).

THIS REASON IS NOT ADMISSIBLE AGAINST THE DOCTRINE THAT ‘COGNITION
(CONSCIOUSNESS) ALONE EXISTS’; AS (UNDER THAT VIEW) WHAT
IS COGNISED (BY THE COGNITION) IS THE APPEARANCE OF
ITSELF; AS IN THE CASE OF THE MAN WITH DEFECTIVE
VISION.—FURTHER, COGNITION IS ALWAYS FOUND TO
BE DESTROYED IMMEDIATELY AFTER APPEARANCE;
IF THEN, THE BODY WITH THE COGNITION IS
OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE COGNITION,
—WHY IS IT NOT REGARDED AS
MOMENTARY ?—(1911-1912)

COMMENTARY.

‘This Reason is not admissible ’;—i.e. the Reason, if so applied, becomes
subject to the objection of being ‘inadmissible’. For instance, the fact
of 'being cognised by both' cannot be admitted by the Idealist; as for him what is cognised by the Cognition is always its own appearance; as in the case of the man of defective vision seeing two moons.

Then again, when a particular object is cognised, the Cognition is clearly found to disappear immediately after its appearance; hence, if the Body were held to be of the same nature as the Cognition, it should have to be regarded as momentary (like the Cognition).—(1911-1912)

Thus then it has been proved that the 'Subsistence' of Cognitions in the Body cannot be admitted to be of the nature of 'identity' (or 'Sameness'). If 'the subsistence' of the Cognition in the Body be held to consist in its being produced from it,—then the question is—is it 'produced from it' in the sense that the Mental Cognition has the Body for its Receptacle (or Substratum),—in the way that Visual Perception is produced by the Eye which serves as its receptacle?—or, is it 'produced from it' in the sense that it is inseparable from it;—as the Smoke is inseparable from Fire?—Both these forms of 'Subsistence' are inadmissible. Because Mental Cognition does not rest in the Body, like Sense-Cognition; as it does not always follow the changes in the Body. Nor is it invariably concomitant with—inséparable from—it; because in the case of 'formless negations', it is held that there are cognitions without the Body.

Though the facts are so, yet, for the sake of argument, the Author admits that the Reason is 'admissible', but proceeds to show that even so, it is 'Inconclusive' (Doubtful):

**TEXTS (1913–1915).**

If the said 'Subsistence' be held to be due either to the Cognition being produced in the Body as its substratum,—or to its inseparability from the Body,—the Reason put forward is wrong (Inconclusive, Doubtful). The Body undergoing destruction every moment, the previous Consciousness brings about an unbroken continuity of Consciousness in such succeeding bodies. If, by reason of their occurring in the same Chain, the two Bodies be held to be not different from another,—then in the other case also, there could be no difference, on the same ground of occurrence in the same Chain.—(1913–1915)

**COMMENTARY.**

As a matter of fact, there is no incompatibility between the contiguity of other Consciousnesses and the presence of the Consciousness in the Body; for instance, the Consciousness at the moment preceding death brings about contiguity with the Consciousness in the living body coming into existence
at the next moment,—even though this latter Consciousness appears in a
body other than that of the former; because the Body has only a momentary
existence; hence the Reason put forward by the other party is 'Inconclusive'.

If, on the ground of their occurring in the same Chain, the two
Bodies be regarded as one and the same, and on that ground the fact of the
Consciousness appearing in the 'same' body be assumed,—then, the same
might be said in the other case also,—of the Bodies appearing during the stage
intervening between the two physical bodies. Because the Body appearing
in the other regions (at which the intervening bodies appear) is only one
other state of the Chain of the same Body consisting of the five 'Receptacles'
(Āyatanas),—just like the states of Childhood and old age.

In the second argument (of the Opponent) also, the Probans or Reason
adduced is 'because it is Cognition (or Consciousness)'; and no evidence
has been adduced to prove that the said Reason is not present where the
contrary of the Probandum is known to be present; so that the Reason is
clearly 'Inconclusive'. Doubtful. This fact was quite clear; hence
the Author did not mention it.—(1913—1915)

The third argument adduced by the other party is that—'the dying
Consciousness of the man beset with affections can bring about another
Consciousness,—because it is Dying Consciousness,—like the Consciousness
of the man free from affections'.—This is now taken up:

TEXT (1916).

WHY HAS IT BEEN HELD THAT THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE PERSON FREE
FROM THE IMPURITIES OF THE AFFECTIONS IS NON-CONTIGUOUS?

—IF THIS VIEW IS HELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCTRINE OF
OTHERS,—THAT CANNOT BE RIGHT; BECAUSE THE AUTHO-
RITY (AND VALIDITY) OF THESE DOCTRINES IS NOT
ACCEPTED (BY THE MATERIALIST).—(1916)

'COMMENTARY.

'Non-contiguous',—i.e. that which has no contiguity with another
Consciousness.

What is meant to be shown by this is that the Corroborative Instance
cited is 'not admitted' by either one or the other of the two parties con-
cerned. For instance, how does the Materialist know that in the case of the
Arhats, the dying Consciousness does not bring about the contiguity of another
Consciousness?

It may be that under the Buddhist Philosophy, the following assertion
is found—'My life is at an end, I have led the life of the Student, I have done
my duty, I know of no more birth',—and it is in accordance with this faith
of the Buddhist that the Materialist has based his assertion that 'there is
no contiguity of the dying Consciousness'.

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This however cannot be right. As a matter of fact, the Materialist does not admit the authority or validity of the doctrines of other people; how then could he come to have a conviction on the basis of what he does not accept as valid? Specially, in this same way he may come to the decision that the 'other world' exists.

If it is from any other valid source of knowledge that the Materialist derives the said conviction,—then, why has not that same source been cited as the proof? Where was the use of putting up a Reason which does not lead to the desired conclusion and which only indicates sheer stupidity? Certainly that other proof could not be unfit for proving the other conclusion (of the Materialist)—for which reason it has not been adduced.—(1916)

Even though the statement may be made on the basis of the Buddhist doctrine, yet there are some Buddhists who cannot admit the Corroborative Instance (of the Arhats) to be endowed with the Probandum (not bringing about further consciousness).—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1917-1918).

As regards this matter, there are some wise persons who describe the Jinas (Buddhas) as 'Beings' whose 'Nirvāṇa' is not 'absolute and final';—and the Two Paths as aiming at that same Path.—For these people the instance cited cannot be admitted to be endowed with the Probandum;—even though it has been cited (by the Materialist) on the basis of the doctrine of the other disputant.—

(1917-1918)

COMMENTARY.

'This matter',—the doctrine of the Buddhists.
'Some wise persons',—the Mahāyānist-Mādhyanikas.

These people have declared that the 'Nirvāṇa' of the Buddhas consists in the absence of absolute finality; on the ground that both 'Birth-Cycle' and 'cessation of conscious existence' are neither final nor absolute for them. —As regards the Neophyte and the Prospective Buddha, these also have the same 'path of the Buddha' as their goal; as is clear from such statements as—'There is only one Path, that of the Mahāyāna'.—(1917-1918)

Having pointed out the defect in the Corroborative Instance, the Author proceeds to show that the Probans also is open to the charge of being 'Inconclusive':—
TEXT (1919).

INASMUCH AS NO ARGUMENT HAS BEEN ADDUCED AS NEGATIVING THE CONTRARY,—THERE IS AN UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE (OF THE PROBANS WITH THE PROBANDUM); SO THAT, THERE BEING A SUSPICION REGARDING THE PRESENCE (OF THE PROBANS) IN THE CONTRARY OF THE PROBANDUM,—THE PROBANS REMAINS ‘INCONCLUSIVE’.—(1919)

COMMENTARY.

‘Inasmuch as, etc. etc.’;—this is the reason for the uncertainty regarding the Negative Concomitance [i.e. there is no certainty as to the Probans being absent whenever the Probandum is absent].

‘There being a suspicion, etc. etc.’.—This is the reason for ‘Inconclusive’ ness’.

‘Vijñātyasadbhāva’—is presence in the contrary.—“Whose presence ?”—of the Probans.

The compound ‘Shāntyamāna, etc. etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘whose presence in the contrary is suspected’.

Nor could the contingency of the idea (of Death-Cognition producing another Cognition) being taken to imply the absence of death be taken as serving the purpose of the argument negativing the contrary. Because in reality there is no ‘death’ of anything in the shape of the ‘Soul’ and other things; what really happens is that a dissimilar Chain becomes set up, which brings about the cessation of the condition which gave the name to the particular body; and it is this that is spoken of as ‘Death’ in common parlance and also in scientific treatises.—(1919)

It has been argued above (under Text 1865) that—“it is sheer audacity to assert that there is Consciousness in the Fœetus, etc. etc.”

The answer to this is as follows :

TEXTS (1920–1922).

‘There is no audacity in asserting that ‘there is Consciousness in the Fœetus’; even though the sense-organs have not appeared in it, why cannot Cognition be there ?—In fact the assertion that does involve audacity is that ‘all Cognition proceeds from sense-organs and objects’; because the contrary is found to be the case during dreams.—In reality, Cognition is apprehended also in a form which is distinct from that of the object, as is found in the case of swoon. From this it is clear that Consciousness can be there in the Fœetus.—(1920–1922)

COMMENTARY.

If all Cognition were apprehended only through the Sense-organs and the Objects,—then our assertion would have been an audacious one; as a matter
of fact, however, in Dreams and other states there appears Subjective Consciousness envisaging the Blue and other objects, which Subjective Consciousness is apprehended even when there is no Sense-organ nor any Object in the shape of Colour, etc.—Nor can it be said that at that time the substratum of the Consciousness consists of the Sense-organ in the body; because what figures in the Consciousness is the Blue Object (which is not present in the body); and every bodily Cognition apprehends only tangible objects. Hence it is not right to say that 'all Cognition is in the form of the apprehension of things'. It is thus that there is nothing incongruous in asserting the presence of Cognition in the state of swoon and similar conditions.——

(1920–1922)

The following might be urged—"There is nothing incongruous in the idea of Consciousness existing there in the form of a latent potency, but the idea that it is actually there in its potent form is certainly incongruous".

The answer to this is as follows:——

TEXTS (1923–1927).

Consciousness is not present in the Fetus merely in the form of a potency; the view held is that Consciousnesses are present there in their actual form.—Whence do you derive the idea that there is no Consciousness during sleep and swoon and such other conditions?—If it be argued that—"the idea is obtained from the absence of Consciousness",—then, the question is—how has this absence been cognised? In case your idea proceeds thus—"we do not cognise any Consciousness at the time",—then that itself proves the presence of Consciousness at the time.—It might be argued that—"If Consciousness is present during the said states, then why is there no remembrance of it on awakening, etc.?"—This fact (of non-remembrance) is not effective (in refuting our view); the absence of Remembrance is due to the absence of vividness and other conditions (in the Consciousness)—as in the case of the Consciousness of the newborn infant.——

(1923–1927)

COMMENTARY.

There would certainly be an incongruity if there were some means of knowing with certainty that there is no Consciousness at all during the states of sleep, swoon and the like.

"There is this means of knowledge available in the fact that there is no consciousness or cognition of the Consciousness itself."

That cannot be right; how has this absence of the Consciousness of itself been cognised? As ex hypothesi there can be no definite cognition of the absence of Cognition.
LOKAYATA—MATERIALISM.

If also your definite Cognition proceeds in the form that—"in sleep, swoon and other states, I am not cognisant of any Consciousness",—then this definite cognition itself proves the existence of Cognition (or Consciousness).

It might be argued that—"if there were Consciousness during sleep and other conditions, then why should not there be remembrance of it on awakening, etc.?"—The 'et cetera?' is meant to include the state when the swoon and the intoxication have passed off".

But this non-remembrance is not effective in proving that what has been cognised did not exist there. It would be so if the mere cognition of a thing meant that there must be remembrance of it. As a matter of fact, however, in many cases, even when there is Cognition, there is no Remembrance,—on account of the absence of vividness, repetition and interest in the Cognition; just as is found to be the case of the new-born infant, where, even though there is Cognition, there is no Remembrance.—(1923–1927)

Question:—"What proof or authority have you for asserting that Consciousness is present,—where there is doubt regarding the appearance of Remembrance?"

This is the objection urged by the Opponent in the following—

TEXT (1928).

"If it is so, then how do you postulate the presence of this (Consciousness) in these (states)?"—(1928/1)

COMMENTARY.

'Of this'—of the Consciousness.

'In these',—in the states of sleep, etc.—(1928)

Our reason is as follows, as has been explained already:—

TEXTS (1928–1930).

We conclude this from reasons already explained before.—If the presence of Consciousness is not admitted during the states of sleep, swoon and the like,—then there should be death; while if another Consciousness is produced, then there would be no death at all.—Thus Mental (subjective) Consciousness must be regarded as independent, as it is not dependent upon the eye, etc., and it is present on the strength of its own cause, just as during dreams, etc.—(1928–1930)

COMMENTARY.

The Reason as already explained before is as follows:—On awakening, the first Consciousness that the man has must be regarded as arising from
its own Cause,—because it is Consciousness,—like the Reminiscent Cognition following after experience. The Probans adduced here is not 'Inconclusive'; because on the previous occasion it has been shown by the rejection of the possibility of other causes, that the necessary invariable concomitance is there.

Then again, if there were no Consciousness during sleep, etc., then there would be Death.

If, on the other hand, it be held that—"after the Body has become entirely deprived of all Consciousness, another Consciousness is produced (on awakening)",—then, such appearance of Consciousness would mean that there can be no Death at all; because, as in the case of the man awakening from sleep, so in the case of the dead man also, there would be reappearance of Consciousness. Specially as it is only Mental (subjective) Consciousness that has the capacity to link up the next birth; as has been thus declared—'Linking up, Dispassion and the rest are admissible only when the subjective Consciousness is there'.

From all this it follows that Subjective Consciousness rests entirely upon the previous Consciousness; this is the idea expressed in the words—'Subjective Consciousness must be regarded as independent'.—The reason for this 'independence' consists in the fact of its not requiring anything else. In all cases, this Subjective Consciousness proceeds entirely from its own Cause,—because it does not stand in need of any causes other than its own, in the shape of the Eye, etc.;—as is found to be the case during sleep.—(1928–1930)

The following Text disposes of the charge of 'inadmissibility' against the Reason just stated:—

TEXT (1931).

FOR INSTANCE, CONCEPTUAL COGNITIONS ARE NOT DEPENDENT UPON SENSE-ORGANS AND OBJECTS,—BECAUSE THEY COME ABOUT EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THESE LATTER,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'SKY-LOTUS' AND SUCH THINGS.—(1931)

COMMENTARY.

'Tatāvayāpāra, etc. etc.'—Even when there is no functioning of the Sense-organ and the Object. When one thing comes about without the functioning of the other, this latter cannot be the cause of the former. If it were, it would lead to absurdity.—(1931)

The following might be urged:—"The Conceptual Cognition of the Sky-lotus and such things may be independent of the Sense-organ and the Object,—because it comes about even in the absence of these latter; how could the Conceptual Cognition however, which appears when the Eye is fixed upon the Blue object before one, be independent of the Sense-organ
and Object,—which could save the Probands from being 'inadmissible' in regard to a part of the 'Subject' (Minor Term)?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS (1932-1933).**

**Even on the presence of the Sense-organ and the Object, the Conceptual Cognition that appears in relation to the Past, etc., should be regarded as on the same footing as the conception that envisages a non-entity. It has been already explained in detail that the form of an entity cannot figure in Conceptual Cognitions, because they involve verbal expressions.—(1932-1933)**

**COMMENTARY.**

'Tayoh'—of the Sense-organ and the Object.

'Asatārthoparāgēya'—is 'that which envisages what does not exist',—i.e. the conception of things like the Sky-lotus.—On the same footing as this would be the conception relating to the Past (if Cognitions were dependent upon the actual presence of the Object cognised).

"How so?"

All Conceptual Cognitions appear as associated with verbal expressions, and hence they envisage verbal expressions also; and that which envisages the verbal expression cannot envisage an entity; because verbal expressions do not bear upon the form of things; as words are not fixed by Convention in relation to the actual form of things.—All this has been explained in detail under the Chapter on 'Word and its Denotation' (Chapter XVI).

The Reason is present in everything where the Probandum is known to be present; hence it cannot be regarded as 'Contradictory'.—Nor is it 'Inconclusive'; because if the Cognition were not produced from its own cause, it would have to be regarded as without cause.—(1932-1933)

It might be argued that—"as the Cognition would subsist in the Body, it could not be regarded as without cause".

The answer to that is as follows:—

**TEXT (1934).**

**In the states of Paralysis, etc.,—even though there is change in the Body, there is no change in the Subjective Consciousness; hence this latter cannot be regarded as subsisting in the Body.—(1934)**

**COMMENTARY.**

When the body is struck with diseases like Paralysis, there is modification in it; but that does not make any change in the Subjective Consciousness:
hence this Subjective Consciousness cannot be regarded as subsisting in the Body; when one thing does not become directly modified upon the modification of another thing, it cannot be regarded as subsisting in this latter;—
—e.g. the Horse, which is not modified by the modification of the Cow (does not subsist in the Cow);—on the modification of the Body, Subjective Consciousness does not always and directly become modified, in the state of Paralysis, etc.;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character (which implies the absence of the less wide).—(1934)

The following text proceeds to show that the character of subsisting in something is invariably concomitant with the character of becoming directly modified on the modification of the latter thing:—

TEXTS (1935-1936).

IN CASES OF AFFECTIONS OF THE EYE, WHENEVER THERE IS THE SLIGHTEST DEFECT IN THE EYE, THE COGNITION BASED UPON THE EYE APPEARS IN A DEFECTIVE FORM.—THUS, EVEN WHEN THE BODY HAS PERISHED, THE SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS, WHICH DOES NOT SUBSIST IN IT, CONTINUES TO EXIST THROUGH THE FORCE OF ITS OWN CAUSE;—THERE CAN BE NO INCONGRUITY IN THIS. —(1935-1936)

COMMENTARY.

As the wider character is absent, it is proved that the Subjective Consciousness does not subsist in the Body.

'Thus'—therefore—even on the cessation of the Body,—the Subjective Consciousness shall not cease. There is no incongruity in this.—When one thing does not subsist in another, it does not necessarily cease upon the cessation of the latter; e.g. the cessation of the Cow does not lead to the cessation of the Garaya;—and the Body is not the substratum of Subjective Consciousness; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character.—(1935-1936)

It has been argued above (under Text 1869) that—"when the other body has not been seen, how can it be understood that the required substratum is the Body that is born subsequently?"

The answer to that is as follows:—
WHEN THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS BY ITSELF, WE ARE NOT EAGER TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF ANOTHER BODY.—BUT, EVEN THOUGH NOT SEEN, SUCH A BODY CANNOT BE DENIED; BECAUSE THE NON-PERCEPTION MAY BE DUE ONLY TO UNCERTAINTY IN THE MAN WITH DEFECTIVE EYESIGHT,—AS IN THE CASE OF SCANTY SMOKE.—(1937-1938)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—What is meant to be proved is the existence of the ‘other world’; and how can it be proved?—It can be proved if it is shown that Consciousness is without beginning and without end; as it is only an aspect of Consciousness that figures in the Idea of the ‘other world’; this Idea cannot subsist in the Body, which is a material object with a shape; as the ‘other world’ is held to be there even when the Body is not there. If the ‘Chain of Cognitions’ is proved to be without beginning and without end, then the existence of our ‘other World’ also becomes proved. Hence we do not put forth any effort towards proving the existence of the other Body; as it would be useless.

Simply because the other body is not seen, it cannot be denied; as this not-seeing may be due to the absence of necessary attention, as happens in the case of the man with defective eyesight,—even though the body may be there all right; as it happens when there is a scanty line of smoke; so that mere non-perception does not prove non-existence. In fact a subsequent body is described as actually perceived by persons of pure birth and super-normal vision.

For these same reasons, there can be no denial of the ‘migratory body’ (Līṅgashārīra) postulated by the Sāṅkhya.

In the case of the previously-born body also, it is just possible that there may be non-perception due to the remoteness of place;—due either to its being produced at a remote place, or to the difference in its character, as in the case of Ghosts and Goblins. Even when the bodies are not remote, people with normal vision can never cognise with certainty that it is such and such a being who has become born as a bird; just as there is no recognition in cases where the body is changed by means of the use of medicines with unthinkable potency.—(1937-1938)

Question:—“How is it then that Cognitions appearing in different substrata are spoken of as belonging to the same Chain?”

Answer:—
Even though two Cognitions subsist in two different bodies, yet, by reason of the later Cognition appearing in the same particular character as the preceding one, the later Cognition is connected with the same 'Chain' with which the previous Cognition is connected.—Further, even in the case of newly-born infants, there is activity towards sucking the breast, as also displeasure at being baulked; all which is inferred from such acts as crying, sucking the breast and so forth.—All this is of the nature of Conceptual Cognition, and Conceptual Cognition is associated with names (verbal expression).—(1939–1941)

COMMENTARY.

'By reason of the later Cognition, etc. etc.'—That is, the Cognitions of the present life appear with the same peculiarities as the Cognitions of the previous life. This has been thus declared—'Through repeated practice, good and evil deeds appear in the nature of men; and these same appear in future lives, without any instruction,—like a dream'.

The Materialist has argued as follows:—"The Body in this world and the Body in the 'other world' being entirely different, the Chain of the Cognitions in those two bodies cannot be one and the same; so that the first Cognition that appears in the Fetus cannot belong to the same Chain as the Cognition under dispute,—because they belong to different bodies,—like the Cognitions of the Buffalo, the Boar and other animals".

This also becomes refuted by what has been said above.

Then again, for the following reason also the existence of the 'other world' should be admitted:—Every Conceptual Cognition is preceded by the repeated Cognition of words,—because it is Conceptual,—like the Conceptual Thoughts occurring in youth and old age;—the Conceptual Cognition involved in the desire for sucking the breast and so forth appearing in newborn infants is Conceptual;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The Reason cannot be said to be one which has an unadmitted substratum; because the existence of the Minor Term in the shape of the desire for sucking the breast, etc., is proved by such effects in newborn infants as crying and actual breast-sucking; such crying and breast-sucking cannot be possible in one who has no conception of liking and disliking.

Nor is the Reason 'inadmissible by itself'—this is shown by the words 'all this is of the nature of Conceptual, etc. etc.'—'All this'—i.e. the desire for breast-sucking, etc.—is of the nature of Conceptual Thought; because it is apprehended as something sought after.

That the Reason is not 'Inconclusive' is shown by the words—'is associated with names'. 'Sah' stands for Conceptual Cognition. Inasmuch as Conceptual Cognition is associated with verbal expression, it is said to be 'associated with names'. This 'association with names',—
of the Conceptual Cognition—is not possible without repeated Convention; as has been explained by us already in detail.—(1939–1941)

The following might be urged:—"There may be association with names due to repeated practice; but that does not prove what is wanted; in fact, it only proves the contrary, i.e. the fact of being preceded (and produced) by repeated practice during the present life."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1942).

IN THE CASE IN QUESTION THERE CAN BE NO 'NAME-FORM' TO WHICH ONE HAS BEEN HABITUATED, DURING THE PRESENT BIRTH.—AS IN THE CASE OF THESE PERSONS, IF THERE HAS BEEN NO PREVIOUS BIRTH, THERE SHOULD BE ENTIRE ABSENCE OF THE SAID DESIRE, ETC.—(1942)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—The practice or habitual use during the present life in this world is negatived by all evidence,—in the case of newborn infants. The Reason adduced in support of a conclusion that is so annulled cannot be said to be 'contradictory', because the Proban has been said to be 'contradictory' only when the Probandum is one that is not already annulled.

'Name-form',—i.e. the form of the Name, i.e. its expressiveness; even though this really functions in the mind, it is imposed upon (attributed to) the verbal forms.

'These persons'—i.e. the newborn infants.

'Absence of, etc. etc.'—i.e. absence of the said Desire for breast-sucking and so forth.—(1942)

The following Text sums up the purport of the above arguments:—

TEXT (1943).


COMMENTARY.

'Tat'—stands for 'tasmāt', 'For these reasons'.—(1943)

The following text describes the upshot of the above arguments:—
TEXT (1944).

Because the Conceptual Cognition of the said persons is born of the fruition of the impressions left by the repeated Cognition of the Name during that same birth,
—therefore 'another birth' becomes established.—(1944)

COMMENTARY.

'Name'—verbal expression.—'Cognition'—apprehension, knowledge;—'abhyaśa', repeated appearance.

The compound 'yamnāma, etc. etc.' is to be expounded as 'that birth during which there has been repeated cognition of the Name',—this compound being in accordance with a particular rule (of Pāṇini's)—'Saptami, etc.';—the impressions are left by this repeated Cognition;—these Impressions have this 'fruition', development, attainment of their full character, by producing their effects;—and it is from this 'fruition' that the said Conceptual Cognition is born.

'Of the said persons'—i.e. of new-born infants.—(1944)

The following Text sets forth the opponent's Reductio ad absurdum argument against the above view:—

TEXT (1945).

"If the said Conceptual Cognition of the newborn infants proceed from the repeated Cognition of Names,—how is it that they do not have the memory or the clear speech of eloquent speakers?"—(1945)

COMMENTARY.

"If the Conceptual Cognition proceeds from the repeated Cognition of the Convention during previous lives,—then the newborn child should have remembrance of the past Convention; because the continuity of a habit could not be possible without remembrance; also the child should have clear speech like eloquent speakers;—and in that case, there would be no need for the setting up of any Conventions during the present life.—And yet none of these things happens.—Hence it follows that, as there is no Remembrance, and there is no clear speech,—the idea that the Conceptual Cognition is preceded and produced by repeated Cognition is incompatible with facts".

By means of this Reductio ad absurdum, which rejects the very nature of the Major Term, the Opponent shows that the final Conclusion (of the Buddhist) is defective.—(1945)

In the following Text, the author points out that the Reason put forward in this Reductio ad absurdum is 'Inconclusive' (Doubtful);—
TEXT (1946).

That speech is not there is due to the fact that the development 
(of the impressions) becomes hampered by powerful 
impediments,—just as in the state of highly 
complicated fever.—(1946)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Repeated Cognition is not invariably concomitant 
with Remembrance, etc.;—by virtue of which concomitance it should always 
produce the said Remembrance; or should cease on the cessation of the 
same. Because it is quite possible that there may be continuance of the 
previous habit, and yet there may be no Remembrance.

The mention of the 'high complicated fever' is only by way of 
illustration.

'Powerful impediments'—due to existence in the mother's womb.

'The development becomes hampered'—That is the full development 
of the Impressions becomes hampered; i.e. it does not proceed in exact 
accordance with the peculiarities of the particular place, time and character 
of things as previously cognised.

This answers the following argument of the Materialist:—"Remem-
brance of previous birth cannot be admitted; because there is Remembrance 
of all men coming from the same village".—The fact of the matter is that 
even those coming from the same village do not have the Remembrance; as 
among them there are some who are dull-witted who lose their memory.

'Tāsām'—stands for the words, speech.—(1946)

The following Text shows that the Reason adduced in the Reductio ad 
absurdum is 'inadmissible' regarding its substratum:—

TEXT (1947).

In the case of those high-souled men, where there is not the 
slightest impediment,—clear speech is actually 
heard and they do have clear remembrance 
of them also.—(1947)

COMMENTARY.

'High-souled men'—Men of exceptionally pure life.—(1947)

The following texts set forth another argument in proof of the idea of 
the 'other world':—
As a matter of fact, all these feelings of Love, Hatred and the rest become strong through habit and repetition,—as has been ascertained by positive and negative concomitance.—These feelings, appearing for the first time (in the child), are entirely devoid of any habit and repetition during the present life; what then is the cause of their appearance,—if there is no other life?—Their appearance cannot be due to the presence of their (external) excitants; because even when these excitants are present, the feelings in question do not appear, if there is Disgust; and when this Disgust ceases, they are found to be strong, even in connection with past and future things, when the counterfeelings appear in intensified form.—The feelings of Love, Hatred and the rest are found to proceed in regard to Women and other things, when the man attributes to them Goodness, devotedness and constancy and so forth; even though these qualities may not be actually there.—For these reasons, these feelings appearing in this life must be regarded as appearing, without the excitants being actually present,—through the force of the habitual appearance of similar feelings in the past,—because they are feelings of Love, etc.,—like these same feelings appearing subsequently.—(1948–1953)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be thus formulated:—The strength of the feelings of Love, Hatred, Jealousy, Haughtiness and Pride, etc.,—as also Wisdom, Compassion, Sympathy and so forth—is due to habitual practice; just as during the present life, it is found in men possessed of the varying degrees of these feelings;—during the present life, there is in the Body, etc. of a man, a degree of strength of the feelings, which is not due to any such practice during the present life;—so this is a Reason based upon the relation of cause and effect. As all such relations of cause and effect are determined by positive and negative concomitance, the Reason cannot be said to be 'inadmissible'.—This is what is meant by the words—'Ascertained by positive, etc. etc.'.

It cannot be urged that—'the Reason is 'contradictory', as cited in proof of the fact of the feelings due to habitual repetition during other lives'.
What is meant is that these feelings as appearing for the first time during the present life have not been habitually repeated during this life;—this may not be a Reason directly proving the fact of these feelings being due to habitual practice during previous lives; but what is stated as the Reason being admitted to be a fact, it could not be without some cause; if it were without cause, it would be there at all times;—hence if another life were not there, what could be the cause of the strength of the said feelings of Love, Hatred, etc.? Hence the conclusion is that the habitual repetition during past lives is the cause of the said strength of the feelings;—and thus the 'other world' becomes established.

The external objective excitant cannot be the cause of the feelings in question; because in many cases, even when these excitants are there, the feelings of Love, etc. do not appear at all,—if there happen to be present a feeling of Disgust against the evil character of the things.—The term 'pratikhyāna', 'disgust' stands for that counter-feeling against Love, etc., which is based upon the idea of evil.—Sometimes, even when the excitant is not there, the said feelings of Love, etc. actually appear. Hence the presence of the feelings cannot be due to the presence of the excitants.

Then again, even in regard to past and future things, the feelings are found to be strong in the man in whom the feeling of Disgust has ceased, and feelings due to the absence of pleasure have become intensified through strong desire. And when there is no change in the presence or absence of a certain thing, or the presence or absence of another thing,—the one cannot be the cause of the other; otherwise these would be incongruities.

For the following reason also, the feelings of Love, etc. cannot be due to the presence of the excitants:—Because, if the feelings appeared exactly in accordance with the excitants, they would proceed from the excitant exactly in the same manner as the Cognition of Blue and other things (which always proceeds in accordance with these things);—the feelings however do not proceed in this way; on the contrary, the said feelings appear in regard to the Woman and other things, in men who attribute to the woman the form of their own lasting pleasure, etc. which have not been experienced at all; and yet the objects (woman, etc.) are not actually possessed of the said form of goodness, etc.;—and when a thing is devoid of a certain form, it cannot be the excitant or basis of the Cognition of that form; otherwise it would lead to absurdity.

'Tuṭi'—i.e. for these reasons, the feelings of Love, etc. as pertaining to imposed things must be regarded as devoid of an objective basis (or excitant); and from this it follows that the said feelings of Love, etc., when they appear for the first time during present life, proceed from the repeated experience of similar feelings in the past.—(1948-1953)

Question:—"If Objects are not the excitants of the feelings, then how is it that feelings of Love, etc. appear only when the Objects are present?"

Answer:—


COMMENTARY.

The process is as follows:—When the Object is present, there appears pleasure born of the sense-organ concerned;—from this Pleasure, proceed the 'Afflictions' of Love, etc.,—in men devoid of wisdom (and dispassion) and subject to evil propensities and tendencies,—out of the fruition of the Impressions left by the previously experienced feelings of Love, etc.; so that the Objects are not the direct cause of the feelings.

The following might be urged:—"You are only expounding your own doctrine; you state no reasons".

The answer to this is—'A single Affliction, etc. etc.'—'Single'—i.e. of a single kind.—'Tatra'—in regard to the object.—'Tasya'—of the object.—'Like the Cognition of things';—i.e. like the Cognition apprehending the form of the Blue and other things.—As a matter of fact however, a single 'Affliction' is not what actually appears; for instance, in regard to the single object in the shape of the body of the Woman,—while in one man the feeling aroused is that of Love, in another it is Hate, while in yet another, mere jealousy; so that there are several kinds of 'Afflictions' (Feelings) that appear.—(1954–1956)

The following might be urged:—"The feelings of Love, etc. that appear during the present life cannot be the effect of repeated experience in the past; they arise either from the seeing of the actual act done by others, or from the advice of other persons".

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (1957).

THE APPEARANCE OF THE FEELINGS CANNOT BE DUE EITHER TO THE PERCEPTION OF THE DOINGS OF OTHERS, OR TO HEARING OF THINGS FROM OTHER PERSONS;—BECAUSE SUCH IS NOT FOUND TO BE THE CASE ALWAYS.—(1957)

COMMENTARY.

'Vṛtti' stands for doings.—(1957)

The following text shows how that is not found to be the case always:
TEXT (1958).

Boars, Bucks and other animals,—who have never seen or heard of the doings,—become perturbed at the touch of females of their own kind.—(1958)

COMMENTARY.

‘Doings’—intercourse and the like.
‘Sabhāgagati, etc. etc.’—females of the same kind,—i.e. the sow and the doe.

When there is contact—proximity—of these, there is ‘perturbation’—disturbance,—i.e. desire for intercourse.—(1958)

TEXT (1959).

Such qualities as Wisdom, Gentleness, Compassion and the like,—which are not habitually practised in the world,—do not proceed by themselves, like Pride, etc.—(1959)

COMMENTARY.

It must be admitted that the feelings of Love, etc. appear by themselves, as the effect of habitual experience in the past;—because such qualities as wisdom, gentleness and the rest,—which are not habitually practised in the world,—are not found to appear by themselves;—like Pride, etc.;—this is an instance of dissimilarity. ‘Pride’ is haughtiness.—Otherwise, like Pride, etc., Wisdom and the rest also would appear by themselves.—(1959)

Some people have held the following view:—“Love proceeds from Phlegm (in the physical constitution of the Body),—Hatred from Bile,—and Delusion from Wind”.

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXTS (1960-1961).

The origination of the feelings cannot be due to Phlegm and the rest. Because, as in the previous case, the entire falsity of this idea is perceived in experience.—For these reasons, that time repeated practice during which is the cause of the feelings appearing for the first time, must be the ‘other Birth’, which thus becomes established; and the doctrine of ‘Non Est’ becomes damned.—(1960-1961)

COMMENTARY.

‘Balāsa’ is Phlegm.
‘As in the previous case’,—in the case of objects, as shown under Text 1950 above.
Then again, as a matter of fact, there is no increase and decrease in the feelings of Love, etc. upon increase and decrease of Phlegm. And when the change in one thing does not bring about a change in the other, the former cannot be the cause of the latter. —Similarly, fierce Hatred, and not fierce Love, has been seen to appear in one with preponderance of Phlegm; while one with preponderance of Bile is found to have fierce Love, not fierce Hatred; this sort of comingling is often met with; and when one thing appears without the other, this latter cannot be the cause of the former. Further, the man with Love is often found to be in the same condition as the man with Hatred.

—From these non-concomitances, it follows that the feelings of Love, etc. are not the effects of Phlegm, etc.

"Tasmāt"—Thus; this sums up the chapter.

"Yadabhyaśa, etc. etc."—The compound is to be expounded as—

'Repeated experience during which is the cause of the feelings in question'.—

(1960-1961)

The following texts set forth the objections of the other party:


"(a) If what is meant to be proved is the fact of the feelings being produced by repeated experience during the present life,—then such an idea is annulled by well-perceived facts, and is also contrary to what is desired (by the Buddhist).

(b) If what is meant to be proved is the fact of their being produced by the repeated experience of other lives,—then the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum.—(c) If what is meant to be proved is the mere unqualified fact of the feelings being produced by 'repeated experience',—the Reason put forward is 'Contradictory',—because it proves the contrary of the fact of the feelings being due to the repeated experience of another life."—(1962-1963)

COMMENTARY.

The sense of the objection is as follows:

"In reference to the feelings of Love, etc. appearing for the first time, what is it that is desired to be proved.—(1) Is it that they proceed from repeated experience during present life?—Or (2) that they proceed from the repeated experience during other lives?—Or (3) that they proceed only from mere 'repeated experience' without any qualifications?—As, if this is proved, then by implication, it becomes proved that they are due to experiences of the 'other world';—these are the only alternative views possible.

(1) If it is the first,—then there is 'badhana' of it—inequality with facts of perception; because in fact, the Love, etc. in question are never
found to appear from experience during the present life;—and there is
'bādhana'—denial—also of what is desired by the upholder of the 'other
world'.

"(2) Under the second view, the Corroborative Instance cited becomes
devoid of the Probandum; because for the Materialist, there can be no
instance where the feelings proceed from experiences of past lives.

"(3) Under the third view, the Reason becomes 'contradictory';—
as, like the Corroborative Instance, it proves only the negation of the desired
idea of the feelings being due to experiences during other lives."—(1962-
1963)

The above objection is answered in the following—

TEXT (1964).

WHAT IS MEANT TO BE PROVED IS THE GENERAL FACT. NOR WOULD
THE REASON BE 'CONTRADICTORY'; THERE IS NO INCOMPATI-
BILITY BETWEEN THESE AND THE REASON, BY REASON
OF WHICH INCOMPATIBILITY, IT COULD
NEGATIVE IT.—(1964)

COMMENTARY.

It is the third of the above alternative views that is meant by us.
Nor is the Reason 'Contradictory'.
"Why?"
Because there is no incompatibility between 'being produced from
past experience' and 'Love and other feelings',—by virtue of which incompati-
bility, the idea of 'being due to past experience' could be set aside.

Further, such notions as 'this world' and 'the other world' are based
on differences in the state or condition of things,—and the differences of
childhood, youth and so forth.

In this way, the beginninglessness (of things) becomes established.
Hence this should not be emphasised—as it amounts to the view-point of
other disputants (Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka, etc.).—(1964)

End of Chapter on Materialism.
CHAPTER XXIII.

‘External World.’

COMMENTARY.

Under the Introductory Texts, ‘Prātiṣṭya-samutpāda’, ‘Intervolved Chain of Causation’, has been described as ‘pratibimbādi-sannibham’, ‘resembling the Reflection of things’. In support of this assertion the Idealist sets forth as follows:—This entire universe comprising the threefold phenomena (Subjective or Immaterial, Objective or Material, and Imaginary or Fictitious) is mere ‘Ideation’; and this Ideation or Idea, through the diversity of ‘chains’ varying with each individual ‘Being’, is endless, and impure—for persons who have not realised the Truth,—but pure,—for those whose ‘Karma’ has been wiped off; it is in perpetual flux (being destroyed every moment), and affects all living beings; it is not one and unmodifiable, as held by the ‘followers of the Upaniṣads’ (Vedāntins).

Such is the view of the Idealist Buddhists.

The idea of the entire universe being mere Idea is got at by the following two methods:—(1) Anything external, in the form of Earth, etc., which could be apprehended, being non-existent, there can be no apprehender;—or (2) even though existent, in another ‘Chain’, the two factors would be devoid of the character of the ‘apprehender’ and ‘apprehended’.—The argument, may be formulated as follows:—Every Cognition is devoid of both ‘apprehended’ and ‘apprehender’ because it is Cognition,—like the Cognition of the Reflected Image;—and the Visual and other Perceptions of the Healthy man are Cognition;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The Reason cannot be regarded as ‘not concomitant’ (with the Probandum); because, for the Cognition, there does not exist any such apprehended object as the ‘external world’, in the shape of the Earth, etc.; because such a world would be devoid of one as well as of several forms. This argument may be formulated as follows:—That which is not of one or several forms cannot be regarded by an intelligent man as ‘existent’,—e.g. the sky-lotus;—and the Earth, etc. postulated by other people are devoid of one and several forms; hence there is non-apprehension in them of the wider character;—as, no third alternative possible, existence is invariably concomitant with the presence of one or several forms;—and the impossibility of the relation of ‘pervaded and pervader’ (that which is concomitant, and that with which it is concomitant) would be the reason that would reject any idea to the contrary; hence the Reason adduced cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’.—Nor can it be regarded as ‘Contradictory’; because it is present everywhere where the Probandum is known to be present.

In bringing forward against this Reason, the charge of being ‘inadmissible’, the Opponent has argued thus:—‘You may accept the principle
that the material substances do not exist at all'; and while proceeding to show that such a Proposition would be contrary to perceptible facts, the Opponent explains that the first Reason is not concomitand (with the Probandum),—in the following—


"If the four material substances do not exist apart from the Cognition (Consciousness, Idea), then, how is it that they are distinctly and clearly perceived?—Even when so perceived, if they are held to be non-existent, then for you, what would be the proof for the existence of the Cognition also?"—(1965-1966)

COMMENTARY.

'Distinctly'.—This indicates the fact of the four substances being something distinct from Cognition;—and 'clearly' indicates that it is clearly perceived.

This same idea is further strengthened by a Reductio ad Absurdum—

'Even when so, etc. etc.'.—(1965-1966)

The Answer to the above is as follows:


When the external object is perceived,—in what form is it perceived? Is it in the form of the Atom? Or in that of a composite thing?—As for the former, the form of the Atom is not what is actually cognised; because in the Cognition, there is no recognition of several impartite corporeal things; while, if the Atoms had appeared in the Cognition, they should have appeared as devoid of all distinctions of component parts; otherwise they would not be 'perceptible', for the simple reason they would not be impressing the Cognition with their own form.—(1967–1969)

COMMENTARY.

If the external object were cognised by Perception, it could be so either (1) as one and not-different from the Atoms,—or (2) as one, but in the form of a composite whole composed of the Atoms;—or (3) as a single gross object (by itself) not composed of parts.—These are the likely alternatives.

It cannot be the first of these; that is, it cannot be held to be cognised as one and not-different from the Atoms; because there is no recognition in the Cognition (of the object) of several impartite corporeal atoms; in fact, what is
actually recognised in Consciousness is the idea of something gross.—If the reading is ‘pratyayē aprativedanāt’, there is to be no compounding.—The argument may be formulated as follows:—That which does not appear in its own form in the Cognition which is held to be Perception, should not be regarded as ‘perceived’;—for instance, the ‘sky-lotus’;—the Atom, many and corporeal, does not appear in this form in the Cognition which is held to be Perception, which always apprehends the gross form;—thus there is no apprehension of the wider character (which would imply perceptibility); because ‘Perceptibility’ is invariably concomitant with ‘appearance of its own form’.—This same invariable concomitance is shown by the words—‘If the Atoms, etc. etc.’.—(1967–1969)

The following might be urged—“In as much as we hold the doctrine that the Atoms are always produced, and also perish, in the aggregated form,—there can be no appearance of the Atoms singly; as has been asserted by Bhadanta-Shubhagupta—‘Atoms cannot come about one by one, each independently by itself; that also is the reason why they do not appear singly in consciousness’.”

The following Text shows that this is no answer to the argument urged above (under 1967 et seq.).

**TEXTS (1970-1971)**

**Even if they come into existence in the aggregated form, the Atoms should appear in their own form (in the Cognition); because even under those conditions they do not abandon their impartite form.—If it be said that—‘Their form is one that has reached the lowest limit of dimunition (smallness)’,—then, why should not they be regarded as incorporeal, like. Sensation, etc.?—(1970-1971)**

**COMMENTARY.**

‘Under those conditions’—in the aggregated form.

Further, if the Atoms are impartite (indivisible), then they should not be regarded as corporeal; so that the present assertion of the Opponent involves a self-contradiction.—This is what is shown by the words ‘If it be said, etc. etc.’—‘Labdhāpa, etc.’ means ‘that form or character which has reached the lowest limit of diminution’. That is to say, if the Atoms are not liable to diminution through the diminishing contacts of component parts,—i.e. if they are indivisible, without parts,—they must be regarded as ‘incorporeal’, like Sensations and Feelings,—as there would be no distinction between them.—(1970-1971)

The following Text anticipates the answer that may be given by Bhadanta-Shubhagupta:—
TEXT (1972)

"Just as in the case of the coming into existence of similar 'moments', there is an illusion of permanence,—so when there is an unbroken series of cognitions of similar Atoms, there is an illusion of Grossness."—(1972)

COMMENTARY.

He has offered the following answer:—"In the case of sound and other things what are perceived are several similar 'Moments' coming into existence one after the other; and yet there is an illusion of there being a permanent entity;—in the same manner, in the case of Atoms, what are perceived simultaneously are so many homogeneous Atoms present in an unbroken chain, which gives rise to the mental delusion that what is perceived is a gross object.—Thus the Reason adduced above in Text 1968 is 'inadmissible'."—(1972)

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1973–1979)

If the Perception, entirely by its own function, did not bring about the recognition (of the impartite Atoms),—then, how could these be regarded as 'amenable to Perception'?—That things are momentary is ascertained by means of proofs; but how are the Atoms cognised as 'white', 'yellow', and the rest?—It might be said that—'The first visible thing must be an aggregate of minute (invisible) things,—because it is gross,—like the Hill and such things;—there is this Inference (which proves our assertion)'.—The answer to this is that grossness is not admitted to be present in the two things; the Composite is not gross, nor are the Atoms so,—If what has been spoken of as such (gross) is the well-known form that is found extended in space,—even so, as such form appears in illusory Cognition also, there would always be doubt.—If the answer be that—'Illusory Cognition is wrong, hence what is cognised is not admitted to be so',—then the answer is that, unless a distinction is established, what would be the difference between this and that?—If it is compatibility with effective action,—and this is said to consist in compatibility with the Cognition envisaging that effective action,—then such compatibility is possible otherwise also; on account of the capacity for action being restricted.—(1973–1979)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by the emphasising particle 'ēva', 'entirely', is the fact of there being no dependence upon the Inferential Indicative or the
Reliable Word. What is meant is that, even though Perception comes about, it does so, in an unspecified (indeterminate) form; and yet that factor alone is regarded as 'Perceived' for practical purposes in regard to which it produces a Re-cognition of the form actually apprehended; while that factor with regard to which it does not produce this Re-cognition is as good as not-apprehended, even though it might be apprehended. Hence our Reason cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible'. Specially because what is meant by the clause 'Pratyayāprativedanāt' (in Text 1968) is that 'it does not figure in that cognition which is meant to be Perception, and which is put forward as the Reason in the Minor Premiss.'

It has been argued (in Text 1972) that—"the idea of grossness is a mental illusion".—That is not right; because if the Atom had been established by suitable proof, then alone could the idea of grossness be regarded as wrong or illusory;—as it is only when the momentary character of things has been established by suitable proof, that the idea of permanence is regarded as wrong. As a matter of fact however, the Atoms have not yet been established; as they form the subject of the present investigation.

Further, this 'illusion of grossness' cannot be said to be 'mental',—as it appears quite clearly; while what is confined to mere Conceptual Thought can never be clear; because the generic form is always indistinct; and without the generic form, there can be no Conceptual Thought.

The following might be urged:—"Like the non-eternity of things, Atoms also are actually established by suitable proofs. For instance, whatever is gross is only of the nature of the aggregate of minute things,—as for example, the Hill and other things;—and the first visually perceived object is gross;—hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things. The qualification 'visually' has been added for the purpose of excluding the 'Atomic Diad' (which is not visually perceived)."

The answer to this is as follows:—In the premiss 'because it is gross',—if it is real 'grossness', as a property of the thing, that is put forward as the Probans (Reason),—then such 'grossness' is not admitted by your disputant (the Buddhist) either in the Probandum or in the Corroborative Instance; and in that case the Probans is 'inadmissible' and the Corroborative Instance is 'devoid of the Probandum'.

If, on the other hand, the 'grossness' meant is that which appears as extended in space, which cannot stand the test of investigation, and which is well-known to all common people, down to the veriest cowardly,—then, 'even in the case of illusory cognition like Dream, such 'gross form' actually figures in Consciousness, even though there is no 'aggregate of Atoms' at the time; and hence your Probans becomes 'Inconclusive'.

If, in order to avoid this difficulty, you add the qualification 'there being no illusion',—then, so far as the Idealist is concerned, so long as the difference, between the visual cognition produced under normal conditions on the one hand and the cognition produced during dreams on the other, is not established,—there is no Cognition that can be accepted as being 'free from illusion'; hence the qualification also becomes 'inadmissible'.

The following might be urged:—"Between the normal healthy visual
cognition and the Dream-cognition, the difference is quite clear—in that while the former is compatible with effective action, the latter is not”.

The answer to this is—What is this ‘compatibility with effective action’?—If it is the reaching of the external object,—then, that is not yet established; in fact, it is for the establishing of the external object that the Reason has been put forward.—If, on the other hand, ‘compatibility with effective action’ be held to consist in the Cognition envisaging the desired effective action,—then, otherwise also,—i.e. even without the external object,—such compatibility would be possible; so that the Reason adduced is clearly ‘Inconclusive’.

Question:—“How would it be possible otherwise?”
Answer:—‘On account of the capacity for action being restricted’;—i.e. because the capacity of the cause, consisting in the immediately preceding Cognition, is restricted; that is, a certain preceding Cognition is capable of bringing about only a particular Cognition; all are not able to produce all; for example, your own ‘External Object’; which also proves that there is restriction in the capacity of things.—(1973–1979)

The following texts urge the defect of ‘inadmissibility’ in the Probans adduced by the Buddhist,—‘because it is not recognised in consciousness’,—from the view-point of Sumati, the Digambara (Jaina):

TEXTS (1980–1983)

“Atoms having two forms, similar (common) and dissimilar (uncommon),—when the common form is the thing apprehended, then the uncommon form is not apprehended; such being the case, what is it that is not possible?—In fact, all things exist in two forms, the ‘universal’ and the ‘particular’; hence Atoms are declared to have two forms—the common and the uncommon. Of these, it is the common form that is amenable to sense-cognition. Hence it is only in reference to Atoms that there can be cognition of only one form. That form of the Atoms which is uncommon is held to be amenable to Mystic Perception’.—Such are the confounded assumptions of some dull-witted persons.—(1980–1983)

COMMENTARY.

Sumati has argued as follows:—All things have two aspects—the Universal and the Particular; consequently Atoms exist in two forms—the common and the uncommon; of these, it is the Common form that is apprehended by the Senses, not the uncommon form. In this way there is nothing incongruous in there being one uniform Cognition apprehending all Atoms; and thus it is by Perception that Atoms become established.

‘Confounded’—indefinite; in as much as it implies no one definite form. —(1980–1983)
Says the Opponent—"The assertion that 'things have two forms' is quite definite ".

True,—that assertion is there; but the assertion is not right.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1984-1985)

**HOW CAN IT BE RIGHT TO SAY THAT A SINGLE THING HAS TWO FORMS?**

*In fact, there would be two things, each differing from the other in form.—If they were of the same form as one another, the duality of forms would be annulled; and it would be the uncommon form that would be apprehended by the eye and other sense-organs.—*(1984-1985)*

**COMMENTARY.**

For instance, if there are two forms of a thing, different from one another, then there are two things; as the two forms, being different from one another, would be two different things; and it would not be right to say that a single thing has two forms.

Then again, the two forms, being not-different from the Thing itself, would be identical, both being like the form of a single thing; how then could it be a single thing having two forms?

Further, as the Particular form of a thing is not entirely different from the Universal form, there would be a possibility of the former being apprehended by the senses; and in that case there could not be the clear cut distinction that 'the Common form is amenable to Sense-cognition and the Uncommon form is amenable to mystic cognition'.—*(1984-1985)*

Further, the assertion that 'one thing has two forms' involves, not only a self-contradiction, but it also implies what is more damaging, that the one thing has two mutually contradictory forms.—This is what is shown in the following—

**TEXT (1986—First Line).**

**HOW COULD ONE AND THE SAME THING HAVE TWO MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY FORMS (AND CHARACTERS)?**—*(1986)*

**COMMENTARY.**

The two forms—Common and Uncommon—are such that the absence of one implies the presence of the other and *vice versa*; how then can any single thing have these two forms?—*(1986)*

The following Text sets forth the view of Kumārila;—
'EXTERNAL WORLD.'


"As is actually found to be the case, it is not impossible for one and the same thing to have contradictory characters. That 'one thing should have one and only one form' is not a royal edict—in fact every-thing has to be accepted as it is perceived."—[Sthlo Vā.—

Śūnyavrāda, 219]

(1986-1987)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila argues thus:—"It is not true that mutually contradictory forms cannot belong to any one thing;—why?—because it is actually found to be the case. Further, there is no such Edict of Kings that 'one thing must have only one form';—in fact, everything should be accepted to be exactly as it is found; as all notions of things are based upon our Cognition of the same. As a matter of fact, the Cognition that is found to appear in connection with things is in one form,—as in the form of 'Being'—and also in many forms; hence the nature of each thing has to be determined on the basis of the way in which it is actually cognised."—(1986-1987)

The answer to the above is as follows:—


This cannot be right; because there is cognition of the non-entity also;—e.g. that of the yellowness of the conch-shell. Of 'difference' too there is no other characteristic except the presence of contradictory properties.—(1988)

COMMENTARY.

If it be as asserted, then no Cognition could be wrong; and there would be an end to all notions of 'difference'.

It might be possible to characterise that Cognition as 'wrong' which is subsequently sublated. But even so, when the idea of 'many' in reference to what is one is sublated, how could it be not-wrong?

Thus it is found that the existence of Atoms cannot be proved either by Perception or by Inference; consequently the proposition denying the external world does not involve the contradiction of any fact of perception. Nor is the Reason adduced by us 'inadmissible'.—(1988)

In the following text, the Opponent raises the objection that the Reason propounded in the form—'Because the Earth and other things are not of
the nature of one or several [therefore they must be non-existent] — is doubtful and hence 'inadmissible':

TEXT (1889).

"The existence of atoms may not be proved. There may be doubt regarding them. But how could intelligent persons have the certainty that atoms do not exist at all?" — (1889)

COMMENTARY.

The following texts supply the answer to this:


In every object, if the form of the atom at the centre,—which is in conjunction with, or distinct from, or lying contiguously with, the front part of another atom,—is regarded as also facing a third atom,—then, in that case, there would be no aggregation in the form of the hill and other things.—If, on the other hand, the idea is that what is in front of the other atom is another form of the first atom,—then, in that case, how could such an atom be one?" — (1990–1992)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—That which is devoid of the form of one or many is fit for being regarded as non-existent,—as the 'sky-lotus';—the Atoms postulated by the other party are devoid of the form of one or many;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

It cannot be said that the Reason here adduced is 'inadmissible'; because that the Atom is one cannot be admitted; because in the Hill and other things which are aggregates of Atoms, there is diversity of facings towards various directions.

This 'diversity of facings in various directions' must be present in the Atoms also, otherwise it could not be possible in the aggregates of Atoms, like the Hill and other things;—this is what is set forth in the words—'If the assumption is, etc. etc.'

Some people hold that in every Object, the Atoms are in close conjunction with one another;—others hold that they remain there separate from each other, always, without touching one another;—others again hold that there is
no intervening space between atoms, hence they are said to be in contact.—
Under all these three views, when the Atom in the middle is surrounded by
many other Atoms, if there were no diversity in its facings towards various
directions, then,—as in the case of the Mind and Mental entities,—no aggrega-
tion would be possible, as Atoms have no parts. For instance, that form in
which the central Atom would be facing one Atom,—if in that same form,
it also faced other Atoms,—then, it would imply that all the surrounding
Atoms occupy the same point in space, and no aggregation of them would be
possible.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—Whatever faces the
Atom of one form must occupy the same point in space,—as for example,
the Atom lying in space behind the said Atom,—or the House that stands
facing another House;—and all the Atoms surrounding the central Atom
stand facing that central Atom which has only one form;—hence this is a
Reason based on the nature of things. As a consequence of this, there could
be no aggregation (of Atoms).

If, on the other hand, the central Atom faces the other Atom in another
form, then as the diverse facings would be there, the Atom could not be one,—
being just like the Jar and other things.

Bhadanta-Shubhagupta has offered the following explanation:—“In
the case of an entity, as differentiated from the ‘non-existent’ and the
‘non-entity’, several Universals are assumed, but not in reality; similarly
in the case in question, as Atoms exist in several things, they are assumed
to be many, but not in reality. Because there is no distinct Category in the
shape of Space (or Direction) as posited by Kaṇāda and others; because if
this Space were one only, then the diverse notions of ‘East’, ‘West’ and the
rest, would not be possible. It is only the Atoms that lie there one after
the other which come to be spoken of as ‘Space’ or ‘Direction’; hence
when it is said because there is diversity of facings in Space, all that is
meant is that one Atom is surrounded of several Atoms,—and not that the
Atom has parts”.

This is not right. Because, if the Atom has no parts, it is like the Mind;
and hence there cannot be any such diversity as its ‘upper’ or ‘lower’
parts; and in that case there could be no ‘surrounding’ of the one by the
many; just as there is none in the case of the Mind and Mind-products.
Thus the ‘surrounding’ being, in reality, non-existent,—how could there
be any existence (of the Atom) in the middle of surrounding Atoms;—by
virtue of which diversity due to facings could be assumed?

If, even in the absence of ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ parts, there were ‘sur-
roundings’ by other Atoms,—then there could be such surrounding of Mind
and Mental effects also; and in that case, like the Atoms, these latter also
would subsist in Space. If not, then the Atoms also could not subsist in
Space. Hence it follows that there could be no aggregation of Atoms; this
is absolutely certain.

The following might be urged—“In the case of the Present ‘Mind-
moment’ there is immediate sequence, in time, to the Past and Future
‘Mind-moments’,—and yet the Present Moment has no parts like the
various divisions of Time—Seconds, Minutes and so forth;—in the same manner, in the case of Atoms, even though there is surrounding of one Atom by many Atoms, there would be no parts in the Atom, due to the facings in Space."

This is not right. As a matter of fact, there is no real immediate sequence between the Present Moment and the Past and Future Moments; because at that moment, these latter are non-existent; and there can be no real sequence to what is non-existent. All that is possible is that, because there can be no relation of Cause and Effect between things existing at the same moment, therefore through that relation the existence of the Past and Future Moments is implied and assumed;—just as there is assumption of Prior and Posterior Non-existence. In the case of Atoms however, there cannot be any such assumption of sequence in space; as in that case, no aggregation would be possible.

Then again, it cannot be right to regard things as without cause; for if they were so, they would be always there.

Even the person who admits the 'illusory' character of things, must regard all things as with cause. And when they are with cause, it is not right that the Cause and Effect should exist at the same moment; nor can the Cause be non-existent before the Effect, as, in that case, it could not have the requisite potency; after the appearance of the Effect, there would be no use for the Cause. Hence it must be admitted that all Causes exist before the Effect. This idea has been thus expressed—'Previous to the Effect if the Cause is non-existent, it can have no potency; after the Effect, there is no use for it; hence all causes must have existence prior to the Effect; hence no Object can exist along with its cognition.'

Thus, even when all things are without parts, the existence of some sort of sequence in time stands to reason; but how could there be any sequence in space, if there were no parts? This is the point that is urged.

If, even in the absence of parts, there were sequence in space, then there could be such sequence in the case of Mind and Mental effects also; as there would be no difference between the two cases, as already pointed out above.

"There is difference due to corporeality."

Not so; as in the absence of parts, there cannot be corporeality also. So this explanation means nothing more than the assertion of the presence of parts. There is no other point of difference. So there is nothing in this.

Thus then, in the case of all things, it is only sequence in time that has some basis in reason; anything more than that,—in the shape of sequence in space,—is not possible except when there are parts. Hence it is a perfectly correct statement that—'where there is diversity of facings in Space, the thing cannot be one.'—We desist from further labouring of this point.—(1990–1992)

On this subject, some people argue as follows:—"Under the circumstances, Atoms may be regarded as being minuter points of Space itself; and if parts of these would have to be assumed, those parts again would consist in the still minuter points of Space; even though this may involve an infinite
regress. But in no case does it seem to be justifiable to regard Atoms as mere ideal (subjective) entities, for fear of having to regard them as with parts.—Even if they are mere subjective entities, it is necessary to postulate a cause for that Idea; and that which is the cause of that Idea would itself be the Atom.—If what you are seeking to prove is that Atoms do not exist at all,—even so, the Reason adduced—'Because there is diversity of facings'—is 'inadmissible'. Because mere non-entities—like the 'Horns of the Ass'—do not have the diverse facings towards the East and other directions.—Nor can your argument be treated as a Reductio ad Absurdum; because 'the diversity of facings' is not admitted by us'.

The answer to this is given in the following—


As a matter of fact, what we have been considering is the Atom which has been regarded by other people as devoid of division into parts; and it is not improbable that this may lead to something undesirable.—When these people accept the fact of the parts themselves being 'Atoms',—then this certainly involves a deviation from their own Doctrine.—The argument that has been set forth (by us) is only in the form of a Reductio ad Absurdum; this is not open to the charge of 'inadmissibility' regarding its substratum.—The unity of the Atom also becomes discarded by the Conjunction, etc. that the other party admits.—Thus under all views, the Atom cannot be regarded as being essentially one. And when it cannot be one, it cannot be many either.—Thus, for all wise people, the Atom is only capable of forming the object of the definite idea that it is non-existent,—because it has the nature of neither one nor many,—like the Sky-lotus.—(1993–1997)

COMMENTARY.

The man who postulates the 'Atom' must hold that it is a certain entity with a well-defined form. Otherwise, if there were an indefinite Infinite Regress, the form of the 'Atom' could not be determined; and in that case our Opponent would himself have established the fact that it is something 'indescribable', 'indefinite', 'indeterminate'; and thus he would have established what is desired by his Opponent. For these reasons, that same well-defined entity which you would prove to be the 'Atom', without having recourse to an Infinite Regress,—if with regard to that same entity an investigation is carried on, why should there be an Infinite Regress? Specially so when the Infinite Regress would lead to the subversion of your doctrine. But that would not bring about a situation undesirable for your Opponent.

—And as this would be enough to prove what is desired by your Opponent,
the argument that we have put forward is only by way of a Reductio ad Absurdum.

Our Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’. Because the other party has accepted the view that Atoms are in conjunction with one another,—that there is no intervening space between them,—and that each Atom is surrounded by Atoms distinct from one another; if it were not so, how could there be any Cognition of it? Thus though it has not been admitted in so many words that there is ‘diversity of facings’ in Atoms,—yet it follows from the acceptance of their being in conjunction and so forth. Unless there is diversity of ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ parts, there cannot be any Conjunction, etc.,—as there is none in the case of the Mind and Mental Effects;—this has been explained before.

It has been argued that—‘It is necessary to admit a Cause for the Idea of the Atom, and that which is the Cause of that Idea is the Atom’.—The answer to that is that there is already a cause for the illusory idea of ‘Atom’,—in the shape of the notion of the dust-particles coming in through the hole,—this notion resulting from the fruition of the Impressions left by the contemplation of wrong teachings. It cannot be right to regard the Atom itself as the cause of its own Idea; as in that case, the Atom would not have a purely subjective existence. If it were not so, then the cause of the Idea of the Soul would consist of the Soul itself,—and not of the ‘Thought-phases’ (Skandhas) In this way, as of the Atom, so of the Soul also, there could be no denial.

Thus it is established that Atoms cannot be one; and as there can no longer be any doubt on this point, our Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’ for proving the fact of Atoms being non-existent.—(1993–1997)

Having thus proved that the ‘External Object’ is devoid of the nature of ‘many’, the Text proceeds to show that it cannot have the nature of ‘one’;—


BECAUSE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-CONJUNCTION OF THE ATOM, THE
COMPOSITE CANNOT EXIST,—THEREFORE OTHER PEOPLE REGARD
THE COMPOSITE AS COMPOSED OF ATOMS.—(1998)

COMMENTARY.

Those people who admit of the Gross Object, even though not composed of Atoms,—for them, like the Atom, the Gross Object also could not be regarded as one, because of ‘the diversity of its facings’; because if it were one entity, then the shaking of the hand or the limbs would lead to the shaking of the whole body.—As this is quite clear, and was threshed out on several occasions, the Author has not pointed out here any objections to this view.

Thus the Reason—‘that which is devoid of the nature of one and many, etc. etc.’—which has been put forward by us, for proving that there can be no activity in regard to ‘external objects’,—is one that cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’. And when that is ‘admissible’, the Earth and other
external things apprehended should be treated as non-existent. And when the Earth, etc. cannot be 'apprehended', the fact of the Cognition being the 'apprehender', assumed on the basis of the apprehension of those things, also, becomes proved to be inadmissible. Thus it becomes established that all this is mere 'Idea' (has a purely subjective existence).—(1998)

Having thus proved that Idea alone exists, on the ground of there being no 'object', the Author now proceeds to prove the same, on the ground of the absence of the characters of the 'apprehended' and the 'apprehender':—

**TEXT (1999)**

*Either 'not envisaging a form', or 'envisaging a form', or 'envisaging something else',—the Cognition cannot apprehend any 'external thing'.—(1999)*

**COMMENTARY.**

Neither as 'formless', nor as 'with form', nor 'with the form of something other than the object',—can there be any apprehension of the external Object; and there is no other way possible. Hence Cognition is always self-cognisant, even when there is another 'Chain' which is external to it. Hence it becomes established that Idea or Cognition alone exists.

Some people have regarded the Cognition of one form as apprehending (envisaging) a Cognition in another form; for example, the Cognition in the 'yellow' form apprehends also the 'white' conch-shell. This has been thus asserted by Kumārila [Shlokavārtika—Nirālambanavāda, 108]—"In every case, there is an external back-ground, appearing under diverse conditions of Place and Time,—be it during this same life or in another life, or at some other time."

It is in view of this view that the Text has introduced the third alternative.

—(1999)

**Question:**—"Why should not the alternatives just set forth—'not envisaging a form, etc.'—apply to the view that the Cognition (or Idea) is self-cognised?"

**Answer:**—

**TEXT (2000).**

*When the Cognition is produced, it is produced as differentiated from all 'unconscious' forms; and it is this fact of its being 'not-unconscious' that constitutes its 'self-cognisability'.—(2000)*

**COMMENTARY.**

When Cognition is said to be 'self-cognisant', it is not meant that it is the apprehender or cogniser of itself; what is meant is that it shines,—becomes
manifested,—by itself,—by its very nature,—just like the Light diffused in the atmosphere.—(2000)

*Question* :- "Why is the Cognition not regarded as the *Apprehender* (of itself)?"

*Answer* :-

**TEXTS (2001-2002).**

*There can be no 'self-cognition' of the Cognition, in the sense that it is the action and also the active agent; because one and the same entity, which is impartite in form, cannot have three characters. Hence the only right view is that the 'self-cognition' of the Cognition is due to its being of the very nature of consciousness. Under the circumstances, how can there be any cognition of any other thing in the shape of the 'object'? —(2001-2002)*

**COMMENTARY.**

'Three characters'—of the Cognised, the Cogniser and the Cognition.—(2001-2002)

The following might be urged :- "Just as there is self-cognition of the Cognition itself, so would there be cognition of the External Thing also, without there being an *apprehender* and an *apprehended*".

The answer to that is as follows :-

**TEXT (2003).**

*The form of any other thing is not such that upon its cognition, something else would become cognised; because, in reality, things are different from one another.—(2003)*

**COMMENTARY.**

Though it has been assumed that there is the single form of 'Entity'—as differentiated from 'non-entity'—which is common to all things,—yet in reality, they are all different among themselves; hence there is no 'one-ness' among them. This is what is meant by the phrase—'in reality'.—(2003)

The following might be urged :- "Even though the External Thing be different from the Cognition, yet it could be 'cognised', 'apprehended'—just as the Cognition itself is".

The answer to that is as follows :-

IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE COGNITION TO BE COGNISED, BECAUSE IT IS PRODUCED IN THE FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS. THE OBJECT, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN PRODUCED, IS NOT IN THE FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS; HOW THEN COULD IT BE COGNISED?—(2004)

COMMENTARY.

Having thus proved the 'self-cognition' of Cognitions, the Author proceeds to show that there can be no apprehension of the Object by Cognition which is formless (and envisages no form):—

TEXTS (2005-2006).


COMMENTARY.

'Reflection'—i.e. of the form of the Cognition.
'Tādṛṣṭyāt'—on account of its having the same form.
'Indirect'—not primary; secondary.
'Even this'—cognition in the secondary sense, assumed on the ground of similarity.—(2005-2006)


The following might be urged:—"The sword strikes the Elephant, the Fire burns the inflammable thing; and yet the Sword and the Fire are not of the form of the Elephant and the inflammable thing;—in the same way the Cognition, though not assuming the form of the Object, would apprehend that object ".

This is the view set forth in the following—
TEXT (2007).

The following idea may be entertained—"The Sword and the Fire, though not of the form of the Elephant and the Inflammable object, do the cutting and the burning of those objects; in the same way would this (Cognition) also do (the apprehending of the object, without assuming its form).” —(2007)

COMMENTARY.

The genitive ending in 'dantidāhyādēḥ' is in connection with 'chheda-dāhādi'.

'This'—i.e. the Cognition.
The term 'ādi' includes such other cases as the Lamp illuminating the Blue and other things.—(2007)

The following Text provides the answer to the above:—


There is no analogy (between the two cases); because the things cited are productive of the other object in that form, and hence are known as such; while Cognition is not productive in the same way.—(2008)

COMMENTARY.

The Sword is 'productive' of the Elephant, and is, on that account, known as the 'Cutter'; what happens is that when the Elephant is struck by the Sword, there is produced an Elephant with sundered limbs; similarly when the Fuel is touched by Fire, it becomes produced as the Live-coal; in the same manner, the Jar and other external things also become capable of producing cognitions, through Light. But even so, the Cognition does not confer any benefit upon the Object; on the contrary it is the Object that produces the Cognition in a clear form. When, thus, the Cognition does not confer any benefit upon the Object,—how could it be its 'Cogniser'?—The mere fact of the Cognition being the product of the Object cannot justify the idea that it is 'Cognisant' of that Object; as otherwise, the Cognition might be regarded as 'Cognisant' of the Eye and other means of Cognition also.—(2008)

Bhadanta-Shubhagupta has argued as follows:—

"Even though not assuming the form of the Object, the Cognition does apprehend it, because it is of the nature of the apprehension of that Object; hence no question should be raised as to how it apprehends it and like what it apprehends it. This has been thus asserted—'If the Cognition does apprehend the Object, then it is of the nature of the apprehension of
that Object, and no question should be raised as to how, and like what, it apprehends it".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2009-2010).

THE FACT OF THE COGNITION BEING OF THE NATURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF THE OBJECT WOULD BE POSSIBLE, IF THE APPREHENSION OF THE Cognised object were of the form of Cognition. Otherwise it should be clearly stated that Cognition is of the nature of Apprehension; it has not been pointed out that 'the apprehension of the object is in this form'.—(2009-2010)

COMMENTARY.

All this would be true if it were proved that Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of something other than itself; as a matter of fact, this has not yet been proved.—Because the Cognition does not apprehend the Object by its mere existence; if it did so, it would apprehend all things.—Nor does it apprehend the Object, as its product; for, if it did, there would be apprehension of the Eye and other organs also.—Nor is Cognition held to be with form, by virtue of which, being similar to the Object, it could not be distinguished from it and thus regarded as 'cognisant' of it.—Thus then, if the apprehension of the cognised object were of the nature of Cognition, then the Cognition could be said to be of the nature of the apprehension of the object. Otherwise, how can it be unequivocally stated that "Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of the object"?

In fact, Cognition being something different from the apprehension of the object, it must be of the nature of Cognition itself; and hence it becomes established that Idea or Cognition alone is what exists.

The following might be urged:—"There must be some peculiarity in the Cognition, whereby it apprehends the Object only; and what this peculiarity is cannot be exactly indicated".

The answer to this is given in the words—'It has not been pointed out, etc. etc.'—'Bharati' has to be supplied. Though every specific entity cannot be indicated, yet by some feat of imagination it is always spoken of somehow. If it were not so, then no peculiarity could be asserted in regard to Colour and other things also. The mere vague assertion, that 'Cognition is the apprehension of the object' does not state anything clearly and unequivocally and with certainty.

From this it follows that if the existence of objects were established in this vague indefinite form, the objects would indeed become really well-established!—(2009-2010)

It might be asked:—"If there were no Object to be apprehended, whose apprehension would be there?"

Answer:—
TEXT (2011).

There can be no such complaint as—"Whose apprehension would it be?"—In fact, apprehension is the very nature of the cognition; just as 'Satisfaction' is of pleasure.—(2011)

COMMENTARY.

It is the nature or essence of the cognition itself that is called 'apprehension',—by reason of its being of the nature of Light;—just as—'Satisfaction' is of pleasure; when one speaks of 'the satisfaction of pleasure', the mere fact of the two being mentioned separately does not make the satisfaction something different from pleasure.—Similarly, though there are such expressions as 'apprehension of blue', 'apprehension of yellow', and so forth,—where the two appear to be different,—yet, it is the very nature of the cognition that it appears in the form of blue, etc., and hence it is spoken of in the said manner; and the reason for this lies in the fact that cognition is by its nature self-cognisant.—(2011)

. Question:—"What is this 'Self-cognition' that is spoken of?"
Answer:—

TEXT (2012).

It means that for the cognition of its own form, the cognition does not need any other thing; and yet it is not uncognised;—this is what is meant by 'self-cognition'.—(2012)

COMMENTARY.

The following text raises an objection to the statement just made—from the view-point of Kumārila:—

TEXT (2013).

"While functioning towards the apprehending of the object, the cognition does not touch itself; hence, even though it is illuminative, it needs something else for its own apprehension."—[Shlokavārtika—
Śūnyavāda, 184].—(2013)

COMMENTARY.

This is how Kumārila argues—"Though cognition is of the nature of Light, yet for its own manifestation, it needs something else; and it does not
touch—apprehend—itself; as it is wholly taken up in the manifesting (apprehending) of the object; and when it is engaged in one thing, it cannot operate over another thing, without abandoning the former."—(2013)

Anticipating an objection on the basis of the Lamp (which is self-illumined), Kumārila states as follows:—

TEXT (2014).


COMMENTARY.

The question arising—'If the Cognition is not illuminative of itself, how can it be regarded as illuminative of the external object?'—Kumārila offers the following answer:—

TEXT (2015).

"AS IN THE CASE OF THE EYE, IT IS FOUND THAT, EVEN THOUGH IT IS ILLUMINATIVE, YET IT HAS ITS ILLUMINATIVENESS RESTRICTED TO COLOUR,—SO IT WOULD BE IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO."— [Shlokavārtika—Śūnyavāda, 186].—(2015)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the Eye and other organs, it is found that their illuminativeness is restricted to certain definite things, like Colour and the rest,—even though the Eye, etc. are not illuminative of themselves; the same would be the case with Cognition also.—(2015)

The following might be urged (against Kumārila):—'How is it that, abandoning its own self, which is more intimate to itself, the Cognition illuminates only the external Object?'

The answer to this by Kumārila is as follows:—

COMMENTARY.

Question:—'Why should the Cognition not have the potency to illuminate itself?'

Answer:—The potency of things cannot be complained of'; as has been thus declared—'It is fire alone that burns, not Ākāśa,—who is to be complained against for this?'.—(2016)

The answer to the above arguments of Kumārila is as follows:—

TEXT (2017).

IT IS THE 'APPREHENDING OF THE OBJECT' THAT IS CALLED 'COGNITION'. WHEN THEN, IT FORMS ITS OWN ESSENCE, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY OTHER FUNCTION OVER IT?—(2017)

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted (under Text 2013) that—"while functioning over the apprehending of the Object, the Cognition does not touch itself".—This is irrelevant. Because the 'apprehending of the object' is not something different from the Cognition. For instance, it is Cognition itself which is spoken of by such synonyms as 'vitti' (apprehension), 'upalabdhi' (comprehension), 'arthapratiti' (objective consciousness), and 'vijnapti' (ideation). When, then, this 'apprehending of the object' forms the very soul of the Cognition, what other 'functioning',—in the shape of the 'apprehending of the object'—could the Cognition have, apart from itself,—by virtue of which it could be said that 'the Cognition is functioning over the apprehending of the Object'? Certainly it is not right that anything should operate upon itself.—(2017)

The following question might be raised—"How is it known that the 'apprehending of the object' is of the nature of Cognition,—on account of which 'Cognition' and 'apprehending of the object' are regarded as synonymous?"

The answer to this is as follows:—
'EXTERNAL WORLD.'


'Apprehension' forms the very nature of the Object. If that Apprehension were of the nature of 'Cognition', then it might be correct to regard the 'Cognition' as being of the nature of the 'Apprehension of the Object'.—But it cannot be so (under your view), as that would involve the abandoning of your doctrine; even so, though the Cognition would come to be of the nature of 'Apprehension', there would be no apprehending of objects.—

(2018-2019)

COMMENTARY.

'Apprehension' must be regarded as of the nature—form—of the Object; otherwise, how could the Cognition operate over it? There can be no operation of anything upon what does not exist—e.g. the 'Hares' Horn'. Consequently if the said 'nature' of the Object in the form of Apprehension were not-different from Cognition, then alone could it be correct to regard the Cognition as being of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects,—as has been declared (by the Opponent) in the sentence—"the illuminativeness of the Cognition consists in its being of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects" (Text 2014).

On being pressed hard, the Opponent might admit the non-difference of Cognition from the Apprehension of Objects; hence it is added—'But it cannot be so under your view';—'it' stands for the idea of the Apprehension being non-different from Cognition.

'Your opinion',—viz.: that "Cognition is devoid of the apprehension of itself";—this would be abandoned if the said non-difference were admitted. That is, if it be admitted that the Cognition is not different from the Apprehension of Objects, it would mean that Cognition is self-cognised.

The following might be urged:—"When we speak of Cognition as 'illuminative', we do not mean that it is so because it is of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects; but only that it is of the nature of Apprehension, pure and simple".

The answer to this is—'Even when, etc. etc.'—'Tasya' stands for the Cognition.—Even though Cognition has now come to be of the nature of mere Apprehension, not of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects,—even so there could be no distinct Apprehension of Objects,—such as 'this is the apprehension of Blue, not of Yellow'.—(2018-2019)

Question:—"Why should not there be such apprehension?"

Answer:--
TEXT (2020).

For the other party, ‘proximity’ could not be the basis for such apprehension,—as there is under the view that Cognition has a form, in the shape of the ‘Reflected Image’.—(2020)

COMMENTARY.

‘For the other party’,—one who holds the view that Cognition is formless; whose opinion is that ‘it is the external Object that has form, the Cognition is formless’.—(2020)

It has been asserted (under Text 2014) that—“the illuminativeness of Cognition consists in its being of the nature of Apprehension”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2021).

If, by its nature, Cognition is unconscious and as such, can have no apprehension of itself,—then, there would be no consciousness of the Cognition; which would mean that the same is the case with the apprehension of the other also.—(2021)

COMMENTARY.

If Cognition, being unconscious, does not apprehend itself,—then the Cognition itself being imperceivable, the apprehension of the Object also would have to be regarded as imperceivable.—(2021)

The following might be urged—“If the Cognition is not perceptible, why should the apprehension of the Object also cease to be perceptible? Certainly the imperceptibility of Colour does not make Sound also imperceptible”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2022)

The Apprehension of the Object is called ‘Cognition’ itself; if then, there is no perception of the Cognition, how can there be perception of the other?—(2022)

COMMENTARY.

We cannot find any other form (or character) of the Cognition, apart from Apprehension. And so long as we cannot find any such, if we were to carry on any business, we would be deceiving ourselves and also others,
If the Cognition is uncognised, what other cognition could there be of the apprehension of the object? None whatsoever.—(2022)

It might be held that there would be apprehension of it by another Cognition.

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (2023-2024).

**IF THE APPREHENSION OF THE OBJECT WERE APPREHENDED BY ANOTHER Cognition,—THEN IT WOULD MEAN THAT AT THE TIME THAT THE OBJECT IS APPREHENDED, IT IS NOT COGNISED; BECAUSE ITS COGNITION HAS NOT YET COME ABOUT; AND IF THAT IS SO, THEN WHEN AGAIN WOULD IT BECOME COGNISED?—IF IT BE HELD THAT—"IT WOULD BECOME COGNISED WHEN ITS COGNITION BECOMES COGNISED"; —THEN IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE OBJECT WHICH IS NOT COGNISED AT THE TIME OF ITS OWN APPREHENSION, BECOMES COGNISED ON THE APPREHENSION OF SOMETHING ELSE.—THIS INDEED WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY WISE ASSERTION!—(2023-2024)

COMMENTARY.

'Siddhyasamsiddhah'—on account of its cognition not having come about.

—It cannot be right that the thing whose appearance has not become cognised should be regarded as apparent. That is to say, even at the time that the Object is apprehended, there is no cognition of it; because the apprehension consisting of the manifestation of the Object has not yet been cognised; under the circumstances, it behoves you to explain at what time it would become cognised.

If it be held that—'it would become cognised, etc. etc.';—i.e. it would become cognised at the time of the appearance of the Cognition of its cognition,—this indeed would be a very clever assertion! How can a thing which is not cognised at the time of its own apprehension become cognised at the time of the cognition of something else?—(2023-2024)

It might be granted that it does become cognised,—only if there were no infinite regress; as it is however, the idea involves an unavoidable infinite regress.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (2025).

**IF THE SAID COGNITION OF THE APPREHENSION IS NOT COGNISED, THEN THE PRECEDING ONE REMAINS UNCognised. IF OF THAT ALSO, YET ANOTHER COGNITION WERE POSTULATED, THEN THERE WOULD BE AN INFINITE REGRESS.—(2025)

COMMENTARY.

'Tasya'—stands for the second cognition of the apprehension of the Object.
Then again, if it is held that the Apprehension is apprehended by another Cognition,—then in connection with this latter cognition also, there would certainly appear the Remembrance in the form ‘I have had the Cognition of the Cognition’; so that for this Cognition also there will have to be postulated another apprehension;—as without previous apprehension there can be no Remembrance; under the circumstances, it has to be explained what that is which, having nothing else to do, goes on producing this string of Cognitions and Apprehensions.—It cannot be the Object that brings about this string. Because it forms the object of the initial Cognition itself.—Nor can it be the Sense-organ and Light; as these could be effective only in the case of Visual Perception.—Nor can the said string of Cognitions be regarded as without cause. As, in that case, there would be the possibility of its being there at all times.

It might be said that “it is the first Cognition itself which goes on producing Cognitions, one after the other”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2026–2028).

[If it were as suggested], then there would be no room for the cognition of any other object. And yet such cognition is actually found to appear. And if there is cognition of another object, the last of the series of cognitions could not be cognised by any other cognition; so that that would remain uncognised; and if that is not cognised, all the rest of the series must remain uncognised; so that the entire world becomes blind (Unconscious).—If then, the first cognition be regarded as self-cognised, then the same may surely be said of the others also;—because they are all Cognition; otherwise, they would not be Cognition at all,—like the jar and such things.—(2026–2028)

COMMENTARY.

In the way suggested, there is no possibility of the entering of any other Object (into the fold of Consciousness). Because, each succeeding Cognition would be the Object of the preceding Cognition, and would be there in close proximity to its cause; and so long as it had such an intimately connected objective, why should the Cognition take up any other less intimate Objective? In fact, even though such an external Object were present, it could not—simply because it is external,—prevent the Cognition from envisaging the preceding Cognition. If, even though external, the Object could prevent the Cognition
of the Cognition, then no one could never apprehend any Cognition at all. Because there is no point of time when an external Object is not present. —Remembrance also would become rooted out; because there would be no Apprehension that could bring about Remembrance. —Further, for the appearance of the conceptions of 'Past' and the rest, which appear when the Object concerned is not there,—there would be no cause; so that the series of conceptions would continue there as long as the world lasts; and no one would have any anxiety for anything at all.

Granting the presence of other objects,—even though it is not possible, —even so, it behoves you to explain what the other (second) Cognition is cognised.

It might be said that—"that same succeeding Cognition, while apprehending another Object, would apprehend both, this Object as well as the preceding Cognition."

But this cannot be right. Because, when after the Cognition of Sound, there follows the Cognition of Colour,—the Cognition of Sound would figure in the later Cognition of Colour, and hence there should be Cognition of Sound also which would be figuring in its own Cognition.—Even for one who regards Cognition as formless, unless there is apprehension of Sound, there can be no apprehension of what apprehends the Sound; e.g. unless there is apprehension of the stick, there can be no apprehension of the Holder of the Stick. Thus Sound also would figure in the Visual Cognition of Colour. Similarly on the said principle, in the Cognition of Cogitation also in regard to such objects as the letter 'A' and the like,—there would always be two verbal expressions one after the other. For instance, when after the Cogitation over the letter 'I', one Cogitates over the letter 'A',—then, the Cogitation of the letter 'A' should apprehend the apprehender of the letter 'I' also; consequently the verbal expression relating to the letter 'I' as figuring in its own Cognition, should appear in the Cognition of the letter 'A'.

Further, under this view, everything would appear in Consciousness twice over; because it must so appear at the time of its own Cognition also. But as a matter of fact, there is no such double appearance of Objects.

For these reasons, it is not right to say that the succeeding Cognition apprehends both (the preceding Cognition and also the Object).

It might be urged—"The one final Cognition might remain unapprehended and unremembered; where would be the harm?"

The answer to this is—'If there is Cognition of another Object, etc. etc.'—Self-Cognition being not accepted by the other party, the last Cognition cannot be regarded as 'self-cognised'; nor can it be cognised by anything else; as in that case there would be an infinite regress. Thus the final Cognition being uncognised, the Cognition preceding it must remain uncognised, as it would apprehend something that is not perceptible; and so on and on backwards, the Object also will remain uncognised; so that no Object would ever be cognised at all; which means that the entire world becomes blind.

If, in order to avoid the said difficulty, it be admitted that the final Cognition of the series is cognised by itself,—then the entire lot of Cognitions might be self-cognised; as all are equally 'Cognition'.
This argument may be formulated as follows:—Every Cognition, for its own Cognition, does not depend upon the operation of anything else,—because it is Cognition,—like the final Cognition of the series,—the Cognition under dispute is a Cognition; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

If it were not so, then what is itself not cognised would be unconscious, like the Jar and other things; and hence it would lose the character of 'Cognition'. This is an argument annulling a conclusion to the contrary—(2026-2028)

It has been argued above—under Text 2015, that—"Even though it be illuminative, the illuminativeness would be restricted".—The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (2029).

THE EYE IS REGARDED AS 'ILLUMINATIVE' OF COLOUR, BECAUSE IT BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION OF COLOUR,—NOT BECAUSE IT IS ITS APPREHENSION; WHAT SIMILARITY THEN CAN THE EYE HAVE TO COGNITION?—(2029)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the Eye is spoken of as 'illuminative' of Colour, because it brings about the Cognition of Colour:—As regards Cognition, it does not do anything to the Colour; as what it does bring about is entirely Colourless (formless); and what does not do anything to a certain Object cannot be regarded as 'illuminative' of it; otherwise there would be incongruities.

'Tat'—Therefore.

'Upamā'—Similarity.—(2029)

The following texts proceed to address certain arguments to the philosopher who holds Cognition to be formless,—for the purpose of proving that there is non-difference between the Blue and other forms and the Cognition of these forms:

TEXTS (2030-2031).

WHEN THERE IS COGNITION OF A CERTAIN THING, AND ALSO THAT THING OF WHICH THAT ALONE IS THE COGNITION,—THIS THING IS NOT-DIFFERENT FROM THAT COGNITION; OR THIS DOES NOT DIFFER FROM THAT.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE Cognition of the Blue, or the Second Moon;—AND THIS IS THE Cognition of Blue, because it apprehends the Blue form.—(2030-2031)

COMMENTARY.

When there is Cognition of a certain thing,—and also the thing of which that alone—none other—is the Cognition,—then the latter is absolutely not-different from the former.
Or, the 'non-difference' may be stated conversely—the former is non-different from the latter.

What is meant is as follows:—When a certain Object has no Cognition other than a certain Cognition, that Object is non-different from that Cognition;—e.g. the Cognition of the Blue from itself,—or the Second Moon, which figures in the Cognition of the man with defective eye-sight.—The Cognition in question is the Cognition of the Cognition of the Blue; this reiterates the presence of the Probans; the 'Subject' or 'Minor Term' consists of the Blue Form and its Cognition; and the 'non-difference' of these two is the Probandum. The said 'constancy of their being found together' is the Probans. This is the meaning of the Probans that appears in the text of the Great Teacher which says—'There must be non-difference between the Blue and its Cognition, because they are always found together'.

Bhadanta-Shubhagupta however has argued as follows:—"This Probans is 'contradictory'; because in common parlance, the term 'together' is never used except with another thing; hence the Reason that 'they are cognised together' is contradictory.'

This is not right; that Probans is 'contradictory' which resides only where the Probandum is known to be absent; the Probans in question does not reside only where the Probandum is known to be absent; as it resides also where the Probandum is known to be present. For instance, among people, there is the idea that the 'two moons' (seen by the man with defective vision) are perceived together; and yet there is no real difference between them; and people are found to use the term 'together' in such assertions as 'two moons are seen together'. Similarly in the case in question, the term 'together' has been used on the basis of a difference assumed on the basis of the idea that the form (Blue) appearing as 'external' is the 'second', the 'other',—though it is really non-different from the Cognition. In fact, all verbal usage is not in exact accordance with the real state of things; whereby the mere use of the term 'together' would make the Inferential Indicative, which is really concomitant with a certain thing, something different.

The same Bhadanta-Shubhagupta says again:—"If the term 'together' means one, then the Reason is 'inadmissible'; because the Blue and other things are not apprehended as one, in such shows as those of dancers, wrestlers, etc.—Nor are the Blue and the Cognition of Blue both apprehended by one (person); because even when the Blue is apprehended, the Cognitions of the same Blue, appearing in other series or 'chains', are not apprehended. When again, the existence of all living beings and all 'Cognition-moments' are apprehended by the Omniscient Being,—how can it be admitted that there is apprehension by one only?—Then again, it is only when the apprehension of 'others' is negatived, that there can be certainty regarding the apprehension of one;—but the negation of the apprehension of others is not possible; because of what is diverse in nature, both affirmation and denial cannot be possible.—If the term 'together' is meant to convey the idea of being present at the same time, then the Reason becomes 'Inconclusive', in view of the Cognition cognised by the Buddha, and also of the Mind and Mind-effects. For instance, the Cognition in other 'chains' which are
cognised by the Blessed Lord Buddha,—that Cognition and Buddha's Cognition of that Cognition are found to appear together,—i.e. at the same time, —and yet they are different. Similarly in the case of Mind and Mental Effects, even though they are apprehended 'together', yet they are not one and the same. Thus the Reason is 'Inconclusive' ".

All this is not right. What is meant is, not 'apprehension by one', nor 'apprehension of one' ;—what is meant is that there is a single—not separate—apprehension of the Cognition and the Cognised; that is, the apprehension of the Cognised is the same as the apprehension of the Cognition, and the apprehension of the Cognition is the same as the apprehension of the Cognised. In the case of such shows as those of the Dancer, the Wrestler and the like, there is no Cognition of the Cognition which does not apprehend the Cognised also;—nor is there any Cognition of the Cognised which does not apprehend the Cognition also. How then can the Reason be regarded as 'inadmissible'?—Nor can the Reason be regarded as 'of doubtful admissibility'; because the self-cognition of the Cognition is the Cognition of the Object also; as has been admitted also by our opponent, the upholder of the Reality of the External World.—This also serves to refute the 'inadmissibility' urged on the basis of the alternatives—whether what is meant is 'the apprehension of one', etc. etc.—Then again, it is not a fact that the 'Cognition-moments' figuring in another 'chain' are cognised by the Buddha. Because the Blessed Lord, who is free from all obscuring influences, is entirely free from defects as those of the 'apprehender' and the 'apprehended'. This has been thus declared—'For Him, there is no Apprehended, nor Apprehension, nor Apprehensibility by other Cognitions; it is pure Void'.—As regards the declaration of 'being untrammeled' (made in regard to Buddha's Cognition),—that is only in view of His being the Lord of all things; as has been declared in the following words—'He is held to be omniscient, because His knowledge serves the purpose of all and is fully equipped with the Faculties resulting from previous meditations,—as is going to be described later on'. Hence the Reason cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible'.

Says the Opponent:—"Āchārya Dharmakīrti, in setting forth the Pārvapakṣa (the Opponent's view), says—'At first, there is appearance of the Object as the cause of Cognition and hence this is what is apprehended first, and the apprehension of the Cognition comes later'; and here he has shown that what the term 'together' means is simultaneity, not sameness; it is only when simultaneity is meant, that the assertion of the Opponent showing that the two appear at different points of time can be relevant ".

There is no force in this argument. Because difference in time is included under real material difference; hence the assertion of the difference in time as indicating actual difference is quite relevant; because the 'less wide' term should not be inconcomitant with the 'wider' term.

Nor again can the Reason be regarded as 'Inconclusive', in view of the Cognition cognised by the Buddhás; because in that case there is no limitation of the Cognition being one; because one by one all the Buddhás cognise the Cognition. For this same reason, in their case also, there is
'EXTERNAL WORLD.'

consideration regarding the wrongness of Cognitions; because each Cognition is cognised by itself.

Or, there may be Cognition of the Cognition of others by the Buddha; even so, the Reason is not 'Inconclusive'; because there is always differentiation. Even when there is diversity in the apprehension of two things, there is always differentiation; in the case of Cognitions however, when appearing in the same 'Chain', there is no diversity in their specific Individualities. Hence what is meant is that there is apprehension of the Cognition only when there is apprehension of the Object. The apprehension of the Cognition of the Blessed Lord however is not always the same as the apprehension of the Cognitions occurring in other 'Chains';—there is another Cognition also; because the separateness (difference) of His own Cognition is also distinctly apprehended. For this same reason, the Reason does not become wrong, in view of Colour and Light; because Light is perceived also alone by itself; and Colour also is perceived by certain animals (e.g. Cats), even when there is no Light.—Thus then, the Reason, not being present where the Probandum is known to be absent, cannot be regarded as 'Inconclusive'.—(2030-2031)

The following might be urged:—"Even though the presence of your Probans where the Probandum is known to be absent is not known with certainty,—yet it is suspected all the same; and even so the Probans becomes 'Inconclusive'; as its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum is doubtful. Because, inasmuch as the relation of 'Subject' and 'Object' (between the Cognition and the Cognised) is definite, the fact of their 'being apprehended together' (Concomitance) is open to an explanation other than their non-difference; because the Cognition is always of the nature of the apprehender, as it has the character of apprehending things; and the Object is always the apprehended; and the fact of these two being always together is due to their being dependent upon the same set of circumstances.—In the case of the Eye and other sense-organs, it is found that, even though they are equally produced together,—they cannot be the cognised object; simply because they do not have that character. Because, as a matter of fact, what the causal circumstances bring about is the Cognition only in the form of the apprehension of the Blue and other objects,—not in that of the apprehension of such objects as the Eye, etc.; the, Blue, etc. also are produced in the form in which they are apprehended by that Cognition; not so the Eye, etc.—All this has been declared as follows:—'There is no apprehender other than Cognition, nor without the visible and other objects; it is on this ground that the fact of the Blue Object and its Cognition being apprehended together rests, not upon their non-difference;—the antecedent circumstances would bring about the Cognition of the object-moment, in the same way as Light does that of Colour; and in this way they would be apprehended together'.”

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (2032).

The 'nature of Cognition' not being the 'nature of the other thing' [according to the other party];—how could there be apprehension of the Blue form, when there is apprehension of the Cognition of the Blue,—if there is no non-difference between these two?—(2032)

COMMENTARY.

When one thing differs from another, there can be no certainty of their being apprehended together, except through a constant relationship; as otherwise, there would be incongruities. In the case in question, there is no relationship in the cognition of the different thing. For instance, if there were such relationship, it could either consist (a) in being of the same nature or (b) in one being the product of the other;—(a) in the case in question the Opposite party does not admit the sameness of the two factors concerned; and in fact, that is exactly what is going to be proved here;—(b) nor could the fact of being apprehended together be due to one being the product of the other; because there can be no relationship of Cause and Effect between things that come into existence at the same time; and also because in that case, there should be apprehension of the Eye and the other organs also (which are the cause of Cognition).

Nor can their relation of 'Object and Subject' be based upon mere simultaneity due to the antecedent circumstances. Because, in that case, the relationship of 'Object and Subject' would have to be admitted as subsisting between the Mind and Mental Effects on the one hand and the Eye and other Sense-organs on the other.—It cannot be said in answer to this that—"what the Antecedent circumstances bring about is the relationship of object and subject in regulated form, and hence there could be no incongruities";—because, in reality, it is this same 'relation of object and subject' that forms the subject of the present discussion, and as such cannot be admitted as established. In fact, it is only when the constant relationship has become established, that the 'relation of subject and object' could be there; and it is this same constant relationship as the basis of the Relation of subject and object, that is being considered now.

Apart from sameness and being produced, there can be no other constant relationship, on which the Relation of object and subject could be based. And we have just arrived at the conclusion that (in the case in question) no such relation of subject and object can be based upon the said sameness and being produced. Consequently, apart from these there can be no 'joint apprehension'. Why then should the Reason be regarded as having its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum doubtful?—(2032)

A second argument is now put forward in proof of the fact of the form belonging to Cognition:—
TEXT (2033).
ALL THIS COGNITION DOES NOT ENVISAGE OTHER THINGS; THERE IS
COGNITION OF THE BLUE;—LIKE THE COGNITION OF THE
COGNITION ITSELF.—(2033)

COMMENTARY.
Whatever is Cognition does not envisage anything other than the
Cognition itself,—the Cognition of the Blue and other forms is Cognition ;—

hence there is apprehension of something embraced by its contrary; inasmuch
as the 'Cognition' is embraced within the character of not envisaging any
other thing, which is contrary to the character of envisaging some other thing.—

(2033)

The following Texts proceed to establish the Premiss just set forth :

TEXTS (2034-2035).

PRIMARILY, THE COGNITION DOES NOT APPREHEND AN OBJECT AT ALL,
AS IT RESTS WITHIN ITS OWN SELF; ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS
ABSENCE OF THE IMPRINT OF THE OBJECTIVE FORM; NOR CAN IT
BE SAID TO DO SO SECONDARILY (FIGURATIVELY).—THIS
REASONING IS ADDRESSED TO THOSE WHO REGARD
COGNITION AS IMPRINTED WITH THE FORMS OF
THINGS, ITSELF BEING LIKE PURE ROCK-
CRYSTAL.—(2034-2035)

COMMENTARY.
In reality, all things are inactive; hence there can be no apprehension of
one thing by another;—what happens is only that Cognition, being of the
nature of Light, appears in a certain form, and is said to be the 'apprehender'
of itself. Primarily,—in the direct primary sense,—the Cognition cannot
be the apprehender of the Object; because all things rest within their own
self; and the 'self' of one thing cannot be the 'self' of another.

The following might be urged:—"Primarily the Cognition of the Object
is not held to be of the same kind as the self-cognition of the Cognition;
the apprehensibility of the Object consists only in its producing a Cognition
bearing the imprint of that Object. Thus, if it is 'apprehensibility' in the
primary sense that is adduced as the Reason (in the above Buddhistic
arguments), then it is 'inadmissible'. If on the other hand the 'apprehensibility'
meant is based upon the similarity of the idea being regarded as 'apprehen-
sion' in some sort of a way,—then such a Reason cannot prove what is
wanted. Because the similarity of the words 'go' and 'gavaya' cannot
prove the presence of Horns in the Gavaya.—If both kinds of Reason put
forward are with reference to the Blue and other forms that figure in the Cognition,—and in favour of the idea of the form belonging to the Cognition,—then, the whole argument is superfluous—proving what is already admitted. This has been thus described—'Under the view of the form belonging to Cognitions, what is cognised is the imprint of that form; and if what is meant to be proved is the non-difference of this with the Cognition, then the Reason would be open to the charge of proving what is already admitted'."

It is in anticipation of—and in answer to—all this objection emanating from Bhadanta-Shubhaugupta, that the Author has added the words—'There is absence of the imprint, etc. etc.'—In the compound 'arthākāroparāga', 'arthākāra' qualifies 'upāraja', the meaning being—'the imprint of (in the shape of) the form of the object'.

'Idam'—both the aforesaid arguments in question have been put forward against the person who regards Cognition as formless. Hence they are not 'futile'—proving what is already admitted.

Nor can there be an apprehension of something else (other than the Cognition) in the secondary (figurative) sense either; as there is no basis for such figurative expression.—(2034-2035)

It has thus been proved that there can be no apprehension of Objects by a Cognition that does not bear any imprint (objective). The other view—that there can be none even by the Cognition that does bear such an imprint,—is now taken up and expounded:

TEXT (2036).

[SAYS THE OTHER PARTY]—"THE COGNITION ENDOWED WITH SIMILARITY OF FORM MAY BE THE APPREHENDER OF THE EXTERNAL OBJECT".—

THAT ALSO BEING IMPOSSIBLE, IT CANNOT HAVE THE POSITION OF THE APPREHENDER.—(2036)

COMMENTARY.

There can be no real form in the Cognition, on the basis of which the exact nature of things could be determined; and a Cognition with an unreal form could not apprehend the Object; as such form is present in wrong Cognition also.—(2036)

Question:—"Why should Cognitions with forms be unreal?"

Answer:—
AS THE FORM WOULD BE NOT-DIFFERENT FROM THE COGNITION, THERE
COULD NOT BE A MULTIPLICITY (VARIETY) OF FORMS;—CONSEQUENTLY,
ON THE BASIS OF THAT THERE CAN BE NO APPREHENSION.—
OR, THE COGNITION, BEING NOT-DIFFERENT FROM THE
FORMS, SHOULD BE MANY (MULTIPLE). IF NOT, THEN
HOW CAN THESE TWO BE REGARDED AS ONE
AND THE SAME?—(2037-2038)

COMMENTARY.

When one sees a bedspread of variegated colour, there should not be
a multiplicity of forms (colours),—because, like the form of the Cognition
itself, they are all not-different from the Cognition, which is one only.—
Similarly, as the Cognition is not-different from the forms, it should be more
than one.

There are some people who argue thus:—"In the case of the Bedspread
of variegated colours, what happens is that there do appear simultaneously
several homogeneous Cognitions, as many in number as there are forms
(colours); as there is in the case of the Cognition of several diverse sounds.
Hence the Reductio ad Absurdum that has been urged is futile ."

For these people, just as, in the case of the Bedspread of variegated
Colour, there are several forms that are cognised,—so in the case of the white
sheet also which has only one form (colour),—as there are several forms in
the shape of the nearer, remoter and middle parts of the sheet,—the Cogni-
tion would have to be multiple.

It might be said—"Yes; that is certainly our view ."

Well, then, it behoves you to explain which is the Cognition that is
one.

"It is the Cognition that apprehends the Atom which has no parts."

This is contrary to all experience. In no Cognition is the impartite
atomic form ever found to appear.

In the case of incorporeal things, there can be no priority or posteriority
due to space,—for the justification of which there would be some ground for
assuming a multiplicity of Cognitions. The idea of extension in space being
false, how can the forms be real? And yet there is no Cognition of the
Cognition of Blue, etc. apart from the appearance of the Blue, etc. that have
extension in space. Hence the assuming of a multiplicity of Cognitions is
entirely futile.—(2037-2038)

Another defect in the Opponent's view is pointed out in the following—
TEXT (2039).

If the Cognition were entirely like the Object,—then it would have the character of Non-Cognition (Ignorance), etc.
If there is only partial likeness, then every Cognition should apprehend every Object.—(2039)

COMMENTARY.

'Character of Non-cognition'—i.e. being of the nature of the unconscious.
'Et cetera'—is meant to include negation of attachment, negation of hatred and so forth.—(2039)

The following Text proceeds to deal with the third alternative view (suggested in Text 1999)—that "Cognition envisages something else":—

TEXT (2040).

How can the Cognition envisaging (having the form of) one Object apprehend another Object? If it did so, everything would be apprehended by every Cognition;
and there would be no basis for restriction.—(2040)

COMMENTARY.

It might be urged that—"when a Cognition is produced by a certain Object, it apprehends only that Object, and thus every Object could not be apprehended by every Cognition".
The answer to this is—"There would be no basis for restriction"; that is, even the Eye, etc. would become 'apprehended'.—(2040)

The following Text presents Bhadanta-Shubhagupta's answer to the above—

TEXT (2041).

"Just as your Cognition, which is formless in reality, apprehends forms which are non-objective,—in the same way would it apprehend all things."—(2041)

COMMENTARY.

Bhadanta Shubhagupta has argued as follows:—"According to you, Idealists, Cognition is really formless,—as is clear from such assertions as 'Cognition is held to be non-elemental, like the purity of Gold and Akāsha';
—and yet it apprehends forms; in the same manner it would apprehend the external thing also".—(2041)

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (2042–2044).

As a matter of fact, the form of the Mind and Mental Effects is not-common (specific); hence there can be no apprehension of other forms in the real (primary) sense of the term; therefore the name ‘apprehension’ could be applicable to the apprehension of objects only in the secondary (figurative) sense, on the basis of such conditions as ‘being dependent upon the same causal circumstances’, ‘the relation of Cause and Effect’ and so forth. An entity however which has no form, cannot be ‘dependent upon the same form’, nor could the other condition be fulfilled. Hence of such an entity, there can be no ‘apprehension’, even in the figurative sense.”—(2042–2044)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, of what is non-objective, there can be no ‘Apprehension’ in the primary sense of this term. Because of the Mind and Mental Effects,—the only form or nature that figures in ‘Happiness, etc.’ and which is spoken of as ‘I’, is specific—not-common—and is of the nature of Light; and it is this figuring that constitutes their ‘apprehension’ in the primary sense. Hence of ‘non-objective’ things other than Cognition,—which are not of the nature of Cognition,—there can be no such ‘apprehension’ in the primary sense; simply because they are non-objective.—Nor can the same be there in the secondary sense; because there is no basis for such secondary signification. Because the only possible grounds for secondary signification are—dependence upon the same causal circumstances, the relation of Cause and Effect and similarity of form,—this last being indicated by the term ‘and so forth’ in the text. And none of these is possible in the case of what is non-objective. There can be no other ground for the figurative use of the name ‘Apprehension’.—What happens therefore, in such cases, is only that through Nescience (Illusion) a Wrong Cognition comes about indicating a non-objective form, which really does not form the objective (of the Cognition at all).”—(2042–2044)

The opponent says—"That same false cognition would be the basis of the figurative use of the name to the Apprehension of the unreal form".

The answer to that is as follows:
TEXTS (2045-2046).

Or, it may be that the Cognition is spoken of as "apprehending the non-objective form"—through mistake, because in reality it does not apprehend it at all, for the simple reason that it has no object. If you also speak through illusion of the Cognition apprehending such a thing,—then it becomes clearly non-objective.

—(2045-2046)

COMMENTARY.

'Tat'—i.e. the Cognition that is spoken of as envisaging the non-objective form.

In reality, there is no non-objective form at all which could be apprehended; because if it were admitted to be apprehensible in the positive form, then it would have to be regarded as objective.—(2045-2046)

The same writer (Bhadanta-Shubhagupta) says again:—"With reference to the Buddha's Cognition also, the same questions arise—Is it with form or formless? Is it produced at the same time or at different times? That is to say, just as the point is discussed that the Cognition with form cannot apprehend the Object,—why is not a similar point raised in regard to the apprehension of the Object of the Blessed Lord's Cognition?"

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (2047).

Whether with form or formless, it does not apprehend anything else; hence in regard to the Buddha's Cognition, the questions do not arise.—(2047)

COMMENTARY.

The Cognition of the Blessed Lord is not regarded as the apprehender of the Object; hence the question is not raised in regard to that. As a matter of fact, in His case, all obscuration having disappeared,—that there should be no question regarding the Apprehender and Apprehended, is exactly what is right.—(2047)

Says the Opponent:—"Even though the External Object does not exist, which could be apprehended,—yet another Cognition is there, in another 'Chain'; why cannot this be apprehended by the Cognition of the Blessed Lord?"

The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (2048).

If he had the cognition of the Love and Hate, etc. in other persons,—this could arise only from similarity to such love, etc.; and this would imply the presence of 'obscuration',—under the view of the 'Apprehensionist'.—(2048)

COMMENTARY.

If there is apprehension of the Love, etc. occurring in other 'Chains',—that could be due only to similarity, not otherwise; as if it were otherwise, there would be incongruities.—As regards this Similarity (between the Lord's Cognition and the Love, etc. in another person), if it is similarity on all points, then the Lord's Cognition should be tainted with the same Love, etc.;—and in that case, the Afflictions and Obscurations would not have ceased in Him; and there could be possibility of Obscuration.

'Aupalambhika-darshanā'—under the view—opinion—of those who proceed on the basis of Cognitions alone,—i.e. the Apprehensionists, the Idealists.—Or it may be interpreted as 'under the Apprehensionist or Idealistic, view of the Lord'.

If, on the other hand, the said similarity is only partial,—even so, as the two forms would not have ceased, the obscuration of the apprehended object would be there; as it would be tainted with the form of what is apprehended. Because a duality of form in any single object cannot be real; so that the said Cognition would have to be regarded as wrong, mistaken; and thus, as the seed of wrong-cognition, in the shape of Defect, would not have entirely ceased, the Blessed Lord would come to be one whose obscuration has not ceased entirely.—(2048)

Question:—"If the Blessed Lord does not apprehend anything, how can He be omniscient?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (2049-2050).

The Great Sage is like the Kalpa-tree, unshaken by the winds of desires; and yet He brings about the welfare of men.

Even though He has no cognitions, all men regard the Blessed Jina (Buddha) to be omniscient; because by reason of the absence of limitations, He knows all things, without exception,—as is clear from what He does (for the welfare of People).—(2049-2050)

COMMENTARY.

'Adarshanam'—He who has no cognition.

By the force of his previous Meditations, the Lord has no limitations; He is like the Kalpa-tree, bringing about the welfare of the entire Universe;
that is why people regard Him as 'Omniscient,' — not because He has cognitions; in fact, no other character can be attributed to Him.—(2049–2050)

Having thus stated the arguments negating the External World, the Author next refutes the argument adduced by the other party in support of the External World.

TEXT (2051).

If the Cognition is not of the 'White' and other forms,—then, how can it be the apprehension of the object? If it is of the form of 'White,' etc., then what is the evidence for the external object?—(2051)

COMMENTARY.

The external object could be proved either by Perception or by Inference; any other Means of Knowledge, if any, is included under these two.

It cannot be proved by Perception. Because, is the Perceptual Cognition, which apprehends the Object, with form? Or without form? It cannot be formless; as in that case there would be no basis for the necessary contacts (without which there can be no Perception).—Thus then, if the Cognition were not of the White and other forms,—how could it be the apprehension of the Object? It can never be so, as already explained before.—If, on the other hand, the Cognition apprehending the Object is with form, then, the only form of the Blue, etc. that would be perceived would be that in the Cognition itself, and the External Object would be only indirectly cognised (by Inference), not perceived. Because two 'Blues' are never perceived—one in the form of the reflection in the Cognition, and the other in the form of the external object which casts the reflection.

Thus the External Object cannot be proved by Perception.—(2051)

It might be said—"In that case, it could be proved by Inference". And in support of this idea, Bhadanta-Shubhagupta has formulated the argument as follows:—"The form in which the Cognition appears,—if it is in conformity with the real state of things,—must be produced by some other Object of that same form,—like the apprehending form;—and the 'form of Cognition' in question envisaging the Blue and other forms, appearing in the man with underaged sense-organs, is compatible with the real state of things; hence this is a Reason in accordance with the real state of the thing concerned."

This is the argument presented in the following—
"The fact of the appearance of the blue and other forms being produced by something of the same kind is sought to be proved by its being the form of the cognition which is in conformity with the reality,—like the Consciousness."—(2052)

COMMENTARY.

'Samvāditvēṇa;—The Instrumental ending indicates the characteristic feature of the Cognition; the sense being—that form of the cognition which is in conformity with reality,—by that is proved the fact of the form of the Cognition being produced by some other thing of the same kind;—like Consciousness; i.e. like the form of the Apprehender.—(2052)

The following texts point out the defects in this argument:

TEXTS (2053-2054).

(a) If by 'being in conformity with reality' it is meant, either that it presents the external object, or that it has the capacity for presenting it,—then this cannot be 'admissible' by the man who denies the External Object.—

(b) If, on the other hand, 'being in conformity with reality' consists in being the cause of a Cognition envisaging effective action,

—then, this is possible also when the Cognition is without an external objective basis.—(2053-2054)

COMMENTARY.

(a) If 'being in conformity with reality' as the qualification of your Probans, means, either that it represents the external object, or that it has the capacity of representing it,—then, for the person who denies the external object—i.e. for one who holds that Idea or Cognition is all that exists,—such conformity can never be 'admissible'; hence the Probans is one tainted with 'inadmissibility' by one of the two parties.

(b) If 'conformity' means that it brings about a Cognition which envisages the desired effective action,—then,—so long as a proof setting aside the contrary conclusion has not been adduced, there would always be a suspicion of the Probans being present where the Probandum is absent; and this would make the Probans 'Inconclusive'. Because such conformity would not be incompatible with the view that Cognition has no objective basis.—(2053-2054)
The following Texts show how there is no such incompatibility (with the Idealistic position):

**TEXTS (2055-2056).**

*Just as in the case of the External Things, water and the rest, the presence of actual capacity is regarded as the regulating factor in 'Conformity',—this same 'Conformity' of Cognition is found in the case of other Cognitions (Inferential, etc.) also. So that, in view of what appears in Inference, the Reason adduced by the Opponent is 'too wide' (hence 'Inconclusive').—Certainly the form of Fire and other things (inferred) which is quite clear and distinct, is not like that of the Inference itself.—(2055-2056)*

**COMMENTARY.**

Then again, though the Inferential Cognition is devoid of the objective substratum, yet it is in conformity with reality; so that the Reason adduced is clearly found where the Probandum is absent, and hence, like 'cognisability', it is clearly 'too wide', hence 'Inconclusive'.

It might be argued that—"we do not admit that Inferential Cognition is devoid of objective substratum".

The answer to that is—'Certainly, the form, etc. etc.'—This argument may be thus formulated:—When a cognition is devoid of the form of something, it cannot be regarded as having that for its objective basis,—e.g. the Cognition of Colour does not have Sound for its objective; —Inferential Cognition is devoid of the external form;—hence there is apprehension of something that is contrary to a wider factor.—The Reason adduced here cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible'; because the form of the Fire is quite clear and distinct; and as such, it is not like the form of the Inferential Cognition (of that Fire); because the Inferential Cognition is always somewhat hazy and indefinite.—If it were not so, then the Fire which, in Perception, is cognised in a well-defined form, as due to the burning of grasses and leaves, would appear in the same definite form in Inference also; as a matter of fact, what does appear in Inference has abandoned its well-defined form and appears only in a vague general form in accordance with the Indicative on which the Inference is based. Hence so far as the External Object is concerned, it does not appear in Inference at all. Nor can one and the same thing have two forms—the General and the Particular,—which are mutually contradictory, as already explained before.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as 'Contradictory'; because it is present where the Probandum is present.—
Nor is it 'Inconclusive'; for, if it were, then there would be incongruities.—(2055-2056)

With the following Text, the Author sets forth the arguments propounded by Uddyotakara [Nyāyavārtika on Śū. 4. 2. 34]:—

**TEXT (2057).**

"That which appears in various places must be regarded as different from Apprehension which is internal (subjective) —because it is cognisable, etc.,—like the Cognition occurring in another Chain",—if this is urged [then, the answer is as in the next Text].—(2057)

**COMMENTARY.**

He has argued thus:—"The Blue etc. which appear in various places must be regarded as different from Apprehension, which is internal,—because they are cognisable, because they are evanescent, because they are products, and because they have causes;—just like the Cognition appearing in another Chain".

**TEXT (2058).**

In this argument also there is 'Falsity' (Inconclusiveness); as there is no difference, in these respects, between the Colour and the Cognition; and there is 'Inconclusiveness' also, in view of the 'Two Moons' and other things perceived by men with diseased eyes.

—(2058)

**COMMENTARY.**

'In this argument'—i.e. in all the Reasons adduced.

'Falsity'—Inconclusiveness.—Because the 'inner cognition' also has the character of 'cognisability' and the rest; just as there is 'inconclusiveness' also in view of the 'two moons' that appear in the Cognition of the man with the diseased eye.

In things like the 'two moons', cognisability should be understood to be present in the sense that they appear in that form in the Conceptual Cognition; because they are not really cognisable in the sense of forming the object of the cognition itself; because they are not in contact with the Sense-organ; as declared in the saying—'On account of the obstruction of the Hair, etc. the visual perception does not proceed from the Sense-organ'.—(2058)

In the following Texts, the Author notices and answers Kumārila's view, that what has been just cited as the basis of 'Inconclusiveness' (Falsity) of the Reason cannot be 'admitted':—
TEXTS (2059–2063).

If it is alleged that—"in the cases cited, it is really the external object that is cognised";—[then the answer is as follows]:—The form that actually figures in the cognition cannot be of the nature of the real object; as it only figures in the cognition and hence becomes cognised; the actual form of the external object itself does not figure there at all. How is it possible that it should not figure there and yet be cognised? It is certainly a contradiction in terms to say that 'one cognises it' and 'one does not cognise it'.—It is for these reasons that it is not difficult to prove that cognitions are self-cognised; because such is found to be the cognition in everything which is of the nature of 'Light'.—From all this it follows that it is not true that "the wrong Cognition, while apprehending the object, apprehends it as otherwise than it really exists, and thus envisages itself (?)".—(2059–2063)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila argues as follows:—"In the cases cited of wrong cognitions (like that of Two Moons, Yellow conch-shell and so forth), what is put forward as the basis of wrong cognition is an external object itself in the form of the Conch-shell, etc. only it is in the yellow form that it supplies the basis for the Cognition. Hence there is no 'falsity (or 'Inconclusiveness')' at all".

The answer to this is—'The form that actually figures, etc. etc.'—What is meant is briefly as follows:—The only right view is that that same form can be apprehended by a certain Cognition which actually figures in that Cognition; otherwise every Cognition would apprehend everything. Thus then, 'being apprehended' is invariably concomitant with 'appearing or figuring'. In the Cognition of the Yellow form, the white form does not figure at all; because what is meant to be perceptible is not actually perceived; so that the wider character of 'appearing or figuring' being absent, there must be absence of the less wide character of 'apprehensibility'.—The argument may be formulated as follows:—When a certain form does not figure in a Cognition, it cannot be regarded as cognisable (by that Cognition),—e.g. Colour in the Cognition of Sound;—the white colour of the Conch-shell does not figure in the cognition of the yellow form;—and thus there is no apprehension of the wider character.

'One cognises it, etc. etc.'—This shows that there is self-contradiction.

'It is for this reason, etc. etc.'—By this passage the Author tries to establish, by the way, his view that Cognition is self-cognised. And this also serves to set aside what has been asserted by the followers of Jaimini (Shabara-bhāgya) to the effect and that—"Our Cognition is imperceptible and formless".
'From all this, etc. etc.'—The sentence is to be construed as—'Kalpayati sati artham eva anyathā santam kalpayati iti na','—'it is not true that, etc. etc.'—This denies what has been asserted by Kumārila.—(2059–2063)

The following texts set forth a series of arguments put forward by Kumārila:

TEXTS (2064–2068).

"(a) That which is the apprehender of Colour must be different from what is apprehended,—because the Cognition of the one does not appear on the Cognition of the other;—as in the case of the apprehender of Taste, etc.—(b) What is apprehended must be different from the Apprehender; because one who thinks of the one does not necessarily think of the other;—as in the case of the apprehender of Taste, etc.—(c) For the same reason the two must, thus, be concluded to be different from one another, like Taste, etc.—(d) The two must be different, because they are never cognised as being of the same form,—like the Cognition occurring in another 'Chain'.—(e) The Cognition cannot apprehend any portion of itself; because it proceeds from the Cognition;—like its own Potency.—(f) There should be denial also of 'apprehensibility' (of the Cognition by itself);—because the Impression is devoid of the duplicate character.—(g) Chāitra's Cognition cannot bring about the apprehension of the apprehensible part of the Cognition arising out of his Cognition;—because it is Cognition;—just as the Cognition appearing in another person.'—[Shlokavārtika—Shūnyavāda, 172–177]—(2064–2068)

COMMENTARY.

"(a) The Cognition that apprehends Colour must be different in form from what is apprehended;—because when there is Cognition of the Colour, there is no Cognition of the Colour; just as the Apprehender of Taste.—Or (b) what is apprehended,—i.e. Colour, etc.,—must be different from its Apprehender; because when a man thinks of the one, he does not think of the other;—just as in the case of the apprehender of taste, etc.—Or (c) the two—the Colour and its Apprehender—must be different from one another, because there is no thought of the one while the other is thought of,—just like Taste and Colour, etc.—Or (d) the two must be regarded as different, because they are never recognised as being of the same form,—like the Cognition appearing in another 'Chain'.—Or (e) the Cognition cannot apprehend a portion of itself,—because it is produced from the Cognition itself; like its own Potency;—this 'Potency' is what is known as 'Impression'.—(f) Similarly, there should be denial of the 'apprehensibility' of Cognition, which is done in this form:—The portion of Cognition cannot be apprehended by the Cognition itself, because it has come out of the Cognition".
Question:—In between these two arguments where is the Corroborative Instance endowed with the character of the Probandum?

Answer:—"Because the Impression is devoid of the duplicate character;—i.e. the character of the Apprehended and the character of the Apprehender.

(g) Or, there is another argument—This Cognition in question cannot bring about the apprehension of the portion of Cognition produced in one's Cognition,—because it is Cognition,—just as the Cognition appearing in other persons—Maitra and the rest,—does not apprehend the portion arising out of Chaitra's Cognition.—(2064–2068)

The refutation of the above is set forth in the following:—

TEXT (2069).

Because the two are never cognised separately, as explained before,—therefore all the Reasons adduced (by Kumārila),

down to the 'non-cognition of sameness', should

be rejected as 'inadmissible'.—(2069)

COMMENTARY.

'Because the two are never cognised separately';—i.e. because the Blue and its Cognition are always found together; because for the man who has no apprehension of Cognition, there can be no perception of the Object;—all this has been explained before in course of the proof of Cognition being self-cognised;—where the non-difference between the Blue and its Cognition has been established;—because of this, all the Reasons adduced above (by Kumārila) down to the 'non-cognition of sameness' cannot be 'admissible'.

—(2069)

In the following Text, the Opponent urges that the Reasons are well-known and 'admissible':—

TEXT (2070).

"The Cognition of the form of the Apprehended (object) is spoken of as 'connected with external space', and as appearing without the Cognition of the Apprehender (Cognition)."—(2070)

COMMENTARY.

"As a matter of fact, 'the External Object is directly perceived as having a shape and as connected with external space'—as asserted by Shabara, the author of the Bhāṣya (on Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra 1. 1. 5),—where it has
been explained that there is Cognition of the Apprehended Object, even when there is no Cognition of the Apprehending Cognition. Hence the Reason 'Because it is not apprehended on the apprehension of the other' becomes established and hence 'admissible'.'—(2070)

Question:—How are the second and subsequent Reasons (urged under Texts 2065 et. seq.) proved and admissible?

Answer:—

TEXTS (2071–2073).

"As a matter of fact, people have such notions as 'I do not remember if any object was apprehended by me at the time', which shows that they remember the appearance of the Apprehending Cognition, without any idea of the Apprehended Object. If the two were non-different, there would be remembrance of the Apprehended Object also, when there is Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition;—as a matter of fact however, there is idea of the Apprehending Cognition only. Thus the difference between the two becomes proved by positive and negative concomitance.—Thus all these Reasons become established as residing in the Minor Term.'"—[Shlokavārtika-Shānyavāda, 83–85].—(2071–2073)

COMMENTARY.

The Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition is found to appear even without the remembrance of the Apprehended Object;—if there were absolute non-difference between the two, then there would be remembrance of the Apprehended Object also,—just as there is, of the Apprehending Cognition;—hence as they do not share the same fate, the Apprehended Object and the Apprehending Cognition must be different from one another.

It might be urged that—'there is remembrance of the Apprehended Object also'.—The answer to that is—'As a matter of fact, however, etc. etc.'

'Tatra'—At the time that there is Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition.—'Eṣa eva',—i.e. the Apprehending Cognition alone,—not the Apprehended Object. The particle 'eva' is misplaced.

'By positive and negative concomitance'—as between the presence and absence of the Remembrances of the Apprehended Object and the Apprehending Cognition; as there is absence of the Remembrance of the Apprehended Object even when there is presence of the Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition.—(2071–2073)

The above arguments (of Kumārila) are answered in the following:—
TEXT (2074).

As a matter of fact, there can be no apprehension of the object for one who has no apprehension of the cognition; hence there can be no apprehension of the apprehended object without the apprehension of the cognition.—(2074)

COMMENTARY.

The following Text points out the 'Inconclusive' character of the Reason adduced (by Kumārīla, under Text 2070, above) that—'the Object is clearly perceived as connected with outside space':—

TEXT (2075).

The yellow colour is also clearly perceived by people with diseased eyes; and yet it is not apprehended as something differentiated from the element of the apprehending cognition. It should be the same in the other case also.—(2075)

COMMENTARY.

There should be a stop at 'nīskṛṣṭam'.

'Also';—i.e. just as the real 'yellow' is clearly perceived as connected with outside space, so also is the 'yellow' clearly perceived by the man with the jaundiced eyes.

Question:—"What if it is so perceived?"

Answer:—'And yet it is, etc. etc.'—There should be a stop after 'samvedyam na'; and 'nīskṛṣṭam' has to be construed here; and after 'na', 'bhavati' is to be understood.—Thus the meaning comes to be this:—The yellow that is perceived by the man with the diseased eyes does not become apprehended separately, differentiated from the apprehending factor; and yet it is perceived as 'connected with outside space'. Hence the Reason in question is 'Inconclusive'.

'It should be the same, etc. etc.'—i.e. also in the case of the real 'yellow'.—What is meant to be shown by this is that the two cases stand on the same footing only so far as 'being clearly perceived' is concerned.—(2075)

The following Text supplies the answer to the argument urged (by Kumārīla, under 2071, above) that—"People have the notion 'I do not remember, etc. etc.'":—
THE REMEMBRANCE THAT HAS BEEN CITED CERTAINLY APPERTAINS TO THE APPREHENDED OBJECT;—ONLY ITS SPECIAL FEATURES ARE NOT CLEARLY REMEMBERED. THE REMEMBRANCE DOES NOT PERTAIN TO ANYTHING AS DISTINCT FROM EVERYTHING ELSE; BECAUSE REPEATED EXPERIENCE AND OTHER CONDITIONS CANNOT BE THERE.—(2076)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant to be asserted here is the fact that it cannot be 'admitted' that "there is no Remembrance of the Apprehended Object when there is Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition".

The following might be urged:—"If the Remembrance pertains to the Apprehended Object, then why should its special features not be remembered, —when as a matter of fact, one would naturally remember the object as differentiated from all other like and unlike things, exactly as it has been apprehended. Otherwise if it did not apprehend its 'difference' from other things, how could it appertain to it? There would certainly be incongruities".

The answer to this is—'The Remembrance does not pertain, etc. etc.'—What is meant is as follows:—Conception has not the capacity to apprehend things exactly as they exist,—because it does not envisage a real entity; what happens is that, when there has been apprehension of a certain thing, —the subsequent Remembrance that appears appertains to only that aspect of the thing with reference to which there happen to be such predisposing causes as the man's being in need of the thing concerned and so forth; so that the Remembrance itself is always devoid of the object-element. What happens in reality is that it really manifests itself alone, and by imposing the objective character upon what is purely subjective, all Remembrance becomes wrong (false); and when a certain Remembrance is relegated to a certain Object, it is only because of the conception, not because there is any real connection between the two. It is not true that the conception of the Apprehended Object is present in Remembrance; and it appears in a form in which the special features of the Object are not conceived, because the varying grades of contact and repeated experience that would be necessary for such conception of the special features are absent. It is on this account (of the vague conception of the Object) that one Remembrance is distinguished from another.—(2076)

Question:—"How do you know that there is idea of the Apprehended Object involved in the Remembrance?"

Answer:—
TEXTS (2077-2078).

If it were not so, then there could be no Remembrance in the form 'some object had been apprehended'; for Remembrance is never cognised as a piece of pure Rock-crystal.—The two last Reasons (cited by Kumārila) also are clearly 'Inconclusive', in view of such Cognitions as that of the 'Yellow Conch-shell'.—This is the way to deal with the other Reasons also.—(2077-2078)

COMMENTARY.

If the Remembrance did not envisage the Object even in the vague undifferentiated form, then it could not appear even in the vague general form that 'Some object had been apprehended'. Nor is even a Cognition remembered in the form of the pure Rock-crystal, without the imprint of the form of the Object apprehended (and remembered)—by virtue of which it could be asserted that "They remember the appearance of the Apprehending Cognition devoid of the form of the Apprehended Object" as has been asserted by [Kumārila, under Text 2071, above].

Thus it cannot be admitted that "there is no Remembrance of the Object when the Cognition is remembered ".

As regards the last two Reasons put forward (by Kumārila in Texts 2067 and in 2068)—"Because it proceeds from Cognition" (2067) and "Because it is Cognition" (2068),—these are 'Falsified' (Inconclusive) by such instances as the following:—The Cognition of the Yellow Conch-shell, though 'proceeding from Cognition', does apprehend its own subjective factor in the shape of yellow;—and also while being 'Cognition', it brings about the Cognition of the yellow which is part of the Cognition; and so could other Cognitions also do. Hence the two Reasons are 'Inconclusive'.—As regards the Cognition of the 'Yellow Conch-shell', it has been already proved that it is devoid of objective basis; hence what the Cognition of the 'Yellow Conch-shell' apprehends is only that form of Yellow which exists in the Cognition alone (as a subjective factor); and to that extent it proves the fact of Cognition being self-cognised.

'This is the way, etc. etc.'—'With the other Reasons',—that is, other Reasons that the other party has adduced in proof of the existence of the External Thing.

It has been asked by the other party—"What sort of one-ness (of the two) is sought to be proved? Is it meant to be on the ground that there is no such thing as appears in the form of Blue, etc., nor any form of Cognition, such as is met with in experience? How can any such idea be entertained? As if it were so, this would mean a negation of all things ".

The answer to this is as follows:—There would not be negation of all things. Because all that is non-existent by its very nature is the apprehensible thing, like Earth, etc., apart from the Cognition itself. As for
'another Chain', that does not exist as something apprehensible, and hence it is devoid of the apprehensible form. And as for the fact of the Cognition being the Active Agent in relation to it,—on the basis of the idea that the Cognition also cognises,—that active agency also is not there; and hence that too is devoid of the 'apprehensible form';—not so the 'active agency' in relation to the Specific Individuality of the Cognition itself; as everything cannot be brought about by everything.—This has been thus described—'When the Blue, Yellow and the like appear in Cognition as something external,—there does not, in reality, exist anything cognisable, outside; hence the idea of the Cognition being the active agent in relation to that is not true; hence what appears as Cognition is the only one reality, without a second.'—Under this understanding, the following text of the Prajñā-pāramitā also becomes comprehensible:—'Cognition is devoid of the nature of Cognition, in the sense that it is devoid of any definite characteristics.'—(2077-2078)

Having set forth the original formal argument above (in the Commentary introducing Text 1965 on p. 550, Line 13) in the words—'Every Cognition is devoid of both, apprehended and apprehender, because it is Cognition,—like the Cognition of the Reflection';—and having so far established the invariable concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum in this reasoning, the Author sums up the whole position in the following:

**TEXT (2079).**

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COGNITION UNDER DISPUTE MUST BE WITHOUT A SECOND,—BEING DEVOID OF OBJECTIVE AND THE ACTIVE AGENT,—BECAUSE IT IS COGNITION,—LIKE THE REFLECTION.—(2079)

**COMMENTARY.**

What is meant by the epithet 'under dispute' is that the subject of the Reasoning is the Cognition of persons with healthy eyes, etc.,—not all Cognitions;—while what is put forward as the Probans—'because it is Cognition',—is Cognition in general; thus it is that the Probans is not part of the Proposition. 'Being devoid of Objective and Active Agent' qualifies 'without a second'; that is, what is meant by its being 'without a second' is that it is 'without Objective and Active Agent'; and not that no 'second' exists at all.

'Like the Reflection'—The Object being spoken of as the Cognition, the term 'Reflection' stands for the Cognition of the Reflection.—Or the 'Vati' affix, in 'pratibimbavat' may be taken as coming after the Locative ending; then, as the Receptacle (denoted by the Locative), the Cognition itself becomes indicated.

The Probans cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible'; because what is put forward is that character of the Cognition which consists in the 'exclusion of other things',—and not the very nature of 'Cognition'.
Nor is the Probans 'Contradictory'; because it is present wherever the Probandum is known to be present.—(2079)

Another party urges the fact of the Corroborative Instance ('Reflection') being devoid of the Probandum:

TEXT (2080).

"In the case of Reflection also, the Cognition is regarded as having an objective basis; as it is found that on the visual rays being turned back, one's own face is seen as it is in the Reflection."—(2080)

COMMENTARY.

"The light-rays, issuing from the eyes and falling upon the surface of the Mirror, become turned back and thus become connected with one's own face, and then they bring about the cognition of the face. Thus it is the face itself that is seen as within the Mirror. So that it becomes established that the Cognition of the Reflection is not 'devoid of the Apprehender and the Apprehended'".—(2080)

The answer to the above is provided in the following:

TEXT (2081).

It is not his own face that one sees in the mirror,—because it is seen in front of one's self, and because what is seen is different in size, position, etc. (from one's face),—like any other object.—(2081)

COMMENTARY.

It is not his own face that one sees in the mirror,—because the face seen there stands before one's self;—also because what is seen has a position, size, complexion and other details different from the face. —'Like any other object' ;—i.e. like such things as sound and the like.

What is meant is as follows:—If the Cognition were the Apprehender of the face, then it should have apprehended it exactly as the face itself actually stands; because it cannot be right for the Apprehender of one form to apprehend a thing of another form. If this were possible, then there would be incongruities. As a matter of fact, when a man facing the South looks at the mirror, what he perceives in the mirror is the face facing the North; similarly, if the mirror is a small one, the face that he sees in the reflection is smaller than his own face; and it is also perceived as touching the mirror's surface and lying far beneath it. In reality however, the mirror's surface is not of that size, nor is it really in contact with the real face. Similarly when a man is standing on the bank of a lake of clear water, and looks at
the water-surface, he perceives the reflections of the trees standing on the brink of the water, with their tops pointing downwards; and yet they are not really in that condition.—From all this we conclude that the Cognition of the Reflection does not apprehend the man's own face,—because what it envisages is something different from the face,—like the Cognition of sound.—(2081)

Bhadanta-Shubhagupta argues as follows:—"For the proving of the Cognition being the only entity, the character of being Cognition has been adduced as the Reason; but it is not incompatible with the contrary; hence all that is said is nugatory".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2082–2084).

'Being Cognition' is 'luminousness'; and that can have no place in the 'apprehended object';—because it has no connection with the characters of 'not envisaging a form' and the rest;—hence its invariable concomitance has been duly ascertained.—(2082)

COMMENTARY.

The requisite invariable concomitance has already been established under Text 1999 above—'Not envisaging a form, or envisaging a form or envisaging something else, the Cognition cannot apprehend any external thing'. Consequently, the Reason put forward here cannot be regarded as 'inconclusive'.

The Revered Teacher Dinnäga, for the purpose of determining the 'basic cause', has declared as follows:—"When that which is cognisable only in the internal (subjective) form appears as if it were external, that object must be regarded as existing in the form of the Cognition, and also as forming its basic cause'.—This serves to determine the objective element in that aspect of the Cognition which is apprehended.

The same Teacher has said again—'Or, it may be that by transferring the potency, the apprehension of the Object, in due course, brings about, for the bringing about of an effect similar to itself, a potency in the Cognition; so there is no incompatibility'.—This establishes the fact that the said Apprehension (of the Object) transfers to the immediately subsequent Cognition, the potency tending to produce an effect similar to itself, and thus becomes the cause.—(2082)

In connection with this, the same Bhadanta (Shubhagupta) argues as follows:—"Though the apprehended element may be the instrument of Sense-cognition, yet, inasmuch as that cannot figure in the Cognition itself, it could not be the object of the Sense-cognition".

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXTS (2083-2084).

The subsistence of the object in the Apprehended Aspect of the Potency of the immediately following Cognition is not regarded by us to be real. That is why the idea is supported.—The fact of the Cognition being the only entity has been clearly established by clever writers. We also have trodden the same path for the ascertainment of Truth.—

(2083-2084)

COMMENTARY.

' Shaktau anantarē jñānē' ;—the two Locative endings are not to be taken in co-ordination.

'Immediately following Cognition' ,—in the form of the 'Ālayaviññāna' (Recumbent Cognition).

'Potency',—of forming the basic cause of the said idea of the object.

'Is not held to be real' ;—because it is not possible for anything apart from Atoms, etc. to be the objective basis,—as has been established in detail. This has also been asserted by the Revered Teacher, in the following words:—

'The absolute denial of the objective basis may involve incompatibility with a fact of direct experience; and there may be incompatibility with the doctrine enunciated in the Sūtra'—'There are four kinds of causal factors—basic, dominant, immediate antecedent and causal link' ;—in order to show that there is no incompatibility, it has been explained what sort of Basic Cause is meant in this Sūtra and also in ordinary experience. But all this has been done on the plane of 'Illusion', not of Reality; as in reality all Cognitions are entirely devoid of objective basis.

End of Chapter on the External World.
CHAPTER XXIV.

"The Revealed Word."

COMMENTARY.

In the Introductory verses the 'Intervolved Wheel of Causation' has been described as 'not dependent upon any self-sufficient Revelation'; the Author sets forth arguments in support of this:—

TEXT (2085).

Other people, with intellect obscured by ignorance, have asserted as follows:—"It is not right that all this is mere Idea (or Cognition); because this is set aside by the Revealed Word".—(2085)

COMMENTARY.

'Other people'—the followers of Jaimini.

These people argue as follows:—"Injunction alone is the basis for determining Dharma (what one should do) and Adharma (what one should not do), the only light available for all beings, being like the common 'Eye' of all. It must be accepted as authoritative and reliable by all intelligent men seeking to know their Duty (Dharma); not so other words composed by human beings. Because the ordinary human being has his mind beset with Ignorance, Attachment and the rest; hence his word is not capable of affording the right knowledge of supersensuous things; it is for this reason that 'Duty' and such other matters cannot be learnt from the words of such persons.—Nor is Duty amenable to the Sense-perception of people of limited vision; because it is beyond the reach of the Senses and hence absolutely imperceptible.

"For instance Dharma (Duty) and Adharma (its contrary) are characterised by capacity to bring about what is good and what is evil (respectively); as has been asserted in Shabara's Bhaṣya—'That alone is spoken of as Dharma which brings about the good (or welfare) of man;—how do you know that?—when a man performs a sacrifice, people call him dhārmika, firm in the performance of his duty; and it is only when one does something that he is called after it; e.g. the man who does the cooking is called the Cook, and one who does the chopping is called the Chopper; in the same way that is spoken of by the name Dharma which brings man into contact with the highest good'.

"What thus becomes explained is that Dharma is the capacity of Substance, etc. to bring about what is good. For instance, Substance, Quality
and Action are spoken of as particular means of accomplishing the Good; and it is shown that the name 'Dharma' is applicable to these. These, Substance and the rest, are perceptible, in their own forms,—but not as the means of accomplishing the good; and it is in this latter form that they are held to be 'dharma', not merely in their own forms. This has been thus asserted—'The Good consists in the happiness of the man, and this happiness is brought about by Substance, Quality and Action as indicated in the Injunction; hence it is to these that the character of Dharma belongs; even though these, by themselves, are within the reach of the Senses, yet it is not in that form that they are Dharma. The fact of these being the means of accomplishing the good is learnt from the Veda; and it is in this form that these are Dharma; hence Dharma is not amenable to the Senses'. [Vide Shlokavārtika, St. 2, 191, and 13-14.]—'In that form', as being the means of bringing about the Good.—Thus it is established that Dharma is a capacity or Potency.

"From this it is also clearly understood, by implication, that Aadharm also, as contrary to Dharma, is a Potency or capacity to bring about what is not-Good.

"This capacity or Potency a man with limited powers of vision cannot perceive directly by the Senses; because capacity is always inferred from its effects; as has been declared in the passage—'The Potencies of all things are always proved by Presumption from these effects'.—(Shlokavārtika, St. 2, 200.)—If it were not so, then the character of 'having limited powers of vision' would disappear.—Nor can the Perception of mysteries apprehend supersensuous things,—simply because they are Perception,—like any other Perception.

"Nor can Inference be of use in knowing what is Dharma; because Inference can envisage only such a thing as has had its relation with something else already known; and Dharma is not such a thing.

"Nor can Analogy bring about the knowledge of Dharma; because Analogy consists in similitude and brings about the cognition of a thing not before the Eyes; e.g. the seeing of the Gavaya brings about the remembrance of the Cow; and there can be nothing which is known to be similar to Dharma,—which similarity could bring about the cognition of this Dharma.

"Nor is Presumption capable of bringing about the knowledge of Dharma and Adharma. Because Presumption consists in the assuming of something not perceived, on the ground that something else, which has been perceived or heard of, would not be possible or explicable without the said assumption. Dharma is not something without which something else would not be explicable or possible,—whereupon its Presumption could be based.

"Non-apprehension also, which consists in the absence of all Means of Cognition, serves to bring about the idea of this is not, and not any positive idea.

"Thus then, Dharma and Adharma would fall within the jaws of this Non-apprehension and would be swallowed by it, if the Vedic Injunction were not there to save them. Hence Dharma must be regarded as 'that which is indicated by the Injunctive Word as conducive to welfare',—and it cannot be anything that is indicated by the Senses or other Means of Cognition.
As a matter of fact, it is the Injunction that is capable of providing knowledge of what is past, present or future,—also what is subtle or hidden or remote and such like; this cannot be done by any Sense-organ.—(Shabarahbāṣya 1. 1. 2.) For these reasons the Injunction must be regarded as authoritative and reliable.

The name 'Injunction' is applied to words that urge to activity or to avoidance of activity, e.g. the words 'Desiring Heaven, she should perform the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice' urge one to activity; and the words 'One should not injure living beings' urge one to desist from activity.

For you (Buddhists) the only means of establishing the authoritative and reliable character of the Injunction consists in mere Ideation with the 'Three Principles';—such is the meaning of your definite pronunciation (Proposition).—And this view is not correct.—Why?—Because it is set aside by the Revealed Word;—that is, it is negatived by the Veda, which has spoken of Āgniḥotra and other things which are quite distinct from 'Cognition' (Idea); in fact, the Veda itself stands apart from 'Idea'.

The mention of 'mere Ideation' is only by way of illustration. There are other propositions of the Buddhist which are set aside by the Veda, such as 'All things are momentary', 'There is no Soul', 'There has been an Omniscient Person', 'There should be freedom from attachment' and so forth. All these words express ideas that are contrary to what is said in the Veda.'—(2085)

It might be urged against the above Mīmāṁsaka view that all this would be set aside by the Veda only if its authoritative character were established.—Hence the Mīmāṁsaka adds the following:—

TEXT (2086).

'The said Revealed Word is authoritative for all, because it is not the work of a human being; because it is only words emanating from human beings that are found to be false.'—(2086)

COMMENTARY.

True Knowledge is what is called 'Pramāṇa,' 'Right Cognition'; and being the source of right knowledge, the Veda also is called 'Pramāṇa', 'means of Right Knowledge', 'reliable', 'authoritative'.

Why?

Because it is not the work of a human being;—i.e. it has not proceeded from human source. What is meant by this is that the 'authoritative' or 'reliable' character of the Veda is due to the fact that there is no possibility of the presence of Love, Hate and such defects which would render it wrong or unreliable.—The argument may be formulated as follows:—That which is free from the contact of such defects as render the Word false and unreliable must be the source of right knowledge,—e.g. the Eye not affected by any
disorder;—the Veda, not being the work of a human being, is free from the contact of Love, Hatred and such other causes of falsity;—hence this is a Reason (for Reliability) based upon the nature of the thing concerned.

By putting forward a Corroborating Instance *per dissimilarity*, the Arguer indicates the absence of 'Inconclusiveness' in his Reason—'It is only words, etc. etc.'—What is shown by this is that the *absence of the Probandum* is invariably concomitant with the *absence of the Probans*. As a matter of fact, Defects (in the source of knowledge) are the cause of *falsity*; and wherever these Defects are present, there alone they bring about their Effect in the shape of *falsity*,—not anywhere else; and that is so because when the Cause is not there, the Effect cannot be there; even if the Effect were there it would have to be regarded as *without cause*; and what would come about without the cause would not be regarded as the effect of that cause; as that would lead to absurdity. Thus, the impossibility of the relation of Cause and Effect between Defects and Falsity,—and the contingency of falsity being without cause,—constitute the 'Reason' setting aside any conclusion contrary to the one set forth above. Hence the Reason cannot be regarded as 'Inconclusive'.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—Where the Cause of a thing does not exist, the Effect cannot appear,—e.g. Smoke does not appear in water, where its cause, Fire, is absent;—in the case of the *Veda*, the Cause of falsity in the shape of the presence of Love, Hate, etc. is not present;—hence its Effect, Falsity cannot be there.—(2086)

In the following text, the *Mīmāṃsaka* shows that his Reason is not open to the charge of being 'Inadmissible':—

**TEXT (2087).**

"IN THE CASE OF THE ASSERTION OF HUMAN BEINGS, IT IS ALWAYS OPEN TO DOUBT WHETHER OR NOT THERE ARE DEFECTS (IN THE SPEAKER);

IN THE CASE OF THE Revealed WORD, HOWEVER, AS THERE IS NO speaker, WE CAN HAVE NO SUSPICION OF THERE BEING ANY DEFECTS."

—(2087)

**COMMENTARY.**

As a matter of fact, Defects reside in human beings only,—as they are their property; how then could they be there where their substratum is absent? If they could be there, they would be there without a substratum (baseless); in fact it is the very nature of the subsistent thing that it should follow in the wake of its substratum;—and Man—the doer, the compiler,
the speaker—is the substratum of Defects; and any such author is not there in the case of the Veda; whence then could there be any suspicion of there being Defects?

This same argument has set aside also the charge of the Reason being 'doubtful'—hence inadmissible.'—(2087)

The following might be urged against the Mīmāṃsaka—How is it known that there is no 'doer', 'author' (in the case of the Veda), who would be the substratum of Defects?

In view of this, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to establish the fact of there being no Author of the Veda, by showing that no such Author can be cognised by any of the five Means of Cognition:—

TEXTS (2088–2095).

"(a) An author of the Veda is not perceived;—it could only be assumed that such a one existed in the past [but such an assumption can have no basis].—(b) When any relationship (of concomitance) of such an author has never been perceived before, any inference that could be made regarding him must be based only upon present ignorance; hence if such author is assumed (by the other party) it cannot be through inference.—(c) As regards Verbal Authority (Scripture), that also cannot point to an Author of the Veda; because no other scripture is without an author; and hence any other scripture which is the work of an author, being itself unreliable, could not provide a reliable notion of the Author of the Veda. As regards the words of Manu and others, their reliability rests upon the Veda itself. As for any other writer who has no connection with the Veda and is hostile towards it,—how can such a one be truthful on this point? Hence for us, there is no scripture compiled even by others which can declare an author of the Veda.—(d) In case someone were visible now who is similar to the author of the Veda, then alone, on the basis of that Analogy, there might be an analogical Cognition of such an author.—(e) If there were something vouched for by the means of Right Cognition which would be inexplicable if there were no author of the Veda,—then alone, such an Author of the Veda might be accepted on the basis of Presumption; as a matter of fact however, there is nothing in the Veda which could not be possible without such an Author;—on the contrary, if there were an Author, there is much, in the shape of its Reliability and
SO FORTH, WHICH COULD NOT BE DULY COGNISED.—THUS THEN, BEING NOT AMENABLE TO THE SAID FIVE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE, THE AUTHOR IN QUESTION BECOMES AMENABLE ONLY TO THE SIXTH, 
NEGATION (NON-APPREHENSION) : CONSEQUENTLY, HE IS ONE WHOSE EXISTENCE IS IMPOSSIBLE,—AS IT IS PRECLUSED BY NEGATION, WHICH IS THE ONLY MEANS OF COGNITION (APPLICABLE TO HIM).”
(2088–2095)

COMMENTARY.

“(a) The Author of the Veda cannot be known by means of Sense-perception; because it can never be pointed out that ‘Here is the Author of the Veda’, simply because he is not seen at the present moment. It might be assumed that ‘there was an Author’; and as no such person has ever been seen, the assumption can only be that ‘he existed at some time’; and this idea would not be reliable,—this is what is meant and has to be added.

“(b) Nor can the Author be known by means of Inference; this is what is said by the words—‘Adhyatamatra, etc. etc.’;—the detractors of the Veda premise a relationship, in the shape of cause and effect, between the Veda and the Author who has never been seen before; and such a premiss can be based only on Ignorance, as there can be no valid means of Cognition indicating any such relationship; no one can ever be able to apprehend a relationship between Smoke and the Fire that has never been seen. Hence, if such an Author is assumed, such an assumption cannot be supported by Inference.—The particle ‘api’ implies that it is without the support, not of Sense-perception only, but also of Inference.

“(c) The words ‘āgamopī, etc. etc.’ point out that the Author cannot be known by means of Verbal Authority (or Revelation, Scripture). Because, as there is no scripture other than the Veda which is itself without an author, the required scripture cannot be one which is without an author; nor can it be one that has an author; because such a scripture would itself be unreliable. Because, when the scripture would be the work of an author,—it could be the work of (1) Manu and other writers related to the Veda, or of (2) the Sādhyas and Muniś not related to the Veda.—As regards the first alternative,—it is said—‘as regards the words of Manu and others, etc. etc.’:—‘Tatkṛtā’—due to the Veda;—this means that these works are not self-sufficient in their authority.—The objection to the second alternative is next stated—‘Asambaddhastu, etc. etc.’—‘who has no connection’—with the Veda; because such persons are not entitled to the study of the Veda. ‘Any other writer’—i.e. the work of a person who has no connection with the Veda.—‘Vedākāraṇam’,—i.e. speaking of the Author of the Veda.

(d) Pramitam—vouched for by the six Means of Right Cognition.—‘Tena vinā’—without an Author.—‘Kiṁcit’—anything vouched for by the Means of Right Cognition.—‘Aśmin’—Author.

In the word ‘pramāṇāyātī’, ‘reliability and so forth’,—‘so forth’ is meant to include Dharma and such notions.

‘Abhāvāṇa’;—it is only by the sixth Means of Cognition, Negation, that it can be known that a certain thing does not exist; as it is that alone
that envisages negation.—Or it may mean that such an Author is cognised in the form of negation—i.e. as non-existent; because there is no means of knowing him.

' Pramāṇābhāvabādhānāt' ;—' abhāva ', cessation of the Means of Cognition; i.e. Negation as the Means of Cognition;—by this Negation, the idea of the Author is precluded. Hence it is established that there can be no Author of the Veda.—(2088–2095)

The following argument might be urged (against the Mimamsaka):—If you prove the fact of the Veda not being the work of an Author, and then, on that basis, prove its authoritative (reliable) character,—then, lo! the authority of the Veda rests upon something other than itself; as the authority of the Veda cannot become recognised until the fact of its not being the work of an author is recognised.

The Mimāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2096).

"As a matter of fact, the idea of the Veda not being the work of an Author is emphasised only for the purpose of showing that there can be no cause for unreliaibility; and as such an idea (being negative) is a non-entity, it cannot be proved by means of proofs."—(2096)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this is as follows:—We are not proving the Reliability (Authority) as a positive fact, which is not recognised; all that we are doing is to reject the unreliaibility (of the Veda) which has been urged by our Opponent; and when this charge has been set aside, the original positive proposition remains fully recognised by itself.—As a matter of fact, even the idea of the Veda not being the work of an Author is not being sought to be proved by us; because, if it were proved, the implication would be that the reliability of the Veda rests upon something else. The fact of the matter is that the said idea consists in the mere negation of the fact of the Veda being the work of an Author, and as such, it is a non-entity (which cannot be proved).—(2096)

Question:—If it is not proved (by you), how does it become proved by itself?

Answer (from the Mimāṃsaka):—
TEXT (2097).

"When the Logician asserts the fact of the Veda being the work of an Author, the refutation of that fact proves the fact of the Veda not being the work of an Author."—(2097)

COMMENTARY.

*Question*: Even on the refutation of the Opponent's view, if the upholder of the Veda does not actually prove his own view, how could the latter be accepted and the upholders of the Veda become satisfied? This question is further expounded:

TEXT (2098).

*When there are two positive views regarding a question—e.g. 'Primordial Matter' and 'Atom' as the cause of the world,—if one is not proved, the other does not become proved by itself.*—(2098)

COMMENTARY.

The following Text explains the term 'Primordial Matter and Atom':

TEXT (2099).

*Even after refuting the fact of Primordial Matter being the cause of the world, the idea of the Atom being the cause of the world has got to be proved by other Reasons.*—(2099)

COMMENTARY.

Even though the *Vaiśeṣika* has (successfully) refuted the *Sāṅkhya* view that the World is a product of Primordial Matter,—yet he has got to prove, by means of other Reasons, the fact of the world being the product of Atoms;—similarly in the case in question (it is necessary for the *Mīmāṁsaka* to adduce reasons in proof of his view).—(2099)

The answer to the above (from the *Mīmāṁsaka*) is as follows:
TEXTS (2100-2101).

"When a proof is adduced in support of the affirmative view,—if that is refuted, the negative view (to the contrary) becomes rightly proved by itself. Thus it is that, when the other party adduce proofs in support of the two ends of the Veda, the Upholders of the Veda have their purpose accomplished by the refutation of those proofs."—(2100-2101)

COMMENTARY.

'Affirmative view'—that the Veda is the work of an Author; and the denial of that is the 'Negative view'. These two views are so related that the truth of the one involves the falsity of the other and vice versa;—hence the denial of one is concomitant with the affirmation of the other; so that the Negative view becomes proved by itself. For instance, for the purpose of proving the 'two ends'—beginning and end—of the Veda, the Buddhists adduce certain proofs,—the mere refutation of these proofs proves the contrary view that the Veda has no beginning or end, and as such, is not the work of an Author; and when this has become proved, the Upholders of the Veda become satisfied on the accomplishment of what is desired by them.—(2100-2101)

Objection:—Even when the said proofs have been refuted, it is necessary to put forth a further effort to prove the positive fact of the Veda being eternal; under the circumstances, how can the Upholders of the Veda be satisfied, until they have actually proved the Eternality of the Veda?

The answer to this (from the Mimāmsaka) is as follows:—

TEXT (2102).

"As regards the positive fact of the Eternality of the Veda, it becomes established for us on the rejection of the 'two ends' (of the Veda),—even though we do not adduce proofs in support of the said Eternality."—(2102)

COMMENTARY.

'The two ends'—i.e. the proof adduced in proof of the idea of the Veda having a beginning and end.—(2102)

How the rejection of the 'two ends' automatically proves Eternality is explained in the following:—
"The 'first end' of the Veda consists in the idea of its being the work of an Author,—and the 'other end' consists in its being destroyed; and the negation of these (two ends) means 'Eternality'".—(2103)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, 'Eternality' and 'Having the two ends' are mutually exclusive,—one involving the negation of the other; and between two mutually exclusive ideas, the absence of one is always concomitant with the presence of the other; as has been already pointed out.—(2103)

The other party urges—if the 'negation of the two ends' constitutes Eternality, then it comes to this that Eternality is not a positive quality of things.

The answer to this (from the Māṇḍava) is as follows:—

TEXTS (2104-2105).

"The eternity of the Veda consists in the fact that it is not produced in the beginning and does not perish in the end.—If it be urged that 'even so, this eternity is something cognisable',—then [the answer is that] eternity is what is meant by the two characters of 'being not produced' and 'being not destroyed'; and both these being of the nature of negation do not require any proof for themselves."—(2104–2105)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this is that eternity forms part of the very nature of the Veda, which is an entity.

'If it be urged, etc. etc.'—This anticipates the following objection from the Opponent—if it is as stated, then Eternality is an entity and as such it is something that has to be cognised by a Means of Cognition, to be proved.

The answer to this is—'What is meant, etc. etc.'

'Both these'—i.e. the characters of not being produced and not being destroyed.

Proof for themselves'—i.e. any means of cognising their own forms. What is meant is that there need be nothing incongruous in negation being an entity; so that even though Eternality consists in the two characters of 'not being produced' and 'not being destroyed', it need not be a non-entity.—(2104-2105)

"Having thus shown that the five Means of Right Cognition are not effective in the matter, it is regarded as proved that there is no Author of the
Veda; and consequently there can be no 'inadmissibility' in the Reason adduced by the Mīmāṃsaka—that because the Veda is free from the contact of defects that bring about falsity'.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as 'Contradictory'; because it is present wherever the Probandum is present; and being not present where the Probandum is not present, it cannot be regarded as 'Inconclusive.' Thus it becomes established that the Veda is authoritative and reliable.

Now the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out in detail the defects in the two arguments put forward by his Opponent in support of the view that the Veda is not authoritative and reliable.

These two arguments are as follows:—(A) What is perceptible by the senses, and (B) what is produced by effort, must be non-eternal,—e.g. the Jar;—and Sound is both (perceptible and produced by effort); these are Reasons based upon the nature of things, which prove the non-eternity of sound in general; and this being proved, the non-eternity of the Veda necessarily follows; and from this it also follows, by implication, that like the assertions of human beings, the words of the Veda also may be false.—Such is the sense of what is argued by the Buddhists and others.

Against these arguments, the Mīmāṃsaka sets forth in detail the argument that the proposition of the Opponent is annulled by the Verbal and other Means of Right Cognition.

First of all, the following Text shows that the Proposition that the Vedic Words are false is annulled by Verbal Cognition itself:—

**TEXT (2106).**

"ONE WHO ASSERTS THE FALSIETY OF THE VEDIC WORDS ON THE BASIS OF INFERENCE, HAS HIS PROPOSITION ANNULLED BY THE FORCE OF THE COGNITION DERIVED FROM THE VEDA."—(2106)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Vaidika' is derived from the Veda; i.e. such cognitions or notions as Heaven follows from the performance of the Agnihotra;'—by the force of such notions, his Proposition becomes annulled, as it is set aside by it. This has been thus asserted—"As a matter of fact, the notion derived from the Injunction is not of a doubtful character,—in any such form as 'this may or may not be so'; nor at any other time or place, or in any other circumstances, or in any other person, does there appear any notion to the contrary, that 'it is false'. As regards the idea that—'the notion derived from the Vedic Injunction must be false because we have found another statement made in the Veda to be false',—this is only an Inference, and as such, becomes sublated by the aforesaid direct cognition to the contrary."
*(Shabara-bhāṣya-Translation, page 18.)*—(2106)

Says the other party:—The two—Verbal Cognition and Inference—being of equal strength (validity), how can one be annulled by the other? If even
when they are of equal strength, there can be sublation, then why should not the Inference sublate the Verbal Cognition?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2107).

"**The knowledge derived from the Veda is of the same degree as Perception, and hence stronger than Inference; consequently, it can never be annulled by Inference.**"—(2107)

COMMENTARY.

*Question* :—How then is Inference annulled by the Verbal Cognition (derived from the Veda)?

*Answer* :—

TEXT (2108).

"**Inasmuch as the Veda has been placed in the same position as Perception, it is stronger than, and hence sets aside, Inference.**"—(2108)

COMMENTARY.

This has been thus declared—"The cognition derived from the words of the Veda is Perception, and Inference contrary to Perception cannot be valid".—(2108)

*Question* :—In what way is Verbal Cognition (derived from the Veda) stronger than Inference,—by virtue of which it is regarded as equal to Perception?

*Answer* :—

TEXTS (2109-2110).

"**There is a degree of simplicity in the validity of Verbal Cognition—due to the fact of its not needing a Corroborative Instance, and to the absence of defects,—which is not found in Inference. Consequently, whenever there should be any doubt between Verbal Cognition and Inference, it is Verbal Cognition that should be regarded as stronger, and the matter determined accordingly.**"

—(2109-2110).

COMMENTARY.

'Pramāṇāvē'—the Locative is to be construed with 'lāghavam'.

'Which is not found in Inference' ;—because it needs a Corroborative Instance and because defects are possible in it; the defect being that it is
annulled by Cognition derived from the *Veda* which is equal in authority to Perception.—(2109-2110)

The other party raises an objection—As a rule that alone is regarded as a 'Defect' in argument which is admitted by both parties; in the case in question, Revelation is not a means of valid Cognition, for the Buddhist, who posits only two Means of Cognition (Perception and Inference); then how can there be an 'annulment' of Inference by what is not accepted as a Means of Cognition,—so far as the Buddhist is concerned?

The answer to this (from the *Mīmāṃsaka*) is as follows:—

**TEXTS (2111-2116).**

"**While the Veda is clearly bringing about the cognition of things, the assertion that 'it is not a means of Cognition for me' should not be made by a truthful person, by reason of sheer malice. It cannot cease to be a Means of Cognition, on the ground that there is malice against it or because it is not popular; nor can anything become a Means of Cognition, on the ground that one likes it and it is popular. Even those who are hostile to the Veda do not assert any reason why it should not be a Means of Right Cognition;—by virtue of which they could be regarded as truthful people. When people, who have been intent upon the study, the retention and the exposition of the Veda and upon the performance of acts enjoined therein, have not been able to detect any grounds of falsity, how can they be detected by persons who have kept themselves aloof from it? It is only persons who are fully conversant with a thing and who have their purpose centred therein that can detect the good and bad points of that thing. Those evil-minded people on the other hand, who are hostile to Brahman and have been far removed from the Veda,—how can those people bare-facedly speak of the good and bad points in the Veda?"”

—(2111-2116).

**COMMENTARY.**

This is how the *Mīmāṃsaka* argues—"Things do not become established or otherwise merely according to one's whim; by virtue of which the mere assertion of the opinion would set aside the validity of Verbal Cognition; what is established by reason must be accepted by both parties; it has been explained that the conviction derived from the Vedic declarations regarding Agnihotra, etc. is exceptionally strong; how then can it be said that it is not a Means of Cognition? It is a mere assertion of yours, wholly devoid of reason".—Such in brief is what is meant by the *Mīmāṃsaka*.
'Because it is not popular'—People's agreement constitutes its popularity.

'Aloof from the Veda'—Śākya and others who keep away from the Veda; because they are excluded from its study, etc.

'Who have their purpose centred therein'—i.e. whose purpose—ends of life, in the shape of sacrifice, etc.—is centred—expounded—in the Veda.

'Hostile to Brahma'—i.e. Hostile to the Veda. Or 'Brahman' may be taken as standing for the knowledge derived from the Veda.—(2111–2116)

"Or, it may be that the Inference is not annulled by Verbal Cognition; even so, the Proposition of the Buddhist is defective; because it is annulled by Perception and other Means of Cognition".

This is the idea expounded in the following:—

TEXT (2117).

"Then again, the eternality and all-pervasiveness of the Word, is established by Auditory Recognition;—Who, then, could ever conceive of the contrary?"

COMMENTARY.

This shows annulment by Perception.

For instance, at all times, the Word is recognised by Perception as 'the same'; hence the eternality of the Word is proved by this Recognition which is called 'Perception'.—And being recognised as 'the same', in all places, Word is proved to be all-pervasive also.—Under the circumstances, who could conceive of the contrary—of the said eternality and all-pervasiveness?—No one. The 'contrary' of eternality and all-pervasiveness would be non-eternality and non-pervasiveness (respectively).—(2117)

The position is summed up in the following:—

TEXT (2118).

"From all this it follows that the fact of its remaining the same at all times and at all places is proved by Perceptonal Recognition; and this annuls it."—(2118)

COMMENTARY.

'At all times',—i.e. in the past, present and future.

'It'—the 'contrary' (spoken of in the preceding text).—(2118)
The following Texts anticipate and answer the objection that Recognition is not infallible (not always true)—

TEXTS (2119-2120).

"If it be urged that—'in the case of such things as the flame, it is found that though it exists for one moment only, yet there is Recognition',—the answer is that it is not so; what is recognised in these cases is the universal, and that is eternal, for us. In cases where there is notion of difference in regard to any aspect of the thing, on account of certain circumstantial conditions,—there is no Recognition, as is clear from the notion of difference.'—

(2119–2120).

COMMENTARY.

'Such things'—this includes the cases of Hair, nails and grass, etc.—which are cut and grow again,—as also that of water-falls; as in these cases also there is Recognition that these are the same Hairs and Nails, the same grasses, the water-fall, the same river-water and so forth.

This is not right. In all these case what is recognised is the Universal,—the commonality—such as 'Fire' (in the case of the Lamp) and so forth; and this Universal is held to be eternal; where then is there any falsity in our Premiss? The individual form of these things, which is evanescent, that certainly is not recognised (as being the same); where then is there any falsity in our Premiss?

'In regard to any aspect'—as in regard to the greater or less degree.

'On account of certain circumstantial conditions'—the lesser degree being due to going upward.

Question:—How do you know that there is no Recognition in such cases?

Answer:—'As is clear from the notion of difference',—it is deduced from the presence of the notion of difference that there is in such cases.—

(2119-2120)

The Mīmāṃsāka next proceeds to show how the Proposition of the Buddhist (regarding Veda being non-eternal) is annulled by Inferences:—
"(1) The notions of the individual *cow-word*, though diverse in points place, time, etc., must all envisage the same *cow-word*,—they do not envisage several words,—because they always appear in the form 'Cow',—like the notion of 'Cow' that appears at the present moment.—(2) The notion of the *cow-word* that appeared yesterday envisaged this same *cow-word*,—because it envisaged the *cow-word*,—like the notion appearing to-day.—(3) This notion envisages that *cow-word*,—for the same said reason,—like the previous notion.—

(4) Both notions envisage the same *cow-word*,—like the single notion.—(5) All notions of the 'Cow', divergent as regards place, time, etc., are brought about by the same *cow-word*,—because they are notions of the 'Cow',—like the single notion.—(6) The *cow-word* that was uttered yesterday must exist today also,—because it is envisaged by the cognition of the *cow-word*,—like the same word uttered today.—(7) The *cow-word* that is heard today was heard by me yesterday also; for the aforesaid reason,—like the word uttered yesterday.—(8) All such words as are expressive must be regarded as lasting a long time,—because they bring about the cognition of the cognisable thing through the apprehension of relationships,—everything that does this has been found to be permanent,—like the 'Universal' aspect of Smoke.—(9) That which denotes things through the apprehension of relationships cannot be evanescent,—because it must have its relationship continuing till the time of use,—like the light of the Lamp and the Lightning.—Thus the idea of *Word-Sound* being non-eternal is annulled by all these inferences which must be admitted to be perfectly sound. Consequently it becomes established that words are eternal."—(2121–2130)

**COMMENTARY.**

"(1) The notions that appear in connection with the individual words 'Cow',—though divergent through diversities of place, time, quick, middling and prolonged, and so forth,—all envisage the same word,—they do not envisage diverse words,—because they all appear in the same form 'Cow',—like the notion of the *cow-word* appearing at the present time.

"(2) Whenever there is notion of the word 'Cow', it must be taken as referring to the word 'Cow' appearing to-day,—because it envisages the word 'Cow',—like the word appearing to-day;—the notion of the word appearing yesterday envisages the same word.—This is thus a Reason based upon the nature of things.
"THE REVEALED WORD."

"Or, (3) The 'subject' of the Inference may be the notion of the word appearing to-day,—'being envisaged by the notion of the word that appeared yesterday' is the Probandum,—'because it envisages the word' is the Probanis;—and 'the notion of the word appearing yesterday' is the Corroborative Instance.—This is the argument formulated in the words.—'This notion envisages, etc. etc.'—'this notion' stands for the notion appearing to-day.—'That'—the word 'Cow' apprehended by the Cognition of the word 'Cow' that appeared yesterday.—'For the same said reason'—i.e. 'because it envisages the word Cow'.

"Or, (4) Both—the notions appearing to-day and yesterday—envisage the same word,—because both envisage the word 'Cow';—like the notion of the single word 'Cow'.—This argument is expressed in the words 'Both, etc. etc.' The Reason has not been stated in detail, as it is well-known.

"Or, (5) All notions of the universal 'Cow',—though divergent in regard to diversities of place, time, etc.—are produced by the same word 'Cow',—because they are notions of the Cow,—like the notion of the single Cow.—In the previous argument, the 'Subject' (Minor Term) consisted of 'the notions envisaging the word 'Cow' — envisaging the same object' being the Probandum; while in the present argument, the notions envisaging the universal 'Cow' form the Minor Term,—and 'being produced by the same word Cow' is the Probandum;—this is the difference between the two arguments.

"(6) The compound 'hyastanochachāra' means 'that which had its utterance yesterday'—this mentions the Minor Term; 'existing to-day' is the Probandum. The rest is easily understood.

"(7) The word 'Cow' that is heard to-day is the Minor Term;—'was heard yesterday' is the Probandum.—'Aforesaid',—i.e. 'because it is apprehended by the Cognition of the word Cow', is the Probanis.

"Or, (8) 'all such words as are expressive' is the Minor Term;—their 'lasting for a long time' is the Probandum;—and 'because they bring about the cognition of the cognisable thing through the apprehension of relationships' is the Probanis. In the compound 'sambandhānubhavā, etc.' 'sambandhānubhāpēkṣam' qualifies 'jñeyajñānāpavartanam';—'should be regarded as lasting';—'for a long time' qualifies 'lasting'. The 'lasting character' meant here is in regard to time, not in regard to place, as in the case of mountains;—this is what is intended to be indicated by the qualifying term 'for a long time'.—'Like the universal aspect of Smoke' is the Corroborative Instance; the 'specific individuality' of things cannot have any continuity of existence or concomitance, hence it is the 'universal aspect' alone that can serve as the Corroborative Instance.

"(9) 'Cannot be evanescent'—this states the same argument negatively.—'Because it must have, etc. etc.'—Tādātika'—till that time, i.e. till the time of use,—its 'nimitta',—relationship—should continue'.—(2121–2130)

The following objection is raised.—In this way, the Jar and such things also may be asserted to be one only. For instance, all notions of the individual Jar, though diverse through divergence of Place, Time, etc. must be regarded
as envisaging one and the same thing, and not as envisaging several things,—because it appears in the form of ‘Jar’,—like the notion of the Jar appearing at the present moment; and so forth. As a matter of fact, however, such one-ness of the Jar is neither desired nor vouchèd for by perception. Hence all the Reasonings set forth above must be regarded as False (Fallacious).

The answer to this objection (from the Mimâmsâka) is as follows:—

TEXTS (2131-2132).

"If the one-ness of the Jar, that is urged as an undesirable contingency, is in reference to the ‘universal aspect’,—then the argument is superfluous.—If however, one were to urge the contingency of the individual Jars being one, on the strength of the above arguments,—then it can be pointed out that such an idea would be contrary to all forms of Right Cognition; because the multiplicity of individuals has been definitely established by all means of Right Cognition, Sense-perception and the rest."—(2131-2132)

COMMENTARY.

If it is in reference to the ‘universal’—the ‘genus’, ‘Jar’—that one-ness is sought to be proved by the above Reductio ad Absurdum, then, it is superfluous; as it has been declared—That aspect of the object which is Universal, Common, is eternal, the other aspect is held to be perishable.’

On the other hand, if the Reductio ad Absurdum is meant to prove the one-ness of the Individual Jars,—even so, that does not falsify our premises. Because such a Proposition is directly annulled by Sense-perception and other Means of Cognition; specially as all the Reasons adduced in this connection have to be regarded as qualified by the condition that ‘what they assert is not annulled’; how then could there be any falsity in our Reasons?—Such is the sense of the passage.

‘Would be contrary, etc. etc.’—That is, the Proposition in question is so contrary.

The rest is easily understood.—(2131-2132)

Again, the Mimâmsâka proceeds to show that the Proposition that ‘Words are non-eternal’ is annulled by Inference and Presumption.—The Inference that he sets forth is—“When the relation between two things is not-artificial (eternal), the two things themselves must be regarded as not-artificial (eternal);—e.g. Ākāsha and the Atom;—and the relation of Denoter and Denoted between the Word and its denotation in the form of the ‘Universal’ is not-artificial;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.”
"THE REVEALED WORD."

In the following Texts the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to show that the Reason here adduced (that the relation between the Word and its Denotation is eternal) is not 'inadmissible':

TEXTS (2133–2135).

"If the Relationship in question were artificial (set up for the occasion), then, as the particular use will have become accomplished and come to an end,—it would be applicable to that one particular case only, and would not be universal in its application. In the Cow there is a commingling of several factors—such as the 'Earth', 'Substance', 'Being', 'Tail' and so forth,—there could be no definite idea of the 'Cow' except through frequent repeated usage.—From this it follows that the Word is not-artificial: and it never perishes,—because it has an eternal relationship with an eternal entity—like the Ākāśa and the Ātom."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 359–361].—(2133–2135)

COMMENTARY.

The sense requires the reading 'kṣtrimate cha sambandhasya'.

If the Relationship were artificial, then,—inasmuch as the particular use will have been accomplished,—come to an end,—the Word would have come to an end; hence the relationship between the Word and its meaning would not be universal,—i.e. applicable to all uses of the Word at all times.

—Why?—Because it would be applicable to that one particular case only; i.e. it would apply to one particular Cow only. In support of this a Presumption is put forward—When several Cows are there before one, even though the Universal 'Cow' may be subsisting in a single individual Cow, what is understood is the universal 'Cow' as extracted from the word 'Cow'; and this would not be possible if the Word were not there.—Why it would not be possible is explained in the Words—'There is a commingling of several factors, etc. etc.'—This Presumption is based upon the authority of Words.

'For these reasons Word cannot be artificial'.—This sums up the Inference.

'With an eternal entity'—i.e. the object named 'Universal', 'Community'.—'Eternal relationship'—which lasts for all time; just like the relationship of Atoms with Ākāśa, which is eternal.—(2133–2135)
The following texts reject the 'Inconclusiveness' of the above presumption:

TEXTS (2136–2138).

"Inasmuch as the Word, heard but once, envisages several 'Universals' in an indefinite form, it cannot definitely point to its own specific denotation, as distinguished from the other 'Universals'—(until it has been used several times).—As a matter of fact, the word 'Cow' would get at the specific denotation of the particular 'Universal' 'Cow' only after a long time when it has been heard several times, and has thereby excluded the other 'Universals'—'Living Beings', 'the quality of Whiteness', the action of 'moving', the 'Universals' 'Dewlap', 'Tail', and also the 'Individuals', the 'Cow of variegated colour', the 'hornless cow' and the like,—which are diverse by reason of their individual peculiarities."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words—364–366]—(2136–2138)

COMMENTARY.

This has been thus explained in the Bhāṣya (of Shabara, on Śū. 1. 1. 19)
—"If the word 'Cow' is eternal, it is the same word that is uttered many times and has been previously heard also several times, as applied to other individual Cows; and thus by a process of positive and negative concomitance the Word comes to be recognised as denoting the particular Universal; for this reason also, the Word must be eternal."

'Individuals which are diverse, etc. etc.'—i.e. distinguished by their respective peculiarities; their diversity is based upon their being cognised as different from one another. Hence the compound 'evaśanibandhanāḥ' is to be expounded to mean 'which have their diversity based upon the cognition of their respective peculiarities'.

'Having excluded' has to be construed with all these.—(2136–2138)

The following might be urged (against the Mīmāṁsaka):—If the Word get at its denotation after a long time,—even so, how does it become proved that the Word exists for all time?

The answer to this is as follows:—
"The Revealed Word."

TEXTS (2139-2140).

"And if the Word existed for such a long time, who could destroy it after that?—[Shlokavartika—Eternality of Words—367].—

For another reason again it is not possible for the Word to be destroyed: In the case of the Jar and other things, it is understood that they would become destroyed either through decay or through some weapon; there is no such cause by which the Word could be destroyed."—(2139-2140)

COMMENTARY.

'For such a long time',—i.e. during which time it denotes its own meaning after excluding so many other factors.

Says the Opponent:—In the case of the Jar, etc. it is found that though they continue to exist for a long time, yet they come to be destroyed by the stroke of a stick or some such thing; the same may be the case with Word also.

The answer to this is—"For another reason, etc. etc."—'Bṛtyah'—again.

Things like the Jar undergo destruction either by decay or by the stroke of some weapon; there is no such cause for the destruction of the Word.—Why?—Because the Word is incorporeal, while the Jar and other things are corporeal.—(2139-2140)

It has been declared (under Text 2131, above) as follows:—'If the one-ness of the Jar, that is urged as an undesirable contingency, is in reference to the Universal aspect, then the argument is superfluous.—If however, one were to urge the contingency of the Individual Jars being one, on the strength of the above arguments, then it can be pointed out that such an idea would be contrary to all Forms of Right Cognition'.—What has been said there is equally applicable to the present case: For instance—if the one-ness urged is in regard to the 'Universal' aspect of the 'ga' and other letters (composing the word 'Gaḥ'), then it is superfluous, and so forth, all the rest of it may be repeated. Because in view of the diversity of Place, Time and Speaker, the Individual Letters—Ga and the rest are many; and it is in these that the 'Universal' Cow subsists; and in the same way, the Universal aspect of the letter 'ga' is held to subsist in the individual letter; so the two cases are exactly similar in all aspects [and on the same grounds that the individual jars cannot all be the same the individual word 'Cow', or the individual letter 'ga', cannot all be the same].

Anticipating this argument, the Mīmāṃsaka offers the following answer:—
TEXT (2141).

“Even though there are differences of place, time and user,—there is no diversity in the letter ‘Ga’ and the rest; as the ‘recognition’ in their case is clear and distinct.”—(2141)

COMMENTARY.

From Perception, in the shape of Recognition, it is proved that the Individuals (letters) are one;—Inference can have no validity, as against Perception; Perception being the highest of all Means of Right Cognition. Such is the sense of the text.—(2141)

Objection:—Diversity of the Letters is proved by such diversities in their pronouncing as fast, middling, slow and so forth; under the circumstances, how can it be said that their Recognition as being the same is clear and distinct?

The Answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2142).

“Even when there is diversity in the pronunciation being fast, etc., the individual letter ‘ga’ is not clearly cognised as an established entity, distinguished from the other individual letter ‘ga’.”—[Shloka-vārtika—Sphota, 22].—(2142)

COMMENTARY.

‘Established’—not merely conceived or fancied. ‘Distinguished’—distinct, separate, different.


What is meant is that Recognition having established the identity among the individuals, there can be no ‘other’ Individual at all.—(2142)

Says the Opponent—What is recognised is only the Universal aspect of the Letter ‘ga’,—not the individual aspect; how can there be said to be a recognition of the Individuals?

The answer (of the Mīmāṃsaka) to this is as follows:—
TEXT (2143).

"The Individual Letter 'Ga' has no existence apart from the substratum of the Universal 'Ga',—because it can never be apprehended by any cognition other than that of 'Ga',—just like the Universal 'Ga' postulated by the other party."—[Shloka-vārtika—Sphota, 32]—(2143)

COMMENTARY.

'Gānyabdhyanyinirūpya'—Because it is not apprehended—cognised—by any cognition except that of the letter 'Ga'.

'Like the Universal, etc. etc.'—Because the view of the other party is that 'Universals are without universals'.—(2143)

TEXT (2144).

"The same conclusion could be proved on the ground of its being a Letter, like the letter 'Kha'.—As a matter of fact the contrary of this is never perceived; hence the said conclusion cannot be said to be annulled by perception."—[Shloka-vārtika—Sphota, 34]—(2144)

COMMENTARY.

'The same conclusion'—the denial of the individual 'Ga' apart from the Universal.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—The Letter 'Ga' cannot be entirely differentiated from the substratum of the universal 'Ga',—e.g. the letter 'Kha',—and 'Ga' is a letter;—hence here there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the Contrary,—as 'being Letter' is invariably concomitant with the contrary of being the substratum of the Universal 'Ga'.

That the Conclusion of this argument is not sublated by Perception is shown by the words—'The contrary of this, etc. etc.'—'contrary' stands for difference between the two.—'Dṛṣṭam'—Perceived fact.—(2144)

The following might be urged:—The argument adduced is superfluous, as addressed to the Buddhist. Because the idea of 'oneness' is held by him to be based upon 'the exclusion of others', and not upon any Universal in the shape of 'Ga' as apart from the Individuals; so that even when the Universal 'Ga' is denied as a distinct entity, the 'one-ness' of the Letter does not become established on the basis of the idea of 'one-ness',—as it is based upon the 'exclusion of others'. 
This objection is anticipated and answered (by the Mimāmsaka) in the following:

**TEXTS (2145-2146).**

"The entity in the form of the 'letter' is admitted by both parties; it is only right therefore that 'eternalitY' and other characters,—which are attributed to an assumed entity,—should be attributed to what is admitted by both parties. Thus it follows that the one idea arises out of the one-ness of the letter. As regards the ideas of peculiar features, that would be due to the diversity in the character of the manifesting agency."—[Shlokavārtika—Sphoṭa, 18, 23].—(2145-2146)

**COMMENTARY.**

"Why is it that leaving aside the letter itself,—which is admitted by both parties,—such characters as 'eternalitY', 'multiplicity', 'pervasiveness' and the rest are attributed to an assumed entity, in the shape of the 'exclusion of others',—as is clear from such assertions as 'the class and the property thus become determined'? The right thing to do would be to attribute all these to what is admitted by both parties; as otherwise there would be the necessity of assuming much that is never perceived at all. Hence it follows that the recognition of the letter as one and the same must be due to the one-ness of the letter itself."

*Question* :—If that is so, then how could there be such diverse notions regarding the letter, as *short*, *medium* and *loud*?

*Answer* :—'As regards, etc. etc.'—'Manifesting agency'—consisting of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air (proceeding from the throat of the speaker).—(2145-2146)

As a matter of fact, Air is never apprehended by the Ear; conjunctions and disjunctions also of the Air must be inapprehensible by the Ear; under the circumstances, unless the manifesting agency is apprehended, how can the manifested (property) be apprehended? For example, until the Light is seen, there is no perception of the Jar illuminated by it.

With the above idea in his mind, the Opponent of the Mimāmsaka urges the following objection:
TEXT (2147).

One for whom both are amenable to auditory perception could have the dual notion; for you however, the pitch (of the letter-sound) being beyond the senses, how could the said peculiar features be due to the pitch?—

[Shlokavārtika—Sphoṭa, 38].—(2147)

COMMENTARY.

'One for whom'—i.e. the Grammarians and others, according to whom the manifestor consists of the letter-sound in the form of ghosa (articulation), not of the conjunctions and disjunctions of air,—for such men both, the Manifested (letter-sound) and the Manifestor (articulation), are apprehended by auditory perception; for such people, there may be the two notions,—the notion of all as one, and also the notion of the peculiarities of the pitch, etc. But for you, the Mīmāṃsaka, how could the Pitch, which is in the form of the conjunctions and disjunctions of air, bring about the notion of the peculiarities,—as such Pitches, etc. are not perceptible by the ear?—(2147)

To the above objection, the Mīmāṃsaka makes the following answer:—

TEXT (2148).

"Some people assert that when a Word-sound is cognised by the ear as affected by the degree of the pitch,—then it is that there is apprehension of the peculiar degree of pitch, brought about on account of its being mixed up with the Word-sound."

—[Shlokavārtika—Sphoṭa, 39].—(2148)

COMMENTARY.

'Tadupashleṣa'—being mixed with the Word-sound.
'Tasya'—of the pitch.
'Bodhaḥ'—apprehension.
'Some people assert'.—What these people mean is that, though pure Pitch by itself is not apprehended by the Ear, yet when it is mixed up with Sound, it does become so apprehended; and hence the dual notion comes about.—(2148)

The following Text justifies the dual notion, even under the view that there is no apprehension of the Pitch:

TEXT (2149).

"Or, there may be no apprehension of these (Pitches); it is only the cognition of the Word-Sound that is brought about through the Pitch. As for the degrees of the Pitch,—in the shape of Intensity, etc.—they are cognised, in accordance with the impressions (made by the sound-pitch)."—[Shlokavārtika—Sphoṭa, 40].

—(2149)

COMMENTARY.

'Tēśām'—of the Pitches; consisting of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air.

Question:—How can there be a cognition of the Manifested when the Manifester is not cognised?
Answer:—'It is only, etc. etc.'—'Tadvaṣṭ'—through the Pitch; i.e. by the mere presence of the Pitch.

Question:—There may be apprehension of the mere form of the Word-Sound; how is there the apprehension of the degrees of the Pitch?
Answer:—'They are cognised, etc. etc.'—When the more intensive Pitch produces an intensive impression on the Ear, then that intensity is cognised in the Sound; on the other hand, when the impression produced is weak, the Sound is perceived as weak. Thus the varying degrees of the Pitch are apprehended in accordance with the impression made upon the Ear.—(2149)

Says the Opponent:—The varying degrees of Pitch resides according to you, in the Manifester, not in the Manifested (Sound); these degrees therefore would be unapprehended because the Manifester itself is not apprehended; under the circumstances, without apprehending the degrees of Pitch in the Manifester how could one attribute it to the Word-Sound? Until the Water has been apprehended, it is not attributed to—imposed upon—the Mirage?

The answer to this (from the Mīmāṃsaka) is as follows:
Those who have their minds perverted by the disorders of bile perceive the sweet as bitter, and white as yellow;—those who are running fast, or sailing in a boat, mistake the hill and other objects to be moving; those who have applied the fat of the frog to their eyes mistake the piece of bamboo to be a serpent.—In the same manner, through the higher and lower intensities of the individuals, people have the idea of the Universal as being the substratum of those intensities.—Just as, in the cases cited, people have the ideas (of bitterness, etc.) without having any perception of their causes (in the shape of the disordered bile, etc.)—so, in the case in question, without cognising the varying degrees of pitch in the Manifester, there would be a mistaken idea of these in connection with the Manifested.”—[Shlokavārtika—Sphoṭa, 41–44].—(2150–2153)

COMMENTARY.

Through the disorders of Bile, people apprehend the sweet thing as bitter, without having any idea of the character of the Bile;—similarly while running fast or sailing fast on a boat, people are led to the mistaken notion of the Hill and other objects moving along;—similarly when one applies the fat of the frog to his eyes, he perceives bamboo-pieces as serpents;—similarly, through the varying degrees of intensity in the Individuals, people have the idea of the Universal as being the substratum of those degrees; ‘Being’ being the largest, highest, Universal, and the ‘Cow’ and the like being the lesser, smaller, Universals.—If it were not so, then, being eternal and all-pervasive, all Universals would be equal; and in that case to what could the ‘largeness’ or ‘smallness’ of the Universals be due?—Hence the conclusion is that—just as people have the notion of Bitter in connection with the Sweet thing, without having any notion of the Bile to which the misconception is due,—so also, in the case in question, without apprehending the larger or smaller intensity in the Manifester, people would have the misconception of these in connection with the manifested Sound.

‘Abudhvā’, ‘without cognising’;—the sequence of the nominative agent is in reference to the action of ‘misconception’; otherwise the Pastparticipial affix ‘Ktvā’ would not be possible.—(2150–2153)

Question:—How do you know that the idea of Larger and Smaller intensity that appears in connection with Sound is due to extraneous circumstances, and the Sound itself has no such diversity?

Answer (from the Mīmāṃsaka):—
TEXTS (2154-2155).

"The distinction in the Letter itself into short, etc. would be contrary to the doctrine of eternity (of words); for, how can the Letter, which is ever present, be said to be measured by duration? Consequently, it is the articulation of the Letter that should be regarded as measured by duration, for one or two moments; the Letter itself cannot be measured by duration."—[Ślokavārtika—Sphoṭa, 50-51].

(2154-2155)

COMMENTARY.

'Short, long, etc.' The 'et cetera' includes the Long, the ultra-long, the High Pitch, the Low Pitch, the Middling Pitch, and the 'Śadja' and other musical notes.

'Would be contrary, etc. etc.'—That is, because the Eternality of the Letter has been established by Recognition.—(2154-2155)

In the following text, the opposite view is put forward—that the said 'manifestation' cannot be admitted—

TEXTS (2156-2157).

The manifestation of Word-Sound by Articulation is not possible: that manifestation could be due to the embellishment either of the Sound itself, or of the Sense-organ concerned, or of both. If it were the Sound that was embellished, then it would be cognised by all as so embellished; and it being impartite and all-pervading, there could be no embellishment of it in any parts.—(2156-2157)

COMMENTARY.

If there were manifestation of the Word-Sound by the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air, it could be through the embellishment of the Sound itself, or through the embellishment of the Sense-organ, or through the embellishment of both—of the Sound and also of the Sense-organ.—If there were embellishment of the Sound, then when embellished at one place—at Pāṇḍaliputra for instance,—it would become apprehended by people in all places; as it goes everywhere simultaneously.

It might be said that only a part of the Sound becomes embellished.

The answer to that is that it is impartite,—not made up of parts, being incorporeal; hence, even though it is all-pervading, it being without parts, how could there be any embellishment in part?—(2156-2157)
It might be argued that—as the substratum of the Sound varies, there could be embellishment of it, even though it is without parts,—through that diversity of substratum.

The answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXT (2158).

Nor can there be determination of the embellishment through the diversity of substratum; because Sound has no substratum at all,—like Akāsha and Soul.—(2158)

COMMENTARY.

Because Sound is all-pervading, like Akāsha and Soul,—it is without substratum.—(2158)

Says the other party—As a matter of fact Sound is a quality of Akāsha, and qualities always subsist in the Substance to which they belong; so that Akāsha would be the substratum (or receptacle) of Sound.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2159).

If Akāsha is the substratum,—even so, Akāsha itself being without parts, there could be no embellishment in part, because the Word-Sound is always cognised as a whole.—(2159)

COMMENTARY.

The said Akāsha being without parts, the diversity in the embellishment could not be due to the diversity of the parts of the substratum.

The Opponent argues thus—Though Akāsha is without parts, yet there is diversity among substances coming into contact with Akāsha; e.g. we have 'the Akāsha in the Jar' and so forth; so that the Akāsha within the tympanum of one man would be different from that within another man's.

The answer to that is—'Because the Word-Sound, etc. etc.'—this is to be construed with the sentence 'there could be no embellishment in part'; the sense being that Sound itself is always apprehended as being without parts and such an apprehension would not be possible if the embellishment belonged to only one part of the Akāsha.—(2159)

The following text sums up the argument and shows how it is as stated:—
TEXT (2160).

In as much as Sound exists as a whole pervading over the entire Ākāśa, it could not be cognised as a whole, if it were embellished in part.—(2160)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the Word-Sound pervades over the entire Ākāśa; and hence the whole of it could not be cognised if it were embellished only in part.—(2160)

The Mīmāṃsaka's Opponent now sets forth objections against the view that the embellishment pertains to the Sense-organ [the second alternative view suggested under Texts 2156-2157, regarding the variations of Sound being due to embellishments, in the shape of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Sound]—

TEXTS (2161-2162).

Under the view that the Auditory Organ consists of Ākāśa, as the organ would be all-pervading, it would be equally in contact with all things; so that even when the Sound is produced far off, it should be heard here.—In this way the Auditory Organ also would be one only for all living beings; hence at the time that one person hears a Sound, all men should hear it.—(2161-2162)

COMMENTARY.

There are some people who hold that the Auditory Organ consists of Ākāśa; under this view, as Ākāśa is one and all-pervading, it would be in equal contact with all Sounds, and hence it should be possible to hear Sounds at a distance also.—The Auditory Organ also would be one and the same for all living beings; hence when one of them hears a sound, that sound should be heard by all of them; because the Auditory Organ is one and the same for all. It should be added also that if one man does not hear a Sound, no man should hear it.—(2161-2162)

The following might be urged—The Auditory Organ consists of Ākāśa as conditioned by the tympanum embellished by Merit and Demerit; hence as the Sound heard would be subsisting in the Ākāśa as contained in the tympanum,—there would be no room for the two undesirable contingencies just pointed out—viz. : (a) that being all-pervading, the Organ would be in equal contact with all Sounds, and (b) that there would be one and the same Organ for all living beings.

The answer to this is as follows :—
TEXT (2163).

As Ākāśa is without parts, the Auditory Organ could not consist of Ākāśa as conditioned by Merit and Demerit,—which is essential for the two limitations referred to above.—(2163)

COMMENTARY.

For that which is impartite, there can be no parts, by virtue of which a certain part of Ākāśa could constitute the Auditory Organ.

' The two limitations'—the limitation that the contact of the Organ with all-Sounds cannot be the same, and that there are several Auditory Organs.—Or the 'two limitations' may be those relating to the apprehension and non-apprehension of Sound.—(2163)

TEXTS (2164-2165).

Further, the Auditory Organ, once embellished, should bring about the Cognition of all Sounds; when the Eye is opened for seeing the Jar, it does not fail to apprehend the Cloth.—This same contingency may be urged also in connection with the Remembrance of the thing (Sound); as the embellishment appertains, without distinction, to the same space in Ākāśa.—(2164-2165)

COMMENTARY.

Further, once embellished,—the Auditory Organ should lead to the Cognition of all Sounds,—make them apprehended; as the said Organ would apply in common to all Sounds; and also because the Sounds, being all-pervasive, would be occupying the same perceptible place.

It might be argued that—it is for the purpose of cognition that the Speaker has embellished the auditory organ of the Hearer; consequently the organ would bring about the cognition of that same Sound, not others.
The answer to this is—'When the eye is opened, etc. etc.'—'It does not fail to apprehend'—i.e. it does apprehend; that is, on account of the perceptibility of the place being equal.

Question:—Why has the word 'all' been introduced?

Answer:—'As the embellishment appertains, etc. etc.'—All Sounds, being all-pervading in character, occupy the same space in Ākāsha; hence their embellishment also should be without distinction.

In some places, the reading is 'samskārāḥ hya-viṣṇuḥ sāyataḥ'. In that case the particle 'hi' stands for 'because';—'avishēṣṭāḥ' stands for 'avishēṣṭoṣṇa'; hence the meaning comes to be—Because the embellishment has been produced in Sounds without distinction,—on account of their occupying the same space,—therefore it should be possible for all Sounds to be apprehended (at the same time).—(2164-2165)

The following might be urged—Though the embellishment appertains to all Sounds equally,—yet that Word-Sound alone is actually apprehended which the hearer desires to apprehend,—none other.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2166).

The embellishment, when it comes, would come about by the removal of the immobile Air-envelope; and it has been found that when the covering envelope is removed, the apprehension of what has been there follows (as a matter of course).—(2166)

COMMENTARY.

There are two kinds of Air—mobile and immobile; it is the immobile Air which envelopes Sound, like dense Darkness;—it is in this Air-envelope that Conjunctions and Disjunctions are produced by the Air proceeding from the Speaker's mouth;—these Conjunctions and Disjunctions bring about the removal of the said Air-envelope; removal of the Air-covering is what is meant by the 'embellishment' of Sound,—which cannot mean the strengthening of its characteristic features; because Sound is eternal and always of one and the same form.

What if it is so?
'It has been found, etc. etc.'—'Found' in scriptures and also in common experience; e.g. when the enveloping darkness is removed, the Jar that is there,—even though its perception may not be desired,—becomes perceived, because it lies in a perceptible spot.—(2166)

[The following might be urged]—It has been asserted (in Text 2157), that 'if Sound were embellished, it would be heard by all'; but this incongruity does not arise, because even a single Sound may be embellished for one man, while not-embellished for another; just as the same woman, through difference in relationship, may be *mother* to one and *daughter* to another person.

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (2167).**

**THE WORD-SOUND** being one, it cannot be regarded as both *embellished* and *not embellished*; so that *only one condition should be admitted,—no matter whether it be cognised, or not cognised, by all.*—(2167)

**COMMENTARY.**

The Sound being one, the two conditions of being 'embellished' and 'not embellished' cannot belong to it, at the same time; because the *condition* cannot differ from the *conditioned*; so that, as the *conditioned* 'Sound' is one only, its *condition* (embellished or otherwise) must be one only.—As regards the case of one and the same woman being both *Mother* and *Daughter*, —there it is the *name* only that differs, not the thing itself; while in the case in question, the difference is not merely in *name*, as the Sound is there as equally perceptible by all men; whence there could not be perception and non-perception at the same time; and mere change in name cannot deprive a thing of its innate capacity for effective action.

It might be said that the nature of Sound is such that it is perceptible by certain restricted persons only,—so that there would be nothing incongruous in its perception and non-perception at the same time, by reason of the capacity of the particular persons concerned.

This cannot be so; if it were so, then if Sound is not perceived by a man at one time, it would never be perceived by him;—but such is not the case.

Hence, in order to preserve the *one-ness* of the Sound, only one *condition* should be accepted—either the *embellished* or the *unembellished*.

*Question* :—What would be the result of this?

*Answer* :—'So that only one condition, etc. etc.'—(2167)

The following Text puts forward the objection against the view that 'there is embellishment of both, Sound and Sense-organ' (the third alternative view set forth under Text 2157):—
TEXT (2168).

THE OBJECTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN URGED AGAINST EACH OF THE OTHER TWO VIEWS ARE APPLICABLE TO THE VIEW THAT THERE IS EMBELLISHMENT OF BOTH. THUS IT IS NOT POSSIBLE IN ANY WAY THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANY MANIFESTER OF THE SOUND.—(2168)

COMMENTARY.

"To each of the two views"—that there is embellishment of the Sound and there is embellishment of the Sense-organ. The objections that have been urged against these are applicable to the view that there is embellishment of both.

"Thus, etc. etc."—This sums up the whole criticism (against the Mīmāṃsaka's view).

The following texts set forth the Mīmāṃsaka's answer to the above criticism (set forth in Texts 2156 to 2168):—

TEXT (2169).

"The Author of the Bhāṣya has expounded the answer to the above,—on the basis of the idea that the embellishment pertains to the Auditory Organ. The diversity in the hearing by different persons is also due to the diversity of the organ."—(2169)

COMMENTARY.

"The Author of the Bhāṣya".—This is what has been said by him (in Shabara-Bhāṣya on 1. 1. 13)”—For one who holds that the Conjunctions and Disjunctions manifest (not produce) the Word, the said incongruity (of the Word uttered in Śrūgna being heard in Pātaliputra) does not arise, because the Conjunctions and Disjunctions operating in one place do not affect the Ear-drum at a distance; so that the Auditory Organ at a distance does not catch the Word-Sound that is manifested”—(Translation, pp. 34-35).

"Due to the diversity"—in the Ear-drum.

"Diversity in hearing"—diversity in the cognition (of Sound).—(2169)

Question:—How can the embellishment of one thing bring about the manifestation of something else?

Answer (by the Mīmāṃsaka):—
TEXT (2170).

"Just as the Lamp is regarded as the manifesters of the Jar, through the aid that it affords to the Eye,—so (in the case of the Word-Sound) the Articulation would be the manifesters of the Sound) through the impression that it makes upon the Auditory Organ."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 42].—(2170)

COMMENTARY.

Just as the Lamp becomes the manifesters of the Jar, through the help it accords to the Eye, so the Articulation also, would be the manifesters of the Sound through the embellishment of—impression upon—the Auditory Organ.—(2170)

Says the Opponent:—It has to be explained in what way the Articulation brings about the embellishment of the Auditory Organ, which is an accomplished entity.

Answer (from the Mīmāṃsaka):—

TEXT (2171).

"There should not be any such question as to the form in which the embellishment is made; as that question can be similarly raised in the case of the production (of the Word, in the Ear); as in that case also, the capacity (of the things concerned) is beyond Sense-perception."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 43].—(2171)

COMMENTARY.

'That question can be, etc. etc.'—The said question can be raised, with equal reason, in regard to the view that 'there is production of Sound in the Ear'. Under the view that Sound is produced (not manifested) by its causes, the said question could be raised,—'in what form does the Articulation, which consists in Conjunctions and Disjunctions of Air,—or any other cause—produce the Sound? '—Because in that case also,—i.e. in the case of the production of Sounds being brought about,—the capacity of the causes of the Sounds would be beyond the reach of Sense-perception; and so it is in the case of the view that Sounds are manifested (not produced). So the question can be raised, with equal reason, in regard to both the views.—(2171)

Question:—If the Capacity is beyond the reach of the Sense-organs,—how then can it be admitted?

Answer (from the Mīmāṃsaka):—
TEXT (2172).

"Why should any question or objection be raised against the capacity of things, which is always inferable from its effects? And the only proof for it lies in the fact that the particular effect appears only when the particular capacity is there."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 44].—(2172)

COMMENTARY.

Whether it be the capacity to manifest, or the capacity to embellish,—in all cases, whatever capacity is there can always be inferred from its effects; hence no question or objection can be raised against it.

Question:—What is that effect which leads to the inference of the capacity?

Answer:—'And the only proof, etc. etc.'—'Tadbhāvā'—when the Articulation is there,—then alone is 'tadbhāvātā'—i.e. the appearance of the effect, in the shape of the cognition of the Sound; this is the only proof for the existence, in the Articulation, of the capacity to manifest the Word-Sound;—that is, from the effect, in the shape of the cognition of Sound, there is inference of the said capacity.

'Only'—this is meant to preclude the idea of production.—(2172)

The following Text sums up the position:—

TEXT (2173).

"Thus the conclusion is that it is by means of the imperceptible capacity alone that these (articulations) impart an imperceptible capacity to the sense-organ concerned, and thereby appear as causes of the manifestation (of the Word-Sound)."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 45].—(2173)

COMMENTARY.

From all this it follows that these articulations, by means of their imperceptible Capacity, produce, in the Auditory Organ, an imperceptible Capacity, and appear as the causes of manifestation—i.e. 'of Words and Sounds', which has to be added.—(2173)

Question:—Why cannot the Articulations be known (inferred) as the causes of Production (and not of manifestation)?

Answer (from the Mimāmsaka):—
"There are some people, according to whom the Word-Sound is apprehended by the Auditory Organ, when it is produced but not in actual contact with that organ;—for them, the absence of contact being equally present in the case of distant and near sounds, the apprehension and non-apprehension by people far and near would be equally possible; and there could be no order of sequence, nor the greater and less intensity (of sounds heard)."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 119–121].—(2174-2175)

COMMENTARY.

According to the Buddhists, when Sound is apprehended by the Auditory Organ, it has been produced and is not in contact with the organ; in the compound ‘aprāptajāta’, ‘aprāpta’, ‘not in contact’, qualifies ‘jāta’, ‘produced’; because according to their doctrines, the Visual and Auditory Organs are operative without contact, and Sound is produced by the conjunction and disjunction of the Primary Elementary Substance (Air).—In accordance with the view of these people, the ‘non-contact’ with the Auditory Organ would be equally present in the cases of remote, obstructed and approximate Sounds, and their apprehension and non-apprehension by people far and near would be equally possible; that is, the apprehension by the man near the Sound would be exactly like that by the man far off,—there being no difference between the two.

Nor would there be any apprehension of Sound in succession; in the way that the apprehension by the nearer man comes first and then follows the apprehension by the remoter man.

Nor would there be any such difference in the hearing as that of greater or less intensity,—as is found to be the case in actual experience that the Sound heard by the nearer man is more intense than that heard by the remoter man. So also with the difference in grades of intensity also.—(2174-2175)

Says the Opponent:—Even for the Mīmāṃsaka, according to whom the Sound apprehended by the Auditory Organ is one that is in contact with the organ, and is not-produced,—why should the said incongruity not arise?

In view of this question, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to draw a distinction (between the two cases):—
"Thus, from the point of view of the Vedic Scholar also, let us examine the matter: It is an undoubted fact that (in speaking) the Air within the body, on the impact of the man's effort, issues forth; and in thus issuing forth, it undergoes Conjunction and Disjunction with the Palate and other spots in the mouth; and inasmuch as the Air issues forth with some velocity, it goes along as long as the initial momentum lasts;—it is also certain that, in thus issuing forth, the component particles of the Air come into contact with, and become disjoined from, the still Air (through which it passes);—having reached the Ākāsha in the Auditory Organ, this Air imparts a certain Capacity to that organ;—and it is only when this is there that there is Cognition (hearing) of the Sound; from whence it is concluded that there is a certain 'embellishment' of the organ, and this is the only imperceptible factor (that is posited). This would be exactly like 'the Capacity to produce' (which is posulated by the other party).—Similarly peculiar forms would be inferred from particular forms of the Cognition.'" [Shlokavartika—Eternality of Words, 121–126].—(2176–2180)

COMMENTARY.

The mention of the Mīmāṃsaka by the term 'Shotriya', 'Vedic Scholar', is meant to show that he is not a 'Logician', and in this way, by contrary suggestion, he indicates the superiority of his own view.

Question:—What is the view of these Vedic Scholars?

Answer:—'It is an undoubted fact, etc. etc.'—The effort is the form of the operation of the Palate and other centres of speech;—on the impact of this effort, there is urged forward, the Air within the body,—which issuing out from the navel, spreads itself out in the regions of the heart,—revolves in the throat and strikes the brain,—then proceeding through the mouth, it issues out.

All this is shown by the words—'In thus issuing forth, etc. etc.' When this Air issues out, it undergoes contact and disjunction with the Palate, etc.—When thus issuing out, it does not go on as far as Ākāsha extends; it goes along as long as the momentum lasts,—i.e it moves forward in accordance with the momentum imparted to it;—why?—because it issues forth with some velocity;—when the Air thus goes out, there come about Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the particles of that Air with the still Air—the calm, immobile Air. Thus when it reaches the Ear-cavity, it surely imparts a potency to the Auditory Organ. And when this is there,—i.e. when the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Air are there,—there is cognition of Sound; and it is on this ground that it is held that there is embellishment of the Auditory Organ. You yourself hold that there is production of Sound by
other sounds or by articulation, and yet you also posit a potency or capacity; so also is the embellishment held by us.—As declared in the Bhāṣya (Shabara—on Sū. 1. 1. 13)—What happens is that the air-particles disturbed by the sound-provoking stroke, strike against the stagnant air-particles and produce Conjunctions and Disjunctions (i.e. ripples) on all sides, which go on spreading as long as the momentum lasts; the Conjunctions and Disjunctions (Ripples) are not perceived, because the Air (of which they are ripples) is imperceptible; and as for the Sound, it is heard only so long and so far as the ripples do not cease,—and after they have ceased, the Sound is not heard'.—(Translation, p. 35).

Objection:—If that is so, then there is no difference between the view that Sound is produced and the view that it is embellished.

Answer:—'Similarly, etc. etc.'.—'Peculiar forms',—i.e. peculiarities of embellishment are possible through the peculiarities in the cognition of the Sound. Hence the apprehension and non-apprehension by remote and proximate persons cannot be similar; as the embellishment would vary with each person.—(2176—2180)

Question:—Why is there no cognition of Sound when there are obstructions like the intervening wall?

Answer (from the Mimāmsāka):—

TEXTS (2181—2182).

"The interception caused by obstacles like the wall is quite possible in the case of Air. The striking against the tympanum (of which we are at times cognisant) is due to the force of the air-current. And inasmuch as the air proceeds in succession and has a waning intensity and velocity, it becomes the cause of the sequence and varying grades of intensity of the embellishment produced by it.'—(Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 128—130).—

(2181—2182)

COMMENTARY.

Though Sound is not subject to interception, yet, inasmuch as the Air and the Wall are both corporeal substances, they are liable to obstruction and interception; and hence the Air does not reach the Ear (when there is an intervening wall); and hence there is no embellishment of the organ; this is the reason why there is no hearing of the intercepted Sound.—The criticism urged therefore is applicable to those for whom there is perception of Sound without its actually reaching the Ear.

To the question—How then is there the diversity of greater and less intensity?—the answer is—'The striking against, etc. etc.'.—The verb 'yujyate', 'is possible', has to be construed with all these sentences.
'Has a waning intensity, etc. etc.'—The construction is—The liability to wane and velocity are both possible in Sound.—Or the compound may be expounded to mean that 'the velocity is liable to wane' (Karmadārāya); or 'the Sound has a velocity which is liable to wane' (Bahuvarīhi).

The construction is that—On these grounds the varying grades of intensity become quite explicable.

The sequence in the embellishment also becomes explicable, because of the sequence in the Air-current; high intensity becomes explicable on the ground of the Air having velocity; and low intensity becomes explicable, as being due to the waving character of the velocity.

The term 'ādi' is meant to include other variations in the Sound.—

(2181-2182)

Says the Opponent—Under the view that the Auditory Organ is Ākāsha, if there is embellishment of the organ, there are various objections against this as pointed out above—such as 'Being all-pervasive, there would be equality of contact with all Sounds and all organs' (Text 2161);—how then is it that the Author of the Bhāṣya (Shabara) has provided the Answer on the basis of the 'embellishment of the Auditory Organ'?

The Answer to this (from the Mimāṃsākā) is as follows:—

TEXTS (2183-2184).

"We do not necessarily accept the idea of the Auditory Organ consisting of Ākāsha; nor can Ākāsha be regarded as being without parts;—because such an idea has been negatived by the Jainas and the Sāṅkhya.—Consequently the Auditory Organ may be a part of Ākāsha, or it may be a distinct entity by itself;—thus there is a separate Auditory Organ for each person,—which idea is based upon presumption due to the fact that well-known effects cannot be explained except on that basis."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 66–68].

(2183-2184)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this is that the objections urged against that theory are not applicable to the Mimāṃsākā, who does not accept that theory.

'Nor can Ākāsha be regarded as being without parts'—The verb 'abhya-pāyāt' (is accepted) has to be construed here also.

Why?

'Because such an idea has been negatived by the Jainas and the Sāṅkhya'.

—The Jainas—the Ārhatas,—as well as the Sāṅkhyaśas have rejected that idea. It is not that the Mimāṃsakas do not make use of the conclusions of other people; they accept anything that is found to follow from reason; if they did not do this, they would cease to be 'Mimāṃsakas' (Rationalists). Consequently, even if they accepted the Jainas and Sāṅkhya idea of the Auditory Organ consisting of Ākāsha, they would be doing nothing objectionable. 'Or it may be a distinct entity by itself',—called the 'Ear-drum'.
"Presumption due, etc. etc."—i.e. based upon the fact that the phenomenon of the hearing of Sound cannot be explained except on the basis of this idea. —(2183-2184)

Or, even the view that the Auditory Organ consists of the indivisible Ākāsha, is not open to the said objections.—This is what is explained in the following:—

TEXT (2185).

"Even if the Auditory Organ (as consisting of the indivisible Ākāsha) were all-pervading and one,—the embellishment due to articulation could affect only the material substratum of that organ; hence that man alone hears the Sound the substratum of whose organ is affected by that embellishment."—[Shloka-vārtika—Eternality of Words, 68-69]. —(2185)

COMMENTARY.

'Vyāpi'—'Ekam'—qualify 'Shrotram' (understood).

Even so, that man alone, no other, hears the Sound whose 'Ear-drum', as the substratum of the Auditory Organ—is affected by the embellishment due to articulation.

What is meant by this is that the embellishment affects the substratum, not the Auditory Organ;—and as the substratum varies with each person, the objections in question do not apply at all.—(2185)

The following Text explains that the said objections do not apply even if the embellishment is regarded as affecting the Auditory Organ itself:—

TEXT (2186).

"Even if the embellishment affects the organ itself,—as it could affect the organ only through its substratum, that organ of which the Ear-drum has not been embellished would not catch the Sound."—[Shloka-vārtika—Eternality of Words, 69-70]. —(2186)

COMMENTARY.

'Substratum'—the Ear-drum; it is through this Ear-drum that there is embellishment of the Auditory Organ,—not by itself. It is for this reason that in the case of persons at a distance, or with mind preoccupied, or asleep or in a swoon,—Sound is not heard, because the substratum of the organ has not been embellished.
The compound ‘asamskrta, etc. etc.’ is to be explained as ‘that organ of which the Ear-drum has not been embellished’.

In the word ‘adhisāndeshakal’, the ‘tasi’-affix at the end has the sense of the Locative.—(2186).

Says the Opponent:—If the articulations embellish the substratum, or the organ as subsisting in that substratum,—how is it that the Sounds whose presence is apprehended here and there do not come to embellish the substratum of the organs of all living beings?

Answer (from the Mīmāmsaka):—

TEXT (2187).

"There is no embellishment of the Auditory Organ, if and when the Articulation does not reach the locus of the Organ; thus the restriction on the embellishment becomes determined on the basis of the diversity in the substratum (or locus) of the organ."—[Shloka-vārtika
—Eternality of Words, 70-71].—(2187)

COMMENTARY.

Even if Articulations tend to embellish the substratum, or the organ localised in that substratum,—in either case, it is only when they actually get at the object to be embellished that they produce the embellishment; not when they do not get at it. Hence the embellishment cannot affect the substratum of the organs of all persons.

The mention of the ‘Auditory Organ’ in the Text is only by way of illustration; for the matter of that there is no embellishment of the substratum also.

In some places, the reading is ‘aprāptakarṇadēshādvā’. Under that reading, the meaning would be that the answer given before was based upon the idea of the embellishment affecting the Organ through its substratum; while the answer provided under the clause in question is that—even when there is no embellishment of the Organ through the embellishment of its substratum, there can be no objection to the view put forward; because only those air-particles are fit for bringing about the embellishment which have actually reached the base of the Ear-drum,—not those that have not got at it; it is with this other answer in view that the clause has been added. ‘Thus, etc.’—This sums up the explanation.—(2187)

The following text sets forth an objection raised by the Opponent against all the three alternative explanations detailed above:—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXT (2188).

"THE OPPONENT MAY ARGUE AS FOLLOWS—'HAVING BECOME EMBELLISHED IN ONE SUBSTRATUM, THE AUDITORY ORGAN SHOULD BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE WORD-SOUND IN ALL BODIES,—ACCORDING TO ONE WHO HOLDS THE VIEW THAT THE AUDITORY ORGAN IS ONE ONLY (FOR ALL)'."

[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words—71-73].—(2188)

COMMENTARY.

The Auditory Organ being one only, it cannot have the two mutually contradictory characters of being embellished and being not-embellished; hence when there would be embellishment in one, the organ being the same in all bodies, it would become embellished in all bodies; hence the Sound should be heard by all, even by the deaf;—for one who holds the view that the Organ is one only, for all. And in that case, there could be no deafness at all.—(2188)

The answer to the above objection (provided by the Mīmāṃsaka) is as follows:—

TEXT (2189).

"THE APPEARANCE OF THE COGNITION (OF SOUND) IS HELD TO TAKE PLACE IN THE BODIES OF PERSONS; CONSEQUENTLY, BY REASON OF THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR (BODIES) OCCUPYING DIFFERENT PLACES, THE EMBELLISHMENT OF THE AUDITORY ORGAN IS INEFFECTIVE TO THAT EXTENT.'"—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 72-73].—(2189)

COMMENTARY.

Though 'Persons'—in the shape of Souls—are all-pervading, yet the view of the Mīmāṃsakas is that Cognitions appear only in the bodies that are adopted by the Souls by virtue of their merit and demerit. Hence as this principal factor, in the shape of the bodies, would be occupying different
points in space, the embellishment in question, of the Auditory Organ,—
even though the Organ is all-pervading—remains inefficient (in the bringing
about of the Cognition of Sound in all persons); hence there is no room for
the objection that has been urged.

In some manuscripts the reading is ‘sūra sanskṛtiḥ’; in which case,
the construction would be—‘sū sanskṛtiḥ shrotasya’, ‘that embellishment
of the Auditory Organ’.—(2189)

Says the Opponent—The Soul being all-pervading, the cognition of
the Word-Sound in all places should be irresistible.

The Mimāmsāka’s answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (2190–2192).

“**Even though, according to us, the Soul is without parts and
is conscious of all things everywhere, yet it actually apprehends the thing in the body only; and there can be nothing wrong in this explanation.** [Shlokavārtika—Éternality of Words, 73-74.]—On the same grounds does Deafness also become limited in scope; it does not form part of the experience of another Soul, because it is influenced by Merit and Demerit (which varies with different Souls).—Just as when the village-lord has been removed from the Lordship, though continuing to live in the village, does not enjoy the privileges of the Lordship,—so the Soul of the deaf man deprived of the Auditory Organ in the body, though continuing to dwell in the body, does not enjoy the experience (of hearing sounds), which other men are hearing.”—[Shlokavārtika—Éternality of Words, 76–78].—(2190–2192)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:

Though it is as stated, yet the actual cognition of Sound by the Soul
appears only within the limits of the body with which it has been equipped
by reason of its Merit and Demerit; hence the objection urged is not applicable.

Question :—The Soul being the same, how can there be such differentiation
as cognition and non-cognition and embellishment and non-embellishment
of the Auditory Organ?

Answer :—There is no force in this. Though Ākāśha is without parts
yet, on account of the diversity of the objects with which it comes into contact,
it becomes subject to distinctions as ‘ākāśha in the Jar’, ‘ākāśha in the Pot’
and so forth; the same would be the case in the matter under consideration
also.
It is for this same reason that, though the Auditory Organ (as Ākāśha) is all-pervading and without parts, yet there are restrictions in the matter of Deafness, etc. on account of the diversity among objects with which the organ comes into contact.—This is what is meant by the words—‘On the same grounds, etc. etc.’—the ‘grounds’ consist in the diversity among objects with which it comes into contact.

Question:—If the objects with which the Organ comes into contact are diverse,—even so, why is it that only a certain person becomes deaf?

Answer:—‘It does not form part of the experience, etc. etc.’—That same defective Auditory Organ does not form part of the experience of another person;—why?—because it is influenced by Merit and Demerit.

This same idea is further clarified by means of an example.—‘Just as, when the village-lord, etc. etc.’—The Lord of a certain village, even though continuing to live in the village,—if he is removed by the King from the Lordship,—does not enjoy the same privileges in the same village;—in the same manner, the deaf man does not hear the Sound, even though another man hears it.—(2190–2192)

Says the Opponent—All the three factors—the Auditory Organ, the Sound and Ākāśha being without parts and all-pervading,—no partial existence is possible for any of them; then how do you get at the distinction into ‘hearing’ and ‘non-hearing’ determined by such partial existence?

Answer (from the Mīmāṃsaka):

**TEXT (2193).**

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE AUDITORY ORGAN, THE SOUND AND ITS SUBSTRATUM HAVE THEMSELVES NO PARTS,—AND THEY DO NOT EXIST AT ANY ONE PLACE; EVEN SO, OUR VIEW IS NOT OPEN TO OBJECTION."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 78-79].—(2193)

**COMMENTARY.**

The Auditory Organ, the Sound, and the substratum of the Sound—i.e. Ākāśha,—these themselves have no parts; yet such parts are attributed to them figuratively through the diversity among objects with which they come into contact;—this is what is meant by the qualifying term ‘themselves’.

‘Even so, etc. etc.’—‘our view’, regarding the partial existence, and restricted apprehension of sound and so forth.—(2193)

Question:—How so?

*Answer (from the Mīmāṃsaka):*—
TEXT (2194).

"The (vibrating) air-particles, which are the manifesters of the Word-Sound, have their different parts occupying different points in space; and there are different kinds of them also;—and it is through this that the embellishment becomes regulated."—[Shloka-vārtika—Eternality of Words, 79-80].—(2194)

COMMENTARY.

They have different parts occupying different points in space; and there are different kinds of them also,—due to the difference among the contributory causes in the form of such diverse things as the Palate and the rest.—(2194)

Says the Opponent—It has been already pointed out that, 'on being embellished once, the Auditory Organ should bring about the cognition of all Sounds' (under Text 2164).

The answer to this (from the Mīmāṃsaka) is as follows:

TEXT (2195).

"Just as the air-vibration put forth for the purpose of one does not bring about another,—in the same manner, the air-vibration, capable of bringing about the embellishment for the apprehension of one Letter will not bring about another."—[Shloka-vārtika—Eternality of Words, 80-81].—(2195)

COMMENTARY.

'For the purpose of one'—for the producing of another Letter.

'Capable of bringing about, etc. etc.'—that embellishment of the Auditory Organ which brings about the hearing of the Letter, is what is spoken of here by the term 'anyavarṇa-samskāra'; and it is not the embellishment of the Letter itself that is meant; that it is so follows from the fact that it is the embellishment of the Auditory Organ that forms the subject-matter of the present discussion.

'Will not bring about another' ;—i.e. will not embellish another Letter through the embellishment of the Auditory Organ.—(2195)

Question:—Why should there be the restriction in the case of the Air-vibrations only?

Answer (from the Mīmāṃsaka):—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXT (2196).

"ONE SET OF CONTACTS WITH THE PALATE, ETC. SERVES TO BRING ABOUT ONLY ONE LETTER-SOUND, NOT ANOTHER; IN THE SAME MANNER THE CONTACTS BRINGING ABOUT ONE ARTICULATION DO NOT SERVE TO BRING ABOUT ANY OTHER ARTICULATION."—

_Sholokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 81-82._—(2196)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is that there are different articulations,—in the shape of Air-vibrations—which serve to manifest Sounds; and they vary with the variations in the contact of the Palate, etc.

'Only one letter, not another'—'is brought about' has to be taken as understood.

'Bringing about of other articulations'—i.e. the putting forth of them.

'Serving to bring about one articulation'—is to be construed with 'the contacts of the Palate, etc.'—(2196)

The argument is summed up in the following—

TEXT (2197).

"FOR THESE REASONS—IN THE production and manifestation (OF WORD-SOUNDS), THE DIVERSITY OF CAPACITY IS EQUALLY PRESENT, IN THE Effort AND THE Desire to Speak,—SUCH DIVERSITY BEING PRESUMED ON THE BASIS OF CERTAIN EFFECTS (FACTS) WHICH CANNOT BE OTHERWISE EXPLAINED."—_[Sholokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 82-83._—(2197)

COMMENTARY.

The word 'upatityabhivyaktyoḥ' has the Locative ending,—the meaning being—'in the production and in the manifestation of the Word-Sound',—there is equal diversity of capacity in the Effort and the Desire to Speak;—why?—because the fact of certain well-known effects not being otherwise explicable indicates such diversity; that is, in both cases, the Presumption based upon the said inexplicability of certain facts is equally operative.—(2197)

So far the Mīmāṃsaka has taken for granted (for the sake of argument) the idea that the Auditory Organ consists of Ākāśa, as postulated under other doctrines,—or that it consists of the Ear-drum as conceived by common people,—and then proceeded to show that there can be nothing objectionable in the idea of the Word-Sound being manifested through the embellishment
of the said Auditory Organ.—He now proceeds to take his stand upon the idea of the Auditory Organ consisting of space as described in the Veda, and to show that there can be no objection against the idea of Word-Sound being manifested by the diverse embellishments of that organ:

TEXTS (2198-2199).

"Or, the idea that should be entertained is that the Auditory Organ consists of Space,—which idea would be in accordance with the Veda [Shlokavârtika—Eternality of Words, 150]; nowhere in the Veda has it been said that the Auditory Organ consists in Akâsha, etc.—In connection with Dissolutions, it has been declared (in the Veda) that the Auditory Organ becomes dissolved into Space; here we have the description of the organs,—like the Eye and the rest,—becoming dissolved into their original constituents."—[Shlokavârtika—Eternality of Words, 150-151].—(2198-2199)

COMMENTARY.

'The idea that the Auditory Organ consists in space'; i.e. the conclusion should be accepted that 'Space itself is the Auditory Organ.'

Why so?

'Because nowhere in the Veda, etc. etc.'

If that is so, then, nowhere in the Veda is it found declared that 'Space constitutes the Auditory Organ'; then why should that idea be accepted?

Answer:—'In connection with Dissolutions, etc. etc.'—'Dissolution' consists in becoming dissolved into the original constituent cause. At the time of the death of living beings, their Eye and other organs become dissolved into their respective original constituent causes; in connection with the animal that is sacrificed, it is said in the Veda—'May its Eye revert to the Sun, and the Ear to Space';—'may revert' is to be construed with the latter sentence also. 'May revert'—i.e. may it go to that from where it came. Thus though in the Veda it has not been directly declared that 'Space constitutes the Auditory Organ', yet the sentence 'may the Ear revert to Space' clearly implies that idea which is, thus, as good as asserted.

How so?

Answer:—'Here we have the description, etc. etc.'—what the sentence 'may the Ear revert to Space' is meant to describe is the fact that the Ear reverts to its original Constituent Cause, the meaning being—'may the Ear revert to Space, which is its original Constituent Cause.'—'Like what?'—'Like the Eye, etc.'—(2198-2199)

The same idea is further explained—
TEXT (2200).

"Just as, in connection with the Visual Organ, it is asserted 'May his Eye revert to the Sun',—which conveys the idea that the Visual Organ has its origin in Light,—so, in the same manner, the Auditory Organ consists in Space."—
[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 151-152].—(2200)

COMMENTARY.

Just as in the case of the sentence 'May his Eye revert to the Sun' what is asserted is the idea that the Visual Organ has its origin in Light— the term 'chaksuṣaḥ' has to be supplied;—in the same manner, what the sentence 'may the Ear revert to Space' asserts is the idea of the Auditory Organ having its origin in, and consisting in, Space.—The words are to be construed in this way.

'The idea of Light being the origin'—i.e. the idea of the Visual Organ consisting of Light.—(2200)

Question:—What is this 'Space' like?
Answer (from the Mīmāṃsaka):—

TEXT (2201).

"Space is one and all-pervading, and extends as far as Ākāśa; when it becomes limited within the cavity of the Ear, it forms the Auditory Organ,—in the same way as Ākāśa does (for the other party)."—
[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 152-153].—(2201)

COMMENTARY.

The 'all-pervading character' is explained by the phrase 'it extends as far as Ākāśa'.

Objection:—If this is so, then, there can be no 'deafness', etc.
Answer:—'When it becomes limited, etc. etc.'—The entire Space is not the Auditory Organ; it is only that much of Space as is encased within the ear-cavity.—(2201)

Says the Opponent—Space being without parts, how do you secure the division of its parts (which the foregoing explanation implies)?
Answer (from the Mīmāṃsaka):—
TEXT (2202).

"The reasons that the Vaishēṣika can adduce in support of the view that the Auditory Organ is a part of Ākāśa, will apply equally well to the idea of its being a part of Space; with this difference that the latter idea has the support of the Veda."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words—153-154].—(2202)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of Ākāśa, there is an assumption of parts, on the basis of the objects with which it comes into contact; the same would be the case with Space also.

Question:—What then is the difference between this view and the other one under which the Auditory Organ consists of Ākāśa?

Answer:—'With this difference, etc. etc.'—(2202)

In the following Text, the Mīmāṃsaka sums up his position and explains the possibility of Deafness, etc.—

TEXT (2203).

"Thus then, the Auditory Organ consists of a part of the substance Space, which is influenced by Merit and Demerit and which comes to be enclosed within the cavity of the Ear. And it is this organ that is embellished (by articulation)."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 154-155].—(2203)

COMMENTARY.

The Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to explain that the objections urged do not also affect the view that the embellishment pertains to the object (the Word-Sound that is heard).—

TEXT (2204).

"Even if the embellishment pertained to the Object,—it would affect that one object only; and on account of the difference in the capacities of men, the Sound could not be heard by all."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words—83-84].—(2204)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued above (under Text 2157) that 'if the Word-Sound were embellished, it should be heard by all men'.—This criticism is not
applicable at all.—Why?—Because on account of the difference in the capacities of men; this difference in the capacity is due to the fact that in the case of some men the air embellishing the Organ is in close proximity to them, while in others, it is not so.—(2204)

Says the Opponent—The Sound being one and all-pervading, it must be equally related to all men; how then could there be apprehension (by some) and non-apprehension (by others) of it?

Answer from the Mimāmsaka:

TEXTS (2205-2206).

"JUST AS (UNDER THE OPPONENT'S VIEW) THE WORD-SOUND, THOUGH PRODUCED AND APPEARING EQUALLY WITH REGARD TO ALL MEN, IS NOT HEARD BY ALL, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIVERSITIES OF DIRECTION, PLACE AND SO FORTH,—IN THE SAME MANNER, (UNDER OUR VIEW ALSO) THE SOUND IS HEARD ONLY BY ONE WHOSE AUDITORY ORGAN IS EMBELLISHED BY THE ARTICULATIONS MADE NEAR HIM,—AND NOT BY PERSONS AT A DISTANCE."—[Shlokavārtika—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—84-86].—(2205-2206)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—How is it known that what proceeds from the Air-vibrations is the embellishment of the Object (Sound),—and not the Object itself?

Answer (from the Mimāmsaka):

TEXT (2207).


ETERNALITY OF WORDS—126-127].—(2207)

COMMENTARY.

On the ground of Recognition, it has been established that Sound is one and all-pervading; hence there can be no production of Sound [there can be only manifestation of it]; and from this it is deduced, by implication, that what is produced by the articulations is the embellishment, not the Word-Sound.—(2207)

Says the Opponent:—It is clearly known that Sound is the effect of the articulations,—from the fact that it appears only when these are there,—just as, on similar grounds, the sprout is known to be the Effect of the Seed.
In this latter case, it is found that the Sprout is seen only when the seed has been there, and from this it is concluded that the Sprout is the effect of the Seed,—in the same manner, Sounds are perceived only when the articulations have been there; why then, should Sound be not regarded as the effect *produced* by the articulations? Specially because the said fact is the sole basis for anything being regarded as the effect of something else.

The *Mīmāṃsāka’s* answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (2208).**

"ALL THAT THE FACT OF ONE THING APPEARING ONLY WHEN THE OTHER IS THERE INDICATES IS THE PRESENCE (IN THE LATTER) OF A CERTAIN POTENCY (OR CAPACITY),—JUST LIKE THE POTENCY IN THE AUDITORY ORGAN; AND THERE THE PRESUMPTION HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO REST."—*[Ślokavārttika—

ETERNALITY OF WORDS—127-128].—(2208)

**COMMENTARY.**

There is hearing of Sound when the Auditory Organ is there; but this fact of the Sound being heard only when the Organ is there does not lead to the inference that the Auditory Organ possesses the potency to *produce* Sound; all that can be inferred is that it has the potency or capacity of *apprehending* it. Similarly, in the case in question, all that the fact of Sound being heard only when the articulations are there can justify is the inference that these articulations possess a certain *potency*;—it cannot indicate the presence in them of the *capacity to produce* Sound; as the said fact is concomitant only with the presence of the capacity in general,—and not with any particular kind of Capacity. Hence in the proving of the particular kind of Capacity, the said fact, if cited as the Probans, cannot but be ‘fallible’, ‘inconclusive’.—This is what is meant by the *text*.

*Question*.—How then is there the idea of the particular Capacity in the ‘Embellishment’?  

*Answer*.—‘There the Presumption has been allowed to rest.’—That is, Recognition having established the Eternality of the Word-Sound, the Presumption based upon the fact of the well-known phenomenon of Hearing not being otherwise explicable has been made—by the author of the *Bhāṣya* (Shabara)—to rest in the particular *embellishment*; and the capacity of this embellishment has not been *inferred* merely from the fact of concomitance (of the Embellishment and the Hearing).—(2208)

Against the view that ‘there is embellishment of both (Sound and the Auditory Organ)’ [proposed as an alternative in the commentary on *Text* 2157],—it has been argued (under *Text* 2168) that ‘the objections urged against each of the two alternative views are all applicable to the view that there is embellishment of both’.

The *Mīmāṃsāka’s* answer to this is as follows:—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXT (2209).

"AS REGARDS THE VIEW THAT THERE IS EMBELLISHMENT OF BOTH, THE
ASSERTION THAT IT IS OPEN TO BOTH SETS OF OBJECTIONS IS FUTILE.
BECAUSE WHEN SOUND IS NOT HEARD BY ALL, IT IS DUE TO
THE DEFICIENCY IN EITHER ONE OF THE TWO."—[Shloka-
vārtika—Eternality of Words—86-87].—(2209)

COMMENTARY.

The assertion made previously that both sets of objections are applicable
is futile,—useless.
Why?
Because, to the deficiency in either one of the two—of the embellishment
of the Auditory Organ, or of the embellishment of the object, Sound—is due
the fact that Sound is not heard. For instance, even when the embellish-
ment of the Sound is there, the deaf man does not hear the Sound, because
his organ is deficient; and even when there is no deafness, if there is no
manifestation of the Sound (by articulation), there is no hearing of the Sound.
The reading in some places is 'mṛṣā dosadvayā vachakā', the meaning of
which is clear.—(2209)

Says the Opponent—if the Word-Sound is all-pervading, how is it that
it is perceived as several—just like the Jar,—when there is diversity of
place? As a matter of fact, as it is all-pervading, it should be always perceived
in an uninterrupted form. Nor should there be any distinctions of far and
near in the case of what is all-pervading;—nor can it come in from any place,
as it is always present everywhere. Further as it is eternal, there can be
no such distinctions as long and short, or of various degrees of loudness and
so forth. Nor again is difference of time possible.—From all this it follows
that—because Sound is actually perceived as affected and diversified in place,
time and form, therefore, like the Jar, it must be diverse and evanescent.
How then is it that the assertion has been made above (under Text 2207)
that—'Inasmuch as the idea of the production of Sound has been rejected,
etc. etc.' ?
The Mīmāṃsaka's answer to the above is as follows:

TEXT (2210).

"THOUGH THE SUN IS ONE, YET IT IS SEEN (BY ONE AND THE SAME MAN)
AS DIVERSE IN WATER AND OTHER SURFACES AT THE SAME TIME;
AND YET IT DOES NOT MAKE IT MANY; THE SAME SHOULD BE
UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE CASE WITH SOUND ALSO."—[Shloka-
vārtika—Eternality of Words, 178-179, though
the reading there is slightly different].—(2210)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant to be shown by this is that the fact of being perceived as
diverse in different places, as a Reason for diversity, is 'Inconclusive'.—(2210)
Says the Opponent—In the case of the Sun, there are grounds for the illusion of *multiplicity*, in the shape of the diverse receptacles in the form of Water and the other reflecting surfaces; in the case in question however, there is no ground for such illusion; while what we have put forward as the Reason is accompanied by the qualification ‘there being no grounds for illusion’; how then can our Reason be regarded as being ‘False and Inconclusive’?

The *Mīmāṃsaka*’s answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS (2211–2214).**

“Sound is heard in only a particular place, because it is dependent (for its cognition) upon the articulation that manifests it; and articulations have not the capacity to pervade the entire space; consequently, the Word-Sound is not heard continuously all over the world; and because the articulations appear in different places, the hearing is restricted to those places; and as the intervening spaces (between the articulations) are not filled up (by the articulation), there is the cognition of a break (in the continuity of the Sound). And, as these articulations appear only in limited places, there arises the notion that Sound is not all-pervading. Further, as these articulations have movement and a certain velocity,—from whatever place these articulations proceed, the hearer thinks that the Sound that he hears also comes from that same place.”—[Śhlokavārtika—Eternality of Words—172–176].—(2211–2214)

**COMMENTARY.**

What is meant is that in the case in question also, there is ground for illusion, in the shape of the diversity of the manifesting articulations, so that the two cases stand on the same footing.

‘Because it is dependent upon the manifesting articulations’;—i.e. the Cognition of Sound is so dependent.

‘That place’—the place where the articulation has appeared.

‘That’—Sound.

In what way the manifesting articulation becomes the cause of the illusion of interception is explained by the words—‘and articulations do not have the capacity, etc. etc.’;—‘asau’ stands for the Sound;—‘the hearing’—of the Sound;—‘tatra’—in that part of Ākāśa.

‘As the intervening spaces are not filled up’;—what is meant is that they are not filled up by the articulations.

‘Tēṣām’—stands for the articulations.

‘Tē cha āyānti’—this also stands for the articulations.—(2211–2214)
Says the Opponent—it cannot be admitted that the single Sun is perceived as diverse because of the separateness of space (between the reflecting Media); because what are actually apprehended by the Eye are so many diverse reflected images of the Sun; and it is not the Sun that is apprehended. For you, who do not regard the reflected image to be different from the object reflected,—there can be no cause for the apprehension of several reflected images.

This argument of the Opponent is what is referred to in the following:

TEXT (2215).

"The Opponent says—'By what cause are the Reflected Images perceived simultaneously as distinct in each vessel (of Water)?'"—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 179-180].—(2215)

COMMENTARY.

'Āha'—'says'—the Opponent.
'Simultaneously'—at one and the same time.—(2215)

The answer to the above is as follows:

TEXTS (2216-2217).

"Our answer to this is as follows:—What actually happens is that by the light from the Sun scintillating in the Water, the light from the Eye (striking the Water) is turned back in the wake of the reflected solar light, and thus it perceives the Sun in its own region,—but there is an illusion of there being several Suns of diverse forms, by reason of the diversity of the vessels of Water. How then could there be multiplicity of Suns?"—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words—180-182].—(2216-2217)

COMMENTARY.

The solar light in the vessel of Water which flows out makes the light of the Eyes turn back—reflected backwards—and hence, it apprehends the Sun in its own place.
'Yathāpātram'—as many as the number of vessels that are there. It is for this reason that the Sun appears to be of diverse forms. How then can there be multiplicity of the Sun?—It cannot be; because what is diverse is the functioning of the Eye.—(2216-2217)

The following Text shows that it is by reason of the peculiar functioning of the Eye that the Sun, though really one, is perceived as several:—

TEXT (2218).

"When the Eye is slightly pressed by the finger, even a single object is perceived as diverse,—because of the diversity in the functioning of the Eye. The same thing happens in the case in question also,—according to us."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words—182-183].—(2218)

COMMENTARY.

'Iṣat'—slightly, a little.—When the Eye is so pressed,—even a single object is perceived as diverse—many;—why?—because the functioning of the Eye has been diversified. In the same manner, for us, the single Word-Sound would be heard as diverse (if there are adequate reasons for it).—(2218)

TEXTS (2219-2220).

"Other people who hold the view that the Reflected Image is actually produced (as something different from the Reflected Object) urge the following objection:—'If the same Sun is seen in the several vessels, why is not the same seen as being overhead (over one's head, like the real Sun)? How too could it be seen below, in wells and such other deep water-reservoirs, if the Reflected Image were not actually produced there? Further, how is it that when a man facing the East looks at the mirror, he perceives himself as facing the West?'"—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words—183-185].—(2219-2220)

COMMENTARY.

It was argued (under Text 2210) that 'just as in the Water, the single Sun is seen as diverse, etc. etc.'; and as invalidating this reason, some people think that the Reflected Image is something entirely different from the Reflected Object; and they argue as follows:
If what is seen (in the reflection), is the same Sun, and not the Reflected Image,—then, how is it that it is not perceived as being overhead? It could be so seen if the same Sun had been seen in different places (in the reflecting surfaces)—not otherwise; as otherwise there would be incongruities.

Further, in the case of the Well, how could there be perception of the Sun lying so far deep inside, if its Reflected Image were not produced there?—Certainly the Sun does not actually exist there inside the Well.

Then again, when a man facing the East looks at the mirror, how does he come to face the West? Certainly a face is not seen to have been produced at his back.—(2219–2220)

The Mimamsaka's answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXTS (2221–2223).

"WHEN A MAN IS LOOKING AT THE SUN AND THE WATER, HIS EYE (RAYS) PROCEED IN TWO WAYS,—ONE UPWARDS AND THE OTHER DOWNWARDS; THE PERCEIVER DOES NOT PERCEIVE THAT SUN WHICH IS ILLUMINED BY THE EYE-RAYS PROCEEDING UPWARDS, BECAUSE IT IS NOT IN A STRAIGHT LINE WITH THE BODILY SUBSTRATUM OF THE VISUAL ORGAN; WHILE WHAT IS PERCEIVED BY THE DOWNWARD RAYS IS THE SUN SHINING ABOVE PRESENTED MEDIATELY (INDIRECTLY); AND BECAUSE IT IS THE SAME SUN THAT IS SO PRESENTED, THE OBSERVER THINKS THAT WHAT IS SEEN IS 'BELOW'. IT IS THUS THAT IT IS THE SUN ITSELF THAT IS SEEN BELOW, THROUGH THE INTERVENING MEDIUM (OF THE DOWNWARD RAYS)."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 186–188].—(2221–2223)

COMMENTARY.

The opinion entertained is as follows:—If the organ were to go out and then render the Sun cognisable,—then it would be necessary that it should be seen above, not below;—what happens however is that the organ brings about the cognition while it is itself still in the body, and does not move upwards, as has been declared in the following words:—'If the organ, going out, were to render the object cognisable there, then it might be as urged; as a matter of fact, however, it brings about the cognition while still in the body'.—(Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 186-186.)

The whole process is as follows:—Those who see, in the vessel, the Water as well as the Sun, for these persons looking at the Sun and the Water, the single Visual Organ (in the shape of Rays) proceeds in two ways—one upward and the other downward;—then the Sun that is illumined by the upward rays
is not seen by the observer;—why?—because it is not in a straight line with the substratum of the organ;—the substratum of the Visual Organ in the body does not lie in a straight line with the Sun;—but 'mediately'—through an intervening medium—the Sun is presented to the Visual Rays by the rays of the Sun, and hence becomes seen through the downward rays;—so that what happens is that the Solar Rays present the luminous object to the Visual Rays, the Visual Rays present it to the Visual Organ, and the Visual Organ presents it to the perceiving observer. This is what is meant by the 'mediate presentation' of the luminous Sun. Thus it is that the Sun, shining above, is regarded by the observer as if it were below.—Who regards it so? The observing person;—and it is not that there is another Sun shining below.—Why is this so?—Because it is the same; i.e. the Sun is one, not diverse.—Others explain 'tadēkataṁ' as 'because the Visual Organ is one'.—Thus it is under the influence of the downward rays of the Visual Organ, as functioning through a medium, that the Sun is seen below, in the Well;—so also in the case of the diverse vessels containing Water; if it were not so, how could there be cognition of the Sun as one and the same?—(2221-2223)

It has been argued (by some people, under Text 2220)—'How could the man facing the East, come to face the West, when looking at the mirror?'

The Mimāmsaka's answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (2224).

"Similarly (in the case of the man looking at the mirror), it is through illusion that the man cognises the face as facing the West, though in reality what he actually perceives is the face as presented by the Visual Rays proceeding eastward to the rays proceeding westward."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 189-190].

(2224)

COMMENTARY.

What happens is as follows:—First of all the Visual Rays, taking up the face-image, issue forth till they reach the mirror; these are spoken of as 'proceeding eastward';—on striking the mirror-space, the said rays are turned back and come back to the man's face standing there as before; this is spoken of as 'proceeding westward';—the eastward rays thus present the face-image to the westward rays,—and these latter present it to the Soul (the observer); thereupon the Soul, cognising the image as presented by the westward rays, has the illusion that he is facing the West. The sense of all this is that the diversity of the functioning of the Eye is at the root of the illusion in question.—(2224)
Even granting that the Reflected Image is something different, produced in the reflecting medium, the *Mīmāṃsaka* offers another explanation:—

TEXT (2225).

"**EVEN GRANTING THAT THE REFLECTED IMAGE REALLY EXISTS IN THE DIFFERENT PLACES,—THERE CAN BE NO PLURALITY OF THESE IMAGES, BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL APPREHENDED BY THE SAME COGNITION.**"—[Śhlokavārtika—Eternality of Words—190-191].—(2225)

COMMENTARY.

Even if the Reflected Image is something different, these images cannot be several;—why?—*because they are apprehended by the same Cognition*—i.e. they all fall within the same idea.

In the same way, the Word-Sound also becomes established as one,—because it is apprehended by a single Idea.—(2225)

Says the Opponent—When the images are actually perceived in diverse places, why should they not be *several*? That is to say, when the *diversity* of images is admitted on the ground of their being perceived in diverse places,—how can this diversity be set aside by the single Cognition (by which they are all apprehended)?

The *Mīmāṃsaka’s* answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2226).

"**THE IDEA OF DIVERSITY DUE TO DIVERSITY OF PLACE IS *inferential*; WHILE THE IDEA THAT ‘IT IS THE SAME’ IS *perceptional*,—AND HENCE ANNULS THE FORMER.**"—[Śhlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 197-198].—(2226)

COMMENTARY.

'*It annuls the former*;—because Perception is superior in authority to all means and forms of Cognition.—(2226)
The following text points out that the idea that 'it is cognised as appearing at diverse places' is not concomitant with 'diversity', and hence there can be no validity attaching to it:

**TEXT (2227).**

"Just as the single person, Devadatta, passing from place to place, one after the other, does not become different,—so the word-sound also does not differ (simply because it is heard in several places)."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 198-199].—(2227)

**COMMENTARY.**

'So the Word-Sound also does not differ'—'either in regard to time or to place',—this has to be added.

Thus, the non-concomitance between the two (Diversity of Place of Appearance and Diversity of Sound) has been indicated through spacial non-concomitance; next, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out the non-concomitance of the two cognitions, spacial and chronological,—through chronological non-concomitance:

**TEXT (2228).**

"And again, the same Devadatta, whose one-ness is well known, —when seen again and again,—does not become diverse, on account of the diversity of time; similarly the Word-Sound does not become diverse on account of the diversity of place."—[Shlokavārtika, Eternality of Words, 199-200].—(2228)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Jaṭātaikatvaḥ'—'whose unity is well known through Recognition'.

'On account of the diversity in place';—this is by way of illustration; Sound does not become different on account of diversity of time either. By pointing one kind of non-concomitance, the other kinds of non-concomitance also become indicated. [That is why the Text has named place only.]—(2228)
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The following Text anticipates and answers the objection that the Corroborative Instance cited (of Devadatta) is not quite relevant:—

TEXT (2229).

"If it be argued that—' (In the case of Devadatta) the idea of his being one is not incompatible (with the fact of his being seen at several times), because there is succession (in the several cognitions of his presence)'—then (in the case of Word-Sound also) please see that there is no incompatibility; also because the Sound is all-pervading. In fact, the property that explains a perceptible fact may be accepted as belonging to all things.'"—[Śhlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 200-201].—(2229)

COMMENTARY.

The argument of the Opponent is as follows:—'The fact that, even though Devadatta is seen in different places and at different times, he is not regarded as several, what makes this not-incompatible is the fact that the repeated sightings of Devadatta occur in succession, one after the other, and not simultaneously; there is no such reason in the case of Sound. Hence there is difference between the case in dispute and the case cited as an example'.

In answer to this, the Mīmāṁsaka points out that in the case of Sound also there is a reason whereby there can be no incompatibility:—'Please see, etc. etc.'—the construction is that 'Please see that there is no incompatibility, because Sound is all-pervading'.

What the particle 'api', 'also', indicates is the reason mentioned before 'because the articulations do not fill up the intervening space'.

Question:—Why do you accept the all-pervading character of the Word-Sound?

Answer:—'In fact, the property, etc. etc.'—For the purpose of explaining the idea of the same Sound being heard at several places and times,—whatever property is found necessary is admitted through Presumption based upon the fact that a well-known fact cannot be otherwise explained; in the present instance, if the Sound did not possess all-pervadingness, its being heard at several places and times would not be possible; hence on the ground of this Presumption, Sound is regarded as eternal and all-pervading.—(2229)

The Mīmāṁsaka next proceeds to show that the Reason that 'because Sound is cognised as having diverse characters, it must be diverse' is also 'Inconclusive', 'not true':—
"When a large Pit is dug in the ground, there is a notion of the Ākāśa in the Pit being 'large', and when the Pit is small, there is the notion of its being 'small'; in the same way there are similar notions regarding Sound, which also (like Ākāśa) is not something produced; consequently, the illusory idea that people have regarding Sound (being large, increased or small, decreased) is due to other circumstantial conditions; as a matter of fact, 'largeness' and 'smallness' are never perceived as residing in Sound; and the assumption of the 'largeness' and 'smallness' (of Sound) is due to the greater and less keenness of its Perception (Hearing). As regards Perception, it is actually found to be very keen if the object perceived—the Jar—is illumined by a large source of light,—but less keen when it is illumined by a small light.—From all this it follows that such properties as 'Length', 'Shortness' and the like really belong to the articulations."—(2230–2233)

COMMENTARY.

The purport of all this is as follows:—If what the Opponent puts forward as his Reason is the diversity of such character as greater or less intensity (in the Sound),—then such a Reason cannot be 'admissible'; because how could one, who holds Sound to be eternal, admit that the diversity of characters,—which, according to him, belong to other circumstantial conditions,—belong to the Sound?—If, on the other hand, what is adduced by the Opponent as his Reason is the Cognition that people have of Sound being more or less intensive, which Cognition cannot be possible without some difference in the character of the Sound,—then the Reason is 'Inconclusive'; because when a large Pit is dug in the ground, there appears the Cognition of 'largeness' in the Ākāśa contained within the Pit,—even though the 'largeness' does not belong to the Ākāśa; in the same manner, in the case of Sound also,—which is absolutely causeless, not being produced at all,—the Cognition of greater or less intensity and the like would be due to the diversity in the articulations (that manifest the Sound),—even without the Sound itself having the said diverse characters.

This is what is said in the words—'Consequently the illusory idea, etc. etc.'

Question:—How is it known that the said idea is due to other circumstantial conditions,—and the characters do not belong to Sound itself?

Answer:—'Largeness and smallness, etc. etc.'—What is meant by this is as follows:—The man attributes the greater or less intensity, which really belongs to the Perception, to the Sound, and thus falls into an illusion; and it is not possible for the Sound itself to be large or small; because it has been proved through Recognition that Sound is one only.
The following might be urged:—If there were no such diversity in the character of the object perceived, how could it appear in its Cognition?

The answer is—'As regards Perception, it is found to be very keen, etc. etc.'—In the case of the Jar, even though there is no diversity of characters, yet its Perception is more or less keen, on account of the largeness or smallness of the Light illuminating it;—in the same way, in the case of Sound also, the diversity of 'Length', 'Shortness' and the like is due to the diversity in the character of the articulation,—even though there is no such diversity of character in the Word-Sound itself.—(2230–2233)

The Mīmāṃsāka again proceeds to show that the Proposition that 'the Word-Sound is not-eternal' is annulled by the fact that the denotative or expressive potency of the Word cannot be explained otherwise (than by the Presumption of the eternity of the Word):—

TEXT (2234).

"As a matter of fact, a Word, whose relationship to its denotation has not been apprehended, can never be expressive. If it were so expressive, then, each and every new Word could express its meaning."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 242–243].—(2234)

COMMENTARY.

The Presumption that is here put forward is itself based upon another Presumption: For instance, the expressive Potency of the Word is proved by the Presumption that Verbal Cognition cannot be explained except on that basis;—and this Potency cannot be explained except on the basis of the eternity of the Word; hence this Presumption is based upon the previous Presumption.

This same idea is expounded in detail in the Text—where it is shown that the Word by itself cannot be expressive if its relationship with its denotation has not been apprehended.

'If it were so expressive, etc. etc.';—if the word, whose relationship to the denotation has not been already apprehended, were expressive of its meaning,—then even a new word,—never heard before,—could express its meaning; for instance, words like 'Cow', etc. in the case of the inhabitants of the Nārikīla-dvīpa (the Coconut-Isle) (who are not cognisant of such words).—(2234)

Says the Opponent—As regards the argument just set forth, there is no dispute at all; hence it is superfluous; as a matter of fact, there is no one who holds that any meaning is expressed by a Word whose connection with such meaning has not been already known. But the question is—In
what way does this fact of the relationship of the Word being known prove its eternity?

The *Mīmāṃsaka*’s answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (2235).**

"The cognition of such relationship of the Word (to its meaning) could not be possible if the Word were not-eternal; because, if the cognition of that relationship is admitted, it certainly proves the existence of the Word at some other time also."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 243-244].—

(2235)

**COMMENTARY.**

The relationship between the Word and what is denoted by it can be established only when both are present before the man;—and it is only when thus made that it could be cognised at a later time. All this could not be possible if the Word perished as soon as it was produced.

This is what is meant by the words—‘*It would not be possible if the Word were not-eternal*.’

If then, it is admitted that the Word existed at the time, then the idea of its having existed at other times becomes irresistible; as that would not be incompatible with the facts. This has been thus stated—‘If it exists during that time, who can destroy it later on?’—(Text 2139—Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 366).

It might be argued that—it may be that the Word exists at the time that the relationship (with its denotation) is set up; but later on, it would perish of itself.

The *Mīmāṃsaka*’s answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (2236).**

"If the relationship has been recognised with one Word, any other Word cannot be expressive of that meaning (whose relationship has been cognised with another Word). For example, when the relationship has been recognised with the word ‘Cow’, that does not make the word ‘Horse’ expressive (of that meaning)."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 244-245].—(2236)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘*With one word*’—i.e. with the Word that existed at the time that the Convention was set up fixing its denotation.
The rest is easily understood.—(2236)

The following Text anticipates and answers an argument of the Opponent:

TEXT (2237).

"If it be urged that—'that other Word also (which did not exist at the time of the Convention) may be expressive through its own inherent aptitude',—then, in that case, in the absence of any fixed rule, there could be no certainty as to which is the Word that is really expressive."—[Shlokavartika—Eternality of Words, 245-246].—(2237)

COMMENTARY.

'Other Word'—i.e. if the Word that exists at the time of its use is held to be expressive, through its own inherent aptitude, like the Word that existed at the time of the Convention;—that cannot be right; because in the absence of a fixed rule, there could be no certainty as to which Word is expressive of which meaning.—(2237)

Says the Opponent—How do you say that there can be no certainty, when, as a matter of fact, it is clearly ascertained that it is by its inherent aptitude that the word expresses its meaning?

The Mimamsaka's answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (2238).

"If the use of Words be assumed to be based upon actual experience as to which Word brings about the cognition (of a certain thing),—this may serve the purpose of the hearers of the Word; it cannot do so for those who use the Word."—[Shlokavartika—Eternality of Words, 246-247].—(2238)

COMMENTARY.

True; what has been asserted would bring about certainty in the minds of the hearers—as to a certain Word being expressive of a particular thing; because they may have a certain cognition arising on the hearing of the Word. But this will not be possible for those who use the Word; because they do not derive any cognition of anything from that Word; as they use that Word for the purpose of bringing about the cognition for the hearers only. Under the circumstances, how could there be any certainty in the minds of the persons using the Word?—(2238)

The same idea is further explained—
TEXT (2239).

"Without knowing with certainty (what word expresses what) how could the user make up his mind at the outset as to which Word he should use? If, on the other hand, he does know it, then it must have been known to him from before."—[Shloka-
vārtika—Eternality of Words, 247-248].—(2239)

COMMENTARY.

The first objection applies to the view that the user does not definitely know (the Word as having a definite meaning). Under the other view, that he does know it at the time of using it,—it necessarily follows that the Word must have been known to him from before (as expressive of that meaning) which establishes its permanence. This is what is meant by the words 'If, on the other hand, etc. etc.'—(2239)

Says the Opponent—The light of the lamp, even when newly lit, illumines the object; similarly the Word also would express its meaning (when heard and used for the first time).

The Mīmāṃsaka's answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2240).

"Light is auxiliary to the Perception; hence, even when newly lit, it illumines things; [not so the Word].—[If it be urged that] in the case of the Word the comprehension of the meaning of a certain Word is due to its similarity to another well-known Word;—then the answer is that so long as the similarity is not recognised, the Word cannot be expressive (of that meaning)."—[Shloka-vārtika—Eternality of Words, 248-249].—(2240)

COMMENTARY.

'Light is auxiliary to the Perception'—i.e. it is an appurtenance of the Perception; as a matter of fact, it becomes an auxiliary to Perceptual
Cognition, by embellishing either the Object or the Sense-organ; and as such, even when newly lit, it serves the purpose of illuminating things. As regards the Word, on the other hand, directly it denotes only supersensuous things, and as such it cannot be an auxiliary to Perception. So that there is no analogy between the two cases.

Or (the meaning of the Text may be as follows)—What is auxiliary to Perception illumines things independently of the idea of any connection between the two (the illuminator and the illuminated);—e.g. the Eye;—Light is auxiliary to Perception;—hence, even when newly lit, it illumines things;—Word, on the other hand, pertaining, as it does, to imperceptible things, is not auxiliary to Perception.—Hence there is a vast difference between the two cases (of the Lamp and of the Word).

Says the Opponent—Even a new Word would express the meaning through its similarity to a previously-known Word.

The answer is—‘So long as the similarity, etc. etc.’—So long as the Similarity has not been actually recognised, the expressiveness of the Word cannot be due to it; otherwise there would be incongruities.—(2240).

Then again, the recognition of similarity may rest awhile; as a matter of fact, no similarity is possible at all;—this is what is explained in the following:

TEXTS (2241-2242).

"Which particular individual Word would it be, through similarity to which another Word would be assumed to be expressive? All these Words would be equal, in so far as no one among them has its connection (with the meaning) previously known.—If it be held that—'the Word perceived (heard) first of all did actually have a meaning [and the expressiveness of the others would be dependent upon their similarity to that Word]’,—then (the answer is)—how could it continue to exist for such a long time? As a matter of fact, a Word is not comprehended as having a meaning until it has been heard twice or thrice.”—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 249-250].—(2241-2242)

COMMENTARY.

When one Word has been admitted to be expressive, others could be assumed to be expressive on the ground of their similarity to that Word; but this is not possible; because all Words are equally recognised as not connected with a meaning.
It might be argued that—'the first Word that was heard at the time of the fixing of the Convention, certainly had a meaning,—and all the rest would be similar to this one'.

The answer to that is—'How could it, etc. etc.'—How could that first Word—heard previously—continue to exist during all this time when (ex-hypothesis) it must be destroyed as soon as produced.

It might be asked—Even if the Word is destroyed as soon as it is uttered, —why cannot it have a meaning?

The answer to that is—'A word is not, etc. etc.'—That is, the connection between the Word and its Denotation is recognised only after repeated hearing of it.—(2241-2242)

It might be argued that—on the hearing of other words of the same kind, that Word in question would become expressive of the meaning.

The following Text shows that that is not possible:

TEXT (2243).

"FOR PERSONS WHO HAVE NOT HEARD OTHER WORDS (LIKE IT), THE WORD, AT THE TIME, MUST BE MEANINGLESS (INEFFECTIVE); THAT THE SAME WORD WOULD BECOME EXPRESSIVE AS SOON AS THE MAN HAS HEARD OTHER WORDS, WOULD BE A WONDER INDEED!".—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 251-252]—(2243)

COMMENTARY.

For those observers who have not heard other Words of the same kind,—the Word heard for the first time is not expressive of any meaning; because 'similarity' that rests on diversity is not there at the time.—That the same Word, for those same observers,—when they have heard other Words of the kind,—should become expressive would indeed be something extraordinary! How could the two contradictory actions—of expressing and not-expressing—belong to one and the same (Word)?

The compound 'anyashrutinām' is to be expounded as "those persons who have had the ' Shruti ', audition, hearing, of ' anya '—other Words of the same kind ".—(2243)

Having thus proved that Words are eternal, on the ground that otherwise they could not be expressive, the Mimāṃsaka now proceeds to prove
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the same on the ground that otherwise no connection could be set up between the Word and its meaning:

TEXTS (2244-2245)

"No connection can be set up without pronouncing the Word; and when the Word perishes as soon as it is pronounced, it can have no need for any connection. Consequently, as the Word will have perished and would not have had its connection set up, the first Word must be inexpressive (meaningless); how then could the subsequent Word also, which has had no connection set up, be recognised as expressive?"—[Shlokavârtika—

ETERNALITY OF WORDS,
256-258].—(2244-2245)

COMMENTARY.

First of all there is utterance of the Word,—then the setting up of its connection (with its denotation),—then its actual use, in practice;—such is the way in which Words are dealt with in actual practice. How could all this process be gone through if the Word perished immediately on being uttered, and as such how can it be open to any sequential operation? It is not only that for what has perished, no connection can be set up; there would not be any use in setting up any such connection; as it would not be present at the time of usage; and it is only for the purposes of use that Conventions (regarding words and their meanings) are set up.

The words 'Consequently, etc. etc.' sum up the conclusion; the compound 'asambhandhanâsattvâ' is to be explained as—'because it would be asambhanda—without its connection set up,—and because it would be nasi—perished—the first word—that was there at the time of making the Convention,—must be inexpressive'.

It might be said that—'the Word appearing at the time of usage would be expressive'.

The answer to that is—'How then could the subsequent Word, etc. etc.'—(2244-2245)

It might be urged that—if the successive utterance, etc. of the non-sequential Word is not possible,—they may be simultaneous.

The answer to this, from the Mîmââmsaka, is as follows:
TEXT (2246).

"The utterance of the Word, the setting up of its connection and its use,—all this process is, by its very nature, successive; how could any one perform all this simultaneously?"—[Ślokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 258-259].—(2246)

COMMENTARY.

(1) Utterance of the Word, (2) the setting up of its connection, (3) actual usage—all these three acts are, by their very nature, such as can be done only one after the other; and it is absolutely impossible to do them all at the same time. And when there is no simultaneity, there can be no setting up of the Connection. If succession were waited for, that would mean that the Word continues to exist for some time (other than the one at which it is produced).—(2246)

The Mīmāṃsaka reaffirms his view in the following:—

TEXTS (2247-2248).

"For those persons who live at different times and places, etc.—prior to the hearing of other words—there cannot be even one such word as had its connection set up.—Even if the idea be that the Connection is 'asserted' (not set up or created),—the refutation of that also would be the same; as no such 'assertion' is possible in regard to what has perished, or what is non-existent, or what exists only at the present moment."—[Ślokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 260-261].—(2247-2248)]

COMMENTARY.

The term 'ādi', 'etcetera', includes the states of childhood, youth and so forth.
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'Prior to'—this has to be construed with 'hearing of other Words'.
'Perished, etc. etc.'—'what has perished'—i.e. the past;—'what is non-existent'—the future; with regard to these two no 'assertion of connection' can be made, because they are non-existent at the time;—as regards 'what exists'—i.e. the present, which is being uttered,—that also perishes immediately; how could it continue to exist till the setting up of the Connection?

(2247-2248)

The same idea is further explained:

TEXTS (2249–2251).

"Which Word would it be which the Speaker would speak of to the Hearer, as being expressive of meaning,—when he is unable to utter the Word that has been heard previously?

—He cannot speak of the Word as expressive. He might speak of it as similar; but, in that case, it would not be possible for the Hearer to recognise it as similar to that expressive Word; because he has never heard that original expressive Word; while the new Word that he hears is not expressive. And when the man who is a Speaker now becomes the Hearer at a later time, the same difficulties would appear.'—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 261–264].—(2249–2251)

COMMENTARY.

The Speaker cannot speak of the previously heard Word, to the Hearer, because it has perished already; the Word that he does speak to him,—that he cannot prove to be expressive; because this Word has not yet had any connection set up in regard to itself.

It might be possible that he might speak of it as similar to the expressive Word.—But that also is not possible.—This is what is explained in the words—'But in that case, etc. etc.'—What is desired in this connection is not similarity to anything, but similarity to the expressive Word; and that is not possible. If the Hearer had heard any expressive Word, then the similarity could be pointed out to him; as a matter of fact, however, the Hearer has not heard the expressive Word at the time that the Convention regarding its meaning was set up; hence what has been suggested is not possible.

It might be urged that the Word that is being spoken of to him by the Speaker might be expressive.

The answer to that is,—'The new Word that he hears is not expressive'—; the Word that is being uttered at the moment is not expressive; because no connection has been set up in relation to it; as has been already pointed out.
‘When the man who is the Speaker, etc. etc.’—What is meant by this is that when the present Speaker, in his return, becomes the Hearer,—then all these difficulties would affect him also,—i.e. all those difficulties just shown under Text 2250.

Thus then, for all Speakers, there can be no expressive Word at all;—this is the upshot of the whole argument.—(2249–2251)

The following Text sums up the Mimāmsaka’s position:

TEXT (2252).

“For all these reasons, the connection between the Word and its meaning should be accepted as eternal; it cannot be based upon convention; as that is not possible in any way.”—(2252)

COMMENTARY.

In the following Text, the Mimāmsaka sets forth the view opposed to his own—

TEXT (2253).

‘The requisite capacity does not belong to the Denoter (Word) and the Denoted (meaning), by themselves; the idea that people derive from Words is due to Convention;—just as in the case of the winking of the Eye.’—[Shloka-vārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, 12].—(2253)

COMMENTARY.

As between the Denotative Word and the Denoted meaning, there is no such capacity inherent in their very nature, by virtue of which one is denotative and the other denoted.

Question:—How then is any idea deduced from the Word?

Answer:—‘The idea that people, etc. etc.’—When the causal potency of something is such that it stands in need of Convention, then that cannot be its natural potency or capacity;—for example, some idea is derived from the winking of the Eye;—the causal potency of the Word in bringing about the notion of its meaning is dependent upon Convention;—hence here we find something contrary to a wider term.

What the Opponent does here is to refute the objections that have been urged by the Mimāmsaka against the conclusion that ‘Words are not-eternal’.

—(2253)
The answer to the above (from the *Mimāmsa*) is as follows:

**TEXTS (2254-2255).**

"Is this Convention made for each individual mortal being? Or for each utterance of the Word? Or only once at the beginning of the World, by some one Person?—Does the connection also (of the Word with its denotation) differ with each individual? Or is it one only, for all?—If it is one, it cannot be artificial;—if it is different with each, there should be some idea of this difference."—[Shlokavārtika—Sam-
bandhāṅkṝpaparīhāra, 13-14].—

(2254-2255)

**COMMENTARY.**

The 'Convention' is in the form 'this (Word) is the name of this thing (object denoted)';—for the purpose of comprehension, it could be set up either (a) for each individual person,—or (b) for each utterance and use by each person,—or (c) it would be set up aimlessly once only, at the beginning of the world—at the time of creation—by some one Person—an ordainer, in the shape of God.—These three alternatives are possible.

'Does the Connection also, etc. etc.'—The connection also between the Word and its Denotation,—when it is set up,—would it sometimes differ with each living being? Or would it be one only?—This is another point for consideration.

If it were one only, it would, like the 'Universal', continue to remain through all variations of time and place, and as such it could not be 'artificial'; that is, it would be *eternal*.

If, on the other hand, it is different with each living being,—having a different character for each person,—then it would follow that there should be cognition of its difference (and diversity); as diversity in *Cognition* is always based upon diversity of what is *cognised*. As a matter of fact, in the case of the words, 'Cow' and the rest, even after the word has been used hundreds of times, there is no cognition of any difference; as is clear from the fact that in usage it is always regarded as one and the same.—

(2254-2255)

Further, if the Connection is different with each person, then there must be cognition of difference, and this would put an end to all use of the Word. This is what is shown in the following:
TEXT (2256).

"As there would be difference between the ideas of the Speaker and the Hearer (in regard to the Connection),—the use of the Word would become vitiated; as the idea of the Connection in the Mind of the Speaker would be one, while that in the Mind of the Hearer would be totally different".—[Shlokavārtīka—Sam-bandhākṣēparāhara, 21-22].—(2256)

COMMENTARY.

'Difference between the ideas'—The complete phrase should be 'difference between the Connection that forms the object of the ideas'.—Hence the sense comes to be this:—The object, the matter, that figures in the ideas of the Speaker and the Hearer,—being different, there could be no usage based upon the idea of the denotation (of the Word) being one and the same.

Question :—Why so?

Answer :—'As the connection in the mind, etc. etc.'

The Mīmāṃsāka now takes up the view that 'the Convention is made for each mortal being' (the first alternative, under Text 2254); and points out the defect in it:

TEXTS (2257–2263).

"For the purpose of setting up the connection for the benefit of the Hearer,—which 'connection' could the Speaker have recourse to?—The Connection which he has perceived before,—that he cannot set up for the Hearer; while the new one that he might set up has never been actually found to be expressive ..... If it be argued that—'the same arguments apply to the Jar and such things also',—then the answer is that it is not so; because in the case of these what is recognised is the 'Universal', whose existence has been already established;—even as regards the 'individual' (Jar), that individual which has been perceived to be efficient cannot be set up; while that individual which may be set up has not been found to be efficient in bringing about its effect.—Even with all this, however, in the case of utterances, the potency or efficiency has been recognised on the basis of the 'Configuration' (i.e. the 'Universal').—This 'Universal' can have no beginning; but your 'Connection' has beginning.—If, in connection with that (Connec-
TION) also, you admit of an eternal ‘Universal’ (Commonalty),—then our view of the matter becomes established. But even so, there cannot be a dual form. As a matter of fact, the ‘Connection’ is only a kind of Potency; and of this no diversity is perceived; it is always inferred from its effects, and as such, it follows the diversity in the effects.—In fact the Potency is always presumed on the basis of the fact of something well-known not being otherwise explicable; and when this purpose (of explaining) has been accomplished by the presumption of one Potency, there can be no justification for assuming several’].—[Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparīhāra, 22–29].—(2257–2263)

COMMENTARY.

‘That he cannot set up for the Hearer’;—because it has perished (according to the Opponent).

‘Has never been found to be expressive’;—because it has never been perceived before.

‘In the case of the Jar and other things’.—By putting forward this incongruity, the Opponents mean to suggest the ‘Inconclusive’ character of the Mīmāṃsaka’s Reason. What is meant is that what has been urged is applicable to the case of the Jar, etc. also; for instance, the Jar that has been actually found to be efficient in accomplishing an effective action cannot be made again, because it perished as soon as produced; while the one that is made now has never been actually found to be efficient.

The answer to this is—‘It is not so; because in the case of these, etc. etc.’.—‘It is not so’ denies the Opponent’s assertion.—Why is it not so?—Because the ‘Universal’ has been established.

This same idea is further clarified—‘Even with regard to the Individual, etc. etc.’.—Even though the individual Jar has had its efficiency perceived in the past in the fetching of water, yet that individual cannot be made again; as it has come and perished; while the one that is made now, its capacity for effective action has not yet been ascertained.—Even so, the capacity for effective action is taken for granted in all individuals, on the basis of the ‘Universal’ (Commonalty).

How so?

‘This can have no beginning.’—‘This’ stands for the ‘Universal’. In some places the reading is ‘na cha tasyādiniṭṭa, etc.’ the meaning of which is as follows:—Of the efficiency to bring about effects like water-fetching and the like, there is no beginning in time; because the ‘universal’ is always eternal; and it is absolutely non-different from its substrata (in the shape of the Individuals); as declared in the words—‘The Universal has no existence apart from the Individual’.

Says the Opponent—‘The Connection (between Word and Meaning) also may be similarly regarded as eternal, on the basis of the Universal’.
The answer to this is, that that cannot be right; this is what is explained in the words—'But your connection has beginning'.

Further, if you admit of the eternal 'Universal' in the case of the Connection between the Word and its meaning,—in that case it becomes established that there is an entity that is eternal; and this is exactly our view.

It might be urged that that fact (of eternity) does not become established in connection with the Word, which is the matter under consideration.

The answer to that is—'But even so, there cannot be a dual form';—the 'two forms' consisting of the 'Connection' and the 'Universal'; only one form is possible, not the Universal; because the 'Universal' subsists in several individuals; while the 'Connection' is one only.

Question:—How do you know that the Connection is one only?

Answer:—'As a matter of fact, the Connection is only a kind of Potency, etc. etc.'—The 'Connection' is not anything different from the Potency.

Question:—What if that is so?

Answer:—'And of this no diversity is perceived'.—'Diversity'—plurality.

Question:—Why is it not perceived?

Answer:—'It is always inferred from its effects';—that is, in all cases, it can only be inferred from the effects it produces; as declared in the words—'Potencies of all things can be proved only by the fact of their effects not being otherwise explicable'.—It is for this reason that the Potency only follows the diversity of its effects; that is, when it gives rise to any notion of diversity regarding itself, it is only in accordance with the diversity of its effects; that is to say, on the ground that there can be no idea of diversity in the Potency unless there is diversity in its effects.—In the case in question, there is no diversity in the effect. Because the effect (in the case of the Words) consists only in the bringing about of the particular cognition; and this cognition could be based either upon the Word or upon the Object (denoted by it). There is no diversity in the former; because the Word is always recognised as the same. Nor can there be diversity in the cognition based upon the Object; because even when the word 'Cow' has been uttered hundreds of times, the cognition produced is never of any other kind (save that of the Cow).

The upshot of the whole is stated in the words—'In fact, the Potency, etc. etc.'—It is because the cognition of the meaning (denotation of the object, is not otherwise explicable that the Potency of the 'Denoted and Denoter' is presumed; and as this purpose is accomplished by a single Potency, the assumption of several Potencies is absolutely useless.

Nor can the diversity of the Potency be inferred on the basis of the fact of denotation not being otherwise explicable; all that this fact can indicate is mere Potency (not its diversity).—(2257–2263)

The following texts proceed to show that for the following reason also the notion of the Connection being made cannot be right, and consequently, the Connection must be eternal:—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXTS (2264-2265).

"At the time that the Connection is asserted, if the word 'Cow' is uttered, some people, being cognisant of the Connection, comprehend the meaning,—while others do not do so. Consequently, if, at any time, the Connection were non-existent, no one would comprehend its meaning.—It may be argued that—if the Connection were there, all men would comprehend it'.—But that is not possible; because (even though there) the Connection may not be known to certain persons."

—[Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, 30-31].—(2264-2265)

COMMENTARY.

When some one says 'This Cow should not be touched with the foot', some people, having been cognisant of the Connection of Denoted and Denoter between the word and the particular animal, comprehend the object, through that Connection; while others who are not cognisant of the Connection comprehend only the verbal form, not its meaning. Such being the case, if the Connection were not a real entity, then all men, experienced in usage, would be unable to comprehend the meaning. Because the same thing cannot have the two mutually contradictory characters of being existent and non-existent. From this it follows that the Connection must be there permanently.

Says the Opponent—'If the Connection is always there, then how is it that all men do not have the comprehension of the meaning at all times?'

The Mīmāṁsaka anticipates this objection and supplies the detailed answer to it, in the words—'If the Connection were there, etc. etc.'—'That is not possible, etc.' sets aside the objection.

Why so?

'Because the Connection may not be known to certain persons.'—(2264-2265)

Says the Opponent—'Even if the Connection is not known (to some persons), why should it not bring about its own effects? Even though hidden in the holes of the Threshing Yard, the seed does not relinquish its own function of producing the sprout.'

The Mīmāṁsaka's answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2266).

"The Connection is only an indicator; hence (for its functioning) it stands in need of being cognised itself; it is for this reason that, though present, it does not do the indicating until it is itself cognised."—[Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, 32].—(2266)

COMMENTARY.

The nature of the Indicator is different from that of the Producer; the Word, like the Smoke, is only an Indicator, not a producer, like the seed. Hence the objection raised is not applicable.—(2266)
Says the Opponent—It is not possible for the same thing to have the two contradictory characters of being existent and being non-existent; similarly it cannot be right for the same thing to be both known and not known. If there is no incompatibility between these two, why should there be incompatibility between existence and non-existence?

The *Mimāmsaka*’s answer to this is as follows:

**TEXTS (2267–2269).**

"It is often found that though a certain thing *exists*, it is *not known*; but it is never found by any person that what is absolutely *non-existent* is *existent*; because existence and non-existence being mutually contradictory, cannot belong to the same thing. There is no such contradiction between *being known* and *being not known*; because knowledge subsists in the cognisant person; and as personalities vary, there is no incompatibility; hence the absence of knowledge, as residing in one person, does not become excluded (by the presence of knowledge, in another person).—[Shlokavārtika—Sambandhā-kṣepaparihāra, 33–35].—(2267–2269)

**COMMENTARY.**

It is incompatible for two mutually contradictory properties to reside in the same thing,—not when they reside in different things. As regards *being known* and *being not known*,—these reside in different persons; hence there can be no incongruity in this. The same cannot be said of *existence* and *non-existence*, which have been held (by the Opponent) to reside in the same thing (the Connection). Such, in brief, is the sense of the argument.— (2267–2269)

Says the Opponent—In the case of the two characters of *being known* and *being not-known*,—these two also imply the mutually contradictory characters of *existence* and *non-existence* as residing in the same substratum [it being the Object that has the characters of *being known* and *being not-known*, even though the *knowledge* resides in the men]; hence the said incongruity vitiates this view also. Because the *cognition* and *non-cognition* of things are invariably concomitant with their *existence* and *non-existence*; because they are based upon these; if it is not so, then it behoves you to explain why when two persons are standing upon equally suitable places, one sees the thing while the other does not.

In anticipation of this argument, the *Mimāmsaka* says:
TEXT (2270).

"THE WHITE OBJECT STANDING BEFORE PERSONS SOME OF WHOM ARE BLIND AND THE OTHERS ARE NOT,—THE OBJECT IS NOT SEEN BY THOSE WHO ARE BLIND, WHILE IT IS SEEN BY THOSE WHO ARE NOT; BUT THIS DOES NOT MAKE THE OBJECT existent AND non-existent."—[Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, 37].—(2270)

COMMENTARY.

The Colour present before two persons—of whom one is blind and the other not so,—is actually seen only by one whose vision is perfect, and not by the other; and even for these men, this fact does not make the Colour existent (for the one) and non-existent (for the other).—The same would be the case with the Connection also.—(2270)

In order to meet the question as to what is the cause of this,—the Mīmāṃsaka offers the following explanation:

TEXT (2271).

"THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY IN THIS CASE, BECAUSE THERE IS DIVERSITY IN THE CAPACITY AND INCAPACITY OF MEN. IN THE CASE IN QUESTION (OF WORDS) ALSO, THERE IS NO CAUSE OF THE PERCEPTION (OF THE MEANING), OTHER THAN THE Connection."—[Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, 38].—(2271)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—Mere existence is not the cause of a thing being perceived; the cause of it lies in the capacity of the perceiving man; it is for this reason that even when the thing is existent, its non-perception by some one who is devoid of the capacity to perceive it, does not involve any incongruity; hence ‘non-cognition’ cannot be said to be invariably concomitant with non-existence.

Says the Opponent—If that is so, then, even when the Connection (of the Word and its meaning) is not there, the cognition or non-cognition of the meaning by men would be determined by the presence and absence of the capacity in the men; so that it all stands on the same footing.

The answer to this is—‘There is no cause, etc. etc.’—That is, the cognition of the meaning always follows from the cognition of the Connection.—‘Other’ goes with ‘cause’.

‘Of the perception’—i.e. of the apprehension of the meaning of the Word.

‘Darshanasya’—the Genitive is to be construed with ‘hētuḥ’.
In ‘Sambandhāt’, the Ablative is to be construed with ‘anyāḥ’.

‘In the case in question’—i.e. in the matter of the usage relating to Words and their meanings.

Other people take the first half of the text itself as providing the reason demanded by the Opponent, and explain the term ‘Sambandhāt’, as ‘apart from the capacities of men’; and ‘atra’ as standing for the ‘white object’ spoken of above.—(2271)

In the following Text, the Mīmāṃsaka sums up the argument as hearing upon the matter under discussion:

TEXT (2272).

"THUS THEN, THE 'KNOWLEDGE OF USAGE' STANDS ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THE SENSE-ORGANS; SO THAT THOSE WHO HAVE THE SAID KNOWLEDGE APPREHEND THE MEANING, WHILE OTHERS, NOT HAVING THE SAID KNOWLEDGE, DO NOT APPREHEND IT,—JUST AS THE BLIND MAN (BEING DEVOID OF THE VISUAL ORGAN, DOES NOT APPREHEND COLOUR)."

[Shlokavārttika—Sambandhākṣepaparīhāra, 39].

—(2272)

COMMENTARY.

The term ‘vyavahāra’, ‘usage’, here stands for the Connection between the word and its meaning, in the sense that it is on the basis of this that words are used—‘vyavahārīyaṃ asmat’;—the ‘Knowledge’ of this Connection, stands on the same footing as the sense-organs; for instance, those alone who have the sense-organ perceive the object,—while those who have not do not perceive it even though the object is there; similarly, those who have the knowledge of the Connection comprehend the meaning from the Word, while those who do not have that knowledge do not comprehend it, even though the Connection is there;—so really there is perfect analogy between the two cases.—(2272)

[Under the view that the Connection of the Word with its meaning was created, set up at a certain time, by a certain person] it has to be explained, who the Person was who created the Connection and to whom he communicated it.—It cannot be right to say that the man learns it by himself; as the same might be said regarding others also.—If it was communicated to the present man by some one else,—then it should have been communicated to that man also by some one else,—then, in that case, there being no beginning, the Connection must be regarded as eternal.

This is shown by the Mīmāṃsaka in the following:
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXT (2273).

"As a matter of fact, for all persons ignorant (of the connection), the connection becomes known through long-continued tradition,—and there has been no beginning of the connection."—(2273)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—The connection between the Word and its meaning must be regarded as preceded by the usage of elderly people,—because it is a connection,—like connections of the present time,—the connection under dispute is also a connection; hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.—(2273)

Having thus established the conclusion that it is not possible for the Convention to be set up with regard to each mortal being (the first alternative suggested in Text 2254),—the Mimāṃsaka proceeds to reject the other alternative (suggested there) that it is set up in reference to each utterance.

TEXTS (2274–2277).

"Convention in regard to each utterance cannot be made by usage.—At the time of the beginning of the creation, there could not be any such action; and no such time is admitted by us."—[Shlokavārtika—Sambandhāṅgopaparihāra, 42].—The view held by us is that the world was never otherwise than what it is now.—As for the 'universal dissolution', it cannot be known that there can be any such in reality. In fact 'dissolution' may be a name for the Night only, when there is cessation of all activity; the Day in that case would be 'creation', because all sorts of activity proceed at that time. Or 'dissolution' may be there in the form of the destruction of particular countries or destruction of particular families.—There is no evidence for any such dissolution as consists in the destruction of all things."—(2274–2277)

COMMENTARY.

'By usage'—i.e. through the setting up of usage; what is meant is that, otherwise, there could be no setting up of the usage prior to the setting up of the connection.

It has been asserted that the connection could have been set up either at the beginning of creation or it might be set up in the present. This is rebutted by the words—'At the time, etc. etc.'—'Such time'—i.e. the time of the dissolution of the world, when there would be no connection between words and meanings.
'Otherwise than what it is'—i.e. in the state of the utter annihilation of all things—as there is no evidence for this.

Question:—How then do people speak of the 'Dissolution'?

Answer:—'As for Universal Dissolution, etc. etc.'—'cannot be known'—by people:—'in reality' what is meant is that an assumed destruction of all things may not be denied.

These assumptions are exemplified—'Dissolution may be the name for Night only'.

Question:—Why is not the real 'Dissolution' admitted?

Answer:—'There is no evidence, etc. etc.'—(2274–2277)

Granting that there is real 'Dissolution';—even so, as at that time, there would be no creative Person, in the shape of God, who has not entirely lost his memory, intuition and other faculties,—no setting up of the Connection would be possible.

This is shown in the following:

TEXT (2278).

"As a matter of fact there can be no eternal Creator and Destroyer, in the shape of God or any such Being, who, not having lost his memory, could set up the Connection."—(2278)

COMMENTARY.

'There can be, etc. etc.'—Because the possibility of any such Being has been repudiated in detail.—(2278)

In the following texts, the Mīmāṃsaka anticipates the objections of the Opponent—

TEXT (2279).

"[Says the Opponent]—'[Even though the Letters may be eternal] the arrangement (order) of the Letters cannot be eternal;—consequently what is expressive cannot be eternal. Because what is regarded as expressive is the Word; and the idea of the Word is dependent upon the said order (of Letters)'."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 278].—(2279)

COMMENTARY.

The Word is held (by the Mīmāṃsaka) to consist of the definite arrangement of the Letters,—not of any such single entity as the 'Spōṭa' [which,
according to the Grammarians, is what, in the case of every Word, is really the entity representing the whole Word, which expresses the meaning;—and as the arrangement or order of the Letters is always dependent upon the whim of man (the Speaker), it cannot be eternal; and in this way the Letters also must be regarded as non-eternal; because the 'arrangement' is not anything different from the Letters.

How so?

'Because what is regarded as expressive, etc. etc.'—It is the Word, consisting of the Letters, that is regarded to be expressive; because the idea of 'Word' is due to the particular arrangement of the Letters, not to any such other entity as the 'Sphota';—and the arrangement is due to human agency.

(2279)

The same idea is further explained—

TEXTS (2280-2281).

"[The Opponent continues]—'As, according to you, the Letters are all-pervading, any particular arrangement cannot be inherent in themselves; because the arrangement is the product of articulation which is not-eternal,—it must, on that account, be non-eternal.—Further, the said arrangement must be dependent upon the whim of the Speaker, as it owes its appearance to his desire to speak. Thus the eternity of the Letters would be useless for you'."—

[Shlokavartin—Eternality of Words, 279-280].

(2280-2281)

COMMENTARY.

According to you—Mimamsakas—Letters are all-pervading; hence there can be no order or arrangement among them, in relation to space; nor can it be in relation to time, because they are eternal; hence it could be there only as due to the articulation that manifests them;—and as this articulation is not eternal, what is due to it must also be non-eternal.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—'What is due to something non-eternal must be non-eternal,—e.g. the Jar;—the order of the Letters is due to something non-eternal; hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.'
Then again, what comes about through the man's 'desire to speak' must be treated by the intelligent as of human origin,—like the shaking of the hands, the winking of the Eye and so forth;—and the Order of the Letters (in a word) comes about by the desire of man;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(2280-2281)

It might be urged that—the Letters themselves, without any order, as they become heard by the Ear, would express the meaning.

The Opponent's answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2282-2283).

"'Words, without some order, have never been known to be expressive; hence it is the order (or arrangement) which should be regarded as the Word. For those people alone, according to whom the Word is something different from the Letters, and devoid of any order of sequence (or arrangement), can the assumption of the eternity of words have any use?.'"—[Ślokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 282-283].—

(2282-2283)

COMMENTARY.

The Letters themselves, without any order, have never been found to be expressive of meanings; hence a definite order or arrangement of Letters has got to be admitted. Under the circumstances, it is the order that comes to be the Word, and also expressive,—for you, Mīmāṁsakas; and all this character cannot belong to the Letters themselves.

This Order, however, is something non-eternal; hence what is expressive must also be non-eternal; hence the assumption of the eternity of Words is absolutely futile. Because what is desired by you is to prove the eternity of only that Word which is expressive,—not of any other; hence the proofs that you adduce in support of the Letters only are of no use in the matter under consideration; because the mere Letters are not expressive;—then as regards what is expressive, i.e. the order or arrangement of the Letters,—it is not regarded as eternal; hence all your effort is futile.

There are some people,—e.g. the Grammarians,—who regard the *Sphota*, which is an impartite entity as a whole, apart from the Letters, to be expressive;—for these people alone the assumption of the eternity of the Word can have any use; because the said entity 'Sphota' is eternal.—

(2282-2283)

To the above arguments of the Opponent, the Mīmāṁsaka offers the following reply:—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXT (2284).

"THE CONTINGENCY OF THE ORDER OR ARRANGEMENT BEING REGARDED AS
THE WORD DOES NOT ARISE FOR US. BECAUSE THE ORDER OR ARRANGE-
MENT AS SUBSISTING IN ANYTHING ELSE HAS NEVER BEEN
FOUND TO BE ILLUMINATIVE (EXPRESSIVE)."—[Shlok-
vārtika—Eternality of Words, 284].—(2284)

COMMENTARY.

'Order' consists in a certain sequential arrangement; any such arrange-
ment cannot become expressive,—under our view; because it would not be
universally true.—This is shown by the words—'Because, etc. etc.'—'Sub-
sisting in anything else',—e.g. that subsisting in gems, pearls and so forth.
—(2284)

Further, it is not only the order subsisting in the Letters that is held to
be expressive.—Why ?—The reason is explained in the following:

TEXT (2285).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE ORDER OR ARRANGEMENT IS ONLY A PRO-
PERTY OF THE LETTERS; IT IS NOT REGARDED TO BE A DISTINCT
ENTITY BY ITSELF. THE IDEA, IN FACT, IS THAT WHAT ARE
EXPRESSIVE ARE THE LETTERS AS COGNISED IN THE SAID ORDER.'"—
[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Letters, 286-287].
—(2285)

COMMENTARY.

'Not a distinct entity'—i.e., as expressive independently by itself.
Otherwise, there would be real difference between the Property and the Object
to which it belongs,—which difference is not desirable.

Question:—What is it then that is expressive?
Answer:—'The idea in fact, etc. etc.'—'Itham', in a particular order.

What is meant is as follows:—It is not merely the Order that is expressive;
—nor the Order as subsisting in the Letters;—nor merely the Letters; what
are expressive are the Letters as arranged in a certain order; hence in
the matter of expression, the Order is not the principal factor; because the
Letters are cognised as having the Order; hence the Order occupies only a sec-
dary position; and it is the Letters that are recognised as the thing possessing
that Order as their property. This is what is meant by the Text.—(2285)

Two arguments have been urged (by the Opponent, under Text 2280)
to the effect—(1) that the Letters are the products of Articulation, and (2)
that they are dependent upon the whim of the Speaker.—It is pointed out
by the Mīmāṃsaka in the following texts that both these Reasons are
'inadmissible':—
TEXTS (2286-2287).

"As a matter of fact, the Order of Sequence is not a product; because it is always accepted as an already established entity; the Speaker does not adopt any order independently by his own choice; in fact, he always desires to utter the word in the same form in which it has been uttered by others in the past; and other persons coming later also utter it in that same form;—thus it is that this also is without beginning,—like the Connection (of the Meaning)."—[Śloka-vārtika—Eternality of Words, 287-289].—(2286-2287)

COMMENTARY.

'Because it is always, etc. etc.'—i.e. the Speaker adopts the already existing order.

This is further clarified—'The Speaker does not, etc. etc.'.

Like the Connection, the Order also is without beginning.—(2286-2287)

The argument is summed up by the Mīmāṁsaka in the following:

TEXT (2288).

"Thus then, even though the Order is not something unchangeable (and eternal in that sense), yet it is eternal, in usage. And we have to make an effort to refute the idea of men being independent (in their choice of the Order of Letters used)."—[Śloka-vārtika—Eternality of Words, 289-290].—(2288)

COMMENTARY.

'Naḥ'—the Genitive ending is due to the verbal affix found in 'pratiṣedhyā'.

The objection that has been urged is therefore not applicable.

Thus though the Order is not eternal in the sense of being unchangeable, like the Hill,—yet its eternality has to be accepted on the basis of the usage of experienced persons.

What this means is that the Order is eternal for all practical purposes,—and not unchangeably eternal, like the Hills.—(2288)

Question.—If that is so in the case of the Order, why is not the 'eternality' of the Letters also regarded as being for practical purposes only?

Answer:
"In the case of the Letters however, such eternity would not be possible if they were not really unchangeable; it is only when the Letters themselves are eternal that their Order can appear through usage; just in the same manner as the Jar and other things are made only when the eternal Atoms are there; in the absence of these, the making of these things would have no basis at all, and none such is ever perceived."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 290–292].—(2289-2290)

COMMENTARY.

Like the Order, the Letters also could not be regarded as eternal in usage, though not unchangeably eternal, and the phenomena of the comprehension of the meanings of words explained on that basis.

Question:—Why can it not be so explained?

Answer:—'It is only when the Letters, etc. etc.'—If the Letters were unchangeably eternal,—in that case, the usage would be possible through tradition among people and thence the appearance of the Order; i.e. the Order would acquire its existence; as for example, the making of the Jar, etc. proceeds from the Atoms as their basis.

In some places, the reading is 'kramādayah' (for 'kamodayah'); in which case the 'ādś' would include their 'Connection', 'Recognition' and so forth.

Question:—'Why cannot the making (and appearance, of Jar, etc. and Order) be possible without the eternity of the Letters and the Atoms?'

Answer:—'In the absence of these, etc. etc.'— in the absence of these stands for 'if both, the Letters and the Atoms, were not unchangeably eternal'.

Says the Opponent—Just as the Atoms are the constituent cause of the Jar and other things,—so of the Letters also, there would be subtler constituent parts; as has been declared (by Grammarians) that—'Of Letters there are constituent parts, of which the Letters themselves are only the fourth stage'. Under the circumstances, how is it that Letters are described as unchangeably eternal?

Answer:—This does not affect our case. It has been explained in course of the Refutation of Sphoţa (Shlokavārtika), that Letters have no constituent parts.—(2289-2290)

Further, if Letters were not eternal, in the sense of being unchangeable, —then, in the mind of every user of words, the idea could not be there that 'I am uttering only those words that have been used by others'; and yet as
a matter of fact, this idea is there; hence it follows that this could not be possible if the Letters were not eternal.

This is what is explained in the following:

TEXT (2291).

"THE IDEA IN THE MIND OF EVERY SPEAKER IS ALWAYS THAT ‘I AM UTTERING WORDS THAT HAVE BEEN USED BY OTHER PERSONS’; THIS IN ITSELF MAKES THEM ETERNAL; AND THERE IS NOTHING FOR YOU THAT WOULD BE INDICATIVE (OF A CONTRARY CONCLUSION)."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 294].—(2291)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent—If the Order of the Letters, Ga and the rest, is not eternal in reality,—nor are the articulations manifesting them, nor those Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc.,—then one cannot bring about these prompters of the articulations [as they are past and gone immediately on coming]; and the new ones that one does bring about have never before been found to be such prompters;—under the circumstances, how can the Letters, manifested in a certain order, become the means of comprehending the meaning?—(2291)

In view of all these arguments, the Mīmāṃsaka says:

TEXT (2292).


COMMENTARY.

Just as in the case of the Jar, etc., even though they are non-eternal, yet their use is indicated by the ‘Universal’;—so, in the same way, even though the particular arrangement of the Letters may be non-eternal, their use could be determined and explained.—(2292)
How the use could be determined and indicated is next explained:

TEXTS (2293-2294).

"Such Universals as the 'Palate', etc. are always present (in their Universal or common form) in all men; and it is through these that the Speaker emits the Articulations;—and there are distinct Universals of these (Articulations) also, which serve to bring about the manifestation of the Sounds, and there are as many of these as there are Letters;—or it is the particular individuals (Articulations) themselves as associated with the said Universals that bring about the manifestation of the particular Letter-Sounds."—[Shloka-vārtika—Eternality of Words, 296-297].—(2293-2294)

COMMENTARY.

Such Universals as 'the Palate' and other speech-centres subsist in the individual Palates of all men; and as such are present in all men;—it is through these Universals that the Speaker determines these speech-centres, and then emits—exhales—through them the Articulations in the shape of the manifestive air-currents; this is in accordance with the maxim that 'there can be no idea of the Qualified until there is cognition of the Qualification'.

Though these Articulations are evanescent,—yet like the Universal 'Cow' and the like, there are as many 'Universals' as there are Letters; and these same Universals, associated with the Individuals, become manifesters of the Letter-Sounds.

Or, the individual Articulations themselves, associated with the Universals, proceed to manifest the Sounds in consonance with the Letters. This is an alternative view.—(2293-2294)

Says the Opponent—Though there are distinct Universals of the Articulations, yet, even when these Articulations are marked by those Universals, they cannot bring about the particular order in which the Letters are manifested,—unless the Order is there. Because even though, through their respective Universals, they are distinct from one another, yet there can be no Order inherent in themselves; because they are impartite things. Under the circumstances, how can there be any idea of the Order among Letters, brought about by the Order in their manifester?

The Mīmāṃsaka's answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (2295).

"The Order of Sequence among the Articulations would be due to the order among the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc.; and the Eternality of both would be due to their respective Universals."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 298].—(2295)

COMMENTARY.

Though there is no Order among the Articulations by themselves, yet the Order among them is brought about by the Conjunctions and Disjunctions.

The eternity of both,—i.e. (1) of the Order of the Conjunctions and Disjunctions with the Palate, etc., and (2) of the Order of the Articulations,—is due to the Universals subsisting in them respectively.

Thus everything is all right.—(2295)

Question:—When the Order is non-eternal by itself, how can its eternity be indicated by the Universal, by virtue of which it would form part of Usage?

Answer:—

TEXT (2396).

"Just as in the case of Moving About and other Actions, there is an Order of Sequence, through the 'Universal' subsisting in the various factors in the Action,—so a similar Order of Sequence may be there among the Palate, etc., the Articulation and the Letter, through their respective Universals."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 299].—(2296)

COMMENTARY.

Just as in the case of the particular Actions of Moving About and the like,—' and the like ' including Ant-lines, etc.—the presence of the Order of Sequence becomes a part of usage, through the 'Universal', etc. subsisting in the various factors,—here also ' et cetera ' includes the Universals in the Ant-lines, etc.,—so, in the same manner, the presence of the Order of Sequence among the Palate, the Articulations and the Letters is adopted in use, as indicated by the Universals subsisting in the Palate, etc.

The compound ' tālvādīdhevanivarṇabhāk ' is to be expounded as ' tālvādī ', ' Palate, etc.'—' dhevanayaḥ ', ' Articulations '; and ' varnāh ', ' Letters ' [a copulative compound]—' that which bears this ' is ' tālvā . . . bhāk '. Thus what is meant is that—(a) the Order of the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, indicated by its own ' Universal ', is the cause of the exhalation of
the Articulation,—(2) the Order of the Articulations, due to the Order of the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc., indicated by its own 'Universal', becomes the cause of the Order in the manifestation of the Letters; and this last becomes the cause of the comprehension of the meaning.

In some places, the reading is 'bhūgāh'; under which the meaning would be as follows:—Just as the parts of the Actions of Moving About and the like, which appear in a certain Order of Sequence, become the basis of usage, when they are marked by a 'Universal' or by some other property,—similarly the Order of Sequence in the Palate, etc. becomes part of the usage.

Some people read 'Kramānusmṛtirēvam syāt' (in place 'Kramānuṛttri-rēvam syāt'); which would be construed as follows:—Just as the parts of the Actions of Moving About, etc. are remembered as marked by the Universal, etc.,—similarly in the case of the Palate, etc. also there would be remembrance of the Order, as marked by the Universal, etc.—(2296)

Or, the Order of the Articulations may not be due to the Order of the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc.,—it may be due to the Articulations themselves, because they are made up of component parts.—This is the view put forward in the following:—

TEXT (2297).

"Or, the individuals (Articulations) themselves, being extremely subtle in their nature,—there is cognition of the properties of the 'Universal'; and it is through this that there is cognition of order among the letters, even though these are all-pervading."—[Shlokavārttika—Eternality of Words, 300].—(2297)

COMMENTARY.

'Individuals'—stands for the particular Articulations. The parts—components—of the Articulations—which appear in a certain order,—are extremely subtle; hence there can be no usage through them; consequently the properties of the Universal—such as eternity and the rest—become recognised—definitely known—as the causes of the manifestation of the Word-Sound.

Question:—What if that is so?

Answer:—'It is through this, etc. etc.'—Even though the Letters are all-pervading, yet they appear as if in an Order of Sequence, on account of the Order of the Articulations which always appear in a certain order.—(2297)

The following text sums up the discussion:—
TEXT (2298).

"Thus it is that the Letters, following up the properties of the Articulation which appear there as eternal, become expressive of diverse meanings."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 301].—(2298)

COMMENTARY.

'Properties of the Articulation',—such as sequential Order, greater or less intensity, limitation in space and so forth.

'Which appear there as eternal',—through the Universals.

'Following up'—in accordance with.—(2298)

Thus, it has been explained in detail that, if on account of their being eternal and all-pervading, Letters cannot have any Order, etc. by themselves, —even so, all this Order, etc., really belonging to the manifesting Articulations, become attributed to the Letters and thereby become contributors to the comprehension of the meaning of (the Word).—Now the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to set forth another view, under which the said distinctions of Order, etc. really belong to Time, of which the Articulations are only the qualifying adjuncts; and these being perceived in the Letters, become contributors to the comprehension of the meaning.—

TEXT (2299).

"The Order of the Letters, as also the Shortness, Length and Prolongation,—all these are only distinctions or divisions of Time; and they come to be recognised as conditioned (or affected) by the Articulations."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 302].—(2299)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'dhvanyupādhyāyāḥ' is to be expounded as—'The distinctions of Time which have the manifesting Articulations for their qualification'.—(2299)

Says the Opponent—People who have postulated Time have regarded it as one, all-pervading and eternal; as has been declared in the following words:—'Some people regard Time as a substance which is one, eternal and all-pervading,—and something quite apart from the operation of modifiable substances';—under the circumstances, how can there be any 'distinctions' (or divisions) of Time?

The Mīmāṃsaka's answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (2300-2301).

"Time is one, all-pervading and eternal,—and yet it is known to be 'divided' also, among all things;—just like letters; and it becomes manifested by certain things in certain cases;—when it is manifested in connection with letters, it becomes contributory to the act of expressing (or denoting); and as it exists elsewhere also, its form is regarded as eternal."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 303-304].—(2300-2301)

COMMENTARY.

'Divided also';—the term 'also' goes with all that has gone before—it is one also, eternal also, all-pervading also; though it has been misplaced in the Text.

Question:—In what way is it 'divided'? 

Answer:—'Among all things, like Letters'.—What is meant is as follows:—Though the Letter, Ga for instance, is one only and eternal, yet when it comes to be manifested by a particular Articulation at a particular place, then it is known as divided through the divisions of place, etc.; similarly Time also; though it pervades over all things, yet when it comes to be manifested by a certain action in regard to a certain object, it becomes known as 'divided' or 'distinct'; and when it is manifested in connection with Letters, it becomes contributory to the act of expressing.

Question:—If Time is so 'divided', how is it regarded as eternal and all-pervading?

Answer:—'As it exists, etc. etc.'—'Elsewhere'—i.e. in Creepers, Leaves of trees and so forth;—because it exists in these also, its eternity and all-pervasiveness become recognised and established.—' Eternality' alone is mentioned in the Text, by way of illustration.—(2300-2301)

TEXT (2302).

"From all this it follows that there is no such property in Words as is perishable; consequently it becomes established that the Word is eternal, for those who uphold the Eternality of Letters."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 305].—(2302)

COMMENTARY.

'From all this, etc. etc.'—This sums up the Mīmāṃsaka's own view.

'Such property'—as Order, etc.—(2302)
Says the Opponent—If the Order then is a property of Time, or of the manifesting Articulation,—and does not really belong to Letters,—then how does it become contributory to the expressing of the meaning? Certainly the property of one thing cannot belong to the other.

The *Mīmāṃsāka*’s answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (2303).**

"As matter of fact, a property belonging to one thing does become auxiliary to another thing,—as has been pointed out in the case of the Speed of the Horse.—As regards ‘eternal-\nality’, in the case of all things, the only proof of it consists in presumption."—[Shlokavārtika—

Eternality of Words, 306].—(2303)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘As has been pointed out’—in such assertions as ‘People going in a boat, etc. etc.’ where the ‘boat’ is meant to stand for all kinds of conveyance.

‘Like the Speed of the Horse, etc.’—For example, when people are riding a horse, the speed of the horse is contributory to the man’s reaching a distant place, and also the man’s notion that the trees on the roadside are moving. Similarly the Order, though belonging to the Articulation, becomes contributory to the Letters bringing about the comprehension of the meaning.

Having thus shown in detail that the assertion of the non-eternity of Words is annulled by Presumption, the *Mīmāṃsāka* sums up his position in the words—‘As regards eternity, etc. etc.’—The term ‘tasmāt’ as introducing the summing up is to be regarded as understood here.

‘In the case of all things’—What is meant is that it is not the eternity of Letters only that is proved by the fact that the expression of meaning by the Letters cannot be otherwise explained,—but the eternity of the Palate, etc. and also of the Articulations. This has been declared in the *Bhāṣya* (Shabara. 1. 1. 18, Trans., p. 37) in the following words:—‘If the Word ceased to exist as soon as uttered, then no one could speak of anything to others; and in that case, the Word could not be uttered for the benefit of another. On the other hand, if the Word does not cease to exist, then it is only right that on hearing the Word several times, there is comprehension of its meaning’.—(2303)

The *Mīmāṃsāka* proceeds to point out that in denying the eternity of Words, the Opponent goes against (a) his own words, (b) against his own doctrine, (c) against scriptures, and (d) against common experience:—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXTS (2304-2305).

"IN SEEKING TO PROVE THE NON-ETERNALITY OF WORDS, THE OTHER PARTY INCURS THE ODIOUM OF CONTRADICTING HIS OWN WORDS; ETC.; AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVERY PROPOSITION IS ASSERTED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING ABOUT THE COMPREHENSION OF WHAT ONE DESIRES TO PROVE; AND IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT THE NON-ETERNAL WORD CANNOT EXPRESS ITS OWN MEANING. CONSEQUENTLY, AS YOUR OWN ASSERTION EXPRESSES ITS MEANING, IT FOLLOWS THAT IT MUST BE ETERNAL; AND THUS THERE IS REJECTION OF THE DESTRUCTIBILITY (NON-ETERNALITY, OF THE WORD)." — [Shlokavārtika — ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 313-314]. — (2304-2305)

COMMENTARY.

'His own words, etc.' — 'Etc.' is meant to include the contradiction of his own accepted doctrines.

'It has been explained' — Under the Text — 'A Word is not expressive if its connection with the meaning is not known.' (See Text 2234.)

'Consequently, it follows, etc. etc.' — The 'eternity' follows from—is proved by—the comprehension of the meaning. That is, the eternity is proved by the fact of the 'comprehension of meaning' being otherwise inexplicable.—(2304-2305)

The following Texts point out that the Opponent's assertion implies the rejection of his own accepted doctrine:

TEXTS (2306).

"HAVING ADMITTED THE CAPACITY OF WORDS TO EXPRESS THEIR MEANING, IF THE OPPONENT PROCEEDS TO ESTABLISH HIS CASE, HE CLEARLY SETS ASIDE THE 'NON-ETERNALITY' (OF WORDS), BY HIS OWN ACCEPTED DOCTRINE" — [Shlokavārtika — ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 315]. — (2306)

COMMENTARY.

The Mīmāṃsaka shows that the Opponent's Proposition goes against all scriptures—
TEXT (2307).

"For all parties, the perishability (non-eternity, of Words) becomes annulled by 'Scripture' (Verbal authority), through the potencies of Words in the bringing about of the cognition of their meanings,—which potencies form the basis of each and every scripture".—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 316].

—(2307)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'arthapraśiti, etc. etc.' is to be expounded as—'those potencies—of words—that are evinced in the bringing about of the cognition of their own meanings.'—The sense is that these serve to set aside the Proposition asserted by the Opponent.—(2307)

The Mīmāṃsaka next points out that the Opponent's Proposition is annulled by common experience—

TEXTS (2308-2309).

"In the manner shown before, the Opponent's Proposition is annulled by common experience also.—There is annulment by Inference also, for reasons stated before.—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 317].—Annulment by Perception also has been pointed out before—on the ground of the one-ness of Word-sound being definitely proved by Recognition brought about by the Auditory Organ".—(2308-2309)

COMMENTARY.

'In the manner shown above',—in the preceding text. But it should be read as follows—'For all parties the perishability of words becomes annulled by the potencies of words to bring about the comprehension of their meanings,—which potencies are definitely recognised by all men—and also by common experience'.

The words 'There is annulment by Inference, etc. etc.' serve to remind the reader of what has been said before regarding the Buddhist's Proposition being opposed to Inference, etc. The 'reasons stated before' have been of several kinds—those detailed in the Texts 2121 et seq.

'Has been pointed out before'—under Text 2117.—(2308-2309)

The Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out the defects in the 'Subject' (Minor Term) and in the 'Reasons' (Probans) of the Reasoning put forward (by the Opponent)—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXTS (2310–2312).

"It has to be explained what the 'Shabda', 'Word-Sound', is which is being proved to be perishable.—(a) Is it the 'aggregate of the Three Attributes'?—Or (b) something atomic?—or (c) 'a quality of Akāsha'?—or (d) something in the form of mere Sound, as apart from the Letters? Or (e) something in the form of Air*, not expressive (of meanings)? Or (f) 'Sphoṭa' in the form of Words and Sentences? Or (g) mere 'similarity'? Or (h) the 'exclusion of others'?—All these may be non-eternal; according to us eternity does not belong to these.—Hence your reasoning is open to the defects of (1) having a 'subject' whose exact nature is not known or admitted, and (2) having a 'probans' which has no substratum (or basis').—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 318–321].—(2310–2312)

COMMENTARY.

The Texts set forth the several views that have been held by various philosophers regarding the exact nature of 'Shabda' 'Word-sound' (in the present context).

(a) According to the Sāṃkhyaśastra, 'Shabda' is held to be something consisting of the 'Three Attributes' of Harmony, Energy and Inertia.—(b) According to the Digambara (Jainas), it is something atomic; 'pudgala' is Atom; what pertains to the pudgala, is padmina, 'atomic'; i.e. consisting of the Atom.—(c) The followers of Kanāda hold it to be a 'quality of Ākāsha'.—(d) According to the common people, it is something of the nature of mere Sound, as apart from the Letters; as has been declared in Patañjalī's Bhashya—'Or, Shabda among men is known as sound whose meaning is well known'.—(e) According to the author of the Shikṣā, it is of the nature of Air, not expressive; as declared by them: 'The Air becomes the Shabda'.—(f) The Grammarians hold Shabda to consist of the Word-sphoṭa and Sentence-sphoṭa; as has been said by them: 'The sounds sow the seed in the Buddha along

* Text 2311 presents what may be regarded as a 'literary curiosity'. Here we have a quotation from the Shlokavārtika—Chapter on Shabdaniṣṭāta, Shloka 319. Kamalashīla says, this represents the view of the Shikṣā that 'the Shabda consists of Air and is inexpressive'; the reading in the quotation being 'vāyurūpamānačakam'. The reading in the Shlokavārtika itself, however, is 'vāyurūpo'rahuऽačakam', which makes the Shabda, 'arthačakam', expressive of meaning. The Nyāyaratnakara says this is the view of the Shikṣā. One or the other—Tattvasangraha and its Commentary on the one hand, and Shlokavārtika and its Commentary on the other, must be wrong; both cannot be right, as representing the view of the Shikṣā. Pāṇini's Shikṣā does not help to solve the riddle.—On the face of it, the reading adopted in the Tattvasangraha appears to be wrong; as the subject-matter of the whole discussion is the expressive Shabda, not that which is inexpressive.
with the last articulation, and when this seed has developed by repetition, the Shabda becomes cognised'.—(q) According to Vindhyaśāsin, Shabda consists in 'similarity'.—(h) According to the Baudhāyas what expresses the meaning consists in the 'exclusion of others', called 'Apoha of others'.

If what the Buddhist seeks to prove is the 'non-eternity' of these eight kinds of 'Shabda'—as postulated by the Śaṅkhya and others,—then the 'Subject' becomes open to the defect of being futile, which is expressed in its own form; as such 'Subject' has been rejected by us. Nor do the Mimāṃsakas wish to prove the eternity of such Shabda as these.

Further, any such 'subject' as Shabda in the particular forms of the 'Three-Attribute entity' and the rest is not admitted or known, so far as we are concerned; hence the 'subject' becomes open to the charge of having its exact nature unknown. The Probans or Reason also, on that same account, becomes one whose substratum (in the shape of the Subject or Minor Term) is not admitted or known; and any such 'subject' is not admitted at all.—(2310–2312)

**TEXTS (2313-2314).**

"If then, your 'Subject' or 'Minor Term' consists of the Shabda as postulated by us, then, both these fallacies become applicable to you (who do not admit of any such Shabda as held by us).—If mere Shabda (in general, without any qualification) were asserted as the 'Subject' of your reasoning, then, it would mean that for you, the Universal 'Shabda' itself is non-eternal; and such a view would be contrary to the view accepted by all men that the Universal is always eternal; in one form or the other, the 'Universal' is regarded by every one as eternal."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 321–323].—(2313-2314)

**COMMENTARY.**

We, Mimāṃsakas, hold that 'Shabda' consists only in the Letters 'Ga', and the rest, it is not anything apart from these; and if this is the Shabda which the Buddhist and others make the 'Subject' of their Proposition, then both these fallacies—the Proposition having the exact nature of its Subject unknown and the Reason having no basis—would befall them.

If mere 'Shabda' were asserted—i.e. as the subject of the Proposition,—then for you the universal 'Shabda' would itself be non-eternal;—the phrase 'be non-eternal' is to be supplied. Because the epithet 'mere' means the exclusion of all particular features, what else—apart from the Universal—could it be that would be 'mere Shabda'? Thus by implication your proposition would be declaring the non-eternity of the Universal 'Shabda' itself.

'Be it so, what then?'

That cannot be right; as 'such a view would be contrary, etc. etc.'—for instance, the Buddhists themselves, who postulate the Exclusion, 'Apoha,
of others', have declared that 'it is the Universal that stands'. So that the view now put forth would involve the contradiction of what has been admitted by them.

This is what is shown in the words—'In one form or the other, etc. etc.'—In whatever form the 'Universal' has been postulated by philosophers, in accordance with their respective doctrines, it is held, by all parties, to be eternal. If it were not so, then, like the Individuals, each Universal, appearing after the other, would become intermingled; and the very character of the 'Universal' would become lost.—(2313-2314)

Having thus pointed out the defects in the 'Subject' through the various alternative views regarding the nature of the thing itself (Shabda) the Mimāmsaka now proceeds to point out the same, through the various alternative views regarding the exact nature of the Probandum (non-eternity):

TEXTS (2315-2316).

"Then again, if by 'non-eternity' you mean proneness to absolute destruction, then, so far as we are concerned, the 'Subject' comes to be one whose qualification is not admitted.—If what is meant is some sort of character which makes Shabda liable to being called 'non-eternal',—then such 'non-eternity' would be one that is admitted by us also,—in the sense that from the 'unmanifested state' it comes into the 'manifested state'”.—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 326-327].—(2315-2316)

COMMENTARY.

If by 'non-eternity' you mean that the Word-Sound is liable to absolute destruction, leaving no trace behind,—then, so far as we, Mimāmsakas, are concerned, the qualification would be 'inadmissible', and this would vitiate your premis. Because for the Mimāmsakas, as for the Sāṅkhya, there is no such thing as 'absolute destruction'; because even when the Jar disappears, it continues to exist in the form of a Potency; in the case of things like the Lamp also, the view is that (when it is blown out) its subtle particles become scattered in all directions.

If however what you mean to prove is that—the Word-sound is somehow capable of being called 'non-eternal',—then the argument is open to the charge of being 'futile'; because even when Word-sounds are eternal, it is admitted by us also that they may be called 'non-eternal' in the sense of going from the 'unmanifested state' to the 'manifested state' and vice-versa.—(2315-2316)

So far the Proposition (of the Buddhist) that 'Word is non-eternal' has been criticised in detail. The Mimāmsaka now proceeds to criticise his Reason—'Because it is perceptible by the Senses':—
TEXT (2317).

"If the Reason that is put forward is only amenability to the sense-organs,—then it is clearly recognised as fallacious, in view of the Universal which has been established".—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 343-344].—

(2317)

COMMENTARY.

'Only amenability to the sense-organs',—without any such qualification as 'being a product' and so forth.

If the Reason (Probans) is put forward in this unqualified form, then it becomes 'fallacious', 'Inconclusive', in view of the 'Universal' which has been established before; because no 'negative concomitance' would be available (to confirm the Premiss).—(2317)

The following might be urged:—Even though, by reason of the other party (Vaishesika) admitting the Universal, the negative concomitance is not available,—yet as the Baudhā, who is the main opponent of the Mīmāṃsaka, does not admit the Universal, the said negative concomitance would be quite available; how then can the Probans be said to be Inconclusive?

The Mīmāṃsaka's answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2318).

"Just as the Reason ceases to be a True Reason if it does not reside in the 'Subject', according to the other party,—so also, if it is devoid of affirmative and negative Concomitance".—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 344-345].—(2318)

COMMENTARY.

The principle is that 'that Probans alone is able to prove or disprove which is admitted by both parties'; hence, that Probans which is not admitted by any one of the two parties to reside in the 'Subject' becomes 'fallacious'; in the same manner, it becomes fallacious, if either party does not admit its affirmative and negative concomitance (with the Probandum).

The construction is ' anuvayavatīrṣkayoh asiddhayoh ', 'if the affirmative and negative concomitance are not admitted'.—(2318)

Question:—If that Probans alone can prove or disprove which is admitted by both parties,—then, how is it that you yourself have urged the 'inconclusiveness' of a Reason, against the Buddhist, on the basis of the 'Universal' (which is not admitted by him)?

Answer:—
TEXT (2319).

"In the case cited, it may be that the 'Universal' is not admitted by the party adducing the Probans; even so, the Probans remains invalid, so long as the 'Universal' has not been rejected."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 345-346].—(2319)

COMMENTARY.

Even though, by the Buddhist and others who have put forward the Probans in question, the 'Universal' is not admitted as something wherein the contrary of the Probandum is present,—yet, as a matter of fact, the existence of the Universal cannot be denied. The sense is that, even under the circumstances, the Probans is one whose concomitance with the contrary of the Probandum is suspected (and hence invalid).—(2319)

The Mīmāṃsāka puts forward another objection against the Probans and the Probandum,—through another alternative—

TEXTS (2320-2321).

"In regard to amenability to the senses and the rest (that have been cited by the Opponent), it has to be clearly ascertained what it really is; (a) Is it the same as the Individual (things in which it subsists)? or (b) Is it something different from them?—[And if it is different from the Individuals]—(c) is it distinct with each Individual? or (d) one and the same with all?—Under all these, according as the alternative that may be accepted by the other party, the Reason would be subject (respectively) to the fallacies of (a) being 'too specific', (b) being 'Inadmissible', (c) and 'Having the Corroborative Instance devoid of the Probandum'.—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 346-348].—(2320-2321)

COMMENTARY.

'And the rest'—includes non-eternity.

An examination is to be made as to the exact nature of the said 'amenability to the senses': (a) Is it the same as the Individuals? (the individual things in which it subsists)?—Or (b) is it something different from them?—and, if it is different from them, it has to be examined whether these different amenabilities are (c) different with each individual object? or (d) one and the same with all?

(a) If the 'amenability to sense' is the same as the individuals, the Probans is 'too specific'; as there can be no 'negation' of individual; and
like its own form, one Individual, would not be present in another Individual [so that there could be no concomitance, negative or positive, of it].

(b) and (c) If it is different from the Individuals,—as such difference is not admitted by the Mimāṃsaka, whether it be different or the same in regard to each individual, it would, in either case, be 'Inadmissible'.

It is for this reason that the defect in the fourth alternative (d)—whereby the 'amenability' is different from the Individuals, but the same in all—has not been separately mentioned. Because there would be room for it only if the difference were admitted.

In regard to 'non-eternity' (which is another Reason put forward by the Opponent, against the expressiveness of words),—if it is different from the Individuals, the Corroborative Instance would be devoid of the Probandum.—If, on the other hand, it is non-different from them, the Instance would be certainly devoid of the Probandum; because one Individual can never be present in another Individual.—(2320-2321)

Next the Mimāṃsaka proceeds to point out the 'Inconclusive' character of another Probans cited by the Opponent—'Because it is invariably concomitant with effort':—

TEXTS (2322–2324).

"'Being perceived as following from effort' has been adduced as a Reason for the Word being a product and non-eternal. This is 'Inconclusive', in view of certain things that are not-momentary;—such as the three things: (1) Conscious Destruction, (2) Unconscious Destruction, and (3) Ākāsha: (1) When the destruction of things is brought about intentionally, it is regarded as 'Conscious Destruction';—(2) When destruction is not brought about intentionally, it is 'Unconscious Destruction';—both these, being 'imperishable', have been regarded (by the Baudhā) as 'uncaused' also.'—[See Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 22-23]—(2322–2324)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by 'Prayatnānantarīyata' is the character of being perceived as following after an effort.—And as this character is present in cases where the Probandum is absent, the said character, adduced as the Probans, for proving that Words are products and non-eternal, is 'Inconclusive'. For instance, the Buddhists postulate (1) 'Conscious Destruction', (2) 'Unconscious Destruction', and (3) Ākāsha as three entities which are unmodifiable and not-momentary, i.e. eternal. And yet, the Probans in question ('being perceived as following after effort') is found in these also.

This is what is pointed out by the words—when the destruction, etc. etc.'—that destruction of things like the Jar which is brought about intentionally,
is called 'Conscious Destruction'; while that which is not intentional, is 'Unconscious Destruction'; such is the scheme of the Buddhists.

'Tēṣām'—of things like the Jar.
'Tau cha'—i.e. the Conscious and Unconscious Destrucions.
'Uncaused also'—also includes 'non-eternal'.—(2322–2324)

How these two Destrucions are 'uncaused' and 'eternal' and how they subsist in the Probans,—is pointed out in the following Texts,—from the point of view of the Opponent (Buddhaha):

TEXTS (2325–2328).

"They declare that 'Destruction' is brought about by itself, and is without cause... when fuel comes into contact with fire, there proceeds a series of fiery embers.—Destruction is natural, and inherent in everything that is born; it is subtle, and merged in a homogeneous 'series'; it is not perceived; when however a peculiar cause operates upon the homogeneous 'series', then, through a peculiar effect, the Destruction becomes manifested in its gross form. Thus, that same cause from which the heterogeneous 'series' has been produced, also serves to manifest the Destruction, though this Destruction is not produced by that cause."—[Vide Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 24–29].—(2325–2328)

COMMENTARY.

'They'—Buddhists.

Says the Opponent—As a matter of fact, we find the wood being burnt by fire, and the Jar smashed by the bludgeon; where there are causes of Destruction; how then can Destruction be without cause?

Answer:—'When fuel comes into contact, etc. etc.'—In this case what the Fire is the cause of is not Destruction, but the fiery embers,—as is ascertained through positive and negative concomitance; specially as Destruction exists by its very nature.

Question:—If Destruction is something that exists by its very nature,— how is it that it is not perceived there prior to the contact of such causes as the Fire and the like?

Answer:—'It is subtle'—Being deceived by the appearance of the several similar factors in the 'homogeneous series', people fail to perceive the Destruction in its subtle form; in fact by the perception of the homogeneous series, they are led to imagine that the object is 'undestroyed'.

'Peculiar cause'—in the shape of the Bludgeon.

'Peculiar effect'—in the shape of the Potsherds.

It is under these conditions that the grossness of the Destruction becomes manifested.

'Thus, etc. etc.'—sums up the argument.
'Heterogeneous series',—of a different character. 'Hītoḥ' is to be conducted with 'yataḥ'.—'Tēna'—by that same cause,—which has been referred to by the pronoun in 'yataḥ'—is the Destruction manifested.—Such is the construction with the preceding clause.—(2325-2328)

In the following Text, the Mimāṃsaka points out that the Probans in question is present in the contrary of the Probandum:

TEXT (2329).

"Thus as this Destruction, perceived after the effort involved in the stroke of the Bludgeon, is found to be uncaused,—your Probans becomes 'false', 'inconclusive'.

—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 29-30].—(2329)

COMMENTARY.

'This'—the two kinds of Destruction.
The compound 'Prayatnā, etc.' stands for 'invariably concomitant with effort involved in the stroke of the Bludgeon'.—(2329)

It was asserted (under Text 2322) that the Probans is shown to be 'Inconclusive' in view of three factors. Inconclusiveness due to two factors has been shown,—in the shape of the two kinds of Destruction; that due to the third factor of 'Ākāsha' is next pointed out:

TEXTS (2330-2331).

"Ākāsha also, being eternal,—when surrounded by earth and by water,—becomes manifested (rendered perceptible) by the removal of these by means of digging and pumping out; so that here also there is apprehension of Ākāsha following after an effort; consequently the Probans urged in connection with word becomes 'inconclusive'."—[Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 30-32].—(2330-2331)

COMMENTARY.

'By the removal of these'—The removal of the Earth by digging with the spade, etc.
'Tatra'—in regard to the Word-sound.
'Darshanaṁ'—i.e. apprehension following from effort.—(2330-2331)

Having thus pointed out the defects in the Probans (of the Opponent), the Mimāṃsaka proceeds to point out those in the Corroborative Instance:
TEXTS (2332–2334).

"The exact nature of the (Opponent's) Corroborative Instance also has got to be examined:—If it is meant to be taken in its direct denotation (i.e. the Universal), then, it is devoid of the Probandum.—If it is taken in the indirect denotation, as indicating the Individual,—then the question arises as to its being the same as, or different from, the Universal. If it is different (from the Universal), then the 'object' becomes one that cannot be admitted by us; while if it is not different (from the Universal), then the object is one that cannot be admitted by others.—If it is something indefinite (vague),—then such a thing cannot be either entirely eternal or entirely non-eternal, for us. Because that element in it which is called the 'Universal' is eternal, while the other element is perishable; and it has been explained before that every object has a mixed character".—[Vide Shloka-vârtika—Eternality of Words, 350–352].—(2332–2334)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'Sapakṣa' (which is that wherein the Probandum is known by all to be present) here stands for the Corroborative Instance (in the reasoning of the Opponent, where the Jar has been cited as an instance of what is perceived as appearing after effort and is non-eternal).

The question, as regards the Instance that has been cited (the 'Jar') is—

is the word meant to be taken in its direct denotative sense (which is the Universal)?—Or in the sense of the Individual Jar?

If it is meant to be taken in the direct sense, then it is defective, in so far as it is devoid of the Probandum (Non-eternity). ' Shruti ' here stands for the Word;—the ' artha ' is what is directly denoted by it;—and what is so denoted is the Universal ' Jar ';—and the Universal is admitted by all parties to be eternal;—hence there cannot be presence, in it, of non-eternity, which forms the Probandum.

In some places, the reading is ' jātyarthāḥ ' in place of ' shrutyaarthāḥ '; under which ' jāti ' is to be taken as in apposition to ' artha '. The meaning however remains the same as before.

If the second alternative is meant—that the word ' Jar ' stands for the Individual Jar,—then also, it has to be considered whether the Individual that is intended to be the corroborative Instance is the same as, or different from, the Universal; that is, whether the Individual is something different from the Universal? Or non-different from it?

If it is different, then the object cited as the Instance is one that cannot be admitted by the Mīmāṃsaṇa; because the Mīmāṃsaṇa does not hold the Universal to be something absolutely different from the Individual, as the Vaishēṣikas and others do; as has been asserted in the words—'For us the Universal is nothing different from the Individual'.
If, on the other hand, the Individual is meant to be non-different (from the Universal),—then the object cited as the Instance is one that cannot be admitted by the Buddhist and others. These 'others' do not regard the Universal as non-different from the Individual.

If the Jar is meant to be the Instance, in the indefinite form, free from all conceptual contents like difference and non-difference,—even then, according to us, the Instance comes to be one devoid of the Probandum. This is what is asserted in the words—'If it is something indefinite, etc. etc.'—'Tat' stands for the Jar.

Question :—How so ?
Answer :—'That element, etc. etc.'—Of the entity called 'Jar', that factor which is called the 'Universal' is eternal, while the other factor which is called the 'Individual' is perishable.

Question :—How can one and the same thing have two mutually contradictory characters ?
Answer :—'Mixed character, etc. etc.'—(2332–2334)

The Mimāmsaka proceeds again to point out the defects in the Corroborative Instance, through the various alternatives that are possible in regard to the Probandum:

TEXT (2335).

"IN THE SAME MANNER, THE EXACT NATURE OF 'NON-ETERNALITY' (YOUR PROBANDUM) ALSO HAS GOT TO BE CONSIDERED. IF WHAT IS MEANT IS ABSOLUTE DESTRUCTION,—THEN THE INSTANCE IS DEVOID OF THIS PROBANDUM, FOR US. IF IT IS OTHERWISE, THEN THE INSTANCE IS DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM, FOR YOU.—THUS BRIEFLY HAS THE WAY BEEN SHOWN FOR FINDING DEFECTS IN YOUR ARGUMENT".—[Shlokavārtika—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 353].—(2335)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant by your Probandum, 'non-eternity'—is absolute Destruction,—then for us, Mimāmsakas, the Instance is devoid of the Probandum; because we do not admit of any absolute Destruction of things; as they always remain in the form of Potencies.

Though the word used in the Text is the common word, 'nāśa', yet from the Context, its meaning appears to be restricted to uinter, absolute, destruction. If it were not so, why should the writer have urged the argument that the Instance is devoid of the Probandum?

Question :—The question as to what is meant by 'non-eternity' has been already discussed before under Text 2315; why is it discussed over again?
"THE REVEALED WORD."

Answer:—True; but it was discussed there for the purpose of pointing out the defects in the 'Subject', while on the present occasion it is discussed for the purpose of pointing out the defects in the Corroborative Instance. This is the difference.

If, on the other hand, 'non-eternity' that is meant is not in the form of 'absolute Destruction',—but in the form of 'appearance and disappear-
ance',—then the answer is—'If it is otherwise',—i.e. if 'non-eternity' is something other than 'Absolute Destruction'.

'For you'—'there is absence of Probandum'—this has to be construed here also;—i.e. in the Instance.—As you, Buddhists do not admit of 'Destruc-
tion with a residue'—as the Sankhyas do. Hence under your view, the Instance cited would be devoid of the Probandum.

This is the way in which the arguments in support of the non-eternity of Words have to be refuted,—which has been expounded for the learned; other arguments may also be put forward by intelligent people themselves.

—(2335)

The Mīmāṃsaka next sets forth these objections of the opponent against his doctrines:—

TEXTS (2336–2338).

"[Says the Opponent]—'Though the Word, the Meaning and the Connection between them have been proved to be eternal, yet so far as the validity (reliability) of the Meaning of the Sentence is concerned, that cannot be admitted.—[Shloka-
vārtika—On Sentence—1].—It may be that the meaning of sentences has been assumed by the Mīmāṃsakas, without any basis, in accordance with the Conventions of men, just as in the case of such technical terms as guṇa, vyādhi and the like.—Further, being in the form of a compilation, the Veda must be regarded as a human production, like a book of stories. And yet there is no reliable person (known, who could be the author of the Veda);—the Veda therefore must be regarded as unreliable'." [See Shlokavārtika—On Sentence, 108–110].—(2336–2338)

COMMENTARY.

The 'meaning of sentence' consists in the Injunction or Prohibition of particular acts as associated with particular means of accomplishment; herein too lies the validity or efficiency of the Vedic Injunction as a 'Means of Right Cognition'; it does not rest in what is expressed by words, Consequently when the validity or authority or reliability of the Veda has to be proved,—what has been established regarding the eternity of the Word, its meaning and the connection of these, is of no use in the matter at issue.
Further, whenever there is cognition of the meaning of a sentence, it is always found to be based upon Convention; e.g. sentences like 'ād-guṇah' (Pāṇini's Sūtra, defining what is 'guṇa'), bring about the cognition of what is meant by the technical terms 'guṇa', 'vrddhi' and the like;—the cognition of the meaning of the Injunctive Sentence is cognition of the meaning of a sentence;—hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.—This is what is shown in the words—'In accordance with Conventions, etc. etc.' 'Like the technical terms, etc. etc.'—The affix 'vai' has the sense of the Locative.

In support of the said idea it is added—'without any basis'.—That is, it is just possible that without any reason,—through their unbridled imagination,—for the purpose of making a living—the 'Sacrificers' have assumed the meanings of such Vedic sentences as—'Desiring Heaven, one should offer the Agnihotra'.

Then again, as a matter of fact, whatever is a compilation is a human product,—e.g. Dramas and Stories,—and the Veda is a compilation of words;—hence this is a reason based on the nature of the thing.

Thus then, as the Veda is a human work, it must be unreliable—like the words of the man by the roadside.

It might be that it is reliable because it is the work of a reliable person.

The answer to that is—'There is no reliable person known, etc. etc.'—(2336-2338)

To the above, the Mīmāṃsaka makes the following answer:

TEXTS (2339-2340).

"The eternity of the Sentence is to be asserted in the same manner in which the eternity of the Connection (between word and meaning) has been asserted.—[Shlokavārtika—On Sentence, 365].—Even though in the case of the technical words like 'vrddhi', what has been asserted may be possible, because these deal with perceptible things; in regard to the Veda however, the idea of 'conventionality' is not possible; because by whom has the connection between Heaven and the Sacrifices (spoked of in the Veda)—which is beyond the reach of the senses,—been perceived?"—(2339-2340)

COMMENTARY.

The reasoning that has been put forward above in support of the view that the Connection between the Word and its Meaning cannot be artificial, —under the Text 2257,—on the basis of that same reasoning the eternity of the Vedic Sentence also may be asserted.

The Mīmāṃsaka points out the 'inconclusive' character of the reasoning put forward by the Opponent, under Text 2337—in the words—'Because
these deal, etc. etc.'—In the case of the Sūtras like 'adhiparṇah', as they deal with things that are perceptible, it is possible that the ideas conveyed may be based upon Convention;—this however is not possible in the case of the Veda; because Heaven and such things—which are spoken of in the Veda,—are beyond the reach of the senses, and hence no Convention could be made (by men) regarding them.—(2339-2340)

Says the Opponent—If that is so, then the Veda may be meaningless.
The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2341-2342).

"IT CANNOT BE MEANINGLESS; AS ITS MEANING IS CLEARLY APPREHENDED".—(2341)

COMMENTARY.

'It'—stands for the Veda.—(2341)

The Opponent has urged (under Text 2338 the fact of the Veda being on 'aggregate' as a reason for its unreliability. By means of a counter-reason, the Mimāmsaka shows that the said reason is 'Inconclusive':—

TEXTS (2341-2342).

"AS REGARDS THE ARGUMENT BASED UPON THE FACT OF THE VEDA BEING AN AGGREGATE, THE COUNTER-ARGUMENT SHOULD BE STATED AS FOLLOWS:—ALL VEDIC STUDY (BY ANY PERSON) IS ALWAYS PRECEDED BY PREVIOUS 'STUDY' BY HIS TEACHER,—BECAUSE IT IS CALLED 'VEDIC STUDY'—LIKE THE 'STUDY' CARRIED ON AT THE PRESENT TIME".—[Shlokavārtika—On Sentence, 365-366].—(2341-2342)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent—The same can be said in regard to the 'study' of the Mahābhārata also: all 'study' of the Mahābhārata is always preceded by the previous study by the Teacher,—like the 'study' at the present time; but it will not be right to argue thus; hence the counter-argument put forward is 'inconclusive'.
The Mimāmsaka's answer to this is as follows:—
"The argument might be urged in regard to the Mahābhārata also; but it is blocked by the distinct 'remembrance' (mention) of its writer. Though there are such 'remembrances' in regard to the Veda also,—yet, they are all based upon 'commendatory' description."—[Śhlokavārtika—On Sentence, 367].—(2343)

COMMENTARY.

The same argument might be urged in regard to the Mahābhārata also; but the Author, Vyāsa, is clearly 'remembered' (mentioned); hence such an assertion is rendered impossible by this mention of the author, and hence cannot be made. There is no such mention of the 'Author' in the case of the Veda.

Says the Opponent—In regard to the Veda also, the Author is mentioned, in such passages as—'Agnirāvashchakrubh sāmāni...attavāṇāṅgirasaḥ'.

The answer to this is—'Though there are such, etc. etc.'—As regards the mention of 'authors' in the Veda, that is based upon commendatory description; 'arthavāda' is the 'vāda', description, of 'artha', 'facts'; this description is the basis of the said mention (of Authors in the Veda); hence the word 'chakrubh' in the passage quoted does not stand for creating or producing, but for remembering; so the meaning is that the persons named 'remembered' the Śāman, etc.—(2343)

Question:—How has this meaning been determined?

Answer:—

TEXTS (2344-2345).

"The Past and Future times can have no connection with any 'Author of the Veda',—because they are Points of Time,—like the Present time as perceived.—It should be understood that Brahmā and the rest are not the Makers of the Veda,—because they are Persons, etc. etc.,—like ordinary men".—(2344-2345)

COMMENTARY.

The two arguments here set forth are easily understood.—(2344-2345)

In the following Texts, the whole subject-matter of the Context is summed up by the Mīmāṁsaka and supported by arguments:
"Thus then, it should be understood clearly that the Assertion in the Veda is not false (unreliable);—because in the expression of its meaning, it is not dependent upon a Speaker,—just like the Word in the expression of the word-meaning". 

—(2346).

"The Cognitions derived from the Veda must be right,—because they arise from the eternal Sentence,—like the cognition of the Sentence itself,—The arguments detailed before are all applicable here". —[Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepa, 2]. 

—(2347).

"The cognition brought about by the Vedic Injunction must be reliable; (a) because it is produced by causes free from all defects;—like the ideas produced by the Inferential Indicative, or by the Assertion of trustworthy persons, or by Perception;—(b) also because it is produced by an assertion which does not emanate from an unreliable person, and because it is free from sublation at all times and places,—like the idea produced by the assertion of a reliable person". 

—[Shlokavārtika, Sutra 2, 184-185]. (2348-2349)

"It being thus established that the Veda is authoritative and reliable,—the long-standing beginningless line of Teachers and Pupils that has been assumed tends to prove that it is free from defects". —(2350)

**COMMENTARY.**

That which produces a cognition, independently of the person using it, with regard to a certain thing, cannot be false in respect of that thing; e.g. the Word as bringing about the cognition of its own meaning;—the Vedic Sentence produces the cognition of its meaning, independently of any speaker in the shape of its Author;—hence there is apprehension of a condition contrary to the wider condition;—‘falsity’ being ‘less wide’ than ‘being productive of cognitions through dependence upon the composing Person’, which latter thus is the ‘vyāpaka’, the ‘wider condition’,—the ‘viruddha’, ‘contrary’, of this would be ‘being productive of cognitions independently of the composing person’; and this latter condition is apprehended in the case of the Veda.

'Like the Word in the expression of its meaning';—this is meant to show that Words are productive of cognitions in conformity with the real state of things; and the ‘cognition produced by the word’ is not meant to be the Corroborative Instance; the words themselves being that instance.—Thus then, in the argument, Word is the Minor Term; and what is sought to be proved in regard to it is its non-falsity on account of its being the cause of
cognitions in conformity with the real state of things;—consequently, the Corroborative Instance also should have exactly the same character; otherwise the Instance would be devoid of the Probandum.

There is another argument, which is formulated as follows:—That Cognition which is brought about by an eternal sentence must be in conformity with the real state of things and hence right;—just like the cognition of the verbal form of the sentence itself;—the cognition of the fact of the performance of Agnihotra, etc. leading to Heaven is produced by the eternal sentence;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—The eternality (of the Veda) has been proved in detail already; hence the Probans in this argument cannot be said to be 'Inadmissible'.

'The Cognition brought about by the Vedic Injunction, etc. etc.'—This has been already explained.

There are two other arguments, formulated as follows:—The Cognition that is not produced by the assertion of an unreliable Person,—and also that which is free from contradiction (sublation, annulment) throughout the variations of time, place and personalities, must be reliable,—like the Cognition produced by the assertion of a reliable person;—of this same kind is the Cognition produced by the Vedic Injunctive Sentence;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing concerned.

The first of the Reasons adduced here cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible'; because it has been proved at great length that the Veda is not the work of a Person.

Nor can the second Reason be regarded as 'Inadmissible'; because, as has been explained in the following passage—'The idea brought about by the assertion—"Desiring Heaven, one should perform sacrifices"—is not an uncertain one; that is, it is not in the form that—Heaven may or may not follow from the performance of sacrifices; in fact, the idea is a definitely certain one that Heaven does follow; and when this is cognised for certain, it cannot be false. That Cognition alone is false which, having appeared, becomes sublated by the notion that such is not the actual case; the idea in question (that Heaven follows the performance of sacrifices) is never found to be so sublated at any time, or in regard to any person, or under any circumstances, or at any place. Hence it follows that it is not false or wrong'—(Shabara-Bhāṣya on 1. 1. 2, Translation, Page 5).

From all this it becomes established that the Veda is reliable, by itself, being as it is, the basis of all ideas of Dharma and allied matters;—and like Light, it is a trustworthy source of knowledge for all men. Hence, it becomes established that all such theories as 'all that exists is mere Idea', which have been propounded by the Buddhists and others, cannot be right.—(2346–2350)

Says the Opponent—If, like Light, the Veda is, by itself, a reliable source of knowledge for all men,—then how is it that the Buddhist and others do not accept that view? It cannot be right that for them, the Veda is not a reliable source of knowledge.

Anticipating this, the Mīmāṃsaka supplies the following answer:
TEXT (2351).

"Thus, like Light, the Veda being the 'Eye' for all men,—the hostility that arises against it among some people, is like the hostility of the owl (to Light),—and is the effect of their Demerit".—(2351)

COMMENTARY.

When the Sun, which is the common Eye of all, has dispelled all darkness by its mass of effulgent rays and shines all round,—colour does not become visible to the owl which has its Eye inefficient in the performing of its functions; in the same way, people like the Buddhists, whose Eyes of Intelligence have become disabled by Demerit, have their vision obstructed,—even when the one common Eye of all people, in the shape of the Veda, is there.

The particle 'Kila' is meant to indicate displeasure.

[Here ends the case for the Reliability of the Veda, the Revealed Word.
Next follow the arguments against the Reliability of the Revealed Word, Veda.]

The said 'hostility' to the Veda is now expounded:

TEXT (2352).

All this is the product of the false pride of the Twice-born People. There is no truth in this, even by the slightest chance.—(2352)

COMMENTARY.

'Ghunākṣaravat'—even by the slightest chance; like the 'Crow and the Palm-fruit'.—(2352)

1 'Ghunākṣara'—when insects get into a piece of wood and make holes in it, some times, the holes that appear become, by chance, so arranged as to assume the shape of Letters; hence 'Ghunākṣara', 'insect-letters', stands for 'mere-chance'. So also 'Crow and the Palm fruit' stands for mere chance; exemplified by the case when the Palm fruit drops from the tree when the Crow sits upon it, it is mere chance, as the coming of the Crow cannot be the real cause of the falling of the fruit.
It has been argued (by the Mīmāṃsaka) that "that which is free from the contact of defects conducive to falsity must be the source of true cognition, etc. etc."—The Author, for the sake of argument, admits the Reason here adduced, and then proceeds to show that it is 'inconclusive'.

TEXT (2353).

Even though there is no Author, the Veda cannot be regarded as saying what is true;—because it is devoid of those excellences in its source which would make it truthful;—just as in the absence of defects, the Word is not regarded as false.—(2353)

COMMENTARY.

'Evā' stands for the Veda.

A man under the influence of Love and Hatred, etc. is found to say things that are not true; in this way, through positive and negative concomitance, it is ascertained that there are certain defects which lie at the root of falsity; similarly a man full of mercy and other good qualities is found to be truthful; hence these good qualities are excellences that lie at the root of truthfulness.—Thus, in the absence (in the case of the Veda) of these causes of truthfulness, the effect, in the shape of Truthfulness, also should be non-existent.—So that even though the Veda may not be the work of a Person, its truthfulness is not established; hence the Reason put forward by the Mīmāṃsaka is 'Inconclusive'.—(2353)

Question:—"But how is it ascertained that the excellences are absent?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2354).

It is only in the case of the works of Persons that the question arises as to whether the excellences are there or not.

Hence there is no need for such an enquiry in the case in question; and we have not the slightest idea of there being any excellence at all.—(2354)

COMMENTARY.

What this shows is that the grounds for denying the defects in the case of the Veda are also the grounds for denying the excellences also [viz.: the absence of a Person as the author].—(2354)
Summing up the argument, the Author proceeds to show that when we do not find the causes (of truthfulness and falsity), there cannot be any possibility of the Veda being either true or false:

TEXT (2355).

Thus, inasmuch as the causes of truthfulness and falsity,—in the shape (a) of wisdom and mercy and (b) of absence of mercy, etc.,—are not there, the said two qualities cannot belong to the Veda.—(2355)

COMMENTARY.

Wisdom, etc. are the causes of truthfulness, while the absence of mercy, etc. are the causes of falsity,—respectively.

'The two'—I.e. Truthfulness and Falsity.—(2355)

The following Texts show what follows when the Veda is neither truthful nor false—

TEXTS (2356-2357).

Thus the Veda is reduced to futility,—like such sentences as 'six cakes'.—If it be argued that 'meanings are actually comprehended (from Vedic Sentences), in respect of actions and active agents',—[The answer is that] there may be such comprehension in cases where there are explanations supplied by men,—as in the case of the doings of Urvashi,—even though the words (of the Veda) by themselves do not really convey any such meaning at all,—as held by you. —(2356-2357)

COMMENTARY.

The Veda now turns out to be as 'futile' and meaningless as such stray utterances of the mad-cap as 'six cakes', 'ten pomegranates' and the like.

Says the Mimāmaśaka—'In seeking to prove the futility of the Veda, the Buddhist makes his Proposition contrary to a perceptible fact; because it is directly perceived that the Vedic sentence actually provides the comprehension of the idea that 'from the performance of the Agnihotra, follows the attainment of Heaven'. How then can this be denied?'
In answer to this, the Author, with a view to leaving no room for the 
Opponent to say anything, says—‘There may be such comprehension, etc. etc.’ 
—The idea is as follows:—There would have been annulment of our Proposi-
tion if we tried to prove the meaninglessness of the Veda by itself; what we 
are doing is only to put forward a Reductio Ad Absurdum; and this cannot 
set aside our Proposition, as there is no Proposition in such an argument 
at all; all that is done is to show that when the other party does not admit 
the absence of the narrower factor even when the wider factor is absent, 
he inures an undesirable incongruity and contradicts his own words.

Nor is our Proposition contrary to any perceived fact. Because, even 
when the Veda is really meaningless, such comprehension of meaning as 
has been urged may be the effect of the explanations provided by people; 
for instance, in regard to the Vedic sentence ‘Heaven follows from the Agni-
hotra’, some one may say—‘what are described in this sentence are the doings 
of Bharata, Urvashi and other persons’; and even though he may have offered 
this explanation without actually knowing the meaning of the sentence, 
yet subsequently, the man actually has the comprehension of the said idea 
from the sentence. But this does not make the Vedic sentence really 
expressive of that meaning.—In the same manner, the ‘comprehension of 
the meaning’ that has been urged by the other party may proceed from 
the Vedic sentence, even though, in reality, this sentence may be entirely 
meaningless.—How then can our Proposition be annulled by ‘a fact of Perce-
ption’.—(2356-2357)

Further, it may be that in the Veda, there is absence, only of the defects 
conducive to falsity, not of the excellences; even so, the ‘inconclusiveness’ 
of your Probans is irresistible. This is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2358).

Even if there be no Defects, Truthfulness does not become 
proved simply because the other alternative must be 
accepted; because there is a third alternative 
possible, that of ‘Meaninglessness’.—

(2358)

COMMENTARY.

If, in connection with Words, there were only two possible alternatives—
falsity and truthfulness,—then, the absence of one alternative would necessarily 
imply the presence of the other; there is however a third alternative possible 
—that they are meaningless; under the circumstances, the negation of falsity 
does not necessarily imply the assertion of truthfulness; as there is no negation 
of the other alternative of meaninglessness.—(2358)
TEXTS (2359-2361).

IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT—"THE VEDA BY ITSELF, INDEPENDENT OF ANY PERSONALITIES, STANDS CAPABLE OF BRINGING ABOUT THE TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS,—AND IT IS ON THAT GROUND THAT IT IS REGARDED AS TRUTHFUL AND RELIABLE".—IF THAT IS SO, THAT KNOWLEDGE SHOULD BE APPEARING INCESSANTLY,—BECAUSE ITS CAUSE IS ALWAYS THERE,—AS AT THE MOMENT INTENDED.—OR AT THE TIME THAT ONE COGNITION APPEARS, ALL COGNITIONS PROVIDED BY THE VEDA SHOULD APPEAR SIMULTANEOUSLY,—BECAUSE IT IS AN EFFICIENT CAUSE,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE INTENDED COGNITION.—(2359-2361)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"If we had regarded the Veda as truthful by reason of the presence of Mercy and such other excellences in its author, then, as the excellences would be resting in the Person,—when this Person would cease to exist, the excellences would disappear, and thence the truthfulness based upon the excellences would also disappear. As a matter of fact, however, it is by its very nature that the Veda is the source of knowledge of real things,—and this capacity of the Veda is not due to any excellences in any Person; hence there can be no 'inconclusiveness' in our Reason. Nor is there any possibility of the Veda being meaningless'.

Anticipating this argument of the Mimamsaka, the Author says—'If that is so, etc. etc.'—Just as, it is by its very nature that the Veda has a meaning,—in the same way it might be possible that it is false; so that the Reason still remains Inconclusive. This is going to be further explained later on.

If the Veda were the source of knowledge, by its very nature, then the cognitions provided by it should appear at all times and all simultaneously, as their efficient cause would be there always. How then can the contingency of being meaningless be avoided?

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When the efficient cause of a certain thing is there, that thing must come about,—e.g. the cognition of the Agnihotra provided by the Vedic sentences;—the efficient cause, in the shape of Veda, of all cognitions arising from the Vedic sentences, is always present; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(2359-2361)

The Author next points out another objection against the idea of cognitions appearing simultaneously:
TEXT (2362).

After that the Veda's capacity to bring about cognitions would cease; consequently the Veda could not be eternal. If the said capacity continues to exist, then the same cognitions should appear again.—(2362)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, if, after having simultaneously produced all the Cognitions, the Veda loses the capacity to produce Cognitions, then, on account of the cessation of that capacity, which forms the very essence of the Veda, the Veda itself becomes liable to cease to exist.—If however, the Veda does not lose that capacity, then, later on, the same set of Cognitions should appear again. Hence, we conclude that no eternal thing can possess any capacity for effective action.—(2362)

In the following Text, the author puts forward a likely explanation to meet the argument that 'when the efficient cause of a thing is present, that thing must appear' :-

TEXT (2363).

It might be said that—"The Veda stands in need of explanations, etc., and as these explanations appear in succession, the cognitions (brought about by the Veda) are held to be successive also."—(2363)

COMMENTARY.

The 'etc.' is meant to include Conventions.
'These'—stands for the explanations.—(2363)

This objection is answered in the following:—

TEXT (2364).

It cannot be so; when it is efficient (and has the capacity)—what sort of 'dependence' could there be? If it is efficient because of the presence of that on which it is dependent,—what hope, then, can you have of its being eternal?—(2364)

COMMENTARY.

It is only when something is inefficient by itself, that it needs the help of others in securing the required efficiency; when, however, a thing is quite
efficient by itself, there is no imperfection in its character; what sort of need or dependence could there be in that case?

If it be held that at first it is inefficient, but subsequently, it becomes efficient through the contact of contributory causes,—then you had better give up all hope for the eternality of the Veda!—(2364)

Question:—"How so?"
Answer:—

TEXT (2365).

If it was previously inefficient, and is made efficient by the explanations,—then it becomes a source of knowledge through the help of personalities, and hence the work of a person.—(2365)

COMMENTARY.

The underlying idea is that the efficiency or potency is not something apart from the Veda itself; if it were something different, then as there would be no connection between the Veda and the efficiency, the Veda would not be an active agent at all; as effects are produced from efficiency only.

'Source of knowledge'—The Veda as source of knowledge, comes to be born of personalities; the form of the Veda itself becomes born of personalities; and as all this is not different from the Veda, the Veda itself becomes 'born of personalities'.—(2365)

Further, it is not only that by dependence upon something else, the Veda becomes non-eternal; the assumption that it is not the work of an author also becomes futile.—This is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (2366–2368).

The Veda, as it stands, provides no knowledge to us, until it is illuminated (explained) by persons who act as lamps. Consequently there is no reason for the assumption that what brings about the knowledge of things is something which is not the work of a person; because the knowledge in question does proceed from the explanations provided by persons. Thus the character of not being the work of a person, even though it may be present in the Veda, is of no use; because the only result produced by the Veda—I.e. knowledge—is dependent upon persons.—(2366–2368)

COMMENTARY.

The idea that the Veda is not the work of a person is postulated for the purpose of showing that the knowledge provided by it must be right;—
this assumption also is not independent of personalities in providing that knowledge,—hence the assumption is entirely futile. In fact, the Persons, as authors of the Veda, might very well be the reliable source of right knowledge,—what is the use of assuming this independence of Personalities, which, after all, is itself dependent on personalities?—(2365-2368)

It might be argued that—in order to avoid the contingency of the Veda becoming non- eternal, and also that of the assumption of the Veda being independent of Personalities becoming futile,—the Veda is held to be always efficient,—then this view becomes open to the objection already pointed out.—This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2369).

IF THE VEDA IS ALWAYS EFFICIENT (TO PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE), THEN WHY SHOULD IT REQUIRE ANYTHING ELSE? THE REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING FOR YOU FROM THE PRESENCE OF THAT SINGLE EFFICIENT CAUSE.—(2369)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—“Even if the help of Personalities is needed, the idea of freedom from Personalities does not become futile; because what is made clear (explained) by the Persons is the meaning as it is there already,—they do not produce anything new; if they produced something new, then alone would the independence of those Persons become admitted; and in that case, being beset with attachment and other Defects, if they were to set about producing Vedic texts giving expression to wrong ideas, how could they be prevented?”

The answer is that all these contingencies would arise also under the view that the knowledge of the meaning of Vedic Sentences is brought about by the explanations provided by Persons.

This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (2370-2371).

PERSONS, BEING FREE AGENTS, PROCEEDING TO EXPLAIN THE VEDA, ACCORDING TO THEIR WHIMS, COULD NEVER BE CHECKED BY ANY ONE. CONSEQUENTLY, BEING BESET WITH SUCH DEFECTS AS DELUSION, VANITY, ETC., THEY MIGHT PROVIDE WRONG EXPLANATIONS OF THE VEDA.—THERE IS ROOM FOR SUCH A SUSPICION.—(2370-2371)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, no such Person has been postulated as is independently cognisant of the meaning of the Veda, which is beyond the reach of the senses,
who would expound this meaning. Because the power of such a Person to perceive supersensuous things through his knowledge of the Veda, cannot belong to him independently by himself;—and the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda also is not possible without the power to perceive supersensuous things;—thus there is an unavoidable mutual interdependence.

This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (2372-2373).

The other party do not admit any Person capable of perceiving supersensuous things;—and the knowledge of the connection between Heaven and Sacrificial Performance cannot be obtained except from the (Vedic) Injunction; because for you, there is no Person who is capable of directly perceiving supersensuous things; as whoever has any knowledge of these has it only through the Eternal Words.—(2372-2373)

COMMENTARY.

The compound ‘achodanam’ is to be explained as—‘that for which there is no Injunction’; i.e. that which is independent of the Injunction.
The reason for this is next stated—‘Because, etc. etc.’
Question:—“Why is this also so?”
Answer:—‘As whoever, etc. etc.’—As has been declared in the following words—‘For these reasons there is no Perceiver of supersensuous things; whoever knows anything about these knows it only through the Eternal Word’—(2372-2373)

The following might be urged—“The Veda itself would make known to such a person its own meaning, without any action on the part of that Person; so that there is no mutual interdependence”.
The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2374).

The Veda, by itself, without any support, cannot always make known its own meaning; in fact, it stands in need of explanations by Persons,—such explanations being like the stick held by the blind man.—(2374)

COMMENTARY.

When the Vedic sentence is heard by a man for the first time, it does not make known its meaning to that man, if he does not know the conventions (regarding the words and their meanings).
Question:—"What then does it do?"

Answer:—"It needs, etc. etc.'—The compound is to be explained as—
'that which is similar to the stick held by the blind man'.—(2374)

Question:—"It may be in need of it; where is the harm?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2375).

When pulled up by the Explanations, the Veda might fall into the wrong path; and in that case, it would not be right to regard the Veda as the 'Eye' (Illuminating things) like the Light.—(2375)

COMMENTARY.

'Sa'—stands for the Veda.
'Tayā'—stands for the Explanations by men.
'Might fall into the wrong path'—by providing a wrong knowledge of things, expressing things as they are not.

Thus, it cannot be right to say, as has been said (by the Mimāmsaka) —'The Veda, like Light, is the one eye for all men, and there should be no objections raised against it'. (Text 2331).—(2375)

The following Text sums up the discussion:

TEXT (2376).

Even though by itself, the Veda may be able to bring about cognitions,—yet its validity (reliability) cannot be quite clear; as it is dependent upon Personalities.—(2376)

COMMENTARY.

It has been already explained that what is efficient cannot bring about cognitions through the help of Personalities.—Even granting that the Veda is efficient and yet it is productive of Cognitions through the help of Personalities,—even so, though it may be able to bring about cognitions through the help of Personalities, yet its validity and reliability would not be clearly possible.—Such is the construction of the sentence.

The particle 'āpi' is misplaced; it should be construed after 'sati'.— (2376)

The following Text further clarifies this same idea:
TEXT (2377).

The validity of a means of cognition is accepted on the ground of its bringing about cognitions in accordance with the real state of things. If then, the Veda depends upon explanations provided by men, the assumption of its validity (reliability) cannot be right.—(2377)

COMMENTARY.

'The assumption of its validity cannot be right':—because under Text 2375 it has been shown that 'it might fall on the wrong path'.—(2377)

From the above it follows that it is not right to assert as has been asserted (by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2350, above) that—'The Veda being reliable, a beginningless line of Pupils and Teachers tends to make it faultless'.

This is what is shown in the following:

TEXT (2378).

Thus, the Veda not having been proved to be valid, any beginningless line of Pupils and Teachers, even though assumed, cannot make it faultless.—(2378)

COMMENTARY.

After 'mānē', we should read 'a—sthitē'.—(2378)

Question:—"Why cannot it make it faultless?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2379).

Because not a single person among them is held to be capable of perceiving supersensuous things; hence, even though assumed, the traditional line of Pupils and Teachers can be only a line of blind persons.—(2379)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"If it is a line of blind people,—what then?"

Answer:—
TEXT (2380).

When a blind man is led by another blind man, he is not sure to get at the right path; hence the assumption of the beginninglessness of the line (of pupils and teachers) is entirely futile.—(2380)

COMMENTARY.

This has been thus asserted in the Shabara-Bhāṣya (1. 1. 2)—In regard to such things as are beyond the senses, the words of men cannot be a reliable source of knowledge; just as the words of persons born blind cannot be a reliable source of knowledge regarding shades of colour'.—(Translation, page 5).

Hitherto objections against the Veda have been urged after having admitted (for the sake of argument) that the beginninglessness of the Veda is proved by 'the line of Pupils and Teachers'.—Now it is going to be shown that this also is not so proved:—

TEXT (2381).

As a matter of fact, there is no means of knowing for certain that this thing (the Veda and its meaning) has not been made (composed) by such later beings as Manu, Vyāsa and others.—(2381)

COMMENTARY.

'No means of knowing, etc. etc.'—;—because the matter is entirely imperceptible.

The following might be urged—"When we regard the Veda as valid and reliable, it is not because it is the source of true knowledge and hence not the work of any person; we do so simply because the connection between words and their meanings is eternal and what they express is true. This could not be possible if the Veda were the work of a Person".

But this also is 'Inconclusive'; where is the ground for the hard and fast rule that what expresses the truth must not be the work of a Person?—But granting that it is so;—even so the view is open to objections.

This is what is pointed out in the following:—
THE VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE VEDA MAY BE DUE MERELY TO ETERNAL CONNECTION EXPRESSIVE OF TRUE THINGS; EVEN SO, THERE IS NO ONE WHO EVER PERCEIVES THAT CONNECTION, WHICH IS BEYOND THE SENSES. ALL THAT IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORDS (OF THE VEDA) IS SUPERSENSUOUS; HENCE ITS CONNECTION ALSO MUST BE SUPERSENSUOUS; WHILE ALL HUMAN BEINGS BY THEMSELVES ARE INCAPABLE OF SEEING THINGS BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES.—
(2382-2383)

COMMENTARY

'Satyārtha' qualifies 'nityasambandha'.

As a matter of fact, the 'eternal connection' is something that has been assumed; and if it did not bring about the cognition of the meaning, its assumption would be futile; certainly it has no other character except that of being productive of the cognition of the meaning;—the operation of the connection consists only in bringing about the cognition of the meaning; how then can there be a Connection which does not bring about such Cognition? It is not by its mere presence that the Connection brings about the cognition; it does so only when it is itself recognised; if it were not so, then the cognition of the meaning would appear also in one who is ignorant of the convention (bearing upon the connection between words and meanings); and yet the connection cannot be recognised by any one; because one member of the connection—in the shape of Heaven, etc.—being beyond the reach of the senses, the connection itself must also be beyond it.

It might be argued that—''People capable of perceiving supersensuous things would recognise the connection''.

The answer to that is—'All human beings, etc, etc.'—as has been declared in the following words—'Thus there is no direct perceiver of things beyond the senses; if people know these things it is only through the Word'.

'Anatyaksadrśah'—capable of perceiving supersensuous things.—
(2382-2383)

It might be urged that—''the Veda itself would make this Connection known''.

The answer to that is as follows—
TEXT (2384).

The Veda certainly does not say—'such and such is my connection with the meaning'; as regards the 'connection of the meaning' that would be fixed by men, and would not differ from being 'the work of man'.—

(2384)

COMMENTARY.

It is not that the Veda-Personality, over-flowing with sympathy, his mind bent upon piety, devoted to doing good to others, and charitably disposed, invites the Brāhmaṇas and offers to them the meaning of the Veda, saying to them—'O Brāhmaṇas, such and such is my meaning, please accept this'.

Question:—'In that case, the Brahmana would themselves imagine the meaning'.

Answer:—'As regards, etc. etc.'

The following Text explains the 'non-difference' mentioned in the preceding Text:

TEXT (2385)

Just as it is suspected that what the word of man says may be untrue,—in the same way, may it not be suspected that the meaning imagined by man may be wrong?

—(2385)

COMMENTARY.

It sometimes happens that with the intention of knowing things in a jumbled up form, men make use of confused and jumbled up words,—in the same way, they may imagine and determine the meaning of words in the same confused manner. Where then is the difference between the two?

'Sā'—stands for wrongness.

'Shāṅkyā'—might be suspected.—(2385)

At first, it was explained that the Veda itself being unreliable, the assumption of the 'line of pupils and teachers' is futile. Now, it is granted (for the sake of argument) that the Veda is reliable; and then shown that in either case, the assumption of the 'line of pupils and teachers' is futile:
TEXT (2386).

Even if the Veda is a reliable source of knowledge, the beginningless ‘line of pupils and teachers’ that has been assumed becomes like a ‘line of blind persons’.—(2386)

COMMENTARY.

In the following text, the Opponent urges the fallacy of ‘impossibility’ against the foregoing assertion of the Buddhist to the effect—‘May it not be suspected, etc. etc.’ (Text 2385):

TEXTS (2387-2388).

“The cognition that arises in regard to Heaven and such things, from the Vedic sentences speaking of the Agnihotra, etc. is found to be free from doubt and uncertainty,—just like the firm conviction that proceeds from sense-perception. Why then should the Veda, bringing about such cognition not be regarded as reliable? It is for this reason that the idea that one derives from the words of the Veda is never doubtful and uncertain.”—(2387-2388)

COMMENTARY.

‘Arëka’—is doubt, uncertainty.—‘ādi’ is meant to include mistake, wrongness.—As declared in the Shabarā-Bhāṣya (1. 1. 2)—‘The idea brought about by the assertion—Desiring Heaven, one should perform sacrifices—is not an uncertain one; i.e. it is not in the form—Heaven may or may not follow from the performance of sacrifices; in fact, the idea is a definitely certain one—that Heaven does follow; and when this is cognised for certain, it cannot be false. That Cognition or Idea alone is false which, having appeared, becomes sublated by the notion—such is not the actual case; the idea in question—that Heaven follows from the performance of sacrifices—is never found to be so sublated at any time, or in regard to any person, or under any circumstances, or at any place. Hence it follows that it is not false or wrong.’—(Translation, p. 5).

If it were not so, then why should not your mind be swinging in doubt, even when you may be actually feeling the huge flame of fire with gleaming sparks flying on all sides? In fact, under the circumstances, there would be nothing reliable for you.

Such is the sense of the Opponent (Mīmāṃsaka).

His argument may be formulated thus:—That Cognition which is free from doubt and mistake must be regarded by all intelligent men as ‘valid
and reliable;'—e.g. the certain cognition of fire that the man has who desires heat for cooking and whose mind is not under delusion; and the Cognition arising from the Vedic sentences speaking of the Agnihotra, etc. is free from doubt and mistake; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing.

‘Na-avalambita’—is to be construed with (as governing) ‘pramānatām’.

‘Tām kurvan’—bringing about such cognition.—(2387-2388)

The author answers the above argument in the following—

TEXTS (2389-2390).

IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE UNCERTAINTY DOES ARISE (IN THE CASE OF THE VEDIC SENTENCE), JUST IN THE SAME WAY AS IN THE CASE OF ANOTHER ASSERTION TO THE CONTRARY; AND INTELLIGENT PEOPLE DO NOT PERCEIVE ANY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO CASES. IN FACT, IN REGARD TO THINGS BEYOND THE SENSES, THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THEIR existence OR non-existence.—IF IT BE URGED THAT—“THIS CERTAINTY DOES ARISE FROM THE VEDIC SENTENCE’’—THEN (THE ANSWER IS)—WHY CANNOT THERE BE CERTAINTY REGARDING THE CONTRARY OF THAT, FROM ANOTHER SENTENCE?—(2389-2390)

COMMENTARY.

If your Reason means that the notion that intelligent men obtain from the Veda is free from uncertainty, etc.—then it is not ‘admissible’; because the notion that the intelligent man has of Agnihotra leading to Heaven is just as uncertain as that of Agnihotra not leading to Heaven; in fact, in the matter of all supersensuous things, there can be no cause for any absolutely certain cognition as to the thing being existent or non-existent; because the corroboration of the actual perception of the real state of things is equally unavailable in both cases.

‘As in the case of another assertion to the contrary’—The ‘vati’ affix is added to the word with the Locative ending.

It might be argued that—‘the certainty is obtained from the Vedic sentence itself; why seek for another cause for it?’

The answer to this is—‘Why cannot there be, etc. etc.’—i.e. certainty contrary to what is asserted in the Vedic sentence.

‘From another sentence’—i.e. from one emanating from a man.

‘Why cannot there be’—i.e. there must be.—Hence that also should be regarded as valid and reliable; as the ‘absence of sublation’ would be equally available in both cases.—(2389-2390)

It might be argued that—“As a matter of fact intelligent Vedic scholars do actually obtain unshakeable notions from the Veda; hence the Reason cannot be ‘inadmissible’”.

The answer to that is that such notions may be obtained; but even so, if the Reason is not ‘inadmissible’, it certainly is ‘Inconclusive’.

This is shown in the following—

TEXTS (2391–2393).

That Vedic scholars derive unshakable notions from the Veda is due to their minds being influenced by faith; and this is equally present in other people’s minds, in respect of other assertions. For example, quite as unshakable notions are derived by the Buddhists regarding trouble and suffering resulting from sacrifices which involve the killing of animals. Of this latter notion we do not find any sublation till now. If it be said that ‘there may be sublation of it at some future time and place’,—the same is equally possible in the case of the Vedic Sentence also.—(2391–2393).

COMMENTARY.

‘Sā’—the firm conviction.
‘Anyāgām’—of the Buddhist and other people.
‘Anyatuḥ’—from such sentences as ‘From sacrifices, involving the killing of animals, proceed trouble and suffering’.

This is what is shown in the sentence beginning with ‘For example, etc. etc.’—It is easily understood.—(2391–2393).

The Author again shows that the premiss regarding the Veda being independent of personalities is ‘inconclusive’:

TEXTS (2394–2397).

If the Veda expressed its meaning by itself independently of conventions made by the whims of men,—then it might be valid and reliable. As, in that case, it would not abandon its meaning, even when explained otherwise by men with minds perverted by delusion, vanity and other defects;—and it would directly bring about the cognition of that meaning alone, and not express any meaning that may be desired by men.—If however, it depends upon the whims of men, then it does not differ from the common assertions of men; as in that case the expressing of meaning would be dependent upon men, and it is quite possible that it may be wrong.—(2394–2397)

COMMENTARY.

The whims of men are unfettered; if then the Veda depended, in the expressing of its meaning, upon Conventions made by the whims of men,—
it would not express the meaning that is desired; as there would be nothing to restrict it. On the other hand, if the Veda expressed its meaning independently of the Conventions, then it would be possible for it to be valid and reliable; because regardless of the explanations propounded by men, it would directly express its meaning; even though it might be explained otherwise by men, it would never abandon the function of expressing its own meaning by itself,—exactly as the eye and other organs do not abandon their inherent function of apprehending things.—This is the sense of the whole argument.

'Ākhyāyamāna'—Being explained.
'Aram'—Quickly; at once.
'Wrong'—i.e. the whims of men may be wrong.—(2394-2397)

It may be that, on account of the Veda not being the work of an author, its connection with its meaning is inherent; even so, however, what is desired by the Mīmāṁsaka is not proved; as the Reason adduced remains 'Inconclusive'.

This is the view expounded in the following:—

TEXTS (2398-2399).

IT IS SAID THAT THE VEDA, NOT BEING THE WORK OF AN AUTHOR, HAS THE INHERENT CAPACITY OF ASSERTING WHAT IS TRUE;—BUT WHY CANNOT IT BE SUSPECTED THAT WHAT IT SAYS IS NOT TRUE?

JUST AS ITS TRUTHFULNESS IS DEDUCED FROM THE FACT THAT BY ITSELF, IT BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION OF WHAT IS TRUE,—IN THE SAME MANNER IT MIGHT BE SUSPECTED THAT BY ITSELF IT BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION OF WHAT IS NOT TRUE.—(2398-2399)

COMMENTARY.

'Prākṛtam'—pertaining to its nature; inherent.—(2398-2399)

The following text proceeds to urge that the reason for the validity and reliability of the Veda may be held to lie in the fact of its being the work of a reliable person; why rely upon its not being the work of anyone, which only shows your stupidity?
FURTHER, IF YOU ARE REALLY EAGER TO REGARD THE VEDA AS VALID AND RELIABLE, THEN TRY AND PROVE THAT IT IS THE WORK OF A PERSON FREE FROM DEFECTS AND SO FORTH. IF IT IS COMPOSED BY A FAULTLESS AUTHOR AND IS EXPOUNDED IN THE WORLD BY FAULTLESS EXPOUNDERS, IT CERTAINLY CAN BE THE MEANS OF OBTAINING THE COGNITION OF THE REAL TRUTH REGARDING THINGS.—(2400-2401)

COMMENTARY.

‘And so forth’—is meant to include the faultless expounders—(2400-2401)

Question—“How can validity and reliability be accepted as attaching to the Veda as composed and explained by faultless persons?”

Answer :

TEXT (2402).

THE WELL-DEFINED AND EXCELLENT WORDS OF PERSONS FULL OF WISDOM AND COMPASSION, EVEN THOUGH EMANATING FROM PERSONALITIES, ARE ACTUALLY THE MEANS OF TRUE COGNITIONS.—(2402)

COMMENTARY.

This has been thus declared by Shabaravāmin (in his Bhāṣya on Śū. 1. 1. 2)—“As regards the assertion of ordinary men, if it emanates from a trustworthy person,—or if it pertains to something that is directly perceived by the senses,—it must be true”. (Translation, p. 4.)

‘Sadvāchaḥ’—Excellent assertions.—(2402)

The following Text again shows the ‘inconclusiveness’ of not being the work of a Person as a Reason for reliability.

TEXT (2403).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE VEDA CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A SOURCE OF RIGHT COGNITION, SIMPLY BECAUSE IT IS NOT THE WORK OF MAN. BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN FOUND THAT SUCH THINGS AS forest-fire AND THE LIKE ( WHICH ARE NOT THE WORK OF MAN) ARE THE SOURCE OF FALSE COGNITIONS.—(2403)

COMMENTARY.

Mistaken cognitions do not always arise from the presence of defects in men; even in cases where no such defects are possible,—e.g. in the case of
such things as forest-fire,—there are wrong cognitions in regard to the Blue Lotus and such things [the Blue Lotus appearing Red under the glare of the extensive fire].

‘Dāva-vahni’—is the wild fire burning in the woods. What is meant to be cited as the source of wrong cognition is that Fire which starts by itself through the friction of dried bamboos, etc. in the forest. That fire on the other hand which is produced by men by rubbing together of two sticks,—this cannot be regarded as ‘not the work of man’; and hence this could not invalidate the Mimāṃsaka’s Reason.

‘Forest-fire and the like’—‘and the like’ is meant to include the Mirage and such phenomena.—(2403)

How these are the source of wrong cognitions is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2404).


—(2404)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be said (by the Mimāṃsaka)—‘The mere fact of not being the work of a person has not been put forward by us as the Reason (for Reliability),—what is meant by us to be the Reason is that fact along with the fact of not being a product.—Or it is this character of not being a product that is indicated by the character of not being the work of a Person. Hence the Reason is not rendered Inconclusive by the case of the Forest fire, which is a product (with a beginning) ’.—

This is the Mimāṃsaka’s answer which is anticipated and set forth in the words—‘In this case, the Fire, etc. etc.’

‘Taddhētuḥ’—the source of wrong cognition.—(2404)

The answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXT (2405).

DOES THE ‘CHARACTER OF BEING A Product’ MAKE THINGS THE SOURCE OF WRONG COGNITIONS? In that case, Smoke WOULD NOT BE THE CORRECT INDICATOR OF Fire.—(2405)

COMMENTARY.

That alone can be a qualification of the Reason (Probans) which serves to differentiate the Probans from the contrary of the Probandum;—other-
wise, if any and every qualification could make the Reason conclusive, then no Reason could ever be Inconclusive; because qualifications would easily be available by the mere wish for it; — the character of not being a Product does not set aside its capacity to bring about wrong notions; because if being a product were known to be the cause of being a source of wrong notions, then the absence of the former might mean the absence of the latter also.

The Opponent might say— "It is so known".

The answer to that is— 'In that case, etc. etc.' — If the character of being a Product were the reason for being the source of wrong notions, — then the character of not being a Product would be the reason for being the source of right notions; — because Right and Wrong Cognitions being mutually contradictory, both could not proceed from one and the same cause; e.g. Fire, which is the source of Heat, cannot be the source of gold; consequently, as Smoke is a product, it could not be the means of the Right Notion of Fire. — (2405)

The following might be urged:— "What is meant by us is, not that the character of being a product is the cause of wrong cognition only, but that the said character alone is the cause of the wrong cognition; there is no other cause for it; we do not assert that Right Cognition can never be brought about by what is a Product. Everything that is a product is not equally regarded by us as being the cause of Wrong Cognition; by virtue of which, the Right and Wrong Cognitions being mutually contradictory, all that is not-product would be the source of Right Cognition. What is meant by us is that Products being multifarious, it is only some Products that are the source of Wrong Cognition,— e.g. jaundice, etc.— while some are the source of Right Cognition,— e.g. the whole lot of undiseased sense-organs. If it were not so, then, on finding that some products like Ice are the source of cold,— it might be presumed by implication that warmth which is contrary to cold is due to something that is not a Product. As a matter of fact, however, this is not so. — Thus, inasmuch as we do not deny the fact of the Product being the source of Right Cognition, Smoke does remain the means of Right Cognition (of Fire)’.

Anticipating this argument, the Author answers it in the following—

TEXT (2406).

THUS, EVEN THOUGH NOT THE WORK OF A PERSON, THE VEDA CANNOT BE THE SOURCE OF RIGHT COGNITION; HENCE THE ASSUMPTION OF IT IS ENTIRELY FUTILE.—(2406)

COMMENTARY.

If the character of being a Product were the cause of both Rightness and Wrongness,— then the absence of that character would mean the absence of both Right and Wrong Cognition; consequently the fact of the Veda not being a product could not be a ground for its being a source of Right Cognition;
as that is not a cause of this latter; hence the qualification—"not being a product"—as applied to the Probans, is useless.

The following might be urged—"By the qualification—"not being the work of man", what is meant is not the 'Positive-Negative' Premiss, but a purely negative Premiss; the sense being that—being a Product, which is the contrary of the Probans ('not being the work of man'), is concomitant with 'falsity', which is the contrary of the Probandum ('Truthfulness'),—because falsity is found in the words of man only—hence wherever there is the character of not being a Product, which is contrary to that with which Falsity is invariably concomitant,—there, the character of not being a Product,—which is negatively concomitant with falsity—being negatived, its concomitant, Falsity, also becomes negatived; and thus it would follow that what is not a Product asserts what is true; and as thus the desired conclusion would be got even without the affirmative premiss, any statement of such a Premiss would be useless".

True; this is so. If the concomitance between the two contraries is admitted. But it is not admitted. For instance, there would be concomitance between the two contraries of the Probandum, if against the Probans, which is contrary to the Probandum, there were a sublative cognition. There is, however, no such sublative cognition. Mere non-perception does not prove non-existence; as it is not a conclusive proof for non-existence.

The following might be urged—"Being a Product is the contrary of not-being a Product; in the former we find falsity, whence it follows by implication that what is not a Product is devoid of falsity".

This is not right. From seeing something in one place, it does not follow that it does not exist elsewhere; because one and the same thing is found to be concomitant with mutually contradictory things. For instance, the single character of non-eternity is found to be concomitant with what is produced by effort and also what is not so produced; and the mere fact of non-eternity being found in what is produced by effort, cannot lead to the conclusion that it does not exist in what is not produced by effort.

Further, if the mere fact of falsity being sometimes found in what is a Product were to mean that the two are invariably concomitant, then it might be that truthfulness being found in words proceeding from men,—truthfulness and proceeding from men may be regarded as invariable concomitants;—and consequently, on the cessation of the character of being a product, falsity should cease,—as also Truthfulness should cease; so that the mere fact of not being the work of a Person does not prove truthfulness. Enough of this discussion.—(2406)

The Author has, so far, proved, in detail, the 'Inconclusiveness' of the following Reasons (propounded by the Mīmāṃsāka, in support of the Reliability of the Veda)—(a) that it is free from all defects conducive to falsity, as implied by the fact of its not being the work of man,—(b) that it is not the work of man, as indicated by the absence of defects,—(c) that it is not the work of man, which has been directly stated in so many words. He now proceeds to show the 'inadmissibility' of these:
TEXTS (2407-2409).

FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE REASONS IN SUPPORT OF (1) THE VEDA NOT BEING THE WORK OF A PERSON, (2) OF THERE BEING ONLY A ‘MANIFESTATION’ OF IT, AND (3) OF ITS BEING ETERNAL,—AS ALSO (4) OF THE ETERNAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE WORDS AND ITS MEANING,—HAVE ALL BEEN SET FORTH USELESSLY. BECAUSE, EVEN IF THE VEDA HAS ALL THIS CHARACTER, IT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED TO BE THE SOURCE OF TRUE KNOWLEDGE; AS HAS BEEN JUST STATED IN DETAIL. HENCE WE ARE NOT PAYING MUCH ATTENTION TO THE REFUTATION OF THIS IDEA (OF THE VEDA NOT BEING THE WORK OF A PERSON). WHO WOULD EVER CARE TO REFUTE WHAT HAS NO BEARING UPON THE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION?—(2407-2409)

COMMENTARY.

(1) The idea of its not being the work of a Person, (2) the idea that there is ‘manifestation’ of it, and (3) the idea that it is eternal;—the Reasons in support all this.—‘Sūdhana’ being that by which something is proved, i.e. Reason, Probans.—Various kinds of such Reasons have been shown above already.

‘Tasmin’—even if all this be true.—‘Asya’ of the Veda.
‘Upagamyata’—cannot be accepted.
‘Vyāśataḥ’—in detail.
‘Eśatpratikṣēp’—to the refutation of all this idea—of the Veda not being the work of a Person and so forth.

Even if all this is true, what is wanted by the Mīmāṃsaka is not accomplished;—and as this has been explained already; if a further refutation of all this were done, it would be of no use in the present discussion.—(2407-2409)

This same idea is further explained—

TEXTS (2410-2411).

THE QUESTION THAT IS BEING CONSIDERED NOW IS THE IDEA OF THE VEDA BEING THE SOURCE OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE; AND IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT IT CANNOT BE SO, EVEN IF IT BE NOT THE WORK OF A PERSON.—WHAT LITTLE IS SAID IN THIS CONNECTION (BY THE OTHER PARTY) IN SHEER VANITY, ALL THAT VANISHES IN THIS SAME WAY, FOR ALL MEN OF KEEN INTELLECTUAL VISION.—(2410-2411)

COMMENTARY.

‘Ākopuruṣikā’—vanity.—The nominal affix ‘vaiḥ’ being due to the term being included under the ‘Manojña’ group.
Men of keen intelligence, whose vision, in the shape of Intelligence, is very keen.—(2410-2411)

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka under 2095, above, that 'the author of the Veda' is not cognisable by any of the five Means of Knowledge, etc. etc.

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (2412).

The absence of the Means of Cognition does not necessarily mean the absence of the Object of Cognition; because the latter are not causes with which the former is invariably concomitant.—(2412)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this the most important argument (of the Mimāmsaka) is 'inadmissible'.

It is only what is all-pervading, e.g. the Cause, which, being absent, indicates the absence of the less pervasive, e.g. the Effect; because these two are related to each other—the all-pervasive to the less pervasive, by the relation of co-essentiality, and the Cause to the Effect by the relation of the one being produced by the other;—and for you, the effect and the less-pervasive factor cannot be present when their correlatives are not there.—As regards the Means of Cognition, they cannot be pervasive over, and the Cause of, all things. For instance, it is quite possible for a thing far removed in time and place and nature, to exist even without the Means of Cognition applying to it; hence the said Means of Cognition cannot be pervasive over all things. Nor can the Means of Cognition be regarded as the Cause of all things, for the same reason; specially as it is the other way about, the Means of Cognition itself being the effect or product of the Objects of Cognition. And yet when the Effect is absent, it does not imply the Absence of the Cause; as such a premiss is found to be false. And what is neither the Cause nor all-pervasive cannot indicate the absence of its correlatives; as, if it did, there would be incongruities.

Thus it is established that in the proving of the absence of the Object of Cognition only, the absence of the Means of Cognition only, if cited as a Reason, is clearly 'inconclusive' and wrong.—(2412)

The same 'Inconclusiveness' is further confirmed by the possibility of the Reason in the Contrary of the Probandum:
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXT (2413).

Thus, even though not cognisable by the five Means of Cognition, the Author of the Veda is not amenable to 'Non-apprehension' (Negation) alone;—he being just like the Author of the Story-book whose Author is not known.—(2413)

COMMENTARY.

'Tat'—Thus; therefore.

Construe thus—'Pañchabhīṣa aṣamyoṣi shrutīḥ karta'.

'Avijñāta, etc.'—The compound is to be expounded as—'those whose authors are unknown'; and this to be taken as in opposition to (qualifying) 'ākhyāyikādi'; and then the Genitive Ending and the 'vati'—affix.—(2413)

The following Text points out the 'inadmissibility' and hence 'Inconclusiveness' of the Mīmāṃsaka's Proverbs:

TEXT (2414).

If the Author of these Story-books is inferred from the fact of their being expressive of distinctly clear meanings,—

then why cannot the same be done in regard to the Veda also?—(2414)

COMMENTARY.

'Tēsām'—stands for the story-books, etc.

'Why cannot, etc. etc.'—That is, why is not the Author of the Veda also inferred from its being expressive of distinctly clear meanings?—there being no difference between the two cases. Thus the Reason—'because there is no means of knowing such an Author' becomes 'inadmissible', 'untrue'.—(2414)

Further, the Reason as adduced by the Mīmāṃsaka can have two meanings—(1) that the Author is not cognised by any one through the Five Means of Cognition, and (2) that he is not so cognised by the Mīmāṃsaka himself;—in the former sense, it is Doubtful—hence-Inadmissible; and in the latter, it is Inconclusive.—This is shown in the following:
TEXTS (2415-2417)

As regards his being not cognised by all beings,—that is always doubtful; as it is possible that at some time by some means of Cognition, he might become cognised by some one. Because that he is so uncognisable cannot be clearly ascertained by all living beings of all the three worlds coming together without exception.—As regards his being not cognised by the Mimāmsaka himself, it is clearly 'Inconclusive', because that does not prove with certainty that there is no cognition by other persons.—(2415-2417)

COMMENTARY.

'Imam'—i.e. the fact that the Author of the Veda is not cognised by anyone.
'Tathā hi, etc. etc.'—confirms the said 'Inconclusiveness'—through the convictions of other people and also the cogitations of students.—(2415-2417)

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, under Text 2088, that "the Author of the Veda is not perceived".

The following Text shows that this Reason is 'inadmissible':—

TEXT (2418).

It is through Perception that the Readers of the Veda are recognised as the 'makers'. It cannot be right to regard them as 'manifesters'; because the 'manifestation' of eternal things is impossible.—(2418)

COMMENTARY.

If the opinion held is that 'no maker of the Veda is ever perceived',—then, in as much as readers of the Veda are always seen, what is asserted is clearly 'inadmissible'.

If the idea held is that the first 'maker' of the Veda has not been seen,—even so the fact remains doubtful—hence—inadmissible; it being possible that he might have been seen by some one at some time.

If the idea is that the 'Readers' cannot be regarded as 'Makers' or 'Authors'—they are only the 'manifesters' of the Veda,—then the answer to that is that—'It cannot be right, etc. etc.'—'Tē' stands for the Readers.

That the 'Manifestation' of eternal things is not possible is going to be explained later on.

Question:—"How then can there be a 'Manifester' of the non-eternal Jar?"
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Answer:—True; there can be no 'Manifester' for non-eternal things also.

Question:—"How then are things like the Lamp regarded as 'Manifesters'?

Answer:—No; in the cases cited, the Lamp is really the producer of the Jar, inasmuch as it produces the jar capable of bringing about its cognition; and it is spoken of as 'Manifester', in order to indicate the exact nature of the 'producing' done by it.

Such a 'Manifester' is not possible in the case of the Veda; because its nature is such that its successive stages of production are not clearly perceptible.—(2418)

Even granting that there can be a 'Manifester' of the eternal thing;—such a 'Manifester' does not differ from the 'maker'.—This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2419).

THE VEDAS BEING PERCEPTIBLE IN THEIR CHARACTER, THERE IS APPEARANCE OF THEM WHEN THERE IS OPERATION OF THE 'MANIFESTER'.

IF THEY EXISTED EVEN BEFORE THAT OPERATION, THEN THEY SHOULD BE PERCEPTIBLE AT THAT TIME ALSO.—(2419)

COMMENTARY.

Nothing can be regarded as 'Manifester' unless it does something; otherwise there would be incongruities; and if it does something, then it becomes admitted that it is the producer; because the production of a particular thing consists only in the coming about of another character.

'Being perceptible in their character'—This qualifies the Vedas.

It might be argued that—'The Vedas were perceptible in their character even before; then how can they be said to appear through the operation of the Manifester'?

The answer to this is—'If they existed even before, etc. etc.'—'Tēgām' stands for the Vedas that are perceptible in their character.—(2419)

The same idea is further supported:—

TEXT (2420).

THE VEDA IS RECOGNISED AS CAPABLE OF BEING TREATED AS THE EFFECT produced BY THE 'MANIFESTER',—BECAUSE IT APPEARS ONLY WHEN THIS LATTER IS PRESENT;—LIKE THE SPROUT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE SEED.—(2420)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is found to appear when there is functioning of another thing, the former is capable
of being treated as the effect produced by the latter,—for instance, the sprout, appearing when the seed functions, is regarded as its effect;—the Veda is found to appear only when the functioning of the Reader (Manifestor) is there; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

'Being treated' consists in abandoning or securing the thing.—'Adi' stands for being cognised, being spoken of and so forth.

The Reason here adduced is not 'inadmissible'; if it were, then the Veda would be perceived even before (its manifestation by the Reader).

Nor is the Reason 'Inconclusive'; as there can be no other reason for its being treated as a product.—(2420)

It has been argued under Text 2088 above that—"The Author of the Veda has not had his relationship perceived previously, etc. etc.—hence he cannot be inferred".

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (2421).

BECAUSE THEY APPEAR IN THE SEQUENTIAL FORM IN WHICH THEY BECOME MANIFESTED,—LIKE DRAMAS AND STORIES,—THE VEDAS MUST BE THE WORK OF AN AUTHOR; THUS THE AUTHOR IS COGNISED BY MEANS OF INFERENCE ALSO.—(2421)

COMMENTARY.

The reasoning may be formulated as follows:—What appears in the sequential order of the manifestation must be the work of an author;—like Dramas and Stories;—the Veda appears in the sequential order of its manifestation;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The Reason here adduced cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible'; because Letters are actually always cognised in a sequential order.—(2421)

The following Text shows that the Reason just adduced is not 'Inconclusive':—

TEXT (2422).

OTHERWISE [IF THE VEDA WERE NOT THE WORK OF A PERSON],—AS THE VEDA WOULD BE ETERNAL AND ALL-PERVADING, THERE COULD BE NO SEQUENTIAL ORDER IN IT. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO SEQUENCE IN WHAT IS ETERNAL; AS THERE CAN BE NO 'MANIFESTATION' OF IT.—(2422)

COMMENTARY.

'Otherwise'—if the Veda were not the work of a Person, and if it were eternal and all-pervading,—then there should be no sequence in regard to it.
Because in the case of the Veda, there cannot be any sequence of time, as there is in the case of the Seed and the Sprout; because being eternal, the words must be all synchronous.—Nor can there be sequence of place, as there is in the case of the line of ants; because, being all-pervading, they must occupy the same points in space.—Nor can there be sequence of manifestation; because what is eternal cannot have any peculiarity imposed upon itself, and hence cannot become manifested.—(2422)

It has been argued under Text 2089 that—"there is no Verbal authority, —either eternal or artificial,—which declares an Author of the Veda".

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (2423).

IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT 'VERBAL AUTHORITY', 'ANALOGY' AND 'PRESCRIPTION' CANNOT BE THE MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION;
—HENCE IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO BRING THESE FORWARD.—(2423)

COMMENTARY.

'It has been shown'—under the chapter on the Means of Right Cognition. 'Tásām'—of Verbal Authority, Analogy and Prescription.—(2423)

It has been argued under Text 2096 that—"The Veda is held to be without an Author, in order to remove the chances of unreliability, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (2424).

IF THE IDEA OF THE VEDA BEING WITHOUT AN AUTHOR IS INSISTED UPON, IN ORDER TO REMOVE ALL CHANCES OF ITS UNRELIABILITY,
—THEN, SUCH AN IDEA, BEING A POSITIVE ENTITY,
MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY MEANS OF PROOFS.
—(2424)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"How can that idea be a positive entity?"

Answer:—
TEXT (2425).

The Veda is regarded to be self-sufficient,—because it does not depend upon the action of any Person; and the said self-sufficiency must be either the property of a positive entity only, or such a positive entity itself.—(2425)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by the Veda 'being without an Author' is that it is self-sufficient; as the argument that is put forward is that "the Veda is independent of the action of Persons, and hence valid and reliable as a means of knowledge". If it were not so, then what peculiar character would it be which would be proved by the proving of the fact that the Veda is not the work of an Author?

This character of 'not being the work of an author' is the property of an entity for those who regard the distinction between the thing and its property as real.—As a matter of fact, however, the 'property' is only the nature of the entity itself, and is spoken of as its 'property' for the purpose of precluding other diversities. This is what is meant by the words—'or a positive entity itself'—'Such'—i.e. self-sufficient.—(2425)

It has been argued under Text 2100, that—"when the proofs adduced to prove the existence of such an Author are refuted, the absence of such a one follows as a matter of course".

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (2426–2428).

If certain proofs are adduced in support of the view that there is an Author of the Vedas,—if these proofs are refuted, it does not necessarily follow that there is no such Author. In fact on the refutation of the proof of his existence, what follows is that there is no certainty regarding his existence; similarly the mere setting aside of the idea of his existence is not enough to bring about any certainty at all.—As a matter of fact, even on the cessation of the Means of Cognition, there is no certainty regarding the non-existence of the thing concerned; hence all that it can prove is that there is no certainty regarding either of the two views.—(2426–2428)

COMMENTARY.

When a certain proof is adduced for the purpose of bringing about certainty regarding a certain thing,—if that proof is refuted,—all that will
follow would be that there would be no certainty relating to it; it would not follow that the thing itself does not exist. Because on the cessation of the Means of Cognition, the object of Cognition does not cease,—as has been explained above—on the basis of its being the Means or the Pervader.

'Āstē'—on being refuted,

All that can be asserted with reason is that 'neither of the two views is proved'; the particle 'iti' has to be added, after 'nāsti'.—(2426–2428)

The same idea is further strengthened by means of an example:—

TEXT (2429).

FOR INSTANCE, WHEN ON THE GROUND OF 'INCORPOREALITY', THE OTHER PARTY SEeks TO PROVE THE ETERNALITY (OF WORD-SOUNDS), —AND AGAINST THIS IT IS POINTED OUT THAT, IN VIEW OF Pleasure, WHICH ALSO IS 'INCORPOREAL' (AND YET NOT-ETERNAL), THE SAID Reason IS 'INCONCLUSIVE', —IT DOES NOT NECESSARILy FOLLOW (FROM THIS COUNTER-ARGUMENT) THAT THE Word-Sound IS PERISHABLE.—(2429)

COMMENTARY.

For example, the man who holds the Word-Sound to be eternal,—with a view to prove the said eternity, which is one entity,—puts forward the argument that 'the Word-Sound must be eternal, because it is incorporeal, like Ākāsha';—thereupon his opponent puts forward the counter-argument that—'The Word-Sound cannot be regarded as eternal, on the ground of its incorporeality, because in view of the case of Pleasure, the said reason is inconclusive';—in this way, though the Reason for the entity, in the shape of 'eternity', has been refuted, yet it does not become proved that the said Word-Sound is not-eternal;—so also in the case in question—this clause is to be taken as understood.

The term 'yatha' in the text is misplaced; it should be understood as coming after 'uktēpi'.

After the word 'Shabdā', the phrase 'nityāḥ siddhyati' has to be added. Or, a single use may be taken as serving both purposes,—as in the case of 'Bhīmā' and others.—(2429)

It has been argued above—under Text 2101, that—"when the other party adduce proofs in support of the two ends of the Veda, the upholders of the Veda have their purpose accomplished by the refutation of those proofs".

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (2430).

Thus then, when a proof has been adduced in support of the two ends of the Veda,—by the refutation of that proof, the upholders of the Veda do not have their purpose accomplished.—(2430)

COMMENTARY.

'Tat'—Therefore, thus. 'They do not have their purpose accomplished'—i.e. their opinion does not become established.—(2430)

It has been urged above by the Mīmāṃsaka, under the Text 2105, that—"Eternality is what is meant by the two characters of being not produced and being not destroyed, and both these being of the nature of Negation, do not require any proof for themselves".

The Buddhist's answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2431-2432).

If 'Eternality' is what is meant by being not produced and being not destroyed,—then, inasmuch as both would be of the nature of mere Negation,—the same may be said regarding the non-entity also. Consequently, just as the Eternality of the 'Sky-lotus' is not real, in the same way the reliability of the Veda also does not become established.—(2431-2432)

COMMENTARY.

There are two assumptions here—(1) that eternity is asserted on the basis of the two characters of being not produced and being not destroyed, which are of the nature of absolute negation,—and (2) that these latter are of the nature of Relative Negation;—under the former view (1) the Reason being 'inconclusive' (doubtful) in view of the 'Sky-lotus', the 'eternity' of the Veda does not become established as a real entity; because in the case of the 'Sky-lotus', though both the said characters of being produced and being destroyed are denied,—yet its eternity does not become established as a real entity; the same happens in the case of the Veda; hence the Reason is 'Inconclusive'; and from this it would follow that, as in the Sky lotus, so in the Veda also, there would be no reliability.—(2431-2432)

The following Text shows that the Reason in question is also 'Inadmissible':—
TEXT (2433).

Even the denial of the characters of being produced and being destroyed cannot be admitted; as it has been said that 'the proof is set aside'. Hence Eternality does not become established.—(2433)

COMMENTARY.

'Set aside'—Refuted.
'Tat'—Hence.

If the latter view (2)—put forward in the Commentary on 2431—is accepted,—then it should not be said that 'because they are of the nature of Negation, they do not need any proof for themselves'.

This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (2434-2435).

If the two characters meant to be the reasons for Eternality are of the nature of Relative Negation,—then, partaking of the nature of affirmation, they do stand in need of proof for themselves.—Thus, for people who do not wish to prove 'Eternality' as a real entity, the said Eternality does not become proved merely by the rejection of the two contrary views.—(2434-2435)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(2434-2435)

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, under Text 2106, that—"One who asserts the falsity of the Vedic Word, on the basis of Inference, has his Proposition annulled by the force of the cognition derived from the Veda." The Buddhist's answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2436).

The reason that has been adduced by us in its three-fold form,—cannot be refuted even by your father.—(2436)

COMMENTARY.

'The Reason that has been adduced',—under the Chapter on 'Inference'; where the three kinds of Reason have been described, as (1) based upon the nature of things, (2) based upon the relation of Cause and Effect, and (3) based on Non-apprehension.
Such a Reason cannot be refuted; because it is inseparable from the real state of things.—No one can alter the real nature of a thing; because that would mean the producing of another state of the thing; and when another state of the thing is brought about, it does not mean anything for the thing itself; as that would lead to incongruities. Consequently when a certain thing has been proved by proofs, it cannot be set aside by any one. Otherwise if there were setting aside of what is established by proof, the proof itself would become vitiated; this would mean that there would be no confidence in any thing; and hence that proof would not be reliable at all.—(2436)

The same idea is further explained in the following:

**TEXTS (2437-2438).**

The Person who has been spoken of in the Veda as 'not perishing', —the denial of such a Person through Inference has been clearly set forth in the section where 'the no-soul doctrine' has been expounded.—The 'universal' and other things also have been shown there to have been discarded. The Inference based upon well-recognised invariable Concomitance, as explained before, is what sets aside the soul.—(2437-2438)

**COMMENTARY.**

It has been declared in the Veda—'This indeed is the Soul'; and in reference to this Soul, it is asserted—'It is imperishable, it never perishes'; —and again—'Indestructible indeed is the Soul, characterised by indestructibility'.—'Does not perish'—i.e. is eternal. 'Arë'—is an expletive. 'Universal and other things'—'Other things' stands for Qualities and Substances.—In what way these have been discarded by proofs, has been shown under the chapter on the 'Six Categories'.—And the Inference that discards the Soul is one based upon well-recognised Premisses, shown under the Chapter on 'No-Soul'.—(2437-2438)

Says the Opponent—'What is declared by the Veda—how can it be discarded by Inference? If the idea provided by a Means of Right Cognition were discarded,—then why should the Inference also not be discarded?'

The answer to this is as follows:
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXT (2439).

WHEN THE INFERENCES ARE FIRMLY BASED UPON THE NATURE OF THINGS
—WHO WOULD BE THE STUPID PERSON WHO WOULD DISCARD
IT ON THE STRENGTH OF MERE WORDS,—OR BY THE
COGNITION BORN OF SUCH WORDS?—(2439)

COMMENTARY.

'Tasyāḥ—of the Inference.

Words depend upon the whim of the Speaker, and as such they can have
no fixed relationship to any real state of things; hence it cannot be regarded
as a Means of Right Cognition in regard to the state of things.—Inference,
on the other hand, always appears on the basis of the Probans which is
inseparably related either by sameness or by causality; and as such it is
inseparably connected with the thing; that is why it is a Means of Right
Cognition and is capable of discarding notions to the contrary.

'Tadbhāvinyāḥ'—proceeding from words.—(2439)

If even when not inseparably related, the Word were a Means of Right
Cognition, then there would be incongruities.—This is what is shown in the
following:—

TEXT (2440).

WHEN A COGNITION PROCEEDS FROM THE WORDS OF A HUMAN-BEING,
IN REGARD TO SOMETHING BEYOND THE SENSES,—WHY DO YOU
NOT REGARD IT TO BE AS RELIABLE AS THAT DERIVED
FROM SENSE-PERCEPTION?—(2440)

COMMENTARY.

Why should not reliability belong to the words that 'Heaven does not
result from the performance of the Agniḥotra'? Because in both cases—
[in the case of these words and in that of the Vedic declaration that Heaven
does result from the performance of the Agniḥotra]—the character of not
being denied is equally present.—(2440)

The same non-difference between the two cases is further explained:—
Both cases are equally independent of the need of a corroborative instance,—and both are equally free from defects,—because both relate to something imperceptible,—it might be urged that—'in the case of the human assertion, its sublation or denial would be suspected, on the ground of its proceeding from a human being'.—If that be so, then in the case of the Vedic assertion also, the said suspicion cannot be entirely absent; it would be considered only natural that it should be the source of false notions.—(2441-2442)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"It is possible that at the time that the human assertion is made, no defect may be found in it; but, as it arises from a human source, the suspicion is always there that it may be false".

The same may be said of the Veda also. Because truthfulness is as natural to it as falsity.

Hence there is no difference between the two cases.—(2441-2442)

It has been argued (by the Mīmāṃsaka) under Text 2111 that—"while the Veda is clearly bringing about the cognition of things, etc. etc." But the same may be said in regard to the human assertion also to the effect that 'Heaven does not result from the performance of the Agnihotra.' This is what is stated in the following :

TEXT (2443).

While the word (human) is clearly bringing about the cognition of things, no right-minded person should say, through sheer malice, that it is human (and hence unreliable).—(2443)

COMMENTARY.

The assertion that 'Heaven does not follow from the performance of the Agnihotra' is human—i.e. it proceeds from man;—such an assertion even though clearly bringing about the cognition of things, is not reliable for us, Mīmāṃsakas—this should not be said by any right-minded person, through sheer malice.—This is the sense of the passage in the text.—What is meant by this is that in the matter of what is entirely beyond the senses, the capacity to bring about cognitions belongs equally to human and non-human Words. Thus the capacity of bringing about cognitions being equally present in both, there can be no reason why reliability should belong to one and not to the other.
It cannot be right to urge that—"Defects being inherent in men, the falsity of their assertion is always suspected; which is not the case with superhuman assertions".

Because in the case of assertions not proceeding from man also, the suspicion is always likely that it may be bringing about false cognitions.—(2443)

The same idea is further explained:—

TEXT (2444).

THUS IN THE MATTER OF SUPER-SSENSUOUS THINGS, ALL WORDS ARE OF EQUAL STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS; WHY THEN SHOULD YOU BE IN LOVE WITH ONLY ONE KIND OF THEM?—(2444)

COMMENTARY.

'All'—Human and Non-human.
'One kind'—The non-human.—(2444)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2113,—"Even those who are hostile to the Veda do not assert any reason why it should not be a Means of Right Cognition, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2445).

THE PRINCIPLE JUST EXPLAINED FORMS THE REASON WHY IT IS ASSERTED BY THE WISE THAT THE VEDA CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION. AND IN THIS THEY SAY WHAT IS PERFECTLY TRUE.—(2445)

COMMENTARY.

'The Principle just explained'—viz. that 'Words, dependent upon mere whim, can have no inseparable connection with the real state of things'.
'The wise'—i.e. the Buddhists.

The Author of the Bhashya (Shabara) has declared as follows:—"The cognition derived from the Vedic assertion is direct perception; and no Inference can be reliable when it is opposed to Perception" (Sū. 1. 1. 2). [Translation, p. 6];—and again—"As a matter of fact it is the Vedic Injunction which is capable of making known what is past, present and future, also what is subtle or hidden or remote and such like; this cannot be done by any organ of sense". [Translation, p. 4.]

All this becomes discarded by what has been said above;—as all this is equally applicable to human assertions also.—(2445)
It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under 2114 that—"When people who have been intent upon the study, the retention and the exposition of the Veda and in the performance of acts enjoined therein, have not been able to detect any grounds of falsity, how can they be detected by persons who have kept themselves aloof from it?"—

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXTS (2446-2447).**

There is nothing strange in the fact that people, whose intelligence has been dulled by the constant contemplation of the Veda, prompted by false attachment, have failed to detect the sources of falsity (in the Veda). The Pārasīka people who are addicted to the practice do not perceive anything wrong in the remarriage of their mothers.—(2446-2447)

**COMMENTARY.**

The compound is to be expounded as—'those who have been *sadikṛta*—dulled—by the contemplation of the Veda which has been prompted by false attachment.'

'Ādhyānya' is constant contemplation or pondering.

On account of these, false attachment, etc. they do not perceive the defect, even though it is there. As for example, the Pārasīka people see nothing wrong in the marriage of their mothers. So there is nothing strange in what has been urged by the *Mīmāṃsaka*.—(2446-2447)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under *Text* 2117 that—"The eternity and all-pervasiveness of the Word is established, etc. etc." The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (2448).**

The idea of 'Recognition being of the nature of Perception' has been already discarded; and as Wrong Cognition is always associated with 'Conceptual Content', there can be no certainty regarding eternity.—(2448)

**COMMENTARY.**

*Sense-perception* has been defined as what is 'free from Conceptual Content and not wrong'; *Recognition* is not 'free from Conceptual Content', as it always appears as associated with words, in the form 'this is that same'.

—Nor is it 'not wrong'; because it envisages sameness between what was seen before and what is seen now; and yet what is seen now can never
be the same as that seen on the previous occasion; as there could be no notion of succession in what is not successive. The effect is always something that follows from, is born of, something else; when an effect does not come into existence at a certain time,—if its cause is there in its efficient state, why should there be delay in the appearance of the effect?—Then again, what is eternal does not stand in need of the help of anything; hence it is not possible for the delay to be due to the absence of that help. Hence the Cognitions that would proceed from the Eternal Source should all appear simultaneously.—The argument may be formulated as follows:—When the efficient cause of a certain effect is present, that effect must appear at the time;—for example, Visual Perception, when the complete set of its causes is present:—the cognitions proceeding from all words, 'Cow' and the rest, have the complete set of their efficient causes present at all times and under all conditions;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—Consequently,—because it is wrong, and because it is associated with Conceptual Content, Recognition cannot be regarded as Perception. All this has been already explained in course of the examination of the 'Permanence of things'.—(2448)

Even Recognition is not found to be present in the same form in all cases.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (2449–2452).

The idea that there appears in regard to Word-Sounds is found to be mostly divergent; as it is often cognised in such forms as 'This is spoken by the Parrot' and 'This other is spoken by the Shārikā'.—If it is said that 'This is due to the diversity of the manifesters of the Sounds',—then, we shall state the reasons for rejecting this idea of the 'manifestation' (of Sounds). On this ground alone, all this would be one and the same. Hence there can be no manifest, and no manifested. Because when the thing is one and indivisible, that fact precludes all notions of diversity.—Further, there can be no determination, based upon Recognition, that 'these words are human' and 'those others are not uttered by men'.—(2449–2452)

COMMENTARY.

When certain word-sounds are uttered by birds,—like the Parrot, the Shārikā and the like,—there is always the notion of diversity, as that 'this is uttered by the Parrot', 'that by the Shārikā' and so forth; hence Recognition (Word-Sound) does not appear in all cases.

It might be argued that—'this notion of diversity, in regard to the utterances of the Parrot, etc. is due to the diversity among the manifesting
agencies";—that is nothing; because the very idea of the 'manifesting agency' is going to be discarded.

This is what is said in the words—'Soyam, etc, etc.'—'Soyam' stands for the divergent notion.

Then again, even if the diversity in the Word were held to be based upon the diversity in the manifesters,—and not upon the Word itself,—then, there would be no confidence at all. This is the contingency that is indicated in the words—'On this ground alone, etc. etc.'—'all this'—i.e. the entire universe.

"Let that be so; what then?"

Answer—'Hence there can be, etc. etc.'—There could be no ideas of difference, such as 'this is the manifester' and 'that the manifested', which is based upon diversity;—as there is no difference at all. For example, 'these words are human' and 'those others, like Shanno dēvih, etc. are not human'—all such notions would not be possible for you who are so devoted to Recognition; as there is no distinction at all.—(2449–2452)

In the following Text, the Mīmāṃsaka shows how there can be distinction between the common (secular) words and the Vedic words:

TEXT (2453).

"SOME WORDS ARE FOUND ALWAYS IN ONE AND THE SAME ORDER OF SEQUENCE,—THE ORDER OF THE MANIFESTERS BEING FIXED; THESE WORDS ARE HELD TO BE not-human, APPEARING, AS THEY DO, ALWAYS IN THE SAME FIXED ORDER OF SEQUENCE.'"—(2453)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as the order of sequence in the manifesters is fixed and rigid,—there are certain words—such as 'Shanno dēvih, etc.'—which are always found in the same order; hence, as always appearing in the same order, they are regarded as not-human in origin. It follows by implication that those which are otherwise—i.e. not found always in the same order—are human.—(2453)

The above idea is rejected in the following:

TEXT (2454).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE IN THE MANIFESTING AGENCIES, PALATE AND OTHER SPEECH-CENTRES—IS SOMETHING THAT APPERTAINS TO MEN; HENCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT MAY BE OTHERWISE.—(2454)

COMMENTARY.

That the words always appear in the same order cannot be admitted; because the order in the words is held to be due to the order in the manifesters;
and this order in the manifesters—i.e. in the Palate and other speech-centres, —is dependent upon the whim of man, and hence cannot be fixed; as there, can be no restraint on the whim of man. Consequently, there is no reasonable ground for believing that in any set of words—"Shanno dēvīḥ, etc."—the order has been and is going to be always the same; hence it is just possible that the order may be otherwise also.—(2454)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṁsaka, in Text 2119, that—"Even though the Flame is momentary, yet there is Recognition, etc. etc."
The answer to that is as follows:

TEXT (2455).

THE IDEA OF ANY SUCH 'UNIVERSAL' AS 'FIRE' HAS BEEN REJECTED IN DETAIL. HENCE THE 'UNIVERSAL' THAT IS recognised CANNOT BE ETERNAL.—(2455)

COMMENTARY.
The Author next proceeds to show that all that has been said above applies to the case of Letters also:

TEXTS (2456-2457).

SUCH RECOGNITION IS POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF LETTERS ALSO, WHICH ARE PERISHABLE,—FOR THOSE WHO HOLD THAT THE UNIVERSAL CAN BE recognised. THAT ELEMENT WHEREIN THERE APPEARS THE NOTION OF DIFFERENCE,—LIKE SLOW, FAST AND SO FORTH,—IN REGARD TO THESE THERE CAN BE NO RECOGNITION ....... (?)—(2456-2457)

COMMENTARY.
‘Universal’—in the form of the ‘exclusion of others’.—(2456-2457)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṁsaka, under Text 2121, that—"The notions of the individual Cow-word, though diverse, etc. etc."
The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (2458).

IN THE REASONS THAT HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD IN PROOF OF THE IDEA OF THE ONE-NESS OF THE WORD,—THERE IS NO INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE POSSIBLE; BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONTRARY.—(2458)

COMMENTARY.
For proving the idea of the Word being one only, the Inferential Reasons that have been adduced are such that if a contrary conclusion is established,
there has not been shown any reason for sublating such a conclusion; consequently all those Reasons are *Inconclusive.*—(2458)

It has been argued by the *Mimāmsaka,* under *Text* 2128, that—"Everything that does this has been found to be permanent, like the universal aspect of Smoke, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (2459).**

*AS REGARDS THE ‘UNIVERSAL ASPECT OF SMOKE’ . . . . [LACUNA IN THE TEXT] . . . YOUR ARGUMENT IS ‘SUPERFLUOUS’.*—(2459)

**COMMENTARY.**

What is spoken of as the ‘Inferential Indicative’ (Probans) is the ‘Universal’, which is only the Thing as ‘excluded from heterogenous things’; —and this is not eternal; consequently your Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum'.—(2459)

It has been argued by the *Mimāmsaka* under *Text* 2131, that—"If the one-ness of the Jar, which is urged, etc. etc."

The answer to this is the same, in regard to Letters also.

This is what is pointed out in the following:—

**TEXTS (2460-2461).**


—(2460-2461)

**COMMENTARY.**

Five arguments have been set forth (by the *Mimāmsaka*) under *Texts* 2121 et seq.;—if what is meant to be proved by these is the one-ness of the
Universal' in the shape of the 'exclusion of others', then they are superfluous, as proving what is already admitted by the other party; as a matter of fact, on the basis of the single uniform notion that people have in regard to all Individuals, the one 'Universal', in the shape of the 'exclusion of others', is admitted (by us).

If, on the other hand, what is meant to be proved is the one-ness of the Individuals themselves, in the form of their Specific Individualities; then the Premiss would be one that is contrary to and annulled by Perception and Inference; and this would make all the Reasons 'Inconclusive'.

'By means of Sense-perception, etc. etc.'—'Ākṣa' is pertaining to 'akṣa', sense-organ. 'Etc.' includes Inference. The Plural number is in view of the large number of individual Perceptions and Inferences.—(2460-2461)

Question:—"How is the diversity of Individuals recognised by Sense-perception?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (2462-2464).

Diversity in the form of 'agreeable' and 'disagreeable' and so forth, is directly perceived;—the diversity among Cognitions is cognised on the ground of their appearing in succession,—as in the case of the virgin.—The cognitions of the individual 'Cov-words', appearing at different times and places, cannot all denote one and the same object,—because they actually appear as diverse,—like the cognitions of Taste, Colour, etc.—The diversity in the cognitions of the various notes (of sound) in the shape of the 'Sadja' and the rest is cognised by Perception . . . . as is going to be explained later on.—(2462-2464)

COMMENTARY.

'Manojña'—pleasing to the mind, Agreeable;—the contrary of this is 'amanojña', Disagreeable.

Annulment by Inference is next shown—'The diversity among cognitions, etc. etc.'—The exact meaning of this will be made clear below, under the following Text.

The Inference may be formulated as follows:—Those Cognitions that appear as different cannot all envisage the same object,—e.g. the cognitions envisaging Taste, Colour and so forth;—and the cognitions of the individual 'Cov-words' appearing at different times and places appear as different; hence there is apprehension of the wider 'contrary'.

That the Reason here put forward is not 'inadmissible' is shown by the sentence—'The diversity in the cognitions, etc. etc.'—(2462-2464)
The Author supplies the proof for the statement just made (in 2462) regarding the fact that 'the diversity among Cognitions is proved by their appearing in succession, as in the case of the Virgin':—

**TEXT (2465).**

ALL THESE COGNITIONS OF THE 'Cow-word', WHICH APPEARED YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY, CANNOT ALL ENVISAGE THE SAME OBJECT,—LIKE THE SUCCESSIVELY APPEARING COGNITIONS OF COLOUR AND ODOUR, ETC.—(2465)

**COMMENTARY.**

The argument may be thus formulated:—Those Cognitions that appear in succession do not envisage the same object,—e.g. the Cognitions of Taste, Colour, etc. appearing one after the other;—all these cognitions of the 'Cow-words' that appeared yesterday and to-day have appeared in succession;—hence there is apprehension of the wider contrary.—(2465)

The following Text shows that neither of the Reasons just adduced by the Buddhist is 'Inconclusive':—

**TEXT (2466).**

IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN ALL COGNITIONS WOULD HAVE ONE AND THE SAME OBJECT; THERE WOULD BE INCONGRUITY ALSO AS REGARDS THEIR APPEARING IN SUCCESSION, WHEN THEIR EFFICIENT CAUSE IS THERE ALL THE TIME.

—(2466)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Of all cognitions'—i.e. of the cognitions of Taste, Colour and so forth. —The possibility of all having the same object, though appearing diversely—is the argument that annuls the Reason in question. 

'Incongruity as regards appearing in succession'—would annul the reason 'because they appear in succession'.—(2466)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2133, that—"If the relationship in question were artificial, etc. etc.". The answer to that is as follows:—
TEXTS (2467-2469).

It has been explained before that even though there is diversity among things, yet they have the inherent capacity of being conceived as one, with certain restrictions.—But even with such conception, there can be one-ness, etc. of the word. What the common man thinks is that there is repeated use of one and the same word.—The relationship also is possible when subsisting in several individuals. Consequently in all cases, there is a multiplicity of words, but they come to be conceived of as one.—

(2467-2469)

COMMENTARY.

The meaning of this is easily understood.—(2467-2469)

Question:—"Why is it said that it is the common man that thinks so?"
Answer:—

TEXTS (2470-2471).

In reality, there can be no relationship between the Word and its meaning; (a) because there is difference between them,—and (b) because one is not born from the other. The relationship has only been imposed by people under an illusion.—That this is so has been explained in detail already. In fact, the whole position of the Word and its meaning is highly complicated; as there is no invariable concomitance between them.—

(2470-2471)

COMMENTARY.

'Because there is difference';—this precludes the relationship of Identity; —'because one is not born from the other';—this precludes the relationship of Cause and Effect—Apart from these, there is no other relationship possible,—and without such a relationship, there can be no restriction regarding the Word expressing a definite meaning;—if there were, there would be incongruities.—For these reasons, the connection between the Word and its meaning must be regarded as imposed upon them; as has been explained
before, in the section dealing with ‘Apoha’, the ‘Exclusion, of others’.—(2470-2471)

The Mimāmsaka’s argument has been formulated under the Text 2135, in the following words—‘From this it follows that the Word is not-artificial, and it never perishes,—because it has an eternal relationship with an eternal entity—like the Akāśha and the Atom’.

In the following Text, it is pointed out that the Reason and the Corroborative Instance herein adduced are both ‘inadmissible’.

TEXT (2472).

Any such eternal universal as ‘Cow’ has been already rejected; the Relationship also is purely imaginary; the ‘Ākāśha’ and the ‘Atom’ also have been discarded. Hence neither the Probans nor the Corroborative Instance is sound.—(2472)

COMMENTARY.

‘Any such eternal Universal, etc.’—this asserts the fact of the eternal thing being ‘inadmissible’.

‘The Relationship also, etc.’—this asserts the ‘inadmissibility’ of the Reason ‘because there is relationship’.

‘The Atom and the Ākāśha also have been discarded’,—this asserts the ‘inadmissibility’ of the two Instances cited by the Mimāmsaka.

‘Rejected’, ‘Discarded’,—in course of the chapter on the ‘Six Categories’.

‘Na’—denies the Reason, etc.

‘Tat’—Therefore; hence.—(2472)

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka under Text 2136, that—‘Inasmuch as the Word envisages several Universals, etc. etc.’

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2473).

You may take a long time in explaining the fact of the Word (‘Cow’) being expressive of the one Universal ‘Cow’, as extracted (from among the several Universals); on the basis of deluded people cognising it in one and the same form.—(2473)

COMMENTARY.

The following text explains why this should be regarded as a ‘delusion’:
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXT (2474).

IN REALITY, THE THING IS MOMENTARY; HENCE EVEN FOR THAT TIME IT CANNOT REMAIN STATIONARY; HOW THEN CAN IT BE ADMITTED TO EXIST AT THE SUBSEQUENT TIME?—(2474)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka under Text 2140, that—"In the case of the Jar and other things, it is understood that they would become destroyed either through decay, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2475).

IN THE CASE OF THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS ALSO, THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR THEIR DESTRUCTION, WHICH CAN BE CLEARLY POINTED OUT AS 'THIS IS WHAT WILL DESTROY IT'; HOW, THEN, CAN ANY SUCH CAUSE BE POINTED OUT IN THE CASE OF THE WORD?—(2475)

COMMENTARY.

'This is what will, etc. etc.'—As explained in the chapter on the 'Permanent Character of Things'; where it has been explained that there can be no cause for the destruction of things. When in the case of the Jar also, there can be no cause for its destruction,—how can there be any for the destruction of the Word?—The term 'nāshakāraṇam' is to be construed with 'Shabdē'.

What is indicated by this is that the Mimāmsaka's Reasoning is superfluous, and the Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity is 'inadmissible'.—(2475)

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, in Text 2141, that—"Even though there are differences of Place, Time, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2476–2478).

'THAT THERE IS MISTAKE IN RECOGNITIONS HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED BEFORE.—THE 'PROPERTY' VARIES WITH THE VARIATIONS OF PLACE, TIME AND PERSONS USING (THE WORD); AND THE VARIATIONS APPEAR IN THE SHAPE OF THE VARIOUS NOTES, Śadja Rṣabha, Gāndhāra, Paňchama and so forth;—THE Cogniser ALSO IS PERCEIVED DIRECTLY; THE INDIVIDUAL LETTER 'Ga' IS ALSO CLEARLY DISTINCT.—ALL THIS DIVERSITY CANNOT BE REGARDED AS DUE TO THE DIVERSITY IN THE 'MANIFESTER'; THAT THERE CAN BE NO 'MANIFESTATION' IN THE CASE OF eternal THINGS IS GOING TO BE EXPLAINED LATER ON.—(2476–2478)

COMMENTARY.

This is quite easy.—(2476–2478)
It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under Text 2143, that—"The Individual Letter 'Ga' has no existence apart from the substratum of the Universal 'Ga', etc. etc."

This argument is open to the charge of being 'superfluous':—this is what is shown in the following:

**TEXT (2479).**

The Universal 'Ga' is not held to be something real, distinct from the letter 'Ga'; hence the charge of 'futility' is irresistible, as against the *Mīmāṃsaka*’s reasoning.—(2479)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Isyātā', 'is held'; this is to be construed with the 'na' following in the second line.—(2479)

**TEXTS (2480-2481).**

If it be urged that what is sought to be proved (by the *Mīmāṃsaka*’s argument) is that it is not the substratum of the Universal 'Ga', which is of the nature of the 'exclusion of others',—that cannot be right; as that will involve the fallacy of the basis of the reason being 'inadmissible'.—Inasmuch as the letter 'Ga' is nothing apart from 'the exclusion of the Non-ga', to which object would the character of 'being not apprehended by any cognition other than that of Ga' belong?—

(2480-2481)

**COMMENTARY.**

The following might be urged—"What is meant to be proved by the reasoning in question is that the Individual is not the substratum of that universal 'Ga' which is of the nature of the 'exclusion of others'; hence there is no 'futility' in it; because you (Buddhist) do not hold that the Individual Ga is not the substratum of the 'exclusion of others'."

This is the view combated in this Text.

Even when what is sought to be proved is put in this way, the Reason becomes 'inadmissible'. Because the 'exclusion of others' is not anything different from the thing thus 'excluded' from others; in fact, it consists of the same Individual 'Ga'; and it is spoken of as 'exclusion of others' or 'Apoha,' etc. when its precise nature is meant to be determined.
which is thus done through the denial of other exclusions of unlike things. Consequently there being no such object which could form the subject of the argument,—to whom could the Reason,—in the form 'because it is not apprehended by any cognition other than that of Ga'—belong? To nothing at all.—(2480-2481)

As regards the Corroborative Instance cited by the Mimāmsaka, in Text 2143,—'like the Universal Ga postulated by the other party',—that also is one of which the very basic object is not admissible. This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2482).

EVERY RIGHT INFERENCE REQUIRES SUCH CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE,
ETC. AS ARE ADMITTED BY BOTH PARTIES. IN THE CASE OF THE
INFERENCE IN QUESTION HOWEVER, THE OBJECTIVE
BASIS (OF THE REASON) IS NOT SO ADMITTED.

(2482)

COMMENTARY.

'Instance, etc.'—The 'etc.' is meant to include the Reason (Probans) and other factors.—(2482)

Further, even when the first party does not state it in so many words, that is regarded as to be proved which he has in mind; and as a matter of fact, it is not merely the Universal 'Ga' which you have in your mind as to be proved; what you really desire is to prove, through this Universal, the one-ness of the letter 'Ga'; and it has been already shown before that such a Proposition as the latter is annulled by Perception and other Means of Cognition.

This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2483).

ALL THIS ATTEMPT OF YOURS IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVING THE ONE-
NESS OF THE LETTER 'Ga'; AND THIS IS CLEARLY AND UNEQUI-
BLY ANNULLED BY PERCEPTION, AS ALREADY EXPLAINED
TO YOU.—(2483)

COMMENTARY.

'This attempt'—at denying the substratum of the Universal 'Ga'.

'Annulled by Perception'—The particle 'cha' includes 'annulment by
Inference' also.

'Explained'—under the Text 2462 et seq.—(2483)
It has been argued by the *Mimāṃsaka*, under *Text* 2145, that—"The entity in the form of the *Letter* is admitted by both parties, etc. etc."
The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS (2484-2485).**

*All these cognitions of the Letter 'Ga' which appeared yesterday and today, etc. appearing in succession, cannot envisage one and the same thing,—like the cognitions of Taste, Colour, etc.—Thus the 'one letter' is not something 'admitted by both parties'. Hence the 'eternal' that has been assumed appertains to the postulated 'Exclusion of others'.*
—(2484-2485)

**COMMENTARY.**

The term 'udita' is construed here also, with the endings changed.
Thus then, on account of the diversity of Words being annulled by Perception and Inference, there is no single entity in the shape of the 'Letter'; hence the *eternal* that has been assumed can only belong to the assumed 'exclusion of others',—the idea of one-ness being due to the similarity of the conception.—(2484-2485)

It has been argued by the *Mimāṃsaka*, under *Text* 2148, that—"When the Word-Sound is cognised by the Ear, etc. etc."
The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS (2486-2487).**

*At the time that the Word-Sound is heard, there is no perception of the Air-currents reaching the Ear and embellishing the Auditory organ. When the Sound is cognised through the Ear as embellished by the pitch,—there is idea of the Pitch as related to that Sound; and this idea is clearly annulled by direct perception.*
—(2486-2487)

**COMMENTARY.**

If it were known by any Means of Right Cognition that 'there are Air-currents embellishing the Auditory organ', then there might be some
justification for saying that 'the Auditory organ is embellished by the Pitch'. As a matter of fact, however, no such Air-currents are known; hence there is the idea of the Pitch only as related to the Sound and that this idea is perceptual is entirely fanciful.—(2486-2487)

It has been argued by the Mimāmsāka, under Text 2150, that—"Those who have their minds perverted by the disorders of Bile perceive the Sweet as Bitter, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2488).

JUST AS THE NOTION OF ‘BITTERNESS’ WITH REGARD TO WHAT IS ‘SWEET’, AND OF ‘YELLOW’ WITH REGARD TO WHAT IS ‘WHITE’, IS WITHOUT AN OBJECTIVE BASIS,—OF THE SAME KIND WOULD THE NOTION OF THE WORD-SOUND ALSO BE.—(2488)

COMMENTARY.

This also sets aside the idea that 'the cognition of the Word-Sound is due to that'. Because the Cognition which has no shape cannot have anything else for its object; otherwise there would be incongruities.—(2488)

The following might be urged—"Even if the Word-sound is not the objective of the Cognition, why should the cognition be baseless (without an object) ?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2489).

UNDER THE VARIATIONS OF ‘FAST’, ‘MIDDLING’ AND ‘SLOW’,—THE WORD-SOUND ITSELF DOES NOT APPEAR AS DIFFERENT. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHEN THE COGNITION ENVISAGES SOMETHING IN A FORM THAT DOES NOT BELONG TO IT,—WHY SHOULD NOT THIS COGNITION BE OBJECTLESS ?

—(2489)

COMMENTARY.

The Cognition that appears is in the form of 'fast', 'medium' and 'slow';—and the Word-Sound cannot have the 'fast' and other forms;
because being eternal and all-pervading, it must have only one form;—there is nothing else that could have the ‘fast’ and other forms, and appear in the Cognition;—hence there being no real object of the said exact form, the Cognition is clearly objectless.—(2489)

The following might be urged—"The same Word-Sound, appearing in the ‘fast’ and other forms, would form the objective basis of the Cognition; as has been declared that ‘in every case the objective basis consists in the external thing varying with the variations of Time and Place’.

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (2490–2493).

The assertion that ‘one cognises the one thing as otherwise’ involves self-contradiction; if what is cognised is another form, then how can the same object be said to be cognised? Under the view that Cognition is formless, it would exist only in the external form; consequently, if what is cognised is external and yet not of the nature of the external thing,—then how is it that it exists? Even under the view that Cognitions have forms, the Cognition always appears in accordance with the external form; and then alone is the object said to be ‘cognised’.—In the case in question, however, the Cognition does not appear in accordance with the external form.—Hence it follows that all this Cognition, which is wrong, is entirely objectless.—(2490–2493)

COMMENTARY.

‘Self-contradiction’—‘The same’ and ‘Otherwise’ are mutually exclusive, the presence and absence of the one involving the absence and presence (respectively) of the other; and as such, these cannot co-exist in the same object.

Then again, under the view that forms do not belong to Cognitions, all Cognitions are false; while under the view that forms belong to Cognitions, all Cognitions are objectless. This is what is shown by the words—‘Under the view, etc., etc.’—For those who regard the Cognitions as formless, what is perceived is the Blue form as subsisting in the Object. The Conch-shell does not really exist in the yellow form in which it figures in the wrong Cognition; hence this is all the more clearly objectless.

Says the Opponent—"If the yellow form is not in the Object, then it must be in the Cognition; otherwise, if it were in neither, how could there be cognition of it? Thus if it resides in the Cognition, it behoves you to explain how Cognition can be formless?"
This is true; but when we assert that Cognition is objectless, we do so, on accepting the view that Cognition is formless. One who holds Cognitions to be formless has got to provide an answer to the question that has been raised.

Even under the view that the form resides in the Cognition, the apprehension of the Object is explained on the basis of the idea that what is actually apprehended is that form of the Cognition which bears the imprint of the form of the Object. In the case of wrong Cognition there is no apprehension of the form of Cognition bearing the imprint of the Object; hence the Cognition is clearly objectless. Apart from being with form and being without form, there is no other alternative possible, in regard to the apprehension of things. Hence it follows that all Cognition, which is wrong, is objectless.—(2490-2493).

The following Text shows that in the case in question, there is no cause for mistake (wrong Cognition):—

TEXT (2494).

It cannot be right that there should be a 'Manifestor',—
specially for what is eternal,—in accordance with its em-
bellishments (and modifications); consequently there
cannot be diverse cognitions in regard to the Word-
Sound.—(2494)

COMMENTARY.

In regard to 'Dhvani'—i.e. Word-Sound,—the diversity of the manifestor is said to be the cause of the illusion that there is diversity in the sound also. But for anything that is eternal, there can be no 'manifestor'; as in regard to eternal things, there is nothing that the Manifestor can do; and unless it does something to it, it cannot be its 'Manifestor'; if it were, there would be an absurdity; and anything could be the 'Manifestor' of anything.

For these reasons it cannot be right to hold that diverse Cognitions regarding the Word-Sound are due to the embellishments of the manifestor.
—(2494).

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 2170, that—"Just as the Lamp is regarded as the manifestor of the Jar, through the aid that it affords to the Eye, etc. etc."

In the first of the following texts, the Author explains the opponent's position, and in the remaining texts, he sets forth the objections to it:—
"Just as the lamp restricts the potency of the Eye to the perception of the Jar,—so will the articulation restrict the potency of the Auditory organ to the apprehension of the Sound."—If, as it stands by itself, the Sound is capable of being apprehended by the Auditory organ,—then why is it not apprehended, while the Auditory organ is not embellished?—When its efficient cause is there, the apprehension must follow; and this condition is present at the time of the embellishment of the Auditory Organ.—If, on the other hand, the Sound is not capable of being apprehended, how could it become apprehended even at a later time? If the apprehension is there, then what is apprehended must be some other Sound which has the requisite capacity.—If then, even at a later time, there is no cognition (apprehension) of the Word-Sound due to its own inherent capacity,—then it is for this reason that it is asserted that it is produced by the embellished Auditory Organ and other agencies.  

—(2495–2499)

COMMENTARY.

It may be that the Auditory Organ is embellished; but what you have to explain is,—Whether or not the Word-Sound, by its very nature, is capable of bringing about the cognition of itself.

In the former case (i.e. if it is so capable),—then it should be cognised even before the Auditory Organ has been embellished.

This is what is said in the words—"why is it not apprehended, etc. etc.'

' Tasya '—of the Word-Sound.—' Tat '—therefore.

The argument may be formulated, as before, thus—'If its cause is deficient etc.'; and it may be added that in this case the embellishment of the Auditory Organ would be useless.

Under the latter view (that the Word-Sound by itself is not capable of bringing about its own cognition),—the Cognition of the Sound should not come about even when the embellishment of the Auditory Organ is there; because the Sound must, for ever, remain incapable (of being cognised). So that under this view also, the embellishment of the Auditory Organ would be useless.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing does not deviate from the condition in which it was not able to produce a particular effect, it cannot produce that effect;—as, for instance, the Kodrava-seed cannot produce the Paddy-sprout;—and even on the embellishment of the Auditory Organ, the Word-sound does not deviate from the incapacity to produce Cognition;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider condition.

That the Reason here adduced is not 'inadmissible' is shown in the words—'If the apprehension is there, etc. etc.'
‘Yogyatāyogyi’—that which has connection with the capacity.—(2495-2499)

Says the Opponent—"If the Word-Sound were held to be a cause of the production of the Cognition, then there might be some room for raising the question as to its being capable or not capable;—as it is, however, what is held to be the cause of the Cognition of the Word-Sound is the embellished Auditory Organ,—and not the Sound; hence there is no room for the objections that have been urged".

The Author attacks the view directly and refutes it in the following:—

TEXT (2500).

IN THIS WAY THE WORD-SOUND WOULD BE UNCOGNISABLE; AS IT WOULD NOT BE OF ANY USE IN ITS OWN COGNITION, AND, ON THAT ACCOUNT, IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFERENT FROM TASTE AND OTHER THINGS (SO FAR AS HAVING NO BEARING ON THE SAID COGNITION IS CONCERNED).—(2500)

COMMENTARY.

In this way, like Taste, etc., the Word-Sound also would have no bearing upon its Cognition; and this would mean that it is not cognisable by that Cognition.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a certain thing has no bearing upon a Cognition, it cannot be cognised by that Cognition;—e.g. Taste, etc. in regard to Auditory Cognition;—the Word-Sound has no bearing upon the Cognition of that Sound;—hence there is apprehension of something contrary to the wider condition.

The reason here adduced is not ‘Inconclusive’; because, if what has no bearing upon a Cognition were cognised by that Cognition,—there would be no restriction at all, and Taste might also become cognisable by Auditory Cognition.—(2500)

Says the Opponent:—"The cause of the Cognition itself would serve to restrict its scope, and there would be no such absurd contingencies as have been indicated. Because it is the cognition of the Word-Sound—and not that of Taste, etc.—which is actually found to come about from the causal factors appearing immediately after the embellishment of the Auditory Organ,—because the efficiency of the causal factors is so restricted.—Even if the Word-Sound were necessarily regarded as the cause (of its own cognition), some restriction on the efficiency of the cause will have to be admitted; because, if the question is raised—'when all things are equally the cause of the Cognition, then, why is it that the cognition of sound that is produced is of the nature of the apprehension of sound only, not of the apprehension.
of the Auditory organ?"—the only answer possible would be that the efficiency of the Causal factors is restricted in this manner.

Having reviewed all this, the Author answers the charge of 'Inconclusiveness' against his reason:

TEXT (2501).


COMMENTARY.

'Nāma'—'may be taken'—this means that it may be taken for granted (for the sake of argument).—That this view is not tenable is going to be shown later on, under Text 2507.

'By the embellished Auditory Organ, etc.'—The 'etc.' includes the immediately following causal factors.—(2501)

Even if the Word-Sound is not the cause of the Cognition of it, there are incongruities. For instance, there are two alternatives possible—Is the Word-Sound endowed with the nature of being apprehended by its Cognition or not?—If it is, then there is the following discrepancy:

TEXTS (2502–2504).

This Word-Sound being of the nature of what is apprehended by its Cognition,—in whatsoever form it continues to exist [and it exists for all time, ex hypothesi] as 'Word-Sound',—the said Cognition also will have to continue along with it,—under your theory [by which apprehensibility by that Cognition forms the very nature of the Word-Sound];—otherwise it could not be continuing along with the Cognition. And by that same Cognition would that Word-Sound be apprehended;—this would certainly involve the worst incongruity for you. One is of the nature of the Cognition, and the other is of the nature of the Cognised; and the two are therefore tied up together as by a chain; consequently whenever the one is there the other must be there also, without fail.—(2502–2504)

COMMENTARY.

If the Word-Sound is of the nature of being apprehended by its Cognition, then, like the Word, its Cognition also should be eternal, existing at all times; because the nature of apprehensibility by it continues for all
time (in the Word). For example, when the character of holding the stick belongs to Devadatta, it is not possible that the stick should not continue as long as Devadatta is there.

'Tied up together as by a chain'—'Hi' stands for because. The sense thus is as follows:—Because the nature of being cognised and the nature of being Cognition are tied together as by a chain,—therefore it becomes established that whenever the one is present, the other also has to be present,—without fail.—(2502–2504)

Question:—"Let that be so; what is the harm?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2505).

In that case, it would mean that the Word-Sound, which continues to be inseparably related to the Cognition producible of the Embellished Auditory Organ, would be clearly present even when the Auditory Organ has not been embellished.—(2505)

COMMENTARY.

After the compound ending with 'Sambaddha', the phrase 'Shabdaḥ anuvartatā' is understood.

Thus then, because the Word connected with the Cognition producible by the Embellished Organ continues for all time,—therefore it follows that even for the man whose Auditory Organ has not been embellished, the said Cognition would be there; so that there would be no use for the Embellishment of the Auditory Organ.—(2505)

The second alternative [noted in the Introduction to Text 2502, that 'by its very nature, the Word-Sound is not endowed with the character of being apprehended by its Cognition'] also is open to the following objection:—

TEXT (2506).

If the Word-Sound is not of the nature of being apprehended by its Cognition, then, in that case, it would be on the same footing as Taste and other things, which also are not of the nature of being apprehended by the Cognition of Word-Sound; and in that case, Auditory Perception would not be the Cognition of Sound.—(2506)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(2506)

All this has been said after admitting (for the sake of argument) that the Cognition, which is not helped by the Word-Sound, is of the nature
of the Apprehension of that Sound. The Author now proceeds to show that the idea of the Cognition having the nature of the Cognition of the Word-Sound is untenable, unless there is some connection between them.

TEXTS (2507-2509).

What is the relation between the Cognition and the Word-Sound, on the basis of which the Cognition is held to be of the nature of the apprehension of that Sound?—This relation cannot be that of Identity, because the two are clearly different. Nor is the one produced from the other; because the Word-Sound is (ex hypothesi) not produced; and if it were produced, then it would appear at all times; and hence the Cognition of that Sound would either be produced at all times,—or it would not be produced at all. Such being the undesirable state of things, the assumption of the 'Embellishment of the Auditory Organ' is entirely futile.—(2507-2509)

COMMENTARY.

There are only two kinds of relationship among things—the relation of Identity and the relation of Cause and Effect; in no third form can any help be rendered; and there can be no relationship between things which do not render some help to one another; otherwise there would be incongruities.—Neither of these two relationships is possible between the Word-Sound and its Cognition; and in the absence of such a relationship, how could the Cognition be of the nature of the apprehension of the Word-Sound? If it did, there would be incongruities.

It might be urged that—"When the Cognition is produced, it is in the form of the Word-Sound, and it is on the basis of this that the Cognition is held to be of the nature of the comprehension of the Sound,—even though there is no relationship between the two".

This cannot be right; because Cognition has been regarded as formless; the Mīmāṃsakas do not admit the view that Cognitions have forms.—But even if it were as asserted, the view set forth cannot be right; as in that case, the Sound would have to be regarded as imperceptible. That is, under the view, Sound would be imperceptible, not perceptible; and hence there being no means of knowing it, the idea of its Cognition having the form of the Word-Sound would itself be an impossibility. It could not be known by the presence of its effect; because it is not regarded as productive of effects.
The following might be urged—"Even for one who holds the view that Cognitions have forms, and the Object is productive of the Cognition,—the Object would be always imperceptible; how then can it be known that the Cognition has the form of the Object?"

True; but the way in which it is known is this—From the presence of the Effect, it is deduced that there is a Cause for it; and the idea that Cognition serves to differentiate the Blue and other forms, is got at from positive and negative concomitance. For instance, the Eye, the Light, and the Mind-functioning being common to all Visual Cognitions, the difference among the Cognitions of the Blue and others cannot be due to these; hence the implication is that there is some other Cause for it,—this implication being derived from the negative premiss just indicated; and hence it is concluded that the said difference must be due to this other Cause. And on the basis of this it is asserted that the form having been brought about by that, it is this form that is apprehended by the Cognition.—But even this way is not available for you; because you do not regard the Word-Sound to be a Cause at all.

The following might be urged—"The Eye and the other factors are themselves imperceptible; how is it known that these are present in all Visual Perceptions?"

All this is quite true, when we are discussing the doctrine of Idealism. The Idealist holds that the peculiarities of every Cognition are all due to the immediately preceding subjective causal factors,—as in the case of Dreams; and he does not regard them as due to any external or objective conditions. —But all that is being said on the present occasion is on the understanding that the External Object does exist. If it were not so, then the first point to be urged would be—how can the External Object be proved by the Effect? All that could be proved would be the presence of the Cause, not of anything external, objective; because it is quite possible that the said Cause may be something internal, subjective,—as in the case of Dreams.—Enough of this!

Even if the idea of the Word-Sound being productive is accepted,—the incongruity remains;—this is what is shown by the words—'If it were produced, it would be produced at all times, etc. etc.'—'Sā' stands for the production.

The argument is summed up in the words—'Hence the Cognition of that Sound, etc. etc.'

'Or it would not be produced at all',—under the view that Sound is not productive.

'Undesirable state of things'—that the Cognition must be either always present, or always absent.—(2507–2509)

Hitherto the Author has admitted (for the sake of argument) that there is Embellishment of the Auditory Organ;—and then proceeded to consider whether or not the Object is the productive Cause of the Cognition,—which consideration has led to the conclusion that the Embellishment of the Auditory Organ is absolutely useless.—He now proceeds to show that the Embellishment itself of the Auditory Organ is not possible:
Cognition would be possible only if the Embellishment were occasional; the idea of the 'Embellishment' would be acceptable only if it were occasional. The idea of 'Embellishment', which is a kind of Potency, is derived from the effect in the form of the Cognition. Now this Cognition may either appear at all times, or not appear at all. How then could it indicate the occasional Embellishment (of the Auditory Organ)? Hence the explanation based upon the 'Embellishment of the Auditory Organ' has not been sound.—(2510–2512)

COMMENTARY.

Cognition as the effect of Embellishment could be occasional only if the Embellishment were occasional; otherwise if the Cause in its efficient state were there always, why should its effect be occasional? As a matter of fact however, the Embellishment is not occasional;—this is what is shown in the words—'The idea of the Embellishment is derived, etc. etc.'—That is to say, the Embellishment of the Auditory Organ, deduced from the coming about of its effect in the shape of the Cognition (of Sound), could only consist in a certain Potency;—as Potency alone is what can be deduced from an effect;—this Potency should form part of the Auditory Organ itself; it cannot be anything different from it; as in the latter case the Auditory Organ itself would not be the Cause of the effect (Cognition). Then again, as no sort of relationship can be known, whenever the Potency would be there, the resultant Cognition should also be there. If the Cognition is not there, then it could never follow from that Potency; and as a result of this, the Cognition could not be occasional. Under the circumstances, how could the occasional Cognition indicate the Potency as the 'Embellishment of the Auditory Organ'? It could never indicate it.—(2510–2512)

The following might be urged—"It is not an inherent Potency that is inferred from the effect in the shape of Cognition; what happens is that it is an entirely new Potency that is produced in the Auditory Organ by the Articulations; and it is this Potency that is inferred from the Cognition; hence it is quite reasonable that the occasional Cognition becomes indicative of the Potency."

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (2513).

The Potency that is produced in the Auditory Organ,—if it is something not different from the Organ itself,—then that does away with the Eternality of the Ākāsha or of Space; as it would be something produced.—(2513)

COMMENTARY.

The Potency that is produced in the Auditory Organ—(1) is it of the nature of the Organ itself?—or (2) is it something different from it?—or (3) is it different-non-different?—These are the three alternatives possible.

Under the first alternative, like the Potency itself, the Auditory Organ—whether it consists of Ākāsha or of Space,—also becomes non-eternal;—why?—"as it would be something produced";—i.e. because it is produced.

It might be argued that—"The view held is not that the Auditory Organ is non-different from the Potency; but that the Potency is non-different from the Auditory Organ".

Now, just look at this working of sheer blindness! When the nature of one thing is tied up with that of the other, how can this latter be far removed from it at the same time? Because 'non-difference' between two things consists in the fusion of the natures of both into one. While the Milk remains at a distance from the Water, it does not become mingled with it; hence the explanation suggested is futile.—(2513)

The following Text shows that even if it be as suggested, the view remains open to objection:—

TEXT (2514).

The 'Embellishment' of a thing, being not-different from the thing itself, must be eternal; consequently there would be Cognition of things at all times.—(2514)

COMMENTARY.

Like the form of the thing itself, the Embellishment also should be eternal, as it is non-different from it. So that this is an additional objection to which the said view is open.—(2514)

The following Text points out the objection against the second alternative (suggested in the Commentary on 2513,—that the Potency imparted to the Auditory Organ is different from it):—
TEXT (2515).

If the Potency is something different from the Auditory Organ, then there can be no relationship between the two.—Further, the Auditory Organ cannot be an active agent (in the bringing about of the Cognition), as the Cognition would be brought about by the Potency.—(2515)

COMMENTARY.

If the Potency be held to be something different from the thing (the Auditory Organ)—then there could be no such relationship as ‘this is the Potency of that’; because what does not derive any benefit from another thing cannot be dependent upon this latter. And as a matter of fact, the Auditory Organ does not benefit the Potency; because what has been held to render help to the Potency is only the manifesting agency in the shape of Articulation.—If the Auditory Organ be regarded as helping the Potency, then that Potency (of the Auditory Organ), which would help the Potency, would be something different from the Auditory Organ; and so on and on, there would be an Infinite Regress. And in this way, as the Potencies themselves would accomplish all that is necessary, the effect (in the shape of the Cognition) would follow from the Potency, and the Auditory Organ would not be an active agent in bringing it about; and this would render it liable to be regarded as a non-entity.

If (in order to escape from the Infinite Regress) it be held that the Potency that helps the Potency is not anything different (from the Auditory Organ),—then why should there be any hostility against the first Potency itself?

Then again, there would be the contingency of the Potency being produced constantly; as its Cause, in the shape of the Auditory Organ, is eternal; and what does not derive any benefit from anything else could not be dependent upon auxiliaries.—(2515)

The Author now takes up the third alternative (suggested in the Commentary on Text 2513,—that ‘the Potency is different-non-different’ from the Auditory Organ):—

TEXT (2516).

The other alternative also—under which there is neither difference nor non-difference—has already been overthrown.—Thus when the ‘Embellishment of the Auditory Organ’ is put forward as the explanation, it must be due to the fact of the person propounding it being not ‘emphasised’ (cultured).—(2516)

COMMENTARY.

‘Already overturned’—under the chapter on the ‘Pudgala’. The reason for it lies in the fact, that the same thing cannot be both affirmed and
denied. For instance, 'Difference' and 'Non-difference' are mutually exclusive; and the presence of one is always characterised by the absence of the other; when between two things—e.g. 'Existence' and 'Non-existence'—the nature of one cannot be affirmed without the denial of the other, that is, it can exist only when the other is absent;—and when two things are mutually exclusive, the absence of one implying the presence of the other and vice versa,—the affirmation of one must be concomitant with the denial of the other. Consequently when the 'Difference' (of the Potency from the Organ) is denied, it implies the affirmation of Sameness (Non-difference); and it cannot be right to deny this latter also at the same time; because in that case there may be affirmation of Difference also.—Such are the objections that may be pointed out against the view that there is difference-non-difference (between the Potency and the Auditory Organ).—(2516)

TEXTS (2517-2518).

By these same arguments may be rejected the view that there is embellishment of the Object and of both.—From all this it follows that there can be no room for the view that there is 'manifestation' of what is eternal. And from this it also follows that there can be no room for any distinctions that are made on the basis of such 'manifestation',—such distinctions as those of 'long', 'short', 'order of sequence' and so forth.—(2517-2518)

COMMENTARY.

'By these same arguments'—i.e. by putting forward the alternatives regarding the capacity or otherwise to produce Cognitions.

'From all this, etc. etc.'—This sums up the argument.

'Order of sequence, etc.'—'Etc.' is meant to include the ultra-long, the 'Udātta' accent and so forth.—(2517-2518)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2174, that—"There are some people according to whom the Word-Sound is apprehended by the Auditory Organ, when it is produced but not in actual contact with that Organ, etc. etc."

The answer to that is as follows:—
Even when the 'absence of contact' is equally present in all cases, the Cognition of all things does not come about, because the capacity of things is always restricted; as is found in the case of the Iron being attracted by the Magnet.—(2519)

COMMENTARY.

Though there is 'absence of contact' in all things, yet there is no possibility of the apprehension of the antecedent object, because the capacity of things is always restricted; for instance, the piece of substance called 'Magnet' draws to itself the piece of Iron (which is not in contact with it); and yet it does not draw all other things which also are not in contact with it.—(2519)

In the following Text, the Author anticipates and answers the objection that has been taken by Saṅkarasvāmin against the admissibility of the instance of the 'Magnet' just cited:—

TEXT (2520).

If it be urged that—"there is attraction by the Magnet on account of the contact (of the Iron) with the Light emanating from the Magnet",—then the answer is that, as no such Light is visible, how is it known that it exists?—(2520)

COMMENTARY.

Saṅkarasvāmin has argued as follows:—"In the case of the Magnet, the attraction of the Iron is due to its being penetrated by the Light-rays emanating from the Magnet; for, if it were not so, then there would be attraction of all Iron-pieces in the world. Even though the Light emanating from the Magnet is not perceived in the manner of the Light emanating from the Lamp, yet it can be inferred from the fact that there is attraction even where the Iron is at some distance, if there is nothing between the Iron and the Magnet."

The answer to this is—'As no such Light, etc. etc.'—The phrase 'it is not visible' denies the propriety of the Light being existent,—on the ground of its non-apprehension.—(2520)

As regards the Reductio ad Absurdum put forward by the assertion that "there would be attraction of all the Iron-pieces in the world",—the answer to that is as follows:—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXT (2521).

WHY IS IT THAT THE SAID LIGHT DOES NOT ATTRACT PIECES OF WOOD AND OTHER THINGS WHICH COME INTO CONTACT WITH IT?—IF IT IS SAID THAT "IT DOES NOT DO SO BECAUSE ITS CAPACITY IS RESTRICTED",—THEN THE SAME MAY BE SAID REGARDING THE CASE OF 'NON-CONTACT' ALSO.—(2521)

COMMENTARY.

The same contingency is equally possible under the view that there is actual contact:—Why is it that the Light emanating from the Magnet does not attract all those things, wood-pieces and the like, that happen to be in contact with it?

If the answer is that—"The said contingency does not arise as the capacity of things is restricted",—then the same may be said under the view that there is no contact in such cases; who has deprived things of their capacity,—by virtue of which the same is not admitted in this case?

Hence it follows that the assumption of the invisible rays of Light is futile.—(2521)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṁsaka, under Text 2175, that—"For them, the absence of contact being equally present in the case of distant and near sounds, the apprehension and non-apprehension by people far and near would be equally possible, and there could be no order of sequence".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (2522).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE APPREHENSION BY MEN FAR, MIDWAY AND NEAR IS NOT IN ANY ORDER OF SEQUENCE AT ALL; AS IN ALL CASES THE COGNITION IS PRODUCED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE USE (UTTERANCE OF THE WORD-SOUND).—(2522)

COMMENTARY.

'Successive Apprehension' is not admitted, because the Cognitions of all men appear simultaneously.—(2522)

It has been argued under the same Text (2175) that—"the greater and lesser intensity of Sounds would not be possible".

The answer to that is as follows:—
TEXT (2523).


COMMENTARY.

Colour also is perceived without contact with the Eye and is not all-pervading,—and its perception is distinct or indistinct; in the same manner in the case of Sound also, which also is not all-pervading and not in contact with the Ear, there would be Cognitions of greater or less intensity.

Objection:—"The other party does not admit of the perception of Colour without contact; how then is it put forward as the Corroborative Instance?"

Answer:—This does not affect our position. Though it is by mere words that the other party does not admit it, yet what is vouched for by proofs must be admitted by both parties.

"What is the proof that vouches for the idea in question (that there is perception without contact)?"

The proof is provided by the fact that there is simultaneous perception of near and remote things. A thing that has movement gets at the nearer object quickly, and at the remoter object with some delay; when for instance, one goes from one village to another. But in the case of the Branch of the tree and the Moon seen through it,—the perception of both is simultaneous, as soon as the Eyes are opened. From this it is deduced that the Eye is operative without actually getting into contact with the object perceived.

In connection with this subject, Uddyotakara argues as follows:—"Inasmuch as Cognitions are produced quickly, there can be no perception of the time taken; hence the idea, that 'the several Cognitions appear in the manner of the piercing of the hundred petals of the Lotus', is not true."

This is not right. In this way, in the case of the two words 'sara' and 'rasa' also, there should be no recognition of the order in which the letters are heard; the quick production of the perception being present here also; and if that is so, then there should be no difference between the Cognition of the word 'sara' and that of 'rasa'. And as there is 'quick production' in the case of all Cognitions, there would be no perception of any order of sequence at all.—This has been already thrashed out in detail before.

Again says Uddyotakara:—"Even if the Eye were operative without contact, the wall would have no power to obstruct it; hence there would be no concealment of things. Nor would there be this phenomenon that what is remote is not seen while what is near is seen.—It might be argued that—'That object alone is seen which comes within range of the Eye, and what does not do so is not seen'.—But that is not so; without some sort of connection, there can be no coming within range. Because what is this coming within range, apart from being connected? The only difference
is that what I call 'connection' is called by you 'coming within range';
there is no other difference'.

This is not right. What is called by us coming within range is becoming
the Cause;—not Connection. Because when the Eye produces Cognitions, the
Object—Colour, etc.—becomes its auxiliary, and hence called its 'objective';
and it is not called so because it comes into contact with it.—The purpose
served by the aid provided by auxiliaries is of two kinds—(1) mutual benefit,
e.g. between the Light-rays and the thing within cover,—and (2) serving
the same purpose; e.g. when the man sees Colour immediately on opening
his Eyes.—In both ways, the Object of the Cognition is so called because it is
its peculiar Cause, and not because it is connected with it.

"This same restriction or specification of the Cause would not be possible
without some Connection."

Not so; because the necessary restriction is secured by the capacity of
the Cause itself. In fact when the Cause is produced out of its own Cause,
it is produced exactly in the form in which only some of it becomes productive
of the Cognition, not all; because the difference among all things is due to
the difference in their Causes.—Just as under your view,—even though the
Connection is equally present in both cases, why is it that the Eye apprehends
the Colour only, not the Taste?—It might be argued that—"the Taste
is not apprehended because it is not connected with the Eye".—Why should
not the same Connection be present in the case of Taste also?—as the locus
of both (Taste and Colour) is the same; and there is nothing to restrict the
Connection (to Colour only),—whereby, even though residing in the same
locus, the Eye comes up to the Colour only and not to the Taste, though this
also is present at the same place,—and also it does not come up to the Colour
also if it is very remote.

It might be urged that—"the restriction would be due to its own
Cause".

This can be said also under the view that the Eye is operative without
contact.—Enough of this discussion.—(2523)

The following Text anticipates and answers an objection from the other
party:—

**TEXT (2524).**

"How can there be a single objective basis for Cognitions which
appear as diverse?"—If this is urged, then [the answer
is that] the same objection, as against the upholders
of the external World, is equally applicable to
the Cognitions of Colour also.—(2524)

**COMMENTARY.**

"How can there be a single object for Cognition which appears as
diverse?"
What the Opponent means is that in this way the Cognitions of Colour, Taste, etc. might be said to have one and the same objective basis.

The answer to this is as follows:—'The same objection, etc. etc.';—
'To Cognitions of Colours'—i.e. to Cognitions envisaging Colour—this same objection is equally applicable.—How can there be a single objective basis for the distinct Cognitions of things far and near?

All this objection is applicable to those who uphold the reality of the External World, who attribute the form to the Object, not to the Cognition. Those, however, who uphold the Idea alone,—i.e. the Idealists,—for them all Cognition is equally objectless, being self-cognised, and is produced in the distinct and other forms; and hence to these Idealists, the objection does not apply.—Those upholders of the External World who attribute the form to the Cognition do not admit that there is absolute sameness of form between the Object and the Cognition; so that there would be the same form, in certain aspects; and hence there would be no incongruity in there being the same object for Cognitions appearing as diverse; consequently, the objection would not be applicable to these also.—(2524)

Question:—"What proof then is there against the idea that the Word-Sound is apprehended only on contact with the Auditory Organ,—and in support of the idea that it is apprehended without such contact?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2525).

UNDER THE VIEW THAT THE PERCEPTION (OF SOUND) IS THROUGH CONTACT (WITH THE SENSE-ORGAN), THE COGNITION OF THE SOUND OF THUNDER COULD NOT BE IN THE INTERRUPTED FORM,—
LIKE THAT OF THE FEATHER IN THE EAR.—(2525)

COMMENTARY.

'Like the feather in the Ear',—this is an instance per dissimilarity; and the 'vati'-affix is added to the word ending in the Genitive ending. The meaning thus is—when a man is engaged in tickling the Ear with a feather, the Sound made by the feather is heard as continuous, without interruption; in the same manner, when there is Sound of Thunder spreading all round like the filaments of the Kadamba flower, and it is heard on reaching the Ear,—then this hearing also should be continuous, not interrupted.—It cannot be right to say that there is illusion of break on account of the peculiarity of the substratum wherein the conjunction of its Cause subsists. Because there is no perception of such place, etc.; and no Cognition ever appears which imposes forms which have never been cognised; e.g. the Visual Perception does not impose the form of Taste.—(2525)

Having thus stated the proof against the view that Sound is heard on getting into contact with the Sense-organ,—the Author next states the proof in support of the view that the perception takes place without the said contact:
TEXT (2526).

Because the Auditory Organ brings about the Cognition of Sound as interrupted, therefore, like the Mind, it must be regarded as operating without contact;—not otherwise, like the Skin (Tactile Organ).—(2526)

COMMENTARY.

'Tat'—Therefore.

'Not otherwise, etc. etc.'—This supplies the Corroborative Instance for dissimilarity.—In the case of the Tactile Organ (which operates by contact), the perception is not interrupted, and the same would have been the case with the Auditory Organ also (if this also operated through contact).—(2526)

In the following Text, the Author anticipates the objection that the Corroborative Instance—of the Mind—is one that is devoid of the Probandum,—and supplies the answer to it:

TEXT (2527).

For those people who declare that "the Mind also is operative through contact",—there should not be any cognition of far off things in a single moment.—(2527)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara, Kumārila and others put forward the following arguments in support of the sense-organs being operative by direct contact:—"(a) The Eye and the Ear must be regarded as operative by contact,—because they are external organs,—like the Olfactory Organ. The qualification 'External' is added in order to avoid the charge of being 'false' in view of the Mind (which is not operative by contact).—(b) The Eye and the Ear must be regarded as operative by contact,—because being organs, they do not apprehend things hidden and far off,—like the Olfactory Organ. The qualification 'being organs' has been added for the purpose of excluding the object.—(c) Colour and Sound must be regarded as cognisable by means of those external organs that are operative by contact,—because they are objects of external organs,—like Odour and Taste.—(d) the Cognitions of Colour and Sound must be regarded as having for their objective basis such objects as are cognisable by means of external organs operative by contact,—like the Cognitions of Odour and Taste ".

The objections against these arguments are set forth in the following:
TEXT (2528).

**The reason that is put forward, in the form 'because they are external organs',—in support of the view that the organs in question are operative by contact,—is 'fallacious' (inconclusive); because it is unlike their other properties and hence there is contradiction (incompatibility).—(2528)**

COMMENTARY.

The meaning is clear.—(2528)

The following Text supplies the answer to what has been urged by the *Mimāmsaka*, under the Text 2176, to the effect that—"Thus from the point of view of the Vedic Scholar, let us examine the matter, etc. etc.'—

TEXTS (2529-2530).

**The idea of the Air-currents being something different from the Conjunctions and Disjunctions has been already discarded before; and inasmuch as the Air is not-momentary (according to the *Mimāmsaka*), they cannot be the same as the Conjunctions and Disjunctions. For the same reason, as there are no distinctions in it, there can be no movement of it, specially because it has no velocity, and hence cannot go along as long as the velocity lasts.**—(2529-2530)

COMMENTARY.

'Before'—under the examination of the 'Six Categories'.

Says the Opponent—"If they are not different, then they may be non-different, same'".

*Answer:* 'Inasmuch as the Air, etc. etc.'—The Air-currents themselves, produced as conjoined and disjoined, are spoken of as the 'non-different Conjunctions and Disjunctions'; and what are non-momentary cannot become conjoined with things, in succession,—as they are all of one and the same form.—(2529-2530)

It has been asserted by the *Mimāmsaka*, under Text 2179, that—"Having reached the *Ākāsha* in the Auditory Organ, the Air imparts a certain capacity to that organ, etc. etc.'"

The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (2531-2532)

If, on reaching the Ākāsha in the Auditory Organ, the Air imparts a certain capacity to the organ,—then why should there be no cognition of the Air when there is cognition of the Sound,—just as there is of the stroke of the whip (when the whip-stroke is also cognised along with the sound of the whip)?—The idea that—"the cognition of the Sound obstructs the said cognition (of the Air)"—cannot be right, for one who is cognisant of the whip-stroke and another Air (at the same time).—(2531-2532)

COMMENTARY.

There are two views possible in this connection—(1) that the Air is perceptible and (2) that it is not-perceptible.

Under the former view, at the time that Sound is cognised, there should be cognition of the Air also, as in the case of the whip-stroke.

It might be argued that—"as two cognitions cannot appear simultaneously, the cognition of Sound obstructs the cognition of the Air".

This cannot be right—in the mouth of one who is cognisant of the whip-stroke and the other Air, at the time that the Sound is cognised. Just as the 'Other Air' set up by the fan, and the 'whip-stroke' are both perceived at the time that the Sound is heard,—in the same manner there should be the perception of the touch of the Air reaching the auditory organ.

What this shows is that the assertion that there cannot be simultaneous cognitions is contrary to a directly perceived fact.—(2531-2532)

It has been explained already that the idea of simultaneous cognitions is due to the illusion caused by the quickness with which the cognitions appear. It may be that in the case of Cognitions appearing in succession there may be an illusion of simultaneity due to the quickness with which they appear; but in the present discussion, the said explanation is of no use; hence it is nothing.—This is what is asserted in the following:—

TEXT (2533).

Even though in some cases, there may be illusion of simultaneity due to quickness of appearance,—yet that has nothing to do with the present context; because here the Air is not cognised at all.—(2533)

COMMENTARY.

It may be that, on account of the quickness in the appearance of the Cognitions, there is an illusion of simultaneity. But this cannot apply to
the case where there is no perception of a thing which is quite perceptible. For instance, in the present context, there is absolutely no cognition—either successive or simultaneous—of the Air that has reached the regions of the Auditory Organ. Hence the explanation that "the illusion of simultaneity of Cognitions is due to the quickness with which they appear" can have no bearing on the present discussion; i.e. it should be ignored.—(2533)

The following text takes up the second alternative view (suggested in the commentary on Text 2531,—that the Air is not perceptible):—

**TEXT (2534).**

*If the Air (reaching the Ear) is beyond the Senses (imperceptible), as asserted by the followers of Kaṇāda, and also by your-selves,—then, to what can its amenability to Touch be due, which has been spoken of in the Bhāṣya?—(2534)*

**COMMENTARY.**

"Followers of Kaṇāda"—the Vaishēṣikas; according to whom Air is indicated by (inferred from) Sound.

The author of your own Bhāṣya, Shabara has also declared that "when the aerial Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the imperceptible Air proceed from the Ear-drum, they are not perceived". (Mī. Sū. 1. 1. 13.)

The objection to this view is set forth in the words—"To what can its amenability to Touch be due?"—"Spṛṣṭyāptī is the ‘āptī’—possibility of ‘spṛṣṭī’—touch. This is what the author of your Bhāṣya has spoken of; how is that? As against the view of the author of the Shiksā, that ‘the Air becomes the Sound’, the author of the Bhāṣya (Shabara) has said—(under Sū. 1. 1. 22) as follows—"If the Word-Sound were the product of Air, then it could only be Air in a particular shape; as a matter of fact, however, we do not recognise any particle of Air in the constitution of the Word-Sound, in the manner in which we recognise the particles of yarn in the constitution of the Cloth; therefore the Word-Sound cannot be a product of Air;—if the Word-Sound were the product of Air, then we could perceive it with our tactile organ (as we perceive Air); and yet we do not feel by touch any air-particles in the Word-Sound".—(Translation, p. 41.)—(2534)

Even granting (for the sake of argument) that Air is beyond the senses, imperceptible,—the Author proceeds to point out defects in the Opponent’s arguments:—
TEXT (2535).

Or, the Air in question may be beyond the Senses; even so, there would be cognition of the tangible (Air),—which is neither hot nor cold,—resting on the various substances that may be in contact with it; just as there is of other Airs.—(2535)

COMMENTARY.

‘Tadyogah’—contact with the different air-currents;—that which has this contact is ‘tattadyogin’,—i.e. the substances known as ‘Water’, ‘Fire’ and ‘Earth’;—and that which is ‘gata’—resting, residing in these, is ‘tattadyogigata’;—i.e. the Air resting on Water, Fire and Earth. The compounding is in accordance with Panini’s Sutra ‘Dvitya—shri, etc. etc.’—This compound qualifies ‘spartaesa’—the tangible Air;—which is of a nature that is different from hot and cold. There should be ‘vita’—Cognition—of the said Air. ‘Just as there is of other Airs’—i.e. of Air other than that within the body of the Speaker, which Air is held (by the Opponent) to be the manifestor of the particular Word-Sound. The ‘vati’-affix is added to the word ending in the Locative.

What is meant is that there would be cognition of the Air in question, just as there is of the air during winter, carrying with it the coolness of the snows,—of that during summer, when all the quarters are filled with the burning rays of the sun,—of that during the season which is neither hot nor cold, which is yet felt by the touch to be cool or warm.—(2535)

In the following Text, the Author anticipates and refutes the Opponent’s answer:—

TEXTS (2536-2537).

It might be said that “there is no cognition of the Air in question because it is not in contact with the Typanum.”—But, then, how is it known that it has reached the Ākāsha in the Ear?—From all this it follows that all this assumption by the Vedic Scholar is absolutely baseless; it is not agreeable to the learned, and shines only among Vedic Scholars.—(2536-2537)

COMMENTARY.

‘Tasya’—of the Air.
‘Ayogah’—non-contact,—‘with the tympanum’.
The rest is clear.—(2536-2537)
It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under Text 2198, that—"or, the idea that should be entertained is that the Auditory Organ consists of space, which idea would be in accordance with the Veda".

As this is open to the same objections, the Author applies them to that view, in the following:

**TEXT (2538).**

**All those objections that have been urged against those who hold Ākāsha to be without parts, should be understood to be equally applicable to that view also under which the Auditory Organ consists of the one indivisible Space.**—(2538)

**COMMENTARY.**

The view that the Auditory Organ consists of the indivisible Space, is open to all those objections—the futility of embellishment, the impossibility of embellishment, etc.—that have been urged against the view that it consists of the indivisible Ākāsha. Hence it is not necessary to state the objections against this other view separately.—(2538)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under Text 2185, that—"Even if the Auditory Organ were one and all-pervading, the Embellishment due to Articulation could affect only the material substratum of that organ, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXTS (2539–2544).**

**Under the view that Ākāsha is one and all-pervading, there can be no such division as that the one is the substratum of the embellished organ and the other is not so; because Ākāsha is one (and indivisible).—If the Auditory Organ consists of the one Ākāsha, then it cannot have its tympanum ‘unembellished’. Consequently, any restriction in the embellishment on the basis of the substratum cannot stand. Consequently, when the Organ has secured the embellishment in one substratum, it should bring about the Cognition in the bodies of all men;—according to those who declare the Organ to be one only. You may hold that Cognitions (sensations) appear in the various parts of the bodies of men; but according to you, there can be no diversity of place for the principal factor, in relation to Ākāsha which is one only.—The other party might say—"According to us, the Soul is without parts, indivisible, and it is in its entirety
THAT IT COGNISES THINGS, AND YET IT ACTUALLY APPREHENDS IT IN THE BODY ONLY’;—BUT EVEN WITH THIS, THE VIEW IS OPEN TO OBJECTION: THERE WOULD, IN THIS CASE, BE NO SUCH DISTINCTIONS AS THAT OF THE ‘DEAR’ AND THE LIKE, AND FOR THE SAME REASON IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR ONE COGNITION NOT TO BE APPREHENDED BY ANOTHER SOUL; AS THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO.—(2539–2544)

COMMENTARY.

‘Anyat’—the substratum of the unembellished organ.

Such distinction is not possible in the case of what is without parts, indivisible. If there were, it would have to be regarded as with parts, divisible.—If the distinction were merely assumed (not real), then there would be an incompatibility regarding its being with and also without effective action; because effective actions never follow in the wake of mere assumptions; they are always related to real entities. Consequently, if the organ has become embellished in one substratum, it acquires thereby the capacity to bring about the cognition of things; so that in another substratum also, as the organ would really be the same, it would be embellished everywhere, and hence capable of bringing about the Cognition of things.

Thus what has been said (in Text 2542) regarding “the Cognitions appearing in the several parts of the bodies of men”, becomes set aside; because there can be no real division in what is one only.—This is what is shown in the words ‘Pūṁsāṁ, etc. etc.’

‘Pradhānavaiḍēśṭhāyam’—‘Pradhāna’, ‘Principal Factor’, stands for the Body;—‘Vaiḍēśṭha’—residence in different parts of Ākāsha.

‘Evamukṭēpi, etc.’—because there can be no division for what is one only.

‘Anyavasthānam’—impossibility of such distinctions.—(2539–2544)

The following Text shows how there is no difference between the two:

TEXT (2545).

WHEN IT CANNOT ABANDON ITS PREVIOUS FORM, AND WHEN NO NEW FEATURES CAN APPEAR IN IT,—WHY CANNOT THE AUDITORY ORGAN COME WITHIN RANGE OF THE EXPERIENCE OF ANOTHER.—(2545)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—“there would be differences, by reason of the Auditory Organ being influenced by Merit and Demerit”.

The answer to that is as follows:
TEXT (2546).

Inasmuch as it is eternal, independent,—the Akāśic Auditory Organ cannot be influenced by merit and demerit; and hence should not fall within the scope of the experience of any one at all.—(2546)

COMMENTARY.

‘Being eternal’ is the reason for ‘being independent’ and also for ‘being not influenced by Merit and Demerit’.—(2546)

Question:—“Even though it is independent, why cannot it be influenced (by Merit and Demerit)?”

Answer:—

TEXT (2547).

The Ākāsha is never affected by Merit and Demerit; being eternal, it can never be an effect; what sort of ‘influence’ then can there be over it?—(2547)

COMMENTARY.

‘Being independent’ implies that it is not an effect; and what is not an effect cannot be influenced or affected by anything; e.g. the Hare’s Horn, or the ‘Unconscious Destruction’ of things;—and the Auditory Organ is not an effect;—hence there is apprehension of a character contrary to the wider term.

‘Being eternal’ sets aside the ‘inadmissibility’ of the Reason:—‘not being an effect, etc. etc.’ sets aside its ‘inconclusiveness’.—(2547)

Says the Opponent:—“It is found that even what is not an effect is influenced by things: for instance, the Auditory Organ, which was not within range of one’s experience before (in the case of the deaf) comes within its range, through the influence of medicines and charms. Thus your Reason becomes Inconclusive”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2548).

How could the Auditory Organ come within the range of one’s experience, through the influence of charms and medicines, etc.? Being eternal, it cannot derive any peculiarities from these.—(2548)

COMMENTARY.

‘Medicines, etc.’—‘etc.’ includes scratchings, operations.

‘How could it, etc.’—i.e. if, even so, it did not have the character of an effect.
"Even if it is not an Effect, there would be influencing by the mere production of peculiarities."

Answer:—'Being eternal, etc. etc.'—(2548)

[Says the other party]—"If such is the case, then the substratum being not-eternal, the embellishment could be of that, and through that the Auditory Organ also, though eternal, would come to be influenced".
This is the idea set forth and answered in the following:

TEXT (2549).

"Even though the substratum is not-eternal, its non-eternity would not be of the nature of momentariness";—if this is urged, then (the answer is that), inasmuch as no additional properties could be produced in it, Deafness, etc. would not be possible.—(2549)

COMMENTARY.

'If it is non-eternal'—as its destruction would be sure to come in course of time,—till that time, it would continue to have one and the same form; and hence, as in the eternal thing, so here also no additional properties would appear in it; how then, could there be any 'embellishment' of it?—(2549)

Even granting that additional qualities might appear,—the author points out that even so the theory is open to objection:

TEXTS (2550-2551).

Or, the additional property may be produced in the organ; but in no case could it exist in the Akāsha; nor could it be due to its connection with its receptacle; because it is eternal and independent. Hence, Deafness, etc. could not come about through that either.—Even if Akāsha were with parts and divisible, the arguments would apply to it, on the ground of its eternity.—(2550-2551)

COMMENTARY.

'Eṣa', 'it'—stands for the additional property.

"Even if it does not exist there, it may come to it on account of its connection with its receptacle".

It could not be due to its connection with its Receptacle.

As regards the argument that Akāsha is not without parts,—the answer is that if the divisible Akāsha is held to be eternal, then all the objections
that have been urged against the view that 'the indivisible Ākāśa is eternal', become applicable. This is what is meant by the words—'Even if Ākāśa were divisible, etc. etc.'—(2550-2551)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, in Text 2192, that—"Just as the village-lord, removed from the lordship, though continuing to live in the village, does not enjoy the privileges of the Lordship, similarly the soul of the deaf man deprived of the auditory organ, though continuing to dwell in the body, does not enjoy the experience of hearing sounds".

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (2552-2553).

**EVEN FOR YOU, THIS 'REMOVAL FROM THE OWNERSHIP' CANNOT BE POSSIBLE,—UNLESS THE OWNERSHIP IS MOMENTARY. WHAT ADDITIONAL PROPERTY HAS BEEN PRODUCED IN IT, BY VIRTUE OF WHICH IT IS REMOVED FROM THE OWNERSHIP AND DOES NOT ENJOY THE SAME EXPERIENCE AGAIN?—**

(2552-2553)

COMMENTARY.

This is quite easy.—(2552-2553)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2194, that—"The vibrating air-particles, which are the manifesters, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (2554-2558).

**THUS THEN, THERE IS NO 'EMBELLISHMENT' POSSIBLE, EITHER IN THE AUDITORY ORGAN OR IN THE WORD-SOUND; BECAUSE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE EMBELLISHMENT TO BE EITHER DIFFERENT OR NON-DIFFERENT (FROM THEM). FOR INSTANCE, IF THE EMBELLISHMENT IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE AUDITORY ORGAN AND THE SOUND, THEN THESE TWO CANNOT BE REGARDED AS 'EMBELLISHED'; AS THESE WOULD HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EMBELLISHMENT; BECAUSE BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT THINGS, THE ONLY RELATIONSHIP POSSIBLE IS THE CAUSAL ONE; AND IF THIS RELATIONSHIP WERE THERE, THEN THE EMBELLISHMENT WOULD BE THERE AT ALL TIMES, AS ITS CAUSE WOULD BE THERE AT ALL TIMES.—EVEN UNDER THE VIEW THAT THE EMBELLISHMENT IS NOT SOMETHING DIFFERENT,—IT WOULD BE ETERNAL, LIKE THE AUDITORY
ORGAN AND THE SOUND; AND HENCE IT COULD NOT BE PRODUCED BY ANYTHING; CONSEQUENTLY THE COGNITION (DUE TO THE EMBELLISHMENT) WOULD BE EVERLASTING.—BECAUSE ALL THIS IS SO, THEREFORE ANY REGULATION OR RESTRICTION OF THE CAPACITY OF THE AIR-CURRENTS, ETC. CANNOT BE POSSIBLE; AND WHEN WHAT IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IS NOT PRESENT, THE CAPACITY TO ACCOMPLISH IT CAN BE OF NO USE.—(2554–2558)

COMMENTARY.

‘Yadā’—Because—‘Evam’—‘Thus,—in the manner just described, this ‘because’ has to be construed with ‘tāt’ ‘therefore, etc. etc.’ of Text 2558.

How this embellishment is not possible is explained in detail, in the words—‘Because it is not possible for the embellishment, etc. etc.’—What is meant is as follows—When the embellishment comes, it could be either different or non-different (from the thing embellished); these are the only two possibilities, as the matter does not admit of a third alternative.

In the former case,—i.e. if it is different,—there could be no ‘embellishment’ of the auditory organ or of the Word-Sound; because what is brought about is different; and when the Jar is brought about, it is not the Cloth that is embellished. Nor can there be any relationship between the Embellishment and the said two (Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound); by virtue of which by the bringing about of the Embellishment, which is their relative, those two could become embellished.—Because, as it has been held to be different, the relationship of the Embellishment with the Auditory Organ or the Word-Sound could not be of the nature of ‘identity’; in fact whenever there is a relationship between two different things, it can be only of the nature of Cause and Effect; as there could be no help in any other way. If there were this relation of Cause and Effect between the Embellishment and the other two (Auditory Organ and Word-Sound),—the Embellishment would be there for all time, as its cause, in the shape of the Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound, would be there all the time (both of these being eternal, ex hypothesi).

Under the second alternative (that the Embellishment is not different from the Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound), the difficulty is that—‘Even under the view, etc. etc.’—‘Tadvat’—Like the Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound.—‘Asau’—the Embellishment;—and hence, as it would be eternal, the Embellishment could not be produced or brought about by anything.

Thus, under the view that Cognitions are produced by the Embellishment, every cognition would be eternal. This is the difficulty in the Embellishment being eternal.

The whole argument is summed up in the words—‘Therefore any regulation or restriction, etc. etc.’—(2554–2558)

The following Texts set forth the arguments in support of the view that Word-Sound is not-eternal.
TEXTS (2559-2560).

Thus,—inasmuch as no ‘manifestation’ (of the Word-Sound) is possible,—the Cognition of the Word-Sound must be regarded as having this character that it is invariably concomitant with the birth (coming into existence) of what is apprehended by it,—like the cognition of the individual Jār and such things. Consequently, both ‘producing’ and ‘manifesting’,—as brought about by effort and articulation,—will have the diversity of their capacity determined by presumption based upon the nature of the effects produced by them.—(2559-2560)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—What is occasional must be produced by a cause which also has had its production,—as for example, the cognition of the individual Jār;—and the Cognition of the Word-Sound is occasional; hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things.

The Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’, because as a matter of fact, the said cognition is not found to appear at all times.—Nor can it be regarded as ‘inconclusive’; as the idea of Sound being ‘manifested’ has been already discarded.—Nor again can it be regarded as ‘contradictory’; because it is found to be present in all places where the Probandum is present.

‘Idam-phalam’ is a compound, meaning—‘that which has idam’—this, i.e. being invariably concomitant with the birth of what is apprehended by it—for its ‘phalam’, net gain, character.

The rest is easily understood.—(2559-2560)

The objections against the view that the Auditory Organ consists of Space have been already stated before; hence they are not stated again; the Author only reminds the reader of what has been said before:—

TEXT (2561).

ALL THOSE REASONS THAT GO TO INVALIDATE THE VIEW THAT THE AUDITORY ORGAN IS PART OF Ākāsha, SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY INTELLIGENT MEN TO APPLY ALSO TO THE VIEW THAT IT IS PART OF SPACE.—(2561)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, in Text 2204, that—“Even if the Embellishment pertains to the Object, it would affect that one object only, etc. etc.”

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (2562).

The assertion that—"If the Embellishment pertains to the object, it would affect that one object only"—cannot be right; because it has been discarded; also because the capacity of things is limited.

—Hence there cannot be embellishment of the object.

—(2562)

COMMENTARY.

'Na'—That is, it cannot be right to assert that "if the Embellishment pertains to the Object it would affect that one object only".

"Why?"

'Because it has been discarded'—i.e. because the Embellishment itself has been rejected.—That is, the Embellishment, as different and as not-different, has been already discarded.

For the following reason also there can be no Embellishment of the Object.

"What reason?"

Because of the limitations of the capacity of things.—which are going to be pointed out.

After 'Niyatēh' a 'Cha' is understood; hence the meaning comes to be that—also because of the limitations of the capacity of things, there cannot be an Embellishment of the Object.—(2562)

The said 'limitation on the capacity of things' is illustrated—

TEXTS (2563-2564).

If the Word-Sound did not possess the capacity to produce cognitions, then it could never be cognised by anyone anywhere; as it could not have any bearing upon its cognition.—If, on the other hand, it did possess the capacity, then it would be cognised by all men, at all times and at all places; as it would continue to be the cause of that cognition.—

(2563-2564)

COMMENTARY.

By its very nature, the Word-Sound should be either incapable or capable of producing its cognition. These are the only two alternatives possible.—In the former case—i.e. if it is incapable—the Word-Sound would never be cognised by any one. In the latter case, it would be cognised by all men at all times; because it would always be of the same form.
From this it follows that the Embellishment can have no capacity at all.—(2563-2564)

The following might be argued—"Even if the Word-Sound had the capacity to bring about its cognition, it might not bring it about on account of forces to the contrary; similarly, even if it did not have the capacity, it could have the capacity imparted to it by auxiliary forces and thereby bring about the cognition".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2565).

IF THE WORD-SOUND IS, BY ITS VERY NATURE, DEFINITELY CAPABLE OR INCAPABLE,—WHAT HOSTILE OR HELPFUL FORCE COULD SET IT ASIDE ?—(2565)

COMMENTARY.

Unless a thing sets aside, or brings about, the nature of a thing, it cannot be regarded as hostile or helpful; otherwise there would be incongruities. And if the said setting aside or bringing about were admitted, the Word-Sound would lose its eternal character.—(2565)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsakā, in Text 2205, that "Just as the Word-Sound, though produced and appearing equally with regard to all men, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2566-2567).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHEN THE WORD-SOUND APPEARS, IT IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING ITS COGNITION IN SOME PERSONS ONLY; HENCE WHEN IT IS PRODUCED, IT IS NOT COGNISED BY ALL MEN.—OR, HOW COULD IT BE THAT THE SOUND IS HEARD ONLY BY THOSE MEN IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO WHOM IT IS EMBELLISHED BY ARTICULATIONS,—AND NOT BY THOSE AT A DISTANCE ?—(2566-2567)

COMMENTARY.

What has been urged does not affect the view that Word-Sounds are produced (not eternal). Because whenever a Word-Sound is produced by its cause, it is produced as capable of bringing about its cognition under certain limitations; and it is on account of this that it is not heard by all men at all times.

The view, however, that the Sound is (eternal and) is only manifested,—is open to the said objection,—even if the Embellishment is possible. This is what is shown by the sentence beginning with 'or'.
The objection that 'there should be hearing of far-off sound also' is applicable, not only to the view that the Word-Sound is endowed, by its very nature, with the capacity to produce its cognition,—but it is also applicable to the view that there is Embellishment (of the Word-Sound). Hence this has been set forth as another alternative view—'Why it is not heard by persons at a distance?'—'is heard' is to be construed here. What is meant is that it should certainly be heard.—(2566-2567)

The same idea is further clarified:—

TEXT (2568).

EVEN IN CASES OF PROXIMITY, THE EMBELLISHMENT IS SUPPOSED TO BE THE CAUSE (OF THE COGNITION); AND THIS EMBELLISHMENT WOULD BE EQUALLY THERE FOR PERSONS AT A DISTANCE ALSO.—(2568)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, in Text 2270, that—"Inasmuch as the idea of the Word-Sound being produced has been rejected, etc. etc." The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2569-2570).

IF THE IDEA IS THAT PARTICULAR EMBELLISHMENTS ARE PRODUCED BY ARTICULATIONS, THEN IN THAT CASE, NO ONE CAN DENY THE IDEA OF THE SOUND BEING PRODUCED. BECAUSE THE PARTICULAR EMBELLISHMENT IS NOT SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE WORD-SOUND; OTHERWISE THE WORD-SOUND WOULD BE INCOGNISABLE. CONSEQUENTLY THE WORD-SOUND ALSO SHOULD BE REGARDED AS PRODUCED.—(2569-2570)

COMMENTARY.

If the Embellishment is something that is produced, then there should be production of the Word-Sound also; because it is not different from the Embellishment.—In case it is different, then, as the Cognition would be brought about by the Embellishment itself, the Word-Sound would not be an active agent in it; and hence it would not be apprehended by that Cognition. For these reasons it should be admitted that the Word-Sound also is produced.—(2569-2570)

The following might be urged—"Just as for you, the Buddhist, the Word-Sound is produced as capable of bringing about a particular restricted
cognition,—so also for us, there is restriction in regard to the Embellishment also; whereby the Sound is not heard by people at a distance*.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2571).

HAVING BECOME EMBELLISHED ONCE, IF THE WORD-SOUND DOES NOT ABANDON THAT (EMBELLISHED) FORM, ON ACCOUNT OF ITS EVANESCENT CHARACTER,—THEN IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE HEARD FOR ALL TIME.—

(2571)

COMMENTARY.

Even if the idea be that—"The Word-Sound that is embellished is one that is capable of bringing about the cognition within the 'chain' of certain particular persons only"—there would be objections against it. For instance, if the Sound does not abandon the form which is capable of bringing about the cognition, then its cognition should continue to be produced for all time. If it abandons it, then it becomes evanescent, not eternal.—Hence it must be admitted that it is produced.—(2571)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka in Text 2209, that—"As regards the view that there is embellishment of both, the assertion that it is open to both sets of objections is futile, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2572).

EVEN AS REGARDS THE VIEW THAT THERE IS EMBELLISHMENT OF BOTH, THE ASSERTION THAT IT IS OPEN TO BOTH SETS OF OBJECTIONS IS QUITE TRUE; BECAUSE DEFICIENCY IS NOT IN ONE OF THE TWO ONLY; AS THE PREVIOUS ONE CONTINUES.

(2572)

COMMENTARY.

For those who hold the view that the Word-Sound is produced, it is possible that one or the other should be deficient;—it is not possible for those who hold that there is Embellishment (not production); as for them, the previous embellished form would continue to exist.—(2572)

The said 'continuity' is further clarified.—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXT (2573).

THE AUDITORY ORGAN AND THE LETTER-SOUNDS THAT HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY EMBELLISHED BY THE MANIFESTERS CANNOT BECOME DESTROYED,—BECAUSE IF THEY DID, THEY WOULD BE NON-ETERNAL; AND CONSEQUENTLY THEY WOULD BE HEARD AT ALL TIMES.—(2573)

COMMENTARY.

'Chyutīprāpteḥ'—because of liability to become non-eternal. Otherwise, there would be Renunciation of Proposition (on your part).

'Sarva-srutiḥ'—Hearing at all times.—not of all; as in the latter case, the compound would fall under the prohibition contained in Pāṇini's Sūtra 'Karmanī cha'.—(2573)

The following might be urged—"It is of only a few limited number of persons whose Organ and Letter-Sounds would be embellished and fit for audition, and hence the Sound could not be heard by all men".

But in that case, there would be no hearing by those men who were going to hear other Letter-Sounds.

This is what is pointed out in the following:

TEXT (2574).

IF THE EMBELLISHED ORGAN AND LETTER-SOUNDS WERE CAPABLE OF HEARING BY A FEW LIMITED PERSONS, THEN THERE WOULD BE NO HEARING FOR OTHER PERSONS WHO WOULD BE GOING TO HEAR THE SAME LETTER-SOUNDS.—(2574)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'niyatashrutiyogyau' is to be explained as 'shruti-yogyau'—capable of hearing—'niyatānām pūḥsām'—by a few limited persons.

'Anyavarṇa, etc.'—This may be taken as 'other persons who would be going to hear that same sound',—or as 'persons who would be going to hear other sounds'.—(2574)

The following might be urged—"For the benefit of those other persons who would be going to hear the same sound, there would be another embellishment of the Auditory Organ and the Letter-Sound".

The following Text anticipates and answers this argument:
TEXT (2575).

If it be said that—"the Organ and the Letter-Sound are emblazoned again, and are fit for the purpose of the cognition of that Sound by other persons",—then also there would be continuation of the same Organ and Sound, and hence of the hearing also of the same Sound and by the same person.—(2575)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'tādvarṇa, etc.' is to be expounded as—fit for the viññāna—cognition—of those Sounds by those persons;—"which Letter-Sounds?"—those that are heard by the other hearers;—and the 'persons' are the 'hearers of those sounds'.

'Tayorūva'—i.e. the Organ and Letter-Sound embellished previously.

'Tayorapi'—of the previous Person and Letter-Sound.

What is meant is that, when the Letters—ka and the rest—are heard later on by other persons, they should be heard exactly as they had been heard by the previous persons;—because their previous character would still continue.—(2575)

The following Text shows that if there is no such continuation as has been pointed out, then they become non-eternal:

TEXT (2576).

If these other Organ and Letter-Sound are distinct (from those embellished before),—then why does not the hope of these being eternal become entirely baseless?—(2576)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(2576)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, in Text 2210, that—"Though the Sun is one, yet it is seen, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (2577).

In the Water and other reflecting substances, it is not the same Sun seen in various forms; because the cognitions that are there all pertain to the reflected images, and are entirely devoid of any objective basis.—(2577)

COMMENTARY.

It has already been explained before that all wrong cognitions are, without exception, devoid of any objective basis; still it is explained again, in the following Text, in connection with the cognitions of the reflected images,—be they regarded as (a) with or (b) without form.—First the Author takes up the former view (that the Reflected Image has a form):—

TEXTS (2578–2582).

Even under your view, all Cognitions are formless, and it is only the external thing that is held to be with form. The reflected image that is seen is seen within the Water; and yet the Sun existing in the sky is not there in the Water.—"How is it then that it appears as if in the Water?"—It is through delusion, and hence it is that it is clearly devoid of an objective basis; because it has no connection with any object with that form.—If it is urged that "it is the same Sun that is perceived otherwise",—this would be another excellent assertion—the same and yet otherwise.—But in this way, every Cognition would apprehend everything. It would be the Cognition of the same Sun only if it were seen exactly as it is; when however, it is actually perceived in another form, how could it be the perception of the same Sun?—(2578–2582)

COMMENTARY.

For you, the Mīmāṃsaka, Cognitions are formless, and it is the external object that is with form. Hence what is seen in the water cannot be the form of the Cognition; because forms are held to belong to external things only.—Nor is the Reflected Image held to be an entirely different thing; as in that case, it would not be a case of the perception of the Sun at all.—Nor does the Sun itself enter the water, by virtue of which it could appear there (as the Reflected Image); because it remains in the regions of Ākāśa—If it be asserted that—"it is through illusion that it appears in the water",—in that case, the Cognition would not have the Sun for its objective basis; because the form within the water does not belong to the Sun.—From all this it follows that the form that belongs to the object (Sun) does not figure in the
Cognition; and hence having no connection with that form, the said Cognition
is clearly baseless (without an objective basis).

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When an Object has a
form that does not figure in a Cognition, that Object cannot be the objective
basis of that Cognition;—e.g. Colour cannot be the objective basis of Auditory
Cognition;—the Sun does not have the form that figures in the Cognition
of the Reflected Image;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider
character (which implies the absence of the less wide character).—The
Reason here adduced cannot be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’; because in
reality the Sun does not have the form that is within the water.—Nor can
the Reason be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’; as that would lead to incongruities;
as in this way anything could be the objective basis of any Cognition.—
Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Contradictory’; as it is present in all
cases where the Probandum is present.

It might be argued that—‘It is the same Sun that is seen in the water,
only it appears otherwise, on account of the difference in its position, and
consequently, the Buddhist’s Reason is ‘Inadmissible’.’

Who, except an audacious logician like yourself, could make such an
assertion as ‘it is the same—and otherwise’. Because the assertion ‘it is the
same’ affirms that it is of the same form, and the assertion that ‘it is other-
wise’ denies that it has the same form; how then could these two mutual
contraries—Affirmation and Denial—appertain to the same thing (Sun)?

If, even when cognised as otherwise, the thing (Sun) were the same,—
then the entire Universe might be regarded as the same; and as a consequence
of this, the birth and death of things would come at the same time and all
Cognitions would have one and the same object. From this it follows that
if the thing were cognised as it actually exists in relation to particular time
and place, etc. then, the same Sun would have been cognised. How then
can our Reason be ‘Inadmissible’?—(2578–2582)

Under the second view also—that Cognitions are with form,—the Cogni-
tions of the Reflected Images are devoid of objective basis;—this is what is
pointed out in the following:—

**TEXT** (2583).

**Even if the Cognition be with form, it can be regarded as
apprehending an object only if it has a form that is not
different from the object that is
cognised.—(2583)**

**COMMENTARY.**

Even under the view that Cognitions are with form,—though the
Cognition of the Reflected Image may be with form, yet, the external object
can be said to be ‘cognised’ only when the form in which it is apprehended
is not different from the external object itself,—and not when it is appre-
hended in a different form; if it were not so, there would be incongruities.
—In the case of the Cognitions of the Reflected Images, the apprehension is not of a form that is non-different from the form of the Sun; for if it were there, the Cognitions of the Reflected Images would be exactly the same as the true Cognition of the Sun itself.—(2583)

It has been argued by the Māmsaka in Text 2221, that—"When a man is looking at the Sun and the Water, his eye (rays) proceed in two ways—one upwards and the other downwards, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2584-2585).

It may be that what is perceived by the downward rays is the Sun shining above presented mediatelty; but even so, the perceiver regards the Sun shining above as actually down in the Water.—If the Sun were actually perceived just as it stands, then it would be cognised as such, not otherwise. This has been already explained.—(2584-2585)

COMMENTARY.

'What is perceived'—by the Soul.
'Shining above'—this qualifies the 'Sun', as it exists.
'Regards'—i.e. the perceiving Soul thinks.

What is meant is as follows:—If what the Percipient Soul sees is the Sun shining above, presented to him mediatelty, through the downward rays,—how is it that he regards the Sun as actually down in the water, and not as shining above? It would be regarded as such, if it were actually apprehended as it exists; otherwise there would be incongruities.—(2584-2585)

It has been argued by the Māmsaka, under Text 2224, that—"In the case of the man looking at the mirror, it is through illusion that, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2586).

Similarly it is not true that (in the case of the man looking at the mirror)—"It is through illusion that the man cognises the face as facing the West, though in reality what he actually perceives is the face as presented by the visual rays proceeding eastward to the rays as proceeding westward."—(2586)

COMMENTARY.

The reason why this is not true is stated in the following:—
TEXT (2587).


COMMENTARY.

'Tadvilakṣana, etc.'—This word has to be construed as with the abstract ending 'tva'; and as a Bahuvishi compound.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a Cognition envisages something entirely different from a certain thing, it cannot have this latter for its objective basis;—e.g. the Cognition of Taste cannot have Sound for its objective basis; or the Cognition of Sound cannot have Taste for its objective basis;—the Cognitions of the reflected image something entirely different from the real face;—hence here we have the apprehension of something contrary to the wider factor.—(2587)

In the following Texts, the author points out that the Reason here put forward cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible':—

TEXTS (2588–2590).


COMMENTARY.

In a smaller mirror, the face, though really larger, appears as smaller;—the tree reflected in water is perceived top downward and as sunk in the
water;—the face reflected in the mirror is perceived as facing the west;—
and in water, as being far off;—similarly in such reflecting media as the
Bright Sword and the like, the Reflected Image appears in varying degrees
of length, etc. in accordance with the nature of the reflecting medium; and
yet the object reflected does not possess the varying length, etc. Thus then,
the idea that the cognition of the Reflected Image envisages something
different from the Reflected object, cannot be ‘inadmissible’.—(2588-2590)

In the following Text, the author refutes the charge of ‘Inconclusiveness’
against his Reason:—

TEXT (2591).

IF, EVEN WHEN WHAT APPEARS IN THE COGNITION IS SOMETHING QUITE
DIFFERENT FROM THE OBJECT, IT BE REGARDED AS THE COGNITION
OF THAT OBJECT,—THEN ALL COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND
AND OTHER THINGS, WOULD ENVISAGE ALL THINGS.—(2591)

COMMENTARY.

That all cognitions would have all things for their object is the Reason
that serves to annul the conclusion of the other party.—(2591)

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka in Text 2218 that—“When
the eye is slightly pressed by the finger, even a single object is perceived as
diverse, because of the diversity in the functioning of the eye,—the same
thing happens in the case in question also”.

This also is discarded by what has been said above.

TEXT (2592).

WHEN THE EYE IS SLIGHTLY PRESSSED BY THE FINGER, IF A SINGLE OBJECT
IS PERCEIVED AS DIVERSE,—THAT ALSO IS PURE ILLUSION,
ENTIRELY BASELESS.—(2592)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka under the Text 2225, that—
“Even granting that the Reflected Image really exists in the different
places,—there can be no plurality, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (2593).

THE REALITY OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE REFLECTED IMAGE HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCARDED BEFORE; BECAUSE TWO CORPOREAL MATERIAL OBJECTS CANNOT EXIST TOGETHER, BECAUSE THEY ARE MUTUALLY OBSTRUCTIVE.—(2593)

COMMENTARY.

The idea of the Reflected Image being an entity has been rejected before; where it has been shown that one corporeal object cannot occupy the same place as another and so forth.—(2593)

Granting that the Reflected Image is a real entity; even so several such images can figure in the same Cognition;—this is what is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2594).

EVEN IF THE REFLECTED IMAGE EXISTS IN SEVERAL PLACES, IT VARIES REGARDING ITS LARGENESS, SMALLNESS AND SO FORTH; HENCE IT CANNOT BE ONE AND THE SAME.—(2594)

COMMENTARY.

'And so forth'—includes length, etc.

It might be argued that—"Even though there is diversity of largeness and the rest, yet in some way, on account of all being blue, etc., they might figure in the same cognition".

But even so, that does not prove real one-ness; the one-ness might be assumed; but as regards that, your argument would be futile (as that is admitted by us also).

If the one-ness were real, even when the Images are perceived in different places, etc.,—then there may be one-ness between the Brāhmaṇa and the Chândâla, on the ground of both being men;—there would be one-ness between your mother and your wife, on the ground of both being women,—one-ness also between your mouth and the lower orifice, on the ground of both being made up of Earth. In fact, the whole universe would be one, on the ground of everything being a Entity; and in that case the contingency of the simultaneous birth and death of things would become irresistible.—(2594)

The following has been urged in the Bhāṣya (of Shabara):—"It might be urged that it is not possible for one and the same thing to be seen simultaneously at several places; but the foolish man who says this should look at the sun, where one and the same sun is seen in several places...... It might be that its exact position is not ascertained on account of remoteness; hence there is an illusion. The same may be said in regard to the Word-
Sound also; there is no definite cognition of the exact position. (Śū. 1. 1. 15; Translation, pp. 35-36).

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (2595–2599).

The idea that appears in men as to ‘the sun being over my head’ is surely wrong; because all living beings see the same sun at the same time,—and not different suns; because in reality no second solar disc exists; if it existed, it would surely be seen, and yet it is not seen; hence it is definitely concluded that only one sun exists.—As regards the Word-Sound, however, it has never been definitely ascertained to be one and the same; because whether appearing in succession or simultaneously it is clearly characterised by multiplicity. Even when speakers pronounce the letter ‘ga’ at one and the same time, the difference among them is clearly apprehended.—(2595–2599)

COMMENTARY.

If the second solar Disc existed, it would be perceptible; but it is never perceived; hence it follows with certainty that it is one only; hence the idea that ‘the sun is above me’ is held to be wrong.

The one-ness of the Word-Sound, however, is not recognised in this manner; by virtue of which the idea of its being present in several places might be regarded as wrong. It is only when such one-ness is established that the idea of the said presence could be wrong. But that one-ness itself has not been established.

‘Solar disc’.—The term ‘rāvam’ is made up of the noun ‘ravi’ with the ‘aññ’ affix.

Says the Opponent:—“The one-ness of the Word-Sound has certainly been definitely established through Recognition”.

The answer to this is—‘It has never been definitely ascertained, etc. etc.’—That is to say, the validity of Recognition as a means of Right Cognition has been already rejected.

The words ‘even when, etc. etc.’ explain that even when the appearance is simultaneous, there is multiplicity.

‘Clearly’;—because all details regarding swiftness, middling and slow, etc. etc. are clearly perceived.—(2595–2599)

The following Text shows that there is diversity also when the letter is pronounced in succession:
TEXT (2600).

WHEN THE LETTER IS PRONOUNCED IN SUCCESSION, ONE AFTER THE OTHER, THE DIVERSITY IS NOT ONLY DIRECTLY PERCEIVED, BUT ALSO INFERRED THROUGH THE INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE IN THE SHAPE OF THE FACT OF THE COGNITIONS APPEARING IN SUCCESSION.—(2600)

COMMENTARY.

'Not only directly perceived' ;—because even so it is clearly apprehended to be diverse, on account of the diversity in the notes, 'Sadja' and the rest. This cannot be a case of diversity among the manifesters; as that idea has been already discarded.

'Through the Inferential Indicative' ;—i.e. through Inference also; the argument being formulated as follows:—At the time that a thing does not come into existence, its cause is not present in an efficient form,—e.g. visual cognition does not appear when the set of its causes is devoid of the Eye, even though the other factors are there in the form of the Colour, the Light, the mental condition, and so forth;—at the time that the several cognitions of the single letter 'ga' appear, there do not appear those subsequent cognitions which are held to follow from the said cognitions;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider term; the presence of the efficient cause being invariably concomitant with coming into existence, and the said 'presence' being not there.

Says the Opponent:—"If what you seek to prove is the negation of the presence of the efficient cause in general,—then your argument is superfluous; because even though the eternal Word-sound is a cause, there may be a deficiency due to the absence of its auxiliaries, which renders the appearance of the subsequent cognitions impossible; and this fact is admitted by your opponent.—If, on the other hand, what you are negating is the causal efficiency of the Word-Sound in particular,—then your Reason is 'Inconclusive', and the Corroborative Instance is 'devoid of the Probandum'. Because when the Visual Perception does not appear, its non-appearance is not due to the deficiency of the cause of the Word-Sound; it is due to the deficiency (absence) of the eye".

This is not right. What we seek to prove is the fact in its general aspect. Nor is our argument 'superfluous' in that case. Because if the eternal thing had need of another cause, then alone could our argument be 'superfluous'. As a matter of fact, however, the eternal thing does not depend upon another cause; because such a cause could not render any help to the eternal thing; and it is only what helps that is needed; otherwise there would be incongruities. Consequently, if the Word-Sound, independently, were held to be the cause, all the cognitions proceeding therefrom would always have the efficient cause present; and hence they would all appear at all times. If they did not, then the non-appearance of the cognitions proceeding therefrom would indicate the inefficiency of the Word-Sound itself. How then can our argument be 'superfluous'?
“THE REVEALED WORD.”

Even if what is meant to be proved were the deficiency of a particular Cause, our argument could not be ‘inconclusive’; nor would our Corroborative Instance be ‘devoid of the Probandum’; what is meant is as follows:—even when one thing is present, if the other thing does not come into existence, the former cannot be the cause of the latter,—according to you;—e.g. Visual organ does not appear when Sound is present;—even when the particular forms of the letter ‘Ga’ are there, the Cognitions held to proceed from them do not come into existence; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character.

Here also the fact of the Eternal Thing not needing another Cause supplies the reason for the annulment of the contrary conclusion. The case of the Seed in the granary cannot be cited to the contrary; because the seed cannot be the primary cause of the Sprout. We desist from labouring this point further.—(2600)

It has been argued above, by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2211, that—“Because it is dependent upon the manifesting articulations, therefore it is apprehended only at the place where they are, etc. etc.”

Though this idea has been already refuted, the author reverts to it, in order to point out that the view is open to objection even if there be a manifest for eternal things:—

TEXTS (2601–2605).

It may be that the apprehension of the Word-sound is dependent upon the manifesting articulations; but even so it could be apprehended only as it really exists; otherwise, the apprehension would not be of that Sound at all; as its form would not figure in that apprehension. As a matter of fact, the Word-Sound is never apprehended as pervading over the whole Ākāśa. Why then does the Word-Sound follow the diversity of place of the Articulation? When manifested, it would appear by itself, like the Jar and other things. All this about the Cause has been said only by way of an elaboration of our argument. In reality the inefficiency of the manifesters has already been proved on the basis of the impossibility of manifestation.—As regards the directly perceptual notion that ‘this is the same Word-Sound’,—that has been already discarded; and it stands unrefuted that appearing in diverse places, the Word-Sound must be diverse.—(2601–2605)

COMMENTARY.

If the apprehension of the Word-Sound is dependent upon manifesters, then, how is it that it is not apprehended as pervading the entire Ākāśa,
wherein it pervades? Its apprehension must be in that form; otherwise there would be incongruities; all this has been explained before. And yet the Word-Sound is not heard throughout the entire Ākāśa; hence it cannot be right that the hearing of sound is in accordance with the manifesting articulation; in fact, the apprehension must follow that Word-Sound alone of which it is the apprehension. Thus alone could there be apprehension of the Word-Sound, not otherwise. Consequently like the Jar and other things, the Word-Sound should always appear in its entire form. Such in brief is the sense of the text.

'Tat'—Therefore.—(2601-2605)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2227, that—"Just as the single person, Devadatta, passing from place to place, one after the other, does not become different, so the Word-Sound also does not differ simply because it is heard in several places".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2606-2607).

WHEN A MAN PASSES FROM PLACE TO PLACE, ONE AFTER THE OTHER,—
IT IS SO BECAUSE HE IS IN A PERPETUAL FLUX; IF IT WERE NOT SO,
THERE COULD BE NO SUCH 'GOING'; IF HE REMAINED FIXED,
PERMANENTLY, THEN THE MAN, NOT DISSOCIATED FROM HIS
PREVIOUS POSITION, WOULD CONTINUE TO REMAIN
THERE; AND AS SUCH HE COULD NOT GET AT
ANOTHER PLACE.—(2606-2607)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the non-eternal thing, the only 'movement' possible is in the shape of being born in another place; not so in the case of the eternal thing, which, unless it abandons its character as associated with one place, can never 'go' to another place.—This is what is pointed out by the Text 2607.—(2606-2607)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 2230 above, that—"when a large pit is dug in the ground, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (2608).

Ākāśa being indefinable and vague, there can be no 'manifestation' of it; and as it is beyond the reach of the senses, what is seen in the pit, is not Ākāśa, but Light.—(2608)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be proved that Ākāśa is a positive entity; hence there can be no 'manifestation' of it; specially as there is the idea of Ākāśa only when there is nothing tangible perceived; for instance, in deep darkness, when people do not meet with any obstruction, they are found to say—'there is nothing here, it is mere Ākāśa'.

Even for those who regard Ākāśa as a positive entity, it is beyond the reach of the senses; how then could there be any cognition of Ākāśa?—This is what is meant by the words—'As it is beyond the reach of the senses, etc. etc.'

Question:—"If this is so, then what is it that is seen in the pit?"

Answer:—It is only Light that is seen.—(2608)

The following texts point out that—even if Ākāśa is a positive entity, there can be no manifestation of it—

TEXTS (2609–2611).

Further, as in the case of the Word-Sound, so in the case of Ākāśa also, there can be no 'manifestation'; such 'manifestation' would mean cognition; and this would be everlasting, as its cause would be always there.—Just as, in the case of the Word, there can be no manifesters,—so it cannot be in the present case also; and in reality, it is an illusion appearing, through extraneous circumstances, in regard to the cognition of the Word-Sound. Hence the conclusion is that length, shortness and the rest are not properties of the articulation. They could be so only if the articulations were the manifesters of the Word-Sound; and this idea has been rejected.—(2609–2611)

COMMENTARY.

'They could be so'—i.e. Length, etc. could be properties of Articulation.

'This'—the idea that the Articulations are manifesters of the Word-Sound.—(2609–2611)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2234, that—"a word whose relationship to its denotation has not been apprehended can never be expressive, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXTS (2612-2613).

IT HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY EXPLAINED BEFORE THAT WORDS AND THINGS THAT ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE SAME IDEAS. HENCE IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE WORD BECOMES EXPRESSIVE ONLY WHEN ITS RELATIONSHIP TO ITS DENOTATION HAS BEEN APPREHENDED.

BECAUSE, AS ALREADY EXPLAINED BEFORE, IN REALITY, THE WORD, BY ITSELF, IS NOT EXPRESSIVE AT ALL.—(2612-2613)

COMMENTARY.

The sense of this is briefly as follows:—If what you are urging is the contingency that there would be no real denotative relationship between the Word and its denotation,—then your argument is futile; because under the chapter on Word, the idea of the ‘Universal’, or the ‘Specific Individuality’ of things, being denoted by words has been refuted at length.

If what you are urging is in regard to the illusory denotative relationship, then your Reason is ‘Inconclusive’. Because, as a matter of fact, there are certain things which, though entirely different from one another, serve to bring about cognitions of the same form; and these would bring about the illusory denotative relationship between the Word and its meaning;—as we have already explained in course of the discussion on ‘Apotha’. Consequently, as against the Buddhists, who are upholders of the doctrine of Apoha, all that has been urged is entirely worthless and flickers only for a moment.—(2612-2613)

The following texts explain the possibility of ‘Denotation’ on the basis of Illusion:—

TEXTS (2614–2616)

AS A MATTER OF FACT, ALL COGNITIONS PRODUCED BY WORDS ARE EXPRESSIVE OF WHAT IS UNREAL; BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THERE CAN BE NO DENOTATION OF THE ‘UNIVERSAL’ OR OF THE ‘SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY’ AND SUCH THINGS; BUT EVEN THOUGH IN REALITY, THERE IS DIVERSITY, PEOPLE, THROUGH ILLUSION, COME TO TREAT AND SPEAK OF THE WORD—‘COW’ FOR INSTANCE,—AS ONE ONLY,—REGARDING ALL AS THE SAME.—THIS MUCH OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID BY THE GREAT BRAHMAṆA (Mīmāṁsaka) ON THE BASIS OF THE DIVERSITY OF WORDS IS ENTIRELY BASELESS.—(2614–2616)

COMMENTARY.

That idea is called ‘Samyrti’ (Illusory) which, by its appearance, conceals—‘samyavniti’—the real character of another—through not mani-
festing the real character of the thing; and it is purely 'fanciful'; hence the form of things that is presented by such an idea is called 'Samvṛta,' 'illusory,' 'fanciful'.

This is what is meant by 'illusory existence'; it is not real; in reality, it does not exist; and all 'illusory cognition' is devoid of objective basis.—(2614–2616)

The following might be urged—"If the one-ness of the Word is not real,—then how is it that words accomplish the purpose of affirming and denying things,—through mere (illusory) imposition?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2617-2618).

For instance, the shaking of the hand and such gestures are not regarded as one and the same (and yet they indicate affirmation and denial). The cognitions of the Word-Sound that are produced have the varying characteristics of length, shortness, etc.—[which also shows that the Word is not one];—the idea that the one word is variously 'manifested' has been discarded. There is no 'commonality' (common character) perceptible in the several appearances of the word; and it is only through Convention that they become aids to the cognition of Denial, Affirmation and the rest.—(2617-2618)

COMMENTARY.

'Such gestures'—such as winking of the eyes, etc.'

'With such varying characteristics as length, etc.'—this has to be construed with 'budhirhādātaḥ,' 'the cognitions, etc.'

Nor can these characteristics be due to variations in the 'manifesteer'; as the very idea of such 'manifestation' has been discarded.—'Tadvyaktih'—manifestation of the eternal thing (Word-Sound).

Nor can the Word serve as the basis of usage through a commonality; as no such 'commonality' is known; and a 'commonality' that is not known cannot form the basis of usage; as in that case, the usage would go on for all time.

'Aids to the cognition of denial, etc. etc.'—The 'etc.' includes affirmation, permission, request and so forth.—The 'gati' of these is their cognition, comprehension;—the 'aid' to this is its cause.—It is the shaking of the hand, etc. that become such aids.—What is meant is that the same would be the case with words also.—(2617-2618)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsāka, under Text 2252, that—"For these reasons the relationship between the Word and its meaning is declared to be eternal".

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (2619).

It has been already explained that words do not bring about the cognition of things directly,—because there is no invariable concomitance between words and external things; all that the words do is to indicate the presence (in the speaker) of the desire to speak (of things).—(2619)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, there is no real connection between the Word and the thing expressed by it,—which could be either eternal or non-eternal. Because it is not the external objects that words denote; as there is no invariable concomitance between them; as has been previously explained under the chapter on 'Word'. And if words were to denote things without such concomitance, then there would be incongruities.

Question:—"If that is so, then what is it that the words express' ?
Answer:—'All that the words do, etc. etc.'—this 'desire to speak' also, they point to, not as something denoted by them; they only serve as signs indicative of it. That is why they have been spoken of as 'indicating' the Desire to Speak. What happens is that when the Word is uttered, there appears a 'conception' envisaging the object, and not envisaging the Desire to Speak; and what is not envisaged by the Word when heard,—how can that be regarded as 'denoted' by it ?—(2619)

Question:—"If that is so, then what is the connection between the words and the said Desire to Speak,—by virtue of which they could serve to indicate that Desire ?'
Answer:—

TEXT (2620).

Words are definitely known—through Perception and Non-apprehension—as the effect of the Desire to Speak;
hence between them the relationship is clearly that of Cause and Effect.—(2620)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, words are definitely known—through Perception and Non-apprehension in oneself,—to be the effect of the Desire to Speak; hence the relation between them is that of Cause and Effect.—(2620)

Says the Opponent:—"If that is so, then Convention becomes useless; the said causal relation being determined by the said Perception and Non-apprehension ".

The answer to that is as follows:—
TEXT (2621).

It is only when the man has definitely recognised the said causal relationship through Convention that he comprehends, from words, the Desire to Speak; as in the case of the gestures of the hand.—(2621)

COMMENTARY.

The idea is as follows:—The causal relation that has been recognised is with mere 'Desire to Speak' in general; as for the said relation with a particular 'Desire to Speak', as this would naturally be present in the 'subjective chain' of another person (to whom the words are spoken), it could not be known except through Convention; hence it is for the due ascertainment of this that the Convention is made.

Says the Opponent:—"How can this be ascertained through Convention also? If, at the time of the making of the Convention, the particular desire of the other person to speak were the means of bringing about the Cognition, then it might be that the Convention thereupon would, at the time of usage, serve to bring about the Cognition of the particular desire to speak. As it is, however, the said means is not there yet. Because the Convention cannot be made without pronouncing the Word; so that if the particular 'desire to speak' were also comprehended from the same word, then there would be mutual interdependence. Because through Convention, the Word would indicate the particular Desire, and the Convention cannot be made without the Cognition of the particular and general desire to speak; hence there would be clear mutual interdependence".

This does not affect our position. As a matter of fact, the whole verbal usage is admitted only on the basis of one's own impressions; because it is radically wrong, illusory,—like the ideas of the man with the blurred vision having the idea of 'two moons'. Where then does the point of the objection lie?

Nor indeed is the Word the only means of knowing the particular 'Desire to Speak', in all cases. Because there are other ways also in which the Convention can be made,—such as actually pointing to the thing, through Context, etc. by positing a special meaning and thereby indicating the particular 'Desire to Speak'.

Thus there would be no mutual interdependence.

Then again, to you also, who uphold the affirmative view, the objection is equally applicable, that the Cognition of one man not bringing about the Cognition in another man, how can there be any certainty as to the speaker and the hearer having the Cognition of the same thing?—And without the common Cognition of such a thing; there can be no Convention.

The answer that you would make to this objection would be our answer also to your objection.

The following might be urged—"As the Word does not enter into the 'Desire to Speak', how can it have any connection with this desire ascertained
through Convention? Any Convention that is made here cannot be indicative of any other meaning; if it did, there would be incongruities.”

This does not affect our position. What is meant here by the term ‘Desire to Speak’ is that which, even when in confusion as to being in the form of the object or in its own form, does not vary with it. Because in reality it is only this that has the nature of the ‘Desire to Speak’.

And it is this particular form of the ‘Desire to Speak’ that is meant here. Convention also is made in relation to this Desire, not in regard to the Specific Individuality of things; and hence that same particular Desire is what is indicated by the word. Thus alone is it possible for it to be conceived of in that form. Mere desire in general cannot be expressed by the word; as has been explained above.—(2621)

Question:—“If, as just explained, the causal relation of the Word is only with such form of the Object as varies with the speaker’s ‘desire to speak’;—then, how is it that in several places, great teachers have declared the relationship of the Word to consist in the Convention itself,—or to be based upon Convention?”

Answer:—

TEXTS (2622-2623).

IT IS ONLY WHEN THE CONVENTION IS THERE THAT THERE COMES ABOUT THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP OF THE WORD WITH THE OBJECT VARYING WITH THE SPEAKER’S INTENTIONS. IT IS ON THIS ACCOUNT THAT IT HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE ‘DUE TO CONVENTION’;

AND INASMUCH AS IT IS MANIFESTED BY CONVENTION, THE SAID RELATIONSHIP COMES TO BE SPOKEN OF AS ‘CONVENTION’ ITSELF,—BUT NOT DIRECTLY,

(ONLY FIGURATIVELY).—(2622-2623)

COMMENTARY.

‘Sāmāyika’, ‘conventional’, is that which comes about—is present—when the ‘Samaya’—Convention—is present in the mind of the hearer. The term is formed from the noun ‘samaya’ with the nominal affix ‘Than’. Though this affix has been ordained as to be used in the sense of mere presence, yet, in reality, there being no difference between presence and coming into existence, in the present instance, it is the latter that is meant.

The Convention itself is present in the subjective ‘chain’ of the Speaker; and as the said relationship is manifested by that, the relationship comes to be spoken of as ‘Convention’ itself; but only figuratively. And it is not always present every time that the Word is used, as it appears only at certain times.—(2622-2623)

Says the Opponent—“If, as has been said, there is no real relationship between the Object and the Word,—then how does the said causal relationship come about?”

Answer:—
TEXT (2624).

THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT IS NOT ANYTHING DIFFERENT FROM THE THINGS THAT ARE THE CAUSE AND THE EFFECT; IT IS THESE THINGS THEMSELVES THAT ARE SPOKEN OF AS SUCH.—(2624)

COMMENTARY.

'The Cause and the Effect'—i.e. the two things of which one is the Cause and another the Effect.

'Spoken of as such'—as 'Causal relation', etc.—for the sake of brevity.—(2624)

Says the Opponent—'If that is so, then as they vary with each individual person, how could both the speaker and hearer recognise the same Relationship? For instance, the idea present in the speaker's mind is that 'I am speaking of the same thing and by the same word that I knew at the time of the Convention';—and in the mind of the Hearer also, the idea is that 'this man is speaking of the same thing by the same word'. If it were not so, then the cause (word) and the effect (cognition of the thing) being in two different places, how could there be any Usage at all?'

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2625).

EACH OF THE TWO IS APPREHENDED BY DULL-WITTED MEN AS ONE AND THE SAME; THUS IT IS THAT IT IS HELD TO CONTINUE DURING ALL THE TIME FROM THE CONVENTION TO THE USAGE.—(2625)

COMMENTARY.

'Dull-witted men'—i.e. people under illusion.

'Gaṇī'—apprehended.

'Saṅkēta, etc.'—i.e. the time taken—occupied—by the Convention and the Usage;—i.e. by the repeated idea of Cause and Effect and of sameness (of the Word and Meaning).—(2625)

Question:—'Why is not the Relationship regarded to be really one only, and why should it be regarded as illusory (assumed)'?

Answer:—
TEXT (2626).

It is not possible for the Relationship to be real and one. Because the things denoted being distinct and diverse, there would be no Relationship at all.—(2626)

COMMENTARY.

The one Relationship, when there, could subsist either in different, or non-different, things.—It cannot subsist in different things; because each thing rests within itself in its own distinct form; and there can be no intermixture.—If it were in non-different things, then, as the entity would be one only, wherewith would there be any Relationship? So that there would be no Relationship at all.—(2626)

The *Mimāmsaka* has raised the objection against the view that the Relationship consists of the Convention, under Text 2254,—to the effect that—"Is this Convention made for each mortal being or for each utterance of the Word? and so forth".

It is pointed out in the following texts that this argument is entirely 'futile':—

TEXTS (2627-2629).

As regards the assertion that—"The Convention being made for each mortal being, or for each utterance, etc. etc."—has been made without knowledge of the view of the other party. As a matter of fact, the Convention as constituting the Relationship does not belong to the two factors (Word and its meaning),—it belongs to the Man; the only relationship between the two is that one serves to manifest (indicate) the other; and this Relationship also is not direct. —Nor do the other party hold the Convention to pertain to each utterance;—nor (according to them) is the Convention made by God, or any other being, at the beginning of creation; as the idea of such Beings has been already rejected.—(2627-2629)

COMMENTARY.

What the author means is that the contingency that has been urged by the *Mimāmsaka* does not affect the Buddhist position. Because the Buddhist does not hold that the relationship between the Word and Meaning is direct; according to him, it belongs to the Man; so that if the said view is found to be defective, that does no harm to the Buddhist. What belongs to one thing cannot form the Relationship of another thing; if it did, there would be incongruities.

It has been asked—"Is the Convention made for each utterance? Or at the time of creation?"—where two alternative views have been shown.
The answer to that is that this does not affect our position, as we do not accept either of these views. This is what is said in the words 'Nor do the other party, etc. etc.'—'Enam' stands for the Convention.—'Parē'—Buddhists. —'God or any other beings'—i.e. God, Brahmā and so forth.—(2627–2629)

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, under Text 2255,—"Would the Relationship vary with each being or would it be one only for all, etc. etc. ?"

The answer to that is as follows:

TEXT (2630).

The Relationship with each being must be different, because of 'Perpetual Flux'; as for the idea of 'similarity', that is not incompatible with difference.—(2630)

COMMENTARY.

The second view is the one that is favoured. It would not involve the contingency of their being cognised as different; because, even when there is difference, there can be nothing incongruous in their being regarded as similar. Hence when the Mimāmsaka said (in Text 2255) that 'there should be some idea of difference' he said what was 'inconclusive'.—(2630)

The following might be urged—"The Perpetual Flux is not admitted by us; why then should you say that it must be different on account of Perpetual Flux ?"

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (2631).

The Cognitions of things clearly appear in succession; hence they declare that (Relationship) also to be successive; otherwise there would be no succession. —(2631)

COMMENTARY.

'Tasyāpi'—stands for the Relationships.

'Ākūḥ'—they (Buddhists) explain it as such.

'Otherwise, etc. etc.'—i.e. there would be no succession in the Cognitions also.—(2631)

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, under Text 2256, that—"As there would be difference between the ideas of the Speaker and the Hearer, the use of the Word would become vitiated, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:
As the understanding is come to by many persons at one and the same time, the Convention is not held to be different (with each individual); just as in the case of the one Blue-point. It is not that one Connection or Relationship is present in the mind of the Speaker, and an entirely different one in that of the Hearer; because it is of one and the same form and is present, as such, in the minds of both. When the Speaker proceeds to lay down a connection for the benefit of the Hearer, he lays down only that connection which has been known to himself from before. Thus, inasmuch as its Recognition always appears in the same form,—even when the Word, etc. are different, he comes to cognise the oneness (of the Connection).—(2632–2635)

COMMENTARY.

Just as the Blue-point, even when seen by several people, does not become diverse,—similarly, even when the Convention regarding the connection is made by several people, the connected (Word) will not become diverse; what to say of the case where only two persons are concerned? That is to say, all the persons have the same notion regarding it. Consequently, the connection for the Hearer would not be different from that of the Speaker.—(2632–2635)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsāka, under Text 2258, that—"If it be argued that the same arguments apply to the Jar, etc. also, then the answer is that it is not so, because what is recognised in the case of these is the Universal, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2636–2639).

As regards the Jar and other things also, the 'Universal' has been already discarded.—The 'Configuration' ('Universal') is not held to be a quality of Material Substances.—Nor is the capacity of the Jar, to contain water for instance, known from its 'Universal'.—If the Jar, etc. are non-different from the 'Universal', then, like it, they also should be eternal. If then, they are different from the 'Universal', then it becomes open to objections relating to the relation between the two.—If the Relationship were something produced, then the Universal would be non-
eternal.—Hence the capacity (of the Jar) to contain the water cannot be due to the 'Universal'.—Even if the Jar etc. were different,—there would surely be all these objections regarding the 'capacity'; and the effects of this 'capacity', in the shape of the containing of water, etc. would thus have to be regarded as eternal.—(2636–2639)

COMMENTARY.

'Already discarded'—in course of the examination of the 'Universal'.

The refutation of the 'Universal' is briefly set forth here also: 'The Universal is not, etc. etc.'—You, Mimamsaka, do not hold the 'universal' to be a quality of the material substances,—earth, water, etc.—like their dark colour, etc.,—as something distinct from those substances.—Though it is held to be visible, it is never seen.

Nor can it be right to regard it as non-different from these; as in that case the particular material thing also,—like the Jar,—would have to be regarded as eternal, just like its Universal.

Even when it is regarded as different from these things,—it becomes open to the objection that there can be no relationship between them. Between two different things, the only relation possible is the causal one—that the one should be produced by the other; so that if the Universal were regarded as produced by the Individual things,—then the Universal would become non-eternal, on account of its liability to being produced, like the Jar.

In some places, the reading is 'nityatā', 'eternity', for 'anityatā', 'non-eternity'; the meaning in that case is as follows:—If it is held that the Jar, etc. are produced from the Universal, then the Jar, etc. would have to be regarded as eternal; that is, this cause being always there, the Jar, etc. would be there at all times.

If the Universal (or the Jar) be regarded as being of the nature of both, then it becomes open to the objections that relate to both;—and it also leads to its being deprived of its one-ness; because one and the same thing cannot be of the nature of two things. So that the two would be two distinct entities,—and not one, of the nature of both. If the thing be held to be neither the one nor the other, then it ceases to be an entity. It has also to be pointed out that one and the same thing cannot be both positive and negative.

'All these objections'—in the shape of (1) absence of relationship, (2) the contingency of being eternal and so forth.—There is the additional objection that the work of containing water, etc. also would have to be regarded as eternal.—(2636–2639)

It has been argued by the Mimamsaka, under Text 2262, that—'the Connection is only a kind of Potency, etc. etc.'.

The answer to this is as follows:
If it is held that—"the Connection (or Relationship) is only a kind of Potency, and there can be no diversity in Potency",—then the Potency of the Word and its meaning would be one and the same, as there would be no distinction.—Even if there were some distinction, there could be no connection between the Potency and those two.—If it were something produced, then it could not be eternal; and there is no other possibility for anything.—

(2640-2641)

COMMENTARY.

'There is no other, etc. etc.'—There being objections—as explained before—to the Potency being or not being of the nature of both.—(2640-2641)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2264, that—"At the time that the Connection is asserted, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (2642-2648).

At the time of the assertion of the Connection, when the word 'cow' is uttered, some people, who are cognisant of the Connection, comprehend its meaning,—while others do not;—and the reason for this lies in the presence of the Connection in the form and manner in which it has been made known.—Under your view of the 'Connection', however, all men should comprehend the meaning; because according to you, the Connection consists of Potency only, and Potency is eternal; so that it should be able to bring about the cognition of the meaning at all times; or, otherwise, it should not be free from limitations.—If being eternal, it were free from limitations,—why should not all men comprehend the meaning of the word?—If, on the other hand, it has limitations,—what would be the reason for such limitation, when it is in the nature of the Potency itself? A man who has no knowledge of the Convention (bearing on the word), or when he has forgotten it,—does the cognition of the meaning appear in the same one man? Because the Potency restricted to the production of that Cognition is there
ALL THE TIME.—THE IDEA IS THAT THE ETERNAL POTENCY IS EFFECTIVE ONLY WHEN IT IS ITSELF KNOWN,—SO THAT, IF THE KNOWN POTENCY BE DIFFERENT FROM THE UNKNOWN ONE,—THEN IT LOSES ITS ETERNALITY ;—WHILE IF IT IS THE SAME, WHY IS THIS DISTINCTION SET FORTH ?—(2642–2648)

COMMENTARY.

The proper idea would be that some people comprehend the meaning of words through that relationship of cause and effect which might be there; because the fact always remains that such relationship is the means of such comprehension.

But as regards the Relationship that you posit, everything is wrong. This is what is pointed out by the words—'Under your view of the Connection however, etc. etc.' That is (in the case of words) the Connection is held to be a form of Potency,—and Potency is described as productive capacity;—and this capacity is held to be eternal and uniform;—and always restricted to the bringing about of the cognition of the meaning.

Now the question that arises is—Being thus restricted to the bringing about of the Cognition of the meaning,—is this Potency held to be without limitations,—not limited to a few persons only—or is it otherwise? These are the only possible alternatives.

Under the first alternative (that it is without limitations), all men would have the Cognition of the meaning at one and the same time.—Under the second alternative also, the cause that serves to restrict the said productiveness of the Potency to certain persons has got to be pointed out; because in the case of all evanescent effects, there are always certain causal factors that go to regulate and restrict their productivity; not so in the case of eternal things.

The following might be urged—"In the case of eternal things also, their very nature is such that they bring about only certain effects, not all. And certainly no one can object to the nature of things".

In that case, if such is its nature by itself, independently of other things, then, prior to the knowledge of the Convention, or on forgetting the Convention,—under such conditions also, the man who has comprehended that restricted meaning would continue to do so for all time; because the capacity of the Potency to produce that particular cognition would remain there permanently.

The following might be urged—"As the Potency brings about the Cognition, the Potency in the shape of the Relationship can bring about Cognition only after it has itself been recognised,—not while it itself remains uncognitive; hence the incongruity pointed out does not arise".

This is not right. If it is held that the Potency as known differs from the Potency as unknown,—then it loses its eternality.—If there is no difference between them, there is no justification for making any such distinction as the 'Potency known' and 'Potency unknown'. Because for the same person, one and the same thing cannot have the two mutually contradictory characters of being known and unknown.—(2642–2648)
Then again, the Potency would be known only when the means of knowing it would be there; as a matter of fact, however, this means is not there.
—With this idea, the Author puts the following question:

**TEXT (2649).**

**FURTHER, BY WHAT MEANS DOES THE POTENCY BECOME KNOWN?**—(2649)

**COMMENTARY.**

In the following Texts, the Author sets forth in detail the answer from the viewpoint of the other party (the Mīmāṃsaka):

**TEXTS (2649–2651).**

"It is by means of Presumption;—the process being as follows:—
the man perceives the Word-Sound, the Experienced man (pronouncing the word) and the thing spoken of—through Sense-perception;—the fact of the hearer having comprehended the meaning is cognised through Inference from his activity; and the dual Potency is cognised through the fact of the phenomenon not being capable of any other explanation;—thus it is by Presumption that they recognise the Relationship vouched for by the three Means of Cognition". —[Shloka-vārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparīhāra, 140–141].—(2649–2651)

**COMMENTARY.**

The process of the comprehension of the Relationship has been thus described by Kumārila:—(1) First of all, through Sense-perception, one cognises the Word (pronounced), the experienced man who pronounces the word, and the thing spoken of;—after that, through Inference, through the Inferential Indicative in the shape of the activity (of the man), it is known that the Hearer has understood the meaning of the Word;—the ‘activity’ is spoken of as ‘Inference’, in the sense of what is instrumental in bringing about the Inferential Cognition;—then, through Presumption, he cognises the Potency as ‘dual’,—i.e. as subsisting in the Word and the meaning.—As the Potency itself is directly cognised through Presumption, it is said that ‘they recognise it through Presumption’—"Vouched for by the three means of Cognition"—i.e. in the Cognition of which, all the three means of Cognition function—in the shape of Perception, Inference and Presumption. —(2649–2651)

The following Text sets forth the objection to the above view:
THE REVEALED WORD.

TEXT (2652).

The Potency cannot be cognised in the manner suggested; because the phenomenon is quite explicable otherwise; for instance, there is no difficulty in the comprehension of the meaning of the word from the Word itself as aided by Convention.—(2652)

COMMENTARY.

This shows the inconclusive character of the Presumption (cited by the Māṁsāsaka);—the sense is that even without the eternal Relationship, the phenomenon of comprehension of the meaning of words can be explained, as shown.—(2652)

The assumption of the Potency is not right,—not only because there is nothing to prove its existence, but also because the very notion of it is annulled by proofs.—This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (2653–2655)

Under the view that the Potency is eternal, there can be no need for anything in the shape of Convention and the rest; and the comprehension of the meaning of the word would be there at all times.—If a word had the Potency of expressing other meanings also,—as in the case of the words 'Kali' and 'Mārya'—it could not bring about the Cognition of those other meanings; as the Potency of the Word is restricted.—Is the Potency held to be indicative of the several meanings, one or diverse? If it is one, then at one and the same time, there should be comprehension of the several meanings of the one word all at once.—(2653–2655)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—Words that are expressive of things through the aid of Convention cannot have any eternal relationships,—e.g. such words as 'gāvī' and the like;—all Vedic as well as secular words like 'go' (Cow) are expressive of meanings through the help of Convention;—hence there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the contrary;—'dependence' being included under 'presence of non-eternal relationship', which is 'contrary' to the 'presence of eternal relationship'.

That this is so is going to be proved later on. On the present occasion only the Invariable Concomitance is pointed out. It is through Relationship
in the form of Potency,—which is what brings about the comprehension of the meaning,—that Words are held to have a permanent relationship;—thus Potency, being eternal, cannot be helped by anything else;—hence it cannot need any such aids as the Convention and the like. 'Under the circumstances, the comprehension of the meaning of the word should be there at all times.

Further, such a Potency could either be restricted to one meaning or restricted to several meanings?—If it is restricted to several meanings, is the potency of one Word to bring about the cognition of the several meanings, one or several?—These are the only alternatives possible.

Under the first alternative, there could be no comprehension of meanings as is found in such cases as—when a different Convention has been set up in reference to diverse times and places, the Word actually expresses another meaning; as for instance, in the case of the words 'Kali' and 'Mārya' as used among the Dravīḍas and the Āryas, which respectively denote (among one people) 'the last point of time' (death?) and the 'Peril of too much Rain' (?);—no comprehension would be possible as the Potency will have been restricted to one meaning only; as in the case of the Eye and other organs of perception; the Eye certainly is not capable of being made by Convention to bring about the apprehension of Taste, etc.

Under the second alternative also, there would be the possibility of all men comprehending the meaning of the Word at one and the same time.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'Of the one word, etc. etc.'—(2653-2655)

Another objection is pointed out against the same view:

TEXTS (2656-2657).

As the Potency indicative of the meaning remains there at all times, the comprehension of the meaning brought about by it would also be there at all times and for all men.—If, for that, it is assumed that the Potency is dependent upon Convention, then it would be dependent upon a helper; and being helped, it could not be permanent, eternal.—(2656-2657)

COMMENTARY.

'For that'—i.e. for the comprehension of the meaning.

'Sā'—the Potency.

'Achalā'—Eternal.—This is the reason why the Potency cannot be helped'.—(2656-2657)

Even granting the dependence of the Potency upon Convention;—the Author points out another objection:
TEXT (2658).

INASMUCH AS THE CONVENTION THAT SERVES TO INDICATE THE MEANING IS DEPENDENT UPON MAN,—THERE WOULD BE POSSIBILITY OF 'FALSITY' (MISTAKE) IN THE POTENCY, EVEN THOUGH BORN OTHERWISE.—(2658)

COMMENTARY.

With the view that you may have a clear and correct conception of the meanings of words, you have discarded the agency of man (in the matter of the Potency of words), regarding him as the source of confusion and mistake. —But when words used by certain persons become confounded regarding their exact signification,—then the Vedic scholars would have an equal Cognition of all those significations, and would they not themselves make a confusion among them? Specially as those people would not be cognisant of the truth. Thus then the Convention would be dependent upon the whims of men; and who could restrain this whim whence it has begun to operate, in the case of men ignorant of the truth?—Thus the Convention born of the unrestrained whim would itself be unrestrained and hostile: and being so, why should it avoid the wrong signification?—(2658)

Taking for granted (for the sake of argument) that the Word has the Potency of expressing several meanings,—the Author proceeds to point out another objection:—

TEXTS (2659-2660).

A SINGLE WORD MAY HAVE THE POTENCY TO EXPRESS SEVERAL MEANINGS.

EVEN SO, SUCH THINGS AS THE 'AGNIHOTRA' AND THE LIKE, CANNOT ALL BE OF USE TO ALL MEN; BECAUSE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY MAY EXPRESS THINGS CONTRARY TO WHAT IS DESIRED BY A CERTAIN PERSON. HENCE YOUR ASSUMPTION OF AN ETERNAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORD AND ITS MEANING IS ENTIRELY FUTILE.—

(2659-2660)

COMMENTARY.

Even though words may have the capacity of expressing several meanings,—the things denoted by them are not capable of all effective actions; as the causal efficiency of all things is restricted. If it were not so, then there would be nothing destructive or non-destructive. Thus then, when one wishes to speak of something capable of accomplishing a particular fruitful act,—and proceeds to set about the Convention in connection with a Word which by its nature is capable of expressing things,—he should set up only that Convention which would be conducive to the expression of only that particular thing which he desires to speak of;—but how could this be secured? Thus, there being a possibility of mistake, there is no
point in assuming an eternal relationship between Words and Meanings.—
(2659-2660)

The author again proceeds to point out the futility of the assumption—

TEXTS (2661-2662).

WHEN THERE IS NEED FOR THE CONVENTION, WHY ARE YOU SEEKING TO
BOLSTER UP, WITHOUT REASON, THE ‘RELATIONSHIP’ IN THE SHAPE
OF THE ETERNAL POTENCY?—IN THE MATTER OF EXPRESSING
THE MEANING, THERE IS NOT FOUND, APART FROM CON-
VENTION, ANY OPERATION OF SUCH A FULL-FLEDERED
ENTITY AS THE ‘RELATIONSHIP’.—(2661-2662)

COMMENTARY.

If the Relationship, by its mere presence, were the cause of the cognition
of the meaning, then, there would be such cognition even in a man who is
ignorant of the Convention. Hence the need of Convention must be admitted.
That being so, it being admitted that Convention is a means of comprehending
the meaning,—why is any such thing bolstered up as a full-fledged entity in
the shape of the eternal Relationship,—without any reason? Because
the function of the Relationship would lie in the bringing about of the com-
prehension of the meaning; and if this is brought about by Convention,
what is the use of assuming an eternal Relationship?—It has also been
explained hundreds of times that being eternal, it cannot have any peculiar
feature imposed upon it; and hence it cannot need the help of anything
else.

If causal efficiency is attributed to a thing which has never been found
to be efficient,—then why cannot it be assumed that on obtaining the
Haritaki, the Celestial Beings would have their bowels moved?—(2661-
2662)

In the following text, the author points out again the impossibility of
the functioning of the Relationship in question:—

TEXT (2663).

ANY FUNCTIONING (OF THE RELATIONSHIP) HAS NEVER BEEN PERCEIVED,
IN THE ABSENCE OF CONVENTION.—IF IT BE ASSERTED THAT THE
RELATIONSHIP PROCEEDS FROM THE CONVENTION,—THEN
DISASTROUS INDEED WOULD SUCH A REGRESS
BE.—(2663)

COMMENTARY.

‘Tasmāt’—stands for the Convention.
‘Disastrous, etc. etc.’;—as there would be an infinite regress involved in
the assumption of something as the ‘cause’, whose capacity has never been
perceived. For instance, having assumed the Relationship, wherefore could you not go on assuming other causes with unknown potencies? ‘Unseen Potency’ would be common to both cases. And so on and on, there would be a disastrous regress.—(2663)

Having thus established the Invariable Concomitance (Premiss) of the Reasoning annulling the opponent’s conclusion, the Author sums up the argument that mere ‘Presumption’ is ‘inconclusive’,—a fact which has been explained before already:—

TEXT (2664).

All usage becomes explicable on the basis of mere Convention proceeding from the whims of men; hence there is no reason for postulating the Relationship.—(2664)

COMMENTARY.

‘The Relationship’—i.e. as an eternal factor.—(2664)

All this being established, the Author next proceeds to point out the self-contradiction involved in the argument of the Mimāmsaka, set forth under Text 2273, to the effect that—“For all persons ignorant of the Connection, the Connection becomes known through long-continued tradition, etc. etc.”.—

TEXTS (2665-2666).

It is merely suspected that there can be no other explanation for usage; but that does not bring about the proper cognition of the Connection (or Relationship) which is beyond the senses.—As all men would be ignorant, there could be no ‘long-continued tradition’ which could establish the Connection in question. How then can such an assumption be made?

—(2665-2666)

COMMENTARY.

If all men are ignorant,—then every preceding generation would also be ignorant; under the circumstances, how could the Connection be established by that tradition? No ‘tradition’ of Blind people ever tends to bring about the right cognition of Colour; as says Shabara in his Bhāṣya—‘In matters like these mere human assertion cannot bring about right cognition, just as the word of the blind cannot bring about the right cognition of Colour’.

The following might be urged—‘All men are called ‘ignorant’, in the sense that they cannot perceive things beyond the senses, and not that they do not know anything at all. And it is on the strength of the fact that
Verbal usage is otherwise inexplicable that it is believed with certainty that there have been generations of experienced men who have been duly cognisant (of the Connection in question)".

This is not right; because Verbal usage could proceed also on another basis—that of Convention. It has not been quite definitely ascertained, but it is doubtful whether this is eternal or non-eternal.—This is the reason why the Text has used the expression—"it is suspected".—What is meant is that on the basis of the said 'Presumption', all that is sought to be proved is the mere existence of the Relationship; it indicates nothing about the peculiar feature of it;—that is, because there is no concomitance with such a feature. On this point, there is no difference between Presumption and Inference.

The following might be urged—"As a matter of fact, no non-eternal thing has ever been found to bring about the cognition of the meanings of words; nor can this be possible, as has been explained before; and it is this incapacity of the non-eternal that proves the Relationship (which brings about the said Cognition) to be eternal.

This same argument, however, can be urged against the eternal thing also. The Reason adduced is also 'inadmissible'; for instance, it can be said, with equal justification, that the eternal Relationship also has never been found to bring about the cognition of the meaning; and further, such things as gestures by the hand, etc., even though non-eternal, are actually found to be expressive of meanings; hence the Opponent's Reason is 'inadmissible'. Hence it cannot be admitted that "it is not possible for the non-eternal thing to bring about the cognition of the meaning". On the other hand, it is in the case of the eternal thing that the said expression cannot be right; because of the incongruity involved in the affective activity of the eternal thing being consecutive or concurrent.—What has been said therefore, deserves no consideration.—(2665-2666)

Having thus summed up the 'Inconclusiveness' of Presumption, the Author now sums up the argument to the contrary, annulling that Presumption:—

TEXT (2667).

FOR THESE REASONS, ALL SUCH WORDS AS 'Cow', 'Horse' AND SO FORTH CANNOT HAVE ANY ETERNAL RELATIONSHIPS,—BECAUSE THEY ARE DEPENDENT UPON CONVENTION,—LIKE SUCH WORDS AS 'gāvī' AND THE LIKE.—(2667)

COMMENTARY.

'Tat'—Therefore.

'Nityasambandhayogināḥ'—to be construed with 'na'.

The formulation of this argument has been presented before.—(2667)

 Says the Opponent:—"Such words as 'gāvī' and the like are incorrect (grammatically); and as such these are not truly expressives; hence your
Corroborative Instance is inadmissible. This has been thus asserted by Kumārila (in Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 276)—'For us, the word Go is eternal, and people have the idea of the animal Cow from such vulgar deformations of it as Gāvī and the like only when they resemble the original correct word Go; and the use of the incorrect form is due to incapacity.'—The meaning of this is as follows:—The correct word Go being truly expressive, when people say that the idea of the Cow is derived also from the use of the incorrect (corrupt) words as Gāvī and the like, the said idea is not provided, by these incorrect words.—Then how does it arise?—It arises from its being like the original correct word Go;—this (use of the corrupt word) is due to the incapacity of the man to pronounce the correct form 'go';—from this arises the peculiar action of the Palate and other Speech-centres, from which follows the utterance of the corrupt word gāvī. Bhartṛhari also has declared as follows:—The child, on being taught, says ambha, ambha (Mother, Mother) in the indistinct form, and yet people knowing the correct word have the definite cognition from it; in the same manner, when the correct word should be used, if one uses the incorrect form, from that there is inferred a certain meaning through the intervention of the correct word.'

This idea is set forth in the following:

TEXT (2668).

"THE CAPABLE (EXPRESSIVE) WORD 'go' BEING THERE, IF THE IDEA OF THE COW ARISES FROM THE USE OF THE CORRUPT FORM 'GĀVĪ',—

IT IS DUE TO ITS RESEMBLING THE ORIGINAL (CORRECT) WORD;

—SUCH USE BEING DUE TO THE INCAPACITY (OF THE SPEAKER)."—(2668)

COMMENTARY.

The above argument is answered in the following:

TEXTS (2669-2670).

THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT. HOW CAN ANY SUCH COGNITION OF THE RIGHT MEANING APPEAR ON ACCOUNT OF THE RESEMBLANCE TO THE ORIGINAL CORRECT WORD, AMONG FISHERMEN, ETC., WHO ARE IGNORANT OF THE Sanskrit LANGUAGE?—FOR THESE REASONS IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED THAT THERE IS AN ETERNAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORDS AND MEANINGS.

IT CAN ONLY BE BASED UPON CONVENTION;

AS THAT IS POSSIBLE IN ALL CASES.—

(2669-2670)

COMMENTARY.

'Shanaka' is the Fisherman.—'Etc.' includes the Mlechchhas and other people. In the case of these men what really happens is that it is only when
things are spoken of by correct Sanskrit words that they become confounded; hence in such cases, the cognition of the meaning cannot be due to resemblance to the original correct word.—(2669-2670)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2277, that—"Dissolution may be there in the form of the destruction of particular countries or the destruction of particular families, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (2671–2673).

If there be Dissolution in the form of the destruction of particular countries or the destruction of particular families,—or in the form of that undeniable destruction postulated by the Buddhist,—which is suspected of affecting Brahmā, etc. also,—such destruction would be possible for the Veda also. Hence any subsequent ideas that might appear (as based upon the Veda) would be one whose basis has been destroyed, and it might be assumed that they may all be false and wrong, arising from delusion, stupefaction, and such other sources; and hence the Veda now available would be only a mere semblance of the original.—All these notions might go on arising until reasons are not available to the contrary.—(2671–2673)

COMMENTARY.

The view held is as follows:—We also do not speak of a dissolution consisting in the disappearance of all words; nor do we admit of a beginningless Personality who creates and destroys the world. What we hold is that the entire universe is beginningless;—Verbal usage also (according to us) goes on, based upon Conceptions arising from beginningless Impressions.—But as regards the 'Dissolution' that you have described, as consisting in the 'destruction of particular countries' or the 'destruction of particular families',—as also the Buddhist's idea of Dissolution consisting in the withdrawal of the energy of Fire, Water and Air,—extending (a) horizontally over the 'Trisāhasra-mahāsāhasra', (b) downwards to the very limits of the atmospheric Air, and (c) upwards, gradually, to the First, Second and Third stages of 'Dhyāna',—which cannot be negatived by any proofs, and is therefore 'undeniable',—which it is suspected, affects Brahmā and other Beings also;—under both these forms of Dissolution (one posited by the Opponent and the other by the Buddhist), the destruction of the Veda would be quite possible; and it would also be justifiable to assume that what is asserted there is all wrong; so that what is now known as the 'Veda' is something quite
different from the original, of which it is a mere 'Semblance', a mere husk, masquerading as the real Veda.—Such a suspicion is quite possible, and cannot be easily shaken off, until there are proofs to the contrary.—(2671–2673)

The following might be urged—"There is a proof annulling your conclusion. For instance, throughout the country men cannot alter the text of the Veda; from this we conclude that it has been so in the past and is going to be so in the future".

In anticipation of this, the author provides the following answer:—

TEXTS (2674-2675).


(2674-2675)

COMMENTARY.

If it were a fact that even when one has the desire to alter the text of the Veda, there is no change in the words of the Veda,—or if the desire itself to change the text were impossible to be produced,—then alone could it be taken as proved that man has no capacity to alter the Vedic text; but that conclusion also could not apply to all men; as the mere non-perception (of such change) does not prove anything; and also because there is difference in the capacities of men.—As a matter of fact, however, it is quite possible for man to alter the text of the Vedic passages—such as 'Shanno devārabhi-śtayē, etc.'—or to explain them as meaning something quite different from what they are regarded as meaning. For instance, we find that even Mīmāṁsakas and the Author of the Nirukta and others do often differ among themselves regarding the explanation of Vedic texts.—Hence the doubts regarding its veracity and fidelity cannot cease altogether.—(2674–2675)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṁsaka under Text 2286, that—"The Order of sequence is not a product; it is always accepted as an established entity, etc. etc.",—where certain objections have been answered.

The rejoinder to that is as follows:—
The order of sequence is not accepted by all men as fixed for all; in fact, people adopt the order of words and sentences and letters according to their own wish. If that were not so, then, for you, like the Veda, there would be no book written by men; so that the composing of all meaningless (or wicked) works is rendered impossible at one stroke! Because there could be no certainty that this man is uttering words exactly as they had been used previously by others,—therefore like the Relationship, they also could not be regarded as beginningless.—(2676–2678)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'padavākyam, etc.' is to be expounded as—'pada'—words—'vākyam'—sentences—'akṣaram'—letters;—the 'krama'—order of sequence—of these.

'Anarthagrantha, etc. etc.'—construe as 'Kṛtih dvastā', 'composing has been rendered impossible'.

'Anarthagrantha'—is a work which has no 'artha'—sense; i.e. such meaningless sentences as 'ten pomegranates' and the like.—Or 'anartha' may be 'works contrary to the Veda', wicked,—like those formulating the Buddhist doctrines, for instance.—The term 'mātra' denotes universality. —'kṛtī', doing, composing—'tathā'—like the Veda.—

'Aniyati'—no certainty; i.e. there would be no certainty on the point.

'Tat'—Therefore.—(2676–2678)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2291, that—"The idea in the mind of every speaker is that 'I am uttering words that have been used by other persons'; this in itself makes them eternal, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2679).

The idea that 'I am using the words that have been used by other persons' would proceed from illusion, due to the recognition of similarity; just as there is in the case of acts.—(2679)

COMMENTARY.

'Karnabhēdavat'—the 'vati'—affix added after the Locative ending. This points out the possibility of the recognition of similarity leading to a conclusion contrary to that desired by the other party, and thereby indicates its 'inconclusiveness' as a reason in support of the latter.—(2679)
The following might be urged—"How is it known that this is an illusion?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (2680-2681).

As a matter of fact, the words uttered by a man are not exactly those used by others; as there are always differences of accent and other details.—These latter are not properties belonging to the manifesting agency; because they are always perceived in the form of letters. Consequently the letters pronounced by each man must be regarded as distinct,—like the jar and such things. This difference being quite clear, why are you denying the signs of that difference?—(2680-2681)

COMMENTARY.

'Accents'—such as the 'Uḍāṭa' and the rest.
'Other details'—including swiftness, slowness, and middling.
'These are not properties, etc. etc.'—'These'—i.e. Accent, etc.
"Why?"

Because these Accents, etc. are always perceived in the shape of letters; i.e. they are known as such.

'The signs of that'—The signs of the difference of the letters.
'Why are you denying'—in the words 'there is no other sign for you' (Text 2291).—(2680-2681)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṁsāka, under Text 2292, that—"Just as in the case of the jar and such things, etc. etc.

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (2682).

The idea that 'in the case of the jar, etc. their use is characterised and indicated by the "universal"' has already been discarded; because the universal does not exist, and because it can have no connection with the individual thing.—(2682)

COMMENTARY.

'Already'—under the chapter dealing with the 'universal'.
'Because it does not exist'—i.e. because the universal has no existence.
Even if it exists, it can have no connection with the Individual thing, in the shape of the Jar; because it cannot be benefited by this latter. Hence its use cannot be regarded as characterised or indicated by the 'Universal'.—(2682)

The following text points out that, as a consequence of what has gone above, it follows that all that has been alleged by the other party on the basis of the 'Universal' is entirely irrelevant.—

TEXT (2683).

All such Universals, therefore, as 'Palate' and the rest vary in all men; consequently when the speaker utters word-sounds, he does not do so through those Universals.—(2683)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, under Text 2294, that—"there are distinct Universals of the Articulations which serve to bring about the manifestation of the Word-Sounds, etc. etc." The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2684).

Thus there are no distinct Universals of these Articulations which could serve to bring about the manifestation of the Word-Sounds; nor are there as many of these as there are Letters.—(2684)

COMMENTARY.

'Tat'—Therefore; thus.—(2684)

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, under Text 2295, that—"The order of sequence among the Articulations would be due to the order among the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc." The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2685).

Nor, as asserted by you, could the order of sequence among the Articulations be due to the order among the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc.; nor could the eternity of both be due to their respective Universals.—(2685)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, in Text 2296, that—"Just as in the case of Moving About and other actions, there is an order of sequence,
through the Universal subsisting in the various factors of the Action, etc. etc.

As against this, it is pointed out in the following Text that the Corroborative Instance, 'Moving About, etc.' is 'inadmissible':—

TEXT (2686).

JUST AS IN THE ACTIONS OF MOVING ABOUT, ETC. THERE IS NO ORDER OF SEQUENCE THROUGH THE UNIVERSALS,—SO TOO THERE IS NONE AMONG THE PALATE, ETC., THE ARTICULATION AND THE LETTER.—(2686)

COMMENTARY.

That is, because the very idea of the 'Universal' itself has been discarded.—(2686)

It has been argued by the *Mimāmsaka* under Text 2297, that—"The individual Articulations themselves being extremely subtle, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2687).


COMMENTARY.

The second line is the answer to what has been asserted by the *Mimāmsaka* in the second line of Text 2297.—(2687)

It has been argued by the *Mimāmsaka* in Text 2298, that—"The Letters following up the properties of the Articulations, which appear there as eternal, become expressive of diverse meanings".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2688).


COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted by the *Mimāmsaka* in Text 2294, that—"there are distinct Universals of the Articulations, etc. etc.".
Admitting this (for the sake of argument) the Author proceeds to point out objections against the idea of the ‘Universal’:

TEXTS (2689-2690).

There is another point: granting that ‘there are universals which serve to manifest the sounds, and there are as many of these as there are letters’;—under this view, as the manifesters would be always there, the sound should be heard at all times. Consequently, the order of sequence among the letter-sounds cannot be in accordance with the order of the manifestations.—(2689-2690)

COMMENTARY.

The several particles used here are to be taken as serving the purpose of introduction.

‘Iti’—for this reason.

The meaning thus comes to be this:—As universals are the manifesters of the word-sound, there should be apprehension of the sounds at all times. And as there is no order of sequence among the manifestations...

[The passage is corrupt and full of lacunae; hence unintelligible].—(2689-2690)

Granting (for the sake of argument) the relationship between the Universal and the Individual, the Author proceeds to point out objections—

TEXTS (2691-2692).

If the universals continue to exist as related to the individuals, the eternity of the individuals also is irresistible. Or (conversely), if the individuals exist as related to the universals, then the universals also should be non-eternal, even if you do not relish it.—(2691-2692)

COMMENTARY.

Every relationship subsists between two relatives; universals are regarded as eternal; hence what exists in the form related to the universal, must itself be eternal. Otherwise the universals would not have their form consisting of the relationship of the individuals. Similarly, as individuals are held to be non-eternal, the universals, which consist in the relationship to these, must also be non-eternal. If the individuals are non-eternal, the
Universals must also be non-eternal. If it were not so, then, while one of the two relatives would be there in a perfect condition, it cannot be right for the other to be imperfect; as in that case, the Relationship itself would cease.—(2691-2692)

Another objection, urged before, is reiterated—

**TEXT (2693).**

The fact that there can be no connection with manifestation having been already established, the Letters thus could never be expressive.—(2693)

**COMMENTARY.**

(Corrupt.)

It has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsāka under Text 2300, that—"Time is one, all-pervading, eternal, etc. etc."
The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS (2694–2698).**

Time, as something one, all-pervading and eternal, has already been rejected; nor is it manifested in all things, like the Letters, by anything; and if it is manifested in the Letters, it cannot form a factor in the expression of the meaning of words;—as it is not different from other things,—and as it does not exist elsewhere, it cannot be eternal.—Thus then, the order of the Letters,—as also their shortness, length, etc.—are all adjuncts of the articulation, and are not so many phases of Time.—Thus for you, there is no property in Words which is eternal; hence it becomes established that the Word is not-eternal,—for those who regard the Letter as non-eternal.—Nor could it form part of the property of anything else,—like the fleetness of the horse,—if it were assumed that the manifesting Cognitions bring about the manifestation of the words.—(2694–2698)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Already'—under the chapter on the 'Six Categories'.

'It is not manifested by anything'—simply because it does not exist;—even if it existed, the manifestation of the eternal thing would also be eternal.
'Not different from other things'—i.e. it is non-different from other things. Because the nature of the Time that is manifested in the phenomenon consisting of the seed-sprout-creeper does not in any way differ from that which is manifested in the Letters.***** (Lacune in Text).

'Not phases of time'—because there is no such thing as Time. Even if it exists, its divisibility is not admitted.

The rest is easily intelligible.—(2694-2698)

TEXTS (2699-2704).

The Presumption put forward in support of the eternity of all things has been already discarded. It has also been proved that the comprehension of the meanings of words is possible only when words are not eternal.—When one letter-sound is produced by the 'desire to utter,' following from the desire to utter another letter-sound,—the former is heard immediately after the latter;—the cognition proceeding from the cognition of the preceding letter is not heard very quickly; in fact, with the aid of the remembrances of the previous letters, the latter brings about its own remembrance later on. Thus it has the character of an effect, in relation to the cognitions leading up to, and apprehending, it.—Or, the order of the letters may be dependent upon men. From all this it follows that the letters clearly vary with each word; as is found in the case of such words as 'Dama'·'Mada'·'Latā'·'Tāla' etc., where the letters are the same but their order different in the two words. It is under this order of sequence that these words become expressive of different meanings.—Consequently, the assumption of the 'Sphota' also is absolutely futile in this connection.—(2699-2704)

COMMENTARY.

'The Presumption has been discarded.'—Under Text 2617, it has been shown that the Presumption is wrong and also annulled by other means of Cognition.

[The text is corrupt.]

The upshot of the whole of this argument is as follows:—In the 'chain' of the Speaker, from his desire to speak, there arises a series of Cognitions, each member of which is produced by its predecessor;—and these ideas arouse each letter-sound; thus the several letter-sounds come about; and these directly produce, in the 'chain' of the Hearer, successive Cognitions,—each member of which is helped by its predecessor; later on, these Cognitions
bring about successive remembrances relating to themselves, indirectly in due order.

Consequently, these Remembrances come to be regarded as ‘effects’ in relation to the cognitions appearing in the Speaker’s ‘chain’, which have given rise to the Remembrances; while in relation to the cognitions appearing in the Hearer’s ‘chain’, they come to be regarded as the ‘Cause’. Herein lies their ‘order of sequence’;—nowhere else. Thus, as the character of the Letters in every word, is variable,—sometimes appearing as causes and sometimes as effects,—it is only right that in the case of such similar words as ‘sara’ and ‘rasa’, the resultant cognitions should be different. But this cannot be right if the Letters and words are eternal; as eternal things retain the same form at all times. Nor in their case can any order of sequence be regarded as something different from themselves. Even if it were something different, there would be no relationship between them; this is what is really meant.

The meaning of the words of the Text is now explained:—‘When one Letter-sound is produced’—such is the construction.—In the case of such words as ‘sadā’ and ‘samaya’, there is the vowel ‘a’ after ‘s’;—there is desire to utter this arising from the desire to utter ‘s’; hence this is ‘another desire’.—What is meant is as follows:—In the Speaker’s ‘Chain’, there is one ‘desire to utter’ following from another, and so on; this desire is followed by the Letter-Sound produced,—this Sound brings about the Remembrance; such is the connection with what follows in the text later on.

Having thus described the fact of the Letters being ‘effects’ of the series of ‘desires to speak’ in the Speaker’s ‘Chain’,—the author proceeds to point out the fact of its being the ‘cause’ of the cognitions appearing in the Hearer’s ‘Chain’—‘The former is heard, etc. etc.’—‘Tasya’ refers to ‘yah’ in the previous line;—its hearing is produced, it is heard—‘immediately’—without anything intervening.

Having thus shown that it is the cause of the Hearer’s Cognition, the author now proceeds to show that it is the cause of Remembrance.—‘Not heard very quickly’—quick hearing being incapable of being produced by Remembrance.—‘The latter’—i.e. the later ‘Letter’.—‘Remembrances’—of the previous Letters in the chain.—‘With the aid’—with the help of it, it arouses the Remembrance with regard to itself;—‘the cognitions leading up to, and apprehending, it’,—‘it’ stands for the Letter;—this is to be treated as a Copulative Compound; or even as a Tatpurusa or Karmadhāraya;—and in relation to these cognitions, these are ‘effects’; but they are ‘causes’ in relation to the subsequent cognitions and remembrances.

Having thus discarded the idea of the ‘order’ being something different (from the Letters or Words), the Author proceeds next to discard the view of the Grammarians that the ‘word’ that is expressive is of the nature of a ‘Sphota’, which is something entirely different from the Letter-sounds,—by the sentence beginning with ‘Consequently’.—(2699–2704)

[It has to be noted that the commentary is very incomplete in the printed text; and much of the translation there is based upon mere surmise.]
TEXTS (2705-2706).

The 'Sphoṭa' has been assumed by the grammarians for the purpose of explaining the cognition of the meanings of words.

—but the letters themselves being competent to express the meaning of words, the assuming of the said Sphoṭa is futile. As it would be perceptible (if it existed), but is not perceived, it is concluded that it does not exist.—If it is imperceptible, then it cannot be indicative, like the Inferential Indicative (which is effective only when perceived).

—(2705-2706)

COMMENTARY.

[There is a lacuna in the text of the Commentary].

'As it would be perceptible, etc. etc.'—Nothing apart from the Letters.—in the form of Word, eternal and indivisible,—is ever perceived by auditory perception. On the contrary, what is clearly proved is the fact that no such Sphoṭa exists at all.

If the second view is accepted ....... [the reference is clearly to the lacuna]—the cause could be either positive or negative or both positive and negative,—these are the only alternatives possible.—According to the first view (?) ... the Cause could be either the property of what is called 'Sphoṭa', or that of something else. It cannot be the former, as the Sphoṭa itself has been shown to be non-existent. Nor could it be the property of something else; because it could not subsist in the 'subject'; just like the 'arms and feet' in the proving of the non-eternity of the Jar (?).—Nor could the cause be the property of something negative; as that could prove only the contrary of what is desired.—Nor could it be both positive and negative; as that is always 'inconclusive'.

Then again, is the 'Sphoṭa' proved by a Reason based upon the nature of the thing? Or by one based upon the Causal Relationship?—The former view cannot be right; because as it is beyond the senses, its nature cannot be known; if it were known, there would be no point in seeking for the proof of its existence; as its nature would be already known; and the whole attempt is to prove its existence and nature.—Nor is the second view acceptable, because no causal relation can be known in relation to what is beyond the senses.

It might be argued as follows:—"In the case of the Auditory and other perceptions, when it is found that they appear only occasionally, it is concluded that they are dependent upon other causes also; and from that, by implication, it is concluded that there is the Auditory organ; in the same manner, in the case in question, the comprehension of meaning being the 'subject', it is found that even when the Letters are the same,—as in the case of the words 'sara' and 'rasa'—the meanings comprehended are
different; from which we shall infer the presence of another Cause, in the shape of the ‘Sphota’."

This also cannot be right; because nothing apart from the Letters is known. As it has just been established that it is the Letters themselves which, varying in each Word, become capable of bringing about the comprehension of the meaning, through the variations in the relation of Cause and Effect. So that the assumption in question is entirely futile.

It is also implied that the same objections apply also to the view that the existence of the ‘Sphota’ can be inferred.

It might be argued that—"it is not to be inferred, but it is absolutely imperceptible ".

The answer to that is—'If it is imperceptible, etc. etc.'—Just as the Inferential Indicative, while it is itself unknown, does not bring about any cognition,—so this Sphota also, while itself unknown, cannot bring about the comprehension of the meaning.—(2705-2706)

**TEXTS (2707–2710).**

If it be urged that—"The cognition follows from its mere existence; and as its causal character is there, it is held to be able to bring about the cognition like the visual organ":—then, the answer is that, in that case, the said cognition would be there at all times;—even when there is no knowledge of the Convention, and there is no hearing of the Letters;—there would be cognition proceeding from the Sphota, as its efficient cause would be there always; as this entity (Sphota) is eternal (according to the Grammarian), and it has no need for anything else. Nor can there be 'manifestation' of it by articulation or Convention or Letters; as it is never perceived; it is cognition itself that is spoken of as 'manifestation' and there is no cognition of it. Hence it follows that the assumption of the 'manifestor' of the Sphota is also futile.—(2707–2710)

**COMMENTARY.**

It might be argued that—"by its mere existence, the Sphota would be the cause of the comprehension of meanings,—just as the visual and other organs are the cause of the cognition of things ".

But in that case, the cognition proceeding from it should be there always; so that even without any idea of the Convention, etc. bearing upon the Word, the comprehension of its meaning would be there.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'Even when there is, etc. etc.'—The reason in support of this is next stated in the words—'As this entity is eternal, etc. etc.'.
It might be argued that—"It is only when the Sphota has been manifested that it is held to be the cause of the comprehension of the meaning,—and not by its mere presence; so that the difficulty pointed out does not arise".

The answer to this is—"Nor can there be manifestation, etc. etc. ;—"as it is never perceived"—never cognised; because it has been held to be imperceptible.

This same idea is further reiterated by the words—"there is no cognition of it, etc. etc. ".—(2707–2710)

The following might be urged—"It cannot be admitted that the thing appears and is yet not perceived; and it is an actual fact that the Word as an indivisible whole does appear in consciousness, in which there has been a development of the impressions of each preceding Letter (composing the Word) ".

This is what is anticipated and answered in the following :

TEXTS (2711-2712).

"WHAT HAPPENS IS THAT THE ARTICULATION PLANTS THE SEED IN CONSCIOUSNESS, AND IT BECOMES DEVELOPED BY THE LAST ARTICULATION,—AND THEREFORE THE WORD APPEARS IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS ".—THIS ASSUMPTION ALSO IS MADE WITHOUT REASON.

BECAUSE EVEN SO, THE WORD IS NOT PERCEIVED TO APPEAR AS ANYTHING DIFFERENT (FROM THE LETTERS).—(2711-2712)

COMMENTARY.

'Avṛttah'—become; the impressions produced by the cognitions of all the Letters become developed in Consciousness.

'Without reason'.—What is meant is that what happens is that the Letters themselves, after the cognition of each, become subsequently included under the compounded cognition appearing in the form of Remembrance. Because as a matter of fact, we do not perceive,—nor does the Speaker perceive,—any Word as an indivisible whole, after the last letter has been cognised.—It is a mere dream on the part of the Grammarian, arising from the bewildered feeling that the idea of such word as a whole appearing in Consciousness would make things nice for him.—(2711-2712)

So far, the author has pointed out the objections against the view that "the Sphota is eternal ". He now proceeds to point out the objections against the view that "the Sphota is without parts, indivisible ";—which objections are applicable to both views,—of eternity as well as non-eternity :—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXTS (2713-2714).

WHETHER THE Sphoṭa is produced or manifested by the Articulations which appear in succession,—such succession is incompatible with the view of those who uphold the Sphoṭa. When the Sphoṭa is indivisible (without parts), there can be neither manifestation nor production of it in succession. As they would never lie outside the one and the same form,—they would be there for all.—(2713-2714)

COMMENTARY.

Some Vaibhāṣikas hold that there is 'Sphoṭa' of Sentences also, which is produced as the effect of words.

' It is indivisible'—i.e. an entity without component parts.

' They would never lie, etc.'—From the one form—produced or manifested—what is held to be unproduced or unmanifested could not be different.

' They'—i.e. the production and the manifestation,—would be there for all; so that there would be no need for the use of any other letters or words at all.—(2713-2714)

The following Text points out objections against the view that the Sphoṭa is with parts (divisible)—

TEXT (2715).

EVEN IF THE Sphoṭa IS WITH PARTS (DIVISIBLE), AS THE LETTERS EXPRESSING THEM WOULD DO SO ONLY IN SUCCESSION, WHY SHOULD NOT THE Sphoṭa-PARTS ALSO BE LIKewise? WHY SHOULD UNSEEN ONES BE ASSUMED?—(2715)

COMMENTARY.

Would each one of the Sphoṭa-parts be without meaning (inexpressive) or with meaning (expressive)?—If the former, then, as those parts would be appearing in succession, the whole Sphoṭa—like Letters—would be inexpressive. Its expressiveness might be assumed; as there would be attributing a form to a thing which does not have that form. Because the expressive sentence is said to have one form only, and its components are inexpressive; hence the expressive character of these latter could be only assumed—or figurative,—like the character of the Lion attributed to the Boy. The expressiveness thus being assumed, it is far better to regard the component letters themselves as expressive,—rather than assume the unseen Sphoṭa-parts, to no purpose.

If on the other hand the Sphoṭa-parts are expressive (the second view)—then there can be no need for several assumptions; because the 'Sentence' is described as a group of words conveying one complete idea; if each part
of the sentence were expressive, then there would be as many 'sentences' as those parts, and not one 'Sentence' composed of several component parts. And when the meaning of one of these parts would be comprehended, there would be comprehension of the meaning of the whole sentence. This has been thus declared—'If each of the parts were expressive, the assuming of several such would be futile; because the comprehension of the meaning of one part would bring about the comprehension of the meaning of the whole sentence'.—(2715)

It has been said under Text 2714 that—'in the case of the indivisible Sphoṭa, production and manifestation are not possible'.

The following Text sets forth the Opponent's answer to that:

**TEXTS (2716-2717).**

"**EVEN WHEN THE PRODUCING AND THE MANIFESTING (OF THE ENTIRE Sphoṭa) HAVE BEEN DONE ONCE BY ONE ARTICULATION, PEOPLE PRONOUNCE THE OTHER LETTERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF A CLEARER MANIFESTATION; BECAUSE IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE IT AS MANIFESTED ONCE;—THEREFORE IT IS MANIFESTED AGAIN AND AGAIN BY MEANS OF LETTERS WITH SIMILAR APPEARANCES.**"—(2716-2717)

**COMMENTARY.**

Even though the producing or manifesting of the entire Sphoṭa is done by a single Articulation,—yet the subsequent Articulations are not entirely useless; as these serve to render the manifestation clearer; just as a verse, when repeated again and again, becomes more distinct than by a single utterance,—and even though the frequent repetition does not produce anything new in it, yet the repetition is not useless; similarly in the case in question also, the later Articulations are not useless.—This is what is pointed out by the words 'yataḥ, etc. etc.'—'Duravadhārā'—difficult to determine or ascertain.—(2716-2717)

The following Text sets forth the Author's rejoinder to the above argument (of the Sphoṭist):

**TEXT (2718).**

**WHEN, SIR, THAT SAME, OR SOMETHING ELSE, IS REPEATED AGAIN AND AGAIN,—IS IT NOT THE MANIFESTATION OF IT THAT IS REPEATED,—THERE BEING NO DIFFERENCE ?**—(2718)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Nanu' signifies address—'Sir'.

'When 'that same'—the Letter pronounced for the first time,—or 'something else',—some other Letter contained therein,—is repeated again and
again,—is it not the manifesting that is done? Certainly the manifestation would not fail to be accomplished when done by that. Thus then the only effect that the utterance of the subsequent Letters would have would consist in the repetition of the manifestations,—because all of them would be possessed of the same potency; this repetition can be repeated over and over again by the same Letter being repeated; consequently there would be no need for the utterance of the rest of the letters. Nor will it be right to regard the subsequent Letters as possessed of different potencies; because into what is indivisible and without parts, no new features can be introduced; and when no new features can be introduced, the assuming of diverse potencies would be useless.—(2718)

All that is said by the other party might happen, if the Manifestation were there; as a matter of fact, however, this Manifestation itself is not possible.—This is what is pointed out in the following:

TEXT (2719).


COMMENTARY.

'As in the case of Letters';—in connection with Letters, the idea that 'there is manifestation in the shape of the embellishment of the Object and the Sense-organ' has been refuted by showing that none of the alternatives possible is admissible regarding its capacity or otherwise of bringing about cognitions;—the same refutation is applicable to the present case also.

'The cognition envisaging the Sphota'—'Tat' stands for the Sphota. This is said on admitting (for the sake of argument) that there is such a cognition.

What is meant is as follows:—If there did really appear in consciousness a verbal entity called 'Sphota' as something apart from the Letters,—then its 'manifestation' could be possible; as 'manifestation' would mean 'apprehension'. As a matter of fact, however, no such entity appears in Consciousness,—as already explained before.—But, let it appear in Consciousness; even so, the said 'manifestation' cannot be acceptable; as by its very nature, it cannot be either capable or incapable of being apprehended. —(2719)

The following text sums up the position and proceeds to show that the comprehension of the meaning of words is possible even without the Sphota:
TEXT (2720).

FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT IT IS THE WORD THAT IS APPREHENDED ON THE WAKE OF THE PREVIOUS SUCCESSIVE COGNITIONS OF ALL THE COMPONENT LETTERS,—WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF THE COMPREHENSION OF THE MEANING.

—(2720)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent—"The Letters in a Word stand in a definite order,—they are perceived also in a definite order; Remembrance is always in accordance with the previous perception;—how then can there be the single cognition envisaging all the Letters, which can only be of the nature of remembrance,—except through the Spḥoṭa? Certainly when the thing has been cognised as without order, there can be no appearance of the Letters which are there in a definite order?"

In anticipation of this argument, the Author supplies the following answer:—

TEXT (2721).

WHAT HAPPENS IS THAT—WHEN THE FINAL LETTER IN THE WORD HAS BEEN COGNISED, THE IMPRESSIONS LEFT BY THE COGNITION OF ALL THE LETTERS BRINGS ABOUT THE REMEMBRANCE OF ALL THE LETTERS SIMULTANEOUSLY.—(2721)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this is as follows:—First of all, there is apprehension (of the Letters),—then the Remembrances immediately following from them come about in the same order as the Letters;—then from these Remembrances, there follows the cumulative cognition of all the Letters,—this cognition also is of the nature of Remembrance; because it only envisages things that have been previously perceived.—(2721)

In the following Text the Author points out that what has been stated is admitted by all parties,—and it is not only his own assumption:—

TEXT (2722).

ALL PARTIES AGREE THAT THERE IS SUCH SUBJECTIVE (CUMULATIVE) COGNITION IN CONNECTION WITH ALL THINGS,—EVEN WHEN THEY ARE COGNISED IN A CERTAIN ORDER OF SEQUENCE.—(2722)

COMMENTARY.

'État'—stands for the cumulative cognition.—(2722)

The following Text points out that this view, being in due accord with reason, deserves to be accepted:—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXT (2723).

IN CASE THIS IS NOT ADMITTED, THEN, IN CONNECTION WITH THINGS SEEN ONE AFTER THE OTHER, THERE COULD BE NO SUCH CUMULATIVE COGNITION AS THERE IS IN THE IDEA OF 'A HUNDRED' AND OTHER NUMBERS.—(2723)

COMMENTARY.

If all Remembrances appeared only in a certain order of sequence,—then, in connection with things seen one after the other, there could be no such conception of them at one and the same time as is involved in the idea of 'a hundred' and so forth; nor would there be any difference in the conceptions of the 'hundred' and the 'million' and so forth,—at the time of their appearance.—(2723)

The following Text sums up the discussion:—

TEXT (2724).

THUS THEN, THOUGH, IN REGARD TO THE LETTERS, THE COGNITIONS, AUDITORY AND MENTAL, THAT APPEAR AT FIRST ARE IN AN ORDER OF SEQUENCE,—YET, LATER ON, THERE IS REMEMBRANCE OF THEM ALL, AT THE SAME TIME.

—(2724)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"If it is as stated, then the said cumulative cognition itself may be the cause of the comprehension of the meaning,—not the Letters; as these will have long ceased to exist. But this cannot be right; because all men, down to the child, knows that the meaning is comprehended immediately on the cognition of the Word ".

In anticipation of this argument, the Author supplies the following answer:—

TEXT (2725).

THUS THE LETTERS DO ENTER INTO IT; AS THE THINGS DENOTED ARE NOT FAR REMOVED FROM THEM; THIS IS THE REASON WHY PEOPLE SPEAK OF THE COGNITION AS PROCEEDING FROM THE WORD.—(2725)

COMMENTARY.

'Enter into it'—i.e. enter into the said Cumulative Cognition.

'Laukikaih'—the nominal affix has been used here in the reflective sense.

—(2725)
Says the Opponent:—"Even so, as the Letters will have ceased long ago, they do not exist at the time of the comprehension; how then could they enter into the cumulative Cognition?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2726).

ALL THIS IS QUITE COMPATIBLE WITH THE VIEW THAT COGNITIONS HAVE FORMS; OTHERWISE, AS THEY WOULD BE DESTROYED, HOW COULD THEY FIGURE IN THE REMEMBRANCE?—(2726)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"Why is it not compatible with the view that Cognitions have no forms?"

Answer:—'Otherwise, etc. etc.'

Thus the cumulative cognition that Kumārila has urged against the upholder of the Sphota—that "when the last Letter has been cognised, there is a simultaneous Remembrance of all the rest, brought about by the impressions of these" [Shlokavarti, Sphota, 112, reproduced here under Text 2721, with a slight variation]—is true only in accordance with our view, not in accordance with the Mimamsaka's view, that Cognitions are formless. This is what is meant by the Text.—(2726)

Says the Opponent:—"It is true according to the Mimamsakas also; because under their view, the Letters are not destroyed; hence there is nothing to prevent their figuring in the cognition; it is only that their appearance has become concealed; they are there all the same".

This is what is anticipated in the first part of the following Text, and answered by the last part beginning with 'It cannot be so':—

TEXT (2727).

IF IT IS ARGUED THAT—"THE PREVIOUSLY COGNISED LETTERS HAVE ONLY THEIR APPEARANCE CONCEALED, BUT WHEN REMEMBERED, THEY ARE THERE ALL RIGHT";—THEN, THE ANSWER IS THAT—IT CANNOT BE SO; AS, IF IT WERE SO, THEN THERE WOULD BE A CLEAR IDEA OF THEM.—(2727)

COMMENTARY.

If the same Letters that had been heard before are lying with their appearance concealed, and are subsequently apprehended by the cumulative cognition, then like their own cognition, the cumulative cognition also should apprehend them quite distinctly; as the form is exterior to the cognition and it is of one and the same form.—Further, if they have their
appearance concealed, how can they appear? Because 'appearance' is of the nature of apprehension.—(2727)

Then again, if it were possible for what is past to continue to exist, then what is asserted might be true; as a matter of fact however, what is past does not continue to exist; hence the said appearance of the Letters in the Cumulative Cognition cannot be right.—This is what is pointed out in the following:

TEXT (2728).


COMMENTARY.

'Already'—i.e. under the Chapter on the 'Three Points of Time'.
In support of this he adduces an argument annulling the Opponent's idea —'If there were such continuance, etc. etc.';—at the very time when there is cognition of the apprehension of the Letters, there would be the likelihood of the Remembrance appearing. This is the argument that sets aside the Mimāmsaka's view.

'Having the same cause'—Their causes are not different.—(2728)

The Grammarians urge the following objection—'If there is no such single entity as the 'Sphota', of the nature of the Word,—then how is it that on the utterance of the word 'go', ('Cow'), there appears the single cognition in the one form of 'gauḥ' (and not in that of the component letters)?'

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (2729).

WE ARE NOT OBJECTING TO THE SINGLE COGNITION IN THE FORM OF 'gauḥ', THE Cow; BUT THE NOTION OF ONENESS REGARDING THE WORD IS DUE TO THE FACTS.—(1) THAT IT IS APPREHENDED BY A SINGLE IDEA AND (2) THAT IT DENOTES A SINGLE THING.—(2729)

COMMENTARY.

'Ekamatītva'—the fact of there being a single cognition.
'Tadgrāhyatka, etc. etc.'—It is apprehended by a single cognition,—and it serves a single purpose.—The compound being of the 'Copulative
kind.—What is meant is that—(1) because it is apprehended by a single cognition, and (2) because it denotes the single object, the animal with the dewlap,—therefore the word ‘go’ is said to be one—(2729)

The following Text shows that the fact of being regarded as one is not true in all cases:—

TEXT (2730).


(2730)

COMMENTARY.

‘Rapidity’—quickness of utterance.
‘Smallness of the interval’,—the very slight separation between the letter-sounds.
‘Sā’—the unitary conception, the idea of oneness.
In the case of words like ‘dēvadatta’ the articulations are clearly perceived as distinct. Hence the unitary conception is ‘inadmissible’, in regard to a part of the ‘Subject’.—(2730)

The same idea is further supported by a formulated argument:—

TEXT (2731).

THE COGNITION OF THE MEANING MUST BE REGARDED AS ARISING FROM THE LETTERS; BECAUSE IT APPEARS AFTER THE COGNITION OF THESE; WHAT IS LIKE IT ARISES FROM THAT,—LIKE THE COGNITION OF FIRE ARISING FROM SMOKE.—(2731)

COMMENTARY.

The formulation of the argument is as follows:—When one Cognition appears after another cognition, it must be regarded as arising from this latter, indirectly,—e.g. the cognition of the ‘subject’, Fire, proceeding from the cognition of the ‘Indicative’, Smoke;—the cognition of the Meaning appears after the cognition of the Letters; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

What is meant to be proved here is the fact of its being regarded as the effect of that other cognition; this is what constitutes the difference between the Probans and the Probandum.—(2731)
"THE REVEALED WORD."

The following Text shows that the Reason adduced in the preceding text is not 'inadmissible':—

**TEXT (2732).**

**AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE COGNITION OF THE MEANING IS NOT FOUND TO FOLLOW AFTER A COGNITION ENVISAGING A VERBAL ENTITY APART FROM THE LETTERS; HENCE NO OTHER WORD CAN BE EXPRESSIVE (OF THAT MEANING).—**

(2732)

**COMMENTARY.**

That 'cognition' of meaning does not exist which appears after a cognition envisaging any verbal entity apart from the Letters; what does exist is only that 'cognition of meaning' which appears after the cognition of the Letters. Hence the Reason adduced is not 'inadmissible'.

This also points out the fact of things being treated as *non-existent*—when, being perceptible, they are not perceived.—(2732)

The following Text points out that the said Reason is not 'Inconclusive':—

**TEXT (2733).**

**IN ALL CASES, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCES ARE DEFINITELY KNOWN TO BE THE GROUND FOR REGARDING ONE THING AS THE EFFECT OF ANOTHER; AND IT IS THUS THAT THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE IS RECOGNISED IN THE CASE IN QUESTION.—**

(2733)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Kārayāta, etc. etc.'—Being regarded as the cause, or basis, of being regarded as the effect.

"What is that basis?"

It is *positive and negative concomitance.*—This is co-ordinated with 'āṅgam'.—The only basis for one thing being regarded as the effect of another lies in following the positive and negative concomitance between the two things. Hence the impossibility of there being any other basis for regarding the 'cognition of the meaning' as the effect of anything else (other than the Cognition of Letters) provides the proof for the annulment of a contrary conclusion. Hence the necessary Invariable Concomitance between the two becomes established.—(2733)

The following might be urged:—"It may be that the Sphoṭa is not expressive. The Letters themselves, being eternal, would be expressive; and
that these Letters are eternal has been established by Sense-perception and other Means of Cognition”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2734).

IT HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT EXPRESSIVENESS BELONGS TO NON-ETERNAL LETTERS,—THE ‘RECOGNITION’ AND ‘INFERENCE’, PUT FORWARD IN PROOF OF ETERNALITY, BECOME ANNULLED.—(2734)

COMMENTARY.

‘Pratyabhijñānumāṇaḥ’;—i.e. Recognition and Inference.

In some places, the reading is ‘pratyabhijñānumānaḥ’; in which case the compound is to be treated as ‘Samāhara-Dvandva’; or as a Karma-dhāraṇya, involving the deletion of the term ‘sahita’ (the meaning being ‘Recognition along with Inference’).—(2734)

The following Text points out that the argument put forward by the other party involves ‘self-contradiction’;—

TEXTS (2735-2736).

THE OBJECTION IN QUESTION HAS BEEN URGED BY THE OTHER PARTY, THROUGH IGNORANCE THAT HIS DOING SO INVOLVES SELF-CONTRADICTIONS ON HIS PART; BECAUSE THERE ARE ALL THESE (SELF-CONTRADICTIONS), IF YOU HOLD TO THE VIEW OF THE ETERNALITY (OF LETTERS AND WORDS).—IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT IF WORDS ARE ETERNAL, THEY CANNOT BE EXPRESSIVE; BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT HAVE ANY CONNECTION WITH THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE (AMONG THE COMPONENT LETTERS) AND SO FORTH; ALSO BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT PERCEIVED AT ALL TIMES.—(2735-2736)

COMMENTARY.

‘All these’—self-contradictions.

‘With the order of sequence’;—‘and so forth’ is meant to include the fact of their ‘hearing’ and ‘remembrance’ being successive. All this is so, because on account of the eternity (of words) the particular order of sequence cannot be due to time; and on account of their all-pervasiveness, it cannot be due to place; nor can it be due to manifestation; because the idea
of such 'manifestation' has been already rejected.—Similarly, in the bringing about of cognitions, eternal words can serve no useful purpose; as has been explained on several occasions.—(2735-2736)

It has been argued by the Mimâmsaka, under Text 2310, that—"It has to be explained what the Word-Sound is which is being proved to be perishable, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2737–2739).

THE 'INADMISSIBILITY OF THE REASON IN RESPECT OF ITS SUBSTRATUM' WHICH HAS BEEN SOUGHT TO BE PROVED BY THE PUTTING FORWARD OF A NUMBER OF LIKELY ALTERNATIVES REGARDING THE NATURE OF THE 'SUBJECT' (Word),—IS ALL DUE TO IGNORANCE OF THE REAL CHARACTER OF Inference; because the 'Subject' is always that which actually appears (in Consciousness). What actually appears in consciousness is well-known, without cogitation;—even ordinary fishermen know that that alone can form the 'Subject'.—And yet, it is on this very point that dispute has arisen among babblers. There can be no dispute regarding a thing where diversity is created only through one's whim.—(2737–2739)

COMMENTARY.

When the 'Subject' has been indicated in the unqualified form, the setting up of a number of alternatives regarding its qualification constitutes a 'Futile Rejoinder'.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (2740–2742).

WHEN THE 'SUBJECT' HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS, THE SETTING UP OF ALTERNATIVES REGARDING QUALIFICATIONS WOULD PUT A STOP TO ALL INFERENTIAL PROCESSES.—Even with regard to the (Mimâmsaka’s) inference that—"The idea derived from the Vedic Injunction must be right, because it is brought about by causes free from defect";—several such alternatives could be urged against him, as—'If the Subject is meant to be the Cognition brought about by Injunctions that are eternal and related to eternal denotations, then the Probans is one whose substratum is not admitted by the other party.'—(2740–2742)

COMMENTARY.

The Injunction is itself eternal,—and is related to the eternal denotation, —in the shape of the 'Universal' ;—the cognition brought about by such
an Injunction;—if that is the ‘Subject’, then the Probans is one that
cannot be admitted by the other party.—(2740–2742)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2315, that—“If by
non-eternity is meant amenability to absolute destruction, etc. etc.”.
The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2743).

‘Eternality’ consists in continuing in the same condition; and the
opposite of this is ‘non-eternity’. If the continuing in
the same condition ceases, what is left there that could
be held to be ‘extant’?—(2743)

COMMENTARY.

‘What is left, etc. etc.’—The ‘condition’ is not anything different from
the entity to which it belongs; hence when the condition has ceased, the
entity also, as a consequence, ceases. Otherwise, if one thing does not share
the fate of another, it cannot be right to say that it is of the same nature
as the other.—(2743)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2744, that—“If the
Reason that is put forward is only amenability to sense-organs, then it is
clearly fallacious, etc. etc.”.
The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2744).

If the Reason put forward is only amenability to sense-organs,
it is certainly not recognised as fallacious,—in view
of the fact that the ‘Universal’ has already
been discarded.—(2744)

COMMENTARY.

‘Already’—under the chapter dealing with the ‘Universal’.—(2744)

“If there is no ‘fallaciousness’, in view of the ‘Universal’,—even so,
having its negation suspected, the Reason would be Inconclusive”.—
Anticipating this argument, the Author proceeds to point out the Invariable
Concomitance of the Reason, ‘amenability to sense-organs’;—
TEXT (2745).

That which serves as the cause (basis) of the sense-perception envisaging it is spoken of as 'amenable to sense-organ'; but what is eternal can never be a cause; this has been already established.—(2745)

COMMENTARY.

That object is spoken of as 'amenable to the senses' which serves as the cause of that Sense-perception which envisages that object; in the case of an eternal entity, however, no efficient activity is possible, either successively or simultaneously. Hence it is only right that there should be invariable concomitance (between non-eternity and amenability to Sense-organs).—(2745)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2320, that—"as regards amenability to the Senses, it has to be ascertained what it really is, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2746).

It is known to all what sort of a thing serves as the cause (of cognitions); if it were not so, then the speculation like the one started by the opponent could be started even with regard to such causes of cognition as the Smoke and the like.—(2746)

COMMENTARY.

'What sort, etc. etc.'—i.e. the idea is accepted as sound without any hesitation.

If that were not so, then even in regard to Smoke (as the cause of the Inferential Cognition of Fire), the speculation could be started, as—Is the smoke mentioned as the Reason something that is amenable to the Senses? Or is it only a product of 'Idea' or 'Primordial Matter' or 'Time' and so forth? Is it a composite made up of Atoms? Or is it not so composed at all?—And in view of such speculations, the 'Smoke' as the Reason would become 'inadmissible' by one party or the other.—(2746)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2322, that—"Being perceived as following from effort has been adduced as a Reason for the Word being a product and non-eternal;—this is Inconclusive, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (2747).

As regards 'Intentional Destruction', etc. these are not admitted to be productive (cause) of the effect in the shape of the cognition following from effort;—because these are all purely 'illusory'.—(2747)

COMMENTARY.

'Cognition following from effort' is the effect,—of which the producer or cause,—is said to be 'Intentional Destruction', etc.; but these are not admitted to be such cause.—Such is the construction of the sentence.

If it is in accordance with the view of the Sautrāntikas that the Inconclusiveness of our Reason is urged by the Mīmāṃsāka,—then such 'Inconclusiveness' cannot be admitted; because, according to those same philosophers, the 'Intentional Destruction', etc. have a purely 'illusory' existence; and what is illusory cannot be productive of any effect; for, if it were, then it would lose that illusory character; because what is capable of effective action must be real, and everything other than this must be illusory; such are the characteristics of reality and illusoriness (unreality).—(2747)

If the 'Inconclusiveness' urged is from the standpoint of the Vaiśeṣikas,—even so, these people do not regard 'Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha' and the rest as of the nature of 'Destruction', as you have represented them to be.—This is what is pointed out in the following:

TEXTS (2748-2749).

The two 'nirodhas' are not regarded as being of the nature of 'Destruction'; because 'Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha' is regarded as 'dissociation from impurities brought about by wisdom one after the other'; while 'Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha' is that which serves as an absolute bar to the appearance of the impurities.—Thus people, not knowing the true doctrines, and depending upon the wrong notions of things, continue to wobble.—(2748-2749)

COMMENTARY.

'The two nirodhas'—i.e. Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha and Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha'.

Question:—"In what form then are they regarded?"
Answer:—‘Sāshrayān, etc. etc.’—There is ‘niruddha’—‘dissociation’—from Impurities—which is attained by ‘pratīsāṅkhya’, wisdom; hence this is called ‘Pratīsāṅkhya-niruddha’. And this varies with each associated object; hence the text has added the phrase ‘one after the other’. The idea is that as many of ‘associated’ factors there are, so many are the ‘dissociated’ factors also.—As regards the ‘apratisāṅkhya-niruddha’,—this is the name given to that Dissociation which serves as an absolute bar against future impurities.—This is due, not to wisdom, but, to the inefficiency of the causal factors; that is the reason why it is called ‘Apratisāṅkhya-niruddha’.

This has been thus declared—‘Pratīsāṅkhya-niruddha consists in dissociation one after the other; the other, Apratisāṅkhya-niruddha, consists in the absolute bar to the birth of the impurities’.—(2748-2749)

Even if these were of the nature of ‘Destruction’,—there is no ‘falsity’ or ‘Inconclusiveness’ in our Reason.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (2750).

THE Ākāśha AND THE ‘DESTRUCTION’ DO NOT ‘FOLLOW FROM EFFORT’;—AS THEY ARE ENTIRELY DEVOID OF CHARACTER. WHAT FORM THE BASIS OF THE IDEA OF THESE ARE: (1) THE POT-SHERDS, (2) THE MASS OF LIGHT AND SO FORTH.

—(2750)

COMMENTARY.

‘Prayātṇā, etc. etc.’—This compound is to be construed with ‘na’.

“Why?”

‘Because they are entirely devoid of character’.—Because ‘Destruction’ consists merely in the negation of the existence of things,—and ‘Ākāśha’ consists merely in the negation of Tangibility; hence both these—Ākāśha and Destruction,—are devoid of character, featureless. How then can they be following after effort? As it is only character that can be capable of effective action.

Question:—“What then is the basis of the idea of the Destruction, etc.? ”

Answer:—‘The pieces, etc. etc.’—‘mass of light’; ‘and so forth’ includes mass of darkness also.—(2750)

It has been urged by the Mīmāṃsāka, under Text 2333, that—“If it is indefinite, then such a thing cannot be either entirely eternal or entirely non-eternal, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (2751).

The idea of a dual character of any objective entity has been rejected. Consequently, in the case of the Jar, it is not possible that one aspect of it should be eternal, in the shape of the 'Universal'.—(2751)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the Mimamsaka, under Text 2335, that—"In the same manner the exact nature of non-eternity also has to be considered, etc. etc. ".

The answer to this is as follows :

TEXT (2752).

'Non-eternity' is held to consist merely in the overthrow (negation) of the existing state, and it is this that is the Probandum (in our argument); and the Lamp provides a clear corroborative instance of the same.—(2752)

COMMENTARY.

The 'non-eternity' that is meant to be our Probandum is that which is merely of the nature of the negation of the existing state; and in corroboration of this, we have the instance of the Lamp and such things. Wherefore then can our Corroborative Instance be 'devoid of the Probandum'?—(2752)

In the following texts the Author puts forward—from the Opponent's standpoint—the objection that the Instance of the Lamp also is 'devoid of the Probandum':—

TEXTS (2753–2755).

"The perishability (non-eternity) of the Lamp-flame is not admitted. What happens in its case is that very subtle portions of it pass on to another place very quickly; a large mass of Light remains at the point of the wick; that portion which goes upward is called the 'flame'; that which passes even beyond that consists of mere Light (diffused); that which passes still further is too subtle to be perceived."—
(2753–2755)

COMMENTARY.

The portions of the Flame pass on from point to point, very quickly; and it does not perish in a moment.—(2753–2755)
"THE REVEALED WORD."

Question:—Why do not they all move along at one and the same time?

Answer:—

TEXT (2756).

"The path being obstructed by those that have gone before, the others do not go forward at the same time; as the previous ones go on making room, so the later ones proceed forward."—(2756)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—If the said portions of the Flame are capable of moving about, why do not they burn the grass or cotton that lies near it?

Answer:—

TEXT (2757).

"Even though they move about, they do not operate upon the grass and other things."—(2757)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is that it is only when the Flame is in the massed form that it becomes operative,—not when it is scattered about.—(2757)

The answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXT (2757 Second Half).

ALL THIS IS MERE ASSUMPTION; AS NO PROOF FOR IT HAS BEEN ADDUCED.—(2757)

COMMENTARY.

Granting (for the sake of argument) what the other party has said, the Author points out defects in their argument:—

TEXT (2758).

FURTHER, SO LONG AS THE POTENCY (OF THE FLAMES) REMAINS UNAFFECTED,—WHEN THEY COME INTO CONTACT WITH GRASS, COTTON AND SUCH THINGS,—THE POSSIBILITY OF THESE BEING BURNT DOES NOT CEASE; AS BEFORE.—(2758)

COMMENTARY.

'So long as, etc.'—of the parts of the Flame.

'As before'—as in the massed state;—there being no difference between the flame in the two states.—(2758)
If it is admitted that there is difference in the Flame in the two states,—then the loss of eternality becomes inevitable.—This is what is pointed out in the following:

TEXT (2759).

IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN WHAT SORT OF 'ETERNAL THING' WOULD THE FLAME BE,—WHEN THERE REMAINS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ITS EFFICIENT AND INEFFICIENT STATES?—(2759)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(2759)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsakā, under Text 2339 that—"The eternality of the Sentence may be asserted in the same manner as that of the Relationship (between Word and Meaning)."

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (2760).

THE ETERNALITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED; HENCE IT IS NOT RIGHT THAT THE ETERNALITY OF THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS PROVED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THAT OF THE RELATIONSHIP.—(2760)

COMMENTARY.

With the idea that under your (Mīmāṃsakā's) view, the sentence itself is impossible, of which you are seeking to prove the eternality,—the author proceeds to discuss the nature of the Sentence—

TEXT (2761).

WHAT IS THE 'SENTENCE' OF WHICH YOU ARE POSTULATING THE ETERNITY? IS IT WHAT CONSISTS ONLY OF THE LETTERS? OR OF THE LETTERS AS APPEARING IN A CERTAIN ORDER OF SEQUENCE? OR IS IT SOMETHING DIFFERENT (FROM THE LETTERS)?—(2761)

COMMENTARY.

(1) Is the 'Sentence' only the Letters pure and simple, without any qualifications?—Or (2) is it the Letters with the qualification of appearing in a certain order of sequence?—Or (3) is it something different from the
Letters,—in the form of Sphoṭa?—There are these three possible views.—(2761)

The following Text points out the objections against the first view (that the 'Sentence' consists of the Letters only)—

TEXT (2762).

LETTERS, DEVOID OF ORDER OF SEQUENCE, CANNOT BE EXPRESSIVE; HENCE SUCH LETTERS CANNOT CONSTITUTE THE 'SENTENCE'.—(2762)

COMMENTARY.

The objections against the second view (that the Sentence consists in the Letters arranged in a certain order) are stated in the following Texts:—

TEXTS (2762–2766).

NOR CAN THE LETTERS HAVE AN ORDER OF SEQUENCE. AS THEY ARE ALL-PERVADING AND ETERNAL, THERE CANNOT BE ANY SEQUENCE IN THEM OF EITHER TIME OR PLACE,—LIKE WHAT THERE IS IN THE LETTERS REDUCED TO WRITING, OR IN THE CASE OF FRUITS AND FLOWERS.—IF THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE WERE INHERENT IN THE LETTERS THEMSELVES, THEN THEY WOULD ALWAYS BE IN THE FORM 'sa-ra', NEVER IN THE FORM 'ra-sa'; AS THE LATTER WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FORMER ORDER, WHICH IS ETERNAL. THE LETTER 'Ra' THAT MIGHT BE ELSEWHERE CANNOT BE SAID TO APPEAR IN ANY OTHER ORDER OF SEQUENCE, FROM OUT OF AIR. BECAUSE EVERY ONE OF THE LETTERS HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE ONE AND ETERNAL. IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN 'RECOGNITION' PUT FORWARD BY YOU AS A REASON FOR ETERNITY AND 'ONENESS' WOULD BE INCONCLUSIVE; AS IT WOULD BE PRESENT EVEN WHEN THE LETTERS ARE DIVERSE.—(2762–2766)

COMMENTARY.

'Nor can the Letters, etc. etc.'—Because the order of sequence among things can be of only two kinds—spacial and chronological;—there is order of sequence in space, as in the Letters reduced to writing; and there is order of sequence in Time as in the case of the series consisting of the seed-sprout-trunk-flower-fruit.—The first kind of sequence (that is of space) is not possible in the case of Letters,—because they are all-pervading;—the Letters pervading over all things; consequently,—as in Ākāśa, so in Letters also—
there can be no sequence due to breaks in the continuity, because they occupy the whole space entirely; as all things subsist in one part of Ākāsha only.—Nor can sequence in time belong to Letters; because, being eternal, they must be all synchronous.

Then again, the order of sequence could either be made by man or be inherent in the Letters. It is not held to be due to man; as in that case the Veda would have to be regarded as the work of man.—If then, the sequence is inherent in the Letters, then the form would always be ‘sa-ra’,—never ‘ra-sa’.

Nor can it be admitted that the Letters appearing in different words are different; because Letters have been proved to be eternal on the ground of their being recognised as the same everywhere. And it is the denial of this sameness that would be asserted in the said proposition (that they are different in different words). Otherwise Recognition (as the reason for eternity) would be Inconclusive.—(2762–2766)

It might be argued that—"the Sentence shall consist in the order of sequence in the manifestation (and appearance of the Letters)".

The answer to that is as follows:—

**TEXT (2767).**

**THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE IN THE 'MANIFESTATION' CANNOT CONSTITUTE THE Sentence, BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT THERE CAN BE NO 'MANIFESTATION' OF WHAT IS ETERNAL.—FOR THIS REASON THE ETERNITY OF THE Sentence CANNOT BE DUE TO ITS BEING RELATED TO THE Universal 'Sentence'.**

—(2767)

**COMMENTARY.**

The particle ‘cha’ implies that the Sentence cannot consist of the Sphoṭa as something different from the Letters;—the idea being that that idea has been rejected by the Mīmāṃsakas themselves.

‘Nityaś vyakti, etc. etc.’—That is, it having been shown that there can be no ‘manifestation’ of what is eternal.—(2767)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2339, that—"What is said by the Buddhist may be possible in the case of such technical terms as ‘Vṛddhi’ because these deal with perceptible things; but in the case of the Veda, the idea of conventionality cannot be possible, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXTS (2768–2769).

Just as the technical words like 'vrddhi' have their meanings created by the whim of man,—so may also be regarded to be the case with words like 'Svarga', 'Yaga' and so forth.—

In the case of such works of men as stories, dramas and novels, the connection between words and meanings is never meant to be real and eternal.—(2768–2769)

COMMENTARY.

'Ichchhārachīta, etc.'—Whose meanings have been created by the wish of man.

'Utpādyā'—The unheard of story created by the writer,—like that of Mahāshvetā;—and the drama, etc. which also have the same character.—In the case of these the connection between words and their meanings is not meant to be eternal, in the shape of an inherent potency. The same may be regarded to be the case with the Veda also.—This is the sense of the Text.—(2768–2769)

In the following text, an objection—based upon the Inadmissibility of the Corroborative Instance—is raised against the above argument,—from the standpoint of the other party:—

TEXT (2770).

"In the case of the works cited also, the potency is eternal; the non-eternity attaches only to the particular use of the Word; and it is on account of this latter fact that there arise doubts regarding the eternal potency."—(2770)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the said stories, etc. also, the potency is held to be eternal. But the particular use of the words—which is made even when the things spoken of are not real,—which is made by men, is what is not-eternal; and it is by reason of this that there arise doubts regarding the eternal potency.—Hence the corroborative Instance cited (by the Buddhist) is 'inadmissible'.—(2770)

The answer to the above is as follows:—
TEXT (2771).

In reality, the thing spoken of in these works has no real existence outside; wherein then could the meaning be attributed?—If it be said that—"the meaning is attributed to the reflected conceptual content",—then, the same may be said regarding the Veda also.—(2771)

COMMENTARY.

'Existence outside'—Things like Mahāšvetā have had no real existence in the external world.—(2771)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 2340, that—"who has perceived the connection of such things as Heaven, Sacrifice, etc., all of which are beyond the reach of the senses?"
The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2772-2773).

Who can ever cognize the Potency, in the form of the connection between the Word and its meaning? That is why in the case of the Veda, even the use is not regarded as due to human agency.—It could not be learnt from more experienced people; because, by themselves, these also are equally ignorant. The only cognition therefore that may be possible is through the explanations provided by men.—

(2772-2773)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—By implication, you have yourself shown that the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda that there is proceeds only from the explanations provided by men. Because by its very nature, the potency rests in supersensuous things;—hence the use or employment of the Word in regard to this potency cannot be due to man; nor can the cognition of it be derived from the more experienced people; because all these also are equally ignorant;—the case therefore would be like the knowledge of Colour being obtained from blind men.—Hence, by implication, it follows that the said cognition must be due to explanations provided by men; there is no other alternative possible.—(2772-2773)

The Opponent brings forward the following objection:—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXT (2774).

"This objection is equally applicable to the Scriptures composed (by Persons)."—(2774)

COMMENTARY.

The objection that has been urged is applicable also to those scriptures that have been composed (by Persons). For instance, the question can reasonably be raised—whether the ideas that modern people derive from the words of Buddha and others dealing with supersensuous things are in accordance with the intentions of those Persons,—or the reverse.—(2774)

The answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXT (2774).

Not so; because to these (Scriptures) people have recourse through faith and confidence, even in regard to things that are open to doubt.—(2774)

COMMENTARY.

'Tatra'—to the Scripture propounded by a Personality, which deals with matters useful to men. That is, the wise followers of Buddha have recourse to their scriptures in full accordance with Reason,—and not by mere hearsay.

'Faith and confidence'.—The confidence born of well-ascertained notions obtained by means of the due pondering over reasons; as it is in things thus ascertained through proofs that people have confidence,—not in anything else; as in regard to other things, doubts never cease.

'Things that are open to doubt.'—In the case of assertions of Personalities, as the Person expresses what he means, there is a possibility of such ideas having come down through an unbroken line of men who have heard it from their predecessors; so that it is possible that there is an unbroken line of Tradition from the author down to the present day; and hence the ideas expressed are true. Such ground for confidence is not available in the case of the Scripture that has not proceeded from a Personality; as there is no Person who actually taught it.—Further, if there were a Teacher, then, as such a Teacher would be led to propound the Teachings for the benefit of men, it stands to reason that he would propound through words well-known among men; so that the meanings of those words could be rightly learnt from such use by the Teacher. This is not possible in the case of the Scripture that is not the work of a Person; as there can be no intention or effort in that case.—(2774)

Question:—"If this is so, then why do you not act in accordance with any Scripture (from among those propounded by human beings)? Mere doubtfulness would be equally present in the case of all ".

The answer to this objection is as follows:—
TEXT (2775).

[We have confidence in the Scripture] the assertions whereof are found to be confirmed by Perception and Inference.—That cannot be the case with the Veda; as this has been held to be self-sufficient in its authority.—(2775)

COMMENTARY.

When the matter spoken of in the Scripture is not found to be incompatible with facts ascertained by Perception and Inference,—and one acts in accordance with this,—then alone does he act wisely,—even though the matter be in doubt;—not when he acts otherwise; because doubts regarding its being wrong and undesirable are aroused only by its being found to be contrary to well-ascertained facts of Perception (and Inference).

"If that is so, then in the case of the Veda, people would be acting in the same way."

Answer:—'That cannot, etc.'

'As this has been held to be self-sufficient, etc. etc.'—that is, it is regarded as an authority by itself; hence in this case it cannot be right to act after having examined the teachings by proofs and reasonings; as in that case, the authority or reliability of the Veda would be due to something exterior to itself.

Nor is it possible for the teachings of the Veda to be confirmed. Because in the Veda we read of the man, in due course, being the actor and the experiencer,—his own preceding and succeeding forms being imperishable and unborn;—and this cannot be right; as has been explained under the chapter dealing with the 'Soul'.—Then again, we read there of the eternity of certain entities; and that this also is wrong has been explained under the chapter dealing with the 'Permanence of Things'.—Thirdly, the followers of the Veda have held that there exist such things as the 'Universal' and the like, which, though really imperceptible, are declared to be perceptible; and similarly the successive Birth, Existence and Cessation of things have also been spoken of; all of which are absolute impossibilities.—Similarly, it has been taught that the Agent in whom no fresh attributes can be added, and who had not produced a single thing before, becomes the producer of something else; and similarly it has been taught that an established entity, though not produced as an effect, continues to exist, on the strength of something else;—and also the destruction of things by certain causes; and so on and so forth;—much is found that is quite contrary to all Forms of Right Cognition.—How then could any intelligent person undertake any activity on the authority of such a Scripture (as the Veda)?—(2775)

Kumārila has put forward another argument in support of the eternity of the Connection between Word and its meaning; and it is pointed out in the following Text that that argument is invalidated as 'Inconclusive',
with a view to such works composed by men as Stories, Dramas and the like:—

TEXT (2776).

WHAT THE OTHER PARTY HAS URGED IN THIS CONNECTION IS MOST IRRELEVANT AND HAS BEEN SAID WITHOUT PERCEIVING THAT THE SAID CHARACTER OF ORIGINAL STORIES AND DRAMAS, ETC. IS EQUALLY PRESENT IN THE VEDA ALSO.—

(2776)

COMMENTARY.

'Original stories, etc.'—those whose subject-matter is entirely new.
'Said character,'—e.g. that of being composed by the mere whim of man.—(2776)

Question:—"What is it that has been said by the other party?"
Answer:—

TEXTS (2777-2778).

"Barring the eternality of the Word and its Meaning, there could be no other reason for accepting the eternality of their Relationship. Therefore in regard to the Veda, there can be no beginning for the said Relationship.—The Inference of the origination of the said Relationship is negatived by the absence of means (causes); and as for the inference of the non-assertibility of pre-established Relationship, it is set aside by direct sense-perception."—[Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣēpa-parihāra, 136–138].—(2777-2778)

COMMENTARY.

'Word'—consisting of Letters;—'its meaning'—the Universal;—both of these being beginningless, their Relationship also—in the shape of denotive Potency—must be beginningless; that is to say, Potency being not-different from the thing to which it belongs, there can be no means of bringing about the said Relationship, whence it is inferred that there is no bringing about of it.

The argument is formulated as follows:—When one thing is devoid of the means of bringing about another thing,—the former cannot bring about the latter;—the Potter is unable to make the Jar, when he is devoid of the means of making it, in the shape of the Clay, Revolving Stick, Wheel, Water, Thread and so forth;—all men are devoid of the means of making the Relationship (between Words and meanings); hence there is apprehension of a character contrary to the wider character.
The Reason adduced here cannot be regarded as Inadmissible. Because it has been already proved that all men are without such means, under the passage—'To whom would the Speaker have recourse to for the purpose of making up the Relationship for the benefit of the Hearer?'

Question:—If that is so, then, as of the Cause, so of the absence of the assertion of Relationship itself, an Inference may be put forward.

The answer to that is that for the proving of the 'absence of the said assertion', the Reason—'being devoid of the means'—would be inadmissible.

—(2777-2778)

In the following Text, the Mīmāṃsaka shows how the said Reason would be Inadmissible:

TEXT (2779).

"THE ONLY MEANS (OF COMPREHENDING THE MEANING) CONSISTS IN THE PERCEIVING OF ITS REPEATED COMPREHENSION BY EXPERIENCED PEOPLE. AND CERTAINLY THE FAILURE OF SUCH MEANS CANNOT BE ADMITTED, IN REGARD TO THE BRINGING ABOUT OF THE COMPREHENSION".—[Śloka-vārtika—Samandhā-kṣēpa-parihāra, 138-139].—(2779)

COMMENTARY.

The comprehension of the Relationship by experienced persons—perceived again and again—is the only way of asserting that Relationship; unless one knows the Relationship himself, he cannot speak of it to another person.

'The failure of such means',—i.e. the said means being ineffective.

'The comprehension'—of the Relationship.—(2779)

In the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out the defects in the above reasoning (of the Mīmāṃsaka):

TEXT (2780).

ALL THIS WOULD BE TRUE, ONLY IF THERE WERE CERTAINTY IN REGARD TO THE MEANING OF THE VEDA; ONLY IN THAT CASE COULD THE NOTIONS OBTAINED FROM EXPERIENCED MEN BE TRUE (IN CONSONANCE WITH IT); OTHERWISE THE WHOLE FABRIC WILL FALL TO THE GROUND.—(2780)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued (under Text 2777) above that—"Barring the beginninglessness of the Word and its Meaning, etc. etc."—If, it is eternality of the Word and Meaning that is meant by their 'beginninglessness',—then
that is inadmissible; as the much wider conclusion to the contrary has been established in the form of the 'Perpetual Flux'.

If what is meant by the 'beginninglessness' of the Word and Meaning is that there is no beginning of the series of causes and effects,—then the Reason is 'Inconclusive', and also 'Contradictory'; because the Relationship has no existence apart from the Relatives; and consequently, that relationship also would be eternal like the Word and Meaning.

As regards 'Being devoid of the means, etc.' (Text 1976),—that also is 'Inadmissible'; because it has been proved that even when there is difference by their nature, there are some things that are capable of bringing about the idea of *sameness*. Consequently, what is meant is that there is a means available in the shape of the idea of the sameness of the thing cognised by both Speaker and Hearer. And it has also been pointed out (Text 2773) that 'the Cognition cannot be obtained from the experienced men, and they also are equally ignorant'.

'Otherwise, it would fall to the ground';—If it be held that 'the experienced persons, though themselves ignorant, comprehend the Relationship'—then such a view would be clearly contrary to a fact of Sense-perception; the Proposition being like the assertion of the blind man relating to Colours.—(2780)

It has been argued by the *Mimāmsaka*, under Text 2341, that—"As regards the argument based upon the fact of the Veda being an aggregate, the counter-argument should be stated as follows:—Vedic study is always preceded by previous study,—because it is called 'Vedic study',—like the study carried on at the present time'.

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (2781).

**AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO 'COUNTER-ARGUMENT' AGAINST THE REASON 'BECAUSE IT IS AN AGGREGATE'; BECAUSE THIS IS A CHARACTER WHOSE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE HAS BEEN RECOGNISED AS EMBRACING ALL THINGS.**

—(2781)

**COMMENTARY.**

That is, the character of having its invariable concomitance with all things has been duly recognised.

This shows that the Buddhist argument proceeds on the nature and capacity of things; as nothing else can embrace all things. And when an Inference has proceeded on the strength of the nature and capacity of things, there can be no counter-argument against it. Because the nature of things cannot be altered; nor is it possible for two mutually contradictory
characters to subsist in the same thing; or else it would cease to be one thing.—(2781)

The following text points out the all-embracing character of the said Reason (Premiss):

TEXTS (2782-2783).

When Letters are expressive, with distinct meanings, and appear in a particular order of sequence,—they come to be known as 'Word', 'Sentence' and such groups; it is these that have been so spoken of as 'aggregates'.—And it has been shown that all this—expressiveness, distinct meanings and order of sequence—is impossible in the case of words not emanating from personalities.—Hence the Invariable Concomitance (Premiss, put forward by the Buddhist) remains unshaken.—(2782-2783)

COMMENTARY.

'So spoken of,'—i.e. as 'aggregates'.

If Letters do not emanate from Personalities, then all this—expressiveness and the rest—is impossible; this has been proved by us already. And thus our Invariable Concomitance (i.e. the Premiss) becomes fully established.—(2782-2783)

Says the Opponent:—"The Reason (Premiss) that we have put forward (under 2342),—'because it is preceded by Vedic study',—also comprehends all things; as the Author of the Veda has never been found'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2784).

There is no such certainty of Invariable Concomitance in regard to 'the character of being spoken of as Vedic study'; hence such a Reason is open to the charge of its negative concomitance being doubtful.—(2784)

COMMENTARY.

'Such certainty'—as there is regarding the character of 'being an aggregate'; because in the case of 'being an aggregate', its negative concomitance with the contrary of the Probandum is not in doubt;—as it is in the case of the other party's reason—('being spoken of as Vedic study').—(2784)

The same idea is further explained:—
"THE REVEALED WORD."

TEXTS (2785-2786).

If it were known for certain that men are unable to bring about the said order of letters, etc.—then alone would there be the Invariable Concomitance desired by the other party. That, however, can never be known for certain; such a certainty could be obtained only if the capacity and property of all men were perceptible; and this could be possible only for a person who is omniscient.—

(2785-2786)

COMMENTARY.

'Such order'—as is found in the case of such Vedic sentences as 'Svarga-kāmo' gniṣṭomēna yajīta'.—If it were known for certain that all men were unable to compose such collocations of letters, then there might be certainty relating to the Invariable Concomitance (Premiss) urged by the other party. As a matter of fact, however, the said fact cannot be known except by an omniscient person.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'This would be possible only for an omniscient person'.—(2785-2786)

Says the Opponent—'There are certain characteristics in the Veda—such as Teaching of Duty, difficulty of pronunciation and the like,—which are never found in the words of men; whence it follows that it is inconceivable that the Veda should be the work of man; under the circumstances, how can our Reason be open to the charge of being doubtful and hence inadmissible?'

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2787-2789).

It is clearly conceivable that the Veda is the work of man; as it speaks of wrongful sexual acts, killing of animals and telling of lies.—As for the character of being difficult to pronounce, the agreeableness of sound, difficulty of comprehension, disagreeableness to the ear and so forth,—these characteristics of the Veda are found in the works of Declamers of the Veda also.—As regards such properties as capacity to cure poison, etc. that are found to be true,—this is found also in the case of Incantations laid down by Vainatēya and such persons.—(2787-2789)

COMMENTARY.

What the Author means is as follows:—Even if certain characteristics are not found in human assertions,—mere non-perception cannot prove
anything; so that the Reason still remains doubtful and inadmissible; it being just possible that there may be persons who would be able to compose works having the said properties of the Veda.

But the non-perception of the said properties itself cannot be admitted; because there are certain characteristics of the Veda,—such as the laying down of such ‘Duty’ as consists in wrongful sexual act and the like,—which are found in the works of the Deceivers of the Veda also.

‘Wrongful sexual acts’—such as . . . . . This is laid down in connection with the Gosava—sacrifice; where we read ‘Upahā udakam chāsēti, etc. etc.’—where ‘Upahā’ stands for the Sacrificer; who is spoken of as sucking water . . . . .

In connection with the Ashvamēḍha and other sacrifices,—the killing of animals is laid down in the Veda; in such texts as—‘At midday, six hundred animals are used, etc. etc.’

Telling of Lies—has been taught in the text—‘Lying in joke does no harm; nor lying to women; or at the time of marriage; or when there is danger to life; or when there is danger of losing one’s entire property; on these five occasions Lying is not sinful’.

The mention of these is found in the Veda; and these are found in the works of the detractors of the Veda also.

‘Tathā’—also—‘Difficulty of pronouncing’,—‘Agreeableness’,—‘Incomprehensibility’—such as in the Vedic text, ‘Āmandrairindra, etc.’; where the construction is difficult and far-fetched—‘ā’ being connected with ‘yāhi’ occurring later on;—‘Disagreeable to the ear’,—‘Ādi’—includes broken words, ultra-long vowels, and difficulties of accentuation and so forth.

The capacity to cure poison, etc.—Or ‘removing of poison’ and ‘peculiar potency’.—‘Etc.’ includes the curing of obsession by elements and other evil spells.

‘True’—compatible with the real state of things.

‘Vainatēya, etc.’—‘Etc.’ stands for the Incantations current among Buddhists and others.—(2787–2789)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2343, that—‘what has been said regarding the Veda might be said regarding the Mahābhārata; but it is forestalled by the remembrance of its author, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (2790).**

**CANNOT IN THIS WAY AN INFERENCE BE MADE REGARDING THE WORK OF HUMAN BEINGS—SUCH AS THOSE OF THE Sugata (Buddha) ?**—(2790)

**COMMENTARY.**

A similar Inference may be made, such as—The study of the words of the Buddha must have been preceded by similar study, because it is spoken
of as the 'study of the words of the Buddha',—like the present study of the same.—(2790)

Question:—"If that is so, then how can the words be regarded as those of the Buddha ?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (2791-2792).

BECAUSE ITS FORM WAS REVEALED BY HIM, THEREFORE THE WORDS ARE CALLED 'OF THE BUDDHA'. THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE AUTHOR THAT IS THERE MAY ALSO BE REGARDED AS MERELY COMMENDATORY.—IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT—"THIS IS NOT SO ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER PARTY";—BUT IF THE REASON IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE, WHY CANNOT IT BE ACCEPTED?—OR, IT MAY NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER PARTY; EVEN SO, IT MAY BE REGARDED AS POSSIBLE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REASON.—

(2791-2792)

COMMENTARY.

Its form—character, nature,—has been revealed by Buddha.

In this case also, the idea that people have regarding the author of the Buddhist Scripture may be explained as purely commendatory. And here also 'author' may be explained as 'rememberer'.

The following might be urged—"The Buddhists do not accept the view that the idea of the authorship of Buddha is purely commendatory,—hence why should you base your argument on this?"

Answer:—'The Reason being equally applicable (to Mahābhārata and the Buddhist Scripture), etc. etc.'—If the idea is in accord with Reason, then why should the Buddhist not accept it? It is not right for intelligent men not to accept what is in accordance with reason.

Even if the intelligent Buddhist does not accept this idea,—we still put this to you purely on the ground of reason.—(2791-2792)

This idea is confirmed by the words of the Mīmāṃsaka himself—
TEXTS (2793-2795)

"At all times, men are mostly prone to telling lies; just as there is no confidence in regard to things present, so also there is none regarding the description of past events" (Śloka-vārtika Śūtra 1. 1. 2; 144).—By this reason of your own, there can be no person recognised as the author of any work at all; even though he may be declaring it to be his own work.—Thus then, please abandon all hope in the truthfulness of the Word which does not proceed from a Personality; specially as in such words have been mentioned many things contrary to what has been said in the Veda.—(2793-2795)

COMMENTARY.

"By this reasoning, etc. etc."—i.e. the reasoning just stated.

The following might be urged—"Let all the Scriptures be such as are not the work of Personalities".

The answer to that is—"Thus then, etc. etc."—That is, the mere fact of not being the work of Personality cannot prove the truthful character of the Revelation; as such a Reason would be 'inconclusive', in view of the words of Buddha and others. Because these latter speak of many things—such as there is no Soul' and so forth,—which are contrary to what is said in the Veda, and which, according to you, are not true. And it is just possible to suspect that the same may be the case with the words of the Veda also. —(2793-2795)

The 'Inconclusiveness' of the Mīmāṃsaka's reasoning has been shown. The Author now proceeds to show that it is 'Contradictory' also, inasmuch as it demolishes what is desired by him—

TEXT (2796).

Then again, in this way what would be proved would be only beginninglessness, not freedom from personal authorship. Under the circumstances, if the Veda were regarded as not the work of any person, then the same may be said in regard to other Revelations also.—(2796)

COMMENTARY.

What the Mīmāṃsaka desires to prove is the fact that the Veda is not the work of man; but what is proved by his reason is not this,—but, merely the fact of its being without beginning.
It might be argued that—"when it has been proved that it is without beginning, then, by implication it also becomes proved that it is not the work of man; because what is the work of a person cannot be without beginning”.

The answer to this is—"Under the circumstances, etc. etc."—That is, on the ground of there being no beginning, if a Revelation were proved to be not the work of man, then the same may be said regarding the customs of the Pārasīkas and others (in whose case also, there has been no beginning).—(2796)

The same idea is further explained—

TEXT (2797).

THE CUSTOMS OF THE PĀRASIKA AND OTHERS MAY BE BASED UPON OTHERS;
AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATHEISTS ALSO MAY HAVE ITS SOURCE IN THE IDEAS OF OTHER PEOPLE.

—(2797)

COMMENTARY.

'Based upon others'—propounded through the ideas of other people.

'Having their source in, etc. etc.'—i.e. that which has its source in the notions and impressions of other people.—Or 'that which is prone to be brought about by the impressions of other people'. The 'Ka'—affix in this case would have the reflexive sense.—It would be so, because even those doctrines that have been propounded on the strength of the propounder's own intuition,—proceed on the basis of the objective conceptions handed down by other people; hence these also have their source in those same conceptions, just as is the case with the customs of people based entirely upon what is actually visible.—(2797)

It might be argued that—"all these may be regarded as free from human authorship".

The answer to that is as follows:

TEXT (2798).

EVEN IF SUCH FREEDOM FROM AUTHORSHIP WERE PROVED,—WHAT GOOD WOULD THAT DO TO YOU? AS THE WHOLE ATTEMPT OF YOURS HAS BEEN TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHING OF TRUTHFULNESS.

—(2798)

COMMENTARY.

'Such'—i.e. in regard to which there is likelihood of being untrue.

—(2798)
It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2344, that—"The Past and the Future times can have no connection with any author of the Veda, etc. etc."

The answer to that is as follows:

**TEXTS (2799–2800).**

**As regards the Probans—'being time', and 'being person',—the negative concomitance of these is doubtful; because, as shown before, it has not been proved that man is incapable of doing the work in question.—The idea of 'Manifestation' also has been rejected. Hence the speaker himself should be regarded as the 'author' (Maker). Thus then, in both the arguments, the Instance is devoid of the Probandums.—(2799–2800)**

**COMMENTARY.**

The fact that the incapacity of all men to compose the Veda has been proved,—that would have served as the reason annulling the contrary conclusion; but as that incapacity has not been proved, the contrary of the Premiss remains in doubt. Hence the Reason becomes 'Inconclusive'.

'As before'—in the case of the Reason 'because it is spoken of as Vedic study'.

'The Instance is devoid of the Probandum',—i.e. the instance cited in the shape of the 'Common man of the present day'.—(2799–2800)

It has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2346, that—"Please understand that the Vedic word is not false, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (2801).**

**Because it is dependent upon the teaching of men, and because it has been proved to be the product of effort,—therefore 'freedom from the Speaker' does not reside in the 'Subject', nor in the Corroborative Instance.—(2801)**

**COMMENTARY.**

'In the Subject or in the Corroborative Instance',—i.e. in that which has been mentioned as the 'Minor Term', or that which has been
cited as the Corroborative Instance—(in the argument put forward by the Mimamsaka).—(2801)

It has been argued by the Mimamsaka, under Text 2347, that—"The Cognition brought about by the Veda must be correct, because it proceeds from the eternal sentence, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2802-2803).

The eternality of the Sentence having been rejected, the character of 'proceeding from the eternal Sentence' is clearly recognised as non-existent in the 'Subject' and in the Corroborative Instance.—Thus, then the fact of the Vedic Injunction not being the work of a Person being uncertain, your subsequent Reasons also are open to the charge of being Doubtful—hence—Inadmissible.

—(2802-2803)

COMMENTARY.

Here also, as before, the Reason is 'inadmissible', and the Corroborative Instance is 'devoid of the Probandum'.

The Locative ending in the term 'Dharmidrśtāntayaḥ' is with reference to the 'character of proceeding from the eternal sentence'.

'Vākyasya'—is to be construed with 'nityatvē'; the Genitive ending denoting relationship'.

'Nītyavākyodbhavatvasya' goes with 'asiddhiḥ'.

'Pashchimēṇu'—the subsequent Reasons—such as 'being produced by causes free from defects' and so forth.—(2802-2803)

Other two Reasons put forward by the Mimamsaka, under Text 2349, are—(1) "because it is brought about by an assertion that does not proceed from an unreliable person";—and (2) "because there is nothing to annul the idea".

It is pointed out below that both of these are 'Inadmissible':—
TEXTS (2804–2806).

When the 'Perpetual Flux' has been established, the Veda, as something eternal by itself, becomes clearly discarded.—
How then can there be any Cognition produced by it?—It has
certainly been declared in the Veda often enough that
'it does not perish' in regard to the Puruṣa (Spirit, Soul);
but the rejection of this has been clearly set forth above;
hence the Reason is clearly 'Inadmissible'.—If a man is
capable of directly perceiving Time, Space and other Souls
like the jujube-fruit in the palm of his hands,—he alone
can have a Cognition for whom there could be no rejection (of
the said ideas).—(2804–2806)

COMMENTARY.

"That which is eternal by itself becomes discarded"—such is the con-
struction.

What is meant is as follows:—It having been proved, by Inference
based upon valid Reasons, that all things are subject to 'Perpetual Flux',
—the Veda, which has been held to be eternal, becomes discarded. 'Śvaru-
pēṇa', by itself, has been added with a view to exclude the subject-matter.

'How can there be any Cognition produced by it?':—That is, it cannot be.
This means that the Reason—'because it is brought about by assertions
not proceeding from an unreliable person'—is Inadmissible, in respect of its
substratum.

The words 'It has certainly been, etc. etc.' show that the other Reason—
because it is free from annulment',—is 'inadmissible' by itself.—We read
in the Veda that 'being imperishable, it perished not' and 'Indestructible
indeed is this Soul'.—Of this Soul or Spirit, the rejection has been set forth
in the chapter dealing with 'No-Soul'. Hence the Reason is surely 'inad-
missible'.

Says the Opponent:—"There is the clear declaration (in the Shabara-
Bhāṣya) that 'Injunction is the name given to the assertion that prompts
activity'; which shows that it is only a particular portion of the Veda that
is called Injunction, not the whole Veda. And it is the 'Cognition produced
by Injunction' that has been made the 'Subject' of our Reasoning. Conse-
quently, even though there may be rejection of the Veda in regard to other
matters, there can be no rejection of the Injunction. So that the Reason
remains perfectly admissible'.

This does not affect our position. In some place the entire Veda has
been spoken of as 'Chodana' (Injunction),—which name has not always
been applied to the prompting Sentence only. Otherwise, the sentence 'One
should not injure living beings' would not be an Injunction; as it does not
prompt to activity.

This would also be incompatible with the assertion in the Shabara-Bhāṣya
—"Both are here spoken of in the Injunction,—that which is conducive to
welfare as also that which is conducive to trouble";—because the Injunction does not prompt activity that leads to trouble,—which would justify the assertion that 'Injunction speaks of what is conducive to trouble'.

Then again, the Shabara-Bhāṣya says—"The Cognition produced by the words of men is sometimes uncertain and wrong,—but there is nothing to show that the Cognition produced by the Veda is wrong".

As the eternal Veda has been discarded, you cannot prevent the suspicion that the said rejection may apply to the Injunction also. As Kumārila has declared—"The fact of the Veda being a means of Right Cognition shall be proved by the fact of its not being the work of any Person".

As a matter of fact, it is clearly seen that there is rejection of the assertions of the Veda relating to an eternal Soul,—even though it may not be the work of a person;—further, in the case of such Vedic assertions as—'Heaven follows from the performance of the Agnihotra', the said suspicion (of falsity) is inevitable. Hence, as pointed out above, the Reason remains doubtful—hence—inadmissible.

This is the reason why the Author reverts to his previous position and reaffirms the idea that the Reason is doubtful—hence—Inadmissible—'If a man is capable of directly perceiving, etc. etc.'

This also serves to set aside the following assertion (made in Shabara-Bhāṣya) :—"The Cognition produced by the Veda is not found to be wrong either at another place or at another time or in another person; hence it must be true".—(2804-2806)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2351, that—"Thus, like Light, the Veda being the 'Eye' for all men, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS** (2807-2808).

**THE VEDA THUS IS SOMETHING OF WHICH THE EXACT FORM OR SUBJECT-MATTER IS NOT KNOW TO MEN,—AND HENCE IT IS LIKE DENSE DARKNESS, FOR WHICH ONLY DULL-WITTED PERSONS CAN HAVE AN ATTACHMENT;—LIKE THE ATTACHMENT OF THE Pārasikas TO THEIR CUSTOMS. HENCE, LIKE THE Pārasikas, THOSE DULL-WITTED PERSONS ALSO, IGNORANT OF ITS MEANING, HAVE RECURS TO SUCH SINFUL ACTS AS THE KILLING OF ANIMALS AND THE LIKE,—UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRUITION OF THEIR PAST WICKED DEEDS.

—(2807-2808)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Rūpa'—form, text;—'abhidhēya'—subject-matter.—'That of which both these are unknown to men.'

There is ignorance of the 'form' of the Veda; as one cannot, either by himself, or with the help of others, determine whether this is the exact letter, or some other letter, in the Text.
Similarly there is uncertainty regarding the subject-matter, meaning, of the Veda. For these reasons, the Veda is like ‘dense darkness’—there being no light illuminating it.

‘Past wicked deeds’—i.e. evil impressions left by past misdeeds;—the ‘nisyanda’, fruition of that.

‘Like them’—i.e. Like the Pārasīkas.—(2807-2808)

It has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsaka at the very outset, that—“people, seeking for knowledge of Dharma and Adharma, must have recourse to the Veda, as the only Means of Right Knowledge”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (2809).**

**Thus, it has not been proved that the Vedic Injunctions are the valid Means of Right Knowledge of Dharma; for the simple reason that its meaning cannot be ascertained by any one, either by himself or with the help of other dull-witted persons.—(2809)**

**COMMENTARY.**

‘Dharma’ has been mentioned by way of illustration; it includes ‘Adharma’ also.—(2809)

Question:—“If that is so, then how can any definite idea be obtained regarding Dharma and other things?”

Answer:—

**TEXT (2810).**

**For these reasons, please seek for a Person whose inner darkness has been dispelled by the light of knowledge, and who is capable of teaching the clear meaning of the Veda.—(2810)**

**COMMENTARY.**

‘Inner darkness’—Ignorance, ‘Painful and Unpainful’;—who has dispelled this by the light of knowledge.

‘Clear’—correct; pure, free from impurities like animal-slaughter, wrongful sexual acts and so forth.

‘Seek for a teacher’;—i.e. it is only then that your idea of the Veda having no personal author would be of any use; otherwise the meaning being not cognisable, the said idea would be futile.
What is meant by this is as follows:—

The notion of yours, that the Veda is self-sufficient in its authority, cannot be right unless there is an omniscient Person;—hence such a Person has got to be admitted;—otherwise the authority and reliability of the Veda would be impossible; as explained above. Under the circumstances, it is far better to rely upon the word of this Person himself, for the knowledge of Dharma and such matters; what is the use of assuming the Word not proceeding from a Person,—the reliability of which Word must always remain doubtful?

It has been argued that matters like Dharma are not amenable to the direct meditative Perception of the Mystics.—This assertion also is defective; because it is going to be proved later on, by means of Inference, that there can be such perception in the case of Mystics.—(2810)

End of Chapter XXIV
CHAPTER XXV

Examination of the Doctrine of 'Self-sufficient Validity'.

COMMENTARY.

With the following Text, the author proceeds to further support the idea of his doctrine being 'free from all self-sufficient Revelation' (declared in the Introductory Texts):

TEXT (2811).

THUS THEN, IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE VEDAS ARE THE WORK OF A PERSONALITY, THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND VALIDITY ALSO BECOMES OVERTHROWN WITHOUT EFFORT.—(2811)

COMMENTARY.

With a view to establish the authority (and reliability) of the Revealed Word, the followers of Jaimini have declared that of all Pramāṇas (Cognitions and Means of Cognition) the validity is self-sufficient, inherent,—and its only invalidity is due to other causes, extrinsic. They argue that if their validity were extrinsic (due to other causes), there would be an infinite regress; which would strike at the root of all notions of the valid and invalid cognitions.

On this question, there are four views possible:—(1) Sometimes both validity and invalidity are inherent;—(2) sometimes both are extrinsic;—(3) Validity is extrinsic and Invalidity is inherent;—(4) Validity is inherent and Invalidity is extrinsic.

(1) The first view is not tenable; because would both Validity and Invalidity belong to the same individual cognition? Or to different ones (Validity to one and Invalidity to another)? It is not possible for two mutually contradictory and exclusive characters as Validity and Invalidity to belong to one and the same individual.—Nor can they belong to different individuals; as there is nothing to determine which would belong to what; and hence there could be no certainty regarding it; which would mean that there would be no distinction between Valid and Invalid Cognitions which would not be confused. Because both being equally independent, there could be no certainty as to any particular Cognition being valid only. Because, as regards Anulment also, all difference between the two would become obliterated; and there is no other means admitted that could definitely determine the one or the other. Thus any distinction as to one being valid and the other invalid would be impossible.

(2) Nor can the second view be right; because the Cognition that had no character previously would have to be regarded as character-less. Further, Validity and Invalidity being mutually exclusive, if both of these were absent,
—no other character could be recognised as belonging to it; and thus it would become truly 'inexplicable', 'indeterminate'.—This has been thus declared (by Kumārila in Shlokavārtika—Chodanā-Sūtra 35 and 37)—'Both (Validity and Invalidity) cannot be intrinsic, as the two are mutually contradictory; nor can both be extrinsic; as in this case, the Cognition would have to be regarded as featureless (35)... If it be argued that the two characters might not be incompatible, as belonging to different Cognitions,—even so, as it is not dependent upon anything else, it cannot be determined which character belongs to which cognition.'

(3) Nor can the third view be right; [that Validity is inherent and Invalidity, is extrinsic];—as this involves an infinite regress. For instance, what is by itself intrinsically invalid, can never be expected to bring about validity; because it is itself invalid; nor could it be expected to proceed from what is valid; because it stands on the same footing as the other;—if it be expected that validity would come from outside,—then there would be an infinite regress. For the purpose of determining the validity of a single Cognition, one would have to follow up a series of such Means,—and the entire life of man would become used up.

For these reasons, there being no other alternative available, the validity of all Pramāṇas (Cognitions and Means of Cognition) must be regarded as inherent in them, and the invalidity as extrinsic.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When certain things are restricted to a certain thing,—they do not need anything else, so far as that thing is concerned,—e.g. Ākāśa and Incorporeality;—the Pramāṇas in question are restricted to the character of being valid;—hence there is apprehension of something contrary to the wider character.—The Reason adduced here is not 'Inconclusive'; a character which is impossible by itself cannot be thrust upon it by something else; e.g. corporeality cannot be thrust upon Ākāśa.—This has been thus asserted—'The Potency that is non-existent by itself can never be created by anything else.' [Shlokavārtika—Chodanā-Sūtra 47].—(2811)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out objections against the above view (of the Mīmāṃsaka), by showing the insignificant character of his proposition:—

TEXT (2812).

YOU HAVE MADE THE ASSERTION THAT—'THE VALIDITY OF ALL Pramāṇas* SHOULD BE REGARDED AS INHERENT IN THEM'—[Shlokavārtika, Chodanā-Sūtra 47].—NOW WHAT IS THE MEANING THAT YOU ATTACH TO THIS ASSERTION?—(2812)

COMMENTARY.

To this question—what is the meaning that you attach to this assertion?
—the other party provides the following answer:—

* The dual sense of the form 'Pramāṇa' as Cognition and Means of Cognition is brought out clearly in the Commentary on Text 2813. It has been thought best therefore to retain the original term 'Pramāṇa' throughout this chapter.
TEXT (2813).

"[What is meant is that] the capacity to bring about the apprehension of the cognisable thing, etc., belongs to the Pramāṇas by their very nature; the capacity that is not inherent in a thing by itself cannot be produced by anything else."—(2813)

COMMENTARY.

If Cognition is what is 'Pramāṇa' in the sense of the form of Cognition, then the capacity to bring about the apprehension of the cognisable,—i.e. the cognition of what is to be cognised,—must be inherent in it; because Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of things.—If, however, the Eye and the Organs are meant to be 'Pramāṇa', in the sense of the 'means of Cognition', then the capacity to bring about the right cognition of things must be inherent in it; and the Vedic Injunction also must have the capacity inherent in it, of bringing about the cognition of things beyond the senses. All this is included under the term 'ādi', 'etc.' (in the compound 'maya-bodhādikā').

The argument in support of this idea is added in the words (of the second line)—'The capacity that is not, etc. etc.'—(2813)

The same idea is further explained by the Mimāmsaka:

TEXT (2814).

"'Independence' (Self-sufficiency) is the only basis for validity. If 'dependence' were admitted, then the validity itself would be destroyed.'"—(2814)

COMMENTARY.

'Basis of validity'—i.e. of the very idea of 'validity'.
'Tadēva'—Validity itself.—Because on the cessation of the more extensive character, the less extensive one cannot continue.—(2814)

The following might be urged—'Let the validity be destroyed; what is the harm?'
The Mimāmsaka's answer to this is as follows:
EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY'. 1273

TEXT (2815).

"HOW CAN ANY REASONABLE PROTAGONIST ACCEPT A VIEW THAT STRIKES AT THE VERY ROOT OF THE MATTER—WHEN HIS EXPRESSION OF THIS VIEW ITSELF DESTROYS THE VERY MEANS OF ESTABLISHING IT?"—(2815)

COMMENTARY.

'Root of the matter'—i.e. Validity.—This is 'struck at the root'—done away with—by the idea of 'dependence on something else';—because it is contrary to a character more extensive than that. Because 'validity' is 'pervaded by'—less extensive than—'independence'; how then could this 'validity' obtain a footing, if there were the said 'dependence', which is contrary to 'Independence' which pervades 'validity' itself?

'When, etc. etc.'—points out the Invariable Concomitance between 'Validity' and 'Independence'.

'Yēna'—Because.—(2815)

Question:—In what way does it destroy the means of establishing it?
Answer:—

TEXT (2816).

"THAT 'VALIDITY' IS 'DEPENDENT' (NOT SELF-SUFFICIENT) CAN NEVER BE SECURELY ESTABLISHED;—AND WHEN HIS REASON ITSELF HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED, WHO CAN PROVE THAT WHICH IS TO BE PROVED BY THAT REASON?"

—(2816)

COMMENTARY.

'Cannot be securely established',—i.e. it would involve an Infinite Regress. Question.—There might be an Infinite Regress; what is the harm?
Answer:—'When the Reason, etc. etc.'—i.e. that party whose Reason itself has not been established—duly ascertained.—What is meant is that it is only when the Indicator itself has become known that it indicates the object which is 'pervaded by'—invariably concomitant with—itself; it does not do so by its mere presence.—So that, when the Party himself has no definite idea of the Reason, how can he adduce that Reason for convincing the other party?—(2816)

With the following Texts, the Author proceeds to refute the above arguments (of the Mīmāṃsāka in support of the Inherent Validity of Cognitions):—
If this is what is meant,—then the said capacity (Potency) of all things cannot be non-different from themselves, as explained before;—in fact, 'Capacity' is the name given to that form of the thing (Cause) which is capable of producing the desired effect; if then, that form were not of the nature of a positive entity, then the said thing could not be an active agent (Efficient Cause).—(2817-2818)

COMMENTARY.

Now what is it that is meant by the term 'inherent' (belonging to it by its very nature)?—(a) Does it mean that it is 'inherent' in the sense that being eternal, it has no cause? Or (b) that it is 'inherent' in the sense that, even though it is not-eternal, it appears at the same time that the Cognitions have their essence (existence) brought about by their causes,—and not that it is imposed upon them subsequently by other causes?—These are the two alternative views possible.

Now, the first of these [that it has no cause] is not acceptable; because (1) would such a 'Capacity' be something different (from the Cognition to which it belongs)? Or (2) non-different from it? Or (3) neither different nor non-different? Or (4) both different and non-different?—These four alternatives are possible.

Of these the first [that the Capacity is something different] cannot be accepted. Because, there can be no connection between them, and also because in that case, things could never be active agents, etc. etc.—as it has been explained several times, when the conclusion arrived was that in the case of all things, their capacity (Potency) is not anything different from the things themselves.

This is what is pointed out in the words—'In fact Capacity is the name, etc. etc.'—The 'Capacity' of the nature of things consists in its efficiency to produce its effect; and if this 'nature' were not of the nature of a positive entity, then that entity could not be an active agent; and thus (not being capable of effective action) it would become a 'non-entity'.—(2817-2818)

If it is meant that the Capacity is not-different (from the thing, the Pramāṇa),—then, it could not be 'natural', 'inherent'. Because things, as coming into existence through the efficiency of their causes, must be non-eternal; so that the Capacity also, if non-different from the thing, would have to be regarded as non-eternal, on account of its coming into existence through the efficiency of its cause. Otherwise, not sharing the same fate, the two could not be non-different.

This is what is pointed out in the following:—
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TEXT (2819).

How can such a 'Capacity' of Pramāṇas—which is non-eternal, as coming into existence through the efficiency of its Cause,—be held by you to be 'natural' 'inherent'?—(2819)

COMMENTARY.

Further, if the Pramāṇas are non-different from the said 'Capacity', they would themselves, like the Capacity, be eternal and without cause.—This is what is pointed out in the following:

TEXT (2820).

If the 'Capacity' (of Pramāṇas) were 'natural' (inherent), the Pramāṇas themselves would have to be regarded as eternal and without cause. Because Pramāṇas would be of the same nature, they would surely be eternal and without cause.—(2820)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"What is the harm if that is so?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (2821-2822).

In the event of the Pramāṇas being without cause, they would be either permanently existent or permanently non-existent; because they would not be dependent upon anything; under the circumstances, the effect contingent upon those Pramāṇas could not be occasional;—as a matter of fact, however, the form as well as the effect of Pramāṇas is found to be occasional;—hence it is clear that for you, the 'Capacity' in question cannot be 'natural' (inherent).—(2821-2822)

COMMENTARY.

If they are without cause, they must either exist for ever, or never exist at all. That in the event of their eternality, they must exist for ever—is well known; hence it has not been mentioned separately.
Another incongruity is pointed out—"Under the circumstances, etc. etc."
"Tadāyattam"—contingent upon the Pramāṇas.
This shows that the Proposition of the other party is contrary to Perception and Inference. For instance, that the form of the Cognitions and their Means is occasional, is known by direct Perception,—and is also inferred from the fact of its effects appearing successively, one after the other. Thus these two Means of Cognition clearly set aside the idea of the said Eternality of Cognitions.—(2821-2822)

In the following Text, the other party makes an attempt at avoiding the two incongruities just urged:—

TEXT (2823).

IF IT BE HELD THAT—"THE FORM OF THE Pramāṇas ACQUIRES ITS MANIFESTATION THROUGH CERTAIN MANIFESTING AGENCIES; AND THEN THAT FORM, THROUGH THE HELP OF OTHER CAUSAL FACTORS, BRINGS ABOUT ITS OWN EFFECT"—THEN THE ANSWER IS AS BELOW.—(2823)

COMMENTARY.

When the form of the Pramāṇa is manifested by the manifesting agencies, then alone it is apprehended, not otherwise;—hence, even though it is eternal, there is no possibility of its being apprehended at all times.—Nor can there be any possibility of its effect appearing at all times; because our idea is that it produces its effects only with the help of other contributory causes,—and not by itself alone. Thus it is that the effect comes about only occasionally, due to the presence or absence of these contributory causes. —(2823)

The answer to the above explanation of the Mīmāṁsaka is as follows:—

TEXT (2824).

THE WHOLE IDEA OF THE ‘MANIFESTATION’ OF THE ETERNAL THING AND ITS BEING DEPENDENT UPON OTHER CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES HAS BEEN REJECTED ALREADY; HENCE THE EFFECTS PRODUCIBLE BY THE Pramāṇas BY THEMSELVES SHOULD BE APPREHENDED AT ALL TIMES.—(2824)

COMMENTARY.

‘Manifestation—and—dependence upon other causes’.—Under the chapter on the ‘Revealed Word’, the idea of ‘manifestation’ of the eternal thing has been refuted in detail; and it has also been explained that the thing that cannot be helped cannot be dependent upon other causes.
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'The effects producible, etc. etc.'—'Tat' stands for the Pramāṇas; the effects of these by themselves, etc. etc.

The view that "the Potency may be both (different and non-different)" cannot be right, because they are mutually contradictory and also because it would be open to all the objections that have been urged against Difference as also those urged against Non-difference.

Nor can the view that "it is neither different nor non-different" be accepted. Because between two mutually exclusive things, the affirmation of one is inseparable from the denial of the other; hence it can never be right to deny it at the very time that it is affirmed; as the affirmation and denial of the same thing involves an incongruity. This objection is quite clear; hence it has not been stated in the Text.—(2824)

The Author now admits the last three alternative views (for the sake of argument), and then points out objections against them:

TEXT (2825).

WHETHER THE capacity be different or both (different and non-different),—THE Pramāṇa ITSELF MUST BE ETERNAL,—BEING ASSOCIATED WITH THE ETERNAL capacity.—(2825)

COMMENTARY.

'Pṛthaktwam'—i.e. the view that the Capacity is different from the Cognition.—'Ubbhayātmakam', 'Both';—this is by way of illustration; it should be taken as including the view that 'it is neither different nor non-different'.—Or this last also may be taken as mentioned in the same term 'ubbhayātmaka'; as this also consists of both—i.e. the denial of both.

Under all these three views, the Cognition must be eternal, by reason of its being related to the Capacity, which is eternal.—(2825)

Question:—"How so?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2826).

IF THAT WERE NOT SO, THEN THE Capacity COULD NOT BE ETERNAL; AS IT WOULD NOT CONTINUE IN THE SAME FORM;—BEING AT TIMES ASSOCIATED WITH THE Cognition, AND NOT-ASSOCIATED WITH IT AT OTHERS.—(2826)

COMMENTARY.

'If that were not so'—i.e. 'if the Cognition associated with the Capacity were not-eternal,—then, the Capacity itself could not be eternal'.

"Why?"

'Because it would not continue in the same form'—i.e. because there would not be continuance of the same form.
The said 'non-continuance of the same form' is pointed out, by the words—'being at times, etc. etc.';—if the Cognition is not-eternal, then the Capacity would have two forms,—one associated with the Cognition, and the other not-associated with the Cognition; and it is not possible for the same thing to have two mutually contradictory characters; as in that case it would cease to be one; and there would be an end to all notions of difference.—(2826)

The Author now refers to the second alternative view [mentioned in the Commentary on 2817-2818; viz.: that "the Capacity is inherent, in the sense that though it is non-eternal, it appears at the same time that the Pramāṇas have their essence brought about by their causes"]:

TEXT (2827).

If the view taken is that—"the Capacity is produced by the causes of the Pramāṇas themselves, and is not something imposed upon them by other causes, after they have come out of their causes",—then the answer is as follows in the following Text.—(2827)

COMMENTARY.

The following Text provides the answer to this view;—that it is open to the charge of 'futility':—

TEXTS (2828-2829).

Then, there is no dispute between us. Who is there who could make the assumption that the Capacity of an indivisible thing is infused into it after that thing has been produced by its causes? Because the form that is subsequently infused into a thing by other causes is an entirely different entity; and it is not the character of this other entity that is being taught in the present context.—(2828-2829)

COMMENTARY.

Both kinds of things, permanent and impermanent,—which are indivisible—come about in their complete form always, as one indivisible whole; and no causal factor can, later on, infuse into them any capacity; if any such capacity were infused, it would mean the production of an entirely new thing, and not the infusion of the Capacity as a new feature of the same thing. If the Capacity is not regarded as part of the nature of the thing, it would cease to be an active agent; as has been explained before.—(2828-2829)
The following might be urged—"It may be that no Capacity can be imposed upon an indivisible thing subsequently; why cannot it be imposed upon what is divisible?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2830).

'Difference' among things has been explained as consisting in their being associated with contrary (divergent) properties; so that, if on the appearance of the Cognition, there is non-appearance of the Capacity,—the said contrary property is clearly present in the capacity.—(2830)

COMMENTARY.

The following Text proceeds to point out the objection that is specially applicable when things are impermanent:—

TEXTS (2831-2832).

With reference to all things, it has been proved that there is 'perpetual flux'; hence it is not possible for any efficient causal factor to impose a 'Capacity' upon things.—Such things have no subsequent existence, by virtue of which they could acquire a capacity from other causes, for the bringing about of any effect.—(2831-2832)

COMMENTARY.

'For the bringing, etc. etc.'—such as the definite cognition of things. The rest is easily understood.—(2831-2832)

The following might be urged—"If you have no dispute with us, then, why have you accepted the view that the validity of Pramāṇas is extraneous?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2833).

All that the wise Buddhists assert is only this—though present in a certain cognition, the Capacity cannot be apprehended by itself.—(2833)

COMMENTARY.

'Apprehended'—with certainty.

'By itself'—i.e. by the mere presence of the Cognition,—by the mere apprehension of things,—irrespective of the subsequent conformity of its effects.—(2833)
The following might be urged—"Inasmuch as the Capacity is not anything different from the Cognition,—when the Cognition has been apprehended, the Capacity also becomes apprehended as a matter of course; then why cannot it be apprehended?"

*Answer* :

**TEXT (2834).**

**WHO CAN BE CAPABLE OF DEFINITELY APPREHENDING, FROM THE MERE NATURE OF THE COGNITION ITSELF, THE CAPACITY OF THE COGNISED THING, AS IT STANDS, TO BRING ABOUT ITS APPREHENSION AND ATTAINMENT?**—(2834)

**COMMENTARY.**

' *Bodha*' is *apprehension*; ' *āpti*' is *attainment*;—' of the cognised thing as it stands' ;—the capacity to bring about the said *apprehension* and *attainment*—[who can apprehend?]

' *Mere*'—independently of the properties of the cause,—such as ' *Relationship* ' and the like.—(2834)

*Question* :—"Why can no one apprehend it?"

*Answer* :

**TEXT (2835).**


**COMMENTARY.**

' *Kūṣaṇa, etc. etc.*'—In the case of such illusory perceptions as those of the ' Hair-tuft ' (perceived on pressing the Eyes).

What is meant by this is as follows :—Even when the Capacity has been apprehended, as the apprehension resembles an invalid cognition, there can be no certainty regarding it; just as in the case of the potency of antidotes to poison. Mere apprehension cannot bring about certainty; as confirmation by actual appearance is needed for that purpose; and there is certainty only in regard to that aspect on which other properties have not been imposed by causes of misconception.—(2835)

*Question* :—"How then can it be known with certainty?"

*Answer* :—
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TEXT (2836).

Hence what is needed is the cognition of ‘effective action’ or some other factor,—for the purpose of bringing about certainty,—not for infusion of the capacity; as in the case of poison, etc.—(2836)

COMMENTARY.

‘Some other factor’—such as the knowledge of the purity of its source.
‘Not for the infusion, etc. etc.’;—this has to be construed with ‘anyat apêksyatē’.
‘Asyâl’—of the capacity.
Because certain cognition subsists in the Cognising Person, it is only right that for the bringing about of such cognition other causes should be needed;—not so, for the purpose of infusing the capacity; as this ‘infusion’ subsists in the capacity,—and the capacity having come about along with the Cognition, the ‘infusion’ also becomes accomplished on that.—(2836)

The following Text proceeds to explain the example of ‘Poison, etc.’ (cited under Text 2836):—

TEXTS (2837-2838).

In the case of poison and wine, it being found that they are similar to other things, and their effects do not appear immediately,—for the purpose of the certainty of the cognition that it is really poison or wine, it is necessary that its effects should be definitely perceived, in the shape of unconsciousness, sweating, incoherent talk, and so forth.—In the same manner the existence of the capacity in the Cognition can be ascertained only on the appearance of its effects.—(2837-2838)

COMMENTARY.

‘Being found, etc. etc.’—the ‘finding’—perception—of its similarity to ‘other things’;—such for instance as the drink called ‘Nāgara-pāṇa’.
‘And the effects, etc. etc.’—‘Effects’—unconsciousness and the like;—the non-appearance of these immediately; that is, because their effects do not follow immediately.
‘For the purpose of the certainty, etc. etc.’—the sure Cognition that it is really Poison or Wine.
‘The Capacity’—in the Cognition, of apprehending and attaining (getting at) the cognised thing as it really exists.—(2837-2838)

The following Text points out that the Proposition (of the other party) involves contradiction of his own words:—

TEXTS (2839-2840).

FURTHER, INDISPUTABLE ‘VALIDITY’, CONSISTING IN ‘CAPACITY’, CAN BE ASCERTAINED THROUGH ANOTHER MEANS OF COGNITION,—AS HAS BEEN ASSERTED BY YOURSELF, IN THE DECLARATION THAT THE “CAPACITY OR POTENCY OF ALL THINGS IS PROVED BY PRESUMPTION BASED UPON THE FACT THAT THEIR EFFECTS CANNOT BE OTHERWISE EXPLAINED”.—[Shlokavārtika—Śānyavāda, 254].

NOW IF IT IS PROVED BY PRESUMPTION, WHY CANNOT IT BE REGARDED AS PROVED BY SOMETHING EXTRANEOUS TO ITSELF?—(2839-2840)

COMMENTARY.

‘Why cannot it, etc.’—It must be so regarded; that is, because the said Presumption is another Pramāṇa.—(2839-2840)

It has been argued (by the Mīmāṃsaka) under Text 2814, that—‘the validity itself would be destroyed, if it were held to be dependent on something else’.

The following Text points out that this argument is ‘Inconclusive’:—

TEXT (2841).

THE VALIDITY, BEING SOMETHING INDIVISIBLE, HAVING BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY ITS OWN CAUSES,—THERE WOULD BE NO DESTRUCTION OF IT BY ITS DEPENDENCE ON SOMETHING ELSE; AS SUCH DEPENDENCE IS NECESSARY ONLY FOR BRINGING ABOUT CERTAINTY (REGARDING THE VALIDITY).—(2841)

COMMENTARY.

The same idea is further clarified:—

TEXT (2842).

THE OTHER PRAMĀṇA IS NOT NEEDED FOR THE BRINGING ABOUT OF THE VALIDITY ITSELF; IT IS NEEDED IN THE PRAMĀṇA ONLY FOR THE COGNITION OF CERTAINTY REGARDING ITS EXACT CHARACTER.—(2842)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged:—‘If you are seeking to prove the fact of the validity of Cognition being ‘extraneous’ in relation to the Pramāṇa
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itself,—then we also admit it, and hence your argument is futile; because the existence of the Cognition itself is held to be proved by Presumption,—what to say of its validity, which consists in its Capacity? —In the matter, however, of the bringing about of its effect in the shape of the certain cognition of the object, the Cognition does not need anything else; that is why the validity has been described as 'self-sufficient', 'inherent' ".

This cannot be right; because the certain cognition of the object of the Cognition cannot be got at without certainty regarding its validity. Because how can the object, which is still subject to doubt and uncertainty, be independent and self-sufficient, in the bringing about of its effect? If it were dependent upon apprehensions produced by other Means of Cognition,—how could you avoid Infinite Regress involved in your view? So what has been suggested is nothing.—(2842)

The following Texts point out the 'Inconclusive' character of the Reason — "because it is restricted to its presence [the Validity must be self-sufficient]" :—

TEXTS (2843-2846).

Then again, in the way that you have argued, invalidity also would have to be regarded as 'inherent'; because (1) if it did not exist there by itself, it could not be brought about by anything; (2) because 'self-sufficiency' is the only basis for invalidity, so on and so forth,—all this (that you have urged in support of inherent validity) could be urged (in support of inherent invalidity); —and just as (according to you) the capacity for non-conformity (with the real state of things) and 'certain cognition' would be due to other causes; so (according to your opponent) would be the capacity for conformity and certain cognition; so that in all this, both would be on the same footing.—Under the circumstances, what peculiar feature have you seen in 'Validity' which is not present in its contrary ('Invalidity')—on the basis of which, the former has been held to be 'Inherent' and the latter 'Extraneous'?—(2843–2846)

COMMENTARY.

'So also the capacity for conformity'—'and certain cognition' is to be construed here also.

'Both would be on the same footing'—i.e. both Validity and Invalidity.

'In its contrary'—i.e. in Invalidity.

Some people argue as follows—"The inherent character of the Capacities is not due to their eternality; nor is it due to the fact of their coming about from the causes of the Cognition itself; and it does not appear later on—on account of its being not dependent upon other causes; as a matter of fact,
it is the potencies of things that come about, with specific characters, from
the nature of the things themselves; and herein lies their 'naturalness' (or
Inherent character). For instance, that same form (and character) which
belongs to the causes is infused by them in their effect; for example, when
the Jar is produced out of the potsherds, the colour and other properties in
the Jar are brought about by the potsherds through their own properties;
and as for the capacity to contain water, that capacity is not present in the
potsherds, and hence that is not brought about in the Jar in the said manner;
this capacity in fact, appears in the Jar by itself;—similarly, in the case of
Cognitions, the capacity to differentiate and apprehend things, which is not
present in the sense-organs and other causes of the Cognitions, is not brought
about by these causes; it appears in the Cognitions by themselves.—Thus it
is that the Capacity is 'natural' (inherent)'.

This also is mere senseless babbling. Because by the same process of
reasoning, Invalidity also may be shown to be 'inherent'. For instance,'invalidity' consists in 'the capacity to differentiate and apprehend things
otherwise than this real form'; and such capacity is not present in the
Eye and other causes of Cognition.

Further, if it is true that the form that is not present in the Causes is not
produced by them in the Effect,—then how is it that the Sense-organ and other
causes of Cognition produce, in the Cognition, the form that was not present
there before? Just as this form, though not present there, is produced there
by the causes,—so, in the same manner, why could not they produce in it
the capacity for apprehending things also? There can be nothing to prevent
their producing such capacity.

Then again, if Potencies or Capacities are held to be non-different from
the thing (to which they belong), then,—like the form of the Thing—the
capacities also must have their existence concomitant with (and due to) their
causes; whence then could they be 'natural' or 'inherent'?—If, on the
other hand, the capacities are different from the thing,—then, as they would
be existent by themselves, they would have no connection with their sub-
stratum (the Thing); as it would be rendering no help to them and what
cannot render any help cannot be the substratum; otherwise, there would
be incongruities. Further, as they would have no causes, they would be
appearing by themselves without being dependent upon the exigencies of
time and place. For instance, a thing, having come into existence, disappears
only when it is dependent upon something else; that which is not so depen-
dent, and operates by itself independently,—why should it cease to operate
at any time or place? If that were so, then the capacities of things would
not be restricted; anything could operate towards everything else.

Other people argue as follows:—"What has been said (by the Mimânsa,
in Text 2812)—as to the validity of the Pramânás being inherent in
them, is on the basis of what is seen of their effects. Because it is only as
positive existent entities that effects are produced by the Causes;—as is
clear from the fact that the producing of effects is always restricted. What
are mere non-entities,—such as the 'sky-lotus'—cannot be produced any-
where; nor is oil produced out of Sands.—If the non-existent thing were pro-
duced, as all things would be equally non-existent, and there would be no difference among them on that score, their production should come about at all times and at all places 1.

This cannot be right; as, in that case, the Cause would be entirely futile. According to you, nothing that is non-existent is produced; while as for the existent,—as it does not stand in need of anything,—what is there that could be produced for it; then what is there by producing which the Cause would be an active agent? So that under this view there would be an end to the whole principle of Cause and Effect.

It might be argued that—"what is brought about by the Cause is the manifestation of what has been existent".

That cannot be; because the bringing about of the Manifestation also would be incompatible with the view that it is existent or non-existent. Because, in regard to the Manifestation also the same alternatives present themselves—before being brought about, has it been existent or non-existent?

—In the former case, as nothing new is produced, the notion of its being 'produced' cannot be right. If it be held that there is manifestation of the existent Manifestation,—then there would be an infinite regress.—Nor is the second alternative acceptable; because the other party does not admit of the idea of anything non-existent being produced. Even if it be accepted, it would mean that in the case of a positive entity itself, what is produced is something non-existent.

Then again, when the Manifestation is produced, is it produced as something different from the entity manifested? Or as something not-different from it?—If it is something different,—then such production of the Manifested entity would have no effect on the manifested entity itself; because the producing of one thing can have no effect on a thing different from it; if it did, there would be incongruities.

It might be said that—"the manifestation is produced in what is related to the manifested entity".

That, however, cannot be so; because it cannot be related to it, as it is not benefited by it in any way.—If there is any benefit admitted,—if that is something different, etc. etc.—there is an Infinite regress. Hence there can be no relationship in the case.

If the Manifestation is not-different from the manifested entity,—then Causes become futile. If the Manifestation, in the form of some benefit, is produced out of the Entity in which it subsists,—then there should be such Manifestation at all times; as the cause of Manifestation, in the shape of the nature of the Entity, would be always there. It has been explained repeatedly that what cannot be benefited cannot depend upon anything else.

If then, the view is that what is produced is the Manifestation which is not-different from the entity,—that also cannot be right; as in that case there is nothing new produced. Because what the assertion, 'The Manifestation, non-different from the entity, is produced,' means is that 'the nature of the entity is produced'; and as this would be existent already, it could not need anything else; and hence the idea of its being produced would be most improper. Hence we are discussing this same view.
Then again, like the Manifestation, the entity also that would be produced would have to be non-existent; as there is no difference between the two (ex hypothesi). Or, like the nature of the entity, the Manifestation also that would be produced would be existent. Nor is this right; as nothing new is produced in this case; as there would be an infinite regress, as already explained.

Further, if it be held that the Cause operates upon what is already existent, then there would be no cessation of the producing of effects by Causes; as in that case, on securing what, would the Causes cease to operate?—If it be urged that—"they would cease on securing the existence of the effect"—then that cannot be right; as, under your view, that existence would be already there. Hence that non-existent thing alone is produced of which there is a Cause,—and not such non-existent things as the 'sky-lotus'; as there are no causes capable of producing these latter.

Thus it is that the causal relation is always restricted by the limitations of the efficiency of the Cause. Everything cannot be regarded as capable of producing everything else; as the efficiency of all things is restricted within limits through a beginningless 'chain of causes'.

If the idea is that—"because validity, if not existent, could not be produced by anything else, therefore it is said to be inherent",—then, for the same reason, Invalidity also should be regarded as inherent. Hence the explanation is not worthy of notice.

Some people argue as follows:—"The validity of the Cognition consists in its capacity to bring about the apprehension of the Object; and this Capacity resting in the Cognition, which is momentary, if not existent by itself, cannot be produced; and no producing of it can be possible at any of the three points of time. For instance, it cannot be produced before the appearance of the Cognition, as it is in the Cognition that it subsists; and what is subsistent cannot be produced in the absence of the substratum; e.g. the painting cannot be produced in the absence of the wall;—as if it did, it would cease to be subsistent. It is for this same reason of the Capacity being subsistent in the Cognition, that both cannot be regarded as produced simultaneously; e.g. the wall and the painting, which are the substratum and the subsistent respectively, are not produced at one and the same time.—Nor, on the other hand, can the Capacity be produced in the Cognition after the latter has been in existence; because the Cognition is momentary, and cannot continue to exist so long.—It is on all these grounds that the validity of all Pramāṇas is held to be inherent in them".

All this cannot be right. Because, as regards the assertion that—"The validity of cognitions consists in the Capacity productive of the apprehension of things"—this is entirely irrelevant; because 'the apprehension of things' is synonymous with 'cognition'; and the Capacity subsisting in a Cognition cannot be productive of the same cognition; as in that case the capacity would not be subsistent in the Cognition; as the relation of cause and effect can be there only when both are there at one and the same time.

Then, it has been argued that—"being subsistent, the Capacity cannot be produced at the same time as, or before, the Cognition".—This also
cannot be right. Because, the two being non-different (ex hypothesi), the one cannot be subsistent in the other.

The fact of the matter is that when the nature of the thing itself is found to be capable of a particular effective action,—and there arises the question as to its exact character,—the same nature of the thing is called 'Capacity' (Potency); and it is not anything different. If the Capacity were something different from the Thing, the latter would cease to be an active agent; and there would be no possibility of any relationship between the two. This has been already discussed several times.—Thus then the capacity of the Cognition forms its very nature, and is subject to the same fate; and as such, before the appearance of the Cognition, it remains non-existent, just like the nature of the Cognition itself,—and is then brought about. There is no incongruity in this view of the matter.

It is also quite right that the Capacity is produced along with the Cognition itself; because the property that forms the nature of a thing must always share the same fate as that thing itself.

Or, the Capacity may be something different from the thing to which it belongs. Even so, as there can be no subsistence between the existent and the non-existent,—the said subsistence cannot be admitted. Because the Capacity cannot subsist in the Cognition, in the manner that 'Being' does; because it is always completely established and does not depend upon anything else. Nor can there be any substratum for the existent thing; as such a substratum can serve no useful purpose; as for instance, in the case of the Vindhya and the Himalaya mountains.—It might be said that—"what it brings about is continued existence".—But that cannot be right. Because the 'continued existence' cannot be anything different from the existent thing. In fact, it is the nature of the existent thing itself that is spoken of as 'continued existence', with a view to the denial of all other diversities. But the essence of the existent thing is not brought about by such a substratum; hence it is futile.—If the continued existence and the existent thing be different from one another, then anything tending to bring about existence would be futile; as what it would bring about is only something else, in the shape of the continued existence; but the bringing about of one thing cannot produce any effect in another thing; so in either case there would be futility of what brings about the continued existence.—It might be argued that—"it brings about an existence related to it".—That cannot be so; because there can be no relationship between 'continued existence' and the 'existent', as there is between the permanence and what brings about the permanence; and this would also lead to an infinite regress. This has been so often discussed.

Then again, if the 'continued existence' that makes the thing 'lasting', be admitted to be something different from that thing,—then, there can be no Destruction of anything at all; as the continued existence conducive to permanence would be always there.—Nor can it be asserted that—"Even though the continued existence is there, there would be destruction by causes leading to that Destruction". Because such cause also, being futile, could not bring about the Destruction. Because in this case also, the following
alternatives present themselves: When the cause of Destruction brings about the Destruction, does it bring this about as something different from the Thing destroyed? Or is it the Thing itself?—It cannot bring about the Thing itself; as this is already there as an accomplished entity; and if it brings about something different, then it brings about nothing in the Thing itself, which continues to remain as before. Then again, as there can be no Destruction of anything, the cause of Destruction must be futile; all this has been discussed in detail in course of the examination of the 'Permanence of Things'.

Further, by its very nature, the thing could be either impermanent or permanent.—If then, the thing appearing from its cause is impermanent by its nature, then, as soon as that impermanent thing has come about, it should cease to exist by itself,—so that there would be nothing to be done by the two causes—that of continued existence, and that of Destruction.—If, on the other hand, the Thing is permanent, by its nature,—even so, as its nature could not be altered, there would be nothing that could destroy it; and being permanent, by itself, there could be nothing that could make it lasting; so in both cases the causes of Continuance and of Destruction would be futile.

Nor can it be right to hold that the Capacity subsists in something non-existent. Because what is non-existent is devoid of all character,—it cannot have anything introduced into it; nor can it be operative; hence it would be like the 'Hare's Horn'.

From all this it follows that the Capacity cannot be subsistent in anything.

If it were admitted that the Capacity is subsistent;—even so, the Reason would be 'Inconclusive'; because even though Colour, etc. do not subsist in the Jar, they are produced along with it.

Then again, the same could be said regarding Invalidity also; for instance, Invalidity also consists in the capacity productive of the wrong apprehension of things;—and when this Capacity subsists in the Cognition, it cannot be produced at any of the three points of time; so that, as in the case of Validity so in that of Invalidity also, the Capacity consisting of this Invalidity should be inherent in the Cognition.

Further, if at any time, the Capacity of the cognition does not come into existence, then the Cognition becomes devoid of all Capacity. When a certain property is not produced in it at any time, how can that property belong to it? For instance, corporeality can never belong to Akāśha. Where, too, have the Capacities learnt this wonderful magic whereby, even though never produced in the Cognition at any time, they enjoy association with it?—It might be said that—'They enjoy some wonderful substance by reason of their eternality'.—But that is not possible; because in that way everything would be endowed with such Capacities; as there would be nothing to restrict them. When a certain thing is not under the influence of another, we see no reason why it should be restricted in its association with certain particular things only; hence there can be nothing to show that such capacities belong to the Cognition alone, not to anything else. Consequently, there
being no restrictive agency near at hand, the Capacities should belong to all things; as has been explained before.

Nor can there be any substratum for these capacities, as no useful purpose could be served by such a substratum; specially because, being eternal, they cannot have any additional character produced in them.—Enough of this discussion!—(2843–2846)

The following Text continues the discussion on the real meaning of the Proposition of the Mīmāṃsāka:—

TEXT (2847).

"When the validity of the Pramāṇas is described as 'inherent',—what is meant is that what is 'inherent' (self-sufficient) is their activity towards the bringing about of their effect, after they have themselves come into existence."—(2847)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—"By the phrase 'self-validity' it is meant that after the Pramāṇas (Cognitions) have become born (come about), their subsequent activity towards the producing of their own effects is independent of other causes,—that is, their causal efficiency, after they have been born, rests in themselves; so that there is no room for the objections urged above";—this is what is meant by the other party.—The effect of the Pramāṇas themselves consists in either the certainty regarding their own validity, or the definite cognition of the object cognised. In the bringing about of this effect, the Pramāṇas do not need any other cause.—(2847)

Question:—Wherefore then is their need for other causes?

Answer:—

TEXT (2848).

"It is for the securing of their own existence that things stand in need of a cause; when once they have secured their existence, they become operative by themselves towards their own effects."—(2848)

COMMENTARY.

Having pointed out that things in general need a cause for securing their own existence,—the same principle is applied to the case in question, of the Pramāṇas or Cognitions:—
TEXT (2849).

"Thus Cognitions have need of their causes only in regard to the bringing about of their own birth,—and not in regard to the bringing about of the certainty regarding their own qualities".—(2849)

COMMENTARY.

'Regarding their own qualities';—the Locative Ending is in reference to the substratum of the 'certainty'.

What is meant is as follows:—There are certain qualities belonging to the Cognitions themselves,—such qualities, for instance, as being of the nature of right apprehension, being produced by perfect causes, and so forth; in the bringing about of certainty regarding these qualities, they do not need any other causes.—(2849)

Question:—If that is so, then what sort of cause are the Cognitions in regard to the bringing about of the said qualities?

Answer:—

TEXT (2850).

"In the bringing about of their own validity and the definite cognition of the object,—the Cognitions are self-sufficient, and not dependent on other causes;—and in this their action is like that of the Jar and other things." —(2850)

COMMENTARY.

The compound 'pramāṇyārtha, etc.' is to be expounded as the 'pramāṇya'—validity—and the 'artha'—Object;—the 'vinishchiti',—Cognition, of the said two; in the 'janana'—producing, bringing about of the said cognition. —'Arthanishchiti' here stands for mere observance, the vague non-determinate cognition; because the subsequent determinate cognitions are in the nature of certainty itself.

'Action,' is activity, causal character.—(2850)

The following Texts explain the example of the 'Jar' as cited above:—
TEXTS (2851-2852).

"For its own production, the jar needs such causes as the lump of clay, the Potter's stick, the wheel and other things; but in the action of containing water, it does not need these causes.—Thus, ultimately, there must be self-sufficiency of the validity; if the validity were due to other causes, then there would be an infinite regress."—(2851-2852)

COMMENTARY.

Having thus shown that there is no incongruity in his Proposition, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to show the Invariable Concomitance of his Reason (Premiss)—'because it is present when the other is present.'—'Thus ultimately, etc. etc.'—'Antē'—in the last cognition of the series.—'Tat'—validity.

Question :—Why should it be ultimately admitted ?
Answer :—"If the validity, etc. etc.'—(2851-2852)

The same idea is further clarified :—

TEXTS (2853-2854).

"If the very validity of the initial cognition were dependent upon other cognitions,—then, seeking for such corroborating cognitions at each step, we could get to no resting place; because, just as the first cognition would need corroborator by the second cognition, so should we seek for the corroborator of that corroborative cognition also.'—(2853-2854)

COMMENTARY.

'Maulika'—pertaining to the initial or first cognition; i.e. the validity inhering in the initial cognition.

Validity, if extraneous, could be due either to the corroborator of the resultant activity, or to the recognition of the perfect character of the cause of the cognition. The former of these cannot be accepted; this is shown by the words—'Just as, etc. etc.'—(2853-2854)

It might be argued that—in the case of the Cognition which is in conformity with effective action, its validity is held to be inherent, self-sufficient; hence there can be no Infinite Regress.

The answer to this is as follows :—
TEXT (2855).

"If in the case of some one cognition, the validity is admitted to be inherent and self-sufficient,—then why should there be any hostility towards the self-validity of the first cognition itself?"—(2855)

COMMENTARY.

Under the second view also [that the extraneous validity is due to the recognition of the perfect character of the Cause] there would be Infinite Regress.—This is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (2856-2857).

"If then the validity of sense-perception and other cognitions were dependent upon the perfect character (of their causes),—these perfections themselves could never be there without cognitions; hence one seeking for this other cognition apprehending the perfection of the cause would require yet another cognition apprehending the perfection of this last, and so on and on."—(2856-2857)

COMMENTARY.

Dependent upon, etc.'—i.e. dependent upon the recognition of the perfect character of its cause.

Validity'—i.e. certainty regarding its validity.

Could never be there'—i.e. could not become fit for being regarded as being there.

Tasyāpi'—of the cognition apprehending the perfection.

Anyaparichchhinna, etc. etc.'—i.e. the validity would be dependent upon the certainty of the perfection apprehended by another cognition.—(2856-2857)

An instance is cited in support of the above:—

TEXTS (2858–2860).

"Just as in the case of the initial cognition, so in that of the other also, there would be Infinite Regress, as before; and seeking for them one after the other, we could not secure a resting ground.—In case the cognition of the Perfection is not held to be one that has its validity dependent upon the presence of those perfections in its cause,—then the initial cognition of the object also should not need the valid cognition of Perfection in its cause.—Thus then, even going along to a long distance, if one has to admit,
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AT SOME STAGE OR THE OTHER, THE SELF-VALIDITY OF THE COGNITION, —IT IS FAR BETTER TO ADMIT IT AT THE VERY FIRST STEP."—(2858–2860)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is that—just as in the initial cognition, the validity is dependent upon the perfections apprehended by another cognition,—so should it be in other cognitions also.

'As before'—as in the case of certainty of validity arising from corroboration.

'One after the other'—in each preceding cognition of perfections.

If, through fear of Infinite Regress, it be held that the validity of the cognition of perfection is inherent in it, self-sufficient,—then what hostility should there be against the cognitions of the object itself,—by virtue of which its validity is held to be extraneous, not inherent? We do not perceive any reason for this.

Thus then the flying bird, not perceiving the end of the other shore, has to return to the place whence it started; consequently, there is no need for the making of baseless assumptions.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'In case the cognition of the perfection, etc. etc.'—'Dependent upon the perfection'—i.e. that which has its validity dependent upon the certain cognition of the perfection.—(2858–2860)

The following might be urged—There is a difference between the initial cognition on the one hand and the subsequent corroborative cognition, and the cognition of perfection on the other,—on account of which difference, while the validity of these latter two is inherent, that of the former is not so.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2861–2863).

"ON WHAT GROUNDS HAVE THE CORROBORATIVE COGNITION AND THE COGNITION OF PERFECTION BEEN HELD TO BE SUPERIOR TO THE INITIAL COGNITION,—ON THE STRENGTH OF WHICH THE LATTER SHOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THOSE TWO?—FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT VALIDITY MUST BE REGARDED AS INHERENT IN ALL COGNITIONS, AS A GENERAL RULE; AND IT IS DISCARDED ONLY WHEN THERE IS EITHER AN ANNULMENT OF IT OR THE COGNITION OF ITS SOURCE BEING DEFECTIVE. EVEN THOUGH THIS WAY THE DISCARDING OF THE VALIDITY WILL BE DEPENDENT UPON EXTRANEOUS CAUSES, THERE WOULD BE NO INFINITE REGRESS. BECAUSE AFTER ALL, IT WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON VALIDITY, AND THIS IS THERE, INHERENT IN THE COGNITION."—(2861–2863)

COMMENTARY.

Objection:—If Cognition is self-sufficient in its validity,—then all Cognitions become valid, which is absurd.
The answer to this is—'From all this it follows, etc. etc.'—'Utsarga' is a general principle; and 'autsargika' is that which is in accordance with the general principle.

'Annulment'—the certainty that the real state of things is different from that figuring in the cognition;—'cognition of its source being defective'.

Objection.—Thus then, Validity remaining there as a general rule,—how is it discarded? If the invalidity were held to be indicated by annulment and the cognition of the source being defective,—then this invalidity would be due to extraneous causes. It might be argued that—"it is so held by us". But, in that case, as in the case of Validity being extraneous, so here also, there would be Infinite Regress.

The answer to this is as follows:—'Even though this would be dependent upon, etc. There would be Infinite Regress if the invalidity (of one) were due to the invalidity (of another); as a matter of fact, however, invalidity is held to follow from Validity, which is different in kind from invalidity; and it has been established that Validity is self-sufficient; why then should there be an Infinite Regress?—(2861–2863)

The same idea is further explained:—

TEXTS (2864–2865).

"Just as Validity is not proved by Validity cognition,—so Invalidity also is not proved by Invalidity. In the case of one thing being dependent upon another thing of its own kind, there can be no resting ground; in the case of dependence upon something of another kind, its root is firmly established, because it is due to another cause."—(2864–2865)

COMMENTARY.

'Something of another kind'—i.e. Invalidity;—this is to be construed with—'the root is firmly established'.—The reason for this is stated in the words—'because it is due to another cause'; i.e. of which the cause consists of something else, in the shape of the Valid Cognition.

'Has its root firmly established'—i.e. whose root is unshakable by reason of its being free from the defects of Infinite Regress, etc.—(2864–2865)

The following might be urged—Though the sublating or annulling cognition may not have its validity dependent on something else,—yet it is only when that Cognition is recognised as itself unsublated that it can stamp invalidity upon another Cognition; not otherwise.

The answer to this is as follows:—
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TEXT (2866).

"THE SUBLATING COGNITION IS ALWAYS IN THE FORM OF THE COGNITION OF THE THING CONCERNED AS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS ENVISAGED IN THE PREVIOUS COGNITION; AND AS IN THIS FORM, IT IS NOT DEPENDENT FOR ITS VALIDITY UPON ANYTHING ELSE, IT SETS ASIDE THAT PREVIOUS COGNITION."—(2866)

COMMENTARY.

'Sets aside'—discards; i.e. rejects as invalid.—(2866)

The following might be urged—Even when the sublating Cognition is there, it is possible that there may be another Cognition sublating it,—just as there is one for the initial Cognition; how then can there be a cessation of the dependence upon another sublating Cognition,—by virtue of which the sublation of that Cognition would be accepted with certainty?

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2867).

"IT MAY BE THAT THERE TOO THERE MAY BE NEED FOR ANOTHER SUBLATING COGNITION IN CERTAIN CASES, WHERE SUSPICION MIGHT BE AROUSED IN THE MIND OF THE PERSON BY THE PREVIOUS COGNITION; BUT THAT SUSPICION CEASES AFTER VERY LITTLE EFFORT."

—(2867)

COMMENTARY.

'There, in some cases'—i.e. in regard to the sublating Cognition in the form of the 'Cognition of the thing as different from that envisaged in the previous Cognition'.

'Jātāśāṅkasya'—the man whose suspicion has been aroused.

'Pūrvēṇa'—by the initial Cognition.

'Sāpi'—i.e. the dependence upon sublation.

'Alpēṇa'—i.e. by very slight effort.—(2867)

Question:—How does it cease?

Answer:—
TEXTS (2868–2871).

"If another sublating Cognition of it is further sought for, then the middle (second) Cognition would become sublated: which would establish the validity of the first Cognition.—If even after due effort at seeking for it, no other sublating Cognition is found,—on account of there being no basis for it,—then no Cognition sublative of the first sublative Cognition would be found; and thus there being no sublation of this, this becomes strong and hence sublates the initial Cognition; hence it is the validity of this latter that becomes discarded. Thus then, the investigator need not proceed beyond three cognitions; and when the man has not had any further sublating Cognition produced, he need not suspect the presence of such Cognition."—(2868–2871)

COMMENTARY.

If, on further investigation, one finds that there is a sublater of that sublater also, then, as the second Cognition would be set aside by this third sublater, the first Cognition would become valid. If the further (third) sublating Cognition does not appear, on account of the absence of the basic cause, then the second Cognition, which is more powerful, sublates the first Cognition, and thereby its validity becomes set aside.

'Need not proceed beyond, etc. etc.'—"Who?"—The Man, the observer.

Question :—"On the appearance of the third Cognition also, why is there no need for a further sublating Cognition,—as in the case of the second Cognition;—and why should there be only three Cognitions for the investigator?"

Answer :—'When no further sublating cognition, etc. etc.';—'produced'
—found by the investigator.—(2868–2871)

Question :—"Why should it not be suspected?"

Answer :

TEXT (2872).

"If the man, through stupidity, should imagine the existence of the sublating Cognition, even when none has come about,—he would be beset with doubts in all his dealings and would be landed in utter ruin."—(2872)

COMMENTARY.

'Utter ruin'—Destruction; on account of having fallen off from the Truth.—(2872)

The following Text confirms the same idea by a quotation—
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TEXT (2873).

"Vasudeva himself has deprecated such a suspicious nature; in the words—'Neither this world, nor the next,—O son of Kunti,—is for the man of suspicious nature'."

—(2873)

COMMENTARY.

'Vasudeva'—Viṣṇu.
'Son of Kunti'—Arjuna.—(2873)

Objection:—"If that is so, then there should be no suspicion of sublation regarding the first Cognition also; and thus there should be validity of all Cognitions".

Answer:—

TEXTS (2874-2875).

"When in regard to a Cognition, a certain sublation is possible,—and on being sought for, is not found,—then in regard to that Cognition [it has to be concluded that its sublater does not exist]; and in regard to such a thing, Investigators desiring their own welfare should not take their stand upon imagining that such sublation might appear at some time."

—(2874-2875)

COMMENTARY.

'Yatra'—in regard to a certain Cognition,—if a certain sublation is likely; but on being sought for, it is not found to appear,—then, in regard to that Cognition, 'it should be concluded that the sublater does not exist'—this has to be taken as understood.—(2874-2875)

Question:—"How much of sublation is possible and in regard to which Cognition?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2876).

"Place, Time, Man and Circumstances,—diversities of these are met with in actual experience; hence when one is seeking for sublation, he should seek for them in these."—(2876)

COMMENTARY.

The compound—'Dēśa, etc. etc.'—is to be expounded as 'Diversities' of 'Place, Time, Man, and Circumstances'.—(2876)
The following Texts proceed to point out that of these diversities of Place, Time, etc.—only some are sublater of a certain Cognition,—not all of all Cognitions; hence all should not be suspected in regard to all Cognitions:—

TEXTS (2877-2878).

"If there is a wrong perception due to the thing concerned being at a distant place, there would, in some cases, be a suspicion of its really being something else; and the limit of this possibility would extend only till the man has approached near the thing; and in such a case, there is no expectation of any sublation regarding Time, Man and Circumstances; as for example, in the case of the Cognition of the Mirage, etc."—(2877-2878)

COMMENTARY.

'Suspicion, etc.'—of the thing being Water;—'in some cases,'—in the case of such things as the Mirage.

'Till the man has approached, etc. etc.'—This has to be construed with 'limit of the possibility of sublation'.

What is meant is as follows:—In a case where remoteness of the place is the only likely cause of misconception,—all that is necessary is to move up to the thing, for the purpose of finding out whether there is, or not, a sublating cognition; and in such a case, the sublation should not be expected or sought for, in regard to Time and the other factors; because these latter could not be the source of misconception.

An instance is cited—'As for example, etc. etc.'—'Cognition of the Mirage'—i.e. the cognition, in regard to the Mirage, that it is Water.

'Etcetera'—includes such notions as that of 'largeness', in regard to what is small, and the notion of 'smallness' in regard to what is large,—this being due to distance;—and other similar notions. In these cases, there can be no need for investigation of Time and other factors.

Similarly in regard to misconceptions due to Time, etc.—whenever there is possibility of a certain factor being the source of error, the enquiry should proceed in regard to that factor only; and not in regard to any other factor.—This is what is meant to be shown by means of the example cited.—(2877-2878)

The same idea is expressed in regard to particular points of Time:—
TEXT (2879).

"Similarly when at a time of dense darkness, there are doubts regarding the animal seen being a cow or a horse, followed by the ascertainment of the truth,—the limit of all this consists in the appearance of light."—(2879)

COMMENTARY.

'Santamasakāla' is time when there is deep and dense darkness.—(2879)

The same idea is expressed in regard to particular men :

TEXT (2880).

"Similarly, in regard to the moon, the misconception of the directions, and the letters and accents of the Veda, and such things,—that the truth is otherwise is ascertained by enquiries from other persons."

—(2880)

COMMENTARY.

When a man thinks that he is seeing two moons, or has similar delusions,—that the truth is otherwise is ascertained by putting questions to other men; and in that there is no dependence on Time and other factors.—(2880)

The same idea is stated in regard to circumstances :

TEXT (2881).

"When persons having their perceptive organs deranged by love, hate, intoxication, madness, hunger, thirst and the like, come to cognise things that are cognisable with difficulty,—the contrary conclusion is ascertained after the cessation of the said derangement."

—(2881)

COMMENTARY.

'Tadabhāvat'—by the cessation of the circumstances created by Love, Hate, etc.—(2881)

The following Texts proceed to show that even in ordinary business-transactions, the conclusions of the Enquirer (Judge) require only three statements :—
TEXTS (2882–2885)

"In transactions relating to debt and other heads, when there is a dispute between two disputants, there is one statement by the Defendant and two by the Plaintiff; and it is for avoiding an Infinite Regress that no further statements are recorded;—and it is on the basis of the said three statements alone that the Master (Judge), the witnesses and the Assessors should come to a decision.—Thus in all cases, there is a following up of three cognitions only; and it is for this same reason that the Deities are called 'Trisatya' (Three-truth).—Thus then, if the validity of Cognitions is inherent in them, there is no Infinite Regress; and the validity and invalidity remain as they happen to be in reality."—(2882–2885)

COMMENTARY.

"Then again, if it be proved that the validity of Sense-perception and other Pramāṇas is due to extraneous-causes,—the same is not the case with Verbal Cognition,—even so our position becomes established. Because the whole of this effort of ours is meant for the purpose of establishing the reliability of the Vedic Injunction; so that when it is proved that the validity of the Verbal Cognition is inherent, self-sufficient,—the reliability of the Vedic Injunction becomes automatically established;—what need there is then for our trying to prove the self-sufficient validity of the other forms of Cognition?"

With the above idea in his mind, the Māṁśaka proceeds to prove the self-sufficient validity of Verbal Cognition:

TEXTS (2886–2888).

"That Word which is definitely known to be eternal, or uttered by a trustworthy Person, is never vitiated by the hearer or the speaker;—because teachers and fellow-students help to prevent mutilations thereof and are fully competent to preserve such assertions.—Consequently, the Assertion does not become vitiated by the defects which are warded off by the excellences (of the Teacher, etc.).—Or, when there is no pronouncer or 'maker' of the Word or Assertion, there can be no defects, as there would be no substratum for these."—(2886–2888)

COMMENTARY.

Two kinds of Verbal Cognition are reliable, valid—that produced by the eternal Word, and that produced by the words uttered by a trustworthy
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person.—That in both of these the cause or source is faultless is pointed out by the present text.

In that Word or Sentence which is eternal, there can be no defects relating to the Speaker or the Hearer; because such words and sentences are always preserved by Teachers and Students.

That Word or Sentence which is uttered by a reliable Person,—there also the presence of defects is rendered impossible by the presence in him of such excellences as those of Compassion and the like.

The faultlessness of the eternal Word is proved in another way also:—
'Or when there is no maker of the Word, etc. etc.'—Defects, such as Love and Hate, etc. are properties of men; and as such they could reside only in the Maker; hence, when there is no substratum, in the shape of the Maker, how could they affect the words that have not emanated from a personal source? If they did, they would be without a substratum; because it is an essential feature of the subsistent that it must follow in the wake of the substratum.—(2886-2888)

Says the Opponent—In the case of the words of the trustworthy person, if their validity be held to be due to the fact of all defects being discarded by the excellent qualities of the Person,—then the validity would be due to those excellent qualities (not to the Cognition itself); so that the Infinite Regress would continue to vitiate this view.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2889-2890).

"IN THE CASE OF THE WORDS OF THE TRUSTWORTHY PERSON, TWO FACTS HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED: (1) THAT THERE ARE NO DEFECTS, AND (2) THAT THERE ARE EXCELLENCES;—THAT VALIDITY IS NOT DUE TO THE EXCELLENCES HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED BEFORE;—AND ON ACCOUNT OF THESE EXCELLENCES IN THE SPEAKER, THERE CAN BE NO DEFECTS IN HIM, THESE BEING DISCARDED BY THE EXCELLENCES. THUS THE VALIDITY BELONGS TO THE WORD ITSELF,—AND IS INDICATED BY THE ABSENCE OF THE DEFECTS."—(2889-2890)

COMMENTARY.

'Dosabhāva, etc.'—The compound is to be expounded as—the 'dvaya' 'tīva'—which has for its 'ātma', nature,—consisting in the absence of defects and the presence of excellences.

'Explained before'—under Text 2856.

'Discarded by them'—i.e. by the excellences.
'Indicated by the absence of defects';—what is meant is that the function of the excellences free from defects consists only in the setting aside of the Defects, and not in creating validity.—(2889-2890)

Says the Opponent:—If Validity is held to be due to the certainty of the absence of defects,—then too, the Infinite Regress remains.—The Author sets forth this view in the following:—

TEXT (2891).

If the absence of defects in the words of the trustworthy person is deduced from his excellences, then there is the same infinite regress,—for one who would follow up this presence of excellences.—(2891)

COMMENTARY.

According to the view detailed above, the absence of defects is to be deduced from the cognition of the excellences;—the validity of this cognition of excellences again is to be deduced from the absence of defects;—this absence of defects again is to be deduced from excellences; and so on and on; there would be the same Infinite Regress, which would obliterate all usages and distinctions.—(2891)

This is answered (by the Mīmāṃsaka) in the following:—

TEXTS (2892-2893).

"This does not affect us. The cognition of the excellences is not needed at the time. It is not as cognised that the excellences are operative in the matter; by their sheer presence they are competent to set aside the defects; and while they are there, there does not appear any cognition of the defects of the man."—(2892-2893)

COMMENTARY.

'While they are there';—i.e. while the excellences are there.—(2892-2893)

Question:—If the cognition of the defects of man does not appear—what then?

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TEXT (2894).

"Because the defects are not cognised, therefore they do not set aside the validity; not being set aside, it becomes established by itself here also."—(2894)

COMMENTARY.

'The validity is not set aside'—such is the construction.

Question:—Why is it not set aside?

Answer:—'Because they are not cognised'; the defects are discarded by the excellences, hence being non-existent, they are naturally 'not cognised'.

'Not being set aside, etc.'—established, because not set aside. When there is no exception to a general rule, it becomes automatically established.

'Here also'—i.e. in the case of the words of the Trustworthy Person, not only in that of words not emanating from a Personality.—This is what is indicated by 'api'.—(2894)

Says the Opponent—If, in the case of certain words emanating from a personality, no defects are found,—even so they are suspected; because they always subsist in such words. So that, just as the excellences, by their sheer presence, are capable of setting aside the defects,—so the defects also may be capable of setting aside the excellences;—why then should it be said that—'not being cognised, the Defects do not set aside the validity?'

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2895-2896).

"In the case of words emanating from Personalities, there is always room for doubt whether there are defects or not.

In the case of the Veda, however, there being no author, there can be absolutely no suspicion for us regarding the presence of defects.—Consequently, just as validity (and reliability) is accepted in the case of the Veda, on the ground of its being independent and self-sufficient,—so the same validity becomes established in regard to the words of a Trustworthy Person also."—(2895-2896)

COMMENTARY.

The idea is as follows:—"It is not necessary for us to prove the validity of the human assertion; in fact, all this effort of ours is meant for proving the authority of the Veda; so that, if the human assertion turns out to be invalid and unreliable,—that does no harm to the Veda; as its validity is proved by the absence of defects;—this is what is meant by the phrase 'on the ground of its being independent and self-sufficient'.
This has been thus asserted in the Bhāṣya (Shabara)—‘Hence the Veda is authoritative and reliable, because it is not dependent upon anything else; such being the case, there can be no need for another cognition or another Person; because the Veda is self-sufficient in its validity’ (Sū. 1. 1. 5).—(2895-2896)

Then again, is it meant that the Veda operates upon things apprehended by other Means of Cognition? Or is it not so meant? These are the two alternatives possible.—If it is the second view that is accepted—that the Veda is not operative on things apprehended by other Means, then that fact alone proves the self-sufficient validity of the Veda.—This is what is pointed out in the following:

**TEXT (2897).**

"THE FACT THAT OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION NEVER HAVE ANY BEARING UPON WHAT IS SAID IN THE VEDA ESTABLISHES ITS VALIDITY.—

‘OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE MERELY RETERATIVE.’"

—(2897)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘What is said in the Veda’—e.g. that ‘Heaven follows from the performance of the Agniḥotra’, and so forth.

‘Other means of cognition’;—‘Means of Cognition other than the Veda’ are Sense-perception and the rest;—the ‘bearing’ of these consists in their having these same for their objective;—and this ‘bearing’ is absent.

‘The fact’—i.e. the fact that they have no bearing.

‘Āṣya’—of the Veda.

If the other alternative view is accepted,—that the Veda envisages only those things that are apprehended by the other Means of Cognition,—then, one cognition (that produced by the Veda or that produced by other Means) would be apprehending what has been already apprehended by other Means; consequently the later of the two would become invalid. This is what is pointed out by the words, ‘Otherwise, etc. etc.’; —‘otherwise’,—i.e. if it is held that the Veda as a means of Cognition is operative on what is also apprehended by other Means of Cognition, then,—as it would be envisaging only what has been already apprehended by other means, it would be as invalid as Remembrance.

Thus what is itself a valid Cognition cannot need the corroboration of other cognitions; hence it becomes established that all Cognitions are self-sufficient in their validity.—(2897)

The same idea is further elucidated—
TEXT (2898).

"Such corroboration (by other means of cognition) does not form the basis of the validity of other cognitions also; because among cognitions envisaging the same thing, there can be only option,—which means that validity can belong to only one of them."—(2898)

COMMENTARY.

'Other Means of Cognitions',—i.e. the Means of Cognition other than the Veda,—i.e. Sense-perception and the rest.
'Tulyārthānām'—bearing upon one and the same thing.
'To only one'—the one appearing first of all; the other being only reiterative.

The validity of this first Cognition cannot be due to the other subsequent cognitions; because these latter are themselves invalid, inasmuch as they apprehend what has been already apprehended.—(2898)

Says the Opponent—In places where there is dense darkness, it is actually seen that a thing that has been apprehended (vaguely) by the first cognition is again apprehended (and defined) by later cognitions appearing after the appearance of light.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2899).

"Even in a case where the thing is definitely apprehended by the later cognitions,—the thing has not been clearly and definitely apprehended by the first cognition."—(2899)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is that the first cognition, being uncertain and vague, cannot be valid.—(2899)

Further, if the validity of a Cognition were due to corroboration by other Cognitions,—then no validity could belong to the Cognition of a thing that has been born and immediately destroyed, or to the auditory perception; as no other cognition could operate upon them.—This is pointed out in the following:—
TEXT (2000).

"No validity could belong to the cognition of a thing that is destroyed immediately on being born,—or to auditory perception,—because these would not be corroborated by the eye and other means of cognition."—(2000)

COMMENTARY.

'Not corroborated, etc. etc.'—i.e. not related to one another by the relation based upon the sameness of their object.

The argument may be formulated thus:—That which does not need corroboration by other cognitions must be regarded as self-sufficient in its validity;—e.g. the auditory cognition produced once, and the cognition of what has been destroyed;—the cognition of what is asserted in the Veda does not need corroboration by other cognitions; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(2000)

In the following Texts, the Mīmāṃsaka anticipates and answers the objection that the Corroborative Instance cited is devoid of the Probandum:


"If it be urged that—'the validity of the auditory cognition would be due to its connection with another auditory cognition',—then of the Veda also, the validity may be due to the corroboration of another cognition brought about by the Veda. In both cases, the (corroborative) cognition is not produced by other means; hence they do not need corroboration by cognitions produced by other causes.'"—(2001-2002)

COMMENTARY.

When the same sound is heard by several men,—another auditory cognition does become operative (upon the same object); hence it is through the corroboration of this other auditory organ that the validity of the first cognition is ascertained.

The answer to this is provided by the words—'Of the Veda also, etc. etc.'—

'Due to corroboration by another cognition brought about by the Veda';—i.e. due to the connection of another cognition produced by the Veda.

'In both cases'—i.e. in the case of the auditory cognition and that of the cognition of what is said in the Veda.
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What is meant is as follows:—In the phrase 'it does not need the corroboration of other cognitions', what is meant by 'other cognitions' is cognitions produced by other Means of Cognition,—not the cognition produced by the same Means as the Cognition in question. Consequently, the Reason being a qualified one, the Corroborative Instance in our argument is not devoid of the Probandum? 'Corroboration of cognitions produced by other causes';—the compound is to be expounded as—the 'Samvāda'—corroboration—of such 'Jñāna'—cognition—as is 'Kṛta'—produced—by—'hēvantara'—other causes.—(2901-2902)

If it be argued that—'even the operation of such other cognitions as are brought about by the same means as the cognition in question makes the validity of this latter extraneous',—the argument is futile (superfluous).—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (2903).

"Just as, in the case of the validity of Sense-perception, there is the definite basis in the form of corroboration by another cognition produced by the same sense-organ,—the same should be asserted to be the basis in the case of the Veda also."—(2903)

COMMENTARY.

'Definite basis'—as stated in the first line of Text 2901.—(2903)

Question:—How can this be said in regard to the Veda?

Answer:—

TEXTS (2904-2905).

"When the cognition brought about by any one sentence is found to be the same at all times and places, and in all men,—then no other basis need be sought for its validity. Thus then, when a firm conviction produced by a sentence is not found to be incompatible with the cognitions appearing at other times and places and in other men,—it is undoubtedly valid."—(2904-2905)

COMMENTARY.

'Firm'—free from uncertainty and mistake.

'Cognitions appearing at other, etc. etc.'—'ādi' includes 'men' also.—(2904-2905)
The following Text shows that the Reason adduced is not ‘Inadmissible’:

**TEXT (2906).**

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE VALIDITY OF VERBAL AND OTHER COGNITIONS IS NOT TO BE PROVED BY MEANS OF INERENCE. OTHERWISE THE VALIDITY OF SENSE-PERCEPTION ALSO MIGHT HAVE TO BE PROVED BY INERENCE (WHICH IS ABSURD)."—(2906)

**COMMENTARY.**

The cognition produced by the *Veda* cannot have its validity confirmed by Sense-perception, because what is said in the Veda is beyond the reach of the senses.—Nor can it be proved or confirmed by Inference; as that would lead to incongruities.

‘*Shabdānām*’:—this includes the cognitions produced by the Veda.

Or, particular details may be learnt from the Context.—(2906)

The following might be urged—We do hold that the validity of Sense-perception is proved by means of Inference.

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS (2907-2908).**

"IF THE VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS WERE PROVED BY ANOTHER COGNITION, THEN, OF THIS LATTER ALSO, THE VALIDITY WOULD BE PROVED BY ANOTHER, AND SO ON AND ON, THERE WOULD BE INFINITE REGRESS.—IF THE VALIDITY OF THE COGNITION THAT PROVES THE VALIDITY OF ANOTHER COGNITION BE NOT PROVED BY ANY OTHER COGNITION'—THEN THE SAME MIGHT BE THE CASE WITH THOSE WHOSE VALIDITY IS HELD TO BE PROVED BY OTHERS."—(2907-2908)

**COMMENTARY.**

If, like the Sense-perception, the Inference also had its validity proved by another Inference,—then there would be Infinite Regress.

If the validity of the cognition called 'Inference' were not proved by another cognition,—then in the case of Sense-perception also,—whose validity is held to be proved by Inference,—the validity would be such as is not proved by another cognition; as there would be no difference between the two cases.—(2907-2908)

In the following Text, the Bauddha supports the view that the Reason put forward is 'Inadmissible':—
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TEXT (2903).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, SENSE-PERCEPTION, ETC. ARE NOT QUITE RECOGNISED AS 'pramāṇa', 'valid'; AND UNTIL THEY ARE SO RECOGNISED, NO BUSINESS WOULD BE POSSIBLE.— (2909)

COMMENTARY.

If Cognitions did not need (corroboration by) other Cognitions, then, in regard to Sense-perception and the rest, there could be no certainty as to their being 'valid'; and thus there would be an end to all business-transactions.—(2909)

To the above, the Mimamsaka provides the following answer:—

TEXT (2910).

"BEFORE THE COGNITION IS APPREHENDED, IT REMAINS THERE IN ITS OWN FORM; AND SO FAR AS ITS OWN OBJECTIVE IS CONCERNED, IT IS INDEPENDENT AND SELF-SUFFICIENT; AND AFTER ITS OWN OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN COGNISED, THE COGNITION ITSELF COMES TO BE COGNISED BY OTHER COGNITIONS."—(2910)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—Even though in regard to the definite cognition of its own form, the Cognition requires another Cognition,—yet there can be no end to business-transactions; because in regard to the apprehension of its own objective, the Cognition is independent and self-sufficient; and when the object has become apprehended, then by that alone can all transactions be carried on; what use then would there be for considering whether there is certainty or uncertainty? Because the sole purpose of all this lies in the definite cognition of the object concerned. Such in brief is the purport of the argument.

The meaning of the words is now explained—

'Before the cognition is apprehended'—i.e. before the certainty that 'this is valid'.

'In its own form'—i.e. in the form of the apprehension of the thing.

'Independent'—i.e. not depending upon another cognition, for the purpose of the apprehension of its object.

When this—its object—has become duly cognised, with certainty,—then, later on, the Cognition itself becomes cognised through Inference, etc. This has been thus declared—'One does not apprehend the Cognition until the object has been cognised; when the object has become cognised, then the Cognition becomes cognised by means of Inference'.—(2910)
The following might be urged—until the Cognition itself has been
cognised, the apprehension of its objective cannot be possible, as has been
thus declared—'There can be no perception of the object for one who has
had no perception of the Cognition itself'.
The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2911-2912).

"Just as objects are apprehended by the eye and other sense-
organs, which latter are themselves uncognised,—so, in the
same manner are things apprehended by cognitions also,
without these latter being themselves cognised.
Hence becoming cognised is not of much use in the
validity of the cognition. For the same reason
the apprehension of things also is
obtained from the cognition that
is itself uncognised."—(2911-2912)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(2911-2912)

If that is so, then the invalidity also of Cognitions could, in the same
way, be regarded as inherent in them.—Anticipating this objection, the
Mimāmsaka provides the following answer:—

TEXT (2913).

"Like valid Cognition, invalid Cognition also operates upon
its object, by itself (independently); but the fact of its
being false cannot be apprehended without another
means of cognition."—(2913)

COMMENTARY.

Invalid Cognition also has the semblance of the Valid Cognition, and
hence it does apprehend [the 'na' is wrongly put in] the object, by its mere
existence; consequently, 'falsity'—i.e. the fact of its envisaging an unreal
thing—cannot be apprehended without another means of Cognition; we are
going to show later on that this falsity is extraneous.—(2913)

Says the Opponent—The same is equally true of the valid Cognition
also; because that also, in some cases, has the semblance of the Invalid
Cognition.
The answer to this is as follows:—
"The false character of the thing is not apprehended by the former (i.e. the Invalid Cognition) in the way in which the true character (is apprehended by the Valid Cognition).

Thus then, it is only when there appears the Cognition of the truth being otherwise,—or the Cognition that the source of the Cognition has been defective,—that the falsity (invalidity) of the Cognition becomes recognised; not on any other grounds. At the time that it appears it is always recognised as valid."

(2914-2915)

COMMENTARY.

'The former'—i.e. the invalid cognition.

'Āṭta'—apprehended.

'True character';—this is a corroborative instance per dissimilarity.

What is meant is as follows:—Falsity is not apprehended by the Invalid cognition in the same way in which truth is apprehended by the Valid cognition; hence the two do not stand on the same footing. Because as soon as it is born, the Valid cognition is recognised as valid; but the Invalid cognition is not similarly recognised as invalid, as soon as it is born; because it has always the semblance of the Valid cognition.

'Tadatrāpi, etc. etc.'—This sums up the view that the Invalidity of Cognitions is extraneous.

'Yadvā duṣṭakāraṇe'—'dhiḥ' has to be construed here also.

'It is only then that the falsity of the Cognition becomes apprehended':—i.e. when there is the idea that the real state of things is otherwise,—and when there is the idea that the source of the Cognition has been defective.

The following might be urged—The falsity of the Cognition could be admitted only when it would be definitely known that these two ideas are actually true; and for the purpose of recognising the truth of these ideas, there would be need for another Cognition; so that there would be an infinite regress.

The answer to this is given in the words—'At the time that it appears, etc. etc.';—'it' stands for the said two ideas—(1) of the real state of things being otherwise and (2) of the source of the Cognition being defective.—Thus there would be no Infinite Regress.—(2914-2915)

The Buddhists and others have argued that the Words of the Veda must be false,—because they are words,—like such human assertions as 'Fire is cool'.

The Mimāṃsaka proceeds to show that this argument is 'Inconclusive'.—
TEXT (2916).

"For these reasons, even in cases where the falsity is explained to others,—these two ideas have to be pointed out,—
—and not mere similarity."—(2916)

COMMENTARY.

'In cases'—such as that of the Vedic Injunction.
'These two ideas'—i.e. the idea that the truth is otherwise than what has been said in the Veda, and also that what has been so said has had a defective source.
'Mere similarity'—i.e. the mere fact of being 'words' and thereby being similar to human assertions.—(2916)

Question:—Why should mere similarity not be urged?
Answer:—

TEXTS (2917–2919).

"The ignorant men who, on the basis of mere similarity to invalid cognitions, seek to prove the invalidity of all cognitions,—for them such an argument is conducive to their own ruin. Because for the other party also, there comes about an argument which is the reflection of the Buddhist argument; and thus being refuted by this, the argument (of the Buddhist) turns out to be the means of proving what is not true; and as such, it is not capable of setting aside the Vedic Injunction which is inherently valid."—(2917–2919)

COMMENTARY.

If a Cognition were invalid simply because it is similar (to another Cognition which is invalid),—then all Cognitions would have to be regarded as invalid; because some sort of similarity—such as being an entity—can be asserted in all cases.—Such is the meaning of the Text in brief.

Question:—How is it conducive to their own ruin?
Answer:—'For the other party also, etc. etc.'—'Other party'—i.e. the Mīmāṃsaka.—'Reflection, etc.'—just as the reflection appears after the reflected object, so, after the argument of the Buddhist, there appears the counter-argument of the Mīmāṃsaka.

For instance, it is open to the Mīmāṃsaka to argue as follows:—The words of the Veda are not false,—because they are Words, etc. etc.;—like such human assertions as 'Fire is hot, bright and so forth'.

Thus being refuted—negatived—by such counter-arguments,—the argument that had been adduced by the Buddhist and others to prove the idea of Vedic Injunction being false is quite incapable of rejecting the Vedic Injunction.—Why?—Because of the inherent validity of the Vedic
Injunction:—that is to say, the validity of the Vedic Injunction is such as belongs to it by its very nature.—(2917–2919)

With the following Text, the Author begins the refutation *seriatim* of all the arguments that have been set forth by the *Mimāmsaka*, under Texts 2848 onwards:—

TEXT (2920).

The answer to the above is as follows:—As a matter of fact, the distinction that has been made has some basis only in regard to those things that are held to continue to exist after being produced.—(2920)

COMMENTARY.

'Has some basis'—i.e. subsists in a real entity; that is, because what does not exist cannot be operative.—(2920)

Question:—'What is this 'distinction' ?'

Answer:—

TEXT (2921).

It is only for the securing of their existence that things like the Jar stand in need of a cause; when once they have secured their existence, they become operative by themselves towards their own effects.—(2921)

[This is a parody of the *Mimāmsaka's* assertion in Text 2848.]

COMMENTARY.

Question:—'Why can this not be possible in the case of Cognition also? [why should it be restricted to things like the Jar only? ]''

Answer:—

TEXT (2922).

That Cognition which you also regard as not lasting after being born, becomes non-existent after having secured its existence; what sort of activity or operation, then, could it have?—(2922)

COMMENTARY.

'What activity could the non-existent Cognition have? '—none whatsoever; because what is non-existent is devoid of all capacity.
Even if it existed, as all entities are without desire and effort, they could not have any activity. Nor is there any effect to be produced by the Cognition, towards which the Cognition could operate.

"But there is to be produced by it the effect in the shape of making its object cognised."

Not so; 'making cognised its own object' means exactly the same that is meant by the term 'Cognition'; so your assertion would mean that the Cognition produces itself; indeed a most excellent assertion!

"The effect of the Cognition would be the bringing about of the certainty that the Cognition is right and valid."

That is not possible; because in the case of some Cognitions, there is no certainty; and in some the contrary is found to be the case.

What has been said has also shown that the present Proposition of the Mīmāṃsāka is contrary to Perception and other means of Cognition. For instance, if there is non-apprehension of what fulfills the conditions of perceptibility, and there is apprehension of something else,—it follows that what is non-existent cannot have any activity. The same is also proved by Inference,—being, as it is, formless, like the 'sky-lotus'.

The phrase 'which you also regard' serves to point out that what has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsāka involves self-contradiction on his part.—(2922)

This same self-contradiction is pointed out in the following:

TEXTS (2923-2924).

The operation of Causes has always been found to be something different from the birth of the effects; in order to preclude this from the case of Cognition (Pramāṇa), the term 'birth' ('janma') has been introduced [by Jaimini in his Sūtra 1.1.4]

—the idea being that the Cognition does not continue to exist for even a single moment, and yet it is not born as invalid; on account of which it could operate only later on towards the apprehending of the object,—in the manner of the Sense-organs.—

[Shlokavārttika—Sense-perception, 54-55].—
(2923-2924)

COMMENTARY.

In Sūtra 1.1.4, Jaimini has propounded the definition of Sense-perception as consisting in 'the birth of the man's apprehension following from the contact of the sense-organs with an existing object'; and the above four lines have been put forward by Kumārila in justification of the use of the term 'janma' (Birth) in this definition; the sense being that the term 'birth' has been used in order to point out that the Cognition is valid as soon as it is born.
Question: "What is the reason for this?"
Answer: 'The Cognition does not, etc. etc.'—'Tat' stands for the Cognition.—(2923-2924)

In the following Text, the Author anticipates and answers the rejoinder of the other party:

TEXT (2925).

IF THE COGNITION IS HELD TO BE NOT-MOMENTARY AND EVEN ETERNAL, THEN THIS GOES AGAINST WHAT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ELSEWHERE, AND IT IS ALSO NULLIFIED BY REASONING.

—(2925)

COMMENTARY.

In another context, Kumārila has declared the unity and eternity of Cognitions, as declared by him in the following words—"For us, Cognitions being of the same nature as the Spirit (Soul), are held to be eternal and one" [Shlokavārtika—Eternality of Words, 404].

Under this view, the Proposition put forward (that Cognitions are eternal) would go against what has been accepted elsewhere,—as also against Inference. For instance, it has been held that Cognitions are momentary; as said in the Bhāṣya (Shabara)—"It is momentary and does not remain till the time of the appearance of another Cognition" (Śū. 1. 1. 5, page 9, line 17); and it also goes against the words of Kumārila himself, to the effect that—"Cognition does not continue to exist for a single moment" (Shlokavārtika—Sense-perception 55).—(2925)

The following Text points out how the assertion of the Eternality of Cognitions is nullified by reasoning:

TEXT (2926).

(a) IT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN DETAIL THAT ALL THINGS ARE IN 'PERPETUAL FLUX';—(b) AS FOR THE ETERNAL THING, IT IS NEVER produced; WHAT NEED THEN COULD IT HAVE OF A CAUSE?—(2926)

COMMENTARY.

If Cognition is eternal, then it cannot be right to hold that it needs a Cause; this is pointed out in the words—'As regards the eternal thing, etc. etc.'—It is only what is produced that needs something else as its Cause; what is eternal, however, can never be produced; what need can that have of it?—(2926)

In the following Text the author shows, through a formulated argument, that the idea of the Mīmāṃsaka is annulled by Inference—
TEXT (2927).

For these reasons, it can be asserted that by itself the Cognition cannot be valid, the validity comes only later in relation to its effects,—because it is featureless,—like the 'sky-lotus'.—(2927)

COMMENTARY.

In the following Text, the Author admits (for the sake of argument) that Cognitions are not-momentary, and then proceeds to show that the view of the other party is annulled by facts of Sense-perception and other forms of Cognition:

TEXT (2928).

Or, Cognition may be not-momentary, and it may by itself be operative towards bringing about the conviction regarding its validity. But in that case, why should there be any doubts, etc.?—(2928)

COMMENTARY.

If the Cognition itself produces the conviction regarding its own validity, then there should be no Doubt, etc. regarding the Cognition. The 'etc.' includes wrong cognition, as also contradictions due to it, ideas to the contrary, setting forth of self-contradictory definitions, and non-conformity.

Thus, inasmuch as we do meet, after the Cognition, with Doubts, etc. which are contrary to the conviction of validity of the Cognition,—it is clearly established by Perception itself that there is no conviction in the case; and this absence of Conviction becomes proved by Perception, exactly in the same manner as the absence of the Jar is established by the apprehension of the place devoid of the Jar.

Thus the Proposition that there is conviction regarding validity is annulled by a fact of Sense-perception.—(2928)

The following Text points out how there is incompatibility with Perception:

TEXT (2929).

Inasmuch as certainty regarding its validity would be obtained from the Cognition itself, there can be no room for doubt or wrong Cognition, etc.—(2929)

COMMENTARY.

'Tasmin' stands for certainty regarding validity.—(2929)

Question:—"Why should there be no room for Doubt, etc.?"

Answer:—
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TEXT (2930).

INASMUCH AS CONVICTION AND WRONG COGNITION ARE MUTUALLY DESTRUCTIVE,—IF WRONG COGNITION BECOMES EXCLUDED, CONVICTION REMAINS ENTIRELY UNAFFECTED.—(2930)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—"Why should the two be mutually destructive?"
Answer :—'If Wrong Cognition becomes excluded, etc. etc.'—Conviction has a form which is the reverse of Wrong Cognition; hence it does not gain a footing until it has set aside the Wrong Cognition; just as warmth does not gain a footing until it has set aside coolness. Hence when an object has been taken up by Conviction, where could there be any room for the Wrong Cognition?—(2930)

The following Text points out that the Mīmāṃsaka's view involves self-contradiction also:

TEXT (2931).

THUS THEN, FOR ESTABLISHING THE VALIDITY OF THE COGNITION ARISING FROM THE VEDA,—ANY SUCH ASSERTION AS THAT IT ARISES FROM CAUSES FREE FROM DEFECTS AND SO FORTH, IS OF NO USE.—(2931)

COMMENTARY.

'Hūtūthabhāva'—character of arising from causes.
'And so forth'—includes—(a) the assertion of its not being the work of an untrustworthy person, (b) the assertion that it is never sublated. As has been declared in the following passage—"The Cognition produced by the Veda is valid,—(a) because it is produced by causes free from defects, —like cognitions produced by the Inferential Indicative, the Words of a Trustworthy Person, and Sense-perception; also (b) because it is not the work of an untrustworthy person, and (c) because it is free from sublation" —(Shlokavārtika, Śū. 1. 1. 2; 184-185). Consequently, for the proving of the validity of the Cognition produced by the Veda,—when the Mīmāṃsaka states a reason,—it becomes implied that the validity of that Cognition is due to extraneous causes;—and this idea is negativated by the same writer when he asserts that "the validity of all Cognitions is inherent in themselves". Thus there is clear self-contradiction.—(2931)

The following Texts anticipate and answer the rejoinder of the Mīmāṃsaka to the above:—

37
TEXTS (2932–2934).

If it is held that—"the self-sufficiency of the validity of Cognitions having been accepted as a fact, the arguments that have been set forth are only for the purpose of refuting the denial of the same",—even that cannot be right; as there can be no possibility of such denial; there can be a suspicion of such denial, only so long as the firm conviction regarding the validity has not appeared;—as soon as that conviction has appeared, whence could there be any suspicion regarding invalidity,—for the removing of which your attempt could be useful? When a man has been convinced that the tall thing standing before him is a post, he no longer suspects it to be anything else.—(2932–2934)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—"when we put forward our arguments, it is not for proving the validity of the Cognition proceeding from the Veda; it is for refuting the invalidity that has been urged by the other party".

This also cannot be right.—Why?—Because there can be no possibility of any suspicion of invalidity.—It has been declared that 'Conviction and Doubt are mutually destructive' (2930);—so that when Conviction has come about, whence could there be any suspicion of invalidity,—for the removing of which suspicion, your attempt at setting forth arguments could be fruitful?

An example is cited—'When a man, etc. etc.'—i.e. by the observer who has become convinced of its being the post.

'Any thing else'—in the shape of tree or man or some such thing.—(2932–2934)

Question:—"If that is so, then how can the suspicion of invalidity be removed without setting forth arguments?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2935).

When a firm conviction has appeared in a certain form in connection with a certain thing, from a certain cause,—all suspicions to the contrary are removed by that same conviction.—(2935)

COMMENTARY.

'Yadrūpanischayah'—in a certain form.
'Tadviparyaya, etc.'—the suspicion regarding that form or character.
'Tata eva'—from the conviction regarding the same form.—(2935)

An example is cited in support of this:—
TEXT (2936).

When the existence of fire has become cognised through indicatives like smoke,—the idea of the non-existence of fire becomes discarded by that same cognition.

—(2936)

COMMENTARY.

'The idea of its non-existence, etc. etc.'—i.e. the non-existence of the fire.—(2936)

The whole matter is summed up in the following:—

TEXT (2937).

Thus then, please accept the fact that the denial of invalidity is obtained by itself; hence for the denial of invalidity, no arguments are needed.—(2937)

COMMENTARY.

A consolidated argument is set forth in support of this same conclusion—

TEXT (2938).

If there were any suspicion of the two kinds of 'invalidity',—then there would be no certainty regarding 'validity'; since the thing in question would have formed the object of wrong cognition.—(2938)

COMMENTARY.

'Two kinds of invalidity'—in the form of doubt and wrong cognition.—(2938)

In the following text, the Author proceeds to point out 'self-contradiction' on the part of the Mimămsaka, by showing that his view involves the incongruity of a character concomitant with the contrary:—

TEXT (2939).

When a thing has become the object of doubt or misconception, there can be no certainty regarding the real form of that thing;—as in the case of the post.—(2939)

COMMENTARY.

Doubt and misconception are contrary to certainty; and when the thing has become subject to the former two,—and is concomitant with it—then there is no room for certainty regarding it.—(2939)
In the following Text, the Author points out that the view of the Opponent is contrary to Inference,—and also asserts the establishment of his own view:—

TEXT (2940).

For example, (1) the Post, (2) the Fire, and (3) Invalidity are cognised extraneously by means of the notions of (1) the Crow, (2) Smoke and (3) Defects in the source of the Cognition.—(2940)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—Things whose character has become subject to doubt and misconception can have their reality ascertained only by things extraneous to themselves,—e.g. the Post;—the validity of cognitions, for some people, has become the object of Doubt and Misconception; hence this is a Reason based on the nature of the thing concerned.

‘Balibhuk’ (Crow)—‘Dhūma’ (Smoke)—‘hēṭṭhādāsā’ (defects in the source)—the ‘pratayāya’—notions of these;—these are to be construed, respectively, with the ‘Sthānu’ (Post)—‘Tēja’ (Fire) and ‘Aprāmānya’ (Invalidity). [The presence of the Crow indicates that the upright object is the Post, not the Man.]

This shows the Invariable Concomitance of the Probans (with the Probandum).—(2940)

The following Text shows the presence of the Probans in the ‘subject’ and thereby sets aside the defect of ‘Inadmissibility’ from the Reason:—

TEXT (2941).

Because validity has been definitely found to be subject to doubt and misconception,—therefore please understand that any certainty regarding it can be obtained only extraneously.—(2941)

COMMENTARY.

‘Yat’—Because.

‘Gatam’—found.

Question:—“What has been so found?”

Answer:—Validity.

For example, it has been already shown that the cognition produced by the Veda is subject to Doubt and Misconception (i.e. it is found to be doubtful and wrong).

‘Tathā,’—as in the case of the Post, the certainty is obtained only extraneously.

‘Tasya, etc.’—This sets forth the conclusion resulting from the Reasoning.—(2941)
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It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under 2932, that "the self-sufficient validity of cognitions having been accepted as a fact, the arguments that have been set forth are only for the purpose of refuting the denial of the same".—This cannot be right; because, under the circumstances, there could be no doubt regarding the validity; as has been explained.—The position now taken up is—that it may be granted (for the sake of argument) that the arguments have been adduced for the purpose of removing the suspicion of invalidity; but even so, that cannot be right, in accordance with your view.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (2942-2943).

YOUR VIEW IS THAT—"IT IS ONLY IN THE SENTENCE IN WHICH THE NEGATIVE WORD IS FOUND THAT THERE IS DENIAL OF SOMETHING ELSE, AND IN ALL OTHER SENTENCES, IT IS THE POSITIVE DENOTATION ITSELF THAT IS APPREHENDED";—NOW IN YOUR ASSERTION (UNDER TEXT 2348) THAT "THE COGNITION PRODUCED BY THE VEDA IS VALID"—THE NEGATIVE WORD HAS NOT BEEN USED; HENCE IT CANNOT MEAN THE DENIAL OF INVALIDITY.

—(2942-2943)

COMMENTARY.

The view of persons like you, who hold that the denotation of words is always positive, is as follows:—"It is only when the negative word is used in a sentence, that 'the denial of other things' is comprehended,—in all other cases it is only affirmation that is expressed".—In the sentence embodying your argument—"The cognition produced by the Veda is valid, etc. etc."—the negative word has not been used; how then could it express the denial of invalidity?—(2942-2943)

It has been argued by the Author himself (under Text 2928)—'How can there be Doubt and the rest, when the self-validity of the Cognition has become cognised?'—The following Text proceeds to show what is meant by the term 'and the rest' in that sentence:—

TEXT (2944).

FURTHER, IF THE VALIDITY OF ALL COGNITIONS IS DULY RECOGNISED AS BEING INHERENT IN THEM BY THEMSELVES,—THEN WHY IS THERE A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION AMONG DISPUTANTS?

—(2944)

COMMENTARY.

If the validity of all cognitions were inherent in themselves, then there could not be a difference of opinion among the various parties, regarding this validity.—(2944)
Question:—"How do you know that there is this difference of opinion?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2945).

[That there is diversity of opinion is shown by the fact that]

One party consisting of the 'Prāchyas' (Easterners or Ancients) assert definitely that "the validity of cognitions is always inherent, self-sufficient, in themselves"; while others assert that in some cases, the validity is self-sufficient, while in others it is due to extraneous causes;—and there is no hard and fast rule one way or the other.—(2945)

COMMENTARY.

′ One party ′—i.e. the Mīmāṁsakas;—′ others ′—the Buddhists.

These others hold that some cognitions are self-sufficient in their validity; e.g. (a) the direct perception of themselves by the cognitions by the Mystics, — (b) the cognition of the fruitful activity of things,— (c) Inferential Cognition,— (d) Repeated Perception; this latter is definitely recognised as valid by itself as the possibility of misconception has been set aside by the repeated experience;—while this is so in the case of some cognitions, in that of some others, the validity is derived from extraneous circumstances; e.g. the cognition in dispute, arising from the Veda,—and also such Perception as has not had all possibility of mistake removed; as repeated experience or the perception of effective action has not been obtained.

[Says the Opponent]—"If that is so, then, according to you, there should be no diversity of opinion in regard to Inference; as its validity is self-sufficient. And yet there is such diversity of opinion; as some people hold that Inference is brought about by the three-featured Probans; some others hold that it is brought about by the two-featured Probans; while there are others who hold that it is brought by a Probans that is one-featured. Further, under this view, the setting up of the definition of things would be futile.—Similarly, the validity of Inference should not be expounded and justified as against the Materialist; because here also, the validity is self-sufficient".

Answer:—This does not affect our position; because when we assert the self-validity of Inference, what we mean is as follows:—As a matter of fact, Inference proceeds from the definite cognition of the Probans which is invariably concomitant (with the Probandum) through sameness or causation,—and then even without confirmation by subsequent fruitful action, it has been ascertained that it is indirectly produced by the Probans as invariably concomitant with the said Probandum and hence never non-concomitant.
with it. When the disputants quarrel in this matter, it is before the Inference has appeared,—and the reason for this quarrel lies in their ignorance of the nature of the Proban which is related (to the Probandum) by the causal relation; the quarrel does not arise after the Inference has duly come about; as at that time the exact nature of the said Proban has been duly recognised. It is for this reason that what the Teachers do, when putting forward the definition of things, is to explain the nature of the Proban related by the causal relation. How could any Inference come about from the cognition of a Proban other than the one mentioned?

As regards the argument of the Opponent that—"there should be no arguments addressed to the Materialist, for proving the validity of Inference";—it is not right; because what we are seeking to prove is not the validity of Inference, but its use. This we do because, even when the validity of Inference has been proved, the Materialist, deluded by listening to the false teachings of Economic Science (Philosophy of Property), does not make use of it,—as the Sāṅkhya do; hence by showing to him the subject-matter of Inference, we seek to demonstrate to him the use of it;—by pointing out to him that—when one thing is produced by another, the latter is endowed with the capacity to bring about the former;—as is found in the case of Perception and its object;—and the cognition of the 'Subject' as containing the Probandum has been brought about by the perception of the Proban as invariably concomitant with the Probandum;—and by explaining to the Materialist all these conventions, we induce him to make use of Inference. Because in regard to Perception, he has used it as valid only on account of finding that it is not incompatible with the real state of things; and what 'non-incompatibility' could be there except that one should be produced by the other (as in the case of the Proban based upon causal relation)? This has been thus declared—

'The validity of Sense-perception is proved by the fact that it does not appear when its object is not there; and as regards the causal character of that which is invariably concomitant, both the conditions are equally present in it'.—Consequently, as the Sāṅkhya, while recognising the fact that the elephant cannot stand on the tip of a grass-blade, has his mind confounded by listening to the scriptures, and consequently, while not making use of the said negative fact (of the elephant standing on the tip of the grass-blade) has recourse to activities;—similarly the Materialist also.

Then again, the validity of the cognition produced by the Veda has not been established; consequently, its validity could not be proved like that of Inference; because no Invariable Concomitance is established in this case; as it is this same validity that has got to be proved. Hence the two cases (that of the validity of cognitions produced by the Veda, and that of the validity of Inference as upheld by the Buddhist) do not stand on the same footing.—(2945)

The following might be urged—"There may be difference of opinion; but why should not this difference be there, if the validity of cognitions is self-sufficient?"

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (2946).

Dispute always arises from misconception,—and such misconception is rendered impossible by the certainty of conviction; hence when the various parties would have ascertained the truth (regarding the self-validity of cognitions), they would never quarrel among themselves.—(2946)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this is that Dispute is always the effect of Misconception, which is always contrary to firm Conviction,—so that when there is Dispute, on any point, it follows that there is no firm Conviction; consequently, the Proposition that "the validity of Cognitions is self-sufficient" is contrary to Inference.—(2946)

The following Texts point out the perception of another fact which is contrary to firm Conviction:—

TEXTS (2947-2948).

If there were a firm conviction regarding the self-validity of all Cognitions,—then, by virtue of this same conviction, no one could hold a different opinion.—When a man accepts the Invalid as Valid, he becomes deceived. When, however, there is conviction regarding self-validity, no one can be opposed to it.—

(2947-2948)

COMMENTARY.

Disagreement or diversity of opinion is always found to be the effect of a Misconception, which is always contrary to well-ascertained Conviction; therefore such diversity of opinion should not be there, in face of the opinion that all cognitions are inherently valid; because such a Conviction should have removed the misconception that could lead to the said diversity of opinion.

‘Opposed to it’—i.e. holding a different opinion.—(2947-2948)

In the following Texts, the Opponent proceeds to put forward his arguments:—
TEXTS (2949-2950).

"One who acts in pursuance of an invalid cognition meets with non-conformity with reality; and certainty regarding invalidity has been held to be due to extraneous causes and ascertainable by a subsequent sublating cognition. On the other hand, one who acts in pursuance of a valid cognition does not meet with the said non-conformity; and it is in regard to this that we hold that there is firm conviction regarding its validity being inherent and self-sufficient."—(2949-2950)

COMMENTARY.

Non-conformity with reality comes to one who proceeds to act in pursuance of an invalid cognition; and it has already been admitted that the invalidity of cognitions is due to extraneous causes. As for the valid cognition, on the other hand, one who acts in pursuance of that does not meet with non-conformity; and it is of this cognition that validity has been held to be inherent and self-sufficient. In what way then can there be annulment of the assertion of 'self-validity' by Inference?

The answer to the above is provided in the following—

TEXTS (2951-2954).

What has been said is not right; as it proceeds from ignorance of what is meant by us. What is meant by us in regard to the subject of conviction regarding the self-validity of all cognitions is as follows:—In a case where the conviction regarding self-validity is not certain, what is cognised, by elimination is Invalidity; because irrespectively of the fact of the real state of things being otherwise than that envisaged in the cognition,—and the fact of the source of the cognition being defective,—the conviction regarding its invalidity appears immediately after its birth.—Consequently, the Invalid cognition cannot be said to be a case of the 'reversal of validity'; hence no one would ever act in pursuance of the cognition that is not in conformity with reality; because there is always a certainty regarding its non-conformity.—(2951-2954)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by us is as follows:—If you accept the self-validity of all cognitions, then that would imply the acceptance of the fact that 'cogni-
tion' is invariably concomitant with the 'conviction of Validity'; and as a consequence of this, wherever the 'conviction of Validity'—which embraces all cognitions—does not appear, there, by implication, remains Invalidity; and 'Validity' and 'Invalidity' are mutually exclusive. Hence it follows by implication that Invalidity also is inherent in cognitions; irrespectively of any idea of its being not in conformity with reality or of its cause being defective; in fact the conviction regarding Invalidity follows from the mere non-appearance of the conviction regarding Validity. Thus what has been asserted (by the Mīmāṃsaka)—to the effect that "the conviction regarding Invalidity follows from extraneous causes, in the shape of sublating cognitions" (Text 2949)—is not right.

Such being the case, as soon as the Cognition is born, its validity or invalidity becomes ascertained by the birth or otherwise of Conviction regarding its validity; so that the activity of no sane person can follow from an invalid cognition; how then can there be any possibility of the activity not being in conformity with reality?

'Tadgatēḥ'—i.e. from the conviction regarding non-conformity.

All these defects that have been pointed out regarding the Proposition (of the Mīmāṃsaka) should be understood to be the defects in his Reason, which is hereby shown to be not-concomitant (with the Probandum); they should not be regarded as defects of the Proposition. Otherwise, as the Proposition does not form an integral part of the argument, the pointing out of defects in it would involve a 'Clincher' for the other party (the Buddhist).

—(2951–2954)

In the following Text the Author points out the 'Inadmissibility' of the Corroborative Instance cited (under Text 2850) in the shape of the Jar:

TEXT (2955).

IN THE CASE OF THE JAR, THERE IS NO TIME FOR ACTION, APART FROM THE TIME OF ITS BIRTH,—BECAUSE IT HAS A MOMENTARY EXISTENCE; HENCE THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE IS 'INADMISSIBLE'.—(2955)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent—"The Jar is actually seen after birth, independently of the Potter, etc. and found to be performing the useful function of containing Honey, Water and other fluids; how then can it be said that there is no time for its action, apart from the time of its birth?"

The answer to this is as follows:
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TEXT (2956).

Subsequently to their birth, the Jar, etc. do not depend upon the Potter and other such causes; but they do depend upon their own constituent causes and other things; so that of the Jar itself, there can be no action.—(2956)

COMMENTARY.

'Their own constituent causes,'—in the shape of the preceding homogeneous 'moments'.—'Other things' include the man holding it.

What is meant is as follows:—What are seen subsequently are entirely different 'Jar-moments' appearing through their own constituent cause, etc.; and no single Jar is known to exist after the moment of its birth; for the simple reason that all things are momentary.—(2956)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2854, that—"Just as the first Cognition needs corroborations of the second Cognition, so would the latter need another, and so on and on there would be an Infinite Regress."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2957).

If validity is dependent (upon something else), there can be no Infinite Regress. Hence there can be certainty regarding self-validity only when there is cognition of effective action.—(2957)

COMMENTARY.

The other party argues as follows:—

TEXT (2958).

"What peculiar feature is there in the second cognition, different from those of the previous cognition, on account of which it is not regarded to be entirely like the previous cognition?"—(2958)

COMMENTARY.

The answer to this (from the Buddhist) is as follows:—
THE ANSWER TO THE ABOVE IS AS FOLLOWS:—IT IS CONFORMITY WITH
THE REAL STATE OF THINGS THAT IS CALLED ‘VALIDITY’; AND
THERE IS NO FEATURE OF IT EXCEPT THE REPEATED COGNITION
OF EFFECTIVE ACTION.—THE COGNITION ENVISAGING EFFECTIVE
ACTION IS CLEARLY APPREHENDED; AND THE APPREHENSION
BECOMES CONFIRMED BY THE AFTER-THOUGHT ENVISAGING
THE SAME. THUS ITS OWN REAL VALIDITY HAVING BEEN DULY
ASCERTAINED, IT DOES NOT STAND IN NEED OF ANY SUBSEQUENT
COGNITION OF THE SAME EFFECTIVE ACTION. THUS THE VALIDITY
OF THE COGNITION BECOMES MANIFESTED IN THE VERY FIRST COGNI-
TION ENVISAGING THE SAID EFFECTIVE ACTION; AND THEREBY ITS
VALIDITY BECOMES CONFIRMED.—(2959–2962)

COMMENTARY.

The purport of the above, in brief, is as follows:—The name ‘Pramāṇa’.
‘valid cognition,’ is given to that cognition which is in conformity with
the real state of things;—as has been asserted in the declaration that—
‘Pramāṇa is that cognition which is in conformity with things’;—this
‘conformity’ appears in the shape of effective action;—as it is only for
purposes of effective action that there is a desire to investigate the ‘validity’
of Cognitions;—because the same man investigates the validity or invalidity
of cognitions only for the purpose of undertaking activity in accordance
with it,—and not because he likes to do so;—this effective action is one that
figures in the notion of such acts as burning, cooking and the like; as it is
only when this cognition has appeared that the want of the man seeking to
undertake the activity becomes supplied;—this cognition of effective action,
on account of the perceptibility of its own cognition, appears by itself;—and
as this apprehension is quite clear, it is followed by an afterthought, in
accordance with the same apprehension,—which serves to confirm the
cognition;—all this is self-evident.—Nor does the man desire any other
fruit resulting from the said cognition; for the sake of which he would seek
for the appearance of another cognition envisaging another effective action;
which would lead to an Infinite Regress. For instance, in ordinary life, the
fruits of activity that are desired are in the form of prosperity and adversity
(happiness and unhappiness); and this is accomplished by the appearance
of joy and sorrow; and men, being satisfied with this result, desist from
further activity; and this is what is meant when it is said that the result has
been accomplished by itself.

As for the first cognition which has brought about the second cognition,
the validity of that is said to consist only in the capacity to bring about the
second cognition; and the presence of this capacity cannot be ascertained
by people who, on account of the absence of repetition, do not know of the
effective action resulting from it; hence it is ascertained only by the
appearance of its effect in the shape of the second cognition.
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It is for these reasons that the validity of the first cognition is said to be due to something extraneous to itself.—(2959–2962)

In the following Texts, the author sets forth another way of avoiding the Infinite Regress :

TEXTS (2963–2965).

IF THE INITIAL COGNITION DID NOT ENVISAGE A REAL ENTITY, THEN THE SECOND COGNITION, IN THE FORM OF CONFIRMATION BY CONFORMITY TO THE REAL STATE OF THE THING, WOULD NOT APPEAR AT ALL; AS ITS CAUSE WOULD NOT BE THERE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN A MAN HAS THE COGNITION OF FIRE IN REFERENCE TO THE CLUSTER OF ASHOKA-BLOSSOMS, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR THE COGNITION ENVISAGING BURNING AND COOKING (WHICH ARE NOT BROUGHT ABOUT BY WHAT HAS BEEN COGNISED AS FIRE). IF THIS LATTER DOES APPEAR, THEN THE COGNISED OBJECT TURNS OUT TO BE NOT ANYTHING DIFFERENT FROM FIRE; BECAUSE FIRE IS ONLY AN ENTITY THAT IS CHARACTERISED BY THE CAPACITY FOR PRODUCING ITS EFFECT (IN THE SHAPE OF BURNING, COOKING AND THE REST).—(2963–2965)

COMMENTARY.

If the initial—first—cognition had appeared in regard to a non-entity, then the subsequent cognition of its result (in the shape of effective activity) could not come about; because its cause would not be there; because the cognition of effective action is always concomitant with an entity. When the cognition does not envisage real Fire,—when for instance one has the idea of Fire in regard to the bunch of Ashoka-blossoms,—there do not appear the cognitions of such actions as burning and cooking (which are peculiar to Fire).

If such cognitions did appear, then the thing cognised would really be Fire itself;—why?—because Fire is nothing else but what is characterised by the capacity to burn and to cook things.

‘Vibhāvasu’ is Fire.—(2963–2965)

The argument is summed up in the following :

TEXT (2966).

FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT SO LONG AS THE COGNITION ENVISAGING EFFECTIVE ACTION DOES NOT APPEAR, THERE IS ALWAYS A SUSPICION OF THE INITIAL COGNITION BEING WRONG (INVALID); BECAUSE OF THE CAUSES OF MIS-APPRÉHENSION.—(2966)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent:—"Like the initial cognition, the cognition of effective action also is produced directly by the thing, Fire, itself;—then
why should there be suspicion of *invalidity* regarding the initial cognition only, and not regarding the other cognition?"

*Answer:*—

**TEXTS (2967-2968).**

In regard to the first cognition, there are various grounds for suspecting it to be wrong,—such as (1) the non-perception of its effect (in the shape of effective action), (2) perception of similarity, (3) inefficiency of the cognition and so forth. When, however, there appears the cognition envisaging its effect, there are no such grounds; because there is direct perception of action, which is directly related to the entity cognised.—(2967-2968)

**COMMENTARY.**

In connection with the initial cognition (of Fire), there are several grounds for suspecting it to be wrong; for instance, (1) immediately after the cognition, there does not come about its effect in the shape of Burning and the like, (2) it is similar to wrong cognitions, and (3) the inefficiency of the cognition;—‘and so forth’ includes unconcernedness, absence of repetition, etc.—In regard to the cognition of the effect, on the other hand, there is no reason to suspect it to be wrong; hence its confirmation comes from itself.—(2967-2968)

In regard to the initial cognition also, when, by frequent repetition, etc. the grounds of suspicion have been dispelled, the validity comes by itself.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

**TEXT (2969).**

In the case of the initial cognition also, even though its effect may not have been seen, if the cognition has been repeated, a distinct peculiarity is perceived in it which differentiates it from cognitions not pertaining to the thing concerned, [and this establishes its validity].

—(2969)

**COMMENTARY.**

A particular cognition may appear as initially clear and distinct, with all grounds of suspicion regarding its invalidity dispelled by repeated experience; as is found in the case of mystics and in that of experts in gems and coins; in the same manner, in other cases also, through repeated ex-
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perience a clear and distinct cognition may appear, in regard to which all grounds of suspicion regarding invalidity have been dispelled; and it produces immediately after itself a Cogitative Cognition envisaging an object of the same kind,—and thereby it becomes cognised as dissociated from those heterogeneous things which have not figured in the preceding cognition;—in this way its validity is spoken of as being due to itself.

Some people hold the following opinion:—"Even when the cognition is repeated, there is certainty regarding its validity, in the shape of the capacity to bring about its effect,—and this certainty is brought about by Inference based upon the Probans in the form of 'similarity'; so that in all cases validity is cognised through extraneous causes,—and never by the cognition by itself".

This view, however, we fail to comprehend. Because it is necessary to explain from what resource arises the conviction regarding the said Probans itself in the shape of similarity that is not confused.—If it be said that—"it is obtained through repetition",—then, it means that through repetition, it is possible to cognise unconfused similarity, which is common to homogeneous things, and which serves to differentiate heterogeneous things,—because there are no grounds for wrong cognition. If that is so, then whence the hostility to validity itself,—whereby its cognition is denied, even when there are no grounds for wrong cognition?

Further, what is this 'similarity' that is cognised? If it consists in 'being of the form of cognition',—this is present in wrong cognition also; hence the Reason becomes 'inconclusive'.—If it consists in 'appearing in the red form' (in the case of the bunch of Ashoka-blossoms and Fire),—this is present in the blossoms also; hence the Reason becomes 'false'.—If it consists in 'producing the effect of Fire',—then it has to be explained, how this character is ascertained.—If for the proving of this, another Inferential Indicative is sought for, then there is infinite regress.—It might be argued that—"the similarity is cognised by itself, even without the help of the Inferential Indicative, by direct Perception, through repetition". But in that case, if repetition is admitted to possess such capacity,—then why is it not admitted that certainty regarding the capacity (of Cognitions and things) also can come without the help of Inferential Indicatives?—Then again, if it has been established that it is the effect of the cognition, then it is absolutely futile to follow up the Invariable Concomitance; as the recognition of 'being the effect of the Cognition' would itself, like the Inferential Cognition, prove the capacity of getting at its objective (in the shape of fruitful activity). That is to say, Inferential Cognition is brought about through the perception of the Probans as concomitant with the thing concerned, and thereby it becomes cognised as brought about, indirectly, by that thing; and it is on this ground that it is regarded as valid by itself,—and not through similarity; as otherwise, there would be an Infinite Regress;—in the same manner, in the case in question, the validity of the cognition would be self-sufficient by itself. Because, in a case where, even when it is known with certainty that the Probans resides in the 'Subject', the cognition of the Probandum does not come about;—and in such a case the
investigator would seek for the concomitance of the Probans in a Corroborative Instance; e.g. in the case of ‘being an effect’ and ‘non-eternity’; —in the case in question, however, the capacity of the cognition to get at its objective is proved by the fact of that being its effect and hence non-separable from it; consequently, similarity cannot serve as an Indicative, in this case.

Says the Opponent—"If that is so, then how is it that your Teacher has made the following assertion in reference to the Materialist:—'When the Materialist says that Perception is the only Means of Cognition, and Inference is not so,—and finds that while some particular perceptions are in consonance with the reality of things, while others are not so, the necessary definition could be so propounded only on the basis of Invariable Concomitance,—for the benefit of a person who would regulate his activity in accordance with this definition; and the definition thus propounded on the basis of similarity to what has been seen cannot escape from being something inferred.'"

This does not affect us. This assertion has been made by our Teacher with reference to those cognitions of unapprehended things which appear in one's own 'chain' as well as in the 'chain' of others; that this is so is clear from the subsequent qualifying clause—'apart from the cognitions of apprehended things'. If it were not so, if validity in all cases were to be ascertained through similarity, then the qualifying exception 'apart from the cognitions of apprehended things' would be meaningless.

From all this it follows that that cognition, which appears as having all grounds of mistake dispelled by repetition, is self-sufficient in its validity.—(2969)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2854, that—"Just as the first cognition would need corroboration by the second cognition, so should we seek for the corroborative of that corroborative cognition also".

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS (2970–2972).**

If no difference is perceived,—then, on account of the suspicion of the thing being otherwise than cognised, there can be no certainty regarding validity, unless there is a cognition envisaging the resultant effect. In such a case even though the validity may be present there, it cannot be ascertained; it is recognised only through the subsequent cognition of its resultant activity. It is for this reason that the first cognition needs its corroborative; and for the same reason it is not necessary to seek for the corroborative of the corroborative cognition also.—(2970–2972)

**COMMENTARY.**

Even in case where the Validity has been apprehended, there can be no certainty regarding it, because of the presence of the causes of misconception;
and in such cases, the Validity is ascertained only extraneously, through the
cognition of the resultant activity; and what is desired by the man having
been secured by this, there is no need for further corroboration by another
corroborative cognition; as there is in the case of the initial cognition.—
(2970–2972)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2855, that—"if the
Validity of some cognition be held to be self-sufficient, why should there be
hostility to the same being the case with the initial cognition?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2973).

OF THE SECOND COGNITION, THE VALIDITY IS SELF-SUFFICIENT, BECAUSE
THERE ARE NO CAUSES FOR MISAPPREHENSION; IN THE CASE OF
THE FIRST COGNITION, HOWEVER, THERE IS HOSTILITY
TOWARDS ITS SELF-VALIDITY, ON ACCOUNT OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF MISAPPREHENSION.
—(2973)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent:—"That cognition,—which is concomitant with the
suspicion of invalidity, and hence in regard to which there is no certainty
regarding its capacity to get at its objective,—would be like Inference and
hence not valid. Because, in the case of Inference, when there is doubt
regarding the invariable concomitance of the objective, no validity attaches
to it; in the same manner Perceptions also would be not valid."

This does not affect our position. Because when Perception is regarded
as valid, it is not because it represents itself as invariably concomitant with
its objective, like Inference;—but only as tending to the envisaging (or
ideating) of the objective. Because it is called 'valid', when it presents the
desired object to the man seeking for effective action; and this presentation
of the object is not done either by carrying the man to the place where the
object lies, or by carrying the object to the place where the man is; it is
done by prompting the man to activity. Nor does it prompt the man to
activity by taking hold of his hand; it does it by showing the objective
of that activity;—and this showing of the objective is nothing but the cognition
of the object figuring in the Perception.—In a case where there is doubt,
there also there certainly is cognition of the object figuring in the Perception;
if there were no cognition of it, it could not figure in the doubt at all. As
the functioning of the Perception would be complete by this much,—if there
is a doubt later on, regarding the invariable concomitance of the object (with
the Perception),—this doubt could not prevent the functioning of the Per-
cession; so that even when there is this doubt, the validity of the Perception
remains intact.—That Perception, however, which appears as beset by the
idea of a form contrary to the object figuring in the Perception, is not valid;
e.g. the Perception of the Mirage beset by the idea of Water; and the reason
for this lies in the fact that the aforesaid functioning of the Perception does not take place. Similarly when there is cognition of the yellow colour in the Conch-shell, or that of the gem in the light radiating from it,—all this cognition is clearly invalid; as in both these cases, the cognition is not in accordance with the real state of the things concerned.

The apprehension or non-apprehension of the Perception is due to what actually figures in it,—it is not due to mere conformity with the real state of things. In the cases just cited, the thing that actually figures in the cognition is not as it really exists at the particular time and place; in fact the time and place are not the same at all; as time and place also make a difference in the nature of things; if it were not so, there would be an end to all notions of difference.

As for Inference, on the other hand, as it is by its very nature, conceptual, it envisages generalities,—and hence the idea of what forms its object cannot be determined by what actually figures in the cognition; because the object (in the form of generalities) cannot figure in the cognition; its object therefore can be determined only by the conviction (certainty) that it produces; as has been thus declared—'The form that is not determined by convictions,—how can that form the objective of those cognitions?'—Thus it is that though Inference is devoid of the actual appearance of the object, yet it is brought about by the inference of the perception of things that are invariably concomitant, and hence becomes indirectly tied down to the object; and it is on this that its validity is based. Hence in this case, certainty regarding the invariable concomitance is essential; as otherwise, Inference could not come about at all.

For these reasons, Perception cannot be regarded as standing on the same footing as Inference.—(2973)

In the following Text, the other party urges that—"If the validity of Cognitions depends upon extraneous causes, there is mutual interdependence":—

**TEXT (2974).**

"If the validity of the cognition is not definitely ascertained,
—Then how could any sane person have recourse to activity? Because what is wanted is not cognised."—(2974)

**COMMENTARY.**

As a matter of fact, in every case it is necessary that the sane man should have the conviction of the validity of his cognition, and then have recourse to activity following from that cognition; and when this activity is there, then alone can there be any conviction of the validity of the cognition; so that there is mutual interdependence.—Thus then, the sane man having no conviction regarding the desired thing, how could he have recourse to any activity?—(2974)

The following Text supplies the answer to the above:—
TEXT (2975).

Our answer to the above is as follows:—It is through the doubtful Cognition itself that the clever man has recourse to activity; and this does not detract from his cleverness.—(2975)

COMMENTARY.

Activity is of two kinds—(a) tending to fruitful activity, and (b) tending to the ascertainment of validity.—As regards the former, it has been already explained how that activity is possible, even when there is Doubt; and the reason for this lies in the fact that Sense-perception prompts man to activity by the mere Cognition of the thing envisaged by it; and such activity does not detract from the cleverness of the man; because in the case of agriculturists, activity is found, even though the issue in the matter is doubtful. This is what is meant by the Text.—It will not be right to assert that—"agriculturists are regarded as intelligent agents only because they have recourse to activity only when they are sure regarding the efficacy of the measures adopted by them".—Because the Measures are always dependent upon the nature of what is meant to be obtained through them; and hence, if there is no certainty regarding the End, there can be none regarding the Means (or Measures).—(2975)

The following Text proceeds to point out that the second kind of activity (that tending to the ascertainment of validity) is all the more proper,—where there is Doubt regarding validity:—

TEXT (2976).

It is because of the Man having acted on the basis of a Doubt, in regard to the ascertainment of validity,—that its being the proper Means can be ascertained; so that there is this even when there is Doubt.—(2976)

COMMENTARY.

Because, in regard to the ascertainment of validity, the man acts through a doubtful idea, and thereby he ascertains the fact of the thing being the proper Means,—therefore it is only right that there should be activity in regard to that Means, even when there is Doubt.—(2976)

Question:—"How is the fact of its being the Means ascertained?"

Answer:—
WHEN I HAVE RECURS TO ACTIVITY ON THE BASIS OF A DOUBTFUL
Cognition,—if I succeed in obtaining the fruit of that
activity, then certainty regarding the validity of that Cog-
nition would be automatically apprehehended; it cannot be
ascertained in any other way.—Nor can it be reasonable
to raise the question as to 'how the man has recourse to the
said Means'. For the simple reason that there is no other
way available. As a matter of fact, without the Means, no
one can get at the End.—Thus, even when acting on the
basis of a doubtful Cognition, the man does not lose his
character of being a sane person.—(2977–2979)

COMMENTARY.

'Acting on the basis of a doubtful Cognition': i.e. having recourse to
activity, through a mere suspicion that his Cognition may be valid and right.
The rest is easily understood; hence it is not explained in detail.—
(2977–2979)

In the following Text, the other party proceeds to show that the idea
of validity being ascertained by means of the Cognition of effective action is
'Inconclusive',—and thereby to support his contention that there is mutual
interdependence:

TEXT (2980).

''As a matter of fact, Cognition envisaging effective action is
present in Dreams also; and yet, on that account, it is
not valid;—nor is its source, the former Cog-
nition, valid.'''—(2980)

COMMENTARY.

'It's source, the former Cognition'—i.e. the Cognition of effective action;
—this should be construed with 'is not valid'.—(2980)

The answer to the above is as follows:
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TEXTS (2981-2982).

IT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE THE WHOLE OF THAT STATE IS ILLUSORY;
HAVING NO BASIS IN THE EXTERNAL WORLD;—HENCE IN THOSE STATES,
THERE CAN BE NO CONFORMITY WITH EXTERNAL OBJECTS;—
ALL THESE ARE KNOWN IN THEIR OWN FORMS, NOT DIFFERING,
IN THIS, FROM THE MIND AND THE MENTAL STATES.
THIS IS THE REASON WHY THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE TWO STATES IS CLEARLY
PERCEIVED.—(2981-2982)

COMMENTARY.

If what has been urged is against the Buddhist who accepts the reality of the external world, then the Reason adduced is 'inadmissible'; this is what is meant by the first two lines.

What is meant is that the said upholder of the external world admits the validity of Cognitions to be based upon conformity to the real state of things,—and not upon conformity to the Cognition of effective action;—in the case of dreams, there can be no conformity to the real state of things; because all parties are agreed on the point that the entire dream-state is illusory; hence in that state all the Cognitions that appear are without objects, hence they are objectless. Thus then, as the conditions of validity can be applicable to Cognitions of the waking state only, it is not right to urge the 'inconclusiveness' (or falsity) of our Reason on the basis of Dream-Cognition.—This is what is meant by the Text.

Further, the 'Cognition of effective action' that appears during dreams is one that has never appeared before,—it is fleeting,—and confused; while the reverse of it is the case with similar Cognition during the waking state; how then can the validity of this latter be doubtful in view of what happens in the former?

If, on the other hand, what has been urged is against the Yogāchāra (Idealist), then it has no bearing upon the case in question. Because it is for the practical man (from the practical point of view) that Valid Cognition has been defined as 'Cognition in conformity with the real state of things';—and in this connection, 'conformity' can consist only in the Cognition envisaging effective action; as it is only when this latter has appeared that people regard the Cognition in question as 'valid'; and it is for this purpose that people have recourse to activity towards things. This practical Cognition can be only one appearing during the waking state; because it is only activities during this state that are regarded by people as real; never those occurring during dreams. Thus then, so long as 'being waking Cognition' has not been introduced as a necessary qualification, there can be no 'inconclusiveness' or 'falsity' in view of what happens during dreams.—(2981-2982)
TEXT (2983).

THE FOLLOWING MIGHT BE URGED:—“IT BEING ASCERTAINED THAT ITS VALIDITY IS DUE TO EXTRANEOUS CAUSES, THE Cognition SHOULD BE REGARDED AS ‘COGNISED’”—THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN THIS.—(2983)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—“The validity of all Cognitions being equally due to extraneous causes, why should there be this distinction? And under these circumstances, the Cognition itself becomes the object cognised, which is extremely incongruous.”

This is the objection urged by the Opponent. The answer to this is that—‘there is no incongruity in this’;—‘adah’, this.—There is no incongruity in this, as ‘cognition’ and ‘cognised’ are relative terms like ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, and ‘Father’ and ‘Son’.—(2983)

The same idea is further explained:

TEXTS (2984-2985).


COMMENTARY.

When a certain thing is apprehended by a Cognition, this Cognition itself does not become the ‘cognised’ in relation to itself; but in relation to the other Cognition that asserts its validity, it becomes the ‘cognised’;—and is not a ‘Cognition’; hence there is no incongruity or ‘admixture’; just as one and the same thing, spoken of as ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, in relation to different things, does not make an undue ‘admixture’.—(2984-2985)

The following Text sums up the argument:
TEXT (2986).

Thus, it is established that the idea of validity, being ascertained through the Cognition of effective action, does not involve Infinite Regress; as all further need has ceased.—(2986)

COMMENTARY.

'As all further need has ceased' ;—'Parākāṅkṣā' is to be treated as a Karmadāraya compound; 'parā'—'another', 'further'—being a qualification for 'ākāṅkṣā'—'need'.—Or it may be taken as Tatpurūṣa—'need for another'—i.e. anything other than conformity to the reality;—because all such need has ceased.

Further, when it is said that 'Cognition in conformity with reality is valid',—it provides the definition (peculiar characteristic) of that Cognition which brings about the result in the shape of the Cognition of effective action. This definition is not applicable to the Cognition of the result itself; under the circumstances, how could there be any room for the objection that this Cognition also should be regarded as valid? For instance, when the Seed is defined as the cause of the Sprout,—do the wise ones raise the question that the Sprout also should be regarded as the Seed? What happens in this case is that the fact of the Seed being the 'cause of the Sprout' is cognised only when one sees the Sprout (rising from it); in the same manner, the Cognition is cognised as 'valid' only when its result in the shape of effective action is perceived; and this result is not apprehended by another Cognition; only if it did, would there be an Infinite Regress. Because the Cognition of the result, which is in the shape of Cognition, is cognised by itself (not by another Cognition); and there can be no mistake or illusion in the Cognition in regard to itself; because if there were any uncertainty regarding it, the Cognition of itself could not come about at all. Thus there is nothing in what has been urged by the other party.—(2986)

Now, the Opponent urges, in Text 2987, the objection that—"in the event of the validity of Cognitions being ascertained through the perfection of its cause (source), there would be an Infinite Regress" ;—and this objection is answered in the subsequent Texts 2988—2990 :

TEXTS (2987—2990).

"Even when the Cognition has come about, its validity is not ascertained until the perfection of its source has been apprehended by another Cognition [so that there is an Infinite Regress]."—(2987)—The answer of the wise ones to this is that there can be no Infinite Regress; because the said perfection of the source is apprehended by the Cognition of conformity, which is not dependent upon anything else;

COMMENTARY.

There are two kinds of Cognition—one envisaging the object near the observer, and the other envisaging the object remote from him. As regards the former, its validity is ascertained, not by the recognition of the perfection of its cause, but from the Cognition of its being in conformity to effective activity. Because, in this case, the Cognition of the perfection of its sources is not possible, until its truth is recognised through its conformity to effective action; and when its truth has been recognised, if the Cognition of the perfection of its sources comes later on, it can serve no useful purpose.

As regards the Cognition envisaging remote things, its validity can be ascertained through the Cognition of the perfection of its sources;—this is what is pointed out in the sentence—"In the case where the object is not in close proximity, etc. etc."—For instance, the validity of the Cognition of the golden conch-shell, which is far remote from the observer, can be ascertained only from the fact of its being brought about by it,—i.e. being brought about by perfect (efficient) causes,—just like the Cognition of the white conch-shell, which is near the man. This argument may be thus formulated—That Cognition which has been brought about by perfect causes must be valid,—e.g. the Cognition of the white conch-shell, lying near the observer;—this particular Cognition envisaging the remote object, in the shape of the yellow conch-shell, is one that has been brought by perfect causes;—thus this is a reason based upon the nature of the things concerned.—(2987–2990)

Says the Opponent:—"The Reason adduced in this argument is 'inadmissible'; because the 'perfection of the cause' cannot be recognised without 'conformity with the real state of the thing'; because the Sense-organs (which are the cause of Cognitions) are themselves beyond the reach of the senses; and when 'conformity with the real state of things' is needed, that in itself constitutes well-ascertained validity; so that the recognition of 'the perfection of the cause' would serve no useful purpose; as it would come after the validity has become ascertained. It might be argued that—'At times, from the Cognition of the object close by, one would find that it is in conformity with effective action and from that he would know that the source of the Cognition has been perfect, and then he would conclude that the Cognition is valid; while at other times, in the case of the remote object, even though
he may not be cognisant with the fact of its being in conformity with effective action, and yet, in course of time, he would become assured of the perfection of the source of the Cognition, and then secure certainty regarding its validity'.—But this cannot be right. Because things being momentary and perishable, their activity cannot be always of one and the same form; because, as the result of the influence of a succession of causal conditions, they would be acquiring diverse potencies."

Anticipating all this, the Author supplies the following answer:—

TEXTS (2991–2993).

IN REGARD TO THE CONCH-SHELL BEFORE OUR EYES, WHEN IT IS FOUND THAT THE EFFECTIVE ACTION RESULTING FROM ITS COGNITION IS ONE THAT CAN BE PRODUCED BY THE WHITE OBJECT, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE COGNITION OF THE WHITE CONCH-SHELL IS NOT ONE PRODUCED BY EYES AFFECTED BY JAUNDICE. THE PURITY (PERFECTION) OF THE CAUSE HAVING BECOME THUS RECOGNISED, IF, AT THE SAME TIME, THERE SHOULD ARISE THE COGNITION OF THE YELLOW COLOUR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONCH-SHELL MADE OF GOLD,—AS THAT ALSO WOULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY FLAWLESS CAUSES, THERE WOULD BE CERTainty REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF THAT COGNITION,—JUST AS IN THAT OF THE COGNITION OF THE WHITE COLOUR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WHITE CONCH-SHELL, WHICH HAS LED TO EFFECTIVE ACTION.—(2991–2993)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this is as follows:—We do not mean that, in the case of the Cognition of the remote object, appearing at some other time,—its validity is ascertained through the perfection of its source;—if this were our opinion, then alone could our Reason be 'inadmissible', on account of the possibility of fresh potencies appearing under the influence of successive causal conditions;—what we do mean is that, in the case of the Cognition of the white conch-shell near us, at the same time that we have the certainty regarding the flawlessness of the cause brought about by the securing of the effect due to the white colour,—there appears the Cognition of the yellow colour in the golden conch-shell lying far away from us,—it is concluded that as the perceptive cause has been found to be flawless, the said Cognition of the yellow colour must be valid, true.—It is not possible that the source of Cognition should have become changed at the same time; as in that case, there would be no conformity of the Cognition of the proximate object with effective action.—(2991–2993)

The following Text proceeds to show that what has been just said should be quite acceptable to the Mimamsakas:—
TEXT (2994).

The Author of the Bhāṣya also has said the same thing by the mention of the attack of hunger, etc.; hence it is through sheer delusion that the Infinite Regress has been urged.—(2994)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that the Mīmāṃsaka’s proposition involves self-contradiction also. For instance, the Author of the Bhāṣya (Shabara) has declared as follows (Ṣū. 1. 1. 5, p. 8):—“When the Mind or the Sense-organ becomes beset with hunger, etc.,—or when the external object is beset with smallness, etc.,—then the Cognition turns out to be wrong; when they are not so beset, the Cognition is right; because the contact of the Sense-organ—Mind—and object is the cause of Cognition; when this contact is not present, there can be no Cognition; hence any defect in the said contact becomes the cause of wrong Cognition;—when the three factors are defective, the resultant Cognition is wrong; as is clear from the fact, that on the removal of the defect, the correct Cognition is secured.—If it is asked—’how can it be known that the cause is defective?’ the answer is that, if, on careful scrutiny, no defect is discovered, then there being no ground for asserting that there is defect, we conclude that the cause is free from defect.”

In this passage, the Author of the Bhāṣya has clearly stated that the validity of the Cognition is ascertained from the recognition of the flawlessness of the cause. If this were not meant, then what would be the sense of the phrase ‘on careful scrutiny’?

Thus this goes against the assertion that the validity of Cognitions is self-sufficient.—(2994)

It has been asked by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2861 et seq.—“On what grounds have the Corroborative Cognition and the Cognition of perfection been held to be superior to the initial Cognition?”

The answer to this, so far as the Corroborative Cognition is concerned, has been explained before; now the Author provides the answer, in regard to the Cognition of perfection:

TEXT (2995).

The validity of the initial Cognition is not recognised, because of the suspicion that it might have been brought about by defective causes. This is the point in which the ‘Cognition of perfection’ has been regarded as superior.—(2995)

COMMENTARY.

‘Mānatā’—validity.

‘Ādyasya’—of the Cognition of the object itself. It is called ‘initial’ because it comes before the Cognition of the perfection of the cause.
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'Tat'—therefore.—(2995)

The following Text shows the faultlessness of the activity:—

TEXT (2996).

THUS THE PERFECTION OF THE CAUSE BEING ASCERTAINED THROUGH THE COGNITION OF EFFECTIVE ACTION,—IN A CASE WHERE THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE ACTION AT ALL, THE FUNCTIONING CANNOT BE DEPRECIATED.—(2996)

COMMENTARY.

'Akṣṭārtha, etc.'—that which has not performed any effective action.

'Avāchya'—not to be depreciated.

The idea is that it is so, because it is preceded by the ascertainment of validity.—(2996)

It has been asserted by the Mīmāṁsaka, in Text 2862, that—"Validity must be regarded as inherent in all Cognitions as a general rule, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2997–2999).

IF SELF-VOLIDITY OF COGNITIONS IS THE GENERAL RULE, AND IT IS DISCARDED WHEN THERE IS EITHER AN ANNULMENT OF IT OR THE COGNITION OF ITS SOURCES BEING DEFECTIVE,—THEN VALIDITY BECOMES REALLY DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF ANNULMENT AND ABSENCE OF THE COGNITION OF THE SOURCE BEING DEFECTIVE; AND FOR YOU THUS THE CERTAINTY REGARDING VALIDITY IS DUE TO EXTRANEOUS CAUSES. BECAUSE THE SAID 'ABSENCE' IS A NEGATIVE COGNITION, WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE OTHER FORM OF POSITIVE COGNITION,—THIS OTHER FORM BEING 'NON-APPREHENSION' ACCORDING TO YOU, AND 'INFERENCE' ACCORDING TO US.—(2997–2999)

COMMENTARY.

The first two lines reproduce the opinion of the other party, and the other lines state the objection against that opinion.

If the Cognition of annulment, etc. discards the Validity, then it means that conviction regarding Validity is due to the absence of the Cognition of the annulment, etc. ; and this would mean that it is due to causes extraneous to the Cognition itself. Because 'Non-apprehension' (Negation) has been accepted as a distinct form of Cognition.

According to our view the form of Cognition called 'Non-apprehension' is included under 'Inference', and is not a distinct form of Cognition.—(2997–2999)
Further, the said general rule and its exception being ‘conceptual’,—
inasmuch as they pertain to Words and their meaning,—would be always
uncertain (flexible); hence they have no room in a discussion regarding the
nature of entities; because all things are restricted within the limits of their
own nature, and as such do not admit of the nature of other things. Hence
when you put forward the general rule and its exception in this connection,
it shows that you are ignorant of the real objective of Rules and Exceptions.
For instance, in accordance with the reasoning propounded by yourself. a
general rule and exception, contrary to those put forward by you, can be
conceived.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3000-3001).

BY THIS SAME REASONING (THAT YOU HAVE PUT FORWARD) THE INVALIDITY
ALSO OF COGNITIONS MAY BE PROVED TO BE INHERENT IN THEM;
AS THE SAME MAY BE ASSERTED IN SUPPORT OF IT AS FOLLOWS
—‘THEREFORE SELF-INVALIDITY OF COGNITIONS IS THE
GENERAL RULE, AND IT IS DISCARDED WHEN THERE
IS EITHER ABSENCE OF ANNULMENT, OR AB-
SENCE OF THE COGNITION OF ITS SOURCE
BEING DEFECTIVE.’—(3000-3001)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila has declared as follows:—“For these reasons the Validity of
the Cognition must be taken as following from its being of the nature of
apprehension, and it can be discarded by the Cognition of the fact of the
real object cognised being really unlike what figures in the Cognition, and by
the Cognition of defects in its cause.”—(Shlokavṛtiśa, 1. 1. 2; 53).

The following Texts show that the same may be said regarding ‘In-
validity’ also:—

TEXTS (3002-3003).

SIMILARLY, THE INVALIDITY OF COGNITION MUST BE TAKEN AS FOLLOWING
FROM ITS BEING OF THE NATURE OF APPREHENSION, AND IS DIS-
CARDED BY THE COGNITION OF ITS BEING IN CONFORMITY WITH
THE REAL NATURE OF THINGS AND BY THE COGNITION OF
EFFICIENCY OF ITS SOURCE.—IF ‘INVALIDITY’ WERE DUE TO
EXTRANEOUS CAUSES, THERE WOULD BE INFINITE REGRESS;
BECAUSE IT COULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THE VALID COGNI-
TION, AND THIS IS ITSELF UNSTABLE.—(3002-3003)

COMMENTARY.

An ‘a’ should be read before ‘pramāṇatā’.
‘Yathārthajñāna’ is Cognition of its being in conformity with the real
state of things;—‘Hetūsthaguna-jñāna’ is Cognition of the efficiency of the
cause.—These two terms form a Copulative Compound,
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It has been argued (by the Mimamsaka) under Text 2863, that—"If it is due to extraneous causes, then there is no Infinite Regress, because it would be dependent upon Validity and this is there all right".—The answer to this is—'If Invalidity were due, etc.'—'Etat' stands for Invalidity,—'tat', for the Valid Cognition.—(3002-3003)

**Question** :—"Why is it unstable, not firmly established?"
**Answer** :—

**TEXTS (3004-3005).**

For instance, you assert 'Validity' on the ground of the absence of sublating Cognition; and 'absence of sublation' also is held to be a distinct form of Cognition, named 'Non-apprehension';—so that the validity of this latter also is asserted on the ground of the absence of sublating Cognition; and this process proceeding on and on, there can be no resting ground (stability).

—(3004-3005)

**COMMENTARY.**

It has been argued (by the Mimamsaka), under Text 2866, that—"The sublating Cognition consists in the conviction that the thing cognised is otherwise than as cognised; and this conviction, being self-sufficient, sets aside the preceding Cognition".

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (3006).**

Because the fact of the validity of the sublating Cognition being self-sufficient has not been proved, therefore it cannot set aside the preceding Cognition.—(3006)

**COMMENTARY.**

As the form of Cognition called 'Non-apprehension' is always dependent upon something else, its validity cannot be regarded as proved.—(3006)

The following Text proceeds to confirm the view that the Opponent's view involves an Infinite Regress:
TEXT (3007).

If validity is admitted in some cases, even when there is no absence of the sublating Cognition,—then why should there be hostility against the initial Cognition?—(3007)

COMMENTARY.

If, in order to avoid Infinite Regress, it be held that in some cases there is validity, even though the sublating Cognition is not absent,—then, in the case of the initial Cognition also, there need be no dependence upon the absence of sublation; and in this way, all Cognitions would be equally valid.—(3007)

It has been argued (by the Mīmāṃsaka) under Text 2867, that—"It may be that there too, there may be need for another sublating Cognition in certain cases, where suspicion might be aroused in the mind of the person by the previous Cognition; but that suspicion ceases after very little effort".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3008-3009).

If the sublating Cognition sets aside the preceding Cognition, because its validity is self-sufficient,—why should there arise any suspicion regarding it? What could be suspected would be the possibility of another sublating Cognition with self-sufficient validity; but such a suspicion would be self-contradictory, and could never arise in regard to what has been duly ascertained.—(3008-3009)

COMMENTARY.

If the sublating Cognition is one of which the validity is not dependent upon anything else,—then, how could there arise any suspicion regarding its sublation,—in view of which it is said that 'there may be need for another sublating Cognition'? Hence there is clear self-contradiction—involved in the statements that 'the validity of the sublating Cognition is self-sufficient' and that 'its sublation is suspected'.—Because what is meant by 'independence', 'self-sufficiency', is that it has become an object of firm conviction; and as a matter of fact, where there is firm conviction, any suspicion regarding it is absolutely impossible. Because as between 'certainty' and 'uncertainty', one always sets aside the other; and 'suspicion', as envisaging both ends, operates in the manner of 'uncertainty', 'doubt'.—(3008-3009)
EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY'

It has been argued (by the Mimāmsākā) under Text 2869, that—"If, even after due effort at seeking for it, no other sublating Cognition is found,—on account of there being no basis for it,—then no Cognition sublative of the first Cognition would be found, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3010–3017).

UNDER THE THEORY OF THE SELF-VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS, THE VALIDITY BEING ASCERTAINED BY ITSELF, WHY SHOULD AN EFFORT BE MADE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A SUBLATING COGNITION?—BECAUSE, WHEN THE VALIDITY OF A COGNITION IS NOT DEFINITELY COGNISED BY ITSELF, ITS SUBLATING COGNITION IS GOT AT WITHOUT EFFORT. THUS, WHY SHOULD THERE BE SAID TO BE 'THREE COGNITIONS' FOR THE INVESTIGATOR? IN FACT THERE IS NOT ROOM FOR A SINGLE ONE; THE CONVICTION REGARDING IT HAVING COME ABOUT BY ITSELF. —IF IT BE HELD THAT—"EVEN WHEN NO SUBLATING COGNITION IS ACTUALLY FOUND, THERE ARISES SUSPICION DUE TO DOUBT; BECAUSE THE NON-APPRÉHENSION OF SUBLATING COGNITION IS NOT ALWAYS CONCOMITANT WITH ITS ABSENCE";—THEN, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHY HAVE YOU BECOME SATISFIED WITH ONLY THREE (COGNITIONS)? BECAUSE, AS BEFORE, EVEN WHEN THE SUBLATING COGNITION IS NOT THERE, ITS PRESENCE COULD ALWAYS BE SUSPECTED; AND THIS SUSPICION OF SUBLATION COULD NOT CEASE UNTIL ONE MET WITH CONFORMITY TO EFFECTIVE ACTION; HENCE THE RESTRICTION TO THREE ONLY IS ENTIRELY FUTILE.—THUS THEN, EVEN IN A CASE WHERE NO SUBLATION HAS ACTUALLY APPEARED, ITS PRESENCE CAN ALWAYS BE SUSPECTED; ESPECIALLY AS CASUISTRY CAN NEVER LEAD TO THE ASCERTAINMENT OF TRUTH.—EVEN THOUGH A MAN MAY HAVE HAD THE UNSUBLATING COGNITION OF THE CONCH-SHELL AS YELLOW, THROUGHOUT HIS LIFE,—SUCH COGNITION CAN NEVER BECOME VALID.—(3010–3017)

COMMENTARY.

If Validity is ascertained by itself, then Validity being invariably concomitant with conviction,—where there is no conviction, there, by implication, would be Invalidity; so that the presence of its sublating Cognition becomes secured without any effort; hence any effort to prove the existence of the said sublating Cognition would be futile. So that there is no room for even a single Cognition on the part of the investigator; what to say of three? Hence when it is said that 'the Cognition of the investigator does not proceed beyond three', it is something entirely irrelevant. This is what is pointed out in the Text beginning with the word 'Atah' (Text 3012).

The following might be urged—"The absence of the sublating Cognition cannot be ascertained by mere non-apprehension of it; because even when a
thing is existent, it is not apprehended if it happens to be remote, or very small, or hidden; so that non-existence is not invariably concomitant with non-apprehension; hence it is that effort is made for proving that there is no sublating Cognition.”

If that is so, then please give up the idea of any such restriction as that ‘the investigator should have only three Cognitions’; because, as in the case of the first Cognition, so in all other Cognitions, the presence of sublation would be suspected; until the Cognition of the fruit (result) of the Cognition has appeared,—how can the suspicion of sublation be prevented, in view of which, there could be the restriction of the number of Cognitions to three only? Unless there is proof for it, mere proclamation cannot bring about the cessation of suspicion in the minds of intelligent men. Because the whole investigation regarding Cognitions proceeds on the basis of real things; and what has been started is not mere Casuistry, whereby only a few Cognitions are examined.

If the validity of Cognitions rested upon the limitation of the investigation to three Cognitions only,—then in the case of men who have suffered from the jaundiced eye throughout their life, as the conch-shell is always cognised as yellow,—that Cognition would be quite valid.—(3010–3017)

The following question might be raised:—If the Cognition is invalid, how is it that the sublation of it does not appear after the investigation of the three Cognitions?—The answer may be that, because it does not appear, therefore it is concluded that it does not exist.—The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3018).

IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT THE SUBLATING COGNITION DOES NOT APPEAR BECAUSE THE CAUSE OF THE REMOVAL OF THE DEFECT IS NOT AVAILABLE, OR BECAUSE OF SOME OTHER REASON; HENCE THE SUSPICION REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS BEING THERE DOES NOT CEASE.—(3018)

COMMENTARY.

‘Cause of the removal of the defect’—such as the dropping of the juice of the Dropa-flower into the eyes (which cures the jaundice);—when no such remedy is available, the Cognition sublating the Cognition of yellowness in the conch-shell does not appear.

‘Or because of some other reason’;—for instance, when looking at the mass of mirage and mistaking it for water, if one does not move up to it, the corrective Cognition envisaging the sandy desert as distinguished from water does not appear.—(3018)
EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ‘SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY’. 1349

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 2872, that—“If the man, through stupidity, should imagine the existence of the sublating Cognition, even when none has come about, he would be beset with doubts in all his dealings, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3019–3021).

THUS, EVEN WHERE THE SUSPICION (OF SUBLATION) IS DUE TO STUPIDITY, THERE IS ALWAYS SOME GROUND FOR IT; WHEN THERE IS COGNITION OF THE PERFECTNESS OF THE CAUSE AND THAT OF CONFORMITY TO REALITY, THERE ARISES NO SUSPICION IN THE MIND OF THE WISE.

SO THAT HE DOES NOT BECOME BESET WITH DOUBT IN ALL HIS DEALINGS: AS HIS MIND HAS BECOME FREE FROM DOUBT, ON THE COGNITION OF THE SAID PERFECTNESS AND CONFORMITY.

—IF EVEN AFTER THIS, A FOOLISH MAN ENTERTAINS SUSPICIONS,—IT IS IN REFERENCE TO SUCH A PERSON THAT THE SUSPICIOUS CHARACTER SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DEPRECIATED BY THE UNBORN ONE (IN THE Bhagavadgītā).—(3019–3021)

COMMENTARY.

It has been explained that all doubt and suspicion cease when the perfect character of the cause, and conformity with reality have become perceived.

It has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2873, that—“Suspiciousness has been deprecated by Vāsudēva, etc. etc.”.—What the person making this assertion has shown by this is only his own devotion to the Bhakti-cult, not the real state of things. A mere assertion, without reasons, does not carry conviction regarding the real state of things, to any intelligent person whose mind has risen above the normal.

The words of Vāsudēva (that have been quoted) were pronounced in an entirely different context, and are not incompatible with our view of things. —This is what is shown by the words—‘If, even after this, etc. etc.’.—‘After this’—i.e. after having perceived the perfectness of the cause and also conformity to reality,—one,—like yourself,—entertains suspicions,—as asserted (under Text 2834) that—‘the corroboration of the corroboration also has to be sought for’,—such suspicious character is what appears to have been deprecated by the ‘Unborn One’—Viṣṇu.—(3019–3021)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2874, that—“When, in regard to a Cognition, a certain sublation is possible,—and, on being sought for, is not found,—then in regard to that Cognition, it has to be concluded that there is no sublation at all”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

39
TEXTS (3022-3023).

If the ascertainment of validity is dependent upon the exigencies of place, time, the man and the circumstances,—it is clear that the definite Cognition of validity is dependent upon extraneous causes. For instance, the place and time having been ascertained through the absence of sublation, the ascertainment of the validity of the initial Cognition clearly follows from other Means of Cognition.—(3022-3023)

COMMENTARY.

In this the Author points out the self-contradiction involved in the position of the other party.—For instance, if the Cognition of validity is held to be dependent upon the exigencies of place, time, the man and the attendant circumstances,—then it is clearly meant that the validity is due to extraneous causes; because as regards place, time, etc., when it is ascertained by means of other Means of Cognition, that there is no sublation,—it follows that the initial—first—Cognition is valid;—when this view has been accepted, how can one avoid the conclusion that the validity of Cognitions is due to extraneous causes? Surely the absence of sublation can be ascertained only by other Means of Cognition. Under the view that the validity of Cognition is inherent in it, all Cognitions would have to be regarded as valid; in order to avoid this contingency, you will have to assert that 'self-sufficient validity' belongs only to that Cognition of which there is no sublation;—and this absence of sublation cannot be cognised by mere non-apprehension; as such a conclusion would be wrong; hence the said absence can be ascertained only by the non-apprehension of that which would have been apprehended (if it existed); as it is only this that is invariably concomitant with 'absence of sublation'; and this 'non-apprehension of what would have been apprehended' cannot be any other than that which follows from the Cognition of its conformity with reality;—so that it would mean the acceptance of the view that certainty relating to validity can be obtained through other Means of Cognition; [and this would be contrary to your doctrine of the self-validity of Cognitions].—(3022-3023)

It has been argued by the other party, under Text 2882, that—"In such dealings as debts, as between two parties, while the plaintiff makes only one statement, the defendant makes two, [hence there need be the following up of only three Cognitions].".

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXTS (3024–3026).

As regards dealings regarding Debt, etc. which admit of only three statements,—this condition (of three statements) is applicable to those cases only, and should not be cited in connection with Validity.—In those cases, the two disputants make statements on recalling things to their memory, and do not find time to make a careful scrutiny of things. As regards the Validity of Cognitions however, things have got to be determined in regard to the real state of things,—and not by mere casuistry. Hence the dealings that have been cited are not analogous to the subject under consideration.—(3024–3026)

COMMENTARY.

The exact position regarding the validity of Cognitions, which is related to the real nature of things, forms the subject under consideration; while the transactions relating to Debt, etc. consist in Casuistry and are related to Conventions made by the mere whims of men; the citing of these transactions therefore only shows your ignorance of the subject under consideration.—(3024–3026)

It has been asserted under Text 2884, that—"it is for this same reason that Deities are called Tri-satya (Three-truth)."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3027).

The fact of the Deities being called ‘Trisatya’ cannot lead to any certainty (regarding validity); in fact, if this certainty does not follow from the very first (statement), it cannot follow from others.—(3027)

COMMENTARY.

‘From the first’—i.e. from the first statement;—if the certainty does not follow,—then that certainty cannot follow from others—i.e. from the two statements coming later on.—(3027)

The same idea is further elucidated:—
TEXT (3028).

Inasmuch as the later two statements are of the same two men,—
If there is no confidence in the first one, what peculiarity is there in the other two (which makes them more trustworthy)?

—(3028)

COMMENTARY.

‘Later’—i.e. appearing at a later time.
‘No confidence’—no certainty of conviction.
‘In the other two’—The two other than the first, i.e. the two coming at a later time.

The man who makes one, and also two, false statements,—why should he not make a third false statement? Who is there to prevent him doing it—by virtue of which conviction should result from the third?—(3028)

It has been asserted, in Text 2885, that—“under the view of self-validity, there is no Infinite Regress, etc. etc.”.
The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3029).

Thus, in accordance with the reasoning set forth previously, there is Infinite Regress involved under your view also. And Validity and Invalidity remain as they are in reality.—(3029)

COMMENTARY.

‘The reasoning set forth previously’—i.e. the one set forth under Text 3004 et seq.—(3029)

It has been argued under Text 2886 that—“the Word that is eternal or proceeds from a trustworthy person does not become vitiated by the defects of the hearer or the speaker”.
The answer to this is as follows:—
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TEXTS (3030-3031).

THE ETERNAL WORD HAS BEEN DISCARDED BY US PREVIOUSLY IN DETAIL.
UNDER YOUR VIEW, THERE IS NO TRUSTWORTHY PERSON ENTIRELY
FREE FROM ALL DEFECTS; AND HOW CAN A PERSON BE 'TRUST-
WORTHY', WHEN THE MASS OF HIS IGNORANCE HAS NOT
BEEN DISPELLED? BECAUSE ON THE PRESENCE OF
THE DEFECTS, IT IS ALWAYS OPEN TO SUSPICION
THAT HIS WORD MAY BE FALSE.—(3030-3031)

COMMENTARY.

'Previously'—i.e. under the Chapter on 'The Revealed Word', the
idea of the 'Eternal Word' has been refuted in detail; and when its very
existence is not admitted, how could there be any investigation regarding its
self-sufficient validity?

As regards the 'trustworthy person',—no such person is admitted by
the Mimāṃsaka himself; any work written by him also becomes inadmissible.
Because, if a man has had all the defects,—Love, Hate, etc.—which are the
source of untruth,—completely destroyed, then alone he can be regarded as
'trustworthy'; otherwise, how could trustworthiness be accepted in the case of
a man whose mind is beset with the sources of untruth, in the shape of
Love, Hate and other defects? And you, Mimāṃsakas, do not admit of
any such person as has completely shaken off the entanglements of the
'Afflictions' (Defects); hence there can be no 'word of the trustworthy
person' for you.—(3030-3031)

Then again, granting that there is a 'trustworthy person'; even so
any 'word' (assertion) of such a person cannot be said to be known.—
This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3032–3034).

EVEN THOUGH SUCH A 'TRUSTWORTHY PERSON' MAY BE BORN,—WHO
COULD COME TO KNOW OF THE HOST OF HIS GOOD QUALITIES, AND
THEREBY HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE WORDS OF SUCH A TRUSTWORTHY
PERSON?—IF THERE WERE SOME ONE WITH SUPERNORMAL
VISION WHO COULD PERCEIVE HIS EXCELLENT QUALITIES,—
—WHAT USE COULD SUCH A PERSON HAVE FOR ANY 'WORDS
OF THE TRUSTWORTHY PERSON'? BECAUSE HE WOULD
HIMSELF KNOW ALL THINGS, INDEPENDENTLY OF ALL
ASSERTIONS. AS FOR ANY OTHER PERSON, AS HE
COULD NOT RECOGNISE THE 'TRUSTWORTHY PERSON',
HE COULD NEVER LEARN OF THINGS FROM
HIS WORDS.—(3032–3034)

COMMENTARY.

Unless it has been found who the 'trustworthy person' is, it cannot be
ascertained what is 'the word of the trustworthy person'; and it is not
possible to find out who is the 'trustworthy person'; because the man who has got rid of all his 'Afflictions and defects' and who is capable of perceiving supersensuous things may be able to recognise the 'trustworthy person'; but the word of such a trustworthy person can serve no useful purpose for such a man, as he would himself be able to perceive all things and as such would not depend, for his activity, upon the 'trustworthy person'; hence the recognition of such a person would be of no use to him. As for other ordinary men, whose vision is limited, they cannot recognise the 'trustworthy person'; and hence they cannot learn anything from the words of such a person; as there could be no certainty about it.—(3032-3034)

It has been asserted by the other party, under Text 2887, that—"Teachers and Fellow-students help to prevent mutilations in the Eternal Word, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (3035).

UNDER THE THEORY OF 'SELF-VAILIDITY', THE CERTAINTY COMES ABOUT FROM THE BIRTH OF THE COGNITION ITSELF; HENCE THERE CAN BE NO 'MUTILATION'; WHAT THEN IS THERE TO BE PREVENTED ?—(3035)

COMMENTARY.

'Nishchayajātiḥ'—on account of certainty having come about.—Otherwise, if the certainty did not come about from the Cognition itself,—then the doctrine of 'self-validity' would be done away with.—(3035)

It has been asserted, under Text 2888 that—"the assertion does not become vitiated by the defects which are warded off by the excellence of the Teacher, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (3036).

IT IS TRUE THAT THE ASSERTION IS NOT VITIATED BY THE DEFECTS, WHICH ARE WARD ED OFF BY THE EXCELLENCES; BUT AS THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THE EXCELLENCES, THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THE SAID FACT (OF NOT BEING VITIATED).—(3036)

COMMENTARY.

It may be true that the assertion of highly qualified men is not vitiated by defects, these latter being warded off by the excellences; but even so, inasmuch as the excellences present in the 'chain' of other persons is
beyond the reach of the senses, there can be no certainty regarding it; and in the absence of such certainty, there can be no certainty regarding the assertion of the qualified person; and what has not been duly ascertained cannot be self-sufficient in its validity.—(3036)

It has been argued by the other party in Text 2888, that—"as there is no maker (composer), there could be no defects, for which there would be no receptacle".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3037).

THE IDEA THAT THE 'ETERNAL WORD' IS WITHOUT A 'MAKER' HAS BEEN ALREADY REFUTED; CONSEQUENTLY IT CANNOT BE RIGHT THAT "THERE BEING NO MAKER, THERE COULD BE NO DEFECTS, FOR WHICH THERE WOULD BE NO RECEPTACLE."—(3037)

COMMENTARY.

'Already'—under the chapter on the 'Revealed Word'.—(3037)

It has been argued under Text 2889, that—"in the case of the assertion of trustworthy persons, two facts have been perceived—the absence of defects and the presence of excellences; and it has already been shown how validity cannot be due to the excellences".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3038-3039).

HOW VALIDITY CAN BE DUE TO EXCELLENCES HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED; AND SO LONG AS THE EXCELLENCES ARE NOT RECOGNISED, THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS CANNOT BE PERCEIVED.—THUS THEN, IT CANNOT BE RIGHT THAT THE ASSERTION, VALID BY ITSELF, IS INDICATED BY THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS; BECAUSE, NOT BEING COGNISED, THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS CANNOT SERVE AS AN INDICATOR.—(3038-3039)

COMMENTARY.

'Has been explained'—under Text 2988.

It has been asserted above (2890) that—"the assertion, valid by itself, is indicated by the absence of defects".—This is not right; because excellences are beyond the reach of the senses, and when they cannot be cognised, the absence of defects also, which consists in the presence of excellences, cannot be noticed.—This is what is said in the words—'The absence of defects cannot serve as an indicator'; that is, it cannot serve the purpose of indicating the validity; because it is itself uncognised.—(3038-3039)
The following Text shows that what is itself unknown cannot serve as an indicator:—

TEXTS (3040-3041).

UNLESS PEOPLE KNOW THE stick, they cannot have any idea of the stick-holder. Thus the idea of the 'self-validity' being indicated by the absence of defects becomes discarded by self-contradiction.—The absence of defects can qualify the 'Word' only when ascertained by that means of Cognition which consists of non-apprehension; and in this way validity of a cognition would be due to something extraneous to itself.—(3040-3041)

COMMENTARY.

Further, absence of defects may be a qualification; but even so, the objection remains,—as there is possibility of self-contradiction. For instance, if Validity is indicated and qualified by the absence of defects, then it would clearly mean that Validity is extraneous; and this would go against and discard the assertion that Validity is inherent.

This same idea is further clarified in the words—'the absence of defects can qualify, etc. etc.'.—If the absence of defects is ascertained through the means of Cognition known as 'Non-apprehension', then alone it could serve as a qualification (and an indicator); because what is not ascertained cannot serve as a qualification; and there is no other means of Cognition that could bring about the certain Cognition of the absence (of defects);—consequently it becomes clearly asserted that the Validity of the Cognition follows from Non-apprehension, which is something different from the Cognition itself.—(3040-3041)

It has been argued by the other party, under the Text 2893, that—"while the excellences are there, there does not appear any Cognition of the defects of the man".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3042).


COMMENTARY.

If, while the excellences are there, there can be no Cognition of the defects (of the Man), then,—as the excellences, lying within the 'chain'
of another person, and hence beyond the senses, would not be cognised,—there could be no certainty regarding the absence of defects; as the 'absence of defects' consists in the 'presence of excellences'; and unless there is Cognition of the place devoid of the Jar, there can be no Cognition of the absence of the Jar.—(3042)

The same idea is further clarified—

TEXT (3043).

DEFECTS,—IN THE SHAPE OF HATE, DELUSION AND THE LIKE—ARE SET ASIDE BY EXCELLENCES,—IN THE SHAPE OF KINDNESS, WISDOM AND SO FORTH; CONSEQUENTIALY, IF THERE IS NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THESE LATTER—KINDNESS, ETC.—HOW CAN THERE BE ANY COGNITION OF THE ABSENCE OF THOSE (DEFECTS)?—(3043)

COMMENTARY.

'Tēśām' 'of those'—i.e. of the Defects.—(3043)

Kumārila has argued as follows:—"At the time (of the Cognition of the absence of defects) the excellences do not function on being themselves cognised; in fact, it is by mere presence that they help in the cognising of the absence of defects".—[Shlokavārtika 1.1.2; 67.]

This is the objection set forth in the following:—

TEXT (3044).

"AT THE TIME (OF THE COGNITION OF THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS), THE EXCELLENCES DO NOT FUNCTION ON BEING THEMSELVES COGNISED; IN FACT, IT IS BY MERE PRESENCE THAT THEY HELP IN THE COGNISING OF THE Absence of Defects."—[Shlokavārtika 1.1.2; 67].—(3044)

COMMENTARY.

'They help'—they help towards bringing about the certainty regarding the absence of defects.—(3044)

The answer to the above is as follows:—
TEXTS (3045-3046).

If it were so, then, there would be no (a) Doubt, nor (b) Wrong Cognition (Misconception),—in the case of the Person recognised as ‘trustworthy’—in the shape of (a) ‘are there defects in this person or not?’, and (b) ‘there are defects in him’. And yet there are such Doubt and Wrong Cognition in some men; until it is recognised that he is the receptacle of excellences.—

(3045-3046)

COMMENTARY.

If, in bringing about certainty regarding the absence of defects, excellences functioned by their mere presence,—then in the case of the person recognised as ‘trustworthy’, no one could have any Doubt or Misconception in regard to the absence of defects; as both these will have been barred by the certainty. —And yet such is not the case; so long as the certainty relating to the presence of the excellences does not come about,—there certainly do appear Doubt and Misconception regarding the absence of defects. Hence it follows that the excellences are not operative by their mere presence.—(3045-3046)

TEXT (3047).

If there were certainty regarding the self-validity (of cognitions) even when there is no cognition of the absence of defects,—then, in regard to the Speaker, there could not be the ‘contrary Cognition’ spoken of above (under 3045).—(3047)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—“The excellences may not be operative towards the bringing about of the certainty regarding the absence of defects; even so, from the uncertain absence of defects there would follow the certainty regarding validity”.—This also cannot be right; as in that case, as before, there could be no diversity of opinion in regard to the speaker recognised as ‘trustworthy’. Because when there is certainty regarding the self-validity of the assertion,—there can be no such notions in regard to the person making that assertion, as—‘is he telling the truth or not,—or is he not telling the truth at all?’—The term ‘vimati’ (contrary Cognition) here stands for Doubt and Misconception; ‘vimati’ being ‘mati’, notion, that is ‘contrary’; and as Doubt envisages both the extremes, it can be regarded as ‘contrary’.—(3047)
Kumārila has again argued as follows—"Thus then, from excellences follows the absence of defects,—from this absence, follows the absence of the two forms of Invalid Cognition; consequently the general law remains undenied", and so forth.—[Shlokavārtika I. 1. 2; 65].

This also cannot be right, when there is no certainty regarding the absence of defects.—This is what is pointed out in the following:

**TEXTS (3048-3049).**


**COMMENTARY.**

If there came about a Cognition free from the Doubt and Misconception, which are 'contrary' to that Cognition,—then that Cognition should be valid; otherwise, if the matter were beset with the contrary notions, how could the general law come in at all? Because the two contrary notions, Doubt and Misconception, are effects of defects; hence there can be no certainty regarding the absence of these contrary notions, unless there is certainty regarding the absence of defects.

'The absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition'—i.e. the absence of Doubt and Misconception.—(3048-3049)

The following Text points out the 'contrary Cognition':—

**TEXT (3050).**

[THE CONTRARY COGNITION BEING IN THE FORM]—(a) 'IS HIS ASSERTION TRUE OR UNTRUE? ' (DOUBT),—OR (b) 'IT IS ABSOLUTELY UNTRUE' (MISCONCEPTION); [THESE WOULD BE 'CONTRARY'] BECAUSE THERE IS THE CERTAINTY THAT ALL COGNITIONS ARE VALID BY THEMSELVES.—(3050)

**COMMENTARY.**

So far it has been explained that the absence of defects and other conditions do not, by their mere presence, help in the bringing about of the certainty regarding Validity; now the Author proceeds to explain in detail that if the certainty regarding the said Absence of Defects were essential,
then (a) the validity would be extraneous, and (b) there would be an Infinite Regress:—

TEXT (3051).

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY THAT THERE SHOULD BE DEFINITE COGNITION OF ALL THE THREE FACTORS—
(1) ABSENCE OF DEFECTS, (2) ABSENCE OF INVALID COGNITIONS AND (3) PRESENCE OF EXCELLENCES.—(3051)

COMMENTARY.

(1) Absence of defects, (2) absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition (Doubt and Misconception), and (3) the presence of excellences,—the Cognition—certainty—of all these must be admitted. Otherwise, there could be no certainty regarding Validity, as has been explained already.—(3051)

Question:—"If the definite Cognition of these three is not admitted, what then?"

Answer:—

TEXT (3052).

IN REGARD TO ALL THESE, THERE WOULD BE THE TWO POSSIBILITIES—IS THE COGNITION OF THESE VALID OR INVALID? HOW THEN WHAT IS ITSELF INVALID BE A FACTOR IN THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY?—(3052)

COMMENTARY.

The Cognition of the said three factors, which is regarded as a factor in Validity,—is it valid or invalid?—These are the two alternatives possible.—If it is invalid, then it cannot form part of the certainty regarding validity,—as it is itself invalid; if the witness (evidence) has been regarded as untrustworthy, he cannot help in the decision regarding the matter under dispute.—(3052)

TEXTS (3053-3054).

[IF THE SAID COGNITION IS VALID, THEN] ITS CERTAINTY REGARDING ITS VALIDITY COULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF VALIDITY WERE EXTRANEIOUS.—

HOW AGAIN IS IT ASCERTAINED THAT THE SAID COGNITION (OF THE THREE FACTORS) IS VALID?—IF IT BE SAID THAT—"IT IS DEDUCED FROM THE ABSENCE OF COGNITIONS TO THE CONTRARY",—THEN THE QUESTION ARISES—IS THIS DEDUCTION ITSELF VALID OR NOT?—THUS ALL THE OBJECTIONS URGED ABOVE COME BACK IN FULL FORCE.—(3053-3054)

COMMENTARY.

If the second alternative (put forth under 3052) is what is accepted,—then the validity of the Main Cognition turns out to be extraneous; and there is Infinite Regress also.
In order to indicate this Infinite Regress, the Author puts the question—
‘How again, etc. etc.’.
‘So’pi’—i.e. the absence of the Cognition to the contrary.—(3053-3054)

Question:—“How does the same objection become applicable here also?”

Answer:—

TEXTS (3055-3056).

The Validity of the Cognition in question could be possible only
if Validity were extraneous;—how too can the Invalid
Cognition bring about a right Cognition in keeping with
the reality of things? It is to be considered how
the validity of this also becomes appreheended;—
it may be deduced from the absence of Cogni-
tions to the contrary and so forth ;—all
this comes about which cannot be
desirable (for the other party).
—(3055-3056)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily comprehensible.
‘How the validity of this, etc. etc.’—i.e. of the absence of the Cognition
to the contrary.—(3055-3056)

Then again, if the Validity in all cases is determined in accordance with
the principle propounded in the following assertion—“From Excellences
follows the Absence of Defects; from this absence follows the absence of the
two forms of Invalid Cognition; consequently the general law remains un-
denied.”—(Shlokavārtika 1. 1. 2 ; 65),—then it would mean that the very first
Cognition is valid, and there would be Infinite Regress also.
This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3057-3058).

Thus then,—“From Excellences follows the absence of defects;
from this absence, there follows the absence of the two
forms of Invalid Cognition; hence the General Law
remains undenied”;—If the validity in all cases is
determined on this principle, then in the case in
question also,—all the aforesaid objections
become applicable; and it also involves
an Infinite Regress.—(3057-3058)

COMMENTARY.

‘Aforesaid objections’.—That is, Excellences and the rest lying in the
‘chain’ of other persons, they are beyond the senses of people of limited
vision,—hence there can be no certainty relating to them; this would mean that there is no certainty relating to the absence of defects also;—and uncertain also is the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition; so that Validity could not be established on the basis of Excellence, etc. If these (Excellence, etc.) help in the matter by their mere presence, then there could be no Cognition to the contrary;—all this host of objections would be applicable to all cases.—(3057-3058)

Further, Kumārila's assertion quoted above—"therefore from Excellence follows the Absence of Defects, etc. etc."—has declared validity, and also the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition and the Absence of Defects,—as part and parcel of the certainty.—Now the 'absence' here spoken of can be either (a) of the nature of 'absolute negation of what is possible', or of the nature of 'relative negation'; these are the only two alternatives possible.

The following Text points out the objections against the first alternative (that it is of the nature of absolute negation):

TEXTS (3059-3060).

THE ASSERTION THAT "THere IS Validity WHEN THERE IS Absence of Defects" CONTAINS A negation; IF THIS negation IS MEANT TO BE absolute; THEN IT CAN NEVER BE PROVED.—IT CANNOT BE PROVED BY apprehension, BECAUSE IT IS OF THE nature OF negation;—NOR CAN IT BE PROVED BY Non-apprehension, AS THAT WOULD INVOLVE AN Infinite Regress.—(3059-3060)

COMMENTARY.

If it is Absolute Negation that is meant, then it cannot be proved. Because would such Negation be proved by itself? or by something else? If it is proved by itself, (1) would it be due to its being of the nature of 'self-illumination'? or (2) to the fact of its bringing about certainty?—If it is proved by something else, is it proved, (3) by Apprehension? or (4) by Non-apprehension?—These are the alternative views possible.

(1) Now, it cannot be right to assert that it is proved by itself, through its being 'self-luminous'; because it is a non-entity, while 'luminousness' is the property of entities; it is Cognition alone that is proved by its own apprehension, on account of its being 'self-luminous' by nature;—not so Negation, which is of the nature of the denial of the nature of things.

(2) Nor can the Negation be regarded as proved by itself, through bringing about certainty. Because as a matter of fact, Negation is devoid of all capacity; hence it cannot bring about anything. If it did bring about anything, it would have to be regarded as an Entity; and secondly, as it would not be possible for it to have any new peculiarity produced in it, its effect would be such as comes about from it itself, independently of all contributory causes, and hence the appearance of such an effect would be incessant.
(3) If the Absence be regarded as proved by something else,—through Apprehension,—that also is not possible;—why?—because it is of the nature of Negation, and there can be Apprehension only of what is a positive entity.

(4) Nor lastly can it be right to hold the view that the Absence is proved through Non-apprehension. Because that would involve an Infinite Regress. For instance, this Non-apprehension also being negative in character,—how is it proved? By itself? Or through something else? All these questions arise here. It cannot be by itself, because of the objections urged above; nor can it be through something else, as that would involve an Infinite Regress.—(3059-3060)

The said 'Infinite Regress' is pointed out in the following:—

**TEXT** (3061).

**If the Absence of Defects and that of the Two Kinds of Invalid Cognition are proved by Non-apprehension,—and this absence of apprehension is proved by another Non-apprehension,—then there is Infinite Regress.—(3061)**

**COMMENTARY.**

'Dosā, etc. etc.'—The compound is to be expounded as 'the absence of Defects, and of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition'.—(3061)

The following Texts point out the objections against the view that the 'absence of Defects, etc.' is of the nature of Relative Negation (the second alternative suggested in the Introduction to Text 3059):—

**TEXTS** (3062–3065).

**If the Absence is of the nature of Relative Negation,—then its Cognition would only be the negation of something other than itself; so that the Cognition of the absence of defects would be of the nature of the Cognition of excellences; and it would thus come to be of the nature of the Cognition of the intended Valid Cognition. The Cognition of the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition also would turn out to be of the contrary nature. Or, in case the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition were cognised independently by itself,—how could you secure the conviction that the rest of it is valid?—If it be urged that "the conviction is due to the fact that well-known facts could not be explicable otherwise",—then this
CONVICTION WOULD BE GOT AT EITHER THROUGH PRESUMPTION, OR THROUGH INFERENCE, OR THROUGH SOME OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION; SO THAT IT WOULD BE DERIVED FROM SOURCES OTHER THAN THE COGNITION ITSELF.—(3062-3065)

COMMENTARY.

Through Relative Negation, ‘Absence of Defects’ would be the same as ‘Excellences’; hence the Cognition of the said absence also would be the same as the Cognition of Excellences;—and this cannot be desirable (for you); because of your assertion that—‘The Excellences do not operate, as cognised’.

The ‘absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’ also becomes the same as ‘Valid Cognition’, under the view that it is Relative Negation that is meant by ‘absence’; hence the Cognition of ‘the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’ also would be of the nature of the intended ‘Valid Cognition’; and in that case the assertion—that ‘there is absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition, hence the general law remains undenied’;—cannot be right; as it involves a confusion of thought; for instance, the same Cognition being known to be valid,—if from that same fact it is deduced that the Cognition is valid,—such a confused assertion of Cause and Effect, becomes difficult to understand; as there is no difference (between the two Cognitions).—Further, if the two were regarded as different, because the cause must be different from the effect, then it comes to this that ‘the Cognition of the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’ is different from ‘the Cognition of the valid Cognition’; while it is not right to regard what is of the nature of ‘Relative Negation’, as different from the valid Cognition.

‘Or, in case the absence of the two kinds, etc. etc.’—This argument admits (for the sake of argument) the Cognition of ‘the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’;—and then, in accordance with the views of the other party, shows that the Validity of Cognitions becomes extraneous.

‘Due to the fact that well-known facts, etc. etc.’—That is, ‘there is no other alternative possible except the self-validity of all Cognitions except the Doubtful and Wrong Cognitions’.—(3062-3065)

The following Text proceeds to show the ‘Inconclusive’ character of the reasoning set forth in the assertion that—‘From Excellences follows the absence of defects, etc.”.—(Shlokavārtika 1. 1. 2 ; 65):—

TEXTS (3066-3070).

FROM THAT SAME REASONING OF YOURS IT MIGHT FOLLOW THAT THE INVALIDITY IS INHERENT IN COGNITIONS; AS THE SAME ARGUMENTS APPLY CLEARLY TO, AND CAN BE ASSERTED IN REGARD TO, THAT VIEW ALSO;—HENCE IT IS THE ABSENCE OF EXCELLENCE THAT FOLLOWS FROM THE DEFECTS; AND FROM THAT ABSENCE FOLLOWS THE ABSENCE OF VALIDITY; HENCE THE GENERAL LAW STANDS
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undenied.—INASMUCH AS THIS GENERAL LAW IS THE CREATION OF MERE WHIM, IT CAN BE ASSERTED QUITE CLEARLY IN REGARD TO INVALIDITY, JUST AS WELL AS IN REGARD TO VALIDITY.—BECAUSE IT IS IN THE NATURE OF APPREHENSION THAT COGNITION IS REGARDED AS INVALID,—AND IT IS DISCARDED ONLY BY THE KNOWLEDGE THAT IT IS RIGHT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REALITY OF THINGS, AND BY THE COGNITION OF THE EXCELLENCE OF ITS SOURCES;—AND THE INVALIDITY IS NOT SET ASIDE BY THE EXCELLENCES, AS THESE HAVE NOT BEEN COGNISED; HENCE BEING NOT-DENIED, THE INVALIDITY REMAINS ESTABLISHED AS BEING INHERENT IN THE COGNITION.—(3066–3070)

COMMENTARY.

'Adaḥ'—This.

Question :—"What is it that can be asserted ?" 

Answer :—It is this :—'Hence it is the absence, etc. etc.'

'Mānakvata'—the 'vati'-affix is added after the Locative, the meaning being—'as in regard to validity'.

'Tadapi'—Invalidity.

The rest is easily understood.—(3066–3070)

It has been argued under Text 2895, that—"In the case of words emanating from personalities, there is always room for doubt, whether there are defects or not; in the case of the Veda, however, there being no author, there can be absolutely no suspicion, for us, regarding the presence of defects ".

The answer to this is as follows :

TEXT (3071).

IN THE CASE OF WORDS EMANATING FROM PERSONALITIES, THERE IS ALWAYS ROOM FOR DOUBT WHETHER THERE ARE DEFECTS OR NOT; AND AS IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT THERE MUST BE AN AUTHOR OF THE VEDA, IT IS NOT TRUE THAT WE CAN HAVE NO SUSPICION REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF DEFECTS IN IT.—(3071)

COMMENTARY.

Under the Chapter dealing with the 'Revealed Word', it has been proved that there must have been an author of the Veda; hence the statement 'because there is no author' cannot be admitted. Hence it is not true that, for us, intelligent people, there is no suspicion regarding the presence of defects in the Veda; in fact, the suspicion is actually there.—(3071)
It has been asserted under Text 2896, that—"Thus, because the validity of the Veda is accepted on the ground of its being self-sufficient, etc. etc.". The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3072).

Thus, what has been asserted regarding the validity of the Veda being self-sufficient, cannot be admitted,—because as a matter of fact, that also is dependent upon the Author.—(3072)

COMMENTARY.

'That also'—i.e. the Veda.—(3072)

It has been argued under Text 2897 that—"The fact that other Means of Cognition never have any bearing upon what is said in the Veda establishes its validity; otherwise, it would be merely reiterative".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3073).

In case there is no corroborative Cognition, nor perfection in its source,—the appearance of Doubt, and consequent invalidity, is inevitable, in the Veda.—(3073)

COMMENTARY.

Confirmatory Cognition of effective action, and the Cognition of perfection of the cause,—supply the source of the certainty regarding Validity; and both these are not admitted (by the other party) in the case of the Veda; consequently there are no means of ascertaining the validity of Cognitions provided by the Veda; hence there can be no certainty regarding such validity; as the effect cannot appear without its cause.—(3073)

It has been argued under Text 2898 that—"such corroborations does not form the basis of the validity of other Cognitions also, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3074).

In the case of the validity of other Cognitions also, such corroborations is always regarded as the ground (for validity); hence certainty must be based upon that corroborations.—(3074)

COMMENTARY.

'Such corroborations',—in the shape of conformity with reality, and Cognition of perfection.
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The objection that this involves Infinite Regress has already been refuted. Hence there is no truth (conclusiveness) in the premiss that "what is valid does not need the corroboration of another Cognition". Because for the purposes of certainty, such corroboration is always needed.—(3074)

The same idea is further explained:—

TEXT (3075).

IT IS ONLY WHEN THE VALIDITY IS THERE THAT CERTAINTY REGARDING IT IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THIS (CONFIRMATION), AND THIS DOES NOT PRODUCE A FRESH VALIDITY IN IT.—(3075)

COMMENTARY.

This also serves to set aside the argument set forth under Text 2899—to the effect that—"Even in a case where the thing is definitely apprehended by the later Cognitions, the thing has not been clearly apprehended by the first Cognition".—Because the fact of the certainty of validity being brought about by later Cognitions cannot deprive the first Cognition of that validity which consists in its capacity to lead to its object.—(3075)

It has been argued under Text 2900, that—"no validity could belong to the Cognition of a thing that is destroyed immediately on being born, etc. etc.".

TEXT (3076).

IN THE CASE OF THE THING THAT IS DESTROYED IMMEDIATELY ON BEING BORN, VALIDITY DOES BELONG TO THE COGNITION; IN FACT, IT IS THERE, EVEN IN A CASE WHERE THERE IS NO CERTAINTY REGARDING IT,—THE CERTAINTY APPEARING IN THE MANNER DESCRIBED.—(3076)

COMMENTARY.

'Sā'—validity.—(3076)

The manner in which certainty appears is described in the following:—
TEXTS (3077–3079).

WHEN THERE IS Cognition OF THE EXCELLENCE OF THE CAUSE AND OTHER CONDITIONS, THEN THERE FOLLOWs CERTAINTy;—AND ALSO WHEN EFFECTIVE ACTION IS FOUND DIRECTLy, IN THE SHAPE OF BURNING, ETC.;—OR REPEATED FUNCTIONING BRINGS ABOUT THE RESULT INDEPENDently.—WHEN THERE IS ABSENCE OF ALL THESE MEANS (OF CERTAINTy), THEN THERE IS NO CERTAINTy AT ALL. THUS EVEN IF VALIDITY WERE THERE, IT WOULD BE UNCERTAIN,—AS GOOD AS NON-EXISTENT; THAT IS WHY IT IS SAID THAT IT IS NOT PRESENT.—

(3077–3079)

COMMENTARY.

'If effective action is found'—'then there is certainty'—this has to be construed with this.

Says the Opponent:—"As the Cognition of effective action envisages an entirely different thing, the certainty regarding the validity of the preceding Cognition cannot be due to that. For instance, the visual Cognition of water can apprehend colour only, as there is no composite substance; as for the Cognition of effective action in the shape of Bathing and the like, it can be secured only by means of Touch; how can the Cognition of one thing confirm the validity of the Cognition of another thing? If it did, then there would be incongruities".

Answer:—This does not affect our position. As a matter of fact, when two objects occur in the same 'chain', which are invariably concomitant,—the Cognition of one object will certainly establish the validity of the Cognition of the other. In the instance cited, the Colour and the Touch do not exist entirely apart from one another; in fact both are placed under exactly the same circumstances. So that, even if the first Cognition is objectless, it proceeds on the basis of a definite objective; and the subsequent Cognition apprehending the Touch which is invariably concomitant with the object of the previous Cognition is not needed for the bringing about of certainty of conviction.

Says the Opponent:—"Even so, as all things are momentary, the functioning of the later Cognition cannot envisage the Touch which is invariably concomitant with the Colour envisaged by the previous Cognition; how then could the certainty follow from that?"

Answer:—This does not affect our position; because the subsequent colour-moments have the same effective action as the colour-moments envisaged by the previous Cognition; hence all of these colour-moments stand on the same footing and share the same fate; and hence are treated as one and the same. In fact, people with limited vision do not deal with 'moments' at all.

Or, the object envisaged by the later Cognition is invariably concomitant with the colour, etc. envisaged by the previous Cognition; hence even though
the previous Cognition being the cause of the later one, the two are regarded as distinct,—yet there is no incongruity in the idea of the certainty being brought about by it.—(3077–3079)

It has been argued under Text 2900, that—"no validity could belong to Auditory Cognition because it could not be corroborated by the Eye and other means of Cognition".

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXTS (3080–3082).**

*It is not true that there can be no corroborations of Auditory Cognition by the Eye and other Means of Cognition. Because Colour, Sound and the rest are dependent upon the same circumstances. In fact all these are mutually concomitant and, as occurring in the same 'chain', they are the cause of each other. Thus it is clear that there is relationship among them. Through these then there is connection among their cognitions also; just as between 'Smoke' and 'the effect of wet fuel'. Thus Auditory Cognition would be quite valid,—on account of being corroborated by other Cognitions.—* (3080–3082)

**COMMENTARY.**

It cannot be admitted that the Auditory Cognition cannot be corroborated by other Cognitions. Because the sound emanating from the Lute, and the colour of the Lute are both dependent on the same circumstances; and are consequently inseparable and invariably concomitant with one another; so that the two are quite related; just like 'Smoke' and the 'Effect of wet Fuel'. And as both appear in the same 'chain' and are mutually dependent, each preceding factor becomes the cause of each succeeding factor; so that there is between them this direct causal relation also.—Thus among the Cognitions also of the said Colour, Touch, etc. there is similar causal relation, based indirectly upon the above-mentioned relation.

In this way, Auditory Cognition can be quite valid, because of its being related to the other Cognitions, through the Eye and other Means of Cognition. —For instance, when one hears from a distance the sound proceeding from the Lute, if he wants to have the Lute, there arises a doubt in his mind as to whether or not it is the sound of the Lute that he has heard,—this doubt being due to the fact of the sound of the Lute being similar to the sound of the Flute; he then proceeds towards the Lute; and when he actually sees the Lute, the Doubt that had arisen as to the sound being of the Lute or of the Flute or of singing becomes set aside. At a place where the man hears what he thinks to be the reverberations of the sounding of the Drum, and proceeds towards it, if he does not perceive the drum,—then there being
absence of the necessary corroboration, he concludes that the Cognition is invalid.—(3080-3082)

It has been argued under Text 2902, that—"In both cases, the Corroborative Cognition is not produced by other means, hence they do not need corroboration by Cognitions produced by other causes".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3083).

This Cognition produced by other means is quite certain; that is why the corroboration by Cognitions produced by other means is desired.—(3083)

COMMENTARY.

'This Cognition'—apprehending the shape of the Lute, etc.—(3083)

It has been argued under Text 2903, that—"just as in the case of the validity of Sense-perception, there is the definite basis in the form of corroboration by another Cognition produced by the same sense-organ,—the same should be asserted to be the basis in the case of the Veda also".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3084).

Thus, in the case of the validity of Sense-perception, there is the definite basis in the form of corroboration by other Cognitions produced by several Sense-organs; but such is not found to be the case with the Veda.—(3084)

COMMENTARY.

'Such is, etc. etc.'—i.e. Corroborations by other Cognitions produced by several Sense-organs.—(3084)

Question:—"How is this found to be the basis in the case of Sense-perception?"

Answer:—

TEXT (3085).

The first Cognition of Water that appears is produced by the Eye; then there follows the later Cognitions relating to drinking and bathing, as dependent upon the gestatory organ and the Body (respectively).—(3085)

COMMENTARY.

'Produced by the eyes'—i.e. the visual Cognition of Colour.

'Later Cognition',—i.e. one appearing at a later time.—(3085)
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It has been argued under Text 2904, that—"when the Cognition brought about by any one sentence is the same at all times and places, and in all men,—then no other basis need be sought for its validity".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3086-3087).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY ANY ONE SENTENCE IS NEVER FOUND TO BE THE SAME AT ALL TIMES AND PLACES, AND IN ALL MEN; AS IN ALL CASES THERE ARISES DOUBT.

IT IS TRUE THAT THE SAME WORDS—'HEAVEN IS ATTAINED BY THE PERFORMANCE OF Agnihotra AND OTHER RITES'—ARE HEARD BY ALL MEN; BUT IT IS DEVOID OF ALL ELEMENTS OF CERTAINTY, RESEMBLING THE MERE CROAKING OF FROGS.—(3086-3087)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that the corroboration by facts cannot be admitted. Because when the Sentence—'From the performance of Agnihotra, follows Heaven'—is heard, the intelligent man derives no certain Cognition from it; hence it cannot be admitted that it is the same at all times and places.—(3086-3087)

The following Text proceeds to show that the Cognition is not the same in all men:—

TEXT (3088).

EVEN AMONG BrĀHMANAS THERE IS DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN REGARD TO 'HEAVEN' AND SUCH THINGS; HENCE THE COGNITION DERIVED FROM THE VEDA IS NOT FOUND TO BE THE SAME IN ALL MEN.—(3088)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, the author of the Nirukta and other authorities describe 'Heaven' as—'the abode of Personalities superior to human beings,—located in such places as the summit of Mount Mēru,—the place affording superhuman pleasures,—full of numerous amenities';—while the Mīmāṁsākās describe it as 'a particular form of happiness found among men'.

In regard to 'Sacrifices' also, there is difference of opinion. For example, it is heard that in ancient times it was only animals made of flour that were sacrificed; while other wicked and cruel people have declared that it was the living animal that was sacrificed.—(3088)

It has been argued under Text 2905, that—"when a firm conviction produced by a sentence is not found to be incompatible with the Cognitions
appearing at other times and places and in other men, it is undoubtedly valid”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3089).

AS REGARDS THE FIRMNESS OF THE CONVICTION PRODUCED BY THE VEDIC INJUNCTION,—THAT HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED; BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE SAID FIRMNESS IS ALWAYS DOUBTFUL; AS THE MATTER APPREHENDED BY THE SAID COGNITION IS SIMILAR TO OTHERS.—(3089)

COMMENTARY.

‘Already’—i.e. under the chapter on the ‘Revealed Word’.

‘Is similar to others’;—i.e. it stands on the same footing as the notion derived from such human assertions as ‘the performance of Agnihotra does not lead to Heaven’.—(3089)

Further, it is a mere assertion of yours that—“the Cognition produced by the Vedic Injunction does not vary at different times and places, etc.”. This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (3090).

HOW HAVE THE BRĀHMAṆAS, WHO ARE CERTAINLY NOT OMNISCIENT, BEEN ABLE TO ASCERTAIN THAT “THE COGNITION PRODUCED BY THE VEDIC INJUNCTION IS THE SAME AT ALL PLACES AND TIMES”?—(3090)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued under Text 2906, that—“the validity of verbal and other Cognitions is not to be proved by means of Inference, etc. etc.”. The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3091).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT THE VALIDITY OF PERCEPTION ALSO IS ASCERTAINED BY MEANS OF INFEERENCE. FOR INSTANCE, A CERTAIN PERCEPTION IS VALID, BECAUSE IT IS PRODUCED BY FLAWLESS CAUSES, LIKE OTHER PERCEPTIONS.—(3091)

COMMENTARY.

That argument is called ‘Reductio ad Absurdum’ which indicates an undesirable possibility; and it is not undesirable that the validity of Percep-
tion should be proved by Inference; hence what has been urged cannot be a Reductio ad Absurdum.—How the validity of Perception can be proved by Inference has been shown before; this is what is recalled in the words—‘For instance, etc. etc.’—‘Like other perceptions’—i.e. like Perceptions bearing upon things before one’s eyes.—(3091)

It has been argued under Text 2907, that—“If the validity of Cognition were proved by another Cognition, then, of this latter also, the validity would be proved by another and so on and on, there would be Infinite Regress”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3092).

THE VALIDITY OF ALL COGNITIONS IS NOT PROVED BY OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION; AS IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT THERE IS NO MISCONCEPTION INVOLVED IN THE CASE WHERE THERE IS COGNITION OF EFFECTIVE ACTION.—(3092)

COMMENTARY.

That there is no misconception in the case where there is Cognition of effective action has been proved above under Text 2959.

Thus validity being dependent upon corroboration by the Cognition of effective action, there can be no Infinite Regress.—(3092)

The following Text shows that there can be no Infinite Regress even when validity is proved by means of Inference:—

TEXT (3093).

WHEN THE INFERENCE IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE INDICATIVE (PROBANS) IN THE SHAPE OF ITS NATURE AND ITS EFFECT,—THE INDICATIVE WHEREOF THE ‘INFALLIBILITY’ HAS BEEN ASCERTAINED,—THERE CAN BE NO MISTAKE IN IT.—(3093)

COMMENTARY.

‘Atmā’ nature,—and ‘effect’;—such being the name of the Indicative (Probans);—of which Indicative, the ‘infallibility’ has been duly ascertained.

What is meant is as follows:—When the ‘nature’ and ‘effect’ of the Probans has been duly ascertained on the basis of ‘sameness’ and ‘causal relation’,—and on the strength of these Probans, there follows the Inference,—this Inference is valid by itself; as there can be no room for mistake in such Inference.—Thus there would be no Infinite Regress.—(3093)
It has been argued under Text 2908, that "If the validity of the Cognition that proves the validity of another Cognition be not proved by any other Cognition,—then the same might be the case with those whose validity is held to be proved by others".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3094).

In some cases, the mistake or illusion that arises from the various causes of illusion is set aside by another Cognition; because there is no certainty in such a case.

—(3094)

COMMENTARY.

In some cases, it so happens that there being no means, in the shape of repeated Cognition, of securing certainty, some sort of illusion or mistake comes in; hence the validity cannot rest in the Cognition itself.—(3094)

It has been asserted, under Text 2910, that—"Before the Cognition is apprehended, it remains there in its own form, and so far as its own objective is concerned, it is independent and self-sufficient, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3095).

There can be no 'manifested thing' until its manifestation has become manifested; hence it must be admitted that the Cognition itself is actually cognised,—just like the sense-perception in other persons.—(3095)

COMMENTARY.

'Avyakta, etc.'—The compound means 'that thing of which the manifestation has not become manifested'.

The Cognition must itself be cognised. If it were not cognised, then there would be the contingency of the absence of Cognition of all things. Because what is spoken of as 'Cognition' of a thing is only its manifestation—nothing else;—if this manifestation then were imperceptible, the thing itself would be imperceptible; just as the object envisaged by another man's Cognition is not perceived by one, because its manifestation is not manifested to the latter.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When to a certain person the manifestation of a thing has not become manifested, that thing cannot be perceptible to him;—e.g. the object envisaged by the perception appearing in another man;—the Cognition in question is one of which the manifestation
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has not become manifested to any person;—hence there is apprehension of something contrary to a more extensive character.

The reason here adduced cannot be regarded as 'inconclusive'; because if the thing were perceptible without its manifestation having come about, all things would become perceptible.—Such, however, is not the case. Hence the case is quite the reverse.—(3095)

It has been argued, under Text 2911, that—"Just as objects are apprehended by the Eye and the other Sense-organs, which are themselves not cognised, so, in the same manner, are things apprehended by Cognitions, without these latter being themselves cognised, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3096).

BEING THEMSELVES 'INSIENT' THE EYE AND OTHER SENSE-ORGANS DO NOT APPREHEND THINGS; THEY ONLY SERVE AS THE CAUSE OF COGNITION OF THOSE THINGS.—(3096)

COMMENTARY.

Like the things themselves, the Sense-organs are insentient; hence they do not directly apprehend things; they only serve as the cause of the Cognition of those things,—by virtue of which fact it is assumed that things are apprehended by them; hence it may be that though themselves uncognised, things are 'apprehended' by them, in the sense that they bring about the Cognition of the things. The Cognition itself, however, does not do any such thing for the things; by virtue of which it could be said that "though itself uncognised, it apprehends things, like the Eye and other Sense-organs".

"But the Cognition does bring about the manifestation of things."

That cannot be right; because "manifestation" is synonymous with 'Cognition'. As a matter of fact, all such words as 'abhivyakti', 'upalabdhi', 'parichchhitti', 'samvedana', etc. etc. are synonymous and do not denote different things. And the Cognition cannot be its own instrument; as the operation of anything upon itself involves an incongruity; also because things produced are existent, while those not produced are non-existent. That is, when the Cognition would bring about itself, would it do so when it is itself produced? Or would it do so when it is itself not-produced? The first alternative cannot be accepted, because it would be produced as being on the same footing as itself; because when one thing does not stand on the same footing as itself, it cannot be of the same nature as this latter; if it did, there would be incongruities;—nor can it be right to bring about a nature that has been already produced; because there is no additional peculiarity introduced; and also because there would be no end to such bringing about of things.—Nor can the second alternative be accepted; simply because it does not exist; and there can be no functioning of what does not
exist; because the non-existent is characterised by the absence of all
capacity; so that, if it did function, it would cease to be non-existent. In
fact capacity for efficient activity is what constitutes the existence of things.

Thus there is no analogy between the example cited by the other party
and the case it is meant to illustrate.—(3096)

It has been argued under Text 2912, that "The fact of being cognised is
of no use in the matter of the validity of Cognitions, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3097).

Thus then, the fact of being cognised is of great use in the matter
of the validity of Cognitions; because there can be no
apprehension of things which is not itself
cognised.—(3097)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent—"If the Cognition is cognised by its own Cognition,
then its validity is self-sufficient, inherent in itself".

This is what is anticipated and answered in the following:—

TEXTS (3098-3099).

Even in the Cognition of itself by itself, there is this fact that
there can be no certainty regarding its validity, on account
of the possibility of causes of misconception being pre-
sent. Consequently it is not ascertained that what
is cognised is a real entity; because mere appre-
hension can also be due to similarity, and
there is always the possibility of the
imposition (misconception) of
something else.—(3098-3099)

COMMENTARY.

Merely because the thing has been cognised is not enough to bring about
perfect certainty relating to it; because certainty is dependent upon other
causes; as has been explained in several places. Hence even when the
Cognition is cognised by itself, its capacity to get at its object remains un-
certain, because causes of misconception may be present, in the shape of simi-
larity, absence of repeated experience and so forth, which bar the way to cer-
tainty. Specially because certainty of conviction is something different from
mere apprehension. Thus it is for the excluding of misconception that extra-
nceous conditions are needed, in view of which the validity of Cognition is held
to be extraneous, not inherent; which view is not open to objection.—This is what has been thus declared—'The Cognition itself is cognised by itself, but its validity is ascertained by usage'.

'Tathātvā'—regarding its validity.—(3098-3099)

It has been argued under Text 2013, that—"Like valid Cognition, Invalid Cognition also operates upon its object by itself; but the fact of its being false cannot be apprehended without another means of Cognition".

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (3100).**

**JUST AS REPEATED COGNITION IS REGARDED AS VALID BY ITSELF,—SO ALSO IN SOME CASES WRONG COGNITION IS INVALID BY ITSELF.**

—(3100)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Repeated Cognition'—such Cognition as has been apprehended repeatedly.

Just as in some cases validity is recognised as self-sufficient—as asserted above;—in the same manner, in some cases, wrongness or Invalidity also is recognised by itself. For instance, it is found that people suffering from deranged vision recognise, through repeated experience, the wrongness of the illusion regarding the 'Hair-tuft' immediately after its appearance.

—(3100)

It has been argued under Text 2014, that—"It is only when there appears the Cognition of the truth being otherwise that the falsity of a Cognition becomes recognised".

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (3101).**

**IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT THE IDEA OF FALSITY OF THE COGNITION BEING 'DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF SUBLATING COGNITIONS AND TO THE COGNITION OF ITS SOURCE BEING DEFECTIVE' INVOLVES INFINITE REGRESS. HENCE THE FALSITY (IN-VALIDITY) CANNOT BE RECOGNISED MERELY ON THE BASIS OF THE SAID COGNITIONS.—(3101)**

**COMMENTARY.**

'Already explained'—under Text 3004.

'Tat'—Hence.—(3101)
It has been argued under Text 2915, that—"Invalidity does not become recognised on any other grounds; at the time that it appears, it is always recognised as valid, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (3102-3103).

IT CANNOT BE RECOGNISED THAT IT IS VALID AT THE TIME THAT IT APPEARS;—BECAUSE IT IS NON-CONCEPTUAL AND BECAUSE SELF-COGNITION IS NOT ADMITTED.—NOR CAN IT BE RECOGNISED BY ANOTHER COGNITION; BECAUSE IT IS NOT THERE AT THE TIME; ALSO BECAUSE ITS PRESENCE IS NOT MANIFESTED; OR BECAUSE OF AN UNDESIRABLE CONTINGENCY.

—(3102-3103)

COMMENTARY.

At the time that the Cognition appears (comes about)—(a) is it recognised by itself that it is valid? Or (b) is it so recognised by another Cognition, appearing at the same time? Or (c) by another Cognition, appearing at another time?—These are the three alternatives possible.

(a) The Cognition cannot be recognised by itself, as valid; because, as regards themselves, all Cognitions are non-conceptual (indeterminate), and hence any such notion as that 'this is valid' is impossible.

(b) Nor is the apprehension of a Cognition by another Cognition admitted (by the other party); because it has been held that Cognition is always uncognisable.

Nor can the Cognition be cognised by another Cognition, appearing at the same time; because two Cognitions can never appear at the same time.

Nor can it be cognised by another Cognition, appearing at another time; because if there be no Cognition of this other Cognition,—what is cognised by that third Cognition cannot be known; so that the Cognition cognised by that third Cognition would be one whose manifestation has not been manifested; and if it be held that this also is cognised by yet another Cognition, there would be an Infinite Regress.—(3102-3103)

It has been argued under Text 2916, that—"Even in cases where the falsity is explained to others,—these two ideas have to be pointed out,—and not mere similarity".

The answer to this is as follows:

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TEXTS (3103–3106).

In connection with the Veda, it has been already pointed out that there is a sublating Cognition in the form of Inference; hence by the rejection of the 'Soul' and other things mentioned in the Veda, it becomes established that the Cognition derived from the Veda cannot be valid.—As it has been proved that the Veda is the work of a personal author, the fact of its having a defective source is always open to suspicion.—If the capacity in question (i.e. validity) were inherent in Cognitions, just as the capacity to burn is inherent in Fire,—then such validity should belong to wrong Cognitions also.—Thus it is open to suspicion that the Cognition provided by the Veda proceeds from a defective source, and what is suspected to be defective does not differ from what is actually perceived to be defective.—(3103–3106)

COMMENTARY.

Mere similarity is not urged by the Buddhists as what annuls the Cognition provided by the Veda; what is urged by them is that such things as the Soul, the Universal and the like, which are mentioned in the Veda, are rejected by all Means of Valid Cognition. This has been explained in the Chapters dealing with the 'Soul', etc.

Further, under the chapter on the 'Revealed Word', it has been proved that the Vedas must be the work of an author;—or even if they were without an author,—it is possible that there may be sources of falsity, as there is in the case of the Forest-fire (which is regarded by some people as self-produced, which is not true); consequently it is possible that what is said in the Veda may be false;—this is what has been urged by the Buddhists, not mere similarity.

The following might be urged—"Even though this may be possible, yet, how can mere possibility establish the invalidity (falsity) of what is said in the Veda?"

The answer to this is—'What is suspected to be defective, etc. etc.'—The compound 'Shankyadosam' is to be expounded as—'that in which defects are suspected'.

'Does not differ, etc.'—Because the validity of both is equally liable to being regarded as non-existent.—(3103–3106)

The following Text sums up the argument—
TEXT (3107).

FOR THESE REASONS 'SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY' IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE VEDA ALSO; CONSEQUENTLY PLEASE ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THE VEDA HAS BEEN COMPOSED AND EXPounded BY PERSONS WHO ARE DEFINITELY RECOGNISED AS FREE FROM DEFECTS.—(3107)

COMMENTARY.

'Kṛtākhyāta'—composed and expounded.—'Expounded'—Explained.—'By persons free from defects—the Veda has been composed and expounded'.—The compound thus is the 'Instrumental Tātpuruṣa'.—'Nishchita'—definitely known'—qualifies the said 'character of being composed and expounded by persons free from defects'.—This view, please accept,—if you wish to establish the validity (reliability) of the Veda.

What is meant is that,—if this view is accepted, then the validity would be extraneous; if this view is not accepted, then there can be no validity at all.—(3107)

The following Texts set forth Kumārila's answer to the argument that 'the view should be accepted that the Veda is the work of a Person recognised as free from defects':—

TEXTS (3108–3113).

"As there go on appearing on the scene expounders of the Veda who are beset with love, hatred, etc.,—people become more and more careful in the preserving of the Vedic text. To this end, they go on investigating all such minute details as—(a) which scholar has a weak memory?—(b) who was the earlier scholar?—(c) who would commit mistakes regarding accents?—(d) who would be breaking up words in the wrong places?—When there are so many enthusiastic scrutinisers busy with the guarding of the various points of danger, why cannot the serious reader study the Veda free from flaws?—If Vedic scholars, though themselves pure and honest, were indifferent towards the purity of the Veda, they might be unable to notice the Vedic text mutilated;—and in this way in course of time, the Veda, disregarded and mutilated, would become something quite different, a mere semblance of the Veda.—Under the circumstances, if the Veda is constantly and carefully guarded by persons who keep a check upon persons beset with love and hate bent upon mutilating the Veda,—then the Veda will never lose its real form".—(3108–3113)

COMMENTARY.

(a) The memory, etc. of which scholars are weak?—(b) who has learnt the Veda from whom?—(c) who is likely to commit mistakes in the Accent,
etc. ?—(d) who would read the text, breaking up the words in the wrong place ?—when in regard to each reader of the Veda, all these points are being critically examined by Vedic scholars who are enthusiastically devoted to their task,—how can any reader of the Veda, under the circumstances, not read the Veda with care ?

What is meant by this is that, under the circumstances, as there can be no suspicion regarding the validity of the Veda,—why should the view be admitted that ' the Veda is the work of a person definitely recognised as free from defects ' ?

For instance, if students of the Veda, pure and honest themselves, were indifferent and did not notice the mutilations of the Veda being carried on,—then it would be possible that in course of time, that Veda would become a mere semblance of the original. As a matter of fact, however, the said pure-minded Vedic scholars are ever alert in putting a check upon people beset with Love and Hate bent upon mutilating the Veda,—the Veda is always carefully perceived. How then can it ever lose its original form ?—(3108–3113)

The following might be urged (by the Opponent of the Mimāmsaka)—Though the Veda is constantly guarded by the said scholars, yet may it not be that having become destroyed at the Universal Dissolution, when it reappeared, it did so in the wrong form ?

The Mimāmsaka’s answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3114).

"WHAT WE HOLD IS THAT THE WORLD HAS NEVER BEEN UNLIKE WHAT IT IS NOW ; AND NO UNIVERSAL DISSOLUTION CAN EVER BE PERCEIVED IN REALITY."—(3114)

COMMENTARY.

The Author supplies the answer to the above argument of Kumārila’s—in the following :—

TEXT (3115).

IT CANNOT BE AS ASSERTED. BECAUSE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE THAT THE ACTUAL VERBAL TEXT HAS REMAINED THE SAME ; BUT THAT THE SAME HAS BEEN THE CASE WITH THE COMPREHENSION OF ITS MEANING CANNOT BE ADMITTED UNLESS IT IS ACTUALLY SEEN.—(3115)

COMMENTARY.

All that may be regarded as explained by the above is the fact that the verbal text of the Veda has remained the same ;—but the same has not been the case with the means of comprehending the meaning of the Vedic
texts; hence so far as this is concerned, it has to be admitted that it has
been composed and expounded by a person or persons recognised as free
from defects.—(3115)

Even as regards the verbal text, there can be no certainty regarding its
being the same at all times and places, merely by seeing no change in it,—
except to an omniscient person.—This is pointed out in the following :

TEXTS (3116-3117).

THAT THE VERBAL TEXT HAS REMAINNED THE SAME CAN BE ASCERTAINED
ONLY BY A PERSON TO WHOM ALL MEN, AND ALL TIMES AND PLACES
ARE VISIBLE LIKE THE FRUIT IN THE HAND ; IF IT WERE NOT
SO, THEN, WHY SHOULD THERE HAVE BEEN A DIFFERENCE
OF OPINION DUE TO THE DIVERGENCE OF TIME, PLACE,
PERSONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES ?—(3116-3117)

COMMENTARY.

The argument in support of the preceding assertion is stated in the words
—'If it were not so, etc. etc.'—If the verbal text had remained the same,
then there could be no difference of opinion—doubt—among persons, regard-
ing it, by reason of the divergence of place, time, etc.—(3116-3117)

It has been asserted (by Kumārila) under Texts 2275 and 3114 that—
"the world has never been known to be unlike what it is now and that no
Universal Dissolution can be admitted ".

The answer to this is as follows :

TEXT (3118).

YOU HAVE NO PROOF FOR THE NOTION THAT THE WORLD HAS ALWAYS
BEEN AS IT IS NOW. THE EXISTENCE OF THE 'Samvarta'
(DISSOLUTION) ALSO CANNOT BE DENIED SIMPLY
BECAUSE IT IS NOT SEEN.—(3118)

COMMENTARY.

There is no evidence in support of the idea that the World has always
been as it is now.

The Buddhists speak of the 'Samvarta' as the dissolution of all things;
—the Smṛti-writers also have declared that—'This world was a mass of dark-
ness, unknown and undiscernible, unthinkable, unknowable, as if asleep all
round' (Manu, Chapter I) ;—where we have the mention of two kinds of
'Samvarta', 'Dissolution'; and there is no proof to the effect that there is
no such Dissolution,—on the strength of which the world could always remain
as it is now.—Merely because a certain thing is not seen, it does not follow
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that it does not exist; because it often happens that a thing, even though existent, is not seen; specially as it is not known that there is invariable concomitance between 'non-existence' and 'non-perception'.—(3118)

Then again, the validity of the Veda being self-sufficient, it always brings about certainty regarding its subject-matter; so that there can be no delusion regarding it;—and as it is eternal, there is no likelihood of its essential nature being altered;—thus in neither of the two ways can there be any mutilation of the Veda,—in accordance with your view. Under the circumstances, all the attempt that has been made by Vedic Scholars to preserve the text of the Veda has been superfluous.

This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3119–3122).

UNDER THE VIEW THAT THE VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS IS INHERENT IN THEM, CERTAINTY OF CONVICTION MUST BE REGARDED AS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE VEDA BY ITSELF, IN REGARD TO ITS OWN FORM (TEXT); HENCE THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBILITY OF DELUSION IN RESPECT TO THAT.—THUS, THERE BEING NO ROOM FOR IGNORANCE, OR DOUBT, OR MISCONCEPTION,—EVEN THE INFANT OF THE BRAHMAṆA SHOULDN'T REQUIRE ANY TEACHING.—JUST AS THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE THING WHOSE ROOT (CAUSE) IS UNKNOWN,—HOW COULD THERE BE ANY DESTRUCTION (MUTILATION) OF WHAT IS ETERNAL AND SUPERIOR EVEN TO THE DIAMOND (IN ITS INDESTRUCTIBILITY) ?—IF IT BE SAID THAT "THERE MAY BE DESTRUCTION IN THE SHAPE OF PERVERSION OF THE MANIFESTATION",—THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH MANIFESTATION OF WHAT IS ETERNAL HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED.—HENCE IF WISE PEOPLE SEEK TO PRESERVE THE VEDIC TEXT, THE ATTEMPT IS ENTIRELY SUPERFLUOUS.—(3119–3122)

COMMENTARY.

'Infant of a Brahmaṇa'—a Brahmaṇa-child.

Thus far it has been shown that the destruction (or mutilation) of the Veda is not possible, if it is self-sufficient in its validity. The author now proceeds to show that it is not possible, on account of its eternity also; to this end, he puts the question—'How could there be, etc. etc.?'

'If it is urged, etc. etc.'—this is to be construed with 'destruction' of the preceding sentence.

'Sā'—manifestation.

'Āṣya'—of the Veda.—(3119–3122)

The following Text sums up the whole section:—
TEXT (3123).

FOR THESE REASONS PLEASE ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN AUTHOR OF THE VEDA,—ONE WHO IS CAPABLE OF SEEING THINGS BEYOND THE SENSES, WHO HAS SHAKEN OFF THE ENTIRE MASS OF DARKNESS AND IGNORANCE, AND WHO IS CONVERSANT WITH THE MEANING OF THE VEDA AND ITS DIVISIONS.

—(3123)

COMMENTARY.

‘Darkness’—i.e. Ignorance, ‘afflicted’ as well as ‘unafflicted’ [vide Yogasūtra—‘Vṛttaḥ-kliṣṭā-kliṣṭāḥ’]; the ‘mass’ of this Ignorance has been shaken off by him;—‘conversant with its divisions’—i.e. the right expounder.

‘Author’—i.e. of the Veda.

Thus it has been established that the Proposition (of the Mīmāṃsaka) is found to be entirely annulled by Means of Valid Cognition,—his Reason, in the shape of ‘being present when the other is present’, is Inconclusive,—the proof for the Reason (adduced by the Buddhist) being present where the Probandum is present has been already indicated above, under Text 2939.

As regards the four alternatives set forth (by the Mīmāṃsaka) under the commentary on Text 2811, (1) Both validity and invalidity are inherent in cognitions,—(2) Both are extraneous at times,—(3) Validity is inherent and Invalidity is extraneous,—and (4) Validity is extraneous and Invalidity is inherent,—and the objections urged against three of them,—they do not affect the Buddhists at all. Because they do not accept any of these alternatives, their view being that there can be no hard and fast rule in the matter; as it has been already explained that both these, Validity and Invalidity, may be sometimes inherent and sometimes extraneous. Hence it was not right to put forward the said four alternatives only; as a fifth alternative was also possible that there can be no hard and fast rule applying to all cases.

Other people have offered an entirely different explanation of the Proposition (regarding the self-validity of Cognitions):—“Validity consists in being of the nature Consciousness; hence it must be natural (inherent) in all cognitions,—it cannot be due to the presence of any excellences; as even in the absence of excellences, when there is wrong cognition, it is quite possible that there should be the ‘essence of cognition’. It is for this reason and in this sense that Cognition is spoken of as ‘self-valid’. All that the excellences do is to remove the defects; hence for the removal of defects, the validity of the cognition needs the excellences; and these are not needed for the bringing about of the validity itself”.

The above view cannot be right. Because it is not correct to say that validity consists in being of the nature of Consciousness; as in that case there would be validity in wrong cognitions also.—If it be held that—“Validity is a particular form of Cognition itself”,—then it should not be said that—“Validity is natural and inherent in cognitions, and not brought about by excellences; because even in the absence of excellences, when there is wrong
cognition, it is quite possible that there should be validity” (as asserted above). Because if Validity were held to be a particular form of Cognition, then alone could there be any justification for the pointing out of the falsity of the premiss that the same validity is due to the presence of excellences,—not of anything else. As a matter of fact, however, when it has been asserted that “it is present also in wrong cognition”, the falsity pointed out is not in the premiss that “the particular form of Cognition is due to the presence of excellences’—but in regard to Cognition in general; and the other party does not hold that cognition in general is brought about by excellences; it is only a particular cognition that is held to be so brought about; and it is not possible to point out falsity in the premiss that ‘a particular cognition is brought about by excellences’.

Then again, we also do not hold the extraneous validity to be due to excellences; by denying which you are seeking to prove inherent validity. What we hold is that a particular cognition, even though apprehended, might be due to a mistake, and as such it cannot bring about the certainty of conviction in accordance with the said apprehension; hence it is concluded that validity, being due to the appearance of the said conviction, must be extraneous.

Further, the same may be said in regard to Invalidity also; as follows—Invalidity is of the essence of cognition;—and this is natural and inherent in cognitions,—and not due to defects; because it is possible even when there is no defect, as in the case of Right Cognition; that is why Invalidity is said to be inherent; and all that the defects do is to set aside the excellences; hence it is for the setting aside of the excellences, that the Invalidity needs the defects,—not for the bringing about of the Invalidity itself.

Thus there is nothing in the explanation put forward above by some people.

Ucchāyaka, on the other hand, has declared as follows:—“The validity of cognitions consists, not in their being of the nature of Consciousness, but in being in conformity with the real state of things; because, in a case where there is Consciousness, if there is no conformity with the real state of things,—the cognition is invalid; e.g. the cognition of silver in regard to the piece of shell; and conversely, even when there is no Consciousness, if there is conformity with real state of things, the cognition is valid; e.g. the cognition of smoke in Fire. Hence from this positive and negative concomitance, it follows that Validity consists in being in conformity with the real state of things”.

“The cognition of this conformity proceeds from that same cause which brings about the original cognition itself,—not from any other circumstantial conditions; it is in this sense that the validity of cognitions is spoken of as inherent in themselves;—the term ‘sva’ (in the word ‘svatah’) stands for ‘svaśita’, ‘what belongs to oneself’; so that the word ‘svatah’ means ‘due to its own cause’. The second half of the passage—‘the capacity which is not present in the thing itself cannot be produced in it by something else’,—only serves to point out the reason for denying the idea of its being brought about by other circumstances; the meaning being
that the capacity which is not present in the thing itself cannot be brought about by anything else;—i.e. by anything else besides the causes bringing about the Cognition itself.

The following might be urged against the above view:—As a matter of fact, the causes of cognitions are common to valid as well as invalid cognitions; how then could validity be invariably concomitant with the mere character of 'being the cause of cognitions'?—From this it is clear that validity is due to other circumstantial causes, not merely to the cause of the cognition itself. This 'other circumstantial cause' must be one that is accompanied by excellences; so that the cause of validity would consist also in the excellences of the Sense-organs and other Instruments of Cognition. In the case of Verbal Cognition the excellence of this other cause, as ascertained from actual experience, consists in 'being composed (spoken) by a trustworthy person'. So that there being no such composer (or Speaker) in the case of the Veda, it would have to be regarded as invalid.

The answer to this (provided by Ubēyaka) is as follows:—"What has been just asserted does not affect our position; because it cannot be proved that validity is due to other circumstantial causes. It is not possible for us to recognise any positive functioning of the Excellences towards the bringing about of the effect in the shape of validity; what produces the idea of the cognition being in conformity with the real state of things is the cause in the shape of the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition themselves, independently of anything else. As regards the function of the ointment (applied to the Eyes to remove defective vision),—that tends only towards the removal of defects, and not to the producing of excellences".

It might be argued that—The Sense-organs and the other Means of Cognition are there in the case of the invalid cognition also; so that under the above view, validity should be produced in all cases; as the cause of it would be there in its efficient condition.

"This is not so,"—says Ubēyaka—"because after the defects have been cured, other causes would become operative towards the bringing about of particular effects".

The following might be urged:—Why is not the contrary of this accepted—that the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition bring about wrong cognitions, independently of other things,—and that on the cure of the excellences, other circumstantial causes become operative towards bringing about the right cognition in conformity with the real state of things?

Ubēyaka's answer to this is as follows:—"True; this is so; but through positive and negative concomitance, it has been found in the case of Inference, that what brings about the validity is that same 'presence of three factors' which brings about the cognition itself; and hence it is assumed that in the case of Perception also, the validity would be produced by the same cause that produces the cognition. As regards the wrong cognition, on the other hand, it is an effect that is not found to be produced by the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition, and hence it leads to the assumption that it must be due to other circumstantial causes.—Thus there can be no objection to our explanation of validity".
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[The Author's answer to the above view of Uḍāyaka]—All this is certainly not free from objections. For instance, it has been asserted that "the validity of cognitions consists in its being in conformity with the real state of things; and that it proceeds from the cause of the cognition itself".—This is superfluous, futile; because we also admit that 'that cognition alone is valid which is in conformity with the real nature of things',—which clearly means that Validity consists in being in conformity with the real state of things.—But the 'cognition' is specially mentioned as qualifying 'validity'; validity is not regarded as belonging directly to the Smoke and such other means of cognition, which are themselves not of the nature of 'cognition'; hence it cannot be admitted that validity consists only in 'being in conformity with the real state of things'. Specially because it is Cognition alone which is primarily operative towards things to be abandoned or acquired. For instance, even though the Smoke, which is invariably concomitant with Fire, is there,—the Agent does not have recourse to activity towards the securing of the Fire, until the cognition of the Smoke comes about; which shows that it is the cognition that is the direct and immediate prompting agent towards the man's activity. This has been thus declared—'The Cognition must be valid, because that is the primary cause of activity towards things to be abandoned or obtained'.

As regards the character of 'being in conformity with the real state of things', which belongs to the Cognitions, and which is there in the form of the capacity to lead up to the thing cognised,—this consists in this same getting at the thing; as it is only in regard to this that Invariable Concomitance is possible; and the capacity of things forms their very nature or essence; hence who could ever think of securing it from other things,—in view of which it would have to be specially denied? Because when the thing itself has been produced, it cannot be that its property and nature have not been produced. If this were so, then there would be incongruities.

This validity then, though being the very essence of the cognitions, cannot be recognised until the effects of the cognition have been brought about,—because of the presence of causes likely to lead to wrong cognitions. Hence the effect is ascertained from extraneous causes such as the cognition of effective action. Hence when the validity is said to be extraneous, it is in reference to the said certainty regarding it, not in reference to its being produced. Consequently, there can be no useful purpose served by the denial of the production of the validity by other causes; as on that point there is no dispute at all. As regards the certainty, however, regarding the capacity of things, you also hold that it is brought about by extraneous causes. This has been declared thus (by Kumārila himself)—"The capacities of things are proved through Presumption based upon the fact that certain effects cannot be explained otherwise" [Shlo-Vā., p. 341].

As regards the argument that "the capacity that does not belong to a thing by itself cannot be produced by anything else";—which has been put forward in support of the denial of the idea of the validity being due to other circumstantial causes,—that is equally applicable to Invalidity also; so
that that also should have to be regarded as inherent in the cognition. Hence the Reason adduced is no Reason at all; as it is false and inconclusive.

It has been argued that—“Excellences are never recognised as operating positively towards the bringing about of Invalidity”.

It cannot be understood what the clear meaning of this affirmation is. What is the meaning of this ‘positive operation’?—If it means intentional activity towards the producing of a certain effect, following upon the determination that ‘I shall do this’,—then such activity cannot be possible for the Sense-organs. Nor is it possible for things to act intelligently and intentionally; because all things being momentary, effort and activity are impossible; consequently, for the Sense-organs also, no positive activity is possible; and hence they can never serve as Causes.—If it be argued that—“even without any operation in the form of activity, the Sense-organs operate, by their mere presence, towards the production of effects; and as such are held to be Causes”—then the answer is that this can be said, with equal reason, in regard to Excellences also. In the producing of the effects, all Causes are not always found to have an activity apart from their mere presence.—The following might be urged—“When the Excellences are present, the Defects disappear, and thence comes about validity; so that, as they act through the disappearance of the defects, it is said that there can be no positive operation possible for the Excellences”—The same, however, may be said regarding the Defects also; for instance, when the Defects are present, the Excellences disappear and thence there comes about invalidity; hence towards the bringing about of Invalidity also, the Defects would have no positive operation. Thus Invalidity also would be inherent,—there being no difference between the two cases. As a matter of fact, Defects are never found to set aside Excellences and operate directly towards the bringing about of Invalidity. Hence there can be no causal relation apart from the condition that the presence and absence of one thing is concomitant with the presence and absence of the other. Such causal relation is equally possible for Defects as well as Excellences.

It has been argued that—“The form of the Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition, independently of anything else, serves to bring about cognitions in conformity with the real state of things”.

This also is not right; because, all cognitions would, in this case, be valid,—as their efficient cause would be always present; specially as they would be of the nature of Consciousness. The character of being of the nature of Consciousness, as present in cognitions, is inseparably related to the preceding cognition; so that even when there are defects, their efficient cause and the said character would be there in the case of all cognitions;—the character of being in conformity with the real state of things would also, in the same way, be there in all cognitions.

The following might be urged—“In the case of Defects bringing about Invalidity, the efficient cause would not be there in all cases; because Validity and its opposite, being mutually exclusive, could never be present in the same cognition. The character of being of the essence of Consciousness, however, can be present in all cases, without any opposition”.
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If that is so, then the Sense-organ by itself, independently of everything else, cannot turn out to be the cause; because, even when the Sense-organ is there in its efficient condition, its effect, in the shape of Validity, does not come about. What is independent of everything else can never fail to be productive of its effect; and when between two things, one does not come about even when the other is there, the former cannot be regarded as having the latter as its only cause; if it did so, there would be incongruities.

Then again, you have got to explain this—if Validity has its efficient cause present in its perfect condition, why is it that it does not come about, even when the Defects are there?—If the answer is that—"it does not come about on account of the presence of the Defect, which is a cause operating against the Validity";—then, the same may be said regarding Invalidity also; it does not come about at the time on account of the presence of the Sense-organ, etc. which are the cause operating against the Invalidity.

Further, even if the Validity were unwilling to come about because it is afraid of the Defect which operates against it,—how could its own cause which is present there in its efficient condition, ignore the effect? In fact, the untrammelled potency of the cause would be manifested only if it forced the effect to come about, even though unwilling.—If the idea is that the Sense-organ would not bring about Validity, when its potency would be obstructed by the presence of Defects,—then, being impotent, it could not bring about the Cognition either. Otherwise it would not be true that "Validity is brought about by the cause of the Cognition itself"; as it would not come about even when the Cognition has come about. If between two things, one is not produced even when the other has been produced,—then both cannot be regarded as necessarily having the same cause; as for instance, when the paddysprout is not produced on the production of the Kodravasprout;—and it has been found that even when the Cognition has been produced, its Validity is not always produced; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character.—Then again, when a Potency forms the very essence of a thing, nothing can obstruct it, without destroying the nature of that thing. Thus then it may be possible to assert as follows—'Please accept the view that there is validity of all Apprehensions, because the Potency which is inherent in a thing cannot be destroyed by anything else' [a parody of Kumārila's assertion].

The following might be urged—"What is held to be the cause of validity is not the mere Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition, but only such Sense-organ, etc. as are free from defects; so that the above objections are not applicable".

If that is so, then it comes to this that what brings about the Validity is the Sense-organ as along with Excellences—which is something different from the cause of the Cognition itself; because it is only when a thing is equipped with Excellence that it can be free from defects. Thus you cannot say that "the validity is not known to be brought about by other circumstantial causes".

"What the Excellences operate towards is the removal of defects, not the producing of validity".
That cannot be right. 'Removal' is a mere negation; hence there can be no operation towards it; for instance, it is not possible for anything to have any operation towards a non-entity, like the 'Hare's Horn', which is not something to be produced.

It has been argued that—"In the case of Inference, it has been found that the presence of the Three-factors, which produces the Cognition, brings about the Validity also".

This also is inadmissible. What brings about the Inferential Cognition is, not merely the presence of the three factors, but also such excellences in the cogniser as absence of delusion, and full remembrances and impressions. For instance, even when the three factors are present, if the man has no recollection of the relationship and other impressions regarding these factors, the Inferential Cognition does not appear at all; consequently, from this positive and negative concomitance, it is clear that it is not true that what produces the validity is the same cause that produces the cognition itself. Hence the conclusion to the contrary remains irresistible.

It has also been argued that—"The effect in the shape of wrong cognition does not proceed from the mere Sense-organs".

This is an extremely audacious statement. It implies the possibility of Wrong Cognitions appearing independently of the Sense-organs. When one thing, by its very nature, does not proceed from another, it can never be dependent upon the latter; as otherwise, it would lead to absurdity. As a matter of fact, even the cognitions of 'two moons' and the like which appear in men suffering from defective vision, never appear independently of the Sense-organs.

Further, if Validity is described as 'conformity with the real state of things',—then how is it ascertained that the Cognition produced by the Veda is in conformity with the real state of things,—in view of which you, who are a man of limited vision, come to regard it as valid? In fact, the presence of a potency in a thing cannot be ascertained by men who have not perceived the effects of such Potency. If it were so ascertained, it would lead to incongruities.

Thus it is found that the Validity is not proved in the case of the Veda,—in the hope of establishing of whose reliability all this verbal net-work has been spread out (by the Mīmāṃsaka); so that all this effort has been like the effort of the man who thumps mere husks, in the hope of finding rice. This point need not be laboured any further.—(3123)

End of Chapter XXV
CHAPTER XXVI

Examination of the 'Person of Super-normal Vision'

COMMENTARY.

It has been declared in the Introductory Verses (Texts 5-6) that—
'The great Teacher, the best of Expounders, has expounded the doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation,—having abounding Mercy acquired during vast æons of time; after bowing to this same Teacher, this Compendium of True Doctrines is being composed'.—Herein it has been asserted that the Doctrine of the 'Intervolved Wheel of Causation' is qualified as having been taught by an Omniscient Person.

In support of this notion, the Author proceeds with the mere introduction of this subject:

TEXT (3124).

Thus, it having been proved that the validity of all cognitions is not inherent in themselves, no attempt is made to prove the existence of the person cognisant of things beyond the reach of the Senses.

—(3124)

COMMENTARY.

Thus,—i.e. by the reasonings just set forth,—it is established that the Validity of all Cognitions is not inherent in themselves;—hence the existence of a Person knowing all things, even those beyond the reach of the Senses, becomes established without any effort; consequently, for the purpose of proving this no further effort is being made.—(3124)

Question:—"How does it become established without effort?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (3125-3127).

Inasmuch as the validity and reliability of the Veda also is due to a Person,—it follows from that itself that the said validity is possible only if that Person is cognisant of supersensuous things. If it were not so, then the Person would be liable to Ignorance, Doubt and Wrong Cognition; and when such a Person would be the author of the Veda, this latter could not have any validity,—like other assertions. Inasmuch as the connection between Heaven and Sacrificial
COMMENTARY.

'Tasya'—of the Person.
'Tatah'—the Person, its composer.
'Tasmin'—in the Veda;—the Locative ending is in relation to the word 'Pramāṇatā', 'Validity'.

'Validity'—capacity to make known supersensuous things in accordance with their true nature.—This has been said in reference to the view of the other party.

What is meant is as follows:—If you must insist upon the validity and reliability of the Veda,—then that validity must be due to the Person who composed it, and not to the Veda itself. This has been explained already. If this Author of the Veda is capable of perceiving supersensuous things,—then alone can reliability belong to him; otherwise if the author were liable to wrong and doubtful cognitions, the Veda would be just like the utterances of mad and demented people, and hence entirely unreliable. Hence it follows that the Author of the Veda, whose existence has been proved in the chapter on 'The Revealed Word', must be regarded, at least by implication, to be one who is capable of perceiving supersensuous things. Hence there should be no denial of such an Author.

As a rule, men have their powers of perception beset with defects like Love and Hate, and hence they are unable to perceive supersensuous things; having realised this truth, people lose all hope of establishing the validity of scriptures composed by such men; so when one seeks to obtain the knowledge of what is Dharma and what is Adharma, he will rely upon the reliability of the Veda,—just like the bird which is unable to perceive the shore.

With this idea, the Mīmāṃsakas, being devoid of all excellent qualities (?), deny the existence of the Person cognisant of supersensuous things; their argument being as follows:—"All men being beset with Love and Hatred, etc. as also by Ignorance, and not knowing how to get rid of these, they become confused; hence there can be no Person who is capable of perceiving supersensuous things; consequently, Dharma can be known only through the Veda, not through the senses; 'as it is the Veda only which can make known things past, present and future, subtle and remote and near,—not so the Sense-organ or any other Means of Cognition' (Sahāra-Bhāṣya). In support of this view, they put forward the following reasoning: A thing that falls within the scope of the Means of Cognition known as 'Non-apprehension', which consists in the absence of the five means of Cognition (Sense-perception and the rest), can be regarded by the wise only as non-existent; e.g. the 'sky-lotus',—the omniscient Person falls within the scope of the said 'Non-apprehension';—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things; the Probandum consisting of capability of being used and regarded. As for the negation of this, it can be cognised by 'Non-apprehension' only".

—(3125–3127)
EXAMINATION OF THE ‘PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION’. 1393

Says the Mīmāṃsaka’s Opponent:—All that is cognisable is included under the five things, Colour (Taste, Odour, Touch and Speech); and men who know all these are well known; hence the Mīmāṃsaka’s Proposition—that ‘there is no one who knows all things’—is contrary to ordinary experience”.

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (3128).

“ALL THAT IS PERTINENT TO THE PRESENT CONTEXT IS THE DENIAL OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF Dharmā (BY MAN); WHO IS DENYING THE POSSIBILITY OF A PERSON KNOWING OTHER THINGS?”

—(3128)

COMMENTARY.

“In the present context, which deals with the question of the Reliability of the Veda, all that is meant by us is the denial of the existence of any person who knows all things relating to Dharma,—not the denial of the person knowing all things that are included under the denotation of the term ‘all’. Thus if people apply the term ‘omniscient’ (all-knowing) to a certain person, in the sense that he knows all things except Dharma and Adharma,—we do not deny this; hence our Proposition does not run counter to ordinary experience”.—(3128)

“Further, if you Buddhists also urge, against us, the possibility of regarding, as ‘all-knowing’, the man who knows all things except Dharma and Adharma,—then that is entirely superfluous.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3129).

“IN EVERY CASE, THE TERM ‘ALL’ IS USED IN REFERENCE TO THE CONTEXT; HENCE IF THERE IS A PERSON KNOWING ALL THINGS RELATING TO A CERTAIN CONTEXT,—WHAT HARM DOES THAT DO TO OUR POSITION?”—(3129)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—What is that ‘all’ that relates to the present context?
Answer:—

TEXT (3130).

“THERE ARE CERTAIN EFFECTS (SPOKEN OF) WHICH, IF FOUND IMPOSSIBLE IN RELATION TO THE OBJECT DENOTED BY THE WORD, ARE APPLIED TO THE WORD ITSELF; HENCE THE MAN WHO KNOWS THE word ‘ALL’, MAY BE CALLED ‘ALL-KNOWING’ IN NAME.”—(3130)

COMMENTARY.

“For example, in Grammar, we find such assertions as ‘agnīrdeśk’ and so forth which lay own such effects as the addition of certain affixes;
now this effect cannot be brought about in the thing denoted by the words concerned; consequently, by implication, they are applied to the words themselves, by Grammarians.—In the same manner, if you also, finding that it is impossible for any one to know all things, explain the term ‘all’ appearing in the statement of your doctrine, as standing for the word ‘all’,—so that the man knowing the word ‘all’ would be ‘all-knowing’,—then this may be so in name,—i.e. in name only; for no one can prevent a man applying to words any meaning he likes; as the naming of things depends upon the mere whim of man”.—(3130)

TEXT (3131).

“If the thing related to the context is some such thing as Oil, Water or Clarified Butter,—and if a person knowing all about such a thing is called ‘all-knowing’,—then he may be so; we do not deny that.”—(3131)

COMMENTARY.

“If what is meant by the term ‘all’ are things other than Dharma and Adharma,—such as Oil, Water, Clarified Butter, etc.—and the Person is regarded as ‘all-knowing’ on account of his knowledge of these things,—then your argument is superfluous”.—(3131)

“Further, is the ‘all-knowing’ person regarded as such—because he knows a little of the universe as a whole? Or because he knows the whole of it in full detail?—If the former, then it is futile; it being admitted by us. This is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3132-3133).

“The whole universe is included under the two terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative’; if one who knows this epitome of the world is called ‘all-knowing’,—then who is there that does not accept such an ‘omniscient’ person?—In the same way, the term ‘all’ may be applied on the basis of such universal terms as ‘knowable’, ‘cognisable’ and the like (which include all things); if one who knows this is called ‘omniscient’,—who can object to this?”—(3132-3133)

COMMENTARY.

“The whole world, consisting of things that are mutually exclusive, is ‘negative’; and when the things are spoken of positively, it is ‘positive’;—
thus these two characters, 'positive' and 'negative', have been described by us as standing for the entire universe; if, it is on the basis of the knowledge of the whole world in this form (as consisting of Positive and Negative entities), that the 'Omniscient Person' is sought to be proved,—even this is acceptable to us. But this alone cannot prove the 'omniscient character' of any person'.

'This epitome of the world'—Being of the Positive and Negative form constitutes the 'epitome' of the World, in the sense that it epitomises it.

Similarly if the whole world is viewed as 'knowable', 'cognisable', etc.—and one knowing it thus is 'all-knowing',—then this also is what is readily admitted by us.—(3132-3133)

TEXT (3134).

"WHEN CERTAIN PEOPLE HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SUCH AND SO MANY ARE ALL THE THINGS THAT EXIST,—ALL THOSE WHO KNOW THIS AND THOSE WHO HAVE LEARNT THE WORKS WRITTEN BY THEM SHOULD BE 'ALL-KNOWING'."

—(3134)

COMMENTARY.

It might be that there are some people who have come to the conclusion in their own systems that so many are all the things that exist, and have postulated them to be as such;—e.g. the Bauddhas have postulated the 'Five Thought-phases';—the Vaisheshikas have postulated the 'Six Categories';—the Nyayaikas have postulated the 'Sixteen Categories',—'Means of Cognition', 'Objects of Cognition' and so forth;—the Sankhyas have postulated the twenty-five Principles—'Primordial Matter', the 'Great Principle' and so forth.—And one who knows these is held to be 'all-knowing'.—In this way, it leads to absurdities; such as people who read the works written by these people also become 'all-knowing'.—(3134)

TEXT (3135).

"FOR INSTANCE, ONE WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THE SIX 'OBJECTS OF COGNITION', THROUGH THE SIX 'MEANS OF COGNITION', WOULD BE 'KNOWING ALL' IN AN EPISTOPISED FORM; WHO IS THERE WHO WOULD NOT ADMIT SUCH AN OMNISCIENT PERSON?"—(3135)

COMMENTARY.

It might be urged that,—'If a man, through the six Means of Cognition—Perception, Inference, Analogy, Word, Presumption and Non-apprehension—cognises the six kinds of objects, he would be regarded as omniscient';—but this also would be futile, proving what is already admitted. Because
—(a) Perception being restricted in its scope to the five objects, in the shape of Colour, etc. cannot apply to Dharma and Adharma; (b) Inference also, envisaging the subject as related to the Probans which has been cognised by Perception, cannot appertain to Dharma and Adharma; because Dharma, etc.—are beyond the reach of the senses; hence no relationship of these with anything can be apprehended by Perception;—(c) as regards the Word, even though it appertains wholly to imperceptible things, yet through verbal cognition one cannot be regarded as ‘perceiving supersensuous things’; because verbal cognition, envisaging imperceptible things, cannot be of the nature of Perception; and the man who is wholly addicted to non-perceptional cognition can never be one ‘perceiving supersensuous things’;—(d) as regards Analogy, envisaging Similarity and its adjuncts, can never apply to Dharma and Adharma; as has been thus declared—‘Hence what is remembered would be qualified by similarity,—and this would be the object of Analogical Cognition; or the similarity as resting in that thing’ (Śloka-vārttika—Analogy, 37);—(e) as regards Presumption, it envisages only a thing different from the one in question, which, as heard of or seen, would be inexplicable without that other thing; hence, it cannot appertain to Dharma and Adharma; as there is nothing either seen or heard of, which cannot be explained without the presumption of Dharma and Adharma. Even if Presumption does envisage Dharma and Adharma,—it cannot be of the nature of Perception; hence one who rests upon it cannot be said to be ‘directly perceiving Dharma and Adharma’;—(f) as regards Non-apprehension, as it envisages only the absence of cognisable things, it can never envisage Dharma and Adharma.—(3135)

Thus it has been explained that the attempt to prove the Omniscient Person on the basis of the knowledge of the epitomised form of things, is superfluous. The Mīmāṃsaka now proceeds to point out objections against the idea of the ‘Omniscient Person’, on the basis of his knowing the whole world in detail:—

**TEXT (3136).**

"IF ONE ASSUMES THE EXISTENCE OF A PERSON CAPABLE OF DIRECTLY PERCEIVING ALL THINGS IN DETAIL,—SUCH ASSUMPTION IS ABSOLUTELY FUTILE AND FALSE.”—(3136)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘Mūlha’—Futile, useless; because it is not conducive to the fulfilment of any purpose of man. —

‘False’—not true, as envisaging an impossibility.—(3136)

The following Text shows in what way it is an impossibility—
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TEXT (3137).

"Even in a single body, there are so many atoms, and so many hairs, etc.;—who can know all these?"—(3137)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, it is impossible for men to know in detail all the atoms contained even in a single body; what to say of the knowledge of all the little details that go to make up the entire Universe?—(3137)

The following Text points out the futility of assuming the Omniscient Person:

TEXT (3138).

"If an attempt were made to prove that one has the knowledge of the details of all individuals and components of the whole world,—it would be as futile as the investigation of the Crow's teeth."—(3138)

COMMENTARY.

'Components'—Hands and Feet, etc.—'Individuals'—in the shape of the particular trees, Dhava, Khadira, Palāsha and so forth.—'Samasta, etc.'—all components and individuals;—the 'details' of these are in the shape of atoms, hairs, leaves and so forth;—one who has the knowledge of all this is 'Samasta...jñāna',—the term 'jñāna' standing for one who knows—the 'Lyuṭ-affix' in 'jñāna' denoting the active agent;—any attempt to prove,—establish the presence of—such a knower—would be absolutely futile; that is, because, being impossible and not having any bearing upon Dharma and Adharma, it can be of no use in fulfilling any purpose of man.—(3138)

This same idea is further supported by means of an illustration:

TEXT (3139).

"Just as the assertion that 'one knows all things with his eyes' is futile, so also would be the Proposition that 'there is a Person capable of directly perceiving all things'".—(3139)

COMMENTARY.

This means that the Proposition is superfluous and also contrary to common experience.—(3139)
The following Text proceeds to point out where there is difference of opinion, and the proving of which would be useful for man:

TEXTS (3140-3141).

"By proving the existence of the Person knowing only Dharma and Adharma, whom the Buddhist postulates,—one secures the reliability and acceptability of the Scripture composed by Him; and by denying the said Person, one secures the unreliability and rejectability of the said scripture.—Thus when people proceed to prove the existence of the Person knowing all the little details of the entire world, they put themselves to the unnecessary trouble of writing treatises on the subject and carrying on discussions on the same."—(3140-3141)

COMMENTARY.

'Sva-dharma, etc. etc.'—the Person cognisant of Dharma and Adharma,—as posited by the Buddhist himself; when there is proving or denying of such a Person. The compound is to be taken as with the Locative ending. When there is (a) proving and (b) denying of such a person,—it becomes established whether the scripture composed by such a person is to be (a) accepted or (b) rejected, respectively.

What is meant is as follows:—If the Party postulating the said Person succeeds in proving that such a Person exists as his Instructor fully conversant with Dharma and Adharma,—then it becomes established that the scripture composed by him should be accepted; on the other hand, if the Party denying the said Person postulated by the other party as conversant with Dharma and Adharma only, succeeds in refuting the existence of such a Person,—it becomes proved that the Scripture composed by the said Person should be rejected;—when, however, one gives up all consideration of only Dharma and Adharma, and proceeds to compose treatises and carry on discussions regarding the 'Omniscient Person' who is affirmed by one party as knowing all the minute details of the whole world, and is denied by the other party,—such attempt involves useless trouble.

The Locative ending at the end of the compound—'Sarva, etc.'—connotes 'for the purpose of';—while that at the end of the compound 'granthavādayoh', it connotes the receptacle of the attempt.—(3140-3141)

The following might be urged—If there is no Person cognisant of Dharma and Adharma, then how can people have any idea of what is moral, good and what is immoral, evil?

The Mīmāṃsaka's answer to this is as follows:—
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TEXTS (3142–3144).

"PERCEPTION AND OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION REGARDING THE OMNISCIENT PERSON HAVING BEEN DISCARDED, IT WOULD FOLLOW THAT MORALITY AND IMMORALITY ARE COGNISABLE THROUGH SCRIPTURE (RELIABLE WORD) ONLY.—THIS ALONE BEING SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE DOCTRINE OF THE Mīmāṁsaka, IF AN EFFORT IS MADE TO REFUTE THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, IT IS LIKE AN ATTEMPT TO KILL WHAT IS ALREADY DEAD. THE 'PERSON COGNISANT OF DHARMA' HAVING BEEN REJECTED, ON THE GROUND OF HIS VERY ROOT BEING CUT OFF,—IF PEOPLE GO ON ASSERTING THE EXISTENCE OF OMNISCIENT PERSONS, IT IS LIKE THE THUMPING OF HUSKS."—(3142–3144)

COMMENTARY.

'Kevalāgama, etc. etc.'—i.e. being cognisable through the reliable Word only.—Though the term 'āgama' connotes the reliable word in general, yet, here, by implication, it should be taken as standing for that Word (or Scripture) which does not emanate from Man.

'This alone, etc. etc.'—That is, only by the rejection of the Person cognisant of Dharma, the Mīmāṁsaka's doctrine, that 'Dharma is that beneficial thing which is indicated by the Veda', becomes established; even so, if we make further repeated efforts—as shown later on—for rejecting the Omniscient Person, it is useless; the desired result having been already achieved, such further Effort is like the killing of what is already dead.

The Omniscient Person having been rejected, if the Buddhists still make attempts to prove his existence, that also,—as not bringing about the desired result,—is like the thumping of husks, by the person seeking for Rice; involving needless labour. Just as in the case cited, after the rice has been removed, if the man seeking for rice proceeds to thump the husks, it is entirely useless,—so also, when the main factor of the Person cognisant of Dharma, etc. has been set aside, if the Buddhist proceeds to prove the existence of the Person knowing all the little details that go to make up the world, which is of no use in regard to the main factor,—such attempt is entirely useless. Herein lies the similarity to the thumping of husks.

'On account of their very root having been cut off',—i.e. of whom the main point, regarding the knowledge of Dharma and Adharma, has been refuted.—(3142–3144)

The following Text shows that the said attempt of the Buddhist to prove the Omniscient Person is not only futile,—it also involves something undesirable for him:
"If the person has the direct perception of all things, then he should have direct knowledge of such tastes, etc. also as are unclean;—who could assume the existence of such a person?"—(3145)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—The omniscience of the Teacher has been inferred by the Buddhists from the fact of His having propounded the teaching of the truth regarding all things; hence this Inference annuls the Mīmāṃsaka’s ‘Proposition’ [that ‘there can be no Omniscient Person’]; and his Reason also is inadmissible.

Anticipating this objection, the Mīmāṃsaka supplies the following answer:—

"As a matter of fact, the words of the Buddha and others are not found to provide any knowledge of what is contained in the Vedas, the Upavedas and the Subsidiary Sciences and their auxiliaries; how then can such a person be regarded as ‘omniscient’, without reason?"—(3146)

COMMENTARY.

Vedas—named ‘Ṛk’, ‘Yajus’ and ‘Sāman’—Upavedas—Āyurveda, Dhanurveda and the like.—Subsidiary Sciences—the six subsidiaries of the Veda, in the shape of Śikṣā, Kalpa, Vyākaraṇa, Nirukta, Chhandas and Jyotisha.—Auxiliaries—the parts of these, in the shape of Verbal Roots, etc. including the Commentaries, etc. of these.

The ‘artha’ of these is what is contained in them.

Of this ‘artha’, ‘contents’, of the said works,—no knowledge is provided by the words of Buddha and other Teachers. That is, no words of the Buddha are found to expound what is contained in the Veda, etc. As a matter of fact, no such Person is found who has composed a Scripture that provides the knowledge of all things; the reason for this being that the various scriptures are found to deal with different subjects.—(3146)

It might be argued that—when it is found that the Teachings of Buddha deal with a few things, it is inferred that He knows those things also which have not been taught by him, from the perceived fact that He is possessed of the requisite capacity; hence the said objection (annulment by Inference) against the Mīmāṃsaka’s proposition still remains.

This is anticipated and answered in the following:—
TEXT (3147).

"If it be held that things not spoken of in their treatises were known to the Teachers,—then all poets, by the composing of their poems, might be regarded as omniscient."—(3147)

COMMENTARY.

If it be held, on the strength of Inference, that—"even when a certain thing is not mentioned in the works composed by the Teachers, it must have been known to them",—then those poets also who have composed works relating to stories created by their own imagination, could be assumed to be omniscient, on the ground of their powers of perception; there being no difference between the two cases.

Thus the Reason (of the Buddhist) becomes 'Inconclusive'.—(3147)

The following might be urged—In the case of Buddha, the Teachings are found to be related to supersensuous things; not so the works of poets; hence the knowledge of all such things is inferred only in the case of Buddha, not in that of others. If it were not so, the person who does not possess the knowledge of all supersensuous things could not have the knowledge of even some of these things; as there would be no difference between the two cases. Consequently the addition of the qualification—'being a person knowing supersensuous things' would prevent the Reason applying to the case of Poets and hence from 'Falsity' (Inconclusiveness).

The Mīmāṃsaka's answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3148).

"When there are many omniscient persons, preaching mutually contradictory doctrines,—the grounds of reliability being the same in all,—which one of these should be accepted as reliable?"—(3148)

COMMENTARY.

There are many Teachers,—Buddha, Kapila, Kanāda, Gautama and so forth,—who are regarded by their respective devotees as omniscient; and each one of these is sought to be proved to be omniscient;—which one of them is to be definitely recognised as reliable? The ground of omniscience, in the shape of having taught doctrines relating to supersensuous things, is equally present in all of them.—It cannot be right to regard them all as omniscient; because what is taught by them is mutually contradictory. When several persons propound teachings contrary to each other, they cannot all be regarded as knowing the truth; as the truth regarding any particular thing can be one only; hence it cannot admit of mutually contradictory properties.—(3148)
If it be said that—Buddha is the only one to be accepted as such—then the Mimāmsaka's answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (3149).

"If Buddha is omniscient, then what is the proof for Kapila
not being so.—If both are omniscient, then how is it
that there is difference of opinion between
them?"—(3149)

COMMENTARY.

It might be said that both are omniscient;—in view of this, it is added—
"If both, etc. etc."—(3149)

The following might be urged—When the Word of any one has been found
to be true to facts,—it is that same person in regard to whom it is inferred
that his words relating to all things would be in keeping with reality.
The Mimāmsaka's answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (3150).

"In the matter of one matter, of Arithmetic for instance,—
all beings—Jina, Buddha and others,—are found to be
truthful; and no distinction is found among
them."—(3150)

COMMENTARY.

The words of all men,—Jina, Buddha and others,—are found, in the
one matter of Arithmetic,—to be true, quite in keeping with the real
state of things; in fact, when people speak of a lot of things, it is not possible
that not one should be true; as has been declared in the following words—
'When a man talks a lot, it cannot be that not a single word is true'.—
Thus then, the reason being equally present in all cases, no difference can
be recognised among men, and all should be regarded as omniscient.—This
however cannot be true, because they have propounded mutually con-
tradictory teachings,—as already pointed out above.—(3150)

It might be argued that—When, in regard to a person it is found that,
on being scrutinised by all Means of Cognition, what he has said cannot be
gainsaid,—then that person alone can be regarded as omniscient.
The answer to this is as follows:
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TEXTS (3151–3153).

"That same reason, by which the omniscience of one Person is proved, merely on account of your love for your own view of things,—is found to be present in other Persons also;
—The objections also that the Buddhists, with great zeal, urge against the arguments in proof of the omniscience of Jīna, are also urged by the Jainas (against the other party).—Under the circumstances, how can any definite conclusion be arrived at through such reasonings and Counter-reasonings, which are uncertain and swallowed by their own reflections?"—(3151–3153)

COMMENTARY.

There is a certain reasoning adduced by the Buddhists in support of the omniscience of Buddha;—in this form—'Buddha must be regarded as a person who directly knew the true nature of all things,—because he has taught things unheard of, uninferred and in conformity with the real state of things,—just like the ordinary man who has seen water and talks about it'. This same reasoning is put forward by the Digambara Jainas for proving the omniscience of Jīna.—So that the matter remains as doubtful as before.—Again, when the Jainas has put forward his reasoning in support of the omniscience of Jīna,—the Buddhists put forward objections against it,—in the form—'The teachings of Jīna, in regard to Syādvāda and other doctrines being impossible, he cannot be regarded as omniscient'; these same are urged by the Jainas when the Buddhist adduces his reasoning in support of the omniscience of Buddha,—the Jaina's counter-reasoning being—'Buddha cannot be regarded as omniscient because his teachings regarding the Perpetual Flux, etc. are impossible'.

In this way this becomes a case like that of Reflection and Counter-reflection: When the reflected object is there, its reflection appears; in the same way when the Reasonings and Counter-reasonings have been put forth, reasonings and counter-reasonings to the contrary come forward. These reasonings and counter-reasonings thus being always uncertain,—they are swallowed by their own reflections; how then can there be any definite conclusion regarding the omniscience of any Person?—(3151–3153)

The following might be urged that—That person alone may be regarded as omniscient in whose case no objection can be urged to the contrary.

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (3154).

"In this way pseudo-omniscient persons having been beaten off by each other, the few that remain shall be beaten off by the Upholder of the Veda."—(3154)

COMMENTARY.

The Mimāmsaka asserts his own superiority in the following:

TEXTS (3155-3156).

"Any herb that has been touched by the teeth of the mongoose removes the poison of all serpents, even when applied in play (carelessly); in the same way any stray secular and spiritual argument proceeding from the mouth of the Vedic scholar will destroy the poison of all serpent-like Buddhists and others."—(3155-3156)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—What is this 'stray argument'?

Answer:—

TEXTS (3157-3158)

"Who can (reasonably) assume (accept) the existence of a Person (omniscient) who can be rejected by such Reasons as—'being knowable', 'being cognisable', 'being an entity', 'being existent' and so forth? The man who assumes the existence of an omniscient Person knowing all things through a single means of cognition may certainly apprehend all such things as Taste, Odour, etc. through the eyes alone."—(3157-3158)

COMMENTARY.

When several such Reasons as 'being knowable' and the rest,—which are free from such defects as 'being equally co-existent with the Probandum and the absence of the Probandum'—are available for refuting the idea of the Omniscient Person,—such a person must be an utter impossibility; and cannot be accepted by any sane person.

For instance, the following reasoning may be set forth—'Buddha cannot be omniscient, because he is knowable, cognisable, an entity, existent, a speaker, a person and so forth,—like any common man on the road.' These Reasons could not be regarded as 'Inconclusive'. Because a man is
called 'omniscient' because he knows all things; this knowledge of all things could be either through Sense-perception or through Mental Perception. —It cannot be through Sense-perception; because the scope of such Perception is limited and it cannot envisage all things; this reasoning may be thus formulated —Perceptions through the eye and other Sense-organs are restricted in their scope, because they are produced by the Sense-organs which are always restricted in their scope; that is why in ordinary life, they are never found to go beyond the bounds of those limitations; consequently the apprehension of all things through these is an impossibility. Otherwise there would be no need for more than one sense-organ; and the result of this would be that all such divergent things as Taste, Odour, etc. would become apprehended by means of a single Cognition! The Buddhist who makes such an astounding assumption,—as is clear from his assertion that "By one He knows all, by one He sees everything",—could apprehend all such divergent things as Taste, Odour, etc.; through the one Perception proceeding from the eye alone!

No such assertion can be made; for if it were so, then there would be the apprehension of several things through a single Cognition at one and the same time. It could be possible only through several Cognitions; because there cannot be several Cognitions at one and the same time. Even if it were possible, there could be no apprehension of all things; because the mind of another person cannot be envisaged by the Sense-perception of any man; nor is it possible for him to apprehend, by its means, things beyond the reach, of the senses,—such as those that are remote or too small or hidden and so forth.—(3157-3158)

The following might be urged—Though it is true that at present the perceptions derived from the Eye and other sense-organs do not apprehend diverse and heterogeneous things,—yet it is possible that at some time in the past, such apprehension of divergent heterogeneous things did appear in a certain Person.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3159).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE PERCEPTION OF CERTAIN THINGS THROUGH CERTAIN CAUSES IN THE PAST WAS EXACTLY AS IT IS FOUND TO APPEAR AT THE PRESENT TIME."—(3159)

COMMENTARY.

The nature of things is always determined by the exact concomitance of definite causes, not haphazard. If it were not so, then all characters could be attributed to all things; and if such were the case, then how could it ever be possible for the nature determined by causes to be otherwise? That is to say, it is not possible for the Smoke,—which has its existence concomitant with Fire—to be produced from anything else.
Nor can the view be accepted that the apprehension of all things comes about through Mental Perception,—[the second alternative put forward in the commentary on 3157-3158, on p. 1405, line 2].—Because, though Mental Perception may envisage all things,—yet it has no independent operation of its own towards the apprehension of things; if it had, then there would be no deaf or blind persons. It is then dependent upon something else; and as a matter of fact it is found that it envisages only those things that have been apprehended by Perception through the Senses; so that there can be no apprehension by Mental Perception of anything that has not been envisaged by Sense-perception,—such things, for instance, as are remote, small, hidden, and the mind of another person and so forth.—(3159)

The following might be urged—Through Practice and other causes, it is found that the powers of intelligence and other faculties vary with each Person; and from this is deduced the possibility of a Person in whom these powers have reached the highest stage of perfection [and such a person would be omniscient].

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3160-3161).

"Those persons who have been found to be superior to others are so only on account of intelligence, memory and strength,—which vary slightly with varying persons,—and not on account of the capacity to perceive super-sensuous things.—Even the intelligent man who is capable of perceiving subtle things is superior to other persons, without going beyond the limitations of his own kind."—(3160-3161)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, however much he has practised, no one has been found to become capable of perceiving things beyond the reach of the senses. For instance, a man, even though exceptionally intelligent, and capable of apprehending things that can be apprehended only by keen intelligence,—is never found to transcend the limitations of his own species,—i.e. the human weakness, in the shape of the absence of abnormal vision and the like,—and he is never found to be endowed with such abnormal vision, etc. Consequently there is no justification for any such assertion as the following which has been loudly proclaimed by Buddhists—'He sees with abnormal eyes, pure and transcending beyond the limitations of man, beings entering into excellent states and even inferior states, etc. etc.'—(3160-3161)
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Granting that all Intelligences become superior by practice and exercise—even so, they become superior without transcending their inherent limitations.—This is what is pointed out in the following:

TEXTS (3162-3163).

"As a matter of fact, in the matter of the auditory perception of sounds, superiority among men is found in the apprehending of distant and subtle sounds,—not in the apprehending of colour and other things. Similarly in the matter of visual perception, what is brought about by the attainment of superiority is the perception of remote and subtle colour,—not the perception of sound and other things."

(3162-3163)

COMMENTARY.

'The apprehensions'—Cognitions—'of distant and subtle sounds';—the Instrumental ending connotes 'Indication'. In some places, the reading is 'upalabdhitah', in the Ablative; connoting 'reason'; the 'tasi' at the end coming under the rule 'Vidhāyaḍi, etc.'

'The apprehension of sound, etc.'—is not brought about by the Eyes.—

(3162-3163)

Hitherto it has been shown that Sense-perception cannot transcend its limitations; it is now going to be shown that in the case of Mental Cognition also, the superiority that is perceptible does not go beyond the range of the subject of repeated experience:

TEXT (3164).

"Similarly great superiority is often found in men, in the matter of scientific discussions; but that alone does not prove that the man is an expert in all sciences."—(3164)

COMMENTARY.

The same idea is further clarified:
TEXTS (3165–3167).

"When one has learnt Grammar, his intelligence goes very far in the matter of correct and incorrect forms of words; but not in the matter of the determination of stars, dates, eclipses and such subjects.—Similarly, the Astronomer, though superior in the matter of the knowledge of the Moon, the Sun, Eclipses and so forth, is incapable of determining the correctness of such words as 'bhavati' and the like.—Again a man, very superior in his knowledge of the Veda, History and such subjects, is unable to visualise such matters as Creation, Deity, and Apūrva."—(3165–3167)

COMMENTARY.

'Astronomer'—one who knows the science of the stars.
'Védātihāsa, etc.'—The compound is to be expounded as meaning—'one who has the superiority relating to his knowledge of the Veda, etc.'
'Apūrva'—stands for Dharma and Adharma (Merit and Demerit).—(3165–3167)

Further, even when the superiority transcends the limitations of its subject, it does not reach its highest point; it is found to proceed only up to a certain point.—This is pointed out in the following:

TEXT (3168).

"The man, who can jump into the sky to the height of 15 feet, can never jump to the height of eight miles,—however much he may practise jumping."—(3168)

COMMENTARY.

For example, it may so happen that men who, by reason of the accumulation of fat, are unable to jump to the height of even two feet, succeed in reducing their fat by means of exercise and become capable of jumping to the height of 15 feet; but even so, though they may carry on the exercise hundreds of times, they can never jump to the height of 8 miles in the sky. —(3168)

In the following Text, the Mināmsaka sums up his position:
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TEXT (3169).

"THUS THEN, EVEN WHEN THE SUPERIORITY OF KNOWLEDGE PROCEEDS VERY FAR, IT CAN COMPREHEND ONLY A LITTLE MORE THAN OTHERS,—IT CAN NEVER COMPREHEND THINGS BEYOND THE SENSES."—(3169)

COMMENTARY.

‘Atishayajñāna’—superiority of knowledge.—The compounding is according to the rule ‘Triṣṭyā, etc.’—The Instrumental Ending connotes instrumentality.—(3169)

The same idea is further clarified :

TEXTS (3170-3171).

"WHILE THE MAN IS SEATED IN A HUT, THE SENSE-PERCEPTION THAT HE HAS HAS ITS RANGE RESTRICTED WITHIN THAT HUT, IT DOES NOT EXTEND INTO ANOTHER HUT. THOSE THINGS AGAIN WHICH ARE SEPARATED FROM ONE ANOTHER BY INTERVENING LANDS, HILLS AND OCEANS, COUNTRIES, CONTINENTS AND ISLANDS,—WHO CAN PERCEIVE ALL THESE WHEN SEATED IN ONE PLACE ?"—(3170-3171)

COMMENTARY.

‘Varṣa’, ‘Continent’—a particular region of the world; e.g. the region of Bhārata is called ‘Bhārata-varṣa’.—(3170-3171)

In the following Text, the Mīmāṃsaka shows that his view is supported by others also :

TEXTS (3172-3173).

"WHEN Nala AND Rtuparṇa,—WHO WERE EXPERTS IN MATTERS RELATING TO HORSES AND TO GAMBLING, RESPECTIVELY—WERE GOING TOGETHER IN THE CHARIOT, Rtuparṇa MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT—‘ALL MEN DO NOT KNOW ALL THINGS,—NO ONE CAN BE OMNISCIENT,—THERE IS NO END TO KNOWLEDGE, RESTING IN ANY ONE MAN.’"—(3172-3173)

COMMENTARY.

‘Samvāha’—chariot.

The following story has been told—There was a King named Nala; not being expert in the art of Gambling, he lost his entire kingdom at Gambling;
he had a queen named Damayantī. The King, having lost his entire kingdom, went away into the forest, accompanied by the said Queen alone. When he reached the forest, he became separated from her, through ill-luck. Having his face clouded with tears due to separation from his beloved wife, the King drowned in the ocean of grief and anxiety,—his body emaciated,—went about wandering hither and thither; and (in brief) somehow managed to secure a living under King R̄tuparna, and remained there incognito. His Queen somehow reached her father’s place. In order to fetch her husband, she proclaimed it far and wide that Damayantī was going to choose a husband. When King R̄tuparna heard that Damayantī was going to choose a husband, he started to go there, accompanied by Nala as his charioteer. R̄tuparna was an expert in the art of Gambling, but did not know much about horses; while Nala was an expert in matters relating to Horses, but did not know much about Gambling. R̄tuparna somehow came to know that Nala was an expert in matters relating to Horses. Having come to know this, he said to Nala—‘Please teach me the science of Horses’.—Nala said—‘I shall teach it to you, if you will teach me the art of Gambling’.—Thereupon R̄tuparna said—‘All men do not know all things, etc. etc.’—Then Nala learnt the art of Gambling from R̄tuparna, and won back his kingdom.

Such is the story.—(3172-3173)

Further, if a man is omniscient, he must know the past and future things also; otherwise, if he knew only what came up at the moment, then he would be only a partial knower, not all-knowing (omniscient); and yet it is not possible for any one to know future things.—This is what is pointed out in the following:

TEXT (3174).

"S T E N C E - P E R C E P T I O N H A S N E V E R BEEN FOUND TO POSSESS THE CAPACITY TO APPREHEND FUTURE THINGS; AND AS FOR INFFERENCE AND OTHER FORMS OF COGNITION, THESE CAN NEVER COME ABOUT WITHOUT THE INDICATIVE AND OTHER FACTORS.”—(3174)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Sense-perception is brought about by the capacity of things; and as what is still in the future cannot be an entity, a thing,—Sense-perception cannot apply to it.

Nor can Inference apply to it; because there can be no Inferential Indicative; there can be no Indicative which is known to be concomitant with what is in the future; because what has not yet appeared is non-existent. ‘Other factors’ include the Corroborative Instance.

The mention of the Future is only by way of illustration; what has been said should be taken as applicable to the Past also; because, the past thing also being a non-entity, there can be no functioning of Sense-perception over it.

Thus the invariable concomitance (Premiss) relating to the Reasons—‘being cognisable’ and the rest (put forward under Text 3157)—becomes
established; and this implies the establishment of the Invariable Concomitance of the previously-mentioned Reason—'being envisaged by the only Means of Cognition, Non-apprehension'.—(3174)

Having thus established the Invariable Concomitance of his Reason, the Mīmāṃsaka sums up his position:

TEXT (3175).

"THUS THEN, THERE CAN BE NO ONE WHO PERCEIVES THINGS BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES; HE ALONE KNOWS SUCH THINGS WHO KNOWS THEM THROUGH THE ETERNAL WORD."—(3175)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—It is not through the Eternal Word alone that all men know things; for instance, Shakya-Muni (Buddha) knows things from the words of sages like Kanaka, Kāśyapa and the like; and others know them from His words.

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (3176-3177).

"IF SOME ONE, NOT ACCEPTING THE ABOVE, THINKS THAT IN THE CASE OF Buddha AND OTHERS THE KNOWLEDGE OF SUPER-SENSUOUS THINGS HAS BEEN DERIVED FROM THE WORDS OF OTHER MEN,—THEN, HE SHOULD ASSERT THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE WORDS OF THOSE OTHER MEN, ON THE GROUND OF THEIR STANDING ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THOSE WORDS (OF Buddha);—AND THE UNRELIABILITY OF THIS LATTER SHOULD BE ASSERTED ON THE BASIS OF THE REASONS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED.”—(3176-3177)

COMMENTARY.

'This'—what has been just said,—'He alone knows such things who knows them through the Eternal Word';—one who does not accept this and thinks that the Buddhist and others do not know all things through the Eternal Word, but through the word uttered by other Persons; e.g. Buddha knows them through the scriptures composed by other persons, like Kanaka, Kāśyapa and others;—one who makes this assertion should assert the unreliability of those words—i.e. of the words of those other persons; because they stand on the same footing as the words of the person who has been seen by one and who is held to be omniscient.—He should also assert the unreliability of the man,—the composer of the scripture himself,—why?
—because of the Reasons adduced before—such as ‘being cognisable’ and the rest.—(3176-3177)

Says the Opponent—The line of Buddhas has been without beginning; hence the doctrine propounded by them is also beginningless; so that on account of the beginninglessness of both these being exactly like that of the Veda and the Vedic Tradition,—they must be regarded as free from defects.

The answer to this from the Mīmāṃsāka is as follows:—

TEXT (3178).

"The beginninglessness that is asserted in regard to the Composer and the utterances emanating from him is itself based upon two invalid notions; hence it cannot prove the reliability of the said Composer and his words."—(3178)

COMMENTARY.

The same idea is further explained:—

TEXT (3179).

"The words of Shawaddhodani (Buddha) cannot be reliable, because they are dependent upon others; so also Buddha himself cannot be reliable because he has no direct knowledge of Dharma."—(3179)

COMMENTARY.

Just as Buddha himself and his words are unreliable, so also are Kanaka, Kāshyapa, etc. and their words.—(3179)

TEXT (3180).

"The beginninglessness of such persons, even though assumed, rests upon what is invalid, and hence cannot itself be far removed from invalidity."—(3180)

COMMENTARY.

The beginninglessness of such persons and their words,—even though assumed,—is not very far from Invalidity; because it rests upon an invalid basis.—(3180)
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TEXTS (3181-3182).

"THUS THEN, WHEN THE BUDDHISTS, LIKE Pseudo-Mimāmsakas, ASSERT THE SIMILARITY OF BUDDHA AND OTHER PERSONS TO VEDIC SCHOLARS, ON THE GROUND OF ALL THESE BEING WITHOUT BEGINNING,—THIS IS ONLY A FORM OF IGNORANCE, AND DOES NOT MAKE THEM EQUAL; BECAUSE EVEN SO, WHAT WOULD BE WITHOUT BEGINNING WOULD BE ONLY THE UNRELIABILITY AND RELIABILITY OF THESE TWO SETS OF PERSONS (BUDDHA, ETC. AND VEDIC SCHOLARS) RESPECTIVELY."

—(3181-3182)

COMMENTARY.

If the similarity that is pointed out between Buddha and others on the one hand and the Vedic Scholars on the other, is in regard to both being beginningless,—then our answer is that mere beginninglessness does not establish their reliability; because neither reliability nor unreliability is incompatible with beginninglessness; all that would happen would be that beginninglessness would belong to the Reliability of Vedic Scholars, while it would belong to the Unreliability of Buddha and others; and neither Reliability nor Unreliability would belong to both, on the ground of beginninglessness.—This is the upshot of the whole argument.—(3181-3182)

This same idea is further clarified by means of an example:—

TEXTS (3183-3184).

"THE GOOD POINTS OF WHAT IS RELIABLE, AND THE BAD POINTS OF WHAT IS UNRELIABLE,—BOTH BEING BEGINNINGLESS,—ARE EQUAL ONLY IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE BEGINNINGLESS. FOR INSTANCE, REAL GOLD HAS BEEN IN USE SINCE TIME WITHOUT BEGINNING AND END,—SO HAS BEEN UNREAL GOLD ALSO; BUT DO THE TWO BECOME EQUAL?"—(3183-3184)

COMMENTARY.

"Pramāṇa, etc.'—The compound is to be expounded as—‘the good and bad points of what is Reliable and what is Unreliable’.—(3183-3184)

Now the Vedic Scholar proceeds—(1) to refute the objection that "the Reason, in the shape of being amenable to non-apprehension, is inadmissible", —(2) to prove the non-existence of the omniscient Person,—and (3) to prove that the case of the Veda is different:—
TEXT (3185).

"For the benefit of those people who declare (1) the Omniscience of Buddha and others, and (2) the Eternality of the Veda, as standing on the same footing,—the point wherein the latter differs from the former is now going to be pointed out."—(3185)

COMMENTARY.

'Declare as standing on the same footing.'—Some people hold the opinion that—"Both—Buddha, etc. and the Veda—are equal sources of right knowledge, hence the knowledge of supersensuous things can be obtained from the words of Omniscient Persons, as also from the Veda."—To these people it is now pointed out wherein the case of the Veda differs from that of the said Persons.—(3185)

"As a matter of fact, the existence of the Omniscient Person has not been vouched for by any one of the five Means of Cognition—Perception, Inference, Word, Analogy, Presumption;—how then can such a Person, who falls within the scope of 'Negation' (Non-apprehension only) and is non-existent, stand on the same footing as the Veda which is known to all men down even to the milk-woman?—With this idea, the Vedic Scholar proceeds to refute the idea of the Omniscient Person being cognisable by any one of the five Means of Cognition, Perception and the rest:—

TEXT (3186).

"The Omniscient Person is not seen by us at the present time;—nor is there any Indicative recognised as part of the subject, which could lead to his Inference."—(3186)

COMMENTARY.

"By means of Perception we, men of limited vision, do not see the Omniscient Person; because the perception of men of limited vision is of three kinds:—(1) Perception through the Senses, (2) Perception through the Mind, and (3) the Self-Cognition of all minds and mental phenomena.—None of these three kinds of Perception can bring about the Cognition of the Omniscient Person; because He does not form an object of such Cognition; (1) Perception through the senses is restricted to the five objects—Colour, Odour, Taste, Touch and Sound; hence the mental functions subsisting in the 'chain' of other persons cannot figure in Perception through the Senses.—(2) Nor can the Omniscient Person be the object of Perception through the Mind; because the Mind, as such, apprehends only such things as have been already apprehended by Perception through the Senses; and hence it is, like this latter, restricted to the same objects, Colour and the rest.—(3) Nor can He be the object of 'Self-cognition'; because this apprehends only such mind and mental operations as occur in one's own 'Chain'; and
consequently, it cannot apprehend the mind, etc. occurring in other ‘Chains’, or even such mental operations occurring in one’s own ‘Chain’ as are yet to come. As regards the Perception by Mystics,—such perception forms the subject-matter of dispute; hence the question regarding the Omniscient Person being perceived or not perceived by Mystics does not arise at all.

(2) “Nor can the Omniscient Person be proved by means of Inference. The Buddhists have regarded Inference as based upon three kinds of Indicative (Probans)—[viz.:—(a) Based on non-apprehension, (b) Based on causal relation, and (c) Based on the nature of things]. (a) In the present instance, what is needed is a positive reason, hence there is no room for non-apprehension.—(b) Nor is there room for causal relation; because the causal relation is always based upon Perception, and no Perception is possible of the far off Omniscient Person; whose causal relation with anything therefore is impossible.—(c) As for the nature of things, any Reason based upon that also cannot prove the existence of the Omniscient Person; because such a Person himself being imperceptible, his nature, which must be inseparable from himself, cannot be apprehended; hence it cannot serve as an Indicative which is ‘perceived’—well-known, recognised,—as ‘being part’—of the ‘Subject’ (Omniscient Person),—leading to the inference of the Omniscient Person.

Then again, any Reason that may be adduced in proof of the existence of the Omniscient Person, cannot escape from the three kinds of flaw (fallacy) —being ‘inadmissible’, ‘contradictory’ and ‘inconclusive’. For instance, when the Reason is adduced, is it adduced as a property belonging to a positive entity? Or to a negative entity? Or to both?—These are the only three alternatives possible.—As regards the Omniscient Person, there can be no such ‘Property belonging to a positive entity’ as is admitted by both parties; because that positive entity itself (in the shape of the Omniscient Person) is yet to be proved;—if he were admitted, there would be no dispute at all; if a party accepts the idea of such a property belonging to that entity, how could he not accept the entity itself? Because the mere property cannot exist without its substratum in the shape of the entity.—Nor can the Reason proving the Omniscient Person consist of a property belonging to a negative entity; because such a Reason would prove the non-existence of the entity, and hence it would be ‘contradictory’.—Nor, lastly, can the Reason be one that belongs to both; because such a Reason would be ‘inconclusive’. How could any Reason which belongs to both positive and negative entities serve as proving the existence of an entity,—which it could do only if it were inseparable from the entity, and if it were excluded from existence in the Negative Entity, which is present in cases where the contrary of the Probandum is present?

Thus none of the three kinds of Indicative, as part of the ‘Subject’, can bring about the Inference of the Omniscient Person, whose existence, therefore, cannot be proved.—(3186)

The following Text shows that the Omniscient Person cannot be cognised by means of the Word:
“There is no scriptural declaration affirming an eternal Omniscient Person. How can any such Person be proved by a declaration that is artificial and not true?”—(3187)

COMMENTARY.

That Cognition is ‘verbal’ which proceeds from Words, in regard to things not in close proximity to the man. It is of two kinds—that produced by the eternal Word, and that produced by the utterances of men. As asserting the existence of the Omniscient Person, there is no eternal scriptural Word; hence the former verbal Cognition is not possible in this case.—What we read in the Upaniṣād regarding ‘Him who is truthful in word, truthful in volition, truthful in desires—He should be sought after, He should be sought to be known’, and so forth,—all this should be understood to be merely commendatory.

As regards the human assertion that is quoted, such as—‘The Blessed Lord the Tathāgata, the Arhat, is Truly Enlightened, etc.’,—no reliability can attach to such assertions. How then could any reliable information be deduced from such an unreliable source?—(3187)

The following might be urged—We do not accept the Omniscient Person on the strength of any and every stray assertion; we do so on the strength of the assertions of that same Blessed Lord, such as—‘I am omniscient, perceiving all things, there is nothing that is unknown to the Tathāgata, etc. etc.’. Thus it is on His own word that we accept His omniscience.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3188).

“If the Omniscient Person is recognised as such on the strength of His own word,—how could this be regarded as established, in view of the mutual interdependence of both?”—(3188)

COMMENTSARY.

Under the circumstances, there would be an objectionable interdependence.—(3188)

Question:—How so?
Answer:—
EXAMINATION OF THE 'PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1417

TEXT (3189).

"The assertion is true because it has been made by the Omniscient Person, and such an Omniscient Person exists because he asserts it. How can both these notions be established without some other well-known basis?"—(3189)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, there can be no certainty regarding the reliability of his word unless it is recognised that it has been spoken by an Omniscient Person; and that the speaker is omniscient is learnt from his own words; hence there is clear interdependence.

'Without some other well-known basis'—i.e. some other well-known reason.—(3189)

The following might be urged—The existence of the Omniscient Person is accepted on the basis of the words of such men as Shrāvaka-Achchhāriputra (?), who says—'This worthy scion of the Śākya-race is omniscient'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3190).

"When people admit of the Omniscient Person on the basis of the baseless assertions of persons who are not omniscient, why cannot they derive the same knowledge from their own words?"—(3190)

COMMENTARY.

The assertion of men whose reliability has not been demonstrated does not differ from one's own assertion; hence there is no reason why the Buddhists should not derive their knowledge of the Omniscient Person from their own words. We see no reason—except stupidity—why they should seek to know it from the words of other persons.—(3190)

The following view might be held—There have been innumerable Tathāgatas (Enlightened Ones) in the past and they are going to appear in the future; and it is from the words of one of these that we derive the knowledge of the omniscience of the other; and that of the omniscience of the former from the words of a third, and so forth.

The answer to this is as follows:—
"For the proving of the existence of one Omniscient Person, it would be necessary to assume several Omniscient Persons; and if a single one of these happen to be not-omnis-
cient, he would not be able to recognise the Omniscient Person."—(3191)

COMMENTARY.

If for the purpose of proving the existence of one Omniscient Person, one goes on following up a series of Omniscient Persons, no man with limited vision could ever get at certainty regarding the Omniscient Person,—even at the end of his whole life; hence several Omniscient Persons would have to be assumed. [See Shlokavārtika 1. 1. 2, 135.]—(3191)

Then again, we shall lay aside, for the present, the idea that people of the present day are incapable of knowing the Omniscient Person as no such is present before them; as a matter of fact, even people who lived at the same time as that Person could not know him, because they would themselves be not-omniscient.—This is what is pointed out in the following:

TEXTS (3192-3193).

"As a matter of fact, even the contemporaries of the Omniscient Person could not know him as ‘omniscient’, as they would be devoid of the knowledge of the Cognitions of that Person [or, of the knowledge of the things cognised by that Person].—[See Shlokavārtika 1. 1. 2, 134]. And if the Omniscient Person is not recognised by any one,—for that man, the assertion of that Omniscient Person could not be reliable; as the very basis of that assertion would be unknown,—as in the case of the assertion of other ordinary men."

[See Shlokavārtika 1. 1. 2, 136.]—(3192-3193)

COMMENTARY.

The compound ‘tajñānajñēya, etc. etc.’ is to be expounded as—‘they are devoid of—without—that Cognition which has for its object—i.e. which envisages—the Cognitions of the Omniscient Person’.—Or as ‘who are devoid of the Cognition of all the things cognised by that Person’,—because he is himself not omniscient.

By merely looking at the body, one does not conclude that ‘he is omniscient’; because such conclusion must be accompanied by the recognition of the presence of exceptional knowledge (in the Person); this ‘exceptional knowledge’, in order to be able to prove omniscience, must envisage all
things; and this fact of the Cognition envisaging all things cannot be recognised unless the things comprehended by that Cognition are known; for instance, the Cognition of the 'man with the stick' is not possible unless one knows the stick.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When the Cognition of one thing forms the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of another thing, there can be no Cognition of the latter thing without the Cognition of the former thing;—e.g. the Cognition of the stick being the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of the man with the stick, there is no Cognition of the man with the stick unless there is Cognition of the stick;—the Cognition of things cognised by the Omniscient Person, which is the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person himself, is not possible for men of limited vision; hence there is non-apprehension of the more-extensive character (which implies the absence of the less extensive); because the Cognition of the necessary adjunct is more extensive (wider) than the Cognition of that to which the said adjunct belongs; and the former is absent in the case in question.

Thus then, even in the case of a man contemporaneous with the Omniscient Person, unless such a man is himself omniscient, he cannot know the Omniscient Person; so that for such a man, even the assertions of Omniscient Persons would be of doubtful veracity and hence unreliable; as the basis of it—the grounds of certainty regarding reliability, in the shape of the definite cognition of the Cognitions of the Omniscient Person,—would be absent.

'As in the case of the assertion of ordinary men'—i.e. of the assertion of common people.—(3192-3193)

The following view might be put forward:—Without any effort the Omniscient Person makes his omniscience known to his disciples by attracting their minds through His unfailing knowledge of their character and the workings of their mind.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3194-3195).

"Even if a person were to comprehend the things known to all his disciples, he would not be 'omniscient'; as he would be devoid of the comprehension of the things known to people other than those disciples.—Nor is it possible to comprehend all the things cognised by all men; as there can be no coming together of men of the past, present and future, inhabiting all the three Regions of the World."—(3194-3195)

COMMENTARY.

Even if the man who knew only those things that were known to the people contemporaneous with, and in close proximity to, himself,—he could
not be 'omniscient'; as he would have no knowledge of things known to persons other than those, who may be contemporaneous with him, but not in close proximity to him. By knowing only a part, one does not know the whole; if he did, there would be an absurdity.

As a matter of fact, it is not possible to comprehend even all those things that may be known to all his contemporaries who may be in close proximity to him. Because there can be no comprehension of what is far off and what is known to people having no connection with him.

The following might be urged—It may be that all men approach the Tathāgata simultaneously,—and whatever questions they put, He answers them all,—so that the people do come to know what is known to that Omniscient Person.

The answer to this is that—'there can be no coming together, etc. etc.'—nowhere is it possible to bring together men of the past, present and future,—or those inhabiting the regions of Heaven, the Nether World and the World of Mortal Beings.

Or, the three 'regions' may be taken as standing for the 'Imaginary', 'Objective' and 'Subjective' Regions.—(3194-3195)

The following might be urged—if the Omniscient Person did not possess the power to know the things known to all men,—how could He have the power of comprehending even some of those things? And yet He did have the power to comprehend some of those things; hence we conclude that He did possess the power to know all things.

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXTS (3196-3198).**

"A man who knows little can delude a few men, to the extent that, having their mind deluded by devotion, they come to accept him as omniscient. Through the art of chiromancy, some people are able to know what has been eaten, what is being thought of, what lies within a man's fist and so forth,—though they are entirely devoid of any knowledge of Dharma and cognate matters. Similarly, people expert in the arts of illusion, magic, etc. deceive an ignorant man;—by which they appear to be omniscient."—(3196-3198)

**COMMENTARY.**

By knowing only a few supersensuous things, a man cannot be regarded as possessing knowledge of Dharma and Adharma;—because such a reasoning would be inconclusive in view of the case of men expert in chiromancy, magic and so forth. For instance, by the use of certain incantations and medicinal
herbs, people are found to comprehend rightly the food a man has eaten, the thing he has thought of in his mind, the thing lying in his closed fist; and yet merely by this, they do not become persons conversant with such things as Dharma and Adharma. For instance, some people who are expert in magic are able to show to people strange gardens, flying cars, celestial damsel, and heavenly beings in the sky. Hence in view of all this, the reason adduced must be rejected as 'Inconclusive'.—(3196–3198)

Says the Opponent—In the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, Brahmā and other Beings have been described as omniscient; as we read there of Brahmā's knowledge and dispassion being 'unobstructed'. How then can it be said that the existence of the Omniscient Person is not vouched for by the Scriptural Word?

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3199–3201).

"The description that we meet with in Itihāsas and Purāṇas of Brahmā being omniscient and of his knowledge and dispassion as untrammelled,—all this should be understood in the figurative sense,—like the commendatory declarations relating to Mantras.—Or, the 'untrammelled knowledge' that is spoken may be taken as referring to the knowledge of dharma and other matters relating to the particular context;—what is meant is that his knowledge of such things as 'Duty', 'Property', 'Pleasure' and 'Liberation', is 'untrammelled'; it cannot refer to all things."—(3199–3201)

COMMENTARY.

Just as, in regard to Vedic Mantras there are Commendatory Declarations, so in the Itihāsa and Purāṇa, the assertion of the omniscience of Brahmā and other Beings, should be taken as Commendatory Declarations. When a set of words directly expressing one thing is taken as expressing something else, it is called 'arthavāda', 'Figurative or Commendatory Declaration'.

Or the meaning may be that the knowledge of Brahmā is untrammelled so far as the things spoken of in the Itihāsa and Purāṇa are concerned,—such as Duty, Property, Pleasure and Liberation; and it does not refer to the knowledge of all things.—(3199–3201)

Question:—If the knowledge of Brahmā relating to other things were 'trammelled' (obstructed),—then how could it be called 'untrammelled'?

Answer:—
TEXT (3202).

"Being untrammelled does not mean that it envisages all things; it may be called 'untrammelled' when it is so only in relation to its own particular object."—(3202)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—If that is so, then so far as the particular object of a Cognition is concerned, the Cognition of all men is 'untrammelled'; what peculiarity then would there be in the Cognition of Brahmā that it alone should be specially called 'untrammelled'?

Answer:—

TEXTS (3203-3204).

"That is so because it is only the Cognition of Dharma, etc. that is fruitful; no useful purpose is served by the Cognition of such ordinary things as the Tree and the like.—Thus then, inasmuch as this whole fruitful Cognition is not obstructed, it is called 'untrammelled'."—(3203-3204)

COMMENTARY.

This is the explanation given:—As regards Dharma and other matters useful for man, it is the knowledge of Brahmā alone that is untrammelled,—not of others. That is the reason why the knowledge of Brahmā alone—not others,—has been called 'untrammelled', by reason of its not being obstructed in relation to its own objective.

'Aupayika-jñāna'—The knowledge of such useful matters as Dharma and the rest.

'Yāvat'—whole. This qualifies 'jñānam', 'knowledge'.—(3203-3204)

The following Text offers another explanation:—

TEXT (3205).

"Or, the knowledge spoken of may be that of his own 'self'—brought about by the practice of Meditation; as such knowledge would never be obstructed, it is spoken of as 'untrammelled'."—(3205)

COMMENTARY.

'Self'—Spirit.

'Tasya'—the knowledge of that same self.—(3205)
EXAMINATION OF THE 'PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1423

Question:—In connection with God, we read of 'ten imperishable qualities', in the shape of knowledge and the rest; and if He is equipped with these imperishable qualities, why cannot He be regarded as omniscient?

Answer:—

TEXT (3206).

"When Śaṅkara is spoken of as equipped with 'ten imperishable qualities' in the shape of Knowledge, Dispassion, Supreme Power and so forth,—He also is 'possessed of knowledge' only in the sense of knowing His own self."

—(3206)

COMMENTARY.

'Knowledge'—recognition of truth;—'Dispassion'—detachment from objects;—'Supreme Power'—of eight kinds, 'Smallness', 'Lightness', 'Greatness', 'Attainment', 'Capacity for Enjoyment', 'Power', 'Control', 'Freedom of Movement';—these ten qualities belong to God, in their imperishable form.

'Smallness'—is that quality by virtue of which having assumed a subtle body, one becomes capable of going to happy regions, being unseen by people.

'Lightness'—by virtue of which one moves about like Air.

'Greatness'—by virtue of which one is respected among all men, honoured and worshipped as the greatest of the great.

'Attainment'—by virtue of which one gets whatever he thinks of.

'Capacity for Enjoyment'—by virtue of which one, when having strong desires, is capable of satisfying them and enjoying things.

'Power'—by virtue of which one becomes the master of the Three Regions.

'Control'—by virtue of which one brings under his control all beings moveable and immoveable, and becomes master of them.

'Freedom of Movement'—by virtue of which one is able to live in all regions,—of Brahmā, of Prajāpatis, of Devas, of Gandharvas, of Yākṣas, of Rākṣasas, of Pitṛs, of Pīshāchas, of human beings, of lower animals and other places.

'Only in the sense of His knowing His own self'.—It is on account of knowing His own self that He is 'equipped with knowledge',—not because He knows all things.—(3206)

Question:—How is it that, though knowing only a part of things, Śaṅkara alone—and no one else—is spoken of as 'equipped with knowledge'?

Answer:—
TEXT (3207).

"His knowledge consists only in the direct perception of His pure Self; when the source of that knowledge is not pure, the knowledge itself is called 'Ignorance'." —(3207)

COMMENTARY.

'Pure' qualifies the 'Self'; —the perception of this.

'It's basis' —the basis of the perception of the pure self.—What is that basis?—The Self itself.—When this Self is not-pure, then the 'perception of the Self' that appears is called 'no knowledge', 'Ignorance'; because it is of a low order.—(3207)

Says the Opponent:—If you admit that it is possible for Brahmā and others to acquire pure knowledge through the practice of Meditation,—then, why should there be hostility towards Buddha and others,—by virtue of which the knowledge of these latter is not held to be 'untrammelled' and 'pure'? —In anticipation of this, the Vedic Scholar presents another view and thereby shows the difference between Brahmā and the others:—

TEXTS (3208-3209).

"It may be that Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Mahādeva are embodiments of the Veda, and as the Veda consists in the knowledge of all things, these are omniscient; but how could that apply to Man? Where, on one side are the mortal men, Buddha and the rest,—and where on the other, are the said three Superior Deities? Hence the idea that the former, in rivalry to the latter, are also omniscient,—is sheer delusion." —

(3208-3209)

COMMENTARY.

As the Veda forms their very self, they are called 'embodiments of the Veda'.

The Veda 'consists in the knowledge of all things' because it is the Means of obtaining the knowledge of all things.

What is meant is as follows:—

In the case of Brahmā, etc. also, the 'untrammelled knowledge' of Dharma, etc. does not come about independently; it comes only through the Veda.—This however you do not admit in the case of Buddha, etc., whose knowledge is held to be dependent upon themselves.—Further, in the case of Brahmā, etc.
it is only possible that there should be pure knowledge through the Practice of Meditation; because being Deities, they are superior to all Persons; and also because they are named in the Veda. In the case of a human being, on the other hand, there is no possibility of any such capacity; as his character is quite the reverse. Hence the idea that human beings also are omniscient is sheer delusion;—i.e. this is mere deluded fancy on your part.—(3208-3209)

The following might be urged—If Brahmā, etc. are named in the Veda, then, why should not the Veda be regarded as non-eternal, on account of its connection with non-eternal things? If the Vedas are held to be eternal, then the idea that Brahmā, etc. are spoken of in the eternal Veda is incongruous, as the said Brahmā, etc. are not-eternal. If there is no incongruity in this, then there can be no incongruity in Buddha, etc. also being mentioned in the Veda.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3210).

"There is mention of the three Deities, Brahmā, etc., in the Veda, which is eternal; and yet the eternity of the Vedas does not become impaired; because Brahmā and the rest are themselves eternal."

(3210)

COMMENTARY.

'Tannityatvā'—on account of the eternity of Brāhmā and the other Deities.—(3210)

The same idea is further clarified in the following—

TEXTS (3211-3212).

"They are equipped with eternal qualities and eternal functions; hence there is no incongruity in these being mentioned in the eternal Veda,—On the other hand, Buddha, etc. are perishable beings, hence it is not possible for them to be mentioned in the eternal scripture. And when the scripture is held to be eternal, the assuming of the Omniscient Person is entirely futile."—(3211-3212)

COMMENTARY.

'To be mentioned in the eternal scripture'—Because, if they were so capable, the relationship between the Word and its meaning would have to
be regarded as ephemeral, not-eternal; because the other party does not admit of an eternal scripture;—and because, if they did admit of it, the postulating of the Omniscient Person would be entirely futile.—(3211-3212)

The same idea is further explained:—

TEXTS (3213-3214).

"RATHER THAN ADMIT THE IDEA OF THE SCRIPTURE INDICATING THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, IT IS FAR BETTER TO ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT IT INDICATES Dharma. BECAUSE THE CLEAR KNOWLEDGE OF Dharma (DIRECTLY FROM THE VEDA) IS SUPERIOR TO THE UNCLEAR KNOWLEDGE DERIVED INDIRECTLY THROUGH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON MENTIONED IN THE VEDA.—THUS IT CANNOT BE MAINTAINED THAT THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS SPOKEN OF IN THE SCRIPTURES."—(3213-3214)

COMMENTARY.

Rather than entertain the idea that the Eternal Scripture mentions the Omniscient Person, it is better to accept the idea that Dharma is taught by that Scripture.

Question:—In what way is it better?

Answer:—'Because the clear knowledge, etc. etc.'—The knowledge of Dharma derived from the Veda is clear and direct; because the light emanating therefrom is equally available for all things. On the other hand, the Dharma learnt through the knowledge of the Omniscient Person mentioned in the Scripture is indirect and indistinct; because the said Person has retired into Nirvāṇa and cannot be clearly perceptible. Even when He had not retired into Nirvāṇa, He would have no desires, and hence could not impart any teachings. Even if He did impart teachings, these could not be heard by all men at all times and places.—(3213-3214)

The following Text shows that the Omniscient Person cannot be vouched for by 'Analogy':—

TEXT (3215).

"IF ANY PERSON SIMILAR TO THE OMNISCIENT PERSON WERE SEEN AT THE PRESENT TIME, THEN ALONE COULD THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON BE COGNISED ON THE STRENGTH OF ANALOGY."—(3215)

COMMENTARY.

Analogy, as a Means of Cognition—based upon similarity and its adjuncts,—envisages the far off things, and is invariably concomitant with the Cogni-
tation of a similar thing; for example, there is remembrance of the Cow through the perception of the Gavaya;—it is not possible for any one to perceive at the present time any person similar to the Omniscient Person;—hence, on account of the similar thing not being perceptible, Analogy cannot be operative in the case in question.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—When any object similar to an object is not perceptible, the latter cannot be amenable to Analogy,—e.g. the Son of the Barren Woman;—any person similar to the Omniscient Person is not perceptible;—so there is non-apprehension of the wider character.—(3215)

Further, it is not only that the knowledge of the Omniscient Person cannot be derived from Analogy; on the contrary, it would be right for all men to deduce, from Analogy, the fact that there can be no Omniscient Person.

This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (3216).

"Finding that all men of the present time are not Omniscient, —the certainty is derived from Analogy based upon this similarity, that all other men (of the past and the future) could not be Omniscient."—(3216)

COMMENTARY.

In order to show that the Omniscient Person cannot be known through Presumption, the Vaidika puts forward the view of the other party:—

TEXTS (3217-3218).

"Some one may accept the Omniscient Person on the following grounds: (A) The teachings of Buddha relating to Dharma and Adharma cannot be explained, if there be no Omniscient Person;—thus from Presumption, one can admit the Omniscient Person,—even though it has been shown that Perception and the other means of Cognition are not capable of affording the knowledge of the said Person."—(3217-3218)

COMMENTARY.

'The teachings of Buddha and others that are met with cannot be explained, except on the presumption of His omniscience;—i.e. if Dharma and all such things were not known to Him. Hence, even though Perception, etc. have been denied, as vouching for the existence of the Omniscient Person,
yet through Presumption it becomes established that the Omniscient Person does exist.

If any one holds this view, then he understands things wrongly. This is what is meant.—(3217-3218)

The following Texts show that the argument put forward just now may be regarded as Inference; it need not be taken as Presumption:—

TEXTS (3219–3221).

"' (B) Or, this Argument in support of the Existence of the Omniscient Person may be Stated in the Form of the Following Inference of the Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa Kind (Difference from the Universal to the Particular):—In every other case Teaching is found to be preceded by the Knowledge of the Thing taught, and wherever there is Teaching, it is always preceded by the Knowledge of the Subject taught; as in the case of the Potencies of Haritākī and such things;—the Teaching of Dharma and Adharma has been given by Buddha;—hence it is inferred that the Teaching must have been preceded by a Knowledge of Those Matters."—(3219–3221)

COMMENTARY.

The special mention of the 'Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa' Inference (from the Universal Premiss) implies the impossibility of the Particular Premiss; as a matter of fact, it is only when the relation between the particular Probans and the particular Subject has been perceived, that, at a later time, the same Probans is made to yield an Inference that sets aside all doubts on the point; and it is this Inference that is called 'Vishēṣatodṛṣṭa' (based on a particular Premiss). As a matter of fact, no relationship has been perceived between the Omniscient Person and the Teaching of Dharma, etc.; hence this can be an instance of Inference from a Universal Premiss only. For instance, it has been found as a universal truth that in any one 'chain', the Teaching is always preceded by knowledge; hence just as in the case of Dēvadatta, it having been found that his change of place is preceded by movement, so in the case of the sun, the change of place leads to the inference of its movement;—in the same manner, from the fact that Buddha imparted teachings relating to Dharma, it is inferred that He possessed the knowledge of Dharma.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—Every Teaching is preceded by the Teacher's knowledge of what is taught;—e.g. the teachings relating to the potencies of the Haritākī;—Buddha's teaching of Dharma is Teaching; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(3219–3221)

The Mīmāṃsaka's answer to the above is as follows:—
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TEXTS (3222-3223).

“As the fact is capable of another explanation, the presumption (put forward) has no efficacy (in proving the existence of the Omniscient Person). For the same reason, the inference that has been put forward is not valid. For instance, the fact of Buddha and others having taught Dharma, etc. can be explained in another way—for instance, as being due to dreams, or to delusion, or to the Veda itself, or to wrong teaching.”—(3222-3223)

COMMENTARY.

Teaching by people may be due to delusion and other causes also;—hence both, the Presumption and the Inference cited, are inconclusive.

Question:—How can it be otherwise explained?

Answer:—‘To dreams, etc. etc.’—as declared in Shabara’s Bhasya (1. 1. 2.)—‘Teaching proceeds from delusion also; and when there is no delusion it proceeds from the Veda also’.—Teaching proceeding from Delusion is found in cases where things dreamt of are taught; and that proceeding from the Veda is found in the case of the teachings of Manu and others.—(3222-3223)

As regards Sugata and others, who are ignorant of the Veda,—their teachings might have proceeded from sheer Delusion;—for the purpose of deceiving people.

This is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3224-3225).

“Those who are ignorant of the Veda cannot have their teaching based upon the Veda; it can proceed from delusion only. In the world the teachings that are propounded by wicked teachers are not based upon the Veda; they proceed either from delusion or for the purpose of duping the disciples.”—(3224-3225)

COMMENTARY.

‘Atadāśhrayat’—not based on the Veda.—(3224–3225)

Question:—How is it known that the teaching of Buddha does not proceed on the basis of the Veda?

Answer:—
"If the teaching of Buddha had been based upon the Veda, it would have been imparted to only such persons as were Vedic scholars,—just like the teachings of Manu and others. As a matter of fact, however, Buddha's teachings are found to have been imparted to ignorant persons and Shūdras; hence it must be defective and illusory, like the making of counterfeit coins."—(3226-3227)

COMMENTARY.

If Buddha's teachings regarding Dharma had been based upon the Veda, then, He would have imparted them,—like Manu and other teachers—to learned Brāhmaṇas; as a matter of fact, however they were imparted—not to Brāhmaṇas, but to the ignorant Shūdras; hence we conclude that the teaching must be 'illusory'—false, just like the making of counterfeit coins.—(3226-3227)

As regards Manu and others, these were learned in the Veda; hence their teachings regarding Dharma, etc. are all based upon the Veda,—they are not independent of it.—This is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (3228).

"As regards Manu and others, who are well-known among Vedic scholars, and whose compilations are accepted by Vedic scholars,—their assertions have their source in the Veda."—(3228)

COMMENTARY.

The tree Vedas,—Rk, Yajus and Sāman—are called 'Traya', 'Triad'. those who know these are 'Trayīvid', 'Vedic scholars'—Brāhmaṇas.

These Teachers are such as have their compilations accepted by Vedic scholars.

The reason for this acceptance is stated—'Their assertions proceed from the Veda'. They are persons whose assertions have their source in the Veda.—(3228)

Question:—How is this also known?

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TEXT (3229).

"IT IS NOT CONCEIVABLE THAT THESE TEACHERS SHOULD HAVE COMPILED THEIR WORKS AND THEN IMPARTED THEM TO OTHERS,—WITHOUT HAVING FOUND, OR SHOWN TO THE PUPILS, THE ORIGINAL VEDIC TEXTS.'"—(3229)

COMMENTARY.

'Imparted'—Taught.

Thus, it having been found that the Omniscient Person cannot fall within the scope of any of the five Means of Knowledge,—it follows that he must fall within that of the sixth, Non-apprehension, Negation. Hence the Reason that 'he is envisaged by Negation' becomes established.—That this Reason is not Inconclusive has been already shown above; that this is so is proved by the fact that the regarding of the Person as non-existent cannot have any other cause.—(3229)

Some people have held the following opinion:—We do not seek to single out any particular person as being omniscient; all that we seek to prove is the possibility of there being such a Person; our idea being that there is some one who is omniscient,—or that omniscience does exist in some person—as can be deduced from the fact that there are ascending grades of wisdom.

The answer to these is as follows:—

TEXTS (3230-3231).

"IF PROOFS WERE ADDUCED TO PROVE THAT 'THERE IS SOME ONE WHO IS OMNISCIENT', OR THAT 'THERE IS OMNISCIENCE IN SOME MAN',—THEN THAT WOULD FALL SHORT OF YOUR PROPOSITION. IN FACT THESE ASSERTIONS DO NOT REPRESENT WHAT IS MEANT TO BE PROVED. THERE IS NO PURPOSE IN PROVING WHAT IS ASSERTED IN THE ABOVE FORM.'"—(3230-3231)

COMMENTARY.

It has been explained before that the Reason adduced by the Buddhist is Inconclusive; the Mīmāṃsāka therefore proceeds to point out the defects in his 'subject' (Proposition).

What the Buddhist wishes to prove is the omniscience of his own Teacher,—not merely Omniscience in general. Because, when the Omniscient Person is sought for by the intelligent man,—it cannot be for mere fun. The man seeking for Him does so with the idea that—'From His words I shall find out what Dharma and Adharma are and regulate my activity or inactivity accordingly'. Even if the existence of the Omniscient Person in general were proved, it could have no effect upon the activity of the
man; because there can be no conviction regarding the words of such a Person until a particular person had been found to be really such. Hence it is the particular Omniscient Person whose existence should be proved by one who wishes to regulate his activity. Thus therefore the general assertion would be far short of the Proposition.

'What is meant to be proved'—i.e. the fact that one wishes to establish.

'Sah'—i.e. the particular Omniscient Person, in the person of your own Teacher.

'Anayā'—the Proposition now put forward.

'What is asserted'—i.e. the vague statement that 'some Omniscient Person exists' or 'omniscience belongs to some one',—without reference to any particular person. By the proving of such a Proposition, no useful purpose would be served.—(3230-3231)

Question:—How so?

Answer:—

TEXT (3232).

"By proving some Omniscient Person in general, you cannot get at that particular Person whose omniscience you are asserting for the purpose of establishing the truthfulness of his Word."—(3232)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—Why cannot such a Person be got at?

Answer:—

TEXT (3233).

"So long as Buddha is not proved to be omniscient, His Words remain false (unreliable). How can the truthfulness of Buddha be established by the proving of some Omniscient Person in general?"—(3233)

COMMENTARY.

Because so long as the Omniscience of Buddha himself is not proved, there can be no certainty regarding the truthfulness of His Word.—On the proving of some Omniscient Person in general, the truthfulness of Buddha's words does not become established. Because the requisite Invariable Concomitance is not there.—(3233)

The same idea is further elucidated:
TEXT (3234).

"The omniscience of one person cannot establish the truthfulness of the word of another person. It is only when the two are co-substrate—that they support one another."—(3234)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—When is there invariable concomitance between the two (Omniscience and Truthfulness)?

Answer:—'It is only, etc. etc.'—'Co-substrates'—subsisting in the same Person.—'Tayoöl'—between 'omniscience' and 'truthfulness of word'.—'Support'—signifies causal relation.

What is meant is as follows:—It is only when the two reside in the same Person that Omniscience can be the reason for truthfulness; not otherwise. If it were not so, there would be incongruities.—(3234)

The following Texts show that these same arguments serve to reject the argument that other people have put forward in support of the existence of the Omniscient Person:

TEXTS (3235–3237).

"[The argument put forward is]—'All the things that there are in this world must be perceptible to some person,—because they are entities, cognisable and knowable,—like the curd, Colour, Taste and other things'.—Inasmuch as mere knowledge is mentioned, it falls short of the original Proposition (of the Buddhist); so that the 'Omniscient Person' whose existence is desired to be proved does not become established in this manner.—If some person other than Buddha had become omniscient, of what use could this knowledge be in the proving of the reliability of the words of Buddha?"—(3235–3237)

COMMENTARY.

'Whatever is endowed with cognisability, knowability and the character of being an entity, must be perceptible to some person,—e.g. the curd, Colour, Taste and so forth,—all things have the said characters of knowability, etc.;—hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.'

Here also, as before, it has to be pointed out that the conclusion falls far short of the desired Proposition, and the Reason is Inconclusive.
Thus then, it is not possible to prove the existence of the Omniscient Person, either in general or in particular. Hence it becomes established that there can be no Omniscient Person. And when there is no Omniscient Person, there can be no words of such a Person; consequently no man can undertake an activity through such words.—(3235-3237)

Or, there may be an Omniscient Person; even so, there can be no 'words' ('assertion') uttered by Him,—on which your activities could be based.—This is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (3238-3239).

"When He occupies the Ten Stages, and all His Attachment and other defects have ceased, then alone He can apprehend all things, through His Knowledge which is like pure crystal. When rapt in Meditation, His mind concentrated on the idea of all things, He would be pervaded by all things; and would not be able to impart any teachings."—(3238-3239)

COMMENTARY.

Standing upon the Ten Stages, all impositions of Attachment, etc. having disappeared, His Knowledge becomes like the pure crystal, whereby all cognisable things become apprehended;—such is your explanation.

Now, at this stage, His mind would be concentrated—being intent upon the idea of all things; so that He could not be in a position to propound any teachings relating particularly to Dharma; being unable to perform all these functions all at once.—(3238-3239)

It might be said that "He would impart the teaching on waking from Meditation".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (3240).

"At the time that He would teach some one thing, like any ordinary speaker,—it would be the assertion of a man with partial knowledge, not that of an Omniscient Person."—(3240)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Speaking can never proceed without some Cognition; hence when He would teach Dharma, He could do so only when His mind
would be in the *conceptual state*; and in this state there is no difference between the child and the wise man; so that He would be *not-omniscient*, and His assertion would not be the assertion of the Omniscient Person.—

(3240)

The following might be urged—He does not actually teach anything at all; as He is always rapt in *non-conceptual* (indeterminate Abstract) Communion; what happens is that, under His supervision, there become revealed the teachings relating to the various forms of *Dharma*, in the shape of the ideas of things. This has been thus declared—'During the night that *Buddha* became enlightened, and when He reached *Parinirvāṇa*,—at that time, not a single syllable was uttered by Him, nor was anything said;—why?—because *Buddha* is ever rapt in Communion; what happens however is that His disciples, who can grasp only teachings expressed in spoken words, hear sounds proceeding from the mouth of Buddha, like that of wool issuing out of the *uṣṇīṣa* (*turban*)'.

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (3241-3243).

"THE FOLLOWING ASSERTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE (BY BUDDHISTS)—'WHEN Buddha IS RAPT IN COMMUNION, AND STANDS UNRUFFLED LIKE THE Chintā-jewel,—TEACHINGS ISSUE FORTH, FREELY, FROM EVEN THE WALLS; AND WITH THE HELP OF THESE, MEN COME TO KNOW ALL THAT THEY WANT TO KNOW; AND THUS THEY QUICKLY SECURE ALL THAT IS GOOD FOR THEM'.—SUCH ASSERTIONS SOUND WELL ONLY WHEN ADDRESSED TO PEOPLE IMBUED WITH FAITH; WE HOWEVER ARE WANTING IN THAT FAITH, AND HENCE ASK FOR REASONS.'"—(3241–3243)

COMMENTARY.

'Chintā-ratna' is the Chintāmanī, a gem believed to provide all that one desires.

The upshot of the whole is as follows:—An assertion like the one just made, without any reasons in support, sound well only when addressed to the faithful; people like us, however, admit of only such things as can be supported by reasons, and hence Reason is what we ask for; how then can we accept such assertions wholly unsupported by reasons?—(3241–3243)

Then again, the assumption put forward may be true; even so, as regards the teachings issuing forth from the walls, there would always be a doubt as to their proceeding under the supervision of the Omniscient One; hence intelligent enquirers cannot rightly believe them to be true and reliable.—This is what is pointed out in the following:
"Teachings issuing from the walls could not be accepted as taught by a Reliable Person. In fact, there would be no confidence in them,—it being doubtful by whom they have been propounded—have they been propounded by Buddha, or by deceitful Brāhmaṇas, put forward in joke, by means of words bearing the semblance of the words (of Buddha),—or by petty unseen Elementals and others.—For these reasons, people who regard themselves as wise should place no confidence in such teachings."—(3244–3246)

COMMENTARY.

All this is easily comprehensible.—(3244–3246)

So far the Author has set forth arguments, from Kumārila's point of view, against the Buddhist view that there are Omniscient Persons.—He now sets forth arguments adduced by the two writers, Śāmaṇa and Yajñāṇa, against the idea of the Omniscient Person:

TEXTS (3247–3261)

"Thus then, there is no room for the omniscience of men. We now proceed to consider why the Omniscient Person has been postulated?—Your Omniscient Person—does he apprehend all things by a single Cognition? Or by several Cognitions? And then, does he apprehend them all at once? Or in succession—noticing only the more important things? In no case has it been seen that a single Cognition apprehends such contradictory things as pure and impure and so forth; nor have several divergent Cognitions been found to appear at one and the same time.—Who too is there who could apprehend, even in hundreds of years, each of the endless number of things, past, present and future?—Even if the Person, by his own undiversified nature, apprehends all things,—he cannot apprehend the specific individualities of all things. Under the circumstances, what would be the use of the Omniscient Person who knows the things only in their general form? Specially as in no other form is the thing apprehended.—Then again, this uniform Cognition could be either true or false.—If it be held to be true, then this would be contrary to perceived facts; as it would mean that all is one, without a second; and the result of this
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WOULD BE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SUCH DIVERSE ENTITIES AS THE DISCIPLE, THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, Dharma, Adharma, AND THE TEACHINGS OF THE SAID PERSON; AS THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THESE WOULD NOT BE COGNISED.—IF THE ONE UNIFORM COGNITION BE HELD TO BE FALSE, THE OMNISCIENT PERSON TURNS OUT TO BE A DELUDED PERSON; SO THAT NO CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE REPOSED IN HIS WORDS, WHICH ARE LIKE THE WORDS OF DEMENTED AND INTOXICATED MEN.—IF THEN THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS HELD TO BE THAT PERSON WHO APPREHENDS ALL THINGS AND THEIR CAUSES, THROUGH A SINGLE ABNORMAL COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY COMMUNION,—THEN THERE CAN BE NO MEANS OF COGNITION TO VOUCH FOR HIS EXISTENCE,—IN THE SHAPE OF PERCEPTION OR INFERENCE OR WORD, THAT IS NOT PRODUCED BY THAT PERSON HIMSELF. HENCE THE CONCLUSION WOULD BE THAT SUCH A PERSON DOES NOT EXIST.—WHETHER SIMULTANEOUSLY OR SUCCESSIVELY, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY INFERENCE WITHOUT AN EFFECT?—AS A MATTER OF FACT, A CERTAIN PERSON CAN EITHER HAVE NO POTENCY AT ALL, OR IF HE HAS, THEN HE WOULD HAVE ALL POTENCIES; SO THAT ALL BEINGS WOULD BE ABLE TO HAVE THE COGNITION OF ALL THINGS. AND YET AS A MATTER OF FACT, WANTING IN THE NECESSARY MEANS, PEOPLE DO NOT COGNISE ALL THINGS.—THE IDEA THAT 'THERE IS ONE PERSON WHO HAS ACQUIRED SPECIAL POWERS NOT COMMON AMONG MEN, AND HE KNOWS ALL THINGS'—IS ENTIRELY BASELESS.—THUS THEN, NO OMNISCIENT PERSON OF ANY KIND IS CONCEIVABLE. CONSEQUENTLY NO HUMAN ASSERTION COULD BE THE MEANS OF PROVIDING THE KNOWLEDGE OF Dharma."—(3247–3261)

COMMENTARY.

Does the man regarded as 'omniscient' know all things at one and the same time? Or in succession, one after the other?—Or, does He apprehend the whole world as one, in one form, such as eternal and the like? Or only the more important things—those for instance that are useful to men, such as the effects following from Acts and so forth?—Or is He called 'omniscient' because He possesses the capacity to know all things,—like Fire, which, though not actually devouring all things, either simultaneously or in succession, is yet called 'all-devourer'?

Under the first alternative, two alternative views are possible. Does He know all things simultaneously through a single Cognition? Or through several Cognitions?—He could not know them through a single Cognition; because never has it been seen that several mutually contradictory things,—such as the pure and the impure—are apprehended by a single Cognition.

It might be argued that—what happens is that at one and the same time there exist in Him several Cognitions envisaging the various mutually contradictory things.
The answer to this is—‘Nor have several divergent, etc. etc.’—This has to be construed with ‘na drṣṭah’, changed from the ‘drṣṭam’, of the previous clause. As a matter of fact, several Cognitions in the same ‘Chain’ of a Cognition have never been found to appear. 

[Several lines of the text are missing here.]

[The Buddhist’s answer to the Mīmāṃsaka’s arguments against the Omniscient Person,—embodied in Texts 3128–3261.]

TEXTS (3262-3263).

THUS HAVE THE MĪMĀṂSAKAS ARGUED, BEING FIRM BELIEVERS IN THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE VEDA.—BUT WE HAVE ALREADY PROVED IN DETAIL THAT THE VEDA IS THE WORK OF A PERSON.—HENCE THE CONCLUSION IS IRRESISTIBLE THAT THERE IS A PERSON WHO HAS THE DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS; AND NO ONE CAN KNOW THINGS BY MEANS OF THE ETERNAL WORD, WHICH IS AN IMPOSSIBILITY.—(3262-3263)

COMMENTARY.

Thus the conclusion is that there is a Person who perceives things directly by Himself, not through the ‘Eternal Word’; because the ‘Eternal Word’ is an impossibility.

‘The ‘ēva’ after ‘draṣṭā’ should be construed after ‘sākhā’.—(3262-3263)

It may be possible to have the ‘Eternal Word’; even so, however, it cannot be right to accept it as a means of knowing supersensuous things.—This is what is pointed out in the following:

TEXT (3264).

THE ‘ETERNAL WORD’ CAN NEVER HAVE THE CAPACITY TO BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF ITS OWN MEANING;—BECAUSE THERE IS INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN ‘SUCCESSION’ AND ‘SIMULTANEITY’.—(3264)

COMMENTARY.

‘Its own meaning’—what is expressed by the word.—Or, ‘ēva’ (in ‘svārtha’) may stand for the ‘self’, the nature, of the Word;—and ‘arthā’ for what is expressed by it; so the compound ‘svārthājñāna’ would mean ‘the Cognition of the Word itself and its meaning’.

For the bringing about of such Cognition, the capacity of the ‘Eternal Word’ could be either inherent in itself, or due to other contributory causes. It cannot be inherent in it; because in the matter of an Eternal Thing bringing about its effect, there is incompatibility between succession and simultaneity;
and apart from these, there is no other method possible whereby there could be effective action; as the two (succession and simultaneity) are mutually exclusive. Hence all effective action must be invariably concomitant with succession and simultaneity.

Now, in the case of the ‘Eternal World’, it cannot bring about the Cognition of its ‘meaning’ in succession; because at the time that the first effect is being brought about, the cause would not have lost its capacity to bring about the subsequent effects (Cognitions); so that all these should appear, all at the same time. Nor is it possible for these effects to be brought about in succession; because even at the later moment,—just as at the moment of the bringing about of the first effect—the efficiency of the cause would be there intact, and hence there would be an incongruity if it did not bring about the first effect over again.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a thing is devoid of a wider character, it must be devoid of the less wide character;—e.g. the Jar, which is devoid of the character of ‘tree’, is devoid of the character of ‘shimshapā’ (a particular tree); the ‘Eternal Word’ called Veda is devoid of the character of ‘succession and simultaneity’ which includes under itself the character of ‘effective action’;—hence, by implication, there is non-apprehension of the wider character.—Thus it is not possible for the ‘Eternal Word’ to have the said capacity inherent in itself.

Nor can the said capacity be due to any other contributory cause. Because the capacity being nothing apart from its very nature, cannot, like this nature, be brought about by any such cause. Even if there were some such cause, any relationship to it would be impossible. This has been discussed several times.

Thus then, the idea of the Cognition of supersensuous things being due to the ‘Eternal Word’, being rejected by Inference, cannot be accepted.—(3264)

It has been argued that—“The Perceiver of Dharma cannot exist, because the only means of Cognition by which his existence can be envisaged is ‘Non-apprehension’ (Negation).”

In answer to this, the Buddhist is going to show from the other party’s own point of view, that this Proposition that ‘there can be no Perceiver of Dharma’ is annulled by Presumption, and the Reason adduced (‘because envisaged by non-apprehension’) is Inadmissible:—

TEXTS (3265–3267).

FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THINGS LIKE HEAVEN, SACRIFICE AND THE LIKE HAVE BEEN SPOKEN OF BY THE PERSON WHO KNEW THEM BY HIMSELF. IN FACT, UNDER YOUR VIEW ALSO THE AUTHOR OF THE VEDA WOULD BE SUCH A PERSON CAPABLE OF PERCEIVING SUPERSSENSOUS THINGS;—OR A PERSON WHO KNOWS ALL ABOUT PRIMORDIAL MATTER, SPIRIT AND OTHER THINGS; OR ONE WHO KNOWS OF ALL THINGS.—IN FACT, IF SUCH AN AUTHOR WERE NOT
admitted, there could be no reliability in the Veda. Thus then, the acceptance of the 'Perceiver of Dharma' having been brought about by Presumption,—it annuls the denial of such a Person which you have elaborated in such detail.—(3265-3267)

COMMENTARY.

'By Himself'—independently of all else; i.e. independently of the knowledge provided by the Veda.

'Such a Person'—i.e. the like of whom you are denying.

'Brought about by Presumption'—i.e. by the force of the doctrine that the Veda is reliable.

It is on this ground that the opponent's Reason—'because He is envisaged by Negation'—becomes Inadmissible; because He is actually envisaged by Presumption.—(3265-3267)

Under Text 3129 et seq. it has been asserted by the Opponent that "the term 'all' is used in reference to the context",—and on this several alternatives have been put forward and many objections urged (against the idea of the All-knowing, Omniscient, Person).

But there is no room for all this; because we do not admit of any such idea. When we postulate the Omniscient Person, we do not mean that He knows all possible things, even those other than Dharma. And the objections urged would be applicable to only such an idea. In fact, the 'Omniscient Person' postulated by us is one whose mind has become freed from all aberrations and afflictions, obstacles to knowledge and impurities,—by virtue of which Dharma and other things all become revealed to his consciousness. Against such a view you have not put forward a single argument.

Again, it has been argued by the Opponent under Text 3137 that—"In one body alone, there are so many atoms, etc. etc.—and who can know all these?—etc. etc."—This is a mere assertion, made without any proof; and nothing can be proved by a mere assertion without reasons in support of it.—Because in this way, all things would be established for all men.

With a view to all this, the Author makes the following statement:—

TEXTS (3268-3269).

FURTHER, WHAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED—AS TO THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ANY ONE KNOWING ALL HAIRS AND NAILS, ETC.—IS WITHOUT ANY BASIS, DUE ENTIRELY TO IGNORANCE; BECAUSE IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THERE MAY BE SOME ONE FOR WHOM ALL THINGS BECOME MANIFESTED BY THE CLEAR AND UNFLINCHING LIGHT OF KNOWLEDGE ;—AND NO REASON HAS BEEN ADDUCED AGAINST SUCH POSSIBILITY.—(3268-3269)

COMMENTARY.

'Without any basis'—that in support of which the three-factored Probans is not available.
The knowledge is ‘clear’, free from impurities, and aberrations obstructing the vision of things to be known;—it is ‘unflinching’, not shaken by the gusts of passion, etc.—The knowledge is spoken of as ‘light’, because it *illuminates* things; all things—*Dharma*, etc.—become ‘manifested’—made known. The irregular compounding is done on the strength of implication.

*No reason has been adduced, etc. etc.*—i.e. any proof to the contrary.—It is not only that no proof has been adduced; in fact, there *can* be no proof to the contrary.

(A) For instance, there can be no Perception annulling the idea of the Omniscient Person; because He is not amenable to that Means of Cognition. It is only when a thing is amenable to Perception that, if it is cognised as something contrary to its well-known form, such cognition is annull by Perception; e.g. when Sound is cognised as inaudible, this Cognition is annull by the perception of audibility. There can be no such annulment in a case where Perception is not applicable at all. As a matter of fact, the Cognitions appearing in the ‘Chain’ of other people are never amenable to perception by one who is not omniscient; and it could be only if such were the case, that the assertion of Omniscience could be annull by Perception. And the reason for this inapplicability of Perception lies in the fact that all men are possessed of limited powers of vision. If such Cognitions were amenable to Perception by any one, that person himself would be omniscient; and hence Omniscience could not be denied.

The following might be urged—"We do not mean that it is by being applied to the Omniscient Person that Perception proves His non-existence,—but as being inapplicable to it. That is, when Perception is not applicable to a certain thing, it proves the non-existence of that thing; e.g. in the case of the ‘Hare’s Horns’. In a case where Perception does apply, the thing perceived does exist; as in the case of things like the Sword. As regards the Omniscient Person, Perception has never been found to be applicable; hence, from this *inapplicability of Perception* it is inferred that the Person does not exist”.

This is entirely irrelevant. Because the conclusion that is deduced from the *inapplicability of Perception* cannot be said to have been brought about by *Perception*; because presence (*applicability*) and absence (*non-applicability*) cannot co-exist in the same thing. Further, the *inapplicability of Perception* is not invariably concomitant with *non-existence* of the thing concerned; and it is only if it were so that the *non-existence* could be inferred from *inapplicability of Perception*; because even when a thing is there, Perception is found to be inapplicable, if the thing is hidden or remote, etc.

The following might be urged—"We do not say that the inapplicability of Perception proves non-existence; all that we mean is that when the Perception is inoperative, it proves the non-existence”.

This is a mere change in the wording of your statement; there is no difference in the meaning; mere change of words cannot alter facts; or else there would be incongruities.—Because ‘cessation’, or ‘not-operating’ of a thing means the denial or negation of existence; the same meaning is also expressed by the word ‘become inoperative’, ‘ceased’; the only
difference is that while one (cessation) denies other things and expresses the one thing meant, the other ('ceased') expresses the same thing without denying other things. In reality, both terms express the 'non-existence' of the thing concerned. What again is non-existent cannot be a cause; and non-existence is characterised by the absence of all potencies. It is for this reason that when one thing is productive or illuminative of another, it is so productive or illuminative only when its existence is there, not when its existence has ceased; e.g. the Seed which is productive of the sprout, and the Lamp which is illuminative of colour; and when these two (Seed and Lamp) have ceased, they are not able to do the producing or the illuminating.

Further, what is the meaning of the statement that—"Perception, having ceased, proves non-existence"? If the meaning is that Perception has ceased, disappeared, from the 'present' state,—then it would imply that it is there in the 'past' and 'future' states; and it has been already proved that the 'past' and the 'future' thing does not exist at all;—how then could there be any operation of what is non-existent?—If, secondly, the meaning of the statement is that though existing at the present time, it does not come about (appear) in connection with a certain thing,—and it is in this sense that Perception is said to have 'ceased' (become inapplicable),—even so, this cannot prove the non-existence of the thing in question; as the premiss would be wrong and fallible; as the mere fact that Visual Perception does not appear in connection with Odour, Taste, etc. cannot prove that these latter do not exist.—Thus Perception cannot prove the non-existence of anything.

[Says the Opponent]—"If that is so, then how is it that, on the basis of Perception, in the form of Non-apprehension, you declare, in another place, the non-existence of the Jar?"

This is not so. What is said there is, not that Perception proves non-existence of the thing because the thing is envisaged by Non-apprehension,—but that, when two things are capable of figuring in the same Cognition, if only one appears there, it means the non-appearance (non-existence) of the other. And the reason for this lies in the fact that both cannot be cognised in one and the same form, on the ground that the capability is equally present in both.—In the case in question however, we have never definitely cognised the fact of Omniscience figuring in the same Cognition as anything else; the presence of which latter could lead us to deduce the non-existence of Omniscience; because this latter is always absolutely imperceptible.

Thus it is clear that Perception cannot annul the notion of the Omniscient Person.

(B) Nor can Inference prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because it is held that Inference always envisages affirmation; as is clear from the fact that it is only Non-apprehension that has been regarded as envisaging negation. For this same reason, the other three Means of Cognition, Presumption (Analogy and Word) cannot prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person.

The following might be urged—"When we assert that there is no Omniscient Person, we are not asserting an absolute negation; all that we
are asserting is the Relative Negation, Negation of omniscience, in relation to all men; so that there is certainly room for the operation of Inference and other Means of Cognition.

It may be so; but even so, Inference is not possible; because there is no Indicative (Probans) known to be present in all men, which is invariably concomitant with Omniscience. Such character as ‘being knowable’, ‘being a Teacher’ and so forth, which have been put forward,—all these are Inconclusive, as we are going to show later on.

Nor again is Presumption able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because, in the first place, we do not admit of any Means of Cognition apart from Perception and Inference. Secondly, even if there are other Means of Cognition, Presumption is not capable of proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because Presumption is based upon the idea that a certain well known fact—seen or heard of,—is not explicable otherwise than on the basis of the unseen factor which is thus presumed;—and as a matter of fact, there is no well-known fact—seen or heard of—among men, which is not explicable except on the basis of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person, which, therefore, should be presumed.

Nor is Analogy able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. What is cognised by means of Analogy is, either the remembered thing having for its adjunct the similarity of the thing before the eyes,—or mere similarity of the thing before the eyes, to the Remembered Thing. For example, when a man who has had the perception of the Cow goes to the forest, and sees the Gavaya there, he perceives in this latter, the similarity to the Cow. This has been thus declared—‘Thus what is remembered and perceived as similar, forms the object of Analogy,—or the Similarity itself’ (Shlokavartika Upamâna, 37). Thus the object that is remembered forms the object of Analogical Cognition; and what is remembered is only what has been apprehended before, not anything else;—and there is no Omniscient Person who has apprehended the Cognitions occurring in the ‘Chain’ of all men; hence these could not be remembered by any one. Nor is there anything apprehended by all men which is definitely known as possessing properties in common with non-omniscience, on the basis of which the non-omniscient character of all men could be cognised through Analogy.—As regards the quality of ‘existence’ etc. which has been found in the non-Omniscient Person, those also have not been found to be in common with non-omniscience. Because the quality of ‘existence’ is not incompatible with the Omniscient Person also. Further, the perception of ‘existence’ in the Gavaya does not lead to the Analogical Cognition of the Jar being similar to the Gavaya. All men may be alike on the ground of being existent; but that does not prove their non-omniscience.

This also refutes the argument that has been set forth by the other party under the Text 3216.

Nor again can Word, as the Means of Cognition, set aside the existence of the Omniscient Person.—As regards the Word emanating from human beings, that is regarded by the Mimâmsaka as itself unreliable in matters beyond the senses. And as regards the Word not emanating from human beings, that
cannot be reliable, as we have shown above. Nor is there any Vedic assertion found to the effect that all men are non-omniscient.—Nor can the mere fact of something not being mentioned in the Veda establish the non-existence of that thing; because all things are not meant to be spoken of in the scriptures. Otherwise, there would be non-existence of the marriage of your mother and such things, as these are not mentioned in the Veda.—Nor again can it be right to deduce that a certain thing is not mentioned in the Veda at all from the fact of its not being mentioned in a certain text. Because there being many Ressenstial Texts of the Veda, it is always probable that the thing may be mentioned somewhere in them.—And we are going to show later on that a certain Vedic Text does speak of the Omniscient Person.

The non-existence of the Omniscient Person cannot be proved by the argument that He forms the objective of the Means of Cognition called Negation (Non-apprehension). Because if this Negation as a means of Cognition is described as consisting in the absolute negation of Cognition,—then, it cannot form either the Cognition, or the Means of Cognition, of anything at all; and hence the Omniscient Person could not be envisaged by it; as it is a non-entity; and hence cannot be a Means of Cognition (or Cognition).

If, on the other hand, Negation, is held to be of the nature of Relative Negation—standing for the negation of the entity—in the shape of the Means of Cognition,—even so, as it would be of the nature of the negation of the Means of Cognition, it could not be reliable at all. One who is a non-Brāhmaṇa cannot be a Brāhmaṇa.

The following might be urged—"Negation, as a Means of Cognition, is not described by us as consisting in the exclusion of all Means of Cognition; it is described as a particular form of Cognition, only different from the five other Means of Cognition."

If that is so, then it behoves you to explain in what form it appears.

"It appears in this form—Inasmuch as the Omniscient Person is not cognisable by any one of the five Means of Cognition, He does not exist."

If it is in this form, then it is not a Means (or form) of valid Cognition; as it is Inconclusive, False. Because the inapplicability of the five Means of Cognition cannot set aside the entity in the shape of the Omniscient Person, which is not invariably concomitant with the said inapplicability; on the strength of which the said Cognition (that the Omniscient Person does not exist) could be regarded as true.

Thus it is established that there is no Proof that sets aside the possibility of the existence of the Omniscient Person.—(3268-3269)

The following might be urged—"That same Non-apprehension which you have described as a form of Inference, will be the proof against the existence of the Omniscient Person; what need have we to seek for another proof?"

It is true that Non-apprehension is a proof, a Means of Cognition. But the following has to be borne in mind, in this connection:—When you put forward Non-apprehension as proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person, do you mean the absence of your own apprehension? Or the
absence of the apprehension of all men? The Non-apprehension also,—is it meant to be without any qualification,—as is shown by the absence of any such qualifying phrase as ‘of what fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility’? Or is it meant to be qualified in some way?—The non-existence of the Omniscient Person cannot be proved by unqualified Non-apprehension by yourself.

This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3270).

MERE ‘non-apprehension’ CANNOT PROVE HIS NON-EXISTENCE. BECAUSE APPREHENSION IS NEITHER THE ‘CAUSE’ NOR THE ‘PERVADER’ OF THINGS.—(3270)

COMMENTARY.

The term ‘mere’ has been added with a view to exclude the qualification ‘fulfilling the conditions of apprehensibility’.

‘Cannot prove His non-existence’—i.e. cannot prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person.

‘Why?’

Because, in regard to things, Apprehension is neither the ‘cause’ nor the ‘pervader’.—As a matter of fact, Apprehension by people of limited vision is not the ‘pervader’ of things,—in the sense in which the ‘Tree’ is the ‘pervader’ of the ‘Shimshapā’ (a particular Tree).—[That is, all things are not apprehended, just as all trees are not Shimshapā; i.e. ‘being a thing’ is wider than ‘being apprehended’]; because even when the ‘thing’ is there, there may be no ‘apprehension’ of it by reason of remoteness and other circumstances.—Nor is ‘apprehension’ the ‘cause’ of things,—in the sense in which Fire is the cause of Smoke; because it is the things that are the cause of apprehension.—When one thing is neither the ‘cause’ nor the ‘pervader’ of another thing, the absence of one cannot mean the absence of the other; for, if it did, there would be incongruities. As regards the presence of the ‘Non-apprehension’ of the effect, it does not imply the absence of all Causes, but implies the absence of only that Cause whose capacity is untrammeled; and in the case in question, for men of limited vision, the capacity of things to bring about Apprehension is not untrammeled; by virtue of which the absence of Apprehension could prove the non-existence of the things.—(3270)

Question:—“Even when there is absence of the ‘Cause’ and the ‘Pervader’, why should that imply the absence of something else?”

Answer:—
When there is absence of (a) the 'Cause' and (b) the 'Pervader', it is only right and proper that there should be absence of (a) the 'Caused' and (b) the 'Pervaded'; (a) because the birth of the one proceeds from the other, and (b) because one is of the same nature as the other;—for example, when there is absence of (a) the Fire and (b) the Tree, there is absence of (a) the Smoke and (b) the 'Mango-tree, etc.'—If it were not so, (a) the one could not be the cause of the other, and (b) there would be diversity.—(3271-3272)

Commentary.

'Caused'—that which has a cause; i.e. the effect;—the Dvandva compound is between 'caused' and 'pervaded';—these two are construed with the foregoing 'nivṛttiṇyujyate',—the meaning being that 'it is only right and proper that there should be absence of the Caused and the Pervaded. The reason for this is supplied—'Because the birth of the one, etc. etc.'—(a) When there is absence of Cause, there is absence of Effect, because the Effect derives its existence from the Cause; e.g. when there is absence of Fire, there is absence of Smoke. (b) Similarly when there is absence of the Pervader, there is absence of the Pervaded; because the Pervaded is of the same essence as the Pervader,—both being of the same nature; e.g. when there is absence of the Tree, there is absence of the Mango, Khadira and other particular Trees; because it is only a particular Tree that is known as the 'mango'.

If it were not so,—i.e. if on the absence of the Cause, the Effect were not absent,—then the Cause would not be a true cause at all. Because when one thing can be present even when the other is absent, the latter cannot be the cause of the former; otherwise, there would be absurdities. Similarly when one thing is not absent when the other is absent, they cannot be of the same nature, e.g. the Cow and the Gavaya. Hence it follows that when the Pervader is absent, the Pervaded must be absent,—and where the Cause is absent, the Effect must be absent; it would not imply the absence of anything else; as that would lead to incongruities.

This has been thus declared—'Thus when a certain nature is related to a thing, its absence would imply the absence of that thing; and the absence of the cause would imply the absence of the effect; because of the infallibility of their relationship. If it were not so, why should the absence of the one mean the absence of the other? Because a man has no horse, does it mean that he should have no Cow either? '—(3271-3272)

If it is insisted upon by the other party that one's own Apprehension is the Cause and Pervader of all things—then his Proposition involves self-contradiction.—This is pointed out in the following—
EXAMINATION OF THE 'PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1447

TEXTS (3273-3274).

IF YOUR OWN APPREHENSION IS RECOGNISED—THROUGH SOME MEANS OF COGNITION, AS BEING THE 'CAUSE' AND THE 'PERVADER', OF ALL THINGS,—THEN YOUR OWN OMNISCIENCE BECOMES ESTABLISHED, WITHOUT ANY EFFORT. WHY THEN SHOULD YOU YOURSELF BE HOSTILE TO YOUR OWN OMNISCIENCE?—(3273-3274)

COMMENTARY.

'Hṛtutvanyapaktyayoḥ'—The Genitive Ending is in relation to 'nishchaya'.

'Upalambhasya cārthēṣu'—The Genitive Ending in 'Upalambhasya', and the Locative Ending in 'arthēṣu' is in reference to the 'Cause' and the 'Pervader'; the former connoting the relationship of these, and the latter the fact of their being envisaged.

What is meant is as follows:—If, through some Means of Cognition, you have recognised the fact of your own Apprehension being the 'Cause' and 'Pervader' of all things,—then, your own omniscience becomes clearly asserted; because unless one is omniscient, his Apprehension can never comprehend all things. And yet you are putting forward proofs in support of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Thus there is clear self-contradiction on your part.—(3273-3274)

Thus it has been shown that mere Non-apprehension, without a qualification, does not deserve to be put forward as proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Nor will it be right to put forward 'Non-apprehension' as qualified by the phrase 'of what fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility', as the reason for denying the existence of that Person.—Because when such 'Non-apprehension' is put forward, it could be put forward, (a) either directly by itself,—for instance, as the argument 'the Jar does not exist, because while conditions of being apprehended are present, it is not apprehended', so also would be the argument proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person;—or (b) indirectly, by other words, by pointing out the absence of something which is the Pervader of its cause and which is apprehensible; e.g. when it is said 'There can be no Smoke here because there is no Fire', or 'The particular tree Skīṃshapā cannot be here, as there is no Tree at all'. It has been already explained that the absence of one thing does not necessarily mean the absence of another, except when they are invariable concomitants or when one is the 'Cause' or the 'Pervader' of the other. For if it did, there would be incongruities. Nor does mere absence of the 'Cause' and the 'Pervader' prove the absence of the thing the absence of whose 'Cause' and 'Pervader' has not been definitely ascertained. So here also it would be necessary to add the qualifying phrase that 'it should fulfill the conditions of apprehensibility'. This same principle would apply to the case of the Omniscient Person also.

Or, the negation of a thing can follow only from the affirmation of something else which is directly or indirectly contrary to the former,—not if
this is not so contrary; as in the latter case, it would be possible for both to co-exist. For instance, when it is said that 'there can be no coolness of touch here as there is Fire', we have the affirmation of Fire which is directly contrary to coolness, from which affirmation follows the negation of coolness; the same should be the case with the negation of the Omniscient Person also. Similarly, the negation of the Omniscient Person could follow only from the affirmation of something indirectly contrary to Him, or of something contrary to its Pervader; e.g. coolness is the 'pervader' of the Icy-touch,—the contrary of Coolness is Fire,—and when there is affirmation of this Fire, there follows the negation of the Icy-touch.—The said negation of a thing would follow also from the affirmation of something contrary to the cause of that thing; e.g. when there is affirmation of Fire, which is contrary to coolness which is the cause of thrilling chill, there follows the negation of the said chill which is the effect of coolness.—Or, the negation of a thing would follow also from the affirmation of an effect contrary to that thing; e.g. when there is affirmation in regard to a certain place, of the Smoke which is an effect of Fire which is contrary to coolness, there follows the negation of the coolness of touch.—Or the negation of a thing can follow from the apprehension of an effect contrary to the cause of that thing; e.g. when there is perception of Smoke which is the effect of Fire which is contrary to coolness which is the cause of thrilling chill,—there follows the negation of this chill; the argument being—'This place cannot contain a person who has caught the chill, because we find here Smoke'.—Or again the negation of a thing may follow from the affirmation of something invariably concomitant with the contrary of that thing; e.g. when there is affirmation of dependence which is invariably concomitant with impermanence which is contrary to Permanence, there follows the negation of Permanence.

Now none of these arguments for negation is applicable to the proving of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person; because the Omniscient Person is always inapprehensible, while all the conditions described are cases of negation of things that are apprehensible.

This is what is pointed out in the following—

**TEXTS (3275-3276).**

*For these reasons, the Omniscient Person cannot be one 'capable of being perceived'; if he were capable of being perceived, then that alone would establish his omniscience, without any effort on our part. In fact, how can that Person be perceptible to you who has knowledge of all things,—unless you also had the knowledge of all things?*—(3275-3276)

**COMMENTARY.**

For the reasons explained above, for fear of incurring self-contradiction, you cannot regard the Omniscient Person as 'apprehensible' by yourself. As in that case it would mean that you are yourself omniscient.
"Why ?"

Answer:—'How can that Person, etc. etc.'—If your own knowledge comprehended all things, then alone could the Omniscient Person be apprehensible to yourself,—not otherwise; because the Omniscient Person can never be apprehended by one who is not himself omniscient.—(3275-3276)

The following might be urged—"The Omniscient Person may not be apprehensible by us; even so, why should the said negative arguments not be urged in proof of his non-existence ?"

Answer:—

TEXT (3277).


COMMENTARY.

Because the Omniscient Person is not apprehensible by you, therefore the 'pervader', the 'cause' and the 'nature' of the Omniscient Person, if not apprehended, cannot be regarded as the 'non-apprehension of what is apprehensible'. That is to say, the arguments based upon the non-apprehension of the 'pervader', of the 'nature', or, of the 'cause',—which are the first three arguments urged above,—are not applicable.—(3277)

Says the other party:—"In that case, the other arguments may be operative; even so the non-existence of the Omniscient Person would become proved ".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3278-3279).

THIS 'NON-APPR E H ENSION' PROCEEDS IN nine WAYS: DUE TO ITS BEING PUT FORWARD IN DIVERSE WAYS CONSISTING OF THE non-cognition AND cognition OF THE SAID THREE AND THEIR CONTRARIES (RESPECTIVELY). AND WHEN IN ITS VERY BASIC FORM, THE 'NON-APPR E H ENSION' HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE INAPPLICABLE TO THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, THE OTHERS BECOME SET ASIDE WITHOUT MUCH EFFORT.—(3278-3279)

COMMENTARY.

This—the aforesaid non-apprehension—of (1) the nature, (2) the Pervader and (3) the Cause—with its ramifications becomes ninefold.
"How?"

Answer:—'Due to, etc., etc.'—The term 'tat' stands for the aforesaid three, called: (1) 'Nature', (2) 'Pervader', and (3) 'Cause';—'tadviruddha' is that which is contrary to these; this also is three-fold—(1) contrary to 'Nature', (2) contrary to 'Pervader', and (3) contrary to 'Cause';—the term 'ādi' includes (1) the contrary effect, (2) the effect contrary to the cause, and (3) those pervaded by its contraries.—The second 'tat' refers again to the said three—(1) Nature, (2) Pervader and (3) Cause;—so that the compound 'tat-tadviruddha', stands for (a) the three (Nature, etc.), and (b) the contraries of these three;—the 'agati' and 'gati' stand for the (a) non-cognition and (b) cognition of these respectively, i.e. the non-cognition of the Nature, the Pervader and the Cause, and the cognition of the contrary of these;—the diversities are due to these;—and the arguments are put forward on the basis of all this.

That which is due directly to the non-cognition of these, the Non-apprehension of the Nature, Cause and Pervader, has been pointed out above; of this same basic Non-apprehension, all the other Non-apprehensions are merely indirect indicatives; hence this three-fold Non-apprehension forms their 'basis'. For instance, the 'cognition of the contrary' indicates (1) the apprehension of the contrary of its Nature, (2) the apprehension of the contrary of its Pervader and (3) the apprehension of the contrary of its Cause.—The term 'ādi' indicates (1) the apprehension of the contrary effect, (2) the apprehension of the effect contrary to the cause, and (3) the apprehension of what is pervaded by the contrary.—All these indirectly indicate, respectively, the Non-apprehension of the Nature, of the Pervader and of the Cause.

Thus by showing that the three basic forms of Non-apprehension are not able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person, the incapacity of their ramifications to do the same follows without effort; hence no attempt need be made for proving that these ramifications also are unable to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because, when the root itself has been cut off, the branches cannot continue to live.

In reality, the Non-apprehension of the nature of the thing itself is the root of all; it is only in view of the diversity of other things that the three-fold Non-apprehension has been spoken of as the 'basis' or 'root'.—(3278-3279)

The following might be urged—"If the Omniscient Person is not amenable to Apprehension,—then it may be that a particular Non-apprehension of HIM is not possible; but His 'Cause' and 'Pervader' are certainly amenable to Apprehension; why then cannot there be particular Non-apprehension of these two? The contraries also of these being amenable to apprehension, why should not there be apprehension of these contraries?"

The answer to this is as follows:
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TEXTS (3280-3281).

EFFECT AND CAUSE, PERVADED AND PERVADER, AND CONTRARINESS—
ALL THESE,—AS ALSO THE 'NATURE' OF THE THING WITH A QUALIFI-
CATION—ARE POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN THE THING IS PERCEPTIBLE.

—THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, HOWEVER, IS NOT PERCEPTIBLE
FOR YOU; HENCE ALL THESE 'NON-APPRHENSIONS'
ARE NOT CAPABLE OF PROVING HIS NON-
EXISTENCE; AND ANY OTHER FACTOR OF
NEGATION, THERE IS NONE.—(3280-
3281)

COMMENTARY.

'Kārya, etc.'—is a copulative compound formed of—(1) the relation of
Effect and Cause, (2) the relation of Pervaded and Pervader, and (3) the
relation of Contrariness.

(1) The relation of Cause and Effect can be proved only by the Non-
apprehension of what is perceptible; and as the Omniscient Person is not
perceptible, there can be no relation of Cause and Effect with Him. (2)
Nor is the relation of Pervader and Pervaded possible in regard to Him; as
that also has to be preceded by the Non-apprehension of what is apprehensible;
for instance, when the absence of one thing is always followed by the absence
of the other, the latter is said to be 'pervaded' by the other; and the said
absence is not possible except where there is Non-apprehension of what is
apprehensible.—(3) Contrariness also is recognised only between two per-
ceptible things, not between those that are not perceptible.—For instance,
there is 'contrariness' between two things when they can never co-exist;
and this is perceived by you when there is absence of one while the other is
present—even when the efficient cause of the former is present; and as a
matter of fact, the presence and absence of things cannot be ascertained
unless the things themselves are capable of being apprehended.—The other
kind of 'contrariness' consists in mutual exclusion; and it is recognised in
cases where the cognition of one thing is invariably concomitant with the
non-cognition of the other; as between succession and simultaneity. This
cognition is not possible if the thing is not apprehensible.

"If that is so, then how can there be contrariness between Existence
and Non-existence? Certainly both of these are not perceptible".

This does not affect our position. As a matter of fact, Existence and
Non-existence are not cognised separately, and then they are regarded as
'contrary' on account of their exclusion of one another;—what happens is
that they are cognised separately and then 'contrariness' becomes cognised.
For instance, the contrariness of Existence and Non-existence is determined
only in reference to one and the same thing and at one and the same time,—
not in reference to different things. Certainly the Existence of the Horse is
not in any way 'contrary' to the non-existence of the Cow.—Nor is there any
contrariness between existence and non-existence, if taken in reference
to different points of time; for instance, if one thing did not exist at some pre-
vious time, its non-existence or existence at some future time is not deducible.
It is only in regard to the same thing and the same time that both existence
and non-existence are found incompatible; and not after being cognised and
then found to be mutually exclusive.—It might be asked—"How can there
be exclusion of what has not been cognised?"—The answer is that it is for
this same reason,—i.e. because it is not cognised in connection with the
particular thing—that its exclusion would be possible. Otherwise, how
could there be any exclusion of what has been definitely cognised? In fact,
this cognition itself of the existence of the thing that constitutes the exclusion
of its non-existence; and the cognition of the non-existence of one thing also
constitutes the exclusion of the existence of the thing other than that. Hence
when the non-existence of a certain thing is excluded, and its existence is
cognised,—then they must be regarded as 'perceptible'; because what is not
perceptible cannot be cognised, and what is not cognised cannot have the
contrary character excluded.

All this is not possible in the case of the Omniscient Person. In the
first place all men are not perceived by any one; in view of which the
presence of non-omniscience could be cognised in them, and the exclusion of
omniscience could be secured; because that same man would have to be
regarded as omniscient.—Thus then, there can be no 'contrariness' (incom-
patibility) between omniscience and non-omniscience in connection with a
person who is not capable of being apprehended. It is possible, however,
within one's own 'chain'; but there also, not with regard to the future,
because the future is not perceptible at the time.—Thus the fact remains that
the relation of cause and effect and the like is possible only in that which
is perceptible.

'As also the nature of a thing, with a qualification'—'is possible' should
be construed here. 'Nature' here stands for the character of the thing;
and this is to be taken along with its qualification; and this qualification
consists in freedom from the three kinds of remoteness.

'All these non-apprehensions'—i.e. the non-apprehensions of the 'Cause'
('Nature' and 'Pervader'),—are not capable of proving the non-existence
of the Omniscient Person; because the Omniscient Person can have no such
relationship with anything as that of Cause and Effect, of Contrariness, and
of Pervader and Pervaded; also because, even when there are other causes of
apprehension present, the said Person cannot be perceptible.

'Any other factor of negation, there is none',—i.e. barring the particular
kind of Non-apprehension.—(3280-3281)

The Author again proceeds to point out the Inconclusiveness of the
Reason adduced by the other party,—by pointing out the incongruity
involved in the putting forward of one's own 'non-apprehension', without
any qualification :—
If the Omniscient Person is denied on the ground of mere 'non-apprehension',—then you might also deny the marriage of your own mother and such other facts.—(3282)

COMMENTARY.

'Such other facts'—includes the intercourse of ...... and in that case there would be doubts regarding ......

This has been thus declared—'If, dull-visioned as you are, your non-apprehension should set aside things, then you would be damned; as it would be impossible to name your Father.'—(3282)

The following Text anticipates and rejects the Opponent's answer to the above:—

TEXT (3283).

If it be urged that—"On seeing the effect in the form of the Son, there is cognition of the cause of that effect",—then (the answer is that) in certain cases, the effect is found in the absence of the cause in question.—(3283)

COMMENTARY.

"The mother's marriage is inferred from the presence of its effect in the shape of the Son; hence there is no non-apprehension of the said marriage; hence there is no possibility of the marriage not being there".

The inconclusiveness and doubtful character of the said Cause is pointed out—'In certain cases, etc. etc.'—Even in the absence of the marriage in question, and even in the absence of ...... a wicked woman might bring forth the effect in the shape of the Son; and the same might be the case ......; so that the said Inference of marriage cannot be true; hence the doubt regarding your parentage is irresistible.

The Teacher Dharmakirti also has urged this same argument.—(3283)

The following Text sets forth the Opponent's answer to the above and rejects it:—

TEXT (3284).

If it is said that—"The non-existence of the marriage is not cognised, because other people know of it",—then (the answer is) how do you know that other people know of it?—(3284)

COMMENTARY.

'Anyopâlambha'—The knowledge that other people have.
'Tasya'—of the mother's marriage.
‘Non-existence’—i.e. what is cognised is not non-existence, but existence. The answer to this is that it cannot be known what the knowledge of other people is.—(3284)

The Opponent having been asked—‘How do you know?’—supplies the answer,—which is then refuted:

TEXTS (3285-3286).

“WE KNOW IT FROM THE ASSERTION (OF OTHER PERSONS)”.—THEN (THE ANSWER IS) IS THERE NOT SUCH ASSERTION IN REGARD TO THE OMNISCIENT PERSON ALSO?—THEN AGAIN, HOW IS IT THAT YOU DO NOT RECALL ANOTHER ASSERTION OF YOURS TO THE EFFECT THAT—“MEN ARE ALWAYS FOUND TO BE LIARS”? AND JUST AS THERE CAN BE NO CONFIDENCE IN THE WORDS OF MEN REGARDING PRESENT THINGS, SO ALSO THERE CAN BE NONE IN THE WORDS SPEAKING OF PAST THINGS.—(3285-3286)

COMMENTARY.

The word ‘Upadēśa’ has to be construed with ‘siddha’ of the preceding text.

By showing the incongruity involved, the author points out the inconclusive character of what has been urged—‘Is there not, etc. etc.’—‘Ayam’—the assertion;—is it not present in regard to the Omniscent Person? It is certainly present. Under the circumstances, if the assertion regarding the marriage of one’s mother is accepted as reliable, then why should you not regard our assertion, that ‘the Omniscent Person does exist’, as reliable? There is no difference between the two cases.

Further, in your words, you have declared that assertions are unreliable; this is pointed out in the words—‘How is it that you do not recall, etc. etc.’.—(3285-3286)

So far it has been explained that the absence of one’s own apprehension of the Omniscent Person cannot serve as a proof of His non-existence;—because, without a qualification, it is inconclusive, and with a qualification, it has no substratum;—now the Author proceeds to explain that the absence of the apprehension of all men also cannot serve as proof of the non-existence of the Omniscent Person; because such non-apprehension by all men cannot be proven:—
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TEXTS (3287-3288).

Or, there may be no such assertion (regarding the existence of the Omniscient Person); nor may such assertion be reliable; even so, you have come to the certainty that "the Omniscient Person is not apprehended by any man"; and such certainty could be possible only if the Souls of all men were known to you; and if all these were known to you, then you yourself would be omniscient,—as has been pointed out above.—(3287-3288)

COMMENTARY.

'Assertion'—i.e. the one declaring the existence of the Omniscient Person.

'Asya'—reliability of the said assertion.

'If the Souls of all men were known'—i.e. if you knew the nature of all men.

It might be said—"We do have the knowledge of the nature of all men." —The answer to this is—'If all these were, etc. etc.'—i.e. if the souls of all men were known to you.—(3287-3288)

TEXTS (3289-3290).

If it were not so, then, even on non-apprehension, there would be doubt only (regarding the existence of the Omniscient Person),—just as there is regarding the existence of certain things.—There are some saintly persons too who are believed to have knowledge of the Omniscient Person.—It is also conceivable that the Omniscient Person, being self-luminous, perceives himself by himself.—For these reasons there can be no certainty regarding the non-apprehension of the Omniscient Person by all men.—(3289-3290)

COMMENTARY.

'If it were not so',—if there is no knowledge of the Souls of all men.

'Like the existence of certain things'—i.e. as in the case of the existence of things far removed in place or time.

What is meant is as follows:—In the case of things far removed in space and time, even when the thing is not apprehended, there is always a suspicion regarding its existence,—even though there is non-apprehension of the thing; in the same manner, it is only right that there should be suspicion regarding the existence of the Omniscient Person who has been apprehended (known) by other men.
Or, the meaning may be as follows:—Just as in regard to the Existence of the Omniscient Person, there is doubt, even though He has not been apprehended,—in the same manner there would be doubt, even when His omniscience is apprehended; because both are equally liable to non-apprehension due to remoteness.

Says the Opponent:—"It is only right that there should be suspicion regarding the existence of things; because even when the thing is present, there is found to be non-apprehension of it; hence there is a probability that it may be there; in the case of the Omniscient Person, on the other hand, it is not possible for any man with limited vision to perceive Him; and no sane person can have any suspicion regarding the existence of an impossible thing ".

The answer to this is—' There are some persons, etc. etc.'

' Himself'—This has been asserted on the basis of the doctrines of other people.—This same idea is reiterated by the phrase ' by himself'. ' Ātma '—the Man.—' Luminous '—the Soul being of the nature of Consciousness and hence being like Light.—(3289-3290)

The same idea is further supported:—

TEXT (3291).

Because the term ' all ' stands for all living beings; and the Person himself must be included in ' all '; hence there can be no certainty regarding the Non-apprehension (of the Omniscient Person).—(3291)

COMMENTARY.

' The Person himself '—i.e. the Omniscient Person.—(3291)

The following might be urged—"What are meant by the term ' all ' are only men with limited vision, not the Omniscient Person; hence there can be no suspicion regarding His existence ".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3292).

By the exclusion of that one Person alone, what connection could there be (of this with the non-existence of the Omniscient Person)? One's own illness does not cease merely because other people do not know of it.—(3292)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant by the exclusion of the Omniscient Person is that the Reason for the non-existence of the Omniscient Person consists in the fact
of his not being apprehended by other people who have limited vision,—then this Reason is Inconclusive; because, like your own 'Non-apprehension', the said Non-apprehension by other men of limited vision would have no 'connection',—in the shape of invariable concomitance—with 'the non-existence of the Omniscient Person'.

The second sentence—'One's own illness, etc. etc.'—is meant to support the said absence of connection.—(3292)

So far it has been proved that 'Non-apprehension' as the proof (for the non-existence of the Omniscient Person) is 'Inconclusive' as well as 'Inadmissible'.—Now the author proceeds to show that the other Reason—'Because His body is envisaged by the only means of Cognition, Negation'—is 'doubtful'—hence—inadmissible':—

TEXTS (3293–3295).

Even some men with limited vision do apprehend the Omniscient Person through Inference; and it is only a few notions of some people that are perfectly correct. For instance, the proof of the momentary character of the Veda, the Earth and other things though clearly stated by us, has not been understood by dull-witted men. Consequently, the matter is open to doubt and the absence of apprehension cannot be certain,—simply because some people are sure that they perceive His non-existence.—(3293–3295)

COMMENTARY.

There are some clever men, even among men with limited vision, who do apprehend the Omniscient Person by means of Inference; hence the probability of His existence being there, the Reason—'because He forms the object of Negation as the Means of knowledge'—is open to the charge of being 'Doubtful'—hence—'Inadmissible'.—For instance, the fact of such things as the Vedic Word, the Earth, Mountains, Body, Diamond and the rest, being momentary and Soul-less—though it is not apprehended by the beastly Mimámsakas,—is true, as proved by us through strong reasons. So that if, in regard to the Omniscient Person, proof is not found at the present moment, yet as His existence is probable, the matter may be in doubt; hence it cannot be admitted that the said Person is subject only to Negation, which consists in the absence of all the other five Means of Cognition;—such a Reason being open to doubt.

'Because'—there being no proof of it.—(3293–3295)

Then again, it may be that all men with limited vision are not capable of inferring the existence of the Omniscient Person; even so, the Reason of the other party remains Inconclusive.—This is pointed out in the following.—
TEXT (3296).

Even if there be no Inference, that alone cannot bring about certainty regarding non-existence (of the Omniscient Person);

as in the case of the existence of the Fire which has not yet begun to emit its effect in the shape of Smoke.—(3296)

COMMENTARY.

It has been explained before that Proof (Means of Cognition) cannot be the cause of things; nor can it be their Pervader; how then can the absence of Proof mean the absence of the Thing? For instance, in the case of the Fire in the heated Iron-ball,—while its effect in the shape of Smoke has not begun to appear, and it is still hidden inside a hut,—there is no Inference of it, because the Inferential Indicative (in the shape of Smoke) is not there; and yet its existence does not cease (on that account),—and there can be no certainty regarding its non-existence; in the same manner, in the proving of the Existence of the Omniscient Person, if there is no Inference, that makes the matter only doubtful.

‘That alone’—that is, mere absence of Inference.

‘Asamārabhā, etc. etc.’—That Fire which has not begun to bring about its effect in the shape of smoke; in regard to the existence of this fire, there can be no certainty.—(3296)

In the following Texts, the other Party shows that in the case of the hot Iron-ball, the root of the Doubt lies in Apprehension, while in the case of the Omniscient Person, there is no Apprehension at all,—hence there can be no reason for any doubt; and thus the Reason put forward by the Buddhist is Inconclusive:—

TEXTS (3297-3298).

"In the case of a thing that has been apprehended at some time or the other, it is possible that there may be doubt; as for instance, in the case of the Post, which partakes of the nature of both factors (of the doubt); because the Post and the Man have both been seen somewhere, therefore it is possible that there should be doubt as to its being this or that. The Omniscient Person, however, has never been thus perceived.”—

(3297-3298)

COMMENTARY.

When a certain thing has been seen somewhere previously,—in regard to that alone, there may be doubt—e.g. in regard to the Post,—and not in
regard to anything else; because it is the Post which partakes of the nature of both (Man and Post).—If it were not so, then Doubts may arise in regard to even those things that have never been seen; so that the condition necessary for all Doubt—viz. the partaking of the nature of both factors,—would not be present.—Thus it is only right that there should be doubt in regard to the existence of Fire in the Iron-ball;—not so in regard to the Omniscient Person; as such a person has never been perceived.—(3297-3298)

The Author's answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXT (3299).

IN THIS MANNER, O CLEVER MAN, THE NON-EXISTENCE OF YOUR MOTHER'S MARRIAGE BECOMES ESTABLISHED 'FREE FROM ALL DOUBT'.—(3299)

COMMENTARY.

If the idea is that there can be Doubt only in regard to a thing that has been perceived some time or the other,—and in regard to all other things there should be certainty of non-existence,—then under that principle, the non-existence of your mother's marriage becomes established, beyond all doubt; because you have never before perceived that marriage; by virtue of which there could be no certainty regarding its non-existence.

The rest of the objection is to be answered as before.

'Clever man'—is said in derision.—(3299)

Says the Opponent—''If such be the case, then there can be no basis for Doubt at all''.

Answer:—

TEXT (3300).

WE HOLD THAT THERE IS DOUBT ALSO WHEN THERE IS NO VALID COGNITION; IT ARISES IN REGARD TO existence AS WELL AS NON-EXISTENCE, FROM THE ABSENCE OF THE OPERATION OF ANY OF THE MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION.

—(3300)

COMMENTARY.

The 'absence of the operation of any Means of Right Cognition' can always be shown in regard to both existence and non-existence of things; hence there can be no restriction in this matter. Hence our explanation is that Doubt arises whenever there is no certainty (regarding either existence or non-existence). This has been thus declared—'Doubt is that wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one
The following might be urged—"In no case is it found that the Means of Cognition are not applicable to both existence and non-existence of a thing".
The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXTS (3301-3302).**

*When there is a defect in the eye, there is no cognition, even though the thing is there; and even when the eye is free from defects, there is no cognition, because the thing is not there;—as in the case of things like the jar.—Thus, inasmuch as mere non-apprehension (absence of cognition) is found in both cases, it is far better to hold that it is doubt that arises from the non-apprehension of the omniscient person.—*(3301-3302)*

**COMMENTARY.**

Even when the object, jar for instance, is there, if the man is without the eye, he has no cognition of it;—so also, even when the eye is perfect, if the object is not there,—in the sense that it is not close by,—there is no cognition of it; this clause has to be construed here also;—this is just what happens in the case of the jar which is not there in a suitable place.

'Mere non-apprehension'—i.e. non-apprehension without the qualification of 'perceptibility' of the thing concerned.

'Found in both cases'—i.e. in the case of existence and in the case of non-existence.

'Tat'—Therefore.

'It is far better, etc. etc.'—better than searching for a perfect source. For instance, when things have had the idea of their being due to a perfect source cut off by wrong cognition,—there may be a desire to look out for the perfect source; as has been declared in the words—'Two perceptions describe the junction, and two perceptions give rise to the desire' (?)—It is for this reason that our Teachers affirm the presence of doubt in such cases, in the words—'If it is asked what is the proof for His existence?—the answer is that, for this same reason, let the matter remain in doubt'.—*(3301-3302)*

The following might be urged—"If the omniscient person exists, why is He not seen by any one at any time? If the view is that He can never be cognisable by men of limited vision,—even so, why is it that no action of His is ever perceived by any one? Even though the visual organ itself is not perceptible, its action, in the shape of the visual perception, is not necessarily inapprehensible".

The answer to this is as follows:
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TEXTS (3303–3306).

THOUGH EXISTENT, HE WOULD NOT BE SEEN DIRECTLY BY DULL-WITTED PERSONS; JUST LIKE THE CONCEPTIONS OF OTHER PEOPLE. NOR IS HE CONSTANTLY ACTIVE, JUST AS THE FIRE IN THE IRON-BALL IS NOT ACTIVE. EVEN WHEN THERE, HIS ACTIVITY WOULD NOT BE PERCEPTIBLE, LIKE THE FEELING OF LOVE ARISING IN OTHERS OUT OF THEIR FANCIES. EVEN IF HIS ACTIVITY WOULD BE PERCEPTIBLE, HIS CONNECTION WITH SUCH ACTION WOULD NOT BE COGNISED; BECAUSE THE PERSON KNOWING ALL THINGS IS ALWAYS IMPERCEPTIBLE FOR PEOPLE WHOSE EYE OF COGNITION IS DULL. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT HIS EXISTENCE CANNOT BE PROVED BY MEANS OF INFERENCE. IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT THERE CAN BE NO ‘CAUSE’ OR ‘PERVADER’ IN HIS CASE. AND YET IT HAS BEEN SEEN THAT EVEN WHEN THE INFERENCE OF THE THING IS NOT POSSIBLE, THE THING DOES EXIST. THUS IT IS THAT THE MATTER (OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON) REMAINS IN DOUBT.—(3303–3306)

COMMENTARY.

‘Sākṣāt’, ‘Directly’, is to be construed with ‘Nēkṣyāta’, ‘would not be seen’.

As a matter of fact, there is nothing that must be cognised once,—on the basis of which it could be argued that “because there is no Cognition of the Omniscient Person, He cannot exist” ;—because the conception of one man, though existent, is not cognised by other men. Nor is it necessary that causes should always be bringing about their effects,—on the ground whereof it could be argued that—“as the action of the Omniscient Person is not perceptible, He cannot exist”; because it is found that even when the Fire in the Red Hot Iron has not begun to produce Smoke, it is still seen there.

Granting (for the sake of argument) that Causes are constantly active in bringing about their Effects; even so, there can be no certainty regarding the absence of those Effects; because all the Effects that are produced are not always perceived; and it is only if it were so, that the non-perception of the Effect could prove the non-existence of the Cause; because, even when produced, the Effect is not always perceived;—‘as in the case of the Love proceeding from fancies, in other men’; in the case of another person, it is found that though Love has been produced in his mind by fancies regarding the agreeable character of things,—such Love is not perceived by other men; and yet it is not regarded as non-existent.

Or, even in cases where the effect is perceived, if its cause is something imperceptible,—and the observer is unable to perceive its affirmative and negative concomitances,—no inference of that cause is possible. Similarly even when the Omniscient Person is there, it is quite possible that His existence cannot be proved by Inference.

‘People whose eye of Cognition is dull.’ The Cognition is the Eye; and those whose this eye is dull.
Then again, it has been pointed out before that the Means of Cognition cannot be the 'cause' or the 'pervader' of things; how then, can the absence of Inference—which is neither the 'cause' nor the 'pervader' of the thing in question (the Omniscient Person)—lead to the absence of that thing?—The compound 'ahātavyāpakam' is Copulative—what is 'not cause—nor pervader'.

Nor can it be asserted that—"when the Means of Cognition called 'Inference' is inoperative,—even though it is neither the 'Cause' nor the 'Pervader' of the thing concerned,—the thing is actually found to be non-existent; and there can be nothing incongruous in what is actually seen".

In view of such an assertion, the Text adds—'Even when the Inference is not possible, etc. etc.'—Even when the Inference is not there, the thing in question has been found to exist; as in the case of the Red-hot Iron-Ball; as has been pointed out already.—(3303–3306)

Having thus shown in detail that there is no possibility of any proof in support of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person,—the author sums up his view:—

TEXT (3307).

THUS, THEN, THERE IS NOTHING THAT CAN SET ASIDE THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON; THE PROOF IN SUPPORT OF HIS EXISTENCE IS GOING TO BE ADDEDUCED LATER ON.—(3307)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—"as there is no proof for setting aside the Person, so you have none in support of His existence".

The answer to this is that—'The proof in support, etc. etc.'—(3307)

It has been argued by the other party under Text 3138, that—"If an attempt were made to prove that one has the knowledge of the details of all the individuals and components of the whole world,—it would be futile".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3308).

IT IS WITH A TOTALLY DIFFERENT MOTIVE THAT THE WISE BUDDHISTS MAKE AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS, —EVEN THOUGH SUCH ATTEMPT PROVE FUTILE.—(3308)

COMMENTARY.

'With a different motive'—with another intention.—(3308)

Question:—"What is that motive?"

Answer:—
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TEXT (3309).

What is primarily and directly understood by us is that there is a Person who knows the means of attaining Heaven and Liberation;—but not this alone; it is also believed that there is a Person who also knows all things.—(3309).

COMMENTARY.

What we are primarily concerned with proving is the fact that the Blessed Lord knows the means of attaining Heaven and Liberation; as for the proving of the fact of His knowing all things, without exception, that is done only incidentally; what we mean is that in matters other than Heaven and Liberation also, the knowledge of the Blessed Lord is not hampered by obstacles, and hence knowing all things, if He becomes Omniscient, there is nothing to prevent it. Hence it is not right for the wise to deny such omniscience; but for those who seek to be sure of the omniscience, it is only right that they should try to secure that certainty. This is what is meant by us.—(3309)

Thus then, there being no proof against the existence of the Omniscient Person,—and clear proof of His existence going to be set forth later on,—the definite denial that you make of the Omniscient Person, whose recognition is certain, can be due only to delusion.

This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (3310).

Thus then, there being no reasons against, while there is clear reason in support of it,—why should dull-witted persons object to the idea of the Omniscient Person?—(3310)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"We deny the Omniscient Person because we think that there is no proof in support of the existence of such a Person; and we do not deny Him through delusion".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3311).

Even if there be no proof in support of it,—so long as there is no reason definitely against it,—the matter should remain in doubt; on what could this certainty of these people be based?—(3311)

COMMENTARY.

What is said here is on granting the position of the Opponent for the sake of argument; in reality, there is definite proof in support, as is going to be shown later on.
‘This certainty’—i.e. the certainty of the Mīmāṃsakas that “the Omniscient Person does not exist.”—(3311)

The following assertion has been made by you Mīmāṃsakas—“The Veda can make known such things as the past, the present, the future, the subtle, the hidden and so forth; which cannot be done by any other Sense-organ” (Shabara-Bhāṣya 1. 1. 2).—This is also a mere assertion without any reason,—based upon sheer faith.—This is what is shown in the following:

TEXT (3312).

THE ASSERTION THAT—“THE VEDA ALONE—AND NOTHING ELSE—IS ABLE TO PROVIDE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST, ETC.—COULD BE TRUE ONLY IF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE OTHER SOURCES WERE CERTAIN.—(3312)

COMMENTARY.

‘Nothing else’—in the shape of Perception by the Omniscient Person and so forth.

‘The non-existence of other sources’;—if it were quite certain that the other source, in the shape of the Omniscient Person is non-existent,—then alone, not otherwise, could it be reasonable to make the above assertion; as any such restriction would, under the circumstances, be meaningless.—(3312)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Texts 3140-3141 that—“By proving the existence of the Person knowing only Dharma and Adharma whom the Buddhist postulates, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXTS (3313-3314).

THE PROOF IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSON KNOWING PRIMORDIAL MATTER AND THE SPIRIT AND OTHER THINGS, AS ALSO OF THE PERSON KNOWING ALL THINGS, HAS BEEN ALREADY DECLARED BEFORE, AND LATER ON ANOTHER PROOF ALSO IS GOING TO BE SET FORTH.

—HENCE IT IS NOT FOR NOTHING THAT PEOPLE TAKE THE TROUBLE OF PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF THE PERSON KNOWING THE MINUTE DETAILS OF THE WHOLE WORLD, BY MEANS OF ENTHUSIASTIC TREATISES AND DISCUSSIONS.—(3313-3314)

COMMENTARY.

When we try to prove the existence of the Omniscient Person, we do not give up all considerations regarding that Person Himself; in fact our
effort is directed towards the proving of the existence of the Person who knows the principal factor of Dharma itself. Thus on a previous occasion, under Text 3267, we have set forth the proof, in the shape of Presumption, in due accordance with your own view,—where we pointed out that 'your denial of the Omniscient Person is set aside by the acceptance of the knower of Dharma, on the strength of Presumption';—and we are also going to set forth another proof, in the shape of Inference.—It is not for nothing that people take all this trouble,—in fact, it is for a very right and proper purpose.—(3313-3314)

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, under Text 3142, that—“Perception and the other Means of Cognition regarding the Omniscient Person having been discarded, it would follow that Morality and Immorality are cognisable through the reliable Word only”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3315).

**As Perception and other Means of Cognition regarding the Omniscient Person cannot be discarded, it does not follow that Morality and Immorality are cognisable through the reliable Word only.**—(3315)

**COMMENTARY.**

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, under Text 3143, that—“this alone being sufficient to establish the doctrine of the Mimāmsaka, if an attempt is made to refute the existence of the Omniscient Person, it is like an attempt to kill what is already dead.”

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3316).

**The doctrine of the Mimāmsaka being thus demolished, the attempt that the other party has made to refute the Omniscient Person has been made through sheer stupidity.**—(3316)

**COMMENTARY.**

'Demolished'—By the existence of the Omniscient Person being established.

'Other party'—the Mimāmsakas.—(3316)

It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka under Text 3144, that—“The Person cognisant of Dharma having been refuted, on the ground of his very
root being cut off,—if people go on asserting the existence of Omniscient Persons, it is like the thumping of husks”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3317).

The ‘Person cognisant of Dharma’ not being refuted, on account of the root not being cut off,—if people have asserted the existence of Omniscient Persons they have shown their wisdom by this.—(3317)

COMMENTARY.

There is an ‘a’ suppressed before ‘haté’.
‘People’—The Buddhists.—(3317)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 3145, that—“If the Person had the direct perception of all things, then He would have direct knowledge of such tastes, etc. also as are unclean; who could assume the existence of such an Omniscient Person? ”

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3318-3319).

If the Omniscient Person had experienced the unclean taste, etc. through the contact of his gestatory organ, then alone could He be regarded as blameworthy. As a matter of fact however, things,—even those that are deprecated under ‘illusion’,—become cognised by Him without actual contact, through the Mind, whose perceptiveness has been brought about by the impressions of past experiences.—(3318-3319)

COMMENTARY.

If the Omniscient Person had direct experience of the said tastes, etc.—even then that would not detract from His being the ‘knower of Dharma’.
—If it is urged that—“He would become blameworthy”,—the answer is as follows:—The man who experiences the said Taste, etc. through the direct contact of these with the gestatory organ, becomes blameworthy; the Blessed Lord, however, has no such perception; He perceives things only
through the Mind, and that also without its coming into contact with the thing; hence He is not regarded by people as blameworthy.

As a matter of fact, there is no one who is really blameworthy; because 'blame' is not something fixed, it is relative; for instance, what may be 'blameworthy' for the Vedic Scholar, is not so for the low-born; what happens in the world is that, under the spell of Illusion, Wine and such things are considered evil. But even so, if the Blessed Lord perceived these, He would not be 'blameworthy'; because His perception of these is purely mental.

The following might be urged—"When other people suffer from tasting wine through its contact with the Gestatory Organ, so would He suffer from experiencing it through the Mind".

That is not so. When the Taste, etc. are experienced through the contact of the Sense-organs, they either benefit or injure that organ and hence become sources of pain, etc.; but they are known to be the source of pain and suffering, not for all men, but only for some men whose mind has become disordered through the influence of their past misdeeds. For instance, Water becomes Puṣa for only some dead people, not for all.—All this, however, is not there in the case of the Blessed Lord. Because His experiences being through the Mind, there is no possibility of injury to the Sense-organs; specially because the Lord having all his five-fold activity free from the impurities of the 'Afflictions',—there is no possibility of his actions being influenced by the Afflictions. Nor is His Mind capable of being disordered, because He cognises all things in their right form and as evanescent. For these reasons, in the case of the Blessed Lord, there is no possibility of even mental pain, in the shape of unhappiness, etc.; specially because all these have their source in delusion.

All these objections, however, arise only if the External World exists; under the doctrine of Idealism, there is no room for all this at all.—For instance, for Idealists, there being no Colour-phase, there can be nothing 'unclean' for them in reality; nor can there be any impression due to that; because all this arises from Ideas only. All these therefore do not appear within range of the vision of persons who have realised the Highest Truth and have shaken off all impurities; just as, on being cured of visual disorder, people do not have any illusory cognitions like the 'Hair-tuft' and the like. This has been thus declared:—'The unclean Taste and other things manifest themselves only through Ignorance; hence they are imperceptible (for the Wise One); just like the second Moon'.

On the other hand, the Brāhmaṇa has resounding within his mouth, the words of the Veda, which, being all-pervading, are in contact with all unclean places; as such, how can he be free from blame?—(3318-3319)

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 3146, that—"The words of Buddha and others are not found to provide any knowledge of what is contained in the Vedas, etc. ;—how then can such persons be regarded as omniscient, without reason?"

The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (3320-3321).

It is because no word of Tāyin are found to provide knowledge of things mentioned in the Veda, that He is ‘omniscient’. It is quite possible too that He had knowledge of all false philosophical doctrines also; as He does make the declaration that what is asserted in the Veda regarding the Soul and other things is wrong.—(3320-3321)

COMMENTARY.

A man becomes ‘omniscient’ by knowing everything exactly as it exists, in its true or other forms; and things that are spoken of in the Veda do not exist exactly as described there; as they are found to be annulled by proofs. How then could man be a ‘knower of truth’ by expounding things exactly as they are taught in the Veda?—It cannot be asserted that the Buddha did not know these things at all—not even as false; because they were actually known to Him as such. For instance, it has been pointed out by Him that Animal-sacrifice and other evil paths of action lead to damnation; He says—‘There is no such thing as the Soul, all those things that are there are the effects of causes’; where He has declared that the Soul and other things are non-existent. Thus it is not true that the Blessed Lord had no knowledge of the things taught in the Veda.—(3320-3321)

It has been argued by the Mīmāmsakā under Text 3147, that—“If things not mentioned in one’s own books were held to be known to him, then, by merely composing one’s own poems, poets would be omniscient.”

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3322).

The doctrine of ‘No-soul’ has been clearly taught by Him for the benefit of His disciples—the doctrine which is the unique gateway to the Highest Good, and the fright of all upholders of wrong doctrines.—(3322)

COMMENTARY.

‘Unique’,—because not understood by other philosophers; all these being enmeshed in the false doctrines of the Soul. All these qualifications apply to the ‘doctrine of No-soul’.

‘Gateway to the Highest Good’;—it is so called because it is the means of entering Nirvāṇa; it is Nirvāṇa that is meant by the term ‘shiva’, ‘Highest Good’,
'Kudṛṣṭinām'—Those upholding wrong doctrines, regarding the Soul and other things.—The Path taught by Buddha is the 'fright'—inspires fear in those childish people who have their faith fixed in false doctrines.—This has been thus declared—'The childish man is always beset with such fears as—I am not, I may cease to exist, naught is mine, nothing shall be mine; the wise one is without fear'.

What is meant by this is that men who are obsessed with false doctrines cannot even speak of the True Doctrine, how can they understand it?—(3322)

The following Texts point out that the True Doctrine has never been known before by people at the stage of the common man:

**TEXTS (3323-3324).**

**IT IS NOT KNOWN TO THE WORLDLY MAN; WHEN KNOWN, IT SETS ASIDE ALL EVIL; FOR THOSE WHO ARE DEVOTED TO ITS PRACTICE, IT IS A VERITABLE MINE OF VALUABLE QUALITIES. IF THE POETS KNOW THIS HIGHEST TRUTH, THEN WHO IS THERE WHO WOULD NOT REGARD THEM, KNOWING THE PRIMORDIAL MATTER, THE SPIRIT AND OTHER THINGS, AS OMNISCIENT?—(3323-3324)**

**COMMENTARY.**

'Not known to'—not practised by—'worldly man'—common people.

*Question:* 'In what way does it benefit people—that it has been taught by the Lord?'

*Answer:* 'When known, etc. etc.'—when it becomes 'known'—directly and realised,—it sets aside the whole lot of evils, such as the Afflictions, Birth and so forth. Even subsequently, when it is *practised*, it brings about excellent qualities.

If such a truth, leading as it does to the fulfilment of the Highest Good, is known to the Poets,—they may very well be 'omniscient'; we do not for a moment think that omniscience is confined to a single Person; in fact, whoever is cognisant of the said Truth, he alone, no one else, is held by us to be omniscient. Such knowledge, however, does not belong to the Poets; hence the contingency that has been urged does not arise.—(3323-3324)

The following Texts show that what has been just said disposes of what has been urged by the other Party under *Text* 3148, to the effect that—'There being many Omniscient Persons, imparting mutually contradictory teachings,—how can any one be singled out as the One Omniscient Person?'
This knowledge of the doctrine of 'No-soul' as described does not belong to Vardhamāna and others; in fact, all philosophers have become lost in the doctrine of the 'Soul'.—All such doctrines as the 'Syādvāda' and others involving the notions of things being not-momentary, are discarded by direct perception; how then can persons who have asserted many such unreasonable things be 'omniscient'? People who tremble over things that are perceptible and known even to the ploughman,—how could they ever have any clear knowledge of things that are beyond the senses? Thus the fact of these persons being not-omniscient is clearly understood from their being attached to wrong doctrines and expounding wrong teachings; just in the same way as any other man who perceives the man in the Post is said to be mistaken.—One is to be recognised as omniscient only when he has been found to satisfy all tests and all reasons, and has been found to have the true knowledge of all things.—Thus then our Reason should not be regarded as being one whose contrary is open to doubt.—(3325–3330)

COMMENTARY.

If the said knowledge of Truth belonged to Vardhamāna, Kapīla and others,—then they also might be omniscient. As a matter of fact however, all these persons have been held in the clutches of the crocodile of the false doctrine of the 'Soul', which is the root of all evil,—and have taught that things are not-momentary and so forth, which are all annulled by Perception and other forms of Cognition;—being thus found to be tripping even in regard to things known even to the veriest child, how could their knowledge of supersensuous things ever fall within range of possibility,—in view of which it could be asked—"what proof is there that Kapīla is not omniscient?" [as has been asked by the other party under Text 3149].—Because there is the following proof available which can be clearly stated:—People who are attached to false doctrines cannot be omniscient;—e.g. the man who mistakes the Post for the Man;—Vardhamāna and others are actually attached to false doctrines;—hence there is apprehension of something pervaded by its contradictory; as 'attachment to false doctrines' is pervaded by 'being non-omniscient', which is the contradictory of 'omniscience'.—The Reason here put forward cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible'; because by all sorts of tests it has been shown that all these Teachers have taught false doctrines.—Nor can the Reason be said to be 'inconclusive', on the ground of its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being doubtful; because omniscience has been held to depend upon the full knowledge of all things without exception; and a person who possesses True Knowledge can never have any false idea of things at all.—(3325–3330)
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The following might be urged—"If these Teachers have taught false doctrines,—even so, it cannot be deduced from this that they are addicted to the false notions of things; because it is open to men to act contrary to their convictions,—the tendencies of men being peculiarly divergent; consequently, your Reason is 'doubtful—hence—inadmissible'."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3331).

IF THE ASSERTION OF THESE TEACHERS REGARDING THE 'Syādvāda'
AND OTHER DOCTRINES BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MADE WITH
SOME (OTHER) MOTIVE,—THEN (WE ASK)—WHAT IS THAT
FORM OF THINGS WHICH THEY HOLD TO BE
REAL AND TRUE?—(3331)

COMMENTARY.

If it be said that—"it is with some other motive that these Teachers have asserted the doctrines of Syādvāda, etc., which are against all canons of truth";—then (our answer is that) let them assert the doctrines; we do not wish to prove that Vardhamāna, etc. are, by themselves, non-omniscient; all that we have done is to put forward the diversity of opinion among these Teachers, as a proof in answer to the question that you, taking your stand upon the mutually contradictory doctrines taught by Kapila and others, have asked—"If Buddha is omniscient, what is the proof that Kapila is not so?" Hence our Reason cannot be 'inadmissible'.

Then again, if what has been asserted by them has some other motive behind it, then it behoves you to explain what, according to them, is the real nature of things.—(3331)

TEXTS (3332-3333).

"THERE IS NO SOUL;—THINGS ARE MOMENTARY AND SO FORTH."—IF THAT IS SO, THESE TEACHERS ARE OMNISCIENT; BECAUSE THEY HAVE DIRECTLY PERCEIVED THE TRUE NATURE OF ALL THINGS. IN THAT CASE THEY ARE ALL OMNISCIENT, HOLDING THE SAME VIEW OF THINGS. AS FOR THE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY TEACHINGS, THEY NEVER EXPONDED ANY SUCH TEACHINGS,—THEY MEANT SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT.—(3332-3333)

COMMENTARY.

Being questioned as above, the other Party answers—"The correct teaching according to these Teachers is that there is no soul, things are momentary, and so forth".
If this is the answer, then it means that there is no difference of opinion between these Teachers and Buddha; hence our Reason would not be ‘inadmissible’.

The Author therefore says in his reply—‘If that is so, etc. etc.’—We do not mean to point our finger to any one Person and say that ‘He is omniscient’, we only assert it in a general way that ‘there are omniscient persons’. If it is admitted that Kapila and others also have the said knowledge of truth, then you should not say—‘why is there a difference of opinion between the two’?—Because under the circumstances, they would all be of the same opinion.

Then, as regards the mutually contradictory teachings of these Teachers, it will have to be interpreted in some other way; for people holding the same opinions cannot expound contradictory teachings; the only right view is that all of them expound only the true nature of things. Hence whenever one meets with a diversity of opinion, he should understand that its meaning is something quite different.

In case they are held to be holders of divergent opinions, there can be no room for the question—‘who is the one to be selected as omniscient?’ (as has been asked by the other party in Text 3148). Because in that case Sugata (Buddha) would be selected as the only person possessing the said knowledge and hence being omniscient,—and no other person could be so regarded.—(3332-3333)

Then again, if Kapila and others are accepted as holding the said opinion regarding things, then they become Buddhas themselves.—This is what is pointed out in the following:

**TEXTS (3334-3335).**

*The Buddhas are omniscient only because they have the direct knowledge of truth regarding all things, as explained above.*

*If then this same knowledge belongs to the other Teachers also, then they also are ‘Buddhas’ and their ‘Buddha-hood’ does not differ from that of the Buddha; because they also possess perfect knowledge, and this is the sole characteristic of the Buddha.—(3334-3335)*

**COMMENTARY.**

The ‘Truth’ whose character has been explained as consisting in there being no Soul, etc. etc.

‘Tēsām’—of Vardhamāna and others.

‘This’—i.e. possessing perfect knowledge.

‘Tasya’—of Buddha-hood. Because that person is called ‘Sugata’ (Buddha) who has attained the perfect knowledge of there being no Soul, and has got rid of all that obscures the right view of things.—(3334-3335)
Further, even if what is proved is omniscience in general, by implication it becomes recognised as belonging to the Blessed Lord only.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (3336).

Thus, though the Omniscient Person whose existence has been proved is only such a Person in general, yet in reality, it is Buddha alone who stands out as the only such person; as it is only He in whom all the characteristics of the Omniscient Person are present.—(3336)

COMMENTARY.

'Tat'—Thus, therefore 'As it is, etc. etc.'; because it is only He in whom all the characteristics of the Omniscient Person are present.—(3336)

Question:—"Without such specification, how can this idea be got at?"
Answer:—

TEXT (3337).

Even when one is specifically singled out, that Person alone could be Omniscient who knows the whole world in its real form of 'being without Soul' and the rest.—(3337)

COMMENTARY.

Though the definition of the Omniscient Person is stated in the general form that—'That Person is Omniscient who knows the whole world in its real form of being without Soul and the rest',—it follows by implication that the particular person who fulfills the conditions of this definition is meant to be Omniscient; and hence it is not necessary to specify that Person. As a matter of fact, it is only our Blessed Lord—and none else—who fulfills all the conditions of the said definition of the 'Omniscient Person'; as it is only He who has expounded in various ways the truth regarding what should be sought for and what rejected,—along with the means of the same, in the shape of the 'Four Truths' in their perfect form. If a man does not know a thing, he cannot expound teachings that are perfect and true as regards the real state of that thing.—This has been thus declared—'The expounding of the imperceptible to be secured and the means thereof is an extremely difficult task'.—(3337)

Question:—"Even though He knows the World as soul-less, etc. how does he become omniscient?"
Answer:—
TEXT (3338).

WHEN ONE HAS PERCEIVED THE FACT OF THERE BEING NO Soul,—NO DEFECT CAN OBTAIN A FOOTING IN HIM; BECAUSE IT IS ITS CONTRADICTORY. JUST AS WHEN THE BRIGHT LAMP IS THERE, THERE CAN BE NO DARKNESS.—(3338)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Omniscience follows from the removal of Hindrance of Afflictions and the Hindrance of cognisable things;—it is the Afflictions themselves, in the form of Love, Hate, etc.—which obstruct the perception of the real nature of things,—which are called 'the cover of the Afflictions'; and 'the cover of cognisable things' consists in the want of capacity to discern all about things to be secured and to be rejected, and also the inability to describe them. Of these two, 'the cover of the Afflictions' is removed by the direct perception of the fact of there being no Soul; and 'the cover of cognisable things' is removed by the faithful and intense and long-continued meditation upon the said Soul-less-ness. All these Afflictions—Love, Hate and the rest—have their root in wrong notions of the Soul, as has been found through positive and negative concomitance; and they do not proceed from the external things; because, even when the external thing is there, the said Afflictions do not appear without feelings of agreeableness, etc. (?) ; and conversely, even when the external thing is not there, they appear, when the man is face to face with agreeableness, etc. (?) ; and when the presence and absence of one thing do not follow the presence and absence of another thing, this latter cannot be the cause of the former; if it were so, there would be incongruities.

Nor can these Afflictions subsist in the Soul postulated by other philosophers; because such a Soul has been already rejected.—But even if such a Soul existed, there would be constant appearance of the Afflictions of Love, etc.; because the Soul, which ex-hypothesis, is the cause of the appearance and continuance of the Afflictions, would be always present in its perfect form; specially as the Eternal Cause cannot have any potencies imposed upon it by anything else, it could not stand in need of the help of anything else. All this has been discussed in several places.—Further, as one and the same thing has been denied to be the substratum of both the existent and the non-existent, it cannot be right to hold that these Afflictions subsist in anything.—From all this it follows that these Afflictions cannot be related to any Eternal Cause.

Nor can they proceed from the external things. They really proceed from the wrong notion of the 'Soul'. For instance, unless one has the notion of 'I', he cannot have self-love; and unless he has the notion of 'mine', he cannot have the idea of anything being conducive to bringing pleasure to himself, and he cannot be attached to it as his 'own'; Hatred also towards anything does not appear unless one recognises that it is conducive to
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bringing pain to himself; because there can be hatred against what is not harmful to what is his own, or against what removes that harm.

Similarly with regard to Name, etc. also.

From all this it is clear that the notion of 'Soul', which has persisted from time without beginning, having been brought about, the repeated notion of similar 'Souls' is what produces the notion of 'one's own'; these two produce Love for 'one's own'; this produces Hatred and the rest; from this positive and negative concomitance, it is clearly known to all men, down to the very cowherd, that all these Afflictions—Love, etc.—have their root in the notion of 'one's own', which proceeds from the notion of one's self or soul.

Contrary to this idea of 'Soul' is the idea of 'No-Soul'; because this rests upon a form quite the reverse of the former. It is incompatible too that both these—Soul and No-Soul—should be identical or co-exist in any one 'Chain'; because these are as contrary to each other as the notions of 'serpent' and 'rope' with regard to the same object. Thus the doctrine of 'No-soul' being contrary to the doctrine of 'Soul', it becomes contrary to—incompatible with—Love, Hatred and other Afflictions also; just as Fire is contrary to the shivering caused by cold. Consequently, when one has directly realised the doctrine of 'No-soul'—which is incompatible with all Defects and Aberrations,—its contrary—in the shape of the whole host Love and other defects—ceases to exist; just as Darkness ceases in a place flooded with light. It is in this way that the 'cover of Afflictions' becomes set aside by the realisation of the doctrine of 'No-soul'.

The argument may be formulated thus:—When the contrary of a certain thing obtains a footing at a certain place, then that thing itself cannot secure a footing,—e.g. Darkness does not secure a footing at a place flooded with lamp-light;—there is perception of 'No-soul', which is contrary to the whole host of defects, in the Person who has realised the doctrine of 'No-soul'; hence there is apprehension of the contrary.

The following might be urged—"When the mind is obsessed with the idea of 'No-Soul', there is no room for the appearance of its contrary, the idea of the 'Soul'; similarly there is no room for the appearance of the idea of 'No-soul' when the Mind is obsessed with the idea of the 'Soul'; because the incompatibility rests equally in both. Consequently (as practically all men have their minds obsessed with the idea of 'Soul') no one could have the idea of 'No-soul' at all; and to that extent your Reason is 'inadmissible'.—There may or may not be the idea of 'No-soul'; even as these two—'Soul' and 'No-soul' are not absolutely destructive of one another,—as is the case with Love and Hate, or Pleasure and Pain. Then again, what you have sought to prove is the absolute destruction (removal) of one by the other, and not mere absence of co-existence; hence your Reason is also 'Inconclusive'. As a matter of fact, too, we find Love, Hate and the rest appearing in their full force even in good men. For this reason also, your Reason is 'Inconclusive'."

It is not so,—we reply. If it were absolutely impossible for the conception of the doctrine of 'No-soul' to appear in the 'chain' of a man whose
Afflictions have not been destroyed,—then there would be no room for the appearance of the notion of 'No-soul'; as a matter of fact, however, it is a fact of common experience that the notion of 'No-soul' presents itself before all men; and when this same notion is pondered over, it reaches to high stages,—just like the conception of a young woman,—and subsequently becomes quite clearly perceptible, and ultimately reaches the stage of direct perception,—as envisaging a directly perceived thing; how then can it be impossible for the notion of 'No-soul' to appear in the mind of men?

Then again, in a place wrapped in darkness, there is possibility of light appearing after some time;—so here also why should not there be the possibility of the appearance of the notion of 'No-soul'?

It cannot be said that "the said conception of 'No-soul' cannot appear in any man;—which could lead to the appearance of the perceptual Cognition".—Because, the reason has to be pointed out why this is not possible.

For instance, what would be the reason for no use being made of the said conception? Would it lie in the fact of no one wanting it,—and all activity of sane men being accompanied by some desire?—Or, even if they desire it, the sane man does not have recourse to activity, because he has no knowledge of what has got to be avoided,—and unless a Defect is known, it cannot be avoided.—Or, even though he knows the Defect, the man knows that the Defect is permanent and hence does not put forth any effort to remove it, because what is permanent cannot be removed.—Or, even if the Defects are not permanent, one recognises the fact of their having no cause and desists from any activity towards their removal,—because what is self-sufficient can never be set aside.—Or, even though they have causes, there is no certain knowledge of such causes, and hence one does not pay any heed to the said conception,—because, as in the case of disease, it could not be removed until its cause were definitely ascertained?—Or, even if their cause is known, is it that the intelligent man knows that cause to be eternal and hence does not dare to try to remove it,—because if the cause is present in its efficient condition, the effect cannot be restrained?—Or even though the cause is non-eternal, the man, seeing that Defects are inherent in all living beings, does not make an attempt to remove them,—because what forms the very nature of the thing cannot be set aside.—Or, if the Defects do not form part of the nature of the beings, the man desists because there are no means of removing them,—because unless the means is there, the end cannot be attained;—or, even if the means are there, its use would be impossible, because the man does not know them,—because what is not known cannot be used.—Or even though he knows the means, he does not employ them because he considers it impossible for the conception to reach—by jumping as it were,—the highest stage, on account of there being no re-birth, and hence the conception would continue to remain at the same stage at which it has already reached.—Or even granting that the conception does reach the highest stage, and by this appearance of their contrary, the Defects become destroyed;—but even so, he thinks that, like the solidity of Copper and other metals, it may be that the Defects are bound to appear again and hence he does not try to remove them?
Now, it cannot be admitted that the man does not want it (the removal of Defects). Because those persons whose minds are beset with sufferings due to Birth and other causes, and frightened at the prospect of Births and Rebirths,—do certainly want to have peace of mind; and when these people have acquired the true understanding of Disciples, this fear of Birth and Rebirth itself becomes the cause of their desire to seek for the conception of 'No-soul'. Those people who, by reason of belonging to a particular family, are by their nature bent upon doing good to others,—when they find the world suffering from the three kinds of Pain beginning with Tendencies and Dispositions, they are moved to compassion and begin to suffer for the sufferings of others; and giving up all idea of benefiting themselves, they come to look upon all living beings as their own 'self', and then concentrate themselves upon removing their sufferings; and in the case of these men, the said compassion itself is the cause of the appearance of the conception in question. Because it is extremely difficult to know and speak of what is imperceptible and its cause.—If it is asked—"What is the use in any sane man doing what is good for others?"—the answer is that the same doing good is the use or purpose; as this is highly desirable in itself.—Nor will this mean dependence upon others. Because the wish to do good to one's self is based upon the assumed knowledge of the Soul; and doing good to others has been regarded by all good men as leading to desirable results. Then again, what the other party began to prove was the impossibility of any one wishing to proceed with the conception; well, even if he were an unintelligent person, why should he not wish to undertake even this much of activity? Hence he should have to say that "no one ever acts towards helping others, because it does not serve any useful purpose for himself". And the impossibility of such a view has been already explained.—Further, while there are some people who are found to be past masters in the art of cruelty, taking delight in injuring others, without rhyme or reason, and pleased at the suffering of others,—there are yet others who are past masters in the art of mercy, taking delight in the happiness of others, pained at the suffering of others, —without any other cause; why should this not be possible?

Nor is there no knowledge of the nature of the Defects (to be removed). Because all such Afflictions and Defects as Love, Hatred, Delusion, Pride, Arrogance, Jealousy, Envy, etc.—following upon Calamities, Disappointments, the prosperity of one's own self and that of persons related to him,—are such as have their nature fully known, as they continue to appear and disappear.

Nor are these Defects eternal; because they are always found to appear occasionally.—For the same reason, they cannot be without cause; because what has no cause does not depend upon anything else and hence cannot suffer any restrictions of time, place and character.—This same reason also sets aside the idea that their causes are eternal. Because the cause, in the shape of the Soul, etc., would be always there, and they would be independent of other things, as being eternal, they could not have any peculiar potency added to them; and under the circumstances, all the effects emanating from those causes themselves would be liable to be appearing simultaneously. From all this it follows, by implication, that their causes must be non-eternal.—And this non-eternal cause of the Defects also is one whose form is well-known.
Because the host of Defects like Love, Hatred and the like have their cause in the reverses experienced by one's own self and also by people related to himself; as they always appear in accordance with the positive and negative concomitance of these latter.

Nor can the Defects be regarded as inherent in all living beings; because those living beings themselves are not admitted; in fact there is no object in the shape of the 'living being', whose properties these Defects—Love, etc.—could be. It is only something set up by Conception as something spoken of as 'this', as the whole idea of quality and qualified is purely conceptual (fanciful).—If it be held that the Defects are to be regarded as the properties of living beings, because they are subjective in character—or because they are produced in the mind,—then also there is 'inadmissibility' and 'inconclusiveness'. For instance, if the other party wishes to regard the Defects as objects and the Mind as the subject,—then he has to admit that the Mind is of the nature of the apprehension of things; as otherwise the Mind and the Thing could not be related as object and subject. And when the Mind is admitted to be of the nature of the apprehension of things,—it will have to be asserted that it is apprehended by a part of that same nature of itself; how else could it be apprehended? If it were apprehended by a form that did not exist, then there could not be the relation of object and subject. For instance, the Object does not exist in the form in which it is envisaged by the Cognition; and the Thing is not envisaged by the Cognition in the form in which it exists; so Cognitions would become objectless, and this would lead to the absurdity of all things being unknown.—From all this it follows that the character of apprehending things in their well-known forms constitutes its very nature; and it has been explained that the well-known form of things consists in being momentary, soul-less and so forth. Thus Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of soul-lessness, not of the nature of the apprehension of the Soul.

As regards any other character of it, that can be postulated only by deluded people; and can proceed only from some adventitious circumstances; and not because that is its very nature; in fact it is like the notion of 'serpent' in regard to the Rope. It is for this reason that the host of Afflictions, even in their most blatant forms, are unable to shake the strength of the doctrine of 'No-soul'. Because being due to adventitious causes, the Afflictions are never very firm. As regards the idea of 'No-soul', on the other hand, it forms the very nature of things and is also helped by Means of Cognition; hence it is strong and firm. Hence even though the hostility rests equally in both, yet it is the idea of the 'Soul' on which its contrary fastens itself,—not so the idea of the 'Soul' upon the other, because it is contrary to that.

Even for the man who holds the view that the external world does not exist, Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of 'No-soul', not of the nature of the apprehension of the 'Soul'; because this Soul does not exist. For instance, if, on the ground of the object (No-soul) not being existent, the Cognition be not regarded as of the nature of the apprehension of that,—then it must be admitted that the Cognition is of the nature of its own apprehension. Otherwise there would be no fixity regarding the Cognition either. The Soul too can be cognised only in the form of 'No-soul',
without a second,' and so forth,—not in any other form; as there would be incongruities as before.

From all this it follows that the Defects and Afflictions are not properties of living beings.

If the mere fact of the Afflictions being produced in the living beings leads to the assumption that they constitute the nature of these beings,—then there could be no possibility of getting rid of them, because there would be nothing definite and absolute regarding them. For instance, the notion of 'Serpent' is produced in the Rope, and yet it is set aside by the true Cognition when it appears.

Nor is the means of destroying the Afflictions impossible; because the means is always possible in the shape of the repeated Cognition of the character contrary to the cause of the Afflictions. For instance, those Afflictions, the repeated Cognition of the character contrary to which is quite possible, are capable of having their 'Chain' entirely cut off; as in the case of the Vrihi and other corns;—to this same category belong Love, Hatred and the rest;—hence the means of their destruction is quite possible.

Nor is it right that there can be no knowledge of these Means; because the knowledge of the cause of the Afflictions themselves provides the clear idea of what is hostile to them, in the form of the thing having a form contrary to those. And it has been already shown that it is the idea of 'No-soul' that envisages a form hostile to the Afflictions and destroys them.

Nor again is the upward trend rigidly fixed, as in jumping, because what is generated by each preceding repetition becomes observed in its very nature and hence indestructible, and as such it goes on producing fresh peculiarities in the subsequent efforts; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the substratum is a fixed one. Wisdom and the rest also are produced out of previous homogeneous seeds; not so jumping, etc. (?)—as is going to be explained later on.

Nor is another birth impossible; because it has been proved that the present life is an effect of the previous birth.

Nor is it possible for the Defects to come up again,—like the solidity of Copper and other metals. Because when their contrary, in the shape of the idea of 'No-soul', has become totally absorbed, it can never cease. In the case of the solidity of Copper and other metals on the other hand, its contrary consists in Fire; and as this can be there only occasionally, the solidity is there only when the Fire is not there; so that when the Fire disappears, it is only natural that the solidity should re-appear. The same cannot be the case with Impurities (Defects); even on the ceasing of the 'Path', the reappearance of the Defects does not always follow; as such a possibility would be annulled by the instance of Ashes. That is to say, after the Wood has been reduced to ashes by contact with Fire,—even if the Fire is removed, there is no reappearance of the Wood; so also in the case of the Defects. Hence your argument is inconclusive.

Then again, being adventitious, the Defects, from the very outset, are inefficient; how then could they have the capacity to set aside the 'Soullessness' that has become entirely absorbed? Certainly the nature of
things cannot be set aside without special effort;—and no effort of intelligent men is possible towards the rejecting or acquiring of anything until the good and bad points of the things to be acquired and rejected have been duly perceived. And until the man has become very much upset, he cannot perceive good points in Defects and bad points in their contrary; for the simple reason that he has not been upset. People whose minds have not become perverted do not acquire things free from Defects as defective; they do not acquire the defective thing as gold. The idea of ‘No-soul’, however, can never be defective; because it is always free from all discrepancies and hence always good. For instance, when all impurities have totally disappeared, there cannot come in any discrepancies on the basis of the past perception of things;—nor can the presence of Love, Hatred and the rest bring about discrepancies in the shape of the burning of the Body and the Mind (?); nor any discrepancies relating to Birth, in the shape of Disease, etc. Because there are no Afflictions which alone bring about Birth. Nor is there any discrepancy in the shape of insipidity, as appears in the case of worldly pleasures; because the pleasures of calm and peace are never galling. Consequently it cannot be right to make any effort to get rid of this knowledge of ‘No-soul’. In fact, if there is any effort, it should be towards not losing hold of the said knowledge; specially because the Intelligence of man is by its nature partial to what is good.—Nor should there be an effort for the acquiring of the Defects; because they are all evil, being the abode of all troubles.

Thus the conception of ‘No-soul’ is quite possible; and when this reaches its highest stage, it has been found to bring about the clear Cognition of things; just as in the case of the love-lorn young man thinking of his beloved; in the case of such a man, there appear such illusory words as ‘I see her’, ‘I embrace her’ and so forth, and there are corresponding bodily reactions also.

Thus then our Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’.

Nor is our Reason ‘Inconclusive’; because the idea of ‘No-soul’ envisages a well-established fact, and is consequently more powerful than the idea of the ‘Soul’, which is the reverse of it and hence not strong. Thus there is hostility between these two ideas.

Love and Hatred also proceed on the basis of the notion of ‘Soul’ which is not well-established; and they are not hostile to one another on account of their envisaging contrary forms. It is not due to mistake; because the two are not brought about by mistakes, and yet they are themselves mistaken, wrong. Nor is the hostility of these two well recognised; specially because both have their source in the notion of the Soul. For instance, it is only when one has the notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ that there appears Hatred against what hampers those, not otherwise;—and when both proceed from one and the same cause,—and are themselves of the nature of cause and effect,—they cannot be destructive of one another; just as there is none in the case of Smoke and Fire, both emanating from the same fuel; or just as in the case of the notion of ‘I’ and affection. If it were not so, there would be incongruities.—As regards their not appearing simultaneously, that is due to the Mind not having the capacity to project
two similar mental images at one and the same time.—Nor is there any hostility between Pleasure and Pain. Because Pleasure and Pain are of two kinds—subjective and objective;—those that are subjective are associated with Hatred and Apologetic Spirit, and hence stand on the same footing as Love and Hatred, and hence are the reverse of one another; they envisage the same form of the Soul, and have their source in the idea of the same 'Soul', and they bear to each other the relation of cause and effect; hence there can be no hostility between them.—As regards the objective Pleasure and Pain, they are not restricted to different causes; hence there can be no hostility between them. Because when Pleasure proceeds from a certain thing, Pain also proceeds from the same thing when one becomes too much addicted to it; hence their causes are not necessarily different.—It is not so in the case of the ideas of the 'No-soul' and 'Soul'.—Further, in the case of Pleasure and Pain, they are of equal strength, because both proceed under the influence of their objective,—not so between the 'Path' and the 'Defects'; of which latter the 'Path' is the stronger, because it envisages an accomplished fact; not so the 'Defects'. Then again, Pleasure and Pain do not continue for a long time;—not so the idea of 'No-soul'; because having become absorbed, it never ceases; as has been explained above. Hence there is no falsity in our Premiss.—As for the two not appearing at the same time, the reason for this has been already explained.

It has been argued that even for those who have cognised the doctrine of 'No-soul' through Inference, Love and Hatred, etc. do appear.—But that is not right; because the idea of 'No-soul' consists of a mere Idea, clear and distinct, directly envisaging soul-less things, non-conceptual; and as envisaging well-ascertained things, it is not mistaken; it serves to uproot the idea of the 'Soul' and has, on that account, been described as 'hostile' to it; and it does not consist of the pondering of what has been 'heard' (learnt). Because the Impurities, which have become firmly rooted through repeated experience from time without beginning, go on being reduced gradually by the rise of their opposites, and hence come to be destroyed only gradually; not by merely hearing of the teaching once; as there is destruction of cold by the mere touch of Fire. When too the idea of 'No-soul', consisting of the cogitation of what has been heard, appears before one, the whole lot of Love and the rest do not remain there at all; in view of which our Premiss could be false. Because the Buddhists always set aside the presence of Love etc. by thinking of them as evil. It is for this reason that these people become recognised as having their greatness unbesmirched. The hostility too of the Idea of 'No-soul' towards love, etc. is affirmed for this same reason; because they become set aside as soon as the idea of 'No-soul' presents itself. When between two sets of things, one becomes set aside at the presence of the other,—then, on the rise of the latter to its very height, the former becomes absolutely and entirely destroyed; e.g. the Fire-flame on the appearance of the rise of water;—and the Defects are liable to destruction in the presence of the idea of 'No-soul';—hence when this idea reaches its height, how could the Defects continue to exist?

Thus our Reason is not 'Inconclusive'. And because it is present whenever the Probandum is present, it is not 'contradictory' either.—(3338)
Thus the 'removal of the Hindrance of Afflictions' having been established, the Author proceeds to describe the 'removal of the Hindrance of Cognisable things'—

TEXT (3339).

ALSO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE PECULIAR CHARACTER OF THE DIRECT PERCEPTION, THE DEFECT ALONG WITH THE DISPOSITIONS CEASES FORTHWITH; AND THUS THROUGH FREEDOM FROM ALL 'OBSTACLES', OMNISCIENCE BECOMES ACCOMPLISHED.—(3339)

COMMENTARY.

'Direct perception'—of what?—of the idea of 'no-soul'; this is to be understood from the context.—The peculiar character' of this Direct Perception consists in the complete realisation of the good and bad points of the said idea and its contrary (respectively), by a long-continued process. It is because this complete realisation is wanting in those who are still in the stage of pupillage, that these are not omniscient. And the reason for this lies in the fact that, on account of the absence of the said long-continued practice, the 'Hindrance of Cognisable things' has not been removed; because the said contemplation is still wanting.

The argument may be formulated thus:—That Contemplation which is carried on uninterruptedly with due faith for a long time brings about its fruit in the shape of the direct perception of things as if they were in one's palms,—as for example, the contemplation by the lover of the loved one;—the contemplation by the Merciful Lord of the doctrine of 'No-soul' is fully equipped with all the said three qualifications;—thus there is a reason based on the nature of things.—The Reason here adduced cannot be said to be 'inadmissible'; because it has been already explained that it is always possible for the Merciful one, seeking for some end (such as the welfare of mankind) to have recourse to such activity.—Nor can the Reason be said to be 'Inconclusive'; because the thing under discussion, which is the mental perception of the 'soul-lessness' of all things, is what is sought to be proved as rendered manifest by the aforesaid contemplation with the three qualifications. And the invariable concomitance of the character of the Probans with the character of the Probandum is well-known; specially because the clear manifestation of it does not need any other cause to bring it about; and from this there follows by implication, its invariable concomitance with omniscience also; because 'omniscience' is nothing other than the said clear manifestation of the Cognition envisaging the 'Soul-less-ness' of all things. Thus then the invariable concomitance of the contemplation with the expected clear manifestation in general being established, that with 'omniscience' also becomes established by implication. Specially because in connection with the subject in question no other clear manifestation is possible.
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By this same argument all those arguments become answered which the other party had brought forward against the existence of the Omniscent Person; because the existence of the Omniscent Person is not something to be proved; what is meant to be proved is the clear manifestation of the thing in question in the well-known mind (of that Person).

In this way, on account of the peculiar character of the direct perception, the entire effects of the Defects,—in the shape of the deficiencies of Body, Speech and Mind,—become dispelled; and thus both kinds of 'Hindrance' become set aside; and all hindrances having been set aside, Omnisience becomes an accomplished fact.—(3339)

The following might be urged—"It may be that Omnisience in general has been proved; yet the Omnisience of Buddha has not been proved ."

The answer to this is as follows :

TEXT (3340).

IN FACT, THIS (OMNISCIENCE) THAT HAS BEEN PROVED IS THAT OF BUDDHA HIMSELF, AS IT IS HE WHO, AT THE VERY OUTSET, EXPOUNDED THE DOCTRINE OF 'NO-SOUL'. THAT IS WHY HE STANDS AT THE HEAD OF ALL PHILOSOPHERS.

—(3340)

COMMENTARY.

The said omniscience has been proved really as belonging to Buddha, not to Kapila and others.—"Why"?—Because at the very outset, it was He who expounded the doctrine of 'No-soul'.

What is meant is as follows :—By pointing out that all things are included among the five 'Thought Phases', Buddha taught, at the very outset, that there is 'No-soul'.—It is this same Teacher whose existence is proved by the Inferential Indicative in the shape of the teaching of 'Soul-less-ness'; and it is this Person who is called by us 'Sugata' (Buddha). Through this teaching of His, complete knowledge of all things, obtainable and discardable, along with the means of obtaining and discarding them, becomes secured. Hence it is through His connection with this complete knowledge that He becomes recognised as omniscient and reliable; hence it is only right and proper that His existence should be proved by persons who desire to understand His teachings. His Omniscience does not rest upon His knowledge of such things as the number of insects in the world; though it is proved that the knowledge of such things also is possible for Him; as His knowledge relates to the Truth relating to all things and is lasting. For instance, by the teaching of the doctrine of 'No-soul',—which is in full accordance with Reason and proofs—His knowledge becomes established—by the teaching that this 'Soul-less-ness' has always been there and will always be there. He has shown that His knowledge of things is lasting;—specially because His teachings relating to the three kinds of Pain and allied things are in agreement with all the nine sections of the scriptures and with the teaching of the 'Three Paths'.—As He has made known the 'Four Truths' by various
means, it is inferred from this that He knows all things; specially as any incapacity there might have been there to comprehend all things has been dispelled. In fact, no one could expound such teachings, who did not know all the good and bad points of things and was not able to expound them. Nor can it be right to assert that “He has expounded these teachings after having learnt it from the Veda; as it has been shown that the Veda is the work of a human being.

From all this we conclude that the Blessed Lord stands at the head of all Philosophers, because of the superiority of His knowledge of things.—(3340)

For this same reason there can be no equality between the Blessed Lord of the superior knowledge and any one else. This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3341-3342).

There can be no equality between this Teacher endowed with the true knowledge of Truth, and other Teachers who have expounded false doctrines. The knowledge of these latter is not vouched for by any means of right cognition, and their word is beset with annulment; therefore the capacity to know supersensuous things must be very far away from them.—(3341-3342)

COMMENTARY.

There is no reason to prove that these other Teachers possess superior knowledge. If there were such reason at all, it could only be in the form of the Inferential Indicative in the form of their own Word; and their Word has been found to be asserting things contrary to all forms of valid cognition; how then could such Word prove the presence, in them, of superior knowledge? —(3341-3342)

It might be urged that—“The word of Buddha also is contrary to all forms of valid cognition.”

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3343).

[The words of Buddha are] well-knit,—they propound a compatible method,—and set forth what is useful for men; even in regard to perceptible things, they are not, in the least degree, annulled by the two means (and forms) of cognition.—(3343)

COMMENTARY.

‘Well-knit’,—the various sentences form one composite whole comprehending one and the same purpose; they are not disconnected, like such stray sentences as ‘ten pomegranates’, ‘six cakes’ and so forth.
A 'compatible' —i.e. practicable—'method' —in the shape of meditating upon soul-less-ness—is taught in them; and they do not lay down such impracticable methods as the securing of the crest-jewel of the king of serpents.

'They set forth what is useful for men' —in the shape of Prosperity and the Highest good; they do not set forth such useless things as the investigation of the subject of the teeth of crows.

Says the Opponent—"All this is applicable to the words of Kapila and other teachers also".

Answer:—'Even in regard to, etc., etc.'—'Perceptible' —i.e. regarded as amenable to Perception and Inference;—'not annulled by the two means of Cognition'—Perception and Inference; because the real state of things is exactly as spoken of in the words.

That is to say, what is regarded as amenable to Perception is the five-fold group of Thought-phases—in the shape of the conceptions of (a) the Blue and other objects, (b) Pleasure, Pain and other Feelings, (c) the causes of these, (d) the Apprehension, (e) Love and Hate, etc., —and it cannot be otherwise than what is asserted by Buddha; just like the imperceptibility of things regarded as imperceptible; so also of what other parties have regarded as perceptible,—such as the various varieties of Colour, Sound and the rest, Pleasure, etc., and Substances, Actions, Universals and Conjunctions;—also such things as functioning through the potencies of things, and the rest are regarded as amenable to Inference,—all these are exactly as asserted (by the words of Buddha). Similarly too, the four 'Noble Paths', which are not regarded as amenable to Inference, are actually found to be not so amenable; just as the Soul and other things which are regarded by other parties as amenable to Inference functioning through the potency of things.

The particle 'api', also', indicates that the words are not otherwise, even in regard to things that are not perceptible. For instance, what the words of Buddha have taught, for the removal of Love, etc., is the doctrine of 'No-soul' as contrary to and countering the doctrine of 'Soul' which is at the root of that Love and Hate, etc. and the things emanating therefrom;—and they have not taught—like the words of Kapila and others—such means as Bathing, performance of the Agnihotra and so forth, which are not incompatible with the root cause of Love, Hate, etc.—(3343)

The following Text points out that it was for this reason that the Blessed Lord declared that—'This is to be accepted by the wise, after proper testing, as in the case of gold':—

TEXT (3344).

[The words of Buddha] are free from impurities, like gold tested by 'heating', 'cutting' and 'touching'; and, like the gold, they do not undergo any change in the process of testing and investigation.

—(3344)

COMMENTARY.

Just as gold, which is free from all impurities, pure, when tested by 'Heating', etc., does not undergo any change,—so also the jewel-like words of
the Blessed Lord,—when tested—(a) by ‘Perception’, which is like ‘Heating’ —(b) by ‘Inference’ based on the capacity of things, which is like ‘Touching —and (c) by Inference based on the Reliable Word, which is like ‘cutting’,—
do not undergo any change. It is thus only right that the activity of intelligent
gent men should proceed on the basis of such Reliable Word only,—not of
any other. This is the purport of the Test.—(3344)

The following Texts point out the similarity of the Lord’s Word to
jewels:—

TEXTS (3345–3347).

The jewel-like Word of Buddha, whose appearance is conducive
to the destruction of the entire mass of the darkness of
Wrong Notions, is never got at by men beset with sins. That
is why wise men declared Buddha alone to be omniscient,
—cognisant of all such things as Primordial Matter
and Spirits; He has been called the ‘Great Physician’.
—Thus there is the definitely certain Cognition
that Buddha is omniscient, not Kapila. Though
this Cognition has been clearly spoken of,
it has not been understood by dull-witted
men.—(3345–3347)

COMMENTARY.

‘Wrong ideas’ are the ‘darkness’; conducive to the destruction of that
is the appearance of the Lord’s Word.
‘By men beset with sins’—i.e. by men who have no piety.
‘Spoken of’—as brought about by the Inferential Indicative in the
shape of the True Word.—(3345–3347)

It has been argued by the other party, under Text 3150, that—“In
regard to one matter, of Arithmetic for instance, all beings are found to be
truthful and no distinction is found among them, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3348).

From what has been said, it is also learnt wherein lies the dis-
tinction of the ‘Suppressor of Desires’ (Buddha) from Rṣabha
and other incompetent Teachers.—(3348)

COMMENTARY.

The above described ‘Superiority of Knowledge’ of the Blessed Lord,
the ‘Suppressor of Māra’ (Desire) having established His ‘Distinction’
(superiority) over Rṣabha, Varāhamāna and others—it is not open to you,
if you are truthful, to assert that 'no Distinction is perceived'. Such is the upshot of the whole.—(3348)

It might be urged that—"on finding, in the one domain of Arithmetic that both sets of Teachers are equally right, we assert them to be equal".—

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (3349).

WHAT FOOL IS THERE WHO WILL REGARD A PERSON WHO KNOWS THE LETTERS OF THE ALPHABET ONLY, AS CONVERSANT WITH THE ESSENCE OF ALL THE SCIENCES,—MERELY ON THE GROUND OF HIS POSSESSING EQUAL KNOWLEDGE OF FOOD ?—(3349)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the other party, under Texts 3151 et seq., that—"The Reason that the Buddhist adduces in support of the Omniscience of one Person will be available in the case of other Persons also, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3350).

THUS THEN, THAT REASON BY WHICH THE OMNISCIENCE OF ONE PERSON IS ESTABLISHED IS not AVAILABLE IN THE CASE OF ANOTHER PERSON ;—BECAUSE THE ESSENCE OF THAT REASON IS ABSENT IN THIS LATTER CASE. —(3350)

COMMENTARY.

'Tat'—Therefore ; thus.

'The essence of that Reason';—though the mere verbal expression of the Reason may be applicable,—in the form 'Because they are Teachers of the Šrāvaka and other doctrines which are true and all-pervading[therefore Jina and others should be regarded as Omniscient]';—yet the essential factor of that Reason which is concomitant with the reality of things, is absent in such reasonings,—which therefore cannot be available for the case of Kapila and others. It is only when one real thing is concomitant with another real thing,—and not merely a verbal expression—that brings about the right apprehension of things.—(3350)

It has been argued by the other party, under Text 3152, that—"The objections that the Buddhists forcibly urge against the arguments in
support of the Omniscience of *Jīna*, are also urged by the *Jainas* against the other party, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (3351).**

**Thus, those objections that the Buddhists, without anger, urge against the assertion of the Omniscience of *Jīna*,—the Jainas are not in a position to urge (against the Buddhist).—(3351)**

**COMMENTARY.**

'Without anger'—Free from anger. In fact the Buddhists proceed to put forward those arguments only through pity for you, not, through anger or arrogance, like yourselves.

'This'—Because it has been shown that the *Svādvāda* and other teachings propounded by him are defective.—(3351)

It has been argued under Text 3153,—"How can any definite conclusion be arrived at through such reasonings and counter-reasonings, which are uncertain and swallowed by their own reflections?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS (3352-3353).**

**Because the truth that has been found in the Buddhist doctrine, through proofs with well-established premises,—has not been so found in any other doctrine,—therefore please draw as many definite conclusions as you can, through various reasonings and counter-reasonings, which are well-founded and not swallowed by their own reflections.—(3352-3353)**

**COMMENTARY.**

'Yat'—Because.

'Siddhāpratibandhēna'—By means of Premises asserting identity and the causal relations, on the strength of the real state of things.

'Tēna'—Therefore.—(3352-3353)

It has been argued, under Text 3157,—"Who can reasonably accept the existence of a Person who can be regarded by such reasons as 'being cognisable', etc. etc.?"

The answer to this is as follows:—
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TEXTS (3354-3355).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, BETWEEN THE CHARACTER OF ‘KNOWING ALL THINGS’ AND THAT OF ‘BEING COGNISABLE, ETC.’—IN FACT ‘COGNISABILITY’ IS PROVED BY THE ‘ABSENCE OF INCOGNISABILITY’, NOT BY THE ‘ABSENCE OF OMNISCIENCE’; THIS LATTER THEREFORE RETAINS ITS CHARACTER.—(3354-3355)

COMMENTARY.

When one desires to establish the denial of one thing by the affirmation of another, he should affirm that which may be incompatible either directly or indirectly, with what is to be denied,—and not that which is not so incompatible. If it were not so, then the affirmation of anything at random might lead to the denial of all things. In the case in question, there is no incompatibility, direct or indirect, between ‘Omniscience’ and ‘cognisability’. For instance, incompatibility between any two things can be of only two kinds—(1) in the form of mutual exclusion, the presence and absence of one implying the absence and presence, respectively, of the other,—e.g. between Existence and Non-existence, or between Succession and Non-succession; and (2) in the form of impossibility of co-existence; e.g. between Fire and Coolness.—That the former kind of ‘incompatibility’ is not there between ‘Omniscience’ and ‘cognisability’ is shown by the words—‘Cognisability is proved, etc. etc.’—It has been pointed out on a previous occasion that there is ‘incompatibility’ of the kind of mutual exclusiveness between those two things only of which the cognition of one means the non-cognition of the other; and ‘cognisability’ is there, as excluding, not ‘Omniscience’, but ‘incognisability’.—(3354-3355)

The following Text shows that the second kind of incompatibility also is not there in the case in question:—

TEXT (3356).

OMNISCIENCE HAS NEVER BEFORE BEEN SEEN TO APPEAR ON THE APPEARANCE OF ITS COMPLETE CAUSE,—BY VIRTUE OF WHICH IT COULD BE SAID TO CEASE ON THE APPEARANCE OF THE CHARACTER OF ‘BEING AN ENTITY’ AND SO FORTH.—(3356)

COMMENTARY.

It is only when between two things, one does not appear even when its Cause is present in its perfect condition,—by reason of the presence of the other,—that the two are said to be ‘incompatible’, in the sense of never co-existing;—as regards the case in question, Omniscience has never before been seen to appear on the appearance of its Cause in perfect condition,—by virtue of which it could cease on the appearance of the character of ‘being an entity’.—(3356)
Question:—"Why is it that Omniscience has not come into existence on the presence of a Cause?"

Answer:—

TEXT (3357).

Being featureless and uncognised even by itself, it can never come into existence. Thus it would mean that before its appearance, the Omniscience actually existed (and was not brought into existence by any cause).—(3357)

COMMENTARY.

If you hold the view that "Omniscience disappears on the appearance of the character of 'being an entity' and 'cognisability'"—then, in that case, it would mean that, before the appearance of the character of 'being an entity', etc. the Omniscience was 'not an entity' and was not 'cognisable' even by itself; and thus, (a) being a non-entity, it would be featureless, and (b) being incognisable, there would be no self-cognition of it; which means that the Omniscience is never brought about, and does not exist at all; how then can it be said to have appeared previously and then ceased? Certainly there can be no appearance, coming into existence, of what is featureless. Nor can there be any basis for the existence of what is not cognised; as all notions of the existence of things are dependent upon their being cognised. What is meant by all this is that the reasoning of the Opponent involves self-contradiction.

Then again, if its previous appearance is admitted, then this appearance itself, without any effort on our part, establishes the existence of Omniscience; hence it cannot be right to deny it; otherwise there would be self-contradiction.—This is what is pointed out in the Text, by the words—'Before its appearance, etc. etc.'—i.e. if it is admitted that the Omniscience existed before the appearance.—(3357)

It might be argued that—"It may be that Incognisability and the rest are not incompatible with Omniscience: even so they indicate the non-existence of the Omniscient Person."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3358).

The affirmation of what is not incompatible cannot be rightly regarded as setting aside the other. Otherwise the presence of colour might mean the absence of taste.—(3358)

COMMENTARY.

Some people argue as follows:—"Even though 'Cognisability', etc. are not incompatible with 'Omniscience', yet the character of 'being
a speaker’ is certainly incompatible with it; because Omniscience cannot co-exist along with ‘Speakership’, of which ‘Conceptual Content’ is the indirect Cause; because on the principle that ‘one cannot utter words without previous cogitation and thinking’, Conceptual Content is the cause of Speaking; and as all Conceptual Content is associated with verbal expression, it cannot apprehend the forms of things,—this latter being amenable to only such cognition as is free from Conceptual Content; thus during the conceptual stage, there being no apprehension of the form of things, there can be no Omniscience. Thus Omniscience being contrary to (incompatible with) Speakership, the presence of one would mean the absence of the other, due to the non-apprehension of its Cause. So that our Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’.—This Reason, ‘Speakership’ is implied by the term ‘ādi’ in the sentence ‘one who has the characters of being knowable, cognisable, etc. etc.’ (under Text 3157).”

This is the view anticipated in Texts 3359-3360, and answered in Texts 3361-3362, as follows:—

TEXTS (3359–3362).

In this matter, the ‘Speakership’ of the Lord being implied by the first word uttered by Him, a certain party thinks that there is an incompatibility between such ‘Speakership’ and ‘Omniscience’, and hence concludes that there can be no ‘Omniscience’; because there can be ‘speakership’ only when there is ‘Conceptual Content’, while one could be ‘omniscient’ only if there were no ‘Conceptual Content’; as a matter of fact, (he urges) an entity is never apprehended by a cognition associated with verbal expression.—As regards this reasoning also, those who think that the ‘Speakership’ of the Omniscient Person follows from cogitation and thinking, do not admit the Omniscient Person on the ground of his being a ‘Speaker’; nor on the ground of his conceptual knowledge; in case, however, there is no ‘Conceptual Content’, there can be no ‘Speakership’.—(3359–3362)

COMMENTARY.

Some people hold that the ‘Speakership’ of the Lord is due to the appearance of the ‘Conceptual Content’; while others are of the opinion that, on account of previous impetus, the Lord proceeds to speak even without any conceptual idea.

Under the former view, if what is meant to be proved is that ‘there can be no Omniscience during the conceptual state’, then the argument is superfluous; because these people themselves admit that in the conceptual state, the Lord is not omniscient.—If, on the other hand, what is meant to be
proved is the absence of Omniscience in the non-conceptual state, then the
Reason adduced is 'inadmissible'; because in that state, there is no speaking
at all; for the simple reason that in that state there is no Conceptual Content
that could prompt the Speaking.—(3359–3362)

Says the Opponent:— "If it is held that in the conceptual state, the
Lord is not omniscient,—then His words would be words uttered by one who
is not omniscient, and as such, not reliable."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3363–3365).

Even so, it cannot be right to regard His Words as those uttered
by one who is not-omniscient; because His non-omniscience
has been discarded by His Omniscience; hence there should
be agreement. For instance, having experienced heat, one
speaks of it [and this speech is reconciled, in agreement, with
the previous experience or Cognition]; from this there is no
disagreement with the real state of things, because the
speech is the outcome of the direct Cognition of those
things. Thus then, at the time when the Lord is omniscient,
the Reason adduced by the other party is not present;
and as regards the time of ordinary usage, His argument
would be superfluous.—(3363–3365)

COMMENTARY.

Though at that time the Lord is not omniscient,—yet that does not
mean that His words are such as have been uttered by one who is not-omni-
scient;—why?—because this non-omniscience has been set aside by Omnisci-
ence. It is on this account that the Words in question become reliable
also,—having been prompted by the Conceptual Content brought about by
the force of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person, and therefore
connected, indirectly, with the real state of things; this reliability is just
like the reliability of the Inferential Conception.

An example is cited in support of the said idea—'For instance, etc. etc.'
'Tasmât'—from the speech coming after the experiencing of heat.
'The speech is the outcome, etc. etc.'—i.e. because the Conceptual Content
has been brought about, indirectly, by the direct cognition of the Heat.

The following might be urged—"If the Omniscient Person has Concep-
tual Cognitions, then there is likelihood of His being mistaken; because,
by its very nature, Conception is mistaken, wrong, because it appears as the
Cognition of a thing as what is not that thing".

This is not so. The Lord could be mistaken, only if He did not know
the distinction between the Real and the Imposed (Unreal). As a matter of
fact, however, He recognises the object of the Conceptual Cognition as only imposed (unreal), while He looks upon the real external object,—which is envisaged by the Non-conceptual Cognition,—as something quite different, and real; how then can He be said to be 'mistaken'?

"If He is not mistaken, why does He impose (fancy) things during the conceptual state?"

Not so; because He is cognisant all the time of the means whereby speech is prompted. As a matter of fact, He does not perceive anything else,—apart from the imposing conception—as prompting the speech;—nor does He apprehend any other connotation of the Words, apart from what is imposed; hence, knowing the means whereby speech is prompted, He takes pity on the world, and, without expounding to others the things as He has actually perceived them, He cannot sit idle; and being urged by the desire to expound them, He creates the imposing conception,—as the means prompting speech,—as also the imposed, in the shape of the connotation of Words.

All this objection the Author will bring up later on and answer it. We have introduced it in the present context, because it had some bearing upon it.

For the same reasons, it cannot be right to regard the Omniscient Person as affected by Love, on the ground of His speakership. Because speech can proceed from other causes also. Speaking, Movement and such actions are not always due to Love, etc.; they are due to the mere desire to speak; and this Desire to speak is possible also in the Person devoid of Love, being due to His mercy. Hence the Reason adduced is not true.

"Mercy itself is only a form of Love."

Not so; because Mercy does not bring about any undesirable effects; while Love has been described as that attachment of the mind which appertains to things beset with impurities, and which is indicated by the notion of 'I' and 'mine' and of one's 'lasting happiness'; while Hate is the desire to harm, against anything that injures the 'me' and 'mine';—and the notion of 'I' and 'mine' is sheer delusion; not so Mercy; because Mercy appears, even without any notion of 'I', through the repeated perception of particular forms of Pain and Suffering. It is on this ground that the Scriptures have asserted that Persons free from Love and Attachment are moved by Friendliness and other feelings that are based entirely upon Dharma, etc.—(3363–3365)

The following might be urged—"If we had wanted to prove only that the knowledge of all things is not always present before Him, then perhaps our argument might have been superfluous, seeking to prove what is already admitted. As a matter of fact however, what we mean to prove is the fact that He does not possess the capacity to know in detail the truth relating to all things; hence our reasoning is not superfluous; nor is our Reason 'Inadmissible'; because what our Reason means is the capacity to use."

The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (3366-3367).

Even if you deny the capacity to know all things, your reason still remains open to the charge of its presence in the contrary of the Probandum being doubtful.—Even if you wish your reason to consist in the capacity to use, the same defect, of the possibility of its presence in the contrary of the Probandum, persists.—(3366-3367)

COMMENTARY.

In both cases there is nothing to set aside the possibility of the presence of the Reason in the contrary of the Probandum; and this doubt renders the Reason 'Inconclusive'.—(3366-3367)

Other Buddhists have held that words proceed from the Blessed Lord, even without conceptual content;—with reference to this view, the Author says—

TEXTS (3368-3369).

'Even when Tādyin (Buddha) is free from Conceptual Content, His Teachings go on under the force of the initial momentum, —in the manner of the revolutions of the wheel';—even against the wise men who hold this view, the argument of the other party is of no avail.—(3368-3369)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the Potter's wheel, even after the turning by the stick has ceased, its revolution continues under the force of the momentum imparted to it; similarly in the case of the Blessed Lord, even after the cessation of the entire web of conceptual content, His Teaching goes on under the force of the momentum originally imparted by His previous Piety.

Such is the view that has been held by some 'wise men'—i.e. the Idealist Buddhists.

As against these also, the Reason adduced by the opponent remains clearly 'inadmissible'.—(3368-3369)

The following might be urged:—"Under the view just referred to, everything is a mere reflection of one's own apprehension (Idea), hence there can be no real 'speakership' at all in the case of any man; in fact, even when he does not speak, the reflected ideation appears in another man; so that the person remains the dominating cause, and hence people come to regard him as the 'speaker'; and it is this popularly conceived 'speakership' that has been adduced by us as the Reason (for Buddha being not-omniscient);
either the Reason or the 'subject' of our reasoning is not in accordance with our own doctrine, but in accordance with the popular notion of things. Consequently there can be no 'Inadmissibility' in the Reason adduced by us".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3369-3370).

The 'speakership' that is popularly conceived by men,—if that is put forward as the Reason, then it would be open to the charge of having its presence in the contrary of the Probandum possible.—(3369-3370)

COMMENTARY.

Here also, its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being doubtful, the Reason becomes 'Inconclusive'.—(3369-3370)

The following Text clarifies that 'Inadmissibility' which the opponent has urged against the doctrine of the Idealist:—

TEXT (3370).

"When the doctrine in question has no reason in its support,
what sort of 'inadmissibility' would there be in regard to it?"—(3370)

COMMENTARY.

The opponent argues as follows:—"Only those arguments in support of, or against, anything, are admissible which set forth ideas accepted with certainty of conviction by both parties,—not what is not accepted by either party, or what is doubtful; because arguments of the latter sort would need further arguments in support of them. When, thus, the doctrine of the Idealist is one that is not vouched for by any Means of Right Cognition, how can Inadmissibility be urged (against any Reason urged against it)? A conclusion does not become vitiating by the arbitrary assumption of admissibility or inadmissibility; it is effective only when these are vouched for by proofs; and as a matter of fact the doctrine of Idealism has not been
established by any Means of Right Cognition; in fact it has been rejected in detail".—(3370)

The answer to the above is as follows:

**TEXTS (3371–3373).**

Our answer is as follows:—If 'Speakership' by itself, is meant to be the Reason, then it is one whose substratum is unknown,—or its 'Inadmissibility' is suspected. In fact, the exact connotation of the word being doubtful, the fact remains that it is one whose 'Inadmissibility' is suspected. Consequently, if you have to urge such an argument, you can do so only as a Reductio ad absurdum.—And in such an argument what has to be urged must be what is knowable only from the Scriptures (of the other party); and there can be no other means of proving its existence.—(3371–3373)

**COMMENTARY.**

There are only two alternative views possible—(1) 'speakership' may be a Reason, independently by itself—or (2) it may be in the nature of a Reductio ad absurdum.—Under the former view, the substratum of the qualification would be 'unknown'; hence the Reason would be 'unknown', 'inadmissible'. If the substratum is meant to be, not qualified, but in general,—even so, until the 'speakership' has been proved to the satisfaction of the other party, its admissibility must remain doubtful; in accordance with the principle that a reason can prove a conclusion only when it is itself admitted by both parties.

'Asya'—i.e. of 'speakership'.

Thus in order to avoid this difficulty, you have to admit that what you have urged is only a Reductio ad absurdum. But even as regards this Reductio ad Absurdum, what has to be put forward as the Reason is only that character which cannot bear any scrutiny and what is knowable only from the scriptures of the other party; as the putting forward of such a Reason would expose the self-contradiction on the part of the opponent;—and no attempt should be made to prove such a character; as that could serve no useful purpose.

And so far as the case in question is concerned, 'speakership' is not a character knowable only from the scriptures of the other party. So that your Reason remains 'Inadmissible' under both alternatives.—(3371–3373)

The following Texts sum up the author's position and point out that the assertions of the opponents are contrary to the real state of things:
TEXTS (3374–3377).

WHEN REASONS SUCH AS 'BEING KNOWN', 'BEING AN ENTITY', 'BEING' AND SO FORTH ARE INCAPABLE OF SETTING ASIDE THE OMNISCIENT PERSON,—WHO IS THERE WHO WILL NOT ADMIT HIS EXISTENCE?—THUS NO REASON, EITHER TEMPORAL OR SCRIPTURAL, THAT THE UPHOLDER OF THE VEDA CAN HAVE IN HIS MOUTH, IS CAPABLE OF REMOVING THE POISON OF THE AwFUL SERPENT IN THE SHAPE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE Shākya.—IN FACT, THE FEEBLE AND DULL-WITTED Brāhmaṇa, EVEN WHEN MERELY GLANCED AT BY THE POISON FROM THE EYES (OF THAT SERPENT), BECOMES UNABLE EVEN TO BREATHE,—WHAT TO SAY OF SETTING IT ASIDE! ANY REASONING, EVEN WHEN SOUND, BECOMES UGLY IN THE MOUTH OF THE VEDIC SCHOLAR,—ON ACCOUNT OF ITS ABUNDANCE IN A LOWLY SUBSTRATUM; JUST LIKE THE STRING OF BEADS PLACED AT THE FEET.—(3374–3377)

COMMENTARY.

'Who will not admit His existence?'—i.e. as a probability. That is to say, when the mere absence of proofs to the contrary establishes that possibility.—This matter may rest here.

There is no wonder that the unsound reasoning appearing in the mouth of the Vedic Scholar does not shine; what is strange, however, is that even a sound reason when asserted by you, fails to shine, on account of the defective character of its substratum.—(3374–3377)

Question :—'How so?'
Answer :—

TEXTS (3378–3379).

HE CANNOT ASSERT EVEN THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE CONCOMITANCE BETWEEN Smoke AND Fire; BECAUSE, UNDER HIS VIEW, Smoke EXISTS ELSEWHERE ALSO; IN FACT, BEING OF THE ONE UNIFORM NATURE OF 'ENTITY', IT EXISTS IN THE OCEAN ALSO; AND IF Fire EXISTS THERE ALSO, THEN WHERE WOULD THE absence (OF THE PROBANS) LIE?—(3378–3379)

COMMENTARY.

That the birth of Smoke is related to Fire, and that it is invariably concomitant with Fire is known even to the veriest cowherd; and yet you, by describing the whole world as really one and uniform in the shape of 'Entity', are unable to say that Smoke is infallible in its concomitance with Fire; because under your view, in the form of 'Entity', it is present in water also.

"Even so there would be concomitance with Fire."
Answer:—"If Fire exists, etc. etc."—If it is admitted that, under the principle of all things being one and the same, the Ocean is of the same nature as Fire,—then, in the proving of Fire, Water could not be regarded as that where the Probandum (Fire) is known to be absent; and thus there being nothing where the Probandum is absent, on what basis would the Proban, Smoke, be non-existent where the Probandum is absent?—(3378-3379)

TEXT (3380).


COMMENTARY.

If the view is that Fire is really present in Water,—then why is there no recognition of the form of the Fire in Water,—or the recognition of its effects, in the shape of Burning, Cooking and the like?

If it is said that some sort of difference is also accepted,—then the answer is that 'the only other, etc. etc.'—This has been discussed in detail, under the chapter on Syādvā. So it may be allowed to rest here.—(3380)

It has been argued by the opponent under Text 3158, that "The man who assumes the existence of the Omniscient Person knowing all things through a single means of cognition may himself apprehend all things like taste, odour and the rest through the eyes alone."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3381–3389).

THE ONLY EVIDENCE THAT IS SUGGESTED IS THAT OF THE mental Cognition of Omniscience as brought about by the repeated practice of the 'Truth' relating to all things;—and not the ordinary Visual and other Cognitions. Under the circumstances, how can it be asserted that the said Person should cognize Taste, etc. through the Eye?—As regards Mental Cognition of things like Colour and the rest, it has been accepted, without dispute, even by the other party; in fact, it is on the basis of this mental Cognition that the Remembrance of Colour and other things has been said to be produced.—During Dreams also, there is Mental Cognition in the shape of the apprehension of all things.—Thus then, the Omniscient Person being postulated on the basis of Mental Cognition, the
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scope of which is not restricted,—how could he cognise taste, etc. through the eye? This objection might apply, if he were held to know all things through the eye itself. As a matter of fact however, he does cognise taste and other things collectively, through the mind.—Even in cases where some superior peculiarity is found (in the cognitions of the omniscient person), in regard to the perception of subtle and remote things,—it is all within the scope of the said mind and mental concepts; and it is not due to the functioning of the auditory organ on colour; all these undesirable contingencies that other people have urged against us are not applicable to us at all; because all the superiority and peculiarity lies in the mental cognition itself, and it does not lie beyond the scope of this cognition. Thus then for us, the things that were cognised in the past by certain means of cognition are precisely the same that are cognised now by the same means of cognition.—(3381–3389)

COMMENTARY.

If it had been held (by us) that the visual and other sense-perceptions apprehend all things, then there might have been room for the objection that has been urged. As a matter of fact, however, when we postulate the omniscient person we do so on the basis of the fact that at one and the same time he knows all things through mental cognition,—which apprehends all entities, and which is as good as perception, on account of its distinctness and its being in agreement with the real state of things,—real mental cognition having been brought about by the practice of meditation upon the truth relating to the permanent and other characters of all things; and we do not hold that he apprehends all things through the visual or other sense-perceptions.

It cannot be right to assert that—"mental cognition is not known to apprehend all things". Because you have yourself explained that there is remembrance of colour, sound and other things; and remembrance is certainly a mental cognition.—Then again, it is a well-known fact that in dreams, there is cognition of colour and other things; so that the denial of mental cognition is impossible. Consequently, the peculiarities in the cognition of the omniscient person falling well within the scope of mental cognition, what you have urged does not affect our position at all.—(3381–3389)

If there is an idealist who holds the view that the omniscient person apprehends all things by perception through the eye and other sense-organs themselves,—even, under his view, all notions and impressions of disability having been removed, all cognitions become applicable to all things and consequently all-pervading; as it is only the said Disability that goes to
restrict the scope of cognitions. When, therefore, that Disability has been removed, how could there be any restriction upon the scope of Cognitions?

With this opinion in view, the Author makes the following statement:—

TEXTS (3390–3392).

Or, all Cognition, when pure, would, as a rule, apprehend all things; though in a certain case, there may be some peculiarity in the resultant of the Cognition, due to particular causes. For instance, the Ámalaki is found to yield a smaller fruit; because the Ámalaki growing in the desert has been found to yield a small fruit, it does not necessarily follow that it will always, in other places also, produce fruits of the same small size.—Similarly, there is the assertion that Serpents hear through their eyes.—In fact, the capacities of action belonging to all things are wonderful and anything might be possible for them.—(3390–3392)

COMMENTARY.

The nature of things is found to vary and become restricted under the influence of a variety of causes; it is not right therefore to deduce that a certain thing will always retain the same character that has been perceived in it once; e.g. on seeing that the Ámalaki fruits growing in deserts are very small in size, no sane man can conclude that in all places,—even though there may be diverse causes operating,—they would be the same.—Hence it is quite possible that even through the Eye,—as improved by the practice of Yoga,—a man may become able to see all things. Hence there can be nothing incongruous in this possibility.—(3390–3392)

It has been argued by the other party, under Text 3159, that—"The perception of certain things through certain causes in the past was exactly as it is found to appear at the present time".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3393).

Such an assertion can sound well only when proceeding from one who has the apprehension of all things at all the three points of time, as restricted in their capacity.—(3393)

COMMENTARY.

'With their capacities restricted'—construe thus—'to whom all things appear as restricted in the desired manner'.—(3393)
Question:—"What is the assertion that sounds well?"
Answer:—

TEXTS (3394–3396).

[Such an assertion as that]—"The perception of certain things through certain causes in the past was exactly as it is found at the present time".—As a matter of fact, even at the present time, it cannot be known what the capacity of people is, by you, who are a mere animal devoid of the definite knowledge of the capacity of all things. In fact, if you had the knowledge of the capacity of all things, omniscience would indeed be yours!—Nor can it be known by means of Inference, as there would always be a suspicion regarding its being otherwise.—(3394–3396)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"When we say that this should have been the same in the past, we do not say so on the basis of what we have actually seen, but on the basis of Inference; the inference being in the form—'The means of cognition that is found to apprehend certain things now must have done the same in the past, because it is a Means of Cognition.'"

The answer to this is—'Nor can it be known by Inference';—as in the case of the Āmalaki just cited, peculiar effects are found to be brought about by peculiar causes; hence it might be possible that, through some cause, the Means of Cognition apprehends a different kind of things. Hence the Reason adduced would be 'Inconclusive'.—(3394–3396)

It has been argued by the other party, in Text 3160, that—"Those persons who have been found to be superior to others are so only on account of intelligence, memory and strength, which vary slightly with varying persons,—and not on account of the capacity to perceive supersensuous things'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3397–3401).

It is found that on account of the capacity to perceive supersensuous things also, the presence of Intelligence and other qualities is perceived as arising from the force of their learning, etc. For instance, there is the Art of 'Īkṣaṇika' (Thought reading?) which, properly practised, brings about, even during the present life, the knowledge of what is passing in another man's mind: and (with its help) people come to know and describe things past, present and future, that
HAVE NOT BEEN EITHER inferred OR heard of DURING THE PRESENT LIFE. SIMILARLY, PEOPLE ARE DISTINCTLY AND TRULY FOUND TO BE POSSESSED OF THE CAPACITIES OF CURIOUS INCANTATIONS, NĀGAS, DEMONS AND SPIRITS OF ALL KINDS.—ALL THIS MAY NOT BE seen, AND YET THERE IS NO PROOF FOR DENYING IT. HENCE IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT HE DOES NOT EXIST.—(3397-3401)

COMMENTARY.

The assertion made in 3160 to the effect that—“it is not on account of the capacity to perceive supersensuous things that some people are found to be superior to others”,—is not true. Because through such arts as that of Telepathy, witches and others are found to be able to read the thoughts of others, and also to have the knowledge of past, present and future things.

The term ‘ādī’ ‘others’, is meant to include the Gāndhāri and others.

People have also been found to have the knowledge of supersensuous things through the obsession of various elementals, planets, etc.;—all which cannot be denied.

Granting that there is no supernormal vision anywhere,—even so, the mere fact that the Omniscient Person is not seen cannot prove His non-existence. Hence it cannot be true that He—the knower of supersensuous things—does not exist.—(3397-3401)

It has been argued under Text 3161 that—“Even the intelligent man who is capable of perceiving subtle things is superior to other persons, without going beyond the limitations of his own kind”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3402-3403).

THE AUTHOR OF THE VEDA HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE MANNER ABOVE DESCRIBED, YOU HAVE TO ADMIT OF THE PERSON CAPABLE OF PERCEIVING SUPERSSENSUOUS THINGS. IN THIS WAY, THE INTELLIGENT MAN WOULD BE ABLE TO SEE SUBTLE THINGS, AND WHILE TRANSCENDING THE LIMITATIONS OF HIS OWN KIND, HE WOULD BE RISING ABOVE OTHER MEN.—(3402-3403)

COMMENTARY.

‘In the manner described’—by us, under the chapter on ‘the Revealed Word’.

The author states an argument in support of the above:—
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TEXT (3404).

JUST AS THE CAPACITY OF THE EAR AND OTHER SENSE-ORGANS IN RELATION TO THEIR OBJECTS, BECOMES IMPROVED BY SPECIAL EXERCISE, MEDICATION AND OTHER MEANS,—SO WOULD BE THE CASE WITH THE MIND ALSO.—(3404)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the potency of the sense-organs—Ear and the rest—relating to their objectives, becomes improved by particular exercises and by the application of particular unguents, etc.; and in the same manner it is quite possible that the capacity of the Mind also should become improved by certain special means.—(3404)

The following Text shows how the capacity of the Ear, etc. is improved by exercise:—

TEXT (3405).

FOR EXAMPLE, VULTURES ARE ABLE TO SEE THINGS LYING AT A VERY GREAT DISTANCE: AND PEOPLE ARE ENABLED TO PERCEIVE HIDDEN TREASURES AND OTHER THINGS BY THE USE OF UNGUENTS AND COLLYRIUM WITH MAGICAL POWERS.—(3405)

COMMENTARY.

The words—'People are enabled, etc.'—point out the improvement caused by medication.

'Unguents, etc. with magical powers' is construed with 'is seen' of the previous sentence;—the Instrumental Ending connoting cause or instrumentality.—(3405)

Having thus shown that particular exercises and methods bring about an improvement in the powers of perception,—the author applies the same principle to the case in question:—

TEXT (3406).

IN THE SAME MANNER, THROUGH SPECIAL EXERCISES, ONE WOULD BE ENABLED TO SEE THE CELESTIAL AND OTHER BEINGS, AS ALSO THINGS SUBTLE, HIDDEN AND SO FORTH,—IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS OWN LIMITATIONS.—(3406)

COMMENTARY.

'In accordance, etc., etc.'—There are such natural limitations as—'Vision of such and such a person turns downwards, not upwards' and so forth;
and if, in accordance with such well-known limitations, people have the Cognition of the Mahārajikas and other celestial Beings,—who can prevent it?—(3406)

The following Text shows the superiority acquired by means of Mystic Practices:—

TEXT (3407).

Through particular practices of Yoga, the mind of the Mystics and their cognitions come to be of superior order. There can be nothing incongruous in this.—(3407)

COMMENTARY.

If the superior powers among men is denied on the ground that the said practices and medication, etc. are impossible,—then such denial is entirely superfluous. This is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3408-3409).

If what you deny is the impossibility of the superiority of knowledge in cases where the said practice and meditation, etc. are absent,—then such denial is most improper. As it is only natural that when the cause is not there the effect should not be there.—Just as the knowledge of other sciences does not follow from the knowledge of any one science only,—in the same manner, each step towards superiority is not gained if the corresponding causes are not there.—

(3408-3409)

COMMENTARY.

'Superiority'—among the celestial Beings.

This same argument sets aside what has been said by the other party under Text 3162, regarding the 'auditory perception of Sounds, etc. etc.'—What is meant is that mere non-perception of the said superiority cannot justify the denial of it.—(3408-3409)
It has been argued, under Text 3164, that—"Similarly great superiority is found among men in the matter of scientific discussions, but that does not prove that the man is an expert in all sciences".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3410–3413).

When the existence of the Omniscient Person is asserted, it is not on the basis of His knowledge of any one part of things,—in view of which the knowledge of the Veda and the allied subjects could make Heaven, etc. perceptible to Him. What we find in Him is a superior grade of Wisdom, Mercy and such qualities brought about by constant practice,—and from our knowledge of these qualities we deduce our knowledge of His other kinds of superiority also. And as these are qualities of the Mind, there is every possibility of their rising to the highest stage.—Like the cruelty (of wicked people), the knowledge of all things reaches the highest stage, through constant practice; thus is that Wisdom attained which consists in the knowledge of things; and it remains incomplete while even a single thing remains unknown.—(3410–3413)

COMMENTARY.

We do not accept the view that there is knowledge of all things, on the basis of the knowledge of a single thing, in view of which you have asserted that 'merely that does not secure the knowledge of other sciences' (Text 3164). What we do hold is that, through constant practice, the highest stages of wisdom are reached; and from that we gather that other kinds of superiority are also brought about by the knowledge of supersensuous things, through the rising grades of that same practice. That this is so has been already proved before; it is further supported,—the argument being formulated as follows: all qualities of the Mind reach their highest stage through constant practice,—like the cruelty and other qualities of the Vedic Sacrificers (?);—and Wisdom is a quality of the Mind; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—The Reason adduced here cannot be regarded as 'Inconclusive'; because Wisdom, which consists in the comprehending of the nature of things, cannot reach its highest stage without the knowledge of all things.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as 'Inadmissible' on the ground of its qualification being unknown; because it has already been proved before in detail that constant practice is what is quite feasible.—The word 'Kāśṭhā' is synonymous with 'highest stage'.—(3410–3413)
TEXTS (3414-3415).

Then again, the grains that originally grew out of the seeds of the same kind, turn out gradually to be vastly superior, through the superior treatment that they receive. And as in the case of the Vṛihī and other grains, so in the case of Mercy, Wisdom and other qualities also, it is quite possible that when these latter, endowed with the said character, reach their higher stages, there results omniscience.—(3414-3415)

COMMENTARY.

Or, the grains that originally grew out of the same kind of seeds are found, on undergoing special treatment, to become vastly superior; and just as this happens in the case of grains, so it does in the case of the qualities of Mercy, Wisdom, etc. also. So this is a Reason based on the nature of things. As before, here also the Reason is not 'Inconclusive' or 'Inadmissible'. 'Mati'—wisdom.

'Endowed with the said character'—i.e. originally growing out of the same kind of cause.—(3414-3415)

TEXTS (3416-3418).

In things that are liable to deterioration in the presence of their opposites,—there comes about an utter deterioration,—as is found in the case of the impurities in gold.—Afflictions, wrong notions of cognisable things and so forth, are all endowed with the said character (of deteriorating in the presence of their opposites): hence on the destruction of these, Cognitions become free from impurities. If it is possible for these, endowed as they are with the said character, to have impurities,—then it is equally possible for their opposite to uproot that impurity.—(3416–3418)

COMMENTARY.

Or, things that have been found to deteriorate in the presence of their opposites are liable to utter deterioration when their opposite rises to its
highest stage of development; as is found to be the case with the impurities of gold;—Love, Hatred and the rest are found to deteriorate in the presence of the knowledge of ‘Soul-less-ness’;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—The Reason adduced cannot be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’; because it has been proved that the knowledge of ‘Soul-less-ness’ is destructive of Love, etc.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’; because when the opposite of something rises to the highest point, that thing cannot continue to exist. Otherwise, if a thing were unable to entirely uproot another thing,—how could it bring about even a slight deterioration in this latter? For instance, the diamond, even when lying in the midst of flaming fire, does not undergo any deterioration at all.—Nor can the Reason be held to be ‘Inconclusive’ on the ground of the impossibility of the opposite rising to the highest stage of development; because it has been already proved in detail, that such high development is quite possible.

Or, those things that are liable to deterioration in the presence of their opposites, are likely to have opposites that are capable of utterly uprooting them,—as in the case of the impurities of gold;—the Afflictions and the wrong notions of knowable things are liable to deterioration in the presence of their opposites; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. Here also the charge of ‘Inconclusiveness’ and ‘Inadmissibility’ may be rebutted as in the previous cases.

‘Ādi’ includes the ‘wrong notions of action’.—(3416-3418)

TEXTS (3419-3420).

IN SOME CASES, THERE IS ABSOLUTE DETERIORATION OF THINGS THAT OBSTRUCT THE PERCEPTION OF TRUTH, AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE EXTERNAL AS WELL AS INTERNAL DARKNESS. WHEN THERE IS DETERIORATION OF THIS, TRUE KNOWLEDGE APPEARS UNTRAMMELLED AND PROCEEDS TO APPLY TO THE WHOLE CIRCLE OF KNOWABLE THINGS.—

(3419-3420)

COMMENTARY.

Or, things that serve as obstacles to the Perception of Truth are liable to absolute deterioration,—e.g. the external and nocturnal darkness,—and Afflictions and Wrong notions of things, etc. are obstacles to the perception of Truth; so that this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

That this Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’ is pointed out by the words—‘when there is deterioration of this, etc. etc.’—‘of this’—of the internal darkness (of Ignorance).—(3419-3420)
TEXTS (3421–3424).

Or, those that subsist in a lasting substratum, having come about in it somehow, and—so long as there is no force to the contrary, they do not need any further effort towards bringing them about again,—these, by the excellence of the treatment they receive, reach the highest stage of perfection;—as for example, the purification of gold;—knowledge, mercy and such qualities are all of the said kind; so that when these have reached the highest state of perfection, there is brilliant omniscience.—Nor can this reason be held to be fallible (false) in view of the two cases of Jumping and Water-heating; because Jumping follows not from the Jumping itself, but from strength and effort.—

(3421–3424)

COMMENTARY.

Or, if there are things that subsist in a lasting substratum, and have had some peculiarity produced in them somehow,—if there is no force to the contrary,—they do not stand in need of further effort for their production; and if they receive excellent treatment, they proceed to the highest stage of perfection; as is found in the case of the purification of Gold and such things;—Knowledge, Mercy and such things (i.e. those under discussion) have the character just described—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

‘Nor can this Reason be said to be fallible, in view of the cases of Jumping and Water-heating’; i.e. by reason of the qualifications that have been added in the above statement of the Reason. Neither Jumping nor Water-heating is produced only once; nor do they not need another effort for producing them again; nor do they subsist in a lasting substratum.

Or, it may be said that there is no ‘fallibility’ in the Premiss because of the further qualification that ‘it should proceed from a seed of the same kind’ (see Text 3414).—This is what is pointed out by the words—‘Jumping follows, not from the jumping itself, etc. etc.’,—i.e. the Jumping is not produced by the Jumping.

Question:—“From what then, does it proceed?”

Answer:—‘Jumping proceeds from strength and effort’;—i.e. when there is strength, and also effort, then there comes Jumping; it does not come when there is Jumping itself. These two—Strength and Effort—have their capacities restricted and fixed; consequently, the Jumping also has its character restricted and fixed.

The following might be urged—"If Jumping proceeds from Strength and Effort, not from Jumping itself, then, the Jumping-capacity that comes to man after practice, should be his even prior to that practice".
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This does not affect our position. What happens is that before the practice, the body was disabled by the presence of too much fat, and hence the same degree of Jumping could not be attained. Subsequently however, by repeated effort, the said disability gradually disappears, and the Jumping is attained exactly in accordance with the man's strength.—That such is the case must be admitted; as otherwise, the Jumping would proceed from the Jumping itself, and in that case there could be no fixity in its degree of excellence.—(3421–3424)

Or, the Jumping also being dependent upon particular causes, there can be no fixity in its degree of excellence, and hence this case could not invalidate our Reason.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3425–3427).

Or, the Jumping also is something that is capable of reaching the highest stage of perfection,—which would proceed from its own causes, through concentrated effort and strength: this capacity is named ‘Manojava’ (Mind-Force). It is in connection with such capacity that we hear (and read) of such facts as that the Lord reaches remote places by merely thinking of it.—The mere fact that such power is not seen cannot prove that it does not exist; nor can the Opponent put forward any reason that could annul such an idea.—(3425–3427)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, we also admit that, through Concentration of Mind and the use of great strength, Jumping reaches the highest degree of perfection; as for instance, we read of the Lord having the power called 'Mind-Force', by means of which one becomes as swift in his movement as the Mind; that is why it has been named 'Mind-Force'. Nor is there any reason annulling the possibility of this Power. Nor can mere non-perception of it justify its denial; as in that case, great incongruities would result.—(3425–3427)

Further, it is actually seen that when peculiar conditions are produced in the Receptacle, the Movement reaches very superior excellence; so that from that also we could deduce such perfect movement in the case of the Blessed Lord.—This is what is shown in the following—
TEXTS (3428–3430).

The young Rāja-hamsa (Swan) is unable to move out of the house even; but through practice, it becomes able to go beyond the ocean also. Just as this movement of his is the result of the exercise of the particular conditions of the receptacle (i.e. the Body),—similarly, why cannot similar, or even higher, powers be possible (in the Blessed Lord)? At the preceding stage of the ‘Bodhisattva’, however, He is not able to attain such power of movement; but the great sage would certainly attain it on His reaching the highest state of ‘Communion’.—(3428–3430)

COMMENTS.

The young one of the Swan, in the beginning, is unable even to go out of its nest; but later on, after even slight practice, its wings having grown, it flies even beyond the seas. In the same manner, it is quite possible that other people, through the exercise of the conditions attaching to the body, attain similar process of movement.

“That the bird is enabled to go to distant places, is due to the growth of wings, not to Practice”.

Even after the wings have grown, the young bird is not found to fly up into the air all on a sudden. What happens is that when it begins to fly from one branch to the other of the tree, it flies, at first only to a short distance,—then, having got rid of all fear and doubt, it flies to remoter regions.

Then again, just as in the case of the swan, after it has acquired a particular substratum, it acquires the powers of movement that it did not possess before,—similarly in the case of the Blessed Lord also, it is quite possible that, though He did not possess the particular power at the stage of the ‘Bodhisattva’, yet, when He attained a particular stage of Communion, He secured a particular substratum which enabled Him to acquire the movement in question.—This is all that is meant by the Text; the mention of ‘Practice’ has no significance.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—That Practice which is related to the receptacle of a particular condition leads up to the power of going very very far,—as is found in the case of the Practice by the young Swan;—the Practice of human beings also is capable of being related to the receptacle of a particular condition;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(3428–3430)

It has been argued above, by the other party, under Text 3168, that—“The man who can jump into the sky to the height of 15 feet, can never jump to the height of 8 miles, however much he may practise jumping”.

The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (3431).

If a man is able to jump to the height of 15 feet, he could certainly acquire the capacity to jump to greater heights, through similar means.—(3431)

COMMENTARY.

The following Text proceeds to show that the Author's Reason is not falsified by the case of the 'Heating of Water'; because of the qualifying phrase 'having a lasting substratum' (in Text 3421):—

TEXT (3432).

While the Water is being heated, it is gradually undergoing destruction (evaporation); thus the substratum being not 'lasting', what and where would the 'perfection' lie?
—(3432)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"How is it known that Wisdom and other qualities have a lasting substratum?"

Answer:—

TEXT (3433).

Of mental qualities, the substratum consists in the 'chain of Consciousness'; and this never ceases to function through its connection with its receptacle.—(3433)

COMMENTARY.

'This'—i.e. The Chain of Consciousness.

'Function through, etc. etc.'—i.e. from functioning through its connection with its receptacle, in the shape of the Bodhisattva; because what is meant is a particular 'Receptacle'.

What is meant is as follows:—It has been proved that there is another 'Region' (Plane);—the Bodhisattvas are persons thoroughly imbued with great Mercy, and they live for the sole purpose of saving all beings from the meshes of Birth and Rebirth; the 'Chain of Consciousness', therefore, that subsists in them is all the more 'lasting'. That 'Chain of Consciousness', on the other hand, which subsists in the Disciples is not so 'lasting'; because these latter enter into Nirvāna sooner, and hence their Mercy is not so intense; which fact leads them to make no effort to continue to live on (for the benefit of living Beings).—(3433)
Question:—“How is the second qualification (being brought about somehow, under Text 3421) known to exist?”
Answer:—

TEXT (3434).

AS THE FLOW OF QUALITIES GOES ON APPEARING IN THE ‘CHAIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS’, SO IT GOES ON BECOMING MORE AND MORE LUMINOUS.—(3434)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—“How is this also known?”
Answer:—

TEXT (3435).

THIS ‘CONSCIOUSNESS’ IS OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE ‘PERCEPTION OF TRUTH’, AND HENCE IT IS LUMINOUS, BY ITS VERY NATURE; BECAUSE IMPURITIES ARE ALL HELD TO BE ADVENTITIOUS.—(3435)

COMMENTARY.

All this has been explained by us already,—that all these, Wisdom, Mercy and the rest, by their very nature, are of the same essence as the Perception of Truth; and as such they constitute the nature of ‘Consciousness’. It thus becomes established that, as these Wisdom, etc. are of the very essence of Consciousness—when they have been once brought about, they continue to function automatically.—(3435)

Question:—“How is it known that the second qualification, ‘which is of the same essence as the Perception of Truth’, belongs to Consciousness?”
Answer:—

TEXTS (3436-3437).

IF CONSCIOUSNESS WERE RESTRICTED TO THE COGNITION OF SOMETHING APART FROM ITSELF, THEN, AS IT ITSELF WOULD NOT BE COGNISED, THERE COULD BE NO COGNITION OF THINGS. CONSEQUENTLY CONSCIOUSNESS HAS TO BE REGARDED AS ESSENTIALLY ‘SELF-COGNISED’, SPECIALLY BECAUSE IT IS ILLUMINATIVE. HENCE THIS CONSCIOUSNESS REMAINS AS SOMETHING FREE FROM ALL IMPOSITION.—

(3436-3437)

COMMENTARY.

Primarily, the most important form of Consciousness consists in self-cognition;—this has to be admitted by all parties. Otherwise, if Consciousness
were cognised by another cognition, then, as its own apprehension would be impossible, there could be no cognition of things. Consequently 'self-illumination' is the most important character of Consciousness. This 'self' of the Consciousness is something entirely ephemeral; hence, by implication, it follows that Consciousness is of the nature of the 'Perception of Truth'.—(3436-3437)

The following might be urged—"Consciousness may be of the nature of the Perception of Truth; even so, inasmuch as things destroyed are liable to appear again,—all the Reasons that have been adduced are irresistibly Inconclusive".

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS (3438–3440).**

**When, thus, the 'Path' has become identified with Him, there can be no suppression of it by Love, Hatred and other Defects, since they had been already feeble before. The 'Path'—which is destructive of all Defects,—having become thus identified,—there can be no loss of it without effort; and there can be no such effort, as its good points have been perceived.—Thus it is that Jīna is understood to be the Omniscient Person adorned by a pure and firm host of good qualities, whose soul cannot be shaken by the storm of Defects.—(3438–3440)**

**COMMENTARY.**

Even before the identification of the 'Path', the impurities of Love, etc., already feeble on account of their adventitious character, are unable to suppress that Path; how then can they suppress the Path when it has become identified and absorbed?

Further, when the quality of the Mind has become absorbed, it cannot be removed without effort; just as the cruel nature of the Vedic sacrificer and the Demon (?) cannot be removed. Nor is it possible for any wise man to make an effort to get rid of what has been found to be possessed of good qualities.—'Why?''—Because its good points have been perceived. This has been already explained before.

'Apakṣāla' is Defect.—(3438–3440)

Or again, the character of 'being an entity' and so forth, which you have put forward (under Text 3157 et seq.) as reasons for denying the existence of the Omniscient Person,—are themselves enough to prove His existence. In
order to show this, the Author proceeds to point out the Invariable Concomitance of the said characters (with Omniscience):—

**TEXTS (3441–3443).**

*Whatever things are conceived become clearly manifest, at the completion of the conception; as is found in the case of the objects of desire;—all things are conceived by great sages, for a long time and several times, in their real form, as 'Void', 'No-Soul' and so forth. That the 'Void', 'No-Soul' and the rest are the real forms has been proved before. Hence as arising out of the conception of really existent things, the said conception has been rightly regarded as right and valid.—(3441–3443)*

**COMMENTARY.**

The principal argument to be expounded later on, may be formulated thus:—Things that are possessed of the characters of 'being entity', 'being cognisable' and so forth are those that become clearly manifest in a single cognition which forms the highest stage of conception;—e.g. the loved woman, the son and the thief who are conceived of by men who are obsessed by the feelings of love, etc.,—all things are possessed of the said characters of 'being entity' and the rest;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—The Reason adduced here cannot be said to be 'Inconclusive'; because whatever thing, real or unreal, is conceived of, is always found to bring about, at the culmination of the conception, the clear cognition of that thing; e.g. the man in love has the clear cognition of the woman he loves;—all things are conceived of in their real form, for a long time, by persons who are absorbed in mercy;—hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things.

This shows that Conception is invariably concomitant with the resultant clear cognition.

*Question:*—The clear cognition of things is independent of other things; how is it known that the 'Void', 'No-Soul' and the rest constitute the real form of things?"

*Answer:*—'That the Void, No-Soul and the rest, etc. etc.'—(3441–3443)

The Author now proceeds to show that the cognition of the 'Void' and the rest is vouched for by Perception itself:—
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TEXTS (3444–3446).

THE COGNITION IN QUESTION IS VOICED FOR BY 'PERCEPTION', BECAUSE IT IS CLEARLY MANIFEST, AND IS IN KEEPING WITH THE REAL NATURE OF THINGS; JUST LIKE THE APPEARANCE OF BLUE AND OTHER THINGS, ARISING FROM THE CONTACT OF THE EYE AND OTHER SENSE-ORGANS. THE SINGLE CLEAR APPEARANCE OF ALL THINGS IN A SINGLE COGNITION IS QUITE POSSIBLE,—WHICH PLEASE UNDERSTAND; ALSO BECAUSE THINGS ARE SO CONCEIVED OF, LIKE THE WOMAN, THE SON AND THE THIEF; CONCEPTION TOO IS NOT DIFFICULT TO GET AT, AS IT CAN PRESENT ITSELF BEFORE ONE BY MERELY WISHING FOR IT.—(3444–3446)

COMMENTARY.

As it is clearly manifested, it cannot be merely fanciful;—as it envisages things vouched for by means of Right Cognition, it cannot be incompatible with the reality; hence it must be regarded as a valid form of Perception, like the Visual and other perceptions.

Thus it having been proved that it arises from mere conception and is clearly manifest, it also becomes proved that all things become clearly manifested simultaneously in a single cognition; and thus the Invariable Concomitance becomes established, and we get the Premiss that 'all things can appear clearly in a single cognition at one and the same time'.—The argument may be formulated as follows:—Things that are conceived of are capable of being clearly manifested in a single cognition;—e.g. the Woman and other things;—all things are conceived of;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The Reason cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible';—this is pointed out by the next sentence—'Conception too is not, etc. etc.'—That is, the possibility of conception having been proved before, the Reason cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible'.—(3444–3446)

Having thus established the Invariable Concomitance by pointing out that the capacity of being clearly manifested is connected with mere conception, the author now proceeds to point out the main purport of his argument:—

TEXTS (3447–3449).

ALL THINGS MUST BE REGARDED AS CLEARLY MANIFESTED BY THE ONE COGNITION THAT REPRESENTS THE HIGHEST STAGE OF THE CONCEPTION,—BECAUSE OF SUCH REASONS AS 'BEING ENTITIES', 'BEING EXISTENT' AND THE LIKE,—LIKE THE BELOVED WOMAN AND OTHERS.—SIMILARLY, WHEN THE CERTAINTY REGARDING A THING IS CAPABLE OF BEING PROVED BY SUCH REASONS AS 'BEING AN ENTITY', 'BEING EXISTENT', 'BEING PRODUCED' AND THE LIKE,—WHO IS THERE WHO WILL NOT REGARD IT AS WELL-ESTABLISHED?
HERE then is fully established the existence of the Omniscient Person, who is the crest-jewel of all Suras and Asuras, and whose single cognition comprehends all that is knowable.—(3447–3449)

COMMENTARY.

The highest stage of the development of the Conception is represented by the cognition in question. Even in the absence of co-ordination, the Bahuvarhi compound is based upon the sense of the words. The meaning thus is that—all things are such as are clearly manifested in the single cognition that represents the highest stage of the Conception.—And the Person in whose one cognition all things become clearly manifested in this way is one ‘whose single cognition comprehends all that is knowable’, and who is ‘the crest-jewel of all Suras and Asuras’;—and this Person is thus proved to be ‘omniscient’.—(3447–3449)

TEXT (3450).

Dharma and other things must have been known to some Person, without any verbal expressions,—because they have been taught by truthful men,—like the purity of gold and such things.—(3450)

COMMENTARY.

Or, things that have been taught by truthful men must have been known to some one,—like the purity of gold and such things;—and Dharma and other things have been taught by truthful men;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(3450)

The following might be urged—‘It is possible that the Teachers have taught Dharma, etc. after learning it from the Veda; hence your argument is futile’.

The answer to this is as follows:

TEXT (3451).

It having been proved that the Veda is the work of a human being, our argument is not proving what is already proved (and hence futile). Mere random teaching of what is not known cannot be always true.—(3451)

COMMENTARY.

Under the chapter on the ‘Revealed Word’, it has been proved that the Veda is the work of a human being; hence our present argument is not ‘futile’.
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It might be argued that—"Teachings can be imparted at random, without knowing the things taught; so that your Reason is 'Inconclusive'."

The answer to this is—"Mere random teaching, etc. etc.'—It is not possible that anyone, without knowledge, should go on talking, and that too against all forms of Right Cognition.—(3451)

TEXTS (3452-3453).

THE SUPERSENSUOUS POTENCY OF GESTURES, MAGIC CIRCLES AND INCANTATIONS TO CURE THE ATTACK OF GHOSTS AND WITCHES, TO REMOVE THE EFFECTS OF POISONS;—ALSO THE SAGES AND Gāruḍa AND SUCH BEINGS;—IF THE CLEAR KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THESE THINGS BY DIRECT PERCEPTION, AS APART FROM WORDS AND INFERENCE, DID NOT BELONG TO THESE PERSONS;

—HOW IS IT THAT THEY HAVE SPOKEN OF ALL THIS?—(3452-3453)

COMMENTARY.

Further, the knowledge of Incantations and other things as possessing the capacity to remove the effects of Poison, etc.,—things that are entirely beyond the reach of the senses,—if these things were not directly known to Buddha and others, how is it that they have spoken of them? This needs to be explained.—(3452-3453)

"It may be that they have spoken of these things after having come to know them through Inference.'"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3454).

HIS KNOWLEDGE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DERIVED THROUGH INFERENCE, AS THERE HAD BEEN NO PREVIOUS PERCEPTION; AND HENCE NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE COULD BE RECOGNISED.—(3454)

COMMENTARY.

Nothing can form the object of Inference of which the relationship to the Indicative has not been recognised; and it is not possible to have any definite notion of the relationship of any Inferential Indicative to a thing which is entirely beyond perception.—(3454)
Nor could he derive his knowledge by hearing it as asserted by another person; as the case of the latter also would be open to the same objections.—Nor can the conformity (of the Teaching) with the real state of things be merely accidental. Because the teaching is avowedly in regard to Dharma; hence it could not be attributed to any other motive; and it is only when something has been done with a different motive that such 'accident' may be suspected; e.g. when a thirsty man is going in search of the river,—if he comes by a tree, that can be said to be 'accidental'.—(3455–3457)

COMMENTARY.

It might be said that—"His knowledge has been derived from the assertions of another person".—But that cannot be right, as the case of this latter also would be open to the same objections. For instance, the following consideration arises here also: How did the other person know it? There can be no teaching, without knowledge;—if he learnt it from another person;—and so on, there would be an infinite regress; thus there being a case of the blind following the blind, all would have to be regarded as ignorant, and no teaching would be right and sound. This has been thus declared.—'In regard to such matters (as Dharma), the assertion of man cannot be reliable, as it would be like the assertion of the blind regarding colour.'

The following might be urged—"The Conformity of the Teaching to the real state of things might be purely accidental'.

The answer to this is that—'Nor can, etc. etc.'—The compound is to be expounded as—that of which accidental conformity is the character. It is only when the effort made for one thing leads one to another thing that the conformity to this latter may be accidental; e.g. when a man is going along in search of the river-side, if he comes by the shade of the tree. In the case in question, however, the Teaching has not been imparted with any other motive; as the Blessed Lord has clearly introduced His teaching with the words—'O Bhikṣus, I shall now teach you Dharma', and then proceeded to expound His Teachings regarding Dharma and other matters; so that it is clear that His teaching has not proceeded with any other motive.

'Vāhini' is River;—'Vidruma' is Tree,—or Coral.—(3455–3457)

It might be argued that—"it is possible that the Teaching might have proceeded from Delusion; and hence the Reason put forward is 'Inconclusive'".

The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (3458).

NOR IS THE Teaching the assertion of demented people with disordered minds; because it is found to be in a regular sequence and is an excellent fulfiller of its purpose.—(3458)

COMMENTARY.

Demented persons with disordered minds cannot make any such long assertions as appear in well-ordered sequence, as a connected whole accomplishing the purposes of man.

Thus it becomes established that there has been some one who possessed the direct knowledge of Dharma and allied matters.—(3458)

The following might be urged—"It might have been established in a general way; but even so, what you wished to prove was the fact that Buddha had the knowledge of Dharma; how is that proved"?

In answer to this, the Author proceeds to show that the Blessed Lord did possess the knowledge of Dharma:—

TEXTS (3459–3461).

WHEN A Person who, intent upon the Truth, which is neither heard of nor inferred, expounds it,—such an expounder must be regarded as one who has had direct knowledge of that Truth; for example, when the man who has actually seen water, points it out to others;—the Great Sage, intent upon the Truth, has actually expounded, with firm conviction, the Truth which had never been heard of or inferred,—which is beyond the reach of the senses, the potencies of which, like those of Gestures, Magic Circles and the like, are not known to others.—(3459–3461)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be thus formulated:—One who, intent upon the Truth, teaches the truth regarding unheard of and un-inferred things, he must be regarded as being directly cognisant of the real essence of those things,—e.g. the man who, having actually seen water, points it out to others;—the Blessed Lord has actually taught such Truths;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The truthfulness of the Teachings having been already established, the Reason cannot be said to be 'Inadmissible'.—Nor is it 'Inconclusive'—as has been shown already.—And as all our Reasons are present wherever the Probandum is present, the Reason cannot be regarded as 'Contradictory'. 
'Parājñāta, etc.'—The Gesture, etc. whose potency is not known to other people.—(3459-3461)

It has been argued by the other party, under Text 3169, that—"Even when the superiority of knowledge proceeds very far, it can comprehend only a little more than others, it can never comprehend things beyond the senses".

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (3462).**

**Thus, when there is superior knowledge, and it proceeds on the basis of proper means, it can comprehend all that is more than others,—even that which is beyond the senses.—(3462)**

**COMMENTARY.**

It has been argued under Text 3170, that—"While the man is seated in a hut, the Sense-perception that he has has its range restricted within that hut, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXTS (3463-3464)**

**When a man is seated in a hut, the sense-perception that he has has its range restricted within that hut, it does not extend to another hut;—all this you could be in a position to assert with certainty only when you had the direct apprehension of the capacity of all things; otherwise, on what could such certainty be based?—(3463-3464)**

**COMMENTARY.**

When you made this statement you made it entirely on the basis of that assertion itself; for people of limited vision, mere non-apprehension cannot justify any certainty regarding the incapacity of all men to cognise supersensuous things.—(3463-3464)

The following might be urged—"When we declare the incapacity of men to cognise supersensuous things, we do not do so on the basis of mere non-apprehension; in fact, we do it on the basis of inference from such reasons as 'being human' and so forth. For instance, all men are incapable of per-
ceiving things remote, concealed, etc.,—because they are human, because they are entities, because they are cognisable,—like myself'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3465-3466).

IF YOU DEDUCE THE INCAPACITY OF OTHER PERSONS, IN REGARD TO A CERTAIN EFFECT, FROM YOUR OWN EXAMPLE,—ON THE BASIS OF SUCH REASONS AS 'BEING HUMAN' AND THE LIKE,—THEN YOU LAND YOURSELF IN ABSURDITIES.—IN THIS WAY, YOUR OWN STUPIDITY HAVING BEEN ASCERTAINED,—FROM YOUR OWN EXAMPLE, ALL LEARNED MEN MIGHT BE REGARDED AS STUPID.—(3465-3466)

COMMENTARY.

'Nishchayē', 'deduce', is to be construed with 'Kāryē', 'in regard to a certain effect'.

The Reasons cited are all 'Inconclusive'; as leading to absurdities.—Because in this same manner, it may asserted as follows:—'All men are stupid, because they are human, etc. etc.,—like yourself'.—And yet there can be no such deduction. Because Dharma is not found in one man, it cannot be deduced that it cannot be found in any man; because men are found to be differently circumstanced.—(3465-3466)

As regards Ṛtuparṇa's assertion, quoted under Texts 3172-3173—to the effect that—"All men do not know all things, etc. etc.'',—that also is a mere assertion made without reasons.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3467).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO LIMIT TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN. HENCE THE STATEMENT IN QUESTION IS A MERE ASSERTION MADE WITHOUT ANY REASON.—(3467)

COMMENTARY.

Or, it may be that the statement made by Ṛtuparṇa is in regard to men like ourselves; in that case, there being no incompatibility between this view and our doctrine of the Omniscent Person,—it has no bearing on the present discussion.—This is what is pointed out in the following—
TEXTS (3468–3472).

Or, it may be that the statement made by Ṛtuparṇa was with reference to common dull-witted persons like himself, whose minds have not been purified.—In support of the possibility of there being an Omniscient Person, we have already stated the proof in detail;—arguments to the contrary brought forward by other parties have also been refuted.—In fact, even if the proof in support of His existence had not been put forward, the mere annulment of the arguments to the contrary would have established the probability of His existence. Because where nothing against a certain idea is perceived, nor anything in support of it,—there arises a doubt regarding it; which indicates its probability. In fact, it is only when this probability is there, that there can be such an assertion to the contrary (made by the Mīmāṃsakas) as that—“it is by means of the Veda alone that Dharma can be known”.—(3468–3472)

COMMENTARY.

'Svasamān'—People like—similar to—himself.—(3468–3472)

It has been argued, under Text 3174, that—“The capacity of Perception has never been found applicable to the future, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3473).

Even in regard to future things, the capacity of Perception would be applicable, in the case of Mystics,—as has been pointed out in the chapter on 'The Three Points of Time'.—(3473)

COMMENTARY.

'As has been pointed out in the chapter, etc. etc.'—This is what has been said under that chapter:—All things, directly or indirectly, bear to each other the relation of cause and effect; the Present thing is always, directly or indirectly, the effect of the Past, and the cause of the Future thing. What the Mystics do is to apprehend all things by direct Perception, and thereby determine the Past and the Future entity also, on the basis of the 'chain of entities', past and future, which are related as cause and effect respectively, —by means of conceptions that are object-less and hence not entirely in conformity with reality, or purely worldly,—which follow on the wake of the said Perception.
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This is what has been declared in Texts 1853–1855 under the chapter on the 'Three points of Time'—[For translation see, in loco, above].—(3473)

The above is not accepted by the Sautrāntika (section of Buddhists), who hold that the Blessed Lord has the direct perception of all things. Hence the Author sets forth the view of the Sautrāntika in the following—

TEXT (3474).

Or, through the powers of Yoga, the mental Perception of Mystics would clearly envisage the Past and the Future also, independently of Inference and the Word.

—(3474)

COMMENTARY.

When one has a true dream, even though the cognition is objectless, yet it is there, independently of Inference and Word,—appearing through the peculiar nature of its substratum, and it is in conformity with the real state of things. In the same manner, in the case of mystics, through the powers of Meditation and Communion, the Past and the Future thing becomes clearly perceptible, independently of Inference and Word. This Perception is held to be a valid proof (of omniscience).—(3474)

The following might be urged—"Perception has been held to envisage the Specific Individuality of things; there is no Specific Individuality that is Past or Future; then how can the knowledge of these envisage the Specific Individuality"?

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3475-3476).

As apprehending its own manifestation, it envisages a Specific Individuality; and as envisaging a clear and distinct manifestation, it is held to be Perception.—Thus there is some one who perceives supersensuous things directly. And as there is no eternal Word, one does not perceive anything through that.—

(3475-3476)

COMMENTARY.

Though it is true that there is no Specific Individuality that is Past or Future, yet, inasmuch as the cognition apprehends itself, it has been declared in the scriptures to be envisaging the Specific Individuality; hence there is no incongruity in this.
And as this cognition is clear and distinct, and is free from conceptual content, and is in conformity with the real state of things,—it fulfills all the conditions of ‘Perception’, and hence it becomes established that it is Perception—(3475-3476)

Not accepting this view (that the Lord has the direct Perception of all things), the Author asserts the following, in answer to what the other party has asserted under Text 3175 to the effect that—"He alone sees things who sees them through the eternal Word".—

TEXT (3477).

The wise men have declared that the knowledge of the Sage of supersensuous things proceeds from the Inference stated before,—not from any Revealed Word.—(3477)

COMMENTARY.

The wise men—i.e. the Buddhists—have declared that the knowledge of supersensuous things, belonging to the Blessed Lord, which directly envisages all things, is brought about by the force of his meditations,—through the aforementioned Inference, independently of the Revealed Word;—and that it does not proceed from any scriptures compiled by men. Hence as this view is not accepted by us, the objection does not affect us.—(3477)

It has been argued, under Text 3178, that—"the beginninglessness that is asserted in regard to the composer and the utterances emanating from him is itself based upon two invalid notions, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3478-3479).

Beginninglessness is not asserted in regard to the Composer or to the utterances emanating from him,—for the purpose of proving their validity; because beginninglessness belongs to the invalid (wrong) cognition also; for instance, the Unbelievers and their words,—as also the Vedas and their expounders,—are not valid and reliable, even though they may be beginningless.—(3478-3479)

COMMENTARY.

When we assert Beginninglessness, it is not as a reason for reliability; because such a reason, as present in the absence of the Probandum also,
would be 'Inconclusive'. Hence, the objection that you have urged has been urged by imputing to us a view that is not held by us.—(3478-3479)

Then again, it is you yourselves who assert the *beginninglessness* of the Vedas and their Expounders as a reason for the reliability of the Veda; so that all the objections that you have urged are clearly applicable to you.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3480).


COMMENTARY.

The compound is to be expounded as—'The expounders' and 'the eternal sentences'. 'Expounder' stands for those who expound the meaning of the Vedas.—(3480)

*Question* :—“How is the Beginninglessness denied ?”

*Answer* :—

TEXT (3481).


COMMENTARY.

'Dependent upon them'—i.e. upon the Expounders.

"How so ?"

Because the knowledge of the meaning of the Vedas is derived from the explanations provided by those Expounders,—therefore the validity and reliability of the Vedas are dependent upon those persons.—(3481)

*Question* :—“What is the harm if that is so ?”

*Answer* :—
TEXTS (3482–3484).

In this way, the Vedic Sentences, being dependent upon other things, cannot be reliable.—As regards the Expounders, as they do not themselves perceive Dharma, these also can never be reliable. Of such Expounders, even though beginninglessness may be postulated, it would be in a position that is not reliable; and hence it would not be different in character from the beginninglessness of the unbelievers and others. Thus there being no difference discernible, all this comes to be on the same footing; so that neither Reliability nor Unreliability would be beginningless.—(3482–3484)

COMMENTARY.

'Can never be reliable'—That is Reliability can never be theirs.

When, in this way, the Vedic Sentences themselves, being dependent upon other things, cannot be reliable,—their Expounders would be like a group of blind people, having no knowledge of dharma; and as such these also would be unreliable.

Thus what has been asserted by the other party, to the effect that—"Reliability (Validity) and Unreliability (Invalidity) would thus be beginningless'—cannot be right.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'Na mānatvāpramanānatvā, etc. etc.'—Only if the reliability of the Expounders and the Veda had been established, could the said Reliability be beginningless; as a matter of fact, however, that itself has not been established; hence it is not right to assert that both these are beginningless.—(3482–3484)

Then again, when we asserted that the Vedas and their expounders stand on the same footing as Buddha and His Teachings,—it was merely as a counterblast; as a matter of fact, there can be no equality between the Blessed Lord and His Teachings on the one hand and the Vedas and their expounders on the other; there is really a great difference between them.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3485).

In fact, there is this difference between the Sage and those Words,—that He perceived the Dharma Himself and expounded them through Mercy.—(3485)

COMMENTARY.

It has been already proved that the Blessed Lord had the direct perception of Dharma and taught it. Hence what the opponent has asserted (under Text 3179) regarding the unreliability of one who has never himself perceived Dharma, is 'inadmissible'.—(3485)
The following might be urged—"How is it known that the Lord Himself expounded the Dharma?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (3486).**

*That is described as 'Dharma' by all wise persons from which follows 'Prosperity' and the 'Highest Good'.*—(3486)

**COMMENTARY.**

'The Highest Good'—'follows from which'—such is the construction.

'Prosperity' is Happiness, and 'Highest Good' is Final Liberation.

'This is what is described as Dharma'—as is clear from the assertion (in the *Vaishešika-Sūtra*) that 'Dharma is that from which follows the fulfilment of Prosperity and the Highest Good'.—(3486)

[Says the Opponent]—"It may be that Dharma is the means of accomplishing Prosperity and the Highest Good; but how is the Word of Buddha the means of knowing Dharma,—by virtue of which He should be recognised as 'cognisant with Dharma'?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (3487).**

*As a matter of fact, wherever the rules laid down by Him relating to Incantations and Communion and such things, are properly followed in practice, one becomes endowed with even such perceptible qualities as Wisdom, Health, Power and so forth.*—(3487)

**COMMENTARY.**

The compound is to be expounded as—'The rules relating to Incantations and Communion' which 'have been laid down by the Blessed Lord'.

The term 'yoga' stands for Communion.

'And such things' is meant to include Gestures, Magic Circles and so forth.

'Even perceptible qualities'—i.e. during the present life itself,—and not only in the other regions, after death. This is what is indicated by the word 'even'.—(3487)

Having thus shown that the words of Buddha are conducive to 'Prosperity', the Author proceeds to show that they are also conducive to the 'Highest Good':—
TEXTS (3488-3494).

From the realisation of the Doctrine of the 'Soul-less-ness of all things' as taught by Him, follows the cessation of the whole mass of Afflictions due to the notion of things having such existence. This notion of the reality of things appears in the form of 'self' and 'things related to the self'; it is only when there are notions of 'I' and 'mine' that the whole mass of Afflictions becomes operative.—The said perception of 'Soul-less-ness' is the enemy of this notion of reality; hence when the former becomes duly absorbed and realised, the latter disappears; therefore the entire mass of Afflictions due to that notion of reality ceases, on account of the absence of its cause; and when that ceases, there is no more Birth due to that. Thus there being absolute liberation from Birth, this state is spoken of as the 'Final Goal'.—Thus the perception of 'Soul-less-ness' is the door to Unrivalled 'Good'.—All other Philosophers have held that liberation follows from the cessation of the 'I-notion'; but if there is a 'Soul', this 'I-notion' can never cease; because its efficient cause would always be there; so the objective of that notion too would not be abrogated. If it were abrogated, there would be negation of it, which would mean a complete volte-face on their part.—(3488-3494)

COMMENTARY.

It is accepted by all that Liberation consists in the absolute cessation of the series of Births and Rebirths. But the only means of attaining this consists in the Teachings of the Blessed Lord; as it is only here—and nowhere else,—that we have the 'teaching of the doctrine of no-Soul', which is the sole destroyer of 'Afflictions' which are the source of 'Birth and Rebirth'; and all other Philosophers are wedded to the false doctrine of the 'Soul'. Thus it is the word of the Blessed Lord alone which, as being the means of attaining Prosperity and Highest Good, can be the indicator of Dharma; hence it is this alone that should be depended upon by all who seek their own welfare.—Such is the purport of the whole text.

The meaning of the words is now explained:—

Question:—"How do you know that the mass of Afflictions arises from the notion of the real existence of things?"

Answer:—'The notion of the reality of things, etc. etc.'—This has been already explained by us before.

Question:—"If the mass of Afflictions arises from the notion of the real existence of things, even so, how is it set aside by the perception of 'Soul-less-ness'?"
Answer:—'The said perception of Soul-less-ness, etc. etc.'—'Notion of
reality'—i.e. the notion of existence; i.e. the idea that things are really
existent,—of this, the 'perception of Soul-less-ness' is the 'enemy'—
opponent.—This also has been already explained by us before.

'The former'—i.e. the Perception of 'Soul-less-ness';—the latter'—i.e.
the notion of the real existence of things.

'Due to that'—due to the notion of real existence.

'On account of the absence of its cause'—i.e. on the cessation of its cause
in the shape of the notion of real existence.

'When that ceases'—i.e. when the mass of Afflictions disappears.

'Due to that'—i.e. due to the Afflictions.

'There is no more Birth'—when the cause is not there, the effect cannot
appear; if it did, it would do so without cause.

'Absolute liberation from it'—i.e. from the Afflictions or from Birth,
there is absolute liberation, there being no more Birth; as it has been
declared that 'Final Liberation consists in absolute emancipation from it'.

Says the Opponent—"Under other systems also the Perception of Truth
has been held to be the means of 'Highest Good', and the 'Ten Noble Paths'
also have been laid down as leading to 'Prosperity'. Why then should the
doctrine of Soul-less-ness be the only way to Liberation?"

The answer to this is as follows:—'All other Philosophers etc. etc.—For
instance, all 'thought-phases' having their source in the 'I-notion', there is
Liberation on the cessation of this notion;—on this point all men seeking
for Liberation are agreed. This cessation of the 'I-notion', however, is not
possible under the other philosophical systems; as they are all obsessed
with the false notion of 'Soul', and this notion of 'Soul' is the very root
of the said 'I-notion'. So long as this 'Soul' is there obsessing the men,—
and this, in its perfect state, is the cause of the 'I-notion',—and its own
objective, in the shape of the 'Soul' has not been abrogated,—how could
the said 'I-notion' cease?—This has been thus declared—'So long as the
Mind is beset with the I-notion, the series of Birth and Rebirth does not cease;
and so long as the idea of the Soul is there, the I-notion does not cease;
there is no other Teacher, except Thyself, who teaches the doctrine of no-
soul; hence there is no other Path to Peace except the one declared by Thee'.
The reason for this lies in the fact that the properties of the Mind cannot be
pulled out like thorns and thrown away; they have arisen from the wrong
notions of things, and as such they automatically cease on the cessation of
their cause in the shape of the said wrong notions.

It might be argued that—"the Yogin does abrogate it".

The answer to that is—'If it were abrogated, etc. etc.'—If the 'Soul'
were abrogated (and repudiated), it could be repudiated only in the words
'it does not exist'; as otherwise, there would be no point in repudiating it.
Because if, after having accepted the 'Soul', one were to repudiate it as the
'source of pain', then such repudiation would be useless; because the repudia-
tion of a thing is done for the purpose of abandoning it; and no abandoning
could be possible of what one regards as his ever-lasting self; hence the said
repudiation would be useless.—Nor can those other philosophers repudiate
the ‘Soul’ as being non-existent; because when they have regarded the Soul as existent, if they regard it as non-existent,—this would mean a complete volte-face on their part.—(3488-3494)

Further, there may be repudiation of it either as being the source of suffering or as something else; even so there could be no cessation of the I-notion whose sole root lies in the notion of the ‘Soul’.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (3495).

THE NOTION ‘I AM NOT’ CANNOT BE RIGHT IF THE ‘I’ REALLY EXISTS.

OR ELSE, IT IS NOT TRUE ‘THAT ONE WHO KNOWS THE TRUTH
MUST ATTAIN Nirvāṇa.’—(3495)

COMMENTARY.

‘I am not’—This idea that ‘I am not’ cannot be right;—‘if the I really exists’,—i.e. if the Soul exists.

Hence that your ‘knower of Truth’ attains Nirvāṇa cannot be true; because Liberation has been held to follow from the cessation of the I-notion’, and so long as the ‘Soul’ is there as the object of that notion, there can be no cessation of the I-notion’; how then could there be Liberation?—(3495)

The following Texts sum up the Author’s position:—

TEXTS (3496-3497).

THUS THEN, UNDER OTHER SYSTEMS, THERE IS JUST A LITTLE ‘WELFARE’
(PROSPERITY) SECURED THROUGH THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ‘TEN
SINS’;—THE ATTAINMENT OF THE HIGHEST GOOD THERE IS
NONE IN THE LEAST; AND THE REASON FOR THIS LIES IN
THE FACT THAT ALL THESE ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE
NOTION OF THE ‘REAL EXISTENCE’ (OF THE SOUL)
AND HENCE THE ROOT OF THE ‘AFFLICTIONS’
IS NOT REMOVED.—(3496-3497)

COMMENTARY.

‘Through the destruction of the Ten Sins’—These sins are—(1) Killing of life, (2) Taking what has not been given, (3) Indulgence in (sexual) desire, (4) Dishonest Behaviour, (5) Lying, (6) Backbiting, (7) Cruelty, (8) Incoherent Talking, (9) Malice or Deceitfulness, and (10) Wrong knowledge.—Or they may be the following:—(1) Not saving others, (2) Not giving, (3) Not serving, (4) Lying, (5) Harsh words, (6) Injuring others, (7) Neglect of study, (8) Faithlessness, (9) Mercilessness, and (10) Undue Desire.—The
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'opposites' of these are the 'Ten noble Paths'.—When these said 'Ten sins' are destroyed, there follows Dispassion and thence the 'Ten Noble Paths'.

'Just a little'—Inasmuch as it is preceded by the aforesaid 'volte face'
—the man lapses away very quickly.

The 'root of the Afflictions' is the notion of the existence (of the Soul).—
(3496-3497)

The superiority of the Lord's Teaching is shown further, even though this also brings about Welfare (Prosperity)—

TEXT (3498).

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE 'TEN NOBLE PATHS' THAT HAVE BEEN TAUGHT
BY Tāyin (Buddha) ARE EMBEDDED IN TRUE KNOWLEDGE
AND HENCE THEY ARE SUFFICIENTLY POWERFUL.
—(3498)

COMMENTARY.

'Powerful'—as leading to lasting and excellent results.—(3498)

Question:—"Why cannot the teachings of others also be regarded as
'powerful'?"
Answer:—

TEXTS (3499-3500).

THOSE OTHERS ARE CLOTHED IN THE NOTION OF THE REAL EXISTENCE (OF
THE SOUL) AND INVOLVE A 'Volte face'—AS SUCH THEY ARE NOT
PURE; CONSEQUENTLY PURE RESULTS DO NOT FLOW FROM
THEM.—THUS THEN, IF ONE DOES NOT HIMSELF PERCEIVE
IN THE GREAT SAGE THE TEACHER OF THE ESSENCE OF
Dharma, AND CONSEQUENTLY REMAINS IGNORANT
OF Dharma,—HOW CAN HE ATTAIN PEACE OF
MIND?—(3499-3500)

COMMENTARY.

Pure results follow only from pure causes, not from impure ones.

'The Great Sage'—i.e. the Highest, Best,—among the sages of various
grades (?).—(3499-3500)

It has been argued under Text 3185 that—"The omniscience of Buddha
and others on the one hand, and the eternality of the Veda, on the other, are
asserted as standing on the same footing, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXTS (3501-3502).

The 'Omniscience of Buddha' and the 'eternity of the Veda' have not been declared by any wise man to stand on the same footing; and this because the said eternity is impossible. The argument against it has been already pointed out, as consisting in the incompatibility involved in 'simultaneity' and 'successiveness';—by reason of this it cannot bring about any such effects as Cognition and the like.—(3501-3502)

COMMENTARY.

'Tāyin'—is the Blessed Lord Buddha.

If the Veda could be eternal, then alone it could be said that "the omniscience of Buddha and the eternity of the Veda (stand on the same footing)"; as a matter of fact, however, that itself is not possible; as arguments to the contrary have been already adduced above. The Author recalls the same arguments in the words, 'consisting in the incompatibility, etc. etc.'—What this means has been already explained before.—(3501-3502)

It has been argued under Text 3186 that,—"The Omniscient Person is not seen by us at the present time, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3503-3504).

As regards the argument that the Omniscient Person is not seen at the present time—by you or by all men,—this has been already answered in detail. As regards non-perception by you, that, by itself, is 'fallible', 'inconclusive'; as regards non-perception by all other men, that must remain always doubtful.—(3503-3504)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued further by Kumārila (Śloka-vārtika) that—'That He existed in the past cannot be presumed in the way in which it is presumed that He did not exist in the past'.

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (3505).

"His existence in the past cannot be presumed in the way in which his non-existence has been presumed"—this assertion in regard even to the past cannot be right; because such denial is impossible.—(3505)

COMMENTARY.

The assertion that—"The denial can be made to the effect that the Omniscient Person did not exist in the past,—in the same way, it cannot be presumed that He did exist in the past";—Such an assertion is most improper; because even in reference to the past, the denial of the said Person is not possible.—The term 'even' implies that it is not possible in reference to the Present and the Future also. It has been already pointed out that the mere fact that a certain thing is not seen cannot justify the conclusion that it does not exist.—(3505)

The following Texts anticipate and answer the Opponent's argument.—

TEXTS (3506-3507).

The following might be urged—"The period that is past was devoid of the Omniscient Person,—because it was a period of time,—like the present time which is actually perceived".—This argument however, is not right, as its contrary is open to doubt; inasmuch as there can be no certainty regarding the Present Time being devoid of the Omniscient Person.—(3506-3507)

COMMENTARY.

The argument of the other party may be thus formulated—"The Past must be regarded as devoid of the Omniscient Person,—because it is a period of time,—like the Present Time"

In this argument, inasmuch as nothing has been adduced to show that the contrary of the Probandum is impossible,—there will always be a doubt regarding the existence of such a contrary, and consequently, the Reason would remain 'Inconclusive'. The Corroborative Instance also would be 'Inadmissible', as the presence of the Probandum would be doubtful. —(3506-3507)

Granting that the Corroborative Instance is admissible (and the Omniscient Person does not exist at the present time),—even so, mere apprehension cannot rightly prove the existence of what is desired.—This is pointed out in the following:
TEXT (3508).

It is quite possible that what existed in the Past is not there in the Present because the whole set of its causes is not present. Why should it not be that such a Person existed in the Past,—like Rāma and others?—(3508)

COMMENTARY.

What truth can there be in any such premiss as that ‘what does not exist in the Present could not have existed in the Past’. For instance, the mere fact that Rāma, Bharata and others do not exist at the present time cannot justify the inference that they did not exist in the past. Thus, in view of the case of Rāma and others, the Reason put forward by the other party is ‘Inconclusive’.—(3508)

It has been argued under Text 3186, that—“no Indicative is recognised as part of the Subject which could lead to His inference”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3509).

‘Wisdom’ and the rest have been made the ‘subject’, and then the Inferential Indicative has been set forth; hence it is not true that ‘no Indicative is recognised’.—And yet we are not seeking to prove the existence (of the Person).—(3509)

COMMENTARY.

Under Text 3414 above, Wisdom, etc. have been made the ‘subject’ of the Reasoning, and the necessary Inferential Indicative has been asserted; hence it is not right to assert that “no Indicative is recognised”.

But existence is not what we are proving; all that we are proving is the fact of there being higher stages of the Wisdom, etc.; it is the highest stage of such Wisdom that constitutes ‘Omniscience’.—Consequently the objections that have been urged against the proving of the existence of the Omniscient Person are not applicable at all.—(3509)

It has been argued under Text 3187, that—‘There is no scriptural declaration affirming an eternal Omniscient Person, etc. etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXT (3510).

We are not affirming the existence of the Omniscient Person on the basis of scriptural declarations. When the inferential reason is available, who would make an assertion on the basis of verbal authority? — (3510)

COMMENTARY.

So long as Inference on the basis of the capacity of things is available, who would seek to establish the existence of things on the basis of mere verbal assertion which is entirely dependent upon the whim of man? It is for this reason that we are not proving the existence of the Omniscient Person on the basis of scriptural declarations; — in fact, we are doing it on the basis of Inference; and this has been already explained before. — (3510)

Nor is it true (as asserted by the Opponent) that — 'there is no scriptural declaration affirming the eternal Omniscient Person' ; — this is what is pointed out in the following: —

TEXTS (3511-3512).

But if you regard the Veda as reliable, then, how is it that you, deluded people, do not apprehend the Omniscience of the Blessed Lord? As a matter of fact, in the Vedic Rescensional Text called 'Nimitta', the learned Brahmaṇas clearly read of the Revered Great Sage as 'omniscient'. — (3511-3512)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, there is a particular Vedic Rescensional Text under the name 'Nimitta'; and therein, the Blessed Lord, Shakya-Muni is clearly spoken of as 'omniscient'. — How is it then, that you, dull-witted people, while taking your stand upon the Veda, are denying Him? — (3511-3512)

The following Text points out how He is spoken of in the said Vedic text; —
TEXTS (3513-3514)

[He is described as] one who, having shown himself in a dream as a six-tusked white elephant, was born as one going to be a Bodhisattva, the ocean of fine qualities, his fame proclaimed, omniscient, full of mercy, attaining the state of immortality, pure, the father of the whole world.—(3513-3514)

COMMENTARY.

'His fame proclaimed'—i.e. his fame well-known to the whole world.

'Attaining the state of Immortality'—i.e. on reaching the state of Nirvāṇa, which consists in the cessation of all afflictions along with the Dispositions.

'Pure'—consisting of constituents free from all impurities. This indicates that superiority of the Blessed Lord which is conducive to his own welfare and which consists in the destruction of all Ignorance; the phrase, 'The Father of all' indicates that superiority which is conducive to the welfare of others.—'Father', Teacher and Controller,—of the world;—because He establishes the Three forms of Right Knowledge.—(3513-3514)

The following Texts anticipate and answer the rejoinder of the other party, to the above:—

TEXTS (3515-3516).

If this Recensional Text just mentioned is not accepted as such, —then, for that, we can discover no reason except sheer hostility on your part. Because accentuation and other properties that belong to the Vedic Text are all possible in regard to this Text also: specially as these properties are dependent upon the mere whim of men.—(3515-3516)

COMMENTARY.

'This'—i.e. the Recensional Text named 'Nimitta'.

The second line beginning with—'Then, for that, etc. etc.' states the answer to the Opponent's position.—(3515-3516)

The following text sets forth the Opponent's rejoinder:—
TEXT (3517).

"As a matter of fact, no scriptural text to this effect can be found; but if such an assertion were eternal, then it could be only commendatory; and if it really spoke of a person, then it would be not-eternal."—(3517)

COMMENTARY.

'To this effect'—i.e. speaking of the Omniscient Person.

Question :—"Why cannot it be found?"

Answer :—'If it is eternal, etc. etc.'—If the scriptural text speaking of the Omniscient Person is eternal, then it must be purely commendatory,—so that it must be taken as really having an entirely different meaning. If it is not held to be merely commendatory, then it must be non-eternal.—(3517)

Question :—Why should it be commendatory, if eternal?

Answer :—

TEXT (3518).

"If the scripture is eternal, then the assumption of the Omniscient Person is futile: as people would learn Dharma from the Scripture itself."—(3518)

COMMENTARY.

'Tatkalpanā'—assumption of the Omniscient Person.

Question :—Why is it futile?

Answer :—'As people, etc.'—'Tatah'—from the Eternal Scripture itself.—(3518)

The author's answer to the above argument of the other party is as follows:—

TEXTS (3519-3520).

In fact, eternality does not belong even to the Veda well-known as such; because it represents Cognition following after effort, or the result of successive Cognitions and so forth.—But in case the well-known Veda is accepted as reliable, you have to accept the other Rescensional Text also as reliable, because that also is Veda.—

(3519-3520)

COMMENTARY.

Though the Rgveda and the rest are well-known as Veda, yet it is not well known that they are eternal.
“How so?”

‘Because, etc. etc.’; ‘yat’ stands for ‘yasmāt’, ‘because’;—the Cognition after effort, or the successive Cognition, is all not-eternal; just like the Jar and other things;—so also is the Veda;—hence it is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—The charges of ‘Inadmissibility’, etc. against this Reason have been fully refuted under the chapter on the ‘Revealed Word’; hence it is not done over again here.

‘Etasya’—of the well-known Veda.—(3519-3520)

“But the fact of the other Rescensional Text (put forward) cannot be admitted”—says the Opponent.

The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (3521).**

*It behoves you to prove beyond doubt that the Text in question is not ‘Veda’; as otherwise, the reason that you have put forward (against the Omniscient Person) that He is not mentioned in the ‘Veda’ becomes doubtful.*

(3521)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘Otherwise’—i.e. if you do not establish the fact that it is not Veda; in that case, what you have asserted regarding the Omniscient Person being not mentioned in the ‘Veda’, becomes open to doubt and hence ‘Inadmissible’ (as Reason).—(3521)

It has been argued under Text 3517 that—“if the Text in question refers to the Person, then it is not-eternal”.—The answer to this is as follows:

**TEXT (3522).**

*The Veda may be eternal; it may also refer to the Omniscient Person. But if it refers to the Person, why should it, on that account, become not-eternal?—‘Because it would, in that case, be associated with what is perishable’*

—[Says the Opponent].—(3522)

**COMMENTARY.**

On being asked—‘Why should it become not-eternal?’—the Opponent replies—‘Because it would, etc. etc.’—i.e. because it would be associated with-related to—something that is perishable, evanescent.—(3522)

The following text points out the ‘Inconclusiveness’ of the Opponent’s answer:
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TEXT (3523).

If that be so, then how are all such things as Clarified Butter, Nivāra-Corn and Fire, which are not-eternal,—spoken of in the Veda, which is eternal?—(3523)

COMMENTARY.

'Ājya' is Clarified Butter;—Nivāra is a particular kind of Corn;—Chāmikarajāta' is Fire.—'Tēna'—by the Veda.—(3523)

The following texts anticipate and answer the Opponent's rejoinder:—

TEXTS (3524-3525).

If it is urged that—"In these cases also, there is the Universal, which is eternal",—then (the answer is that) that also has been discarded. Then again, if the word expresses the Universal alone, then it cannot bring about the Cognition of the particular things, Clarified Butter and the rest. If it expresses this latter also, then does it not lose its eternality? Further, in regard to the Omniscient Person also, the Scriptural word could retain its eternality in the same way, even though denoting the Person (who is not-eternal).—(3524-3525)

COMMENTARY.

[The other Party says]—"In the case of the Clarified Butter and other things, there is the Universal which is expressed by the word; so that there could be no incongruity".

This cannot be right; because under the chapter on the 'Universal', the Universal has been rejected in detail.

Granting that the Universal is there; even so, as the word 'Clarified Butter' would express the Universal only, it could not bring about the notion of the Individual; and in that case, the denoting of the Universal would be useless, so far as that man is concerned who seeks to do some act that could be accomplished only through the Individual.

"The Individual is cognised because it is unseparable from the Universal".

That cannot be; because, as a matter of fact, there is no such remoteness in the Cognition. That is to say, it does not so happen that when the word is uttered, the Cognition that comes about first is that of the Universal,—and then later on, follows the Cognition of the Individual as inseparable from that Universal. What actually happens in ordinary experience is that the Cognition of the usefully effective thing (which is the Individual) follows from the word immediately (directly); in fact, people use the word
for the purpose of speaking of that useful thing itself. Hence it cannot be right to say that "the Cognition of the Individual does not follow from the word directly".

If the word denoted the Universal only, and not the Individual, then a sane man would not be prompted to activity by the Word which denotes something not connected with that activity,—and such a word would be like the Injunction of milking the Bull!

If, in order to avoid this contingency, it is admitted that there is denotation of the thing in its individual aspect also,—then how would the Veda escape from the contingency of losing its eternity?

Further, it may be that primarily the words denote Universals;—and there is denotation of Individuals only as inseparable from Universals. Even so, however, there would be nothing incongruous in the Scripture speaking of the Omniscient Person being eternal.—This is what the Author points out in the words—'Then too, in regard, etc. etc.' That is to say, even when the Omniscient Person is one only, a multiplicity might be supposed on the basis of varying states; and thereby it would be possible for Him to be spoken by means of a word denotive of the Universal;—what to say then when there is an immeasurable line of Omniscient Persons?—(3524-3525)

Then again, if you do not accept the Rescensional text called 'Nimitta' as Veda,—yet, even so, your assertion, that "the Omniscient Person is not mentioned in the Veda", becomes doubtful at any rate.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

**TEXTS (3526-3527).**

**AS REGARDS THE WORDS OF THE VEDA, AS THEY ARE SELF-SUFFICIENT, THEIR MEANING COULD NOT BE ASCERTAINED FROM THE VEDA ITSELF;**

—nor from the learner by himself,—or from some other person,—who might be under the influence of delusion and other disabilities. **Under the circumstances, how could there be any certainty regarding the assertion that—**

'what is meant by the Vedic Words—

Agnihotram juhuydt svargakāmah—is not that Jīna is omniscient?

(3526-3527)

**COMMENTARY.**

The words of the Veda, on account of their eternity, must be self-sufficient, independent; hence what these words mean cannot be ascertained from the Veda itself; because the Veda nowhere says 'My meaning is this'—not that';—nor could it be ascertained from the learner by himself;—or from some other person, in the shape of an expounder; because all these
men, according to you, might be under the influence of Delusion and other disabilities.—Under the circumstances, it is quite possible to take the words relating to the Agnihotra as meaning that ‘the Blessed Lord is omniscient’. ‘Any certainty, etc. etc.’—i.e. no certainty at all.—(3526–3527)

It has been argued under Text 3195, that—“It is not possible to comprehend all the things cognised by all men”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3528–3529).

That one is ‘Omniscient’ is understood only from the clear teaching that He imparts regarding Heaven and the Highest Good: because that bears testimony to His knowledge of the most important matters. Of what use is the knowledge of the number of sands of the seas? What then have we got to do with His knowledge of other things?—(3528–3529)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued under Text 3200 that—“The descriptions that are met with of Omniscient Persons in the Purāṇas, etc. should be understood in the figurative sense”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3530–3531).

That the descriptions should be understood in the figurative sense, like the Mantra and Arthavāda texts,—would be right only after the actual existence of the Omniscient Person had been rejected.—As a matter of fact however, there is nothing to annul the idea of such a Person; while, on the contrary, His existence has been actually proved in great detail. So that the idea of all this being figurative must remain doubtful: inasmuch as it is possible for it to be true in its primary sense.—(3530–3531)

COMMENTARY.

If the existence of the Omniscient Person had been rejected by proofs, then no other explanation being possible, the assertions in question might be taken in their figurative sense;—not otherwise, if the primary meaning were in any way possible. It cannot be right to regard the eternal Word to be mere Arthavāda; because an assertion is taken as an Arthavāda only when

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some other meaning is intended; in a case therefore where there is no such intention, there being no speaker desiring to make the assertion,—that condition cannot be fulfilled.—(3530-3531)

It has been further argued, under the same Text 3200, that—"the 'untrammelled knowledge' spoken of may be taken as referring to certain particular things only, not to all things".

The answer to this is as follows:—

**TEXT (3532).**

IN CASE THE 'UNTRAMMELLED' NATURE OF HIS KNOWLEDGE IS REGARDED AS TRUE, IN REFERENCE TO SUCH THINGS AS Dharma AND THE LIKE, —THEN CLEARLY THE BUDDHISTS HAVE WON THEIR CASE.—(3532)

**COMMENTARY.**

*Question:*—"How have the Buddhists won their case?"

*Answer:*—

**TEXT (3533).**

BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN PROVED BEFORE THAT IT IS THE LORD'S KNOWLEDGE RELATING TO PROSPERITY AND HIGHEST GOOD, ALONG WITH THESE MATTERS (Dharma AND THE REST), WHICH IS 'UNTRAMMELLED':—THIS IS QUITE CLEAR EVEN TO THE VERIEST PIPER.—(3533)

**COMMENTARY.**

It has been proved before that the Lord's knowledge of the Highest Good is 'untrammelled'. Hence it must be known to all men, down to the veriest piper, that He possesses the knowledge of Dharma and allied matters; so that, by his own words, the opponent admits the "Omniscience" of the Lord, (after admitting His knowledge of Dharma and such matters).—(3533)

It has been argued under Text 3205, that—"The knowledge spoken of may be that of his own self".

But even so, as such knowledge is possible for the Lord Himself, what has been urged is nothing undesirable for us.—This is what is pointed out in the following—
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TEXT (3534).

As regards the knowledge of self, brought about by the practice of meditation,—this also has been already proved to be 'untrammelled' in the case of those persons.—(3534)

COMMENTARY.

'This also'—i.e. the knowledge of self. 'Teso'—of the revered Buddhas. 'Already'—Under Text 3434.—(3534)

Says the Opponent—"The knowledge of self there mentioned is that consisting in self-Cognition, not that of the Spirit functioning within. How then can our argument be futile (proving what is already admitted) ?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3535).

That alone is knowledge of self which consists in the perception of the pure self,—as therein the only cognition is that of pure consciousness freed from all adventitious impurities.—(3535)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"How is it known that there is knowledge of pure consciousness only ?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (3536-3537).

It has been shown before that all cognition is in the form devoid of the Apprehender and Apprehended; it is free from the two aberrations. This is the cognition or knowledge that has been expounded by the Buddhas. That is what proves these to have been possessed of vast wisdom and of knowledge not conducive to birth and rebirth and it is the teachings inculcated under the guidance of these persons that are luminous to the present day.—(3536-3537)

COMMENTARY.

'Before'—Under the chapter (23) on the 'External World'. 'Samsâra, etc.'—i.e. whose knowledge is not conducive to Births and Rebirths.—(3536-3537)
Question:—"What are those Teachings that were promulgated under Their guidance?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (3538–3540).

In regard to the luminous Consciousness, not marred by the two forms,—who could entertain any wrong notions, if his mind is not deluded by the two forms?—As soon as there is recognition of the ‘Soul-less-ness’ of both,—all those defects of love, hate and the like which have their source in the thoughts of women and such things, disappear without effort. —This is the Highest Truth which the ‘Expounder of unity’ propounded,—which brings all kinds of Prosperity, far beyond the reach of Kēśava and others.—(3538–3540)

COMMENTARY.

‘If his mind is not deluded, etc.’—i.e. who has got rid of all obsession of the apprehender and the apprehended.

‘As soon as there is recognition, etc. etc.’—i.e. the recognition of the fact that the (1) Body and (2) All other things are without soul;—or it may mean the recognition of the ‘nairātmya’—unreality—‘of both’—i.e. of the apprehended as well as the Apprehender.

‘Far beyond the reach of, etc. etc.’—‘Kēśava’ stands for Hari (Viṣṇu).—‘And others’ includes ‘Iśvara’ and the rest.—(3538–3540)

Question:—“Why is not the self-Cognition of Kēśava and others also regarded as pure?’

Answer:—

TEXTS (3541–3543).

Other people recognise the ‘Soul’ as something permanent, resembling the pure rock-crystal; this idea of these people is clearly wrong, as the existence of the permanent ‘Soul’ has been rejected. If the Cognition envisaging the soul proceeds from one’s own soul, then there should be the Cognition of all souls at one and the same time.—If it does not proceed from one’s own soul,—or if it is regarded as eternal,—then it could not envisage the Soul at all:—being, in this respect like the Cognitions of other persons.—(3541–3543)

COMMENTARY.

‘Other people’—Kēśava and others.

Under the Chapter on the ‘Soul’, the existence of the Soul has been rejected; any Cognition of it must be wrong and hence impure.
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Further, the knowledge of these people relating to the eternal Soul that is spoken of,—does this knowledge or Cognition proceed from the person's own Soul or not? These are the only two alternatives possible. In the former case, all his Cognitions should appear simultaneously, as their efficient cause would be there.—In the latter case, is the Cognition eternal or not-eternal? In both cases, that Soul would only be a replica of his own Soul, and hence, like the Cognition of other people, it could not envisage that Soul.——(3541–3543)

It has been argued under Text 3207, that—"His knowledge consists in the direct perception of His pure Self, and when the source of that knowledge is not pure, the knowledge itself is called Ignorance".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3544–3546).

His knowledge does not consist in the direct perception of His pure self; because that is devoid of the characteristics of the 'Cognisable', as has been proved in detail.—If the Soul (self) is held to be of the nature of Cognition (Consciousness),—there can be no apprehension of it as such; because of the difference between the 'seen' and the 'seeing'.—If then the said Cognition is held to be self-illumined, then it comes to be 'self-Cognition', and as such it would mean that the Cognition is amenable to direct perception.——(3544–3546)

COMMENTARY.

If the Soul is held to be unconscious in its essence, then the Cognition that apprehends it must be regarded as impure; as it has been proved under the chapter on the 'External World' that by their very nature, all Cognitions are devoid of the apprehended and the apprehender.

If, on the other hand, the Soul is held to be of the nature of Consciousness itself, then there would be non-difference between what is seen (cognised, i.e. the soul) and the seeing (Cognition, Consciousness); so that they could not be related to each other as the apprehended and the apprehender; which would mean that the Cognition could not be regarded as apprehending the Soul. Because it is only when there is some difference between the subject and the object that they can bear to each other the relation of the apprehender and the apprehended.

If, lastly, the idea is that, being luminous, like the lamp, the Cognition apprehends and envisages itself,—then there would be 'self-Cognition', which you do not admit; and it would set aside your idea that Cognition cannot be perceived. This is what is shown by the words—'It would mean that Cognition is amenable to direct Perception.'——(3544–3546)
It has been argued under Text 3208, that—"If it be held that Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva are the embodiments of the Veda, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3547–3549).

There can be no connection between Brahmā (and others) and the Veda;—(a) because there is difference between them, (b) because both are regarded as eternal, and (c) because there is no mutual dependence;—just as in the case of any other thing.—Thus it is absurd to talk of Brahmā, etc. being 'embodiments of the Veda'.—Equally absurd it is to speak of the Veda as 'consisting of all knowledge'; for the simple reason that the meaning of the Veda cannot be ascertained.—It has been explained that (for us) the Omniscient Person is recognised independently by Himself; and He is not assumed on the ground of Brahmā and others being 'embodiments of the Veda'.—(3547–3549)

COMMENTARY.

If Brahmā and others had any connection with the Veda, then alone could they be regarded as the 'Embodiment of the Veda'; as a matter of fact, there can be no connection between these and the Veda. Because there can be only two kinds of connection or relationship among things—(1) that of identity and (2) that of cause and effect,—as has been explained before;—as the two—Brahmā and Veda—are held to be different, the relation between them cannot be that of Identity.—Nor can it be the relation of Cause and Effect; because both are regarded as eternal, and as such cannot derive any benefit from one another, as neither could be in need of the other.

'The idea of the Veda consisting of all knowledge'—this has to be construed with 'is absurd' of the previous sentence.

"Why is it absurd?"

Because 'the meaning of the Veda cannot be ascertained';—if the meaning of the Veda were ascertained, then alone could it be assumed that it consists of all knowledge. This ascertainment however cannot be got at through any Cognition, as has been pointed out already.

Nor again do we accept the Omniscient Person on the strength of the Veda,—as you do. In fact, the Cognition of the Lord is self-born, and hence He is omniscient, by Himself;—as we have already explained before.—(3547–3549)

It has been argued in Text 3209, that—"Where on one side are Buddha and others who are mortal, where on the other are the three excellent Vedas, etc. etc.".
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The answer to this is that the 'mortality' of the Lord has not been proved.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3550).

BEING BEYOND THE 'METEMPSYCHIC CYCLE' CONSISTING OF THE 'FIVE STATES', THE BUDDHAS ARE NOT HELD BY US TO BE 'MORTAL'.

WHAT HAS BEEN REGARDED AS THEIR 'BIRTH' IS ONLY THE CREATION OF THEMSELVES BY THEMSELVES.—(3550)

COMMENTARY.

'Hell', 'Regions of the Dead', 'Regions of Beasts', 'Region of Celestials' and 'the Human Regions'—are the 'five states' that make up the 'Metempsychic Cycle';—the Blessed Lords all lie beyond this five-fold Cycle; so that their 'mortality' cannot be admitted.

Question:—'How is it then they are heard of as having been born in the family of Shuddhodana and others?'

Answer:—'What has been regarded, etc. etc.'—(3550)

The following Text supports this same idea by scriptures:

TEXT (3551).

'It is in the delightful city of Akaniśṭha, free from the habitation of unclean beings,—that the Buddhas become awakened;

And what is awakened here (in this world) is only their own creation'.—(3551)

COMMENTARY.

'Akaniśṭha' is the name of a certain region;—'free from the habitation of unclean Beings'—'Ashuddhāvīśakāyika' are celestial beings;—here only such people dwell who are noble and pure;—on the top of this rests the Māheśvara-Bhavana (the Palace of the Supreme Lord);—it is in this Palace that there appear the Bodhisattvas who have passed through the 'ten stages' and reached the highest;—what is perceived here in the world is only what is created under their supervision.

Such is the assertion met with in the scriptures.—(3551)

It might be argued by the Opponent that—'We do not admit of what has been asserted here'.

The answer to that is as follows;—
TEXTS (3552-3553).

HOW TOO DO YOU ASCERTAIN, INDEPENDENTLY, THE SAID ‘MORTALITY’? C
CERTAINLY NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE ‘SCRIPTURE’ OF OTHER PEOPLE;
AS WHAT THAT SCRIPTURE SAYS HAS JUST BEEN POINTED OUT.—
NOR DO WE POSTULATE OUR ‘OMNISCIENT PERSONS’ AS
RIVALS TO THE ‘OMNISCIENT PERSONS’ POSTULATED
BY OTHERS; WHO COULD EVER CONCEIVE OF
ANY RIVALRY BETWEEN REAL ENTITIES AND
‘SKY-FLOWERS’?—(3552-3553)

COMMENTARY.

If you hold to the ‘mortality’ independently, then your Reason is
doubtful—hence—Inadmissible’. In fact, you have no proof in support of
the idea of the Blessed Lord being mortal,—by virtue of which the said
mortality could be regarded as independently ascertained. Hence the
‘mortality’ has to be asserted by you on the basis of the scripture of the
other party; and what the scripture of the other party has to say on the
point has just been shown.—Thus the ‘mortality’ of the Blessed Lords
remains ‘unproven’.—(3552-3553)

Question:—“How is it known that these other Omniscient Persons are
like sky-flowers?”
Answer:—

TEXT (3554).

IT HAS BEEN PROVED BY US THAT ANY Eternal Beings, BEING DEVOID OF
ALL CAPACITY, MUST BE FORMLESS. HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT THE
‘THREE-EYED DEITY’ AND OTHER SUCH BEINGS, WHO ARE HELD
BY OTHERS TO BE OMNISCIENT, DO NOT EXIST
AT ALL.—(3554)

COMMENTARY.

The other party holds Shāṅkara and others to be Eternal Beings;—and
it has been proved by us that eternal entities cannot have any capacity at
all; as any effective action on their part,—either successively or simultaneous-
ly—would be incompatible;—‘being devoid of all capacity’ again is what
characterises non-existence; hence it follows that Shīva and other eternal
beings posited by the other party are non-existent. Thus it is that it is
known that they are ‘like sky-flowers’.

‘Tryambaka’, ‘Three-Eyed Deity’, is Shāṅkara, Shīva.—(3554)
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Further, Shiva and others may be there. Even so, they belong to a very inferior order; hence we are not making any comparison between these and the Blessed Lords.—This is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3555-3556).

THEN AGAIN, THE KNOWLEDGE OF THOSE PERSONS IS ALL WRONG, BECAUSE IT INVOLVES NOTIONS OF THE ‘SOUL’ AND SUCH OTHER THINGS. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE Buddhas, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS not wrong; AS HAS BEEN EXPLAINED IN DETAIL. THERE IS THEREFORE NO COMPARISON MADE BETWEEN THESE TWO SETS, ON THE GROUND OF GREATER OR LESS PROXIMITY; WHO COULD INSTITUTE ANY COMPARISON BETWEEN THE BLIND AND THE MAN WITH PERFECT EYES?—
(3555-3556)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(3555-3556)

It has been argued under Text 3210, that—“the three Deities, Brahmā and the rest, are mentioned in the eternal scripture of the Veda; and the eternality of these does not militate against the eternality of the Vedas”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3557).

IN FACT, THE ETERNALITY OF ALL SUCH THINGS AS QUALITY, ACTION, GOD, AS ALSO OF THE Vedas, HAS BEEN TOTALLY REJECTED. CONSEQUENTLY WE DO NOT ADMIT OF ANY ETERNAL ‘SCRIPTURE’.—(3557)

COMMENTARY.

By establishing the ‘Perpetual Flux’ as affecting all things, it has been proved that nothing can be eternal. Hence all this (about eternality) is wholly irrelevant.—(3557)

It has been argued under Text 3215, that—“If any person were seen at the present time to be similar to the Omniscient Person, then the existence of that Person could be cognised through Analogy”.

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXTS (3558–3561).

We do not hold that the existence of the Omniscient Person is proved by Analogy; because it has been shown that Analogy is not a reliable means of cognition. Hence the said existence could not be proved by it. It is only when the existence of a thing has been cognised, that its similarity can be perceived; and what is desired to be proved in the present context is the existence of the all-knowing Person;—and this cannot be proved by means of Analogy. Hence your denial of this (in reference to the said Person) is entirely futile.—If all men have been perceived by you to be not-omniscient,—then omniscience belongs to you yourself, since you perceive all men, those near you as well as those remote;—and since you perceive the capacity of cognitions appearing in the ‘chain’ of all other men.—(3558–3561)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, no reliability attaches to Analogy, as a means of cognition,—by virtue of which the Buddhist could seek to prove the existence of the Omniscient Person by its means.—Even if Analogy were reliable, it would be of no use in the proving of the said existence. Because all that Analogy proves, for instance, is merely the similarity of the Gacaya in the well-known object, Cow; in the case in question, however, the Omniscient Person is not a well-known object,—as, according to you, He is still to be proved; consequently when, under your view, the Existence of the Omniscient Person is put up as what is to be proved,—there can be no room for Analogy; so that, there being no possibility of its applying to the case in question, your denial of it is entirely futile; as it is only what is regarded as possible that is denied.

It has been argued under Text 3216, that—“Having found that all men of the present day are not-omniscient, it is definitely concluded, through Analogy, that all men are not-omniscient”’.—The answer to this is that—If all men, etc. etc.—If all men have been seen by you, then your denial of the Omniscient Person involves self-contradiction. Because, when you admit that you yourself see all men, far and near,—and also that you have definite knowledge of the cognitive capacity of the ‘chain’ of other men,—you clearly attribute Omniscience to yourself; because your said admission would imply your perception of all things far removed in time, place and nature; as such perception can never belong to one who is not omniscient. And yet in denying such Omniscience, you are putting forward arguments, and are actually denying it; so that there is self-contradiction on your part; just like the assertion ‘your mother is barren’.—(3558–3561)

The following Text points out that the Person also that is adduced by the other party is ‘Inadmissible’, ‘Unproven’;—
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TEXTS (3562-3564).

Even if the Person were standing before you, how could you have the certainty that ‘He is not omniscient’? If you had this knowledge, you would be cognisant of things beyond the senses!—If you deduce the fact of all persons being not-omniscient from seeing that you yourself are not so,—then, there would be this incongruity that (your) Brahma and other deities would deduce the omniscience of all persons from their own omniscience.—If it be urged that—“There is conviction regarding the presence of such qualities in all men only when we do not perceive anything to the contrary”, then our answer is that in regard to the matter under consideration, the mere suspicion to the contrary has the same effect as the actual perception of that contrary.—(3562-3564)

COMMENTARY.

That is, even when the man is standing before one, one sees only his body, and if the observer is himself not-omniscient, he cannot know that the man before him is not-omniscient.

‘Bhāvā’—i.e. if there were the certainty that the man is not-omniscient.

If, in order to save the Reason from being ‘inadmissible’, the conviction regarding all men being not-omniscient be taken as deduced from one’s own non-omniscience;—then there would be incongruities and the Reason would become ‘Inconclusive’.—This is what is pointed out by the words—‘If you deduce, etc. etc.’.—The compound ‘ādmāsarvajñatādṛṣṭād’ is to be expounded as—‘dṛṣṭād’—from the perception—‘asarvajñatāyād’—of non-omniscience—‘ādmāt’,—in yourself.

The following might be urged—“In the case of the proving of the presence of a certain quality in all men, the idea is rendered impossible by the perception of the diversity of wisdom, etc. among men; hence no attempt is made to prove it; in the case of non-omniscience, however, the idea is not rendered impossible by anything; hence there could be no such incongruity as has been indicated”.

This is not right. Just as a Reason cannot prove that of which the contrary has been perceived, similarly it cannot also prove that of which the contrary is suspected; and in this respect, the suspicion of the contrary does not differ from the perception of the contrary. Consequently, there can be no proving of non-omniscience, because its contrary is open to suspicion.—(3562-3564)

It has been argued, under Text 3217, that—‘the teaching of Buddha and others is capable of another explanation also, etc. etc.’.

The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (3565).

Who else except the fool can regard the Teaching of the Buddhas as having its source in Delusion,—when it has been proved to be the flawless exposition of the Path to Heaven and the Final Goal?—(3565)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be admitted that the Teaching is capable of another explanation. Because the flawless exposition of the Path to Heaven and Final Liberation cannot have its source in Delusion;—and that the Teaching of the Blessed Lord is flawless has been proved by all the investigations and tests herein made.

"Fool"—i.e. Kumārila. He is a fool if he entertains the idea referred to.

—(3565)

It has been argued, under Text 3225, that—"The teaching of Buddha, etc. might have been for the purpose of deluding their disciples, etc. etc.". The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3566).

It is indeed a great delusion that has been brought about by Buddha in His disciples who, during the present life itself, have attained, through it, Prosperity, as also the highest stage of the alleviation of all Afflictions of the Mind!—(3566)

COMMENTARY.

"Drishti"—during the present life.

"Prosperity"—in the shape of lasting health, vigour and so forth;—these "they have attained"—such is the construction.

"Alleviation of all afflictions of the Mind"—i.e. the cessation of Love, Hatred and other defects.

"Through it"—Through the proper following of the Teachings of the Lord, regarding Mantras, Meditations, etc.

"A great delusion has been brought about"—This is figurative; the sense is—if you regard this as 'delusion', then it is you yourself who are deluded,—inasmuch as you regard what is not delusion, as delusion.—(3566)

It has been argued, under Text 3226, that — "If it were based upon the Veda, then they should have imparted it to the expounders of the Veda itself, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—
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TEXT (3567).

THE TEACHING OF THE Buddhas IS CERTAINLY NOT BASED UPON THE VEDA; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS 'FLAWLESS', WHILE THE VEDA IS FULL OF FLAWS.—(3567)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be possible for the flawless Teaching to be based upon what is full of flaws.—(3567)

It has been argued, under Text 3227, that—"Because the Teachings were imparted by them to the illiterate Shūdras, therefore it is concluded that they are defective and illusory".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3568-3569).

THE SAID TEACHING OF THE Buddhas IS NOT FOR ANY SELFISH PURPOSE; IN FACT, THE WHOLE EFFORT WAS MADE FOR THE BENEFIT OF OTHERS. THUS IT WAS THAT THE ALL-MERCIFUL Buddhas TAUGHT THAT PATH TO ALL MEN,—HAVING MADE UP THEIR MINDS TO BRING ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE WORLD, AND THUS BEING THE DISINTERESTED WELL-WISHERS OF ALL BEINGS.—(3568-3569)

COMMENTARY.

'Padam'—this is the name given to that Path to Prosperity and Highest Good which consists in the cultivation of all good qualities.—(3568-3569)

The following text shows that it is in the case of Manu and other teachers, who imparted the teaching to Vedic scholars alone, that it is possible for the teachings to have been propounded for the purpose of deluding those people:—

TEXT (3570).

THOSE TEACHERS WHO WERE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF GREED, FEAR, HATRED, JEALOUSY, ETC. AND WERE DEVOID OF MERCY,—IT IS THE TEACHING OF SUCH PERSONS WHICH COULD BE PARTIAL AND LOCAL.—(3570)

COMMENTARY.

On the other hand, the Teaching of the Blessed Lord was imparted to all men down to the veriest child;—and such Teaching only bears testimony to their high-souled character.—This is pointed out in the following:
TEXTS (3571–3573).

Those Teachers, on the other hand, who were led by mercy alone,—who had a clear perception of the Truth,—who had no fear of any contradiction,—imparted their teachings to all. As a man, through ignorance, goes on being affected by defects, so there grows in the Lords, mercy towards him. —They do not desire to establish any such connection with men as that of Vivāha (Marriage) or Āvāha (Home-coming of the Bride) and so forth; the only thought in their mind is that of doing good to others. That is what has been so well sung of.—(3571–3573)

COMMENTARY.

‘Āvāha’—is the coming of the Bride to the house of the Bridegroom.—(3571–3573)

Question: —“What has been so well sung of?”
Answer: —

TEXT (3574).

‘The wise ones view with equal regard—the Brāhmaṇa equipped with learning and character, the bull, the elephant, the dog and the dog-eater.’—[Bhāgavadgītā].—(3574)

COMMENTARY.

In fact, by having openly and arrogantly used the expression “to illiterate Śūdras”, through pride of caste, you have yourself shown your own great illiteracy and stupidity. For instance, (1) do you put forward the assumption that there is a distinct genus of the name of ‘Brāhmaṇa’ and thereupon you, Brāhmaṇas carry on your backs a million loads of superiority? Or (2) is it on the basis of your superiority in the matter of having had all your Birth and other Sacraments duly performed? Or (3) on the basis of your having been born of a Brāhmaṇa Mother and Brāhmaṇa Father?—If it is the first, then this ornament of yours is only like that caused by the ‘sky-lotus’.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—
TEXTS (3575-3577).

Hundreds of times has the 'genus' (Universal) been rejected; whence then is this pride due to 'caste' (genus)? Specially when no superiority over others is perceived in it, why should it be regarded as superior? In fact, men belonging to other castes also are found, on the presence of particular qualities, to be the receptacle of qualities of Self-control and free from all impurities. If, by reason of their connection with the particular (Brahmana) caste, they had been superior to others, in the matter of possessing the said qualifications, then alone could they be admitted to be really superior,—not if they merely belonged to the Brahmana caste, but in actual life were like fowlers, and others.—(3575-3577)

COMMENTARY.

We grant that there is such a 'caste'; even so, your pride would be justified if there were some superiority perceptible in you, due to that caste. As a matter of fact, however, we do not perceive any such superiority in you.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'specially when no superiority, etc. etc.'—'others'—i.e. people other than Brahmanas,—i.e. the Shudra, etc.—superiority over these—none is perceived. That is to say, in the Brahmana, we do not find any superiority over the Shudra, etc. in regard to their Intelligence, Memory, etc., or to their Blood, Urine, etc.; thus no superiority being perceptible, how could the caste be regarded as superior on the basis of that superiority',—by virtue of which, through arrogance born of your caste-pride, you assert that 'they should have imparted it to the Vedic scholars alone—not to Shudras'?—In case, by belonging to the Brahmana-caste, you were, by your very nature, superior persons, endowed with such powers as self-control, fulfilment of wish, Mercy and so forth, and had all evils removed from you,—then you would certainly be superior beings; otherwise, if you simply belonged to the Brahmana-caste and led the life of the Fowler, the Fisherman, the Cobbler, etc.,—what superiority could be yours?—(3575-3577)

The following Text points out the objections to the second alternative (the superiority of the Brahmana in the proper performance of his sacraments):

TEXT (3578).

As regards the well-known sacraments of the Birth-rite and the rest,—they are all purely illusory (artificial) and are to be found even among other people,—even those who are artificial Brahmanas.—(3578)

COMMENTARY.

'Among others'—i.e. among the artificial Brahmanas.

'Illusory'—purely artificial, like the Naming-rite.
Under the third alternative also (that of superiority being due to birth from Brāhmaṇa parents),—no pride is proper; because, as has been pointed out before, there is no difference between the body of the Brāhmaṇa male and female and that of the Shūdra male and female,—both consisting of the same unclean ingredients of Semen, Blood and so forth.—(3578)

Then again, the fact of your being born of a Brāhmaṇa Father is always open to doubt; hence there should be no pride on that score also.—This is pointed out in the following—

**TEXTS (3579-3580).**

A VERY LONG TIME HAS ELAPSED AND WOMEN ARE VERY UNSTEADY; HENCE IT CANNOT BE CERTAIN IF THERE IS Brāhmaṇa-hood IN YOU. FOR YOU, THERE IS NO ONE WHO IS COGNISANT OF SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS; NOR HAS EVEN THE VEDA DECLARED THE PURITY OF YOUR GENEALOGY.—(3579-3580)

**COMMENTARY.**

After the lapse of a long time, it is just possible that though not belonging to a Brāhmaṇa family, you may have become a Brāhmaṇa.—Or even if your ancestors were Brāhmaṇas, your . . . . ; so that it is possible that your birth may be defective. Because, as a rule . . . . You do not admit that there is any man capable of perceiving supersensuous things,—through whom certainty on this point could be obtained. Nor lastly, does the Veda declare the purity of your genealogy.—(3579-3580)

Then again, it is not only for yourselves that it is not right to indulge in arrogance due to your Brāhmaṇa-hood, which is open to doubt; as regards Manu and other teachers also,—as they could not know who were real Brāhmaṇas, the Teachings, if imparted to Brāhmaṇas alone, must have been imparted under a delusion.—This is pointed out in the following—

**TEXT (3581).**

**Th**us, Manu and other teachers, not knowing who were real Brāhmaṇas, could not have imparted the Teachings to Brāhmaṇas alone: because they could not be sure of it.—(3581)

**COMMENTARY.**

‘Avijñāta’—Those who could not be sure of the Brāhmaṇa-hood of any one.
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'Tadanishchayāt'—Because they could not be sure of people being Brāhmaṇas.—(3581)

Then again, the fact that Manu and others imparted their teachings to you alone does not redound to your credit; in fact, it only indicates the dullness of your intelligence.—This is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3582-3583).

We suspect that Manu and other teachers, for some reason, came to realise that what is stated in the Veda is not quite reason- able and not quite comprehensible by itself,—and also that the Brāhmaṇas, having become dull-witted by the reading of the Veda, were incapable of discriminating things for themselves;—and it was for this reason that they expounded their teachings to the Brāhmaṇas alone.—(3582-3583)

COMMENTARY.

'Vedādhistija'—Those who have become 'jāda'—dull-witted—by the 'adhiti'—reading—of the Veda; i.e. those whose powers of discriminating things had been set aside by the reading of the Veda.

'For some reason'.—Somehow.—(3582-3583)

It was for this reason that Manu and others, realising the irrationality of the Veda, etc., declared, in reference to their own words, that they were to be regarded as so many 'commandments' (to be obeyed without question).—This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (3584-3585).

[They have declared that]—"The Purāṇa, the Dharmashāstra propounded by Manu, the Veda with its subsidiaries, and the science of Medicine,—these four are self-sufficient commandments, and should never be attacked with reasonings",—This threat, in regard to the self-sufficiency of their authority, we think, was pronounced by them to the dull-witted people for the same reason. Or else, how could a mere verbal statement make anything self-sufficient in its authority?

—(3584-3585)

COMMENTARY.

'Purāṇa'—the literary works known under that name;—'mānaṇo dharmah'—the code composed by Manu;—'the Veda with its subsidiaries'—
i.e. with its six subsidiaries, Grammar and the rest. —'Chikitsitaṁ' — the science of Medicine.

'For the same reason', — i.e. on account of having found that the teaching of the Purāṇa, etc. was irrational and that your Brāhmaṇas were dull-witted.—(3584-3585).

TEXTS (3586-3587).

Those great Teachers on the other hand who were quite sure of the reasonableness of their own teachings and who were confident also of their own powers to expound those teachings,—having shaken off all fear, and bringing about the lowering of the arrogance of the maddened elephants in the shape of the false Philosophers—always roar like lions, as follows.—(3586-3587)

COMMENTARY.

The 'false Philosophers' are likened to the 'maddened elephants'; and the Roaring has the capacity to bring about the lowering of the arrogance of these elephants.

'Thus' — i.e. as described below.—(3586-3587)

Question: — "What is that lion-like roar?"
Answer: —

TEXT (3588).

'O Bhikṣus, my words should be accepted by the wise, not out of regard for me, but after due investigation,—just as gold is accepted as true only after heating, cutting and rubbing'.—(3588)

COMMENTARY.

Further, even the Blessed Lords have imparted their teachings to real Brāhmaṇas;—this was not done by Manu and others.—This is pointed out in the following: —
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TEXTS (3589-3590).

Those who are Brāhmaṇas in reality, by reason of having removed all their sins, and who have practised the teaching of 'No-Soul',—are all within the purview of the Great Sage Himself; it is for this reason that it has been declared that 'Herein is the Shramaṇa' who has been described under four classes; and the teachings of others are entirely devoid of the Shramaṇa-Brāhmaṇas.—
(3589-3590)

COMMENTARY.

The connotation of the term 'Brāhmaṇa' is 'one who has removed all sins'; and such Brāhmaṇas are possible only under the teaching of the Great Sage, where they are taught the practice of 'Soul-less-ness'; this is not possible under any other teachings, as these latter do not provide any means for the destroying of sins.—It is for this reason that the Blessed Lord has declared that 'It is here that there is Shramaṇa',—the Brāhmaṇa—and the teachings of others are devoid of real Brāhmaṇas in the shape of Shramaṇas. —Of these Shramaṇas, there are four classes—'Srotāpanna' (joined the stream) and the rest; and Brāhmaṇas also, with the same characteristics, are of the same four kinds.—(3589-3590)

It has been argued under Text 3230 that—"If proofs were adduced to prove that there is someone who is omniscient, then this would fall short of your Proposition".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3591).

It has been explained that the proving of the proposition that 'there is some man who is omniscient' is not vitiated by the defect of falling short of our Proposition. —(3591)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"By what part of your work has this been explained?".
Answer:—
TEXT (3592).

This has been explained by us above (under Text 3308) where it has been asserted that—It is with a totally different motive that the wise Buddhists make an attempt to establish the knowledge of all things, even though such attempt prove futile.—(3592)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, we are not proving the existence of the Omniscient Person with a view to ascertain that a certain teaching has been propounded by the Omniscient Person, and then and therefore to follow that teaching in practice. In fact, we ourselves seek to attain the position of the Omniscient Person and to that end we seek to prove that it is possible to get rid of the Defects and attain the excellent qualities (that mark the Omniscient Person). And the reason for this lies in the fact that the Buddhists have recourse to activities tending to the fulfilment of the several aims of man,—not on the strength of mere words, but on the basis of Inferences from the capacity of things. It has already been explained in what way such reasons as ‘cognisability’ and the rest can lead to conclusions.

It has been argued under Text 3238, that—“When He has passed through the Ten Stages, and Love and other Defects have become destroyed, then reft in meditation…. He would not be able to impart any teachings”—The answer to this is that this argument also has been put forward by you, through your ignorance of our doctrine. The Blessed Lord is not held by us to be standing upon the Ten Stages; what we hold is that the Ten Stages are occupied during the Bodhisattva-Stage, and beyond and above that lies the Buddha-Stage, the state of Perfect Enlightenment, Buddha-hood.—(3592)

It has been argued under Text 3240, that—“What has been asserted by one who knows only a part cannot be the assertion of the Omniscient Person”.

The following Text points out that this also has been already answered:—

TEXT (3593).

As regards the argument that “What is asserted by one who knows only a part cannot be regarded as the assertion of the Omniscient Person”—the answer to this has already been given, that it would be due to the actual presence of the knowledge of all things.

—(3593)

COMMENTARY.

The same explanation is reiterated in the following—
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TEXTS (3594-3595).

THE MAN OF LIMITED VISION, HAVING PERCEIVED A FEW DESIRABLE THINGS, FIXES THEM IN HIS MIND, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DESCRIBES THEM, ON THE BASIS OF THOSE PERCEPTIONS;—AND YET IT IS NOT THAT HIS WORDS DO NOT PROCEED FROM HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THOSE THINGS; THE SAME WOULD BE THE CASE WITH THE ASSERTION OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON; THE DIFFERENCE WOULD LIE IN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BASIS OF THE TWO ASSERTIONS.—(3594-3595)

COMMENTARY.

'The man of limited vision'—i.e. one who is not omniscient.

'Proced from his knowledge, etc. etc.'—the knowledge of those things—Heart, etc.—from which proceeds the assertion. The two negatives 'na-na' indicate that the words do proceed from the said knowledge of the things.

'The same, etc. etc.'—That also would be reliable as proceeding from the said actual knowledge.

Question:—"If this is so, then what would be the difference between the words of the man who knows little and the words of Buddha, the Omniscient?"

Answer:—'The difference would lie, etc. etc.'—(3594-3595)

The same idea is further clarified:—

TEXT (3596).


COMMENTARY.

'Asya'—of the words of Buddha.

'Tasya'—of the words of the man who knows only a part of things.—3596)

The opponents urge the following objection:—
TEXT (3597).

"There being no Conceptual Content in his case,—how could there be any desire in him to speak? Inasmuch as he has renounced all activity, there can be no Conceptual Content for him."—(3597)

COMMENTARY.

There can be no 'desire to speak' on the part of a person in whom no Conceptual Content is possible; because the said desire is only a form of Conceptual Content. The Desire thus being invariably concomitant with 'Conceptual Content', how could it exist in the absence of this latter? Certainly when the 'tree' is absent, the 'Shimshapa' cannot be there. For the Omniscient Person, any Conceptual Content is impossible; because all obstacles in the shape of the Afflictions, etc. have disappeared, and Conceptual Content is, by its nature, wrong, mistaken. Consequently if He had the Conceptual Content, the Omniscient Person would have to be regarded as 'mistaken'.—(3597)

The Author answers this objection in the following—

TEXT (3598).

It cannot be so; because, as regards the Conception that is beset with Afflictions, no such is possible in his case, as all 'obscuration' has disappeared from him. While that Conception which is favourable to the world's welfare and hence 'healthy',—who would prevent that?—(3598)

COMMENTARY.

Conceptual Content is of two kinds—(1) that which is favourable to troubles, and hence 'beset with Afflictions', and (2) that which is favourable to the appearance of 'freedom from greed' and such qualities, and hence 'Healthy'.—Of these that which is 'beset with Afflictions' can never be present in persons who have got rid of all obscurations in the shape of the Afflictions,—because the cause of this is not present there; while that which is 'Healthy', that is not incompatible with the man who has got rid of the obscurations; hence if this 'healthy' Conceptual Content does appear, through the mercy of the Blessed Lord,—as it would be favourable to the welfare of the world and hence 'healthy', why should any one object to its appearance?—(3598)

The following might be urged—"As a matter of fact, all Conceptual Content, by its nature, appears in the form of the conception of a thing
as beneficial, when it is not beneficial,—and hence it is wrong, mistaken; consequently any appearance of it would be incompatible with the character of the man who has got rid of his obscurations”.
The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3599-3600).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, HE DOES NOT RECOGNISE THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AS BENEFICIAL (USEFUL); HE KNOWS IT TO BE BASELESS; HE IS LIKE THE MAGIC-PERFORMER. THE MAGIC-PERFORMER KNOWS THAT THE IDEA THAT HE HAS PRODUCED ENVISAGING THE REAL HORSE IS REALLY WITHOUT AN OBJECTIVE BASIS; AND HENCE HE HIMSELF DOES NOT BECOME MISTAKEN OR MISLED BY IT.—(3599-3600)

COMMENTARY.

If He had apprehended the Conceptual Content, which is devoid of objective basis, as having an objective basis, then alone He would be regarded as mistaken. As a matter of fact, however, He is like the magic-performer, and regards the Conceptual Content only in the form of the conception itself; how then can He be regarded as ‘mistaken’?—(3599-3600)

It has been argued, under Text 3243, that—“such assertions sound well only when addressed to people imbued with faith,—we, however, are wanting in that faith, and hence ask for reasons”.
The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3601).

WHEN THE Brāhmaṇa (OPPONENT) HAS ASSERTED—that “SUCH ASSERTIONS SOUND WELL ONLY WHEN ADDRESSED TO PEOPLE IMBUED WITH FAITH”,—HE HAS NOT SAID ANYTHING RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION.—(3601)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—“Why? What is the subject under consideration,—to which our remark is not relevant?”

Answer:—
TEXTS (3602–3605).

The subject under consideration was the statement that "the Omniscient Person, being excluded from all things, could not be able to impart teachings".—To this, the wise men made the answer—'If He had no power to impart teachings, what would happen? '—The proper rejoinder for you should have been that—"in that case there would be no reliable Scripture".—What you have asserted is—"it may be so, but have you seen Him actually speaking?"—Now if, in this, you are urging a Reductio ad Absurdum against us, then it should only mean as follows:—"If His speakership is not admitted, then there could be no getting at the Scripture; hence if the Scripture composed by Him is admitted, His speakership also will have to be admitted."—(3602–3605)

COMMENTARY.

The Author thinks that the Opponent will say that—"what I have asserted is only a Reductio ad Absurdum, and not an independent argument by itself";—and consequently he proceeds to lend support to the idea that what the Opponent has urged is a Reductio ad Absurdum, with the words 'what you have asserted, etc. etc.'—What you have asserted is that—"Being excluded from all things, the Person could not have the capacity to teach"; in connection with this, you have to be asked—He may not have the capacity to teach, what is the harm in that?—Being thus asked, what the Opponent would say, the Author himself states—'The proper rejoinder for you should have been that in that case there would be no reliable Scripture'.—The answer to this rejoinder is—There may be no reliable Scripture, what is the incongruity in that?—He has not been seen speaking, by which there would be incompatibility with a perceived fact.—Being thus questioned, you should have said—"I am not proving His speakership after having myself seen that the Scripture had been composed by Him; you yourself regard your Scripture as composed by Him; and this is not possible if you do not admit His speakership; hence when you must insist upon the fact of the Scripture having been composed by Him, you must admit His speakership also".—This is the undesirable contingency that is presented to the Buddhist by means of the Reductio ad Absurdum.—(3602–3605)

Having thus supported the idea of the Reductio ad Absurdum, the Author now proceeds to show how the putting forward of this Reductio ad Absurdum is not pertinent to the subject under consideration:—
TEXTS (3606–3610).

If that is so, then, the Principle accepted by all Relationalists is that a Reductio ad Absurdum (in this case) can be urged only on the basis of a character that is accepted on mere faith; if it were based upon well-known reasons, there would be independent (direct) arguments in support. As a matter of fact, the Scripture that is postulated by the other party (the Buddhist) as composed by the Omniscient Person, is as thus described—'without any appurtenances, the Teachings of that Person proceed freely even from the walls,—as if they were coming out of the Chintamani gem'.—Thus then it is purely through supervision that He is regarded as the 'composer' of the Teachings; hence His speakership need not be associated with any Conceptual Content.—Thus then, when you assert that—'we are wanting in that faith and hence ask for reasons'—you do so without knowing what is meant by Reductio ad Absurdum.—(3606–3610)

COMMENTARY.

That character which the other party admits on the basis of the Scripture alone,—that alone should be urged in the Reductio ad Absurdum;—such is the well-recognised principle. Now, if the other party (Buddhist) had held the fact of the Scripture being composed by the Person on the ground of His speakership,—then there could be some point in urging that—'if He is not the speaker, then the Scripture could not have been composed by Him'. As a matter of fact, however, when Buddha is regarded as the composer (Author) of the Scripture, it is only as a Supervisor, an over-lord,—not as the actual speaker.—Consequently, the argument that you have urged in the form of the Reductio ad Absurdum,—that 'if He is the composer of the Scripture, He must be the speaker',—is one that has been urged by you without knowing what is meant by 'Reductio ad Absurdum'.—(3606-3610)

It has been argued, under Text 324, that—'Teachings issuing from walls could not be accepted as taught by a Reliable Person'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3611).

Why should words issuing from the walls not be accepted as taught by a Reliable Person,—when they are prompted by His over-lordship?—(3611)

COMMENTARY.

If the teachings had not been prompted by the over-lordship of the Omniscient Person, then they might not be accepted as those of a Reliable
Person. When, however, it has been admitted that they do proceed under His supervision, then why should not they be regarded as taught by Him?

—(3611)

It has been argued, under the same Text 3244, that—“there would be no confidence in these Teachings”.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3612–3619).

Being devoid of teachings of mixed character and those of slaughter and such other evil things,—how could these teachings be the work of sportive goblins and others? In them, there is no teaching of mixed character; nor of slaughter and other evil things, which alone could be the work of sportive goblins and others.—All that lies within the purview of the two Means or Forms of Right Cognition is in strict accord with these; and nothing of the slightest thing contrary to them is vouched for by the two Means of Cognition. Even in regard to absolutely supersensuous things, the said Teaching is not annulled by anything past or future; it prompts the manifestations of such qualities as Compassion and the like; it is endowed with all forms, expounds right behaviour; it is conducive to various forms of welfare here and elsewhere; it teaches the antidote to all kinds of Love, Hatred and the rest; it opens the gate to the City of Nirvāṇa.—If such Teaching could be the work of playful persons or demons, then these same may be the ‘Enlightened Beings’, as fulfilling all the conditions of ‘enlightenment’! Merely by giving a different name to a thing, its real form does not become altered. In fact, if a man were to call the cultured ‘uncultured’,—he himself would be subject to the derision of all good people.—(3612–3619)

COMMENTARY.

If there were teaching of dancing, music, slaughter, incest and such things—as to be done,—then, in as much there would be found the work of playful goblins and such persons,—it might come within the range of possibility to think of it as the work of these persons; as a matter of fact, however, the words of the Blessed Lord are found to be—not incompatible with any forms of right cognition,—free from self-contradictions,—fit for noble people,—prompting men to Compassion and other such qualities,—conducive to the attainment of Heaven and Final Liberation;—all this has been fully explained before.—How could such teaching be the work of playful goblins?

—if you apply the name ‘goblin’ to men also, you may do so; but mere nam-
ing does not deprive the thing of its nature. On the contrary, you yourself, by behaving like an uncultured person towards the highly cultured Blessed Lord, would be open to the derision of good men.

Such in brief is what is meant by the Text as a whole. The meaning of the words is as follows—'Teachings of mixed character'—e.g. those of singing, etc.;—'slaughter'—killing of animals;—'evil things'—like sensuality, dishonesty and the like.—'In accord with the two means or forms of right cognition';—the two means are Perception and Inference; 'accordance with these'—is saying nothing contrary to these;—'matam'—found to be;—'in all matters contained therein'—matters within the purview of the two Means of Right Cognition,—it is in strict accord with these latter; such is the construction of the sentence.—'Right behaviour'—which is excellent, in the beginning, middle and end; such as Continence and the like.—'Sarvānushayasandoha'—the entire mass of perception, thoughts and 'Afflictions'—'Fulfilling all the conditions'—Having all the characteristics of the 'enlightened Person'.—This has been thus described—'When all that had to be known becomes known, all that had to be reflected upon has become reflected upon, all that had to be abandoned has become abandoned,—then the Person is said to have become Buddha, Enlightened'.—(3612–3619)

On the contrary, it is the Veda that is liable to be regarded as the work of playful goblins,—in as much herein we find the teaching of incest and other improper acts in connection with the Gosāva and other sacrifices.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3620-3621).

IN FACT, IT IS IN THE CASE OF WORDS THAT ARE MARKED BY THE MENTION OF SEXUALITY, DISHONEST BEHAVIOUR, ANIMAL-SLAUGHTER AND SO FORTH, AND WHICH SPEAK OF MANY BARBAROUS ACTS,—THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR SUSPICION REGARDING THEIR BEING THE WORK OF ROGUES, DEMONS AND THE LIKE. SUCH WORDS ARE LIKELY TO PROCEED ONLY FROM PERSONS WHO ARE ADDICTED TO SUCH PRACTICES.—(3620-3621)

COMMENTARY.

'Bhujanga'—is Rogue.—(3620-3621)

It has been argued, under Text 3249, that—"One and the same cognition has never been found to apprehend such mutually contradictory things as the pure and the impure and so on".

The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (3622).

THE SIMULTANEOUS APPIREHENSION BY ONE AND THE SAME COGNITION OF MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY THINGS,—LIKE THE PURE AND THE IMPURE AND SO FORTH,—HAS ACTUALLY BEEN FOUND.

BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH Cognition.—(3622)

COMMENTARY.

Even though there are some things that are mutually incompatible, yet, they are quite compatible with the Cognition; as is clear from the fact that several mutually incompatible things are actually perceived at one and the same time.—(3622)

The same idea is further clarified:—

TEXTS (3623-3624).

IN THE CASE OF THINGS THAT ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE BY THEIR NATURE, OR IN THOSE THAT CAN NEVER COEXIST,—THERE MAY BE incompatibility; BUT THERE IS NO incompatibility IN BOTH FIGURING IN THE ONE AND THE SAME COGNITION; BECAUSE THERE IS PERCEPTION THROUGH THE EYE OF SUCH CONTRARIES AS (a) THE PURE AND THE IMPURE THINGS, (b) THE SERPENT AND THE PEACOCK AND SO FORTH.—(3623-3624)

COMMENTARY.

Incompatibility among things is of two kinds—(1) mutual exclusiveness, and (2) non-coexistence. Those things that are mutually exclusive,—their unification is clearly incompatible; those again that are non-coexistent, their coexistence is incompatible. But by figuring in the same cognition, things do not become either unified or coexistent. Hence there is no incompatibility in their figuring in the same cognition. In fact, it is actually seen that even incompatible things figure in the same cognition; for instance, the Pure and the Impure things, which are mutually exclusive,—and the Serpent and the Peacock, which can never live together,—are perceived, through the Eye, at one and the same time.—‘And so forth’ includes such pair of opposites as Light and Shade and the rest.—(3623-3624)

Says the Opponent—"If then, there is nothing incompatible in contraries figuring in the same cognition, then it should be possible for Pleasure and Pain, or Love and Hate, to figure in the same cognition."

The answer to this is as follows:—
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TEXT (3625).

That there is no simultaneous cognition in the case of Pleasure and Pain,—that should be understood to be due to the requisite cause being absent; there is nothing incompatible in it.—(3625)

COMMENTARY.

'Should be understood';—That Pleasure and Pain are not cognised at one and the same time is due to the fact that they do not appear at one and the same time, on account of the causes of both not being present,—not on account of any incompatibility.—This is what should be understood to be the case.—What is meant is that the cause of the non-cognition of both lies in the absence of their causes, not in their mutual incompatibility.—(3625)

In the case of those things also where the Incompatibility is real,—and not merely conceptual, as in the case of Pure and Impure,—there is figuring in the same cognition.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (3626).

The various colours,—Blue, Yellow, White, etc.—though mutually incompatible, on account of the differences of place, origin, etc.—are actually seen at one and the same time.—(3626)

COMMENTARY.

The construction is—'incompatible, on account of the differences of place, origin, etc.'—'Difference of place' consists in both not occupying the same point in space;—'difference of origin or nature'—'nature' in the shape of the Blue, etc. and 'origin' in the shape of the blue components.—(3626)

It has been argued under Text 3250,—"Who can apprehend each one of the endless things, past, present and future,—even in hundreds of years?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3627).

The Omniscient Person whose existence we have established is one who comprehends within a single cognitive moment the entire round of all that is to be known; it is for this reason that no succession is admitted in this case.

—(3627)

COMMENTARY.

In this connection some people belonging to our own party, while supporting the opinion of the Idealist, argue as follows:—If the entire round of cognisable things is embraced within a single cognitive moment, then that would imply a limit on the number and extent of things; and this would militate against the accepted idea that the number and extent of things
are endless. Because when all things would be embraced within the orbit of a single cognition,—how could they be saved from the contingency of not being endless?—This has been asserted thus—'Being embraced within a single cognition, there is nothing outside that limit; and thus the idea being that things are only so many, they cannot be endless, they become limited'.

—Under the circumstances, the idea of the simultaneous cognition of all things would be open to the same objection that has been urged against the idea of their successive cognition.

There is no force, however, in this argument. If this argument is put up on the basis of the opinion that Cognitions are formless,—then it is all irrelevant. Because, whenever a thing, on becoming cognised, thereby acquires existence,—all that is comprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person is that it is existent, and is, therefore, said to be embraced by it; and it is not meant by this that it covers the place occupied by the thing, in the way that the cloth covers a number of jars. The mere fact that certain things are apprehended by a single cognition does not deprive the things of their own nature or character; whereby, by reason of being apprehended by a single cognition, they would renounce their endless character. When various things, like the Blue, the Yellow and so forth, appearing in a single picture, become apprehended by a single cognition,—they do not cease to be many; nor do they become merged into one another; in fact, they are apprehended by the cognition exactly as they are,—not in any other form. In the same manner, the World which has existence is apprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person exactly as it exists.—As a matter of fact, there is no end to the extent of the worldly region in any direction; hence it is apprehended as limitless,—not as limited. How then could it be regarded as having an end?

It might be urged that—"If the apprehension of the entire world is admitted, then, how could there be no apprehension of the limits?"

It is not so, we reply. Where is there any such universal Proposition that 'wherever there is apprehension of the entirety of things, there must be apprehension of the limits also'? As a matter of fact, of all the things that exist, there is not one which has existence and has its form unapprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person; in fact all things appear and disappear only as having their forms apprehended by the consciousness of the Omniscient Person; not a single thing is left out. This is what is meant by His apprehending 'all things in their entirety'. This also is what is meant by all things being 'embraced in a single cognition'; otherwise, the fact of all things being spoken of as 'all' may also be not admitted,—in order to avoid their having limits. So there is nothing in this.

It has been argued that—"on account of the things being all included under a single cognition, there would follow the corollary that there is nothing apart from all these; how then would it be denied that the said things have their limit?"

This also is not right. Under the view of people who regard Cognition as formless, there can be no actual 'inclusion' of things within the Cognition; all that happens is that they become indicated by the Cognition merely as
Nor has the 'endlessness' of things been accepted on the ground of their not being comprehended under Cognition; by virtue of which, if they became apprehended, they would come to have limits. All that has been held is that the extension of space being limitless, the Region 'containing' the things is 'limitless', 'endless'; as the Region of pure 'Existence' is 'endless', also because there can be no limits to the enumeration (of things). Nor is there any incompatibility between 'being apprehended' and the 'absence of limits' for the filling up of space;—on account of which 'incompatibility', things would have to be regarded as 'not apprehended'.—If it is asked—

"If He does not comprehend all things within His Cognition, how can He be omniscient?",—the answer is that, it would be so, for that very reason; that is, it is just because He does not apprehend things as limited that He becomes omniscient; otherwise, if He had apprehended the limitless things as limited, He would be clearly mistaken. Because one is called 'omniscient' only when He apprehends existing things as existent, and non-existing things as non-existent;—and to the Region of existence, there is no limit at all. Hence if one apprehends as non-existent, the limit, which does not exist in the form of movement,—and if He apprehends as existent, the Limit, which does exist in the form of being cognised by the Omniscient Person,—why should He be regarded as 'Not-Omniscient'?

The following might be urged—"Under the view that Cognition is formless, there can be no apprehension of objects; because such Cognition would be indistinguishable. Consequently, no differentiation of particular things and functions being possible,—this view of Cognition being formless should not be put forward at all; as it would be always open to objection".

This is not right. In regard to the Cognition of the Omniscient Person, no differentiation of things and their functions is admitted; because the said Cognition envisages all things: because the idea is that the said Cognition (of the Omniscient Person) envisages, not the Blue only, nor the yellow only, but all things. In the case of men with limited powers of vision, their Cognition envisages only particular things; hence as in his case,—under the view that 'Cognitions are formless',—all things would stand on the same footing, the impossibility of well-known distinctions is declared to be open to objection. Because, as there could be no such distinction as 'this is the Cognition of Blue', 'that is the Cognition of Yellow'—even common people would be equally omniscient; this is what is urged against this view; as regards the Omniscient Person himself, such non-distinction would be only right; hence how could the said contingency be urged as an undesirable one?—Thus in the state of Omniscience, it is only right and proper that the Cognition should be formless and brought about by the powers of mysticism.

It might be argued that—"In that case things could not be distinguished as (1) those to be acquired, and (2) those to be abandoned".

Not so, we reply. If in the event of the limitless number of things appearing in consciousness at one and the same time,—there were incompatibility with the things being cognised as (1) to be acquired and (2) to be abandoned,—and if there were no such incompatibility with other things, and there were some loss of character on the part of the things to be acquired and
things to be abandoned as they appear in consciousness,—or even the lost character were not distinguished,—or even when they appeared in consciousness, if there came about no ordinary Cognition envisaging them,—then, under these contingencies, there might be room for asserting what has been asserted. As a matter of fact, however, when the entire world appears in consciousness, even the thing to be acquired and to be abandoned appear in consciousness without any incongruity, and without losing any of their essential character; and subsequently, it all becomes apprehended by the pure ordinary Cognition brought about by the force of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person. Why then, can there be no Cognition of things as distinguished from one another?

Thus it has been proved that there is no room for the objection as against the view that Cognitions are formless.

If then, the objection is meant to be urged against the view that Cognitions have forms,—then, also there is no such incompatibility as has been urged. Because as the limit-less things, manifesting themselves in endless forms, come into existence,—so also does the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person, which appears as envisaging the forms of all those limit-less things; and there is no incongruity in this; as there is nothing incompatible in a single Cognition envisaging the forms of several things.

"Certainly, if what is one envisages many forms,—there is incongruity".

Not so; because the forms are unreal. If the one thing had several real forms, then there would be incompatibility between the one and the many. As a matter of fact, however, the view that is held is that the many forms do not really belong to the one thing.

"If that is so, then the Cognition of the Omniscient Person would be associated with a wrong Cognition; and thereby the Omniscient Person would be mistaken".

Not so; as He would cognise things as they are, there would be nothing wrong in it. He would be ‘mistaken’ if He had cognised as real what is really unreal. When, however, He cognises the unreal forms as unreal,—then, how can He be said to be ‘mistaken’?

"When all things are embraced within a single Cognition,—and yet He treats them differently, as ‘seen’ and the rest; how then can He be regarded as not-mistaken?"

There is no force in this; because, He is cognisant of the right means, He could be mistaken, if he neglected the right means of apprehending the thing, and apprehended it by some other secondary means. In fact however, according to the view that Cognitions have forms, there is no means of apprehending a thing except the apprehension of the form of its Cognition; how then could the Person be mistaken if He apprehended the thing by the right and proper means?

Thus then, just as in the case of the knowable things, so in the case of the Cognition also, there is apprehension of the forms of limitless things,—and on that account it is said that ‘limitless things’ are embraced by it.

When things enter into the Cognition in certain forms,—in those same forms they become recognised by the representative consciousness that
appears later on. And so far as the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person is concerned, things do not enter into it as appearing in a limited number of diverse forms, but everything that happens to be existent enters into it. Because the capacity of the Person is such that in becoming the substratum of the Cognition of all things, it is not trammelled in any way; specially as mental Cognition envisages all things. Thus then, there being no incongruity in the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person apprehending the forms of limitless things,—and any ordinary cognition that comes later on cannot apprehend things to the farthest limit,—how could there be any Cognition such as ‘so many are the things’? And it would be only if such a Cognition were there, that there could be a limit or end to the number of things.

If, again, the representative Cognition appears in the form that ‘there is nothing beyond what has actually appeared in consciousness’,—even so, it would not be possible for the things to be so limited. Because if all that appeared in the non-conceptual Consciousness of the Omniscient Person appeared as limited in extent,—then the representative Cognition following upon that might apprehend the things as so limited [Read ‘antavattam’ for ‘anantatvam’], and this Cognition would deprive the things of their limitless-ness. As a matter of fact, however, what appears in the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person appears actually as without limit,—because the capacity of the Omniscient Person has no limitations; consequently anything else that appears in consciousness must be limited; and it is only this that is apprehended by the representative Cognition; so that you have more clearly than ever established the limitlessness of things. Hence there is no force in what has been urged.

There are some people who hold the view that the whole Consciousness of the Mystic is devoid of objective basis, and resembles the true dream, whence, being in conformity with the real state of things, it is reliable.—As against these people, there is much less room for the objection regarding things becoming limited.—We have had enough of this!—(3627)

There are some people who hold that there are Persons who become omniscient at will; under their opinion also, there is no incongruity in what has been said above.—This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (3628-3629).

Whatever He wishes to know He comes to know it without fail;—such is His power, as He has shaken off all evil. He knows things either simultaneously or in succession, just as He wishes; and having secured the knowledge of all things, He becomes the Lord.—(3628-3629)

COMMENTARY.

The following Texts point out that there is no incongruity even under the view that the Lord’s Cognition of things is successive:—
TEXTS (3630-3631).

Or, he knows all that is knowable, in the shape of the 'Four Truths', by means of his sixteen 'Cognitions', in succession, and on that account he is omniscient. When this cognition of the Lord thus appears in succession—not even a single moment has to be awaited; what to say, my friend, of a hundred years!—(3630-3631)

COMMENTARY.

'By means of Sixteen Cognitions'—i.e. by Forgivenesses' and 'Cognitions': There are eight 'Forgivenesses',—in the shape of the Forgiveness of Pain, Dharma, Knowledge and so forth;—and there are eight 'Cognitions', in the shape of the cognition of Pain, Dharma, Knowledge and so forth;—all this is clear from the declaration that—'The Truth is divided sixteen-fold'.

'Even a single moment'.—The lowest measure of time is called 'Kalā'; 120 Kalās make one Kṣaṇa; 60 Kṣaṇas make one Lava.

'My friend'—is a form of address.

'Abda'—is year.—(3630-3631)

It has been argued under Text 3251, that—"Even if the Person by his own undiversified nature, apprehends all things, he cannot apprehend the specific individualities of all things".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3632).

The Person who apprehends all things in their own undiversified form, knows the very forms of all things.—(3632)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent:—"In the scriptures it is said that the Cognition of the Mystics, free from all impurities, appertains to Universals only,—not to Specific Individualities; how do you say that the Consciousness of the mystics, which envisages Universals, apprehends the very forms of all things?"

The answer to this is as follows:—
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TEXTS (3633-3634).

It is the 'Specific Individuality' itself, as differentiated from heterogeneous and non-momentary things, which is spoken of here as 'Universal', on the ground of its leading to Calmness and Dispassion.—The Cognition that apprehends this and is brought about by the force of Medication, and appears only in great Mystics, envisages the Specific Individuality itself.—(3633-3634)

COMMENTARY.

That same 'Specific Individuality', which, differentiated from things of other kinds, becomes the basis of the notion of 'Uniformity', and is then called the 'Universal'. Hence the consciousness of the Mystic which apprehends it and which becomes clearly manifested by the force of his Meditation, envisages the Specific Individuality itself; hence there is nothing incongruous in the same Cognition apprehending the Universal as well as the Specific Individuality.

It has been argued under Text 3253, that—'the said uniform cognition would be either true or false; if it is true, it goes against perceptible facts, as it makes all things one'.

All this also has been answered by what has been just explained; because what the mystic consciousness apprehends is the Specific Individuality.—(3633-3634)

If what is meant by Mystic Consciousness envisaging Specific Individuality is that it apprehends that Universal which we have declared to be 'illusory', not capable of being described as that or not-that,—and which other philosophers have regarded as real,—then the said idea cannot be accepted.

This is what the Author points out in the following:—

TEXT (3635).

What is apprehended by the Mystic Consciousness is not that Universal which is incapable of being spoken of as 'that' or 'not-that' and so forth, and which other people have regarded as real'.—(3635)

COMMENTARY.

'And so forth' is meant to include 'eternal' or 'non-eternal', etc. etc.—(3635)
Question:—"Why cannot there be apprehension of that Universal?"
Answer:—

TEXT (3636).

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE MYSTIC IS FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND IS NOT ERRONEOUS; AND IF IT APPREHENDED THE SAID UNIVERSAL, IT WOULD BE SOMETHING BESET WITH CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND ERROR.—(3636)

COMMENTARY.

The Mystic Consciousness has been held to be valid Perception, because it is free from Conceptual Content and is not erroneous. If however, it envisaged the Universal as described above, then it would apprehend an illusory thing and thus become beset with Conceptual Content; and as apprehending the unreal thing in the shape of the Universal as assumed by other people, it would become beset with Error also.

Or both being taken as referring to both, there are two objectionable features.—(3636)

It has been shown that the Cognition in question, as apprehending an unreal and purely fanciful thing, becomes beset with Conceptual Content and Error. It is next shown in another way, that it becomes beset with Error for the following reason also:—

TEXT (3637).

BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT THE UNIVERSAL WHICH CONSISTS OF THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND IS INCAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF, AND IS IN THE FORM OF PERMANENT CONTIGUITY, IS FORMLESS (FEATURELESS).—(3637)

COMMENTARY.

It has just been said that the Universal, which is incapable of being spoken of'—that is, the Universal which cannot be spoken of as either 'this' or 'not-this'—forms the very essence of Conceptual Content;—'because'—inasmuch as—this has been already explained under the section on 'Apoha',—'therefore the said Consciousness becomes beset with Conceptual Content';—such is the connection with what has gone before (in the preceding text).

The reason for this is as follows:—As the Universal is of the nature of Conceptual Content, the Mystic Consciousness that envisaged it would also be of the nature of Conceptual Content; because it is apprehended as of that nature. As regards the Conceptual Content, wherever it appears, it presents as good and desirable, what is not-good and not-desirable; hence it is always wrong; hence the said Apprehension becomes beset with Error.
As regards the Universal postulated by other people, in the form perpetual contiguity,—that also has been shown, under the chapter on 'the Universal', as being entirely feature-less, characterless. So that if the Apprehension envisages this Universal it becomes all the more clearly 'beset with Conceptual Content and Error'.—(3637)

It has been argued under Text 3256, that—"If the Omniscient Person is held to be that Person who knows all things and their causes, through a single abnormal Cognition,—then there can be no Means of Cognition to vouch for His existence, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3638-3639).

That Person is certainly called 'Omniscient' who knows all things along with their causes, through a single abnormal Cognition brought about by Communion. The existence of such a Person has been already established before, by means of Inference. Thus there is a distinct Means of Cognition vouching for His existence. Hence it follows that such a one really exists.—(3638-3639)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued under Text 3258,—"Whether simultaneously or successively, how could there be any Inference, without an effect? etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3640).

Simultaneously or successively, there is cognition following from the effect that is manifested. When He imparts the Teaching, He has the requisite capacity also.—(3640)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(3640)

It has been argued under Text 3260, that—"The idea that there is one Person who has acquired special powers not common among men and He knows all things,—is entirely baseless".

The answer to this is as follows:—
TEXTS (3641–3644).

That Person who has profounded this Teaching—which is pure and wherein the Dharma of ‘No-Soul’ has been reiterated,—and which has been supported by the whole of this work and not traversed by any form or means of Valid Cognition,—which is not known to worldly men,—which is beyond the ken of Kṛṣṇa and others,—which is highly borne on the head by all wise men,—which destroys the entire host of enemies in the shape of evils,—and is the cause of various kinds of Prosperity as also of the attainment of Nirvāṇa,—such a Person acquired special powers not common among men, which distinguishes him from all other men, and He alone is Omniscient;—this is entirely vouched for by means and forms of right Cognition.—(3641–3644)

COMMENTARY.

‘Samāstāstrēṇa,—by the whole of this work, the Tattvasāṅgṛaha.

‘Which is not known to worldly men’—i.e. the Teaching which envisages knowledge that is not easily attained by worldly men.

‘Beyond the ken of Kṛṣṇa, etc. etc.’—Though this word is in the Masculine Gender, yet it qualifies the word ‘Dēṣhāṇā’ (Feminine).

‘Which destroys, etc. etc.’—The evils themselves are the enemies;—and their hosts are destroyed by it.

‘Is the cause of various kinds, etc. etc.’—the word ‘Kāraṇa’ is to be construed with each of the two members of the compound.—(1) It is the cause of the various kinds of Prosperity, and also (2) it is the cause of the attainment of Nirvāṇa.—(3641–3644)

It has been argued under Text 3261—“Thus, no omniscient Person of any kind is conceivable; consequently no human assertion could be the means of providing the knowledge of Dharma’.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3645).

Thus, as it is quite conceivable that there is an Omniscient Person, human assertion can certainly be the means of providing the knowledge of Dharma.—(3645)

COMMENTARY.

‘An Omniscient Person’—i.e. Buddha Himself alone; not Kapila, or any one else; as already established before.

As regards the objection that has been urged regarding Cognition being formless or with form,—that has been answered by us already.—(3645)
Says the Opponent—"It has been asserted (by Buddhists) that—
'Cognition never apprehends the external object,—either as manifested or as
unmanifested or as envisaging something else'. But how can both views
be free from objections?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3646).

ANY DISCUSSION REGARDING formlessness AND THE REST IS OF NO USE
IN REGARD TO THE Omniscient PERSON. IN FACT, JUST AS
YOUR Cognition APPEARS IN REGARD TO A CERTAIN
OBJECT, SO DOES THE OTHER (SUPERIOR)
Cognition also.—(3646)

End of Chapter.

Thus ends the TATTVASAÑGRAHA by Shântarakśita.

COMMENTARY.

The discussion that we carried on earlier, regarding the Cognition being
formless, etc. etc., from the Idealistic point of view,—can serve no useful
purpose on the present occasion, as against you Mîmâmsakas who are wedded
to the External World, when we are proving the existence of the Omniscient
Person on the understanding (for the sake of argument) that the external
world exists.

Question :—"Why?"

Answer :—'In fact, etc. etc.'—You must assert that there is Cognition of
the External object,—whether the Cognition be formless or with form; as
otherwise the whole external world would disappear. So that, just as there
comes about your Cognition of a certain thing,—in the same manner would
come about also the other—and the superior—Cognition of the Omniscient
Person (which is to be construed here).—So that the objection that has been
urged has no force at all and should not have been urged.—(3646)

This excellent and extensive, pure and lasting, (Teaching) that
has been secured by me,—may it become the abode of the magnificence
of the unrivalled Jina; and with its effulgence, may it delight the hearts
of all men!—May thereby the whole of mankind become like the Buddhist
Kamalashīla (or, may all men attain the character of the Lotus as
blooming under the rays of the sun of the Great Teaching)!

End of the Commentary

by

Kamalashīla.

END.
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<td>7.12.82</td>
<td>18.12.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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P.T.O.